Mom ROSS & HARRIS,
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(IJornpU IGaui ^rlynnl ICtbraty
Cornell University Library
KF 5305.B36
V.I
Commentaries on the law of public corpor
3 1924 019 959 497
Cornell University
Library
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tine Cornell University Library.
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COMPAlSrY LAW
COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OP
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
INCLUDINa
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS
AUD
POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL CORPORATIONS
OF EVERY CLASS.
BY
CHARLES FISK BEACH, Jr.,
OF XUE NKW YORK B.AB,
ATITHOB op "PRIVATB COEPOBAnONS," "MODEKK EQTinT JlIBISPin)DENCE,"
" CONTHIBBTOBY NkQLIOENOE," "THB MODEBN LAW OP RAILWATS,"
"Eboeivbrs," "Wilis," etc.; Editob of "Thb Amebicah
FBOBATE BEFOBTS," and 80HETIHE EDITOB OP " THX
Railway abd Cobfobation Law Jodbmal."
DT TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. I.
INDIANAPOLIS:
THE BOWEN-MERRILL COMPANY.
1893.
COFTBIGHT, 1893,
BY
THE BOWEN-MEREILL COMPANY.
STATE JOURNAL PEINTmO COMPANY,
PRmTBRS AND STBRBOTYPERB,
lUDISON, WIS.
TO THE
HON. THOMAS M. COOLEY. LL.D.
IN TOKEN OF
S ESTEEM AND
THESE VOLUMES ABE
OOSDIALLT AND BESFEOTFaLLT
DEDICATED.
PREFACE.
In these volumes I have attempted to consider all the law
of public corporations, including municipal corporations, and
governmental or political corporations of every class. The
scope of the work is, therefore, somewhat wider than that of '
any other with which I am acquainted. I have proposed to
myself the task of making a treatise which shall cover the
entire field of public company law in all its details, using the
term "public companies" in its widest modern sense, and I
have studiously undertaken in the volumes in hand not to
omit the law, as declared in the decided cases or defined by
statute, of any sort of a public corporation.
This work, therefore, and my " Private Corporations "
(Chicago, 1891) complement each other, and, taken together,
are intended to constitute a complete treatise, in four uniform
volumes, on Company Law; in all its phases, from the federal
government at the one extreme — which, in this country at
least, is the first of public corporations (United States v. Mau-
rice, 2 Bro43k. 96, 109 {per Marshall, C. J.); Ableman v. Booth,
21 How. 506), possessing defined and limited corporate powers,
with the capacity to contract and bs contracted with, to sue in
its corporate name (" The Government of the United States,"
Cohens v. Yirginia, 6 "Wheat. 264) and to be sued by consent,
and which, having been duly created as a corporation by the
people of the several original States, acquired a true cor-
porate entity, and went into operation, or commenced tiie
transaction of its business, on Wednesday, March 4, 1789
(Owings V. Speed, 5 Wheat. 420) — to the most insignificant
Joint-stock association or local incorporation, at the other
extreme. Within this wide range should seem to be included
every sort of an association among men which' passes for a
corporation or a company, aside from partnerships on the one
hand, and political S'overeignties on the other.
VI PEEFAOB.
The subject of Public or Municipal Corporations, as com-
pared with that of Private Corporations, is, both in this coun-
try and in England, largely statutory, and the intelligent
reader will, therefore, perhaps not be surprised at the space
given in the text to the consideration of many local statutes
and ordinances. Sometimes these statutes are types of classes
of statutes found in many States, but perhaps more frequently
are distinct and sui generis, and must, therefore, in a treatise
designed to be general, be separately considered.
In collecting and arranging the matter for so large and
comprehensive a work as this, I have, of necessity and as of
course, relied very much upon the intelligent and faithful labor
of several young men in my oflSce upon whose assistance I have
come very much to depend in work of this character, and
without which, in view of my other engagements, it would
have been altogether impossible for me to prepare the work
in its present shape,
I trust that iwhat has been here collected, collated and di-
gested upon this important title may be accorded the same
generous and indulgent reception which my other works have
had at the hands of my professional brethren.
Chablks F. Beaoh, Jb.
The MiiiLS BinLDiNO, 35 Wall Street,
New York, February 4 189a
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
VOLUME I.
CHAPTER L
niTEODtrCIOEY— HISTOEICAL VIEW. ^ - .
§ 1. The genus corporation defined 1
2. Species of corporations 4
3. Subdivisions of public corporations 6
4. Subdivisions of strictly public corporations ... 8
6. Definition of the municipal corporation .... 10
6. Definition of the public guasi-corporation .... 13
7. Examples of municipal and public guasi-corporations . 13
8. Counties 14
9. The New England towns 16
10. The same subject continued 17
11. The State 19
12. Long Island towns 20
13. The development of the municipal corporation — (a) In gen-
eral 21
14. (b) Greece and Rome 22
15. (c) Italy and France — The mediaeval cities ... 24
16. Conclusion 25
CHAPTER II.
OF THE CEEATION OP THE COEPOEATIOII.
' Page.
g 17. The Teutonic town 28
18. The old English town SO
19. The same subject continued 31
20. Guilds 33
21. The English boroughs 84
22. The same subject continued 36
23. Creation of modern English municipal corporations . . 38
24. Municipal corporations created by charter from the crown 39
25. Municipal corporaitions created by act of parliament . . 40
26. Municipal corporations at common law aiid by prescription
in England 41
27. Municipal corporations by implication in England . . 42
28. The Municipal Corporations Reform Act of 1835 . . 43
VIU TABLE OF CONTENTS — TOLUME I.
Page.
§ 29. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1883 « . . ^0
30. The American town ^1
31. The power to create municipal corporations in the United
States— Where vested— (a) In the State ... 49
33. (b) In the federal government ^
38. Municipal corporations created by the federal government —
(a) Territories 53
34. (b) The District of Columbia B3
35. Municipal corporations by prescripyon in the United States 53
36. The same subject continued — Instances of incorporation by
prescription in the United States 54
37. Municipal corporations by implication in the United States 65
38. The same subject continued 56
39^ Creation of municipal corporations in the United States —
(a) In general 57
40. (b) By special charter 58
41. (c) By general municipal incorporating acts ... 58
42i Constitutional limitations of legislative power to create mu-
nicipal corporations 59
43. Construction of such constitutional limitations — (a) Corpo-
rations for " municipal purposes" and "bodies politic or
corporate" 60
44. (b) "Corporate powers". . . . ' \, • • • ^^
45. Miscellaneous instances of such constitutional limitations . 61
46. Incorporation by courts 63
47. The same subject continued 64
48. Classes of cities under general incorporating acts . . 65
49. The corporate limits — Territory of the corporation . . 65
50. Acceptance of charters by corporators not necessary . . 66
51. The same subject continued 67
53. Substantial compliance with incorporating acts necessary . 68
53. Instances of irregularities in incorporation- . , . 68
54. Notice of incorporation 69
55. Validity of incorporation — How .tested .... 70
56. The same subject continued 71
57. The charter of a municipal corporation is a law ... 71
58. The American township 73
59. Local self-government a delegation of legislative power . 73
60. The same subject continued . . ' . . . . 74
CHAPTER m,
THE CMABTER.
Page.
g 61. Early charters 75
63. Political element in charters 76
63. Charters at the present day 77
64. Municipal charters not within the rule in the Dartmouth
College Case 78
TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUME I.
IX
65. The present English statutes
66. The Municipal Corporations Act and the royal prerogative
67. Contents of charter
68. Prominent features of, special charters
69. What charters cannot confer ....
70. Wherein the constitutional limitation consists .
71. Acceptance — When necessary ....
72. The same subject continued ....
73. Compulsory acceptance .....
74. Charters, how proved
75. Proof of fact of incorporation ....
76. Proof of corporate existence ....
77. General rules of construction of charters . .
78. Can charters be modified . ' .
79. How far the State can enforce performance of local
80. Change in municipal boundaries
81. EfTects of amendments of charter on city ordinances
82. Reorganization under general law — Effect of .
83. Beorganization must be strictly according to statute
84. The same subject continued
85. New York constitution a general law
86. How far special legislation is permissible
87. Written constitutions — Operation of .
88. Power to make by-laws — How limited
89. Conflict of by-laws and general acts .
90. The ordinance when passed must be reasonable .
91. Reasonableness — How determined . . .
duties
Page.
79
81
83
83
84
85
86
87
8P
89
91
91
93
03
95
95
96
97
98
98
99
100
100
.103
103
104
106
CHAPTER IV.
AHENDMEKT, BEPEAL AND FORFErrOBB OF CHARTER.
FagB.
§ 92. The power of the State to amend, repeal or modify the char-
ters of municipal corporations 108
93. The charter of a municipal corporation not within the rule
of the Dartmouth College Case ' 110
94 Construction of repealing and amendatpry acts — (a) Gen-
eral principles Ill
95. (b) Statutes in pari materia construed together — Repeal by
implication 113
96. Municipal charter not repealed by subsequent general law
unless intent to repeal is clear 113
97. The same subject continued 114
98. Instances of repeal of charter by general acts . . . 114
99. Repeal and amendment of charter by subsequent amend-
ment of State constitution 115
100. Repeal of general laws by enactment of municipal charter 115
101. Repeal of general laws by municipal ordinance . . . 116
X TABLE OF CONTENTS TOLUMB I.
Page,
§ 102. The same subject continued 117
103. Construction of amendatory and repealing acts made appli-
cable only to cities of a certain class .... 118
104. Effect of legislation upon the charter of a city organized
under special law, and not by its acceptance thereof snb-
' ject to the general law 119
105. Miscellaneous instances of effective repealing and amenda-
tory acts 120
106. The same subject continued 131
107. "What is an amendment or repeal of a municipal charter? . 132
108. Acceptance of amendment 133
109. Manner of acceptance 123
110. Constitutional limitations on power of legislature to amend
or repeal municipal charters — (a) In general . . . 124
111. (b) Special legislation 125
113. (c) Vested rights — Impairment of obligation of contracts —
Recognition by constitution 126
113. (d) Title of amendatory or repealing acts . . . . 126
114. The same subject continued 137
115. Forfeiture of charter in England 138
116. The same subject continued 139
117. Instances of forfeiture of charter under English law . . 139
118. The charter of a municipal corporation in the United States
not forfeitable by judicial action ..... 130
119. The same subject continued 131
CHAPTER V.
MEMBEKSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP — PEKSONAI. UABIUTT OF MBMBEBS OP THE
COBPOEATION.
§ 120. Definitions — Membership — Citizenship .... 133
121. Qualifications for membership in English municipal corpo-
rations 133
123, The same subject continued 134
123. Qualifications for membership in American municipal cor-
porations 135
124. Citizenship in England 135
125. The same subject continued 136
126. Citizenship in the United States ...... 137
127. Natural citizens 138
128. The same subject continued 138
129. Naturalized citizens ' 139
180. The same subject continued 140
131. Right of naturalized citizens to hold and receive lands . 140
132. The status of Chinese before the law 141
133. The stattis of American Indians before the law . . . 143 '
134. Privileges and immunities of citizens 143
TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUME I. XI
Page,
i 133. The same subject continued ...... 144
136. Rights of citizens 145
137. The same subject continued 147
138. Personal liability of members of the corporation . , 148
139. The same subject continued — Russell t). The Men of Devon 149
140. Personal liability of members of public guasi-corporationa
in New England 149
141. The same subject continued 150
143. Beardsley«. Smith — (a) The reason for the New England
doctrine of personal liability of members ... 151
143. (b) The doctrine in England 153
144. (c) The doctrine in Massachusetts and Maine . . , 153
145. (d) The doctrine in Connecticut . . ' . . . . 154
146. Limitations upon the personal liability of members of New
England public Quasi-corporations .... 156
CHAPTER VI.
OFFICERS AND AGENTS.
■~ Page.
147. Legislative power to create officers and agents ... 158
148. Legislative control over officers and agents . . . 159
149. Conduct of elections — Construction of election statutes . 159
150. Miscellaneous instances of the construction of election.stat-
utes 160
151. Validity of election — General principles .... 163
153. The same subject continued — Illustrations ... 163
153. English rule as to majority 164
154. Election by ballot 165
155. Election by city council .166
156. Election by definite bodies generally — Majority and plu-
rality . 168
157. The same subject continued — Quorum majority . . 168
158. Informal ballot 169
159. Tenure of office 170
160. Tenure of office where city passes from one class to an-
other 173
161. Power to hold over — English and American rules . . 173
163. The same subject continued 175
163. Appointment of officers . . . i . . . . 176
164. Validity of appointment 177
165. Appointment b}- de facto officers 178
166. Compensation of officers — In general .... 178
167. The same subject continued — Failure of corporate funds . 180
168. The same subject continued — Illustrations . . . 181
169. Miscellaneous instances 183
170. Extra compensation 184
171. Compensation of attorneys 185
173. The same subject continued 186
B
Xll
TABLE OF CONTENTS TOLUME I.
173. Compensation ^ Power of legislature to control
174. Qualifications for office-holding . . .
175. Official oath
176. The same subject continued . . .
177. Duties of officers
178. Powers of mayor . .
179. The same subject continued — Statutory provisions .
180. The same subject contiiiued — Miscellaneous powers .
181. Miscellaneous instances of powers or municipal officers
183. Z)e /acio officers — General statement . .
183. The same subject continued — Color of title . .
134. Incumbent of an unconstitutional office ...
185. Possession of office by de facto officer . . .
186. Bights and liabilities of de facto officers . . .
187. Resignation by acceptance of incompatible office .
188. Acceptance and withdrawal of resignation
189. Removal of officers and agents — How effected . .
190. Causes for removal — English and American rules .
191. Power of corporation to remove officers and agents .
193. The same subject continued . .
193. Notice of proceeding to remove .
194. The same subject continued
. 195. All persons charged with notice of duties and
municipal agents
196. Liability of officers to the corporation
197. Instances of fraudulent acts of municipal agents
198. Liability of corporation to officers . ,
199. Indictment of municipal officers . .
powers of
Page.
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
19 J
197
198
199
199
200
200
201
203
203
201
205
206
207
207
208
209
210
211
CHAPTER Vn.
PERSONAI. LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS.
Page.
200. Liability on contracts — Presumption against liability . 313
201. The same subject continued — Negotiable instruments . 213
203. The same subject continued — Excess of authority, fraud,
etc. 214
203. Exemption from liability for legislative acts . . . 215
204. The foregoing rule qualified — Breach of trust . . . 215
205. Liability of judicial' officers considered .... 216
806. Qitasi-judicial officers — Corrupt motives .... 218
207. Liability of ministerial officers 219
208. The same subject continued 2S0
209. No personal liability for strictly public acts . . . 23i
210. Default of subordinates 223
211. Ejection of member of council by order of mayor . . 233
818. Negligence of recorder of deeds 235
-813. The same subject continued 236
814. Liability of assessor of taxes 226
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME t XUl
CHAPTER VIII.
THE LIABILITY OP THE CORPORATION FOR THE ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS AND
AQENTS.
Page.
S 215. Introductory 229
216. Liability ex contractu 229
217. Contracts within scope of powers of corporation . . 230
218. The same subject continued 231
219. The doctrine of ultra vires applied with greater strictness
to public than to private corporations .... 282
220. The reason for the rule 233
231. Municipal bonds void when ultra vires .... 233
222. The same subject continued 234
223. Ultra vires — How modified by estoppel . . . 234
224. The same subject continued — Hitchcock r. Galveston . 235
225. Irregularity in exercise of power 237
226. Ultra vires — How modified by the doctrine of implied con-
tract — General principles ...... 237
227. The same subject continued 238
228. Illustrations of the doctrine of implied contracts . . 239
229. The same subject continued 240
2<S0. Liability of the corporation to repay taxes illegally col-
lected 240
231. The same subject continued — Restrictions . . . 241
232. Illegality of assessment 242
233. Actual receipt of taxes by the corporation .... 243
234. Compulsory payment of taxes 243
235. The same subject continued ...... 244
286. Illustrations of the rule 245
237. The same subject continued 246
238. The doctrine of the federal Supreme Court considered . 247
239. The same subject continued 248
240. Contracts within the scope of powers of officer or agent . 249
241. The same subject continued — Clark t). Des Moines . . 249
242. AH persons contracting with strictly public corporations
charged with knowledge of scope of powers of officer or
agent 251
243. The same subject continued 252
244. Liability of corporation for act of its officers or agents in
violation of law 258
245. The same subject continued 254
246. Effect of representation of officer or agent as to authority . 255
247. The same subject continued 256
248. Ratification of contracts 256
249. The same subject continued 257
250. Ratification by authorized officers necessary . . . 257
251. Manner of ratification . . . . ' . . . . 258
25a Manner of execution of contracts by officers and agents . 259
253, The same subject continued 260
XIV
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I,
254. Contracts by ordinance or resolution
255. Signature of contract .
256. The same subject continued
257. Liability ex delicto — (a) In general
258. (b) Discretionary and legislative acts
259. (c) The same subject continued .
260. (d) Ministerial acts . • < •
261. (e) Public as contradistinguished from private duties
262. The rule applied to public guasi-corpqrationa .
263. Conclusion
Page.
261
262
263
263
263
264
265
266
266
CHAPTER IX
PUBLIC BOARDS.
Page.
I 264. Corporate assemblies of the old English corporations . . 269
265. The same subject continued — Notice at common law . 270
266. The same subject continued — Presence of the mayor . 272
267. Regular or stated meetings — Time for holding . . , 272
268. Adjournments 273
269. Special meetings 274
270. Adjourned meetings 275
271. Notice of special meetings 275
272. The same subject continued — Specifications of object of
meeting 277
273. Adjourned meetings — Time for holding .... 278
274. Corporation represented by governing boards . . . 279
275. The same subject continued — Meeting essentiial to o£Scial
action 280
276. The same subject continued — Delegation of powers . . 282
S77. The same subject continued 283
278. Delegation of powers — A Pennsylvania case . . .\ 284
279. The same subject continued — The rule limited . . . 285
280. Constitution of council 287
281. The same subject continued ...... S88
282. Conflicting councils — Kerr r. Trego 289
233. Acts of de facto councils 290
284. Quorum of definite body 291
285. The same subject continued 293
286. The same subject continued — An exception to the rule . 293
287. The same subject continued — Special charter provisions . 293
288. Quorums and majorities further considered — The rule in
England 294
289. The same subject continued — Decisions in the United' States 294
290. Further application of majority principle .... 295
291. Execution of authority vested in two persona ... 296
293. Presiding ofiicer 297
293. The same subject continued 298
294. Commitment for contempt — Whitcorab's Case ... 299
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I.
XV
895. Ayes and nays . . . , • , . .
296. Parliamentary law
297. Reconsideration and rescission — General power
398. The same subject continued . . . ,
299. Power to reconsider and rescind qualified . .
300. The same subject continued . . . ,
301. Reconsideration distinguished from repeal . .
303. Joint assemblies of definite bodies . . .
Page.
80')
801
303
303
803
804
303
806
CHAPTER X
OFFICIAL BONDS.
i 303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
814.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
330.
321.
333.
323.
324.
835.
326.
327.
328.
Official bonds — Definition , . ,
What ofiScers must give bonds . .
Form and requisites of bond . .
Efi'ect of signing o£Scial bond in blank
The same subject continued
Construction of courts on bonds improperly approved
Defective bonds valid as common-law obligation .
The same subject continued
Time when an official bond takes effect
Effect of not filing bonds within the time prescribed by stat-
ute
The same subject continued .....
Liability of sureties on a treasurer's bond . . .
The same subject continued
Mingling of and defalcation out of two funds . .
Liability of sureties as affected by subsequent legislation
Liability of surety when subsequent legislation imposes new
duties of the same general character
The same subject continued
Liability of officer on his bond where the loss is occasioned
by the act of Ood or the public enemy . .
The same subject continued ....
Duty of obligee to notify sureties of increased risk
Liability of sureties on successive bonds — (a) Where differ
ent sureties are given on each bond
The same subject continued
(b) Where funds received by the officer during his first
term remain in his hands during his second term .
(c) When the sureties of the first term are liable for money
converted or collected by the officer during his second term
(d) When an officer before entering on his second term
makes a report to or settlement with the proper author-
ities
The same subject continued ...
(e) Where the officer applies money received in his second
term to pay deficiencies in his first term .
Page.
309
309
310
810
811
812
312
313
813
814
315
315
316
818
819
819
320
821
322
323
823
324
335
325
336
337
8S8
XVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I.
Page.
330. (f) Where the bond ia given for a term of oflBoe or a certain
period of time . ' 328
331. Laches or negligence of other officers or principal . . 339
332. Liability of sureties where additional bonds are given . 329
833. Liability of surety where the ofiScial occupies two or more
offices 330
334. Liability of surety for unofficial acts of officer . . . 3:^1
335. The same subject continued 332
336. Liability of sureties for acts done under color of office . 332
337. The same subject continued — Lanfmon v. Feusiei — The
doctrine of the federal Supreme Court .... 333
338. The same subject continued ...... 334
339. The same subject continued — The doctrine of the State
courts 335
340. The same subject continued ...... 335
341. Illustrations of the doctrine 336
342. Distinction between judicial and ministerial duties . . 337
343. Illustrations of the doctrine 338
844. The same subject continued ...••• 839
CHAPTER XL
MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS.
345. Town meeting in Kew England and elsewhere
846. Right to meeting — Mandamus to enforce .
347. Application for and authority to call a meeting
348. Secondary authority to call a meeting
349. General purpose of a warning . . .
350. Designation of time and place of meeting .
851. General and formal requisites of a warrant
352. The same subject continued
353. Service of warrant . .
354. Time of service . . .
355. Return of service . .
356. Notice of annual meetings .
357. The same subject continued
358. Time of meeting .
359. Place of meeting .
360. Organization of meeting — The moderator
361. The same subject continued — Clerk and clerk pro tern.
362. Adjournments of meetings ....
363. The same subject continued ...
364. The power of adjournment limited . .
365. Adjourned meetings
366. Reconsideration and rescission — The general ru
367. The same subject continued — Illustrations
368. The same subject continued — The rule qualified
369. Ratification of doings of invalid meetings .
Page.
341
342
343
844
845
846
347
848
849
350
351
852*
353
854
354
355
856
857
358
359
360
361
862
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I.
XVU
870. Parliamentary law in town meetin°;3 . . .
371. The same subject continued — Illustrations
878. "Validity of votes as determined by the warrant —
trations
373. The same subject continued , , . .
874. Invalidity of votes — Illustrations
375. The same subject continued ....
376. Votes of town meetings — General rules of construction
377. Record of proceedings
378. Parol evidence of proceedings ....
379. Doings of meetings not legally called . . .
380. Presumptions in favor of ancient meetings .
3S1. Notice of election
383. Qualification of voters — Power to prescribe .
383. Begistration acts
384. Place of election
885. The same subject continued ....
886. Popular elections — Plurality ....
887. The same subject continued — Majorities, etc. .
388. Voting by ballot
389. The same subject continued ....
390. The Australian ballot and cumulative voting .
391. Absolute accuracy not required in a ballot . .
393. Votes for ineligible candidates ....
393, Putting up offices at auction — Tax collector
394, City council as judges of election and qualification
members
395, Canvass and return and contest of elections .
lUus-
of its
Page.
865
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
873
873
873
874
876
877
378
879
380
380
883
883
383
884
386
387
388
889
CHAPTER XII.
CONSOLIDATION AND BEORGANIZATION.
P»g6-
896. How effected 390
397. Power of legislature 391
398. Constitutionality of laws for annexation i . . . 391
399. Delegation of legislative power 393
400. Illinois decisions 393
401. Maryland decisions 394
403. Michigan decisions 895
403. Missouri and Tennessee decisions ..... 89i^
404. Ruling as to Baltimore city - . . . . . . 397
405. Rule as declared in Washington ..'... 398
406. Powers of cities -under the law ...... 398
407. The same subject continued ...... 400
408. What may be annexed — General rule .... 400
409. The same subject continued — Construction of statutes . 401
410. The same subject continued ...... 403
411. Right of taxation as to annexed lands .... 403
ZVIU
TABLE or CONTENTS — VOLUME I.
413.
413.
414
415.
,-416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
42S.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
§436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
453.
Taxation for antecedent debts .
Remedy Of tax-payer . . . •
Effects of consolidation . , .
The same subject continued . .
Annexation proceedings — Notice .
Mode of voting
Jurisdiction and procedure . .
The same subject continued . .
Reasonableness of annexation .. .
Validity of annexation . . *.
Procedure to test validity . . .
The same subject continued . .
Special acts as to reorganization ,
Nebraslia act
Effect of reorganization . .
The same subject continued
The same subject continued — Decisions in
Tennessee
Validity Of reorganization — Special case
Invalid reorganization
Property right passing to new corporation
For what the reorganized corporation becomes liable
Further scope of the foregoing doctrine . .
What are such liabilities
Remedy of creditors of the old corporation
California and
Page.
404
404
405
406
407
407
408
409
411
411
412
413
414
415
415
416
417
418
419
430
431
422
423
434
CHAPTER XIII.
PAETITION AND DISSOLTJTIOIT.
(a) Pabtitioh. Page.
Partition — General rule ....... 427
Validity of partition 428
Rules as to division of counties and towns . . . . 439
Procedure for division not applicable -in vacating a town . 431
^Indiana rules . . . 433
Michigan rules . 433
Rules as to severing tei-ritory 435
Pennsylvania rule 436
Constitutionality — Wisconsin 437
Rulings as to constitution of Wisconsin on division of coun-
ties 438
The same subject continued — Uniformity of system of
government 439
Title of act 439
Florida decisions as to constitutionality of acts . . . 441
Kansas decision' 443
How partition affects oflScers 443
Where unorganized territory has been attached to a county 444
Settlement of inhabitants ....... 446
TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUME I.
XIX
§453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
463.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
Territory severed fronj an old to form a new corporation is
a part of the old until the new is fully organized
Some Wisconsin acts construed .
Provisions of act as to county sites
Apportionment of liabilities
Bales as to property and liabilities
The same subject continued
A Wisconsin case on property rights
Rules as to apportionment, liabilities and remedies
Rules in North Carolina as to settlement between new and
old counties
Rules for adjustment of liabilities
Liabilities which fall upon the portion severed
Defenses to claims growing out of partition
Enforcement of obligations of old and new
Miscellaneous
(6) DlSSOLOTIOlf.
Dissolution — How effected in general .
The same subject continued ...
Surrender of charter
The same subject continued . . .
Florida decisions on constitutionality of acts to dissolve
Vacated towns
This 'vi-as no dissolution ....
Effect of dissolution as to liabilities and funds in 1
Effect of dissolution upon liabilities .
What does not affect liabilities and remedies
Repealing charters
The same subject continued ...
Receiver for a city .....
The same subject continued . . .
Where such a receiver was appointed .
hand
Page.
447
447
448
449
451
452
453
454
455
456
458
459
461
462
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
474
475
476
477-
479
480
CHAPTER XIV,
ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS.
Page.
482. Introductory 483
483. By-laws, ordinances and resolutions 483
484. Distinction between ordinance and resolution . . . 484
485. The same subject continued — Illustrations • • . 485
486. The province of ordinances 486
487. Power to make ordinances 487
488. The same subject continued 488
489. By whom the power is to be exercised .... 489
490. Validity in respect of form — (a) Meeting of council . . 490
491. (b) The same subject continued 491
492. (c) Quorum and votes 493
493. (d) The same subject continued . . . . . . 494
XX TiBLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I.
... ^ f . . •' - ^*se-
§ 494. (e) Mode of enactment 496
495. (f) The same subject continued 498
496. (g) The signing, of the ordinance . . . . • • 499
497. (h) The same subject continued 500
498. (i) Publication of the ordinance — When mandatory . . 501
499. (j) The same subject continued — When directory . . 503
500. (k) The same subject continued — Amendments and re-
enactments 503
501. (1) Manner of publication 504
503. (m) The same subject continued 505
503. (n) Time and proof of publication 506
504. (o) Title of the ordinance ....... 508
505. (p) Record of the ordinance 509
506. Validity in respect of matter — (a) Constitutionality . . 511
507. (b) The same subject continued 511
508. (c) Consistency with statute and charter .... 512
509. (d) The same subject continued ...... 513
510. (e) Consistency with general penal law 514
511. (f) The same subject continued 516
513. (g) Reasonableness of the ordinance 518
513. (h) The same subject continued — Illustrations . . . 520
514. (i) The same subject continued — Reasonableness a question
of law 531
515. (j) Vagueness of the ordinance ...... 531
516. Motives of council not to be Impeached .... 533
517. Construction of ordinances ...... 533
518. The same subject continued — Ordinances void in part . 524
519. Amendment and repeal — By subsequent ordinance . . 535
520. Repeal by act of the legislature 537
531. Repeals by implication 538
532. Power to impose penalties 539
523. Mode of enforcement of ordinances — By a purely civil ac-
tion 530
534. Jurisdiction of proceedings . 531
535. Imprisonment in default of payment of fine . . . 532
636. Imprisonment as a penalty 533
537. Forfeitures 534
538. The same subject continued 535
639. Cumulative fines and fines for continuous and repeated of-
fenses 537
530. Enforcement by complaint — Nature of proceeding . . 538
531. The complaint — General requisites 539
533. The same subject continued -^ Pleading .... 640
533. Pleading further considered 642
534. Proof of ordinances 643
535. Right to trial by jury 544
536. The same subject continued 545
537. Certiorari and habeas corpus 546
lABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME XXI
CHAPTER XV
EXPRESS COBPORATE POWERS.
Page.
538. Powers of a municipal corporation generally ... 648
539. Delegation of powers 549
640. The same subject continued ...... 550
541. Exercise of powers ...551
643. Mode of exercise 553
543. Proceedings not reviewable ...... 553
544. The same subject continued ...... 555
545. Constitutionality of acts granting powers .... 556
546. The same subject continued 557
547. Validity of acts granting powers ..... 558
548. Power to " trade " should not be granted .... 558
549. Power of towns as to villages within them ... 660
550. Power to issue commercial paper ..... 661
651. As to trusts ......... 563
552. Purchase at tax sales ........ 564
553. Granting exclusive franchises ...... 565
554. The same subject continued ...... 567
555. Contracts not exclusive ....... 568
556. Improvements generally ....... 569
657. Costs of improvements ....... 570
558. Gas and water supply . 671
559. Natural-gas companies ....... 573
560. Establishment of electric plant 574
561. Public property ......... 576
563. The same subject continued ...... 577
563. Parks 578
564, Wharves 578
665. The same subject continued ...... 579
566. Markets 580
567. The same subject continued - . 581
56& Streets generally 683
569. Construction of statutory provisions ..... 583
570. Protection of streets ........ 684
571. Grading of streets 586
573. Allowing the use of streets by railroads .... 587
5731 The same subject continued 588
574. Regulations as to railroads using streets .... 688
575. The same subject continued 589
576. Crossing of railways 590
577. Sewers 693
578. Fire limits 593
679. Directions as to buildings ....... 594
580. Police power • . 595
681. The same subject continued ...... 597
583. To promote health . 598
583. General welfare, etc 598
xxu
TA3LK OF CONTENTS — VOLUME Z.
584, Licenses . . . .
585, Occupations . . .
586, The same subject continued
587, Public offenses .
588, The same subject continued
589, Nuisances . , . .
590, Holidays, etc. . . .
591, Miscellaneous • . .
Pag<>.
(iOO
600
801
603
603
604
605
606
CHAPTER XVL
ULTRA. VIRES.
592.
593.
594,
595,
596,
597,
598,
599.
600,
601.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607.
610.
611,
612.
613,
614.
615,
616,
617,
618.
619,
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
ruling
General statement of the rule . . .
Purchase of land for use of a railroad
Illusti'ations of the general rule .
Grant of power to regulate highways construed
Contracts for exclusive privileges in highways
Strictly official duties not to be confided to non-ofiScial
sons
Police ordinances — Wooden buildings
The same subject continued — Railroad crossings
The same subject continued — Markets, eta
Donations
The same subject continued . .
Subscription to stock of railroads .
City council as judge of elections
Governing authorities of school districts F
The same subject continued
Purchase of real estate for school purposes — Texas
Condemnation of land outside of territorial limits
Diversion of lands dedicated to public uses .
Sale of real estate — Prescribed mode controls .
Appropriations for highways and school buildings
Power to purchase realty does not authorize giving notes
Work on public buildings, etc
Issuing of bonds
The same subject continued — Municipal aid
The same subject continued — Public improvements
Contracts abrogating control of streets . .
General legislation — Offers of rewards . .
Contracts for water supply
The same subject continued
Contracts for lighting streets .
Grant of exclusive privileges
Curative legislation . . .
Ratification
Estoppel
Purchasers of bonds are bound to take notice
per-
Page.
607
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
681
633
633
633
634
635
636
637
638
689
6(0
641
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLTJME I. XXIH
Page.
637. • Corporations may contest ultra vires contracts ... 643
628. Liability upon ultra vii-es contracts 643
629. Ttie same subject continued 644
630. Ultra vires, when not a defense to actions by the corporation 645
631. Tax-payers' resistance 646
632. Tax-payers' suits 647
633. The same subject continued 648
634. Suits to restrain the enforcement of contracts ... 648
635. Injunction the proper remedy 650
636. The same subject continued 6E0
CHAPTER XVII.
IMPLIED POWERS A.ND EMINENT DOMAOT.
(a) luPLiED Fgwebs. Page.
637. General statement of tlie rule 653
638. Compromise of claims 654
639. The samesubject continued — Application of the rule in Iowa 654
640. The dissenting opinion in the Iowa case .... 655
641. Compromise of ultra vires claims 656
643. Submission to arbitration . 657
643. Employment of attorneys ....... 658
644. Power to hold property in trust 659
645. Acquisition of property for other than municipal purposes 660
646. The same subject continued — Erecting public buildings . 661
647. Power to indemnify. officers 662
648. The same subject continued 663
649. Offers of rewards 664
650. The same subject continued — The power generally denied , 665
651. The same subject continued — The foregoing rule qualified 666
652. Expenditures in obtaining or opposing legislation . . 667
C6) EmHEHT Domain.
653. Nature and definition 668
654. The same subject continued — Constitutional limitation . 669
655. What property may be taken 670
656. Quantity of estate 671
657. What constitutes a taking 673
658. The same subject continued — The leading case . . . 673
659. The same subject continued — Constitutional amendments 674
6C0. Property already appropriated to public use . . . 675
661. The same subject continued 676
663. Change of grade 677
663. Change of use — Additional use 677
664 The same subject continued — Electric railways . . 679
665. Grant of power to municipal corporations .... 681
666. Public use and necessity of appropriation, by whom deter-
mined 682
667. Legislative declaration conclusive 683
668. Public use as respects municipalities — Parks and streets . 684
669. The same subject continued — Water, gas, etc, . . . 685
XXIV
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUSlE I.
670.
671.
673.
673.
674.
675.
676.,
677.
678.
679.
680.
681.
683.
683.
684.
685.
686.
687.
683.
The same subject continued — Cemeteries, sewers, etc.
The same subject continued — Leasing for public use
The same subject continued — Ornamental purposes
Notice of proceeding — Necessity for
Parties entitled to notice
Service of notice .
Treaty with the owner
The application or petition
The tribunal
Eight to jury trial
Right to abandon proceedings
Damages upon discontinuance of proceedings
Compensation
Elements in estimating compensation
The same subject continued . .
Benefits ......
Payment . . . , . .
Review of proceedings -^ Certiorari .
The same subject continued — Appeal
Page.
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
697
697
699
700
701
703
703
704
706
CHAPTER XVia
CONTRACTS.
Page.
689. How contracts are made ....... 707
690. The same subject continued 708
691. Authority of agents and formality of execution . . 709
693. Compliance with prescribed formalities .... 710
693. Informal distinguished from ultra vires contracts . . 710
694. Power to relieve a contractor in case of hardship . . 711
695. Ratification of contract 713
696. The same subject continued 713
697. Mandatory provisions 713
698. Contracts let to bidders 714
699. The same subject continued 715
700. Plans and specifications 715
701. The same subject continued 716
703. Forfeiture of contracts 717
703. The same subject continued 717
704. Right of set-off in foreclosure of mechanics' liens . . 718
703, Recovery against the corporation upon a quantum meruit . 718
708. Actions by corporations on contracts — Estoppel to deny
validity 719
707. Failure of specified means of payment — Implied contract 720
708. Eights of property owners in respect of contracts for im-
provements . . 730
709. Fiduciary position of officers — Improvident contracts . 721
710. Action by assignee of contractor — Pleading . . . 731
711. Miscellaneous rulings 723
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I.
XXV
CHAPTER XIX.
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL.
' Page.
712. Legislative control subject to limitations ^ .... 724
713. Powers that the Statu cannot relinquish .... 735
/14. Impairment of legislative grants 726
715. The same subject continued ...... 727
716. Bemission of forfeitures 728
717. Property held for public use 729
718. Tenure of office of municipal officer ..... 729
719. 'Agencies of municipal administration .... 730
720. Diversion of funds 731
731. The same subject continued — Public interest paramount
to private right 731
722. Application of revenues 782
723. The same subject continued 782
724. Impairment of obligations to individuals .... 733
725. The same subject continued 784
736. Impairment of remedies against the corporation . . 735
727. The same subject continued — Control of taxing power lim-
ited 735
738. Vacating assessment of damages 737
729. The rule summarized . 787
CHAPTER XX.
TORTS AND CRIMES.
730. Torts by the sovereign power
731. The State not liable for officers' torts — No respondeat supe-
rior
732. Suits against United States — Court of claims
783. Suits against New York — Board of claims
734. Counties, etc. , as divisions of the State .
735. The same subject continued . . .
736. Non-liability of New England towns .
787. Liability of New England towns
738. Liability of towns, etc., as to special duties
739. Non-liability of school districts and drainage districts
740. Non-liability for separate boards and bodies
741. Non-liability for torts of independent officers
743. The same subject continued — Who are independent offi'
cers
743. The same subject continued — Applied in New York
etc. ... . .
744. Non-liability for firemen
745. Non-liability for police
746. Liability for acts of mobs .
747. Private interests must yield to public
city,
Page.
740
741
741
743
743
745
746
747
748
750
751
751
753
753
754
755
756
757
XXVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUME II.
etc. —
§ 748. The same subject continued — Destroying buildings to
check fire
, 749. Non-liability for negligence in public service
750. Non-liability as to jails
751. Non-liability as to hospitals ....
753. Non-liability as to fire-works ....
753. Liability as to city wells aad water ...
754. Non-liability to trespassers ....
755. Liability for nuisances
756. Municipal liability in general .♦ . . .
757. Chartered cities, etc., distinguished from counties.
The conflict
758. Municipal liability in exercise of private powers
759. Liability commensui-ate with duty . . .
760. Municipal liability as to water front .
761. Liability for fright of horse ....
762. Municipal liability for acts of officers and agents
763. Not liable for uHro vires acts of officers
764. Non-liability in the exercise of discretionary powers
765. The same subject continued — New York and Georgia rule
766. The same subject continued — Drainage
767. Non-liability for errors of judgment .
768. Liability for trespass ....
769. Liability for waste ....
770. Liability after notice — Implied notice
771. The same subject continued — Statutory notice .
772. The same subject continued — New York decisions
773. Impeaching legi.slative acts for fraud . . ,
774 Indictment for torts .
775. Not indictable for felony
Page.
759
759
760
763
763
764
765
766
767
768
770
771
772
773
773
774
774
776
77B
777
778
780
780
783
784
784
785
787
VOLUME IL
CHAPTER XXL
FISCAL MANAGEMENT,1
(a^ Fowkb to lycuB Incebtednbss.
776. Manner of contracting ....
777. Construction of statutory provisions . ,
778. Borrowing money
779. The same subject continued ...
780. Employment of attorneys ....
781. Contracts for construction of county buildings
783. Support of the poor
783. Taxation for school purposes . . .
784. The same subject continued
jPage.
790
791
793
795
796
797
798
800
801
TABLE OF 00NTENT8 VOLUME U.
XXVU
Page.
§785, Thesamesubject continued— Validity of resolutions . 802
786. Levy of taxes 803
767. Contracts for water supply and lighting .... 804
788. School boards and directors 805
789. Erection of school-houses 806
790. School district board — Contracts for building ... 808
791. Contracts with teachers , 809
793. Authority of county treasurer, etc. 811
793. Authority of officers in particular instances ... 813
794. The same subject continued 813
795. Powers of a trustee of a school township .... 814
796. Town selectmen, etc 815
797. The same subject continued ...... 816
798. Township boards 818
799. The same subject continued — Michigan decisions . . 818
800. Town trustees — Indiana decisions 820
801. The same subject continued ...... 821
802. Directors of schools — Illinois decisions .... 823
803. Town supervisors — Illinois and Minnesota decisions . . 824
804. Power of towns and town officers in Maine ... 825
805. Powers of towns in Massachusetts 836
806. Michigan decisions . . u . . . . . 837
807. Selectmen in New Hampshire ...... 828
808. Towns and town officers in New York .... 829
809. Towns and town officers in Vermont ..... 830
(h) LlUTTATIOK OF InDBBTEDNESS.
810. Construction of constitutional provisions .... 831
811. Rulings of the United States Supreme Court ... 833
813. Bulings in California 835
813. Rulings in Colorado 836
814. Rulings in Illinois 837
815. Rulings in Indiana . 839
816. Rulings under the Iowa constitution ..... 840
817. The same subject continued 841
818. Rulings under the Oregon and Washington constitutions . 842
819. Rulings under Texas laws 842
820. Rulings in West Virginia . 848
821. Special statutory provisions ...... 844
822. The same subject continued ...••• 845
823. Indebtedness for water and lights . . • • . 846
824. Effect of exceeding the limit .847
825. Remedy of tax-payers against increase of debt . ' . . 848
CHAPTER XXIL
MUNICIPAL FUNDS.
(a) Cabb and Disbubbeubnt of Fvsna, ' ■ - ■ ■ Paee
g 826. Funds appropriated to specific uses 851
827. Custodians of fupds 852
838. Thp same subject continued 854
XXVUl
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME 11.
829.
830.
831.
833.
883.
834.
833.
836.
837.
838.
839.
810.
841.
843.
843.
844.
845.
846.
847.
848.
849.
850.
851.
853.
853.
854.
855.
856.
857.
858.
859.
860.
861.
863.
863.
864.
865.
866.
867.
868.
870.
871.
878.
Compensation of treasurers
The same subject continued .
Settlements witli treasurers .
Actions to recover county funds
Actions on treasurer's bond .
Public depositories
Examination of county officers' accounts
Liability of custodian of funds .
Liabilities on bonds of custodians of school funds
Investment of school funds . ^ .
Loan of school funds ....
Liability of officers and agents of towns
(b) Affbopbutiohs.
Appropriations out of special funds .
Appropriations anticipating revenue .
Special funds
The same subject continued — Construction of statutes
Statutory provisions further considered
Appropriations for schools . . .
The same subject continued . .
Budget
Annual appropriations
Appropriation of taxes to sinking fund
(c) Uhl^wfol Ezpenditdses.
The New York statute providing for investigatioii .
(d) CLims.
Presentation of claims
The same subject continued
The same subject continued — Yerification of claim .
Presentation of claims for injuries ....
Presentation as a condition precedent to right of action
Allowance of claims ,
The same subject continued — Procedure .
The same subject continued — Adjudication by the board
Conclusiveness of adjudication
Proceedings after disallowance of claim . .
Malfeasance in over-allowance
Proper and improper charges against a county . .
The same subject continued
Apportionment of indebtedness upon division of a county
Claims of contractors for extra work . ' .
Claims for services to indigent persons ...
Proceedings to enforce payment of judgments . .
Mandamus to county officers
(fi) Wabramts.
Character of warrants as evidences of indebtedness .
How drawn
Mandamus to compel the signing of a warrant .
TABLE OF OONTEHTS — TOLUMB 11. XXIX
■■ "■ Page.
873. Duty of officers in drawing warrants 906
874. Validity of warrants 907
875. Actions upon warrants . 908
876. Mandamus to compel payment of warrants ... 910
877. Defenses to actions on warrants 913
878. Votes of counties 914
879. Votes of towns 915
880. Township orders 916
881. The same subject continued ••.... 917
882. School board orders , . . 918
883. School warrants • . - 919
CHAPTER XXIII.
BONDS AND COUPONS.
Page.
i 884 Implied power to issue bonds 922
885. The doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States . 923
886. The same subject continued 924
887. Brenham v. German-American Bank — The language of the
court 924
888. Brenham v. German-American Bank — The dissenting opin-
ion 926
889. Implied power to issue negotiable bonds — The general rule 927
890. The corporation must have a legal existence . . . 927,
891. No right of action on void bonds 928
893. Constitutional limitations — Public purpose ... 929
893. Aid to manufacturing enterprises 930
894. Internal improvements 931
895. Municipal aid to railroads — Express legislative authority
essential 931
898. Railway aid bonds — Legislature may authorize . . 932
897. The same subject continued — Negotiable bonda . . 934
898. Conditions precedent . 934
899. The same subject continued — Assent of tax-payers . . 935
900. The same subject continued — Election .... 937
901. Conduct of election continued 938
903. Conditional subscriptions 939
903. The same subject continued 940
904. Ratification 940
905. The same subject continued ...... 942
906. Eifect of consolidation of companies on authority to sub-
scribe 943
907. Eifect of constitutional prohibitions 943
908. > The same subject continued ■ 944
909. Effect of recitals — Knox County v. Aspinwall . . . 945
910. The same subject continued 946
911. Authority to determine performance of conditions prece-
dent 947
XXX
TABLB OF CONTENTS VOLUMB Q.
912. The same subject continued — Illustration. ... 918
913. The same subject continued — Illustration .... 948
914 The same subject continued — Illustration. , . . 949
915. The doctrine of the United States Supreme Court sum-
marized ... 950
916. The rule in New York 951
917. Signature to bonds 953
918. Sealing 953
919. Date — Ante-dating 953
920. To whom payable . . . ♦ 911:
93J. Place of payment ........ 954
933. Time of maturity . . ■ ^955
933. Delivery 956
924. Quality of municipal bonds as ccimmercial paper . . 956
935. Coupons 957
926. Payment of coupons . 958
927. Interest upon interest 958
928. Refunding, substituted and renewal bonds .... 959
929. The same subject continued 959
930. Estoppel by matter in pais 960
931. Estoppel to set up over-issue in violation of statute . . 961
932. Over-issue in violation of the constitutipn — No estoppel by
recitals 963
933. The same subject continued — The rule qualified . . 963
934. Bona fide holders 963
935. The same subject continued ...... 965
936. Defenses available against bona ^de holders ... 965
937. The same subject continued ...... 966
CHAPTER XXIV.
CHAEITIES AND COREECTION.
938. General rules governing directors of poor, etc. . .
939. Rulings in Massaohusetts'as to overseers of the poor .
940. Rulings in Maine and New York ....
941. Conti"acts by governing boards for the support of the poor
943. Discretionary powers of governing boards
943. Medical treatment for the poor .
944. The same subject continued
945. Settlement of paupers — Generally
946. The same subject continued
947. The same subject continued — Illegitimate children
948. Massachusetts decisions on settlement of soldiers mustered
out of service
949. Settlement of married women
950. Settlement acquired by residence and payment of taxes
951. The same subject continued
953. Constitutionality of laws for the removal of paupers .
Page.
967
969
969
970
972
973
974
975
976
977
979
9S0
981
983
983
TABLE OB" CONTENTS — VOLUME U. XXXI
953. Rulings on removal of paupers . . .'.".'". 985
954. Notice in oases for removal of paupers .... 986
955. Notice of charge by one town to another .... 986
956. What corporations are liable for support of paupers . . 988
957. No implied liability 989
958. Special liabilities . 990
959. Various rulings as to the poor 991
960. Support of patients at State lunatic asylums ... 991
961. The same subject continued 993
962. Support of insane poor further considered .... 993
963. Aid to children 994
964. Liability of tlie corporation for support furnished to pau-
pers 995
965. The same subject continued 996
966. Duty to furnish immediate relief 997
987. Proceedings to compel relative to support paupers . . 998
968. Liability of a pauper for his support 999
969. Municipality cannot recover for voluntary aid ... 999
970. Actions for support of paupers 1000
971. The same subject continued 1003
973, Statutes prohibiting the bringing of paupers from other
States . 1004
973, Liability to pauper for negligence of employees ... 1005
974, Support of the insane ,1006
975, The same subject continued 1'006
976, Soldiers' homes 1008
977, Reformatories 1008
978, Liability of counties for the care of prisoneiB ... 1010
979, Care of prisoners continued ...... 1010
980, Hiring of convicts 1011
981, Liability for personal injuries to prisoners . • . . 1013
983. The same subject continued ...... 1013
CHAPTER XXV.
PUBLIC HEALTH — BOABDS OP HEALTH, AND QUAHANTINE.
Page,
§ 983, Municipal regulations for the promotion of public health . 1016
984, Power of the State legislature ...... 1017
985, Declaring nuisances is not an exercise of judicial func-
tions 1018
986, Extent of authority illustrated 1018
987, The same subject continued 1019
088. Regulation of occupations 1030
989. Powers conferred on boards of health not exclusive " . 162O
990. Power to control manufactures . . . . . 1031
991. Limitations of police power over occupations ... 1022
992. Establishment of sanitary districts 1033
993. The same subject continued . . . < . . . 1033
ZZXU TABLE OF OONTE]<rrS — VOLTTMB H.
— Page.
§ 994. Beasonableness of ordinances
1034
995. Begulating removal of garbage 1025
996. Begulating burials and burial permits .... 1036
997. Boards of bealth generally 1037
993. Powers of town trustees in Iowa as boards of health . 1037
999. Power of boards of health as to employment of physicians 1038
1000. Owner of property condemned as a nuisance entitled to a
hearing 1039
1001. The same subject continued 1039
1003. Conclusiveness of determination by board of health . . 1030
1003. Power of board of health as a corporation — New Jersey
decisions 1031
1004. The same subject continued 1033
1005. Injunction upon application of board of health in New
Jersey 1038
1006. Abatement of nuisances under general authority to pro-
mote health ' 1034
1007. Power to forbid the exercise of offensive trade . . 1034'
1008. Actions by town boards of health to suppress nuisances by
injunction 1086
1009. Expenditures by boards of health, to what municipal cor-
poration chargeable 1036
1010. No corporate liability for torts of health ofiScers . . 1087
1011. The same subject continued 1038
l(n3. Personal liability of members of board of health for negli-
gence 1038
1013. The same subject continued ...... 1039
1014. Quarantine regulations generally ..... 1040
1015. Extent of power of municipal authorities .... 1041
1016. Liability of owner of vessel for quarantine expenses . 1041
1017. Power and duty of boards of health under Florida quaran-
tine laws 1043
1018. Charges against vessels in quarantine .... 1043
1019. A limitation upon quarantine regulations • . . 1043
CHAPTBE XXVL
SUFPBESSION OF NITISANCES.
Page.
§ 1030. Nature of the power of public authorities to suppress nui-
sances 1045
1031. The same subject continued — A police power . . . 1046
1033. Abatement of nuisances by destruction of property . . 1047
1033. The same subject continued — Constitutional limitation . 1048
, 1034. Discretion of municipal bodies in regulating and abating
nuisances 1048
1085. The power of municipal corporations as to declaring what
is a nuisance 1049
1036. liie extent of the power to abate nuisances . . . 1050
TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLTJMB D.
XXXIU
Page.
1037. Abatement of decayed and noisome tenement houses . 1050
1028. Bemoval of occupants — Express authority or extraordi-
nary peril 1051
1039. Power to define nuisances not absolute . ■ - . 1053
1030. The same subject continued . . . ., . . . 1053
1031. Limitation of power to define nuisances further illustrated 1053
loss Municipality confined to mode prescribed in the charter or
statute 1053
1033. The same subject continued 1054
1034. Abatement of structures endangering public safety , . 1055
1035. Person charged with maintaining a nuisance entitled to
notice or hearing 1055
1036. Construction of statutes requiring notice to owners to re-
move nuisances 1056
1037. Proceedings in equity for abatement of nuisances — New
Jersey decisions 1057
1038. The same subject continued — Minnesota decisions . . 1058
1039. The same subject continued — The rule in other States . 1059
CHAPTER XXVIL
PCBLIO IMFBOVEMBNTS.
1040. Public improvements generally
1041. Passage of ordinance . . .
1043. When power to be strictly construed
1043. Petition for improvements
1044. The same subject continued .
1045. Determination of sufficiency of petition
1046. The same subject continued
1047. Rule of strict construction illustrated
1048. Authority to assess for cost not exclusive .
1049. Cost of new sidewalk required by change of grade
1050. Conclusiveness of determination of council
1051. Including several streets in one improvement .
1053. Notice of proposed improvements . . .
1053. Ordinances for improvements ....
1054. What must be specified in an ordinance . .
1055. Formality and irregularity in proceedings .
1056. . Changing plan of improvement . °. .
1057. Railroad bridges across a street not a local improvement
1058. Rule as to repaving, etc., in Pennsylvania .
1050. Opening and widening streets ....
1060. Reconstruction of streets and sidewalks — Second
ment
1061. Paving streets , .
1063. Paving and repairing distinguished . . .
1063. Repairs of streets, etc. . . . . ,
1064. Lawful improvements .....
Page
1063
1064
1064
1065
1066
1067
1068
1068
1069
1070
1070
1071
1073
1073
1073
1075
1075
1076
1076
1077
1077
1078
1079
1080
1080
XXXIV TABLE OF CONTKHTS — VOLTJlIBi 11.
■> fage.
§ 1065. Curative legislation • • 1081
1066. Supervisors of a county ordering improvements in a town 1081
1067. Sidewalks 1082
1068. Contracts in restraint of right to control or improve streets 1083
1069. Discretion of municipal authorities 1083
1070. The same subject continued 1084
1071. Streets with railways intersecting them .... 1084
1072. Local assessments 1C85
1073. Special taxation in Illinois 1086
1074. Constitutionality of assessments for sidewalks . . . 1087
1075. Fee in land condemned la part of the cost of an improve-
ment .......... 108S
1076. Highways 1088
1077. Opening highways 1089
1078. Repairing highways 1090
1079. Bridges • . 1090
1080. Construction of bridges 1091
1081. Agents of counties in the construction of bridges in New
York 1092
1082. Sewers 1093
1083. Construction of sewers ....... 1093
1084. The same subject continued 1094
1085. Contracts for construction of sewers . .... 1094
1086. Power as to drains and sewers discretionary ... 1095
1087. Local assessments for drains and sewers .... 1096
1088. Drainage continued 1097
1089. Liability of the corporation 1098
1090. The same subject continued 1098
1091. The same subject continued — Rights in percolating water 1099
1092. Massachusetts decisions as to assessment for sewers . . 1100
1093. Use of street for private drain 1101
1094. Improvements by street-railway companies ... 1101
1095. The same subject continued 1102
1096. Street-railway company bound to repair .... 1103
1097. The same subject continued 1103
1098. Contracts — Construction of, etc 1105
1099. Decisions on particular contracts 1106
,1100. The same subject continued — Lowest bidder, etc. . . 1107
1 101. The same subject continued — Advertisement for bids, etc. 1107
1103. Conditions precedent to recovery by contractor, etc. . . 1109
1103. Indiana decisions as to letting contracts .... 1111
1104. The same subject continued ...... 1112
1105. Assignment of contract 1112
1106. The same subject continued ...... 1113
1107. Assignment and. subletting continued .... 1114
1108. Effect of assignment of a contract ..... 1115
1109. When a contract is complete 1116
1110. Letting contract after returning bids .... 1116
TABLE OP CONTENTS VOLUME II.
XXXV
1111. Reletting contract
1113. Discretion of municipal authorities .
1113. Power to reject a contract
1114. Repaying — Pennsylvania rule illustrated .
1115. Title to street essential to jurisdiction
1116. Opening and improving streets in one proceeding
1117. Description of work in resolution
1118. Conclusiveness of assessor's action .
1119. Assessments for paving streets and constructing sidewalks
1120. When cost of repairing cannot be charged to abutters
1121. Power of assessment illustrated and limited . .
1135. The same subject continued
1123. Assessments for benefits and damages ...
1134. Notice for bids • ^
1125. Collateral attack of assessments ....
1126. Decisions as to property benefited ....
1127. Liabilities and rights of abutters ....
1128. Damages for change of grade
1139. Action by abutter to enjoin completion of a contract
1130. Actions to vacate assessments
1131. Actions to restrain collection of assessments
1133. The same subject continued . . . -' .
1133. Actions to recover money paid upon illegal assessments
1134. Power to assess abutting owners ....
1185. The same subject continued
1136. The same subject continued — Homestead subject to sale
1137. Instances of tax-bills adjudged invalid . . .
1138. Liability of the corporation for negligence . .
1139. The same subject continued
1140. Damages for improper construction ....
1141. The same subject continued — Constitutional provisions
1142. The same subject continued — Defective streets
1143. Unauthorized modification of contracts .
1144. Rights of abutters
1145. Rights and remedies of abutters .
1146. The same subject continued
1147. Interest of abutters in streets . . .
1148. Liability of corporation for consequential injuries
1149. The same subject continued
1150. Flowage of surface water from streets
1151. The same subject continued
1153. Flowage of water by construction of a levee
1153. Damages for change of grade .
1154. The same subject continued
1155. The same subject continued — ^^Connecticut rule
1156. The same subject continued — "Damage" clause in coH'
stitutions
1157. The same subject continued — Measure of damages
Page,
1117
1118
1119
1130
1120
1130
1121
1133
1123
1123
W24
1134
1135
1125
1136
1137
1128
1129
1139
1131
1133
1133
1133
1134
1134
1135
1136
1136
1137
1138
1189
1140
1140
1141
1142
1143
1143
1144
1143
1146
1146
1147
1148
1149
1150
1151
1151
xxxvi
TABLB 07 OONTBNTS — VOLUMB IL
1158. Damages by change of grade further considered
1159. The same subject continued — Common-la'w actions
1160. Bight to damages in Pennsylvania .
1161. Estoppel of land-owner . . .
1163. Estoppel further considered . .
1163. Actions by abutters — Pleading, etc.
1164 Questions for the jury
Page.
1153
1153
1153
1154
1154
1155
1156
CHAPTER XXVIIL
LOCAI. ASSESSMENTS.
1165. Theory supporting local assessments .
1166. Express legislative authority requisite .
1 167. Tiie same subject continued — Illustrations
1168.' A continuing power
1169. What constitutes a local improvement .
1170. Purposes for assessment illustrated . .
1171. The same subject continued
1173. Assessable property — Statutory exemptions
1173. Statutory exemptions continued
1174. Assessments against railroad companies .
1173. Assessment districts .....
1176. The same subject continued
1177. Prescribed formalities must be strictly followed
1178. The same subject continued
1179. Ordinance or resolution
1180. Petition . . .
1181. The same subject continued
1183. Description of improvement
1183. Delegation of matters of detail
1184. Necessity of prescribed rule of apportionment
1185. Notice — Stewart i;. Palmer
1186. The same subject continued — ITlman v. Mayor &o. .
1187. The same subject continued — Avery v. City of Keokuk
1188. Notice at some stage of proceedings ....
1189. Personal liability of land-owner ....
1190. Becovery of money paid on illegal assessments .
1191. The same subject continued
1193. The same subject continued — Coercion in law .
1193. Apportionment by superficial area ....
1194. , Apportionment by value — Bnle in Arkansas and Tennessee
1195. The frontage rule
1196. Assessments exceeding value of property ■ .
1197. Assessments according to benefit . . .
1198. Bule in sewer assessments ....
1199. Contractor's default no defense to the lot-owner
1300. Injunction against illegal assessments .
1201. The same subject continued ....
Page
1158
1160
1161
1161
1161
1163
1163
1165
1165
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1173
1173
1174
1175
1176
1176
1177
1178
1179
1180
1181
1183
1183
1184
1185
1185
1186
1187
1187
1188
1188
1189
1190
TABLB OF OOMTENTS — VOLUME 11. XXXVll
V
CHAPTER XXIX.
CONTROIi OF STREETS AND WHAETES. _
- " Page.
1208. Power to vacate streets 1191
1303. Restraining the vacation of a street 1193
1304. Discontinuance of ways 1193
1305. Discretion in improving unused streets .... 1194
1206. Damages for closing a street — Massachusetts decisions ' - 1194
1307. Use of streets for private purposes 1195
1308. Powers not to be surrendered 1196
1309. Liability for defective streets 1196
1310. The same subject continued 1197-
1311. The same subject continued — Defective sidewalks . . 1198
1313. Right of corporation to indemnity for damage paid . . 1199
1313. The same subject continued 1300
1314. Proper evidence in actions for injuries .... 1301
1315. Power of park board over streets ..... 1303
1316. Extent of control of streets 1303
1817. Grant of use of streets to railway companies . . . 1203
1818. The same subject continued 1204
1319. Use of streets by railroad companies .... 1305
1830. Extension of track in streets 1306
1231. Power over streets used by railways . • • . 1807
1333. The same subject continued ...... 1808
1833. Regulating speed of cars 1809
1334. The same subject continued ....... 1310
1385. Regulating trains at crossings ...... 1310
1336. Use of snow-plows regulated 1311
1337. Measureof damages in appropriating a railroad right of way 1313
1838. Danger signals 1813
1339. Contract rights in streets 1813
1330. When obstructions allowable 1314
1331. The same subject continued 1315
1333. Right to build a railroad in street — Particular charter pro-
vision .......... 1816
1333. Hay scales in streets 1317
1834. Removal of shade trees . 1317
1835. Summary removal of obstructions ..... 1818
1336. The same subject continued ...... 1319
1337. Awnings 1819
1338. Poles for electric wires < . 1320
1839. The same subject continued ...... 1881
1840. Liability growing out of obstructions .... 1338
1341. Injunction against encroachments 1333
1343. Stock running at large 1383
1843. Music in the streets — Salvation army parades . . . 1384
1344. The same subject continued ....*. 1384
1345. Control of wharves 1835
1346. Restraint of certain uses of wharves .... 1836
1247. Limit of liability growing out of control of docks . . 1336
ZXXVUl TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLTIMB II.
CHAPTEE XXX.
POLICE POWERS.
I Page.
§ 1248, Nature of the police power ...... 1328
1349. Exercise of police powers by municipal corporations . 1239
1250. Bequiring abutting owners to remove snow from side-
walks . ^ . 1330
1351. The same subject continued ...... 1331
1253. Power to license occupations ...... 1331
1353. The same subject continued ...... 1233
1354. The license ordinance ....... 1233
12.^5. License fees 1234
1356. Hawkers and peddlers 1234
1257. The same subject continued — Discrimination against non-
residents 1335
1358. Reasonableness of license fees for hawkers and peddlers . 1236
1259. Hackmen, draymen, etc 1236
1260. Auctioneers 1338
1361. The same subject continued 1388
1362. Unreasonable license fees for auctioneers .... 1339
1263. License of book canvassers — Interstate commerce . . 1340
1364. Intoxicating liquors 1340
1265. The same subject continued 1341
1366. Hackmen and hotel runners 1343
1267. Regulation of markets 1243
1368. The same subject continued ...... 1343
1269. Ordinances enforcing observance of Sabbath . . . 1344
1370. Regulating weight of bread 1345
1271. Building permits 1245
1273. Wooden buildings and fire limits 1246
1373. Prohibiting carrying concealed weapons .... 1347
1374. Policy shops 1347
1375. Disorderly houses 1348
1376. Distribution of hand-bills 1249
1377. Ordaining offenses — Criminal intent .... 1349
CHAPTER XXXL
JIUNICIPAL COURTS AND RECORDS.
(a) MuHicaPAL Codbtb. Page.
§ 1278. Introductory 1251
1379. The same subject continued — Scope of subject . . 1353
1280. Creation — Abolition — Increase of power . ... 1253
1381. The same subject continued 1254
1283. Jurisdiction — Criminal, civil and special . ... 1354
1883. • The same subject continued ...... 1255
1284. Summary powers 1256
1285. The same subject continued 1257
1286. The same subject continued — Felonies and misdemeanors 1358
1287. Jurisdictional limitation . ^ 1259
TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLITME 11.
XXXIX
1388,
lt!89.
1390.
1391.
1393.
1393.
1394,
1293.
1396.
1297.
1398.
1399.
1300.
1301.
1303,
1303.
1304.
1305.
1306.
1307.
1308.
1309.
1310.
1311.
1313.
1313.
1314.
1315.
1316.
1317.
1318.
1319.
1330.
1331.
1332.
1333.
1334,
The same subject continued — Constitutional limitations ,
Qaalifioations of oflScers — Judges and jurors . . .
Appeals
Method of procedure ........
The same subject continued ....*•
(&) MUKIOIFAL BECORDS.
Recording of ordinances .......
Evidential character — Originals
The same subject continued — Copies ....
Proof of records — By originals
The same subject continued — By certified copies . .
Parol evidence .
The same subject continued . . . . .
Amendments
The same subject continued ......
Right of abstract makers to take transcript of public rec-
ords
The same subject continued
Remedial rights • .
CHAPTER XXXIL
FIBEMKN AND FOLICEIIEN.
Organization of flre department , . .
Liability of corporation for removal of fii-eman
Certiorari to review dismissal of fireman .
Policemen unlsnovrn to the common law . .
Qualification of officers — Non-partisan boaras .
Police fund — Legislative control of ,
Suspension pending trial on charges of misconduct
The tribunal to hear charges ....
The bearing
Counsel and witnesses .....
Examining the accused as a witness ...
Neglect and absence from duty ...
Violating regulations .....
Evidence of intoxication
Conduct unbecoming an officer . .~ .
The same subject continued ....
Severity of punishment .....
Review of proceedings by certiorari . . .
Recovery of salary after restoration upon certiorari
City marshals
Page.
1360
1261
1268
1263
1364
1265
1266
1267
1268
1368
1369
1270
1371
1373
1373
1273
1274
1270
1277
1377
1278 '
1271
1279
1280
1281
1283
1283
1384
1385
1286
1287
1289
1290
1290
1391
1293
1393
CHAPTER XXXIIL
WATER AND LIGHTS.
§ 1385. Power of municipality as to water supply
1336, Contracts for water supply . . .
1337. Limitations upon power to contract . .
1394
1395
1296
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II.
1S28. Contracts further illustrated
1329. The same subject continued — Monopolies
1880. Construction of contracts . . .
1331. The same subject continued . .
1833. No ezcluBive right ....
1883. Bent of hydrants ....
1884. Water-works companies under Kew Jersey Btatutes
1335. Infringement of riparian rights .
1886. The right to waters of a stream .
1337. Connecting pipes . . . * .
1388, Liability of water-works companies .
1339. The same subject continued . .
1340. Water-rates' .....
1841. The same subject continued . .
1343. Collection of water-rents .
1343. Power of municipality to contract for lights
1344. The same subject continued
1845. Authorized contracts illustrated .
1846. Unauthorized contracts . . .
1847. Contract for gas lighting construed .
1848. The same subject continued
1349. Construction of statutory and charter proTisions
1350. The same subject continued ....
B»ge.
1397
1398
1299
1300
1301
1301
1303
1803
1304
1306
1307
1307
1308
1809
1310
1311
1813
1813
1314
1314
1815
1816
1316
CHAPTER XXXIV.
FUBUO EDUCATION.
1351. Introductory
1353. Constitutional provisions and State statutes
1353. Legal status of school system .
1354. State board and superintendent of education
1855. County superintendents ....
1856. Change of boundaries of school districts .
1357. Presumption of legal organization of district
1358. District school boards ....
1359. Meetings of district school boards
1360. Prescribing test-books — Bescission of resolution
1361. Power of board of school trustees to contract
1363. Power to require parents to sign and return teacher's re-
port
1363, Fiduciary capacity ....
1364. Limitation of powers . . .
1865. Personal liability of directors
1366. Meetings of district electors — Elections
1B67. . Term of school oflicer — Holding over
1868. School fund
1369. The same subject continued — Mandamus to State comp-
troller
Boge.
1818
1319
1320
1331
1331
1323
1324
1325
1327
1827
1329
1331
1333
1333
1883
1334
1337
1337
1338
TABLE OF CONTENTS — TOLUMB U. xU
li " ■ ~ Page.
§ 1S70. School taxes 1339
1871. School lands 1340
1378. School bonds 1341
1873, Schoolteacher — Appointment — Contract — EemoTal . 1343
1374. Pupils 1343
1S7S. Race question in schools 1344
1376. Bible in schools 1345
1377. Actions and defenses 1346
CHAPTER XXXV.
TAXATION.
PftSe.
§1378. Distinction between "tax ''and "assessment" . . . 1349
1379. Situs of taxable property 1349
1380. The same subject continued 1350
1381. The same subject continued — Shares of stock . . . 1351
1383. The same subject continued — Credits and choses in ac-
tion— Insurance premiums 1352
1383. The same subject continued — Vessels and ferry-boats . 1353
18S4. Subjects of taxation 1353
1385. The same subject continued 1354
1386. License fees and taxes on business 1355
1387. The same subject continued 1356
1388. The saDie subject continued — The power strictly con-
strued . 1357
1389. Local taxation of transportation companies ... 1358
1390. Banks 1358
1391. The same subject continued ...... 1359
1393. Miscellaneous property — Water companies ... 1360
1398. Gas companies 1360
1394. Miscellaneous corporations 1361
1395. Apportionment by benefits 1863
1396. Agricultural lands 1363
1397. The same subject continued 1364
1393. The same subject continued — New Jersey and "Wisconsin
decisions 1364
1399. Taxation after changing'the corporate limits . . . 1865
1400. The same subject continued 1366
1401. The same subject continued — Kentucky and Iowa de-
cisions 1366
1403. Effect of change of corporate limits 1367
1403. The same subject continued 1868
1404. Equality and uniformity 1368
1405. The same subject continued 1869
1406. The same subject continued — Limitation of the rule . 1870
1407. Taxation to pay debts 1371
1408. The same subject continued 1371
1409. The same subject continued — Implied duties . . . 1373
Xlii TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME H.
Page.
§ 1410. Implied duties further considered 13'''3
1411. Limitation of State control 13'''3
1413. The same subject continued — Rules of construction . 1373
1413. Other limitations of taxing power 1374
1414. The same subject continued ...... 1374
1415. Effect of annulling the municipal charter ... 1375
1416. Mandamus 1376
1417. The same subject continued 1376
1418. The same subject continued — Implied obligation to levy
tax . . . • ^ 13''"''
1419. Mandamus after judgment 1378
1420. Proceedings in equity 1379
1421. When mandamjis is Improper 1379
1433. Execution 1380
1433. Legislative control 1381
1434. Taxing powers . • 1383
1435. The same subject continued — Express authority . . 1383
1426. Grant of power strictly construed . . . . • 1383
1437. The same subject continued 1384
1428. Implied powers 1384
1429. Charter limitations 1385
1430. The same subject continued ...... 1386
1431. Taxation to aid private enterprises 1386
1483. The same subject continued ...... 1387
1433. Discrimination against non-residents . .... 1387
1434. State control 1388
1435. The same subject continued .....; 1389
1436. Execution of charter powers 1389
1437. Voting the tax '.".". . 1390
1438. The same subject continued ...... 1391
1489. Assessment and collection further considered . . . 1891
1440. Purposes for which the tax may be levied ... 1393
1441. Local taxes for schools 1394
1443. Lien of taxes 1895
1443. Exemptions 1395
1444. Tlie same subject continued — Corporations . . . 1396
1445. Exemptions further considered — Whiting V, West Point 1397
14'J6. Remedies 1899
1447. The same subject continued '. . • • . . 1400
CHAPTER VXXVIt
EIGHWAYS.
Fttge.
§ 1448. Highway defined — Different kinds 1403
1449. Modes of creating highways ...... 1404
1450. Dedication of highway — Nature and requisites . . 1405
1451. Dedication continued — EvideiLce and presumptions . 1407
1453. Footways — Dedication, etc 1408
TABLE OF CONTENTS ^- VOLUME II.
xliii
1463. Conditional or qualified dedication — Revocation
1454. Acceptance of highway — Nature of
1455. Dedication by States, by cities .
1456. The subject of dedication continued .
1457. Immemorial public user of highways
1458. Acquiring streets by prescription
1459. The same subject continued — Prescription in various
States
1460. Appropriating land for highway — Damages .
1461. Laying out highway — Compliance with statute
1462. The same subject continued
1463. Laying out — Property exempt from . . .
1464. Laying out — Private owner's rights
1465. Proceedings^^to establish highways — Parties — Notice
1466. Laying out — Petition — Jurisdictional facts .
1467. The same subject continued — Objections to petition
1468. Abandonment of highway by non-user
1469. Discontinuing or vacating highways . .
1470. Bridges — Part of highway, etc. ....
1471. Bridges over navigable rivers and waters .
1473. Bridges between States — Between counties
1473. County bridges
1474. County commissioners' discretion as to erection of bridges
1475. City bridges > .
1476. Bridges in towns and townships and boroughs .
1477. Contribution to cost of bridges
1478. County liability for neglecting to repair bridges
1479. General duty to repair bridges
1480. Latent defects — Duty to inspect bridges .
1481. Rule as to heavy loads on bridges ....
1483. Abutting owners' rights and easements .
1483. The same subject continued
1484. Liability for defective construction ....
1485. Defective highway plan — Liability for .
1486. The same subject continued
1487. Duty to keep streets reasonably safe ....
1488. Highway duty of New York towns and villages
1489. Excuse of want of funds
1490. Primary municipal duty — Abutting owners' liability
1491. Municipal and abutting owners' statutory liability .
1492. Limited liability for acts, etc., of independent contractors
1493. Municipal duty of supervision over others
1494. General municipal liability for neglect of streets
1495. Municipal liability in Michigan ....
1496. The same subject continued — The rule in other States
1497. Exceptions to the general rule
1498. Duty of keeping streets safe to whom due
1499. Liability for ways which public is invited to use
1500. Not liable for whole width of rural highways .
1)
1408
1409
1409
1410
1412
1413
1414
1415
1413
1416
1417
1417
1418
1419
1420
1420
1421
1422
1423
1424
1425
1436
1426
1428
1429
1430
1430
1431
1431
1433
1433
1434
1435
143^
1438
1439
1439
1440
1441
1443
1445
1445
1446
1447
1448
1448
1449
145e
XliT
TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUME 11.
§ 1501. Municipal recourse against third persons .
1503. Transfer of liability
1503. Liability when defects concur with other causes
1504. Plaintiif's concurring act in cases of danger and exigency
1505. Limited liability in grading streets .
1506. Liability in respect of latent defects .
1507. Municipal liability as to snow and ice
1508. The same subject continued
1509. The same subject continued — Notice
1510. Liability for obstructions . .* .
1511. The same subject continued — Obstructions for private
convenience
1518. Liability for structures over the street . .
1513. Municipal liability for fright of horses
1514. Duty to light streets — To light excavations, etc.
1515. Crossings — Duty to keep safe
1516. Sidewalk openings and excavations — Coal holes .
1517. Duty as to railings and barriers ....
1518. Founderous highway — Deviation from .
1519. When notice of defect may be imputed to municipality
1530. When notice should not be imputed ....
1521. Notice when a question for the jury ....
1523. Notice from similar accidents
1523. When notice is not necessary .....
1534. Notice to o£5cers, etc
1535. , Notice of injury . . ,
1526. The same subject continued — Beqnisites of notice .
1537. The same subject continued — Illustrations of sufiScient
notice
1538. Pleading of notice — Evidence of .
1529. Preliminary presentment of claim . .
1530. Evidence of specific defect
1531. Subsequent repairs as evidence
1532. Evidence of contributory negligence
1333. Instructions to jury — May supplement each other
1584. Correct instructions as to negligence illustrated
1335. . Interest on damages for injuries
1536. . Contributory negligence -^Knowledge of danger
1537. . Negligence in the priesence of danger — Lawful obstruc-
tions "...
1538. The same subject continued
1339. . Duty to look and listen
1540. Pedestrians' duty to use d-ossings and sidewalks
1341. The same subject continued — Care required at night
1543. Infirm persons — Duty of caution ....
1543. Intoxication as contributory negligence .
1544. Violation of ordinance, etc., as contributory negligence
1545. Travelers' haste
1546. Pleading and proof as to contributory negligence
Page.
1451
1453
1453
1455
1456
1457
1458
1460
1461
1463
1463
1465
1466
1468
1469
1469
1471
1473
1473
1474
1473
1476
1478
1479
1480
1481
1483
1483
1485
1485
1486
1487
1488
1489
1490
1491
1493
1494
1496
1497
1499
1500
1501
1503
1503
1504
TABLE OP CONTENTS — VOLUME II.
xlv
CHAPTER XXXVII.
MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO,
(a) M.iin)A)rD8.
1547. Mandamus to compel restoration of members — To call
election
1548. Refusal to grant mandamus illustrated — Issuance discre
tionar^
1549. Denial of writ further illustrated
1550. The same subject continued
1551.- The same subject continued — Reinstatement of o£Scer —
Canvass of election
1553, Premature application — Laches
1553. Control of official discretion
1554. The same subject continued
1555. The same subject continued — Board of assessment
1556. The same subject continued — Improvement of highways
1557. The same subject continued — Rebuilding a bridge
1558. Petition for mandamus
1559. Relator's right
1560. The same subject continued ....
1561. Particular instances illustrating use of mandamus
1563. The same subject continued ....
1563. Private parties as relators
1564. The same subject continued ....
1565. Acts in excess of officer's powers
1566. Michigan decisions — Control of official discretion
1567. Restoration to office
1568. To compel performance of judicial functions .
1569. The same subject continued ....
1570. To compel payment of judgment
1571. The same subject continued — Compelling audit of claims
1573. Audit of claims continued ....
1573. Payment of claims and warrants
1574. To compel public boards to reverse their decisions
1575. To compel subordinate officer to recognize board
1576. Removal of obstructions in streets .
1577. The same subject continued ....
1578. The same subject continued — Control of discretion
1579. Discretion to remove obstructions further considered
1580. To appoint school trustees
1581. Apportionment, etc., of school moneys
1583. To restore school funds
1588. To compel signing of teachers' warrants
1584. To dissolve an injunction against a city
1585. To compel approval of official bond ,
1586. Approval of bonds continued , .
1587. To restore removed officials . .
1588. To compel execution of tax deed .
Pago.
1507
1508
1509
1510
1510
1511
1513
1513
1514
1514
1615
1516
1517
1517
1518
1519
1520
1531
1521
1533
1533
1523
1534
1535
1535
1526
1527
1538
1528
1539
1530
1531
1533
1533
1533
1534
1534
1535
1536
1536
1537
1538
xItL
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOUJME II.
— To
Page.
1539
1539
1540
1541
1543
1543
1543
1544
1545
1546
1546
1547
1548
1549
1549
1550
1551
1551
1553
1553
1554
§ 1589. To compel approval of contract ,
1590. To a county treasurer to refund taxes
1591. Abatement of public nuisance — Canvass of election
police commissioners to enforce law
1593. Obstructions in streets — Contract for improvement
1593. For payment of claim
1594. The same subject continued ....
1595. Title to oflSce and custody of records
1596. License to sell liquors . . . . ■
1597. The same subject continued — Hearing of complaint
1598. By tax-payer to compel investment of funds
1599. To levy tax to pay a judgment — Previous demand
1600. The same subject continued
1601. Peremptory or alternative
1603. Practice — Parties
1603. Parties further considered
1604. The same subject continued
1605. Pleading ....
1606. ' To compel payment of claims
1607. Enforcement of public duties
1608. To obtain possession of office
1609. InSprovement of highways
C6) Quo 'W.iBXANTO.
1610. Scope of proceeding — Title to office — Policeman
1611. Validity of incorporation — Evidence
1613. Against municipal officers under void organization
1613. Usurpation of franchise by a city — Parties
1614. Common council as judge of election
1615. Mandamus and quo warranto distinguished
1616. Florida decisions on quo warranto — Council as judges of
election
1617. Practice in Massachusetts — Contest of election
1618. Qiio warranto against municipal corporation ,
'1619. Jurisdiction of court
1620. Election contests — Rules in Colorado . ,
1631. Title to office — Practice in Michigan . ,
CHAPTER XXXVin.
tax-payers' actions.
' ~- Page.
§ 1623. Introductory 1564
1623. The same subject continued 1565
1634. Remedies for illegal taxation — In general , , . 1566
1625. Injunctions against taxation 1567
1626. The same subject continued — Requisites for injunction . 1568
1627. Requisites for injunction continued 1570
1628. No injunction against irregular taxes .... 1571
1639. Void taxes 1573
1554
1555
1555
1556
1557
1557
1558
1559
1560
1561
1563
1563
TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUME 11. Xlvii
•**-"? '. Page.
§ 1630. Injunctions against municipal taxation .... 1573
1631. Taxes on personal property 1573
1633. Taxes on real property 1574
1633. Certiorari 1574
16 i4. The same subject continued 1575
1635. When certiorari does not lie — Effect of issuance . . 1578
1636. Becoveries by tax-payers of taxes paid .... 1576
1637. The same subject continued 1577
1638. Actions against officers • . . 1578
1639. The same subject continued 1579
1640. Misappropriations 1579
1641. The same subject continued — Remedies .... 1580
1643. Injunction further illustrated 1581
1643. The same subject continued 1583
CHAPTER XXXIX.
ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST PUBLIC CORPORATIONS.
Page.
§ 1644. Capacity to sue and be sued — Whether a county is subject
to suit 1584
1645. The same subject continued ...... 1587
1646. Service of process 1588
1647. Corporate name in suits 1589
1648. Authority to bind town by appearance .... 1590
1649. Pleading in suits upon bonds 1591
1650. The same subject continued ...... 1593
1651. Bill of interpleader by public officer 1593
1653. Writofprohibitioninbehalf of a town — Office of the writ 1593
1653. Execution against municipal corporations . . . 1595
1654. Garnishment of municipal corporations .... 1595
1655. The same subject continued 1596
1656. Presentation of claims — Charter provisions construed . 1697
1657. Action by contractor — Remedy by tax-|;>ill when not ex-
clusive ... 1598
1658. Corporate liability to qui tarn action for penalties . . 160O
1659. Statutory liability for injuries to sheep by dogs — Filing of
statement . . . . ' . . . . . 1600
1660. The same subject continued — Connecticut decisions . 1603
1661. The same subject continued — Massachusetts decisions . 1603
1663, Liability for acts of officers in killing dogs running at
large 1604
TABLE OF CASES.
Crhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-78S; Vol. n, pp. 78!>-1605.]
Aaron v. Broiles (64 Tex, 316), 1039.
Abbett V. Johnson County (114 Ind.
61). 9. 1014.
Abbey v. Billups (35 Miss. 618). 261.
Abbott V. Board (114 Ind. 61). 1436.
Abbott V. Mills (3 Vt. 531). 1406.
Abbott V. Town of North Andover
(145 Mass. 484; 44 N. E. Rep.
754), 916.
Abell I'. Prairie Civil Tp. &c. (Ind..
31 N. E. Rep. 477), 1601.
Abendroth v. Manhattan R. Co. (133
N. Y. 1). 1433.
Aberdeen v. Blackmar (6 Hill, 334).
1453.
Abernathy v. Phifer (84 N. C. 711),
891.
Abington v. North Bridgewater (33
Pick. 177). 976.
Achley's Case (4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.)
35), 288.
Ackerman v. HuBF (71 Tex. 317), 692.
Ackley v. Town of Vilas (Wis., 48
N. W. Rep. 257), 457.
Acklev School District ti. Hall (113
U. S. 139), 957.
Adams v. Carlisle '(18 S. C. 243), 337.
Adams v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (39
Minn. 286; 39 N. W. Rep. 629),
1144, 1433.
Adams v. Chicopee (147 Mass. 440),
1437. 1460, 1475.
Adams v. Crowell (40 Vt. 31). 372.
Adams v. Fisher (63 Tex. 654; 75
Tex. 657; 6 S. W. Rep. 772), 1135.
Adams v. Hyde (27 Vt. 221). 139).
Adams v. Mack (8 N. H. 493), 1266.
Adams v. Natick (18 Allen, 429),
1473.
Adams v. Ohio Falls Car Co. (Ind..
31 N. E. Rep. 57 », 58.5. 5S6. 1195.
Adams v. Oshkosh (71 Wis. 493; 36
N. W. Rep. 614). 784, 1463. 1479.
Adams v. Paiae (7 Pick. 542). 209.
Adams v. Pratt (109 Mmss. .^9), 372.
Adams V. Railroad Co. (U Barb. 453;
10 N. Y. 328), 1333, 1413.
Adams v. Richardson (38 N. H. 306),
218.
Adams v. Richardson (43 N. H. 212),
339.
Adams v. Rome (59 Ga. 765). 937.
Adams v. Saratoga (11 Barb. 414),
1143.
Adams v. Somerville (3 Head, 363),
1357, 1370.
Adams V. Stanyan (24 N. H. 405),
352, 374.
Adams v. State (N. H., 18 Atl. Rep.
321). 1335.
Adams v. State of Illinois (83 111.
133). 823, 1333.
Adams i'. Tator (43 Hun, 384), 200.
Adams v. Thomas (Ky., IS S. W.
Rep. 940). 1343.
Adams v. Wiscasset Bank (1 Greenl.
(Mp. ) 3S I !, 8, 1 50, 1 54, 1 56. 365. 746.
Adams v. Wiscasset Bank (1 Greenl.
(Me.>264), 915.
Adams Bank v. Anthony (18 Pick.
238). 323.
Adams County v. City of Quincy
(130 111. 566; 32 N. E. Rep. 624),
1073.
Addis V. Pittsburgh (85 Pa; St. 379).
259.
Addison v. Sauliner (19 Cal. 82).
1356.
Addison Smith, In re (52 N. Y. 536).
499.
Addy V. City of Janesville (70 Wis.
401; 35 N. W. Rep. 931), 1099.
Adkins v. Brewer (3 Cow. 203). 339.
Adley v. Reeves (2 Maule & Sel. 60).
530, 531, 534.
Adrian Water Works v. City of Ad-
rian (64 Mich. 584; 31 N. W.
Rep. 529). 1300.
Adsit V. Brady (4 Hill, 6 0; 38 Am.
Dee. 669; 40 Am. Dec. 305), 21'J.
320. 1440.
^tna Ins. Co. v. Mabbett (18 Wis.
6„7), 323.
JEitxiA Life Ins. Co. v. Lyon County
(44 Fed. Rep. 329), 838.
^tna Mills v. Waltham (126 Mass.
422), 692.
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1603.]
Agawam v. Hampden (130 Mass.
5-38). 1434.
Agawam Bank v. South Hadley (138
Mass. 503), 230. 234.
Agnew V. Brail (124 111. 312; 20 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 134), 197. 654,
657.
Agnew u, -Corunna City (55 Mich.
438), 776, 1467.
Agricultural Branch E. Co. v. Win-
chester (13 Allen, K2), 942.
Ahem v. Steele (115 N. Y. 203; 29
N. Y. St. Rep. 295), 1036.
Ah Kow V. Nunan (5 Saw. 552).
533.
Ah Lit, Ex parte (26 Fed. Rep. 513),
• 534.
Ahrens v. Fiedler (43 N. J. Law, 400),
905.
Ah Toy, In re (45 Fed. Rep. 795),
524.
Ah You, Ex parte (88 Cal. 99). 518.
Ah You. In re (83 Oal. 339), 1360,
1261.
Ah You, In re (Gal., 35 Pao. Rep.
«74), 1349.
Ah Yup, In re (5 Sawyer C. G. 155),
141. .
Aiken County v. Murry (S. C, 14 S.
E. fiep. 954), 868.
Aikman v. School Dist. (37 Kan. 129),
1335.
Aitcheson v. Huebner (Mich., 51 N.
W. Rep. 634). 1538.
Akron v. McCorabs (18 Ohio St. 229),
766.
Alabama R. Co. v. Kidd (39 Ala. 321),
4,7.
Alamango v. Albany County (25
Hun, 551). 761. ,
Albany v. Abbott (61 N. H. 157),
838.
Albany r. Gnnliff(3 N. Y. 165), 331,
253, 642.
Albany v. McNamara(117 N. Y. 168;
83 N. E. Rep. 931), 999.
Albany v. Savannah &c. R. Co. (71
Ga. 158), 1354.
Albany &c. Mining Co. v. Auditor-
General (37 Mich. 393), 1190,
1568.
Albany &c. R. Co. v. Brownell (34
N. Y. 345). 676.
Albany Gitv Nat. Bank v. Albany (93
N. Y. 363), 238, 257, 713.
Albany Street, Matter of (11 Wend.
149), 677.
Albee v. Ward (8 Mass. 79). 339.
Alberger i>. Mayor &c. of Baltimore
(64 Md. 1 ; 20 Atl. Rep. 988), 1118,
1179.
Alberts on v. Town of Cicero (129 111.
326), 1176.
Albrecht v. City of St. Paul (47
Minn. 531 ; 50 N. W. Rep. 608),
1137.
Albrittin v. Hnntaville (60 Ala. 486),
90, 265, 1474.
Albuquerque v. Zeiger (N. M., 37
Pac. Rep. 315). 1190.
Alcorn v. Hamer (38 Miss. 652), 67,
87, 1185.
Alcorn v. Philadelphia (113 Pa.. St.
494). 1163.
Alden v. Alameda County (48 Cal.
%70), 1377.
Alden v. City of Minneapolis (34
Minn. 254), 677, 1144, 1145.
Alden v. Rounsville (7 Met. 218),
1335.
Aldermen r. School Directors (91 111.
179;, 1558.
Alderson v. Comm'rs (West Va., 8 S.
E. Rep. 274), 389.
Alderton v. Binder (81 Mich. 133),
1530.
Aldrich«7.Collins(So. Dak., 52 N. W.
Rep. 854), 626, 6v;7.
Aldrich v. TuscumbiaR. Co. (2 Stew.
& P. (Ala.) 199; 23 Am. Dec.
.307), 682.
Aleppo School District's Appeal (96
Pa. St. 76), 1333.
Alexander v. Baltimore (5 Gill, 396),
1166.
Alexander v. Bennett (60 N. Y. 204).
1254.
Alexander v. Big Rapids (76 Mich.
282), 1437, 1469.
Alexander v. City of Vicksburg (68
Miss. 564; 10 So. Rep. 63), 754.
Alexander v. Greenville (54 Miss.
659), 1216.
Alexander v. Milwaukee (16 Wis.
248), 1146, 11^1.
Alexander v. Oneida County (76
Wis. 56; 45 N. W. Rep. 21), 917,
Alexander v. People (7 Colo. 155),
383, 555.
Alexander v. Town of Newcastle
(115 Ind. 51; 17 Atl. Rep. 20t)),
226.
Alexander Avenue, In re (N. Y., 31
N. E. Rep. 316, 17 N. Y. Supl.
93.3), 554.
Alexandria v. Fairfax (95 U. S. 774),
1588.
Alexandria & W. R. Co. v. Alexan-
dria & F. E. Co. (75 Va. 780),
681.
Alexandria Coal Co. v. Swann (5
How. 83), 658.
Alf ord V. Jones (Tex , 9 S. W. Rep.
470), 446.
Alger V. Curry (10 Vt. 437), 348, 367.
Alger V. Eaton (119 Mass. 77), 1578.
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Alger V. Lowell (3 Allen. 405), 1450,
1473, 1501.
Allaire v. Hartshorne f21 N. J. Law,
665), 957.
AUec V. Reece (39 Fed. Eep. 341 ; 40
Alb. L. J. 386). 817, 338.
Allegheny City i'. McClurkin (14 Pa.
St. 81), 836. 645.
Allegheny City's Appeal (41 Pa. St.
60). 1395.
Allegheny County v. Gibson (90 Pa.
St. 3S7), 757.
Allegheny County v. Van Campen
(3 Wend. 49), 310.
Allegheny County v. Watt (3 Pa. St.
462), 1011.
Allen V. Archer (49 Me. 846), 351,
1578.
Allen V. B. & O. R. Co. (114 U. S.
311), 1568.
Allen V. Burlington (45 Vt. 803), 346,
347. 369. 370, 831.
Allen V. Chippewa Falls (53 Wis. 430),
1146.
Allen V. Commonwealth (83 Va. 94),
819.
Allen V. Dallas &c. R. Co. (8 Woods
(C. C), 316), 965.
Allen V. Bist. Tp. (70 Iowa. 434),
1383.
Allen V. Drew (44 Vt. 174), 1164.
Allen V. Galveston (51 Tex. 802), 859,
1135, 1170.
-Allen V. Gray (11 Conn. 95), 539.
Allen V. Grew (44 Vt. 174), 1187.
Allen V. Hostetter (16 Ind. 15), 433.
Allen V. Intendant (89 Ala. 641 ; 8
So. Rep. 30), 813, 814.
Allen V. Jay (60 Me. 184), 559, 930,
1387.
Allen V. Jer§ey-City (53 N. J. Law,
528), 1433.
Allen V. Jones (47 Ind. 448). 681.
Allen V. Louisiana (103 U. S. 80),
93t:
Allen V. Metcalf (17 Pick. 208), 1334.
Allen V. People (84 III. 502), 131.
Allen V. St. Louis (13 Mo. 400). 1364.
Allen u State (61 Ind. 268; 88 Am.
Rep. 673). 330.
Allen V. Taunton (19 Pick. 488), 576,
827.
Allen V. Watts (88 Ala. 497; 7 So.
Rep. 190), 918.
Allen County v. Bacon (98 Ind. 81).
1484.
AUentown v. Henry (73 Pa. St. 404),
1160, 1164.
AUentown School Dist. v. Derr(115
Pa. St. 439), 9.i6.
Alley V. Adams County (76 111. 101),
939.
Alley V. Edgcomb (53 Me. 446). 1393.
AUine v. Le Mars City (71 Iowa,
654), 1498.
Allison V. Railway Co. (9 Bush,
247), 646.
Alna V. Clough (8 Me. 834), 835.
Altgelti'. City of Antonio (Tex., 17
S. W. Rep. 75), 1898, 1360.
Alton V. ..Etna Ins. Co. (82 111. 45),
1393.
Alton V. County of Madison (81 III.
115), 634.
Alton V. 111. Transp. Co. (12 III. 60),
6 4.
Alton V. Kirsch (68 111. 861), 539, 540.
Alton V. Mulledy (21 111. 76), 207,
260, 286. 485. 540.
Altoona v. Lotz (114 Pa. St. 830; 7
Atl. Rep. 240), 1492.
Alves' Ex'r v. Henderson (16 B. Mon.
131), 624.
Alvis V. Whitney (43 Ind. 83), 1368.
Alvord V. Syracuse (98 N. Y. 599),
961.
Amador County v. Kennedy, (70
Cal. 458; 11 Pac. Rep. 758), 600.
Ambrose v. State (6 Ind. 851), 604.
American Ins. Co. v. Stratton (59
Iowa, 696), 814.
American Print Works v. Lawrence
(81 N. J. Law, 248), 669, 1047.
American Rapid Tel. Co. v. Hess
(125 N. Y. 641), 1432.
American Union Exp. Co. v. St.
Joseph (66 l|Io. 675), 1369.
Amerv v. City of Keokuk (72 Iowa,
701). 1180, 1187.
Ames V. City and County of San
Francisco (76 Cal. 325; 18 Pac.
Rep. 397), 884, 890.
Ames V. Lake Superior &c. R. Co.
(81 Minn. 241), 694, 695.
Amesbury v. Bowditch &c. Ins. Co.
(6 Gray, 596), 584.
Amesbury &c. Co. v. Amesbury (17
Mass, 461), 1577.
Amev V. AUeghanv City (84 How.
3"64), 510, 1265, 1385.
Amherst v. Hollis (9 N. H. 107), 976.
Amherst v. Shelburne (11 Gray, 107),
994.
Amherst Bank v. Root (2 Met. 528),
323.
Amite City v. Clements (34 La. Ann.
87), 589.
Amos V. Fond du Lac (46 Wis. 695),
1448.
Amy V. Dubuque (98 U. S. 471), 9i8.
Amy V. Selma (77 Ala. 103), 485, 473.
473.
Amy V. Smith (1 Litt. 336), 144.
Amy V. Supervisors (11 Wall. 186).
319.
Anderson, In re (47 Hun, 803), 1105.
lii
TASLE or CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. !8^1605.]
Anderson v. Baker (98 Ind. 587), 1430.
Anderson v. Baker (33 Nev. 531), 376.
Anderson v. Caldwell (91 Ind. 451),
696.
Anderson v. City of May field (Ky.,
19 S. W. Kep. 598), 880.
Anderson V. City of Wellington (40
Kan. 173), 104, 105, 530, 602.
Anderson v. City of Wilmington
(Del., 19 Atl. Rep. 509); 1099.
Anderson v. Equitable Gas Light
Co. (13 Daly, 463), 573.
Anderson v. Kerns Drain Co. (14
Ind. 199), 687, 1024.
Anderson v. Meeker County (46
Minn. 337), 1433.'
Anderson v. Pemberton (89 Mo. 61),
1418.
Anderson v. Prairie School Tp. (Ind.,
37 N. E. Rep. 439), 1341.
Anderson v. Santa Anna (116 U. S.
856), 689.
Anderson v. Tuberville (6 Cold.
• (Teiln.) 150), 682.
Anderson City v. East (117 Ind. 136),
864, 7'! 5.
Anderson County v. Beal (113 U. S.
237), 356, 946, 961.
Anderson County v. Houston &c. R.
Co. (53 Tex. 2S8), 947. .
Anderton v. City of Milwaukee
(Wis., 53 N. W. Rep. 8(5 1, 557.
Andover v. Canton (13 Mass. 547),
976.
Andover v. Can- (55 N. H. 453), 1336.
Andover v. Grafton (7 N. H. 298),
838, 839.
Andress v. School Dist. (45 Minn. 88),
1336.
Andrews v. Boylston(110 Mass. 314),
857, 370, 372.
Andrews v. Durant (18 N. Y. 496),
1491.
Andrews «. Estes (11 Me. 267), 314.
Andrews v. Insurance Co. (37 Me.
356), 103, 488, 518.
Andrews v. King (77 Me. 324), 1282.
Andrews v. Portland (79 Me. 484 ;
10 Am. St. Rep. 284). 180, 210.
Andrews v. Pratt (44 Cal. 809), 184,
609.
Andrews v. School Dist. (37 Minn.
96; 33 N. W. Rep. 217), 627,
1380, 1333.
Andrews v. United States (2 Story
C. C. 203), 180.
Annapolis v. Jiarwood (33 Md. 471),
1160.
Anon. (Free. 474), 315.
Answer of Justices (122 Mass. 600),
1365.
Anthony v. Adams (1 Met. 284), 251,
636.
Anthony v. Jasper County (101 U. S.
698), 642, 946. 954.
Anthony v. State (29 Ala. 27), 543.
Anthony v. Williams (47 Ind. 565),
■ 1113.
Anwin v. Wolseley (1 Term E. 674),
213.
Apgar, V. Hayward (110 N. Y. 225),
237.
Appeal of Aleppo School Dist. (96
Pa. St. 7fi), 1323,
Anpeal of Alleghany City (41 Pa. St.
^60), 1395.
Appeal of Ayars (122 Pa. St. 226; 16
Atl. Rep. 356), 173.
Appeal of Borough of Chartiers (Pa.,
8 Atl. Rep. 181). 1149.
Appeal of Borough of Dunmore (53
Pa. St. 374), 1371, 1372.
Appeal of Borough of Hanover (Pa.,
24 Atl. Rep. 669), 583, 584.
Appeal of Brinton (142 Pa. St. 511 ;
21 All. Rep. 978), 410.
Appeal of Brumm (Pa., 12 Atl. Rep.
855); 1310.
Appeal of Burgess &c. of Darby (140
Pa. St. 250; 21 Atl. Rep. 394),
457.
Appeal of Butler (73 Pa. St. 448),
1238, 1353, 1856.
Appeal of Chaffee (56 Mich. 244),
681.
Appeal of City of Erie (91 Pa. St.
398), 832, 839.
Appeal of City of Philadelphia (78
Pa. St. 88), 1203.
Appeal of Commonwealth (Pa., 9
Atl. Rep. 524). 1192.
Appeal of Des Moines Water Co. (48
Iowa, 334), 572, 1360, 1361.
Appeal of Devore (56 Pa. St. 168),
1866.
Appeal of Durach (63 Pa. St. 491),
1354.
Appeal of Earley (103 Pa. St. 273),
231.
Appeal of Freeport Water-works Co.
(129 Pa. St. 605; 18 Atl. Rep.
560), 1301.
Appeal of Geist (104 Pa. St. 351),
1115.
Appeal of G'lchrist (109 Pa. St. 600),
1850.
Appeal of Gillespie (Pa., 24 AtL R^p.
626). 563.
Appeal of Grayson (140 Pa. St. 250;
21 Atl. Rep. 394), 457.
Appeal of Gross (18 Atl. Rep. 557),
69.
Appeal of Haupt (125 Pa. St. 211),
1304.
Appeal of Hewitt (88 Pa. St 55),
I 1081, 1365, 1367. <i
TABLE OF OASES.
liii
pche references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
Appeal of Holt (5 R. I. 603), 1336.
Appeal of Hougbtoa (42 Cal. 35),
706.
Appeal of Huntington &c. R. Coi
(Pa., 34 All. Rep. 189), 583.
Appeal of Lehigh Water Company
(103 Pa. St. 515), 1301.
Appeal of Luburg (Pa.. 17 Atl. Rep.
345; 28 W. N. C. 454). 1836.
Appeal of McGee (114 Pa. St. 470),
1192, 1195.
Appeal of North Beach &c. R, Co.
(33 Cal. 499), 1167, 1358.
Appeal of Orphan Asylum (HI Pa.
St. 135), 1S49.
Appeal of Philadelphia (86 Pa. St.
179), 1115.
Appeal of Piper (33 Cal. 580), 1188.
Appeal of Pittsburgh (Pa., 12 Atl.
Rep. 366), 1190.
Appeal of Pittsburgh (Pa., 16 Atl.
Rep. 92), 1354.
Appeal of Pittsburgh (188 Pa. St.
401 ; 21 Atl. Rep. 757), 174.
Appeal of Powers (39 Mich. 504),
1160, 1391.
Appeal of Reimer (100 Pa. St. 182),
. 1303.
Appeal of Singer (Borough of Wil-
kinsburg) (131 Pa. St. 365; 18
Atl. Rep. 931), 66.
Appeal of Tarbell (129 Pa. St. 146;
18 Atl. Rep. 758), 647.
Appeal of Truesdell (58 Pa. St. 148),
1891.
Appeal of Verona (108 Pa. St. 83),
510.
Appeal of Whelan (108 Pa. St. 162),
231.
Appeal of Wier (74 Pa. St. 230),
1053.
Appeal of Witner (Pa., 15 Atl. Rep.
428), 1332.
Apple V. Marion County Board (127
Ind. 553), 1430, 1431.
Appleby v. Mayor &o. of New York
(!5 How. (N. y.) Pr. 428), 308,
351, 253, 643.
Application for Widening &c. (4
Rob. (La.) 357), 697.
Application of Mayor &c. of New
York, In re (N. Y. Ct. App.
1892; N. Y. Law Jour., Oct. 27,
1892), 676, 687.
Arbegast v. Louisville (3 Bush (Ky.),
271), 1364. 1366.
Arberry v. Beavers (6 Tex. 467). 220.
Arbitration between Eldon and Fer-
guson Tps. (6 Upper Can. L. J.
270), 657.
Areata v. Areata &c. R. Co. (92 Cal.
639; 28 Pac. Rep. 676). 588.
Archer v. Hart (5 Fla. 234), 313.
Archer v. Noble (3 Greenl. 418), 333,
835.
Arev V. City of Newton (148 Mass.
598; 20" N. E. Rep. 837), 1502.
Argenii v. San Francisco (16 Cal.
255), 236, 237, 339, 259, 612, 626,
634, 645, 649.
Argentine v. State (Kan., 26 Pac.
Rep. 751), 1081.
Argo V. Barthand (80 Ind. 63), 1137.
Argus County v. Albany (55 N. Y.
495). 361.
Argus V. Village of Sturgis (Mich.,
48 N. W. Rep. 1085), 1493.
Arkadelphia v. Windham (49 Ark.
139 ; 18 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
347), 10, 769, 1448.
Arkadelphia Lumber Co. v. City of
Arkadelphia (Ark., 1892; 19 S.
W. Rep. 1053), 485.
Arkansas Smelting Co. v. Belden
Mining Co. (127 U. S. 379), 1114.
Arlington v. Merricks(3 Saund. 411),
339.
Arlington v. Pierce (122 Mass. 370), ■
363.
Armington v. Barnett (15 Vt. 745),
670.
Armstrong v. Athens County (10
Ohio, 235), 1166.
Armstrong v. Cit|v of Topeka (36
Kan. 433; 13 Pac. Rep. 843), 412.
Armstrong v. School Dist. (19 Mo.
App. 462), 1343.
Armstrong v. School Dist. (38 Mo.
App. 169). 1343.
Armstrong v. Tama County (34 Iowa,
309), 1001.
Armstrong v. Town of Ackley (71
Iowa, 76; 33 N. W. Rep.. 180),
1301, 1477, 1485. ^
Armstrong v. Truitt (53 Ark. 387), 895.
Armstrong County v. Brinton (47
Pa. St. 367). 935.
Arnold v. Blaker (L. R. 6 Q. B. 433),
1408.
Arnold v. Cambridge (106 Mass. 352).
1169.
Arnold v. Holbrook (L. R. 8 Q. B.
96; 28 L. T. (N. S.) 33), liOt^,
1473.
Arnold v. Hudson River Co. (."iS N.
Y. 661), 670, 673.
Arnold v. Mayor &c.. of Poole (4
Man. & G. 8.60), 261.
Arnold v. Styles (3 Blackf. (Ind.) 391),
433.
Arnold v. Village of Decatur (29
Mich. 77). 693.
Arnoultv. New Orleans (11 La. Ann.
54), 392.
Artz V. Chicago &c. R. Co. (34 Iowa,
153;, 654.
liv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. X, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
Asbell V. Mayor &c. of Brunswick
(80 Va. 503), 289, 1383.
Ash V. People (11 Mich. 347 ; 83 Am.
Dec. 740), 1244, 1356.
Ashberry v. Town of "West Seneca
(11 N. Y. Supl. 306), 1439.
Ashby V. White (2 Ld. Raym. 938 ;
6 Mod. 45; 1 Salk. 19), 318, 219,
232.
Aslier V. Texas (128 U. S. 129),- 1340.
Ashland v. Marlborough (106 Mass.
366), 980.
Ashley v. Port Huron (35 Mich. 296),
1144, 1147.
Ashley v. Town of Calliope (Iowa,
33 N. W. Rep. 458), 64.
Ash ton V. City of Rochester (14 N.
Y. Supl. 855), 306.
Ashton V. Newton (134 Mass. 507),
1451.
Ashuelot Nat. Bank v. School Dist.
(41 Fed. Rep. 514), 1341.
Ashuelot R. Co. v. Elliott (57 N. T.
397), 958.
Askew V. Hale County (54 Ala. 639 ;
25 Am. Rep. 730)) 8, 10, 15, 16,
450, 459, 744. .
Askin V. London (1 Upper Can. Q. B.
254), 180.
Askins v. Commonwealth (1 Duv.
(Ky.) 275). 478.
Aspinwallv. Daviess CountyComm'rs
(33 How. 364), 109, 620, 933, 944,
945, 1374.
Astor V. Hoyt (5 Wend. 603). 690.
Astor V. Miller (2 Paige, 68). 1419.
Astor V. New York (62 N. Y. 567),
296.
Atchison v. Bartholow (4 Kan. 134),
60, 61.
Atchison v. Butcher (3 Kan. 104),
933 941.
Atchison v. Challis(9 Kan. 603), 1436.
Atchison v. King (9 Kan. 550), 508,
1198.
Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Jefferson
County (17 Kan. 29), 941.
Atchison &c. R Co. v. Phillips Co.
(25 Kan. 261), 939.
Atchison &c. R. Co. i;. Wilhelm (38
Kan. 206), 1386.
Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Wilson (33
Kan. 333), 1394.
Atchison County v. Tomlinson (9
Kan. 167), 1010.
Atchison St. Ry. Co. v. Missouri
Pac. Ry. Co. (31 Kan. 660; 3 Pao.
Rep. 284), 1304.
Athearn v. Independent Dist. &c.
(33 Iowa, 105), 283.
Athens -v. Georgia R. (3o. (73 Ga.
800). 534.
Athens v. Long (54 Ga. 330), 1396.
Athol V. New Salem (7 Pick. 42),
981
Atkins *«. Phillips (Fla., 1891; 8 So.
Rep. 429), 496.
Atkins V. Randolph (31 Vt. 226), 1389.
Atkinson v. Bowman (43 How. 404),
31.
Atkinson v. Goodrich Transportation
Co. (60 Wis. 141), 518.
Atkinson v. Marietta &c. R. Co, (15
Ohio St. 18), 59.
Atlanta v. Central R. Co. (53 Ga.
* 120), 696.
Atlanta v. Charope (66 Ga. 659). 1474.
Atlanta v. Gate City Gaslight Ca
(71 Ga. 106), 1316.
Atlanta v. Green (67 Ga. 388), 674.
Atlantic v. Wilson (59 Ga. 544), 1471.
Atlantic &c. Tel. Co. v. Chicago &c.
R. Co. (6 Biss. 158), 678.
Atlantic City Water Co. v. Consum-
ers' Water Co. (51 N. J. Law,430;
17 Atl. Rep. 824), 584, 1303.
Atlantic City Water Co. v. Read (50
N. J. Law. 665), 330, 1296, 1297.
Atlantic City Water-works v. San
Mateo Water-works (64 Cal. 123),
1395
Atlas Bank v. Brownell (9 R. I. 168),
323.
Attaway v. Cartersville (68 Ga. 740),
1013.
Attleborough v. Mansfield (15 Pick.
19), 1003.
Attorney-General, In re (14 Fla.
277); 315.
Attorney-General v. Barstow (4 Wis,
749), 389.
Attorney-General v. Board of Can-
vassers (64 Mich. 607; 31 N. W.
Rep. 539). 389, 449, 1538.
Attorney-General v. Boston (133
Mass. 460), 647.
Attorney-Gnneral v. Brown (1 Wis.
513), 113, 158.
Attorney-General v. Cain (84 Mich.
323; it N. W. Rep. 484), 1555.
Attorney-General v. Cambridge (16
Gray, 347), 1096.
Attorney-General v. Chicago &c. R.
Co. (35 Wis. 435), 60.
Attorney-General v. Connors (Fla.,
9 So. Rep. 7), 1293.
Attorney-General v. Crocker (138
Mass. 214), 355, 356, 371.
Attorney-General v. Detroit (71
Mich. 103), 1244.
Attorney-General v. Dublin (1 Bligb,
313), 647.
Attorney-General v. Eau Claire (37
Wis. 400), 559, 663.
Attorney-General v. Ely (4 Wis. 430).
160, 885.
TABLE OF CASES.
Iv
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Attorn«!y-General v. Fitzpatrick (3
Wis. 543), 453.
Attorney-General v. Eolihan (89
Mich. 116), 1557.
Attornev-General v. Manderson (13
Jur. 383), 838. •
Attornev-General v. Marston(N. H.,
23 Atl. Rep. 51)0), 189.
Attorney-lieneral v. Mayor (3 Mylne
& Cr, 40QJ., 663.
Attorney-General i\ Metropolitan R.
Co. (135 Mass. 515; 38 Am. Rep.
204), 590. 678.
Attornev-General v. Poole (1 Craig &
Ph. "17), 647.
Attornev-General v. Railroad Com-
panies (35 Wis. 425). 113.
Attorney-General v. Rice (64 Mich.
385; 81 N. W. Rep. 303), 68, 427.
Attorney-General u. Salem (103 Mass.
138), 130.
Attornev-General v. Shepard (68 N.
H. 383), 133, 124, 169, 295,
Attorney-General v. Shrewsbury (6
Beav. 220), 139, 464.
Attorney-General v. Simonds (HI
Mass. 856), 374, 358, 360.
Attornev-General v. Stfevehs (1 Saxt.
(N. J.) Ch. 369; 3 Ain. Dec. 531),
639.
Attorneys-General Qpinions (1796-
1872, ^8), 839, 830.
Atwater v. Baltimore (31 Mo. 463),
2(54.
Atwater v. Canandaigaa Village (134
N. y. 603), 758, 779.
Atwater v. Woodbridge (6 Conn.
228), 150, 155, 345, 915,
Atwell I'. Zeloff (26 Micli. 118), 1577.
Atwood V. Austin (16 Johns. 180),
279. ■ .
Atwood V. Lincoln (44 Vt. 833), 369.
Atwood V. Partree (56 Conn. 80),
1540.
Auburn v. Eldridge (77 Ind. 126), 541.
Auburn &c. Plank Road Co. v.
Douglass (9 N. Y. 444, (568.
Auchenbach v. Seibert (120 Pa. St.
159: 13 Atl. Rep. 558), 163.
Auditor Curie's Case (11 Rep. 2), 897.
Auditor v. McArthur (Mich., 49 N.
W. Rep. 593). 1394.
Auditor-General t>. Board of Super-
visors (Mich., 51 N. W. Rep.
483), 431.
Auditor-General v. Fisher (84 Mich.
128; 47 N. W. Rep. 574), 10B6.
Auditor-General v. Railroad Co. (82
Mich. 436), 195.
Auditors v. Benoit (30 Mich. 176),
199.
Auer V. City of Dubuque (65 Iowa,
650), USD.
Augusta V. Dunbar (50 Ga. 387), 1160,
1350, 1353.
Augusta V. Hafers (61 Ga. 48), 1477.
Augusta V. Kingsfield (36 Me. 235),
981.
Augusta V. Leadbetter (16 Me. 45),
654, 836.
Augusta V. National Bank (47 Ga.
562), 1354.
Augusta V. North (.57 Me. 392), 479,
1388.
Augusta V. Perkins (3 B. Mon. 437),
624.
Augusta V. Walton (37 Ga. 630),
1354, 1384.
Augusta Bank v. Augusta (49 Me.
507), 933.
Augusta City Council v. Hudson (fl8
Ga.399;'l5 S. E. Rep. 678), 1428.
Augusta Factory v. City Council of
Augusta (83 Ga. 734; 10 S. E.
Rep. 359), 618.
Aulanier v. Governor (1 Tex. 653),
19S, 1357.
Auld V. Walton (12 La. Ann. 129),
377.
Aurora v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (119
HI. 846), 1393.
Aurora v. Fox (78 Ind. 1), 1869.
Aurora v. Hillman (90 111. 61), 1477,
1479, 1495. 1503.
Aurora v. Reed (57 111. 30), 677.
Aurora v. West (32 Ind. 88, 508), 982,
939, 958, 966.
Aurora City v. Cheshire (55 Ind. 484),
1450.
Aurora City v. West (7 Wall. 82),
959
Austin "u. Allen (6 Wis. 134), 347,
694.
Austin V. Austin Gaslight &c. Co. (09
Tex. 180), 1370, 1898.
Austin V. D.St. Tp. of Colony (51
Iowa, 103; 49 N. W. Rep. 1051),
848.
Austin V. Gas Co. (69 Tex. 187), 1360.
Austin V. Johns (68 Tex. 179). 186.
Austin V. Murray (16 Pick. 121), 106,
581, 1037.
Austin V. Walton (68 Tex. 507; 5 S.
W. Rep. 70), 186, 541.
Austin V. York (57 Me. 304), 348,
370.
Austin City v. Ritz (73 Tex. 391),
1478, 1489.
Austrian v. Guy (31 Fed. Rep. 500),
Averingtt Russell (33 Barb. 863), 141.
Avery v. Newton (148 Mass. 598),
1499.
Avery v. Slack (19 Wend. 50), 196.
Avery v. Springport (14 Blatohf . 273),
953.
Ivi
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
Avery v. Stewart (1 Gush. 496), 368,
370.
Avery v. Township Board (73 Mich.
622; 41 N. W. Rep. 818). 916, 917.
Avont V, Flynn (So. Dak., 49 N. W.
Rep. 17), 593.
Axt V. Jackson School Tp. (90 Ind.
101), 208, 643. 832.
Ayars' Appeal (123 Pa. St. 226; 16
Atl. Rep. 3.56). 173.
Ayer v. Norwich (39 Conn. 376),
14C7.
Aver V. St. Paul (27 .Minn. 457), 758.
Ayers, Jjire (,133 CJ. S. 443). 20.
Ayers v. Commissioners (60 Ga. 404),
112, 128.
Ayers v. Lawrence (59 N. Y. 192),
647, 780.
Ayers v. Newark (49 N. J. Law, 170),
1292.
Ayres v. Hammondsport (7 N. Y.
Supl. 174), 1461.
Ayres v. Penn. R. Co. (52 N. J. Law,
405; 48 N. J. Law, 44), 1408.
B.
Babbitt v. Savoy (3 Cush. 530), 664.
Babcock v. BuflEalo (56 N. Y. 268),
1084.
Babcock v. Granville (44 Vt. 325),
1575.
Babcock v. Gifford (29 Hun, 186),
220.
Babcock v. Helena (34 Ark. 499), 93.
Babcock v. Welsh (71 Cal. 402), 1423.
Babington v. St. Charles (27 La. Ann.
331), 647.
Babson v. Rockport (101 Mass. 93),
1455.
Bach V. Carpenter (29 Kan. 349), 55.
Bachelder v. Epping (28 N. H. 354),
668, 838.
Bachelor v. New Hampton (60 N. H.
207), 694. 1420.
Bachlers' Appeal (90 Pa. St. 307),
671.
Back man v. Charleston (42 N. H.
183), 257,
Backus V. Lebanon (11 N. H. 19; 35
Am. Dec. 466), 633, 696, 1196.
Bacon v. Bacon (Cro. Car. 601), 136.
Bacon v. City of Savannah (86 Ga.
301; 12 S. E. Rep. 580), 1073,
1187.
Bacon v. Robertson (1'8 How. 480),
464, 465.
Badkins v. Robertson (53 Ga. 613),
1244.
Bagg V. Detroit (5 Mich. 338), 1163.
Bagg's Case (11 Coke, 93 (b); 11 Rep.
99a), 203, 303, 206.
Bagott's Case (7 Edw. IV. 29), 43.
Bailey v. Lawrence County (S. Dak.,
51 N. W. Rep. 331), 1517.
Bailey v. Mayor &c. of New York
(3 Hill, 531; 2 DeniOi 431), 7,
219, 454, 480, 749, 753, 764, 766,
1397.
Bailey v. State (SO Neb. 855 ; 47 N. W.
Rep. 208), 643, 1266.
Bailey v. Winn (101 Mo. 649), 1856.
Bailey v. Woburn (126 Mass. 416), 688.
Baileyville v. Lowell. (20 Me. 178),
♦ 654.
Baily v. Commonwealth (Pa., 20 W.
N, C. 321 ; 9 Atl. Rep. 233), 968.
Baily v. Commonwealth (Pa., 10 Atl.
Rep. 764), 854.
Bainbridge v. Dowine (6 Mass. 353),
813.
Baines v. Lacon (84 111. 461), 48.
Baird v. Daily (68 N. Y. 547). 1486.
Baird v. Todd (37 Neb. 783), 833.
Baker v. Board (40 Iowa, 228), 555.
Baker v. Boston (13 Pick. 184; 23
Am. Dec. 481), 778. Ip34, 1054.
Baker v. Chambles (4 Grreene (Iowa),
428), 214.
Baker v. Cihcinnati(ll Ohio St. 534],
1356, 1370.
Baker v. City of Seattle (Wash., 27
Pac. Rep. 462), 842, 869.
Baker v. City of UticaXl9 N. Y. 326),
181.
Baker v. City of Washington (7 D. C.
134), 665.
Baker v. Cushman (127 Mass. 105),
303, 304.
Baker v. Johnson (41 Me. 15), 910.
Baker v. Normal (81 111. 108), 535.
Baker v. Portland (58 Me. 199), 1503.
Baker v. Preston (1 Gilmer, 335), 209,
336.
Baker v. Schofield (58 Ga. 182), 510,
1270.
Baker v. Shephard (24 N. H. 208),
350, 368.
Baker v. Tobin (40 Ind. 810), 1112.
Baker v. Torrey (69 Tenn. i), 1340.
Baker v. Windham (13 Me. 74), 664.
Balch V. County Comm'rs (103 Mass.
106), 686.
BalcOmbe v, Northrup (9 Minn. 173),
314.
Baldwin v. Bangor (36 Me. 518), 681.
Baldwin v. Carter (15 Johns. 496),
279
Baldwin v. City (68 111. 418). 544.
Baldwin v. City Council (53 Ala. 437),
1383.
Baldwin v. City of Elizabeth (43 N.
J. Eq. 11), 564.
Baldwin v. Elv (66 Wis. 188; 28 N.
W. Rep. 893), 558.
TABLE OF CASES.
Ivii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
Baldwin v. Franks (120 U. S. 678),
147.
Baldwin v. Green (10 Mo. 410), 103,
488,'S13. ,
Baldwin v. Marshall (3 Humph.
(Tenn.) 116), 225.
Baldwin v. Mayor &c. (48 Barb.
549), 1372.
Baldwin v. Murphy (83 111. 485), 538.
Baldwin v. Nickerson(Wyo., 19Pac.
Rep. 439), 1336.
Baldwin v. North, Branford (32
Conn. 47), 347, 349, 369. 371.
Baldwin v. Smith (82 111. 163), 527.
Baldwin v. Tucker (16 Fla. 258),
1573.
Bales V. Pidgeon (129 Ind. 548; 20
N. E. Rep. 34), 1413.
Balfe V. Lammers (109 Ind. 847),
1190.
Ball V. Fagg (67 Mo. 481), 176, 543,
1269.
Ball V. Town of Woodbine (61 Iowa,
83; 47 Am. Rep. 805), 764.
Ballard v. Davis (31 Miss. 525), 296,
1335.
Ballard v. Gray (108 N. C. 544), 1263.
Ballard v. Harrison (4 M. & W. 392),
1473.
Ballard v. Tomlinson (L. R. 29 Ch.
D. 115), 764.
Ballerino v. Mason (83 Cal. 447). 327.
Ballston Spa v. Markham (11 N. Y.
Siipl. 826), 13:j5.
Baltimore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co. (31 Ind. 50), 1574.
Baltimore v. BonJdin (23 Md. 328),
690. 1419.
Baltimore v. Eschbach (18 Md. 276),
253 259 1173
Baltimore v. Gill" (31 Md. 375), 646,
832, 1583.
Baltimore v. Greenmount Cemetery
{7Md. 547). 1166.
Baltimore v. Hughes (1 Gill & J.
480), 534, 1169.
Baltimore v. Musgrave (48 Md. 272),
330, 249.
Baltimore v. O'Donnell (53 Md. 110),
1468.
Baltimore v. Poultney (35 Md, 18),
280.
Baltimore v. Radecke (49 Md. 217),
518, 530.
Baltimore v. Railroad Co. (21 Md.
50), 195.
Baltimore v. Reynolds (20 Md. 1),
253.
Baltimore v. Scharf (54 Md. 499), 283.
Baltimore &c. Co. v. Nesbit (10 How.
395). 697.
Baltimore &o. R. Co. v. North (103
Ind, 359), 675.
Baltimore City v. Marriott (9 Md,
160), 1138.
Baltimore Turnpike (5 Binney, 481),
376, 296.
Bamber v. City of Rochester (63
How. Pr. 103), 1038.
Bambrick v. Campbell (37 Mo. App.
460), 499, 1075.
Bancroft v. Cambridge (126 1 Mass.
438), 687.
Bancroft v. Lynnfleld (18 Pick. 566.)
663, 664.
Bangor [v. Inhabitants &c. (71 Me.
535), 1000.
Bangor v. Readfleld (32 Me. 60), 98n.
Bangor &c. R. Co. v. McCombs (60
Me. 290). 699.
Bangor Savings Bank v. City of
Stillwater (49 Fed. Rep. 721),
726, 914. 933.
Bank v. Brainard School Dist. (Mich.,
51 N. W. Rep. 814), 750.
Bank v. Bridges (30 N. J. Law, ll3>,
131.
Bank v. Brown (36 N. Y. 467), -87.
Bank v. Charleston (3 Rich. Law,
343). 1361.
Bank v. Chester (10 Rich. L. (S. C.)
561), 1359. ,
Bank v. Chillicothe (7 Ohio (Part II),
31), 93, 794.
Bank v. Chillicothe (7 Ohio, 354), 933,
Bank v. !Ed wards (5 Ired. Law, 516),
1361.
Bank v. Hamlin (14 Mass. 178), 1366,
1269.
Bank v. Madison (3 Ind. 43), 1358,
1359.
Bank v. Mayor &c. of New York
(43 N. Y. 185), 1576. 1579.
Bank v. Peel (11 Ark. 750), 385.
Bank v. Sarlls (Ind., 28 N. E. Rep.
434), 575.
Bank v. Savannah (Dudley, 130),
1359.
Bank v. Statesville (84 N. C. 169),
250, 640.
Bank of Chenango v. Brown (36
N. Y. 467), 64, 525, 1390.
Bank of Columbia v. Patterson (7
Cranch, 299), 338, 257, 260, 263,
708.
Bank of Commonwealth v. New
York (43 N. Y. 189), 240, 244,
1134.
Bank of Hamburg v. Wray (4 Strob.
(S. C.)87; 51 Am. Dec. 659), 215.
Bank of Louisiana v, Farrar (1 La.
Ann. 49). 528.
Bank of New Orleans V, New Or-
leans (13 La. Ann. 43i), 344.
Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome
(18 N. Y. 38), 933.
Iviii
TABLE OF CASES.
[Tho references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
Bank of Santa Rosa v. Chalfant (52
Cal. 170), 1400.
Bank of United States v. Dandridge
(13 Wheat. 64), 176, 287, 259,
260, 314, 1366.
Bank of United States v. Planters'
Bank (4 Wheat. 205), 7.
Bank of United States v. Planters'
Bank (9 Wheat. 907), 4, 7.
Bank head v. Brown (25 Iowa, 540),
683, 684, 685.
Barber v. City of East Dallas (Tex.,
18 S. W. Rep. 488), 433.
Barber v. Comm'rs (93 N. C. 143),
1349.
Barber v. Roxbury (93 Mass. 318),
1466.
Barber Asphalt Pavement Co. v.
City of New Orleans (41 La. Ann.
1015; 9 So. Rep. 484). 871.
Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Gog-
reve (41 La. Ann. 251), 1173,
1186.
Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hunt
(100 Mo. 22; 13 S. W. Rep. 98).
499.
Barber Surgeons v. Pelson (2 Lev.
252), 90.
Barbie^ v. Connolly (113 U. S. 27),
511.
Barbour v. Camden (51 Me. 608), 370.
Barbour v. Ellsworth (07 Me. 294),
775.
Barbour County v. Brunson (36 Ala.
362). 744.
Barbour County v. Horn (48 ^la.
R49i, 744.
Barclay i'. Howells' Lessees (6 Pet.
498). 671, 1400.
Bard v. Poole (12 N. Y. 495), 1424.
Barden v. Citv of Portage (79 Wis.
. 126), 1148."
Bargatei). Sliortridge (5 Clark (H. L.),
297), 947, 954.
Barhvte v. Shepherd (35 N. Y. 255),
1514.
Barhyte v. Sheppard (35 N. Y. 338),
1178, 1578.
Barker v. Hovev(Kan., 26 Pac. Rep.
585), 1088, 1089, 1155, 1416.
Barker v. Omaha (16 Neb. 269), 1190.
Barker v. People (3 Cowen, 686 ; 15
Am. Deo. 3a3), 189. 37B.
Barker v. Smitli (10 S. C, 236), 528.
Barker v. State (48 Ohio, 514), 1365.
Barker u. Town of Oswegatchie (10
N. Y. Siipl. 884). 816, 1092.
Barker v. Town of Oswefratcbie (16
N. Y, Supl. 737), .^54.
Barkley v. Comm'rs (93 U. S. 258),
1379.
Barley v. Mayor (3 Hill, 331), 4.
Barling u. West (39 Wis. B07),486, 518.
Barnard v. Campau (39 Mich. 162),
2i5.
Barnard v. Campbell (55 N. Y. 456),
' 940.
Barnard v. Knox County (Mo., 16 S.
W. Rep. 917), 832.
Barnert v. Paterson (48 N. J. Law,
395), 291, 493, 493.
Barnes v. Atchison (8 Kan. 454),
1385.
Barnes v. Bakersfield (57 Vt. 375),
184.
i^arnes v. Barnes (6 Vt. 388), 91, 93,
1334.
Barnes v. Brookman (107 111. 317),
313.
Barnes v. Chapin (4 Allen, 444), 1467.
Barnes v. Chicago (138 Mass. C7)»
1478.
Barnes v. Common Council (89 Ala.
602), 1269.
Barnes v. County of Marshall (56
Iowa, 23), 1540.
Barnes v. District of Columbia (91
U. S. 551). 9, 51, 53, 109, 265,
549, 75:i. 754', 768, 1136, 1445.
Barnes v. Dyer (56 Vt. 469), 1176.
1349.
Barnes v. Lacon (81 111. 461), 932,
1383.
Barnes v. Marshall (56 Iowa, 20),
1575, 15T8.
Barnes v. State (19 Conn. 398), 1349.
Barnes v. Williams (53 Ark. 205; 13
S. W. Rep. 845). 187.
Barnett. Ex parte (51 Ark. 215; 10
S. W. Rep. 492), 1012.
Barnett v. Newark (28 111. 62), 503,
1064.
Barney v. Dewey (13 Johns. 236),
1453.
Barney Dumping Boat Co. v. New
York (40 Fed. Rep. 50), 754.
Barnum v. Oilman (27 Minn. 466),
386.
Barnum v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore
(62 Md. 375), 563, 660.
Barr v. Atlanta (64 Ga. 3i5), 1388.
Barr v. Auburn (89 111. 361), 543,
1369.
Barr v. Deniston (19 N. H. 170), 646.
Barr t'. Kansas City (105 Mo. 55U),
1451, 1478. 1.503.
Barr r. Oskaloosa (45 Iowa, 275),
1195.
Barr v. Stevens (1 Bibb. 392), 706.
Barre r. Coventry (63 Vt. 95; 20 Atl.
Rep. 925). 978.
Barre v. Greenwich (1 Pick. 129),
983.
Barrel! v. Black (56 Me. 498), 766.
Barren's Case (L. E. 10 Ch. App.
bU), 717.
TABLE OF OASES.
lis
[The references ore to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
Barrett, Ex parte (43 Ala. 498), 1051.
Barrett v. Cambridge (10 Allen,
48), 1577.
Barrett v. Crane (16 Vt. 246), 344.
Barrett v. School Dist. (87 N. H.
445), 1330.
Barrett v. Schuyler County Court
(44 Mo. 197), 940.
Barrett v. Sbaubbut (5 Minn. 823),
225.
Barron v. Krebs (41 Kan. 338), 1172.
Barrow v. Baltimore (7 Peters, 243),
670.
Barrow v. Davis (46 Mo. 394), 1189,
1573.
Barry v. GoaJ (89 Cal. 2,15; 26 Pac.
^ep. 785; 24 Pac. Rep. 1033),
810.
Bany v. Lowell (3 Alien, 127). 1146.
Barry v. Terkildsen (72 Cal. 254; 13
Pac. Rep. 657), 1496.
Bany Water Co., In re (Vt., 20 Atl.
Rep. 109), 1305.
Barter r. Commonwealth (3 Pa. 253),
i99, 529, 531, 1303, 1253.
Barthet v. City of New Orleans (24
Fed. Rep. 563), 520, 603.
Bartholomew v. Harwinton (33
Conn. 410). 817.
Bartle v. Des Moines (38 Iowa, 414),
841.
Bartlett v. Board of Education (59
111. 304), 313.
Bartlett v. Crozier (15 Johns. 250),
219.
Bartlett v. Crozifer (17 Johns. 439),
1439. 1445.
Bartlett v. Governor (2 Bibb, 586),
320.
Bartlett v. King (12 Mass. 537), 538.
Bartlett v. Knsley (15 Conn. 337),
836, 367, V63o.
Bartlett v. Sayer (12 N. Y. Supl.
170), 1337.
Bartlett v. Tucker (104 Mass. 336;
6 Am. Rep. 240), 215.
Bartmeyer v. Iowa (18 Wall. 129),
144.
Barton v. Gadsden (79 Ala. 495),
526.
Barton v, Pittsburgh (4 Brewst. 373),
543, 1173, 1365.,,
Barton v. Sweptson (44 Ark, 437),
208. '
Barton v. Syracuse (36 N; Y. 54),
768, 777, 1080, 1137.
Barton County v. Walser (47 Mo.
189), 15.
Bartram v. City of Bridgeport (55
Conn. 122), 1176.
Bass V. Columbus (30 Qa. 845). 941.
Bass V. Fort Wavne (121 Ind. 389; 33
N. K Rep. 2o9), 1^17.
Bass V. State (84 La. Ann. 494), 669.
Bass Foundry & Machine Works v.
Board i&o. (115 Ind. 234), 713,
798 893
Bassett't). Denn (17 N. J. Law, 433),
190.
Bassett v. Fish (12 Hun. 209), 319.
Bassett v. Fish (75 N. Y. 304), 1492.
Bassett v. Porter (4 Cush. 487), 54,
91, 93, 1324.
Bassett v. St. Joseph (53 Mo. 290),
1430, 1471.
Bastrop County v. Hearn (70 Tex.
563; 8 S. W. Rep. 302), 857.
Bateman v. Florida Commercial Co.
(Fla.. 8 So. Rep. 51), 1400.
Bateman v. Mid. Wales R. Co. (L. R.
1 C. P. 499), 933.
Bateman Overseer of Poor v. Mather
(N. J., 24 Atl. Rep. 444), 980.
Bates V. Bassett (60 Vt. 530; 15 Atl.
Rep. 300), 661. 831.
Bates V. Gregory (Cal., 22 Pac. Rep.
683), 1587.
Bates V. Mobile (46 Ala. 158), 1351,
1356, 1859.
Bates V. Ovei'seers &c. of Plymouth
(14 Gray. 168), 348, 1375.
Bates V. Porter (74 Cal. 224 ; 15 Pac.
Rep. 732), 851.
Bates 0. Village of Rutland (63 Vt.
178; 20 Atl. Rep. 278), 752. 782.
Bates County v. Winters (97 U. S.
85). 966.
Batesviile &c. Co., Ex parte (39 Ark.
82). 280. ,
Batesviile Institute v. KauSman (18
Wall. 151), 480.
Bath County v. Amy (13 Wall. 344),
1379.
Bathurst v. MoPherson (L. R. 4 App.
Cas. 256), 768, 7b6.
Bathurt v. Course (3 La. Ann. 260),
1273.
Baton Rouge v. Bearing (15 La. Ann.
208), 1253.
Battle V. Mobile (9 Ala. 234), 1353.
Battles V. Laudenslager (84 Pa. St.
. 446). 965.
Bauer v. Rnchester (35 N. Y. St. Rep.
959), 1463, 1469.
Bauman v. Detroit (58 Mich. 441),
264.
Baumgartner v. Hastv (100 Ind. '
575; 50 Am. Rep. 830), 13, 593,
643, 1047, 1346.
Baws V. Allentown (34 N. H. 351),
56.
Baxter v. City of Seattle (Wash., 38
Pac. Rep. 537), 595.
Baxter v. State (9 Wis. 88), 1839.
Baxters. Winposki Turnpike (28 Vt.
133), 10, 156, 747, 1536.
Ix
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Bay County v. Brock (44 Mich. 45),
11536. •
Bay County v. Bullock (51 Mich.
544), 396, 434.
Bayard v. Baker (76 Iowa, 330 ; 23
Am.- & Eng. Corp. Cas. 136),
301, 498. 507, 509.
Bayard v. Klinge (16 Minn. 349),
381, 1390.
Bayley v. Taber (5 Mass. 386), 956.
Bayliss v. Pearson (15 Iowa, 379),
313, 314.
Baysinger v. People (115 111. 419). 311.
Beach v. City of Elmira (11 N. Y.
Supl. 913), 1099.
Beach v. Leahy (11 Kan. 63), 14, 61,
1320.
Beacon Falls v. Seymour (44 Conn.
310), 987.
Beal V. Ray (17 Ind. 550), 375.
Beale v. Guerneey (8 Johns. 446),
1491.
Bealey v. Dickenson (43 Vt. 599),
1336,
Beall V. Athens (81 Mich. 536), 1447,
1454, 1467, 1471.
Beals V. Amador County (35 Cal.
634), 1371.
Beals V. Rubber Co. (11 R. I. 381; 33
Am. Rep. 473), 1166.
Beals V. Supervisors Amador County
(38 Cal. 449), 453.
Beam v. Patterson (47 N. J. Law,
15), 1073.
Beaman v. Lake County (43 Miss.
337), 928.
Bean v. Board (51 Iowa, 53; 49
N. W. Rep. 1049), 883.
Bean v. Concord (48 Vt. 30), 783.
Bean v. Jay (33 Me. 117), 657.
Bean v. People (7 Colo. 200), 1374.
Bean v. Thompson (19 N. H. 390), 853.
Bear v. City of AUentown (Pa., 3
Atl. Rep. 1063), 1154.
Bearce v. Fossett (34 Me. 575), 351,
'373
Beard v. City of Brooklyn (31 Barb.
143), 1600.
Beard v. Decatur (64 Tex. 7 ; 63 Am.
Rep. 735), 1S3.
Bearden v. Madison (73 Ga. 184), 486.
Beardsley v. City o^ Hartford (50
Conn. 529), 1150.
Beardslev v. Smith (16 Conn. 368),
150, '151, 156, 345, 915, 1376.
Bearton v. Farmers' Bank &o. (13
Peters, 134 ),3. ^
Beasley v. Beckley (38 West Va. 81),
546, 1576.
Beasley v. United States (31 Ct. CI.
225). 743.
Beatty u. Litus (47 N. J. Law, 89),
1407, 1426.
Beatty v. Sibley County (33 Minn.
470), 856.
Beaufort i\ Ohlandt (34 S. C. 158;,
1357, 1363.
Beaumont v. Wilkesbarre (143 Pa. St.
198; 31 Atl. Rep. 888), 119, 510,
1187, 1266.
Beaver v. State (124 Ind. 334), 861.
Beaver County v. Armstrong (44 Pa.
St. 63), 958.
Beaver Creek v. Hastings (53 Mich.
528), 277. '
Bilfevers v. Trimmer(3N. J. Law, 97),
1036.
Beck V. Carter (68 N. Y. 383), 766.
Beck V. Hanscom (29 N. H. 313), 307.
Becker v. City of Washington (94
Mo 375; 7 S. W. Rep. 291), 501,
631, 542, 107-3,
Becker v. Keokuk Water-works (79
Iowa, 419; 44 N. W. Rep. 694),
1315, 1307, 1893.
Beckham v. Nacke (56 Mo. 546), 1349.
Beckwith v. Whaleu(65 N. Y. 323),
1323
Beckwith v. Whalen (70 N. Y. 430),
1430.
Bedell, £x parte (20 Mo. App, 135),
504, 605.
Beecher v. City of Detroit (Mich.,
52 N. W. Rep. 731), 586, 1172.
Beecher v. Clay County (52 Iowa,
140), 1579.
Beeoroft i'. Council Bluffs (63 Iowa,
646;, 1128.
Beekman, In re (31 How. Pr. 16),
396.
Beekman v. Frost (18 Johns. 544),
225.
Beekman v. Saratoga &c. R. Co. 13
Paige Ch. 45; 23 Am. Dec. 679),
669, 683, 695.
Beekman Street, Matter of (4 Bradf.
503), 677.
Beekman Street (20 Johns. 269), 697.
Beer Co. v. Massachusetts (97 U. S.
25), 86, 1032, 1231.
Beers n Botsford (3 Day (Conn.).
159), 150, 155.
Beers v. Dallas City (16 Oregon, 334 ,
18 Pac. Rep. 18.S), 707, 711.
Beers v. State (20 How, 527), 740.
Beesman v. Peoria (16 111. 484), 1262.
Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz (135 III.
691 ; 36 N. E. Rep. 704), 385.
Beikman's Case (11 Abb. Pr. 164),
1064.
Belcher v. Farrai: (8 Alien, 825),
1029, 1035,
Belfast V. Leominster (1 Pick, 123),
826, 969.
Belfast &o, R. Co. v. Brooks iCO
Me. 568), 348, 367, 937.
TABLE OF OASES.
Ixi
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Belfast &c. Ry. Co. v. Unity (62
Me. 148), 305, 361.
Belisle v. Clark (49 Ala. 98), 315.
Belknap v. Reinhait (2 Wend. 375;
20 Am. Dec. 631). 213.
Bell V. Boston (101 Mass. 506), 1080.
Bell V. City of Americus (79 Ga.
153; 3 S. E. Rep. 613), 938.
Bell V. City of Rochester (11 N. Y.
Supl. 305), 1036.
Bell V. McKiBney (63 Miss. 187),
218.
Bell V. Mobile &o. R. Co. (4 Wall.
598), 993.
Bell V. Nashville Bank (Peck (Tenn.),
396), 50.
Bell V. New York (105 N. Y. 139),
1381.
Bell V. Ohio &c. R. Co. (25 Pa. St.
161). 635.
Bell V. Platteville (71 Wis. 189; 86
N. W. Rep. 831), 663.
Bell County v. Alexander (22 Tex.
350), 563, 660.
Belleview v. Hohn (83 Ky. 1), 252.
Bellinger v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (23
N. Y. 43), 779, 1447.
Bellows V. Courter (6 N. Y. Supl.
7S), 1001.
Belmont v. Vinah haven (82 Me. 534 ;
20 Atl. Rep. 89), 977.
Belo V. ForsvtKe County (76 N. C.
489), 935," 961.
Beloit u. Morgan (7 Wall. 619), 961.
Belt V. Abstract Co. (73 Md. 389; 34
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 440),
1273, 1874.
Bemis v. Le&nard (118 Mass. 503),
850.
Benedict v. Goit (3 Barb., 459), 679.
Benjamin v. Webster (100 Ind. 15)y
1390.
Benjamin v. Wheeler (15 Gray, 486),
339.
Bennet v. People (30 111. 389), 1340.
Bennet v. United States (3 Wash. T.
179), 158S.
Bennett v. Buffalo (17 N. Y. 373),
1181, 1383.
Bennett v. Burch (1 Denio, 141), 344.
Bennett v. McKee (6 W. & S. (Pa.)
513), 335.
Bennett v. New Bedford (110 Mass.
433), 303.
BoLnett v. State (58 Miss. 556), 315.
Bennett v. Whitney (94 N. Y. 303),
319, 330.
Bennett's Appeal (65 Pa. St. 243),
4, 5.
Bennington v. Park (50 Vt. 178),
1390.
Benoist v Inhabitants of Carondelet
(8 llo. ;;50), 908.
Benoist v. St. Louis (19 Mo. 179), 395,
1362, 1385.
Benoit v. Wayne County (80 Mich.
176), 210.
Bensley v. Mountain Lake Water
Co. (13 Cal. 306), 697.
Benson v. Monroe (7 Cush. 125), 244,
246.
Benson v. Village of Waukesha (74
Wis. 31 ; 41 N. W. Rep. 1017),
1194.
Bentley v. Barton (41 Ohio St. 410),
1394.
Benton v. Boston (140 Mass. 13),
762.
Benton v. Hamilton (110 Ind. 294;
11 N. E. Rep. 238), 633.
Benton v. Milwaukee (50 Wis.* 368),
1171.
Benton v. Taylor (46 Ala. 388). 1575.
Bepler v. Cincinnati (23 Weekly Law
Bui. 229), 1182.
Bergen v. Clarkson (6 N. J. Law (1
Halst.), 352), 278, 535.
Bergen v. State (33 N. J. Law, 490),
489.
Bergman v. St. Louis &o. R. Co.
(Mo., 1 S. W. Rep. 384). 508.
Bergman v. St. Paul &c. R. Co. (31
Minn. 533), 698, 699.
Berkely r. Taunton (19 Pick. 480),
983.
Berlin v. Bolton (10 Met. 115). 975.
Berlin v. Gorham (34 N. H. 366), 67,
74, 86, 87, 95. 109, 415.
Berlin Bridge Co. v. Wagner (57
Hun, 346), 1438.
Berlin Iron Bridge Co. v. Wagner
(10 N. Y. Supl. 840), 1093.
Bernard v. Torrance (5 Gill & J.
(Md.) 383), 313.
Bernards Township v. Morrison (133
U. S. 523), 630, 947.
Bernards Township v. Stebbins (109
U. S. 341), 948, 953.
Berrenberg v. Boston (137 Mass. 331 ;
50 Am. Rep. 896), 1486.
Berry v. Commonwealth (Ky., 14 S.
W. Rep. 589), 860.
Berry v. McComb City (69 Miss. 882),
1407.
Bertholf v. O'Reilly (74 N. Y. 509),
740.
Bertonmeau v. Directors (3 Woods,
177), 1345.
Bessinger v. Dickerson (20 Iowa,
260), 334. 337, 331.
Bethany v. Sperry (10 Conn. 200),
344, 347.
Bethlehem v. Alexandria (32 N. J.
Law, 66), 446.
Bethlehem v. Town of Watertown
(51 Conn. 490), 987.
Izji
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
Betholto V. Conely (9 III. App. 3^9),
648.
Bethune v. Hughes (28 Ga. 560), 106,
1344.
Betts V. Baglpy (13 Pick. 573), 344.
Belts V. Village of Gloversville (8 N.
Y. Supl. 795), 1436.
Bevans v. United States (13 Wall.
56), 321.
Bevai-d v. Hoffman (18 Md. 479; 81
Am. Dec. 61S). 218.
Bibel V. People (07 III. 175), 283, 549.
Bicljer.'!taff, In re (70 Cal. 35), 1333,
1342.
Bickneli v. Widner School Tp. (73
Ind. 501) 8-n.
Biddle v. Willavd (10 Ind. 63), 202.
Bidelman v. State (110 N. Y. 233),
1428.
Bidwell V. Pittsburgh (85 Pa. St.
. 413), 758.
Bidwell V. Town of Murray (40 Hun,
190), 1439, 1445.
Bieling v. City of Brooldvn (120 N. Y.
98; 24 N. E. Rep. 389), 1466.
Bigelow V. Bridge (8 Mass. 275), 339.
Bigelow V. Chicago (90 111. 49), 1169,
1187.
Bigelow Vy Hillman (37 Me. 52), 803,
536, 933.
Bigelow V. Perth Amboy (25 N. J.
Law, 297). 1161, 1270.
Bigelow V. Railroad Co. (27 Wis. 478),
524.
Bigelow V. Randblpli (14 Grav, 541),
156, 749, 750, 759, 763, 1015.
Bigelow V. Weston (3 Pick. 267),
1-167.
Bigelow V. Wilson (1 Pick. 485), 350.
Big$;s V. Citv of Huntington (33
West Va.V)), 1498.
Biggs V. Mi-Bride' (Oreg., 31 Pac.
■ Rep. 8;S), 158.
Bigler v. Mayor (5 Abb. N. C. 51),
845.
Bill V. Dow (56 Vt. 5631, 363.
Billings V. Kneen (57 Vt. 43-<), 975.
Billings V. L:)fferty (31 111. 318), 218.
Billings V. Worcester (102 Mass. 329),
1437, 1453,
Bills V. City of Goshen (117 Ind. 391 ;
30 N. E. Rep. 115), 484, 501, 504,
530, 521, 602, 1333.
Binde v. Klinge (30 Mo. App. 285),
1343.
Binghamton v. Binghamton &c. Ry.
Co. (16 N. Y. Supl. 225). 1103.
Binsse v. Wood (37 N. Y. 530), 1453.
Bird V. Merrick (L. & R. 115). 375.
Bird V. New York (33 Hun, 396). 196.
Bird V. Perkins (33 Mich. 38), 70.
Bird V. Wasco County (3 Oreg. 282).
187.
Birdsall v. Clark (73 N. Y. 73; 39
Am. Rep. 105), 383, 386, 489, 549,
551, 573.
Birge v. Berlin Iron Bridge Co. (16
N. Y. Supl. 596), 367.
Birge v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (65 Iowa,
440), 691.
Birmingham v. McCary (84 Ala. 469:
4 So. Rep. 630). 1478, 1499.
Birmingham v. Rumsey (63 Ala.
352), 1380.
Birmingham &c. St. Ry. Co. v. Bir^
« mington St. R. Co. (79 Ala. 465).
568, 1103.
Bish V. Johnson (31 Ind. 299), 943.
Bishop V. Brainard (28 Conn. 289;.
943.
Bishop V. Cone (3 N. H. 515), 374.
1273.
Bishop V. Fahey (15 Gray, 61), 1604.
Bishop V, Marks (15 La. Ann, 147),
1185, 1369.
Bishop V. Moorman (98 Ind. 1), 651.
Bishop V. Schneider (46 Mo. 472),
226.
Bishop V. Williamson (11 Me. 405),
333.
Bissell V. Hopkins (4 Cowen, 53),
1491.
Bissell V. Jeffersonville (34 How. 287),
787, 916.
Bissell V. Kankakee (64 111. 349), 619,
, 930. 1374.
Bissell V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (23 N. Y.
63), 1406.
Bissell V. Saxton (66 N. Y. 55), 337.
Bissell V. Sexton (77 N. Y. 191),
334.
Bissell V. Spring Valley Tp. (110 TJ. S.
163), 833, 952.
Bittinger u.'Bell (65 Ind. 445), 937.
Black V. Cohen (53 Ga. 621), 911. ,
Black V. Columbia (19 S. C. 412),
364.
Black V. Cornell (30 Mo. App. 641),
632, 805, 1330.
Black V. Mayor &o. of Baltimore ()0
Md. 335), 697, 69S.
Black V. Saunders County (8 Neb.
440; 1 N. W. Rep. 144). 890.
Black V. Town of Brinkley (54 Ark.
373; 15 S. W. Rep. 1030), 413,
414.
Blackburn v. Walpole (9 Pick. 97),
367, 368.
Blackett v. Blizzard (9 Barn. & C.
851), 391, 493.
Black man v. Lehman (63 Ala. 545),
957,
Blackmore v. Vestry &c. (L. R. 9 Q.
B. D. 451), 768,
Blackstone v. County Comm'rs (108
' Mass. 68), 1404.
TABLE OF OASES.
Ixiii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 78»-I605.]
Blackstone v. White (41 Penn. St.
330), 90.
Bladen v. Philadelphia (60 Pa. St.
464), 252.
Blain v. Bailey (35 Ind. 165), 113.
Blair v. Cuming County (111 XJ. S.
363), 930, 931, 953.
Blair v. Forehand (100 Mass. 136),
1604.
Blair v. Hanna (87 Ind. 298), 1419.
Blair v. Lantry (Neb., 31 N. W.
Rep. 790), 853.
Blair u Lunnins; (76 Cal. 134), 1175.
Blair D. Eidgelv (41 Nfev. 63; 97 Am.
Dec. 248). 378.
Blair v. West Point (3 McCrary, 459),
57.
Blake v. Dubuque (13 Iowa, 66),
704.
Blake v. Ferris (5 N. Y. 48), 1315,
Blake v. Johnson (1 N. H. 91), 1579.
Blake v. Lowell (143 Mass. 296), 1437,
1480.
Blake v. Macon (53 Ga. 173), 1583.
Blake v. Newfield (68 Me. 365), 1488.
Blake v. Orford (64 N. H. 399), y49,
637.
Blake v. People (109 111. 504), 1558.
Blake v. Railroad Co. (39 N. H. 435),
432.
Blake v. Walker (33 S. C. 517), 549.
Blake w. Windham (13 Me. 74), 826.
Blakely v. Benneke (.'59 Mo. 193), 315.
Blakely v. Troy (18 Hun. 167), 1474.
Blakely Township v. Devine (36
Minn. 53; 29 N. W. Rep. 342),
1059.
Blakeraore v. Dolan (50 Ind. 194),
526. '
Blakie v. Staples (13 Grant (Canada),
67), 647.
Blanehard v. Bissell (11 Ohio St. 96),
393, 401. 403, 500, 1064, 1366.
Blanehard v. Blackstone (102 Mass.
343), 263.
Blanehard v. City of Kansas (16 Fed.
Rep. 444), 1139.
Blanchford v. Dow (33 Me. 557),
1579.
Blandford School District v. Gibbs
(3 Cush. 39), 163.
B/inding v. Burr (13 Cal. 843), 95,
109.
Blank. Matter of (73 N. Y. 388), 573.
Blank v. Levonia (79 Mich. 1), 1431.
Blanlon v. McDowell Co. (101 N. C.
533), 959.
Blashfleld v. Telegraph Co. (18 N. Y.
Supl. 250). 1432.
Blatchley v. Moser (15 Wend. 315),
515, 103.->.
Bledsoe v. Gary (Ala., 10 So. Rep.
503), 1353, 1354, 1355.
Blessing v. City of Galveston (43
Tex. 641,659), 110,465,
Bleu V. Bear River Co. (20 Cal. 603),
713 941
Blight 'v. Rochester (7 Wheat. 535),
139.
Bliss' Petition (63 N. H. 135), 144.
Bliss V. Hosmer (15 Ohio, 44), 670.
Bliss V. South Hadley (145 Mass. 91),
1448.
Blize V. Castlio (8 Mo. App. 390),
706.
Block V. Bourbon County Oomm'rs
(99 U. S. 686), 9-)6.
Block V. Jacksonville (36 111. 301),
508, 543, 1268.
Blodgett V. Boston (8 Allen, 237),
1448.
Blodgett V. Holbrook (39 Vt. 336),
368, 370, 1391.
Bloodgood V. M. & H. R. Co. (18
Wend. 9), 703.
Bloom V. Xenia (33 Ohio St. 461),
1064.
Bloomer v. StoUoy (5 McLean (U.
S.) 158), 73, 535.
Bloomfleld v. Charter Oak Bank
(121 U. S. 121), 16, 345, 348, 358,
364, 3;3, 374, 816, 915, 960, 1371,
1376.
Bloomfleld v. Trimble (54 Iowa, 399),
515, 604.
Blooming Valley (56 Pa. St. 66),
13B6.
Blooraington v. Bay (43 111. 503),
1308, 1449.
Bloomfleld &c. Natural Gas Light
Co. V. Richardson (63 Barb. 437),
686.
Bloomington v. Brokaw (77 111. 194),
1381.
Bloomington v. Chicago &c. R. Co.
(134 111. 451 ; 26 N. E. Rep. 366),
1076.
Bloomington v. Pollor!k(Ill., 31 N. E.
Rep. 146), 1152.
Bloomington v. Wahl (46 III. 489),
106, 1244.
Bloomington Cemetery Ass'n v. Peo-
ple (111., 28 N. E. Rep. 1076),
1081, 1165, 1166.
Bloomington School Tp. v. Nat.
School Furnishing Co.' (107 Ind.
43; 7 N. E. Rep. 760), 208, 815,
821
Bloor V. Delafleld (69 Wis. 378),
1468.
Blount V. Janesville (31 Wis. 648),
558.
Bluffton V. Mathews (93 Ind. 313),
1484.
BluflE Creek v. Hardenbrook (40
Iowa, 130), 1334.
. Ixiv
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; VoL H, pp. 789-1605.]
Blush V. Colchester (39 Vt. 193), 346.
848, 869.
Bly V. HaTerhill (UO Mass. 530),
1467.
Bly V. Whitehall Village (120 N. Y.
506), 1493, 1499.
Blythe v. Tompkins (3 Abb. Pr. 468),
839.
Board &c. v. Arnett (116 Ind. 438),
.1430.
Board &c. v. Bailey (133 Ind. 46),
1435.
Board &o. v. Baker (34 111. App. 331),
1432, 1334.
Board &c. v. Baker (34 111. App.
620), 867, 1383.
Board &c. v. Beckwith (10 Kan.
603), 671.
Board &o. v. Board (58 Miss. 619),
1866.
Board &c. v. Board of County
Comm'rs of Bent County (15
Colo. 330; 25 Pac. Eep. 508), 457.
Board &o. v. Board of Ed. (30 West
Va. 434), 1334.
Board &c. v. Board of Siiperyisors
(18 N. Y. Supl. 883), 1011.
Board &o. v. Boehr {ri 111. App. 639),
1836.
Board &c. v. Boswell (Ind., 30 N. E.
Eep. 534), 1014.
Board &c. v. Boynton (30 Ind. 859),
798. 973.
Board &c. v. Bradford (73 Ind. 455 ;
37 Am. Rep. 174). 666.
Board &o. v. Brod (Ind., 29 N. E.
Eep. 430), 1431.
Board &c. v. Brown (89 Ind. 48),
1432, 1435, 1427, 1484.
Board &o. v. Brown (Ind., 80 N. E.
Eep. 935), 996.
Board &c. v. Brown (33 La. Ann.
333), 329.
Board &o. v. Burkey (1 Ind., App.
565; 37 N. E. Rep. 1108), 993.
Board &o. v. Byrne (67 Ind. 21), 798.
Board (Sfc. v. Casey (18 N. Y. St.-
Rep. 251), 1036.
Board &c. v. Catlett's Ex'rs (86 Va.
158), 891.
Board &c. v. Chipps (Ind., 29 N. E.
Rep. 1066), 1431.
Board &o. v. Cbitwood (8 Ind. 504),
1330.
Board &c. v. Cincinnati Steam Heat-
ins Co. (Ind., 37 N. E. Rep. 612),
797.
Board &o. v. City of Kingston (DO
Hun, 485 ; 3N. Y. Supl. 231), 1003.
Board &o. v. Clark (93 N. Y. 391),
184, 330.
Board &c. v. Cole (Ind., 28 N. E.
Rep. 772), 606.
Board &c. v. Comm'rs of Hendricks
Co. (33 Ind. 334), 433.
Board &c. v. Common Council of
Detroit (38 Mich. 437), 15.
Board &c. v. Crotty (9 Colo. 318;
13 Pac. Rep. 151), 1537.
Board &c. v. Darrow (13 Colo. 460;
23 Pac. Rep. 784; 40 Am. &Eng.
Corp. Cas. 342), 207, 388.
Board &c, v. Da vies (Wash., 1890;
24 Pac. Rep. 540), 114, 115, 414.
Board &o. v. Day (ip Ind. 450), 909,
* 933.
Board &c. v. Deprez (87 Ind. 509),
1427.
Board &c. v. Dombke (94 Ind. 73),
1430.
Board &o. v. Edmonds (76 111. 544),
1595.
Board &c. v. Emmerson (95 Ind, 579),
1430.- 1484.
Board &c. v. Fahlor (114 Ind. 176;
15 N. E. Rep. 880), 898.
Board &o. v. Fonda (77 N. Y. 350),
313, 825, 953.
Board &c. v. Fullen (111 Ind. 410;
12N. E. Rep. 398), 898, 1161.
Board <S;o. «. Fullen (118 Ind. 158;
20 N. E. Rep. 771), 898.
Board &c. v. Gantt (73 Md. 531 ; 21
Atl. Rep. 548), 803, 1533,
Board &c. v. Harrodsburg Educa-
tional Dist. (Ky., 7 S. W. Rep.
313), 874.
Board &c. v. Hicks (3 Ind. 527), 1534.
Board &c. v. Hildebrand (1 Ind. 555),
1000.
Board &c. v. Hill (115 Ind. 816; 16
N. E. Rep. 156), 637, 839, 898.
Board &o. v. Hill (123 Ind. 315), 798.
Board &c. v. Hon (87 Ind. 356), 798,
973.
Board &c. v. Horton (75 Iowa, 371 ;
39 N. W. Rep. 394), 376, 378.
Board &o. v. Half (91 Ind. 333), 1415.
Board &c. v. Jennings (104 Ind. 108),
798. ,
Board &o. v. Jewell (44 Minn. 437;
46 N. W. Rep. 914), 381, 865.
Board &c. v. Johnson (134 Ind. 145),
307, 1536.
Board &o. v. Johnson (127 Ind. 238;
26 N. E. Rep. 821). 895.
Board &c. v. Judice (39 La. Ann. 666),
339.
Board &c. v. Legg (110 Ind. 479),
1422. 1425, 1436, 1437, 1430. -
Board &o. v. Leggett (US Ind. 544;
18 N. E. Rep. 53), 893.
Board &c. v. Linnon (26 Kan. 1),
1345.
Board &c. v. Lomax (Ind., 81 N. E.
Rep. 584), 798, 974.
TABLB OV OASES.
Ixv
[The references are to pages: Vol.
Board &c. v. MoLeod (34 Kan. 306),
968.
Board &o. v. McManus (54 Ark. 446),
1537.
Board &o. v. Markle (46 Ind. 96).
526.
Board &c. v. Mesenheimcr (78 111.
22), 1338.
Board &c. v. Minor (23 Ohio St. 311),
1346.
Board &c. v. Moore (17 Minn. 417),
750.
Board &c. v. Motherwell Iron &
Steel Co. (123 Ind. 364),/797.
Board &c. v. Muhlenbacker(18 Kan.
139), 694.
Board &c. v. Newlin (Ind., 31 N. E.
Rep. 465), 897. 898.
Board &c. v. Neidenberger (78 111.
58), 1381.
Board &c. v. New York Horse Ma-
nure Co. (N. J. Eq., 19 Atl. Rep.
1098), 1058.
Board &c. v. Osborn (Ind., 31 N. E.
Rep. 541), 799, 893, 968, 973.
Board &c. v. Pashley (19 S. C. 315),
1388.
Board &c. v. Pearson (120 Ind. 426),
1430.
- Board &c. v. People (24 HI. App.
410). 1552.
Board &c. v. People (38 111. App.
339), 1531.
Board &c. o. Pierce (New Mex., 1893 ;
38 Pac. Rep. 513), 473.
Board &c. v. Quick (99 N. Y. 138),
184.
Board &c. v. Railway Co. (46 Tex.
316), 563.
Board &c. v. Reissner (58 Ind. 260 ;
66 Ind. 568), 813.
Board &c. v. Reynolds (49 HI. 186),
974.
Board &c. v. Rickel (106 Ind. 501),
1436.
Board &c. v. Bistine (124 Ind. 342),
1000.
Board &c. v. Ritter (90 Ind. 362),
798, 974.
Board &c. •. Biehr (23 111. App.
629), 633-.
Board &c. v. Rogers (55 Ind. 297),
660.
Board &c. v. Ross (46 Ind. 404),
703.
Board &c. v. Scbmoke (51 Ind. 416),
1000.
Board &c. v. School Dist. (Ark., 19
S. W. Rep. 969), 1167.
Board &o. v. Srhool Dist. (Wis., 51
N. W. Rep. 874), 1338.
Board &c. v. Seaton (90 Ind. 158),
798, 973.
I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Board &o. v. Shields (Ind., 39 N. E.
Rep. 385), 971.
Board &c. v. Silvers (33 Ind. 491),
897.
Board &c. v. Spitler (13 Ind. 335),
432.
Board &c. v. Springfield (63 HI. 66),
1024.
Board &c. v. State (61 Ind. 379), 1636,
1537.
Board &c. v. State (113 Ind. 179),
1426.
Board &c. v. State (115 Ind. 64), 945.
Board «S:o. v. State (133 Ind. 333),
1341.
Board &o. v. State (43 Kan. 337),
1554.
Board &c. v. State (43 N. J. Law,
263). 1425.
Board &c. i>. State of Ohio (45 Ohio
St. 555), 1345.
Board &c. v. Taylor (123 Ind. 148;
30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 394),
659, 797.
Board &c. v. Templer (84 Ind. 333),
861.
Board &c. v. Templeton (116 Ind,
369: 19 N. E. Rep. 183), 184.
Board &c. v. Thomas (Ky., 15 S. W.
Rep. 670), 1337.
Board &c. v. Thompson (106 Ind.
534), 1428.
Board &c. v. Valentine (32 N. Y. St.
Rep. 919), 1036.
Board &c. v. Ward (69 Ind. 441),
666.
Board &c. v. Weeks (Ind., 39 N. E.
Rep. 776). 812.
Board &c. v. Wertz (112 Ind. 268;
13 N. E. Rep. 874), 881.
Board &c. v. Wood (136 Ind. 168;
35 N. E. Rep. 190), 861.
Board &o. v. Woods (77 Mo. 197),
576.
Board of Trade Tel. Co. v. Barnett
(107 111. 507), 678.
Boardman v. Flagg (70 Mich. 373),
819.
Boardman v. Ealliday (10 Paige,
238), 199.
Boardman v. Supervisors (85 N. Y.
359). 1855, 1575.
Bobbett V. State (10 Kan. 9), 343,
1520.
Bock V. City of Brooklyn (2 N. Y.
Supl. 559). 1190.
Bodwio V. Fennell (1 Wils. 833), 530,
Boehm v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore
(61 Md. 259), 1025.
Bogart V. Green (8 Mo. 115), 333.
Bogart V. Township of Lamotte (79
Mich. 394; 44 N. W. Rep. 612),
330, 383, 630, 631.
Ixvi
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Boge V. Girardey (38 La, Ann. 7L7),
1357.
Bogert V. Indianapolis (13 Ind. 134),
1036.
Bogert V. Trustees (43 N. J. Law,
358), 343, 347.
Bohen v. Waseca (33 Minn. 176), 365,
1466.
Bohler v. Schneider (49 Ga. 195),
1356, 1370.
Bohlman v. Railway Co. (40 Wis.
157), 190.
Bohmy«. State (81 Tex, App. 597),
513.
Bohn V. Metrop, EI, R, Co. (129 N, Y.
576), 1433.
Boland v. City of Kansas (33 Mo.
App, 8), 1495.
Bolger V. Foss (65 Cal, 350), 1433.
vBollest). Brimfield (130 U*. S, 759; 7
S, Ct. Rep. 736), 63% 941.
Bolton V. Good (41 N. J. Law, 296),
375.
Bonaparte v. C. &c, R. Co, (1 Bald.
• 305), 4, 7.
Bond V. Hiestand (20 La, Ann, 139),
113, 113.
Bond V. Kenosha (17 Wis, 384), 558,
Bond V. Newark (19 N; J. Eq. 376),
1130,
Bonesteel v. Mavor (33 N. Y, 163),
253, 634, 1140.
iJonham v. Taylor (Tex,, 16 S, W,
Rep, 5S5 ; 33 Am, «fc Eng. Corp,
Cas, 647), 637, 871,
Bonne v. Logan (43 N, J, Law, 421),
641,
Bonnell v. Allen (53 Ind, 130), 651,
BonnelL v. County of Nuckolls (49
N. W. Rep, 225), 833,
Bonner v. McPhail (31 Barb, 106),
1259
Bonner k State (7 Ga, 473), 1558,
Bonsall v, Lebanon (19 Ohio, 419),
1123, 1181,
Bontong v. City of Brooklyn (15
Barb, 375), 1133.
Boody V. United States (1 Woodb, &
M, 150), 380,
Book V. Earl (87 Mo, 246), 634, 833.
Booker v. Young (13Gratt, 303), 169.
Boom V. Utica (3 Barb, 104), 350,
252,
Boom Co, V. Patterson (98 U. S, 403),
591. B93, 1088, 1151.
Boone v. People (4 111, App, 231),
1333,
Boone County v. Armstrong (23 Neb,
764; 37 N, W, Rep, 63B), 881.
Boone County v. Keck (31 Ark. 387),
1596.
Boone County v. Jones (54 Iowa, 699 ;
87 Am, Kep, a6B), 208, 312, 336,
Booneville v. Ormrod (36 'Mo, 193),
1419.
Booth V. Town of Carthage (67 111.
108), 538.
Booth V. Woodbury (33 Conn. 125),
817,
BootKbay v. Giles (68 Me. 160), 313,
Boots V. Washburn (79 N. Y. 307)»
1093.
Bordages v. Higgins (Tex., 19 S. W.
Rep. 446), 1135.
Bordeaux v. Meridian Land &c, Co.
(67 Miss, 304), 1340.
Bore V. Bush (6 Mart, N, S, (La.) 1),
339,
Boring v. Williams (17 Ala. 510), 328,
1259.
Bork V. City of Buffalo (127 N. Y,
• 64; 37 N, Y, St, Rep, 333), 845.
Borough w. Simmons (113 Pa. St.
384;,5 AlhRep. 434), 1101,
Borough of fipthlehem v. Haus (Pa.,
26 W, N. C, 348; 19 Atl, Rep,
437), 1096,
Borough of Chartiers' Appeal (Pa,,
8 Atl. Rep 181), 1149,
Borough of Dunmore's Appeal (53
Pa, St, 374), 458, 1371, 1373.
Borough'of Freemansburg v. Rodg-'
ers (Pa., 8 Atl, Rep, 873), 1143.
Borough of Freeport v. Marks (9 Pa,
St, 253), 215,
Borough of Greensburg v. Young (53
Pa. St, 280), 1133,
Borough of Hanover's Appeal (Pa.,
24 Atl, Rep, 669), 583, 584,
Borough of Little Meadows (35 Pa,
St. 335), 1366,
Borough of Milford v. Milford Water
Co. (124 Pa, St, 610; 17 Atl, Rep,
185; 23 W, N, C, 413), 1397, .
Borough of Millvale v. Railway Co.
(131 Pa, St. 1 ; 18 Atl, Rep. 993),
1307.
Borough of Mt, Pleasant v. Balti-
more &c. R, Co, (Pa„ 30 Atl,
Rep. 105i), 1168.
Borough of -Norristown v. Fitzpat-
riok (94 Pa. St. 121), 755.
Borough of Norristown v. Norris-
town Pass, Rv. Co. (Pa., 33 Atl,
Rep. 1060), 1103,
Borough of Sayro v, Phillips (Pa.,
1892), 34 Atl, Rep, 76), 520, 1335.
Borough of Taylorsport, In re (18
Atl. Rep. 224), 64.
Borough of West Philadelphia (5
Watts & Serg, 281), 403,
Borough of Yarmouth Case (3
Brownlow & Goldsb. 392), 43.
Borough of York v. Forsoht (23 Pa,
St. 391), 635,
Boss V. Hewett (20 Wis, 460), 957,
TABLE OF OASES.
Ixvu
rrhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Boss V. Litton (5 Car. & P. 407),
1498.
Bossy V. Gillmore (3 Me. 191), 1393.
Boston V. Baldwin (139 Mass. 315),
1261.
Boston u Brazer (11 Mass. 447), 657.
Boston t'. Mt. Washington (139 Mass.
15; 29 N. E. Rep. 60), 980.
Boston V. Schaffer (9 Pick, 415),
1233.
Boston V. Shaw (1 Met 130), 518,
S21, 1188.
Boston V. Simmons (150 Mass. 461;
15 Am. St. Rep. 330), 209, 216.
Boston V. Wells (14 Mass. 884). 982.
Boston V. Weymouth (4 Cush. 53S),
1266.
Boston Belting Co. v. City of Boston
(149 Mass. 44; 20 N. E. Rep.
320), 1099.
Boston Mills v. Cambridge (117
Mass. 896), 772.
Boston & Albany R. Co., In re (53
N. y. 574), 676.
Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Lowell &c.
R. Co. (124 Mass. 368), 676.
Boston djoc. R. Co. v. Boston (140
Mass. 87), 1404.
Boston ate. R. Co. v. Folsom (46
N. H. 64), 705.
Boston &c. Society v. Boston (116
Mass. 181; 17 Am. Rep. 15B),
llt)6.
Bostwick V. Barlow (14 Hun, 177),
221.
Bostwick V. Van Voorhis (91 N. Y.
3)3), 323.
Boucher v. New Haven (40 Conn.
456), 1445, 1478.
Boulden v. Fowler (11 Colo. 396; 18
Pac. Rep. 337), 1096.
I Boulder v. Niles (9 Colo. 415), 265,
1417, 1458, 1459.
Bouldin v. Baltimore (15 Md. 18),
1171.
Boulton V. Crowther (3 Barn. & C.
703J, 757.
Bound V. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. (45
Wis. 543). 617, 646, 945, 1583.
Bounds V. Kirven (63 Tex. 159),
,674.
Bourdeaux v. Meriden Land & In-
dustrial Co. (67 Miss. 304), 800.
Bourget v. Cambridge (Mass., 31 N.
E. Rep. 390), 1448.
Bourne v. State (Neb;, 52 N. W. JEJep.
7i0), 1331.
Bouton V. Brooklyn (15 Barb. 393),
1574.
Bouton V. McDonough Co. (84 III.
384), 614.
Bouton V. Neilson (3 Johns. 475),
1189.
Bow V. AUenstown (34 N. H. 351),
54, 92, 13:i5.
Bowditch V. Boston (101 U. S. 16),
759.
Bo wdoinham v. Richmond (6 Greenl.
(Me.) 112), 1389.
Bowen v. Mayor &o. (79 Ga. 709),
937.
Bowen v. Morris (2 Taunt. 374). 262.
Bowen v. Newell (16 R. I. 238; 14
Atl. Rep. 87U), 1397.
Bowen v. State (108 N. Y. 166), 20.
Bowers v. Fleming (67 Ind. 541), 331.
Bowler v. Drain Comm'rs (47 Mich.
154), 190. ,
Bowlin V. Furman (28 Mo. 437). 624.
Bowling Green v. Carson (10 Bush,
64). 106, 1243.
Bowman v. Tripp (14 R. L 242), 1480.
Bowman v. Venice &o. R. Co. (103
111. 459), 691, 693.
Boy V. Girardey (38 La. Ann. 717),
1370.
Boyce v. Auditor-General (Mich., 51
N. W. Rep. 4^7), 818.
Boyd V. Alabama (91 U. S. 645),
1032.
Boyd V. Chambers (78 Ky. 140), 95,
109, 12)3.
Bovd I'. City of Selma (Ala., 11 So.
■ Rep. 393), 1355.
Boyd V. Insurance Patrol (113 Pa, St.
169), 9, 10.
Boyd V. Readsboro (52 Vt. 522), 783.
Boyd V. School Tp. (114 Ind. 310; 16
N. E. Rep. 511), 815, 830, 1333.
Boyd V. State (88 Ala. lB9j, 1344.
Boyden v. BrooUline (8 Vt. 284), 183.
Boyden v. United States (13 Wall.
17), 331.
Boyer v. Hoboken (44 N. J. Law,
131), 506.
Boyland v. Mayor &c. (1 Sandf. 27),
250, 643.
Boyle V. Brooklyn (71 N. Y. 495),
1174.
Boyle V. City of New Orleans (8 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 339), 646.
Boyt«. Dougherty Co. (79 Ga. 211;
3 S. E. Rep. 613), ^68.
Brabham v. Supervisors of Hurds
Co. (54 Miss. 363). 10.
Braoeville v. Doherty (30 111. App.
645), 520, 1235.
Brackenridge v, Fitchburg (145
Mass. lUO). 1499.
Brackeit v. Blake (7 Met. 335), 1115.
Braden v. ]p.cNutt (114 Ind. 314: 16
N. E. Rep. 170), 1326, 1,340.
Bradford v. Armiston (92 Ala. 349),
1431.
Bradford v. Chicago (25 111. 412), 242,
343.
Ixviii
TABLB OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: YoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605J
Bradish v. Lucken (88 Minn. 168),
1573.
Bradley v. Bander (36 Ohio St. 36),
1351.
Bradley v. City of Eau Claire (56
Wis. 168; 14 N. W. Rep. 10),
893.
Bradley v. City of Rochester (7 N. Y.
Supl. 337). 1334, 1335.
Bradley v. Fisher (18 "Wall. 351),
317.
Bradley v. Frankfort (99 Ind. 417),
695.
Bradley v. Franklin County (65 Mo.
638), 941. .
Bradley v. Love (76 Iowa, 397; 41 N.
W. Rep. 53). 873.
Bradley v. McAtee (7 Bush, 667),
1163,
Bradley v. Richmond (6 Vt. 131),
1596.
Bradley v. Village of West Duluth
(Minn., 47 N. W. Rep. 166), 1078.
Bradshaw v. Camden (39 N. J. Law,
416), 1533.
Bradshaw v. Omaha (1 Neb. 16), 110,
403, 1367. •
Bradshaw v. Rogers (30 Johns. 103),
670.
Bradstreet v. Supervisors (13 Wend.
546), 141.
Brad well v. State (16 Wall. 130), 144,
147.
Brady v. Ellis (59 N. Y. 630), 714.
Brady v. Howe (50 Miss. 607), 178.
Brady v. King (53 Cal. 44), 1173.
Brady v. Lowell (3 Gush, 131), 746,
770, 1448.
Brady v. Mavor &e. of Brooklyn (1
Barb. 584), 657.
Brady v. Mayor &c. of New York (20
N. Y. 312), 251 ; 256, 257, 259, 639,
640, 643, 713, 714.
Brady v. Mayor &o. of New York
(N. Y.., 30 N. E. Rep. 757), 716.
Brady v. Northwestern Ins. Co. (H
Mich. 435), 1054, 1346.
Brady v. Weeks (3 Barb. 157), 1047.
Braidy v. Theritt (17 Kan. 468), 200.
Brainard v. New Xondon (33 Conn.
552), 664.
Braintree v. Battles (6 Vt. 395), 90,
93.
Braley v. Dickinson (48 Vt. 599),
351.
Bramah v. Roberta (3 Bing. N. C.
963), 922.
Bramwell v. Guheen (Idaho, 29 Fac.
Rep. 110), 370, 1394.
Branch v. Commissioners (3 Call
(Va.), 438). 337.
Branch v, Marengo (43 Iowa, 600),
1359.
Brandlrff v. Harrisan County (50
Iowa, 164), 648.
Brandon, Ex parte (49 Ark. 143; 4
S. W. Rep. 453). 1012.
Brandt v. City of Milwaukee (69
Wis. 386; 34 N. W. Rep. 246;
1193.
Branham v. San Josd (24 Cal. 585),
624, 643.
Brannon v. County Court (33 West
Va. 789; 11 S. B. Rep. 34). 843.
Braun v. City of Chicago (110 111.
% 186), 1339.
Braun v. Sauerwein (10 Wall. 318),
475.
Bray v. Wallingtord (30 Conn. 416),
156, 1597.
Bray ton v. Fall River (113 Mass. 218),
772, 785.
Brazil v. McBride (69 Ind. 244), 180.
Breaux v. Parish of Iberville (23 La.
Ann. 333), 633.
Breaux's Bridge, Jn re (30 La. Ann.
1105), 500.
Breckner v. Gordon (81 Ky. 665 ; 4
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 395), 95,
109.
Breed v. Conley (14 Iowa, 369), 336.
Breese ii. Poole (16 111. App. 551),
698.
Bregguglia v. Lord (N. J., 30 Atl.
Rep. 1083), 603.
Brehm v. Mayor &o. (104 N. Y. 186),
1598.
Brehm v. Mayor &c. (39 Hun, SSB),
1184.
Breichelbeil w. Powlez(15N. Y. Supl.
465), 991.
Brenham v. Brenham Water Co. (67
Tex. 543: 4 S. W. Rep. 143), 549,
567, 635, 637, 1398.
Brenham u German- American Bank
(144 U. S. 173), 561, 796, 934, 926,
937.
Breninger v. Belvidere (44 N. J. Law,
350), 104, 519.
Brennan v. Bradshaw (53 Tex. 330),
405.
Brennan v. St. Louis (92 Mo. 433),
1430, 1486.
Bres V. Louviere (37 La. Ann. 736),
1341.
Brevoort v. Detroit (24 Mich. 333),
1188.
Brewer v. Bowman (9 Ga. 37), 684.
Brewer v. Inhabitants of New Glou-
cester (14 Mass. 316). 150, 153.
Brewer v. Springfield (97 Mass. 153),
1188, 1573.
Brewer v. Watson (71 Ala. 299). 1374.
Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer (63 Me.
03 ; 16 Am. Rep. aa5), 930, 1354,
1393, 1396.
TABLE OF OASES.
Ixix
(The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
Brewis v. Duluth (3 McO. (U. S. C.
Ct.) 219), 454.
Brewster v. Dennis (31 Pick. 233),
983.
Brewster v. Harwich (4 Mass. 278),
451.
Brewster v. Hyde (7 N. H. 206), 344,
349.
Brewster v. Syracuse (19 N. Y. 118),
1181.
Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor
&c. of New York (5 Cow. 538),
606, 1026.
Brickill v. New York (7 Fed. Eep.
479), 749.
Bricklayer v. Plasterers (Palm. 396),
487.
Bridge Co. v. Frankfort (18 B. Mon.
41), 645.
Bridge Co. v. Hoboken Land & Im-
provement Co. (13 N. J. Eq.
(2 Beas.) 81). 584, 1216.
Bridge Co. v. United States (105 U.
S. 470), 1433, 1424.
Bridgeport v. Housatonio R. Co. (15
Conn. 475), 208, 2ai, 643, 932,
933, 941.
Bridgeport v. Railroad Co. (36 Conn,
255), 591, 1160.
Bridgeport Ins. Co. v. Wilson (34
N. Y. 281). 1452.
Bridges v. Griffin (33 Ga. 113), 1353.
Bridges v. Sballcross (6 West Va.
562), 158.
Bridges v. WvokofE (67 N. Y. 130),
1408, 1422.
Bridgewater v. Plymouth (97 Mass.
383), 980.
Bridgford v. Tuscambia (4 Woods,
611), 1270.
Briegel v. City of Philadelphia (26
W. N. C. 853; 19 Atl. Rep. 1038),
1099.
Brientnall v. City (103 Pa. St. 156),
592.
Brieswick v. Mayor &c. of Bruns-
wick (51 Ga. 639), 533.
Briggs V. Borden (71 Mich. 87; 38
N. W. Eep. 713), 368, 631, 648,
1336.
Briggs V. Coleman (51 Ala. 561),
319
Briggs v. Murdock (13 Pick. 305), 347,
350, 351, 353.
Briggs V. Wardwell (10 Mass. 356),
339.
Briggs V. Whipple (6 Vt. 94), 664
Brigham v. Edmunds (7 Gray; 359),
778.
Bright V. Association (33 La. Ann.
59), 719.
Bright V. McCulIough (27 Ind. 223),
441, 1356.
Bright V. Supervisors (18 Johns. 242),
184.
Brightman v. Bristol (65 Me. 436),
757.
Brighton v. Kirner (32 Wis. 54),
1361.
Brighton v. Pensacola (93 U. S. 266),
474.
Brimmer v. Boston (102 Mass. 19),
633.
Brinckerhoff v. Board of Education
(6 Abb. Pr. (N.'S.) 428; 37 How.
Pr. 499; 2 Daly, 443), 1595.
Brinkmeyor v. Citv of Evansville "
(39 Ind. 187), 9, 323, 744.
Brinton's Appeal (142 Pa. St. 511),
407, 410.
Briscoe v. Bank (11 Peters. 357), 20.
Bristol V. Johnson (34 Mich. 133),
1572.
Bristol V. New Chester (3 N. H. 521),
67, 83, 451, 1368.
Biitton V. Fort Worth (78 Tex. 227 ;
34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas, 411),
317, 318.
Britton v. Platte City (2 Dill. 1), 804.
Brizzolari v. State (37 Ark. 3ii4),
604.
Broad v. City of Paris (66 Tex. 119;
18 S. W. Rep. 342). 318, 327.
Broadnac's Case (1 Vent. 196), 90.
Broadway &c. R. Co. v. Mayor &o.
(1 N. Y. Supl. 646), 1212.
Broadway Bapt. Church f, McAtee
(8 Bush. 508), 1166, 1182.
Broadway Widening, In re (63 Barb.
573), 296.
Broberg v. Des Moines (63 Iowa,
523), 1480.
Brockmau v. City of Creston (79
Iowa, 587; 44 N. W, Rep. 823;
29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 69),
104, 577, 61«, 648.
Brockton v. Cross (138 Mass. 297),
889.
Brockton v. ITxbridge (138 Mass.
292), 980.
Brodhead v. Milwaukee (19 Wis.
624), 931.
Brodie v. McCabe (33 Ark. 690),
1373.
Brokaw v. City of Terre Haute (97
Ind. 451), 697.
Brokaw V. Comm'rs&c. (130 III. 482),
1533.
Brome v. Cuming Countv (Neb., 34
Am. & Eng. Corp. " Cas. 481),
659.
Bronsoo v. Borough of Wallingford
(54 Conn. 513 ; 9 Atl. Rep. 393),
1137. *
Bronson v. Oberlin (41 Ohio St. 476)
557. '
bcz
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages; Vol. J, pp. 1-788; Vol. IT, pp. 789-1605.]
Bronson v. Town of Washington (57
Conn. 346; 18 Atl. Eep. 264),
1593, 1600.
Bronson v. Woolsey (17 Johns. 46),
213.
Brookfleld v. Eeed (153 Mass. 568),
1080.
Brookhaven v. Strong(60 N. Y. 57), 31.
Brooklyn v. Breslin (57 N. Y. 591),
489, 519. 521, 549, 551, 1238.
Brooklyn v. Brooklyn E. Co. (47 N,
Y. 476), 1453.
Brooklvn v. Cleves (1 Hill & D. Sup.
231), 581.
Brooklyn i). Insurance Co. (99 U. S.
363). 964.
Brooklvn v. Meserole (26 Wend. 132),
1573.
Brooklyn v. Railroad Co. (47 N. Y.
486), 1200.
Brooklyn Central R. Co. v. Brooklyn
City R. Co. (32 Barb. 358), 103,
488.
Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Arm-
strong (45 N. Y. 234), 94, 624,
671, 683.
Brooklyn Street, In re (118 Pa. St.
640), 1407.
Brooklvn Trust Co. v. Hebron (51
Conn. 33), 350, 851, 3B4, 372.
Brooks v.. Fischer (79 Cal. 173; 21
Pac. Rep. 652), 63, 69, 96.
Brooks V. Mangan (Mich., 49 N. W.
Rep. 633). 1335, 1236.
Brooks V. Mitchell (9 M. & W. 15),
957.
Brooks V. Polk County (53 Iowa,
460), 1364.
Brooks V. Riding (46 Ind. 15), 1144.
Brooks V. Shelton (47 Miss. 343), 1568.
Brooks V. SomerviJle (106 Mass. 371),
1478.
Brookville v. Gagle (73 Ind. 117), 530,
589.
Brophy r. Hyatt (10 Colo. 333; 15
Pac. Rep. 399), 177, 301, 1025.
Brophy- v. Landman (28 Ohio St.
543). 1170.
Brophy v. Perth Amboy (44 N. J.
Lrtw, 217). 539.
Brothers V. Comm'rs (70 N. C, 726)
832.
Broughton v. Manchester Water-
works (3 Barn. & Aid. 1), 933.
Broughton v. Pensacola (93 U. S.
266), 97, 417, 421, 423. -
Brouwtr v. Appleby (1 Sandf. 158),
87.
Brown's Case (153 Mass. 1). 1355.
Brown v. Austin (1 Mass. 208; 3 Am.
Deo. 211), 213.
Brown v. Beatty (34 M:8^. 327), 669,
704.
Brown V. Big Rapids (83 Mich. 101),
758.
Brown v. Board of Infirmary Di-
rectors (Ohio, 81 N. E. Rep. 744),
1007.
Brown v. Bon Homme County (86.
Dak.. 46 N. W. Rep, 173), 630,
911, 948.
Brown v. City of Atchison (39 Kan.
37), 338, 719.
Brown v. City of Cape Girardeau (90
Mo. 377). 1391.
Btown V. City of Denver (7 Colo.
305), 1178.
Brown v. City ot oiibLd Rapids (81
Mich."]Ol; 47 N. W. Rep. 117),
1125.
Brown v. County Comm'rs (3 Mc-
Crary, 469), 792.
Brown v. County Comm'rs (21 Pfl.
St. 37), 528.
Brown v. Crego (33 Iowa, 438), 1378.
Brown v. Denver (3 Colo. 169), 1169.
Brown v. Duplassis (14 La. Ann. 842),
590.
Brown v. Finiey (3 MacArthur, 77),
1596.
Brown v. Gates (15 West Va. 131), 12,
1380.
Brown v. Glasgow (57 Mo. 156), 1430.
Brown v. Green (46 How, Pr. 306),
1535.
Brown v. Hicks (1 Pike (Ark.), 332),
1367.
Brown v. Hummel (6 Pa. St. 86); 5.
Brown v. Illius (37 Conn. 84), 765.
Brown v. Inhabitants of Melrose
(Mass., 30 N. E. Rep. 87), 818.
Brown v. Inhabitants of Vinal Haven
(65 Me. 40?), 1037.
Brown v. Insurance Co. (3 La. Ann.
177.), 465. .
Brown v. Jerome (103 111. 871), 1355.
Brown v. Lowell (8 Met. 172), 677.
Brown v. Lunt (37 Me. 423). 198.
Brown v. Mayor &c. of New York
(63 N. Y. 239), 259, 639.
Brown v. Merrick County (18 Neb.
355), 1434.
Brown V. Moseley (11 Sm. & Marsh.
(Miss. 354), 835.
Brown v. Powell (35 Iowa, 329), 1419.
Brown v. Rome &o. R. Co. (86 Ala.
306), 694.
3rown v. Ruse (69 Tex. 589; 7 S. W.
Rep. 489), 906.
Brown v. Rush County (Kan., 17
Pac. Rep. 304), 389.
Brown u.. School Dlst. (64 N. H. 303;
10 Atl. Rep. 119), 627.
Brown v. Smith (24 Barb. 419), 1578.
Brown v. Southbury (53 Conn. 313),
1483.
TABLE 07 OASES.
Izzi
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1605.]
Brown i). State (82 Ga. 224; 7 S. E.
Rep. 915), 1544.
Brown v. Town Board &c. (77 Wis.
27; 45 N. W. Rep. 67B), 830, 909,
917, 919. 1347.
Brown v. Town of Canton (4 Lans.
(N. Y.)409), 830.
Brown v. Utica (2 Barb. 104), 643.
Brown v. Winterport (79 Me. 305 ; 9
All. Rep. 844), 257, 304, 352, 358,
862, 3U6, 363, 811.
Brownell v. Palmer (32 Conn. 107),
860, 374.
Brownell v. Town of Greenwich
(114 N.Y. 51^), 956.
Browning v. Board (44 Ind. 11), 1124.
Browning v. City of Springfield (17
111. 143), 267.
■ Brownlee v. Board (81 Ind. 186), 815.
Brownlee v. Union (53 Iowa, 489),
1400.
Brownsville Comm'rs v. Loague (139
U. S. 493), 1375.
Brownville v. Cook (4 Neb. 102), 589,
604.
Bruce v. Dickey (116 111, 537),>658,
713, 824.
Bruck V. Broesigks (18 Iowa, 393),
5li5.
Brucker v. Covington (69 Ind. 33),
1500.
Bruecher v. Village of Portchester
(101 N. Y. 240), 113.3, 1184.
Brus;geraian v. True (25 Minn, 133),
.696.
Brumm's Appeal (Pa., 12 Atl. Rep.
855), 1310.
Brunswick v. Brunswick (51 Ga.
639), 128.
Brunswick v. Dunning (7 Mass. 445),
451.
Brunswick v. Finney (54 Ga. 317),
64. >
Bi'unswick v. Litchfield (3 Greenl.
(Me ) 38), 1389.
Brunswick v. McKean (4 Me. 508),
373.
Brush V. City of Carbondale (78 III.
74) 591 1194.
Brusso' V. Buffalo (90 N. Y. 679),
1444, 1469, 1478, 1491, 1497.
Bryan v. Cattell (15 Iowa, 538), 187,
1293. ,
Bryan v. Page (51 Tex, 533; 33 Am.
Rep. ^7), a38, 259, 485, 639, 659.
Bryan v, Uuited States (1 Black,
140), 325
Bryan v. Wsar (4 Mo. 106), 1268.
Bryant v. City of St. Paul (33 Minn.
289 ; 8 Am. & Bng. Corp. Cas.
201), 744, 851, 1037.
Bryant v. Robbins (70 Wis. 258 ; 85
N. W. Rep. 545), 1097.
Bryant v. Town of Randolph (14 N.
Y. Supl. 844), 767, 773.
Bryant v. Town of Randolph (133
N. Y. 70), 748, 1471.
Bryant i;. Wood (11 Lea (Tenn.), 337),
314.
Brydon v. Campbell (40 Md. 381),
225.
Bryson v. Johnson County (100 Mo.
76; 13 S. W. Rep. 239), 793, 1091.
Buchanan v. City of Duluth (45
Minn. 403; 43 N. W. Rep. 204),
1098.
Buchanan v. Curtis (35 Wis. 99),
1406.
Buchanan v. Litchfield (102 U. S.
278), 633, 834, 936, 946, 963.
Buchanan v. School Dist. (35 Mo.
App. 85), 613. 633.
Buchanon v. Satlein (9 Mo. App.
564), 709.
Buck V. Colbath (3 Wall. 341), 333,
334.
Buck V. Collins (51 Ga. 391), 1373.
Buck V. Lockport (6 Lansing (N. Y.),
351), 1376.
Buckinghouse v. Gregg (19 Ind, 401),
433.^
Buckland v. Conway (16 Mass. 396),
657.
Buckley v. Briggs (30 Mo. 453), 260.
Buckley v. Drake (41 Hun, 384), 704.
Bucknall v. Story (36 Cal. 67), 1160,
1574.
Bucknall v. Story (46- Cal. 589), 344,
247.
Buckner. Ex parte (4£ing. (Ark.) 73),
1.576.
Buckner v. Augusta (1 A. K. Marsh.
9), 634.
Buckner v. Gordon (81 Ky. 665), 377.
Bucksport V. Spofford (i3 Me. 487),
347, 351, 353.
Bucroft V. City of Council Bluffs
(63 Iowa, 646), 644.
Buell V. Ball (20 Iowa, 283), 522, 785,
13t)4, 1366,
Buell V. Buckingham (16 Iowa, 284).
492.
Buell V. State (45 Art. 336), 1348.
Buffalo, In re (78 N. Y. 363), 1265
Buffalo V. Chadcayne (N. Y., 31 N.
E. Rep. 443), 595.
Buffalo V. Schliefer (25 Hun, 275),
539.
Buffalo V. Webster (10 Wend. 99),
106, 521, 580, 1243.
Buford 13. State (73 Tex. 182; 10
S. W. Rep. 401), 121, 130, 413.
419, 465. ' '
Building Inspectors, 7b re (R. X, 21
Atl. Rep. 913), 177.
Bull V. Bull (43 Conn. 469), 1389. %,
Ixzli
TABLE 07 OASES.
(The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Bull V. Conroe (13 "Wis. 333), 557.
Bull V. Read {]3Gratt. 73), 68, 67.
Bullitt V. Clement (16 B. Mon. (Ky.)
193), 2ia.
Bullitt County v. Washer (130 U. S.
142), 286.
Bullock V. Curry (2 Met. (Ky.) 171),
1386, 1390.
Bullock V. Geomble (45 111. 218),
5S6.
Bullock V. New York (99 N. T. 634),
1438.
Bullock V. Spence (91 N. Y. 303),
1491.
Bullock V. Town of Durham (19 N. Y.
Supl. 635), 1431.
Bulow V. Charleston (1 Nott & McC.
527), 1359.
Bump V. Smith (11 N. H. 48), 1323.
Bunch V. Edenton (90 N. C. 431),
1493.
Bunn V. People (45 111. 397), 183.
Bunner v. Downs (17 N. Y. St. Eep.
633), 594.
Bunting v. Willis (27 Gratt. (Va,)
144), 202.
Burch V. Hardwicke (30 Gratt. 24),
755 1277
Buroheil v. City of New York (6 N.
Y. Supl. 196), 1185.
Burchfield v. New Orleans (41 La.
Ann. 75), 230.
Burchfield v. City of New Orleans
(43 La. Ann. 235; 7 So. Rep.
448), 233, 709.
Burden v. Stein (27 Ala. 104), 686.
Burdette v. Allen (West Va., 13 S.
E. Rep. 1012), 605.
Burdick v. Richmond (16 E. L 503),
886.
Burford v. Grand Rapids (53 Mich.
98), 264.
Burgess v. Pue (2 Gill, 11), 64, 1382.
Burgess v. Pue (3 Gill (Md.), 354),
376.
Burgess &c. of Darby's Appeal (140
Pa. St. 350; 21 Atl. Rep. 394),
457.
Burgess &c. v. Citizens' Pass. Ry.
Co. (Pa., 1892; 23 Atl. Rep. 1062),
489.
Burhans v. Village of Norwood Park
(111., 37 N. E. Eep. 1088), 1093.
Burk V. Ayers (19 Hun, 17), 686.
Burk V. State (5 Lea (Tenn.), 349), 98,
420.
Burke v. Galveston County (76 Tex.
267), 1341, 1347.
Burke v. Jeffries (20 Iowa, 145), 59'.
Burke v. Supervisors (4 West Va.
371), 389.
Burke v. United States (31 Ct. CI,
317), 741.
Burke County Comm'rs v. Bun-
combe Co. Conam'rs (101 N. C,
520; 8S. E Rep. .176), 977.
Burleigh v. Town of Rochester (5
Fed. Rep. 667), 952, 956.
Burley v. Bethune (1 Marsh. 120). 218.
Burlington v. Baumgardner (42 Iowa,
673), 1357, 1383.
Burlington v. Beasley (94 IT. S. 310),
931.
Burlington V. Burlington &c. E. Co.
(41 Iowa, 134), 1383.
Buijington v. Burlington St. E. Co.
(49 Iowa, 144 ; 31 Am. Rep. 145),
527.
Burlington v. Dankwardt (73 Iowa,
170; 84 N. W. Eep. 801), 615,
1343, 1344.
Burlington v. Dennison (43 N. J.
Law, 165), 385,484.
Burlington v. Estlow (43 N. J. Law,
13), 528.
Burlington v. Gilbert (31 Iowa, 356),
645, 1175.
Burlington v. Insurance Co. (31
Iowa, 102), 485, 1234, 1356.
Burlington v. Kellar (18 Iowa, 59),
103, 488, 530, 583.
Burlington v. Palmer (43 Iowa, 681),
118.
Burlington v. Quick (47 Iowa, 246),
1182.
Burlington &c. E. Co. v. Clay County
(13 Neb. 367), 1386.
Burlington &c. R. Co. v. Spearman
(12 Iowa, 113), 393.
Burlington Water-Works Co. v. City
of Burlington (43 Kan. 735 ; 38
Pac. Rep. 1068), 573, 1301, 1303.
Burtington Water Co. v. Woodward
(49 Iowa, 58), 841.
Burnes v. Atchison (3 Kan. 454), 52,
933.
Burnett, Ex parte (30 Ala. 461), 106,
534, 1260.
Burnett v. Sacramento (12 Cal. 76),
1169, 1174.
Burnham v. Brown (33 Me. 100),
957.
Burnham v. Chicago (24 111. 496),
1120.
Burnham v. Fond du Lac (15 Wis.
193), 1596. ,
Burns v. Bender (36 Mich. 195), 820.
Burns v. City of Bradford (Pa., 20
Atl. Rep. 997), 1199.
Burns v. Clarion County (62 Pa. St.
422), 1371.
Burns v. Le Grange (17 Tex. 415),
1257.
Burns v. Norton (59 Hun, 616), 218.
Burnside v. Lincoln County Court
(86 Ky. 423), 1544.
TABLE OF OASES.
Ixxiii
PChe referenoea are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. IT, pp. 789-1605.]
Burr V. Atlanta (64 Ga. 235), 1285.
Burr V. CharitOD County (3 McCrary,
604), 941.
Burr V. City of Carbondale (76 111.
455), 803.
Burr V. Leicester (121 Mass. 241),
677.
Burr V. Pinnev (13 Wend. 309), 1458.
Burrill v. Boston (3 Cliff. 590), 643,
713.
Burroughs v. Comm'rs(39 Kan. 196),
893.
Burroughs v. Lowder (8 Mass. 373),
313.
Burt V. Boston (123 Mass. 333), 1449.
Burt V. Brigham (117 Mass. 307),
699.
Burt V. Winona &o. R. Co. (31 Minn.
472), 199, 290.
Burton v. Burton (1 Keyes (N. Y.),
559), 138.
Burton v. Norwich (34 Vt. 345), 831.
Burton v. Tuite (78 Mich. 363), 1273.
Burton v. Wakefield (4 N. H. 47),
. 982.
Bur well v. Comm'rs 'of Vance
County (93 N. C. 73), 672.
Busbee v. Comm'rs (93 N. C. 148),
1159.
Bush V. Geisey (16 Oregon, 355; 49
Pac. Rep. 133), 911.
Bush V. Seabury (8 Johns. 419), 106,
580, 1343.
Bush V. Wolf (Ark., 17 S. W. Rep.
709), 900.
Bushnel r. Whitlook (77 Iowa, 285 ;
43 N. W. Rep. 186), 1038.
Bushnell v. Com. Ins. Co. (15 Serg.
& R. 186), 5.
Buskirk v. Strickland (47 Mich. 889),
673.
Butchers' Ass'n v. Boston (139 Mass.
390), 1404.
Butchers' Co. v. Bullock (2 Bos. &
Pul. 434), 537.
Butchers' Co. v. Morey (1 Bla. 370),
1323.
Butchers' Union &o. Co. v. Crescent
City &c. Co. (Ill U. S. 746), 1344.
Butler's Appeal -(73 Pa. St. 448),
1233, 1353, 1856.
Butler V. Oomm'rs (15 Kan. 178),
719. ,
Butler V. Counly of McLean (32 111.
App. 397), 667.
Butler V. Bangor (67 Me. 385), 1468.
Butler V. Board &c. (46 Iowa, 326),
1540.
Butler V. Charlestown (7 Gray, 12),
253, 281, 659, 709, 1141.
Butler V. Dunham (37 111. 474), 933,
961.
Butler V. Kent (19 Jolins. 233), 233.
Butler V. Milwaukee (15 Wis. 493), 664.
Butler V. Muscatine (11 Iowa, 433),
1364.
Butler V. Neosho County (15 Kan.
178), 186.
Butler V. Nevin (88 111. 575). 1171.
Butler V. Passaic (44 N. J. Law, 171),
1033.
Butler V. Pennsylvania (10 How.
403). 86, 187.
Butler V. Regents &c. (33 Wis. 124),
183.
Butler V. Sullivan County (Mo., 18
S. W. Rep. 1142), 813.
Butler V. Supervisors (46 Iowa, 326),
1578.
Butler V. Supervisors &c. (26 Mich.
22), 1178, 1179.
Butler V. United States (21 Wall.
273), 311.
Butler V. United States (88 U. S. 273),
314.
Butler V. Village of Edgewater (6
N. Y. Supl. 174), 1099.
Butler V. Worcester (113 Mass. 541),
1096.
Butte V. Cohen (Mont., 34 Pac. Rep.
306), 316, 317,
Butte County v. Boydstun (68 Cal.
189: 11 Pac. Rep. 781). 556.
Butte County v. Morgan (76 Cal. 1 ;
18 Pac. Rep. 115), 331, 858.
Butterfield v. Inhabitants of Melrose
(6 Allen, 187), 353.
Butterfoss v. State (40 N. J. Eq. 335),
1058.
Butternut v. O'Malley (50 Wis. 333),
422, 470.
Butterworth's Case (1 Woodb. & M.
O. C. 333). 140.
Buttrick v. Lowell (1 Allen, 172),
755, 1014, 1278.
Butz V. Citv of Muscatine (8 Wall.
575), 94,' 473, 1377, 1381, 1385.
Butz V. Kerr (133 111. 659), 1024.
Butzraan v. Whit beck (42 Ohio St.
223), 1357.
Buxton V. Chesterfield (60 N. H.
357), 989.
Byerly v. City of Anamosa (79 Iowa,
204; 44 N. W. Rep. 359), 1471,
1492.
Byers iJ.. Commonwealth (43 Pa. St.
89), 544. 1257.
Byler v. Asher (47 111. 101). 377.
Byles V. Golden (53 Mich. 612), 827.
Byram t>.- Detroit (50 Mich. 56), 1190.
Byrd, Ex parte (84 Ala. 17 ; 5 Am.
St. Rep. 328), 1243, 1344.
Byrnes v. Cohoes (67 N. Y. 204), 767,
1147.
Byron v. Low (109 N. Y. 291; 16 N.
E. Rep. 45), 720.
Ixxiv
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: VoL
Byron v. State (35 Wis. 313). 786.
Byrum v. Peterson (Net., 51 N. W.
Eep. 839), 1519.
c.
Cabot V. Britt (86 Vt. 349). 1269.
Cadmus v. Farr (47 N. J. Law, 395),
391. i
Cadmus v. Farr (47 N. J. Law, 208),
297.
Cadwallader v. Durham (46 N. J.
Law, 53), 993.
Cagwin i». Town of Hancock (84 N.
Y. 533), 951.
Cahill, In re (110 Pa. St. 167), 1253,
1354,
Cahokia v. Rautenberg (88 111. 219),
213 ^
Cahoon u. Coe (58 N. H. 518), 350.
Cain V. Comm'rs (86 N. C. 8). 1159.
Cain V. Syracuse (95 N. Y. 83), 263,
7:6.
Cairo v. Allen (8 111. App. 398), 1381.
Cairo v. Bross(101 111. 475), 5«1.
Cairo &c. E. Co. v. Sparta (77 III.
505), 48, 93.5, 955, 1383.
Cairo &c. R. Co. v. Turner (31 Ark.
494), 670. 704.
Calder'v. Police Jury (La., 10 So,
Rep. 786). 1030.
Caldwell v. Alton (33 111. 416), 520,
1243, 1244.
Caldwell V. Harrison (11 Ala. 755),
396. ,
Caldwell V. Justices (4 Jones (N. Q.)
Eq. 323). 48, 1382.
Caldwell v. Rupert (10 Bush (Ky.),
182). 1160.
Caldwell v. State (55 Ala. 133), 533.
Caldwell County v. Harbert (68 Tex.
381 ; 4 S. W. Rep. 607), 813, 1343,
1371.
Caldwell County v. Texas (68 Tex.
331), 1346, 1347.
Calhoun, Ex parte (87 Ga. 359), 1371.
Calhoun County v. Galbraith (99 U.
S. 314), 943." 947, 955, 956.
California v. Pacific R. Co. (127 U.
S. 39), 51.
California &c. R. Co. v. Butte County
Supervisors (18 Cal. 671), 939,
1576.
Calking v. Baldwin (4 Wend. 667),
704.
Calkins v. Hartford (33 Conn. 67),
1477.
Call' v. Chadbourne (46 Me. 206), 64,
67, 87.
Callahan v. Mayor (66 N. Y. 656), 1255.
Callahan v. Morris (30 N. J. Law,
161), 769.
I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Callan v. Wilson (127 U. S, 540), 545,
546, 1357.
Callanan v. Gilman (107 N. Y. 360),
1434, 1468, 1464.
Callanan v. Madison (45 Iowa, 561),
1400.
Callaway County v. Foster (93 U. S.
567), 943, 947.
Callender v. Marsh (1 Pick. 418),
757.
Calwell V. Boone (51 Iowa. 6^7), 264.
Cambria Street, In re (75 Pa. St.
% 357). 190.
Cambridge v. Chandler (6 N. H 'HtX),
350.
Cambridge v. Railroad Comm'rs (158
Mass. 161), 1427.
Camden v. Allen (36 N. J. Law, 398),
472 538
Camden v. Bloch (65 Ala. 336), 546,
1363.
Camden v. Mulford (36 N. J. Law,
49), 546, 1174.
Camden i'. Village Corporation (77
Me. 530), 661.
Cameron v. Cappeller (41 Ohio St.
533), 13.55.
Cameron v. School Dist. (43 Vt. 507),
373.
Camp V, Minneapolis (38 Minn. 461 ;
83 N. W. Rep. 461), 406.
Camp V. State (37 Ala. 53), 1340.
Campau v. Langley (39 Mich. 451),
. 537. 10.'5i
Campbell. In re (1 Wash. 287; 24
Pac. Rep. 624). 98.
Campbell v. City of Cincinnati (Ohio,
1893; 31 N. E. Rep. 600), 498,
1064.
Campbell v. Citv of Kenosha (5
Wall. 194), 6iS8, 941.
Campbell v. City of Montgomery (53
Ala. 62T). 756.
Campbell v. Dwiggins (83 Ind. 473),
690, 1178.
Campbell V. Evans (45 N. Y. 356),
1025.
Camrbell v. Kennedy (34 Iowa, 494),
1417.
Campbell v. Morris (3 Har. & MoH.
• 551), 144. 145. •
Campbell v. Race (7 Cush. 408), 1473.
Carapb^ll V. Seaman (63 N. Y. 568),
1052.
Campbell v. Taylor (8 Bush, 206),
1393i
Campbell v. Thompson (16 Me. 117),
539.
Campbell County v. Knoxville R.
Co, (6 Coldw. (Tenn.) 598), 932,
934.
Camphor v. People (12 111. 290), 330.
Canaan v. Derush (47 N. H. 218), £88.
TABLE OF OASES.
Ixxv
(The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. l-788j Vol, tf, pp. 789-1605.5
Canal Co. v. Conirn'rs of Drainage
(26 La. Ann. 740), 6T1. ■
Canal Co. v. Garrity (1 15 111. IfjS ; 3
N. E. Rep. 448), 5'S7.
Canal Co. v. Outagamie County (76
Wis. 588 ; 45 N. W. Rep. 536), 598.
Canal St., 7w re (11 Wend. 155), 698.
Canepa v. Birtninghani CQS Ala. 358),
1246.
Canfield v. Bayfield County (74 Wis.
64; 41 N. W. Rep. 437; 43 N. W.
Rep. 100), 598.
Canniffi v. Mayor (4 E. D. Smith
(N. Y.), 430), 190.
Cannon v. New Orleans (20 Wall.
577), 580, 1043, 1388.
Canova v. Comm'rs.&c. (18 Fla. 512),
449, 450, 906.
Canterbury v. Boston (141 Mass. 215),
1483.
Canto, Ex parte (31 Tex. App. 61 ;
17 S. W. Rep. 155; 57 Am. Rep.
609), 582, 1244.
Canton v. Nist (9 Ohio St. 489), 103,
488, 513, 1245.
Canton v. Smith (65 Me. 303), 349,
358, 360, 364, 367.
Cantrell v. Clark County (47 Ark.
239), 988.
Cantril v. Sainer (59 Iowa, 36), 524.
Cantwell v. City of Appleton (71
Wis. 463), 1480, 1496.^
Canyonville Road Co. v. County of
Douglass (5 Oregon, 380). 706.
■ Gape Girardeau v. Fougeau (80 Mo.
App. 551), 484.
Cape Girardeau v. Riler (52 Mo. 534),
504.
Cape Girardeau v. Riley (73 Mo. 320),
513, 518.
Cape Girardeaa &o. Road v. Dennis
(67 Mo. 438), 683.
' Cape Girardeau County Court v. Hill
(118U. S. 68), 111.
Cape Girardeau Road v. Renfroe (58
Mo. 365), 679.
Cape May &c. R. Co. v. Cape Mav
(35 N. J. Eq. 419), 537.
Capen v. Foster (13 Pick. 485; 33
Am. Dec. 633), 377.
Capital Bank v. School Dist. (6 Dak.
348; 48 N. W. Rep. 863), 808, 809,
920, 1336, l;^95.
Capital Gas Light Co. v. Charter
Oak Co. (51 Iowa, 34), 1361.
Capps V. Railroad Co. (67 111. 607),
1456.
Card V. Ellsworth City (65 Me. 547),
1467.
Cardigan v. Page (6 N. H. 183), 350,
1272. 1891.
Cardwell v. American Bridge Co.
(113 U. S. 305), 1423.
F
Carey v. Board &o. (N. J., 31 Atl.
Rep. 492), 1281.
Carey v. City of Duluth (Minn., 36 N.
W. Rep. 459). 423.
Cai'ey v. City of East Saginaw (79
Mich. 73: 44 N. W. Rep. 168),
1110.
Carey v. State (34 Ind. 105), 835, 337.
Carev v. Water-works Co. (41 La.
Ann. 910). 633.
Carland v. Commissioners (5 Mont.
579)i 890.
Carleton v. Franconia &o. Steel Co.
(99 Mass. 316). 766.
Carleton v. People (lb Mich. 350),
/ 198, 390, 398.
Carlin v. Cavender (56 Mo. 388),
^1175.
Carlton v. Newman (77 Me. 408),
1383.
Carlton v. Redington (31 N. H. 391),
1036.
Carlton Street, In re (16 Hun, 497),
301, 498.
Carlyle v. Clinton County (111., 30 N.
E. Rep. 782), 812.
Carlyle Water, Light & Power Co.
V. City of Carlyle (31 111. App.
325), 6"35, 839.
Carney v. Marseilles (136 III. 401; 26
N. E. Rep. 491), 1374, 1430,> 1440.
Carpenter v. Aldrich (3 Met. .58),
1591.
Carpenter v. City of St. Paul (38
Mihn. 332). 1071.
Carpenter i;. Cohoes (81 N.-Y. 81),
1428, 1450, 1473.
Carpenter v. Gwynn (35 Barb. 895),
1405.
Carpenter v. Lathrop (51 Mo. 483),
947.
Carpenter x\ People (8 Colo. 116; 7
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 110), 95;
109, 120.
Carr v. Ashland (63 N. H. 665), 783.
Carr v. City of Easton (Pa., 21 Atl.
Rep. 832), 1493.
Carr v. McCampbell (61 Ind. 97),
1374.
Carr u Northern Liberties (35 Pa.
St. 330). 364, 775, 785.
Carr v. St. Louis (9 Mo. 191), 103, 488,
513.
Carr v. State (103 Ind. 548). 694, 1430.
Carr v. United States (98 TJ. S. 438),
740.
Carricou. People (123 HI. 198; 14 N.
E. Rep. 66), 1323, 1835.
Carrier v. Shawangunk (10 Fed. Rep.
330), 947.
Carroll v. Langan (63 Hun, 380),
1256.
Carroll v. Mayor (13 Ala. 173), 1576.
Ixxvi
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 78^1603.]
Carroll v. St. Louis (13 Mo. 444), J86,
659.
Carroll v. Siebenthaler (37 Cal. 193),
SIO.
Carroll v. Wall (35 Kan, 36), 298, 299,
495.
Carroll County v. Graham (98 Ind.
' a79), 1399.
Carroll County v. Smith (111 TJ. S.
556), 208, 381, 964.
Carrolton v. Clark (21 111. App. 74),
298.
Garron «. Martin (26 N. J. Law, 594),
1174.
Carson v. Hartford (48 Conn. 68),
697, 698. .
Carson v. McPhetridge (15 Ind. 327),
375.
Carter v. Citv of Augusta (Me., 24
Atl. Eep."892), 990.
Carter u. Clark (89 Ind. 238), 679.
Carter v. Dow (16 Wis. 298), 1370,
1604.
Carter v. McFarland (75 Iowa, 196 ;
39 N. W. Eep. 268). 275.
Carter v. Monticello (68^ Iowa, 178),
1477, 1479.
Carter v. Ottawa (24 Fed. Rep. 546),
964.
Cartersville v. Lyon (69 Ga. 577),
1261.
Carthage v. Frederick (132 N. Y.
268), 1229, 1331.
C^rthan ■». Lang (69 Iowa, 384), 648.
Cartright f. Beimont (58 Wis. 373),
1451.
Carv V. City of North Plainfield
(N. J., 7 Atl. Rep. 42), 1238.
Cary v. Ottawa (8 Fed. Rep. 199),
947.
Cary v. Pekin (88 111. 154), 1364,
1365.
Carver v. Taunton (152 Mass. 484;
25 N. E, Rep. 963), 985.
Case of Spain (47-J'ed. Rep. 208),
1240.
Case V. Blood (71 Iowa, 633), 1338.
Case u. Favier(12 Minn. 89), 571.
(.ase V. Johnson (91 Ind. 477), 1126.
Case V. Mobile (30 Ala. 538), 90, 541.
Casey v. Rae (58 Cal. 163), 1473.
Caskey v. Greensborbugh (78 Ind.
233), 314.
Casparv V. City of Portland (19 Ore-
gon, 496; 24 Pac. Rep. 1036),
774.
Cass V. Bellows (31 N. H. 501), 1266,
12T3.
Cass V. Dillon (.! Ohio St. 6071, 112,
933, 944.
Cass V. Dillon (16 Ohio St. 38), 1379.
Cass County v. Gillett (100 U. S.
585),. 943, 944, 964.
Cass County v. Green (66 Mo. 498),
964,
Cass County v. Johnston (95 V. S.
360), 380. 381. 947.
Cassedy v. Stockbridge (21 Vt. 391),
1502.
Cassidy v. Bangor (61 Me. 434), 275,
303.
Cassidy r. City of Covington (Ky.,
168. W. Rep. 93), 1078.
Cassin v. Zavalla County (70 Tex.
419). 37«.
C*t Plate Mfrs. v. Meredith (4 T. R.
794), 757.
Castle V. Berkshire (11 Gray, 26),
1194.
Cathcart v. Comstock (56 Wis. 590),
439, 448.
Catron v. La Fayette County (106
Mo. 659; 17 S. W. Rep. 577), 847,
848, 947, 1592.
Cavan v. Citv of Brooklyn (5 N. Y.
Supl. 758), 1598.
Cavanagh v. Boston (139 Mass. 436),
778.
Cavanagh v. Brooklyn (38 Barb. 233),,
775, 1438.
Cavanaugh v. Smith (84 Ind. 380),
1419.
Caviel I). Coleman (73 Tex, 550), 1343.
Cavis V. Robertson (9 N. H. 534).
374.
Cawley v. People (95 111. 249), 209,
314.
Cedar Rapids &c. Ry. Co. v. Cowan
(77 Iowa, 535). 1540.
Cemetery Ass'n v. Meniuger (14 Kan.
312), 571.
Cemetery Co. v. Buffalo (46 N. Y.
, 503). 1133.
Centerville v. Miller (57 Iowa, 56),
529.
Central v. Sears (2 Colo. 588), 183,
485, 486;
Central Bridge Co. v. Lowell (15 Gray,
106), 380, 490,
Central Bridge Corporation v. Lowell
(4 Gray, 474), 670.
Central City Horse Ry. Co. v. Fort
Clark, Horse Ry. Co. (87 III. 533),
671.
Central Park Extension, In re (16
Abb. Pr. 56), 685.
Central Ry. Co. v. State (33 N. J.
Law, 320), 591.
Centre Street, In re Vacation of
(115 Pa. St. 247; 8 Atl. Rep. 56),
1134, 1125.
Cerf V. Pfleging (94 Cal. 131), 1407.
Cervo Gordo v. Rawlings (111., 25 N.
E. Rep. 1006), 1335.
Chaddook v. Day (75 Mich. 527), 1244,
1356.
TABLE OF OASES.
Ixxvii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Chadwiok v. Colfax (51 Iowa, 70),
1381.
Chadwick v. McCausland (47 Me.
. 342). 1408.
Chaffee's Appeal (56 Mich. 244), 6S1.
Chaffee v. Middlesex R. Co. (146
Mass. 224), 958.
Chaffe« County v. Potter (142 U. S.
355). 962.
Chafln V. Waukesha County (62 Wis.
463), 539.
Chahoon's Case (21 Gratt. 822), 1254.
Chalk V. White (Wash., 29 Pac. Rep.
I 979j, lo08.
Challis V. Atchison (16 Kan. 117),
682.
Challis V. Parker (11 Kan. 394), 1169.
Cballiss V. Comui'rs (IS Kan. S3),
1.568.
Chamberlain v. Bell (7 Cal. 292), 225.
Chamberlain v. Cleveland (34 Ohio
St. 55), 1173.
Chamberlain v. Dover (13 Me. 460),
355, 357, 360, 364. 1273.
Chamberlain v. Elizabeth Steam
Cordage Co. (41 N. J. Eq. 43),
68).
Chamberlain v. Enfield (43 N. H.
197),. I -168.
Chamberlain v. Evansville (77 Ind.
54S), 519, 528.
Chamberlain of London v. Compton
(7 D. & R. 597), 106, 518.
Chamberlin «. Morgan (68 Pa. St.
168), 686.
Chambers v. Bridge Mfg. Co. (16
Kan. 270), 1588.
Chambers v. City of St. Joseph (33
, Mo. App. 536), 1599.
Chambers v. Farrv (1 Yeates, 167),
678.
Chambers V. Lewis (9 Iowa, 533),
70.1.
Chambers v. St. Louis (29 Mo. 543),
663. 660.
Chambers v. Satterlee (40 Cal. 497),
669, 1163.
Chambers v. Territory of Washing-
ton (H Wash. T. 280), 1543.
Chambers County v. Clews (21 Wall.
317), 935.
Champaign v.- Forrester (29 III. App.
117), 1096.
Champaign v. Harmon (98 III. 491),
565.
Champaign v. Jones (132 111. 304),
1463.
Champaign'City v, Patterson (50 111.
• 61), 1449.
Champlin v. Penn Yan (84 Hun, 33),
1466.
Chandler v. Boston (112 Mass. 200),
393, 1866.
Chandler t>. Bradish(23 Vt. 416), 175,
244, 367.
Chandler t). Comm'rs(141 Mass. 208),
1.594.
Chandler v. Hanna (73 Ala. 891),
555.
Chandler v. Reynolds (19 Kan. 249),
442, 1368.
Chapin v. School Dist. (80 N. H. 25),
349, 350, 1336.
Chapin v. School Dist. (85 N. H. 445),
660.
Chapin v. Waukesha County (63
Wis. 463). 544.
Chapin x\ Worcester (124 Mass. 464),
1097.
Chaplain v. Brown (15 R. L 579; 10
Atl. Rep. 639). 1144.
Chaplin v. Hill (24 Vt. 628), 640.
Chapman v. Clark (49 Mich. 305),
190.
Chapman v. Commonwealth (35
Gratt. 721), 328.
Chapman v. County Comm'rs (79
Me. 267), 288.
Chapman v. Douglas County (107 U.
S. 348), 2a7, 240, 628.
Chapman v. Ferguson (1 Barb. 267),
385.
Chapman v. Gates (54 N. Y. 140),
703.
ChapmaTi v. Nobleboro (76 Me. 427), ■
1481.
Chapman v. Oshkosh &c. R. Co. (33
Wis. 629), 699.
Chapman v. Swan (65 Barb. 310),
1409, 1414, 1415.
Chapman v. -Town of Milton (31
West Va. 384; 7 S. E. Rep. 23),
1450, 1479.
Chariton v. Holliday (60 Iowa, 391),
299.
Charles v. Haskins (11 Iowa, 339),
336.
Charles v. Hinckley Local Board (53
L. J. (N. S.),554), 764.
Charles v. Hoboken (37 N. J. Law,
203), 296.
Charles v. O'Mailley (18 111. 407),
1266.
Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge (11 Pet. 420), 566, 584,
1196, 1318.
Charleston v. Ashley Phosphate Co.
(34 S. C. 541), 1264, 1368, 1369.
Charleston v. Chur (3 Bailey (S. C,)i
164), .541.
Charleston v. Lunenburgh (31 Vt,
488), 1588.
Charleston v. Oliver (16 S. C. 47),
531, 1233, 1356, 1357.
Charleston v. Reed (37 West Va. 681),
693, 1346.
IXXVIU
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789- ■'^605.]
Charlestown v. County Comm'rs (3
Met. 203), 639.
Charlestown v. County Comm'rs fl09
Mass> 270). 705. 1576.
Chailotte &o. Co. v. Gow (59 Ga.
685). 333.
Charlton v. Barker (54 Iowa, 360)
603.
Chartiers Tp. v. Langdon (131 Pa. St.
77: 18 Atl. Eep. 930; 25 W. N.
C. 203). 191.
Chartiers Tp. v. Philips (122 Pa. St.
601), 1454.
Chase v. Chase (95 ]Sr. Y. 373), 1134.
Chase v. City of Oshkosh (Wis., 51
N. W. Rep. 560), 582.-1194, 1318.
Chase v. County of Saratoga (33 Barb.
603), 1526.
Chase u Merrimack Bank (19 Pick.
I 564), 150, 153, 345, 915, 1376.
Chase v. RaiJioad (97 N. Y. 389), 710.
Chase v. Rutland (47 Vt. 393), 695.
Chase v. Stevenson (71 lU. 385), 1327,
1345.
Chase v. Worcester (108 Mass. 601,
1101.
Chattanooga v. Geiler (13 Loa, 611),
1139.
Chatterton v. Parrott (46 Mich. 433),
1417.
Cheaney v. Hooser (9 B. Mon. (Ky.)
• - 330), 74, 393, 403, 1364, 1366.
Cheatham v. United States (93 U. S.
85), 1569. /
Chedsey v. Canton (17 Conn. 475),
747.
Cheeney v. Brookfleld (60 Mo. 53),
643, 910.
Cheetham v. Hampson (4 T. R. 318),
1036.
Cheezen v. State (3 Ind. 149), 529.
Chegaray v. Jenkins (5 N. Y. 876),
. 837.
Chelmsford v. Demerest (7 Gray, 1),
329.
Chemung Bank v. Supervisors (5
Denio, 517), 253.
Chenery v. Holden (16 Gray, 135),
1602, 1603, 1604.
Cheney, Ex parte (90 Cal. 617),
1347.
Cheney v. Brookfield (60 Mo. 53),
231.
Cherokee , v. Fox (34 Kan. 16), 639,
123(5.
Cherokee &c. Co. v. Whitfield (38
Ga. 121), 1339.
Cberokees v. Georgia (5 Peters, 1),
— 142.
Cherry v. Board of Comm'rs (N. J.,
' 30 Atl. Rep. 970), 1077.
Cherry v. Keyport (58 N. J. Law,
544), 1077.
Chesapeake &c. Cai al Co., The (1
Md. Oh. 248), 67(j
Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v.
Baltimore & Chi* R. Co. i.* Gill
&J. 122), 129.
Chesapeake &c. R. Co. v. Bradfcfrd
(6 West Va. 620). 697.
Chesapeake &c. R. Co. v. Hoard (16
WestVa. 270). 113.
Cheshire Prov. Inst. v. Stone (52 N.
H. 365), 993.
Chess V. Manown (3 Watts, 319). 678. '
Chegfehii-e v. People (116 111. 493; 6
N. E. Rep. 4861. 1556.
Chester &c. R. Co. v. Caldwell
County (72 N. C. 480), 381, 935.
Chester City v. Black (132 Pa. St.
570; 19 Atl. Eep. 3761), 593, 1081,
1169.
Chester Couutv V. Barber (97 Pa. St.
455), 629, 659.
Chester Couijty v. Brower (117 Pa.
St. 647). 674.
Chestnutwood v. Hood (98 III. 133),
1384.
Chicago V. Babcock (111., 32 N. E.
Eep. 371). 1469, 1496.
Chicago i;. Baer (41 III. 306), 1167,
1188.
Chicago V. Barbian (80 111. 483), 704.
Chicago V. Bartee (100 III. 61), 1235.
Chicago V. Brophy (79 111. 277), 1479.
Chicago V. Dalle (115 111. 886), 781,
1474.
Chicago V. Edwards (58 111. 252), 205.
Chicago V. Fidelity Bank (11 Bradw.
165), 1.577, 1578.
Chicago V. Gage (95 111. 593; 3S Am.
' Rep. 182). 209, 311, 314.
Chicago V. Gallagher (44 111. 395),
1436.
Chicago V. Halsey (35 111. 595), 1381,
1395.
Chicago V. Hay (75 111. 580), 1467.
Chicago V. Johnson (58 111. 91), 1479.
Chicago V. Keefe (114 111. 233), 1449.
Chicago V. Laflin (49 111. 173). 1034.
Chicago V. Langlass (66 111. 361), 1431,
1436.
Chicago V. Larned (34 111. 203), 1363.
Chicago V. McCarty (75 111. 603), 1474.
Chicago V. McCoy (111., 26 N. E. Rep.
363), 505.
Chicago ij. McLean (133 111. 148),
1497.
Chicago V. Powers (43 111. 169), 1427,
1477.
Chicago V. Quimby (38 111. 274), 538.
Chicago V. Robbins (3 Black, 418), 9,*
1200, 1452.
Chicago V. RumpflE (45 111. 90), 568,
608, 688, 1210.
Chicago V. Sheldon (9 WaU. 50), 1108.
TABLE OF OASES.
Ixxix
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
Chicae:o v. Shober &c. Co. (6 Bradw.
(111.) 560), 307.
Chicago V. Taylor (135 U. S. 161),
674.
Chicago V. Trotter (111., 26 N. E. Rep.
359), 518, 602.
Chicago V. Union BId'g Ass'n (]'03
III. 379). 674, 1195.
Chicago V. Wright (69 111. 318), 571,
1170, 1383.
Chicago &c. Ry. Co. v. City of Chi-
cago (111., 29 N. E. Rep. 1109),
590, 1168.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. City of JoHet
(79 111. 25). 1050.
Chicago &c. R, Co. v. City of Quincy
(111., 37 N. E. Rep. 192). 1208.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. City of Quinby
(III., 38 M. E. Rep. 1069), 107(5,
1083.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Cole (75 111.
591), 1571.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Engle (76 111.
317), .54H, 12(i8.
Chicago &c. Ry. Co. v. Haggai-ty (67
111. 113), 191)9.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Harris (Kan.,
30 Pac, Rep. 456), 910.
Chicago &r. Ry. Co. v. Hock (118
111. 587), 696.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Iowa (94 U. S.
155), 6.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Jacobs (110
111. 414), 699. 700.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Lake (71 111.
333),. 682.
Chicago &c, Ry. Co. v. Langlade
County (56 Wis. 614), 199, 439,
■ 448.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Makepeace (44
Kan. 676; 24 Pac. Rep. 1104),
940.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Minnesota
Cent. R. Co. (14 Fed. Rep. 525),
527.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Osage County
(33 Kan. 597), 945.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. People (120
III. 104). 1168.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Pinckney (74
III. 377), 934, 937, 944.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Siders (88 III.
320), 1189, l.i68.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Smith (63 111.
268), 933.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. South Park
Comm'rs (11 III. App. 5K2), 1108.
Chicago &c. Rv. Co. v. Sutton (Ind.,
30 N. E. Rep. 29i;, 1417.
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Swinney (97
Ind. 586), 697.
Chicago &c. Ry. Co. v. Town of
Oconto (50 Wis. 190), 427.
Chicago Dock Co. v. Garrity (115
Bl. 155), 93.
Chicago Packing Co. v. Chicago (88
111. 381), 515, 1832.
Chickasaw County Supervisors v.
Clay County Supervisors (62
Miss. 325). 459.
Chickering v. Robinson (3 Cush. 643),
338.
Chioopee Bank v. Chapin (8 Met. 40),
957.
Chicora v. Crews (6 S. C (N. S.)243),
50.
Chicot County v. Kruse (47 Ark. 80;
14 S. W. Rep. -469), 1374, 1509.
Child V. City of Boston (4 Allen (86
Mass.). 41), 7r7, 1436.
Child V. Chappel (9 N. Y. 346), 1411.
Child V. Colburn (54 N. H. 71), 348,
364, 367, 369.
Child V. Hudson's Bay Co. (3 P.
Wms. 207), 530.
Childrey v. Radv (77 Va. 518), 315.
Childs V. Nelson (69 Wis. 125; 33 N,
W. Rep. 587), 1194, 1318.
Childs V. West Troy (33 Hun, 68),
1485.
Chillieothe i). Brown (38 Mo. App.
609), 601, 1243.
Chin Yan, Ex parte (60 Cal. 78),
518, 1234.
Chiniquy v. People (78 111, 570), 940.
Chinn v. Trustees (33 Ohio St. 338),
1189.
Chirac v. Chirac (3 Wheat. 1), 139.
Chisholm v. Montgomery (3 Woods,
594), 794.
Chisholm v. State of Georgia (2
Dallas, 419). 19, 51, 740,
Chittenden v. Town of Barnard (61
Vt. 145), 976.
Choate v. Rochester (13 Gray, 92),
982, 983. .
Choteau v. Rowse (56 Mo. 6.'i). 219.
Chouteau v. Allen (70 Mo. 390), 257.
Chrisman v. Brace (1 Duv. (Ky.)
63), 218.
Christensen, Ex parte (85 Cal. 208),
524.
Christensen, In re (43 Fed. Rep. 243),
J241.
Christian Church i?. Johnson (53 Ind.
273), 360.
Christian County v. Rockwell (35 111.
App. 20), 974.
Christman v. Phillips (58 Hun. 383;
12 N. Y. Supl. 338), 799, 973.
Christopher v. Van Liew (57 Barb.
17), 339.
Christy v. Ashtabula County (41
Ohio St. 511), 660.
Christy v. Newton (60 Barb. 332),
1430.
Ixxx
TABLE OF CASES.
[The reterenoea jfre to pages: Vol..!, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Christy v. Whitmoro (67 Iowa, 60),
1028.
Christ's Church v. Woodward (26
Me. 172), 350, 351.
Chumasero v. Gilbert (26 III. 39),
385.
Church V. CasetS Roht. (N. Y.) 649),
291
Church' V. Detroit (64 Mich. 571),
1446.
Church V. Stack (7 Cush. 226). 1375.
Churchman v. Indianapolis (110 Ind.
359), 244, 1171.
Cicero v. Williamson (91 Ind. 541),
1419.
Cihak V. Klekr (17 111. App. 124),
1411.
Cincinnati v. Bryson (15 Ohio, 625),
1160, 1237.
Cincinnati v. Buckingham (10 Ohio,
257), 535, 537, 1^43.
Cincinnati v. Cameron (33 Ohio St.
336), '108, 711.
Cincinnati v. Gwynne (10 Ohio, 192),
539, 1255,
Cincinnati v. Kasselman (Ohio, 33
Weekly Law Bui. 332 1. 1163.
Cincinnati v. Morgan (3 Wall. 275),
947.
Cincinnati v. Penny (31 Ohio St. 499),
1100, 1456.
Cincinnati v. Eice (15 Ohio, 2S5),
1244,
Cincinnati v. White's Lessees (6 Pet.
4:^1), 571. 1406.
Cincinnati &c. Assurance Co. v.
Rosenthal (55 111. 85), 3.'i4.
Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. Belle
Centre (Ohio, 27 N. B. Rep. 464),
675.
Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. Clinton
County (1 Ohio St. 77), 933.
Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. C.umniins;s-
ville (14 Ohio St. 523). 590, 678.
Cincinnati College v. State (19 Ohio,
110). 1166.
Cincinnati Gas Light Co. v. Avon-
dale (43 Ohio St. 257), 600.
Ciucinnati Health Association v.
Rosenthal (55 111. 85), 144.
Citizens' &c. Ins. Co. v. Sortwell (8
Allen, 219), 374.
Citizens' Gas & Mining Co. v. T&wn
of Elwood (114 Ind. 332; 16 N.
E. Rep. 624), 486, 51)8. 608.
Citizens' Loan Ass'n v. Lyon (29 N.
J. Eq. 110), 647.
Citizens' Ry. Co. v. Jones (34 Fed.
Rep. 679), 1103.
City V. Alexander (23 Mo. 483), 933.
City V. Fox (78 Ind. 1), 1172.
City V. Gardner (97 Ind. 1 ; 49 Am.
Rep. 416), 643.
City V. Hannibal &o. R. Co. (39 Mo.
476), 1361.
City V. Hays (93 Pa. St. 72). 713.
City V. Kern (Mont., 29 Pac. Rep.
720), 1264.
City V. Kingsbury (101 Ind. 290),
691. ,
City V. Lamson (9 Wall. 477). 638.
City V. McQuillikin (9 Dana, 513),
1186.
City r. Murphy (79 Ga. 101), 1160.
CititejW. Nichols (28 Pac. Rep. 679),
1265.
City V. Southgate(]5 B. Mon. (Ky.)
491). 403.
City V. Trvon (35 Pa. St. 401), 593.
City V. Wistar (35 Pa. St,. 427), 593.
City & County of St. Louis v. Alex-
ander (23 Mo. 488), 9.i2.
City & Countv of San Francisco r.
Itsell (80"Cal. 57; 22 Pac. Rep.
' 74), 625. •
City & Suburban Ry. Co. v. City, of
Savannah (77 Ga. 731 ), 594, 1211.
City Bank v. Bogel (51 Tex. 354),
1354, 1359.
City Council v. Ashley Phosphate
Co. (S, C. 1891 ; 13 S. E. Rep.
845), 530, 540. '
City Council v. Baptist Church (4
Stroljh. 306). ,525, 5?7, 594, 1026.
Citv Council v. Benjamin (3 Strobh.
(S. C.) Law, 508), 1244.
City Council v. Capital City Water
Co. (Ala., 9 So. Rep. 339). 635.
City Council i'. Dunn (1 McCord
(S. C), 3;i3), 543, 1268.
City Council d. King (4 McCord
(S. C ), 487), 1363.
City Council v. Marks (50 Ga. 612),
702.
City Council v. Murphey (79 Ga. 101 ;
3S. E. Eep. 326), I'Si.
City Council v. Pepper (1 Rich. (S. C.)
364), 1255, 12ii2.
City Council v. Seeba (4 Strobh. Law
(S. C), 319), 541.
City Council v. Walton (77 Ga. 517),
564.
City Council v. Yeomans (85 Ga.
708). 378.
City Council <Sf Montgomery, Ea;
parte (04 Ala. 46H), "MS.
Citv of Albany v. CunlifCe (2 N". Y.
165), 353.
City of Albany v. MrNamara (117
N. Y. 168; 32 N. E. Rep. 931.,
999.
City of Alleghany v. Zimmerman
(95 Pa. St. 287), 1203.
City of Allegheny u. Western Penn.
R. Co. (Pa., 21 Atl. Eep. 7B2),
1168.
TABLE OF OASES.
Ixxxi
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1603.]
City of Allentown v. Adams (Pa., 8
Atl. Rep. 430), 1186.
City of Alton v. County of Madison
(31 111. 115). 634.
City of Altoona v. Lotz (114 Pa. St.
338; 7 Atl. Rep. 340). 1493.
City of Anderson v. O'Conner (98
Ind. 168), 1019.
City of Argentine v. State (Kan., 26
Pac. Rep. 751), 1081.
CJity of Ateliison v. Challjs (9 Kan.
603), 1436.
City of Atchison v. King (9 Kan.
550). 1198.
City of Atchison v. Price (Kan. , 25
Pac. Rep. 605), 1163.
City of Atlanta v. Church (86 Ga.
730), 1166.
City of Auburn i'. Paul (Me., 34 Atl.
. Rep. 817). 1096.
City of Augusta v. North (57 Me.
392). 479.
City of Auroral). Hillman (90 111. 61),
1495.
Citv of Aurora v. Reed (57 111. 30),
677.
City of Austin v. Gas Co. (69 Tex.
187), 1360.
City of Austin v. Ritz (73 Tex. 391 1
9 S. W. Rep. 884), 1487, 1489.
City of Austin v. Walton (68 Tex.
507; 5S. W. Rep. 70), 186.
City of Baltitpore v. Reynolds C20
Md. 1). 858.
City of Bangor v. Inhabitants &c.
(71 Me. 5.S5), 1000.
City of Binghamton v. Binghamton
&c. Ry. Co. (!6 N. Y. Supl. 335),
1103.
City of Birmingham v. McCrary
(Ala.. 4 So. Rep. 630), 1499.
City of Blair v. Lantry (Neb., 31
N. W. Rep. 790), 858.
City of Bloomington v. Bay (43 111.
503), 1308.
City of Bloomington v. Chicago &c.
R. Co. (134 III. 451; 36 N. E.
Rep. 366), 1076, 1167. 1170.
City of Bloomington V. Pollock (111.,
51 N. E. Rep. 146), 1153.
City of Bonham D. Taylor (Tex.. 16
S. W. Rep. 555; 83 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 647), 637, 871.
City of Boston v. Mt. Washington
(139 Mass. 15; 39 N. E. Rep. 60),
980.
City of Boulden ■». Fowler (U Colo.
396; 18 Pac. Rep. 337), 1096.
City of Boulder v. Niles (9 Colo. 415),
1447. 1459, 1488,
City of Bowling Green v. Carson (10
Bush, 64), 1843.
City of Brenham v. German-Ameri-
can Bank(144U. S. 173), 561, 937.
City of Brenham v. Wattr Company
67 Tex. 542; 4 S. W. Rep. 143), .
567, 635. 1398.
City of Bridgeport v. New York &c.
R Co. (36 Conn. 855), 591.
City of Brooklyn ?'. Clevf s (1 Hill &
D. Sup. 831), 531.
City of Brooklyn v. Railroad Co. (47
N. Y.'486), 1300.
City of Buffalo, In re (64 N. Y. 547),
671.
City of Buffalo, In re (68 N. Y. 167),
676.
City of Buffalo v. Chadcayne (N. Y.,
31 N. E. Rep. 443), 595.
City of Burlington v. Burlington
&c. R. Co. (41 Iowa. 134), 1383.
City of Burlington v. Dankwardt
(73 Iowa, 170; 34 N. W. Rep.
801), 615, 1843. 1244.
City of Burlington v. Dennison (48
N. J. Law, 165), 1032.
City of Burlington v. Gilbert (31
Iowa, 356), 645, 1154.
City of Burlington v. Kellar (l8
Iowa. 59), 530.
City of Butte v. Cohen (Mont., 24
Pac. Rep. 206), 316, 317.
City of Cairo v. Bross (101 111. 475),
581.
City of Camden it. Allen (36 N. J.
Law, 398), 479, 533.
City of Cape Girardeau v. Fougean
(30 Mo. App. 551), 484.
City of Cape Girardeau v. Riler (58
Mo. 534), 504.
City of Carlyle v. Clinton County
(111., 30 N. E. Rep. 783), 813.
City of Cedar Rapids. In re (Iowa,
51 N. W. Rep. 1143), 578, 814.
City of Center ville v. Miller (57 Iowa,
56), 589.
City of Central v. Sears (3 Colo. 588),
183, 485, 486.
City of Champaign v. Forrester (39
111. App. 117), 1096.
City of Champaign v. Harmon (98
111. 491), 565.
City of Charleston v. Ashley Phos-
phate Co. (34 S. C. 541), 1360.
City of Chai'lton v. Barker (54 Iowa,
360), 603.
City of Chicago v. Gage (95 111. 598).
811.
City of Chicago v. Halsey (85 111.
595), 1595.
City of Chicago v. Larned (34 III.
• 803). 1187.
City of Chicago v. McCoy (111., 36 N.
E, Rep. 363), 505.
Ixx^ii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
City of ChicaRO v. Rumpff (45 111.
90), 568, 608, 1210.
City of Chicago v. Trotter (111., 26 N.
E. Rep. 359), 603.
City of Chicago v. Wright (69 111.
318). 571.
City of Chillioothe v. Brown (38 Mo.
App. 609), 601, 1243.
City of Cincinnati v. Cameron (33
Ohio St. 336), 708.
City of Cincinnati v. Seasongood (46
Ohio St. 396; 21 N. E. Rep. 630),
1173.
City Of Cincinnati v. Sherike (47
. Ohio St. 217 ; 35 N. E. Rep. 169),
1069.
City of Cincinnati v. White's Lessees
(6 Pet. 431), 571.
City of Cleburne v. Brown (73 Tex.
443; 11 S. W. Rep. 404), 636.
City of Cleburne v. Gulf &c. R. Co.
(66 Tex. 457; 1 S. W. Rep. 342),
578, 925.
City of Cleveland v. King (133 U. S.
395; 10 S. Ct. Rep. 90), 1463.
City of Cohoes v. Del. & H. Canal
Co. (N. Y., 31 N. E. Rep. 887),
1323.
City of Columbus v. Strassner (124
Ind. 483; 25 N. E. Rep. 65), 1323.
City of Connersville v. Hydratilic
Company (86 Ind. 184), 910.
City of Conyers v. Kirk (78 Ga. 480;
3 8. E. Rep. 443), 847, IBll.
City of Covington v. Arthur (Ky., 14
S. W. Rep. 121), 1363.
City of Crawfordsville v. Bond (96
Ind. 238). 1099.
City of Crawfordsville v. Braden
(Ind., 28 N. E. Rep. 849), 551, 575.
City of Cumberland v. Wilson (50
Md. 138), 1137.
City of Dallas v. Western Electric
Co. (Tex., 18 S. W. Rep. 553),
1396.
City of Davenport v. Peoria Marine
& Fire Ins. Co. (17 Iowa, 376),
478.
City of Delphi v. Sturgman (104 Ind.
■ 343; 11 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
37), 647.
City of Denver v. Brown (11 Colo.
3371 1597
City of Denver v. Capelli (4 Colo. 29),
1138.
City of Denver v. KnOwles (Colo.,
1893; 30 Pac. Rep. 1041), 1160,
1187.
City of Denver v. Mullen (7 Colo.
345), 1049.
City of Denver v. Rhodes (9 Colo.
554; 13 Pac. Rep. 729), 1137.
1147.
City of Denver v. Williams (13 Colo.
475; 21 Pac. Rep. 617), 1445. '
City of Dea Moines v. Gilchrist (67
Iowa, 310), 1054.
City of Detroit v. Daly (68 Mich. 503,
509; 37 N. W. Rep. 11), 586,
1170.
City of Detroit v. DetrSit &c. Co. (43
Mich. 140), 1314.
City of Detroit v. Detroit City Ry.
Co. (87 Mich. 558), 1205.
City of Detroit v. Hosmer (79 Mich.
^384), 1313, 1536.
City of Detroit v. Weber (39, Mich.
241, 834.
City of Duluth v. Krupp (Minn., 49
N. W. Rep. 335). 1336,
City of Duluth v. Mallet (43 Minn.
204; 45 N. W. Rep. 154), 589,
1311. ' • .
City of East Dallas v. State (73 Tex.
370; 11 S. W. Rep. 1030), 400, 413.
City of East St. Louis v. East St.
Louis Gaslight Co. (98 111. 415).
635, 805, 839.
City of East St. Louis v. Flannigen
(36 111. App. 50), 837, 855, 876.
City of East St. Louis v. O'Flynn
- (119 111. 200; 10 N. E. Rep. 395),
1193.
City of East St. Louis v. Rhein (111.,
38 N. E. Rep. 1089), 406.
City of El Paso v. Mundy (Tex., 30
S. W. Rep. 140), 1177.
City of Elgin v. Eaton (83 IlL 532),
1153.
City of Elgin v. Hoag (25 111. App.
650), 1096.
City of Elk Point v. Vaughn (Dak. , 46
N. W. Rep. 577), 117. 1243.
City of Elkhart v. Wickwire 021
Ind. 331: 33 N. E. Rep. 344),
1126. 1190.
City of Ellsworth v. Rossiter (46 Kan.
■ 237; 26 Pac. Rep. 674), 183, 719.
City of Emporia v. Gilchrist (37
Kan. 532; 15 Pac. Rep. 532),
1082.
City of Emporia v. Smith (43 Kan.
433; 22 Pac. Rep. 616), 392, 403.
City of Enterprise- ■^^ Fowler (38
Kan. 415; 16 Pac. Rep. 703), 884.
City of Erie's Appeal (91 Pa. St. 398;,
832. 839.
City of Erie v. The Erie Canal Co.
(59 Pa. St. 174), 86.
City of Eufala 17. McNa (6 Ala. 588),
2;!0.
Citv (it Evansvi.le v. Blend (118 Ind.
426), 1277. 1279,
Citv of Evansville v. Decker (84
Ind. Zi5: 43 Am. Rep." 86), 1096,
1098, 10J9.
TABLE OF CASES.
Izxxiii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
City of Evansville v. Page (S3 Ind.
525), 401.
City of Fayetteville v. Carter (52
Arlr. 301 ; 6 L. R. An. 509), 1234.
City of Flora v. Naney (111., 26 N. E.
Rep. 645), 1595.
City of Fort Wayne v. Shrafif (106
Ind. 66). 1190.
Citv of Frankfort v. Aughe (114 Ind.
77), 516.
City of Franklin v. Harter (187 Ind.
446 ; 26 N. E. Rep. 882), 1470.
City of Frostburg v. Duffy (70 Md.
47: 16 Atl. Rep. 643), 109B, 1099.
City of Gainesville v. Caldwell (81
Ga. 76), 1589. .
City of G-alesburg v. Galesbnrg
Water Co. (34 Fed. Rep. 675),
71.5.
City of (r.-.lesburg v. Hawkinson (75
111. 156), 96.
City of Galesburg v. Searles (114 III.
217: 29 N. E. Rep. 686), 1075,
10S6. 1087, 1363.
City of Galveston p. Devlin (Tex., 19
S. W. Rep. 895), 716.
City 01 Galveston v. Posnainsky (62
Tex. 118; 13 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 484), 13, 366.
City of Garden City u. Hall (Kan.,
26Pac. Rep. 1021). 1511.
City of Goshen v. Myers (119 Ind.
196; 21 N. E. Rep. 667),' 1427.
City of Grand Rapids v. Bateman
(Mich., 53 N. W. Rep. 6), 1250.
Citv of Grand Rapids v. Grand Rap-
'ids/H. R. Co. (66 Mich. 43; 33 N.
W. Rep. 15), 1196, 1213.
City of Grand Rapids v. Grand Rap-
ids Hydraulic Co. (66 Mich. 606;
33 N. W, Rep. 749), 12H9.
City of GraiM Rapids v. Hughes (15
Mich. 54), 530.
City of Grand Rapids v. Widdicomb
(Mich., 53 N. W. Rep. 635), 1077.
City of Greeley v. Ham man (13 Colo.
94), 544, 545.
City of Hannibal v. Missouri & Kan-
sas Telephone Co. (31 Mo. 23),
1220.
City of Hannibal v. Price (29 Mo.
Ap)). 280), 1237. '
City of Hannibal v. Richards (82 Mo.
330), 1019.
City of Harrisburg v. Legebaum
(Pa., 24 Atl. Rep. 1070), 1120.
City of Harrisburg v. -McCormick
(129 Pa. St. 213; 18 Atl. Rep.
126), 593, 1081, 1169.
City of Hartford v. Taloott (48 Conn.
.535), 1201.
City of Hartford v. West Middle
Dist. (45 Conn. 462), 1167.
City of Helena v. Gray (7 Mont. 486 ;
17 Pao. Rep. 504), 1343.
City of Henderson v. Lambert (8
Bush (Ky.), 607), 395.
City of Hopkins v. Railroad Co. (79
Mo. 98), 1551.
City of Houston v. Emery (76 Tex.
382), 1589.
City of Houston v. Isaacs (68 Tex.
116), 1498.
City of Houston v. Voorhies (Tex., 8
S. W. Rep. 109), 900.
City of'Huntington v. Cheesbro (57
Ind. 74), 541.
City of Huntington v. Pease (56 Ind.
805). 541. ^ ^
City of^Independence v. Gates (Mo.,
19 S. W. Rep. 738), 1134, 11H5
City of Indianapolis v. Huegle (in
Ind. 581 ; 18 N. E. Rep. 172), 515,
517.
City of Indianapolis v. Huffer (30
Ind. 335), 1099.
City of Indianapolis v. Imberry (17
Ind. 17.5), 1113.
City of Indianapolis v. Indianapolis
Gaslight Co. (66 Ind. 396), 568,
708, 971. "^
City of Indianapolis v. Lauzer (38
Ind. 348), 1098.
City of Indianpolis V. Miller (37 Ind.
894), 1048.
City of Indianapolis v. Patterson (113
Ind. 344 ; 14 N. E. Rep. 551). 399.
City of Jacksonville v. Allen (35 III.
App. 54). 303, 1393.
City of Jacksonville v. Ledwitb (26
, Fla. 163; 7 So. Rep. 885), 580,
663, 1243, 1344.
City of Jacksonville v. L'Engle (20
Fla. 344), 441.
City of Janesville t'. Carpenter (77,
Wis. 303; 46 N. W. Rep. 138),
557.
City of Jefferson v. Edwards (37 Mo.
App. 617), 1587.
City of Jeff ersonville D. Myers (Ind.
App., 38 N. E. Rep. 999), 1139,
1150, 1593.
City of JeffeVsonville v. Patterson
(36 Ind. 16), 958.
City of Kansas v. Baird (98 Mo. 215;
11 S. W. Rep. 243), 1135.
City of Kansas v. Birmingham (45
Kan. 313; 25Pac. Rep. 569). 1313.
City of Kansas v. Clark (68 Mo. 588),
604.
City of Kansas v. Hill (80 Mo. 523),
696.
City of Kansas v. McAleer (31 Mo.
App. 433), 1053.
City of Kansas v. O'Connell (99 Mo.
357; 13S. W. Rep. 791), 1315.
lX3£xiv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
City of Kansas v. Vindquest (36 Mo.
App. 584), 1233.
Citv of Kansas v. White (69 Mo. 26),
526.
City of Kearney v. Thoemanson (25
Nell. 147; 41 N. W. Eep. 115),
1098.
City of Kenosha v. Lamson (9 Wall.
477). 909.
City of Keokuk v. Scroggs (39 Iowa,
447', 1054. I
City of Knoxville v. Chicago &c. R.
Co. (Iowa, 1891 ; 50 N. W, Eep.
61). 530, 605.
City of Kokomo r. Mahan (100 Ind.
342). 1095, 1111, 1153.
City of Lafavette v. Fowler (34 Ind.
140). 1161.
Citv of Lafayette v. James (93 Ind.
"240; 42 Am. Rep. 140), 321.
City of La Fayette v. Larson (73 Ind.
367), 1222.
City of Lafayette v. State (29 Ind.
218), 875.
City of Lafayette v. Timberlake (88
Ind. 330). 744, 771, 775.
City of La Fayette v. Wortnaan (107
Ind. 404; 8 N. E. Rep. 277), 1153.
City of Lake View v. Tate (130 111.
247; 22 N. E. ,Rep. 791),^1210.
City of Lansing v. Van Gorder (24
Mich. 4Sfi), 1600.
City of Laredo v. Macdonell (52 Tex,
511),-fi40.
Citv of Xieadville v. Matthews (10
"Colo. 123; 14 Pac. Rep. 112), 179.
Citv of Leavenworth v. Casey (Mc-
■ "Cahon'sRep. 122), 1198.
City of Leavenworth v. Mills (6
Kan. 288), 1600.
City of Leavenworth v. Rankin (2
Kan. 357), 254.
City of Lexington v. Butler (14 Wall.
282). 909.
City of Little Rock v. Katzenstein
(53' Ark. 107), 1169.
City of Logansport ?;. Crockett (64
Ind. 319), 711.
City of Logansport v. Dykenian die
Ind. 15; 17 N. E. Rep. 587), 708,
840. 971, 1136.
City of Logansport v. Humphrey (84
Ind. 467), 565.
City of Logansport v. La Rose (99
Ind. 117). 1524.
City of Logansport v. Pollard (50
Ind. 151). 1153.
City of "Logansport v. Seybold (59
Ind. 235), 405.
City of Logansport v. Shirk (88 Ind.
563), 673. " ' .
City of Logansport v. Wright (25
Ind, 512), 1099, 1137.
City of London's Case (8 Coke, 187),
533.
City of Louisville v. Commonwealth
(1 Duv. 295), 573.
City of Louisville v. Kean (18 Binn.
9), 1549.
City of Louisville v. Sherley (80 Ky.
71 ; 3 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
541), 1355.
City of Lowell v. Parker (10 Met
309). 333.
Ci^of Lvnchburg v. Slaughter (75
•Va. 57). 964.
City of Lynn v. County Comm'rs
(148 Mass. 14-8), 1335.
City of Lvons v. Cooper (39 Kan.
324: ]'8 Pac. Rep. 296), 1842.
City of McGregor v. Cook (Tex., 16
S. W. Rep. 936). 1595.
City of McPherson v. Nichols (Kan.,
29 Pac. Rep. 679). 708.
City of Mankato v. Arnold (36 Minn.
62; 30 N. W. Rep. 305), 1009.
City of Mankato v. Fowler (32 Minn.
364). 1239.
City of Memphis v. Memphis Water-
" works (S Heisk. 495), 477.
City of Miles Citv /y. Kern (Mont., 29
Pac. Rep. 730), 541.
City of Mobile v. Craft (Ala., 10 So.
Rep. 534), 600.
City of Monroe v. Gerspach (i}3 La.
Ann. 1011), 605.
City of Montgomery v. Townsend
184 Ala. 478; 4 So. Rep. 780),
674, 1155, 1156, 1157.
City of Morrison «. Hinkson (87 111.
587), 1595.
City of Mt. Pleasant v. Bruce (11
Iowa, 399), 603.
City of Napa r. Easterby (76 Cal.
322; 18 Pac. Rep. 253), 501,
508.
City of Navasota v. Pearce (46 Tgx.
525), 9.
City of New Albany v. McCulloch
(127 Ind. 500), 839.
City of New Kiowa v. Craven (Kan.,
26 Pac. Rep. 436), 703.
City of New Orleans v. Crescent City
(41 La. Ann. 904), 719.
City of New Orleans v. Firemen's
Charitable Ass'n (43 La. Ann.
447; 9 So. Rep. 486), 719.
City of New Orleans v. Great So.
Tel. Co. (4 La. Ann. 41; 3 So.
Rep. 533). 713.
City of New Orleans «. United States
(49 Fed. Rep. 40), lii25.
City of New York v. Dimick (3 N. Y.
Supl. 4(j). 1443.
City of New York v. Reilly (13N. Y.
Supl. 521), 1107.
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixxxv
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
City of New York v. South Coving-
ton &c. Co. (89 Ky. 29 ; 11 S. W.
Rep. 954), 1358.
City of Newark v. Del. &o. R. Co.
(N. J., 7 Atl. Rep. 123). 1319.
City of Newark v. Stout (53 N. J.
Law, 35; 18 Atl. Rep. 943), 171,
316.
.City of Newburyport v. City of
Waltham (150 Mass. 311, 669;
23 N. E. Re{). 46. 379), 978.
City of Newburyport v. Creedon
(148 Mass. 158 ; 19 N. E. Rep. 341),
1006.
City of Newport v. Newport & Cin.
Bfidge Co. (Ky.. 8 L. R. An. 484 ;
29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 491 ;
'' 13 S. W. Rep. 720). 617.
City of Newport v. Newport Light
Co. (Ky., 12 S. W. Rep. 1040),
571, 1315, 1316.
City of Newport v- Ringo's Ex'r (87
Ky. 635; 10 S. W. Rep. 2). 1355.
Citv of Newton v. Belger (143 Mass.
'59S; 10 N. E. Rep. 464), 603, 616.
City of North Vernon v. Voegler
(103 Ind. 314). 1099.
City of Olney v. Harvey (50 111. 453),'
458.
City of Olney v. Wharf (115 111. 519,
523; 5 N. E. Rep. 3b6), 587, 674.
City of Olympia v. Mann (1 Wash.
St. 389; 35 Pao. Rep; 337), 594,
1246.
City of Omaha v. City of South
Omaha (Neb., 47 N. W. Rep.
118), 68.
City of Omaha v. Kountz (25 Neb.
60), 1183.
City of Omaha v. Kramer (35 Neb.
489: 41 N.,W» Rep. 295), 1149,
1151.
City of Oshkosh v. Milwaukee &o.
Ry. Co. (74 Wis. 584; 43 N. W.
Rep. 489), 1530, 1531.
City of Oshkosh v. Schwartz (55
Wis. 487), 544.
City of Ottawa v. People (48 111. 233),
1553.
City- of Ottawa v. Spencer (40 111.
211), 1187.
City of Ottawa «. Washabaugh (11
. Kan. 124), 1198.
City of Ottumwa v. Chinn (75 Iowa,
405; 39 N. W. Rep. 670), 1060.
City of Owensborov. Hickman (Ky.,
14 S. W. Rep. 688), 378.
City of Paterson v. Society &c. (24
N. J. Law, 386), 63, 74, 473.
City of Pensaoola v. Sullivan (23 Fla.
1). 1393.
Cily of Peoria r. Crawl (28 111. App.
154), 1099.
City of Peoria v. Johnston (56 111. 53),
413.
City of Philadelphia's Appeal (78 Pa.
St. 33). 1203.
City^of Philadelphia v. Ball (Pa., 23
Atl. Rep. 5B4). 1178.
City of Philadelphia v. Contributors
&c. (Pa.. 22 Atl. Rep. 744). 1166.
City of Philadelphia v. Dibeler (Pa.,
23 Atl. Rep. 567), 1077.
City of Philadelphia v. Evans (Pa.,
31 Atl. Rep. 200), 1078.
City of Philadelphia v. Given (60 Pa.
St. in6), 1292.
City of Philadelphia v. Miller (49
Pa. St. 440), 1179.
City of Philadelphia v. Phil. &o. R.
Co. (88 Pa. St. 314), 712.
City of Philadelphia v. Rink (Pa., 3
Atl. Rep. 515). 1293.
City of Philadelphia v. Smith (Pa.,
16 Atir Rep. 493; 33 W. N. C.
243). 1497.
City of Pittsburg v. Reynolds (Kan.,
1893; 29 Pac. Rep. 757), 605.
City of Plattsburg v. Riley (42 Mo.
App. 18), 405.
City of Plattsmouth w Boeck (Neb.,
49 N. W. Rep. 395), 1139, 1149.
City of Plymouth t). Milner (117 Ind.
334; 20 N. E. Rep. S3 5), 1494.
City of Pontiac v. Carter (33 Mich.
164), 757.
City of Providence v. Miller (11 R. L
372; 23 Am. Rep. 453), 213.
City of Providence v. Union R. Co.
(12 R. I. 47.S), 528.
City of Pueblo v. Robinson (13 Colo.
693), 1177, 1186.
City of Quincy v. O'Brien (24 III.
App. 591), 604, 1323.
City of Raleigh v. Peace (110 N. C.
33; 14 S. B. Rep. 521), 570, 606,
1159, 1173, 1183, 1186.
City of Richmond v. Dudley (129
Ind. 113; 26 N. E. Rep. 184). 602.
City of Richmond v. Dudley (Ind.,
28 N. E. Rep. 313), 520.
City of Riclimond v. Long (17 Gratt.
b75), 763. 1037.
City of Richmond v. Mulholland
(116 Ind. 173), 1496.
City of Rochester v. Campbell (123
N. Y. 405 ; 25 N. E. Rep. 937), 1200.
City of Rochester v. Erickson (46
Barb. 92), 1059.
City of Rochester v. Town of Rush
(80 N. Y. 303), 572.
City of Roodhcuseu Jennings (39 111.
App 50 , 606.
City of Rushville «. Rushville Nat-
ural Gas Co. (Ind., 38 N. E. Rep.
849), 552, 568, 573, 574.
Ixxxvi
TABLE or OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
City of St. Joseph v. Anthony (30
Mo. 538), 11S6, 1383.
City of St. Joseph «. Farrell (Mo., 17
S. W. Rep. 497), 1185.
City of St. Joseph v. Owen (Moi, 19
S. W. Rep. 713), 1094, 1135.
City of St. Joseph v. Porter (29 Mo.
App. 605), 1233.
City of St. Louis v. Alexander (23
Mo. 483), 933.
Citv of St. Louis V. Arnot (94 Mo.
. "275; 7 S. W. Rep. 15), 1310.
City of St. Louis v. Bell Telephone
Co. (96 Mo. 623; 10 S. W. Rep.
197), 609.
City of St. Louis v. Bowler (Mo., 7
S. W. Rep. 434), 1233.
Citv of St. Louis v. Cafferata (34 Mo.
" 94), 599.
City of St. Louis v. Davidson (103
Mo. 149; 33 Am. St. Rep. 764),
. 255, 645.
City of St. Louis V. Escelsior Brew-
ing Co. (96 Mo. 677), 1169.
City of St. Louis v. Herthel (88 Mo.
128), 609.
City of St. Louis v. Rankin (96 Mo.
497), 1171.
City of St. Louis v. Schoenbush (95-
Mo. 618; 8 S. W. Rep. 791), 515,
604.
City of St. Louis v. Weber (44 Mo.
547), 1024.
City of St. Louis v. Withaus (16 Mo.
App. 247), 491.
City'of St. Paul v. Gilfillan (36 Minn.
298; 31 N. W. Rep. 49), 616, 1053.
City of St. Paul v. Laidler (2 Minn.
190). 575.
City of Salem v. Eastern R. Co. (98
Mass. 431), 1019, 1030, 1039, 1031,
1056.
City of Salem v. Maynes (123 Mass.
372), 1055.
City of San Diego v. Granniss (77
Cal. 511; 19 Pao. Rep. 875), 416.
City of Sandwich v. Dolan (133 111.
177), 1495.
City of Santa Rosa v. Coulter (58 Cal.
537), 1363.
City of Scranton v. Barnes (Pa,, 23
Atl. Rep. 777), 1173.
City of Scranton v. Gore (134 Pa. St.
595 ; 33 W. N. C. 419), 1497.
City of Scranton v. Hyde Park Gas
Co. (103 Pa. St. 383), 909.
Citv of Seward v. Conroy (Neb., 50
" N. "W. Rep. 339). 409.
City of Seymour v. Comra'rs (119
Ind. 148; 21 N. E. Rep. 549), 1098.
City of Seymour v. Jefferson ville &c.
R. Co. (126 Ind. 466; 26 N. E.
Rep. 128), 675.
City of Sioux City v. Weare(59'Iowa,
95). 937.
City of South Omaha v. Cunning-
ham (Neb., 47 N. W. Rep. 930),
1140.
City of Spokane Falls w. Browne
(Wash., 27 Pac. Rep. 1077), 1170.
City of , Springfield v. Greene (120
111. 269), 1186. 1187.
City of Springfield v. Mathus (134
III. 88; 16 N. E. Rep. 92), 1073,
1175.
(Sty of Springfield v. Sale (137 111.
359), 1163, 1175.
City of Sterling v. Gait (117 111. 11 ;
7N. E. Rep. 4711, 1074. 1J87.
City of Sterling v. Merrill (124 111.
522; 17 N. E. Rep. 6), 1489.
City of Stockton v. Western Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. (Cal., 15 Par.
Rep. 314), 130.
City of Syracuse v. Reed (Kan., 26
Pac. Rep. 1043). 855.
City of Taunton v. Taylor (116 Mass.
254), 1059, 1060.
City of Taunton v. Wareham (153
Mass. 193; 26 N. E. Rep. 451),
983, 993, 994.
City of Terre Haute v. Hudnot (113
Ind. 542; 13 N. E. Rep. 686),
1136.
City of Terre Haute v. Tej-re Haute
Water-works Co. (94 Ind. 305),
'711.
City of Terrell v. Dissaint (Tex., 9 S.
W. Rep. 593), 843.
City of Toledo v. Board of Educa-
tion (48 Ohio St. 833), 1167.
City of Topeka v. Gillett (32 Kan.
431 ; 23 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 778),
125, 412.
City of Topeka v. Sells (Kan., 39 Pac.
Rep. 604). 1153.
City of Topeka v. Tuttle (5 Kan. 311),
1198.
City of Troy v. Winters (4 T. & C.
(N. Y.) 256), 1246.
City of Valparaiso v. Gardner (97
Ind. 1), 568, 627, 647, 839. 1313.
City of Vincennes v. Callender (88
Ind. 484), 971.
City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas
Light Co. (Ind., 31 N. E. Rep.
573). 568,
Citv of Wahoo t'. Dickinson (23 Neb.
" 426: 36 N. W. Rep. 813), 393'.
City of Wahoo u. Reeder (Neb., 43 N.
W, Rep. 1145), 14.
City of Warsaw v. Dunlap (113 Ind.
576; 14 N. E. Rep. 568), 1474.
City of Waterloo v. Union Mill Co.
(72 Iowa, 437; 84 N. W. Rep.
197), 1318.
TABLE OF OASBS.
Ixxxvii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
City of Watertown v. Robinson (69
Wis. 230). 1588.
City of Westport v. Kansas City (103
Mass. 141), 396.
City of Westport v. Kansas City (Mo.,
• 1891 ; 15 S. W. Rep. H8), 133.
City of Wheeling; v. Baltimore (1
Hughes, 90), 579.
City of Winona v. School Dist. (40
Minn. 13), 1323.
City of Wyandotte v. White (13 Kan.
191). 1198.
City of Zanesville v. Gas Lij;ht Co.
(Ohio, 23 N. E. Rep. 55), 574.
Citv Sav. Bank v. Wayne Co. Treas-
■ urer (84 Mich. 391 ; 47 N. W. Rep.
690), 863, 863.
Civil Ria;hts Cases (109 U. S. 3), 147.
Claflin V. Hopkinton (4 Gray, 502),
664.
Claflin V. McDonougli (83 Mo. 412),
1183.
Claiborne County v. Broolcs (111
U. S. 400), 563, 619, 933, 934, 925,
982, 9H3, 934.
Clapp V. Davis (35 Iowa, 315), 1597.
Clapp V. Hartford (35 Conn. 66).
1164. 1180, 1185. 1188.
Clapp V. Tovrn of Ellington (51 Hun,
58), 1439.
Clapper v. Waterford (131 N. Y. 383),
748.
Claridge v. Evelyn (5 Barn. & Aid.
81), 386.
Clarissy v. Metropolitan F. Dep't (7
Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 353). 1595.
Clark's Case (18 Barb. 444), 140.
Clark's Case (5 Coke, 64), 533.
Clark V. Austin City (38 Minn. 487),
783, 1443.
Clark V. Barnard (103 U. S. 436), 20.
Clark V. Board -&o. (34 Iowa, 366),
1345.
Clark V. Chillicothe (7 Ohio, 354), 933.
Clark V. Citv of Davenport {14 Iowa,
494), 113, 803, 1160, 1385.
Clark V. Des Moines (19 Iowa, 19i9;
87 Am. D6C. 433), 814, 231, 249,
351, 353, 634, 891, 904, 910, 1160,
1315, 1307.
Clark V. City of Providence (16 R. I.
337; 15 Atl. Rep. 763), 1195.
Clark V. City of Richmond (83 "Va.
355; 5 S. E. Rep. 369). 14#9, 1468.
Clark V. City of South Bend (85 Ipd.
276; 44 Am. Rep. 13), 575, 1054,
1246.
Clark V. City of Utica (18 Barb. 451),
696.
Clark V. Columbus (Ohio, 23 Wkly.
Law Bui. 389), 7«3.
Clark V. County Examiners (136
Mass. 283), 385.
Clark V. Dutoher (9 Cowen, 674).
244. 247.
Clark V. Ennis (45 N. J. Law, 69),
315.
Clark V. Holdridge (58 Barb. 61), 217.
Clark V. Janesville (10 Wis. 186), 503,
794, 933.
Clark V. Jefferson ville &c. R. Co.
(44 Ind. 248), 651.
Clark V. Lebanon (63 Me. 393), 1467.
Clark V. Le Cren (9 B. & C. 53), 106,
518.
Clark 1'. Lincoln County (Wash. Ter.,
1889 ; 35 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
311), 9.
Clark V. Locke (9 N. Y. Supl. 918),
1392.
Clark V. McKenzie (7 Bush (Ky.),
523), 389.
Clark V. Manchester (63 N. H. 577),
759, 760, 765, 770, 782.
Clark V. Mayor &c. of Syracuse (13
Barb. 32), 1034.
Clark V. Miller (54 N. Y. 538). 219.
Clark V. Mobile School Comm'rs (36
Ala. 621), 1596.
Clark V. Montagu (1 Gray, 446), 1591.
Clark V. North Muskegon (88 Mich.
308). 1589.
Clark V. Norton (49 N. Y. 243), 1178.
Clark V. Phelps (4 Cowen, 190), 339.
1417.
Clark V. Polk County (19 Iowa, 248),
251, 891, 904, 909.
Claik V. Robinson (88 111; 498), 384.
Clark V. Saline County (9 Neb. 516),
649.
Clark V. Saratoga Couhty (107 N. Y.
553; 14 N. E. Rep. 438), 811.
Clark V. School Directors (78111. 474),
833.-
Clark V. School Dist. (3 R. I. 199),
933.
Clark V. Sheldon (106 N. Y. 104),
1546.
Clark V. State (109 Ind. 388; 10 N. E.
Rep. 185), 1341.
Clark V. Thompson (87 Iowa, 536). 14.
Clark V. Village of Dunkirk (12 Hun,
182; 75 N. Y. 613), 1122, 1189,
1568.
Clark V. Waltham (128 Mass. 567),
760, 763.
Clark V. Wardwell (55 Me. 61), 353.
Clark V. Washington (12 Wheat. 40),
261, 283.
Clark V. Worcester (125 Mass. 326),
671.
Clark County v. Hine (49 Ark. 145 ;
4 S. W. Rep. 458), 9«8.
Clark County (3ourt v. Turnpike Co.
(11 B. Mon. (Ky.) 143), 1379.
Clarke v. Brookfield (81 Mo. 503),'576.
Ixxxviii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1005.]
Clarke v. Lyon County (8 Nev. 181),
186, 658. 713, 1587.
Clarke v. Manchester (56 N. H. 503),
697.
Clarke v. May (2 Gray, 410), 339.
Clarke v. Rochester (5 Abb. Pr. 107),
465.
Clarke v. Rochester (34 Barb. '446),
12, 93.S.
Clarke v. Rogers (81 Ky. 48), 64, 67.
Clason V. Milwaukee (30 Wis. 316),
518, 520, 531, 1234.
Classen v. Shaw (5 "Watts (Pa.), 468),
313.
Clay V. Nicholas County (4 Bush,
154), 933.
Clay V. Wright (44 Vt. 538). 831.
Clay County v. McAleer (115 U. S.
616), 1374, 1527. '
Clay County v. Simonsen (1 Dak.
403; 46 N. W. Rep. 592), 321,
855, 860, 861.
Clay Countv v. Society of Savings
(104 U. S. 579 ; 5 Am. & Eng. R.
Cas. 170), 945.
Clay brook v. Owensboro (33 Feu.
ReD. 634), 1345.
Clayburgh v. City of Chicago (25 III.
535), 1153.
Clayton v^ Harris (7 Nev. 64), 376.
Clayton v. Williams (49 Miss. 31 1), 9 1 0.
Clearfield Ind. School Dist. (79 Pa.
St. 419), 1336.
Clearwater v. Meredeth (1 Wall.
25), 5.
Cleary v. Eddy County (N. Dak., 51
N. W. Rep. 586), 1519.
Cleburne?;. Brown (73 Tex. 443; 11
S. W. Rep. 404), 636.
Cleburne v. Railroad Co. (66 Tex.
,461), 578, 925.
Clegg V. Richardson Co. (8 Neb. 178),
61.
Cleghorn v. Postlewaite (43 111. 428),
1571.
Cleland v. Porter (74 111. 76), 380.
Clemence v. Auburn (66 N. Y. 834),
■•.63, 14 36. 1438, 1457.
'Clemens v. Baltimore (16 Md. 208),
1181.
Clement v. Burns (43 N. H. 609, 613),
694. 1419.
Clement v. City of Philadelphia(Pa.,
20 Atl. Rep. 1000). 1116.
Clements v. Lee (114 Ind. 397), 1075,
1113.
Clements v. West Troy<10 How. Pr.
199), 1405.
Cleik V. Andrews (1 Show. 9), 1594.
Clerk V. Tucket (3 Lev. 381 ; 3 Vent.
183), 534, 535.
Cleveland, In re (51 N. J. Law, 319;
18 Atl. Rep. 67), 163, 193.
Cleveland, In re (53 N. J. Law, 188;
19 Atl. Rep. 17), 177.
Cleveland v. Amy (88 Mich. 374),
1337. 1343.
Cleveland v. Heisley (41 Ohio St.'
670), 1367. '
Cleveland v. King (133 V. S. 295),
773, 1445, 1447, 1463, 1469.
Cleveland v. State Bank of Ohio (16
Ohio St. 236; 88 Am. Dec. 445),
307, 230.
Cleveland v. Steward (3 Ga. 283), 7.
Olieveland v. Tripp (13 R. L 50), 1180,
1187.
Cleveland v. Wick (18 Ohio St. 303),
1163.
Cleveland &c. R Co. v. Wynant(114
Ind. 425), 1468.
Cleveland Cotton Mills v. Comm'rs
of Cleveland County (108 N. C.
678; 13 S. E. Rep. 271), 7t.'0.
Cleveland Library Ass'n v. Pelton
(36 Ohio St. 253), 1166.
Clevenger v. Rushville (90 Ind. 258),
541.
Clews V. Lee County (3 Woods, 474),
1379.
Click V. Lamar County (79 Tex. 121),
141.5.
Clifford V. Comm'rs (59 Me. 262),
695.
Clifton V. Wynne (80 N. C. 145), 1380.
Clinton V. Cedar Rapids &c. R. Go.
(24 Iowa, 455), 95, 110.
Clinton v. Englebrect (IS Wall. 434),
52
Clinton v. Phillips (.58 111. 102), 518.
Clinton v. York (if, Me. 167), 983.
Clinfonville v. Keeting. (4 Denio,
341), 131.
Clodfelter v. State (86 N. C.-51), 741,
743.
Cloherty,/Jn re (2 Wash. St. 137),
1253.
Cloud V. Norwich (57 Vt. 448), 310.
Ciough V. Hart (8 Kan. 487), 186, 659.
Cioughessey i;. Waterbury'(51 Conn,
405). 1483.
Coal V. Black River Falls (57 Wis.
110), 199.
Coal Float v. JefiEersonville (113 Ind.
19), 519.
Coast Line R.,Co. v. Mayor &c. (30
Fed. Rep. 646), 1103.
Coates V. Campbell (37 Minn. 498),
930.
Coates V. Mayor &c. of New York
(7 Covven, 585), 530, 606, 1018,
1026. 1046, 1052, 1231, 1361.
Cobb V. Boston (113 Mass. 181), 699.
Cobb V. Kingman (15^ Mass. 197), a5,
109.
Cobb V. Lucas (15 Pick. 1), 705.
TABLE or OASES.
IxxxLs
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Cobb V. Portland (55 Me. 381), 756.
Cobb V. Ramsdell (14 N. Y. Supl. 93),
1003.
Cobb V. School Dist. (63 Vt. 647 ; 31
Atl. Rep. 957), 810, 1342.
Coburn v. Ellenwood (4 N. H. 99),
56.
Cochran v. Collins (29 Cal. 129), 1189.
Cochran v. MoCleary (23 Iowa, 75),
193, 288, 390, 397, 298.
Cochran v. Village of Park Ridge
(111., 27 N. E. Rep. 939), 1073,
1093.
Cocke V. Halsey (16 Pet. 71), 198.
Cockrell v. Cholmeley (1 Russ. & Myl.
418), 953.
Codman v. Marston (10 Mass. 150),
353.
Codner v. Bradford (10 Wis. 443),
1449.
Cody V. Fort Wavne (43 Ind. 197),
1169.
Coe V. Bearup (14 Week. Dig. 246),
1411.
Coe ". California &c. R. Co. (27
Minn. 197). 939.
Coe V. Meriden (45 Conn. 155), 121.
Coe V. Smith (24 Wend. 341), 986.
Coftey r. Edmonds (58 Cal. 521), 166.
Coffin V. City of Portland (43 Fed.
Rep. 411), 301.
Coffin V. Nantucket (5 Cush. 269),
282.
Coffin V. State (7 Ind. 157), 187.
Coggeshall v. City of Des Moines (78
Iowa. 235; 41 N. W. Rep. 617),
793, 1108.
Goggeshall v. Pelton (7 Johns. Ch.
293). 660.
Cogswell V. Lexington (4 Cush. 307),
1450.
Cohen v. New York (113 N. Y. 532),
1463, 1404.
Cohen v. St. Louis &c. R. Co. (34
Kan. 158). 699.
Cohoes V. Delaware &c. Canal Co.
(47 N. Y. St. Rep. 612), 1404,
1408.
Cohoes V. Del. & H. Canal Co. (N. Y.,
81 N. E, Rep. 887), 1233.
Colburn v. Ellis (5 Mass. 437), 200.
Colburn v. Mayor of Chattanooga
(Tenn., 17 Am. L. Reg. :191), 563.
Colchester v. Brooke (7 Q. B. 283). 97.
Colchester v. Seaber (3 Burr. 1866),
391, 464.
Colden v. Botts (13 Wend. 234), 546.
Colden v. Thurbur (3 Johns. 434),
1406.
Coldwaier v. Tucker (36 Mich. 474),
1886.
Cole V. City of Shreveport (41 La.
Ann. 8a9), 720.
Cole V. La Grange (113 U. S. If 7
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 379), 559,
930, 931.
Cole V. Laws (108 N. C. 185; 13 S. E.
Rep. 985), 323.
Cole V. Medina (37 Barb. 318), 263,
466. 775. 1438.
Cole V. Newburyport (129 Mass. 594),
773.
Cole V. President &c. (57 Wis. 110),
466.
Cole n. Skrainka (105 Mo. 303; 16
S. W. Rep. 491). 1136.
Cole County v. Schmidt (Mo., 10
S. W. Rep. 888). 858.
Coleman. In re fHO Hun, 544), 1575.
Coleman's Case (35 Gratt. 865), 1365,
1366.
Colenifin v. Marvin County (50 Cal.
493), 940.
Coleman v. Ormond (60 Ala. 328),
asi.
Coleman v. Pike County (83 Ala.
336: 3 So. Rep. 755), 858.
Coleman v. Second Ave. R. Co. (38
N. Y. 201). 633.
Coleman v. State (47 N. Y. St. Rep.
(;09), 743.
Coler V. Board of Comra'rs (New
Mex., 27 Pac. Rep. 619), 95-?.
Coler V. Cleburne (131 U. S. 163; 9
S. Ct. Rep. 730). 608, 953, 954.
Colerain v. Bell (9 Met. 499), 338.
Coles V. County of Madison (Breese
(111.), 120). 67, 88, 466.
Coles V. WiJIiamsburgh (10 Wend.
659), 393.
Coles County v. Allison (33 111. 437),
1558.
Coll V. Board (83 Mich. 367), 1528.
Collender v. Marsh (1 Pick. 418), 779.
Collingwood V. Pace (1 Vent. 413; 1
Jenk. Cent. Cas. 3), 136.
Collins V. City of New Albany (59
Ind. 396\ 401.
Collins V. City of Philadelphia (9a
Pa. St. 373), 1154.
Collins V. City of Waltham (151
Mass. 196; 24 N. E. Rep. 337),
109S.
Collins V. Dorchester (6 Cush. 396),
1477.
Collins V. Holyoke (146 Mass. 298),
287.
Collins V. King County (1' Wash.
416), 988.
Collins V. Louisville (3 B. Mon. 134),
1171.
Collins V. McDaniel (66 Ga. 203), 319.
Collins V. Welch (58 Iowa, 73; 43
-4.m. Rep. Ill), 655. 656.
Colmanv, Anderson (10 Mass. 105),
347.
xc
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1603.]
Colman v. Shattuok (68 N. Y. 348),
-,30.
Coloma V. Eaves (93 U. S. 484), 834,
933, 946. 951.
Colter V. Morgan (12 B. Mon. 378),
330.
Columbia v. Harrison (3 Treadw,
Const. (S. C.) 315). 530, 531, 537.
Columbia v. Hunt (5 Rich. (S. C.)
■ 550), 1160.
Columbia Bridge v. Kline (Bright,
320), 563.
Columbia County Comra'rs v. King
(13 Fla. 451), 1378, 1379.
Columbia R. Co. v. Hawthorne (144
U. S. 303), 1486.
Columbia Township v. Pipes (183
Ind. 239), 1601.
Columbus V. Jacques (30 Ga. 500),
1344.
Columbus V. Story (35 Ind. 97), 1171.
Columbus V. Strassner (134 Ind. 483;
25 N. E. Rep. 65), 1833.
Columbus V. Street R. Co. (45 Ohio
8t. 98), 1358.
Columbus V. Woolen Mills Co. (33
Ind. 435), 677.
Columbus <&c. R. Co. v. Grant
County (65 Ind. 487), 1390.
Colusa County v. De Jarnett (55 Cal.
375), 887.
Colville V, Judy (73 Mo. 651), 694.
Colwell V. City of Boone (51 Iowa,
687 ; 8 N. W. Rep. 614), 524, 755,
1014.
Colwell V. Landing Co. (19 N. J. Eq.
245). 524.
Comanche County v. Lewis (133
U. S. 198), 91, 924, 987.
Comer v. Bankhead (70 Ala. 493), 813.
Comer v. Folsom (13 Minn. 819), 941.
Commercial Nat. Bank v. City of
lola (20 Wall. 655; 3 Dill. 653),
61, 930, 933.
Comm'rs &c. v. Babcock (5 Oregon,
473), 826. \
Comm'rs &c, v. Baker (44 Md. 1), 9.
Comm'rs &c. v. Block (99 U. S. 686),
956.
Comm'rs &o. v. Board &c. (57 Ind.
15), 798.
Comm'rs &c. v. Bond (3 Colo. 411),
1596.
Comm'rs &c. v. Brewer (9 Kan. 807),
719.,
Comra'rs &c. v. Bridge Co. (12 Cush.
343), 1423.
Comm'rs &c. v. Bunker (16 Kan. 498),
442, 450.
Comm'rs &o. v. Burtis (103 N. Y.
136), 1588.
Comm'rs &o. v. Carthage (27 111. 140),
1576.
Comm'rs &c. v. Chissom (7 Ind. 688),
539.
Comm'rs &e. v. City of Sevmour (79
Ind. 491; 41 Am. Rep. 618),
1098. ,
Comm'rs &c. v. Claw (15 Johns. 537),
706.
Comm'rs &o. v. Comm'rs of Brad-
ford County (18 Fla. 512), 459,
463.
Comm'rs &c. v. Comm'rs of Davis
County (79 N. C. 565), 450.
Cojpm'rs &o. v. Comm'rs of Harvey
County (26''Kan. 181), 448. )
Comm'rs &c. v. Comm'rs of Vance
(107 N. C. 291 ; 18 S. E. Rep. 39),
456.
Comm'rs <!fec. v. Covey (Md., 88 Atl.
Rep. 866), 594, 1346.
Commissi )ners &c. v. Cox (6 Ind.
403). 351.
Comm'rs iStc. v. Day (19 Ind. 450),
. 910.
Comm'rs &c. v. Detroit (88 Mich.
836), 95.
Comm'rs &c. v. Directors &c. (7 Ohio
St. 65), 1000.
Comm'rs &c. v. District Township of
Doone f43 Fed. Rep. 644), 963".
Comm'rs &c. v. Dockett (20 Md. 468),
1397.
Comm'rs &c. v. Durham (43 111. 88),
703.
Comm'rs &c. v. Fairfield (90 Cal.
186), 1371.
Comm'rs &c. v. Gas Co. (18 Pa. St.
'318), 518, 520, 521.
Comm'rs &c. i;. Harris (N. C, 7
Jones' L. 281), 523.
Comm'rs &c. v. Hearne (59 Ala. 371),
801.
Comm'rs &c. v. Holmali (34 Ind.
256), 798, 968.
Comm'rs &c. v. Johnson (21 Fla.
578), 911, 1548.
Comm'rs &c. v. Johnson (184 Ind.
145; 24 N. E. Rep. 148), 1537.
Comm'rs &c. t). Johnston (71 N, C.
398), 703.
'^Comm'rs &c. v. Keller (6 Kan. 510),
909, 910.
Comm'rs &c. v. Kent (5 Neb. 127),
278.
Comm'rs' &c. v. King (13 Fla. 451),
281.
Comm'rs &o. v. Leckey (6 Serg. & R.
99), 396.
Comm'rs&c. v. McClintock (51 Ind.
325), 1583.
Comm'rs &c. v. McDaniel (7 Jones'
(N. C.) Law, 107), 198.
Comm'rs &c. v. Mighels (7 Ohio St.
109), 1015.
TABLE Of cases.
XCl
[TheTeferences are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 78»-]605.]
Comm'rs &c, v. Morrison (23 Minn.
178), 1565.
Comm'rs &c. i\ National Land Co.
(23 Kan. 196), 244.
Comm'rs &c. v. Nelson (19 Kan.
234). 443.
Comm'rs &o. v. Newell (80 111. 587),
1383.
Comm'rs &c. v. O'Conner (86 Ind.
531), 1381.
Comm'rs &c. v. Osborn (46 Oh'o St.
271 ; 20 N. E. Rep. 333). 887.
Comm'rs &c. v. Quinn (111., 27 N.
E. Rep. 187). 1089.
Comm'rs &o. v. Railroad Co. (63
Iowa, 397), 699.
Comm'rs &c. v. Kanney (18 Ohio St.
888), 887.
Comm'rs &c. v. Rather (48 Ala. 438),
425.
Comm'rs &c. v. Ross (46 Ind. 404), 659.
Comm'rs &c. v. Silvers (23 Ind. 491),
485.
Comm'rs &c. v. Smith (5 Tex. 471),
220.
Comm'rs &c. v. State (45 Ala. 399),
1382
Comm'rs &c. v. Walker (8 Kan. 431),
1183.
Comm'rs &c. v. Ward (69 Ind. 441),
659.,
Commissioners of Central Park, In
re(50N. Y. 493). 118.
Comm'rs of Public Works, In re (10
N. Y. Supl. 705), 671.
Common Council v. Board of Public
Works (Mich., 49 N. W. Rep.
481), 1084.
Common Schools v. Comm'rs of Al-
leghany Co. (20 Mich. 449), 803.
Commonwealth's Appeal (Pa., 9 Atl.
Rep. 524), 1193.
Commonwealth u Abrahams (Mass.,
30 N. E. Rep. 79). 578.
Commonwealth v. Adams (3 Bush
(Ky.), 46). 309.
Commonwealth v. Adams (114 Mass.
323), 1503.
Commonwealth v, Ahearn (3 Mass.
285), 1374.
Commonwealth v. Alburger (1
Whart. 469), 624.
Commonwealth v. Alger (7 Cush. 53),
594, 1047.
Commonwealth v. Alleghany
Comm'rs (16 Serg. & R. 317),
1377.
Commonwealth v. Alleghany County
(32 Pa. St. 218), 939.
Commonwealths. Allegheny County
(37 Ph. St. 237), 937, 954.
Commonwealth v. Allen (70 Pa. St.
465), 388, 1557, 1562.
Commonwealth v. Arrison (15 Serg.
& R. 180), 298.
Commonwealths. Baldwin (1 Watts,
54 ; 26 Am. Dec. 33), 1585.
Commonwealth v. Bank (5 Allen,
428), 1369.
Commonwealth v. Bank (28 Pa. St.
389), 29S.
Commonwealth v. Bean (14 Gray,
53), 550.
Commonwealth v. Bennett (108
Mass. 37), 88.
Commonwealth v. Boston (16 Pick.
442), 1404.
Commonwealth v. Boston &o. R. Co.
(3 Cush. 3,1), 1213.
Commonwealth v. Boynton (3 Allen,
160), 1249.
Commonwealth v. Brennan (140
Mass. 63; 23 N. E. Rep. 628),
443.
Commonwealth v. Brooks (109 Mass.
855), 551.
Commonwealth v. Charlestown (1
Pick. 180), 681.
Commonwealth v. Chase (6 Cash.
248), 1267, 1268, 1269.
Commonwealth v. Chely (56 Pa. St.
270), 386.
Commonwealth v. City of Frankfort
(Ky., 17 S. W. Rep. 132), 587.
Commonwealth v. City of Philadel-
phia (1 33 Pa. St. 288 ; 19 Atl. Rep.
136), 1317.
Commonwealth v. Commercial Bank
of Pennsylvania (28 Pa. St. 383),
129.
Commonwealth v. Comly(3 Pa. St.
372), 331.
Commonwealth v, Comm'rs (6 Binn.
5), 1527.
Commonwealth v. Comm'rs (1
Whart. 1), 1527.
Commonwealth v. Comm'rs &o. (37
Pa. St. 279), 1372, 1378, 1381,
1384, 1530.
Commonwealth v. Cooley (10 Pick.
37), 538.
Commonwealth v. Coombs (3 Mass.
492), 629.
Commonwealth v. Council &c. (88
Pa. St. 66), 1379.
Commonwealth v. Council of Pitts-
burgh (34 Pa. St. 496), 1530.
Commonwealth v. County Comm'rs
(5 Rawle (Pa.), 75), 378.
Commonwealth v. CuUen (1 Harris
(Pa.), 13.S), 465.
Commonwealth v. Curtis (9 Allen,
268), 524, 542, 543, 550, 596.
Commonwealth v. Cutter (Mass., 29
N. E. Rep. 1146), 519, 522, 541,
596, 1264.
ZCIl
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages; Vol I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Commonwealth v. Dallas (3 Teates
(Pa.), 300), 193, 1263.
Commonwealth v. Davis (140 Mass.
485). 503, 504, 518. 599.
Commonwealth «;. Dean (110 Mass.
357), 88.
Commonwealth v. Delaware Canal
Co. (133 Pa. St. 594), 1S!70.
Commonwealth v. Dow (10 Met. 382),
534.
Commonwealth v. Downing (6 Mass.
73), 705.
Commonwealth v. Dugan (13 Met.
233), 1278.
Commonwealth v. Emnlons(98 Mass.
6), 1350.
Commonwealth v. Emory (11 Cush.
406), 1263.
Commonwealth v. Ensminger (74 Pa.
St. 479). 389. ^
Commonwealth v. Erie &c. E. Co.
(27 Pa. St. 339), 103, 488, 591.
Commonwealth v. Essex Co. (13
Gray, 339). 1214.
Commonwealth v. Fahey (5 Cush.
408), 540, 1026.
Commonwealth z\ Fairfax (4 Hen. &
M. 208), 329.
Commonwealth v. Farren (9 Allen,
489), 1349.
Commonwealth v. Fenton (1^9 Mass.
195), 1235.
Commonwealth v. Finnegan (134
Mass. 324), 1250.
Commonwealth v. Fowler (10 Mass.
290), 1365, 1557.
Commonwealth t\ Genther (17 Serg.
& E. 135), 308.
Commonwealth v. George (Pa,, 24
Atl. Eep. 59), 583, 1070.
Commonwealth v. German Society
(15 Pa. St. 251), 207.
Commonwealth v. Goodrich (13
Allen, 546), 1036.
Commonwealth v. Grabbert (5 Bush,
438), 330.
Commonwealth v. Hargest (7 Penn,
Co. Ct. 333), 307.
Commonwealth v, Hastings (9 Met.
359), 1278.
Commonwealth v. Hauck (103 Pa.
St. 531)), 1203.
Commonwealth v. Hawkes (123
Mass. 525), 1263, 1265.
Commonwealth v. Hefifron (103 Mass.
. 148), 1266, 1367.
Commonwealth v. Holbrook (10
Allen, 200). 1249.
Commonwealth v. Holmes (25Gratt.
771). 319, 331.
Commonwealth v. Howard (Pa., 24
Atl. Eep. 308), 283.
Commonwealth v. Insurance Co. (5
Mass. 230), 1561.
Commonwealth v. Ipswich (2 Pick.
70), 291.
Commonwealth v. Johnson (41 Me.
15), 910.
Commonwealth v. .Johnson (P Pa.
St. 136), 1585.
Commonwealth v. Judges (8 Pa. St.
395), 64, 67.
Commonwealth t'. Kepner (10 Phila.
5101, 288. 298.
Commonwealth u. King(13Met. 115),
♦ 1438.
Commonwealth v. Leech (44 Pa. St.
232), 388, 555, 1557.
Commonwealth v. Loomis (128 P.a.
St. 174), 1426.
Commonwealth v. Lowell Co. (12
Allen, 75). 4, 1360. 1361.
Commonwealth ■;;. McCafferty (145
■ Mass. 384; 14 N. E. Eep. 453),
502, 518, 550, 599. 1219.
Commonwealth v. McClelland (83
Ky. 686), 377.
Commonwealth v. McDonald (16
Serg. & E. 390), 1406.
Commonwealth v. McWilliams (11
Pa. St. 61), 933.
Commonwealth v. Marshall (69 Pa.
St. 328), 1081.
Commonwealth v. Mathews (132
Mass. 60). 506.
Commonwealth v. Meeser (44 Pa. St.
341), 388, 1557.
Commonwealth v. Mitchell (83 Pa.
St. 350), 1530.
Commonwealth v. New York &c.
E. Co. (138 Pa. St. 58; 20 Atl.
Eep. 951), 1549.
Commonwealth v. Nichols (10 Met.
259^, 1249.
Commonwealth v. OdenwelIer(Mas8.,
30 N. E. Eep. 1022), 543, 1264.
Commonwealth v. Page (Mass., 29
N. E. Eep. 512). 596, 1337, 1243.
Commonwealth v. Painter (10 Pa. St.
214), 64, 67, 86.
Commonwealth v. Parks (Mass., 30
N. E. Eep. 174), 595.-
Commonwealth v. Patch (97 Mass.
331), 513. 530, 596, 1035.
Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania
Benef. Institute (2 Serg. & E.
141), 206.
Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania
Canal Co. (66 Pa. St. 41; 5 Art.
Eep. 339), 671.
Commonwealth v. Perkins (7 Pa. St.
43), 1530.
Commonwealth v. Perkins (43 Pa.
St. 400), 933, 1376, 1381.
TABLE OF OASES.
XClll
pThe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Commonwealth v. Peters (3 Mass.
239), 693, 1419.
Commonwealth v. Pindar (U Met.
539), 1355.
Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh (H
Pa. St. 177), 176, 287, 303.
Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh (34
Pa. St. 49B). 932, 937, 1372, 1376,
1877, 1378, 1385.
Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh (41
Pa. St. 378), 933.
Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh (88
Pa. St. 66), 1377.
Commonwealth i'. Plaisted (148
Mass. 37.1), 489, 512, 519, 550,
1335. 1378, 1379.
Commonwealth v. Proprietors &c.
(3 Gray, 339), 786, 787, 1314.
Commonwealth v. Railroad Co. (37
Pa. St. 339), 1205.
Commonwealth v. Ray (140 Mass.
433), 531.
Commonwealth v. Raymond (97
Mass. 567), 1349.
Commonwealth v. Rice (9 Met. 353),
580, 1343.
Commonwealth v. Roark (8 Cush.
210), 1355.
Commonwealth v, Robertson (5 Cosh.
438), 518, 533, 1024.
Commonwealth v. Eowe (141 Mass.
79), 540.
Commonwealth v. Roxburv (9 Gray,
451), 17. •
Commonwealth v. Rush (14 Pa, St.
186), 624, 1203.
Commonwealth v. Ryan (5 Mass. 90),
1262.
Commonwealth v. Sessions (2 Pick.
414), 1552.
Commonwealth, v. Shaw (1 Pitts-
burgh (Pa.), 493), 351, 353, 356,
369, 1359.
Commonwealth v. Sheldon (3 Mass.
188), 705.
Commonwealth v. Smith (103 Mass.
444), 1349.
Commonwealth v. Smith (132 Mass.
289), 375.
Commonwealth v. Stark (3 Cush.
556), 543.
Commonwealth v. SteSee (7 Bush
(Ky.), 161), 518.
Commonwealth V. Stockley (12 Phila.
316), 1233.
Commonwealth v. Stockton (5 T. B.
Mon. (Ky.) 192), 336.
Commonwealth v. Stodder (3 Cush.
562), 487, 488, 531, 534, 550, 551,
133S, 123.5.
Commonwealth v. Sutherland (3
Serg. & R, 145), 203.
Commonwjealth v. Tewkesbury (11
Met. 55), 593.
Commonwealth v. Towanda Water-
works (Pa., 15 Atl. Rep. 440),
1555.
Commonwealth v. Towles (5 Leigh,
743), 144.
Commonwealth v. Turnpike Co. (10
Bush, 354), 939.
Commonwealth v. Waite (11 Allen,
364), 1249.
Commonwealth v. Wentworth (118
Mass. 441), 1350.
Commonwealth v, Wentworth (145
Mass. 50), 366, 368.
Commonwealth v. West Chester (9
Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 643). 1539. 1530.
Commonwealth v. Westborough (3
Mass. 406), 1591.
Commonwealth v. Westfield Bor-
ough (11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 369),
1531.
Commonwealth v. Wilkins (131
Mass. 356), 538, 1244.
Commonwealth v. Williamson (10
Phila. (Pa.) 490), 1345.
Commonwealth v. Wilmington (105
Mass. 599), 1471.
Commonwealth v. Winthrop (10
Mass. 177), 705.
Commonwealth v. Woelper (3 Serg.
& R. 29), 189.
Commonwealth v. Wolbert (6 Bin-
ney, 39:2), 645.
Commonwealth v. Woods (44 Pa. St.
113), 59^. 1163, 1169.
Commonwealth v. Worcester (3 Pick.
463). 518, 531, 533, 539, 550.
Commonwealth v. Wyman (137 Pa.
St. 508; 31 Atl. Rep. 389), 173,
288.
Commonwealth v. Young (135 Mass.
536), 489, 551.
Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Cleve-
land &o. R. Co. (41 6arb. 9).
953.
Comstock V. City of Syracuse (5 N.
Y. Supl. 874), 846, 847.
Comstock V. Grand Rapids (54 Mich.
641), 758, 1135.
Comstocku School Committee (R. I.,
34 Atl. Rep. 145). 370.
Conboy r. Iowa City (3 Iowa, 00), 90.
510, 541, 1262.
Concord v. Boscawen (17 N. H. 465),
1386, 1393.
Concord v. Concord Horse R. Co. (6)
N. H. 80), 283.
Concord v. Merrimack County (60 N.
H. 531), 992.
Concord v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank
(93 V. S. 635), 944, 961.
XCIV
TABLE OF OASES.
[Tho references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL H, pp. 789-1605.]
CJoncord v. Robinson (181 U. S. 165;
7 S. Ct. Eep. 937), 562, 619, 620,
640, 925, 932, 934.
CoDcord R. Co. v. Greeley (17 N. H.
€7), 682. •
Condict V. Jersey City (46 N. J. Law,
157), 753.
Condict V. Mayor (46 N. J. Law, 157 ;
19 Cent. L. J. 313), 1037.
Condon, In re (L. R. 9 Ch. App. 609),
248.
Condran v. City of New Orleans
(La., 9 So. Rep. Bl),709, 718.'
Cone V. Hartford (28 Conn. 363),
1164.
Conery v. New Orleans Water-works
Co. (39 La. Ann. 770; 3 So. Rep.'
555), 646.
Corierv v. New Orleans Water-works
Co. (41 La. Ann. 910; 7 So. Rep.
8). 573.
Congl-eve v. Morgan (18 N. Y. 84),
1452.
Conklin v. City of Keokuk (73 Iowa,
343; 35 N. W. Rep. 444), 1157.
Conklin v. N. Y. &e. R. Co. (103
N. Y. 107), 1457;
Conklin v. Thompson (29 Barb. 218),
763.
Conley v. Supervisors &c. (2 West
Va. 416). 528.
Conlin v. Aldrich (98 Mass. 557),
1523, 1560.
Conlin v. Seaman (23 Cal. 549), 1189.
Connecticut River R. Co. v. County
Comm'rs (127 Mass. 50), 1594.
Connellsville Borough v. Gilmore
(15 W. N. C. 343), 1057.
Conner v. Board (57 Indw 15), 973.
Conner v. Elliott (18 How. 591), 144.
Conner v. Mayor (2 Sandf. 355; 5 N.
Y. 285), 187, 202.
Connersville v. Banl; (16 Ind. 105),
1359.
Connolly v. Beverly (151 Mass. 437),
636, 668.
Connolly v. Chedic (6 Nev. 322), 1573.
Connor v. Mayor &c. of N. Y. (1
Seld. (5 N. Y.) 285), 187.
Connor v. Tomkibs (23 Mo. 443),
1323.
Connors v. Carp River Iron Co. (54
Mich, 168). 113.
Conover v. Devlin (15 How. Pr.
(N. Y.) 470), 199.
Conrad v. Ithaca (16 N. Y. l58), 10,
753. 768, 776, 1199, 1439, 1441,
1444, 1445.
Conrad v. Stone (78 Mich. 685), 168,
169, 170, 381.
Conroe v. Bull (7 Wis. 408), 1588.
Conservators &c. v. Ash (10 Barn, &
Cress. 849), 48.
Consumers' Gas & Electric Light Co.
V. Congress Spring Co. (15 N. Y.
Supl. 634), 678.
Converse v. Fort Scott (93 U. S. 503),
940.
Converse ti. McArthur (17 Barb. 410),
998.
Converse v. Porter (45 N. H. 885),
357, 868, 1416.
Conway v. Ascberman (94 Ind. 387),
691.
Conway v. Beaumont (61 Tex. 10), 263.
Conway v. Russell (151 Mass. 581),
219.
Conway v. St. Louis (9 Mo. App.
488), 199.
Conwell V. Corxnersville (8 Ind. 358),
1169.
Conwell V. O'Brien (11 Ind. 419), 103.
488.
Conyers v. Kirk (78 Ga. 480; 3 S. E.
Rep. 443), 847, 1311.
Cook V. Anamosa City (66 Iowa, 428),
746, 14S0.
Cook V. Boston (9 Allen, 393), 241.
Cook V. Charlestown (98 Mass. 80),
1467.
Cook V. City of Beatrice (Neb., 48
N. W. Rep. 838). 935.
Cook V. City of Macon (54 Ga. 468),
755, 1013.
Cook V. Commissioners (6 McLean,
613), 792.
Cook V. Crandall (Utah, 26 Pao. Rep.
937), 1364.
Cook V. Harris (61 N. Y. 448), 1405,
1406, 1409.
Cook V. Humber (11 C. B. (N. Si)83;
31 L. J. C. P. 73), 134.
Cook V. Luckett (3C. B. 168), 134.
Cook V. Manufacturing Co. (1 Sneed,
698), 933.
Cook V. Montague (115 Mass. 571),
1467.
Cook V Pennsylvania (97 U. S. 556),
1234.
Cook V. Quick (Ind., 26 N. E. Rep.
1007), 1129.
Cook V. School Dist. (13 Colo. 453),
453, 1338.
Cook V. Slocum (27 Minn. 511; 8
N. W. Rep. 755), 1131, 1169.
Cook V. Sudden (94 Cal. 448), 1407.
Cook V. Town of Barton (63 Vt.
566), 1433.
Cook County u. ^Industrial School
(125 111. 540), 1346.
Cook County v. McCrea (93 111. 236),
549. 791.
Cool v. Crominet (13 Me. 350), 690,
1417.
Cooley V. Essex (27 N. J. Law, 415),
787.
TABLE OF OASES.
xov
PThe references are to pages; Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Coolidge V. Brookline(114 Mass. 592),
17, 636, 668.
Coolraan v. Fleming (82 Ind. 117), 694.
CJoombes v. County Comm'rs (68 Me.
484), 1193.
Coonley v. City of Albany (57 Hun,
327: 83N. Y. St. Rep. 411; 10
N. Y. Supl. 512), 614, 773, 785,
1227, 1404.
Cooper V. Asli (76 111. 11), 1396.
Cooper V. City of Dallas (Tex., 18 S.
W. Rep. 565), 1146.
Cooper 11. District of Columbia (4
MacArthur, 250), 525.
Cooper V. Lampeter (8 Watts (Pa.),
125), 285, 296.
Cooper V. Metropolitan Board of
Health (32 How. Pr. 107). 1018.
Cooper V. People (41 Mich. 403), 539.
Cooper V. Phibbs (L. R. 2 H. L. Cas.
149; 17 Irish Ch. R. 79), 248.
Cooper V. Sullivan County (65 Mo.
542), 939.
Cooper V. Town of Delavan (61 111.
96), 834.
Copcutt V. City of Yonkers (13 N. Y,
Supl. 452), 1172.
Cope V. Collins (37 Ark. 649), 1380.
Cope V. Thomas Haven Dock & Rail-
way Co. (6 Exch. 849), 261.
Copeland v. Packard (16 Pick. 217),
685, 1591.
Copes V. Charleston (10 Rich. (S. C.)
Law, 491), 933. 941.
Copland v. State (126 Ind. 51; 25
N. E. Rep. 866), 1536.
Copp V. Henniker (55 N. H. 189), 696.
Corbalis v. Newberry Township (132
Pa. St. 9) 771.
Corbett v. Troy (6 N. Y. Supl. 381 ;
53 Hun, 328), 1461.
Corbin v. Cedar Rapids &c. Co. (66
Iowa, 73), 697,
Corbin v. Wis. R. Co. (66 Iowa, 269),
1420.
Corcoran v. Peekskill (108 N. Y. 151),
1486.
Cordell v. N. Y. Central &c. R. Co.
(84 N. Y. 535), 1503.
Cordell v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (75 N.
Y VO), 1504.
Cordell v. State (33 Ind. 1), 529.
Cordrell v. Frizell (1 Nev. 130), 175.
Corey v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. (100
Mo. 283), 693.
Corfield v. Coryell (4 Wash. 380),
143, 144.
CorkJe v. Maxwell (3 Blatch. 413),
1577.
Corliss, In re (11 R. L 638). 302, 386.
Corliss V. Corliss (8 Vt. 373), 344.
Cormack v. Commonwealth (5 Binn.
(Pa.) 184), 3a3, 335.
Cormack v. Wolcott (37 Kan. 891),
1274.
Cornell v. Barnes (1 Denio, 35), 310.
Cornell v. Connersville (15 Ind. 160),
1351.
Cornell v. Gnilford (1 Denio, 510),
207, 350, 251, 252. 642.
Cornell v. People (107 111. 872). 1889.
Cornell College v. Iowa County (32
Iowa, 520), 648.
Corning v. Go^ld (16 Wend. 531),
1421.
Corning «. Greene (23 Barb. 33), 63,
67.
Corning v. Rector &c. of Christ
Church (33 N. Y. St. Rep. 766;
11 N. Y. Supl. 762), 564.
Cornish v. Pease (19 Me. 184), 370.
Cornwell v. Comm'rs (10 Exch. 771),
1408.
Corporation of Bluffton v. Studi-
haker (106 Ind. 129). 712, 820.
Corporation of Columbia v. Hunt (5
Rich. (Law R.) 5.50), 1043.
Corporation of Knoxville v. Bird (13
Lea, 121), 1055.
Corrigan v. Gage (68 Mo. 541), 1234.
Corrothers v. Clinton Dist. Board
&c. (16 West. Va. 537), 1568,
1571.
Corvallis v. Carlile (10 Oregon, 139),
517, 1245.
Cory V. Carter (48 Ind. 337), 1345.
Cory V. Sqmerset Freeholders (44
N. J. Law, 445), 259.
Costello V. Village of Wyoming
(Ohio, 30 N. E. Rep. 613), 556.
Coster V. Mayor &c. (43 N. Y. 319),
1195.
Coster V. Tide Water Co. (18 N. J.
Bq. 54), 682, 684.
Cotes V. Davenport (9 Iowa, 327),
677.
Cothran v. City of Rome (77 Ga. 583),
796.
Cotter V. Doty (5 Ohio, 394), 535.
Cotterill v. Starkey (8 Car. & P. 691),
1498.
Cotton V. Atkinson (53 Ark. 98), 831.
Cotton V. Comm'rs (6 Fla. 610), 816,
933.
Cotton V. Davies(l Str. 59), 164.
Cotton V. Ellis (7 Jones' (N. C.) Law,
545), 187.
Cotton V. Mississippi Boom Co. (23
Minn. 373), 50. ■
Cotton V. New Providence (47 N. J.
Law, <101; 2 Atl. Rep. 253), 948,
950 1592.
Cotton V. Phillips (56 N. H,220), 189,
201.
Cougot V. New Orleans (16 La. Ann.
. 31), 581.
XGVl
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol i; pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-160B.]
Conlson v, Portland (Deady, 481),
903.
Coulter V. Coulter (81 Ind. 642),
1037.
Coulter V. Robertson (24 Miss. 278),
432.
Coulterville v. Gillen (72 111. 599),
1240.
Oouncil.w. Pepper (1 Rich. 364), 532.
Council Bluffs v. Stewart (51 Iowa,
385; 1 N. W. Rep. 638), 840.
'County V. Quarter Sessions (8 Barr,
214), 86.
County V. Rogers (7 Wall. 181), 94.
County Comni'ts v. Baker (44 Md.
1), 319.
County Comm'rs v. Burgess (61 Md.
29), 1493.
County Comm'rs v. County Comm'rs
(1 Wy. Ty. 140), 455.
County Comm'rs v. Cox (6 Ind. 403),
423, 464.
CountT Comm'rs v. Duckett (30 Md.
468), 315, 219.
County Comm'rs v, Duvall (54 Md.
351), 223.
County Comm'rs v. King (13 Fla.
451), 449, 461.
County Comm'rs v. Lineberger (3
' Mont. 231), 321.
County Comm'rs v. The President
(51 Md. 465), 403.
County Comm'rs of Columbia
County V. King (13 Fla. 451),
442.
County Comm'rs of Lake County v.
Slate (34 Fla. 368; 4 So. Rep.
795), 440, 441. 448.
County Court v. Boreman (West Va.,
, 13 S. E. Rep. 490), 843.
County Court v. Griswold (58 Mo,
175), 683.
County Court v. Robinson (37 Ark.
116), 1345. ■
County of Adams v. City of Qulncy
(130 111. 566), 1165. 1166.
County of Bay v. Brock (44 Mich.
45), 1536.
County of Bearer v. Armstrong (44
Pa. St. 63), 958.
County of Caldwell v. Harbert (68
Tex. 321 : 4 S. W. Rep. 607), 813,
1342. 1347, 1371.
Countv of Calloway v. Foster (93 U.
S. 567), 943.
County of Carter v. Linton (120 U.
S. 517; 7 S. Ct. Rep. 650). 459.
Countv of Cass v. Gillett (100 U. S.
585), 984.
County oi Cass v. Johnston (95 U. S.
369), 493.
County of Christian v, Rockwell (25
111. App. 30), 974.
County of Cook v. Industrial School
(135 111. 510), 1346.
County of Delaware v. McDonald
(46 Iowa. 171), 1006.
County of Franklin v. County of
Henry (S6 III. App. 1'93). 976, 988.
County of Grundy v. Hughes (8 III.
App. 41), 1003.
County of Hardin v. McFarlan (83
III. 138). 791.
County of Jasper v. Ballou (108 U. S.
' 745). 941.
County of Knox v. • Aspinwall (31
How. 539), 945.
County of Lancaster v. Fulton (138
Pa. St. 481; 18 Atl. Rep. 384;
24 W. N. C. 401), 639.
County of McLean v. City of Bloom-
ington (106 III. 309). 1165. .
County of Mobile li. Kimball (103
U. S. 704), 740.
County of Montgomery v. Auohley
(93 Mo. 136; 4 S. W. Rep. 425),
1338, 1593.
County of Montgomery v. Auohley
(Mo., 15 S. W. Rep. 6), 1338.
Countv of Northampton v. Innes (26
Pa. St. 156), 1011.
County of Piatt v. Goodell (97 111.
84), 460.
County of Pike v. State (11 111. 203),
. 1553.
County of Pulaski v, Yatighn (83
Ga. 270), 863.
County of Richardson v. Truenbaoh
(34 Neb. 596), 1006.
County of Richland v. County of
Lawrence (18 III. 1), 1024. .
County of San Luis Obispo v. Hen-
dricks (71 Cal. 343; 11 Pac. Rep.
683), 491, 508.
County of Scotland v. Hill (132 U. S.
107), 943, 944, 964.
County of Scotland v, Thomas (94 U.
S. 6«3), 943.
Countv of Sorocco v. Leavitt (N.
Mex., 13 Pac. Rep. 759), 114, 115.
County of Tipton v. Kimberlin(Ind.,
9 N. E. Rep. 407), 1587.
County of Tipton v. Locomotive
Works (103 U. S. 523), 943.
County of Wapello v. Bingham (10
Iowa, 39 ; 74 Am. Dec. 370), 339.
County of Warren v. Portsmouth
Sav. Bank (97 U. S. 110), 964.
County Treasurer v. Bunbury (45
Mich. 84), 195.
Courser v. Powers (34 Vt. 517), 190,
300.
Courtney v. Louisville (13 Bush (Ky.),
419). 933, 1364.
Covington v. Arthur (Ky., 14 S. W.
Rep. 121), 1368.
TABLE OF OASES.
XCVll
[The reterenoea are to pages: Vol 1, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
Covington v. Boyle (6 Bush, 804),
1186.
Covington v. Casey (3 Bush, 698),
1174.
Covington v. East St. Louis (78 111.
548). 60, 112, 513, 802, 1366.
Covington v. Ludlow (1 Met. (Ky.)
285), 543, 1269, 1272.
Covington v. Powell (2 Met. (Ky.)
226), 1354, 1577.
Covington v. Rockingham (93 N. G.
134), 1568.
Covington v. Southgate (15 B. Mon.
491), 1366.
Covington County v. Dunklin (52
Ala. 28), 1377.
Covington &c. R. Co. v. City of
Athfins (85 Ga. 367; 11 S. E. Rep.
663), 230, 233, 589.
Cowart V. Foxworth (67 Miss. 322),
800, 1340.
Cowdin V. Huff (10 Ind. 83), 187.
Cowdrey v. Town of Canadea (16
Fed. Rep. 533). 939.
Cowen I'. West Troy (43 Barb. 48),
103, 488. 513, 639, 1265.
Cowles V. Brittam (2 Hawks, 204),
1265.
Cowles V. School Dist. (23 Neb. 655 ;
37 N. W. Rep. 493), 1332.
Cowlev V. Town of Rushville (60 Ind.
327), 536. '
Cox V. James (59 Barb. 144), 1411.
Cox V. James (45 N. Y. 557), 1411.
Cox V. St. Louis (11 Mo. 431), 90,
541.
Coy V. City Council &c. of Lyons
(17 Iowa, 1). 1376. 1377, 1547.
Crabtree v. Gibson (78 Ga. 230 ; 3 S.
E. Rep. 16), 1091, 1190.
Gr^cken v. ViUage of Markesan (76
Wis. 499; 45 N. W. Rep. 323),
1501.
Craddock v. Graham (2 Met. (Ky.)
56), 1376.
Craddock v. State (18 Tex. App. 567),
1245.
Crafiford v. Supervisors &c. (87 Va,
110), 3.
Craft 17. Loflnok (34 Kan. 365), 442.
Crafts V. EUiottville (47 Me. 141),
1595.
Craig V. Burnett (33 Ala. 728), 1356.
Craig v. Philadelphia (89 Pa. St.
265), 1170, 1188.
Craig V. First Presbyt'n Church (86
Pa. St. 42), 381.
Craig V. Rochester &o. R. Co. (39 N.
y. 404), 1433.
Craig v.'Secrist (54 Ind. 419)', 660.
Craig V. Sedalia (63 Mo. 417), 1430.
Craig V. Town of Andes (93 N. Y.
404), 937.
Crampton v. Zabriskie (101 TJ. S.
601), 646, 647, 649, 1566, 1580,
1581.
Crandall v. Amador County (20 Cal.
73), 1547.
Crandall v. Nevada (6 Wall. 35), 145.
Crandall v. State (10 N. Y. 340), 144,
Crandall v. State (10 Conn. 339), l44.
Crane v. Fond du Lac (16 Wis. 198),
1, 4, 1377, 1381.
Crane v. Janesville (20 Wis. 305),
1171.
Crane v. School Dist. (61 Mich. 299),
809.
Cranston v. Augusta (81 ,Ga. 572),
547.
Craw V. Tolono (96 111. 255), 1075,
1182, 1187.
Crawford v. Bradford (23 Fla. 404),
1573. .
Crawford v. Dunbar (52 Cal. 36),
189. 386.
Crawford v. Meredith (6 Ga. 552),
313.
Crawford v. Rutland (52 Vt. 412),
1480.
Crawford v. Village of Delaware (7
Ohio St. 459), 779.
Crawford v. Wilson (4 Barb. 504),
1325.
Crawford County v. Iowa County (3
Pin. (Wis.) 368), 439.
Crawford County v. Marion County
(16 Ohio. 466), 453.
Crawfordsville v. Bond (96 Ind. 236)*
1099, 1478. -
Crawfordsville v. Braden (Ind., 38
N. E. Rep. 849), 551, 575.
Crawn v. Commonwealth (84 Va.
283; 10 Am. St. Rep. 839), 317.
Crawshaw v. Roxbury (7 Gray, 374),
257, 665, 713.
Craycraft v. Selvage (10 Bush, 696),
&0% 642.
Creager v, Wright School Dist. (63
Mich. 101 ; 28 N. W. Rep. 794),
1330.
Creed v. Hartman (29 N. Y. 591 ; 86
Am. Dec. 341), 209.
Creek, In re (3 B. & S. 459). 134.
Cregg, .Eajparfe (2 Curtis C. C. 98),
140.
Cregier v. New York (1 1 Daly, 171),
Creighton v. Commonwealth (83 Ky.
142). 315.
Creighton v. Manson (27 Cal. 613),
501.
Creighton v. Piper (14 Ind. 183), 189.
Creighton v. San Francisco (42 CaL
446), 1371.
Creighton v. Scott (14 Ohio St. 439),
1164,1181,1188.
XCVIU
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages; VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1606.]
Crepps V. Durden (Cowp. 640), 538.
Crescent Township v. Anderson (114
Pa. St. 643; 8 Atl. Rep. 379), 1494.
Gresson's Appeal (30 Pa. St. 437),
563.
Crist V. Town Trustees (10 Ind. 462),
296.
Crittenden v. Terrill (2 Head (Tenn.),
588), 338.
Crittenden County v. Shanks (Ky.,
11 S. W. Rep. 468), 869.
Crocker v. McGregor (76 Me, 282),
' 1468.
Crockett v. Boston (5 Cush. 182), 685,
1080.
Croll V. VillaKe of Franklin (40 Ohio
St. 340), 538.
Cromartie v. Comm'rs (87 N. C. 134),
1380.
Crommett v. Pearson (18 Me. 344),
296, 825.
Cromwell v. Connecticut Brown
Stone Q. Co. (50 Conn. 470), 624.
Cromwell v. Sao County (96 U. S.
51), 956. 957, 959. 964, 965.
Cronin v. People (82 N. Y. 318; 37
Am. Rep. 564), 606, 1231, 1244.
Cronin v. Stoddard (97 N. Y. 271),
199 312 314
Crook V. People"(I06 III. 237; 5 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 460), 94, 109.
Cross V. City of Kansas (90 Mo. 13),
1154.
Cross V. Hecker (Md., 24 Atl. Rep.
99), 1256, 1261.
Crosby v. Hanover (36 N. H. 404),
1196.
Cross V. Mayor of Morristown (18
N. J. Eq. 305), 258, 259, 485, 1171,
1189.
Cross V. School Directors (24 HI. App.
191), 1333.
Crossett v. Janesville (28 Wis. 420),
6774
Crouse, Ex parte (4 Wheat. 9), 1008.
Crow V. Board (118 Ind. 51 ; 20 N. E.
Rep. 643), 971.
Crow V. Oxford (119 TJ. S. 215), 640.
Crow Dog's Case (109 U. S. 556), 142.
Crowder v. Town of Sullivan (128
Ind. 486; 28 N. E. Rep. 94), 568,
839, 971.
Crogdon v. County of Sullivan (47
N. H. 179). 976, 994.
Crowell V. Bristol (5 Lea (Tenn.), 685),
786.
Crowell V. Crispin (4 Daly, 100), 212.
Crowell V. Sonopia County (25 Cal.
313), 969.
Crowly V. Copelv (2 La. Ann. 329),
11B6, 1185.
Crownen v. Wellsville Water Co. (3
N. Y. Supl. 177), 1304.
Crudupr. Ramsey (54 Ark. 168; 15
S. W. Rep. 458), 90S.
Cruger v. Dougherty (43 N. Y. 107),
1383.
CruKer v. Hudson River R. Co. (10
N. Y. 190), 696.
Cruikshanks. v. Charleston (1 Mc-
Cord, 360), 1565.
Crume v. Wilson (104 Ind. 583), 697.
Crutchfield r. City of Wan-ensburg
(30 Mo. App. 456). 709, 710.
Cudden v. Eastwick TSalk. 183), 10.
Cttbertson v. Citv of Fulton (137 111.
30; 18 N. E."Rep. 781), 832, 838,
876.
Culbertson v. Coleman (47 Wis. 193;
2N. W.Rep. 124), 557.
Cullen V. Carthage (103 Ind. 196: 14
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 256; 53
Am. Rep. 504), 638, 659, 712,
820.
Cullen V. Meeks (87 Mo. 396), 393.
Cumberland v. Magruder (34 Md.
381), 112, 113.
Cumberland v. Pennell (69 Me. 357),
322.
Cumberland v. Willison (50 Md. 138),
779, 1137.
Cuming County v. Tate (10 Neb. 193),
659.
Cumming v. Grand Rapids (46 Mich.
150), 1169.
Cumming v. Mayor &c. of Brooklyn
(11 Paige, 596), 181.
Cumming i\ Savannah (R. M.
Charlt. (Ga.)26), 1351, 1356.
Cumming v. United States (22 Ct. CI.
344), 742.
Cummings v. Brown (43 N. Y. 514),
335
Cummings v. Clark (15 Vt. 653), 200.
Cummings V. City of St.. Louis (90
Mo. 259; 2 S. W. Rep. 130), 577,
634.
Cummings v. Peters (56 Cal. 593).
686.
Cummins v. City of Sevmour (79
Ind. 491 ; 41 Am. Rep'. 135), 643,
1099.
Cummins v. Lawrence County (So.
Dak., 46 N. W. Rep. 184), 962.
Cummins v. National Bank (101 U. S.
153), 1190.
Cunningham v. Almonte (21 Upper
Can. C. P. 459), 537.
Cunningham v. Bucklin (8 Cow.
178), 339.
Cunningham v. Campbell (S3 Ga.
635). 695.
Cunningham v. Macon &c. R. Co.
(109 U. S. 446), 30.
Cunningham v. Squires (2 West Va.
435J, 1363.
TABLE OF OASES.
XOIX
CThe references are to pages: Vol I, pp. 1-788; Vol. It, pp. 789-1605.]
Cupp V. Seneca County (19 Ohio St.
173), 690.
Curran v. Arkansas (15 How. 812),
423.
Curran v. Boston (151 Mass. 505; 30
Am. & Eng. Corp. Gas. 506), 9.
Curran v. Louisville (83 Ky. 628),
1421.
Curran v. Shattuck (34 Cal. 437),
1418.
Curry V. District Township of Sioux
City f62 Iowa, 104), 14.
Curry v. Jones (4 Del. Ch. 559), 1190.
Curry v. Mt. Stirling (15 HI. 330).
591.
Curry v. Savannah (64 Ga. 290), 1381.
Curtis V. Butler County (34 How,
485), 95?.
Curtis V. Gowan (34 111. App. 516),
185, 059, 891.
Curtis V. Lyman (34 Vt. 33S), 336.
Curtis V. Pocahontas County (73
Iowa, 115). 1419.
Curtiss V. Whipple (34 Wis. 350).
930, 1393.
Gushing v. Bedford (135 Mass. 526),
778.
Gushing v. Frankfort (57 Me. 541),
290.
Gushing v. Stoughton (6 Gush. 389),
657, 659.
Cushman v. Smith (34 Me. 247), 704.
Cutcomb V. Utt (60 Iowa, 156), 1173.
Cutler V. Ashland (131 Mass. 588),
218.
Cutler V. Eussellville (40 Ark. 105 ;
4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Gas. 414),
300, 497.
Cutliff V. Albany (60 Ga. 597), 1370.
Cutter V. Demmon (111 Mass, 474),
209.
Cuyler v. Trustees of Rochester (12
Wend. 16'i). 250, 643.
Cypress Pond Draining Go. v. Hooper
(2 Mete. (Ky.) 350), 687.
D.
Dady v. Mayor &o. (10 N. Y. Supl,
819), 1095.
Dafoe V. Harshaw (60 Mich. 300; 36
N. W. Rep. 879), 189.
Daggett V. City of Cohoes (7 N. Y,
Supl. 882). 1099.
Daggett V. Hudson (43 Ohio St. 548;
54 Am. Rep. 833), 376, 377, 378.
Daggett V. Mendon (Vt., 34 Atl. Rep.
343), 373.
Dailey v. State (8 Blackf. (Ind.) 339),
189.
Daily «. Swope (47 Miss. 367), 1185,
1383,
Daily v. Worcester (131 Mass. 452),
1473.
Dair v. United States (6 Wall. 1),
311.
Dake v. Beeson (79 Ind. 34), 1419.
Dakota v. Town of Winneconne (55
Wis. 532), 1000.
Dallas V. Fosdick (40 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
349). 1345.
Dallas City v. Western Electric Co.
(Tex., 18 S. W. Rep. 553), 1596.
Dallas County v. McKeiizie (110
U. S. 686). 961.
Dale V. Delaware R. Co. (73 N. Y.
468), 1486, 1487.
Dale V. Irwin (78 111. 170), 358, 379.
Dalrymple v. Milwaukee (53 Wis.
178), 1166.
Dalton V. Salem (139 Mass. 91), 1483.
Dalton V. State (43 Ohio St. 653 ; 1
West. Rep. 773), 389.
Dalton V. Upper Tyrone Township
(137 Pa. St. 18), 771.
Daly V. City and County of San
Francisco (73 Cal. 154; 13 Pac.
Rep. 331), 643, 1105.
Daly V. Georgia &c. R. Co. (80 Ga.
793; 7 S. E. Rep. 146), 589. 590.
Dalv V. Morgan (69 Md. 4eO; 16 Atl.
"Rep. 287), 391, 395, 397, 1370.
Dalzell V. Davenport (12 Iowa, 437),
677.
Damon v. Granby (2 Pick. 345), 8,
285, 287. 391, 296, 363.
Dana, In re (4 Ben. 14), 545, 546.
Danaher v. Brooklyn (119 N. Y. 341),
764.
Dane v. Gillmore (51 Me. 544), 833.
Danforth v. Durrell (8 Allen, 343),
1408.
Daniel v. Mayor &o. (11 Humph.
(Tenn.) 583), 95, 109, 659.
Daniel v. New Orleans (a6 La. Ann.
1), 1174.
Daniel v. Richmond (78 Ky. 543),
1335.
Daniels v. Athens (55 Ga. 609). 1435.
Danilels v. Burford (10 Upper Can.
(Q. B.)481), 208.
Daniels v. Lebanon (58 N. H. 384),
1499.
Daniels v. Railroad Co. (35 Iowa,
139), 704.
Daniels v. Tearney (103 U. S. 415),
645.
Danolds v. State (89 N. Y. 36), 741.
D'Antignao v. Augusta (31 Ga. 700),
1171.
Danville v. Shelton (76 Va. 325), 549,
101)4, 1173, 1371. i;-i99.
Danville &c. Co. v. Parks (88 111. 463),
1363.
Darby v. Sharon (U2 Pa, St. 66), 436.
TABLE OT" CASES.
[The references are to pages! VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 78&-1605.]
Darcantel v. People's S. & R. Co.
(La., 1893; 11 So. Rep. 239), 501,
Darling v\ Bangor (68 Me. 108), 1436.
Darling v. Gunn (50 111. 424), 1179.
Darling v. St. Paul (19 Minn. 389),
883, 1238.
Darling v. Westmoreland (53 N. H.
401), 1468. 1477.
Darlington v. Commonwealth (41 Fa.
St. 68), 690. 1270.
Darlington v. Jackson- County (101
U. S. 6S8), 946.
Darlington v. Laclede (4 Dill. 200),
961.
Darlington v. Maygood (31 N. Y.
164), 1023, 1.^95.
Darlington v. New York (31 N. Y.
164), 756.
Darrow v. People (8 Colo. 417), 188,
1563.
Darst V. People (51 111. 336), 603.
Dartmouth v. County Coram'rs (153
Mass. 12), 291.
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4
Wheat. 519), 2, 4, 77, 78, 89, 111,
713, 741.
Dartmouth Sav. Bank v. School Dis-
tricts (6 Dak. 332 ; 43 N. W. Rep.
822), 621, 1335. , . '
Dasball v. Olmstead (30 Minn. 96), 10.
Dasent, In re (3 N. Y. Supl. 609),
8a4.
Dasey v. Skinner (11 N. Y. Supl.
881), 1165,
Dashiell v. Baltimore (45 Md. 615),
1181.
Daugherty v. Brown (91 Mo, 26).
1415.
Daiisch V. Crane (Mo., 19 N. W. Rep.
' 61), 305.
Davenaut v. Hurdia (Moo. 584), 487.
Davenport v. Bird (34 Iowa, 524),
539.
Davenport v. Dodge County (105
U. S. 237), 1379.
Davenport v. Hallowell (10 Me. (1
Fairf.) 317), 368, 826.
Davenoort v. Johnson (49 Vt. 403),
83i.
Davenport v. Kelley (7 Iowa, 108),
1244.
Davenport v. Kleinschmidt (6 Mont.
503; 16 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
501), 569, 638, 805, 848.
Davenport v. Lord (9 Wall. 409),
1376, 1378.
Davenport v. Mayor (67 N. Y. 456),
189.
Davenport v. Peoria Marine & Fire
Ins. Co. (17 Iowa, 276), 478, 13M0.
Davenport Vi Ruckman (87 N. Y.
568), 1198, 1445, 1500.
Davehport v. Stevenson (34 Iowa,
335), 364.
Davenport &c. Ass'n v. Schmidt (15
Iowa, 313), 1417.
Davenport &c. R. Co. v. Davenport
(13 Iowa. 329), 488, 511. 1261.
Davenport &o. R. Co. v. Lowry (51
Iowa, 486), 1578.
Davey w Baker (4 Burr. 8461), 543.
Davidson v. Mayor &c.. of New
York (37 How. Pr. 343), 109.
Davidson v. New Orleans (96 U. S.
97), 558, 692, 1168, 1178, 1179,
1180, 1183, 1565.
Davidson v. Ramsey County (18
Minn. 483), 934.
Davies v. City of Saginaw (87 Mich.
439; 49 N. W. Rep. 667), lil7,
1170, 1171, 1173, 1175, 1176.
Davies v. Fairbarn (3 How, 636), 117,
513.
Davies v. Los Angeles (80 Cal. 87;
24 Pac, Rep. 771), 690.
Davies v. McKeeby (5 Nev. 369), 376.
Davies p. Morgan (1 Cromp. & J.
587), lOH, 518, 536.
Davies v. New York (48 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 194), 208.
Daviess County v. Dickinson (117
U. S. 6.'57: 6 S. Ct. Rep. 897). 308,
330, 633, 840, 936, 933,
Daviess County v. Huidekoper (98
U. S. 98), 947. '
Davis V. Anita (73 Iowa, 335; 35
N. W. Rep. 344), 518, 1217.
Davis V. Bangor (43 Me. 522), 786,
787, 1467.
Davis V. Berger (54 Mich. 652), 190.
Davis V. Bruce (82 III. 542), 1391.
Davis V. Capper (10 Barn. & C. 28),
318.
Davis V. Charlton (140 Mass. 423),
1483.
Davis V. City of Crawfordsville (119
Ind. 1; 31 N. E. Rep. 449), 1149.
Davis V. Citv of Lynchburg (84 Va.
861; 6S". E. Rep. 230), 1186.
Davis «. City of Newark (N. J., 33
Atl. Rep. 27ii), 1167.
Davjs V. Clinton (55 Iowa, 549), 1565.
Davis V. Commissioners (153 Mass.
218; 26 N. E. Rep. 848), 1105.
Davis V, Des Moines (71 Iowa, 500),
841.
Davis V. Dubuque (80 Iowa, 458),
1865.
Davis V. Dudley (4 Allen, 557), 1455.
Davis V. East Tenn. &c. R. Co. (Ga.,
13 S. E. Rep. 567), 590.
Davis V. Kingston (5 N. Y, Supl.
506), 1476.
DaVis V. JVlacon i64 Ga, 138). 1355,
1370.
TABLB OF OASES.
CI
Cnie references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Davis V. Mayor &c. of Jackson (61
Mich. 530; 38 N. W. Rep. 536),
713, 1437.
Davis V. Mayor &c. of Knoxville
(Tenn., 18 S. W. Rep. 354), 761,
1013.
Davis V. Mayor (1 Duer (N. Y.), 451),
633, 706.
Davis V. Mayor &c. of N. Y. (14 N.
Y. 506), 568, 579, 633, 1196, 1205,
1314, 1464.
.Davis w. Montgomery (51 Ala. 139),
264, 775.
Davis V. Point Pleasant (33 West Va.
389), 68, 1367.
Davis V. Reed (65 N. Y. 566), 383,
1390.
Davia v. School Dist. (34 Me. 349),
2.59, 640,1141.
Davis V. School Dist. (81 Mich. 314),
809, 1333, 1342.
Davis V. School Dist. (43 N. H. 381),
373.
Davis V. School Dist. (44 N. H. 398),
377.
Davis V. Smith (130 Mass. 113), 685.
Davis V. Town of Seymour (59 Conn.
531), 1603.
Davis V. Woolhaugh (9 Iowa, 104),
1256.
Davis V. Yuba County (75 Cal. 453),
955
Davison v. Otis (34 Mich. 33), 546.
Dawes v. Jacltson (9 Mass. 490), 313.
Daws V. Town of Elmwood (34 Fed.
Rep. 114), 956.
Dayvson v. Aurelius (49 Mich. 479),
1578.
Dawson County v. 'McNamara (10
Neb. 376;, 931.
Day V. City of Mt. Pleasant {70 Iowa,
193; 30 N. W. Kep. 853), 1470.
Day V. Clinton (6 111. App. 476), 526.
Day V. Day (94 N. Y. 153), 1428.
Day V. Gallup (2 Wall. 97), 333.
Day V. Green (4 Cusb. 433), 383, 489.
Day V. Milford (5 Allen, 98), 1445,
1466.
Day V. Putnam Ins. Co. (16 Minn.
408), 667.
Day u Reynolds (33 Hun, 131), 235.
Day V. Springfield (103 Mass. 310),
1594.
Dayton v. Qnigley (39 N. J. Eq. 77),
518.
Dayton v. Rounds (27 Mich. 83),
1379.
Dean v. Borchsenius (30 Wis. 236),
558, 1163.
Dean v. Carron (36 N. J. Law, 238),
1163.
Dean v. Davis (51 Cal. 406), 5, 1024.
Dean v. Lufkin (54 .Tex. 265), 1386.
Deane v. Randolph (133 Mass. 475),
760, 1080.
Deane v. ^odd (33 Mo. 90), 1573.
Deansville Cemetery Ass'n, In re
(66 N. Y. 569; 33 Am. R;p. 86),
583, 683.
Dearing v. Shepherd (78 Ga. 28),
1553:
De Blois V. Barker (4 R. I. 445),
1123.
Decatur County Board v. State (86
Ind. 8). 1375.
Decatur Gaslight & Coke Co. v. City .
of Decatur (24 III. App. 544; 120 •'
III. 67), 635, 1317.
Deckert u. Commonwealth (113 Pa.
St. 241), 1530.
De Clerq v. Hager (12 Neb. 185),
931
Decorah u BuUis (25 Iowa, 13), 390,
291. 298.
Decorah v. Dunstan (38 Iowa, 96),
526, 528, 1234.
Deeds v. Sanborn (26 Iowa, 419),
1365.
Deel V. Pittsburgh (3 Watts, 363),
531.
Deer Isle v. Eaton (13 Mass. 320),
1000.
Deerfield v. Conn. River R. Co. (144
Mass. 325). 1491.
DeerBeld v. Delano (1 Pick. 469),
1005.
Deering, In re (93'N. Y. 361), 686.
Defer v. City of Detroit (67 Mich.
346), 1144.
De Forth v. Wisconsin &c. R. Co.
(53 Wis. 320), 936.
De Fremery v. Austin (53 Cal. 383),
1401).
De Grave v. Monmouth (4 Car. & P.
Ill), 290.
Dehail v. Morford (Cal., 30 Pac. Rep.
593), 1175.
De Hart v. McGuire (10 Phila. 359),
325.
Dehm v. City of Havana (28 111.
App. 520), 83a
Deiman v. Fort Madison (30 Iowa,
542), 1365.
Deitz V. City of Central (1 Colo. 323),
53, 530, 532.
De Lacey v. City of Brooklyn (13
N. Y. Supl. 540), 173.
Delacey v. Neuse &c. Co. (1 Hawks
(N. C), 274). 206.
Delafield v. State of Illinois (2 Hill,
159; 8 Paige, 531; 36 Wend,
193), 214, 252, 257, 258. 718.
Delahanty r. Warner (75 III. 185; 20.
Am. 'Rep. 237), 307.
Delancev, Matter of (53 N. Y. 80),
1134".
cu
TABLE OF CASES.
(The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL H pp. 789-1605.]
Delaney, Ex parte (43 Cal. 478), 598.
Delano v. Mayor (33 Hun, 144), 1185.
Delany v. Gault (30 Pa. St. 65). 691.
Delaware v. McDonald (46 Iowa,
171), 1006.
Delaware &i'. R. Co. u East Orange
(41 N. J. Law, 137), 518, 621.
Delaware &c. E. Co. v. Village of
Whitehall (90 N. Y. 21), 591.
Delaware & Earitan Canal Co, v.
Earitan &o. R. Co. (1 C. E.
Green, 321), 584.
Delaware Co. v. McClintock (51 Ind.
3i5), 933.
Delaware County Comni'rs v. Die-
, bold Safe & Lock Co. (133 U. S.
473; 10 S. Ct. Eep. 399), 1113,
1114.
Delaware Eailroad Tax (18 Wall.
230). 1351.
Delcambre v. Clere (34 La. Ann.
1050), 1383.
Delgado v. Chavez (XJ. S.. 11 8. Ct.
Eep. 874; 25 Pao. K^). 948),
1529.
Delhi School Dist. v. Everett (53
Mich. 314), 1341.
Dells V. Kennedy (49 Wis. S55), 377.
Delmonico f. New York (1 Sandf.
223), 767.
Deloach v. Rogers (86 N. C. 357), 163.
Delphi V. Bowen (61 Ind. 29). 1574.
Delphi V. Evans (36 Ind. 90), 301,
485. 497, 1161, 1174, 1265, 1270,
, 1271.
Delphi V. Lowery (74 Ind. 530), 1367,
1477.
Delphi V. Sturgman (104 Ind. 343;
11 Am. & Eng. (3orp. Cas. 87),
047.
Demarest v. New York (74 N. Y. 161),
78, 93, 109.
Demarest v. Wickham (63 N. Y. 330),
290 298
Denair 'v. City of Brooklyn (5 N. Y.
Supl. 835). 1598.
Denham v. County Gomnn'rs (108
Mass. 203), 685, 1404.
Dennehy v. City of Chicago (130 111.
627), 1240.
Dennett v. Nevers (7 Me. 399), 836.
Denning v. New Albany R. Co. (3
Ind. 437), 91, 93.
Denning v. Roome (6 Wend. 651),
1266, 1267, 1268, 1406, 1407, 1409.
Dennis v. Maynard (15 111. 477), 1034.
Dennison v. City of Kansas City (95
Mo. 416; 8 S. W. Rep. 429), 1173,
1174, 1175.
Denniston v. Clark (125 Ma?s. 206).
339.
Denniston v. School Dist. (17 N. H.
492), 342, 345, 347, 133S.
Denny u. Denny (113 Ind. 88; 14 N. E.
Rep. 593), 651,
Denton v. Jackson (2 Johns. Ch. 330),
56, 1386.
Denver v. Brown (11 Colo. 337), 1597.
Denver v. Capelli (4 Colo. 39), 1138.
Denver v. Deane (10 Colo. 375; 16
Pac. Eep. 30), 1480.
Denver v. Ehodes (9 Colo. 554; 13
Pao. Eep. 739), 1137, 1147.
Denver &c. E. Co. v. Domke (11
Colo. 247 ; 17 Pac. Eep. 777), 1204.
Denver &c. E. Co. v. Glasscott (4
Colo. 270), 1468.
Denver City Ey. Co. v. City of Den-
ver (Colo., 30 Pac. Rep. 1048),
1234.
Deompecki). Kumbert(44 Barb. 596),
1414.
Depereu. Bellevue (31 Wis. 120), 423,
439, 453.
Dermont v. Detroit (4 Mich. 435),
1144,
Dermott v. State (99 N. Y. 107), 568.
Derr v. Lubey (1 MacArthur, 187),
1596.
Derry v. Rockingham County (63
N. H. 485), 977.
De Saussure v. Gaillard (127 U. S.
216), 20.
Desha County v. Newman (33 Ark.
788), 895.
Deskins v. Gose (83 Mo. 485), 1344,
Desmare v. United States (93 U. S.
605), 976.
Des Moines v. Chicago &c. R. Co.
(41 Iowa, 569), 527, 1358.
Des Moines v. Gilchrist (67 Iowa,
210), 1054, 1347.
• Des Moines v. Layman (31 Iowa, 158),
696.
Des Moines County v. Harker (34
Iowa, 84). 19.
Des Moines ,Ga8 Co. v. City of Des
Moines (44 Iowa, 505; 34 Am.
Rtep. 756), 116, 486, 568, 612.
Des Moines Water Co.'s Appeal (48
' Iowa, 334), 1360, 1361.
Des Plaines v. Poyer (33 111. App.
574), 1053.
Detroit v. Beckman (34 Mich. 185),
1144, 1437.
Detroit v. Blakeley (81 Mich. 84), 9,
10, 769, 1446.
Detroit v. Chaflfee (70 Mich. 80; 37
N. W. Rep. 883), 1443.
Detroit v. Corey (9 Mich. 165), 1397.
Detroit v. Daly (68 Mich. 509 ; 37 N.
W. Rep. 11), 586.
Detroit v. Dean (106 TJ. 8. 537: 1 S.
Ct. Rep. 560), 1130.
Detroit V. Detroit City Ry. Co. (37
Mich. 558), 1205.
TABLE 07 OASES.
cm
prhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Detroit v. Hosmer (79 Mich. 384),
1312, 1530.
Detroit v. Jackson (1 Doug. (Mich.)
10;i), 261, 713.
Detroit v. Martin (34 Mich. 171), 244,
245, 1183.
Detroit v. Moran (46 Mich. 213), 193.
Detroit v. Osborne (135 XJ. S. 492),
772.
Detroit v. Plank-road Co. (43 Mich.
140; 5 N. W. Eep. 275), 595.
Detroit v. Putnam (45 Mich. 265),
769, 1446.
Detroit v. Weber (29 Mich. 24), 324.
Detroit &c. R. Co. v. Bearss (39 Ind.
598), 352.
Detroit City Ry. Co. v. Mills (85 Mich.
634),_C78, 679. 680.
Detroit Sharp-Shooters' Ass'n v.
Highway Comm'rs (34 Mich. 36),
623.
De Varaigne v. Fox (2 Blatchf. 95),
671, 682.
Dever v. City of Junction City (Kan.,
25Pac. Rep. 861), 1118.
Devereaux v. City of Brownsville (29
Fed. Rep. 742), 1373.
Devereaux v. City of Brownsville (35
Fed. Eep. 742), 475.
Devlin v. New York (63 N. Y. 8),
1115.
I Devlin v. Smith (89 N. Y. 470), 1444.
Devoe v. School Dist. (77 Mich. 610),
809, 1342.
Devore's Appeal (56 Pa. St. 163), 393,
1366.
De Voss V. Richmond (18 Gratt. 338;
98 Am. Dec. 647), 937, 955.
Devoy v. New York |35 Barb. 264;
23 How. Pr. 226), 158.
Dew v. The Judges (3 Hen. & Mun.
1), 1533. . •
De Walt V. Lackawana County (Pa.,
24 Atl. Rep. 185), 384.
Dewein v. City of Peoria (24 111. App.
396), 1096.
Dewey v. Cent. Car Co, (42 Mich.
399), 1588.
Dewhurst v. Allegheny City (95 Pa.
St. 437), 758.
Dewirc v. Bailey (131 Mass. 169), 1438.
De Witt V. Ithaca Village (15 Hun,
668), 1411.
De Wolf V. Watterson (39 Hun, 111),
1342.
Dexter v. Canton Toll Bridge Co. (79
Me. 563), 1432.
Dexter v. Cumberland (R. I,, 21 Atl.
Eep. 347), 1242.
Dey V. Jersey City (19 N. J. Eq. 412),
252, 280, 501, 1141.
Dey V. Lee (4 Jones' (N, C.) Law,
238), 303.
Deyo V. Otoe County (37 Fed. Eep.
246), 941, 960.
Dhrew v. Citv of Altoona (Pa., 15
Atl. Eep. 636), 848, 872.
Dibble v. Town of New Haven (56
Conn. 199). 818.
Dickerson v. Franklin (113 Ind. 178),
1365.
Dickerson Hardware Co. v. Pulaski
County (Ark., 18 S. W. Rep.
462), 613.
Dickey v. Hurlburt (5 Cal. 343). 375.
Dickey v. Polk (58 Iowa, 287; 12 N.
W. Rep. 292). 1578.
Dickey v. Tennison (37 Mo. 373), 684.
Dickinson v. City of Poughkeepsie
(75 N. Y. 65;, 643, 714, 809.
Dickinson v. Mayor &c. (93 N. Y.
584), 1598.
Dickinson v. Worcester (7 Allen, 19),
1146.
Dickinson County v. Hagan (39 Kan.
606), 693, 1419.'
Dickson v. Racine (61 Wis. 545), 561,
1349.
Diefenthaler v. Mayor &c. (Ill N. Y.
331), 1131, 1183.
Diefenthaler v. New York (43 N. Y.
184), 244.
Dieschel v. Town of Maine (Wis., 51
N. W. Rep. 881), 282.
Diggins V. Brown (76 Cal. 318; 18
^Pac. Rep. 373), 1135.
Dilcher v. Raap (73 111. 2(6), 219.
Dill V. Roberts (30 Wis. 178), 558.
Dill V. Wareham (7 Met. 438), 208,
250, 642.
Dillard v. Webb (55 Ala. 468), 283.
Dillingham v. Snow (5~- Mass. 547),
54,91,92,1335,1578. \
Dillon V. Myers (Bright. (Pa.) 436),
200.
Dillon V. Syracuse. (9 N. Y. Supl.
98), 1140, 1141.
Dimook v. Nuffield (30 Conn. 129),
1467.
Dimpfel v. Railroad Co. (110 U. S.
209; 3S. Ct. Rep. 573), 1130.
Dingley v. Boston (100 Mass. 544),
671, 682, 6«6.
Dingwall v. Common Council (82.
Mich. 568; 46 N. W. Rep. 93b).
293, 299. ~
Directors v. Houston (71 111. 318),
5,7.
Directors &c. v. Manlay (64 Pa. St.
18), 1000.
Directors of Poor v. Donnelly (Pa.,
7 Atl. Rep. 204), 899.
Dishon v. Smith (10 Iowa, 312), 160,
853, 375, 389. 1356.
Distilling Co. ?;. City of Chicago (112
111. 19), 1239, 1240.
cxv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
District of Columbia v. Armes (107
U. S. 519), 1477.
District of Coluitibia v. Waggaman
(1 Mackey, 328), 519.
District of Columbia v. Washington
&c. R. Co. (4 Am. & Eng. E.
Gas. I6l), nog.
District of Columbia v. Woodbury
(136 U. S. 450), 773, 1447.
District Township v. Thomas (59
Iowa, 50), 618.
District Township of Doon v. Ciim-
mins (U.S., 13 S. Ct. Rep. 220),
840, 941.
District Township of Norway v. Dis-
trict Township of Clear Lake (11
Iowa, 506), 238.
District Township of Walnut v. Ran-
kin (70 Iowa. 65), 657.
Dlvely V. Cedar Falls (87 Iowa, 327),
841, 1261.
Dlveny v. Elmira (51 N. Y. 506), 768,
781, 1261, 1438. .
Division of Howard County (15 Kan.
194), 465.
Division of Valley Township, In re
(Pa., 23 Atl. Rep. 238). 431.
Dlx V. School Dist. (33 Vt. 309), 368.
Dlx i\ Town of Dummerstown (19
Vt. 373), 657.
Dixon V. Brooklyn City &c. R. Co.
(100 N. Y. 176), 1331.
Dixon V. Cincinnati (14 Ohio, 340),
1363.
Dixon u. City of Detroit (Mich., 49
N. W. Rep. 628), 1189.
Dixon V. Mayes (72 Cal. 166),, 1363.
Dixon County v. Field (HI U. S. 83:
4 S. Ct. Rep. 315). 208, 680. 633,
834, 946, 953, 961, 963.
Doane v. Houghton (75 Cal. 300),
1175.
Dobney's Adm'r ,v. Smith (5 Leigh,
13), 325.
Doctor V. Hartman (74 Ind. 331),
695.
Dodd V. Hartford (35 Conn. 333),
1569, 1573.
Dodds v./Henry (9 Mass. 363), 355.
Dodge V. City of Memphls'(51 Fed.
Rep. 710), 938, 934.
Dodge V. Essex County Comm'rs (3
Met. '380), 704.
Dodge V. Gallatin (130 N. Y. 117),
1271.
Dodge V. Gridley (10 Ohio St. 20),
113.
Dodge V. People (113 111. 491), 466.
Dodge V. Piatt County (83 N. Y. 316),
953.
Dodge V. Woolsey (18 Hun, 348), 1130.
Dodge County Comm'rs v. Chandler
(96 U. S. 205), 931.
Dodson V. Cincinnati (34 Ohio St.
376), 677.
Dodson V. Fort Smith (33 Ark. 511),
410. 411.
Doe V. Deavors (11 Ga. 79), 1565.
Doev. Jones (11 Ala. 64). 1406.
Doe V. McQuilkin (8 Blackf. 335),
1391.
Doering v. State (49 Ind, 56), 1378.
Doggett V. Cook (11 Cush. 362), 389.
Dolan V. Joint School Dist. (Wis., 49
N. W. Rep. 960), 1330.
Dolkn V. Lane (55 N. Y. 217), 15231
Dolan V. Mayor &c. (68 N. Y. 274 ;
33,Am. Rep. 168), 200, 210, 1292.
Dolan V. New York (63 N. Y. 472),
1175.
Dolesei>. Pierce (124 111. 140; 16 N.
E. Rep. 218), 393, 406.
DonahoetJ. Richards (38 Me. 379; 61
Am. Dec. 856). 318, 319, 1346.
Donahue v. Graham (61 Cal. 876), 1 15.
Donaldson v. Boston (83 Mass. 508),
1446.
Donaldson v. County of Butler (98
Mo. 163), 1591,
Donnelly v. City of Brooklyn (7
N. Y. Supl. 49), 883.
Donnelly v. City of Pittsburgh (Pa. ,
23 Atl. Rep. 394), 1031.
Donnelly v. Decker (58 Wis. 461),
1024.
Donnelly v. Town of Ossining (18
Hun; 352), 830.
Donnelly v. Tripp (13 R. I. 97), 773,
Donnersberger v. Prendergast (128
111. 32U ; 31 N. E. Rep. 1), 406.
Donougb V. Dewey (83 Mich. 309),
' 199, 274, 277, 1333.
Donovan v. McAlpin (85 N. Y. 185 ;
35 Am. Rep. 649), 323.
Donovan v. Mayor &c. of New York
(44 Barb. 180), 844.
Donovan v. Mayoi' &c. of New York
(33 N. Y. 391), 208, 280, 35.',
640.
Donovan v. Vioksbiirg (89 Miss. 247),
535.
Doolan v. Manitowoc (48 Wis. 312),
180.
Dooley v. Muse (Neb., 48 N. W. Rep.
143), 1323.
Dooley v. Town of Sullivan (112
Ind. 451), 775, 1111.
Doolittle V. County Court (28 West
Va. 258), 1516.
Doolittle V. Selectmen &c. (59 Conn.
• 402), 1549. '
Dorchester v. Youngman (60 N. H.
385), 493.
Dore V. City of Milwaukee (42 Wis.
108), 1151, 1153.
Dorey v. Boston (146 Mass. 336), 287.
TABLE OF CASES.
CV
rrhe references are to pages: Vol,
Dorgan v. Boston (13 Allen (94 Mass.),
233), 684, 1096.
Dorgan v. Mobile (31 Ala. 469), 1013.
Dorman v. Jacksonville (13 Fla. 588),
677.
Dorman v. Lswiston (81 Me. 4111,
693, 1419.
Dorn V. Backer (61 N. Y. 261; 61
Barb. 597), 326.
Dorsey v. Eacine (60 Wis. 292), 1481.
Dorsey v. Smyth (38 Cal. 21), 310,
ia93.
Dorsey County v. Whitehead (47 Ark.
305; 1 S. W. Rep. 97), 308, 907.
Doster v. Atlanta (72 Ga. 833), 761.
Doster v. Howe (38 Kan. 353), 659.
Dotterer v. Bo we (84 Gal 769; 11
S. E. Rep. 896), 1596.
Doty V. Elsbree (11 Kan. 309), 927.
Dougan v. Cham plain Trans. Co. (56
N. y. 1), 1486.
Dougherty v. Brown (91 Mo. 86 ; 3
S. W. Rep. 810), 1155.
Doughertys. Hitchcock (35 Cal. 513),
,1171.
Dougherty v. Hope (3 Denio, 598),
352, 1383.
Dougherty v. Miller (36 Cal. 83), 706.
Douglas i;. Chatham (41' Conn. 811),
933.
Douglas V. Downing (Miss., 9 So.
Rep. 297). 930.
Douglas V. Jones (62 Ga. 433), 243.
Douglas V. Town of Harrisville (9
West Va. 162), 1189, 1369.
Douglas County v. Bardon (79 Wis.
641 ; 48 N. W. Rep. 969), 817.
Douglas County v. Walbridge (38
Wi?. 179), 940.
Douglass V. Commonwealth (2
Rawle, 883), 1^46.
Douglass V. County of Baker (23 Fla.
419; 2 So. Rep. 776), 374.
Douglass V. Pike County (101 U. S.
677), 946. 1373.
Douglass V. Placerville (18 Cal, 643),
570. 646.
Douglass V. State (31 Ind. 439), 1893.
Douglass V. Wickwire (19 Conn. 489),
' 198.
Douglass County v. Timme (Neb.,
49 N. W. Rep. 366), 179.
Douglass County Comm'rs v. Bolles
(94 U. S. 104), 947, 960.
Douglasville v. Jones (63 Ga. 433),
241.
Dousman v. Pres't &o. of Town of
Milwaukee (1 Pin. (Wis.) 81),
434.
Dousman v. St. Paul (33 Minn. 387),
. 1127.
Dovaston v. Payne (3 Sm. L. Cas.
143), 1406.
I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Dove' V. Ind. School Dist. (41 Iowa,
689), 1345.
Dover v. MoClintock (6 Watts & S.
80), 1368.
Dover v. Murphy (4 N. H. 16l), 995.
Dover v. Twombly (43 N. H. 59), 329.
Dow V. Backer (61 Barb. 597), 1578.
Dow V. Bullock 113 Gray, 136), 175.
Dow V. Chicago (11 Wall. 108), 1568,
1569, 1573, 1574.
Dow V. Norris (4 N. H. 17), 524.
Dowlan r. Sibley County, In re (36
Minn. 430; 31 N. W. Rep. 517),
15, 1125.
Do.wner v. Boston (7 Cush. 377),
1188.
Downer v. Lent (6 Cal. 94), 1031.
Downing v. Herriok (47 Me. 463),
218.
Downing v. Mason Co. (87 Ky. 208;
12 Am. St Rpp, 473), 10.
Downing v. Miltonvale (36 Kan. 740),
507, 541, 543.
Downing v. Rugar (21 Wend. 178),
276, 296, 297, 1335. 1390.
Downs V. Board &c. (Wash., 30 Pac.
Rep. 147), 1589
Dows V. Town of Elmwood (34 Fed,
Eep. 114), 941.
Doxey v. Inspectors (67 Mich. 601 ; 35
N. W. Rep. 170), 621,
Doyle V. Austin (47 Cal. 360), 1393.
Doyle V. Falconer (1 Privy Council
Appeals, 329), 305.
Drainage Co. Cases (11 La. Ann. 3S8),
1034.
Drake v. Lowell (13 Met. 293), ]44.'i.
Drake v. Lowell (110 Mass. 514),
1466.
Drake v. New York (3 Johns. Cas.
79), 1533.
Drake v. Phillips (40 111. 388), 646,
1160,
Drake v. Railroad Co. (7 Barb. 737).
484.
Drake v. Stoughton (6 Cush. 893),
657.
Draper v. Cambridge (30 Ind. 368),
1345.
Draper v. Springport (104 U. S. 501),
260, 953.
Drath v. B. & M. E. Co. (15 Neb.
365), 697.
Drefenthaler v. New York (111 N. Y.
331), 842.
Dr. Gaskin's Case (8 T. E. 209), 202.
Drew V. Morrill (63 N. H. 23), 194,
314.
Drexel v. Town of Lake (127 111. 54;
20 N. E Rep. 38), 591.
Driftwood &c. Turnpike Co. v. Bar-
tholomew County Comm'rs (72
Ind. 226), 231, 2|60, 643.
OVl
TABLE OF CASES.
[The reterpnoes axe to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
Drlggs V. Phillips (103 N. Y. 77; 3 N.
Y. St. Rep. 69), 1223, 1405, 1421.
Drisko v. Columbia (75 Me. 73), 368.
Dritt V. Snodgrass (66 Mo. 286; 27
Am. Rep. 343), 218, 219.
Dronberger v. Reed (11 Ind. 420),
696.
Drott V. Riverside (4 Ohio C. 0. 312),
181.
Drucker v. Manhattan R. Co. (103 N.
. Y. 157), 1433.
Druiffi V. Parker (L. R. 5 Eq. 131),
P53
Druliner v. State (20 Ind. 308), 166.
Drummond i\ City of Eau Claire
(Wis.. 48 N. "W. Rep. 244), 1171.
Drury v. Foster (2 Wall. 24), 311.
Drydenty. Swinburne (20 West Va.
89), 386.
Duanesburgh v. Jenkins (57 N. Y.
177), 932, 941, 1382, 1889, 1390.
Duanesville v. Jenkins (57 N. Y. 186),
952. '
Dubach v. Hannibal &a R. Co. (89
Mo 483; 1 S. W. Rep. 86), 587,
1206.
Dubois i;. Augusta (Dudley (Ga.), 30),
. 513.
Du Bois V. Decker (130 N. Y. 325; 29
N. E. Rep. 313; 4 N. Y. Supl.
768),, 1006.
Dubuque v. Chicago &o. R. Co. (47
Iowa, 207), 1384.
Dubuque v. III. Cent. R. Co. (39
Iowa, 56), 1358, 1383.
Dubuque v. Insurance Co. (29 Iowa,
9), 1352, 1357. 1362.
Dubuque v. Rebman (1 Iowa, 444\
1257, 1262.
Dubuque &c. College v, Dubuque
(13 Iowa, 555), 257, 713, 1330,
1331.
Dudley v. Grayson (6 T. B. Mon.
(Kv.) 251). 1368.
Dudley v. Mayhew (3 N. Y. 15), 555.
Duel V. Lamb (1 Thomp. & C. 66),
998.
Duer V. Small (4 Blatchf. 263), 1359.
DuflEy V. Dubuque (63 Iowa, 171; 18
*r. W. Rep. 900), 1448, 1466.
Dugan V. Farrier (47 N. J. Law, 383),
290, 297.
Dugan V. United States (3 Wheat.
172), 214.
Duggen V. MoGruder (Walk. (Miss.)
112), 1576.
Duke V. Brown (96 N. O. 137; 1 S. E.
Rep. 937), 377, 643.
Duke V. Rome (30 Ga. 635), 776, 778.
Dullan>\ Wellaon (53 Mich. 393; 51
Am. Rep. 128), 207.
Dullanty v. Vaughn (77 Wis. 38),
618.
Duluth V. Krupp (Minn., 49 N. W.
Rep. 335), 1236.
Duluth V. Mallet (43 Minn. 204; 45
N. W. Rep. 154), 589, 1211.
Dumas v. Patterson (9 Ala. 484),
326 330
Dun V. Howard (6 Ark, 461), 1355.
Dunavan v. Board of Education (47
Hun, 13), 1343.
Duncan v. Buffalo (3 N. Y. Supl.
503), 1460.
Duncan v. Findlates (6 CI, & F. 894),
* 332.
Duncan v. Lawrence County
Comm'rs (101 Ind. 403), 286, 971.
Duncan v. State (7 La. Ann. 377),
329
Duncan v. Terre Haute (85 Ind. 104),
691, 1418, 1419.
Duncombe's Case (Cro. Car. 366),
1473.
Duncombe v. Fort Dodge (38 Iowa,
281), 361.
Duncombe v. Prindle (13 Iowa, 1),
465.
Dundas v. Lansing City (75 Mich.
499), 1477, 1479, 14«6, 1493, 1503.
Dundy v. Richardson Co. (8 Neb.
■ 508), 60, 61.
Dunham v. People (96 111. 331), 1024.
Dunham v. Rochester (5 Cowen, 462),
106, 518, 521, 535, 1232.
Dunham v. Village of Hyde Park (75
111. 371), 681.
Dunham v. Williams (37 N. Y. 251),
1412.
Dunleith v. Reynolds (53 111. 45),
1350.
Dunleith &o. Bridge Co. v. Dubuque
(32 Iowa. 427), 1361.
Dunlop V. Keith (I Leigh. 430), 533.
Dunlop V. Munroe (7 Cranch, 242),
222.
Dunman v. St. Paul R. Co. (36 Minn.
357), 1503.
Dunovan v. Green (57 111. 63). 1371.
Duntley v. Davis (43 Hun, 239), 814.
Dunwiddie v. Town of Rushville (37
Ind. 66), 1190.
Du Page V. Jenks (65 111. 272), 1189.
Du Page Co. v. People (65 111. 360),
160.
Duperier v. Viator (35 La. Ann. 957),
1390.
Duraoh's Appeal (63 Pa, St. 491),
1354.
Durand v. Borough of Ansonia (57
Conn. 70). 1070.
Durango v. Pennington (8 Colo. 257),
258, 713, 1116.
Durango v. Remsberg (16 Colo. 327),
12B4.
Durant v. Eaton (98 Mass. 469), 1573.
TABLE OF OASES.
CVII
prhe references are to pages; Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Durant v. Iowa County (1 Woolw,
69), 882. 964.
Durant v. EauSman (34 Iowa, 194),
1364, 136i
Durant v. Palmer (39 N. J. Law,
544). 1451.
Durfey v. Town of Worcester (63
Vt. 418; 32 Atl. Rep. 609), 987.
Durham v. City of New Britain (55
Conn. 378; 11 Atl. Rep. 354),
1049.
Durham v. Hyde Park (75 Ul. 371),
591.
Durkee v. Janeeville (38 Wis. 464),
557, 558.
Durkin, In re (10 Hun, 269), 505.
Duryea v. Smith (16 N. Y. Supl. 688),
1155.
Durvee v. Mayor &c. (96 N. Y. 477).
1491.
Dusenbury v. Mutual Tel. Co. (11
Abb. N. C. 440). 678. 1433.
Dutten V. Hanover (43 Ohio St. 215),
343, 467.
Dutton V. Aurora (114 111. 138). 805.
Dwight V. Mayor (12 Allen, •622),
1351.
Dwyer v. Hackworth (57 Tex. 245),
563, 934.
Dyar v. Corporation (70 Me. 515),
1097.
DyckmHn v. Mayor &o. (5 N. Y.
484), 681.
Dyer v. Boogan (70 Cal. 136), 1271.
Dyer v. Chase (53 Cal. 440), 1161.
Dyer v. City of St. Paul (37 Minn.
457; 8 N. W. Rep. 373), 1144.
Dyer v. Heydenfeldt (Cal., 4 West
Coast Eep. 585), 1173.
Dyer v. Smith (13 Conn. 384), 217,
E.
Eadle v. Slimmon (86 N. Y. 9), 1183.
Eagle v.. Beard (33 Ark. 497), 450.
Eagle V. Kohn (84 111. 293), 940.
Eames v. Savage (77 Me. 312), 1376.
Earl of Exeter v. Smith ^2 Keb. 367 ;
Can. 177), 487.
Earley's Appeal (103 Pa. St. 273),
231.
Early v. Hamilton {75 Ind. 376). 694.
East Dallas v. State (73 Tex. 370; 11
S. W. Rep. 1030), 400, 413.
East Lincoln v. Davenport (94 U, S.
801), 943. 947, 961.
East Oakland v. Skinner (94 U. S.
255), 230, 633, 936.
East River Gas Light Co. v. Don-
nelly (93 N. Y. 557), 331.
East St. Louis v. Amy (120 U. S.
600), 115, 1374, 1375.
East St. Louis v. Board of Trustees
(6 111. App. 76), 849.
East St. Louis v. East St. Louis &c,
Co. (98 111. 415), 237, 635, 645,
805, 887, 839.
East St. Louis v. Flannigan (26 III.
App. 449), 80."), 837.
East St. Louis v. Flannigan (84 111.
App. 596), 855.
East St. Louis v. Maxwell (99 111.
439), 113, 113.
East St. Louis v. O'Flynn 119 111.
200; ION. E. Rep. 39.1), 1193, 1195.
East St. Louis v. People (6 111. App.
130), 849.
East St. Louis v. People (124 111. 655;
33 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 408),
843.
East St. Louis v. Rhein (111., 38 N. E.
Rep. 1089), 406.
East St. Louis v. St. John (47 III.
463). 6S1.
East St. Louis v. Thomas (11 Dl.
App. 283), 283.
East St. Lnuis v. Trustees (6 111. App.
130), 1380.
East St. Louis v. Trustees (103 111.
489), 1357.
East St, Louis v. United States (110
U. S. 331), 1374.
East St. Louis v. Wehrung (50 111.
28), 283. 550, 1390.
East St. Louis v. Zebley (110 TJ. S.
331), 1379, 1380.
East Sudbury v. Sudbury (12 Pick.
1), 983.
East Syracuse, In re (20 Abb. N. C.
131), 879, 880. 1124.
East Tennessee University v. Knox-
ville (6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 166), 11.
Eastern &c. Pass. Ry. Co. v. City of
Easton (133 Pa. St. 505; 19 Am.
St. Rep, 658), 1055.
Easthampton v. County Comra'rs
(154 Mass. 424), 676.
East Hampton v. Kirb (68 N. Y.
459), 21.
Eastman v. City of Concord (64
N. H. 263; 8 Atl. Rep. 822), 883.
Eastman v. Company (44 N. H. 146),
1036.
Eastman v. Meredith (36 N. H. 284 ;
73 Am. Dec. 303), 10, 17, 39, 94,
156, 759, 763, 766, 775, 785. 1015.
Easton v. Chanfiler (11 Wend. 90),
1578.
Easton v. Neff (103 Pa. St. 474), 775.
Eastport v. Lubec ((i4 Me. 246), 995.
Eaton V. Berlin ,(49 N. H. 219), 838.
Eaton V. Boston &c. R. Co. (51 N. H.
504, 673, 674.
Eaton V. Chesebrough (83 Mich. 214),
1395.
cvui
TABLE OF 0ASE8.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL II, pp. 789-1605.]
Eaton V. Eeegan (114 Mass. 433),
1245.
Eaton V. Miner (5 N. H. 543). 349.
Eaton V. Supervisors &c. (44 Wis.
489), 14, 15.
Eatontown v. Shrewsbury (49 N. J.
Law, 188; 6 Atl. Rep. 319), 976.
Eberhardt v. Wood (6 Lea(Tenn.),
467; 2 Tenn. Ch. 490), 314.
Eberhart v. Railroad Co. CJO III. 347),
1456.
Eohsbaoh v. Pitts (6 Md. 71), 1181.
Ecliert V. Long Island K. Co. (43 N.
Y. 502), 1493.
Eckman v. Township of Brady (81
Mich. 70), 995.
Ecorse Township v. Board &c. (75
Mich. 270), 1429.
Eddy V. Board of Health (10 Phila.
;94), 105U
Eddy V. Wilson (43 Vt. 363), 361, 366,
373, 663.
Edenton,i>. Wool (63 N. C. 379), 1255.
Edgecumbe v. Burlington (46 Vt.
218), 686.
Edgerly v. Concord (6? N. H. 8), 759,
775.
Edgerton v. HufE (36 Ind. 35), 672.
Edgerton v. New Orleans (1 La. Ann.
485), 1595.
Edin burg -American Land Co. v. City
of Mitchell (So. Dak., 48 N. W.
Rep. 131), 807, 9S0.
Edmands v. Boston (108 Mass. 535),
699. 701, 1101.
Edmands v. Banbury (28 Iowa, 367;
4 Am. Rep. 177), 377.
Edmunds v. Gookins (34 Ind. 169),
393, 401, 1366.
Edwards v. City of Chicago (111., 30
N. E. Rep. 350), 1170.
Edwards v. Davis (16 Johns. 283),
lOOG.
Edwards v. Ferguson (73 Mo. 686J,
318.
Edwards v. Kearzey (96 U. S. 595).
435.
Edwards v. Town of Pocahontas (47
Fed. Rep. 368). 763, 768.
Edwards v. Trustees &o. (30 111. App.
538), 1338.
Edwards v. United States (13 Otjo,
471), 301, 203. ■
Edwards v. Watertown (34 Hun,
436), 386.
Edwards v. Williamson (70 Ala. 145),
435.
Eels V. American &c. Tel. Co. (30
N. Y. Supl. 600), 1433.
Effingham v. Hamilton (68 Miss, 633;
,10 So. Rep. iJ9), 1509.
Egan V. Chicago (5 111. App. 70), 485.
Ege V. Koontz (8 Pa. St. 109), 241.
Eggleston v. Columbia Turnpike Co.
(18 Hun, 146), 1466.
Eglestoh V. City Council (1 Mills,
Const. (S. C.) 45), 1354.
Egremont v. Benjamin (135 Mass.
15), -338.
Egypt Street, In re (3 (Grant (Pa.)
Cas. 455), 113.
Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin (27
Mo. 495), 1185, 1356, 1370.
Ehrgott V. New York (96 N. Y, 364),
* 265, 753. 1445.
Eichels v. Evansville St. Rv. Co. (73
Ind. 261 ; 41 Am. Rep. 861), 109,
114, 590.
Eifert v. Central Covington (Ky., 15
S. W. Rep. 180), 13i)9.
Eilert v. Cshkosh (14Wis. S87), 1171.
Ela V. Smith (5 Gray, 131), 193, 195,
1603.
Elbin V. Wilson (33 Md. 135), ,318.
Elder v. Bemis (3 Met. 599), 339.
Elder v. Dwight Mfg. Co. (4 Gray,
201), 1356.
Elder v. Territory (3 Wash. T. 438),
1336.
Eldora v. Burlingame (63 Iowa, 23,
33), 534. 644.
Eldred v. B^rnadotte (53 111. 368),
1381.
Elgin V. Eaton (83 111. 535), 1153,
1456.
Elgin V. Hoag f23 111. App. 650), 1096.
Elizabeth v. Force (39 N. J. Law,
587), 965.
Elizabeth v. Westfield (7 N. J. Law,
439), 978.
Elizabeth Citv v. N. J. Cent. R. Co.
(53 N. J. Law, 491), 1413.
Ellzabethtown v. Lefler (28 111. 90),
641. 543, 1064.
Elk V. Wilkihs (113 U. S. 94), 143.
Elkhart v. Ritcer (66 Ind. 136), 1430,
1484.
Elkhart v. Simonton (71 Ind. 7), 697.
Elkhart t!. Wickwire (131 lad. 331;
23 N. E. Eep. 344), 1126.
Elk Point V. Vaughn (1 Dak.M13; 46
N. W. Rep. 577), 117, 514, 515,
1343.
Elliott V. City of Oil City (Pa., 18
Atl. Rep. 553), 1099.
Elliott V. Fair Haven &c. R. Co. (33
Conn. 579), 590..
Elliott V. Palmer (10 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep.
437), 131)3.
Elliott V. Philadelphia (75 Pa. St.
347), 755.
Elliott V. Sackett (108 U. S. 133), 953.
Elliott V. Swartwout (10 Pet. 137),
1577.
Elliott V. Supervisors (58 Mich. 452 ;
35 N, W. Rep. 461), 817, 1029.
TABLE OF CASES.
CIX
rrhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1805.]
Elliott V. Williamson (10 Lea (Tenn.),
38^, 3 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
603), 1893.
Elliott V. Willis (1 Allen, 461), 198.
Ellis V. Am. Acad. (120 Pa. St. 608),
1412.
Ellis V. Bristol (2 Gray, 370), 1533.
Ellis V. Northern Pac. R. Co. (77 Wis.
114; 4.5 N. W. Rep. 811), 617.
Ellis V. Page (1 Pick. 43), 528.
Ellis V. Peru City (23 111. App. 35),
1492.
Ellis V. Washoe County (7 Nev. 291),
658, 659.
Ellison V. Lindford (Utah, 25 Pac.
Rep. 744), 1363.
Ellison V. Raleigh (89 N. C. 125), 204.
Ellsberry v. Seary (83 Ala. 614), 1345,
1347.
Ellsworth V. Rossiter (46 Kan. 237 ;
26 Pac. Rep, 674), 183, 719.
Elmenriorf v. Board of Finance (41
N. J. Law, ia5), 658.
Elmendorf- v. Mayor &c. of New
York (25 Wend. 693), 174, 301,
497, 500. 1265.
Elmore v. Drainage Comm'ra (13.'5
III. 269; 34 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 491), 268, 750.
Elmore v. Overton (104 Ind. 348 ; 54
Am. Rep. 343; 4N. E. Rep. 197),
217, 219.
Elmore County v. Long (52 Ala. 277),
1377.
Elmwood V. Marcy (92 IT. S. 289),
911, 947.
Elson V. O'Dowd (40 Ind. 300), 651.
Elster V. City of Springfield (Ohio,
30 N. E. Rep. 274), 582, 765.
1100, 1101.
Elston V. Crawfordsville (SO Ind.
272), 392, 1366.
Elwood V. Bullock (6 Q. B. 383), 519,
1233
Ely V. Board &c. (87 Cal. 166 ; 25 Pac.
Rep. 240), 1550.
Ely V. Campbell (59 How. Pr. 333),
615. 1464.
Ely V. Des Moines (Iowa, 53 N. W.
Rep. 475), 1498.
Ely V. Niagara County (36 N. Y. 297),
757.
Ely V. Parsons (55 Conn. 83; 10 Atl.
Rep. 499), 222. 223.
Ely V. Rochester (36 Barb. 138), 662.
Ely V. St. Louis R. Co. (77 Mo. 34),
1486.
Ely ton Land Co. v. Ayres (62 Ala.
413). 646, 1189.
Embden v. Lehigh Coal Co. (47 Pa.
St. 76), 959.
Embler v. Walkill (132 N. Y. 222),
1453, 1493.
Embury v. Conner (3 N. Y. 511), 671.
Emerich v. City of Indianapolis (1 18
Ind. 279), 1544.
Emerie v. Gilman (10 Cal. 404). 1595.
Emerson v. Babcbck (66 Iowa, 258 ;
23 N. W. Rep. 656), 1217.
Emerson v. Newberry (13 Pick. 377),
713.
Emery v. Bradford (29 Cal. 75). 706.
Emery v. Gas Co. (28 Cal. 345), 1166,
1172, 1188.
Emery v. Hapgood (7 Gray, 55 ; 66
Am. Dec. 459). 209.
Emery v. Lowell (137 Mass. 138),
2i4:
Emmitt v. City of New York (13 N.
Y. Supl. 887), 184, 188.
Emmons v. City of Lewiston (135
III. 36: 24 N. E. Rep. 1006), 1235.
Emory v- Lowell (104 Mass. 13). 773.
Empire v. Darlington (101 U, S. 87),
943, 964.
Emporia v. Gilchrist (37 Kan. 532;
15 Pac. Rep. 533), 1083.
Emporia v. Loden (85 Kan. 588),
686,
Emporia v. Norton (16 Kan, 336),
504.
Emporia v. Schmidling (33 Kan. 485),
1484. 1486.
Emporia v. Smith (42 Kan. 433 ; 32
Pac. Rep. 616), 393.
Emporia v. Volmer (12 Kan. 623)i
539
Empire City Bank, In re (18 N. Y,
199), 690.
Enfield v. Jordan (119 U. S. 6S0),
964.
Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford
&c. R, Co. (17 Conn. 40), 1196.
Engle V. New York (40 Fed, Rep. 51),
754.
English V. Chicot County (36 Ark.
454), 932.
English V. People (96 111. 566), 929.
English V. Smock (34 Ind. 113 ; 7 Am.
Rep. 215), 651.
Enos V. Springfield (113 111. 65), 1074,
1078, 1086. 1187.
Enright v. Falvey (4 L. R. Ir. 397),
333.
Enterprise v. Fowler (38 Kan. 415;
' 16 Pac. Rep. 703). 884.
Episcopal Church, Matter of (75 N.
Y. 324), 1071.
Episcopal Society v. Dedham Epis-
copal Church (1 Pick. 878), 257.
Erie v. Bootz (72 Pa. St. 196), 112.
Erie v. Erie Canal Co. (59 Pa. St. 174),
86.
Erie v. Knapp (29 Pa. St. 173), 159fi.
Erie Academy v. Erie (31 Pa, St.
515), 1365.
ex
TABLE OF CASES.
/
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. U, pp. 789-1605.]
Erie City v. McGill (101 Pa. St. 616),
1500.
Erie City v. Schwingle (33 Pa. St.
384), 385, 1440.
Erie County v. Erie (113 Pa. St. 360),
1397.
Erlinger v: Boreau (5l III. 94), 64.
Ernst V. Kunkle (5 Ohio St. 530),
1115.
Erskine v. Van Arsdale (15 Wall.^
77), 1577.
Escanaba Company v. Chicago (107
U. S. 678), 758.
Eschbach v. Pitts (6 Md. 71). 1395.
Eslava v. Jones (83 Ala. 139). 219.'
Espy V Fort Madison (14 Iowa, 236),
1577.
Essex Turnpike Corporation v. Col-
lins (8 Mass. 393). 305.
Estep V. Keokuk County (18 Iowa,
199i, 351, 642.
Estes t). Owen (90 Mo. 113; 3 S. "W.
Rep. 133). 589, 1161.
Estey V. Starr (56 Vt. 690), 303, 363.
Estopinal v. Peyroux (37 La. Ann.
477), 3.'{8.
Euf ala' V. McNab (67 Ala. 588), 330,
549.
Eufeka Basin &c. Co., In re (96 N.
Y.48; 3 Dill. 37R), 931.
Eureka Springs v. O'Neil (Ark., 1893;
19 S. W. Rep. 969), 525. >
Eustace v. Johns (38 Cal. 3), 1301.
1441.
Evans v. Council Bluffs (65 Iowa,
238). 435, 1363.
Evans v. Etheridge (96 N, C. 43). 230.
Evans v. Hughes County (6 Dak.
102; 50 N. W. Eep. 720). 596.
Evans V. Savage (77 Me. 213), 150.
Evans v. Sharp (29 Wis. 564), 558.
Evans v. Town of Stanton (33 Minn.
368), 835.
Evans v. Utica (69 N. Y. 166), 1438,
1492.
Evanston v. Gunn (99 U. S. 660), 9,
365.
Evansville v. Blend (118 Ind. 436),
1377. 1379.
Evansville v. Decker (84 Ind. 335; 43
Am. Eep. 86), 1096, 1098. 1099.
Evansville v. Hall (14 Ind. 37), 13.59.
Evansville v. Martin (41' Ind. 145)?
520.
Evansville v. Page (33 Ind. 535). 401.
Evansville v. Plisterer (34 Ind. 36),
1574.
Evansville v. State (1 18 Ind. 436),
1279, 1383.
Evansville &c. R. Co. v. Evansville
(15 Ind. 895), 283.
Evansville Co. v. State (73 Ind. 319),
1419.
Evartu. Pastal (86 Mich. 325; 49 N.
W. Rep. 53), 316.
Eve V. Simon (78 Ga. 120), 1.545.
Eveleigh v. Hounsfleld (34 Hun, 140),
1439, 1440.
Everett v. Council Bluffs (40 Iowa,
66), 1050.
Everett v. Smith (23 Minn. 53), 381,
494.
Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v.
Beecher (53 Conn. 551), 686.
Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v. City of
TIew Haven (43 Conn, 334i, 677.
Everaon v. Syracuse (100 N. Y. 577),
773,
Everton v. Sutton (5 Wend. 280), 339.
Everts- v. Rose Grove Dist. Tp. (77
Iowa, 37; 41 N. W. Rep. 478),
613, 1331. 1333.
Evertson v. First National Bank (66
N. Y. 14), 958.
Ewbanks v. Ashley (36 III. 177), 530,
1064, 1264.
Ewing V. State (81 Tex. 173), 1556,
1557.
Exchange Bank v. Hines (3 Ohio St.
591), 1573.
Exchange Bank v. Lewis County (38
West Va. 373), 313. 314.
Exeter v. Glyde (4 Mod. 37), 306.
Exeter and Northmoreland Town-
ship Line (8 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep.
534), 430:
Exeter v. Starre (2 Show. 158), £40.
Ex parte Ah Lit (26 Fed. Rep. 513),
534.
Ex parte Ah Yon (83 Cal. 339), 1261,
Exparte Ah You (88 Cal. 99), 518.
Ex parte Andrews (18 Cal. 678), 1018..
Ex parte Baltimore Turnpike Co. (5
Binn. 481), 1390.
Ex parte Harnett (51 Ark. 215; 10
'8. W. Rep. 493), 1013.
Ex parte Batesville &o. R. Co. (39
Ark. 82). 220.
Ex parte Bedell (30 Mo. App. 135),
504, 505.
Exparte Brandon (49 Ark. 143; 4 S.
W. Rep. 453),- 1012.
Exparte Burnett (30 Ala. 461), 106,
534, 1051, 1260.
Ex parte Byrd (84 Ala. 17 ; 5 Am.
St. Rep. 328), 1243, 1344.
Exparte Calhoun (87 Ga. 359), 1371.
Exparte Campbell (74 Cal. 30; 15
Pac. Rep. 318), 1240.
Exparte Canto (31 Tex, App. 61; 17
S. W. Rep. 155), 582, 1344.
Ex parte Cassinello (63 Cal. 538),
1020.
Exparte Cheney (90 Cal. 617), 1347.
Ex parte Chin Yan (60 Cal. 78), 518,
1334.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXI
[The references are to pages: Vol.
Ex parte ClnistenBeji (85 Cal. S08),
524.
Ex parte City Council of Montgom-
ery (64 Ala. 463), 533.
Ex parte Gregg (2 Curtis C. C. 98),
140.
Ex parte Grouse (4 Wheat. 9), 1008.
Ex parte Delaney (43 Gal. 478), 598.
Ex parte Firemen's Ins. Go. (6 Hill,
243), 1589.
Ex parte Fiske (73 Gal. 135; 13 Pac.
Rep. 810), 507, 1246.
Ex parte Frank (53 Cal. 606), 518,
531, 608.
Ex parte Garza (28 Tex. App. 381 ;
19 Am. St. Rep. 845), llB, 117,
118, 1233.
Ex parte Green (Cal., 29 Pac. Rep.
783), 583.
Ex parte Gregory (20 Tex. App. 210),
1234, 1337.
Ex parte Halstead (97 Gal, 471),
1256.
Ex parte Hanson (38 Fed. Rep. 127),
1235.
Ex parte Harris (52 Ala. 87 ; 23 Am.
Eep. 559), 1536.
Ex parte Heath (3 Hill, 42), 190, 389,
1559.
Ex parte Heilbron (65 Gal. 609),
1018.
Ex parte Heyleman (93 Gal. 493; 28
Pac. Rep. 675), 1336.
Ex parte Hitz (111 U. S. 766), 705.
Ex parte HoUwedell (74 Mo. 395),
539, 544. 604.
£« parte Humphrey (10 Wend. 612),
307. .
Ex parte Jackson (45 Ark. 158), 1012.
Ex parte Kiburg (10 Mo. App. 442),
539, 544.
Ex parte Lane (76 Gal. 587), 541,
1264..
Ex parte Lawhorne (18 Gratt. 85),
175.
Ex parte Lynch (2 Hill, 45), 830,
1589.
Ex parte McGollum (1 Cowen, 550),
443.
Ex parte Mayor (23 Wend. 277),
1169.
Elf parte Mirande (73 Gal. 365; 14
Pac. Rep. 888), 274, 358, 1355.
Ex parte Murphy (7 Gowen, 153),
163.
Ex parte Norris (8 S. G. 408), 200.
Ex parte O'Donovan (24 Fla. 881),
1042.
Ex parte O'Leary (65 Miss. 80; 3 So.
Rep. 144), 1053.
Ex parte Parsons (1 Hughes, 282),
804.
Ex parte Reed (4 Granch, 583), 533.
I, pp. 1-T88; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Ev parte Reed (4 Hill, 572). 335.
Ex parte Reily (85 Gal. 632), 199,
1258.
Ex parte Reynolds (87 Ala. 138 ; 6
So. Rep. 335; 29 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Gas. 1), 617.
Ex parte Robinson (13 Neb. 383),
1356, 1370.
Ex parte Robinson (3 Pugsley, 389),
378.
Ex parte Robinson (Tex., 17 S. W,
Rep. 1057), 600.
Ex parte Rogers (7 Cowen, 526, n.),
276.
Ex parte Samuel J. Peacock (35
Fla. 478), 1261.
Ex parte Schmidt (24 S. C. 368), 118,
1257.
Ex parte Schneider (11 Oregon, 288),
1233.
Ex parte Selma &c. R. Go. (45 Ala.
696), 16, 933.
Ex parte Shrader (33 Gal. 279),
1018, 1020.
Ex parte Slattery (8 Ark. 484), 1355,
12.^8.
Ex parte Smith (38 Cal. 702), 1018,
1240.
Ex parte Smith (8 S. C. 495), 200.
Ex parte Snyder (64 Mo. 58). 199.
Ex parte Solomon (Cal., 27 Pac. Rep.
757), 518.
Ex parte State (52 Ala. 231). 740.
Ex parte Stockton (33 Fed. Rep. 95),
1840.
Ex parte Strang (21 Ohio St. 610),
■ 199.
Ex parte Taylor (58 Miss. 478), 1335.
Ex parte Thomas (71 Cal. 804), 1388.
Ex parte Trask (1 Pug. & Bur. 377),
533.
Ex parte Tuttle (91 Cal. 589 ; 37 Pac.
Rep. 933), 597, 1348.
.Ea; i)ar<e Virginia (100 TJ. S. 389),
147.
Ex parte Wells (21 Fla, 280), 469.
Ex parte Weston (11 Mass. 417), 705.
Ex parte ^o\t (14 Neb. 84; 6 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Gas. 158;, 873,
275.
Ex parte Wolters (65 Gal. 869), 1240.
Eyerlv v. Board &c. (81 Iowa, 189),
1540.
Eyerlj' v. Jasper County (73 Iowa,
150), 1540.
Everly v. Jasper County (77 Iowa,
■ 470), 1540.
Eyerraan v. Blaksley (78 Mo. 145),
529, 1349.
Eyke, City Treasurer, v. Lange
(Mich., 51 N. W. Rep. 680), 1522.
Eyre v. Jacob (14 Gratt. 423), 13)7,
1370.
CZU;
TABLE OF OASES.
[The refecences are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 78^1605.]
P.
Faber v. Graf mi Her (109 Ind. 206),
1173.
Face V. Ionia City (90 Mich. 104),
1404, 1446.
Facey v. Fuller (13 Mich. 527), 398.
Fagan v. Chicago (84 III. 334). 1 1B7.
Fairchild i'. City of St. Paul (Minn.,
49N. W. Rep, 33.5). 1088.
Fairchild v. Keith (39 Ohio St. 156),
8:^8.
Fairchild v. Wall (Cal., 39 Pac. Bep.
60), 1118.
Fairfax v. Hunter (7 Cr. 603), 189,
141.
Fairfield v. Gallatin County (100
U. S. 47), 944.
Fairfield v. RatcUfiE (30 Iowa, 396),
1160. ,
Falconer v. Buffalo &c. R. Co. (69 N.
Y. 491), 699, 939. 944, 945.
Falconer v. Campbell (3 McLean C.
C. 195), 50.
Falconer v. Shores (37 Ark. 386). 315.
Falk w. Strofcher(84 Cal. 644; 33 Pac.
Rep. 67(5), 888.
Falls V. Cairo (58 III. 403), 244.
Falmouth v. Watson (5 Bush, 660).
1355.
Fane's Cas^ (Doug. 153), 303.
Fanning v. Gregoire (16 How. 534),
. 361, 566.
Faribault v. Wilson (34 Minn. 354),
541.
Farley v. Chicago «fcc. R. Co. (36 III.
App. 517). 857.
Farley v. Commissioners (136 Ind.
468), 1263.
Farman v. Town of Ellington (46
Hun, 40), 1439.
Farmer v. People (77 III. 322), 1250.
Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank
V. School Dist. (6 Dak. 355 ; 43
N. W. Rep. 767), 631, 809.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bor-
ough of Ansonia (61 Conn. 76),
1168.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Gales-
burg (133 U. S. 156; 10 S. Ct.
Rep. 316), 715, 966.
Farmington River Water-Power Co.
V. County Comm'rs (113 Mass.
306), 704, 705, 1576.
Farnham v. Benedict (39 Hun, 22),
310.
Farnham i>. Pierce (141 Mass. 203; 6
N. E. Rep. 830), 1008.
Farris worth v. Pawtuoket (13 R. I.
8,3), 529.
Farnsworth v. Rock Island (83 Me.
. 508), 1434.
Farnum v. Concord (3 N. H. 898),
156, 747.
Farquar v. Roseburg (3 Pac. Rep.
1103), 265.
Farr v. Brackett (30 Vt. 344). 528.
Farr v. Hollis (9 Barn. & C. 333). 320.
Farrar v. City of St. Louis (80 Mo.
379), 1103, 113.5. 1161, 1173.
Farrel v. City of New York (5 N. Y.
, 673), 1230.
Farrel v. London (13 Upper Can.
»Q. B. 343), 540.
Farrel v. Town of Derby (58 Conn.
234; 84 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas,
391), 667, 815.
Farrell v. Bridgeport (45 Conn. 191),
1277.
Farrell v. Mayor &c. (20 N. Y. St.
Rep. 13; 5 N. Y. Supl. 673). 614.
Farren «. King (41 Conn. 448), 1272.
Farrington v. Investment Co. (N.
Dak., 45 N. W. Rep. 194), 593.
Farrington v. Turner (53 Mich. 27),
379
Fass V. Seehawer (60 Wis. 525), 558,
706, 1083.
Fath V. Koeppel (73 Wis. 389; 39 N.
W. Rep. 539), 1031.
Fatout V. School Comm'rs (102 Ind.
■ 323), 1336.
Faulk V. McCartney (43 Kan. 695;
23 Pac. Rep. 713), 806.
Faulk », Strother (84 Cal. 544; 34
Pac. Rep. Il6), 1553.
Faulkner v. City of Aurora (85 Ind.
130), 744. 775.
Faulkner v. Hunt (16 Cal. 170). 1577.
Faulks V. People (39 Mich. 300), 1249.
Faviell v. Railway Co. (2 Exch. 344),
658.
Favrot v. East Baton Rouge (34 La.
Ann. 491), 1380.
Fay V. Town of Lindley (11 N. Y.
Supl. 855), 1439.
Fayette v. Shafroth (25 Mo. 445),
1256.
Fayetteville v. Carter (53 Ark. 301),
1284.
Fayssoux v. De Chaurand (36 La.
Ann. 547), 1171.
Fearing v. Irwin (55 N. Y. 486), 1195.
Fecheimer v. Louisville (84 Ky. 306),
1888.
Federgreen v. Town of Fallsburgh
(25 Hun, 153), 830.
Felch V. Gilman (33 Vt. 38), 1417.
Feldman v. Charleston (23 S. C. 57),
930 1393
Fell V. State "(43 Md. 71). 487.
Fellowes v. New Haven (44 Conn,
. 240 ; 26 Am. Rep. 447). 677,
Fellows V. Gilman (4 Wend. 414), 310,
313.
TABLE OV OASES.
cxia
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
Fellows V. Walker (39 Fed. Rep. 651),
931.
Felton V. Milwaukee (47 Wis. 494),
698, 699.
Felton V. Short Route Oo. (85 Kv.
640), 1423.
Fender n. Neosho Falls (33 Kan. 305),
1368.
Fenelon's Petition (7 Pa. St. 173),
1188.
Fensier v. Lammon (6 Nev. 109). 334.
Fenton v. Salt Lake County (4 Utah,
466; 11 Pac. Rep. 611). 883.
Fenwick v. East London Co. (L. R.
20 Eq. 544), 1295.
Ferdinand v. Mayor &c. of New
York (13 N. Y. Supl. 226), 1117.
Ferguson v Bqroush of Stamford (60
Conn. 432), 1177.
Ferguson v. Chittenden Co: (6 Ark.
479), 392.
Ferguson v. City of Selma (43 Ala.
398), 1048, 1051.
Ferguson v. Kinnoull (9 CI. & F.
351), 219.
Ferguson v. Landram (5 Bush, 230),
645.
Fernald v. Lewis (6 Greenl. (Me.)
264), 150, 345. 915.
Fernbach v. Waterloo (Iowa, 34 N.
W. Kep. 610), 1488, 1503, 1503,
1504.
Fernbach v. Waterloo (76 Iowa, 598 ;
41 N. W, Rep. 370j, 1487, 1488,
1503.
Ferrari v. Board of Health (24 Fla.
390; 5 So. Rep. 1), 1043.
Ferree v. School Dist. (76 Pa. St.
376), .671.
Ferrier, In re (103 III. 367), 1008.
Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park (97 U.
S. 659), 1046, 1054, 1312.
Field V. Commonwealth (33 Pa. St.
478), 203, 210.
Field V. Des Moines (39 Iowa, 575 ;
18 Am. Rep. 46), 669, 759, 1055.
Field V. Field (9 Wend. 394), 380.
Field V. Girard College (54 Pa. St.
233), 202.
Field V. New York (6 N. Y. 179), 1115.
Field V. People (3 III. 79), 159.
¥veld V. Stokeley (99 Pa. St. 306; 44
Am. Rep. 109). 759. 1054.
Field V. West Orange (36 N. J. Eq.
118; 37 N. J. Eq. 600). 1145.
Fifleld V. Marinette County (63 Wis.
533; 23 N. W. Rep. 705), 593,
- 1133.
Finch V. Board of Education (30
Ohio St. 37; 27 Aiu. Rep. 414),
10. 323, 750.
Flndlay v. McAllister (113 U. S. 104),
1375.
Findley v. Salem (137 Mass. 171),
760, 1037.
Fink V. Milwaukee (17 Wis. 26), 539,
1364.
Fink V. St. Louis (71 Mo. 52). 1163.
FinleyuDietrick(12 lowa,516), 1366.
Finley v. Philadelphia (32 Pa. St.
381), 1350.
Finn v. Adrian City (Mich., 53 N. W.
Rep. 614). 1469. 1499.
Finney v. Oshkosh (18 Wis. 220),
1171.
Finney v. State (126 Ind. 577; 26
N. E. Rep. 150), 865, 1334.
Fire Department v. Helfenstein (16
Wis. 136), 144.
Fire Department' v. Kip (10 Wend.
267), 67, 87.
Fire District v. Comm'rs (108 Mass.
142), 1390.
Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd (120 Pa. St.
624). 754.
Firemen's Ins. Co., Ex parte (6 Hill,
45). 1539.
First Municipality v, Blineau (8 La,
Ann. 689), 1054.
First Municipality v. Comm'rs of
Sinking Fund (1 Rob. 279), 9S.
First Municipality v. Cutting (4 La.
Ann. 335), 580, 1343.
First Nat. Bank v. Americus (68 Ga.
119). 1400.
First Nat. Bank v. Arlington (16
Blatchf. 57), 953.
First Nat. Bank v. Cook (77 111. 632),
1568.
First Nat. Bank v. Countv of Sara-
•toga (lOe N. Y. 488"; 13 N. E.
Rep. 439), 914.
First Nat. Bank v. Meredith (44 Mo.
500), 13.=)9.
First Nat. Bank v. Ottawa (43 Kan.
295), 1596, 1597.
First Nat. Bank v. Peck (43 Kan.
643; 33 Pac. Rep. 1077). 8Q3.
First Nat. Bank v. Rush School Dist.
(81 Pa. St. 307), 833.
First Nat. Bank v. Sarlls (139 Ind.
301), 1246.
First Nat. Bank v. Scott (14 Minn.
77), 965.
First Nat. Bank v. Town of Concord
(1)0 Vt. 357), 936.
First Nat. Bank v. Town of Dorset
(16 Blatchf. 63), 936.
First Nat. Bank v. Union School Tp.
(75 Ind.. 3,61), 821.
First Nat. Bank v. Yankton County
(101 U. S. 129), 941.
First Parish &o. v. Cole (3 Pick. 232),
660.
First Parish in Sudbury w. Stearns
(31 Pick. 148), 162, 391.
toxiv
TABLE OF CASES.
rrhe references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-16(B.]
First Presbvterian Church v. Fort
Wayne "(Se Ind. 338), 1160, 1166.
Fish V. Branin (33 N. J. Law, 484),
1351.
Fish V. Dodge (38 Barb. 163). 219.
Fish V. Perkins (53 Conn. 200), 090.
Fisher v. Board of Directors (La., 10
So. Rep. 494). 808.
Fisher v. Bo9ton (104 Mass. 87), 264,
754, 760, 7(i.S, 775, 1037.
Fisher v. Cambridge Village (133 N.
Y. 527), 1430, ir)03.
Fisher v. Deans (107 Mass. 118), 338.
380.
Fisher v. Harrisburg (Pa., 2 Grrant's
Cas. 291), 518, 531, 539, 1034,
1234.
Fisher v. McGirr (1 Gray, 1), 534.
Fisher v. People (84 III. 491). 1384.
Fisher v. Prowse (3 Best & S. 7T0),
1408.
Fisher v. School Dist. (4 Cush. 494),
640.
Fisher v. Vaughan (10 Upper Can.
Q. B. 493), 1172.
Fisk V. Hazard (7 R. I. 438). 664.
Fisk V. Jefferson &c. Jury (116 U. S.
131), 1375.
Fisk V. Kenosha (26 Wis. 23). P2.
Fiske, Ex parte (73 Cal. 125; 13 Pac.
Rep. 310). 507. 1346.
Fister v. La Rue (15 Barb. 833), 708,
711.
Fitch V. McDiarmid (26 Ark. 482),
1517.
Fitch V. New York (40 Hun. 512), 192.
Fitch V. Pinckard (5 111. 78), 91, 92,
543, 1171, 1268.
Fitchburg v. Lunenburg (103 Mass.
358), 978.
. Fitchburg R. Co. v. Grand Junction
&c. R. Co. (1 Allen, 552|, 198.
Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth (5 Al-
len, 509), 1009.
FitzgferaJd v. City of Troy (7 N. Y.
Supl. 103), 1476.
Fitzgerald v. Walker (Ark., 17 S. W.
Rep. 703), 813.
Fitzgerald «. Woburn (1Q9 Mass. 204),
1437, 1460. 1486.
Fitzpatrick v. Board &c. (87 Ky. 133 ;
7 S. W. Rep. 896), 1336.
Fitzsimmons v. Brooklyn (103 N. Y.
536), 210, 1292.
Flack V. Green Island Village (123
N. Y. 107), 1405, 1406.
Flack V. Harrington (1 III. 313), 339.
Flagg V. Hudson (143 Mass. 280;,
1455.
Flagg V. Palmyra (33 Mo. 440), ^54,
1378.
Flagg V. St. Charles (37 La, Ann.
319), 647.
Flagg V. Worcester ,(13 Gray, 601),
1146.
Flatan v. State (56 Tex. 93), 315.
Flatcher v. Boodle (18 C. B. (N. S.)
152), 134.
Flater v. Detroit (70 Mich. 644), 1468.
Fleckner v. Bank of U. S. (8 Wheat.
3:^8), 360, 361.
Fleming v. City of Appleton (S5 Wis.
90; 13 N. W. Rep. 463), 892.
Fleming v. Springfield (154 Mass.
530), 1475, 1480.
Ftemming v. Clark (£0 N. J. Law,
' 280), 1273.
Fletcher v. Auburn R. Co. (35 Wend.
463), 1457.
Fletcher u Inhabitants of Belfast (77
Me. 3^4), 975.
Fletcher v. Lincolnville (30 Me. 439),
343, 344, 350, 1335.
Fletcher v. Lowell (15 Gray, 103),
192.
Fletcher v. Oshkosh (18 Wis. 229),
1171.
Fletcher v. Peck (9 Cranch, 87). 741.
Flewellen v. Proetzel (Tex., 15 S. W.
Rep. 1043), 1160, 1170, 117!.
Flint V. Webb (25 Minn. 93), 1164.
Flint &c; R. Co. v. Detroit &c. R.
Co. (64 Mich. 350), 1213.
Flint River Dist. v. Kelley (55 Iowa,
568), 1330.
Flood V. State (19 Tex. App. 584),
513, 1245.
Flora V. Lee (5 111. App. 629), 543.
Flora V. ^fifaney (111., 26 N. E. Rep.
645), 1595.
Flora v., Sachs (64 Ind. 155), 532.
Floral Springs W. Co. v. Rives (14
Nev. 434), 1587.
Flori V. St. Louis (69 Mo. 341), 10,
149.
Flournoy v. City (17 Ind. 109), 320,
695.
Floyd Acceptances (7 Wall. 666), 207,
214, 966.
Floyd V. Barker (13 Coke, 26), 216.
Floyd V. Commissioners (14 Ga. 356),
548, 1258. '
Floyd V. Eatonton (14 Ga. 854), 539.
Floyd V. Gilbreath (37 Ark. 675),
1568. 1576.
Fluty V. School Dist. (49 Ark. 94 ; 4
S. W. Rep. 278), 612.
Flynn r. Canton Company (40 Md.
813), 1201, 1441. .
Flynn v. City of Boston (153 Mass.
373; 36 N. E. Rep. 868), 480.
Flynn v. Hurd (118 N. Y. 19), 1438.
Flynn v. Taylor (137 N. Y. 596),
1434.
Fobes V. Rome &c. R. Co. (131 N. Y.
505), 1433.
TABLE OP OASES.
CXV
[Tha references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1603.]
Fogg V. Dummer (58 N. H. 505). 829.
FosK V. Nahant (98 Mass. 578), 773.
Foley V. City of Haverhill (144 Mass.
353), 1183.
Foley V. Troy (45 Hun, 396), 1458,
1461.
Folnier v. Curtis (86 Alfl,. 354; 5 So.
Rep. 688). 1223.
Folsom V. School Directors (91 111.
403). 833.
Foltz V. Kerlin(105 Ind. 821), 189, 200.
Fones Bros. Hardware Co. v. Erb
(Ark., 17 S. W. Rep. 7). 878.
Foot V. Howard County (1 McCrary,
218), 1373.
Foot V. Prowse (1 Str. 635; 3 Bro.
169), 174.
Foot V. Stiles (57 N. Y. 399). 695.
Foote V. Board &o. (67 Miss. 156),
1510.
Foote V. Brown (60 Miss. 155), 800.
Foote V. Cincinnati (11 Ohio, 408),
67, 86, 133.
Foote V. Hancock (15 Blatchf. 373),
985.
Poote V. Howard County Court (4
McCrary, 218), 1K75.
Foote V. Linck (5 McLean, 616), 1573.
Foote V. Pike County (101 U. S. 688),
946.
Popper V. Town of Wheatland (59
Wis. 623), 1483.
Forbes v. Appletoa (5 Cush, 115),
1188. 1577.
Force v. Batavia (61 111. 99), 375, 935.
Forcey v. Caldwell (Pa., 9 Atl. Rep.
466), 214.
Ford V. Booker (53 Ind. 39.5), 526.
Ford V. Chicago &c. R. Co. (14 Wis.
609), 682.
Ford V. Clough (8 Me. 334), 351, 353,
867.
Ford V. McGregor (80 Nev. 446), 226,
227.
Ford V. North Des Moines (80 Iowa,
626; 45 N. W. Eep. 1031). 63,
401, 407. 411, 1367.
Ford V. School Dist. (Pa., 15 Atl.
Rep. 818), 1324.
Ford V. ThrailkiU (84 Ga. 169; 10 S.
E. Rep. 600), ."593, 605, 1846.
Ford V. Umatilla County (15 Oregon,
313), 1503.
Foreman v. MEU-ianna (43 Ark. 384),
411.
Forest County v. Langlade County
(76 Wis. 605; 45 N. W. Eep. 598j,
437, 439. 453, 468.
Forkes v. Borough of Sandy Lake
(130 Pa. St. 133; 18 Atl. Rep.
609). 1500. 1503.
Forks Township v. King (84 Pa. St.
230), 1494.
Forman v. Town of Ellington (46
Hun, 40), 1445.
Forshay v. Ferguson (5 Hill, 154),
1183.
Forsyth v. Atlanta (45 Ga. 153), 776.
Forsyth v. Dunnagan (94 Cal. 438),
1403.
Forsyth v. Kreuter (100 Ind. 27),
1174,
Forsythe v. Ellis (4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.)
398). 336.
Fort V. Stiles (57 N. Y. 399), 312,
Fort Dodge v. More (37 Iowa, 388),
1397.
Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith (30
N. Y. 44). 568.
Fort Scott V. Brothers (20 Kan, 455),
1198.
Fort Smith v. Ayers (43 Ark. 88),
1030
Fort Smith v. Davis (57 Tex. 225),
1171.
Fort Smith v. Dodson (46 Ark. 296),
536.
Fort Wavne v. Breese (Ind., 33 N. E.
Rop, 1038), 1491.
Fort Wavne v. De Witt (47 Ind. 391),
1484."
Fort Wayne v. Lehr (88 Ind. 68 ; 3
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 600), 230,
1398.
Fort Wayne v. Shoa£E (106 Ind. 66),
1134.
Fort Worth v. Crawford (64 Tex.
303 ; 53 Am. Rep. 753), 364, 760.
Fortin v. Eastbarapton (145 Mass.
196; 13 N. E. Rep. 599). i476.
Fortman v. State (Ind., JON. E. Rep.
94), 1340.
Fortune v. St. Louis (33 Mo. 239),
1596.
Fosdick V. Perrysburg (14 Ohio St.
473), 112, 468. 944, 1385.
Foshay v. Glen Haven (85 Wis. 288),
1469.
Foss V. City of Chicago (56 111. 354),
1074.
Foss V. Crisp (80 Pick. 131), 141.
Fossett V. Bearce (89 Me. 583), 353.
Foster v. Clinton County (51 Iowa,
541), 745.
Foster v. Coleman (10 Cal. 379), 634.
Foster v. Fowler (60 Pa. St. 37), 4, 5,
1381.
Foster v. Lane (30 N. H. 305), 13.
Foster v. ScarflE (15 Ohio St. 533),
353 375
Foulk V. McCartney (48 Kan. 695),
1348.
Fountain County v. Warren County
(Ind., 87 N. E. Rep. 133), 1434. .
Fowle V. Alexandria (3 Peters, 398),
10, 97, 777, 1282, 1468.
cxvx
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-78S; Vol. n, pp. ?89-1605.]
Fowler v. Atkinson (6 Minn. 579),
213.
Fowler v. Beebe (9 Mass. 231), 200,
1265.
Fowler v. Pirkins. 77 111. 271), 1532.
Foxworthy v. Citv of Hastings (35
V Neb. 133; 41 N. W. Rep. 132),
1450, 1462.
Fox V. Drake (8 Cowen, 191), 212.
Fox V. Ellison (43 Minn. 41 ; 44 N. W.
Rep. 671). 1261.
Fox V. Fort Edward (48 Hurd, 363),
93.
Fox V. New Orleans (12 La. Ann.
154), 253.
Fox V. Shipman (19 Mich. 218), 819.
Fox V. Sloo(10 La.' Ann. 11). 353,709.
Fox V, State (3 Tex. App. 329), 1250.
Fox V. State of Ohio (5 How. 433),
604.
Fractional School Dist. v. Boards of
Inspectors (63 Mich. 611), 1336.
Fractional School Dist. v. Mallory
(23 Mich. Ill), 819.
Francis v. Howard County (50 Fed.
Rep. 44). 796, 843.
Francis v. Railroad Co. (70 111. 238),
1456.
Frank, Ex parte (52 Cal. 606), 518,
530, 531, 608.
Frank «. San Francisco (21 Cal. 668),
97.
Fraiike v. Paducah &c. Co. (88 Ky.
467), 383. 130S.
Frankel v. City of New York (2 N. Y.
Supl. 294), 1462.
Frankfort v. Aughe (114 Ind. 77), 516.
Frankfort v. Winterport (54 Me.
250), 668, 825.
Franklin v. Cromwell (Dal. 95), 487.
Franklin v. Harter (1:27 Ind. 446; 26
N. E. Rep. 882), 1470.
Franklin v. Mayberry (6 Humph.
368), 1123, 1135.
Franklin v. Westfall (27 Kan. 614),
528.
Franklin's Estate, In re (Pa., 1892;
24 Atl. Rep. 626), 563.
Franklin Bank v. Cooper (36 Me. 179).
323.
Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood (14 Ga.
80). 50.
Franklin County v. County of Henry
(36 111. App. 193), 976, 988.
Franklin County v. Laymiin (34 111.
App. 606), 797.
Franklin County Comra'ra v. La-
throp (9 Kan. 453), 634.
Franklin Co. Court v. Bank (87 Ky.
370), 1396.
Franklin Tp. v. Lebanon Tp. -(51
N. J. Law, 93; 16 Atl. Rep. 184),
981.
Franklin Wharf Co. v. Portland (67
Me. 46), 7T2.
Frantz v. Jacob (Ky., 11 S, W. Rep.
654), 796.
Frazee's Case (63 Mich. 396; 30
N. W. Rep. 72), 105, 107, 489,
518, 530, 1334, 1349.
Frazer v. Lewiston (76 Me. 531), 156.
Frederick v. Augusta (5 Ga. 561), 941,
1393.
Frederick v. Groshen (30 Md. 486),'i
1583.
FrI&holders &c; v. State (24 N. J.
Law, 718), 274, 277.
Freeholders &c. ■;;, Strader (18 N. J.
Law, 108), 9.
Freeman v. Davis (7 Mass. 200), 313.
Freeman v. Howe (34 How. 450), 334.
Freeman v. Otis (9 Mass. 272 ; 6 Am.
Dec. 66), 213, 215.
Freemansburg v. Rodgers (Pa., 8
Atl. Rep. 873), 1143.
Freemont Bldg. Ass'n v. Sherwin (6
Neb. 48), 931.
Freeport v. Board of Supervisors (41
111. 495), 976.
Freeport v. Isbell (83 111. 440), 232,
364, 1468, 1471.
Freeport v. Marks (59 Pa. St. 253),
215. 533, 940.
Freeport Water-works Co.'s Appeal
(129 Pa. St. 605; 18 Atl. Rep.
560), 1301.
Freese v. Woodruff (37 N. J. Law,
. 139), 1385.
Freetown v. Comm'rs (9 Pick. 46),
705. 1591.
Fremont v. Boling (11 Cal. 380),
1190.
Fremont &c. R. Co. v. Brown Countv
(18 Neb. 516 ; 26 N. W. Rep. 194),
445,
French v. Benton (44 N. H. 28), 989.
French v. Boston (129 Mass. 593), 264,
769.
French v. Burlington (42 Iowa, 614),
832. ,
French v. Common Council &c.
(Mich., 48 N. W. Rep. 174), 1511,
1541.
French v. Quincy (3 Allen, 9), 663.
French v. Spalding (61 N. H. 395),
350.
French v. Teschemaker (24 Cal. 518),
933.
Frenchtown Township v. Monroo
County (89 Mich. 204). 1429.
Frey v. Michie (68 Mich, 323), 1563.
Friday v. Floyd (63 III. 50), J 223.
Friend v. Hamill (34 Md. 298), 218.
Fries V. Brier (111 Ind. 65), 1178.
Friesner v. Common Council &G.
(Mich., 52 N. W, Rep. 19), 554.
TABLE OF OASES.
CXVll
PThe references are to pages: Vol.
!Frith t>. Dubuque (45 Iowa, 403),
264.
Fritsch v, Allegheny (91 Pa. St. 236),
1468.
Frommer v. Richmond (31 Gratt.
646), 1370.
Frosh V. Galveston (Tex., 11 S. W.
Rep. 403), 1173.
Frost V. Beekman (1 Johns. Ch. 288),
225.
Frost V. Belmont (6 Allen, 153), 647.
Frost V. Cherry (Pa., 15 Atl. Rep.
782), 561.
Frost V. Flick (1 Dak. 131). 1568.
Frost V. Inhabitants of Belfast (6 Al-
len, 152), 668.
Frost V. Leatherman (55 Hich. 38),
1171.
Frost V. Mayor of Chester (5 El. & B.
531), 1523. •
Frostburg v. Duflfy (70 Md. 47; 16
Atl. Rep. 643), 1096, 1099.
Fry V. Albemarln County (86 Va,
1951, 744, 745.
Fry V. Lexington (3 Met. 314), 943.
Fuhrman v. Huntsville (54 Ala. 363),
539
FuUam' v. Brookfleld (9 Allen, 1),
363.
Fuller V. Atlanta (66 Ga. 80). 677.
Fuller V. Colfax County (Neb., 50
N. W. Ren. 1044), 883.
Fuller V. Groton (11 Gray, 340), 368,
663, 664.
Fuller V. Hampton (5 Conn. 417),
150 155
Fuller V. Heath (89 111. 296), 801, 849,
1064.
Fuller V. Mayor &c. (83 Mich. 480;
46 N. W. Rep. 731). 1198.
Fuller V. Morrison County (36 Minn.
309), 1371, 1383.
Fuller V. Mower (81 Me, 380; 17
Atl. Rep. 313), 917.
FuUerton v. Spring (3 Wis. 667),
539.
Fulliam v. Muscatine City (70 Iowa,
436), 1495.
Fulton V Cummins (Ind., 30 N. E.
Rep. 949), 554.
Fultan V. Davenport (17 Iowa, 404),
1366.
Fulton V. Lincoln (9 Neb. 358), 360,
1171.
Fulton County v. Lucas County (3
Ohio St. 508), 453.
Fulton Street, In re (29 How. Pr.
439), 1079.
Fulweiler v. St. Louis (fil Mo. 479),
13U1.
Furman v. Nichol (8 Wall. 44), 94.
Furman Street, In re (17 Wend.
649), 699, 701, 1151.
I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-160S.]
G.
Gabel v. Houston (39 Tex. 336), 1244.
Gaddis v. Richland County (92 111,
119), 982, 935.
Gage V. Currier (4 Pick. 399), 237.
Gage V. Dudlev (64 N. H. 437), 1393.
Gage V. Evans (90 III. 509), 1189.
Gage V. Graham (57 111. 144), 1383,
1572.
Gage V. Hornellsville (106 N. Y. 667;
13 N. E. Rep. 817), 8S5. 1598.
Gage County v. Fulton (16 Neb. 5),
974.
Gainesville v. Caldwell (81 Ga. 76),
1589.
Galatian v. Gardner (7 Johns.' 106):
1414.
Oalbraith v. Littiech (73 111. 209),
1269.
Galbreath v. Newton (30 Mo. App.
380), 1175.
Gale V. Village of Kalamazoo (23
Mich. 344; 9 Am. Rep. 80), 283,
568, 613, 683, 638, 665, 1332,
1244.
Galena v. Amy (5 Wall. 705), 1372,
1373.
Galena v. Corwith (48 III. 433; 95
Am. Dec. 557), 937, 959.
Galesburg v. Hawkinson (75 111.
156), 13, 96, 393, 1368.
Galesburg v. Searles (114 111. 317; 29
N. E. Rep. 686), 1086, 1087, 1187,
1363.
Galesburg Ed. Board v. Arnold (113
III. 11), 1343.
Gall V. Cincinnati (18 Ohio St. 563),
1344.
Gallagher v. St. Paul (38 Fed. Rep.
305), 1463.
Galline v. Lowell (144 Mass. 491),
1449.
Galloway v. Corbitt (53 Mich. 460),
1576.
Gallup V. Tracy (25 Conn. 10), 396.
Gallup V. Woodstock (29 Vt, 347),
681.
Galveston r. Devlin (Tex., 19 S. W.
Rep. 395), 716.
Galveston v. Hemmis (73 Tex. 558),
1499.
Galveston v. Morton (53 Tex. 409), 71 3.
Galveston v. Posnainsky (63 Tex.
118; 12 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
484), 9, 10*13, 265, 366, 768.
Galveston &c. Ry. Co. v. G. 0. S. Ry.
Co. (63 Tex. 539), 1205.
Galveston City Co. v, Galveston (56 '
Tex. 486). 844.
Galveston Wharf Co. v. Galveston
(63 Tex. 14), 1897,
cxvm
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-160!!.]
Galveston Wharf Co. v. Gulf &o.
Rv. Co. (Tex., 17 S. W. Eep. 57),
1216.
Galway v. Metropolitan El. R. Co.
(128 N. Y. 133), 1433.
Gamble v. Marion County (Iowa, 52
.N. W. Rep. 556), 894.
Game well Fire Alarm Tel. Co. v.
Mayor &c. (31 Fed. Rep. 313i, 887.
Gans V. The City (102 Pa. St. 97),
1057.
Garden City v. Abbott (34 Kan. 283),
1332.
Gardiner v. Gardiner (5 Me. 133),
1351, 1359.
Gardner, Matter of (68 N. Y. 467),
1533.
Gardner v. City of Newbern (N. C,
3 S. E. Rep. 500), 853.
Gardner v. Haney (86 Ind. 17), 941,
1379.
Gardner v. People (20 111. 430), 1241.
Gardner v. State (21 N. J. Law, 557),
185S.
Gardner v. Village of Newburgh (2
Johns. Ch. 161), 686, 688, 670.
Garfield v. Douglass (23 111. 100), 218.
Gargan v. Louisville &c. R. Co. (89
Ky. 312), 1141, 1143, 1423.
Garland v. Denver (11 Colo. 534; 19
Pac. Eep. 960), 541.
Garland v. Dover (19 Me. 441), 983.
Garland v. Jackson (7 La. Ann. 68),
1330.
Garlinghouse v. Jacobs (29 N. Y.
297), 231.
Garrand County Court v. Bayle
County Court (10 Bush (Ky.),
208), 1434.
Garrard v. Davis (53 Mo. 332), 335.
Garrett v. City of St. Louis (25 Mo.
505), 1135.
Garside v. City of Cohoes (13 N. Y.
Supl. 192; 58 Hun. 605)> 167.
Garty v. Deeming (61 Conn. 423),
1263.
Garvie v. City of Hartford (54 Conn.
440; 7 Atl. Rep. 723). 185.
Garvin v. Daussman (114 Ind. 429),
1178, 1180.
Garvin v. Wells (8 Iowa, 286), 90,
541.
Garza, Ex parte (28 Tex. App. 381 ;
19 Am. St. Rep. 845), -116, 117,
118, 1233.
Gfas 'Co. V. City of Des Moines (44
Iowa, 505), 1336.
Gas Co. V. Parkersburg (30 West Va.
435 ; 4 S. E. Rep. 650), 568.
Gas Co. V. San Francisco (6 Cal. 190),-
484,485.
Gas Co. V. San Franciscq (9 Cal. 469),
711.
Gaskill V. Dudley (6 Met. 346), 150,
345. 915, 1376.
Gaskins v. Atlanta (73 Ga. 746), 1468.
Gas Light Co. v. City of Saginaw (38
Fed. Rep. 539), 567.
Gas Light Co. v. Donnelly (93 N. Y.
557), 714.
Gas Light Co. v. Middletown (59 N.
Y. 838), 566, 1318.
Gas Light Co. v. New Orleans (41
La. Ann. 91), 633.
Gaston v. Babcook (9 Wis. 503), 437.
GSstwiler v. Willis (33 Cal. 11), 1141.
Gatch V. City of Des Moines (63
Iowa. 718), 1180.
Gate.i V. Delaware County (18 Iowa,
405), 203.
Gates V. Hancock (45 N. H. 588), 360.
Gates V. School Dist. (58 -'Vrk. 468 ;
14 S. W. Rep. 656), 811.
Gatlin v. Tarboro(78N. O. 119), 1356,
1370.
Gaughaa v. Philadelphia (119 Pa. St.
503; 13 Atl. Rep. 300), 1449.
Gause v. Clarksville (5 Dill. 165), 631,
633, 795, 923, 960.
Gaussen v. United States (97 U. S.
584), 320, 321.
Gay V. Bradstreet (49 Me. 580), 1193.
Gay V. Cambridge (128 Mass. 387),
1481.
Gaylord v. City of New Britain
(Conn., 20 Atl. Rep. 365), 1199.
Gear v. Dubuque &o. R. Co. (20
Iowa, 523). 698.
Gearhart v. Dixon (1 Pa. St. 824),
1171, 1368, 1370, 1391.
Geist's Appeal (104 Pa. St. 351),
1115.
Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1 Wall. 175),
927, 933, 947, 955. 956, 958, 959,
1373.
Gemmil v. Arthur (125 Ind. 858< 25
N. E. Rep. 358), 895.
Genesee &c. Bank v. Livingston (53
Barb. 233), 1575.
G«nesee School Dist. v. McDonald
(98 Pa. St. 444), 1330.
Genesee Township v. McDonald (98
Pa. St. 441), 878.
Genet v. Brooklvn (99 N. Y 396),
1124.
Geneva u Cole (61 111. 397), 70, 1558;
Genois, Mayor &o. v. Lockett (13
La. 545). 195.
Genovese v. Mavor (55 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 397), 1141.
Gentle v. Board «&c. (73 Mich. 40;
40 N. W. Rep. 928), 277, 1336.
George v. Dean (47 Tex. 73). 1571.
George v. Mendon (6 Met. 497). 1335.
George v. Oxford Township (16 Kan.
72), 937, 966.
TABLE OF CASES.
OXIX
[The references are to pages: Vol I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
George v. School Dlst. (6 Met. 497),
348, 349, 361, 3H6.
George's Creek Coal Co, v. New
Central (40 Md. 425), 690.
Georgetown College v. District of
Columbia(4MacArthur, 43), 1577.
Georgia v. Atkins (35 Ga. 815), 19.
740.
Georgia v. Savannah (Dud. 132),
1359.
Georgia «. Stanton (6 Wall. 65), 19.
Georgia State Building & Loan Ass'n
V. Owens (88 Ga. 224 ; 14 S. E.
Rep. 210), 1260.
Gerald v. Boston (108 Mass. 580),
1498.
Gerber v. Ackley (33 Wis. 233), 335.
Gerberling v. Winnenberg (51 Iowa,
125), 1407.
Gere v. Supervisors of Cayuga (7
How. Pr. 255), 991.
Gerhard v. Comm'rs (15 R. I. 334; 5
Atl. Rep. 199), 1195.
Gerken v. County of Sibley (39 Minn.
433; 40 N. W. Rep. 508), 855.
German- American Bank v. Brenham
(35 Fed. Rep. 185), 924.
German Sav. Bank v. Franklin
County (138 U. S. 526), 939.
Gerrard v. Omaha &c. R. Co. (14
Neb. 370), 690.
Gerrish v. Brown (51 Me. 256). 773.
Getchell v. Benton (Neb., 47 N. W.
Rep. 468), 931.
Getchell v. Wells (55 Me. 434), 361.
Gibbons v. Railroad Co. (36 Ala.
410), 933.
Gibbons v. iTnited States (8 Wall.
269). 741.
Gibbs V. Comm'ra (19 Pick. 298),
1576.
Gibbs V. School Dist. (Mich., 50
N. W. Rep. 294). 949.
Giboney v. Cape Girardeau (58 Mo.
141), 1365, 1367..
Gibson V. Bailey (9 N. H. 168), 350,
353, 374, 1272.
Gibson v. District of Columbia (116
U. S. 404), 1353.
Gibson v. Keyser (16 Mo. App. 404),
1161.
Gibson v. Mason (5 Nev. 283). 159.
Giekey v. Merrill f67 Wis. 459), 647.
Gifford V. Railroad Co. (10 N. J. Eq.
171), 046.
Gififord V. Town of White Plains (25
Hun, 606), 829.
Gilbert v. Board of Education (45
Kan. 31; 35 Pac. Rep. 236; 34
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 399), 318,
865.
Gilbert v. Hebard (8 Met. 129). 1594.
Gilbert v. Luce (11 Barb. 91), 303.
Gilchrist's Appeal (109 Pa. St. 600),
1350.
Gilchrist v. Little Rock (1 Dill. 261),
956.
Gilchrist v. Schmidling (13 Kan.
263), 536, 1323.
Gildersleeve v. Board of Education
(17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 201), 273, 307.
Giles V. School Dist. (31 N. H. 304),
13, ^44, 1336.
Gilhara v. Bank (3 Scam. 245), 385.
Gilham v. Wells (64 Ga. 192), 518,
597
Gill V. Brown (13 Johns. 385), 313.
Gillan v. Hutchinson (10 Cal. 153),
704.
Gillespie v. Brooks (3 Redf. Sur. 363),
1066.
Gillespie v. McGowan (100 Pa. St.
144), 765.
Gillett V. Logan County (67 111. 256),
286.
Gillett V. McGonigal (80 Wis. 158),
1416.
Gillette ix Denver (31 Fed. Rep. 822),
1180, 1185.
Gillette v. Hartford (31 Conn. 351),
395, 1363, 1365.
Gilliam County v. Wasco County (14
Or. 535; 13 Pac. Rep. 324), 462.
Gillmore v. Lewis (12 Ohio, 281), 667.
Gilluly V. Madisou (63 Wis. 518), 365,
534, 767.
Oilman v. Contra Costa County (8
Cai. 52), 1595. '
Oilman v. Deerfield (15 Gray, 577),
1495.
Oilman v. Hoyt (4 Pick. 358), 353.
Oilman v. Milwaukee (61 Wis. 588),
549.
Oilman v. Philadelphia (3 Wall. 713),
758, 1433.
Oilman v. School Diat. (18 N. H. 315),
908.
Oilman v. Sheboygan (2 Black, 510),
1369, 1381, 1399.
Gilmanton v. Sanbornton (56 N. H.
336), 994.
Gilmer v. Laconia (55 N. H. 130), 9,
265.
Gilmer v. Lime Point (19 Cal. 47),
692.
Gilmore v. City of Utica (131 N. Y.
26; 29 N. E. Rep. 841), 378, 286,
1125, 1126, 1174,1176.
Gilmore v. Hentig (33 Kan. 156),
1073.
Gilmore v. Holt (4 Pick. 358), 353.
Gilmore v. Norton (10 Kan. 491), 61.
Gilroy v. School Dist. (17 Oregon,
533), 1343.
Gilson V. Board &c. (138 Ind. 65; 27
N. E. Rep. 335), 1534.
cxx
TABLE OF OASES.
[Tbo references are to pages: Tol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Gimbel v. Stolte (59 Ind. 446), 691,
1419.
Glrard v. Philadelphia (7 Wall. 1),
94, 97, 109. 391, 893, 406, 480,
563, 1366.
Girard's Will, In re (3 La. Ann. 898),
.563.
Glaessner v. Anheuser-Busch Brew-
ing Ass'n (11 Mo. 508; 13 S. W.
Eep. 7071, 589.
Glasgov7 V. Rowse (43 Mo. 479), 1356,
1369, 1870.
Glasgow V. St. Louis (107 Mo. 198;
17 S. W. Rep. 743), 757, 784,
1193, 1195, 1433.
Glasier v. Town of Hebron (131 N.
Y. 450). 771, 1438, 1473.
Glass V. Ashbury (49 Cal. 571), 553.
Gleason v. City of Boston (144 Mass.
38; ION. K. Rep. 476), 995.
Gleason v. Soper (24 Pick. 181), 705.
Glencoe v. People i78 III. 883), 1538.
Glidden v. Reading (38 Vt. 58), 1500.
Globe &c. Mills v. Bilbrough (19
N. Y. Supl. 176), 1253, 1355.
Gloucester v, 0.sborn (1 H. L. Cas.
385), 563.
Gloucester County* v. Middlesex
County (Va., 14 S. E. Rep. 660),
1430.
Glover v. City of Terre Haute (Ind.,
39 N. E. Rep. 413), 401, 405.
Goddard, In re Petition of (16 Pick.
504). 117, 513, 539, 1096, 1138,
1301, 1311, 1830.
Goddard v. Boston (20 Pick. 407),
118.
Goddin v. Crump (8 Leigh (Va.), ISO),
933.
Goeltz V. Town of Ashland (75 Wis.
642), 1451.
Goetchens v. Matthewson (61 N. Y.
480), 318.
Goetler v. State (45 Ark. 454), 1333.
Goettman v. Mayor &c. (6 Hun,
132), 201.
Goetzman v. Whitaker (Iowa, 46
N. W. Rep. 1058), 895.
Goff V. Frederick (44 Md. 67), 110.
Goforth V. Construction Co. (96 N. C.
535). 938.
Going V. Dunwiddie (86 Cal. 633),
218.
Goldman v. Conway County (10 Fed.
Rep. 888), 908.
Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells
Comm'rs (L. R. 1 Eq. 161), 765.
Goldwaite v. City Council &o, (50
Ala. 486). 541.
Gonzales u. City of Galveston (Tex.,
19 S. W. Rep. 284), 1323.
Gooch V. Association &,c. (109 Mass.
558), 768, 1380, 1381.
Goodale v. Brocknbr (61 How. Pr.
451). 1004.
Goodale v. Fennel! (27 Ohio St. 426),
1378 1381
Goodale v. Lawrence (88 N. Y. 513),
1000.
Goodel V. Baker (8 Cowen, 286), 357.
Goodenough v. Buttrick (7 Mass.
140), 5881.
Goodfellow V. New York (100 N. Y.
15), 781. X
Goodhue v. Beloit (31 Wis. 636), 433.
GSodin v. Canal Co. (18 Ohio St.
169), 1151.
Goodin v. City of Des Moines (55
Mich. 67; 7 N. W. Rep. 411),
1313.
Goodman V. Simonds (30 How. 343),
957.
Good now V. Ramsey County (11
Minn. 31), 891.
Goodrich v. Brown (30 Iowa, 291),
90, 541, 1255.
Goodtitle v. Alker (1 Burr. 183), 673.
Goodwin v. C. & W. Canal Co. (18
Ohio St. 169). 701.
Goodwin v. Roberts (L. R. 1 App.
Cas. 476), 957.
Goodyear v. School Dist. (17 Oregon,
517), 1342.
Goose River Bank v. Willow Lake
School Tp. (No. Dak., 44 N. W.
Rep. 1003), 643, 919, 1338, 1343.
Gordon v. Baltimore (5 Gill (Md.),
831), 1359.
Gordon i'. Cornes (47 N. Y. 608),
1169, 1363, 1389.
Gordon v. City of Richmond (83 Va.
486: 2 S. E. Rep. 737), 1447, 1491,
1493, 1496.
Gordon v. Clifford (28 N. H. 403),
854.
Gordon v. Court (3 How. 133), 1359.
Gorgier v. Millville (3 Barn. & C. 45),
957.
Gorham v. Gross (135 Mass. 333),
767.
Gorham v, Springfield (21 Me. 59),
63, 67, 88. 393, 1366.
Goring v. McTaggart (93 Ind. 200),
on, 1190, 1574.
Gorman v. Sinking Fund Comm'rs
(25 Fed. Rep. 647), 958.
Gormley v. Day .(114 111. 185; 28 N.
E. Rep. 693), 527, 1511.
Gorton v. Erie R. Co. (45 N. Y. 660),
1502.
Goshen v. Croxton (34 Ind. 389),
539
Goshen v. England (119 Jnd. 868),
1486.
Goshen v. Hillsborough (46 N. H.
189), 1005.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXZl
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Goshen v. Kern (63 Ind. 468), 541.
Goshen v. Myers (119 Ind. 196; 31 N.
E. Rep. 657), 1427.
Goshen Township v. Shoemaker (18
Ohio St. 624), 981.
Gosling u Veley (4 H. L. Cas. 679;
12 Q. B. 328; 19 L. J. (N. S.) Q.
B. 135), 106, 169, 294, 380, 386,
483, 518.
GoEselink v. Campbell (4 Iowa, 296),
536. 1025, 1§23, 1224.
Goasigi v. New Orleans (41 La. Ann.
522), 1244.
Goszler v. Georgetown (6 Wheat.
595), 579, 779.
Gottsch'alk v. Becher(Neb.i 49 N. W.
Rep. 71.5), 403, 404, 407.
Gough V. Dorsey (37 Wis. 119), 437.
Gould V. City of Rochester (105 N.
T. 46; 12 N. E. Rep. 375). 1086.
Gould V. Glass (19 Barb. 179). 200.
Gould V. Mayor &c. (59 Md. 378),
1066.
Gculd V. Paris (68 Tex. 511: 17 Am.
& Eng Corp. Oas. 340). 843.
Gould V. Sterling (23 N. Y. 456), 937,
933, 935, 952, 1390.
Gould V. Topeka (32 Kan. 485 ; 4 Pao.
Rep. 833), 1198, 1436.
Gove V. Epping (41 N. H. 539). 664.
Governors. Allen (8 Humph. (Tenn.)
176), 313.
Governor v. Dodd (81 111. 162), 219.
Governor v. Gibson (14 Ala. 326),
S24.
Governor v. Hancock (2 Ala. 728),
335.
Governor v. Humphreys (7 Jones (N.
C), 258), 313.
Governor v. McEwen (5 Humph.
(Tenn.) 241), 477.
Governor v. Perrine (23 Ala. 807),
331, 337.
Governor v. Ridgeway (3 111. 14),
320.
Governor v. Robbins (7 Ala. 79), 336,
330.
Gowen v. Philadelphia Exchange
Co. (5 Watts & S. 141), 1408.
Goyne v. Ashley County (31 Ark.
552), 895.
Gozzler v. Georgetown (6 Wheat.
597), 1219.
Grable v. Roderick (28 Neb. 50.5),
1534.
Graf V. City of St. Louis (8 Mo. App.
562), 692.
Graflf V. Mayor &o. of Baltimore (10
Md. 544), 697, 693, 11:20.
Graffty v. City of Rushville (107
Ind. 502), 608, 1235.
Grafton Bank v. Kimball (20 N. H.
107), 373.
Graham v. City of Greenville (67
Tex. 63; a S. W. Rep. 742), 64,
405, 408, 1366.
Graham v. flartnell (10 Neb. 518),
1413.
Graham v. State (1 Pike (Ark.), 171),
1253.
Graham v. Washington County (9
DanafKy.), 184). 320.
Gram v. Village of Greenbush (3 N.
Y. Supl. 76), 1458.
Granby v. Thurston (38 Conn. 416),
109, 915.
Grand Chute v. Winegar (15 Wall.
371), 947..
Grand Gulf &o. R. Co. v. Buck (53
Mis-i. 246), 1361.
Grand Island Gas Co. v. West (28
Neb. 853: 45 N. W. Rep. 243),
1316.
Grand Rapids v. Blakely (40 Mich.
367). 341, 343, 15B7.
Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids &c.
R. Co. (58 Mich. 641), 693. 1196,
1313.
Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids &c.
R. Co. (66 Mich. 43; 33 N. W.
Rep. 15), 1196, 1313, 1399.
Grand Rapids v. Hughes (15 Mich,
54). 530.
Grand Rapids v. Widdicorab (Mich.,
53 N. VV. Rep. 635), 1077.
Grand Rapids v. Wyman (46 Mich.
5:6), 1474, 1480.
Grand Rapids &c. R. Co. v. Alley (34
Mich. 16). 691.
Grand Rapids &c. R. Co, v. Gray
(38 Mich. 461), 1255, 1359, 1361.
Grand Rapids &o. R. Co. v. Sanders
(54 How. Pr. 314), 957.
Grand Rapids E. L. & P. Co. v.
Grand Rapids E. E. L. & F. Gas
Co. (33 Fed. Rep. 659), 615.
Grand Rapids Booming Co. v. Jar-
vis (SO Mich. 320), 674.
Grand Rapids St. Ry. Co. v. West
Side St. Ry. Co. (48 Mich; 433),
fi80.
Grandville v. Jenison (84 Mich. 54),
1413.
Granger v. Pulaski County (26 Ark.
37). 15.
Grant v. Common Council (Mich.,
51 N. W. Rep. 997), 1119. 1539.
Grant v. Davenport (36 Iowa, 396),
646, 839, 870. 1360.
Grant v. Erie (69 Pa. St. 420), 264,
775.
Grant County v. Lake County (17
Oregon, 453; 31 Pac. Rep. 447),
833.
Grantlaud v. Memphis (12 Fed. Rep.
387), 435.
cxxu
TABLE OF CASES.
(The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
Granville v. Southampton (138 Mass.
356), 985.
Grave v. Fort Wayne (45 Ind. 439),
' 1466.
Gravel Hill School Dist. v. Old
Farms School Dist. (55 Conn.
344), 1333.
Graves v. Citv of Bloomington (17
111. App. 4' 1), 1036.
Graves v. Ctolby (9 Ad. & El. 356\
531.
Graves v. Cole (3 Dak. 301), 348.
•Graves v. Jasper School Tp. (So.
Dak.. 50 N. W. Eep. 904), 13BR.
Graves v. Lebanon Nat. Bank (10
Bush (Ky.), 33; 19 Am. Eep. 50),
323.
Gray v. Baynard (5 Del. Cb. 499),
618.
Gray v. Board of Aldermen (Mass.,
31 N. E. Rep. 784), 1101.
Grav V. Brooklvn (3 Abb. App. Dee.
367), 95, 109. •
Gray v. Brooklyn (10 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)
186), 784.
Gray i'. Granger (R. I., 21 Atl. Rep.
343^, 176.
Gray v. State (2 Harr. (Del.) 376),
1260.
Grayson's Appeal (140 Pa. St. 250; 21
Atl. Rep. 3!)4), 457.
Grayson v. Latham (84 Ala. 546; 4
So. Rep. 300), 907, 909, 913.
Great Barrington v. Comra'rs (16
I Pick. 572), 1351.
Great Barrington v, Lancaster (14
Mass. 253), 446.
Great Falls Mfg. Co. v, Worster (45
N. H. 110), 993.
Great Western Ry. Co. v. North
Cavuga, In re (23 Upper Can.
C. P. 28), 525, 527.
Greeley v. Ham man (13 Colo. 94),
544, 545, 1266, 1267.
Greeley v. Jacksonville (17 FJa. 174),
113, 525.
Greeley v. Passaic (43 N. J. Law,
\ 87), 538.
Greeley v. People (60 111. 19), 662,
1034.
Green, Eoe parte (Cal., 39 Pac. Eep.
783), 533.
Green v. Buckfield (8 Greenl. (Me.)
136), 983.
Green v. Burke (23 Wend. 490). 200.
Green v. Cape May (41 N. J. Law,
45). 485, 640, 1032.
Green v. City of Springfield (180 III.
515), 1170. •
Green u. County of Richland (27 S.
C. 9; 3 S. E. Rep. 618). 889, 898.
Green v. Durham (1 Burr. 131), 290,
298.
Green v. Dyersburg (2 Flip. (U. S.)
477), 934, 906.
Green v. Harrison County (61 Iowa,
311; 16 N. W. Rep. 136). 1015.
Green V. Hotaling (44 N. J. Law,
347), 1161, 1397.
Green v. Indianapolis (22 Ind. 193),
541.
Green v. Indianapolis (25 Ind. 490),
1268.
Green v. Miller (6 Johns. 39), 296.
Giieen v. Morris &c. R. Co. (1 Beas.
(N. J ) 165), 953.
Green v. Muraford (5 R. L 472), 1568,
1509, 1573.
Green v. Rutherford (1 Ves. 462),
563.
Green v. Savannah (R. M, Charlt.
(Ga.) 368). 1351, 1356.
Green v. Spencer (67 Iowa, 410),
I 1485.
Green v. State (73 Cal. 29), 20.
Green v. Tacoma City (51 Fed. Rep.
622), 779.
Green v. Ward (83 Va. 334), 1160,
1161, 1181, 1183.
Green v. Wardwell (17 111. 278), 810.
Green Bay v. Brauns (50 Wis. 204),
301. 497.
Green Bav Canal Co. v. Water-Power
Co. (70 Wis. 635; 35 N. W. Rep.
529), 663.
Green Township. In re (9 Watts &
.S. (Pa.) 22). 415.
Greenbanks v. Boutwell (48 Vt. 207),
351, 358, 365, 663.
Greenburg v. Corwin (58 Ind. 518),
539.
Greenburg Borough v. Laii-d (138 Pa.
St. 533; 21 Atl. Rep. 96), 1120.
Greencastle Township v. Black (5
Ind. 557), 412.
Greene v. Town of Canaan (29 Conn.
157), 1406.
Greene Countv v. Boswell (Ind., 30
N. E. Rep." 534). 761.
Greene Countv v. Eubanks (80 Ala.
204), 15, 16.
Greenfield v. Cushraan (16 Mass. 393),
1005.
Greepfleld d. Wilson (18 Gray, 384),
335.
Greensburg v. Young (53 Pa. St. 219),
1166.
Greenville County v. Runion (9 S.
C. 1), 868.
Greenville Water-works Co. v. City
of Greenville (Miss., 7 So, Rep.
409), 572, 635, 1397.
Greenwood v. Freight Co. (105 IT. S.
13), 1103, 1130.
Greenwood v. Louisville (13 Bush,
326), 264.
TABLt; OF OASES.
cxxni
[Tbe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Greenwood v. State (6 Bax. 567),
604.
Greer v. Rowley (1 Pittsb. Bep. 1),
1596.
Gregg V. Jamison (55 Pa. St. 468),
198.
Gregory, Ex parie (20 Tex. App. 210),
1234.
Gregory v. Adams (14 Gray, 242),
1432.
Gregory v. Bridgeport (41 Conn. 76 ;
19 Am. Rep. 485), 283, 286, 664.
Gregory v. Brooks (37 Conn. S), '-'19.
Gregory v. Brown (4 Bibb (Ky.), 28),
218.
Gregory v. Burk (35 Alb. L. J. 278),
1096.
Gregory v. Mavor &c. of New York
(113 N. Y."416 ; 23 N. Y. St. Rep.
703), 183, 620.
Gregory v. Small (39 Ohio St. 846),
218, 219.
Grenada County v. Brogden (112 U.
S. 261), 638, 639, 941.
Greyatoc^, In re 02 Upper Can. Q.
B. 458), 533.
Gribble v. Sioux City (38 Iowa, 390),
1495.
Grider v. Tally (77 Ala. 423; 54 Am.
Rep. 65), 219, 320.
Gi-idley v. Bloomington (68 111. 47),
1449.
Gridley v. Bloomington (88 III. 554),
1160, 1199, 1441.
Grier v. Shackelford (3 Brevard
(S. C). 190), 164.
Griffin v. Mayor of New York (9 N.
Y. 456), 263, 785, 1080.'
Griffin V. Rising (11 Met. 339), 237.
Griffith V. Carter (8 Kan. 565), 1351.
Griffith V. Cochran (5 Binn. 87), 1530.
Griffith V. County of Sebastian (49
Ark. 24; 3 S. W. Rep. 896),
1587.
Griffith V. Crawford County (20
Ohio, 609), 933.
Griffith V. Watson (19 Kan. £6), 1351.
Griggs V. St. Croix Co. (.27 Fed. Rep.
333),- 1340.
Grimes v. Hamilton County (37
Iowa, 290). 654. 656.
Grimmell v. Des Moines (57 Iowa,
144), 1185.
Grimmet v. Askew (48 Ark. 151 ; 2
S. W. Rep. 707), 274.
Grimsleyu. State (119 Ind. 130; 17
N. E. Rep. 928), 864.
Grindley v. Barker (I Bos. & Pull.
229), 296.
Groflf V. City of Philadelphia (Pa.,
24 Atl. Rep. 1048), 1148.
Grogan v. San Francisco (18 Cal.
590), 48, 239, 625, '626.
Gro?an v. Town of Hay ward (4 Fed.
Rep. 161), 1143.
Grogan v. Worcester (140 Mass. 227),
1482.
Grondin v. Logan (Mich., 50 N. W.
Rep. 130). 1512.
Gross' Appeal (18 Atl. Rep. 557), 69.
Gross V. City of Lampasas (Tex,, 11
S. W. Rep. 1086), 1098.
Grove v. City of Fort Wayne (45
Ind. 439; 15 Am. Rep. 263). 1048.
Grove Street. In re (61 Cal. 438), 694.
Giover v. Huokins (26 Mich. 476),
529, 537, 1035.
Gi'over V. Pembroke (11 Allen, 89),
848, 368.
Groves v. Lebanon Nat. Bank (10
Bus^h (Ky.), 23), 323.
Grumon v. Raymond (1 Conn. 40),
339.
Grundv V. Hughes (8 111. App. 41),
1003.
Grusenmeyer v. Citv of Logansport
(76 Iiid. 549), 1038, 1524.
Gubasko v. New York (1 N.,Y. Supl.
215), 147").
Guenther i>. Whiteacre (24 Mich.
504), 339.
Guernsey v. Burlington Township (4
Dillon, 372), 931.
Guerrero, In re (69 Cal. 88), 505,
1390.
Guest V. City of Brooklyn (69 N. Y.
506). 1)31, 1571.
Guild V. Chicago (83 111. 472), 95, 109.
Guilford v.. Supervisors (13 N. Y.
143), 1371.
Guilford v. Supervisors &c. (18
Barb. 61.i), 1371.
Guillotte V. New Orleans (12 La.
Ann. 433). 537.
Guldin V. Schuylkill County (Pa.
C. P., 48 Phila. Leg. Int. 197),
179.
Gulf &c. R. Co. V. Gasscamp (69
Tex. 545), 1493.
Gulf &c. R. Co. V. Miami County (12
Kan. 230), 936.
Gulf City St. Ry. Co. v. Galveston
City Ry. Co. (65 Tex. 502), 1216.
Gulf R. Co. V. Black (32 Ind. 468),
1571.
Gulick V. New (14 Ind. 93), 192, 262,
387, 1536.
Gunn V. Barry (15 Wall. 610), 944.
Guhn V. City of Macon (84 Ga. S65i
1232.
Gunn's Adm'r v. Pulaski County (3
Ark. 427), 1376.
Gunter v. City ofFfiyetteville (Ark.,
19 S. W. Rep. 577), 409, 411.
Gurley v. New Orleans (41 La, Ann.
75; 5 So. Rep. 659), 230, 33;?, 618.
OXXIV
TABLE OF QiSES,
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. IT, pp. 789-1605.]
Gurnee »; Brunswick County (1
Hughes, 370), 891.
Gurnee v. Chicago (45 Mich. 431),
1161.
Gustin V. School Dist. (10 Gray, 85),
1384. I
Guthrie v. Armstrong (5 Barn. &
Aid. 638), 296.
Gwynn v. Turner (18 Iowa, 1), 226.
Qwynne v. Burnell (7 Clark & F.
5". 3; SBing. N. C..7). 328.
Gvvynne v. Pool (Lutw. 290), 317.
Hackensack Water Co. v. City of
Hoboken (51 N. J. Law, 220),
1296.
Hackett v. Ottawa (99 U. 8. 86), 929,
931. 946:
Hackettstown v. Swackhamer (37 N.
J. Law, 191), 923.
HackfoW •". N. Y. Cent. B. Co. (53
N. Y. 654), 15U4.
Haddock's Case (Sir T. Raymond,
439; 1 Vent. 355), 406, 1351.
Haddox v. Clarke County (79 Va.
677), 375.
Hadley v. Citizens' Sav. Inst. (123
Mass. 301), 1430.
Hadlev v. State (66 Ind. 271), 1334.
Hadsell v. Hancock (3 Gray, 536),
868, 663.
Hafford v. New Bedford (16 Gray,
297), 264, 754, 760, 763. 775, 1038.
Hagan v. Brooklyn (136 N. Y. 643),
180.
Hagaru. Brainard (44 Vt. 294), 1418.
Hagar v. Reclamation District (111
U. S. 701), 558, 690, 693, 1168,
1179, 1180, 1565.
Hagar v. Supervisors of Yolo (47
Oal 238), 1565.
Hager v. Burlington (42 Iowa, 681).
1174.
Hagerstown v. Dechert (33 Md. 369),
79, 115, 1353.
Hagerstown v. Schuer (37 Md. 180),
lie.
Haggard v. Hawkins (14 Ind. 299),
483..
Hagner v. Heyberger (7 Watts &
Serg. 104), 398.
Hagood V. Southern (117 U. S. 52),
20.
Hague V. City of Philadelphia (48
Pa. St. 52r), 333, 253, 356, 358,
639, 640.
Haight V. Keokuk (4 Iowa, 199), 678.
Haight V. New York (24 Fed. Rep.
93), 751.
Haile v. Palmer (5 Mo^ 403), 1367.
Haines v. Campion (3 Harr. 49), 641 .
Haines v. School I)istrict (41 Me.
346), 241, 1328.
Halbeck v. Mayor &c. (10 Abb. Pr,
(N. Y.)439), 190.
Halbert v. State (33 Ind. 125), 321.
Haldeman v. Penn. R. Co. (130 Pa.
St. 435), 671.
Hale V. Burnett (15 Cal. 580), 624.
Hale V. Kenosha (29 Wis. 599), 1166,
1369.
Hale V. Smith (78 N. Y. 480), 1504.
Hatey v. Whitney (53 Hun, 119),
237.
Hall. In re (36 Kan. 670; 17 Pac.
Rep. 649), 445. >
Hall V. Baker (74 Wis. 118; 42 N. W,
Rep. 104; 27 Am. & Enig. Corp.
Gas. 20S), 439, 463, 6.)4. ,
Hall V. Buffalo (1 Keyes, 193), 1115.
Hall V. Chippewa Falls (47 Wis. 267),
1171.
Hall V. Cockrell (38 Ala. 507), 313.
Hall V. Corporation of Washington
(4 Crancih. 583), 533.
Hall 1-. De Cuir (95 U. S. 485), 145,
1344.
Hall V. Holden(n6 Mass. 172), 362.
Hall V. People (57 III. 307), 343, 692.
Hall V. Railroad Co. (90 111. 43). 1456.
Hall V. School Dist. (46 Vt. 19), 368.
Hall V. Smith (2 Bing. 156), 223.
Hall V. Westfield (133 Mass. 433),
780.
Hallecki). Boylston (117 Mass. 469),
373 1 369
Hallenbeck k Hahn (3 Neb. 377),
933
Haller v. Railroad Co. (83 111. 308),
1456.
Hallock V. Franklin County (3 Met.
558), 704.
Halloran v. Carter (13 N. Y. Supl.
214), 1510.
Hallo well v. Gardner (1 Me. 93), 981.
Hallowell v. Harwich (14 Mass. 186)i
1002.
Hallowell V. Saco (5 Me. 143). 983,
995.
Hall's Free School Trustees i'. Home
(80 Va. 470), 1345.
Halsey v. People (84 III. 89), 1169.
Halsey v. Rapid Transit Street Rv.
CJo. (47 N. J. Eq. 380 ; 20 Atl. Rep.
8.59), 280, 553, 679.
Halstead, Ex parte (97 Cal. 471), 1356.
Halstead v. Mayor &c. of New York
(3 N. Y. 430), 331, 250, 352, 643,
659, 664.
Ham 17. Grove (34 Ind. 18), 333.
Ham V. Mayor &c. of New York (70
N. Y. 459), 751, 1038.
Ham V. Salem (10 Mass. 350), 686.
TABLE OF OASES.
cxxv
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1005.]
Hamar v. Covington (3 Met. (Ky.)
4941, 786.
Hambletnn v. Dexter (89 Mo. 188),,
467, 1551.
Hamden v. Bethany (43 Conn. 312),
987.
Hamilton v. Columbus (53 Ga. 4851,
265.
Hamilton v. Masaachusetts (6 Wall.
• 6331, 1361.
Hamilton v. Newcastle &o. R. Co.
(9 I'nd. 359). £60.
Hamilton v. Phflipsburg (55 Me.
193), 35-3. 364.
Hamilton v. President &c. of CaTth-
age (34 III. 83), 70.
Hamilton r. State (4 Ind. 458), 343.
Hamilton v. State (3 Tex. App. 643),
604.
Hamilton v. Viclcsburg R. Co. (119
U. S. 280), 1433.
Hamilton County v. Mighels (7 Ohio
St. 109). 8. 15, 759. 76S,.1585.
Hamlin v. Dlns;man (5 Lans. (N. T.)
61). 200. 290.
Hamlin v. Kassafer (15 Oreson, 456 ;
3 Am. St. Rep. 176j. 198, 399.
Hammel, In re (9 R. I. 248), 300. ,
HammPtt v. City of Philadelphia
(65 Pa St. 1461. 593, 1077. 1163,
• 1163, 1164, 1.B87.
Hammond v. Commissioners (1.54
Mass. 509; 33 N. E. Rep. 902),
1195.
Hammond «. Haines (25 Md. 541), 113.
Hammonds v. Richmond County
(73 Ga. 188). 761.
Hampshire v. Franklin (16 Mass. 76),
, 451, 1368, 1389.
Hampson v. Taylor (R. I., 8 Atl.
Rep. 231), 1413, 1493.
Hampton v. Coffin (4 N. H. 517),
704.
Hampton v. Conroy (56 Iowa, 498),
535.
Hancock v. Boston (1 Met. 128),
1591.
Hancock v. District Tp. (78 Iowa,
550), 1333.
Hancock v. Hazzard (13 Cush. 112),
208. 321.
Hancock Street Extension (18 Pa.
St. 26), 1163.
Hand v. Brookline (126 Mass. 324),
779.
Hand v. Fellows (Pa., 23 Atl. Rep.
1186), 583.
Hand v. Newton (93 N. Y. 88), 21.
Handy v. City ot New Orleans (39
La. Ann. 107; 1 So. Rep. 593),
646.
Hanev v. City of Kansas (94 Mo.
334; 7 S. W. Rep. 417), 1099.
■Haney v. Marshall, (9 Md. 194), 144.
Hanger v. Abbott (6 Wall. 533), 475.
Hanger v. City of Des Moines (53
Iowa, 193; 35 Am. Rep. 266),
666.
Hankins v. People (106 111. 638),
515.
Hannah V. Cincinnati (30 Ind. 30),
943.
Hannewinkip v. Georgetown (15
Wall. 548), 1569, 1.569, 1570, 1574.
Hannibal iJ. Missouri & Kansas Tele-
phone Cq. (31 Mo. 23), 1330.
Hannon v. Agnew (96 N. Y. 439),
283.
Hannon v. Grizzard {89- N. C. 115),
188.
Hannon v. Grizzard (96 N. C. 293),
318.
Hannon v. St. Louis County (63 Mo.
313), 748.
Hanover v. Lowell (5 Met. 35), 368.
Hanover School &c. v. Gant (125
Ind. 5571, 1326.
Hanscom v. Bpston (141 Mass. 242),
1470, 1474.
Hanscom v. Citv of Omaha (11 Neb.
37), 1170, 13"49.
Hanson, Ex parte (28 Fed. Rep. 127),
1235.
Hanson v. Borough of Warren (Pa.,
14 Atl. Rep. 405), 1459.
Hanson v. Eichstaedt (69 Wis. 538;
20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 137),
1273.
Hanson v. Electric Light Co. (Iowa,
48 N. W. Rep. 1U05), 1316.
Hanson v. Suuth Scituate (115 Mass.
336), 978, 980.
Hanson u. Vernon (27 Iowa, 38), 934,
1387, 1393.
Hapgood V. Doherty (8 Gray, 373),
696.
Harbaugh v. Monmouth (74 111. 367),
535.
Harbeck v. Toledo (11 Ohio St. 219),
690.
Harbor Comm'rs v. State (45 Ala.
399), 13!)2.
Harcourt v. Good (39 Tex. 456), 933.
Hardcastle v. State (37 N. J. Law,
553)* 353.
Harden berg v. Van Keuren (4 Abb.
N. C. 43). 943.
Hardenbrook v. Town of Ligonier
(95 Ind. 70), 513, 533, 542.
Harder v. City of Minneapolis (40
Minn. 446; 42 N. W. Rep. 350),
783, 1483.
Hardin v. Carrico (3 Meto..(Ky.) 289),
337.
Hardin v. Governor (63 Ga. 688),
1562.
OXXVl
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
Hardin County v. Louisville &o. R.
Co. (Kv., 17 S. W. Rep. 860), 283,
' 620.
Hardin ■ Countv v. McFarlin (83 111.
l.SSi, 791. "
Hardin County v. Wright County
(67 Iowa, 137), 1001.
Hardins; v. Bader (73 Mich. 316),
277.
Harding r. Goodlet (3 Yerg. 40; 24
Am. Deo. .546), 683.
Harding v. Rockford &c. R. Co. (65
HI. 90), 937. ^
Hai-ding v. Vandewater (40 Cal. 77),
276.
Harding v. Woodcock (137 U. S. 43).
220.
Hardmann v. Bowen (39 N. Y. 196),
313
Hard wick v. Pawlet (3S Vt. 320),
994.
Hardy v. Keene (53 N. H. 370), 775.
Hardy v. Keene (54 N. H. 449), 1420.
Hardy v. McKinney (107 Ind. 364),
706.
Hardy v. Merriwether (14 Ind. 203),
93'' '
Hardy^w. Waltham (3 Met 163), 576,
827. ■
Hargreav^s v. Deacon (25 Mich. 1),
765.
Hargreaves v. Hopper (1 C. P. D.
195), 133.
Hargro v. Hodgdon (89 Cal. 623; 26
Pao. Rep. 1106), 1411.
Hargroves v. Cooke (15 Ga, 331),
1339.
Hark v. Gladwell (49 Wis. 172; 5
N. W. Rep. 323), 302, 366.
Harker v. Mayor (17 Wend. 199), 90,
541.
Harlem. Gas Light Co. v. Mavor &c.
(3 Robt. 124; 33 N. Y. 809), 845.
Harman v. Harwood (58 ,Md. 1), 158.
Harman v. Tappenden (1 East, 563),
307.
Hariiion v. Chicago (110 111. 400; 51
Am. Rep. 698), 4S6, .511, 616,
1053.
Harmon v. Marlborough (9 Cush.
> 525), 1368.
Harmon v. Omaha (17 Neb. 648 ; 23
N. W. Rep. 503), 1139, 1139.
Harmony v. Bingham (13 N. Y. 99),
1183.
Harness v. State (76 Tex. 566; 13 S.
W. Rep. 535; 29 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 50), 98, 173.
Harney v. Heller (47 Cal. 17), 1173.
Harper v. City of Milwaukee (30 Wis.
; 372), 767, 1137.
Harper v. Comm'rs (S3 Ga. 566),
1565.
'Harper v. Lexington &c. R. Co. (3
Dana(Ky.), 227). 691.
Harper County Comm'rs v. Rose
(140 TJ. S. 71; 11 S. W. Rep.
710), 928.
Harrigan v. City of Brooklyn (119
N. Y. 156). 1597, 1598.
Harrigan v. Village of Hoosic Falls
(IN. Y. Supl. 57), 1458.
Harrinian v. Boston (114 Mass. 241),'
1474.
Harrington v. Buffalo (2 N. Y. Supl.
^338), 1453, 1460.
Harrington v. City of Wilmington
(Del., 12 Atl. Rep. 779). 1099.
Harrington v. Comm'rs &c. (2 Mc-
Cord (S. C), 400). 339.
Harrington v. County Comm'rs f22
Pick. 263), 704.
Harrington v. Plainview (27 Minn.
224), 1-390, 1580.
Harrington v. Wafford (46 Wis. 31),
691.
Harris, Ex parte (52 Ala.' 87 ; 33 Am.
Rep. 559). 1536.
Harris v. Atlanta (62 Ga. 290), 755,
101 3'.
Harris v. Baker (4 M. & S. 27), 322.
Harris v. Board &c. (105 111. 145),
1024.
Harris v. Board &o. (121 Ind. 299)*
1430.
Harris v. Chickasaw County (77
Iowa, 345 ; 42 N. W. Rep. 313),
894.
Harris v. Hanson (3 Fairf. (Me.) 341),
333 335 '
Harris v. Nesbit (24 Ala. 498), 130.
Harris v. Pepperell (L. R. 5 Eq. 1),
953.
Harris v. School District (8 Foster
(28 N. H.), 58), 13, 353, 373, 1330,
' 1336.
Harris v. Springfield (107 Mass. 533),
1080..
Harris v. Thompson (9 Barb. 350),
683.
Harris v, Wakeman (Say. 254), 487,
540.
Harris v. Webelhoer (75 N. Y. 169),
1500.
Harris v. Whitcomb (4 Gray, 433),
377, 1368. ,
Harris v. Wood (6 T. B. Mon. 641),
1565.
Harrisburg v. Crangle (3 Watts &
S. 460), 690.
Harrisburg v. Legelbaum (Pa., 34
Atl. Rep. 1070), 1120.
Harrisburg v. McCormick (129 Pa. St.
213; 18 Atl. Rep. 136), 592, 1081.
Harrisburg v, Scheck (104 Pa. St.
53), 1X3.
TABLE OF OASES.
CXXVll
[TheTererenoes are to pages: Vol.. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Harrisburg City Pass. Ry. Co. v.
City of Harrisburg (Pa., 34 Atl.
Eep. 56), 1207.
• Harrison v. Augusta Factory (73 Ga.
447), 1144.
Harrison v. Bridgton (16 Mass. 16),
451. 1368, 1388.
Harrison i\ City of New Orleans (40
La. Ann. SOS; 4 So. Rep. 133),
812.
Harrison v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore
(1 Gill, 264), 594, 1019, 1041, 1043,
1346.
Harrison v. Milwauliee (49 Wis. 247),
244, 1577, 1578.
Harrison v. Milwaukee County (51
Wis. 663), 1146.
Harrison v. Williams (3 Barn. &
Cress. 162), 12.
Harsbman v. Bates County (93 U. S.
5fi9), SO", 948, 943.
Harsbman v. Knox Conntv Ci urt
(123 U. S. 306). 1375.
Hart V. Brooklyn (36 Barb. 22i>), 1133.
Hart V. Burnett (15 Cal. 580), 625,
' 1593.
Hart V. Lancashire R. Co. (31 L. T.
(N. S.)361), 1487.
Hart V. Mayof &c. (3 Paige, 213),
1031, 1034.
Hart V. Mavor &c. (9 Wend. 571),
530, 535. 538, 614, 1025, 1048.
Hart '■. New Orleans (13 Fed. Rep.
292), 1380.
' Hart V. Oceana (44 Mich. 417). 828.
Hart V. Poor Guardians (81 Pa. St.
466), 323.
Hai-t V. United States (118 U. S. 63),
742.
Harter v. Kernochan (103 U. S. 562),
943.
Hartford v. Bennett(10 Ohio St. 441),
201.
Hartford v. Talcott (48 Conn. 535),
1301. 1331, 1441.
Hartford Bridge Co. v. East Hart-
ford (16 Conn. 149), 451. 1368.
Hartington v. Lui;e (Neb., 50 N. W.
Rep. 957), 403, 409.
Hartnian v. City of Muscatine (70
Iowa, 511), 1495.
Hartnall v. Ryde Comm'rs (4 B. & S.
361^ 7ii8, 786.
Hartshorn v. Sohoflf (58 N. H. 197),
388.
Hartwell v. Armstrong (19 Barb.
166) 686, 1024.
Hartwell v. Littleton (13 Pick. 229),
13(2.
Harvard College v. Boston (104 Mass.
470), 1167.
Harvey v. De Woody (18 Ark. 353),
• 1043.
Harvey v, Helena (6 Mont. 114),
694.
Harvey v. Indianapolis (33 Ind. 244),
646. 1583.
Harvey v. Rush County (32 Kan. 159),
179.
Harvev v. Thomas (10 Watts, 63),
669, 670.
Harvey v. Tyler (3 Wall. 325), 692.
Uarward v. St. Clajr &c. Drainage
Co. (51 111. 130), 619.
Harwinton v. Catlin (19 Conn. 520),
681.
Harwood v. Huntoon (51 Mich. 639),
1399.
Harwood r. Lowell (4 Cush. 310),
770, 1448.
Harwood v. Marshall (9 Md. 83), 190.
Hasbrouck v. Milwauloee (13 Wis.
37), 1373, 1385, 1389.
Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee (25 Wis.
122), 1384.
Haskell v. Bartlett (34 Cal. 281). 506.
Haskell v. New Bedford (108 Mass.
208), 773.
Haskellu. Penn Yan Village (5 Lans.
4(f), 1.504. \
Hassell v. Long (2 Moore & S.,363),
329.
Hassen v. City of Rochester (65 N. Y.
516), 1190.
Hastings v. Bolton (1 Allen, 529),
1591.
Hastin^rs i\ Columbus (43 Ohio St.
585), 507.
Hastings v. Farmer (4 N. Y. 293),
143.
Hastings v. San Francisco (18 Cal.
57). 1585.
Hatch V. Buffalo (38 N. Y. 376), 1575.
Hatch V. Hawkes (136 Mass. 177),
339. 1417.
Hatch V. Inhabitantsof Attleborough
(97 Mass. 5H3), 320.
Hatcheson v. Tilden (4 Harr. & McH.
(Md.) 379), 887.
Hathaway v. Addison (48 Me. 440),
357, 358.
Hathaway v. Saokett (33 Mich. 97),
660.
Hathaway v. Town of Homer (5
Lans. (N. Y.) 307), 830.
Haupt's Appeal (125 Pa. St. 311),
1304.
Havemeyer v. Iowa County (3 Wall.
294), 423.
Haven v. Asylum (13 N. H. 632),
1271.
Haven V. Grand Junction & D. Co.
(109 Mass. 88), 958.
Haven v. Lowell (3 Met. 35), 281,
Havens v. Latheue (73 N. C. 505),
322. , ,
cxxvm
TABLE 07 OASES.
IThe references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
Haverhill Bridge Proprietors v.
Comm'rs (^03 Mass. 120; 9 Am.
Rep. 518), 6S3.
Hawes v. Fox Lake (33 Wis. 443),
1451.
Hawk V. Marion County (48 Iowa,
472), 663, 666, 667.
Hawkes v. Kennebec (7 Mass. 461),
1376.
Hawkins v. Calloway (88 111. 155),
190.
Hawkins r. Comm'rs (2 Allen, 351),
691, 1418.
Hawkins v. Dougherty (Del., 18 Atl.
Rep. 951), 1551.
Hawkins County i). Carroll County
(nO Miss. 735), 983, 935.
Hawks V. Charlemont (107 Mass.
414), lOSO.
Hawley v. Fairbanks (108 TJ. S. 543),
1379.
Hawley v. Fayetteville Comni'rs (82
N. y. 33), 1376.
Hawthorn v. St. Louis (11 Mo. 59),
1596. I
Hawthorne v. East Portland (13
Oregon, 371), 1171.
Hay V. Cohoes Co. (3 N. Y. 159), 778,
779.
Hayden v. Attleborough (7 Gray,
1338), 1450.
Harden v.Nayes (5 Conn. 391), 103,
■ 346, 369.
Hayden v. Tucker (37 Mo. 314), 1053.
Hayes v. City of West Bay Citv
(Mich.. 51 N. W. Rep., 1067),
1201.
Hayes v. Covington (31 Miss. 408),
613.
Hayes v. Hanson (13 N. H. 390),
1416.
Haves V. Holly Springs (1 14 U. S.
" 120). 230, ()33. 926, 936. 942.
Hayes v. Hyde Park (153 Mass. 514),
1455.
Hayes v. Missouri (130 U. S. 68). 147.
Hayes v. Oshkosh (33 Wis. 314), 752,
754, 1037.
Hayes v. Pacific &c. Co. (17 How.
596), 1353.
Hayes v. Simonds (9 Barb. 360),
991.
HayforJ v. County Comm'rs (78 Me.
158). 694.
Haygood v. Justice (20 Ga. 48"i), 9.
Haynes v. Bridge (1 Coldw. (Tenn.)
' 3-'), 832.
Haynes v. Cape May (40 N. J. Law.
55), 519.
Haynes v. Cape May (53 N. J. Law,
180; 19 Atl. Ri-p. 176). 601, 1237.
Haynes v. County of Washington
(19,111. 66), 447.
Hays V. Cambridge (136 Mass. 403),
1435.
Hays V. City of Oil City (Pa., 11 AtL
Rep. 63), 185.
Hays V. Commonwealth (82 Pa. St.
518)..'), 384.
Hays V. Hogan (5 Cal. 343), 1577.
Hays V. Porter -(22 Me. 371), 219.
Hayward's Case (10 Pick. 358), 705.
Hay ward v. Mayor &c. of New York
(8 Barb. 48K), 686.
Hayward v. School Dist. (3 Cush.
* 419), 344, 1335.
Haywood v. Charlestown (34 N. H.
23), 1419.
Haywood v. Savannah (13 Ga. 404),
113,511.488. *
Hazard v. Wason (152 Mass. 370),
1591.
Hazen v. Lerche (47 Mich. 626), 1330,
1335.
Hazzard v. City of Council Bluffs
(79 Iowa, i06; 44 N. W. Rep.
319), 1098.
Hazzard v. Heacock (30 Ind. 173),
1181.
Head v. Providence Ins. Co. (3
Cranch, 127). 252. 634.
Headrick v. Whittemore (105 Mass.
23), 691.
Healey v. City of New Haven (49
Conn. 394), 1153.
Healy v. New York (3 Hun, 708),
1501.
Heard v. Brooklvn (60 N. Y. 342), 671.
Heard v. Harris (6b Ala. 43), 338.
Heath, jBaj parte (3 Hill, 43), 190, 389,
1263. 15.59.
Heath v. Barmoip 50 ■T. Y. 302), 671.
Heath v. Railroad O/. (61 Iowa, 11;
15 N. W. Rep, 573). 1-217.
Hebard v. Ashland County (55 Wis.
145), 832.
Hebert v. De Valle (37 111. 448). 635.
Hebron G, R. Co. v. Harvey (90 Ind.
192; 46 Am. Rep. 199), 1096.
Hecht V. Boughtou (3 Wyo. 368),
1391.'
Heckel v. Sandford (40 N. J. Law,
1(50), 473.
Heckscher v. City of Philadelphia
(Pa., 9 Atl. Rep. 281). 1589.
Hedges ]>. Madison County (I Gilm.
V 567), 267. 745.
Heeney v. Sprasrne (11 R. I. 456),
530, 1201, U4l.
Heenev v. Trustees &c. (33 Barb.
360), 140.
Heffleman v. Pennington County
(So. Dak., 52 N. W. Rep. 851),
^ 908. 909.
Heffner v. Commonwealth (28 Pa.
St. 108), 843, 1530, 1549.
TABLE OF CASES.
cxxix
[The references are to pages; Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Heick V. Voight (110 Ind. 279), 1420.
Heidelberg v. San Francisco Countv
(100 Mo. 69), 360, 1091.
Heidelberg School District v. Horst
(62 Pa. St. 301), 263.
Heidler, In re (133 Pa. St. 653; 16
Atl. Rep. 97), 402, 410.
Heigel v. Wichita County (Tex., 19
S. W. Rep. 562), 1430."
Heine v. Levee Comm'rs (1 Woods,
247), 479), 1379.
Heine v. Levee Comm'rs (19 Wall.
655), 479, 1376, 1379. 1395, 1570.
Heinemann v. Heard (63 N. Y. 448),
1133.
Heiple v. Clackamer County (20 Ore-
gon, 147; 25 Pac. Rep. 391),
1089.
Heise v. Columbia (6 Ridh. 404), 535,
537
Heiser v. Hatch (86 N. T. 614), 1453.
Heiser v. Mayor &c. of New York
(104 N. Y. 72; 9 N. E. Rep. 866),
555, 751. 1143, 1457.
Heiskell v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore
(65 Md. 135), 291, 393, 493.
Heland v. Lowell (3 Allen, 407). 551.
Held V. Bagwell (58 Iowa, 139), 321,
323.
Helena v. Gray (Mont., 17 Pac. Rep.
564), 521.
Helena v. Turner (36 Ark. 577), 646.
Helleu V. Noe (3 Ired. Law, 493),
536, 1034.
Hellenkamp v. City of La Fayette
(30 Ind. 193), 897. 1154.
Heller v. Sedalia (53 Mo. 159). 364.
Heller v. Streoimel (52 Mo. 309), 11,
13.
Helms V. Chadbou^ne (45 Wis. 60),
1588.
Heman v. Wolf (33 Mo. App. 300;,
1163.
Hembling v. Big Rapids (89 Mich. 1),
757, 758.
Hemingway v. Machias (33 Me. 4451,
1578.
Hemphill v. Boston (8 Cush. 195),
1408.
Hempstead v. Des Moines (52 Iowa,
303; 3N. W. Rep. 123), 1153.
Hempstead County v. Howard
County (51 Ark. 344 ; 11 S. W.
Rep. 478), 458, 896.
Hendershott v. Ottumwa (46 Iowa,
658), 677.
Henderson's Tobacco (11 Wall. 652),
113.
Henderson v. Baltimore (8 Md. 352),
1065. 1171, 1383.
Henderson v. City of Minneapolis
(33 Minn. 319; 30 N. W. Rep.
31,2). 586, 75f, 1144, 1145.
Henderson v. Covington (14 Bush
(Ky.;, 312), 93, 668.
Henderson v. Davis (106 N. C. 88), 70,
1260.
Henderson v. Lambert (8 Bush, 607),
395, 1362.
Henderson v. Lambert (14 Bush, 24),
1189.
Henderson v. Mayor (3 La. 563), 1 95
Henderson v. Nashville R. Co, (17 B.
Mon. (Ky.) 173), 096.
Henderson v. Smith (26 West Va.
829; 55 Am. Rep. 138), 31«.
Henilersonville v. Price (96 N. C.
42:{), 645.
Hendricks' Appeal (103 Pa. St. 858),
674.
Hendricks v. Board of Comm'is (35
Kan. 483; 11 Pac. Rep. 450),
1010.
Hendricks v. Chautauqua County
(35 Kan. 483; 11 Pac. Rep. 450),
888.
Hendricks v. Johnson (45 Miss. 644),
910.
Hendrickson v. Decan (1 Saxt. 577),
495.
Heney v. Pima County (Ariz., 17
Pac. Rep. 263), 894.
Henkeu. McCord (55 Iowa, 378), 535,
549.
Henker v. Fond du Lac (7-1 Wis. 616),
1442.
Henley v. Major &c. (5 Bing. 91),
219.
Henline v. People (81 111. 269). 694.
Hennen, In re (13 Pet. 230), 203.
Henniker v. Weave (7 N. H. 57a),
982.
Henniker v. Wyman (58 N. H. 528),
829.
Henry v. Camden (42 N. J. Law,
835), 1523.
Henry v. Dubuque (10 Iowa, 540),
703.
Henry v. Gregory (29 Mich. 68), 1573.
Henry v. Lansdowne (42 Mo. App.
431), 1263.
Henrv v. State (98 Ind. 381), 864.
Henry v. Taylor (57 Iowa, 73), 428.
Henry v. Thomas (119 Mass. 583),
1174.
Henry County v. Nicolay (95 U. 8.
619), 943.
Henrv Street, In re (123 Pa. St. 346),
67, 99, 112,. 119, 133.
Henshaw v. Cotton (127 Mass. 50),
1594.
Henshaw v. Foster (9 Pick. 312), 165.
Hepburn v. City of Philadelphia (Pa.,
34 Atl. Rep. 27H), 106 1.
Hequenibourg v. City of Dunkirk
(2 N. Y. Supl. 447), 847.
cxxx
TABLE OF CASES.
tThe references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp^ 789-1605.]
Herholdu. Chicago(]08Ill. 467), 1413.
Heriot's Hospital v. Eoss (13 CI. & F.
507), 763.
Herman v. Crete (9 Neb. 350), 338.
Herr v. Lebanon (Pa., 24 Atl. Rep.
207), 1454.
Herriok v. Carpenter (54 Iowa, 340;
6 N. W. Rep. 874), 555.
Herrick v'. Stover (5 Wend. 581),
1415.
Herring v. Wilmington R. Co. (10
Ired. 403), 1503.
Harrington v. District Tp. of Liston
(47 Iowa, 11), 1038.
Hernngton v. Lansingburgh (110
N. Y. 145). 1444.
Hersohbei-ger v. Pittsburgh (115 Pa.
St. 78), 1395.
Hersev v. Supervisors &c. (16 Wis.
198). 1190.
Hersev v. Supervisors &c. (37 Wis.
75), 1571.
HershoS v. Beverly (45 N. J. Law,
288), 534, 540, 1259.
Herzo v. San Francisco (33 Cal. 134),
636, 1064.
Hesketh v. Braddook (3 Burr. 1847);
531, 532.
Hessu PeKg(7Nev. 23), 110.
Hesser v. Gral'toh (33 West Va. 548 ;
US. E. Rep. 211), 1500.
Hessler v. Drainage Comm'rs (53 III.
lOo), 695.
Hester's Lessee v. Fortner (2 Binn.
(Pa.) 40), 225.
Hetli V. Fond du Lao (63 Wis. 338 ; 53
Am. Rep. 379), 1146.
Heth Tp. V. Lewis (114 Ind. 508), 820.
Hewes V. Reis (40 Cal. 255), 570, 1064,
1171.
Hewett V. Miller (31 Vt. 402). 1323.
Hewison v. New Haven (34 Conn. 1),
265.
Hewison v. New Haven (37 Conn.
475), 9, 770, 1453. 1466.
Hewitt's Appeal (88 Pa. St. 60), 1081.
Hewitt's Appeal (88 Pa. St. 155),
1365, 1367.
Hewitt u. State (6 Har. & J. 95; 14
Am. Deo. 259), 324. 335.
Hewitt V. Wiiite (Mich., 43 N. W.
Rep. 1043), 603.
Hexamer v. Webb (101 N. Y. 377),
1444.
Heyfron v. Mahoney (9 Mont. 497),
378.
Heymann v. Cunningliam (51 Wis.
506). 158S.
Heyneiiian v. Blake (19 Cal. S^O), 69(i.
H-ywai-d v. Mayor &c. (7 N. Y. 325),
671, 68-,'.
Heywood v. City of Buffalo (14 N.
Y. 531), 1131, 1189, 1574, 1575.
Hibbard v. Clark (56 N. H. 155), 533.
Hickey v. Board of Supervisors (63
Mich. .94; 38 N. W. Rep. 771),
■ 888, 1543.
Hickey v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (6 IH.
App. 173), 283.
Hickok V. Hine (33 Ohio St. 523),
629..
Hickok «.*Platt8burgh (15 Barb. 427),
219.
Hickok V. Shelburne (41 Vt. 409),
356. 360, 368, 13t)8.
Hicks V. Dorn (43 N. Y.. 47), 219.
Hicks V. Ward (69 Me. 441). 1194.
Hicks V. Westport (130 Mass. 480),
1399
Hiesu Erie City (135 Pa. St. 144),
754. .
Higby V. Peed (98 Ind. 430), 1430.
Higert V. Greencastle City (43 Ind.'
574), 1484.
Higgins V. Ansmuss (77 Mo. 351),
1183.
Higgins V. Chicago (18 111. 276), 704.
Higgins V. City of Boston (I48 Mass.
485; 20 N. E. Rep. 105), 1473.
Higgins V. City of New York (N. Y.,
30 N. E. Rep. 44), 179.
Higgins V. Curtis (39 Kan. 383; 18
Pac. Rep. 307), 308.
Higgins V. Salamanca , Village (6
N. Y. St. Rep., 119), 781.
Higginson v. Nahant (11 Allen, 530),
685, 689.
Highland Turnpike Co. v. McKean
(10 Johns. 159). 91, 93.
Hight V. Comm'rs (68 Ind. 575), 659,
666.
Hightown v. Staton (54 Ga. 108),
1596.
Highway Comm'rs v. Ely (54 Mich.
173), 330, 339.
Highway Comm'rs i'. Van Dusan (40
Mich. 429). 630.
Higley v. Bunce (10 Conn. 435; 10
Conn. 567), 50 i, 504.
Hiland V. Lowell (3 Allen, 407), 486.
Hilbish V. Catherman (64 Pa. St. 159),
939.
Hildreth v. Lowell (11 Gray. 345),
686.
Hildreth v. Mclntyre (1 J. J. Marsh.
(Ky.)S06), 291, 398.
Hill v. Boston (132 Mass. 351; 33
Am. Rep. 333), 10, 17, 135, 150,
156, 489, 746, 747. 75§, 759, 765,
770, 775, 1005, 1376, 1436, 1448.
Hill V. Charlotte (73 N. C^ 55; 21
Ain.^Rep. 451), 233, 264, 763,
785.
Hill V. City of Fond du Lac (56 Wis.
243; 14 N. W. Rep. 35), 1301,
1441.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXXXl
pThe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol, II, pp. 789-160S.]
Hill V. City of Kahoka(35 Fed. Eep.
33), 474.
Hill V. Dalton (72 Ga. 814). 1257.
Hill V. Decatur (23 Ga. 203), 487.
Hill V. Easthampton (140 Mass. 881),
605.
Hill V. Fitzpatrick (6 Ala. 314), 326.
Hill V. Forsyth (67 N. C. 368). 933.
Hill V. Higdon (5 Ohio St. 243), 1169,
1353.
Hill V. Indppendipnt Dist. &o. (Iowa,
46 N. W. Rep. i043), 282.
Hill V. Keiiible(9 Cal. 71), 331.
Hill V. Mayor (72 Ga. 314), 544.
Hill V. Memphis (134 U. S. 198: 10 S.
Ct. Rep. 562; 7 R. R. Corp. L. J.
470; 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
135). 5fi2, 681, 633, 933, 925, 938,
933, 9.34.
Hill V. Ogden (5 Ohio St. 346), 1370.
Hill V. Peekekill Sav. Bank (101 N.
Y. 490), 960.
Hill V. Portland &o. E. Co. (55 Me.
' 438). W77.
Hill V. Railroad Co. (5 Denio, 206),
693.
Hill V. Railroad Co. (11 La. Ann.
293), 719.
Hill V. School Dist. (17 Me. 316),
1330.
Hill V. State (4 Sneed (Tenn.), 443),
211, 78B.
Hill V. Tionesta Township (146 Pa.
St. 11). 1495.
Hill V. Warrell (Mich., 49 N. W. Rep.
479). 1164.
Hill V. Winsor(118 Mass. 251), 1449.
Hiller v. Sliarou Springs {i^ Hun,
344), 1478.
Hillesum v. City of New York (56
N. Y. Super. Ct. 596; 4 N. Y.
Supl. 806), 1485.
Hillsborough v. Derring (4 N. H. 86),
995.
Hilton V. F.nda (86 N. Y. 339). 227.
Hilyard v. Harrison (37 N. J. Law,
170). 950.
Himmelmann v. Satterlee (50 Cal.
68), 1161.
Hinchman V. Railroad Co. (17 N. J.
Eq. 80), 1331.
Hincks l'. Milwaukee (46 Wis. 5C9 ; 1
N. W. Kep. 230), 557, 1442,
Hine v. New Haven (40 Conn. 478),
669, 1246.
Hiner v. City of Fond du Lao (71
Wis. 74: 36 N. W. Rap. 622),
1443, 1489.
Hines v. Charlotte City (73 Mich.
378; 40 N. W. Rep, 333), 776.
785.
Hines v. Lsaven worth (3 Kan. 186),
1169.
Hines u. Lookport (50 N. Y. 236), 321,
748. 768, 776. 1440.
Hingham &c. Co. v. County of
Norfolk (6 Allen, 353), 683, 1069,
1096.
Hinkle, In re (81 Kan. 712), 95, 110,
199, 465.
Hinkle v. Commonwealth' (4 Dana
(Ky.), 518). 543.
Hintrager r. Richter (Iowa, 53 N. W.
Rep. 188), 841, 909. 910.
Him V. State (1 Oiiio St. 30), 113.
Hirschman v. Paterson Horse R. Co.
(17 N. J. Eq. 75), 590.
Hirschoff v. Beverly (45 N. J. Law,
288).' 581.
Hiss V. Baltimore &c. R. Co. (53 Md.
342; 36 Am. Rep. .371), 590.
Hitch f. Lambright (66 Ga. 228), 2 IS.
Hitchcock V. Daubury R. Co. (25
Conn. 516), 1417.
HitchcoQki). Galveston (96 TJ. S. 341),
236, 237, 286^, 550, 628, 644, 645,
720. 793, 938, 1160, 1176.
Hitchcock V. Galveston (48 Fed. Rep.
640), 1531.
Hitchcock V. Galvestoa (4 Woods,
308), 1380.
Hitchcock «. St. Louis (49 Mo. 484),
1582. .
Hitchins v. Frostburg (68 Md. 100),
776, 1137.
Hite V. Whitley County Court (Ky.,
15 S. W. Rep. 57), 761.
Hixon V. Lowell (13 Gray, 59), 770, *
1448, 1466.
Hoadley v. City of San Francisco'
(30 Cal. 265), 1143.
Hoag V. Durfey (1 Aik. (Vt.) 286),
1269, 1273.
Hoagland v. Culvert (20 N. J. Law,
387), 190.
Hobart v. Milwaukee City E. Co. (37
Wis. 194 ; 9 Am. Rep. 461), 590.
Hobart v. Supervisors (17 Cal. 33),
64, 87.
Hobbs V. Board &c. (116 Ind. 876; 19
N. E. Rep. 186), 1136.
Hobbs «;. Lowell (19 Pick. 405), 571,
1406.
Hobbs u. Yonkers (108 N. Y. 13), 180.
Hoblvn V. Regem (3 Bro. P. C. 339),
39p.
Hoboken v. Gear (37 N. J. Law, 265),
506. 1533.
Hoboken v. North Bergen (43 N. J.
Law, 146), 1166.
Hoboken v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (184
, U. S. 6.56), 1410.
Hoboken Land Co. v. Hoboken (36
N. J. Law, 540), 1410.
Hockady v. County Comra'rs (Colo.,
29 Pac. Rep. 287), 869.
cxxxu
TABLB OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Hookett V. State (105 Ind, 250; 5 N.
E. Rep. 178), 6, 573.
HodKes V. BuflEalo (2 Denio. 110; 5
Denio, 567), 207, 250, 251, 253,
639, 713, 652, 664, 713.
Hodges V. Percival (132 111. 53), 1486.
Hodges V. Eunyan (30 Mo. 491), 214.
Hodgman v. St. Paul &o, R. Co. (20
Minn, 48), 940, 1391.
Hodgson V. Dexter (1 Ci'anch, 345),
212,213.
Hodman v. Chicago &c. E. Co. (20
Minn. 48), 989.
Hoev V. Gilroy (89 N. Y. 132; 14 N.
Y. Supl. 159; 37 N. Y. St. Rep.
754), 585, 614, (540, 1820.
Hoff V. City of Philadelphia (93 Pa.
Su. 272), 1154.
Hoff r. Lafayette (108 Ind. 14), 1366.
Hoffeld V. City of Bgfralo(N. Y., 29
N. E. Rep. 747), 1138, 1189.
HofEman v. Greenwood County (23
Kan. 307), 186.
Hoffman v. San Joaquin County (31
Cal. 426), 769.
Hogenson xi. St. Paul &c. Ry. Co. (31
Minn. 336; 17 N. W. Rep. 374),
1145.
Hoglan II. Carpenter (4 Bush, 89),
189.
Hoitt V. Burnham (61 N. H. 620), 350.
Hoke V. Henderson (4 Dev. (N. C.) 1),
187, 203.
Hoke V. Perdue (62 Cal. 545), 1189.
' Holbrook v. Faulkner (55 N. H. 311),
303, 365, 627, 1335.
"Holcomb V. Danby (51 Vt. 428), 783.
Holcombe v. Comm'rs (89 N. C. 346),
1393.
Holdane v. Cold Spring (23 Barb.
103; 21 N. Y. 474), 1403, 1405,
1406, 1409.
HoUaday v. Frisbie (15 Cal. 630), 624,
1380, 1595.
Holland a Baltimore (11 Md. 186),
93, 114, 1173, 1384, 1574.
Holland v. Davies (36 Ark. 446), 380,
1335.
Holland v. San Francisco (7 Cal.
361), 553.
Holland v. State (23 Fla. 123; 1 So.
Rep. 521), 285.
HoUenbeck v. Winnebago County
(95 111. 151), 745, 1014.
HoUiday v. St. Leonards (11 C. B.
(N. S.), 193), 232. 763.
Hollingswnrth v. State of Virginia
(3 Dallas, 378), 51, 740.
HoUmon v. Carroll (27 Tex. 23), 336.
Holloway v. Delano (64 Hun, 27),
1412.
Holloway v. Ogden School Dist. (62
Mich. 153), 1343.
Hollwedell. Ex parte (74 Mo. 395),
539, 544, 604.
Holly V. Bennett (46 Minn. 386),
1269.
Holman v. School Trustees (77 Mich.
605), 1331, 1344.
Holman v. Townsend (13 Met. 300),
746.
Holmes v. Baker (16 Gray, 259),
1384.
Holmes v. Jersey City (12 N. J. Eq.
_^ 299), 1163.
Hblmes V. Seeley (19 Wend. 510),
1473.
Holmes v. Village of Hyde Park (121
111. 129; 13 N. E. Rep. 540), 571,
1093.
Holt's Appeal (5 R. I. 603), 1336.
Holt V. Antrim (64 N. H. 284), 1394.
Holt V. City Council of Somerville
(137 Mass. 408, 411), 302, 671,
1096, 1173.
Holt V. Denny (118 Ind. 449), 1382.
Holton V. Board of Comm'rs (55 Ind.
194), 660.
Holton V. Milwaukee (31 Wis. 27),
1163.
Home ,of Refuge v. Ryan (37 Ohio
St. 197), 1008.
Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta (50 Ga.
530), 1356, 1370.
Home Ins. Co. v. Holway (55 Iowa,
571), 333.
Home Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.
Co. (11 Hun, 182), 1491.
Hommert v. Gleason (38 N. Y. St.
Rep. 348; 14 N. Y. Supl. 5B8),
192, 217. .
Honey Creek School Township v.
Barnes (119 Ind. 213; 21 N. E.
ReJD. 747), 621, 1333.
Hood V. Finch. (8 Wis. 381), 696.
Hood V. Mayor &c. of Lynn (1 Allen,
103), 633, 664.
Hood V. Trustees of Lebanon (Ky. ,
15 S. W. Rep. 516), 1076.
Hoodley u San Francisco (124 U. S.
646), 625.
Hooksett V.' Amoskeag &c. Co. (44
N. H. 105), 529.
Hooper V. Emery (14 Me. 375), 747,
835, 1387.
Hooper v. Goodwin (48 Me. 79), 198.
Hopeu Dead wick (8 Humph. (Tenn.)
1 ; 47 Am. Dec. 597), 50.
Hopkins v. Baltimore &c. R. Co. (6
Mackey, 311), 1306. y
Hopkins v. Elmore (49 Vt. 176), 345,
915.
Hopkins v. Mayor of Swansea (4
M. & W. 6a 1). 486.
Hopkins v. Railroad Co. (79 Mo. 98),
1551.
TABLE OF OASES.
OXXXUl
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Hopkins v. Rush River (70 Wis. 10),
1493.
Hopper V. Covington (8 Fed. Rep.
777), 947.
Hopper V. Covington (118 TJ. S. 148),
«32, 926.
Hopple V. Brown Township (13 Ohio
St. 311), 933.
Hoquerabourff v. City of Dunkirk (3
N. Y. Supl. 447), 163.
Horan v. Lane -(53 N. J. Law, 275 ;
21 Atl. Rep. 3021, 166, 177.
Horn V. Mayor &e. (30 Md. 218), 643.
Horn V. Town of New Lots (83 N. Y.
101), 1133. 1183.
Horn V. "Whittier (6 N. H. 88), 313,
829.
Hornblower v. Duden (35 Cal. 664),
186, 658. 659.
Horner v. Wood (33 N. Y. 850). 1115.
Hornung n. State (II 6 Ind. 458; 19
N. E. Rep. ir)l), 299.
Horsley v. Bell (1 Bro. C. C. 101), 213.
Horton v. Harrison (33 Barb. 176),
296.
Horton v. Mobile School Commis-
sioners (43 Ala. 59S). 61.
Horton i\ Newell (R. L, 33 Atl. Rep.
910), 773.
Horton v. Parsons (37 Hun, 42), 190,
200.
Horton v. Taunton (97 Mass. 366),
773.
Horton v. Town of Thompson (71
N. Y. 513), 640, 960.
Hosier v. Higgins Township Board
(45 Mich. 340), 827.
Hoskins v. Brantley (57 Miss. 814),
386.
Hospers v. Wyatt (63 Iowa, 265),
647.
Hospital V. Philadelphia (34 Pa. St.
229), 1577.
Hot Springs R. Co. v. Williamson
(45 Ark. 429), 674.
Hotchkiss V. Borough of Phillipsburg
(Pa.. 8 Atl. Rep. 434), 1493.
Hotehkiss v. Plunkett (60 Conn.
230), 663, 664.
Hotz V. School Dist. (1 Colo. App.
40), 1343.
Houfe V. Town of Fulton (34 Wis.
608), 1450.
Hough I'. Bridgeport (57 Conn. 290;
18 Atl. Rep. W>), 303.
Houghton's Appeal (42 Cal. 3.5), 706.
Houghton V. Davenport (33 Pick.
235). 353.
Houghton V. Huron Copper Min. Co.
(57 Mich. 547; 24 N. W. Rep.
820), 623, 13«6.
Houghton V. Swarthout (1 Denio,
589), 339.
Houghton Overseers v. Jay Over-
seers (9 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 412),
985.
House V. Board (60 Ind. 580), 1430.
House V. Metcalf (27 Conn. 631),'
1477.
House V. State (41 Miss. 737), 1333,
1241.
House Bill No. 331, In re (9 Colo.
624; 21 Pac. Rep. 472); 3;6, 896.
House Resolutions &c., In re (13
Colo. 3-*9; 31 Pac. Kep. 484), 120.
Householder v. Kansas City (83 Mo.
488), 1139, 1456.
Houston V. Emery (76 Tex. 283),
1590.
Houston V. Houston (67 Ind. 376),
1419.
Houston V. Isaacs (68 Tex. 116), 1478,
1496.
Houstou V. Moore (5 Wheat. 1), 139.
Houston V. Voorhies (Tex., 8 S. W.
Rep. 109). 900.
Houston &c. Ry. Co. v. Carson (66
Tex. 345; 18 S. W. Rep. 107),
1205.
Hover v. Barkhoof (44 N. Y. 113),
319, 330. 339, 748.
Hovey V. Haverstraw (124 N. Y. 273),
1420.
Hovey v. Mayo (43 Me. 322;, 677,
1189.
Hovey «. State (119 Ind. 386; 31 N.
E. Rep. 890), 158.
Howard's Case (Hutton, 87), 464.
Howard v. Augusta (74 Me. 79),
1400.
Howard v. Brogan (31 Me. 358), 313.
Howard v. Carnett (Ky., 1 S. W.
Rep. 1), 1337,
Howard v. Francis County (50 Fed.
Rep. 44), 924.
Howard v. McDiarmid (26 Ark. 100),
.110.
Howard v. Proctor (7 Gray, 138),
1390.
Howard v. Providence (6 R. I. 514),
699.
Howard v. San Francisco (51 Cal.
53), 264.
Howard v. Shaw (136 III. 53), 706.
Howard v. Shields (16 Ohio St. 25),
1«0.
Howard v. Shoemaker (35 Ind. Ill),
189, 192, 195, 1262.
Howard t. The Church (18 Md. 457),
1188.
Howard v. Trustees (10 Ohio, 365),
1000.
Howard v. Worcester (153 Mass.
436), 759, 760, 766.
Howard County Comm'rs v. Jen-
nings (104 Ind. 108), 191.
CXXXIV
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol.' I, pp. 1-78S; Vol. n. pp. 18ft-1605J
Howard Street, In re Vacation of
(Pa., 21 Atl. Rep. 974). 1193.
Howe V. Cambridge (114 Mass. 388),
1097, 1565.
,Howe V. Castleton (25 Vt. 163), 1433.
Howe V. Keeler (27 Conn. 538), 713,
941.
Howe V. Mason (14 Iowa, 510), 218.
Howe V. Treasurer of Plainfield (37
N. J. Law, 145), 548, 604, 1356,
1258.
Howell v. Bristol (8 Basil, 493), 1188,
1389.
Howell V. Buffalo (15 N, Y. 512),
1160, 1383, 1578, 1598.
Howell V. Peoria (90 III. 104), 848.
Howell V. Philadelphia (38 Pa. St.
471), 479. 1395.
Howell V. State (3 Gill (Md.), 14),
1353.
Howes V. Grush (131 Mass. 207), 1490.
Howes V. Oakland (104 11. S. 450),
1130.
Howland v. City of Chicago (108
III. 500), 1839.
Howland v. County Comm'rs (49
Me. 143), 1194.
Howland .1% Eldredge (46 N. Y. 457),
1514.
Howland v. School Dist. (15 R. I.
184), 352, 371, 1336. 1340.
Howland v. Wright County (Iowa,
47 N. W. Rep. 1086), 183.
Hoyt V. Gity of Des Moines (76 Iowa,
430: 41 N. W. Rep. 63), 1485,
1486, 1487.
Hoyt V. Comm'rs (23 Barb. 238),
\ 1350.
Hoyt V. East Saginaw (19 Mich. 39),
571, 1065J 1126, 1165, 1169, 1172,
1188. ,
Hoyt u. Hudson (37 Wis. 656), 1146.
Hoyt V. Thompson (19 N. Y. 207),
713.
Hubbard v. Elden (43 Ohio St. 380),
336.
Hubbard v. Newton (53 Vt. 346),
348, 366, 368.
Hubbard v. Russell (34 Barb. 404),
1036.
Hubbard v. Taunton (140 Mass. 467),
(i05.
Hubbard v. Town of Medford (30
Oregon, 315 ; 25 Pac. Rep. 610),
594, 1246.
Hubbard v. Williamstown (61 Wis.
397). 350, 375.
Hubbard v. Winsor (15 Mioh. 146),
Hubbel'l V. Viroqua City (67 Wis.
343), 776.
Hubbell V. Yonkers (104 N. Y. 434),
771, 773, 1438, 1471.
Huber v. Reily (53 Pa. St, 122), 376.
Hudson V. Cuero Land & Emigrgr
tion Co. (47 Tex. 561, 678.
Hudson V. Geary (4 R. L 485). 1244.
Hudson v. Marietta (64 Ga. g8S), 260,
846.
Hudson V. Marlborough (154 Mass.
, 318), 1473.
Hudson V. Thorne (7 Paige Ch. 261).
531.
Hudson <fec. Cd v. Seymour (35 N. J.
Law, 47), 1377. ' ,
Huasou Countv I'. State (34 N. J.
Law, 718). 67. 273, 275. ■;
Hudspeth v. Wallis (55 Ark. 323),
1323.
Huels V. Hahn (75 Wis. 468 ; 54 N. W.
Rep. 507), 161.
Hue.sing v. City of Rock Island (128
111. 465; 21 N. E. Rep. 558j, 581,
609.
Huff V. Cook (44 Iowa, 639), 189.
Huffman v. Comm'rs &c. (23 Kan.
381). 658, 719.
Huffsniith v. People (8 Colo. 175),
1240..
Hugg V. Camden (29 N. J. Eq. 6),
185, 659.
Hugsans v. Riley (51 Hun, 501; 4
N. Y. Su.pl. 282), 1091.
Huggans v. Biley (125 N. Y. 88; 25
N. E. Rep. 993), 1080, 1093; 1404,
1428.
Huggins V. Hinson (1 Phil. (N. C.)
, 126), 1578.
Hughes V. Bingham (N. Y., 46 Alb.
L. J. 517 ; 32 N. E. Rep. 78), 1408,
1410, 1421.
Hughes V. City of Fond du Lao (73
Wis; 382; 41 N. W. Rep. 407),
557, 1467. 1479.
Hughes ». Kline (30 Pa. St. 230), 1189.
Hughes V. Overseers of Chatham (5
Man. & G. 54), 134j'
Hughes V. Parker (20 N. H. 58), 298.
Hughes V. P. iiple (8 Colo. 536), 604.
Hughes V. Recorder's Court (75 Mich.
574), 1244.
Hughes V. School Dist. (73 Mo. 643),
97.
Huidekoper v. Buchanan County (3
Dill. 175), 947.
Huidekoper lo. Meadville (83 Pa. St.
158). uao.
Huling V. Kaw Valley Ry. & 'Imp.
Co. (130 U. S. 559). 693.
Hull V. Independent Dist. (Iowa, 46
N. W. Rep. 1053; 48 N. W.' Rep.
82), 810, 1343.
Hull V. Marshall County (13 Iowa,
132), 314.
Hull V. Mayor (73 Ga. 319), 548.
Hull V. People (57 111. 807), 1553.
TABLE OF OASES.
CXXXT
[The references are to pages: Vol
Hullin V. Second Municipality of
New Orleans (11 Rob. (La.) 97),
697. 698.
Hullman i\ Honcomp (5 Ohio St.
237), 1166.
Hultz V. Com. (3 Grant's Gas. 61),
811.
Humboldt County v. Churchill
County Comm'rs(6 Nev. 30), 441.
Humboldt County v. Dinsraore (75
Cal. 604), 1417, 1419.
Humboldt Township v. Long (93 U.
S. 643), 947, MSO. 961.
Hume V. Conduit (7d Ind. 598), 1419.
Hume V. Mayor (47 N. Y. 640). 781.
Hurae V. New York (74 N. Y. 264),
1445, 1466.
Humes i'. Mayor (1 Humph. (Tenn.)
403), 6"; 7.
Humiston v. School Trustees (7 111.
App. 122), 1333.
Huramqlman v. Danos (32 Cal. 441),
1171.
Humphrey, Ex parte(W Wend. 612),
307.
Humphreys v. Hears (1 M. & E. 187),
223.
Humphreys I'. Norfolk (25Gratt. 97),
1352, 1362.
Hunerberg v. Village of Hyde Park
(130 III. 156; 22 N. E. Eep. 486),
1093.
Hungerford v. Hartford (39 Conn.
279), 1164.
Hunneman v. Fire District (37 Vt.
40), 358, 368.
Hunneman v. Grafton (10 Met. 454),
360, 361, 363, 365.
Hunnewell v. Charleston (106 Mass.
350), 1573.
Hun? aker v. Borden (5 Cal. 288), 744.
Hunsaker 1). Wright- (30 IK. 146),
1353.
Hunt V. City of Oswego (107 N. Y.
629; 14 N. E. Rep. 97), 885.
Hunt V. Genet (14 Daly, 225), 1260.
Hunt V. Kansas & Missouri Bridge
Co. (11 Kan. 413), 1434.
Hunt V. Pownal (6 Vt. 411), 1453.
Hunti). Salem (121 Mass. 294), 1449.
Hunt V. School Dist. (14 Vt. 300),
350, 369. 1336.
Hunter w Mobley (36 S. C. 192; 1
S. E. Rep. 670), 873, 1537.
Hunter v. Nolf (71 Pa. St. 383), 639.
Hunter v. Sandy Hill (6 Hill, 407),
1406, 1409.
punting V. Curtis (10 Iowa, 152),
697.
Huntingdon . u. Bieen (79 Ind. 39),
1493.
Huntington v. Cheesbro (57 Ind. 74),
541.
I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Huntington v. Palmer (104 U. S.
482), 1130.
Huntington v. Pease (56 Ind. 305J,
541.
Huntington &c. R. Co.'s Appeal
(Pa., 24 Atl. Rep. 189), 583.
Huntley v. Railroad Co. (38 Mich.
540), 1477.
Hupert V. Anderson (35 Iowa, 578),
699.
Hurford v. Omaha (4 Neb. 336), 677,
1171.
Hurla V. City of Kansas City (Kan.,
27 Pac. Rep. 143), 393, 40^, 403;
1363.
Hurtado w California (llO'U. S. 516),
1565.
Huse V. Glover (119 TJ. S. 543), 1423.
Huse V. Lowell (10 Allen, 149), 1330.
Hussner v. Brooklyn R. Co. (114
N. Y. 433), 1438.
Huston V. Iowa County (43 Iowa,
456). 746.
Huston Tp.'Poor Dist. v. Benezette
Tp. Poor Dist. (135 Pa. St. 893).
983.
Hntchcraft v. Shront's Heirs (17 B.
Mon. 26; 15 Am. Dec. 100), 380.
HUtchings v. Scott (9 N. J. Law. 218),
1355.
Hutchins v. Boston (12 Allen, 571),
1466.
Hutchinson v. Concord (41 Vt. 271),
264, 775.
Hutchinson v. Filk (Minn., 47 N. W.
Rep. 255), 1059.
Hutchinson v. Parkersbnrg (35 West
Va. 336), 674.
Hutchinson v. Pratt (11 Vt. 403), 356,
510, 1266. \
Hutchinson v. State (39 N. J. Eq.
669), 1034.
Hutchinson «. Western &c. R. Co.
(6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 634), 7.
Hutchisson v. Mt. Vernon (40 111.
App. 19), 1265.
Huthsing v. Bousquet (7 Fed. Rep.
833), 212.
Hutson V. Mayor &c. of New York
(9 N. Y. 163), 219, 768, 771, 1080,
1444.
Hutt V. City of Chicago (133 111. 352),
1164.
Hutton V. City of Camden (39 N. J.
Law, 133), 1056.
H^att V. Bates (35 Barb. 808 ; 40 N.
Y. 164K 555, 1526.
Hyde D. Brush (34 Conn. 454), 377.
Hyde v. Jamaica (27 Vt. 443), 747.
Hyde v. State (52 Miss. 665). 187.
Hyde v. Stone (7 Wend. 354), 1491.
Hyde Park v. Borden (94 111. 26), 571,
1093.
CXXXVl
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-783; Vol. n, pp. 78D-1605.]
Hyde Park v. City of Chicago (184
111. 156; 16 N. E. Rep. 232), 406,
412. 413.
Hyde Park v. County Comm'rs
(Mass., 31 N. E. Rep. 693), 1591,
1594.
Hyde Park v. County of Norfolk
(117 Mass. 41'6). 694, 1420.
Hydes v. Joyes (4 Bush, 464; 96 Am.
Dec. 311), 283, 1123.
Hymes v. Aydelott (36'lnd. 431), 696.
I.
Illinois V. Ridgway (12 III. 14), 320.
Illinois &c. Canal Co. v. St. Louis (3
Dill. 70). 579.
Illinois &c. R. Co. v. McLean County
(17 III. 291). 1353.
Illinois & M. Canal Co. v. Chicago
(13 111.403). 1166.
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. City of Chi-
cago (111., 28 N. E. -kep. 740).
590. ■
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. City of Chi-
cago (111., 30 N. E. Rep. 1044),
590, 591.
Illinois Cent. E. Co. v. Decatur (ISG
III. 92), 1172.
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Galena (40 111.
344), 524.
Illinois Conference Female College
V. Cooper (25 III. 148), 103, 488,
511.
Illinois River R. Co. v. Beers (27 111.
189), 943.
Imlay v. Union Branch R. Co. (36
Conn. 849), 679.
Imperial Land Co., In re (L. R. 11
Ex. 478), 947.
Improvement Co. v. Arnold (46 Wis.
214; 49 N. W. Rep. 971), 558.
In re Addison Smith (58 N. Y. 526),
499/
In re Ah Toy (45 Fed. Rep. 795), 534.
In re Ah You (82 Cal. 339; 25 Pac.
Rep. 971), 1249, 13B0.
In re Ah Yup (5 Sawyer C. C. 155),
141.
Jn re Alexander Avenne (N. Y., 31
N. E. Rep. 316; 17 N. Y. Supl.
933), 554, 1168.
In re , an Alien (7 Hill, 137), 140.
In re Anderson (49 Hun, 203), 1105.
In re Application of Mayor i&c. of
•New York (N. Y. Ct. App., Oct.,
1893; N. Y. Law Jour., Oct. 27,
1892), 676, 687.
In re Arbitration between Eldon and
Ferguson Tps. (6 Upper Can. L. J.
270), 657.
In re Astor (53 N. Y. 617), 1163.
In re Att'y Gen'l (U Fl.n. 277), 315.
In re Ayers (123 U. S. 413), 20.
In re Barry Water Co. (Vt., 20 Atl.
Ren. 109), 130.1.
In re Bassford (.')0 N. Y. 509), 1169.
In re Beekman (31 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
16). 296.
In re Bickerstaffi (70 Cal. 35), 1233,
1242.
In re Borough of Taylorsport (18
Atl. Rep. 284), 64.
In re Boston & AllTany R. Co. (53
N. Y. 574), 676. '
In re Breaux's Bridge (80 La. Ann.
llOo). 500.
tn re Bridge (100 N. Y. 642). 1414.
In re Broadway Widening (83 Barb.
572). 29.').
In re Brooklyn Street (118 Pa. St.
640). 1407.
In re Buffalo (78 N. Y. 363). 1265.
In re Building Inspectors (E, I., 21
Atl. Rep. 913), 177.
In re Burmeister (76 N. Y. 174),
1161, ll(i3.
In re Cahill (110 Pa. St. 167), 1253,
1254.
In re Cambria Street (75 Pa. St. 357),
190.
In re Campbell (1 Wash. 287; 24
Pac. Rep. 034). 08.
In re Canal &c. (13 N. Y. 406\ 1863.
In wCan.il Street (M Wend. 155), 698.
In re Carlton Street (16 Hun, 497),
301. 498.
In re Central Park Extension (16
Abb. Pr. 56), 685
In re Christensen (43' Fed. Rep. 243),
1841.
In re City of Buffalo (18 N. Y. Supl.
771), 1259.
In re City of Buffalo (64 N. Y. 547),
671.
In re City of Buffalo (68 N. Y. 167),
676.
In re Citv of Cedar Rapids (Iowa,
51 N. W. Rep. 1143), 578, 814.
In re Cleveland (51 N. J. Law, 319;
iSAtl. Rep. 67), 163, 1W3.
In re Cleveland (53 N. J. Law, 188;
19 Atl. R<-p. 17i, 177.
In re Cloherty (2 Wash. St. 137),
1853.
In re Coleman (SO Hun, 514), 1575.
In re College Street (8 R. I. 474),
1116,
In re CoramisBioners of Central
Park (50 N. Y. 493), 113.
In re Comni'r of Pulilic Works (10
N. Y. Supl. 705), 6ri.
In re Condon (Ij. R. 9 Ch. App. 609),
248.
In re Corliss (11 R. L 638), 203, 886.
TABLE OF OASES.
cxxxvn
[The references are to pages: Vol.
In re County of Jlampshire (143
Mass. 424), 1168.
In re Creek (3 B. & S. 459), 184.
In re Dana (4 Ben. 14), 545, 546.
In re Dasent (3 N. Y. Supl. 609), 884.
In re Deansville Cemetery Ass'n (66
N. Y. 569; 23 Am. Rep. 86), 583,
68J.
In re Deering (93 N. Y. 361), 686,
In re Division of Valley Township
(Pa., 23 At!. Kep. 323), 431.
In re Dowlan (36 Minn. 430 ; 31 N. W.
Rep. 517), 1125.
In re Dugro (50 N. Y. 513), 1168.
In re Durliin (10 Hun, 269), 505.
In re Eager (46 N. Y. 100). 1171.
In re East Syracuse (20 Abb. N. 0.
.131). 879, 880, 1124.
In re Egypt Street (3 Grant's (Pa.)
Cas. 455), 113.
In re Empire City Bank (18 N. Y.
199). 690.
In re Eureka Basin &c. Co. (96 N. Y.
42: 3 Dill. 376). 931.
In re Ferrier (103 III. .S67), 1008.
In re Frank (52 Cal. fi06), 530.
In re Franklin's Estate (Pa., 24 Atl.
Rep. 626), 568.
In re Frazee (63 Mich. 396), 489, 518,
520, 1324, 1249.
In re Fulton Street (29 How. Pr.
429), 1079.
In re Furman Street (17 Wend. 649),
699, 701, 1151.
In re Garvey (77 N. Y. 538), 1173.
In re Goddard (16 Pick. 504), 117,
539, 1201. 1211, 1239.
In re Greystoc.k (13 Upper Can. Q,
B. 458), 583.
In re Grove Street (61 Cal. 438), 694.
In re Guerrero (69 Gal. 88), 505,
1390. * "^
In re Hall (36 Kan. 670 ; 17 Pao. Rep.
649), 445.
In re Hamrael (9 R. I. 248). 800.
In re Heath (3 Hill, 43), 1363.
In re-Heidler.(123 Pa. St. 653; 16
Atl. Rep. 97). 403, 410.
In re Henry Street (123 Pa. St. 346),
67, 99, 112, 119, 123.
In re Hinkle (bl Kan. 712), 95, 110,
199. 465.
In re House Bill No. 231 (9 Colo.
624; 21 Pac. Rep. 473), 376, 896.
In re House Resolutimis &c. (13
Colo. 289; 21 Pac. Rep, 484), 120.
In re Imperial Land Co. (L. R. 11
Ex. 478), 947.
In re Incorporation of Edgewnod
Borough <! 30 Pa. St. 348; 18 Atl.
Rep. 646), 65, 66, 70, 407.
In reincorporation of Pennsborough
(13 Atl. Rep. 98), 65.
I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
In re Ingrahara (64 N. Y. 3!0).' 1133.
In re Jacobs (9S N. Y. 98), 1239.
In re John and Cherry Streets (19
Wend. 659), 624.
In re Keeney (Cal., 24 Pac. Rep. 34),
. 1036.
In re Kiernan (63 N. Y. 457), 1174,
1175.
In re Kimmel (41 Fed. Rep. 775),
1240.
In re Knoop's, Estate (11 N. Y. Siipl.
773), 1260.
In re Ladue (118 N. Y. 218), 1413.
In re Linehan (73 Cal. 114; 13 Pac.
Rep. 170). 1030.
/rare Look Tin Sing (21 Fed. Rep.
905 ; 17 Chicago Leg. News, S7),
137, 138, 141. 142,
In re McGraw's Estate (111 N. Y. 66),
1838.
In re Manhattan R. Co. (102 N. Y.
301), 1171.
In re Mason (43 Fed. Rep. 510), 300.
In re M.iyor (99 N. Y, 669), 1336.
In re Mayor of New York (11 Johns.
77), 116(i.
In re M. E. Chui-ch (66 N. Y. 395),
1374.
In re Merrill (8 N. Y. Supl. 737),
1847.
In re Michie &c. (11 Up. Can. C. P.
379), 1174.
In re Middletown Village (83 N. Y.
196). 6':'6.
In re MoUie Hall (10 Neb. 537), 585,
527.
In re Mount Morris Square (3 Hill,
20), 301, 497, 554, 1575, 1576.
In re New York (11 Johns. 77), 1361,
1396.
In re New York &c. R. Co. (66 N. Y.
407), 683.
In re New York &c. Ry. Co. (90 N. Y.
IS : 1 N. E. Rep. 27), 583.
In re New York &c. Trustees (57
How. Pr. (N. Y.) 500), 283.
In re Newland Avenue (38 N. Y. Bt.
Rep. 796; 15 N. Y. Supl. 63),
273.
In re Niagara Falls &c. Ry. Co. (108
N. Y. 875), 683.
In re Nichols (48 Fed. Rep. 169),
1240.
In re Norton (Q. B,, June 8, 1872),
208.
In re O'Keefe (19 N. Y. Supl, 676),
524.
In re Osborne (101 Pa. St. 284), 68.
In re Pearce (44 Ark. 509), 1576.
/rare Pearl Street (11 Pa. St. 565),
1143.
In re Pennsylvania Hall (5 Pa. St.
204), 1357, 1373.
CXXXVUl
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
In re Petition of Cleveland (51 N. J.
Law, 319; 52 N. J. Law, 188;
80 Am. & Eng. Corp. Gas. 230),
375.
In re Pliillips (60 N. Y. 16), 499.
In re Piscataway Townships (N. J.,
24 Atl. Rep. 759), 1416.
In re Polling Lists (18 E. I. 729), 877.
In re Powers (25 Vt. 261), 1257.
In re Quong Woo (13 Fed. Eep. 229),
1233, 1390. ,
In re Ramsliay (83 Eng. C. L. 174),
210.
In re Report of Comm'rs of Adjust-
ment (49 N. J. Law, 288 ; 23 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 484), 564.
In re Road Case (17 Pa. St. 71). 980.
In re Road in Roaring Brook Tp.
(Pa., 21 Atl. Rep. 411). 1090.
In re Road in Sterrelt Tp. (114 Pa.
St. 637), 694.
In re Roads in Sadsbury Tp. (Pa., 23
Atl: Rep. 772). 1090.
In re Roqhester Electric R. Co. (123
N. y. 351), 1453.
In re Rochester Water Comm'rs (66
N. Y. 413), 686.
In re Rogers (7 Cowen, 526). 396.
In re Rolfs (30 Kan. 758), 1258.
In re Rosenbaum (6 N. Y. Supl. 184).,
1106.
In re Royal Street (16 La. Ann. 893),
1174.
In re Ruan Street (133 Pa. St. 257 ;
19 Atl. Rep. 319), 1203.
In re Ryan (45 Mich. 173), 112.
In re Ryers (73 N. Y. 1), 606.
In re Sadler, Appeal of Brinton (143
Pa. St. 511; 31 Atl. Rep. 978),
402. 407.
In re St. Helen's Mill Co. (3 Sawy.
88), 1141.
In re St. John's Cemetery (N. Y.. 31
N. E. Rep. 103; 16 N. Y. Supl.
894), 583.
In re St. Paul &c. Ry. Co. (34 Minn.
337), 682.' 683.
In re Sam Kee (31 Fed. Rep. 680),
1023.
In fe Sawyer (134 U. S. 323), 390,
298.
In re Saxon Life Assurance Co. (2
J, & H. 408), 248.
In re School Fund (15 Neb. 684 ; 50
N. W. Rep. 3731, 866.
In re Senate Resolution &c. (13 Colo.
390'; 21 Pac. Rep. 484), 120."
In re Sewer in Thirty-fourth' Street
(31 How. Pr. 43), 396.
In re Sharp (56 N. Y. 357), 1174.
In re Shay (15 N. Y. Supl. 488), 1548
In re Sic (Cal., 14 Pac. Rep. 405),
518. *
In re Sixty-sevepth Street (60 How.
Pr. 264), 1411
In re Smith (99 N. Y. 434), 1078,
1163.
In re Snell (IS Vt. 207), 117, 513.
In re Stock (50 Hun, 385; 3 N. Y.
, Supl. 231), 1149.
In re Strahl (16 Iowa. 369), 290, 298.
In re Strand (Cal., 31 Pac. Rep. 654),
63, 69, 96.
In re Stratman (K9 Cal. 517), 1355.
In re Summit Borough (Pa., 7 Atl.
♦ Rep. 319), 68. 69.
In re Tie Loy (26 Fed. Rep. 611), 511.
In re Tipperary Elec. (9 Ir. R. C. L.
217), 386.
In re Towanda Bridge Co. (91 Pa.
St. 216), 670.
In re Town of Bastchester (53 Hun,
181 : 6 N. Y. Supl. 130), 879, 880.
In re Townsend (39 N. Y. 171), 939,
In r-eVurfler (44 Barb. 46), 1383.
Inre Twenty-second Street (1 5 Phila.
409), 670.
/m re Tyerman (48 Fed. Rep. 167),
1340.
In re Underbill's Will (3 N. Y. Supl.
305), 564.
In re Union E. R. of Brooklyn (113
N. Y. 61 ; 19 N. E. Rep. 664),
595.
In re Union Ferry Co. (98 N. Y. 139),
569, 683.
In re Vacation of Center Street (115
Pa. St. 247; 8 Atl. Rep. 56),
1124, 1125, 1181, 1349.
In re Vacation of Henry Street (133
Pa. St. 346; 10 Atl. Rep. 785),
119. ,
In re Vacation of Howard Street
(Pa., 31 Atl. Rep. 974), 1193.
In 're Vandine (6 Pick. 187). 521.
In re Wall (48 Cal. 379), 487.
In re Wan Yin (22 Fed. Rep. 701),
1232.
In re Washington Ave. (69 Pa. St.
352). 1170, 1389.
In re Wellington (16 Pick. 87; 26
Am. Dec. 631), 683, 1520.
In re White (43 Fed. Rep. 913), 1340.
In re Whitney (3 N. Y. Supl. 838),
1541.
In re Widening of Burnish Street
(Pa., 31 Atl. Rep. 500), 681.
In re Widening of Washington
Street (14 N. Y. Supl. 470). 1077.
In re Willcocks (7 Cowen, 402), 391,"
493.
In re Wilson (33 Minn. 145), 546.
In re Wo Lee (26 Fed. Rep. 471),
1241.
In re Wright (29 Hun, 857), 547.
TABLE OF OASES.
CXXXIX
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
In re Tick Wo (68 Cal. 394 ; 58 Am.
Kep. 13\ 533.
In the Matter of Albany Street (11
Wend. 149), 677.
In the Matter of Appeal of Des
Moines Water Co. (48 Iowa, 324),
572.
In the Matter of Beekman Street (4
Bradf. 503), 677.
In the Matter of Church (92 N. Y.
1), 704.
In the Matter of Evans (9 Ad. & El.
679), 134.
In the Matter of Lawrence Street
(4 R. I. 230), 669.
Incorporated Town of Bayard v.
Baker (Iowa, 40 N. W. Rep. 818),
497.
liicorporated Town of Spencer v.
Andrew (Iowa, 47 N. W. Rep.
1007), 602, 1317, 1440.
Incorporated Village of Shelby v,
Clagett (Ohio, 23 N. E. Rep.
407), 1440.
Incorporation of Edgewood Borough,
In re (130 Pa. St. 349; 18 Atl.
Rep. 646), 65, 66. 407.
Incorporation of Pennsborough, In
re (13 Atl. Rep. 93), 65.
Independence v. Gates (Mo., 19 S.
W. Rep. 738), 1134, 1135.
Independence v. Moore (33 Mo. 893),
. 529.
Independence v. Trouvalle (15 Kan.
70), 543, 1269.
Independent School Dist. v, Duser
(45 Iowa, 391), 1322.
Independent School Dist. v. Gookin
(73 Iowa, 387), 1347.
Independent School Dist. v. Hull
(Iowa, 48 N. W. Rep. 82), 1330.
Independent School District v. Wirt-
ner (Iowa, 53 N. W. Rep. 243),
282.
Indiana &c. R. Co. v. Indianapolis (13
Ind. 620), 624.
Indiana &c. R. Co. v. Sprague (103
U. S. 756), 965.
Indianapolis v. Cook (99 Ind. 10),
1463.
Indianapolis v. Gaston (58 Ind. 234),
1430, 1500.
Indianapolis v. Huegle (115 Ind. 581),
515 517.
Indianapolis v. Huflfer (30 Ind. 235),
1099.
Indianapolis v. Iniberg (17 Ind. 175),
485, 1112, 1370.
Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas Co.
(66 Ind. 896), 109, 354, 383, 568,
708, 971, 1313.
Indianapolis v. Jones (29 Iowa, 383),
497.
J
Indianapolis v. Lauzer (38 Ind. 348),
1098.
Indianapolis v. MoAvoy (86 Ind. 587),
342, 1399.
Indianapolis v. Mansur (15 Ind. 113),
1163.
Indianapolis v. Miller (37 Ind. 394),
1048.
Indianapolis v. Patterson (113 Ind.
344; 14 N, E. Rep. 551). 399.
Indianapolis v. Scott (73 Ind. 196),
1484.
Indianapolis Cable St. R. Co. ,u. Cit-
izens' St. R. Co.), 129 Ind. 369;
34 N. E. Rep. 1054 ; 26 N. E. Rep.
893), 1214.
Indianapolis R. Co. v. Hurst (93 U. S.
39), 954.
Indianapolis Water- works Co. v.
Burkhart (41 Ind. 364), 671.
Indianola v. Gulf &o. Ry. (56 Tex.
599), 1205.
Indianola v. Jones (29 Iowa, 383),
301.
Industry v. Harks (65 Me. 167), 836.
Information of Oliver (21 S. C. 318).
.541.
Ingerman v. State (128 Ind. 235; 37
N. E. Eep. 499). 1517, 1518.
Inglis V. Sailors' Snug Harbor (3
Peters, 13!). 139.
Ingman v. Chicago (78 111. 405), 520.
Ingraham, Matter of (4 Hun, 495),
1411.
Ingraham v. Camden & R. Water
Co. (83 Me. 335; 19 Atl. Rep.
861), 1305, 1306.
Ingram v. McCombs (17 Mo. 558),
326.
Inhabitants v. Cutter (114 Mass. 344),
1080.
Inhabitants v, Lyons (131 Mass.
338), 1000.
Inhabitants v. Stearns (31 Pick. 148),
494.
Inhabitants v. Weir (9 Ind. 334), 251,
642.
Inhabitants &c. v. Cole (3 Pick. 832),
296.
Inhabitants &c. v. Stratton (138
Mass. 137), 1000.
Inhabitants &c. v. Turner (14 Mass.
337), 1000.
Inhabitants &o. v. Wood (13 Mass.
193), 55.
Inhabitants of Belmont v. Vinal-
haven (82 Me. 524 ; 30 Atl. Rep.
89). 977.
Inhabitants of Boston v. Brazer (11
Mass. 447), 657.
Inhabitants of Brookfield v. Reed
(153 Mass. 568; 20 N. E. Rep.
138), 1080.
cxl
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Inhabitants of Bucksport v. Spof-
foi-d (13 Me. 4b7). 347, 351. 353.
Inhabitants of Carver v. City of
Taunton (153 Mass. 484; 35 N. E.
Rep. 965), 985.
Inhabitants of Charlestown v.
County Comm'rs (3 Met. 203),
629.
Inhabitants of Hampshire County
V. Inhabitants of Franlilin
County (16 Mass. 86). 451.
Inhabitants of Hyde Park v. County
Comm'rs (Mass., 31 N. E. Rep.
698), 1591, 1594.
Inhabitants of Liberty v. Inhabit-
ants of Palermo (79 Me. 473 ; 10
Atl. Rep. 455), 994.
Inhabitants of Lyman v. Inhabitants
of Kennebunkport (83 Me. 319;
23 Atl. Rep. 103). 970.
Inhabitants of New Salem, Petition-
ers'(6 Pick. 470), 1591.
Inhabitants of Oakham v. Inhabit-
ants of Sutton (13 Met. 193), 696.
Inhabitants of Reading v. Ciitv of
Maiden (141 Mass. 580), 1003.
Inhabitants, of Schell City v. Rum-
sey Manuf. Co. (39 |iIo. App.
264), 708.
Inhabitants of South Bewick v.
Huntress (53 Me. 89), 311.
Inhabitants of South Scituate v. In-
habitants of Scituate (Mass., 39
N. E. Rep. 639), 979.
Inhabitants of Springfield v. Rail-
way Co. (4 Cush. 71), 639.
Inhabitants of Templetpn v. Inhab-
itants of Winchendon (138 Mass.
109), 993.
Inhabitants of Watertown v. Mayo
(109 Mass. 315), 1059.
Inhabitants of Windham v. Portland
(4 Mass. 384), 451.
Inhabitants of Winthrop v. Farrar
(11 Allen, 398), 1059.
Inhabitants of Worcester v. Eaton
(13 Mass. 371). 660.
Inkster v. Carver (16 Mich. 484), 524.
Inman v. Tripp (11 R. I. 530), 1147.
Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker (94
U. S. 238). 1043, 1388.
Innes v. Wylie (1 C. & K. 357). 206.
Inos V. Winspear (IS Cal. 397), 339.
Insurance Co. v. Comm'rs (38 Barb.
318), 1350.
Insurance Co. v. Fyler (60 Conn.
448), 1339.
Insurance Co. v. Morse (30 Wall.
445), 145.
Insurance Co. v. Poilldn (7 N. Y.
Supl. 834), 1338.
Insurance Co. v, Sanders (36 N. H.
253), 373.
Insurance Co. v. Sortwell (8 Allen,
317), 892.
Insurance Co. v. Tard (17 Pa. St.
331), 1568.
Intendant v. Chandler (6 Ala. 297),
546.
Intendant v. Pippen (31 Ala. 543),
1019, 1573.
Intendant v. Sorrell (1 Jones, 49), 598.
International Bank v. Franklin
County (65 Mo. 105), 909.
Interstate Nat. Bank v. Ferguson
• (Kan., 80 Pac. Rep. 237), 863.
In wood V. State (42 Ohio St. 186), 544.
Iowa &c. Land Co. v. Carroll County
(39 Iowa, 151), 15.
Iowa County v. Webstet County (31
Iowa, 331), 534.
Iowa Railroad &c. Co. v. Sac County
(39 Iowa, 124),. 1377.
Ipsom V. Mississippi &c. R. Co. (36
Miss. 300), 696.
Ipswich V. Comm'rs (10 Pick. 519),
1591.
Iredell v. Barbee (9 Ired. L. (N. C.)
250), 313.
Ireland v. City of Rochester (51 Barb.
414), 1178..
Iron R. Co. v. Ironton (19 Ohio St.
299). 1196.
Iron Works v. Elgin &o. Ry. Co. (111.,
30 N. E. Rep. 1050), 1253, 1355',
1256.
Iron Works v. Speed (59 Mich. 373),
1536.
Irrigation District v. De Lappe (79
Cal. 351), 1265.
Irvin V. Gregory (86 Ga. 605 ; 13 S.
E. Rep. 120), 801, 1336, 1343,
1345.
Irvin V. New Orleans &c. R. Co. (94
111. 113), 1353.
Irving V. Ford (65 Mich. 241 ; 83 N.
W. Rep. 601), 1082.
Irwin V. Lowe (89 Ind. 490), 1391.
Irwin V. Town of Ontario (3 Fed.
Rep. 49), 947.
Isbell V. New York &c. R. Co. (35
Conn. 556). 371.
Israel v. Jacksonville (3 111. 290), 530.
Israel v. Jewett (39 Iowa, 475), 702.
Ivinson v. Hance (1 Wy, Ter. 275),
791.
Ivory V. Town of Deer Park (116 N,
Y. 476), 1233, 1439, 1471.
Jack V. Moore (66 Ala. 184), 658, 659.
Jacks V. Helena (41 Ark, 313), 939.
Jackson, Ex parte (35 Ark. 153),
1012.
TABLE 07 OASES.
cxli
prhe references are to pages: Vol.
Jackson v. Bowman (39 Miss. 671),
254, 1232.
Jackson v. Burns (3 Binn. 75), 139.
Jackson v. Collins (16 N. Y. Supl.
651). 282, 883.
Jackson v. Edwards (7 Paige, 386),
691.
Jackson v. Fitzsimmons (10 Wend.
9), 141.
Jackson v. Green (7 Wend. 338), 141.
Jackson v. Hartwell (8 Johns. 422),
563.
Jackson v. Lunn (3 Johns. Cas. 109),
138.
Jackson v. Newman ({59 Miss. 385),
1183.
Jackson v. People (9 Mich. Ill), 546,
1576.
Jackson v. Rankin (67 Wis. 285), 694,
1419.
Jackson v. Rutland &c. Co. (25 Vt.
150), 671.
Jackson v. Simonton (4 Cranch C. C.
255), 315.
Jackson v. Smith (120 Ind. 520; 23
N. E. Rep. 431), 217, 1126.
Jackson v. State (104 Ind. 516), 1172.
Jackson v. White (30 Johns. 313),
138.
Jackson v. Toung (5 Cowan, 269),
1416.
Jackson County v. Brush (77 III. 59),
383.
Jackson County v. Waldo (85 Mo.
640), 1415.
Jackson County Horse R. Co. v. In-
terstate Rapid Transit Ry. Co.
(34 Fed. Rep. 306), 1305.
Jackson School Township v. Iladley
(59 Ind. 534), 631.
Jackson Townshjp v. Wagner (137
Pa. St. 184). 1438, 1454.
Jacksonport v. Watson (33 Ark. 704),
647, 1582.
Jacksonville v, Akers (11 111. App.
393), 1345.
Jacksonville v. Allen (25 HI. App.
54), 203, 1293.
Jacksonville v. Holland (19 111. 271),
531, 539.
Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Ry. Co.
(67 III. 540), 624.
Jacksonville v. Led with (26 Fla. 163;
7 So. Rep. 885), 580, 662, 1243,
1244.
Jacksonville &c. R. Co. v. Jacobs
(110 111. 414), 699.
Jacksonville &o. R. Co. v. Virden
(104 111. 339), 987.
Jacksonville '&c. R. Co. v. Walsh
(106 III. 253), 699.
Jacksonville R. Co. ". City of Jack-
sonville (114 III. 503). 1074. '
I, pp. 1-788J Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Jacobs, In re (98 N. Y. 98), 1339.
Jacobs V. Bangor (16 Me. 187), 1494.
Jacobs V. Hamilton County (1 Bond,
500). 749.
Jacqiiemin v. Andrews (40 Mo. App.
507). 868.
Jaflery v. Gough (86 Cal. 104), 1183.
James v. City of Darlington (71 Wis.
173; 36 N. W. Rep. 834). fil5.
James v. Lammis (133 N. Y. 239),
1415.
James v. Pine Bluff (49 Ark. 199),
1174.
James v. Portage (48 Wis. 681), 1451.
James Countv v. Hamilton County
(89 Tenn". 237; 14 S. W. Rep.
601). 430.
Jameson v. Oil Co. (128 Ind; 5; 38
N. E. Rep. 76), 1314.
Jameson v. People (16 III. 357; 63
Am. Dec. 304), 54, 56, 70, 71, 91,
93.
Jamestown v. Chicago &c. R. Co.
(69 Wis. 648; 34 N. W. Rep.
728), 1090, 1530.
Jamison v. Springfield (58 Mo. 324),
704.
Janesville v. Carpenter (77 Wis. 303 ;
46 N. W. Rep. 128), 357.
Janesville v. Markoe (18 Wis. 350),
113,114.'
Janesville v. Milwaukee <S?c. R. Co.
(7 Wis. 484), 541, 542, 658.
Jansen v. Atchison (16 Kan, 358),
1198, 1441.
Jardine v. New York (11 Daly, 116),
1107.
Jarrolt v. Moberly (108 U. S. 580),
944.
Jarvis v. Dean (3 Bing. 447), 571,
1406.
Jasper County v. Ballou (103 U. S.
745), 940, 959, 960, 961.
Jasper County v. Osborn (59 Iowa,
208), 1000.
Jay's Case (1 Vent. 302), 204.
Jeffers v. Lawrence (43 Iowa, 505),
1383.
Jefferson v. Hartley (Ga., 9 S. E.
Rep. 174), 336.
Jefferson u Hazeur (7 La. Ann. 183),
1295.
Jefferson v. Johnson (18 N. J.- Law,
382), 824.
Jefferson v. Whipple (71 Mo. 519),
1395.
Jefferson City v. Bdwards (87 Mo.
App. 617). 1587.
Jefferson City Gas Light Co. v. City
of New Orleans (41 La. Ann. 91),
1314.
Jefferson County v. Arrighi (54 Miss,
668), 689.
TABLE OF GASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol.
Jefferson County v. Cowan (54 Mo.
234), 1174.
Jefferson County v, Slagle(66 Pa. St.
202), 285.
Jefferson School Tp. v. Litton (116
Ind. 467; 19 N. E. Eep. 323), 815,
875, 1347.
Jefferson Village v. Chapman (127
111. 438), 1443, 1469, 1478, 1479.
JeffersDnville v. Myers (Ind. App.,
28 N. E. Eep. 999), 1150, 1593.
Jeffersonville v. Patterson (26 Ind.
16). 958,
Jefler.sonville v. Weems (5 Ind. 547),
1366.
Jeffersonville &o. R. Co. v, Hen-
dricks (41 Ind. 48), 144.
Jeffiiest). Lawrence (42 Iowa, 498),
93'^ 945 1392
Jetts u.' York (10 Cush. 392), 215.
Jelliff V. Citv of Newark (48 N. J.
Law, 101), 1161.
Jelly V. Dills (27 West Va. 267),
1240.
Jenal v. Green Island Draining Co.
(12 Neb. 163), 687.
Jenkins v. Andover (103 Mass. 94),
9S0.
Jenkins v. Cheyenne (1 Wy. Ter.
287), 538.
Jenkins v. Lemonds (29 Ind. 294),
331. •
Jenkins v. School Dist. (89 Me. 220),
296.
Jenkins v. Stetter (118 Ind. 275; 20
N. E. Rep. 788), 1083, 1171.
Jenkins r. Thomasville (35 Ga. 145),
517. 12.')6.
Jenkins v. Waldron (11 Johns. 114),
318.
Jenks ('. Osceola Tp. (45 Iowa, 200),
1597.
Jenne v. Sutton (43 N. J. Law, 257),
763.
Jenner v. Jolifle (9 Johns. 881), 319.
Jennins;s v. Le Breton (80 Cal. 8),
1186.
Jennings' Lessee v. Wood (20 Ohio,
261), 225.
Jensen v. Supervisors (47 Wis. 298),
1889. • .
Jericho t'. Town of Underhill (Vt.,
•3t Atl. Rep. 251), 991.
.Ternee v. Monmouth (53 N, J. Law,
55H), 1425.
Jerome v. Ross (7 Johns. Ch. 315),
670.
Jersey City v. Jers^ City &c. E. Co.
(20 N. J, Eq..3b0)i 94, 109.
Jersey Gity v. . Kiernan (50 N. J.
Law, 246), 787.
Jeiisey City v. O'Callagban (41 N. J.
Law, 349;, 242.
I, pp. 1-788; VoL H, pp. 789-1685.]
Jersey City v. Quaife (3 Dutch.
(N. J.) 203), 181.
Jersey City v. State (30 N. J. Law,
521), 303.
Jersey City &c. E. Co. v. Jersey City
& H. R. Co. (20 N. J. Eq. 69),
590.
Jester v. Overseers (11 Pa. St. 540),
999.
Jessup V. United States (106 IT. S.
147), 312.
Jewell V. Mills (3 Bush (Ky.), 73),
•336.
Jewett V. City of New Haven (38
Conn. 368 ; 9 Am. Rep. 883), 264,
775, 1038.
Jewhurst v. Syracuse (108 N. Y. 303),
1450.
Jex V. Mayor (103 N. Y. 536), 1133,
1184.
Jimison v. Adams Co. (130 III. 558),
1322.
Jobson V. Bridges (84 Va. 298 ; 5 S.
E. Rep. 539). 163, 170.
John I', Cincinnati R. Co. (85 Ind.
639), 933.
John anrl Cherry Streets, In re (19
Wend. 659), 634.
Johns V. County Comm'rs (Fla., 10
So. Rep. 96), 906.
Johns V. State (Ind., 30 N. E. Rep.
640), 1395.
Johnson v. Americus (46 G^. 80),
1261.
Johnson v. Campbell (49 111. 316),
619.
Johnson v. Campbell (39 Tex. 88),
910.
Johnson v. City of Kansas (78 Mo.
661; 6 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
197), 1393.
Johnson v. City of Parkersburg (16
West Va. 402;, 1139.
Johnson v. City of Winfield (Kan.,
39 Pac. Rep. 559), 543.
Johnson v. Comm'rs (7 Dana, 388),
1359.
Johnson v. District (67 Mo. 202),
1091.
Johnson v. District of Columbia (118
U. S. 19), 777.
Johnson v. Drummond (20 Gratt.
417), 1853.
Johnson v. Dunn (134 Mass, 622),
339.
Johnson v. Harney (84 N. Y. 363),
814.
Johnson v, Lewis (13 Conn. 303),
1036.
Johnson v. Lexington (14 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 648), 1352. 1354.
Johnson v. Macon (63 Ga. 645), 1383.
Johnson v. Maan (77 Va. 265^ 815.
TABLE OF OASES.
C^iii
■ {The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vtfl. n, pp. 789-1805.]
JoboBon V. Milwaukee (40 Wis. SlU),
556.
Johnson ». Oregon (8 Oregon, 327),
1352.
Johnson v. Philadelphia (60 Pa. St.
445), 524, 1234.
Johnson v. Bainldn (70 N. C. 550),
670.
Johnson v. Santa Clara County (38
Cal. 545), 634.'
Johnson t). SeholDl Dist. (67 Mo. 321),
710.
Johnson V. Simonton (43 Cal. 243),
1018.
Johnson v. Smith (64 Ind. 275), 464.
Johnson v. Stark County (24 111. 75),
619, 955.
Johnson v. State (116 Ind. 374; 19
N. E. Bep. 298), 1126.
Johnson v. Taylor (68 Miss. 330),
1267, 1269.
Johnson v. Wakulla County (Fla., 9
So. Rep. 690), 882.
Johnson v. Wilson (2 N. H. 202),
1091.
Johnson County v. January (94 TJ. S.
202), 947.
Johnson County Comm'rs v. Thayer
(94 U. S. 631), 930, 947.
Johnson School Tp. v. Citizens' Bank
(81 Ind. pl'5), 815, 821.
Johnston v. District of Columbia (1
MaOkey, 427.>,1136,
Johnston v. District of Columbia (118
U. S. 19), 263.
Johnston v. Macon (62 Ga. 645), 1370.
Johnston v. Moorman (80 Va. 131),
218, 338.
Johnston v. People's Natural Gas
Co. (Pa., 5 Cent. Rep. 564), 6W6j
Johnston v. Railroad Co. (10 R. I.
365), 591.
Johnston v. Wilson & N. H. 202),
200.
Joint Free High School Dist. t». Town
of Green Grove (77 Wis. 532 ; 46
N. W. Rep. 895), 801.
Joliet V. Verby (35 111. 58), 1449.
Jonas V. Cincinnati (18 Ohio St. 318),
1164, 1384.
Jones V. Andorer (9 Pick. 146), 296.
Jones V. BaHgor Bm'otigh (144 Pa. St.
638), 758, 1149, 1457.
Jones V. Blanton (6 Ired. E(J. 120),
330.
Jones V. Board of Education (88
Mich. 371), 1329.
Jones V. Boston (104 Mass. 461), 1163,
1188, 1466.
Jones V. Carmarthen (8 M. & W.
605), 180.
Jones V. City of Albany (17 N. Y.
Supl. 332), 886.
Jones V. Davis (35 Wis. 376), 1413'.
Jones V. Gridley (2 Kan. 584), ^5.
Jones V. Hays (3 Ired. Eq. 5021 380.
Jones V. Housatonic B. Co. (107 Mass.
261), 1467.
Jones V. Insurance Co. (2 Daly (N.
Y.), 307). 488.
Jones V. Kolb (56 Wis. 863), 1383.
Jones V. Le Tombe (3 Dallas, 384),
812.
Jones V. Loving (55 Miss. 109), 215.
Jones t>. McAlpine |64 Ala. 511), 526.
Jones V. Mayor &c. (25 Ga. 610), 933.
Jones v. New Haven (34 Conn. 1),
7-70, 1448.
Jones Vi New Orleans &c. R. Co. (70
Ala. 227), 699.
Jones V. New York (37 Hun, 513),
1184.
Jones V. New York (9 N. Y. St. Rep.
247), 751.
Jones V. Pendleton County Court
(Ky., 19 S. W. Rep. 740), 799,
Jones V. People (19 111. App. 300),
336.
Jones V. Sanford (66 Me. 585), 347;
Jones V. Sherwood (37 X!onn. 466),
1602.
Jones V. Town of Lind (79 Wis. 64;
48 N. W. Rep 247), 975.
Jones V. Troy (4 N. Y. Supl. 733),
1461.
Jones V. Williams (11 M. & W. 176),
1048.
Jonesboro v. Cairo <S;o. R. Co. (tlO
U. S. 192), 941.
Jonesboro Co; v. Baldwin (57 Ind.
86),. 1500,
Jonesborough- v. McKee (2 Terg.
167), 532.
Jordan v. Hanson (49 N. H. 199),
338.
Jordan v. Osceola County (59 Iowa,
38tf), 797.
Jordan v. School Dist. (38 Me. 164),
364. 373, 1268.
Jordan Village v. Otis (37 Barb. 50),
1414.
Joseph V. Hamilton (43 Mo. 283).
697.
: Joseph V. O'Donoghue (31 Mo. 345),
1169.
Joslyn u. Detroit (74 Mich. 458; 42
pr. W. Rep. 50), 1463.
Josselyn v. Stone (28 Miss. 753), 1585.
Joyes V. Shadburn (Ky., 13 S. W,
Rep. 361), 1186.
Joyner v. School Dist. (3 Cnsh. 567),
24'3
Judd i\ Fox Lake (88 tVis. 583), 647.
Judd V. Thompson (185 Mass. 553).
371.
oxliv
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Jndevine v. Hardwick (49 Vt. 180),
831.
Judge V. City of Meriden (38 Conn.
90),.775, 1137.
Judge of Probate v, Webster (46
N. H. 518), 992.
Judkins v. Hill (50 N. H. 140), 162.
Judson V. Beardon (16 Minn. 431),
512.
Judson V. Smith (104 Mo. 61 ; IS S.
W. Rep. 956), 860.
Juker V. Commonwealth (20 Pa. St.
484), 378.
Julia Bide. Ass'n v. Bell Tel. Co. (88
Mo. 258). 678.
Julienne v. Mayor &c. (Miss., 10 So.
Eep. 43), 1604.
Junction City v. Webb (44 Kan. 71),
529.
Jung V. Stevens Point (74 Wis. 547),
1493.
Jusseii V. Board of Comm'rs (95 Ind.
567), 277, 936.
Justice V. Logansport (101 Ind. 326;
9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Gas. 456),
1395.
Justices V. Smith (2 J. J. Marsh.
(Ky.) 472), 313.
K.
Eahn v. Board of Supervisors &c.
(79 Cal. 388; 21 Pac. Rep. 849;
25 Pac. Rep. 403). 1067, 1068.
Kaine v. Harty (4 Mo. App. 357),
'526.
Kaiser v. St. Paul &c. R. Co. (22
Minn. l49), 679, 1434.
Kalbrier v. Leonard (34 Ind. 497),
1365.
Kame v. Commonwealth (101 Pa. St.
490), 1345.
Kamp V. People (111., 30 N. E. Rep.
680), 1555.
Kane v. City of Fond du Lao (40
Wis. 495), 657, 658.
Kane D. Footh (70 III. 587), 1532.
Kane u. Mayor &o, of Baltimore (15
Md. 240), 686.
Kane v. N. Y. El. R. Co. (125 N. Y.
164), 1433.
Kane v. Parker (4 Wis. 123), 438.
Kane v. School District (Iowa, 47 N.
W. Rep. 1076), 840.
Kanev.-'Eroy (IN. Y. Snpl. ,536),
1463.
Kankakee County v. Mtaa L. Ins.
Co. (106 U. S. 668), 952.
Kanouse v. Town of Lexington (12
111. App. 318), 533.
Kansas v. Collins (31 Kan. 434),
1235.
Kansas City v. Baird (98 Mo. 215 ; 11
S. W. Rep. 243), 1135, 1415.
Kansas City v. Clark (68 Mo. 688),
526, 604.
Kansas City i'. Corrigan (86 Mo. 67),
488, 511.
Kansas City v. Flanagan (69 Mo. 22),
540.
Kansas City, v. McAleer (31 Mo. App.
433). 1052.
Kansas Cftv v. O'Connell (99 Mo.
357; 12"S. W.Tlep. 791); 1095.
Kafisas City v. Payne (71 Mo. 159),
1395.
Kansas City v. Vindquest (36 Mo.
App. 584), 1283.
Kansas City &c. R. v. Albricht (33
Kan. 211). 1386.-
Kansas City &c. R. Co. v. Alderman
(47, Mo. 349), 939, 944.
Kansas City &c. R. Co. v. Campbell
(62 Mo. 585). 692.
Kansas City &c. R." Co. v. Rich
Township (45 Kan. 275; 25 Pac.
Rep. 59D), 935. 937.
Kansas City Grading Co. v. Holden
(107 Mo. 305), 758.
Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Comm'rs of
Wyandotte County (16 Kan. 587),
24t, 245.
Karwisch v. Atlanta (44 6a. 204),
1244.
Katzenberget v. Aberdeen (16 Fed.
Rep. 745). 932.
Katzenberger v. Aberdeen (121 U. S.
172; 7 S. Ct. Rep, 947), 639, 941.
942.
Katzenberger v. Lawo (90 Tenn.
235; 16 S. W. Rep. 611), 1210.
Kavanagh v. Mobile &c. R. Co. (78
Ga. 271), 590.
Kaveny v. Troy (108 K Y. 571), 1458,
1459, 1460, 1462.
Kayser v. Bremen (16 Mo. 88), 70.
Keane v. Cushing (15 Mo. App. 96),
499.
Keane v. Village of Waterford (2
N. Y, Supl. 183). 1459.
Kearney, In re (7 Wheat. 38), 205.
Kearney v. Andrews (10 N. J. Eq.
70), 314.
Kearney v. Covington (4 Met, (Ky.)
339), 1600.
Kearney v. Thoemanson (25 Neb.
147; 41 N. W. Rep. 115), 1098.
Kearney County v. Tuttle (16 Neb.
34), 859.
Keasy v. Louisville (4 Dana (Ky,),
154), 677.
Keating v. Cincinnati (38 Ohio St.
141), 677, 1456.
Keating v. City of Kansas (84 Mo.
419), 642, 710.
TABLE OF OASES.
cxlv
CThe references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Keefer v. Schwartz (47 Pa. St. 509),
994.
Keeler v. Frost (22 Barb. 400), 296.
Keeler v. Milledge (24 N. J. Law,
142), 539, 540. 1264.
Keenan v. Cook (12 R. I. 52). 218.
Keeney v. Jersey City (47 N. J. Law,
449; il Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
309), 259, 844.
Keese v. City of Denver (10 Colo.
112;15Pao. Rep. 825). 1185, 1190.
Kehn v. Tiie State (93 N. Y. 291),
179.
Kehrer v. Richmond (81 Va. 745),
1456.
Kehrig v. Peters (41 Mich. 475), 1357.
Keiffer v. Ehler 08 Pa. St. 386). 964.
Keil V. City of St. Paul (Minn., 50
N. W. Rep. 83), 1129.
Keith V. Bingham (100 Mo. 300),
1170.
Keith V. City of Philadelphia (126
Pa. St. 575), 1186.
Keith V. Eastou (2 Allen, 552), 1467,
1471.
Keith V. Howard (24 Pick. 292), 219.
Keithsburg v. Frick (34 111. 405), 941.
Kellar v. Savage (17 Me. 444), 352,
357j 370.
Keller v. Leavenworth County (6
Kan. 510), 891.
Keller v. State (II Md. 525), 1388.
Keller v. Wilson (Ky., 14 S. W. Rep.
332). 564, 719.
Kelley v. City of Madison (43 Wis.
638), 783, 893.
Kelley v. Cleveland (34 Ohio St. 468),
1169.
Kelley v. Columbus (41 Ohio St. 268),
1451.
Kelley i'. Kennard (60 N. H. 1), 492,
1076.
Kelley v. Mayor &c. of Brooklyn (4
Hill, 263), 260, 937.
Kelley v. Milan (21 Fed. Rep. 842),
549 93^
KeXiev'v. Milan (127 U. S. 139; 8
S. Ct. Rep. 1101), 563, 633. 933,
925, 931, 934, 944, 1372, 1378.
Kelley IJ. Pittsburg (85 Pa. St. 170;
104 U. 8. 78), 12, 1010, 1365, 1367,
1387, 1565.
Kellinger v. Forty-second Street &o.
R. Co. (50 N. Y. 206). 1433.
Kellogg V. Corrico (47 Mo. 157), 506.
Kellogg V. Ely (15 Ohio St. 64), 1399,
1574.
Kellogg V. Malin (50 Mo. 496), 671.
Kellogg V. Northampton (4 Gray; 65),
1451.
Kelly 17. Baltimore (53 Md. 134). 1583.
Kelly V. Fond du Lac (31 Wis. 179),
1451,
Kelly V. Gahn (112 III. 23), 160.
Kelly V. Harrison (2 Johns. Cas. 39),
138.
Kelly V. McCormick (38 N. Y. 318),
953
Kellv V. Mayor &c. (11 N. Y. 433),
1444.
Kelly V. Meeks (87 Mo. 396), 408, 411,
Kelly V. Moore (51 Ala. 864), 839.
Kelly V. Multnomah County (18
Oregon, 356; 23 Pan. Rep. 1110),
1010.
Kelly V. New York &c. R. Co. (9 N.
Y. Supl. 90), 1492.
Kelly V. Owen (7 Wall. 496\ 138.
Kelly V. Railroad Co. (28 Minn. 98),
1486.
Kelly V. Toronto (23 U. C. Q. B. 425),
1244.
Kelly Township v. Union Township
(5 West Va. 535), 977.
Kelsey v. King (33 Barb. 410; 1
Trans, App. 137), 683, 1413.
Kelso V. Boston (120 Mass. 297), 1576.
Kemp V. Neville (10 C. B. (N. S.)523;
31 L. J. C. P. 158; 7 Jur. (N. S.)
913; 4 L. ,T. 640; 10 W. R. 6),
218.
Kemper V. Campbell (Kan,, 26 Pac.
Rep. 78). 1080.
Kemper v. King (11 Mo. App. 116),
1124, 1164.
Kemper v. Louisville (14 Bush, 87),
1263.
Kempner v. Galveston County (73
Tex. 216; 11 S. W. Rep. 188), 859.
Kendall v. Camden (47 N. J. Law,
117), 1559.
Kendall v. City of Albia (73 Iowa,
341 ; 34 N. W. Rep. 833), 1490,
1495.
Kendall v. Post (8 Oregon, 161), 696.
Kendall v. Powers (4 Met. 553), 339.
Kendall v. Stokes (3 How. 98). 227.
Kendrick v. Farquhar (8 Ohio, 189),
1166.
Kenfield v. Irwin (52 Cal. 104), 375.
Kenicott v. Jefferson County (16
Wall. 452), 947.
Kenicott v. Wayne County (16 Wall.
453), 933.
Kennard v. Cass County (8 Dill. 148),
1591.
Kennedy v. Board &c. (83 Cal. 483;
22 Pac. Rep. 1043), 1343, 1553.
Kennedy v. Board of Health (2 Pd.
St. 366), 1049.
Kennedy v. City of Troy (14 Hun,
308), 1568.
Kennedy v. Citv of Troy (77 N. Y,
493), 1122. 1189, 1575.
Kennedy v. Corporation of Washing-
ton (3 Cr. C. C. 595), 580.
e?lvi
TABLE OF 0ASI;B.
[The references ore to pages: Vol.
Kennedy v. Covington (8 Dana, 50),
624.
Kennedy v. Jones (11 Ala. 6a), 1143,
Kennedy v. Lawrence (128 Mass. 318),
1481.
Kennedy v. Le Van (33 Minn. 513),
1406.
Kennedy v. New York (73 N. Y. 365),
1471.
Kennedy v. Newman (1 Sandf. (N.
Y.) 187), 1366.
Kennedy?'. Phelps (10 La. Ann. 337),
605, 1031, 1034. 1054.
Kennedy v. Sacramento (19 Fed. Rep.
580; 5 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
553), 95, 109, 1376.
Kennedy v. Snowden (1 MoMul. 333),
1223'.
Kennett Square v.. Entriken (7 Fa.
Co. Ct. Rep. 469), 1186.
Kenney v. Gfeorgen (36 Minn. 190),
201.
Kenosha u. Lamson (9 Wall. 477), 909.
Kensington v. Glenat (1 Phila. 393),
531.
Kent V. Bingham (100 Mo. 300; 13
S. W. Rep. 683), 1134.
Kent V. Town of Lincoln (32 Vt. 591),
1477.
Kentucky R. R. T^x Cases (115 U. S.
331), 147, 558.
Kenworthy v. Ironton (41 Wis.
647), 9.
Keokuk V. District of Keokuk (58
Iowa, 352; 5 N. W. Rep. 503),
1201, 1441.
Keokuk v. Scroggs (30 Iowa, 447),
1054, 1247.
Keokuk &c. Co. v. Qiaincy (81 111.
423), 534.
Keough V. Board &c. (Mass., 31 N.
E. Rep. 887), 1560.
Kepner v. Commonwealth (40 Fa.
St. 124), 501.
Kernochan v. N. Y. El. R. Go. (138
N. Y. 559), 1438.
Kerns v. Schoonmaker (4 Ohio, 331),
339.
Kerr v. Hitt (75 III. 51), 506.
Kerr v. Jones (19 Ind. 351), 189.
Kerr v. i^eaver (11 Alien, 151), 1604.
Kerr v. Trego (47 Pa. St. 292), 288,
289
Kesler v. Smith (66 N. G. 154), 529.
Ketcham v. Wagner (Mich., 51 N.
W. Rep. 281), 444,
Ketchum v.. Buffalo (14 ?J. Y. 356),
576, 654.
Ketchum v. Duncan (9G U. S. 659),
958.
Kettering v. Jacksonville (50 111. 39),
70, 535, 1558.
I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Kewanee v. Depew (80 III. 119),
1497.
Keyes v. Marcellus Village (50 Mich.
439), 1438, 1451.
Keyes v. Westford (17 Pick. 273),
396.
Keys V. Marin' Goumty (43 Cal. 253),
705.
Keyser v. McKissan (3 Rawle (Pa.),
130), 200.
Keyser v. School Dist. (35 N. H. 477),
396, 640.
Khron v. Brock (144 Mass. 516), 767.
Ki»urg, Ux parte (10 Mo. App. 442),
539, 544.
Kick V. Merry (33 Mo. 7^). 667. .
Kidder v. Gonstaible (7 Gray, 104),
1455.
Kidder v. Peoria (29 111. 77). 690.
Kieffer v. Surametstown (Pa., 17 L.
R. An, ^17), 1455.
Kiernan v. Jersey City (50 N. J. Law,
246), 1099.
Kiley v. Cramer (51 Mo. 541), 1272.
Kiley v. Kansas City (87 Mo. 103),
9, 365, 776, 1474.
Kilgpre v. Commonwealth (94 Fa.
St. 495), 112.
Kilgour V. Thompson (103 U. S. 168),
305.
Kilham v. Ward (3 Mass. 236), 138.
Killion V. Van Patten (43 Kan. 395 ;
23 Pae. Rep. 383), 180.
Kilpatrick v. Smith (77 Va. 347), 315.
Kimball v. Alcorn (45 Miss. 151), 300.
Kimball v. Bank (1 Bradw. 209),
1579.
Kimball v. Board of Supervisors (46
Cat. 19); 69,6.
Kimball v. Boston (1 Allen, 417), 755.
Kimball v. Boraan (74 Mieh, 699;
4S N. W. Rep. 167), 1195.
Kimball v. Lamprey (19 N. H. 215),
1375.
KimibgrVl v,. Marshall (44 N. H. 465),
27i*, 379, 807', 860.
Kiml>9ll V. Merchants' &c. Go. (89
111. 611), 1573.
Kimlfail v. Rpsendale (42 Wis. 407 ;
24 Am, Rep. 421), 60, 941.
Kimball v. School Dist. (28 Vt. 8),
1330.
Kimble v. City of Peoria (111.. 29 N.
E. Rep. 733), 502, 1074, 1175.
Kimmisl) v. Ball (129 U. S. 217), 144.
Kincaid's Appeal (66 Pa. St. 411 ; 5
Am, Rep. 377), 1026.
Kincaid v. Hardin County (53 Iowa,
430; 3B Am. Hep. 836), 10, 149,
745, 746, 1015.
Kiiadinger v. Saginaw (59 Mich. 855),
1261.
King V. Beeston (3 Term R. 593), 396.
TABLE OF OASES,
cxlvii
[Tlie references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1t788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1603.]
King V. Belkinger (4 Term R. 810),
494.
King V. Buller (8 East, 889), 307.
King V. City of Buffalo (10 N. Y.
Supl. 564), 177.
King V. City of Chicago (111 111. 63),
B77.
Kingu. Comtn'rs (8 Barn. & C. 355),
757.
King V. Davenport (98 111. 305), 669,
1846.
King V. Dixon (3 M. & S. 11), 1349.
King V. Duryea (45 N. J. Liw, 258),
1167.
King V. Hardwick (11 East, 577),
153.
King V. Hawkins (10 East, 211), 386.
King V. Inhabitants of Bilton (1
East, 13). 349.
King V. Inhabitants of Essex (4
Term R. 591), 603.
King V. Ireland (68 Tex. 682), 313.
King V. Jacksonville (3 111. 306), 530.
King V. Leake (i B. & Ad. 469), 1406.
King I). Lizzard (9 Barn. & C. 418),
189.
King V. McDrew (31 111. 418), 1596.
King V. Madison (17 Ind. 48), 1359.
King V. Mahaska County (75 Iowa,
339, 629, 643.
King V. Market St. Comm'rs(4 Barn.
& Ad, 335), 697.
King V. Mayor of Colchester (2
Durnf. & East. 259), 155S.
King ti. Miller (6 Term R. 278). 307.
King V. Minneapolis Stc. R. Co. (32
Minn. 334), 699, 700, 701.
King V. Nichols (16 Ohio St 80), 320.
King V. Oshkosh (75 Wis. 517), 781,
1463.
King V. Parry (14 East, 540), 886.
King V. Portland (2 Or. 14fi). 1187.
King V. Railway Co. (38 Minn. 224;
20 N. W. Rep. 135). 1151.
King v. Richardson (1 Burr. 517),
204.
King V. Russell (6 East, 427), 1464.
King V. Theodorick (8 East, 543),
348.
King V. Utah See. R. Co. (Utah, 22
Pac. Rep. 158), 1395.
King V. Warley (6 Term R. 534), 349.
King V. Williams (2 Maule & Sel.
141), 306'.
King V. Wilson (11 Dill. C. C. 555),
1508.
King V. Woburn (10 East, 395), 1.53.
£ing County v. Collins (1 Wash.
m% 988.
Kinghorn v. Kingston (25 Up. Can.
Q. B. 130), 548.
Kingman &c.. Petitioner (153 Mass.
566; 27 N. E. Kep. 778), 1169.
Kingman v. City of Brockton (153
Mass. 355; 26 N. E. Rep. 998),
559, 869.
Kingman v. School Dist. (3 Cush.
425), 640, 1330.
Kings Go. Fire Ins. Co. v. Stevens
(101 N. Y. 411), 624.
Kingsbury r. Dedham (13 Allen (95
Mass.), 186), 1467, 1471.
Kingsbury v. School Dist. (13 Met. ,
99), 296, 347, 368, 1335.
Kingsland v. Mayor &c. (5 Daly,
448), 844.
Kingsland v. Mayor (1 10 N, Y. 569 ;
18 N. Y. St. Rep, 701), 614.
Kingsley v. Norris(60 N. H. 131), 713.
Kingsloi V. Towle (48 N, H. 57).
1418.
Kingston &c. Ins. Co. v. Clark (33
Barb. 196), 329.
Kinmundy v. Mahan (72 111. 462),
283, 530, .550, 1390. '
Kinneen v. Wells (144 Mass. 497; 59
Am. Rep. 105). 376, 377. 378.
Kinney v. City of Tekamah (Neb., 46
N. W. Rep. 83,5), 1199.
Kinney v. City of Troy (108 N. Y.
567), 1458.
Kinsella v. City of Auburn (7 N. Y.
Supl. 317), 1108, 1164.
Kinsey v. Pulaski County (3 Dill.
353), 793.
Kinsley v. City of Chicago (134 111.
359 , 599, 1240.
Kip V. City of Buffalo a N. Y. Supl.
685), 181, 193.
Kip V. Patterson (26 N. J. Law. 298),
106, 518, 539, 540, 1355. 1357.
Kirby v. Association (14 Gray, 249),
1201.
Kirby v. Boyleston (14 Gray, 352),
1231.
5irby v. Shaw (19 Pa. St. 258), 1362,
1366, 1869.
Kirchenor v. George C. Flint & Co.
(11 N. Y. Supl. 741), 1261.
Kirk V. Brazos Countv(73 Tex. 56;
11 S. W. Rep. 143)," 1003.
Kirk V. NoweU (1 Term Rep. 134),
534.
Kirkham v. Russell (73 Va. 956), 518.
Kirkpatrick v. Conim'rs (13 Vt. 310),
1123,
Kirkpatrick v. Taylor (118 Ind. 329),
706.
Kirkwood v. Newburg (45 Hun, 333),
1092.
Kirkwood v. Newburg (133 N. Y.
571), 1428.
Kirkwood v. Soto (Cal., 25 Pac. Rep.
48M), 179.
Kirtland v. Hotchkiss (100 U. S.
4'Jl), 145, 1351. 1358.
cxlviii
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Kisler v. Cameron (39 Ind. 488), 389.
Kissell V.' Anderson (73 Ind, 485),
1037.
Kistner v. Indianapolis (100 Ind.
210), 264.
Kitchell V. Board of Comm'rs (Ind.,
84 Ni E. Rep. 366), 555.
Kitson V. Ann Arbor (36 Mich. 335),
1356.
Kittingpr v. Monroe School Tp. (Ind.,
29 N. E. Rep. 931), 808, 1830.
Kittle V. Fremont (1 Neb. 338), 14S3.
Kittle V. Sherwin (11 Neb. 65), 1370.
Kittredge v. North- Brookfield (138
Mass. 286), 348, 367.
Kittredge v. Walden (40 Vt. 211),
368.
Klatt V. Milwaukee (53 Wis. 196),
746. 1474.
Klauder v. McGrath (35 Pa. St. 128;
78 Am. Dec. 329), ^09.
Klein v. City of Dallas (71 Tex. 380 ;
8 S. W. Rep. 90), 1478, 1489.
Klein v. New Orleans (99 U. S. 149).
1381. /
Klein v. St. Paul &o. Ry. Co. (30
Minn. 451), 706.
Klein v. Smith Supervisors (54 Miss.
354). 1376.
Klein v. Warren Supervisors (51
Miss. 878), 1376.
Klinsler v. Bickel (117 Pa. St. 336),
1055, 1346.
Klosterman v. Loos (58 Mo. 290), 314.
Knabe v. Seville (N. Y., N. Y. Law
Jour., Jan. 14. 1893), 1411.
Knapn v. Grant (37 Wis. 147), 941,
1389.
Knapp V. Hoboken (38 N. J. Law,
371), 1376.
Kneedler v. NorristOwn (100 Pa. St.
368), 518, 531, 535, 595, 1303,
1347.
Kneeland v. Water Co. (15 Wis. 454).
1353. ,
Knell V. City of Buffalo (7 N. Y.
Supl. 233), 1106, 1173, 1173.
Knight V. Ashland (61 Wis. 383), 423,
434, 439.
Knight V. Clark (48 N. J. Law, 23;
57 Am.iRep. 534), 213, 313, 314.
Knight V. Fairfield (70 Me. 500). 990.
Knight V, Kansas City &c. R. Co.
(70 Mo. 331), 543, 1266.
Knight V. Philadelphia (15 W. N. C.
307), 754.
Knight V. Woods (Ind., 28 N. E. Rep.
BOG), 1333.
Kniper v. Louisville (7 Bush, 599),
1356, 1357.
Knobloch v. Chicago &c^ St. Ry. Co.
(31 Minn. 403; 18 N. W. Rep.
106), 1311.
Knoop's Estate, In re (11 N. Y. Supl.
773), 13B0.
Knottman v. Ayer (3 Strob. (S. C.)
93), 315.
Knowles v. Davis (2 Allen, 61),
339
Knowles v. Seale (64 Cal. 377), 1138.
Knowles v. Yates (31 Cal. 93). 878.
Knowlton v. SupervisorB(9 Wis. 410),
1363, 13B9, 1572.
Knox V. Board &c. (45 Kan. 156),
1345.
Knox v: Peterson (31 Wis. 347), 565,
1171.
Knox Comm'rs v. Aspinwall (34
How. 384), 1878.
Knox County v. Ai-ms (33 111. 175),
1595.
Knox County v. Aspinwall (31 How.
.539), 945.
Knox County v. Davis (63 lU. 405),
380.
Knox County v. Johnson (Ind., 36
N. E. Rep. 148). 1323.
Knox County v. McCombs (19 Ohio
St. 330), 634.
Knox County Court v. United States
(109 U. S. 239), 1374, 1375.
Knoxville v. Bird (13 Lea (Tenn.),
131). 1055, 1346.
Knoxville i). Chicago &c. R. Co.
(Iowa, 50 N. W, Rep. 61), 530,
605.
Knupfie V, Knickerbocker Ice Co.
(84 N. Y. 488), 1301, 1441.
Kobs V. City of Minneapolis (33 Minn.
159), 1145.
Koehler v. Hill.(60 Iowa, 617), 159.
Koestenbader v. Price (41 Iowa, 204),
702.
Koester v, Ottumwa (34 Iowa, 43),
746.
Koetke v. Ringer (46 Minn. 259),
1363.
Kokorao V. Mahan (100 Ind. 343),
1095, 1111, 1129, 1153.
Kolb V. O'Bfien (86 111. 310), 319.
Konrad v. Rogers (70 Wis. 493; 36
N. W. Rep. 261», 663.
Koonce v. Comm'rs &c. (106 N. C.
192; 10 S. E. Rep. 1038). 1543.
Koontz V. Burgess &c. of Hancock
(64 Md. 134; 20 Atl. Rep. 1039),
390, 1391.
KoppikusD. Capitol Comm'rs (16 Cal. •
258), 870.
Korah v. Ottawa (33 111. 139; 83 Am.
Deo. 355), 539.
Kornburg v. Board of Comm'rs (10
Mont. 325; 35 Pao. Rep. 1041),
890.
Koshkonong v. Burton (104 U. S.
668), 958.
TABLE OF OASES.
cxlix
[The references are to pages: Vol.
Kosmak v. City of New York (53
Hun, 329; 6 N. Y. Supl. 453),,
1099.
Eountze v. Oraaha (5 Dill. 443), 1364.
Kraft V. Keokuk (14 Iowa, 86), 1577.
Kramer v. Cleveland &c. R. Co. (5
Ohio St. 140), 690, 696.
. Kranirath v. Albany (53 Hun, 206),
285.
Kramrath v. City of Albany (127
N. Y. 575), 845.
Kranz V. Baltimore (64 Md. 491), 777,
1137.
Kreidler v. State (24 Ohio St. 22)^
175.
Kreigh v. City of Chicago (86 111.
407), 1208.
Kress v. State (65 Ind. 106), 217, 338.
Krickle v. Commonwealth (1 B.
Mod. (Ky.) 261), 533.
Krippendorf v. Hyde (110 U. S. 276).
334.
Kroeger v. Pitoairn (101 Pa. St. 311;
47 Am. Eep. 718), 315.
Kroop V. Forman (:il Mich. 144), 683.
Kucheman v. Chicago &c. R. Co.
(46 Iowa, 360), 679.
Kuhn V. Board of Education (4 West
Va. 99), 110.
Kundingert). Saginaw (59 Mich. 355),
692.
Knnkle v. Town of Franklin (13
Minn. 127), 941.
Kunz V. Tracy (16 N. Y. St. Rep.
459), 781.
Kuhz V. Troy (104 N. Y. 344), 1444,
1463, 1474, 1475.
Kurtz V. Boylston Market Ass'n (14
Gray, 252). 1441. •
Kuschke v. City of St. Paul (Minn.,
47 N. W. Rep. 786). 1140.
Kyle V. Kyle (55 Ind. 387). 1420.
Kyle V. Malin (8 Ind. 34), 93, 1160,
1174, 1383.
Kynaston v. Shrewsbury (2 Str.
1051), 370.
L.
JJa Crosse City v. Town of Melrose
(22 Wis. 459), 1483.
Ladd V. City of 'East Portland (18
Oregon, 87; 23 Pao. Rep. 538),
500, 510.
Ladd V. Clements (4 Cush. 477), 343,
344.
Ladd V. Franklin (37 Conn. 62), 817.
Lade v. Shepherd (2 Str. 1004), 140B.
Ladue, In re (118 N. Y. 213), 1412.
Lafayette v. Cox (5 Ind. 38), 92, 932.
Lafayette v. Cummins (3 La. Ann.
673), 1369.
I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n. pp. 789-1605.] ,
La Fayette v. Fowler (34 Ind. 140),
1163, 1188, 1399.
Lafayette v. James (92 Ind. 240 ; 42
Am. Rep. 140), 321.
Lafayette v. Jenners (10 Ind. 70), 60.
La Fayette v. Larson (73 Ind. 367),
1222.
Lafayette v. Male Orphan Asylum
(4 La. Ann. 1), 1166.
Lafayette v. Schultz (44 Ind. 97), 703.
Lafayette v. State (29 Ind. 218), 375.
Lafayette v. Timberlake (S8 Ind.
.S30), 264, 744. 775. :
La Fayette v. Wortman (107 Ind. '
404; 8N. E. Rep. 277), 1153.
Lafayette &c. R. Co. v. Geiger (34
Ind. 185). 64, 67, 87, 932.
Lafayette &c. Ry. Co. v. Winslow
(66 111. 219), 699.
Lafayette City v. Blood (40 Ind. 62),
1484.
Lafon V. Dufroy (9 La. Ann. 350),
1263.
Lagare v. City of Chicago (111., 28
N. E. Rep. 934), 606.
Lahr v. Railroad Co. (104 N. Y. 268),
615.
Laird v. De Soto (33 Fed. Rep. 431),
419, 431, 474.
Lake v. City of Decatur (91 111. 600),
1074.
Lake v. Florida (18 Fla. 501), 60.
Lake v. Williamsburg (4 Denio, 520),
1160.
Lake &c. Water Co. v. Contra Costa
Co. (67 Cal. 659), 686.
Lake County v. Graham (130 TJ. S.
674), 835, 963.
Lake Countv v. Rollins (130 U. S.
663; 9 S."Ct. Rep. 651), 835,
Lake County Comm'rs v. State (34
Fla. 363; 4 So. Rep. 995), 440.
Lake Shore &c. Rv. Co v. Chicago
&c. R. Co. (97 111. 506), 591.
Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Cincinnati
&c. R. Co. (116 Ind. 578), 675,
690, 1420.
Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. City of
Chicago (56 111. 454), 1074.
Lake View v. Letz (44 III. 81), 520.
Lake View u. Tate (130 111. 247; 22
N. E. Rep. 791), 1210.
Laker v. Bi-ookline (13 Pick. 343),
330.
Lally V. Holland (1 Swan (Tenn.),
396), 22.'».
Lamar v. Board of Com m' is (Ind,,
30N. E. Rep. 912), IQll.
Lamb v. Burlington &c. R. Ca (39
Iowa, 333), 428, 1368.
Lamb v. Lane (6 Ohio St. 167), 696.
Lambar v. City of St. Louis (15 Mo.
610), 1436.
d
TABLE OF OASES.
pEhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. l-WSj Vol. U, pp. 789-1605.]
Lambert v. People (76 N. Y. 320)^
199.
Lambert v. Thornton (1 Ld. Ray In.
91), 487.
Lamborn v. Coram'rs of Dickinson
County (97 U. S, l&l). 241, 244,
245, 246.
Lament v. Hajght (44 How. Ft. 1),
381.
Lamm v. Chicago R. Co. (45 Minn.
71), 1422, 1433.
Lamm v. Port Deposit &e. Associa-
tion (49 Md. 283), 257.
Laramert v. Ledwell (62 Mo. 18S),
64.
Lammon v. Fenster (111 TJ. S, 17),
333.
La Moille Valley &c. R. Co. v. Fair-
field (51 Vt. 357), 932, 906.
Lamson v. Newburyport (14 Allen,
30), 990.
Lamcaater v. ClavtoH (86 Ky. 373),
1397.
Lancaster v. Fulton (J28 Pa. St. 481 ;
18 Atl. Rep. 384; 24 W. N. C.
401). 629.
Lancaster County Poor Directors v.
Hartman (9 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 177),
994, 999.
Land v. Allen (65 Miss. 455; 4 So.
Rep. 117). 907.
Land Co. v. Buffalo County (15 Neb.
605; 19 N. W. Rep. 711), 403.
Land Grant &c. Co. v. Coffey County
>(6Ean. 8«), 1434.
Land, Log; & Lumber Co. v. Brown
(73 Wis. 894; 40 N. W. Kep.482),
60, 560. 561, 1364. 1365.
Landers v. Staten Island R. Co. (53
N. Y. 450), 1254.
Landis v. Borough of Vineland
(N. J., 1893; 30 N. E. Rep. 357),
525.
Landgrove v. Plymouth (52 Vt. 503),
994.
Lands v. Richmond (31 Gratt, 571;
31 Am. Rep. 742), 1123.
Lane, Ex parte (76 Cal. 587), 541,
1264.
Lane v. Baker (13 Ohio, 237), 1845.
Lane v. Commonwealth (103 Pa. St.
481), 158.
Lane v. Cotton (1 Salk. 17), 219.
Lane v. ^mbden (73 Me. 354), 371,
947, 958.
Lane v. Oregon (7 Wall. 71), 532.
Lane v. Saginaw^ (53 Mich. 542), 693.
Lane v. Schomp (30 N. J. Eq. 82),
961.
Lane v. School Dist. (10 Met. 462),
259, 640.
Lane V. Woodbury Tp. (58 Iowa,
463), 14S5.
Lanfear v. Mayor (4 La. 97; 28 Am.
Dec 477), 587, 1048.
Langan v. Atchison (35 Kan. 318),
149S.
Langdon v. Castleton (30 Vt. 285),
183, 185, 711.
Lange v. Benedict (73 N. Y. 12), 318.
Langford v. Coram'rs (16 Minn. 875),
690.
Langford V. United States (101 U. S.
341), 740, 741.
Laoghorne v. Robinson (20 Gratt.
* 661), 933, 1109. 1383, 1399.
Lansfltois v. City of Oohoes (11 N. Y.
S^pl. 908; 58 Hun, 226)^ 1076,
1487.
Langsdale v. Bouton (12 Ind. 467),-
1370.
Langstafl v. Dalv(49 N. J. Law, 356),
906.
Langstpn V. South Carolina R. Co.
(3 S. C. 348), 9p9.
Lang.worthy v. Dubuque (16 Iowa,
271), 110, 1366, 1367.
Lanier v. Mayor (o9 Ga. 187), 1357.
Lanier v. Padgett (18 Fla. 848), 816.
Lanigan v. N. Y. Gas Light Co. (71
U. Y. 29), 1493.
Lanman v. Des Moines (29 Iowa, 310),
1578.
Lanning v. Carpenter (30 N, Y. 474),
70.
Lanpher v. Dewell (56 Iowa, 153),
Lansing v. Carroll (4 Cowen, 190),
1417.
Lansing v. Toolan (37 Mich. 152; 33
MieJh. 315), 1437.
Lansing v. Treasurer (1 Dill. 522),
1S6I.
Lansing v. Van Gorder (34 Mich.
456). 1600.
Lapham v. Rice ((55 N. Y. 472), 1438.
La Pointe v. O'Malley (47 Wis^ 333),
432.
Laramie County v. Albany County
(93 U. S. 807), 15, 109, 451, 1366,
138::?.
Lareau v. Davigfidn (5 Abb. Pr. (N.
S.) 367), 141.
Laredo v. Maedonell (62 Tex. 511).
640.
Laredo v. Nail© (65 Tex. 359), 1.597.
La»gen v. State (76 Tex. 333; 13 S.
W. Rep. 161), 99, 133, 471.
Larkin v.. Bostoa (138 Mass. 531),
1481.
Larkin v. Burlington &c. Ry. Co.
(Iowa. 1892; 53 N. W. Rep. 480),
526, 1266.
Larned v. AH«n (13 Mass. 395), 826.
Lamed v. Briscoe (62 Mich. 393),
339.
TABLE OF OASES.
cli
[The references are te pages: Vol I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
LaTned v. Burlington (4 Wall. 276),
794.
Larney v. Cleveland (34 Ohio St.
599), 539.
•Larsh u. Des Moines (74 Iowa, 513;
38 N. W. Eep. 884), 1490, 1494.
Lassen County v. Shinn (88 Cal. 510;
26 Pac. Eep. 365). 796.
Latham's Appeal (80 Pa. St. 465),
844.
Lathrop «. Bowen (121 Mass. 107),
1591.
Lathrop v. State (6 Blackf. (Ind.)
503), 1334.
Luthrop i>. Town of Sunderland (Vt.,
23 Atl. Rep. 619). 132:i.
Latta V. Williams (87 N. C. 126),
1357.
Lauenstein v. Fond du Lac (28 Wis.
3:^6), 283.
Launder v. City of Chicago (111 111.
291). 601.
Laundry License Case (13 Fed. Eep.
239), 1241.
Laundry License Cases (33 Fed.- Eep.
701), 1234.
Launtz v. People (113 111. 137; 55
Am. Eep. 405), 169, 294, 898, 299,
493.
Laurel v. Blue (1 Ind. App. 128 ; 27
N. E. Rep. 301), 1014.
Lavalle v. Song (96 111. 467). 1544.
Lavery v. Hannigan (30 J. & Sp.
463). 1464.
Law V. Fairfield (46 Vt. 435), 783.
Law V. Johnston (114 Ind. 439), 1180.
Law V. Lewis (46 Cal. 549), 1397.
Law V. People (87 111. 385). 790, 870.
Lawber v. Mayor &b. of N. Y. (5
Abb. Pr. 325). 13.
Lawhorne, Ex parte (18 Gratt. 85),
175.
Lawrence v. Bassett (5 Allen, 140),
1591.
Lawrence v. Boston (119 Mass. 136),
699.
Lawrence v. Fairhaven (5 Gray, 110),
7B0.
Lawrence v. Hanley (Mich., 47 N.
W. Eep. 753), 1532, 1523.
Lawrence v. Ingersoll (88 Tenn. 53;
12 S. W. Eep. 422; 6 L. R. A.
308; 17 Am. St. Eep. 870), 166,
168, 169, 175, 395, 299, 381, 494.
Lawrence v. Mt. Vernon (35 Me. 100),
1467.
Lawrence v. Trainer (136 111. 474; 87
N. E. Eep. 197), 277, 282, 800,
802, 1327, 1340.
Lawrence County v. Hudson (41
Ark. 494), 856.
Lawrence County v, Eailroad Co.
(81 Ky. 225), 15.
Lawson v. Milwaukee &c. E. Co. (30
Wis. 597), 937.
Lawton v. Commissioners (2 Caines
(N. Y.). 179). 1S68.
Lawton v. Erwin (9 Wend. 233), 310.
Lay V. Wissman (36 Iowa, 305), 957.
Laycock v. Baton Eouge (35 La. Ann.
475), 330, 643, 845.
Layton v. New Orleans (12 La. Ann.
515), 392, 404, 13«6, 1371, 1372.
Ld. Cromwell's Case (Dver, 383),
487.
Lea V. Hernandez (10 Tex. 137). 465.
Leach v. Cargill (60 Mo. 316), 1171.
Leach v. County of Wilson (('8 Tex.
353: 4S. W. Rep. 613), 918.
Leach v. People (12 J 111. 420), 199.
Lead villa u. Matthews (10 Colo. 135;
14 Pac. Rep. 112), 179.
Learned v. Burlington (3 Am. Law
Eeg. (N. S.)394), 15185.
Learoyd v. Godfrey (138 Mass. 315),
1500.
Leasure v. Mahoning Township (8
West. Eep. 551), 618.
Leath v. Summers (3 Ired. Law,
108), 694.
Leavenworth v. Casey (MoCahon's
Eep. 123), 1198.
Leavenworth v. Mills (6 Kan. 388),
1600.
Leavenworth v. Norton (1 Ean. 433),
1385.
Leavenworth v. Rankin (8 Ean.
357), 330, 254, 642.
Leavenworth &o. R. Co. v. Platte
County Court (43 Mo. 171), 936,
937.
Leaven worth. County v. Barnes (94
U. S. 70), 947.
Leavenworth County v. Brewer (9
Kan. 307), 186.
Leavenworth County v. Miller (7
Kan. 479), 933.
Leavenworth County Comm'rs v.
Sellew (99 U. S. 634), 881.
Leavitt v. Eastman (77 Me. 117),
1336.
Lebcher v. Comm'rs' of Custer
County (9 Mont. 315; 33 Pac.
Eep. 713), 634.
Le Claire v. Davenport (13 Iowa,
210), 106, 1244.
Le Clerq v. GallipoliS (7 Ohio, 354),
634.
Lecoul V. Police Jury (20 La. Ann.
308), 683, 1295.
Le Cooteulx v. City of Buffalo (33
N. Y. 333), 654.
Le Duo I'. Hastings {39 Minn. 110),
1353.
Ledvard v. Ten Eyck (36 Barb. 102),
1404.
clii
TABLE OF CASES.
prhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
Lee V. Minneapolis (23 Minn, 13),
677. 758, 1145.
Lee V. Munroe (7 Cranch. 366), 314.
Lee V. School Dist. (71 Mich. 371),
1348.
Lee V. Terapleton (13 Gray, 476),
245, 1577.
Lee V. Thomas (49 Mo. 112), 1363,
1364.
Lee V. Troy &c. Co. (98 N. Y. 115),
1504.
Lee V. Trustees &o. (7 Dana (Ky,), 28),
666.
Lee V. Trustees &c. (36 N. J. Eq.
581 ; 3 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
560), 1394.
Lee V. Village of Sandy Hill (40 N.
Y. 443), 774.
Lee V. Wallis (1 Kenyon, 295), 534,
535.
Lee V. Waring (3 Desauss. (S. C.) 57),
312.
Lee County v. Graham. (130 U. S.
674), 962.
Lee County v. Lackie (30 Ark. 764),
988.
Leech v. State (78 Ind. 570), 202.
Leeds v. City of Richmond (103 Ind.
372), 681, 708. 777, 1095.
Leeper v. South Bend (106 Ind. 375),
1365.
Lees V. Child (17 Mass. 351), 705.
Lees V. City of Richmond (31 Barb.
142), 1600.
Lefevre v. Detroit (2 Mich. 586),
1166.
Lehew v. Brummel (103 Mo. 546),
1845.
Lehigh Co. v. Hoffort (116 Pa. St.
' 119), 264, 775, 785.'
Lehigh County v. Kleckner (5 Watts
& a 181), 1589.
Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Chicago
(38 Fed. Rep. 415), 1128.
Lehigh Valley Ins. Co. v. Fuller (81
Pa. St. 396), 1588.
Lehigh Water Company's Appeal
(102 Pa. St. 515), 587, 1301.
Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton (121
tJ. S. 391), 567, 568.
Lehn v. City of San Francisco (66
Cal. 76), 1136.
Leigh V. State (69 Ala. 261). 389.
Leisse v. St. Louis &c. R. Co. (8 Mo.
App. 105; 5 Mo. App. 185; 72
Mo. 501), 698.
Leitch V. Wells (48 N. Y. 586), 964.
Leland v. Long Branch Coram'rs (42
N. J. Law, 875), 1064.
Leloup V. Port of Mobile (127 U. S.
640), 1240.
Lemmon v. People (20 N. Y. 562),
144.
Lemon v. Newton (184 Mass. 476),
778.
Lemont v. Singer &c. Co. (98 111. 94),
1568, 1571.
Le Neve v. Mile End (8 El. & Bl.
1054), 1403.
Lennington v. 31odg«tt (37 Vt. 310),
, 238, 349.
Lennon v. New York (55 N. Y. 361),
489.
Lenon v. Mayor (55 N. Y. 363), 1189.
Lent V. Tillson (72 Cal. 404). 1067.
Lent V. Tillson (140 U. S. 316; 11 S.
Ct. Eep. 835), 558.
Lenz V. Sherrott (36 Mich. 139), 528.
Leonard v. Brooklyn (71 N. Y. 498),
1381.
Leonard v. City of Canton (35 Miss.
189), 93, 244, 651, 1233.
Leonard v. Commonwealth (112 Pa.
St. 607), 376.
Leonard i;. Holyoke (138 Mass. 78),
1483.
Leonard v. Peacock (8 Nev. 157),
1576.
Le Roy v. New York (4 Johns. Ch.
352), 1571, 1572.
Lerov v. New York (20 Johns. 430),
1576.
Lescouzeve v. Ducatel (18 La. Ann.
470), 331.
Lester v. Baltimore (29 Md. 415),
1577.
Lethbridge v. Mayor &c. (15 N. Y.
Supl. 563), 183.
Levee Co. v. Hardin (37 Mo. 496),
1134, 1135.
Lever v. McGlachlin (38 Wis. 364),
390.
Levery v. Nickerson (130 Mass. 306),
765.
Levy V. Salt Lake City (Utah, 16
Pac. Rep. 598; 1 Pac. Rep. 160),
1099.
Levy «. State (6 Ind. 281), 1035.
Lewey's Islapd R. Co. v. Bolton (48
Me. 451), 350.
Lewis v. Atlanta (77 Ga. 756), 1468.
Lewis V. Bourbon County (12 Kan.
186), 936, 966.
Lewis V, Brown Township (109 U. S.
162),, 964.
Lewis V. City of New Britain (53
Con^. 568). 1070.
Lewis V. Comm'rs (16 Kan. 102). 389.
Lewis V. Jersey City (51 N. J. Law,
240), 1533.
Lewis V. Mayor &c. (9 C. B. (N. S.)
401), 658, 663.
Lewis V. N. Y. &c. R. Co. (133 N. Y.
496), 1414.
Lewis V. St. Lpuis (4 Mo. App. 563),
' 1061.
TABLE OF OASES.
cliii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Lewis V. Sherman County (3 Mc-
Crary, 464), 931.
Lewis V. Sherman County Comm'rs
(5 F^d. Rep. 269), 931.
Lewis V. Shreveport (3 Woods (C. C),
205), 941.
Lewis V. Shreveport (108 U. S. 283),
308, 230, 256, 563, 639, 933.
Lewis V. Spencer (7 West Va. 689j,
1571.
Lewis V. State (31 Ark. 209), 1255.
Lewis V. State of New Yorli (96 N. Y.
71), 740, 741, 743.
Lewiston v. Fairfield (47 Me. 481), 541.
Lewiston v. Proctor (23 111. 533), 539.
Lexington v. Butler (14 Wall. 282),
909, 947, 955, 957.
Lexington v. Headley (5 Bush, 508),
543, 1171, 1174, 1266. 1269.
Lexington v. Long (31 Mo. 369), 703,
1263.
Lexington v. Lull (30 Mo. 480), 1361.
Lexington v. Mulliken (7 Gray, 280).
1376.
Lexington &c. R. Co. v. Applegate
(8 Dana, 289), 1143.
Libby v. County of Anoka (38 Minn.
448; 38 N. W. Rep. 205), 856.
Libby v. West St. Paul (14 Minn.
278), 1576.
Liberty v. Hurd (74 Me. 101), 15T8.
Liberty i>. Palermo (79 Me. 473; 10
Atl. Rep. 455), 994.
Liberty Bell. The (23 Fed. Rep. 843),
1568, 1580,
Lieb V. Wheeling (7 West Va. 501),
1374.
Liebman v. City and County of San
Francisco (11 Sawyer, 147), 1067.
Liebstein v. Newark (34 N. J. Eq.
203), 1130.
Li£Bu V. Town of Beverly (145 Mass.
549; 14 N B. Rep. 787), 1483.
Ligare v. City of Chicago (111., 28
N. E. Rep. 934), 587.
Light V. State (14 Kan. 489), 375.
Lightborne v. Taxing District (4 Lea
(Tenn.), 219), 13.55.
Lilly V. Taylor (88 N. C. 489), 1371.
Lima v. Cemeterv Ass'n (43 Ohio St.
158), 1165.
Lincoln v. Beckman (33 Neb. 677; 37
N. W. Rep. 593), 1470.
Lincoln v. Boston (148 Mass. 578),
364, 756, 760.
Lincoln v. Cambria Iron Co. (103 U.
S. 513), 946.
Lincoln v. Chapin (133 Mass. 470),
208.
Lincoln v. Stockton (75 Me. 141), 331,
643, 713.
Lincoln v. Woodward (19 Neb. 359;
37 N. W. Rep. 110). 1174.
Lincoln v. Worcester (8 Cush. 51),
1576.
Lincoln City v. Smith (28 Neb. 763;
45 N. W. Rep. 41), 1451.
Lincoln County v. Oneida County
(Wis., 50 N. W, Rep. 344), 887.
Linden v. Supervisors &c. of Ala-
meda County (45 Cal. 6), 343,
1549, 1550.
Lindley I'. Polk County (Iowa, 50 N.
W. Rep. 975), 760, 1014.
Lindsay v. Chicago (115 111. 13Q),
513, 1369.
Lindsay v. Des Moines (68 Iowa,
368), 1451, 1488, 14S9.
Linehan v. Cambridge (109 Mass.
212), 657.
Linford v. Fitzrov (13 Q. B. 240),
218.
Lingo V. Burford (Mo., 18 S. W.
Rep. 1081), 1155.
Lingo V. Burford (Mo.,30S. W. Rep.
459), 1415.
Lining u Bentham (2 Bay(S. C), 1),
338.
Linnehan v. Lampson (126 Mass.
506), 1493.
Linneus v. Duskey (19 Mo. App. 30),
604.
Linneus v. Sidney (70 Me. 114), 990.
Linton v. Athens (53 Ga. 588), 1365.
Lionberger v. Rowse (43 Mo. 67),
13.59.
Lipes V. Hand (104 Ind. 503), 696,
703, 1066, 1098.
Lippelman v. Cincinnati (4 OhioCir.
Ct. 337), 1083.
Lippincott v. Pana (93 111. 24), 935,
944.
Lippman v. South Bend (84 Ind. 276),
541.
Lipps V. City (38 Pa. St. 503). 592.
Lisbon v. Clark (18 N. H. 234), 529.
Lisso V. Red River (89 La. Ann. 492),
610.
List V. Wheeling (7 West Va. 501),
832, 843.
Litchfield v. Ballou (114 U. S 190),
834.
Litchfield v. Londonderry (39 N. H.
247), 995.
Litchfield V. McComber (43 Barb.
288). 1181.
Litchfield v. Parker (64 N. H. 443;
14 Ath Rep. 735), 611.
Litchfield v. Polk County (18 Iowa,
70'. 648.
Litchfield v. Vernon (41 N. Y. 133),
1163, 1169, 1383.
Littpn V. School Tp. (127 Ind. 82; 26
N. E. Rep. 567), 815, 1330.
Little ?'. City of Madison (49 Wis.
605), 764.
cliv
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Little V. Merrill (10 Pick. 543), 227,
344, 1335.
Little V. Moore (4 N. J. Law. 74). 217.
Little Falls v. Bernards (44 N. J.
Law, 621), 978, 981.
Littlefield v. City of Norwich (40
Conn. 406), 1150.
Little Eock v. Board of Improve-
ments (42 Ark. 152), 281, 1124.
Little Bock v. Katzenstein (Ark., 12
S. W. Rep. 198), 1134.
Little Rock v. Merchants' Nat. Bank
(98 U. S. 3081, 928, 959.
Little Rock v. Parish (36 Ark. 166),
94. 110.
Little Rock v. Willis (37 Ark. 572), 9.
Littlewort v. Davis (50 Miss. 403),
1321.
Livermore v. Camden (31 N. J. Law,
508), 769, 787, 1435.
Liverpool Water- works v, Atkinson
(6 East, 507), 329.
Livingston v. Lynch (4 Johns. Ch.
696), 1028.
Livingston v. Mayor &c. of New
, York (8 Wend. 85), 1163. 1411.
Livingston v. Paducah (80 Ky. 656),
13T0.
Livingston v. Pippin (31 Ala. 542),
208. ■
Livingston v. Wilder (53 111. 203),
1389
Livingston v. Wolf (136 Pa. St. 519),
1303.
Livingston County v, Darlington
(101 U. S. 407), 1362.
, Livingston County v. Portsmouth
Bank (138 U. S. 102), 943.
Lloyd V. New York (5 N. Y. 369),
749.
League v. Taxing Dist. of B;:owns-
ville (35 Fed. Rep. 742), 475.
Loan Ass'n v. Topeka (20 Wall. 655),
559, 619, 840, 929, 930, 933, 1372,
1884, 1387, 1393.
Locke V. Central City (4 Colo. 65),
180, 183.
Locke V. Davison (111 III. 19), 791.
Locke V. Rochester (5 Lans. (N. Y.)
11), 303.
Locke V. United States (3 Mason,
446), 333.
Lockhart v. Railway Co. (139 Pa. St.
419), 678, 679. 680.
Lockhart v. Troy (48 Ala. 579), 290.
Lock wood V. St. Louis (34 Mo. 20),
1135, 1159, 1166, 1167, 1573.
Lodie V. Arnold (3 Salk. 458), 1048.
Loeb V. Attica (82 Ind. 175), 1241;
Loeb V. Railroad Co. (118 111. 208),
1456.
Loesnitz v. Seelinger (137 Ind. 432;
25 N. E. Rep. 1037), 1089, 1189.
Loewer v. Sedalia City (77 Mo. 431),
1502,
Loftin V. Citizens'- Bank (85 Ind. 346),
1369.
Logan . V. Pyne (43 Iowa, 524 ; 23
Am. Rep. 261), 568, 612, 637.
Logan County v, Lincoln (81 111. 156),
1024, 1394. "
Logansport v. Blakemore (17 Ind.
318), 945.
Logansport v. Crockett (64 Ind. 319),
301, 489, 711, 1269. 1272.
Ld|ansport v. Dick (70 Ind. 65), 1444.
Logansport D. Dvkeman (116 Ind. 15;
17 N. E. Rep. 587), 301, 708, 840,
971, 1126.
Logansport v. Humphrey (84 Ind.
467), 360, 565.
Logansport v. Justice (74 Ind. 378),
1479.
Logansport v. La Rose (99 Ind. 117;
8 Am. &i Eng. Corp. Cas. 512),
1400, 1524.
Logansport v. Legg (20 Ind. 315),
292, 294, 1173.
Logansport v. Pollard (50 Ind. 151),
1153.
Logansport v. Seybold (59 Ind. 235),
405, 1365.
Logansport v. Shirk (88 Ind. 563),
673.
Logansport v. Wright (25 Ind. 512),
1099, 1137.
Lohr V. Metropolitan R. Co. (104
N. Y. 368), 1433. "'
Loker v. Brookline (13 Pick. 343),
634, 642.
Lombar v. East Tawas (86 Mich. 14),
1486.
Lombard v. Stearns (4 Cush. 60), 686.
London v. Wilmington (78 N. C. 109),
1370.
Londonderry v. Andover (28 Vt. 416),
91, 93.
Londoner v. People (15 Colo. 557; 26
Pac. R6p. 135), 173.
Long V. Boone County (36 Iowa, 60),
644.
Long V. Charleston (103 Mass. 378),
1350.
Long V. City of Duluth (Minn., 51
N. W, Rep. 913), 565. 566.
Long V. Fuller (68 Pa. St. 170), 686.
Long V. Long (57 Iowa, 497), 219.
Long I'. Mayor &c. (81 N. Y. 425).
199.
Long V. Strauss (107 Ind. 94; 6 N. E.
Rep. 133; 7 N. E. Rep. 763), 815.
Long V. Taxing District (7 Lea, 134),
518.
Longan i'. Taylor (31 111. App. 363 ;
130 111. 413; 33 N. E. Rep. 745),
866, 1333.
TABLE OF CASKS.
clv
[The rrfereBoes«i« to pages: Vd. I, pp. 1-788^ Vol. D, pp. 789-1605.]
Longworthy v. City of Dubuque (13
Iowa, 86), 412.
liook V. Industry (51 Me. 37S), 1578.
Look Tin Sins, In re (31 Fed. Rep.
905; 17 Chicago Leg. News, 57),
137, 138, 141, 148.
Loorais V. Spence (1 Ohio St. 153),
933.
Loomis V. Wadhams (8 Gray, 538),
1591.
Leper V. State (Kan., S9 Pac. Rep.
687). 853.
Lopp V. Woodward (Ind., 37 N. E.
Rep. 575), 866.
Lord V. Anoka (36 Minn. 176; 30 N.
W. Rep. 550), 377.
Lord V. Meadville Water Co. (Pa.,
19 Atl. Rep. 1007; 36 W. N. C.
110). 1304.
Lord V. Oconto (47 Wis. 386), 283. 634.
Lord V. The Governor &c. (3 Phill.
740). 398.
Lord Bruce's Case (2 Str. 819), 203,
204.
Lorillard v. Monroe (13 Barb. 161),
1578.
Lorillard v. Town of Monroe (11 N.
Y. 393), 785, 1038.
Los Angeles v. Southern Pac. R. Co.
(R7 Cal. 433), 1358.
Los Angeles Gas Co. v. Toberman (61
Cal. 199), 259.
Loser v. Board of Managers (Mich.,
52 N. W. Rep. 956), 1008.
Lott V. City of Waycross (84 Ga. 681;
11 S. E. Rep. 558), 847.
Lott V. Morgan (41 Ala. 246), 1388.
Lott V. Ross (38 Ala. 156), 1160, 1171.
Lott V. Swezey (29 Barb. 87), 1185.
Lottman v. San Francisco (20 Cal.
96), 254, 63C. ,
Loud V. Charleston (99 Mass. 208),
1573.
Loughbridge v. Harris (43 Ga. 500),
682.
Loughran v. Citv of Des Moines (73
Iowa, 383; 34 N. W. Rep. 172),
1099.
Loughridge v. Huntington (66 Ind.
252), 506.
Louisiana v. Jumel (107 U. S. 711),
20.
Louisiana v. Mayor of New Orleans
(109 U. S. 285), 425. 756, 1374.
Louisiana v. Pilsbury (105 U. S. 291),
425, 1369.
Louisiana v. Taylor (105 U. S, 454),
943.
Louisiana v. Wood (103 U. S. 294),
237, 628, 954.
Louisiana Ice Mfg. Co. v. City of
New Orleans (La., 9 So. Rep.
31), 1084.
K
Louisville «. Anderson <79 Ey. 831;
3 Am, & Eng. Corp. Cas. 685),
1899.
Louisville v. Commonwealth (1 Duv.
295), 572, 1380, lS97.
Louisville v. Henning (1 Bush (Ky.),
381). 348, 1352, 1354.
Louisville v. Hyatt (2 B. Mon. 177),
1174.
Louisville v. Kean (18 Binn. 9), 1549.
Louisville v. McKegney (7 Bush
(Ky.), 651), 1368.
Louisville v. Murphy (Ky., 18 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 431), 659.
Louisville v. Nevin (10 Bush, 549;
19 Am. Rep. 78), 1165.
Louisville v. Pillsbury (105 U. S.
378), 537.
Louisville v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank
(104 U. S. 469), 944.
Louisville v. Webster (108 111. 414),
1247.
Louisville &c. R. Co, v. City of East
St. Louis (134 111. 656; 35 N. E.
Rep. 962), 1083, 1168.
Louisville <Sc. R. Co. v. Davidson
County Court (1 Sneed (Tenn.),
637). 381, 933, 935.
Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Dryden (39
Ind. 393), C96.
LouiBville &c. R. Co. v, Etzler
(Ind., 30 N. E. Rep. 33), 1413.
Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Louisville
(8 Bush, 415), 249, 487, 1034, 1219.
Louisville &o. R. Co. v. Shires (108
111. 617). 70, 92, 104, 1368, 1369.
Louisville Bridge Co. v. Louisville
(81 Ky. 189), 1850, l:d63.
Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas
Light Co. (115 U. S. 683; 6 S.
Ct." Rep. 265), 569.
Loute I'. Allegheny (3 Pittsb. R.
412), 903.
Lovcjov V. Whipple (18 Vt. 879),
9.i6.
Loveland-u. Detroit (41 Mich. 337),
006.
Lovell V. Seelback (45 Minn. 465; 48
N. W. Rep. 33), 984.
Levering v. School Dist. (64 N. H.
102), 1347.
Lovett V. Eastman (77 Me. 117), 1369.
Lovinsston v. Wilder (53 111. 302),
1382.
Lovington v. School Trustees (99 111.
664), 1333.
Low V. Cobb (3 Sneed, 18), 33S.
Low V. Marysville~(5 Cal. 214), 570.
Low V. People (87 III. 385), 849.
Lowber v. Mayor 6i,o. (5 Abb. Pr.
325), 4t)5.
Lowe V. City of Omaha (Neb., 60 N.
W. Rep. 760), 1151.
clti
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol.'ll, pp. 789-1605.]
Lowe V. Clinton (133 Mass. 526),
1483.
Lowe V. Commissioners (B. M.
Charlt. (Ga.) 302), 176, 1257,
1264.
Lowe V. Pettengill (12 N. H. 387),
1272.
Lowell V. Boston (111 Mass. 463; 15
Am. Rep. 39), 559, 930, 1384,
1393.
Lowell V. French (6 Gush. 223), 1181.
Lowell V. Hadley (8 Met. 194), 1123,
1189.
Lowell V. Newport (66 Me. 87), 995.
Lowell V. Parker (10 Met. 309), 332.
Lowell V. Railroad Co. (23 Pick. 24),
1200, 1443.
Lowell V. St. Paul (10 Minn. 290),
1181.
Lowell V. Simpson (10 Allen, 88),
489.
Lowell V. Wheelock (11 Cush. 391),
1170, 1268.
Lowell Savings Bank v. Winchester
(8 Allen, 109), 207.
Lower v. Wallick (35 Ind. 68), 532.
Lower Augusta v. Selinsgrove (64
Pa.. St. 166), 977.
Lower Augusta Tp. v. Northumber-
land County (37 Pa. St. 143),
, 994.
Lowery v. Delphi City (55 Ind. 250 ;
74 Ind. 520), 1427.
Lowndes County v. Hunter (49 Ala.
J 511), 1585.
Lowry v. Polk County (51 Iowa, 50 ;
49 N. W. Rep. 1049), 822, 853.
Lozier v. Newark (48 N. J. Law,
452), 513.
Luhurg's Appeal (Pa., 17 Atl. Rep.
245; 23 W.N. C. 454), 13.3b.
Lucas v. Hunt (5 Ohio St. 488), 240.
Lucas V. San Francisco (7 Cal. 463),
553.
Lucas V. Sheperd (18 Ind. 368), 309.
Lucas County v. Hunt (5 Ohio, 488),
651.
Luce 17. Board &c. (153 Mass. 108 ;
26 N. E. Rep. 419), 1560.
Luce V. Fensler (Iowa, 52 N. W. Rep.
517). 555.
Luckett V. Buekman (Ky., 1 S. W.
Rep. 391), 1340.
Ludlam v. Ludlam (26 N. Y. 356),
136, 137, 138,
Ludlow V. Trustees (78 Kv. 357),
• 1168, 1169.
Luehrman v. Taxing District &c.
(2 Lea (Tenn.), 4251, 192, 464,
476, 477, 1376.
Lufkin V. Galveston (58 Tex. 549),
1135; 1164.
Luling V. Racine (1 Biss. 314), 961.
Lum V. City of Bowie (Tex., 18 S. W.
Rep. 142), 399, 405. 420.
Lum V. McCarty (30 N. J. Law, 287),
1273.
Lumbard v. Aldrich (8 N. H. 31),
1371.
Lumber Co. v.' Arkadelphia (Ark,,
. 19 S. W. Rep. 1053). 1369.
Lumber Co. v. Crystal Falls (60 Mich.
570), 758, 1!25.
Lumsden v. Cross (10 Wis. 282), 558.
Liunsden v. Milwaukee (8 Wis. 485),
695.
Luna V. Cemetery Ass'n (42 Ohio St.
128), U65.
Lund I'. Tingsboro (11 Cush. 563),
1455.
Lundrom v. City of Manistee (Mich.,
m N. W. Rep. 161), 1190.
Luques v. Dresden (77 Me. 186), 1387.
Lusk V. Perkins (43 Ark. 238 ; 2 S. W.
Rep. 847), 908.
Luther v. Borden (7 How. 1). 159.
Lutterloh v. Town of Cedar Keys
(15 Fla. 306), 678.
Luttrel'a Case (4 Rep. 88), 406.
Luzaderv. Sargent (Wash., 30 Pac.
Rep. 143), 937.
Lyddy v. Long Island City (104 lii Y.
218; 10 N. E. Rep. 155), 185, 230,
633, 610, 714.
Lydecker v. Eells (3 N. Y. Supl. 323;
30 N. Y. St. Rep. 886), 1057.
Lyell V, Supervisors (6 McLean, 446),
903.
Lyell V. Supervisors &c. (8 McLean,
580), 1595.
Lyman v.. Gedney (114 HI. 388; 39
N. E. Rep. 383), 576.
Lyman v. Hampshire County (138
Mass.. 74), 1483.
Lyman U. Kennebunkport (83 Me.
219; 22 Atl. Rep. 102). 970.
Lynch, Ex parte (2 Hill, 45), 830,
1539.
Lynch V. Clark (1 Sandf. Ch. 684),
' 137, 138.
Lynch v. Eastern &c. R. Co. (57 Wis.
432), 1580.
Lynch v. Lafland (4 Coldw. 96), 95,
109, 477.
Lynch v. New York (47 Hun, 524),
1501.
Lynch v. New York (76 N. Y. 60),
1457.
Lynch v. People (16 Mich. 472), 542.
Lynchburg v. Norfolk &c. R. Co. (80
Va. 237), 1232, 13.^)7.
Lynchburg v. Slaughter (75 Va. 67),
964.
Lynchburg &c. R. Co. v. Board of
Comm'rs (N. O., 13 S. E. Rep.
783), 813.
TABLE OF CASES.
clvii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.].
Lyndon v. Miller (36 Vt. 329), 328.
Lynn v. County Comm'rs (148 Mass.
148), 1335.
Lynn v. Newburvport (5 Allen, 545),
985, 988.
Lynde v. Winnebago County (16
Wall. 6), 947, 955.
Lyon V. Adams (4 Serg. & R. 443),
1377.
Lyon V. Adamson (7 Iowa, 509), 214.
Lyon V. Alley (130 U. S. 177), 1171.
Lyon V. Cambridge (136 Mass, 419),
1468.
Lyon V. Fairfield County (2 Root, 30),
1586.
Lyon I'. Goree (15 Ala. 360), 319.
Lyon V. Irish (58 Mich. 518), 313.
Lyon V. Jerome (K Wend. 569), 670.
Lyon V. Jerome (26 Wend. 485; 37
Am. Dec. 271), 383, 549, 703,
1390.
Lyon V. Mun3on (8 Cowen, 436),
1420.
Lyon V. Rice (41 Conn. 245), 841, 345.
Lyons v. Brookline (119 Mass. 491),
1448.
Lyons v. Cook (9 III. App. 543), 1400.
Lyons v. Cooledge (89 111. 529), 824.
Lyons v. Cooper (39 Kan. 334; 18
Fao. Rep. 296), 1243.
Lyons v. Munson (99 U. S. 684), 946.
Lyth V. City of Bufifalo (48 Hun,
175), 191.
M.
McAdam v. New York (36 Hun,
340), 193.
McAllister v. Citv of Albany (18
Oregon, 436 ; 23 Pac. Rep. 845),
1444, 1463, 1468, 1469.
McAllister v. Pickup (Iowa, 50 N.
W. Kep. 556), 1413.
Md Alpine v. Sweetser (76 Ind. 78),
1420.
McArthur v. Saginaw (58 Mich. 357 ;
25 N. W. Rep. 313), 776, 1198.
McAuliffe V. City of New Bedford
(Mass., 29 N. E. Rep. 517), 1383,
1387.
McBean v. Chandler (9 Heisk. 349;
24 Am. Rep. 308), 1185.
McBrien v. Grand Rapids (56 Mich.
95; 33 N. W. Rep. 206), 259, 643.
McCabe v. Cambridge (134 Mass.
484), 1483.
McCabe v. Comm'rs (46 Ind. 380),
659, 711.
MeCaflferty v. Guyer (59 Pa. St. 109),
376.
MeCaflferty v. Spuyten Duyvil R.
Co. (61 N. Y. 178), 1444.
McCaffrey v. School Dist. (74 Wis.
100), 1333.
McCaffrey v. Smith (41 Hun, 117),
678.
McCall V. Coates (Pa., 23 Atl. Rep.
■1127), 5S3.
McCallie v. Mayor &c. (3 Head
(Tenn.), 317), 935.
McCarthy v. Commonwealth (110
Pa. St. 243), 47,
McCarthy v. Froelke (63 Ind. 607),
188.
McCarthy v. Portland (67 Me. 167),
1448.
McCarthy v. Syracuse (46 N. Y. 194),
219, 776, 1080, 1137.
McCartney v. Chicago &o. R. Co.
(112 III. HID, 588.
McCarty v. Deming (51 Conn. 432),
113.
McCavty v. Marsh (1 Seld. (5 N. Y.)
363), 140.
McCash V. Citv of Burlington, (73
Iowa, 26;, 33 N. W. Rep. 346),
1156.
McCautey v. School Dist. (Pa., 19
Atl. Rep. 410; 25 W. N. C. 519),
1342.
McChesney v. Village of Hyde Park
(III., 28 N. E. Rep. 110), 1175.
McClain v.' Garden Grove (Iowa, 48
N. W. Rep. 1031), 1431.
McClay v. City of Lincoln (Neb., 49
N. W. Rep. 283). 403, 1363.
McClellan v. Reynolds (49 Ma 312),
214.
McClenticks v. Bryant (1 Mo. 598 ^
14 Am. Dec. 390), 213, 215.
McCloskey v. Kreling (76 Cal. 511),
134G.
McCloskey »«. Mayor &c. (7 Hiin,
, 473). 845.
McClure v. City of Red Wing (28
Minn. 186; 9 N. W. Rep. 767),
1144, 1145.
McCIure v. Hiir(36 Ark. 368), 319.
McClure v. Niagara (3 Abb. Ct. App.
Dec. 83), 1598.
McClure vi Oxford Township (94
U. S. 429), 208, 935, 964, 966.
McClurg V. St. Paul (14 Minn. 420),
181.
McCoUum, Ex parte (1 Cowen, 650),
443.
McComb V. Bell (^ Minn. 295), 1086,
1383.
McCombs V. Akron (16 Ohio, 476), 9,
265.
McConnell v. City of Osage (80 Iowa,
393; 45 N. W. Rep. 550), 1201.
McConnell v. Dewey (5 Neb. 585), 9.
McCpnnell v. Hamm (16 Kan. 238),
930, 931.
clviii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pagea: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1603.] '
McCnnnell v, Simpson (36 Fed. Rep.
750), 8^4.
McCool V. Smith (1 Black, 459\ 111.
McCool V. State (23 Ind. 127). 533.
McCord V. High (34 Iowa. 336), 318,
219 231.
McCord V. Pike (121 III. 288). 413.
McCorinack v. Patch in (53 Mo. 33;
14 -Am. Rep. 440). 1133. 1189.
McCormick v. Bay City (23 Mich.
4.57), 301, 313. 1265.
McCormick v. Burt (95 111. 363; 85
Am. Rep. 163), 218, 219, 1348.
McCormick v. Moss (41 111. 853), 336.
McCormick v. Railroad Co. (49 N,
Y. 315), 1491.
McCormick v. Washington Town-
ship (113 Pa. St. 185), 1433.
McCormiok's Estate v. City of Har-
risburg (Pa., 18 Atl. Rep. 126).
1187.
McCortle v. Bates (29 Ohio St. 419),
S8 1.1330.
McCfoy V. Briant (53 Cal. 350), 553,
642, 9S3, 1064.
McCoy V. Chillicothe (3 Ohio, 370),
1573.
McCoy V. City of Buffalo (9 Hun,
401 ; 74 N. Y. 619), 1038.
McCoy V, Curtice (9 Wend. 17), 296.
McCoy V. Newton (37 N. J. Law,
133), 978.
McCoy V, Washington County (3
Phila. 381), 954.
McCracken v. Loucy (39 111. App.
619), 300.
McCracken v. San Francisco (16 Cal.
.^91), 239, 353, 393, 393, 553, 636,
633.
McCraw v. Williams (33 Gratt. 510),
198.
McCrea v. Chahoon (54 Hun, 577 ; 8
N. Y. Supl. 88), 315, 889.
McCrea v. Jacobs (19 Abb. N. 0.
188), 1260.
McCready v. Guardians &c. (9 Serg.
& R. 94), 396, 610.
McCready v. Virginia (94 XT. S. 391),
144.
McCreckart v. Pillsbury (88 Pa. St.
1^3), 244.
McCue V. Wapello County (56 Iowa',
698), 300.
McCul.ie V. Mayor of Chattanooga (3
Head. 317), 477.
McCuUooh V. Maryland (4 Wheat.
316), 50, 51.
McCullock V. Brooklyn (4 N. Y. 430),
1181.
McCuUough V. Moss (5 Denio, 577),
1028.
McCuUough V. Talladega Insurance
Co. (46 Ala. 376), 860.
McCune v. Norwich Gas Co. (30
Conn. 531), 4, 7.
McCurdy v. Bowes (88 Ind. 583),
833.
McCurdy v. Rogers (31 Wis. 197; 91
Am. Dec. 468). 215.
McCutoheon v. Horner (43 Mich.
483), 9. 769, 1438.
McCutcheon v. People (69 III. 601),
1249.
McDade v. Chester City (117 Pa. St.
415). 364, 775, 785.
Mc®aniel v. Richards (1 McCord
(S. C), 187), 141,
McDanieli v. Tebbetts (60 N. H. 497),
326.
McDaniels v. Flower Brook &o. Co.
(33 Vt. 374), 357.
McDermott v. Board of Police (5
Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 433), 486;
McDermott V. Miller (45 N. J. Law,
251), 291, 1533. ,
McDonald v. City of Ashland (78
Wis. 251), 1140.
McDonald v. City of Troy (38 N. Y.
St.' Rep. 704), 783.
McDonald r. Mass. Gen'l Hospital
(130Mass. 432), 762.
McDonald v. Mayor (68 N. Y. 33; 23
Am. Rep. 144: 4 N. Y. Super.
Ct. (T. & C.) 177), 207, 208, 251,.
253, 254, 256, 260. 639, 640, 645,
709, 710, 714, 845,' 1141.
McDonald v. Murphree (45 Miss: 705),
1189.
McDonald v. Payne (114 Ind. 359),
675.
McDonald ». Schneider (27 Mo. 405),
710.
McDonough v. Gilman (3 Allen, 264),
767, 1036.
McDonough v, Murdoch (15 How.
367), 660.
McDonough's Case (8 La. Ann. 171),
563.
McDonough Will Case (15 How.
367), 563.
McDougal V. Supervisors &c. (4
Minn. 189). 1596.
McDowell V. Construction Co. (98
N. C. 514), 377. •
McElha:ney v. Gilleland (30 Ala. 183),
335.
McElrov V. Albany (65 Ga. 387), 755,
1013.
McElroy v. Kansas City (21 Fed,
Rep. 257), 674, 1139.
McEneney v. Town of Sullivan (125
Ind. 407; 25 N. E. Rep. 540),
1174.
McFaddcn v. County of Los Angeles
(74 Cal. 571 ; 16 Pao. Rep. 397),
1309.
TASLE 01* OASfiS.
cIL:
[The referencea are to pdges: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. D, pp. 789-1665.]
' MbFadden v. Town o( Dresden (80
Me. 134; 13 Atl. Rep. S75). 812.
McFarlan v. Insurance Co. (4 Denio,
393), 1266.
McFarlane v. Milwaukee (51 Wis.
691), 1443.
McFate's Appeal (105 Pa. St. 323),
113, 409.
McFerron v. AUoway (14 Bush, 580),
1169.
McGaffigan v. City of Boston (149
Mass. 289), 1470, 1475.
McGaflSn v. Cohoes (11 Hun, 331),
1485.
McGargell v. Hazleton Coal Co. (4
Watts & Serg. 424). 198.
McGavty v. Deeming (51 Cal. 432),
1257.
McGary v. Loomis (68 N. Y. 108),
1448.
McGear v. Woodruflf (33 N. J. Law,
315), 542, 544, 548, 1257.
McGee's Appeal (114 Pa. St. 470),
1192, 1195.
McGee v. Laramore (50 Mo. 425),
214.
McGee v. State (103 Ind. 444), 1543,
1544.
McGeheev. Columbus (68 Ga. 581),
1577.
McGeheev. Mathis (21 Ark. 40), 1185,
1856, 1370.
McGill V. Bruner (65 Ind. 421), 1075.
McGinness v. School Dist. (89 Minn.
499), 1343.
McGivin v. Board of Education (133
111. 123), 127.
McGivnev v. Pierce (Cal., 53 Pac.
Rep. 269). 132.
McGlue V. Philadelphia (10 Phil. 348),
844.
jfcGovern v. Loder (N. J. Eq.. 20
Atl. Rep. 209), 1117, 1130, 1131.
McGowen v. Deyo(8 Barb. 340), 3 1 2.
McGrath v. Chicago (24 III. App.
19), 97, 167. 174.
McGrath v. Village of Bloomer (73
Wis. 39; 40 N. W. Rep. 585),
1470.
McGraw's Estate, In re (HI N. Y.
6b), 1338.
McGregor v. Cook (Tex., 16 S. W.
Rep. 963). 1595.
McGrew v. Governor (19 Ala. 89),
337.
McGruder v. State (Ga., 10 S. E,
Rep. 281). 112.
McGuinn v. Peri (16 La. Ann. 326),
,1174.
McGuire v. City of Rapid City (6
Dak. 346), 633.
McGuire v. Galligan (57 Mich. 38),
219.
McGuire v. Spenoe (91 N. Y. 808),
1448, 1496.
McGurn v. Board of Education (138
111. 122), 1323.
McHenry v. School Trustees (08 111.
140), 1333.
McHenry v. Township Board &c. (65
Mich. 91. 1540.
Mclnerney », City of Denver (Colo.,
29 Pac. Rep. 516), 515, 584, 535,
544, 545, 546.
Mclnery v. Galvestoa (58 Tex. 334),
180.
Mclnstrey v. Tanner (9 Johns. 135),
198.
Mclntyre v. School Trustees (3 111.
App. 77), 324.
MclDtyre r. State (5 Blackf. 384), 702.
Mcllvain v. State (87 Ind. 603), 532.
MoKall V. United States (7 Wall.
123^, 1569.
McKay v. Welch (3 N. Y% Supl. 358),
9e6.
McKean v. Mt. Vernon (51 Iowa,
306). 428.
McKecknie v. Ward (58 N. Y. 541),
323
McKee'u, BidweU (74 Pa. St. 318),
1437.
MoKeer. Brown (28 La. 306), 1174.
McKee v. McKee (8 B. Mon. (Ky.)
433), 586. 1234.
McKee v. Vernon Countv (3 Dill.
210). 953, 980, 961.
McKeigne v. City of Janesville C68
Wis. 50; 31 N. W. Rep. 398),
885, 1479, 1493.
McKellar v. Detroit (57 Mich. 158),
1438.
McKenna V. Edmunstone (91 N. Y.
231), 113.
McKenna v. Kimball (145 Mass. 555),
1334.
McKenna v. McGroarty (Penn. C.
P. ; 6 Kulp, 195), 88.
McKenna V. St. Louis (6 Mo. App.
330), 364.
McKenzie v. Wooley (39 La. Ann.
699; 3 So. Rep. 138), 500, 504.
McKevitt V. Hoboken (45 N. J. Law,
482), 1161.
McKibben v. Fort Scott (35 Ark.
85J), 536.
McKinney v, Monroe County (68
Miss. 384; 8 So. Rep. 648), 881.
McKinney v, Robinson (Tex., 19 S.
W. Rep. 699), 853, 856.
McKinney v. Town of Salem (77 Ind.
313), 1544, 1545.
McKinnon v. Penson (8 Ex. 337; 25
Eng. L. & Eq. 457), 786.
McKnight v. Parish (30 La. Ann.
361), 1381.
olz
TABLE OF OASES.
IThe references are tp pages: VoL 1, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
McKnight v. Pittsburgh (91 Fa. St.
273), 712, 758.
McKusick V. City of Stillwater (44
Minn. 372; 46 N. W. Rep. 769),
1121.
McLain v. School Dist. (12 Pa. St.
204), 1330.
McLaughlin v. Burroughs (Mich., 51
N. W. Rep. 383), 1522.
McLaugifilin v. Municipality (5 La.
Ann. 504), 698.
McLaughlin v. Stephens (2 Cr. O. C.
148), 604.
McLauren v. City of Grand Forks
(6 Dak. 397; 43 N. W. Rep. 710),
570, 1065, 1175.
McLaury v. McGregor City (51 Iowa.
717), 1498.
McLean County v. Humphreys (104
111. 378), 1008.
McLellan v. St. Louis School Board
(15 Mo. App. 362), 1343.
McLellan v. Young (54 Ga. 399; 21
Am. Rep. 276), 1596.
McLin V. City of Newbern (70 N. C.
12), 1243.
HcLorinam v. Bridgewater Tp. (4fl
N. J. Law, 634; 10 Atl. Rep. 187),
981.
McLond V. Selby (10 Conn. 390), 150,
156,345, 915, 1586.
MoMahon v. Mayor &c. (66 Ga. 217 ;
42 Am. Rep. 65), 377.
McMannis v. Butler (51 Barb. 436),
1405, 1409.
McMaQus V. MuDonough(107 111. 95),
696.
McMasters v. Commonwealth (3
Watts, 292), 1103, 1168.
McMicken v. Ciurinnati (4 Ohio St.
394), 695.
McMillan t).Richard8(90al.4l7), 1577,
McMillan v. School Comm'rs (107
N. C. 609>, 1345.
McMillen v. Anderson (95 17. S. 37),
692, 1179, 1180, 1387.
McNair v. Ostrander (Wash., 23 Pac.
Rep. 414), 1161.
MoN^Uy V. Cohoes (53 Hun, 202 ; 6
N.Y. Supl.,842), 784, 1474.
McNamara v. Estes (22 Iowa, 246),
1160, 1161.
MoNeal v. Gloucester City (N. J., 18
Atl. Rep. 112), 1589.
McNutt V. Livingston (7 Sm. & M.
(Miss.) 641), 223.
McOsker v. Burrell (55 Ind. 435), 218.
McPheetersD. Wright (110 Ind. 519),
1340.
McPherson V. Chebanse (114 111 46),
513, 1244.
McPherson v. Foster (43 Iowa. 48),
840, 842, 901, 1215, 130/', 1374.
McPherson v. Nichols (Kan., 29 Pac,
Rep. 679), 708), 1268.
McPike V. Pen (51 Mo. 63). 375.
McPike V. Pew (48 Mo. 585). 1573,
McQuillen v. Hatton (42 Ohio St.
202), 683.
McRea v. Americus (59 Ga. 168), 515.
McSherry if. Canandaigua Village
(129 N. Y. 612), 1439.
McSpedon v. Mayor &c. (15 How.
428), 252.
McTeer v. Lebow (85 Tenn. 121). 218.
McVeany v. Mayor &c. of New York
(eO N. Y. 185), 388.
MoVerry v. Boyd (89 Cal, 304; 26
Pac. Rep. 885), 1163.
MoVichie v. Town of Knight (Wis.,
51 N. W. Rep. 1094), 343, 347,
350, 351.
Mabon v. Halsted (30 N. J. Law,
640), 697, 698.
Macauley v. New York (67 N. Y.
602). 772, 1403.
MacDonald v. New York (68 N. Y.
23), 230.
Mace V. Nottingham West (1 N. H.
52), 989.
Mack V. Jones (21 N. H. 393>, 618,
1396.
Mackey v. Columbus Townshi;] (71
Mich. 227; 38 N. W. Rep. 899),
1092.
MacLean v. Circuit Judge (53 Mich.
257), 1536,
Macklin v. Trustees (88 Ky. 592), 11
S. W. Rep. 657), 801, 1340.
Macklot V. Davenport (17 Iowa, 379),
218, 1576.
Macomber v. Nichols (34 Mich. 212),
1403.
Macomber v, Taunton 000 Mass.
255). 1468.
Macon v. Bank (60 Ga. 133), 1359.
Macon v. Jones (67 Ga. 489),' 1350.
Macon v. Patty (57 Miss. 378: 34
Am. Rep. 451), 1123, 1163, 1169,
1182.
Macon County Case (99 U. S. 582),
1373.
Macon County v. Shores (97 U. S.
272), 944, 947, 956.
Macy V. Citv of Indianapolis (17 Ind.
367), 1095.
Madden v. Smeltz (2 C. C. Rep. (Ohio),
168). 547.
Maddox v. Graham (2 Met. (Ky.) 56),
281, 93l\ 1378, 1549.
Maddox: v. Neal (45 Ark. 121), 1345.
Maddux v. City of Newport (Ky., 14
S. W. Rep. 957), 1078.
Madison v. Baker (103 Ind. 41), 1484.
Madison v. Korbly (32 Ind. 74), 176,
303, 207.
TABLE OF CASES.
clxi
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
Madison v. Smith (83 Ind. 503), 1128.
Madison v. "Whitney (31 Ind. 261),
1359.
Madison County v. People (58 111.
456), 619.
Madison Overseers v. Poor Directors
(9 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 435). 985.
Madison Tp. v. Dun]£le(114 Ind. 262),
820, 854.
Madry i). Cox (73 Tex. 538; 11 S. W.
Rep. 541), 404. 416, 1367.
Maers V. Reading (21 Pa. St. 188), 125.
Magee v. City of Troy (1 N. Y. Supl.
24), 884, 1463, 1476.
Magee v. Commonwealth (46 Pa. St.
358), 592, 1186.
Magee v. Supervisors (10 Cal. 376),
389.
Magie v. Stoddard (25 Conn. 065),
200.
Magill V. Kauffman (4 Serg. & R.
317), 238.
Magneau v. Citv of Fremont (30 Neb.
843; 47 N. W. Rep. 280), 275, 277,
278, 356.
Maguire v. City of Cootersville (76
Ga, «4), 1096.
Maguire t>. Middlesex R, Co. (115
Mass. 239), 1477.
Maguire v. Smock (42 Ind. 1), 1174.
Maguire v. State Saving Institution
(63 Mo. 344), 1577.
Mahady v. Bush wick R. Co. (91 N.
Y. 149 1, 1433.
Mahaska County v. Ingalls (16 Iowa,
81), 337. ,
Maher v. Chicago (38 111. 266), 236,
237, 645.
Maher v. Railroad Co. (91 111. 312),
1456.
Mahony v. Bank (4 Ark. 630), 56.
Main v. Ft. Smith (49 Ark. 480), 287,
1175.
Mairs v. Manhattan &c. Ass'n (89
N. Y. 503), 1452, 1491.
Makemson v. Eauffman (35 Ohio St.
444), 1190.
Malchus V. Highlands (4 Bush, 547),
1169.
Mallett V. Uncle Sam &c. Co. (1 Nev.
188), 178. I
Mallorv v. Griffey (86 Pa. St. 275),
1468.
Mallory v. Supervisors (2 Cowen,
531), 184.
Malloy V. Walker Township (77
Mich. 448). 1471.
Malone, Be (31 S. C. 435), 1345.
Malone v. Murphy (2 Kan. 350), 1256.
Malone v. Toledo (38 Ohio St. 643),
671.
Manchester v. Hartford (30 Conn.
118), 1445, 1478.
Manchester v. Reserve Tp. (4 Pa. St.
85), 1323.
Maneval v. Township of Jackson (9
Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 28; 28 W. N.
C. ISO; 21 Atl. Rep. 672), 791,
817.
Manga m v. Brooklvn (98 N. Y. 585;
5 Am. Kep. 705), 187.
Manice v. Mayor &c. (8 N. Y. 120),
1160, 1383.
Mankato v. Arnold (36 Minn. 62; 30
N. W. Rep. 305), 1009. 1253.
Mankato v. Fowler (33 Minn. 364),
1239.
Manker». Faulhaber (94 Mo. 430; 6
S. W: Rep. 872), 97. 205, 206.
Manley V. Emlen (46 Kan. 665; 27
Pac, Rep. 844), 1297.
Mann v. Yazoo City (31 Miss. 574),
327.
Manning v. Den (90 Cal. 610), 1183.
Manning v. Fifth Parish (6 Pick. 6),
373, 1269.
Mannix v. Stat« (115 Ind. 245). 1548.
Manor v. McCall (5 Ga. 522), 1552.
Mansfield w. Fuller (50 Mo. 338). 1376.
Mansfield Village v. Moore (124 III.
133; 1« N. E. Rep. 246), 1449,
1488, 1490.
Manuel u. Comm'rs (98 N. C. 9; 3
S. E. Rep. 829), 1014.
Manufacturers' Nat. Bank v. Dick-
erson (41 N. J. Law, 448; 32 Am.
Rep. 237). 333.
Manufacturing Co. v. Rasey (69 Wis.
246 : 34 N. W. Rep. 85), 893.
Manufacturing Co. v. Schell City (21
Mo. App. 175), 484.
Marbec v. State (28 Ind. 86\ 321.
Marble v. McKenney (60 Me. 332),
353, 373.
Marble v. Whitney (28 N. Y. 297),
1406.
Marble v. Worcester (4 Gray, 395),
1453.
Marblehead v. County Comm'rs (5
Gray, 451), 705.
Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch, 137),
314.
March v. Commonwealth (12 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 2.5), 103, 488, 528.
March v. Scituate (153 Mass. 34). 361.
Marchand v. Town of Maple Grove
(Minn., 51 N. W. Rep. 606), 1418.
Marchant v. Langworthy (6 Hill,
646; .3 Denio, 536). 346, 353. 1336.
Marcy v. Taylot (19 111. 634), 1406.
Marcy v. Townsliip of Oswego i93
U. S. 637), 834. 047, 951, 960, 961.
Marden v. City of Boston (Mass., 29
N. E. Rep. 588), 881.
Marietta v. Fearing (4 Ohio, 427), 9£L
109, 527.
cisii
TABLE OT 0A9ESt.
pTIie references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 78*-1605J
Marion v. . Epler (5 Ohio St. 250),
1188.
Marion &o. R. Co. v. Cliamplin (37
Kan. 683). 1370.
Marion County v. Clark (94 U. S.
278), 953, 956.
Marion County, i). Harvey County
(26 Kan. 181). 1368.
Mark v. State (97 N. Y. 672), 117,
513.
Market St. Ry. Co, v. Central Ry.
Co. (51 Cal, 586), 1205.
Markey v. City of Milwaukee (76
Wis. 849; 45 N. W. Rep. 28),
1095.
Markle v. Akron (14 Ohio, 586), 487,
539, 1258.
Marklee v. Wright (13 Ind. 548). 298.
Marks v. Trustees (37 Ind. 155), 1166.
Marlboro Tp. v. Freehold (50 N. J.
Law, 509; 14 All. Rep. 595), 446,
981.
Maruey v. State (18 Mo. 7), 820.
Marquette County v. Ward (50 Mich,
174), 331.
Marseilles v. Howland (124 111. 547),
1440.
Marsh v. City of Brooklyn (59 N. Y.
280), 1134.
Marsh v. Fulton Co. (10 Wall. 676),
280, 253, 256, 358, 628, 633, 640,
810, 936, 933, 934, 942, 946, 961,
966, 1374.
Marsh v. Supervisors &c. (43 Wis.
502), 1571.
Marsh v. Town of Little Valley (64
N. Y, 112; IHun, 554), 830.
Marshall v. Comm'rs of Allegheny
City (59 Pa. St. 455), 713, 1365.
Marshall v. Donovan (10 Bush, 681),
1363.
Marshall v. Harwood (5 Md. 438),
175,
Marshall v. Silliman (61 111. 218), 937,
1383.
Marshall v. Smith (L. R. 8 C. P. 416),
53S
Marshall v. State (1 Ind. 72). 1524.
Marshall v. Vicksburg (15 Wall. 146),
1388
Marshall County v. Cook (36 111. 44),
937, 961.
Marshall County v. Johnson (137
Ind. 238; 26 N. E, Rep. 831), 184.
Marshall County v. Schenck (5 Wall.
773), 257, 940. 947, 956. 961.
Marshalltown v. Blum(58Iowa, 184),
1388.
Marshalsea Case (10 Coke, 68), 217.
Martin v. Brooklyn (1 Hill, 545), 6*3.
Maiiin v. Brown (63 Tex. 48i), 1341.
Martin v. Charleston (13 Rich. Eq.
■ 50), 1861.
Martin v. T>\x (53 Miss. 53), 416, 670,
1365, 1367.
Martin v. Gleason (139 Mass. 183; 29
N. E. Rep. 664), 670, 686.
Martin v. Hilb (53 Ark, 300; 14 S. W,
Rep. 94), 1094.
Martin v. Lenion (26 Conn. 193), 296.
Martin v. Mayor &c. (1 Hill, 545),
223, 250, 352, 6«4, 698, 699.
Martin u Neal (125 Ind. 547; 35 N.
E. Rep. 813). 898.
Martin v. Stanabach (N. J., 23 Atl.
♦ Rep. 58), 978.
Martin v. State (33 Neb. 371 ; 36 N.
W. Rep. 554), 1544.
Martin v. Towle (58 N. H. 31), 1487.
Martin ?;. Town of Rosedale (Ind.,
39 N. E. Rep. 410), 596, 1335.
Martindale v. Martindale (10 Ind.
566), 539.
Martindale v. Palmer (52 Ind. 411),
198, 373. 501. 533, 1075.
Martinsville v. Frieze (38 Ind. 507),
542.
Martz V. Long {In re Martz's Elec-
tion) (110 Pa. St. 502; 1 Atl. Rep.
419), 161.
Marvin v, McCullom (20 Johns. 288),
956.
Marvin v. Town of Jacobs (77 Wis.
31; 45 N. W. Rep. 679), 918.
Marvin v. United States (44 Fed.
Rep. 405), 185.
Marzpt V. Pittsburgh (137 Pa. St.
548: 20 Atl. Rep. 693; 37 W. N.
C. 73). 649.
Mass. Cent. R. Co. v. Boston &c. R.
Co. (131 Mass. 124). 1213.
Mason, In re (43 Fed. Rep. 510), 300.
Mason v. Bristol fclO N. H. 36), 9f9.
Mason v. City of Sioux Falls (So.
Dak., 51 N. W. Rep. 770), 570,
571, 1065, 1163.
Mason v. Tearson (9 How. 248), 1126.
Mason v. Kennedy (Mo., 14 S. W.
Rep. 514), 368.
Mason v. Lancaster (4 Bush, 406),
1856.
Mason v. Mayor &o. (35 N. J. Law,
190), 1533.
Mason v. Messenger (17 Iowa, 261),
690.
Mason v. School Dist. (20 Vt. 487),
344, 347, 3,50, 1386.
Mason v. Shawneetown (77 III. 533),
539, 9.37.
Mason v. Trustees (4 Bush, 406), 1240.
Massing V. Ames (37 Wis. 645), 1171.
Masters V. Troy (50 Hun, 485; 3 N. Y,
Supl. 450), 1476, 1477, 1482, 1485.
Mather w. City of Ottawa (114 111.
659; 3 N. E. Rep. 816; 2 West.
Rep. 46), 559, 618, 931.
TABLE OF OASES.
clxiii
' [The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Mather v. Crawford (36 Barb. 564),
1093, 1428.
Matheson v. Mazomanie (20 Wis.
191). 1578.
Matter of Albany Street (11 Wend.
149), 677.
Matter of Appeal of Des Moines
Water Co. (48 Iowa, 824), 572.
Matter of Application of Cooper (28
Hun, 515), 686.
Matter of Beekman Street (4 Bradf.
503). 677.
Matter of Blank (73 N. Y. 388), 573.
Matter of Burke (63 N. Y. 224), 1161,
1163.
Matter of Churcli (93 N. Y. 1). 704.
Matter of Clark v. Sheldon (106 N.
Y. 104), 879.
Matter of College Street (8 R. I. 476),
1166.
Matter of Comm'rs of Public Parks
(47 Hun, 302). 1167.
Matter of Comm'rs of Washington
Park (53 N. Y. 131). 694, 1419.
Matter of Deansville Cemetery Ass'n
(66 N. Y. 569), 686.
Matter of De Graw Street (18 Wend.
568). 1163.
Matter of Delancey (52 N, Y. 80),
1134.
Matter of Eleventh Ave. (81 N. Y.
436), 1411.
Matter of Episcopal Church (75 N.
Y. 324). 1071.
Matter of Evans (9 Ad. & El. 679),
134.
Matter of Ford (6 Lans. (N. Y.) 92),
1178.
Matter of Frazee (63 Mich. 396), 602.
Matter of Gardner (68 N. Y. 467).
1523.
Matter of Gorham (43 How. Pr. 263),
937.
Matter of Hamilton Ave. (14 Barb.
405), 673.
Matter of Ingraham (4 Hun, 495),
1141.
Matter of Lawrence Street (4 E. I.
230), 669.
Matter of Llvington (121 N. Y. 94),
1190.
Matter of Lnckport &c. E. Co. (77
N. Y. 557), 693.
Matter of Marsh (71 N. Y. 315), 692,
693.
Matter of Mayor of New York (99 N.
Y. 569), 685.
Matter of the Metropolitan Gas
Light Co. (85 N. Y. 526), 1173.
Matter of New Eochelle Water Co.
(46 Hu'n, 525), 686.
Matter of N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (66 N.
Y. 407), 1420.
Matter of N. Y. Cent. E. Co. (77 N.
Y. 248), 1403.
Matter of Opening House Ave. (67
Barb. 350), 692.
Matter of Opening of First Street
(66 Mich. 42; 33 N. W. Eep. 15),
633.
Matter of Orphan Home (92 N. Y.
116), 1189.
Matter of Petition of De Peyster (80
N. Y. 565), 690.
Matter of Petition of United States
(98 N. Y. 227), 703.
Matter of Rinebeck &c. E. Co. (67
N. Y. 243), 697.
Matter of Ryers (73 N, Y. 1), 686,
687.
Matter of State Reservation (103 N.
Y. 734), 706.
Matter of Taxpayers of Greene (38
How. Pr. 515), 936.
Matter of Torrance Street (4 E. 1. 230),
1188.
Matter of Trustees &o. (31 N. Y.
574), 1178.
Matter of Twenty-sixth Street (12
AVend. 203), 1163.
Matter of Union Ferry (98 N. Y.
139), 670.
Matter of Village of Middletown (82
N. Y. 196), 690, 693.
Matter of Waverly Water-works (85
N. Y. 478), 697.
Matter of Wortman (22 Abb. N. C.
137), 1513.
Matter of Yick Wb (68 Cal. 294), 599.
Matthews v. Alexandria (68 Mo. 115),
282, 624.
Matthews v. Baraboo (39 Wis. 677),
1451.
Matthews V. Westborough (131 Mass.
521), 657.
Matthews v. Westborough (134 Mass.
555), 368, 373, 657.
Mattingly v. City of Plymouth (100
Ind.-545), 1153, 1173.
Mauch Chunk v. Shortz (61 Pa. St.
399), 1163.
Mauldin v. City Council &c. (33 S. C.
1; 11 S. E. Eep. 434), 573, 1314.
Maupin v. Franklin County (67 Mo.
327), 231, 643, 1091.
Maurin v. Smith (25 La. Ann. 445),
1385.
Maury Countv v. Lewis County (1
Swan(Teun.), 236), 15.
Maus V. Springfield (101 Mo. 613),
1493.
May V. Boston (150 MSss. 516; 33 N.
E. Eep. 320), 1481.
May V. County of Juneau (30 Fed.
Eep. 341), '750.
May V. Holdridge (23 Wis. 93), 558.
clxiv
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
May V. Logan County (30 Fed. Eep.
250), 749.
May V. Mercer County (30 Fed. Eep.
246), 749.
Mav V. People (Colo., 27 Pao. Eep.
" 1010), 530.
May V. Eailroad Company (113 Mass.
161), 799.
Mayall &a v. Citv of St. Paul (30
Minn. 294; 15 "N. W. Eep. 170),
1073, 1127.
Mayfield v. Moore (53 III. 428), 200.
Mayhew v. Gay Head (13 Allen, 129),
301, 373.
Malone v. St. Paul (40 Minn. 406),
783.
Maynard v. Board of Canvassers
(84 Mich. 338), 384.
Maynard v. City of Northampton
(Mass., 31 N. E. Eep. 1063), 1101.
Maynard v. Woodward (36 Mich.
433), 660.
Mayor, In re (99 N. Y. 569), 1386.
Mayor of Durham's Case (1 Sid. 33),
174.
Mayor &c. v. Allaire (14 Ala. 400),
104, 514, 515, 604.
Mayor &o. v. Bailey (3 Hill, 538; 2
Denio, 433), 754, 1138. 1393.
Mayor &c. v. Baldwin (57 Ala. 61),
1573.
Mayor &c. v. Baltimore &o. E, Co.
(6 Gill, 388), 1396,
Mayor &c. v. Beasley (1 Humph.
(Tenn.) 332), 518.
Mayor &c. v. Blache (6 La. 500), 339.
Mayor &c. v. Board of Police (15
Md. 376), 1877.
Mayor &c. v. Bolt (5 Ves. 129), 1059.
Mayor &c. v. Boyd (64 Md. 10; 30
Atl. Eep. 1038), 1065.
Mayor &c. v. Broadway &c. E. Co.
, (97 N. Y. 37.5), 536.
Mayor &c. v. Brpwn (9 Heisk. 6),
1013.
Mayor &c. v. Cabot (28 Ga. 50), 572.
Mayor &c. v, Conner (5 Ind. 171),
298.
Mayor &c. v. Crowell (40 N. J. Law,
207; 29 Am. Eep. 224), 329.
Mayor &c v. Cunlilf (3 N. Y. 165),
S50, 1450.
Mayor &o. v. Diokerson (45 N. J.
Law, 38), 316.
Mayor &o. v. Elliott (3 Eawle, 170),
563, 660.
Mayor &o. v. Esohbach (18 Md. 276),
214, 643,
Mayor &c. v. Fahm (60 Ga. 109),
1281.
Mayor &c. v. Finney (54 Ga. 317),
67, 99, 123, 124.
Mayor &c. v. Furze (3 Hill, 613), 1080.
Mayor &c. v. Gerspach (33 La. Ann.
1011), 1021, 1054.
Mayor &c. v. Gill (31 Md. 395), 650.
859.
Mayor &c. v. Gilmore (21 Fed. Eep.
870), 932, 934.
Mavor &c. v. Hardwioke (L. E, 9
Ex. 13), 261.
Mayor &c. ii. Harrison (30 N. J. Law,
73), 645.
Mavor &c. v. Harwood (32 Md. 471);
" 1043.
M^or &c. V. Hays (25 Ga. 590). 1293.
Mayor &c. v. Henley (2 CI. & F. 331),
139.
Mayor &c. v. Hoffman (29 La. Ann,
651), 593, 1054.
Mayor &o. v. Hook (62 Md. 371),
1120,
Mayor &o. v. Hyatt (3 E. D. Smith,
156), 515, 537. .
Mayor &c. v. Inman (57 Ga. 370), 113,
937.
Mayor &e. v. Insurance Co. X15 Daly,
215), 1363.
Mavor &c. v. Johns Hopkins Hospi-
tal (50 Md. 1), 1179, 1180.
Mayor &c. v. Johnson (63 Md. 235),
1190.
Mayor &o. v. Kelly (98 N. Y. 467),
184..
Mayor &c. v. Keyser (72 Md. 106),
650.
Mayor &c. u. King (7 Lea, 442), 1025.
Mayor &c. v. Kirkley (29 Md. 85),
642.
Mayor &c. v. Lanham (67 Ga. 753),
537, 1025.
Mayor &c. v. Lasser (9 Humph.
(Tenn.) 757), 9, 1013.
Mayor &,Ci v. Lombard (51 Miss, 125),
927.
Mayor &c. v. Long (31 Mo. 369), 695.
Mayor &c. v. Lord (9 Wall. 409),
1379.
Mayor &e. v. McWilliams (67 Ga.
106), 1312.
Mayor &o. v. Marriott (9 Md. 160),
1059.
Mayor &c. v. Meserole (20 Wend.
132), 1189.
Mayor &c. v. Mitchell (79 Ga. 807;
5 S. E. Eep. 301), 1050.
Mayor &c. v. Murphy (40 N. J. Law,
145), 530.
Mayor &c; v. Musgrave (48 Md. 273),
642, 697.
Mayor &c. v. Nichols (4 Hill, 209),
103j 488. 51.S.
Mayor &c. v. 0'Donneli(53 Md. 110),
14B2.
Mayor &o. v. Ohio- &o. E. Co. (26
Pa. St. 355), 1103.
TABLE OV OASES.
clxv
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1805.]
Mayor &o. v. O'Neil (63 Md. 336),
1277.
Mayor &c. v. Ordrenan (18 Johns.
123), 535.
Mayor &c. v. Park Comm'rs (44
Mich. 602), 685.
Mayor &c. v. Phelps (27 Ala. 55),
106, 523.
Mayor &c. v. Porter (18 Md. 289 ; 79
Am. Deo. Q86), 283.
Mayor &c. v. Proprietors &c. (7 Md.
517), 1066.
Mayor &c. v. Eadecke (49 Md. 217),
602.
Mayor &c. v. Bailroad Comm'rs (113
Mass. 161), 970.
Mayor &o. v. Railroad Co. (26 Pa. St.
355), 1205.
Mayor &c. v. Ray (19 Wall. 468), 203,
238, 23(5, 237. 638, 640, 793, 794,
883, 891, 983. 928.
Mayor &c. v. Reilly (59 Hun, 501;
' 13 N. Y. Supl. 581), 717.
Mayor &c. v. Reynolds (20 Md. 1;
83 Am. Dec. 535). 314, 643.
Mayor &c. v. Root (8 Md. 95 ; 63 Am.
Dec. 692), 1596.
Mayor &c. i\ Scharf (54 Md. 499),
1079, 1179.
Mayor <S:c. v. Scharf (56 Me. 50),
1179.
Mayor &c. v. Sheffield (4 Wall. 189),
9, 1450.
Mayor &c. v. Sheldon (1 Head (Tenn.),
24), 63.
Mayor &c. v. Sibberns (3 Abhi App.
Dec. 266; 7 Daly. 436), 320. 335.
Mayor &c. i;. Sonneborn (113 N. Y.
423; 21 N. E. Rep. 121), 645,
719.
Mayor &c. v. ^ate (15 Md. 376: 74
Am. Dee. 572), 126, 458, 1261,
1378, 1278.
Mayor &c. v. State (30 Md. 112), 441.
Mayor &c. v. Steamboat Co. (R. M.
Charlt. 348), 95.
Mayor &c. v. Stone (57 Ala. 61),
1189.
Mayor &c. v. Thome (7 Paige, 261),
1247.
Mayor &c. v. Williams (15 N. Y.
, 502). 599. .
Mayor &c. v. Winfleld (8 Humph.
(Tenn.) 707). 106, 518, 580.
Mayor &c. v. Woodward (13 Heisk.
(Tenn.) 499), 1293.
Mayor &c. «. Ynille (3 Ala, 137), 529,
'535.
Mayrhofer v. Board (89 Cal. 110),
1585.
Mays V. Cincinnati (1 Ohio St. 268),
513, 1383.
Mayson v. Atlanta (77 Ga. 682), 1241.
Maysville v. Schultz (3 Dana, 10), 97.
Maywood v. Village of Maywood
(111., 29 N. E. Rep. 704), 1093,
1178.
Maxim v. Town of Champion (4 N. Y.
Supl. 515), 1439.
Maximilian v. New York (63 N. Y.
160). 745, 753, 770, 1014, 1037.
Maxwell v. Board (119 Ind. 20), 696.
Maxwell v. Newbold (18 How. 511),
1183.
Maxwell v. Tolly (26 S. C. 77 ; 1 S. E.
Rep. 160), 389.
Meacbam v. Fitchburg R. Co. (4
Gush. 391), 708.
Mead v. Inhabitants of Acton (139
Mass. 341 ; 8 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 545), 559, 668.
Mead «. New Haven (40 Conn. 73),
1038.
Meadow Dam v. Gray (30 Me. 547),
943.
Meagher v. Storey County (5 Nev.
244), 199, 310, 1392.
Means v. Hendershott (34 Iowa, 78),
667.
Means v. Webster (23 Neb. 433; 36
N. W. Rep. 809), 907.
Meares v. Wilmington (9 Ired. Law
(N. C), 73), 9, 365.
M. E. Church, In re (66 N. Y. 395),
1374,
Medical Institute v. Patterson (1
Denio. 61 ; 5 Denio, 618). 56, 88.
Medford v. Learned (16 Mass. 315),
1000.
Medway v. Milford(81 Pick. 349), 657.
Meech v. Buffalo (39 N. Y. 19,8),
1160.
Meek v. McClure (49 Cal. 638), 1400.
Meeker v. Vmi Rensselaer (15 Wend.
387), 105.5.
Meggett V. City of Eau Claire (Wis.,
51 N. W. Rep. 566), 558, 598,
1138, 1169.
Megowan v. Commonwealth (3 Met.
(Ky.) 3), 1844.
Meinzer v. City of Racine (68 Wis.
341; 38 N. W. Rep. 139), 1156.
Mele V. Delaware Canal Co. (37 Jones
& Sp. 367). 1504.
Melvin's Case (68 Pa. St. 338), 379.
Melvin v. Lisenby (72 III. 63), 940.
Memphis v. Adams (9 Heisk. (Tenn.)
518; 24 Am. Rep. 331), 186, 659.
Memphis v. Bolton (9 Heisk. 508),
699, 703.
Memphis v. Brown (30 Wall. 289),
186..
Memphis v. Hernando Ins, Co. (6
Baxt. 537), 1383.
Memphis r. Kimbrough (19 Heisk.
' 133), 1013.
clxvi
TABLE OF CASBS.
' [The references are to paiges: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
Memphis v. Laski (9 Heisk. (Tenn.)
511), 1596.
Memphis v. Memphis Water-works
(5 Heisk. 495), 477.
. Memphis v. O'Connor (53 Mo. 468),
540. 5tl.
. Memphis v. United States (97 U, S.
893). 1378, 1880.
. Memphis &c. R. Co. v. Comm'rs (112
U. S. 619), 1556.
Memphis &o. R. Co. v. Payne (37
Miss. 700), 704.
Memphis Freight Co. v. Mayor &c.
(4 Cold. (Tenn.) 419), 683.
Memphis Gas Co. v. State (6 Cold.
(Tenn.) 310), 1381.
Menasha v. Hazard (103 U. S. 81),
943, 946.
Mendehall v. Burton (43 Kan. 570;
33 Pao. Rep. 558), 65, 70, 91, 403,
1363.
Mendel v. Wheeling (38 West Va.
233), 264.
Mendocino Co. v, Morris (33 Cal. 145),
312.
Mendon v. County Comm'rs (5 Allen,
13),. 705.
Menges v. City of Albany (56 N. Y.
374), 695.
Menken v. Atlanta (78 Ga. 668),
517.
Mentz V. Cook (108 N. T. 505), 961.
Meranda v. Spurlin (100 Ind. 380),
694, 1430.
Mercer v. Woodgate (L. R. 5 Q. B.
26), 1404, 1408.
Mercer County '». Hackett (1 Wall.
83), 946, 957.
Mercer County v. Pittsburgh &o. R.
Co. (37 Pa. St. 389), 953.
Merchants' Bank v. Bergen County
(115 U. P. 384), 207, 965, 966.
Merchants' Bank v. Cook (4 Pick.
405), 150, 153,746.
Merchants' Nat. Bank v. McKinney
(So. Dak., 48 N. W. Rep. 841),
918.
Meriwether v. Garrett (103 U. S!
472), 86. 109. Ill, ISO, 149, 330,
478. 479, 634, 1371. 1375, 1376,
1380, 1383, 1394, 1395.
Merkee «. Rochester (13 Hun, 157),
533.
Merrell v. Campbell (49 Wis. 535),
1596.
Merriam v. New Orleans (14 La.
Ann. 318), 533, 1369.
Merrick v. Amherst (12 Allen, 500),
1363.
Merrick v. Baltimore (43 Md. 319),
697.
Merrick v. Plank Road Co. (11 Iowa,
74), 260, 713.
Merrick v. Troy (19 Hun, 253; 83
N. Y. 514), 1485.
Meirick v. Wallace (19 111. 486). 23.1.
Merrifield v. Worcester (110 Mass.
216), 1436.
Merrill, In re (8 N. Y. Supl. 737),
1347.
Merrill v. Abbott, 62 Ind. 549), 1171.
Merrill v. Hampden (36 Me. 234),
1467.
Merrill v. Humphrey (24 Mich. 170),
%1190.
Merrill v. Marshall County (74 Iowa,
38), 1540.
Merrills;. Monticello (138 U. S. 673;
11 S. Ct. Rep. 441 ; 16 Cent. L.
J. 90), 563, 795, 822, 923, 925, 926,
928, 932.
Merrill v. North Yarmouth (78 Me.
200), 1493.
Merrill v. Plainfleld (45 N. H. 136),
646, 664, 1583.
Merrimack County v. City of Con-
cord (N. H., 23 Atl. Rep. 87),
1007.
Merrimack County v. - Grafton
County (63 N. H. 550), 976.
Merrimack River Sav. Bank v. City
of Lowell (152 Mass. 556; 20 N.
E. Rep. 97), 1309.
Merritt v. Farris (23 111. App. 243),
1335.
Merritt w. Hinton (Ark., 17 S. W.
Rep. 370), 180.
Merritt v. Merritt (Ark., 16 S. W,
Rep. 287), 1338.
Merritt v. Portchester (71 N. Y. 309X
570, 1064, 1126, 1171.
Mersey Docks v. Penhallow (1 H.I*
Cas. (N. S.) 93), 9.
Mertz V. Brooklvn (33 N. Y. St. Rep.
577; ISSN.'Y. 617). 784.
Merwin v. Chicago (45 111. 133), 1596.
Merwin v. Rogers (24 N. Y. St. Rep.
496), 837.
Merwin v. Rogers (28 N. Y. St. Rep.
404), 218.
Merwine v. Monroe County (Pa., 21
Atl. Rep. 509), 857.
Merz V. Missouri Pao. Ry. Co. (88
Mo. 672; 1 S. W. Rep. 382), 589,
1209.
Messert v. Supervisors &c. (50 Barb.
190), 1569.
Metcalf y. Andrews (R. I., 7 Atl.
Rep. 4). 171.
Metcalf V. St. Louis (U Mo. 103), 487,
1040.
Metcalf r. State (21 Tex. 174), 1344.
Metcalfe v. Seattle (1 Wash. 297 ; 25
Pao. Rep. 1010), 381, 938.
Methodist P. Church v. The Mayor
(48 Am. Dec. 540), 1146.
TABLE OF CASES..
olxvii.
[The references are to pagen: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
MetropolitaQ Board v. Barrie (34
N. Y. 657), 1023.
Metropolitan Board of Health v.
Heister (37 N. Y. 661), 1033.
Metropolitan Co. v. Newton (4 N. Y.
Supl. 593), 612.
Metropolitan Tel. Co. v. Colwell
Lead Co. (C7 How. Pr. 305), 1433.
Metsker v. Neally (41 Kan. 133; 21
Pao. Eep. 206). 194.
Metzger v. Attioa R. Co. (79 N. Y.
171), 780.
Meuser v. Risdon (36 Cal. 239), 283.
Meyer v. Brown (65 Cal. 583), 1371,
1398.
Meyer v. City of Muscatine (1 Wall.
384), 947, 9.55.
Meyer v. Fromm (108 Ind. 208), 502,
1174.
Meyers v. ChicaRO &o. R. Co. (57
Iowa, 555). 518.
Meyers v. Irwin (3 Serg. & R. 368),
88..
Meyers v. People (26 111. 173), 1255.
Michener v. Philadelphia (118 Pa. St
535; 13 Atl. Rep. 174), 593, 1164,
1169. .
Michia;an &c. Ry. Co. v. Barnes (44
Mich. 222), 700.
Middleborough v. Plympton (19 Pick.
4«9). 975.
Middlebury v. Waltham (6 Vt. 200),
976.
Middleport v. .^tna Life Ins. Co. (83
111. 562), 620, 945.
Middlesex Co. v. City of Lowell (149
Mass. 509; 21 N. E. Rep. 872),
1C9B.
Middlesex R. Co. v. Charleston (8 Al-
len, 330), 13.58.
Middleton v. City of Elkhart (120
Ind. 166), 64B.
Middleton v. Greeson (106 Ind. 18),
621, 823, 1329, 1330.
Middleton v. Mullica (113 U. S. 433),
953.
Middleton v. Railroad Co. (26 N. J.
Eq. 269), 529.
Middleton v. State (120 Ind. 166),
309.
Middletown Village. In re (83 N. Y.
196), 68U.
Midland School Districts, In re (40
Mich. 551), 819, 830.
Mikesell v. Durkee (81 Kan. 509; 9
Pac. Rep. 278), .586, 1195.
Milan v. Tennessee Cent. R. Co. (11
Lea (Tenn.), 330), 932, 944.
Miles V. Albany (59 Vt. 79), 1393.
Miles V. Citv of Worcester (154 Mass.
511), 7e6.
Miles City u. Kern (Mont, 29 Pac.
Eep, 7£0), 541.
Milford V. Greenbush (77 Me. 330 ;'
9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 71),'
1399
Milford v. Milford Water Co. (124
Pa. St. 610; 17 Atl. Rep. 185;
33 W, N. C. 413), 1297.
Milford Scliool Town v. Powner (126
Ind. 538; 26 N. E. Rep. 484), 286,
810.
Milford School Town v. Zeigler (1
Ind. App. 138; 27 N. E. Rep. 303),
28B, 1342.
Milhau V. Sharp (15 Barb. 193), 785.
Milhau V. Sharp (17 Barb. 435; 27
N. Y. 611; 84 Ara. Dec. 314),
283, 568, 579, 612, 633, 1314.
Milk V. Kent (60 Ind. 226), 433.
Millard v. Education Board (19 111.
App. 48), 1326,
Millard v. Jenkins (9 Wend. 398),
218.
Miller v. Berlen (13 Blatchf. 315),
965.
Miller v. Board (66 Ind. 162), 933.
Miller v. Bradford (13 Iowa, 14). 335.
Miller v. Brown (56 N. Y. 383), 339.
Miller v. Callaway (33 Ark. 666), 300.
Miller v. Erabreo (88 Ind. 183), 895.
Miller V. Gorman (38 Pa. St. 309),
1568.
Miller v. Grice (2 Rich. Law (S. C),
27), 339.
Miller i». Horton (152 Mass. 540: 26
N. E. Rep. 150), 595, 1020. 1048.
Miller v. Jones (80 Ala. 89), 617.
Miller v. Lpnch (1 Wall. Jr. 310), 563.
Miller v. Mc Williams (50 Ala. 427),
149, 1377.
Miller v. Mayor &c. (N. J. Eq., 30
Atl. Rep. 61), 1099. 1145.
Miller v. Mobile (47 Ala. 163), 1174.
Miller v. Moore (3 Humph. 189), 325.
Miller v. New York (109 U. S. 385),
758.
Miller v. O'Reilly (84 Ind. 168), 539.
Miller «..Ru*;ker(l Bush (Ky.), 135),
318.
Miller v. St. Paul (38 Minn. 134; 36
N. W. Rep. 371), 334, 1437, 1468,
1473.
Miller v. Supervisors (35 Cal. 93), 190,
203.
Miller v. White River School Tp.
(101 Ind. 503), 821.
Milliard v. Lafayette (5 La. Afln.
113), 698.
Milliken v. City Council &o. (54 Tex.
388), 520.
Mills V. Brooklyn (33 N. Y. 489), 263,
775, 777, 1080, 1137, 1435, 1436,
1438.
Mills V. Charleton (29 Wis. 400), 558,
1383, 138U. . .
clxviii
TABLE OF CASES,
[The references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 78B-1605.]
Mills V. Gleason (11 Wis, 470; 8 Am.
Law Reg. 693), 257, 288, 713,
794. 928. 933, 941.
Mills V. Hendricks (50 Ind. 436),
1577.
Mills V. Thornton (26 III. 300), 1350.
Mills V. Township of Richland (73
• Mich. 100; 40 N. W. Rep. 183),
439.
Mills V. Williams (11 Ired. 558), 110,
111.
Mills County v: Burlington &c. R.
Co. (47 Iowa, 66), 654.
Millsaps V. Monroe (37 La. Ann. 641),
609.
Milner v. Pensacola (3 Woods, 633).
97, 417, 423, 1368.
Miltenberger v. Cooke (18 Wall. 431),
628.
Milward v. Thatcher (2 T. R. 81),
189, 201.
Milwaukee v. City of Milwaukee (13
Wis. 93), 439, 4.54, 1368.
Milwaukee v. Koeffler(U6 U. S. 219),
1573.
Milwaukee v. Railway (7 Wis. 85),
1090.
Milwaukee &c. R. Co. v. Faribault
(23 Minn. 167), 683.
Milwaukee Industrial School v. Su-
pervisors (40 Wis. 328), 1008,
1009.
Mims V. West (38 Ga. 18). 964.
Miner v. Fredonia (27 N. Y. 155;,
1359.
Miners' Bank v, Iowa (13 How. 1), 53.
Miners' Bank v. United States (1
Greene (Iowa), 553), S, 7.
Miners' Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach (87
Cal. 543), 5, 230, 353.
Miniok v. aty of Troy (83 N. Y.
514), 1698.
Minis V. Minis (35 Ala. 23), 335.
Minneapolis v. Northwestern R. Co.
(32 Minn. 453), 706.
Minneapolis &c. Ry. Co. v. Becket
(75 Iowa, 183), 1540.
Minneapolis Gas Light Co. v. Minne-
'apolis (36 Minn. 159; 30 N, W.
Rep. 450), 194, 283, 1390.
Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Palmer
(30 Minn. 468), 1160,
Minor v. Bank (1 Pet. 46), 308.
Minor v. Happersett (31 Wall. 163),
• 147, 376.
Minot V. Curtis (7 Mass. 441), 451.
Minot V. West Roxbury(112 Mass. 1;
17 Am. Dec. 52), 636, 668.
Minturn v. Larue (23 How. 435), 93,
549, 56ti. 633, 638.
Minturn v. Larue (1 McAl. 370), 597.
Mirande, Ex paHe (78 Oal. 365; 14
Pac. Rep. 888), 274, 358.
Mississippi v. Johnson (4 Wall. 498),
1339.
Mississippi &o. Boom Co. v. Patter-
son (98 U. S. 403), 700.
Missouri v. Horseman (16 Upper Can.
(Q.'B.)588). 308.
Missouri v. Lewis (101 U. S. 33), 147,
1253.
Missouri Paci R. Co. v. Hennessey
(75 Tex. 155), 1486.
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Houseman
(41 Kan. 300), 692.
Mis^uri Pac. R. Co. v. Hunes (115
U. S. 513), 696.
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. City of
Wyandotte (Kan., 33 Pac. Rep.
930), 509, 1064. ,
Missouri River &c. R. Co. v. Comm'rs
Of Marion County (12 Kan. 483),
360.
Mitchell V. Brown (18 N. H. 315), 355,
361. 363.
Mitchell -u Burlington (4 Wall. 370),
561. 794, 935, 933.
Mitchell V. Cuvell (11 La. Ann. 253),
710.
Mitchell V. Illinois &o. R. Co. (68
III. 386). 696.
Mitchell V. Inhabitants of Albion (81
Me. 483; 17 Atl. Rep. 546), 917,
918.
Mitchell V. Milwaukee (18 Wis. 92),
1574.
Mitchell V. Pittsburgh (33 Mo. App.
555). 14S6.
Mitchell V. Rockland (41, Me. 363),
1040.
Mitchell 1'. Rockland (45 Me. 496 ; 66
Am. Deo. 252), 281, 251, 642,
1040.
Mitchell V. Rockland (53 Me. 118), 10,
156, 1038, 1378.
Mitchell V. Tallapoosa County (30
Ala. 130), 744. -
Mitchell V. Treasurer of Franklin
County (25 Ohio St. 143). 14.
Mitchell V. United States (31 Wall.
350), 976.
Mitchell V. Wardeld (20 111. 160),
1075.
Mitchell V. Worcester (139 Mass. 535),
1481.
Mix V. Ross (57 111. 131), 1395.
Moale V. Mayor &c. (61 Md. 224),
1179.
Moberry v. Jeffersonville (38 Ind.
198). 1112, 1172, 1174.
Mobile V. Baldwin (57 Ala. 61), 1353.
Mobile V. Craft (Ala., 10 So. Rep.
534), 600.
Mobile V. Jones (43 Ala. 630), 539.
Mobile V. Rowland (26 Ala.
1598.
TABLE OF CASES.
clxix
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Mobile V. Watson (116 U. S. 289),
130, 421, 434, 474.
Mobile I'. Yuille (30 Ala. 137), 599.
Mobile County v. Kimball (103 U. S.
691). 740, 773, 1168, 1337, 1403,
1433, 1434.
Mobile &o. R. Co. v. Kennerly (74
Ala. f566), 1396.
Mobile Sav. Bank v. Oktibbeha
County (24 Fed. Rep. 110), 940,
965, 966.
Moers v. Sm^dley (6 Johns. Ch. 37),
1569.
Moffett V. South Park (111., 28 N. E.
Rep. 975), 1408.
Moffitt V. State (40 Ind. 317), 1036.
Moger V. Escott (L. R. 7 C. P. 158),
134.
Mohawk Bridge Co, v. Utica &c. R.
Co. (6 Paige, 554), 5fi8, 584.
Moiles V. Watson (00 Mich. 415), 1338.
Moir V. Hopkins (16 111. 313 ; 63 Am.
Dec. 313). 209.
Molett V. Keenan (22 Ala. 484), 690.
Moll V. School Directors (23 111. App.
508). 919, 1347.
MoUaiidin v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. (14
Fed. Rep. 394), 674.
MoUie Hall, In re (10 Neb. 537), 525,
537.
Mona^han v. Philadelphia (28 Pa. St
207), 1377.
Monk V. New Utrecht (104 N. Y. 552),
748, 771. 1432, 1471.
Monougahela Bridge Co. ■». Bevard
(Pa., 11 Atl. Rep. 575), 1493.
MoDongahela Bridge Co. v. Pitts-
burgh R. Co. (114 Pa. St. 478),
1432.
MoBongahela City v. Fischer (111 Pa.
St. 9), 1438, 145t
Monroe v. City of Lawrence (44 Kan.
607; 24 Pac. Reo. 1113), .599.
Monroe v. Collins (17 Ohio St. 665),
376, 377, 378.
Monroe v. Gerspach (33 La. Ann.
1011), 605.
Monroe v. Hoffman (39 La. Ann,
651), 1246.
Monroe v. Neuer (35 La. Ann. 1192),
1358.
Monroe County v. Flynt(80 Ga. 489;
6 S. E. Rep. 173). 1587.
Monroe County v. Teller (51 Iowa,
670), 1006.
Monson v. Tripp (81 Me. 34; 16 Atl.
Rep. 337), 196.
Montolair v. Ramsdell(107 U. S. 147),
948.
Monterey v. Berkshire (7 Cush. 395),
1420.
Montezuma v. Minor (73 Ga. 484),
1263.
Montezuma v. Wilson (Ga., 9 S. E.
Rep. 17), 1473.
Montgomery v. Belser (53 Ala. 879),
646. ■
Montgomery v. Des Moines (55 Iowa,
101), 1478.
Montgomery v. Hernandez (13
Wheat. 129), 475.
Montgomery v. Hutchinson (13 Ala.
573), 1034.
Montgomery v. Jackson County (33
Wis. 69), 659.
Montgomery v. Knox (64 Ala. 463),
1382.
Montgomery v. Sayre (65 Ala. 564),
1568.
Montgomery v. State (38 Ala. 162),
1383.
Montgomery v. Townsend (84 Ala.
478; 4. So. Rep. 780), 674, 1156,
1157.
Montgomery v. Township of St.
Marys (43 Fed. Rep. 362), 953.
Montgomery v. Wasem (116 Ind.
343; 15 N. E. Rep. 795), 1126.
Montgomery City Council v. Mont.
&c. R. Co. (31 Ala. 76), 643.
Montgomery County v. Auchley (93
Mo. 126: 15 S. W. Rep. 6), 867,
1338, 1.592.
Montgomery County v. Menifee
County Court (Ky., 18 S. W.
Rep. 1021), 458. 1391.
Montgomery Gas-light Co. v. City
Council (87 Ala. 315; 6 So. Rep.
113), 1314, 1315.
Montgomery S. R. Co. v. Sayre (73
Ala. 443). 696.
Monticello y. Lowell (70 Me. 437), 332.
Montpelier v. East Montpelier (29 Vt.
13), 480, 1368.
Montross v. State (61 Miss. 439), 1261.
Montville v. Haughton (7 Conn. 543),
Q19 QRJJ
Moode 'v. Board &c. (43 Minn. 312),
1347.
Moody V. Mayor (43 Barb. 282), 1036.
Mooers v. Sm"edley (6 Johns. (3h. 28),
1189.
Mooney v. Kennett (19 Mo. 551), 90,
541.
Moor V. Newfield (4 Greenl. (Me.)
44), ^48, 372, 915, 1336.
Moore v. Abbott (32 Me. 46), 1453,
1495.
Moore v. Atlanta (70 Ga. 611), 1139.
Moore v. Beattie (33 Vt. 219), 348,
368.
Moore v. City of Albany (98 N. Y.
396), 257, 1134.
Moore v. City of Huntington (31
West Va. 843; 8 S. E. Rep. 512).
1491, 1495, 1496, 1497, 1499.
«clxx
TABLE OF OASES.
pThe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
Moore V. City of Ionia (81 Mich. 635;
48 N. W. Rep. 25), 1198.
Moore V. City of Minneapolis (43
Minn. 418; 45 N. W. Rep. 719),
600.
Moore v. City of Plattville (Wis., 47
■ N. W. Rep. 1055), 1140.
Moore v. City of Riclimond (85 Va.
538; 8 S. E. Eep. 387). 1485. 1497.
Moore v. Cline (61 Ind. 113), 1112.
Moore v. Directors (59 Pa. St. 333),
1391, 1580.
Moore v. Fassenbeok (88 111. 433),
1333.
Moore v. Gadsden (93 N. Y. 13),
1300, 1331, 1441.
Moore V. Graves (3 N. H. 408), 313.
Moore v. Illinois (14 How. 19). 604.
Moore v. Madison Co. (38 Ala. 670),
325
Moore v. Mayor (4 Sandf. Ch. 456),
691.
Moore v. Mayor &c. of N. Y. (73 N.
Y. 238!, 330, 237, 238, 651.
Moore v. Railroad Co. (136 N. Y.
671), 1491.
Moore v. State (11 Lea (Tenn.), 35),
5b7.
Moore V. State (9 Mo. 330), 310.
Moore v. Townsliip of Kenockee (75
Mich. 332), 1431.
Moor^u. Sweetwater (2 Wyo. 8). 1577.
Moore V. Waco City (Tex., 20 S. W.
Rep. 61), 1413.
Moore V. Williams (15 N. Y. 503),
1231.
Moose V. Carson (104 N. C. 431 ; 17
Am. St. Rep. 681), 1143, 1144.
Moral School Tp. v. Harrison (74
Ind. 93), 314.
Moran v. Long Island City (101 N. Y.
439), 93, 114.
Moran v, Lurdell (53 Mo. 339). 1175.
Moran v. Miami County (3 Black,
723), 947. 957.
Moran v. New Orleans (113 TJ. S. 69),
511.
Moran v. Rennard (3 Brewst. (Pa.)
601), 218.
Morano v. Mayor (3 La. 217), 580,
581, 1243.
Morey v. Brown (43 N. H. 873),
1605.
Morey v. Fitzgerald (56 Vt. 487),
1473.
Morford v. Unger (8 Iowa, 83). 63,
67, 88, 128, 393. 403, 441, 1360.
Morgan i;. Beloit City (7 Wall. 613).
391, 439. 45.5.
Morgan v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (36
Mich. 428), 691.
Morgan v. Commonwealth (55 Pa.
St. 456), 1373.
Morgan v. Cree (46 Vt. 773), 139fi.
Morgan v. Dudley (18 B. Mon. (Ey.)
69J). 318.
Morgan v. Gloucester City (44 N. J,
Law, 137), 375.
Morgan v. Hendricks (33 Ind. 334).
]3tj8.
Morgan v. Hollowell (57 Me. 375),
770, 1448.
Morgan v. Long (39 Iowa, 434), 331.
Morgan v. Menzies (69 Cal. 341),
254.
Mo%an V. Parkham (16 Wall. 471),
1353.
Morgan v. Quackenbnsh (33 Barb.
72), 199, 389.
Morgan County t>. Seaton (133 Ind.
53 1 ; 24 N. E. Rep. 313), 798, 974.
Morgan Park v. Gahan (33 111. App.
646; 36 N. E. Rep. 1085), 717,
1105.
Moi-gan Steamship Co. v. La. Board
of Health (118 U. S. iSn), 1043.
Morley v. City of New York (13 N.
Y. Supl. 609), 183, 204.
Morley V. Town of Metamora (78 111.
394; 30 Am. Rep. 266), 309, 325,
326.
Morrell v. Sylvester (1 Greenl. (Me.)
348), 310.
Morrill v. State (38 Wis. 428). 1388.
Morrill v. Thurston (46 Vt. 733), 339.
Morrill v. T. M. &c. Co. (10 Nev.
137), 1588,
Morris v. Baltimore (5 Gill (Md.),
344), 246.
Morris v. 6oard of Comni'rs (Ind., 31
N. E. Rep, 77), 1014.
Morris D. Kasling (Tex., 15 S. W.
Rep. 2'.'6), 607.
Morris v. Mason#(43 La. Ann. .590),
1271.
Morris v. Mayor (3 La. 317), 1344.
Morris t>. Powell (125 Ind. 281; 25
N. E. Rep. 221), 378.
Morris v. Sea Girt Imp. Co. (38 N. J.
Eq. 301), 685.
Morris v. State (63 Tex. 728), 136.
Morris v. State (65 Tex. 53), 466.
MoiTis County v. Hinchman (31 Kan.
729), 713.
Morrison v. Fayette County (127 Pa.
St. 110: 17Atl. Rep. 755), 890.
Morrison v. Hershire (33 Iowa, 271),
1163, 1186.
Morrison v. Hinkson (87 111. 587),
1381, 159.5.
Morrison v. Howe (120 Mass. 565),
339.
Morrison v. Lawrence (98 Mass. 219),
301, 774, 126S.
Morrison v. McDonald (31 Me. 650),
193, 195.
TABLE OF OASES.
clxxi
FThe references are to pages: VoL 1, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
Morrison v. McFarland (51 Ind. 206),
218, 319.
Morrison v. Wasson (79 Ind. 477),
1572.
Morristown v. Fitzpatriok (94 Pa. St.
121), 75K.
Morrow v. Weed (4 Iowa, 77), 691.
Morrow County v. HenJrvx (14 Or.
397), 450.
Morse v. City of West port (Mo., 19
S. W. Rep. 831), 583.
Morse v. Hitchcock County (19 Neb.
566), 445.
Morse v. Minneapolis R. Co. (30
Minn. 465), 1486.
Moi-se V. Richmond (41 Vt. 435),
1467.
Morse v. Stooker (I Allen, 150), 1096.
Morse v. Williamson (35 Barb. 473),
339.
Morse v. Worcester (139 Mass. 389),
767.
Morseman v. Ionia (33 Micfa. 283),
693.
Mortgage Co. v. City of Mitchell (So.
Dak., 48 N. W. Rep. 131), 909.
Morton v. CoirptroUer-General (4 S.
C. 430). 220.
Morton v. Peck (3 Wis. 714). 14.
Morton u. Youngerman (89 Kv. 505),
169.
Morville v. American Tract Society
(123 Mass. 139). 238, 628.
Moser v. Shamlefler (39 Kan. 635;
18 Pac. Rep. 956). 173, 175.
Moser v. White (39 Mich. 49), 1391.
Moses V. Railroad Co. (31 111. 516),
587.
Moses V. St. Louis Sectional Dock
Co. (84 Mo. 243; 9 Mo. App. 571).
692.
Mosher V. School Dist. (44 Iowa, 132),
840.
Mosier v. Des Moines (31 Iowa, 174),
437.
Mosley v. Walker (7 Barn. & C. 55),
1243.
Moss V. Cummings (44 Mich. 359),
1579.
Moss V. Harpeth Academy (7 Heisk.
(Tenn.) 383), 933.
Moss V. Oakland (88 111. 109), 508.
Moss V. Overseers of Litchfield (7
Man. &G. 72), 134.
Moss V. Shear (25 Cal. 38), 1368.
Moss V. State (10 Mo. 338; 74. Am.
Dec. 116), 329.
Mossman v. Forrest (37 Ind. 333), 694.
Mott V. Hicks (1 Cowen, 513 ; 13 Am.
Dec. 5r)0), 213.
Mott V. Reynolds (37 Vt. 206), 1272.
Mott V. United States Trust Co. (19
Barb. 569), 955.
L
Motz V. Detroit (18 Mich. 495), 1154,
1169, 1187, 1574.
Moulton V. Evansville (25 Fed. Rep.
382), 961.
Moulton V. Sanford(51 Me. 127), l453,
1454.
Moultrie v. Rockingham &c. Sav.
Bank (93 U. S. 631), 947.
Moultrie County v. Fairfield (105 U.
S. 370), 944, 945.
Moultrie Co. v. Rockingham &c.
Bank (93 U. S. 631), 960.
Moundsville v. Fountain (27 West
Va. 182), 1240, 1369, 1262.
Moundsville v. Velton (35 West Va.
679), 1364.
Mount Adams &c. Inclined Ry. Co.
V. City of Cincinnati (35 Wkly.
Law Bull. 91). 610.
Mount Morris Square, In re (3 Hill,
14), 301, 497, 554, 1575, 1576.
Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith (100 tJ.
S. 514), 78, 94, 391, 421, 434, 439,
464. 1379, 1394.
Mount Pleasant v. Breeze (11 Iowa,
399), 529, 603.
Mount Vernon v. Dusouchett (3 Ind.
586), 1500.
Mount Vernon v. Hovey (56 Ind.
563). 933.
Mount Vernon v. Patton (94 111. 65),
658, 824.
Mount Zion v. Gillman (14 Fed. Rep.
123), 1571.
Mountain v. Multnomah County (16
Or. 379; 18 Pac. Rep. 464), 634.
Mower v. Leicester (9 Mass. 347; 6
Am. Dee. 63), 8, 9, 153, 156, 746,
749, 1603.
Mozley v. Alston (1 Phill. 790), 398.
Mugler V. Kansas (133 U. S. 623),
1544.
Muhler v. Hedekin (119 Ind. 481 ; 20
N. E. Rep. 700), 204.
Mulcairns v. Janesville (67 Wis. 34),
773.
MulhoUand v. Bryant (39 Ind. 163),
166. ■
MulhoUand v. City of New York (113
N. Y. 631 ; 20 N. E. Rep. 856).
1109.
MulhoUand v. Mayor (113 N. Y. 631 ;
30 N. E. Rep. 856). 71'6.
MuUarky v. Cedar Falls (19 Iowa, 21),
283.
MuUpn V. Mayor &c. of New York
(12 N. Y. Sup!. 269), 182. 188.
MuUer v. Dows (94 U. S. 444), 3.
Muller V. English (21 N. J. Law, 317),
378.
Mulligan v. Smith (59 Cal. 306), 693,
1067, 1068, 1174.
Mullikin V. State (7 Blackf. 77), 1334.
clxxii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n. pp. '(89-1605.]
Mulvane v. City of South Topeka (45
Kan. 45; 25 Pao. Rep. 317), 1313.
Mumford v. Memphis &o. R. Co. (3
Lea(Tenn. ), 393 ; 1 Am. Rep. 616),
321
Mumma's Appeal (127 Pa. St. 474),
999
Muncey v. Joest (74 Ind. 409), 691,
1419.
Munday v. Rahway (48 N. J. Law,
338), 1371.
Mundell v. City of Pasadena (87 Gal.
520; 25 Pac. Rep. 1061), 188.
Mupger V. City of Waterloo (Iowa,
49 N. W. Rep. 1028), 1201.
Municipality v. Biineau (3 La. Ann.
688), 520.
Municipality v. Cutting (4 La. Ann.
3'35), 484, 533. 1243.
Municipality v. Duncan (3 La. Ann.
'183), 1369.
Municipality v, Dunn (10 La. Ann.
57), 1159, 1161, 1163, 1363.
Municipality v. Morgan (1 La. Ann.
Ill), 535.
Municinality v. Michaud (6 La. Ann.
605), 1864.
Municipality v. Millaudon (13 La.
Ann. 769), 1383.
Municipality v. Orleans Theatre Co.
(3 Rob. (La.) 209), 941.
Municipality v. State Bank (5 La.
Ann. 394), 1358.
Municipality v. White (9 La. Ann,
446), 1363.
Munn V. Illinois (94 U. S. 113), 6,
573, 574.
Munro v. Merchant (28 N. T. 9), 141.
Munroe v. Jackson (55 Me. 59), 995.
Munson v. Minor (23 111. 595), 1573.
Munson v. New York (3 Fed. Rep.
339), 749.
Murdock v. Academv (13 Pick. 344),
206, 207.
Murdock v. District of Columbia (23
Ct. CI. 464), 1105.
Murphey v. People (3 Cowen, 815),
1357.
Murphy, Ex parte (7 Cowen, 158),
163.
Murphy v. Bank (30 Pa. St. 417), 1561.
Murphy v. Brooklyn (98 N. Y. 648),
1404.
Murphy v. Buffalo (38 Hun, 49),
1485.
Mutphy V. City of Albina (Oregon,
39 Pao. Rep. 353), 1140, 1141.
Murphy v. City of Peoria (119 111.
509; 9N. E. Rep. 895), 1094.
Murphy v. Conim'rs (14 Minn. 69),
1003.
Murphy v. East Portland (43 Fed.
Rep. 308), 843.
Murphy v. Gloucester (105 Mass.
4f0), 1471, 1473.
Murphv V. Hall (68 Wis. 210; 31 N.
W." Rep. 754), 558.
Murphy v. Indianapolis (83 Ind. 76),
1493.
Murphy *. Jacksonville (18 Fla. 818),
666, 816.
Murphy v. Louisville (9 Bush, 189),
643, 1170.
Murphy u. Ramsey (114 U. S. 15), 53.
Murphy v. Wilmington (6 Houston,
* 108), ]lii77. 1579.
Murray v. Hoboken Land &c. Co.
(it How. 272), 984, 1178.
Murray v. Lardher (3 Wall. 110), 957,
958.
Murray v. Railroad Co. (93 N. C. 93),
1493.
Murray v. Tucker (10 Bush, 240),
706, 1189.
Muscatine v. Keokuk &c. Packing
Co. (45 Iowa, 185). 244.
Muscatine v. Steck (7 Iowa, 505),
1262, 1264.
Muscatine &c. R. Co. v. Harton (33
Iowa, 33), 318.
Muscatine Turnverein v. Funok (18
Iowa, 469). 465.
Musgrave v. St. Louis Church (10
La. Ann. 431), 1036.
Musgrove i'. Nevinson (1 Str. 584 ; 3
Ld.Raym. 1359), 371.
Muskegis V. Drainage Comm'rs
(Wis., 47 N. W. Rep. 11). 1097.
Mussel V. Tama County (73 Iowa,
101 ; 34 N. W. Rep. 762), 988.-
Musselman v. Manly (43 Ind. 463),
301.
Musser v. Johnson (43 Mo. 74; 97
Am. Dec. 316), 314.
Mulchler v. Easton City (9 Pa. Co.
Ct. 613). 717.
Mutual &o. Co. V. Wilcox (8 Biss. C.
C. 197), 313.
Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Elizabeth
(43 N. J. Law, 335), 641, 948, 950.
Mutual L. & B. Ass'n v. Price (IB
Fla. 304; 36 Am. Rep. 703), 329.
Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Easton &o. R.
Co. (38 N. J. Eq. 133), 691.
Mutual Union Telegraph Co. v. Chi-
cago (16 Fed. Rep. S09), 1319.
Muzzy V. Shattuck (1 Denio, 233),
831.
Mvers v. Indianapolis &c. R. Co.
(113 111. 386), 1497.
Myers v. Irwin (3 Serg. & R. 368), 56.
Myers v. People (36 III. 173), 1356.
Myers v. School Trustees (21 111. App.
323), 1341.
Myers v. United States (32 Ct. 01.
80), 742.
TABLE OF OASES.
elxxiii
pThe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Myers v. United States (1 McLean,
493), 334.
Myrick v. City of La Crosse (17 Wis.
442). 1126.
Mygatt V. Green Bay (1 Bias. (C. C.)
392), 947, 955.
Mygatt V. Washburn (15 N. Y. 316),
327.
N.
Nagel V. Buffalo (34 Hun, 1), 1485.
Nail & Iron Co. v. Furnace Co. (46
Ohio St. 644), 1431.
Nally V. Carpet Co. (51 Conn. 524),
1486.
Nance v. Johnson (Tex., 19 S. W.
Rep. 5'59), 651.
Napa V. Easterby (61 Gal. 509), 503.
Napa V. Easterby (76 Cal. 223; 18
Pac. Rep. 353), 501, 506, 508.
Napa &c. R. Co. v. Napa County (30
Cal. 437). 683.
N'apnian v. People (19 Mich. 353),
488, 543.
Nash 7!. City of St. Paul (8 Minn.
173), 332, 640, 641.
Nash V. Lowry (37 Minn. 261; 33 N.
W. Rep. 787), 566.
Nash V. St. Paul (11 Minn. 174), 639.
Nashville v. Altlirop (5 Cold. (Tenn.)
554), 1370.
Nashville v. Smith (86 Tenn. 213),
1397.
Nashville v. Thomas (5 CoW. (Tenn.)
600), 1359, 1383.
Nashville v. Toney (10 Lea, 643),
485.
Nashville &c. E. Co. v. Wiison
(Tenn.. 15 S. W. Rep. 446). 1397.
Nason i;. Directors of Poor (136 Pa.
St. 445; 17 Atl. Rep. 616; 24 W.
N. C. 60). 333, 854, 968.
Natal V. State of Louisiana (139 TT.
S. 621; 11 8. Ct. Rep. 635; 43
La. Ann. 613; 1 So. Rep. 933),
544, 580, 1343.
National Bank v. Comm'rs (9 Wall.
353), 1352.
National Bank v. Kirby (108 Mass.
497), 957.
National Bank v. Matthews (98 IT. S.
621), 646.
National Bank v. Town of Grenada
(41 Fed. Rep. 87), 510, 937.
National Bank v. Yankton (101 U. S.
129), 53.
National Bank &c. v. Lowell (109
Mass. 314), 234.
National Bank of Chemung v. El-
mira (33 N. Y. 49: 6 Lans. (N,
Y.) 116;, 336. 240, 1576.
National Bank of Commerce v. Town
of Grenada (44 Fed. Rep. 363),
484, 503, 503.
National Bank of the Republic v.
City of St. Joseph (31 Fed. Rep.
316), 641, 966.
National D. & C. Ry. Co. v. State
(N. J., 21 Atl. Rep. .570), 591.
National D. R. Co. v. Central R. Co.
(33 N. J. Bq. 755), 591.
National Lumber Co. v. City of Wy-
more(30 Neb. 3S6;46N. W. Rep.
6S3-), 891.
National State Bank v. Independent
Dist. (39 Iowa, 490), 841.
National Water-works Co, v. School
Dist. (48 Fed. Rep. 538). 1299.
Nations v. Johnson (34 How. 195),
690.
Naumann v. Board of City Canvass-
ers (73 Mich. 353; 41 N. W. Rep.
367), 161.
Nauvoo V. Ritter (97 U. S. 389), 947.
Navasota v. Pearce (46 Tex. 535), 9.
Naylor v. Field (39 N. J. Law, 287),
113.
Naylor v. Galesburg(56 111. 385), 536.
Nayior v. Sharpless (3 Mod. 23). 297.
Neal V. Comm'rs of Burke (83 N. C.
420), 977.
Neal V. Delaware (103 U. S. 370), 147,
148.
Neals V. State (10 Mo. 498), 1259.
Neary v. Robinson (98 N. Y. 81 ; 27
mm, 14,5), S99.
Nebraska City v. Campbell (3 Black,
590), 9, 769.
Nebraska City v. Lampkiu (6 Neb.
27), 677.
Needham v. Morton (146 Mass. 476),
1393.
Needham v. School Dist. (Vt., S Atl.
Rep. 198), 1333.
Needham v. Wellesley (139 Mass.
372). 1343.
Neely v. Yorkville (10 S. C. 141),
208, 642.
Neenan v. Smith (50 Mo. 525), 1182,
1187.
Neff V. Wellesley (148 Mass. 487 ; 20
N. E, Rep. Ill), 969, 1005.
Neier v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (Mo.,
1 S. W. Rep. 386), 1209.
Neitzel v. Concordia (14 Kan. 446),
539.
Neitzey v. Baltimore &c. R. Co. (5
Mackev, 34), 1206.
Nelson v. Canisteo (100 N. Y. 89),
2b5.
Nelson v. La Porte (33 Ind. 268),
H€0, 1394.
Nelson v. McArthur (38 Mich. 304),
50.
olxxiv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I; pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp."789-1605.]
Nelson v. Mayor &c. (63 N. Y. 53S
5 Hun, 190), 340, 845.
Nelson v. Mayor of New Tork (5
N./Y. Supl. 689). 715.
Nelson V. Milford (7 Pick. 18), 363,
663, 661. 664, 1384.
Nelson v. Pierce (6 N. H. 194), 851.
Nelson V. St. Martin's Parish (111
N. Y. 716), 526. 1372, 1379.
' Nelson v.- United States (32 Ct. CI.
1591, 742.
Nesbit V. Independent Dist. of River-
side (U. S., 13 S. Ct. itep. 746),
841, 9B3.
Nesbit V. Matthews (16 N. Y. Supl.
303), 1356.
Nesbit V. Riverside School Dist. (35
Fed. Rep. 1)35). 966.
Nesbit V. Trumbo (39 III. 110), 684.
.Neugassu. City of New Orleans (43
La. Ann. 163; 7 So. Rep. 565),
796.
Nevada Bank v. Sedgwick (104 U. S.
111). 13.59.
Nevada Bank v. Steinmitz (64 Cal.
301), 940.
N<j7il vl Clifford (55 Wis. 161). 647.
Nevin v. Roach (86 Ky. 493; 5 S. W.
Rep. 546). 498, 1169.
Nevin v. Rochester (76 N. Y. 619),
1438.
Nevins v. Peoria (41 111. 503). 677.
New Albany v. McCuUoch (137 Ind.
500 1. 839.
New Albany v. Meekin (3 Ind. 471),
13o0, 1351. 13.i3.
New Athens v. Thomas (83 111. 359),
360.
New Bedford v. Taunton (9 Allen,
307). 969. , t
New Bedford &o. R. Co. v. Acushnet
&c. R. Co. (143 Mass. 200). 114. ,
New Boston v. Dunbarton (13 N. H.
409). 50.
New Boston v. Dunbarton (15 N. H.
301). 54. 93.
New Brighton Borough v. Peirsol
(107 Pa. St. 280), 1149, 1457.
New Brunswick v. Williamson (44
N. J. Law, 165), 113.
New Brunswick Rubber Co. v.
Comm'rs (38 N. J. Law, 190),
1176.
New Buffalo v. Irpn Co. (105 U. S.
73), 943.
New Central Coal Co. v. George's
&c. Co. (37 Md. 537), 683.
New Decatur v. Berry (40 Ala. 432 ;
7 So. Rep. 838), 610.
New Hampton v. ConroyX56 Iowa,
498), 1341.
New Hartford v. Town of Canaan
(53 Conn. 158), 990.
New Haven v. Fair Haven &a R.
Co. (38 Conn. 433), 1167.
New Haven v. Sargent (38 Conn. 53),
1150.
New Haven v. Town of Middlebury
•(63 Vt. 399; 31 Atl. Rep. 608), 997.
New Haven &c.' R. Co. v. Chatham
(42 Conn. 465), 373, 961, 1273.
New Ibera Trustees v. Mignes (33 La.
Ann. 923), 1357.
New Jersey v. Wilson (7 Cranch,
164), 741.
Ifcw Jersey v. Yard (95 TJ. S. 104),
1103.
New Jersey &c. Telephone Co. v.
Fire Commissioners (34 N. J. Eq.
il7), 230.
New Kiowa i'. Craven (Kan,, 36 Pac.
Rep. 436), 762.
New London r. Brainard (32 Conn.
552). 616, 1583.
New Marlborough v. Counity
Comm'rs (9 Met. 433), 1591.
New Orleans v. Bank (15 La. Ann.
107), 1358.
New Orleans v. Baudro (14 La. Ann.
303). 541.
New Orleans v. Bonds (14 La. Ann.
303), 90.
New Orleans v. Brooks (36 La. Ann.
641), 375.
New Orleans f. Canal &c. Co. (33 La.
Ann. 105), 1363.
New Orleans v. Carondelet &c. Cp.
(36 La. Ann. 396), 1396.
New Orleans v. Cazelar (37 La. Ann.
156). 1363, 1365.
New Orleans v. Clark (95 U. S. 644),
2.59. 416, 1371.
New Orleans v. Commercial Bank
(10 La. Ann. 735), 13.58.
New Orleans v. Costello (14 La. Ann.
87). 1257,
New Orleans v. Crescent City (41
La. Ann. 904). 719.
New Orleans v. Elliott (10 La. Ann.
59), 1370.
New Orleans v. Firemen's Charita-
ble Ass'n (43 La. Ann. 447 ; 9 So.
Rep. 486), 719.
New Orleans v. Fonrohy (30 La.
Ann,, pt. 1, 910). 1353.
New Orleans v. Great So. Tel. Co.
(4 La. Ann. 41 ; 3 So. Rep. 533),
718.
New Orleans v. Home Mut. Ins. Co.
(23 La. Ann. 61), 1595.
New Orleans v. Hoyle (23 La. Ann.
740), 110.
New Orleans v. Kauflman (29 La.
Ann. 383). 1369.
New Orleans v. Lagarde(10 La. Ann,
150), 704.
TABLE OF OASES.
clxxv
[Th? references are to pages: Vol.
New Orleans v. Michoud (10 La. Ann.
763), 403.
New Orleans v. Morris (3 Woods,
103), 581, 1380.
New Orleans v. New Orleans &c. Co.
(33 La. Ann. 105), 1396.
New Orleans v. People's Bank (32 La.
Ann. 82), 1353.
New Orleans v. Poutz (14 La. Ann.
866), 941.,
New Orleans v. St. Charles R. Co.
(S8 La. Ann. 597), 719.
New Orleans r. St. Louis Church (11
La. Ann. 214), 303, 936, 1026.
New Orleans V. Savings Bank (31 La.
Ann. 826), 1353.
New Orleans v. Ship Windermere
(12 La. Ann. 84), 1042.
New Orleans v. Southern Bank (15
La. Ann. 89). 112.
New Orleans v. Stafford (27 lla, Ann.
417), 530, 1243, 1244.
New Orleans v. Steiger (11 La, Ann.
68). 1369.
New Orleans v. Sugar Shed Co. (35
La. Ann. 548), 719.
New Orleans v. Turpin (13 La. Ann.
56), 1356.
New Orleans v. United States (10
Pet. 717), 634, 1143.
New Orleans v. United States (49
Fed. Rep. 40), 1535.
New Orleans v. Water-works Co.
(36 La. Ann. 432), 719.
New Orleans v. Wire (30 La. Ann.
500). 1181.
New Orleans &c. Co, v. New Or-
leans (30 La. Ann. 1371), 1577.
New Orleans &c. Co, R. v. Mayo (39
Miss. 374), 703.
New Orleans &c. R. Co. v. New Or-
leans (26 La. Ann. 478), 634.
New. Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana
Light Co. (115 U. S. 650), 1103.
New Orleans Cras 'Light Co. v. City
of New Orleans (43 La. Ann.
188; 7 So. Rep. 559), 569, 1313.
New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Hart
(40 La. Aiin. 474; 4 So. Rep.
21.5), 1218, 1231.
New Orleans R. Co. v, Frederic (46
Miss. 1), 690.
New Providence v. Halsey(117 U. S.
336), 948, 956.
New Providence v. McEachron (33
N. J., Law, 339), 331.
New Rochelle Water Co., Matter of
(46 Hun, 525), 686.
New Salem, Petitioner (6 Pick. .470),
705.
New Shoreham v. Ball (14 R. I. 566),
661.
New .York, In re (11 Johns. 7.7), 1361.
I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
New York v, Bailey (2 Denjo, 483);
686.
New York v, Broadway &c. R. Co.
(17 Hun, 243), 1358.
New York v. Colgate (12 N. Y. 141);
1181.
Now York v. Dimick (2 N. Y. Supl.
46), 1443.
New York v. Furze (3 Hill, 612), 749,
771, 1445.
New York v. Lord (18 Wend. 126),
759.
New Yoi'k V. Odrenaux (13 Johns.
132), 538.
New York v. ReillT (13 N. Y. Supl.
632), U07.
New York v. Ryan (35 How. Pr. 408),
3?0.
New York v. Second Ave. R. Co. (32
N. Y. 261). 568, 612, 1355.
New York &c. R. Co., In re (66 N.
Y. 407), 683. '
New York &c. R. Co. v. City of
Waterbury (55 Conn. 19; 10 Atl.
Rep. 163), 50Q.
New York &o. R. Co. v. City of
Waterbury (60 Conn. 1 ; 22 Atl.
Rep. 439), 1070.
New York &c. R. Co. v. Marsh (12
N. Y. 308), 1577.
New York &o. R. Co. w.. Marvin (H
N. Y. 276), 1?63.
New York &c. R. Cd. v. Met. Gas
Co. (63 N. Y. 326), 4, 7.
New York &c. R. Co. v. New York
(1 Hilt. 563), 785.
New York &c. R. Co. v. Van Horn
(57 N. Y. 473), 640, 1382.
New York &c. Ry. Co., In re (90
N. Y. 18; 1 N. E. Rep. 27), 582.
New York & Harlem R. Co. v. Rail-
way Co. (50 Barb. 285), 1205.
New York &c. Saw Mill Co. v. Brook-
lyn (71 N. Y. 580), 751.
New York &c. Trustees, In re (57
How. Pr. (N. Y.) 500), 283.
New York Cent. R. Co., Matter of
(77 N. Y. 248), 1403.
New Yoi'k Health'Depslrtiient v.
Van Cott (51 N. Y. Super. Ct.
413),'197.
New York Indians' Case (5 Wall^
761), 142.
New York Life Ins, Co. v. Staats (21,
Barb. 570), 297.
New York Life Ins. Co. v. White (17
N. Y. 469), 335. .
Newark v- Assessor (30 N. J. Law, .
13), 1351.
Newark v. Deh &c. R. Co. (N. J., 7
Atl. Rep. 123), 1219.
Newark «. Elliott (5 Ohio St. 114),
624, 939.
elxxvi
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Newark v. Tank (13 Ohio St. 469),
1597.
Newark v. Stoekton (44 J?. J. Eg.
179), 624.
Bewail t>. Stout (52 N. J. Law, 35;
. 18 Atl. Rep. 943), 171, 316.
N«'wark Aqueduct foard v. City of
Passaic (45 N. J. Eq. 393; 18
Atl. Rep. 106), 1033.
Newark Aqueduct Board v. Lowe
(46 N. J. Bq. 593; 30 Atl. Rep.
54 ; 23 Atl. Rep. 55). 1083.
Newaygo Cbunty Mfg. Co. v,
Echtinau (81 Mich. 41^, 377, 389.
Newberry v. Fox (87 Minn. 141; 33
N. W. Rep. 333), 330, 233, 249,
640.
Newbury v. Brunswick (3 Vt. 151),
S94.
Newburvport v. Cbunty Comra'rs
(13 Met. 211), 1575, 1576.
Newburyport v. Creedon (148 Mass.
158; 19 N. E. Rep. 341), 1006.
Newburyport v. Waltham (150 Mass.
311; 23 N. E. jtep. 46), 978, 980.
Newby v. Free (72 Iowa, 379) 1347.
Newcastle R. Co. v. Peru &c. B. Co.
(3 Ind. 464). OaS.
Newell V. Cincinnati (Ohio, 15 N. E.
Rep. 196), 1171.
KJBwgass V. City of New Orleans (42
La. Ann. 169), 632. 933.
Newlan v. Aurora (14 111. 3ti4), 544.
Newland v. Marsh, (19 HI. 376), 524.
Newland Ave., In re (38 N. Y. St.
Rep. 796: 15 N. Y. Supl. 63), 373.
Niewling v. Franojs ;;! L. R. 189), 189.
Newman v. Arcbe (9 Baxt. 380), 1386.
N«wtnan v. City of Emporia (32
Kan. 456), 259, 1171.
Newman v. Justices (5 Sneed (Tenn,),
695), 1378.
Newman v. Metropolitan &c. By. Co.
(118 N. Y. eiS), 70a
Newman v. Scott &Ci (1 Heisk, 787),
1376.
Newman v. Sylvester (43 lad. 112),
214.
Newman v. tTdited States (31 Ct, CI.
205), 743.
Newman v. Wait (46 Vt. 689), 1359.
Newmeyer v. Railroad Go. (62 Mo,
. 83), 613, 646.
Newport v. Newport & Cin. Bridge
Co. (Ky., 8 L R, An. 484; 29
Am. & Bng. Corp. Cas. 491; 13
8. W. Rep. 730), 617.
Newport v. Newport Gas Light Co.
(84 Ky. 166), 631, 1315.
Newpwt V. Ringo's Ex'r (87 Ky.
635), 1355,
Newsom v. G-eorgia R. Co. (62 Ga.
339), 1468.
NewsoB V. Galveston (76 Tex. 559),
1344.
Newton V. Belger (143 Mass. 598; 10
N. E. Rep. 464), .580, 616.
Newton v. Ellis (85 Eng. C, L. 133),
1452.
Newton V. 7be Commissioners (100
U. S, 528), 86.
Ney u Swinney (36 Ind. 454), 698.
Ney V. Troy (3 N. Y. Supl. 679),
1461.
Niagara &c. Bridge Co. v. Bachman
• (66N. Y.361), 1406, 1411.
Niagara Falls v. Salt (45 Hun, ,41),
1343.
Niagara Falls &c. Ry. Co., In ve (108
». Y. 375), 682.
Nichol V. Mayor &c. (9 Humph. 253),
93; 933.
Nichols, In re f6 Abb. N. C. 474; 57
How. Pr. 895), 306.
Nichols, In re (48 Fed. Rep. 169),
1240.
Nichols V. Athens (66 Me. 403), 1468.
Nichols V. Boston (98 Mass, 39), 193,
767.
Nichols V. City of Bridgeport (33
Conn. 189), 669, 690, 702, 1163,
1188, 1419.
Nichols V. City of St. Paul (44 Minn.
494; 47 N. W. Rep. 168), 1140.
Nichols V. Duluth (40 Minn. 389),
758.
Nichols V. MacLean (101 N. Y. 536),
200.
Nichols V. Minneapolis (30 Minn. 545),
783, 1488.
Nichols V. Walter (37 Minn. 364; 33
N. W. Rep. 800), 557.
Nickman v. O'Neil (10 Cal. 294), 1254.
Nicolay v. St. Clair County (3 Dill.
(C. C.)168), 947, 961.
Niconlin v. Lowery (49 N. J. Law,
891), 518.
Nightingale's Case (11 Pick. 168), 551,
580, 705, 124*}.
Niklaus v. CoBkliDg(118'Ind. 289; 30
N. E. Rep. 7^7), 1126.
Niles V. Patch (IS Gray, 354), 866.
Niles, Mavor &c. v, Mbzzv(83 Mich.
1; 30 'Am. Rep. 670), 186.
Niles Water-works v. Niles (59 Mich.
311; 11 Am. & Eng. Corp* Cas.
299), 360, 80.5.
Nims V. Mavor (59 N. Y. 508), 1137.
Niven v. Rochester (76 N. Y. 619),
1492.
Nixon V. Newport (13 R. I. 454),
759
Nixon V. School Dist. (83 Kan. 510),
1395.
Nixon V. State (96 Ind. Ill), 854.
Noble V. Vinceanes (42 Ind. 135), 936.
TABLE OF OASES.
clxxvii
[The references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; VoL n. pp. 789-1605.]
Noble Scbocl Furniture Co. v. Wash-
ington School Tp. (Ind., 39 N. E.
Rep. 935), 814, 815.
Noeckeru People (91 111. 494), 1249.
Nolan V. King (97 N. Y. 565), 1494.
Nolan V. Reese (S3 Cal, 484), 1189.
Nolan County v. Simpson (74 Tex.
218: 11 S. W. Rep. 1098), 854.
Nolan County u. State (17 S. W. Rep.
823). 576, 796, 843.
Noll V. Bubuque &c. R. Co. (33 Iowa,
66), 669.
Noonan v. City of Albanv (79 N. Y.
470; 35 Am. Eep. BiiO), 9, 263,
767, 1147.
Noonan v. City of Stillwater (33
Minn. 198). 1086.
NorfleetiJ. Cromwell (70 N. G. 634;
16 Am. Rep. 787), 686.
Normand v. Otoe Co. (8 Neb. 18), 646,
Norris, Ex parte (8 S. O. 408), 200.
Norris v. Eaton (7 N. H. 281), 349.
Norris v. Mayor (1 Swan (Tenn.),
167), 392. 418, 467, 1366.
Norris v. Mayor &c. (7 Md. 515),
1120.
Norris v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore
(44 Md. 5a8), 698.
Norris v. Nashville (6 Lea (Tenn.),
337), 1366.
Norris v. School Dist. (12 Me. 293),
1330
Norris u Staps (Hob. 211), 90.
Norris v. Waco (57 Tex. 635), 416,
1362, 1367.
Norristown v. Fitspatripk (94 Pa.
St. 121), 755. 763: "
Norristown v. Moyer (67 Pa. St. 355),
1198, 1446.
North V. Cincinnati &c. R. Co. (10
Ohio St. 548), 1588.
North Beach &c. E. Co.'a Appeal (32
Cal. 499), 1358.
North Carolina Endowment Fund v.
Satchwell (71 N. C. Ill), 50.
North Carolina R. Co. v, Alamance
(77 N. C. 4), 1577.
North Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Town
of Lake View (105 111. 207 ; 44
Am. Rep. 788), 1053, 1054.
North Hempstead v. Hempstead
(Hopk. 288), 1386.
North Hempstead v. Hempstead (2
Wend. 109), 8, 56, 451, 464, 1368.
North Lebanon v. Arnold (47 Pa. St.
488), 149.
North Manheim ',.v. Arnold (119 Pa.
St. S80), 1467.
North Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Lack-
land (35 Mo. 515), 698.
North Pac.'Lumbering & Manuf. Co.
V. City of East Portland (14 Ore-
gon, 3; 13 Pac. Rep. 4), 1110. ,
North Pa. R. Co. v. Adams (54 Pa,
St. 94). 958.
North Springfield v. City of Spring-
field (111., 39 N. E. Rep. 849), 408.
North Vernon v. Voegler (103 Ind.
814), 1099.
North Yarmouth v. Skillings (45 Me.
133), 95, 391, 451, 1388.
Northampton v. Itiuea (26 Pa. St.
156), 1011.
Northampton Bridge Case (116 Mass.
- 442), 670.
Northern Bank of Toledo v. Porter
Township (110 U. S. 608), 256,
640, 642, 834, 946, 963.
Northern Cent. R. Co. v. Baltimore
(31 Ind. 93), 383.
Northern Ind. R. Co. v. Connelly (10
Ohio St. 159). 1166. 1108.
Northern Liberties v. Gas Co. (13 Pa.
•St. 318), 1207.
Northern Liberties v. St. John's
Church (13 Pa. St. 104), 593, 1166.
Northern Liberties v. Swain (13 Pa.
St. 113), 1164.
Northfield v. Merrimack County (43
N, H. 165), 976.
Northfield v. Taunton (4 Met. 433),
985.
Northrop v. Burrows (10 Abb. Pr.
365), 1048.
Northrup v. Town of Pittsfield (2
N. Y. Super. Ct. (T. & S.) 108),
830.
Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Over-
holt (4 Dill. 287), 955.
Northwestern Packet Co. v. St. Paul
(3. Dill. 454). 580.
Northwestern Union Packet Co. v.
City of Louisiana (4 Dill. 17, n.),
580.
North wood v. Barrington (9 N. H.
369), 375. '
Norton, In re (Q. B., June 8, 1872),
203.
Norton v. Brownsville (129 U. S.
479), 944.
Norton v. City of East St. Louis (36
111. App. 171), 838.
Norton v. Dyersburg (127 U. S. 160;
8 S. Ct. Rep. 1111), 563, 925, 931,
1372, 1378.
Norton v. Peck (^ Wis. 714), 703.
Norton v. Petrie (59 Conn. 200),
1363.
Norton v. St. Louis (97 Mo. 537),
1443.
Norton v. Shelby County (118 U. S.
.435), 199, 391, 840,. 927.
Norton v. Walkill R. Co. (63 Barb.
77), 1419.
Norwich v. County Comm'rs (13
Pick. 60), 1096.
olxxviii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Norwich v. Saybrook (5 Conn. 384),
98».
Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich
City Gas Co. (25 Conn. 19), 568,
613.
Norwich Overseers &c. v. New Ber-
lin &c. (18 Johns. 383), 648.
Norwood V. Gonzales County (79
Tex. 318), 1416.
Note's Case (11 Me. 308). 1259.
Nottingham v. Amwell (31 N. J.
Law, 37), 978.
Nowell V. WriRht (3 Allen, 166). 319.
Noxon V. Hill (3 Allen. 315), 338.
Noyes v. Haverhill (11 Gush. 388),
1578.
Noyes v. Mason City (53 Iowa, 418;
5 N. W. Rep. 593), 1153.
Noyes v. Spaulding: (37 Vt. 420), 943.
Noyes v. Stillman (34 Ctmn. 15). 1036.
Nudd V. Hobbs (17 N. H. 534^ 1408.
Nugent V. State a8 Ala. 521). 1355.
Nugent V. Supervisors of Putnam
County (19 Wall. 241), 943, 943,
945.
Nugent V. Wrinn (44 Conn. 378), 979.
Nuneaton Local Board v. Sewage
Co. (L. R. 20 Eq. 127), 1059.
o.
Oakes v. Hill (10 Pick, 333), 135.
Cakes v. Hill (14 Pick. 442), 1367.
Oakham v. Sutton (13 Met. 193), 983.
Oakland v. Carpenter (13 Cal. 540),
283, 293, 550, 1389.
O'Brien v. City of St. Paul (18 Minn.
163), 1145.
O'Brien v. City of St. Paul (35 Minn.
331), 586, 673, 1144, 1145.
O'Brien v. Mayor &c. of New York
(19 N. Y. Supl. 793), 720.
O'Brien i'. Pennsylvania &c. R. Co.
(llOta. St. 184), 674.
O'Brien v. Philadelphia (150 Pa. St.
689), 1457.
Oceana v. Hart (48 Mich. 319), 838.
O'Connor v. Memphis (6 La. 730), 97.
O'Connor v. Pittsburg (18 Pa, St,
187), 779, 1149.
Oconto County v. Hall (47 Wis. 308),
292,
O'Dea V. City of Winona (41 Minn,
424; 43 N, W. Rep. 97), 1108,
1109.
Odiorne v. Rand (59 N. H. 504), 326.
O'Donnell v. Bailey (34 Miss. 386),
1359, 1383.
O'Donovan v. Wilkins (Fla., 4 So.
Rep, 789), 1043.
O'Dowd V. City of Boston (149 Mass.
4i3; 31 N. E. Rep. 949j, 305.
O'Ferrall v. Colby (2 Minn. 180), 389.
Ogden V. City of Philadelphia (143
Pa. St. 430; 33 Atl. Rep. 694),
1149, 1157.
Dgden v. Daviess County (103 U. 8.
634), 619, 643, 933, 934.
Ogden V. Ravmond (33 Conn. 379;
58 Am. Dee. 429), 313.
Ogdsn V. Town of Lake View (121
111. 433), 1175.
Ogden City v. McLaughlin (Utah,
16 Pac. Rep. 781), 1348.
Ogg V. Lansing (35 Iowa, 4915), 333,
»735, 778, 1037.
Ohio V. Comm'rs &c. (14 Ohio St.
569), 933.
Ohio V. Covipgton (89 Ohio St. 103).
50.
O'Hare v. Town of Park River (N.
Dak., i891; 47 N. W. Rep. 380),
180, ,503^;V
Ohio V. Treasurer (23 Ohio St. 144),
1330.
Ohio &c. R. Co. V. Lawrence (37 111.
50), 1576.
Ohio Val. I. Works v. Moundsville
(11 West Va. 1), 619.
Oil City V. McAboy (74 Pa. St, 849),
1589.
Oil City Bridge v. Jackson (114 Pa.
St. 331), 1449.
Oil Co. V. Palmer (20 Minn. 468),
1127.
O'Keefe, In re (19 N. Y. Supl. 676),
534.
O'Keefe v. Northampton (145 Mass.
115; 13 N. E. Rep. 383), 899.
Olathe City v. Mizee (48 Kan. 435),
1468.
O'Laughlin v. Dubuque (43 Iowa,
•539), 1498.
Olcott V. Supervisors (16 Wall. 678),
61, 933. 964, 1373.
Old Colony &c. R. Co. v. Fall River
(147 Mass; 455), 1189.
Oldis V. Donmille (Show. Pari. Cas.
63), 1594.
Oldknow V. Wainwright (3 Burr.
1017; 1 W. Bl. 339), 164, 169,
494.
Oldtown V. Bangor (58 Jle. 353), 138.
O'Leary v. How (7 La. Ann. 25),
1163.
O'Leary t'. Mankato City (23 Minn.
276), 1486,
Olin V. Meyers (55 Iowa, 209), 1265.
Oliphant v. Comm'rs of Atchison
County (18 Kan, 386), 693, 694,
1416.
Olive Cemetery Co. v. Philadelphia
(93 Pa. St. 129), 1166.
Oliver v. Keightley (34 Ind. 514),
646.
TABLE or OASES.
clxxix
pThe references are to pages: Vol.
Oliver v. Memphis &c. R. Coi (30
Ark. 128), 1571.
Oliver v.. Omaha (3 Dill. 360), 1364,
1365.
Oliver v. Washington Mills (11 Allen,
268), 144. 1351.
Oliver v. Worcester (103 Mass. 489),
480, 760, 768, 769, 770, 1006, 1226,
1448.
Oliver v. Worthington (11 Allen,
268), 1388.
Olmstead v. Board (24 lovira, 33), 648.
Olmstead v. Camp (33 Conn. 551),
682.
Olmstead v. Dennis (77 N. Y. 378),
200, 202, 319, 390.
Olmsted v. Proprietors &c. (46 N. J.
Law, 495), 683.
Olney V. Harvey (50 111. 453), 97,
458, 1368, 1381.
Olney v. Wharf (115 111. 528; 5 N. E.
Rep. 866), 587, 674.
Olph V. Leddick (59 Hun, 637; 14
N. Y. Supl. 41), 814.
Olsen V. City of Chippewa Falls (71
Wis. .'558; 37 N. W. Rep. 575),
1473.
Olson V. Worcester (142 Mass. 536),
1478.
Olyinpia v. Mann (1 Wash. St. 389 ;
25 Pac. Rep. 337), 594, 1346.
Omaha v. Kramer (25 Neb. 489; 41
N. W. Rep. 295), 1149, 1151.
Omaha v. Olmstead (5 Neb. 446),
1263,
Omaha v. South Omaha (Neb., 47
N. W. Rep. 1118), 400.
Omaha Nat. Bank v. Omaha (15 Nev.
333), 939.
O'Maley v. Freeport (96 Pa. St. 24),
518.
O'Malia v. Wentwprth (65 Me. 129),
541.
O'Mally V. McGuin (53 Wis. 353),
1267.
O'Marrow v. Port Huron (47 Mich.
585), 312.
O'Meara v. Green (16 Mo. App. 118),
1123.
O'Meara v. Green (25 Mo. App. 199),
1161.
O'Meara v. Mayor &c. (1 Daly, 425),
1038.
Oneida Bank v. Ontario Bank (31 N.
Y. 490), 236, 645.
O'Neil V. Battle (15 N. Y. Supl. 818),
13B0.
O'Neil V. Deerfleld (86 Mich. 610).
1431.
O'Neil V. Freeholders (41 N, J. Law,
161), 697.
O'Neil V. New Orleans (30 La. Ann.
320), 9, 265.
I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
O'Neil V. West Branch (81 Mich.
344), 1447, 1450.
O'Neill V. Register (Md., 23 Atl.
Rep. 960), 1878.
Ontario v. Hill (99 N. Y. 324), 952.
Ontario &c. R. Co. v. Taylor (6 Ont.
Rep. Q. B. Div. 338), 699.
Ontario Bank v. Bonnell (10 Wend,
186), 1860.
Opdike V. Daniel (59 Ala. 311), 983.
Opelousas v. Andrus (87 La. Ann.
699), 500.
Opinion of Judges (33 Me. 587), 396.
Opinion of Judges (38 Me. 597), 885.
Opinion of Judges (58 Me. 590), 559,
1393.
Opinion of Judges (64 Me. 596), 385.
Opinion of Judges (41 N. H. 551; 11
Am. Law Reg. 743), 384.
Opinion of Judges (58 N. H, 631),
389.
Opinion of Judges (58 N. H. 623),
1373.
Opinion of Justices (6 Cush. 580),
393.
Opinion of Justices (117 Mass. 603),
158.
Opinion of Justices (150 Mass. 592;
24 N. E. Rep. 1084), 559, 560.
Opinion of Justices, In re House
Bill No. 519 (Mass., 30 N. E.
Rep. 1142), 559.
Opinion of Supreme Court &c. (9
Colo. 689; 31 Pac. Rep. 478),
458.
Orange &o. R. Co. v. Alexandria (17
Gratt. 176), 1166, 1301, 1385,
1396.
Orchard v. School Dist. (14 Neb, 878),
987.
Ordinary v. Retailers (42 Ga. 335),
1333.
O'Reiley v. Kankakee County (32
Ind. 169). 684, 1024.
O'Reilley v. Kingston (1 14 N. Y. 439 ;
21 N. E. Rep. 1004), 1123, 1174,
1186.
O'Reilly v. Holt (4 Woods, 645),
1185.
O'Reilly v. Sing Sing (15 N. Y. St.
Rep. 905: 1 N. Y. Supl. 582),
781, 1501.
Oregon «.' Jennings (119 U. S. 74),
255. 946.
Oregon v. Pyle (1 Oreg. 149), 187.
Oregonian Ry. Co. v. Railroad (10
Saw. 464), 645.
Orford v. Benton (36 N, H, 395), 872.
Orleans v. Perry (34 Neb, 831 ; 40
N. W. Rep. 417), 1499.
Orleans v. Piatt (99 U. S. 676), 964.
Orleans <&c. R. Co. v. Dunn (51 Ala;
128), 933.
\ f I'^'X A
TABLE OF OASES.
CThe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Orman v. Cheworth (6 Mad. 163>,
1404.
Orfne'v. Richmond (79 Va. 86), 1471.
OrovilJe &c. E. Co. v. Plumas
County (37 Cal. 362). 1547.
Orphan Asylum's Appeal (111 Pa.
St. 133), 1163, 1949.
Orr V.' Hodgson (4 Whe^t. 453], 139.
Orr V. Quimby (54 N. Hi .M6), 704.
Orser v. Hoag (8 Hill, 79), 138.
Orton V. State (IS Wis. 509), 186.
Osage City v. L^rkins (40 Kan, 203 ;
19 Pac. Rep. 6.58), 1463.
Osborn v. Bank of the United States
(9 Wheat. 738), 4, 51.
Osborn v. Bank of the United States
(9 Wheat. 61), 51.
Osborn v. People (103 111. 334), 1558.
Osborn v. Selectmen of Lenox (2
Allen, 207), 1604.
Osborn v. United States (86 U. S.
577), 839.
Osborne, In re (101 Pa. St. 334), 68.
Osborne v. Adams County (106 U. S.
181 ; 3 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
284), 931.
Osborne v. Detroit (33 Fed. Rep. 36),
1446, 1476, 1477, 1493.
Osborne v. Ke'rr (13 Wend. 179), 313.
Osborne v. Hamilton (39 Kan. 1),
1480.
Osgood V. Blake (31 N. H. 551). 350,
373.
Oshkosh V. Milwaukee &c. Ry. Co.
(74 Wis. 534 ; 48 N. W. Rep. 489),
1530, 1531.
Oshkosh V. Schwartz (55 Wis. 483),
539, 541, 544.
Osterhoudt v. Rigney (98 N. Y. 322),
210, 780, 990.
Oswald II. Mayor of Berwick (5 H. of
L. Cas. 856), 331,
Oswego V. Collins (38 Hun, 171),
1242.
Oswego V. Oswego Canal Co. (6 N. Y.
237), 140(5, 1409, 1414.
Oswego Falls Bridge Co. v. Fish (1
Barb. Ch. 547), 568.
Otis V. De Boer (116 Ind. 531 ; 19 N. E.
Rep. 141), 1126.
Otis V. Stockton (76 Me. 506). 941.
Otis V. Strafford (10 N. S. 352), 989.
Otoe County v. Baldwin (111 U. S.
1), 639, 941.
Otsego Lake Township v. Kireten
(Mich., 40 N. W. Rep. 36), 916.
Ottawa V. Carev (108 U. S. 110; 3 S.
Ct. Rep., 361), 559, 619, 6i;9, 931,
933, 934. '
Ottawa V. National Bank (105 U. S.
■ 342), 931, 946, 956.
Ottawa V. People (48 111, 233), 1553.
Ottawa V. Spencer (40 III. 211), 1863.
Ottaiwa V. Washabaugh (11 Kan,
12% 1198,
Ottawa Comrn'rs v. Nelson (19 Kan.
234), 1369.
Ottawa Gas Co. n. McCaleb (81 111.
556), 1363, 1399. " '
Ottawa Gas Light Co. v. People (111.,
37 N. E. Rep. 934), 796.
Ottendorfer v. Fortunato (56 N. Y.
Super. Ot. 495; 4 'K Y. Supl.
639), 1106,
Ottoman Calivey Co, v. Philadel-
- pjiia (Pa., 13 Am. & Eng. Corp.
' Cas. 534), 308.
Ottumwa V. C3iinn (75- Iowa, 405),
1060.
Ottumwa V. Schaub (52 Iowa, 515),
548, 1366, 1367, 1269.
Ould V. Richmond (33 Gratt. 464),
1355, 1369.
Outagamie County v. Town of
Greenville (77 Wi^. 165 ; 45 N. W.
Rep. 1090), 888, 891, 892.
Over V. Greenfield (107 Ind. 231), 261.
Overing v. Foote(65 N. Y. 363), 1178,
1179.
Overseer of Franklin Township v,
t)verseer of Clinton Township
(51 N. J. Law, 93 ; 16 Atl. Rep.
184), 446.
Overseer of Franklin Township v.
Overseer of Lebanon Township
(51 N. J. Law, 93; 16 Atl. Rep.
184|, 446.
Overseers v. McCoy (3 P. & W. (Pa.)
342), 977.
Overseers v. Overseers (18 Johns.
407). 195.
Overseers v. Overseers of Pharsalia
(15N. Y. 341), 252. '
Overseers of Gilpin Tp. v. Overseer
of Polk Tp.(118 fa. St. 84 -^'il
Atl. Rep. 791), 977,
Overseers of Lewisbutg «. Overseers
of Milton (P^., 18 W. N. C."l41X
982.
Overseers of Manchester v. Guard-
ians &o. (16 Q. B. 72'§), 977.
Overseers of Norwich v. Overseers
of Berlin (18 Johns. 383), 208','
Overseers of Pittsburg v. Oversegrs
of Plattsburg (15 Johns. 436), 196.
Overseers of Poor &c. v. Sears (33
Pick. 123). 135.
Overseers of Poor of Cascade Tp. v.
Overseers of Poor of Lewis Tp.
(Pa., 33 Atl. Rep. 1003), 978.985.
Overseers of Poor of Lawrence Tp. v.
Overseers of Poor (Pa., 38 Atl.
Rep. 1134), 982.
Overseers of Poor of Walker Tp. v.
Overseers of Poor (Pa., 23 Atl.
Rep. 1C02), 978.
TABLE OF OASES.
clxxxi
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1606.]
OTe^aeem oS- Taylor v. Overseers of
Shenango (114 Pa. St. SJ94; 6 Atl,
iRep. 47^. 9i?T.
Overseers of WashingtoQ Tp. v.
Overseers of SSast %unswieb Tp.
(3 Penny. (Pa.) 108), 983.
Oveiwhiner v. Jones (66 Ind. 452),
1113.
Ovitt w. Chase (37 Vt. 196). 348, 368,
1836.
Owen V. Hill (61 Mich. 48), 1385.
Owens V. MUvv>aukee (4f-WJa. 461),
1577.
Owens V. O'Brien (78 Va'. 116), 315.
Owens V. State (64 Tex. 500), 166.
Owensboro v. Hickman (Ey., 14 S.
W. Bep. 698), 378.
Owings V. Jones (9 Md. 108), 1036.
O wings V. Speed (5 Wheat- 430), 91,
93, 1266.
Owners &o. v. Albany (15 Wend.
374), 685, 690.
Owners of Lands v. People (113 111.
304), 1024.
Oxford &c. Society v. Society (55
N. H. 463), 503.
Ozier i>. Hinesburgh (44 Vt. 220),
1451.
Pace V. Ortiz (73 Tex. 437; 10 S. W.
Eep. 541), 1538.
Pace V. People (50 III. 432), 203.
Pacific V. Seifert (79 Mo. 210), 523.
Pacific Bridge Co. v. Clackamas
County (45 Fed. Rep, 217), 790.
Pacific Hotel v. Lieb (83 111. 602),
1363.
Pacific B. Co. V. Cass (53 Mo. 17),
1361.
Pa0ifi& R. Co. V. Bensbaw (18 Mo.
310), 943.
Pack V. Mayor &c. (8 N. Y. 232),
1444.
Pack V. Supervisors (36 Mich. 377),
1317,
Packard v. Jefferson County (2 Colo.
938), 935, 939.
Packard v. Mendegbftll (42 Ind. 598),
1419.
Packard v. Railway Co. (48 N. J.
Eq. ,281 ; 22 Atl. Rep. 227), 593,
1077.
Packet Cq. v. Keokuk (95 V. 8. 80),
579
Packet Co. v. St. Louis (KM U. S.
•428), 1388.
Packet Co. v. Sorrels (50 Ark. 466),
624.
Padelford v. Savannah (14 Ga. 438),
1351, 1356.
Padgett V. State (98 Ind. 396), 1534.
Paduoah v. Cully (9 Bush, 323), 324.
Paducah v. Memphis &c. Co. (13
Heisk. (Tenn.) 1), 702.
Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah
Water Supply Co. (Ey., 13 8. W.
Rep, 554), 1308.
Page V. Allen (58 Pa. St. 338), 377,
646.
Page V. Hardin (8B. Mon. (Ey.) 648),
303, 207, 376. 1529.
Pagew. 0'To6le(144 Mass.. 303), .j673.
Paine v. Spratley (5 Kan. 523), 1166. :
Painter v. Township of Blairstown "
(N. J., 1^ Atl. Rep. 1S7), 1392.
Palmer v. Bearing (93 N. Y. 7), 1491,
1492.
Palmer v. Doney (2 Johns. Cas. 346),
1391.
Palmer v. Fitz (51 Ala. 489), 1388.
Palmer v. Highway Comm'rs (49
Mich. 45). 1420.
Palmer v. McMahon (133 U. S. 668 ;
10 S. Ct. Rep. 324), 558.
Palmer v. Mayor &c. of New York
(3 Sandf. 318), 184.
Palmer v. Stumph (29 Ind. 329), 1154,
1166, 11&7.
Palmer v. Vandenburgh (3 Wend.
193), 196, 991.
Palmer v. Way (6 Colo. 106), 1123,
1160, 1331.
Palmyra v. Morton (35 Mo. 593), 690,
1134. 1349.
Pana v. Bowler (107 U. S. 529), 958,
964.
Pana v. Lippincott (3 111. App. 466),
938, 941, 966.
Pandeman v. St. Charles County
(Mo., 19 S. W. Rep. 733), 1480.
Paola &c. Ry. Co. v. (/omm'rs (16
Kan. 302), 376, 377, 881.
Fappen v. Holmes (44 111. 360), 536.
Papworth v. Milwaukee (64 Wis.
390), 1443.
Paralee v. State (Ark., 4 S. W. Rep.
634), 1248.
Pardridge v. Village of Hyde Park
(131 III. 537). 526.
Paret v. Bayonne (89 N. J. Law,
559), 657, 658.
Paris V. Farmers' Bank (30 Mo. 575);
1361.
Paris V. People (37 111. 74). 311.
Parish v. Eden (62 Wis. 272), 1480.
Parish v. Golden (35 N. Y. 464), 1171.
Parish v. Stearns (21 Pick. 148), 1375.
Parish v. Wheeler (32 N. Y. 494).
646.
Parish in Sherburne t>. Fiske (8
Cush. 264), 208.
Parish of Ouichita v. Monroe (43 La.
Ann. 782), 549.
clzxxii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n. pp. 7S9-1605.]
Parish School Board v. Packwood
(43 La. Ann. 468; 7 So. Eep.
537), 806, 1334.
Park V. Board (3 Ind. App. 536; 30
N. E. Eep. 147), 1014, 1430.
Park V. Seattle (Wash., 31 Pao. Rep.
310). 1456.
Park County v. Jefferson County (13
Colo. 585; 31 Pac. Rep. 913),
' looi:
Parke Comm'rs *. O'Conner (86 Ind.
531), 1114.
Parker's Case (36 N. H. 84), 690.
Parker v. Buckner (67 Tex. 20), 1346.
Parker v. Challis (9 TLaa. 155), 1169,
1186.
Parker v. City of Springfield (147
Mass. 391). 1490. 1494, 1497.
Parker V. Commonwealth (6 Pa. St.
507), 74. .
Parker u. County of Saratoga (106
N. Y. 39-2; 13 N. E. Rep. 308),
811, 881, 914, 915.
Parker v. Portland. (54 Mich. 808),
1540.
Parker v. St. Paul (47 Minn. 317),
1406, 1431.
Parker v. Smith (3 111. App. 356),
939.
Parker v. Syracuse (31 N. Y. 376).
1115.
Parker v. Titcomb (83 Me. 180; 19
Atl. Rep. 162), 349, 361, 363, 633,
1333.
Parkersburg' v, Byown (106 IT. S.
487 ; a Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
263). 649, 939, 930, 1885, 1387.
Parkersburg Co. v. Parkersburg (107
- V. S: 691), 1423.
Parkersburg Gas Qo.v. Parkersburg
(30 West Va. 435), 549, 1313.
Parkhill v. Brighton (61 Iowa, 103),
1495.
Parkinson v. Parker (48 Iowa, 667),
327
Parkland v. Gains (Ky., 11 S. W.
Eep. 649), 1186.
Parks V. Boston (8 Pick. 318), 685,
1193, 1576.
Parks V. City of Boston (15 Pick.
193), 690, 1418, 1419,
Parks r. Newburyport (10 Gray, 38),
1146.
Parks V. Pleasant Grove School Dist.
(65 Iowa, 209). 1347. ,
I'arksham v. Justices (9 Ga. 841),
U83.
Parmerlee v. Chicago (60 111. 367),
1167.
Parnell v. Comm'rs (34 Ala. 378),
705.
Parr v. Village of Greenbush (73 N.
Y. 463), 262, 511, 034, 809.
Parrott v. Ice Co. (46 N. Y. 369),
1491.
Parry v. Berry (Comyns, 269), 290,
298.
Parsons, Ex parte (1 Hughes, 282),
804,
Parsons v. Brainard (17 Wend. 522),
335.
Parsons, v. City of Charleston (1
Hughes, 383), 1384.
Parsons v. Goshen (11 Pick. 396),
351, 643, 826, 1.398.
P^sons V. Jackson (99 TJ. S. .434),
965.
Parsons v. McGavock (3 Tenn. Ch.
581), 1596.
Parsons v. Monmouth (70 Me. 262),
356, 933.
Parsons ». Trustees (44 Ga. 529), 510.
Passage v. School Insp. (19 Mich.
330), 1336.
Patrick v. Robinson (83 Ala. 575; 3
So. Eep. 694), 1593.
Paterson i-. Barnet (46 N. J. Law,
I 62), 485.
Paterson v. Byram (23 N. J. Law,
394), 978.
Paterson v. Sobietv &c. (34 N. J.
Law, 385). 39, 40, 63, 67, 74, 86,
87, 109. 473, 1166.
Patten v. Green (13 Cal. 325), 1178,
1179.
Patterson v. Barlow (60 Pa. St. 54),
377.
Patterson v. Baumer (43 Iowa, 477),
686, 687, 1399.
Patterson v. City of Butler (83 Ga.
606), 1342.
Patterson v. Inhabitants <S;c. of Free-
hold (38 N. J. Law, 255), 324.
Patterson v. McReynolds (61 Mo.
203), 1364.
Patterson v. Miller (2 Met. (Ky.)
493). 200.
Patterson v. Munyan (93 Cal. 136),
1407.
Patton I). Board (96 ^nd. 131), 1430,
Patton V. Springfield (99 Mass. 637),
1363.
Patton V. Stephens (14 Bush(Ky.),
3- ), r,65. 6B6.
Pauer . . Albrecht (Wis., 39 N. W.
Rep. 771), 1218.
Paul I'. Carver (24 Pa. St. 207), 1195,
Paul V. Carver (26 Pa. St. 323), 1203. ■
Paul V. Detroit (33 Mioh. 108). 696.
Paul V. Gloucester County (50 N. J.
. Law, 585). 550.
Paul V. Kenosha (23 Wis. 266), 234,
Paul V. Pacific R. Co. (4 Dill. C. C.
35), 1571.
Paulson V. City of Portland (16
Oregon, 450), 1134, 1170, 1189.
TABLE OF OASES.
clxxxiii
FThe references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Paxson V. Sweet (13 N. J. Law (1
Green). 196), 531, 1123.
Payne v. Town of Dunham (29 111.
125), 976.
Payne v. Treadwell (16 Cal. 332), 625,
1388
Peabody v. Flint (6 Allen. 53). 398.
Peake v. City of New Orleans (38
Fed. Rep. 779), 905.
Pearce, In re (44 Ark. 509), 1576.
Pearce v. Augusta (37 Ga. 597), l351,
1356.
Pearce t'. Hawkins (3 Swan (Tenn.),
87), 200.
Pearce v. Hyde Park (126 111. 387),
1175.
Pearl Street, In re (11 Pa. St; 565),
1143.
Pearson v. City of Duluth (40 Minn.
438; 42 N. W. Rep. 394), 1099.
Pearson v. Wilson (57 Miss. 648),
190.
Pearsons v. University (44 Ga. 539),
1270.
Pease v. Whitney (8 Mass. 93), 1.S99.
Peavey i;. Robbins (3 Jones (N. C.)
Law, 339), 218.
Peay v. Little Rock (33 Ark. 31),
1185.
Peek V. Board (87 Ind. 321), 1037.
Peck V. Booth (43 Conn. 271), 348.
Peck V. Burr (10 N. Y. 394), 251.
Peck V. City of Rochester (3 N. Y.
Supl. 872). 493.
Peck V. Sherwood (56 N. Y. 615),
1066.
Peck V. Spencer (26 Fla. 23), 816.
Peck V. Watrous (30 Ohio St. 590),
1575.
Peckham v. Lebanon (39 Conn. 235),
1403.
Peddicord v. Baltimore &c. R. Co.
(53 Md. 243; 36 Am. Rep. 371),
590.
Pedrick v. Bailey (13 Gray, 161), 195,
518, 550, 551,1331, 1445.
Pedrick v. City of Ripen (73 Wis.
623; 41 N. W. Rep. 705), 647.
Peebles v. Comm'rs (83 N. C. 385),
■S89.
Peers v. Board of Education (73 111.
508), 833.
Peete v. Morgan (19 Wall. 581), 580,
1043, 1348.
Pegram v. Cleveland County
Comm'rs (64 N. C. 557), 1376,
1378.
Pegram v, Comm'rs &c. (65 N. C.
115), 281, 1549.
Peik V. Railway Co. (94 IT. S. 164),
6, 574.
Pekin v. Reynolds (31 111. 539), 955.
Pekin v. Smelzel (31 III. 464), 1241.
Pell V. Newark (40 N. J. Law, 550;
29 Am. Rep. 266), 125.
Pell V. Ulmar (31 Barb. 500), 397.
Pells V. Webquish (129 Mass, 469),
149.
Pelt V. Littler (14 Cal. 194), 336.
Pelton V. Crawford County (10 Wis.
63), 908.
Pelton V. Ottawa County Supervis-
ors (52 Mich. 517; 18 N. W. Rep.
245), 407.
Pembroke v. County Comm'rs (12
Cush. 351), 694.
Pendleton v. Amy (13 Wall. 397), 933, )
947, 960, 961.
Pendleton v. Miller (82 Va. 390),
1337.
Penn Tp. v. Perry Co. (78 Pa. St.
457), 1433.
Pennie v. Reis (133 U. S. 464), 1280.
Pennington v. Baehr (48 Cal. 565),
' 952.
Pennington v. Straight (54 Ind. 376),
230.
Pennock v. Hoover (5 Rawle, 291),
593, 1180.
Pennoyer «. Neff (95 U. S. 714), 693.
Pennover v. Saginaw (8 Mich. 534),
1147.
Pennruddock'a Case (5 Coke, 1006),
1036.
Pennsylvania Coi v. Frana (13 111.
App. 91), 523.
Pennsylvania Co. v. Henderson (51
Pa. St. 315), 1487.
Pennsylvania Co. v. Langendorff (48
Ohio St. 316), 1493.
Pennsylvania Co.'u. Sinclair (62 Ind.
301), 1500.
Pennsylvania Hall, In re (5 Pa. St.
304). 1257, 1373.
Pennsylvania L. Rod Co. v. Board
&c. (20 West Va. 360), 1830.
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Heister (8
Barr, 445), 694.
Pennsvlvania R. Co. v. Jersey City
(47 N. J. Law, 386). 518, 535.
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Marchant
(119 Pa. St. 541), 674.
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Philadel-
phia (47 Pa. St. 189), 932.
Penny v. Penny (37 L. J. Ch. 340),
699. 700.
Penny Pot Landing v. Philadelphia
(10 Pa. St. 79), 1143.
Penobscot &c. Co. v. Lawson (16 Me.
234). 139.
Penrice v. Wallls (37 Miss. 173), 702.
Pensacola v. Sullivan (23 Fla. 1),
1393.
People V. Abbott (107 N. Y. 325),
1334.
People V. Adams (9 Wend. 333), 1267.
clxxxiv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
People V. Adsit (3 Hill, 619). 786.
People V. Ah Ung ^Cal., 38 Pac. Rep.
373), 1255.
People V. Alameda County (26 Cal.
641), 453, 1371.
People V. Albany (11 Wend. 539),
776), 786.
People V. Albany Supervisors (13
Johns. 416), 1378.
People V. Albertson (8 How. Pr. 363),
198
People v. Albertson (55 N. Y. 50), 48,
158, 1277.
People V. Allen (53 N. Y. 588), 936,
1576.
People V. Andrews (104 N. Y. 570;
13 N. E. Rep. 374), 194.
People V. Anthony (6 Hun, 143), 178.
Peoples. Arensberg (105 N. Y. 123),
1231.
People V. Armstrong (73 Mich. 288),
1349.
People V. Assessors (44 Barb. 148),
1514.
People V. Assessors (39 N. Y. 81). 1575.
People V. Auditors (5 Hun, 647), 839.
People V. Auditors (13. Mich. 233),
1528.
People V. Austin (47 Cal. 353), 1163.
People V. Austin (11 Colo. 134; 17
Pac. Rep. 485), 911.
People V. Bagley (85 Cal. 343; 34
Pac. Rep. 716), 418.
People V. Baltimore &c. R. Co. (117
N. Y. 150; 27 N. Y. St. Rep.
153), 614.
People V. Bancroft (Idaho, 29 Pac.
Rep. 113), 468.-
People V. Bank (34 Wend. 431). 814.
People V. Baraga Township (39 Mich.
554), 308, 642.
,People V. Barden (30 N. Y. St. Rep.
53), 1513.
People V. Barnes (114 N. Y. 317; 20
N. E. Rep. 609; 21 N. E. Rep.
739), 889, 1525.
People V. Barrett (18 Hun, 206), 937.
People V. Barrett (8 N. Y. Supl. 677),
174.
People V. Bartlett(6 Wend. 423), 390.
People V. Batchellor (53 N. Y. 138),
48, 1382, ia89, 1393.
People V. Batchelor (23 N. Y. 128),
273 274 275
People v. Bedell'fS Hill, 196). 176.
People V. Bell (3 N. Y. Supl. 314),
1285 1289
People V. Bell (3 N. Y. Supl. 812),
1386.
People V. Bell (4 N. Y. Supl. 869),
1387.
People V. Bell (8 N. Y. Supl. 748),
1286, 1290.
People V. Benevolent Society (34 ^
How. Pr. 216), 206.
People V. Bennett (54 Barb. 480),
1379.
People V. Bennett (39 Mich. 451 ; 18
Am. Rep. 107), 18, 39. 393, 403.
People V. Betts (55 N. Y. 600|, 1576.
People V. Bingham (83 Cal. 238), 388.
People V. Bird (8 N. Y. Supl. 801),
160.
People V. BlatAman (14 Mich. 336),
819.
Peflple V. Blake (49 Barb. 9), 1S8.
People V. Blodgett (13 Mich. 137),
384.
People V. Board &c. (27 Cal. 65.5),
«61.
People V. Board &c. (101 111. 208),
1345. ^
People u. Board &c. (26 111. App.
4:76), ]3i7.
People V. Board &c. (18 Mich. 400),
1345.
People V. Board &c. (41 Mich. 647),
434.
Peoples. Board &c. f3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)
177), 1513.
People V. Board &c. (33 Barb. 344),
554.
People V. Board &c. (4 Hun, 94), 830.
People V. Board &c. (20 Hun, 333),
1290.
People V. Board &c. (46 Hun, 354),
1007.
People V. Board &c. (55 Hun, 445 ; 8
N. Y. Supl. 640), 1385.
People V. Board &c. (56 Hun, 459; 10
N. Y. Supl. 88), 888, 1519.
People V. Board &c. (58 Hun, 595;
35 N. Y. St. Rep. 411; 12 N. Y.
Supl. 5B), 1056.
People V. Board &c. (53 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 520), 1343.
People V. Board &c. (1 N. Y. Supl.
383), 1083.
People V. Board &c. (1 N. Y. Supl,
460), 901.
People V. Board &c. (1 N. Y. Supl.
593), 1336, 1368.
People V. Board &c. (1 N. Y. Supl.
743), 1337.
People V. Board &c. (4 N. Y. Supl.
108), 1344, 1347.
People V. Board &c. (5 N. Y. Supl.
392), 1541.
People V. Board &c. (7 N. Y. Supl.
806), 1283.
People V. Board &o. (11 N. Y. Supl.
841), 1283.
People V. Board &c. (12 N. Y. Supl.
165), 1533.
People V. Board &c. (18 N. Y. Supl.
561), 1030.
TABLE OF OASES.
clxxxv
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. IT, pp. 789-1605.]
People V. Board &o. (13 N. Y. Supl.
447), 1509.
People V. Board &c. (15 N. Y. Supl.
308), 1585.
People V. Board &c. (15 N. Y. Supl.
748). 1526.
People V. Board &o. (16 N. Y. Supl.
254), 1536.
People V. Board &o. (16 N. Y. Supl.
705). 1081, 1083.
People V. Board &c. (51 N. Y. 401),
1428.
People V. Board &o. (72 N. Y. 415),
1290.
People V. Board &c. (75 N. Y. 88),
179.
People V. Board &c. (93 N. Y. 397),
1428.
Peoples. Board &c. (114 N. Y. 245;
21 N. E. Rep. 481). 1285.
Peoples. Board &c. (!21 N. Y. 845;
49 Hun. 308), 993, 998.
People V. Board &c. (123 N. Y. 652;
25 N. E. Rep. 853). 993.
People V. Board &c. (136 N. Y. 528),
1321.
People V. Board &o. (133 N. Y. 468),
534.
People V. Boston &c. R. Co. (70 N.
Y- S69), 591.
People V. Brayton (94 III. 341), 406.
People 17. Breen (58 N. Y. Super. Ct.
167), 170.
People V. Brenham (3 Cal. 477), 353,
375
People V. Brennan (39 Barb. 651),
1514.
People V. Bridge Co. (13 Colo. 11;
21 Pac. Rep. 898). 1561.
People V. Brooklyn (23 Barb. 166),
1163.
People tf. Brooklyn (4 N. Y. 419),
1163, 1169, 1188, 1849.
People V. Brooklyn (71 N. Y. 495),
1174.
People V. Brooklyn Assessors (111 N.
Y. 505). 1397.
People V. Brooklyn Common Coun-
cil (77 N. Y. 508; 33 Am. Rep.
659), 189, 343.
People V. Brooklyn Fire Dep't
Corom'rs (103 N. Y. 370), 1378.
People V. Brown (11 111. 478). 381.
People V. Brown (80 Mich. 615), 1355,
1260.
People V. Brown (55 N. Y. 180),
1378.
People V. Buchanan (4 Idaho, 681),
541.
People V. Bull (46 N. Y. 57), 158,
1277.
People V. Burkhart (76 Cal. 606), 380.
People r. Burns (5 Mich. 1 14), 483.
People V. Bush (40 Cal. 344), 220.
People V. Butte (4 Mont. 174), 64, 88.
People V. Campbell (73 N. Y. 496),
1539, 1541.
People V. Canaday (73 N. C. 198; 21
Am. Rep. 465), !S5, 376, 377,
People V. Ca;nty (55 III. 33). 1383.
People V. Carpenter (24 N. Y. 86),
298, 393, 428, 429, 1556.
People V. Carrigue (3 Hill, 98), 188,
200.
People V. Carter (119 N. Y. 557),
1183.
People V. Case (19 N. Y. Supl. 625),
1587.
People V. Cass County (77 111. 438),
935.
People V. Cassidy (3 Lansing (N. Y.),
394). 1358.
People V. Central Pac. R. Co. (43 Cal.
398), 1369.
People V. Chapin (103 N. Y. 635),
1514.
People 17. Chapin (104 N. Y. 96; 10
N. E. Rep. 141), 1510. 1514, 1526.
Peoples. Chenango (11 N. Y. 563),
1390.
People V. Chicago (51 111. 17), 1389.
People V. Chicago (51 111. 58), 1883.
People V. Chicaso &c. R. Co. (18 111.
App. 125). 537, 1214.
People V. Chicago &o. R. Co. (67 111.
118), 591.
People V. ChicaKO &c. R. Co. (118 III.
113). 488, 511.
People V. Cicott (16 Mich. 283 ; 97
Am. Dec. 141), 163, 385. 389.
People V. Citizens' Co. (39 N. Y. 81),
1361.
People V. City of Bloomingdale (130
111. 406), 1340.
People V. City of Butte (4 Mont. 17.4),
53, 67.
People V. City of Chicago (27 111.
App. 217), 1551.
People V. City of New York (5 N. Y.
SupL 538), 206. '
People V. City of Oakland (92 Cal.
611; 28 Pac. Rep. 807), 414, 4-17,
1556.
People V. City of Riverside (70 Cal.
461; 11 Pac. Rep. 759), 70.
People V. City of Rochester (50 N. Y.
525), 681.
People V. Civil Service Boards (17
Abb. N. C. 64), 754.
People V. Clark (53 Barb. 171), 937.
People V. Clark (70 N. Y. 517), 1556,
1560.
People V. Clark County (50 111. 213),
909, 1376.
People V. Cline (63 111. 394), 961.
People V. Clunie (70 Cal. 504), 113.
clxxxvi
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol.
People V. Clute (50 N. Y. 451), 380,
381, 38ij.
People V, Coffee (131 N. Y. 569: 35
N. E. Rep. 64; 63 Hun, 86; 16
N. Y. Supl. 50n, 1313, 1535.
People V. Coghill (47 Cal. 361), 1391.
People V. Coleman (4 Cal. 46), 144,
1354. 1356, 1370.
People V. Collins (84 How. (N. Y.)
236), 1331.
People V. Collins (7 Johns. 549), 198.
People V. Collins (3 Mich. 347), 5i5.
People V. Collins (19 Wend. 56), 281,
343, 1518.
People V. Common Council (85 Cal.
369; 24 Pac. Rep; 727), 1508.
People V. Common Council (38 Mich.
2S9). 1383, 1389.
People V. Common Council (77 N. Y.
50.j), 313.
People V. Common Council (78 N. Y.
33), 1318, 1514.
People V, Common Council of Syra-
cuse (78 N. Y. 56), 697.
People V. Comm'rs (3 Hill. 599), 297.
People V. Comm'rs (4 Neb. 150),
1427.
People V. Comm'rs (58 N. Y. 242),
1352.
People V. Comm'rs (59 N. Y. 40),
1351.
People V. Comm'rs (83 N. Y. 463),
1358.
People V. Comm'rs (91 N. Y. 593).
1575.
People V. Comm'rs (95 N. Y. 554),
1395.
People V. Comm'rs &c. of Brooklyn
(106 N. Y. 64), 208.
People V. CdmptroUer (77 N. Y. 45),
1115.
People V. Comptroller &c. (20 Wend.
595), 203.
People V. Comstock (93 N. Y. 585),
335.
People V. Conklin (3 Hill, 67), 140,
141.
People V. Connor (13 Mich. 338),
1563.
People V. Conover (17 N. Y. 64),
176.
People V. Contracting Board (27
N. Y. 378), 1509, 1514, 1533,
1539.
People V. Cook (7 Ala. 114), 160.
People V. Cook (8 N. Y. 67), 160,
191. 2Q8, 380, 385.
People V. Coon (35 Cal. 648), 654,
933.
People V. Cornell (35 How. Pr. 31),
1375.
People V. Cowles (13 N. Y. 350),
353, 375.
I, pp. Wm; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
People V. Cox (76 N. Y. 4'7), 538.
People V. Cregier (111., 28 N. B. Rep.
818), 1241.
People V. Crimmins (1 N. Y. Supl.
656), 1386.
People p. Crissey (91 N. Y. 616), 314,
375, 384.
People V. Croton Aqueduct (49 Barb.
259), 1533, 1539.
People V. Cunningham (1 Denio,
534), 1464.
People V. Curley (5 Colo. 412), 1253.
PIbple V. Daley (37 Hun, 461), 123,
1541.
People V. Davenport (91 N. Y. 574),
1166, 1361, 1396.
People v. Davis (61 Barb. 456), 536.
People V. Dean (3 Wend. 438). 190.
People V. Delanoy (49 N. Y. 655),
1576.
People V. De Mill (15 Mich. 183),
1555.
People V. Denison (19 Hun, 187; 80
N. Y. 656), 845.
People V. Dennison (84 N. Y. 272),
740.
People V. Detroit (18 Mich. 445),
539.
People V. Detroit (28 Mich. 228 ; 15
Am. Rep. 201), 48,' 257, 754,
1277.
People V. Detroit White Lead Works
(83 Mich. 471; 46 N. W. Eep.
735), 10^4.
People V. Devoe (3 T. & C. (N. Y.)
142), 936.
People V. Dickson (10 N. Y. Supl.
604), 990.
People V. Doe (36 Cal. 220), 1397,
1595
People V. Draper (18 N. Y. Supl. 282),
1331.
People V. Draper (15 N. Y. 532), 48,
99, 100, 109, 298, 1033, 1377,
1378.
People V. Du Puyt (71 111. 653), 619,
13S8.
People V. Dutoher (58 111. 144),
939.
People V. Dutchess (23 Wend. 360),
1417.
People V. Dutchess &c. R. Co. (58 N.
Y. 1.53), 591.
People V. Dwyer m N. Y. 403),
1226.
People V. Easton (13 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)
161), 1345, 1513.
People V. Edmonds (15 Barb. 529; 19
Barb. 468), 910.
People V. Edwards (9 Cal. 286), 310,
330.
People V. English (111., 39 N. E. Rep.
678 , 1336.
TABLE OF OASES.
clxxxvii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
People V. Eonis (19 N. Y. Supl. 946),
1278.
People V. Fairbury (51 111. 149). 175.
People V. Farnbam (35 111. 662), 56,
71.
People V. Faulkner (107 N. Y. 477;
38 Hun. 607), 333, 884.
People V. Ferguson (8 Cowen, 102),
385.
People V. Ferguson (20 Weekly Dig.
(N. Y.) 876), 314.
People V. Ferris (16 Hun. 219), 17.5.
People V. Ferris (76 N. Y. 326). 1533.
People V. Fields (58 N. Y. 491), 647.
People V. Flagg (17 N. Y. 584; 16
How. Pr. 36). 713, 941.
People V. Flagg (46 N. Y. 401), 1371,
1389, 1428.
People V. Fleming (10 Colo. 553), 63,
64, 74.
People V. Flint (39 Cal. 670), 632.
People V. Fredericks (48 Barb. 173),
1575.
People V. Freeman (Cal., 22 Pac.
Rep. 173), 158.
People V. Freese (83 Cal. 453), 207.
People V. French (6 How. Pr. 377),
1290.
Peoples. French (33 Hun, 112), 1290.
People V. French (46 Hun. 233), 1280.
People V. French (51 Hun, 437; 3
N. Y. Supl. 841), 1283, 1284.
People V. French (I N. Y. Supl. 878),
1291.
People V. French (4 N. Y. Supl. 222),
1288.
People V. French (5 N. Y. Supl. 55),
1388.
People V. French (5 N. Y. Supl. 57),
1290.
People V. French (6 N. Y. Supl. 313),
1284 1291
People V. French (6 N. Y. Supl. 394),
1391.
People V. French (7 N. Y. Supl. 443),
1290.
People V. French (7 N. Y. Supl. 460),
1291.
People V. French (8 N. Y. Supl. 456),
1284.
People V. French (8 N. Y. Supl. 459),
1385.
People V. French (13 N. Y. Supl. 337),
1288.
People «. French (91 N. Y. 38). 179.
People V. French (108 N. Y. 105),
1280.
People V. Frost (33 111. App. 242),
- 277.
People V. Garey (6 Cowen, 643), 443.
People V. Garner (47 111. 246), 381.
1 eople V. Gartland (75 Mich. 148; 43
N. W. Eep. 687), 1333, 1557.
People V. George (Idaho, 36 Pao.
Rep. 98;^), 429.
People V. Giegerich (14 N. Y. Supl.
263), 180.
People V. Gilon (126 N. Y. 147), 1167.
People V. Gilson (24 Abb. N. C. 125;
18 Civ. Pro. E. 113; 30 N. Y. St.
Eep. 019), 1514.
People V. Gleasoh (N. Y., 35 N. E.
Rep. 4: 4 N. Y. Supl. 883), 714.
People V. Gleason (8 N. Y. Supl.
728), 1518.
People V. Goldtree (44 Cal 333). 62}.
People V. Gooseraan (80 Mich. 611).
1255. 1360.
People t'. Gordon (81 Mich. 306; 45
N. W. Rep. 658), 1053.
People v. Graceland Cemetery Co.
(86 III. 836), 1166.
People V. Grant (126 N. Y. 473; 12
N. Y. Supl. 889; 27 N. E. Eep.
964), 1238.
People V. Green (5 Daly, 254 ; 46 How.
Pr. 168). 201.
People V. Green (11 Hun, 58), 1541.
People V. Green (64 N. Y. 606), 677.
Peoples. Green (29 Mich. 121), 1520.
People V. Greenbush Police Comm'rs
(58Hun.234; 136 N.Y. 323), 1290.
People V. Greensburg (57 N. Y. 549),
1417.
People V. Gregg (13 N. Y. Supl. 114),-
191.
People V. Gunn (85 Cal. 338; 24 Pac.
Eep. 718), 89.
People V. Hagar (52 Cal. 171), 691,
1068.
People V. Hall (80 N. Y. 117), 388,
1510, 1559, l.')63.
People V. Hall (104 N. Y. 170; 10 N.
E. Eep. 135), 194.
People V. Ha mill (134 111. 666; 33
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 39), 832,
945.
People V. Hamilton (24 111. App. 609),
188
Peoples. Hanifan (96 111. 420), 189,
300.
People V. Hannan (10 N. Y. Supl.
71; 56Hun, 4B9), 1283, 1291.
People II. Hanr.ihan (75 Mich. 611),
112, 514. 1035.
People V. Harper (91 111. 357), 1024.
People V. Harrington (63 Cal. 257),
296.
People V. Harahaw (60 Mich. 200),
287, 298, 388.
People V. Hartwell (12 Mich. 508 ; 86
Am. . Dec. 70), 353, 375, 1356,
1563. ■
People V. Hatch (33 111. 139), 1548.
People V. Hatch (1 T. & C. (N. Y.)
113), 936.
clxxxviii
TABLE OF CASES.
pnie references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-160B.]
People V. Haverstraw (47 N. Y. St.
Rep. 891), 1415.
People V. Hawes (37 Barb. 440), 1371.
People V. Hawley (3 Mich. 330). 669.
People V. Haws (36 Barb. 59). 910.
People V. Hayden (6 Hill, 359). 703.
Peoples. Hayden. (16 N. Y. Supl.
98), 1291.
People V. Hawkins (46 N. Y. 9), 830,
; 1539.
People V. Head (25 111. 325), 1508.
Pecfple V. Hegeman (4 N. Y. Supl.
351), 1395.
People V. Henshaw (61 Barb. 409),
93fe.
People V. Herkimer (4 Cowen, 345;
15 Am. Deo. 379), 1585.
People V. Hess (Mich., 48 N. W. Rep.
181), 1248. .
People V. Higgins (3 Mich. 233; 61
Am. Dec. 491), 160, 385.
People V. Hill (7 Cal. 97). 4B5.
People V. Huffman (116 111. 587; 56
Am. Rpp. 793), 377, 378.
People V. Holden (91 111. 446). 939.
People V. HoUey (12 Wend; 481), 314.
People V. Holmes (3 Wend. 281), 310.
People V. Hopson (1 Denio, 574), 200,
290.
People V. Horton (64 N. Y. 610),
1434.
People V. Howell (13 N. Y. Supl.
217), 203.
People V. Hughitt (5 Lans. (N. Y.)
' 89), 936.
People V. Hulett (15 N. Y. Supl. 630),
1355.
People V. Hurlbert (46 N. Y. 110), 937.
People V. Hurlbut (24 Mich. 44; 9
' Am. Rep. 103), 10, 48, 95, 477,
1277.
People V. Button (18 Hun, 116). 939.
People V. Hyatt (66 N. Y. 606), 1532.
People V. Hyde Park (117 III. 463),
697.
People V. Hyland (41 Cal. 129), 1256.
People V. Hynds (30 N. Y. 470), 1415.
People V. Iralay (20 Barb. 68), 144.
People V. Inspectors (4 Mich. 187),
1520.
People V. Insurance Co. (2 Johns. Ch.
37-1), 298.
Pi-oplp V. Irvin (21 Wend. 188), 141.
I'eople V. Jackson County (93 111.
444), 985, 1374.
People V. Jaehne (103 N. Y. 183), 131.
People V. Jansen (7 Johns. 332), 741.
People V. Johnson (6 Cal. 499), 832.
People V. Johnson (80 Cal.. 98), 539.
People V. Johr (23 Mich. 461), 310,
313.
People V. Jones (112 N. Y. 597; 30
N. E. Rep. 577), 554.
People V. Judge &c. (40 Mich. 64),
693, 1419.
People V. Justices (12 Hun, 65), 541.
People V. Justices (74 N. Y. 406),
1257.
People V. Keir (Mich., 48 N. W. Rep.
1039), 507, 601.
People V. Kelly (76 N. Y. 475), 844,
876, 1423. 1427.
People V. Kennedy (37 Mich. 67),
385.
People V. Kenney (96 Ind. 294), 384.
People V. Kerr (27 N. J. 188), 1023,
1205, 1433. ,
People V. KildufiE (15 111. 492), 165,
1508.
People •«. Kilman (69 N. Y. 33),
1428.
People V. Kingman (24 N. Y. 559),
1403, 1408, 1417.
People V. Kingston &c. Road Oo. (23
Wend. 193; 35 Am. Deo. 551),
129.
People v. Kline (63 111. 394). 937.
People V. Kniffin (21 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
43), 3.'.8.
People V. Knowles (47 N. Y, 415),
. S37.
People V. Kopplekorn (16 Mich. 343),
377.
People V. Laine (33 Cal. 55), 377,
People V. Lake County (33 Cal. 487),
695.
People V. Lake Shore &o. Ry. Co. (52
Mich. 277), 1213.
People V. Lansing (55 Cal. 393),
1^23
People V. La Rue (67 Cal. 526; 8 Pac
Rep. 84), 1556.
People V. La Salle County (84 111.
303), 15.')3.
People V. Lawrence (54 Barb. 589),
706.
People 17. Lawrence (6 Hill, 244), 664,
• 910.
People' V. Lawrence (41 N. Y. 137),
1169.
People V. Leavitt (41 Mich. 470), 574.
People V. Leonard (73 Cal. 230), 189.
People V. Lippincott(81 111. 19^!). 959.
People V. Loehfelm (103 N. Y. 1),
1405, 1406, 1409, 1434.
People I'. Logan County (63 111. 384),
935.
People V. Lohnas (54 Hun, 604), 1176.
Peoples. Londones (13 Colo. 303: 23
Pac. Rep. 764), 113, 130, 388,
1562.
People V. Lucas (93 N. Y. 585), 331.
People V. McCarthy (45 How. Pr.
97), 541.
People V. McClave (8 N. Y. Supl.
615), 1291.
TABLK OF 0ASK8.
clxxxix
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
People V. McClave (9 N. Y. Supl.
203), 13H9.
People V. McClave (10 N. T. Supl.
441), 1288.
People V. MfCIave (10 N. T. Supl.
561), 1290.
People V. McClave (13 N. Y. Supl.
340). 1280.
People r. McClave (123 N. Y. 512; 25
N. E. Rep. 104«7; 10 N. Y. Supl.
764), 1284.
People r. McCreery (34 Cal. 433),
1189, 1871.
People V. McFadden (81 Cal. 489;
29Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 37),
61. 67.
People V. McFall (26 111. App. 319),
1827. 134S.
People V. MoXinney (53 N. Y. 374),
158, 1277.
People V. McLarie (10 Cal. 563), 1381.
People V. McLean (8 N. Y. Supl.
511), 1S87.
People V. McLean (13 N. Y. Supl.
677), 12S8.
People V. McLean (13 N. Y. Supl.
685), 12>S7.
People V. McLean (14 N. Y. Supl.
77), 1291. ■
People V. MacLean (17 N. Y. Supl.
475), 1388.
People V. McRoberts(03 111. 40), 1139,
1153,
People V. Madison (51 N. Y. 442),
1576.
People V. Mahaney (13 Mich. 481),
• 187, 18'. 8.
People V. Maher (56 Hun, 81). 1171.
People V. Mallory (40 How. 281), 614.
People V. Maniiattan Ry. Co. (20
Abb. N. C. 39.3J, 1533.
People V. Marigold (71 Mich. 335),
1261.
People V. Martin (12 Cal. 409), 375.
People V. Martin (8 N. Y. Supl. 516,
1284.
People V. Martin (10 N. Y. Supl. 511),
1291.
People V. Wartl-i (5 N. Y, (1 Seld.)
22), 27.5. 357, 358. 339, 360.
People V. Martin (131 N. Y. 196; 30
N. E. Rep. 60), 1280, 1513.
People V. Mattimore (45 Hun, 448),
1231.
People V. Maxton (111., 28 N. E. Rep.
1074), 1260.
People V. May (27 Barb. 238), 706.
People V. May (9 Colo. 80; 10 Pac.
Rep. 641), 836.
People V. May (9 Colo. 404; 12 Pac.
Rep. 838), 836, 837, 908.
People V. May (9 Colo. 414; 15 Pac.
Eep. 36), 837.
People V. May (Colo., 15 Pac. Rep.
86), 900.
People V. May (17 111. App. 361),
1343.
People V. Maynard (15 Mich. 463), 70,
434, 158SJ.
People V. Mayor (18 Abb. N. 0. 123),
015.
People V. Mayor (9 Hill, 9) 554, 1263.
People t'. Mayor &c. (1 N. Y. Supl.
9.')). 1219.
People I". Mavor &c. (59 How. Pr.
277). 615, 1464.
People r. Mavor &c. of Brooklyn (4
N. Y. 419). 669, 1085, 1371.
People V. Mayor &e. of Chicago (51
III. 17: 2 Am. Rep. 278), 48, 1382.
People r. Mayor &c, of New York (5
Barb. 43). 176.
People V. Mayor &o. of New York
(33 Barb. 103), 669.
People V. Mayor &c. of New York (7
How. Pr. (N. Y.) 81), 90. 541.
People V. Meach (14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)
429)-, 1092. 1093.
People V. Mead (24 N. Y. 114), 952,
953
People V. Meakim (56 Hun. 626; 24
Abb. N. C. 477; 10 N. Y. Supl.
161). 1545.
People V. Meakim (183 N. Y. 214),
771, 787.
People V. Mellen f32 111. 181), 127.
People V. Merrick (16 N. Y. Supl.
246), 176. ,
People V. Mersereau (74 Mich. 687;
43 N. W. Rep. 153), 336.
People V. Metropolitan Police (19
N. Y. 188; 20 N. Y. 316), 1093.
People V. Metzker (47 Cal. 594), 388.
People V. Meyers (95 N. Y. 223), 597.
People V. Miller (38 Hun, 82), 1248.
People V. Miller (16 Mich. 205), 1563.
People V. Mills (33 Hun, 459), 303,
^104.
People V. Minck (31 N. Y. 539), 1268.
People J'. Mitchell (35 N. Y. 551),
932 933
People 1'. Molitor (23 Mich. 341), 386,
1563.
People V. Montgomery County Su-
pervisors (34 Hun, 599), 894.
People V. Morgan (55 N. Y. 587). 939.
People r. Morrell (81 Wend. 563; 2
Denio. 372), 187, 437, 443.
People V. Morris (13 Wend. 325), 4,
5, 10, 67, 85, 87, 89, 95, 109, 473,
477.
People V. Mott (64 N. Y. 600), 910,
People V. Murray (57 Mich, 896), 543,
1866.
People V. Murray (73 N. Y. 585), 178,
474^
cxc
TABLE OF CASES.
prhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
People V. Nearing (37 N. Y. 308), 686,
1181.
People V. Negus (90 N. Y. 403), 780.
People V. New Lots Auditors (34
Hun, 336), 1037.
People v.- 'New York (5 Barb. 43),
1576.
People V. New York (83 N. Y. 491),
203.
People V. New York &c. E. Co. (84
N. Y. r,(\r,). 21.
People V. New York Board &c. (64
N. Y. 627). 1376.
Peoplp V. New Y6rk Cent. &c. R. Co.
(74 N. Y. 30'i), 501.
People V. New York Police Cotnm'rs
(98 N. Y. 333), 1383.
People V. Newell (13 Barb. 86; 7
N. Y. 9), 297,
People V. Newton (126 N. Y. 656: 27
N. K. Rep. 870; 11 N. Y. Supl.
783), 1513.
People V. Nichols (79 N. Y. 583), 203,
?06.
People V. Niles (35 Cal. 283), -1350.
People V. Nostrand (46 N. Y. 375),
188, SOO, 290, 396.
People V. O'Brien (111 N. Y. 1 ; 7
' Am. St. Rep. 684), 78, 536, 595,
1214.
People V. OgdensburKh (48 N. Y.
390), 1350, 1853, 1575.
People V. Olmsted (45 Barb. 644),
1514.
People I'. O'Neil (109 N. Y. 251), 131.
People V. Omaha (2 Neb. 106), 1596.
People V. Oregon (37 111. 29), 311.
Peoples. Osborn (20 Wend. 186),
706.
People V. Osborne (7 Colo. 605), 158.
People V. Otis (90 N. Y. 48), SO."?.
People V. Ottawa (88 111. 203), 937.
Peoples. Pacheco (7 Colo. 175), 870.
People V. Page (Utah, 33 Pac. Rep.
791), 65, 119, 131.
People V. Palmer (52 N. Y. 84). 396.
People V. Parka (58 Cal. 634), 931.
People V. Peabody (6 Abb. Pr. 228 ;
15 How. Pr. 470), 198.
People V. Pennook (60 N. Y. 421),
■321, 331.
People V. Perkins (85 Cal. 509), 190,
315.
People V. Peters (4 Neb. 354), 1336.
People V. Phillips (1 Denio, 388), 189.
People V. Phippin (Mich., .37 N. W.
Rep. 888), 144.
People V. Phoenix Bank (24 Wend.
131), S58.
People v: Pinckney (33 N. Y. 877),
109, 1038.
People V. Police Comm'rs (9 Hun,
323), 1390.
People V. Police Comm'rs (11 Hun,
403), 1290.
People V. Police Comm'rs (77 N. Y.
153), 1290.
People V. Police Comm^rs (8 Wkly.
Dig. 466), 1290.
People V. Police Comm'rs (15 Wkly.
Dig. 278), 1390.
People n. Police Justices (7 Mich.
456), 1363.
People V. Pope (53 Cal. 437), 1143.
Pe»ple v; Porter (6 Cal. 36), 203, 375.
People V. Potter (63 Cal. 137), 190, 310,
139a.
People V. Power (25 111. 187), 109,
1371, 1.373.
People V. Pratt (N. Y., 29 N. E. Rep.
7), 6l)6.
People V. President &c. (33 Wend.
254), 1437.
People V. Pres't Manhattan Co. (9
Wend. 351), 67, 87, 129, 415.
People V. Provines (34 Cal. 530), 320.
People V. Queens Co. (1 Hill, 193),
1575.
People V. Quigg (59 N. Y. 83)j 113.
People V. Railwav.Co. (41 Mich. 413;
3 N. W. Rep.' 188), 1079.
People V. Raymond (37 N. Y. 428),
158, 1023.
People V. Reardon (49 Hun, 430),
1514.
People V. Reed (81 Cal. 70), 1407, 1409.
People V. Regents &c. (4 Mich. 98),
343, 1530.
People V. Reid (10 Colo. 138), 175.
People, w. Rensselaer County Super-
visors (34 Hun, 366), 889.
People V. Reynolds (10 111. 1), 67, 87.
People V. Riordan (73 Mich. 508; 41
N. W. Rep. 482), 1556, 1557.
People V. Riverside (70 Cal. 463), 49.
People V. Robb (55 Hun, 435 ; 8N. Y.
Supl. 502), 1397.
People V. Robb (5 N. Y. Supl. 869),
1291.
People V. Robb (9 N. Y. Supl. 831),
1284, 1388.
People V. Robb (16 N. Y. Supl. 134),
1386.
Peoples. Roby (53 Mich. 577), 1349,
People V. Roche (134 111. 9). 1340.
People r. Rochester (31 Barb. 656),
1174.
People V. Rochesler (44 Hun, 166),
518. • ,
People V. Rochester (5 hunk (N. Y.)
142), 273.
People V. Romero (18 Cal. 93), 1547.
People V. Rosborough (39 Cal. 415),
375.
People V. Roseborough (14 Cal. 180),
375.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXQl
(The references are to pages: Vol
People V. Runkel (9 Johns. 147),' 174,
Z90.
People V. Russell (4 Wend. 570), 741.
Paople V. Sacramento (6 Cal. 422),
529. , ^
People V. St. Lawrence County (25
Hun, 131). 1525.
People V. Salem (20 Mich. 452 ; 4 Am.
Rep. 400), 934.
People V. Sanderson (30 Cal. 160),
189.
People V. San Francisco (37 Cal.
655). 634.
People V. Saratoga Springs (54 Hun,
16), 1513.,
People V. Sawyer (52 N. Y. 296), 986.
People V. School Trustees (78 III.
136), 1320.
People V. Schuyler (5 Barb. 166),
355.
People u Schuyler (4 N. Y. 173),
335.
People V. Scrughara (20 Barb. 202),
1523, 1558.
People V. Seaman (5 Denio, 409), P85.
People V. Searle (52 Cal. 620), 1333.
People V. Sheffield (47 Hun, 481),
1553.
People V. Shepard (36 N. Y. 285),
755, 1377, 1278.
People V. Sisson (98 III. 385), 368,
1323.
People V. Smith (21 N. Y. 595), 681,
683, 690, 696.
People V. Smith (45 N. Y. 781), 953.
People V. Solomon (51 111, 37), 61, 67,
86, 87, 1024, 1397.
People V. Son (19 N. Y. Supl. 309),
S53.
People V. Soucey (26 III. App. 505),
1542t
People V. Spencer (55 N. Y. 1), 937.
People V. Squire (107 N. Y. 593; 14
N. E. Rep. 820). 1212.
People V. State Auditor (43 Mich.
432), 1520.
People I'. State Treasurer (33 Mich.
499), 931.
People V. State Treasurer (34 Mich.
46S), 934.
People ». Staton (73 N. C. 546), 178,
People 'v. Stephens (71 N. Y. 527),
715, 741.
Pertple V. Stevens (5 Hill, 616), 178,
290.
Peoplev. Stevens (13 Wend. 341), 515.
People r. Stewart (6 111. App. 63),
331.
People V. Stocking (50 Barb. 573),
829, 1525.
People V. Stone (78 Mich. 635; 44
. N. W. Rep. 333), 1336, 1337.
1, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 780-1605.]
People V. Stott (Mich., 51 N, W. Eep.
509). 1260.
People V. Stout (23 Barb. 849), 67, 74,
87.
People V. Stowell (9 Abb. N. C. 456),
190, 281.
People V. Stupp (2 N. Y. Supl. 537),
8T2.
People «. Sturtevant (9 N. Y. 263;
5;) Am. Dec. 536), 1214.
People V. Summers (30 N. Y. St. Rep.
614). 1513.
People V. Supervisors &o. (11 Abb.
14), 1S71."
People u. Supervisors &c. (15 Barb.
607), 1532.
People V. Supervisors &c. (48 Barb.
232 ; 34 N. Y. 516). 554.
People V. Supervisors &c. (11 Cal.
206). 1371.
People V. Supervisors &c. (1 Hill,
3021, 180, 184.
Peoi>le V. Supervisors &o. (4 Hill, 20),
1514.
People j;. Supervisors &o. (7 Hill,
171), 993.
People t'. Supervisors &c. (3 How.
Pr. (N. S.) 243), 1526.
People V. Supervisors &c. (21 How.
Pr. 322), 1525.
People V. Supervisors &c. (33 Hun,
305), 1526.
People V. Supervisors &c. (100 111.
332), 1549.
People V. Supervisors &c. (110 111.
511). 1024.
People V. Supervisors &o. (3 Mich.
475), 1528.
People V. Supervisors &c. (38 Mich.
421), 1520.
People V. Supervisors &c. (12 Johns.
414), 1532.
People V. Supervisors &o. (U N. Y.
563). 1517, 1533.
People V. Supervisors &c. (20 N. Y.
252), 11B9.
People V, Supervisors &o. (51 N. Y.
401), 1379.
People V. Supervisors &o. (51 N. Y.
442), 1.525.
People V. Supervisors &c. (10 Wend.
363), 1379.
People V. Supervisors &c. (12 Wend.
257). 184.
People V. Swift (31 Cal. 26), 257, 259,
636, 713.
People V. Syracuse (63 N. Y. 84),
296.
People V. Taylor (57 Cal. 620), 315.
People V. Tazewell County (83 UL
147), 955.
People V. Ten Eyck (13 Wend. 448),
825.
oxcu
TABLR OF OASES.
[The references oreto pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1601]
People V. Thompson (99 N. Y. 611 ; 1
N. E. Rep. 543), 1541.
People V. Thurber (13 111. 544), 144.
People V. Tisdale (1 DoukL 59), 385.
People V. Toal (85 Cal. 383; 23 Pac.
' Rep. 203), 199.
People V. Tompkins (74 111. 482). 330.
People V. Town Auditora (74 N. Y.
310), 220, 748.
People V. Town Auditors (75 N, Y.
316), 2-20,339.
People V. Town of Mt. Morris (111.,
27N. E. Rep. 757). l.-,17.
People V. Town of Oian (121 111.
650; 13 N. E. Rep. 73u). 460.
People V. Township Board (20 Mich.
452), 1387.
People V. Tracy (1 Denio, 617), 1549.
People V. Treasurer (S4 Mich. 468),
1374.
People V. Tremain (17 How., Pr,
142), 1537.
People y. Troop (12 Wend. 183), 518.
People V. Trustees (78 III. 136). 1388.
People V. Tweed (63 N. Y. 202). 109.
People V. Utica Ins. Co, (15 Johns.
358), 298, 13.")9.
People V. Van Cleve (I Mich. 362; 53
Am. Dec. 69), 389.
People V. Vanderbilt (28 N. Y. 396),
1048.
People V. Van Slyck (4 Cowen, 297),
389.
People V. Van Tassel (19 N. Y. Supl.
643; 17 N. Y. Supl. 938), 300.
People V. Vilas (36 N. Y. 459; 3 Abb.
Pr. (N. S.) 358),, 184, 309, 320.
People V. Village oif Highland Park
, (Mich., ."iO N. W. Rep. 660). 163.
People V. Village of Little Falls (29
N. Y. St. Rep. 723), 1513.
People V. Village of Saratoga Springs
(54 Hun, 16; 26 N. Y. St. Rep.
54; 7N. Y. Supl. 125), 1513.
People V. Wagner (7 Lans. (N. Y.)
467), 936.
People V. Wagner (Mich., 49 N. W.
Rep. 609), 1245.
People V. Waldrogel (49 Mich. 337),
1350.
People V. Walker (23 Barb. 304), 277.
People V. Walker (9 Mich. 338), 1275.
People V. Walter (68 N. Y. 403), 554.
People V. Warfleld (20 III. 159), 381.
People V. Warren (14 111. App. 296),
659.
People V. Waynesville (88 111. 469),
936, 940.
People V. Weber (86 111. 283), 200, 1532.
People V. Webber (89 111. 347), 177,
200, 259.
People V. Weldon (14 N. Y. Supl.
447), 970.
People V. Weller (6 Cal. 49). 375.
People V. Weller (11 Cal. 49; 70 Am.
Dec. 754), 375.
Peoples Wendell (57 Hun, 363; 88
N. Y. St. Rep. 129; ION. Y. SupL
587), 1513, 1.550.
People V. Wendell (71 N. Y. 171), 910.
People V, Whalen (5 Weekly Dig.
410). 829.
People V. Whittomb (55 111. 172),
412.
People V. White (24 Wend. 520), 200,
%290, 298.
People V. Whitman (10 Cal. 38), 189.
'People i;. Whitney's Point (33 Hun,
503), 538.
People V. Wiant (48 111. 263). 381.
People I'. Wilson (62 Hun. 618). 1265.
People V. Wilson (15 111. 389). 1253.
Peofile V. WiUon (3 N. Y. Supl. 326),
1174.
People V. Wilson (63 N. Y. 186), 377.
Peoples. Wilson (119 N. Y. 315; 30
N. Y. St. Rep. 79; 7 N. Y. Supl.
637). 1514.
People V. Wong Wang (97 Cal. 277),
1355.
Peoples. Woods (7 Cal. 579), 1381.
People V. Wren (5 III. (4 Scam,) 269),
■ 67, 88, 4li5. 466, 1024.
People V. Wright (31 Mich. 871),
1334.
People V. Yeazel (84 111. 539), 1833.
Peoples' Board of Supervisors of
Queens County. In re (133
N. Y. 468; 30 N. E. Rep. 488; 16
N. Y. Supl. 705), 553.
Peoples' R. Co. v. Memphis R. Co,
(10 Wall. 38), 6H3, 1196..
Peoples' R. Co. v. Memphis R. Co.
(10 Wall. 501). 549.
Peoria v. Calhoun (29 111. 317), 519.
Peoria v. Crawl (38 111. App. 154),
1099.
Peoria v. Kidder (36 111. 351), 1166,
1189, 1399.
Peoria v. Johnston (56 111. 52), 412.
Peoria &o. R. Co. v. Peoria &c. R.
Co. (66111. 174), 1196.
Peoria &c. ^t. Co. v. Scott (116 III.
401), 1384.
Pepper v. City of Philadelphia (114
Pa. St. 96), 730.
Pepper v. Smith (15 Lea (Tenn.), 551),
419.
Peppin V. Cooper (3 Barn. & Aid.
431). 329.
Perdue v. Ellis (18 Ga. 586), 487.
Perin v. Carey (24 How. 465), 563,
660,
Perkin v. Proetor (3 Wils. 382), 317.
Perkins v. Burlington (77 Iowa, 553),
1363, 1367,
TAHOr OF OASES.
cxcin
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1603.]
Perkins v. Corbin (43 Ala. 103), 1353.
Perkins v. Crocker (109 Mass. 128),
1335.
Perkins v. Fayette (68 Me. 152), 1488,
1451.
Perkins v. Lawrence (136 Mass. 305),
779.
Perkins v. Ledbetter (68 Miss. 827; 8
So. Eep. 507). 1342.
Perkins v. New Haven (53 Conn. 214),
755
Perkins' v. School Dist. (56 Iowa, 476),
1331,
Perkins v. Slack (86 Pa. St. 270), 844.
Perkins v. Watertown (5 Biss. 320j,
1588.
Perkins v. Weston (3 Cush. 549),
1275.
Perkinson v. St. Louis (4 Mo. App.
333). 207.
Perley v. Georgetown (7 Gray, 464),
1578.
Perley v. Muskegon County (33
Mich. 132), 323.
Perrin v. Lyman (33 Ind. 16), 313.
Perrine v. Farr (23 N. J. Law, 356),
68.),
Perry v. Cheboygan (55 Mich. 350),
i83.
Perry v, Cumberson (39 Hun, 436),
i411.
Perry v. Dover (13 Pick. 206), 252,
1335.
Perry v. Keene (56 N. H, 514), 929,
933.
Perrv v. Putney (53 Vt. 538), 783.
Perry v. Rockdale (63 Tex. 457),
1383
Perry v. Salt Lake City (Utah, 35
Pac. Eep. 739), 1342.
Perry v. State (9 Wis. 19), 438.
Perry v. Tossever (8 Ohio, 531). 1353.
Perry v. Tynen (82 Barb. 137), 298,
297.
Perry v. Washburn (20 Cal. 318),
479.
Perry County v. City of Du Quoin
(99 111. 479), 974.
Perry County v. Conway County (53
Ark. 430; 12 S. W. .Rep. 877),
883.
Perryman v. Bethune (89 Mo. 158),
1336.
Perryman v. City of Greenville (51
Ala. 507), 90.
Peruvian &c. R. Co. v. Thames &c.
Ins. Co. (L. R. 2 Ch. 617), 922.
Pesterfleld v. Vickers (3 Cold. 205).
103, 488, 1013.
Peterborough v. Lancaster (14 N. H.
383), 352. 874. 1400.
Peters v. Litchfield (34 Conn. 364),
»»6.
Peters v. Lvnchburgh (76 Va. 927),
1369.
Peters v. Town of Fergus Falls (35
Minn. 549), 1059.
Petersburg v. Applegarth (38 Gratt.
831). 9.
Petersburg v. Mappin (14 111. 193),
657.
Petersburg v. Metzker (31 111. 205).
103. 488, 513,
Petersilea v. Stone (119 Mass. 465),
198.
Peterson v. Mayor &c. (17 N. Y. 449),
308, 338, 351, 260, 639, 640, 710,
845.
Petition of Brady (85 N. Y. 268),
1169.
Petition of Cleveland. In re (51 N. J.
Law, 319: 58 N. J. Law, 188: 30
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 330),
375
Petition of De Pierris (83 N. Y. 343),
1173.
Petition of Garvey (77 N. Y. 633),
1163.
Petition of LandafI (34 N. H. 163),
705.
Petition of Merriam (84 N. Y. 596),
1390.
Petition of Mt. Washington Road
Co. (35 N. H. 135), 685.
Petrie v. Doe (30 Miss. 698), 396.
Pettengill v. City of Yonkera (116
N. Y. 558). 1469.
Pettibone v. Beardslee (1 Luzerne
Leg. Rep. 180), 1596.
Pettigrew v. Bell (34 S. O. 104), 1337.
Pettiarew v. Village of Evansville
(35 Wis. 323), 1096.
Pettingill v. Town of Glean (48 N. Y.
St. Rep. 96), 1458.
Pettis V. Johnson (56 Ind. 139), 585,
1193.
Petty V. Looker (21 N. Y. 267), 189.
Petty V. Myers (49 Ind. 1). 933.
Peyser v. Mayor &c. of New York
(70 N. Y. 497), 242, 1182, 1184,
1185.
Peyser v. The Mayor (79 N. Y. 621),
1134.
Pfefferle v. Comm'rs (89 Kan. 432 ; 1 8
Pac. Rep. 506), 1014.
Phelan v. City of New York (14 N.
Y. Supl. 785). 182.
Phelan v. Granville (140 Mass. 386),
181.
Phelan v. Mayor (119 N. Y. 86; 83
N. E. Rep. 175), 720, 1110.
Phelps V. City of New York (113 N.
Y. 316; 19 N. E. Rep. 408), 342,
244,282. 1106, 1183.
Phelps V. Lewiston (15 Blatcbf, 131),
947.
CXOIV
TABJ.E OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
Phelps V. Mankato City (23 Minn,
376). 145 . 1488. /
Phelps' v.n 0 (60 N. Y. 10). 1331.
PMladelphia ., Appeal (86 Pa. St.
179), 1115.
Philadelphia v. Comm'rs (53 Pa. St.
451), 16.
Philadelphia v. Dibeler (Pa., S3 Atl.
Rep. 567), 1077:
Philadelphia v. Dickson (38 Pa. St.
347), 703,
Philadelphia v. Duncan (4 Phila,
145), 533.
Philadelphia v. Dungan (134 Pa. St.
52; 16 Atl. Rep, 524; 23 W, N.
C. 243), 1057.
Philadelphia v. Dyer (41 Pa. St. 463),
703.
Philadelphia v. Evans (Pa., 31 Atl.
Rep. 200), 1078.
Philadelphia v. Ferry Ry. Co. (53
, Pa. St. 177), 13S4.
Philadelphia v. Field (58 Pa. St, 320),
1169.
Philadelphia v. Fianigan (47 Pa, St.
27), 634, 642.
Philadelphia v. Fox (64 Pa. St. 169).
11, 74, 94, 109, 436, 480, ,163.
Philadelphia v. Germantown Pass.
R, Co. (10 Pliila. (Pa.) 165), 683.
Philadelphia v. Given (60 Pa. St,
136); 200, 1392.
Philadelphia, v. Greble (38 Pa, St,
339). 479, 1395,
Philadelphia v. Jewell (135 Pa, St.
339), 712.
Philadelphia v. Luckhardt (73 Pa.
St. 311), 1115, 1116.
Philadelphia v. MuUer (49 Pa, 440),
■ 1178, .
Philadelphia v. Phila. &o, R, Co. (58
Pa, St. 353), 624.
Philadelphia v. Phila. &c. R, Co. (88
Pa. St. 314), 712.
Philadelphia v. Providence Trust
Co. (133 Pa. St. 334; 18 Atl. Rep.
1114), 1049.
Philadelphia v. Railroad Co, (33 Pa.
St. 41), 1168.
Philadelphia V, Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry,
Co. (143 Pa, St. 444; 22 Atl, Rep.
695), 1104.
Philadelphia v. Rink (Pa„ 2 Atl,
Rep. 515), 1293.
Philadelphia v. Rule (93 Pa. St. 15),
1186.
Philadelphia v. Scott (81 Pa. St. 80),
■ 669.
Philadelphia v. Smith (Pa., 16 Atl.
Rep. 493: 33 W. N. C. 343), 1441,
UU, 1474, 1497.
Philadelphia v. Tryon (35 Pa. St. 401).
1163.
Philadelphia v. Verner (8 Pa. Co. Ct.
Rep. 97), 1164.
Philadelphia v. Wistar (93 Pa. St.
404), 1120.
Philadelphia v. Wright (100 Pa. St.
235), 1149.
Philadelphia &c. R. Co. «. Williams
(54 Pa. St. 103), 690.
Philadelphia & Trenton R, Co,, In
re (6 Whart, 26), 635.
Philips V. Jefferson (5 Kan. 412),
^1577,
Philips V. New York (113 N. Y. 216),
'241.
Philips V. Wickham (1 Paige Ch.
590), 465.
Phillips, In re (60 N. Y, 16), 499,
Phillips V. Albany (38 Wis, 340),
349, 617, 934,
Phillips V. Allen (41 Pa. St, 481),
5S5.
Phillips ■«, Ash's Heirs (63 Ala, 418),
555.
Phillips V. Commonwealth (44 Pa, St,
197), 311,
Phillips V. County Court (31 West
Va. 477), 1493.
Phillips V. Foxhall (L. R. 7 Q. B.
666), 323.
Phillips V. Mayor &c, of N. Y, (1
Hilt. (N. Y. Com. PI.) 483), 187.
Phillips V. School Dist. (79 Mich.
170; 44 N. W. Rep. 439)i 806,
Phillips V. Stevens Point (35 Wis.
594), 1576, 1578.
Phillips V. Tecumseh (5 Neb. 312),
1340.
Phillips County v, Lee County (34
Ark. 340), 438.
Pickering v. De Roohemont (N. H.,
23 Atl. Rep. 88). 345. 347, 1336.
Pickering v. Pickering (11 N. H. 141),
373.
Pickering v. Shotwell (10 Barr, 27),
663.
Pickering v. State (106 Ind. 228; 5
N. E. Rep. 611), 1127).
Pickett V. Adams (Ky., 15 S. W. Rep.
805), 1.333.
Pickett I'. Harrod (86 Kv. 485). 1323.
Pickett V. Hastings (47 Cal. 369), 624.
Pickett V. School District (35 Wis.
551), 393.
Pickford v. Mayor &c. of Lynn (98
Mass. 491), 705.
Pickles V. Dry Dock Co. (38 La. Ann.
413), 573.
Pidgpnn V. McCarthy (82 Ind. 321),
55.
Pierce v. Benjamin (14 Pick. 856),
1579.
Pierce v. Drew (136 Mass, 75', 678,
Pieice V. Emery (33 N, H. 507), 1556.
TABLE OF OASES.
CXCV
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Pierce v. New Bedford (139 Mass.
534), 264.
Pierce v. Richardson (37 N. H. 306),
1373.
Pierce v. Whitcomb (48 Vt. 137). 766.
Pierce Mfp;. Co. v. Bleckwenn (16
N. Y. Supl. 768). 876.
Piercy v. Averill (37 Hun, 360), 319,
331.
Fieri v. Sbieldsboro (43 Miss. 493),
1034.
Pierie v. Philadelphisv (139 Pa. St.
573: 31 Atl. Eep. 90), 184.
Pierrepoint v. Loveless (73 N. Y.
311), 1444.
Pierson v. Glean (14 N. J. Law, 37),
1036.
Pike V. Megoun (44 Mo. 391), 218.
Pike County v. State (11 111. 303),
11)53.
Pillsbury v. City of Augusta (79 Me.
71; 8 Atl. Rep. 150), 1193.
Pillsbury Vi Moore (44 Me. 154),
1036.
Piinental v. San Francisco (31 Cal.
351), 339. 393, 293, 636, 649.
Pine Bluff Water & Light Co. v.
Sewer District (Aik., 19 S. W.
Rep. 576), 1094.
Pine City v. Munch (43 Minn. 343),
1058, 1059, 1588.
Pine Civil Township v. Huber Mfg.
Co. (83 Ind. 131), 307, 643, 815,
820.
Pine Countv v. WiUard (39 Minn.
125: 39 "N. W. Rep. 71), 323.
Pine Grove Township v. Talcott (19
Wall. 6B6), 933. 934, 1383.
Pinkerton v. Bailey (8 Wend. 600),
1339.
Pinkhara v. Topsfleld (104 Mass. 78),
1437, 1460.
Pinney r. Brown (60 Conn. 164), 353.
PioUet V. Simmers (106 Pa. St. 95),
1467, 1468.
Piper V. Chappell (14 M. & W. 634),
533.
Piper V. Pearson (3 Gray. 130), 339.
Piper V. Singer (4 Serg. & R. 354),
1397.
Piqua V. Zimmerlin (35 Ohio St. 507),
535.
Piqua Branch of State Bank v.
Knoop (16 How. 369), 94. 109.
Piscatauqua Bridge v. New Hamp-
shire Bridge <7 N. H. 35), 671.
PIscataway v. Perth Amboy (4 Harr.
173). 993.
PIscataway Townships, Jn re (N. J.,
34 Atl. Rep. 759). 1416.
Pitts V. Opelika (79 Ala. 537). 502.
Piusburg V. ClarksvUle (58 N. H.
2J ), 1439.
Pittsburg V. Cluley (74 Pa. St. 362),
1269.
Pittsburgh. Danforth (56 N. H. 371),
346, 369.
Pittsburg V. Grier (33 Pa. St. 54),
767, '773.
Pittsburg V. Reynolds (Kan., 29 Pac.
Rep, 757), 503.
Pittsburgh's Appeal (Pa., 16 Atl.
Rep. 92), 1354.
Pittsburgh's Appeal (138 Pa. St. 401 ;
31 Atl. Rep. 757), 174.
Pittsburgh v. Scott (1 Pa. St. 309),
683.
Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Rose (74
Pa. St. 363), 609.
Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Swinney
(97 Ind. 5861, 698.
Pittsburgh E. Co. 'j, Taylor (104 Pa.
St. 306), 1494.
Pittston Borough v. Hart (85 Pa. St.
m% 1471.
Pitzman v. Freeburg (93 III. HI),
932.
Pixley V. Clark (35 N. Y. 520), 779.
Pixley V. Western Pac. R. Co. (33
Cal. 183), 703.
Place V. Providence (12 E. I. 1), n4fi.
Place V. Taylor (23 Ohio St. 317). 337.
Placer County v. Campbell (Cal., 11
Pac. Rep. 603). 887.
Planters' Ass'n v. Avigno (38 La.
Ann. 553). 965.
Plaquemines Police Jury v. Mitchell
(37 La. Ann. 44i, 1395.
Platenius v. State (17 Ark. 518). 740.
Piatt V. Chicago &c. R. Co. (Iowa, 31
N. W. Rep. 883). 1193.
Piatt V. People (65 III. 360), 160.
Platte County v. Gerard (13 Neb.
844), 659.
Platter v. County of Elkhart (103
Ind. 360; 3 N. E. Rep. 544; 1
West. Rep. 335), 308, 643, 971,
1111, 1534.
Platteville v. Bell (43 Wis. 488), 539,
544.
Platteville v. Galena &o. R. Co. (43
Wis. 493), 1391. ,
Platteville v. Hooper (63 Wis. 381),
313, 317.
Platteville v. McKernan (54 Wis.
487). 539.
Plattsburg v. Riley (43 Mo. App. 18),
405.
Plattsmoiith v. Boeck (Neb. , 49 N. W.
Rep. 895), 1139, 1149.
Plattsinouth v. Fitzgerald (10 Neb.
401). 960.
Pleasant v. Kost (89 111. 490), 1166.
Pleuler v. State (11 Neb. 547), 1356.
Plimpton V. Summerset (33 Vt. 383),
1357.
cxevi
TABtB OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Plumer p. Harper (3 N. H. 8S), 1036.
Pluminer v. Sheldon (94 Cal. 533),
1407, 1432.
Plymouth v. County Comm'rs (16
Gray, 341). 706.
Plymouth v. Graver (135 Pa. St. 24),
771.
Plymouth v. Painter (17 Conn. 585),
198.
Plympton v. Boston Dispensary (106
Mass. 544). 1066.
Pocontico Water-works Co. v. Bird
(4 N. Y. Supl. 317), 1303.
Poe V. Machine Works (34 West Va.
517), 546.
Poillon V. Brooklyn (101 N. Y. 132),
663.
Poindexter v. Greenhow (114 IT. S.
270), ao.
Point Pleasant Bridge Co. v. Tovrri
of Point Pleasant (3 West Va.
328; 9 S. E. Rep. 231), 68.
Point Pleasant Land Co. v. Trustees
(47 N. J. Law, 23.')), 383, 803,
1336.
Polack V. Orphan Asylum (48 Cal.
490), 1195.
Police Comm'rs v. City of Louisville
(3 Bush. 597). 1278.
Police Jury v. Britton (15 Wall. 566),
5fi2, 631, 633, 833, 932, 935, 933.
Police Jury v. McCormack (33 La.
Ann. 624), 624.
Police Jury u. Michel (4 La. Ann.
84', 1595.
Police Jury v, Shreveport (5 La. Ann.
661), 110.
Police Jury v. Succession of McDon-
ough (8 La. Ann. 341), 933.
Police Jury of Ouachita v. Monroe
(38 La." Ann. 680), 14.
Polinsky v. People (3 Hun, 390), 515.
Polk V. Cosgrove (4 Biss. 437), 325.
Polk V. Plummer (3 Humph. (Tenn.)
500), 313.
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan (3 How.
312), 669.
Polling Lists, In re (13 R. L 729),
377.
Pollock V. Lawrence County (3
Pittsb. R. 137). 903.
Pollock V. Louisville (13 Bush, 221 ;
26 Am. Rep. 260). 1013, 1038.
Polly V. Saratoga (9 Barb. 449), 690.
Pomeroy v. Westfield (154 Mass.
462), 1455, 1456, 1493, 1499.
Pomeroy Co. v. Davis (81 Ohio St.
555), 1350.
Pomfrey v. Village of Saratoga
Springs (104 N. Y. 459; 11 N. E.
Rep. 43), 831, 339, 780, 885, 1393,
1409, 1440, 1458, 1474, 1477,
1491.
Pompton V. Cooper Union (101 U. S.
196), 946.
Ponca V. Crawford (33 Neb. 662; 37
N. W. Rep. 609), 1499.
Pond V. Chippewa County (43 Wis.
63), 1171.
Pond V. Medway (Quincy (Mass.),
193), 705.
Pond V. Negus (3 Mass. 230), 303, 526,
1416.
Pontiac v. Carter (33 Mich. 164), 233,
757, 1194.
Po(Jk i\ Lafayette Building Ass'n
(71 Ind. 357), 646.
Pool V. Boston (5 Cush. 219), 667.
Pool V. Trexler (76 N. C. 297), 687.
Pooler V. Reed (73 Me. 139), 200.
Pooley V. City of Buffalo (133 N. Y.
592; 124 N. Y. 306), 1183.
Poor District v. Byers (Pa., 11 Atl.
Rep. 242), 898.
Poor Dist. of Lock Haven v. Poor
Dist. (Pa., 13 Atl. Rep. 742), 983.
Pope V. Phifer (3 Heisk. 683). 1389.
Poplin V. Hawke (8 N. H. 305), 995,
1001.
Poquet V. North Hero (44 Vt. 91),
975.
Port Hudson v. Chad wick (53 Mich.
320), 1144.
Port Huron v. McCall (46 Mich. 565),
93, 93.
Port Jevvis v. First Nat. Bank (98
N. Y. 550), 1300, 1453.
Port Royal v. Graham (84 Pa. St
436), 90S.
Portage Co. v. Wisconsin R. ~&c. Co.
(121 Mass. 460), 9S9.
Porter v. Attica (33 Hun, 605), 1409.
Porter v. Railroad Co. (33 Mo. 138),
1306.
Porter v. Rockford (76 111. 561), 1363.
Porter v. Stanley (47 Me. 515), 338.
Porter v. State (78 Tex. 591 ; 14 S. W.
Rep. 794), 1338, 1533.
Portland v. Bangor (43 Me. 403), 1259.
Portland v. Bangor (65 Me. 130), 1259.
Portland v. Schmidt (13 Oregon, 17),
549. •
Portland v. Water Co. (67 Me. 135).
1353, 1360.
Portland &c. R. Co. v. City of Port-
land (14 Or. 188; 12 Pao. Rep.
265), 578.
Portland &c. R. Co. v. Hartford (58
Me. 33), 361, 935, 939. 960.
Portland &c. K. Co. v. Standish (65
Me. 63), 370, 936.
Portland Sav. Bank v. Evansville
(25 Fed. Rep. 389), 959.
Portland Stone- ware Co. v. Tavlor
(R. I., 19 Atl. Rep. 1086), 1550,
1552.
TA&I.E OF O&SES.
CXCVU
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1603.]
Portsmouth Sav. Bank v. Spriug-
fleld (4 Fed. Rep. 376), 9fil.
Portsmouth Sav. Bank v. Village of
Ashley (Mich., 52 N. W. Rep. 74),
630.
Portwood 1'. Montgomery (52 Miss.
533). 1S6S, 1373.
Post V. Boston (141 Mass. 189), 1437,
1475.
Post V. County of Pulaski (47 Fed.
Rep. 283), 9.38.
Post V. Kendall Co. (105 U. & 667),
208.
Post V. Pearsall (22 Wend. 425), 1410.
Post V. Sparta (63 Mich. 333; 2»
N. W. Rep. 731), 1537. 1540.
Postmaster-General v. Munger (2
Paine, 189). 3^0, 330.
Postmaster-General v. Rice (Gilpin,
554), 645.
Potter V. Canaan (37 Conn. 224),
817.
Potter V. Castleton (53 Vt. 435). 1451.
Potter V. Douglass Countv (87 Mo.
239; 13 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
656), 832.
Potter V. Town of Greenwich (26
Hun, 326). 955.
Potter V. Village of Homer (59 Mich.
8). 1540.
Pottier & S. Man. Co. v. Taylor (3
MacArtlnir, 4), 1596.
Pottner v. City of Minneapolis (41
Minn. 73; 43 N. W. Eep. 784),
1099.
Potts V. City of Pittsburgh (14 W. N.
C. 38). 1589.
Potts 7!. State (75 Ind. 33i), 910.
Poughkeepsie v. Wilisie (36 Hun,
270). 183.
Poulters' Co. v. Phillips (6 Bing.
N. C. 314), 523.
Pound V. Chippewa County (43 Wis.
63). 571, 1063.
Pound V. Turck (95 U. S. 459), 1433.
Powell V. Boraston (18 C. B. (N. S.)
175), 134,
Powell V. Commonwealth (127 U. S.
67^). 599.
Powell V. Farmer (18 C. B. (N. S,)
168), 133.
Powell V. Heisler (45 Minn. .549; 48
N. W. Rep. 411), 8B8.
Powell V. Parkersburg (28 West Va.
698), 114, 1,574.
Powell V. Tuttle (3 N. Y, 396), 297,
1390.
Power V. Village of Athens (99 N. Y.
592), 568.
Powers' Appeal (29 Mich. 504), 623,
671, 13M1.
Powers, In re (25 Vt. 261), 1357.'
Powers V. Bears (13 Wis. 214), 695.
Powers V. City of Council Blufifs (50
Iowa, 197), 1138.
Powers I'. City of Yonkers (114 N. Y.
145; 21 N. E. Rep. 132), 713.
Powers V. Comm'rs (8 Ohio St. 285),
393.
Powers V. Decatur (54 Ala. 214), 531,
1333.
Powers V. Railroad Co. (33 Ohio St.
439), 692.
Powers V. St. Paul (36 Minn. 87),
783.
Powers V. Superior Court (23 Ga. 65),
933.
Powers V. Wood County (8 Ohio St.
285). 1306.
Powers V. Woodstock (38 Vt. 44),
1433, 1429.
Poweshiek County v. Cass County
(63 Iowa, 244), 988.
Poyer v. Village of Desplaines (23
111. App. 576). 1053, 1334.
Prairie v. Lloyd (97 III. 179). 9.56.
Pratt V. Baupre (13 Minn. 187), 314.
Pratt V. Gardner (3 Gush. 63), 317.
Pratt V. Law (9 Cranch, 456). 1144.
Pratt V. Lincoln County (61 Wis. 63 ;
20 N. V/. Rep. 726), 593, 1132.
Pratt V. Short (53 How. Pr. .506 1, 651.
Pratt V. Swanton (15 Vt. 147), 350,
640, 1141.
Pray v. Jersey City (32 N. J. Law,
"394). 9, 10, 769, 1448.
Pray v. Northern Liberties (31 Pa.
St. 69), 1166.
Preble v. Portland (45 Me. 241), 286.
Pre'lt V. McDonald (7 Kan. 426), 193,
19.1, 508. 539. 513, 1269.
Prescott V. Hays (42 N. H. 66), 200.
Prescott V. State (19 Ohio St. 184),
1008.
President v. Coal Co. (50 N. Y. 266),
730.
President &c. v. City of Indianapolis
(13 Ind. 630), 478.
President &c. v, Diffebach (1 Yeates,
367), 692.
President &c. v. Schroeder (58 111.
353), 1014.
President &c. v. State (45 Ala. 399),
1389.
President &c. v. Thompson (20 111.
1U7). 465; 1558.
President &c. of Ottawa v. County
of La Salle (12 III. 339), 113. ,
Pressel v. Bice (142 Pa. St. 263),
1*^55
Prestley v. Foulds (3 Scott, N. R.
205, 2251, 129.
Preston v. Boston (13 Pick. 7), 244,
247, 1399.
Preston v. Culbertson (58 Gal. 209),
379.
OXCVIU
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pagpa; YoL I, pp. 1-788; Yom^ pp.789-1605.]
V. Roberts (13 Bush. 570), Prosnect Park &c. R. Co. v.
Preston v. Roberts (13 Bush, 570),
1170.
Preston v. Rudd (84 Ky. 161), 1187.
Prettyman v. Tazewell County (19
111. 406), 955.
Prewett v. Mississippi County (38
Ark. 313). 988.
Prezinger v. Harness (114 Ind. 491 ;
16 N. E. Rep. 495), 277, 1075, 1136.
Price V. Bartram (Cowp. 69), 1223.
Price V. Grant (7 N. Y. Supl. 904),
1360.
Price V. Methodist Church (4 Ohio,
513), 1166.
Price V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co. (37
Wis. 9S), 700, 1148.
Price V. Railroad Co. (13 Ind, 58),
393, 1173.
Price V. Thompson (48 Mo. 363), 624.
Price V. Town of Breckenridge (93
Mo. 379), 1406.
Prideaux v. Mineral Point (43 Wis.
533). 1436, 1451.
Priest *. Cummings (16 Wend. 617),
140.
Priet V. De La Montanyo (§5 .Cal.
148; S4Pac. Rep. 613), 316.
Priet V. Reis (93 Cal. 85 ; 38 Pao. Rep.
798). 851;
Prince v. City of Fresno (88 Cal. 407;
36 Pac. Rep. 60fi), 183.
Prince v. City of Lynn (149 Mass.
193; 21 N. E. Rep. 296), 171.
Prince v. Lewis (5 Barn. & C. 363),
1343.
Prince v. Quincy (105 111. 138; 3 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 66), 330, 805,
845.
Prince v. Quincy (138 III. 443; 31 N.
E..Rep. 768), 837, 844.
Princeton v. Vierling (40 Md. 340),
341, 344.
Prindle v. Fletcher (39 Vt. 355), 1475.
Pringle and McDonald, In re (Upper
Can. Q. B. 356), 180.
Pritchard v. Atkinson (3 N. H. 335),
1419.
Pritchett «. People (6 III. 535), 290,
313.
Pritchett v. Stanislaus Co. (73 Cal.
310; 14 Pac. Rep. 795), 188.
Privett V. Bicktord (26 Kan. 53),
386.
Procter v. Andover (43 N. H. 348),
635.
Proctor V. Lewiston (35 111. 153),
1143.
Proprietors of Cambridge v. Chand-
ler (6 N. H. 271), 350.
Proprietors of Cardigan v. Page (8
N. H. 183), 350, 353, 388.
Proprietors of Southhold v, Horton
(6 Hill, 501), 67, 87.
Prospect Park &c. R. Co. v. William-
son (91 N. Y. 553), 676.
Prosser v. Davis (18 Iowa, 367), 678.
Prosser D. Secor (5 Barb. 607). 227.
Protestant Home ' v. Mayor (35 N. J.
, Law, 157). 1361, 1396.
Protestant Orphan Asvlum's Ap-
peal (111 Pa St. 135); 1164.
Prout V. Pittsfield Fire Dist, (154
Mass. 450), 657.
Providence v. Clapp(t7 How. 161), 9.
Providenre v. Miller (11 R. L 273; 23
♦Am. Rep. 4.53), 313, 263.
Providence v. Union R. Co. (13 R. I.
473), 538.
Providence &o. R. Co. v. Wright (2
R. L 459), 1358.
Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber (3 R.
L 15), 686), 1361.
Providence InsHtution v. Gardiner
(4 R. I. 484), 1359.
Pi'ovident Inst. v. Jersey City (113
U. S. 506), 1164, 1395.
Provincetown v. Smith (120 Mass.
96), 1042.
Provost V. New York (3 N. Y. SupL
631), M61.
Prowse V. Foot (3 Bro. P. C. 289),
315.
Pruden i;.. Grant County (13 Oregon,
308), i586.
Pruden t\ Love (67 Ga. 190). 218.
Public School Trustees v. Taylor (30
N. J. Eq. 61b), 115.
Public Schools V. Risley (10 Wall.
91), 579.
Pueblo V. Robinson (Colo., 31 Pac.
Rep. 899), 1134.
Puffer V. Orange (133 Mass. 389), 1472.
Pugh V. Little Rock (36 Ark. 75), 543,
1368.
Puitt V. Comm'rs (94 N. C. 709). 1345.
Pulaski V. Gilmore (31 Fed. Rep. 870),
944.
Pulaski County v. Judge of Saline
County (37 Ark. 339). 450.
Pulaski County t;. Reeve (43 Ark. 55),
8, 15.
Pulaski County v, Vaughn (83 6a.
370), 863.
Pulliam t'. Runnels County (Tex., 15
S. W. Rep. 377), 1341.
Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Penn
(141 U. S. 18), 1340.
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. (13 Wall.
166), 670. 1466.
Purcell V. Booth (6 Dak. 17), 1363.
Purcell V. Town of Bear Creek (111.,
38 N. E. Rep. 1085), 860.
Purdy V. Lansing (138 U. S. 557),
939
Purdy v. People (4 Hill, 384), 61, 12a.
Purrington v. Warren (49 Vt. 19), 783.
TABLE or OASES.
CXCIX
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1805.]
Purssell V. Mayor &c. (85 N. Y. 330),
1138, 1184,
Pusey V. City of Allegheny (98 Pa.
fat. 522), 677, 1149.
Putnam v. Douglas County (6 Ore-
gon, 328; 25 Am. Rep. 527), 702.
Putnam v. Langley (133 Mass. 204),
304, 1529, 1560.
Putnam County v. Auditor of Allen
County (10 Ohio St. 322), 451.
Pybus V. Gibb (6 EI. & B. 902),
321
Pye uMankato (38 Minn. 536; 31
N. W. Rep. 863), 782. 1144.
Pye V. Peterson m Tex. 312; 23 Am.
Rep. 608), 593, 1247.
Q.
Quaid V. Trustees (49 N. J. Law,
607). 882.
Queeii v. Aberdare (14 Q. B. 854),
351.
Queen v. Abingdon (5 Q. B. 406),
977.
Queen v. Birmingham &c. lEy. Co.
(6 Ry. Cas. 628; 4 Eng. L. &. Eq.
276), 697.
Queen v. Bishop (5 Q. B. Div. 259),
1249.
Queen «.' Gilbert (3 Pug. & Bur. 619),
533
Queen v. Glossop (1 Q. B. 227), 977.
Queen v. Governors &c. (8 Ad. & El.
632), 202, 210.
Queen v. Justices (4 Q. B. D. 532),
533.
Queen v. Local Government Board
(L. R. 8 Q. B. 237), 41, 1366.
Queen v. Milledge (4 Q. B. D. 333),
533.
Queen v. Poole (L. R. 19 Q. B. D.
602). 787.
Queen v. Prince (L. R. 2 Cr. Cas.
154), 1250.
Queen v. Saddlers' Co. (10 H. L Cas.
404), 206.
Queen v. St. Ives (L. R. 7 Q. B. 467),
977.
Queen v. St. Leonard (1 Q. B. 21),
977.
Queen v. Saintifl (6 Mod. 255), 1408.
Queen v. Worcester (9 Q. B. 340),
977.
Queensbury v. Culver (19 Wall. 83),
1379.
Quick V. Village of River Forest
(130 111. 323; 23 N. E. Rep. 816),
1094.
Quigley v. Aurora (50 Ind. 28), 539.
Quigiey v. Vaughn (17 III. App, 347),
1348.
Quill V. City of ■ Indianapolis (124
Ind. 293 ; 23 N. E. Rep. 788), 627,
889.
Quimby v. Vermont Cent. R. Co. (23
Vt. 387),671.
Quinoy v. Ballance (30 111. 185). 539.
Quincy v. Bull (106 111. 337), 525, 527.
Quincy v. Cook (107 U. S. 549), 941.
Quincv V. Jackson (113 U. S. 332),
1385.
Quincy v. Jones (76 III. 231), 1207.
Quincy v. O'Brien (24 111. App. 591).
604.
Quincy V. Railroad Co. (93 111. 21),
484.
Quincy v. Steel (120 U. S. 341; 7
S. Ct. Rep. 520), 1180.
Quincy &e. R. Co. v. Morris (84 111.
410), 933.
Quinetteu. St. Louis (76 Mo. 402),
523, 528.
Quinlan v. Utica (11 Hun, 317; 74
N. Y. 603), 1477, 1485.
Quinn v. State (35 Ind. 485; 9 Am.
Rep. 754), 376,
Quintinii;. Board &c. (64 Miss. 483;
1 So. Rep. 635), 1052.
Quong Woo, In re (13 Fed. Rep.
229), 1390, 1233.
R.
Racho V. Detroit (90 Mich. 93), 1447.
Radcliffi V. Brooklyn (4 N. Y. 195),
775 779 1457
Radeck's Case (49* Md. 228), 1246.
Rader v. Southeasterly Road District
(38 N. J. Law, 273). 473.
Radway v. Briggs (b7 N. Y, 356),
1403.
Rae V. Flint (51 Mich. 526; 16 N. W,
Rep. 8S7), 817, 1029.
Ragan v. Railroad Co. (Mo., 20 S. W.
Rep. 234J, 1415,
Rahway v. Rahway (49 N. J. Law,
884), 1378.
Rahway Sav, Inst. v. Mayor &c.
(N. J., 20 Atl. Rep. 756), 1593.
Rail V. Potts (8 Humph. (Tenn.) 225',
218.
Railroad Commission Cases (116 U.
S..,307), 6,
Railroad Co. v. Alabama (101 TJ. S.
833), 30.
Railroad Co. v, Bentley (64 111. 4S8),
391.
Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago (UO
III. 267), 1167.
Railroad Co. v. Conn«illy (10 Ohio
St. 159), llti7.
Railroad Co. v. Connolly (7 Ind. 33),
704.
CO
TABLE OF CASES.
p3ie refereoces are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 78a-l(S03.]
Railroad Co. v. Dayton (23 Ohio St.
510), 591, 675.
Railroad Co. v. Evansville (15 Ind.
895). 927.
Railroad Co. v. Gaines (97 U. S.
697), 1374.
Railroad Co. v. Houston (95 U. S.
697). 1493.
Railroad Co. v. Howard (13 How.
307J, 1600.
Railroad Co. v. Lawrence (27 111.
50), 1576.
Railroad Co. v. Lincoln County (67
Wis. 478 ; 30 N. W. Rep. 619), 593:
Railroad Co. v. Marion County (36
Mo. 294), 286. 1390.
Railroad Co. v. Moffltt (75 111. 524),
591
Railroad Co. v. Odum (53 Tex. 343),
510.
Railroad Co. v, Otoe County (1 Dill.
338), 1592.
Railroad Co. v. Otoe County (16
Wall. 667), 933.
Railroad Co. r. Richmond (96 U. S.
521), .':90, 1211.
.Railroad Co. v. Smith (6 Ind. 249),
704.
Railroad Co. v. Spearman (18 Iowa,
112), 1366.
Railroad Co. v. Tennessee (101 U. S.
337). 20.
Railroad Co. v. Town of Lake (71
III. 333), 591, 681.
Railroad Co. v. Wakefield (103 Mass.
361), 1208.
Railroad Co. v. Whalen (11 Neb.
58n). 699.
Railroad Co. v. Wilt6e(116 111. 449 j 6
N. E. Rep. 49), 591.
Railroad Co. v. Wright (5 R. L 459),
1167.
Railroad Co. v. Ziemer (124 Pa. St.
560), 1491.
Railway Co. v. Circuit Judge (44
Mich. 479), 1S36.
Railway Co. v. City of Faribault (23
Minn. 167), 591.
Railway Co. v. City of Louisville (4
Bush (Ky.), 478), 1358.
Railway Co. v. Citv of Louisyille (8
Bush (Ky.), 419), 587.
Railway Co. «>. City of Philadelphia
(58 Pa. St. 119). 1207.
Railway Co. i: City of Philadelphia
(124 Pa. St. 319; 16 Atl. Rep.
741), 1079.
Railway Co. v. City of Philadelphia
(10 Phila. 70). 1307.
Railway Co. v. Easton (133 Pa. St. 505 ;
19 Atl, Rep. 486), 1207.
Railway Co. v. Hoboken (41 N, J.
Law, 71), 1232.
Railway Co. v, Iowa (94 U. S. 155),
574.
Railway Co. v. Oakrs (20 Ind. 9), 704,
Railway Co. v. Williarasport (120
Pa. St. I; 13 Atl. Rep. 496),
1207.
Raines v. Simpson (50 Tex. 995; 32
Am. Rep. 609). 320.
Raina v. Oslikosh (14 Wis. 372), 71.
Raisler v. Athens (i6 Ala. 191), 314,
1400.
Raker v. Magnon (9 III. App. 155),
544.
Raleish v. Peace (110 N. C. 33; 14
S. E. Rep. 5-.'l), .')70. 1177.
Raleigh v. Sorrell (1 Jones (N. C),
Law. 49). 287. 3U0.
Raleigh &c. R. C^o. r. Davis (3 Dev.
& Bat. Law (N. C). 451). 669.
Ralls County v. Douglass (lOOTJ. S.
58.5), 943, 941.
Ralls County Court v. United States
(105 U.S. 733), 42"), 1373, 1380,
1384, 138.").
Ramsay v. Hneger (70 111. 432), 1573.
Ramsey v. Ramsey (121 Ind. 215;,
1000.
Ramsey v. Riley (13 Ohio, 157), 318.
Ramshay. In re (83 Eng. Com. Law,
174), 203, 210.
Ramson v. Mayor &c. (34 Barb. 226),
659.
Ramthun v. Halfman (58 Tex. 551),
140.^.
Ranch v. City (33 Kan. 456), 1171.
Rand v. Wilder (11 Cush. 294), 348,
353.
Randall i'. Christiansen (76 Iowa,
169), 141S.
Randall v. Conway (63 N. H. 513),
1416.
Randall v. Eastern R. Co. (108 Mass.
376). 264. 1468.
Randall v. Van Vechten (19 Johns.
60), 363, 2ii:i.
Randolph v. Biainlree (4 Mass. Slo),
451.
Randolph v. Good (3 West Va. 551),
376.
Randolph v. United States (31 Ct.
CI. 283). 743.
Randolph County v. Post (93 U. S.
502), 940, 914, 947.
Rang I'. Governor (4 Blackf. 2), 329.
Ranney v. Bader (67 Mo. 476), 613,
634.
Ransom v. Boal (39 Iowa, 68), 634.
Rapelye v. School Tru.itees (1 Edm.
(N. Y.) Sch. Cas. 175), 1321.
Rapho Tp. V. Moore (68 Pa. St. 401),
1198. 1433.
Ratcliffe v. County Court (West Va.,
14 S. E. Rep. 1004), 854.
TABLE OF OASES.
CCl
pTbe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 78M603.]
Rathbon v. Budlong (15 Johns. 1),
ai3.
Eathbun v. Acker (18 Barb. 8«3),
1171.
Rau V. Little Rook (34 Ark. 303), 525.
Ravenna v. Pennsylvania Co. (45.
Ohio St. 118; 12 N. E. Rep. 445),
615.
Rawlings v. Beggs (85 Ky. 351), 706.
Rawson v. School Dist. (100 Mass.
134), 1384.
Rawson v. Spencer (113 Mass. 40),
1388.
Ray V. Bank (3 B. Mon. 510). 1577.
Ray V. City (90 Ind. 5fi7), 1 176.
Rayw. City of St. Paul (40 Minn.
458; 42 N. W. Rep. 297), 1450.
Ray V. Citv of St. Paul (44 Minn.
340; 46 N. W. Rep. 675), 783,
1199.
Ray V. Manchester (46 N. H. 59), 364,
775.
Ray V. Wilson (Fla., 10 So. Rep. 618),
910.
Ray County v. Bentley (49 Mo. 336),
746.
Ray County v. Vansycle (96 U. S.
675), 944, 961.
Raymond v. City of Sheboygan (70
Wis. 318; 35 N. W. Rep. 540),
1442.
Raymond v. Fish (51 Conn. 80), 1019,
1031, 1040. 1046.
Raymond v. Harrison (11 Me. 190),
995.
Raymond v. Iiowell (6 Cush. 534).
1469, 1498.
Raynsford v. Phelps (43 Mich, 343 ;
38 Am. Rep. 189). 318, 319.
Re Corliss (11 R. I. 638), 189.
He Creek (3 B. & S. 459), 134.
Re Malone (31 S. C.'435), 1345.
Re Norton (Q. B., June 8, 1872), 203.
Re Pearl Street (11 Pa. St. 565),
1143.
Re Tie Loy (26 Fed. Rep. 611). 1033.
Re Wan Yin (23 Fed. Eep. 701), 1233.
Read v. Calais (48 Vt. 7), 783.
Read V. City of Buffalo (74 N. Y.
463), 913.
Read v. City of Camden (N. J., 31
Atl. Rep. 565), 1084.
Read v. City of Camden (N. J., 34
Atl. Rep. 549), 547, 593, 1084.
Read v. Plaltsmouth (107 U. S. 568 ;
2 Am. & Eng, Corp. Cas. 300),
941, 1371, 1394.
Readdy v. Borough of Shamokin
(Pa., 20 Atl. Rep. 396), 1199.
Reading v. Commonwealth (11 Pa.
St. 196), 1319.
Reading v. Keppleman (61 Pa. St.
233), 94, 109.
Reading v. Savage (120 Pa. St. 108),
47.
Reading v. Wesiport (19 Conn. 561),
976.
Readington v. Dilley (24 N. J. Law,
209), 695.
Reardon v. St, Louis County (36 Mo.
555), 746.
Reardon v. San Francisco (66 Cal.
493), 674.
Reckner v. Warner (23 Ohio St. 275).
696.
Reclamation Dist. v. Goldman (61
Cal. 205), 1166.
Recorder v. Brooks (Colo., 29 Pac.
Rep. 746), 1375.
Rector v. State (6 Ark. 187), 1255.
Red V. Augusta (35 Ga. 386), 302.
936."
Red Rock v. Henry (106 U. S. 596),
944.
Redd V. Henry County (31 Gratt.
695), 936, 961.
Reddall v. Bryan (14 Md, 444), 686.
Reddick v. Amelia (1 Mo. 5i, 53.
Kedraond v. state (36 Ark. 58), 1350.
Redmond v. Town (106 N. G 133; 10
S. E. Rep. 845), 1355.
Redwood County u Tower (38 Minn.
45), 331.
Reed, Ex parte (4 Cranch, 582), 533.
Reed, Ex parte (4 Hill, 573). 335.
Reed v. Acton (117 Mass. 384), 359,
360, 36S.
Reed v. Belfast (20 Me. 248), 747.
Reed v. City of Birmingham (Ala.,
9 So. Rep. 161). 1418.
Reed V. Conway (-'0 Mo. 22), 318.
Reed v. Home Savings Bank (130
Mass. 443), 767.
Reed v. Lancaster (152 Mass. 500;
25 N. E. Eep. 974), 381, 799, 970.
Reed v. Madison (53 N. W. Rep. 547),
1449.
Reed v. Toledo (18 Ohio, 161), 1160.
Reed v. Town of Orleans (Ind., 27
N. E. Rep. 109). 815, 1593.
Reeder v. Harlan (98 Ind. 114), 326.
Reedv v. School Dist. (30 Mo. App.
ri3), 1343.
Reeniilin v. Mosby (47 Ohio St. 570;
36 N. E. Rep. 717), 176.
Rees V. Watertown (19 Wall. 107),
148, 149, 479, 1373, 1373, 1376,
1379, 1588.
Reeve School Tp. v. Dodson (98 Ind.
497), 208, 643, 832.
Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood County
(8 Ohio St. 338). 687, 1024.
Reeves County v. Pecos Countv (69
Tex. 177; 7 S. W. Rep. 54),"463.
Regents &o. v. Detroit (13 Mich.
138), 263.
.ecu
TABLE OF CASES.
[Xhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Regents &o. v. Williams (9 Gill & J.
(Md.) 365), 493.
Regina t'.> Bailiffs (3 Ld. Eaym.
1233), 387.
Eegina v. Bewdley (1 P. Wms. 307),
97, 464.
Regina v. Bowers (1 Denlson, 23),
543.
Regina v. Bradley (3 El. & El. 634),
385.
Regina v. Bridsevrater (10 Ad. &
El. 281), 13, 663.
Regina v. Coaks (3 El. & Bl. 249),
386.
Regina v. Councillors of Derby (7
Ad. & El. 419), 163.
Regina v. Cumberlego (36 L. T.
(N. S.)700), 180.
Regina v. franklin (6 Ir. R. C. L.
239), 386.
Regina v. Orimshaw (10 Q. B. 747),
276.
Regina v. Hiarns (7 Ad. & El. 960),
163.
Regina v. Howard (4 Ont. 377; 4 Am.
. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 377), 1247.
Regina v. Ipswich (2 Ld. Raym.
1340), 206. 207.
Regina v. Justices of Shropshire (8
Ad. & El. .173), 850.
Regina v. Lander (1 Ir. R. C. L.
225), 350.
Regina v. Ledyard (8 Ad. & El. 535),
163.
Regina v. Litchfield (4 Q. B. 893),
663, 933.
Regina v. Mayor of Aberavon (11 L.
■ T. (N. S.) 417; 11 W. E. 90), 81,
83.
Regina v. Mayor of Chipping Wy-
combe (44 L. J. Q. B. 82), 134.
Regina v. Mayor of Exeter (L. R. 4
Q. B. 114), 133.
Regina v. Mayor of Ryde (28 L. T.
(N. S.) 639), 203.
Regina v. Mayor of Tewksbury (Law
Rep. 3 Q. B. 639), 163.
Regina v. Mayor &c. of Bridgnorth
(10 Ad. & El. 66), 134.
Regina v. Mayor &c. of Eye (9 Ad.
& El. 670). 134.
Regina v. Mavor &o. of Kiddermins-
ter (30 L.'J. Q. B. 281), 134.
EegiTia v. Mayor &c. of Leeds (7 Ad.
& El. 963), IGo.
Regina v. Mayor &c. of Leeds (4 Q.
B. 796; Dav. & M. 143), 13.
Regina V. Mayor &o. of New Windsor
(7 Q. B. 908), 134.
Regina v. Mayor &c, of Silverpool
(41 L. J. Q. B. 145), 12.
Regina v. Paramore (10 Ad. & El.
286), 12.
Regina v. Petrie (30 Eng. L. & Eq.
207). 1406.
Regina v. Rippon (1 Q. B. Div, 217),
165.
Regina v. Rowley (3 Q. B. 143; 6
. Q. B. 668). 165.
Regina v. Stamford (4 Q. B.
900, n. a), 663.
Regina v. Staples (9 Best & S.
928, n.). 1561.
Regina v. Tavlor (11 A. & E. 949),
139.
Regina v. Tewkesbury (3 L. R. Q. B.
629), 386.
Regina v. Thomas (8 Ad. & El. 183),
276,
Regina v. Thompsoa (5 Q. B. 477;
Dav. & M. 497). 13.
Regina v. Whip (4 Q. B. 141), 276.
Regina v. York (3 Q. B. 847; 3 G.
& D. 105), 18.
Rehberg v. New York (91 N. Y. 137),
781. 1446, 1448, 1480.
Rehmke v. Goodwin (Wash., 27
Pac. Rep. 473), 843.
Reid V. Board of Supervisors (128
N. Y. 364), 1134.
Reid V. Town of Eatonton (80 Ga.
755), 1345.
Reiflf V. Conner (10 Ark. 241), 303,
537.
Reilly, Ex parte (85 Cal. 633), 199,
1353.
Reilly V. City of Albanv (112 N. Y.
30; 19 N. E. Rep. 508), llOH.
Reilly v. City of New York (51 N. Y,
Super. Ct. 463), H07.
Reillv V. City of Racine (51 Wis. 536;
, 8 N. W. Rep. 417), 1194, 1410.
Reimer's Appeal (100 Pa. St. 183),.
1203.
Reinbolt v. Pittsburgh (41 Pa. St.
278), 927.
Reioeman v. Covington &c. R. Co.
(7 Neb. 310), 933.
Reinhard v. Mayor &c. (3 Daly (N.
Y.), 243), 529, 1449.
Reining v. City of Buffalo (102 N.
Y. 309), 784, 1598.
Reining v. New York &c. R. Co.
(128 N. Y. 157; 28 N. E. Rep.
640), 587, 1433.
Reinken v. Fuehring (Ind., 30 N. E.
Rep. 414), 1163. 1231.
Remington v. Harrison County
Court (12 Bush (Ky.), 148). 657.
Remington v. Ward (78 Wis. 539 ; 47
N. W. Rep. 659), 816.
Rens V. City of Grand Rapids (73
Mich. 237; 41 N. W. Rep. 263),
230, 233, nil, 1140.
Rensselaer v. Davis (43 N. Y. 187),
671, 683.
TABLE OF OASES.
CCUI
[The references are to pages: Vol I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. -789-1606.]
Rensselaer ti. Leopold (106 Ind. 39).
685, 1128.
Rentz V. Detroit (48 Mioh. 544; 13 N.
W. Rep. 694), 1135.
Ren wick v. Hall (84 111. 163), 1556.
Report of Commissioners of Adjust-
ment, In re (49 N. J. Law, aSS ;
23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 484),
5fi3.
Republic &c. v. Pollak (75 111. 292),
1362, 1399.
Requa v. Rochester (45 N. Y. 130),
771, 781, 1445, 1500.
Response to House Resolution (55
Mo. 295), 64.
Respublica v. Duquet (3 Yeates, 493),
629, 1054. V4L
Reubelt v. School Town of Nobles-
ville (106 Ind. 478; 7 N. E. Rep.
206), 971.973.
Reusch V. Chicago &c R. Co. (57 Iowa,
687), 670.
Revell V. Pettit (3 Met. (Ky.) 314),
339.
Rex V. Araery (3 Terra Rep. 515), 464.
Rex V. Andover (1 Ld. Raym. 710),
202.
Rex V. Ashwell (13 East, 32), 535,
526.
Rex V. Atkins (3 Mod. 13; 3 Show.
238), 174. 271, 278.
Rex V. Axraouth (8 East, 383), 134.
Rex V. Bailey (1 Mood. C. C. 33),
134.
Rex V. Bankes (3 Burr. 145S), 1523.
Rex V. Bellringer (4 T. R. 810), 164,
370 291
Rex V. Bird (13 East, 867), R35, 526.
Rex V. Blizzard (L. R. 2 Q. B. 55),
202.
Rex V. Bower (1 Barn. & C. 493), 164,
270 291.
Rex V. Bridge (1 M. & S. 76), 386.
Rexu Bridgewater (3 T. R. 550),
134.
Rex V. Buller (8 East, 892; 1 Rol.
Ahr. 514), 273.
Eex V. Bumstead (3 B. & Ad. 699),
189.
Rex V. Burgess (2 Burr. 908), 1404,
1408.
Rex V. Carlisle (Fortesc. 200; 11 Mod.
379), 203.
Rex V. Carroll (1 Leach. 237). 134.
Rex V. Carter (Cow p. 59), 270.
Rexv. Chalke (1 Ld. Raym. 225; 1
Roll. Rep. 409; 3 Bulst. 189),
304. 206.
Rex V. Chitty (5 Ad. & El. 609), 189.
Rex V. City of London (Mich,, 33
Car. 2; 2 Show. 263), 130.
Rex V. Corry (5 East, 381 ; 1 Smith,
243), 273.
Rex V. Coventry (1 Ld. Raym. 891),
303.
Rex V. Croke (Cowp. 26), 298.
Rex V. Cross (3 Camp. 384), 1464.
Rex V. Dawes (4 Burr. 3:79), 870.
Rex V. Derby (Cas. Temp. Hardw.
154). 207.
Rex V. Devonshire (1 Barn, & C.
609)j,lH4, 370, 291.
Rexv. Djncaster (2 Burr. 738), 204,
206, 270.
Rex V. Eaton (Litt. 23), 136.
Rex V. Ellis (9 East, 252; 2 Str. 994),
190.
Rex V. Faversham (8 Term R. 856),
207. 271, 52.5.
Rexv. Foxcroft (Burr. 1017), 386.
Rexv. Gaborian (11 East, 86, n, ; 2
Show. 238). 271, 372.
Rex V. Greet (8 Barn. & C. 363), 164.
Rex V. Grosvenor (7 Mod. 199), 139,
464.
Rex V. Grunes (5 Burr. 3599), 178,
^7i
Rex V. Harris (1 Barn. & Ad. 936),
275 276.
Rex V. Harris (3 Burr. 1423), 1529.
Rex V. Hastings (1 Barn. & Aid.
148), 1258.
Rex V. Havering-Atte-Bowers (5
Barn. & Aid. 391), 1253.
Rex V. Hawkins (10 East, 211), 386.
Rex V. Head (4 Burr. 2515), 290, 298.
Rex V. Hadley (7 Barn. & C. 496),
164, 291.
Rex V. Hearle (1 Str. 627), 174,
Rex V. Hebden (Andr. 389), 178, 270,
273.
Rex V. Hertford (1 Ld. Raym. 426),
298.
Rex V. Hill (4 Barn. & C. 441), 370,
271.
Rex V. Holmes (H. 9), 1523.
Rex V. Home (Cowp. 672), 542.
Rex V. Hoyte (6 T. R. 430), 164.
Rex V. Jones (1 Barn. & Ad. 677),
201.
Rex V. Jones (3 Camp. 230), 1464.
Rex V. Kent (13 East, 220), 129. 464.
Rex V. Lane (2 Ld. Raymond, 1304),
203.
Rex V. Lathrop (1 Wm. B. 471), 270.
Rex V. Lisle (Andr. 163; 3 Str. 1090;,
178, 198, 270. 272, 1523.
Rex V. Liverpool (2 Burr. 723), 204,
206. 207, 270, 278.
Rex V. Lyme Regis (Doug. 153), 803,
204, 80B.
Rex V. Mason (2 D. & E. 686). 543.
Rex V. May (4 Barn. & Ad. 843), 164.
Rexv. May (5 Burr. 2682), 270, 271.
Rex V. Mayor &o. (8 Mod. Ill), 290.
Rex V. Mayor &c. (5 T. R. 66), 178.
cciv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. TL pp. 789-1605.]
Rex V. Mayor &c. (1 Lev. 291), 203.
Rex V. Mayor ot Cambridge (4 Burr.
2008), 1523.
Rex V. Mavor of Colchester (2 Term
R. 259). 1523.
Rex V. Mayor of Oxford (6 Ad. &
El. 349), 1523.
Rex V. Mayor of York (4 Term R.
Rex V. Medley (6 Car. & P. 292), 764.
Rex V. Miller (6 T. R. 268), 164, 270,
464,
Rex V. Monday (2 Cowp. 580), 164,
270, 294, 386.
Rex V. Morris (3 East, 21.5). 464.
Rex V; Morris (4 East. 26), 270.
Rex V. Okehampton (Burr. S. C. 5),
134.
Rex V. Oabourne (4 East, 326), 464.
Rex V. Overseers of Christ Church (7
E. &B. 409), 164.
Rex V. Oxford (3 Salk. 428), 202.
Rex V. Oxfordshire (30 Eng. C. L,
289), 1425.
Rex V. Parry (6 A. & E. 810), 129.
Rex V. Passmore (3 Term Rep. 241),
464.
Rex V. Paasmore (.Sa T. R. 119), 97.
Rex V. Phillips (1 Str. 394), 174.
Rex V. Ponsonby (1 Ves. Jr. 1), 204.
Rexv. Richardson (1 Burr. 517), 203,
204, 206, 207.
Rex V. St. Luke's Hospital (3 Burr.
1063), 134.
Rex V. Sainthill (2 Ld. Eaym. 1174),
1432.
Rex V. Saunders (3 East, 119), 129,
464.
Rex V. Sefton (Russ. & Ry. 203), 134.
Rex V. Shrewsbury (Cas. Temp.
Hardw. 151). 270, 271.
Rex V. Spencer (if Burr. 1827), 189.
Rex V. StadiriK (1 Str. 497). 543.
Rex V. Stewart (4 East, 17), 464.
Rex V. Taylor (3 Salk. 231), 203, 204.
Rex V. Theodorick (8 East, 543), 270,
271, 273.
Rex V. Thornton (4 East, 308), 174,
270.
Rex V. Tidderley (1 Sid. 14), 204.
Rex V. Tizzard (9 Barn. & C. 418),
201.
Rex V. Trapshaw (1 Leach. 427), 134.
Rex V. Tregony (8 Mod. 129), 464.
Rex V. Trew (8 Barnard, 370j, 272.
Rex V. Tripp (M. T. 1836), 134.
Rex V. Tucker (1 Barnard, 27), 871.
Rex V. Varlo (Cowp. 250), 270, 380.
Rex V. Wake (1 Barnard, 80), 271.
Rex V. Warrington (1 Salk. 152), 897.
Rex V. Wells (4 D. P. C. 563), 125i.
Rex V. Westwood (4 Barn. & C,
799), 390, 298.
Rex V. Weymouth (7 Mod. 371), 189.
Rex V. White (5 A. & E. 613). 129,
Rex V. Williams (3 Maule & Sel. 141,
144), 273.
Rex V. Wilton (5 Mod. 259), 206.
Rex V. York (5 Term R-. 72), 270.
Rexford v. Knight (11 N. Y. 308),
70-3.
Reynolds, Ex parte (87 Ala. 138; 6
So. Rep. 335; 29 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 1), 617.
RernoMs v. Baldwin (1 La. Ann.
*162). 192, 288, 898.
Reynolds v. Mayor (8 Barb. 597),
663.
Reynolds v. New Salem (6 Met.
340). 347, 915. *
Reynolds v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (58
N. Y. 848), 1504.
Reynolds v. Reynolds (15 Conn. 83),
684.
Reynolds v. Stark County (5 Ohio,
204), 624.
Reynolds v. United States (98 U. S.
145), 1285.
Reynolds Land & Cattle Co. v, Mc-
Cabe (78 Tex. 57), 368, 1383.
Rhea v. Umatilla County (3 Oregon,
300), 1189.
Rhine v. City of Sheboygan (Wis.,
52 N. W. Rep. 444), 996.
Rhine v. McKinney (53 Tex. 354),
696.
Rhoda V. Alameda County (69 Cal.
533; 11 Pac. Rep. 57). 883.
Rhodes v. Cleveland (10 Ohio, 159),
677, 766.
Rice V. City of Evansville (108 Ind.
7; 58 Am. Rep. 28), 109S.
Rice V. City of Flint (67 Mieh. 401 ;
34 N. W. Rep. 719), 1147.
Rice V. Des Moines (40 Iowa, 638),
841.
Rice V. Foster (4 Harr. (Del.) 479), 74,
525
Rice V. Montpelier (19 Vt. 470), 1451.
Rice V. Plymouth County (48 Iowa,
1361, 614, 1028.
Rice V. Smith (9 Iowa, 570), 555, 646.
Rice V. State (3 Kan. 141), 1356.
Rice V. Wood (113 Mass. 113; 18 Am.
Rep. 459), 309.
Rich V. Chicago (59 111. 286), 301. 497,
498, 1865.
Rich V. Errol (51 N. H. 350). 888.
Rich V, Player (2 Show. 286), 297.
Rich V. Township of Mentz (19 Fed.
Rep. 725), 939.
Rich V. Township of Mentz (134 U. S.
622), 936.
Richards v. Bria (15 Daly, 144), 1263.
Richards D. Cincinnati (31 Ohio St.
506), 1163.
TABLE 07 CASES.
OCT
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Richards v. Enfield (13 Gray, 344),
1455.
Richards v. Independent School
Dist. (46 Fed. Rep. 460), 920.
Richards v. Mayor &c. (16 J. & Sp.
315), 754.
Richards v. Osceola Bank (79 Iowa,
707), 862.
Richards v. Supervisors (69 Iowa,
613), 848.
Richards v. Town of Clarksburg (30
West Va. 491 ; 20 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. Ill); 204, 280, 287,
549.
Richardson v. Boston (24 Hun, 188),
576.
Richardson v. Central R. Co. (65 Vt.
465), 672.
Richardson v. Morgan (16 La. Ann..
429), 1185.
Richardson v. Royalton &c. Co. (6
Vt. 496), 1432.
Richardson v. Smith (59 N. H. 517),
705.
Richardson v. Truenbach (24 Neb.
596). 1006.
Richardson &c. Co. v. Barstow (26
Abb. N. (). 150), 1434.
Richardson County ^y. Smith (25 Neb.
767; 41 N. W. Rep. 774), lOOS.
Riche V. Bar Harbor Water Co. (75
Me. 91), 686.
Richeson v. People (115 111. 450),
940.
Richland County v. Lawrence
County (13 111. 1), 94, 109, 1388,
1389.
Richland County v. Richland (59
Wis. 511: 18 N. W. Rep. 497),
1857.
Riohlicke v. City of St. LoUis (98
Mo. 437; 11 S. W. Rep. 1001),
1099.
Richmond v. Crenshaw (76 Va. 936),
1568, 1580.
Richmond v. Daniel (14 Gratt. 385),
1352, 1354.
Richmond v. Dudley (129 Ind. 112:
26 N. E. Rep. 184), 602.
Richmond v. Dudley (Ind., 28 N. E.
Rep. 312), 520.
Richmond v. Johnson (53 Me. 437),
825.
Richmond v. Judah (5 Leigh (Va.),
305), 244.
Richmond v. Lisbon (15 Me. 434),
981.
Richmond v. Long (17 Gratt. 375),
762, 1013.
Richmond v. McGirr (78 Ind. 192),
549, 794.
Richmond v. Mulholland (116 Ind.
173; 18 N. E. Rep. 832), 1496.
Richmond v. Richmond &o. R. Ca
C-'l Gratt. 604), 1361, 1383, 1396,
1399.
Richmond v. Scott (48 Ind. (868),
1369.
Richmond v. State (5 Ind. 334), 660.
Richmond &c. v. Bridge Co. (11
Leigh, 521; 13 How. 71), 1812.
Richmond &c. R. Co. «. Louisa R.
Co. (13 How. 71), 1198.
Richmond County GaBlig;ht Co. v.
Middletown (59 N. Y. 228), 612,
638.
Richmond Mayoralty Case (19 Gratt.
673), 1254.'
Rickert v. Drainage Dist. (111., 37 N.
E. Rep. 86), 1395.
Ricketts v. Spraker (77 Ind. 371),
1127, 1189.
Ricketts v. Village of Hyde Park (85
III. 110). 706.
Riddell v. School Dist. (15 Kan. 168),
329
Riddle v. Bedford County (7 Serg. &
R. 386), 300. 290.
Riddle v. Proprietors of Locks &
Canals (7 Mass. 169), 8, 150, 153,
746.
Riddle v. Westfleld Village "(65 Hun,
432), 1484
Rideout v. School Dist. (1 Allen, 332),
368. 1335.
Rider Life Raft Co. v. Roach (97 N.
Y. 378r, 719.
Ridgeway v. West (60 Ind. 371),
535.
Ridley v. Doughty (Iowa, 52 N. W.
Rep. 350), 305.
Ridley v. Sherbrook (3 Cold. (Tenn.)
509), 376.
Riest V. Goshen City (48 Ind. 339),
150.0.
Riggs V. Boylan (4 Biss. 445), 225.
Riggs V. Johnson County (6 Wall.
166), 1373, 1373, 1378, 1379.
Righter v. Newark (45 N. J. Law,
104), 1125.
Rigler v. Railroad Co. (94 N. C. 604).
1493.
Rigney v. Chicago (102 111. 64), 674.
Riker I'. Jersey City (38 N. J. Law,
225), 341.
Riley v. Kansas City (31 Mo. App.
439), 1277.
Riley v. Rochester (9 N. Y. 64), 1386.
Riley v. Trenton (51 N. J. Law, 49t),
550.
Ring V. Cohoes (77 N. Y. 83), 1453.
Ring V. Grout (7 Wend. 341), 1336.
Ring V. Johnson (6 Iowa, 265), 953.
Ripley v. Freeholders (40 N. J. Law,
45), 1425.
Ripley v. Hebron (60 Me. 379), 978.
CCVl
TABLE 07 OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Eipley v. Warren (2 Pick. 593), 1591.
Rlson V. Farr (24 Ark. 161 ; 87 Am.
Dec, 53), 376.
Bitchie v. Franklin (22 Wall. 67),
638. .
Ritchie v. Soutli Topeka (38 Kan.
8fi8; 16 Pac. Rep. 333), 173, UBO,
13&5.
Kitten house's Estate (140 Penn. St.
173; 21 Atl. Rep. 224), 281.
Ritter v. Patch (12 Cal. 298), 1571,
l.'J73.
Rivers v. Augusta (65 Ga. 876), 776,
7S5.
Rivet V. City (35 La. Ann. 134), 647.
Road Case, In re (17 Pa. St. 71), 302,
936.
Road in Augusta Township (17 Pa.
St. 71). 527.
Road in Milton (40 Pa. St. 300), 1499.
Road in Roaring Brook, Jrere(Pa.,
21 Atl. Rep. 411), 1090.
Road in Sterrett Tp. (114 Pa. St. 627),
694. ^
Road in Upper Hanover (44 Pa. St.
277). 608.
Roads in Sadsbury Tp., In re (Pa.,
•23 Atl. Rep. 773), 1000.
Roanoke Gas Co. v. City of Roanoke
(88 Va. 810; 14 S. E. Rep. 665),
1083.
Roanoke R. Co. v. Davis (3 Dev. &
Bat. (N. C.)45), 4, 7.
Robb V. Carter (65 Md. 331), 175, 187.
Robb V. Mavsville &c. R. Co. (3 Met.
117), 700.
Robbing v. Board &c. (91 Ind. 537),
798, 974.
Robbins v. Chicasfo (4 Wall. 057),
1199, 1441, 1444,1452.
Robbins v. Milwaukee &c. Co. (6
Wis. 636), 702,
Robbins v. Taxing Districts (120
U. S. 489), 1240.
Robbins v. Townsend (20 Pick. 349),
975.
Roberson v. Lambertville (38 N. J.
Law, 69), 540.
Robert v. Sadler (104 N. Y. 229; 10
N. E. Rep. 438), 1143.
Roberts' Case (51 Mich. 548), 95, 109.
5S,c)berts v. Bolles (101 U. S. 119), 946.
Roberts v. Boston (5Cu8h. 198), 1345.
Roberts v. City of Louisville (Ky.,
, 17 S. W. Rep. 316), 1336.
Roberts v. Conim'rs (10 Kan. 29),
1010.
Roberts v. Douglas (140 Mass. 129),
1483.
Roberts v. Ogle (30 111. 460), 604,
1025.
Roberts v. People (9 Colo. 458; 13
Pac. Rep. 630), 881.
Roberts «. Williams (15 Ark. 43),
684.
Robertson v. Breedlove (61 Tex. 816),
6^3, 794, 796, 1580.
Robertson v. Frank Bros. Co. (132
U. S. 17), 1183.
Robertson v. Rockford (21 111. 451),
109.
Robertson v. Sichel (137 U. S. 507),
232.
Robey v. Turney (8 Gill & J. 125),
336.
Bobie V. Sedgwick (35 Barb. 319), 53,
QQ
Robins v. Ackerly (91 N. Y. 98), 21.
Robins v. New Brunswick (15 Vt.
116), 1133.
Robinson, Ex parte (11 Nev. 263),
1356. 1370.
Robinson, Ex parte (3 Pugsley, 389),
378.
Robinson, Ex parte ij^e^s.., 17 S. W.
Rep. 1057). 600.
Robinson u. Bidwell (33 Cal. 379),
933.
Robinson v. Burlington (50 Iowa,
240). 346.
Robinson v. Butte County Super-
visors (43 Cal. 353), 1373, 1375,
1378, 1379.
Robinson v. Chamberlain (34 N. Y.
38d; 90 Am. Dec. 713), 319, 330.
Robinson v. Charleston (3 Rich.
(S. C.) 317), 244, 1370.
Robinson v. City of Evansville (87
Ind. 334), 264, 744.
Robinson v. County of Benton (49
Ark, 49; 4 S. W. Rep. 193), 192,
1256.
Robinson v. Fitcbburg &c. R. Co. (7
Gray, 93), 1477.
Robinson v. Franklin (1 Humph.
1.56), 1357.
Robinson v. Greenville (43 Ohio St.
625), 756, 764, 776.
Robinson v. Hague (63 Iowa, 273),
1341.
Robinson v. Hamilton (60 Iowa, 134),
1018.
Robinson v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (66
N. Y. 11), 1504.
Robinson v. Oceanic S. N, Co. (112
N, Y. 315), 144.
Robinson v. Pioche (5 Cal. 460), 1501.
Robinson v. Rippey (HI Ind. 112;
12 N. E. Rep. 141), 694, 1136.
Robinson v. Rockford (31 111. 451),
933.
Robinson v. Rohr (73 Wis. 436; 9
Am. Rep. 810; 40 N, W. Rep.
668), 231.
Robinson v. Rowland (26 Hun, 501),
226, 337.
TABLE OTF OASES.
ccvii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
Robinson v. St. Louis (38 Mo. 488),
362.
Robinson v. Swope (13 Bush, 31), 684.
Roche V. Jones |87 Va. 484 ; 13 S. E.
Rep. 965), 161, 176, 189, 196, 390.
Roche V. Mayor &c. (40 N. J. Law,
257; 18 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 20),
133.
Rochefort v. Attleborough(154 Mass.
142). 1437, 1475.
Rochester v. Campbell (123 N. Y.
405; 25 N. E, Rep. 937), 1200,
1441, 1453.
Rochester v. Close (35 Hun, 308),
1238.
Rochester v. Erickson (46 Barb. 93),
1059.
Rochester v. Montgomery (72 N. Y.
65), 1199, 1453.
Rochester v. Randall (105 Mass. 295;
8 Am. Rep. 519), 334.
Rochester v. Town of Rush (80 N. Y.
303), 573, 1386, 1397.
Rochester v. Upman (19 Minn. 108),
541, 1355.
Rochester &o. R. Co. v. Clarke Nat.
Bank (PO Barb. 234), 198.
Rochester Electric R. Co., In re (133
N, Y. 351), 1453.
Rochester Water Comm'rs, In re (66
N. Y. 413), 6S6.
Rochester White Lead Co. v. Roch-
ester (3 N. Y. 463). 1137.
Rock V. Stinger (36 Ind. 346), 331.
Rock Creek Township v. Strong (96
U. 8. 271), 954. 955.
Rock Island v. Vanlandschoot (78
111. 485). 1503.
Rock Island County v. Sage (88 111.
682), 1024.
Rock Island Supervisors v. United
States (4 Wall; 435), 1378.
Rockingham Savings Bank v. Ports-
mouth (52 N. H. 17), 1573.
Rocsell V. Lowell (7 Grav, 100), 1455.
Roderick v. Whitson (5"l Hun, 620;
4 N. Y. Supl. 112), la24.
Rodman v. Harcourt (4 B. Hon,
224), 1H9. 200.
Rodman v. Justices (3 Bush, 144),
1379. •
Roe V. Lincoln County (56 Wis. 66),
647.
Roeller v. Ames (83 Minn. 132), 1596.
Rogan V. Watertown (30 Wis. 260),
617.
Rogers, In re (7 Co wen, 636), 276,
296.
Rogers v. Brunton (10 Q. B. 26), 487.
Rogers v. Burlington (3 Wall. 654),
561, 63Q, 925, 926, 927, 933. 947,
Rogers v. Jones (1 Wend. 237), 21,
103, 514, 515, 535.
Rogers v. People (68 111. 154\ 13.
Rogers v. Randall (29 Mich. 41), 1083.
Rogers v. St. Charles (3 Mo, App. 41),
699.
Rogers v. St. Paul (33 Minn. 494),
1071, 1169.
Rogers v. Slonaker (32 Kan. 191),
203, 276.
Rogers v. Trustees Graded Schools
(Ky., 18 S. W. Rep. 587). 1343.
Rogers v. Voorhees (134 Ind. 469; 84
N. E. Rep. 374). 898.
Rohde V. Seavey (Wash., 29 Pao.
Rep. 768), 420.
Rohland v. St. Louis &o. Ry. Co. (89
Mo. 80), 1260.
Rolfs, In re (30 Kan. 758), 1258.
Rollins V. Chester (46 N. H. 411),
864, 370.
Rollins V. Lake County (34 Fed. Rep.
845), 836. 837.
Rollstone Nat. Bank v. Carleton
(136 Mass. 226;, 333.
Rome V. Cabot (38 Ga. 5C), 1019.
Rome V. McWilliams (67 Ga. 106),
846.
Ronkendorfif v. Taylor (4 Peters, 349),
1266.
Roodhouse v. Jennings (39 111, App.
50), 606.
Rooney v. Brown (21 La. Ann. 51),
1166.
Rooney v. Randolph (128 Mass. 580),
1435.
Roosevelt v. Draper (23 N. Y. 818),
1583. \
Roosevelt v. Godard (62 Barb. 533),
524.
Roosevelt Hospital v. Mayor (84
N. Y. 108), 1166.
Root's Case (77 Pa. St. 276), 703.
Root V. Alexander (18 N. Y. Supl.
633), 1003.
Roper V. Laurienburg (90 N. C. 427 ;
7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 130),
186, 658, 659.
Roper V. Livermore (28 Me. 193),
843, 3i7.
Roper V. McWhorter (77 Va. 214; 4
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 260),
624, 647.
Roper V. Sangamon Lodge (91 111.
518; 33 Am. Rep. 60). 209. 326.
Roper V. Trustees &o. (91 III. 518V
323
Rose w.'st. Charles (49 Mo. 509), 1385.
Rose V. Turnpike Co. (3 Watts (Pa.),
46), 46.5.
Rosebaugb v. Saffln (10 Ohio, 31>,
535.
Roseboom v. JeflFerson School Tp,
(129 Ind. 377; 23 N. E. Rep.
796), 631. 1339.
covin
TABLE OV OASES.
[T^e references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1605.1
Rosetibauin, In re (6 N. Y. Su|d.
18«, 1106.
EoaeEfthal v. Taylor R. Ob, (79 Hex.
335), 1434.
Ecwewell v. Prior (2 Salk. 460; 1 Ld.
Raym. 713), 1036.
Boss IV. Brown (74 He. S5&), 21S,
214.
Hess V. City of Madison (1 Ind. 381 ;
48 Am. Dec. 361), 361. 711, 1270.
Ross V. City of Philadelphia (115
Fa. St. 332; 8 Atl. Bep. 398),
709.
Ross V. Clinton (46 lon^a, 606), 1147.
Bess V. Stackboiise (114 iBd. 300; 1«
N. E. Rep. 501), 897, 1111, 1112,
1136, 1173.
Roas V; Wiltliiamson (44 Ga. 501),
314.
RoBsire v. Boston (4, Alien, 57), 2^.
Rossiter v. Peck (3 Gray, 539), 344.
Roteniberry v. Bd. 'of Supervisors (67
Miss. 470; 7 So. Rep. 211), 556.
Roth V. Honje of Refuge (31 Md.
839), 1008.
Rothrock v. School District (133 Pa.
iSt. 487: 19 Atl. Rep. 483; 25
W. N. C. 510), 179.
Roude V. Jersey City (18 Fed. Rep.
719), 965.
Rounds V. Mansfield (38 Me. 586),
219, 313.
Bosmds V. Mumford (2 R. I. 154),
623.
Rounds V. Wayuaait (81 Pa. St. 895),
112.
Stramdteee v. Galveston (51 Tex. 302),
1135.
^Quse V. 'Moore (18 Johns. 407), 8,
Rovpe V. Portsmouth (56 N. H. 391),
1137.
Rovrell V. Horton (58 Vt. 1), 309. .
Rowell V. Town of Versihire (62 Vt,
405). 994.
Ronrell V. Tunbrid$:e School Dist. r59
Vt. 658; 10 Atl. Rep. 754), 1330,
1381.
Rowlett V. Eubank (1 Bush (Ky.), '
m.), 813.
Rowley v. Gibbs (14 Johns. 385),
1491.
Blowiting«. Goodehild (3 W. BL 906),
219.
^^ytster v. CoiU'm'FB of GranviUe Co.
(98 N. C. 148; 3 S. E. Rep. 739),
808, 912.
Roz^l vD. Andrews (103 N. T. 150),
1414.
]ie)a?i9r «. St. Fsamcois (34 Mo. 395),
931.
Raan.Street, In re (182 Pa. St. 257 ;
19 Atl. Rep. 219), 1303.
Ruby V. Shain (54 Mo. 207), 613.
Rtugt^CharitT v. Merryweail^er (11
East, 375. 'n.), 1403, 1406.
Rage:l«s v. 'Board of XiHstees of
Wioodland (CaL, 26 fac. Rep.
520), 174.
Ruggles V. City of Fond du Las tS3
Wis. 436; 10 N. W. Rep. 565),
246, 893.
Rna^les v. OolUer (43 Mo. 859), 283,
1390.
Ru^le^u Nantucket (11 Gush. 438),
2!sa.
R^^les V. Town of Nevada (63 Iowa,
185), 1477, 1486.
Ruhland v. Supervisors (55 Wis. 664;
13 N. W. Rep. 877), 348.
Rumford School Dist. v. Wood (13
Mass. 1S3). &57.
Rummel v. Railroad Co. (30 N. Y.
St. Rep. 235; 9 N. Y. Supl. 404),
1411.
Rumsey v. People (19 N. Y. 41), 70.
Rumsey Manuf. Co. v. Inhabitants
of Schell City (21 Mo, App. 175),
708.
Rundle v. Baltimore (28 Md. 356),
1576.
Rundle v. Delaware &c. Canal Co. (1
Wall. Jr. 273), 4, 7.
Runion v. Latimer (6 S. C. 136), 300.
Runkle v. Commonwealth (97 Pa. St.
328), 1530.
Runyan v. Coster (14 Pet. 182), 1434.
Ruohs n. Town of Athens (Tenia,, 18
S. W. Bep. 400), 420, 937.
Rusher r. Ci^ of Dallas (Tex., 18
S. W. Bep. 333), 756.
Rushville v. Adams (107 Ind. 475),
1469.
Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas
Co. and., «8 N. E. Rm. 849),
653,566,573,594.
RushiviUe Qas Co. v. Rushville (121
Ind. 306; 23 N. E. Rep. 72; 6 L.
R. An. 315), 169, 394, 295, 299,
493, 495.
Russell V. Cage (66 Tesx. 428; 1 S. W.
Rep. 370), 551, 798, 843.
Russell V. Canastota ^ JH. Y. 496),
1199, 1441.
Russell V. Chicago (36 111. 285), 176.
Russell V. Columbia <74 Mo. 480),
783, 1462, 1478. •
Russell V. %er .(40 N. Q. 173; 48
N. H. 396), .858.
Russell V. Lowell (7 Gray, 100), 1456.
Russell V. Mayor (8S Hun, 848), 1183.
Russell V. Mayor &c. of New York
(3 Denio, 461), 669. 759, 1047.
Russell V. Nfiw B^ven (51 Conn. 259),
1577.
Russell V. St. Louis (9 Mo. C07),
1364.
TABLE OF OASSS.
CCIX
[The r^erences are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1606.]
Russell V. Town of Steuben (57 111.
SS), 745.
Eussell V. Tate (53 Ark. 54t; 13 S.
W. Eep. 130; 7 L. E. An. 180),
209, 316, 618, 647, 873.
EuBsell V. The Men of Devon (2T. R.
667), 149, 152, 746. 1585.
Russell V. Turner (63 He. 496), 694.
Russell V. Wellington (Mass., 1893;
31 N. E. Rep. 630), 491.
Russell V. Wiliiamsport (9 Pa. Co.
Ct. 139). 179.-
Russellville v. White (41 Ark. 485),
1233.
Ruston V. Grimwood (30 Ind. 364),
1417.
Rutherford v. Davis (95 Ind. 245),
l4l7.
Rutherford v. Hamilton (97 Mo. 548),
374, 377.
Rutherford i'. Swink (90 Tenn. 153),
1266, 1368.
Rutherford v. Taylor (38 Mo. 315),
624.
Rutherford v. Village of Holly (105
N. Y. 633; U it. E. Eep. 818; 37
Hun, 639). 1 147.
Rutland v. County Comm'rs (30
Pick. 71). 705, l.'i9I. 1594.
Rutland v. Paig,e (24 Vt. 181), 953.
Eutter V. Chapman (8 M. & W. 1),
38, 80, 81.
Ruttles V. City of Covington (Ky.,
10 S. W. Rep. 644). 1203.
Rutz V. Kehr (111., 29 N. E. Eep. 553),
576.
Ryan, In re {45 Mich. 173), 113.
Ryan v- County of Dakota (33 Minn.
■ 138), 305. '
Eyan V. Martin j(91 N. C. 464), 645.
Eyan v. United Slates (86 U. S. 514),
339
Eyder v. Eailroad Co. (13 HI. 533), 91.
Eyeg^te v. Wardsboro (30 Vt. 746),
994. ■
Ryers, Matter of Appeal of (7? N. Y.
1), 606, 686, 687.
Ryerson v. Brown (35 Mich. 333; 24
Am. Rep. 564), 682.
Ryerson v. Iiaketon (52 Micli. 509),
1383. '^ •
s.
St. Charles v. O'Mailly (18 111. 408),
1272.
St. Clair v. Board of Appeals (7i Pa.
St. 252), 1572.
St. Francis Society v. Cummings
(Ark., 18 S. W. Eep. 461). 101 1.
St. Helena Water-works v. Forbes
(^ Cal. 182), 686.
St. Helen's Mill Co., In re (3 Sawy.
88), 1141.
St. Jojin Village v- McFarlan (33
Mich. 72), 785. '
St. Johns Cemetery, In re (N. Y.,
81 N. E. Rep. 102; 16 N. Y. Supl.
894), 582.
St. Johnsbury ». Thompson (5S Vt
300), 116,486, 513.
St. Joseph V. Anthony (30 Mo. 537),
* 1 383.
St. Joseph V. Buck^nan (57 Ind. 96),
1400T
St. Joseph V. Owen <Mo., 19 S. W.
Eep. 713), 1094, 1135.
St. Joseph v. Porter (29 Mo. App.
695), 1232.
St. Joseph &c. Ins. Co. v. Leiand
(90 Mo. 177; 59 Am. Eep. 9), 219,
St. Joseph &c. E. Co. v. Buchanan
County Court (39 Mo. 485), 376,
377, 938.
St. Joseph's Orphan Society v. Wol-
pert (80 Ky. 86), 1000.
St. Joseph School Board v. Trustees
Graded School (Ky., 13 S. W.
Eep. 587), 1341.
St. Joseph Township v. Rogers (16
Wall. 664). 381, 434. 639, 932,
933, 946, 957, 965, 1075.
St. Louis V. Alexander (23 Mo. 483),
504.
St. Louis V. Allen (13 Mo. 490), 110,
392, 1366.
St. Louis V. Allen (53 Mo. 44), 1134.
St. Louis V. Arnot (94 Mo. 275; 7 S.
W. Eep. 15), 1310.
St. Louis V. Bell Telephone Co. (96
Mo. 623; 10 S. W. Eep. 197), 549,
609.
St. Louis V. Bentz (11 Mo. 61), 514,
515, 604, 1025.
St. Louis V. Boatman.'s Co. (47 Mo.
150), 1355.
St. Louis V. Boffinger (19 Mo. 13),
4S6, 1040.
St. Louis V. Bowler (Mo., 7 S. W.
Eep. 434). 1333.
St. Louis V. Bucber (7 Mo. App. 169),
1355.
St. Louis V, Calferata (24 Mo. 94),
llO, 514, 515, 599, 604, 1085, 1244.
St. Louis V. Clemens (36 Mo. 467),
1349.
St. Louis V. Clements (43 Mo. 69),
111.5.
St. Louis V. Conn. L. Ins. Co. (107
Mo. 93), 1441.
St. Louis V. Davidson (102 Mo. 149;
22 Am. St. Eep. 764), 232, 237,
255, 645.
St. Louis V. Ferry Co. (40 Mo. 580),
1353.
CCS
TABLE OF CASES.
(The references are to pages: Vol. i; pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
St. Louis V. Ferry Co. (11 Wall. 423),
1350, 1353. ,
St. Louis V. Fitz (53 Mo. 583), 541.
St. Louis V. Foster (53 Mo. 513), 301,
497. 504, 543, 1366.
St. Louis V. Goebel (33 Mo. 295),
533.
St. Louis V. Green (7 Mo. App. 468),
1357), 1370.
St. Louis V. Grove (46 Mo. 574),
1337.
St. Louis V. Gurno (13 Mo. 414),
1456.
' St. Louis V. Herthel (88 Mo. 138),
534, 609.
St. Louis V. Insurance Co. (13 E. L
435), 1363.
St. Louis V. Knox (6 Mo. App. 347),
520.
St. Louis V. Knox (74 Mo. 79), 541.
St. Louis V. Laughlin (49 Mo. 659),
609, 1356, 13i7.
St. Louis V. McCoy (18 Mo. 338),
1040.
St. Louis V. Oeters(36 Mo. 456), 1164,
1169.
St. Louis V. Russell (9 Mo. 607), 99,
110, 393, 1366.
St. Louis V. St. Louis B. Co. (14 Mo.
App. 321), 584.
St. Louis V. St. Louis R. Co. (89 Mo.
44), 524, 543.
St. Louis V. Schoenbush (95 Mo. 618;
8 S. W. Rep. 791), 515, 599, 604.
St. Louis^i^. Shields (63 Mo. 347), 61,
70, 947.
St. Louis V. Spiegel (75 Mo. 145),
1355.
St. Louis V. Steinberg (4 Mo. App.
453), 1356.
St. Louis V. Steinberg (69 Mo. 389),
13B9.
St. Louis V. Stern (3 Mo. App. 48),
1034.
St. Louis V. Vert (84 Mo. S04), 501,
511, 539, 604.
St. Louis V. Weber (44 Mo. 547), 106,
■ , 530, 1334, 1244.
St. Louis V. Wiggins Ferry Co. (11
Wall. 433), 1350.
St. Louis 'V. Withaus (16 Mo. App.
347), 491.
St. Louis V. Withaus (90 Mo. 646),
.375.
St. Louis &c. R. Co. V. Anderson (39
Ark. 167), 699.
St. Louis &c. R. Co. V. City of Belle-
ville (123 N. Y. 376; 13 N. E.
Rep. 680). 1313.
St. Louis Bridge Co. v. East St.
Louis (131 111. 338), 1350. 1363.
St. Louis County Court v. Griswold
(58 Mo. 175), 685.
St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. City of
St. Louis (46 Mo. 131), 1399,
1367.
St. Louis Pub. Schools v. City of St.
Louis (36 Mo. 468), 1166.
St. Louis R. Co. V. Weaver (35
Kan. 413), 1487.
St. Mary's &c. v. Jacobs (L. R. 7 Q.
B. 47), 1408.
St. Mary's Industrial School v.
Brown (45 Md. 310). 650.
St. Paul V. Colter (13 Minn. 41), 519.
Sudani V. Gilflllan (36 Minn. 398;
31 N. W. Rep. 49), 616, 1053.
St. Paul V. Laidler (2 Minn. 190; 73
Am. Deo. 89). 575, 1244.
St. Paul V. Leitz (3 Minn. 297), 1444.
St. Paul V. Stoltz (33 Minn. 333),
1333.
St. Paul V. Traeger (35 Minn. 348),
1844.
St. Paul &c. Co. V. Minneapolis (36
■ Minn. 141). 676.
St. Paul &c. R. Co. V. City of St.
Paul (21 Minn. 536), 1167.
St. Paul &c. Ry. Co., In re (34
Minn. 387), 683; 683.
St. Paul &c. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota
&c. Ry. Co. (36 Minn. 85). 693.
St. Peter v. Bauer (19 Minn. 327),
1255.
St. Peter v. Denison (58 N. Y. 416),
778.
Salem v. Eastern R. Co. (98 Mass.
431), 1048, 1056.
Salem v. Hamilton (4 Mass. 676),
446.
Salem Turnpike v, Essex County
(100 Mass. 383), 1362, 1368.
Salem Water Co. v. Salem (6 Oregon,
30), 805.
Salina City v. Trosper (37 Kan. 545),
- 1502.
Saline County v. Anderson (20 Kan.
298), 310.
Salisbury v. Hershenroder (106 Mass.
458), 1466.
Salisburv v. Merrimack County (59
N. H. 359), 993.
Salmon v. Haynes (50 N. J. Law, 97),
167, 286, 287. 1055.
Salomon v. United States (19 Wall.
17), 708, 719.
Salscheider v. Fort Howard (45 Wis.
519), 157L
Salt Lake City v. Hollister (118 U. S.
356; 6 S. Ct. Rep. 1055), 610,
767.
Saltenberry v, Loucks (8 La. Ann.
95), 337.
Samis t). King (40 Conn. 398), 176,
211, 1371, 1373, 1275.
Sample V. Davis (4 Greene, 117), 331,
TABLE or OASES.
CCXl
[The references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Samuel J. Peacock, Bkc parte (35
Fla. 478), 1361.
San Antonio v. Barnes (96 U. S. 316),
947.
San Antonio v. Jones (38 Tex. 19),
933.
San Antonio v. Lane (33 Tex. 405),
933, 957.
San Antonio v. Lewis (9 Tex. 69),
261.
San Antonio v. Lewis (15 Tex. 388),
634.
San Antonio v. MehaflFy (96 U. S.
312), 947. 953.
Sanborn v. Deerfield (2 N. H. 251),
828.
Sanborn v. Machiasport (58 Me. 83),
351.
Sanborn v. Neal (4 Minn. 136; 77
Am. Dec. 502), 314.
Sanborn v. School Dist. (13 Minn.
17), 304, 346, 353, 863, 1330.
Sanders v. Comm'rs of Butler (30
Gn. 679), 1283, 1354. 1384.
Sanders v. Palmer (154 Mass. 475),
1435, 1440.
Sanderson v. Aston (L. R. 8 Ex. 73 ;
4 Eng. Rep. 458), 323.
San Diego v. Granniss (77 Cal. 511 ;
19 Pac. Rep. 875), 416.
Ban Diego Water Co. v. San Diego
(59 Cal. 517), 640.
Sands v. Manistee Company (138
U. S. 388). 1428.
Sandwich v. Dolan (133111. 177; 31
N. E. Rep. 416). 1493. 1495.
Sanford v. Augusta (32 Me. 536), 747.
Sanford v. Meridian (52 Miss. 383),
1407.
Sanford v. Prentice (28 Wis. 358),
362, 381, 1075.
San Francisco v. Can a van (43 Cal.
541), 95, 109, 624, 1388.
San Francisco v. Hazen (5 Cal. 169),
293.
San Francisco v. Lux (64 Cal. 481),
iai5.
San Francisco v. Oakland (43 Cal,
503), 652.
San Francisco i\ Spring Valley
Water-works (48 Cal. 493), 61,
San Francisco &c. Factory v. Brick-
wedel(60Cal. 1K6), 521.
San Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwedel
(63 Cal. 641), 874.
San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Fran-
cisco (9 Cal. 458), 6^5, 713.
Sangamon &c. R. Co. v. Morgan
County (14 111. 163), 1850.
Sangamon County v. Springfield (63
111. 66), 288.
Sanger v. Comm'rs (25 Me. 391), 343,
1549.
Sanger v. Craigue (10 Vt. 555\ 235.
Sangester v. Commonwealth (17
Gratt. 124), 338, 336.
San Jose v. Welch (63 Cal. 358), 881,
332.
San Jose Gas Co. v. January (57 Cal.
616), 1556.
Sank V. Philadelphia (4 Brewa.
(Penn.) 133), 306, 1064,
San Luis County v. White (91 Cal.
432), 375.
San Mateo County v. Southern Pac.
R. Co. (13 Fed, Rep. 722), 146.
Sansom v. Mercer (68 Tex. 486 ; 5 S.
W. Rep. 62), 435, 436.
Santa Barbara v. Sherman (61 Cal.
57), 539.
Santa Cruz v. Santa Cruz R. Co. (56
Cal. 148), 580.
Santa Rosa v. Coulter (58 Cal. 537),
1363.
Santo V. State (2 Iowa, 165; 63 Am.
Dec. 487). 525.
Sargent v. Cornish (54 N. H. 18), 563,
6K0, 661.
Sargent v. Gorman (131 N. Y. 191;
29 N. E. Rep. 946 ; 14 N. Y. Supl.
481), 1511.
Sargent v. Lynn (138 Mass. 599),
1483.
Sargent v. Newman (43 La. Ann.
873), 1271.
Sargent v. Webster (13 Met. 497),
274.
Sarles v. New York (47 Barb. 447),
757.
Sarpy v. Municipality (9 La. Ann.
597; 61 Am. Dec. 321), 1144.
Satterfield v. People (104 III. 448),
331.
Satterlee v. Matthewson (2 Peters,
380), 94 1.
Satterlee v. Matthewson (16 Serg. &
R. 169), 1081.
Satterlee v. San Francisco (38 Cal.
314), 626.
Satterlee v. Strider (81 West Va. 789),
1516.
Sauerhering v. Iron Bridge Co. (25
Wis. 447), 937.
Saulsbury v. Ithaca (94 N. Y. 27), 776,
1199, 1438, 1439, 1441, 1479.
Sault Ste. Marie Co. v. Van Dusen
(40 Mich. 439). 639. 827.
Saunders v. Haynes(13Cal. 145), 386.
Saunders v. Lawrence (141 Mass.
380), 167.
Saunders w. Provisional Municipality
(24 Fla. 236; 4 So. R^p. 801), 899.
Saunders v. Taylor (9 Barn. & O. 35),
324.
Saunders v. Townsend (36 Hun, 308),
1403.
ccxu
TABLS OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: VoL 1^ pp. 1-788; YoL n, pp. 789-1605.]
Sausburyv. Middleton(ll M^. 396),
175.
Savage v. City of BuflEalo (14 N. Y.
sapi. 101), ino.
Savage v. Crawford County (10 Wis.
49), 909.
Savannah v. Feely (66 Ga. 31), 1400.
Savannah v. Hancock (91 jlo. 51),
682, 684, 1415.
Savannah v. Hartridge (8 6a. 23),
702, 1160, 1359.
Savanjiah v. Hartiudge (37 6s. U3J,
702.
Savannah v. Hussay (SI 6a. 80),
1256.
Savannah v. Kelly (108 U. S. 184),
932,
Savannah v. Raih'oad Co. (3 Woods,
433), 1383.
Savannali v. Wilson (49 6a. 476), 678.
Savannah &c. R. Co, v. May (45 Ga.
603), .590.
Saving Society v. Philadelphia (31
Pa. St. 175), 488, 511.
Savings & Loan See. v. Austin (46
Cal. 416), 1568.
Savings Association v. Topeka (3
Dillon, 376), 61.
Savings Bank v. Davis (8 Conn. 800),
360, 278.
Savings Bank v. Nassau (46 N. H. 398),
1351.
Savings Bank v. United States (19
Wall. 239), 1585.
Savings Bank v. Winchester (8 Allen,
109), 251.
Savyer, In re (124 U. S. 200), .290,
298.
Savifyer v. Corse (17 6ratt. 230; 94
Ana. Dec. 445), 219, 265.
Sawver v. Manchester &o. B. Cp. (62
N. H. 135), 368.
Sawyer u San Francisco (50 Cal.
375;, 625.
^a^yer v. State Board of Health
(135 Mass. 182), 489. 551.
Saxon Life Assurance Co., In re (2
J. & H. 408), 248.
Saxton V. Beach (50 Mo. 489), 288.
Saxton V. Nimms (14 Mass. 315), 352,
372.
Saxton V. St. Joseph (60 Mo. 153),
288.
Sayre v. Phillips CKv,, 24 Atl. Rep.
76), J 235.
aayre v. Tompkins (23 Mo. 443), 1189,
1573.
Scadding v. Lorant (5 £ng. L. & Eq.
m), 275, 290.
Scaine v. Inhabitants of Belleville
(39 N. J. Law, 536), 474,
Scales V. Chattahoochie County (41.
6a. 235), 14, 745.
Scalf V. Collin County (Tex., 16 8.
W. Eep. 314), 577.
Scam men v. Chicago (40 111. 146),
1383," 1387.
Seammon v. Scammp^ (28 X. H.
419), 190, 350.
$canlaa v. Wright (13 Pick. 523),
141.
Scarlet's Case (12 Co^e, 98), 211.
Scarling v. Criett (Moo. 75), 487.
Scfaaeffa: v. Bonham (95 111. 36^
961.
l@qlKiieff@r v- .Town^ip of Jackson
(Pa., 24 Atl. Eep. 639), 1454.
Schafier i>. Cadwallader (36 Pa. St.
126), 478.
Schaller v. City of Omaha C^ ^eb.
335; 36 K W. Rep. 533), eH
1151.
Scheerer v. Edgar (16 Cal. 569; 18
Pac. Rep. 681), 904.
Scheftels v. Tahert (46 Wis. 438), 539.
Schell V. Stein (76 Pa. St. 398), 336,
Schell City v. Bums^y Manuf. Co.
(39 Mo. App. 264), 708. "
Schenck v. Peay (1 Dill, 367), 1390.
Schenck v. Peay (1 Woolw. 175),
288, 396. .
Schenectady &o. Plank Road Co. v.
Thatcher (11 N. Y. 103), 943.
Schenley v. Commonwealth (36 Pa.
St. 29), 1081, 1161, 1163.
Schenley v. Commonwealth (35 Pa.
St. 62), 283, 550. 1390.
Schermerhorn v. City of Schenec-
l;ady (3 N. Y. Supl. .435; 50 Hun,
331 1 182
Scbloss v. White (16 Cal. 65), 337.
Schmidt, Ex parte (34 S, C. 368),
112. 1257.
Schmidt v. County of Stearns (34
Minn. 112), 713.
Schneider, Ex parte (11 Oregon,
288), J333. -
Sohoff V. Bloomfield (8 Vt. 473), 353,
Schoff V. Gould (53 N. H. 512), 351,
353, 374.
Schqff V. Improvement Co. (57 N. H.
110). 1419.
Schofleld V. School Qist. (27 Ck>nn.
499), 158g.
School Commissioners v. Dean (3
Stew. &P. (Ala.) J90), 56.
School Directors v. ScbooL Directors
(105 111. 653), 460.
School Directors v. Ewington (36 111.
App. 379), 1343.
School Directors v. Pogleman (76 111.
189), 834.
School Directors v. Uppy (54 111.
287), 823.
School Directors v. McBride (32 Fa.
St. 215), 1330.
TABLE OF OASES.
CCZIU
prho references are to pages: Vol.
School Direetors it School Direetors
(111., 28 N. E. Rep. 49), 1323.
School Dist. V. Atherton (13 Met.
lOi), 175, 378. 127Q, 1372, 1335.
School Dist. V. Bailey (12 Me. 254),
1330. .
School Dist. V. Bennett (53 Ark.
511), 1335, 1339, 1330, 1335.
School Dist. V. Blakeslee (13 Cona.
237), lasS, 1335.
School Dist. V. Board (37 Mich. 1),
1576.
School Dist. V. Board (73 Mo. 627),
1368.
School Dist. V. Bodenhauer (43 Ark.
140), 1380.
School Dist. V. Buagdon (33 N. H.
507), 353, 374.
School Dist. V. Carr (63 N. H. 201), 196.
School Dist. V. Clark (Mich., 51 N.
W. Rep. 539). 807, 1370.
School Dist. V, Crews (23 111. App.
367). 1342.
School Dist. V. Deshon (51 Me. 454),
1334.
School Dist. V. Driver (Ark., 7 S. W.
Rep. 387), 1340.
School Dist. V. Fuess (98 Pa. St. 600),
968.
School Dist. V. Gage (39 Mich. 484),
1596.
School Dist. V. Garvey (80 Ky, 159),
1891.
School Dist. V. Insurance Co. (103 TJ.
S. 707), 61.
School Dist. V. Jennings (10 111. App.
643). 1335.
School Dist. V. Lombard (2 Dill. 493),
891 903
School Dist! V. Lord (44 Me. 374),
343, 373, 1274, 1335.
School Dist. V. McDonald (39 Iowa,
464), 327.
School Dist. V. Macloon (4 Wis. 79),
453, 1331.
School Dist. V. Mawry (Ark., 14 S.
W. Rep. 669), 1343.
School Dist. V. Mercer (Pa., 9 Atl.
Rep. 64), 1848.
School Dist. V. Oxford (63 N. H.
277), 1347.
School Dist. V. Prentiss (N. H., 19
Atl. Rep. 1090), 1338.
School Dist. V. Randall (7 Cush.
478). 1334.
School Dist. «. Roach (41 Kan. 531 ;
21 Pac. Rep. 597), 1322.
School Dist. V. Roach (43 Minn. 495 ;
45 N. W. Rep. 1097), 1333.
School Dist. V. St. Joseph &c. Ins.
.Co. (101 U. S. 472). 60.
School Dist. .i". Saline County (9
Neb. 405), 1534.
I, pp. 1-788; VoL H, pp. 789-1605.]
School Dist. V. School Dist. (20 Kan.
76), 1323.
School Dist. V. School Dist. (E^n.,
26 Pac. Rep. 43), 1395.
School Dist. V. School Dist. (63 Mich.
61; 29 N. W. Rep. 489), 653,
1320, 1323.
School Dist. V. School Dist. (81 Mich.
330), 1333.
School Dist. V. School Dist. (18 Mo.
App. 266), 1346.
School Dist. V. School D|st. (94 Mo.
612: 7S. W. Rep. 385). 133'5. -
School Dist. V. Stone (106 U. S. 183), '
832.
School Dist. V. Sullivan (Kan., 29
Pac. Rep. 1141). 613.
School Dist. V. Tebbetts (67 Me. 239),
1334.
School Dist. V. Thelander (31 Minn.
333). 1334.
School Dist. V. Thompson (5 Minn,
280), 1331.
School Dist. V. Town (Vt., 33 Atl.
Rep. 570), 1325.
School Dist. V. Town of Bridport
(Vt.. 23 Atl. Rep. 570), 1338.
School Dist. V. Town of Greenfield
(64 N. H. 84), 1333.
School Dist. V. Town Treasurers (61
Mich. 673), 1337.
School Dist. V. Township of River-
side (67 Mich. 401 ; 34 N. W. Rep.
886). 1333.
School Dist. V. Twitchell (68 N. H.
11), 1338.
School Dist. V. Webber (75 Mo. 558),
1895.
School Dist. V. Wickersham (84 Mo.
App. 337). 1340.
School Dist. V, Williams (38 Ark. 454),
14.
School Dist. V. Wood (13 Mass. 193),
8. 18, 153, 1376.
School Dist. V. Xenia Bank (19 Neb.
89) 958 938
School Fund, In re (15 Neb. 684; 50
N. W. Rep. 272), 866.
School Town &c. v. Powner (126
Ind. 528; 26 N. E. Rep. 484),
1342.
School Town of Milford v. Zeigler
(Ind., 27 N. E. Rep. 303), 810,
811, 1348.
School Town of Monticello v. Ken-
dall (72 Ind. 91; 37 Am. Rep.
139), 214.
School Town of Princeton v. Geb-
hart (61 Ind. 187), 711.
School Tp. of Allen v. School Town
of Macy (109 Ind. 559), 464.
School Tp. V. Barnes (119 Ind. 213;
21 N. E. Rep. 747), 815.
CCXIV
TABLE OF CASES.
IThe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Sohoolbred v. Charieston (3 Bay,
63), 1379.
Sohoolfleld's Ex'r v. Lynchburg (78
Va. 366). 1369.
Schools V. Eisley (10 Wall. 91), 679.
Schott V. People (89 111. 195), 543.
Schriber v. Langlade (66 Wis. 616),
439, 465.
Schroeder v. City Council (3 Treadw.
Const. 726), 1241.
Schroth V. Prescott (68 Wis. 378; 33
. N. W. Rep. 621), 1476.
Sohroyer v. Lynch (8 Watts (Pa.),
453), 333.
Schultz V. Cambridge (38 Ohio St.
659), 534.
Schultz V. Milwaukee (49 Wis. 354),
264.
Schumni v. Seymour (34 N, J. Eq.
143), 207, 280, 640, 730, 1130.
Schuyler County v. Mercer County
(4 Gilm. 20), 1532.
Schuyler County v. Thomas (98 XT. S.
169), 943, 947.
Schwartz v. Barry (Mich., 51 N. W.
Rep. 379), 863.
Schwartz v. Flatboats (14 La. Ann.
243), 1390.
Schwartz v. Oshkosh (55 Wis. 490),
503, 514, 1265.
Schwartz v. Wilson (75 Cal. 502 ; 17
Pac. Rep. 449), 835, 874.
Schwiiohow V. Chicago (68 111. 444),
597.
Scituate v. Weymouth (108 Mass.
128), 1424.
Scofield V. City of Council Bluffs (68
Iowa, 695), 644.
Scofield V. Lansing (17 Mich. 437),
283.
Scoles V. Wilsey (11 Iowa, 261), 336.
Scotland County v. Hill (133 U. S.
107)', 913, 944, 964.
Scotland County v. Thomas (94 U. S.
682), 943, 947.
Scotland County Court v. United
States (140 U. S. 41), 1385.
Scott V. Chickasaw (53 Iowa, 47; 3
N. W. Rep. 835), 1400, 1579.
Scott V. City of Toledo (36 Fed. Rep.
385), 558, 670.
Scott V. Davenport (34 Iowa, 208),
840, 843.
Scott V. Paulen (15 Kan. 162). 377.
Scott V. Shreveport (20 Fed. Rep.
714). 640.
Scott V. State (46 Iowa. 303). 331.
Scott V. Union County (63 Iowa, 583),
377.
Scott County v. Hinds (Minn., 52 N.
W. Rep. 523), 569, 1186.
eoovill 1'. Cleveland (1 Ohio St. 136),
95, lOa, 390, lHiO, 1169.
Scoville V, Mattoon (55 CSonn. 144),
1333.
Soranton v. Catteson (94 Pa. St. 202),
1463, 1480.
Scranton v. Gore (134 Pa. St. 595; 33
W. N. C. 419), 1497.
Scranton v. Hyde Park Gas Co. (103
Pa. St. 383), 909.
Scranton v. Pennsylvania Coal Co.
(105 Pa. St. 445). 1134.
Scranton City v. Hill (103 Pa. St.
378). 1498.
Scrip;ure v. Burns (59 Iowa, 70),
1530.
Soudder v. Trenton &0..C0. (1 N. J.
Eq. (Saxt.) 694; 33 Am. Dec.
756), 683. 696.
Scully V. O'Seary (11 Chicago Legal
News, 37), 1257.
Seabury v. Howland (15 R. I. 446),
350, 368, 371, 1337, 1336, 1395.
Seagraves v. Citv of Alton (13 111.
366), 339, 974, 1034.
Seaman v. . Baughman (Iowa, 47 N.
W. Rep. 1091), 370, 807, 1395.
Seaman r. Hicks (8 Paige, 65). 684.
Seaman v. Mayor &o. (80 N. Y. 339),
1227, 1403.
Seaman v. Patten (3 Caines, 313),
1031.
Searcy v. Tarnell (47 Ark. 369). 70,
634.
Searing v. Heavysides (106 III. 85),
1573.
Searle v. Abraham (73 Iowa, 507),
848, 1311.
Searlf 8 v. Manhattan R. Co. (101 N.
Y. 661), 1454.
Sears v. Dennis (105 Mass. 31 0\ 1455.
Searsmart v. Lincolnville (83 Me. 75;
31 Atl.. Rep. 747), 978.
Seattle v. Tyler (Wash. Ty., 1877), 53.
Seattle v. Yesler (1 Wash. T. 577),
1182, 1188.
Sebastian v. Bryan (31 Ark. 647),
334, 330.
Secombe v. Railroad Co. (33 Wall.
108), 693.
Second Congregational Church Soc.
V. City of Omaha (Neb., 53 N.
W. Rep. 839), 586.
Second Univ. Soc. v. Providence (6
R. L335), 1166.
Secrist v, Delaware Comm'rs (100
Ind. 59). 1114.
Seebold v. People (86 III. 33). 116.
Seebold v. Shitler (34 Pa. St. 133),
624.
Seeger v. Mueller (133 111. 86; 24 N.
E. Rep. 513), 623, 643.
Speley v. Peters (5 Gilm. 130), 604.
Seelev v. Westport (47 Conn. 394),
1183.
TABLB 07 OASES.
CCXV
[The references are to pages: VoL 1, pp. 1-V88; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
Seely v. Pittsbursh (83 Pa. St. 360),
1170, 1186, 1349.
Seely v. Sebastian (4 Oregon, 25),
687.
Seibert v. Botts (57 Me. 430), 633.
Seibrecht v. New Orleana (13 La.
Ann. 496). 259, 643.
Seifert v. Brooklyn (15 Abb. N. C.
97), 777.
Seifert v. Brooklyn (101 N. Y. 186),
363.
Seitzinger v. Steinberger (13 Pa. St.
379), 1361.
Selby V. City of Portland (14 Ore-
gon, 243; 12 Pac. Rep. 377), 1378,
1293.
Selby V. Comm'rs (14 La. Ann. 434),
1369.
Selma v. Mullen (46 Ala. 411). 260.
Selma v. Rome &c. Co. (45 Ga. 180),
703.
Selma &c. R. Co., Ex parte (iS Ala.
69ii), 16, 93g.
Seneca County Supervisors v. Allen
(99 N. Y. 532), 856.
Seneca Falls v. Zalinski (8 Hun,
571), 1453.
Serrill v. Philadelphia (38 Pa. St. 355),
1363.
Sessions v. Crunkilton (30 Ohio St.
349), 686, 1024.
Severin v. Cole (38 Iowa, 463), 690.
Seward v. Conrov (Neb. , 50 N. W.
Rep. 339), 409.
Seward v. Rising Sun City (79 Ind.
853), 1351.
Sewall V. Brainard (38 Vt. 364), 958.
Sewall V. St. Paul (20 Minn. 511),
1127, 1171.
Sewell V. Cohoes (75 N, Y. 4.5), 1450,
1486.
Sewer in ThirtyeFourth St. (31 How.
Pr. 42), 296.
Sewer Street, In re (8 Pa. Co. Ct.
Rep. 2i6), 1404.
Sexton V. County of Cook (114 111.
174; 28 N. E. Rep. 608). 613.
Seymer v. Lake (66 Wis. 651), 1502.
Seymour v. Carter (2 Met. 520), 1080.
Seymour t). Comm'rs (119 Ind. 148;
21 N. E. Rep. 549), 1098.
Seymour v. Jeffersonville &c. R. Co.
(126 Ind. 466; 26 N. E. Rep. 128),
675.
Seymour v. School Dist. (53 Conn.
502), 1597,
Seyniour v. Van Slyke (8 Wend.
403), 741.
Shafer v. Mumma (17 Md. 331), 193,
195, 544, 548, 604, 1035, 1258.
Shaffer v. Weech (34 Kan. 595), 1174.
Shakespear v. Smith (77 Cal. 638; 20
Pac. Rep. 294), 919, 1333.
Shankland v. Phillips (3 Tenn. Ch.
556), 1330.
Shanks v. Dupont (3 Peters, 242),
13S.
Shannon v. O'Bozle (51 Ind. 565), 624.
Shannon v. Portsmouth (54 N, H,
183), 621.
Shannon v. Reynolds (78 Ga. 760; 3
S. E. Rep. 653), 901.
Shannon v. Town of Tama City (74
Iowa, 23), 1450.
Sharp V. Apgar (31 N. J. Law, 858),
1576.
Sharp V. Contra Cnsta County (34
Cal. 284), 744, 1371, 159.5.
Sharp V. Johnson (4 Hill, 92), 1181,
■I OQQ
Sharp v'. Mayor &c. (40 Barb. 364),
830.
Sharp V. Smith (32 111. App. 336),
868.
Sharp V. Spier (4 Hill, 76), 565, 1160,
1383.
Sharp's Executor v. Dunavan (17 B.
Mon. 223), 1364, 136H.
Sharps v. Robertson (5 Gralt. (Va.)
518), 187.
Sharpless v. Mayor &c. of Philadel-
phia (21 Pa. St. 147; 59 Am. Dec.
759), 86, 929, 933, 1331, 1387,
1389.
Shaver v. Starrett (4 Ohio St. 494),
685.
Shaw V. Crocker (42 Cal. 435), 677.
Shaw V. Dennis (10 Hi. (5 Gilm.) 405),
933, 1024, 1169. 1363.
Shaw V. Kennedy (Term Rep. (N. C.)
158), 536.
Shaw II. Mayor &o. (19 Ga. 468), 210.
Shaw V. Norfolk R. Co. (5 Gray, 180),
941.
Shaw V. Reed (16 Mass. 450), 339.
Shaw V. Statler (74 Cal. 258; 15 Pac.
Rep. 833), 835, 874,
Shaw V. Village of Snn Prairie (74
Wis. 105; 42 N. W. Rep. 271),
1477.
Shawnee County v. Carter (3 Kan.
11,5), 1389.
Shawneetown v. Baker (85 111. 563),
356, 257, 657.
Shawneetown v. Mason (82 HI. 337),
703.
Shay, In re (15 N. Y. Supl. 488),
1548.
Shea V. Milford (145 Mass. 525), 281,
799, 970.
Shebovgan v. Railroad (21 Wis. 675),
1090.
Sheehan's Case (128 Mass. 445), 1265.
Sheehan v. Martin (10 Mo. App. 285),
1124.
Sheehan v. Owen (82 Mo. 458), 1136.
CCXVl
TABLE 07 OASES.
[The references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1605.]
Sheehan v. Samaritan's Hospital (50"
Mo. 155; U Am. Rep. 412), 1134,
1135, 1166, 1361.
Sheehan v. Sturgis (53 Conn. 481),
1344.
Sheehy v. Kansas City Cahle Ey.
Co. (94 Mo. 575), 674, 1456.
Sheel V. City of Appleton (49 Wis.
125; 5 N. W. Rep. 37), 783, 893,
1474. ■
Sheeley v. Detroit (45 Mich. 425),
1163.
Sheets v. Selden's Lessee (3 Wall.
190), 350.
Sheffield i'. Otis (107 Mass. 282), 980.
Sheffield v. Watson (3 Uaines (N. Y.),
69), 213.
Sheffield School Tp. v. Andress (56
Ind. 157), 260, 823, 922.
Shehan v. Gleeson (46 Mo. 100), 283.
Sheidley v. Lynch (95 Mo. 487; 8
. S. W. Rep. 434), 869.
Shelby v. Alcorn (36 Miss. 373; 72
Am. Dec. 169), 198.
Shelbv V. Clagett (Ohio, 33 N. E.
Rep. 407), 1440, 1478.
Shelby County Court v. Cumberland
&c. R. Co. (8 Bush, 209), 945.
Sheldon v. Kalamazoo (21 Mich. 383),
1578.
Sheldon v. Litchfield County (1 Root,
158), 1586.
Shellabarger v. Binns (18 Kan. 345),
318.
Shelley v. St. Charles County (30
Fed. Rep. 603), 1371.
Shellhouse v. State (110 Ind. 509),
1413.
Shelton v. Derby (27 Conn. 414), 690,
1418.
Shelton v. Mayor of Mobile (30 Ala.
540), 535.
Shelton County v. Borough of Birm-
ingham (Conn., 24 Atl. Rep.
978), 1150.
Shely V. Detroit (45 Mich. 431), 1187.
Sheni^ndoah Borough v. Erdman
(Pa., 12 Atl. Rep. 814), 1499.
Shepard v. Pulaski County (Ky., 18
S. W. Rep. 15), 760.
Shepardson v, Milwaukee &c. R. Co,
(6 Wis. 605), 703.
Shepherd v. Burkhalter (13 Ga. 444),
225.
Shepherd v. District Tp. (23 Iowa,
595), 904.
Shepherd v. Lincoln (17 Wend. 350),
219, 323.
Shepherd v. Staten (5 Heisk, (Tenn.)
79), 200.
Shepley v. Detroit (45 Mich. 531), 1161.
Sheppard's Election Case (77 Pa. St.
295), 160.
Sherbourne t" . Guba County (21 Cal.
613; 81 Am. Dec. 151), 9.
Sheridan v. Colvin (78 111. 337), 591,
803.
Sheridan v. Hibbard (111., 9 N. E.
Rep. 901), 1488.
Sheridan v. Salem (14 Oregon. 328;
13 Pac. Rep. 985), 93, 138, 885,
1098, 1447.
Sherman v. Board (84 Mich. 108; 47
N. W. Rep. 513), 1510.
Sherman v. Buick (33 Cal. 341), 684,
Sherftlan v. Oarr (8 R. L 431), 658,
663.
Sherman v. Highway Comm'rs
(Mich,, 51 N. W. Rep. 1123),
1416.
Sherman v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co.
(40 Wis. 645), 679.
Sherman v. Torrey (99 Mass. 473),
,368.
Sherman City v. Nairey (77 Tex. 291),
1431.
Sherman County v. Simons (109 U.
S. 735). 15, 9C3.
Sherry v. Gilmore (58 Wis. 324), 55.
Sherwin v. Bugbee (17 Vt. 337; 16
Vt. 439), 91. 93, 347, 348, 354,
358, 361, 1324, 1336.
Sherwin v. Wigglesworth (129 Mass.
64), 1399.
Sherwood v. Lafayette City (109 Ind.
411), 690, 1418.
Sherwood v. St, Paul R. Co. (21 Minn.
137), 1418.
Shields v. Chase (33 La. Ann. 409),
1380.
Shields v. McGregor (91 Mo. 534),
163.
Shlnbone v. Randolph County (56
Ala. 183), 1377, 1378.
Shinners v. Proprietors &c. (154 Mass.
168), 1486.
Shipley v. Baltimore &c. R. Co. (34
Md. 336). 702, 70:i.
Shipley v. Mi chanics' Bank (10 J. R,
484), 1539.
Shipman v. State (43 Wis. 381), 230.
Shippey v. Au Sable (65 Mich. 494),
1433.
Shippy V. Wilson (Mich., 51 N. W.
Rep. 853), 900.
Shirley v. Watertown (3 Mass. 323),
981.
Shoemaker v. Grant (36 Ind. 175),
1400.
Shell V. German Coal Co. (118 DL
427), 682.
Shontz V. Evans (40 Iowa, 139), 1391.
Shook V. City of Cohoes (108 N. Y.
648 ; 15 N. E. Rep. 531), 1463,
1492.
Short V. Spier (4 Hill, 76), 344.
TABLE OT CASES.
CCXVU
prhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. '!SS-1WS.1
Short V. Symmes (159 Mass. aOS), 200.
snorter v. Rome (53 Ga. 621), 947.
Shreve v. Town of Cicero (129 111.
226 ; 21 N. E. Rep. 815), 1093.
Shreveport v. Levy (36 La. Ann.
671), 613, 1345.
Shreveport v. Eoos (85 La. Ann.
1010), 529.
Shrewsbury v. Salem (19 Pick. 389),
975.
Shriver v. Pittsburgh (66 Pa. St. 466),
1351, 1356.
Shue V. Comm'rs (41 Mich. 638), 695.
Shuetze v. Bailey (40 Mo. 69), 214.
Shuford V. Comm'rs (86 N. C. 562),
1177.
Shuman v. City of Fort Wayne (187
Ind. 109; 26 N. E. Rep. 560), 601.
Shutesburg v. Oxford (16 Mass. 102),
988.
Sibley v. Mobile (3 Woods, 535), 1372,
1373, 1380.
Sic, Jn re (Cal., 14 Pac. Rep. 405),
518.
Sidener v. Essex (22 Ind. 301), 699.
Siiles V. Portsmouth (09 N. H. 24),
1463.
Sidner v. Alexander (31 Ohio St.
378), 326.
Siebrecht v. New Orleans (13 La."
Ann. 496), 230.
Siedler v. Chosen Freeholders (39 N.
J. Law, 633), 1^94.
Siefert w. Citv of Brooklyn (101 N.
Y. 136; 4 N. E. Rep. 321), 1099.
Sights V. Yarnalls (13 Gratt. 292),
135.5.
Sikes V. Hatfield (13 Gray, 347). 281.
Sikes V. Manchester (59 Iowa, 65; 13
N. W. Rep. 755). 1474.
Sill w. Village of Corning (15 N. Y.
297), 458.
SUliman v. Fredericksburg &c. E.
Co. (37 Gratt. 119), 214.
Silly V. Taylor (88 N. C. 489), 1373,
1384.
Silsbee v. Stockle (44 Mich, 561),
1387.
Silver v. Cummings (7 Wend. 181),
196.
Silver v. People (45 111. 334). 1548.
Silver Lake Bank v. North (4 Johns.
Ch. 370), 336, 645.
Simmes v. Chicot County (50 Ark.
5C6; 9S. W. Rep. 308), 894.
Simmes v. St. Paul (33 Minn. 408), 9.
Simmons v. Camden (36 Ark. 276;
7 Am. Rep. 620), 677.
Simmons v. Citv of Toledo (5 Ohio
Cir. Ct. R. 184), 649.
Simmons w State (18 Mo. 268), 1356.
Simms v. Citv of Paris (Ky., 1 S. W.
Rep. 543). 1305.
Sihiondst). Heard (33 Pick. 120; 34
Am. Dec. 41), 813.
Simonds v. Parker (1 Met. 508), 1591.
Simons v. Kern (93 Pa. St. 455),
1057.
Sims V. Board (39 Ind. 40). 1036.
Sims V. City of Frankfort (79 Ind.
446), 585, 1195.
Sims V. Hines (181 Ind. 534; 33 N. E.
Rep. 515). 706, 897.
Sinclair v. Baltimore (59 Md. 593),
1469.
Singer's Appeal (131 Pa. St. 365; 18
Atl. Rep. 931), 66.
Singt-r Mfg;. Co. v. Elizabeth (43 N. J.
Law, 849), 955.
Single V. Marathon County (38 Mo.
364), 943.
Siniar v. Canaday (53 N. Y. 298),
691.
Sinnett V. Moles (38 Iowa, 35). 555.
Sinnottu. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. (Wis.,
50 N. W. Rep. 10971, 588.
Sinton v. Ashbury (41 Cal. 525), 1371.
Sioux City i\ School Dist. (55 Iowa,
150), 1166, 1353.
Sioux City v. Weare (59 lowa^ 95),
987.
Sipe V. Murphy (Ohio, 31 N. E. Rep.
884), 1239.
Skinner v. Bateman (96 N. C. 5),
1342.
Skinner v. Henderson (10 Mo. 305),
709.
Slack V. Blackburn (64 Iowa, 373),
937
Slack v. Mavsville &c. R. Co. (13 B.
Mon. (Ky.) 1), 933.
Slack V. Norwich (38 Vt. 818), 1578.
Slater v. Wood (9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 15),
198, 195.
Slattery, Ex parte (3 Ark. 484), 1355,
1858.
Slaughter v. Commonwealth (13
Gratt. 767). 144, 1357, 1370.
Slaughter v. Mobile County (73 Ala.
134), 435.
Slaughter v. People (2 Doug. (Mich.)
334), 517, 1858.
Slaughter-House Cases (16 Wall. 36),
144, 145, 1244.
Slee V. Bloom (5 Johns. Ch. 366),
174.
Sleeper r. Bullen (6 Kan. 300), 1574.
Sleeper v. Landown (53 N. H. 244),
1500.
Sleight V. People (74 111. 47), 1389.
Slessman v. Crozier (80 Ind. 487), 535.
Sloan V. Beebe (84 Kan. 343), 1164.
Sloan V. State (8 Blaokf. (Ind.) 361),
79, 109.
Small V. Inhabitants of Danville (51
Me. 359), 480.
COXVIU
TABLK OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1605.]
Small V. Orne (79 Me, 78; 8 Atl.Rep.
153), 167, 399. .
Smalley v. Appleton (75 Wis. 18),
1441, 1470, 1481.
Smartwood v. Walbridge (10 N. Y.
Supl. 863), 1343.
Smead v. Indianapolis &c. B. Co, (11
Ind. 104), 251.
Smedley v. Irwin (51 Pa. St. 445),
C83.
Smeltzer v. White (93 U. S. 390), 909.
Smith, Ex parte {38 Cal. 708), 1810.
Smith, Ex parte {8 S. C. 495), 200.
Smith. In re (99 N. Y. 324), 1078.
Smith's Case (4 Mod. 55), 139, 464.
Smith V. Aberdeen (35 Miss. 458),
1185.
Smith V. Adrian (1 Mich. 495), 95,
109.
Smith V. Appleton (19 Wis. 468),
1381.
Smith V, Aston (Freem, Ch. 388),
953.
Smith V. Banss (15 111. 399), 412.
Smith V. Board County Comm'rs (45
Fed. Rep. 735), 91, 98, 99, 160,
1G4. 347, 875.
Smith V. Board County Comm'rs (46
Fed. Eep. 340), 744.
Smith V. Boston (7 Cush. 254), 1194,
1195, 1423.
Smith V. Bradley (20 N. H. 117),
inc.
Smith V. Buffalo (1 Sheld. (N, Y.)
493), 1064.
Smith V. Chicago (38 Fed. Rep, 388),
1458.
Smith V. City of Des Moines (Iowa,
51 N. W. Eep. 77), 1201.
Smith V. City of Eau Claire (Wis., 47
N. W. Rep. 830), 1151.
Smith V. Citv of Leavenworth (15
Kan. 81),' 1198.
Smith V. City of Louisville (Ky., 6
S. W. Rep. 911), 1238.
Smith V. City of Rochester (76 N. Y.
506), 754, 770, 774, 1038.
Smith I'. City of Pochester (92 N. Y.
463), 672.
Smil h V, City of Saginaw (81 Mich,
123; 45 N, W. Rep. 964), 395.
Smith V. City of Toledo (34 Ohio St,
126), 1171.
Smith V. City of Waterbury (54 Conn.
174; 7 Atl. Rep. 17). 186, 187.
Smith V. City of Wilmington (98
N. C. 343), 377, 378.
Smith V. Clark County (54 Mo. 58),
935, 944, 947, 954.
Smith V. Cofran (34 Cal. 310), 1383.
Smith V. Comm'rs (31 Kan. 669). 968.
Smith V. Commonwealth (35 (iratt.
780). 319.
Smith V. Commonwealth (41 Fa. St.
335). 181.
Smith V. County of Jefferson (10
Colo. 17), 1332.
Smith V. Cronkjte (8 Ind. 134), 314.
Smith V. Crutcher (Ky., 18 S. W.
Eep. 521), 375.
Smith V. Davis (30 Cal. 536), 1383.
Smith V. Dedham (144 Mass. 177; 10
N. E. Eep. 783), 805, 847.
Smith V. Engle (44 Iowa, 365), 1120.
Smith V. Ferri^ (6 Hun, 553), 1418.
biuith V. Gould (61 Wis. 31), 21u
1146.
Smith V. Holmes (54 Mich. 104), 228.
Smith V. Hubbard (1 Pickle, 306; ;;
S. W. Eep. 569), 1093.
Smith V. Kernochen (7 How, 198),
114.
Smith V. Law (31 N. Y. 296), 275.
Smith V. McCarthy (56 Pa. St. 359),
64, 67, 86, 87, 398, 1366.
Smith V. Madison (7 Ind. 86), 93, 118.
Smitli V. Masourick (44 Ga. 163), 646.
Smith V. Marston (5 Tex. 426), 540.
Smith V. Mayor &o. (13 Cal. 531),
658, 659.
Smith V. Mayor &o. (81 Mich, 123),
1520.
Smith V. Mayor &c. (10 N. Y. 504),
253.
Smith V. Milwaukee (18 Wis. 63),
1171.
Smith V. Morse (2 Cal. 524), 383, 5,50,
1389.
Smith V. Nashville (4 Lea (Tenn.),
69), 659, 664.
Smith V. Nashville (88 Tenn. 464; 13
S. W. Rep. 934), 573.
Smith V. Newbern (70 N. C. 14), 549.
Smith V. Newburgh (77 N. Y. 130),
256, 639, 845.
Smith V. New York (37 N. Y, 518),
■ 187.
Smith V. Peoria County (59 111. 412),
320.
Smith V. Philadelphia (13 Phila.
(Pa.) 177), 658,
Smith V. Proctor (6 N. Y, Supl. 212 ;
53 Hun, 143), 1336.
Smlthr. Proctor (130 N. Y. 319; 29
N. E. Rep. 313), 93S.
Smith V. Eeadfield (27 Me. 145), 1577.
Smith V. Saginaw (81 Minh. 123).
1367.
Smith V. San Antonio (17 Tex. 643),
1257, 1265.
Smith V. School Dist. (40 Iowa, 210),
1345.
Smith V. School Dist. (69 Mich. 589),
809, 1342,
Smith V. Schroeder (15 Minn. 86),
I 1577.
TABLE OF OASES.
CCXIX
(The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
Smith V. Sherry (50 Wis. 210), 1365.
»1367.
Smith V. Sherwood Township (62
Mich. 159), 1471.
Smith V. Smith (3 Dessaus. (S. C.)
557), 464.
Smith V. Titcomb (81 Me. 272), 64.
Smith V. Tobener (32 Mo. App. 601),
491.
Smith V. Vicksburg (54 Miss. 61.5),
1354.
Smith V. Washington (20 How. 135),
757, 779.
Smith V. Weldon (7.S Ind. 454)^694.
Smith V. Wildes (143 Mass. 556),
1499.
S nith V. Wright (24 Barb. 170). 219.
Smith V. Wright (27 Barb. 621), 1439,
1445.
Smith V. Zaner (4 Ala. 99), 141. .
Smithfield v. Waterville (64 Me. 412),
990.
Smoot V. The Mayor (24 Ala, 112), 90.
Smout V. Ilberry (10 M. & W, 1),
215
Rnedicor v. Davis (17 Ala. 472), 223.
Snell, In re (58 Vt. 207), 117, 513.
Snell V. Belleville (30 U. C. Q. B.
81), 1244.
Snell V. Bridgewater &c. Co. (24
Pick. 296), 112.
Snell V. Campbell (24 Fed. Rep. 880),
1399.
Snell V. Hope (3 Denio, 594), 1390.
Snelling v. Joflfrion (43 La. Ann. 886;
8 So. Rep. 609), 632, 791,
Snelson v. State (16 Ind. 29), 709.
Snodgrass v. Morris (Ind., 24 K. E.
Rep. 151), 1338.
Snow V. Fitchburg (136 Mass. 183),
1183.
Snow V. Provincetown (109 Mass.
123). 677.
Snyder, Ex parte (64 Mo. 58), 199.
Snyder v. Foster (77 Iowa, 638 ; 42
N. W. Rep. 506), 629, 647.
Snyder v. North Lawrence (8 Kan.
82), 524.
Snyder v. Plass (28 N. Y. 465), 1417.
Snyder v. Trumpbour (38 N. Y. 355),
1417.
Snyder Township v. Bovaird (122 Pa.
St. 442; 15 Atl. Rep. 910; 23 W.
N. C. 563), 618, 917.
Society &c. v. New London (29 Conn.
174), 933, 936.
Society &c. v. Pawlet (4 Peters, 480),
56, 70, 88.
Society &c. v. Vandyke (3 Whart.
(Pa.) 309), 206.
Society of Scriveners v. Brooking (3
Q. B. 95). 518.
Socns V. Racine (10 Wis. 871), 558.
Solomon, Ex parte (Cal., 27 Pac.
Rep. 757), 518.
Solomon v. City of Kingston (24 Hun,
5B3), 757.
Solomon v. Hughes (24 Kan. 211),
643, 1366.
Solon V, Williamsburg Sav. Bank (85
Hun, 1), 937. 953, 965.
Solon V. Williamsburgh (.114 N. Y.
123), 960.
Soloy V. City of New Orleans (33 Lh.
Ann. 79), 647.
Somerset v. Parson (105 Pa. St. 360).
296.
Somerville V. Boston (120 Mass. 574>,
981.
Somerville v. Dickerman (137 Mass.
273). 549.
Soon Hing v. Crowley (113 U. S.
703), 511.
Soper V. Henry County (26 Iowa,
264), 15. 746.
Soper V. Livermore School Dist. (88
Me. 193), 350. 370, 1335.
Soule V. City of Passaic (N. J. Eq.,
20 Atl. Rep. 346), 1145.
Soule V. Thelander (81 Minn. 337),
1334.
South V. Maryland (18 How. 393), 333.
South Bend v. Paxon (67 Ind. 238),
1484. .
South Berwick v. Huntress (53 Me.
89), 311.
South Brunswick v. Township of
" Cranberry (53 N. J. Law, 126;
20 Atl. Rep. 1084), 978.
South Carolina v. Georgia (93 U. S.
4), 1423.
South Covington &c. Ry. Co. v.
Berrv (Ky., 18 S. W. Rep. 1026),
59-"), 596.
South Hampton v. Hampton Falls
(UN. H. 134), 983.
South Omaha w. Cunningham (Neb.,
47 N. W. Rep. 930), 1140.
South Ottawa v. Foster (20 111. 396),
745.
South Ottawa v. Perkins (94 U. S.
260), 208, 932.
South Park Comm'rsw. Railroad Co,
(107 111'. 105), 1168.
South Park Comm'rs v. Williams (51
ill. 57). 685.
South Platte Land Co. v. Crete (11
Neb. 347), 15i)8.
South School Dist. v. Blakeslee (13
Conn. 227), 348, 354, 368.
Southampton v. Mecox Bay Oyster
Co. (116 N. Y. 1), 20.
Southard v. Bradford (53 Me. 389),
344, 364.
Southborough v. Marlborough (24
Pick, 168), 975, 983.
ccxx
TABLE 01" CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. It, pp. 789-1C05.]
Southerland v. Goldsboro (96 N. C.
49). 381.
Southern Pao. R. Co. v. Hixon (5
Ind. 16S), 306.
Southern Pao. R. Co. v. Reed (41
Cal. 256), 679.
Southern R. Co. v. Ely (95 N. C. 77),
706.
Soutliport V. Ogden (S3 Conn. 128),
103. 488, 513, 528.
Southwell V. Detroit (74 Mich. 438;
43 N. W. Rep. 118), 1201.
Soutter V. Madison (15 Wis. 30), 423,
1376.
Sower V. Philadelphia (35 Pa. St.
231), 48t, 485.
Spain's Case (47 Fed. Rep. 208), 1240.
Spalding v. Kelly (66 Mich. 693),
435.
Spangler v. City &o. of San Fran-
cisco (84 Cal. IS; 33 Pac. Rep.
1091), 1099.
Spangler v. Jacobv (14 111. 397), 801,
1365.
Spangler v. York County (13 Pa. St.
337), 1066.
Spann v. Webster Co. Comm'rs (64
Ga. 498), 846.
Sparland v. Barnes (98 111. 595),
1380.
Sparrow v. Evansville &c. R. Co. (7
Porter (Ind.), 369), 943.
Spaulding v. Arnold (125 N. Y. 194;
36 N. B. Rep. 295; 34 N. Y. St.
Rep. 980), 879, 1546.
Spaulding v. City of Saginaw (84
Mich. 134; 47 N. W., Rep. 444),
290.
Spaulding v. Inhabitants of Peabody
(163 Mass. 129; 10 L. R. An. 397;
36 N." E. Rep. 421; 33 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 638), 636.
Spaulding v. Lowell (83 Pick. 71),
208, 330, S51, 642. 663, 837, 1343.
Spaulding V. North San Francisco
&c. Ass'n (87 Cal. 40; 25 Pac.
Rep. S48), 1068, 1118.
Spaulding v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co.
(57 Wis. mi), 706.
Speaker v. Glass (3 Privy Council
Appeals, 560), 205.
Spearbracker v. Larrabee (64 Wis.
573), 1477, 1481. 1492.
Specht V. Commonwealth (8 Pa. St.
312), 1344.
Spectit V. Dc-troit (20 Mich. 168), 633.
Speedlingr. Worth County (68 Iowa,
153J, 1006.
Speer i). City of Athens (85 Ga. 49 ;
11 S. E. Rep. 803), 1170.
Speith V. People (87 111. 600), 801.
Spellman v. Chicopee (131 Mass. 443),
1483.
Spellman v. New Orleans (45 Fed
Rep. 3), 1240.
Spencer v. County of Sully (Dak., 3 1
N. W. Rep. 97), 889.
Spencer v. Merchant (135 TT. S. 84'i :
8 S. Ct. Rep. 9S1), 558, 1168.
1178, 1179, 1180.
Spencer v. Perry (17 Me. 413), 339.
Spencer v. Pierce (5 R. I. 63), 959.
Spencer Tp. v. Riverton Tp. (56
Iowa, 85). 1485.
Spengler v. Trowbridge (63 Miss. 46),
moe.
Spioeland v. Alier (98 Ind. 467),
1484.
Spicer v. Elkhart County (126 Ind.
552), 1435, 1427.
Spicer v. Hoop (51 Ind. 365), 651.
Spidell V. Johnson (138 Ind. 235; 23
N. E. Rep. 889), 898.
Spier V. New Utrecht (131 N. Y.
430), 1414.
Spies V. Brooklyn (18 N. Y. Supl.
170), 763.
Spiller V. Woburn (IS Allen, 137),
1346.
Spilnian v. City of Parkersburg (35
West Va. 605; 14 S. E. Rep.
379), 843, 844.
Spitler V. Young (63 Mo. 42), 1233.
Spitzer v. Village of Blanchard (83
Mich. 334; 46 N. W^ Rep. 400),
^ 630, 948, 949.
Spitjsnogle v. Ward (64 Ind. 30), S18.
rSpooner v. Freetown (139 Moiss. 335),
1483.
Sprague w. Brown (40 Wis. 6K),158.
Sprague v. Coenen (30 Wis. 209),
564.
Sprague v, Norway (81 Cal. 173),
160.
Spring V. Hyde Park (137 Mass.
554). 778.
Spring Valley Water-works v. San
Francisco (83 Cal. 386), 130S,
1309.
Spring Valley Water-works v. San
Mateo Water-works (64 Cal. 123),
683.
Spring Valley Water-works v, Schot-
tler (62 Cal. 100), 1556.
Spring Valley Water- works v. Sohot-
tler (110 U. S. 347), 6.
Springer v. Chicago (135 111. 552),
1456.
Springer v. City of Philadelphia
(Pa., 12 Atl. Rep. 490), 1459.
Springer v. Clay County (35 Iowa,
241), 909.
Springfield v. Connecticut River Co.
(4 Cnsh. 63), 676.
Springfield v. Doyle (76 111. 202),
1473.
TABLE OF OASES.
CCXXl
[The references are to pages: Vol.
Sprinsrfield v. Edwards (84111. 626),
S43, 848, 870. 1583.
Springfield v. Le Claire (49 111. 476),
1478. 1479.
SpringfielJ u. Mather (184 111. 88; 16
N. E. Kep. 92), 1073.
Springfield v. Power (25. 111. 187),
1034. • .
SprinKfield v. Schmook (68 Mo. 394),
•tOi.
Springfield v. Teutonic Sav. Bank
(84 N. Y. 403). 936.
Springfield v. Walker (42 Ohio St.
843), 658.
Springfield R. Co. v. Springfield (85
Mo. C76). 1423.
Springwell v. County Treasurer (56
Mich. 240). 431.
Sprowl V. Lawrence (33 Ala. 674).
314, 31.i.
Spurrier v. Wirtner (18 Iowa, 480),
706.
Staats V. Washington (44 K. J. Law,
610), 53.5,
Staats V. Washington (45 N. J. Law,
318; 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
38). 275. 277, 535, .'iSl, 537, 1294.
Staats V. Washington (46 N. J. Law,
209), 625.
Stack V. City of East St. Louis. (85
III. 377), 587.
Stackhouse v. City of La Fayette (26
Ind. 17; 89 Am. Deo. 450), 1099.
Stackhou.se v. Clark (S2 N. J. Law,
291). 301.
Staokpole v. Healy (16 Mass. 33),
1417.
Stadler v. Detroit (13 Mich. 340), 203,
210.
Stadler v. Roth (59 Mo. .400), 1273.
Stafford v. Albany (7 Johns. 541),
699.
Stafford v, Oskaloosa (57 Iowa, 748),
1451.
Stafford v. Oskaloosa (64 Iowa, 251),
1463.
Stamford v. Fischer (17 NI Y. Supl.
609), 1835.
Stamford v. Eeadsboro (46 Vt. 61 1),
976. .
Stamford Water Co. v. Stanlev (39
Hun, 424), 686.
Stamp V. Cass County (47 Mich. 330),
666.
Stamper v. Temple (6 Humph.
(Tenn.) 113), 667.
StandardjOil Co. v. Bachelor (89 Ind.
1), 1355.
Standart v. Burtis (46 Hun, 82), 210.
Standish v. Washburn (21 Pick. 287),
1477.
Stanhart v. Sittey (N. J., 19 Atl. Rep.
464), 1259.
1. 1, pp. 1-788; Vol n, pp. 789-1605.]
Stanleyr. City of Davenport (54 lowHi
4m: 37 Am. Rep. 816), 590, 1469.
Stanton v. Camp (4 Bai'b. 274), 263.
Stanton v. City of Salem (145 Mass.
476), 1459.
Stanton v. Springfield (13 Allen, 568),
14H7, 14(10, 1466.
Stan wood v. City of Maiden (Mass.,
31 N. E. Rep. 702), 1194.
Staples V. Town of Canton (69 Mo.
592), 14a0.
Staibiid V.Falmouth (51 Me. 101),
344.
Starbuck v. Murray (5 Wend. 148;
21 Am. Deo. 17i), 090. '
Starin v. Town of Genoa (23 N. Y.
439). 631, 933. 953.
Stark V. Lancaster (57 N. H. 88),
1450.
Starkey v, Minneapolis (19 Minn.
i:03). 200, 708.
Starkwell v. State (101 Itid. 1). 1358.
Starr v. Burlington (45 Iowa, 87),
486, 1171.
Starr v. Rochester (6 Wend. 564V
1570.
Starr v. Trustees (6 Wend. 564), 1263.
State V. Adams (65 Ind. 393), 1562.
State V. Adams.(58 Yt. 694). 363.
State V. Allen (7 Jones Law (N) C),
584), 337.
State V. Allen (2 McCord, 55), 984.
State V. Allen (23 Neb. 451; SON. W.
Rep. 756), 856.
State V. Ailing (12 Ohio, 16), 178.
State V. Ames (20 Mo. 314). 1344.
State V. Anderson (36 Fla. 240; 8
So. Rep. 1), 1559.
State V. Anderson (44 Ohio St. 247),
119, 126.
State V. Anderson (2 S. C. 499>, 1396.
State v: Anderson County (8 Bazt.
(Tenn.) 349), 1378.
State V. Andrews (11 Neb. 533), 1240i
State V. Andrews (1-5 R. I. 394; 6
Atl. Rep. 596).. 163.
State V. Appleby (35 S. C. lOO), 881,
1543.
State r. Applegate (N. J., 8 Atl. Rep.
505), 803.
State V. Armstrong (73 Mich. 288),
611.
State V. Armstrong (30 Neb. 493; 46
N. W, Rep. 618), 439.
State V. Assessors of Taxes (51 N. J.
Law. 279; 17 Atl. Rep. 132),
1391, 1543.
State V. Atlantic (84 N. J. Law, 99),
1163.
State V. Atlantic City (49 N. J. Law,
558 ; 17 Am. & En^. Corp. Cas.
342; 9 Atl. Rep. 759), 841, 805,
848, 1396.
ccxxu
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; VoL H, pp. 789-1605.]
State V. Atlantic City (53 N. J. Law,
333; 19 Atl. Rep. 780), 1533,
1539, 1550.
State V. Atlantic Highlands (50 N. J.
Law, 457), 1560.
State V. Atter (5 Ohio C. C. 253), 171.
State V. Babcock (19 Neb. 330), 931,
1387.
State V. Babcock (20 Neb. 528), 1171.
State t!. Babcock (21 Neb. 599), 9;!5.
State V. Babcock (33 Neb. 614). 923.
State V. Babcock (23 Neb. 179; 36
N. W. Rep. 474). 981.
State V. Babcock (25 Neb. 278). 933.
State V. Babcock (35 Neb. 709; 41
N. W. Rep. 654), 65, 67, 87.
State V. Bacon (S. C, 9 S. E. Rep.
76r)), .903.
State V. Baker (La., 10 So. Rep. 405),
' 540, 1249, 1264.
State V. Baker (38 Wis. 71), 376, 377.
State V. Baldwin (45 Gonn. 134), 529.
State V. Ball (59 Mo. 321). 1053.
State V. Bank (45 Mo. 538), 314.
State V. Bank of Smyrna (8 Houst.
99), 1359.
State V. Barbour (53 Conn. 76 ; 55
Am. Rep. 65; 23 Atl. Rep. 686),
166, 167, 170, 302, 304.
State V. Barnes (33 Fla. 8), 875.
State V. Barnet (46 N. J. Law, 63),
484.
State V. Bartlett (30 Miss. 624), 313,
313.
State V. Bartlett (35 Wis. 387). 540.
State V. Baxter (50 Ark. 447 ; 8 S. W.
Rep. 188), 608.
State V. Bayonne (85 N. J. Law, 335),
484.
State V. Bayonne (49 N. J. Law, 311),
1171.
State V. Bays (Neb., 48 N. W. Rep.
270), 1519.
State V, Bean (76 N. C. 78), 331.
State V. Bean (91 N. 0. 554), 1244.
State V. Beattie (16 Mo. App. 143),
604.'
State V. Beeman (35 He. 343), 350,
368.
State V. Beirce (37 Conn. 319), 542.
State V. Bell (34 Ohio St. 194), 282,
550, 1064. '
State V. Beloit Supervisors (20 Wis.
79). 1377.
State V. Beners (86 N. C. 588), 230.
State V. Bently (83 N. J. Law, 533),
1351.
State V. Benton (39 Neb. 460; 45 N.
W. Rep. 794), 1340. 1341.
State V. Berdetta (73 Ind. 185), 585,
1111, 1195.
State V. Bergen (38 N. J. Law, 89),
486, 496.
State V. Bergman (6 Or. 341), 604.
State V. Berry (12 Iowa, 58), 112,
693.
State V. Berry (14 Ohio St. 315), 383.
State V. Berry (47 Ohio St. 233), 388,
1557.
State V. Bieler (87 Ind. 330), 1543.
State V. Bill (13 Ired.'Law (N. C),
373). 546.
State V. Binder (38 Mo. 450), 118, 291,
381
State V. Bishop (39 N. J. Law, 326),
68 1.
State V. Blackstone (63 Wis. 862), 937.
State V. Blair (33 Ind. 313), 310,
State V. Blake (35 N. J. Law, SOS),
641.
State V. Blake (36 N. J. Law, 44S), 669.
State V. Blend (121 Ind. 514), 1277,
1279.
State V. Blohn (26 La. Ann. 538), 339.
State V. Bloom (17 Wis. 521), 199,
1338.
State V. Blossom (19 Nev. 312), 199.
State V. Bloxham (26 Fla. 407; 7 So.
Rep. 873), 179.
State V. Boal (46 Mo. 528), 386, 887.
State V. Board &c. (Fla., 8 So. Rep.
749), 1548.
State V. Board &o. (Ind., 20 N. E.
Rep. 892), 1524.
State V. Board &c. (45 Ind. 601),
1534.
State V. Board &c. (63 Ind. 497),
1534.
State V. Board &o. (80 Ind. 478),
1426.
State V. Board &c. (113 Ind. 170),
1426.
State V. Board &o. (119 Ind. 444),
1426.
State V. Board &c. (135 Ind. 247),
1426.
State V. Board of Conim'rs (39 Kan.
657), 965.
State V. Boneil (42 La. Ann. 1110),
529.
State V. Board &o. (37 Minn. 443 ; 8
N. W. Rep. 161), 1071, 1137.
State V. Board &c. (N. J., 8 Atl. Rep.
509). 193.
State V. Board &c. (N. J., 14 Atl. Rep.
560), 1556. '
State V. Board &c. (16 N. J. Law,
504), l'-181.
State V. Board &c. (N. J., 33 Atl.
Rep. 343), 813.
State V. Board &c. (N. J., 23 Atl.
Rep. 949), 1033, 1033.
State V. Board &c. (46 N. J. Law,
170j 6 Atl. Rep. 659), 1283.
State V. Board &c. (49 N. J. Law,
170), 1393.
TABLE OF CASES.
CCXXllI
[The reterenoesare to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
State V. Board &c. (.53 N. J. Law,
69), 1534.
State «. Board &c. (18Nev. 173), 1328.
State V. Board &c. (17 Nev. 96),
1338.
State V. Board &b. (27 Ohio St. 96),
1379.
State V. Board &c. (85 Ohio St. 368),
1838.
State V. Board &c. (24 Wis. 683),
1509, 1539.
State ?'. Board &c. (63 Wis. 234),
1331.
State V. Bodeii (N. J., 16 Atl. Rep.
50). 305.
State V. Boeker (56 Mo. 17), 203.
State V. Bolche (1 S. W. Rep. 234),
1551.
State V. Bonnell (119 Ind. 494; 21
N. E. Rep. 1101), 1544, 1545.
State 11. Borough (N. J., 10 Atl. Rep.
377), 1556.
State V. Bradford (33 Vt. 50), 1556,
1560.
Slate V. Bradley (54 Conn. 74X 1324.
State V. Bradley (3 New Eng. Rep.
713). 54.
State V. Brainerd (23 N. J. Law,
484). 94.
St.ite V. Branin (23 N. J. Law, 484),
109. 113, 473, 1361.
State V. Brennan's Liquors (35 Conn.
478), 198.
. State V. Brewer'(64 Ala. 287), 1383.
State V. Brigantine Borough (N. J.,
24 Atl. Rep. 481), 814.
State V. BrinkerhofiE (66 Tex. 45),
189, 201.
State V. Brittafn (89 N. C. 574), 513.
State V. BrodboU (Neb., 44 N. W.
Rep. 186), 87.5.
State V. Brossiieid (67 Mo. 331), 634.
State V. Brown (20 Atl. Rep. 773),
1363, 1364.
State V. BroA-n (112 Ind. 600; 14 N.
E. Rep. 487), 864.
State V. Brown (11 Ired. Law (N. C),
141), 335.
State V. Brown (54 Md. 318), 835.
State V. Brown (Minn., 53 N. W.
Rep.,935), 1098, 1009.
State V. Browning (28 N. J. Law,
550), 1336.
State V. Brunswick (33 N. J. Law,
548), 1163.
State V. Bryce (7 Ohio, part II (82),
414), 206.
State V. Burbridge (24 Fla. 112), 373.
btate V. Burlington (36 Vt. 531), 78S.
State V. Burton (45 Wis. 150), 1331.
State V. Button (35 Wis. 109), 447.
State V. Butts (31 Kan. 537), 377,
378.
State V. Buttz (9 S. C. 158), 201.
State a. Cain (4 West Va. 559), 1350.
State V. Cainaii (94 N. C. 8»3), 533,
524, 541, (J03.
State V. Calhoun (61 Miss. 556), 379.
State V. Camden (5 N. J. Law, 87; 17
Am. & Eng. Corp. Gas. 638), 125.
State V. Camden (47 N. J. Law, 64;
54 Am. Rep. 117). 161, 1503.
State V. Campbell (13 Atl. Rep. 585),
599.
State V. Campton (3 N. H. 513), 786.
btate V. Canterbury (28 N. H. 218),
67, 88.
State V. Cantieny (34 Minn. 1), 535,
532
State V.' Canvassers (17 Fla. 39), 389.
State V. Carletou (1 Gill, 249), 319.
State V. Carpenter (60 Conn. 27; 22
Atl. Rep. 497), 519, 541, 1248,
1264.
State V. Carr (Ind., 38 N. E. Rep. 88),
180.
State V. Carr (5 N. H. 367). 70.
State V. Carrick (70 Md. 586), 339.
State V. Carroll (33 Conn. '449), 197,
198, 199. 291.
State V. father ■(22 Neb. 793; 36 N.
W. Rep. 157). 903.
State V. Cavers (23 Iowa, 343), 389.
State V. Chamber of Commerce (20
Wis. 63), 631.
State V. Chamberlin (37 N. J. Law,
388), 535.
State V. Chapman (44 Conn. 595),
302, 303.
State V. Charleston (10 Rich. L. (S.
C.) 204), 1388.
State V. Charleston (5 Rich. L. (S. C.)
843), 1359.
State V. Charleston (3 Speer's L. (S.
C.)719), 1351, 1356.
State V. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. (80
Iowa, 586), 690.
State V. Christopher (13 Wis. 637),
1163.
State V. Churchill (41 Mo. 41), 314.
State V. Cincinnati Gas Co. (18 Ohio
St. 262), 523.
State V. Circuit Court (N. J., 15 Atl.'
Rep. 272), 561.
State V. City Clerk &c. (7 Ohio St.
835), 527.
State V. City Council (13 Rich. 703),
1123.
State V. City of Bayonne (N. J., 8
Atl. Rep. 114), U2I.
State t). City of Bayonne (N. J., 20
Atl. Rep. 69), 1075.
State V. City of Bayonne (N. J., 23
Atl. Rep. 648), 587.
State V. City of Bayonne (35 N. J.
Law, 335), 485,
COXXIV
TABLS 07 OASBS.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1606.]
State V. City of Camden (N. J., 11
Atl. Rep. 137). 103, 114, 518.
State V. City of Cliarleston (10 Rich.
B03), 594.
State V. Citv of Cincinnati (19 Obio,
178), 1345.
State V. Cincinnati (20 Ohio St. 18),
60, 61, 135.
State V. Citv of Crete (Neb., 49 N. W.
Rep. 273), 1.5-10.
State 11. City of Elizabeth (N. J., 24
Atl. Rep. 495), Wl.
State V. City of Hobolcen (N. J., 18
Atl. Rep. 085). 495.
State V. City of Kearney (25 Neb.
262), 1518.
Stater. City of Millville (N. J., 21
Atl. Rep. 568), 1393.
State V. City of New Albany (127
Ind. 221; 26 N. E. Rep. 791).
1530, 1511.
State V. City of New Orlean's (40 La.
Ann. 399; 3 S. E. Rep. .582), 877.
State V. Citv of New Orleans (41 La.
Ann. 9i), 424.
State V. City of New Wliatcora
(Wash., 27 Pac. Rep. 1030^ 398.
State V. City of Newarls (N. J., 8
Atl. Rep. 128), 1831.
State V. City of Newark (N.' J., 12
Atl. Rep. 770), U70.
State V. City of Newark (N. J., 23
Atl. Rep. 281), 585.
State V. Citv of Orange (13 Atl. Rep.
240), 1235.
State V. City of Orange (N. J., 32
Atl. Rep. 1004). 505, 1076.
State V. City of Passaic (N. J., 23
Atl. Rep. 945), 1167.
State V. City of Plainfield (N. J., 24
Atl. Rep. 493), 584.
State V. City of Portage (13 Wis.
662), 693.
State V, City of Toledo (48 Ohio St.
112; 26 N. E. Rep. 1061), 1394.
State V. City of Topeka (36 Kan. 76),
548.
State V. City of Trenton (51 N. J.
1 Law, 498; 18 Atl. Rep. 110), 515,
616.
State V. City of Waxahacliie (Tex ,
17 S. W. Rep. 348), 399, 400, 408,
414.
State V. Clark (4 Ind. 315), 971.
State V. Clark (43 Mo. 533), 1592
State V. Clark (N. J., 19 Atl. Rep.
4621, 1330, 1336, 1340.
State ti. Clark (52 N. J. Law, 391),
803, 803.
State V. Clarke (54 Mo. 17), 116, 117,
118, 513, 519. 5'35, 1422.
State V. Clarke (3 Nev. 566), 189,
302.
State V. Clarke (25 N. J. Law (1
Dutch.). 54), 117. 518.
State V. Clarke (73.N. C. 255), 321.
State V. Clary (23 Neb. 403; 41 N.
W. Rep. 356). 1«33.
State V. Claly County (46 Mo. 231),
1376.
State v: Clayton (37 Kan. 443), 202.
State V. Clevenger (37 Neb. 433),
1368.
State V. ,Clinton (N. J., 21 Atl. Rep.
304), 533.
Stalte V. Clinton (53 N. J. Law, 329),
530.
State V. Clinton (6 Ohio St. 380),
1378.
State V. Clothier (30 N. J. Law, 351),
157.5.
State V. Cleveland (SO Mo. 108), 310.
State V. Cobb (H4 Ala. 137). 965.
State V. Cockrell (3 Rich. (S. C.)
Law, 6J. 164.
State V. Coke Company (18 Oljio St.
263), 56S.
State V. Cole County Court (80 Mo.
80), 992.
State V. Clin (37 Vt. 318), 1358.
State V. Columbia (27 S. C. 137),
1350.
Stat^ V. Colvig (15 Oreg. 67). 314.
State V. Commercial Bank (13 Sra.
& M. 539; 53 Am. Dec. 106),
139.
State V. Comm'rs &o. (4 Dev. (N. C.)'
345), 211.
State V. Comm'rs &c. (39 Kan. 700),
1564.
State V. Comm'rs &c. (41 Kan. 630),
1367.
State V. Comm'rs &c. (14 Neb. 32),
138K.
State V. Comm'rs (17 Nev. 96 ; 28 Pac.
Rep. 133), 876.
State V. .Comm'rs &c. (3 N. C. Law,
617), 811.
State V. Comm'rs '&o. (6 Ohio St.
380), 1378.
State V. Comm'rs &c. (Ohio, 30 N. E;
Rep. 785), 1513.
State V. Common Council &c. (15
Wis. 30), 30, 1549.
State V. Compton (38 Neb. 485; 44
N. W. Rep. 660), 632, 1333, 1335.
State V. Conlin (37 Vt. 318), 544.
State V. Conner (83 Neb. 265; 3 Am.
St. Rep. 367; 17 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 453). 3T6, 377.
State V. Conover (4 Dutch. 224), 33.5.
State V. Constaiitine (43 Ohio St.
437; 51 Am. Rep. 813), S76, 884.
State V. Consumers' Water Co. (51
N. J. Law, 420), 1303.
State V. Cooper (20 Fla. 547), 908:
TABI-E OF CASKS.
CCXXV
[The references are to pages: Vol I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
State V. Corning (44 Kan. 443; 24
Pac. Rep. 966). 893.
State V. Cornish (N. H., 21 Atl. Rep.
180), 1005.
State V. Corrigan &o. Street Ry. Co.
(8.) Mo. 363), 590, 1103.
State V. Council (2 Speer's L. (S. C.)
623), 1851.
State V. County Comm'rs (21 Fla. 1),
403.
State V. County Comm'rs (23 Fla. 29),
1553.
State V. County Comm'rs (23 Kan.
264), 389.
State V. County Comm'rs (Neb., 48
N. W. Rep. 146), 1341.
State V. County Comm'rs (38 S. C.
258), 1542.
State V. Countv Court (19 Ark. 3601,
1353.
State V. Countv Court (Mo., 8 S. W.
Rep. 844), 900.
State V. County Court (44 Mo. 230),
314.
State V. County Court (44 Mo. 504),
933.
State V. Countv Court (83 West Va.
589; 11 S. E. Rep. 73). 1516.
State V. County Judge (5 Iowa, 380),
1377.
State V. County Judge (7 Iowa, 186),
343, 389.
State V. County of Fillmore (82 Neb.
870; 49 N. W. Rep. 769), 1508.
State V. Covington (29 Ohio St. 103),
15H. 1278.
State V. Cowan (39 Mo. 330), 110,
617.
State V. Cozzens (42 La. Ann. 1069 ;
8 So. Rep. 268), 1211.
State V. Cram (16 Wis. 343), 439.
State V. Crane (84 Me. 271 ; 24 Atl.
Rep. 853), 1254, 1355, 1260.
State V. Crane (36 N. J. Law, 394),
695.
State V. Crawford (36 N. J. Law,
394), 1171,
State V. Crenshaw (94 N. C. 877),
521, 532.
State V. Crites (48 Ohio St. 142; 26
N. E. Rep. 1052), 1516, 1548.
State V. Croolts (7 Ohio, part 2, 221),
329.
State V. Crosby (86 N. J. Law, 428),
302.
State V. Cross (Ark., 18 S. W. Rep.
170), 1013.
State V. Crummey (17 Minn. 73),
515.
State V. Curran (10 Ark. 142), 200.
State V. Curran (13 Ark. 321), 67, 88.
State V. Culver (27 .Am. Ri-p. 295),
1421.
State V. Custer (11 Ind. 210), 1331.
State V. Dahl (65 Wis. 510; 27 N. W.
Rep. 843), 853,
State V. Dallas County Court (73 Mo.
339), 944.
State V. Daly (50 N. J. Law, 356; 13
Atl. Rep. 6), 884, 906.
State V. Damares (80 Ind. 619), 1436.
State V. Davenport (13 Iowa, 335),
1376, 1377, 1878, 1383.
State V. Daviess County Court (64
Mo. 80), 940, 1391.
State V. Davidson (33 Wis. 114), 316,
365.
State V. Davis (17 Minn. 439), 1647.
State V. Davis (44 Mo. 139), 187.
State V. Dean (23 N. J. Eq. 335),
1163.
State V. Deane (23 Fla. 121), 1540.
State V. De Bar (58 Mo. 395), 116,
118.
State V. De Gress (58 Tex. 387), 189.
State r, Deliesseliue (1 McCord (S. C),
52), 1(».
State u. Dennv (118 Ind. 449; 21 N.
E. Rep. 274), 1014, 1277, 1279,
1382.
State V. Deshler (25 N. J. Law, 177),
1825.
State V. Dillon (135 Ind. 65), 169.
State V. District Board (76 Wis. 177),
1345, 1346.
State V. JJistrict Court (41 Minn.
518; 43 N. W. Rep. 389). 500.
State V. District Court (Minn., 60
N. W. Rep. 476), 1189.
State V. District Court of Hennepin
County (33 Minn. 235; 7 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 206), 308.
State :;. District Court of Ramsey
County (33 Minn. 295), 1071,
1072, 1127.
State V. District of Narragansett
(R. I., 16 Atl. Rep. 901), 62.
State V. Dodge County (20 Neb. 595;
31 N. W. Rep. 117), 632.
State t!. Doherty (35 La. Ann. 119;
— Am. Rep. 131), 203.
State V. Donahay (30 N. J. Law, .
404), 353.
State V. Douglass (33 N. J. Law,
363), 1354.
State V. Dousman (28 Wis. 541), 60.
State V. Dowling (50 Mo. 134), 1859,
1576.
State V. Drake (33 N. J. Law, 194),
1179.
State V. Druly (3 Ind. 431), 385.
State V. Dunbar (43 La. Ann. 836),
540, 1264.
State V. Dunn (11 La. Ann. 549), 329.
State V. Dunnington (12 Md. 340),
1536.
CCXXVl
TABLE 07 CASKS.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
State v. Dunson (71 Tex. 65; 9 S. W.
Rep. 103), 98, 413. 419, 420, 465.
State V. Duval County (33 Fla. 488),
137.
State V, Dwyer (SI Minn. 512), 513.
State V. Earnhardt (107 N. 0. 789; 12
S. E. Rep. 426), 603.
State V. Eastman (109 N. 0. 785),
1403.
State V. Easton E. Co. (36 N. J. Law,
181), 676.
State V. Eau Claire (40 Wis. 533),
559, 686.
State V. Eberhardt (14 Neb. 201),
1520.
State V. Eberly (12 Neb. 616). 1596.
State V. Echols (41 Kan. 1), 1386.
State V. Eidson (76 Tex. 303), 1323.
State V. Elizabeth (30 N. J. Law,
365), 1186.
State V. Elizabeth (37 N. J. Law,
432), 485, 1174.
State V. Elvins (32 N. J. Law, 363),
440, 458.
State V. Elwood (11 Wis. 17), 438,
439.
State V. Ely (4 Oregon, 277), 5t4.
State V. Engelmann (106 Mo. 628),
1415.
State V. Everett (53 Mo. 89), 1551.
State V. Fagan (42 Conn. 33), 299,
381.
State V. Falconer (44 Ala. 696), 314.
State V. Falkenburgh (15 N. J. Law,
320). 1576.
State V. Fan- (47 N. J. Law, 208), 493.
Stale V. Farrier (47 N. J. Law, 3b3),
199.
State V. Fenton (Neb., 45 N. W. Rep.
464), 874,
State V. Ferguson (33 N. H. 424), 530,
681.
State V. Ferguson (31 N. J. Law,
107), 301, 203.
State V. Pindley (10 Ohio, 51), 314.
State V. Fishblate (83 N. C. 654), 311.
State V. Fiske (9 R. L 94), 283, 550,
1390.
State V. Fltts (49 Ala. 402), ^02,
State V. Fitzgerald (44 Mo. 425). 1559.
State V. Fitzpatrick (64 Mo. 185), 336.
State V. Flannagan (67 Ind. 140),
1048.
State V. J'leetward (16 Miss. 448),
542.
State V. Floyd County Judge (5
Iowa. 380), 1376.
State V. Foley (30 Minn. 350), 1371.
State V. Follet (6 N. H. 53), 542.
States. Folwell (N. J., 20 Atl. Rep.
1079), 1263.
State V. Fond du Lao (12 Wis. 287).
6D2.
State V. Forest County (74 Wis. 610;
43 N. W. Eep. 551), 60, 63, 438,
439.
State V. Forney (21 Neb. 233; 31 N.
W. Eep. 802), 444.
State V. Fosdick (21 La. Ann. 434),
144.
State V. Foster (17 N, J. Law, 101),
303.
State V. Francis (88 Mo. 557), 1562.
State V. Francis (95 Mo. 44; 14 West.
Rep. 353), 74.
Stattr. Franklin (40 Kan. 410; 19
Pac. Rep. 801), 1050.
State V. Franklin County (21 Ohio
St. 648), 659.
State V. Frazier (48 Ga. 137), 1561,
15t5.
State V. Freeholders &o. (37 N. J.
Law. 254^, 663.
State V. Freeman (38 N. H. 436), 100.
518, 599.
State V. Fuller (96 Mo. 165). 70.
State V. Fuller (34 N. J. Law, 237).
1164,1186,1188.
State V. Fyler (48 Conn. 159), 817.
State V. Gallagher (42 Minn. 41),
127.
State V. Gandy(12 Neb, 232; 11 N.
W. Rep. 39B). 910. '
State V. Garibaldi (La., 11 So, Rep.
36), 1244.
State V. Garroutte (67 Mo. 445), 944.
State V. Gas Co. (18 Ohio St. 363),
1312.
State V. Gastineau (20 La. Ann. 114),
386.
State V. Gates (48 Conn. 533), 38.5.
State V. Gates (35 Minn. 385), 388.
State V. Gayhart (Neb., 51 N. W.
Eep. 746), 1538.
State V. George (23 Fla. 585; 3 So.
Rep. 81), 175, 189.
State V. Georgia Medical Society (38
Ga. 608), 103, 488, 513.
State V. Gilman (10 S. E. Eep. 283),
144.
State V. Gisch (31 La, Ann. 544),
1244.
State V. Glasgow (N. C. Conf. 186),
311.
State V. Gleason (12 Fla. 190), 1559.
State V. Glenn (54 Md. 572), 548, 1357.
State V. Goetz (23 Wis. 363), 353,
375.
State V. Goflf (15 E. L 505), 200.
State V. Goldstucker (40 Wis. 134),
MS.
State r. Goodwin (69 Tex. 55 ; 5 S. W.
Rep. 678), 64, 98, 166, 290.
State V. Gordon (60 Mo. 383), 515.
State V. Gorham (37 Me. 451), 786,
1199,1425, 1441.
TABLE OF OASES.
CCXXVU
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. It, pp. 780-1605.]
State V. Gorton (33 Minn. 345), 1343.
State V. Gouldey (N. J., 18 Atl. Rep,
695), 170.
State V. Goulding (44 N. H. 284), 642.
State V. Governor (89 Mo. 388), 1551.
State V. Grace (Oregon, 25 Pac. Rep.
38S), 1530, 1548, 1550.
State V. Gracey (11 Nev. 223), 1396.
State V. GrafEmuUer (26 Minn. 6),
540.
State V. Graham (31 Neb. 329), 1341. ■
State 1). Grammier (29 Ind. 551), 2U8,
326.
State V. Graves (19 Md. 370), 527,
698, 1120.
State V. Gray (93 Ind. 303), 1345.
State V. Gray (23 Neb. 365; 36 N. W.
Rep. 577), 172, 298. 495.
State V. Green (15 N. J. Law, 88),
190.
State V. Green (37 Ohio St. 227), 169.
294, 381. 493.
State V. Green County (54 Mo. 540),
93.^.
State V. Greene Co. Board (119 Ind.
444). 1426.
State V. Grimes (Minn. , 1892; 52 N.
W. Rep. 42), 529, 604.
State V. Grimshaw (Mo., 1 S. W.
Rep. 3fi3J, 1323.
State V. Grosvenor (19 Neb. 494),
, 1343.
State V. Grubb (85 Ind. 213), 1345.
State V. Guiney (26 Minn. 313), 296.
State V. Guraber («7 Wis. 298), 529.
State V. Gutierrez (15 La. Ann. 190),
1257.
State V. Guttenberg (38 N. J. Law,
419), 1373.
State V. Guttenberg (39 N. J. Law,
660), 1374, 1377.
State V. Haben (22»Wis. 660). 1389.
State V. Hadley (37 Ind. 496), 315.
State V. Hall (97 N. C. 474; 1 S. E.
Rep. 683), 211.
State V. Hallock (16 Nev. 373), 1346.
State V. Hamilton (40 Kan. 3S3; 19
Pac. Rep. 733), 465.
State V. Hamilton (Miss., 50 So. Rep.
57), 1343.
State V. Hammer (43 N. J. Law,
435), 557.
State V. Hammond (40 Minn. 43 ; 41
N. W. Rep. 243), 611.
State V. Hammonton (38 N. J. Law,
430; 20 Am, Rep. 404), 662.
State r. Hand (31 N. J. Law, 547),
1174.
State V. Haney (2 Dev. & Bat. 390),
543.
State V. Hanna (97 Ind. 469), 704.
State V. Hannibal &c. R. Co. (.75 Mo.
208), 618, 1369, 139o, 1398.
State V. Hanson (20 Nev. 401), 1336.
State V. Hardy (7 Neb. 377), 506,
525.
State V. Harney (57 Miss. 863), 313.
State V. Harper (42 La. Ann. 312),
1240.
State V. Harper (6 Ohio St. 607), 821.
State V. Harris (Minn., 53 N. W. Rep.
387), 600.
State V. Harris (90 Mo. 29), 618.
State V. Harris (19 Nev. 222), 1337.
States. Harris (17 Ohio St. 608).
1379.
State V. Harris (53 Vt. 216), 356, 382,
383.
State V. Harrison (67 Ind. 71), 275.
State u. Harrison (113 Ind. 434; 3
Am. St. Rep. 663), 175, 20T.
State V. Harrison (38 Mo. 540), 389.
State V. Harrison (4^ N. J. Law, 79),
1294.
State u. Harshaw (73 Wis. 211; 40
N. W. Rep. 641), 452, 896.
State V. Hartfield (24 Wis. 60), 1249.
State V. Harwi (36 Kan. 588 ; 14 Pac.
Rep. 158), 413.
State V. Haskell (20 Iowa, 276), 642.
State V. Hastings (10 Wis. 518), 214,
1588.
State V. Hauser (63 Ind. 155), 282,
286, 711.
State V. Hauss (48 Ind. 105), 202.
State V. Hawes (113 Ind. 323; 14
N. E. Rep. 87), 815, 822, 839, 864.
State V. Hayes (7 La. Ann. 118), 328,
329.
State v'. Hayes (61 N. H. 264). 488.
States. Haynes (72 Mo. 877). 280, 576.
State V. Haynes (50 N. J. Law, 97),
170, 905.
State V. Hays (52 Mo. 578), 314.
State V. Heath (20 La. Ann. 173 ; 96
Am. Dee. 390), 658.
State V. Heidenbain (43 La. Ann.
483; 7 So. Rep. 631), 605, 1034.
State V. Heidorn (74 Mo. 410), 504.
State V. Heisey (56 Iowa, 404), 313.
State u. Helf rid (3 Nott & McCord
(S. C), 833), 1354.
State V. Henderson (38 Ohio St. 644),
501.
State V. Henshaw (76 Cal. 436), 1253.
State V. Herdt (40 N. J. Law, 264),
532.
State V. Hermann (75 Mo. 340), 119.
State i>. Herod (29 Iowa, 123), 135S.
State V. Hill (54 Ala. 67), 743.
State V. Hill (10 Ind. 219), 1406.
State V. Hill (10 Neb. 58), 389.
State V. Hinkle (37 Ark. 540), 89.").
State V. Hipp (38 Ohio St. 129), i:'oT.
State V. Hohoken (33 N. J. Law, 2Su>,
1232, 1355.
CCXXVlU
TABLE 07 CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
State V. Hoboken (38 N. J. Law, 110),
499, 1294.
State V. Holcomb (68 Iowa, 107), 1025.
State V. Holden (19 Neb. 249; 27
N. W.Rep. 120), 415.
State V. Holmes (La., 10 So. Rep.
173), 180.
State V. Horn (94 Mo. 163), 313.
State V. Horton (19 Nev. 199), 1337.
State V. Houston (78 Ala. 576), 323.
State V. Houston (83 Ala. 361), 323.
State V. Hoyt (i ©regon, 246), 303,
936.
State V. Hudson (39 N. J. Law, 104),
1171, 1576.
State V. Hudson (39 N. J. Law (5
Dutch.), 475), 501, 641.
State V. Hudson County (30 N. J.
Law, 137), 1435.
State V. Hudson County Comm'rs
(37 N. J. Law. 12), 74.
State V. Hudson Tunnel E. Co. (38
N. J. Law, 548), 633.
State V. Huggins (Harper, Law, 94),
163.
State V. Humphreys (35 Ohio St.
530J, 1386.
State V. Hunter (38 Kan. 578), 1278.
State V. Hunter (106 N. C. 796), 530.
State V. HurfiE (38 N. J. Law, 310),
1336.
State V. Hutchins (Neb., 60 N. W.
Rep. 165), 1835,
State V. Hutchinson (60 Iowa, 478),
336.
State V. Hutchinson (39 N. J. Eq.
218), 1033.
State V. Hutt (3 Ark. 382), 188.
' State V. Independent School Dist.
(43 Minn. 357; 44 N. W. Rep.
120), 1331^
State V. Inhabitants of Summit (53'
N. J. Law, 483; 19 All. Rep.
966), 197.
State V. Inliabitants of Trenton (36
N. J. Law, 29), 613.
State V. Innis (33 N. J. Law, 516),
1359.
State V. Ironton Gas Co. (37 Ohio St.
45). 6, 1234.
Statute V. Isabel (40 La. Ann. 34.0),
1544.
State V. Jack (Tenn., 18 S. W. Rep.
257), 1013.
State V. Jackson (8 Mich. 110), 1263.
State V. Jacksonville St. R. Co.
(Fla., 10 So. Rep. 590). 1519.
State V. Jacobs (17 Ohio, 143), 178,
290, 444.
State V. Jennings (37 Ark. 419), 64,
94, no.
State V. Jersey City (N. J., 18 All,
Rep. 586), 1304.
State V. Jersey City (N. J., 23 Atl.
Eep. 123), 1383.
State V. Jersey City (N. J., 23 Atl.
Eep. 666), 1377.
State V. Jersey City (35 N. J. Law,
309), 373, 875, 277, 286, 1390.
State V. Jersey City (25 N. J. Law
(1 Dutch.), 636), 203, 205, 20^
631.
State V. Jersey City (26 N. J. Law,
444), 283, 1383.
State V. Jersey City (37 N. J. Law,
*441), 1189,
State V. Jersey City (37 N, J. Law,
493), 48').
State V. Jersey City (39 N. J. Law,
170), 106, 113, 546, 1034, 1050.
State V. Jersey City (30 N. J. Law,
93), 501.
State V. Jersey City (34 N. J, Law,
390), 1223.
State V. Jersey City (35 N, J. Law,
381), 1576.
State V. Jinks (42 Ohio St. 345), 1857.
State V. Johnson (100 Ind. 489), 815.
State V. Johnson (41 Minn. Ill; 43
N. W. Rep. 786), 611,
State V. Johnson (4 Wall. 475), 220.
State V. Jones (19 Ind. 356). 353, 1356.
State V. Jones (19 Ind. 431; 81 Am.
Dec. 408), 37.').
State V. Jones (18 Tex. 874), 1416.
State V. Judge (13 Ala. 80.5), 385.
State V. Judges (35 La. Ann. 1075),
204.
State V. Julian (93 Ind. 292), 1334.
State V. Justice (24 N. J. Law, 413),
302.
State V. .Justices &c. (4 Hawks (N.
C), 194). 211.
State V. Kantler (33 Minn. 69), 373,
5^5 536 1334
State V. KaVanagh (34 Neb. 506; 39
N. W. Rep. 431), 1517.
State V. Kearns (47 Ohio St. 566; 35
N. E. Rep. 1027), 160, 170, 178.
301, 306.
State V. Keith (94 N. C. 933), 517.
State V. Keith County (16 Neb. 608).
931.
State V. Kempf (69 Wis. 470; 3 Am.
St. Rep. 763; 17 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 390). 388, 1559, 1563.
State V. Kilroy (86 Ind. 118), 1543.
State V. King (Neb., 51 N. W. Rep.
754). 540, 543. 1369, 1519.
State V. Kirk (46 Conn. 395), 276, 299.
State V. Kirk (44 Ind. 401),.189.
State V. Kirkley (29 Md. 86), 533.
State V. Knight (31 S. C. 81; 9 S. E.
Rep. 693). 1513.
State V. Knight (Wis., 51 N. W.Rep.
1137), 853.
TABLE OF CASES.
CCXXIX
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1603.]
State V. Kraft (IS OreKon, 550;,23
Pao. Ken, 663; 30 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 842). 163, 388.
State r. Labatut (39 La. Ann. 516; 2
So. Eep. 5.')0). 528.
State t!. Laml^ertville (45 N. J. Law,
379), 593.
State t). Lancaster (3 N. H. 267). 144.
State V. Lane (.13 N. J. Law, 375; 21
Atl. Rep. 302), 166, 177.
State V. Lane (16 R. I. 620; 18 Atl.
Rep. 10:55). 1387, 1.555.
State v. Lanier (31 La. Ann. 423),
322
State v. Larrabee (t Wis. 200). 438.
State V. Laughton (Nev., 9 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 79). 315.
State V. Lavanac (34 N. J. Law, 201),
678.
State V. Leatberman (38 Ark. 81), 54,
64, 70.
Stater. Leaver (63 Wie. 387; 29
N. W. Rep. .570), 583, 1194. 1218.
State V. Lee (29 Minn. 153), 544.
State V. Lee (29 Minn. 445), 539, 604,
1356.
State V. Leffingwell (54 Mo. 458), 14,
15. 60.
State V. Leverton (.'>3 Iowa, 483),
1333
State V. Levi (90 Ind. 77), 1338.
State V. Lewis (35 N. J. Law, 877),
803.
State I'. Lingo (26 Mo. 496). 631.
State V. Little Valley (64 N. Y. 112),
1376.
State V. Lockwood (43 Wis. 403),
1358.
State V. Long (8 Ired. (N. C.) 415),
331. 335.
State V. Long (94 N. C. 89fi). 1403.
State V. Longstreet (38 N. J. Law,
812), 704.
State V. Lovey (39 N. J. Law, 135),
323.
State V. Lowery (49 N. J. Law, 391),
1031.
State V. Ludwig (31 Minn. 202),
1025.
State V. Lufy (19 Nesr. 391), 159.
State V. McAuley (15 Cal. 45.5), 870.
State V. McCann (21 Ohio St. 198),
1345.
State V. McClarv (27 N. J. Law,
253), 15^6.
State V. McCormack (50 Mo. 568),
326.
State V. McCullough (30 Neb. 158),
1561.
State V. McFadden (23 Minn. 40),
450.
State V. McKee (Oregon, 35 Pac. Rep.
293), 299, 366.
State V. McMillan (Mo., 18 S. W. Rep.
784). 384.
State V. McNincb (87 N. C. 567), 603.
State V. McReynolds (61 Mo. 303),
1366.
State V. Maedonald (26 Minn. 445),
CO").
State V. Macon County (68 Mo. 29),
1374.
State V. Macon County Court (41 Mo.
453). 944, 1393, 1509.
State V. Madison (7 Wis. 688), 794,
922, 933.
State V. Madison Council (15 Wis.
30), 281, 1377.
State V. Mahner (La., 9 So. Rep. 480),
603.
State 1'. Maloy (20 Kan. 619). 61.
State V. Mansfield (41 Mo. 470), 1259.
Slate V. Marlow (15 Ohio St. 114),
388.
State r. Martin (27 Neb. 441; 43
N. W. Rep. 244), 194, 654, 874,
878.
State V. Matheny (7 Kan. 327), 190,
815.
State V. May (22 Ark. 445), 1333.
State V. Mayhew (2 Gill (Md.), 487),
395, 156.5.
State V. Mavnard (14 111. 419), 1268.
State V. Mav.or &c. (22 Fla. 21), 910,
911, 1547. 1548.
State V. Mayor &c. (11 Huiuph.
(Tenn.) 217), 211.
State V. Mayor &c. (23 La. Ann. 358),
870.
State V. Mayor &o, (29 Md. 85), 642.
State V. Mayor &o. (N. J., 18 Atl.
Rep. 586), 611.
State V. Mayor &o. (N. J., 31 Atl.
Rep. 453), 1170.
State V. Mayor &c. (N. J., 23 Atl.
Rep. 1004), 608.
State V. Mavor &o. (N. J., 23 Atl.
Rep. 618), 1075.
States. Mayor &o. (N. J., 24 Atl."
Rep. 448). 592.
State V, Mavor &c. (N. J., 24 Atl.
Rep. 481). 592.
State V. Mavor &o. (N. J., 34 Atl.
Rep. 671), (J08.
State V. Mayor &o. (25 N. J. Law,
399), 1064.
State V. Mayor &o. (29 N. J. Law,
441), 706.
State V. Mayor &c. (33 N. J. Law,
49), 1175.
State t'. Mayor &c. (37 N. J. Law,
348), 518, 521.
State V. Mayor &c. (37 N, J. Law,
41.5), 1123, 1231.
State V. Mayor &o. (38 N. J. Law,
110), 534.
ccxxx
TABLE OF OASES.
[The retereuues are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. 789-1605.]
State V. Mayor &o. (52 N. J. Law,
33), 60.
State V. Mayor &o, (R. M. Chailt. (Ga.)
350), 93, 95, 110.
State V. Mayor &o. (13 Rich. (S. C.)
480), 1257.
State V. Maysville (12 S. O. 76), 1373,
1883.
State V. Meadows (1 Kan. 90), 46i.
State V. Medberry (7 Ohio St. 532),
870.
State V. Medbury (3 R. I. 138), 144,
145.
State V. Merrill (37 Me. 339), 487. 599.
State V. Merriman (6 Wis. 14), 488.
State V. Merritt (83 N. C. 677), 541,
603.
State V. Miller (41 La. Ann. 58 ; 7 So.
Rep. 673), 589, 1209.
Stater. Miller (30 N. J. Law, 368;
86 Am. Dec. 188), 121.
State V. Mills (34 N. J. Law, 177),
116.
State V. Mills (39 Wis. 333), 697.
State V. MUwaukee(30 Wis. 87), 1376,
1877, 1378, 1381.
State ». Milwaukee ^20 Wis. 501), 14.
State V. Milwaukee (35 Wis. 133), 94.
State V. Minneapolis (33 Minn. 501),
939
State v'. Mitchell (58 Iowa. 567). 1413.
State V. Mitchell (31 Ohio St. 593), 61.
State V. Mobile (30 La. Ann. 325),
544.
State V. Mobile (5 Porter (Ala.), 279),
678.
State V. Montgomery (74 Ala. 236),
935. 940, 965.
State V. Moore (74 Mo. 418), 331, 336,
598, 1303.
State V. Morristown (33 N. J. Law,
57), 113, 117. 513.
State V. Morristown (34 N. J. Law,
445), 1175.
State V. Morse (50 N. H. 9), 693, 1419.
State V. Morton (37 Vt. 310), 542.
State V. Moss (2 Jones (N. C), 66),
1257,
State V. Mott (61 Mo. 297), 530.
State V. Moultrieville (Rice {N. C),
Law, 158), 538.
State V. MuUenhofE (74 Iowa, 271),
■ 1544.
State V. Murrav (41 Minn. 133; 43
N. W. Rep."858), 160.
State V. Murray (38 Wis. 96), 188.
State V. Nashville (15 Lea (Tenn.),
697; 54 Am. Rep. 4,21), 181.
State V. Natal (39 La. Ann. 439), 96.
State V. Natal (41 La. Ann. 887; 6
So. Rep. 722), 581.
State V. Neidt (N. J., 19 Atl. Rep.
318), 1057, 1058.
State V. Nelson (Neb., 51 N. W. Rep.
648), 480.
State V. Nelson (57 Wis. 147), 1174. '
State V. Nevin (19 Nev. 163). 821.
State V. New Orleans (30 La. Ann.
129), 1876, 1878.
State V. New Orleans (34 La. Ann.
477), 1379.
State V. New Orleans (34 La. Ann.
1149). 1375.
State V. Newark (N. J., 12 Atl. Rep.
770), 1163. •
St^e V. Newark (27 N. J. Law, 185),
1166. 1167, 1576.
State V. Newark (30 N. J. Law, 303),
641, 1173.
State V. Newark (34 N. J. Law, 336),
489.
State V. Newark (35 N. J. Law, 157),
1166.
State V. Newark (37 N. J. Law, 415),
1174. 1186.
State V. Newark (40 .N. J. Law, 550),
60, 61.
State I'. Newark (47 N. J. Law, 117),
550.
State V. Newburg (77 N. Y. 136),
359
State V. Newton (33 Ark. 276). 827.
State V. Newton (44 Iowa. 45). 1350.
State V. Nolan (57 Minn. 16), 1240.
State V. North (42 Conn. 89), 1325.
State V. North (27 Mo. 464), 1354,
1388.
State V. Noyes (47 Me. 189). 1314.
State V. Noyes (30 N. H. (10 Fost.)
379), 67, 87, 88.
State V. O'Brien (47 Ohio St. 464 ; 34
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 361 ; 25
N. E. Rep. 131), 388. 1557.
State V. O'Connor (Wis., 47 N. W.
Rep. 433), 1089.
State V. O'Day (69 Iowa, 368), 160.
State V. Odom (86 N. C. 43>). 330.
State 17. Oleson (36 Minn. 507), 515,
604.
State V. Orange (33 N. J. Law, 49),
691, 1174, 1418.
State V. Orvis (30 Wis. 235), 853, 375,
1356.
State V. Osawkee Township (14 Kan.
418; 19 Am. Rep. 69), 559, 929,
930, 996.
State V. Osborne (36 Kan. 530; 13
Pac. Rep. t'SOl. 465.
State V. Osborne (33 Mb. App. 536),
1344.
State V. Otoe (6 Neb. 139), 693.
State V. Pamperin (43 Minn. 330; 44
N. W. Rep. 251), .•597.
State V. Parker (35 Minn. 815), 1556.
State V. Parker (33 N. J. Law, 31.3),
1353.
TABLE OF CASES.
CCXXXl
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
State V. Parker (31 N. J. Law, 49),
1576.
State V. Passaic (41 N. J. Law, 90),
1171.
State V. Passaic (41 N. J. Law, 379).
359.
State V. Passaic (43 N. J. Law, 429),
530.
State V. Passaic (46 N. J. Law, 124),
1391.
Slate V. Paterson (84 N. J. Law, 163).
383, 489, 551, 1333, 1390.
State V. Paterson {30 N. J. Law, 159),
641.
State V. Paterson (40 N. J. Law, 186).
185, 659.
State V. Peck (53 Me. 284), 313.
State V. Pender (66 N. C. 313), 1255.
State V. Pendergrass (106 N. C. 664),
598, 1244.
State V. Penny (10 Ark. 621). 140.
State V. Pepper (31 Ind. 76), 312.
State V. Perkins (24 N. J. Law, 409),
191,
State V. Perth Amboy (38 N. J. Law,
425), 641, 1171.
State V. Phillips (79 Me. 506; 11 Atl.
Rep. 374). 167, 304.
State V. Pierce Countv (71 Wis. 827;
37 N. W. Eep. 233), 793.
State V. Plainfield (38 N. J. Law, 95),
489.
State V. Pointer (Neb., 51 N. W.
Rep. 6.')2), 430.
State V. Police Cora m'rs (16 Mo. App.
48), 1281.
State V. Police Jury (34 La. Ann.
673), 1372.
State V. Portage (12 Wis. 563). 558.
State V. Porter (7 Ind. 204), 314.
State V. Porter (113 Ind. 79), 291,
294
State v. Portland (74 Me. 268), -786.
State V. Powell (40 La. Ann. 234; 8
Am. St. Eep. 523), 329.
State V. Powell (67 Mo. 395), 322.
."-later. Powell (97 N. C. 417). 1357.
State V. Powers (40 La. Ann. 234; 8
Am. St. Eep. 533), 328.
State V. Priester (Minn., 45 N. W.
Eep. 712), 497.
State V. Prince (26 Iowa. 223), 1420.
State V. Proctor (90 Mo. 334). 1415.
State V. Pugh (43 Ohio St. 98). 61.
State V. Eahway (33 N. J. Law, 110),
343.
State V. Eailway Co. (85 Mo. 263),
1079.
State V. Randall (35 Ohio St. 64), 389.
State V. Eeis (38 Minn. 371 ; 38 N. W.
Rep. 97), 1162, 1163, 1187.
State V. Eenick (37 Mo. 270), 381,
495.
State V, Rhoades (6 Nev. 352), 827.
State V. Rice (N. C, 2 8. E. Rep. 180),
522.
State V. Richards (31 Minn. 47), 541.
State V. Richmond (26 N. H. (6 Fos-
ter). 233), 695, 1430.
State V. Ricker (33 N. H. 179), 1256.
State V. Ring (29 Minn. 78), 314.
State V. Riordan (34 Wis. 484), 60.
State V. Robb (17 Ind. 536), 218.
State V. Roberts (12 N. J. Law, 114),
326.
State V. Robinson (43 Minn. 107; 43
N. W. Rep. 833), 601, 1236.
State V. Robinson (29 N. H. 274), 542.
State V. Rodman (43 Mo. 256), 389.
State V. Roggen (32 Neb. 118), 937.
State V. Rowe (72 Md. 548; 30 Atl
Rep. 179). 104. 616.
State V. RuflE (30 La. Ann. 497), 530.
State V. St. Anthony (10 Minn. 433),
1336.
State V. St. Louis (34 Mo. 546), 1388.
State V. St. Louis (47 Mo. 595), 1576.
State V. St. Louis (73 Mo. 435), 99,
123.
State V. St. Louis (90 Mo. 19), 203.
State V. St. Louis Police Comm. (16
Mo. App. 48), 203.
State V. St. Paul (86 Minn. 529), 1396.
State V. St. Paul &o. Ry. Co. (35
Minn. 131 ; 38 N. W. Eep. 3), 591.
State V. Saline County (45 Mo. 342),
952.
State V. Saline Countv (48 Mo. 390),
947.
State u Sappington (67 Mo. 529; 68
Mo. 454), 330.
State V. Sauk County (70 Wis. 485),
.')61, 1516.
State V. Savannah (1 T. U. P. Charlt.
235; 4 Am. Dec. 708), 517.
State V. Saxon (25 Fla. 792), 1508.
State V. Soates (43 Kan. 330; 33 Pac.
Rep. 479), 883.
State V. Schlemmer (42 La. Ann.
1166; 8 So. Rep. 307), 1345.
State V. School Dist. (10 Neb. 544).
935.
State V. School Dist. (22 Neb. 48),
1332
State V. School Dist. (21 Neb. 725),
1327, 1336.
State V. School Dist. (30 Neb. 520:
46 N. W. Rep. 613), 1519.
State V. School Dist. (31 Neb. 552),
1332.
State V. School Dist. (Neb., 48 N. W.
Rep. 393), 13i4, 1534.
State V. School Dist. (N. J., 10 Atl.
Rep. fOl), 1836.
State V. School Trustee (43 N. J.
Law, 358), 1336.
coxxxu
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
State' V. School Trustees (46 N. J.<
Law, 76), 1345.
State V. Schuchardt (48 La. Ann.
49; 7 So. Rep. 67), 593, 594, 614,
1247.
State V. Scott (17 Mo. 521). 64, 67.
State u. Spavey (23 Neb. 4.")4), 1378.
State V. Seavy iNeb., 35 N. W. Rep.
235), 1379.
State u Severance (49 Mo. 401), 524,
State V. Severance (55 Mo. 378), 121.
State V. Shakspeare (43 La. Ann. 93;
8 So. Rep. 8ii3). 1507, 1538.
State V. Shay (101 Ind. 36). 1563.
Hi ate v. Shelby (16 Lea, 240), 604.
State V. Shelby ville (4 Sneed, 176),
786.
State v. Sheriff of Ramsey Countv
(Minn , 51 N. W. Rnp. 113). 557.
State u. Shropshire (4 Neb. 411), 1517.
State V. Sickles(24 N. J. Law, 125),
1391.
State V. Simon (47 Minn. 315). 1433.
State V. Simon (20 Oregon, 305 ; 26
Pac. Rep. 170), 17-i.
State V. Simons (32 Minn. 540), 64.
State V. Sims (16 S. C. 486), 1379.
State V. SUirving (19 Neb. 497), 353,
375
State V. Slocum (Neb., 51 N. W.
Rep. 969), 890, 1524.
State V. Smith (23 Minn. 218), 273,
274, 276, 277, 499,
State V. Smith (Mo,, 15 S. W. Rep.
614), 1511, •
State V. Smith (96 Mo. 326 ; 72 Am.
Dec. 204). 338.
State V. Smith (38 Mo, 524), 328.
State V. Smith (46 Mo. 60), 413.
State V. Smith |87 Mo. 158), 895.
State ti. Smith (89 Mo. 408; 14 S.W.
Rep. fJ57), 881.
State V. Smith (Neb., 48 N. W. Rep.
468), 190!).
State V. Smith (100 N. C. 550), 1403.
State i\ Smith (Oregon, 25 Pac. Rep.
389), 356. ,
State V. Smith (10 R, L 258), 1249.
Slate V. Smith (11 Wis. 65), 386,
137».
Rtiite V. Smith (.52 "Wis. 134), 544.
State V. Snodgrass (I Wash. 305; 25
Pac. Rep. 1014). 381, 938.
State u, Soniers (96 N. C. 467), 301.
State V. South Orange (49 N. J. Law,
104),1171.
Stale V. Savereisn (17 Neb. 17*), 864.
State V. Spaude (37 Minn. 322; 84 N.
W. Rep. 164). 94, 114. 115.
State V. Spidle ('f4 Kan. 439; 24 Pac.
Rep. 965), 893.
State V. Stanley (66 N. C. 50), 190.
State t). Stark (18 Fla. 255), 60, 468.
State V. Starkey (Minn., 1893; 62 N.
W. Rep. 241, 489.
State V. Staten (6 Cold. (JTeiin.) 233),
376.
State V. Staiib (Conn., 23 Atl. Rep.
924), lrt39.
State V. Steamboat Co. (13 Md. 181),
1249.
State V. Stearns (1 1 Neb. 104), 1517.
State V. Stearns (31 N. H. lOS), 539.
State V. Steers (44 Mo. 234), 389.
State V. Sterling (20 MH. 503), 395.
Start «, Stevens (21 Kan. 210; 18
Am. L. Rep. (N. S.) 48i, 130.
State V. Stewirt (74 Wis. 620), 1024,
1097.
State V. Stoutmeyer (7 Nev. 342),
1345.
State V. Stovall (103 N. C. 416), 598.
State V. Strader (25 Ohio St. 527),
1386.
State V. Stnmpf (31 Wis. 579), 160.
State V. Sullivan County Court (51
Mo. 523), 944.
Stat^• )•. Suiiimerfi6ld'(107 N; C. 895;
12 S. E. Rep. 114), rm.
State t'. Siipervisors--(58 Wis. 291),
343.
State V. Supervisors (61 Wis. 278),
431.
State V. Sutterfield (.'54 Mo. 3911, 381.
State V. Swift (11 Neb. 128), 549.
State V. Svmonds (57 Me. 148), 376.
State V. Taft <37 Conn. 92), 374.
State V. Tappan T, Clerk (29 Wis.
664), 929.
State V. Taylor (Neb., 42 N. W. Rep.
729), 162. ,
State I'. Ta-vlor (108 N. C. 196; 12 L.
R. A. 202; 12 S. E. Rep, 100.5),
198
State v. Telegraph Co. (73 Me. 518),
1096.
State V. Tenant (N. C, 14 S, E. Rep.
387), 530, 521.
State V. Thayer (74 Wis. 48). 1343.
State V. Tliompson (49 Mo. 188), 313.
State V. Tiediuan (69 Mo. 515), 1330.
Slate V. Timme (54 Wis. 318), 432.
State V. Tool (4 Ohio St. 5.53), 314.
State V. Toomer (7 Rich. (Law), 316),
315.
State V. Topeka (36 Kan. 76). 1259.
State V. Town Board(Wis., 51 N, W.
Rep. «53). 1415.
State V. Town of Baird (Tex., 15 S.
W. Rep. 98), 0(i.
State V. Town of Lime (28 Minn.
521). 343. 344, 349.
State V. Town of Somerset (44 Minn.
549; 47 N. W. Rep. 103), 1515.
State V. Town of Tipton (Ind., 9 N.
E. Rep. 704), 71.
TABLE OF OASES.
CCXXXlll
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Stats V. Town of West Hoboken (.53
N. J. Law, 64; 20 Atl. Rep. 737),
1073.
State V. Town of Winter Park (29
Fla. 371), 69.
State 1'. Township of East Orange
(N. J., 8 Atl. Rep. 107), 1188.
State V. Traeej' (Minn., 51 N. W.
Rep. 613), 1560. 1561,
State V. Track (6Vt. 355), 1406.
State V. Tracv (94 Mo. 217), 1395.
State V, Treasurer (43 Mo. 228), 910.
State V. Trenton (N. J., 20 Atl. Rep.
1076), 520, 598.
State V. Trenton (N. J.. 23 Atl. Rep.
281), 585. 1221, 1222.
State V. Trenton (35 N. J. Law, 485),
190.
State V. Trenton (36 N. J. Law, 198),
113 1222
State V. Trenton (36 N. J. Law, 499),
641, 693.
State V. Trenton (42 N. J. Law, 74),
550.
State V. Trenton (42 N. J. Law, 395),
283.
State V. Trenton (51 N. J. Law, 498;
28 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 161),
283
State V. Troth (24 N. J. Law, 879),
94, 109.
State V. Trustees &c. (5 Ind. 77),
464.
State V. Tryon (39 Conn. 183), 486.
State V. Turnpike Co. (31 N. J. Law,
12), 1561.
State V. Tuttle (53 Wis. 45), 376.
State V. Union (32 N. J. Law, 343),
1265.
State V. Union (33 N. J. Law, 350),
441, 489.
State V. Vail (53 MTo. 97), 386.
State V. Valle (41 Mo. 29), 752.
State V. Vanosdal (Ind., 31 N. E.
Rep. 78). 275. 292.
State V. Van Pelt (1 Ind. 304), 325.
State V. Van Winkle (25 N. J. Law,
73), 1266, 1268.
State V. Varnum (Wis., 51 N. W.
Rep. 958), 1533.
State V. Vershire (52 Vt. 41), 356.
State V. Vickers (51 N. J. Law, 180;
17 Atl. Rep. 153), 1561.
State V. Votaw (8 Blaokf. (Ind.) 2),
433.
State V. Vreeland (79 Iowa, 466),
1336,
State V. Waddell (Minn., 52 N. W.
Rep. 213). 578, 1203.
State V. Waggoner (88 Tenn. 293; 12
S. W. Rep. 721). 4fi4.
State V. Wakely (3 Nott & McC.
(S. G.) 410), 1576.
State V. Waldron (17 N. J. Law,
369),. 698.
State V. Walker (Mo., 7 Cent, L J.
890), 1509.
State V. Walker (85 Mo. 41), 634.
State V. Walker (17 Ohio, 135). 443.
State V. Wall (Ohio, 24 N. E. Rep.
897), 119.
State V. Walsh (7 Mo. App. 142), 386.
State V. Wapello County (18 Iowa,
388), 929, 934.
State V. Ware (13 Oregon, 880), 343.
State V. Water Comm'rs (30 N. J.
Law, 247), 641.
State V. Watts (23 Ark. 304), 325.
330.
States. Webber (107 N. C. 983; 12
S. E. Rep. 59H), 520, 525, 603.
State V. Weir (33 Iowa, 134). 74.
State V. Welch (36 Conn. 215), 517,
599, 1244.
State V. Wells (46 Iowa, 663), 1259,
1262.
State V. Wells (8 Nev. 105), 175.
State V. West (33 La. Ann. 1261),
200.
State V. Wheeler (27 Minn. 76), 1240.
State u White (29 Neb. 288: 45 N.
W. Rep. 631), 874, 1533, 1543.
State V. White (64 N. H. 48), 1225.
State ti. Whittemore (50 N. H. 245),
140.
State V. Whittingham (7 Vt. 390),
786.
State V. Wilcox (42 Conn. 364; 19
Am. Rep. 538), 88.
State «. Wilcox (45 Mo. 458), 64, 67.
State V. Wilcox (17 Neb. 219), 1534.
State V. WilkesviUe(20 Ohio St. 288),
292.
State V. Wilkinson (2 Vt. 480), 140.3.
State i\ Williams (25 Me. 561), 352,
373
State v. Williams (11 S. C. 288), 599,
604.
State V, Williams (5 Wis. 308). 376.
State V. Wilmington (3 Harr. (Del.)
294). 193, 381.
State V. Wilson (13 Lea (Tenn.), 257,
464.
State V. Wilson (Neh, 38 N. W. Rep.
31), 389.
State V. Wilson (29 Ohio St. 349),
183.
State V. Wish (15 Neb. 448), 529.
State V. Witherford (54 Wis. 150),
1331.
State v. Witter (107 N. C. 792), 1241.
State V. Wolever (127 Ind. .306; 25
N. E. Rep. 762), 192, 217.
State V. Womack (Wash., 29 Pac.
Rep. 939), 303.
State V. Woodbury (76 Me. 457), 66.
CCXXXIV
TABLE OF CASES.
\-
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
State V. Woodward (89 Ind. 110),
1545.
State V. Wordin (56 Conn. 216; 14
Atl. Eep. 801). 1017.
State V. Wright (8 Blackf . (Ind.) 65),
1325!
State V. Wright (N. J., 23 Atl. Rep.
116), .583.
State V. Young (8 Kan. 445), 52, 71,
93. 1253.
State V. Young (17 Kan. 414), 116.
State V. Zeigler (32 N. J. Law, 262),
522, 530, 540.
State &o. V. Court of Conunon Pleas
(36 N. J. Law, 72; 13 Am. Eep.
422), 88.
State Bank v. Charleston (3 Rich,
Law, 342), 1396.
State Bank v. Gibbs (3 McC. (S. C.)
377), 7.
State Bank v. Knoop (16 How. 380),
79.
State Board v. Aberdeen (56 Miss.
518), 1394.
State Board of Agriculture v. Citi-
zens' Street Ry. Co. (47 Ind. 407),
644.
State' Board of Education v. Aber-
deen (56 Miss. 518), 238.
State Center v. Barenstein (66 Iowa,
249), 518, 521, 1233, 1234, 1236.
State Cent. R. Co. v. Mutchler (41
N. J. Law, 96). 1568. 1571.
State R. Co. r. Easton E. Co. (36 N.
J. Law, 181), 1418.
State Railroad Tax Cases (92 U. S.
575), 1568, 1570, 1571, 1573.
State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds
(15 Wall. 300), 1566.
State Tonnage Cases (12 Wall. 204),
1043.
Steamship Co, v. Port Wardens (6
Wall. 81), 580.
Stearns v. Richmond (88 Va. 993),
1456.
Stebbins v. Kay (4 N. Y. Supl. 566),
1171.
Stebbins v. Kay (51 Hun, 589), 1187.
Stebbins V. Jennings (19 Pick. 172),
56, 57, 657.
Stebbins u. Mayer (38 Kan. 578; 16
Pac. Rep. 74,5), 1293.
Stebbins v. Mayes (Kan., 16 Pac.
Rep. 745), 509.
Stebbins v. Merritt (10 Cush. 27),
1366.
Stebbins v. Oneida Village (5 N. Y.
Supl. 483), 1475, 1484.
Stebbins v. Oneida Village (23 N. Y.
St. Rep. 703), 781.
Steokert v. East Saginaw (23 Mich.
104), 293. 300, 301, 497, 1265.
Steel's Petition (44 N. H. 220), 1420.
Steel Co. V. Martin (115 111. 358), 1490.
Steele v. Boston (128 Mass. 588), 264,
760.
Steele v. Calhoun (61 Miss. 556), 166.
StefCan v. Buffalo (21 N. Y. W, Dig.
389), 781.
Stein V. Citv of Council Bluffs (73
Iowa, 18"0). 1478.
Stein V. Mobile (17 Ala. 284), 1360.
Stein ul Mobile (24 Ala. 591), 983,
1360, 1397.
Stein V. Mobile (49 Ala. 862; 30 Am.
«ep. 388), 1360.
Stein V. Railroad Co. (75 III. 41),
1457.
Stein V. Water Supply Co. (34 Fed.
Rep. 145), 567.
Steines r. Franklin County (48 Mo.
167), 936, 947.
Steinmeyer v. City of St. Louis (8
Mo. App. 256), 1436.
Stephens v. Mayor (84 Ga. 630; 30
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 383), 377,
878
Sterling v. Gait (117 111. 11; 7 N. E.
Rep. 471), 1074, 1175.
Sterling v. Merrill (134 111. 533), 1474,
1489.
Sterling v. Parish of West Feliciana
(26 La. Ann. 59), 682.
Sterling Gas Co. v. Higby (134 111.
557; 25 N. E. Rep. 660), 796.
Stern v. People (96 111. 475), 324.
Stetson V. Kempton (13 Mass. 373; 7
Am. Dec. 145), 17, 350, 642, 664,
826, 1383. 1893.
Steuart v. Mayor &o. (7 Md. 516),
704.
Steubenville v. Gulp (38 Ohio St. 18),
210.
Steven v. Insurance Co. (39 Neb.
187), 1363.
Stevens v. Commonwealth (6 Met,
243), 543.
Stevens v. Danbury (53 Conn. 9), 697.
Stevens v. Dudley (50 Vt. 158), 319.
Stevens v. Railroad Co. (39 Vt. 546),
646.
Stevens v. Society (12 Vt. 688), 1269.
Stevens Point &c. Co. v. ReiUy (44
Wis. 295), 60.
Stevenson v. Bay City (26 Mich. 44),
510, 1365.
Stevenson v. Lexington (69 Mo. 157),
364.
Stevenson v. Summit (85 Iowa, 462),
1378.
Stevenson V. Weber (29 La. Ann. 105),
647.
Steward v. Jefferson (8 Harr. S35),
64.
Steward v. Kalamazoo (30 Mich. 69),
1583.
TABLE OF OASES.
CCXXiT
prhe references are to pages; Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Stewart v. Baltimore (7 Md. 500),
696.
Stewart v. Cambridge (135 Mass.
102). goo.
Stewart v. Citv of Council Bluffs (58
Iowa, 649); 286.
Stewart v. City of Council Bluffs
(Iowa, 50 N. W. Rep. 219), 1150.
Stewart r. Clinton (79 Mo. 604), 510,
70B, 1271.
Stewart v. Hovey (Kan., 26 Pao.
Rep. 683), 1155.
Stewart v. Lee (3 Cal. 364), 810.
Stewart v. Otoe County (2 Neb. 177),
628.
Stewart v. Philadelphia (Pa., 7 Atl.
Rep. 192). 1186.
Stewart v. Polk County (30 Iowa, 1),
934.
Stewart i'. Sherman (4 Conn. 553),
996.
Stewarts Southard (17 Ohio, 403;
49 Am. Dec. 468), 218. 219. 1845.
Stewart v. State (4 InQ. 396), 175.
Stickney v. Bangor (30 Me. 404),
■ 1578.
Stickney v. Salem (8 Allen, 374),
144H, 1455.
Stifel V. Brown (24 Mo. App. 102),
1187.
StifBer v. Board of Comm'rs (lud,,
27 N. E.' Rep. 641), 895.
Stiger V. Red Oak (64 Iowa, 465),
230.
Stiles V. Middlesex (8 Vt. 436), 697.
Still V. Lansingburgh (10 Barb. 107),
634.
Stillwater v. Green (9 N. J. Law, 59),
446.
Stillwater Water Co. v. City of Still-
water (Minn., 53 N. W. Rep. 893),
586.
Stillwell V. Coons (133 N. Y. 243; 25
N. E. Rep. 316), 9s5.
Stillwell V. Coope (4 Denlo, 325),
1339.
Stillwell V. Kennedy (51 Hun, 114; 5
N. Y. Supl. 407). 985, 986.
Stillwell V. New York (17 Jones &
Sp. 360; 96 N. Y. 649), 785.
Stilz V. Indianapolis (55 Ind. 515),
393, 1365, 1307.
Stilz V. Indianapolis (81 Ind. 582),
1368, 1568.
Stinchfleld v. Little (1 Greenl. (Me.)
331; 10 Am. Dec. 65), 313.
Stinson v. Gardiner (4a Me. 348),
1448.
Slinson v. Smith (8 Minn. 366), 1086.
Stitt V. Castelline (88 Mich. 339),
1430.
Stock V. City of Boston (149 Mass.
410), 1310.
Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge (12
Mass. 400). 54, 90.
Stockdale v. School Dist. (47 Mich.
. 22H), 305.
Stocket V. New Albany (3 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 85). 647.
Stockton. Ex parte (33 Fed. Rep.
95), 1240.
Stockton V. Creanor (45 Cal. 643),
383.
Stockton V. Powell (Fla., 10 Bo. Eep.
688), 273, 5T0. 953.
Stockton V. Western Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. (Cal., 15 Pac. Rep. 314),
120.
Stockton &o. R. Co. v. Stockton (41
Cal. 147), 683. 933.
Stockton &c. R Co. v. Stockton (51
Cal. 328), 939.
Stockwell V. White Lake (22 Mich.
341). 819.
Stoddard v. Oilman (33 Vt. 568), 303,
306. 349, 361, 863.
Stoddard v. Kimball (6 Cush. 469),
957
Stoddard v. Johnson (75 Ind. 30), 377.
Stoddard v. Village of Saratoga
Springs (4 N. Y. Supl. 745), 1098.
Stoddard v. Winchester (154 Mass.
149), 1437.
Stokes V. City of New York (14
Wend. 88). 538. 599, 1231.
Stokes V. Early (45 N. J. Law, 478),
705.
Stone V. Boston (3 Met. 220), 705.
Stone V. Cambridge (6 Cush. 270),
1175.
Stone V. Citv of Charlestown (114
Mass. 314"). 396, 1368.
Stone V. Commercial Rv. Co. (4 M.
6 C. 182). (;97, V
Stone V. Elliott (11 Ohio St. 252),
964. ,
Stone V. Godfrey (5 De G., M. & G.
76), 248.
Stone V. Hubbardston (100 Mass. 49),
1486.
Stone V. Mississippi (101 U. S. 814),
1545.
Stone V. New York (25 Wend. 157),
759
Stone V. School Dist. (8 Cush. 592),
344, 1835.
Stone V. Seymour (15 Wend. 19), 328.
Stone V. Small (54 Vt. 498), 360.
Stone V. Viele ' (38 Ohio St. 314),
1^76.
Stone V. Woodbury (51 Iowa, 523),
1578.
Stoneman i\ London &c. Co. (L. R.
7 Q. B. 1). 1418.
Stoner v. Flournoy (28 La, Ann.
850), 1365, 1367.
COXXXVl
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1605.]
Storrs V. Utica (17 N. Y. 104), 1397,
1444, 146S.
Story V. N. Y. El. R. Co. (90 N. Y.
122), 615. 678, 1406, 1410, 1411.
Stoughton School Dist. v. Atherton
(11 Met. 105), 915.
Stout 77. Freeholders (85 N. J. Law,
203), 682.
Stout V. Woods (79 Ind. 108), 1420.
Stoutenbergh v. Hennlok (129 U. S.
141), 14, 51, 53. 1240.
Stow V. Common Council (79 Mich.
595; 44 N. W. Rep. 1047), 171.
Stowe V. Wyse (7 Conn. 114), 276.
Strader v. Sussex (18 N. J. Law,
108), 769.
Strafford v. Sharon (61 Vt. 126),
1429.
Strahan v. Town of Malvern (77
Iowa, 454; 43 N. W. Rep. 369),
609.
Strahl. In re (16 Iowa, 369), 290,
398.
Strand, In re (Cal., 21 Pao, Rep.
654), 62, 69, 96.
Strang. Ex parte (21 Ohio St. 610),
199.
Strang v. District of Columbia (1
Maokey, 265), 718.
Stratman, In re (39 Cal. 517), 1355.
Stratton v. Collins (43~ N. J. Law,
563), 1353.
Stratton v. Oulton (28' Cal. 44), 175,
310.
Sti-auder v. West Virginia (100 U. S.
313), 147.
Strauss v. Cincinnati (38 Weekly
Law Bui. 359), 1171.
Street Case (1 La. Ann. 413), 375.
Street v. Comm'rs (70 N. C. 644), 882,
Street v. Laurens (5 Rich. Eq. 337),
8-34.
' Street v. Railway Co. (79 N. Y. 293),
1088.
Street Ry. Co. v. Philadelphia (51
Pa. St. 465), 1354.
Street Ry. Co. v. West Side Ry. Co.
(7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 95), 1205.
Strenna v. City Council &c. (86 Ala.
340), 1189.
Strickler v. City cf Colorado Springs
(16 Colo. 61; 26 Pac. Rep. 313),
670,
Striebu. Cox (111 Ind. 299; 13 N. E.
Rep. 481), 637, «39, 898, 1137.
Strike v. Collins (54 L. T. (N. S.)
153), 1344.
Strikers. Kelly (7 Hill, 9; 2 Denio,
323), 800, 301, 497. 500, 1365.
Striling v. Thomas (60 III. 3ii5). 9.
Strom v- Iowa City (47 Iowa, 43),
1583.
Strong V. Brooklyn (68 N. Y. 1), 1411.
Strong V. Campbell (U Barb. 135),
233.
Strong V. District of Columbia (4
Maokey (D. C), 243; 9 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 568), 381.
Strong V. McKeever (103 Ind. 578),
1415.
Strong I). N. Y. El. R. Co. (90 N. Y.
123), 1433.
Strong V. Stevens Point (63 Wis.
253), 1449.
Strong V. United States (6 Wall.
788), 320.
Strong, Petitioner (20 Pick. 484),
1555, 1560.
Strosser v. City (100 Ind. 443), 413,
643.
Stroud V. City of Philadelphia (61
Pa. St. 255), 593. 1163.
Strngh V. Supervisors &o. (119 N. Y.
312). 1546.
Strunk v. Ochiltree (11 Iowa, 158),
336.
Strusburgh v. Mayor (87 N. Y, 453).
1123, 1131, 1133, 1184.
Struthers v. Railway Co. (87 Pa. St.
282), 591.
Stuart V. Maehiasport (48 Me. 477),
1503.
Stuart «. Palmer (74 N. Y. 183), 595,
690. 1177, 1178, 1179.
Stuart V. Warren (b7 Conn. 335), 851,
366, 817.
Stubbs V. Lee (64 Me. 195). 188, 200.
Stuhr V. Hoboken (47 N, J. Law,
148). 503.
Sturgeon v. Hampton (88 Mo. 203),
634.
Sturm V. School Dist. (45 Minn. 88;
47 N. W. Rep. 462), 347.
Stutsman County v. MansSeld (5
Dak. 78; 37 N. W. Rep. 304),
853.
Stuyvesart v. Mayor (7 Cowen, 588),
102, 488. 1172.
Sublettt). Bed well (47 Miss. 266; 12
Am. Rep. 338), 38fi.
Successor of Irwin (38 La. Ann. 68),
614.
Sudbury v. Heard (108 Mass. 543),
1579.
Sudbury v. Stearns (21 Pick. 148),
344, 1274.
Sudbury v. Waltham (13 Mass. 461),
983.
Suffolk Siiv. Bank v. Boston (149
Mass. 364), 964.
Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis Grain
Elevator Co. (82 Mo. 124), 1206.
Sullivan v. Board of Supervisors (58
Miss. 790), 670.
Sullivan v. Boston (126 Mass. 540),
759.
TjLBLia OF OASES..
CCXXXVll
[The reterenoes are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. U, pp. 789-1605.]
Sullivan v. City of Fall River (144
Mass. 579; 13 N. E. Rep. 553),
1143.
Sullivan v. City of Leadville (11
Colo. 483; 18Pac. Rep. 7361,301,
7ia, 877, 1116.
Sullivan v. Gilroy (S5 Hun, 285),
1553.
Sullivan v. Holyoke (135 Mass. 373),
1080.
Sullivan V. Jones (9 Gray, 570), 339.
Sullivan v. Pausch (5 OhioC. C. 198),
301.
Sullivan v. Phillips (110 Ind. 320),
1095.
Sullivan v. School District (39 Kan.
347), 257, 1330.
'Sullivan v. Shanklin (63 Cal. 247),
220.
Sullivan i'. State (121 Ind. 343; 23
N. E. Rep. 150), 812.
Sullivan v. Walton (20 Fla. 552), 959,
1391.
Summers v. Daviess County Comm'rs
(103 Ind. 263; 53 Am. Rep. 513),
207. 744, 1014.
Summerville v. Pressley (33 S. C. 56 ;
11 S. E. Rep. 545), 593. 594.
Summit Borough, In re (Pa., 7 Atl.
Rep. 319), 68, 69.
Sumner v. Comm'rs (37 Me. 112),
694.
Sumnerv. Lebee(3Greenl. (Me.) 223),
374.
Sunapee v. Town of Lempster (65 N.
H. 655; 3»Atl. Rep. 535), 981.
Sunderland v. Martin (113 Ind. 411),
1189^
Superintendents of Poor v. Nelson
(75 Mich. 154; 43 N. W. Rep.
797), 1004.
Supervisors &c. v: Bates (17 J^. Y.
242), 253.
Supervisors &c. v. Birdsall (4 Wend.
453), 657.
Supervisors &c. v. Bowen (4 Lans.
(N. Y.) 24), 657.
Supervisors &c. v. Briggs (2 Denio,
36). 709.
Supervisors &c. v. Brush (77 III. 59),
1390.
Supervisors &o. v. CoflSnbury (1
Mich. 355), 312, 3W.
Supervisors &c. v. Cowan (60 Miss.
876), 1371, 1383.
Supervisors &c. v. Dorr (25 Wend.
■ 440; 7 Hill, 583), 333.
Supervisors &c. v. Galbraith (99 TJ.
S. 214), 9.?4.
Supervisors &c. v. Garrejl (20 Gratt.
484). 681.
Supervisors &c. v. Horton (75 Iowa,
371), 30 i.
Supervisors &o. v. Minturn (4 West
Va. 300), 1516.
Supervisors &c. v. Morgan (4 Abb.
Ct. App. Dee. 339), 993.
Supervisors &o. v. O'Malley (47 Wis.
333), 470.
Supervisors &c. v. People (25 III.
. 181), 301.
Supervisors &c. v. People (110 111.
511), 1362.
Supervisors &c. v. Stimson (4 Hill,
13&}. 195, 196, 200.
Supervisors &o. v. Supervisors of
Gogebic County f74 Mich. 721;
42N.,W. Rep. 170), 450.
Supervisors &o. v. Supervisors of
Gogebic County (Mieh., 46 N. W.
Rep. 170), 462.
Supervisors &c. v. Supervisors of
La Crosse Cotinty (IS Wis. 547).
487.
Supervisors &c. v. Supervisors of
Sumner County (S8 Miss. 619),
450.
Supervisors &c. v. United States (4
Wall. 435), 9, 426, 804.
Supervisors &c. v. United States (18
Wall. 71), 803), 1392, 1509.
Surgi V. Snetchman (11 La. Ann.
387), 1369.
Susquehanna Banku. Brown County
Supervisors (25 N. Y. 313), 1189,
1568.
Sussex V. Strader (18 N. J. Law,
108). 787.
Sutherland v. Godsborough (98 N. C.
49; 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
393), 377.
SutlifF V. Lake County (47 Fed. Rep.
106), 837.
Sutro V. Pettit (74 Cal. 332; 16 Pac.
Rep. 7), 208, 230, 231, 233, 233,
234, 249, 836.
Sutro V. Rhodes (93 Cal. 117; 28 Pac.
Rep. 98), 836.
Sutton V. Clarke (6 Taunt. 34), 222.
Sutton V. Louisville (5 Dana, 28), 702.
Sutton V. McConnell (46 Wis. 269),
Sutton V. Orange (6 Met. 484), 446.
Sutton V. Spectacle Makers' Co. (i:i
L. T. (N. S.)411), 2H1.
Swain v. Comstock (18 Wis. 463), 70.
Swan V. Grav (44 Miss. 393), 1536.
Swan V. Williams (3 Mich. 427), 090.
Swann v. Buck (40 Miss. 268)i 112,
187.
Swann v. Cumberland (8 Gill, 150),
1576.
Swanzey v. Somerset (13? Mass. 313),
1433.
Swart V. New York (5 N. Y. Supl.
98), 1496.
CCSJ^XVUl
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-IB05.]
Swarthu People (109 111. 631), 1233.
Swartz V. Large (47 Kan. 304; 27
Pac. Rep. 993), 1558.
Sweatt «. Faville (28 Iowa, 326), 556.
Sweet V. Gloverville (13 Hun, 302),
1474.
Sweet V. Morrison (116 N. Y. 32; 22
N. E. Kep. 276), 720.
Sweetser v. Hav (3 Gray, 49), 312.
Sweitzer v. Liberty (83 Mo. 309),
5oa.
Swepstou V, Barton (39 Ark. 549),
163.
Swift V. City of Newport (7 Bush
(Ky.). 37), 1364, 1366.
Swift v.- City of Poughkeepsie (37
N. Y. 511), 227, 1133.
Swift V. City of Topeka (43 Kan.
671). 524.
Switzer v. Wellington (40 Kan. 250 ;
10 Am. St. Rep. 196), 1596.
Sykes v. Mayor of Columbus (55
Miss, lir)), 639, 942, 1374.
Sykes v. Town of Pawlet (43 Vt.
446), 1451.
Syme v. Bunting (91 N. C. 48), 330.
Symonds v. Clav County (71 111. 355),
9, 149.
Syracuse v. Reed (Kan., 26 Pac.
Rep. 1043), 855.
Syracuse Water Co. v. City of Svra-
ouse (116 N. Y. 167; 22 N. E.
Rep. 381; 5 L. R. An. 546; 26
N. Y. St. Eep. 364; 29 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 307), 230, 566,
567, 613.
T.
Taber v. Ferguson (109 Ind. 227),
1075. 1113.
Taft V. Gifford (13 Met. 187); 3S3.
Taf t V. Montagu (14 Mass. 283),- 640,
1141.
Taft V. Pittsford (28 Vt. 286). 359,
643.
Taft V. Wood (14 Pick. 363), 237,
1384.
Taggart v. Newport Street E. Co. (16
E. I. 668), 678, 679.
Tainter v. Lucca (28 Wis. 375), 1571.
Tainter v. Worcester (123 Mass. 311),
264.
Tait's Ex'r v. Centr. Lunatic Asylum
(Va.,4S. E. Rep. 697), 683.
Talbot V. Dent (9 B. Mon. 526), 801,
933, 1385, 1387.
Talbot V. East Machias (76 Me. 415),
183.
Talbot V. Hudson (16 Gray, 417), 683.
Talbot «. Queen' Anne's County (50
Md. 245), 8, 15.
Talbot Paving Co. v. Common Coun-
cil (Mich., 61 N. W. Eep. 933),
1539.
Talcott V. Bufifalo (57 Hun, 43). 650.
Talcott V. Bufifalo (125 N. Y. 380), 780.
Talkington v. Turner (71 111. 234),
385.
Tallant v. Burlington (39 Iowa, 543),
, 1174.
Tall man v. White (3 N. Y. 66). 1383.
Tamwortli v. Freedom (17 N. H. 379),
983, 983.
Tape V. Hurley (66 Cal. 473), 1345.
Tapley V. Martin (116 Mass. 275),
323 '
Tappan'u. Bank (19 Wall. 490), 1351.
Tappan v. People (67 III. 339), 1333.
Tappan v. Young (9 Daly, 357), 53i;
573
Tarbell's Appeal (129 Pa. St. 146; 18
Atl. Rep. 758), 647.
Tarbox v. Sughrue (36 Kan. 225),
163.
Tartman v. State (109 Ind. 860), 464.
Tash V. Adams (10 Cush. 252), 664,
1399, ln83.
Tate V. Railroad Co. (6 Mo. 158),
1206.
Tatlock V. Louisa County (46 Iowa,
797.
Taunton v. Inhabitants of Wareham
(153 Mass. 19i; 26 N. E. Rep.
451), 982, 993, 994.
Taunton v. Middleborough (12 Met.
35), 983.
Taunton v. Tavlor (116 Mass. 254),
489, 551, 1035, 1059. lOv-0.
Taunton v. Westport (12 Mass. 355),
1001.
Tawney v. Lynn &e. Ey. Co. (6 L. J.
(N. S.) Eq. 283), 697.
Tax-payers' Ass'n v. City of New Or-
leans (33 La. Ann. 567). 647.
Taylor, Ex parte (58 Miss. 478), 1335.
Taylor V. Americus (39 Ga. 59), 546.
Tavlor v. Board of Health (31 Pa.
St. 73), 1577.
Taylor v. Boulware (17 Tex. 74).
.1366.
Taylor v. Carondelet (23 Mo. 105),
523, 534.
Taylor v. City of Cohoos (105 N. Y.
54), 1598. •
Taylor v. City of Cumberland (64
Md. 68; 20 Atl. Rep. 1037), 771,
1138, 1222.
Taylor v. Citv of Lambertville (N. J., ■
10 Atl. Rep. 809), 1312.
Taylor tJ.Clemson (11 Clark & F.
610), 693.
Taylor v. Comm'rs (88 111. 526), 1089.
Tayloi: v. Commonwealth (3 J. J.
Marsh. 401), 158. •
TABLE OF CASES.
CCXXXIX
(The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
Taylor v. Dist. Tp. of Wayne (25
Iowa, 447), 904, 1028.
Taylor v. Dunn (Tex., 16 S. W, Eep.
733), 1^15, 1216.
Taylor v. Fort Wayne (47 Ind. 274),
393, 1866.
Taylor v. Henry (2 Pick. 397), 357,
359, 360, 372, 1275.
Taylor «.. Hopper (2 Hun, 646; -62
N. Y. 649), 1410, 1412.
Taylor v. Knipe (3 Pearson (Ala.),
151), 1596.
Taylor v. Lake Shore R. Co. (45
Mich. 74), 1441.
Taylor v. Lambertville (43 N. J. Eq.
107), 238.
Taylor v. McFadden (Iowa, 59 N. W.
Rep. 1070), 280. 552, 1075, 1384.
Taylor v. Morton (37 Iowa, 550), 3^1.
Taylor v. New Berne (3 Jones' Eq.
(N. C.) 141), 67, 124.
Taylor v. Palmer (31 Cal. 240), 501,
507, 1115, 1181, 1183, 1189.
Taylor v. People (66 III. 322), 242.
Taylor v. Philadelphia Board &c.
(31 Pa. St. 73), 344.
Taylor v. Phillips (West Va., 14 S.
E. Rep. 130), 1421.
Taylor v. Pine Bluff (34 Ark. 603),
488.
Taylor v. Plymouth (8 Met. 465),
759.
Taylor v. Porter (4 Hill, 140; 40 Am.
Dec. 274), 684.
Tavlor v. Railroad Co. (45 Mich. 74 ;
" 7 N. W. Rep. 728), 1201.
Taylor v. Salt Lake County (2 Utah,
405), 1587.
Taylor v. Sullivan (45 Minn. 309; 11
L. R. A. 373; 47 N. W. Rep. 803),
188.
Taylor v. Taylor (10 Minn. 107), 381,
389.
Taylor v. Thompson (42 III. 9), 802.
Taylor v. Town of Constable (10 N.
T. Supl. 607), 1493.
Taylor v. Town of Constable (15 N.
Y. Supl. 795), 748.
Taylor v. Whitehead (Doug. 745),
1473.
Taylor v. Williston (62 Vt. 369),
1433.
Taylor v. Yonkers (105 N. Y. 203),
14.13, 1459, 1460, 1461.
Taylor County v. Standley (79 Iowa,
666; 44 N. W. Eep. 911), 603,
797, 859.
Taylors of Ipswich (1 Rol. 5), 129.
Tayraouth v. Koehler (35 Mich. 22),
640, 1391.
T. B. Scott Lumber Co. v. Oneida
Co. (72 Wis. 158), 561.
Tearney v. Smith (86 111. 391), 231.
Teegarden v. City of Racine (56 Wis.
645; 14 N. W. Rep. 614), 554,
561, 1169.
Teft V. Size (10 111. 433). 544.
Temple v. Mpad (4 Vt. 535), 165.
Ten Evck v. Delaware &o. Canal Co.
(18 N. J. Law, 200). 4. 7.
Tennant v. Crocker (85 Mjoh. 338;
48 N. W. Rep. 577), 299; 1538.
Tensas &c. Jury v. Britton (15 Wall.
670), 236.
Terhune v. Mayor &c. of New York
(88 N. Y. 247), 179, 210, 755.
Terrail v. Tinney (20 La. Ann. 444),
339
Terre Haute v. Beach (96 Ind. 48),
1419.
Terre Haute v. Hudnut (113 Ind,
542), 775, 1186.
Terre Haute v. Lake (43 Ind. 480),
527.
Terre Haute v. Terre Haute Water-
works Co. (94 Ind. 303), 711.
Terre Haute v. Turner (36 Ind. 522),
677.
Terre Haute &c. E. Co. v. Earp (21
111. 293). 943.
Terre Haute &c. R. Co. v. Nelson
(Ind., 27 N. E. Rep. 486. 1083.
Terre Haute &c. R. Co. v. Voelker
(31 111. 314), 1369.
Terre Haute &c. R. Co. v. Voelker
(129 111. 540), 510.
Terre Haute R. Ca v. Clem (123 Ind.
15), 1486. ' ,
Terrell v. Andrew County (44 Mo.
309) 325.
Terrell v. Dissaint (Tex., 9 S. W.
Rep, 593), 843.
Terrell v. Sharon (34 Conn. 105), 646,
1583.
Terrill v. Philadelphia (38 Pa. St.
355), 396, 1365.
Territory v. Board of Comm'rs (8
Mont. 396; 30 Pac. Rep. 396),
897.
Territory of Dakota v. Armstrong
(6 Dak. 326 ; 50 N, W. Rep. 833),
1556.
Territory of Washington v. Stewart
(39 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas, 32)i
63.
Terry v. Hartford (39 Conn. 291),
1169.
Terry v. Milwaukee (15 Wis. 490),
909.
Terry v. Waterbury (35 Conn. 536),
1420.
Terry Co. v. East St. Louis (102 111.
560), 1239.
Tesh V. Commonwealth (4 Dana
(Ky.), 5a3), 1253.
Tevis V. Randall (6 Cal. 632), 310.
TABLE OF OASES.
[The ref erfences are to pagest Vol.
ffeje'ai'fe Vtte. %. Co. V. City of Nrnt-
QWfeans (40 Fed. Rep. Ill), 1103.
Texas Banking Ins. C9. V. SMe (43
Tex. 4S6), 1357, 1370.
Thatcher v. CfMc&go &e. Ry. Cb.
mo III 660; 11 N. E. Rep. 853),
793
Tfb^chlit V. Cbram'rs (13 Kah. 1'88),
„;'iB8S,'«S9.
TIraifcher V. Humbte («7 lad. 444),
651.
Tb&tcber*. P^Ofde (79 I11.S97), ifi^Tl.
•Thaver v. feoston (19 Pick. 511), 766,
774, 'f75.
Thayer v. Montgomery CoUHty (3
E»i(U 38'9). ISffl.
Thayer v. Stearns (1 Pick. 109), 351,
Thayer 'u United States (20 Ct. CI.
. 137), 'r#..
The Acorn (3 Abb. (N. S.) 4^), 140,
The Borough 6t '^arhlouth Case (2
BrownlOw & Goldsb. 392), 43.
The Bricklayei'S v. The Plasterers
(Palm. 396). 487.
The Chesapeake &c. Canal Co. (1 Md.
Ch. 248), 670.
The Davis (lO Wall. 15), 740.
The Dublin Case (38 N. H. 4S9). 660.
The Floyd Acceptances (7 Wall. 666),
307. 214.
The 36ing v. The Inhabitants of
Hard wick (11 EaSt, 577^). 153.
The iKiMg t". Inhabitants of Woburn
(10 East. 395), 153.
ft* King V. liizzard (9 Barn. & O.
418). 189.
The ■fe,ease of the City of London (8
How. State Trials, 1340), 130.
The liberty Bell («3 Fed. Rep. 843),
1568; 1580.
The f^feofil* i}. Oregon (27 111. 29).
311.
The Siren (7 Wall. 153), 740.
Theilan v. Porter (14 Lea, 623; 53
Am. Rep. 173), 1047.
Thiessen v. City of Belle Plaine
tIo\va,-46 N.'W. Rep. 854), 1199.
/ Third Nat. Bank &c. v. Seneca iFalls
i;i5?P8a.'B#t). "^Sg), 947.
Third Schpdl Di^. Vi Athertoh (13
Met. 105), 373.
Thomas, M!pa>rttl{n Cal. 304), 1388.
Thomas v. Ashland (13 Ohio St. 124),
S9, 1S53.
Thomas v. Brooklyn (58 Iowa, 438),
'1403.
Thomas v, Burlington (69 loWa, 140),
M6<841.
Thomas v. Citizens' flotse R. Co.
(104)111. 462), 277.
Thomas v. Dakin (S3 Wend. 9), 3, 50,
I, pp. IJ?®; Vol. n, pp. '?89-l«)5.]
ThoiUafe-u. G^in (35 Mi(3l. fSS), 1179,
1185, 1186.
Thotoas V. Lelsttia (84 WehA. 6S),
1363, 1383, 1389.
Thomas v. Mdrgan CouKty (39 111
496), 956.
Themais t. Mount V^ra6h (9 Ohio,
290), 533. 136®.
f hoH«te 'V. 0weas A TSfd. f8% 175,
376.
Thbrti&s V. Port Httron (27 Mich. 330),
934.
^Hiorlias V. RiblnMOnd (13 Wall. 349),
78, 92, 330, 354, 634.
^raibmas V. weed (14 Johns. SS
1491,
Thotaals V. White (13 Mass. 3i
Bl3.
Thomasbn V. Ashworth (73 Cal. 73)
. 93, 114.
Thpmasson v. State (13 Iiid. 549),
ThomaSton v. St. GteoirgB (17 Me,
117), 981.
Thompson v. Abbott (61 Mo. 176),
391, 1333.
Thompson v. Andrbscoi^in River
Imp. Co. (54 N. H, 8*5), 673,
674.
Thompson v. Allen County (115 U. S.
550), 1379.
Thompson v. Board of Trusteed (30
111. 99),'^.
Thompson v. Bridge-water (7 Pick,
188), 1300.
Thompson v. City of JSIil^atfiee (69
Wis. 493; 34 N. W. Rep. 402),
93, 137.
Thompson V. Dickefson (3'2 Iowa,
860), 334.
Thompson v. Holt (53 Ala. 491), 330.
Thompson v. Justices (3 fiamph.
(Tenn.) 333), 1536.
TbbinpgoHO. Eelly (3 Ohio St. 647),
944.
Thornpson v. Lee County (3 Wall.
827), 433, 622, 636, ^33, 955.
Thompson v. Mamakaling (37 !Bun,
. 400), 966.
Thompson v, Milwaukee &e. B. Co.
(27 Wis. 93), 1148.
Thompson v. New York (52 N. T.
Super. Ct. 437). 755.
Thompson 'tJ. New York &C. B. Co.
(8Bah«t. Ch. 635), 568.
Thompson *. Norris- (63 Ga. 638),
15 ?7.
Thompson v. Batifie R. Co. (9 Wall.
579), 51.
Thompson v. Perri'ne (103 U. S. 806),
688, 830.
Thompson «. Perrine (106 U. S. 589),
967. ,
TABLE OF OASES.
ccxli
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Thompaioii V. Scherraerhorn (6 N. Y.
(2 Seld.; 92), 282, 549, 573, 1160,
1389.
Thompson v. Treasurer of Wood
County (U Ohio St. 338), 1034.
Thompson v. Village of Quincv (83
Mich. 173; 47 N. W. Eep. 114),
1140.
Thompson b. Whipple (54 Ark. 203 ;
. 15 S. W. Rep. 604), 223.
Thorn pnon-Houston Electric Co. v.
City of Newton (43 Fed. Rep.
723), 551, 552, 574, 576.
Thomson v. BoonvUle (61 Mo. 282),
283, 677, 1390.
Thomson v. Railroad Co. (9 Wall.
579), 7.
Thorn v. Sweeney (12 Nev. 251),
686.
Thorn V. West Chicago Park Comm'rs
(130 111. 594; 23 N. E. Rep. 530), i
1174.
Thornton v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (42 i
Mo. App. 58), 667.
Thorp V. Brookaeld (36 Conn. 320),
1503.
Thorp V. Witham (65 Iowa, 566), 696,
704.
Thorpe v. Rutland &c. R. Co. (27 Tt.
140). 85, 1212. 1228.
Throop II. Forman (31 Mich. 144),
1419.
Throop V. Langdon (40 Mich. 686),
1535.
Thrower's Case (1 Ventr. 208), 1408.
Thrush v. City of Cameron ^1 Mo.
App. 391). 709.
Thurston v. St. Joseph (51 Mo. 510),
1456.
Tice V. Bay City (78 Mich. 209; 44
N. W. Rep. 53), 1222.
Tice V. Bay City (84 Mich. 461 ; 47
N. W. Rep. 1062). 1140.
Tidd V. Smith (3 N. H. 178). 330.
Tide Water Canal Co. v. Archer (9
G. & J. <Md.) 479). 190.
Tie Loy, In re (26 Fed. Eep. 611),
511.
Tiedt V. Carstensen (61 Iowa, 334^,
705.
Tierney v. Brown (65 Miss. 563; 7
Am. St. Rep. 679), 277.
Tierney v. Dodge (9 Minn. 166), 118,
121, 1263.
Tiflft V. Buflfalo (7 N. T. Supl. 633),
1163. 1171.
Tifft V. Buffalo (82 N. T. 204), 671.
Tigat V. Commonwealth (19 Pa. St.
456), 696.
Tighe V. Lowell (119 Mass. 472), 1418.
Tilden v. Metcalf (2 D*y, 209), 1588.
Tilford V. City of ©lathe (44 Kan.
721), 403.
Tilyon v. Town of Gravesend (104
N. Y. 356; 10 N. E. Rep. 542).
609.
Tims V. State (26 Ala. 165), 1257,
1263.
Tindley «. Salem (137 Mass. 171),
763, 1005. 1310.
Tingoe v. Village of Portchester (lOX
Jd. Y. 294), 1133, 1133. 1189.
Tinker v. City of Rockford (111., 28
N. E. Rep. 573), 1139.
Tiqsley v. Kirby (17 S. G. 1). 290.
Tinsman v. Belvidere Delaware R,
Go. (26 N. J. Law, 148). 4, 7.
Tinsman v. Monroe Probate Judge
^3 Mich. 562j, 1097.
Tippecanoe County Comm'rs v. Cox
(6 Ind. 403), B43.
Tipperary Elec, In re (9 Ir. R. C. L.
217), 386.
Tippets V. Walker (4 Mass. 59.5), 213.
Tipton V. Norman (72 Mo. 380), 484,
529, 543, 1265, 1266.
Tipton County v. Kimberlin (Ind., 9
N. E. Rep. 407), 1587.
Tipton County v. Locomotive Works
(103 U. S. 533), 944.
Tisdale v. Norton (8 Met. 292), 740.
Tisdale v. President &c. of Minonk
(46 111. 9). 70, 506, 533, 1558.
Titus V. Northbridge (97 Mass. 258),
773, 1455.
Tobey v. Hudson (2 N. Y. Sa.pl. 180),
1460.
Tobin V. Portland &c. R. Co. (59
Me. 183), 766.
Todd V. Birdsall (1 Cowen, 260), 195,
196.
Todd V. Troy (61 N. Y. 506), 1438,
1444, 1461.
Todemier v. Aspinwall (43 111. 401).
1419.
Toledo &c. R. Co. V. Munson (57
Mich. 43), 694.
Toledo &c. Ry. Co. v. Chenoa (43 111.
S09),529.
Tdledo &c. Ry. Co. V. Detroit &a
R. Co. (63 Mich. 564), 633, 1212.
Toledo &c. Ry. Co. v. Toledo Elec-
tric Ry. Co. (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep.
362), 1268.
Tolland v. Comm'rs (13 Gray, 12),
1591.
Tompert v. Lithgow (1 Bush (Ky.),
176). 206.
Tompkins v. Sands (8 Wend. 462),
218, 339.
Tone V. New York (70 N. Y. 157),
731.
Toop V. City of New York (13 N. Y.
Supl. 280), 1095.
Tootle 17. Wells (89 Kan. 453), 318,
892.
ccxlii
TABLE OS" OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, ppj 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Topeka v. Gillett (33 Kan. 431 ; 23
Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 778), 119,
125, 412.
Topeka v. Sherwood (Kan., 18 Pao.
Rep. 933), 1436.
Topeka v. Tiittle (5 Kan. 311), 1198.
Topeka Citv v. Cowee (48 Kan. 345),
1408, 1413.
Topeka Water Supply Co. v. City of
Potwin Place (43 JKan, 404; 23
Pac. Rep. 578), 1096.,
Topping I-.. Gray (7 Hill. 259), 298.
Topsham v. Chelsea (60 Vt. 219), 994.
Topsham v. Rogers (43 Vt. 199), 257.
Torbitt V. City of Louisville (Ky., 4
S. W. Rep. 345), 1363.
Torbush v. Norwich (38 Conn. 235),
364.
Torr V. Corcoran (115 Ind. 188), 277.
Torrent v. Muskegon (47 Mich. 115),
663.
Torrey v. Millbury (21 Pick. 64),
367.
Torrey v. Willard (8 N. Y. Supl. 393;
55 Hun, 78), 1340.
'Towanda Bridge Co., In re (91 Pa.
St. 216), 670.
Tower V. Tower (18 Pick. 263), 1604.
Towle V. 3rown (110 Ind. 65; 10
N. E. Rep. 636), 464.
Towle V. Brown (110 Ind. 599), 1338.
Towle V. Marrett (3 Me. 23), 112.
Towle u. State (Ind., 10 N. E. Rep.
941), 1367.
Town Council &o. v. Court (1 El. &
El. 770), 276.
Town of Ackley v. Town of Vilas
(Wis., 48 N. W. Rep. 257), 457.
Town of Albuquerque v. Zeiger
(N. M., 37 Pac. Rep. 815), 1173,
1174.
Town of Areata v. Areata &o. R.
Co. (92 Cal. 639; 28 Pac. Rep.
676), 588.
Town of Arkadelphia v, Clark (53
Ark. 23; 11 S. W. Rep. 957),
1053.
Town of Aurora v. Chicago &c. R.
Co. (119 111. 2461, 1393.
Town of Bayard v. Baker (76 Iowa,
220; 40 N. W. Rep. 818), 801,
498, 507, 509.
Town of Bethlehem ii. Town of Wa-
tertown (51 Conn. 490), 987.
Town of Bloornfield v. Chai'ter Oak
Nat. Bank (131 U. S. 121 ; 7 S.
Ct. Rep. 865), 816. 915.
Town of Bruce v. Dickey (116 111.
527), 713, 834.
Town of Butternut v. O'Malley (50
Wis. 333), 470.
Town of Camden v. Bloch (65 Ala.
236), 546.
Town of Chittenden v. Town of
Barnard (61 Vt. 14.5), 976.
Town of Cicero v. Williatnson (91
Ind. 541), 1419.
Town of Coloma v. Eaves (92 U. a
484). 256, 834, 932. 946, 951.
Town of Concord v. Portsmouth
Sav. Bank (92 U. S. 635), 944,
961.
Town of Covington v. Nelson (35
, Ind. 533), 1190.
Town of Dakota v. Town of Winne-
conne (55 Wis. 522), 1000.
To^rn of Danville v. Shelton (76 Va.
325), 1064.
Town of Decorah v. Duustan (38
Iowa, 96), 526.
Town of Depere v. Town of Bellevue
(31 Wis. 120), 423.
Town of Dixon v, Maves (73 Cal.
166), 1363.
Town of £)uanesville v. Jenkins (57
N. Y. 1^6). 953. . ,
Town of Durango v. Pennington (8
Colo. 357), 258, 359, 713, 1116.
Town of Eagle v. Kohn (S4 111. 393),
940.
Town of East Hartford v. Hartford
Bridge Co, (10 How. 511), 94,
109.
Town of East Lincoln v. Davenport
(94 U. S.^801), 943, 961.
Town of East Oakland v. Skinner
(94 U. S. 255), 230.
Town of Eastchester, In re (53 Hun,
181 ; 6 N. Y. Supl. 120), 879, 880.
Town of Elkhart v. Ritter (66 Ind.
186), 1430.
Town of Elniwoodu. Marcy (93 IT. S.
289), 941, 947.
Town of Enfield v. Jordan (119 U. S.
680), 964.
Town of" Flora v. Lee (5' 111. App.
639), 543.
Town of Fox v. Town of Kendall (97
111. 72), 1034.
Town of Freeport v. Board of Super-
visors (41 III. 495), 976.
Town of Geneva j;.,Cole (61 111. 397),
1558.
Town of Haokettstown l'. Swack-
hanier (37 N. J. Law, 191), 630.
Town of Hamden v. Rice (34 Conn.
349), 660.
Town of Henderson v. Davis (106 N.
C. 88), 1360.
Town of Jacksonville v. Holland (19
111. 871), 539.
Town of Jamestown v. Chicago &c.
R. Co. (69 Wis. 648; 34 N. W.
Rep. 728), 1090.
Town of Jericho v. Town of Under-
bill (Vt., 34 Atl. Rep. 351), 991.
TABLE OF OASES.
ccxliii
CThe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
Town of Kirkwood v. Newbury (123
N. Y. 571), 1428.
Town of Kosciusko v. Slomberg
(Miss., 9 So. Rep. 297), 1044.
Town of Laurel v. Blue (1 Ind. App.
128; 27 N. E. Rep. 301), 1014.
Town of Louisville i\ Portsmouth
Sav. Bank (104 U. S. 469). 944.
Town of Lvons v. Cooledge (89 111.
539). 824.
Town of Marietta. V. Fearing (4 Ohio,
427), 537.
Town of Mentz v. Cook (108 N. Y.
505). 961.
Town of Middleport v. .^tna Life
Ins. Co. (82 111. 563), 945.
Town of Milford ' v. Powner (126
■ Ind. 528 ; 26 N. E. Rep. 484), 810.
Town of Milwaukee v. City of Mil-
waukee (12 Wis. 93), 454.
Town of Montezuma V. Wilson (Ga.,
9 S. E. Rep. 17), 1478.
Toyvn of Montgomery v. County of
Le Sueur (33 Minn. nSi), 1037.
Town of Monticello v. Banks (48 Ark.
351; 2S. W. Rep. 853), 1185.
Town of Monticello v, Cohn (48 Ark.
354; 3 S. W. Rep. 130). 646.
Town of Moundsville v. Velton (35
West Va. 317; 18 S. E. Rep.
373), 541.
Town of Mount Vernon v. Patton (94
111. 65), 834.
Town of Muskego v. Drainage
Comm'rs (Wis., 47 N. W. Rep.
11), 1097.
Town of Needham v. Morton (146
Mass. 476), 1393.
Town of New Hartford v. Town of
Canaan (52 Conn. 158), 990.
Town of New Haven v. Town of
Middlehury.(Sg Vt. 399; 21 Atl.
Rep. 608), 997.
Town of Clin ■ v. Meyers (55 Iowa,
209), 300.
Town of Petersburg v. Mappin (14 111.
193; 56 Am. Dec. 501), 654.
Town of Pierrepoint v. Loveless (72
N. Y. 311), 1444.
Town of Plainfield v. Village of
Plainfield (67 Wis. 525 ; 30 N. W.
Rep. 6'7i). 899.
Town of Prairie v. Llovd (97111. 179),
956.
Town of Remington v. Ward (78
Wis. 539 ; 47 N. W. Rep. 659), 816.
Town of Rensselaer v. Leopold (106
Ind. 29), 685.
Town of Rhine v. City of Sheboygan
(Wis., 52 N. W. Rep. 444), 996.
Town of Rockingham v. Springfield
(59 Vt, 531 ; 9 Atl. Rep. 341), 899,
975.
Town of Saukville v. State (69 Wis.
178), 786.
Town of Solon v. Williamsburg Sav.
Bank (35 Hun, 1), 937.
Town of Solon v. Williamsburg Sav.
Bank (114 N. Y. 123), 953, 960,
965.
Town of Somerset v. Town of Glas-
tenbury (17 Atl. Rep. 748), 68.
Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins
(94 U. S. 360), 933.
Town of Spencer v. Andrews (Iowa,
47 N. W. Rep. 1007), 1217.
Town of Springfield v. Teutonia
Sav. Bank (84 N. Y. 403), 936.
Town of Sullivan v. Phillips (110 Ind.
320). 1095.
Town of Summerville v. Presslej' (83
S. C. 56; 11 S. E. Rep. 545), 593,
594, 1018.
Town of Sunapee v. Town of Lemp-
Bter(65 N. H. 655; 23 Atl. Rep.
535), 981.
Town of Tipton v. Normaa (72 Mo.
380). 543.
Town of Union v. Durkes (38 N. J.
Law, 21), 1145.
Town of Van Buren v. Wells (58
Ark. 368; 14 S. W. Rep. 38), 516,
60a
Town of Venice v. Murdook (92 U. S.
494), 834, 953.
Town of Venice v. Woodruff (63 N.
Y. 462), 953.
Town of Waltham v, Kemper (55
111. 846). 745.
Town of Wellsborough v. New York
&c. R. Co. (76 N. Y. 182), 937.
Town of West Hartford v. Board of
Water Company (44 Conn. 361),
573.
Town of Weyauwega v. Ayling (99
, U. S. 113), 954.
Town of Winamac v. Huddleston
(Ind., 31 N. E. Rep. 561), 6.7, 651.
Town of Winchester v. Cheshire
County (()4 N. H. 100; 5 Atl.
Rep. 767), 1001.
Town of Windham v. Town of Leb-
anon (51 Conn. 319), 988.
Town of Windsor v. Hallett (97 111.
304), 952.
Town of Worcester v. Town of East
Montpelier (61 Vt. 139), 976.
Townsend, In re (39 N. Y. 171), 929,
933.
Townspnd v. Billerica (10 Mass. 411),
1003.
Townsend x\ City of Manistee (88
Mich. 408; 50 N. W. Rep. 831),
871, 1128.
Townsend v. Greely (5 Wall. 326),
1SU5.
ccxliv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. IE, pp. 789-1605.]
Towns'end v, Hoyle (20 Conn. 1),
682.
Towusend v. Lamb (14 Keb. 824),
939.
Township Board v. Hackman (48 Mo.
343), 686.
Township of Blakely v. Devine (36
Minn. 53; 29 N. W. Rep. 342),
1059.
Township of Burlington v. Beasley
(94 U. S. 310). 931.
Township of Hutchinson «. Tilk
(Minn., 47 N. W. Rep. 235), 1059.
Township of Norway v. Township
of Clear Lake (11 Iowa, 506),
708.
Township of Rock Creek v. Strong
(96 U.S. 271), 954, 955.
Township of Snyder c. Bovaird (122
Pa. St. 443; 15 Atl. Rep. 910; 22
W. N. C. 563), 618, 917.
Township of Springwell v. County
Treasurer (56 Micb. 240), 431.
Township of St. Joseph v. Rogers (16
Wall. 644), 965.
Township of Union v. Rader (41 N.
J. Law, 617), 471.
Township of Walnut v. Wade (103
U. S. 683), 936, 953.
Township of Washin'ston ti. Coler(51
Fed. Rep. 363), 985.
Tracey v. People (6 Colo. 151 ; 4 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 373), 301, 497,
713, 1064, 1116.
Tracev v. Phelps (23 Fed. Rep. 634),
966.
Tracy v. Cloyd (lO West Va. 19),
a23.
Tracy v. Elizabethtown &c. R. Co.
(80 Ky. 259), 6^3.
Tracy v. Gcodwln (5 Allen, 4091,
b33, 335.
Tracy v. Williams (4 Conn. 107), 339,
539 ' (
Trafton v. Alfred (3 Shepl. (15 Me.)
258), 208.
Trageser v. Gray (73 Md. 250), 1240.
Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co.
(144 Mass. 523), 1043. 1048.
Trammell v. Lee County ^Ala,, 10
So. Rep. 213), 1012.
Trammell v. RussellviUe (34 Ark.
105), 217, 1013.
Transit Co. v. Mayor (138 N. Y. 510;
28 N. E. Rep. 525), 582.
Transporlation Co. v. Chicago (S9 U.
S. 635), 677, 758.
Transportation Co. v. Wheeling (94
U.S. -873), 1388.
Trapnell v. Red Oak Junction (39
N. W. Rep. 884), 1479.
Trask, Ex parte {1 Pug. & Bur. 277),
533.
Travelers' Ins. Co. v. City of Denver
(II Colo. 434; 18 Pao. Rep. 356),
904, 911.
Traver v. Merridk County (14 Neb.
327), 931.
Treadway v. Schnauber (1 Dak. 236),
643.
Trenjain v. Cohoes Co. (3 N. Y. 163),
779.
Tremont v. Mt. Desert (36 Me. 390),
983.
Trench v. Ncilan (B Ir. E. C. L. 464;
37 L. T. R. 69), 386.
Treftor v. Jackson (51 Abb. Pr. (H. S.)
124), 614.
trescott V. Waterioo (26 Fed. iJep.
593), 363, 778.
Trigally v. Memphis (6 CdlQ*.
(Tenn.) 382), 529, 1258.
Trigg V. Glasgow (2 Bush (Ky.), 594),
1350.
Trimble v. City (Ky., 13 S. W. Rep.
1066), 13.">4.
Trimmer v. City of Rochester (N. T.,
39 N. E. Rep. 746), 1133, 1134,
1183, 1184.
Trimmier v. Bomar (20 S. C. 354),
938.
Trinity Cbunty v. Polk County (58
Tex. 321), 450.
Tripler v. TJew York City (17 N. Y.
Supl. 750), 1400,
Trippler v. City of New York (125
N. Y. 617; 26 N. E. Rep. 721; 6
N. Y; Supl. 48), 1183. 1185.
Tritz V. City of Kansas (84 Mo. 633),
1430.
Trott V. Warren (11 Me. 237), 54.
Trotter v. City of Chicago. (33 111.
App. 206), 603.
Trottman v. San Francisco (20 Cal.
96; 81 Am. Dec. 96), 634, 1141.
Trowbridge v. Newark (46 N. J.
Law;, 140), 176, 524.
Trowbridge v. Town of Brookline
(144 Mass. 139; 10 N. E. Rep.
7196), 765, 1099.
Troxel v. Vinton (77 Iowa, '90 ; 41
N. W. Rep. 580), 1476, l495.
Troy V. Atchison &c. R. Co. (11 Kan.
5% 643, ^267, 1268.
Troy V. Winters (2 Hun, 68; 4 T. &
G. 256), 698, 1246.
Truax v. Pool (4B Iowa, 256), 1366.
Truchelut v. City Council (1 Nott &
McC. (S. C) 227), 489.
True V. Davis (133 111. 523: 33 N. E.
Rep. 410; 6 L. R. An. 266), 109,
391, 894 406, 838.
Truesdell's Appeal (53 Pa, St. 148),
1391.
Truesdell v. Combs (83 Ohio St. 186),
338.
TABLS OS OASES.
ccjdv
[The reterenoes are to pages: VoL I, pp. 1-788; Vol. EC, pp. 789-1803.]
Trumbo ». People (75 III. 563). 1538.
Trustees v. Broadhurst (N. C., 13
S. E. Eep. 781), 1395.
Trustees v. City of Atlanta {T6 Ga.
181;83Ga. 448), 1166.
Trustees v. Cowen (4 Paige, 510),
1233, 1411.
Trustees v. DerBott (13 Ohio, 104),
1000.
Trustees ti. Erie (31 Pa. St. 515), 527.
TrBStees v. Jamison (Ky., 15 S. W.
Rep. 1), 807. 1322.
Trustees v. Leffens (23 III. 90), 90.
Trustees v. Mk;ConaeU (12 111. 138),
1353 1370
Trustees' v. Peaslee (15 N. H. 331),
660.
Trustees v. Railway Co. (63 HI. 299),
1888.
Trustees v. Rome (29 Hun, 396),
852.
Trustees v. Shepherd (111., 28 N. E.
Rep. 1073). 1333.
Trustees v. Trustees (81 111. 470),
1S31.
Trustees v. White (48 Ohio St. 577;
29 N. E. Rep. 47), 887.
Trustees v. Winston (5 St. &P. (Ala.)
17), 7.
Trustees &c. v. City of Davenport
(65 Iowa, 633), 1180.
Trustees &c. v. Hill (6 Cowen, 23),
S90.
Trustees &c. v. King (12 Mass. 546),
563.
Trustees &c. v. Moody (62 Ala. 389),
280.
Trustees &c. v. Parks (10 Me. 441),
56.
Trustees &c. v. Rausch (122 Ind, 167 ;
23 N. E. Rep. 717), 1105.
Trustees &c. v. Tatman (13 111. 27),
im, 1024, 1368.
Trustees of Beltast Academy v. Sal-
mond (1 1 Me. 109), 633.
Trustees of Belleview v. Hohn (82
Ky. 1), 230, 644.
Trustees of Eiie Academy v. Erie (31
Pa. St. 515), 97, 510.
Trustees of Public Schools v. Taylor
(30 N. J. Eq. 61«), 7a, 8,5.
Trustees of Schools v. People (121
111. .553), 1347.
Trustees of Schools v. Southaitl (31
lU. App. 359), 867.
Tubble V. Everett (51 Miss. 37), 246.
Tube Works Co. v. City of Cham-
beriain (Dak., 37 N. W. Rep.
763), 643.
Tuckahae Canal v. Tuckahoe R. Co.
(11 Leigh (Va.), 43), «7B.
Tucker v. Aiken (7 N. H. 113), 198,
348, 356, 368, 387.
Tucker v. Justice (13 Ired. (N. C.)
Law, 434), 303.
Tucker v. Justices (34 Ga. 870),
1383
Tucker 'v. Raleigh (75 N. G. 267),
937.
Tucker «. Rankin (15 Barb, 471),
1415.
Tucker v. Sellers (Ind., 30 N. E. Rep.
531), 1189.
Tufts V. Charlestown (4 Gray, 537),
699, TOO.
Tufts V. State (119 Ind. 232; 21 N. E. -
Rep. 892), 133&
Tufts V. Town of Chester (63 Vt.
353), 995.
Tugman v. Chicago (78 111. 405), 518,
520, 608, 1310.
Tuley «. State (1 Ind. 500). 1.S34.
Tunbridge v. Royalton (58 Vt. 213),
1429.
Tupelo V. Beard (56 Miss. 632), 1399.
Turfler, In re (44 Barb. 46). 1383.
Turk V. Commonwealth (129 Pa. St.
151), 189.
Turner v. Althous (6 Neb. 54), 1364,
1577.
Turner v. Commissioners (10 Kan.
16), 1530.
Turner v. Cruzen (70 Iowa, 203), 240,
651.
Turner v. Dartmouth (13 Allen, 291),
1146.
Turner v. Hadden (62 Barb. 480),
1000.
Turner v. Indianapolis (96 Ind. 51),
1484.
Turner v. Killian (12 Neb. 580), 336.
Turner v. Mayor &c. of Forsyth (78
Ga. 683; 3 S. W. Rep. 649), 615.
T.a»ner V. Newbtltgh (109 N. Y. 301;
16 N. E. Rep. 344), 781, 1438, 1444,
1484, 1486.
Turner V. SiEson (137 Mass. 191), 336.
Turner v. Thomas (10 Mo. App. 342),
214.
Turner v. Wilson (49 Ind. 581), 532.
Turner v. Woodbury County (57
Iowa, 440), 10, 745.
Turaey v. Town of Bridgeport (55
Conn. 412; 13 Atl. Rep. 520),
8ie, 869, 880.
Turnpike Co. v. Buffalo (58 N. Y.
639), 1491.
Turnpike Co. v. McKean (11 Johns.
Wl 1266, 1367.
Turnpike Co. v. Pomfret (30 Conn,
899), 1271, 1273.
Turnpike Road Co. v. Graver (45 Pa.
St, S86), 1141.
Turpen v. County Comm'rs (7 Ind.
■ 182). 187.
Turrill v. Grattan (53 Cal. 97), 1174.
ccxlvi
TABLE or CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
/Tuscaloosa v. Wright (3 Port. (Ala.)
3b0), 1367.
Tutt V. Hobbs (17 Mo. 486), 313.
Tuttle, Ex parte (Cal., 37 Pac. Rep,
933), 597.
Tuttle V. Gary (7 Me. 426), 351.
Tuttle V. Everett (51 Miss. 27), 241.
Tuttle V. Weston (59 Wis. 151), 353.
Twenty-second Street, In ro (15
Phila. 409), 670.
Twiss V. City of Port Huron (63 Mich.
528; 30 N. W, Rep.. 177), 1066,
1173.
Twogood V. New York (102 N. Y.
216), 1480.
Tyerman, In re (48 Fed. Rep. 167),
1240.
Tyler v. Alford (38 Me. 530), 339.
Tyler v. Beacher (44 Vt. 648)', 682,
930.
Tyler v. Elizabethtown &c. R. Co.
(9 Bush, 510), 97.
Tyler v. Henry (2 Pick. 397). 1270.
Tyler v. Hudson (147 Mass. 609), 68B.
Tyler v. Nelson (14 Gratt. 214), 335.
Tyler v. State (63 Vt. 300), 1265.
Tyler v. Sturdy (108 Mass. 196), 1404,
1408.
Tyler v. Trustees (14 Oregon, 485 ; 13
Pac. Rep. 329), 711.
Tyler v. Williston (63 Vt. 269), 1429,
1481.
Tyree v. Wilson (9 Gratt. 59), 326.
Tyron v. School Directors (51 Pa, St.
9), 1393.
Tyson v. Milwaukee (50 Wis, 78), 677.
u.
Uhl V. Taxing Dist. (6 Lea, 610),
1376,
Uhrig V. St. Louis (44 Mo, 458), 1188.
Ulam V. Boyd (87 Pa. St, 477), 863,
2ii3.
Uline V. New York Cent, R. Co. (101
N. Y, 98), 1457.
Ulman v. Mayor of Baltimore (73
Md. 587), 1178, 1179, 1186,
Ulrich V, Commonwealth (6 Bush,
400). 1350.
Underbill v. Essex (Vt., 23 Atl. Rep.
617), 1429.
Underbill v. Gibson (2 N, H. 353),
828.
Underbill's Will, In re (3 N, Y. Supl.
2051, 564.
Underwood v. Brockman (4 Dana,
309), 1577.
Underwood v, Stuyvesant (19 Johns.
181). 1406,
Union v. Crawford (19 Cofan. 831),
150, '
Union v. Durkes (38 N. J. Law, 31),
1145.
Union v. Rader (41 N. J. Law, 617),
471.
Union &c. Ry. Co. v, Philadelphia
(101 U, S. 538), 1358,
Union Bank v. State (9 Yerg, (Tenn,)
490), 1352. 1383,
Union Civil Tp. v. Berrvman (Ind.,
28 N. E. Rep, 774), 1014.
Union County v. Knox County (90
Tenn. 541; 18 S, W. Rep, 354),
'm..
Union County v. Slocum (16 Oregon,
237; 17 Pac. Rep. 876i, 894.
Union County Court v. Robinson (27
Ark, 116), 1391,
Union Depot & R. Co. i). Smith
(Colo.. 27 Pac. Rep, 329); 195,
Union E, R. of Brooklyn, In re (112
N, Y. 61; 19 N. E, Rep, 664),
,595
Union Ferry Co.. In re (98 N, Y.
139), 569, 670, 682.
Union Pac. Ry, Co. v. City of Kan-
sas City (42 Kan, 497; 22 Pac.
Rep, 633), 400,
Union Pac, R. Co. v. Colfax County
(4 Neb, 450), 931,
Union Pac. Ry, Co. v. Comm'rs of
Davis County (6 Kan, 256), 443,
945,
Union Pac. R. Co, v. Comm'rs of
Dgdge County (98 U. S. 541j,
241, 244, 245, 246, 247, 1567,
Union Pac. R. Co. ■;;. Lincoln County
(3 Dill, 300), 931, 935, 960, 1568.
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Merrick County
(3 Dill, 359), 960.
Union Sav. Ass'n v. Kehlor (7 Mo,
App, 165), 709.
Union School Tp. v. First Nat, Bank
(102 Ind, 4«4; 3 N, E, Rep, 194;
1 West. Rep. 107), 643, 815, 821.
Union Township v. Smith (39 Iowa,
9), 331.
Union Trust Co. v. Monticello &c,
R. Co, (63 N, Y. 814), 958.
Union Trust Co. v. Weber (96 111.
346), 1573.
United Brethren Church v. Van
Dusen (37 Wis. 54), 393.
United Hebrew Ass'n v. Benshimol
(130 Mass. 325), 529.
United States v. Adams (24 Fed,
Rep. 348), 331,
United States v. American Water-
works Co. (37 Fed. Ref). 747),
1311.
United States v. Anthony (11 Blatch.
(U, S, C. C.) 200), 376.
United States v. Arredondo (6 Pet,
729), 609.
TABLE OF CASES.
ocxlvii,
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
United States v. Austin (2 Cliff. 325),
185.
United States v. Boyd (5 How. 39),
337.
United States w.-Boyd (15 Pet. 187),
319. 334.
United States v. Brown (9 How. 487),
181.
United States v. Chassell (6 Blatohf.
431). 18.1.
United States v. City of New Or-
leans'(31 Fed. Eep. 537), 900.
United States v. City of Sterling (3
Biss. 410). 804, 1379.
United States r. Clark County (96
U. S. 312), 137.4.
United States v. County of Clark (95
U. S. 769), 1375; \rm, 1.547.
United States u Cruiksliank (93 U. S.
542), 144, 145. 376.
United States t). Dashiel (4 Wall. 182),
331.
United States v. Davis (B McLean,
484), \6'i5.
Uniteil States v. Gaussfn (3 Woods,
93; 97 U. S. 584). 820.
United States v. Giles (9 Cranch,
213), 334.
United States v. GirauU (11 How.
28), 337. ,
United States v. Great Falls Mfg.
Co. (113 U. S. 645), 741.
United States v. Green (19 D. 0.
230). 1257, 12.19.
United States v. Harris (1 Sumn. 31),
671, 683.
United States v. Harris (106 U. S.
6§9), 147.
United States v. Hillogas (8 Wash.
C. C. 73), 740.
United States v. Hine (8 MacArthur
(D. C). 37), 336.
United States v. Hodson (10 Wall.
i'9.5), 313.
United States v. Holly (3 Cr. C. C.
656). 604.
United States v. Hoyt (1 Blatchf.
33fi). 330.
United States v. Hudson (7 Cranch,
33), 205.
United States©. Humason(6 Sawyer,
199). 313. 331.
United States v. Insurance Co. (32
Wall. 99), 50.
United States v. Irwin (137 U. S.
135), 743.
United States v. Jefferson County
(1 McCrary, 356), 944, 1373.
United States u Jones (109 U. S. 518),
669, 695, 696.
United States v. Keehler (9 Wall.
88), 321.
United States v. Keokuk (6 Wall.
514), 1379.
United States v. Kirkpatrick (9
Wheat. 720), 819, .'520, 831, 329, 741.
United States v. Labette County (3
McCrary, 35), 1509.
United States v. Le Baron (IS How.
72), 814.
United States v. Lee (106 U, S. 196),
30, 740, 741. 1573.
United States v. Lincoln County (5
Dill. 184), 1375.
United States v. Linn (15 Peters,
290), 313. 953.
United States v. McCarney (1 B^ed.
Rep. 1041, 330.
United States v. McDougall (121
U. S. 89), 743. /
United States v. McKelden (MacAr-
thur & Mackey, 163), 354, 361,
375.
United States v. Macon County (99
U. S. 582), 1373, 1374; 1380, 1384,
1385.
United States v. Maurice (3 Brock.
C. C. ll-i), 313.
United States v. Memphis (97 U. S.
384\ 395, 404, 1365, 1366, 1367,
1368.
United States v. Miller County (4
Dill. 233), 804.
United States v. Moore (3 Brock.
C. C. 317), 334i
United States v. Morgan (11 How.
154). 331.
United States v. Morgan (3 Wash.
C. C. 10), 810.
United States v. Nelson (3 Brock.
(U. S.)64), 311.
United States v. New Orleans. (98
U. S. 38!), 794, 1373,- 1375, 1378,
13til. 1384, 15ii5. .
United States v. NichoU (13 Wheat.
505). 319, 741.
United States v. Percheman (7 Pet.
51), 1367.
United States v. Port of Mdbile (12
Fed. Rep. 768), 434.
United States v. Port of Mobile (4
Woods, 536), 1375.
United States v. Powell (14 Wall.
493), 330.
United States v. Prescott (3 How.
578), 331, 834.
United States v. Railroad Bridge Co.
(6 McLean, 517). 684.
United States v. Reese (93 U. S. 314),
145, 876.
United States v. Reynolds (98 U. S.
145), 53.
United States v. liogers (38 Fed. Rep.
607), 313.
United States v. School Dist. (20
Fed. Rep. 294). 1379.
United States v. Silverman (4 Dill.
234), 1379.
ccxlviii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
tTnited States v. Singer (15 Wall.
Ul), 320.
UnitPd States v. Slater (4 Woods (XJ.
8. C. C), 356), 376.
United States v. State Bank (96 U.
S. 30), 209.
United States v. Swearingen (11 Gill
& J. 373), 1585.
United States v. Thomas (15 Wall.
337), 321.
United States v. Tingey (5 Pet. 343),
.313.
United States v. Twenty-five Cases
of Cloth (Crabbe (U. S.), 356),
111.
United States v. Union Pac. E. Co.
(91 U. 8. 73), 956.
United States v. Van Zandt (11
Wheat. 184), 319, 741.
United States v. Villato (3 Dallas,
370). 139.
United States v. Watts (1 New Mex.
553), 321.
United States v. Wells (3 Cr. C. C.
45), 604.
United States v. Wiley (11 Wall. 508),
475.
United States v. Williams (5 McLean,
133). 1585.
United States v. Wright (1 McL. (U.
S.) 509), 203.
United States Distilling Co. v. Chi-
cago (113 III. 19), 1243.
United States Mortgage 'Co. v. Gross
(93 111. 483), 639.
University v. Indiana (14 How.
368), 4.
Universitv v. Skidmore (87 Tenn.
155), 1353.
UpdegraflE vl Crans (47 Pa. St. 103),
398.
UpdegrafE v. Palmer (107 Ind. 181),
1420.
Upham V. Marsh (138 Mass. S46), 339.
Uppington v. Oviatt(34 Ohio St. 332),
1385.
Upton V. Northbridge (15 Mass. 547),
976.
Upton V. Stoddard (47 N. H. 167). 370.
Urquhart v. Ogdensburg (91 N. Y,
67), 776, 1080, 1435.
Urquhart v. Ogdensburgh (33 Hun,
75), 1504.
V.
Vacation of Centre Street, In re
(115 Pa. St. 247; 8 Atl. Eep. 56),
1124, 1135.
Vacation of Henry Street, In re (123
Pa. St. 346; 10 Atl. Rep. 785),
119.
Vacation of Howard Street, In re
(Pa., 31 Atl. Rep. 974). 1193. '
Vail V. Bentley (23 N. J. Law, 533),
1576.
Vail V. Long Island R. Co. (106 N. Y.
283), 1410.
Vail V. Morris &c. Coi (31 N, J. Law,
189), 1419.
Valentine v. Boston (33 Pick. 75),
1404.
Valentine v. St-'Paul (34 Minn. 446), .
343.
Vale Mills v. Nashua (63 N. H. 136),
777.
Valley County v. Robinson (Neb., 49
N. W. Rep. 356), 860.
Valley Iron Works v. Moundsville
(11 West Va. 1), 931.
Valparaiso v. Gardner (97 Ind. 1 ;
49 Am. Rep. 416), 568, 637, 647,
805. 839, 848, 971, 131H.
Van Allen v. Assessors (3 Wall. 583),
1353.
Van Alstine v. People (37 Mich. 533),
1064,
Van Baalen v. People (40 Mich. 358),
601, 1384.
Van Bergen v. Bradley (36 N. Y.
316), 1415.
Van Brunt v. Town of Flatbush
(128 N. Y. 50: 37 N. E. Rep.
973; 13 N. Y. Supl. 545), 1093.
Van Buren v. Wells (53 Ark. 368; 14
S. W. Rep. 38), 516, 603.
Van Camp v. Board &c. (9 Ohio St.
406), 1345.
Vance v. Little Rock (30 Ark. 439),
llfiO, 1377, 1383, 1386.
Van Cott V. Supervisors (18 Wis.
347), 1573.
Van Da Vere v. Kansas City (107
Mo. 83), 1456.
Vandemark v. Porter (40 Hun, 397),
1406, 1414.
Van Den burgh i;. Greenbush(66N.Y.
1), 536.
Vanderbeck v. Inhabitants of Eogle-
wood (39 N. J. Law, 845), 450.
Vanderbilt v. Adams (7 Cowen, 349),
669, 1018, 1331.
Vanderslice v. Philadelphia (103 Pa.
St. 103), 1479.
Vandertolph v. Highway Comm'rs
(50 Mich. 330), 705.
Vandine, Petitioner (6 Pick. 187),
531, 550, 596, 1035.
Van Doren v. Mayor (9 Paige, 388),
1574.
Van Dusen t>. Fridley (6 Dak. 333;
43 N. W. Rep. 703). 436.
Vandyke v. State (34 Ala. 81), 740.
Van Eppes v. Mobile County (85 Ala.
460), 744.
TABLE OF CASES.
ocxlix
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. H, pp. T89-1605.]
Van Hastrup. v. Madison City (1
Wall. 291), 946.
Van Hook v. Barnett (4 Dev. L. (N.
oaes), 313.
Van Hook v. Selraa (70 Ala. 361),
520, 1234, 1355.
Van Horn v. Des Moines (68 Iowa,
447), 264, 1807.
Van Husan v. Heames (Mich., 53 N.
W. Rep. 18). 584.
Van Norman c. Circuit Judge (45
Mich. 204), 1.536.
Van Orsdall v. Hazard (3 Hill, 243),
203.
Vanover v. Justices (27 Ga. 354), 802,
1393, 1568.
Van Pelt v. City of Davenport (42
Iowa, 308), 1136, 1436.
Van Phul v. Hammer (29 Iowa, 232),
60.
Van Rensselaer v. Albany (15 Abb.
N. C. 457), 777.
Van Rensselaer v. Palmatier(2 How.
Pr. (N. Y.) 24), 1588.
Van Sant v. Harlem Stage Company
(59 Md. 334), 617.
Van Schaick v. Sigel (60 How. Pr.
(N. Y.) 122), 333, 22.i.
Van Sicklen v. Burlington (27 "Vt.
70), 1394.
Van Steenbergh v. Bigelow (3 Wend.
42), 339.
Van Swarton v. Commonwealth (34
Pa. St. 131), 1258.
Van Val ken burg v. Brown f43 Cal.
43; 13 Am. Rep. 1.36), 376.
Van Valkenburg v. Milwaukee (43
Wis. 574), 698, 699.
Van Valken burgh v. Earley (1 Lu-
zerne Leg. Reg. 257), 1596.
Van Valkenburgh v. Patterson (47
N. J. Law, 146). 331.
Van West Bd. of Ed. v. Edson (18
Ohio St. 221). 624.
Van Wormer v. Mayor &c. of Albany
(15 Wend. 263), 1018, 1023.
Varden v. Mount (78. Ky. 86), 535,
537
Varick'v. Smith (5 Paige, 137; 28
Am. Deo. 417), 632.
Vamey v. Justice (86 Ey. 596), 160.
Varney v. Manchester (58 N. H. 430),
1448.
Varney v. Stevens (23 Me. 331), 1066.
Vason V. Augusta (38 Ga. 543), 517,
1353.
Vaughan v. Congdon (56 Vt. Ill),
339
Vaughan v. Johnson (77 Va. 300), 315.
Vaughn v. City of Ashland (Wis., 37
N. W. Rep. 809), 1160.
Vaughn v. Village of Port Chester
(15N. Y. Supl. 474). 1183.
V&ught V. Board (101 Ind. 1S3), 1430.
Vaux V. Nesbit (1 McCord Ch. (S. C.)
378), 140. 141.
Vawter v. Franklin College (53 Ind.
88), 301.
Veale v. Boston (135 Mass. 187). 760.
Veeder v. Lima (19 Wis. 280), 966.
Veeder v. Little Falls (100 N. Y. 343),
1438, 1450, 1473. 1473.
Venable v. Curd (3 Head (Tenn.),
583). 300.
Veneman v. Jones (llfilnd. 41), 1342.
Venice v. Murdock (93 U. S. 494), 834,
947, 953, 1390.
Venice v. WoodruflE (63 N. Y. 463),
953
Verheck v. Scott (71 Wis. 59). 3S0.
Verderey v. Village (83 Ga. 138),
1370.
Vermont &c. R. Co. v. County
Comm'rs (10 Cush. 13). 1594.
Verona's Appeal (108 Pa. St. 83), 510.
Vestal t\ Little Rock (54 Ark. 321 ;
16 S. W. Rep. 891), 401, 403,411.
Vestal «. Little Rock (54 Ark. 323;
15 S. W. Rep. 891 ; 16 S. W. Rep.
291), 400, 409, 410.
Vioksburg v. Hennessey (54 Miss.
391), 1438. 1494.
Vicksburg v. Marshall (59 Miss. 563),
1431.
Vicksburg v. Tobin (100 U. S. 430),
1388.
Vidal V. Girard's Ex'rs (2 How. 127),
. 563, 660.
Vida'at v. New Orleans (43 La. Ann.
1181), 757.
Vigo Tp. V. Board of Comm'rs (111
Ind. 170; 12 N. E. Rep. 305),
898, 907.
Village of Ballston Spa v. Markham
(11 N. Y. Supl. 826), 12;S5.
Village of Betholto v. Conely (9 111.
App. 389), 548.
Village of Braceville v. Doherty (30
111. App. 64.5), 530, 1235.
Village of Brooklyn v. Smith (104
111. 4391. 673.
Village of Buffalo v. Harling(Minn.,
53 N. W. Rep. 931), 1588.
Village of Cahokia v. Rautenberg (88
III. 319), 213.
Village of Carthage v. Frederick
(123 N. Y. 36S), 653, 1389, 1331.
Village of Cerro Gordo v. Rawlings
(111., 25 N. E. Rep. 1006), 1335.
Village of Corning u. Rector &c. of
Christ Church (33 N. Y. St. Rep.
766; 11 N. Y. Supl. 763). 564.
Village of Des Plaines v. Poyer (33
111. App., 574), 1053.
Village of Fulton v. Tucker (3 Hun,
529), 1199.
ccl
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Village of Glenooe v. People (78 111.
383), 1583.
VillaKe of Hartington r. Luge (Neb.,
50 N. W. Rep. 957). 403. 409.
Village of Hyde Park v. Borden (94
111. SfiV 571, 1093. 1172.
Village of Hyde Park v. Carton (133
111. 100). 1175.
Village of Hyde Park v. City of
Chicago (124 111. 156; 16 N. E.
Eep. 333). 406.^413. 418.
Village of Jefferson v. Chapman (137
111. 438; 20 N. E. Eep. 33), 1478,
1479.
Village of Mansfield v. Moore (111.,
16 N. E Rep. 346). 1488, 1490.
Village of Morgan Park v. Gahan
(Ill.,2fi N.E.Rep. 108.i), 717, 1105.
Village of Niagara Falls v. Salt (45
Hun, 41), 1243.
Village of North Springfield v. City
of Springfield (111., 29 N. E. Eep.
849), 408.
Village of Orleans v. Perry (24 Neb.
831 ; 40 N. W. Rep. 417). 1499.
Village of Pine City v. Munch (43
Minn. 348), 1058, 1059, 1588.
Village of Ponca v. Crawford (23
Neb. 663; 37 N. W. Rep. 609),
1499.
Village of St. Johnsbury v. Thomp-
son (59 Vt. 301), 486. 513.
Village of Shelby v. Clagett (Ohio,
33 N. E. Rep. 407), 1478.
Village of Sheridan v. Hibbard (111.,
9 N. E. Rep. 901), 1488.
Village of Stamford v. Fischer (17
N. y. Supl. 609), 1335.
Village of Tarrytown v. Pocontico
Water-works Co. (1 N, Y. Supl.
394;. 1295.
Village of Winooski v. Gokey (49 Vt.
282), 539.
Villivaso v. Barthet (39 La. Ann.
247), 533, 1344.
Vinal V. Dorchester (7 Gray, 431),
1466.
Vincennes v. Callender (86 Ind. 484),
971.
Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas Light Co.
(Ind., 31 N. E. Rep. 573), 568.
Vincennes University v. Indiana (14
How. 268). 7, 51, 53, 465.
Vincent v. County of Lincoln (30
Fed. Rep. 747), 15^7.
Vincent v. McCosta County Super-
visors (53 Mich. 340), 1540.
Vincent v. Nantucket (18 Cush. 103),
308, 350, 642, C64.
Vintners' Co. v. Passey (1 Burr. 235),
533 531
Virginia, Ex parte (100 U. S. 339),
147.
Virginia v. Hall (96 111. 278), 1182.
Virginia v. Rives (100 U. 8. 813),
147.
Virginia &o. R. Co. v. Elliott (5 Nev.
358), 696, 699. 700.
Virginia &c. R. Co. v. Lyon County
(6 Nev. 681, 939.
Vivian v. Otis (24 Wis. 518; 1 Am.
Eep. 199), 334, 327.
Voegtly V. Pittsburgh &c. E. Co. (2
Grant's Cas. (Pa.) 243), 691.
Vogel V. Antigo City (Wis., 51 N.
♦W. Rep. 1008). 782. 893.
Vogel V. City of Little Eock (Ark.y
19 S. W. Eep. 13). 401, 408. 410.
Voght V. City of Buffalo (N. Y., 31
N. E. Eep. 340), 1 122.
Volk V. Newark (47 N. J. Law, 117),
513.
Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy (4
Wall. 585), 94, 435, 473, 1372, 1373,
1S78, 1381.
Voorhies v. City of Houston (70 Tex.
331; 7S. W. Rep. 679). 873.
Vore V. Willard (47 Barb. SiO), 1399.
Vosburg V. McCrary (77 Tex. 568;
14 S. W. Rep. 1W.5). 104. 620.
Vose V. Frankfort (64 Me. 229), 825.
Vroman v. Dewey (23 Wis. 530), 438.
w.
Wabash &o. E. Co. v. McCleave (108
111. 368), 1380.
Wabash Cityu. Carver (129 Ind. 553),
142.1. 1437. 1481.
Wabaunsee County v. Walker (8
Kan. 431), 1577.
Waco V. Texas (57 Tex. 635), 1365.
Wade V. City of Richmond (18 Gratt.
583), 393, 396, 646, i;i66, 1368.
Wade V. Newbern (77 N. C. 460),
360, 261, 263.
Wadleigh v. Oilman (13 Me. 403),
59:i, 1054, 1346.
Wadraven v. Memphis (4 Coldw.
(Tenn.)431), 176.
Wadsworth v. Eau Claire County
(103 U. S. 584), 944.
Wadsworth v. Supervisors (103 U. S.
534), 630.
Wadsworth v. Wadsworth (13 N. Y.
376). 141.
Wadsworth v. Wendell (5 Johns. Ch.
224), 958.
Waffle V. Short (25 Kan. 503), 318.
Wager v. Trov Union E. Co. (35 N.
Y. 526), 679.
Wahlgreen v. Kansas City (43 Kan.
243), 11 7.').
Wahoo V. Dickinson (33 Neb. 426 ; 36
N. W. Eep. 813), 393.
TABLE OF OASES.
cell
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Wahoo V. Reeder (Neb., 43 N. W.
Rep. 1145), 14.
Wait V. Ray (67 N. Y. 36), 973.
Waitz V. Ormsby County (1 Nev.
370), 1587.
Wakefield v. Alton (3 N. H. 378), 983.
Wakefield v. Patterson (25 Kan. 709),
355 379 13^3,
Wakefield v. Phelps (37 N. H. 295),
528.
Wakeham v. St. Clair Township
(Mich., 51 N. W. Rep. 696), 1457,
1493.
Walcottv. Walcott (19 Vt. 37), 296.
Waldenr. Dudley (49 Mo. 431). 1364.
Waldo V. Wallace (13 Ind. 569), 193,
195, 1262.
Waldron v. Haverhill (143 Mass.
583; 10 N. E. Rep. 481), 760,
lObO.
Waldron v. Lee (5 Pick. 333), 1368.
Wales V. Muscatine (4 Iowa, 302).
1597.
Walker v. British Guardian Ass'n
(18 Q. B. 277; 21 L. J. Q, B.
257), 332.
Walker v. City of Aurora (III., 39 N.
E. Rep. 741), 1094, 1164, 1186,
1366, 1367.
Walker v. City of Camden (111., 39
N. E. Rep. 741), 519.
Walker v. Chapman (33 Ala. 46), 320.
Walker v. Cincinnati (21 Ohio St.
14), 933.
Walker v. District of Columbia (6
Mackey, 352). IICO.
Walker v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co.
(6 Harr. 594), 697.
Walker v. Evansville (33 Ind. 393),
486.
Walker v. Kansas ^ity (99 Mo. 647),
1430, 1451.
Walker v. Osgood (98 Mass. 348),
309.
Walker v. Eogan (1 Wis. 597), 296.
Walker v. St. Louis (15 Mo. 563),
1577.
Walker v. Springfield (94 111. 364),
1357, 1370.
Walker v. Swartwout (13 Johns. 444 ;
7 Am. Dec. 334), 312, 213.
Walker v. Town of Reidsville (96 N.
C. 382; 3 S. E. Rep. 74), 1493.
Walker v. Wasco County (Oregon,
19 Pac. Rep. 81), 1587.
Walkley v. Muscatine (6 Wall. 481),
1376, 1378, 1379.
Wall, In re (48 Cal. 279), 487.
Wall V. County of Monroe (103 U. S.
74), 823, 903, 938.
Wallv. TurnbuU (16 Mich. 228), 819.
Wallace v. Fletcher (30 N, H. 434),,
1413. ' ;
Wallace v. Karlenoweski (19 Barb.
118), 703.
Wallace v. Lawyer (54 Ind. 501),
1114, 1596.
Wallace v. Menasha (49 Wis. 79),
752, 773, 1578.
Wallace v.' Muscatine (4 Greene
(Iowa), 373), 9.
Wallace v. San Jose (39 Cal. 180).
208, 234. 643.
Wallace v. Shelton (14 La. Ann. 498),
1185.
Wallace v. Trustees (84 N. C. 164),
110.
Waller 17. Wood (101 .Ind. 138), 1036.
Wallich V. Manitowoc (57 Wis. 9; 14
N. W. Rep. 812), 1151.
Wallingford v. Southington (16
Conn. 435), 990, 996.
Wallis V. Johnson School Township
(75 Ind. 3681, 213, 214. 830.
Wain V. Philadelphia (99 Pa. St.
330). 501. 503.
Walnut Township v. Jordan (38
Kan. 563; 16 Pac. Rep. 813), 444,
463, 466.
Walnut Township v. Wade (103 XT. S.
683), 936, 952, 958, 959.
Walpole V. Hopkinton (4 Pick. 358),
985, 988.
Walrath v. Eedfield (18 N. Y. 457).
1491.
Walsh V. City of Union (13 Or. 589;
11 Pac. Rep. 312), 517, 604.
Walsh V. Rutland (56 Vt. 228), 752.
Walsh V. Trustees &o. (96 N. Y.
427), 1427.
Walston V. Nevin (128 U. S. 578),
1179.
Walters v. Duke (31 La. Ann. 668),
1356, 1370.
Walters v. Shields (3 Met. (Ky.) 553),
1364.
Waltham v. Brookline (119 Mass.
479), 993.
Waltham v. Kemper (55 111. 346), 265,
267, 745.
Waltham v. Newburyport(150 Mass.
569; 33 N. E. Rep. 379), 980.
Waltham v. Town of MuUaly (37
Neb. 433), 996.
Walther v. Warner (35 Mo. 377).
703. •
Waltmeyer v, Wisconsin &c. Ry.
Co. (64 Wis. 59), 706.
Walton V. Riley (85 Ky. 418; 3 S. W.
Rep. 605), 791.
Walwoi-th Bank v. Farmers' L. & T.
Co. (15 Wis. 639), 293.
Wan Yin, In re (23 Fed. Rep. 7011
13.33.
Wapella v. Davis (39 111. App. 693),
1267.
cclii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1805.]
Wapello V. Bingham {10 Iowa, 39 ; 74
Am. Dec. 370). 339.
Ward V. Churn (18 Gratt. 801), 956.
Ward t>. Davis (3 Sandf. 503), 1406.
Ward V. Farwell (97 III. 593), 548.
Ward V. Flood (48 Cal. 36), 1345.
Ward V. Hartford County (13 Conn.
404), 745, 1585, 1586, 1596.
Ward V. Little Rock (41 Ark. 526),
1034.
Ward V. Maryland (31 Md. 379), 1388.
Ward V. Maryland (13 Wall. 163),
145.
Ward V. Maryland (13 Wall. 418),
144, 1355.
Ward V. Stahl (81 N, Y. 406), 331,
337.
Ward V. Town of Forest Grove (Ore-
gon, 25 Pac. Rep. 120), 710. 711.
Ward V. Ward (7 Exch. 838), 1421.
Wardens of St. Saviours v. Bostock
(2 N. R. 175), 329.
Wardsboro v. Jamaica (59 Vt. 514),
1429.
Ware v. Peroival (61 Me. 391), 1399,
1400, 1579.
Waring v. Mayor &c. of Mobile (24
Ala. 701), 94, 97, 110. 537.
Waring v. Savannah (60 Ga, 96),
1396.
Warner v. Beers (23 Wend. 103), .50.
Warner v. Charlestown (2 Gray,
104), 1366.
Wai'ner v. Grace (14 Minn, 487), 667.
Warner v. Holyoke (112 Mass. 362),
1472.
Warner v. Knox (60 Wis. 434; 7 N.
W. Rep. 372), 558.
Warner v. Mower (H Vt. 385), 375,
353, 360.
Warner ti. Rising Fawn Iron Co. (3
Woods, 514), 958.
Warner v. Village of Lawrence (62
Mich. 251 ; 28 N. W. Rep. 844),
1537.
Warnock v. Lafayette (4 La. Ann,
419), 293.
Warren v. Brown (Neb., 47 N. W.
:Pep..633), 1089.
Warren v. Bunnell (U Vt. 600), 685.
Warren v. Charlestown (2 (Jray,
104), 16, 67, 88, 393, 415, 534.
Warren v. City of Chicago (118 111.
329; 9 N. E. Rep. 218), 1165.
Warren v. Clement (34 Hun, 473), 230.
Warren v. Geer (117 Pa. St. 207),
1388.
Warren v. Grand Haven (30 Mich.
24), 1186, 1399.
Warren v. Henly (31 Iowa, 31), 1130,
1169.
Warren v. Mayor of Lyons (83 Iowa,
351), 634.
Warren v. Skinner (30 Conn. 562),
1339.
Warren v. Stat^ (11 Mo. 583), 326.
Warren v. Town of Wausau (66 Wis.
206), 1192.
Warren County v. Marcy (97 U. S.
96), 9i7, 960, 964.
Warren County v. Portsmouth Sav.
Bank (97 U. S. 110). 964.
Warren Countv v. Post (97 U. S.
110), 964.
Whrren Countv v. Ward (21 Iowa,
84), 327.
Warren County Supervisors v, Pat-
terson (56 III. Ill), 624.
Warrensburgh v. Miller (77 Mo. 56),
1578.
Warrin v. Baldwin (105 N. T. 534;
12 N. E. Rep. 49), 883.
Wartman v. City of Philadelphia (33
Pa. St. 203), 599, 1244.
Warts V. Hoagland (114 U. 8. 606),
696.
Warwick v. Mayo (15 Gratt. 528),
1258. '
Wash V. New York (107 N. Y. 220),
1427.
Washburn v. Board of Comm'rs (104
Ind. 321 ; 3 N. E. Rep. 757), 198,
798, 968, 973. 974.
Washburn v. 0shkosh(6O Wis. 453;
5 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 517),
109, 1364, 1365, 13G6, 1367, 1400.
Washburn v. Phillips (3 Met. 396),
1594.
Washer v. Bullitt County (110 U. S.
558), 1424, 1425, 1437.
Washington v. Coler (51 Fed. Rep.
363), 965.
Washington v. Frank (1 Jones, 436),
543.
Washington v. Hammond (76 N. C.
933), 517. "
Washington v. Kent (38 Conn. 249),
988.
Washington v. Nashville (1 Swan,
177), 1123, 1186.
Washington v. Stanford (3 Johns.
193), 446,
Washington v. State (13 Ark. 753),
1336, 1370.
Washington &c. Church v. New
York (20 Hun, 297), 1572.
Washington Avenue, I,n re (69 Pa.
St. 352), 1186, 1349, 1389.
Washington Cemetery v. Prospect
Park R. Co. (68 N. Y. 591), 671,
681, 1433.
Washington County v. Weld County
(13 Colo. 152; 20 Pac. Rep. 373),
463.
Washington Gas Co. v. Seminary (53
Mo. 480), 314.
TABLE OF CASES.
ccliii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
Washington Ice Co. v. Lay (103 Ind.
48; a K E. Rep. 222), 347, 1415.
Washington Supervisors v. Darant
(9 Wall. 415), 1378.
Water Comra'rs v. East Saginaw (33
Mich. 164), 1373.
Water Comm'rs v. GafiEney (34 N. J.
Law, 183), 1897.
Water Co. v. City of Syracuse (116
N. Y. 167; 22 N. E. Rep. 381),
566, 567.
Water Co. v. Ware (16 Wall. 566),
1215, 1444.
Waterbury v. Board of Comm'rs (10
Mont. 515; 24 Am. St. Rep. 67),
1597.
Waterbury v. Darien (8 Conn. 163;
9 Conn. 256), 1600.
Waterbury v. Laredo (60 Tex. 519),
186.
Waterbury v. Laredo (68 Tex. 565 ;
5 S. W. Rep. 81), 636.
Waterbury v. Lawlor (51 Conn. 171),
1400.
Waterloo v. Union Mill Co. (72 Iowa,
487; 34 N. W. Rep. 197), 1218,
1406.
Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Shan-
ahan (128 N. Y. 345), 684.
Waters v. Bay View (61 Wis. 642),
1146.
Waters v. Carroll (9 Yerg. 102), 330.
Waters v. Leech (3 Ark. 110), 106,
518.
Watertown v. Cowan (4 Paige, 510),
1403.
Watertown v. Mayo (109 Mass. 315),
669, 1059.
Watertown v. Robinson (69 Wis.
230), 1588.
Watertown F. Ins. Co. v. Simmons
(131 Mass. 85; 41 Am. Rep. 196),
323.
Waterville v. County Comm'rs (59
Me. 80), 1371.
Waterville v. Kennebec Co. (59 Me.
80), 1169.
Water-works Co. v. Burkbart (41
Ind. 364), 112, 682.
Water-works Co. v. Atlantic City
(N. J., 6 Atl. Rep. 24), 1313.
Water- works Co. v. Water Co. (N. J.,
15 Atl. Rep. 581), 561.
Watkins v. County Court (30 West
Va. 657; 5 S. E. Rep. 654; 20
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 305), 10,
1014.
Watkins v. Walker (17 Tex. 585),
670.
Watson V. Bennett (12 Barb. 196),
. 260.
' Watson V. Chicago (115 111. 78), 1124,
1187.
Watson V. City of Apple ton (63 Wis.
267; 22 N. W. Rep. 475), 893.
Watson V. Comm'rs (83 N. C. 1),
1868.
Watson V. Corey (Utah, 21 Pac. Rep.
1089), 415.
Watson V. Crowsore (93 Ind. 220), 694.
Watson V. N. Y. &c. R Co. (47 N. Y.
157), 691.
Watson V. South Kingston (5 R. I.
5621, 684.
Watson V.' Sutherland (5 Wall. 74),
651.
Watson V. Tripp (11 R. L 98), 1308.
Watson V. TurnbuU (34 La. Ann.
856), 578.
Wattles V. People (13 Mich. 446). 211.
Watts V. McLean (38 111. App. 537),
806.
Watuppa Reservoir v. Fall River
(134 Mass. 367), 765.
Wauwatosa v. Gunyon (25 Wis. 271),
1887.
Waxahachie t!. Brown (67 Tex. 519;
17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 348;
4 S. W. Rep. 207), 623. 833.
Way V. Center Point (51 Iowa, 708),
428.
Waycross City Council v. Youmans
(85 Ga. 708). 203.
Wavland v: County Comm'rs (4
"Gray, 500), 686, 1397.
Waymire v. Powell (105 Ind. 328),
895.
Wayne County v. Detroit (17 Mich.
899). 604.
Wavne Savings Bank v. Stockwell
"(84 Mich. 587), 1431.
Wayne Tp. v. Porter Tp. (138 Pa. St.
181 ; 20 Atl. Rep. 989), 979.
Weare v. New Boston (8 N. H. 203),
Quo
Weare i>. Sawyer (44 N. H. 198),
1886.
Weaver v. Benjamin (18 N. Y. Supl.
630), 998.
Weaver v. Cherry (8 Ohio (N. S.),
564), 1386.
Weaver v. Devendorf (3 Denio, 117),
227, 1578.
Webb V. Auspach (3 Ohio St. 522),
387.
Webb V. Heme Bay Comm'rs (L. R.
5 Q. B. 642), 947.
Webb V. La Fayette County (67 Mo.
353), 634.
Webb V. Neal (5 Allen, 575), 568.
Webber v. Townley (43 Mich. 534),
1273.
Weber v. Agricultural Society (44
Iowa, 239), 646.
Weber v. County of Santa Clara (59
Cal. 263), 696.
coliv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
Weber v. Creston City (75 Iowa, 16 :
89 N. W. Rep. 136), 1436.
Weber v. Hamilton (72 Iowa, 577;
34 N. W. Rep. 424), 193.
Weber v, Johnson (37 Mo. App. 601),
508.
Weber v. Reintiard (73 Pa. St. 373),
1188.
Weber v. San Francisco (1 Cal. 455),
1399.
Weber v. Traubel (95 III. 437), 1383.
Webster v. Byrnes (34 Cal. 273), 377.
Webster v.' Harwinton (33 Conn.
131), 646, 664, 915, 1583.
Webster v. Lansing (47 Mich. 193),
540.
Webster v. People (98 111. 343). 1382.
Webster County v. Hutchinson (60
Iowa, 731), 337.
Webster County v. Taylor (19 Iowa,
117). 891.
Weckerly v. Geyer (11 S. & R. (Pa.)
85), 218.
Weckler v. Chicago (61 III. 143), 681.
Wedneri;. State (49 Ark. 172), 1340.
Weed V. Ballston Spa Villag;e (76 N.
Y. 329), 321, 781, 1438, 1440,
1462. 1492.
Week V. McClure (49 Cal. 638),
1577.
Weeks v. Batchelder (41 Vt. 317),
368, 1336.
Weeks v. City Treasurer (16 N. J.
Law, 337), 1353.
Weeks v. Dennett (63 N. H. 2), 164,
613.
Weeks v. Forman (16 N. J. Law,
237), 530.
Weeks v. Milwaukee (10 Wis. 242),
109, 558, 930, 1019, 1354, 1367,
1370, 1384, 1396. .
Weet V. Brocfcport (16 N. Y. 161),
769.
Wehn V. Com'm'rs of Gage County
(5 Neb. 494), 672.
Weidman v. Board of Education (7
N. Y. Supl. 309), 1343.
Weightman v. City of Washington
(1 Black,, 39), 9, 769, 1198.
Weightman v. Clark (113 U. S. 256),
938, 1388.
Weil V. Greene County (69 Mo. 281),
1588. ■'
Weil V. Ricord (24 N. J. Eq. 169),
1039.
Weill D. Kenfield(54 Cal. Ill), 1173.
Weimer v. Bunbury (30 Mich. 201),
984, 1178.
Weinckle v. New York &c. R. Co.
(15 N. Y. St. Rep. 689), 588.
Weir «. Borough of Plymouth (Pa.,
24 Atl. Rep. 94), 1146.
Weir V. State (93 Ind. 311), 1543.
Weirs v. Jones County (80 Iowa,
351), 746.
Weis V. City of Madison (75 Ind. 241 ;
59 Am. Rep. 1351, 1095, 1098,
1099.
Weisenberg v. Appleton (26 Wis.
56), 1477.
Weismer v. Douglas (64 N. Y. 91),
929, 930. 1393.
Weitz V. Independent Dist. (79 Iowa,
433), 809, 1330, 1332.
W^ch V. Bowen (103 Ind. 253), 525.
Welch V. County Court (39 West
Va. 63; IS. E. Rep. 337), 449.
Welch V. Gardner (133 Mass. 529),
1483.
Welch V. Gleason (38 S. C. 247), 339.
Welch V. Hotchkiss (39 Conn. 140),
551, 1346.
Welch V. Portland (77 Me. 384), 1484.
Welch V. Seymour (38 Conn. 387),
339.
Welch V. Ste. Genevieve (1 Dillon
C. C. 130), 130, 372, 290, 465, 471.
Welch w. Strother (74 Cal. 413; 16
Pac. Rep. 23). 836.
Weld V. Brooks (152 Mass. 397), 1489.
Weidman v. Board (7 N. Y. Supl.
309), 1330.
Welker v. Potter (18 Ohio St. 85), 59,
1064, 1171.
Welland v. Comstock (58 Wis. 565),
1568.
Weller v. Burlington (60 Vt. 28),
364, 753, 782.
Weller v. McCormick (47 N. J. Law,
397; 1 Atl. Rep. 516), 1123, 1201,
1441.
Welles V. Battelle (11 Mass. 477),
1272.
Wellington, In re (16 Pick. 87;. 26
Am. Dec. 631), 682, 1530.
Wellman v. Board &c. (84 Mich. 558;
47 N. W. Rep. 1099), 1289.
Wells, Ex parte (31 Fla. 280), 469.
Wells V. Atlanta (43 Ga. 67), 573, 1393.
Wells V. Board of Ed. (78 Mich. 360),
1331.
Wells V. Bnrbank (11 N. H. 393), 56,
88, 350.
Wells V. Burnham (20 Wis. 113),
1174.
Wells V. Company (47 N. H. 235),
350.
Wells V, Mayor &c. of Kingston-
upon-Hull(L. B. IOC. P. 402).
261.
Wells V. Pontotoc County (103 U. S.
635), 933, 934.
Wells V. Pressey (Mo., 16 S. W. Rep.
670), 709.
Wells V. Rhodes (114 Ind. 467), 694,
1420.
TABLK OF CASES.
ccIt
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Wells V. Somerset &c. E. Co. (47 Me,
345), 670.
Wells V. Supervisors (103 U. S. 635),
619. 933.
Wells V. Town of Salina (119 N. Y.
380; 33 N. E. Rep. 870), 79.1.
Wellsborough v. New York &o, R.
Co. (76 N. Y. 183), 937.
Welsford v. Weidlein (23 Kan. 601),
1174.
Welsh V. First Div. R. Co. (35 Minn.
314), 958.
Welsh V. St. Louis (73 Mo. 71), 1462.
Welsh V. Taylor (31 N. E. Rep. 896),
1412.
Welsh V. Village of Rutland (56 Vt.
338). 10S7.
Welsh V. Wilson (101 N. Y. 354),
1434.
Welton V. Missouri (91 U, S. 375),
1433.
Welton V. Townof Woloott(45Conn.
339), 998.
Welton Co. v. Borough of Birming-
ham (Conn., 24 Atl. Rep. 978),
1070.
Wendell v. Brooklyn (39 Barb. 304),
184.
Wendell v. Fleming (8 Gray, 613),
310.
Wendell v. Troy (4 Abb. App. Dec.
563). 1478.
Wendell v. Troy (39 Barb. 829). 1475.
Wentworth v. Rochester (63 N. H,
244), 1416.
Wentworth v. Smith (44 N, H. 419),
1468.
Wentworth v. Summit (60 Wis. 381),
1481.
Wenzlich v. McCotter (87 N. Y. 137),
1300, 1441.
Werner v. Galveston (72 Tex. 33),
1385.
Werth V. City of SpringHeld (78 Mo.
107), 708.
Wertz V. Blair County (66 Pa. St.
18), 994, 1000.
Wessman v. City of Brooklyn (16
N. Y. Supl. 97), 1080.
West V. Ballard (32 Wis. 168), 647.
West V. Bancroft (33 Vt. 367). 1393.
West V. Brockport Village (16 N. Y.
161), 786, 1198.
West V. Columbus (30 Kan. 633),
541.
West V. Errol (58 N. H. 233). 838.
West v. Lynn (110 Mass. 514), 1466.
West V. West &c. R. Co. (61 Miss.
536). 694.
West Boston Bridge Co. v. County
Comm'rs (10 Pick. 270), 676.
West Carroll Parish v. Gaddis (34
La. Ann. 928), 634.
West Chester v. Apple (35 Pa. St.
384), 1475.
West Chester Gas Co. v. Chester (30
Pa. St. 332), 1861.
West Chester R. Co. v. McElwee (67
Pa. St. 311), 1487.
West Hampton v. Searle (127 Mass.
502). 1391.
West Hartford v. Board of Water
Co. (44 Conn. 361). 572.
West Newbury v. Bradford (3 Met.
428). 983.
West Philadelphia &c. Ry. Co. v.
City of Philadelphia (10 Phila.
' 70), 1103.
West River Bridge Co. v. Dix (6
How. 507), 633. 670, 689, 1196.
Westbrook's Appeal (57 Conn. 95),
278.
Westbrook v. Deering (63 Me. 231),
668, 835.
Westbrook v. N. Y. &c. R. Co. (57
N. Y. 95: 16 Atl. Rep. 734), 1314.
Western &o, E. Co. v. Young (83
Ga. 513), 510.
Western &c. Society v. Philadelphia
(81 Pa. St. 175)," 1394, 1397.
Western College v. Cleveland (13
Ohio St. 375), 322, 351, 264, 756.
Western Paving & Supply Co. v.
Citizens' Street R. Co. (128 Ind.
525; 26 N. E. Rep. 188; 38 N. E.
Rep. 88). 1079, 1103.
Western Pub. House v. Blackman
(So. Dak., 51 N. W. Rep. 314),
1347.
Western R. Co. v. Nolan (48 N. Y.
514), 1575.
Western Saving Fund Society v.
Citv of Philadelphia (31 Pa. St.
175), 945.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Carew
(15 Mich. 525). 106.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. City of
Philadelphia (Pa., 12 Atl. Rep.
144), 1320.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mayer (28
Ohio St. 537), 1357.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendle-
ton (132 U-. S. 359), 1319.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Richmond
(36 Gratt. 1), 1363.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. State (55
Tex. 314), 1370.
Western Union Tfel. Co. v. Thayer
(38 Ohio St. 537),. 1370.
Westervelt v. Gregg (13 N. Y. 309),
1178.
Westfield Borough v. Tioga County
(150 Pa. St. 152), 1404, 1433, 1435,
1429.
Westhampton v. Searle (137 Mass.
503), '368.
oslvi
TABLE OF CASES.
[rhe references tfra to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; VoL n, pp. 789-1605.]
Westlake v. St. Louis (77 .Mo, 47),
709.
Weston, Ex parte (11 Mass. 417),
705.
.Weston V. Syracuse (17 N. Y. 110),
1313.
Westport V. Kansas City (103 Mo.
141; 15 S. W. Rep, 68), 133,
396. .
Wetherell v. Devine (116 III, 631),
1034.
Wetmore v. Storv (33 Barb. 414), 275.
Weyauwega v. Ayling (99 U. S, 113),
946, 954.
Weymire v. Wolfe (53 Iowa, 533),
1508.
Weymouth V. City (40 La. Ann. 344),
581.
Weymouth v. Comm'rs (108 Mass.
148), 1388.
Whalen v. La Crosse (16 Wis. 370),
1171,
Whalin v. Macomb (76 111. 49). 1265.
Wharton v. School Trustees (43 Pa.
St. 358), 1330, 1391,
Wharton County v. Ahldag (Tex., 19
S. W. Eep. 391); 856. •
Whately v. Comm'rs (1 Met. 336),
1591, 1594.
Wheat ■u,,Sn?ith (50 Ark, 366), 188.
Wheaton v. Wiant (48 111. 26H), 1075.
Whelen's Appeal (108 Pa, St, 168),
331, 647.
Wheeler v. Bedford (54 Conn. 344),
1540.
Wheeler v. Bowery Sav. Bk, (30
. Abb. N. C. 243), 1260.
Wheeler v. Brady (15 Kan. 26), 1325.
Wheeler v. Cincinnati (19 Ohio St.
19), 264.
Wheeler v. City of Chicago (57 111,
415), 11 36.
Wheeler v. Jackson (41 Hun, 410),
784.
Wheeler v. Miller (16 Cal. 134), 1595,
Wheeler v. Patterson (1 N, H. 88),
318.
Wheeler v. Plymouth City (116 Ind.
158; 18 N. E. Eep. 533), 264,775,
785,
Wheeler v. Russell (17 Mass. 357),
1245.
Wheeler v. Wayne County (81 111.
App, 399; 133 111, 599; 34 N, E.
Rep. 685), 790.
Wheelinp V, Baltimore (1 Hughes,
90), 579.
Wheeling v. Black (25 West Va.
366), 175, ,541, 1363, 1865.
' Wlieeling &c. Co. v. Wheeling (99
U. S. 278), 1353.
. Wheelock's Election Case (83 Pa. St.
397), 160.
Wheelock v. Young (4 Wend. 647),
670.
Whidden v. Drake (5 N. H. 13), 1597.
Whipple V. Fair Haven (63 Vt. 821),
783.
Whitaker v. Benton (48 N. H. 157),
1419.
Whitall V. Gloucester (40 N. J. Law,
303), 1423," 1425, 1437.
Whitbeck v. Hudson (50 Mich. 86),
1576.
Whitcomb's Case (130 Mass. 118),
♦ 399, 300.
White, Im re (43 Fed. Rep. 913),
1840.
White V. Bayonne (49 N, J. Law,
311), 513.
White V. Board (Ind., 28 N, E. Rep.
846), 761, 1014.
White V. Bond County (58 111. 397;
11 Am. Rep. 63), 9, 745.
White V. Burkett (119 Ind, 431; 31
N. E. Rep. 1087), 1534.
White V. Chowan County (90 N. C.
437 : 47 Am. Rep. 534), 10.
White V. City of Kansas (33 Mo. App.
49;, 698,
White V. Comm'rs (13 Oregon. 317;
54 Am. Rep, 833, n, ; 13 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 485), 376, 377,
646.
White V. Conover (5 Blackf. 462),
695.
White V. Corporation of Yazoo City
(87 Miss. 357), 1436.
White V. Fleming (114 Ind. 560; 16
N, E. Rep. 487), 377, 1089.
White V. Fox (33 Me. 341), 330.
White V. Hart (13 Wall. 646), 1373.
White V. Hiudley Local Board (L. R,
10 Q. B. 319), 768,
White?;. Levant (77 Me. 396), 183,
White V. Levy (93 Ala. 484), 12H0.
Whiter. Marshfield(48 Vt. SO), 232.
White V. Morse (139 Mass. 163), 338.
White V. New Orleans (15 La. Ann,
667), 353.
White V. People (94 lU. 604), 1075,
1086, 1174, 1187, 1349,
White V. Phillipson (10 Met. 108),
208.
White V. Polk (17 Iowa, 413). 186.
White V. School Dist. (Pa,, 8 Atl, Rep.
443), 1330.
White V. Stamford (37 Conn. 578),
817,
White V. State (69 Ind. 373), 711.
White V. Stevens (67 Mich. 33), 571,
1065. 1171, 1173.
White V. Tallman (36 N. J. Law, 67),
535
White v. Vermont &c, R, Co, (31
How, 575), 957.
TABLE OF OASES.
cclvii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. II, pp. 789-1605.]
White V. Yazoo City (27 Miss. 857),
2ii4.
White Deer Tp. Poor Overseers' Ap-
peal (95 Pa. St. 191), 999. .
White S. M. Co. v. Mullins (41 Mich.
339), 321.
Whiteford Tp. v. Probate Judge (53
Mich. 180), 1177, 1178.
Whitehall t;. Meaux (8 111. App. 182),
531.
Whitehead v. Arkansas &c. R. Co.
(26 Ark. 460), 696.
Whitely v. Lansing (27 Mich. 131),
1372.
Whiteseil v. Northampton (49 Pa.
St. 526), 1351.
Whiteside v. People (36 Wend. 685),
277, 307.
Whiteside v. United States (98 U.
S. 247), 208, 214.
Whitfield V. Longest (6 Ired. (Law),
268). 586, 1323.
Whitfield V. Meridian City (66 Miss.
570), 1440, 1474.
Whitford V. Laidler (94 N. Y. 145),
260.
Whiting V. Mt. Pleasant (11 Iowa,
4S2), 427, 441.
Whiting V. Quackenbush (54 Cal.
306), 1187.
Whiting. V. Sheboygan &c. E. Co.
(25 Wis. 167), 617, 934.
Whiting V. Town of Potter (18
Blatohf. 165), 961.
Whiting V. Town of West Point
(Va., 14 a E. Eep. 698), 812,
1396, 1397, 1899.
Whiting V. Townsend (57 Cal. 515),
1169.
Whitlock V. West (26 Conn. 406), 538.
Whitmer v. Comm'rs (96 III. 392),
1089.
Whitmore v. Village of Tarrytown
(16 N. Y. Supl. 740). 1139.
Whitney, In re (3 N. Y. Supl. 838),
1541.
Whitney v. Boston (106 Mass. 89),
1573.
Whitney v. City of New Haven (58
Conn. 450; SO Atl. Rep. 606), 278,
280, 286, 878.
Whitney v. City of Pittsburgh (Pa.,
23 Atl. Eep. 395), 1174,
Whitney v. City of Port Huron
(Mich,, 50 N. W. Eep. 316), 500.
882.
Whitney v. Essex (43 Vt. 520). 1451.
Whitney V. Lynn (122 Mass. 338),
699.
Whitnev v. Stow (111 Mass. 368),
368," 1368.
Whitney v. Thomas (23 N. Y. 261),
237.
Whitney v. Tioonderoga (127 N. Y.
40; 32 N. Y. St. Eep. 135), 1439,
1463.
Whitney v. Van Buskirk (40 N. J.
Law, 403'. 303, 304.
Whitney v. Village of Hudson (69
Mich. 189: 30 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 453), 294, 298, 302, 305, 368,
495.
Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow (63
N. Y. 62). 646, 719.
Whitsett V. Union Depot & R. Co.
(10 Colo. 243), 264, 1193.
Whitson V. Franklin (34 Ind. 392),
541, 1209.
Whittaker v. Tuolumne County
(Cal., 80 Pao. Eep. 1016), 1585.
Whyte V. City of Kansas (22 Mo.
App. 409), 607.
Wliyte V. Mayor &c. of Nashville (3
Swan. 864), 283, 518, 550, 608,
1133. 1389.
Whyte V. Mills (64 Miss. 158; 8 So.
Eep. 171), 864.
Wick ware v. Bryan (il Wend. 545),
218.
Widner v. State (49 Ark. 173 ; 4 S. W.
Rep. 657), *13.
Wier's Appeal (74 Pa. St. 230), 1053.
Wier V. Bush (4 Litt. (Ky.) 439), 175.
Wiggin t). Freewill Baptist (8 Met.
301), 376. '
Wiggin V. Mayor (9 Paige, 16), 1365.
Wiggins V. Chicago (68 ill. 373), 532,
1388.
Wiggins V. McCleary (49 N. Y. 846),
1412.
Wiggins V. Tallmage(ll Barb. 457),
1213, 1405.
Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis
(103 III. 560), 1358, 1357, 1370.
Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis
(107 U. S. 365). 1353, 1357, 1370.
Wight «. Phillips (36 Me. 551), 1417.
Wilbur V. City of Springfield (133
III. 395; 14 N. E. Eep. 871), 1073,
1186.
Wilbur V. Tobey (16 Pick. 179). 141.
Wilcox V. Deer Lodge County (3
Mont. T. 574), 931.
Wilcox V. Heiiiming (.'58 Wis. 144; 46
Am. Rep. 63.5), 525, 585. 536.
Wilcox V. Rodman (4(i Mo. 3331, 187.
Wilcox V. Smit1i(5 Wend. 331). 198.
Wilcox V. Township of Eagle (81
Mich. 271), 1340.
Wild V. Deig (43 Ind, 455), 685, 1269.
Wild V. Paterson (47 N. J. Law, 406),
755.
Wilde V. Dunn (11 Johns. 513), 379.
Wilder v. Board (41 Fed. Eep. 512),
833.
Wilder v. Chicago (26 111. 182), 176.
Golviii
TABLE OF OASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol.
Wilder v. Cincinnati (36 Ohio St.
884), 1186.
Wilder v. Chicago &c. Ey. Co. (70
Mich. 382; 38 N. W. Eep. a90),
557.
Wilder v. East St. Louis (55 III. 138),
1383, 1389.
Wilder v. Savannah (TO Ga. 760),
1337.
Wiles V. Hoss (114 Ind. 371 ; 16 N. E.
Rep. 800), 1111, 1113.
Wilev V. Bluffton (lU Ind. 153), 126.
Wiley V. Flournoy (30 Ark. 609),
1574.
Wiley V. Palmer (14 Ala. 367), 1388.
Wiley V. Town of Brim field (59 111.
306). 935.
Wilhelm v. Cedar County (50 Iowa,
354), 260, 658.
Wilkes V. DinsQian (7 How, 39),
218.
Wilkes V. Mayor (79 N. Y. 631),
1134.
Wilkesbarre t'. Myers (113 Pa. St.
395), 1393.
Wilkey v. Pekin (19 III. 160), 1353.
Wilkin V. St. Paul (16 Minn. 271),
690. *
Wilkins v. Detroit (5 Mich. 336),
1163.
Wilkins v. Detroit (46 Mich. 120),
1161.
Wilkins v. Rutland (61 Vt. 336; 17
Atl. Rep. 735), 753, 764, 1462.
Wilkinson v. Bixter (88 Ind. 574),
697.
Wilkinson v. Cheatham (43 Ga. 258),
930, 1379, 139'3.
Wilkinson v. Leland (3 Peters, 637),
941.
Wilkinson i>. Peru (61 Ind. 1), 947.
Wilkinson v. Township of Long
Rapids (74 Miob. 63; 41 N. W.
. ' Rep. 861), 817, 918, 1038.
Wilkinson v. Van Orman (70 Iowa,
330:), 833, 848.
Willamette Bridge Co. v. Hatch
(123 U. S. 113), 1433.
Willamette Mfg. Co. v. Bank of
British Columbia (119 U. S. 191),
1556.
Willard's Appeal (4 R. I. 595), 306.
WillardJ'. Comstock (58 Wis. 565),
1580. ■
Willard v. Killingworth (8 Conn.
247), 92. 371, 543.
Willard v. Newburyport (12 Pick.
337), 826. 837.
Willard V. Piko (59 Vt. 302). I33S.
Willard v. Presbury (14 Wall. 676),
11-63,1168.
Willco'fekB, In re (7 Cowen, 403), 391,
493.
I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.] >
Willett V. Young (Iowa, 11 L. R. A.
115; 47 N. W. Rep. 990), 213,
868.
Willey V. Greenfield (30 Me. 452),
825.
Willey V. Portsmouth (35 N. H. 303),
353, 374, 1451.
Williams' Case (3 Bland Cb. 186),
1369.
Williams v. Augusta (4 Ga. 509), 539,
548, 593, 599, l'J58.
Williams v. Bagot (3 Barn. & C. 786',
«t307.
Williams v. Brooklyn El. R. Co.
(126 N. Y. 96), 143 ».
Williams v. Camm'kck (27 Miss. 309),
, 1185.
Williams v. Citizens' Rv. Co. (Ind. ,
39N.-'E. Rep. 408). 1313.
Williams v. City of Gloucester (148
Mass. 356; 19 N. E. Rep. 348),
166.
Williams v. City of Nashville (Tenn.,
15 S. W. Rep. 364), 391, 897,
464.
Williams v. Clayton (6 Utah, 86; 21
Pac. Rep. 398), 1529.
Williams v. Clinton (28 Conn. 364),
1471.
Williams v. Corey (73 Iowa, 194; 34
N. W. Rep. 813), 1193. ;
Williams v. Davidson (44 Tex. 1),
935.
Williams v. Detroit (3 Mich. 560),
1160, 1163, 1109, 1573.
Williams v. Detroit (45 Mich. 431),
1161.
Williams v. Directors (33 Vt. 371),
1387.
Williams v. Directors &c. (Wright
(Ohio), 579), 1345.
Williams v. Duanesburg (66 N. Y.
129), 953.
Williams v. Ehringhaus (3 Dev. L.
(N. C.)297), 313.
Williams i). Grand Rapids (59 Mich.
51), 1469.
Williams v. Hartford &o. R. Co. (13
Conn. 397), 691.
Williams v. Holden (4 Wend. 327),
1189.
Williams v. Leyden (119 Mass. 237),
1455.
Williams v. Lunenburg (21 Pick. 75),
391.
Williams v. New Orleans R. Co. (60
Miss. 689), 697.
Williams v. N. Y. &o. E. Co. (16
N. Y. 97), 679, 1433.
Williams v. People (133 111. 574), 375.
Williams. v. Pittsburgh (83 Pa. St.
7 1),- 696.
Williams v. Poor (65 Iowa, 410), 438.
TABLi OF CASES.
cclix
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Williams v. Powell (101 Mass. 407),
819.
Williams v. Bawlinson (10 Moore,
371), 338.
Williams v. Rees (9 Biss. 405), 1361.
Williams v. Eoberts (88 111. 11), 935,
941.
Williams v. Safford (7- Barb. 309),
1473.
Williams v. Saginaw (51 Mich. 120),
758, 1125.
Williams v. School Dist. (21 Pick. 75),
290, 344, 351, 368, 1189, 1416.
Williams v. School Dist. (33 Vt. 271),
686.
Williams v. Shelby (2 Oreg;. 144), 313.
Williams v. Smith (3 Hill. 301), 957.
Williams v. Warsaw (60 Ind. 457).
604.
Williams v. Weaver (75 N. Y. 30;
100 U. S. 547), 226, 227.
Williams v. Willard (23 Vt. 369),
1064.
Williamsburg v. Lord (51 Me. 599),
1390.
Williamson v. Commonwealth (4 B.
Mon. 146), 530, 531, 540, 1253,
1262.
Williamson v. Keokuk (44 Iowa, 88),
128, 932, 1374.
Williamson «. Massey (33Gratt. 337),
1399.
Williamsport v. Commonwealth (84
Pa. St. 487). 923, 927.
Williamsport City v. Beck (138 Pa.
St. 147). 1164.
Williamstown School Dist. v, Webb
(89 Ky. 264; 12 S. W. Rep. 298),
368, 1333.
Willington v. Petitioners (16 Pick.
105), 1549.
Willis V. Boonville (38 Mo. 543), 1256,
1263.
Willis V. Legnis (45 111. 289), 536.
Willis V. Sproule (13 Kan. 257), 347,
694.
Willis V. Webb (Kan., 37 Pac. Rep.
825), 813.
Willman v. Willman (57 Ind. 500),
1419.
Wills V. Austin (53Cal. 152), 1183.
Willyard v. Hamilton (7 Ohio (Part
II), 111; 30 Am. Dec. 195). 695.
Wilmington v. Macks (86 N. C. 88),
1355.
Wilmington v. Yopp f71 N. C. 76),
1159.
Wilmington Cortim'rs v. Roby (8
Ired. L. (N. C.) 250), 13S8.
Wilson, In re (33 Minn. 145). 546.
Wilson V. Atlanta (60 Ga. 473), 1471.
Wilson V. Board of Burr Oak (87
Mich. 240), 1416.
Wilson V. Board of Comm'rs (68 Ind.
507), 278.
Wilson V. Board of Trustees (133 111.
443; 27 N. E. Rep. 203), 1021,
1034.
Wilson V. Burks (71 Ga. 868), 1576.
Wilson V. Chilcott (12 Colo. 600),
1160.
Wilson V. Clity of Charlotte (108 N.
C. 121 ; 12 S. E. Rep. 846), 1398.
Wilson i\ City of Macon (Ga., 14 S.
E. Rep. 710), 761.
Wilson V. Comm'rs (7 Watts & S,
197), 1595.
Wilson V. European &c. R. Co. (67
Me. 358), 690.
Wilson V. Hardesty (1 Md. Ch. 56),
911.
Wilson V. Hathaway (43 Iowa, 173),
690.
Wilson V. Hetnming (58 Wis. 144),
1233.
Wilson V. Huntington Comm'rs (7
Watts & S. 197), 1377.
Wilson V. Jefferson County (13 Iowa,
181), 746.
Wilson V. Lewis (10 R. I. 385), 1597.
Wilson V. Marsh (34 Vt. 352), 218, 22«.
Wilson V. Mayor (1 Denio, 595; 43
Am. Dec. 719). 219, 1080.
Wilson V. Mayor &c. (4 E. D. Smith
(N. Y.), 675), 1353.
Wilson V. Mayor &c. of Macon (Ga.,
14 S. E, Rep. 710), 1013.
Wilson V. Neal (23 Fed. Rep. 139),
906.
Wilson V. New York (1 Denio, 595),
263, 775, 777, 1438, 1457.
Wilson V. Pelton (40 Ohio St. 306),
1182.
Wilson V. Peverly (1 Am. L. Cas.
785), 222.
Wilson V. Poole (83 Ind. 448), 611,
1190.
Wilson V. Roberts (11 C. B. (N. S.)
50; 31 L.J. C. P. 78), 134.
Wilson V. Rockford &c. R. Co. (59
111. 273), 703.
Wilson V. Salamanca (99 U. S. 499),
834, 943, 946, 961.
Wilson V. School Dist. (32 N. H. 118),
13, 259. 640, 1141, i;h30.
Wil*)n V. Spoffiord (33 N. Y. St. Rep.
533), 1462.
Wilson V. Sutter County Supervis-
ors (47 Cal. 91), 1398.
Wilson V. Town of (}rantz (47 Conn.
59), 1433.
Wilson V. Troy (N. Y., 46 Alb. L. J.
518), 1491.
Wilson V. Wall (6 Wall. 83), 143.
Wilson V. Waltersville School Dist.
(44 Conn. 157), 348, 370, 1335.
Gclx
table: of oases.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Wilson V. Wheeling (19 West Va.
324), 265.
Wilson County v. Third Nat. Bank
(103 U. S. 770), 936.
Wiltse V. Tilden (77 Wis. 152), 1438.
Winans v. Williams (5 Kan. 227),
1325.
Winbigler v. Los Angeles (45 Cal.
36), 10, 769, 1448.
Winchendenr. Hatfield (4 Mass. 133),
976, 981.
Winchester v. Cheshire County (64
N. H. 100; 5 Atl. Eep. 767), 1001.
Windham v. Commissioners (36 Me.
,406), 693, 1419.
Windham v. Portland (4 Mass. 884),
446, 1368,
Windham v. Town of Lebanon (51
Conn. 319), 988.
Windsor v. Field (1 Conn. 279), 694,
11S9, 1568.
Windsor v. Hallett (97 111. 304), 953.
Wing V. Gliok (56 Iowa, 473; 37 Am.
Rep. 142, n.), 313.
Winn V. Board of Park Comm'rs
(Ky., 14 S. W. Rep. 421), 124.
Winn V. Macon (21 Ga. 375), 941.
Winn V. State (Miss., 7 So. Rep. 353),
1332.
Winnsboro v. Smart (11 Rich. 551),
1244.
Winona v. Burke (23 Minn. 354),
541.
Winona v. School Dist. (40 Minn. 13),
1333.
Winona &e. E. Co. v. City of "Water-
town (S. Dak., 44 N. W. Eep.
1072), 1187.
Winona &c. R. Co. v. Waldron (11
Minn. 515), 670.
Winooski v. Gokey (49 Vt. 383), 539,
542, 543.
Winpenny v, Philadelphia (65 Pa. St.
135), 773.
Winship v. Enfield (43 N. H. 197),
, 1454, 1468.
Winslow V. Comm'rs (64 N. C. 218),
1381.
Winslow V. Perquimans County (64
N. C. 318), 1378.
Winspear v. Holman Tp. (37 Iowa,
548), 14, 840.
Winston v. Railroad Co. (1 Baxt. 61),
1393.
Winston v. Taylor (99 N. C. 310),
1160.
Winston v. Tennessee &c. R. Co. (1
Baxt. (Tenn.) 60), 933.
Winston v. Westfeldt (23 Ala. 760),
964.
Winter v. City Council of Montgom-
ery (83 Ala. 589 ; 3 So. Rep. 335),
1319.
Winter v. Montgomery (65 Ala. 403),
1400.
Winthrop v. Farrar (11 Allen, 398),
1059.
Wintz V. Board (28 West Va. 237),
1516.
Wirth V. Wilmington (68 N. C. 34),
103, 468. 513.
Wisconsin &o. R. Co. v. Taylor (53
Wis. 43), 1353, 1363, 1869.
Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Ashland
County (Wis., 50 N. W. Rep.
«37), 303, 380.
Wisconsin Cent. E. Co. v. Ashland
County (Wis.. 50 N. W. Rep.
939), 302, 593, 1132.
Wiser v. Blachly (1 Johns. Ch. 607),
953.
Wisner v. Davenport (5 Mich, 501),
819.
Wistar v. Philadelphia (80 Pa. St.
505), 1120, 1164.
Wistar v. Philadelphia (HI Pa. St.
604), 1120. 1163, 1849.
Witherop v. Titusville School Board
(7 Pa. Co. Ct. Eep. 45), 1336,
1336.
Withers v. Buckley (20 How. 84),
670.
Witherspoon v. Meridian (69 Miss.
288), 1407, 1421.
Withington v. Harvard (63 Mass. 66),
360, 361, 363, 1580.
Witkowski v. Bradley (35 La. Ann.
904), 1386.
Witkowski v. Skalowski (46 Ga. 41),
1576.
Witner'S Appeal (Pa., 15 Atl. Eep.
438), 1333.
Witson V. Mayor &c. of New York
(1 Denio. 595), 308.
Witter V. Damitz (Wis., 51 N. W.
Rep. 57.5). 1407, 1416.
Wixon V. Newport (13 R. L 454), 763.
Woffenden v. Board &o. (1 Ariz.
237 ; 35 Pac. Rep. 647), 1519.
Wolcott V. Lawrence County (36 Mo.
273), 634. 1091.
Wolcott V. Wolcott (19 Vt. 37), 385.
Wo Lee, In re (36 Fed. Rep. 471),
1841.
Wo Lee v. Hopkins (118 U. S. 856),
1341.
Wolf, Ex parte {U Neb. 34), 373, 375.
Wolf V. Bross (73 Tex. 133), 1406.
Wolf V. Keokuk (48 Iowa, 139), 1186.
Wolf V. Marshall (52 Mo. 171), 709.
Wolf V. Philadelphia (105 Pa, St. 25),
1103, 1181.
Wolff V. New Orleans (103 U. S.
358), 334, 435, 1381, 1384.
WoUsonv. Rubicon (68 Mich. 49),
1540.
TABLB OF 0ASB3.
cclxi
IThe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Wolsey V. Board (33 Iowa, 231), 1420.
Wolters, Ex parte (65 Cal. 269),
1340.
Wong V. City of Astoria (13 Oregon,
538), 544.
Wood V. Bangs (1 Dak. 179; 46 N. W.
Eep. 586), 797.
Wood V. Bank (9 Cowen, 194), 67,
1266. 1267.
Wood V. Bartling (16 Kan. 109), 386.
Wood V. Board of Comtn'rs (125
Ind. 370; 25 N. E. Bep. 188),
8B1.
Wood V. Brooklyn (14 Barb. 425),
103, 488. 518,"539.
Wood V. Cutter (138 Mass. 149), 303.
Wood w. Galveston (76 Tex. 126; 13
S. W. Rep. 227). 1135. 1173.
Wood V. Louisiana (103 U. S. 294),
234.
Wood V. Lynn (1 Allen, 108), 251,
642.
Wood V. Mo(5rath (Pa., 24 Atl. Eep.
682), 1101.
Wood V. Pres't Jefferson County
Bank (9 Cow. 194), 87.
Wood t?. Quincy (11 Cuah. 487), 370.
Wood V. Simmons (51 Hun, 335; 4
N. Y. Supl. 368), 1003.
Wood V. Simons (110 Mass. 116), 372.
Wood I'. Stirmon (37 Tex. 584). 1579.
Wood V. Strotiier (76 Cal. 545), 1173,
1513.
Wood V. Town (106 N. C. 151 ; 10
S. E. Rep. 845). 1355.
Wood V. Watertown (58 Hun, 298),
1444.
Wood V. Water-works Co. (83 Kan.
590), 572.
Woodbridge v. Amboy (1 N. J. Law,
246), 446.
Woodbury v. Detroit (8 Mich. 309),
113U.
Woodbury v. Hamilton (6 Pick. 101),
826.
Woodcock V. Bolster (35 Vt. 632),
1325.
Woodcock V. Worcester (138 Mass.
268), 1486.
Woodes V. Dennett (9 N. H. 55), 989.
Woodger v. Hadden (5 Taunt. 126),
1406.
Woodman v. Tufts (9 N. H. 88),
1036.
Woodruff V. City of Eureka Springs
(Ark., 19 S. W. Rep. 15), 400,
410.
Woodruff V. Fisher (17 Barb. 224),
1024.
Woodruff V. Neal (38 Conn. 166), 634,
1150.
Woodruff V. Okolona (57 Miss. 806),
955.
Woodruff V. Paddock (130 N. Y.
618), 1421.
Woodruff V. Stewart (63 Ala. 308),
533.
Woodruff V. Town of Glendale (23
Minn. 537; 26 Minn. 78), 1059.
Woods V. City of Chicago (135 111.
582; 36 N. E. Rep. 608), 1073.
Woods V. Colfax County (10 Neb.
552), 10.
Woods V. Groton (111 Mass. 357),
1467.
Woods V. Henry (55 Mo. 560), 1366.
Woodf V. Lawrence County (1 Black,
386), 947.
Woods V. Oxford (97 N. C. 227), 377.
Woodstock V. Gallup (28 Vt. 587). 689.
Woodward v. Town of Rutland (61
Vt. 316; 17 Atl. Rep. 797), 179.
Wooley V. Staley (39 Ohio St. 354),
1399
Woolfolk V. Randolph County (83
Mo. 501). 709.
Woolley V. Baldwin (101 N. Y. 688),
219.
Worcester v. Auburn (4 Allen, 574),
983.
Worcester v. Ballard (38 Vt. 60), 996.
Worcester v. Eaton (13 Mass. 371),
661.
Worcester v. Keith (5 Allen. 17), 694.
Worcest3r v. Milford (18 Pick. 379),
993.
Worcester v. Town of East Mont-
pelier (61 Vt. 139), 976.
Worcester County v. Worcester (1 16
Mass. 193), 1165.
Worden v. New Bedford (131 Mass.
23), 661, 767, 1006.
Work V. State (2 Ohio St. 296), 1258.
Worley v. Harris (82 Ind. 493), 70.
Wormley v. District Tp. (45 Iowa,
666), 1330.
Wormwood v. City of Waltham
(144 Mass. 184; 10 N. E. Rep.
800), 886.
Worster v. Canal Bridge (16 Pick.
541), 1484.
Worth V. Fayetteville Comm'rs
(Winst. (N. C.) Eq. 70), 1351,
1356, 1573.
Wortlven v. Badgett (33 Ark. 496),
1386.
Worthington v. Covington (83 Ky.
365), 259, 1170.
Worthington v. Wade (83 Tex. 36),
1408.
Worthley v. Steen (43 N. J. Law,
543), 135.
Worts V. Watertown (16 Fed. Rep.
534), 1589.
Wragg V. Penn Township (94 111. 11),
604.
colxii
.TABLE OF. CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-160B.]
Wray v. Mayor &o. of Pittsburgh
(46 Pa. St. 365). 593. 1163.
Wreford v. People (14 Mich. 41),
1084.
Wren v. Luzerne' County (9 Pa. Co.
Ct, aS; 6Kulp, 37), 179.
Wright V. Augusta (78 Ga. 341). 364.
Wright V. Bishop (88 111. 303 1. 646.
Wright V. Boston (9 Cush. 383), 1163,
1578.
Wright V. Carter (37 N. J. Law, 76),
679.
Wright V. Chicago (30 111. 253), 1048,
1160.
Wright V. Chicago &c. E. Co. (7 111.
App. 438). 534.
Wright V. Corporation (4 Cranch C.
C. 534), 1153.
Wright V. Forrestal (65 Wis. 341 ; 37
N. W. Rep. 53), 496, 1194.
Wright V. Harris (31 Iowa, 373), 881.
Wright V. Linn (9 Pa. St. 438), 660.
Wright V. Nagle (101 U. S. 791), 566,
1313.
WHght ■». North School Dist. (53
Conn. 576), 364, 309, 370, 1337,
1335.
Wright V. People (87 111. 583), 1169,
1391.
Wright V. Railroad Co. (64 Ga. 782),
1190.
Wright V. Rouss (18 Neb. 334), 338^
Wright V. Simpson (6 Ves. 714 1, 323.
Wright V. Tacoma (3 Wash. T. 410),
1174.
Wright V. Templeton (183 Mass. 49),
1499.
Wright V. Town of Victoria (4 Tex.
375), 633.
Wright V. Town Clerk of Stockport
(5 Man. & G. 33), 134.
Wright V. Wilmington (93 N. C. 156),
777.
Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v, Jasper
(68 Mich. 441), 837.
Wrought Iron Bridge Co. «. Town
of Attica (2 N. Y. Supl. 359), 1093.
Wulleuwaber v. Dunigan (Neb., 50
N. W. Rep. 438), 937.
WuUenwaher v. Dunnigan (Neb., 47
N. W. Rep. 430), 989.
Wyandotte v. White (13 Kan. 191),
1198.
Wyandotte v. Zeitz (31 Kan. 649),
643.
Wyandotte &o. Br. Co. v. Comm'rs
(10 Kan. 331), 343.
Wyandotte City v. Wood (5 Kan.
603), 60, 61, 125.
Wyley v. Wilson (44 Vt. 404), 348,
369.
Wynehamer v. People (13 N. Y, 378),
678.
Wynn f. State jMiss., 7 So. Eep. 353),
1337.
Wynne v. Wright (1 Dev, & Bl.
(N. C.) 19), 1388.
Wyoming Coal Co. v. Price (81 Pa,
St. 156), 671.
Wysinger v. Crookshank (83 Cal.
588), 1345.
Y.
Yaftarv V. District Tp. (80 Iowa, 131),
1338.
Yale V. West Middle School Dist. (59
Conn. 489), 1343.
Yale College v. City of New Haven
(57 Conn. 1), 1070.
Yancy v. Harrison (17 Ga. SO), 701.
Yanist v. City of St. Paul (Minn.,
53 N. W."Rep. 925). 586.
Yarmouth v. North Yarmouth (34
Me. 411). 95, 109.
Yarnell v. City of Los Angeles (87
Cal. 603; 35 Pac. Rep. 767), 177,
649.
Yates V. Lansing (5 Johns. 883), 217.
Yates V. Milwaukee (10 Wall. 497),
672, 1050, 1034.
Yates V. Town of West Grafton
(West Va., 12 S. E. Rep. 1075),
1203.
Yates V. Yates (9 Barb. 324), 660.
Yavapai County v. O'Neil (Ariz., 29
Pac. Rep. 430). 887.
Yeakel u City of La Fayette (48 Ind.
116), 1113.
Yeatman v. Crandall (11 La. Ann.
320), 1166, 1185, 1369.
Yelton V. Addison (101 Ind. 58),
706.
Yesler v. City of Seattle (Wash., 25
Pac. Rep. 1014), 381, 509, 953,
1075.
Yick Wo, In re (68 Cal. 394; 58 Am,
Rep. 13), 533.
Yick Wo «. Hopkins (118 U. S. 356;
6 S. Ct. Rep. 1064), 511, 520,
1033.
York County v. Watson (15 S. C. 1),
322.
Yorker v. Sandy Lake Borough (130
Pa. St. 123), 1498.
Yorty V. Paine (62 Wis. 154), 199,
439.
Young V, Blackhawk Countv (66
Iowa, 460), 383. 1028.
Young V, Buckingham (5 Ohio, 485),
296.
Young V. Charleston (30 S. C. 116;
47 Am. Rep. 827). 9, 769.
Young V. City of Kansas (37 Mo.
App. 101), 1098, 1099.
TABLE OF CASES.
cclxiii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-788; Vol. n, pp. 789-1605.]
Young V. Clarendon Township (133
U. S. 340; 10 S. Ct. Rep. 107),
563, 633, 933, 925, 931, 932, 956,
1376.
Young V. dommissioners of Boads
(3 N. & McC. (S. C.) 537), 9.
Young V. District of Columbia (3
MacArthur, 137), 1313.
Young V. Henderson (76 N. C. 420),
1356, 1370.
Young V. Laconia (59 N. H. 634),
694.
Young V. Leedom (67 Pa. St. 351),
767.
Young V. McKenzie (3 Ga. 31), 670.
Young V. St. Louis (47 Mo. 492),
1134, 1173.
Young V. State (7 Gill & J. (Md.)
258), 310, 313.
Youngblood V. Sexton (33 Mich. 406),
1357, 1371, 1573.
Zabel V, Louisville Baptist Orphans'
Home (Ky., 17 S. W. Rep. 212),
1166.
Zabriskie v. Railroad Co. (23 How.
381), 67, 253.
Zabrisliie v. Trustees (52 N. J. Law,
104), 368.
Zanesviile v. Gas Light Crt. (47 Ohio
St, 1 ; 23 N. E. Rep. 55). 574.
Zanesviile i\ Richards (5 Ohio St.
590), 136-3, 1370, 1384.
Zeigler v. Chapin (136 N. Y. 842; 27
N. E. Rep. 471 ; 59 Hun, 314; 13
N. Y. Supl. 783), 196, 635.
Zeigler v. Hopkins (117 U. S. 683),
1173, 1174.
Zottler V. Atlanta (66 Ga. 195), 1313,
1498.
Ziegler v. Flack (54 N. Y. Super. Ct.
69). 1171.
Zimmerman v. Canfield (42 Ohio St.
463 ; 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
882). 686.
Zimmerman v. Snondeil (88 Mo. 218),
1174.
Zorger v. Green sburgh (60 Ind. 1),
523.
Zottman v. San Francisco (20 Cal.
98), 5.53, 1171.
Zylstra v. Charleston (1 Bay (S. C),
382), 638, 1260.
COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OP
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS.
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS.
CHAPTEK I.
INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL VIEW.
§ 1. The genus corporation defined.
3. Species of corporations.
3. Subdivisions of public corpora-
tions.
4. Subdivisions of strictly public
corporationa
5. Definition-of the municipal cor-
poration.
6. Definition of the public qiuisi-
corporation.
7. Examples of municipal and
public giWj«i-corporations.
§ 8. Counties.
9. The New England towna
10. The same subject continued,
11. The State.
18. Long Island towns.
13. The development of the mu-
nicipal corporation — (a) In
general.
14 (b) Greece and Rome.
15. (c) Italy and France — The
mediaeval cities.
16. Conclusion.
§ 1. The genus corporation defined. — The definition of a
corporation most familiar to American jurisprudence is that
of Chief Justice Marshall, which declares a corporation to
be " an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law." ' This phrase of the chief justice,
1 The full text of the decision from
which thf quotation in the text is an
extract is as follows : — "A corpora-
tion is an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in con-
templation of law. Being the mere
creature of law it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its
creation confers upon it, either ex-
pressly or as incidental to its very
existence. These are such as are
supposed best to effect the object for
which it was created. Among the
most important are immortality ; and,
if the expression may be allowed,
individuality ; properties by which a
perpetual succession of many per-
sons are considered as the same, and
may act as a single individual. They
enable a corporation to manage its
own affairs, and to hold property
without the perplexing intricacies,
the hazardous and endless necessity
of perpetual conveyances for th6
purpose of transmitting from hand
to hand. It is chiefly for the purpose
of clothing bodies of men in succes-
sion with those qualities and capaci-
ties that corporations were invented
and are in use. By these means a
perpetual succession of individuals
are capable of acting for the promo
2 INTEODirOTDET — HISTOEIOAL VIEW. [§ 1.
however, though forcible and suggestive, is, as Judge Dil
Ion observes,' rather a description than a definition ; and the
same observation may be made of Justice Story's statement
in the same case, that a corporation is an artificia,! person
existing in contemplation of law, and endowed with certain
powers and franchises, which, though they must be exercised
through the medium of its natural members,' are yet consid-
ered as subisting in the corporation itself as distinctly as if it
were a real person.* Chancellor Xent defines a corporation
as " a franchise possessed by one or more individuals who
subsist as a body politic under a special denomination, and
are vested by the policy of the law with the capacity of per-
petual succession, and of acting in several respects, however
numerous the association may be, as a single individual." ' So
Lord Coke had defined a corporation to be " a body to take
in possession framed as to its capacity by policy, and there-
fore called by Littleton (sec. 413) a lody politic; it /is called a
ciEJfporation or body corporate because the persons are made
into a body, and are of capacity to take, grant, etc., by a par-
ticular name." * These definitions, or rather descriptions/are,
however, too general to be of practical use, except as sugges-
tions ; and they insist too much on the theory that a corpora-
tion is strictly a legal or artificial person or individual, ignor-
ing the fact that, while a corporation in most of its relations
acts as a unit, and may therefore- for the most part be con-
veniently regarded as a legal person, it is in many of its rela-
tions properly conceived of as composed of an aggregation of
persons.' As has been said, the effort of practical jurispru-
tidii ot the patticular object like one Corporations, declares that the fiction
immortal being. But this being does of the " legal person " has outlived
not ehare in the civil government of its usefulness, and is no longer ade-
the country, unless that be the pur- quate for the purposes of an accu-
pose for which it was created." rate treatment of the legal relations
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 arising through the prosecution of a
Wheat 636. corporate enterprise. ' In an article
• 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp. 37. in the American Law Review, Pro-
2 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, fessor Pomeroy appi-oves and ampli-
4 Wheat. 518, 667. fies the idea contained in Mr. Tay-
- 3 Kent's Commentaries, 267. lor's remark, and calls attention to
* 5 Co. Litt 250a. the fact that many modem corpora-
s 1 Beach on Private Corp. 8. Mr. tions differ in essentials very little
Taylor, in the preface of his work on from partnerships, except that they
§1.]
INTEODUCTOEY HISTOEICAI, VIEW.
dence should be to regard it as a unit or collection of persons
according to the relation in which it acts in a given instance.'
The most accurate and serviceable definition of a corporation
is, perhaps, that of the earliest writer on the subject, who de-
fines it to be " a collection of individuals united into one body
under a special denomination, having perpetual succession
under an artificial form, and vested by the policy of the law
with the capacity of acting in several respects as an individ-
ual, particularly of taking and granting property, of contract-
ing obligations, and of suing and being sued, of enjoying
privileges and immunities in common, and of exercising a va-
riety of political rights, more or less extensive, according to
the design of its institution or the powers conferred upon it,
either at the time of its creation or any subsequent period of
its existence."*
can Rue and be sued, make contracts,
acquire rights and incur liabilities in
and by their corporate names, and
that a change of membership does
not work their dissolution. He i-e-
marks further that the English
courts have always carefully distin-
guished between the statutory joint-
stock companies with limited liability
(which are practically identical with
the corporations formed under the
statutes of our several States) and
common-law corporations. "Legal
Idea of a Corporation," 19 Am. Law
Rev. 114, 115, 116. So, also, it has
been held in the Supreme Court of
the United States that a suit by or
against a corporation is to be re-
garded for juiTsdictional pui^poses as
a suit by or against the stockholders
of the corporation. Muller v. Dows,
94 U. S. 444. Where the word " per-
sons " is used in a statute, " corpora-
tions are to be deemed and considered
as ' persons ' when the circumstances
in which they are placed are identi-
cal with those of natural persons ex-
pressly included in such statutes."
Bearton v. Farmers' Bank &c., 13
Peters, 134, 135 ; Crafford v. Super-
visors &c., 87 Va. 110.
1 1 Beach on Private Corp. 4. For
explanative discussions of this ques-
tion, see the essay of Prof. Pomeroy
above cited, '"The Legal Idea of a
Corporation," 19 Am. Law Rev. 114,
116, and Lowell on Transfers of
Stock, g 2. Mr. Lowell insists on the
theory that a corporation is strictly
distinct from its members. He says :
" A corporation is distinct from its
members in the same sense that a
State is distinct from its citizens.
The parallel, indeed, between a State
and a corporation is very close."
2Kyd on Corporations, 13. See,
also, for a good definition of a corpo-
ration. Thomas v. Dakin, 32 Wend. 9,
where it is said that a corporation
aggregate is an artificial body of
men composed of divers individuals,
the ligaments of which body are the
franchises and liabilities bestowed
upon it, and which bind and unite
all into one, and in which consists
the whole frame and essence of the
corporation.
4 INTE0D0CTOET HI8TOKI0AL V;iEW. [§ 2.
§ 2. Species of corporations. — For the purposes of this
work, corporations may be properly classified into public and
private corporations. ->This division is recognized by all writers
on the subject, although they differ somewhat in limiting the
precise boundary between the two classes. In the Dartmouth
College case, Mr. Justice Washington discussed at length the
proper method of division of corporations. He said : — " Public
corporations are generally esteemed such as exist for political
purposes only, suclj as towns, ciftes, parishes and counties;
and in many respects they are so, although they involve some
pri te interests ; but, strictly speaking, public corporations
are such only as are founded by the government for public pur-
poses when the whole interests belong also to the government.
If, therefore, the foundation be private, though under the
charter of the government, the corporation is private, however
extensive the uses may be to which it is devoted, either by the
bounty of the founder, or the nature and objects of the institu-
tion. For instance, a bank created by the government for its
own uses, whose stock is exclusively owned by the govern-
ment, is in the strictest sense a public corporation. So a hos-
pital created and endowed by the government for general
charity. But a bank whose stock is owned by private per-
sons is a private corporation, although it is erected by the
government, and its objects and operations partake of a public
nature. The same doctrine may be affirmed of insurance,
canal, bridge and turnpike companies. In all these cases the
uses may, in a certain sense, be called public, but the corpora-
tions are private; as much so, indeed, as if the franchises were
vested in a single person.^ The division suggested by Mr.
' Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Commonwealth v. Lowell Gas Co.,
4 Wheat 518, 668. See, also, on this 13 Allen, 77; McCune v. Norwich
subject, Osborn v. United States Gas Co., 30 Conn. 531; New York
Bank, 7 Wheat. 738 ; Bank of United &c. E. Co. v. Met Gas Co., 63 N. T.
States V. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat 336 ; People v. Morris, 18 Wend. 335,
907 ; University v. Indiana, 14 How. 337 ; Barley v. Mayor, 3 Hill, 381 ;
268; Eundle v. Delaware &c. Canal Ten Eyck v. Delaware &c. Canal
Co., 1 Wall. Jr. 390 ; Bonaparte v. C. Co., 18 N. J. Law, 800 ; Tinsman v.
&C. R. Co., 1 Bald. 305 ; Roanoke R. Belvidere Delaware E. Co., 36 N. J.
Co. V. Davis, 2 Dev. & Bat (N. C.) Law, 148 ; Bennett's Appeal, 65 Pa.
45; Ala. E. Co. v. Kidd, 29 Ala. 221 ; St 342; Foster v. Fowler, 60 Pa St
§ 2.] INTEODUOTOET HISTOEIOAL VIEW. 5
Justice "Washington may, however, be properly modified in
these modern days of immense private corporations, such as rail-
ways, canal companies, telegraph companies and express com-
panies, involving public interests and subject to the orders of
the public, although maintained generally only for private
emolument and of private foundation. The division set forth
in a California case seems to conform more nearly to the
requirements of modern conditions. In that case, corpora-
tions were divided into three classes; the first class being
public municipal corporations, the object of which is to pro-
mote public interests, and which may be called strictly public
corporations ; the second class being quasi-TpnhWo corporations,
which are technically private but are of a quasi-Tpuhlic char-
acter, having in view some public enterprise in which the public
interests are involved and owing certain duties to the public
as such, for example, railroad, turnpike and canal companies ;
and the third class being strictlj'^ private corporations, of pri-
vate foundation, maintained strictly for private emolument and
having in view only strictly private enterprises.' The differ-
ence between strictly private and strictly public corporations
is obvious and radical — the former being formed by the vol-
untary action of the corporators, between whom there exists a
contract whereby each subjects his interest, with certain re-
strictions, to the control of the corporate management for
the accomplishment of the ends for which the company was
formed,^ and the latter not being in the same sense voluntary
associations, and no contract existing between the members.'
The distinction, however, between quasi-puhlio and private
corporations is much less clearly marked. These g^Mas^-public
corporations partake both of the nature of private and of
public corporations. They are private corporations in that
they are voluntary in their inception ; that they are main-
27 ; Bushell v. Com. Ins. Co., 15 Serg. v. Commonwealth, 83 Pa. St 518 ;
& R 186; Directors v. Houston, 71 Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. St 86;
III 318; Miner's Bank v. United Hare's American Constitutional Law,
States, 1 Greene (Iowa), 553 ; Sean v. 600.
Davis, 51 Cal. 406. '■> Bennett's Appeal, 65 Pa. St 242 ;
> Miners' Ditch Co. v. Tellerbach, 37 Foster v. Fowler, 60 Pa St 27 ; Bush-
Cal. 543. ell v. Com. Ins. Co., 15 Serg. & E.
2 Beach on Private Corp. 42 ; Clear- 186 ; People v, Morris, 13 Wend,
water v. Meredeth, 1 WaU. 25; Hays 325, 337; Dean v. Davis, 51 Cal. 40a
6 INTEODtrCTOET HI8TOBI0AL VIEW. [§ 3.
tained for private gain ; and that there subsists a contract be-
tween their incorporators. They are public in that they have
in view a public enterprise in which the pubhc interests are
involved ; in that their property is devoted to a use in which
the public has an interest, and that they are therefore con-
trolled by the public for the common good to the extent of
that interest.' Thd old principle of law enunciated by Chief
Justice Hale, that when " private property is affected with a
public interest it ceases to be jiMds prwaU only," ^ has been
greatly extended and amplified in this country by the doc-
trine of Munn v. Illinois,' which doctrine was further applied
in the line of decisions known as the " Granger Cases " and
the " Kailroad Commission Cases." This doctrine is succintly
stated and the limits of the power of the government over these
quasi-^xib^G corporations is clearly defined in Munn v. Illinois,
where it was said : — " When, therefore, one devotes his prop-
erty to a use in which the public has an interest, he in efifect
grants to the public an interest in that use and must submit to
be controlled by the public for the common good to the extent
of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his
grant by discontinuing the use, but so long 'as he maintains
the use he must submit to the control." *
§ 3. Subdivisions of public corporations.— It is manifest
from the scheme of division indicated in the preceding section
that public corporations are naturally divided into the two
great classes of strictly public and quasv-^uhWc corporations.
The courts of this country, however, although, as shown in the
1 Munn V. Illinois, 94 D. S. 113, 136. water companies. State v. Ironton
• 21 Hargrave's Law Tracts, 78. Gas Co., 87 Ohio St. 45 ; Spring Val-
3 94U. S. 113. ley Water-Works v. Schottler, 110
4 Munn V. Illinois, 94 U. S. 118, 126. U. S. 347, 350. See on this subject, 1
The doctrine in that case was ap- Beach on Private Corp. 34r-37, 55-59 ;
plied to gi-ain elevators. It has been " The Dartmouth College Case and
also applied , to railroads. See the Private Corporations," by William P.
"Granger Cases:" Chicago &c. R. Wells, 9 Am. Bar Assoc. Rep. 239;
Co. V. Iowa (1876), 94 U. S. 155 ; Peik Address by James A. Gareeld, 5 Leg.
u Chicago &c. R. Co. (1876). 164, 178. Gaz. 408; -The Doctrine of Pre-
Also the "Railroad Commission sumed Dedication of Private Prop-
Cases," 116 U. S. 307. It has been erty to Public Use," by -George Tick-
applied to telephones. Hockett v. nor Curtis (John Wiley & Sons, N. Y.,
State, 1)5 Ind. 350. Also to gas and 1881).
§ 3.] INTEODUCTOEY HISTOEIOAL VIEW. 7
preceding section, they have gone to great lengths in enforc-
ing governmental control over quasi-Tpnhlic corporations, have
not generally applied the term "public" or " ^wasi-public " to
such corporations, but have with practical unanimity held that
if the whole interest does not belong to the government, or if
the corporation is not created for the administration of polit-
ical or municipal power, it is a private corporation.' In reading
the cases on this subject, therefore, public corporations are not
generally considered to include what we have denominated
jwasi-public corporations. Leaving for a later portion of the
work the discussion of these* quas'i^Tpublic corporations, we
shall proceed to consider the subdivisions of strictly public
corporations, or, as they are generally denominated in the
cases, public corporations. Public corporations, then, using
the term in the limited sense in which it is used in the text-
books and cases, are subdivided into municipal and public
5'«ffi«i-corporations. /Municipal corporations embrace incorpo-
rated cities, villages and towns, which are full-fledged corpo-
rations, with all the powers, duties and liabilities incident to
such a status; while public g-Mflsi-corporations possess only a
portion of the powers, duties and liabilities of corporations.
As instances of the latter class may be mentioned counties,
hundreds, townships, overseers of the poor, town supervisors,
1 Bundle v. Delaware &c. Canal not necessarily a public corporation.
Co., 1 WalL Jr. 275, 390 ; Vincennes Cleveland v. Steward, 3 Ga 283. And
University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268 ; the fact that a corporation was em-
Bank of United States v. Planters' ployed in the service of the govern-
Bank, 9 Wheat. 907 ; Bonaparte v. C. ment has been held not to make it a
&C. K. Co., 1 Bald. 205 ; Alabama R. public corporation. Thomson v. Bail-
Co. V. Kidd, 29 Ala. 221 ; New York road Co., 9 WalL 579. If the State
&c. R Co. V. Met Gas Co., 63 N. Y. is a stockholder in a corporation or
326 ; Bailey v. Mayor, 3 Hill, 581 ; one of the corpoi-ations, the coi-pora-
Directors v. Houston, 71 IlL 318; tion is not a public corporation.
Miners' Bank v. United States, 1 Bank of United States v. Planters'
Greene (Iowa), 553 ; Ten Eyck v. Del- Bank, 4 Wheat. 205 ; Hutchinson v.
aware &c. Canal Co., 18 N. J. L. 300 ; Western &c. B. Co., 6 Heis. (Tenn.) 634.
Tinsmau v. Belvidere Delaware E. But see, contra, Trustees v. Winston,
Co., 26 N. J. L. 148; McCune v. Nor- 5 St. & P. (Ala.) 17. In South Caro-
wich Gas Co., 30 Conn. 521; Boa- lina a corporation owned in ioio by
noke B. Co. v. Davis, 3 Dev. & Bat the State was held to be a private
(N. C.) 45. It hasbeen held in Georgia corporation. State Bank v, Gibbs, 3
that a corporation deriving part of McC. (S, C.) 377.
its support from the government was
S INTKODUOTOEY HISTORICAL YIEW. [§ 4.
school districts and road districts.* ^t must be borne in mind
that public quasi-coripor&tions and qiuisi-pnhlio corporations
are entirely distinct classes; the former being represented, as
we have said, by townships, counties and such governmental
subdivisions of the State, the latter being represented by cor-
porations, the property of which is devoted to a use in which
the public has an interest, such as railroads, grain elevators,
telegraph companies and similar corporations.
§4. Subdivisions of strictly public corporations. — The
generic difference between these two classes of corporations
lies in the fact that municipal corporations are created at the
request or with the consent of their members, and for the
protaotion of their convenience and welfare, while public quasi-
corporations are merely local subdivisions of the State, cre-
ated by the State of its own sovereign will, without any par-
ti""" lar solicitation or request on the part of the members of the
Corporation, and created almost exclusively with a view to the
policy of the State at large. The municipal corporation is
asked for, or at least assented to, by the people it embraces;
the public quasi-corporation is superimposed by a sovereign
and a, paramount authority.^ From this fundamental differ-
ence in inception flow many minor -and consequential differ-
ences between the two classes of corporations under discus-
sion. These differences will be more fully considered later
herein. The principal differences arise from the fact that pub-
lic g"Mas*-corporations are purely auxiliaries to the State, and
have no powers, duties or liabilities except as conferred ex-
pressly by statute ; and as a result, in many cases municipal
corporations are held responsible for damages to persons in-
jured through negligence or default of the corporation, where
there is no express provision of law to that effect ; ' while
• Talbot V. Queen Anne's County, die v. Proprietors, 7 Mass. 169 ; Adams
50 Md. 245 ; Pulaski County v. Eeeve, v. Bank, 1 Me. 363.
43 Ark. 55; Askew v. Hale (1875), 54 2 Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio
Ala. 639 ; Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, 7 St 109. This case contains a clear
Ohio St 109 ; Bouse v. Moore, 18 discussion of the difference between
Johns. 407; North Hempstead w. municipal and. public gwsi-corpora-
Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109; School tions. See, also, the cases cited in
District v. Wood, 13 Mass. 198 ; the preceding section.
Mower v. Leicester, 9 Masa 352; 'The rule stated briefly seems- to
Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. 352 ; Bid- be, that where a municipal corpora-
§*.]
1NTEOD0CTOET HI8TOEI0AL VIEW.
9
public 5'«as«*-corporations, being mere subdivisions of the State,
and created solely for a public purpose, are not liable in tort
in the absence of a statute expressly creating such liability and
authorizing an action thereon.* The doctrines just enumer-
tion acts for a purpose purely and
essentially public, acts as an agent of
tlie State, and nothing more, the cor-
poration is regarded as a part of the
sovereign State, and cannot be sued
for a tort, unless express permis-
sion by statute to bring such a suit
has been given. But where munic-
ipal corporations act, as private cor-
porations, for the local benefit and
advantage of their members, they
are liable in tort just as a private cor-
poration would ba Mayor &c. of
Memphis v. Lasser, 9 Humph. (Tenn.)
757 ; O'Neil v. New Orleans, 30 La.
Ann. 220 ; Brinkmeyer v. Evansville,
29 Ind. 18T, McConneU v. Dewey, 5
Neb. 585 ; Kenworthy v. IrontOn, 41
Wis. 647; Wallace v. Muscatine, 4
Greene (Iowa), 37.3; Simmes v. St.
Paul, 23 Minn. 408 ; Young v. Com-
missioners of Roads, 2 N. & McC.
(S. C.) 537 ; Curran v. Boston, 151 Mass.
505 ; s. C, 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
506 ; McCombs v. Akron, 15 Ohio, 476 ;
Noonan v. Albany, 79 N. Y. 470 ; s. c,
35 Am. Bep. 540 ; Striling v. Thomas,
60 IlL 265 ; Hewison v. New Haven,
87 Conn. 475 ; Meares v. Wilmington,
9 Ired. Law (N. C), 73 ; Gilmer v. La-
conia, 55 N. H. 130 ; s. C, 20 Am. Rep.
175; Comm'rs of Baltimore Co. v.
Biker, 44 Md. 1 ; Boyd v. Insurance
Patrol, 113 Pa. St 169; Barnes v.
District of Columbia, 91 U. 8. 551 ;
Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U. S. 660; Chi-
cago V. Robbins, 2 Black, 418 ; Mayor
&c. of N. Y. V. Sheffield, 4 Wall. 189;
Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black, .
39 ; Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161 ;
Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 Black,
590 ; Supervisors of Rock County v.
United States, 4 Wall. 485; Peters-
burgh V. Applegarth, 28 Gratt. 321 ;
Kiley v. Kansas City, 87 Mo. 103; Lit-
tle Rock V. Willis, 27 Ark. 573;
McKinnon v. Penson, 25 Eng. L. &
Eq. 457 ; Mei-sey Docks v. Penhallow,
1 H. L. Cas. (N. S.) 93. In New
Jersey, Michigan and South Caro-
lina it is held, as an application of
this principle, that a municipal cor-
poration is not liable in damages at
the suit of one who is injured by its
failure to perform the statutory duty
of keeping highways in repair, no
right of action being expressly given
by the statute. Freeholders &c. v.
Strader, 18 N. J. Law, 108 ; Pray v.
Mayor &c., 33 N. J. Law, 394 ; Detroit
V. Blakeley, 21 Mich. 84 ; s. C, 4 Am.
Rep. 450 ; followed in McCutcheon v.
Homer, 43 Mich. 483 ; S. c, 38 Am.
Rep. 212; Young v. Charleston, 20
S. C. 116; s. C, 47 Am. Rep. 837. But
these cases ai-e opposed to the over-
whelming weight of authority. Gal-
veston V. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118, in
which the' -authorities are exhaust-
ively cited and discussed, and City
of Navasota v. Pearce, 46 Tex. 535,
where a contrary rule was applied, is
deprived of any value. Dillon on
Munic. Corp., § 996 et seq.; Beach on
Contributory Negligence, § 244.
'Sherbourne v. Guba County, 21
Cal. 613 ; s. c.,81 Am. Dec. 151 ; Mower
V. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 ; s. C, 6 Am.
Dec. 63 ; White v. Bond Co., 58 111. 397 ;
S. c, 11 Am. Rep. 63 ; Clark v. -Lincoln
Co. (Wash. T., 1889), 35 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 311 ; Haygood v. Justice,
20 Ga. 485 ; Symonds v. Clay Co., 71
IlL 355 ; Abbett v. Johnson Co., 114
10 INTEODUCTOET HISTOEICAL VIEW. [§ 5.
ated have the support of an overwhelming majority of the
cases on the subject. There are, however, authorities holding
that municipal corporations are not in any case liable in tort
unless such liability is established by express statute.*
§ 5. Definition of the municipal corporation. — In the
English Municipal Corporation Act, 1882, the municipal cor-
poration is, defined to be " the body corporate constituted by
the incorporation of the inhabitant of a borough ; " ^ and in
the same section the borough is defined to be " a city or town
to which this act applies." The municipal corporation has
also been tersely defined to be " the investing of the people of
a place with the local government thereof." ' An old writer has
said : — " The essence of a municipal corporation is constituted
by uniting the several circumstances between a corporation and
other communities." * The meaning of this statement seems to
be, that by combining the characteristics of a community, such
as a city, with those of a corporation, the idea of a municipal
corporation is obtained. Bouvier defines a municipal corpora-
tion to be a public corporation created by the government for
political purposes and having subordinate and local powers of
legislation.' The idea of a municipal corporation has been fre-
Ind. 61 ; Galveston v. Posnainsky, Eep. 472 ; Kincaid v. Hardin Co., 53
62 Tex. 118 ; Woods v. CoTfax Co., 10 Iowa, 430 ; s. c, 36 Am. Rep. 236 ; De-
Neb. 552; Askew v. Hale Co., 54 Ala. troit v. Blakeley, 21 Mich. 84; Turner
639 ; Flori v. St Louis, 69 Mo. 341 ; v. Woodbuiy Co., 57 Iowa, 440 ; Finch
Mitchell V. Rockland, 52 Me. 118; v. Board of Education, 30 Ohio St 37 ;
Conrad v. Ithaca. 16 N. Y. 158 ; Bax- Pray v. Jersey City, 32 N. J. Law, 394.
ter V. Turnpike Co., 22 Vt 123 ; Fowle i Arkadelphia v. Windham, 49 Ark.
V. Common Court of Alexandria, 3 . 139 ; s. C, 18 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
Peters, 398 ; Boyd v. Insurance Patrol, 347; Winbigler v. Los Angeles, 45
113 Pa. St 169 ; Eastman v. Meredith, Cal. 36.
36 N. H. 284; S. 0., 72 Am. Dec. 302; 2 English Municipal Corporations
Dasball v. Olmstead, 80 Minn. 96 ; Act, 1882, § 10.
Brabham ?;. Supervisors of Hurds Co., 'Cudden v. Eastwick, Salk. 183.
54 Miss. 363 ; Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. This definition has been quoted with
351 ; S. C, 23 Am. Rep. 332; White v. approval in People v. Morris (1835),
Chowan Co., 90 N. C. 437 ; S. C. 47 13 Wend. 325, 334,' and in People v.
Am. Rep. 534 ; Watkins v. Preston Co. Hurlbut (1871), 24 Mich. 44
Court, 30 West Va. 657 ; s. C, 20 Am. * Glover on Munic. Corp. 6.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 305; Downing v. 5 2Bouvier's Dictionary, tit "Mu-
Mason Co., 87 Ky. 208 ; s. c, 12 Am. St nicipal Corporation."
§ 5.] INTEOD0OTOBT HISTOKICAL VIEW. 11
quently defined and described by the courts of this country.
Thus it has been said in Missouri that the definition of a munici-
pal corporation would only include organized cities and towns
and other like organizations with political and legislative
powers for the local civil government and police regulation
of the inhabitants of particular districts included in the bound-
aries of the corporation.^ In Pennsylvania a municipal corpo-
ration has been declared to be a public corporation created by
the government for political purposes, and having subordinate
and local powers of legislation ; an incorporation of persons,,
inhabitants of a particular place or connected with a particular
district, enabling them t6 conduct its local civil government,
and to be merely an agency instituted by the sovereign for
the purpose of carrying out in detail the objects of the gov-
ernment.^ In a Tennessee decision it was said that a munici-
pal corporation was a body corporate and politic established
by law to share in the civil government of the country, but
chiefly to regulate the local or internal affairs of the city,
town or district incorporated.' These definitions, though use-
ful, are too narrow to meet the requirements of a broad and
general definition of the idea. The following excellent defini-
tion has been given : — "A municipal corporation is a body pol-
itic specially chartered by the State or voluntarily organized
under a general legislative act, including both territory and
inhabitants, for the purpose of local government subsidiary to
that of the State ; or (as in England) it may be a similar body
which has acquired governmental powers and privileges by
prescription." * Judge Dillon's fine definition leaves little if any-
thing further to be desired. He says : — " We may therefore
define a municipal corporation, in its historical and proper sense,
to be the incorporation by the authority of the government of
the inhabitants of a particular place or district, and authoriz-
ing them in their corporate capacity to exercise subordinate
1 Heller v. Stremmel (1873), 53 Mo. in its broader sense is a body politic,
309. such as a State, and each of the gov-
2 Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St 180. ernmental subdivisions of the State,
3 East Tennessee University v. such as counties, parishes, townships,
Knoxville, 6 Baxt (Tenn.) 166. hundreds. New England towns, and
* Am. & Eng. Encyc of Law, tit. school districts, as well as cities and
" Municipal Corporations," § 1, p. 952, incorporated towns, villages and
- con;inu-iir, "A municipal corporation boroughs."
12 INTEODtrOTOEY — HISTOEICAL VIEW, [§ 6.
specified powers of legislation and regulation with respect to
their local and internal concerns. This power of local govern-
ment is the distinctive purpose and the distinguishing feature
of a municipal corporation proper." * The definition should,
however, be amplified to embrace the weU-settled principle
that the term " municipal corporation " embraces both the
territory and its inhabitants.'' It follows from this definition
that the citizens of the incorporated territory together with
that territory form the municipal *corporation.' Neither the
municipal government nor the officers of that governmervt are
the corporation : they are merely its agents.^ As popularly
and loosely used, the term " municipal corporation " frequently
includes the public g-wasi-corporations, such as counties, school
districts, and like bodies, the nature of which has been dis-
cussed in the preceding sections.
§ 6. Definition of the public quasi-corporation. — The
preceding sections indicate the essential differences between
the municipal and the public g'was^rcorporation. The latter
may be defined to be an involuntary political or civil divis-
ion of the State, created by general laws to aid in the admin-
istration of government.' An eminent judge has said of this
class of corporations : — " They may be considered under our
institutions as g't«as*-corporations with limited powers, co-
extensive with the duties imposed upon them by statute or
usage, but restrained by the general use of authority which
belongs to these metaphysical persons by the common law." *
1 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 20. iams, 3 Bam. & Cress. 163 ; Reginaw.
2 Kelly V. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78; Paramore, 10 Ad. & Ell. 286; Eegina
Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 111. 156 ; v. Mayor &c. of Bridgewater, 10 Ad.
People V. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451. & Ell. 281 ; Eegina v. Mayor &c. of
'Lawber v. Mayor &c. of N. Y., 5 Silverpool, 41 L J. Q. B. 145 ; Regina
Abb. Pr. 335 ; Clarke v. Bochester v. Mayor &c. of Leeds, 4 Q. B. 796 ;
(1857), 24 Bai-b. 446. S. C, Dav. & M. 143 ; Regina v. Thomp-
* Baumgartner v. Hasley, 100 Ind. son, 5 Q. B. 477 ; S. C, Dav. & M. 497.
575 ; Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. ' 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp.,' § 25.
1 ; S. C, 49 Am. Rep. 416 ; Brown v. This definition is applied by Judge
Gates, 15 West Va. 131; Lawber w Dillon to counties only, but it is suffi-
Mayor &c. of N; Y., 5 Abb. Pr. 325 ; ciently general to answer as a deflni-
Clarke v. Rochester (1857), 24 Barb, tion of the class.
446; Regina v. York, 2 Q. B. 847; « Opinion of Parker, C. J., in School
S. a, 2 G. & D. 105 ; Harrison v. Will- District v. Wood, 13 Mass. 192, 197. ■
§ 7.] INTRODDCTOET HISTORICAL VIEW. 13
Counties, townships, school districts, road districts and like
public g'waw^corporations do not usually possess corporate
powers under special charters ; but they exist under general
laws of the State, which apportion the territory of the State
into political divisions for convenience of government, and
require of the people residing within those divisions the per-
formance of certain public duties as a part of the machinery
of the State, and, in order that they may be able to perform,
these duties, vests them with certain corporate powers.*
§ 7. Examples of mnnicipal and public quasi-corpora-
tions.— As may be gathered from the preceding sections, the
distinction between these two classes of corporations is ob-
vious. As a result, however, of looseness of nomenclature in
the statutes of the various States affecting this subject, it is
frequently a matter of doubt to which class a particular cor-
poration should be assigned. Thus where the Missouri statute
provided that no person should be eligible to a certain office
who held office under a municipal corporation, it was held that
the incorporated board of public schools w^as not a municipal
corporation within the meaning of the act.^ And in general
school districts are considered public g'Mas?'-corporations of the
most limited powers.' On the other hand, the constitution of
1 Cooley's Const Lim. 294 In City best promote the welfare of all." See,
of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. also, the cases cited in the preceding
118, a gunsi-corporation is spoken section.
of as "a subdivision of a State, 2 Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309.
created solely for a public purpose, ^ Harris v. School District, 8 Foster
by a general law applicable to all (N. H.), 58. In this case it was said : —
such subdivisions;" and again, as "These little corporations have
being "created to caiTy' out a pol- sprung into existence within a. few
icy common to the whole State, years, and their corporate powers and
and not mainly to advance the in- those of their officers are to" be settled
terest of the particular locality, and by the constructions of the court
to bring advantage or emolument upon a succession of crude, uncon-
to the inhabitants of the munici- nected and often experimental en-
pality." Still again, " they are ere- actments. School districts are in
ated for a public purpose as an agency New Hampshire gttast-corporations
of the State through which it can of the most limited powers known to
most conveniently and effectively the law.'' See, also, Foster v. Lane,
discharge the duties which the State, 30 N. H. 305 ; Giles v. School District,
as an organized government, assumes 81 N. H. 304; Wilson v. School Dis-
to every person, and by which it can trict, 33 N, H. 118 ; Rogers v. People,
14 INTEODtrCTOEY — HISTOEICAL VIEW. [§ 8.
Iowa prohibited a political or municipal corporation from in-
curring indebtedness to an amount exceeding five per cent, on
the taxable property of the corporation, and a school district
township was considered to come within the prohibition.' The
police juries of the Louisiana parishes are considered munici-
pal corporations.^ In the constitution of Wisconsin the term
" municipal corporation" has been held not to include towns;
and consequently, when the same term is used in the statutes
of that State, towns are not consicJfered to be within the mean-
ing of th^ provisions of the statute unless the legislative in-
tent to include them is clear.' The term " city," oT course,
applies only to municipal corporations;* as does the word
" village." ' The District of Columbia is a municipal corpora-
tion.'
§ 8. Counties. — Counties are, of course, to be classified as
public g"Masi-Gorporations under the scheme of division' that
has been indicated in this chapter ; as a county is an involun-
tary civil division of the State created by statute to aid in the
administration of the government. In an Ohio case it is said : —
" Counties are at most but local organizations, which, for the
purposes of civil administration, are invested with a few func-
tions characteristic of a corporate existence. They are local
subdivisions of the State, created by the sovereign power of
the State, of its own sovereign will, without the particular
solicitation, consent or concurrent action of the people who
inhabit them. The former organization (referring to municipal
corporations) is asked for, or at least assented to, by the people
it embraces ; the latter (referring to counties) is superimposed
68 III. 154; Scale v. Chattahooohie Peck, 3 Wis. 714; State v. Milwau-
County, 41 Ga. 325 ; Beach v. Leahy, kee, 20 Wis. 87 ; Watertown v. Cady,
11 Kan. S3. 20 Wis. 501 ; Crane v. Fond du Lac,
1 Winspear v. District Township of 16 Wis. 196. As to what constitutes
Holnian, 37 Iowa, 642; Curry v. Dis- a corporation created "for municipal
trict Township of Sioux City,62 Iowa, purposes," see State v. Le£SngwelI, 54
104 ; Clark v. Thompson, 37 Iowa, Wis. 458.
536. See, also, School District v. * Mitchell v. Treasurer of Franklin
Williams, 38 Ark. 454. County, 25 Ohio St 148.
2 Police Jury of Ouachita v. Mon- * City of Wahoo v. Beeder (Neb.),
roe, 38 La. Ann. 630. 48 N. W. Rep. 1145.
» Eaton V. Supervisors of Manito- * Stoutenburgh v. Eennick, 129 U.
woe County, 44 Wis. 489 ; Morton v. 8. 141.
§8.]
INTEODUCTOKY HISTORICAL VIEW.
15
by a sovereign and paramount authority."* But notwith-
standing this radical difference, the county is much more nearly
allied to the municipal corporation than are other quasi-corpo-
rations, such as school districts, townships and other like bodies,
as the county has a much more compact organization than
those corporations, and possesses generally much fuller powers.
Consequently there is some conflict in th6 decisions as to
whether the term "municipal corporation" should be con-
strued to include counties. In the large majority of cases the
natural division Is followed and counties are not held to be
included by that term.^ But both in Iowa and in Minnesota
counties have been declared to be municipal corporations
within the meaning of statutes affecting such corporations ; '
and a provision in the constitution of Alabama authorizing
" municipal corporations " to take property by right of emi-
1 Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7
Ohio St 109 ; Talbot v. Queen Anne's
County, 50 Md. 245.
2 Askew V. Hale County, 54 Ala.
639 ; S. C, 25 Am. Rep. 730 ; Hamil-
ton County u Mighels. 7 Ohio St. 109 ;
Sherman County v. Simons, 109 U. S.
735; Laramie County v. Albany
Ciounty, 93 U. S. 807 ; Maury County
V. Lewis County, 1 Swan(Tenn.), 236 ;
Barton County v. Walser, 47 Mo. 189 ;
Granger v. Pulaski County, 2fi Ark.
37: Greene County v. Eubanks, 80
Ala. 204 ; Lawrence County v. Kail-
road Co., 81 Ky. 225 ; Talbot tt Queen
Anne's County, 50 Mo. 245 ; Pulaski
County V, Reeve, 42 Ark. 55 ; Soper
V. Henry County, 26 Iowa, 264 ; State
V. LefBngwell, 54 Mo. 458 ; Board of
Park Commissioners v. Common
CouncU of Detroit, 28 Mich. 237. In
t le case just cited Judge Cooley
eaid : — " It is because, where an urban
population is collected, many things
are necessary for their comfort and
pi-otection which are not needed in
■<the country, and which the county
and township organizations, with
their imperfect powers and machin-
ery, cannot well supply, that the
State is then called upon to confer
larger powers, and to make of the
locality a subordinate common-
wealth, which, while it shall perform
for the State, wholly or in part, what
the county and township officers per-
formed befoie, shall also be endowed
with capac'ties to provide for its citi-
zens such matters of necessity or con-
venience as their health, protection,
comfort or enjoyment as a political
community may demand." In Wis-
consin, also, the term "counties" or
"municipal corporations" has been
construed to include only cities and
villages and other strictly municipal
corporations, but not to include'school
districts and like bodies. Eaton v.
Suppi-visors of Manitowoc County, 44
Wis. 489.
3 Iowa &C. Land Co. v. Carroll
County, 39 Iowa, 151 ; Dowlan v.
Sibley County, 36 Minn. 430. In
the latter case the term was used in
the amendment to the constitution
of the State concerning the assess-
ment of property for local improve-
ments.
16 INTEODUCTOEY — HISTOEICAL VIEW. [§ 9.
nent domain was held to include counties.^ In Pennsylvania,
also, a city which was coterminous with a county, and which
had assumed the liabilities of the county, was held to be bound
by a statute imposing a liability on " counties." ^
§ 9. The New England towns.— The New England town
represents an intermediate stage between the municipal and
the public quasirCOTTporation, having many of the powers pe-
culiar to the former class, and at^the same time performing
many of the functions of a township or county, and being
subject in many respects to the limitations of a public quasi-
corporation. It lacks the representative feature that is gen-
erally so essential in the government of a municipal, corpora-
tion. As was said in a Massachusetts decision : — " The marked
and characteristic distinction between a town organization
and that of a city is that in the former all of the qualified
inhabitants meet, deliberate, act and vote in their natural and
personal capacities, whereas in a city government this is all
done by their representatives." ' These towns have only the
powers conferred on them by statute. As was said by Mr.
Justice Gray in the Supreme Court of the United States : —
" Towns in Connecticut, as in the other New England towns,
differ from trading corporations and even from municipal
corporations elsewhere. They are territorial corporations,
into which the State is divided by the legislature from time
to time at its discretion, for political purposes and the con-
venient administration of government ; they have those powers
only which have been expressly cpnferred upon them by stat-
ute, or which are necessary for conducting municipal affairs;
and all the inhabitants of the town are members of the quasi-
corporation." * This plan of municipal government by the
citizens without representation is of course impracticable
when the towns become populous; and accordingly, as the
population of the county increased, regularly incorporated
^ Ex parte Selma ^c. E. R. Co., 45 'Warren v. Charlestown, 3 Gray
Ala. 696. See, also, Askew v. Hale (Mass.), 84, 101. See, also, an interest-
County, 54 Ala. 639; a C, 25 Am. ing essay on the "Municipal Court of
Eep. 730; Greene County v, Eubauks, Boston, and its Justicea," 2 L. Rep.
80 Ala. 304 225.
3 Philadelphia v. Comm'rs, 63 Pa. * Bloomfleld v. Charter Oak Bank,
St. 451. 131 U. 8. 13.
§ 10.] mXEODUOTOEY — HISTOEIOAL VIEW. 17
cities, governed on the principle of representation, were cre-
ated by the legislature; so that in New England the two
classes of municipalities now exist side by side, the smaller
towns being governed and administered by the whole body
of citizens, while the affairs of the larger cities are directed
by a representative body, or common council, such as is to be
found in the cities of other States. The people of New Eng-
land were and stiU are, with reason, much attached to their
peculiar local system of town government, and only adopted
with reluctance the representative system. Thus in Massa-
chusetts the legislature incorporated no city before 1820 ; and
Boston retained its town government, where each citizen had
an immediate voice in the direction of its policy, until 1822,
although it had at that time about seven thc^usand qualified
voters.^ The statutory provisions regulating the powers of
these towns are numerous, and have been frequently judi-
cially construed. They will be considered at length in a sub-
sequent portion of this work.' This peculiar system, exhibiting
an example of pure democracy, has worked well, giving to
these towns an honest, virile and independent government.'
§ 10. The same subject continued. — By some of the earli-
est legislation, under the charter of the province of Massachu-
setts, the- boundaries of all existing towns were confirmed,
and the towns were empowered to assess and levy taxes to
maintain schools and support the poor, and meet other neces-
sary charges, and were declared for the first time capable of
1 Hill V. Boston, 123 Mass. 344 ; while New England towns are invol-
Quincy's Municipal History of Bos- untary corporations, having given no
ton, oh. 1. See, also, as to the sub- assent to their creation, and having
ject of New England towns, Com- been incorporated by virtue of no
monwealth v. Eoxbury, 9 Gray, 451 ; contract, express or implied, with the
1 Swift's System, 116; Eastman v. State.
Meredith, 36 N. H. 384 In the latter 'gee Stetson v. Kempton, 18 Mass.
case it is said that the decisions re- 273 ; Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 375 ;
lating to English municipal corpora- Goolidge r. Brookline, 114 Mass. 593.
tions are but remotely applicable to Judge Dillon has exhaustively dis-
New England towns, inasmuch as cussed this subject in his work on
English municipal corporations are Municipal Corporations, sees. 38-30.
for the most part voluntary corpora- s Quinoy's Municipal History of
tions, between which and the govern- Boston, ch. 1 ; Bryce's American Com-
ment contractual relations exist ; monwealth, chs. XLVHI, '^T.Ty.
18 INTEODUCTOEY HISTOEICAL VIEW. ' [§10.
suing and being sued.' When the constitution of the State
was adopted it was declared that " the inhabitants of every
town within this government are hereby declared to be a body
politic and corporate." ^ In Massachusetts, which may be
taken as the typical ISew England State, no provision was
made for incorporating cities proper until 1820, when the
second amendment to the constitution of that State was
passed.' In Howard's Local Constitutional History of the
United States, we find these intefisting statements regarding
the New England town: — "It was the parish of the Stuarts,
already in some places passing into the hands of an irrespon-
sible oligarchy, the select vestry, with which the pioneers of
New England were acquainted. But it was not this institu-
tion which they introduced into the new world. In the trans-
planting of English local organisms to American soil, two re-
markable phenomena attract attention. On the one hand
there is so much that is new in constitutional names and func-
tions, so much of original expedient and experimentation, as
to render New England town government almost unique,
while, at the same time, its continuity in general outline with
that of the mother country can be plainly discerned. On the
other hand occurs a most interesting example of institutional
1 Prov. Stats. 1692-93 (4 W. & M.), government thereof, and to prescribe
ch. 28 ; 1694-95 (6 W. & M.), ch. 13 ; 1 the manner of calling and holding
Frov. Laws (State ed.), 64, 66, ^81 ; public meetings of the inhabitants in
Anc. Chart, 247, 249, 279. wards or otherwise, for the election
2 Stat. 1785, ch. 75, § 8 ; Eev. Stat., of oflScers under the constitution,
ch. 15, § 8 ; Gen. Stat, ch. 18, § 1. and the manner of returning the
' The second amendment to the votes given at such meetings : Pro-
constitution of Massachusetts pro- vided, that no such government shall
vides that " the general court shall be erected or constituted in any town
have full power and authority to not containing twelve thousand in-
erect and constitute municipal or city habitants, nor unless it be with the
governments in any corporate town consent oh the application of a ma-
or towns in this commonwealth" jority of the inhabitants of such
(thus recognizing the diflference be- town, present and voting thereon,
tween the existing towns and a true pursuant to a vote at a meeting duly
city government), " and to grant to warned and holdeu for that purpose ;
the inhabitants thereof such powers, and provided also, that all by-laws
privileges and immunities, not repUg- made by such municipal or city
nant to the constitution, as the gen- government shall be subject at all
eral court shall deem necessary or times to be annulled by the general
expedient for the regulation and court"
§ ll.J INTEODnOTOET HISTOKIOAL VIEW. 19
retrogression, — many features of the primitive village com-
munity are revived. The colonists go back a thousand years
and begin again; or, to speak with greater accuracy, new life
is infused into customs which, though passing into decay, are
yet not wholly extinct in the old English home. All this is
perfectly natural. It is a case of revival of organs and func-
tions on recurrence of the primitive environment." '
§ 11. The State. — A State is a body politic, or society of
men united together for the purpose of promoting their mut-
ual safety and advantage by the joint efforts of their com-
bined strength.^ In this country, the term is, of course, applied
to the members of the United States. The definition given
above applies to the States of this country ; and it is clear from
that definition that each State is in many important respects
a corporation. Although consisting of many members, it acts
as a unit, under a special denomination, having perpetual suc-
cession under an artificial form, and is vested with the capacity
of acting in many respects as an individual, particularly of
taking and granting property, of contracting obligations, and
of suing and being sued.' But the State is sovereign, and all
other corporations are its creatures (saving the corporations
created by the federal government). The State, therefore,
notwithstanding its similarity or identity in essentials with a
corporation, is not so denominated in the ordinary nomen-
clature of the subject. Thus, in Iowa, it has been held that
the term " bodies political and corporate," as used in the stat-
ute of limitation, does not include the State;* and in Georgia
the State is not included in the term " corporation " used in
the United Statutes revenue statutes.^ The State, being sov-
1 Local Constitutional History of accord." Burlamaqui on Polit. Law,
the United States, by George B. How- ch. 5. See Chisholm v. Georgia. 2
ard, 1889, toI. 1, ch. 3. Dall. 457 ; Des Moines Co. v. Harker.
^Cooley's Const Lim. 1; Vattel, 34 Iowa, 84; Georgia v. Stanton, 0
b. 1, ch. 1, § 1 ; Story on Const; 207 ; Wall. 65.
Wheat Int Law, pt 1, ch. 2, g 2 ; Hal- » See § 1, supra.
leek on Int Law, 63 ; Bouvier'a Law *Des Moines Co. v. Barker, 34
Dictionary, tit " State." It is defined Iowa, 84
by Burlamaquitobe"Amultitudeof '' Georgia v. Atkins, 35 Ga. 815. In
people united together by a com- that case, Erskine, J., conceding that
munion of interest and by common the term in its most comprehensive
laws to which they submit with one signification would comprise a State,
20 INTKODUCTOEY HI8TOEI0AL VIEW. [§ 12.
eign, can only be sued by its own permission and consent;'
and to this consent any conditions may be attached, according
to the pleasure of the State.^ The State may be said to be a
public quasi-coTTporsition, differing from other public quasi-cot-
porations in that it is sovereign and voluntary.
§ 12. Long Island towns. — Long Island towns were a
somewhat different organization. They were nearly all cre-
ated by royal charter. The patejjts were intended not only
to create the corporate bodies and thus clothe the inhabitants
with the power of government, but they also served the pur-
pose of grants, and conveyed to the inhabitants the title to the
land within the town boundaries." There was never any su-
premacy of the Dutch over Long Island at its eastern end,
and the rights and titles of the towns there are all of English
origin, dating to the grant of the Duke of York and the royal
charters issued under his government. These charters usually
granted the lands described to certain named persons as in-
habitants, and created them a body corporate under a given
name, and the charter usually recognized the existence of a
civil community alr.eady occupying the lands granted, having
some form of government, and when it did so the officers of
that government were made patentees ; and it was provided
said : — "So far as my limited re- must be determined just as those of
searches go, I am unable to discover a private person. Bowen v. State, 108
a single case in the Supreme Court, N. Y. 166 ; Green v. State, 73 Cal. 29.
or in any of the circuit or district A suit nominally against an oflQcer,
courts of the United States, wherein but really against a State, to enforce
it has been decided that the term performance of its obligation iu its
" corporation " — body corporate or political capacity, wiU not lia In re
politic — when used in a statute, in- Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 ; Hagood v.
dudes a State, or where the one Southern, 117 U. S. 62 ; Louisiana v.
term is used as a synonym for the Jumel, 107 U. S. 711. But if an offi-
other." cer, claiming to act as such, invade
1 Railroad Co. .v. Tennessee, 101 private right under color of constitu-
U. S. 337 ; Railroad Co. v. Alabama, tional laws, it is otherwise. Poin-
101 U. S. 832; Briscoe v. Bank, 11 dexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. a 270;
Peters, 257. This immunity can, how- Cunniiigham v. Macon &c. R Co.,
ever, be waived by appearing. Clark 109 U. S. 446 ; United States v, Lee,
V. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436. ' 106 U.'S. 196.
2 De Saussure v. Gaillard, 127 U. S. 8 Southampton v. Meuoz Bay Oys-
216. But under those conditions the ter Ca, 116 N. Y. 1.
rights and liabilities of the State
§ 13.] INTEODUOTOEY HISTOEIOAL VIEW. 21
that the lands granted should have relation to the town in
general, "for the well government thereof." But the cases
show conclusively that alterations have been repeatedly made
by act of legislature in the privileges and charters of these
towns, just as if originally created by the legislature.^
§ 13. The development of the municipal corporation —
(a) In general. — It is of course unnecessary and impossible
within the limits of a legal text-book, designed for the use of
practicing lawyers, to make any effort towards giving any but
the barest outline of the interesting history of the develop-
ment of municipalities. It is believed, however, that a brief
sketch of the course of that development will prepare the
mind of the reader for a more intelligent appreciation of the
laws now governing the. corporations of which this volume is
to treat. There have been, of course, since mankind first
emerged from barbarism, gatherings and centers of popula-
tion. These rude and formless bodies gradually obtained a
higher degree of compactness and organization until even in
very remote antiquity there seem to have been cities of great
wealth and splendor, which could only have been maintained
by a system of municipal government by no means contempt-
ible, although in every respect repugnant to modern theories.
The earliest myths and legends that are known to us seem to
recognize the existence of towns and cities ; and the explora-
tions and excavations of modern times, revealing the ruins
and relics of civilizations wholly vanished, show that men
have gathered together for purposes of mutual protection
from the eadiest times. The storied splendors of the prehis-
toric cities of Egypt and India, of Central Asia, of Mexico, of
Central and South America, have been shown to be not wholly
mythical; while in our own country the mound-builders and
the cliff-dwellers, mysterious peoples who have left no trace
on the pages- of history, seem also to have had their towns
and villages. From the faint traces of knowledge that re-
main to us of these prehistoric cities, we can gather little or
1 Broothaven v. Strong, 60 N. T. 565 ; East Hampton v. Kirb, 68 N. Y.
57 ; Hand v. Newton, 93 N. Y. 88 ; 459 ; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. 237 ;
Robins v. Ackerly, 91 N. Y. 98 ; Peo- Atkinson v. Bowman, 42 How. 404
pie i: New York &c. R. Co., 84 N. Y.
22 INTEODUOTOEY -^ HISTOEICAL VIEW. [§ 14.
nothing of their organization. The cities of Egypt and of the
East in general seem to have been the seat of great wealth
and splendor, where the government was in the hands of a
small class, who ruled the masses by the forces of superstition
and military power, and where no niunicipal government in
its modern sense existed. As each nation worked out its de-
velopment and rose in the scale of civilization, a process of
evolution changed the unformed village or country settlement
into a body more highly organiz46, more capable of action as
a unit, — in a word, brought it nearer to the idea of the modern
municipal corporation. This process, of course, has varied
radically in the case of different nations, but its general trend
and effect has been to convert an unorganized into an organ-
ized body ; as the formless mass of protoplasm, helpless and
unorganized, is developed, according to the theories of the
school of modern evolution, into the highly organized and ef-
ficient forms of life to be found in the higher grade of the
animal kingdom.'
§ 14. (b) Greece and Borne. — In the typical Grecian civil-
ization the city was the State. In the earlier stages of Hel-
lenic development, before the corrupting influence of the
Macedonians and the Eomans was felt, each State, with few
exceptions, consisted of a city with a surrounding strip of
farm land, cultivated by the dwellers in the city. These
cities were governed in general by the whole body of free
citizens, who met in the agora and discussed and voted on ques-
tions of domestic and foreign policy. This form of govern-
ment is closely akin in many respects to the present govern-
ment of the New England towns, to which reference has been
made, with the important exception that in the Hellenic cities
the voters were only the free inhabitants of the city, while
the slaves, who generally constituted the large majority of the
population of the city, performed the manual labor, were the
hewers of wood and drawers of water ; so that the free citi-
zens had an abundant leisure to engage in the practical gov-
ernment of their city. It is to be noted that this system, in
spite of the differences, produced the same virile and public-
spirited government that exists to-day in the New England
1 See " History of Municipal Corporations and Boroughs," 13 Law Mag. 401.
§ 14- J IHTEODUOTOKY HISTOEICAL VIEW. 23
towns. With the decadence of the Hellenic civilization before
the power of Eome and Of Macedon, this democratic form of
government Avas superseded by a stifling despotism, and the
formerly autonomous cities and States became mere tributa-
ries and puppets in the hands of foreign powers.' The his-
tory of Home is the history of the greatest municipal corpora-
tion the world has seen. Taking its origin in the city by the
Tiber, the Eoman republic was but a development and an ex-
tension of that city, preserving in many respects the essen-
tially municipal features of the parent government. The
bestowal of Eoman citizenship upon the inhabitants of a con-
quered and assimilated city made those inhabitants members
of the great municipal corporation of which Eome was the
head. The cities subdued under the Eoman dominion were
accorded various degrees of liberty, the municipal towns hav-
ing the full privilege of Eoman citizenship, while the prefect-
ures and colonies enjoyed a lesser freedom. The Eoman
republic, and the empire erected upon its foundations, were
both remarkable for the great power and influence of the
municipalities, in which were centered all of the wealth and
culture of the period — the country villas of the rich being
only summer houses, for the most part, and not permanent
residences. The great city of Eome itself was on the whole
well governed. The plunder of the world had given its citi-
zens unbounded resources to adorn and beautify the imperial
city. Its great aqueducts and sewers, its immense public
baths and public buildings, its arches and its monuments, were
worthy of its power and its greatness. Its citizens had nom-
inally great powers of local self-government ; but these pow-
ers seem to have been for the most part frustrated and evaded,
first by the wealthy patricians with their trains of clients, and
afterwards by the successful generals and statesmen, who
were able by the prestige and power gained by successes
abroad to determine and control the policy of the govern-
ment of the city. Under the empire the autonomy of the
city became an empty name. The servile maxim of the Eoman
law, " Qiiod prvnei^i placuit, legis hdbet vigorem" shows the
spirit of the municipal as well as of the national government.
iSeeHeeren on the Political His- semblies of the AtbeniaDS, 346;
tory of Greece (edit. Oxford, 1834); Grote's History of Greece, vol. II;
§chomann's Dissertation on the As- 1 Kent's Commentaries, 368.
24 INTEOD0OTOBT — HI8T0BICAL VIEW. [§ 15.
The city was at the mercy of the emperors, who were in turn
controlled largely by the insolent soldiery of the Praetorian
Guard. The Eoman populace was lapped into indolence and
degradation by public supplies of food, and were amused by
the great public spectacles furnished at the expense of the
empire. The general decadence and corruption of the times
rendered the great government an easy prey to the fierce and
hardy barbarians who assailed it from every side.^
§15. (c) Italy and France — The mediaeval cities. — In
the anarchy that involved civilization after the fall of the
Eoman empire, the cities preserved what was left of knowl-
edge, of culture and of art. In that unhappy time there
seems to have been .but little semblance of municipal or of
other organized government. The city, like the State, was at
the mercy of roving bands of plundering barbarians, and
only by passive resistance and the power of wealth were they
able to maintain any appearance of government. Out of this
darkness Europe emerged with the rise of Christianity and the
feudal system. In that system the cities played but a sftiall
part. The castle of the baron and not the town hall of the*
burgess was the unit of government. The towns, however,
went on their way, prospering under the security afforded by
the military protection of king and baron, for which the towns
paid by tax and largess. By degrees this brought greater
rights of self-government, until the great cities of Italy and
of the Hanseatic league acquired a complete independence
and became sovereign States. In Italy the great cities of
Venice, Florence, Pisa and Genoa, by the power of wealth
and intellect, became great powers in Europe. The represent-
ative system begins to appear in the government of these
cities, but their rulers were for the most part the commercial
aristocracy. Like all plutocracies, the period of their freedom
was short ; and torn by internal strife, and, betrayed by their
own citizens, they soon became subservient to foreign powers.
In France the towns early obtained a high degree of inde-
pendence. They bought or forced from the king or the feu-
1 Liddell's Rome, ch. 27 ; Lauci- (edit. Oxford), p. 42 ; Recent Excava-
ani's Ancient Rome in the Light of tions of the Roman Forum, 13 Irish
Recent Discoveries ; Guizot's His- Law Times, 346.
tory of the Civilization of Europe
§ 16.] INTEODDOTOET — HISTOEIOAL VIEW. 25
dal barons charters conferring privileges and immunities, and
so became true municipal corporations. THeir government
"was democratic, every citizen, under certain restrictions, voting
on questions of public policy. As the feudal system declined
and the power of the king became absolute, the towns grad-
ually lost their independence, and with the rest of France
became subject to the will of the king, by whose appointees
they were goveened.^ A brief view of the development of
the municipal corporation in England will be given in the next
chapter. Our American municipal corporations are so closely
connected in many respects with their English prototypes that
a more extended consideration than has been given in the case
of other countries will be necessary.
§ 16. Conclusion. — The lesson that is taught froi'n a view
of the course of development of the municipal corporation
seems to be that good government is only to be secured by
the active co-operation of good citizens in the government of
the municipality. A city governed by an aristocracy, whether
of birth or of wealth, though it may be splendidly adorned
with all that wealth and taste can afford, will still lack the
virility and independence that can onlj' be secured by the
active interest of the governed in the government. It will
contain the seeds of decay, that will ultimately cause the de-
cadence of civic spirit and the consequent degradation of its
citizens. On the other hand, where the upper classes, absorbed
in the pursuit of wealth and of pleasure, scornfully neglect the
details of the government of the municipality, the ignorant
and the vicious, controlled by unscrupulous and self-seeking
demagogues, will infallibly plunge the municipal government
into extravagance and corruption. It is to the criminal indif-
ference of the educated classes that is due the great scandals
of maladministration in the populous cities of our country.
The remedy for the evil is obvious and has been pointed out
time and again. The property-owning and tax-paying classes,
who suffer most, from a material point of view, through the
corruption of municipal administration, have the remedy jn
their own hands if they choose to exercise it. By discarding
• See Hallam's Middle Ages, ch. 11, Smith's Wealth of Nations, book VI,
part II; Guizot's History -of Civili- ch. 111.
zation in France, sec. 19; Adam
26 INTEODUOTOET HISTOEIOAL TIEW. [§ 16.
political prejudices, and by taking the active and intelligent
interest in the administration of their public property that
they manifest in the conduct of their private affairs, a clean and
economical municipal administration can be secured. When
the citizens of our great cities recognize the fact that the ad-
ministration of city affairs is a matter of business and not
of politics, and that it is to the advantage of all classes that
the conduct of municipal affairs should be along the same lines
of honesty and of common sense «on which business men man-
age their private enterprises, the day of reform in municipal
administration will be at hand. These truths are trite, but
they are disregarded, and until they are generally acknowl-
edged and put into practice, no permanent reform can be ex-
pected. They have been acted upon in the government of some
cities — notably Glasgow and Berlin — which afford excel-
lent examples of a city government managed as a business and
not as a political enterprise. In our own country the govern-
ment of the great cities is almost entirely in the hands of pro-
fessional politicians, and while their shrewdness has generally
kept them from plunging into the excesses of dishonesty and
crime that characterized the rule of Tweed in New York city,
the whole system of government is maintained on false and
vicious principles, which make the offices of the city govern-
ment the reward for political influence instead of capacity and
honesty, and which pile upon the shoulders of the tax-payer a
heavy burden for an indifferent municipal government.'
1 For intelligent discussions of the City," in 8 Mag. of Am. Hist 598 ;
interesting subject of municipal re- and the same subject is treated in an
form the reader is referred to Mr. article on " Municipal Eef orni in New
J. A. Eoebuck's essE^y on "The Ee- York and the Cumulative Vote," in 8
form of Municipal Corporations," 30 L. Mag. & Eev. (N. S.) 206. An en-
Westminster Review, 48 ; to " Con- tertaining and instructive account of
siderations on Municipal Govern- the great Tweed conspi*acy will be
njent," 95 Fraser's Mag. 34 ; and to found in a series of articles by Mr.
an intelligent discussion of the sub- C. F. Wingate on " The Tweed Ring,"
ject of " Municipal Government " by to be found in 119 N. A. Rev. 859 ; 120
Mr. Dorman B. Eaton in 5 American N. A. Rev. 119; 121 N. A. Rev. 113;
Journal See. Sci. 1. The municipal , and 123 N. A, Rev. 362 ; and in an
government of New York city is essay by Mr. Samuel J. Tilden on
fully analyzed in an essay by Mr. " Municipal Corruption — The New
John Franklin Jameson on "The York Ring," 2 Law Mag. & Rev.
Origin and Development of the Mu- (N. S.) 225.
nicipal Government of New York
CHAPTEE n.
OF THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION.
17,
18.
19
20
21.
22.
23.
25.
2&
27.
30.
31.
32.
33.
84
85
36.
37.
sa
The Teutonic town.
The old English town.
T^ie same subject continued.
oruilds.
The English boroughs.
The same subject contmued.
Creation of modei-n English
municipal corporations.
Municipal corporations created
by charter from the crown.
Municipal corporations created
by act of parliament
Municipal corporations at com-
mon law and by prescription
in England.
Municipal corporations by im-
plication in England.
The Municipal Corporations Re-
form Act of 1835.
TheMunicipal Corporations Act
of 1882.
The American town.
The power to create municipal
corporations in the United
States — Where vested —
(a) In the State.
(b) In the federal government.
Municipal corporations created
by the federal government —
(a) Territories.
(b) The District of Columbia.
Municipal corporations by pre-
scription in the Uni ted States.
The same subject continued —
Instances of incorporation
by prescription in the United
Statea
Municipal corporations by im-
plication in the United
States.
The same subject continued.
§ 39. Creation of municipal corpora^
tions in the United States —
(a) In general :
40. (b) By special charter.
41. (c) By general municipal incor-
porating acts.
42. Constitutional limitations of
legislative power to create
municipal corporations.
43. Construction of such constitu-
tional limitations — (a) Cor-
porations for " municipal
purposes " and " bodies poli-
tic or corporate."
44 (b) " Corporate powers.''
45. Miscellaneous instances of such
constitutional limitations.
46. Incorporation by courts.
47. The same subject continued.
48. Classes of cities under general
incorporating acts.
49. The corporate limits — Terri-
tory of the corporation.
50. Acceptance of charters by cor-
porators not necessary.
51. The same subject continued.
52. Substantial compliance with in-
corpoi'ating acts necessary.
53. Instances of irregularities in
incorporation.
54 Notice of incorporation.
55. Validity of incorporation —
How tested.
66. The same subject continued.
57. The charter of a municipal cor-
poration is a law.
58. The American township.
59. Local self-government a dele-
gation of legislative power.
60. The same subject continued.
28 OEEATION OF THE OOEPOEATION. [§ 17.
§ 17. The Teutonic town. — The germ from which the great
cities of the Anglo-Saxon peoples have developed is to be found
in what a modern English historian calls the " farmer common-
wealths" of the primitive Teutons on the continent ot Europe.
In Sleswick, in the fifth century, we find the first historical
record of Englishmen known as such. The same historian to
whom we have referred gives a graphic and interesting de-
scription of the government of these early forefathers of our
nations. " The blood-bond gave beth its military and social
form to old English society. Kinsmen fought side by side in
the hour of battle, and the feelings of honor and discipline
which held the host together were drawn from the common
duty of every man in each little group of warriors to his
house. And as they fought side by side on the field, so they
dwelled side by side on the soil. Harling abode by Harling
and Billing by Billing ; and each ' wick ' or ' ham ' or ' stead '
or ' tun ' took its name from the kinsmen who dwelt together
in it. The home or ' ham ' of the Billings would be ' Billing-
ham,' and the ' tun ' or township of the Harlings would be
Harlington. But in such settlements the tie of blood was
widened into the larger tie of land. Land with the German
race seems at a very early time to have become the accom-
paniment of full freedom. The freeman was strictly the free-
holder, and the exercise of his full rights as a free member of
the community to which he belonged was inseparable from
the possession of his ' holding.' The landless man ceased for
all practical purposes to be free, although he was no man's
slave. In the very earliest glimpse we get of the German
race we see them a race of land-holders and land-tillers. Taci-
tus, the first Eoman who sought to know these destined con-
querors of Eome, describes them as pasturing on the forest
glades around their villages and ploughing their village fields.
A feature which at once struck him as parting them from the
civilized world, to which he himself belonged, was their hatred
of cities, and their love, even within their little settlements, of
a jealous independence. ' They live apart,' he says, ' each by
himself, as woodside, plain or fresh spring attracts him.' And
as each dweller within the settlement was jealous of his own
isolation and independence among his fellow settlers, so each
settlement was jealous of its independence among its fellow
§ 17.] OEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION. 29
settlements. Of the character of their life in this early world,
however, we know little save what may be gathered from the
indications of a later time. Each little farmer commonwealth
was girt in by its own border or ' mark,' a belt of forest or
waste or fen, which parted it from its fellow villages, a ring
of common ground which none of its settlers might take for
his own, but which sometimes served as a death ground where
criminals met their doom, and was held to be the special
dwelling-place of the nixie and the will-of-the-wisp. If a
stranger came through this wood or over this waste, custom
bade him blow his horn as he came, for if he stole through
secretly he was taken for a foe, and any man might lawfully
slay him. Inside this boundary the ' township,' as the village
was then called, from the ' tun ' or rough fence and trench
that served as its simple fortification, formed a ready-made
fortress in war, while in peace its intrenchments were service-
able in the feuds of village with village or house with' house.
Within the village we find from the first a marked social dif-
ference between two orders of its in-dwellers. The bulk of
its homesteads were those of its freemen or 'ceorls,' but
amongst these were the larger homes of 'eorls,' or men dis-
tinguished among their fellbws by noble blood, who were held
in an hereditary reverence, and from whom the leaders of the
village were chosen in war time, or rulers in time of peace.
But the choice was a purely voluntary one, and the man of
noble blood enjoyed no legal privilege among his fellows. The
holdings of the freemen clustered around a moot hill or
sacred tree where the community met from time to time to
order its own industry and to frame its own laws. Here
plough-land and meadow-land were shared in due lot among
the villagers, and field and homestead passed from man to
man. Here strife of farmer with farmer was settled accord-
ing to the ' customs ' of the township, as its ' elder men ' stated
them, and the wrong-doer was judged and his fine assessed by
the kinsfolk; and here men were chosen to follow headman
or ' ealderlnan ' to hundred court or war. It is with a rever-
ence such as is stirred by the sight of the headwaters of some
mighty river that "one looks back to these tiny moots where
the men of the village met to order the village life and the
village industry, as their descendants, the men of a later Eng-
30 CREATION OF THE COEPOBATION. [§ 18.
land, meet in parliament at Westminster" to frame laws and
do justice for the great empire that has sprung from this little
body of farmer commonwealths in Sleswick." ^
§ 18. The old English town.— The same form of govern-
ment described in the preceding section was carried by the
Angles, the Saxons, and the Jutes to Britain. " War was no
sooner over than the warrior settled down into a farmer, and
the home of the peasant churl ros&»beside the heat of goblin-
haunted stones that marked the site of the villa he had burnt.
Little knots of kinsfolk drew together in 'tun' or 'ham'
beside the Thames and the Trent as they had settled beside
the Elbe or the Weser, not as kinsfolk only, but as dwellers
in the same plot, knit together by their common holding
within the same bounds. Each little village commonwealth
lived the same life in Britain as its farmers had lived at home.
Each had its moot hill or sacred tree as a centre; its 'mark'
as a border; each judged by witness of the kinsfolk, and made
laws in the assembly of its freedmen, and chose the leaders
for its governance, and the men who were to follow headrtian
or ealderman to hundred court or war." " The necessities of
war and conquest, however, modified this primitive and demo-
cratic form of government. The temporary war leader of
the earlier times became a permanent king ; and a military
nobility of " thegns " sprang up around him. The nobility
gradually superseded the ealdermen of the primitive society.
Under the king and the " thegns " the powers of the towns-
men became less. Local self-government was no longer as
absolute as it had been. The beginnings of a feudal system
were to be seen. With the Conquest and the attendant in-
crease in power of the military classes, and the consequent
temporary subjugation of the masses, the towns continued to
lose the free and independent system of self-government so
characteristic of the Teutonic townships. The feudal system
was for the time firmly established in England, and in that
system, as has been said, towns played but a small part. Thus,
the municipal system of England became affected by Norman
1 Green's Short Histoiy of the Eng- 2 Green's Short History of the Eng-
lish People (Harper & Bros., ed. 1889), lish People (Harper & Bros., ed.
sec. I, p. 3. 1889), sec. II, p. 15.
§ 19.] CEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION. 31
principles of government which were based on the Eoman
law. This fact explains why the commons had so little voice
in the creation of corporations in England for so long; for the
Norman nobles and clergy controlled all the departments of
state, and William the Conqueror aT»d his sons were thorough
Normans in their predispositions and prejudices. The Norman
cities gained their charters slowly. Rouen and Falaise are
said to have been the first incorporated towns in that dH-chy,
their privileges being acquired by grant in 1207. The char-
acteristic of the earlier English charters, being in fact conces-
sions from a military superior to his subjects, was that they
conferred the right to protection of person and property,
rather than any right of self-government.'
§ 19. The same subject continued. — That right the people
were not yet disposed to demand. They were not yet in a
position to defend themselves, and security of life and prop-
erty seemed a great enough boon to acquire. But as the na-
tion became settled, and communities gained wealth by trade,
they were encouraged to beg, buy or demand greater priv-
ileges,— more voice in their own private local affairs, — so,
little by little, local self-government again became the feature
of municipalities, after so long an abeyance that it is often
deemed to have had its origin at this point in history." And
1 History of Municipal Corpora^ pal corporations called 'boroughs'
tions and Boroughs, 13 L. Mag. 401. became more and more conspicuous.
See, also, as to Scotch municipalities. The arrangement just mentioned in
" Municipal Corporations in Scot- relation to tolls and duties seems to
land," 24 Westm. Kev. 156. have suggested the idea of a bor-
2 "We quote here the desci-iption of ough, considered as a corporation,
the rise of municipalities given in Some of the principal inhabitants of
Angell and Ames' treatise on the Law a town undertook to pay the yearly
of Private Corporations, in the intro- rent which was due to the superior,
duction : " § 21. In the reign of and in consideration of which they
Henry the First of England, who were permitted to levy the old duties,
was a contemporary of Louis le Gros, and become responsiblefor the funds
the inhabitants of London had be- committed to their care. As man-
gun to form their tolls and duties, agers of the community, therefore,
and they obtained a royal charter for they were bound to fulfill its obliga-
that purpose. The example of Lon- tions to the superior, and by a very
don was soon followed by the other natural extension of the same princi-
trading towns, and from this time pie, it was finally understood that
forward the existence of the munici- they might be prosecuted for all its
32 CEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION. [§ 19.
in the great struggles for liberty and law by which the Eng-
lish people wrested from king and priest their birth-right of
freedom, the towns were always arrayed against ;srbitrary
power. " In the silent growth and elevation of ths. English
people the boroughs led the way ; unnoticed and despised by
prelate and noble, they had alone preserved or woi* back again
the full tradition of Teutonic liberty. The rights of, self-gov-
ernment, of free speech in free meeting, of equal justice by
one's equals, were brought safely Across the ages of tyranny
by the burghers and shop-keepers of the towns. In the quiet,
quaintly-named streets, in town-mead and market place, in
the lord's mill beside the stream, in the bell that swung out its
summons to the crowded borough-mote, in merchant-gild, and
church-gild and craft-gild, lay the life of Englishmen who
were doing more, than knight and baron to make England
what she is, the life of their home and their trade, of their
sturdy battle with oppression, their steady, ceaseless struggle
for rights and freedom. It is diffilcult to trace the steps by
which borough after borough won its freedom. The bulk of
them were situated in the royal demesne, and, like other ten-
ants, their customary rents were collected and justice admin-
istered by a royal officer. Amongst our towns London stood
chief, and the charter which Henry granted it became the
model for the rest. The king yielded the citizens the right of
justice ; every townsman could claim to be tried by his fellow-
townsmen in the town court or hustings, whose sessions took
place every week. They were subject only to the old English
trial by oath, and exempt from the trial by battle which the
Normans had introduced. Their trade was protected from
toll or exaction over the length and breadth of the land. The
king, however, still nominated in London, as elsewhere, the
portreeve or magistrate of the town, nor were the citizens as
debts. The society was thus viewed pense with the protection of their
in the light of body politic, or ficti- superior; and took upon themselves
tious person, capable of legal acts to provide a defense against foreign
and executing every kind of transac- invaders, and to secure their internal
tion by means of trustees. This al- tranquillity. In this manner they
teration in the state of English towns ultimately became completely in-
was accompanied by many other im- vested with the government of the
provements; they were placed in a place."
condition that enabled them to dis-
§ 20.] CEEATION OF THE OOEPOEATION. 33
yet united together in a commune or corporation ; but an im-
perfect civic organization existed in the 'wards' or quarters
of the town, each governed by its own alderman, and in the
' gilds ' or voluntary associations of merchants or traders,
which insured order and mutual protection for their members.
Loose, too, as these bonds may seem, they were drawn firmly
together by the older English traditions of freedom which the
towns preserved. In London, for instance, the burgesses gath-
ered in town-mote when the bell swung out from St. Paul's,
to deliberate freely on their own affairs under the presidency
of their aldermen. Here, too, they mustered in arms if dan-
ger threatened the city, and delivered the city banner to their
captain, the Norman baron, Fitz-Walter, to lead them against
the enemy. Few boroughs had as yet attained to power such
as this, but charter after charter during Henry's reign raised
the townsmen of boroughs from mere traders, wholly at the
mercy of their lord, into customary tenants, who had pur-
chased their freedom by a fixed rent, regulated their own
trade, and enjoyed exemption from all but their own justice." '
§ 20. Guilds. — In England, as indicated in the preceding
section, the increase and encouragement of commerce was at
the basis of municipal rights. For, long before municipalities
acquired their chartered privileges, associations of tradesmen
secured from the crown, for a consideration, franchises and
privileges in the line of their particular business. These guilds
were little centres of trade, — around them towns grew up, —
the members of the guild being electors or franchise-holders
in the towns. To these towns, as their trade-homes, they be-
came attached. The town and guild became more and more
identified, and eventually the privileges they sought were for
the towns themselves, — and these privileges were given by
the king in charters. The privileges conferred in these char-
ters were sufficient to build up a class rivaling in power the
great lords and barons. Glover traces the successive steps of
the English municipality in the introduction to his work on
Municipal Corporations, saying: " Eespecting the early con-
stitution of municipal corporations in England and "Wales, it is
1 Green's Short History of the English People (Harper & Broa, ed. 1889),
sec. VI, p. 9&
8
M OEEATION OF THE' COEPOEATION. [§21.
certain that many of their institutions were established in
practice long before they were settled by law. In some places,
as at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Carlisle and Sc&rborough, the
forms of the municipal government were defined by an ex-
press composition between the magistracy and the people."
The same writer continues : " It is probable that the powers
of government in all ordinary cases were exercised by the
superior magistracy, but that in extraordinary emergencies
the whole body of burgesses was Sailed upon to sanction the
measures which interested the community. The difficulty of
conducting business in such an assembly seems to have sug-
gested the expedient of appointing a species of committee,
which acted in conjunction with the burgesses, and which was
dissolved when the business was concluded." These boroughs,
thus organized, had subsequently representation in parliament.
Later, as they acquired influence in parliament, they were
able to modify the character of its laws. 'New principles took
root, — the people were having a voice in the making of the
laws that were to affect them, so that equality and public
good were increasingly prevailing considerations in legislation.'
§ 21. The Englisli boroughs. — The development of the
English boroughs under the influence of civic spirit made
formidable by the power of commerce and wealth is clearly
traced by Mr. Green is his admirable History of the English
People. First came the " frith-guild " or peace-club, a volun-
tary association of neighboring land-owners for the purposes
of order and self-defense. This rude organization is but a step
removed from the primitive Teutonic town. In the beginning
these early English boroughs were but gatherings of farmers.
The first Dooms of London provide especially for the recov-
ery of cattle belonging to the citizens. But with the growth
of commerce and the security of peace, which enabled each
peasant farmer to dwell apart on his own field,, the town and
the country were more sharply distinguished. The frith-guilds
1 Glover, cited above, treats fully municipal institutions tothe Munici-
<rf the history and growth of mu-./pal Corporations Act (5 & 6 Will
nicipalities in England, Wales, Scot- lY.). See, also, Hallam's Middle Ages,
land and Ireland. Judge Dillon, in vol. Ill, ch. YIII ; 1 Stephen's Eng-
his introductory, historical view (Dil- lish Constitution, ch. Ill, p. 62.
Ion on Mania Corp., ch, 1), traces
§ 21.J OEBATION OF THK COEPOEATIOIT. 33
became merchant-guilds. The active members of these guilds
were the landed burghers — land-owners as well as merchants.
Around. them gathered a mass of new settlers, "composed of
escaped serfs, of traders without landed holdings, of fanailies
who had lost their original lot in the borough, and generally
of the artisans and the poor, who had no part in the actual
life of the town." The burgher class, secure in their wealth
and their land, ground the faces of the landless artisans, who
for protection formed," craft-guilds " or associations of artisans,
the prototypes of the labor unions of modern times. These
associations of workingmen, gained charters from the king,
and thus obtained a legal standing in the civic government.
The struggle between these " craft-guilds " and the old and
powerful " merchant-guilds " was lon'g and bitter. Little by
little the monopoly of power over trade and the municipal
government, which the merchant-guilds had gained, was wont
from them by the craft-guilds, which in time obtained an al-
most absolute control of trade, and stand with the merchant-
guilds in the government of the municipality.' As these Eng-
lish boroughs, towns and cities developed, charters were ob-
tained from time to time from the crown. In the beginning
they were not incorporated and could not be called bodies pol-
itic ; nor were they represented in parliament. The charter
of London was granted by Henry I. during the early years of
the twelfth century, and was secured afterwards by express
provision of Magna Charta; in fact all of the privileges
granted by the borough charters were of a local character in
every respect. Judge Dillon in the portion of his work just
cited gives an excellent historical sketch of the English bor-
oughs, to which the reader is referred. The material for this
section is largely taken from that sketch. During the reign
of John, indeed, the principal towns and boroughs received
charters and the power of local self-government.* But it was
not until Edward L that the right of electing representatives
1 Green's Short History of the Eng- ch. Ill, p. 62: "The principal Ijb-
lish People (Harper & Bros., ed. 1889), erties granted in the early charters
oh. rv, sec. IV, pp. 193, 201. See, are exclusive jurisdictions, a mer-
also, Brentano's Essay, prefixed to chant-guild, the appointment of the
'' Ordinances of English Guilds." various ofl3cers for the administration
^Dillon on Munic Corp., § 8, quot- of justice, fairs and marketed with
ing 1 Stephen's English CJonstitution, freedom from all tolls."
36 CEEATION OF THE COKPOEATIOK. [§ 22.
in parliament was formally accorded to the boroughs,* al-
though as early as A. D. 1265, Earl Simon of Montford sum-
ford summoned two citizens from each borough to sit in
,parliament. Until the time of Edward I., however, these bur-
gess-members attended irregularly and had but a slight in-
fluence. That king driven by need of money to carry on
the Avars of his reign, summoned two burgesses from " every
city, borough and leading town." These burgesses were at
first the active supporters of the king. He used them to
break the power of the great barons of the realm ; and the
burgesses in turn sought the protection of the king against
the oppression of the nobility. But with the advance of the
autocratic power of the king under the Tudors and the Stu-
arts, these burgesses stood out as leaders in the fight for the
liberties of the people. Under Charles II. the municipal cor-
porations of England were the especial objects of royal dis-
pleasure. The city of London and many other municipalities
were deprived of their charters by process of quo warrcmto.
But under "William and Mary the charters of these cities were
restored.
§ 22. The same subject continued. — Many of these bor-
oughs, however, early lost the independence which had char-
acterized their early government. " The borough franchise
was suffering from the general tendency to restriction and
privilege which in the bulk of towns was soon to reduce it to
a mere mockery. Up to this time (the fifteenth century) all
freemen settling in a borough and paying their dues to it be-
came, by the mere settlement, its burgesses; but from the
reign of Henry the Sixth this largeness of borough life was
roughly curtailed. The trade companies, which vindicated
civic freedom from the tyranny of the older merchant guilds,
themselves tended to become a narrow and exclusive oli-
garchy. Most of the boroughs had by this time acquired civic
property ; and it was with the aim of securing their own en-
joyment of this, against any share of it by 'strangers,' that
the existing burgesses for the most part procured charters of
incorporation from the crown, which turned them into a close
> Green's Short History of the English People (Harper & Bros., ed.
ch. iy, sec. II, pp. m-179.
§ 22.] OEBATION OF THIS OOEPOEAnON, 37
body, and excluded from their number all who were not bur-
gesses by birth, or who failed henceforth to purchase theif
right of entrance by a long apprenticeship. In addition to
this narrowing of the burgess-body, the internal government
of the boroughs had almost universally passed, since the failure
of the communal movement in the thirteenth century, from the
free gathering of the citizens in borough-mote into the hands of
common councils, either seltelected or elected by the wealth-
ier burgesses ; and it was to these councils, or to a yet more
restricted number of ' select men ' belonging to them, that
clauses in the new charters generally confined the right of
choosing their representatives in parliament. It was with this
restriction that the long process of degradation began which
ended in reducing the representation of our boroughs to a
mere mockery." ' Thus in the course of time the system of
borough representation in England became rotten with abuses.
The famous Keform Act of 1832 abolished in great measure
the abuses of the system, by placing the government of the
' boroughs in the hands of a larger electorate, and by doing
away with many of the " pocket boroughs " which had dwin-
dled into petty villages, owned by neighboring land-lords, for
whose personal ends the burgesses were elected. In 1835 the
Municipal Corporations Keform Act ^ restored to the mem-
bers of municipal corporations the rights of local self-govern-
ment, of which they had been deprived since the fourteenth
century. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1882 consoli-
dated and codified all the previous legislation on the • subject
of municipal corporations in England.'
1 Green's Short History of the Eng- chises of the City of London ; 3 Hal-
lish People (Harper & Bros., ed, lam's Middle Ages, ch. VIII, part I ;
1889), ch. VI, sec. 1, p. 373. 1 Stephen's English Constitution,
2 5 & 6 WilL IV., ch. 76. ch. Ill ; Hearn's Government of Eng-
' For a full treatment of the inter- land, ch. XV ; Willcook's Municipal
esting subject outlined in the preced- Corporations, 513 ; Glover on Coi-p.,
jng sections, see Dillon on Munic. XXXVIII; Crabbe's History of Eng-
Corp., in loco; Green's Short His- lish Law, ch. 8; 1 Blackstone's
tory of the English People (Harper & Commentaries, 114 ; 3 Kent's Com-
Bros., ed. 1889), pp. 92-95, 139, 156, mentaries, 378; Vaughan's Revolu-
177,194-301,373, 403,663, 843; Nor- tions in English History, book 3, ch.§;
ton's Commentary on the History, Frothingham's Rise of the Republic,
Coostitutiou and Chartered Fran- 14.
33
OEEATION OF THE OOEPOEATION.
t§
§ 33. Creation of modern English municipal corporations.
The modern English municipal corporation is created either
by charter granted by the king under the general provisions
of the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882 or by act of parlia-
ment. The general statute provides that if, on the petition to
the queen of the inhabitant householders of any town or towns
or district in England, or of any of those inhabitants, praying
for the grant of a charter of incorporation, her majesty, by
the advice of her privy counci* thinks fit by charter to cre-
ate such town, towns or district, or any part thereof spieoi-
fied in the charter with or without any adjoining place, a mu-
nicipal borough, and to incorporate the inhabitants thereof, it
shall be lawful for her majesty by the charter to extend to
that municipal borough and the inhabitants thereof so incor-
porated the provisions of the Municipal Corporations Act.^
1 Municipal Corporations Act of
1882, § 310. The crown has always
possessed, says an English writer, the
power of creating corporations and
conferring franchises (see 1 Kyd on
Corporations,' 61) ; but where privi-
leges and powers are to be conferred
Which are not recognized by the com-
mon or statute law, an act of parlia-
ment is necessary. This act (the Mu-
nicipal Corporations Act of 1883),
though even without the saving pro-
vision contained in section 359 it
woijld not at all abridge the common-
law prerogative of the crown, never-
theless prevents its granting charters
of incorporation with the powers con-
ferred by this act, save with the, ad-
vice of the privy council and on pe-
tition by " the inhabitant household-
ers." Eawlinson's Municipal Corpo-
rations Act (8th ed. by Thomas Geary,
1884), p. 393, nota The saving pro-
vision mentioned prescribes that
nothing in this act shall prejudicially
afEect heir majesty's royal preroga-
tive, and the enabling provisions of
this act shall be deemed to be in ad-
dition to and not in derogation Of the
powers exercisable by her majesty
by virtue of her royal prerogative.
Municipal Corporations Act of 1883,
§ 359. Of this provision the. same
writer from whom we have quoted
says: "This seems merely re-affirming
the old doctrine that the crown is not
affected by any statute unless ex-
pressly named therein." Bawlinson'S
Municipal Corporations Act (8th ed.
by Thomas Geary, 1884), p. 339, note.
See on this topic generally, "Munici-
pal Corporations — How Organized
and Dissolved," a note by H. B. John-
son, 18 Am. L. Eeg. (N. 8.) 43. See
on the subject of the common-law .
prerogative of the crown to grant
charters: Butter v. Chapman(in error),
in the Exchequer Chamber, 8 M.
& W. 1; Eegina v. Mayor of Aber-
avon, 11 L. T. (N. S.) 417 ; S. C, 11
W. R. 90. It is further provided that
eveiy petition for a chapter under this
act shall be referred to a committee
of the lords of her majesty's privy
council ; and that at least one month
before the petition is taken into con-
sideration by the committee, notice
thereof and of time at which it will
be so taken into consideration shall
be published in the London Gazette
§ 24.] OEEATION OF THE OOEtOEATIOlT. 39
The corporation created by charter from the crown under the
general statute possesses in general all the common-law pow-
ers and qualities of a corporation, except as limited by express
provision of the charter,' while parliament has power to con-
fer upon the corporations created by its act special and un-
usual powers not incident to common-law corporations.^
§ 34. Municipal corporations created by charter from the
crown. — This class of corporations, as indicated in the pre-
ceding section, possesses the powers and attributes of com-
mon-law corporations, and no other. These powers and attri-
butes are of course subject to the restrictions imposed by the
charter. It is a fundamental principle that the crown can
impose no charter upon a community without the acceptance
and consent of the people of the community. "And as ac-
ceptance was necessary to make the king's charter operative,
it will be found that the municipal charters which he gave
were all given to existing communities, having a recognized
and organized existence, and in the habit of acting as one
body through elections or agencies and officers. So far as we
can judge from history, they were to all intents and purposes
already as complete corporations for all practical purposes as
are simpler municipal bodies, and accustomed to what was
practically corporate action, and known as g'wasi-corporations.
But even these could get nothing from the royal grant but
liberties or franchises. Any coercive or exclusive power,
which by the principles of the common law could not be
granted by the king's charter, could only be given by act of
parliament." ' A royal charter is a formal authorization, doc-
and otherwise as the committee di- ^ Rawlinson's Municipal Corpora-
rect, for the purpose of making it tions Act (8th ed. by Thomas Geary,
known to all persons interested. Mu- 1884), p, 293, note (d) ; "Willcock on
nicipal Corporations Act of 1883, Munic. Coip. 63, 64 ; 1 Kyd. on Cor-
§ 311. porations, 61 ; Dillon on Hunic. Cori>.
1 See for American cases on the 83 ; Glover on Munic. Corp. 84
powers of corporations created by ^1 Kyd on Corporations, 61. See
charter from the crown : People v. Patterson v. Society &c., 34 N. J. L.
Bennett, 29 Mich. 451 ; s. c, 18 Am. 385 ; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H.
Rep. 107 ; Paterson v. Society &e., 34 384 ; People v. Bennett, 39 Mich. 451 ;
N. J. Law, 385. See, also, 1 Kyd, 61 ; Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, tit " Mu-
Willcock on Mun. Corp. 30 ; Angell nicipal Corporations," p. 956,
& Ames on Corp., § 69,
40 OKKATION OF THE COEPOEATION. [§ 25.
umentary in form, under the great seal, to the persons named
therein, to incorporate themselves in a certain place and for
certain purposes. It is addressed to all the subjects of the
king. The king's charter is wholly inoperative until the per-
sons named therein as incorporators accept it. Their assent
is essential to give life to the charter, and this assent must be
to the very charter proffered them. In case of partial accept-
ance the charter avails nothing, unless the modification be
approved'by the king. In the cas© of a new corporation, how-
ever, a partial acceptance is considered an acceptance of the
whole charter. It is said to have been a settled principle at
common law that the king had a prerogative right to grant
charters — municipal as wefU as private. But this only meant
that he had a prerogative to confer privileges. He had no
power to impose political obligations on any person or com-
munity, unless they were in the form of conditions, nor could
he compel the acceptance of any charter.' After the charter
has been accepted, the crown cannot withdraw the charter
and thereby destroy the life of the corporation^ its creature,
without the consent of the members of the corporation.^
§ 25. Municipal corporations created by acts of parlia-
ment.— In contrasting parliamentary with royal incorpora-
tions, it must be borne in mind that the charters granted by
the crown were given to existing communities having a rec-
ognized organized existence. Inasmuch as their assent was
necessary to reinder the charter operative, in no other way
could it have been signified except by a body acting through
agencies or oflBcers. The powers of parliament regarding the
institution of municipal corporations are plenary ; for, as we
have seen, there is only one party, the public, concerned in
the creation of a municipal corporation, and the persons incor-
porated have no contractual rights under their charter. The
charter of a corporation created by parliament is the act of
parliament. No assent is necessary to render an act of par-
liament operative. Not only that, but without assent the in-
' Willcock on Munic. Corp. 30 ; City 34 ; 1 Kyd on Corporations, 61 et seq.;
of Patterson v. Society &c., 4 Zab. Willcock on Munic. Corp. 30 ; Angell
385. & Ames on Corp., § 69.
* 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., g§ 33,
§ 26.] CEEATION OF THE OOKPOKATION. 41
oorporated individuals may be deprived of the franchises orig-
inally given. Moreover, the powers granted may even be
contrary to the usual rules of law ; only, if that be so, there
must be no ambiguity in terms, as such grants are not to be
implied.^ Parliament can create corporations the privileges of
which can never be affected by subsequently-granted royal char-
ters, and can at the same time Control and alter any corpora-
tion instituted under permission from the crown. While it
has been said that no assent is prerequisite in the case of par-
liamentary corporations, it must be stated in qualification that
an act of parliament usually contains provisions for the condi-
tions of incorporation. The English statute for local gov-
ernment in " towns and populous districts " ^ provides that
this local government is to be adopted by the people who are
to exercise the power; for example, in a corporate borough
the council adopt the provisions of the act ; and in a place
under commissioners the adoption would be by resolution of
the commissioners. This adoption of the provisions of the
act, and complying with the conditions therein prescribed, is
equivalent to an assent of the persons to be incorporated.'
Parliamentary corporations at first were usually such as were
to Ipe invested with extraordinary privileges or powers. "When
the ordinary powers alone were to be given the charter of the
king was sufficient. If a royal charter gave too much power,
it was to that extent void, and parliament could validate it by
enactment. But under the Municipal Corporations Act now
in force in Efigland,* nearly all corporations are parliament-
ary in their origin. Such laws establish uniform conditions,
confer uniform privileges, to all who will meet the prescribed
requirements. These general statutes will now be considered.
§ 26. Municipal corporations at common law and toy pre-
scription in England. — Although municipal corporations in
England can be created only by one of the two methods
pointed out in • the preceding section — by charter from the
crown or by act of parliament — still many municipal corpora-
1 Glover on Munio. Corp. 24 ; Will- ' Queen v. Local Government
cock on Munic. Corp. 31 et seq.; 1 Board, L. R 8 Q. B. 337.
Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 34. * Act of 1882.
2 21 and 23 Vict, oh. 98, § 13.
42 CEEATION OF THE COEFOEATION. [§ 27.
tions which owe their origin to neither of these two sources
are in existence in that country. These are divided into two
classes, known as municipal corporations at common law and
municipal corporations by prescription. As the law never
presumes the continued existence of anything unlawful, a
legal inception for both classes is presumed. Municipal cor-
porations at common law are those to which several capacities
have been annexed, in virtue of their political character, by
the universal assent of the comnwinity, from the most remote
period to which their existence can be traced. These corpo-
rations have existed, enjoying and exercising corporate rights
from time immemorial. This immemorial usage is the basis
of their continuing right. The second class — corporations
by prescription — are presumed to owe their origin to a char-
ter from the crown or an act of parliament, that has been lost
or destroyed. Such corporations are of course much more
common in England than in the United States, although pub-
lic corporations by prescription have been held to exist here.'
Prescriptive corporations have a definite legal status. The
powers and privileges they have customarily enjoyed are con-
ceded to them — the supposition being that the customs and
usages regulating them were defined and prescribed in the lost
charter. These customs are not always so strictly interpreted
as those under a charter of modern origin ; for, as has above
appeared, the earliest charters were granted in the days when
the power of the king had few if any parliamentary restric-
tions, and hence he could confer greater privileges, and create
corporations with ampler powers, than the sovereign to-day.'
§ 37. Municipal corporation by implication in England. —
The municipal corporation by implication, as it is styled, does
not constitute a class of municipal corporations distinct by
origin from the corporations discussed in the preceding sec-
tions. Where the royal charter or act of parliament plainly
intends to constitute a corporate municipal body, yet fails ex-
pressly to confer on that body any attribute or power essen-
tial to corporate existence, the law ut res magis valeat qua/m
pereat implies from the intention of the charter or act such
attribute or power ; and the body so created is considered to
1 See infra, § 36. 2 Co. Litt 250o.
§ 28.] OEBATION OF THE OOBPOEATION. 43
be validly incorporated. Such a municipal corporation is Called
a municipal corporation by implication.' There are many in-
stances of these corporations by implication in the early Eng-
lish cases. Thus a grant of incorporation to the burgesses
of Yarmouth was held by Lord Coke to be good although it
failed to expressly confer incorporation upon their successors ;^
and a royal grant to the men of a district authorizing them to
elect a mayor, and to plead and be impleaded by the name of
the mayor and commonalty, "was considered suflBcient to in-
corporate them.'* A grant of land by the king to the inhabit-
ants of B., their heirs and successors, rendering rent, was held
to constitute them a corporation.^ Also a grant by the crown
to the men of a certain locality that they be discharged of
tolls was thought to incorporate them for that purpo. at
least.'
§ 3S. The Manicipal Corporations Reform Act of 1835
In the reign of William IV. the question of reforming the
municipalities of the realm was agitated in the house of com-
mons. An investigating committee, composed of barristers,
was finally appointed, and they made a thorough tour of the
kingdom. They separated into several subdivisions, and, facil-
itated their labor by all the expedients known to the English
parliamentary invesjiigating committees. The state of facts
disclosed was startling. It was, among many other things,
discovered that in nearly all the municipalities the governing
bodies were self-constituted and self-electing, and that these
governing bodies appointed the municipal officers from their
own clique or ring,, thus giving unbounded opportunity for
corruption and oppression. The committee reported that no
uniform judicial system existed, nor any equable and uniform
fiscal policy pursued ; that the magistrates were not often qual-
ified by education or birth for the offices they held : the juries
1 1 Kyd on Corporations, 63 ; Grant - The Borough of Yarmouth Case,
on Corporations, 43; 10 Co. Litt 27-, 2 Brownlow & Goldsb. 293.
The Borough of Yarmouth Case, 2 » 21 Edw. IV., 56.
Brownlow & Goldsb. 292 ; Conserva- *2 Jac. Law, tit '"Corporation,"
tors &c. V. Asli. 10 Barn. & Cress, p. 94.
349; 1 Dillon oh Munic. Corp,, § 42, » Vin. Abr., Ccarp. K, p. 6; Bagott's
from whose text the instances given Case, 7 Edw. IV., SO.
3d this section are taken.
4A OEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION. [§ 28.
were improperly and partially impaneled ; the corporations de-
nied accountability ; that responsibility could not be fastenesl
anywhere ; and that the constabulary was ill-organized, and the
usual duties of a municipality wholly neglected. In short, the
absence of system, the non-existence of definitely prescribed
regulations of law, was manifest everywhere throughout the
two hundred and forty-six municipalities which the report of
the commissioners showed to exist. The commission pointed
out that the corporations existed independently of the commu-
nities in which they had been established, and there was no
identity of interest between them, and that in some cases the
franchises of corporation had been bestowed not on selected
individuals of the community, but sometimes on nonresident
freemen. Altogether it was found that among the inhabit-
ants of the English municipalities generally dissatisfaction ex-
isted with their form of local government The report closed
by stating that the commissioners felt it to be their duty to
represent to his majesty that the municipal corporations, of
England and Wales neither possessed nor deserved the confi-
dence and respect of his majesty's subjects; and they sug-
gested that a thorough reform be effected, in order that they
might become useful and eflicient instruments of local govern-
ment.' In consequence of this report, an act was passed the
same year, 1835,'' which in its main provisions still obtains, and
is at the basis of the municipal system both of England and the
United States. It provided that the governing bodies and ex-
isting magistrates of every corporation should be removed that
year ; that town councils were to be elected trienniaUy by the
burgesses; that any one was eligible to be a burgess who had
been rated three years to support the poor. It enumerated
in schedules all the existing municipalities, and provided for
their re-incorporation under the name of the mayor, aldermen
and burgesses — or citizens, as the case might be — of so-and-so,
and that by such name it should " have perpetual succession,
and shall be capable in law, by the council hereinafter men-
tioned of such borough, to do and suffer all acts which now
lawfully they and their successors respectively may do and
1 Municipal Corporations Rep. 49. porations, by J. A. Roebuck, 30
See, also, Reform of Municipal Cor- Westni. Rev. 48.
«5 and 6 Will IV., eh. 78.
§ 29.] OEEATION OF THE OOEPOEATION. 45
suffer by any name or title of incorporation." The act fur-
ther settled the metes and bounds of the re-organized munici-
palities, provided for courts therein, settled the qualifications
and mode of election of the city or borough ofiBcers, and or-
ganized a constabulary. It authorized the councils to make
by-laws, provided for the municipal funds, abolished chartered
admiralty jurisdiction, laid down various rules ' of procedure,
and finally authorized the crown to grant charters of incor-
poration " upon petition " of the inhabitant householders iu
any municipality alluded to in the act.^
§ 29. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1882. — The pre-
amble to this act states clearly the reasons actuating parlia-
ment in its passage. " Whereas divers bodies corporate at
sundry times have been constituted in the cities, towns and
boroughs of England and Wales to the intent that the same
might forever be and remain well and quietly governed : Abd
whereas, the act of the session of the fifth and sixth years of
the reign of King William the Fourth, chapter seventy-six, ' to
provide for the regulation of municipal corporations in Eng-
land and Wales,' applies to most of those bodies constituted
before the passing of that act, and to every of the bodies
constituted after the passing of that act ; and that act having
been from time to time much altered and added to by other
acts, it is expedient that all the acts aforesaid be reduced into
one act with some amendments : Be it therefore enacted,"
etc.^ The act is chiefly a consolidation statute, the alterations
being generally merely for the purpose of accommodating its
meaning to that of the previous statutes as defined by subse-
quent decisions.' The previous legislation affecting municipal
corporations was expressly repealed with some qualifications
and exceptions by the act.* Under the provisions of the act
no one can be enrolled as a burgess or citizen unless he is of
1 The principal municipal corpora- 8 Municipal Corporations Act of
tion amendment acts were passed in 1888, 45 and 46 Vict., ch. 50.
1836 and 1837, and are known as The * Eawlinson's Municipal Corpora-
Municipal Boundaries Act ; The Mu- tions Act (8th ed. by Thomas Geary,
nicipal Funds Act; The Municipal 1884), p. 1.
Jurisprudence Act; The Recorders' *See for list of repealed enact-
Courte Act ; The Municipal Elections ments Eawlinson's Municipal Corpo-
Aot ; The Municipal Bates Act rations Act (8th ed. by Thomas
46 OEEATION OF THE COEPOBATION. [§29.
fall age ; lias for twelve months occupied a house, -warehouse,
country house, shop or other building in the borough; has
during the whole of those twelve months resided in the bor-
ough or within seven miles thereof ; has been rated for and
paid all poor-rates in respect to the property so occupied for
those twelve months ; is not an alien ; has not received for
twelve months any union or parochial relief or other alms ; or
is not disentitled under the act of parliament.* The council
of the borough is composed of the%nayor, alderman and coun-
cillors of the borough.' The aldermen are elected by the
council out of the number of the councillors or persons quali-
fied to be councillors ; and if a councillor is elected to and ac-
cepts the office of alderman he thereby vacates his office of
councillor.' The councillors are elected by the burgesses.
There are numerous qualifications necessary in order to be
chosen councillor, chief of which is the requirement that a
person must be enrolled or qualified to be enrolled as a bur-
gess and must be seised or possessor of property in the bor-
ough of one thousand pounds if the borough has four or more
wards; and if the borough has a less number of wards, of
five hundred pounds.^ ^o one holding any office or place of
Geary, 1884), pp. 343-346. It is pro- this act, or.pending at its commence-
vided in the saving clauses of the ment; or any established jurisdic-
act that nothing therein contained tlon or practice; or the terms on
shall prejudicially affect any charter which money has been borrowed be-
granted before the commencement fore the commencement of this act
of the act; or alter the boundaries under any enactment repealed by
of any borough or the number, ap- this act, together with other savings
portionment or qualification . of the and exceptions less important And
aldermen or councillors thereof or it is further provided that the repeal
the division thereof into wards ; or effected by this act shall not extend '
the respective jurisdiction of county to Scotland or Ireland. Municipal
and borough justices ; or the effect Corporations Act of 1882, 45 and 46
of any local act of parliament; or Vict, ch. 50, §§250-260.
the effect of the Prison Acts ; or the i Municipal Corporations Act of
rights, knowledge, duties and lia- 1882, 45 and 46 Vict, ch. 50, § 9.
bilities of the universities of Oxford 2 Municipal Corporations Act of
and Cambridge; or the ecclesiasti- 1882, 45 and 46 Vict, ch. 50, § 10, sub-
cal jurisdiction over cathedral pre- div. 2.
cincts; or shall prejudicially affect ^ Municipal Corporations Act of
her majesty's prerogative; or shall 1883, 45 and 46 Vict, ch. 50, § 14
affect anything done or suffered be- * Municipal Corporations Act of
fore the commencement of this act 1883, 45 and 46 Vict, ch. 50, § 11.
under any enactment repealed by
§ 30.] OEEATION OF THB COKPOEATION. 47
profit in the gift of the council, except the office of mayor or
sheriff, can be elected councillor; nor can a minister of the
church of England of a dissenting congregation be elected.'
The mayor is elected by the council from among ten alder-
men or councillors or persons qualified to be such." It is of
course impossible within the scope of this work to give any
detailed outline of the general provisions of the act. The es-
sential distinction between the system of municipal govern-
ment established by the act in England, and the system most
general in this country, is that in the English municipalities
the entire government is practically confided to^the council,
generally consisting of from twelve to sixty-four members,
of whom the mayor is one ; while in our system the powers
of government are generally divided between the mayor and
the common council or board of aldermen. Both systems
have their advantages, but on the whole the English plan is
simpler and affords less opportunities for evasion or shifting
of responsibilities.'
§ 30. The American town. — As this country was founded
by Englishmen and its government established on the lines of
the common law of England so modified as to meet the re-
quirements of a republic, our municipal corporations were es-
tablished in accordance with the English principles of liberty.
They generally possess, however, powers of local self-govern-
ment far greater than those of the English towns. Thus in
Pennsylvania it is provided by the constitution of that State
that the general assembly shall not pass any local or special
law regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships or like
bodies.* Thus it has been said by an eminent writer : " In
contradistinction to those governments where power is con-
centrated in one man or in one or more bodies of men whose
supervision and active control extends to all the objects of gov-
ernment within the territorial limits of the State, the Ameri-
can system is one of complete decentralization, the primary
1 Municipal Corporations Act of Shaw on Existing Municipal Govem-
1883, 45 and 46 Vict., ch. 50, § 13. ment in Great Britain, Political
2 Municipal Corporations Act of Science Quarterly, voL IV, p. 97.
1883, 45 and 46 Vict, ch. 50, § 15. < Reading v. Savage (1888), 130 Pa.
' See 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 36, St. 198 ; McCarthys. Commonwealth,
citing an excellent article by Mr. 110 Pa. St 343.
48 OEEATION OF THE OOEPOEATION. [§ 30.
and vital idea of which is that local affairs shall be managed
by local authorities and general affairs only by the central
authorities."^ These municipal corporations are peculiarly
the subject of State as distinguished from federal control.
They are the creatures of the State legislatures, and must re-
main subject to the wise control of their creators within
constitutional limitations. It was said by an eminent New
York justice: — "When the present constitution was formed,
the entire territory of the State was sep^irated and appropri-
ated by its civil divisions, its counties, cities and towns. These
civil divisions are coeval with the government. The State has
never existed a moment without them. All our thoughts and
notions of civil government are inseparably associated with
counties, cities and towns. They are permajient elements in
the frame of government ; they are institutions of the State,
durable and indestructible by any power less than that which
gave being to the organic law. They are, however, subject to
control and regulation by the legislature. It may enlarge or
circumscribe their territorial limits, increase or diminish their
members, separate them into parts and annex some of the
parts to others ; but they must still assume the form and be
known and governed only as counties, cities or towns. The
State at large is and ever has been an aggregate of these local
bodies.'"* In addition to the usual municipal corporations,
such as cities, towns and villages, it has been the policy of
1 Cooley's Const Lim. 223 ; People " one of the ablest of American com-
V. Detroit (1873), 28 Mich. 228 ; s. c, mon-Iaw judges "), exhaustively dis-
15 Am. Rep. 204. In the famous De- cusses the inherent and hereditary
troit Park Case just cited, it was held right of local self-government See,
that the legislature could not compel also, Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal.
a city to issue bonds for the purchase 590 ; People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y.
of land for a park against the will 128 ; People u Mayor See. of Chicago,
of the city council. In his opinion 51 111. 17 ; S. a, 2 Am. Eep. 278 ;
Judge Cooley says: — "Itisafunda- 'Baines v. Lacon, 84 111, 461; Cairo
mental principle in this State, recog- &a E. E. Co. v. Sparta, 77 HI. 505.
nized and perpetuated by express This subject will be more fully
provision of the constitution, that the treated infra, in discussing legislative
people of every hamlet, town and control of municipal corporations. ■
city of the State are entitled to the 2 People u Draper, 15 N. Y. 561,
benefits of local self-government." per Brown, J.; People v. Albertson
Caldwell v. Justices, 4 Jones (1858) (1873), 55 N. Y. 50; People u Hurlbut,
(N. C), Eq. 323. In the last cited case 24 Mich. 44; & G, 9 Am. Rep. lOa
Ruffin, J, (whom Judge Dillon calls
§ 31.j OEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION. 4:9
American legislation to incorporate, at least for some purposes,
many minor subdivisions of the State, such as townships,
school districts, road districts and similar bodies, thus organ-
izing to the highest degree the State government and afford-
ing the greatest liberty of action to even the unimportant
branches of State administration,*
§ 31. The power to create municipal corporations in the
United States — Where vested — (a) In the State. — Public
as well as private corporations must in this country, as a rule,
with but irregular and unimportant exceptions, derive their
right to corporate existence from the force of legislative au-
thority. This authority is exercised by the State, upon which
descended this power along with the other prerogatives vested
in the crown, upon the emancipation from British dominion.
It had been, as we have seen, the peculiar prerogative of the
crown to grant charters to municipalities ; and, although par-
' liament has usurped this prerogative along with the other
royal powers, the acts of parliament conferring charters upon
these bodies to this day direct that it shall be lawful for her
majesty, under the circumstances contemplated by the statute,
to grant a charter to the inhabitant householders of any dis-
trict in England.' As the States upon our separation from
Great Britain became sovereign, and succeeded to the powers
and prerogatives of the crown, it became the peculiar prerog-
ative of the law-giving power of the State to confer the gift
of corporate existence upon public as well as private corpora-
tions. Consequently the several sovereign States have power
to grant charters to municipal and other public corporations,
subject only to the prohibitions and limitations imposed by
the charters of the respective States;' and subject also to the
limitation that this power must be exercised in a manner con-
sistent with the powers delegated by the States to the federal
government. These principles are established beyond all
question.* And this sovereign power of the States has been
1 Cooley's Const Lim. 223, note, preceded the State governmeut. See
As an instance of a body possessing Arnold's History, ch. 7.
unusually pure and immediate form 2 Municipal Corporations Act of
of self-government the New England 1883, § 310. See supra, %
town is remarkable. It is curious to » See infra, §
note that in Bhode Island the towns * 1 Beach on Priv. Corp., § 3 ; Peo-
4
60
CEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION.
[§32.
so far recognized that the courts have held that it was not
withdrawn even though the State exercising it had at the time
of such exercise seceded from the Union and was engaged in
war with the United States.^
§ 32. (b) In the federal government. — To define the
power of the federal government to create public corporations
it is necessary to consider the general powers possessed by
that government, as no express authority to create corpora-
tions is granted by the States to that government in the con-
stitution.* There being, then, no express delegation of power
in the constitution to create corporations, there can be no
implied power to do so, except as a means or instrument by
which to accomplish the objects for which the federal govern-
ment was created.^ The federal government, therefore, has
no power to create publicor private corporations except where
such a power is necessary in order to carry out some power
pie V. Riverside, 70 Cal. 462 ; Hope v.
Deadwick, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 1 ; S. 0.,
47 Am. Dec. 597 ; New Boston v. Dun-
barton, 13 N. H. 409. And for cases
aflHrming;, in regard to private as well
as public corporations, this funda-
mental principle, see Franklin Bridge
Co. V. Wood, 14 Ga, 80; Bell v. Nash-
ville Bank, Peck (Tenn.), 269; Fal-
coner V. Campbell, 2 McLean, C. C,
195- Thomas v. Dakin, 23 "Wend. 9;
Warner v. Beers, 33 Wend. 103 ; Nel-
son V. McArthur, 38 Mich. 204 ; Ohio
V. Covington, 39 Ohio St. 103 ; Cotton
V. Mississippi Boom Co., 32 Minn. 873 ;
Angell & Ames on Corp. (11th ed.),
§71.
1 United States v. Insurance Co., 33
Wall. 99. Bnt it has been considered
inexpedient to recognize the exist-
ence of a corporation so created by
the State, in aid of such a war. 1
Beach on Priv. Corp., g 3 ; North Caro-
lina Endowment Fund v. Satohwell,
71 N. C. Ill ; Chieora v. Crews, 6 S.
C. (N. S.) 343.
2 1 Beach on Priv. Corp., § 3, where
it is said: "In tlie convention of
States which framed the constitution
an effort was made to invest the con-
gress with power to grant acts of in-
corporation, but after three days of
debate the proposition was voted
iown, eight out of the eleven States
represented voting in the negative,"
citing Madison Papers, September 14,
1787, and citing also "Arguments by
Simon Sterne in Opposition to the
Signature by the President of the
United States of Senate Bill No. 1805
(50th Congress, 3d Session), to Incor-
porate the Maritime Canal Company
of Nicaragua (Gibson Brothers,
Washington, 1889); 4 Jeflferson's
Memoirs, Correspondence, etc., 533,
536 (Charlottesville, Va, 1829)." One
of the reasons of the rejection urged
in debate was that congress would
then have power to create a bank,
which would render the great cities,
where' there were prejudices and
jealousies on that subject, averse to
the adoption of the constitution.
' 1 Beach on Priv. Corp., § 3, citing
McCulIoch V. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316.
§32.]
CEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION.
51
expressly delegated in the constitution to that government.^
The federal government has, consequently, under the power
to govern the public domain, the incidental and auxiliary
power to create municipal corporations in the Territories and
in the District of Columbia, a district ceded by Virginia and
Maryland to the United States as a seat of government.^ To
recapitulate, the power of the State to create public corpora-
tions is incidental to its sovereignty, and may be exercised for
any lawful purpose not repugnant to its constitution or to the
voluntary limitations imposed upon itself by its ratification of
the federal compact ; while the power of the federal govern-
ment to create public corporations is an implied power, and
exists only in so far as it is necessary for the federal govern-
ment to create such corporations in order to carry out powers
expressly delegated to that government by the States in the
constitution.
11 Beach on Priv. Corp., §§ 3-6;
U. S. Const, Amend. X ; McCulIooh v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 ; Thompson
V. Pacific R R Co., 9 Wall 579 ; Cal-
ifornia V. Pacific R R Co., 127 U. S.
39 ; Chisholm v. Georgia, 3 Dall. 419 ;
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall.
378 ; Osborn v. Bank of the 'Dnited
States, 9 Wheat. 738 ; Story on the
Constitution, § 1266. See on this
topic: "National Corporations," 81
Cent. Law J. 438 ; Hare's American
Constitutional Law (Boston, 1889), 98,
105, 111, 249, 1310. For statutes ex-
ercising this power see : 19 U. S.
Stat at Large, 38 ; 13 D. S. Stat at
Large, 665 ; 3 U. S. Stat at Large,
266.
2 Vincennes University v. Indiana
(1853), 14 How. 368; Barnes v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540 ; Stqut-
enbergh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141.
This power of the congress to create
municipal corporations stands upon
the same basis and is governed by the
same principles as its power to create
a national bank (McCulloch v. Maiy-
land, 4 Wheat 316 ; Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 9 Wheat 61) ; or
its power to authorize the constrution
of railroads through the Territories.
California v. Pacific R R Co.,127 U. S.
39. A curious instance of an exten-
sion of this implied power is found
in the charter granted by the fiftieth
congress in its second session to the
Maritime Canal Company of Nica-
ragua, a company organized for the
purpose of constructing, equipping
and operating a ship canal from the
Atlantic to the Pacific ocean through
the territory of Nicaragua or Nica-
ragua and Costa Rica. To the mind
of the writer that extension is un- '
warrantable, as the charter in ques-
tion cannot be considered as neces-
sary to the exercise of any power
expressly delegated to the federal
government in the constitution. 1
Beach on Priv. Corp., § 6 ; " Align-
ment by Simon Sterne in Opposition
to the Signature by the President of
the United States of Senate Bill No.
1303 (50th Congress, 2d Session), to
Incorporate the Maritime Canal Com-
pany of Nicaragua (Gibson Brothers,
Washington, 1889)."
52 CpEATION OF THE COKPOBATION. [§ 33.
% 33. Municipal corporations created by the federal gov*
ernment — (a) Territories. — By virtue of this implied power
of the federal government to create corporations where it is
necessary to erect such bodies in order to exercise a power
expressly delegated in the constitution to that government,
the congress of the United States has power to prov ide for
the creation of municipal and other public corporations in the
Territories, as incidental, and it has been provided by act of
congress that the legislative assQjpbUes of the several Terri-
tories shall not grant private charters or especial privileges,
but may by general incorporation acts permit persons to as
sociate themselves together as bodies corporate for mining,
manufacturing and other industrial pursuits.^ And this act
has been held to prohibit territorial legislatures from incoi*-
porating municipal corporations by special act ^ auxiliary to the
express power possessed by the federal government to govern
the public domain.' This power possessed by the fedefal gov-
ernment is delegated to the territorial legislature, generally
by a provision in the act creating the Territory that the power
of the territorial legislature shall extend to all rightful sub-
jects of legislation. The general clause embraces the power
to create municipal and other corporations.*
« R. S. U. S., g§ 1889, 1890. Clinton v. Englebreot, 13 Wall 434.
2 Seattle v. Tyler (Wash. Territory, For cases showing the complete con-
1877). trol of the congress over the Terri-
'^Vinoennes University v. Indiana, tories, see United States v. Beynolils,
14 How. 268 ; People v. City of Butte. 98 U. S. 145 ; National Bank v. Yank-
4 Mont. 174; Burnes v. Mayor &c. ton, 101 U. S. 139; Murphy v. Ram-
of Atchison, 2 Kans. 454; Miner's sey, 114 U. S. 15. In the last named
Bank v. Iowa, 12 How. 1; Story on case it was decided that congress had
the Constitution, § 1206 ; " National power to exclude polygamists from
Corporations," 21 Cent Law J. 428 ; voting.
Beach on Priv. Corp., § 3, ad^nejre; <Vincennes University w Indiana,
Cooley's Const Lim. 87. The legis- 14 How. 268 ; Burnes v. Mayor &c. of
lation of the territorial legislatures Atchison, 2 Kans. 4541 ; Dietz v. City
must not, of course, be at variance of Central, 1 Colo. 323. This power
with the territorial organic act, con- also necessarily carries with it the
f erring the power to legislate; but right to mal^e by-laws and ordi-
such a variance will be presumed to nances to control the members of
be iapproved by congress if disre- the municipal corporation. State v.
garded for a number of years after Young, 3 Kans. 445. In Keddick v.
the attention of congress has been Amelia, 1 Mo. 5, the question was
called to the conflict of legislation, raised whether a territorial legisla-
I
§§ 34, 35.] OEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION. 5'i
§ 34. (1)) The District of Columbia.— The District of Co-
lumbia was organized under the act of congress of February
21, 1871.' Under this act it was authorized to " exercise all
other powers of a municipal corporation not inconsistent with
the laws and constitution of the United States and the pro-
visions of this act," — with the usual powers to sue, be sued,
contract, have a seal, etc. It is declared to be, in the first
section of the act, a body corporate for municipal purposes.
The United States Supreme Court, having occasion to consider
the powers of the district so constituted, and the powers of
certain of its departments, uses the following language, ex-
pressing clearly some of the relations of municipalities : " A
municipal corporation in the exercise of all of its duties, in-
cluding those most stY-iotly local or internal, is but a depart-
ment of the State. The legislature may give it all the powers
such a being is capable of receiving, making it an immature
State within its" locality. ' Again, it may strip it of every
power, leaving it a corporation in name only; and it may cre-
ate and recreate these changes as often as it chooses, or it
may itself exercise directly within the locality any or all the
powers usually committed to a municipality. We do not re-
gard its acts as sometimes those of an agency of the State, and
at others those of a municipality, but that, its character and
nature remaining at all times the same, it is great or small
according as the legislature shall extend or contract the sphere
of its action." ^ ^
§ 35. Municipal corporations l»y prescription in the
United States. — The general rule being that corporations
must in this country derive their origin from express legis-
lative enactment, municipal corpoijations by prescription are
in the United States the rare exception; but such municipal
corporations concededly exist. Thus, in New Tork, the exist-
ence of a public g^MOsi-oorporation, such as a school district,
has been proved by prescription.' And in Massachusetts and
ture, not being sovereign, could ere- 1 16 Stat 419.
ate a corporation. It was held that ^ Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91
the congress had the power to create U. S. 544 ; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick,
corporations under the limitations 129 TJ. S. 141.
set forth, and could lawfully delegate ' Robie v. Sedgwick, 35 BarU 319.
that power. And it was further held in this case
54: CKEATION OF THE OOEPOEATION. [§ 36.
other New England States, it has been decided that where no
charter or act of incorporation of a town can be found, it may
be proved to be a town by reputation, or it may be shown to
have claimed and exercised the powers of a town, with the
knowledge and assent of the legislature, and without objection
or interruption, for so long a period as to furnish evidence of
a prescriptive right.^ In Illinois the same doctrine has been
approved, the opinion of the court stating that municipal
corporations are created for the ptblic good and demanded by
the wants of the community ; and the law, after long con-
tinued use of corporate powers with public acquiescence, will
presume in favor of their legal existence.^ The question as to
whether in any given instance the municipality^ is to be deemed
incorporated by prescription is one of fact and not of law, and
is to be decided by the jury and not by the judge.'
§ 36. The same subject continued — Instances of incorpo-
ration by prescription in the United States. — In Indiana
Gen. William Henry Harrison made a map of an addition to
the city of Vincennes in which he marked a certain lot as
" General Harrison's Keserve." This lot was assessed and
taxed by the city government for sixty years without ques-
tion or opposition. This fact was considered suflBcient to
that prescriptive proof of the exist- lie reputation to be put in as evi-
ence of such a corporation also dence of incorporation, that it was
proved that the body possessed all well known that the public records
the powers given by law to such cor- had been in a large part destroyed
poratioDs. The case is a fair ex- by fire. Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass.
ample, as it was one where the 547.
trustees of the school district and 2 Jameson v. People, 16 111. 357.
their predecessors had under the same See, also. State v. Leatherman, 38
name and title exercised their func- Ark. 81, where the original incorpo-
tions as such trustees for forty years, ration of the municipality was in a
without objection. court lacking jurisdiction ; and it
1 Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge, was held that the State itself was es-
13 Mass. 400 ; Dillingham v. Snow, 5 topped, by long acquiescence in and
Mass. 547: Bow v. Allenstown, 34 recognition of the incorporation as
N. H. 851 ; Baasett v. Porter, 4 Cush. valid, from quo warranto proceed-
487 ; New Boston v. Dunbarton, 15 ings attacking the incorpoi-ation.
N. H. 301; Trott u. Warren, 11 Me. sCooley's Const Lim. 238; New
237 ; State v. Bradley, 3 New Eng. Boston v. Dunbarton, 15 N. H. 201 ;
Eep. 713. In a Massachusetts case Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351;
the judge remarked, in allowing pub- Trott v. Warren, 11 Me. 227.
§ 37.] CEEATION OF THE COItPOEATION. 55
show that the lot was within the corporation limits.^ So in
a "Wisconsin case proceedings by which a certain territory
was added to a town were considered regular after twenty
years.^ And ten years has been held a sufficient period to
perfect a defective incorporation against collateral attack.'
§ 37. Mnnicipal corporations by implication in tlie United
States. — The general principles governing the creation by
iir plication of municipal corporations have been already con-
sidered in discussing the creation of English municipal cor-
porations. These principles hold good, of course, in the case
of American as well as of English municipalities ; and they
have often been applied by the courts of this country. So,
where the legislature confers or imposes upon a certain body
of men powers or liabilities of such a character as to render it
necessary to incorporate such body in ordet to give effect to
the legislative intention, the body is considered incorporated
to such an extent as to carry out the design of the legislature.
For example, in Massachusetts the legislature confers upon
the inhabitants of the different school districts power to raise
money to erect, repair or purchase a school-house, with other
incidental powers of legislation. It was decided in the ap-
pellate courts of that State that this legislative act created
the inhabitants of the school district a corporation for the
purpose of bringing an action on a contract to build a school-
house.^ And in New Hampshire, where a certain territory
1 Am. & Eng. Enoya of Law, tit. ciples elucidated in the text were ap-
" Municipal Corporations," vol. 15, plied to a somewhat diflEerent state of
p. 956 ; Pidgeon v. McCarthy, 83 Ind. facts in a Kansas case where a city
331. was as a matter of fact included in a
2 Sherry v. Gilmore, 58 Wis. 324. certain class of cities, although ao-
' Austrian v. Guy, 31 Fed. Eep. 500. cording to a strict legal classification
In that case original incorporation of the city in question belonged to a
the town was Invalid. The town, different class. It was held that as
however, existed de facto and levied the city was universally recognizea
taxes. Certain town lots were sold to belong to the former class, it could
at a tax sale, and a subsequent owner lawfully act as belonging to that
of the lots instituted proceedings to class, although de jure belonging to
clear up the title. It was held that the latter. Bach v. Carpenter, 39
the incorporation of the town could Kan. 849.
not be thus collaterally impeached * Inhabitants &c. v. Wood, 13 Mass.
after such a lapse of time. The prin- 193 ; 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp^, § 43.
56 OEEATION OF THE OOEPOEATION. [§ 38.
was annexed by the legislature to the town of AUentown (the
words of the act describing AUentown as a municipal corporar
tion), such action of the legislature was considered sufficient
to create AUentown a municipal corporation by implication.*
There are many cases in the books where similar principles
have been applied in this country.'
§ 38. The same subject continued.— In a leading ITew
York case OhanceUor Kent elaborated the principles indicated
in the preceding section. The fown of Hempstead, Long
Island, was settled in 1644, under a patent from William Kieft,
the governor at that time of the Dutch province. By this
patent the tract of land comprised in the town was granted
to six persons, named therein, with their dissociates, their h&irs
omA successors, to build a town . . . and to erect a hody
'politic or civil combination among themselves, etc. The chan-
cellor says : — " I should conclude that such a grant as this, pro-
ceeding from the English government, would have given a
qualified corporate capacity to the inhabitants of Hempstead,"
and he then shows that this is true a fortiori of a Dutch grant,
since under the common law of the Dutch, corporations were
created with " less ceremony and difficulty even than with
us." ' The implication is in every case that the intent of the
creating power was to erect a corporation ; and as the intent
of that power is controlling, the corporation is deemed to have
been thereupon erected. The words "creation by implica-
tion," without having in mind the above qualifications, are
misleading. But the intent of the legislature must be clearly
shown, as the onus prolandi rests on those who endeavor to
prove the existence of a corporation by implication.* So it
has been held that creation by implication wiU not be recog-
1 Baws V. AUentown, 34 N. H. 351. era v. Dean, 2 Stewi & P. (Ala) 190 ;
2 Thomas v. Dakin, 23 Wend. 9 ; Cooley's Const Lim. 238 ; Angell &
Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. Ames on Corp., § 77.
320; North Hempstead V.Hempstead, ^ Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch.
2 Wend. 109 ; Cobum v. Ellenwood, 825.
4 N. H. 99 ; Stebbins v. Jennings, 10 * Society &c. v. Pawlet, 4 Peters,
Pick. 172 : Mahony v- Bank, 4 Ark. 480 ; Medical Institute v. Patterson, 1
630 ; Trustees &o. v. Parks, 10 Me. Denio, 61 ; s. c, 5 Denio, 618 ; Myers
441 ; People v. Farnhara, 35 111. 563 ; v. Irwin, 2 Serg. & E. 368 ; Wells v.
Jameson v. People, 16 111. 257 ; S. C, Burbank, 17 N. H. 393 ; 1 Dillon on
63 Am. Dec. 804 ; School Commission- Munic. Corp., § 43 ; Cooley's Const
§39.] CREATION OF/ THE COBPOEATION. 57
nized by the courts, unless it appears that the powers conferred
by the legislature can be enjoyed only through such implied
incorporation, and in no other way.* And . it has even been
declared that the doctrine of creation by implication will be
upheld only where a contract made in good faith cannot other-
wise be enforced.*
§ 39. Creation of municipal corporations in the United
States — (a) In general. — Until comparatively recent times
there were no general laws regulating and providing for the
incorporation of municipalities under general rules. In this
country as in England, each district, as its population increased
to a point where incorporation became necessary or expe-
dient, applied to the legislature for a special charter, by virtue
of which it assumed corporate existence. But this system of
incorporation was open to grave and obvious abuses. Being
in the nature of special legislation, it possessed all the disad-
vantages incident to such legislation. The privileges granted
by the special charter were greater in the case of one city than
of another ; and these disparities, with their consequent jeal-
ousies, gave just cause for popular dissatisfaction for the sys-
tem of incorporation by special charter, A remedy was found
in establishing general laws under which each district could,
by a method of procedure established by the statute, procure
its own incorporation whenever it became necessary or desir-
able. Under these general and uniform ^laws there was no
longer any disparity in the privileges of the dififerent munici-
palities. Each village, town, city or school district was one
of a certain class sharing alike the powers and liabilities of the
class according to the provisions of the general incorporating
act. The great advantage of this system has been universally
recognized, and it is used in all of the United States at the
present day. In most of the States the legislature is expressly
forbidden to incorporate towns or cities by special charter,
but it is still allowed in several of the States.'
Lim. 338 ; Am. & Eng. Encyc. of » In the following States the legis-.
Law, tit " Municipal Corporations," lature is allowed to create municipal
vol. 15, p. 960. corporations by special act : New
'Stebbms v. Jennings, 10 Pick, IIZ. York (Constitution 1846, art 8, § 1);
'Blair v. West Point, 3 McCrary, Michigan (Constitution 1850, art 15,
459. § 1); California (Constitution 1849,
58 OEEATION OF THE CORPOEATION. [§§ 40, 41,
§ 40. (I)) By special charter. — Judge Dillon gives an excel-
lent outline of the provisions of the ordinary special charter
creating a municipal corporation. He observes that while
these charters were on the whole constructed according to
one general model, there was great variety in the particular
provisions of the different charters as to the powers conferred
and the liabilities imposed on the corporation. Following his
outline of the provisions of such a charter, we find that the
first incorporating clause of th# instrument usually declares
" that the mhabitants of the town of Dale are hereby consti-
tuted a body politic and corporate by the name of ' the town
of Dale,' and by that name shall have perpetual succession,
may use a common seal, sue and be sued, purchase, hold and
sell property," etc. The charter then proceeds to provide for
the legislative body of the municipal corporation, usually
called the town or city council, regulating the number of
councilmen or aldermen and the organization of the body.
The qualifications of voters are then prescribed and the man-
ner of holding elections for the members of the couucil and
for the executive officers of the town. The powers and duties
of these executives are defined and limited. The charter gen-
erally closes with a specific enumeration of the powers of the
city council, which are numerous, and include the right to levy
taxes for municipal purposes, to enact ordinances to protect
the health and safety of the citizens of the town, and in gen-
eral to exercise those subordinate powers of local legislation
which the State deemed it necessary and expedient to dele-
gate to the council for the purposes of local self-government.'
§ 41. (c) By general mnnicipal incorporating acts. — The
legislatures of the several States, in compliance with the
provisions of their constitutions respectively, and subject to
art. 4, g 31) ; Minnesota (Constitution of Missouri prohibits the creation of
1857, art 10, § 3) ; Oregon (Constitu- any municipal corporation by special
tion 1857, art 11, § 2) ; Louisiana act, unless the city contain at least
(Constitution 1864, title 7, art. 131); five thousand inhabitants; and in
Nevada (Constitution 1864, art 8, g 1). that case the special charter must be
Also in Maine, Maryland, North Car- approved by a vote of the people,
olina, Texas and Alabama. 15 Am. Constitution of Missouri (1865), art
& Eng. Encyolop. of Law, tit Munic. VIII, sec. 5.
Corp., p. 958, n. 3. The constitution ' 1 Dillon, Munic. Corp., § 39,
§ 42.] OBEATION OF THE OOEPOKATION. 59
the limitations imposed by those provisions, have passed gen-
eral incorporating and enabling acts providing for the incor-
poration and government of municipalities within the limits
of the State. These acts generally provide in substance that
all corporations organized for purposes of municipal govern-
ment shall be divided into certain specified classes, according
to the number of inhabitants of the city, town or village.
The manner of incorporating each class, and the powers, du-
ties and liabilities of the several classes, are fully prescribed by ;
the act. The method of incorporation, and the powers, du-
ties and liabilities of each class, difPer from those of the other
classes ; but the method of incorporation, the powers, duties
and liabilities of the corporations included in any one of the
classes, are always uniform. It is sometimes provided in these
acts that all special charters theretofore granted shall be re-
pealed and abolished, and that all the municipal corporations
of the State, whether created before or after the passage of
the act, shall be governed by its provisions.' On the other
hand, it is at times prescribed that municipalities previously,
incorporated by special act of the legislature shall not be af-
fected by the passage of the general act, unless such corpora-
tion shall elect to come in and submit to the provisions of the
general act.^
§ 42. Constitutional limitations of legislative power tq
create municipal corporations. — In many of the States there
are constitutional provisions that the legislature shall provide
by general law for the organization of cities, towns and mu-
nicipalities, and the creation of municipal corporations by spe-
cial act is expressly forbidden.' Some of the States have pro-
1 See infra, chapter IV. § 4) ; Missouri (Constitution, art 9,
2 Burke v. Jeffries, 20 Iowa, 145. § 7); Arkansas (Constitution, art 12,
'This is the case in Ohio (Constitu- § 3); California (Constitution, art. 11,
tion, art. 13, § 6) ; Illinois (Constitu- § 6) ; and Nevada (Constitution,
tion, art. 10, § 6) ; Michigan (Consti- art 8, § 8). Also in Iowa, New Jer-
tution, art 15, § 13) ; Wisconsin (Con- sey, West Virginia, Tennessee, Flor-
stitution, art 11, § 3); Kansas (Con- idaand Indiana. This constitutional
stitution, art 13, § 5); Nebraska provision is construed in Ohio by
(Constitution, art 10, S§ 4, 5) ; Vir- Thomas v. Ashland, 13 Ohio St 134 ;
ginia (Constitution, art 6, § 30); Welker u. Potter. 18 Ohio St 85 ; At-
North Carolina (Constitution, art 8, kinson v. Marietta &c. E. Co., 15 Ohio
60 CREATION OF THE COEPOEATION. [§ 43."
vided that their legislatures shall create a uniform system of
county, town and municipal government.* Massachusetts* pro-
vides that the legislature may charter cities in towns having
more than twelve thousand inhabitants. Pennsylvania ' and
Texas * have the same provision in regard to towns of over
ten thousand. In Missouri ' and California,' the remarkable
provision exists that any city having a population of more
than a hundred thousand may frame a charter for itself. This,
as of course, is subject to special %estrictions, and the method
in which the charter shall be framed is carefully defined.
§ 43. Construction of sucli constitutional limitations —
(a) Corporations " for municipal purposes" and "bodies
politic or corporate." — The constitutions of Missouri and
Illinois, of California and of Alabama prohibit the creation
by special act of corporations " for municipal purposes." In
Missouri it has been held that such a corporation must be
connected with the municipal corporation itself and must be
connected with the municipalities;^ and a corporation formed
for the purpose of filling up ponds in the city of St. Louis was
considered to be for municipal purposes within the meaning
St. 18 ; State v, Cincinnati, 30 Ohio School District No. 56 v. St. Joseph
St. 18 ; in Illinois by Covington v. &c Ins. Co., 101 XJ. S. 473,; 1 Dillon
East St. Louis, 78 IlL 548 ; in Wis- on Munic. Corp., §§ 45-49 ; Morawetz
• consin by State v. Forest County on Corporations' (3d ed.), §§ 9-13.
(1889), 74 Wis. 610; S. C, 43 N. W. i Wisconsin (Constitution, art 4,
Rep. 551; Attorney-General v. Chi- § 23); Missouri (Constitution, art 9,
cagq &c. R Co., 35 Wis. 425 ; Kim- § 7) ; California (Constitution, art 11,
ball V. Eosendale, 43 Wis. 407 ; S. a, § 4) ; Nevada (Constitution, art 4,
34 Am. Eep. 431 ; Stevens Point &c. § 35); Georgia (Constitution, art 11,
Co. V. Reilly, 44 Wis. 395 ; Land &c. § 31) ; Florida (Constitution, art 4,
Co. V. Brown, 73 Wis. 394 ; in Kansas § 21). See State v. Eiordan, 34 Wis.
by Wyandotte City v. Wood, 5 Kan. 484 ; State v. Dousraan, 28 Wis. 541 ;
603; Atchison v. Bartliolow, 4 Kan. State v. Forest County, 74 Wis. 610;
134 ; in New Jersey by State v. New- s. d, 43 N. W. Rep. 551 ; State v.
ark, 40 N. J. Law. 550 ; State v. Mayor Stark, 18 Fla, 255 ; Lake v. Florida,
(fee. of Somers Point, 53 N. J. Law, 18 Fla. 501.
33; in Missouri by State v. LefBng- 2 Constitutional Amendments, 3.
well, 54 ■ Mo. 458 ; in Nebraska by ' Constitution, art 15, § 1.
Dundy v. Richardson, 8 Neb. 508; in < Constitution, art 11, §4
Indiana by Lafayette v. Jenners, 10 'Constitution, art. 9, § 16.
Ind. 70 ; in Iowa, by Van Phul v. « Constitution, art 11, § 8.
Hammer, 39 Iowa, 323. See, also, ' State v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458.
§§ 44, 45.] OJIEATIOIT OF THE OOEPOEATION. 61
of the act:* In Illinois an act organizing a board of park cDm-
missioners was held to be constitutional under this restric-
tion.* In an Alabama case a special act creating a corporation
to carry on a public school was held to be constitutional.' A
county in California has been held not to be a corporation for
municipal purposes ; * audit has also been held that under
this constitutional limitation no powers can be conferred upon
a corporation created for other than municipal purposes, ex-
cept by general acts.' The constitution of 'New York pro-
vides that a two-thirds majority of the general assembly shall
be necessary for the passage of any act " creating, continu-
ing, altering or renewing any'body politic or corporate." The
term " body politic or corporate " has been construed to in-
clude public as well as private corporations.'
§ 44. (b) " Corporate powers." — In Nebraska, Kansas,
Ohio and New Jersey there are constitutional provisions that
the legislature shall pass no special act conferring corporate
powers. This prohibition has been held in Kansas and Ohio
to apply to acts creating municipal corporations.' But in New
Jersey the provision has been construed to include only pri-
vate corporations.' In Nebraska an act authorizing a school
district to issue bonds to build a school-house was considered
void as coming within the prohibition of the provision.'
§ 45. Miscellaneous instances of such constitutional lim-
itations.— A provision in the Ehode Island constitution that
1 St Louis V. Shields <1876), 62 Mo. Pugh, 43 Ohio St. 98. See generally
247.> ■ on this subject : Commercial National
2 People u Solomon, 51 111. 37. Bank v. City of lola, 2 Dillon C. C.
3 Horton v. Mobile School Commis- 358; s. C, 20 Wall. 665; Olcott v.
Bioners, 43 Ala. 598. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678 ; Savings
* People V. McFadden, 81 Cal. 489 ; Association v. Topeka, 3 Dillon, 376 ;
B. C, 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 37. School District v.' Insurance Co., 103
*San Francisco v. Spring Valley U. S. 707.
Water-works (1874), 48 Cal 493. » State v. Nevs-ark, 40 N. J. Law,
ePurdy v. People, 4 Hill, 384, re- 550.
versing 2 Hill, 31. ' Clegg v, Richardson Co., 8 Neb.
' State V. Maloy (1878), 20 Kan. 619 ; 178 ; Dundy v. Richardson Co., 8 Neb.
Wyandotte City v. Wood, 5 Kan. 603 ; 508. In Kansas, hovcever, an act for
Atchison v. Bartholovc, 4 Kan. 124 ; the same purpose has been upheld aa
Gilmore v. Norton, 10 Kan. 491 ; State not unconstitutional. Beach v. Leahy,
V. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St 18; State v. 11 Kan. 63.
Mitchell, 31 Ohio St 593; State v.
62 OEEATION OF THE OOEPOBATION. [§ 46.
when any bill shall be presented to create a corporation for
any other than for religious, literary or charitable purposes,
or for a military or fire company, it shall be 'continued till an-
other election of members of the general asseinbly shall have
taken place, and public notice of its pendency shall be given,
does not apply to public corporations.' In California there is
a constitutional provision that the charters of cities must be
consistent with and subject to the constitution of the State.
Under this prohibition it has beeft held that charters repug-
nant in some of their provisions to the general laws of the
State are not entirely valid.* Constitutional limitations on
the legislative power to incorporate towns and cities must of
course be construed with reference to other portions of the
constitutions and the statutes.'
§ 46. Incorporation by courts.— The legislatures of certain
States authorize and empower a court to incorporate a certain
district upon the petition of a designated number of the in-
habitants of the district. The constitutionality of such acts
has been questioned as being an undue delegation of legislative
powers. In Iowa such an act has been upheld as not being
unconstitutional.* A similar ruling has been made in the
1 State V. District of Narragansett said division," etc., " be submitted to
(R I.), 16 At], Eep. 901. a vote of the legal electors of the
2 In re Strand (Gal.), 21 Pac. Eep. town or towns to be affected thereby,"
654; Brooks w. Fischer, 79 Cal. 173. on petition of two-fifths of such
' So when the constitution of Wis- legal voters, it was held that such act
• cousin provided that " the legislature was not unconstitutional because it
may confer on the boards of super- was a discrimination between coun-
visors of the several counties, . . . ties, as the legislature has power to
such powers, of a local, legislative resume the authority conferred by
and administrative character, as they sections 670, 671, upon the county
shall from time to time prescribe ; " boards. State v. Forest County
and the statutes (E. S., §§ 670, 671) (Wis.), 43 N. W. Eep.' 651; & C, 74
delegated to the county board of the Wis. 610.
several counties the power " to set * The code of Iowa provides tha(V
off, organize, vacate and change the where the inhabitants of any part of
boundaries of the towns In their re- any county not embraced in any in-
spectlve counties ; " and a special act corporated city or town shall desire
divided Forest county into three to be organized into a city or town,
towns, and provided that none of they may apply to the district court
said towns should " be divided, va- by petition signed by not less than
cated or have the boundaries thereof twenty-flve of the qualified electors
changed by the board of supervisors of such territory, and the court shall
of said county until the question of appoint commissioners to call an dec-
§46.]
CREATION OF THE COEPOEATION'.
63
courts of Colorado.' But in "Wisconsin an act authorizing the
district judge to declare a town or village incorporated upon
the petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants praying
for such incorporation was declared unconstitutional as being
a delegation of legislative functions to a judicial court.* In
tion in the territory ; and, if the elec-
tion be in favor of the incorporation,
the clerk shall give notice of the re-
sult, and copies of all the papers and
record entiies shall be filed iu the re-
corder's office of the county and in
the office of tlie secretary of State ;
and when such papers are filed, and
officers elected, the incorporation
shall be complete. The sections fur-
ther provide for the annexation of
territory to an incorporated city or
town on the filing of a like petition
and having like proceedings. It was
held that the act is not unconstitu-
tional as authorizing the creation of
a municipal corporation by judicial
act instead of by the legislature, since
the only power thereby conferred on
the court is the appointment of com-
missioners of the election. Ford v.
Incorporated Town of North Des
Moines(1890), 45 N. W. Rep. 1031.
1 People V. Fleming, 10 Colo. 553.
See, also. Mayor pf Norristown v.
Sheldon, 1 Head (Tenn.), 24
2 Territory of Washington v. Stew-
art, 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 23,
where the judge expressly dissented
from the doctrine of People v. Flem-
ing, 10 CaL 553 ; and quoted Judge
Cooley (Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.)
141), as follows : — « We think the bet-
ter doctrine is that laid down by
Judge Cooley in his work on Consti-
tutional Limitations, which is as fol-
lows : — ' The prevailing doctrine in
the courts appears to be that except
iu those cases where, by the consti-
tution, the people have not expressly
reserved to themselves a power of de-
cision, the function of legislation can-
not be exercised by them even to
the extent of accepting or neglecting
a law which has been framed for
their consideration.' " But the same
learned author quoted by the judge
in the case just cited says elsewhere,
after referring to the power of the
legislature to create and abolish mu-
nicipal corporations without refer-
ence to the desires of the incorpo-
rators : — " Nevertheless, as the corpo-
rators have a special and peculiar
interest in the terms and conditions
of the charter, in the powers con-
ferred and liabilities imposed, as well
as in the general question whether
they shall originally be or afterwards
remain incorporated at all or not, and
as the burdens of municipal govern-
ment must rest upon their shoulders,
and especially as by becoming incor-
porated they are held in law to un-
dertake to discharge the duties the
charter imposes, it seems eminently
proper that their voice should be
heard on the question of their incor-
poration, and that their decisions
should be conclusive unless for strong
reasons of State policy and local ne-
cessity it should seem iinportant for
the State to overrule the opinion of
the local majority. The right to re-
fer any legislation of this character
to the people peculiarly interested
does not seem to be questioned and the
reference is by no means unusual."
Cooley's Const Lim. {6th ed.) 139.
Citing Bull v. Read, 13 Gratt 78;
Corning v. Greene, 23 Barb. 33 ; Mor-
f ord V. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82 ; City of
Paterson v. Society &c., 24 N. J. Law,
385; Gorham v. Springfield, 21 Me.
64
CEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION.
[§4T.
Arkansas, also, the courts have decided that the legislature
cannot delegate to the courts the power to create municipal
corporations.^
§ 47. The same subject continued. — In order that the
courts may' acquire jurisdiction under these acts it is neces-
sary for the petition for incorporation to be signed by the
proportion of inhabitants required by the statute.' The find-
ings of the court in these cases will not in general be disturbed
by appellate courts;' and the provisions of the statute are
construed with considerable liberality.*
58 ; Commonwealth v. Judges, 8 Pa.
St. 391; Commonwealth v. Painter,
10 Pa. St 214; Call v. Chadbourne,
46 Me. 206 ; State v. Scott, 17 Mo. 531 ;
State V. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458 ; Hobart
V. Supervisors &c., 17 Cal. 23; Bank
of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467 ;
Stev^avd v. Jefferson, 3 Harr. 335;
Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11 ; Lafayette
&c. E. Co. V. Geiger, 34 Ind. 185;
Clarke u Rogers, 81 Ky. 43 ; People
V. Butte, 4 Mont 174; Smith v.
McCarthy, 56 Pa. St 359; Smith v.
Titconib, 31 Me. 272; Erlinger v.
Boreau, 51 HI. 94 ; Lammert v. Led-
well, 63 Mo. 188 ; Brunswick v. Fin-
ney, 54 Ga. 317 ; Response to House
Resolution, 55 Mo. 295; People v.
Fleming, 10 Colo. 553; Graham v.
Greenville, 67 Tex. 72.
1 State V. Leatherman, 38 Ark. 81 ;
State V. Jennings, 27 Ark. 419. See,
also. State v. Simons, 32 'Minn. 540.
2 So under the Pennsylvania stat-
ute it has been held that where a
court finds that it is doubtful if a
petition for the incorporation of
a borough is signed by a majority
of the freeholders residing within the
proposed limits, it loses jurisdiction
to entertain the petition or take fur-
ther proceedings thereunder. In re
Borough of Taylorsport (1888), 18
AtL Rep. 224. And in the same case
it was held that the court could not
acquire jurisdiction by reducing the
territorial limits so that there would
be a majority of freeholders left,
whose names are on the petition.
In re Borough of Taylorsport (1888),
18 AtL Rep. 224
' As when, upon proceedings by a
village under Code Iowa, sections
440-446, to be severed from the limits
and control of an incorporated town,
the trial court has found in favor of
the petitiohers, the Supreme Court
will not disturb such finding, unless
there has been a manifest abuse of
discretion. Ashley v. Town of Cal-
liope (Iowa), 32 N. W. Rep. 458. And
where the Texas statute required
that, before an election to determine
if a city should be incorporated shall
be ordered by a county judge, proof
should be made before him that the
territory sought to be incorporated
contains the requisite number of in-
habitants, the finding of a county
judge in such a case was considered
conclusive, as no provision was made
for revising it State v, Goodwin
(1887), 5 S. W. Rep. 678.
* In Pennsylvania a proposed bor-
ough which contains a small assem-
blage of houses, collocated on the plan
of streets and lanes, is entitled to in-
corporation by the coui-ts, with the
concurrence of the grand jury, under
act of Pennsylvania of 1834, section 1
§§ 48, 49.] OKBATION OF THE COEPOEATION. 65
§ 4:8. Classes of cities under general incorporating acts. —
As indicated in the preceding sections, it is customary under
the general municipal incorporating acts for the municipal
corporations of the State to be divided into classes accord-
ing to the number of inhabitants of the incorporated terri-
tory. Under these statutes the municipality takes its posi-
tion in the class to which it belongs without any acceptance
by the incorporators of their allotment to that class. For
example, the Utah law divides cities into classes, and provides
the way, but not an exclusive one, by which cities should de-
termine to which class they belong. Under this provision it
was decided that the court would take judicial notice of the
class to which a city belongs, and that the city would become
a member of its proper class without anything done on its
part.* And likewise by the Nebraska statute, which provides
that " all cities, towns and villages containing more than fif-
teen hundred and less than fifteen thousand inhabitants shall
be cities of the second class, and be governed by the provis-
ions of this chapter, unless they shall adopt a village gov-
ernment, as hereinafter provided." All towns and villages
containing more than fifteen hundred and less than fifteen
thousand inhabitants are created by the force of act into
cities of the second class, without any acceptance or other act
of such town or city, or of its inhabitants.*
§ 49. The corporate limits — Territory of the corpora-
tion.— The general incorporating acts make provision for
(Brightly, PurdL Dig., p. 196, § 1), porated as a village. Mendenhall v.
which provides that "the several Burton (1889), 23 Pac. Eep. 558.
courts of quarter sessions within the Where the report of a grand jury,
commonwealth shall have power, by on a petition for incorporation of a
and with the concurrence of the borough, referred to " the annexe:!
grand jury of the county, to incor- petition," and it appeared that the
porate any town or village within petition was enfolded with, but not
their respective jurisdictions." In re attached to, the report, it was not
Incorporation of Village of Edge- error for the court to order the clerk
wood (1889), 18 AtL Eep. 646. And to attach it In re Incorporation of
under General Statutes Kansas, 1868, Pennsborough (1889), 13 Atl. Eep. 93.
chapter 108, § 1, conferring power i People v. Page (Utah, 1890), 23
upon the probate court to declare Pac. Eep. 761.
any town or village incorporated 2 State v. Babcock (1889), 25 Neb.
upon petition, the probate court has 709 ; 41 N. W. Eep. 654
power to declare a town to be incor-
5
66 OEBATION OF THE OOItPOEATIOII. [§ 60.
determining the corporate limits of the municipalities created
under those acts, and in the case of incorporation by special
act, the limits of the city or town are expressly defined in the
act of incorporation. The Pennsj'lvania statute provides that
whenever an application shall be made, by the freeholders of
any town, for incorporation into a borough, and the bounda-
ries embrace lands exclusively used for farming, the courts of
quarter sessions of the county where such application is made
may, at the request of the pai^y aggrieved, change such
boundaries so as to exclude such land. The proposed bounda-
ries can be modified, " at the request of the party aggrieved,"
only at the time the charter is before the court for approval.^
In Texas the fact that the corporate limits include a number
of acres of purely agricultural land will not invalidate the
corporation.^ The description of the territory to be incorpo-
rated should be sufficiently definite to enable identification of
the territory. Thus in Maine a description which, in a deed
by the State, would be sufficient to describe a plantation, suf-
ficiently describes it in the record of a meeting for its organ-
ization.'
§ 50. Acceptance of charter fey corporators not neces-
sary.— It is now well settled that the consent of the cor-
1 Appeal of Singer (Borough of of the villages into a borough, it cau-
Wilkinsburg), 131 Pa. St. 365 ; 18 not be said that the limits of that
AtL Eep. 931. In the same Statfe it village would be unduly extended, or
has been held that a village seeking adjacent territory of the neighboring.
to incorporate ■with itself adjacent village invaded, by granting the ap-
territory, with the consent of its land- plication. In re Incorporation of
owners, should not be denied the Village of Edgewood (Pa, 1889), 18
privilege because of objection, made AtL Rep. 646.
by persons outside the disputed terri- 2 state v. Town of Baird (Tex., 1891),
tory, that taxable property would be 15 S. W. Eep. 98. And under the
thereby withdrawn from their con- same Texas statute, where a town has
trol. In re Incorporation of Village been incorporated by a legal election,
of Edgewood (Pa., 1889), 18 AtL Eep. its incorporation will be declared in-
646. And in the same case it was valid because there is included within
decided that the existence of a natu- the corporate limits land not laid off
ral boundary line between two vil- into lots or blocks, and the house of
lages, such as a deep, wooded ravine, one relator, who, though he does no
13 not such division of territoiy as business in the town, yet attends
requires separate corporate exist- church in it, and sends his children
ence; and where a majority of the to school there. State v. Town of
land-ownei-s on each side of the ra- Baird (Tex., 1891), 15 S. W. Eep. 98.
viae demand incorporation wiLh one ' State v. "Woodbury, 76 Me. 457.
§ 51.J CEEATION OF THE OOEPOKATION. 67
porators is not necessary to the validity of the incorporation
of municipalities. The acts, whether general or special, cre-
ating municipal corporations are laws, and as such are bind-
ing upon all persons subject thereto, whether consenting or
unwilling.' Although this power of the legislature to force a
municipal corporation upon unwilling corporators is un-
doubted, the exercise of such power has been held to be con-
trary to the genius of our government."
§ 51. The same subject continned. — Although the legisla-
ture is not bound to consider the wishes of the corporators in
creating municipal corporations, it is constitutional for the
legislature to submit a proposed charter to the inhabitants of
the district to be incorporated, to be adopted or rejected by a
vote of those inhabitants.' Thus the question of the consoli-
dation of Pittsburg and certain adjacent districts into one cor-
poration was submitted to the vote of the persons interested ;
and the act submitting the proposed measure was considered
constitutional.* On the same principle it has been held in New
York that a statute affecting a certain municipality shall ter-
minate unless assented to by the voters of the corporation
within a fixed time.*
1 People V. City of Butte, 4 Mont ' Mayor &c. of Brunswick v. Fin-
174; Gorhamu. Springfield, 2] Me. 58; ney, 54 Ga. 317; Alcorn «. Hamier,
Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266 ; 88 Miss. 653 ; Clarke v. Rogers, 81 Ky.
State V. Canterbiyy, 38 N. H. 218; 48; Call w Chadbourne, 16 Me. 307;
Bristol V. New Chester, 3 N. H. 534 ; People v. McFadden, 81 Cal. 489 ;
State V. Curran, 13 Ark. 831 ; People People v. Solomon, 51 111. 37 ; People
V. Wren, 5 111. 369 ; Coles v. Madison v. Reynolds, 10 111. 1 ; Paterson t'._So^
Co., Breese (111.), 115; Warren- «. ciety &c., 24 N. J. Law, 385 ; Hudson
Charlestown, 3 Gray, 104; Peoples. County v. State, 34 N.J. Law, 718;
Morris, 13 Wend. 335 ; Fire Depai-t- In re Henry Street, 123 Pa. St. 346 ;
ment v. Kip, 10 Wend. 367 ; People v. Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Pa. St.
President, 9 Wend. 351 ; People v. 314 ; Commonwealth v. Judges, 8 Pa.
Stout, 33 Barb. 349 ; Proprietors &c. St. 395; Bull v. Read, 13 Gratt. 73;
wHorton, 6 Hill, 501; Wood u Bank, State v. Scott, 17 Mo. 521; Stater.
9 Cow. 194; Morford v, Unger, 8 Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Lafayette &c.
Iowa, 82 ; Taylor v. New Berne, 3 R Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind. 185 ; State
Jones' Eq. (N. C.) 141 ; State v. Bab- v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 379 ; Foote v. Cin-
cock, 25 Neb. 709 ; Zabriskie v. Rail- cinnati, 11 Ohio, 408.
road Co., 33 How. 381. . < Smith u McCarthy, 56 Pa. St 359.
2 Paterson v. Society &c., 34 N. J, ' Corning v. Greene, 23 Barb. 33,
Law, 385.
68
OEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION.
[§§ 52, 63.
§ 52. Substantial compliance with incorporating acts
necessary. — If the requirements of the acts authorizing the
creation of municipal corporations are substantially followed,
the courts will in general uphold the proceedings, and will
not declare the incorporation void because unessential formal-
ities have been overlooked in whole or in part. So in Nebraska,
where it was apparent that a city of the second class had
in fact been duly organized in good faith, mere irregularities
in some of the proceedings woulft not, it was held, render the
organization void.' Following this principle the courts will
presume that the necessary formalities were performed in the
absence of proof to the contrary." Nor is it always necessary
for the records to show on their face that aU the conditions
required by the statute were present.'
§ 53. Instances of irregularities in incorporation. — The
Pennsylvania act of 1834, relating to the incorporation of bor-
1 City of Omaha v. City of South
Omaha (1891), 47 N. W. Rop. 118.
2 For instance, where a committee
was appointed by the court to estab-
lish the divisional line between towns
in response to a petition in accordance
with the Vermont statute, it was pre-
sumed, on exceptions to the commit-
tee's report, that all the facts alleged
in the petition, and which were neces-
sary to be established in order to en-
title the petitioner to the relief prayed
for, were either admitted or proved
at the preliminary hearing. Town
of Somerset v. Town of Glastenbury
(1889), 17 Atl. Rep. 748. And in the
same case it was held that it was not
necessary that it should appear by the
report of the committee that they
were sworn as required by law.
Town of Somerset v. T6wn of Glas-
tenbury (1889), 17 AtL Rep. 748.
' By the code of West Virginia of
1887, chapter 47, section 49, it is pro-
vided that the corporate limits of
towns containing a population of less
than two thousand inhabitants shall
be changed by a vote ordered by the
council, the result of which vote, if in
favor of the change, shall be certified
to the circuit court. Section 49 pro-
vides that the circuit court shall
enter an order approving and con-
firming the change, and directing a
copy certified to the council, etc. It
was held to be n.ot necessary to the
validity of the order approving
such change that it should show on
its face that the town contained less
than two thousand inhabitants.
Davis V. Town of Point Pleasant
(W. Va.), 9 S. E. Rep. 228 ; 32 W. Va.
289; Point Pleasant Bridge Co. v.
Town of Point Pleasant, 9 S. K Rep.
231 ; 2 W. Va. 328. See, also, Attorney-
General V. Rice, 64 Mich. 385. But
where the Pennsylvania statute re-
quired that a petition for the incor-
poration of a borough should be
signed by the petitioners within three
months immediately preceding its
presentation to the court, that fact
need not be stated in the petition, but
must appear in the record. In re
Summit Borough (Pa., 1887), 7 AtL
Rep, 219; In re Osborne, 101 Pa. St
284.
§ 54.] CREATION OF THE OOEPOEATION. 69
oughs, provided for a reference of an application for incor-
poration to the grand jury, and that, if a majority thereof,
" after a full investigation of the case, shall find that the con-
ditions presented by this act have been complied with, and
shall believe that it is expedient to grant the prayer of the
petitioners, they shall certify the same to the court." Under
this provision an indorsement of " approved " on the petition
by the foreman of the grand jury, with his signature, was not
considered a sufficient certificate.' But the failure to mark as
" filed," a plot of a borough, sought to be incorporated, at the
time it was presented, can be cured by an order for it to be so
marked nunc pro tunc, according to a decision in the same
State.* The constitution of California relating to the adoption
of city charters provided that the charter should " be submit-
ted to the legislature for its approval or rejection as a whole,
without power of alteration or amendment, and if approved
by a majority vote of the members elected to each house, it
should become the charter of such city." The resolution of
approval need not be in the form of a bill passed in the ordi-
nary manner, and approved by the governor, as the constitution
does not niake the governor a part of the legislature.'
§ 54. Notice of incorporation. — It is frequently provided
in the acts relating to the incorporation of municipalities that
notice of the proposed incorporation be published for a pre-
scribed period. In Florida it has been held that, where such
notice has been given, the proceedings for incorporation may
be had on the last day of the notice.'' In that case the statute
required the notice to be published " for a period of not less
than thirty days." According to the judicial coj;istruction of
this requirement, it was complied with if thirty days' notice
had been given by excluding the 'first and including the last
day; and it was held that the statute did not mean thirty
clear days.* The notice must be sufficiently explicit to enable
the proposed corporators to vote intelligently upon the ques-
1 JTft re Summit Borough (1887), 7 31 Pac. Eep. 653; In re Strand (CaL;
AIL Eep. 319. 1889), 21 Pac. Rep. 654.
2 Appeal of Gross (1889), 18 AtL Eep. < State v. Town of Winter Park
657. ' (1889), 25 Fla. 371.
'BrooksD. Fischer, 79 Cal. 173; S.C., 6 state v. Town of Winter Park
(1889), 25 Fla. 371.
.70 CREATION OF THE OOBPOEATION. [§ 55.
tion of incorporation.* And where all the parties interested
in proceedings to incorporate a municipality are in court, they
cannot be heard to object that the notice of the proceedings
was insufiScient.*
§ 55. Validity ofincorporation^- How tested. — The State,
being the creator of municipal corporations, is the proper
party to impeach the validity of their creation ; and conse-
quently where the corporation ift acting under color of law
and IS recognized by the State as so acting, its corporate ex-
istence cannot be collaterally attacked.' This doctrine applies
even though the validity of the incorporation may be attacked
on constitutional grounds,* In Illinois a town brought an ac-
tion against a citizen to recover a tax on property in the town,
and it was decided by the court that the validity of the incor-
poration of the town could not be impeached in such an action.*
If the State acquiesces in the validity of a municipal corpora-
tion and recognizes the corporation as val'd for a long period,
it will be estopped from denying the validity of the incorpo-
ration." In the words of Judge Cooley : — " The State itself
may justly be precluded, on the principle of estoppel, from
' A notice by the county supervis- v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463 ; Lanning
ore of an election to decide upon the v. Carpenter, 20 N. Y. 474 ; Bumsey
incorporation of a California city, on v. People, 19 N. Y. 41 ; Swam v. Com-
petition of proper parties, the notice stock, ISWis. 463 ; Jameson v. Peo-
stating that the "petition set forth pie, 16111. 257; S. C, 63 Am. Dec. 304 ;
the boundaries of the proposed cor- Tisdale v. Minonk, 46 111. 9 ; Ketter-
poration, and stated the number of ing v. Jacksonville, 50 HI. 39 ; Searcy
inhabitants therein to be about three v. Garnell, 47 Ark. 269 ; Louisville
thousand," was decided to be a suffi- &c. B. Co. v. Shires, 108 lU. 617 ;
cient notice to enable the voters to Henderson v. Davis, 106 N. C. 88 ;
classify the proposed municipal cor- Eayser v. Bremen, 16 Mo. 88 ; State
poration under the law in cities of v. Fuller, 96 Mo. 165; State v. Carr,
the sixth class, according to the stat- 5 N. H. 367 ; Hamilton v. President
ute of that State, and to vote Intel- &c. of Carthage, 24 111. 22; Worley
ligently upon the question of incor- v. Harris, 82 Ind. 493 ; Mendenhall V.
poration. People v. City of River- Burton, 43 Kan. 570.
side, 70 Cal. 461 ; 11 Pao. Rep. 759. <St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247.
2 In re Incorporation of Village of " Geneva v. Cole, 61 111. 397.
Edgewood (1889), 18 Atl. Rep. 646. estate v. Leatherman, 38 Ark. 81;
'Society &c. v. Pawlet, 4 Pet. 480; People u Maynaw, 15 Mich. 463; 1
Bird V. Perkins, 33 Mich. 88 ; People Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 43a.
§§ 56, 67.] CREATION OF THE OOKPOEATION. 71
raising such an objection where there has been long acquies-
cence and recognition." ^
§ 56. The same subject continued. — And it may be laid
down as a general principle that where the validity of the in-
corporation of a municipality is attacked, the presumption is
strongly in favor of its validity.' In a "Wisconsin case it was
held, following this principle, that the complaint in an action
against a city need not allege that the defendant was a mu-
nicipal corporation.* A striking application of this doctrine is
found in a recent Indiana case where an information in a pro-
ceeding in the nature of a quo warranto to test the legality of
the organization and incorporation of a city, which averred
that a census was not taken as required by law, and that a
majority of the legal voters of the town did not vote in favor
of the adoption of a city charter, but which failed to aver that
the clerk and inspector did not do their duty, and make a
suitable record as required by law, was held bad on demurrer,
because such record was considered conclusive as to all ques-
tions except as to whether a majority of the votes cast were
in favor of the proposed change.*
§ 57. The charter of a municipal corporation is a law. —
The power of the legislature over the charters of municipal
corporations finds its origin in the fact that the acts, whether
general or special, creating such corporations are statutes bind-
ing upon the persons affected thereby ; and are not contracts
as are the charters of private corporations. Being public
statutes or laws they can be amended or repealed at the pleas-
ure of the legislature provided no contractual rights are in-
jured. Unlike the decision of a court, the act of the legislature
1 Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.) 310. vote in favor of adopting the city
2 People V. Farnham, 35 111. 562; charter, or otherwise concur in the
Jameson v. People, 16 111. 257 ; State proceedings of which he complains.
V. Young, 3 Ean. 445, and cases cited And it was further decided that the
in preceding section. averment that a majority of the
3 Rains v. Oshkosh, 14 Wis. 373. legal voters did not vote in its favor
* State V. Town of Tipton (Ind., was not equivalent to an averment
1887), 9 N. E. Rep. 704. And in the that a majority of the votes cast were
same ease the information was also not favorable. State v. Town of Tip-
held bad on demurrer, because it did ton (Ind., 1887), 9 N. E. Rep, 704
not show that the plaintiS did not
72 OEEATION OF THE COEPOKATIOK. [§ 58.
of this year cannot bind the legislature of next year. Each
represents a sovereignty, the people, and possesses the same
powers, and the same right to exercise its discretion. An
illustration of this is that a proposed law is often adopted by
one legislature which has been rejected by its predecessors for
several years. Unless, therefore, an act of legislature assume
the form of a contract, it cannot be irrevocable. Otherwise,
if a permanent character could be given to legislation, the
most injurious consequences wouM result. Its policy on great
interests, once crystallized into a law, would be fixed and un-
changeable. This would retard, perhaps materially injure, the
general prosperity. Consequently, every legislative body,
unless restricted by the constitution, m^y modify or abolish
the acts of its predecessors.^ In fact the constitution, as Judge
Cooley points out in his treatise on Constitutional Limita-
tions,^ in conferring the legislative authority, has prescribed
to its exercise certain limitations. These limitations were
such as the people chose to impose, and no other power but
that of the people can superadd other limitations. " To say
that the legislature may pass irrepealaWe laws is to say that
it may alter the very constitution from which it derives its
authority; since, in so far as one legislature could bind a sub-
sequent one by its enactments, it could in the same degree re-
duce the legislative power of its successors." '
§ 58. The American township. — Every State in the Union
is as to its internal affairs essentially independent of every
other. We might, therefore, expect to see such individuality
in the municipal corporations erected by the several States as
characterized the English local bodies of the seventeenth
century But practically there are three distinct kinds or
types of township organizations, which we can call the Penn-
sylvania, the New York and the Minnesota types. The first,
since practically adopted by Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas and
Missouri, has this general structure. It gives the people local
self-government. The townships are the State agencies. The
i Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean, 158. notations of case in 12 Fed. Rep. 772,
2 Cooley's Const Lim. (5th ed.), eh. by Robert Desty ; " Legislative Con-
5, p. 149. trol of Municipal Corporations," by
» Upon " Altering Charter," see an- W. P. Wade, 8 Cent L. J. a
§ 59.] CEEATION OF THE COEPOEATION. 73
officers are the local administrative body. Each township
has the power of self-taxation, and usually controls the public
schools. But there is no right of representation on the
county board, nor is there anything corresponding to the
town meeting ovfolkmote, as it has been ^called. The county
authority is superior to and controls the township, and the
inhabitants have no voice except such as is expressed in elect-
ing officers at the polls. The New York plan, followed in
Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin and 2Tebraska, gives freest ex-
pression to the " spirit of localism." Each township is consti-
tuted on a general model. It has a definite' symmetrical or-
ganism. There is a town-meeting, which has powers suffi-
cient to deal with all local requirements and emergencies.
There is subordination, as in the former instance, to the
county organization, but the supervisors of the township have
seats in the county board, and so the township has fair repre-
sentation. The Minnesota plan is less perfect. There is no
representation on the county board. But the powers pos-
sessed are greater than under the Pennsylvania plan, for there
is a town-meeting, endued with authority to choose officers
and enact by-laws and local ordinances. The New York plan
has, it appears, many points of superiority as compared with
either of the others. As has been said, it prevails in the
Northwest, and may possibly and might well be adopted more
widely.
§ 59. Local self-government a delegation of legislative
power. — "When municipalities are erected under general or
special laws, they are invested with the right of local self-
government, carrying with it, expressly or by implication, the
right to pass by-laws and ordinances ; that is, to legislate for
local purposes. But it is one of the settled constitutional
axioms that the power vested in the legislature to enact laws
cannot be by that body delegated to any other body or indi-
vidual. Locke, in his Essay on Civil Government, has the
following impressive passage : — " These are the bounds which
the trust that is put in them by the society, and the law of
God and nature, have set to the legislative power of every
commonwealth, in all forms of government. First. They are
to govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied
74 CEEATION OF THE OOEPOEATION. [§ 60.
in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for
the favorite at court and the countryman at plough. Secondly.
These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ulti-
mately but the good of the people. Thirdly. They must not
raise taxes on the property of the people without the consent
of the people, given by themselves or their deputies. . . ,
Fourthly. The legislature neither must nor can transfer the
power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere
but where the people have." %
§ 60. The same subject continued. — We then have a seem-
ing convict — theyac^ that municipalities have a sort of legis-
lative power which they habitually exercise, as opposed to the
principle that legislative power cannot be delegated.' In the
first place we observe that the powers conferred upon mu-
nicipalities to pass ordinances is not a delegation of power ; '
and, in the second place, the bestowal of these subordinate
powers of legislation do not trench on the maxim that legis-
lative power must not be delegated, " since that maxim is to
be understood in the light of the immemorial practice of this
country and of England, which has always recognized the
propriety and policy of vesting in the municipal organizations
certain powers of local regulation, in respect to which the
parties immediately interested may fairly be supposed more
competent to judge of their needs than any central authority.
As municipal organizations are mere auxiliaries of the State
government in the important business of municipal rule, the
legislature may create them at will from its own vijBws of
propriety or necessity, and without consulting the parties in-
terested ; and it also possesses the like power to abolish them
without stopping to inquire what may be the desire of the
corporators on that subject." '
1 People V. Fleming, 10 Colo. 552; 2 State v. Francis, 95 Mo. 44; 14
State V. Hudson County Com're, 37 West Rep. 353.
N. J. Law, 13 ; State ». Weir, 33 Iowa, 'Cooley's Const Lim. (5th ed.),
134 ; Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. 140, citing City of Paterson v. So-
St 507 ; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479 ; ciety &c., 24 N. J. Law, 385 ; Cheany
People V. Stout, 23 Barb. 349. v. Hooser, 9 B. Hon. 330 ; Berlin v.
Gorham, 34 N. H. 266.
CHAPTEK IIL
THE CHAETER.
§61.
63.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
Early charters.
Political element in charters.
Charters at the present day.
Municipal charters not within
the rule in the Dartmouth
College Case.
The present English statutes.
The Municipal Corporations
Act and the royal preroga-
tive.
Contents of charter.
Prominent features of special
charters.
What charters cannot confer.
Wherein the constitutional lim-
itation consists.
Acceptance — When necessary.
The same subject continued.
Compulsory acceptance;
Charters, how proved.
Proof of fact of incorporation.
Proof of corporate existence.
General rules of construction of
charters.
Can charters be modified.
§ 79. How far the State can enforce
performance of local duties..
80. Change in municipal bound-'
aries.
81. Effects of amendments of char-
ter on city ordinances.
82. Reorganization under general
law — Effect of.
83. Reorganization must be strictly
according to statute.
84. The same subject continued.
85. New York constitution a gen-
eral law.
86. How far special legislation is
permissible.
87. Written constitutions — Opera-
tion of.
88. Power to make by-laws — How
limited.
89. Conflict of by-laws and general
acts.
90. The ordinance when passed
must be reasonable.
91. Reasonableness — How deter-
mined.
§ 61. Early charters. — The word charter is derived from
the Latin word cha/rta, which signified first a leaf of the Egyp-
tian papyrus, through the Greek b xdpzrjz, and then any ma-
terial to write upon, and subsequently any instrument or
writing under seal. Cha/rta regia, or a royal charter, was an
instrument in writing conferring a grant from the crown on
any person or persons, or any body politic, of any rights, lib-
erties, franchises or privileges.^ The early charters were called
muniments, as they "fortified and defended that which was
granted." * In a history of Charles V., by Dr. Eobertson, the
1 Bracton, fol. 386 ; The Prince's a muniendo, quia muniunt et defend-
Case, 8 Ca unt hsereditatem. 4 Co. 153.
2 Chartse sont appelle " muniments "
76 THE CHASTEB. [§ 62.
manner in which the early charters were granted is exhaust-
ively examined. The learned author points out that during
the existence of the feudal system, and the turbulence and
disorder attendant upon it throughout Europe, personal safety
was the first great object of every individual. The barons,
being the gi'eat military lords, were the only ones strong
enough to afford protection, and hence the people, for the sake
of their protection, would become their vassals, and surrender
some rights or a part of their iniiependence in exchange. But
, when a large number of persons came to be assembled in com-
munities, their number and the fortifications of the place were
an equally reliable means of defense. So charters were either
granted by or wrung from the lords, or drawn up among the
individuals of the compiunity, in which they bound themselves
under solemn oath to aid in the mutual defense, and the re-
dress of any injury or affront to any individual member. Any
one subsequently entering the community had to subject him-
self to the same oaths and conditions. Little by little local
regulations, developing later into a system or code of law,
were made and enforced. In addition to the obligation to aid
in maintaining the personal security of every member of the
community, the charter usually required every member to
buy a house or land, or to keep a considerable amount of his
personal property within the town, so that he might thus be
interested in the common secjirity of property. The com-
munity usually was subject to some fixed tax payable to the
feudal superior who was grantor of the charter, and accepted
by him in lieu of arbitrary imposts and taxes. And the pay-
ment of this sura was evenly distributed. So general, in short,
was the practical independence of members of such communi-
ties that they were called libertates.
§ 62. Political element in charters. — Security of life and
then security of property having been acquired, a desire for a
higher independence arose. In England, the dominant idea,
both of lords and people, being the encouragement of com-
merce, the custom soon obtained of allowing the merchants
to form guilds, with the power of making their own regula-
tions. "We have already seen ' the manner in which the priv-
« See supra, g§ 20-22.
§ 63.] THE CHAETBE. 77
ileges of the guilds grew into the privileges of towns. A
measure of domestic jurisdiction was given to the more im-
portant towns, — that is, the towns in which the larger guilds
were located. The guild might continue separate and dis-
tinct frona the town, or it might become merged in and iden-
tified with it. But wheresoever there was an identification
of the two, a political character was immediately given to the
community interests. The object of the members was to ac-
quire greater local independence, and less interference by any,
outside and superior powers. And the financial importance
of the merchants of England was the means by which they
secured many of their rights and privileges. Many charters
had been granted and enjoyed before the principle was gen-
erally held that the towns so enfranchised were corporations ;
and many towns were deemed corporations without express
words of incorporation having been used. In the reign of
Henry VI.' occurred the first reported instance of allusion to
a commonalty as a body corporate. But no charters, it is be-
lieved, really incorporated the burgesses or commonalty of
any municipal body until the eighteenth ypar of the same
monarch, in which Kingston-upon-Hull was incorporated.*
§ 63. Charters at the present day. — A charter of incorpo-
ration is the evidence of the act of a legislature, governor,
court or other authorized department or person, by which a
corporation is or was created.' A municipal corporation being
regarded as a mere agent of government and a depository
of political power conferred by the legislature, its charter is
not a contract, as is the charter of a private corporation.* It
is the absence of the contractual element which leaves a mu-
nicipal corporation at the mercy, so to speak, of the power
that created it, for the reason that there is no vested right to
the franchises conferred; they are revocable at the will of
the creating power.* For the same reason the municipal cor-
i Year Book, 7 Henry VI., 43. 'Anderson's Diet Law, tit Char-
* There are proofs of earlier char- ter.
ters being granted to this town : one * Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
by Edward 1, confirmed by Edward 4 Wheat 518, 634, 712.
II., Edward III, Richard IL, Henry 6 Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 181;
IV. and Henry V. But actual terms Chase's Blackstone, 189, n. ; 1 DiUon
of incorporation were not used prior on Municipal Corporations, 54.
to the charter of Henry VL
T8 THE CHAETEE. [§ 64.
poration can exercise only such privileges and rights as are
expressly granted to it in its instrument of incorporation, or
charter, or by some statute amending or extending it.' And
the creating power, being practically the only party having a
voice in giving these privileges, can change, modify or recall
any such franchises as the exigencies of the public service or
vrelfare may require. This is now well settled in the decided
cases.^
♦
. § 64. Municipal charters not within the rule of the Dart-
mouth College Case. — The prohibition in the federal consti-
tution against the passage of State laws impairing the obliga-
tions of contracts, and the rule in the Dartmouth College Case
applying this prohibition to statutes amending or repealing
the charters of private corporations, have no application to
public and municipal charters,' But while the prohibition
does not extend to the municipal charter itself, it is applicable
to contracts made by the municipality prior to the enactment
of the amending or repealing statute, and obligations incurred
or rights vested prior thereto are not affected by subsequent
legislation.* Municipal corporations have vested in them
merely a small portion of the public administration, and their
1 Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. ' The distinction between private
524. and public charters in thia regard was
2 Thomas v. City of Richmond, 13 fully discussed in Woodward «. Dart-
Wall. 356 ; Demarest v. New York, 74 mouth College, 4 Wheat 518, and the
•N. Y. 161. " A municipal corporation ratio decidendi of the case in the fed-
may be viewed in different aspects, — eral court as against the decision of
tha,t which it has to the citizen, and the New Hampshire court turned
that which it bears to the State. Seen upon the private nature of the insti-
in the latter relation it is a revocable tution whose character was in ques-
agency, constituted for the purpose tion. The sanctity of charters granted
of carrying out in detail such objects to private corporations was freely ad-
of the government as may be prop- mitted by the State tribunal in Trust-
erly intrusted to a subordinate, hav- ees of Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ing no vested right to any of its forms ward, 1 N. H. 111. See Beach on
or franchises, and entirely under the Private Corporations, g 17.
control of the legislature, which may * People v. O'Brien, W. IT. Y. 1;
enlarge or circumscribe its territorial " Municipal Debts Not Disc)'«rged by
limits or functions, may change or Repeal of Charter," annotations by
modify its various departments, or H. H. IngeraoU, 31 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.)
extinguish it with the breath of arbi- 181, Cf. " Relations of Municipal Cor-
trary power," Hare on Amer, Con- porations to the State," an address
stitutional Law, vol, I, p, 638 ; 15 Am. before the Alleghany County Bar As-
& Eng. Encyc, Law, 976, sociation by W, S, Pier, in 1886;
§ 65.] THE OHAETEE. 79
charters may be changed at the ■will of the legislature.' As
has been said, they are established only for the local govern-
ment of towns or particular districts. The special powers
conferred upon them are not vested rights as against the State,
but, being wholly political, exist only during the will of the
general legislature.* These powers can at any time be abro-
gated by the legislature, either by a general law operating
upon the whole State, or by a special act altering the powers
of the corporation, or they may be repealed by an amendment
to the constitution, inconsistent with the provisions in the
charter.' The reason is distinct ; for were this not the case,
there would have been numberless petty governments existing
within the State, forming part of it, but Independent of its
control.* Political Frankensteins are the dread of all govern-
ments. The creation of corporations would rapidly have to
determine if, when created, they became equal or superior to
the power that created them.'
§65. The present English statutes. — It will be interest-
ing here to give in substance the English statutes regarding
the granting of charters. They are included in what have
been already referred to as the Municipal Corporation Acts.'
"§ 210. If on the petition to the queen of the inhabitant
householders of any tow^n or towns, or district in England, or
of any of those inhabitants, praying for the grant of a charter
of incorporation, her majesty, by the advice of her privy
council, thinks fit by charter to create such town, towns or
district, or any part thereof specified in the charter, with or
without any adjoining place, a municipal borough, and to in-
corporate the inhabitants thereof, it shall be lawful for her
majesty, by the charter, to extend to that municipal borough
and the inhabitants thereof so incorporated, the provisions of
"Municipal Corporations: Can the lor, 30 N. J. Eq. 618; Hagerstown v.
Legislature of a State Empower Dechert, 33 Md> 369.
Them to Amend Their Own Char- * Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. 361.
ters? " 3 Cent L. J. 83. * See the chapter on LEOlSLATrvE
1 State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. Control, infra.
(TT. S.) 380. ' See Bawlinson's Municipal Corpo-
2 Sloan V. State, 8 Blackf. 361. ration Acts, 8th edition; also 45 &
» Trustees of Public Schools v. Tay- 46 Vict, ch. 50. See, also, supra,
m 28, 29.
80 THE CHAETEE. [§ 65.
the MunicipaJl Corporation Acts." "§ 211. (1) Every peti-
tion for a charter under this act shall be referred to a commit-
tee of the lords of her majesty's privy council " (in this part
called the committee of council). " (2) One month at least
before the petition is taken into consideration by the commit-
tee of council, notice thereof and of the time when it will be
so taken into consideration shall be published in the London
Gazette, and otherwise in such manner as the committee di-
rect, for the purpose of makingtt known to all persons inter-
ested." The queen, having received such a petition, and the
council having examined and approved thereof, if she deter-
mines to grant a charter of incorporation, has certain powers
regarding the election and officers in the new boroughs. She
can fix the number of councillors, and also the number and
boundaries of the borough wards, and assign the councillors
among the wards. She may also " fix the years, days and
times for the retirement of the first aldermen and council-
lors,— thus giving the crown the power of fixing the time of
elections." ' The committee of council, before approving a pe-
tition to the queen, may settle a scheme for the adjustment
of the powers, rights, privileges, franchises, duties, property
and liabilities of any then existing local authority whose dis-
trict comprises the whole or part of the area of that borough,
either with or without any adjoining or other place, and also
of any officer of that authority. This scheme is not binding
if objected to by the inhabitants or a part of them, unless
confirmed by parliament, and it must in any wise be sub-
mitted for approval to the secretary of State and the local
government board.* Section 216 of this act further provides
that " A charter creating a municipal borough which, purports
to be granted in pursuance of the royal prerogative and in
pursuance of or in accordance with this act, shall after ao-
ceptanoe be deemed to be valid and within the powers of this
act, and her majesty's prerogative, and shall not be questioned
in any legal proceeding whatever." This section was intended
to prevent the necessity, which so frequently arose before the
140 & 41 Viot, ch. 69; 46 & 46 245 & 46 Vict, ch. 50, §214
Vict, ch. 50, § 213; Butter v. Chap-
man, 8 M. & W. 1.
§ 66.] THE CHAETEE. 81
passing of these acts, of having acts of parliament to confirm
different charters.'
§ 66. The Municipal Corporation Acts and the royal pre-
rogative.— Sir Christopher Eawlinson, whose compilation of
the Municipal Corporation Acts is a standard English work,
calls attention to the section concerning the queen's power to
grant charters : " The crown has always possessed the power
of creating corporations and conferring franchises (see 1 Kyd
on Corporations, 61) ; but where privileges and powers are to
be conferred which are not recognized by the common or
statute law an act of parliament is necessary. This act,
though it would not at all abridge the common-law preroga-
tive of the crown, nevertheless prevents its granting charters
of incorporation with the powers conferred by this act, save
with the advice of the privy council, and on petition by ' the
inhabitant householders.' The petition to the queen must be
by the inhabitant householders. It seems a compound house-
holdef is included under the term." ^ Notwithstanding the pro-
vision of section 216, quoted above, as to the validity of charr
ters purporting to be granted in pursuance of this act, there
is an interesting case regarding the validity of a borough
charter granted under 5 and 6 W. 4, ch. 76, § 141, and 7 W. 4
and 1 Vict., ch. 78, § 49, both of which elections were repealed
by 40 and 41 Vict., ch. 69, but substantially reproduced in this
act. It was the case of Eutter i?. Chapman,' decided in the
court of exchequer chamber, and related to the charter of
Manchester. It appears that a petition, which had been
agreed upon at a meeting of the rate-payers of the parlia-
mentary borough of Manchester, convened by public adver-
tisement, and which was in fact attended (and which petition
was afterwards signed) by four thousand inhabitant house-
holders of the borough, was presented to her majesty, praying
for the grant of a charter of incorporation to the inhabitants
of such borough under the provision of the act. Afterwards,
and before the day appointed for this petition being taken
iSee, also, 40 and 41 Viot, ch. 69, 11 L. T. (N. S.) 417; s. C, 11 W. E. 90;
§ 9 ; 18 and 19 Vict, ch. 31 ; 20 and 21 41 and 43 Vict, ch. 26, § 14 ; 43 and
Vict, ch. 10. 43 Vict, ch. 10.
2 See Eeg. v. Mayor of Aberavon, ' 8 M. & W. 1.
6
82 THE CHAETEE. [§ 67.
into consideration by the privy council, a counter petition,
signed by six thousand of such inhabitant householders, was
presented to her majesty, praying her not to grant such char-
ter. The whole number of inhabitant householders in Man-
chester was at that time forty-eight thousand. The court of
exchequer chamber held as follows: — (1) That the second
petition did not necessarily, in point of law, deprive her maj-
esty of the power to grant such charter upon the first petition ;
but that whether the first petition was, under all the circum-
stances, the petition of the inhabitant householders of tbe
borough, so as to authorize the exercise of the powers con-
ferred by the act, was a question of fact for a jury, and that
the determination of the privy council to advise the crown to
grant the charter upon such petition was not conclusive of its
validity. The court further held that the grant of such char-
ter of incorporation is an exercise of the common-law prerog-
ative of the crown, although it also extends to the new corpo-
ration the powers of the municipal act,' which the crown has
power to do only by virtue of the sections of this act. More-
' over, the charter may be granted to a part only of the bor-
ough, from the whole of which the petition emanated, and is
not necessarily to be conferred on the inhabitant householders
of the whole borough. The decision went much further into
detail than this brief summary. The point first mentioned
was upheld by a subsequent decision, to the eflfect that when
the first petition had once given the crown power to act
under these sections, such power could not be taken away by
anything that happened subsequently.^
§ 67. Contents of charter.— In the United States, the char-
ter being an act of the legislature usually, either specially di-
rected to the incorporation of one separate city therein named,
or general in its provisions, it is instructive to take up and
examine, an illustrative example of a special charter. The
general laws of the States have already been discussed. Selec-
tion may be made almost at random among special municipal
incorporations, for the general features are the same. The
city of Auburn was incorporated by the people of the State
»5 and 6 W. 4; ch. 76. 2 Reg. v. Mayor of Aberavon, 11
L. T. (N. S.) 417.
§ 68.] THE OHAETEE. 83
of New York, represented in senate and assembly, by an act
passed March "21, 1848. The act sets out the territorial out-
line of the proposed municipality, and declares that it " shall
hereafter be known by the name of the city of Auburn, and
the inhabitants residing therein shall be a corporation under
the name and style of the mayor and common council of the
city of Auburn, and as such may sue and be sued, complain
and defend, in any court of law or equity in this State." The
city is then set off into wards. Then follow provisions as to
the eleqtion of ward and city officers, and the powers and
duties of the " common council " are then enumerated. The
powers conferred are the powers of the city relating to its
domestic economy, its constabulary and its finances. Sub-
ordinate legislative powers are delegated, " such as are neces-
sary to carry into full effect the powers given to said council
by this act." The duties of the city officers are next defined,
after w^hich the subject of municipal taxes is fully treated.
The common council are constituted commissioners of high-
ways to keep the streets and roads in repair. Additional
powers are conferred on them with regard to prevention of
fires, to establishing school districts, to caring for the poor, to
regulations as to pestilence and disease, and numerous subordi-
nate miscellaneous duties. Such in brief is the outline of a
special municipal charter.
§68. Prominent features of special "charters. — In the
charter just examined, it will be seen that the act is more
minute and specific regarding the powers and privileges given
than in any other part. It would seem as if local self-govern-
ment were so great and valuable a right that the people feel
that it is to be exercised only upon terms and conditions, and
the determination of what these terms and conditions shall in a
given instance be is to be left to the wisdom and discretion of the
legislature, which bears the relation of mouth and voice to the
body of the people. This succinctness in stating what powers
are conferred makes it possible to know exactly the limits of
the city's jurisdiction, and, in case of the passage of general
acts subsequently, the charter is the criterion of inconsistency
between the special and the general acts. But under a gen-
( ral law — which may be said to be a species of divisible char-
84 THE CHAETEE. [§ 69.
ter, as many municipalities may at the same time point to it
as containing the enumeration of their charter rights — the
provisions are much the same : only general terms are used,
such as " any . . . complying with the provisions of this
act . . . shall," etc. A royal charter.ls an instrument in
writing setting forth the privileges or an assurance of rights
granted by the sovereign to the people.' When it establishes
a municipal corporation, it prescribes the territorial limits, the
form, methods and franchises o^the proposed municipality,
very much as an act of parliament would. It is, however, ad-
dressed by the king to all his subjects, and names the persons
to be incorporated, and constitutes them and their successors
a body corporate.^ "Whether, then, the incorporation be by
means of a formal, special document, such as a charter proper,
or by means of a particular enactment of the governing body,
or whether it be concealed in a general statute, such as the
Municipal Corporations Act, it is equally the criterion of every
right and privilege enjoyed. It is the constitution of the mu-
nicipality. If the power of the common council, or of the
city executive, be called in question, the charter, in whatever
form it exist, has to be judicially examined and construed.
If the right to lease ferry privileges is controverted, the char-
ter is the controlling witness to the existence or lack of the
right.
■"n
§ 69. What charters cannot confer. — Judge Hare, in his
learndd treatise on American Constitutional Law,' in discuss-
ing charters of incorporation, and particularly whether or not
charters confer contractual rights which cannot be violated
consistently with the constitution, draws a distinction be-
tween public and private corporations in this regard, and
points out not only that the powers delegated are liable to re-
call, but that many powers cannot, by reason of their very
nature, be delegated irrevocably. " Many powers," he argues,
" and among them the power to coin money and regulate the
value thereof, the police power and that of eminent domain,
1 Amer. & Eng. Encyo. of Law, form, appoint the officers and give a
voL III, tit Charter. proper name to the municipality.
2 A royal charter may, however, Glover on Munio. Corp. 24.
empower another to prescribe the ' Vol. I, p. 608.
§ 70.] THE OHAETEK. 85
are not only sovereign, but so essential to the care which the
State should have for the lives and fortunes of its citizens that
they cannot be vested irrevocably in private hands, or exer-
cised save for a public purpose ; and any attempt made by the
State to alienate its authority in these regards will be merely
void, and may be so treated by the courts." ^ The same writer
states certain,qualifications of this general proposition as fol-
lows : — " A State may forego the power of taxation, but cannot
confer it ; or, in other words, may covenant not to tax the cov-
enantee, though not that he shall have the right to tax other
people.^ So the powers requisite for municipal and local govern-
ment may be delegated to a natural or artificial person ap-
pointed by the State, or chosen by the inhabitants of a town
or district, but cannot be vested irrevocably in the appointee ;
and a stipulation to that effect will be nugatory."
§ 70. Wherein the constitutional limitation consists. —
It appears, therefore, from the preceding section that the fed-
eral constitution, in providing that no State shall pass any
law impairing the obligation of contracts, looks to the pro-
tection of property rights and not political rights. The lat-
ter are vested in the people at large, but cannot be vested in
communities. The constitution is general, and embraces in
its scope every citizen. No absolute political rights, then, can
vest in any one individual or collection of individuals, as
against the legislature, representing the people at large, or as
against any other individual or individuals.' If the State,
therefore, chooses to organize governmental agencies, — as- all
public corporations are shown to be under the rule of the
Dartm6uth College Case, — this agency can be modified or re-
voked at any time by the State. " This is true of all public
corporations," says Judge Hare, in the treatise to which ref-
1 The Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 erty. " Taxation,"' to quote the lan-
U. S. 33 ; Thorp v. The Eailroad Co., guage of the master, " is, in its es-
27 Vt. 140 ; Trustees of Public Schools senoe, an exercise of sovereign power
V. Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 618. over an inferior; it is an exaction,
' In Trustees of Public Schools v. payment of which by the inferior is
•Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 618, 633, the court compelled by the superior."
declared it was impossible for the » The People v, Morris, 13 Wend,
legislature to clothe a municipality 335, 337.
with the power of taxing State pi op-
86 THE CHAETEB. [§ 71.
erence has already been made,' " and applies with fuU force to
the charters which confer the right of local self-government
on towns and boroughs." * " One distinctive feature of such
an agency is that the legislature creates the body which it
employs and authorizes, another that the corporation con-
tracts in its own name, and not on the credit of the citizens
individually, or of the State. Hence, when it is dissolved,
the entire fabric crumbles, and if another is substituted, it
will not necessarily inherit the obligations of its predecessor." '
§71. Acceptance — When necessary. — All private incor-
. poration being of the nature of a contract, assent to or ac-
ceptance of the contract is essential to its validity. This is not
true in the case of municipal corporations. The legislature
being supreme, the public interest being that for which the
town or city is to be incorporated, the legislature is not in-
fringing any right if it impose a charter on a locality and its
inhabitants without their consent or even against their will.
Nevertheless, the legislature can unquestionably provide that
any particular charter shall not talie effect until accepted ;
and it can prescribe the way in which the acceptance shall be
signified, as that it must be by a majority vote of the inhab-
itants. And if such provision is not unconstitutional, as has
been repeatedly held,* there is no tenable ground to take
against its going further, and prescribing the manner in which
such majority vote shall be ascertained. Thus, in the Ohio
case just cited, the township and city occupying identical ter-
ritorial limits, and the legislature having provided that an
amendment to the city charter should be accepted by a ma-
jority of the voters of the city, the vote was proceeded to, but
1 Hare's Am. Const Law, § 43. municipal obligations rest upon th*
^ Shaipless v. Philadelphia, 21 Fa. organization that takes the place of
St. 149 ; £arb7 v. Shaw,' 19 Fa. 258 ; one that has been dissolved will be
City of Erie v. The Erie Canal Co., more fully discussed.
59 Pa. St 174; Pattei-son f. The So- < Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Fa St
ciety, 24 N. J. Law, 385; Berlin v. 359; Commonwealth v. Fainter, 10
Gorham. 34 N. H. 266 ; Butler v. Barr (Fa.), 395 ;. County v. Quarter
Pennsylvania, 10 Howard, 402 ; New- Sessions, 8 Barr, 214 ; Paterson v. So-
ton V. The Commissioners, 100 U. S. ciety &c., 4 Zabr. (N. J.) 385 ; People
528. 548. V. Solomon, 51 111. 53 ; Foote v. Cin-
8 Meriwether v. Garrett 103 U. S. cinnati, 11 Ohio, 408.
472. Further on, the extent to which
§ 72.] THE OHAKTEE. 87
the council ordered the vote to be taken at the township polls ;
and this was held not to be a city vote, and not an acceptance
within the provisions of the act, for the voters of the city and
township had to possess different qualifications.
§ 72. The same subject continued. — A royal charter was
never operative until the acceptance of those to be incorporated
was signified. The proposed body of incorporators were sup-
posed to receive and consider the charter, and then to acceipt
or reject it. If they accepted it, their acceptance was irrev-
ocable, but the acceptance had to be of the whole charter, or
it was deemed to be rejected; and if the crown assented
to the proposed alterations, then the amended charter was
offered again as a new charter. And in the case of the crea-
tion of a corporation by the legislature, the acceptance of the
charter, or indeed whether there need be any acceptance, is
wholly for the legislature to say. It was at first thought un-
constitutional for the legislature to provide that a charter shall
not take effect until accepted by a majority of the inhabitants,
on the ground that it was a delegation of legislative power.
The courts have, however, interpreted it otherwise, holding
such a provision to be wholly constitutional. It is not a dele-
gation of legislative power, but merely the declaration by the
legislature of a condition precedent to incorporation, to wit,
the vote of a certain proportion of the inhabitants.* By the
same reasoning, the legislature can make the right to make
certain improvements or incur certain liabilities depend upon
a vote of the people interested.^ And the power of police
regulation, one of the most essential attributes of sovereignty,
1 Lafayette &c. R Co. v. Geiger, 34 solidated is valid. Smith v. McCarthy,
Ind. 185 ; Hobart v. Supervisors, 17 56 Penn. St 359.
Cat 33 ; Call v, Chadbourne, 46 Me. 3 For decisions holding acceptance
206 ; Bank v. Brown, 36 N. Y. 467 ; not to be essentia], see People v. Mor-
People i>. Solomon, 51 111. 53 ; Alcorn ris, 13 Wend. 325; People v. Pres't-
V. Hamer, 38 Mies. 652 ; Patterson v. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. 351 ; Fire
Society &c,, 4 Zabr. 385 ; People v. Department of New York v. Kip, 10
Reynolds, 10 III. 1 ; State v. Noyes, 30 Wend. 267 ; Proprietors of Soutli-
N. H. 379 : Sedgwick on Construction hold v. Horton,'6 Hill, 501 ; Wood w
of Statutory and Constitutional Law, Pres't Jefferson County Bank, 9 Cow.'
1.35, n. A statute submitting to the 194; Brouwer v. Appleby, 1 Sandf.
people of several municipalities the 158 ; People v. Stout, 83 Barb, 249 ;
question whether they shall be con- State v. Babcock, 35 Neb. 709 ; Berlin
88 THE CHAETEE. [§ 73.
may be committed to the majority of the citizens in separate
communities.* The right of the legislature to organize munici-
palities regardless of the consent of those to be affected rests
on the very theory of our government. That theory is that
it is a government by the people, who act through their rep-
resentatives. They delegate their authority to their agents,
who speak and act for them in making laws, and hence they
are bound by properly enacted laws promulgated by their
agents. They give their consenf to these laws by clothing
their agents with power and authority to make them, and
there is, therefore, no reserved power in the people to consent
to or reject laws properly enacted by their lawfully consti-
tuted agents."
§ 73. Compulsory acceptance. — In no respect is the dis-
tinction between private and public corporations more marked
than in the fact that np private corporation, or rather body of
individuals, can be incorporated compulsorily, while in the
case of public corporations the rule is otherwise. The reason
IS evident ; for a private corporation by its incorporation en-
ters into a contract with the legislative power ; when it accepts
its charter the grant is irrevocable, and the contractual rights
ft Gorham, 34 N. H. 366 ; State v. 357 ; State v. Noyes, 10 Foster, 279 ;
Canterbury, 38 N. H. 195 ; Bristol v. State &c. v. Court of Common Pleas.
New Chester, 3 N. H. 534; Gorham w 36 N. J. Law, 73: S. C, 13 Am. Eep.
Springfield, 31 Me. 58; State v. Cur- 433. '
ran, 13 Ark. 331 ; People v. Wren, 4 2 Angell & Ames on Corporations,
Scam. 369; Coles v. Madison Co., § 79, and cases cited ; People v. Butte,
Breese (III.), 115 ; Warren v. Mayor 4 Mont. 174 ; Medical Inst v. Patter-
dec, of Charlestown, 3 Gray, 104 ; Mor- son, 1 Denio, 61 ; 5 Den. 681 ; Meyers
ford V. Unger, 8 Iowa, 83; People v. v. Irwin, 2 Serg. & E. 868; Wells v.
Butte, 4 Mont, 174. Burbank, 17 N. H. 393; Society u
iThe "local option" liquor laws Town of Pawlet, 4 Pet 480. Under
are instances in point These have the classification of cities made by
been declared constitutional in many Pennsylvania act of May 23, 1874, a
courts. Said the Supreme Court of city having more than ten thoasand
Errors of Connecticut : — " The law is population by the last decennial cen-
perfect and complete as it comes sus became ipso facto a city of the
from the hands of the law-making third class without accepting or adopt-
power." State v. Wilcox, 43 Conn, ing the provisions of the act Com.
364 ; S. C, 19 Am. Rep. 536 ; Com- McKenna v. McGroarty (Penn. C. P.),
monwealth v. Bennett, 108 Mass. 37 ; 6 Kulp, 195.
Commonwealth v. Dean, 110 Mass.
§ 74. J THE CHAETEE. 89
cannot be impaired or destroyed by any subsequent act of leg-
islation.i But when the legislative body determines that the
public interest demands that a city or other municipal corpo-
ration should be incorporated, it can confer the necessary
franchises and impose the necessary duties on the inhabitants
of the place, even against their wish. ITor do the franchises
that they confer vest any rights in the persons incorporated.
This is the learning in the case of People v. Morris,^ where
Nelson, J., in writing the opinion, said: — " It is an unsound,
and even absurd, proposition, that political power conferred
by the legislature can become a vested right as against the
government in any individual or body of men." As a matter
of fact the prevalence of general laws on the subject of the
incorporation of niunicipalities makes this question of accept-
ance of less importance, inasmuch as under a general law it is
only possible to prescribe under what conditions certain com-
munities can avail themselves of the provisions of the act and
become municipalities. Acceptance, then, is implied when a
particular community avails itself of the said provisions, and
is constituted a municipality.' Supposing that the general
law provides that whenever the inhabitants, or a majority
thereof, of a community containing at least so many inhabit-
ants, desire to be incorporated as a municipality, they shall
express such desire by a petition to a certain authority, and
upon such petition an election shall be held to ascertain the
wishes of the inhabitants, with similar regulations, after which
the community shall be a village or town, or city of the first,
second or third class, as the case may be, the incorporation
becomes the voluntary act of the incorporators, and is com-
pulsory only in cases where there is dissent on the part of a
minority, who are bound by the majority's action.
§ 74. Charters, how proved. — The charter of a municipal-
ity incorporated by the legislature is matter of public record
and knowledge, like any other act of the legislature ; conse-
quently the courts will take judicial notice thereof. This is. as
of coursij when the charter is declared to be a public statute,
1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, ner prescribed invalidates the char-
4 Wheat 518. ter. People v. Gunn, 85 CaL 238 ;
2 13 Wend. 325. S. C, 24 Pac Eep. 7ia
' A failure to proceed in the man-
90 THE CHAETEB. [§ 74,
but there are a number of cases, e. g., in Alabama,* holding
that, even when the act of incorporation is merely public or
general in its nature and purposes, and is not expressly de-
clared to be a public statute, the courts will judicially notice
it. But while the charter is judicially noticed by the courts,
the laws or ordinances enacted by the municipality are not so
noticed unless by the courts of the municipality. This is true
both in England and America.'' Therefore, when any such
by-laws or ordinances are to be plfeaded they must be pleaded
in substance. If the charter or a statute directs the courts
judicially to notice such ordinances, the statute prevails over
the general rule and the courts are bound by it. How, then,
is this charter brought before a court? How is it proved?
Courts will take judicial notice of a charter of a municipality
whether it be in the form of a general statute or be declared
to be general or public in its character or purposes. It being
an expression of the supreme will of the State, the courts will
presume it to be a matter of universal knowledge within the
State ; therefore it need not be specially pleaded.' But if it
prove necessary to establish the fact that a municipality was
duly incorporated, the charter itself — that is to say, the act
or a true copy thereof, certified or otherwise authenticated —
is admissible, and such evidence would be primary. In the
absence of primary evidence, it is proper to produce secondary
or parol evidence.*
1 Albrittin v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. ' Smoot v. The Mayor, 34 Ala. 112,
486 ; Ferryman v. Greenville, 51 Ala. 131 ; Case v. The Mayor, 30 Ala. 538 ;
510; Case v. Mobile, 30 Ala. 538; Ferryman v. City of Greenville, 51
Smoot V. Wetumpka, 24 Ala. 121. Ala. 507 ; Albrittin v. The Mayor, 60
2 Norris v. Staps, Hob. 311 ; Willo. Ala. 486.
166, pi. 403 ; Willo. 173, pL 433 ; Willc. * A certified copy from the secre-
173, pi, 425 ; Broadnao's Case, 1 Venti tary of State was admitted when the
196; Barber Surgeons v. Felson, 3 originalcouldnotbefoundinthetown
Lev. 253 ; Goodrich v. Brown, 30 clerk's office. Braintree i'. Battles, 6
Iowa, 291 ; Garvin v. Wells, 8 Iowa, Vt. 395. Blackstone v. White, 41
236; Conboy v. Iowa City, 8 Iowa, Fenn. St 330, where a sworn copy
90 r Cox V. St Louis, 11 Mo. 431; (not official) was held to be proper
People V. Mayor &a, 7 How. Pr. 84 ; secondary evidence. Stockbridge v.
Harkeru. Mayor, 17 Wend. 199; New West Stockbridge, 18 Mass. 400, a
Orleans v. Bonds, 14 La, Ann. 303 ; case of proof by paroL
Trustees v. Leffen, 33 IlL 90; Mooney
V. Kennett, 19 Mo. 551.
§§ 75, 76.] THE CHAETEE. 91
§ 75. Proof of fact of incorporation.— Although the char-
ter of a city may be judicially noticed, yet it may be the case
that the corporate existence of a municipality is alleged, while
there is no charter for the courts judicially to notice. This would
occur in the case of a corporation by prescription. In such
case, proof of user of corporate privileges is admissible, and it
is competent to show that the town has for many years exer-
cised corporate powers. Or it may be that the legislature
has passed an act conferring some additional right or duty on
the town, thus giving it, as it were, legislative recognition.'
The principle is that the public is the party interested in
the incorporation of municipalities, and if the public chooses
to consider an existing unincorporated municipality as incor-
porate, and waives its right to refuse its recognition, do one
else is in a position to assert that it is not a corporate body.
Reputation and user are therefore competent to be proven to
establish corporate existence.- While there may have been
irregularities in the incorporation of a municipality, yet the
courts will not favor their interposition long afterward to dis-
prove corporate existence.' And in no case can the legal
character of a de facto municipal corporation be collaterally
impeached by private citizens. It belongs to the State alone,
by the proper officers, to institute proceedings in which the
regularity of its incorporation may be determined.*
§ 76. Proof of corporate existence. — A recent writer has
said : — " The charter or the act of incorporation of a munici-
pality, like records generally, are to be proved by inspection,
or by copies properly authenticated ; but if there be suffi-
' " It is universally affirmed that ham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547 ; Ryder v.
when a legislature has full power to Railroad Co., 13 111. 533 ; Highland
create corporations, its act recogniz- Turnpike v. McKean, 10 Johns. 154;
ing as valid a de faato corporation, Owings v. Speed, 5 WheAt 420 ; Lon-
whether private or municipal, oper- donderry v. Andover, 28 Vt. 416 ;
ates to cure all defects in steps lead- Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt 439.
ing up to the organization, and 3 Fitch v. Pinckard, 5 111. 76 ; Jame-
makes a dejure out of what before son v. People, 16 IlL 257; Denning v,
was only a de facto corporation." Railroad Co., 3 Ind. 437. See, also,
Brewer, J., in Comanche v. Lewis, Smith v. Board Com'rs, 45 Fed. Rep.
133 U. 8. 198, 203. 735.
2 Barnes v. Barnes, 6 Vt 388 ; Bas- * Mendenhall v. Burton, 43 Kail.
sett V. Porter, 4 Cush. 487 ; Dilling- 570 ; S. a, 83 Pac. Rep. 588.
92 THE CHABTEE. [§ 77.
cient proof of the loss or destruction of the record, much in-
ferior evidence of its contents may be admitted.'" When
the inquiry into the corporate existence of a municipality is
merely collateral, only that the municipality exists de fcbcto
need be proved.' The incorporation of a town may be proved
by reputation, or by long user of corporate powers, or, as we
have previously seen, by grants from the legislature implying
a corporate existence.' It is not conclusive proof of no pre-
vious corporate existence that a town has been incorporated
under act of the legislature, for it may have desired to obtain
the rights and privileges given by virtue of some general stat-
ute. At the most it would be a question for the jury. So in
an action against a village, it was held that a recital in a stat-
ute to the effect that the village had been incorporated was
proof of such incorporation.*
§ 77. General rules of construction of charters.— " It is
ai well-settled rule, in regard to acts of incorporation, that
thfey must be strictly construed, and especially municipal cor-
porations, for the reason that as they are invested with a por-
tion of the authority which properly appertains to the sover-
eign power of the State, they must be confined to those powers
which are clearly granted, as it is only by such grants that
the government proper can surrender its just authority." '
1 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, tiit < Fox v. Fort Edward, 48 Hurd, 363.
!Municipal Corporations, § 10, p. 965. See as to manner of proving organ-
3 Parol proof of incorporation, ization under a general act, Louis-
Robie V. Sedgwick, 35 Barb. 319 ; ville &c. R. Co. v. Shires, 108 IlL 617.
Highland Turnpike Co. w McKean, ^ Leonard v. City of Canton, 35
10 Johns. 159 ; Dillingham v. Snow, Miss. 189, 190 ; Mintum v. Larue, 23
5 Mass. .547; Bassett v. Porter, 4 How. (U. S.) 435; Lafayette v. Cox,
Cush. 487 ; Fitch v. Pinckard, 5 IlL 5 Ind. 38 ; Bank v. Chillicothe, 7 Ohio
76 ; Jameson v. People, 16 111. 257 ; (part II), 31 ; Thomas v. Richmond,
Barnes v. Barnes, 6 Vt 388; Brain- 12 Wall. 849; Willard v. Killing-
tree V. Battles, 6 Vt 895 ; Sherwin v. worth, 8 Conn. 247 ; Port Huron v.
Bugbee, 16 Vt 439 ; Londonderry v. McCall, 46 Mich. 565 ; Nichol v.
Andover, 28 Vt 416 ; Dennihg v. Mayor &c., 9 Humph. 252 ; Hender-
New Albany' E. Co., 2 Ind. 437; son v. Covington, 14 Bush, 812;
Owings V. Speed, 5 Wheat 420. See; Sedgwick on Construction of Statu-
also, the preceding section. tory and Constitutional Law, 838 ; 1
3 See Bow v. AUenstown, 34 N. H. Dillon on Municipal Corporations,
S51; New Boston v. Dunbarton, 15 §91; 15 Am. & Eng. Ency& Law,
N. H. 201. 1041.
§ 78.] THE CHARTER. 93
But where the inquiry is merely as to whether there is a cor-
poration the foregoing rule does not apply, and every intend-
ment must be taken in favor of the sufficiency of the legisla-
tive action.* And where the extent of the powers conferred
has been ascertained by the cardinal rule of interpretation,
the exercise of authority within the recognized limits is favored
by the courts.'. The charter of a city in Michigan empowered
the common council to " issue new bonds for the refunding of
bonds and evidences of indebtedness already issued," and, in
deciding that a judgment against the city was within the lan-
guage quoted, Judge Cooley said : — " When a power is con-
ferred which in its exercise concerns only the municipality
and can wrong or injure no one, there is not the slightest
reason for any strict or literal interpretation with a view to
narrowing its construction." ' That is good sense, and it is
the application of correct principles in municipal affairs. The
wholeinstrument, all preceding charters, the general legislation
of the State, and the object of the legislature in the erection
of municipalities, should be consulted in construing particular
provisions of charters.*
§ 78. Can charters be modified? — All public corporations
created for municipal purposes may be controlled, and have
their charters amended and altered, at the pleasure of the
legislature.' Still, it is conceivable that the legislature may
in incorporating a municipality njake a grant, in the nature of
a contract with the municipality, which contract it could
1 State n Young, 3 Kan. 445. 73 Cal. 73 ; Chicago Dock Co. v. Gar-
2 Kyle V. Malin, 8 Ind. 34. "The rity, 115 HI. 155; Holland v. Balti-
strictness to be observed in giving more, 11 Md. 186; Moran v. Long
construction to municipal charter^ Island City, 101 N. Y. 439; Babcock
should be such as to cany into effect v. Helena, 34 Ark. 499.
every power clearly intended to be ' State v. The Mayor, R. M. Charlt
conferred on the municipality and (Ga.) 250. And amendatory acts are
every povcer necessarily implied in not local or private within the mean-
order to the complete exercise of the ing of constitutional provisions rer
powers granted." Smiths. Madison, quiring such laws to embrace only
7 Ind. 86, 87. one subject, and that to be expressed
3 Port Huron v. McCall, 46 Mich, in the title. Thompson v. City of
565, 574. Milwaukee, 69 Wis. 492; s. c, 34 N.
<1 Dillon on Municipal Corpora- W. Rep. 402. See, also, Sheridan ■».
tions, § 87; Thomason v. Ashworth, Salem, 14 Oregon, 328; s. C, 13 Pac.
94 THE CHAETEE. [§ 78.
neither impair nor resume.' And moreover, the power of the
legislature to change existing charters at pleasure is modified
by the constitution of the United States. For example, no
State could so legislate as to prevent an existing municipality
from performing any contract it may have entered into, for
the reason that no State can pass a law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts.^ Mr. Justice Clifford, in discussing the re-
lations of the legislature to municipalities which it has created,
said : ' — " Corporations of a municipal character, such as towns,
are usually organized in this country by special acts or pursuant
to some general State law; and it is clear that their powers
and duties differ in some important particulars from the towns
w^hich existed in the pajrent country before the Kevolution,
when they were created by special charters from the crown,
and acquired many of their privileges by prescription, with-
out any aid from parliament. Corporate franchises of the
kind granted during that period partook much more largely
of the nature of private corporations than do the municipali-
ties created in this country, and known as towns, cities and
villages.* Power exists here in the legislature, not only to
fix the boundaries of such a municipality when incorporated,
but to enlarge or diminish the same subsequently, without the
consent of the residents, by annexation or set-off, unless re-
strained by the constitution, even against the remonstrance
of every property holder and voter within the limits of the
original municipality." '
Eep. 935 ; State v. Spaude, 37 Minn, forth by Chief Justice Perley, in
332 ; s. c, 34 N. W. Rep. 164. Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284.
1 Richland v. Lawrence, 13 111. 1. ' See further as to repeal or change
- Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 of charter, Town of East Hartford v.
U. S. 514, 532 ; Von Hoffman v. City Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511 ;
of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 554. See Piqua Branch of State Bank v.
County V. Rogers,. 7 Wall. 181, 184; Knoop, 16 How. 369; Girard v. Phil-
Butz V. City of Muscatine, 8 Wall, adelphia, 7 Wall. 1 ; Waring •». Mayor
575, 583 ; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall, of Mobile, 24 Ala. 701 ; Little Rock
44, 63 ; Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 69 ; v. Parish, 36 Ark. 166 ; State v. Jen-
State V. Milwaukee, 25 Wis. 123 ; nings, 27 Ark. 419 ; Crook v. People,
Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Arm- 106 III. 237 ; State v. Troth, 34 N. J.
strong, 45 N. Y. 234. L. 379 ; State v. Brainerd, 23 N. J. I*
3 Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 484 ; Jersey City u J. C, R. Co., 20
U. S. 514, 531. N. J. Eq. 360; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64
* The dissimilarities are well set Pa. St 169 ; Reading v. Keppleman,
§§ 79, 80.] THE OHAETEE. 95
§ 79. How far the State can enforce performance of local
duties. — Where the legislative control is confined simply to
municipal corporations as agencies of the State in its govern-
ment, then this legislative control is ample,^ because in all
matters of general concern there is no local right to act inde-
pendently of the State. The local authorities of a city have
no right, and cannot be permitted, to determine for them-
selves whether, for example, they will contribute through tax-
ation to the support of the State government, or assist, when
called upon by the State, to suppress insurrection, or aid in the
enforcement of the police laws. Upon all such subjects the
State may exercise compulsory authority and may enforce the
performance of local duties.^ But at the same time the fact
remains and must not be lost sight of, that municipal corporar
tions have objects and purposes peculiarly local, in which the
State at large has legally no concern whatever, and in which
it is not its function to intermeddle, except in so far as it con-
fers the powers and can regulate their exercise.'
§ 80. Change in mnnicipal boundaries. — The right to in-
crease or diminish the area of a municipality must be given
by the legislature — the same power which is competent to
amend the charter ; for any change in the boundaries of a mu-
nicipality — whethftr the territory be enlarged or diminished,
or whether a division of territory be made, or any change
whatsoever be effected in boundaries or otherwise — must neo-
61 Pa. St. 233 ; Breckner v. Gordon, Burr, 18 Cal. 343 ; San Francisco i'.
81 Ky. 665; Boyd v. Chambers, 78 Canavan, 43 Cal. 541; Marietta v.
Ky. 140 ; In re Hinkel, 31 Kan. 712 ; Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427 ; Scovill v. Cleve-
Demarest v. New York, 74 N. Y. 161 ; land, 1 Ohio St. 127 ; Lynch v. Laf-
Gray v. Brooklyn, 3 Abb. App. Dec. land, 4 Coldw. 96 , Daniel v. Mayor
267 ; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 825 ; of Memphis, 11 Humph. 582 ; Guild v.
Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266 ; Cobb Chicago, 82 111. 472 ; Kennedy v. Sac-
V. Kingman, 15 Mass. 197; Smith v. ramento, 19 Fed. Rep. 580.
Adrian, 1 Mich. 495 ; Kobert's Case, i People v. Hurlbert, 24 Mich. 44. .
61 Mich. 548; Yarmouth v. North ^Comm'rs &c. u Detroit, 28 Mich.
Yarmouth, 34 Me. 411 ; North Yar- 286, by Cooley, J., who treats the
mouth V. Skillings, 45 Me. 133 ; Car- subject in an exhaustive essay with
center v. People, 8 Colo. 116 ; Clinton characteristic clearness and learning.
- V. Cedar Bapids &c. R Co., 24 Iowa, ^ cf, " Power of the Legislature to
455 ; State v. Mayor of Savannah, E. Compel Levy of Tax by Municipal
M. Charlt 250 ; Mayor v. Steamboat Corporations," a note by T. Eurwell,
Co., E. M. Charlt 342; Blanding v. 11 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 80.
96 THE CHAETER. [§ 81.
essarily. contract or enlarge the sphere of the municipal juris-
diction, and therefore it constitutes ^/-o tanto an amendment
of an existing charter. The power is thus clearly legislative,
and it is, in general, incapable of being delegated. In that it is
legislative it cannot be conferred on the judiciary. The courts
cannot then determine to what extent a city can acquire addi-
tional territory, or whether it can or cannot acquire it, except
in so far as such questions might arise in construing and in-
terpreting the city charter. The legislature may, however,
delegate to the municipal corporation itself power and author-
ity to make changes in its boundaries, because this is not in
fact a delegation of legislative power; for it is in legal intent
only a provision by the legislature that if certain exigencies
arise and certain conditions then exist, then, and in that event,
the boundaries may be altered or enlarged. No discretion is
given, and if the city proceeds to enlarge its boundaries, sup-
posing the conditions to exist when as a matter of fact they
do not, the court will pronounce the action invalid and void.'
§ 81. Effect of amendments of charter on city ordi-
nances.— It is often necessary to inquire whether the ordi-
nances of a city passed prior to the enactment of certain
amendments to the city charter are affected thereby. It is
the better view to hold that they are not the less binding on
that account. The acquisition of a new charter by a city does
not abrogate city ordinances passed under the old charter
unless they are clearly inconsistent therewith.^ I^or would
the ordinances of a city, or the provisions of its charter,' be
affected by a general law, unless they were obviously incon-
sistent. Thus, in Missouri the court held, in a case where the
city charter authorized the mayor and aldermen to remove
for cause any person holding an office created by the charter
or by ordinance, that it was not inconsistent with, and there-
fore not repealed by, a general act providing for the removal
1 City of Galesburg v. Hawkinson, -will mot be declared invalid in toto
75 111. 156. because a few of its provisions may
estate V. Natal. 39 La. Ann. 439. conflict with general statutes. Brooks
3 Under a constitutional provision v. Fischer, 79 Cal. 173 ; s. a, 21 Pac
that city charters must be ''consist- Eep. 652 ; In re Straud (Cal.), 21 Pac
ent with and subject to the constitu- Eep. 654.
tion and laws of this State," a charter
§ 82.] THE CHAETEE. 97
from ofBce of any officer who did not actually spend his time
in performing the duties of his office, or of any official guiltjr
of wilful violation or neglect of his official duty.'
§ 82. Reorganization under general law — Elfect of. — :"When
a charter is amended, we have elsewhere seen that it has no
effect on ordinances passed prior to the amendment which are
not inconsistent to the charter as amended. It is usually held
that a mere amendment of a charter has no efifect on city offi-
cers, so as to determine their tenure of office. But suppose
an incorporated municipality reorganizes under: a general in-
corporation act, it is clear that the reorganization must have
some efifect upon the officers under the old charter. This
effect is to abrogate their tenure of office, unless the general
law contains some saving clause continuing them in office.''
" Where a new form is given to an old municipal corporation,
or such corporation is reorganized under a new charter, taking
in its new organization the place of the old one, embracing
substantially the same corporators and the same territory, it
will be presumed that the legislature intended a continued ex-
istence of the same corporation, although different powers are
possessed under the new charter, and different officers admin-
ister its affairs ; and in the absence of express provision for
their payment otherwise, it will be presumed that the legisla-
ture intended that the liabilities as well as the rights of prop-
erty of the corporation in its old form should accompany the
corporation in its reorganization." ' The United States circuit
court has held that the organization of tlte city of Pe^nsacola;
under a general law of the State of Florida, was merely, in
legal effect, an assumption by the city of the new powers and
privileges which the act conferred..*
1 Manker v. Faulhaber, 94 Mo. 430. delphia, 7 Wall. 1 ; Frank v. San Fran-
2McGrath v. Chicago, 24 IlL App. cisco, 31 Cal. 668; Olney v. IlarTey,
19. 50 IlL 453; Maysville v. Schultz. 3
3 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Dana, 10 ; Waring v. Mobile, 24 Ala.
pp. 973, 973, citingBroughtonv. Pen-, 701; O'Connor v. Memphis, 6 Lfu
saoola, 93 U. S. 266 ; Rex t>. Passmore, 730; Hughes w School Dist, 73 Mo.
37 T. E. 119 ; Eegina v. Bewdley, 1 P. 643 ; Tyler v. Elizabethtown &c. R
Wms. 207 ; Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. Co., 9 Bush, 510.
B. 383 ; Trustees of Erie Academy v. * Milner v. Pensacola, 3 Woods, 633 ;
Erie, 31 Pa. St 515 ; Girard v. Phila- Fowle v. Common Council of Alex-
7
98 THE CHAETEE. [§§ 83, 84.
§ 83. Reorganization must be strictly according to stat-
ute.— The statutes often provide, where a city wishes to be
incorporated and application is made to a judge of the county
to order an election to be held, that proof must be made upon
such application that the territory sought- to be incorporated
contains the requisite number of inhabitants.' Whatever find-
ing the court makes on the proof as presented to him is in such
cases conclusive." And when a petition contained the neces-
sary statement of the number of inhabitants, w-hich was sup-
ported, by an express finding, but the notice, of election was
deficient in that particular, the court declined to adjudge the
subsequent proceedings invalid on account of the mere irreg-
ularity.' The provisions of the statutes are usually held to be
mandatory. For example, the town of Nacogdoches, in Texas,
kept up its corporate existence until about the year 1882, hav-
ing been originally incorporated in 1859. The Eevised Stat-
utes of the State prescribe the manner in which an existing
municipal corporation may surrender its corporate existence
and re-incorporate under the general act. Notwithstanding
this, steps were taken in 1887 as for the original incorporation
of a city or town. The court held that these proceedings did
not operate to create a corporation, nor to dissolve the one
existing prior to their institution.*
§ 84. The same subject continued. — A town in Louisiana
was organized under a general law. Subsequently it obtained
and reorganized under a special charter. This charter being
repealed, it was held to be no longer an incorporated town.*
andria, 3 Pet. 398 : First Municipality mains. Harness v. State, 76 Tes.
of New Orleans v. Comm'rs of Sink- 566 ; s. C, 13 S. W. Eep. 535 ; 29 Am.
ing Fund, 1 Rob. 279. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 50. An act per-
1 E. g.. Rev. Stat Texas, art 508. mitting certain towns to re-incorpo-
* State V. Goodwin, 69 Tex. 55. rate that had attempted to incorpo-
' Smith u Board County Com'rs, 45 rate under a previous void act was
Fed. Rep. 735; construed not as a validating act, but
< State V. Dunson, 71 Tex. 65 ; s. G, as a grant of a new power, under
9 S. W. Rep. 103. Where a municipal which a town might re-incorporate
corporation attempts to re-incorpo- with a larger territory than was in-
rate under a statute which does not eluded in the first attempt In re
authorize such re-incorporation, but Campbell, 1 Wash. 287 ; S. a, 24 Pac.
ouly an oi'iginal incorporation, the Rep. 624.
proceedings are without effect, and SBurk v. State, 5 Lea 849.
the original corporate existence re-
§ 85.] THE CHAETEE. 99
The legislature, in providing for the amendment of a munici-
pal charter or for its reorganization, may expressly provide
that it shall take effect only upon the assent of the people of
the municipality or a given majority thereof.' But if such an
act be adopted or consented to, acts amendatory thereof do
not require additional consenting, unless the amendatory act
itself calls for such assent.*
§ 85. New York constitntion a general law. — The consti-
tution of 1§46 adopted by the State of ITew York was a con-
stitution not framed for a people entering into a political so-
ciety for the first time, but for a community already organized,
and furnished with legal and political institutions adapted to
all or nearly all the purposes of civil government. It was not
intended to abolish these institutions, except where they
might be repugnant to the new constitution. In its first arti-
cle it provides that all the acts of the legislature then in force,
and not repugnant to it, should continue to be the law of the
State, subject to such alterations as the legislature might see
fit to make. "What effect, then, di^ the adoption of this gen-
eral law, this new constitution, have upon existing municipali-
ties and their officials? By the acts of the legislature, thus
continued in force, a great number of offices had been cre-
ated, and among them, and constituting numerically far the
largest portion of all the functionaries of the State, were the
county, city, town and village offices, by which the local gov-
ernment was carried on. As to these existing offices and their
incumbents, it is clear that neither their functions nor rights
changed at all in consequence of this new general act.' What,
then, was its effect? It was to set up a criterion, a standard,
by which to determine whether the legislature, in creating,
amending or repealing municipal franchises, is acting in con-
1 Mayor &c. v. Fiiiney, 54 Ga. 317 ; an injunction restraining the can-
In re Henry St, 133 Pa. St. 346; vassing of the returns. Smith v.
State V. St Louis, 73 Mo. 435; St Board County Com'rs, 45 Fed. Rep.
Louis V. Russell, 9 Mo. 507 ; Largen 725.
V. State, 76 Tex. 323. An election '^5 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law,
held in disregard of the registry laws p. 972.
does not effect an incorporation, and ' People v. Draper, 15 N. T, 532,
a non-resident owner of property 540.
within the proposed limits may have
100 THE CHABTEE, [§§ 86, 87.
travention of any vested right. But it affected no office or
officer not antagonistic to or inconsistent with the provisions
thereof.
§ 86. How far special legislation is permissible. — It is
the business of the legislature to adjust in the interest of the
whole people of the State the distribution of the powers of
government, taking care that no direct provision of the con-
stitution is violated, and that no^arrangement which it has
made is incidentally disturbed. Plenary power in the legis-
lature for all purposes of civil government is the rule. As a
political society, the State has an interest in the repression of
disorder and the maintenance of peace and security in every
locality within its limits ; and if, from exceptional causes,
the public good requires that legislation, either permanent
or temporary, be directed toward any particular locality,
whether consisting of one county or of several counties, it is
within the discretion of the legislature to apply such legisla-
tion as in its judgment the exigency of the case may re-
quire ; and it is the sole judge of the existence of such con-
ditions. The representatives of the whole people, convened
in the two branches of the legislature, are subject to con-
stitutional limitations, the organs of the public will in every
district or locality of the State. It follows, therefore, that
to the legislature belongs the arranging and distributing of
the administrative functions, committing such portions as
it may deem suitable to local jurisdictions, and retaining other
portions to be exercised by officers appointed by the central
power. As to the constitutional limitations, they are not so
much limitations of the legislature as of the power of the peo-
ple themselves, self-imposed by the constitutional compact.
So when a law is declared unconstitutional, it amounts to say-
ing that the sovereign power of the people in that regard has
been abdicated by themselves. Otherwise the legislature is
untrammeled, and can legislate in cases of local disorder as it
wiU.»
§87. Written constitutions — Operation of. — Limitation
upon legislative power is one of the purposes to be effected
1 People V. Draper, 15 N. T. 533-^37. '
§ 87.] THE CHAETEE. 101
by a written constitution. Its necessity lies in the fact that,
if no limitations existed, the government could have no ele-
ments of permanence and durability; and the distribution of
its powers and the vesting their exercise in separate depart-
ments would be an idle ceremony. The right of self-govern-
ment in the local bodies and the power of the people of those
communities to select the local officers and conduct the local
administration would utterly disappear, or exist only at the
pleasure of the legislature. But the theory of the constitu-
tion is that the several counties, cities, towns and villages are
of right entitled to choose whom they will have to rule over
them ; ' and this right cannot be taken from them, or the elect-
ors and inhabitants be disfranchised, by any act of the legis-
lature, or of any or all the departments of the state govern-
ment combined. Therefore a written constitution must be
interpreted, and effect given to it, as the paramount law of
the land, equally obligatory upon the legislature as upon other
departments of government and individual citizens. Nor must
it be literally construed. A written constitution would be of
little avail as a practical and useful restraint upon the differ-
ent departments of government, if a literal reading only was
to be given it, to the exclusion of all necessary implication,
and the clear intent ignored. Broad, reasonable interpreta-
tions must be placed on its provisions in order that it operate
equally and beneficently. The difference between a written
and an unwritten constitution, according to Hare,^ is similar
to that which " distinguishes the natural integuments, which
yield to the motions of the body and expand with the growth
of every limb, from an artificial covering that may become'
too narrow in the course of time. A country that is bound
by fixed rules prescribed by a former generation, which can-
not be altered without a long and complicated process, may
find itself powerless in the face of some unforeseen exigency,
and be obliged to violate its organic law as the price of
safety." »
1 The Roman empire tottered into stituent peoples to maintain the
ruin because all power was centered status quo.
at Rome. This cardinal defect in its ^ i Hare's American Constitutional
system of administration removed Law, 214, 215;
the strongest inducement for its con- > Daniel Webster, in his speech on
102
THE CHABTEB.
[§88.
§ 88. Power to make fey-laws — How limited. — " The
power of municipal corporations to make by-laws," said Judge
Gooley,' "is limited in various ways: 1. It is controlled by the
constitution of the United States and of the State. The re-
strictions imposed by those instruments which directly limit
the legislative power of the State rest equally upon all the in-
struments of government created by the State. If a State
cannot pass an ex post facto law, or law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts, neither can any agency do so which acts
under the State with delegated authority.^ By-laws, therefore,
which in their operation would be em post facto, or violate con-
tracts, are not within the power of municipal corporations;
and whatever the people by the State constitution have pro-
hibited the State government from doing, it cannot do indi-
rectly through the local governments. 2. Municipal by-laws
must also be in harmony with the general laws of the State,
and with the provisions of the municipal charter. Whenever
the Independence of the Judiciary
(Works, vol. Ill), said : — " It cannot
be denied that one great object of
written constitutions is to keep the
departments of government as dis-
tinct as possible; and for this pur-
pose to impose restraints designed to
have that effect. And it is equally
true that there is no department ou
which it is more necessary to impose
restraints than upon the legislature.
The tendency of things is almost al-
ways to augment the power of that
department in its relation to the ju-
diciary. The judiciary is composed
of few persons, and those not such
as mix habitually in the pursuits and
objects which most engage public
men." Then he comments upon the
legislature, and its liability, if in no
wise restrained, to encroach upon the
judiciary. "The constitution being
the supreme law, it follows, of course,
that every ^t of the legislature con-
trary to that law must be void. But
who shall decide this question? Shall
the legislature itself decide it? If so,
then the constitution ceases to be a
legal, and becomes only a moral, re-
straint upon the legislature. If they,
and they only, are to judge whether
their acts be conformable to the
constitution, then the constitution is
admonitory or advisory only, not le-
gally binding; because if the con-
struction of it i-ests wholly with them,
their discretion in particular cases
may be in favor of erroneous and
dangerous constructions.' Hence, the
courts of law necessarily, when the
case arises, must decide on the valid-
ity of particular acts.'' "Without
this check, no certain limitation could
exist on the exercise of legislative
power."
1 Cooley's Const Lim., 238 ; " Power
of Municipal Corporations to Make
By-Laws," 15 Sol. J. & Eep.; 209 and
330 ; "Municipal Ordinances," by Irv-
ing Browne, 27 Alb. L. J. 284.
2 Cooley's Const. Lim., 238, citing
Stuyvesant v. Mayor, 7 Cow. 588;
Brooklyn Central E. R Co. v. Brook-
lyn City R. R. Co., 83 Barb. 358; Illi-
nois Conference Female College u
Cooper, 35 IlL 148.
§ 89.] THE OHAETEE. 103
I
they come in conflict with either the by-law must give way." '
It is often the case, however, that the charter contains a pro-
vision that the general laws of the State on some particular
subject shall not be operative in that particular city, and that
the corporation may pass local laws at discretion. But this
exclusive privilege, when granted, can be at any time reoalled.-
And this privilege of passing local by-laws, although denied to
other cities by a general law, if not inconsistent with the gen-
eral law, is not affected by the general law, and can stand to-
gether with it.
§ 89. Conflict of by-laws and general acts. — " It is said
that the by-law of a town or corporation is void if the legis-
lature have regulated the subject by law. If the legislature
have passed a law regulating as to certain things in a city, I
apprehend," says Mr. Justice Woodw.orth,' " the corporation
are not thereby restricted from making further regulations.
Cases of this kind have occurred and never been questioned
on that ground ; it is only to notice a case or two out of many.
The legislature have imposed a penalty of one dollar for servile
labor on Sunday ; the corporation of New York have passed
a by-law, imposing the penalty of five dollars for the same
offense. As to storing gunpowder in New York, the legisla-
ture and corporation have each imposed the same penalty.
Suits to recover the penalties have been sustained, under the
corporation law. It is believed that the ground has never
been taken that there was a conflict with the State law." In
a case in Mobile, where the validity of a municipal by-law
was questioned, which provided a fine of fifty dollars for
assault and battery committed within the city limits, the court
held: — "The object of the power conferred by the charter,
and the purpose of the ordinance itself, was not to punish
iCooley's Const. Lim., 338, (jiting March v. Commonwealth, 13 B. Mon.
Wood V. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 435; 25. See, also, Baldwin v. Oreen, 10
Mayor v. Nichols, 4 Hill, 309 ; Peters- Mo. 410 ; Cowen v. West Troy, 43
burg V. Metzker, 21 111. 305 ; South- Barb. 48 ; State v. Georgia Medical
port V. Ogden, 33 Conn. 128 ; Andrews Society, 38 Ga. 608 ; Pesterfield v.
V. Insurance Co., 37 Me. 356; Canton Yickers, 3 Cold. 305; Wirtb v. Wil-
V. Nist, 9 Ohio St. 439 ; Carr v. St mington, 68 N. C. 34.
Louis, 9 Mo. 191 ; Commonwealth v. ^ state v. City of Camden (N. J.), 11
Erie & Northeast R E. Co., 37 Pa. St. Atl. Rep. 137.
339 ; Burlmgton v. Kellar, 18 Iowa, ■> Rogers v, Jones, 1 Wend, 261.
59; ConweU u O'Brien, 11 Ind. 419;
104 THE CHABTEE. [§ 90,
for an offense against the criminal justice of tlie country, but
to provide a mere police regulation, for the enforcement of
good order and quiet within the limits of the corporation. It
is altogether immaterial whether ihe State tribunal has inter-
fered and exercised its powers in bringing the defendant be-
fore it to answer for the assault and battery ; for whether he
has then been punished or acquitted is alike unimportant.
The offense against the corporation and the State are distin-
guishable and wholly disconnecte<>, and the prosecution at the
suit of each proceeds upon a different hypothesis : the one
contemplates the observance of the peace and good order of
the city ; the other has a more enlarged object in view, the
maintenance of the peace and dignity of the State." * The
power to pass a city ordinance must be vested in the govern-
ing body of the city by the legislature in express terms, or be
necessarily or fairly implied in and incident to the powers
expressly granted, and must be essential to the declared pur-
poses of the corporation, — not simply convenient, but indis-
pensable. Any fair or reasonable doubt concerning the
existence of the pbwer is resolved by the courts against the
corporation, and the power is denied.* Powers encroaching
upon the rights, of the public or of individuals must be plainly
and literally conferred by the charter.'
§ 90. The ordinance, when passed, must be reasonable. —
A city, although fully authorized to enact ordinances, cannot
therefore pass unreasonable ones. The ordinance of a city
must be reasonable; not inconsistent with the laws of the
State; not repugnant to fundamental rights. It must not be
oppressive. It must not be partial or unfair. It must not
make special or unwarranted discriminations. In short, it
must not contravene common right. The Kansas courts held,
in a case where an ordinance was passed directed at the street
parades of the Salvation Army and interdicting them, that it
-Mayor of Mobile v. Allaire, 14 822; State v. Eowe (Md.), 20 Atl.
Ala. 400. C/. "Proper Relations of the Eep. 179; Vosburg u McCrary, 77
State to Municipal Institutions," by Tex. 56fi; s. c, 14 S. W. Rep. 195;
H. M. White, 5 Tenn. Bar Asso. Rep. Louisville &c. R. Ca v. Shires, 108
159. 111. 617.
' Anderson v. City of Wellington, ' Breningel- v. Belvidere, 44 N. J. L.
40 Kans, 173 ; Brockman v. Crestou, 350 ; Horr & Bemis on Municipal
79 Iowa, 587 ; S. c, 44 N. W. Rep. Police Ordinances, la
§90.]
THE OHABTEB.
106
was illegal and void, as being partial, unreasonable and in con-
travention of common right.' All charters and laws and ordi-
nances must be capable of construction, and must be construed
in accordance with constitutional principles and in harmony
with the general laws of the land ; and anj' ordinance that
violates any of the recognized rights and privileges, or the
principles of legal and equitable rights, is necessarily void so
far forth, and void entirely if it cannot be applied accord-
ing to its terms.^
' Anderson v. City of Wellington,
40 Kan. 173. The reasoning of the
court is interesting : — " The object of
this ordinance, and the danger appre-
hended and to be avoided by its en-
actment, as expressed by its terms, is
to prevent the calling together of a
large or unusual crowd of people on
any of the streets, avenues or alleys
of the city of Wellington. Then the
question is this: Is a street parade
with music or singing legally objec-
tionable in itself? or does it threaten
the public peace or the good order of
the community? This ordinance pre-
vents any number of the people of
the State attached to one of the sev-
eral political parties from marching
together with their party banners and
inspiring music, up and down the
principal streets, without the written
consent of some municipal oflBoer.
The Masonic and Odd Fellows organ-
izations must first obtain consent be-
fore their charitable steps desecrate
the sacred streets. Even the Sun-
day-school children cannot assemble
at some central point in the city and
keep step to the music of the band as
they march to the grove without per-
mission first had and obtained. The
Grand Army of the Republic must be
preceded in its march by the written
consent of his honor the mayor, or
march without drums or fife, shouts
or songs. It prevents a public address
upon any subject being made on the
streets. It prevents an unusual con-
gregation of people on the streets
under any circumstances without
permission. The ordinance is framed
on the theory that an unusual crowd
or congregation of people upon one
of the public streets of a city is either
of itself a disturbance of the public
peace, or that it threatens the good
order of the community. A ci'owd •
of people is one of the most ordinary
incidents of every-day life in any city
of considerable size in this country.
It is not a fair estimate of the char-
acter and habits of the American
people to assume that the public peace
is threatened when numbers of them
congregate. We do not believe that
the legislative grant of power to the
city council can be so construed! as to
authorize the city council to take
from the people of a city and the sur-
rounding country a privilege exer-
cised by them in every locality
throughout the land, to form their
processions and parade the streets
with banners, music, songs and shouts.
The power to pass such an ordinance
should be clear and controlled before
it can be upheld. Public parades of
this character are not unlawful in
their intent, purpose and result ; they
are not mala in se. If they are to
be mala prqhibita it ought to be by
some general law and not by local
regulation."
^Frazee's Case, 63 Mich. 396. See.
106 THE CHAETEE. [§ 91.
§91. Keasonalbleness — How determined. — How shall it
be determined whether or not a by-law of a city is unreason-
able? There are various conditions which such a by-law should
fulfill. The objects for which a corporation is created, and to
aqcomplish which its powers are given, are usually definite and
certain. !N"o by-law, therefore, should be passed which does
not in some degree look to the accomplishment of these ob-
jects. For example, a power to license certain employments
is generally granted to cities. TBis does not mean that the
Jicense can be so fixed as to prohibit an employment by rea-
son of its large amount ; nor that the license shall be imposed
solely for the sake of revenue, for that would be an exercise
of the power of taxation, which power, to be rightfully exer-
cised, must be distinctly enumerated in the charter or incor-
porating act. A by-law ought also to be certain.^ It should
be in harmony with common sense and common law.^ It
should not abridge rights or privileges conferred by the gen-
eral laws of the State, unless express authority can be pointed
out for it in the charter. It is quite possible that some things
have a greater tendency to produce danger and disorder in the
cities than in smaller towns and in rural places. This may jus-
tify reasonable precautionary measures, but nothing farther ;
and no inference can 'extend beyond the fair scope of powers
granted for such a purpose, and no grant of absolute discre-
tion to suppress lawful action altogether can be granted at
all. That which is an actual nuisance can be suppressed just
so far as it is noxious, and its noxious character is the test of
its wrongfulness. There may be substances, like some ex-
plosives, which are dangerous in cities under all circumstances,
also, Davies v. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & J. • Mayor of Huntsville v. Phelps, 27
587 ; Chamberlain of London v. Comp- Ala. 55 ; Piper v. Chappel, 14 M. & W.
, ton, 7 D. & E. 597 ; Clark v. Le Cren, 624.
9 B. & C. 62 ; Gosling v. Veley, 13 2 Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. 90 :
Q. B. 328 ; Dunham v. Eochester, 5 Bush v. Seabuiy, 8 Johns. 418 ; Bow-
Cow. 462 ; Mayor of Memphis v. Win- ling Green v. Carson, 10 Bush, 64 :
field, 8 Humph. 707 ; Hayden v. Noyes, Le Claire v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 310 ;
5 Conn. 391 ; Waters v. Leech, 3 Ark. St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547 ;
110 ; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 481 ; Bloomington v. Wahl, 46 IlL 489 ;
Austin V. Murray. 16 Pick. 121 ; West Bethune v. Hayes, 28 Ga. 560 ; Kip
Union Tel. Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 535 ; v. Paterson, 26 N. J. 298. See Cooley,
State V. Freeman, 38 N. H. 436 ; State Const Lira., 345, note, and the cases
V. Jersey City, 39 N. J. 170, cited.
§ 91.] THE CHAETEB. 107
and made dangerous by municipal conditions ; but most dan-
gerous things are not so different in cities as to require more
than increased or quah'fied safeguards ; and to suppress things
not absolutely dangerous as an easy way of getting rid of the
trouble of regulating them is not a process tolerated under
free institutions. Eegulation, and not prohibition, unless under
clear authority of the charter, and in cases where it is not op-
pressive, is the extent of municipal power.'
1 Fi-azee's Case, 63 Mich. 896.
CHAPTEE IV.
AMENDMENT, REPEAL AND FORFEITURE OF CHARTER.
92. The power of the State to
amend, repeal or modify the
charters of municipal cor-
porations.
93. The charter of a municipal
corporation not within the
rule of the Dartmouth Col-
94 Construction of repealing and
amendatory acts — (a) Gen-
eral principles.
95. (b) Statutes in pari materia
construed together — Repeal
by implication.
96. Municipal charter not repealed
by subsequent general law
unless intent to repeal is
clear.
97. The same subject continued.
98. Instances of repeal of charter
by general acts.
99. Repeal and amendment of
charter by subsequent
amendment of State consti-
tution.
100. Repeal of general laws by en-
actment of municipal char-
ler.
01. Repeal of general laws by
municipal ordinance^
102, The same subject continued.
103. Construction of amendatory
and repealing acts made ap-
plicable only to cities of a
certain class.
§ 1^4. Effect of legislation upon the
charter of a city organized
under special law, and not
by its acceptance thereof
subject to the general law.
105. Miscellaneous instances of
effective repealing and
amendatory acts.
106. The same subject continued.
107. What is an amendment or re-
peal of a municipal charter?
108. Acceptance of amendment
109. Manner of acceptance.
110. Constitutional limitations on
power of legislature to
amend or repeal municipal
charters — (a) In general
111. (b) Special legislation.
113. (c) Vested rights — Impair-
ment of obligation of con-
tracts— Recognition by con-
stitution.
113. (d5 Title of amendatoiy or re-
pealing acts.
114. The same subject continued.
115. Forfeiture of charter in Eng-
land.
116. The same subject continued.
117. Instances of forfeiture of char-
ter under English law.
118. The charter of a municipal
corporation- in the United
States not forfeitable by
judicial action.
119. The same subject continued.
§ 92. The power of the State to amende repeal or modify
the charters of municipal corporations. — The charter of a
strictly public corporation is granted for purposes of the local
§92.]
AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHARTEE.
109
government of the district incorporated. The powers con-
ferred by this charter are not vested rights as against the
State, but, being wholly political, exist only during the will
of the legislature ; otherwise, as was declared in an Indiana
case, there would be numberless petty governments existing
within the State, forming a part of it, but independent of the
control of the sovereign power. Such powers may at any
time be repealed or abrogated by the legislature, either by
general law operating upon the whole State, or by special act
altering the powers of the corporation.' For the same reasons
the State has power to amend or modify municipal charters at
its will ; and it may be stated as a general proposition, that the
legislature of the State has full power to amend, repeal or
modify the charters of the municipal corporations within the
boundaries of the State, subject only to constitutional limita-
tions of that power.* As is said by Judge Cooley, restraints
1 Sloan V. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 361.
2 Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S.
473 ; Barnes v. District of Columbia,
91 U. S. 540 ; Kennedy v. Sacramento,
19 Fed. Rep. 580 ; S. C, 5 Am. & Bug.
Corp. Cas. 553; Laramie Co. v. Al-
bany Co., 92 U. S. 807; Girard v.
Philadelphia, 7 WaU. 1; Town of
East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge
Co., 10 How. 511 ; Piqua Branch of
State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369 ;
A spin wall v. Commissioners &c., 23
How. 364 ; Cobb v. Kingman, 15 Mass.
197 ; Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266 ;
Granby v. Thurston, 33 Conn. 416;
Yarmouth v. Noi-th Yarmouth, 34
Me. 411 ; North Yarmouth v. Sell-
ings, 45 Me. 133; Demarest v. New
York, 74 N. Y. 161 ; People v. Tweed,
63 N. Y. 203 ; People v. Pinkney, 33
N. Y. 377 ; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y.
532 ; Davidson v. Mayor &c. of New
York, 37 How. Pr. 342; Gray v.
Brooklyn, 3 Abb. App. Dec. 367;
People V. Morris, 13 Wend. 335;
Crook V. People, 106 111. 337 ; S. C, 5
Am. &. Eng. Corp. Cas^ 460 ; True v.
Davis (111.), 3 N. E. Rep. 410 ; Guild v.
Chicago, 83 HL 473 ; People v. Power,
25 111. 187; Robei-tson v. Rockford,31
111. 451 ; Trustees of Schools v. Tat-
man, 13 111. 37 ; Richland County v.
Lawrence County, 13 111. 1 ; Marietta
V. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427; Scoville v.
Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 136 ; San Fran-
cisco V. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541 ; Bland-
ing V. Burr, 13 Cal. 343 ; Philadelphia
V. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169; Reading v.
Keppelman, 61 Pa. St. 233 ; Sloan v.
State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 361 ; Eiohels v.
Evansville &c. R. Co., 78 Ind. 261 ;
S. C, 41 Am. Rep. 561 ; Indianapolis v.
Indianapolis G. L. & C. Co., 66 Ind.
396; Roberts' Case, 51 Mich. 548;
Smith V. Adrian, 1 Mich. 495 ; Lynch
V. Lafland, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 96 ; Dan-
iel V. Mayor &o. of Memphis, 11
Humph. (Tenn.) 582; Breckner v.
Gordon, 81 Ky. 665 ; s. C, 4 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 395 ; Boyd v. Cham-
bers, 78 Ky. 140; State v. Troth, 34
N. J. Law, 379 ; Patterson v. Society
&c., 24N. J. Law, 385 ; State v. Branin,
28 N. J. Law, 484; Jersey City v.
Jersey City &c. R. Co., 20 N. J. Eq.
360 ; Washburn v. Oshkosh, 60 Wis.
453; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis.,
342 ; Carpenter v. People, 8 Col. 116 ;
110 AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE. [§ 93.
on the legislative power of control must be found in the con-
stitution of the State, or they must rest alone in the legislative
discretion.*
§ 93. The charter of a municipal corporation not within
the rule of the Dartmouth College Case. — Municipal cor-
porations do not, of course, come within the rule of the
Dartmouth College Case, by which the charters of private
corporations were declared to be contracts, and as such pro-
tected by the constitutional prohibition of laws impairing the
obligation of contracts. This is one of the fundamental dif-
ferences between strictly public and other corporations. This
difference and the reasons therefor are thus stated by Judge
Pearson : — " The substantial distinction is this : Some corpora-
tions are created by the mere will of the legislature, there
being no other party interested or concerned. To this party
a portion of the power of the legislature is delegated, to be
exercised for the general good, and subject at all times to be
modified, changed or annulled. Other corporations are the
result of contract. The legislature is not the only party in-
terested ; for, although it has a public purpose to be accom-
plished, it chooses to do it by the instrumentality of a third
party. ' These two parties make a contract. T\^e legislature
for and in consideration of certain labor and outlay of money
confers upon the party of the second part the privilege of
being a corporation with certain powers and capacities. The
expectation of benefit to the public is the moving considera-
tion on one side ; that of expected remuneration for the out-
lay is the consideration on the other. It is a contract, and
S. a, 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 110; State v. Cowan, 39 Mo. 330; Wallace
Clinton D. Cedar Rapids &a E. Co., v. Trustees, 84 N. C. 164; MUls v,
24 Iowa, 455; Little Rock v. Parish, Williams, 11 Ired. 558; Langworthy
36 Ark. 166; State v. Jennings, 27 «. Dubuque, 16 Iowa, 271; Ho ward «.
Ark. 419; State v. Mayor &o. of Sa- McDiamid, 26 Ark. 100; Bradshaw v.
vannah, R. M. Charlt (Ga.) 250 ; Po- Omaha, 1 Neb. 16 ; Kuhn v. Board of
lice Jury v. Shreveport, 5 La. Ann. Education, 4 W. Va. 99 ; Hess v.
661 ; New Orleans v. Hoyle, 23 La. Pegg. 7 Nev. 23 ; GofiE v. Frederick,
Ann. 740 ; In re Hinkel, 31 Kan. 712 ; 44 Md. 67 ; Hagerstown v. Sohuer, 87
S. C, 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 369 ; Md. 180 ; Blessing v. Galveston, 42
Waring v. Mayor &c. of Mobile, 24 Tex. 641.
Ala. 701; St Louis v. Cafferata, 24 'Cooley's Const Lim. 229. See,
Mo. 94; St Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. also, §§ 57, 63, 64, 69, 70, 78, 79, SMiwa.
400; St Louis v. Rossell, 9 Mo. 507;
§9i.]
AMENDMENT, ETC., OF OHAETEE,
111
therefore cannot be modified, changed or annulled without
the consent of both parties." '
§ 94. Construction of repealing and amendatory acts —
(a) General principles. — The great principle controlling the
construction of repealing and amendatory acts, as of all other
statutes, is that the intention of the legislature must be ascer-
tained and carried into effect. In addition to this fundamental
principle, it is also to be constantly borne in mind in constru-
ing these acts, that the courts require the clearest expression
of the intention on the part of the legislature to repealer alter
existing laws. "Where the two statutes can be so construed as
to allow both to stand, the courts v,nll always adopt such a
construction. In order to effect repeal the later statute must
either expressly repeal the former, or its provisions must be
so entirely repugnant to those of the earlier statute that by no
reasonable construction can the two acts stand together, as
the law does not favor repeals by implication.'^
1 Mills V. Williams, 11 Ired. 558;
Cooley's Const. Lim. 334-337. See
the preceding section. It is conceded
learning that the charter of a mu-
nicipal corporation is not a contract
In order to obviate the diflSculties
arising from the fact that the char-
ters of private corporations are con-
tracts, and as such inviolable, many
of the States have constitutional pro-
visions and general statutes reserv-
ing the right of amendment and
repeal of such charters. 1 Beach on
Priv. Corp., § 36, and cases cited.
"In consequence of the decision in
that case (Dartmouth College Case, 4
Wheat 518), a general law was
spread upon the statute book of
nearly all, if not quite all, the States
of the Union, reserving to the legis-
lature power to alter or modify all
such charters as should be thereafter
granted, according to Its will and
pleasure." "Legislative Power to
Amend Charters," by Wm. L. Eoyall,
Esq., 11 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 1, where
several phases of the exercise of this
power are discussed. Such constitu-
tional and statutory reservations are
unnecessary in the case of strictly
public corporations. As was said by
Justice Field in a recent and impor-
tant case, considering the effect of
legislation by which the municipal
government of Memphis was abol-
ished : — '■ There is no contract be-
tween the State and the public chat
the charter of a city shall not at all
times be subject to legislative con-
trol. All persons who deal with
such bodies are conclusively pre-
sumed to act upon knowledge of the
power of the legislature. There is
no such thing as a vested right held
by any individual in the grant of leg-
islative power to them. Meriwether
V. Garrett, 103 U. S. 473. See, also,
an article by H. Campbell Black,
Esq., on "Legislation Impairing the
Obligation of Contracts," lin 35 Ann.
L. Reg. (N. S.) 81, 88.
2 Cape Girardeau County Court v. .
Hill, 118 U. S. 68; McCool v. Smith,
1 Black, 459 ; United States v. Twenty-
112
AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE.
[§95.
§ 95. (b) Statutes in pari materia construed together —
Bepeal Iby implication. — An excellent illustration of the rule
is found in a Maryland case, where an amendment to the
charter of the city of Cumberland prohibited the mayor and
common council from pledging the credit of the city for any
sum exceeding $10,000 without first submitting the question
to the voters after notice, and a subsequent statute author-
ized those officers to issue bonds for the purpose of raising
money to build a certain bridge.* The courts decided that
there was no repugnancy between the amendment and the
subsequent act, and that the exercise of the new power must
be subject to the proviso previously annexed to the effective
part of the charter. It was declared in the opinion that where
two laws only so far differ as that by any other construction
they may both stand, the rule leges posteriores pnores con-
trarias ahrogomt does not apply, and that the later law is no
repeal of the earlier act.^ ' As is said by Judge Cooley : — " Ke-
ave Cases of Cloth, Crabbe (U. S.),
356 ; Hendei-son's Tobacco, 11 WalL
652 ; Snell u. Bridgewater &c. Co., 34
Pick. 296; Goddard v. Boston, 20
Pick. 407 ; Towle v. Marrett, 3 Me. 33 ;
Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis.
518; Attorney-General v. Kailroad
Companies, 35 Wis. 435; Janesville/
V. Markoe, 18 Wis. 350 ; In re Henry
Street, 133 Pa. St. 346; McFate's
Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 333; Kilgore v.
Commonwealth, 94 Pa, St. 495;
Rounds V. Waymart, 81 Pa. St 395 ;
Erie v. Bootz, 72 Pa. St. 196; Mc-
Kenna V. Edmunstone, 91 N. Y. 231 ;
People V. Quigg, 59 N. Y. 83 ; Coving-
ton V. East St. Louis, 78 111, 548;
East St Louis v. Maxwell, 99111. 439;
New Brunswick v. Williamson, 44
N. J. Law, 165 ; Naylor v. Field, 39
N. J. Law, 287 ; Water-works Co. v.
Burkhart 41 Ind. 364 ; Blain v. Bai-
ley, 25 Ind. 165 ; Him v. State, 1 Ohio
St 20; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St 607;
Fosdick V. Perrysburg, 14 Ohio St
473 ; Dodge w Gridley, 10 Ohio St 20 ;
Clark V, Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494;
State V. Berry, 13 Iowa, 58 ; Chesa-
peake &c. R Co. V. Hoard, 16 W. Va.
370 ; Ex parte Schmidt, 34 S. C. 363 ;
McGruder v. State (Ga.), 10 S. E. Rep.
381 ; Greeley v. Jacksonville, 17 Fla,
174 ; New Orleans v. Southern Bank,
15 La. Ann. 89 ; Swann v. Buck, 40
Miss. 368; People v. Hanrahan, 75
Mich. 611 ; Connors v. Carp River
Iron Co., 54 Mich. 168; In re Ryan,
45 Mich. 173 ; Ayeridge v. Social Cir-
cle Commissioners, 60 Ga. 404 ; Peo-
ple V. Londoner, 13 Colo. 803. See,
also, cases cited in preceding note.
1 DUlon on Munic. Corp., §§ 86, 87 ;
15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 974,
975, tit " Municipal Corporation ; "
Annotated Case by M. D. Ewell, Esq.,
18 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 30, 25 (1879),
containing a full citation of cases
upon the general subjecj; of repeals
by implication.
1 Cumberland v. Magruder, 34 Md.
881. Subsequent laws do not repeal
former ones by containing different
provisions: they must be contrary.
Bond V. Hiestand, 30 La. Ann. 139.
§ 96.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF OHAKTKE. 113
peals by implication are not favored, and the repugnancy be-
tween two statutes should be very clear to warrant a court in
holding that the later in time repeals the other when it does
not in terms do so. This rule has peculiar force in the case
of laws of special and local application, which are never to be
deemed repealed by general legislation except upon the most
unequivocal manifestation of intent to that effect." '
§ 96. Mnnlcipal charter not repealed by subsequent gen-
eral law unless Intent to repeal is clear. — As the charter of
a municipal corporation is a special act, a general law passed
subsequent to the charter will not repeal the provisions of the
charter either by implication or by a general clause repealing
all acts contrary to its provisions, unless the intent of the
legislature to effect such repeal is clear.^ For example, a city
in California adopted in its charter the methods of the general
revenue act, at that time in force^ for collecting and assessing
the municipal taxes, and when that general revenue act was
repealed and a general law regulating the creation and gov-
ernment of municipal corporations and containing provisions
for the assessment and collection of the city taxes was passed,
the courts held that the provisions of the charter were not
repealed by the passage of the subsequent legislation, and that
the municipality should continue to a^ess and collect its taxes
according to the methods prescribed in its charter.*
1 Cooley's Const Lim. 183; 18 Am. Cal. 504; Bond v. Hiestand, 20 La.
li. Reg. (N. S.) 30, 25 (1879> Ann. 139; Cumberland v. Magruder,
2 State V. Branin, 23 N. J. Law, 484 ; 34 Md. 381 ; Hammond v. Haines, 25
State V. Morristown, 33 N. J. Law, Md. 541.
S7 ; State v. Ti-enton, 36 N. J. Law, 3 People v. Clunie, 70 Cal. 504. In
198 ; State v. Jersey City, 5 Dutch. New Jersey a similar case arose, in
170; Tierney u Dodge, 9 Minn. 166; which the same principle was upheld
President &c. of Ottawa v. County of and a provision in a city charter con-
La Salle, 13 111. 389 ; East St Louis cerning taxation was declared to re-
V. Maxwell, 99 111. 439 ; Haywood v. main in force notwithstanding the
Mayor &c. of Savannah, 12 Ga. 404 ; passage of a subsequent general act
Mayor v. Inman, 57 Ga. 370 ; McCarty regulating that subject. State v.
V. Deming, 51 Conn. 423 ; Harris- Branin, 23 N. J. Law, 484. See, also,
'burgh V. Scheck, 104 Pa, St 53 ; In re last note to preceding section, and
Egypt Street, 8 Grant (Pa) Cas. 455 ; § 81, supra, as to effect of amend-
JrarJ Commissioners of Central Park, ment of charter upon existing ordi-
50 N. Y. 493; People v. Clunie, 70 nances.
8
114 AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEB. [§§ 97, 98.
§ 97. The same subject continued.— Where the two stat-
utes are so inconsistent that they cannot be construed to stand
together, the usual principles governing the construction of
statutes must be applied in order to ascertain whether it was
the intention of the legislature that the charter should be
superseded by the general statute, or whether the charter is
excepted from the operation of the general law. In order to
arrive at the intention of the legislature, the charter and the
general act must be considered in Hhe light of the general leg-
islation on the subject, and each provision of the charter or
the general statute must be read with reference to the other
provisions.*
§ 98. Instances of repeal of charter by geujsral acts.—
Thus, an act of the New Jersey legislature which in terms
applied to all cities was construed to apply to all, and to re-
peal all incoi^sistent charter provisions because the constitu-
tion of that State prohibited special legislation, and if any city
were excepted from the operation of the act in question, it
would be a special law and unconstitutional. Therefore, ut
res magis valeat quam pereat, the interpretation which vali-
dated the law was adopted.* And so where a chapter of a
Minnesota statute provided that every village incorporated
under the general statutes should thereafter be governed ac-
cording to the provisions of that chapter, to the end that uni-
formity of village government and equal privileges to all
might be secured, it was held that in view of this expresged
intention, and the fact that the general statutes contained no
1 state V. City of Camden (N. J.; 540 ; Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 CaL
1887), 11 AtL Eep. 187; New Bedford 73; Eichels v. Evansville &e. E. Co.,
&c. E. Ca V. Acushnet &c. E. Co., 78 Ind. 261 ; 1 Dillon on Hunic
143 Mass. 200 ; County of Socorro v. Corp., § 87. As an illustration of the
Leavitt (N. M., 1887), 18 Pac. Eep. doctrine of the text in a Maryland
759 ; Moran v. Long Island City, 101 case, the definition in a later statute
N. Y. 439 ; Smith v. Kernochen, 7 of a term used in an earlier law was
How. 198 ; State u Spande, 37 Minn, considered by the courts in constru-
322 ; S. G, 34 N. W. Eep. 164 ; Hoi- ing the prior statute. Holland v.
landtt Baltimore (1857), 11 Md. 186; Baltimore (1857), 11 Md. 186. See^
Janesville v. Markoe, 18 Wis. 850 ; also, § 77, supra.
Powell V. Parkersburg, 28 W. Va. 2 State v. City of Camden (N. J.,
698; Board of Commissioners &c. v. 1887), 11 Atl. Eep. 137.
Davies (Wash., 1890), 24 Pac. Eep.
§§ 99, 100.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF OHAETEE. 115
provision as to village government, the section applied to all
villages incorporated under any general law of the State.'
§ 99. Eepeal and amendment of charter by subsequent
amendment of State constitution. — In this case as in other
cases of repeal the intention of the legislature is the point
to be considered, but with the qualification that the courts
incline strongly to declare the charter provisions vpid if there
be any inconsistency, and do not go so far in their efforts to
reconcile the two laws. This, of course, is due to the greater
weight of the constitution as the organic law of the State.
Thus in a California decision the provisions of a city charter
referring to streets were considered to have been repealed by
the enactment of a new State constitution containing provis-
ions thought by the court inconsistent with the charter pro-
vision.* And so where the charter of the city of East St.
Louis contained a limitation on the power of taxation for the
payment of bonded indebtedness, that limitation was held to
be abrogated by an inconsistent provision of a State constitu-
tion subsequently adopted.'
§ 100. Repeal of general laws by enactment of municipal
charter. — The principles considered in the preceding sections
1 State V. Spaude (1887), 37 Minn, its terms it provides for corporations
333 ; S. a, 34 N. "W. Eep. 164. Laws attempted to be organized under a
N. M., 1884, chs. 37, 39, relating to previous void act, and existing coi--
the incorporation, disincorporation porations are authorized to adopt its
and re-incorporation of cities, are provisions as to government and
in pari materia, and must be read classification. Board of Com'rs u
together, and be taken as part of the Davies (Wash., 1890), 34 Pac. Eep.
same act ; and their joint effect is to 140. In the last cited case it was
continue the existence of municipal declared, in accordance with the doc-
corporations created under the act of trine of the text, that where two
February 11, 1880, entitled " An act statutes embracing the same subject-
for the incorporation of cities,'' and matter are passed at the same ses-
to enable them, if they choose, to sion of the legislature, they should
either re-incorporate under the pro- bo construed as one act if possible,
visions of chapter 39, laws 1884, or to but if in irreconcilable conflict the
dissolve their corporation absolutely, later statute should prevail.
County of Socorro v. Leavitt (N. M., « Donahue v. Graham, 61 Cal. 276.
1887), 13 Pac. Rep. 759. Act Wash., a East St Louis v. Amy, 130 U. S.
March 37, 1890, providing for the or- 600 ; Public School Trustees v. Tay-
ganization of municipal corporations, lor, 30 N. J. Eq. 618; Eagerstown v.
affects existing corporations, since by Deebert, 33 Md. 369.
lis AMENDMENT, ETC., OB OHABTEE. [§ 101.
must be applied in coasidering the question whether the en-
actment of a municipal chacter repeals the provisions of a
prior general law. The intention of the legislature to repeal
the general law by the enactment of the charter must be
clear and beyond uncertainty. The rule that repeals by im-
plication are not favored is strictly applied in this relatibn.^
The ordinances of a municipal corporation, if authorized by
its charter, have the same effect within its limits and with re-
spect to persons upon whom thejis lawfully operate that an act
of the legislature has upon the people at large.^ Consequently,
where an ordinance authorized by the charter of the munici-
pality is in apparent or real conflict with a general law, the
same principles must be applied in deciding whether the gen-
eral law and the ordinance can stand together, or whether
they are fatally inconsistent, as where the provision of the
charter itself is in question.
§ 101. Repeal of general laws by municipal ordinance. —
In a Yermont case there is a strong and interesting presenta-
tion of the learning on this point. A general law of the State
of Yermont authorized the selectmen of villages to license vic-
tualing-houses. "With this law in force the village of St. Johns-
bury was incorporated by act of the legislature with a char-
ter authorizing the village to pass by-laws regulating the
licensing of victualing-houses. Under this charter the village
adopted a by-law authorizing its trustees to license viotualing-
shops. The validity of the by-law was called into question,
and in the opinion of the court it v^as said : — " The by-laws
of municipal corporations, when authorized by the charter,
have the same effect within its limits, and with respect to per-
sons upon whom they lawfully operate, that an act of the legis-
lature has upon the people at large.' So if the by-law is author-
lEx parte Garza (1890), 28 Tex. « St Johnsburyw Thompson, 59 Vt.
App. 381 ; S. C, 19 Am. St Eep. 845 ; 300; Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des
State V. Clarke (1873), 54 Mo. 17; Moines, 44 Iowa, 508; S. C, 24 Am.
State V. De Bar (1874), 58 Mo. 395 ; Eep. 756. This is conceded learning.
St Johnsbury v. Tiiompson, 59 Vt The cases supporting the doctrine
300 ; State v. Young (1877), 17 Kan. will be found in the chapter on Bt-
414 ; State v. Mills, 34 N. J. Law, 177 ; laws and Ordinances.
Seebold v. People, 86 111. 33. See, 'St Johnsbury v. Thompson, 69
also, g§ 77, 94, supra. Vt 300.
§ 102.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE. IIT
ized by the charter, it has the efPect of a special law of the leg-
islature within the limits of the village, and supersedes the
general law upon the subject of victualing-houses therein ; for
the charter giving the village power to pass the by-laW incon-
sistent with, and repugnant to, the general law, by necessary
implication operated to repeal the general law, within the ter-
ritorial limits of the village, on ^the principle that provisions
of different statutes which are in conflict with one another
cannot stand together, and in the absence of anything showing
a different intent on the part of the legislature, general legis-
lation upon a particular subject must give way to later incon-
sistent special legislation upon the same subject." '
§102. The same subject continned. — An interesting ap-
plication of the principles discussed in the last section is to be
found in the efforts of various municipalities to license houses
of prostitution, where such houses are prohibited by the gen-
eral criminal statutes of the State. In a recent Texas case
this question arose.^ By its charter the city of San Antonio,
which was incorporated by special act of the legislature, was
empowered inter alia to suppress and restrain disorderly
houses, bawdy-houses and houses of prostitution, to enact or-
dinances to restrain and punish prostitutes and to prevent and
punish the keeping of houses of prostitution within the city.
Under these powers the city council passed an ordinance licens-
ing houses of prostitution within the city. At the time of the
passage of the ordinance houses of prostitution were prohib-
ited by the penal code of the State. It was claimed on the
one hand that the ordinance was void as being repugnant to a
general law of the State, while on the other hand it was con-
tended that by the passage of the charter provisions authoriz-
ing the city to restrain, regulate and suppress such establish-
• 1 Dillon on Munio. Corp., § 88 ; thorizing it to tax the sale of liquor
4 Kent's Commentaries, 466, noie; may be required to pay an additional
In re Snell, 58 Vt. 207 ; State v. Mor- license under a city ordinance author-
ristown, 33 N. J. Law, 67 ; State v. ized by a charter granted after the
Clarke, 35 N. J. Law, 54 ; Davies v. county license Was issued. City of
Fairbarn, 3 How. 636 ; In re Goddard, Elk Point v. Vaughn (Dak.), 46 N. W.
16 Pick. 504 ; State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. Eep. 577. See § 88, mpra.
17 ; Mark u State, 97 N. Y. 573. One 2 E'a; parte Garza, 38 Tex. App. 881 ;
licensed by a county under a law au- S. C, 19 Am. St Rep. 845.
118 AMENDMENT, ETC., OF OHABTEB. [§ 103.
ments, the general law was, although not expressly, still by
necessary implication, repealed. The former view was upheld
by the courts, and in the opinion it was said : — " If it was the
intention of the legislature to repeal this general law within the
corporate limits of said city, it is reasonable to presume that
such intention would have been plainly and expressly declared,
and not left to be implied merely. It is reasonable to presume
that if it had been intended to grant the power to license such
houses, the legislature would, as ft did in the charter of the
city of "Waco, have expressly granted such power. That' such
was not the legislative intent is also, and to otir minds very
cogently, shown by the fact that the power to license other
occupations was expressly conferred upon the city." '
§ 103. Construction of amendatory and repealing acts made
applicable only to cities of a certain class. — The provisions
of amendatory and repealing statutes are sometimes made ap-
plicable in terms only to cities of a certain grade or class. In
construing these acts the question often arises as to whether
they take effect, ipso facto, upon the city reaching the required
population, or whether it is necessary for the city to comply
with the statutory formalities required in order to formally
raise the city from the lower to the higher grade before the
acts take effect. In a recent Utah case where certain sections
of a statute amendatory of city charters were by express
terms made applicable to cities having a population of over
twenty thousand, and pointed out a manner in which the num-
ber of inhabitants of a. given city might be determined,
the court nevertheless enforced the act by taking judicial
1 Sa;porfe Garza (1890), 28 Tex. App. suppress bawdy-houses, while by an
381 ; S. C., 19 Am. St. Eep. 845. The amendment the city was further em-
opinion also refers to tlie Missouri powered to regulate and suppress
case on the same subject, where it these resorts. In another Missouri
was held that the power to regulate decision it was held that a special act
included the power to license. State of the legislature expressly conferring
V. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17. See, also, State upon the city of St Louis the power
V. De Bar, 58 Mo. 395 ; Smith v. Madi- to permit beer saloons to remain open
son, 7 Ind. 86 ; Burlington v. Palmer, on Sunday operated within the city
42 Iowa, 681. But it is to be noted, limits a repeal of the general statute
as is remarked in the opinion, that in prohibiting such act. State v. Binder,
the Missouri case the original charter 38 Mo. 451. ,
authorized the city of St. Louis to
§ 104.J AMENDMENT, ETC., OF OHAETEE. 119
notice of the population as shown by the last decennial cen-
sus without anything being done on the part of the city.^
On the other hand, under the Ohio statute providing that
" existing corporations organized as cities of the second class
shall remain such until they become cities of the first class,"
a mere increase of population has been held not to advance
such cities from the second to the first class, but to accom-
plish that end the provisions of the statute must be complied
with .2
§ 104. Effect of legislation upon the charter of a city
organized under special law^ and not hy its acceptance
thereof subject to. the general law. — Where it is provided,
as is frequently the case, that a city organized by special act
may elect to become subject to a subsequent general law
providing for the creation of municipalities throughout the
State, and any city refuses to make such election and remains
subject to its original special charter, legislation affecting
cities organized under the general law does not effect an
■ amendment or repeal of the provisions of that special charter.
So the city of Wilkesbarre, never having accepted the provis-
ions of the Pennsylvania statute regulating the government
of cities, and making the petition of a majority of the lot-
owners a condition precedent to the pavement of a street, was
held to be not subject thereto, but to be governed by its own
charter, which did not require such petition.' And in Colorado
and California a similar ruling was made even in the case of
1 People ex rel. Bynon v. Page struing the same general statute, it
(Utah), 23 Pac. Eep. 761 ; s. C, 29 Am. was held accordingly that the stat-
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 57. See, also, §48, ute in question, the act of May 23,
supra. The courts will in general 1874 (P. L. Pa. 231), and the supple-
talre judicial notice of the population mental act of April 11, 1876 (P. L. 21),
of a cit^ as ascertained by the fed- establishing a uniform and general
eral census. State v. Hermann, 75 system of government for all cities,
Mo. 340 ; State v. Anderson, 44 Ohio was not designed to repeal any
St 347 ; Topeka v. Gillett, 39 Kan. municipal charter previously created
431. by special enactment, and a city
2 State V. Wall (Ohio), 24 N. E. Eep. which has not accepted the act is
897. not subject to its provisions. In re
' Beaumont v. City of WilkesbaiTe Vacation of Henry St (1889), 123 Pa.
(1891), 21 At). Eep. 888. And in con- St 346 ; s. C, 10 Atl. Eep. 785.
120
jMIBNDMENT, ETd., OF OHAETBB.
[§ 105.
constitutional provisions affecting cities organized under the
general law.'
§ 105. Miscellaneons instances of effective repealing and
amendatory acts. — Where a repealing or amendatory act ex-
pressly declares that the act shall apply to all" cities and towns
of the St^ite, of course those charters of cities and towns
within the State which are inconsistent with the provisions of
the act are thereby repealed or altered, as the intention of the
legislature to effect such repeal or amendment is expressly in-
dicated.? Where the earlier and later legislation are obvi-
1 The constitution of Colorado, ar-
ticle 14, section 13, authorized the gen-
eral assem-bly to provide by general
laws for organization and classifica-
tion of cities and towns, and to define
by genera.1 laws the powers of each
class, so that all of the same class
shall possess the same powers, etc.
Section 14 provided that the general
assembly should make provision by
general law whereby any city incor-
porated by special law might elect to
become subject to the general law.
The city of Denver never elected to
be re-incorporated under the general
laws ; but, on the contrary, its charter
was often amended. It was decided
that Constitution, article 7, section IS,
providing that the general assembly
shall by general law designate the
courts and judges by whom electiqn
contests shall be tried, did not in
effect repeal an existing provision in
the Denver city charter authorizing
the city council to determine con-
tests as to tjhe electiQn of mayor, nor
did it invalidate ^ subsequent amend
ment to such provision. People v.
Londoner, 13 Col. 303 ; s. a, 23 Pac.
Kep. 704 ; Carpenter v. People, 8 Col.
116 ; s. c, 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Caa.
110. The cpn^plaint in an action by
a California city organized under a
special charter was according to the
form prescribed by a section of the
charter. There was nothing to indi-
cate that silch section had been re-
pealed or modified prior to the
adoption or the constitution of
California of 1879, or that the city as
a corporation ever re-organized under
the act of 1883 (Acts CaL 1883,
p. 235), providing for the organiza-
tion of cities under general laws.
The court held that the complaint
was not obnoxious to the constitution
of California of 1879,.article 11, section
6, providing that "corporations for
municipal purposes shall not be cre-
ated by special laws; but the legis-
lature, by general laws, shall provide
for the incorporation, organizE^tion
and classification in proportion to
population of cities, towns," etc.
City of Stockton v. Western Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. (Cal., 1887X 15 Pac
Rep. 3J4.
3 Thus a clause in an act declaring
that " this act shall apply to all cities
and towns in this State, anything in
their charters to the contrary not-
withstanding," makes the act opera-
tive in those cities whose charters
have contrary provisions. In re
House Resolutions Relating to House
Bill No. 116 (1889), 12 Colo. 289; S. a,
21 Pac. Rep. 484 ; In re Senate Reso-
lution Relating to Senate Bill No. 1
(1889), 12 Colo. 290 ; S. c, 21 Pac. Rep.
484. Also it has been decided that
§ 106.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE. 121
ously and fatally inconsistent, the later act repeals the former.
Thus, a Texas statute which incorporated the town of Hen-
derson, with limits one mile square, the court-house being
in the center, was impliedly repealed by a subsequent act in-
corporating the same town, with limits extending " one-half
mile in every direction from the court-house." ^ In the fa-
mous cases in which the members of the board of aldermen
of New York, known as the " boodle " aldermen, were in-
dicted for receiving bribes in connection with the purchase by
Jacob Sharp of the franchise to operate a street railway
through Broadway, the charter of the city provided a penalty
in the case of municipal ofiBcials for the crime of receiving
bribes. A provision of the penal code adopted after the pas-
sage of that charter provision imposed a greater penalty upon
the same offense. The provision of the penal code was held to
supersede and repeal the charter provision.*
§ 106. The same subject continued In general it may be
stated that where a question arises as to whether the provis-
ions of a municipal charter are repealed by subsequent legis-
lation, the intention of the legislature must be ascertained
according to the general rules governing the construction of
statutes «ubject to the special limitations indicated in the
preceding sections, and where, either expressly or by clear
and necessary implication, the intention of the legislature to
amend or repeal the provisions of the charter is apparent,
such amendment or repeal is effected.'
Laws of Utah, 1888, chapter 48, arti- i Buf ord v. State, 73 Tex. 183 ; S. C,
cle 30, section 5, providing that the 10 S. W. Rep. 401.
sections thereof specifying the num- ^People w O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 351;-
ber of wards, and the ofBcers to be People v. Jaehne, 103 N. Y. 183.
elected, in cities of certain classes, 'Buford v. State, 73 Tex. 183;
shall apply to cities already organ- s. a, 10 S. W. Eep. 401 ; State v.
ized, effects an amendment of the Seaverance, 55 Mo. 378 ; State v. Mil-
charters of such cities, though the ler, 80 N. J. Law, 368 ; s. a, 86 Am.
act contains no repealing clause. Dec. 188 ; Allen v. People, 84 111. 503,
People V. Page (Utah), 38 Pac. Rep. and cases already cited. N. Y. Laws
761. See, also, Clintonville v. Keet- 1885, oh. 370, providing for the pres-
ing, 4Denio, 841 ; Bank v. Bridges, 30 ervation of the public health, etc.,
N. J. Law, 113 ; Coe v. Meriden, 45 being general in its application, re-
Conn. 155 ; Tiemey v. Dodge, 9 Minn, peals and supersedes the provisions
lfl6. of a village charter relating to the
122
AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHABTEB.
[§ lor.
§ 107. What is an amendment or repeal of a municipal
charter? — The constitution of the State sometimes pre-
scribes specific methods according to which the amendment
or repeal of municipal charters may be effected. Under these
constitutional provisions it is necessary to determine whether
legislative or other action is an amendment or a repeal of
the charter within the meaning of the statute. In Mis-
souri it has been decided that an ordinance extending the
limits of a city, the boundaries ef which had been originally
defined bv its charter, was an amendment to the charter.'
But an act of the (legislature, conferring upon a city powers
additional to what it already has under its charter, was re-
garded in an Oregon case as supplemental to the charter,
and not as an amendment or revision of it, within that
provision of the constitution which provides that when an
same subject. People v. Daley (1885),
37 Hun, 461. The provision of the
city charter of Oakland, granted in
1854, giving the common council ex-
clusive jurisdiction to determine an
elation contest for the office of coun-
cilman, was impliedly repealed by
Code Civil Proc. Cal., § 1111 et seq.,
providing that any elector of a
county or city, or any political sub-
division of either, may contest for
causes therein stated, and that such
contest must be determined by a
special session of the superior court.
McGivney v. Pierce (Cal.), 52Pac. Eep.
369. The construction of municipal
ordinances is governed by the same
rules that are applied to statutes in
similar cases. Eoche v. Mayor &c.,
40 N. J. Law, 257; S. C. (annotated),
18 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 30.
1 The constitution of Missouri, arti-
cle 9, section 16, provides that any
city having a popufation of one hun-
dred thousand may frame a charter
for its own government^ which must
be approved by four-sevenths of the
qualified voters, and which, when
"bo adopted, may be amended by a
proposal therefor made by the law-
making authorities of such city, . . .
and accepted by three-fifths of the
qualified voters of such city, . . .
and not otherwise." Kansas City
adopted such a charter, one of vehose
provisions defined the territorial lim-
its of the city. It was held that an
ordinance to extend such limits was
an amendment to the charter, and
must be accepted by three-fifths of
the voters, as required by the consti-
tution. And, although the same sec-
tion of the constitution further pro-
vided that " such charter shall always
be , . , subject to the constitu-
tion and laws of this state," this was
decided to confer no authority on the
legislature to authorize amendments
to the charter otherwise than as pro-
vided by the constitution ; and hence
act of Missouri, March 10, 1887, pro-
viding that the territorial limits of
such a city may be extended by or-
dinance, was held to be void so far
as it proposes to dispense with the as-
sent of three-fifths of the qualified
voters of the city to such ordinance.
City of Westport v. Kansas City
(Mo., 1891), 15 S. W. Rep. 68.
§§ 108, 109.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE. 128
act is revised, or a section amended, the act or section so
revised or amended shall be set forth at full length.' The
charter of the city of New York originally provided that the
aldermen of that city should sit as judges of the court of gen-
eral sessions, and it was held that an act depriving the alder-
men of that right was an act amending the charter, and, as
such, required a vote of two-thirds of the members elected to
each branch of the legislature. Such an act passed without
that vote was declared void.*
§ 108. Acceptance of amendment. — The legislature -has,
in the absence of constitutional limitations to the contrary,
the power to impose an amendment of the charter without
the consent of the inhabitants of the municipality, as it has
the power to impose the original charter without such con-
sent ; ' but it is frequently provided that an amendment of
the charter shall not become a law until the municipal gov-
ernment or the inhabitants of the municipality shall, in a man-
ner indicated by the statute, signify their acceptance of the
amendment.*
§ 109. Manner of acceptance. — "Where this acceptance is
made a condition of the amendment it must be signified ac-
cording to the method prescribed by the statute in order to
validate the amendment. Thus in Ohio it was provided that
an amendment to a city charter should take effect when
• Sheridan v. Salem, 14 Oregon, act prescribed the manner of propos-
328 ; s. C, 13 Pac. Eep. 925. ing and voting upon amendments,
2 Purdy V. People, 4 Hill, 384. and further provided that " no
' See §§ 50, 71, 73, 73, supra, amendments shall be proposed or
* Attorney-General v. Shepard, 63 submitted by any board of aldermen
N. H. 383; In re Henry Street, 123 which shall, contravene, or be repug-
Pa. St 346 ; Largen v. State, 76 Tex. nant to, the constitution or statute
323 ; State v. St. Louis, 73 Mo. 435 ; laws of this State." The constitu-
Foote V. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio, 408 ; tionality of this law is discussed by a
Mayor &c. of Brunswick v. Finney, correspojident of the Central Law
54 Ga. 317 ; §§ 51, 72, 73, supra. The Journal, who arrives at the conclu-
legislature of Texas passed an act sion that it is not obnoxious to the
empowering "any incorporated town maxim which forbids a delegation
or city " to amend its own charter, of legislative authority. 2 Cent L.
" whenever in the judgment of the Jour. 33. See, also, People v. Bag-
board of aldermen " an amendment ley (Cal.), 24 Pac. Rep. 716 ; and
became necessary or desirable. The §§ 41, 46, supra.
124 AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEB. [§ 110.
adopted " by a majority of the voters, of the city," The city
and the township were coterminous, but different qualifica-
tions for voters were in force in the two corporations. The
vote on the acceptance of the amendment was held at the
township polls, and the courts declared that the election was
void and the amendment ineffectual, on the ground that the
statutory provision contemplated a vote at the city polls.* A
substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute
is, however, suflScient.^ When ncf provision is made by the
amending act for the assent of the municipality or its citizens,
it Is proper^^r the court to infer that assent from such acts
of the citizens as show their willingness to become subject to
the amendment.'
§ 110. Constitutional limitations on power of legislature
to amend or repeal municipal charters — (a) In general. —
It has been already stated that the sole restrictions on the
power of the legislature to amend, repeal or alter the charters
of municipal corporations are to be found in the constitutions
of the United States and of the several States. These re-
strictions are the same that are imposed <m other forms of
legislation ; and they are the sole restraints on the legislative
power of control of municipal corporations except the power
of public opinion and the power of the people expressed
through their votes. As is said by Judge Cooley : — "If the
legislative action in these cases operates injuriously to the
municipalities or to individuals, the remedy is not with the
1 Foote V. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio, 408. amendment was legally passed. At-
2Thus, where Laws of New Hamp- torney-General v. Shepard, 63 N. H.
shire, 1881, chapter 255, sections 1, 883. See, also, Winn v. Board of
3, 11, provided that an amendment Park Com'rs (Ky.), 14 S. W. Eep. 421 ;
of the charter of the city of Con- g§ 47, 53, 54, 83, 84, supra.
cord should not become a law un- 'Taylor v. Newberne (N. C), 2
less the city government or the in- Jones' Eq. 141. In this case the as-
liabitants of the city should by " a sent of the city of Newberne to an
majority vote of the legal voters amendment of its charter was in-
present and voting thereon by ballot ferred from the election by its citi-
determine to adopt the same ; " and zens of legislators who made the
at a meeting of the board of alder- adoption of the amendment an issue
men six of the seven members were in their canvass, and were elected as
present, three of whom voted in the favoring the amendment See. iilso,
affirmative on the question and three § 73, supra.
refused to vote, it was held that the
§ 111.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF OHAKTER. 125
courts. The courts have no power to interfere, and the peo-
ple must be looked to, to right through the ballot-box all these
wrongs." ' In considering whether an act amending or repeal-
ing a municipal charter is constitutional or unconstitutional,
the same criteria are to be applied as in considering other
legislation. If such an act impairs the obligation of a con-
tract, if it deprives any person of his private property with-.
out due process of law, in short if it violates any provision
of the federal constitution or of the constitution of the State
by the legislature of which it is enacted, it is unconstitutional
and void, as all other legislation would under like circum-
stances be unconstitutional and void.
§ 111. (b) Special legislation.— It is prescribed by the con-
stitutions of several of the States that no special or local law
shall be enacted affecting municipal corporations. This pro-
hibition has been held in ]S"ew Jersey to apply to a law alter-
ing the ward limits of a city and changing the time of election
of certain of the municipal officers.* The Pennsylvania con-
stitution prohibits the passage of any law creating, renewing
or extending the charter of more than one corporation. An
act enlarging the powers of several municipal corporations
was not considered unconstitutional under this prohibition.'
In Ohio and Kansas, statutes extending or defining the cor-
porate limits of the municipality have been declared to be
within the constitutional prohibition of special acts.* A curi-
ous instance of an attempt to evade this prohibition is to be
found in an Ohio statute which allowed certain privileges to
iCooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.) 330. Am. & Eng. Corp..Cas. 638. But a
2 Pell V. Newark, 40 N. J. Law, 550 ; city charter may in New Jersey be
S. C, 39 Am. Rep. 366. Under the repealed by a special act. Worthley
same prohibition it has been held v. Steen, 43 N. J. Law, 543. See, also,
that where a general statute is en- § 44, supra.
acted, applying to all cities in the 8 Maers v. Reading, 31 Pa. St. 188. '
State, all special laws inconsistent * State v. Cincinnati, 30 Ohio St
therewith are repealed by the^ general 18; Wyandotte City v. Wood, 5 Kan.
repealing clause of the statute, as 603; City of Topeka v. Gillett, 33
otherwise the statute would not ap- Blan. 431 (1888) ; S. C, 33 Am. L. Reg.
ply to all cities and would therefore be (N. S.) 778, and a valuable note (p. 785)
unconstitutional as speoiallocallegis-/ by Frank P. Pritchard, Esq., on the
lation affecting municipalities. State general topic of local and special
V. Camden, 5 N. J. Law, 87 ; S. C, 17 legislation.
126 AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHABTEE. [§§ 112, 113.
cities having at the last federal census a population of sixteen
thousand five hundred and twelve. < The city of Akron was
the only city in the State to which the federal census had
given that exact figure of population, and the statute was
very properly declared unconstitutional as being special legis-
lation,^
§ ll2. (c) Vested rights — Impairment of obligation of
contracts — Recognition by constitution. — "Where the
amendatory or repealing act affects vested rights of creditors,
the right of private property, or the obligation of contracts,
they must be closely inspected to see that they are not avoided
by the restrictions imposed by the constitution of the United
States and of the several States upon such legislation. For a de-
tailed statement of the learning on these difficult and obscure
points, reference is made to a subsequent chapter." As was
declared in a Texas case, the repeal of a municipal charter
cannot deprive of their vested rights those to whom the mu-
nicipality is under obligation.' But if the constitution makes
mention of a municipal corporation and recognizes it as such,
it is not thereby secured against legislative control.* And it
has been held in numerous cases in Indiana that a provision
in the State constitution continuing in existence certain mu-
nicipal corporations until "modified" or "repealed" by the
legislature did not prohibit amendments to charters so as to
enlarge territorially or otherwise the jurisdiction of the cor-
porate authorities.*
§ 113. Title of amendatory or repealing acts. — The con-
stitutions of many States provide that no statute shall embrace
more than one object, which shall be clearly expressed in its
title. Legislative acts amending or repealling municipal char-
ters are of course obnoxious, along with other legislation to
this provision. The object of such provisions is, of course, to
enable legislators to see at a glance the general scope of the
act which they are called upon to pass ; and thus to prevent
the passage of vicious legislation through the inattention of
1 State V. Anderson, 44 Ohio St 247. ^ Mayor &c. of Baltimore v. State,
2 See Chapter on Legislative Con- 15 Md. 376 ; s. c, 74 Am. Dec. 573.
TROL. sWiley v. Bluffton, 111 Ind. 152,
» Morris v. State, 62 Tex. 728. and cases there cited.
§ 114.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE. 127
the law-giving body. It is evident that this object will be at-
tained if the title of the act is suflBciently particular to show
the general object and effect of the statute, even though de-
tails may be omitted from the title. This is well illustrated
by a Minnesota case. The constitution of Minnesota con-
tained such a provision. A special law entitled " An act to
define the boundaries of and establish a municipal government
for the city of Duluth," by repealing a former act extinguished
a village organization and annexed its territory to the city.
The constitutionality of the act was attacked on the ground
that its title did not comply with the constitutional require-
ment. The courts upheld the statute, and in the opinion it
was said : — " It would be impracticable to require all these
minor subjects to be expressed in the title: all that is re-
quired is that they and the provisions in respect to them shall
be germane to the subject expressed in the title — such as have
a just and proper reference thereto ; such as by the nature of
the subject indicated are manifestly appropriate in that con-
nection. It could not be required that every other law re-
pealed by implication because of repugnancy or inconsistency
shall be mentioned in the title of the new act." '
§ 114. The same subject continued. — The constitution of
Wisconsin provides local and private acts " shall not embrace
more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title."
It has been decided in that State that amendments to the
charter of the city of Milwaukee are not local or private acts
within the meaning of the constitutional provision.^ But under
a similar provision in the constitution of Illinois it was held
that a statute entitled " An act to repeal certain acts therein
named," by which the previous acts of incorporation of a city
were repealed, and the former city re-incorporated into a town,
was unconstitutional, on the ground that the repealing por-
tion of the act was alone designated by the title, and that the
subsequent clauses were not designated in the title according to
the requirement of the constitution.' In an Iowa case a stat-
1 state V. Gallagher, 43 Minn. 41 ; 2 Thompson v. City of Milwaukee,
State V. Duval County, 23 Fla. 483 ; 69 Wis. 492 ; s. C, 34 N. W. Rep. 402.
McGwin V. Board of Education, 133 3 People v. MeUen, 33 IlL 181.
III. 133.
128 AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE. [§ 11.5.
ute entitled " An act to amend the act to incorporate the city
of Muscatine " extended the limits of that city, which limits
had been defined by the original act of incorporation^ The
courts held that the objept of the statute was suificieritly set
forth in its title and that the act was not unconstitutional.'
The constitution of Georgia contained a clause providing that
no law or ordinance should be passed " which refers to more
than one subject-matter or contains matter different from
what is expressed in the title tHereof." A subsequent stat-
ute entitled " An act to prescribe the manner of incorporating
towns and villages," which contained a clause amending exist-
ing charters, was held to be void, as not complying with the
constitutional requirement.*
§ 115. Forfeiture of charter in England. — The charter of
an English municipal corporation can be declared forfeited by
the courts for misuser or non-user on the part of the corpo-
ration of the provisions of its charter.' This forfeiture of
charter and consequent dissolution of the municipality is ac-
complished by quo warromto and scire facias proceedings, as
in the case of private corporations. The former proceeding
is in form a criminal but in its essence a civil proceeding, and,
was originally used where there was a defect in incorporation
whereby the municipality had merely a de facto corporate ex-
istence and could not legally exercise its powers. In later
times, however, it was used not only as an appropriate means
for testing the right to exercise corporate franchises, but also
as the proper remedy for the abuse thereof. The writ of scire
facias, on the other hand, is properly used where the munici-
pality is properly incorporated, but has misused or non-used
its franchises.*
1 Morf ord w. Unger, 8 Iowa, 83. date and amend the several acts in-
In the same State a statute entitled corporating the city of Brunswick
an amendment to a municipal cbar-i and for other purposes" therein men-
ter was declared void as containing tioned was also declared unconstitu-
objects not mentioned in the title, tional and void on the same ground.
Williamson v. ECeokuk, 44 Iowa, 88. See, also, 1 Dillon on Muuic. Corp.
2 Ayeridge v. Commissioners, 60 (4th ed.)> § 51, where many cases on
Ga. 404. See, also, Brunswick w this point are collected.
Brunswick, 51 Ga. 639, where a ' Willcock on Corporations, 335.
statute entitled "An act to consoli- *For a discussion of this subject
§§ 116, 117.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OP CHAETEE. 129
§116. The same subject continued.— The English doc-
trine that the charters of municipal as well as of private cor-
porations are liable to forfeiture by quo warranto and scire
faoias proceedings arises from the fact that there is an im-
plied condition upon the grant of any charter, public or pri-
vate, that the franchises thereof shall not be neglected or
abused.' It is conceded that this doctrine applies to private
corporations in this country.* But as will be shown in the
succeeding sections, the charters of municipal corporations
cannot in the United States be declared forfeited by the courts
for any cause.
§ 117. Instances of forfeiture of charter under English
law. — The boroughs and cities of England had always been
the centers of intellectual activity, and consequently of rest-
iveness, under the attempted tyranny of the Tudors and the
Stuarts. "When Charles II. was restored to the throne he took
measures to quell the rebellious cities, and notably the great
capital of London, by attacking the charters which were the
source of their independence. A servile judiciary subserved
his aims, and on frivolous grouiids the charter of London was
and of the authorities relating not, however, be refused merely be-
thereto, with especial reference, how- cause the granting it may or even
ever, to piivate corporations, see 1 will dissolve the corporation. Rex v.
Beach on Private Ct)rp., § 53. White, 5 A. & E. 613 ; Rex v. Parry,
11 Dillon on Munio. Corp., § 165, 6 A. & E. 810, 830.
citing Blackstone's CJoinmentaries, ^ 1 Beach on Private Corp., § 45,
485 ; 2 Kyd on Corporations, 447 ; citing People v. Kingston &o. Koad
Willcock on Corporations, 335; Tay- Co., 33 Wend. 193; s. C., 35 Am. Deo.
lors of Ipswich, 1 Eol. 5; Rex v. 551 and note; State v. Commercial
Grosvenor, 7 Mod. 199 ; Smith's Case, Bank, 13 Sm. & M. 539 ; S. c., 53 Am.
4 Mod. 65, 58 ; Rex v. Saunders, 3 Dec. 106 ; Chesapeake & Ohio Canal
East, 119; Mayor &c. of Lyme v. Co. v. Baltimore & Qhio R Co., 4
Henley, 2 CL & F. 331 ; Rex v. Kent, Gill & J. 132 ; People v. President
18 East, 230; Prestley v. Foulds, 2 &c. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. 351;
Scott, N. E. 205, 235 ; Attorney-Gen- Penobscot &o. Co. v. Lawson, 16 Me.
eral v. Shrewsbury, 6 Beav. 220. 324; Commonwealth v. Commercial
Where it is clear that the object of Bank of Pennsylvania, 28 Pa. St. 388.
the quo warranto against an indi- The exercise of this power in this
vidual member of the corporation is country is exclusively vested in the
to call in question the validity of the courts ; because a legislature caunor,
charter granted to it by the crown, as a rule, declare a private ch.arter
the court will refuse it Eegina v. forfeited. 1 Beach on Private Corp.,
Taylor, 11 A. & E. 949. The writ will § 45, and cases cited,
9
130 AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE. [§ 118.
declared forfeited.* The charter was only restored to the city
upon conditions which virtually vested in the crown the power
of appointing the municipal officers. London was not alone
in this predicament. Judge Dillon states that eighty-one quo
i^arrcmto informations were brought against English munici-
pal corporations by Charles II. and James II. These efforts of
tyranny extended to the American colonies, which were at
that early time vigorous in their opposition to unconstitu-
tional despotism. The charters c^ Massachusetts, of Khode
Island and of Connecticut were abrogated. But after the Rev-
olution these wrongs were righted, and the charters of all
corporations forfeited during the reigns of Charles 11. and
James 11. were restored by act of parliament.*
§ 118. The charter of a municipal corporation in the
United States cannot be forfeited by judicial action. — The
English law allowing the forfeiture of municipal charters by
quo wa/rranto and scire facias proceedings has no place in the
American system of jurisprudence. The power to dissolve a
municipal corporation is vested wholly and exclusively in the
legislative branch of our government.' This distinction seems
to arise from the fact that the English municipal corporation
was, in the incipienoy of its existence as a corporation, a body
of burgesses within the borough — a close Corporation which
controlled the town but was not itself the town.* This char-
ter of this close corporation, in many respects conducted for
private advantage although performing at the same time the
function of a governing body over the town or city, was con-
sidered to be subject to forfeiture for wilful misuser or non-
1 1 Dillon on Munio. Corp., citing ' Mobile v. "Watson, 116 U. S. 289 ;
Rex V. City of London, Mich. 33 Car. 2 ; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 IT. S. 472 ;
S. C, 2 Show. 262. See, also. Pulling, Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon
Laws &c. of London, 14 ; Norton's C. C. 130 ; Attorney-General v. Bos-
Commentaries on History &c. of ton, 123 Mass. 460 ; Attorney-Geherat
London, book 1, ch. X The Lease of v. Salem, 103 Mass. 138 ; Buford v.
the City of London, 8 How. State State, 72 Tex. 182 ; Harris v. Nesblt,
Trials, 1340. 24 Ala. 498. Non-user of corporate
21 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 8; 2 powers is not a forfeiture of corpo-
Chandl. Com. Debs. 316 ; 1 Stephen's rate existenca State v. Stevens, 21
English Const, ch. VII, p. 455 ; Ma- Kan. 210 ; S. G (annotated), 18 Am. L.
caulay's History of England, vol. Ill, Reg. (N. S.) 43, 46.
ch. XV. < See supra, § 22.
§ 119.] AMENDMENT, ETC., OF CHAETEE. 131
user in regard to matters which went to the essence of the
contract between it and the crown, just as a private corpora-
tion is subject to such forfeiture. The same tacit condition
was considered to be annexed to the charters of these corpo-
rations that is annexed, as is everywhere conceded, to the
charters of private corporations; that is, that the corpora-
tion shall be subject to dissolution, by forfeiture of its charter
effected through regular judicial proceedings, for wilful mis-
user or non-user of the franchises of that charter.
§ 119. The same subject continued. — But in the United
States our municipalities are free from any such vestige of an
earlier stage of development. The American municipal cor-
poration is simply and purely a strictly public corporation.
It is a corporation of citizens, for citizens and by citizens. Its
sole object is local government. Being maintained, therefore,
only for the public' advantage, it is manifestly unjust and even
impossible that the charters of our municipal corporations
should be forfeited by judicial proceedings. To give such a
power to the judiciary would be to make them co-ordinate
with the legislature in their control of local government and
local legislation. The illegal acts of municipal officials can be
avoided and enjoined by vaiious methods of judicial proced-
ure, but the charter itself being the creature of the legislature
can be destroyed only by the same power that created. We
have seen that the power of the legislature over municipal
charters is unlimited except by constitutional limitations and
by the power of the ballot-box. We may further add that
this power of control has no_^rival, and that neither the judi-
cial nor the executive departments of our government can
create nor destroy a municipality, which is a subdivision of
the State government. There are to the knowledge of the
writer no cases in which this exclusive control of the legisla-
ture has been successfully questioned.^
' See, upon this point, 1 Dillon on laterally. §§ 55, 75, swpro. The effect
Munic. Corp.,§ 168 ; 3 Dillon on Munic. of dissolution of corporations by leg-
Corp., § 896 ; Annotated Case, 18 Am. islative action will be fully treated in
L. Reg. (N. S.) 43, 46. Regularity of the subsequent chapter on Partition
incorporation cannot be attacked col- akd DISSOLUTION.
CHAPTEE V.
MEMBERSHIP
§120.
AND CITIZENSHIP — PEESONAL LIABILITY
MEMBERS OF THE CORPORATION.
OF
Definitions — Membership —
Citizenship.
121. Qualifications for membership
in English mimicipal corpo-
rations.
123. The same subject continued.
123. Qualifications for membership
in American municipal cor-
porationa
124 Citizenship in England.
125. The same subject continued.
126. Citizenship in the United
States.
127. Natural citizens.
138. The same subject continued.
129. Naturalized citizens.
130. The same subject continued.
181. Right of naturalized citizens
to hold and receive lands.
182. The status of Chinese before
the law.
183. The status of American In-
dians before the law.
134 PrivUeges and immunities of
citizens.
139.
140.
141.
143.
§ ^35. The same subject continued.
136. Rights of citizens.
137. The same subject continued.
138. Personal liability of members
of the corporation.
The same Subject continued —
Russell V. The Men of Devon.
Personal liability of members
of public g^agi-corporations
in New England.
The same subject continued.
Beardsley v. Smith — (a) The
reason for the New England
doctrine of personal liability
of membera
143. (b) The doctrine in England.
144 (c) The doctrine in Massachu-
setts and Maine.
145. (d) The doctrine in Connecti-
cut
146. Limitations upon the personal
liability of members of New
England public guowi-corpo-
rations.
§ 120. Definitions — Membership — Citizenship. — Mem-
bership is the state of being a member.^ Citizenship is the
state of being vested with the rights and privileges of a cit-
izen.^ A member is an individual of a community or society.
Every citizen is a member of the State or body politic. So the
individuals of a club, a corporation, or confederacy, are called
its members.' A citizen is strictly a member of a common-
wealth {oimtas), possessing all the rights which can be enjoyed
or exercised under its fundamental laws.* A citizen is the
1 Webster's Diet
2 Webster's Diet;
» Webster's Diet
* Burrill's Law Diet (2d ed.).
§ 121.] MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY. 133
native of a city, or an inhabitant who enjoys the freedom
and privileges of the city in which he resides ; the freeman
of a city, as distinguished from a foreigner, or one not en-
titled to its franchises. In the United States, a person, na-
tive or naturalized, who has the privilege of exercising the
elective franchise, or the qualifications which enable him to
vote for rulers, and to purchase and hold real estate ; ' any
person who, under the constitution and laws of the United
States, has a right to vote for public oflScers, and who is qual-
ified to fill offices in the gift of the people;* a free inhabit-
ant, born within the United States, or naturalized under the
laws of congress.'
§ 131. Qualifications for membership in English munici-
pal corporations. — Before the passage of the statute known
as the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, the qualifications
for members or officers of municipal corporations depended
upon the charter, usage or by-laws of the particular corpo-
ration, the usual qualifi(8ations being that the person claim-
ing to be admitted to the freedom of the corporate town
should be the son of a freeman, or should have served an ap-
prenticeship to a freeman, or (in some instances) married his
daughter, or acquired the privilege by gift or franchise.* But
this was changed by the said act of 1882, and under it no
person is entitled to be enrolled as a burgess unless he is qual-
ified as follows : (a) Is of full age,* and (h) is on the 15th of July
in any year, and has been during the whole of the then last
preceding twelve months, in occupation, joint or several,' of
any house,^ warehouse, counting-house, shop or other building,'
in this act referred to as qualifying property' in- the borough.
1 Webster's Diet But see Hargreaves v. Hopper, 1 CL P.
2 3 Story on Const 1 687 (1st b±). D. 195.
» 3 Kent's Commentaries, 258, note. * A joint occupation gives the mu-
* 1 Dillon on Hunia Corp. (4th ed.), nicipal franchise. Begina v. Mayor
§ 36, note. of Exeter, L. E. 4 Q. B. 114.
sit should seem from these words 'This may include part of a house,
that it is suflBcient if the person seek- when separately occupied. Municl-
ing to be enrolled were of full age at pal Corporations Act of 1883, § 31.
the time of the revision of the lists. ^See Powell v. Farmer, 18 C. B.
9 This property need not be the same Eawlinson's Municipal Corporations
during the twelve months. See § 33, Act of 1883 (8th ed.), p. 118.
134
MEMBEE8HIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITT.
[§ 122.
§ 122. The same subject continued. — This statute further
provides that no person shall be entitled to be enrolled as
a burgess unless he (a) "Has during the whole of those
twelve months resided in the borough or within seven miles '
thereof, and (5) Has been rated ' in respect of the qualifying
property to all poor rates made during those twelve months
for the parish wherein the property is situate ; and (o) Has on
before the twentieth of the same July paid' all such
or
rates,* including borough rates (if tny), as have become pay-
able by him in respect of the qualifyijig property ' up to the
(N. S.) 168 ; Powell v. Boraston, 18 C.
R {N, S.) 175; Ee Creek, 3 B. & a
459 ; Begina v. Mayor &c. of Eye, 9
Ad. & El. 670 ; Rex v. Sef ton, Russ.
& Ry. 302 ; In the Matter of Evans,
9 Ad. & El. 679. Where a burgess
occupies a " house," and is described
as occupying a " counting-house," his
name must be expunged from the
burgess roll. Reg. v. Mayor of Chip-
ping Wycpmbe, 44 L. J. Q. B. 82. In
cases where a house is let out to sep-
arate tenants, and each tenant has
complete control ov^r his portion, see
Bex V. Trapshaw, 1 Leach, 427 (4th
ed.); Rex v. Bailey, 1 Mood. C. C. 23;
Rex V. Carroll, 1 Leach, 237 (4th ed.);
Beg. V. Mayor &c. of Eye, 9 Ad. &E1.
6'70; Cook V. Humber, 11 C. B. (N. S.)
83 ; S. C, 31 L. J. C. P. 73 ; Wilson v.
Roberts, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 50; S. C, 31
L. J. C. P. 78.
>As to the n^ode in which this
distance is to be measured, see Raw-
linson's " Municipal Corporations
Act, 1.883" (8th ed.), §231.
2 It is now established that, in order
to constitute a good rating, the name
of the party intended to be charged
must appear on the rate. Moss, Ap-
pellant, V. Overseers of Lichfield,
Respondents, 7 Man. & G. 72. See,
also, Lord Mansfleld'g reasons in the
judgment in Rex v. St. Luke's Hos-
pital, 2 Burr. 1063 ; and the oases col-
lected, on this subject, in Elliott on
Registration (2d ed.), 190 ; and Rex v.
Tripp, M. T. 1836 ; Glover on Corp.,
693.
' Payment by another person act-
ing as a volunteer, and without any
authority from the person liable, is
not sufficient Reg v. Mayor &o. of
Bridgnorth, 10 Ad. & El. 66. But
where the payment is made by the
landlord in consequence of an agree-
ment between him and the tenant,
by which the tenant was to pay ad-
ditional rent in respect thereof, such
payment is sufficient. Wright, Ap-
pellant, V. Town Clerk of Stockport,
Respondent, 5 Man. & G. 33; Moger
V. Escott, L. R. 7 C. P. 158 ; Cook,
Appellant, v. Luckett, Respondent, 2
C. E. 168 ; Hughes, Appellant, v. Over-
seers of Chatham, Respondents, 5
Man. & G. 54. The decisions on set-
tlement cases accord with this view.
Rex V. Axmouth, 8 East, 383 ; Rex v.
Okehampton, Burr. S. C. 5 ; Rex v.
Bridgewater, 3 T. R. 550.
* See Rawlinson's " Municipal Cor^
porations Act, 1882" (8th ed.), §§ 144,
197. The non-payment of an illegal
rate does not disqualify the party.
Reg. V. Mayor &c. of New Windsor,
7 Q. B. 908. As to the payments of
compositions for poor-rate under lo-
cal acts, see Regina v. Mayor &c. of
Kidderminster, 20 L. J. Q. B. 281.
sSeeFlatcher v. Boodle, 18 C.B.
(N. S.) 152.
§§ 123, 124.J MKMBEESHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY. 13S
then last preceding fifth of January." Every person so qual-
ified shall be entitled to be enrolled as a burgess, unless he
(a) " Is an alien ; or (J) Has within the twelve months afore-
said received union or parochial relief or other alms ; or (e) Is
disentitled under any act of parliament." '
§ 123. Qualifications for membership in American mu-
nicipal corporations. — The question whether a person is a
member of a public corporation, strict or qitasi, is in this
country determined by the residence of the person in ques-
tion. If he lives within the limits of the corporation he is
considered a member of the corporation ; if he lives without
those limits he is not a member. The decision of the question
is not affected by the wishes either of the person or of the
corporation. In the case of private corporations the question is
of course decided in an entirely different manner. One who
holds stock in the corporation is considered a member.*
§ 124. Citizenship in England. — Natural citizenship is cre-
ated in England by birth within the allegiance of the king.
By a statute of the reign of Edward III.' it was provided that
children " which henceforth shall be born out of ligeance of
the king, whose fathers and mothers at the time of their birth
be and shall be at the faith and ligeance of the king of Eng-
land, shall have and enjoy the same benefit and advantage,
to have and bear inheritance within the same ligeance as the
other inheritors aforesaid in time to come, so also that the
mothers of such children passed the sea by the license and will
of their husbands." The question whether this statute was
1 Municipal Corporations Act of 346, Judge Morgan says : — " When a
1883, § 9. man moves into a town he becomes
2 0akes v. Hill, 10 Pick. 833,346; a citizen there (if possessed of the
Overseers of Poor &c v. Sears, 23 requisite qualifications aa to age, etc..
Pick. 133, 130. "In all guas^-corpo- and if he remains the requisite
rations, as cities, towns, parishes, length of time), whatever may be
school districts, membership is con- the desire of himself or the town.''
stituted by living within certain See, also, Dillon on Munic. Corp.
limits." Per Shaw, C. J., in Over- (4th ed.), chaps. II and III; People U
seers of Poor &c. v. Sears, 33 Pick. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198; s. a, 21 Am.
133, 130; Hill v. Boston (1877), 133 Eep. 405.
Mass. 344, 356; S. C, 23 Am. Eep. 3 25 Edw. IIL, oh. a
333. In Oakes v. Hill, 10 Pick. 333,
1 36 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP — LIABILITT. [§ 125.
introductory of a new rule or simply declaratory of the previous
law was considered in a "New Tork case, and the conclusion
was reached " that it is perhaps not easy to determine from
the statute itself, taken in connection with its history,
whether it was in truth aS enabling or a declaratory act." *
Judge Selden, however, continued his consideration of the
question by saying : — " Principles, however, have since the
statute been thoro,Ughly settled, which is my view and decis-
ion of the question. The subject ^f alienage was very elabo-
rately examinee! in Calvin's Case (7 Coke, 1; 6 James I.).
Aptiong the principles settled in that case and which have re.-
maiited unquestioned since tire these : — (1) That natural alle-
^ance does not depend upon locality or place; that it is
purely mental in its nature, and cannot, therefore, be confined
within any certain boundaries ; or, to use the language of
Coke, that ' ligeance, and faith and truth, which are her mem-
bers and parts, are qualities of the mind and soul of man, and
cannot be circumscribed within the predicament of uhi.' . (Page
76.) (2) That it is not sufficient, in a plea of alienage, to aver that
the plaintiff was born out of the kingdom or out of the jurisdic-
tion of the king, but every such plea must aver that the plaint-
iff is not of the allegiance of the king; and judgment was
given for the plaintiff in (!)alvin's Case ' for that the plea in
this case doth not refer faith or liegeance to the king indefi-
nitely and generally, but limiteth and restraineth' faith and
liegeance to the kingdom.' (Id., p. 10a.) (3) That allegiance
and protection («'. e., the rights and the duties of citizenship)
are reciprocal, the one being the consideration for the other.
(Id., p. 6a.) (4) That a British subject, although residing
abroad, still owes allegiance to the king of England." *
§ 125. The same subject continned. — From his considera-
tion of the cases and authorities the learned judge finally
reaches the conclusion " that the children of English parents,
iLudlam v. Ludlam (1863), 36 Law, 4; Halleck on Int. Law, ch.
N. Y. 356, 363. 29, § 4, p. 698 ; Ludlam v. Ludlam,
2 Brooke's Afjridgment, title Den- 26 N. Y. 356, 364. The learned judge
izen, 21 ; Rex v. Eaton, Litt. 28 ; Col- continued his collation and analogies
lingwood V. Pace, 1 Vent. 413, 422 ; of authorities, referring to Cobble-
1 Jenk. Cent, case 2; Bacon v. dike's Case, cited in Calvin's Case,
Bacon, Cro. Car. 601 ; 2 Phil, on Int. p. 9&.
§126.] MEMBEESHIP AND CITIZENSHIP — -LIABILITY. 137
though born abroad, are nevertheless regarded by the common
law as natura,l-born citizens of England." He continues : —
" Now upon what ground can allegiance in such cases be
claimed? If natural allegiance or allegiance by birth does not
depend upon boundaries or place, as Calvin's Case asserts,
upon what does it depend? There can be but one answer to
the question. It is impossible to suggest any other ground
for the obligation than that of parentage. It must, I appre-
hend, be transmitted from the parents to the child or it could
not exist. This being then the nature of permanent alle-
giance, it follows that the king of England may properly claim
allegiance from the children of his subjects wherever born.
If, then, the child of English parents, though born abroad, is,
mibdiinis natus, a born subject of the king, he must also be a
born citizen of the kingdom. Allegiance and citizenship are,
as we have seen, correlative terms, the one being the consid-
eration of the other. So long, therefore, as the parents con-
tinue to owe allegiance to the crown of England, so long will
their children, by the rules of the common law, whether born
within or without the kingdom, owe similar allegiance, and
be entitled to the corresponding rights of citizenship." ^
§ 126. Citizenship in the United States. — There are in the
United States two classes of citizens — natural and naturalized
citizens. Citizenship of the former class is created by the
birth of the citizen within the jurisdiction of the United States.
Citizenship of the latter class is created by the performance of
certain requirements defined by statute. The naturalized
citizen is from the time of naturalization a full-fledged citizen,
entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a natural
citizen, saving certain disabilities which relate back to the
period during which he was an alien. It is conceded learn-
ing that birth within the jurisdiction of the United States
creates natural citizenship whether the parents of the citizen
are aliens or citizens." To this rule the aboriginal Indians of
this country furnish an exception that is, however, only appar-
1 Ludlam v. Ludlam, 36 N. Y. 356, 905. In the latter case a child bom
365. in the United States of alien Chinese
2 Lynch v. Clark, 1 Sandf. Ch. 584 ; parents was declared to be an Ameri-
Jn re Look Tin Sing, 21 Fed. Rep. can citizen. See g 133, infra.
138 MEMBERSHIP AND OITIZBKSHIP LIABILITY. [§§ 127, 128.
ent. A child of Indian parents born in. this country is not
considered to have been born within the jurisdiction of the
United States, and is not therefore a citizen.'
§ 127. Natural citizens. — Where a person is born within
the jurisdiction of the United States he is a natural citizen.'
Likewise a person born in a foreign country and out of the
jurisdiction of the United States is a citizen of the United
States if at the time of his biJth his father was a citizen
thereof."
§ 128. The same subject continued. — "Where a citizen of
the United States marries an alien woman who might be nat-
uralized, she becomes a citizen ; * and if the husband is nat-
uralized after marriage, the wife becomes a citizen.' In cases
where a citizen leaves this country and either takes with him
a son born in the United States or lias one born abroad, and
either the father or son elects to and does become a subject
of the country to which they have emigrated, they both be-
come aliens, and neither one can inherit real property in the
United States."
' See infra, § 133. to indicate an intention of a perma-
^ Fourteenth Amendment to the nent change of domicile, otherwise
Federal Constitution ; In re Look Lin than as before stated, his child, born
Sing, 21 Fed. Eep. 905 ; S. a, 17 Chi- to him in Peru of a wife a native
cago Leg. News, 57 ; Lynch v. Clarke, of that country, is a citizen of the
1 Sandf. Ch. 584, 639. United States. Ludlam «. Ludlam,
3 U. S. Rev. Stat, § 1993; Ludlam 26 N. Y. 356.
V. Ludlam, 26 N. Y. 356 ; Oldtown v. * U. S. Rev. Stat, § 1996.
Bangor, 58 Me. 353. In the absence » 10 U. S. Stat at Large, p! 604, § 2 ;
of any law of the United States gov- Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496 ; Burton
erning the particular case, the ques- v. Burton, 1 Keyes (N. Y.X 559 ; White
tion whether one bom out of the v. White, 2 Met (Ky.) 185.
United States is a citizen is to be de- * Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Peters, 243 ;
termined by the common law' as it Jackson v. White, 20 Johns. 313,
existed, irrespective of English stat- Orser v. Hoag, 3 Hill, 79 ; Kilham v.
utes, at Jthe adoption of the federal Ward, 2 Mass. 336. The division of
constitution. It was accordingly an empire works no forfeiture of pre-
held that where a citizen of the viously vested property rights. Kelly
United States went to Peru at the v. Harrison, 2 Johns. Cas. 29 ; Jack-
age of eighteen years with the inten- son v. Lunn, 3 Johns. Cas. 109. A
tion of indefinite continuance there person born in the United States who
for the purpose of trading, but took left the country before the deolara-
no steps to be naturalized in Peru or tion of independence and never re-
§ 129.]
MEMBEESHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY.
139
§ 129. Naturalized citizens.— In the United States citizen-
ship may be acquired by naturalization.' Under the United
States statutes an applicant for admission to citizenship must
possess certain qualifications and comply with certain rules
before he is entitled to admission to citizenship.*
turned became thereby an alien, and
incapable of subsequently taking
lands by descent Inglis v. Sailors'
Snug Harbor, 3 Peters, 131. See, also,
Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cr. 603 ; Jackson
V. Burns, 3 Binn. 75 ; Orr v, Hodgson,
4 Wheat 453 ; Blight v. Rochester, 7
Wheat 535.
1 Congress controls exclusively the
rules -which , govern naturalization.
Houston V. Moore, 5 Wheat 1. As
to the time when the power of nat-
uralization takes effect, see Chirac v.
Chirac, 3 Wheat 1 ; United States v.
Villato, 2 Dallas, 370.
3 These requirements are defined
by statute as follows: — (1) "Any
alien, except Chinese, may be nat-
uralized and become a citizen of the
United States on the following con-
ditions : — The applicant shall de-
clare on oath or affirmation before
some State court of record, having
a seal and clerk, and having com-
mon-law jurisdiction, or before a
United States district or circuit
court, or before a clerk of any of the
said courts, two years at least before
his admission, that it is his intention
to become a citizen of the United
States, and to renounce forever his
allegiance to his own sovereignty,
which must be in peace with the
United States at the time. (2) At
his final admission to citizenship he
shall declare on oath or affirmation
before some of the courts aforesaid
that h^ will support the United States
constitution, and that he renounces
all allegiance to any foreign sov-
ereign, and especially to his own,
whereof he was subject before his
application for citizenship. (3) He
must prove by at least two witnesses
who are citizens that hejias resided
within the United States five years ;
at least and within the State or Ter-
ritory where the court is located at
least one year ; that during that time
he has been a good moral person,
attached to the principles of this
government, and is well disposed in
this regard. (4) He must renounce
all titles to nobility, if he has any.
(5) Any alien (except a Chinese) who
is a minor, who shall have refolded
within the United States three years
next preceding his arriving at his
majority, and who shall continue to
reside therein at the time of making
application for citizenship, may,
after reaching his majority, and hav-
ing resided in the United States at
least five years, including the three
years of his minority, be given citi-
zenship without any preliminary dec-
laration. (6) Any alien (except a
Chinese) who is twenty-one years of
age or over, enlisting in the armies
of the United States, either in the
regular or volunteer, and who shall
be honorably discharged therefrom,
can be admitted to citizenship with-
out the preliminary declaration of
his intentions, but he must prove one
year's residence in the United States.
(7) The children of parents duly nat-
uralized, being under the age of
twenty-one years at the time of such
naturalization, shall, if residing in
the United States, be considered as
citizens. (8) If an alien who shall
have declared his intentions shall die
before he is actually naturalized, his
140
MEMBEKSHIP AND OITIZBNSHIP -r- LIABILITT.
[§§ 130, 131.
§ 130. The same subject continued.— Congress has made
special provisions by which alien seamen may become natural-
ized citizens. Under the act he must first declare his intention
of becoming a citizen before the proper court, and then serve
three years on a United States merchant vessel.^ A clerk has
no power to admit a person to citizenship,, and the admission
must be granted by the court, as it is a judicial act.' But the
applicant may iriake his declaration of intention to become a
citizen before the recording officer of a court of record, and
it is properly receivable by the plerk, as he, acts in that capac-
ity ministerially and not judiciailly.'
§ 131. Right of naturalized citizens to hold and receive
lands. — Where a person becomes naturalized he has the same
right as a natural-born citizen to hold, inherit and receive
lands, but the capacity to take by descent must exist at the
time the descent happens.* Where an alien, having acquired
widow and children shall be consid-
ered citizen^ on taking the oath pre-
scribed by law. (9) No alien who
shall be a citizen, denizen or subject
of any country, State or sovereign
with whom the United States shall
be at war at the time of bis applica-
tion shall be then admitted to be a
citizen of the United States. U, S.
Rev. Stat, tit 30.
1 Act of Congress of 1872, § 29 ; 17
Stat at Large, 268.
2 McCarty v. Marsh, 1 Seld. (5 N. Y.)
263; The Acorn, 2 Abb. (U. S.)434;
Caark's Case, 18 Barb. 444.
3 Butterworth's Case, 1 Woodb. &
M. C. C. 323 ; State v. Whittemore,
50 N. H. 245 ; Eso parte Cregg, 2 Cur-
tis C. C. 98. As to naturalization of
a married woman without her hus-
band's consent, see Priest v. Cum-
mings, 16 Wend. 617. The necessary
witnesses must be present in court
and examined there openly and pub-
licly, and affidavits taken outside of
the court as to the applicant's char-
acter and residence are not admissi-
ble. In re , An Alien, 7 Hill, 137.
Where a father becomes naturalized,
and at that time has a son residing
in the United States, but who is a
minor, the son becomes a citizen by
reason of his father's naturalization.
State V. Penny, 10 Ark. 621. For the
privileges and immunities to which a
naturalized person is entitled, see
2 Kent's Commentaries, 66.
♦People V. Conklin, 3 Hill, 67;
Heeney V. Trustees &c., 33 Barb. 360;
Vaux V. Nesbit 1 MoCord Ch. (S. C.)
372. M., an American citizen, died
seized of Certain lands' in 1779, leav-
ing no lawful issue and no blood rel-
atives, save such as were aliens. By
his will he devised all his real estate
to his wife, also an American citizen,
to hold during her life, remainder to
his two sisters and seven nephews
and nieces, as tenants in common, in
fee ; empowering his executors to sell
the lands after his wife's death, and
divide the proceeds equally among
the devisees in remainder. The will
further provided that in case any of
the devisees in remainder died, before
such division, leaving lawful issue.
§ 132.]
MBMBEKSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP UABILITY.
141
lands by purchase, is afterward naturalized before office founds
bis title becomes thereby confirmed so that he may hold even
Otherwise where his claim is by descent.*
as against the State.
§ 132. The status of Chinese before the law The Chi-
nese form an exception to our naturalization la^s. A Chinese
person, not born in this country, cannot become a citizen of
the United States by naturalization.' A Chinese, however, if
born within the limits of this country, even though of alien
parents, is a citizen of the TJnited States and of the State
wherein he resides. This question was decided by Justice
Field in a recent case.' The learned judge held that birth
within the jurisdiction of the United States conferred citizen-
ship ; that this rule was in force, except as to Africans and
the latter should take the share to
which the parents, if living, would
have been entitled. The devisees in
remainder all died aliens prior to
September, 1828, one of them (a
nephew) leaving a son named E. E.,
who became naturalized September 3,
1838. The widow died in 1832. In
ejectment by the people claiming the
lands devised on the ground of their
having escheated to the State, it was
held that E. E. took no interest in
them, either as devisee or heir, which
could avail him as against the plaint-
iffs, and that the latter were entitled
to recover. The fee was not in abey-
ance during the life of the widow,
but the remainder vested in interest
on the death of the testator; and
though the devisees in remainder
died before they were entitled to the
possession, their estate would have
descended had they left heirs capable
of inheriting. The People v. Conklin,
3 Hill, 66. Judge Bronson in his opin-
ion says: — "Although the devisees
in remainder were aliens, they could
take lands by purchase, which in-
cludes a title by devise and any other
form of acquiring the land by pur-
chase ; " and cites as supporting his
view, Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cr. 603,
619 ; Vaux v. Nesbit, 1 McCord, Ch.
(S. C.) 352 ; 1 Pow. Dev., 259 (ed. 1838).
The learned judge further says: —
" The statute of 1830 will not help E. E.
because it was passed since the death
of M. ; " and cites Jackson v. Green, 7
Wend. 333 ; Jackson v. Fitzsimmons,
10 Wend. 9. And see People v. Irvin,
31 Wend. 128.
1 People V. Conklin, 3 Hill, 66. See.
also, Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cr. 603;
Bradstreet v. Supervisors, 13 Wend.
546 ; Lareau v. Davignon, 5 Abb. Pr.
(N. S.) 367; Avering v. Russell, 32
Barb. 263; Munro v. Merchant, 28
N. Y. 9 ; Wadsworth v. Wadsworth,
12 N. Y. 376; Scanlan v. Wright, 13
Pick. 528 ; Wilbur v. Tobey, 16 Pick.
179; Foss v. Crisp, 20 Pick. 121;
Smith V. Zanor, 4 Ala. 99. The nat-
uralization must be complete. Mc-
Daniel v. Richards, 1 McCord (S. C),
187.
2 In re Ah Yup, 5 Sawyer C. C. 155.
See, also, the United States statutes
of 1882 and 1884, restricting Chinese
immigration.
8 Jn re Look Tin Sing, 21 Fed. Rep.
905.
142 MEMBERSHIP i^JSTD CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY. [§133.
•their descendants, before the passage of the fourteenth amend-
ment, which was intended to abolish that exception.^ In this
respect the Chinese share that privilege which our laws be-
stow on all persons born within our dominion, except in the
case of aboriginals of our country.
§ 133. The statas of American Indians before the law. —
The status of American Indians in this country is anomalous.
Although born within the limits^of the United States and
subject to taxation and the other burdens of citizenship, they
are yet debarred from enjoying any of its privileges. They
are not considered to be within the fourteenth amendment of
the federal constitution, which provides that " all persons born
and naturalized in the United States and subject to the juris-
diction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside." * The Indian tribes are regarded
as alien peoples living within our boundaries, but not of us.
And it is also held that the consent of the United States is
necessary in order to enable the members of any tribe to be-
come citizens of the United States by naturalization. They
cannot become naturalized citizens of their own motion with-
ilt is to be noted, however, that was not subject to the jurisdiction of
the children of Chinese ambassadors the United States within the mean-
er persons otherwise employed in ing of the fourteenth amendment,
the service of the Chinese govern- and was not therefore a citizen of
ment are not citizens, though bom in the United States. It was held that
this country. This results from the an Indian is a resident alien in a con-
familiar rule that the residence of dition similar to that of the children
an ambassador is considered a part of foreign ministers born in this
of his own country. In re Look Tin country ; that the Indian owes alle-
Sing, 81 Fed. Eep. 905. giance to his tribe and not to our
2 Elk tt, Wilkins, 113 U. S. 94. Here government, and that he can become
an Indian claimed the right to vote a citizen only by naturalization or
under the clause of the fourteenth by treaty. From this opinion Jus-
amendment quoted in the text, and tice Harlan and Justice Woods dis-
also under the fifteenth amendment, sented, contending that the Indian
that " the right of citizens of the was within the purview of the four-
United States to vote shall not be teenth and fifteenth amendments,
denied or abridged by the United See, also, Crow Dog's Case, 109 U. S.
States or by any State on account of 556 ; Cherokees v. Georgia, 5 Peters, 1 ;
race, color or previous condition of New York Indians' Case, 5 Wall. 761 ;
servitude."* The court denied his Hastings u. Farmer, 4 N. Y. 293 ; fells
right to vote on the ground that he v. Webquish, 129 Mass. 469.
134.]
MEMBERSHIP AUD CITIZENSHIP LIABIUTT.
143
out such consentj which must be expressed by treaty or stat-
ute.*
§ 134. Privileges and immunities of citizens. — Although
a full discussion of the rights, privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States, as secured by the federal consti-
tution and the constitutions of the several States, and defined
by judicial interpretation of those constitutional provisions, is
obviously beyond the scope and plan of this work, it will be
well to indicate briefly the fundamental principles upon which
these rights, privileges and immunities depend. The citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the several States.' "Although the pre-
1 Wilson V. Wall, 6 Wall. 83, and
cases cited In preceding note.
2 Const of United States, art 4, §2.
Judge Washington discusses this pro-
vision as follows: — "What are the
privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several States? We feel no
hesitation in confining these expres-
sions to those privileges and immu-
nities which are in their nature
fundamental, which belong of right
to the citizens of all free govern-
ments, and which have at all times
been enjoyed by the citizens of the
several States which compose this
Union, from the time of their be-
coming free, independent and sover-
eign. What these fundamental prin-
ciples are, it would perhaps be more
tedious than difficult to enumerate.
They may, however, be all compre-
hended under the following general
heads: — Protection by the govern-
ment, the enjoyment of life and lib-
erty, with the right to acquire and
possess property of every kind, and
to pursue and obtain happiness and
safety, subject, nevertheless, to such
restraints as the government may
justly prescribe for the general good
of the whole. The right of a citizen
of one State to pass through or to re-
sale in any other State, for purposes
of trade, agriculture, professional pur-
suits, or otherwise ; to claim the ben-
efit of the writ of habeas corpus; to
institute and maintain actions of
every kind in the courts of the State ;
to take, hold and dispose of propertj',
either real or personal; and an ex-
emption from higher taxes or impo-
sitions than are paid by the citizens
of the other State, — may be men-
tioned as some of the particular priv-
ileges and immunities of citizens
which are clearly embraced by the
general description of privileges
deemed to be fundamental ; to which
may be added the elective franchise,
as regulated and established by the
laws or constitution of the State in
which it is to be exercised. These,
and many others which might be
mentioned, are, strictly speaking,
privileges and immunities, and the
enjoyment of them by the citizens of
each State in every other State was
manifestly calculated (to use the ex-
pression of the preamble of the cor-
responding provision in the old arti-
cles of confederation) ' the better to
secure and perpetuate mutual friend-
ship and intercourse among the peo-
ple of the different States of the
Union.' " Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash.
C. C. 380. The Supreme Court pre-
144
MEMBEKSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP-
■ LIABILITY.
[§^135.
cise meaning' of ' privileges and immunities ' is not very con-
clusively settled as yet, it appears to be conceded that the
constitution secures in each State to the citizens of all other
States the right to remove to and carry on business therein;
the right, by the usual modes, to acquire and hold property,
and to protect and defend the same in law ; the right to the
usual remedies for the collection of debts and the enforcement
of other personal rights ; and the right to be exempt in prop-
erty and person from taxes or burdens which the property or
persons of citizens of the same State are not subject to." '
§ 135. The same subject continued.— No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States, or deprive any per-
son of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws.* But it is an undoubted fact that many
fers to decide each case as it comes
up, and will not define and describe
those privileges in a general classifi-
cation. Conner v. Elliott, 18 How.
591 ; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S.
391 ; Ward v. Maryland, 13 Wall. 418.
See, also. United States v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U. S. 543 ; Kimmish v. Ball,
139 U. S. 317 ; Lemmon v. People, 30
N. T. 563; People v. Imlay, 30 Barb.
68; Robinson v. Oceanic S. N. Co.,
113 N. Y. 315 ; Haney v. Marshall, 9
Md. 194 ; Bliss' Petition, 63 N. H. 185 ;
State V. Lancaster, 8 N. H. 367 ; State
V. Fosdick, 31 La. Ann. 484 ; State v.
Oilman, 10 S. E. Rep. 383 ; Crandall
V. State, 10 Conn. 340 ; State v. Med-
bury, 3 R. L 138 ; People v. Thurber,
13 111. 544 ; Cincinnati Health Asso-
ciation V. Rosenthal, 55 111. 85 ; Jef-
fersonville &c. R. Co. v. Hendricks,
41 Ind. 48 ; People v. Phippin (Mich.),
37 N. W. Rep. 888 ; FireDept v. Hel-
fenstein, 16 Wis. 136; People v. Cole-
man, 4 Cal. 46 ; Bradwell v. State, 16
Wall. 130; Bartmeyer v. Iowa, 18
Wall. 139 ; Smith v. Wright, 3 E. D.
Smith, 441 ; Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt.
336; Campbell v. Morris, 3 Har. &
McH. 554; Slaughter v. Common-
wealth, 13 Gratt 767; Common-
wealth V. Towles, 5 Leigh, 743;
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall 36.
1 Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.) 490,
citing Corfleld v. Coryell, 4 Wash.
380 ; Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & MoH.
554 ; Crandall V. State, 10 Conn. 339 ;
Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen,
368.
2 Const of United States, 14th
Amendment As laid down by Judge
Cooley : — " The line of distinction be-
tween the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States and
those of citizens of the several States
must be traced along the boundaries
of their respective spheres of action,
and the two classes must be as differ-
ent in their nature as are the func-
tions of the respective governments.
A citizen of the United States, as
such, has the right to participate in
foreign and interstate commerce, to
have the benefit of the postal laws,
to make use in common with others
of the navigable waters of the United
§ 13a.]
MEMBEKSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP — LIABILITY,
145
rights and privileges depend upon actual residence. And a
statute which allows process by attachment against a non-
resident debtor, even though such process is not admissible
against a resident, does not violate the constitutional provis-
ions.'
§ 136. Bights of citizens. — The fourteenth amendment to
the constitution has several objects, and among others it de--
States, and to pass from State to
State, and into foreign countries, be-
ci^use over all these subjects the ju-
risdiction of the United States ex-
tends, and they are covered by its
laws. Story on Const (4th ed.), § 1937.
These, therefore, are among the priv-
ileges of citizens of the United States.
So every citizen may petition the
federal authorities which are set over
him in respect to any mattor of pub-
lic concern ; may examine the public
records of the federal jurisdiction;
may visit the seat of government
without being subjected to the pay-
ment of a tax for the privilege
(Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35) ; may
be purchaser of the public lands on
the same terms with others; may
participate in the government if he
comes within the condition of suf-
frage, and may demand the care and
protection of the United States when
on the high seas or within the juris-
diction of a foreign government.
Slaughter-House Cases. 16 Wall. 30.
The privileges suggest the immuni-
ties. Wherever it is the duty of the
United States to give protection to a
citizen against any harm, inconven-
ience or deprivation, the citizen is
entitled to an immunity wliich per-
tains to federal citizenship. One very
plain and unquestionable immunity
is exemption from ary tax, burden
or imposition under state laws, as a
condition to the enjoyment of any
right or privilege under the laws of
the United States. A State, there-
10
fore, cannot require one to pay a tax
as importer, under the laws of con-
gress, of foreign merchandise (Ward
V. Maryland, 12 Wall. 163) ; nor im-
pose a tax upon travelers passing by
public conveyances out of the State
(Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35) ; nor
impose conditions to the right of cit-
izens of other States to sue its citi-
zens in the federal courts. Insurance
Co. V. Morse, 20 Wall. 445. These in-
stances sufficiently indicate the gen-
eral rule. Whatever one may claim
as of right under the constitution
and laws of the United States by
virtue of its citizenship is a pi'ivilege
of a citizen of the United States.
Whatever the constitution and laws
of the United States entitle him to
exemption from, he may claim an
immunity in respect to. Slaughter-
House Cases, 16 WalL 36. And such
a right or privilege is abridged
whenever the State law interferes
with any legitimate operation of the
federal authority which concerns bis
interest, whether it be an authority
actively exerted, or resting only in
the express or implied command or
assurance of the federal constitution
or laws." Cooley, Principles of Const.
Law, 246. See United States v. Reese,
92 U. S. 214; United States v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U. S. 542 ; Hall v. D&Cuir,
95 U. S'. 485 ; Kirkland v. Hotchkiss,
100 U. S. 491.
1 State V. Medbury, 8 E. I. 138;
Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 544.
146
MEMBERSHIP AND OTTIZENSHIP — LIABILITV.
[§136.
Clares the inviolability of the public debt of the United States,
and forbids the United States or any other State assnming or
paying any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection
or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the
loss or emancipation of any slave. It also disqualiiies from
holding federal or State offices certain persons who shall have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States
or given aid or comfort to the engmies thereof.^ This amend-
ment does not profess to' secure the benefit of the same laws
and the same remedies to all persons in the United States.
But great diversities may and do exist in these respects in
different States. All that a person can demand under the
last clause of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment is that
he shall have the same protection under the laws as is given
« Cpoley's Const Lioi. (6th ed.) 14.
fTudge Field says of this amend-
ment : — " That amendment was un-
doubtedly proposed for the purpose
of fully protecting the newly-made
citizens of the African race in the
enjoyment of their freedom, and to
prevent discriminating State legisla-
^tion against them. The generality
of the language used necessarily ex-
tends its provisions to all persons of
eveiy race and color. Previously to
its adoption the Civil Rights Act had
been passed, which declared that citi-
zens of the "United States of every
race and color, without regard to
any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, should have
the same rights in every State and
Territory to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties and give
evidence, to inherit^ purchase, lease,
sell, own and convey real and per-
sonal property, and to full and equal
jshenefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and prop-
erty, as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and should be subject to like punish-
-ment, pains and penalties, and to
none other. The validity of this act
was questioned in many quartera,
and complaints were made that, not-
withstanding the abolition of slavery
and involuntary servitude, the freed-
men were in some portions of the
country subjected to disabilities from
which others were exempt There
wers also complaints of the existence
in certain sections of the southern
States of a feeling of enmity grow-
ing out of the collisions of the war
towards citizens of the north.
Whether these complaints had any
just foundation is immaterial ; they
were believed by many to be well
f Sunded ; and to prevent any possible
legislation hostile to any class from
the causes mentioned, and to obviate
objections to legislation -similar to
that embodied in the Civil Rights
Act, the fourteenth amendment was
adopted. This is manifest from the
discussions in congress with refer-
ence to it There was no diversity
of opinion as to its object between
those who favored and those who
opposed its adoption." San Mateo
County V. Southern Pacific R. Co., 13
Fed. Rep. 732.
§ 137.] MEMBEESHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY. 147
to other classes and persons under like circumstances in the
same place.'
§ 137. The same subject continued.— On this subject
Judge Strong says : — " A State acts by its legislative, its exec-
utive or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way.
The constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no
agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its
powers are executed, shall deny Jo any person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection of its laws. Whoever by virtue
of public position under a State government deprives aiiother
of property, life or liberty without due process of law, or de-
nies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates
the constitutional inhibition ; and as he acts in the name and
for the State, and is clothed with the State's authority, his
act is that of the State. This must be so, or the constitutional
prohibition has no meaning." ^ It is declared by the fifteenth
amendment to the constitution of the United States that the
rights of citizens of the United States shall not be abridged or
denied by any State, or by the United States, on account of
previous condition of servitude, color or race.'
1 Hayes v. Missouri, ISO U. S. 68; in the amendment." Civil Rights
Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 33. For Cases, 109 U. S. 3. On this see, also,
taxation of railroads as a class, see Baldwin v. Franks, 130 U. S. 678 ;
Kentucky R R. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629.
831. 3 As to these amendments, see
2 Esc parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339. Story on Const (4th ed.), chs. 46, 47,
This view was approved in Neal v. 48, and ap}:endix to vol. II. Women
Delaware, 103 XT. S. 370, 397. The are not entitled to vote by reason of
fourteenth amendment does not, says the new amendments. Minor v. Hap-
Judge Bradley, " invest congress with peraett, SI Wall. 163; Brad well v.
power to legislate upon subjects State. 16 Wall. 130. See, also, note 1
which are within the domain of State in Cooley's Const Lim, (6th ed.) 15.
legislation, but to provide modes of The fourteenth amendment gave col-
, relief against State legislation or ored persons the right to be protected
State actions of the kind referred to. from unfriendly legislation solely on
It does not authorize congress to ere- account of their color, the rights of
ate a code of municipal lav/ for the citizenship, and exemption from leg-
regulation of private rights ; but to islation which might lessen their
provide modes of redress against the rights, tend to reduce them to the
operation of State laws and the ac- condition of a subject race, or lower
tion of State officers, executive and them in civic society. Ex parte
judicial, when theso are subversive Virginia, lOO V. S. 870; Virginia v.
of the fundamental rights specified Rives, lOOU. S.313; Strauderu Webt
148 MKMBEESUIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITT. [§ 138.
§ 13S. Personal liability of members of the corporation.
At common law and under the statutes of all our States
save those of N^ew England, the members of municipal corpo-
rations are not personally liable for the debts of the munici-
pality. As is said by Mr. Justice Field in the case in which
the creditors of the city of Memphis endeavored to satisfy the
debts of the corporation out of the private property of its cit-
izens:— "In no State of the Union outside of New England
does the doctrine obtain that the private property of individ-
uals within the limits of a municipal corporation can be
reached by its creditors and subjected to the payment of their
demands. In Massachusetts and Connecticut, and perhaps in
other States in New England, the individual liability of the
inhabitants of towns, parishes and cities for the debts of the
latter is maintained, and executions upon judgments issued
against them can be enforced against the private property of
the inhabitants. But this doctrine is admitted by the courts
of those States to be peculiar to their jurisprudence, and an
exception to the rule elsewhere prevailing. Elsewhere the
private property of the inhabitants of a municipal body can-
not be subjected to the payment of its debts except by way
of taxation, but taxes, as we have already said, can only be
levied by legislative authority. The power of taxation is not
one of the functions of the judiciary; and whatever authority
the States may, under their constitutions, confer upon special
tribunals of their own, the federal courts cannot by reason of
it take any additional powers which are not judicial." In Eees
V. Watertown,^ from which we have already quoted, the power
asserted by the decree was claimed by counsel but was re-
jected by the court. "Assume," said the court, " that the
plaintiff is entitled to the payment of his judgment and that
the defendant neglects its duty in refusing to raise the
amount by taxation, it does not follow that the court may
order the amount to be made from the private estate of one
of its citizens. This summary proceeding would involve a vio-
lation of the rights of the latter. He has never been heard
in court. He has had no opportunity to establish a defense to
the debt itself, or, if the judgment is valid, that such exemp-
Virginia, 100 U. a 813 ; Neal v. Dela- » 19 Wall. 116.
ware, 103 U. S. 37a
§§ 139, 140.] MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP — LIABILITY. 149
tions may be perpetual in their duration, and that they are, in
some cases, beyond legislative interference. The proceeding
supposed would violate the fundamental principle contained
in chapter twenty-ninth of Magna Charta, and embodied in
the constitution of the United States, that no man shall be de-
prived of his property without due process of law ; that is, he
must be served with notice of the proceeding and have a day
in court to make his defense." '
§ 139. The same subject continned — Russell v. The Men
of Devon. — This doctrine that the members of a municipal
corporation are not personally liable for its debts is of early
authority. In the famous English case of Eussell v. The Men
of Devon, where the plaintiff brought suit against the inhab-
itants of the county of Devon for negligence on the part of
the county for allowing a public bridge to remain in a danger-
ous condition, through which the plaintiff sustained injury, it
was decided that, as the county possessed no public fund out
of which the judgment, if recovered, could be satisfied, the ac-
tion could not be maintained. The court refused to sanction
the doctrine of the personal liability of the inhabitants of the
county, on the ground that, if that doctrine were enforced,
the jiidgment might be satisfied out of the private property
of one or more of the inhabitants, and that the persons whose
property had been applied in satisfaction of the judgment
would have no Remedy over against the other inhabitants ex-
cept by an impracticable multiplicity of actions.^ The doc-
trine of this case has been followed in the American cases ;
and, as has been said, the members of a municipal corporation
are personally liable for its debts nowhere in this country out-
side of New England.'
§ 140. Personal liability of members of public quasi-cor-
porations in New England. — By a curious and unique custom
• Eees w. Watertown, 19 Wall. 116, Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 116;
133. Symonds v. Clay County, 71 111. 355 ;
2 Russell V. The Men of Devon, 3 North Lebanon v. Arnold, 47 Pa. St.
Term Rep. 667. 488; Flori v. St. Louis, 69 Mo. 341 ;
' Cooley's Const Lim. 300 ; 1 Dil- Kincaid v. Hardin County, 53 Iowa,
lononMuni(3.Corp.(4thed.),§963,n.; 430; Miller v. Mc Williams, 50 Ala.
Merriwether v. Garrett, 103 U. S. 472 ; 427.
150 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY. [§ 141.
the members of public j^wasi-corporations in New England
are held to be personally liable ior the debts of the fcorpora-
tion ; and a judgment obtained against the 'public quastAxtt'
poration can be satisfied out of the private property of any of
its members.' The reason for this peculiar practice seems to
have been that judgments against these quasi-oorpotalions
could not be satisfied out of any corporate fund, as no such
fund existed, and therefore it was necessary to resort to the
private property of the members of the corporation. This
private property could be reached either by taxation or exe-
cution, and in the Kew England States the inconvenient and
unjust system of levying execution on private property in
order to satisfy judgments against the corporation has been
adopted.*
§ 141i The same>sulbject continued.— In the other States
of the Union judgments rendered against public quasi-oorpo-
rati^ns which have no corporate fund out of which to satisfy
judgments are satisfied by taxation of the members of the
corporation instead of by execution. As is said by Judge
Cooley : — " So far as this rule (*'. e., that members of a public
qtiasi-corpoT&tion are personally liable for its debts) rests
upon the reason that these organizations have no common
fund, and that no other mode exists by which demands against
them can be enforced, it cannot be considered applicable in
those States where express provision is made by law for com-
pulsory taxation to satisfy any judgment recovered against
1 Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 368 ; 19 Conn. 331 ; Cooley's Const Lim.
Merchants' Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick. 297. In Maine it has been decided
405 ; Kiddle v. The Proprietors &c., that a statute providing that judg-
7 Mass. 187; Brewer v. Ihliabitants ments against the town niaybecpl-
of New Gloucester, 14 Mass. 216; lected from the private property of
Chase i'. Merrimack Bank, 19 Pick, members of the town is not in con-
564 ; Gaskill v. Dudley, 6 Met 546 ; Hill travention of the constitutional pro-
v. Boston, 123 Mass. 344 ; s. C, 23 Am. hibition against the taking of private
Rep. 332 ; Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, property without due process of law.
1 GreenL (Me.) 361 ; Fernald v. Lewis, Evans v. Savage, 77 Me. 212.
6 Me. 264 ; Beers v. Botsford. 3 Day 2 gee infra, g 143, where the rea-
(Conn.), 159 ; Fuller v. Hampton, 5 sons for the custom ■ are fully set
Conn. 417 ; Atwater v. Woodrich, 6 forth in the opinion in Beardsley V.
Conn. 223; McCloud v. Selby, 10 Smith, 16 Conn. 368, 875.
Conn, 300; Union v. Crawford,
§142.] MEMBEESHIP AND CITIZENSHIP — LIABILITY. 151
the corporate body — the duty of levying the tax being im-
posed upon some oflBcer who may be compelled by mandamus
to perform it. Nor has any usage, so far as we are aware,
grown up in any of the newer States like that which had so
early an origin in New England. More just, convenient and
inexpensive modes of enforcing such demands have been es-
tablished by statute, and the rules concerning them are con-
formed more closely to those which are established for other
corporations." ^
§ 142. Beardsley v. Smith — (a) The reason for the New
England doctrine of personal liability of members. — In this
leading case ^ the learning relating to this peculiar custom of
New England is so clearly stated in the opinion by Judge
Church in the Supreme Court of Connecticut that we quote
his words at length : — " We know that the relation in which
members of municipal corporations in this State have been
supposed to stand in respect to the corporation itself as well
^s to its creditors has elsewhere been considered in some
respects peculiar. We have treated them for some purposes
as parties to corporate proceedings, and their individuality has
not been considered as merged in their corplorate connection.
Though corporators, they have been holden to be parties to
suits by or against the corporation and individually liable for
its debts. Heretofore this has not been doubted as to the in-
habitants of towns, located ecclesiastical societies and school
districts. Frojp a recurrence to the history of the law on this
subject, we are persuaded that the principle and usage here
recognized and followed in regard to the liability of the in-
habitants of towns and other communities were very early
adopted by our ancestors; and whether they were considered
as a part of the common law of England, or originated here as
necessary to our state of society, it is not very material to in-
quire. We think, however, that the principle is not of dorties-
tic origin, but to some extent was operative and ai>plied in
the mother countrj^, especially in cases where a statute fixed a
liability upon a municipality which had no corporate funds.
The same reason and necessity for the application of such a
principle and practice existed in both countries. Such corpo-
1 Cooley's Const Lim. 300, 301. « 6 Conn, 375.
152 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY. [§§ 143, 144.
rations are of a public and political character ; they exercise
a portion of the governing power of the State. Statutes im-
pose upon them important public duties. In the performance
of these they must contract debts and liabilities which can
only be discharged by a resort to individuals, either by taxa-
tion or execution. Taxation in most cases can only be the
result of the voluntary action of the corporation, dependent
upon the contingent will of a majority of the corporators and
upon their tardy and uncertain action. It affords no security
to creditors, because they have no power over it. Such rea-
sons as these probably operated with our ancestors in adopt-
ing the more efficient and certain remedy by execution which
has been resorted to in the present case, and which they had
seen to some extent in operation in the countries whose laws
were their inheritance. The plaintiff would apply to these
municipal or g^Ma«i-corporations the close principles applicable
to private corporations. But inasmuch as they are not,
strictly speaking, corporations, but only municipal bodies with-
out pecuniary funds, it will not do to apply to them literally
and in all cases the law of corporations." '
§143. (b) The doctrine in England.— The individual lia-
bility of the members of quasi-corporations, though not ex-
pressly adjudged, was very distinctly recognized in the case of
Eussell V. The Men of Devon.* It was alluded to as a known
principle in the case of The Attorney-General v. The City of
Exeter, applicable as well to cities as to hundreds and parishes.
That the rated inhabitants of an English parish are consid-
ered as the real parties to suits against the parish is now sup-
posed to be well settled ; and it was so decided in the cases of
The King v. The Inhabitants of Woburn and The King v. The
Inhabitants of Hardwick.' And in support of this principle
reference was made to the form of the proceedings, as that
they were " against the inhabitants," etc.
§ 144. (c) Doctrine in Massachusetts and Maine. — In the
State of Massachusetts, the individual responsibility of the
• Citing School District v. Wood, 13 Devon, 2 Term Rep. 667t See supra,
Mass. 193. § 1R».
2 Citing Russell v. The Men of >The King v. The Inhabitants of
§144] MEMBEESHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITY. 153
inhabitants of towns for town debts has long been estab-
lished. Distinguished counsel in the case of The Merchants'
Bank -w. Cook, referring to municipal bodies, says: — "For a
century past the practical construction of the bar has been
that, in an action by or against a corporation, a member of
the corporation is a party to the suit." ' In several other
cases in that State the same principle is repeated. In the case
of Riddle v. The Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on Mer-
rimack Eiver,^ Parsons, C. J., in an allusion to this private re-
sponsibility of corporators, remarks : — " And the sound reason
is that, having no corporate fund and no legal means of ob-
taining one, each corporator is liable to satisfy any judgment
obtained against the corporation." So in Brewer v. The Inhab-
itants of New Gloucester,' the court says : — " As the law pro-
vides that, when judgment is recovered against the inhabitants
of a town, execution may be levied upon the property of any
inhabitant, each inhabitant must be considered as a party."
In the case above referred to of The Merchants' Bank v. Cook,
Parker, C. J., expresses the opinion of the court upon this
point thus : — " Towns, parishes, precincts, etc., are but a col-
lection of individuals with certain corporate powers for polit-
ical and civil purposes, without any corporate fund from which
a judgment can be satisfied ; but each member of the com^
munity is liable in his person and estate to the execution
which may issue against the body ; each individual, therefore,
may be well thought to be a party to a suit brought against
them by their collective name. In regard to banks, turnpike
and other corporations the case is different." The counsel con-
cerned in the case of Mower v. Leicester,* without contradic-
tion speak of the practice of subjecting indviduals as one of
daily occurrence. The law on this subject was very much con-
sidered in the case of Chase v. The Merrimack Bank,' and was
applied and enforced against the members of a territorial par-
ish. " The question is," said the court, " whether on an execu-
tion against a town or parish the body or estate of any inhab-
Wobum, 10 East, 395; The King V. The 3 Brewer v. The Inhabitants of
Inhabitants of Hardwick, 1 1 Bast, 577. New Gloucester, 9 Mass. 247.
1 Merchants' Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick. * Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247.
405. 'Chase v. The Merrimack Bank,
2 Riddle v. The Proprietors &&, 7 19 Pick.' 564.
Mass. 187.
154 MEMBEESHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITT. [§ 145.
itant may be lawfully taken to satisfy it. This question seems
to have been settled in the affirmative by a series of decisions,
and ought no longer to be considered an open question." The
State of Maine when separated from Massachusetts retained
most of its laws and usages as they had been recognized in the
parent State, and among others the one in question. In Adams
V. Wiscasset Bank,* Mellen, 0. J., says : — "It is well known
that all judgments against gMffls*-oorporations may be satisfied
out of the property of any individlial inhabitant."
§ 145. (d) The doctrine in Connecticut. — " The courts of
this State from a time beyond the memory of any living law-
yer have sanctioned and carried out this usage as one of com-
mon-law obligation; and it has been applied, not to towns
only, but also, by legal analogy, to territorial ecclesiastical so-
cieties and school districts. The forms of our process against
these communities have always corresponded with this view
of the law. The writs have issued against the inhabitants of
towns, societies and districts as parUes. As early in the his-
tory of our jurisprudence as 1705, a statute was enacted au-
thorizing communities such as towns, societies, etc., to prose-
cute and defend suits, and for this purpose to appear either by
themsehes, agents or attorneys. If the inhabitants were not
then considered as parties individually and liable to the conse-
quences of judgments against such communities as parties,
there would have been a glaring impropriet}' in permitting
them to appear and defend by themselves ; but if parties, such
a right was necessary and indispensable. Of course this priv-
ilege has been and may be exercised.' Our statute providing
for the collection of taxes enacts that the treasurer of the
State shall direct his warrant to the collectors of the State
tax in the several towns. If neither this nor the further pro-
ceedings against the collectors and the selectmen authorized
by the statute shall enforce the collection of the tax, the law
directs that then the treasurer shall issue his execution against
the inhabitants of such town. Such an execution may be
levied upon the estate of the inhabitants ; and this provision
of the law was not considered as introducing a new principle
or enforcing a novel remedy, but as being only in conformity
1 Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 2 1 Swift's System, 337.
Greenl. (Me.) 361.
§ 145.] MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZE^'SHIP LIABILITY. 155
with the well-known usage in other cases. The levy of an
execution under this statute produced the case of Beers v.
Botsf ord.' There the execution which had been issued against
the town of Newton by the treasurer of the State had been
levied upon the property of the plaintiff, an inhabitant of that
town, and he had thus been compelled to pay the balance of a
State tax due from the town. He sued the town of Newton
for the recovery of the money so paid by him. The most
distinguished prof essional gentlemen in the State were engaged
as counsel in that case ; and it did not occur, either to them or
to the court, that the plaintiff's property had been taken with-
6at right ; on the contrary, the case proceeded throughout on
the conceded principle of our common law that the levy was
properly made upon the estate of the plaintiff. And without this
the plaintiff could not have recovered of the town, but must
have resorted to his action against the officer for his illegal
and void levy. In Fuller v. Hampton,* Peters, J., re-marked
that if costs are recovered against a town the writ of execu-
tion to collect them must have been issued against the property
of the inhabitants of the town; and this is the invariable
practice. The case of Atwater v. Goodrich' also grew cut of
this ancient usage. The ecclesiastical society of Bethany had
been taxed by the town of Woodrich for its money at interest,
and the warrant for the collection of the tax had been levied
upon the property of the plaintiff and the tax had thus been
collected of him, who was an inhabitant of the located society
of BethanyN Brainerd, J., who drew up the opinion of the
court, referring to this proceeding said : — ' This practice with
regard to towns has prevailed in New England, so far as I
have beei- able to investigate the subject, from an early pe-
riod — from, its first settlement ; — a practice brought by our
forefathers from England, which had there obtained in corpo-
rations similar to the towns incorporated in New England.'
It will here be seen that the principle is considered as appli-
cable to territorial societies as to towns, because the object to
be attained was the same in both — ' that the town or society
should be brought to a sense of duty and make provision for
payment and indemnity ; ' — a very good, reason and very ap-
plicable to the case we are considering. The law on this sub-
i Beers v. Botsford, 3 Day (Cionn.), ^ Fuller v. Hampton, 5 Conn. 417.
159, ' Atwater v. Goodrich, 6 Conn. 223.
156 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP LIABILITT. [§ 146.
ject was more distinctly brought out and considered by this
court in the late case of McCloud v. Selby,^ in which this well-
known practice as it has been applied to towns and ecclesias-
tical societies was extended and sanctioned as to school dis-
tricts; ' else it would be breaking in upon the analogies of the
law.' ' They are communities for different purposes, but es-
sentially of the same character.' And no doubt can remain,
since the decision of this case, but that the real principle of
all the cases on this subject has beerf and is that the inhabit-
ants of ywasj-corporations are parties individually as well as
in their corporate capacities to all actions in which the corpo-
ration is a party. And to the same effect is the language of
the elementary writers." *
§ 146. Limitations to the personal liability of members
of New England public quasi-corporations.— It may be
noted here, although the subject will be more thoroughly dis-
cussed in a subsequent portion of this work, that while the
members of these New England public quasi-oorpora,tions are
personally liable for the debts of the corporation, still this
liability is much curtailed by the doctrine, which is well settled,
that these corporations, like counties and other jitasi-corpora-
tions, are not liable for torts, unless a statute expressly cre-
ates guch liability.' This rule is, however, subject to limita-
tion in the case of New England public g'wasi-corporations.
It is not applicable in cases where the injury arises from a neg-
lect of special duties or the abuse of special authorities, imposed
or conferred upon the town with its consent or at its request.*
• McCIpud V. Selby,' 10 Conn. 390. v. 'Wliscafiset Bank, 1 Greenl. (Me.)
2Bear()sleyv. Smith, 16 Conn. 375; 361; Mitchell v. Bockland, 53 Me.
2 Kent'^ Commentaries, 231 ; Angell 118; Frazer v. Lewiston, 7ft Me. 531
& Ames on Corp. 374 ; 1 Swift's Di- Farnum v. Concord, 2 N. H. 392
gest, 73, 794; 5 Dane's Ahr. 158; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284
2 Dillon on Munic. Corp., g 963, note ; S. C, 72 Am. Dec. 302 ; Baxter v.
Cooley's Const Lim. 297-300. Judge Winoonski Turnpike Co., 33 Vt 133
Cooley cites and approves Beardsley Bray v. Wallingford, 30 Conn. 416
V. Smith, and quotes at length the Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 375
opinion of Judge Church. Cooley's Const. Lim. 30 ; 3 Dillon on
»See infra, §§ 000, 000; Mower v. Munic. Corp., §§ 963-965.
Leicester, 9 Mass. 347 ; s. C., 6 Am. * Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 Gray,
Dec. 63; Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 541; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H.
Gray, 541; Hill v. Boston, 133 Mass. 384; Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344.
351 ; S. a, 23 Am. Rep. 332; Adams
CHAPTEE YI.
OFFICERS AND AGENTS.
§ 147. Legislative power to create
§170.
officers and agents.
171.
148, Legislative control over cflS-
172.
cers and agents.
173.
149. Conduct of elections — Con-
struction of election stat-
174
utes.
150. Miscellaneous instances of the
175.
construction of election stat-
176.
utes.
177.
151. Validity of election— General
178.
principles.
179.
152. The same subject continued —
Illustrations.
180.
153. English rule as to majority.
154. Election by ballot.
181.
155. Election by city counciL
156. Election by definite bodies
generally — Majority and
183.
plurality.
157. The same subject continued —
183.
Quorum majority.
158. Informal ballot.
184
159. Tenure of ofiSce.
160. Tenure of office virhere city
185.
passes from one class to an-
other.
186.
161. Power to hold over -^English
and American rules.
187.
163. The same subject continued.
163. Appointment of oflScers.
,18a
164 Validity of appointment.
165. Appointment by de facto oflB-
189.
cers.
166. Compensation of officers — In
190.
general.
167. The same subject continued —
191.
Failure of corporate funds.
168. The same subject continued —
192.
Illustrations.
193.
169. Miscellaneous instances.
Extra compensation.
Compensation of attorneys.
The same subject continued.
Compensation — Power of leg-
islature to control
Qualifications for office-hold-
ing.
Official oath.
The same subject continued.
Duties of officers.
Powers of mayor.
The same subject continued —
Statutoiy provisions.
The same subject continued —
Miscellaneous powers.
Miscellaneous instances of
powers of municipal offi-
cers.
De facto officers — General
statement.
The same subject continued —
Color of title.
Incumbent of an unconstitu-
tional office.
Possession of office by de facto
officer.
Rights and liabilities of de
facto officers.
Resignation by acceptance of
incompatible office.
Acceptance and withdrawal
of resignation.
Removal of officers and
agents — How effected.
Causes for removal — English
and American rules.
Power of coiporation to re-
move officers and agents.
The same subject continued.
Notice of proceeding to re-
movei.
158
OFFICERS AND AGENTS.
[§ 147.
194 The same subject continued.
195. All persons charged with no-
tice of duties and powers of
municipal agents.
196. Liability of officers to the cor-
poration.
§ 197. Instances of fraudulent acts
of municipal agents.
198. Liability of corporation to
officers.
199. Indictment of municipal offi-
cera
§ 147. Legislative power to create officers and agents. —
The authority that makes the laws has a large discretion in
determining the means through whif h they shall be executed;
and the performance of many duties for which they may pro-
videby law may be refefrred either to the chief executive of the
State, or, at their option, to any other executive or ministerial
officer, or even to a person specially named for the duty.'
"Whatever power or. duty is expressly given to, or imposed
upon, the executive department, is altogether free from the
interference of the other branches of the government. Espe-
cially is this the case where the subject is committed to the
discretion of the chief executive officer, either by the consti-
tution or by the laws. So long as the power is vested in him
it is to be by him exercised, and no other branch of the gov-
ernment can control its exercise ; and from those duties which
the constitution requires of him he cannot be excused by law.^
But other powers or duties the executive cannot exercise or
1 Cooley's Const Lim'. (6th ed.),
ch. V, 133 ; Bridges v. Shallcross, 6 W.
Va. 563 ; People v. Osborne, 7 Colo.
605.
8 Attorney-General v. Brown, 1
Wis. 513. The legislature may ap-
point a State board if the constitu-
tion does not expressly empower the
governor to do so. People v. Free-
man (Cal.), 28 Pac. Rep. 173. See,
also, State v, Covington, 29 Ohio St
102; Biggs V. McBride (Oreg.), 21
Pac. Rep. 878; Hovey v. State, 119
Ind. 886 ; S. C, 21 N. E. Rep. 890. It
is not unconstitutional to allow the
governor to supply temporary va-
cancies in offices which under the
constitution are elective. Sprague
V. Brown, 40 Wis. 612. If the gov-
ernor has the power to appoint with
the consent of the senate, and to
remove, he may remove without
such consent Harman v. Harwood,
58 Md. 1 ; Lane v. Com., 103 Pa. St
481. As to discretionary powers, see
Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.), pp. 54,
55. An appointment to office was
said, in Taylor v. Commonwealth,
3 J. J. Marsh. 401, to be intrinsically
an executive act Where an office
is elective, the legislature cannot fill
it by appointment or by extending
the term of the incumbent People
V. McKinney. 52 N. Y. 374; People v.
Bull, 46 N. T. 57; Devoy v. New
York, 85 Barb. 264 ; 23 How. Pr. 326 ;
People V. Blake, 49 Barb. 9 ; People
V. Raymond, 87 N. Y. 438 ; People v.
Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50 ; State v. Gold-
stucker, 40 Wis. 134; Opinions of
Justices, 117 Mass. 603.
§§ 148, 149.] OFFICEES AND AGENTS. 159
assume, except by legislative authority, and the power which
in its discretion it confers it may also in its discretion with-
hold or confide to other hands.^
§ 148. Legislative control over officers and agents. — Al-
though, by their constitution, the people have delegated the
exercise of sovereign powers to the several departments, they
have not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty. They
retain in their own hands, so far as they have thought it
needful to do so, a power to control the governments they
create, and the three departments are responsible to and sub-
ject to be ordered, directed, changed or abolished by them.
But this control and direction must be exercised in the legiti-
mate mode previously agreed upon.^ The maxim which lies
at the foundation of our government is that all political power
originates with the people. But since the organization of
government it cannot be claimed that either the legislative,
executive or judicial powers, either wholly or in part, can be
exercised by them. By the institution of government the
people surrender the exercise of all the sovereign functions of
government to agents chosen by themselves, who at least
theoretically represent the supreme will of their constituents.
Thus all power possessed by the people themselves is given
and centered in their chosen representatives.'
§149. Condnct of elections — Construction of election
statutes. — The statutes of the different States point out spe-
cifically the mode in which elections shall be conducted; but,
although there are great diversities of detail, the same gen-
eral principles govern them all. Election statutes are to be
tested like other statutes, but with a leaning to liberality in
view of the great public purposes which they accomplish; and
except where they specifically provide that a thing shall be
done in the manner, indicated and not otherwise, their provis-
ions designed merely for the information and guidance of the
" Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.), 2 Cooley, Const Lim, (6th ed.),
ch. V, p. 134 "In deciding this ch. XVII, 747.
question [as to the authority of the ' Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 383, 291.
'' governor], recurrence must be had See Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 ;
to the constitution." Field v. Peo- Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 617 ; State
pie, 3 III 79, 80. v. Lufy, 19 Nev. 391.
160
OFFICEES AHD AGENTS.
[§ 150.
officers must be regarded as directory only, and the election
will not be defeated by a failure to comply with them, pro •
vided the irregularity has not hindered any who were enti-
tled from exercising the right of suffrage, or rendered doubt-
ful the evidences from which the result was to be declared.*
§ 150. Miscellaneous instances of the construction of
election statutes. — "Where a city council is the sole judge of
the election and qualifications of4ts members, it cannot, after
' Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.), ch.
XVII, 776,777; People v. Cook, 14
Barb. 359, and 8 N. Y. 67. See, also,
People V. Cook, 7 Ala. 114; Dishon v.
Smith, 10 Iowa, 313; Attorney-Gen-
eral V. Ely, 4 Wis. 430 ; People v.
'Higgins, 3 Mich. 333; Piatt i). People,
39 III. 54; Du Page Co. v. People, 65
111. 360; State v. Stumpf, 31 Wis.
579; Sprague v. Norway, 31 Cal. 173;
Howard v. Shields, 16 Ohio St. 35 ;
Sheppard's Election Case. 77 Pa. St.
295; Wheelock's Election Case, 82
Pa. St. 397; State v. O^Day, 69 Iowa,
368. All votes received after the
polls should be closed are illegal.
Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky. 596. Where
a city council passes an ordinance
redistricting the city into wards, a
special election thereunder is specific-
ally prohibited by the Revised Stat-
utes of Ohio, and hence, where a spe-
cial election is attempted to be held
for the selection of members of the
council under such ordinance, such
special election is inoperative, and
persons holding seats in the council
by virtue of certificates based upon
such special election may be ousted
by quo warranto. State v. Kearns,
47 Oliio St 566: S. C, 25 N. B. Rep.
1027. A town was incorporated by
a special act, its managers to consist
of five trustees, to be elected. It was
held that a subsequent general act,
repealing all inconsistent provisions
in earlier acts, and fixing a day for
the election of all town oflBoers, made
that day the day on which the five
trustees should be elected. Kelly v.
Gahn, 113 111. 33. Where a statute
providing for an election by the in-
habitants ^within the boundaries of a
proposed municipal corporation, at
which the question of incorporation
shall be submitted to the people, fails
to provide for any census or enumer-
ation of the people preliminary to
such proceedings, a failure to make
such enumeration will not affect the
validity of the election, where the
board of county commissioners made
a record in their proceedings de-
claring the number of inhabitants.
Smith V. Board County Comm'rs
Skagit County (1891), 45 Fed. Rep. '
735. Testimony of the village clerk
that the names contained in the pe-
tition for the election represented a
majority of the tax-payers of the
village, as contained in the last as-
sessment roll, is sufiicient proof that
the petitioners represented a major-
ity of the tax-payers. People v. Bird,
8 N. Y. Sup]. 801. The laws of Min-
nesota of 1885. as amended by laws of
1687, designating the second Tuesday
of March as the day upon which the
city council of St Paul shall elect a
corporation attorney, absolutely pro-
hibits an election upon a day ante-
cedent to that specified. State v.
Murray, 41 Minn. 133 ; S. C, 42 N.
W. Rep. 858.
§ 150.]
OFFICERS AND AGENTS.
161
having seated a member on investigation, at a subsequent
meeting order a second investigation. OerUorari may issue in
such case without waiting for the report and final order.' If
there is a tie in the election for mayor between the incumbent
and another candidate, and the, city council fails to choose one
of them for mayor by lot, as required by the city charter,
equity will not interfere to restrain the incumbent from exer-
cising the fundtions of the office.^ Once the polls are closed
in accordance with the law they cannot be legally re-opened
and votes received.' The mere fact that, the number of officers
to be elected to fill vacancies was not determined prior to the
election does not make the election void.*
' State V. Camden, 47 N. J. Law,
64 ; s. C, 54 Am. Rep. 117. The laws
of the State of Michigan, 1887, No.
208, providing for the correction of
frauds and mistakes in the cauvass
and returns made by inspectors of
elections, does not apply in the case
of elections for aldermen for the city
of Detroit, and an application for an
investigation of the returns of such
election should be made to the board
of aldermen; the city charter as
amended in 1887 providing that the
board of aldermen shall be the judges
of the election and qualifications of
its own members, and shall have
power to determine contested elec-
tions to said board. Naumann v.
Board of City Canvassers, 73 Mich.
353; s. a, 41 N. W. Eep. 267.
2Huels V. Hahn, 75 Wis. 468; s. c,
54 N. W. Rep. 507.
8 The Virginia Code of 1887, § 5,
Bubd. 16, provides that the word
" city " shall be construed to mean a
town containing a population of
five thousand or more, and having a
corporation or hustings court It
was held that section 1016, provid-.
ing that officers provided for in
the "charter of the several cities
shall be elected or appointed as the
charters may prescribe: provided,
that the councilmen ... of
11
each ward of a city shall be chosen
by the qualified voters of such
ward," does not apply to a town
which has less than five thousand
population, and no corporation or
hustings court. Roche v. Jones, 87
Va. 484 ; s. C, 13 S. B. Eep. 965. The
act of Pennsylvania, passed March
30, 1863, provided for the election of
six supervisors by the qualified voters
of Hempfleld township at the first
succeeding election, and made it the
duty of such supervisors to then di-
vide the township into six districts,
giving each district a supervisor.
The court deci.ded that this act re-
pealed by implication the act of
February 36, 1853, authorizing the
election of one supervisor each by
two particular districts, and of two
by the third ; and that each district
of the township was entitled to one
supervisor, who was to be elected,
however, by the voters of the wliolt^
township. Martz v. Long {In re,
Martz's Election), 110 Penn. St. UK ;
S. a, 1 Atl. Rep. 419.
* An election of five town council-
men of North Providence, R. 1, un-
der Pub. St. R. 1, ch. 37, § 1, provid-
ing that there shall be annually
elected in each town not less than
three nor more than seven council-
men, is not void by reason of the
162
OFFICERS AND AGENTS.
[§ 151.
§ 151. Validity of election — General principles. — In
Judge Cooley's L,Jinirable work on constitutional limitations
it is said that it is a little difficult at times to adopt the
true mean between those things which should, and those
which should not, defeat an election ; for while, on the one
hand, the laws should seek to secure the due expression of his
will by every legal voter, and guard against any irregularities
or misconduct that may tend to prevent it, so, on the other
hand, it is to be borne in mind that charges of irregularity or
misconduct are easily made, and that the danger from throw-
ing elections open to be set aside or controlled by oral evi-
dence is perhaps as great as any in our system. An election
honestly conducted under the forms of law ought generally
to stand, notwithstanding the individual electors may have
been deprived of their votes, or unqualified voters allowed to
participate.' The admission of illegal votes at an election
will not -necessarily defeat it ; but to warrant its being set
aside on that ground, it should appear that the result would
have been different had they been excluded.'^
votera' failing to determine, in ad-
"v^ance of the election at the annual
meeting, the precise number to be
elected, as required by section 6 ; the
number of five having been fixed
upon in 1874, and that number hav-
ing ever since remained unchanged,
but no formal vote on the point hav-
ing been taken except in 1875, 1878
and 1883, the number being consid-
ered as having been fixed by common
acquiescence or consent State v.
Andrews, 15 R I. 394 ; s. c, 6 Atl.
Rep. 596. Where the vacancy in the
office of township supervisor, caused
by -resignation, has not been filled by
appointcnent, as prescribed by Comp.
St. Neb., ch. 26, § 103, (1) by the town
board; (8) where the offices of the
town board are all vacant, by the
township clerk ; (3) where there be
no township clerk, by the county
clerk, — the same may be filled by
election fit a special town meeting,
when properly convened, under
Comp. St. Neb.,ch. 18, providing that
electors at special town meetings,
when properly convened, shall have
power to fill vacancies in. any of the
town offices when the same shall not
have already been filled by appoint-
ment State V. Taylor (Neb.), "43
N. W. Rep. 739. The acts of Virginia,
1883-4, § 12, amending the'charter of
the city of Portsmouth, and provid-
ing that the city council shall judge
by a majority vote of the qualifica-
tions of its members, has application
only where a seat is contested. Job-
son V. Bridges, 84 Va. 398; s. a, 5
S. E. Rep. 529.
1 Cooley's Const Lim. ( 6th ed.), ch.
XVII, 785. See also. People v. Vil-
lage of Highland Park (Mich.), 50
N. W. Rep. 660.
2 First Parish in Sudbury v.
Stearns, 21 Pick. 148; Blandford
School District v. Gibbs, 3 Cush. 39 ;
Ex parte Murphy, 7 Cowen, 153;
Judkius V. Hill, SO K. H. 140; De-
§ 152.]
OFFICKES AND AGENTS.
163
§ 152. The same subject eontinaed — Illustrations. — An
erroneous recital in the proclamation of a clause as part of the
act, which clause was stricken out before the passage of the
act, will not invalidate the election, the date and title of
the act being properly given, and it not appearing that the
result of the election was in any way affected by the error.'
loach V. Rogers, 86 N. C. 857 ; Shields
V. McGregor, 91 Mo. 534; People v.
Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283 ; Tarbox v. Sug-
hrue, 36 Kan. 225 ; Swepston v. Bar-
ton, 39 Ark. 549. In England candi-
dates are nominated and known prior
to election day, and the system of
Toting was known as open voting,
and some cases there favor the prop-
osition that votes which were cast
for a disqualified person are not
good, and the other candidate is
elected. Regina v. Ledyard, 8 Ad. &
EL 535; Rawlinson on Corporations
(5th ed.), 64, note ; Regina v. Council-
lors of Derby, 7 Ad. & El. 419 ; Re-
gina V. Hiarns, 7 Ad. & El. 960. But
if the voter is ignorant of his candi-
date's disqualification, the 'vote is
counted in determining whether an
opposing candidate has a majority.
Regina v. Mayor of Tewksbury, Law
Rep. 3 Q. B. 629.
' In, re Cleveland, 51 N. J. Law,
319; s. c, 18 At). Rep. 67. The New
York laws of 1871, creating the board
of water commissioners of the village
of Dunkirk, and granting them spe-
cific powers, creates a new office
within the meaning of the constitu-
tion of New York, article 10, section
2, which provides that all city, town
and village oflScers for whose elec-
tion or appointment the constitution
makes no provision shall be elected
by the city, etc., or some authority
thereof, and all other officers for
whose election or appointment the
constitution makes no provision, and
all officers whose offices shall there-
after be created by law, slia'.I te
elected by the people or appointed in
such manner as the legislature may
direct, and is not unconstitutional
because it names the persons who are
to constitute the commission. Ho-
quembourg v. City of Dunkirk, 8
N. Y. Supl. 447. Under the laws of
Pennsylvania of 1874, section 208,
providing that cases of contested
elections of the fourth class (embrac-
ing municipal council men) shall be
tried and determined by the court of
quarter sessions, and ,Iaws of Penn-
sylvania of 1887, page 204, providing
that " each branch of councils shall
judge of the qualifications of its mem-
bers, and contested elections shall be
determined by the courts of law,''
the court of quarter sessions has no
jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifi-
cation of a councilman, but only upon
the regularity of the election. Au-
chenbach v. Seibert, 120 Pa. St 159 ;
S. c, 13 Atl. Rep. 558. The charter
of the city of A., section 22 (Sess.
Acts Greg. 1889, p. 240), provides that
the council shall be the judge of the
qualifications of its members, and, iu
case of a contest between two per-
sons claiming to have been elected
thereto, must determine the same,
subject to the review of any court of
competent jurisdiction. The court
decided that this is not exclusive of
the jurisdiction of the circuit courts,
under the general statutes of the
State, to determine such contests in
the first instance. State v. Erafl^ 18
Oregon, 550 ; S. c, 23 Pac. Rep. 66a
See, also, State v. Huggins (1824^
Harper, Law, S4; State v. Deliessft-
164
OFFICEES AND AGENTS.
[§ 153.
Although the statute requires that the notice shall state the
number of inhabitants within the boundaries of the proposed
corporation as ascertained by the board of commissioners, a
failure to do so is a mere irregularity, which cannot prejudice
a non-resident property owner and will not affect the validity
of the election.'
§ 163. English rule as to majority. — Although it is clear
that, in the absence of any special provision to the contrary,
the corporate body are bound by the acts not only of the
major part of them, but by the niajor part of those who are
present at a regularly convened corporate.meeting, yet where
the corporate body consists of a definite number, and it is
provided that an act shall be done by the body for the time
being, or a major part of them, a majority of the whole must
meet for the purpose; and if the body be so reduced as that
a majority of the whole definite number no longer remains,
the act cannot be done unless permitted by the charter or by
usage.^
line (1831), 1 McCord (S. C), 53 ; Grier
V. Shackelford (1814), 8 Brevard
(S. C), 196; State v. Cockrell, 3 Rich.
(S. C.) Law, 6.
1 Smith V. Board County Ciomm'rs
Skagit County, 45 F.ed. Rep. 735.
The laws of New Hampshire provide
that "city councils shall have por.er
to provide for the appointment or
election of all necessary officers for
the good government of the city, not
otherwise provided for." It was de-
cided that a city council has no right
to determine when a board of assess-
ors shall exercise their power to
choose one of their number as clerk
of the board. Weeks v. Dennett, 62
N. H. 3. Holding, also, that a notice
of an election to determine the ques-
tion of incorporation, signed by the
county auditor, who is ecu officio clerk
of the board of commissioners, and
in which it appears that the election
was ordered by the board, is a suffi-
cient compliance with the provision
of the statute that such notice shall
be given by the board of commission-
ers.
2 Rex V. Hoy te, 6 T. R 430 ; Rex v.
Belbringer, 4 T. R. 810, and the cases
there cited. But a majority of those
present, when legally assembled, will
bind the rest. Rex v. Miller, 6 T. R.
368. See, also. Rex v. Monday, Cow-
per, 531, 588 ; Rex w Devonshire, 1 Barn.
& O. 609 ; Rex v. Bower, 1 Barn. &
C. 493. See further as to plurality
and majority rule at popular elec-
tions, the chapter on Meetings and
Elections, infra, and the rules gov-
erning elections by definite bodies,
§§ 157, 158, infra. Rex v. May, 4
Barn. & Ad. 843; Rex v. Greet, 8
Barn. & C. 368 ; Rex v. Headley, 7
Barn. & C. 496 ; Cotton v. Davies, 1
Str. 59; Oldknow v. Wainwright,
3 Burr. 1017; 1 W. BI. 339; Rex v.
Overseers of Christ Church, 7 E. &
B. 409. "Where an election of four
couucilloTS had taken place on the
§ 154.J
OFFIOEES A.ND AGBNT8.
165
§ 154. Election by ballot. — The mode of voting in this
country, at all general elections, is almost universally by bal-
lot.* " A ballot may be defined to be a piece of paper or
other suitable material, with the name written or printed upon
it of the person to be voted for ; and where the suffrages are
given in this form, each of the electors in person deposits such
a vote in the box or other receptacle provided for the pur-
pose and kept by the proper officers." *
that purpose, called Diribitores, de-
livered to each voter as many tahlets
as there were candidates, one of
whose names was written upon every
tablet The voter put into a chest
prepared for that purpose which, of
these tablets he pleased, and they
were afterwards taken out and
counted. Cicero defines tablets to be
little billets, in which the people
brought their suffrages. The clause
in the constitution directing the elec-
tion of the several State officers was
undoubtedly intended to provide that
the election should be made by this
mode of voting to the exclusion of
any other. In this mode the freemen
can individually express their choice
without being under the necessity of
publicly declaring the object of their
choice ; their collective voice can be
easily ascertained, and the evidence
of it transmitted to the place where
their votes are to be counted, and the
result declared with as little incon-
venience as possible." Temple v.
Mead, 4 Yt 535, 641. In the case last
cited, and in Henshaw v. Foster, 9
Pick. 313, it was held that a printed
ballot complies with a constitutional
provision which requires all ballots
for certain .State officers to be " fairly
written." Common lines on ruled
paper do not render the election void.
People V. Kilduff, 15 111. 493. But
where the law prohibits "any device
or mark" by which a ticket may be
distinguished, a dotted line under the
title of an office for which uo candi-
flrst of November, three of whom
were to supply ordinary vacancies,
and tlie fourth an extraordinary va-
cancy, but no distinction had been
made between them, either in the
notice of election, the voting papers
or in the publishing of the names of
the four persons elected, such elec-
tion was held to be irregular and
void. Begina v. Rowley, 8 Q. B. 143 ;
S. G. in the Exchequer Chamber, 6
Q. B. 668. See, also, Begina v. Eip-
pon, 1 Q. B. D. 317 ; Begina v. Mayor
&c. of Leeds, 7 Ad. & El. 963.
' Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th ed.),
ch. XVII, 760.
2 Cush. Leg. Assemb., § 108. " In
this country, and indeed in every
country where officers are elective,
different modes have been adopted
for the electors to signify their choic&
The most common modes have been
either by voting viva voce, — that if,
by the elector openly naming the per-
son he designates for the office, — or
by ballot, which is depositing in a box
provided for the purpose a paper on
which is the name of the person he
intends for the office. The principal
object of this last mode is to enable
the elector to express his opinion se-
cretly, without being subject to being
overawed or to any ill-will or prose-
cution on account of his vote for
either of his candidates who may be
before the public. The method of
voting by tablets in Rome was an ex-
ample of this manner of voting.
Tkere certain officers appointed for
166
OFFIOICBS AND AOEITTS.
[§ 155.
§ 155. Election hj city council. — Under the laws or con-
stitution of some States the council or city government has
the power to elect officers or fill vacancies by vote.' Where
city ordinances require that its city solicitor shall be chosen
aldermen is composed of nine alder-
men. By section 4 the mayor can-
not vote, except in case of a tie.
Section 5 provides tliat a majority of
the%oard shall form a quorum. An
ordinance provides that any vacancy
on the board of education shall be
filled by an election by the mayor
and aldermen. At such an election
eight of the aldermen and the mayor
were present Complainant received
four votes, there were three scatter-
ing votes and one blank. The mayor
did not vote, but declared complain-
ant elected. It was held that a ma-
jority of the eight aldermen present
was necessary to elect complainant,
and the blank vote must be counted
to show that he did not receive
such majority. Nor was the action
of the mayor, iii declaring com-
plainant elected, equivalent to a
vote for him. Lawrence v. Inger-
soll, 88 Tenn. 53; s. G, 13 S. W. Rep.
433. See this case cited and com-
pared with other authorities in §§ 157,
158, infra. An election ordered by
officers de facto is held a good elec-
tion. State V. Goowin, 69 Tex. 55 ;
S. C, 5 S. W. Rep. 678. A common
council, constituted as it will be when
a term of oflBce about to expire shall
end, and having authority to ap-
point the successor of the incumbent,
may lawfully make such appoint-
ment before the expiration of the
current term. Horan v. Lane, 53 N. J.
Law, 275 ; s. C (sub nom. State v.
Lane), 31 Atl. Rep. 303, where it is also
held that when a statute empowers
the council to appoint to a certain
office, an ordinance of the council
which, if enforced against succeed-
ing councils, would defeat or ma-
date is named is sufficient to con-
demn the whole ballot. Steele v.
Calhoun, 61 Miss. 556. See, also, Dru-
liner v. State, 20 Ind. 308 ; MulhoUand
V. Bryant, 39 Ind. 363. A different
method from the one usually in force
in printing the names of officers will
not make the ballot void. Coffey v.
Edmonds, 58 Cal. 531 ; Owens v. State,
64 Tex. 500. The board of aldermen
having no power to elect except by
ballot, no action by them ratifying
their previous action can make such
election valid. Laiyrence v. Inger-
soll, 88 Tenn. 53 ; s. C, 13 S. W. Rep.
422. A provision of the rules of the
council, that officers whose salaries
are payable from the city treasury
shall be electei^ by ballot, applies only
to elective officers to be chosen by
the council under the charter, and
not to subordinate appointees whose
compensation is fixed by the mayor
and aldermen. Williams v. City of
Gloucester, 148 Mass. 356; s. C, 19
N. E. Rep. 848. A city council was
empowered to appoint, in joint con-
vention, a prosecuting attorney. No
mode was prescribed, and there was
no power of removal The conven-
tion balloted, and A- received a ma-
jority of the votes cast It was held
that A.'s title to the office was not af-
fected by the fact that a resolution
declaring him elected was lost, and
that a resolution declared the ballot
void by reason of errors which did
not in fact exist, and that another
resolution declared another person
elected. [Park, C. J., dissenting.]
State V. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76 ; S. c,
55 Am. Rep. 65.
1 Under the charter of the city of
Enoxville, the board Of mayor and
§ 155.]
OFFICERS AND AGENTS.
167
by a concurrent vote of both branches of the city council,
he cannot be legally chosen unless by a concurrent vote. And
the fact that the record untruly states that a vote was in con-
currence, when it also states facts showing that it was no^,
does not show a valid election.^ "Where, by the city charter,
the mayor is allowed a casting vote in the city council, in ac-
cordance with the statute of Maine, his act is sufficiently for-
mal for that purpose if he determines and declares which of
two candidates is elected, although he may not go througli
the formality of casting a ballot.^
terially impair their power of ap-
pointment, is void. Under the charter
of the city of Hartford, providing
that the common council should ap-
point a prosecuting attorney, but
giving no direction as to the mode of
appointment, the council met, and a
member moved that the convention
proceed to ballot for a prosecuting
attorney, which motion prevailed.
A ballot was taken, giving relator a
majority of votes. The result hav-
ing been announced, another mem-
ber offered a resolution declaring
relator elected, which was lost Two
resolutions were then offered and
passed, one declaring the ballot for
relator null and void by reason of
errors in the same, and the other de-
claring defendant' elected to the
office. It was held that relator was
elected when the result of the first
ballot was announced, there being no
error therein, and the convention had
no power afterwards to deprive him
of the oflSoe. (Pai'k, C. J., dissenting.)
State V. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76 ; s. c,
23 AtL Rep. 686. The election of an
assessor by the board of aldermen at
a legal meeting cannot be reconsid-
ered at an adjourned session, and an-
other person elected in his place.
State V. Phillips, 79 Me. 506 ; s. c. 11,
Atl. Rep. 374.
1 Saunders v. Lawrence, 141 Mass,
3»0. Since the Illinois act of 1873,
providing a new mode for the assess-
ment and collection of taxes, and
authorizing the appointment of a
city tax commissioner, is unconsti-
tutional and void, an ordinance,
under which such a city tax commis-
sioner was elected, is void, and in-
capable of conferring any rights
upon him. McGrath v. City of Chi-
cago, 34 III. App. 19. A common
council, being the sole judges of the
election of its members, may, upon
a contest respecting the electipn of
one of its members, appoint a com-
mittee to take testimony, and to re-
port the facts and the evidence to the
council; Salmon v. Haynes, 50 N. J.
Law, 97 : s. c, 11 Atl. Rep. 151.
i Small V. Orne, 79 Me. 78 ; a C, 8
Atl. Rep. 153. See the sections on
Presiding OfBcers in the chapter on
Public Boards, infra. The charter
of the city of Cohoes provides that
" the mayor and aldermen of the city
shall constitute the common council
thereof," and that the common coun-
cil "shall be judge of the election
and qualification of its own mem-
bers." It was held that the common
council was not the judge of the
election of mayor, he not being one
of their " own " members within the
spirit or intent of the charter. Gar-
side V. City of Cohoes, 12 N, Y, Supl.
193; s, c, 58 Hun, 005,
168 OFFICBES AND AGENTS. [§§ 156, 157.
§ 156. Election by definite bodies generally — Majority
and plurality. — When an election is to be made by a definite
body of electors, as by a board of aldermen or common coun-
cil, the authorities are not in accord as to whether a majority
is requisite to elect a candidate or whether a mere plurality
is suflScient. On the one hand it is asserted by the Supreme
Court of Tennessee to be " well settled " and " not open to
controversy "that in such cases a majority is necessary.' On
the other hand it was held by the Supreme Court of Michigan
in a recent case that " in this country it is generally under-
stood that, in the absence of any statutory provision expressly
requiring more, a plurality of the votes cast will elect. It is
only in cases where the statute so provides that a majority of
all the votes cast is necessary to the choice of an officer." ^
This is the only case, so far as the author's examination has
enabled him to discover, where it has been distinctly decided
that a candidate may ,be chosen by a definite body without
receiving more votes than all of his competitors combined.
§ 157. The same subject continued — Quorum majority.
Assuming that a majority is necessary to elect, shall it be a
majority (1) of those present (provided they constitute a
quorum), (2) a majority of the quorum voting, or (3) simply a
majority of those, however few, who vote? According to the
Tennessee case cited in the preceding section, a majority of those
who are present must concur to do any valid act, including the
1 Lawrence v. IngersoU (1889), 88 the fact that the charter provided for
Tenn. 53 : S. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 433 ; 6 the transaction of business only by a
L. R A. 308 ; 17 Am. St Eep. 870 ; majority of a quorum, and gave the
citing Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 283 mayor a right to a vote when a ma-
(wherein the author says a majority jority thereof could not decide,
must concur to do any valid act), '"thereby conclusively showing," said
find 6 Am. & Eng. Enoyo. of Law, the court, "that a majority must
i^l. Turney, C. J., dissented. He concur or there is no result." S. G,
does not affirm, however, that a p. 63.
plurality is sufficient, but dilfers ^Conrad v. Stone (1889), 78 Mich,
from the majority of the court on 635, 639. In this case there were three
another ground, to be noticed in the candidates, and, of a board of sixteen
following section. Although the members present, eight voted for
court deemed this to be the settled one, seven for another, and one for
common-law rule, the intrinsic value the third. The first was declared
of the ease is seriously impaired by elected.
§ 158.]
OFFICEES AND AGENTS.
169
election of of5oers.' In respect to the second and third ques-
tions, some of the courts draw a distinction between elections
and ordinary business of the board.'' And the rule requiring
only a majority of those actually voting for a candidate is de-
clared by a decided preponderance of authority.' Those who
refrain from voting are conclusively presumed to acquiesce in
the action of those who do, and even an express protest on
the ground that a quorum has not voted is unavailing.*
§ 158. Informal ballot. — An interesting point regarding
an " informal ballot," so called, was determined in a recent
case by the Supreme Court of Michigan. A statute provided
for the election by ballot of a school examiner on a certain
for a quorum to vote in any case;
See, also, cases cited In preceding
note, and RushTille Gas Co. v. City
of Eushvllle (1889), 121 Ind. 206 ; & c,
6 L. R. A. 315. State v. Dillon (1890),
125 Ind. 65, holds that if a candidate
receives a majority of those voting,
which is less than a majority of those
present, but is a majority of the num-
ber necessaiy to constitute a quoi-um,
it is saflFioient. It la competent for a
council to adopt a rule that a major-
ity of those elected, and voting, may
choose a candidate. Morton v. Young-
erman, 89 Ky. 505.
* Gosling V. Veley, 4 H. of Lw Cas.
679 ; Willcook on Munic. boi-p., g 546 ;
State V. Green, 37 Ohio St 227. In
Conrad v. Stone, 78 Mich. 635, it is
stated as a general rule that a plural-
ity suffices to elect In the cases
cited in the preceding note, a major-
ity of those voting, though less than
a quorum, satisfies the law. All act-
vfdUy voted in the former case, and
in none of the latter cases were there
more than two candidates competing.
Suppose there are three or more
candidates — Qucere: May a plurality
(i. e., less than a majority) of less
than ■ a quorum of votes elect, a
quorum being present?
'Lawrence v. Ingersoll (1889), 88
Tenn. 52 ; s. c, 12 S. W. Rep. 423 ; 6
L. R A. 808, where a blank ballot was
not counted as a vote, Turney, C. J.,
dissenting. -Tha court quotes from
Dillon en Municipal Corporations,
§ 217, in support of its conclusion;
and the same section is also quoted
in Rushville Gas Co. v. City of Rush-
ville (1889), 131 Ind. 206, 210, to sus-
tain exactly the opposite contention.
The latter case related to business of
the body, not an election, and is cited
with other authorities ih the chapter
on Public Boards, infra.
2 State V. Green, 37 Ohio St 227;
Launtz v. People, 113 IlL 137, 143;
Oldknow V. Wainwright (or Rex v.
Foxcraft), 2 Burr. 1017; Gosling v.
Veley, 4 H. of L. Cas. 679. These
cases decide that if a quorum be pres-
ent the majority cannot defeat an
election by refraining from voting,
although they might by such conduct
block the business proceedings of a
meeting,
3 Launtz v. People, 113 lU. 137 (1885),
extending the rule to a vote on the
approval of the bond of the oflScer
thus elected; Booker v. Young, 13
Gratt 303 (private corporation) ; At-
torney-General V. Shepard, 68 N. H.
383, where it was held not necessary
170
OFFIOEBS AND AGENTS.
[§ 159.
day by the chairmen of the boards of school inspectors. At
a meeting convened for that purpose five informal ballots were
taken, with the same result, and at a subsequent meeting on
the same day a candidate was formally elected. It was de-
cided that the person who h^,d a plurality of the informal ballot
was duly chosen. The court said : — " When the law requires cer-
tain persons to be elected by ballot, there is and can be no
such thing as an ' informal ballot.' All ballots cast under
statutory requirements are formaf and final if there is an elec-
tion, and cannot be repeated. Informal ballots are sometimes
taken in a caucus or in a nominating convention ; but they
have no place in an election required by law for the election
of oflBcers."^
§ 159. Tenure of office. — The term of ofBce for which an
ofiBcer is elected to serve is, as a general rule, fixed by the or-
dinance or law under which he is elected or appointed.'
V. Keams, 47 Ohio St. 566 ; s. C, 25
N. E. Eep. 1027. The New Jersey
statute of 1886, by which the term of
office of the members of the city
council, etc., is made three years,
does not apply to the alderman of At-
lantic City, who is ex officio a mem-
ber of the common council, and
elected annually. State v. Gouldey
(N. J.), 18 Atl. Eep. 695. See, also.
State V. Haynes, 50 N. J. Law, 97 ;
Jobson V. Bridges, 84 Va. 298. The
Michigan statute of 1889, entitled
"An act to amend section 4 of Act
No. 382 of the Local Acts of 1877, en-
titled 'An act to revise the charter of
the city of Grand Bapids,' " provides
" that the elective officers now hold-
ing office within that part of the said
city comprised of the Third, Eighth,
Ninth and Tenth wards, as created by
this act, shall continue to hold the
offices for which they were respect-
ively elected, and to discharge the
duties of said offices for the whole of
the territory for which they were
elected, -until the officers are duly
elected and qualified, as provided by
1 Conrad v. Stone (1889), 78 Mich.
635, holding also that it was not nec-
essary for the chairman to declare
the candidate elected ; on which point
see, also. State v. Barbour, 63 Conn.
76.
* The New York City Consolidation
Act of 1883 says that clerks of the
district courts " shall hold office for
the term of six years from the date
of appointment." It was held to in-
clude the case of a clerk appointed
to flu a vacancy caused by the resig-
nation of a clerk during his six years.
People V. Breen, 53 N. Y. Super. Ct
167 : Truax, J., dissenting. The Ee-
vised Statutes of Ohio, relating to
nmnicipal corporations, provides that
members of the council in office shall,
unlesa-a vacancy sooner occurs, serve
until the end of their respective
terms. Section 8 provides that any
person holding an office or public
trust shall continue therein until his
successor is elected, or appointed, and
qualitied. It was decided that mem-
bers of the council were entitled to
hold over under this section. State
§ 159.]
OFFIOBES AND AGENTS.
171
Where a statute provides that, before the election of town
councilmen, the number to be elected shall be determined, an
informal acceptance of five as the number to serve, accepted
by common consent through several years, will be deemed as
valid a determination of the number of councilmen to serve in
that capacity as a decision by formal vote of the electors.'
the city charter at the annual char-
ter election on the first Monday of
April, A. D. 1890, and after said date
the several aldermen whose terms of
office shall not have expired shall
onlj represent the territory within
the ward in which they shall then re-
spectively reside, and at said annual
charter election in 1890 aldermen and
other ward officers shall be elected
in accordance with the provisions of
the charter of said city and the re-
quirements of this act" It was de-
cided that the provision for the alder-
men to continue in theofiice to which
they were elected, in the wards in
which they reside, until such elected
term expires, is not an appointment
of city officers by the legislature, and
that sufficient provision is made for
the election of aldermen in the new
wards. Stow v. Common Council,
79 Mich. 595 ; s. C, 44 N. W. Rep. 1047.
A superintendent is not rendered an
agent of the city by an ordinance
which provides that " he shall con-
tinue in office until removal, or until
a successor be chosen." Prince v. City
of Lynn, 149 Mass. 193 ; s. C, 21 N. E.
Kep. 396. One elected under a stat-
ute which fixes the term of office at
a longer period than the constitution
allows cannot exercise the duties of
such office for any period. State v.
Atter, 5 Ohio C. C. 353.
1 Metoalf V. Andrews (B. I.), 7 Atl.
Rep. 4. In this case a city charter pro-
vided that certain officers, including
the city treasurer, should be ap-
pointed by the common council, to
continue in office until the office
should be declared vacant, or another
person should be appointed to suc-
ceed him, and should enter upon the
duties of his office ; and that the city
treasurer should, before entering on
his duties, give bond with sureties
for the faithful performance of his
duties. S. was appointed treasurer in
January, 1867, and continued in office
until January, 1875. He gave bonds,
with sureties, in conformity with the
city charter. In an action on the
bond, the sureties pleaded that, by
the rules and usages of tlie common
council, all the officers appointed by
it, including the city treasurer, were
appointed for one year, subject to re-
moval at pleasure, and, when not re-
appointed at the expiration of the
term, were suffered to hold over at
pleasure ; and that they executed the
bond with a knowledge of the said
rules and usages of the common
council, and on assurances, made by
the common council and the plaint-
iffs, that they would be bound as such
only for the term of one year. The
court held that the provisions of the
charter as to the mode of appoint-
ment and term of office must be
strictly followed, and this plea pre-
sented no defense. City of Newark
V. Stout, 53 N. J. Law, 35 ; S. C, 18
Atl. Rep. 943. Incumbents super-
seded by councilmen elected under
or by virtue of void proceedings are
Entitled to be restored by due process
of law ; but the legal organization of
the city, and the acts of the council-
men de facto, within the purview of
the statutes, will be recognized and
172
OFFICEES AND AGENTS.
[§ 160.
The constitution of Colorado provides that every person hold-
ing a civil office in a municipality shall, unless removed ac-
cording to law, exercise the duties of such office until his suc-
cessor is duly qualified. It was held that where a candidate
for mayor is by the proper canvassing board declared elected,
files his oath and enters upon the discharge of his official
duties, the outgoing mayor vacating the office without objec-
tion, the court may, on the election being contested and ad-
judged illegal, order him to yield the office to the president of
the board of supervisors, since a Colorado statute provides
that in case of a vacancy in the office of mayor the president
of the board of public works shall act.'
§ 160. Tenure of office where city passes from one class
to another. — When under a statute a city is divided into
classes, and no provision is made by the statute for the elec-
tion of new officers, the officers in office at the time of the
upheld. State u Gray, 23 Neb. 365;
s. C, 86 N. W. Rep. 577. Persons
who are acting as town ofiBcers
under an incorporation which is void
hecause of a pre-existing valid char-
ter will be ousted on proceedings in
quo warranto, when the boundaries
of the districts from which they were
elected are not coterminous with
those prescribed in the original char-
ter. Harness c. State, 76 Tex. 566;
S. a, 13 S.. W. Kep. 535.
1 Londoner v. People, 15 Colo. 557 ;
S. C 26 Pac Rep. 135. Brooklyn
City Charter 1888, tit 3, § 4, pro-
vides that persons appointed to
certain city offices "shall severally
execute a bond to the corporation in
such penaltj' and with such sureties
as the common council may require,
conditioned for the faithful perform-
ance of their respective duties. . , .
Such sureties shall qualify in such
form as the common council shall
prescribe ; and the bonds thereby re-
quired, after having been fully ap-
proved, shall be filed in the office of
the city clerk, . . . before any of
the officers required to execute the
same shall enter upon the duties of
their respective offices." City Or-
dinances, tit 9, § 3, provides that
"the clerk of the common council
shall also indorse and certify on each
bond, before the same shall be filed,
the resolution of the common coun-
cil approving the same, and the time
of such approval" 1 Rev. St N. Y.
(8th ed.), p. 397, § 9, provides that
every officer shall hold over after
"his term of office shall have ex-
pired, until a successor in such office
shall be duly qualffied." It was de-
cided that an incumbent of one of
the enumerated offices is entitled to
hold over after the expiration of his
term of office, and to draw the salary
therefor, until the bond is approved
and filed as required by the city
charter and ordinances, and an ap-
proval by a justice of the supreme
court is not sufficient De Lacey v.
City of Brooklyn (1891), 13 N. Y.
Supl. 540.
§ 161.]
OFFICERS AND AGENTS.
173
passing of the statute remain in oflSce until new officers are
elected and qualified.'
§ 161. Power to hold over — English and American rules.
Formerly in England the law was well settled that the terra
' Under the laws of Kansas, 1885,
after a city of the third class is or-
ganized into a city of the second
, class, the mayor is to be elected on
the first Tuesday of April of each
odd-numbered year, and a vacancy
must be filled at a special election
called and held for that purpose, as
provided by ordinance; and where
no one is elected mayor of such a
city, after its organization, on the
first Tuesday of April of an odd-
numbered year, and no special elec-
tion is called by ordinance, the mayor
of the city of the third class will
hold over. Moser v. Shamlefifer, 39
Kan. 635; s. c, 18 Pac. Eep. 956.
When a city of the thii-d class is
made a city of the second class, under
the Kansas statute, the city ofiBcers
continue until new officers are
elected and qualified. Ritchie v. City
of South Topeka, 38 Kan. 368; s. c,
16 Pac. Eep. 333. The Pennsylvania
act of 1889, relating to the division
of the cities of the' state into three
classes in accordance with their pop-
ulation, provides (section 2) that at
the election occurring not less than
one month after a city has changed
classes " the proper officers shall be
elected to which the city shall be-
come entitled under the change in
classification; and upon the first
Monday next succeeding thereto the
terms of all officers of said city then
in office, whose oflSces are superseded
by reason thereof, shall cease and de-
termine." The court decided that,
where a city passed from the third
into the second class, it was entitled
to such new oflBcers as were pro-
vided for in cities of the second class
which did not exist in cities of the
third class only, and the terms of
such of its existing oflBcers only as
were abolished in cities of the second
class expired; and where the city
had twenty-six councilmen under the
third class, and was entitled to but
thirteen under the second class, and
the terms of thirteen of such council-
men would expire during the current
year, it was not necessary to elect
new councilmen, as all the old mem-
bers held over for their respective
terms. Commonwealth v. Wyman,
137 Penn. St. 508 ; S. C, 31 Atl. Eep.
389. The Pennsylvania act of 1887,
dividing the cities of the state into
seven classes, and providing that in
the fourth to the seventh classes the
persons then in office should hold for
the terms for which they were elected,
except as otherwise provided, the pro-
visions of the charter of a city of the
fifth class for the election and instal-
lation of members of the council
apply until the terms of all the mem-
bers then in office expire, at which
time the provisions of the act of
1887, in relation thereto, will take
effect; and the provisions that the
councils then in office should hold
until their " successors " should be in-
stalled, according to the act. and that
at the first election under the act the
members should be chosen, etc., do
not show a contrary intention ; there
being a provision that the terms of
members in cities of the fourth class
should cease at the end of that mu-
nicipal year. Appeal of Ayara, 133
Penn. St 336; s. C., 16 AtL Eep. 356..
174
OFFICEES AND AGENTS.
[§ 161.
of office of the mayor or other head officer was animal and
expired at the end of the year, and that he could not hold
over until his successor was provided, unless there was a special
provision in the statute to that effect.' But the American
courts have not adhered to the strict English rule, but have
decided that the chief officer, unless the legislative intent to
the contrary is apparent, holds over until his successor is ap-
pointed.^ The re-organization of a city under the general in-
incorporation law is no abrogatilm of its'former charter, and
determines the tenure of all officers under it, except such as
are within the saving clause of the general law.'
See, also, Pittsburgh's Appeal, 338
Penn. St 401 ; s. c, 21 Atl. Rep. 757,
759, 761.
1 Eex V. Hearle, 1 Str. 627 ; Rex v.
Thornton, 4 East, 808 : Eex v. Atkins,
3 Mod. 12 ; Mayor of Durham's Case.
1 Sid. 33 ; Foot v. Prowse, 1 Str. 625 ;
S. C, 8 Bro. 169; Glover, 173. Some
charters provided that the chief of-
ficer should hold office until his
successor was provided, although his
aiig'"nal term of office was only one
syear. Rex v. Phillips, 1 Str. 394
For the manner by which this was
changed, see 9 Anne, ch. XX, sec. 8.
2 2 Kent's Com. 238; Elmendorf u
Mayor &c. of New York, 25 Wend.
693; Slee v. Bloom, 5 Johns, Ch. 866,
378 ; People v. Runkel, 9 Johns. 147.
By the general Municipal Incorpora-
tion Act of California, 1883, it is pro-
vided that officers chosen at a special
election to be held within two weeks
after the vote in favor of re-organiza-
tion shall hold their respective offices
only until the next general niunicipal
elections. By section 752 it Is pro-
vided that all elective officers of
cities of the fifth class shall be chosen
at a general municipal election to be
held therein in each odd-numbered
year; the marshal, assessor, etc., to
hold office for two years, and the
trustees for four years ; but there is,
a further proviso that the first
board of trustees elected under the
provision of this act shall so classify
themselves by lot that three of their
number shall go out of office at the
expiration of two years, and two at
the expiration of four years. It was
decided that the elective officers, ex-
cept members of the board of trust-
ees, are to hold office for two years,
and they for four years, and that an
election must be held every two years.
Euggles V. Board of Trustees of Cily
of Woodland (Cal., 1891), 26 Pac. Rep.
520. The New York Consolidation
Act, 1888, provides that the terms of
all officers, whensoever actually ap-
pointed, shall cpmmence on the Ist
day of May in the year in which the
terms of office of their predecessors
shall expire; but the commissioner
of public works to be appointed on
the expiration of the term of the
present incumbent in December,
1884, shall hold from the 1st day of
May succeeding such month. It
was hold that it was clearly the
intention that the commissioner's
term should begin May 1, 1885, and
it was immaterial that the termina-
tion of his predecessor's term was
erroneously stated to be in December,
1884. People v. Barretfc 8 N. Y. Supl.
677.
'McGrath u City of Chicago, 24
IlL App. 19. Where, upon the re-
§ 162.]
OFFICEES AND AGENTS.
.ili
§ 162. The same subject continued. — In this country it is
generally held that an annual officer of whatever grade, espe-
cially if his duties consist in the safe-keeping and current man-
agement of property committed to his custody, holds over
until the appointment and qualification of another in his place.
That conclusion was reached upon a review of the authorities
by the Supreme Court of California jn 1865, where the doctrine
was placed upon considerations of public convenience and ne-
cessity.' And the Court of Appeals of Maryland in a compara-
tively recent case makes the following comprehensive state-
ment:— " Unless there is some clearly expressed and positive
prohibition which, by its terras, operates as an ouster, the
person filling the office should, continue to discharge those
duties until a successor is qualified, no matter whether the
office is created by the constitution, by an act of the general
assembly, or by a municipal ordinance. Ubi eadem est ratio,
eadem est lex." " The same rule obtains in many other juris-
dictions.'
vision of a city charter, the term and
mode of election to a city office are
omitted, though the oiBce is con-
tinued in existence, the then incum-
bent rightfully in possession holds
over until superseded by proper legis-
lative action. State v. Simon, 20
Oregon, 305 ; S. C, 26 Pac. Eep. 170.
A certificate issued by the recorder of
the board of aldermen, which is not
authorized by law, notifying com-
plainant of his election, and signed
'■by order of the board," is no evi-
dence of ratification of previous in-
valid action. Lawrence v. Ingersoll,
88 Tenn. 53; S. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 422.
See, also, State v. George, 33 Fla. 585.
• Stratton v. Oulton, 38 Cal. 44. In
that case the office of State librarian
was in contention, but the remarks
of the court show that the rule would
certainly be applied to subordinate
officers of a municipal corporation.
It is often expressly declared by stat-
ute that an incumbent shall hold over.
2 Robb u Carter (1886), 65 Md. 831,
335, where a city solicitor, appointed
under ordinance, held over ; Thomas
V. Owens, 4 Md. 189; Marshall v.
Harwood, 5 Md. 423; Sausbnry v.
Middleton, 11 Md. 296.
5 School Dist. V. Atherton, 13 Met
105 ; Dow V. Bullock, 13 Gray, 136 ;
Chandler v. Bradish, 23 Vt 416;
Kreidler v. State, 34 Ohio St 23;
Stewart v. State, 4 Ind. 396 ; State i'.
Harrison, 113 Ind. 434; People v.
Fairbury, 51 111. 149; People v. Fer-
ris, 16 Hun, 319; Cordrell v. Frizell,
1 Nev. 180 ; State r. Wells, 8 Nev. 105 ;
Ex parte Lawhorne, 18 Gratt (Va.)
85; Wheeling v. Black, 35 W. Va.
366; People v. Eeid, 10 Colo. 188;
Moser v. Shamlefifer, 89 Kan. 685;
Wier V. Bush, 4 Litt (Ky.) 439. For
a construction of statutes relating to
the holding over of officers, see cases
cited in Throop on Public Officers,
§§ 335 et seq.; Mechem's Public Of-
fices and Officers,' §§ 398 et seq.
176
OFFICERS AND AGENTS.
[§ 163.
§ 163. Appointment of officers. — "Where a city council is
authorized to elect officers and no particular mode of election
is prescribed, it may appoint them by resolution,^ and has com-
plete control over all offices and officers existing under by-
laws, unless specially restricted by law.'
1 People V. Bedell, 3 Hill, 196 ; Com-
monwealth V. Pittsburg (Police Force,
1850), 14 Pa. St 177; Low v. Com'rs
of Pilotage, R M. Cliarlt (1830, Ga.)
302 ; Trowbridge v. Newark, 46 N. J.
Law, 140 ; Russell v. Chicago, 26 III.
385 ; Wilder v. Chicago, 36 I'll. 183.
2 People V. Conover, 17 N. Y. 64 ;
People V. Mayor &c. of New York, 5
Barb. 43 ; Samis v. Eing, 40 Conn.
298 ; Wadraven v. Memphis, 4 Coldw.
(Tenn.) 431; Madison v. Korbly, 32
Ind. 74, 79; Ball v. Fagg, 67 Mo. 481.
The acts of artificial persons afford
the same presumptions as the acts of
natural persons. Chief Justice Story,
in Bank of United States v. Dan-
dridge, 13 Wheat 64, 70, and cases
there cited. The constitution of Vir-
ginia providing that all city, village
and town ofiBcers whose election or
appointment is not provided for by
the constitution shall be elected by
the electors of such cities, towns and
villages, or appointed by such au-
thorities as the general assembly
shall designate, is merely enabling,
and does not prohibit the legislature
on incorporating a town from ap-
pointing officers until an election is
held. Roche v. Jones, 87 Va. 484;
s. c, 13 S. E. Rep. 965. The Public
Laws of Rhode Island, 1890, provid-
ing for the appointment by the
mayor of Providence in February,
1891, and triennially thereafter, of a
commissioner of public works, and
requiring that the commissioner
" now in office and those hereafter
to be appointed " should have con-
trol of the city engineering depart-
ment, and should appoint a city en-
gineer on the first Monday in May of
each year, abolished the then exist-
ing office of city engineer after the
fiftt Monday in May, 1890, and did
not provide for an additional city
engineer to be connected with the
board of public work^ Gray v.
Granger (B. I), 31 Atl. Rep. 342.
Laws of New York, 1888, chapter 314,
title 8, section 2, provides for the
appointment of city officers, and de-
clares that, if the council shall fall
to appoint any such officer within
three weeks after any vacancy oc-
curs, it shall be the duty of the
mayor, immediately on the expira-
tion of said three weeks, to appoint
sueh officer and fill such vacancy.
It was held, where the city engineer
resigned after the expiration of three
weeks, the power of the council to
fill such vacancy ceased. People v.
Merrick, 16 N. Y. SupL 346. A mu-
nicipal board having been abolished
by a special act and its duties trans-
ferred to a new one, the members of
the old board cannot enjoin the ap-
pointment of the members of the
new board on the groimd that the spe-
cial act is unconstitutional Reemi-
lin V. Mosby, 47 Ohio St 570 ; s. G, 36
N. E. Rep. 717. The Public Laws of
Rhode Island, 1890, which provide
that " the town councils of the sev-
eral towns throughout the State, and
the mayors of the several cities, ex-
cept the city of Providence, shall
each elect an inspector of buildings,
who shall be paid such amount for
his services as shall be determined
by the town or city council electing
him," requires such inspectoiB to be
§ 164.]
OFFIOEKS AND AGENTS.
177
§ 164. Validity of appointment. — The appointment of a
person to a city office by a mayor under a law which requires
confirmation by the council gives the appointee no right to
the office without such confirmation by the proper and legal
city council.' Where a statute empowers the council of a city
to appoint to a certain office, an ordinance providing that the
council shall elect, every three years, a fit person to such office,
who shall hold his office for the term of three years, and until
his successor is elected, is void, as impairing the power of ap-
pointment of succeeding councils.*
appointed by the mayors, and not by
the city councils, of the cities of Paw-
tucket, Woonsooket and Newport
In re Building Inspectors (1891, R. L),
31 Atl. Eep. 913. The charter of Los
Angeles (Act CaL, Jan. 31, 1889), di-
recting the city council to appoint as
a depositary of the public moneys the
bank offering the highest rate of in-
terest therefor, and the treasurer to
deposit the city funds there daily, is
void, being inconsistent with that
provision of the constitution of Cali-
fornia which provides that the leg-
islature shall not delegate to any
private corporation, company or in-
dividual the right to interfere with
or control any county, city or mu-
nicipal money, and that the public
moneys shall be deposited with the
treasurer, and that making any profit
out of such moneys shall be a felony ;
and also with the Penal Code of Cali-
fornia, punishing by imprisonment
the misappropriation of public mon-
eys by the person charged with keep-
ing them. Yamell v. City of Los
Angeles, 87 CaL 603; S. O., 25 Pac.
Eep. 767.
1 People u Weber, 89 III 347. Under
an ordinance providing for the an-
nual appointment of a gas inspector
by the city council, an appointment
to such oflSce, " subject to the further
orders of this council," is invalid.
12
Kins' V. City of Buffalo (1890), 10 N. T.
Supl. 564.
SHoran v. Lane, 53 N. J. Law, 875;
s. c, sub nom. State v. Lane, 21 Atl.
Eep. 303. Proceedings had under the
act of New Jersey, approved April 6,
1889, providing for an election to de-
termine whether the mayor of a city
shall have the power to appoint cer-
tain o£5cers, are not invalidated by a
raisrecital of some of the provisions
of the act in the proclamation of an
election ; the act not requiring their
Insertion in the proclamation, and
there being nothing to show that the
en-or affected the result of the elec-
tion. In re Cleveland, 52 N. J. Law,
188 ; s. c, 19 Atl. Rep. 17. The rec-
ord of the appointment of a village
marshal was read and approved by
the board of trustees, as being in
accordance with the facts. The va-
lidity of his appointment was ques-
tioned because the record was inter-
lined. It was held that the interline-
ation was immaterial. Brophy v.
Hyatt, 10 Colo. 223 ; S. a, 15 Pac. Eep.
399. The appointment by a city coun-
cil of a member thereof to an office
which the statutes of Ohio makes a
member of council ineligible to fill,
and his acceptance thereof, does not
work an abandonment of his office
as councilman, for the appointment
to the second office is absolutely void.
178 OFFIOEES AND AGENTS. [§§ 165) 166.
§ 165. Appointments by de facto officers. — Whether an
appointment to office by one who is himself only a de facto
officer gives a good title to the appointee is not settled. In
England, whei-e a town burgess was appointed by a ^ faeto
mayor, and the latter was ousted upon a quo wn/rrcmto, the
judgment was held conclusive in a like proceeding against the
former.* In North Carolina and in Ohio such appointments
are brought within the general rule touching the validity of
acts of de facto officers in which the public have an interest,
and the appointee continues to hold the office after the ouster
of his superior.* The Supreme Court of New York, on the
other hand, has held that a judgment in an action in the nat-
ure of a gv,o warranto, whereby an officer is ousted and his
contestant declared entitled, is evidence in favor of an ap-
pointee of the latter against one who derives title from the
former.'
§166. Compensation of officers — In general. — It is a
general rule of law that corporations are liable to its officers
for their salaries when the work has actually been done ; but
it is highly necessary that great care should be exercised in
appointing or electing the officers to their positions, as the
least omission or technicality may be fatal to their appoint-
ment or election, in which event they have no right to com-
pensation.* The salary of an official may be reduced during
State V. Keams (Ohio, 1889), 25 N. E. that the city comptroller "shall have
Bep. 1037. the supervision and control of the
iKex V. Lisle^ Andr. 163; s. a, 3 fiscal concerns of all departments,
Str. 1090. See, also, Rex v. Mayor &a, bureaus and ofiScers of the city and
5 T. R. 66 ; Rex v. Grunes, 5 Burr, school districts. ... He shall be
2599 ; Rex v. Hebden, Andr. 389. paid a fixed yearly salary." The
2 People V. Staton, 73 N. C. 546; school district of Easton did not ac-
State V, Ailing, 12 Ohio, 16; State v. cept this act^ but continued to ac|i
Jacobs, 17 Ohio, 143. See, also, Mai- under a special law. It had power
lett V. Uncle Sam Sec. Co., 1 Nev. 188 ; to appoint an auditor to the school
Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607. accounts. The city comptroller au-
' People V. Anthony, 6 Hun, 14S. dited the school accounts, the school'
See, also. People v. Murray, 73 N. Y. board having passed a resolution that
585 ; and a dictum, contra, by Bron- it was his duty as city comptroller to
son, J., in People v. Stevens, 5 Hill, do so. It was decided that, not hav-
616. ing been appointed auditor by the
< An act passed in Pennsylvania school district, he could not recover
May 23, 1874 (P. L. 252), provided compensation for. such" services.
§ 166.]
OFFIOBBS AND AGEXTS.
1Y9
his term of office.' But an officer cannot be compelled to
take less compensation for his services than that fixed by
statute.'
Eothrock v. School District, 183 Pa.
St 487; S. C., 19 AlL Rep. 483; 25
W. N. C. 510. Under the General
Statutes of Colorado, §3326, which
provides for annual appropriation
bills by the city councils of munici-
palities, and that the objects and
purposes for which appropriation is
made shall be specified, an appro-
priation bill by the city of Leadville,
which recites a total appropriation
of a certain amount, subdivided into
appropriations for the following spe-
cific objects or purposes, to wit, "sal-
ary fund," "streets," "fire," "gas,"
"interest," and "contingent ex-
penses," is a suflScient compliance
with the statute to entitle a street
commissioner duly elected, whose
salary is fixed by ordinance or reso-
lution of the city council, to resort to
the salary fund for payment of his
salary : and it is not necessary that
the bill should specify each particu-
lar office, and the exact sum to be
paid the incumbent thereof. City of
Leadville v. Matthews, 10 Colo. 125 ;
S. C, 14 Pac. Rep. 112. A laborer in
the employ of a city, who was dis-
missed, and afterwards reinstated,
under Laws of N. T., 1887, ch. 464,
providing for preference of honor-
ably discharged Union soldiers as
employees upon public works, etc.,
cannot recover from the city wages
for the time between his removal
and reinstatement, where his posi-
tion has been filled by another, who
performed the duties thereof, and
was paid therefor by the city. Hig-
gins V. City of New York (N. Y.),
30 N. E. Rep. 44, reversing s. C, 14
N. Y. Supl. 554, and following Ter-
hune V. Mayor, 88 N. Y. 248, and ad-
1 Harvey v. Rush County, 32 Kan.
159 ; Hoboken v. Gear (1859), 3 Dutch.
(N. J.) 365. Unless prohibited by the
constitution. Douglass County v.
Timme (Neb.), 49 N. W. Rep. 266.
Municipal oflScers, such as police-
men, are not public officers within a
constitutional provision that no law
shall increase or diminish the salary
or emoluments of a public officer
after his election or appointment
Russell V. Wilhamsport, 9 Pa. Co. Ct
129. See, further, for a construction
of such provisions. State v. Bloxham,
26 Fla. 407; S. C, 7 So. Rep. 873;
Kirkwood v. Soto (Cal.), 25 Pac. Rep.
488; Wren v. Luzerne County, 9
Pa. Co. Ct 22; S. C, 6 Kulp. 37;
Guldin V. Schuylkill County (Pa.
C. P.), 48 Phila. Leg. Int 197.
2 People ex rel. Satterlee v. Board
of Police, 75 N. Y. 88; People ex rel.
Ryan v. French, 91 N. Y. 38; Kehn
V. The State, 93 N. Y. 291. Under
the Vermont act of 1884, No. 12, § 2,
which provides that highway taxes
shall be collected by the town col-
lector when there are no street com-
missioners, the tax bills were not
given by the town to plaintiff, who
was first constable and ex officio col-
lector, but were collected by the
town treasurer. It was held that,
where the declaration in a suit for
the fees for such collection claimed
no agreement for fees as collector,
as provided by R L. Vt, § 2724, nor
alleged any services rendered, the
town was not liable therefor, and a
subsequent promise to pay such fees
would be without consideration.
Woodward v. Town of Rutland, 61
Vt 316; s. G, 17 AtL Rep, 797.
180
OFFIOBBS AKD AOXSHa.
[§167.
§ 167. The same subject continued — Failure of corporate
funds. — If no salary is attached to an office in a municipal
corporation, the corporation is not liable, as the officers are
deemed to have been familiar with the law or ordinance cre-
ating the office when they accepted the position, and there is
no implied contract for compensation.^ Where an officer ac-
cepts the amount of compensation, his acceptance of that sum
estops him from claiming more.^ If the salary of an official is
prescribed by an ordinance or bj»law as being payable in a
certain manner or out of certain assessments or taxes, and
such assessments or taxes have not been collected, and the
corporation is not guilty of negligence in collecting them, the
corporation is not liable for the salary until they have been
collected.'
hering to the general rule that pay-
ment to a de facto officer is a defense
to an action brought by the de jure
officer to recover the same salaiy.
See, also, Hagan v. Brooklyn, 136
N. Y. 643, and for a contrary view,
State V. Carr (Ind.), 28 N. E. Eep. 88,
and a criticism of the prevailing rule
by Mr. Freeman in a note to An-
drevcs. v. Portland (79 Me. 484), 10
Am. St Rep. 384. Where a contest-
ant recovers a public office from the
incumbent, he is also entitled to re-
cover from the latter the salary re-
ceived by him during the term which
belonged to the former. Eillion v.
' Van Patten, 42 Kan. 295 ; S. C, 23
Pao. Eep. 383. See, also, State v.
Holmes (La.), 10 So. Eep. 173. But
it must be shown that the incumbent
actually received ihe salary. Mer-
rltt V. Hinton (Ark), 17 S. W. Eep.
370. The clerk of the city and county
of New York, having been desig-
nated by that title for years before
the passage of Laws of N. Y., 1857,
oh. 628, is the city clerk within the
provision of section 33 of that act,
that bonds taken pursuant thereto
by excise commissioners, from appli-
cants for licenses, shall, in cities, be
filed " in the city clerk's office ; " and
such clerk is therefore entitled, for
filing each such bond, to the fee of
six cents allowed him by Code Civil
Proo. N. Y., § 3304, for filing any
paper required by law to be filed in
his office other than is expressly pro-
vided for, no special fee being pre-
scribed therefor by any statute.
People V. Giegerich, 14 N. Y. Supl.
263.
1 Locke V. Central City, 4 Cola 65 ;
Brazil v. McBride, 69 Ind. 244 ; Doolan
U Manitowoc, 48 Wis. 313 ; Jones v.
Carmarthen, 8 M. & W. 605 ; Askin
V. London, 1 Upper Can., Q. B. 354;
Pringle and McDonald, In re, Upper
Can., Q. B. 356 ; Eegina v. Cumber-
lege, 36 L. T. (N. S.) 700.
2Hobbs V. Yonkers, 103 N. Y. 13;
Mclnery v. Galveston, 58 Tex. 334.
If an officer renders a bill purporting
to cover the whole of his services,
but really for less than he is entitled
to, and it is allowed and paid, be is
debarred from recovering more in
the absence of surprise, accident or
mistake of fact O'Hare v. Pai'k
Eiver (N. D.), 47 N. W. Eep. 380.
3 Andrews v. United States; 2 Story,
C. C. 303; People v. Supervisors, 1
§ 168.]
OFFIOEES AND AGENTS.
181
§ 168. The same subject continued — Illustrations. —
Where a statute requires the appointment of a town collector
fro tempore to be made by writing under tbe hands of the se-
lectmen, it is not satisfied by a writing signed with the names
of all by one selectman, in une absence of the others, and
with no other authority than that which is implied by their
having agreed that the party should be appointed ; and a col-
lector thus appointed cannot maintain an action against the
town for compensation for his services in coUefiting the taxes.'
HUl, 362; Baker v. City of Utica, 19
N. Y. 326; Gumming v. Mayor &C.
of Brooklyn, 11 Paige, 596 ; Smith v.
Commonwealth, 41 Pa. St 335 ; Jer- '
sey City u Quaife, 3 Dutch. (N. J.)
203 ; United States v. Brown, 9 How.
487; McClurg v. St; Paul (1869), 14
Minn. 420. The charter of the city
of Bufialo provided that the comp-
troller should, on or before the 1st day
of April in each year, furnish to the
council a financial statement for the
current year, together with an esti-
mate of the current expenses of each
department Heads of departments
were also required to furnish esti-
mates of the amounts required by
their respective departments for the
current year. The council might
amend such estitnates, and were re-
quired to pass upon them not later
than May 1st The expenditures of
each department were required to be
kept within the estimates made for
it; each oflBce or purpose being
debited with the whole sum appro-
priated, and credited with the salaries
and other fixed sums to be paid there-
from, and "the other expenditures"
were not to exceed the remainder of
the estimate. Contracts for amounts
• exceeding such remainder should not
bind the city as to the excess. The
mayor fixed the salary of the secre-
tary of the civil service commission
at $600 per annum, payable monthly,
but the council only appropriated
$60 for the expenses of the commis-
sion for the whole year. After pay-
ing all the fixed expenses of the
mayor's department, a balance re-
mained to its credit of less than the
amount of salary due the secretary.
It was held that the latter could re-
cover the $50 appropriated for the
expenses of the commission and the
unexpended balance to the credit of
the mayor's fund, but no more. Kip
V. City of Buffalo, 7 N. Y. Supl. 685.
But a superintendent employed "by a
village for the erection of a public
building cannot recover his salary
if the statutory certificate that the
nfoney necessary was in the villiage
treasury was not issued by the village
clerk. Drott v. Riverside, 4 Ohio
C. C. 313.
1 Phelan v. Granville, 140 Mass. 386.
A city charter provided that the
mayor's compensation should he
$3,400 per annum, and might be
changed, but not during his term of
offica It was decided that an ordi-
nance declaring that, after the expi-
ration of the existing term, the
mayor should serve without compen-
sation, was void, and that a mayor
elected with knowledge of the ordi-
nance could claim a salary, even
though as an inducement to his elec-
tion he had said that he would serve
without compensation. State v.
Nashville, 15 Lea (Tenn.), 697 ; 8. G,
54 Am. Rep. 437. A statute making
182
07FICEB8 AND AOEHTS.
[§ 168.
"Where the recorder of a city is vested under the code of the
State with concurrent jurisdiction with justices of the peace
of all actions, civil and criminal, arising within the corporate
limits of the city, and shall receive such fees for his services
as may be allowed by law to justices of the peace for like serv-
ices, except that for his services in criminal prosecutions for
violations of ordinances he shall be entitled to receive only
such monthly salary as the board of trustees shall by ordi-
nance prescribe, he is vested with a dual jurisdiction as re-
corder and justice, and the fines he receives for violations of
the penal code are to be paid over to the county treasurer,
and he must be paid for his services as in the case of justices.^
If the compensation of an officer is not fixed by the laws of
the State, his services, if of a strictly official nature, must be
gratuitous.^ It was decided in an Iowa case that where the
no provision fox* the payment of a
school agent, a promise on the part
of the town to pay for his services is
not implied from the fact of his elec-
tion and ,the rendition of service.
Talbot V. East Machias, 76 Me. 415.
The aqueduct commissioners of the
city of New York have power under
the New York statute to employ and
dismiss inspectors of the work of con-
structing the aqueduct, but have no
power to suspend such an inspector
without pay, there being no provision
in the statute for such suspension;
and an inspector may recover pay
for the time during which he was so
suspended. Mullen v. City of New
York, 13 N. Y. Supl. 289, following
Gregorys. Mayor, 113 N.Y. 416. And
although the New York statute au-
thorizes the aqueduct commissioners
of New York city to suspend without
pay an inspector of the work of con-
structing the aqueduct, and also
authorizes them to appoint and fix
the compensation of inspectors, such
an inspector, who was suspended, is
estopped from claiming his pay
where he signed a writing which re-
cited his appointment, and provided
that, if he should at any time be sus-
pended, his pay should cease. Phelan
V. City of New York, 14 N. Y. SupL
785.
1 Prince v. City of Fresno, 88 CaL
407 ; s. C, 26 Pac. Rep. 606. Under
the New York act passed February 37,
1883, entitled "An act to supply the
city of Schenectady with water," and
providing for the appointmejit of
three commissioners, who, "for the
first year after the commencement
of the construction of water-works
as hereinafter prescribed, shall each
receive such salary as the common
council shall fix, . . . which shall
not exceed $500," and empowering
them to adopt and report any fea-
sible plan for the works, " embracing
the purchase of any water-works,"
the commissioners are entitled to
compensation for the adoption and
the recommendation to the council
of a plan for purchasing works and
for their control and management of
the works after the purchase. Scher-
merhorn v. City of Schenectady, 3
N. Y. Supl. 435 ; s. C, 50 Hun, 331.
2 Boyden v. Erookline, 8 Vt. 284 ;
Langdon v. Castleton, 30 Vt 285;
§ 169.]
OFFIOEBS AST) AGENTS.
183
mayor of an incorporated town was invested by the code of
that State with the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in
criminal cases, which did not, however, make any provision for
compensation, he was not entitled to recover from the county
the reasonable value of his services in the hearing and trial
of a criminal case in which the prosecution failed.'
§ 169. Miscellaneous instances. — One who is appointed a
member of a committee to superintend the construction of
water-works for a city, because of his knowledge and experi-
ence as a civil engineer, is not such a public officer as to pre-
clude him from recovering compensation for the services
rendered under such appointment, where no compensation
therefor has previously been specifically provided.^ If there
is an omission in a village charter to make provision for com-
pensation to members of a certain board, and it is apparent
that such omission was intentional, the members cannot re-
cover any compensation.' Where an inspector, under suspen-
City of Central v. Sears, 3 Colo. 588;
Locke V. Central City, 4 Colo. 65.
iHowland v. Wright County
(Iowa), 47 N. W. Kep. 1086, two
judges dissenting.
2 City" of Ellsworth v. Eossiter, 46
Kan. 237 ; s. C, 26 Pac. Hep. 674. See,
also, Bunn v. People, 45 UL 397 ; But-
ler V. Regents &o., 33 Wis. 124, 131 ;
State V. Wilson, 29 Ohio St 349. In
the absence of any statutory author-
ity for the suspension of an assistant
engineer in the department of public
works of the city of New York, ap-
poit.t-()d under Laws N. Y. 1883, at a
certain salary per year, he may re-
cover such salary for the time during
which he is so suspended and is not
allowed to render service. Morley
V. City of New York (1891), 12 N. Y.
Supl. 609 ; Lethbridge v. Mayor &c.,
15 N. Y. Supl. 563, where a clerk in
a city department maintained an ac-
tion under similar circumstances.
A city having a treasurer duly ap-
pointed and qualified under the gen-
eral act of incorporation cannot
defeat his right to commissions for
disbursement of the municipal funds
by placi:!g them in the hands of the
mayor for disbursement Beard v.
Decatur, 84 Tex. 7 ; s. c, 53 Am. Rep.
735. A selectman, overseer of the
poor and town agent, secured a pen-
sion for one of the town's paupers,
and appropriated -the amount re-
ceived, in pursuance of a previous
agreement with the pauper, to the
settlement of the town's claim
against the latter for support This
amount the pauper subsequently re-
covered from the selectman by suit
It was held that the selectman was
not entitled to compensation from
the town for the expenses incurred
by him in this suit White v. ISb-
vant (1885), 77 Me. 396.
' Perry v. Cheboygan, 55 Mich. 350.
Under the Vermont statute which
provides that auditors sliall not allow
any claim for personal services ex-
cept when compensation is fixed by
184
0FFICEE8 AND AGENTS.
[§ ITO.
sion without pay, exeeates a written agreement, with aqueduct
commissioners, which recites his previous appointment, and
thereby agrees that if he is suspended or discharged for any
cause whatever, while in the employ of such commission, his
pay as such inspector shall cease from and after the time of
such suspension, subject to the direction of the commissioners,
he is estopped from claiming the invalidity of the agreement
as to any period of suspension which follows its execution.'
§ 170. Extra compensation. — It has iong been a fixed
rule of law that one who accepts a public office which has a
definite salary attached to it must perform all the duties of
the office without extra compensation, and. even if after he
enters into office his duties are inoreas^ he cannot compel
payment of extra compensation.* Where an officer's fees are
fixed for an actual day's work, and his duties embrace the work
of two or more departments, he cannot recover further com-
pensation than the amount fiLjoed by statute.' But where a
law or by vote of the town, a tax-
lister can recover onty such compen-
sation as the town votes him. Barnes
V. Bakersfield (1885), 57 Vt. 376.
Chapter 52 of New York Laws of
1880, amending the charter of New
York City, fixes at $3,000 the salaries
of " the clerks of the police courts."
This provision has been held not to
include the clerk's assistants. C^egier
V. New York, 11 Daly (N. Y.), 171.
1 Emmitt v. City of New York, 13
N. Y. Supl. 887.
2 People V. Vilas, 36 N. Y. 459, and
cases cited; Mayor &c. of N. Y. v.
Kelly, 98 N. Y. 467 ; Board of Super-
visors V. Clark, 92 N. Y. 391 ; Board
&c. of Auburn v. Quick, 99 N. Y. 138 ;
Marshall County v. Johnson, 137 Ind.
238 ; s. C, 26 N. E. Rep. 821 ; Pierie
V. Philadelphia, 139 Pa. St 573; S. G,
21 Aa Eep. 90. Right of salaried
oflScer of a public corporation to
claim extra compensation on the
ground that the duties of his office
have been increased or new duties
added since his salai-y was fixed, see
People V. Supervisoi-8, 1 Hill, 362;
Wendell v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. 204;
Palmer v. Mayor &c. of New York, 2
Sindf. 318. See, also, Andrews v.,
Pratt, 44 CaL 309. Eight of officer
to recover when duty performed is
outside of his regular official duty,
see Bright v. Supervisors, 18 Johns.
242 ; Mallory v. Supervisors, 8 Cowen,
531 ; People v. Supervisors, 12 Wend.
357.
' Under the Indiana statute of 1879,
providing that the per diem of town-
ship, trustees for each actual day's
service shall be $2, to be paid out of
the township fund, and that for serv-
ices as overseer of the poor he shall
be paid out of the county treasury,
one who is the duly elected township
trustee, and has been paid $2 per day
out of the township fund for his serv-
ices, cannot claim a further compen-
sation out of the county treasury,
for the same time, for services as
overseer of the poor. Board of Com-
missioners V. Templeton, 116 Ind. 369 ;
s. c, 19 N. E. Rep. 183. If extra
§ 171.] OFFICtEES AND AGENTS. 18S
constitutional provisaon forbids a raunioipality to pay or grant
any extra compensation to a public officer, or to increase his
compensation during his continuance in office, it has been de-
cided that a city council, the members of which receive no
regular pay, has no right to vote compensation to members
for special services performed as a committee.'
§ 171. Compensation of attoriwys. — A public corporation,
unless restrained by its charter, has the power to employ at-
torneys to conduct and carry on such legal business as comes
within its corporate capacity ; * and it is bound to pay for such
services.' Likewise a corporation may employ extra counsel
to prosecute or defend certain suits or to do certain-legal
work either in conjunction with the city solicitor or alone.*
Where a charter gives power to a municipal corporation to
employ an attorney when necessary, and a subsequent chap-
ter provides for a law department, and a chief officer to be
called the attorney and counsel, with a salary, the depart-
ment to have charge of and conduct all the law business of
the corporation, the subsequent chapter is an implied repeal
of the power to employ an attorney under the charter.' The
services are performed by direction 186 ; Smith v. Sacramento, 13 Cal.
of the proper authorities, having no 531.
connection -with the duties of the ' Langdon v. Castleton (1858), 30
office, the officer may be allowed Vt 285.
compensation therefor. United Estates ■* Hugg v. Camden (1878), 39 N. J.
V. Austin, 3 Cliff. 325 ; United States Eq. 6. See, also, Curtis v. Gowan, 34
V. Chassell, 6 Blatchf. 421. HI. App. 516.
iGarvie v. City of Hartford, 54 5 Lydfly ,,. Long Island City (1887),
Conn. 440 ; & C, 7 Atl. ilep. 7S3. 104 N. Y. 318. Where an action was
Where a statute fixes the city treas- brought by a city attorney to i-ecover
urer's salary, and says that he shall for services pei'formed for the city,
not receive "any other fee or reward it was decided that the preparation
whatever," he can claim nothing for of a digest or a codification of the
collections of county taxes which it laws applicable to such city was
is made his duty to collect as such vdthin the line of his duty as laid
officer. Poughkeepsie v. Wiltsie, 36 down by the city charter, which pro-
Hun (N. T.), 370. But when the vjded that he "should do all and
functions of two appointments or every professional act incident to the
offices are separate and distinct, one office which might be required of
person may be entitled to recover him" by the officers of said city,
compensation for both. Marvin v. Hays v. City of Oil City (Pa.), 11 Atl.
United States, 44 Fed. Rep. 405. Rep. 6a
2 State r. Paterson, 40 N. J. Law,
186
OFFIOEES AUD AGBNTS.
[§ 172.
retaining of extra counsel must be authorized by the corpo-
ration,'
§ 172. The same subject continued. — The duties and com-
pensation of attorneys are generally regulated or fixed by
statute or ordinance. sAnd a State statute which, without
limitation, gave the city attorney of a city fees for the trial
of cases, was held in a Connecticut case not to be restricted in
its application to cases tried in the city courts.* Where a city
has power to allow its attorney "fees," it may also allow
him a commission on all sums of money collected for the city ;
and under an ordinance authorizing such allowance, no dis-
tinction can be taken between collections in civil and in crim-
inal cases.' When it is forbidden by statute to increase the
1 Memphis v. Adams (1872), 9 Heisk.
(Tenn.) 518; S. C, 24 Am. Eep. 331;
Clark V. Lyon Co., 8 Nev. 181 ; Mem-
phis r. Brown (1873), 20 Wall. 289,
331. See Eorer v. Laurinburg, 90
N. C. 427 ; Waterbury v. Laredo, 60
Tex. 519. See, also, Hornblower v.
Duden, 35 CaL 666 ; Clough v. Hart,
8 Kan. 487. Compensation of city
attorney, see Orton v. State, 12 Wis.
509 ; Carroll v. St Louis, 12 Mo. 444;
Dillon on Munic. Corp (4th ed.), chap-
ter on corporate oflBcere, where the
mayor may be employed as attorney
and counsel. See Niles, Mayor &o.
V. Muzzy (1875), 33 Mich. 61 ; S. a, 20
Am. Eep. 670. If a county attorney
goes beyond the limits of his county,
with the consent and at the instance
of the county board, he may recover
reasonable compensation in addition
to his salary. Leavenworth Co. v.
Brewer, 9 Kan. 307 ; White v. Polk,
17 Iowa, 413 ; Butler v. Neosho Co.,
15 Kan. 178 ; Hoffman v. Greenwood
Co., 23 Kan. 307.
2 Smith V. City of Waterbury, 54
Conn. 174 ; S. C, 7 Atl. Eep. 17. In
the last cited case it was held that
the words " continuance in office," in
the constitution of Connecticut,
amendment 34, prohibiting the leg-
islatui'e from increasing the salary
of any public officer during his
"continuance in office," mean con-
tinuing office under one appoint-
ment ; and the act of 1881, providing
that " the city attorney {of Water-
bury) shall be entitled to fees for his
services in cases tried for the city," is
not unconstitutional, so far' as it af-
fects that officer upon hjs re-appoint-
ment to that position in 1881, at the
expiration of his former term. And
also that a statute giving a city at-
torney fees for " cases tried for said
city " is not restricted in application
to technical " cases " in courts of jus-
tice, but applies also to a trial of
certain matters for the city before a
railroad commission.
'Austin V. Johns, 63 Tex. 179.
Under an ordinance which gives a
city attorney ten per cent on all
sums of money collected for the city,
such percentage is not restricted to
sums which the attorney actually as-
sisted to collect City of Austin v.
Walton, 68 Tex. 507; S. C, 5 S. W.
Eep. 70, where it was also decided
an ordinance which gives a city at-
torney ten per cent of all sums of
§ 173.]
OFFIOEBS AND AOEKTS.
18T
compensation of the attorney for the city during his term of
office, the fact that the city advances from the second to the
first class during the attorney's term of office doe? not abro-
gate the statutory prohibition.'
§ 173. Compensation — Power of legislature to control.—
The State legislature, except as restrained by the constitution,
has the power to increase, diminish, or cut off entirely, the sal-
ary of an official.^ Likewise the legislature may increase the
duties without enhancing the compensation, or may dimin-'
ish the compensation without lessening the duties.'
money collected for the city is not
repugnant to a subsequent ordinance
giving him a salary and fees in addi-
tion in specified cases, and is not im-
pliedly repealed thereby. A city or-
dinance, passed in 1880, gave the
city attorney a salary in lieu of all
other compensation. A subsequent
statute gave him fees for the trial of
cases. It was held that the compen-
sation given by the statute, not
being in terms in lieu of all other
compensation, was cumulative, and
that the city attorney was entitled
both to the salary given by the ordi-
nance and the trial fees given by the
statute. Smith v. Waterbury, 54
Conn. 174; s. c, 7 Atl. Rep. 17.
' Under an Arkansas statute which
provided that a city council should
not increase the salary of a city offi-
cer during his term in office, whea
the council of a city of the second
class had fixed the salary of the city
attorney, it cannot, after becoming a
city of the first class, increase his
salary during his term in office.
Barnes v. Williams, 53 Ark. 305 ; s. C,
13 S. W. Rep. 845.
2Swann v. Buck (1866), 40 Miss.
i^68 ; Connor v. Mayor &c. of N. Y.
(1851), 1 Seld. (5 N. Y.) 285; affirm-
ing s. C, 3 Sandf. 355 ; People v. Mor-
rell (1839), 31 Wend. 563; Warner v.
People, 7 Hill, 81 ; S. c, 3 Denio, 373 ;
Phillips V. Mayor &c. of N. Y., 1 Hilt
(N.Y. Com. PL) 483; Smith v. New
York (1868), 37 N. Y. 518; Butler v.
Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; Cooley,
Const Lim. 376 ; People v. Mahaney, 13
Mich. 481 ; Bird r. Wasco Co. (1871), 3
Oreg. 282 ; Oregon v. Pyle, 1 Oreg. 149 ;
Coffin V. State (1855), 7 Ind. 157 ; Tur-
pen V. County Comm'rs, 7 Ind. 172 ;
Cowdin V. Huff, 10 Ind. 88 ; Bryan v.
Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538, 553, per Wright,
C. J. ; Cotton v. Ellis, 7 Jones (N. C),
Law, 545 ; Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev.
(N. C.) 1. Police officers of cities are
not within the constitutional provis-
ion forbidding legislation to change
the compensation of public officers
while in office. Mangam v. Brooklyn,
98 N. Y. 585 ; s. c, 5 Am. Rep. 705. An
officer who held over, and discharged
his official duties until his successor
qualified, has been held to be entitled
to pay for his services, although there
was no such provision of law. Robb
V. Carter, 65 Md. 331.
' State V. Davis, 44 Mo. 129 ; Hyde
V. State, 53 Miss. 665 ; Wilcox v. Rod-
man, 46 Mo. 322 ; Sharpe v. Robert-
son, 5 Gratt (Va.) 518. The Califor-
nia statute of 1883 provided that mar-
shals of cities of the sixth class should
receive a compensation to be fixed by
ordinance by the board of trustees ;
also prescribed the marshal's duties,
and provided that he should, for serv-
188
OtnCKSS AND AOEirrs.
C§ 174.
§ 174. Qnalifl«ations for office-holding. — Where neither
hy constitution nor by statute are the qualifications for office
prescribed, any one is eligible who possesses the elective fran-
chise. It may happen, therefore, that one may be an officer
who is not a citizen of the United States, for in a number of
the States aliens, who have declared their intention to be-
come citizens, and have the qualification of residence, are given
the franchise.* The State constitution or statutes generally
lay down the qualifications of officers.* Eligibility to office
ice of any process, receive the same
fees as constables. The court decided
that the compensXtioi]!! fixed by ttie
trustees under the statute was for all
duties imposed on the marshal. Mun-
dell V. City of Pasadena, 87 Cal. 530;
s. c, 25 Pac. Eqp. 1061. Under the
New York statute authorizing the
aqueduct commissioners of the city
of New York to appoint and fix the
compensation of inspectors of the
work of constructing the aqueduct,
the commissioners have no power to
suspend such an insjjector without
pay, there being no provision in the
statute for such suspension ; and an
inspector may recover pay for the
time during which he was so sus-
pended. Emmitt v. City of New York,
13 N. Y. Supl. 887, following Mullen v.
Mayor &e., 12 N. Y. Supl. 269 Under
the California statute of 1883, munic-
ipal corporations are divided into
classes, and by the same act the board
of trustees of cities of the fifth and
sixth classes are authorized to fix by
ordinance the compensation of city
ijiurshals. In an action by the mar-
shal of a city (of the sixth class) to
recover for services rendered, the
complaint failed to state that the
hoard of trustees of such city had
passed any ordinance fixing the com-
pensation of the marshal, or to state
to what class of municipal corpora-
tions such city belonged. It was de-
cided that the complaint was demur-
raHe. Pritchett v. Stanislaus Co., 73
Cal. 310 ; s. C, 14 Pac. Rep. 795.
1 McCarthy v. Froelfce, 63 Ind. 507.
2 State V. Murray, 28 Wis. 96; State
V. Smith, 14 "Wis. 497 ; Wheats Smith,
50 Ark. 266 ; Hannon v. Grizzard, 89
N. C. 115. A provision that only a
qualified elector shall hold office does
not prevent making payment of taxes
a qualification for election as alder-
man. Darrow v. People, 8 Colo. 417.
A statute providing that a person in
arrears in payment of taxes should
not be eligible as an alderman was
held to apply to the office and not to
the election, and therefore payment
at any time before assuming the of-
fice removed the disqualification.
People V. Hamilton, 24 111. App. 609,
holding also that an arrearage result-
ing from the fault of the tax collector
in omitting an item from his state-
ment was not within the contempla-
tion of the statute. Cf. Taylor v. Sul-
livan, 45 Minn. 309 ; s. C, 11 L. R. A
272 ; 47 N. W. Rep. 802, where it was
held that ineligibility of an alien by
reason of his having taken no steps
to become naturalized could not be
cured a*ter the election. Some quali-
fications are required by implication ;
for example, a person shall not hold
incompatible offices. People v. Car-
rigne, 2 Hill, 98 ; People v. Nostrand,
46 N. Y. 375 ; Stubbs v. Lee, 64 Ma
195; State v. Hutt, 2 Ark. 282. If a
person already holding an office is
§ 175.]
OFMOEBS AND AGENTS.
189
belongs not exclusively or specially to electors enjoying the
right of suffrage. It belongs equally to aU persons whomso-
e\rer not excluded by the constitution,^ and cannot be changed
by any ordinance or acts of the corporation.*
§ 175. OfQcial oath. — Public officers are usually required
by statute to take an oath before entering upon the duties of
the office.' Where the form is prescribed by law it should
elected or appointed to another in-
compatible with the one which he
holds, and he accepts and qualifies to
the second, such acceptance and qual-
ification operate, ipso facto, as a resig-
nation of the former office. State v.
Brinkerhofl, 66 Tex. 45. Of. Attorney-
General V. Marston (N. H.), 32 Atl.
Rep. 560 ; People v. Hanif an, 96 111.
420; The King v. Lizzard. 9 Barn. &
C. 418 ; Mil ward v. Thatcher, 3 L. R. 81.
See Turk v. Commonwealth, 139 Pa.
St. 151 ; Cotton v. Phillips, 56 N. H.
219. Sometimes it is provided that
no person shall hold two lucrative
offices, or offices in two departments
of the government, at the same time.
Davenport v. Mayor, 67 N. Y. 456 ;
People V. Brooklyn Common Council,
77 N. Y. 503 ; s. c, 33 Am. Rep. 659 ;
Be CorUss, 11 R. 1 038 ; Dailey v. State,
8 Blackf. (Ind.) 339 ; Rodman v. Har-
coui-t, 4 B. Hon. 334, 499 ; State v. De
Gress, 53 Tex. 887; State v. Clarke, 3
Nev. 566 ; People v. Leonard, 73 Cal.
230 ; Ci-eighton v. Piper, 14 Ind. 183 ;
Kerr v. Jones, 19 Ind. 851 ; Howard
V. Shoemaker, 35 Ind. 115 ; State v.
Kirk, 44 Ind. 401 ; Foltz v. Kerlin,
105 Ind, 231 ; People v. Whitman, 10
Cal. 88 ; People v. Sanderson, 30 Cal.
160 ; Crawford v. Dunbar, 52 Cal. 36 ;
Hoglan V. Carpenter, 4 Bush, 89.
Women may be school officers in
Massachusetts (115 Mass. 602); also
in Iowa. Huff v. Cook, 44 Iowa, 639.
1 Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686, 703.
See State v. George, 23 Fla. 585.
2 People V. Phillips. 1 Dtnio, 388;
Petty V. Looker, 31 N. Y. 267; Com-
monwealth V. Woelper, 3 Serg. & R
29; Rex v. Spencer, 3 Burr. 1827;
Newling v. Francis, 3 L. R. 189 ; Rex
V. Bumstead, 3 B. & Ad. 699 ; Rex v.
Chitty, 5 Ad. & El. 009 ; Rex v. Wey-
mouth, 7 Mod. 371. Where the char-
ter of a city provides that the mayor,
recorder and aldermen, when assem-
bled, shall constitute the common
council, and further provides that the
common council shall be judge of the
election and qualification of its mem-
bers, this power extends to the elec-
tion and qualification of the mayor ;
and being conclusive, the court will
not grant a quo warranto after the
council has t^ken action. Dafoe v.
Harshaw, 60 Mich. 200 ; s. C, 26 N. W.
Rep. 879. When the government of
a city or town is controlled by the
general municipal incorporation act
of Florida, neither six months' resi-
dence nor registration is requisite
to eligibility to office in such city
or town, in the absence of any con-
stitutional or statutory provision to
that effect. State v. Geoirge, 23 Fla.
585 ; s. &, 3 So. Rep. 81. The legisla-
ture incorporating a town may ap-
point the officers to exercise their
functions until a regular election, not-
withstanding the constitution pro-
vides that town officers shall be
elected by the electors of such towns.
Roche V. Jones, 87 Va. 484.
'The subject of official bonds is
discussed in a special chapter, infra..
190
OFFICEES AND AGENTS.
[§ 176.
be substantially followed : a literal adherence is not neces-
sary ; 1 but a material variation will invalidate the oath.^ It
need not been in writing or subscribed unless the statute ex-
pressly so provides.' The officer who is required to admin-
ister the oath cannot lawfully refuse to do so on account of
the ineligibility of the person elected.*
§ 176. The same subject continued. — According to the
weight of authority in this coui$ry, statutory provisions fix-
ing the time within which an official oath must be taken are
construed to be directory, and a delay does not ipso facto
vacate the office, provided the oath is taken before the office
is declared vacant by judicial proceedings.* But a contrary
doctrine is declared in several oases, holding that such stat-
utes are not directory where the delay is caused by neglect
or refusal.* A statute requiring an oath to be administered
by a particular officer was decided in New York to be direct-
ory, and that the oath might be taken before any officer
authorized by a general statute.'
1 State V. Trenton, 35 N. J. Law,
485 ; Bassett u Denn, 17 N. J. liaw,
433 ; Tide Water Canal Co. v. Archer,
9 G. & J. (Md.) 479; Hawkins v. Cal-
loway, 88 III. 155.
2 State V. Trenton, 35 N. J. Law,
485; Bowler v. Djiain Comm'rs, 47
Mich. 154; Chapman v. Clark, 49
Mich. 305 ; Bohlman v. Railway Co.,
40 Wis. 157. An oath " faithfully to
discharge their duties" does not ful-
fill a prescribed form to discharge
their duties " impartially, and to the
best of their judgment" In re Cam-
bria Street, 75 Penn. 357. See, for
other defects pronounced merely
formal, Horton v. Parsons, 37 Hun,
42, a strong case; Colman v. Shat-
tuck, 63 N. Y. 348 ; People v. Stowell,
9 Abb. N. C. 456; Hoagland y. Cul-
vert, 30 N. J. Law, 387; People v.
Perkins, 85 Cal. 509 ; Bassett v. Denn,
17 N. J. Law, 433. And for evidence
that the oath has been taken. Hal-
beck V. Mayor &c., 10 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.)
489 : Harwood v. Marshall, 9 Md. 83 ;
Soammon v. Soammon, 38 N. H. 419;
State V. Green, 15 N. J. Law; 88*
' Davis V. Berger, 54 Mich. 653.
< People V. Dean, 3 Wend. 438, case
of an infant. See, also. Miller v. Su-
pervisors, 35 Cal. 93.
»Throop on Public Officers, § 173,
and numerous cases there cited.
6 Throop on Public Officers, §§ 173,
174, 175, citing (on p. 188) State v.
Matheny, 7 Kan. 837; Courser v.
Powers, 34 Vt 517, where a justice Ajf
the peace, sued for an arrest, could
not justify unless he had taken tho
oath of office before the arrest, al-
though he took it on the same day.
The oath need not be taken while a
contest is pending to determine who
is legally entitled to the office.
Mechem's Public Offices and Officers,
§ 263, citing People v. Potter, 63 Cal.
137 ; Pearson v. Wilson, 57 Miss. 648.
' Eb parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42 ; Can-
nifl V. Mayor, 4 E. D. Smith (N, Y.).
430. See, also, State v. Stanley, 66
N C. 50, and contra, Rex v. Ellis, ii
§ 177.]
OBTIOEES AND AGENTS.
191
§ 177. Duties of officers As a rule the duties of ofiBcers
are fixed by the ordinance or statute creating them ; but in a
"New York case ' it was held that " statutes directing the mode
of proceeding by public officers are directory, and are not re-
garded as essential to the validity of the proceedings them-
selves unless it be so declared in the statute." Where from
the nature of the office the officer is called upon to exercise
duties involving jadgment and discretion, he cannot delegate
his power.* Where all the legitimate lights for ascertaining
the meaning of the constitution have been made use of, it
may still happen that the construction remains a matter of
doubt ; and in such a case every one called upon to act, where,
in his opinion, the proposed action would be of doubtful con-
stitutionality, is bound upon the doubt alone to abstain from
acting.' It is frequently provided by statute that the incum-
bents of certain municipal offices shall not be in any manner
interested in contracts for which the corporation is liable.
These statutes are generally strictly construed.*
East, 252, note; S. C., 3 Str. 994 But
irregularities of this nature do not
prevent the application of the rule
validating acts of de facto officers.
State V. Perkins, 34 N. J. Law, 409.
1 People V. Cook, 14 Barb. 390 ; S. C.,
8 N. Y. 67.
2 The duty to examine and pass
upon resolutions and ordinances of
the common council,'and determine
whether they should be approved,
imposed by the city charter on the
mayor, is a duty calling for the ex-
ercise of his judgment and expe-
rience, and cannot be delegated to
the mayor's clerk. Lyth v. City of
Buffalo, 48 Hun, 175. The mayor of
Hudson, not being one of the oflS-
cials designated in Laws of New
York of 1890, was not obliged to take
the test oath required of such offi-
cials by section 3 of the same act
People V, Gregg, 13 N. Y. Supl 114.
'Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th ed.),
ch. IV, 88. The Revised Statutes of
Indiana make it the duty of a town-
ship trustee to grant temporary relief
to one, not an inhabitant of the town-
ship, who is sick or in distress, and
without money or friends, etc. It
was decided that the trustee is not
precluded from acting by the fact
that such a person has been received
into a house from chai-itable mo-
tives, and has been and is being cared
for. Howard County Comm'rs v.
Jennings, 104 Ind. 108. The fact that
a supervisor, at the request of citi-
zens of the town, built a sidewalk at
the expense of the town, did not im-
pose on him any duty to repair as an
mdividuaL That duty rested upon
the persons who directed him to build
the walk. Chartiers Tp. v. Langdon,
131 Pa. St 77 ; s. C, 18 AtL Rep. 930 ;
35 W. N. C. 203.
* The New York Acts of 1883 de-
clare that no clerk in the employ of
New York city shall become inter-
ested in the performance of any con-
tract work or business the price of
which is payable by the city. It was
192
OFHOBBS AND AUSTifiak
[§ 178.
§ 178. Powers of mayor, — The mayor is the chief oflBcer
or executive magistrate of the corporation, and his powers de-
pend entirely upon the provisions of the charter, or constitu-
ent act of the corporation and valid by-laws passed in pursu-
ance thereof ; ' and although his duties are primarily executive
and administrative, judicial duties are often superadded to
those which properly appertain to the office of mayor, and he is
invested by legislative enactment with the authority to ad-
minister not only the ordinancesi of the corporation, but also
judicially to administer the laws of the State.*
held that a clerk could not become a
lecturer in an evening school under
an appointment from the board of
education. McAdam v. New York,
36 Hun (N. Y.), 340. New York Laws
of 1882 prohibit an ofBcer of the cor-
poration of New York from being
interested in the performance of any
work to be paid for from the city
treasury. It was held that an exam-
iner in lunacy could not be a sani-
tary inspector in the vaccinating
corps. Fitch v. New York, 40 Hun
(N. Y.), 513.
1 Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.),
291.
2 Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.),
391, 392; Waldo v. Wallace (1859), 13
Ind. 569. See, also, S!ater v. Wood,
9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 15 ; Morrison v. McDon-
ald (1843), 31 Me. 550 ; Commonwealth
V. Dallas (1801), 3 Yeates (Pa.), 300;
State V. Wilmington (18S9), 3 Harring.
(Del.) 394; Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md.
831; Luehrman v. Taxing District
' (Tenn.), 2 Lea, 425; Reynolds v. Bald-
win, 1 La, Ann. 162; Howard v.
Shoemaker, 35 Ind. Ill; Gulick v.
New, 14 Ind. 93 ; Prell v. McDonald,
7 Kan. 426 ; Martindale v. Palmer, 53
Ind. 411. The power to take general
affidavits vested in justices of the
.peace by the Arkansas statutes
(Mansf. Dig., § 2918) may be exercised
by the mayors of incorporated towns
within the liofits of their corpora-
tions, by virtue of the statute (Mansf.
Dig., § 797) which confers upon such
mayors " all the powers and jurisdic-
tion of a justice of the peace m all
matters, civil and criminal, arising
under the laws of the State, to all
intents and purposes." Such mayor
may consequently take an affidavit
to be used in prosecuting an appeal
from a judgment of the county court
to ,the circuit court. Robinson v.
County of Benton, 49 Ark. 49 ; s. a,
4 S. W. Rep. 195. When the mayor
has judicial authority to conduct
criminal examinations he is not per-
sonally liable in damages for refusal
to proceed with an examination until
the following day, and to accept bail,
and for directing that the accused be
locked up until the following day.
Hommert v. Gleason, 14 N. Y. SupL
568. If he has acquired complete ju-
risdiction he enjoys the same im-
munity from personal liability for
subsequent excesses of authority that
is accorded to the j udges of courts gen-
erally. State V. Wolever, 127 Ind. 306 ;
S. G, 26 N. E. Eep. 763. For the history
and nature of office of mayor, see Dil-
lon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), g§ 13, 174,
353, 260, 271, 331, 428; Norton's Com.,
pp. 90, 402, 403; PuUing's Laws, Cus-
toms &C, of London, ch. II, 16 m ; 3
Bouvier's Dictionary, 150 ; 4 Jacobs'
Law Dictionary, 264, 265; 3 Toml.
Law Dictionary, 540; Fletcher v.
§ 179.]
OFFIOEKS AHD AGENTS.
193
§ 179. The same subject continued — Statutory proTis-
ions. — It is often provided by statute that the duties of the
mayor shall fall, in his absence, upon the president of the
council or a similar officer.' The New York statute authoriz-
ing the mayor of each city to prescribe civil service rules and
to employ suitable persons to make inquiries and examina-
tions and prescribe their duties gives the mayor power to des-
ignate a secretary for the civil service commission appointed
by him under the act and to fix his salary.^ The mayor
Lowell, 15 Gray, 103 ; Ela v. Smith, 5
Gray, 131 ; Nichols v. Boston, 98 Mass.
39; Cochran v. McCleary (1867), 23
Iowa, 75, 83. Under the Code of
Iowa, section 506, providing that
" the mayor of eacli city or incorpo-
rated town shall be a magistrate or
conservator of the peace, and, within
the same, have the jurisdiction of a
justice of the peace in all matters
civil and criminal ; . . . but the
criminal jurisdiction shall be co-ex-
tensive with the county in which
such city or town is situated," it was
held that the mayor is given the
same jurisdiction in civil cases as a
justice of the peace, and, therefore,
his jurisdiction extends to a case
brought before him by a resident of
his incorporated town against a resi-
dent of the county, but not of the
corporation nor of the township in
wliich it is situated, by a notice served
on the defendant within his township,
but outside the limits of the corpora-
tion, and of the township wherein
it is situated. Weber v. Hamilton,
73 Iowa, 577 ; S. C., 34 N. W. Eep. 434.
1 Upon an issue as to title to a mu-
nicipal office, the power of appoint-
ment to which is vested in the mayor,
proof of appointment by the presi-
dent of the council, who is author-
ized to act as mayor in certain cases,
is not sufficient without showing the
facts upon wliich the right to exer-
cise such power depends. State v,
13
Board of Health (N. J.), 8 Atl. Rep.
609. Where the charter provides
that in case of the absence of the
mayor from the city another pfficer
shall act in his place, only such an
absence as will render the mayor un-
able to perform his duties is intended.
Detroit v. Moran, 46 Mich. 213. Un-
der a provision in the charter of Jer-
sey City authorizing the president of
the council to act as mayor in the
absence of the latter from the city,
except in faking certain appoint-
ments, the president may issue a
proclamation as mayor pro tempore,
submitting the adoption of the act to
the voters of the city, that power
being vested in the mayor by said
actL In re Cleveland, 51 N. J. Law,
319 ; s. C, 18 Atl. Eep. 67. The New
Jersey statute, approved 1889, author-
izes the mayors of the cities of the
State to appoint the principal mu-
nicipal officers, in case the actsliould
be accepted at a popular election, and
authorized the respective mayors of
the cities, by proclamation, to call
such election. It was decided that in
case the mayor was absent, and tlie
charter, in such contingency, vested
the powers of the mayoralty in a
specified officer, such officer could
proclaim the election. In re Cleve-
land, 63 N. J. Law, 188; S. C, 19 Atl.
Rep. 17. See, also. In re Cleveland,
51 N. J. Law, 319.
a Kip V. City of Buffalo, 7 N. Y.
194
OFFIOEES AND AGENTS.
[§ 180.
and city council of a Nebraska city have power to compromise
claims against the city arising under a contract to erect asys-
tem of water-works for the city.* The mayor may adminis-
ter oaths to city oflBcers ; and under the New York statute he
may appoint municipal officers independent of the board of
aldermen.*
§ 180. The same subject continued — Miscellaneous
powers. — Under authority to preserve the public peace the
mayor may resist the lawful police force when they are at-
SupL 685. A mayor, supposing that
he had power to make an ad interim
appointment of a (Aty officer, at-
tempted to exercise that power, and
that alone. But it was held that, if
he did not have the power which he
attempted to exercise, the appoint-
ment could not be deemed an appoint-
ment for a full term, which the
mayor had the power, but not the in-
tention, to make. People v. Hall, 104
N. Y. 170 ; S. C 10 N. E. Eep. 135.
1 State V. Martin, 27 Neb. 441 ; S. C,
43 N. W. Eep. 244. The mayor of a
city of the first class does not have
the authority to suspend the city en-
gineer under Compiled Laws of Kan-
sas, chapter 18, defining the powers
of mayors of such cities and vesting
such authority in the corporation it-
self. Metsker v. Neally, 41 Kaa 122 ;
s. c, 21 Paa Eep. 206. Under the
General Statutes of New Hampshire,
chapter 42, section 3, mayors of cities
are authorized to administer oaths to
aldermen and common councilmen,
and by chapter 40, section 2, all pro-
visions of the statutes relating to se-
lectmen and town clerks of towns
are construed to apply to mayors,
aldermen and city clerks of cities;
and, the former being authorized by
statute to administer oaths to all
town oflBcers, the mayor of a city
has that authority in relation to city
oflBcers. Drew v. Morrill, 62 N. H.
23.
2 The laws of New York of 1884,
chapter 43, section 1, entitled "An
act to center responsibility in the
municipal government of the city of
New York," which provides that all
the appointments to oflBce in the city
of New York previously made by the
mayor, and confirmed by the board
of aldermen, shall thereafter be made
by the mayor without such confirma-
tion, applies to excise commissioners
in New York, the power to appoint
whom was previously vested in the
mayor subject to confirmation by the
aldermen, although they may be, in
a technical sense. State officers. Peo-
ple V. Andrews, 104 N. Y. 570 ; S. C.,
12 N. E. Eep. 274. The charter of
the city of Minneapolis (Sp. L. of
Minn. 1881, ch. 76, subch. 4, § 5, subd.
11) authorized the city council by
ordinances " to erect lamps, and to
provide for lighting of the city," and
"to create, alter and extend lamp
districts." And it was held that the
power so conferred requires the ex-
ercise of judgment and discretion,
and cannot be delegated to a com-
mittee of the council, so that the de-
termination of the committee will be
final, either as to establishing new
lamps or discontinuing those already
established. Minneapolis Gas-Light
Co. V. City of Minneapolis, 36 Minn.
159; s. c, 30 N. W. Eep. 450. See,
further, as to delegation of powers, the
chapter on PuBUC Boards, infra.
§ ISl.j OFFIOEES AND AGENTS. 195
tempting to commit an unlawful act, and may call to his aid
a rival body of police.' Where both by charter and ordinance
the mayor is vested with certain executive power, it is not
abridged by an ordinance confiding authority in the particu-
lar case to another ofBcial also ; * and if the law requires that
a certain fact " be made to appear to " the mayor as a condi-
tion precedent to action by him, his judgment is conclusive
and protects him from civil liability.' In Louisiana the Su-
preme Court sustained a suit by the mayor in his oifioial ca-
pacity to restrain a contemplated violation of the charter by
other municipal officers. " We cannot prescribe to him," said
the court, " the course which he is to pursue in the discharge
of his official duties. The power to see the charter faithfully
executed being given to him, the selection of the means nec-
essary to its exercise is left to his discretion, and we cannot
interfere with them if they violate no law." * Authority con-
ferred upon the mayor to punish summarily infractions of po-
lice regulations is not an encroachment upon the judicial
power vested elsewhere by the constitution."
§ 181. Xiscellaneons instances of powers of municipal
officers. — At the common law, in addition to suits by indi-
viduals and corporations, there are some collective bodies,
1 Slater v. Wood, 9 Bo8w. (N. T.) their capacity to sue is commensu-
15. rate with their public trusts and du-
2 Pedrick v. Bailey, 13 Gray, 161. ties, see Auditor-General v. Railroad
A city cennot by ordinance confer a Co. (1890), 82 Mich. 426, 429, citing
greater power upon its mayor than Supervisor v. Stimson, 4 Hill, 136 ;
that given by charter. Union Depot Overseers v. Overseers, 18 Johns.
& R Co. V. Smith (Colo.), 27 Pac. Eep^ 407 ; Todd v. Birdsall, 1 Cowen, 260 ;
329. County Treasurer v. Bunbury, 45
SEla V. Smith, 5 Gray, 121. He Mich. 84 The execution of an ap-
may order the abatement of a public peal bond by a mayor on behalf of a
nuisance (Henderson v. Mayor, 3 La. city is not incidental to the power to
563) ; and notice to him of a nuisance prosecute appeals, and therefore does
on city property is notice to the city, not bind the city. Baltimore v. Rail-
Nichols V. Boston, 98 Mass. 39. road Co., 21 Md. 50.
<Genois, Mayor &a v. Lockett, 13 'Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331.
La. 545, which is questionable law, Cf. Waldo v. Wallace, 13 Ind. S69 ;
according to Judge Dillon. Dillon on Howard v. Shoemaker, 35 Ind. Ill ;
Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 208. That Morrison v. McDonald, 81 Mo. 550 ;
[jublio officers need not be expressly Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426.
authorized to bring suit, but that
L&6
OFFICEBS AND AOBNT8.
[§ 181.
whicb, althougk not strictly corporations, have been invested
by law with certain corporate powers, and may sue in respect
to the matters specially committed to their charge ; and in
general, all public officers, although not expressly authorized
by statute, have a capacity to sue commensurate with their
public trusts and duties.' A town treasurer has no power to
convey real estate in behalf of the town, unless expressly au-
thorized by vote, and a note given in payment of such unau-
thorized deed i§ without oonsidei*tion and void.* Councilman
of a town appointed by its charter, who enter upon, and per-
form the duties of their office, are de facto officers, and, though
the charter be unconstitutional, their acts in levying a license
tax, as uuthorized by it, are binding.'
1 Supervisors v. Stimson, 4 Hill
CN. Y.), 136 ; Overseers of Pittstoven
V. Overseers of Plattsburgh, 15 Johns.
436; Todd u Birdsall, 1 Cow. 260,
and cases cited in note. See, also,
Palmer v. Vandenbergh, 3 Wend.
193; Silver v. Cummings, 7 Wend.
181; Avery v. Slack, 19 Wend. 50;
Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.),
§237.
2 Monson v. Tripp, 81 Ma 24 ; S. 0.,
16 AtL Eep. 327. Town selectmen
have no right to inquire into the le-
gality of the vote of a school district
to raise money; they have only to
assess the tax voted, and may be
compelled to do so by mandamus.
School District v. Carr, 63 N. a 201.
The laws of New York of 1886, chap-
ter 335, annexing the town of New
Lots to the city of Brooklyn, author-
ized the mayor and other officers of
the city to purchase the property
and franchises of a water company
incorporated in the town, at such
price as might be agreed upon by
such officers and the company, and,
if they should be unable to agree
upon a price, power to acquire the
property and franchises by right of
eminent domain was given the city
"within two years hereafter." No
agreement was made for the pur-
chase of the property, and no pro-
ceedings were taken to acquire title
to it within two years after the pas-
sage of the act But it was held that
the power of the officers named to
buy expired with the two years to
which the right to take by eminent
domain was limited. Ziegler v.
Chapin (1891), 13 N. Y. Supl. 783;
R C. 126 N. Y. 342.
8 Roche V. Jones (Va.), 12 S. E. Kept
965. The board of estimate and ap-
portionment of New York city have
no power to transfer money to pay
clerks employed by the commission-
ers of accounts, the appropriation for
their payment having been stricken
oflE from the provisional estimate.
Bird V. New York, 33 Hun. (N. Y.),
396. Where a county physician re-
fuses to treat a person in urgent need
of medical attendance a township
trustee has authority to employ aa-
other, and his declarations concern-
ing payment are competent. Wash-
bum V. Shelby County Comm'rs, 104
Ind. 321 ; s. G, 54 Am. Eep. 332. A
department of the city government
which has permitted another depart-
ment to use buildings cannot resume
possession of them against the vrill
§ 182.] OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 197
§ 182. Be facto officers — General statement. — The lead-
ing modern case wherein de facto oflBcers are defined and the
general rules relating to their acts succinctly stated and sup-
ported by a vast array of authorities in an opinion of great in-
trinsic weight is State x. Carroll,' decided by the Supreme
Court of Connecticut. Chief Justice Butler summarizes the
law as follows : — An officer de facto is one whose acts, though
not those of a lawful officer, the law upon principles of poKcy
and justice will hold valid, so far as they involve the interests
of the public and their persons, where the duties of the office
were exercised : — First, without a known appointment or elec-
tion, but under such circumstances of reputation or acquies-
cence as were calculated to induce people without inquiry to
submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to be the offixjer
he assumed to be. Second, under color of a known and valid
appointment or election, but where the officer has failed to
conform to some precedent requirement or condition, as, to
take an oath, give a bond, or the like. Third, under color of
a known election or appointment void because the officer was
not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the elect-
ing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irreg-
ularity in its exercise, such irregularity, want of power or
defect being unknown to the public. Fourth, under color of
an election or appointment by or pursuant to a public uncon-
stitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.^
of the department occupyiDg them. State having the charge or control of
New York Health Department v. the water supply of such municipal
Van Cott, 51 N. Y. Super. Ct 413. corporation," may make a contract
Where a party, before the expitatlon for obtaining or furnishing a supply
of the time for an- appeal from a of water for extinguishing flres and
judgment in favor of a municipal other proper purposes; and that
corporation, proposes to compromise " any such contract and agreement,
with the council by paying one-half when so made, shall be a valid and
oi such judgment and costs, such lawful contract of such municipal
council does not exceed its powers corporation." And it was held that
by settling with such party in the under this act the township commifc-
manner proposed. Agnew v. Brail, tee may make a contract with a
124 IlL 313 ; s. C, 16 N. E. Rep. S30. water company for a supply of water,
The laws of New Jersey of 1888, and order the levy of a tax to pay
page 366, provide that " the board of therefor. State u Inhabitants of
aldermen, common council, . . . Summit Tp., 53 N, J, Law, 483 ; S. C,
township committee, ... or 19 Atl. Rep. 966.
other board, body or department of ' 38 Conn. 449.
any municipal corporation in this ^ state v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, sua-
198
OFFIOEBS AND AGENTS.
[§ 183.
§183. The same subject continued — Color of title. — It
was formerly deemed essential to the validity of the acts of
an officer de facto that he should be in possession under color
of title by an election or appointment ; ' but although that
rule is still maintained by some of the authorities,* the later
tendency is toward more liberal views in favor of the public.
" Third persons, from the nature of the case, cannot always
investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important
office, even so far as to see that he has color of title to it, by
virtue of some appointment or election. If they see him pub-
licly exercising its authority, if they ascertain that this is
generally acquiesced in, they are entitled to treat him as such
officer, and, if they employ him as such, should not be sub-
jected to the danger of having his acts collaterally called in
question," ' while the acts of a mere usurper or intruder with-
out color of right are utterly void.* Such a person may, by
public acquiescence, gain sufficient color of authority to sup-
port him as an officer die facto?
taining a conviction for crime in a
court presided over by a de fado
jadge. The acts done must be such
as an oflBcer de ^ure flight lawfully
do. Shelby v. Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273 ;
s. a, 73 Am. Dec. 169. See, also, gen-
erally, on the subject of de facto of-
ficers, Throop on Public Officers,
ch. XXVII, and Mechem on Public
Offices and Officers, ch. VIII.
1 Eex V. Lisle, 3 Str. 1090 ; S. C.,
Andr. 163.
« Cocke V. Halsey, 16 Pet 71 ; Fitch-
burg R. Co. V. Grand Junction &c. B.
Co., 1 Allen, 553 ; Brown v. Lunt, 37
Me. 433 ; Hooper v. Goodwin, 48 Me.
79 ; Carleton v. People, 10 Mich. 250 ;
Douglass V. Wickwire, 19 Conn. 489 ;
State V. Brennan's Liquors, 35 Conn.
278 ; Plymouth v. Painter, 17 Conn.
585 ; Elliott v. Willis, 1 Allen, 461 ;
People V. Albertson, 8 How, Pr.
868; People v. Collins, 7 Johns. 549;
Kclnstry v. Tanner, 9 Johns. 135;
Rochester &c. R. Co. v. Clarke Nat
Bank, 60 Barb. 334; "Wilcox v. Smith,
5 Wend. 331 ; Commissioners v. Mc-
Daniel, 7 Jones' (N. C.) Law, 107;
MoGargell v. Hazleton Coal Co., 4
Watts & Serg. 434; Gregg v. Jami-
son, 55 Pa. St 468 ; Aulanier v. Gov-
ernor, 1 Tex. 653.
*Per Devens, J., in Petersilea v.
Stone (1876), 119 Mass. 465, 467. See,
also. People v. Staton, 73 N. C. 546 ;
State V. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; Peo-
ple V. Peabody, 6 Abb. Pr. 328, 233;
S. c, 15 How. Pr. 470; Throop on
Public Agents, § 624; "Who is de
Jacto Officer," 11 L. R. A. 105.
estate V. Taylor (1891), 108 N. C.
196; s. C, 12 L. R. A. 203; 12 S. B.
Rep. 1005 ; McCraw v. Williams, 33
Gratt 510; Hooper v. Goodwin, 48
Me. 80; Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H.
113; Hamlin v. Kassafer, 15 Oreg.
456"; S. C, 8 Am. St Rep. 176.
6 State V. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449;
S. C, 9 Am. Eep. 409; Mechem on
Public Offices and Officers, §§'319,
331.
§§ 184, 185.] OFFIOBBS ANI) AGENTS. 199
§ 184. Incumbent of an unconstitutional office.— It is no
impeachment of the acts of an officer who is otherwise de facto
that his appointment or election is unconstitutional ; as, for
instance, where he is appointed in violation of a constitution
providing for his election)- But where no office legally exists,
there can be no de facto officer. This qualification of the rule
was declared in an elaborate opinion by Mr. Justice Field of the
Supreme Court of the United States, and an unconstitutional
act creating an office " is, in legal contemplation, as inoper-
ative as though it had never been passed." ' And the same
rule is applied when an office is abolished by statute; thence-
forth there can be no de facto incumbent.'
§ 185. Possession of office by de facto officer. — In order
to confer validity on the acts of a tZfi facAo officer he must be
in possession and control of the office. There cannot be a joint
occupancy by two persons of a single office,' and if both are
assuming to act officially, the one who is destitute of legal title
can perform no valid act.* Where each of two rival claim-
ants held possession for three days, the court decided that
neither could sustain the character of an officer defacto.^
1 Chicago &c. Ey. Co. v. Langlade two school inspectors was unconsti-
County, 56 Wis. 614 See, also, Leach tutional because only one was author-
V. People, 122 111. 420; Meagher v. ized, the acts of both incumbents
Storey County, 5 Nev. 244 ; Iiatnbert would be valid until the law should
V. People, 76 N. Y. 220 ; State v. be declared unconstitutional.
Bloom, 17 Wis. 521; Coal u Black » Long w. Mayor &c., 81 N.Y. 425;
Eiver Falls, 57 Wi& 110; VjX 'parte Ex parte Snydei-, 64 Mo. 58; Conway
Strang, 21 Ohio Sfe 610; State u Car- u St Louis,' 9 Mo. App. 488; In re
roll, 38 Conn. 449. Hinkle, 31 Kan. 712 ; Yorty v. Paine,
2 Norton v. Shelby County, 118 62 Wis. 154 ; Burt v. Winona &o. R
U. S. 425, 442. Mr. Justice Field says Co., 31 Minn. 472; Leach v. People,
that the last paragraph of Chief Jus- 122 111. 420. But c/. State v. Farrier,
tice Butler's definition (second pre- 47 N. J. Law, 383.
ceding section, swpra) "refers not to *Boardman v. Halliday, 10 Paige,
the unconstitutionality of the act ere- 223, 232. See, also, Throop on Public
j>ting the oflBce, but to the nnconsti- Officers, § 641 ; Mechem on Public
tutionality of the act by which the Offices and Offlcei-s, §§ 322, 323 ;
officer is appointed." See, also, JEJc Morgan v. Quacken|}ush, 22 Barb. 80 ;
parte Reilly, 85 Cal. 632 ; People v. Hamlin v. Kassafer, 15 Oregon, 456 ;
Toal, 85 Cal. 333 ; " Acts of de facto s. c, 3 Am. St. Rep. 176.
Councils" in chapter on Public » State v. Blossom, 19 Nev. 313;
Boards, infra. Cf. Donough v. Auditors v. Benoit, 20 Mich. 176;
Dewey (1890), 83 Mich. 309, where it Cronln v. Stoddard, 97 N. Y. 271.
was held that if a law providing for * Conover v. Devlin, 15 How. Pr.
200
0FFI0EE8 AND AGENTS.
[§§ 186, 187.
§ 186. Rights and liaMlities of de facto officers.— An
oMcer de facto can neither maintain nor defend suits in his
official capacity. When he sets up a title by virtue of his
office, he must show an unquestionable right.' An infant
cannot justify for service of process as a constable.* Actual
incumbency merely gives a public officer no right to recover
SEdlary of fees either by suit against the municipality or against
privkte persofis.' Nor can he bring a suit in his official title
for pecuniary penalties.*
§ 1S7. Resignation by acceptance of incompatible office.
Where a person holds an office which he is at liberty to re-
linquish at his cwn pleasure, the acceptance of another and
incompatible office vacates the first ofiice; ' and it requires no
(N. Y.) 470. See, also, Braidy v.
Theritt, 17 Kan. 468 ; Runion v. Lati-
mer, 6 S. C. 136; Ex parte Norris, 8
S. C. 408; Esis parte Smith, 8 S. C.
495.
1 Adams v. Tator, 43 Hun, 384;
Dolan V. Mayor &o., 68 N. T. 374;
Venable v. Curd, 3 Head (Tenn.), 583 ;
Shepherd v. Staten, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.)
79 ; Riddle v. Bedford County, 7 Serg.
& R 386; People v. Nostrand, 46
N. Y. 875 ; Dillon v. Myers,^ Bright
(Pa.) 436 ; Fowler v. Beebe, 9 Mass.
331; Hamlin v. Dingman, 5 Lans.
(N. Y.) 61; Kimball v. Alcorn, 45
Miss. 151 ; People v. White, 34 Wend.
630; Patterson w Miller, 3 Met (Ey.)
493 ; People v. Hopson, 1 Denio, 574 ;
People V. Weber, 86 111. 388; s. a. 89
III. 347; Nichols v. MacLean, 101
N. Y. 536; Miller v. Callaway, 33
Ark. 666 ; Olmsted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y.
878; Keyser v. McKissan, 3 Rawle
(Pa.), 130. But he will be protected
in public expenditures for lawful
piirpoBes.. McCracken v. Loiioy, 39
IlL App. 619.
2 Green v. Biirke, 33 Wend. 490.
See, also, Short v. Symmes, 159 Mass.
398; Colburn v. Ellis, 5 Mass. 437;
Cummings v. Clark, 15 Vt 653;
Courser v. Powers, 34 Vt 617 ; John-
ston V. Wilson, 3 N. H. 303; Pearce
V. Hawkins, 3 Swan (Tenn.), 87; Peo-
ple V. Weber, 86 111. 383 ; s. C, 89 HL
347; Miller v. Callaway, 33 Ark. 666;
Patterson v. Miller, 2 Met (Ky.) 493;
Rodman v. Harcourt^ 4 B. Mon. (Ky.)
234.
'Dolan V. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 274;
S. C, 33 Am. Rep. 168 ; People v.
Hopson, 1 Denio, 574; Mayfield v.
Moore, 53 111. 438 ; McCue v. Wapello
County, 56 Iowa, 698; Prescott v.
Hays, 42 N. H. 56 ; Riddle v. Bedford
County, 7 Serg. & R. 393 ; Philadel-
phia V. Given, 60 Pa. St 136 ; Dolliver
«. Parks, 136 Mass. 499. He cannot
recover, for instance, if he omitted
to take the oath required by statute.
Thomas tt Oweiis, 4 Nev. 189 ; Phila-
delphia u Given, 60 Pa. St 136.
•* Gould V. Glass, 19 Barb. 179;
Supervisor v, Stimson, 4 Hill, 136;
Horton v. Parsons, 87 Hun, 43 ; Peo-
ple V. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375.
» People V. Nostratjd, 46 N. Y. 875;
People V. Carrique, 2 Hill, 93 ; Magie
V. Stoddard, 35 Conn. 565 ; State v.
Curran, 10 Ark. 142; Pooler v. Reed,
73 Ma 139; Stubs v. Lee, 64 Me. 195;
State n Goflf, 15 R L 505 ; People v.
Hanifan, 96 III. 430 ; Foltz v. Kevan,
105 Ind. 221 ; State v. West, 33 La.
§ 188.] OPFIOEES AND AGENTS. 201
legal proceedings to effect this result,' If a person be elected
simultaneoasly to two incompatible offices, by qualifying for
either he Signifies his refusal of the other.'* But where the
officer is' holding over by law until his successor is chosen, it
seeins that he may continue the exercise of the first without
prejudice to the second ; ' and where the acceptance of the
last office is made compulsory, under a penalty,^ or in case of
ineligibility to occupy the same,* there is no implied abandon-
ment of office. " "Where one office, is not subordinate to the
other," said the Court of Common Pleas of New York, " nor
the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent
and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which
the law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vaca-
tion of the other. The force of the word in its application to
this matter is that from the nature and relations to each
other of the two places, they ought not to be held by the
same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which
would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and
impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incum-
bent of the other." ^
§ 188. Acceptance and withdrawal of resignations. — At
common law it was an indictable offense for one to refuse an
office in a public corporation to which he had been duly
elected.' This principle has been applied by the English and
several American authorities so as to render a resignation of
such an officer after entering upon his office * wholly ineffective
Ann. 1261 ; Kenney v. Georgen, 36 * Goettman v. Mayor &c., 6 Hun,
Minn. 190; State v. Brinkerhoflf, 66 133. Of. Hartford v. Bennett, 10
Tex. 45. Ohio St 441.
1 State V. Buttz, 9 S. C. 158, and " State v. Keams, 47 Ohio St 566.
cases cited in the preceding note. ' People v. Green, 5 Daly, 254 ; s. c,
2 Cotton V. Phillips, 56 N. H. 220. 46 How. Pr. 168. See, also, for a col-
Formerly, in England, in the case of lection of English and American rul-
incompatible offices, the incumbent ings on incompatibility, Throop on
was held to retain the superior, but Public Officers, § 35 et seq.
such is not now the rule. Eex v. ' State v. Ferguson, 81 N. J. Law,
Jones, 1 Barn. & Ad. 677 ; Milward v. 107 ; Com. Dig., tit Officer, B. 1. See,
Thacher, 3 T. R 81 ; Rex v. Tizzard, also, Edwards v. United States, Dillon
9 Barn. & C. 418 ; Com. Dig., tit Offl- on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 223.
cer, K 5. ' There can be no resignation by
3 State V. Somers, 96 N. C. 467. one who has not qualified. Miller v.
202
OrFICEBS AND AGENTS.
[§189.
without the express or implied assent of the appointing power.'
But the rule is not settled, many authorities holding that the
office becomes ipso facto vacant when a resignation is trans-
mitted and received.* "Where such is the law, a resignation is
as irrevocable as an appointment, and if it be unconditional it
cannot be withdrawn.' But a prospective resignation may be
withdrawn with the consent of the authority accepting where
no new rights have intervened.*
§ 189. Removal of oflRcers and agents — How effected. —
The power of a corporation to remove its officers depends
greatly upon the tenure of office of such officers ; as, where
the power of removal is discretionary, they may be removed
without notice or hearing ; but if their term of office is dur-
ing good behavior, or where' the removal can only be for cer-
tain causes, they cannot be removed except after notice and
hearing.' The power to remove is incidental to a corporation
Supervisors, 25 Cal. 93 ; Rex v. Bliz-
ard, L. H. 3 Q. B. 55. See, also. In re
Corliss, 11 E. L 638.
1 Rex V. Lane, 2 Ld. Raym. 1804 ;
Edwards v. United States, 13 Otto, 471.
Cf. United States v. Wright, 1 McL.
(U. S.) 509 ; Van Orsdall v. Hazard, 3
Hill, 243, where Cowen, J., said it is
en'tirely cfear that the resignation
may be either in writing or by parol,
express, or even by implication, so that
there be an intent to resign on one
side and an acceptance on the other.
State V. Ferguson, 31 N. J. Law, 107 ;
Hoke V. Henderson, 4 Dev. (N. C.)
1, 29 ; State v. Clayton, 37 Kan. 443;
Rogers v. Slonaker, 33 Kan. 191;
Waycross City Council v. Youmans
(1890), 85 Ga. 708; State v. Boeker,56
Mo. 17.
2 Olmsted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378,
citing Gilbert v. Luce, 11 Barb. 91 ;
People V. Porter, 6 CaL 26; State v.
Hauss, 43 Ind. 105 ; Leech v. State, 78
Ind. 570 ; Gates v. Delaware County,
13 Iowa, 405 ; State v. Clarke, 3 Nev.
566; Conner v. Mayor, 3 Sandf.
355; S. C 5 N. Y. 385, 395.
' State V. Fitts, 49 Ala. 403 ; Gates
V. Delaware County, 13 Iowa, 405
Bunting v. Willis, 37 Gratt (Va.
144; State v. Hauss, 43 Ind. 105
Pace V. People, 50 111. 432.
^Biddle v. Willard, 10 Ind. 62, 66
State V. Clayton, 27 Kan, 443 ; S. G,
41 Am. Rep. 418. See, also, Throop
on Public Officers, ch. XVIL
8 People V. New York, 83 N. Y.
491 ; Queen v. Governors &c., 8 Ad.
& Ell. 633 ; Rex v. Oxford, 3 Salk. 438 ;
Bagg's Case, 11 Coke, 93 (b); Ram-
shay, In re, 83 Eng. Com. Law, 174,
189 ; Rex u Coventry, 1 Ld. Raym.
391 ; R6x V. Mayor &c., 1 Lev. 391 ;
Dr. Gaskin's Case, 8 T. R. 309 ; Will-
cock on Munic. Corp. 353, 254 ; 3 Kyd
on Corp. 58, 59 ; Rex v, Andover, 1
Ld. Raym. 710; Field v. Common-
wealth, 33 Pa. St 478 (1859); Hen-
nen. In re, 13 Pet (U. S.) 330. For
removal, where duration of term is
not fixed, see People v. Comptroller
&c., 20 Wend. 595 ; People v. Nich-
ols, 79 N. Y. 582; Field v. Girard
College, 54 Pa. St 233; Common-
wealth V. Sutherland, 3 Serg. & R.
§ 190.]
OFFIOEKS AND AGENTS.
203
at large, and unless delegated to a select body or part, it must
be exercised by the whole corporation.^
§ 190. Causes for removal — English and American rules.
It is said in Kyd on Corporations* that "the offenses for
which a corporator may be disfranchised, or a corporate officer
removed, have been distributed into three distinct classes : —
First, such as relate merely to his corporate or official char-
acter and amount to breaches of the condition tacitly or ex-.
pressly annexed to his franchise or office.' Seeojidly, such as
have no immediate relation to his corporate or official char-
acter, but are in themselves of so infamous a nature as to ren-
der the offender unfit to enjoy any public franchise; such as
perjury, forgery, etc. And thirdly offenses of a mixed nat-
ure, being not only against his corporate or oflBciaLduty, but
also indictable at common law." *
145; State v. St Louis, 90 Mo. 19;
State V. Doherty, 35 La. Ann. 119;
8. a, — Am. Rep. 131 ; Page v. Hardin,
8 B. Men. 648 ; Madison v. Korbly, 32
Ind. 74; Stadlerv. Detroit, 13 Mich.
346. The New York statutes of 1887
and 1888 provided that conductors
on the Brooklyn bridge, who were
soldiers in the war of the Rebellion,
and honorably discharged, must be
notified of all charges against them
before being removed from their po-
sitions. It was held, on mandamvs
to reinstate such a soldier, who had
been removed from such position as
conductor without a hearing, that,
as he was entitled to a hearing with-
out regard to the merits of his case,
an order for a bill of particulars was
unnecessary, and should be reversed.
People V. Howell (1891), 13 N. Y.
Supl. 317. The charter of the city of
Jacksonville provided that no officer
could be removed by the city council
without first being heard in his de-
fense. It was decided that the hear-
ing must be had before the city coun-
cil itself, and not before one of its
committees. City of Jacksonville v.
AUen, 25 111. App. 54 A board of
police commissioners is not guilty of
an arbitrary and unwarrantable ex-
ercise of authority in suspending an
o£Scer pending a ti-ial before the
board on charges which if true
would involve his dismissal State u
St Louis Police Ctomm., 16 Mo. App.
48.
1 State V. Jersey City, 25 N. J, Law,
536; Fane's Case, Doug. 153; Lord
Bruce's Case, 2 Str. 819 ; Rex v. Rich-
ardson, 1 Burr. 517 ; Rex. v. Taylor, 3
Salk. 231 ; Rex v. Lyme Regis, Doug.
153; 2 Kyd on Corp. 56; Grant, 210,
241 ; Glover, 329.
2 2 Kyd on Corp., 63.
SBagg's Case, 11 Rep. 98a.
< Rex V. Carlisle, Fortesc. 200 ; s. a,
11 Mod. 379. As to whether the
power of amotion still exists now
that municipal ofiicers are elected
under statutory provisions, see JJe
Norton, Q. B., June 8, 1872. As to re-
scinding an invalid amotion, see Re.-
gina V. Mayor of Ryde, 28 L. T. (N. S.)
629. For amotion and disfranchise-
ment, see 2 Kent Commentaries, 278,
297 ; and Angell ,& Ames on Corp.,
204
OWWICSSS AND AOENTS.
[§191.
§ 191. Power of corpoi'ation to reraore o£Bcers and
agents. — One of the common-law incidents of all corpora-
tions is the power to remove a corporate officer from his office
for just and reasonable cause.' The leading case on this sub-
ject is The King v. Richardson,' in which it was decided that
a corporation, in the absence of an express grant of authority,
had the incidental power to make a by-law to remove offi-
cii. XII, where the doctrine of the
English decisions is presented, and
earlier cases cited. Richards v.
Clarksburg (1887), SOW. Va. 491. Dis-
franchisement destroys and takes
away the franchise or right of being
a member of a corporation. Will-
cook on Munie. Corp. 245-376;
Grant, 2S0, 263; 8 Kyd on Corp.
50-94; Glover, eh. XVI, pp. 327, 328.
Under the code of West Virginia,
which provides that " all the corpo-
. rate powers of the corporation shall
be exercised " by the common coun-
cils of towns or villages to which said
chapter applies, the power of amotion
of oflBcers for misconduct, which at
common law is vested in the " corpo-
ration at large," is conferred on such
councils. Bicharda v. Town of
Clarksburg, 30 W. Va. 491; S. C,
4 S. E. Rep. 774. The Revised Stat-
utes of Indiana confer express au-
thority upon the common council Of
a city to expel or remove, by a two-
thirds vote, any member thereof, or
any officer of the corporation,
whether elected or appointed, and re-
quires the council to make provision
as to the mode in which charges
shall be preferred and heard. Section
3278 provides that the common
council shall be authorized, through
a committee, to investigate the books
and papers, together with all matters
pertaining to the management of the
water-works, and, in case of neglect
of duty or malfeasance on the part of
any officer connected therewith, to
remove the offender. 'And it was
held that a court of equity has no
jurisdiction to restrain the council of
a city from proceeding to investigate
charges preferred against trustees of
the water-works in the mode pro-
vided by the by-laws and ordinances
of the city. Muhler v. Hedekin, 119
Ind. 481; S. C, 20 N. E. Rep. 700.
Acts of an officer, after bis suspen-
sion, in seeking and accepting other
employment, are not admissible
against him to show that he under-
stood when he received notice of sus-
pension that he was discharged.
Morley v. City of New York, 12 N. Y.
Supl. 609.
1 Dillon on Munic. Coi-p., § 212 (4th
ed.) ; Richards v. Clarksburg (1887), 30
W. Va. 491 ; State v. The Judges, 35 La.
Ann. 1075 ; Ellison v. Raleigh, 89 N. C.
125 ; Rex v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517 ;
Rex V. Doncaster, 2 Burr. 738 ; Rex v,
Liverpool, 3 Burr. 723 ; Lord Bruce's
Case, 2 Str. 819; Jay's Case, 1 Vent
303 ; Rex v. Lyme Regis, Doug. 153 ;
Rex V. Ponsonby, 1 Ves. Jr. 1 ; Rex
V. Taylor, 3 Salk. 231 ; Rex v. Tidder-
ley, 1 Sid. 14, per Hale, C. B. ; 3 Kyd
on Corp. 50-94, where the old cases
are digested ; Rex v. Chalke, 1 Lord
Raym. 325 : 1 Boll. Rep. 409 ; S. C, 3
Bulst. 189 ; Willcook on Munic. Corp.
246; Grant, 340; 2 Kent's Com. 397.
For earlier cases, see Lord Bruce's
Case, 3 Str. 819, 820; Tidderley's
Case, 1 Sid. 14, per Hale, 0. B.
21 Burr. 517.
§ 1J)2.] OFFICEES AND AGENTS. 20S
ccrs for just cause.' Where the charter of a municipal cor-
1 oration gives to the common council express power to " ex-
pel a member for disorderly conduct," the right to expel
depends upon the construction of the words disorderly con-
duct?
% 192. The same subject continued. — The revised statute
of Missouri which revised the city charter of Sedalia provided
that the mayor should have power, with the consent of the
board of aldermen, to remove from office any person holding
oflBce, created by charter or ordinance, for cause. It was held
that this statute was not repealed by a subsequent statute
which provided for the removal from ofiBce of persons who
failed to devote their time to their duties, or who were guilty
of wilful or fraudulent violation of duty. In an action for
wrongful ouster from ofSce, it is not error to permit plaintiff
to strike out an allegation as to the power of defendant mayor
and aldermen to remove for cause the incumbent of an office
created by charter or ordinance, as the state of facts on which
the action was based remained unaltered.'
1 Dillon on Munic. Corp^ (4th ed.), of courts in United States to punish
§ 351. The Massachusetts statutes of for contempt Burr's Trial, 355 ;
1885 provide that subordinates of the Kearney, In re, 7 Wheat 38 ; United
various city boards of Boston may be States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 33.
removed by the board " for such cause Power of congress. 13 U. S. Stats, at
as they may deem sufficient and shall Large, 383 ; 11 U. S. Stats, at Large,
assign in their order for removal The 155. See, also, Kilgour v. Thoinp-
oourt decided that it does not require son (1 880), 103 U. S. 168.
that a subordinate shall be given a ' Manker v. Faulhaber(Mo.), 6 S. W.
hearing before the board, on charges Eep. 373. The Missouri constitution
preferred against him, before* he can of 1875 provided that all lav?s in force
be removed. O'Dovpd v. City of Bos- at the adoption of the constitution,
ton (1889), 149 Mass. 443; s. C, 31 and not inconsistent .therewith,
N. E. Bep. 949. Charter power of re- should remain in force until altered or
moval, at any time, without cause, repealed by the general assembly. It
of a police patrol appointed for a was accordingly decided in the ca^e
year, see Chicago v. Edwards (1871), lastcitedthattheactof Marchl8,lB73,
58 111. 358. . as amended by an act of 1875 revis-
2 State V. Jersey City (1856), 1 ing the charter of the city of Sedalia,
Dutch. (N. J.) 536. For power to and providing for the removal of city
punish for contempt in England, see ofiScers by the mayor and board of
Doyle V, Falconer, 1 Privy Council aldermen for cause, is not repugnant
Appeals, 339 ; Speaker v. Glass, 3 to said constitution of 1875, regarding
Privy Council Appeals, 560. Power the duties of persons holding offices
206
OFFICEES AND AGENTS.
[§ 193.
§ 193. Notice of proceeding to remoTC Before an offi-
cer whose tenure of office is not discretionary can be re-
moved, he is entitled to a personal notice of the proceeding
against him, which notice must contain the fact that a pro-
ceeding to amove is intended and the time when and place
where the trial body will meet.^ The charges must be spe-
cifically stated, with substantial certainty,^ and the accused
must be given time to produce his testimony and present his
answer, and is entitled to be represented by counsel and to
cross-examine the witnesses against him.'
of trust or profit, and the power of
the general assembly to provide for
their removal for violation or neglect
of official duty. Implied power of
removal for cause by appointing
powei". Willard's Appeal, 4 R I. 595,
597, per Ames, C. J. In an action for
damages for wrongful removal from
oflSce by the mayor and aldermen of
a city, the refusal by the court to
permit defendants to read the pro-
visions of the city charter giving
them authority to remove for cause
is erroneous. Manker v. Faulhaber
(Mo.), 6 S. W. Rep. 373. The Consol-
idation Act of New York provides
that the heads of all the departments
of New York city may be removed
by the mayor, after opportunity to be
heard. It was d'ecided that the viola-
tion of the provision in the act that no
head of the department shall become
interested directly or indirectly in
the purchase of real estate by the
corporation constitutes suflBcient
cause for removal by the mayor, and
it is immaterial that the act also con-
tains a provision for the punishment
of such offense. People v. City of
New York, 5 N. Y. SupL 538. Where
judgment of ouster is pronounced
against persons holding seats in a
city council, and they are ousted
therefrom on the ground that the
wards from which they claim to have
been elected had. no legal existence,
such ouster does not create vacancies
in the council which may be filled
by a special election. State v. Kearns
(1891), 47 Ohio, 566 ; S. a, 25 N. E.
Rep. 1027.
1 People V. Benevolent Society, 24
How. Pr. 216; People v. Nichols, 79
N. Y. 582; Nichols, In re, 6 Abb.
New Caa. 474 ; S. c, 57 How. Pr. 395 ;
People ex rel. v. Commissioners &a
of Brooklyn, 106N. Y.64; Common-
wealth V. Pennsylvania Benef. In-
stitute, 2 Serg. & R 141 ; Society v.
Vandyke, 2 Whart (Pa.) 309; De-
lacey v. Neuse &c. Co., 1 Hawks (N. C.),
274; South. P. R Co. v. Hixon, 5 Ind.
165; Innes v. Wylie, 1 C. & K. 257;
Queen v. Saddlers' Co., 10 H. of L.
Cas. 404; State v. Bryce (1836), 7
Ohio, part II (82), 414, 416; Rex v.
Richardson, 1 Burr. 540; Rex v,
Liverpool, 2 Burr. 731 ; Rex v. Don-
caster, 2 Burr. 738. See 1 B. & Ad.
942; Exeter v. Glyde, 4 Mod. 37;
Bagg's Case, 11 Rep. 99a; Rex v.
Wilton, 5 Mod. 259; Willc. 264, 265;
Reg. V. Ipswich, 2 Ld. Raym. 1240.
When notice may be dispensed with,
see Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.),
§254.
2 Bagg's Case, 11 Co. 99a; S. c, 1
Roll. 225 ; Tompert u Lithgow (1866),
1 Bush (Ky.), 176; Willcock on
Munic. Corp. 267; Glover, 334; Rex
V. Lyme Regis, Doug. 179.
'Murdock V. Academy, 12 Pick.
244; State v. Bryce (1836), 7 Ohio,
part II (82), 414; Rex v. Chalke, 1
§§ 194, 195.]
OFFIOEKS AND AGENTS..
207
R 194. The same subject continued.— 'When the charge is
not admitted it must be examined and proved.' Before an
officer can be ousted by authority other than the appointing
power, he is entitled to a hearing, for the reason that the ques-
tion whether he shall be ousted is a judicial one, and a decis-
ion given without afifording hira time and opportunity to be
heard is ineffectual.'' Where the charge stated does not jus-
tify the removal, or where the removal is erroneous, the officer
is entitled to be restored by mandamus?
% 195. All persons charged with notice of duties and pow-
ers of municipal agents. — The statutes prescribe the powers
and duties of officers and agents of a public corporation, and
all persons dealing with them are charged with the knowledge
of the nature of these duties and the extent of these powers.*
Ld. Eaym. 326 ; Rex v. Derby, Cas.
Temp. Hardw. 154; Eex v. Richard-
son, 1 BuiT. 540 ; Rex v. Liverpool, 2
Burr. 734.
iMurdock v. Academy, 12 Pick
M4; Willcock on Munic. Corp. 267;
Glover, 334 ; Harman v. Tappenden,
I East, 562; Rex v. Faversham, 8
Term R 356.
* Board of Comm'rs of Knox
County V. Johnson, 124 Ind. 145;
s. a, 19 Am. St. Rep. 88 ; DuUan v.
Wellson, 53 Mich. 393 ; S. C, 51 Am.
Rep. 128; PeojAe v. Freese, 83 Cal.
453; Williams v. Bagot, 3 Bam. &
G. 786; Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Mon.
648. The power to oust an officer
rightfully in office is essentially a
judicial one, except where it is exer-
cised by appointing power. State v,
Harrison, 113 Ind. 434; S. a, S Am.
St Rep. 663.
'State V. Z^rsay City, 1 Dutch.
(N. J.) 536 ; Commonwealth v. Ger-
man Society (1850), 15 Pa. St 251 ;
Madison v. Korbly (1869), 33 Ind. 74;
Reg. V. Ipswich, 3 Ld. Raym. 1340.
Equity will not enjoin the corporate
authorities from making an unlaw-
ful removal or appointing a suc-
cessor. Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th
ed.), ch. XXI and § 847; Delahanty
V. "Warner (1874), 75 111. 185 ; s. C., 20
Am. Rep. 237. One who has been
duly elected, qualified, and inducted
into office as a city alderman cannot
be summarily removed, by resolution
of the board, upon a charge of dis-
qualification, without notice and
without hearing or investigation of
any kind. Board of Aldermen v.
Darrow, 13 Colo. 460 ; S. C, 23 Pac.
Rep. 784.
< The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall.
(U. S.) 606 ; Merchants' Bank v. Ber-
gen Co., 115 U. S. 384; Hodges v.
Buffalo. 2 Den. (N. Y.) 110; Cornell v.
Guillford, 1 Den. (N. Y.) 510 ; McDon-
ald V. Mayor &c. of New York, 68
N. Y. 23; Schumm v. Seymour, 24
N. J. Eq. 143 ; Lowell Savings Bank
V. Winchester, 8 Allen, 109 ; Perkin-
son V. St Louis, 4 Mo. App. 822 ; Cray-
craft V. Selvage, 10 Bush (Ky.), 708 ;
Cleveland v. State Bank of Ohio, 16
Ohio St 236 ; s. G, 88 Am. Dec. 445 ;
Chicago V. Shober &c. Co., 6 Bradw.
(III.) 560 ; Alton v. MuUedy, 21 IlL 76 ;
Pine Civil Township v. Huber Mfg.
Co., 83 Ind. 121 ; Summers v. Daviess
208
OFFIOESS AND AGENTS.
[§ 196.
§ 196. Lial)ility of ofBcers to the corporations. — Public
officers elected pursuant to statute by a municipal corporation
are not the servants or agents of the corporation in such a sense
as will enable the corporation, in the absence of a statute giving
the remedy, to maintain actions against such officers for negli-
gence in the discharge of their official duty.* When an officer
who is about to enter upon the discharge of his duties for a
second term makes a report to, or a settlement with, the
proper authorities, from which it,appears that he has on hand
at the close of his first term a certain sum of money, such set-
tlement is, in the opinion of many of the courts, conclusive upon
him, if the officers with whom the settlement is made acted in
good faith and have no knowledge that the sum of money
which he reports is not actually in his hands.'
Co., 103 Ind. 263; Axt v. Jackson
School Township, 90 Ind. 101 ; Eeeve
School Township v. Dodson, 98 Ind.
497; Platter u Elkhart Co., 103 Ind.
360; Bloomington School Township
V. National School Furnishing Co.,
107 Ind. 48 ; Barton v. Sweptson, 44
Ark. 437 ; Dorsey Co. v. "Whitehead,
47 Ark. 205'; Wallace v. Mayor &c.
of San Jose, 29 Cal. 181 ; Sutro v.
Pettit, 74 Cal. 333 ; S. C, 5 Am. St
Rep. 443. See, also, Whiteside v.
United States, 93 U. S. 247; Hai-sh-
man v. Bates Co., 92 U. S. 569; Mo-
Clure V. Oxford Township, 94 U. S.
429; South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94
TJ. S. 260 ; Lewis v. Shreveport, 108
U. S. 283; Dixon Co. v. Field, 111
U.S. 83; Carroll Co. v. Smith, 111
U. S. 556; Post v. Kendall Co., 105
U. S. 667 ; Daviess v. Dickenson, 117
U. S. 657;, Mayor &o. of Nashville v.
Ray, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 468 ; Vincent v.
Nantucket, 13 Cush. (Mass.) 103; Dill
V. Wareham, 7 Mete. 438 : Spalding v.
Lowell, 23 Pick. Tl ; Bridgeport v.
Housatonic R. Co., 15 Conn. 475;
Donovan v. Mayor Sec of New York,
33 N. y. 291; McDonald v. Mayor
&c. of New York, 68 N. Y. 23; s. c;,
23 Am. Rep. 144 ; Overseers of Nor-
wich V. Overseers of Berlin, 18 Johns.
383; Davies v. New York, 48N.Y.
Supr. Ct. 194; Appleby v. Mayor &c.,
15 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 428 ; Peterson v.
Mayor &c of New York, 17 N. Y.
449 ; Ottoman Cahvey Co. v. Phila-
delphia (Pa.;, 13 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 524; Livingston v. Pippin, 31
Ala, 543 ; People v. Baraga Township,
39 Mich. 554; Neely v. Yorkville, 10
S. C. 141.
J Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.),
§ 236 ; Witson v. Mayor &c. of New
York, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 595; Minor v.
Bank, 1 Pet (U. S.) 46, 69 ; Lincoln
V. Chapin, 182 Mass. 470 ; Parish in
Sherburne v. Fiske, 8 Cush. 264, 266;
Dewey, J., White v. PhiUpson, 10
Met 108; Trafton v. Alfred, 3 ShepL
(15 Me.) 258 ; Hancock v. Hazard, 12
Cush. 112; Commonwealth v. Gen-
ther (Pa.), 17 Serg. & R. 135. Whether
municipal councillors are liable to
the corporation for misappropriating
its funds, see Municipality of East
Missom-i v. Horseman, 16 Upper Can.
(Q. B.) 588. For payment of money
on Illegal order or resolution, Daniels
V. Burford, 10 Upper Can. (Q. B.) 481.
2 Boone County v. Jones, 54 Iowa,
699 ; s. C, 37 Am. Rep. 266 ; State v.
§ 19T.]
OFFICEKS AND AGENTS.
209
§ 197. Instances of frandnlent acts of municipal agents.
Municipal officers and agents are held to a stri'ct accountability
in their dealings with or on behalf of the corporation, and
will be held personally liable in case of injury arising either
to the corporation or a third party out of any tortious act in
their official capacity. If a member of a municipal board
authorized to select and purchase a site for public purposes
agrees with a third person to inform the latter of the site
selected by such board, and that the latter shall thereupon
purchase such site, and then sell it to the board at a profitj
and the agreement is carried out through the aid of the offi-
cer, and the municipality is thereby made to pay a higher
price for the property than it could have been purchased for
from the original owner, aa action can be sustained against
the officer and his confederate for the amount of profit realized
by them.i
Grammier,29Incl. 551 ; Baker v. Pres-
ton, 1 Gilmer, 235 ; Morley v. Town
of Metamora, 78 111. 394 ; S. C, 20 Am.
Eep. 266 ; Eoper v. Sangamon Lodge,
91 IlL 518; S. G, 33 Am. Eep. 160;
Chicago V. Gage, 95 III. 598 ; s. c, 35
Am. Eep. 182 ; Cawley v. People, 95
111. 249.
1 Boston V. Simmons, 150 Mass.
461; s. a, 15 Am. St Eep. 230; 23
N. E. Eep. 210 ; "Walker v. Osgood, 98
Mass. 348; Cutter v. Demmon, 111
Mass. 474; Eice v. Wood, 113 Mass.
133, 135; s. G, 18 Am. Eep. 459;
Adams v. Paige, 7 Pick. 542, 550:
United States v. State Bank, 96 U. S.
30, 35 ; Emery v. Hapgood, 7 Gray,
55, 58 ; s. G, 66 Am. Dec. 459. All
who aid in the commission of a tort
are joint tort-feasors, and,"as such,
jointly liable for the result of their
act Creed v. Hartman, 29 N. Y. 591 ;
S. G, 86 Am. Dec. 341 ; Elauder v.
McGrath, 35 Pa St 128; s. G, 78
Am. Dec. 329 ; Moir v. Hopkbis, 16
111. 318 ; S. G, 63 Am. Dec. 312. De-
fendants, who were members of the
town council, with others, entered
14
into a bond in a certain sum for the
purpose of building a court-house in
the town. Afterwards the town coun-
cil, of which defendants were mem-
bers, illegally appropriated $1,000 of
the town funds to aid in building the
court-house, a portion of which sum
was immediately paid over. The court
held that the defendants were liable
for the amount thus paid, in an ac-
tion brought by the tax-payers for its
recovery. Eussell v. Tate (1890), 52
Ark. 541; s. G, 13 S. W. Eep. 180.
The laws of New York, 1881, chapter
531, provides that municipal oflBcers
" and other persons acting for or on
behalf of any town, county, village .
or municipal corporation" may be
enjoined, in a suit by tax-payers,
from committing any illegal oflScial
act. or from committing waste or in-
jury to any property, funds or estate
of such town, etc. It was held that
an action will lie against city oflBcers
to prevent them from compromising
for a nominal sum a final judgment
in favor of the city against persons
for violation of the excise law, the
210
0FFICEB8 AND AGENTS.
[§ 198.
§ 198. Liability of corporation to officers. — Corporations
are in general liable for their oflBcers' salaries while they con-
tinue in office, and if they improperly remove them, they still
remain liable.* A highway surveyor, however, cannot recover
from the town an amount expended by him in excess of the
tax committed to him.^ And it has been decided that a mu-
nicipal officer who is kept out of his office and has not per-
formed his duties cannot maintain an action against the city
to recover the fees accruing fronfthe office.'
proceeds of which belong to the poor
fund. And in such action the judg-
ment debtors, who are alleged to be
acting in collusion with the officers,
are properly joined as defendants.
Standart v. Burtis, 46 Hun, 83. The
Missouri statute making town, city,
state and county officers liable, etc.,
for converting public moneys to their
own use, embraces township offlcei-s.
State V. Cleveland, 80 Mo. 108. Town
officers who, in constructing a ditch,
act according to their best judgment,
refraining from unnecessary injury,
are not liable for errors of judgment
in choosing the location or method of
construction. Smith v. Gould, 61
Wis. 31. Town bonds were delivered
by the town to a railroad company
in exchange for its stock. A. re-
ceived them as president of the com-
pany and sold them for the company.
A. was also town supervisor. The
court held that as he acted for the
company, he was not liable to an ac-
tion by the town for having sold
them to bona fide purchasers, know-
ing them to be invalid. Famham v.
Benedict, 39 Hun, 33.
1 Stadler v. Detroit, 13 Mich. 346 ;
Shaw V, Mayor &c., 19 Ga. 468.
Where overseers of the poor procure
supplies on their own credit, instead
of following the procedure laid down
in the statute, they are not precluded
from charging the same to the town,
and demanding that the account be
audited by the town board of audit
Osterhoudt v. Rigney, 98 N. Y. 333.
-Cloud V. Norwich, 57 Vt 448.
8 Dolan V. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 379; Sa-
line Co. V. Anderson, 30 Kan. 298.
See, also, Terhune v. Mayor &c., 88
N. Y. 347 ; McVeany v. New York,
80 N. Y. 185 ; Steubenville v. Gulp, 38
Ohio St. 18 ; Benoit v. 'Wayne County,
30 Mich. 176. But where an officer's
removal was reversed on certiorari,
he was entitled to recover for the
time during which he was deprived
of his office, without deduction for
wages earned in another capacity.
This is because there is no contract
in favor of the officer as there is in
the ordinary relation of master and
servant He receives his salary aa
an incident to his offlca Fitzsim-
mons V. Brooklyn, 102 N. Y. 536. An-
drews V. Portland, 79 Me. 484. to the
same point, although the salary had
been paid to a de facto incumbent
Such is also the rule in California.
Stratton v. Oulton, 38 Cal. 44; People
V. Potter, 63 Cal. 137 ; Doraey v.
Smith, 28 Cal. 21; Meagher v.
County, 5 Nev. 344 ; Can-oil v. Sie-
benthaler (1869), 37 Cal. 193. Courts
of equity will not as a rule enjoin the
payment of the salary to the incum-
bent pending a contest Field v. Com-
monwealth (1849), 32 Pa. St 478;
In re Ramshay, 83 Eng. C. L. 174;
Queen v. Governors &c., 8 Ad. & EL
632. Persons who are neither offi-
§ 199.]
OFFICERS AND AGENTS.
211
§ 199. Indictment of municipal ofiScers.— Provision is
generally made by statute for the indictment of municipal
oflBcers for wilful misfeasance or non-feasance in their oflScial
capacity. Thus in North Carolina " a public oiBcer intrusted
with definite powers to be exercised for the benefit of the
community, who wickedly abuses them or fraudulently ex-
ceeds them, is punishable by indictment." ' And it has been
held in the State of Tennessee that the mayor and aldermen
may be indicted for neglecting to keep the streets of a city or
town in reasonable repair.*
cers de jure nor de facto cannot re-
cover the salary of an officer. Samis
V. King, 40 Conn. 398.
1 State V. Glasgow, N. C. Conf. 186,
187 ; State v. Justices &c.. 4 Hawks
(N. C), 194. See, also, State v. Fish-
blate, 83 N. C. 654; State v. Com-
missioners of Fayetteville, 2 N. C.
Law, 617; Paris v. People, 37 111.' 74.
The Illinois statutes make it a crim-
inal offense for a town officer to
withhold the town records from the
county clerk's office, on the discon-
tinuance of the township system in
the county. But it was held that the
indictment need not state the manner
in which the town office was abol-
ished, and that it was not necessary
to a conviction that a demand should
have been made on the officer for
the records withheld. Baysinger v.
People, 115 m. 419.
2 Hill V. State (1857), 4 Sneed, 443.
See, also, Phillips v. Commonwealth,
44 Pa. St 197. The mayor and alder-
men of a city are indictable for any
wilful or negliRent failure to dis-
charge the duties devolved upon
them by the city chai-ter. They can-
not with impunity arbitrarily refuse
to exercise the powers with which
they are invested, nor can they wil-
fully prevent them from' being exer-
cised. But they constitute a part of
a city government distinct from the
board of audit and finance of the
city, and the two cannot be jointly
indicted for refusal or failure to per-
form their duties under the charter.
State V. Hall, 97 N. C. 474; s. a, 1
S. E. Rep. 683. For requisites of in-
dictment for non-performance of
official duty see the case last cited;
3 Chitty, Crim. Law, 586, 606; State
V. Mayor, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 317;
Wattles V. People, 13 Mich. 446;
State V. Comm'rs, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 345.
One who procures himself to be
sworn into a public office to which
he knows he has no title is indictable
at common law. Scarlet's Case, 12
Coke, 98.
CHAPTER VII.
PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS.
200. Liability on contracts — Pre-
Bumption against liability.
201. The satne subject continued —
Negotiable instruments.
203. The same subject continued —
Excess of authority, fraud,
etc.
803. Exemption from liability for
legislative acts.
204. The foregoing rule qualified —
Breach of trust
205. Liability of judicial officers
considered.
206. @«asi-judicial officers — Cor-
♦ rupt motive.
207. Liability of ministerial offi-
cers.
208. The same subject continued.
209. No personal liability for strict-
ly public acts,
310. Default of subordinates.
211. Ejection of member of coun-
cil by order of mayor.
212. Negligence of recorder of
deeds.
213. The same subject continued.
214. Liability of assessor of taxes.
§ 200. Liability on contracts — Presumption against lia-
bility.— Upon considerations of public policy a distinction
has been established between the personal liability of public
agents on contracts made in behalf of their principal, and that
of private agents under like circumstances. It is presumed
that persons dealing with public officers do not rely upon their
individual credit, and in order to make them personally liable
there must be a clear intent to that effect.^ It makes no dif-
1 Willett V. Young (1891, Iowa), L
E. A. 115; s. C, 47 N. W. Rep. 990,
where trustees of a township were
held not liable on an order directed
to the town clerk to be paid out of
township funds, and signed by them
with the word " trustees '' added to
their signatures, as it was manifest
from the whole instrument that there
was no intention to assume liability ;
nor would the invalidity of the order
given for property purchased for the
township affect the case. In Huth-
sjng V. Bousquet, 7 Fed. Rep. 833, su-
pervisors offered a reward beyond
their power ; but as the offer as pub-
lished clearly appeared to be intended
as official, they were held not liable
PS individuals. Hodgson v. Dexter,
1 Cranch, 345, a leading case by Chief
Justice Marshall; Knight v. Clark
(1886), 48 N. J. Law, 22 ; S. C, 57 Am.
Rep. 534; Cutler v. Ashland, 121
Mass. 588 ; Jones v. Le Tombe, 3 Dal-
las, 384 ; Crowell v. Crispin, 4 Daly,
100 ; Fox V. Drake, 8 Cowen, 191 ;
Belknap v. Reinhart, 2 "Wend. 375;
S. C, 30 Am. Dec. 631; Walker v.
Swart won t, 13 Johns. 444; B. C, 7
Am. Dec. 384 ; Osborne v. Kerr, 12
§ 201.J PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICBES AND AGENTS.
213
ference whether the contract be written, by parol, or sealed.'
But where it is evident that the olflcer intended to pledge his
private responsibility he is liable.* '
§ 201. The same subject continued — Negotiable instru-
ments.— A public agent is not personably liable on negotiable
instruments executed by him in his oflBcial capacity, but in the
absence of intent to the contrary evident on the face of the
instrument the presumption is that the agent acts in his private
character, and is therefore individually liable;' that is, the
distinction between public and private agents in respect of
personal liability on contracts has been said not to. apply to
negotiable paper ; and where a note is signed by an agent in
his own name, the addition of his official title will not free him
from responsibility if the body of the obligation purports to
bind him personally.* There are cases, however, which have
Wend. 179 ; Eathbon v. Budlong, 15
Johns. 1; Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cowen,
513; s. c, 13 Am. Dec. 550; Sheffield
V. Watson, 3 Caines (N. Y.), 69 : Bron-
son V. Woolsey, 17 Johns. 46 ; Brown
V. Austin, 1 Mass. 208 ; s. C, 2 Am.
Dec. 11; Tippets v. Walker, 4 Mass.
595, 597; Bainbridge v. Dowine, 6
Mass. 253 ; Dawes v. Jackson, 9 Mass.
490; Freeman v. Otis, 9 Mass. 279;
s. c, 6 Am. Dec. 66 ; Comer v. Bank-
head, 70 Ala. 498 ; Wallis v. Johnson
School Township, 75 Ind. 368 ; Per-
rin V. Lyman, 33 Ind. 16; McClen-
ticks V. Bryant, 1 Mo. 598 ; s. a, 14
Am. Dec. 310; Tutt v. Hobbs, 17 Mo.
486; Lyon v. Irish, 58 Mich. 518;
StinchBeld v. Little, 1 GreenL (Me.)
331 ; S. C, 10 Am. Dec. 65 ; Bernard
V. Torrance, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 383. It
has been said, however, that this rule
in regard to public officers does not
apply in favor of the officers of a
municipal corporation which is ca-
pable of making contracts for itself
and is liable t6 be sued thereon. Si-
monds v. Heard, 33 Pick. 130 ; Hall v.
Cockrell, 38 Ala. 507. And see City of
Providence v. Miller (1876), 11 E. 1 372.
' Hodgson V. Dexter. 1 Cranch,
345; Knight v. Clark, 48 N. J. Law,
23 ; s. C, 57 Am. Rep. 534 ; Anwin v.
Wolseley, 1 Term R 674; Walker v.
Swartwout, 13 Johns. 444; S. c, 7
Am. Dec. 334.
2 Simonds v. Heard, 33 Pick. 120 ;
S. c, 34 Am. Dec. 41 ; Ogden v. Ray-
mond, 33 Conn. 379 ; s. c, 58 Am.
Dec. 439 ; Bayliss t). Pearson, 15 Iowa,
379; Wing u. Glick, 56 Iowa, 473;
S. C, 37 Am. Rep. 143, n. ; Cahokin v.
Rautenberg, 88 UL 319; Ross v.
Brown, 74 Me. 353 ; Fowler v. Atkin-
son, 6 Minn. 579 ; Sheffield v. Wat-
son, 3 Caines (N. Y.), 69; Gill v.
Brown, 13 Johns. 385; Exchange
Bank v. Lewis County, 38 West Va.
273 ; City of Providence v. Miller, 11
R. I.. 373; s. C, 33 Am. Rep. 453;
Horsley v. Bell, 1 Bro. C. C. 101.
> Story on Agency, § 306 ; 1 Daniels'
Negotiable Instruments, § 445 ; Tiede-
man on Commercial Paper, § 137;
Mechem's Public Offices and Officers,
§ 831 et seq.
< Village of Cahokia v. Rautenberg
(1878), 88 111. 319 ; Fowler v. Atkinson,
6 Minn. 579; Wing v. Glick, 66 Iowa,
214 PEESONAL LIABILITT OF OFFICEES AND AGENTS. [§ 202.
taken what is termed by a standard text-writer * " a praise-
worthy step " in holding that the official designation is not a
mere desoriptio personce, but indicates an intent to charge the
corporation.* Whether parol evidence is admissible to show
that a note containing a promise, individual in form, but exe-
cuted officially, was intended to bind the corporation, is a
question not settled. It was held in Iowa that extrinsic
evidence could not be resorted to in such a case ; ' but in
Minnesota and Missouri the preva%ing rule in cases of private
agency is applied, and the ambiguity may be explained.^
§ 202. The same subject continued — Excess of author-
ity, fraud; etc. — The rule that all persons are bound to know
the law precludes them from alleging ignorance of the limits
and extent of authority conferred on a public officer ; * which
is no more than saying that the latter does not ordinarily
warrant the validity of his contracts ; but his express repre-
sentations of matter of fact relating to his agency are binding
473; S. C, 37 Am. Kep. 143, note;
Exchange Bank v. Lewis County, 28
West Va. 278 ; Eoss v. Brown (1882),
74 Ma 352; Bayliss v. Pearson, 15
Iowa, 279; American Ins. Co. v.
Straiten, 59 Iowa, 696; Forcey v.
Caldwell (Pa.), 9 Atl. Eep. 466. Cf.
Lyon I'. Adamson, 7 Iowa, 509 ; Baker
V, Chambles, 4 Greene (Iowa), 428.
1 Tiedeman on Commercial Paper,
§ 137.
* School Town of Monticello v. Ken-
dall, 72 Ind. 91 ; s. C, 37 Am. Rep^
189 ; Moral School Tp. v. Harrison, 74
Ind. 98; Andrews v. Estes, 11 Me.
267; Wallisu. Johnson School Tp.,
75 Ind. 368. See, also. Knight v. Clark
(1886), 48 N. J. Law, 22 ; s. C, 57 Am.
Rep. 534 (case of a sealed note);
Sanborn v. Neal, 4 Minn. 126 ; S. C,
77 Am. Dec. 503; Dugan v. United
States, 3 Wheat 172; Balcombe v.
Northrup, 9 Minn. 173; Hodges v.
Bunyan, 30 Mo. 491 ; McGee v. Lara-
more, 60 Mo. 425.
» American Ins. Co. v. Stratton, 59
iDwo, C96.
* Sanborn v. Neal, 4 Minn. 136 ; S. C,
77 Am. Dec. 503 ; McClellan v. Rey-
nolds, 49 Mo. 313. See, also, Pratt v.
Baupre, 13 Minn. 187 ; Musser v. John-
son, 43 Mo. 74; S. C, 97 Am. Dec.
316; Shuetze v. Bailey, 40 Mo. 69;
Washington Gas Co. v. Seminary, 53
Mo. 480 ; Klosterman v. Loos, 58 Mo.
290 ; Turner v. Thomas, 10 Mo. App.
342.
SLee V, Munroe, 7 Cranch, 366;
The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 680 ;
Whiteside v. United States, 93 U. S.
347; Hull v. Marshall County, 13
Iowa, 133 ; Clark v. Des Moines, 19
Iowa," 199; a C, 87 Am. Dec. 433;
Newman v. Sylvester, 42 Ind. 112;
Mayor &c. v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 388 ;
Mayor &c. v, Reynolds, 30 Md. 1;
S. a, 88 Am. Dec. 535 ; State v. Hays,
52 Mo. 578; State v. Bank, 45 Ma
528 ; People v. Bank, 34 Wend. 431 ;
Delafield v. State, 36 Wend. 193; Sil-
liman v. Fredericksburg &c R. Co.,
27 Gratt. 119; State u Hastings, 10
Wis. 518. See, also, § 196, supra.
§§ 203, 204.] PERSONAL LIABILITY OP OFFIOEES AND AGENTS. 215
upon him ; ^ and he must answer for fraudulent concealments
or misstatements of such facts.' So he may, by denying his
agency, estop himself from subsequently asserting it to avoid
liability ; ' and the obligation may be enforced against him
where his principal is a legal myth.*
§ 203. Exemption from liability for legislative acts. — It
is a well-settled and salutary rule that the motives of the in-
dividual members of a legislative assembly in voting for a
particular law cannot be inquired into and its supporters made
personally liable upon an allegation that they acted mali-
ciously towards the person aggrieved by the passage of the
law. Whenever the officers of a municipal corporation are
vested with legislative powers, they hold and exercise them
for the public good, and are clothed with all the immunities
of government, and are exempt from all liability for their mis-
taken use.* Thus where a mayor sought to recover damages
from the aldermen of a town by reason of an ordinance by
which they " unlawfully and maliciously deprived him of his
legal rights, fees, privileges and emoluments, and of his office
of mayor," a demurrer was sustained although the defend-
ants may have exceeded the measure of their authority in
passing the ordinance in question.*
§ 204. The foregoing rule qnalifled — Breach of trust. —
But if the conduct of members of a municipal legislative board
1 Belisle v. Clark, 49 Ala. 98 ; Jef ts Md. 469 ; Borough of Fi-eeport v.
V. York, 10 Gush. 393; Bartlett v. Marks, 39 Pa. St 253. See, also, Cooley
Tucker, 104 Mass. 336; S. c, 6 Am. on Torte (2d ed.), 443.
Rep. 240; Kroeger v. Pitcairn, 101 "Jones v. Loving (1877), 55 Miss.
Pa. St 311; a C, 47 Am. Rep. 718; 109. "If they exceeded their author-
Bank of Hamburg v, Wray, 4 Strob. ity," it was a brutum fulmen, and
(S. C.) 87 ; S. C, 51 Am. Dec. 659 ; could not for one moment have de-
McCurdy v. Rogers, 21 Wis. 197; prived the plaintiff of any privi-
S. G, 91 Am. Dec. 468. leges, emoluments or fees of his
2Smout V. Ubery, 10 M. & W. 1; offica If he chose voluntarily to
Bank of Hamburg v. Wray, 4 Strob. yield obedience to a void law, it was
(S. C.) 87 ; Kroeger v. Pitcairn, 101 his own folly, .for which the courts
Pa. St 311. can afford him no relief by award-
> Freeman v. Otis, 9 Mass. 273 ; a C, ing damages against the individuals
6 Am. Dec. 66 ; McClenticks v. Bry- voting for the ordinance. See, also,
ant 1 Mo. 598. McCrea v. Chahoon (1889), 54 Hun,
«Blakely v. Bennecke, 59 Mo. 193. 577; a C, 8 N. "S. SupL 8a
° County Comm'rs v, Duokett, 20
216 PEESONAL LIABILITY OB OFFICEES AND AGENTS. [§205.
amounts to a breach of trust, or a conversion of trust money
belonging to the municipality, they are personally liable for
tort. A declaration in an action by a city against a former
chairman of its water board and another person alleged that
the board was authorized to buy land for the city for a reser-
voir; that the chairman, of whose position, knowledge and
authority the other defendant had knowledge, knew and shared
in determining the action of the board regarding the purchase ;
that both together, taking advantage of this and intending to
defraud the city, corruptly agreed that the chairman should
impart to the other the doings of the board in selecting the
land and the parcel it considered fit for a reservoir site, where-
upon such other was to become the purchaser thereof; that
the board should afterwards buy it at an advanced price from
him and that the profits should be divided between them ;
that in pursuance of this agreement the chairman revealed the
particular lot thought suitable by the board to the other, who
thereupon bought it, and the board, influenced by the chairman,
subsequently purchased it from him at an advance ; and that
the two divided the profits of the transaction. A demurrer
was overruled on the ground that a good cause of action was
disclosed against both defendants for the injury sustained by
the city.' The aldermen of a town, having executed a bond
binding themselves to build within the corporate limits a
court-house to be given to the county, illegally voted an ap-
propriation of a sum out of the municipal funds to aid in such
building, which was immediately paid by the treasurer on the
order of the mayor. It was held that the taking of the money
by the defendants was the conversion of a trust fund for which
they were liable.''
§ 205. Liability of judicial officers considered. — As long
ago as in the time of Lord Coke it was said : — " Such as are by
law made judges of another shall not be criminally accused or
made liable to an action for what they do as judges," ' and the
principles which should govern such actions have been settled
by a vast number of cases, although their application is some-
J Boston u Simmons (1890), 150 2 Russell v. Tate (1889), 52 Ark. 541 ;
Mass. 461 ; s. C, 23 N. E. Kep. 210. S. c, 13 S. W. Rep. 130.
3 Floyd V. Barker, 13 Coke, 26.
§ 205.] PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICEES AND AGENTS. 217
times difficult. Where there is no jurisdiction at all there is
no judge,' and the protection extends only to judicial decisions
or acts of a judicial character and not to mere administrative
acts. But where the court, though of limited jurisdiction, has,
in a given case, jurisdiction of the subject-matter ^ and of the
person interested, a judicial officer is not civilly liable for an
erroneous decision, however gross the error may have been or
how^ever bad the motive which inspired it.' Thus, where
the mayor of a city had the same jurisdiction as justices of
the peace, he was held not liable to a civil action for false im-
prisonment for "corruptly and maliciously" retaining juris-
diction and imposing a fine and imprisonment in default of
payment, after the defendant had upon proper affidavit moved
for a change of venue, the statute requiring him to grant the
motion under such circumstances.*
1 Perkin v. Proctor, 3 Wils. 383 ;
Marshalsea Case, 10 Coke, 68-76.
2 By which is not meant simply
jurisdiction of the particular case
then occupying the attention of the
court, but jurisdiction of the class of
cases to which the particular case
belongs. Jackson v. Smith, 130 Ind.
530, 533 ; Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns.
383.
8 Gwyiine v. Pool, Lutw. 390, 397 ;
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 351;
Kress u. State, 65 Ind. 106; Elmore
V. Overton, 104 Ind. 348; S. C, 54
Am. Rep. 343; 4 N. E. Rep. 197;
Pratt V. Gardner, 3 Cush. 63 ; AUeo
V. Reece, 39 Fed. Rep. 341 ; s. C, 40
Alb. L. J. 336 ; Little v; Moore, 4 N.
J. Law, 74; Clark v. Holdridge, 58
Barb. 61 ; Dyer v. Smith, 13 Conn. 384
There is an interesting and instructive
discussion in Cooley on Torts, ch.
XrV ; Throop on Public Officers, in
loco; Mechem's Public Offices and
Officers, § 619 et seq., and particularly
State V. Wolever 'Jnd., 1891), 36 N. E.
Rep. 763, where the subject of im-
munity of judicial officers from pri-
vate suits is fully discussed. "A judi-
cial act is one which involves the ex-
ercise of a discretion, in which some-
thing has to be heard and decided.
A ministerial act is one which the
law points out as necessary to be
done under the circumstances with-
out leaving any choice of alternative
courses.'' Clerk & Lindsell on Torts,
574. The act of a mayor in issuing
a warrant of arrest for the violation
of an illegal and void ordinance is
judicial and gives no cause of action
against him, or the officer executing
it, or the city itself. Trammell v.
Town of EussellviUe (1879), 34 Ark.
105.
* " The ruling on such a motion is
a judicial act." State v. Wolever
(Ind., 1891), 36 N. E. Rep. 763." The
reader will find, by consulting the
authorities and text-writers cited in
this section, that the principles here
enunciated are of general application ;
and as the proceedings of municipal
courts furnish no peculiarities or ex-
ceptions, the author does not deem it
expedient to enter into a more mi-
nute consideration of the topic See
also, Hommert v. Gleason, 38 N. Y.
St. Rep. 343 ; S. C, 14 N. Y. Sup). 568,
which is almost identical with the
218
PEKSOKAL IJABIIiITT OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS. [§ 206.
§ 206. Qnasi-judicial officers, — Corrupt motive. — There
are various duties involving the exercise of judgment and dis-
cretion which nevertheless are on the border line between
those of a strictly judicial and those of a ministerial nature.
In such cases the rule is laid down in many decisions that the
test of personal liability for error in their performance is that
of honest or corrupt motive.^ Thus, a superintendent of
schools is not liable for a mere mistake in his decision on the
case cited abov^ ; Bell v. McKinney,
63' Miss. 187; Johnston v. Moorman,
80 Va. 131 ; Merwin v. Rogers, 38 N.
Y. St Rep. 404 ; Burns v. Norton, 59
Hun., 616 ; Going v. Dunwiddie (1890),
86 Cal. 633; the leading case of
Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 13 ; the
title on " False Imprisonment," in 7
Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, p. 661 et
seq., and an article by Arthur Biddle,
Esq., on " Liability of OflScers Acting
in a Judicial Capacity," 15 Am. Law
Rev. 427 (July, 1881).
>Cobley on Torts (2d ed.), 483;
Linford v. Fitzroy, 13 Q. B. 340;
Kemp V. Neville, 10 C. B. (N. S.)
523; S. C, 31 L. J. C. P. 158; 7 Jur.
(N. S.) 918; 4 L. T. 640; 10 W. R 6;
Davis V. Capper, 10 Barn. & C. 28 ;
Burley v. Bethune, 1 Marsh. 220;
Ashby V. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938;
S. C, 6 Mod. 45'; 1 Salk. 19 ; Pruden v.
Love, 67 Ga. 190 ; Donahoe v. Rich-
ards, 38 Me. 379 ; S. C, 61 Am. Dec,
356 ; Downing v. Herrick, 47 Me. 463 ;
Bevard v. HoflEnian, 18 Md. 479 ; S. C,
81 Am. Dec. 618; Friend v. Hamill,
34 Md. 298 ; Elbin v. Wilson, 33 Md.
135; Raynsford v. Phelps, 43 Mich,
343; S. C, 38 Am. Rep. 189; Mo-
Cormick v. Burt, 95 111. 263 ; s. C, 35
Am. Rep. 163; Billings v. LaSerty,
31 111. 318; Garfield v. Douglass, 23
111. 100; Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo.
386; s. c, 27 Am. Rep. 343; Edwards
V. Ferguson, 73 Mo. 686 ; Pike v. Me-
goun, 44 Mo. 391 ; Reed v. Conway,
20 Mo. 33; Henderson v. Smith, 26
West Va. 839 ; s. C, 53 Am. Rep. 138 ;
Keenan v. Cook, 12 R I. 52 ; Ramsey
V. Riley, 13 Ohio, 157 ; Gregory v.
Small, 39 Ohio St 346; Stewart v.
Southard, 17 Ohio, 402; Wilson v.
Marsh, 34 Vt 352; Hitch v. Lam-
bright, 66 Ga. 228; Spitznogle v.
Ward, 64 Ind. 30 ; Morrison v. Mc-
Farland, 51 Ind. 206; State v. Robb,
17 Ind. 536;McOsker v. Burrell, 55
Ind. 425; Morgan v. Dudley, 18 B.
Mon. (Kj-.) 693; Bullitt v. Clement,
16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 193; Chrisman v.
Bruce, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 63; MiUer v.
Rucker, 1 Bush (Ky.), 135; Gregory
V. Brown, 4 Bibb (Ky.),,38; McCord
V. High, 24 Iowa, 336 ; Howe v. Ma-
son, 14 Iowa, 510 ; Macklot v. Daven-
port, 17 Iowa, 379 ; Muscatine & C. R.
Co. V. Harton, 38 Iowa, 33 ; Wheeler
V. Patterson, IN. H. 88; Adams v.
Richardson, 38 N. H. 306; Hannon
V. Grizzard, 96 N, C, 398 ; Wilkes v.
Dinsman, 7 How. 39; Jenkins v.
Waldron, 11 Johns. 114; Millard v.
Jenkins, 9 Wend. 298; Wick ware tt
Bryan, 11 Wend. 545 ; Tompkins v.
Sands, 8 Wend. 463; Goetchens
V. Matthewson, 61 N. Y. 420 ; Peavey
V. Robbins, 3 Jones (N. C), Law, 339;
Moran v. Rennard, 3 Brewst (Pa.)
601 ; Weckerly v. Geyer, 11 S. & R
(Pa.) 35; Rail v. Potts, 8 Humph.
(Tenn.) 325; McTeer v. Lebow, 85/
Tenn. 121; Throop on Public Offi-
cers, § 733 ; Mechem's Public Offices
and Officers, § 640 ; Bishop on Non-
Contract Law, § 789.
§ 207.] PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFI0EE8 AND AGENTS. 219
subject of licensing a teacher,* but an action lies if he refuses
a license from corrupt or malicious motives,^ and the same
rules control liability for dismissing a teacher.' In Connecti-
cut it was held that the proof of actual malicious intent would
sustain an action against a wharfmaster for ordering the re-
moval of a vessel from a dock.*
§ 207. Liability of ministerial officers. — A ministerial of-
ficer is under constant obligation to discharge the duties of
his office with reasonable skill and care, and if he fails in these
and damage ensues to one specially interested in the discharge
of such duties he becomes liable.' Conversely, as it is the
1 Stewart v. Southard, 17 Ohio, 403 ;
S. C., 49 Am. Dec. 463 ; Donahoe v.
Richards, 38 Me. 376; S. C, 61 Am.
Dec. 356.
2 Elmore i'. Overton (1885), 104 Ind.
348; s. C, 54 Am. Bep. 343; Bmton
V. Fulton, 49 Pa. St 151.
« Gregory v. Small, 39 Ohio St
346 ; Morrison v. McFarland, 51 Ind.
206; McCormick v. Burt 95 111. 263;
S. a, 35 Am. Eep. 163 ; Dritt v. Snod-
grass, 66 Mo. 286 ; s. C, 27 Am. Rep.
843.
* Gregory v. Brooks,. 37 Conn. 3.
5 Olmsted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378;
Rowning v. Goodchild, 2 W. Bl. 906 ;
Ashby V. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938;
Lane v. Cotton, 1 Salk. 17 ; Ferguson
V. Kinnoull, 9 CL & F. 251 ; Amy v.
Supervisors, 11 WalL 136 ; Henly v.
Mayor &c., 5 Bing. 91 ; Sawyer v.
Corse, 17 Gratt 230; S. c, 94 Am.
Dec. 445; Lyon v. Goree, 15 Ala.
360; Briggs v. Coleman, 51 Ala. 561 ;
Eslava v. Jones, 83 Ala. 139 ; Bassett
V. Fish, 12 Hun, 209 ; Piercy v. Ave-
rill, 37 Hun, 360 ; Bartlett v. Crozier,
15 Johna 2.50; Shepherd v. Lincoln,
17 Wend. 250; Jenner v. Jolifife, 9
Johns. 381; Bailey v. Mayor Sec, 8
Hill, 531 ; Adsit v. Brady, 4 Hill, 630 ;
S. a, 38 Am. Dec. 669; Wilson v.
Mayor, 1 Denio, 595; s. C, 43 Am.
Dec. 719; Hickok v. Pittsburgh, 15
Barb. 427 ; Robinson v. Chamberlain,
34 N. Y. 389; s. C, 90 Am. Deo.
713 ; Smith v. Wright, 24 Barb. 170 ;
Fish V. Dodge, 38 Barb. 163 ; Hutson
V. Mayor, 9 N. Y. 163 ; Hicks v. Dorn,
42 N. Y. 47; Hover v. Barkhoof, 44
N. Y. 113; Bennett V. Whitney, 94 N.
Y. 302 ; WooUey v. Baldwin, 101 N. Y.
688; Clark v. Miller, 54 N. Y. 528;
McCarthy v. Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194 ;
Keith V. Howard, 24 Pick. 292 ; Con-
way V. Russell, 151 Mass. 581 ; Will-
iams V. Powell, 101 Mass. 407 ; Now-
ell V. Wright, 3 Allen, 166 ; Eayns-
ford V. Phelps, 43 Mich. 342; s. a, 38
Am. Rep. 189 ; McGuire v. Galligan,
57 Mich. 38; Grider u Tally, 77 Ala.
422 ; s. C, 54 Am. Rep. 65 ; Choteau
V. Rowse, 56 Mo. 65 ; St Joseph &c.
Ins. Co. V. Leiand, 90 Mo. 177 ; s. C,
59 Am. Rep. 9 ; Rounds v. Mansfield,
38 Me. 586 ; Stevens v. Dudley, 50 Vt
158 ; County Comm'rs v. Duckett, 20
Md. 468 ; County Comm'is v. Baker,
44 Md. 1 ; Hays v. Porter, 22 Me. 371 ;
Long V. Long, 57 Iowa, 497 ; MoCord
V. High, 24 Iowa, 336; Kolb v.
O'Brien, 86 111. 210 ; Dilcher v. Raap,
73 111. 266; Governor v. Dodd; 81 III.
163; McClure v. Hill, 36 Ark. 268;
Collins V. McDaniel, 66 Ga. 203. Allen
V. Commonwealth, 83 Va 94, holds
that where a duty is of such a char-
acter as tu leave no margin whatever
220 PEKSONAL LIABILITY OP OFFICERS AND AGENTS. [§ 208.
duty of a purely ministerial officer to do, not reason why,' he
incurs no liability for injuries suffered without negligence or
corrupt intent on his part.^ A judicial or g'was^-judicial officer
may also have ministerial functions to perform; and in re-
spect of these, the absolute protection commonly afforded to
officers in the' exercise of judicial or legislative functions does
not extend.'
§208. The same subject centinued. — A ministerial act
has been defined to be " official action, the result of perform-
ing a certain and specific duty, arising from fixed and desig-
nated facts ; " * and again, as '\ one which a person performs in
a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the mandate of legal authority, without regard to, or the ex-
ercise of, his own judgment upon the propriety of the act done." *
Owing to the multitude and complexity of the duties annexed
to public offices, the courts in many instances find considerable
difficulty in determining whether a particular act is judicial or
ministerial. It is held in some States that highway officers
charged by statute with the duty of keeping highways in re-
pair, and provided with funds for that purpose, act in a min-
isterial capacity, and are liable for injuries suffered by their
neglect.* The board of street commissioners of a Wisconsin
for the exercise of judgment the law v. Streight, 54 Ind. 376 ; Evans v.
must he oheyed to the very letter. Etheridge, 96 N. C. 42. And further
1 Mechem's Public OfSces and Offl- definitions in State v. Johnson, 4
cers, § 661. ' Wall. 475, 498; Sullivan v. Shanklin,
2 Sage V. Laurian, 19 Mich. 137; 63 Cal. 247, 351; Morton v. Comp-
Highway Comm'rs v. Ely, 54 Mich. troUer-General, 4 S. C. 430, 474 ; Com-
175. In such cases he cannot, under missioner v. Smith, 5 Tex. 471 ; Ar-
any principle of law, be made, a tres- berry v. Beavers, 6 Tex. 467 ; Raines
passer. Harding t;. Woodcock (1890), v. Simpson, 50 Tex. 995; S. C, 33
137U. S. 43. Am. Rep. 609; Clerk & Lindsell on
s Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 433 ; s. a, Torts, 574.
54 Am. Rep. 65 ; Thompson v. Holt, 6 Bennett v. Whitney, 94 N. Y. 303 ;
53 Ala. 491; People v. Provines, 34 People w Town Auditors, 75 N.Y. 316;
Oal. 530 ; People v. Bush, 40 Cal. 344; People v. Town Auditors, 74 N. Y.
Throop on Public Officers, § 539. 310 ; Warren v. Clement, 24 Hun,
^Grideru. TaUy, 77Alav 423; s. C, 473; Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y.
54Am. Rep. 65. 113; Adsit v. Brady, 4 Hill, 630;
5 Flourney v. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. S. C, 40 Am. Dec. 305 ; Robinson v.
169. See, also. Ex parte Batesville Chamberlain, 34 N. Y. 389 ; S. G,
&c. R. Co., 39 Ark. 83; Pennington 90 Am. Deo. 713; Babcockv. GiflEord,
§ 209.] PEH80NAL LIABILITY OF OFFICEES AND AGENTS. 221
city, disregarding the requirement of the charter that all
work for the city should be let by contract, resolved that the
work of repairing and reconstructing a bridge should be
done by themselves under the supervision of their committee
and the superintendent appointed by them. The court de-
cided that although they were not amenable to any one for
their adoption of plans and specifications, yet in the execu-
tion of the worli they were mere ministerial ofiicers and not
judicial or legislative, and accordingly they were liable to
third persons for negligence or misfeasance.^
§ 209. No personal liability for strictly public acts. — An
officer cannot be subjected to a private action for neglect of a
duty to be discharged exclusively for the benefit of the public
even by a person specially injured thereby, and though the
act was wilful and malicious.'' " He must show the wrong
which he specially suffers," said Judge Cooley, " and damage
alone does not constitute a wrong." ' Thus in the case last
cited, where a county supervisor approved the bond of a treas-
urer knowing him to be in default, but not disclosing the fact
to the surety, no right of action accrued to the latter.^ And
where the charter of a city required that certain work should
be awarded by the aldermen to the lowest bidder, but those offi-
cers, in violation of their duty, gave the contract to one whose
bid was higher than the plaintiff's, the latter being in fact the
lowest, it was adjudged that the aldermen were not liable,
their duty being of an essentially public nature.' The same
is true, also, of the official act of a highway commissioner in
29 Hun, 186 ; Lament v. Haight, 44 " Held v. Bagwell (1883), 58 Iowa,
How. Pr. 1 ; Garlinghouse v. Jacobs, 139.
29 N. Y. 297 ; Piercy v., Averill, 37 3 Cooley on Torts (3d ed.), 449.
Hun, 360, holding the mayor and * Held v. Bagwell (1883), 58 Iowa,
aldermen of a city liable ; Hines v. 139. If a policeman were to neglect
Lockport, 50 N. Y. 336; Weed v. his duty to preserve the peace and
Ballston Spa, 76 N. Y. 339 ; Pomf rey protect property, whereby some per-
V. Saratoga Spr., 104 N. Y. 459 ; Mc- son was injured by violence or his
Cord V. High, 24 Iowa, 336 ; Tearney house robbed, it is clear that there is
V. Smith, 86 111. 891 ; Bostwiok v. Bar- no private remedy against the officer,
low, 14 Hun, 177. Cooley on Torts (3d ed.), 448 ; Shear-
1 Robinson v. Rohr (1889), 73 Wis. man & Eedfleld on Negligence (4th
436 ; S. &, 9 Am. Rep. 810 ; 40 K. W. ed.), § 316. ^
Rep. 668. " East River Gas Light Co. v. Don-
222 PEESONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICEES AND AGENTS. [§ 210.
improperly opening or discontinuing a road to the prejudice
of an individual,' and the neglect of a quarantine officer to
take ordinary precautions to prevent the spread of contagion.'
§ 210. Default of sulbordinates. — Public officers or agents
engaged in the public service, or acting for public objects,
whether their appointment emanates from particular public
bodies or is derived from general laws, and whether those
objects are of a local or generail nature, are not responsible
for the misfeasances or positive wrongs, or for the nonfeasance
or negligences or omissions of duty, of the sub-agents or serv-
ants or other persons properly employed by and under them
in the discharge of their official duties.' But the principal is
liable if he directs or authorizes the wrong,* or fails to require
his deputies to observe statutory regulations," or if he neglects
to superintend properly the discharge of their duties,* or neg-
ligently employs or retains unfit or improper persons.' There
is also an important distinction to the effect that if the inferior
or sub-agent holds not an office known to the law, but his ap-
pointment is private and discretionary with the officer, the
latter is responsible for his acts.' This is illustrated in a re-
nelly, 93 N. Y. 557. See, also. Strong 4 M. & S. 27 ; Hall v. Smith, 3 Bing.
V. Campbell, 11 Barb. 135 ; Martin v. 156 ; Donovan v. McAlpin, 85 N. Y.
Mayor &c., 1 HiU, 545; Butler v. 185; s. C, 39 Am. Rep. 649; Knch u
Kent, 19 Johns. 328 ; Ashby v. White, Board of Education, 30 Ohio St 37;
1 Salk. 19. S. C, 37 Am. Rep. 414.
' Sage V. Laurain, 19 Mich. 187. * Ely v. Parsons, 55 Conn. 83 ; S. C,
sCooley on Torts (3d ed.), 450, 10 Atl. Rep. 499; Tracy v. Cloyd, 10
citing Freeport v. Isbell, 83 111. 440 ; West Va. 19.
White V. Marshfield, 48 Vt. 20 ; Brink- » Bishop v. Williamson, 11 Me. 495,
meyer v. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187 ; Ogg where a postmaster was held liable
V. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495 ; Western for the default of one whom he al-
CoUege &c. v. Cleveland, 13 Ohio St lowed to have the care of the mails
375; Hill v. Charlotte, 72 N. C. 55; without being sworn according to
s. c, 31 Am. Rep. 451 ; Pontiao v. Car- law.
ter, 33 Mich. 164. « Dunlop v. Mnnroe, 7 Cranch, 242 ;
astory on Agency (9th ed.), §319; Schroyer v. Lynch, 8 Watts (Pa.),
Story on Bailments (9th ed.), §§ 461, 453; Ford v. Parker, 4 Ohio St 576.
462; Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U. S. 'Wiggins v. Hathaway, 6 Barb.
507. See, also, HoUiday v. St Leon- 632 ; Schroyer v. Lynch, 8 Watts
ard, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 192; Duncan u (Pa.), 453. See, also, Throop on Pub-
Findlates, 6 CI. & F. 894; Humphreys lie OflSces and Officers, § 593.
V. Mears, 1 M. & R. 187; Sutton v. 8 The distinction is more fuUy
Clarke, 6 Taunt 84 ; Harris v. Baker, stated in a note to the case of Wilson
§ 211.] PEESONAL LIABILITY OP OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 223
cent Connecticut case, where a selectman, for the purpose of
cleaning a highway obstructed by the growth of trees and
shrubbery, directed a laborer employed by him " to cut the
brush and the trees and make the road passable." No trees
were pointed out and no limits given, nor any expression of
judgment by the selectman, but the matter was left to the
judgment and discretion of the laborer, who, in good faith,
cut down some trees on the land of an adjoining owner, the
removal of which was not necessary. The selectman was held
liable for the damage.^ So, also, an officer is liable for the
defaults of his private servant or agent within the scope of
his employment ; ^ and ministerial officers, generally, who are
charged with the performance of duties to individuals, as dis-
tinguished from purely public duties, are subject to the rule
of respondeat superior?
% 211. lyection of meml)er of city council by order of
mayor. — A statute provided that the mayor should be ex
officio president of the council and preside at its meetings,
and he was also authorized by an ordinance "to preserve
order and decorum and to decide all questions of order, sub-
ject to an appeal to the council." An alderman's behavior
was insulting and disorderly, but did not threaten personal
injury nor arrest the progress of business, and, failing to
observe the mayor's admonition, he was conducted out of
the council chamber by the chief of police under an order
V. Peverly, 1 Am. L. Cas. (5th ed), top Shaick v. Sigel, 60 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
p. 785. In Shepherd v. Lincoln, 17 123. Bee, also, Smith w. Holmes, 54
Wend. 250, it was held, Cowen, J., Mich. 104. Clerks of courts. McNutt
delivering the opinion, that a super- v. Livingston, 7 Sm. & M. (Miss.)
intendent of repaire on the canals of 641 ; Snedicor v. Davis, 17 Ala. 472.
the State is personally liable in an Sheriffs. Meohem's Public Offices
action on the case for damages sus- and Officers, § 798. A register of
tained by an individual through the deeds is liable for the penalty imposed
negligence of workmen employed in by statute for the issue of a marriage
making repairs. license without reasonable inquiry as
> Ely V. Parsons (1887), 55 Conn. 83 ; to the age of the parties, if either is
S. C, 10 Atl. "Eep. 499. See, also, under eighteen, where a blank license
County Comm'rs v. Duvall, 54, Md. signed by him is filled up by a person
351. specially deputized by him for the
^Mechem's Public Offices and Of- purpose, though the deputy made in-
ficers, § 802. quiry. Cole v. Laws, 108 N. C. 185;
> Such as recorders of deeds. Van & c, IS S, E. Rep. 985.
224 PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFIOEES AND AGENTS. [§ 211.
from the mayor. The court held that the obstreperoiis mem-
ber was entitled to an action for damages against both the
mayor and chief of police.^ " The ordinance is only declar-
atory of the common law," said the court; "it neither in
terms nor spirit increases or extends the duties or powers
usually pertaining to the position [of the president of the
council]. What then are such duties and powers according
to the general usages of deliberative bodies? They comprise
the duty and power to preserve* order and decorum during
the deliberations of the body. It is said to be the privilege
of any member, and the special duty of the presiding officer,
to take notice of any offense during deliberation, and to call
the attention of the assembly to it. In such cases the presi-
dent declared to the assemblj'^ that a member named is guilty
of irregular or improper conduct, and specifies it. When it
has been stated by the president, the member is entitled to
be heard in exculpation.^ When the president has called an
offending member to order and stated the matter of the of-
fense to the house, it seems that he has discharged his duty
and exhausted his power in the premises. He thereby trans-
mits the further disposition of the matter to the house. The
power to punish is not among his prerogatives; that belongs
exclusively to the house, and he can never exercise it save as
it is expressly ordered by the house. If he has other powers,
the fact has escaped the recognition of writers. If noise or
tumult in the house, breaches of good order and decorum in
the course of proceedings, or an exhibition of disrespect and
contempt for the president, would justify a forcible exclusion
by him of an offending member, it cannot be that the history
of proceedings in deliberative bodies would furnish no in-
stance of the assumption of such power." '
1 Thompson v. Whipple (1890), 54 a matter for the action of the house.
Ark. 203 ; S. C, 15 S. W. Eep. 604 If the member disregards its order,
3 " Delicacy and custom requires the president may enforce it Thus
that he withdraw in order that the far, and no farther, c^n we find that
matter may be fully discussed and the president is authorized to order
considered free from any resti-aints that a member be expelled." Thomp-
of his presence. If a sense of pro- son v. Whipple, 54 Ark. 203.
priety does not constrain him to ' " It is said that the power of the
withdraw, the house may order that speaker is well stated by Mr. Speaker
he do so ; buthis failure to do it is Lenthall, who, when Charles I came
§ 212.] PEBSOilA'L LIABILITY OF OFFICBES AND AGENTS.
225
§212. Negligence of recorder of deeds.— Where a re-
corder of deeds is employed by tHe owner of land to make a
search of title, he is not liable for an error to one who lends
money on the faith of it and loses it, at least in the absence
of knowledge that it was to be u^ed for procuring a loan.* He
-is undoubtedly liable for damage resulting from an erroneous
record of a conveyance, although it be the negligence of a
deputy;'' but who is entitled to sue, and the measure of dam-
ages, are often very nice and difficult questions. The decis-
ions are conflicting, and depend more or less on the language
of the statutes. While some courts hold that a grantee's title is
valid, notwithstanding defective record, if he has filed his deed
for record,' others decide that all persons may rely upon the
record actually raade, and that the negligence of the recorder
is, in effect, imputed to the one who employed him when the
rights of third parties are concerned.''
195, and the dissenting opin-
into the House of Commons and
asked him whether any of five mem-
bers that he came to apprehend were
in the house, whether he saw them,
and where they were, replied : ' May
it please Your Majesty, I have neither
eyes to hear nor tongue to speak in
this place but as the house is pleased
to direct, whose servant I am." s. G,
jp. 206. Bat it was conceded that
the president might order an arrest
to prevent an injury being done to
another member without waiting for
the action of the house, as that would
be no more than any other person
would be justified in doing any-
where. S. c., p. 307. Parsons ' v.
Bralnard, 17 Wend. 523, was con-
trolled by a New York statute, and
is without force out of that State.
It was there held that the presiding
oflScer of a town meeting, with stat-
ute authority to maintain order, may
make a valid order for the removal
of a disorderly person, though no vio-
lence was threatened. A verdict for
fifty cents damages was reversed.
iDay V. Reynolds (1880), 33 Hun,
131. C/. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100
15
U. S.
ion.
'Van Sch^ick v. Sigel, 60 How.
Pr. (N. Y.) 133.
'Merrick w. Wallace, 19 111. 486,
497 ; Polk v. Cosgrove, 4 Biss. 437 ;
Riggs V. Boylan, 4 Biss. 445; Gai^-
rard v, Davis, 53 Mo. 333; Minis v.
Minis, 35 Ala. 33.
* Frost V. Be'ekman, 1 Johns. Ch.
388, 298; reversed, but not on this
ground, Beekman v. Frost, 18 Johns.
544; New York Life Ins. Co. v.
White, 17 N. Y. 469 ; Chamberlain v.
Bell, 7 Cal. 293; Shepherd v. Burk-
halter, 13 Ga. 444; Miller u. Brad-
ford, 12 Iowa, 14; Brydon v. Camp-
bell, 40 Md. 331 ; Barnard v. Campau,
29 Mich. 162 ; Barrett v. Shaubhut, 5
Minn. 823 ; Terrell v. Andrew County,
44 Mo. 309 ; Hester's Lessee v. Fort-
ner, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 40 ; Lally v. Hol-
land, 1 Swan (Tenn.), 896 ; Jennings'
Lessee v. Wood, 30 Ohio, 361 ; Bald-
win V. Marshall, 3 Humph. (Tenn.)
116 ; Sanger v. Craigue, 10 Vfc 555 ;
Cooley on Torts (8d ed.), 454; Throop
on Public Officers, § 743. On the
question of proximate cause of an in-
226 PERSONAL LIABILITT OP OFFICEES AND AGENTS. [§§ 213, 214.
§ 213. The same subject continued. — Where the error
consists in omitting to index or in indexing incorrectly, the
decisions are also at variance. In some of them the index is
deemed a mere collateral convenience for the benefit of the
recorder, an error in which does not prejudice the grantee's
title.' But where the statute requires the index to give infor-
mation of the contents of the deed, the record is not con-
structive notice of anything which is not disclosed by the
index.^ •
§ 214. Liability of assessor of taxes. — Tax assessors are
not liable for innocent mistake when acting within the scope
of their authority ; ' but they must be careful not to assume a
jurisdiction which the law does not confer upon them. If they
decide upon the rights of others in cases which the law has
not confided to their judgment, they are liable to the same
extent as if they possessed no official character whatever. In
the leading case in New York it was held that an action could
be maintained by a bank to recover a tax levied under an as-
sessment upon its capital stock contrary to a statute which
provided, instead, for the taxation of the stockholders. " The
distinction," said Chief Justice Church, " is between an erro-
neous and an illegal assessment. The former is where the
officers have power to act, but err in the exercise of the
power ; the latter where they have no power to act at all, and
it does not aid them to decide that they have." * In assessing
jury to a second grantee by reason of ^jjeeder v. Harlan, 98 Ind. 114;
the negligence of the recorder com- Gwynn v. Turner, 18 Iowa, 1 ; Breed
bined with the fraudulent act of the v. Conley, 14 Iowa, 269 ; Scoles v.
grantor (a point which Judge Cooley Wilsey, 11 Iowa, 361.
leaves unsolved — Cooley on Torts, ' National Bank of Chemung v. El-
455, 456), cf. Beach on Contributory mira, 53 N. Y. 49, reversing s. c, 6
Negligence (3d ed.), § 33, p. 88, n. 3, Lans. (N. Y.) 116, and reviewing the
aiid cases there cited, with Alexander New York cases ; Williams v. Weaver,
V. Town of Newcastle, 115 Ind. 51; 75N. Y. 30; a c, affirmed, 100 U. S.
S. a. 17 Atl. Rep. 200, cited in Beach 647 ; Robinson v. Rowland, 26 Hun,
on Contributory Negligence (3d ed.), 501 ; Ford v. McGregor (1890), 20 Nev.
§ 345, p. 335. And see Wharton on 446 ; McDaniell v. Tebbetts, 60 N. H.
Negligence, § 134. 497; Cooley on Taxation, 553; Wil-
iSchell V. Stein, 76 Pa. St 398; son v. Marsh, 34 Vt 352; Odiome v.
Bishop V. Schneider, 46 Mo. 472; Rand, 59 N. H. 504.
s. c, 3 Am. Rep. 533 ; Comm'rs v. * National Bank of Chemung v, El-
Babcock, 5 Oregon, 472 ; Curtis v. mira, 53 N. Y. 49 (cited in preceding
Lyman, 24 Vt 33a note); Dom v. Backer, 61 N. Y. 261,
§ 214.] PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS.
227
property not taxable, or in deciding erroneously as to a tax-
able inhabitant, they act ministerially and not judicially.*
On the other hand, if they have jurisdiction both of the per-
son taxed and of the subject-matter, there is no individual lia-
bility, however erroneous or unequal the tax may be, provided
they act in good faith.^ Thus where the statute required an
assessment upon the market value of certain shares of stock,
and it was made upon the par value, there was .no remedy
against the assessors.' It was held in New York that an as-
sessor, in determining the value of property, is protected irre-
spective of motive;* but it is believed that the prcjvailing
rule makes him liable for a malicious overestimate.^
reversing s. C, 61 Barb. 597 ; Hilton
V. Fonda, 86 N. Y. 339. See, also,
Mygatt V. "Washburn, 15 N. Y. 316;
Whitney v. Thomas, 23 N. Y. 261 ;
Chegaray v. Jenkins, 5 N. Y. 376;
Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117 ;
Prosser v. Secor, 5 Barb. 607 ; Swift
V. Poughkeepsie, 37 N. Y. 511 ; Haley
V. Whitney, 53 Hun, 119. It was said
in Apgar v. Hay ward (1888), 110 N. Y.
225, that if assessors had no jurisdic-
tion to make a certain increase which
they did make, they would not be
liable for property taken to pay the
tax, but only for the difference be-
tween the correct and erroneous tax.
1 Ford V. McGregor (1890), 20 Nev.
446.
2 Williams u Weaver, 75 N. Y. 30;
S. C, aflBrmed, 100 U. S. 547; Bal-
lerino v. Mason (1890), 83 Cal. 447,
quoting from Chief Justice Taney's
opinion in Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How.
98; Apgar v. Hayward (1888), 110
N. Y. 225.
3 Williams v. Weaver, cited in pre-
ceding note. See, also, an excellent
case, Eobinson v. Rowland, 26 Hun,
501.
* Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio,
117. But see Apgar v. Hayward (1888),
110 N. Y. 225, at p. 233.
" Parkinson v. Parker, 48 Iowa, 667,
669; Ballerino v. Mason (1890), 83
Cal. 447, where, however, the court
held that an averment that the de-
fendant " wilfully and against law "
assessed property too high was not
an allegation of malice or of intent
to wrong or injure the owner. They
are exempt by statute in Massachu-
chusetts except for want of integ-
rity (Pub. Stat, of Mass., p. 113, § 94);
but formerly in -that State the rule
was more severe than that adopted
elsewhere. Gage v. Currier, 4 Pick.
399 ; Taf t v. Wood, 14 Pick. 362 ; Lit-
tle V. Merrill, 10 Pick. 543. Assessors
are not liable for an unintentional
omission to tax a person, whereby he
loses his vote, Grifito v. Rising, 11
Met. 339.
CHAPTEE VIII.
THE LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION FOR THE ACTS OF ITS
OFFICERS AND AGENTS.
1815.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
331.
333.
834
235.
227.
228.
829.
230.
331.
333.
233.
234
235.
236.
237.
Introductory.
Liability ex contractu.
Contracts -within scope of
powers of corporation.
The same subject continued.
The doctrine of ultra vires
applied with greater strict-
ness to public than to pri-
vate corporations.
The reason for the rule.
Municipal bonds void when
ultra vires.
The same subject continued.
Ultra vires — How modified
by estoppel
The same subject continued —
Hitchcock V. Galveston.
IiTegularity in exercise of
power.
Ultra vires — How modified
by the doctrine of implied
contract — General princi-
ples.
The same subject continued.
Illustrations of the doctrine of
implied contracts.
The same subject continued.
Liability of the corporation
to repay taxes illegally col-
lected.
The same subject continued —
Restrictions.
Illegality of assessment.
Actual receipt of taxes by the
corporation.
Compulsory payment of taxes.
The same subject continued.
Illustrations of the rule.
The same subject continued.
The doctrine of the federal
Supreme Court considered.
The same subject continued.
340. Contracts within the scope of
powers of officer or agent.
841. The same subject continued—
Clark V. Des Moines.
342. All persons contracting with
strictly public corporations
charged with knowledge of
scope of pow6l:s of officer or
agent.
343. The same subject continued.
244 Liability of corporation for
act of its officers or agents
in violation of law.
245. The same subject continued.
246. Effect of representation of of-
ficer or agent as to author-
ity.
247. The same subject continued.
248. Ratification of contracts.
249. The same subject continued.
250. Ratification by authorized offi-
cers necessary.
351. Manne;r of ratification.
353. Manner of execution of con-
tracts by officers and agents.
353. The same subject continued.
354 Contracts by ordinance or res-
olution.
355. Signature of contract.
356. The same subject cbntinued.
357. Liability ex delicto — (a) In
general
358. (&) Discretionary and legisla-
tive acts.
259. (c) The same subject contin-
ued.
260. (d) Ministerial acts.
361. (e) Public as contradistin-
guished from private duties.
363. The rule applied to public
gitasi-corporatioDB.
363. Conclusion.
§§ 215, 216.] LIABILITT FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, BTO. 229
§ 215. Introductory. — A municipal corporation, like other
corporations, can of course act only through its agents. Every
liability of such a corporation is in a sense a liability for the
acts of its oflBcers or agents. A more detailed statement of
the different classes of liabilities incident to municipal corpo-
rations will be found in the subsequent chapters of this work.
It is the writer's purpose in this chapter to consider the liabil-
ity of the corporation for the acts of its oflBlcers and agents
with special reference to the powers and authority of those
agents, and the extent to which the municipality is bound by
those acts. The liability of the corporation is naturally con-
sidered under two heads. Every liability is either a liability
ex contractu or a liability ex delicto. In other words, the act
of the officer or agent by which the municipality is sought to
be l)ound is claimed to be either a contract or a tort. The
principles governing these two classes of liability, though sim-
ilar in many respects, differ materially in others; and in
considering any specific question of liability we must first in-
quire whether that liability arises from contract or from tort,
before we attempt to decide whether the corporation is bound
by the acts of its officer or agent.
§ 216. Liability ex contractu — Requirements for valid
contracts. — A municipal corporation is liable, just as is a pri-
vate corporation or a natural free person, upon contracts prop-
erly assumed by the corporation. There may be said to be
three requirements necessary for a valid and enforceable con-
tract by a municipal corporation. In the first place the con-
tract must be within the scope of the powers of the corporation ;
that is to say, the corporation must be authorized, either ex-
pressly or impliedly by its charter or other statute by virtue of
which it has come into existence, to make such a contract. In
the second place the contract must be made by the proper offi-
cers or agents. The officers or agents through whom the cor-
poration acts in assuming the contract liability must be within
the authorized scope of their powers in making the contract on
behalf of the municipality. Finally, if the manner in which
the municipal corporation must make its contracts is expressly,
and imperatively prescribed by mandatory statutes, the con-
tract must be made according to the manner prescribed by
230
LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC.
[§ 217.
law in order to be valid.^ If these requirements are observed
the municipal corporation is liable to private persons upon its
contracts to the same extent as a private corporation or a
natural person. The constitutional prohibition of laws im-
pairing the obligation of contracts applies in favor of private
creditdrs of the municipality whether they be corporations or
persons, maintaining inviolable the rights of these creditors
against any subsequent legislation^
§ 217. Contracts within scope of powers of corporation.—
The municipal corporation being an artificial person and de-
riving its existence and power to act solely from the express
or implied provisions of its charter or other creating statute,
it cannot make a valid contract which is wholly beyond the
scope of its powers. Consequently no officer or agent can
make a binding contract on behalf of the municipal corpora-
tion, if such contract is wholly beyond the express or im-
plied powers of the corporation.' It now seems well estab-
1 See infra, §§ 252-356, where these
different requirements are discussed
in detail.
2 Wolff V. New Orleans, 103 U. S.
358; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S.
472. The proposition in the text is of
course conceded learning, and it is
needless to quote in this connection
more of the great number of cases
which establish the doctrine.
' Daviess County v. Dickenson, 117
U. S. 657; Hayes v. Holly Springs,
114 tr. S. 120 ; Lewis v. Shreveport,
108 U. S. 282 ; Town of East Oakland
V. Skinner, 94 U. S. 255 ; Marsh v. Ful-
ton County, 10 Wall. 676 ; Thomas v.
Richmond, 13 Wall. 349; Leaven-
worth V. Rankin, 3 Kans. 358; Bo-
gart V. Lamotte Township, 79 Mich. .
294 ; Reus v. Grand Rapids, 73 Mich.
337 ; Newberry v. Fox, 37 Minn. 141 ;
B. C, 5 Am. St Rep. 830 ; Burchfield v.
New Orleans, 43 La, Ann. 235 ; Gurley
V. New Orleans, 41 La. Ann. 75 ; Lay-
cock V. Baton Rouge, 25 La. Ann. 475 ;
Siebrecht v. New Orleans, 12 La, Ann-
496 : Spalding v. Lowell, 33 Pick. 71 ;
Laker v. Brookline, 13 Pick. 343; Bal-
timore V. Musgrave, 48 Md. 373 ; Sti-
ger V. Red Oak, 64 Iowa, 465 ; State
V. Beners, 86 N. C. 588; Fort Wayne
V. Lehr, 88 Ind. 62 ; Covington &e. R.
Co. V. Athene, 85 Gai 367 ; Citj- of
Eufala V. McNab, 67 Ala. 588; New
Jersey &c. Telephone Co. v. Fire
Commissioners, 84 N. J. Eq. 117;
Sutro V. Pettit, 74 Cal. 333; S. c, 5
Am. St Rep. 443; Miners' Ditch Co.
V. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 548 ; Agawam
Bank v. South Hadley, 138 Mass. 503 ;
Atlantic City &c. Water Co. v. Read,
50 N. J. Law, 665 ; Prince v. Quincy,
105 111. 188 ; Trustees of Belleview v.
Hohn, 83 Ky. 1 ; Cleveland v. State
Bank of Ohio, 16 Ohio St 236; Ship-
man V. State, 43 Wis. 381 ; Syracuse
W. Co. V. Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167;
Lyddy v. Long Island City, 104 N. Y.
218; Moore v. New York, 73 N. Y.
838; MacDonald v. New York, 68
N. Y. 23 ; Buffett v. Troy &c. R. Co.,
40 N. Y. 168; Donovan v. New York.
f 3T8".] ZZABILTTT FOK AOTS OF OFFTOEES, ETC. 2St
Hshed law that where the contract is properly ultra vires, — that
is to say, where it is wholly beyond the express or imlied pow-
ers of the corporation, — it is absolutely void, and cannot be
ratified by performance or by acceptance of benefit thereunder.
As is said in a recent California case, neither the doctrine
of estoppel or of ratification nor of iona fide holding can be
invoked to support such a contract.*
§ 218. The same subject continued.— There is, however,
much conflict in the cases bearing on this point. The great
preponderance of authority is undoubtedly in favor of the
doctrine of our text, but in many cases the judges seem to
have allowed their desire to prevent the defeat of substantial
justice by the interposition of the technical defense of uli/ra
vires to obscure their judgment in deciding the legal rights of
the parties. Thus, in a recent case in which the city of St.
Louis sued to recover upon a contract, which the court ac-
knowledged to be void, but under which the defendant had
enjoyed benefits, it was held that the defendant was estopped
from impeaching the validity of the contract. The decision
was also placed upon the doubtful ground that a contract
made by a municipal corporation, although ultra vires, was yet
not illegal if not prohibited by its charter ; and that while the
corporation might successfully set up the plea of uli^a vires if
sued upon such a contract, still the party contracting with the
corporation could not set up that plea against the corporation
after receiving and retaining benefits under the contract. The
decision may be justified on the ground of estoppel under the
particular facts of the case, but the general doctrine laid down
33 N. Y. 291 ; Albany v. Cunliff, 3 are but a few of a great number
N. Y. 165 ; Halstead v. Mayor, 3 N. Y. which support the proposition of the
430 ; Appeal of Whelen, 108 Pa. St text The writer has endeavored to
163 ; Barley's Appeal, 103 Pa. St 373 ; cite the leading and recent cases in
Maupin v. Franklin Co., 67 Mo. 837 ; the different States, by consulting
Cheney v. Brookfleld, 60 Mo. 53; which other authorities in the reports
Bridgeport v. Housatonic R. Co., 15 of that State may be ascertained.
Conn. 475 ; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 i Sutro v. Pettit, 74 Cal. 333 ; s. c, 5
Iowa, 199 ; Lincoln v. Stockton, 75 Am. St Eep. 443. And this doctrine
Me. 141 ; Mitchell v. Eockland, 45 Me. has the high authority of Judge Dil-
496; Driftwood &c. Turnpike Co. v. Ion. 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., §457;
Bartholomew County Commission- 3 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 935. See
ers, 73 Ind. 336, The cases above cited cases cited in preceding iiote.
332 LIABILITY FOE ACTS 01" OFFIOEES, ETC. [§ 219.
that a oity may recover upon an ultra vires contract unless
such contract is expressly, prohibited by law, is certainly
dangerously broad. The concluding sentence of the decision
seems to indicate the real ground of the decision :-r-" In rul-
ing thus we give no sanction to a municipal. corporation leav-
ing the narrow pathway marked out by its charter, nor do we
intimate that we would enforce an ultra vi/rea contract if
executory ; we merely hold that good morals and even-handed
justice demand that the defendant thould disgorge.'? ^
§ 819. The doctrine of ultra vires applied with greater
strictness to public than to private corporations.-r-In a-re-
cent Minnesota case,^ a contract for grading the streets was
made by the officers of a town in the first instance, althoitgh
the charter required that the duty to make the improvement
should be first imposed upon the adjacent proprietors. In a
well-considered opinion the contract was adjudged uUra vires
and void. The court said : — " The doctrine of ultra vires has
with good reason been applied with greater strictness to mu-
nicipal bodies than to private corporations, and in general a
municipality is not estopped from denying the validity of a
contract made by its officers when there has be no authority
for making such a contract." ' A different rule of law would
in effect vastly enlarge the powers of public agents to bind a
municipality by contracts not only unauthorized but prohibited
by the law. It would tend to nullify the limitations and re-
strictions imposed with respect to the powers of such agents,.
and to a dangerous extent expose the. public to the very evils
and abuses which such limitations are designed to prevent.*
1st. Louis v. Davidson, 103 Mo. 149.; trary to public:, policy is void, nofc-
s. c, 22 Am. St Rep. 764. withstanding the fact that the, city
'i Newberry v. Fox, 37 Minn. 141 ; has received some benefits there-
S. C, 5 Am. St Eep. 830. under.
"Citing Mayor v. Ray, 19 WaU. *See to the same effect; .Burch-
468; Brady w Mayor of New York* field v. New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 335 ;.
30 N. Y. 313; Hague v. City of Phil- Gurley v. New Orleans, 41 La. Ann.
adelphia, 48 Pa. St 537; 1 Dillon on 75; Reus v. Grand Rapids, 78 Mich.
Munic. Corp., § 457 ; Nash t). City of St. 337 ; Bogart v. Lamotte Township, 79
Paul, 8 Minn. 173, In Covington &c Mich. 394 ; Sutro v. Pettit 74 CaL
R. Co. V. Athens, 85 Ga. 367, it is de- 333; s. c, 5 Am. St Rep. 443, and
cided that a contract entered into by cases cited in preceding sections,
a city outside of its powers a^nd cou.^
§§ 220, 221.] UABIUTT FOB ACTS OF OFFIOBES, ETC. 233
§ 220. The reason for the rule.^The reason for the
stringent application of the doctrine of ultra vires to strictly
public corporations is well stated by Judge, Cooley: — "The
powers conferred upon municipalities must be considered
with reference to the object of their creation, namely, as
agencies of the State in local government. The State can
create them for no other purpose, and it can confer powers of
government to no other end, without at once coming into
conflict with the constitutional maxjm that legislative power
cannot be.delegated, or with other maxims designed to confine
afl the agencies of government to the exercise of their proper
functions ; and wherever the municipality shall attempt to ex^
ercise powers not within the proper province of local self-
government, whether the right to do so be claimed under
express legislative grant or by implication from the charter,
the act must must be considered as altogether ultra vires and
therefore void." '
§ 221. Municipal bonds void when ultra, vires.— An inter-
esting instance of the application of the preceding doctrines
is found in a California case already cited.^ The legislature
of that State authorized the board of supervisors of the county
of San Luis Obispo to issue bonds " not exceeding in the ag-
gregate the sum of forty thousand dollars " for the purpose
of erecting a court-house. By some means bonds to the
amount of forty-two thousand dollars were issued. Under
the California statutes such bonds could be legal only by
virtue of the express authority of the legislature. The court
held that the action of the supervisors in issuing the bonds in
excess of forty thousand dollars did not bind the county, as
the county had no power to issue bonds without legislative
sanction ; that the bonds were absolutely void. " It is quite
probable," said the opinion of the court, "that the respond-
ents paid full par value for these bonds and that they will
lose their money," but " those who contract with a municipal
1 Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 861. the corporate wings clipped, down to
And Judge Dillon says :-r" The his- the lawful standard." 1 Dillon on
tory of the workings of municipal Munic. Corp, g 457.
bodies has demonstrated the salutary 3 Sutro v. Pettit, 74 CaL 333 ; s. a,
nature of this principle, and that it 5 Am. St Rep. 442.
is the part of true wisdom to keep
25i LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFICBKS, ETC. [§§^ 222, 22?,
corporation are bound to know the extent of the power of its
officers.^ Bespondents would have discovered the worth-
lessness of the bonds upon the slightest inquiry. At aU events,
hard cases cannot be allowed to make bad law. An over-
issue of twenty thousand dollars would have been no less
valid than the over-issue of two thousand dollars ; and any
other rule would put the people of a county in the complete
power of careless or unscrupulous public ofQcers." ^
§ 222. The same subject continued. — The Supreme Court
of the United States has, however, decided, where municipal
bonds are by virtue of misrepresentations contained in the
bonds themselves apparently valid, and are sold to lona fide
purchasers, and the purchase price received and appropriated
by the city, that the city is liable to the purchasers for the
price paid for the bonds upon an implied contract to restore
money illegally obtained,' But the doctrine of the case cited
in the preceding section* has often been sustained ; and under
the circumstances of the individual case it has been decided in
several instances in Massachusetts that the holders of void
municipal bonds were without remedy,*
§ 223. Ultra vires — How modified by estoppel. — The
foregoing principles are to be applied cautiously, however;
lating Wallace v. Mayor of San <Sutro v. Pettit, 74 Cal. 333,
Jose, 29 Cal. 181. * Agawam Nat Bank v. South
2Sutro V. Pettit, 74 Cal. 333; S.C., Hadley, 138 Mass. 503; National
5 Am. St. Rep. 443, 445. In the Bank &c. v. Lowell, 109 Mass. 314.
same case the board of supervisors See chapter on Bonds and Coupons.
attempted to correct their error by It will be noticed that the Supreme
ordering the bonds to be redeemed. Court of the United States is more
The court very justly held this to be lenient towards bonaflde holders for
brutum fulmen, saying : — " The char- value of irregular or void bonds than
acter of one void act of public ofiS- are the State courts — possibly be-
cers cannot be changed by a second cause the federal tribunal feels less
void act of the same officers declar- keenly the local dangers of allowing
ing the first act to be valid." careless or unscrupulous public offl-
' Wood V. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 394 cers to trifle with the financial obli-
So also in a Wisconsin case the same gations of the corporations whose
doctrine was upheld, and it was also servants they are, and consequently
decided that it was not necessary is more at liberty to exercise the nat-
under those circumstances for the ural feeling of pity for the bond-
holders to offer to return the bonds holders who have become the victims
before bringing action. Paul v. Ke- of that carelessness or unscrupulous-
nosha, 33 Wis. 366.
§ 224.] LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC. 235
and it does not always follow from the fact that the munic-
ipality has undertaken an ultra vires act, that the other con-
tracting party is without remedy for the corporation's default.
As has been before indicated, the courts are reluctant to ap-
ply the hard doctrine of ultra vires, and have to some extent
used the same expedients to evade that doctrine which have
in the case of, private corporations so far restricted its appli-
cation. The doctrine of estoppel is frequently invoked against
the plea of ultra vires. Thus, to use the words of Judge
Dillon, " Where an act in its external aspect is within the gen-
eral powers of the corporation, and is only unauthorized be-
cause it is done with a secret unauthorized intent, the defense
of ultra vires will not prevail against a stranger who in good
faith dealt with it without notice of such intent." '
§ 224. The same subject contiuued — Hitchcock v. Galves-
ton.— A notable instance is to be found in a case in the federal
Supreme Court,^ where the city of Galveston contracted with
certain parties to pave its streets. This was within the scope
of the powers of the corporation, but a clause in the contract
provided for the issue of negotiable municipal bonds in pay-
ment for the contract which was ultra vires the corporation.
The contractors proceeded with the work, and when partially
completed brought action against the city on the contract.
The plea of ultra vires was set up and sustained in the trial
court but overruled in the Supreme Court. The grounds of
the decision were stated by Mr. Justice Strong as follows : —
" They (the plaintiff contractors) are not suing upon the bonds,
and it is not necessary for their success that they should as-
sert the validity of those instruments. It is enough for them
that the city council have power to enter into a contract for
the improvement of the sidewalks ; that such a contract was
made with them ; that under it they have proceeded to furnish
materials and do work as well as assume liabilities ; that the
city has received and now enjoys the benefit of what they
have done and furnished ; that for these things the city prom-
ised to pay ; and that after receiving the benefit of the con-
1 2 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 936 ; cases to that date substantially in the
citing 5 Am. L. Rev. (Jan., 1871) 372, language of the text
which says the distinguished author ^ gg XJ. S. 341.
sums up the result of the English
236 LIABILITY FOE ACTS OP OFFICBES, ETC, [§ 224.
tract the city has broken it. It matters not that the promise
was to pay in a manner not ■authorized by law* If payments
cannot be made in bonds because their issue is uWa uires, it
would be sanctioning rank injustice to hold that payment need
not be made at all. Such is not the law. The contract be-
tween the parties is in force,.so far as it is lawful. There may
be a difference between the case of an engagement made by a
corporation to do an act expressly prohibited by its charter
or some other law and a case of wftere legislati¥e power to do
the act has not been granted. Such a distinction is asserted
in some decisions. But the present is not a case in which the
issue of bonds was prohibited by any statute. At most the
issue was unauthorized ; at most there was a defect of power.
The promise to give bonds to the plaintiffs in payment of
what they undertook to do was therefore at furthest only
ultra vvres; and in such a case, though specific performance of
an engagement to do a thing transgressive of its corporate
power may not be enforced, the corporation can be held liar
ble on its contract. Having received benefits at the expense
of the other contracting party, it cannot object that it was not
empowered to perform what it promised in return in the
mode in which it promised to perform. This was directly
ruled in The State Bowrd of Agi'i<nlllMrev. The Citizens^ Street
EaiZway Go} There it was held that ' although there may be
a defect of power in a corporation to make a contract, yet if
a contract made by it is not in violation of its charter or of
any statute prohibiting it, and the corporation has by its prom-
ise induced a party, relying, on the promise and in execution
of the contract, to expend money and perform his part thereof,
the corporation is liable on the contract} " *
1 47 Ind. 407. opinion of the court, by Tensas &c.
2 Hitchcock V. Galveston (1877), 96 Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall 570, and
U. S. 841, citing Alleghany City v. Mayor of Nashville v. Bay, 19 WaU.
' HcClurkin, 14 Pa. St 81; Maher v. 468, where it was held thatamunici-
Chicago, 38 UL 266 ; Oneida Bank u pality has inherently no implied
Ontario Bank, 21 N. Y. 495 ; Argenti power to to issue bonds. But in the
V. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 356 ; Silver Galveston case the liability of the
Lake Bank v. North, 4 Johns. Ch. city was based upon the contract and
(N. Y.) 373, The decision of the the court did not decide the question
lower court in this case (Hitchcock v. of the validity of the bonds. The ar-
Galveston) was supported, in the guments of the opinion quoted in the
§§ 225, 226.] LIABILITY FOE AOTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC. 237
§ 325. Irregularity iii exercise 6f poTfer.— And in pursu-
ance of the same policy the courts have held that where the
oflBcers of the municipal corporation enter into contract which
is within the scope of the powers of the corporation, but dp
so in an irregular manner, the corporation is estopped from
setting up ultra vires against one who has contracted in good
faith.' And in an Illinois ease it was decided that where a
municipal corporation enters upon a contract in reliance upon ■
a power which it is subsequently discovered not to possess, it
will not be relieved of its obligation if that obligation can be
satisfied by the exercise of a power which it lawfully pos-
sesses."
§ 226. Ultra vires — How modified by the doctrine of im-
plied contract — General principles. — The elementary prin-
ciple that the law presumes a contract to restore to the rightful
owner property obtained through fraud or mistake is applied
to municipal corporations with effects that greatly modify
and ameliorate the doctrine of ultra vires. "This doctrine
of implied municipal liability applies to cases where money or
other property of a party is received under such circumstances
that the general law, independent of express contract, imposes
the obligation upon the city to do justice with respect to the
same." ' These words of Chief Justice Field indicate the great
breadth and vagueness of the doctrine and the consequent
great difficulty in its application to individuals. There are
few subjects in the law of public corporations in which it is
more difficult to lay down general principles from the adjudi-
cations. The general principle of the liability of corporations
on an implied contract, where the law presumes a contract to
restore money or property obtained by mistake or without
authority of law, is supported by a vast number of authorities.*
texi were considered applicable even ' Moore v. New York, 73 N. Y. 238.
if the bonds were conceded to be il- * Maher v, Illinois, 88 111. 267.
legal and void. It will be noted that » Argenti v, San Francisco, 16 Cal.
the conclusions of this case are close S55.
in principle to St Louis i\ Davidson, < Chapman v, Douglas Co., 107 U. S.
102 Mo. 149, already cited and con- 848 ; Louisiana v. Wood, 102 U. S.
sldered. See to the same eflfeot. East 294 ; Mayor &e. of Nashville v. Roy,
St Louis V, East St Louis Gas &c. 19 WaJL 468 ; Bank of U. S. v. Dan-
Co. 98 IlL 415. dridge, 12 Wheat 74 ; Hitchcock v.
238 LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFICEES, ETC. [§ 227.
The difficulty is to determine under what circumstances the
general rule applies.
§227. The same sulbject continued. — The law must be
dete/minfed from the circumstances of each case, and general-
ities will be little more than indications of the trend of the
decisions. The result of this state of things is that which
always follows when the law is in the breast of each judge.
There is great and ir*econoilable conflict in the cases. A few
general rules are laid down, however, by Chief Justice Field
which may be studied with advantage'. " If the city obtain
money of another by mistake or without authority of law, it
is her duty to refund it — not from any contract entered into
by her on the subject, but from the general obligation to do
justice which binds all persons, whether natural or artificial.
If the city obtain other property which does not belong to
her it is her duty to restore it ; or, if used by her, to refund
an equivalent to the true owner from the like general obliga-
tion ; the law, which" always intends justice, implies a prom-
ise. In reference to money or other property, it is not diffi-
cult to determine in any particular case whether a liability
with respect to the same has attached to the city. The money
must have gone into her treasury or been appropriated by
her ; and when it is property other than money it must have
been used by her or be under her control. But with refer-
ence to services rendered the case is different. Then accept-
ance must be evidenced by ordinance to that effect. If not
originally authorized, no liability can attach upon any ground
of implied contract. The acceptance upon which alone the
obligation to pay could arise would be wanting. As a gen-
eral rule, undoubtedly a city corporation is only liable upon
Galveston, 96 U. S. 341 ; Albany City Miss. 518 ; Herman v. Crete, 9 Neb.
Nat. Bank v. Albany, 93 N. Y. 363 ; 350 ; District Township of Norway v.
Moore v. Mayor &c. of N. T., 73 N. T, District Township of Clear Lake, 11
338 ; Peterson v. Mayor &a of N. Y., Iowa, 506 ; Morville v. American
17 N. Y. 449; Bank of Columbia u Tract Soo'y. 123 Mass. 139; Brown «.
Patterson, 7 Cranch, 399 ; Taylor v. Atchison, 39 Kan. 37 ; Bryan v. Page,
Lambertville, 43 N. J. Eq. 107; San- -51 Tex. 533; Lemington v. Blodgett,
gamon Co. v. Springfield, 63 111.66; 37 Vt. 815; MagiU V. Kauffman, 4
Canaan v. Derush, 47 N. E. 213 ; State Serg. & B. 817,
Board of Education v. Aberdeen, S6
§ 228.] LIABILITY FOB ACTS OP OFFICERS, ETC. 239
express contracts authorized by ordinance. The exceptions
relate to liabilities from the use of. money or other property
which does not belong to her or to liabilities springing from
the neglect of duties imposed by the charter from which
injuries to parties are produced. There are limitations even
to these exceptions in many instances, as where money or
property is received in disregard of positive prohibitions ; as,
for example, the city would not be liable for moneys received
upon the issuance of bills of credit — as this would be in effect
to support a proceeding in direct contravention of the inhibi-
tion of the charter." ^
§ 228. Illustrations of the doctrine of implied contracts.
In an Illinois case the municipal corporation was bound by its
charter to support its paupers. An action was brought by a
person who had furnished necessaries to a pauper, after hav-
ing applied to the municipal authorities for relief, which was
refused. The city was held liable under an implied contract
to remunerate the person who had thus performed what was
the duty of the city.'' The cases in which said doctrine is
more frequently applied arise where the city has obtained
through mistake or fraud money or other property, and an
implied contract to return the property thus obtained is pre-
sumed by the law. So in a famous series of California oases
known as the " City Slip Cases," where the municipal oflBcers
conveyed real estate by virtue of an ordinance which was
void, it was held that the sales were absolutely void ; that no
title passed to the supposed purchasers, and that the corpora-
tion was liable in an action brought by them to recover the
purchase-money, although that money had already been ap-
propriated for municipal purposes.'
1 Argenti v. San Francisco, 16 Cal peated applications to the city au-
355. thorities for relief, which was refused.
2 Seagraves v. Alton, 13 III 366. In If Reeves was a pauper in fact, the
the opinion it was said by the court: — plaintiS by continuing to maintain
" In the present case the evidence him pursue,d the course that human-
tended to the conclusion that Reeves ity prompted and the law approved,
was a pauper and properly charge- and he ought to be remunerated."
able to the corporation. It also 'Punental v. San Francisco, 21
clearly appeared that the plaintiff, Cal. 351; Grogan v. San Francisco,,
with whom Reeves resided, made re- 18 CaL 590; McCracken v. San Fran-
240 UABILITT FOE AOTS OF OFFICEES, ETC. [§§ 229, 230.
§ 229. The same subject contimied.^In a recent interest-
ing case in the Supreme Ccmrt a Nebraska county purchased
certain lands for a pobr-farm, and j^aid for the same partly in
cash and partly in promissory notes. It was subsequently de-
cided by the State courts that the'promissory notes were ultra
vires and void. Suit was brought that the sum due on account
of the purchase price, should be paid or that the county should
reconvey the lands. The Supreme Gonrt held that the contract
was void only so far as the mode'^f payment was concerned,
and that the county was liable f6r the balance due on account
of the purchase price, and decreed that that balance should be
paid within a reasonable time or the property reconveyed to
the rightful owners.' The courts have freiqnently decided, in
accordance with the maxim that " he who seeks equity must
do equity," that a municipal corporation which seeks to be
relieved from a contract must, if it has received benefits under
that contract^ restore the benefits it has received before its
prayer will be granted.*
§ 230. Liability of the corporation to repay taxes ille-
gally collected. — A liability on an Implied contract arises
under proper circumstances where the municipal corporation
has collected and received illegal taxes. The principles upon
which this liability is based are clearly the same as those
which have been discussed in the preceding sections. The
law presumes a contract on the part of the corporation to
repay the taxes to the rightful owner, if the conditions are
such that the municipality has not equitably a right to retain
the money collected as taxes.' The money thus received is
Cisco, 16 Cal 591. In a New York i Chiapman v. Douglas County, 107
case sewers were 'furnished under an U. S. 348,
unauthorized contract The courts 2 Turner v. Cruzen, 70 Iowa, 803;
held that the contractor could not Lucas v. Hunt, 6 Ohio Sb 488. The
recover on the express contract, but diflScnlt subject of implied contracts
indicated in a dictum that "if, as will be more fully discussed in the
alleged, the city has obtained his chapter on contracts. As has been in-
property without authority, but has dicated, the cases are conflicting, and,
used and received the avails of it, it it is perhaps impossible to lay down,
would seem that independently of general rules on the subject to which
the express contract an implied con- many exceptions are not to be found,
tract would arise to make compensa- ' National Bank of Chemung v. El-
tion." Nelson v. Mayor &p., 63 N. Y. mira, 53 N. Y. 49 ; Bank of Common-
635. wealth v. New York, 43 N. Y. 189;
§ 231.] LIABILITY FOE A0T8 OF OFFIOEKS, ETC. 241
considered in law to be money had and received for the
rightful owners, the tax-payers, and can be recovered by them
in an action in assumpsit on this common-law liability inde-
pendently of the statutory provisions on the subject that are
in force in several of the States.
§ 231. The same subject continued — Restrictions. — It is
manifest, however, that a loose application of the doctrine
enunciated in the preceding section would be fraught with
grave damage to the corporation. If the town, city or other
strictly public corporation could be held liable to repay all
taxes irregularly collected, even if paid voluntarily, it is qVi-
dent that great public inconvenience would ensue. Such a
condition of things would afford unlimited opportunity to
demagogues to appeal to the natural avarice of mankind.
Actions would be brought to recover taxes, necessary and
legal in their essentials, but collected irregularly or by virtue
of legislation in which some technical defect could be found.
The administration of government would be seriously impeded',
and the just and equitable principle of the common law would
be distorted into an instrument of injustice. The courts have
Grand Bapids v. Blakely, 40 Mich. less to release his person or property
367 ; Tuttle v. Everett, 51 Miss. 27 ; from detention or to prevent an im-
Bouglasville v. Jones, 62 Ga. 433; mediate seizure of his person or
Lamborn v. County Commissioners, property, such payment must be
97 U. 8. 181 ; Union Pacific E. Co. v. deemed voluntary, and cannot be re-
Commissioners of Dodge County, 98 covered back. And the fact that the
U. S. 541 ; Philips v. New York, 113 party at the time of making the pay-
N. Y. 216 ; Ege v. Koontz, 8 Pa. St ment files a written protest does not
109 ; Princeton v. Vierling, 40 Md. make the payment involuntary. But
340 ; Kiker v. Jersey City, 38 N. J. whera a party not liable to taxation
Law, 235 ; Haines v. School District, is called upon peremptorily to pay
41 Me. 346 ; Cook v. Boston, 9 Allen, upon such a warrant, and he can
393. The liability of the corporation save himself and his property in no
for the repayment of taxes illegally other way than by paying the illegal
collected exists under the proper con- demand, he may give notice that he
ditions at common law independent so pays it by duress and not volun-
of statute, and has been recognized tarily, and by showing that he is not
by the Supreme Court of the United liable recover it back as money had
States. "Where a party pays an iile- and received." Union Pacific E. Co.
gal demand with a full knowledge of v. Commissioners of Dodge County,
all the facts which render such de- 98 U. S. 541, cited and quoted in 3
mand illegal without an immediate Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 947.
and urgent necessity therefor, or un-
16
■242 LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC. [§ 232.
therefore wisefy hedged about the application of the doctrine
hy stringent rules. These rules are stated by Judge Dillon
with his usual succinctness and clearness : — " Actions against
a municipal corporation to recover back money upon the
ground of the illegality of the tax or assessment are upon
principle and the weight of authority maintainable when, and
ill general bhly when (if thece be no Statute enlarging the liar
bility), the following requisites coexist : 1. The authority to
levy thiB tax or to levy it upon th% property in question must
be whoV/y wantrng, or the tax itself wholly lanauthorized, in
which case the assessm.€nt is not simply iTregtilar but abso-
lutely roid. 2. The money sued for mast have bfeem actually
received by the delfeadant tjorporatioft and received by it for
its own nse and ndt as an ageut o^ lAgtrament to assess and
collect money for the benefit of the State or other pablic
corporation or person. Aad 3. The payment by the pliiiiatiff
must have been made upon 06m pulsion 5 as, for example, to pre-
vent the immediate seizure of his goods or the arrest c^ the
person and noi mlwrvtarih^ Unless thes6 oo^ditiofis coaeur,
paying under protest WiU not withoat ■Sfeatalnsrjp^ aid giv« ^
right of recov^lpy." *
§ 232. Illegality of assessin«nt^ — According to the first rule
laid down in the preieedilig section, the assessment must b&
absolutely void and not merely irregular in ordef to justify a.
recovery by the tas-payeP ot the rtiolhey paid ia as taxes. TDhus-
where property exempt by law from taxation is fllegally
taxed, the assessment is void and the money may be recovered.*
And in accordance with this principle it has been held in several
cases that where the eoi^oratioa levies an assessment upon
property for street improvement and the lilce, and the assess-
ment is void in law, the sum paid under the assessment can be
recovered.' This rule is also applied when the corporation
1 2 Dillon on Munic, CJorp., § 940. N. J. Law, 849. But it is held in a
2 Indianapolis v. McAvoy, 86 Ind. Kew York case that when the a.ssess-
587. ment is made under an ordinance
' Taylor v. People, 66 HI. 838 ; which is void on its face, the pay-
Bradford V. C!hicago, 35 111. 413;- ment of the assessment being a mere-
Drefenthaler v. New York, 111 N. Y. mistake of law is not such a payment
831 ; Peyser v. New York, TO N. Y. as to justify a recovery. Phelps u.
497 ; Jersey City v. O'Callaghan, 41 New York, 113 N. Y. 316. ~
§§ 233, 234.] TJABILITT FOB ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETO. 243
levies an assessment and afterwards fails to carry out the im-
provement for which the assessment was. levied.^ In con-
formity with the general policy of the law in restricting the
application of the doctrine under consideration, it is conceded
learning that the assessment is considered prima fade valid,
and the burden of its illegality proof is thrown upon the person
attempting to recover money paid under that assessment.^
§ 233. Actual receipt of taxes })j the corporation. — The
second restrictive rule prescribed by Judge Dillon is well illus-
trated in a Massachusetts case. The tax-payers of a town
paid a sum of money under a void assessment, in order to
build a school-house. This money was paid by the treasurer
of the town to a building committee of the school district, A
tax-payer brought action against the school district and recov-
ered his proportionate share of the money from the school
district, although the town had levied the assessment.* It is
indeed obvious where the corporation exercises only a naked
agency, and pays over the money collected to a third person,
natural or artificial, that the actual Ijenefidary is liable in an
action broiaght to recover the money so paid. This principle
is, however, applied virith discretion, and the money must be
actually paid over to the third person before the corporation
can claim exemption under the rule. Thus where the city of
Grand Eapids illegally collected a tax for street improvement,
and an action was brought to recover the money so paid, it
was claimed by the defendant that the fund was not for city
use and that the city was not therefore liable. The court held
very properly that the plea was untenable, saying, " where the
party entitled demands restoration, it is no answer for the city
to say it holds the funds for somebody else."*
§ 234. Compulsory payment of taxes. — In order to justify
a recovery by the tax-payer, it is not only necessary that the
assessment he void and that the corporation actually receive
the money, but it is also necessary that the payment be made
• Bradford v. Chicago, 25 III 413; ' Joyner v. School District, 3 Cush.
Valentine v. St Paul, 34 Minn. 446. 567.
2 Douglas *•. Jones, 62 Ga. 423, and < Grand Eapids v. Blakely, 40 MicL
cases cited in preceding sections. 867.
Mi LIABILITT FOE ACTS OF OFFIOBES, ETC. [§ 235.
involuntarily and under compulsion. It is by the application
of this rule that these actions are, if unsuccessful, generally
defeated, and consequently there are a great number of cases
regulating and defining the application of the rule. There is
considerable variety and some actual conflict in the cases on
this subject. It is, however, upon the whole, well settled
that the payment must be made under direct and immediate
compulsion, and under such circumstances that the person
called upon to pay the tax can sJve himself or his property
only by paying the illegal demand.^ The stringent applica-
tion of this rule often results in hardship in individual cases,
but, for the reasons already stated, the general beneficence of
the rule is undoubted.
§235. Theit same) subject continued. — Under the rule" just
laid down, it will be seen that it is necessary for the payment
to be made under compulsion. Therefore, if the payment be
voluntary, and made only through ignorance of law, and not
through mistake of fact, the money so paid cannot be recov-
ered even if it was paid under an illegal assessment.^ There
1 Union Pacific E. Co. v. Commis- Miss. 189; Baisler v. Athens, 66 Ala.
sioneis of Dodge County, 98 U. S. 194; Clark v. Dutcher, 9 Cow.
541. In this case the rule is laid (N. Y.) 674; Muscatine u Keokuk
down by Chief Justice Waite as in &a Packet Co., 45 Iowa, 185 ; Falls
the text The language of the rule v. Cairo, 58 IlL 403 ; Harrison v. Mil-
is taken from the decision of Chief waukee, 49 Wis. 247 ; Eichmond v.
Justice Shaw in Preston v. Boston, Judah, 5 Leigh (Va.), 305 ; Phelps v.
12 Pick. 14, which is cited and ap- New York, 113 N." Y. 216 ; Diefen-
proved by Chief Justice Waite in his thaler v. New York, 111 N. Y. 831 ;
opinion. See, also, Lamborn v. Dick- Bank of Commonwealth v. New
inson County, 97 U. S. 181. It is be- York, 43 N. Y. 184; Bucknall v.
lieved that the doctrine of the text Story, 46 Cal. 589 ; Emery v. Lowell,
is also supported by the following 127 Mass. 138 ; Benson v. Monroe, 7
cases : Galveston City Co. v. Galves- Cusb. 125 ; Churchman v. Indianapo-
ton, 56 Tex. 486 ; Princeton v. Vier- lis, 110 Ind. 259 ; McCreckart v.
ling, 40 Md. 340 ; Commissioners of Pillsbury, 88 Pa. St 133 ; Taylor v.
Dickinson County v. National Land Philadelphia Board &o., 31 Pa. St
Co., 23 Kan. 196; Kansas, Pacific R. 73.
Co. V. Commissioners of Wyandotte * Union Pacific E. Co. v. Commis-
County, 16 Kan. 587 ; Detroit v. Mar- sioners of Dodge County, 98 U. S.
tin, 34 Mich. 170; Bank of New 541; Emery «. Lowell, 127 Mass. 138;
Orleans v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. Eichmond v. Judab, 5 Leigh (Va.),
421 ; Robinson v. Charleston, 2 Eich. 305 ; Bank of the Commonwealth v.
(S. C.) 817; Leonard v. Canton, 35 New York, 43 N. Y. 184; Falls v.
§ 236.^ LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC. 245
is some conflict in the cases on the question as to what con-
stitutes such compulsion as is necessary in order to recover
money paid for illegal taxes. The Supreme Court of the United
States has taken a rather extreme position on this point, as ap-
pears bj' a case already cited, in which an illegal assessment
had been laid upon certain real estate of a railroad company,
and a tax warrant had been issued for the collection of the
tax ; but the warrant had not actually been levied, nor had any
property actually been seized to satisfy the tax. Under these
circumstances, the company paid the tax under protest. The
court did not consider this payment to have been made under
the compulsion which the law requires as a prerequisite to
the bringing of an action to recover the money so paid.' Chief
Justice Waite seems to have rested this decision on the ground
that it was absolutely necessary for the payment to have
been made under such circumstances that the tax-payer could
have saved himself in no other way than by paying the
illegal demand. " The real question in this case is," he says,
" whether there was such an immediate and urgent necessity
for the payment of the taxes in controversy as to imply that
they were made under compulsion." ^
§ 236. Illustrations of the rule. — The hard doctrine of the
federal Supreme Court is in accordance with the decisions of
some of the States, but its rigor is modified in others. Thus in
a Michigan case an assessment was laid upon real estate under
an unconstitutional statute, and the land was to be sold to sat-
isfy the tax. In order to avoid the threatened sale the owner
]taid the tax under protest. Even under these circumstances
the payment was considered voluntary, and the right of the
owner to recover the tax-money was denied on the ground
that as the law was unconstitutional and void the sale would
also have been void, and would not therefore have disturbed
the owner's title.' As has already been indicated, it is held
Cairo, 58 III 403. See, also, cases cited See, also, to the same effect : Falls v.
in preceding section. Cairo, 58 IlL 403 ; Lee v. Templeton,
1 Union Pacific E. Co. v. Commis- 13 Gray, 476 ; Kansas Pacific R. Co. v.
sioners of Bodge County, 98 XJ. S. 541. CommissionersofWyandotteCounty,
2 Union Pacific E. Co. v. Commis- 16 Kan. 597. In Lambom v. Com-
sioners of Dodge County, 98 U. S. 541. missioners of Dickinson County, 97
'Detroit v. Martin, 34 Mich. 170. U. S. 181, the rule of the text is up-
24:6 ' LIABILITY FOE A.OTS OF OFFICEBS, ETO. [§ 237.
in many cases that some overt act towards collecting the tax
must have been taken before the tax can be considered to
have been paid under such compulsion as the law requires.
The mere issuing of a tax warrant or the mere threat to col-
lect the tax does not, according to these authorities, create
the compulsion required by law.'
§ 237. The same sulbject continued. — As an instance of a
less rigorous application of the rule may be cited an Iowa case
where the owner of real estate paid without protest the first
instalment of an illegal assessment. His right to recover the
money thus paid was aflSrmed by the court on the ground that
no protest was required by the ordinance.* And in the same
State money paid under protest for illegal taxes is considered
as paid under compulsion, although no active steps were taken
to enforce the payment of the tax.' In Mississippi it has
been held that if the legislation imposing the tax is void, and
if the tax has been paid to the ofBcer who appeared to be au-
thorized to collect it, the money can be recovered even if paid
without protest.* The Kentucky rule seems to hold that
money paid under mistake of law, as well as of fact, can be
recovered.*
held. The court said : — " If the legal- 244, and cases cited in preceding seo-
ity of the text is merely doubtful, tion.
and the validity of the sale would de- * Bobinson v. Burlington, 50 Iowa,
pend upon its legality according to 240. See, also. Buggies v. Fond du
the law of Kansas, the party, if he Lac, 53 Wis. 436.
chooses to waive the other remedies ' Thomas v. Burlington, 69 Iowa,
given him by law to test the validity 140.
of the tax, must take his risk either *Tubble v. Everett, 51 Miss. 37.
voluntarily to pay the tax and thus * Louisville v. Eenning, 1 Busb
avoid the (jUestion, or to let his land (Ky.), 381. This broad proposition is,
be sold at the hazard of losing it if however, clearly opposed to the great
the tax should be sustained. Having weight of authority in the federal
a knowledge of all the facts it is held and State courts, which conclusive)^
that he must be presumed to know establish the rule that money, if paid
the law, and in the absence of any under mistake of fact, maybe recov-
f raud or better knowledge on the part ered, but if paid without compulsion
of the officer receiving payment, he under mere mistake of law cannot be
cannot recover back money paid recovered by the tax-payer in an ac-
under such a mistake." tion in assumpsit on the implied con-
1 Union Pacific E. Co. v, Commis- tract Lamborn v. Commissioners of
sioners of Dodge County, 97 TJ. S. Dickinson County, 97 U. S, 181;
641 ; Morris v. Baltimore, 5 Gill (Md.), Benson v. Monroe, 7 Cush. 125 j
§ t38.] UABUJTY FOE A0T8 OF 0?FIOBES, BTO. ?47
§ 338. The doctrine of the federal Supreme Court con-
sidered.— To the mind of the writer, the rule laid down in the
ITHion Pa&ific Eailroad case ' seems unnecessarily harsh. With
all deference to the great ability of that court, and especially to
the clear and forcible intelligence of the justice who delivered
the opinion in the case under consideration, it would seem
that all the useful objects of the rule which prescribes that
the compulsory payment of illegal taxes is an essential requi-
site to the maintaining an action to recover the money so
paid would be attained by a less rigorous construction of that
rule. It la difficult to perceive why it should be necessary for
the tax-payer to wait supinely until active steps are taken tO
ooHect the tax before attempting to save his rights by pay-
ing under protest the sum demanded, and then testing in the
courts the validity of the legislation purporting to impose the
tax. Nor in the opifiioa of the writer does the decision of
Chief Justice Shaw in Preston v. Boston ^ warrant the conclu-
sion drawn therefrom by Chief Justice Waite. In the Mas-
gachusetts case it was said :=-" When a party not liable to tax-
ation is called upon peremptorily to pay upon such a warrant,
and he can save himself and his property in no other way than
by paying the illegal demand, he may give notice that he so
pays it by duress and not voluntarily, aod by showing that he ig
not liable to recover it back as money had and received." Says
Chief Justice Waite after quoting this passage: — "This, we
think, is the true rule, but it falls far short of what is requiretj
in this case." In the Union Pacific Bailroad case, a warrant
had been issued to the treasurer of the county, in the nature
of an execution running against the property of the parties
charged with taxes. By virtue of this warrant the treasurer
was authorized to seize and seU the goods of the company to
satisfy the tax. It i» to be noted also that the railroad com-
pany had had no opportunity of testing in court the validity
of the tas'aet. Under th§ge conditions the eompany paid the
amount of the taxes to the treasurer under a general protect,
and with notice that suit would be commenced to recover
back the full amount that was paid. The company certainly
Bucknall V, Story, 46 Cal. 589 ; Ckike 1 Union Pacific E. Co. v. Commig-.
V, Dutcber, 9 Cow, (N. Y.) 174 sioners of Dodge Couniy, 98 U. S. 541.
2 12 Pick. 14.
248 LIABILITY FOE ACT'S OF OFFICBES, ETC. [§ 239.
seems to have done everything that prudence and respect for
the laws could have dictated, unless Jt was necessary for it to
wait until the treasurer had, actually seized its property.
There can be no reason why its inaction should have been
carried to that point. To allow its property to be so seized
would have caused great inconvenience to the company and
to the public, and it cannot be the policy of the law to require
such useless and detrimental delay on its part.
§ 239. The same subject continued. — Moreover the ac-
tion of the company seems to have brought it within the let-
ter and the spirit of the rule as laid down by Chief Justice
Shaw of Massachusetts. The issuing of the warrant, it may
fairly be said, placed the railroad company in such a position
that it could save itself and its property in no other way than
by paying the illegal demand. By its protest it gave notice
that it so paid the demand by duress and not voluntarily, and
by showing that it was not liable it was entitled to recover
the amount paid by it as money had and received. These
considerations are strengthened by the fact that " there is a
strong tendency in the later cases, both English and Ameri-
can, to give relief where justice requires it, against a common
mistake of law, although there may be no element of actual
fraud." 1 This tendency is in the direction of modifying the
hide-bound rules of the common law, and adapting them to
the natural and equitable principles of justice dictated by
reason. It is believed by the writer that therigorous applica-
tion in the Union Pacific Kailroad case of a rule the general
wisdom of which is undoubted deffeats the very objects of
that rule, and, by requiring of tax-payers an unreasonable and
useless delay, stimulates them to evade the operation of the
statutes, which the rule is intended to support.
12 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 945, distinction between a mistake of the
note ad finem, citing 1 Spence, generallawof the land and one relat-
Equity, 633, 633 ; Bispham's Equity, ing toA matter of private right, the
§§ 185-188; Story's Equity Juris- latter being considered as a matter of
prudence, § 212a, written by Judge fact rather than of law); Stone v.
Eedfleld ; Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 Godfrey, 5 De G., M. & G. 76 ; In re
House of Lords, 149 ; S. C, 17 Irish Saxon Life Assurance Co., 3 J. & H.
Ch. E. 79 (noting luminous judg- 408 ; Jn re Condon,- L. R. 9 Ch. App.'
ment of Lord Westbury drawing- a 609.
§§ 240, 241.J . LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC. 249
§ 240. Contracts within the scope of powers of officer or
agent. — It has already been indicated the contract must not
only be within the scope of the powers of the corporation, but
it must be within the scope of the powers of the officer or
agent by whom the contract is made on behalf of the corpora-
tion. In other words the contract, in order to be valid, must
not only be a contract which the corporation is authorized ex-
pressly or impliedly by its charter or by other legislation to
make, but the oflBcer or agent who makes the contract for the
corporation must be properly authorized to make the contract.
The rule that the doctrine of ull/ra vi/res is more stringently
appLi>d in the case of strictly public than in private corpora-
tions ^ids its application in this class of contracts as well as in
those contracts when the question arises whether the contract
is ultra vires the corporation. "We have seen that the rule is in
force in the case of contracts which are without the scope of
the powers of the corporation itself.' In conformity to the
principle underlying the rule, the actual powers of public of-
ficers or agents are more closely scrutinized than are the pow-
ers of agents of private corporations, and acts within the appar-
ent scope of the powers of public agents,/but actually without
those powers, are frequently held invalid, when in the case of
the agents of a private corporation the contrary view would
be held by the courts. In general it may be said that the con-
tract of a public oflicer or agent, if beyond the actual scope of
his powers, will not bind the corporation unless the oflScer is
authorized by the corporation to represent himself as duly
empowered to make the contract.^
§ 241. The same subject continued — Clark v. Des Moines,
An excellent illustration of the rule is found in an Iowa case,
where action w-as brought upon warrants or orders of the city
of Des Moines by an innocent assignee of those warrants or
orders It appeared that the charter granted no express or
implied power to the officers who undertook to execute the
1 See suryra, § 219 et seq. Eep. 830 ; Louisville &c. R. Co. v.
2 Caark V. Des Moines, 19 Iowa. 199 ; Louisville, 8 Bush (Ky.), 415 ; Balti-
a G, 87 Am. Dec. 423. and cases there more v. Musgrave, 48 Md. 373. See,
cited; Sutro v. Pettit, 74 CaL 832; also, cases cited in succeeding sec-
S. C 5 Am. St Kep. 447 ; Newberry tion.
V. Fox, 37 Minn. 141 ; s. G, 5 Am. St
250 LIABIUTT yoa AOIB OS OFUCffiBS, KTO. [§ 241.
warrants to issa^ nege^iable paper in the name and on behalf
of the corporation. It was held that these warrants were
negotiable paper, but that they were Toid ab initio from the
want of power on the part of the oflScera to issue the paper;
that the honafids hdders of the warrants were bound at their
peril to aseertain the nature and extent of the powers of the
officer and of the eity; and that the fact that these warrants
were in the hands of iunoeent Imia Jid^ holders for Yaiue
eould not validate them. An opnion is delivered by Judge
Dillon, who lays down the fundamental prindples with his
usual perspicuity and force: — " The general principle of law
is well known and definitely settled that the agents, officers,
or even city council, of a munidpal corporation cannot bind
the corporation when they transcend their lawful and legiti"
mate powers. This doctrine rests upon this reasonable
ground ; The body corporate is constituted of all the inhabit-
ants within the corporate limits. The inhabitants are the
corporators. The officers of the oorporatioB, inelndiag the
legislative or governing body, are merely the public agents of
the corporators. Their duties and powers are preseribed by
statute. Every one, therefore, may know the mature of these
duties and the extent of these powers. These considerations,
as well as the dangerous nature of the opposite doctrine, dem^
onstrate the reasonableness and necessity of the rule that the
corporation is bound only when its agents, by whom from the
very necessities of its being it must act, if it acts at all, keep
within the limits of their authority. Not only so, but such a
corporation may successfully interpose the plea of uUm mretf
that is, set up as a defense its own want of power under its
charter or constituent statute to enter into a given contract or
to do a given act in violation or excess of its corporate power
and authority." '
1 See, also, Hodges v- Buffalo^ 3 jnerouB and aniform, and that some
Denio,110; HaJsteadttMayor,3N.Y. o( the mora important opes need
480; Martin v. Mayor, 1 Hill, 545; only be cited. Mayor of Albany
BooTi nUtica,8 Barb. 104; Cornell v. Cunliflf, 3 N. y. 1(16; Cuyler w.
V. Guilford, 1 Denio, 510 ; Boylan Trustees of Boohester, 18 Wend, 165 ;
V. Mayor & Aldermen of New York, Dill v. Warehara, 7 Met 438 ; Vincent
1 Sandf. 37. It ia observed by the v. Nantucket, IS Cush. lOS ; Stelsoo
distinguished judge that the cases V. Eenipton, 13 Mass. 272 ; s, C, 7 Am.
asserting these principles are nu- Pec. 145 ; Parsons V. Inbabitanto (d
§ 242.]'
LIABILITY FOB ACTS OP OFFIOEES, ETC.
251
§ 242. All persons contracting with strictly public cor-
porations charged with knowledge of scope of powers of
officer or agent. — Since the powers of public officers and
agents are defined either by the charter or other constituent
act, and since these statutes are open to public inspection and
*' afford to every person the certgiin means of ascertaining the
authority of these officers," ^ " it is fundanaental," says Judge
Folger, " that those seeking to deal with a. municipal corpora-
tion, through its officials, must take great care to learn the;
nature and extent of their power and authority." *
Goshen, 11 Pick. 396 ; "Wood v. Inhab-
itants of Ljnn, 1 All^i, 108; Spauld-
ing V. Lowell, 33 Pick. 71 ; Mitchell
V. Rockland, 45 Me. 49&; s. 0., 66 Am.
Pea 353 ; Anthony v. Adams, 1 Met
384 ; Western College v. Cleveland,
12 Ohio Sb 375; Commissioners v.
Cox, 6 Ind. 403 ; Inhabitants v. Weir,
9 Ind. 334; Smead v. Indianapolis
&C. E. Co, 11 Ind. 104; Brady v.
Mayor, 20 N. Y. 313; Appleby v.
Mayor, 15 How. Pr. 438; Estet v.
Eeokuk County, 18 Iowa, 199, and
cases cited by Cole, J. ; Clark v. Polk
County, 19 Iowa, 347.
'Clark V. Des Moines, 19 Iowa,
199; 8. C, 87 Am. Dec. ^3i.
2 McDonald v. The Mayor &c. of
New York, 68 N. Y. 33 ; S. a, 33 Am.
Kep. 144, citing Hodges v. Buffalo, 3
Denio, 110; Cornell v. Guilford, 1
Denio, 510; Savings Bank v. Win-
chester, 8 Allen, 109. In McDonald
V. The Mayor &c. of New York the
plaintiff sued for the value of mate-
rials furnished the city of New York.
The defense set up was that plaintiff
had failed to comply with statutory
regulations providing that the neces-
sity for such materials should be
certified to by the head of the depart-
ment of public works and the ex-
penditure therefor authorized by the
common council; and further pro-
viding that the materials should be
furnished upon sealed bids or pro-
posals made in compliance with pub-
lic notice advertised. The defense
was supported by the court under
the circumstances of the case. Judge
Folger's Ofnoion is valtiable : — " Itis
plain," says he, "that if the restric-
tions put upon municipaiitiea by the
legislature for the purpose of reduc-
ing and limiting the incurring of
debt and the expenditure of the pub-
lic money may be removed upon the
doctrine now contended for (i. a, that
the defendant, having appropriated
the materials of the plaintiff and used
them, is bound to deal justly and pay
him the value of them), there is no
legislative remedy for the evils of
m^unicipal government which of late
have excited so much attention and
painful foreboding. Restrictions and
inhibitions by statute are practically
of no avail if they can be brought to
naught by the unauthorized action
of every official of lowest degree, ac-
quiesced in or not repudiated by his
superiors. Donovan v. The Mayor
&c., 33 N. Y. 391. seems to be an au-
thority in point, though the exact
question now presented was not con-
sidered. And incidental remarks of
Denio, J., in Peterson v. The Mayor,
17 N. Y. 449, are to the same import
And see Peck v. Burr, 10 N. Y. 394
The views here set forth are not to
be extended beyond the facts of the
case. It may be that where a mu-
252
LIABILITY rOE ACTS OF OFFIOBES, BTO.
[§ 243.
§ 243. The same subject continued. — The rule of the pre-
ceding section is conceded learning in its general sense. There
is, however, diificnlty in its application to individual oases. This
difficulty lies in deciding to what extent the rule is modified
by the doctrine of estoppel, of implied contracts, and of ratifi-
cation. It may be safely stated, however, that when the aii-
thority of the agent is statutory, and therefore a matter of
record, the rule is strictly applied.' Now in general the in-
tention of the legislature in imposing the statutory restric-
tions on the power of the public officer must be considered,
and it is a cardinal question whether the abrogation ot .ue
restrictions in the particular case under consideration will de-
nicipality has come into the posses-
sion of the money or the property of
a person without his voluntary in-
tentional action concurring therein,
the law will fix a liability and- imply
a promise to repay or return it Thus
money paid by mistake, money col-
lected for an illegal tax or assess-
ment, property taken and used by an
official as that of the city when not
so, — in such cases it may be that the
statute will not act as an inhibition.
The statute may not be carried fur-
ther than its intention, certainly not
further than its letter. Its purpose
is to forbid and prevent the making
of contracts by unauthorized official
agents for supplies for the use of the
corporation. This opinion goes no
further than to hold that where a
person makes a contract with the
city of New York for supplies to it
without the requirements of the char-
ter being observed, he may not re-
cover the value thereof upon an im-
plied liability."
1 Clark V. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199 ;
S. C, 87 Am. Deo. 433 ; Delafield v.
lUinois, 2 HIU, 159, 174; Bodges to
Buffalo, 2Denio, 110; Supervisors v.
^Bates, 17 N. Y. 243; Overseers v.
Overseers of Pharsalia, 15 N. Y. 341 ;
Butterfleld v. Inhabitants of Melrose,
6 Allen, 187 ; Eossire v. Boston, 4 Al-
len, 57 ; Zabriskie w Cleveland &c. R
Co., 33 How. 381 ; Chemung Bank v.
Supervisore, 5 Denio, 517 ; Baltimore
V. Esohbach, 18 Md. 276 ; Baltimore v.
Reynolds, SO Md. 1 ; Marsh v. Fulton
County, 10 Wall. 676 ; Hague v. Phil-
adelphia, 48 Pa. St 527; Head v. In-
surance Co., 3 Cranch, 127 ; White v.
New Orleans, 15 La. Ann. 667 ; Dey
V. Jersey City, 19 N. J. Eq., 413 ; But-
ler V. Charleston, 7 Gray, 12 ; Bladen
V. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St 464; Bone-
steel V. Mayor &o., 22 N. Y. 162 ; Al-
bany V. Cunliff, 3 N. Y. 165 ; Halstead
V. Mayor, 8 N. Y. 430; Martin v.
Mayor, 1 Hill, 545 ; Boom v. Utica, 2
Barb. 104; Cornell v. Guilford, 1
Denio, 510; Appleby v. Mayor &c., 15
How. 438 ; McSpedon v. Mayor &c., 7
Bosw. (N. Y.) 601 ; Donovan v. Mayor
&c., 33 N. Y. 291 ; Smith v. Mayor &c'.,
10 N. Y. 504 ; Minei-s' Ditch Co. v. Zel-
lerbach, 37 Cal. 543; Belleview v.
Hohn, 83 Ky. 1. See, also, cases cited
in preceding sections. For many of
the authorities cited in this note the
writer is indebted to the exhaustive
brief of D. J, Dean, Esq., assistant
counsel to the corporation of the city
of New York, in McDonald v. The
Mayor &c., C8 N. Y. 23 ; S. C, 23 Am.
■Rep. 144.
§•244.] LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC. 253
feat the general intention of the legislation. In other words,
in the opinion of the writer, the question will generally be
best determined by ascertaining whether the particular case
at bar is of such a nature that a decision in favor of the con-
tracting party will invalidate the precautions imposed by the
legislature. If so, the restriction should be enforced ; if, on
the other hand, the case is such that a decision in favor of the
plaintiff will not affect the general policy of the charter or
other legislation as evidenced by the restrictions therein de-
fined, and will also satisfy the natural laws of justice and
equity, then the corporation may be safely held liable.'
§ 244. Liability of corporation for act of its officers or
agents in violation of law. — A contract made by the officers
or agents of a public corporation in contravention of express
law is of course void and the corporation cannot be held liable
therefor.' Thus where a contract was made by individual
members of the common council of a municipal corporation in
1 This rule is not, so far as the defeat" Citing Fox v. Sloo, 10 La.
writer has ascertained, definitely laid Ann. 11. See, also, Seibrecht v. New
down in the cases. It is, however, Orleans, 13 La. Ann. 496, where it is
shadowed forth in many of the opin- said in the vernacular of the civil'
ions, and it is believed that the best- law : —" Corporations possess only
considered decisions fall within its jura minorum. They have not the
scope. power of contracting on all subjects
2 Fox v. New Orleans, 13 La. Ann. like persons of full age and sui juris.
154, where the action' was brought Respublica minorum jure solet, idea
upon an alleged contract between the que auxilium, restitutionis implorare
plaintiff and defendant. This con- potest. Code, Const 4, tit 54, liber
tract was for filling in certain city 3; Ibid., Const 3, liber 11, tit 39;
lots. The statute providing that all Ibid., Const 4, liber 11, tit 31." "A
contracts for public or other work or- contract made by a corporation
dered by the municipality should be which is expressly prohibited by
let out to the lowest bidder at auc- statute is so far void that the corpora-
tion was disregarded, and the court tion cannot maintain an action upon
held that the contract was void, say- the contract even though the statute
ing: — "No action can be maintained does not in terras declare that such
upon a contract made in violation of a contract shall be void, but merely
law. If by overriding this statute prescribes a penalty for making it
municipal oflBcers could saddle the Whenever the legislature prohibits
city with the expenses of the con- an act or declares that it shall be un-
tracts they choose to make in deJi- lawful to perform it, every rule of in-
ance of its mandates, the tax-payers terpretation must say that the legis-
would become an easy prey to the lature intended to interpose its power
jobbing contracts which it was the to prevent the act, and as one of the
commendable objeci of the statute to means of its prevention that the
254 LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFICEES, ETC. [§ 246.
a manner not authorized by its charter in disregard of the
forms therein directed to be observed in the making of its
contracts, it was decided that snc3i a contract was not the
gtound of any claim agaiost the corporation ; and where the
charter required the contract to be made by the common
council, a contract made by a special committee of that body
was adjudged to be primarily invalid, and it was further de-
cided that no subsequent action of the common council could
confer validity upon it.* *
§ 245. The same subject continued. — The doctrine of the
preceding section is so clearly and positively established that
attempts have been made by the courts to so extend it as to
validate contracts which, although beyond the scope of the
powers of a public col-poration, are yet not positively prohibited
by its charter or other legislation. Thus in a Missoari case
already mentioned, a contract was made by the city of St.
Louis for the services of prisoners in its work-house to a pri-
vate person. The charter of the city provided that all persons
in the city work-house should ** woA for the city at such labor
as his or her strength will permit, within or without said
work-house, or -olh^p place, not exceeding ten hours each work-
ing day, and for such work the person so employed shall be
allowed, exclusive of his or her board, fifty cents per day for
each day's work'' on account of the fine and costs imposed
upon the prisoner. This statutory provision clearly did not
allow, even if it did not prohibit, the hiring out of the work-
house prisoners to private persons. The court held, however,
that the contract, thou^ ultra vires, was not absolutely void,
and that the city could recover upon a bond given by a con-
courts shall hold it void. This is as Bosenthal, 55 III. 85. See, also, to the
manifest as if the statute had de- same effect: Morgan v. Menzies, 60
dared that it should be void. That CaL 341 ; Lottman v. San Francisco,
the legislature imposes by a subse- 20 Oal. 96; Indianapolis u Indian-
quent section of the act a penalty for apolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 896 ; Jackson
the violation of the law does not in v. Bowman, 39 Misa 671 ; McDonald
the remotest degree legalize or give v. Mayor, 68 N, T. 38 ; S. C, 23 Am.
validity to the contract. It but shows Eep. 144 ; Thomas v. Richmond, 13
that the general assembly intended WaU. 349.
to adopt such measures as should i Lottman i\ San Francisco, 20 Cal.
compel the observance of the law." 96 ; City of Leavenworth v. Hankin,
"Cincinnati &c. Assurance Co. v. 2 Kau. 357.
§ 24:'6.] LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC. 255
tractor to the city to secure the perfortnance of a contract
upon his part, saying in the opinion : — " It will be observed that
the charter of the city, while it does not permit, yet does not
plPohibit, the makiing of such a contract as the one before us ; so
that although the contract is idlff'a vires the corporation, yet
it is ftot illegal becaiuse not prohibited by the charter. This
is a distinction clearly marked out by the authorities." *
§ 246, Effect of representation of oificer or agent as to
aHthority. — Th« general rule is well settled that since parties
dealing with municipal corporations are charged with knowl-
edge of the extent of the powers of the officers and agents of
these corporations, therefore a contract beyond the scope of
the powers of the officer or agent is not to be enforced against
the principal corporation.' But to this rule there are excep-
tions due to the application of the rules of estoppel. Thus
where the public officer or agent is charged with the sole duty
of ascertaining whether a condition precedent to the issuing
of municipal bonds has been performed, the recital in the bond
that such condition precedent has been performed will estop
the corporation from setting iap the td«fense -of non-perform-
ance of the tjondition precedent against an innocent purchaser
for valn-e of the bonds.*
1 Oily of St Louis v. Davidson, 103 upon the authorization of the CEtshier
Mo. 149 ; s. a, iS3 Am. St. Rep. 764. of the 'ban'k. It was held that the
*See ante, §§ 243, 343, and cases ajct was entirely beyond the scope of
there cited. In United States v. City the power of the cashier ; that his
B&nk of Oolnmbus, 21 Hoiw. 356, the representation concerning the power
tsasbier wtf'the defendant corporation of tte bearer did not bind the bank,
wrote a 'tetter stating that the "bearer and thitt ixinsequently the plaintiff
was authorized to contract on behalf could not recover. "We think the
of the ■bant for the 'transferor money safe rule," said Mr. Justice Wayne,
from the east to the south or the "in all instances of acts done by the
west for ttie federal government officers of corporate companies or by
Acting upon this letter the then sec- those who have the management of
retary of the treasury, Hon. Thomas their business from which contracts
Corwin, delivered to the bearer a are alleged to have been made, is to
draft to be transferred to New Or- test that fact by an inquiry into the
leans for $100,000, which the bearer corporate ability that has been given
cashed, but the proceeds of which he them and to their subordinate offi-
did not transfer or account for. The cera or which the directors of the
United States brought action against company can confer upon the latter
the City Bank of Columbus to re- to act for them."
cover the sum advanced as aforesaid 8 Oregon v. Jennings, 119 U. S. T4 ;
256 LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFICERS, ETC. [§§ 247, 248:
§ 247. The same subject continned. — The decisions on the
rule stated in the last sentence arise chiefly in deciding the
validity of municipal or public bonds, and will be fully dis-
cussed in a subsequent chapter.* For the present it is suffi-
cient to quote the rule as laid down in the Supreme Court
of the United States. " When legislative authority has been
given to a municipality or to its officers to subscribe for the
stock of a railroad company and to issue municipal bonds in
payment, but only on some precedent condition, such as a
popular vote favoring the subscription, and where it may be
gathered from the legislative enactment that the officers of
the municipality were invested with power to decide whether
the condition precedent has been complied with, their recital
that it has been, made in the bonds issued by them and held
by a 'bona fide purchaser, is conclusive of the fact and binding
upon the municipality, for the recital is itself a decision of the
fact by the appointed tribunal." *
§ 348. Eatification of contracts. — A most important dis-
tinction exists between the two classes of vli/ra vires pubho
corporations that we have just considered. The distinction is
in respect of the power of the corporation to ratify by subse-
quent acquiescence, active or passive, the unauthorized con-
tract. If the contract be wholly beyond the scope of the
powers of the corporation it is void ah initio, and no subse-
quent acquiescence can validate it.' Like a still-born child, it
Anderson County v. Beal, 113 U.S. McDonald w, Mayor &c. of New York,
227 ; Northern Bank of Toledo u 68 N. Y. 23 ; Brady v. Mayor &c. of
Porter Township, 110 U.S. 608; Town New York, 20 N. Y. 312; Marsh v.
of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484. Fulton Co., 10 Wall 676 ; Shawnee-
iSee the Chapter on Bonds and town u. Baker, 85"I1L 563; Hague v.
Coupons. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 528 ; Parsons
2Townof Coloma «. Eaves, 92 U.S. v. Monmouth, 70 Ma 262; Bank v.
484. In the opinion in that case, Mr. Statesville, 84 N. C. 169. See ante,
Justice Strong refers to the state- §§ 217, 218, and cases cited. An ex-
ment by Judge Dillon of this rule in amination of the cases will show that [
his work on Municipal Corporations the rule of the text applies both to \
(1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 523), and cases where the act is from its nat-
gives the rule in the words quoted in ure entirely beyond the charter
the text as a restatement of Judge powers, express or implied, of the
Dillon's proposition. corporation, and also to cases where
' Lewis V. Shreveport, 108 U. S. the officer or agent acted wholly be-
288 ; Smith v. Newburg, 77 N. Y. 130 ; yond his statutory authority in mak-
§§ 249, 250.] UABILITT FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEKS, ETC. 25T
lacks any element of life that may be fostered into active
force. This strict rule is based on the general principles which
determine the validity or invalidity of ultra vires municipal
contracts.' Ratification is a species of estoppel, and as the
contracts we are considering are absolutely void, no principles
of estoppel will be allowed to control.
§ 249. The same subject continued. — If, on the other hand,
the contract itself be within the scope of the powers of the cor-
poration, but be unauthorized only because the officer or agent,
while not forbidden by the law to make the contract, was not
properly authorized to do so, in that case the contract may be
ratified and validiated by subsequent assent of the corpora-
tion.* Thus in a Kansas case one member of a school board
made a contract for the building of a school-house. This con-
tract was a perfectly proper one in its nature, but was unau-
thorized because made by only one member of the board. The
full school board afterwards accepted the contract, which was
thereby ratified and validated.'
§ 250. Ratification by authorized officers necessary. — It
is obvious that the officer or officers who undertake to ratify
an unauthorized contract must possess an authority which in
the beginning would have enabled them properly to make the
original contract in behalf of the corporation.* In a leading
iug the contract, so tbat the act of 470 ; Chouteau v. Allen, 70 Mo. 390 ;
the officer or agent is virtually in Crawshaw v. Roxbury. 7 Gray, 374;
contravention of the law. Sullivan v. School District, 39 Kan.
1 See §317. 347; People v. Swift, 31 Cal. 36;
2 Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, 7 Episcopal Society v. Dedham Episco-
Cranch, 399 : Marshall County u pal Church, 1 Pick. 373 ; Topsham v.
Schenck, 5 Wall 772 ; Moore v. Al- Eogers, 43 Vt 199. This doctrine
bany, 98 N. Y. 396 ; Albany City Nat frequently finds its application in
Bank v. Albany, 93 N. Y. 363 ; Brady cases where unauthorized officers
V. Mayor &e. of New York, 30 N. Y. have made expenditure of publie
313 ; Backman v. Charlestown, 43 funds. A subsequent assent by the
N. H. 135; Shawneetown v. Baker, proper officials to such expenditure
85 IlL 563 ; Brown v. Winterport, 79 will in the absence of express statn-
Me. 305 ; People v. Detroit, 38 Mich, tory prohibition ratify the expendi-
S38; Dubuque Female College «. Dis- ture. See cases cited.
trict Township, 13 Iowa, 555 ; Lamm ^ Sullivan v. School District^ 39
V. Port Deposit &c. Association, 49 Kan. 347.
Md. 333: Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. « Delafleld v. lUinois, 3 Hill (N. Y4
17
258 LIABILITY FOB ACTS OF OFFICERS, ETC. [§ 251.
case in ISew York this principle was forcibly enunciated.
By a statute of the State of Illinois, certain officers or agents
of the State were authorized to borrow money for public use,
and for that purpose to sell its bonds or public stocks at not
less than their par value. These officers sold the bonds at
par, to be paid for in future instalments without interest,
while the bonds drew interest from the time of sale. This
was held to be a sale below par, and therefore unauthorized and
invalid. It was contended by the bondholders that the act
of the governor in signing the bonds with knowledge of the
terms of sale operated as a ratification of the sale. On this
point the court said: — "We are now brought to the inquiry
whether the contracts have been ratified so as to be obligatory
upon the State of Illinois. I felt some difficulty upon the
question upon the argument ; but after reflecting upon it I am
unable to say that there has been a ratification. The appel-
lant relies on the fact that the governor, after he knew of the
first contract, signed the bonds and caused them to be delivered ;
and that some of the other public officers of the State acted
under the contracts, drawing for money and receiving pay-
ments. But the difficulty is that the governor was no more
than an agent for the State, and he as well as^the commission-
ers acted under a limited authority ; and the same remark is
applicable to the auditor and other public officers. None of
them had authority to make such contracts as these were ; and
if they could not make them originally they could not ratify
them. Eatification must come from the principal — the State
of Illinois."!
§ 251. Manner of ratification. — When a certain mode of
execution of a contract is prescribed by statute, the act of
ratification of an unauthorized contract must comply with the
provisions of the statute regulating the manner of entering
into the original contract.* This rule is, however, to be taken
with the modification that if the statutory method of pro-
159 ; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 2 McCracken v. San Francisco, 16
376; Hague wPhiladelphir,48Pa.St CaL 591; Cross v. Morristown, 18
527. N. J. Eq. 305 ; Town of Durango t'.
1 Delafield v. State of Illinois, 2 Hill Pennington, 8 Colo. 257.
(N. Y.), 159, 175, citing People v.
Phoenix Bant, 24 Wend. 131.
§252.] LIABILITY FOB ACTS OF OFFICERS, ETO. '• 259
cedure be regarded as merely directory and not mandatory^
then a different method of procedure may be allowed in the
act of ratification.! Thus, where the council of the corpora-
tion is empowered by the charter to make certain contracts
by ordinance, and the contract is made by resolution, the
subsequent ratification must be by ordinance.'' The mere use
by the corporation of unauthorized improvements, such as
school buildings, does not amount to ratification, unless the
circumstances are such that it would have been natural and
proper to have refused such use, or unless it is proven that
the use was after knowledge of the unauthorized character of
the improvement.'
§ 252. Manner of execntion of contracts ^}J ofiBcers and
agents. — Nothing is more cei'tain, under the modern adjudi-
cations, than that the methods prescribed by charter or other
statute must be observed by the corporation in entering into
contracts, if these statutory provisions are mandatory and in-
tended by the legislature to act as wise restrictions upon the
power of the corporation to contract. If, then, there are man-
datory and restrictive enactments requiring the corporation to
contract only under certain formalities and conditions, then
contracts made by the officers or agents of the corporation
which are not executed according to those statutory require-
ments do not bind the municipality.* Eut where the statu-
1 Cory V. Somerset Freeholders, 44 * Bank of United States v. Dan-
N. J. Law, 445. dridge, 13 Wheat 64 ; State v. New-
2 Brown v. Mayor &c. of New York, burg, 77 N. T. 136; Brady v. Mayor
63 N. Y. 239 ; People v. Swift, 31 Cal. &o. of New York, 20 N. Y. 313 ; Al-
26 ; Cross v. Morristown, 18 N. J. Eq. len v. Galveston, 51 Tex. 302 ; Bryan
305 ; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. v. Page, 51 Tex. 532 ; McBrien v.
644. It has been held in some cases Grand Rapids, 56 Mich. 95; Argenti
that under the circumstances men- v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255 ; Los
tioned in the text, the subsequent Angeles Gas Co. v. Toberman, 61
ratification does not operate to vali- Cal. 199 ; Town of Durango v. Pen-
date the original contract, even nington, 8 Colo. 357 ; People v. Web-
though the ratification be by ordi- bar, 8.9 111. 347 ; Worthington v. Cov-
nanca See Newman v. Emporia, 33 ington, 83 Ky. 265 ; Addis v. Pitts-
Kan. 456, and cases cited. burgh, 85 Pa. St. 379 ; Keeney v. Jer-
' Wilson V. School District, 33 sey City, 47 N. J. Law, 449 ; State v.
N. II. 118 ; Lane v. School District, Passaic, 41 N. J. Law, 379 ; Seibrecht
10 Mete. (Mass.) 463 ; Davis v. School v. New Orleans, 13 La. Ann. 49? ; Bal-
Dlsjtrict, 24 Me. 349. timore v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 376 ; Taft
260
LIABILITY FOB ACTS OF OFFIOEBS, ETO.
[§ 253.
tory provisions prescribing the mode of executing contracts
are merely directory and are not intended to be restrictive
of the powers of the corporation or its oflSccrs to contract, then
a failure to comply with those provisions is not necessarily
fatal.'
§ 253. The same subject continued. — It is frequently pro-
vided by statute that all public contracts shall be in writing.
This being a mandatory provision and restrictive of the power
of the corporation to contract it must be complied with, else
the contract is invalid.^ And the same rule applies in regard
to contracts under seal. " The ancient rule of the common
law that corporations could not bind themselves by a contract
not under seal is no longer efficacious in this country." ' In
this connection it may be noted that by the provisions of the
Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, every English corporation
shall continue to have a common seal,* and certain contracts
are required to be made under the corporate seal.*
V. Pittsford, 28 Vt 286; Fulton v.
Lincoln, 9 Neb. 358 ; Hudson v. Mari-
etta, 64 Ga. 286; Logansportw. Hum-
phrey, 84 Ind. 487 ; Gates v. Hancock,
45 N. H. 528; Heidelberg v. San
Francisco County, 100 Mo. 69 ; Niles
Water Works v. Niles, 59 Mich. SIX ;
Wilhelm v. Cedar Co., 50 Iowa, 254;
Driftwood &c. Turnpike Co. v. Board
of Comm'rs, 72 Ind. 226. The gen-
eral principles enunciated in the text
will be more fully illustrated in a
subsequent portion of the work. See
the chapter on Conteacts.
1 Kelley v. Mayor &c. of Brooklyn,
4 Hill, 263 ; 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp.,
§ 449 and cases cited.
^ Starkey v. Minneapolis, 19 Minn.
203 ; McDonald v. Mayor &c. of New
York, 68 N. Y. 23 ; Stewart v. Cam-
bridge, 125 Mass. 102.
'15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law,
1090, tit "Municipal Corporations,"
citing Alton v. MuUedy, 21 HI. 76 ;
Wade V. Newbern, 77 N. C. 460 ; Selma
V. Mullen, 46 Ala. 411 ; New Athens v.
Thomas, 83 m 259 ; Watson v. Ben-
nett, 13 Barb. 196 ; Bank of Colum-
bia V. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299 ; Sav-
ings Bank v. Davis, 8 Conn. 191;
Hamilton v. Newcastle &c. R Co., 9
Ind. 359; Peterson v. Mayor &c. of
New York, 17 N. Y. 449; Missouri
Elver &C. R Co. v. Comm'rs of Ma-
rion County, 12 Kan. 482 ; Fleckner
V. Bank of U. S., 8 Wheat 338 ; Bank
of U. S. V. Dandridge, 13 Wheat 64;
Christian Church v. Johnson, 53 Ind.
273 ; McCuUough v. Talladega Insur-
ance Co., 46 Ala. 376; Buckley v.
Briggs, 30 Ma 452; Whitford v.
Laidler, 94 N. Y. 145 ; Sheffield School
Township v. Andress, 56 Ind. 157;
Merrick v. Burlington &a Plank
Road Co., 11 Iowa, 75; Trustees &c.
V. Moody, 62 Ala. 389. See, also.
Draper v. Springport, 104 U. S. 501.
* Municipal Corporations Act of
1882, § 250, subd. 1.
5 The appointment by a corpora-
tion of an attorney to conduct their
suits or manage their affairs must be
under the common seal, otherwise he
cannot recover against the corpora-
§ 254.] LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC. 261
§254. Contracts Iby ordinance or resolution.— The city
council being the agents of the corporation, the acts of that
body, if intra vires and regular, are of course binding upon
the corporation ; and a contract made by ordinance or reso-
lution of the council is, so far as regularity of execution is
concerned, valid and binding in the absence of express statu-
tory provisions regulating the mode of execution of corporate
contracts.' Judge Story has said on this subject : — " The acts
of such a body or board, evidenced by a written vote, are as
completely binding upon the corporation and as complete
authority to their agents as the utmost solemn acts done
under the corporate seal." ^ On the question whether such a
contract is without the statute of frauds, there .is doubt.
A New York case approves the doctrine that a contract made
by ordinance and duly entered on the official corporate min-
utes, which are signed by the clerk, is valid.' The decision in
this case is at least tacitly approved by Judge Dillon,* and
seems a reasonable adaptation of the law to modern methods
of corporate government when the business of the corpora-
tion is conducted by a council; but in a North Carolina case
a contract made in a similar matter was declared obnoxious
tion even though they had by resolu- Kingston-upon-HuU, L. E. 10 C. P.
tion expressly directed the business 403. See Eawlinson's Municipal Cor-
to be done. Arnold v. Mayor &c. of porations Act (8th edition by Thomas
Poole, 4 Man. & Q. 860 ; Sutton v. Geary), p. 100, note.
Spectacle Makers' Co., 10 L. T. (N. S.) i Fleckner v. Bank of U. S., 8
411. So an agreement by a corporation Wheat 338; Over v. Greenfield, 107
with one of its officers for an increase Ind. 231 ; Ross v. Madison, 1 Ind. 381 ;
of the salary of an office retained People v. Board of Siiftervisors, 37
by him as compensation for the loss Cal. 655; Fanning v. Gregoire, 16
of another office of which he was de- How. 524 ; Detroit v. Jackson, 1
prived under the act of 1835, though Doug. (Mich.) 165 ; Abbey v. Billups,
upon an executed consideration, is 35 Miss. 618; Clark v. "Washington,
not binding upon the corporation if 12 Wheat 40 ; Wade v. Newbern, 77
not under the common seal. Eegina N. 0. 460; San Antonio v. Lewis, 9
V. Mayor &c. of Stamford, 6 Q. B. Tex. 69.
433. See, also, Cope u Thames Haven 2 Fleckner v. Bank of U. S., 8
Dock & Railway Co., 6 Exch. 849; Wheat 338.
Mayor of Kidderminister v. Hard- 'Argus County «. Albany, 55 N.Y.
wicke, L. R. 9 Ex. 18. It has, how- 495. See, also, Duncombe v. Fort
ever, been held that an agreement Dodge, 38 Iowa, 381.
'for the use of a dock need not be un- < 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 449.
der seal. Wells v. Mayor &c. of
262 LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFICEES. ETC. [§§ 255, 256.
to the objection that it did not comply with the statute of
frauds.*
§ 255. Signature of contract.— It frequently happens that
the officers or agents of municipal corporations in executing
contracts on behalf of the corporation sign their individual
names and affix their individual seals instead of using the
corporate name and seal. The preponderance of American
authorities seems to establish th#rule that such contracts are
valid and binding upon the corporation, if made by the proper
officers and intra vires the corporation ; but that they are
valid and binding only as simple contracts, and that the seal
of the individual officer or agent does not supply the place of
the corporate seal.^ There is some conflict of opinion, but it
is believed that an examination of the cases will show this rule
to be sustained in the United States.'
, § 256. The same subject continued. — Notwithstanding
the fact, however, that the rule of the preceding section pre-
vails, it is far safer for municipal contracts to be signed and
sealed by the proper officers with the corporate name and
seal. Thus in a leading New York case cited by Judge Dil-
lon * a contract relating to public matters was made between
a committee appointed for that purpose by the city and a
natural person. This contract purported to be " between . . .
1 Wade V. Newbern, 77 N. C. 460. within the scope of their authority
2 Parr v. Greenbush, 73 N. Y. 463 j in executing an instrument in belialf
Eandall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns. 60 ; of the corporation sign their own
Stanton v. Camp, 4 Barb. 274 ; Hei- names and affix their own seals, such
delberg School District v. Horst, 63 seals are simply nugatory, and the in-
Pa. St. 301 ; Blanchard v. Blackstone, strument,. according to the weight of
103 Mass. 343 ; Robinson v. St Louis, modern judicial opinion, is to be re-
28 Mo. 488 ; Eegents &c. v. Detroit, 13 garded as the simple contract of the
Mich. 138 ; Bowen v. Morris, 3 Taunt corporation and will bind the cor-
874 But see contra. Bank of Colum- poration, and not the individuals ex-
bia V. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299 ; Ful- ecuting it, where the purpose to
lam V. Brookfield, 9 Allen, 1 ; Provi- act for the corporation is manifest
dence v. Miller, 11 R. I. 273; Ulam «. from the whole paper and where
Boyd, 87 Pa. St 477. there are no words evincing an in-
3 See 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 453, tention to assume a personal lia-
where the learned author says: — bility."
" Where officers or agents of a cor- < 1 Dillon on Munic Corp., § 453.
poration duly appointed and acting
§§ 257, 258.] LIABILITY FOB ACTS OF OFFICERS, ETC. 263
a committee appointed by the corporation of the city of Al-
bany for that purpose, of the. first part, and . . . of the second
part," and was signed and sealed with the individual names
and seals of the persons composing the committee. The court
decreed the enforcement of the contract against the corpora-
tion, as being a public contract.* But in Pennsylvania under
very similar circumstances the committeemen were made per-
sonally liable.^
§ 257. Liability ex delicto — (a) In general. — It is wholly
impossible within the limits of this chapter to lay down with
any degree of precision or minuteness the rules governing
the liability of public corporations for the tortious acts or
omissions of their officers and agents. The rules governing
^the decision of these questions will be set forth and discussed
in detail in the subsequent chapters. For this chapter the ef-
fort of the writer will be to state broadly the general princi-
ples according to which the liability of the corporation for the
torts of its officers and agents is determined — less with a
view to practical utility than to prepare the mind of the
reader for an intelligent consideratioji of the particular rules
obtaining in the different classes of cases in which this liabil-
ity is sought to be enforced. " !No rule on this subject can be
so precisely stated as to embrace all the torts for which it has
been held by some court or another that a private action will
lie against a municipal corporation." '
§ 258. (b) Discretionary and legislative acts. — "Where torts
are committed by the officers or agents of the public corpo-
ration in the exercise of those discretionary and legislative
powers which are delegated to them by the legislature.;
when those officers or agents in exercising those powers, or
by failure to exercise them, incidentally commit torts against
natural persons or private corporations, the municipality is
wholly free from liability.^ The reason for this rule, with an
1 Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns. Fed. Rep. 593 ; Seifert v. Brooklyn,
60. 101 N. Y. 136; Cole v. Medina, 37
2Ulam V. Boyd, 87 Pa. St 477. Barb. 318; Wilson v. New York, 1
3 Conway v. Beaumont, 61 Tex. 10. Denio, 595; Cain u Syracuse, 95
* Johnston v. District of Columbia, N. Y. 83 ; Mills v. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y.
118 U. a 19; Trescott v. Waterloo, 26 489; GrifiBn v. New York, 9 N. Y.
264:
LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC.
[§ 259.
outline of the classes of acts which are deemed discretionary
and legislative within the protection of the doctrine, is clearly
and forcibly stated by Judge Oooley in his work on constitu-
tional limitations. One passage is quoted from that work in
the following section.
§ 259. (c) The same subject continued. — " As no State,"
Bays this eminent publicist, "does or can undertake to protect,
its people against incidental injuries resulting from its adopt-
ing or failing to adopt any proposed, legislative action, so no
similar injury resulting from municipal legislative action or
non-action can be made the basis of a legal claim against a
municipal corporation. The justice or propriety of its open-
ing or discontinuing a street, of its paving or refusing to pa-ve
a thoroughfare or alleys of its erecting a proposed public
building, of its adopting one plan for a public building or
work rather than another; or of the exercise of any other dis-
cretionary authority committed to it as a part of the govern-
mental machinery of the state, is not suffered to be brought
456 ; Whitsett v. Union D. & R. Co.,
10 Colo. 243; Lincoln v. Boston, 148
Mass. 578; French -v. Boston, 139
Mass. 593; Tainter v. Worcester,
123 Mass. 311: Pierce v. New Bed-
ford, 139 Mass. 584 ; Steele v. Boston,
128 Mass. 583 ; Tainter v. "Worcester,
123 Mass. 311 ; Randall v. Eastern &c.
R. Co., 106 Mass. 276 ; Fisher v. Bos-
ton, 104 Mass. 87; HafEord v. New
Bedford, 16 Gray, 397; Wright v.
Augusta, 78 Ga. 341 ; Weller v. Bur-
lington, 60 Vt 38; Hutchinson v.
Concord, 41 Vt. 271; Calwell v.
Boone, 51 Iowa, 687 ; Schultz v. Mil-
waukee, 49 Wis. 354; Anderson v.
East, 117 Ind. 126; Wheeler v. Ply-
mouth, 116 Ind. 158; Lafayette v.
Timberla,ke, 88 Ind. 330; Heller v.
Sedalia, 53 Mo. 159 ; McKenna v. St.
Louis, 6 Mo. App. 320 ; Robinson v.
Evansville, 87 Ind. 334 ; Ray v. Man-
chester, 46 N. H. 59: Atwater v.
Baltimore, 31 Mo. 462; Bauman v.
Detroit, 58 Mich. 444; Burford v.
Grand Rapids, 53 Mich. 98 ; Western
College V. Cleveland, 13 Ohio St 375;
Frith V. Dubuque, 45 Iowa, 403;
Davenport v. Stevenson, 34 Iowa,
235 ; Stevenson v. Lexington, 69 Mo.
157 ; Kistner v. Indianapolis, 100 Ind.
210 ; White v. Yazoo City, 27 Miss.
357; Fort Worth v. Crawford, 64
Tex. 302; Black v. Columbia, 19 S. C.
412; Hill V. Charlott, 73 N. C. 55;
Van Horn v. Des Moines, 63 Iowa,
447; Freeport v. Isbell, 83 111. 440;
Miller v. St Paul, 38 Minn. 134 ; Men-
del V. Wheeling, 28 W. Va. 233;
Wheeler v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St
19 ; Greenwood v. Louisville, 13 Bush,
226 ; Jewett v. New Haven, 38 Conn.
368; Torbush v. Norwich, 38 Conn.
235; Howard v. San Francisco, 51
Cal. 52 ; Davis v. Montgomery, 51 Ala.
1S9 ; Lehigh County v. Hoflfort, 116
Pa. St 119; McDade v. Chester, 117
Pa. St 414 ; Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. St
420 ; Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35
Pa. St 324. See Cooley's Const Lim.
257; 2 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 950.
§ 260.] LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFIOEES, ETC. 265
in question in an action at law and submitted to the deter-
mination of court and jury. If, therefore, a city temporarily
suspends useful legislation ; or orders and constructs public
works from which incidental injury results to individuals ; or
adopts unsuitable or insufficient plans for public bridges, build-
ings, sewers, or other public works ; or in any other manner,
through the exercise or failure to exercise its political authority,
causes incidental injury to individuals, an action will not lie
for such injury. The reason is obvious. The maintenance of
such an action would transfer to court and jury the discretion
which the law vests in the municipality ; but transfer them
not to be exercised directly and finally but indirectly and par-
tially by the retroactive effect of punitive verdicts upon spe-
cial complaints." ^
§ 260. (d) Ministerial acts. — The converse of the prop-
ositions laid down in the two preceding sections is equally
true with those propositions ; that is to say, the municipal
corporation is liable for the tortious acts and omissions of its
officers or agents when those acts or omissions are violations of
absolute and ministerial duties.^ This rule is well established
and rests upon the principle that a municipal corporation is,
like aU other persons natural or artificial, liable for the proper
performance of duties which are not discretionary or legis-
lative in their nature, but which are absolute and ministerial.
This doctrine is, however, to be modified by the rule that this
duty must, even though ministerial, be not for the public but
1 Cooley's Const Lira. 253-5. 111. 346 ; Meares v. Wilmington (N. G),
2 Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U. S. 660 ; 9 Ired. Law, 73 ; Wilson v. Wheeling,
Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 19 W. Va. 334 ; Gilluly v. Madison, 63
U. S. 541 ; Galveston V. Posnainsky, Wis. 518; Boulder u Niles, 9 Colo. 415;
63 Tex. 118; Nelson v. Canisteo, 100 Gilmer v. Laconia, 55 N. H. 130;
N. Y. 89; Ehrgott v. New York, 96 Hewison v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1 :
N. Y. 264 ; Noonan v. Albany, 79 Kiley v. Kansas City, 87 Mo. 103 ;
N. Y. 470 ; Hamilton v. Columbus, 53 Albrittin v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. 486.
Ga. 435 ; Erie City v. Schwingle, 23 Many additional cases could be cited
Pa. St 385 ; Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Gratt in support of the doctrine of the text,
230 ; Farquar v. Roseburg, 2 Pac. but it is believed to be useless to do
Rep. 1103 ; Bohen v. Waseca, 32 Minn. so. The proposition of the text is in-
176 ; O'Nsil v. New Or' cans, 30 La. deed conceded learning in this coun-
Ann. 220; McCombs v. Akron, 13 try.
Ohio, 476; Waltham v. Kemper, 55
266 LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFICERS, ETC. [§§ 261, 262.
for the private advantage of the corporation, as more fully
explained hereafter.
§ 261. (e) Pulblic as contradistinguished from private du-
ties.— The whole doctrine of the liability of public corporations
for the torts of their officers or agents is affected and mod-
ified by the principle that the tortious act or omission must
be in violation not of a public but of a private duty. The reason
and the essence of this rule i^clear and easily to be under-
stood, but its application to the specific cases is often of great
difficalty. The rule is laid down in a recent Texas case, which '
is approved by the editors of the American and English En-
cyclopaedia of Law. " So far as public corporations of any
class and however incorporated exercise powers conferred on
them for purposes essentially public — purposes pertaining to
the administration of general laws made to enforce the general
policy of the state — they should be deemed agencies of the
state, and not subject to be sued for any act or omission occur-
ring while in the exercise of such power, unless by statute the
action be given. In reference to such matters they should stand
as does sovereignty, whose agents they are, subject to be sued
only when the State by statute declares they may be. In so
far, however, as they exercise powers not of this character,
, voluntarily assumed — powers intended for the private advan-
tage and benefit of the locality and its inhabitants — there
seems to be no sufficient reason why they should be relieved
from that liability to suit and measure of actual damage to
which an individual or private corporation exercising the same
powers for purposes essentially private would be liable." ^
§ 262. (f) The rule applied to public quasi-corporations.
The rule of non-liability of a public jwasi-corporation is illus-
trated in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois.
A drainage district enlarged its boundaries, thus discharging
more water on the plaintiff's land than it had a right to do,
and the work was also performed negligently. In declaring
that there was no corporate liability the court said : — " That a
private corporation, formed by voluntary agreement for pri-
1 15 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, sky, 63 Tex. 118; s. a, 12 Am. & Eng.
1141 ; City of Galveston v. Posnain- Corp. Cas. 484.
§ 2 i2.] ' LIABILITY FOE ACTS OF OFFICERS, ETC. 267
vate purposes, is held to respond in a civil action for its negli-
gence or tort, goes without saying; and yet, in deciding the
mooted question at issue in this case, it seems convenient to
restate that proposition. So, also, it is admitted law that
municipal corporations proper, such as villages, towns and
cities, which are incorporated by special charter or volunta-
rily organized under general laws, are liable to individuals in-
jured by their negligent or tortious conduct, or that of their
agents and servants in respect to corporate duties. In regard ;
to public involuntary j'^as^-corporations the rule is otherwise,
and there is no such implied liability imposed upon them.
These latter, such as counties, townships, school districts, road
districts and other similar quasi-coTiporatloias, exist under gen-
eral laws of the State which apportion its territory into local
subdivisions for the purposes of civil and governmental admin-
istration, and impose upon the people residing in said several
subdivisions precise and limited public duties and clothe them
with restricted corporate functions co-extensive with the
duties devolved upon them. In such organizations the duties
and their correlative powers are assumed in invitum, and there
is no responsibility to respond in damages in a civil action for
neglect in the performance of duties, unless such action is«
given by statute.' The grounds upon which the liability of a
municipal corporation proper is usually placed are that the
duty is voluntarily assumed and is clear, specific and complete,
and that the powers and means furnished for its proper per-
formance are ample and adequate.^ In such case there is a
perfect obligation, and a consequent civil liability, for neglect
in all cases of special private damages. The non-liability of
the public quasi-corporsition unless liability is expressly de-
clared is usually placed upon these grounds. That the corpo-
rations are made such nolens volensj that their powers are
limited and specific, and that no corporate funds are provided
which can, without express provision of law, be appropriated
to private indemnification. Consequently in such the liability
is one of imperfect obligation, and no civil action lies at the
12 Dillon on Munio. Corp., §§ 761, man (III), 567; Waltham v. Kemper,
763; Cooley's Const Lim. 340, 347; 55 IlL 346.
Hedges v. County of Madison, 1 Gil- 2 Browning v. City of Springfieldj
17 111. 14a
268 LIABILITY rOE ACTS OF OFFICEES, ETC. [§ 263.
suit of an individual for non-performance of the duty im-
posed." ^
§ 263. Conclusion. — The writer has endeavored in the pre-
ceding sections to give a very general outline of the principles
governing the liability of the corporation for the torts of its
officers and agents. These rules are necessarily broad and
general to a degree which perhaps deprives them of any con-
siderable practical value. The^will serve,, however, to show
the general trend of the 'adjudications in this country on the
subject under consideration. As has been remarked by al-
most every writer on this topic, it is impossible to lay down
rules of greater definiteness. The particular circumstances of
each case must be carefully considered and the decisions re-
lating to the class of torts to which belongs that which forms
the subject-matter of the action must be examined before the
law upon any specific case can be determined. The general
results of these rules may be stated to be as follows : — If the
tort is one for which the municipality is expressly made liable
by statute, that fact of course concludes the liability of the
corporation. If such is not the case, then the tort must con-
sist (in the case of public corporations other than public g'Wfflsi-
corporations) of the violation of a private duty imposed for
private corporate advantage ; and not of a public or govern-
mental duty imposed for the benefit of the public at large. In
the case of public quasi-Gor-porsitions, the general rule is that
they are liable only for those torts for which the statute ex-
pressly prescribes that they shall be liable.
1 Elmore v. Drainage Com'rs (1890), 135 111. 269; s. C, 34 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 491.
CHAPTER IX.
PUBLIC BOARDS.
§ 264 Corporate assemblies of the
§ 283.
old English corporations.
284.
265. The same subject continued —
285.
Notice at common law.
286.
266. The same subject continued —
Presence of the mayor.
287.
267. Eegular or stated meetings —
Time for holding.
288.
268. Adjournments.
269. Special meetings.
270. Adjourned meetings.
289.
271. Notice of special meetings.
272. The same subject continued —
Specifications of object of
290.
meeting.
273. Adjourned meetings — Time
291.
for holding.
274 Corporation represented by
292.
governing boards.
293.
275. The same subject continued —
294
Meeting essential to ofScial
action.
295.
276. The same subject continued —
296.
Delegation of powers.
297.
277. The same subject continued.
278. Delegation of powers — A
298.
Pennsylvania case.
299.
279. The same subject continued —
The rule limited.
300.
280. Constitution of council
301.
281. The same subject continued.
282. Conflicting councils — Kerr v.
302.
Trega
Acts of de facto councila
Quorum of definite body.
The same subject continued.
The same subject continued —
An exception to the rule.
The same subject continued —
Special charter provisions.
Quorums and majorities fur-
ther considered — The rule
in England.
The same subject continued —
Decisions in the United
States.
Further application of major-
ity principle.
Execution of authority vested
in two persons.
Presiding oflBcer.
The same subject continued.
Commitment for contempt —
Whitcomb's Case.
Ayes and nays.
Parliamentary law.
Keconsideration and rescis-
sion — General power.
The same subject continued.
Power to reconsider and re-
scind qualified.
The same subject continued.
I Reconsideration distinguished
from repeal
, Joint assemblies of definite
bodies.
§ 364. Corporate assemblies of the old English corpora-
tions.— In England to constitute a corporate assembly there
must at common law be present the mayor or other head offi-
270 PUBLIC BOARDS. [§ 265.
cer,^ a majority of each definite integral part,^ and some mem-
bers of the indefinite class usually called the commonalty.'
The latter class is generally either by prescription or by char-
ter represented by a common council, and when this body ex-
ists an assembly of such is deemed a corporate assembly, and
the presence of the legal president is necessary although not
required by charter.* "Where there is no indefinite class enti-
tled to participate in corporate acts, and the governing body
consists wholly of a definite or select class, it is necessary to
constitute a corporate assembly (sometimes termed in this case
a select assembly) that a majority of the select class or classes
shall be present. But the attendance of the mayor is not re-
quired at a meeting of this kind unless it is expressly so pro-
vided.*
§ 266. The same subject continued — Notice at common
law. — Where the days and times for the transaction of par-
ticular business are appointed by usage, statute, charter or
by-laws, all the members are presumed to have knowledge
thereof, and no notice is necessary.* When a meeting is as-
sembled for a special purpose, every member who has a right
to vote is entitled to notice,' unless he has quit the munioipal-
1 He must be the o&ceidejure and 5 Willcock on Munic. Corp., §§ 92,
not merely de/acto (Rex u. Hebden, 106. By the English Municipal Cor-
Andr. 391: Eex v. Dawes, 4 Burr, porations Act of 1835 (5 & 6 Wm. IV.,
2279 ; Rex v. York, 5 Term R 72), and ch. 76, § 69) one-third of the council by
he must attend in that capacity. Rex which body the corporation is repre-
V. Carter, Cowp. 59. sented constitutes a quorum. The
2 That is, a majority of that number mayor presides, but if he ift absent a
by which each of these parts is con- presiding officer is chosen who has
stituted. and not merely a majority a casting vote.
of the surviving or existing members. ^ Kex v. Hill, 4 Bam. & C. 441, 443 ;
Rex V. Morris, 4 East, 26 ; Rex v. Bell- Willcock on Munic. Coip., § 59. But
ringer, 4 Term R. 833 ; Rex v. Thorn- if it is intended to do any other act
ton, 4 East, 307 ; Rex v. Miller, 6 Term of importance at such a nieeting, a
R. 278 ; Rex v. Devonshire, 1 Barn, notice is necessary. Rex v. Liverpool,
& C. 614 ; Rex w Hill, 4 Barn. &C. 441; 2 Burr. 734; Rex v. Doncaster, 2
Rex V. Lathrop, 1 Wm. B. 471. Burr. 744; Rex v. Hill, 4 Barn. & C.
3 Rex V. Varlo, Cowp. 250 ; Rex v. 442 ; Rex v. Theodorick, 8 East, 545.
Monday, Cowp. 539 ; Rex v. Bower, 1 ' Rexu Liverpool, 2 Burr. 731 ; Rex
Bam. & C. 498 ; Rex v. Bellringer, 4 v. May, 5 Bun-. 2682 ; Rex v. Shrews-
Term R. 833. bury, Cas. Temp. Hardw. 151 ; Rex
* Willcock on Munic. Corp., § 126. v. Lisle, Andr. 178 ; Kynaston v.
§ 265.] PCBLIO BOARDS. 271
ity without retaining a house or leaving his family within its
limits.' The notice must be issued by order of some one who
has authority to assemble the corporation for that particular
purpose.^ It must be personally served upon him, but in case
of his temporary absence it maj' be left with his family or at
his last place of abode.' It must be given a reasonable time
before the hour of meeting, and if the meeting be not at the
usual place it should contain an intimation of that circum-
stance.* It is not necessary to state what business is to be
transacted when it relates onlj'^ to the ordinary aifairs of the
corporation, but when it is for the purpose of election, a mo-
tion, or making ordinances, the fact should be stated, for some
may " feel it their duty to attend upon such occasions, to coun-
teract the spirit of party and preserve the firidamental prin-
ciples of their constitution."' "If every member of a select
body be present either at a meeting on the charter day, or spe-
cially convened, or even by accident at a proper place and
time, they may by unanimous consent * dispense with notice,
and transact any extraordinary business within their peculiar
province." ' Their unanimity is only necessary for entering
Shrewsbuiy, 2 Str. 1051 ; Rex v. The- ' Hex v. Shrewsbury, Cas. Temp,
odorick, S East, 546 ; Rex v. Hill, 4 Hardw. 153 ; Kynaston v. Shrews-
Barn. & C. 441 ; including every bury, 2 Str. 1051. It need not be in
member of an " indefinite " body, if writing. Rex v. Hill, 4 Barn. & C.
the incidental powers of the corpo- 442.
ration are still exercised by the body * Rex v. Hill, 4 Barn. & C. 442. The
at larga Rex v. Faversham, 8 Term guildhall is the proper place, but if
R. 356. there be none some particular place
1 Rex II Grimes, 5 Burr. 2601 ; Rex should be appointed. Musgrove v.
V. Shrewsbury, Cas. Temp. Hardw. Nevinson, 1 Str. 584 ; s. c, 2 Ld.
151. It is no sufficient excuse for Raym. 1359; Rex v. May, 5 Burr,
omission of notice that the officer 2682.
serving it heard and believed he had ^ 'Wiiicock on Munic. Corp., § 74 ;
departed, if such was not the fact Rex v. Tucker, 1 Barnard. 27 ; Rex v.
Willcock on Munic. Corp., § 68. Shrewsbury, Cas, Temp. Hardw. 151 ;
2 But the want of authority may be Rex v. Theodorick, 8 East, 546 ; Rex
waived by the presence and consent v. Hill, 4 Barn. & C. 441.
of all. Rex v. Hill, 4 Bam. & C. 444 ; « It ought to appear plainly by their
Rex V. Gaborian, 11 East, 86, n. ; S. C, conduct that they are unanimous.
3 Show. 338 ; Rex v. Atkins, 3 Mod. Willcock on Munic. Corp., § 80.
23. At common law a meeting can ' Willcock on Munic. Corp., § 79 ;
be summoned only by the mayor- Rex v. Theodorick, 8 East, 546 ; Rex
Willcock on Munic. Corp., § 94. v. Wake, 1 Barnard. 80.
272 PUBLIC BOAEDS. [§§ 266, 267.
upon the business, after which it may be transacted in the
same manner as if the assembly had met upon proper notice.*
§ 266. The same subject continned — Presence of the
mayor. — It is the common-law privilege attached to the office
of mayor that he is an integral part of the corporation, and
that no corporate act done in his absence is valid.* He must
preside not only at the transaction of those affairs which are
merely voluntary or conveni^t, such as the election of new
members into the corporation, or an indefinite class, but at
those which are of the utmost necessity, as the filling of
vacancies or the annual election of the officers.' The mayor
must also propose the particular business or acquiesce in the
proposal of another,* and he must preside from the beginning
to the conclusion of each distinct transaction.* In some in-
stances, however, either by immemorial usage or by the terms
of the charter, the presence of the head officer was dispensed
,with, and an alternative substituted. In such cases all the
requisites of legality must exist in the office of the person
substituted, and if he hold by delegation from the head of-
ficer, he must not only be the legal deputy, but appointed by
the legal principal."
§ 267. Regular or stated meetings — Time for holding.—
The meetings of corporate bodies are either (1) regular or
1 Willcock on Munic. Corp., § 81. depend entirely upon the provisions
But if the charter requires a special of the charter, or the act under
notice, this cannot be dispensed with, which the corporation is organized,
even by unanimous consent. Eex v. and the by-laws passed in pursuance
Theodorick, 8 East, 543. of such authority." Martindale v.
2 Eex V. Atkins, 3 Mod. 23; s. C, Palmer, 53 Ind. 411, 413; Welch u
3 Show. 338; Tremaine, 233; Eex v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon C. C. 130.
Gaborian, 11 East, 87, n. ; 1 Eol. 'Eex v. Lisle, Andr. 174; Eex v.
Abr. 514, 30 ; Eex v. Trew, 2 Barnard. Hebden, Andr. 393.
370. " The doctrine of the English * Eex v. Gaborian, 11 East, 86, n.,
courts as to the old corporations in 87, n. ; Eex v. BuUer, 8 East, 393 ; 1
that country, that the mayor was an Eol. Abr. 514 ; Eex v. Williams, 2
integral part of the corporation, and Maule & SeL 141, 144
that the acts of the corporation in ^ See cases cited in preceding note,
his absence were invalid, has, it is * Willcock on Munic. Corp., § 105 ;
believed, no application to the office Eex v. Gaborian, 11 East, 86, n. ; Eex
of mayor in this country. With us, v. Corry, 5 East, 381 ; S. a, 1 Smith,
the powers and duties of the mayor 543,
268.]
PDBLIO BOAEDS.
273
stated, (2) special, or (3) adjourned meetings. tTnless the
time for the stated meetings of the governing body is fixed
by charter or statute, or otherwise provided for by law, the,
power of determination resides with the body itself. Where
a city charter requires the council to hold " stated meetings,"
and omits to designate the time, the council may upon simple
motion prescribe such time, which may be changed by the
council alone ; also upon mere motion, although it has been
previously fixed by a formal resolution, approved by the
mayor and published.' All the members of the board are pre-
sumed to have knowledge of the times for holding the stated
meetings, and if any member fails to attend he voluntarily
waives his right to participate in the business of the meeting,
and is bound by whatever is done within the ordinary range
of the duties of the board.'
§ 268. Adjournments. — At a meeting duly called a major-
ity of a quorum have the incidental right to adjourn to an-
other time, either on the same or on a future day.' And if an
lit requires only such action on
their part as expresses the will of the
body. State v. Kantter, 33 Minn. 69 ;
S. CL, 6 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 169.
2 People V. Batchelor (1860), 22N. Y.
138; Gildersleeve v. Board of Educa-
tion (1863), 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 201,
208. As to presiwuptions in favor of
the regularity of meetings, see Hud-
son County V. State, 24 N. J. Law, 718 ;
State V. Smith, 23 Minn. 218 ; Ins. Co.
V. Sanders, 36 N. H. 253 ; State v, Jer-
sey City, 25 N. J. Law, 309. But in
the New York case cited above (23 N.
Y. 128), where the board of aldermen
at a stated meeting adopted a resolu-
tion to meet in convention with the
mayor on the same day, for the pur-
pose of making certain appointments,
it was held that those absent from
the stated meeting were entitled to
reasonable notice of the time for hold-
ing the convention.
9 In re Newland Ave., 38 N. Y. St.
Rep. 796; s. c, 15 N. Y. Supl. 63; Ex
18
pai-te Wolf, 14 Neb. 24; S. C, 6 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 153 (citing Dillon
on Munic. Corp., 287). The power is
incident to special as well as regular
meetings. Stockton v. Powell (Fla.,
1893), 10 So. Rep. 688. By parUa-
mentary law if only a minority have
assembled they may adjourn to the
next day on which the body can
meet for the transaction of business.
People V. Rochester, 5 Lans. (N. Y.)
143, 147. Arbitrary adjournment by
presiding officer, see § 293, infra.
"The rule, as we understand, appli-
cable to all deliberate bodies, is that
any number have power to adjourn,
though they may not be a quorum for
the transaction of business." Kim-
ball V. Marshall, 44 N. H. 465, 468
(board of aldermen). "It is not at
all unusual, and never has been sup-
posed to be unlawful, for meetings of
corporations to be adjourned for
want of a quorum, without transact-
ing any other business." This remark
274 PUBLIC BOAEDS. [§ 269.
adjournment is irregular because of the want of a quorum,
but the adjourned meeting is attended by all the members .
who participate without objection in the proceedings, the ir-
regularity is cured, and in the absence of any finding the
ciourt will presume that all did so attend.' But under an act
providing that sessions " shall dontinue six days, if business
shall so long require, and no longer," a board has no power to
adjourn beyond six days, and pr^eedings at such an adjourned
session are corcmh nonjudice and void.^
§ 269. Special meetings. — It is competent for a public
board, unless expressly or impliedly prohibited by statute, to
call special meetings for the transaction of business proper to
come before it ; and where a regular meeting was adjourned
to the next regular meeting without taking final action on a
certain matter, and at a special meeting called and held dur-
ing the interval it was again taken up and disposed of, the
validity of the proceedings was sustained.' "Where the char-
ter expressly provided that the action of the city assembly at
a special session called by the mayor should be confined to the
objects specially stated to them when assembled, the language
was interpreted to exclude legislation upon matters communi-
■was made in a case where a town Donough v. Dewey (1890), 82 Mich,
meeting adjourned to a certain day 809, 313.
(not the day of a regular meeting), > State v. Smith, 23 Minn. 818. See,
without the choice of a moderator- also, on the last point, Citizens' &c
But the learned judge seems not to Ins. Co. v. Sortwell, 8 Allen, 219, 223 ;
have confined his statement to ad- Sargent v. Webster, 13 Met 497, 504 ;
joumments of popular meetings. Freeholders &c. v. State, 34 N. J.
Attorney-General v. Simonds (1873), Law, 718; Rutherford v. Hamilton,
111 Mass. 256, 260. " The law is silent 97 Mo. 543. The use of the word " re-
as to the power of the board [of cess" by the clerk instead of "ad-
school inspectors] to adjourn. We joum" is immaterial. Ex parte
think they have the right to adjourn, Mirande, 73 CaL 365 ; S. C, 14 Pac
for any sufficient reason, both as to Rep. 888.
time and place ; and unless it be ' Grimmet v. Askew, 48 Ark. 151 ;
made to appear that such adjourn- S. a. 2 S. W. Rep. 707.
ment was an abuse of the corporate ' Douglass v. County of Baker, 33
functions, and operated to the det- Fla. 419 ; S. C, 2 So. Rep. 776. In this
riment of those affected, or to be case, however, no stated time for
affected, by the proceedings, such meetings was prescribed by statute,
action is not subject to review." See, also. People v. Batchelor, 32
N. Y. isa
§§ 270, 271.J
PTIBLIO B0AED8.
275
cated to it by the mayor during the session but after the
time when it assembled.'
§ 270. Adjonrned meetings. — An adjourned meeting of
either a regular or special meeting, is a continuation of the
same meeting, and any business which it would have been
proper to consider at the meeting may be acted upon at the
adjourned meeting.^ Conversely, an adjourned meeting is
limited to those subjects upon which it was competent for the
original meeting to take action. Thus, where a charter pro-
vided that no ordinance should be passed by the common
councQ unless introduced at a previous stated meeting, and the
record showed that the ordinance in question was introduced
at a previous adjourned meeting, without disclosing whether
it was an adjourned meeting of a stated or of a special meet-
ing, the defect was held to be fatal.'
§ 271. Notice of special meetings. — A charter provision
requiring a city council to meet " at such time and place as
they by resolution may direct " is mandatory but not prohib-
1 St Louis V. Withaus, 90 Mo. 646.
= Magneau v. Fremont (1890), 30
Neb. 843 ; Warner v. Mower, 11 Vt
385 ; New Orleans v. Brooks, 36 La.
Ann. 641; Street Case, 1 La, Ann.
413 ; Hudson County v. State, 24 N.
J. Law, 718 ; People v. Batchelor, 23
N. y. 138; Smith v. Law, 21 N. Y.
296; People v. Martin, 5 N. Y. 23;
Rex V. Harris, 1 Barn. & Ad. 936 ;
Scadding v. Lorant, 5 Eng. L. & Eq.
16. Where the statute requires that
a township officer be elected at a
regular meeting held on a particular
day, such officer may properly be
elected at a meeting, held at a later
day, which is an adjournment of the
regular meeting. Carter v. McFar-
land, 75 Iowa, 196; s. a, 39 N. W.
Rep. 268; State v. Vanosdal (Ind.,
1893), 31 N. E. Rep. 79. See, also,
State V. Hanison, 67 Ind. 71 ; Sack-
ett V. State, 74 Ind. 486. A statute
required supervisors to act at their
"session in October." It was held
that they might act at an adjourned
session. Hubbard v. Winsor, 15 Mich.
146. Where a regular meeting ad-
journs for a particular purpose, the
adjourned meeting is not confined to
that purpose, but may take up other
legislative business. Ex parte Wolf,
14 Neb. 24. In this country an ad-
journed meeting of a special meet-
ing is not limited to matters actually
begun, but unfinished, at the' first
meeting, and may, in Judge Dillon's
opinion, consider proper business
ab initio. Dillon on Munic. Corp.,
§ 287, n. See, also, Cassidy v. Bangor
(1871), 61 Me. 434, 441.
8 State V. Jersey City, 25 N. J. Law,
309. See, also, Staats v, Washing-
ton, 45 N. J. Law, 318 ; S. C, 3 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 38. Where the
governing body consists of two
branches, the unfinished business of
either body must be taken up in the
next year de novo, Wetmore v.
Story, 22 Barb. 414.
276
PUBUC BOARDS.
[§ 271.
itory, and a valid meeting may be convened at a time not
fixed bj' resolution.^ Every member entitled to be present at
a special meeting is entitled to notice of the time and place
thereof, which must be served upon him personally, if prac-
ticable, or unless some other mode of notice is prescribed by
statute or charter.^ "Where a charter provided that the mayor
should be ex officio a member of a board of road commission-
ers and preside at its meetings when present, but without a
vote except in case of a tie, it ^as held that he was entitled
to notice of a meeting, although there was not a tie vote in
the particular instance.' But the omission of notice is cured
» State V. Smith, 23 Minn. 218.
Code Iowa, § 303, provides that the
board of supervisors, at any regular
meeting, shall have power "to pro-
vide for the erection of all bridges."
The code provides for special meet-
ings, but does not prescribe the kind
of business that may be transacted.
It was held that the statute does not
prohibit making provision for the
erection of bridges at a special meet-
ing, or reconsidering at a special
meeting provisions made at a regu-
lar meeting. Board of Supervisors v.
Horton, 75 Iowa, 271 ; s. c, 39 N. W.
Rep. 894.
^ Rogers u Slonaker (1884), 33 Kan.
191 ; People v. Batchelor, 33 N. Y.
138 ; Harding v. Vandewater, 40 CaL
77; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill (Md.), 254;
Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend. 178;
Stowe V. Wyse, 7 Conn. 214 ; Paola
&c. Ry. Co. V. Commissioners, 16
Kan. 302, an excellent case, in which
Brewer, J., shows that the rule is not
arbitrary, but founded upon the clear-
est dictates of reason; Wiggin v.
Freewill Baptist, 8 Met 301 ; Ex parte
Rogers, ' 7 Cowen, 526, note ; Balti-
more Turnpike, 5 Binney, 481 ; Cas-
sin V. Zavalla County (1888), 70 Tex.
419. See also § 265, supra. And for
a construction of provisions relating
to notice in> the English Municipal
Corporations Act, 5 & 6 Wm. IV.,
ch. 76, § 69 (Consolidated Act, 1883,
§ 22), Town Council &c. v. Court, 1
El. & El. 770; Regina v. Whip, 4
Q. B. 141; Regina v. Grimshaw, 10
Q. B. 747, 755 ; Regina v. Thomas, 8
Ad. & El. 183 ; Rex v. Hai-ris, 1 Bam.
& Ad. 936.
a State v. Kirk, 46 Conn. 395, hold-
ing also that a written notice to a
member absent from the State, left
at the Store of his son, which he was
in the habit of visiting daily when in
town, was sufficient Code of Iowa,
section 301, provides that, on request
for a special meeting of the board,
the auditor shall fix a day for such
meeting, and give notice in writing
to each supervisor personally or by
leaving a copy thereof at his resi-
dence, at least six days before the
day appointed, and also give notice
by publication in newspapers pub-
lished in the county, or, if there be
none, by causing notice to be posted
at the court-house and at two other
places, one week before the time set
Held, that the six days' limitation of
the notice refers to the copy left at
the residence, and not to the personal
notice ; and the one-week limitation
of the public notice refers to the
posted notice, and not to the publica-
tion in a newspaper. Board of Su-
pervisors V. Horton, 75 Iowa, 271;
s. C, 39 N. W. Rep. 394 Charter pro-
§ 272.]
PUBLIC BOARDS.
277
by the presence and consent of all the members,^ "or at least
of all who were not properly notified." ^
§ 272. The same subject continued — Specification of
object of meeting. — It was held in a very early case in New
Jersey that if the particular purpose of -a special meeting is
visions as to notice must be strictly
pursued. Lord w Anoka, 36 Minn.
176 ; s. a, 30 N. W. Rep. 550. See,
also, Scott V. Union County, 63 Iowa,
583. The notice may be oral, pro-
vided all the membere receive it in
time to attend. Scott v. Paulen, 15
Kan. 162; White v. Fleming (1887),
114 Ind. 560 ; S. a, 16 N. E. Eep. 487.
Two days' notice for persons all re-
siding in the city, and whose duty it
is to reside in the city and to be ready
to perform the functions of their
office, is not so clearly a short no-
tice that on a pleading it will be
pronounced insufficient People v.
Walker, 23 Barb. 304, 305. In White-
side V. People, 26 Wend. 635, the no-
tice was served at 2 o'clock P. M. for
a meeting at 5 P. M. of the same day.
Where notice of a meeting of school
inspectors was required by law to be
given by the township clerk, who
was ex officio clerk of the board, it
was sufficient though signed by him
as " clerk of the board." Donough
V. Dewey (1890), 82 Mich. 309.
' Magneau v. Fremont, 30 Neb. 843 ;
People V. Frost (1889), 32 111. App.
242; Thomas v. Citizens' Horse R
Co., 104 111. 462 ; Lawrence v. Trainer
(ni., 1891), 27 N. E. Rep. 197; Beaver
Creek v. Hastings, 52 Mich. 528;
State V. Smith, 22 Minn. 218. But if
third parties have a right to be heard,
e. g., tax-payers, the notice is juris-
'iictional, and cannot be waived by
the consent of a majority of those in-
terested. Gentle v. Board &c. (1888),
73 Mich. 40; S. C, 40 N. W. Rep. 928.
There is a presumption in favor of
regularity. Staats v. Washington, 45
N. J. L. 318 ; s. c, 3 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 39; Freeholders of Hudson
County V. State, 34 N. J. Law, 718
Rutherford v. Hamilton, 97 Mo. 543
Torr V. Corcoran (1888), 115 lud. 188
Prezinger v. Harness (1887), 114 Ind,
401, and Indiana cases there cited
Stoddard v. Johnson, 75 Ind. 20
Tierney v. Brown, 65 Miss. 563 ; s. C.
7 Am. St Rep. 679 ; Scott v. Paulen,
15 Kan. 163. Of. State v. Jersey City,
35 N. J. Law, 309 : Harding u Bader,
75 Mich. 316, 331 ; Newaygo County
Mfg. Co. V. Echtinau, 81 Mich. 416.
Where the county auditor is empow-
ered to call special meetings of the
board of commissioners, when the
public interests require it, by giving
at Ipast six days' notice, unless in his
opinion an emergency requires a
shorter notice, in which case he may
fix it at his discretion, his determina-
tion is final and conclusive. Jussen
V. Board of Comra'rs, 95 Ind. 567;
Prezinger v. Harness, 114 Ind. 491.
If want of notice affirmatively ap-
pears, it is fatal. Paola &c. Ry. Ca
V. Comm'rs, 16 Kan. 302.
2 Lord V. Anoka, 36 Minn. 176;
s. a, 30 N. W. Rep. 550, 551. Com-
missioners chosen at a regular meet-
ing of the board to let a bridge
contract and superintend the con-
struction, who protested against the
legality and the sufficiency of the
notice of a subsequent special meet-
ing in which the former action was
reconsidered, but took no part in the
whole of such meeting, and at-
tempted by so doing to accomplish
their purposes, are estopped to deny
the sufficiency of the notice of the
278 PUBLIC BOAEDS. [§ 273.
stated in the call, acts of the meeting foreign to the purpose
specified are invalid.* But a contrary rule is laid down in a
recent decision of the Supreme Court of Connecticut.. A
charter authorized the court of common council to provide hy
ordinance for the warning of its meetings, but no provision
of charter or ordinance required information to be given of
the matters to be considered. It was held that the notice of
a special meeting need not specify the object thereof, nor
could the scope of authority of tihe council be confined to pur-
poses actually specified in such notice. " The familiar rule of
notice," said Judge Prentice, " as applicable to meetings of
towns and communities is one prescribed by statute. It has no
application to meetings of governmental representative bodies
like courts of common council. Their status and right to act
are more allied to those of the governing bodies of private
corporations and of the general assembly, and are governed by
the same rules." * Where all the members of the council and
the mayor meet and act as a body, they may at such meeting,
or any adjourned session, transact any business within the
powers conferred by law, notwithstanding no written call for
the meeting was made, or in case one was made which failed to
indicate the purpose of the meeting.'
§ 273. Adjourned meetings — Time for holding. — When a
meeting is adjourned to a fixed hour, and only a part of the
members attend at the precise time and others arrive later, or
special meetin;;. Board of Supervis- Township v. McDonald, 98 Pa. St 444,
ors V. Horton, 75 Iowa, 271 ; s. e., 39 451.
N. W. Eep. 394. « Magneau v. Fremont, 30 Neb. 843.
1 Bergen v. Clarkson (1796), 1 Halst The court said, however, that the de-
(N. J. Law), 353. The court thought cisions of the courts are conflicting
the object of a special meeting ought upon the question whether the call
always to be mentioned in the notice, must specify the object of the meet-
referring to Eex V. Liverpool, 3 Burr, ing when the statute is silent The
735. power of a city clerk to issue a notice
2 Whitney v. City of New Haven for bids for a public improvement, as
(1890), 58 Conn. 450, 461, citing directed by the city council, is not
Cooley's Const Lim. 155 (4th ed. lost because he made a mistake in his
p. 189); Savings Bank V.Davis, 8 Conn, attempt to publish it, where there is
300 ; Westbrook's Appeal &c., 57 no evidence that any one was misled
Conn. 95. See, also, Wilson v. Board or harmed thereby. Gilmore v. City
ofComm'rs, 68 Ind. 507; Comm'rs of Utica (1892). 131 N. Y. 36 ; S. C, 15
&c. V. Kent, 5 Neb. 137; Genesee N. Y. Supl. 274, affirmed.
§ 274.] PDBLIO BOAEDS. 279
some depart before any action is taken, it becomes important
to determine when the proceedings maj' lawfully begin. Upon
' this question the Supreme Court of New Hampshire said : —
" The law has fixed no time at or within which such a meeting
must be organized, called to order or proceed to business. It
has been held that an appearance within the hour after the
time fixed will save the default of a party summoned to ap-
pear at court at a particular hour;* and in former times the
proceedings of town meetings have been set aside by the leg-
islature where a party have been in attendance precisely at
the hour, and have at once commenced and dispatched the
business of the meeting and adjourned finally before the ar-
rival of the members of another party, who relying upon the
usual dilatory mode of commencing such meetings had made
no haste, and had not arrived. And it seems to have been
very properly done. A reasona,ble time should be allowed
for pai"ties interested to be present, and an hour may in ordi-
nary cases be well regarded as a reasonable time. Special
cases must of course rest on their own circumstances where
they show cause for greater delay. . . . And we apprehend
no more definite rule can be laid down than this : that where
parties assemble in pursuance of a notice or appointment, and
remain together for the purpose of attending to the business
as soon as it is found convenient or practicable, the proceed-
ings will be held regular, though the delay may seem unrea-
sonable to impatient persons or to those who have engage-
ments elsewhere ; and no one of the persons thus assembled
would be heard to object to the regularity of the proceedings
if he should go away without having made a suitable effort to
induce the proper officers or persons to proceed with the busi-
ness ; and no third person would be heard to object unless he
could show that his rights were affected by the delay." '
§ 274. Corporation represented by governing boards.—
The corporate body at large of a municipal corporation is
usually represented by a common council or other municipal
1 Or even a few minutes over the Johns. 496 ; Atwood v. Austin, 16
hour. Nugent v. Wrinn (1877), 44 Johns. 180.
Conn. 373. See, also, Wilde v. Dunn, 2 Kimball v. Marshall (1863), 44
11 Johns. 513; Baldwin v. Carter, 15 . N. H. 465, 467.
280 PUBLIC B0AED8. [§ 2Y5.
board.' "Where corporate powers were conferred in general
terms upon "townships," it was decided to belong to the
board of directors, and not to the citizens en masse, to select
and purchase a site for a township hall* So, under a charter
which imposes upon the common council the duty " to man-
age, regulate and control the property, real and personal, of
the city," the expediency of destroying and removing or
repairing a city building is to be determined exclusively by
the council ; and the fact that a i^ajority of the voters of the
city have expressed themselves against the destruction under
an order of a prior council submitting the question to them
does not affect this power.' The legislative and discretionary
powers of the coutlcil can be exercised only by the coming
together of the members who compose it, and its purposes or
will can be expressed only by a vote embodied in some dis-
tinct and definite form.* If no method is prescribed by law,
it is left free to act either by resolution or ordinance.®
§ 275. The same subject continued — Meeting essential
.to official action. — As a general rule the individual members
of a public body possessing deliberative functions have no au-
thority to bind the municipality by unoiRcial statements made
at different times and places.* " The public for whom they act,"
1 Richards u Town of Clarksburg, den (Iowa), 59 N. W. Eep. 1070,
30 West Va. 491 ; s. C, 20 Am. & where a resolution for the levy of a
Eng. Corp. Cas. Ill ; Central Bridge tax was offered at the meeting of a
Co. V. Lowell, 15 Gray, 106 ; Dey v. city council and certified to the au-
Jersey City, 35 N. J. Law, 404 ; ditor, but the record failed to show
Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. Law, that it was adopted by the council,
143; Baltimore v. Poultney, 25 Md. and the adoption, notwithstanding
18. this omission, was inferred from the
2 State V. Haynes (1880), 72 Mo. 377. fact that it was offered and ordered
^ Whitney v. City of New Haven, to be so certified.
58 Conn. 450; S. a, 20 Atl. Rep. 666. 'Halsey v. Rapid Transit R. Ca
* Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. (N. J. Law), 20 Atl. Rep. 859.
Eq. 143. " The mayor and common 6 " it would be of most dangerous,
council," said the court in that case, not to say fatal tendency, to sanction
" exist only as a board, and they can the notion that parol testimony of
do no valid act except as a board, witnesses, were it clear and unquali-
and such act must be by ordinance fled, could be admitted at the end of
or resolution or something equiva- ten or twelve years to establish a con-
lent thereto." Dey v. Jersey City, 19 tract of any kind by a municipal
N. J. Eq. 412. Cf. Taylor v. McFad- agency required by law to act within
§ 275.]
PUBLIC BOAEDS.
281
said the Supreme Court of Ohio, "have the right to their best
judgment after free and full discussion and consultation
among themselves of and upon the public matters intrusted
to them in the session provided for by the statute." ^
a very narrow range of power and to
keep a record of ita public transac-
tions." Strong V. District of Colum-
bia (Board of Public Works), 4
Mackey (D. C), 242, 249 ; s. a, 9 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 568. That the cor-
porate body at large is represented by
its governing body, acting collect-
ively and not as individuals, is illus-
trated by decisions in mandamiLS pro-
ceedings to compel the performance
of a corporate duty. The peremptory
writ may be directed to the corpora-
tion in its corporate name, or to the
proper oflScers in their corporate ca-
pacity and official style without
naming them, and resignations by
officers after service of the alterna-
tive writ do not abate the proceed-
ings. Leavenworth County Comm'rs
V. Sellew, 99 U. S. 624, in which the
court said : — " The board is in effect
the officer, and the members of the
board are but the agents who per-
form its duties." Little Eock v.
Board of Improvements, 42 Ark. 152 ;
Comm'rs v. King, 13 Fla. 451 ; Mad-
dox V. Graham, 3 Met (Ky.) 56; State
V. Madison Council, 15 Wis. 37 ; Peg-
ram V. Cleaveland County Comm'rs,
65 N. C. 114; People v. Collins, 19
Wend. 68.
iMcCortle v. Bates, 39 Ohio St
419, where a written contract signed
by a majority of the members of a
township board of education, which
stipulated that the subscribers would
formally ratify the same at a legial
meeting, was held to be contrary to
public policy, and not enforceable
against them personally. The decis-
ion is recognized as "undoubtedly
sound," in People v. Stowell, 9 Abb.
N. C. (N, Y.) 456, but not deemed to
render invalid a regular resolution of
the common council because the ma-
jority acted in pursuance of a mutual
pledge made before the body met
Heed v. Lancaster, 152 Mass. 500.
But a committee chosen by a town to
erect a building is an agent, not a
board of public officei-s, and may act
by the agreement of the individual
members separately obtained. Shea
V. Mulford (1888), 145 Mass. 538;
Haven v. Lowell, 5 Met 35. "The
vestrymen of a church, as the repre-
sentatives of a corporate body, must
meet in order to take official action.
They cannot act singly, upon the
street or wherever they may be
found. This is because they are re-
quired to deliberate. It is the right '
of the minority to meet the majority
and by discussion and deliberation to
bring them over if possible to their
own views.'' Rittenhouse's Estate
(1891), 140 Penn. St 173, 176 ; s. c, 31
Atl Rep. 224 ; Paola &c. Ry. Co. v.
Comm'rs, 16 Kan. 803, 309. It was
held, obiter, in Butler v. City of
Charlestown, 7 Gray, 13, that if the
mayor and aldermen had power to
retain counsel on behalf of the city it
must be exercised by their official
act at a lawful meeting of the board,
and a contract made by a majority
of the board informally would not be
binding, nor could a custom of the
city to pay bills contracted in that
manner create a valid claim. See,
also, on the last point, Sikes v. Hat-
field, 13 Gi-ay, 347. The fact that the
chairman of a town board of super-
visors, in the presence of another su-
pervisor, told the pathmaster to fix
up a town road so that it could be •
traveled, and that the board after-
282
. PUBLIC BOAKDS.
[§ 276.
§ 276. The same subject continued — Delegation of powers.
It is well settled that the legislative powers of a municipal
corporation cannot be delegated to others. Such powers are
in the nature of public trusts conferred upon the legislative
assembly of the corporation for the public benefit and cannot
be vicariously exercised. Thus, where a charter provided that
a city council should have power " to restrain, prohibit and sup-
press dram-shops," etc., an ordinance of that body prohibiting
the sale of liquor without a liceiise, but authorizing the city
treasurer to fix the fee for a license, and the term thereof,
within certain limits, was held to be void, as an unwarrantable
transfer of discretion designed to be exercised ty the council
alone.^ So, also, where the charter of a street railway company
wards allowed him a portion of his
claim for the work done, does not
amount to the making of a contract
with him by the board so as to en-
title him to sue the town for the bal-
ance of his claim. "To bind the
town the supervi80i;8 must act as a
town board." Dieschel v. Town of
Maine (Wis., 1892), 51 N. W. Eep. 881 ;
Hardin County v. Louisville &c.
R Co. (Ky., 1891), 17 S. W. Rep. 860;
Independent School Dist. v. Wirtner
(Iowa, 1882), 52 N. W. Rep. 243;
Commonwealth v. Howard (Pa., 1892),
24 Atl. Rep. 308 ; Jackson v. Colhns
(1891), 15 N. Y. Supl. 65. See, how-
ever, for modified views, Athearn v.
Independent Dist. &c., S3 Iowa, 105 ;
Hill V. Independent 'District &c.
(Iowa, 1890), 46 N. W. Rep. 1058. A
bill to enjoin collection of a school
tax alleged that the determination
to levy was not made by the school
directors at a regular or special meet-
ing, nor in their corporate capacity,
but as individuals. Held, that such
allegations did not charge that the
directors acted in the matter with-
out meeting togetlier. Lawrence v.
Trainer (111.), 37 N. E. Rep. 197.
1 East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50 111.
28. See, further, as to the delegation
by various municipal bodies of pow-
the exercise of which involves que.s-
tions of expediency, Day v. Green,
4 Cush. 433 ; Coffin v. Nantucket, 5
Cush. 269; Ruggles v. Nantucket, 11
Cush. 433 ; State v Patterson, 34 N. J.
Law, 163 ; Ruggles v. Collier, 43 Mo.
359 ; Jackson County v. Brush, 77 HI.
59 ; Baltimore v. Scharf 54 Md. 499 ;
Cooley's Const Lim,, § 204 ; Thompson
V. Schermerhorn, 6jN. Y. 92. In Mat-
thews V. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115, and
Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 CaL 540,
cities empowered to build and regu-
late wharves undertook to confer the
right upon lessees or contractors. Of.
Gregoly v. City of Bridgeport, 41
Conn. 76, where under an express
power to " ordain by-laws relating to
wharves," and a general authority to
appoint necessary officers to carry by-
laws into effect, an ordinance ap-
pointing a superintendent of wharves
with power to order and regulate the
mooring of vessels was held to be
valid. Birdsall v. Oark, 73 N. Y. 73 ;
State V. Bell, 34 Ohio St. 194; North-
ern Cent. R. Co. v. Baltimore, 31 Ind.
98 ; Evansville &e. R Co. v. Evans-
ville, 15 Ind; 395; State v. Hauser, 63
Ind. 155 ; Phelps v. Mayor &c., 113 N.
Y. 216; Young w Blackhawk County,
§ 277.]
PUBLIC BOARDS.
283
; contained a provision that "said railroad shall be laid out by
the mayor and aldermen in like manner as highways are laid
out," and a single track railroad was laid out by the mayor and
aldermen without any turn-outs, but with a provision in the
record of the laying out that " said horse railroad company
may construct such suitable turn-outs on either side of said
center line as they may find necessary in the prosecution of
the business," etc., it was held that the company could not con-
struct a turn-out, although necessary for their business and re-
quired for public convenience, without a laying out by the
mayor and aldermen.^
§ 277. The same subject continued. — By statute in Con-
necticut it is the duty of the selectmen to, " superintend the
concerns of the town." ^ The person first named on a plurality
66 Iowa, 460 : Hannon v. Agnew, 96
N. Y. 439 ; Indianapolis v. Indianap-
olis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396 ; Hickey v.
Chicago So. R. Co., 6 HI. App. 172;
Bibel V. People, 67 111. 175; Davis v.
Read, 65 N. Y. 566 ; In re New York
&c. Trustees, 57 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 500 ;
Kinmundy v. Mayham, 72 111. 462 ;
Darling v. St Paul, 19 Minn. 389;
Meuser v. Eisdon, 36 Cal. 239 ; State v.
Fiske, 9 R I. 94 ; Smith v. Morse, 2
Cal. 524 ; White' v. Mayor &c., 2 Swan
(Teun.), 364 ; Franke v. Paducah &c.
Co., 88 Ky. 467 ; Gale v. Kalamazoo,
23 Mich. 344; s. C, 9 Am. Rep. 80;
Lord V. Oconto, 47 Wis. 386 ; Schenley
V. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St. 62;
Hydes v. Joyes, 4 Bush, 464 ; S. C, 96
Am. Dec. 311 ; State v. Jersey City,
26 N. J. Law, 444 ; State v. Trenton,
42 N. J. Law, 395 ; State v. Trenton,
51 N. J. Law, 498 ; S. C, 28 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 161 ; Clark v. Washington,
12 Wheat 40 ; Minneapolis Gas Light
Co. V. Minneapolis, 36 Minn. 159, hold-
ing that power conferred by the city
charter on the city council to provide
for lighting the city and altering
lamp districts cannot be delegated to
a committee for final decision. Dill-
ard w. Webb, 55 Ala. 468; East St
Louis u Thomas, 11 111. App. 283 ; Pin-
ney v. Brown (1891), 60 Conn. 164;
MuUarky v. Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa, 21 ;
Milhau V. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435 ; S. C,
27 N. Y. 611; Lyon v. Jerome, 26
Wend. 485; s. a, "s? Am. Dec. 271;
Thomson v. Boonville, 61 Mo. 282;
Scofleld V. Lansing, 17 Mich. 437;
Lauenstein v. Fond du Lac, 28 Wis.
386 ; Shehan v. Gleeson, 46 Mo. 100 ;
Stockton V. Creanor, 45 Cal. 643, hold-
ing that a common council cannot
confer upon a committee of its own
members a power vested in it to ac-
cept a bid or award a contract for
grading a street
1 Concord v. Concord Horse R. Co.
(1888), 65 N. K 30. Where a statute
provides that certain powers thereby
conferred upon a mayor and council
shall be executed by them in a cer-
tain manner, the unauthorized doings
of an officer who undertakes to act
for them cannot be validated by rati-
fication. The doctrine of estoppel
does not apply to such a case. Mayor
&o. V. Porter, 18 Md. 289; s. C., 79
Am. Dec. 686.
' Gen. Stats. 1888, § 64 et seg'.,where
certain duties are also particularized.
284 PUBLIC BOAEDS. [§ 278.
of ballots is first selectman, " and, in the absence of a special
appointment, shall be ex officio the agent of such town." ' A
board of selectmen appointed a superintendent of highways
and a " town agent." The town had previously at a legal
meeting designated the first selectman as superintendent of
highways, but had made no special appointment of a town
agent. It was held that both appointments by the selectmen
were void. In respect of the first, Chief Justice Andrews
said: — "The selectmen had no Authority to make such an ap-
pointment. The selectmen of a town are, to be sure, its gen-
eral prudential oflBcers, and are charged with the duty of
superintending the concerns of the town, but in so doing they
act as the agents of the town and exercise a delegated author-
ity. Their powers are for the most part conferred by some
statute. In respect to the matters mentioned in these stat-
utes they cannot go beyond the special limits of the statute.
In other matters long usage has given to the selectmen of
towns certain powers. In either case their authority is in the
nature of a personal trust to be performed by themselves.
They have no power to appoint another to perform the duties
that devolve on them." And, touching the appointment of
town agent, he continued : — " Undoubtedly a town, like any
other corporation, may appoint an agent for any proper pur-
pose. Possibly a town may appoint an agent to perform
any or all duties usually performed by the selectmen, except
such as are specifically imposed on the selectmen by the con-
stitution or by some statute. But the selectmen, being them-
selves agents, cannot appoint another or one of themselves to
be an agent for their own town. That rule of law governs
which is found in the maxim delegata potestas non potest dele-
gare. Certainly they could not unless specially empowered
so to do. They would have no such authority by virtue of
their general powers."* This is an application of correct
principles to municipal boards.
§ 278. Delegation of powers — A Pennsylvania case. — A
Pennsylvania statute provided that two county commissioners
should form a board for the transaction of business, and when
1 Gen. St 1888, § 4& 2 Finney v. Brown (1891), 60 Conn.
164.
§ 2Y9.] PFBLIC BOAEDS. 285
convened in pursuance of notice or according to adjournment
should be competent to perform the duties appertaining to
their oflBce. The commissioners contracted with one D. to
build a court-house.' D. made a contract with the plaintiff to
supply him with brick. After the plaintiff had delivered part
of the brick called for by his contract he refused to deliver
the rest on the ground that D. had not paid for the bricks al-
ready delivered ; whereupon two of the commissioners went
to the plaintiff, and with D.'s assent told him to proceed with
the delivery of the bricks and that they would pay him. At
that time there was more than enough money due to D. from
the county to pay the plaintiff for the bricks to be delivered.
It did not appear that the other commissioners were informed
of or consulted about the matter or that it was discussed at
any regular session of the board. The court submitted the
question to the jury whether the two commissioners acted in
their official capacity or merely as individuals, and a verdict
against the county was sustained. The decision may be sup-
ported on the ground that the contract of the commissioners
was merely an incident to the main contract for the building,
regularly made, and that the county could not possibly be sub-
jected to any liability under it in excess of the amount pro-
vided in the original undertaking with D. But the opinion
of the court does not touch these features of the case, and its
reasoning is superficial and inadequate of itself to justify the
ruling of the court below.^
§279. The same subject continued — The rule limited.
But while a council or a similar body cannot delegate all the
power conferred upon it by the legislature in a given instance,
it may like every other corporation do its ministerial work by
agents or committees.' Where a city council was vested with
1 This seems to have been done at a deliberation — between the repairing
regular meeting of the board. of an old bridge and the building of
2 Jefferson County u Slagle (1870), a new one. Wolcott u Wolcott, 19
66 Penn. St. 303. See Cooper v. Lam- Vt. 37 ; Throop on Public Officers,
peter (1839), 8 Watts (Penn.), 125, §109.
making a distinction between acts a Holland v. State (1887), 23 Fla. 133;
done by one member in the ordinary S. C., 1 So. Rep. 521 ; Burlington v.
routine of his duty and others of a Dennison, 42 N. J. Law, 165 ; Kram-
nature demanding consultation and rath v. Albany, 53 Hun, 206 ; Damon
286
PUBLIC BOARDS.
[§ 279.
power to cause sidewalks in the city to be constructed, the
Supreme Court of the United States decided that it might
authorize the mayor and the chairmai^ of a committee on
streets and alleys to make in its behalf and pursuant to its
directions a contract for doing the work, and also give to the
owners of abutting lots the privilege of selecting one of
several specified materials, reserving to the chairman of the
committee authority to select in case the lot-owners failed.'
So, also, in the exercise of a like authority, the council may
refer £\,pplications for the location or alteration of streets to a
conimittee to inquire into the matter and report.^ And where
V. Inhabitants of Granby, 3 Pick. 3,45 ;
Whitney v. City of New Haven
(1890), 58 Conn. 450, where a charter
provision that the board of public
■works should execute all orders of
the council relating to parks, etc., did
not deprive the council of authority
to delegate to the city auditor the
work of destroying a public building
situated in a park ; Gilmore v. City
of Utica (1893), 131 N. Y. 36 (15 N.
Y. SupL 374, aff'd); S. a, 39 N. E.
Eep. 841, where clerk of council di-
rected to publish notice of meeting
was permitted to fix the day, dis-
tinguishing State V. Jersey City, 25
N. J. Law, 309; Bullitt County v.
Washer (1888), 130 U. S. 143. Under
a statute authorizing the county
commissioners "to audit the ac-
counts of all officers having the care,
management, collection or disburse-
ment" of county moneys, the com-
missioners have power to contract
with an expert to examine the county
treasurer's accounts. Duncan v.
Lawrence County Comm'rs, 101 Ind.
403 ; Milf ord School Town v. Zeigler,
1 Ind. App. (Griffiths), 138; S. C, 37
N. E. Eep. 303; Gillett v. Logan
County, 67 IlL 256 ; Alton v. Mulledy,
31 II]. 76; Stewart v. City of Council
Bluffs. 58 Iowa, 643 ; State v. Hauser,
63 Ind. 155 ; Edwards v. Watertown.
34 Hun, 436. The English Municipal
Corporations Act of 1883, § 33, pro-
vides that "the council may appoint
out of their body such and so many
committees as they think fit, for any
purposes which in the opinion of
the council would be better regulated
and managed by means of such
committees; but the acts of every
such committee shall be submitted to
the council for their approval." See,
also, Gregory v. Brldgepoit, 41 Conn.
76, cited. In note to § 876, supra.
1 Hitchcock V. Galveston (1877), 96
U. S. 341. In the same case it was
also held that, if the committee were
exercising an unlawful delegation of
power, it was competent for the
council to ratify tlieir acts. See, also,
as to ratification, Milford School
Town V. Powner, 136 Ind. 538; 8. C,
36 N. E. Rep. 484; Salmon v. Haynes,
50 N. J. Law, 97 ; Eailroad Co. v. Ma-
rion County, 36 Mo. 394. But where
the common council was required by
charter to cause certain work to be
done by contract or otherwise, an
ordinance directing the superintend-
ent of streets to "cause the work to
be done" was declared to be unau-
thorized. Birdsall v. Clark. 7.? N. Y.
73.
2 Preble v. Portland, 45 Me. 341. It
is no objection to a sewer assessment
that the mayor and aldermen called
in another person to assist them in
§ 280.] PUBLIC BOAEDS. 287
the council is the sole judge of the election of its members,
it may upon a contest appoint a committee to take testimony
and to report the facts and evidence to the council.*
§ 280 Constitution of council. — In the old English mu-
nicipal corporations, when the mayor or other chief oflBcer
was not present at a corporate assembly, it could transact no
business of the corporation, for without his presence at its
head no corporate act done was valid.^ City charters in this
country do not always agree in the constituents of the coun-
cil or governing body. In some cases there is a separate coun-
cil which is only one of the parts of the city legislature and
requiring the approval of another board or of the mayor act-
ing separately, as the governor does, to complete their action.
But most of our cities, in their earlier stages, if not perma-
nently, have had a council where the mayor sits in person and
over whose action he has no veto. In all such corporations
he has been deemed a member as clearly as the aldermen.'
Where the charter provided "that the intendant of police
shall have a seat in the board of commissioners, and when
present shall preside therein ; in his absence the board shall
appoint a chairman fro tem.pore^^ it was held that the intend-
ant was constituted a member of the board.* And when
making it Collins v. Holyoke, 146 added, who cannot be lawfully ex-
Mass. 298. Council may order a sewer eluded from participation in their
to be built by a committee. Dorey u proceedings. Damon v. Granby, 8
Boston, 146 Mass. 336, 339, and cases Pick. 345.
cited. Where the members of the * Richards v. Town of Clarksburg,
council have personal knowledge of 30 West Va. 491, 497 ; S. O., 20 Am.
a fact, they may act without any & Eng. Corp. Cas. Ill; Willcock on
further or formal inquiry. Bissell v. Munic. Corp., §§ 94, 102 ; Regina v.
Jefifersonville, 24 How. 287, 296 ; Bailiflfs, 2 Ld. Raym. 1233. See § 266,
Main v. Ft Smith, 49 Ark. 480 ; Com- supra.
monwealth v. Pittsburg, 14 Penn. St. ' People v. Harshaw, 60 Mich. 200,
177. holding that a provision in a charter
1 " This is the well-known course of that " the mayor, recorder and alder-
proceeding in every body having men, when assembled together, shall
power to judge of the election of its constitute the common council,"
own members, in case an election is makes the mayor a member of the
contested." Salmon v. Haynes, 50 N. council.
J. Law, 97, 100. The powers of com- * Raleigh v. Sorrell, 1 Jones (N. C.)
mittees may be revoked by the ap- Law, 49. Judge Dillon says that
pointing power or new members " whether the mere fact that a single
288 PUBLIC BOARDS. . [§ 281.
the language of the organic act is that "the mayor and coun-
cilmen shall have power," etc., the co-ordinate action of both
is required before their action can have any binding or obli-
gatory force.'
§ 281. The same subject continued. — If, however, by a
fair construction of the law the body is composed exclusively
of trustees or counoilmen, the mayor is not a member of the
council and has no right to prdWde or vote therein.' It was
decided by the United States circuit court that under a stat-
ute providing for the appointment and qualification of a board
of tax commissioners to consist of a definite number, the board
was not in existence until all had duly qualified, and the pro-
ceedings of a majority were therefore of no validity.' A change
in the membership of a board pending proceedings before it
does not require that the matters be taken up de novo. Thus,
a county commissioner may act with his associates in steps
preliminary to laying out a way, and his successor may after-
wards act in his place in completing the proceedings, where
the acts of the former are separable from those of the latter.''
unauthorized person is by a mistaken But see Hartshorn v. Schofl, 68 N. EL
construction of the charter allowed 197.
to participate in the transactions of * " The board are a court, and the
a meeting of the council would in court is not dissolved by one comrais-
.this country be held necessarily to sioner going out and another coming
avoid them is a question which per- in. It continues to be the same court
haps remains yet to be settled." Dil- though its personality be changed."
Ion on Munic. Corp., § 873, n. Chapman v. County Comm'rs (1887),
• Saxton V. Beach, 50 Mo. 489 ; Sax- 79 Mo. 267, 209. As to the common
ton V. St Joseph, 60 Mo. 153. mode of organizing a municipal body
3 Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa, 75. where part of its members are con-
See, also, Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. stantly in oflBce, and some new mem-
Ann. 162 ; Commonwealth v. Kepner, bers are annually infused, see Kerr v.
10 Phila. (Penn.) 510 ; Achley's Case- Trego, 47 Penu. St 292. Under Act
4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 35. Where a char- Pa. 1887, § 4, providing for certain
ter provided that the "common coun- new executive officers in cities,
cil shall consist of the mayor and al- " which shall be chosen by city coun-
dermen," etc., and that a vote to levy oils," the existing council at the time
a certain tax should be passed by two- of change should choose such officers,
thirds vote of the " members elect," it Commonwealth v. Wyman (1891), 137
was held that the mayor was not en- Penn. St. 508 ; s. C, 21 Atl. Eep. 889.
titled to vote to make up the two- Where two justices of the peace
thirds. Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470. " whose terms will soonest expire "
' Schenck v. Peay, 1 Woolw. 175, were constituted members of a board,
§ 282.] PUBLIC BOAEDS. '2f89
§ 282. Conflicting councils — Kerr v. Trego.— Where two
bodies claim to be regularly organized as the common counciil
of a city, and each is proceeding to act as such, to the great
detriment of the public interests, may the wrongful body be
restrained from acting by means of the equity remedy of in-
junction? This was the question which arose and was deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Kerr v.
Trego.* An drdinance of the common council of Philadelphia
provided that the clerk and assistant clerk elect should con-
tinue in office until the organization of a new council (after an
election) and until their successors should be duly elected, and
it appeared that on the day and at the hour appointed by law
for the organization of the new council there were present
twenty-three members whose terms had j'et one year to run,
among whom was the president of the preceding year. The
clerk and president were in their usual places and proceeded
first to call the roll of all the members whose terms of office
had not yet expired, and then to call on the new members to
present their certificate of election that their names might be
enrolled. Further business was interrupted by the disorderly
conduct of the new members, who proclaimed one of their
number as president, and at a subsequent meeting assumed to
act as the lawful common council. The court held, 1. That
there was a wrong subject to redress by judicial power. 2.
That injunction was the appropriate remedy. 3. That one of
the conflicting bodies might maintain the action against the
other, the attorney-general not having the sole right to file
such a bill. 4. That the maintenance of the regular forms of
organization was the test of right. 6. That the mode of or-
ganization by the members who continued in office was legiti-
mate and according to common usage. 6. That an intention
by the complainants to use their power fraudulently did not
defeat their right to the injunction. The opinion of the court
it is not necessary that the record a common council sit as a court to try-
should show affirmatively that the charges against an officer, if one of
two justices present fulfilled the re- their number presides over the tribu-
quireraent. If they appeared and nal he has a right to vote upon the
acted, the presumption is that they questionof guilt in the absence of any
were entitled to sit as members. Ne- statute or ordinance to the contrary,
waygo County Mfg. Co. v. Echtinau, Asbell v. Brunswick, 80 Va. 503.
81 Mich. 416. Where the members of 1 47 Penn. St 298 (1864).
19
290
PUBLIC BOARDS.
[§ 2S3.
is interspersed with wise and liberal observations in respect
of the proper limits of judicial interference in cases of this
kind, and is strongly supported by the temperate judgment of
Judge Dillon.'
§ 283. Acts of de facto councils. — In applying the princi-
ple that the acts of de facto officers, properly so called, are
valid, no distinction is made, between officers whose duties are
executive or administrative and |;hose who compose the coun-
cil or other municipal legislative body." But an office which
has no de jwre existence cannot have a de facto incumbent.'
Accordingly where a town attempted to re-organize under an
act which did not. apply to it, a new council differently consti-
tuted from that of the old corporation was declared to have
• Dillon on Munic Corp., § 375, n.
See, however, In re Sawyer, 124 U.
S. 223, and the dissenting opinion of
Chief Justice Waite; Demarest v.
Wickham, 63 N. Y. 820 ; High on In-
junctions, g 1812.
2 Roche V. Jones (1891), 87 Va. 484;
s. &, 12 S. K Rep. 965 ; De Grave v.
Monmouth, 4 Car. & P. Ill ; State v.
Jacobs, 17 Ohio, 143; Williams v.
School District, 21 Pick. 75 ; Scoville
V. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St 126 ; Trustees
&c. V. Hill, 6 Cowen, 28; Peoples.
Runkle, 9 Johns. 147 ; People v. Bart-
lett, 6 Wend. 422; People v. Stevens,
5 Hill, 616; Pritchett v. People, 6 III.
529 ; Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa,
.75, 84 ; Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa, 13 ;
Cai'land v. Commissioners, 5 Mont
579; St^te v. Goodwin, 69 Tex. 55,
where a municipal election ordered
by de facto mayor and aldermen was
declared valid. In Dugan u Farrier,
47 N. J. Law, 383, a member of the
board who was ineligible to the o£Bce
of president claimed the right to pre-
side and assumed the chair. The
board acquiesced ^d proceeded to
appoint a county collector. The ac-
tion of the board was sustained.
Spaulding v. City of Saginaw, 84
Mich. 184; S. G 47 N. W. Rep. 444;
In re Strahl, 16 Iowa, 369. See, also,
Eoontz V. Hancock, 64 Md. 134 ; Lock-
hart V. Ti-oy, 48 Ala, 579 ; De Grave v.
Monmouth, 4 Car. & P. Ill ; Rex v.
Mayor &c., 8 Mod. Ill; People v.
Hopson, 1 Denio, 574 ; People v. Nos-
trand, 46 N. T. 375 ; Hamlin v. Ding-
man, 6 Lans. (N. T.) 61 ; Olmsted v.
Dennis, 77 N. T. 378; Riddle v. Bed-
ford, 7 Serg. & R. 386 ; Lever v. Mc-
Glachlin, 28 Wis. 364; Gushing v.
Frankfort, 57 Me. 541. As to appoint-
ment of an oflScer by less than a quo-
rum, § 286, infra. It was held in a
well considered case in England that
an act done by a definite body was
not invalid because officers de jure
and ofiScers de facto united in the
doing of it. Scadding v. Lorant, 5
Eng. Law & Eq. 16. See and com-
pare, Raleigh v. Sorrell, 1 Jones (N.
C.) Law, 49; Willcock on Munic
Corp., § 68 ; Parry v. Berry, Comyns,
269 ; Green v. Durham, 1 Burr. 131 ;
Rex V. Westwood, 4 Barn. & C. 799,
818 ; Rex v. Head, 4 Burr. 3531 ; Hob-
lyn V. Regem, 2 Bro. P. C. 829.
»Burt V. Winona &c. Ry. Co., 31
Minn. 472; Tinsley v. Kirby, 17 S.
C. 1, 8 ; Carleton v. People, 10 Mich.
250 ; People v. White, 24 Wend. 520,
540 ; Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dill.
§ 284.] PUBLIC BOARDS, 291
no power to pass a valid ordinance.' Where a county court
was abolished by act of the legislature and its powers trans-
ferred to a board of county commissioners, who proceeded to
issue bonds under their new authority, and. the statute was
subsequently held to be unconstitutional, the bonds were with-
out validity even in the hands of lona fide holders.*
§ 284. Quomm of definite body.— " The quorum of a body
may be defined to be that number of the body which when
assembled in their proper place will enable them to transact
their proper business, or, in other words, that number that
makes the lawful body, and gives them the power to pass a
law or ordinance.'" When the statute law creating it is
silent as to what shall constitute a legal assembly of a definite
body, the common law, both in England and in this country,
is well settled that the majority of the members elect shall con-
stitute a legal body.* This rule of the common law cannot be
abrogated hy an act of the municipal body itself, unauthorized
by statute or charter.* It can neither enlarge nor diminish
the number required to constitute a quorum. Thus, in the
case already cited, where one of the co-ordinate branches of a
C. C. 130; Hildreth's Heirs v. Mcln- only in case of a tie cannot be counted
tire's Devisees, IJ. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 206. in determining whether there is a
Cf. State V. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; quorum present. State v. Porter
§ 184, supra. (1887). 113 Ind. 79. In the New Eng-
1 Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa, 12 (by land fotcns where the corporate power
C. J. Dillon). is primarily exercised by the citizens
2 Norton v. Shelby Couniy (1885), at large, any number, though less
118 U. S. 425. See § 184, supra. than a majority of the whole, when
' Heiskell v. Mayor &c., 63 Md. 125, assembled at a legal meeting, have
149. the power to act for the whole, unless
* Heiskell v. Mayor &c., 65 Md. 125 ; otherwise provided by law. Damon
Blackert «. Blizzard, !B,Barn.&C. 851; v. Granby, 3 Pick. 345, 355; Com-
Bamett v. Paterson (1886), 48 N. J. monwealth v. Ipswich, 2 Pick. 70 ;
Law, 393; Cadmus v. Farr, 47 N. J. States. Binder, 38 Mo. 450; Church w
Law, 395 ; McDermott v. Miller, 45 Case, 2 Eobt (N. Y.) 649 ; Williams v.
N. J. Law, 251; 5 Dane Abr. 150; Lunenburg, 21 Pick. 75 ; First Parish
Dartmouth w. County Comm'rs (1891), v, Stearns, 21 Pick. 148.
153 Mass. 12; In re Willcooka, 7 *"0f the power of the general
Cowen, 402, 410 ; Rex v. Devonshire, assembly to fix and determine what
1 Barn. & C. 609 ; Rex v. Headley, 7 should be a quorum there can be no
Barn. & C. 496 ; Rex v. Bellringer, 4 possible doubt" Heiskell v. Mayor
T. R. 810 ; Rex v. Bower, 1 Barn. & &C., 65 Md. 125, 147.
C. 492. One who has a right to vote
292 PUBLIC BOARDS. [§§ 28&, 286.
city council adopted a rule prohibiting actiori iiriless two-thirds
of its members were present, it was held that an ordinance
might be repealed at a meeting consisting of a majority only,
and this although the charter contained a provision author-
izing those bodies "to settle their rules of procedure."'
§ 285. The same subject continued. — But it is also essential
to the validity of action upon a proposition submitted to the
board that a majority of all the^members qualified to vote in
the particular instance shall be present, and members having
a direct pecuniary interest in the matter adverse to the mu-
nicipality which they represent are excluded in counting a quo-
rum.' The physical presence of a sufficient number constitutes
a legal quorum. Thus, where half of the members of a board
in regular session for the purpose of choosing an officer, after
several hundred ineffectual ballots, withdrew from the place of
balloting and took places among the by-standers, but without
leaving the room, it was held that the quorum was not broken,
although they refused to vote and protested against further
action.'
§ 286. The same subject continued — An exception to the
rale. — The principle that upholds the acts of de facto officers
prevails over the rule requiring the presence of a quorum for
the transaction of business by public bodies. The charter of
the city of Detroit provides for the designation by the com-
1 " It would be an anomaly indeed," set forth by Judge Cooley in Steck-
said the court, " if the council itself ert v. East Saginaw, 33 Mich. 104.
could deprive itself of the right that As a general rule acts done by less
it admittedly had." Heiskell v. Mayor than a quorum are void. State v.
&c., 65 Md. 135, 153. Wilkesville, 30 Ohio St S88; Pimen-
2 " Perhaps the only recognized ex- tal v. San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351
caption to this rule is the case where McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal
the body or board is permitted to fix 591 ; Logansport v. Legg, 20 Ind. 315
the compensation of its members." Ferguson v. Chittenden Co., 6 Ark.
Oconto County v. Hall, 47 Wis. 308; 479; Price v. Railroad Co., 13 Ind.
Pickett V. School Dist, 25 Wis. 651 ; 58. As to presumptions in favor of
United Brethren Chtirch v. Van Du- a quorum, see Insurance Co. v. Sort-
sen, 37 Wis, 54 ; Walworth Bank v. well, 8 Allen, 217 (private corpora^
Farmers' L. & T. Co., 16 Wis. 629; tion).
Coles V. Williaiasburgh, 10 Wend. » State v. Vanosdal (Ind., 1893), 81
659. The distinction between a re- N. E. Rep. 78. See Beach on Private
mote and direct interest is clearly Corporations, §§ 376, 395.
§ 287,] PUBLIC BOAEDS. 293
mon cotmcil of the aldermen in each ward to the election
districts therein, and also for the appointment of qualified
electors in each district, who with the aldermen shall act as
chairmen respectively of the board of inspectors and of regis-
tration in these districts. These appointments must be made
at least two weeks previous to a general election. At the last
meeting of the council prior to a general election when these
appointments could lawfully be made, the minority faction of
the council withdrew, and the majority, though not constitut-
ing a quorum, proceeded to make the appointments. The
court held that the acts of the ofiicers thus appointed were
valid, as they were oflBcers de facto, but that the council would
be compelled by mandamus to designate immediately, at a
lawful meeting, the chairmen of the different boards of in-
spectors to take the place of those illegally appointed at the
former meeting.*
§ 287. The same subject continued — Special charter pro-
visions.— Where a charter provides that no ordinance or reso-
lution should be passed except by a majority of all the mem-
bers elected, and one of the members resigned after election,
it was held that a bare majority of those remaining was not
empowered to act.' But if the majority is constituted a
quorum to do business " at all meetings " of the board, such a
number may organize and act at the first meeting, as well as
at any subsequent meeting, although it is provided that " the
board," etc., shall assemble for the purpose of organization,'
The power of removing certain officers was conferred upon a
city council, to be exercised " by a vote of two-thirds of that
body," and the court inclined to the opinion that (aside from
the French text of the charter, which disposed of any doubt)
only two-thirds of the body as legally constituted hy the pres-
ence of a quorum was required.* But where the language was
that " the common council, with the concurrence of two-thirds
1 Dingwall v. Common Council, 83 169 ; MoCracken v. San Francisco, 16
Mich. 568 ; S. C, 46 N. W. Rep. 938. Cal. 591 ; Plmental v. San Francisco,
See, also, as to acts of de facto coun- 21 CaL 351.
cils, § 283. supra, and of de facto oflS- ' Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540.
cers and agents, generally, § 281, * Warnock v. Lafayette, 4 La. Ann.
supra, 419.
2 San Francisco v. Hazen, 5 CaL
294 praLio BOAEDS. [§§ 288, 289.
of the members thereof," might order, etc., two-thirds of the
whole number was declared necessary to make a valid order.^
And where a charter requires a two-thirds vote of the mem-
bers of a council on certain measures, and the body is com-
posed of a president and six others, five members must
concur.^
§ 288. Quorums and majorities further considered — The
rule in England. — It is not yet settled by the authorities
whether the business of a common council or other govern-
ing board can be conducted by a bare majority of the number
necessa,ry to constitute a quorum, or whether the passage of
a measure requires the assent of a majority of those present
where more than a quorum are in attendance. Baron Mar-
tin, in delivering his opinion in Gosling v. Veley,' adopted
and explained a remark by Lord Mansfield * suggesting a dis-
tinction between elections and the transaction of other cor-
porate business. " It is clear law," said the Baron, "...
that for the transaction of business, viz., making a law, im-
posing a tax, making a by-law, in fact transacting any business
whatever, there must be, first, a lawful meeting, and secondly,
a vote of the majority ; and unless the majority votes for the
law, tax or by-law, it is not carried." And it was accordingly
held that a valid church rate could not be made at a vestry
meeting where the majority of those present refrained from
voting.'
§ 289. The same subject continued — Decisions in the
United States. — The distinction noticed in the preceding sec-
tion has been recognized and applied in election cases by the
Supreme Courts of Ohio ' and Ilhnois.'' In a recent case in In-
diana ' it appeared that a resolution was introduced at a meet-
ing of a common council for the adoption of the report of a
iLogansport v. Legg, 30 Ind. 315. « State u Green (1883), 37 Ohio Sfc
See, also. State v. Porter, 118 Ind. 79. 327.
2 Whitney v. Village of Hudson 'Launtz v. People (1885), 113 111.
(1888), 69 Mich. 189; & a, 30 Am. & 137.
Eng. Corp. Cas. 453, n. 8 Rushville Gas Co. v. City of Rush-
8 4 H. of L. Cas. 679, 740 (1853). ville (1889), 121 Ind. 206 j s. C, 6 L. E.
* In Hex V. Monday, Cowp. 538. A. 315.
* Gosling V. Veley, 4 H. of L. Cas.
679.
§^0-] PUBLIO BOARDS. 2&5
committee relating to lighting the city. Three of the six mem-
bers composing the council, all being present, voted in favor
of the resolution, but the other three declined to vote and the
mayor declared that it was adopted. The court sustained this
view, and said : — " The rule is that where there is a quorum
present, and a majority of the quorum vote in favor of a meas^
ure, it will prevail, although an equal number should refrain
from voting. It is not the majority of the whole number of
members present that is required ; all that is requisite is a
nixjority of the number of members required to constitute a
quorum."' The same doctrine is affirmed in ITew Hamp-
shire,' while in Tennessee ' the opposite extreme is reached in
holding that a majority of all present is necessary even to a
valid election.
§ 290. Further application of majority principle. — Where
authority to do an act of a public nature is given by law
to three or more persons, if the .act is merely ministerial in
its character, a majority at least must concur and unite in the
performance of it ; but they may act separately and need not
be convened in a body or notified so to convene for that pur-
pose ; but if the act is one which requires the exercise of dis-
cretion and judgment, in which case it is usually termed a
iRushville Gas Co. v. City of Rush- position. Their refusal to vote is, in
ville, 181 Ind. 306. The court con- effect, a declaration that they con-
tinued:— "If there had been four sent that the majority of the quorum
members of the common council may act for the body of which they
present and three had voted for the are members." Judge Dillon, in re-
resolution and one had voted against f erring to this case, says: — "It de-
it, or had not voted at all, no one serves further consideration whether
would hesitate to afiSrm that the res- this result is consistent with the
olution was duly passed ; and it can majority rule applicable to definite
make no difference whether four or bodies." Dillon 9n Munic. Corp. (4th
six members are present, since it is ed.), § 293, n. The court is silent as
always the vote of the majority of to any distinction between elections
quorum that is effective. ■ The mere and business proceedings, although
presence of inactive members does it cites cases in support of its decis-
not impair the right of the majority of ion where the difference was clearly
the quorum to proceed with the busi- recognized.
ness of the body. If members pres- 2 Attorney-General v. Shepard
ent desire to defeat a measure they (1882), 68 N. H. 38a
must vote against it, for inaction will « Lawrence v. IngersoU (1889), 88
not accomplish their purpose. Their Tenn. 52 ; S. C, 12 S. W. Rep. 423 ; 6
silence is acquiescence rather than op- L. R. A. 308; 17 Am. St Rep. 870.
296
PUBLIC BOAEDS.
[§ 291.
judicial act unless special provision is otherwise made, the
persons to whom the authority is given must meet and confer
together and be present when the act is performed, in which
case a majority may perform the act, or, after all have been
notified to meet, a majority having met will constitute a
quorum or sufficient number to perform the act. As a gen-
eral rule, the act may then be legally done by the direction
or with the concurrence of a majority of the quorum so as-
sembled.^ *
§ 291. Execution of authority vested in two persons.—
Where power is conferred upon two persons, or where a larger
number has by death or vacanpy become reduced to two, noth^
1 Martin v. Lemon, 36 Conn. 192 ;
Damon v. Granby, 3 Pick. 345, 354,
which makes a distinction between
committees appointed; by a public
corporation of its own members and
committees of persons not members,
requiring unanimity in the latter
case ; Ballard v. Davis, 31 Miss. 525 ;
Petrie v. Doe, 30 Miss. 698 ; Grindley
V. Barker, 1 Bos. & Pull. 239; Keeler
V. Frost, 33 Barb. 400; Perry v.
Tynen, 23 Barb. 137; In re Rogers, 7
Cowen, 526; Astor v. New York, 63
N. Y. 567, 576, 580 ; In re Beekman,
31 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 16 ; In re Sewer
in Thirty-fourth St, 31 How. Pr. 42.
Upon the death of one, where no
provision exists for filling the va-
cancy, the power vests in the surviv-.
ors. People v. Syracuse, 63 N. Y.
291, citing People v. Palmer, 53 N. Y.
84, and distinguishing People v. Nos-
trand, 46 N. Y. 375. The presump-
tion is that all were notified and that
all met. Astor v. New York, 62
N. Y. 567, 576; Y^oung v. Bucking-
ham, 5 Ohio, 485, 489; Chai-les v.
Hoboken, 27 N. J. Law, 203. See,
also, Jones v. Andover, 9 Pick. 146 ;
Inhabitants &c. v. Cole, 8 Pick. 232,
244; Keyes v. Westford, 17 Pick.
273 ; Kingsbuiy v. School District, 13
Met. 99; Crommett v. Pearson, 18
Me. 344; Jenkins v. School. District,
39 Ma 220 ; Green v. Miller, 6 Johns.
39 ; King v. Beeston, 3 Term R 593 ;
Guthrie v. Armstrong, 5 Barn, &
Aid. 638 ; Eeyser v. School District,
35 N. H. 477; Walcott v. Walcott, 19
Vt 37; Throop on Public Officers,
§ 106; McCoy v. Curtice, 9 Wend.
17, 19 ; Horton v. Harrison. 23 Barb.
176 ; State v. Guiney, 26 Minn. 313 ;
Schenck v. Peay, 1 Woolw. 175, 187;
People V. Harrington, 63 CaL 257;
Walker v. Eogan, 1 Wis. 597; In re
Broadway Widening, 63 Barb. 572;
Downing v. Rugar, 31 Wend. 178;
Somerset v. Parson, 105 Pa. St. 360 ;
Cooper V. Lampeter, 8 Watts (Penn.),
128 ; Commonwealth v. Commission-
ers, 9 Watts (Penn.), 466, 471 ; Bal-
timore Turnpike, 5 Binn. (Penn.)
484; Commissioners v. Leckey, 6
Serg. & R. 170 ; McCready v. Guard-
ians, 9 Serg. & R 99; Caldwell v.
Harrison, 11 Ala. 755; Crist u Town,
Trustees, 10 Ind. 462; Gallup v.
Tracy, 25 Conn. 10, holding that a
town committee to stake out oystec
grounds,' having no fixed place of
acting or consultation, no record, no
clerk, and no time and mode of pro-
ceeding, need not be assembled to
act, and may act by majorities of
such as are competent.
i] PUBLIC BOARDS. 297
ing can be done without the consent of both.' Such is the gen-
eral rule; yet there are authorities which hold clearly that to
prevent a failure of justice one may act alone without con-
sulting the other, as if one be dead or interested or absent
when immediate action is necessary.^ Moreover, the common
presumption in favor of the performance of oflBlcial duty dis-
penses with affirmative proof that the act of one was assented
to by the other, and it has been held that this presumption
can be rebutted only by the testimony of him whose assent
was denied.' So far, also, as their duties are ministerial, it is
competent for one to act as the agent or deputy of both with
the other's consent, which is only an application of the gen-
eral rule that one of a board may be authorized to act in be-
half of the whole in the execution of whatever measure they
may resolve upon.*
§292. Presiding officer. — In England' and generally in
the United States it is one of the duties of the mayor to pre-
side at corporate meetings. But he has not, in virtue of his
office alone, any right to preside, which in all cases depends
upon a construction of the charter, organic law or constituent
act of the corporation.* When the charter provides that the
city council shall elect one of their number to be the president
of the board, but does not prescribe the number of votes nec-
essary to a choice, the votes of a majority of a quorum duly
met are sufficient.'' The presiding officer, although he be the
1 Downing v. Rugar, 31 Wend. 178 ; reversed 7 N. T. 9, but not on this
Pell V. Ulmar, 21 Barb. 500 ; New point See § 376 et seq., supra, on
York Life Ins. Co. v. Staats, 31 Barb, delegation of powers.
570; Perry «. Tynen, 33 Barb. 137; *" Prior to the Municipal Corpora-
Powell V. Tuttle, 3 N. Y. 396. tions Act of 1885 the powers and du-
- 6 Vin. Abr., Coroner (H.), pL 7 ; 14 ties of mayors, including the right to
14 Vin. Abr., Joint and Several (B), preside, depended upon charters, re-
pl. 1 ; Rex u Warrington, 1 Salk. 153; gal and parliamentary, usages, cub-
Naylor v. Sharpless, 3 Mod. 33. And tome, etc." Dillon, J., in Cochran v.
see Auditor Curie's Case, 11 Rep. 3; McCleary, 33 Iowa, 75, 83, citing 4
Rich V. Player, 3 Show. 386; Down- Jacob's Law Diet 364, 365; 3 Bouv.
ing V. Rugar, 31 Wend. 178. 183. Law Diet 150.
» Downing v. Rugar, 31 Wend. 178. « Cochran v. McCleary, 33 Iowa, 75.
♦ Downing u Rugar, 31 Wend. 178; 'Cadmus u Fan- (1885), 47 N.J.
People V. Comm'rs, 3 Hill, 599. See, Law, 308. In Dugan v. Farrier, 47
also, People v. Newell, 13 Barb. 86, N. J. Law, 383, the point was raised
298
FXTBEID EOAEDS'.
[§ 293.
mayor, cannot vote unless he is a member of the body, or is
authorized by the charter to give the casting vote in case of a
tie.^ A right to preside over the meeting of the council is
a " franchise," and if denied a remedy may be had by quo
warranto or information in that nature ; but a bill in equity is
not a proper proceeding for that purpose unless so provided
bv statute.'
§ 393. The same subject continued. — The functions of the
presiding officer are as official as any pa,rt of the meeting of
the board and cannot be exercised bv one who is not a mem-
that the organization of the board,
including the selection of a presiding
officer, is essential to the valid exer-
cise of its other functions, but the
question was left undetermined by
the court
1 Carrolton v. CJlark, 31 III. App. 74 ;
Launtz v. People, 113 III. 137 ; S. C,
55 Am. Eep. 405 ; Carroll v. Wall, 35
Kan. 36; Carleton v. People, 10
Mich. 350; Decorah v. BuUis, S5
Iowa, 12; People v. White, 24 Wend.
530 ; State v. Gray, 33 Neb. 365 ; Hil-
dreth v. Mclntyre, 1 J. J. Marsh,
(Ky.) 206; Eex v. Westwood, 4 Barn.
& C. 799 ; Eex v. Head, 4 Burr. 2515 ;
Rex V. Croke, Cowp. 26; Green v.
Durham, 1 Burr. 131; Parry v.
Berry, Comyns, 269. Where the
charter makes the president a mem-
ber of the council with a right to
vote in every case and a casting vote
in case of a tie, he may vote on a
question and give an additional vote
if there is a tia Whitney v. Village
of Hudson (1888), 69 Mich. 189; & c,
30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. . 453, n.
2 Cochran v. McCleary (1867), 22
Iowa, 75, where the question is dis-
cussed by Judge Dillon; Common-
wealth V. Arrison, 15 Serg. & E. 130 ;
In re Sawyer (1887), 124 U. S. 200;
Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La, Ann. 162,
where the Yight of the recorder of a
municipality, who was ex officio
president of its council, to vote in
cases wliere there was not a tie, was
tested on quo warranto; Rex v.
Hertford, 1 Ld. Raym. 426 ; Com-
monwealth V. Kepner, 10 Phila.
(Penn.) 510 ; Topping v. Gray, 7 Hill,
359; Commonwealth v. Bank, 28
Pa. St. 389; Mayor v. Conner, 5
Ind. 171 ; Markle v. Wright, 13 Ind.
548; People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15
Johns. 358; People v. Ins. Co., 2
Johns. Ch. 371 ; People v. Carpenter,
34 N. Y. 86; People v. Cook, 8 N. Y.
67; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532;
Peabody tt Flint, 6 Allen, 52 ; Mozley
u Alston, 1 Phill. 790 ; Lord v. The
Governor &c., 2 PhilL 740 ; Hagner
V. Heyberger, 7 Watts & Serg. 104 ;
Demarest v. Wickham, Mayor &c., 63
N. Y. 320; Hughes v. Parker, 20 N.
R58; In re Strahl, 16 Iowa, 369;
Updegraff v. Crans, 47 Pa. St 103 ;
Facey v. Fuller, 13 Mich. 527. The
remedy (by quo warranto) does not
exist as a matter of right, and in
offices of short duration there is not
much to favor interference in ordi-
nary cases. People v. Harshaw, 60
Mich. 300, where it was held that
a charter providing that the com-
mon council should have power to
determine contested elections of its
members made the decision of that
body conclusive and not subject to
review.
§ 294,J PUBLIO BOAEDS. 299
ber.^ It is his duty to announce the result of a vote accord-
ing to the fact, and his decision may be attacked collaterally.'
He cannot arbitrarily adjourn a meeting in defiance of the
majority present.' And mcmdamus will lie to compel him to
reverse his decision illegally declaring a resolution carried,
and to declare it lost, unless the resolution is itself illegal upon
its face.* When the mayor has a right to appoint by and with
the consent of the council and also to vote in case of a tie, he
may give a casting vote to confirm his own appointment.'
And the declaration of a presiding oflBcer that a resolution is
adopted has been held to be a casting vote in its favor, if the
other votes are equally divid ed ; ^ otherwise where the vote
is required to be by ballot.' When the chairman announces
the appointment of a secretary in the presence of the meeting
and the secretary serves without objection from any one, the
act of the chairman is the act of the meeting.*
§294. Commitment for contempt — Whitcomb's Case. —
By the law of England a town or city council had no power
without express act of parliament to commit for contempt of
its authority.* The only case directly in point in this coun-
try, so far as the author's reading goes, is Whitcomb's Case,
decided in 1876 by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts.'" A witness having been duly summoned to testify
before a special committee of the common council of Boston,
> State V. Kirk (1878), 46 Conn. 395, ber of the board, voted for himself,
398. thus making a tie, and the chairman
2 Chariton v. HoUiday, 60 Iowa, erroneously assuming that the vote
891 ; State v. Fagan, 42 Conn. 32. -was valid, declared him elected, and
' Dingwall v. Common Council, 83 there was no dissent.
Mich. 568. ' Lawrence v. Ingersoll (1889), 88
«Tennant».Crocker(1891),85Mich. Tenn. 53; S. C, 12 S. W. Eep. 433 ; 6
338; s. C, 48 N. W. Eep. 577. But the L. R. A. 308; 17 Am. St. Rep. 870.
remedy by mandamus is discretion- Cf. Small v. Orne, 79 Me. 78, where,
ary, and in this case it was denied on under a particular statutory provis-
account of the patent illegality of the ion, a declaration by the presiding
resolution. ' officer was deemed a casting vote,
s Carroll v. Wall, 35 Kan. 36. though the voting was by ballot.
SLauntz v. People, 113 HI. 137; « State v. McKee (Oregon, 1890), 35
Rushville Gas Co. u Rushville, 121 Pac. Rep. 293.
Ind. 306 ; S. C, 23 N. E. Rep. 73 ; 6 « Grant on Corporations, 84^86 ;
L. R. A. 315. Contra, Hornung v. Parke, B., in 4 Moore, P. "C. 89 ; Bar-
State, 116 Ind. 458 ; S. C, 19 N. E. Rep. ter v. Commonwealth, 3 Perin. 253.
151, Where a candidate, being a mem- "• 120 Mass. 118.
300
FUBLIO BOARDS.
[§ 295.
appointed with full powers to investigate and report upon
certain charges of corruption against its members, declined to
answer a question relating to the matter, and was committed
for contempt by a regular order of the council. It was held
that the council was neither a legislature nor a court, nor in
the accurate use of language was it vested with any judicial
functions whatever, although the charter gave it authority to
decide upon all questions relative to the qualifications, elec-
tion and returns of its members,%,nd that a statute conferring
power to imprison and punish without right of appeal or trial
by jury was unconstitutional.'
§ 295. Teas and nays. — A provision in a charter that the
yeas and nays "shall" be called and published was held by
the Supreme Court of New York to be directory merely and
not indispensable to the validity of a vote.^ But the weight
of authority and reason is decidedly in favor of the view that
such a provision is mandatory, and that proceedings in con-
travention thereof are void.' And where the record showed
1 Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 118.
See, also. In re Mason (1890), 43 Fed.
Rep. 510, which holds that the power
to punish for contempt is not an inci-
dent to the mere exercise of judicial
functions. In In re Hammel (1869),
9 R L 348, upon habeas corpus it ap-
peared that the petitioner was sum-
moned to testify before a town coun-
cil on a matter pending before that
body, and, refusing to take an oath
or aflSrmation, he was ordered to be
committed to jail, for contempt of
court The proceeding was declared
to be illegal for the reason that no
deflnite term of punishment was
named. The court cited no author-
ities and expressly refrained from
passing upon " other questions
raised." A city charter gave a com-
mittee of the common council power
to issue a summons to any person to
appear and testify in any matter
pending before it, and provided a
penalty of imprisonment for refusal
to obey the summons or to "answer
any proper or pertinent question," but
contained no express provision au-
thorizing the committee to compel
the production of books and papers.
It was held that there was no power
to commit for contempt for refusing
to produce them. People v. Van Tas-
sel (1893), 19 N. Y. Supl. 643; afllrm-
ing s. G, 17 N. Y. Supl. 938.
2 Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill, 9; S. C,
afSrmed, 3 Denio, 333.
s Steckert v. East Saginaw, 23 Mich.
104, where Judge Cooley said: —
" The purpose, among other things, is
to make the members of the com-
mon council feel the responsibility of
their action when these important
measures are upon their passage and
to compel each member to bear his
share in the responsibility by a
record of his action which should
not afterwards be open to dispute."
Town of Olin v. Meyers, 55 Iowa,
309; Cutler v. Russellville, 40 Ark.
§ 296.]
PUBLIC BOARDS.
301
the names of those present at the opening of the meeting,
and that a certain resolution was " adopted unanimously on
call," it was declared to be an insufficient compliance with a
requirement that the votes "shall be entered at large on the
minutes." ' But the omission may be supplied by an order
nunc pro tunc causing the entry to be made.* If the record
fails to disclose that any other members were present than
those who voted " yea," it need not state that the nays were
called for.' A charter providing that a vote shall " in all
cases" be taken by yeas and nays and entered at length upon
the journal does not apply to votes taken upon motions to
adjourn.*
§ 296. Parliamentary law. — In speaking of the action of
county boards it was said : — " It will not do to apply to the
105 ; s. a, 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
414; Tracy v. The People, 6 Colo.
151 ; s. C 4 Am. & Eug. Corp. Ca&
373; Rich v. Chicago. 59 111. 286;
Morrison v. Lawrence, 98 Mass. 319 ;
Sullivan v. Leadville, 11 Colo. 483;
Logansport v. Dykeman, 116 Ind. 15,
where, however, the reason for the
rale was held not to apply ; CofSn v.
City of Portland, 43 Fed. Eep. 411.
See, also, Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 111.
297 ; Sopervisora &c. v. People, 25
111. 181; McCormlck v. Bay City, 28
Mich. 457, holding that a provision
requiring ordinances to be passed by
"a majority of all the aldermen,"
i. ft, of all the members elect, would
necessitate the recording of the
number if not the names of the vo-
ters on each side. Delphi v. Evans,
86 Ind. 90. In such cases a single
vote by yeas and nays on several or-
dinances grouped together is not a
passage of any of them. Sullivan v.
Pausoh, 5 Ohio C. C. 196. The New
York case (Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill,
9) is cited and approved in St. Louis
V. Foster, 53 Mo. 518, but here the
yeas and nays were not required and
the cases are easily distinguishable.
Indianola v. Jones, 29 Iowa, 283; In
re Carlton Street, 16 Hun, 497 ; In, re
Mount Morris Square, 3 Hill, 30;
Elmendorf v. Mayor &c., 35 Wend. -
693.
' Non constat that all who met re-
mamed through the proceedings.
Steckert v. East Saginaw, 32 Mich.
104. A formal call of the roll is not
required if the votes are otherwise
ascertained and recorded. Brophy v,
Hyatt, 10 Cola 238.
' Logansport v. Crockett, 64 Ind.
819 ; Vawter v. Franklin College, 53
Ind. 88; Mayhew v. Gay Head, 13
Allen, 129; Comm'rs v. Hearne, 59
Ala. 871 ; Musselman v. Manly, 42
Ind. 462; Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind.
90. The facts must appear upon the
face of the record, and cannot be
proved aliunde. In re Carlton Street,
16 Hun, 497. The record is not sup-
ported by presumption. Traoey v.
People, 6 Colo. 151 ; s. a, 4 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Caa. 873.
'Town of Bayard v. Baker, 76
Iowa, 220 ; s. C, 23 Am'. & Eng, Corp.
Cas. 126.
* Green Bay v. Brauns, 50 Wis. 204.
302 PUBLIC BOAEDS. [§ 297.
orders and resolutions of such bodies nice verbal criticism and
strict parliamentary distinctions, because the business is trans-
acted generally by plain men not familiar with parliamentary
law. Therefore their proceedings must be liberally construed
in order to get at the real intent and meaning of the body." ^
And it was declared in another case that if municipal bodies
exercising legislative functions pursue .a method of proceeding
understood by themselves which arrives at substantial results,
their action should not be overtJ|rown upon any technical rules
or strict construction of parliamentary law.' It was held to
be no objection to the validity of an assessment that the order
did not receive, in either branch of the city council, two sev-
eral readings before its passage, as required by the rules. " It
is within the power of all deliberative bodies," said the court,
"to abolish, modify or waive their own rules, intended as
security against hasty or inconsiderate action." '
§ 297. Reconsideration and rescission — General power.
It is the undoubted right of corporate bodies, unless clearly
restrained by legislative enactment, to reconsider a vote as
often as they see fit, or to rescind the same, provided vested
rights are not disturbed, up to the time when by a conclusive
vote, accepted as such by itself, a determination has been
reached.* They may adopt rules as to the time when recon-
iHark v. Gladwell, 49 Wis. 177; s. a, 55 Am. Eep^ 65; Stater. Chap-
S. a, 5 N. W. Rep. 833, quoted and man, 44 Conn. 595 ; Baker v. Cush-
approved in Wisconsin Cent R Ca man, 127 Mass. 105 ; State v. Foster,
V. Ashland County (Wis., 1891), 50 17 N. J. Law, 101 ; State v. Justice,
N. W. Eep. 937. 24 N. J. Law, 413 ; State v. Crosby, 36
2 But the effect of what is done must N.J. Law, 428; Jersey City w State,
be gathered from the record and not 30 N. J. Law, 521 ; Bigelow v. Hill-
f rom testimony of members as to man, 37 Me. 58 ; Commonwealth v.
their understanding of it Whitney Pittsburgh, 14 Penn. St. 177 ; Reiflf v.
V. Village of Hudson (1888), 69 Mich. Connor, 10 Ark. 341 ; People u Mills,
189 ; s. G, 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 32 Hun, 459 ; State v. Hoyt, 2 Oregon,
453, n. 246; Red v. Augusta, 25 (it 386;
»Holt V. City Council (1879), 137 Road Case, 17 Penn. St 71, 75;
Mass. 408, 411, citing Bennett v. New New Orleans v. St Louis Church, 11
Bedford, 110 Mass. 43a La. Ann. 244; Dey v. Lee, 4 Jones'
* Higgins d Curtis, 39 Kan. 283 ; (N. C.) Law, 238 ; Tucker v. Justices,
S. a, 18 Pac. Rep. 207; Whitney «, 13 Ired. (N. C.) Law, 434; Estey v.
Van Buskirk (1878), 40 N. J. Law, Starr, 56 Vt 690, where a town meet-
403 ; State v. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76 ; ing rescinded a vote authorizing a
§§ 298, 299.] PUBLIC boards. 30o
sideration may be moved,' and it is not necessary to the va-
lidity of a resolution to reconsider that it should be moved
by one who voted originally with the majority ; ^ and a board
of aldermen which has indefinitely postponed action on a res-
olution of the common council can afterwards rescind that
action and pass the resolution.'
§ 298. The same subject continued. — An order may be
i Bscinded by implication, as where a meeting voted to pro-
ceed to an election of a city attorney by ballot, and subse-
quently made an appointment by resolution vvoa vooe} A
committee appointed by a board for the purpose of making
a contract on its behalf acquires no vested right and may be
deprived of its power by subsequent action of the board ; ' and
a town school committee may reconsider its vote electing a
superintendent of schools at the same meeting, and before it
has been gommunicated to the person so elected.* A resolution
adopted at a meeting when such action was illegal may be cured
by subsequent valid proceedings in consummation thereof.''
§ 299. Power to reconsider and rescind qualified.— As in-
timated in the preceding section, when the rights of third
subscription in aid of a railroad, no passed a vote which was not within
sabscription having actually been the scope of any article except the
made ; Stoddard v. Gilman, 33 Vt one rejected. The court held it to be
568 ; Fond v. Negus, 3 Mass. 380. invalid (for another reason also) and
'State V. Womack (Wash., 1892), simply remarked that "no attempt
39 Pao. Rep. 939. appears to have been made to recon-
2 Locke v. Rochester, 5 Lans. (N.Y.) sider the vote dismissing the . . .
11. They may reconsider at an ad- article." These cases may evidently
journed meeting a vote taken at a stand together, for the first related to
previous meeting. Supervisors &c. the mode of proceeding, the latter to
T Horton (1888) 75 Iowa, 371 ; Locke the proceeding itself. Neither case is
V. Rochester, 5 Lans. (N, Y.) 11 ; Cas- cited in the opinion in the other,
sidy M Bangor (1871), 61 Me. 434. See further, for reconsideration, etc.,
'Hough V, Bridgeport (1889), 57 at town meetings, the chapter on
Conn. 290; s. a, 18 Atl. Rep. 103. Meetings and Elections, infra.
* It would have been more regular * Supervisors &c. v, Horton, 75
to have first formally rescinded the Iowa, 371.
previous order. State v. Chapman, eWood v. Cutter (1884), 138 Mass.
44 Conn. 595. In Holbrook v. Faulk- 149.
ner (1875), 55 N. H. 311, a school dis- 'State v. Dist Ct of Hennepin
trict meeting voted to dismiss an ar- County, 33 Minn. 235 ; & a, 7 Am. &
tide in the warrant, and afterwards Eng. Corp. Cas. 206.
304 PUBLIC BOAEDS. [§ 300.
parties have accrued under proceedings of a public, body they
cannot be affected by a declaration of its change of mind.
Thus, a vote ratifying a contract made by town officers with-
out due authority cannot be rescinded so as to discharge the
town from its obligation.^ The point at which the election
of a public officer by a meeting convened for that purpose
passes beyond its control and becomes irrevocable has been
considered in several cases. "While it is universally admitted
that a ballot may be set aside ^or some irregularity or ille-
gality before the election is declared,* it was stoutly main-
tained by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut that a
common council, having appointed an officer by ballot whom
it had no power to remove, could not nullify the appoint-
ment by a mere declaration that there was error in the ballot
when there was none and a subsequent appointment of an-
other person.' It was also held, in Maine, that after a city
officer has been declared to be chosen by the board of alder-
men, and the declaration recorded, the board cannot at an
adjourned meeting held the next day, reconsider its action
and choose another.*
§ 300. The same subject continued,— Where an officer's
resignation is accepted by the proper board, which then con-
firms the mayor's nomination of a successor, the latter action
is entirely inconsistent with the idea that the matter of resig-
nation remains open for further deliberation ; ' and a board of
1 Brown v. Winterport, 79 Me. 305. was a finality witliout an express
See, also in point, Sanborn v. School declaration by him that the relator
District, 13 Minn. 17. was thereby elected.
2 State V. PhiUipa, 79 Ma 506 ; Put- * State v. PhUlips, 79 Me. 606. But a
nam v, Langley, 133 Mass. 204, where motion to reconsider maybe adopted
the result of a recount, differing at a subsequent meeting, where a
from the first count, was acquiesced legal rule of the board permits it.
in by the meeting; Baker v, Cush- "All contracts implied from a reso-
man, 127 Mass. 105, Iution,"said the court, "are subject
3 State V. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76, to the right to change it by another
where the authorities are examined resolution, passed in accordance with
and adverse views criticised. There the rules of the board." People v.
was a motion to proceed by ballot Mills, 32 Hun, 459.
for prosecuting attorney, and the » Whitney v. Van Buskirk, 40 N. J.
court held that the announcement of Law, 468. Act N. J. March 20, 1860,
tbe result by the presiding officer § 6 (Revision, p. 1201, § 45), providing
§ 301.]
PTJBLIO BOARDS.
305
county commissioners having rejected a claim duly presented
to it cannot, at a subsequent meeting, allow any part of it.'
Where by statute a vote of two-thirds of the members of a
common council is necessary to pass a resolution, a like vote
is required to reconsider or rescind it, in the absence of a con-
trary rule of the council regulating the practice upon motions
for reconsideration.^ But in another case, where subscrip-
tions to stock were required to be passed by a two-thirds
vote, and a proposal was made by the requisite number, it
was held it might be withdrawn before acceptance by less
than a majority, and very likely by any number greater than
one-third.'
§ 301. Reconsideration distinguished from repeal. — A
limitation of the power of municipal legislative bodies to re-
that when two or more candidates
for the same ofiBce have I'eceived the
same number of votes at the annual
meeting, the town committee shall
at their next meeting thereafter elect
between those having an equal num-
ber of votes, unless they shall deem a
special meeting advisable, and in that
case shall have power to call such
special meeting, as now provided by-
law, is mandatory, and, the town-
ship committee having failed to elect,
and ordered a special election, and
caused notices to be posted, cannot
at a subsequent meeting rescind their
action. State v. Boden (N. J.), 16
Atl. Rep. 50.
» Ryan v. County of Dakota (1884),
33 Minn. 138. " A vote may be re-
considered at an adjourned meeting
if it has not been so acted on that it
cannot thereby be rendered nuga-
tory." Mitchell v.- Brown (1846), 18
N. H. 315 (school district meeting).
But in that case such proceedings
had been taken in pursuance of the
vote that the status quo could not be
restored. A resolution once adopted
and again read and approved can-
not be repealed after the lapse of a
20
year, and when the board has been
partly changed by the retiring of
members and the election of others,
on the ground that it was erroneously
entered, upon the mere memory of
the members and without notice to
the parties affected thereby. Ridley
V. Doughty (Iowa, 1893), 53 N. W.
Rep. 350. And a resolution author-
izing the mayor to compromise with
the claimants of certain commons by
conveying the land claimed at a cer-
tain price cannot be repudiated so as
to affect the validity of a deed given
while it remained unrevoked. Dausch
V. Crane (Mo., 1893), 19 N. W. Rep. 61.
2 Whitney v. Village of Hudson
(1888), 69 Mich. 189 ; s. c. 30 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 453, n. ; Stockdale v.
School Dist, 47 Mich. 836. In the
case first cited it was held that a vote
is rendered nugatory by the passage
of a resolution to reconsider it,
although it be not afterwards re-
scinded.
8 Belfast &c. Ry. Co. v. Unity
(1871), 63 Me. 148, citing Essex Turn-
pike Corporation v. Collins, 8 Masa
393.
306 tUBLIC BOAEDS. [§ 302.
consider their actions, and the distinction between a resolution
to reconsider and a vote to repeal, is illustrated in a recent de-
cision of the Supreme Court of New Tork. An ordinance
passed by the common council was vetoed by the mayor, and
passed over his veto. A resolution to reconsider was then
adopted, vetoed, and passed over the veto. It was contended
that the ordinance was by these proceedings rescinded. The
court said: — "The ordinance in question may be repealed but
it cannot be reconsidered, for the reason that when it was
passed over the mayor's veto it became a law, and thereby
passed beyond the power and control of the municipal council
to reconsider it. According to the uniform practice of legis-
lative bodies, where a motion to reconsider has been passed in
the affirmative, the question immediately recurs upon the
question reconsidered. The question reconsidered was never
acted upon in this case ; therefore, if the common council had
the power to reconsider the ordinance, it never rescinded it,
because the question reconsidered was never acted upon.
There is another fatal point in this case, which is that the
ordinance, when passed over the mayor's veto, could not be
again reconsidered. It is a rule well settled by parliamentary
law that a vote on the reconsideration of a vetoed bill cannot
be reconsidered again." '
§ 302. Joint assemblies of definite bodies — Constitution
and proceedings. — In England it is clearly established that
where an act is to be performed by a joint meeting of two
or more definite bodies, a majority of each body is essen-
tial to constitute a legal assembly, and if, after having met,
one of the integral parts withdraws while a proposition is
pending, further action thereon by those remaining is in-
valid.* But this stringent rule has been materially relaxed
1 Ashton ». City of Rochester (1891), meetings. Thus where a town voted
14 N. Y. Supl. 855, 858, citing to the to raise a tax, but at a subsequent
last point, Barclay, Const Man. 197 ; legal meeting, the collector having
Fish, Amer. Man. Pari. Law, 90. See, taken no steps in the matter, it was
also. Sank v. Philadelphia, 4 Brews, voted to " reconsider " the former
(Penn.) 133. But there seems to be vote, the court held that the tax was
no technical nor substantial differ- not lawfully levied. Stoddard v.
ence between reconsideration, and Gilman (1850), 22 Vt 568.
rescission in the proceedings of town ^ King v. Williams, 8 Maule & Sel.
§ 302.] PUBLIC BOAKDS. 307
by some of the courts in this country. Thus, it is held in
!N"ew York that although all the bodies [that is, a majprity of
each] must come together for consultation and deliberation,
yet, when they do, the vote of the majority of persons pres-
ent controls, notwithstanding one of the bodies should leave
before the vote is taken.' The Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire has taken a more radical departure from the rule, hold-
ing in one case- that a legal vote of one body to meet in con-
vention is sufficient without the attendance of a quorum of
such body at the joint meeting;^ and in a later decision, that
a vote by one body to meet the other, assented to by the
latter, who were then in session, but with less than a quorum
present, which members alone attended the convention, was
equivalent to a vote to meet by both bodies.'
141; King v. Buller, 8 East, 389; That all must meet in the first
King V. Miller, 6 Term R 378. instance, see Commmonwealth v.
iGiidersleeve v. Board of Educa- Hargest, 7 Penn. Co. Ct. 333.
tion (1868), 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 301 ; ^Beck v. Hanscom (1854), 29 N. H.
Whiteside v. People (1841), 36 Wend. 218.
634, reversing s. a, 33 Wend. 9; » Kimball v. Marshall, 44 N. H. 465.
Ex parte Humphrey, 10 Wend. 612,
CHAPTEE X.
OFFICIAL BONDS.
303. Official bonds— Definition.
304. What officers must give bonds. '
305. Form and requisites of bond.
806. Effect of signing official bond
in blank.
307. The same subject continued.
308. Construction of courts on
bonds improperly approved.
809. Defective bonds valid as com-
mon-law obligation.
310. The same subject continued.
311. Time when an official bond
takes effect
312. Effect of not filing bonds
within the time' prescribed
by statute.
818. .The same subject continued.
814. Liability of sureties on a treas-
urer's bond.
315. The same subject continued.
316. Mingling of and defalcation
out of two funds.
817. Liability of sureties as affected
by subsequent legislation.
818. Liability of surety when sub-
sequent legislation imposes
new duties of the same gen-
eral character.
319. The same subject continued.
320. LiabiHty of officer on his bond
where the loss is occasioned
by the act of God or the
public enemy.
321. The same subject continued.
322. Duty of obligee to notify sure-
ties of increased risk.
828. Liability of sureties on suc-
cessive bonds — (a) Where
different sureties are given
on each bond.
324. The same subject continued.
825. (b) Where funds received by
the officer during his first
term remain in bis hands
during his second term.
326. (c) When the sureties of the
first term are liable for
money converted or col-
, lected by the officer during
his second term.
(d) When an officer before en-
tering on his second term
makes a report to or settle-
ment with the proper au-
thorities.
The same subject continued.
(e) Where the officer applies
money received in his sec-
ond term to pay deficiencies
in his first term.
(f) Where the bond is given
for a term of office or a cer-
tain period of time.
Laches or negligence of other
officers or principal.
332. Liability of sureties where ad-
ditional bonds are given.
833. Liability of surety where the
official occupies two or more
offices.
Liability of surety for unoffi-
cial acts of officer.
The same subject continued.
Liability of sureties for acts
done under color of office.
887. The same subject continued —
Lammon v. Feusier — The
doctrine of the federal Su-
preme Court
338. The same subject continued.
327.
328.
829.
880.
881.
884.
335.
336.
§§ 303, 304.]
OFFICIAL BONDS.
309
I 339. The same subject continued —
The doctrine of the State
courts.
340. The same subject continued.
341. niustrations of the doctrine.
§ 343. Distinction between judicial
and ministei'ial duties.
343. Illustrations of the doctrina
344. The same subject continued.
§ 303. OfBcial bonds — Definition. — Every bond which is
required or authorized by statute to be executed by an officer
is an oflBoial bond.^ Accordingly an official bond is a contract
with the people for the faithful discharge of the official duties
of the officer,^ and such a bond given by a public officer for the
faithful performance of his duties is an official bond, although
not in the form prescribed by statute.'
§ 304; What officers must give bonds. — Those officers who
receive public moneys as well as those who from the nature
of their duties receive money or property for the benefit of
private individuals, or whose duties and powers bring them
into conflict with the rights of individuals, or involve the seiz-
ure and disposal of the property of individuals, are generally
required by statute to give bonds with sureties for the faithful
performance of their duties.'' The Indiana statute provides
that the mayor and other municipal officers therein named,
including city clerk, shall, before entering on their duties, ex-
ecute a bond, in such penal sum as the council shall direct,
" conditioned for the faithful perform-ance of the duties of his
office and the payment of all moneys received by hini accord-
ing to law and the ordinances of such city." The Supreme
Court of that State accordingly held that a bond filed by a
city clerk with the statutory conditions was authorized by the
statute though there could be, no " money received by him ac-
cording to law and the ordinances of such city." *
1 Commonwealth v. Adams, 3 Bush
(Ky.), 41, 46.
2 Judge Grover in People v. Villas,
3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.). 353 ; S. C, 36 N. Y.
439.
3 Lucas V. Shepherd, 16 Ind. 368.
* Throop on Public Ofllcers, § 170 ;
Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 397 ;
Glover on Corp. 305 ; Grant on Corp.
76.
sMiddleton v. State, 130 Ind. 166;
S. C, 33 N. E. Eep. 133, construing
Rev. St Ind. (1881), § 3095. The Ver-
mont constitution requires "every
officer, whether judicial, executive or
military, in authority under this
State," to take the oath of office. It
was held that municipal officers, list-
ers of taxes, for instance, are not in-
cluded in this requirement. Kowell
V. Horton (1886), 58 Vt 1. A town
may lawfully require any of its offi-
310 OFFICIAL BONDS. [§§ 305, 306.
§ 305. Form and requisites of bond. — Where a statute or
charter provides for the filing of an oflBcial bond it almost
invariably states the requisites of the bond, but a substantial
compliance with the statute or charter is all that is necessary,'
unless the statute or charter expressly declares that it shall
follow the exact wording of the statute or charter.'^ And it
has been repeatedly held that a defect in the acknowledg-
ment of the bond, or a failure to approve or acknowledge it,
does not release the principal oi^ surety; and where the bond
has been approved or acknowledged before an officer having
no authority to approve or acknowledge it, the principal or
surety is not released by reason of this irregularity from lia-
bility on the bond.'
§ 306. Effect ot signing official bonds in blank. — A party
executing a bond knowing that there are blanks in it to be
filled up by inserting particular names or other words neces-
sary to make it a perfect instrument must be considered as
agreeing that the blanks may be thus filled up after he has ex-
eoated the bond. If the party signing the paper shall insert
in the appropriate places the amount of the penalty, or the
names of the sureties, or any other thing he may deem of im-
portance as affecting his interest, he may in that way protect
himself against being bound otherwise than as he shall thus
specify. But if, relying upon the good faith of the principal,
the surety shall permit him to have possession of a bond signed
in blank, the surety will have clothed the principal with an
apparent authority to fill up the blanks at his discretion, in
any appropriate manner consistent with the nature of the ob-
ligation to be given, so that, as against the obligee receiving
cers to furnish bonds with sureties 340 ; Young v. State, 7 Gill & J. (Md.)
that he will faithfully perform the 253 ; Wendell v. Fleming, 8 Gray,
duties of his office. Morrell v. Sylves- 613 ; Moore v. State, 9 Mo. 330 ; Peo-
ter, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 348. pie v. Johr, 33 Mich. 461 ; Green v.
1 Tevis V. Randall, 6 Cal. 683. Wardwell, 17 111. 378 ; State v. Blair,
2 People V. Holmes, 3 Wend. 381 ; 33 Ind. 318 ; People v. Edwards, 9
Allegheny County v. Van Campen CaL 386. The bond must not impose
(1839), 3 Wend. 49; Fellows v. Gil- penalties greater than those re-
man, 4 Wend. 414; Lawton v. Er- quired by the statute. Stewart v,
win, 9 Wend. 233; Cornell v. Barnes, Lee, 3 Cal. 364; United States v.
1 Denio, 35. Morgan, 3 Wash. C. C. 10.
'Musselman v. Com., 7 Pa. St
§ 307.] OFFICIAL BOHDS. 311
the bond without notice or negligence, and in good faith, the
surety will be estopped to allege that he executed the instru-
ment with a reservation or upon a condition in respect of the
filling of such blanks, and this whether the blanks to be filled
have reference to the penalty of the bond, the names of co-
sureties or other matter.'
§ 307. The same subject continued. — An important de-
cision on this point was rendered by the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1874. This was a suit upon the bond of
an internal revenue collector executed by the collector as
principal and by several sureties. One of the sureties pleaded
that when he signed and sealed the bond it was a printed form,
with names, dates and amount of penalty in blank; that he de-
livered it to the collector under an express agreement that the
latter should fill the blank with a penalty of a certain amount
only and procure two other sureties within certain territorial
limits each worth a certain amount, otherwise the bond was to
be null and void and returned to him, and that the collector
fraudulently filled the bond with a greater penalty than that
agreed upon and with two additional sureties, neither of whom
resided within the agreed territorial limits and both of whom
were insolvent. The court decided that the plea was bad and
that the sureties were liable.'
iCity of Chicago v. Gage (1880), was overruled, or, more correctly
95 111. 593. This is a case where speaking, that the old common-law
a printed form of a city treasur- rule upon which the decision in Peo-
er's bond was executed by himself pie v. Oregon is based has been over-
in blank and sent by him to his sure- borne by the application of the doc-
ties, who signed it in blank and re- trine of estoppel in pais. "Where a
turned it to the principal, who some- bond has been executed in blank and
time afterwards took it to the office delivered to the proper official, he
of the corporation counsel, and had may fill in the blank, and the bond
the blanks filled in, when the bond is a good and valid one. Hultz v.
was retui-ned to the city clerk and Com. (Pa.), 3 Grant's Cas. 61. See
presented to and approved by the State v. Pepper, 31 Ind. 76. For con-
common council as the official bond trary decision see United States v.
of said treasurer. The treasurer de- Nelson, 3 Brock. (U,. S.) 64
faulted, suit was brought on the bond 2 Butler v. United States, 31 Wall,
and the sureties entered pleas of non 373. See, also. Dair v. United States,
est factum. The court held that the 6 Wall. 1 ; Drury v. Foster, 3 Wall
sureties were liable, and that the case 34 ; Inhabitants of South Berwick
of The People v. Oregon, 37 111 39, v. Huntress (1865), 53 Ma 89; Stata
312 OFFICIAL BONDS. [§§ 308, 309. -
§ 308. Construction of courts on bonds improperly ap-
proved.— Where a statute does not especially require strict
compliance with its provisions as to the acknowledgment and
execution of ofHcial bonds to render them valid, courts are
very liberal in their construction of the law prescribing the
mode of execution.' The omission of an excise commissioner
to execute an oflBcial bond approved, by the supervisor of the
town does not create a vacancy ; at the utmost, it only fur-
nishes causes for a forfeiture of the office ; a vacancy can be
effected only by a direct proceeding for that purpose.^ Thus
where an excise commissioner failed to procure the approval
of the supervisor to the bond presented and filed by him, and
at a subsequent town meeting, on the supposition that the
failure to have the bond approved \^acated the office, votes
were cast electing another excise commissioner "to fill va-
cancy, if any exist," it was held that the failure of the first
commissioner to have his bond approved did not vacate the
office and that there was no vacancy to fill.'
§ 309. Defective bonds valid as common-law obligations.
It is a well settled rule of law where a defective bond is given
and the officer enters upon and discharges his duties, that the
bond is good as a common-law obligation and the sureties
thereon are liable, unless such rule would be contrary to public
policy or is expressly forbidden by statute.* Thus where the
V. Pepper (1869), 31 Ind. 76, and sCronin u Stoddard, 97 N. Y. 271 ;
cases there cited ; McCormick v. Bay following Fort v. Stiles, 57 N. Y. 399.
City (1871), 23 Mich. 457; State v. ^ United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet.
Peck, 53 Me. 284 ; Bartlett v. Board of 348 ; United States v. Linn, 15 Pet
Education, 59 IlL 364; Mutual &c. 290; Jessup v. United States, 106
Co. V. Wilcox, 8 Biss. 0. C. 197; S. c., U. S. 147; United States v. Rogers,
4 Myer's Fed. Dec, § 635. 28 Fed. Rep. 607 ; Montville v. Haugh-
1 Young V. State, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) ton, 7 Conn. 543 ; State v. Horn, 94
253 ; Boone Co. v. Jones, 54 Iowa, Mo. 162 ; State v. Bartlett, 30 Miss.
699 ; Mendocino Co. v. Morris, 82 Cal. 624 ; Sweetser v. Hay, 2 Gray, 49,
145. For cases where a bond was and cases there cited ; King v. Ire-
held to be vitiated by reason of a de- land, 68 Tex. 682 ; Polk v. Plummer,
fective approval, see O'Marrow v. 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 500 ; Lee v. War-
Port Huron, 47 Mich. 585 ; Crawford ing, 3 Desauss. (S. C.) 57 ; Supervisors
V. Meredith, 6 Ga. 552. v. Cofifenbury, 1 Mich. 355 ; Barnes v.
2 People ex rel. Kelly v. Common Brookman, 107 III. 317; Pritchett v.
Council City of Brooklyn, 77 N. Y. People, 6 111. 525. See, also, Mc-
503. Gowen v. Deyo, 8 Barb. 340 ; Classen
§§ 310, 3H.J OFFICIAL BONDS. 313
board of education of a union free school, incorporated under
a common school act, by mistake and in good faith instead of
taking a bond from one elected as its treasurer, as required by-
said act, accepted a writing in the form of a bond, but not
under seal, the same was held valid and enforcible against
the sureties thereto.^
§ 310. The same subject continaed. — Where the statute
prescribes certain qbligees to whom an official bond is to be
made payable, and a bond is given payable to an obligee other
than the one prescribed by statute, and the bond in other re-
spects complies with the requirements of the statute, it is good
as a common-law bond.* And where parties being under no
legal disability, and capable of making contracts, enter into a
voluntary bond based on a good and valid consideration and
for a lawful purpose, the bond is binding on them at common
law.'
§ 311. Time when an official bond takes effect. — An official
bond resembles a deed in that it takes effect from the date of
V. Shaw, 5 Watte (Pa.), 468; State v. 408; Horn v. Whittier, 6 N. H. 88;
Thompson, 49 Mo. 188; Freeman v. Governor v. Allen, 8 Humph. (Tenn.)
Davis, 7 Mass. 200 ; Burroughs v. 176 ; Van Hook v. Barnett, 4 Dev. L.
Lowder, 8 Mass. 373 ; Howard v. Bro- (N. C.) 268 ; Justices v. Smith, 2 J. J.
gan, 21 Me. 358 ; Rowlett v. Eubank, Marsh. (Ky.) 472.
1 Bush (Ky.), 477 ; Williams v. Shelby, » Archer v. Hart, 5 Fla. 234 It has
2 Oreg. 144. been held that where an officer oc-
1 Board of Education v. Fonda, 77 cupying two oflHcial positions, having
N. Y. 350, distinguishing Hardmann filed a bond for his due and faithful
V. Bowen, 39 N. Y. 196 ; Rounds v. performance of one of them, volun-
Mansfield, 38 Me. 586. See, also, tarily gives a bond for the perform-
Boothbay v. Giles, 68 Me. 160; United ance of the duties of the other posi-
V. Hodsou, 10 Wall. 395; tion, the latter bond is a valid
Thomas v. White, 12 Mass. 369. A common-law obligation, even though
bond without any specified obligee he was not required by statute to
has been held valid as a common- give such a bond. State v. Harney,
law obligation. Fellows v. Gilman, 57 Miss. 863. See, also. Supervisors v.
4 Wend. 414, 419. Coffinbury, 1 Mich. 355 ; People v.
2 United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock. Johr (1871), 22 Mich. 461 ; Platteville
C. C. 115 ; Iredell v. Barbee, 9 Ired. L. v. Hooper, 63 Wis. 381. For contrary
(N. C.) 250 ; Governor v. Humphreys, opinions see State v. Heisey, 56 Iowa,
7 Jones (N. C), 258; Williams v. 404; United States v. Hum'ason, 6
Ehringhaus, 3 Dev. L. (N. C.) 297. Sawyer, 199; State v. Bartlett, 30
See, also, Moore v. Graves, 3 N. H. Miss. 624
314 OFFICIAL BONDS. [§ 312.
delivery thereof.' Thus, it has been held by the Supreme Court
of the United States, that where a bond has been delivered to
the obligee for acceptance and it was accepted afterwards, it
took effect from the date of delivery and not from the accept-
ance thereof.^ The court said : — " A bond may not be a com-
plete contract until accepted by the obligee ; but if it has been
delivered to him to be accepted if he should choose to do so,
that is not a conditional delivery which will postpone the obli-
gor's undertaking to the time q^ its acceptance, but an admis-
sion that the bond is then binding upon him and will be so
from that time if it should be accepted." '
§ 312. Effect of not JSiling bonds within the time pre-
scribed by statute. — The weight of the American authorities
is decidedly in favor of the doctrine that if a statute fixes the
time within which bonds are to be given the provision is di-
rectory and not mandatory ; and that unless it expressly de-
clares that the failure to give the bond by the time prescribed
ipso facto vacates the ofiice, the bond may be given at any
time if no vacancy has been declared.^ And it has been held
1 Johnson v. Harney, 84 N. Y. 363; Wend. 481; People v. Ferguson, 20
Eberhardt v. Wood, 6 Lea (Tenn.). Weekly Dig. (N. Y.) 276 ; Duntley v.
467 ; S. C, 3 Tenn. Ch. 490 ; Bryant Davis, 43 Hun, 229 ; Cronin v. Stod-
V. Wood, 11 Lea (Tenn.), 337. dard, 97 N. Y. 271 ; People v. Crissey,
2 Butler V. United States, 88 U. S. 91 N. Y. 616 ; Marbury v. Madison, 1
373. Cranch, 137; Kearney v. Andrews,
3 See, also. State v. Tool, 4 Ohio St 10 N. J. Eq. 70; Bank v. Dandridge,
558. Where a collector's bond has 13 Wheat 64 ; State v. Churchill, 41
been filed within the time prescribed Mo. 41 ; State v. County Court, 44
by statute, but is not accepted until Mo. 230; Ross v. Williamson, 44 Ga.
the statutory time has elapsed, the 501; Paine on Elections, § 332;
acceptance relates back to the time Sprowl v. Lawrence, 33 Ala. 674 ;
of filing and the bond is valid. Drew State v. Falconer, 44 Ala. 696 ; Smith
V. Morrill, 62 N. H. 23. Where a v. Cronkite, 8 Ind. 134; State v.
statute requires an official bond to Colvig, 15 Oreg. 57 ; State u. Findley,
be given and makes no special pro- 10 Ohio, 51 ; State v. Ring, 29 Minn,
vision for the mode of its delivery, it 78 ; Cawley v. People (1880), 95 111.
has been held that the filing thereof 249. For the effect of the failure of
is a delivery. Sacramento Co. v. a city marshal to give his bond in
Bird, 31 Cal. 66. time, see State v. Porter, 7 Ind. 204.
* Dillon on Munio. Corp. (4th ed.). For city treasurer's bond, see Chicago
§ 314; United States v. Le Baron,' v. Gage (1880), 95 IlL 593; Caskey v.
19 How. 72 ; People v. Holley, 12 Greensborough, 78 Ind. 233.
§§ 313, 314.] OFFICIAL BONDS. 815
where the statute requires an oflBoer to file a bond every year
that his mere failure to do so does not vacate the office.^
§313. The same subject continued. — But the cases are
not unanimous on this point, and in some States it has been
held that the failure to give the bond within the prescribed
time vacates the ofSce, without any proceedings to declare it
vacant ; so tha,t it cannot be restored by any subsequent com-
pliance with the statute.^ Thus in a Texas case ' it was held ,
that a statute requiring an officer to qualify within a certain '
time was directory, only where the delay was caused by some-
thing over which he had no control, and not in case of his
refusal or neglect to qualify.
§ 314. Liability of sureties on a treasurer's bond.— The
sureties on a city treasurer's bond pleaded that by ordinance
it was the duty of the mayor to supervise the conduct of the
treasurer, and, in case of misconduct of the treasurer, to
transmit information to the common council; and that the
mayor was invested with full power to examine all books in
the custody of the treasurer; and that it was the duty of the
common council to examine into the conduct of the treasurer,
and to remove him in case of any violation of his duty ; and
I Clark V. Ennis, 45 N. J. Law, 69. ^Throop on Public Officers, § 173 ;
Where a statute required the master In re Att'y-Gen'l, 14 Fla. 377 : Creigh-
in chancei'y within three weeks after ton v. Com., 83 Ky. 148 ; Falconer
his election to tender his bond for v. Shores, 37 Ark. 386 ; Vaughan v.
approval, and upon its approval to Johnson, 77 Ya. 800 ; Childrey v.
deposit it with the treasurer and sue Eady, 77 Va. 518 ; Owens v. O'Brien,
out his commission, and that " upon 78 Va. 116; State v. Johnson, 100
his failure to do so within the said Ind. 489 ; State v. Matheny, 7 Kan.
time his oflSce shall be deemed ab- 327 ; People v! Perkins, 85 Cal. 509 ;
solutely vacant, and shall be filled by People v. Taylor, 57 Cal. 620 ; State
election or appointment as hereto- v. Hadley, 27 Ind. 496 ; Kilpatrick v.
fore provided," it was held that the Smith, 77 Va, 847 ; Johnson v. Mann,
failure tj comply with this require- 77 Va. 265. See, also, Jackson v.
ment was only cause of forfeiture, Simonton, 4 Cranch C. C. 355 ; Ben-
but not a forfeiture ipso /ac<o. State nett v. State, 58 Miss. 556. For the
V. Toomer, 7 Rich. (Law), 316. See, English rule see Prowse v. Foot, 3
also, State v. Laughton (Nev.), 9 Am. Bro. P. C. 289 ; Anon,, Free. 474
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 79, note ; Sprowl 3 Flatan v. State, 56 Tex. 9a
V. Lawrence, 33 Ala. 674 ; Enottman
V. Ayer, 3 Strob. (S. C.) 92.
316 OFFICIAL BONDS. [§ 315!.
that defendants became sureties, relying on the protection
afPorded them by the faithful discharge of the said duty ; and
that the mayor and the common council refused to perform
such duty, and knowingly suffered the breaches. The court
decided that the duty to discharge the official would arise,
and the non-performance of it be a defense to the sureties,
only after knowledge of the officer's dishonesty was brought
home to the common council; and that ou the averments in
this plea defense was made 0H|the neglect of duty by the
mayor, and his neglect of duty is no defense.^ But a plea by
the sureties on a city treasurer's bond that the city, contriving
and intending to injure defendants, wilfully neglected to ex-
amine the treasurer's accounts annually and otherwise per-
mitted, encouraged and induced and were privy to |he alleged
breaches, is good.^
§ 315. The same subject continued. — A county treasurer's
bond reciting that the treasurer and his sureties are each sev-
1 City of Newark v. Stout, 52 N. J. offered books kept by the, treasurer
Law, 35 ; s. C, 18 Atl. Rep. 943. A which showed parties indebted to
new bond given by a village treas- the city who had in fact paid the
urer at the request of the village treasurer ; also an ordinance provid-
council, and thereafter treated and i ing that the treasurer should keep a
accepted as his official bond, is bind- true account of all moneys received
ing upon him and his sureties, al- by him. Defendants pointed to a
though no formal resolution requir- provision that the city treasurer
ing the bond and no resolution should receive one-sixth of all mon-
approving it were recorded. Evart eys collected by him, and also offered
V. Postal (1891), 86 Mich. 325 ; S. C, the treasurer's books which showed
49 N. W. Rep. 53. Payment by a the amount collected and turned into
city treasurer of a warrant which he the city, and that on this amount the
knows to be illegal out of money set treasurer had received only ten per
apart for the payment of the legal cent. The court decided that the
warrant substituted for that which additional six and two-thirds per
was illegal, thereby exhausting the cent, should have been considered in
fund out of which the former was bar of recovery against the sureties
payable, is a misappropriation of the under a general denial of the corn-
found for which the sureties on his plaint Cityof Butte u Cohen (Mont),
bond are liable. Priet v. De La Mon- 34 Pac. Rep. 206.
tanyo, 85 Cal. 148 ; s. C, 24 Pac. Rep. 2 City of Newark v. Stout, 62 N. J.
612. A complaint alleged that a city Law, 35; s. c, 18 AtL Rep. 943, fol-
treasurer failed to pay over accord- lowing Mayor v. Dickerson, 45 N. J.
ing to law money which came into Law, 38.
bis bands as treasurer. Plaintiff
§ 315.]
OFFICIAL BONDS.
317
erally bound, and that they bind themselves severally, is not
rendered void so as to relieve the sureties from liability by the
failure of the treasurer to execute the bond.' Application of
payments by a public officer is binding on his sureties, and
they cannot escape liability for his failure to pay over money
collected during the term for which they were sureties by
showing that he wrongfully applied such moneys to the pay-
ment of deficiencies occurring during the preceding term.-
1 Douglas County v. Bardon, 79 Wis.
641 ; s. c, 48 N. W. Eep. 969. Op-
posite the signature of each bonds-
man was set the amount for which
he was obligated. Itfthe body of the
instrument, after the part specifying
these amounts, was the phrase, " for
the payment of which, well and truly
to be made, we bind ourselves, our
heirs, ■ representatives, administrators
and assigns, jointly and severally, by
these presents." Compiled Statutes
of Montana, section 631 (Code Civil
Proc), provides that in the construc-
tion of the instrument the intention
of the parties is to be pursued, if pos-
sible, and when a general and par-
ticular provision are inconsistent the
latter is paramount ; and a particular
intent will control a general one that
is Inconsistent with it Section 336
provides that when an agreement has
been intended in a different sense by
the different parties to it, the sense is
to prevail against either party in
which he supposed the other under-
stood it, and, when different con-
structions are equally proper, that is
to be taken which is most favorable
to the party in whose favor the pro-
vision was made. In an action on
the bond the cotnplaint alleged that
" defendants have forfeited the bond
and become and are indebted to
plaintiff in the respective sums set
after their names in said bond."
It was held that the instrument
bound the sureties severally for the
amount only expressly stated as re-
spectively undertaken. City of Butte
V. Cohen (Mont), 24 Pac. Rep. 206.
A bond of a town treasurer comply-
ing with the statute, except that it is
executed to the supervisors of the
town or their successors in office, in-
stead of '• to the town by its name,"
is valid and an action thereon may
be maintained by the town. Platte-
ville V. Hooper, 63 Wis. 381.
^Crawn v. Commonwealth, 84 Va.
282 ; s. C, 10 Am. St Rep. 839. A
city does not, by approving the re-
ports of yie city treasurer from time
to time, estop itself to sue on the
treasurer's bond after the end of his
term, for embezzlement or defalca-
tion prior to such approval. "We
do not think," said the court, " that
the approval by the city of the treas-
urer's reports amounted to an asser-
tion that the treasurer actually held
in his hands the money so appearing
by the reports." Britton v. City of
Fort Worth, 78 Tex. 227, 231 ; s. C, 14
S. W. Rep. 585. Under the Revised
Statutes of Texas, chapter 3, title 78,
article 8791, providing that treasur-
ers of cities having management of
schools shall have the same powers
and perform the same duties as
county treasurers, and article 3728,
providing that county treasurers
shall execute special bonds as school
treasurers, the sureties on the gen-
318 OFFICIAL BONDS. [§ 316.
§ 316. Mingling of and defalcations out of two funds. —
Where the treasurer of a board of education was also the
general manager of a private corporation, and had the con-
trol of its funds as well as of the school funds, and he depos-
ited its funds and the school funds together in a national
bank, in the name of the private corporation, with the knowl-
edge and consent of the officers' of the bank, such funds to be
subject to his control, and to his checks for schools and school
corporation purposes as well as for the private corporation
purposes, it was held that although as manager of the
private corporatfon he drew out the funds in the bank so
as to cause a deficit in the amount of the school funds on
deposit at the time of the execution of a second bond, still, as
more than enough moneys were afterwards deposited by him
as treasurer of the private corporation to liquidate and satisfy
the shortage, such deficit ceased to exist and for a subsequent
defalcation in the school funds the sureties on the second bond
were liable:^ And where a city treasurer was custodian of a
school fund in respect of which the sureties on his official
bond were not liable, and the money received by him was
kept in one mass without any means of determining to which
fund any part of it belonged, and he misappropriated some of
the funds so that it was impossible to say that any sum less
than the whole that was misappropriated belonged to either,
it was presumed in an action upon his official bond that he
embezzled 2, pro rata proportion of each fund.*
eral bond of a city treasurer are not favor the balance is due. Waffle «.
liable for his defalcations out of the Short, 25 Kan. 503 ; Tootle v. Wells,
school fund. Broad v. City of Paris, 89 Kan. 453. And each new item
66 Tex. 119 ; s. C., 18 S. W. Rep. 343. added to the account, in favor of the
' Gilbert v. Board of Education person against whom the balance is
(1890), 45 Kan. 31 ; S. C, 34 Am. & diTe, operates as payment or partial
Eng. Corp. Cas. 399. "In all cases payment of such balance ; and it will
where accounts exist between par- generally operate in payment or par-
ties," said the court, "including tial payment of the oldest item of
bank accounts, a cause of action does the account not yet paid or satisfied,
not exist with reference to each item Shellabarger v. Binns, 18 Kan. 345 ; 1
of the account, but only as to the bal- Morse, Banks, § 355."
ance that may be due to one or the ^Brjtton i,_ 'Wox\, Worth, 78 Tex.
other of the parties ; and it exists in 337 ; s, a, 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
favor only of that party in whose 411.
§§ 317, 318.] OFFICIAL BONDS. 319
§ 317. Liability of sureties as affected by subseauent leg-
islation.— In aYirginiacase^ it was held that the regulations
prescribed by law for the settlement of ofRcers' accounts at
stated intervals being intended for the benefit of the govern-
ment, to secure punctuality and promptness in its oflBcers,
were directory merely and did not enter into and form part
of the .contract of the sureties, so as to prevent the legislature
from altering or'extending the times of settlement at pleasure
without the assent of the sureties ; and therefore, and from
the nature of the officer's obligation and duties, and of the
condition of the bond, such an extension did not operate as a
discharge of the surety. This doctrine was approved in a
case ^ where the surety of a treasurer who had . defaulted to
the State claimed to be discharged of his obligation by the act
of assembly which extended the time of payment by the
debtor and thus enabled him, as was alleged, to default by
postponing the time of the discovery of his delinquencies.'
§ 318. liaMlityof surety when subsequent legislation im-
poses new duties of the same general character. — A public
officer takes his office with the obligation to perform all the
duties incident to or connected with it then existing, or that
may be added by the legislature, provided the nature and
character of the duties remain the same. It is indispensable
to the proper management of public affairs, and serious injury
to the public interest would occur were the rule otherwise.
The obligation is for a faithful performance by the principal
of all the duties of the office during the term of his appoint-
ment, not of duties as they exist at any particular moment.
His duties vary with the requisitions of the statute ; and what-
ever the statute imposes or withdraws becomes or ceases to
1 Commonwealth v. Holmes, 25 regulate the conduct of its own offi-
Gratt 771. cars. They are merely directory to
2 Smith V. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt such ofiScers and constitute no part
780. of the contract of the surety." On
' In the case of United States v. this point see, also, United States v.
Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720, Judge Boyd, 15 Pet. 187-208; United States
Story says these regulations as to v. Van Zandt, 11 Wheat. 184; United
settlements "are provisions of law States v. Nicholl, 12 Wheat 509;
created by the government for its State v. Carleton, 1 Gill, 249.
own security and protection and to
320
OFFICIAL BONDS.
[§ 319.
be a part of his duty. The only limitation to this rule is that
the duties imposed shall be of the same general nature and
character.^
§ 319. The same subject continned. — Mr. Justice Clifford,
in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the TTnited
States, said that " any substantial addition by law to the du-
ties of the obligor of a bond, after the execution of the instru-
ment, materially enlarging his ^abilities, will not impose any
additional responsibility upon his sureties unless the words of
the bond, by a fair and reasonable construction, bring such
subsequently imposed duties within its provisions." ^ In a later
case substantially the same rule was laid down by Judge
Lowell of the United States circuit court.' And in England
it was said by Chief Justice Campbell that " the question is
whether the nature and functions of the ofiBce or employment
are changed ; for if they are, it is not the same office within
1 People V. Villas, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)
253 ; s. c, 36 N. T. 459 ; New York v.
Ryan, 35 How. Pr. 408; Strong v.
TTnited States, 6 Wall 788 ; White v.
Fox, 23 Me. 341 ; Marney v. State, 13
Mo. 7 ; Colter v. Morgan, 13 B. Mon.
278 ; Walker v. Chapman. 33 Ala. 46 ;
Barllett v. Governor, 2 Bibb, 586;
Governor v. Eidgeway, 3 111. 14 ; Cam-
. phor V. People, 13 IlL 290; Graham «.
Washington County, 9 Dana (Ky.),
184 ; Hatch v. Inhabitants of Attle-
borough, 97 Mass. 533. See, also,
Gaussen v. United States, 97 U. S.
584 The imposition by the board of su-
pervisors of a county upon the county
treasurer during his term of office of
the duty of raising, keeping and dis-
bursing large sums of money in ad-
dition to the usual and ordinaiy du-
ties of his office, for instance the
raising and disbursing money during
a war for bounty purposes, does not
discharge the sureties upon his bond
from liability. Board of Supervisors
of Monroe County v. Clarke, 92 N. Y.
391.
2 United States v. Powell, 14 Wall
493, 504, holding, however, that a
distiller's bond for the faithful per-
formance of all the provisions of law
relating to his duties was broad
enough to cover duties subsequently
imposed by law. Farr v. HoUis, 9
Barn. & C. 333. Cf. United States
V. EZirkpatrick, 9 Wheat 730, 738;
United States v. Singer, 15 WaU. Ill ;
People V. Tompkins, 74 111. 483.
3 United States v. McCarney (1880),
1 Fed. Eep. 104, citing Postmaster-
General V. Munger, 3Pain6C. C. 180;
White V. Fox, 32 Ma 341 ; Illinois v.
Rldgway, 13 111. 14 ; Boody v. United
States, 1 Woodb. & M 150 ; Smith v.
Peoria County, 59 111. 412 ; People v.
Vilas, 36 N. Y^ 459, 465 ; Mayor v. Sib-
bems, 3 Abb. App. Cas. 266 ; Bart-
lette V. Governor, 2 Bibb, 586 ; Colter
V. Morgan, 12 B. Mon. 278; Com-
monwealth V. Gabbert, 5 Bush, 438 ;
Marney v. State, 13 Mo. 7; King v.
Nichols, 16 Ohio St 80 ; United States
V. Gaussen, 2 Woods, 92; s. a, £7
U. S. 584 ; United States v. Powell, 14
WalL 493; United States v. Singer.
15 WalL 111.
I 320.]
OFFICIAL BONDS.
821
the meaning of the bond." i Thus where a superintendent of
water-works whose duties were not defined by law gave a
bond for the performance of his duties, inchiding the account-
ing for moneys, and an ordinance was then passed requiring
him to collect water rents, his sureties were not deemed to
guaranty his fidelity in respect of such rents.^
§ 320. Liability of officer on his bond where the loss is
occasioned by the act of God or the public enemy. — It is the
doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States that a
public oflBcer who has given a bond for the faithful perform-
ance of his duties, and the keeping, accounting for and pay-
ing over of the moneys which come to his hands, is relieved
from liability for loss only where it was occasioned by the act
of Grod or the public enemy.' This general rule is affirmed in
many of the State courts,* where it is accordingly held that
'Pybus V. Gibb, 6 EL & B. 903,
which holds that the surety is en-
tirely discharged. See, also, Oswald
V. Mayor of Berwick, 5 H. of L. Cas.
856. But several cases in the United
States enforced the obligation of the
bond in respect of duties imposed by
law at the time it was executed and
declared it void as against the sure-
ties only for the extension. United
States V. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 730 ;
Commonwealth i,\ Holmes, 35 Gratt.
(Va.) 771; Gaussen v. United States,
97 U. S. 584. See, also, Marquette
County V. Ward, 50 Mich. 174.
2 City of Lafayette v. James, -93
Ind. 340; S. C, 43 Am. Rep. 140;
People V. Pennook, 60 N. Y. 431;
Mumfnrd v. Memphis &c. R Co., 3
Lea (Tenn.), 393 ; S. C, 1 Am. Rep.
616; White S. ML Co. v. Mullins, 41
Mich. 339.
5 United States v. Prescott, 3 How.
578, the leading case, where Mr. Jus-
tice McLean does not consider the
law of bailments as applicable to the
case, and places the liability on the
' breach of the express contract, and
fortifies it by considerations of public
31
policy. Bovans v. United States, 13
Wall. 56 ; United States v. Keehler,
9 Wall. 83 ; Boyden v. United States,
13 Wall. 17; United States ii. Dashiel,
4 Wall. 183 ; United States v. Mor-
gan, 11 How. 154; United States v.
Thomas, 15 Wall. 337 ; United States
V. Humason, 6 Sawyer, 199.
* State V. Clarke, 78 N. C. 355, and
United States v. Watts, 1 New Mex.
553, carrying the rule to the uttermost
limits ; Hancock vJ Hazzard, 13 Cush.
113 ; Commonwealth v. Comly, 3 Pa.
St 373 ; New Providence v. McEach-
ron. 33 N. J. Law. 339 ; Board of Edu-
cation V. Jewell, 44 Minn. 437 ; Red-
wood County V. Tower, 38 Minn. 45 ;
County Comm'rs v. Lineberger, 3
Mont 231 ; State v. Harper, 6 Ohio St
607 : State v. Ne vin, 19 Nev. 163 : State
V. Moore, 74 Mo. 418 ; Taylor v. Mor-
ton, 37 Iowa, 550 ; Rock v. Stinger, 36
Ind. 346; Marbecw State, 38 Ind. 86;
Halbert v. State, 33 Ind. 135 ; Clay
County V. Simonsen, 1 Dak. Ter. 403.
See, also. Muzzy v. Shattuck, 1 Denio,
333 ; Union Township v. Smith, 39
Iowa, 9.
322 OFFICIAL BONDS. [§§ 321, 322.
if money is lost by the failure of a bank in which it was de-
posited, the officer and his sureties are liable regardless of peg-
ligenoe.'
§321. The same subject continued. — On the other hand
several State courts of high authority hare arrived at a con-
trary conclusion. Thus, in New York, it was held that there
was no liability on the bond of^ county treasurer for the loss
of money by theft without negligence on his part.*^ In Ala-
bama " the highest amount of care, diligence and vigilance "
is exacted of the officer, but if he is robbed despite great pru-
dence and circumspection, which is a question of fact for the
jury, it constitutes a good defense.' The same rule is declared
in Maine,* South Carolina,* and by implication at least in
Louisiana.*
§332. Duty of obligee to notify sureties of increased
risk, etc. — The question has frequently arisen between pri-
vate corporations and the sureties on the official bonds of
their agents whether the obligee is, bound to communicate to
the guarantor facts which materially increase the risk, such as
the. previous dishonesty or default of the agent. It is de-
clared in Massachusetts that " the creditor owes no duty of
active diligence to take care of the interest of the surety. It
is the business of the surety to see that his principal per-
forms the duty which he has guarantied and not that of the
creditor. . . . Mere inaction of the creditor will not dis-
charge the surety unless it amounts to fraud or conceal-
1 Havens v. Lathene, 75 N. C. 505 ; Faulkner, 107 N. Y. 477, reversing
Lowry v. Polk County, 51 Iowa, 50; S. C, 38 Hun, 607.
Nason «. Poor Directors, 136 Pa. St 'State v. Houston, 78 Ala. 576;
445 ; Hart v. Poor Guardians, 81 Pa. State v. Houston, 83 Ala. 861.
St 466; State v. Powell, 67 Mo. 395; « Cumberland v. Pennell, 69 Me.
Ferley v. Muskegon County, 32 Mich, 357. See, for a qualification of this
183. defense, Monticello v. Lowell, 70 Me.
2 Supervisors v. Dorr, 25 Wend. 437.
440 ; s. G, 7 Hill, 583. And in the same » York County v. Watson, 15 S. C. 1.
State the sureties of a surrogate were * State v. Lanier, 81 La. Ann. 438.
not liable for the loss of money de- See, also. Walker v. British Guardian
posited with a banker in good credit, Ass'n, 18 Q. B. 277 ; S, &, 21 L. J.
who afterwards failed, People v. Q. B. 357.
§ 323.]
OFFICIAL BONDS.
323
ment." ' This is also the rule in lowa,^ Wisconsin,' Illinois,*
Ehode Island,* and New York," but it is opposed to the doc-
trine in England,' New Jersey,' Maine ' and Kentucky."' Ad-
mitting the tortious quality of a neglect to notify the surety
in such cases, it would be difficult to maintain that the sure-
ties on the bond of a public officer are discharged by a fail-
ure to inform them of previous defaults. It was expressly
decided in Minnesota that knowledge by a board of county
commissioners when they accepted a treasurer's bond that the
officer had converted funds during a prior term did not re-
lease the sureties." Nor would the members of the board be
personally liable under the same circumstances.'^
§ 323. Liability of sareties on successive bonds — (a)
Where dift'erent sureties are given on eacli bond. — When
successive bonds with different sureties have been given for
the faithful performance of the duties of the same officer, and
a breach has taken place in the conditions of the bonds in not
accounting for and paying over moneys by him received, con-
1 Watertown F. Ins. Co. v. Simmons,
131 Mass. 85 ; s. c, 41 Am. Eep. 196,
citing Wright v. Simpson, 6 Ves. 714 ;
Adams Bank u Anthony, 18 Pick.
338; Taft v. Giflord, 13 Met 187;
Tapley v. Martin, 116 Mas& 275, and
disapproving Sanderson v. Aston, L.
R. 8 Ex. 73; 4 Eng. Eep. 453. See,
also, Amherst Bank v. Boot, 2 Met
533 ; Locke v. United States, 3 Mason,
446; McKecknie v. Ward, 58 N. Y.
541. Of. Graves v. Lebanon Nat
Bank, 10 Bush (Ky.), 33; S. C, 19
Am. Rep. 50, where the directors of
a bank published a statement show-
ing its affairs to be in good condition
when by reasonable diligence they
would have discovered that the cash-
iet was a defaulter. This was held to
discharge one who became a surety
of the cashier upon the faith of their
statement
2 Home Ins. Ca V. Holway, 65
Iowa, 571.
s ^tna Ins. Co. v. Mabbett, 18 Wis.
667. '
* Roper V. Trustees &c., 91 111. 518.
See, also. Ham v. Grove, 34 Ind. 18.
5 Atlas Bank v. Brownell, 9 R. L 168.
* Bostwick V. Van Voorhis, 91 N.
Y. 353.
'Phillips i;. Foxhall, L. R. 7 Q. B.
666; Enright v. Falvey, 4 L. R. Ir.
397 ; Sanderson v. Aston, L. R. 8 Ex.
73.
8 State V. Lovey, 39 N. J. Law, 135.
'' Franklin Bank v. Cooper, 36 Me,
179, 197.
Id Groves v. Lebanon Nat Bank, 10
Bush (Ky.), 23. See, also, Charlotte
&c. Co. u Gow, 59 Ga. 685.
11 " If the bond was sufficient it was
their duty to accept it" Pine
County V. Willard (1888), 39 Minn.
125; s. c, 39 N. W. Rep. 71."
i-Held V. Bagwell, 58 Iowa, 139,
holding, as intimated in the case last
cited, that the duty of approving
bonds is purely public.
324: OFFICIAL BONDS. [§ 324.
siderable difficulty may be experienced in determining upon
which bond and its sureties the liability shall fall. With re-
spect to the general principle applicable to such cases there is
no great contrariety of opinion ; but in the application of those
principles to existing cases considerable judicial dissension has
been manifested. There is no doubt that an official bond may
be so drawn as to render the sureties answerable for the past
as well as for the future derelictions of their principal. Thus
if the condition of a bond is that the officer shall pay all sums
of money which he has received, and all which he shall here-
after receive, this language will impose on the sureties the lia-
bility for past as well as for future defaults.*
§324. The same subject contiuned. — In other words, it
may be said that the sureties of an officer are answerable only
for those acts or defaults of their principal which occur sub-
sequently to the execution of his official bond. So, if after an
official bond has been given a further bond is executed for
any reason for the same officer, the sureties on this last bond
are answerable only for such moneys as may be received by
their principal after its execution.^ The defaults of a prior
term are not chargeable against the sureties on an official
bond for a subsequent term.'
1 Saunders v. Taylor, 9 Bam. & C. HL App. 77 ; Stem u People, 96 IlL
35. But the construction of all ofS- 475.
cial bonds, in the absence of express 2 Bessinger v. Dickerson, 20 Iowa,
provision to the contrary, is prospect- 360 ; Thompson v. Dickerson, 23
ive rather than retrospective. If the Iowa, 360.
principal in the bond has received SBissell v. Sexton. 77 N. Y. 191;
moneys, prior to its execution, Patterson v. Inhabitants &c. of Free-
whether before or after his appoint- hold, 38 N. J. Law, 355 ; Streets Lau-
ment to the office, the bond will not refas, 5 Rich. Eq. 237 ; Hewitt?;. State,
be construed as having regard to 6 Har. & J. 95 ; s. a, 14 Am. Dec.
such moneys ; and his default in not 859 ; Rochester v. Randall, 105 Mass.
properly accounting for them will 395 ; s. c, 8 Am. Rep. 519. The sure-
not be regarded as a breach of such ties upon the last bond should be
bond. United States v. Boyd, 15 Pet treated precisely as if their principal
187 ; United States v. Giles, 9 Cranch, had not been the incumbent of the
213 ; Governor v. Gibson, 14 Ala. 336 ; office during the preceding term. Pa-
Sebastian V. Bryan, 31 Ark. 447 ; Jef- ducah v. Cully, 9 Bush, 333 ; City of
ferson v. Johnson, 18 N. J. Law, 382 ; Detroit u Weber, 39 Mich. 24 ; Vivian
Myers v. United States, 1 McLean, i-. Otis, 24 Wis. 518; S. C, 1 Am. Rep.
493; Mclntyre v. School Trustees, 3 199. For cases where the svweties
§§ 325, 326.] OFFICIAL bonds. 325
§ 325. (b) Where funds received by the officer during his
first term remain in his hands during his second term. —
If, however, the moneys ■which have been collected during the
first term of ofBce remain in the custody of the oflScer when
he enters upon the discharge of his duties for the second term,
the sureties for the latter term immediately become answer-
able therefor, and those of the former term are relieved from
further liability.^ It is sometimes the duty of an officer, not-
withstanding the expiration of his official term, to proceed to
complete some matter which has devolved upon him officially.
In that event his sureties remain liable for his acts done after ^
the termination of his office. Thus if a sheriff has levied a
writ, it will be his duty to proceed to advertise. And if a
public administrator, or one who from his official position is
charged with the administration of the estates of decedents,
has had committed to him the administration of a particular
estate, it is his duty to proceed to the completion of such ad-
ministration, though the period for which he was elected has
expired. In either case the officer may be re-elected and
enter upon the discharge of his duties for a second term, but
if he does so the sureties on the first term are answerable for
his defaults.*
§ 336. (c) When the sureties of the first term are liable
for money converted or collected by the officer during his
second term. — The proper test in such cases seems to be to
inquire whether the officer had so far entered upon the execu-
tion of a writ before his first term expired that it would have
•were held not liable for moneys 304; Morley v. Town of Metamora,
which either in fact or in contem- 78 111. 394; S. C, 20 Am. Eep. 266.
plation of law came into his posses- ^ People v. T§n Eyck, 13 Wend. 448 ;
sion during the term subsequent to Tyler v. Nelson's Adm'r, 14 Gratt.
that for which they became his sure- 214 ; Dobney's Adm'r v. Smith, 5
fiss, see Bryan v. United States, 1 Leigh, 13; State v. Watts, 23 Ark.
Black, 140 ; Tyler v. Nelson, 14 Gratt 304. In Tennessee it has been held
214; Hewitt v. State, 6 Har. & J. 95 ; that if the sherifiE, after collecting a
a c, 14 Am. Dec. 259. portion of the county taxes, is re-
1 Board of Education v. Fonda, 77 quired to give a new bond and does
N. Y. 350 ; De Hart v. McGuire, 10 so, his sureties on such new bond are
Phila. 359 ; Moore v. Madison Co., 38 liable for the moneys collected be-
Ala. 670; State v. Van Pelt, 1 Ind. fore its execution. Miller «. Moore, 3
Humph. 189.
326 OFFICIAL BONDS. [§ 327.
been his diity to continue in the execution of such writ, even
if he had not been re-elected. Where this is the case the sure-
ties for the first term have in many States been held liable.'
On the other hand it has been held in some States that the
liability of the sureties attaches upon the receipt of the writ,
whether anything is done under it during the term or not.'*
In Missouri and Alabama the rule is that those who were sure-
ties at the actual time of the conversion are liable, though the
oflBcer began to serve the writ during his prior term of office.'
§ 337. (d) When an oificer before entering on his second
term makes a report to or settlement with the proper au-
thorities.— It has been held in many States that where an
officer who is about to enter upon the discharge of his duties
for a second term makes a report to or a settlement with the
proper authorities, from which it appears that he has on hand
at the close of his first term a certain sum of money, such
settlement is conclusive upon his sureties for the second term
as well as upon himself if the officers with whom the settle-
ment is made act in good faith and have no knowledge that
the sum of money which he reports is not actually in his
hands.* On the other hand, it has been held that an official
bond is not retrospective ; that the sureties thereto are only
bound for the public money in the hands of the officer when
the bond was executed and for that which subsequently came
1 Larned v. Allen, 13 Mass. 395 ; v. McCormaok, 50 Mo. 568 ; Governor
Tyree v. Wilson, 9 Gratt 59 ; Low v. v. Bobbins, 7 Ala. 79 ; Dumas v. Pat-
Oobb, 8 Sneed, 18 ; Hill v. Fitzpatrick, terson, 9 Ala. 484.
6 Ala. 314 ; Sidner v. Alexander, 31 * State v. Gramtnier, 29 Ind 551 ;
.Ohio St 378. Where a writ is re- Morley u Town of Metaniora, 78 111.
oeived by a public officer during the 394; s. C, 20 Am. Rep. 266; Baker v.
first term and remains in his hands Preston, 1 Gilmer, 235 ; Roper v. San-
whoUy unexecuted until he enters gamon Lodge, 91 111. 518; s. C, 33
upon the duties of the office for the Am. Rep. 60. The reasoning on this
second term, the sureties for the last subject has been more forcibly stated
term are liable for his neglect to ex- by the Supreme Court of Iowa than
ecute it, or to pay over the moneys elsewhere in deciding the case of
which may be received under it. Bobne County v. Jones, 54 Iowa,
State V. Roberts, 13 N. J. Law, 114. 699; s. C, 37. Am. Rep. 239. As
2 Robey w Turney, 8 Gill &J. 125; against the officer himself, his re-
McCormick v. Moss, 41 III. 353. ports are conclusive. State v. Hutch-
'Wa/rren v. State, 11 Mo. 583; In- inson, 60 Iowa, 478.
gram v. McCombs, 17 Mo. 558 ; State
§ 328.]
OFFICIAL BONDS.
327
into his possession, and cannot be held for past derelictions of
duty by their principal.'
§ 328. The same subject continaed. — If a public officer,
such, for instance, as a receiver of public moneys, gives re-
ceipts for moneys which he has not in fact received, whereby
a fraud is perpetrated on the United States, his sureties at the
time are doubtless estopped from denying that he received
such money .^ But where the sureties for a subsequent term
are pursued a different question arises. The weight of author-
ities favors the rule that the sureties of a public officer are
not estopped by reports made by their principal during or at
the close of the preceding term.'
1 Mahaska County v. Ingalls, 16
Iowa, 81 ; Bessinger v. Dickerson. 20
Iowa, 261 ; Warren County v. Ward,
21 Iowa, 84; School District v. Mo-
Donald, 39 Iowa, 464. Where- at the
time of settlement by a county treas-
urer the board of supervisors did not
in fact insist on the production of the
moneys -which his account showed
to be on hand, but permitted him to
make an apparent showing with
checks and certificates of deposit
which they knew to be either spuri-
ous or worthless, it was held that the
sureties on his bond for the second
term were not estopped by such set-
tlement, and could be relieved fi-om
liability by showing the real amount
which their principal had on hand
at the end of his former term of
office. Webster County v. Hutchin-
son, 60 Iowa, 721.
2 United States v. Girault, 11 How.
22.
3Bi8sell V. Saxton, 66 N. Y. 55;
Mann v. Yazoo City, 31 Miss. 574 ;
Broad v. City of Paris, 66 Tex. 119;
State V. Newton, 33 Ark. 376 ; State
V. Ehoades. 6 Nev. 353; Vivian v.
Otis, 24 Wip. 518 ; s. c, 1 Am. Rep.
199. The leading case on this subject
is that of United States v. Boyd| 5
How. 29, in which the court said : —
"It has been contended that the re-
turns of the receiver to the treasury
department after the execution of the
bond, which admit the money to be
then in his hands to the amount
claimed, should be conclusive upon
the sureties. We do not think so. The
accounts rendered to the department
of money received properly authenti-
cated are evidence in the first in-
stance of the indebtedness of the offi-
cer against the sureties, but subject
to explanation and contradiction.
They are responsible for all the pub-
lic moneys which were in his hands
at the date of the bond, or that may
have come into them afterwards, and
not properly accounted for, but not
for moneys which the officer may
choose falsely to admit in his hands
in his accounts with the government.
The sureties cannot be concluded by
fabricated accounts of their princi-
pal with his creditors ; they may
always inquire into the reality and
truth of the transactions existing be-
tween them. The principle has been
asserted and applied by this court in
several cases."
328 • OFFICIAL BONDS. [§§329, 330.
§ 329. (e) Where the officer applies money received in his
second term to pay deficiencies in his first term.— The
right of an officer to direct the application of payments made
by him seems now to be as well established as that of a pri-
vate individual, though in directing such application he may
in effect, take moneys which he has collected during his second
term, and with them satisfy the deficiency which existed at
the close of the former term, and thus shift the responsibility
for such deficiency from the sureities of his first term to those
of the second.! ijij^g reasoning sustaining these decisions is that
the sureties of the second term are responsible for any mis-
appropriation of the moneys collected during that term, and
the taking of such moneys, and with them paying a deficiency
existing during a preceding term, is as much a misappropria-
tion as though they were taken and used in payment of a
private debt of the principal, or for any other purpose to
which he had no right to apply them.''
§ 330. (b) Where the bond is given for a term of office or
a certain period of time. — The American doctrine seems to
be that where persons have become sureties on an official
bond for a stated period of time or during a particular term
of office, their liability cannot be continued indefinitely by
reason of the failure of the successor of their principal to
qualify. And it makes no difference whether their principal
1 Stone V. Seymour, 15 Wend. 19 ; from which the moneys were ob-
Kgremont v. Benjamin, 125 Mass. 15 ; tained, and the application of them
Lyndon v. Miller, 36 Vt 339 ; Attorr which ouRht in justice and equity to
ney-General v. Manderson, 13 Jur. be made, they are not at liberty to
383 ; Williams v. Bawlinson, 10 Moore, make an application which will di-
371 ; State v. Smith, 26 Mo. 336 ; s. a, vert the moneys from the discharge
72 Am. Dec. 204 ; State v. Smith, 33 of the obligation to which they ought
Mo. 524 ; State v. Hayes, 7 La. Ann. to be applied. Hence if such officers
131 ; State v. Powers, 40 La. Ann. 334 ; know that moneys have been col-
S. C, 8 Am, St Rep. 523 ; Colerain v. leoted by an official during his pres-
Bell, 9 Mpt. 499 : Gwynne v. Burnell, ent term of office, and he does not
7 Clark & F. 573 ; s. c, 3 Bing. N. C. direct their application, they are not
7; Chapman' v. Common wealth, 35 at liberty to apply them to the satis-
Gratt 721. faction of a balance due from him
sWhere a public official pays money for some preceding term. Porter v.
without any direction respecting its Stanley, 47 Me. 515 ; Boring v. Will-
application and the officers to whom iams, 17 Ala. 510.
the payment is made know the source
§§ 331, 332.] OFFICIAL BONDS. 329
is re-eloQted, or some other person is chosen in his stead, new-
bonds must be given. The liability of the sureties will not
terminate immediately upon the expiration of the official term,
but if no officer qualifies within a reasonable time they will
be discharged from all further responsibility, although their
principal may in fact continue in the discharge of the duties
of the office.^ When the office is in fact annual, although not
so recited in the bond, still the bond only covers the official
acts of the year for which it was given.'
§ 331. Laches or negligence of other oflScers or principal.
Sureties on official bonds cannot set up laches or omissions of
other officers of the State as a ground of discharge of their
own liability, nor is the ineligibility or disqualification of their
principal any defense to an action against them on his bond.'
And it has been held that even if the government is guilty of
negligence, or the principal has committed fraud, the surety is
not discharged by reason thereof.*
§ 332. Liability of sureties where additional bonds are
giyen. — Where a bond given by an official is regarded as in-
adequate in amount, he is sometimes required to give an " ad-
ditional bond " in such further amount as may be required by
1 United States v. Kirkpatriok, 9 stock, 2 N. R. 175 ; Liverpool Water-
Wheat 720 ; Kingston &c. Ins. Co. works v. Atkinson, 6 East, 507 ; Ar-
V. Clark, 33 Barb. 196 ; Mayor &c. v. lington v. Merricks, 2 Sauud. 411.
Crowell, 40 N. J. Law, 207 ; S. C, 29 ' gtate v. Hayes, 7 La. Ann. 118
Am. Rep. 324 ; Welch v. Seymour, 28 Duncan v. State, 7 La. Ann. .377
Conn. 387 ; Bigelow v. Bridge, 8 Mass. State v. Dunn, 11 La. Ann. 549
375 ; Rang v. Governor, 4 Blackf . 2 ; Mayor v. Merritt, 37 La. Ann. 568
Mutual L. & B. Ass'n v. Price, 16 Board of School Directors w Brown,
Fla. 204 ; S. C, 26 Am. Rep. 703 ; 83 La. Ann. 383 ; State v. Blohn, 26
Dover v. TwombJy, 42 N. H. 59 ; La. Ann. 538 ; Board v. Judice, 39 La.
Commonwealth v. Fairfax, 4 Hen. & Ann. 896 ; State v. Powell, 40 La.
M. 308 ; County of Wapello v. Big- Ann. 334 ; S. C, 8 Am. St Rep. 523.
ham, 10 Iowa, 39 ; S. C, 74 Am. Deo. The case of Mayor v. Blache, 6 La.
370 ; Moss v. State, 10 Mo. 338 ; s. C, 500, learnedly and scientifically dis-
74 Am. Dec. 116 ; State v. Crooks, 7 poses of the defense of error based
Ohio, part 2, 221 ; Riddell v. School on concealment or failure to give
Dist, 15 Kan. 168 ; Chelmsford v. notice of prior defalcation.
Demerest, 7 Gray, 1. * Osborn v. United States, 86 U. S.
2 Peppin V. Cooper, 2 Barn. & Aid. 577 ; Ryan v. United States, 86 U. S.
431 ; Hassell v. Long, 3 Moore & 8. 514.
863; Wardens of St Saviours v. Bo-
330 OFFICIAL BONDS. [§ 333.
competent authority. The ^sureties on the additional bond
are not liable for any defaleation oommirtted by their principal
prior to its date, nor are the sureties on the prior bond given
by hira released from liability for any of his defalcations,
past or future.* Both bonds become concurrent securities that
the principal will faithfully perform his duties after the giving
of the last bond. But it must not be understood that the
term " additional bond " indicates that it is a bond which can
be resorted to only after the remedies against the other bond
have been exhausted, for on the contrary the liability of the
sureties on the two bonds is the same regarding acts commit-
ted after the signing of the last bond, as if they had become
sureties at the same time and by the same bond.*
§ 333. Liability of surety where the official occupies two
or more offices. — When one person at the same time occupies
two or more ofSces, they should be treated, as far as possible,
as though they were occupied by different persons. The re-
sult is, that a default in one office cannot be charged against
the sureties on the official bond of the officer as the incum-
bent of the other office.' Thus where a sheriff is ex officio tax
collector, but the offices are separate and distinct, separate
bonds being given for each, the sureties on his bond as col-
lector are not liable for acts committed by him as sheriff, nor
can they take advantage of the statutory time within which
actions must be brought upon a sheriff's bond.* But where a
1 Postmaster-General v. Hunger, 2 Mo. 539; S. C, 68 Mo. 454; Jones v.
Paine. 189; Sebastian v. Bryan, 31 Blanton, 6 Ired. Eq. 120; Allen v.
Ark. 547. If moneys collected be- State, 61 Ind. 368 ; S. c, 28 Am. Eep.
fore the additional bond was exe- 673.
cuted are afterwards converted by 'People w. Edwards, 9 Cal. 886. It
the principal, the sureties on both has been held that wliere a clerk of
the original and the additional bond the court is appointed receiver in a
are liable. Governor u Eobins, 7 suit being can-ied on therein, the
Ala. 79; Dumas v. Patterson, 9 Ala. sureties on his official bond are not
484. liable for acts committed by him in
2 Jones V. . Hays, 3 Ired. Eq. 502 ; the course of receivership. Watei-s v.
s. c, 44 Am. Deo. 78 ; Hutchcraft v. Carroll, 9 Yerg. 102 ; State v. Odom,
Shrout's lieirs, 17 B. Mon. 26 ; S. C, 86 N. C. 432 ; Syme v. Bunting, 91
15 Am. -Dec. 100; United -States v. N. C. 48.
Hoyt, 1 Blatchf. 836 ; State v. Watts, < People v. Burkhart, 76 Cal. 606.
23 Ark. 304; State v. Sappington, 67
§ 334.]
OFFICIAL BONDS.
331
person holds two offices, one of them ex afficio^ and they are
so closely connected that only one bond is given for both, his
sureties are liable for an act committed in both offices, al-
though only one may be named in the bond.^
. § 334. Liability of surety for unofficial acts of officers. —
It is of course contemplated by the sureties of an official bond
in incurring their liability that the acts of the officer for
which they bind themselves shall be of an official character.
That is to say, these acts must be such as the law imposes,
upon the incumbent of the office which their principal has
assumed. As a natural consequence it flows from this consid-
eration that the sureties are liable only for the official acts of
their principal.^ Thus where money was paid to a notary
public to be applied by him in canceling a mortgage, his sure-
ties were not held liable for his defalcation, as the receipt of
money for such a purpose was not among the official duties
pf a notary public' And in a CaUfornia case where a city
ceasing to be liable as tax collector.
The court decided, however, that
there was and found for the plaintiff.
2 United States v. Adams, 34 Fed.
Rep. 348 ; People v. Lucas, 93 N. Y.
585 ; Ward v. Stahl, 81 N. Y. 406 ;
People V. Pennock, 60 N. Y. 431;
Governor v. Perrine, 33 ^a. 807;
State V. Bean, 76 N. C. 78; State u
Long, 8 Ired. (N. C.) 415 ; Cotton v.
Atkinson, 53 Ark. 98; Bowers v.
Fleming, 67 Ind. 541 ; Scott v. State,
46 Iowa, 203 ; vWright v. Harris, 81
Iowa, 373 ; Morgan v. Long, 29 Iowa,
434 ; Bessmger v. Dickinson, 30 Iowa,
360; Sample v. Davis, 4 Greene, 117;
Coleman v. Ormond, 60 Ala. 338 ; San
Jose V. Welch, 63 Cal. 358; Hill v.
Kemble, 9 Cal. 71 ; Lescouzeve v.
Ducatel, 18 La. Ann. 470; State v.
Bonner, 73 Mo. 387 ; Watson v. Smith,
36 Pa. St 395 ; Hale v. Commissioners,
8 Pa. St. 415 ; State v. White, 10 Rich.
Law (S. C), 443; State v. Conover, 38
N. J. Law, 334.
« Lescouzeve v. Ducatel, 18 La.
Ann. 470.
1 Van Valkenburgh v. Patterson, 47
N. J. Law. 146 ; People v. Stewart, 0
111. App. 63; Satterfield v. People, 104
UL 448. In the ca.se of Butte County
V. Morgan, 76 Cal. 1, it was shown
that the defendant at the same time
held the oflBces of tax collector an d
treasurer of the same county, and
that in his capacity of tax collector
he made a settlement with the county
auditor in vyhich they agreed upon
the amounts then due to the county,
and the auditor thereupon gave a
certificate which stated that " Will-
iam J. Morgan, tax collector, has
this day the amount as given below,
to be paid into the county treasury."
The. auditor handed the certificate to
Morgan, who took it away with him,
and the auditor credited the tax col-
lector with the amounf; as paid, and
charged the treasurer with it. Suit
was brought against the sureties of
JMorgan as treasurer, and they set up
the defense that there was no evi-
dence to show that Morgan had be-
come answerable as treasurer by
332 OFFICIAL BONDS, [§§ 335, 336,
assessor collected taxes without statutory or other authority
to make such collections, it was decided that his sureties
could not be held.'
§ 335. The same subject continued — In several States it
has been held that the sureties of a constable are not liable
for his default in failing to account for moneys collected by
him, when the claims were placed in his hands for collection
in a personal and not in an official* capacity.'' And a similar
doctrine has been applied in Tennessee to the liability of the
sureties of a sheriff.' So, also, the sureties of a sheriff are not
liable for his failure to protect a person from an attack of a
mob.* Where the sheriff of a Maine county served a writ
without lawful authority to do so, no liability was thereby
imposed upon his sureties." It is to be noted, however, that
when the act is done under color of office, the sureties may
be held liable even for an unauthorized and illegal act of the
officer; as in the case of a Massachusetts constable who
seized goods under color of a process which he had no legal
power to execute, and his sureties were notwithstanding held
to be liable on the ground that although he had no sufficient
warrant for taking them, he was still responsible to third
parties because such taking was a breach of his official duty.'
§ 336. Liability of sureties for acts done under color of
office. — There are many acts which, although illegal, are yet
performed under color of office, and are therefore official acts.
For these acts the sureties on official bonds are of course lia-
ble. This question frequently arises where the officer seizes
under an execution or a writ of attachment or other similar
process the property of a person other than the defendant in
iSan Jos6u Welch, 65 Cal. 358. A expressly affirmed' but is strongly im-
simllar doctrine obtains in the case of plied.
private corporations. Thus the sure- 2 Bogart v. Green, 8 Mo. 115 ; Crit-
ties of an assistant clerk in a bank tenden v. Terrill, 3 Head (Tenn.), 588.
are not liable for his default as book- ' Haynes v. Bridge, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.)
keeper. Manufacturers' Nat Bank v. 33.
Dickerson, 41 N. J. Law, 448 ; S. C, 33 * South v. Maryland, 18 How. 396.
Am. Eep. 337 ; Rollstone Nat. Bank ' Dane v. Gillmore, 51 Ma 544
V. Carleton, 186 Mass. 226. In the last «City of Lowell v. Parker, 10 Met
cited case the doctrine stated is not 309.
§ 337.] OFFICIAL BONDS. 333
the action. The question whether under these circumstances
the sureties on the bond of the officer are liable for his act
has been difiPerently decided in different States. In the
Supreme Court of the United States and in the courts of most
of the States it is now well settled that the act is an official
act, as done under color of office, and that the sureties on the
bond are therefore liable.' The law on this subject was laid
down and the authorities collated in an able and exhaustive
opinion by Mr. Justice Gray in a recent case in the Supreme
Court of the United States, which is quoted in the succeeding
sections.^
§ 337. The same subject continued — Lammon t. Fen-
sier — The doctrine of the Supreme Court. — "The marshal
in serving a writ of attachment on mesne process which directs
him to take the property of a particular person acts officially.
His official duty is to take the property of that person and of
that person only, and to take any such property of his as is
subject to be attached, and not property exempt' by law from
attachment. A neglect to take the attachable property of
that person and a taking upon the writ of the property of an-
other person or of property exempt from attachment are
equally breaches of his official duty. The taking of the at-
tachable property of the person named in the writ is rightful;
the taking of the property of another person is wrongful ; but
each being done bj'^ the marshal in executing the writ in his
hands is an attempt to perform his official duty and is an offi-
cial act. A person other than the defendant named in the
writ whose property is wrongfully taken may indeed sue the
marshal like any other wrong-doer in an action of trespass to
recover damages for the wrongful taking, and neither the offi-
cial character of the marshal nor the writ of attachment af-
fords him any defense to such an action." But the remedy of
a person whose property is wrongfully taken by the marshal
in officially executing his writ is not limited to an action
1 Lammon v. Fensier, 111 U. S. 17; Gratt 134. And see other cases cited
Cormack v. Commonwealth, 5 Binn. in the succeeding sections.
(Pa.) 184; Archer v. Noble, 3 Greenl. SLamnion v. Fensier, 111 U. S. 17.
(Me.) 418 ; Harris v. Hanson, 3 Fair. ^ Citing Day v. Gallup, 3 Wall. 97 ;
(Me.) 343 ; Tracy v. Goodwin, 5 Allen, Buck v. Colbath, 8 Wall 334.
409 ; Sangester v. Commonwealth, 17
334 OFFICIAL BONDS. [§ 338.
against him personally. His official bond is not made to the
person on whose behalf the writ is issued nor to any other in-
dividual, but to the government for the indemnity of all per-
sons injured by the official misconduct of himself or his depu-
ties,' and his bond may be put in court by and for the benefit
of any such person."
§ 338. The same subject continned. — " Where a marshal
upon a writ of attachment on mesne process takes property
of a person not named in the writ the property is in his offi-
cial custody and under the control of the court whose officer
he is and whose writ he is executing, and according to the de-
cisions of this court the rightful owner cannot maintain an
action of replevin against him nor recover the property spe-
cifically in any way except in the court from which the writ is-
sued.'' The principles upon which those decisions are founded
are as declared by Mr. Justice Miller in Buck v. Colbath,' above
cited, that whenever property has been seized by an officer of
the court by virtue of its process the property is to be consid-
ered as in the custody of the court, and under its control for
the time being ; and that no other court has a right to inter-
fere with that possession unless it be some court which may
have a direct "supervisory control over the court whose process
has first taken possession or some superior jurisdiction in the
premises. Because the law had been so settled by this court
the plaintiff in the case failed to maintain replevin in the
courts of the StatS of Nevada against the marshal for the very
taking whiqh is the ground of this action.* For these reasons
the court is of opinion that the taking of goods upon a writ
of attachment into the custody of the marshal as the officer
of the court that issues the writ is, whether the goods are the
propeHy of the defendant in the writ or of any other person,
an official act, and therefore, if wrongful, a breach of the bond
given by the marshal for the faithful performance of the
duties of his office."
1 Citing United States v. Moore, 2 > 3 Wall. 341.
Brock. C. C. 317. * Citing Fensier v. Lammon, 6 Nev,
2 Citing Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 109,
450; Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S.
276.
i§ 339, 340.]
OFFICIAL BONDS.
335
§ 339. The same subject continued — The doctrine of the
State courts. — " Upon the analogous question whether the
sureties upon the official bond of a sheriff, a coroner or a con-
stable are responsible foT his taking upon a writ directing him
to take the property of one person the property of another,
there has been some difference of opinion in the courts of the
several States. The view that the sureties are not liable in
such a case has been maintained by the Supreme Courts of
l^ew York, New Jersey, North Carolina and Wisconsin, and
perhaps receives some support from decisions in Alabama,
Mississippi and Indiana." '
§ 340. The same subject continued.— Mr, Justice Gray
continues : — " And the liability of the sureties in such causes
has been affirmed by a great preponderance of authority, in-
cluding decisions in the highest courts of Pennsylvania, Maine,
Massachusetts, Ohio, Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri. Iowa, Ne-
braska, Texas and California and in the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia." ^ In State v. Jennings ' Chief Jus-
1 Citing Eoc parte Reed, 4 Hill, 573 ;
People V. Schuyler, 5 Barb. 166; State
V. Conover, 4 Dutch. 224; State v.
Long, 8 Ired. Law (N. C), 415; State
V. Brown, 11 Ired. Law (N. C), 141 ;
Gerber v. Ackley, 32 Wis. 333 ; Gov-
ernor V. Hancock, 2 Ala, 738 ; McEl-
haney v. Gilleland, 30 Ala. 183;
Brown v. Moseley, 11 Sm. & Marsh.
(Miss.) 854 ; Jenkins v. Lemonds, 29
Ind. 294; Carey v. State, 34 Ind. 105.
"But," continues the opinion, "in
People V. Schuyler, 4 N. Y. 178, the
judgment in 5 Barb. 166, was re-
versed and the case of Ex parte Reed,
4 Hill, 572, overruled by the Biajority
of the New York Court of Appeals
with the concurrence of Chief Jus-
tice Bronson, who had taken part in
■deciding Reed's case. The final de-
cision in People v. Schuyler, 4 N. Y.
173, has been since treated by the
Court of Appeals as settling the law
upon this point Mayor &o. of New
York V. Sibberns, 8 Abb. App. Dec.
366 ; s. c, 7 Daly, 436 ; Cummings v.
Brown, 43 N. Y. 514; People v. Corn-
stock, 93 N. Y. 585." In addition to
the State courts mentioned by the
learned justice as holding that the
sureties are not liable under the cir-
cumstances under consideration may
be mentioned the Supreme Court of
Maryland. State v. Brown, 54 Md.
318. It is also to be noted that State
V. Dnily, 3 Ind. 431, is in conflict
with Jenkins v. Lemonds, 29i Ind, 394,
the former case aflSrming the liabil-
ity of the sureties under the circum-
stances considered.
2 Citing Cormack v. Common-
wealth, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 184 ; Bennett v.
McKee, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 513; Archer
V. Noble. 3 Greenl. 418; Harris v.
Hanson, 3 Fairf. (Me.) 343; Green-
field o. Wilson, 13 Gray, 384 ; Tracy
»4 0hioSt. 41&
336 OFFICIAL BONDS. [§ 341.
tice Thurman said : — " The authorities seem to lis quite con-
clusive that the seizure of the goods of A. under color of
process against B. is official misconduct in the official making
of the seizure and is a breach of the condition of his official
bond where that is that he will faithfully perform the duties
of his office. The reason for this is that the trespass is not
the act of a mere individual, but is perpetrated colore officii.
If an officer under color of &fi.fa. seizes property of the debtor
which is exempt from executio^ no one, I imagine, would
deny that he had broken the condition of his bond. Why
should the law be different if under color of the same process he
takes the goods of a third person? If the exemption of the
goods from the execution in the one case makes the seizure
official misconduct, why should it not have the same effect in
the other? True, it may sometimes be more difficult to ascer-
tain the ownership of the goods than to know whether a par-
ticular piece of property is exempt from execution ; but this
is not always the case, and if it were it would not justify us
in restricting to litigants the indemnity afforded by the official
bond, thus leaving the rest of the community with no other
indemnity against official misconduct than the responsibihty
of the officer might furnish."
§ 341. Illustrations of the doctrine. — In some cases where
the officer or agent had the legal right and authority to receive
the money in respect to which he defaulted, he did not re-
ceive the funds according to the manner prescribed b}"^ stat-
ute. Thus in North Carolina a judgment debtor paid a sheriff
before the issue of execution a sum of money to be applied in
V. Goodwin, 5 Allen, 409 ; Sangester Mr. Justice Gray. Jefferson v. Harlr
V. Commonwealth, 17 Gratt 134; ley (Ga.). 9 S. E. Rep. 174; Jones w.
Commonwealth v. Stockton, 5 T. B. People, 19 IlL App. 300. In addition
Mon. (Ky.) 193; Jewell v. Mills, 3 to these cases cited in Lammon v.
Bush (Ky.), 78; State v. Moore, 19 Fensier may be mentioned as support-
Mo. 369 ; State v. Fitzpatrick, 64 Mo. ins the doctrine of the text, Strunk
185; Charles v. Haskins. 11 Iowa, «. Ochiltree, 11 Iowa, 158; Hubbard
339 ; Turner v. Killian, 13 Neb. 580 ; v. Elden, 43 Ohio St 380 ; Forsythe
Hollmon u. Carroll, 27 Tex. 33; Van v. Ellis, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 298;
Pelt V. Littler, 14 CaL 194 ; United Turner v. Sisson, 137 Mass. 191 ; Peo-
States V. Hine, 3 MacArthur (D. C), pie v. Mersereau, 74 Mich. 687; S. C,
27. The courts of Georgia and Illi- 43 N. W. Rep. 153.
nois also concur in the conclusions of
§ 342.] OFFICIAL BONDS. 337
payment of the judgment. The sheriff defaulted in respect to
the money, and his sureties were exonerated from liability on
the ground that the receipt of the money by the sheriff before
iexecution issued was an unofficial act.' It is not sufficient that
there is a custom authorizing the defaulting officer to receive
the money in respect to which he has defaulted. It must be
his legal right and duty to receive the funds.^ And the gen-
eral rule may be stated that the sureties of an officer' incur no
liability in respect to money received by him where the stat-
ute did not require him to receive the money.'
§ 343. Distinction between judicial and ministerial duties.
The same distinction between, the judicial and the ministerial
acts of public officers obtains in this branch of the subject under
discussion as where the personal liability of officers and agents
and the liability of the corporation for their acts was consid-
ered.* As the officer is not in general personally liable for his
malfeasance or non-feasance in the discharge of a judicial duty,
and as the corporation itself is not liable in such case, so the
sureties upon his bond cannot be held for such act or omis-
sion.' This general rule is obvious, but there is often great
difficulty in determining whether the particular act under
consideration is a judicial or a ministerial act. This is espe-
cially the case in considering the liability Of the sureties of
justices of the peace and of highway commissioners — from
' State V. Allen, 7 Jones' Law (N. C), paid into court, although there was
564. And in several States it has no statutory authority for his doing
been held where an officer seized so. His sureties were held not liable
property under process, and after- on the gi-ound that the receipt of the
wards by agreement of the parties . moneys by him was not an official
sold that property in a mar ner differ- act'
ent from the mode prescribed by law, 3 Ward v. Stalil, 81 N. Y. 406 ;
that the sureties were not liable for Smith v. Stapler, 53 Ga. 300 ; Branch
default of the officer In respect to the v. Commissioners, 3 Call (Va.), 438;
proceeds of the sale. Webb v. Ans- Saltenberry v. Loucks, 8 La. Ann. 95.
pach, 3 Ohio St. 533 ; Governor v. Per- * See § 205 et seq., supra.
rine, 23 Ala 807 ; Sohloss v. White, 16 » Place v. Taylor, 33 Ohio St. 317 ;
CaL 65. • McGrew v. Governor, 19 Ala. 89. This
2 Carey v. State, 34 Ind. 105 ; Har- is of course a necessary consequence
din V. Carrico, 3 Meto. (Ky.) 289. In of the freedom of the officer and the
the last cited case it was pleaded corporation from liability for the er-
that there was a custom that the rors of the officer in the performance
clerk should receive all moneys of a judicial duty.
S3
338
OFFICIAL BONDS.
[§ 343.
the nature of each office it is evident that it is frequently
difficult to dififerentiate these two classes of duties. It is
perhaps impossible to lay down any general rule to determine
to which class a particular act belongs. The circumstances of
each case must be considered before a conclusion can be
reached. i ,
§ 343. Illustrations of the doctrine.— The act of a justice
of the peace in entering judgment and issuing execution
thereon before the time prescribfed by law has been held in
South Carolina to be a judicial and not a ministerial act.'
And so also the adjournment of a case against the objection
of the plaintiff, where the defendant did not appear, was con-
sidered in a recent New York case to be an act of a judicial
character, although by the provisions of the statute the justice
was required to enter judgment upon the failure of the
defendant to appear.^ These acts being judicial in character
it is not competent for the court to inquire into the motive of
the justice ; and neither the justice nor his sureties incur any
liability therefor.'
1 Abrams v. Carlisle, 18 S. C. 843.
SMerwin v. Rogers, 24 N. Y. St
Rep. 496.
sThroop on Public Officers, § 733.
The learned author collates a number
of cases in which the act of the jus-
tice was decided to be judicial and
not ministerial in its character!
Among them may be mentioned the
following : — An error of the justice
in directing the writ to the sheriff or
any constable, where the statute re-
quired that the writ should be di-
rected to the sheriff. AUec v. Reese,
39 Fed. Rep. 341. The act of a jus-
tice in giving judgment for costs
where the law gave him no authority
to do so. White v. Morse, 139 Mass.
162. Entering judgment for less than
the sum proved to be due. Kress v.
State, 65 Ind. 106. Accepting an in-
formal recognizance; Chickering v.
Robinson, 3 Cush. 543. Error in re-
fnsins to grant an appeal. Jordan v.
Hanson, 49 N. a 199. Error in de-
termining the sufficiency of bail
Lining v. Bentham, 2 Bay (S. C), 1.
See, also, on this subject, Fisher v.
Deans, 107 Mass. 118; Johnston v.
Moorman, 80 Va. 131 ; Heard v. Har-
ris, 68 Ala. 4a The following acts of
justices of the peace have been held
to be ministerial. For these acts,
therefore, their sureties would be
bound : — Refusing to issue a writ of
execution upon a judgment entered
by him. Fairchlld v. Keith, 39 Ohio
St 156. Issuing an execution void
upon its face. Noxon u Hill, 2 Allen,
215. Rendering a judgment exceed-
ing his jurisdiction. Estopinal v.
Peyroux, 37 La. Ann. 477. Issuing a
warrant of attachment or of arrest
in a case where he was not author-
ized at law to issue such process.
Wright ». Rouss, 18 Neb. 234; Trues-
dell V. Combs, 33 Ohio St 186. See,
also, for similar instances collated in
§ 344]
OFFICIAL BONDS.
339
§344. The same subject continued. — The same rule ap-
plies in considering the liability ol" sureties upon the bonds of
highway commissioners. The duties of these ofBoers as of
justices of the peace are of a twofold nature. Some of these
duties are judicial, others are ministerial. Their judicial du-
ties, according to Mr, Throop, include those which are con-
nected with the opening, discontinuing, closing and general
management of highways, together with the assessment of
damages or of benefits thereon. For any act done in the per-
formance of these duties they, and consequently their sureties,
are not liable so long as the act is within the jurisdiction of
the officer as defined by statute.' It is, however, a ministerial
duty for these officers to keep the highways in repair if they
have sufficient funds to do so; and it is also a ministerial duty
for them, if practicable, to obtain the requisite and necessary
funds, and for their official default in respect to these duties
their sureties are considered to be liable.'
Throop on Public Officers, § 734:
Inos V. Winspear, 18 Cal. 397 ; Briggs
V. Wardwell, 10 Mass. 356 ; Sullivan
V. Jones, 3 Gray, 570 ; Fishery Deans,
107 Mass. 118; Albee v. Ward, 8 Mass.
79; State v. Carrick, 70 Md. 586;
Spencer v. Perry, 17 Me. 413 ; Grumon
V. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40; Tracy v.
Williams, 4 Conn. 107 ; Flack v. Har-
rington, 1 HL 213 ; Adkins v. Brewer,
3 Cow. 203 ; Clarke v. May, 2 Gray,
410; Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray, 120;
Doggett V. Cook, 11 Cusli. 263 ; Shaw
V. Reed, 16 Mass. 450 ; Welch v. Glea-
Bon, 28 S. C. 247; Kelly v. Moore, 51
Ala. 864 ; Lanpher v. Dewell, 56 Iowa,
153; Eevell v. Pettit, 3 Mete. (Ky.)
314; Bore v. Bush, 6 Mart N. S. (La.)
1 ; Terrail v. Tinney, 30 La. Ann. 444 ;
Tyler v. Alford, 38 Me. 530; Kendall
V. Powers, 4 Mete. 553; Knowles v.
Davis, 2 Allen, 61 ; Guehther v. White-
acre, 34 Mich. 504 ; Everton v. Sutton,
5 Wend. 280; Tompkins v. Sands, 8
Wend. 463 ; Cunningham v. Bucklin,
8 Cow, 178: HoiTj;Titon v. Swnrthout,
1 Denici, DSQ; Christopher i: Van
Liew, 57 Barb. 17 ; Blythe v. Tomp-
kins, 2 Abb. Pr. 468 ; Kerns, v. Schoon-
maker, 4 Ohio, 331 ; Miller v. Grice, 2
Rich. Law (S. C), 37; Morrill v.
Thurston, 46 Vt. 733; Vaughan v.
Congdon, 56 Vt 111.
1 Throop on Public Officers, § 736,
citing Elder v. Bemis, 3 Met 599;
Benjamin v. Wheeler, 15 Gray, 486 ;
Morrison v. Howe, 120 Mass. 565;
Denniston v. Clark, 125 Mass. 306;
Hatch V. Hawkes, 136 Mass. 177 ; Up-
ham V. Marsh, 128 Mass. 546 ; John-
son V. Dunn, 134 Mass. 522 ; Sage v.
Laurian,"19 Mich. 137; Highway
Comm'rs v. Ely, 54 Mich. 178 ; Larned
V. Briscoe, 63 Mich. 393; Clark v.
Phelps, 4 Cow. 190 ; Van Steenbergh
V. Bigelow, 3 Wend. 43; Miller v.
Brown, 56 N. Y. 383 ; Morse v. Will-
iamson, 85 Barb. 473 ; Harrington v.
Comm'rs &c., 2 McCord (S. C), 400.
Contra, Adams v. Richardson, 43
N. H. 212.
» Throop on Public Officers, § 737,
citin;^ Pom fret v. Snratosra. SpringB,
104 N. Y. 459; People v. Town AuJi-
tors &c., 75 N. Y.316 ; Hover v. Bark-
hoof, 44 N. Y. 113, and other cases.
CHAPTEE XI.
MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS.
345. Town meeting in New Eng-
§ 371. The same subject continued —
land and elsewhere.
Illustrations.
346. Eight to meeting — Jlfanda-
3'J3. Validity of votes as deter-
mus to enforca
mined by the warrant— Il-
847. Application for and authority
lustrations.
to call a meeting.
373. The same subject continued.
848. Secondary authority to call a
374. Invalidity of votes — Illustra-
meeting.
tions.
849. General purpose of a warn-
375. The same subject continued.
ing.
376. Votes of town meetings — Gen-
850. Designation of time and place
eral rules of constructioa
of meeting.
377. Record of proceedings.
851. General and formal requisites
378. Parol evidence of proceedings.
of a warrant.
379. Doings of meetings not le-
853. Th^ same subject continued.
gally called.
853. Service of warrant
380. Presumptions in favor of an-
854 Time of service.
cient meetings.
855. Return of service.
381. Notice of election.
856. Notice of annual meetings.
383. Qualification of voters —
857. The same subject continued.
Power to prescribe.
858. Time of meeting.
383. Registration acts.
359. Place of meeting.
384 Place of election.
360. Organization of meeting —
385. The same subject continued.
The moderator.
386. Popular elections — Plurality.
861. The same subject continued —
387. The same subject continued —
Clerk and clerk pro tern.
Majorities, etc.
363. Adjournpients of meetings.
388. Voting by ballot.
363. The same subject continued.
389. The same subject continued.
864 The power of adjournment
390. The AustraUan ballot and
limited.
cumulative voting.
365. Adjourned meetings.
391. Absolute accuracy not re-
366. Reconsideration and rescis-
quired in a ballot.
sion — The general rule.
893. Votes for ineligible candi-
867. The same subject continued —
dates.
Illustrations.
393. Putting up ofllces at auction-
86& The same subject continued —
Tax collector.
The rule qualified.
894 City council as judges of elec-
869. Ratification of doings of in-
tion and qualification of its
valid meetings.
members.
870. Parliamentary law in town
395. Canvass and return and con-
meetings.
test of electiona
§ 345.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 341
§ 345. Town meetings in Ne«r England and elsewhere. —
In a preceding chapter we have discussed the rules of law by
which the meetings and proceedings of public boards are reg-
ulated.' We shall now consider some of the statutory and
judicial regulations of "town meetings," a term which we
apply generically to all popular meetings of the inhabitants
of local communities — whether of strictly municipal corpora-
tions or of public g"Ma«z-corporations, such as school districts.
The institution of town meetings in this country is coeval with
the settlement of New England, and it is in the decisions of
the courts of the States composing that section that we find the
great body of the law on this subject. These gatherings of
the people have been pronounced by students of political
science who have closely examined their methods of operation
and the influence exerted by them to be the most potent
agents in promoting the art of self-government that the world
has ever known. " In a New England township the people
directly govern themselves ; the government is the people, or,
to speak with entire precision, it is all the male inhabitants
of one-and-twenty years of age and upwards. The people
tax themselves. Once each year, usually in March, but some-
times as early as February or as late as April, a 'town meet-
ing is held at which all the grown men of the township are
expected to be present and to vote, while any one may intro-
duce motions or take part in the discussion.' In early times
there was a fine for non-attendance, but this is no longer the
case; it is supposed that a due regard to his own interests
will induce every man to come. The town meeting is held in
■the town house, but at first it used to be held in the church,
which was thus a meeting house ' for civil as well as ecclesias-
tical purposes.' At the town meeting measures relating to the
administration of town affairs are discussed and adopted or
rejected ; appropriations are made for the public expenses of
the town, or, in other words, the amount of the town taxes for
the year is determined and town oflScers are elected for the
year." * But the administration of local affairs by means of
1 Public Boabds, oh. IX interesting and eloquent dissertation
2Prof. Fiske's "Civil Government on town meetings, the author says : —
in the United States," p. 19. In an- " In the kind of dispussion which it
other part of this work, which is an provokes, in the necessity of facing
343 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 346.
town meetings is not now confined to the towns of New Eng-
land, although these are perhaps invested with more ample
powers than are conferred upon them elsewhere. In many of
the western States the township system with its town meet-
ing for deliberative purposes is steadly supplanting or ceasing
to become subordinate to the system of county government,
and when tried under favorable conditions is not likely to be
abandoned, except when of necessity an increase of population
demands a representative borougn or city government.*
§ 346. Bight to meeting — Mandamus to enforce. — In
Connecticut " special town meetings may be convened when
the selectmen shall deem it necessary or on application of
twenty inhabitants qualified to vote in town meetings." By
judicial construction the la^t clause of this provision is manda-
tory to the selectmen and the requisite number of voters have
a right to demand that a meeting be called for any legitimate
and proper purpose.* Although it is not competent for the
petitioners to dictate to the selectmen the day and hour for
the meeting to be held it is no objection to the petition that
it specifies the day and hour, for the selectmen may call a
meeting at any reasonable time.' If, however, those oflBcers
neglect to perform their duty in the premises the remedy is
by ma/ndamus, but all the selectmen must be made parties to
the proceeding and the writ can only issue in the name of the
State as plaintiff.*
argument with argument, and of Phelps, J., in Lyon v. Eice (1874), 41
keeping one's temper under control, Conn. 345, 251. There is no clear
the town meeting is the best political legal right to have a meeting called
training school in existence. Its ed- "to take action on resolutions to be
ucational value is far higher than offered [in the legislature] for the re-
that of the newspaper, which in spite peal of the charter of the borough.'"
of its many merits as a difluser <Jf in- The court said that " the borough
formation is very apt to do its best meeting is not the proper tribunal to
to bemuddle and sophisticate plain pass upon that question." Feck v.
facts." Page 81. See, also, " Ameri- Booth (1875), 43 Conn. 271, 274
can Political Ideas," by the same ' Lyon v. Eice (1874), 41 Conn. 245.
author, ch. I, Town Meetings. Cf. Denniston v. School Dist (1845),
• See Prof. Fiske's treatise cited in 17 N. H. 493, where it was held that
the preceding note, p. 89 et seq. the choice of day by the petitioners
2 But the purpose must not be un- must not be disregarded,
lawful or manifestly frivolous or im- * Peck v. Booth (1875), 43 Conn. 371,
proper. See dissenting opinion of 274; Lyon v. Bice (1874), 41 Conn.
§ Sir.-]
UEETINQS AND ELEOTTOKS.
343
§ 347. Application for and authority to call a meeting. —
Where a board has authority to call a meeting upon the ap-
plication of a certain number of voters or freeholders the
petition need not describe them as such.' And the decision
of the board that the subscribers are qualified is final and con-
clusive.* An application for a school district meeting bearing
date before the town meeting at which it should be deter-
mined whether the district would be permitted to hold a
meeting is premature and all action under it void.' Any
signer of the petition may withdraw his name before action
has been taken, and if a sufficient number do not remain the
duty to call the meeting ceases.* A board of trustees having
authority to call a meeting when in their judgment the inter-
ests of the district require it can act only at a regular session,
and a call signed by two without notice to the other, who
afterward refuses to sign it, is without any legal efficacy.' A
meeting may be called by officers de facto, provided, of course,
215. In the case last cited the court
Baid: — "Whether the prosecuting
officer alone may apply for and pros-
ecute the writ or whether it may be
prosecuted by any inhabitant of the
town as relator is a question on which
the authorities differ. It is held by
some that any person having a gen-
eral interest in the subject-matter
may be a relator and prosecute the
writ in the name of the State. Peo-
ple V. CoUms, 19 Wend. 56; Hamil-
ton V. State, 4 Ind. 453; State v.
County Judge, 7 Iowa, 187; Hall v.
People, 57 IlL 307. By others it is
held that it can only be prosecuted
by a public officer. People v. Re-
gents &c., 4 Mich. 98; Heffner v.
Commonwealth, 38 Penn. 108 ; Bob-
bett V. State, 10 Kan. 9 ; Linden v.
Alameda County, 45 CaL 6 ; Sanger
V, Comm'rs, 25 Me. 291; Bates u
Overseers iSfcc., 14 Gray, 163." See,
also, Wyandotte &a Br. Co. v.
Comm'rs, 10 Kan. 331; Graves v.
Cole, 3 Dak. 301 ; State v. Ware, 13
Oregon, 380. And c/. State v, Kah-
way, 33 N. J. Law, 110; People v.
Brooklyn Council, 77 N. Y. 503.
1 " It is sufficient if they are such."
Fletcher v. Lincolnville (1841X 20 Mft
439. A meeting called upon the ap-
plication of less than the required
number of persons is void. McVichie
V. Town of Knight (Wis., 1892), 61
N. W. Hep. 1094
'State V. Town of Lime (1877), 23
Minn. 521. Except, perhaps, the court
said, upon a review in a direct pro-
ceeding. Contra, Ladd v. Clements,
4 Cnsh. 477 ; Fletcher v. Lincolnville,
20 Me. 439. See, also, cases cited in
the following section.
s School Dist V. Lord (1867), 44 Me.
374.
< Dutten V. Hanover (1884), 42 Ohio
St. 215. The application need not be
recorded. Roper v. Livermore (1868),
28 Me. 193. And a statute requiring
it is directory merely. State v. Su-
pervisors (1883), 58 Wis. 291.
» Bogert V. Trustees (1881), 48 N. J.
Law, 35&
344 MBETINGS AND ELECTIONS. {§-3^8.
that the same oflScers dejure would have that power.' Where
a school district has exercised a statutory right to prescribe
the manner in which meetings shall be called they cannot be
convened in any other way so long as the vote remains un-
rescinded.*
§ 34S. Secondary anthority to call a meeting. — Authority
to call meetings is frequently given by statute to a certain
oflBcer or board contingent upoa the neglect or refusal of
others to perform the duty cast upon them in the first in-
stance. In such cases the well established principle that noth-
ing can be presumed in favor of the jurisdiction of parties
acting under special authority ' is generally applied and the
existence of the conditions precedent becomes an issuable
fact ; and if successfully controverted the result is so fatal
that a tax collector appointed at a meeting founded on the
call cannot justify in an action of trespass.* But where a
school district committee upon due application for a meeting
on a day certain refused to call it, and, within the time al-
lowed by statute, called a meeting for a day one month later
than that specified, the court held it to be a " neglect . . .
after application," etc., which authorized the selectmen to call
> Williams u School Dist (1838), 21 » Little v. Merrill, 10 Pick. 543;
pick. 75. Cf. Little v. MeiriU (1830), Rossiter v. Peck, 3 Gray, 539; Bar-
10 Pick. 543. rett v. Crane, 16 Vt 346 ; Betts v.
2 Hay ward «. School Dist (1848), 8 Bagley, 13 Pick. 573; Bennett v.
Cush. 419. The power given by stat- Burch, 1 Denio, 141 ; Short v. Spier,
ute to an ecclesiastical body to pre- 4 Hill, 76.
scribe the mode of warning its meet- * Brewster v. Hyde (1834). 7 N. H.
ings does not enable it to dispense 306 ; Giles v. School Dist, 31 N. H.
with a warning by the committee, 304 ; Starbird v. Falmouth (1862), 51
Bethany v. Sperry (1834), 10 Conn. Me. 101. A justice of the peace hav-
200. See, further, for a construction ing authority to call a meeting upon
of statutes and by-law conferring au- application after an unreasonable re-
thority to call school district meet- fusal of the selectmen is powerless to
ings, Stone v. School Dist (1851), 8 act if the majority of the selectmen
Cush. 592 (authority to warn not au- have not been requested. Southard
thority to caXl); Little v. Merrill u Bradford (1866), 53 Me. 389, citing
(1830), 10 Pick. 543 ; Mason v. School Ladd v. Clements, 4 Cush. 477 ;
Dist (1848), 20 Vt 487; Corliss v. Fletcher v. Lincolnville, S!0 Ma 439;
Corliss, 8 Vt 373. And that an ap- SuUbury v. Stearns, 21 Pick. 14a
plication will Toe presumed, Chandler Cf. State v. Town of Lime (1877), 23
V. Bradish (1851), 23 Yt 416 ; Mason Minn. 521, cited in the second note to
V. School Dist (1848), 20 Vt 487. the preceding section.
§ 349.] MEETINGS AND BLBOTIONS. 345
a meeting.* And the same construction of the statute was
adopted in a case where the meeting called upon the original
application would have been illegal for want of sufficient
notice.*
§ 349. General purpose of a warning. — The rationale of
warnings of New England town meetings is, perhaps, placed
upon a firmer foundation by Justice Gray of the United States
Supreme Court than by any other jurist who has had occasion
to discuss the subject. " In Connecticut, as in Massachusetts
and Maine," said he, " by common law or immemorial usage
the property of any inhabitant may be taken on execution
upon a judgment against the town.' A town cannot contract
or authorize any officer or agent to make one except by vote
in a town meetmg duly notified or warned; and the notice or
warning must specify the matter to be acted on in order that
all the inhabitants (whose property will be subject to be taken
on execution to satisfy the obligation of the town) may know
in advance what business is to be transacted 'at the meeting." *
This reason has also been adduced : — " If the object of the
meeting is specified it will present a motive to the inhabitants
to.be present and they will leave business even if it be press-
ing, provided they feel an interest in the subject to be deter-
mined. On the other hand, if the object is unimportant and
any of the inhabitants should feel no concern in the result, they
may with safety pursue their ordinary business ; and this cei'-
taiiily is matter of convenience. The warning designating
the object of the meeting is fair and in prevention of those
• Denniston v. School Dist (1845), * Citing Atwater v. Woodbridge, 6
17 N. H. 493. If the committee could Conn. 333, 338 ; McLoud u Selby, 10
ignore the petitioner's desire in re- Conn. 390; Beardsley v. Smith, 16
spect of the time, "it is plain," said Conn. 68; 5 Dane Abr., 158 ; Chase u.
the court, " that no special meeting Merrimack Bank, 19 Pick. 564, 569 ;
could ever be held against their will" Gaskill v. Dudley, 6 Met 546 ; Adams
In Connecticut the ofiBcers are not in v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Greenl. (Me.)
default if the day fixed by them is 361 ; Femald v. Lewis, 6 Greenl. (Me.)
within a reasonable time. Lyon v. 364; Hopkins v. Elmore, 49 Vt. 176;
Eice (1874), 41 Conn. 345. Rev. Stats. N. H. 1878, oh. 339, § 8.
2 Pickering v. De Eoohemont (N. H., See, also, ch. V, supra.
1891), 33 Atl. Rep. 88, where it was « Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank
held that the warrant need not recite (1887), 131 U. S. 131.
the neglect
346 MEBTnros and elections. [§ BoO.
little artifices which sometimes endanger the public peace and
throw communities into animosities and- divisions." ' Again,
it is to enable the people "to give the subject consideration
previous to the meeting," * and " that the will of individuals
may not be subjected to the will of a majority any further
than it is subjected by law." *
350. Designation of time and place of meeting. — A stat-
ute provided that annual town Aeetings should be held at
the place where the last meeting was held or at such other
place as should have been ordered at a previous meeting.
There was also a general provision that the doings of town
meetings might be reconsidered upon motion made within a
certain time.* It was decided that the mere fact that a ma-
jority of the ballots for town officers cast at a regular meeting
contained words indicating the will of the voters that the
next meeting should be held at a certain place named thereon
was not a sufficient designation within the intent of the law.
The proposition should have been submitted to the meeting
as a deliberative body, and the election of an officer in the
following year at the place assigned was declared to be void.'
If an annual meeting neglects to appoint a time and place
under the f/ower conferred by statute and the latter makes no
provision in case of such a failure, the proceedings of a meet-
ing duly called by the proper authorities will be upheld.' But
a statute providing for such an omission is mandatory.' A by-
law prescribing seven days' notice of meetings is reasonable,'
1 Hayden v. Noyes (1824), 5 Conn, city the right to fix by a standing
891, 896. by-law the time and extent of such
2 Blush V, Colchester (1867), 89 Vt pubUcation, and is not controlled by'
198, 196. the general statutes which prescribe
3 Pittsburg V, Danforth (1875), 66 how town meetings shall be warned.
N. H. 271. Allen v. Burlington (1873), 45 Vt 202.
* The power to reconsider does not > Otherwise no annual meeting
depend on statute; See § 866 et seq., could ever afterwards be held. San-
infra. born v. School Dist (1866), 12 Minn.
5 State V. Davidson (1878), 82 Wis. 17.
114. A charter provision that all ' Marchant ?;. Langworthy, 6 Hill,
warnings of city meetings "shall be 646; s. C, affirmed, 3 Denio, 526.
issued by the mayor and published «Rand v. Wilder (1853), 11 Gush,
in the manner designated in the by- 294
laws of the city" delegates to the
§ 351.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 347
but an ordinance requiring a notice of not less than three
months is void for unreasonabless.*
§ 351. General and formal requisites of a warrant. — The
statutes, with only slight differences in phraseology, require
the time, place and objects of a meeting to be specified in the
notice, or warrant, as it is usually termed. It is not essential
that it be addressed to the- inhabitants or voters,^ or that the
application be recited in it ; ' and, in the absence of statute,
no seal is required.* A date is not indispensable," and if a
warrant be issued by freeholders under statutory authority
their naked signatures suffice.* It is valid if signed by a ma-
jority of the board having power to issue it ; ' and a meeting
is " called by the . . . committee " when the warrant is
signed by the clerk " by order of the . . . committee;"'
but it is not " under the hands of the selectmen " where only
one of the board signs " by order of the selectmen ; " ' and it
is not " issued " by the mayor unless signed by him.'" And a
warrant signed by the proper officer, but without any official
designation or anything in the document to indicate his offi-
cial character, is fatally defective." The year of the meeting
1 Jones V. Sanford (1877), 66 Me. Citing Willis v. Sproule, 13 Kan. 357 ;
585. Austin v. Allen, 6 Wis. 134; Wash-
2 Baldwin v. North Stanford (1864), ington Ice Co. v. Lay, 103 Ind. 48 ;
33 Conn. 47. See, also, Pickering v. s. C, 3 N. E. Rep. 233.
De Eochemont (N. a, 1891), 33 Atl. ^ Reynolds v. New Salem (1843), 6
Rep. 88. Met. 340. Cf. Bogert v. Trustees
> Roper V. Livermore (1848), 38 Me. (1881), 43 N. J. Law, 358, cited in § 347,
193 ; Sherwin v. Bugbee (1844), 16 Vt »upra.
439. See, also, Pickering v. De Roche- 8 Kingsbury v. School Dist. (1846),
mont (N. H., 1891), 33 Atl. Rep. 88 ; 12 Met 99. See, also, Smith v. Board
Mason v. School Bist (1848), 20 Vt County Comm'rs (1891). 45 Fed. Rep.
487. 735. Otherwise if there is no pre-
* Colman v. Anderson (1813), 10 vious authority or subsequent ratifii-
Mass. 105 ; Kingsbury v. School Dist cation. Bethany v. Sperry (1834), 10
(1846), 12 Met 99 ; Inhabitants of Conn. 300.
Bucksport V. Spoflford (1835), 13 Me. 9 Reynolds v. New Salem (1843), 6
487. Met 340. And see S. C, p. 344.
sDenniston v. School Dist (1845), >» Allen v. Burlington (1873), 45 Vt
17 N. H. 493; Briggs v. Murdock, 13 202.
Pick. 305. 11 McVichie v. Town of Knight
« Sturm V. School Dist (1890), 45 (Wis., 1893), 51 N. W. Rep. 1094.
Minn. 88; s. C, 47 N. W. Rep. 463.
348
UEETmOS AND ELEOTIOKS.
[§ 352.
ought to be specified,' and the hour * and place 'are of vital
importance.*
§ 352. The same subject continued. — Technical accuracy
is not required, nor is the warrant to be construed with the
same strictness as a power of attorney, or a penal statute,* or
a special plea.' The law is satisfied if the propositions to be
submitted are indicated with such reasonable certainty that
no person interested can be misl^.' Where the design is to
raise money the subjects need not be set forth with greater
particularity than is expressed in the statute which authorizes
the town to vote money for the purposes named in the warrant.'
If the application for a meeting contains precise and enumer-
ated articles and the warrant is annexed thereto upon the
same paper calling a meeting to act on those articles, they are
a part of the warrant as effectually as if they were embodied
1 Wilson V. Waltersville School
Dist (1876), 44 Conn. 157, which,
however, does not decide that it is
indispensable.
2 If this is omitted in the record of
the warning, parol evidence is inad-
missible to show that the original
did in fact fix the hour, or that all
the legal voters were present and
voted. Sherwin v. Bugbee (1845), 17
Vt. 337; S. C, 16 Vt. 439. See, also.
King V. Theodorick, 8 East, 543;
Moor V. Newfleld (1826), 4 Me 44
8 Sherwin v. Bugbee (1844), 16 Vt.
439. A warrant calling a meeting at
a certain hall may imply that it is in
the town and known to the voters.
George v. School Dist (1843), 6 Met
497.
^The presence and consent of all
the inhabitants at a meeting not le-
gally wai-ned is not a waiver of the
defect Moor v. Newfleld (1836), 4
Me. 44 See, also, Euhland v. Super-
visors, 55 Wis. 664; S. C, 13 N. W.
Eep. 877.
6 Belfast &c.Ey. Co. v. Brooks (1873),
60 Me. 568 ; Grover v. Pembroke, 11
Allen, 89 ; Kittredge v. North Brook-
field (1885), 138 Mass. 386.
* South School Dist v, Blakeslee
(1839), 13 Conn. 337.
7 Wyley v. Wilson (1873), 44 Vt 404 ;
Ovitt V. Chase (1864), 37 Vt 196 ; Moore
V. Beattie (1860), 33 Vt 319 ; Austin
V. York (1869), 57 Me. 304; Alger v.
Curry (1868), 40 Vt 437; Bloomfield
V. Charter Oak Bank (1887), 121 U. S.
131. " They are the language of plain
men for practical purposes." Per Red-
field, J., in Hubbard v. Newton (1880),
62 Vt 346; Blush u Colchester (1867),
39 Vt 193. A statute requiring the
subject-matter to be "distinctly
stated" adds no force to the intent
of a former statute providing that
the "mtent and design" should be
specified. Child v. Colbum (1873). 54
N. H. 71, 80. See. also, cases cited in
the two preceding notes ; and for a
more particular examination of the
subject, § 373 et seq., infra.
8 Alger V. Curry (1868), 40 Vt 437.
See, also, Tucker v. Aiken (1834), 7
N. H. 113,
§ 353.] MEETINGS AlfTO ELE0TI0K8. 349
in it.* And a meeting is called for each and every article in
the warrant, although one article requires a majority vote and
another a two-thirds vote." "Where the action of a town was
invalid because of want of power and also because there was
no notice in the warning of the subject which was considered,
an act of the legislature referring to such proceedings as
"without authority of law" and confirming them heals all
the invalidities.'
§353. Service of warrant. — The statutes generally require
an attested copy of the warrant to be posted in two or more
public places a certain time before the meeting.* The original
may be posted, although the letter of the law specifies a copy
and the original to be returned with the oflBcer's doing thereon.'
The notice must be put up the required length of time,' but
not necessarily in the usual place.^ The words "public
places," as used in statutes, are construed to mean such places
as in comparison with others in the same town are those
where the inhabitants and others most frequently meet or
resort or have occasion to be, so that a notice there would
for that reason be most likely to be seen. The character of
the town and the situation and use of the place and the
amount of resort to it, if disputed, are niatters of fact for a
1 George v. School Dist (1843), 6 also, Lennirigton v. Blodgett (1864),
Met 497. 37 Vt 210.
2 Canton v. Smith (1876), 65 Me. 203. » Brewster v. Hyde (1834), 7 N. H.
» Baldwin v. North Branf ord (1864), 206 ; Norris v. Eaton (1834), 7 N. H. 284.
32 Conn. 47. See, also, Eaton v. Miner, 5 N. H. 543 ;
* It has been said that this duty is King v. Warley, 6 Term E. 534;
personal and cannot be delegated, King v. Inhabitants of Bilton, 1
but the oflScer's return that he East, 13. Copies should include all
"caused" the notice to be posted the signatures to the original,
implies that it was done under his Chapin v. School Dist (1855), 30 N. H.
own eye. Parker v. Titcomb (1889), 25.
82 Me. 180. Cf. Phillips v. Albany 8 And the record may be amended
(1871), 28 "Wis. 340, where the ofBcer to record the fact that it was not
employed others to do the posting, and thus in-validate the action of the
and the court was loath to believe meeting. Blake v. Orf ord (1886), 64
that an objection was seriously N. H. 299. There were no vested
taken ; " if it is, it is as seriously over- rights, " if in • a case of this charac-
ruled." s. C, p. 35.6. Presumption ter the question is material," said the
in favor of regularity. State v. Town court
of Lime (1877), 23 Minn. 521. See, ' 'Stoddard v. GUman(1850), 23 Vt
668.
350
MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS.
[§ 364.
jury. Bat if the facts are apparent it is a question of law
what is a public place.' A " conspicuous " place is not syn-
onymous with "public;" both words are sometimes used in
conjunction to insure the posting of notice in a public place
in such a position that it may readily be seen.''
§354. Time of seryice. — It was held in England that
where notice was required " at least sixteen days before " a
meeting, both the day of the notice and the day of the meet-
ing were to be excluded in the computation,' but according to
the uniform rule in this couptry wherever the question has
arisen only one of these day&is excluded.* It was so decided
where the language was " at least twelve days before the time
appointed."* A^d "at least five days inclusive before the
'Proprietors of Cambridge v.
Chandler, 6 N. H. 371, 279 ; Gibson
V. Bailey, 9 N. H. 168, 175, 178;
Wells V. Burbank, 17 N. H. 393 ; Pro-
prietors of Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H.
183, 190; Russell v. Dyer, 40 N. H.
173, 186, 187; S. C, 43 N. B. 396, 397,
898; Wells v. Canpany, 47 N. H. 335,
255 ; Gaboon v. Coe, 53 N. H. 518, 522 ;
French v. Spalding, 61 N. H. 395, 401.
A shoemaker's shop is not a public
place. Tidd v. Smith, 3 N. H. 17a
Prima facie a blacksmith's shop is.
Soper V. Livermore (1848), 28 Me.
193. And an inn and a post-office.
Hoitt V. Burnham, 61 N. H. 620.
And houses of public worship.
Scaramon v. Scammon (1854), 38
N. H. 419. But not the inside of the
door if it is kept locked. Osgood v.
Blake (1850), 31 N. H. 551, 563. And
a'grist-railL Fletcher v. Lincolnville
(1841), 20 Me. 439. A stage office
may be. Baker v. Shephard (1851),
34 N. H. 208, 312. And a school-
house ; a building formerly used as
a grain building ; a large board fast-
ened on the roadside wall. Seabury
V. Howland (1887), 15 E. I. 446. For
other cases relating to designated or
public places and depending upon
spoijiul facts, see Cliapiu c. Si;liool
Dist (1855), 80 N. H. 25; Briggs l'.
Murdock (1833), 13 Pick. 305 ; Soper
V. Livermore (1848), 28 Me. 193 ; State
V. Beemau (1853), 35 Me. 343. An
allegation in a complaint that the
notice was not posted in the most
public place is a sufficient averment
of fact, and not merely of a legal
conclusion, to withstand a demurrer.
McVichie v. Town of Knight (Wis.,
1892), 51 N. W. Eep. 1094.
2 A neglect to heed this distinction
is fatal. Lewey's Island E. Ca v.
Bolton (1860), 48 Me. 451; Christ's
Church V. Woodward (1846), 26 Me.
173.
' Eegina v. Justices of Shropshire,
8 Ad. & El. 173. See, also, Eegina v.
Lander, 1 Ir. R C. L. 225.
< Mason v. School Dist (1848), 20
Vt. 487; Hunt v. School Dist. (1842),
14 Vt. 300; Hubbard v. Williams-
town (1884), 61 Wis. 397; Brooklyn
Trust Co. V. Hebron (1883), 61 Conn.
23, citing Sheets v. Selden's Lessee, 2
Wall. 190; Bigelow v. Wilson, 1 Pick.
485 ; Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502.
See, also, Osgood v. Blake (1850), 21
N. H. 551, 563.
8 Pratt V. Swanton (1843), 15 Vt
147.
§ 355.]
MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS.
351
meeting is to be held." > Where notice is published the date
of a newspaper is presumed to be the date of its publication,^
although it is printed and many popies sent out on the pre-
ceding day.' Statutory provisions relating to the period of
notice of public meetings are mandatory and a strict com-
pliance therewith is an indispensable prerequisite to valid
action,* but a defect in this particular may be cured by act of
the legislature.'
355. Beturn of service. — A return of service of a warning
Is necessary even if no statute requires it." The return need
not be dated,' nor is the date conclusive of the time of service.*
If it is signed " B., Constable," without adding " of the town
of," etc., it is sufficient.* In Maine, where the statute requires
the return to state " the manner of notice and the time it was
given," it must show specifically and precisely that the notice
was served in exact conformity with the statute.'"
' Brooklyn Trust Co. v, Hebron
(1883X 51 Conn. 23.
nSchofl V. Gould (1872), 53 N. a
513.
» " General publicity cannot fairly
be said to be given to anything con-
tained in it till the day of its date
and general circulation." Queen v.
Aberdare Canal Ca (1850), 14 Q. B.
854.
<McVichie v. Town of Knight
(Wis.. 1893), 51 N. W. Rep. 1094;
Greenbanks v. Boutwell (1870), 43 Vt
207; Stuart v. Warren (1870), 37
Cotm. 235, and the preceding notes
to this section. If the warning is
not dated and is not required to be,
the posted copy need not be dated, in
which case parol evidence is admissi-
ble to show when it was put up.
Braley v. Dickinson (1876), 48 Vt
599.
» Stuart V. Warren (1870). 37 Conn.
333. See, also, Allen v. Archer (1860),
49 Ma 346. But a statute validating
the "doings" of certain cities, etc., in
respect of bounties contemplates only,
the doings of mpptings lp;;a1Iy hekl.
Sanborn v.' Machiasport (1865), 53
Me. 83.
*"Such has been the invariable
practice from time immemorial in
towns and parishes in Massachusetts
and in this State since its organiza-
tion." Tuttle V. Cary (1831), 7 Me.
436, 430.
' Briggs V. Murdock (1833), 13 Pick.
305.
6 Williams v. School Dist (1838), 21
Pick. 75; Inhabitants of Bucksport
V. Spofieord (1855), 13 Me. 487. " It is
the common practice and sanctioned
as legal " to date it on the day of the
meeting. Ford v. Clough (1833), 8
Me. 334; Tuttle v. Cary (1831), 7 Me.
426, 430; Thayer u Stearns, 1 Pick.
109.
' Commonwealth v. Shaw (1843), 7
Met 53.
w General statements in regard to
time or place are insufficient Christ's
Church V. Woodward (1846), 36 Me.
173 ; Bearce v. Fossett (1853), 34 Me.
575 ; Tuttle v. Cary (1831), 7 Me. 436 :
Allen V, Archer (1860), 49 Me. 346;
Ne'son v. Tierce (1P33), 0 :?. II. i3-i;
352
MEETINGS AND ELJIOTIONS.
[§ 356.
§ 366. Notice of annual meetings.^ Although the proceed-
ings of special meetings are founded wholly upon a rigid com-
pliance with the provisions of the statute relating to notice, it
is held in some oases and intimated in others that these regu-
lations are not mandatory in every particular when applied to
annual meetings. Indeed, it was declared in New York that
no notice whatever is essential to the legality of an annual
school district meeting held at a time and place previously
Gibson v. Bailey (1838), 9 N. H. 168,
178 ; Proprietors &c. v. Paige (1833),
6 N. H. 182 ; Clark v. Ward well (1867),
55 Me. 61 ; Hamilton v. Philipsburg,
(1867), 55 Me. 193; State v. Williams
(1846), 25 Me. 561, a thoroughly con-
sidered case. See, also, Howland v.
School Dist (1885), 15 R. L 184. It
must state that the copies were " at-
tested." Fossett V. Bearce (1849), 29
Me. 523. The court will not take ju-
dicial notice that the " Baptist," etc.,
meeting-houses or the " school-house
over the hill " are within the town.
Brown v. Witham (1862), 51 Me. 39.
Cf. Marble V. MoKenney (1873), 60
Me. 833. The original is admissible
if statute does not require a record of
it Inhabitants of Bucksport v. Spof-
ford (1835), 13 Me. 487. The rule is
otherwise than as stated in the text
where the statute does not prescribe
the mode except that it shall be as
the town may agree. Inhabitants of
Bucksport tt Spofford (1835), 13 Me.
487 ; Ford v. Clough (1833), 8 Me. 334.
, Notices presumed to be legally posted
in case of ancient meetings. School
Dist. V. Bragdon (1851), 33 N. H. 507,
5 14 (more than twenty years) ; Adams
V. Stanyon (1852), 24 N. H. 405;
Willey V. Portsmouth (1857), 35 N. H.
303, 309 ; Peterborough v. Lancaster
(1843), 14 N. H. 383 (thirty-eight
years). Especially SchoflE v, Gould
(1873), 52 N. H. 513 (thirty years).
And these defects are amendable ac-
cording to the facta. Kellar v. Sav-
age (1840), 17 Me. 444; Harris v.
School Dist (1853), 38 N. H. 58;
Clark V. Ward well (1867), 55 Me. 61.
An omission to return may be sup-
plied. Bean v. Thompson (1848), 19
N. H. 390. The amendment can be
made only by the ofScer. Fossett v.
Bearce (1849), 29 Me. 523. In Massa-
chusetts the question was formerly
one of doubt, the ground taken being
that it required the formality of an
oflScer's return in a civil suit Perry
V. Dover, 13 Pick. 206; Thayer v.
Steams, 1 Pick. 107; Oilman v. Hoyt
4 Pick. 358. But under the latest ex-
position of the law a general return
of service " according to law " is suf-
ficient Briggs V. Murdock (1833), 18
Pick. 305; Houghton v. Davenport
(1839), 33 Pick. 235; Rand v. Wilder
(1853), 11 Cush. 394. See, also, Com-
monwealth V. Shaw (1843), 7 Met 53 ;
Sanborn v. School Dist (1866), 13
Minn. 17 ; Doughty v. Hope, 8 Denio,
598 ; Detroit &c. R. Co. v. Bearss, 39
Ind. 598; Codraan v. Marston, 10
Mass. 150 ; State v. Donahay, 30 N. J.
Law, 404. Cf. Hardcastle v. State. 37
N. J. Law, 553. The Massachusetts
and Maine cases are reconciled in
State V. Williams (1846), 35 Me. 561,
supra, the distinctness of the Maine
statute controlling the decisions in
that State. Return cannot be im-
peached by parol. If false, the officer
may be indicted. Saxton v. Nimms
(1817), 14 Mass. 315.
§ 357.] MEETINaS AND ELECTIONS. 353
fixed according to law.' Somewhat more guarded expres-
sions are used elsewhere. " The annual election of town of-
ficers," said Justice Gray, " or any other act which the stat-
utes require to be done by the inhabitants at each annual
meeting, might perhaps be suflBciently proved by what was
done at the meeting without proving a special notice of it in
the warning.^ But with these exceptions such a notice is a
necessary prerequisite to the validity of any act of the town
either at annual meetings or at a special meeting." ' And Judge
Cooley says : — " Where, however, both the time and place of
an election are prescribed by law, every voter has a right to
take notice of the law and to deposit his ballot at the time '
and place appointed, notwithstanding the official whose duty
it is to give notice of the election has failed in that duty." *
§ 357. The same subject contiaued. — Where annual town
meetings are empowered to raise money for the support of
the poor, and for defraying all other proper charge^ and ex-
penses of the town, and to direct the institution and defense
of all actions in which the town is a party or interested, the
meeting may vote to allow a certain sum in settlement of a
claim for the support of a pauper without previous notice
that such claim would be presented.' It was said in a Con-
necticut case that a vote at an annual town meeting appoint-
ing a superintendent of highways was void for the reason
that there was nothing in the warning to notify the inhab-
itants that such an officer would be chosen.' A by-law of a
1 Obiter, Marchant v. Langworthy, tra, Foster v. Soarff, 15 Ohio St. 533.
6 Hill, 646; S. a, aflBrmed, 3 Denio, See, also, Warner v. Mower (1839), 11
526. Vt 385, at p. 391. Of course, there
2 Citing Thayer v. Stearns, 1 Pick, can be no contention where the stat-
109 ; Gilmore v. Holt, 4 Pick. 358. ute by fair implication dispenses with
' Bloomfleld v. Charter Oak Bank notice of annual meetings, and such
(1887), 131 U. S. 131. is held to be the case if the statute
* Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 759, requires notice only of special meet-
citing People V. Cowles, 13 N. Y, 350 ; ings. SchoflE v. Bloomfleld (1836), 8
People V. Brenahm, 3 Cal. 477 ; State Vt 473.
V. Jone?, 19 Ind. 356; People v. Hart- ^Tuttle v. Weston (1884), 59 Wis.
well, 13 Mich. 508 ; Dishon v. Smith, 151.
10 Iowa, 313 ; State v. Orvls, 30 Wis. « Per Andrews, C. J., in Pinney v.
335; State v. Goetze, 33 Wis. 363; Brown (1891), 60 Conn. 164. Note,
atate V. Skirving, 19 Neb. 497. Con- however, that in Connecticut a super-
23
354 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§§ 358, 35D.
corporation, fixing a time but not a place for an annual elec-
tion, does not dispense with the public notice required by its
charter or render that provision of the charter merely di-
rectory.*
§ 358. Time of meeting. — A town meeting should be held
substantially at the hour specified in the warning.* It qught
to be opened . within a reasonable time after the hour ap-
pointed. What would be a reasonable time depends in some
measure upon the circumstanced It is frequently the case
that a meeting is named to be holden at nine o'clock in the
forenoon and not opened until some hours afterward. If the
delay is for the mere purpose of enabling the inhabitants to
assemble and without prejudice to any one, it would be out-
rageously unjust to hold their proceedings illegal. But, on
the other hand, if it is such as to create a general belief that
no meeting will be held and thereby induce the great body of
the inhabitants to disperse, and a few afterwards open the
meeting and pass votes which could not have been passed ex-
cept for the delay, it would be unjust to hold them legal and
binding. The presumption is that a meeting was opened at a
suitable and proper time in the day and in pursuance of the
warning, and the burden of proving unreasonable delay is
upon him who attacks the legality of the proceedings. . It has
been decided that a meeting opened one hour and five min-
utes after the hour fixed is not illegal as a matter of law,
although only a few persons remained. The others might
have gone away for the very purpose of preventing the meet-
ing from acting.'
§ 369. Place of meeting. — We have seen that the warrant
must point out the place of meeting,* and it is undoubtedly
intendent of highways is an oflScer sufficient until the contrary should
unknown to the statute. In Gordon be shown.
V. Cliflford (1854), 38 N. H. 403, it was > United States v. McKelden (1879),
objected to the legality of the elec- MacArthur & Mackay, 163.
tion of selectmen that the warning * See Sherwin v. Bugbee (1844), IS
did not specify the purpose of the Vt 439.
meeting, and the case sent up to the ' South School Dist v. Blakesle©
Supreme Court did not show afflrma- (1839), 13 Conn. 337.
tively that the warrant was perfect, *Sec. 851, supra.
yet the court presumed that it was
§ 360.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 355
essential to the validity of the proceedings that the inhabit-
ants assemble at that place.^ But in the absence of fraudulent
intent the courts permit a reasonable adaptation to circum-
stances, and the doings of a gathering at another placa are not
always and as a matter of law illegal. Thus, a meeting was
called at a school building in which it was usually held, and
the clerk having lost the key stationed a boy at the door to
direct persons to a hall where the proceedings were after-
wards conducted in due form with an average attendance.
An election at this meeting was held to be valid.'' When,
however, there is evidence of unfairness or oppression, the
acts of parties who deviate a hair's breadth from the strictly
legal course will be overthrown. "When, for instance, the
place appointed was a school-house, it was taken to mean
within its walls ; and a few persons, including the town clerk,
who meet in the highway in front of the building and formally
adjourn to a distant part of the town, whereby other citizens
are designedly prevented from participating in the transac-
tion of important business, will have only their trouble for
their pains. Such conduct would not be tolerated even if the
first meeting were legally held.'
§ 360. Organization of meeting — The moderator.— The
business of a meeting cannot be conducted without a presiding
officer, or. " moderator," according to the terminology of New
England town meetings.* It is usually made the duty of the
town clerk, by statute, to preside until a moderator is chosen,
and it has been said that his duty to do so is an incident to
his office, without any positive requirement.' It is not neces-
sary that a moderator be elected by ballot or be sworn unless
the statute prescribes it.* And where he neglects to take an
oath as provided by statute, " whether the doings of towns
1 Chamberlain v. Dover (1836), 13 to adjourn before appointing a mod-
Me. 466 ; Wakefield v. Patterson erator, see § 363, infra.
(1881), 25 Kan. 709. 5Dodds v. Henry (1813), 9 Mass.
i Wakefield v. Patterson (1881), 25 262, holding that he is the proper per-
Kan. 709. son-to receive and count the votes
' Chamberlain v. Dover (1836), 18 given for moderator.
Me. 466. See, also, § 364, infra. « Mitchell v. Brown (1846), 18 N. H.
* Attorney-General v. Crocker 315.
(1885), 138 Mass. 214. As to the power
356 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 361.
can, in any case, be held void on that account, and if in any
in what cases, may be questions of no little diflBculty," to quote
from the opinion of the court in an early New Hampshire
case. It was there held, at any rate, that a tax collector
chosen at such a. meeting was a good de facto ofBcer.^ And,
likewisej the acts of a moderator appointed in violation of a
statute requiring a check list were sustained on the principle
which upholds the acts of de facto officers.' And where a
moderator elected at- an annual town meeting was called
without another election to preside at a meeting held during
the year, and there was no objection on the part of any one, a
voter who was present was estopped from contesting the va-
lidity of the proceedings of the meeting.'
§ 361. The same subject Continued — Clerk and clerk pro
tempore. — The town clerk is the proper officer to record the
doings of a meeting, but the fact that the statute provides for
the appointment of a clerk when there is a vacancy does not
preclude the meeting from appointing a clerk juto tempore in
the absence of the regular clerk.* And an appointment by
the moderator acquiesced in by the meeting will be an appoint-
ment by the meeting.' Where the selectmen without author-
ity appointed a clerk pro tempore, who thereupon acted as such
with the acquiescence of the meeting, his record of the pro-
ceedings was valid as the act of an officer de facto? At a
1 Tucker v. Aiken (1834), 7 N. H. « Hutchinson v. Pratt (1839), 11 Vt
113,140. 403, citing Hawkins, P. C. 18, § 3.
1! Attorney-General u Crocker See, also, Hickok v. Shelburne (1868),
(1835), 138 Mass. 314. See, also. Com- 41 Vt 409. There cannot be a record
monwealth u Shaw (1843), 7 Met. witliout a clerk. Attorney-General u.
53, 56. Crocker (1885), 138 Mass. 314.
3 State V. Vershire (1879), 52 Vt. 41. s State v: McKee (Oregon), 25 Pac.
Cf. State V. Harris (1879), 53 Vt 216. Eep. 293 ; State v. Smith (Oregon), 25
These cases and the cases cited in the Pac. Rep. 389.
preceding note seem to dispose of the e Attorney-General «. Crocker(1885),
difHculty suggested in Tucker v. 138 Mass. 214. It was held that a pro-
Aiken, 7 N. H. 113, 140, quoted in the test made by a voter after the election
text As to the efifect of a protest if of town officers at a meeting where
it were made when the moderator such a clerk acted " as to the legality
firstassumedtoact, qwjere. Attorney- of their election " did not show that
General v, Crocker (1883), 138 Mass. he was not reputed to be town clerk.
214, 219. The court refrained from decidin'^
§ 362.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 357
meeting of a school society a clerk ^o tem;pore was appointed
iu the absence of the regular clerk, but he did not take the oath
of office provided by law until some months afterward nor
make any record of the business of the meeting before that
time, and then only from memoranda and recollection. The
record was held to be perfect. The court said : — •" It is suf-
ficient if the oath be administered before the official acts re-
quired of the clerk are performed so that those acts are done
under its influence and sanction. Many acts of public meet-
ings must of necessity transpire before the clerk be sworn ;
such as the choice of presiding officer and the appointment of
clerks themselves. It is not necessary that a clerk be a wit-
ness of the proceedings of a meeting under his official oath ; it
is sufficient if he record them or sanction the record of them
after he has been sworn." '
§ 362. Adjournments of meetings. — When a meeting is
fairly organized it cannot be doubted that it possesses the in-
cidental power of adjournment to another time and place,
unless it is prohibited by statute.^ "Where the voters and offi-
■what the effect would have been if a town meeting shall be held open only
protest had been distinctly and sea- between sunrise and sunset does not
sonably made. S. C, p. 219. require it to be kept open from the
' Bartlettv. Kinsley (1843), 15 Conn, rising until the setting of the sun.
327. A statute requiring a record to It may adjourn from forenoon to
be made of the persons swoi-n into afternoon. People v. Martin (1851),
oflSce is directory, and it does not pre- 1 Seld. (N. Y.) 34, holding, further,
vent the fact from being otherwise that although the statute prescribes
proved when there is no such record, the place of meeting it is competent
So held where the record of a town for a meeting first convened there to
meeting was certified by a clerk pro adjourn to another place. Goodel v.
tem. whose oath of office was not on Baker (1828), 8 Cowen, 286. Reason-
record. Kellar v. Savage (1840), 17 able presumptions will be made in.
Me. 444 favor of regularity and good faith.
2 "Nor is it necessary that the rec- Converse v. Porter (1864), 45 N. H.
ord should state any reason for the 385. See, also, McDaniels v. Flower
adjournment The voters are the Brook &o. Co., 22 Vt 274. Ad-
sole judges of that." Hathaway v. journment to a particular day can-
Addison (1860), 48 Me. 440, at p. 444. not be proved by parol. It must
It is a measure which can be taken appear of record. Taylor v. Henry
only at a regular meeting held at the (1824), 2 Pick.. 397. See, also, An-
place appointed in the warning, drews v. Boylston (1872), 110 Mass.
Chamberlain v. Dover (1836), 13 Me. 214 And where the record shows
466. A statute providing that a an adjournment to another place
358 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§363.
cers by unanimous consent, but without any formal adjourn-
ment or vote, go out into the open air in front of the place of
meeting for greater convenience, and there vote without ob-
jection on the part of any person, and no one is prejudiced in
any way, the action is legal.* A town meeting called to vote
aid to a railroad under a statute which requires a two-thirds
vote may adjourn by a majority vote.^
§363. The same subject continued. — Where the town
clerk presides at the opening of a meeting, though it is not
competent for the meeting to transact business until the ap-
pointment of a moderator, it may nevertheless adjourn, and,
aforUori, where a moderator presides who is illegally chosen.'
If a meeting legally held is adjourned to another day without
specifying the hour, the proceedings of the adjourned meeting
are invalid. " Theoretically, it might be well enough to estab-
lish it as a general rule that when a meeting called at or ad-
journed to a particular hour votes an adjournment without
naming any hour, it shall be taken to be the same hour as that
fixed in the warning or in the last vote for adjournment in
which the hour is named. We are inclined, on the whole,
however, to think that the reasons arising from a considera-
tion of the practical consequences likely to flow from the one
rule and the other weigh most strongly in favor of puttiBg
the vote of adjournment upon the same ground and under the
same rule as has already been established in the case referred
to above * as to the omission in the warning to name any hour
for the meeting." ' But where at a March meeting it was
and proceedings there had It cannot etc., without stating that any vote
be contradicted by parol evidence of was taken, sufficiently shows that it
an adjournment without day. Hun- was the act of the meeting. Hatha-
neman v. Fire District (1864), 37 Vt way v. Addison (1860), 48 Me. 440, at
40. " Recess " and adjournment are p. 444.
synonymous. People v. Martin (1851), 2 Canton v. Smith (1876), 65 Me. 203.
1 Seld. (N. Y.) 34, 27 ; Ex parte Mir- " Attorney-General v. Simonds
ande, 73 Cal. 365; & a, 14 Pac. Rep. (1873), 111 Mass. 256.
888. 4Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt 837;
1 Brown v. Winterport (1887). 79 s. c, 16 Vt. 439.
Me. 305, citing Dale v. Irwin, 78 IIJ. 6 Green banks v. Boutwell (1870), 43
170 ; People v. Kniffin, 21 How. Pr. Vt 207. If the record of an adjourn-
(N. Y.) 43. A record stating that the ment omits the hour, a town clerk
meeting " was then adjourned to," chosen at the adjourned meeting
§ 364.] MEETIKGS AND ELECTIONS. 359
"voted that this meeting stand adjourned to the April meet-
ing," and it was shown to have been the uniform custom for
fifty years to hold a meeting on the firsi Monday of April, it ,
was decided that the regular April meeting called by an inde-
pendent warrant was also a legal adjourned meeting.^
§384. The pawer of adjournment limited.— A limit to
the power of the majority to adjourn a meeting is well illus-
trated in a Yermont case where the charter made it impera-
tive on a village at every annual meeting to elect its oflScers,
and the court held that the majority of the meeting could
not adjourn the same without day in fraud of the law and
the minority, and if a legal minority immediatel}' following
such a fraudulent adjournment reorganizes the meeting and
elects officers they will be entitled to hold their offices. " This
corporation is governmental in its functions," said the court,
" and invested with certain powers, rights and privileges that
it may perform the duties cast upon it, and it cannot by re-
fusing to perform those duties be permitted to defeat the pro-
visions and purposes of the law of its creation. At a meet-
ing duly constituted and organized a majority of the voters
present, in the absence of any statute or other restraining
authority to the contrary, have an implied right to adjourn
the meeting to another time and place. But even this we ap-
prehend must be fairly done and for no improper purpose.
In People v. Martin,* Paige, J., says : — 'I think that the
power of adjourning a town meeting to another time and
place may under peculiar circumstances be oppressively ex-
ercised and lead to a defeat of the public will. This power
ought not to be exercised except in a case of extreme -neces-
sity.' Chancellor Kent, in speaking of cases where the mem-
bers of a corporation are directed to be but are not annually
elected, says that the omission to elect does not take away
the power incident to the corporation to elect afterwards,
when the annual day has passed^ by some means free from
design or fraud,. Now, in the case at bar it was by design
that the last annual meeting was adjourned without day, and
cannot amend it. Taylor v. Henry i Reed v. Acton (1875), 117 Masa
(1834), a Pick. 397, 402. 384
2 5N. Y. 27.
360 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 365.
such adjournment was a fraud both upon the law and upon
the minority who were in favor of abiding by the law." '
§ 365. Adjourned meetings. — It is too well settled; to re-
quire comment that all corporations, whether municipal or
private, may transact any business at an adjourned meeting
which they could haye done at the original meeting. It is
but a continuation of the same meeting. Whether the meet-
ing is continued without interruj)tion for many days, or by
adjournment from day to day or from time to time, many days
intervening, it is evident it must be considered the same meeting
without any loss or diminution of powers.^ If a moderator
is chosen at the original meeting in violation of a statute re-
quiring a check list, all that is done while he presides is of no
binding force, and if town officers are elected at that meeting,
the town may, at an adjourned meeting, elect a moderator
regularly and different town officers, who will be entitled to
their offices as against those claiming under the first elec-
tion.' On the other hand, an adjourned meeting has no
more authority than the original meeting ; if the latter be
void for want of legal notice, or otherwise, no capacity can be
1 Stone v. Small (1882), 54 Vt 498. act business under the original call.
Bowells, J., concludes his opinion on Hickok v. Shelburne (1868), 41 Vt,
this point by quoting from Kimball 409. See, also. Reed v, Acton (1875),
V. Marshall, 44 N. H. 465 (see §273, 117 Mass. 884, 331; Withington v.
supra), where Bell, C. J., said in a Harvard, 8 Cush. 66 ; Hunneman v.
similar case: — "The majority could Grafton, 10 Met 454 The record of
make no legal adjournment to such a vote stating that it was passed " at
a time as would defeat the per- a meeting," etc., "legally holden by
formanoe of the prescribed duty, adjournment," is sufiScient prima
and the minority might keep the facie evidence that it was a legal
meeting in existence till the duty meeting. Brownell v. Palmer (1852),
was done." See, also, People v. Mar- 22 Conn. 107. See, however, Taylor
tin (1851), 1 Seld. (N. Y.) 24, 27; u Henry (1824), 8 Pick. 897, where a
Chamberlain v. Dover (1836), 13 Me. record of doings " at an adjourned
466. meeting," without showing of what
2 Warner w Mower (1839), 11 Vt. meeting it was an adjournment, was
385, 391 ; Canton v. Smith (1870), 65 held insufficient. But in that case
Me. 203. " A regular and proper ad- the record of the original meeting
journment of a town meeting is a did not show an adjournment which
continuation of the same meeting." was in fact taken.
Attorney-General v. Simonds (1873), ' Attorney - General v. Simonds
111 Mass. 256. An adjourned meet- (1873), 111 Mass. 256.
Ing of a special meeting may trans-
§ 366.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 361
acquired by adjournment.* In other words, there can be no
increase of momentum without the application of new force.
§ 366. Beconsideration and rescission — The general
rule. — The general rule is settled beyond dispute that action
taken by a town meeting may be reconsidered and rescinded
at the same meeting, or at any adjourned or any other subse-
quent meeting.^ And a vote not to reconsider a previous vote
taken at the same meeting does not abridge the power of fut-
ure meetings over that vote.' "Where there is a vote in the
negative the voters may nevertheless at the same or any other
meeting rescind the vote and pass measures in the aifirma-
tive,* or they may take inconsistent action without formally
rescinding the vote.' If the votes are repugnant the former
is rescinded by implication.* Where the law requires the as-
sent of a town to be indicated by a two-thirds vote, a proposal
passed by the requisite number may be reconsidered by a
bare majority of the voters before it has become binding by
the acceptance of the party to whom it is made.' When a
motion to " reconsider " a vote is adopted the vote ceases to
have any effect, just as if it had never been passed.'
I United States n McKelden (1879), 'Hunneman v. Grafton (1845), 10
MaoArthur & Mackay, 163 ; Sherwin Met. 454, at p. 457.
V. Bugbee (1844), 16 Vt. 439 ;S. C, 17 ^Stackhouse v. Clark (1890), 53 N.
Vt 337. J. Law, 391.
« March v. Scituate (1891), 158 Mass. » Eddy v. Wilson (1871), 43 Vt. 363.
84;ParkerwTitc0mb(1889),83Me.l8O; 6 George v. School Dist (1843), 6
Hunneman v. Grafton (1845), 10 Met. Met. 497.
454, 456 : Belfast &c. Ry. Co. v. Unity " Perhaps even a minority consist-
(1869), 53 Me. 148 ; Mitchell v. Brown ing of more than one-third might
(1846), 18 N. H. 315 ; Getchell v. "Wells do so. Belfast &c. Ey. Co. v. Unity
(1867), 55 Me. 484; George v. School (1869), 53 Me. 148. Where a vote to
Dist (1843), 6 Met 497 ; Eddy v. Wil- issue bonds to a railroad was passed
son (1871), 43 Vt 363 ; Stackhouse v. by the necessary two-thirds, with a
Clark (1890), 53 N. J. Law, 391 ; With- condition annexed to it, a subsequent
ington V. Harvard (1851), 8 Cush. 66. meeting could not by a mere major-
Of course, such action, to be effective, ity vote to waive the condition. Port-
must be within the scope of the warn- land &c. R. Co. v. Hartford (1870), 58
ing. See § 373 et seq., infra, and, Me. 33.
also, § 397 et seq., supra, relating to ^withington v. Harvard (1851), 8
reconsideration and rescission by Cush. 66 ; Stoddard v. Gilman (1850),
public boards. 33 Vt 568.
362 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§§ 367, 368.
§ 367. The same subject considered — Illustrations.— A
town authorized by the legislature to subscribe to the capital
stock of a railroad and voting to do so at a lawful meeting
may at a subsequent meeting rescind the vote if the rights of
third parties have not intervened and nothing has been done
under the original vote,^ So, also, where the voters at any
legally called meeting were authorized to appropriate a certain
sum for building a school-house, which they accordingly did,
but at a subsequent meeting thS resolution was rescinded, it
was held that they might, at a still later meeting, make the
appropriation.^ After a vote to levy a tax has been reconsidered
the collector cannot lawfully proceed to collect it.' A town
voted to let an inhabitant, who sent his children to school
in another town, " draw his proportion of school money," and
reconsidered this vote before the money was paid. It was
held that assumpsit could not be maintained against the town
for the amount of taxes assessed upon and paid by him for the
support of schools.'' Under authority to divide, unite and
alter school districts from time to time, when deemed neces-
sary, a town at an annual meeting set one district over to an-
other. It was competent at a subsequent meeting to rescind
the vote and reinstate the district."
§ 368. The same subject continued — The rule qualified.
The power to reconsider and rescind is subject to several just
and necessary qualifications. If a vote of the town has given
a cause of action against it, no subsequent proceedings can
impair or destroy this vested right.^ Thus, the appointment
of a committee to make a contract on behalf of the town can-
i"If, therefore, the town when ^Withington v. Harvard (1851), 8
clothed with au optional power may Cusb. 66.
rescind action once taken in its cus- 5 Bill v. Dow (1884), 56 Vt. 563.
tomary municipal affairs, no reason ^ jjall v. Holden (1874), 116 Mass.
can be assigned why it may not, un- 173 ; Nelson v. Milf ord (1828), 7 Pick,
der like circumstances, do the same 18. A vote ratifying the doings of
under a grant of power unusual in selectmen in borrowing money and
its municipal affairs." Estey v. Starr giving a note therefor in behalf of
(1884), 56 Vt 690, 693. the town cannot be rescinded at a
2 Sanford v. Prentice (1871), 28 Wis. subsequent meeting. Brown v, Win-
358. terport (1887), 79 Ma 805.
3 Stoddard v. Gilman (1850), 32 Vt
568.
§ 369.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 363
not be reconsidered and the authority of the committee with-
drawn so as to avoid an intervening contract.' A resolution
which constitutes an acknowledgment so as to take a debt
out of the statute of limitations cannot be taken back and
the claim brought within the bar of the statute.^ And, gen-
erally, rights of third parties resting on a vote cannot be di-
vested by rescission.' Again, if a vote has accomplished its
purpose and worked out the intended result, its force is spent,
and an attempt to reconsider it is futile. For instance, a stat- ;
ute required each town at its annual meeting to vote on the
question of abolishing the school district system and adopt-
ing the town system, and that the result of the vote should be
certified to the secretary of State. At a town meeting the
first vote was a tie, and another was taken at the same meeting
resulting in the abolition of the district system. It was held
that the vote first taken was final and conclusive, and ex-
hausted the authority of the town in the premises, and an
election of officers of a town system was illegal.*
§ 369. Ratification of doings of invalid meetings. — Where
the doings of a town meeting are invalid by reason of a de-
fective warning, or are lacking in some technical requisite, a
subsequent meeting may supersede the vitiating effect of such
irregularities by ratification.' A vote at an illegal meeting
1 Not even at an adjourned meeting, duty of the clerk to certify the vote
" To have been affected by the ad- to the selectmen, vsrho were thereby
journment the subject should have required to assess a tax for the
been suspended or the committee di- amount. At a subsequent meeting
rected not to proceed till the meeting the selectmen not having assessed the
vcas dissolved." Hunneman v. Graf- tax a motion was made to reconsider
ton (1845), iO Met. 454, 45H. Cf. Da- which the moderator refused to put
mon V. Granby (If 24), 2 Pick. 345. to vote. At a later meeting it was
2 Sanborn v. School Dist. (1866), 12 voted to reconsider, but in the mean-
Minn., 17. while the tax had been assessed.
' Where an unauthorized payment Held, that the action of the modera-
by a town treasurer was ratified it tor was unwarrantable, but it did not
could not be rescinded and the operate to reverse or impair the
amount recovered from him. Arling- vote to raise the money, and the
ton V. Peirce (1877), 122 Mass. 270. ■ vote to reconsider was of no effect
estate I'. Adams (1886), 58 Vt 694. because the assessment had inter-
See, also, Parker v. Titcomb (1889), 82 vened. Mitchell v. Brown (1846), 18
Me. 180. A school district voted N. H. 315.
to raise money, and it became the * But this cannot be proved by pa-
364
MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS.
[§ 309.
which has been spread upon the records may be expressly re-
ferred to in such a way as to become part of a vote at a sub-
sequent valid meeting.* But the courts are altogether averse
to an implied ratification ; and a resolution adopting previous
defective proceedings will have effect only to the precise ex-
tent indicated by its terms.^ Thus, a vote to reconsider certain
votes passed at a former meeting does not recognize the valid-
ity of other acts of the same meeting ; ' and a vote not to re-
scind certain doings does not giv%them any eflBcacy.* "Where
a town voted, at a meeting not legally held, to accept the
provisions of an act abolishing school districts, and after-
wards, at a meeting called under an article "to see if the town
will reconsider their action " relating to school districts under
the act, specifying it, " and return to the old school district
system," it was voted that this article be indefinitely post-
poned, it did not legalize the action of the previous meeting.*
rol (Jordan u School Dist, 38 Me.
164) ; and the meeting must be duly
warned. " The vote of those who at-
tend a town meeting being of no va-
lidity against the town or its inhab-
itants unless the object of the vote is
set forth in the notice or warning of
the meeting, the town can no more
ratify an act afterwards than author-
ize it beforehand, except by a vote
passed pursuant to a previous notice
specifying the object. Without the
indispensable prerequisite of such a
notice those present at a meeting
have no greater power to bind the
town indirectly by ratification or es-
toppel than they have to bind it
directly by an original vote." Per
Justice Gray, in Bloomfield v. Char-
ter Oak Bank (1887), 121 U. S. 121.
This is the same principle that con-
trols in the well-settled doctrine that
acts absolutely ultra vires cannot be
ratified. See chapter on Liability
OF THE COEPOEATION FOR ACTS OF
ITS Officers and Agents. Ex nihilo
nihil fieri potest.
1 Canton, v. Smith (1876), 65 Me.
203, at p. 207.
2 Hamilton v. Philipsburg (1867), 55
Me. 193. In Southard v. Bradford
(1866), 53 Me. 389, 891, the court
said : — " We cannot presume the
town intended to ratify the proceed-
ings of a meeting not legally called.
If such was the intention of the
town, it should have used language
so clear and explicit that there could
be no doubt of its purpose."
' " It should have been one of the
articles in the warrant to see whether
the town would ratify those doings
and an affirmative vote had thereon
before they could be confirmed so as
to be binding on the town.'' Cham-
berlain V. Dover (1830), 18 Me. 466,
474.
<"The immunity of the district
was perfect ; no subsequent inaction
could aSect it; it could be taken
from it only by positive vote upon
clear notice that it would pay."
Wright V. North School Dist (1885),
58 Conn. 576. See, also, Brooklyn
Trust Co. V. Hebron (1888), 51 Conn.
22, a strong case.
6 Child V. Colburn (1873), 54 N. 11.
71. See, also, Rollins v. Chester (1860),
§§ 370, 371.J MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 365
§ 370. Parliamentary law In town meetings. — " With the
exception of the election of those officers which the statute
prescribes shall be elected by ballot, all or nearly all of the
functions of a town meeting are such as pertain to a deliber-
ative body or assembly. The subjects upon which a town
meeting may take action are numerous and diversified. The
course of procedure which is to be pursued is not fully marked
out by statute, and I deem it only safe to say that when the
statute does not give direction the general rules of parliament-
ary law, so far as they may be applicable, should be observed
and enforced in conducting the business of a town meeting.
It will necessarily follow that propositions upon which the
town meeting may lawfully act may be submitted to it by
motion or resolution or in the form of proposed by-laws or or-
ders by any elector of the town for the oonsideration of the
meeting. It also follows from such application of the rules of
parliamentary law that the chairman of the meeting cannot
prevent action upon any subject within the power conferred
upon the meeting by neglecting or refusing to present the
same to the meeting for its action." ' It has also been said,
however, that " the technical rules of a legislative body, framed
for its own convenient action and government, are not of
binding force on towns unless such rules have been so acted
upon and enforced by the town in their regular meetings as
to create a law for themselves and binding on the inhabit-
ants." 2
§371. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — A
school district meeting voted to dismiss an article in the war-
rant and afterward passed a vote which was not germane to
any article except the one dismissed. For that and another
reason the court held the vote to be invalid.' A motion was
put to vote and rejected. Afterwards an amendment was
46 N, H. 411; and, for a relaxation Met. 454, 457 — not a very perspicu-
of the rule where the town has ac- ous statement. See, also, § 296, su-
quired property in pursuance of de- pro.
f ective votes, Greenbanks v. Bout- ' On this point the court remarked
well (1870), 43 Vt 207. that "no attempt appears to have
1 Per Lyon, J., State v. Davidson been made to reconsider the vote dis-
(1873), 32 Wis. 114 missing the . . . article," Hol-
2 Hunneman v. Grafton (1845), 10 brook v. Faulkner (1875), 55 N.' H.
366 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 372.
passed, but the original resolution was not again submitted to
the meeting. It was adjudged that it could not be amended
without a reconsideration and therefore there was no .vote.'
Although in strict parliamentary law the acceptance of the re-
port of a committee will not be an affirmance by the constitu-
ent body of the matters contained in it, yet when a matter is
referred to a recognized permanent department of a municipal
corporation, like selectmen, with authority to take or propose
some definite action on the subjegt, and they make a report
accordingly without suggesting any separate vote or resolu-
tion for more effectually carr^nng the measure into effect, a
vote accepting the report has been deemed of itself an adop-
tion and execution of the measure proposed.^ "Where there
was a spontaneous adjournment of a meeting to the open air,
without a vote, the,court in approving the proceeding invoked
the maxim of parliamentary law that anything as to the mode
of action may be done by unanimous consent.'
§ 372. Validity of votes as determined Iby the warrant —
Illustrations. — The measure of exactness which the law re-
quires in specifying the subject-matter in a warrant has
already been discussed in general terms,* and is now reverted
to for the purpose of showing a few illustrations of the well
recognized rules. A liberal construction has always been
given to the language of warrants so as to include all that
is properly, even if incidentally, embraced in the subject to
which they relate, and the articles they contain are mere
abstracts or heads of the propositions to be laid before the in-
habitants.' The question of granting money need not be dis-
tinctly set forth if the subject-matter to be acted on be one
311. Cf. Eddy v. Wilson, 43 Vt 363, « Commonwealth v. Wentworth
and George v. School Dist, 6 Met . (1887), 145 Mass. 50, 52. " These mu-
497, cited in § 366, infra. nicipal divisions of the State [school
1 Stuart V. Warren (1870), 37 Conn, districts] are created to work out
235, beneficial results to the people in
^Niles V. Patch (1859), 13 Gray, 254, education and other vital matters to
261. See, also, Hark v. Gladwell, 49 the well-being of the State, and their
Wis. 172. acts should- not be too sharply criti-
3 Brown v. Winterport (1887), 79 cised." Hubbard v. Newton (1880),
Me. 305, 311. 52 Vt 846.
4«
I 351, 352, supra.
§ 373.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 367
■which is likely to require an appropriation.' Thus, a tax may
be voted under an article " to see what method the district
will take to pay the expense " of a school." And an article " to
see what measures the town will take to build " a bridge, " or
any matters and things relating thereto," will authorize the
raising of money for that purpose.^ A tax may be laid under
a warrant " to take into consideration the expediency of rais-
ing money for the use of schools." * And a warrant " to see
if the town would make an appropriation towards purchasing
a fire engine" is sufficient authority for a vote " to raise and
appropriate " a sum for that purpose.' Under a warrant to
raise money by a tax the town may instruct the collector to
pay it to the selectmen although it is the usual course to pay
it to the town treasurer.*
§ 373. The same subject continued. — A public act author-
izing town aid to railroads need not be noticed in the war-
rant to see if the town will vote such aid.' So, also, "to see
if the town will vote to subscribe for and hold shares in the
capital stock of" the road; " to see if the town will vote to
become an associate for the formation of the" road; and "to
see what action the town will take in regard to raising money
to aid in building" the road, will support a vote authorizing a
committee to borrow money and give notes and bonds there-
for.' On the other hand, if a public act conferring authority
is referred to by title, page and chapter, its provisions need
not be recited.' And a subscription for stock is within the
scope of the warrant " to see if the town will loan its credit
to aid in the construction of the railroad." '" An agent to
build a road may be appointed under a warrant " to choose
1 Blackburn v. "Walpole (1839), 9 not have laid a tax for that purpose.
Pick. 97. Torrey v. Millbury (1838), 31 Pick. 64.
2 Chandler v. Bradish (1851), 33 Vt. « Alger v. Curry (1868), 40 Vt. 487.
416. ' Canton v. Smith (1876), 65 Me. 203.
' Ford V. Clough (1833), 8 Me. 834. 8 Kittredge v. North Brookfield
* Bartlett v. Kinsley (1843), 15 Conn. (1885), 1 38 Mass. 386.
837. 9 Child u. Colburn (1878), 54 N. H.
* But if the warrant had been to 71. See, also, Birge v. Berlin Iron
see if the town would appropriate to Bridge Co. (1891), 16 N. Y. Supl. 596.
a specific object money already in W Belfast v. Brooks (1873), 60 Me.
-the treasury, it seems the town could 568.
368
MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS.
[§ 374.
all necessary town oiScers." ^ Where a warrant was to see
if the town will raise money to pay the bounty " promised "
to soldiers, a vote to pay the bounty " offered " to soldiers
follows the warning.^ A town may vote to unite two existing
districts under an article of the warrant " to see if the town
will alter the boundaries of any of the school districts." ' In
a warning to act upon the acceptance of a town way a gen-
eral description of the way is sufBcient.* A vote to purchase
land for a school-house is sustained by an article of the war-
rant " to see what measures the district wiU take in relation
to building a school-house." ° Many other cases where votes
have been tested by the warrant and declared valid are cited
in the note.*
§ 374. Invalidity of votes — Illustrations. — The subject-
matter being plainly referred to may properly include author-
1 He is not strictly a town officer.
Baker v. Shephard (1851), 24 N. H.
208.
2Blodgett V. Holbrook (1868), 39
Vt 336.
3 Converse v. Porter (1864), 45 N. H.
385.
< State V. Beeman (1853), 35 Me. 243.
s Dix V. School Dist. (1850), 33 Vt.
309.
6 Brown v. Winterport (1887), 79
Me. 305; Davenport v. Hallowell
(1833), 10 Me. 317; Drisko v. Co-
lumbia (1883), 75 Me. 73; Sawyer v.
Manchester &c. R. Co., 63 N. H. 135 ;
Tucker v. Aiken (1834), 7 N. H. 113;
Moore v. Beattie (1860), 33 Vt 219 ;
Hubbard v. Newton (1880), 53 Vt
346; Weeks v. Batchelder (1868), 41
Vt 317; Ovitt v. Chase (1869), 37 Vt
196; Hickok v. Shelburne (1868), 41
Vt 409 ; Kittredge u Walden (1867),
40 Vt 311 ; Hunneman v. Fire Dis-
trict (1864), 37 Vt 40; HaU v. School
Dist (1873), 46 Vt 19; Common-
wealth V. Wentworth (1887), 145
Mass; 50, 52; Matthews v. West-
borough (1881), 131 Mass. 531 ; s. a,
134 Mass. 555; Westhampton v.
Searle (1879), 127 Mass. 503; Reed v.
Acton (1875), 117 Mass. 384; Whit-
ney v. Stow (1873), 111 Mass. 368;
Sherman v. Torrey (1868), 99 Mass.
473; Groveru Pembroke (1865), 11
Allen, 88; Kidout v. School Dist
(1861), 1 Allen, 233; Fuller v. Groton
(1858), 11 Gray, 340; Hadsell v. Han-
cock (1855), 3 Gray, 526; Avery w
Stewart (1848), 1 Cush. 496; Kings-
bury V. School Dist (1846), 13 Met
99; Hanover v. Lowell (1842), 5 Met
35; Williams v. School Dist (1838),
21 Pick. 75 ; Blackburn v. Walpole,
9 Pick. 97; Seabury v. Howland
(1887), 15 R. I. 446; South School
Dist V. Blakeslee (1839), 13 Conn. 227 ;
People 17. Board of Education (1888),
1 N. Y. SupL 593 ; Zabriskie v. Trust-
ees (1889), 52 N. J. Law, 104; Briggs
V. Borden (1888), 71 Mich. 87; s. C,
38N. W. Rep. 712; Mason v. Ken-
nedy (Mo.), 14 S. W. Rep. 514; Will-,
iamstown School Dist v. Webb (1889),
89 Ky. 364 ; s. C, 12 S. W. Rep. 298 ;
Reynolds Land & Cattle Ca v. Mc-
Cabe (1888), 73 Tex. 57; People v.
Sisson, 98 111. 335.
§ 375.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 369
ity to act upon minute specifications and particulars included
and necessarily involved in it, which need not be in pairticnlar
terms enumerated.' But when the main proposition is nar-
row and restrictive it cannot be extended. Thus, where a
town meeting voted to dispense with an article in the war-
rant providing for bounties to men who were drafted between
certain dates and voted a bounty to all, in pursuance of an-
other article, it was held that a subsequent meeting called to
see if the town would ratify " the vote or article " of the pre-
vious meeting to pay a bounty to those described in the re-
jected article could not legally appropriate money for any
except those persons.^ The method as well as the object of
raising money is a matter of substantial interest to the tax-
payers, and a vote to borrow money cannot be founded on a
proposition to levy a tax.' Sweeping clauses, such as " to do
other town business," are entirely nugatory and do not ex-
tend the scope of the specifications preceding them.*
§ 375. The same subject continned. — A meeting warned
to consider "the question of raising money," etc., "for school
purposes for the ensuing ypar," cannot vote money for the
purpose of building a high school building.' An article, " to
see if said town will accept and adopt the report of the com-
mittee to alter school districts," authorizes such alterations as
the committee recommend and no others.* It seems that a
meeting called " to take action with regard to rescinding the
doings " of a former illegal meeting cannot vote to ratify.'
An article in the warrant "to see if the town will vote to pay
the same bounty to those who may enlist," etc., " as is now
'Pittsburg V. Danforth (1875), 56 (1864), 33 Conn. 47; Hupt v. School
N. H. 271. If the warning has been Dist. (1842), 14 Vt 300 ; Child v. Col-
recorded a copy of the record is the burn (1878), 54 N. H. 71. Although
usual evidence. The original need a meeting be duly warned for some
not be produced. Commonwealth v. purposes, if a vote is had upon some
Shaw (1843), 7 Met 53. subject not specified in the warning,
2 Pittsburg V. Danforth, (1875), 56 as to that vote the meeting is void.
N. a 371. Pinney v. Brown (1891), 60 Conn. 164.
3 Blush V. Colchester (1867), 39 Vt. » Allen v. Burlington (1873), 45 Vt.
193 ; Atwood v. Lincoln (1872), 44 Vt 203.
833. « Wyley v. Wilson (1873), 44 Vt 404.
4 Hayden w. Noyes (1834), 5 Conn. f Wright v. North School Dist
391 ; Baldwin v. North Branford (1885), 53 Conn. 570.
34
370 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 376.
paid to those who enlisted," etc., does not authorize a vote to
pay a larger bounty.' A school district meeting Avas called
" for thei purpose of obtaining information with regard to the
recent assessments upon the property of the district." At the
meeting a vote was passed appointing a committee to make
the investigation, with power to employ counsel. It was held
that the district was not liable for the services of counsel who
instituted legal proceedings."'' Q^her cases where the doings
of meetings have been pronounced* to be extraneous to the
purposes specified in the warrant, and therefore invalid, are
cited in the note.'
§ 376. Totes at town meeting — General rules of con-
struction.— Votes upon questions pending in town meetings
may be given in any recognized manner in the absence of spe-
cific requirements and need not be by ballot.* Nor do the
courts expect or demand a scrupulous observance of the most
approved formalities. If th? proceedings are in substance
what they should be and intelligible it would be mischievous
to set them aside for the want of technical precision. A lib-
eral and favorable construction prevails, especially when no
one is injured by it or deprived of any right.* Thus, instru-
ments not under seal executed in pursuance of a vote directing
•Austin V. York (1869), 57 Me. 304. town meeting abolish all school dis-
2 Wright V. North School Dist tricts therein, a town divided into
(1885), 53 Conn. 576. voting districts cannot legally vote in
' Cornish V. Pease (1841) 19 Me. 184 ; district meetings on the question
Allen V. Burlington (1873) 45 Vt 202 ; of abolishing school districta. Com-
EoUins V. Chester 1866), 46 N. H. stock v. School Committee (R. I.,
411 ; Wood V. Quincy (1853), 11 Gush. 1891), 34 Atl. Rep. 145.
487; Wilson r. Waltersville School 'Soper r. Livermore(1848), 28 Me.
Dist, (1876), 44 Conn. 157; Bramwell 193; Kellar v. Savage (1840), 17 Me.
V. Guheen (Idaho, 1893), 39 Pao. Rep. .444. "All that is necessary in respect
110. to the manner in which the purpose
< Where a constitution required of a town in raisi&g monef shall bo
that all elections by the people should expressed in the vflte is that the vote
be by ballot it was held that the should indicate in general terms the
meetings of district townships were purpose or object for which the-
not designed to be elections within money is raised, and if that purpose
the meaning of the term, no judges or object is such as comes within the
of election being provided for, eta scope of the powers of the town it is
Seaman v. Baughman (Iowa, 1891), sufficient" Blodgett v. Holbrpok
47 N. W. Rep. 1091. Under a statute (1866), 39 Vt 336.
providing that any town may at a
§ 377.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 371
an issue of "bonds" were held to be valid obligations,' and- a
vote to pay a certain bounty " to each drafted man who may
be accepted by the board of enrollment" is not void for uncer-
tainty as being applicable to all drafted men wherever they
may belong, but only refers to the men drafted to fill the
quota of the town.* The same rule that applies in construing
a statute under the constitution is applied in construing the
votes and acts of towns under a law of the State, and if the
valid parts of a vote are separable from those that are void,
they will be sustained.'
§ 377. Record of proceedings. — ^Where the statute requires
that a vote shall be passed by two-thirds of the voters pres-
ent, a record of a meeting which states that it was " voted,"
etc., is not sufficient unless it shows that it was carried by
two-thirds.* And where a record that a meeting is " duly or
legally notified" is raSiAe prima facie sufiBcient by statute, a
record simply stating that the meeting was held " according
to notice " is defective." A record of a vote passed " in legal
meeting assembled " is not proof that the meeting was spe-
cially warned for that purpose.' A town was empowered by
special act to guaranty a certain amount of the bonds of a
railroad company provided the vote should be passed by bal-
' Lane v. Emden (1881), 73 Me. 354 does not cure it If, however, he had
2 Baldwin v. North Branf ord (1864), stated it as a fact, the record could
33 Conn. 47. A description of a school not be contradicted by parol testi-
district as "all the territory between" mony, but he might be liable for
two given lines is not necessarily de- fraudulent conduct in his office,
fectiva Allen v. Archer (1860), 49 Judd v. Thompson (1878), 125 Mass.
Me. 346. See, also, Avery v. Stewart 553.
(1848), 1 Cush. 496. » Seabnry v. Howland (1887), 15 R.
'Barbour v. Camden (1865), 51 Me. 1 446. It was held that a record is
608 ; Upton v. Stoddard (1866), 47 N. not objectionable because it omits
H. 167. to state the hour the meeting was
< The maxim omnia prcBSumuntur held when it describes the meeting
rite, etc, does not apply. Portland as that which was notified and the
&c. R. Co. V. Standish (1875), 65 Me. notice appoints the hour. Howland
63 ; Andrews v. Boylston (1872), 110 v. School Dist, (1885), 15 R. 1 184.
Mass. 214. {Of. Attorney-General v. ^WUIard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn.
Crocker (1885), 138 Mass. 214, 215.) 253. See Isbell v. New York &c. R
An amendment by the clerk stating Co. (1857), 25 Conn. 556, for a suflB-
that " to the best of my recollection " cient record in such a case,
the vote was passed by two-thirds
372
MEE'nNGS AND ELECTIONS.
[§ 378.
lot at a meeting called for that purpose. The record of a
meeting showed that it was warned to vote by ballot on the
subject and that the vote in question was " passed." The vote
was not, in fact, passed by ballot but by a division of the
house, and the record was subsequently amended by order of
the court. In the meanwhile the company, on the strength
of the vote, had expended money and made contracts for the
delivery of the bonds. The court held that the town was
estopped from insisting on the invalidity of the vote.^
§ 378. Parol evidence of proceedings. — The ofiBcial record
is the proper evidence of the doings of the meeting, and it is
not open to contradiction, enlargement or explanation by
parol. This general rule applies to the records of towns,
parishes, school districts and all similar organizations.^ But
1 New Hav^n &c. E. Co. v. Chat-
ham (1875), 42 Conn. 465. Cf. Brook-
lyn Trust Co. V. Hebron (1883), 51
Conn. 22.
'Halleck v. Boylston (1875), 117
Mass. 469; Andrews v. Boylston
(1872), 110 Mass. 215; Wood v. Sim-
ons, 110 Mass. 116 ; Adams v. Pratt,
109 Mass. 59; Mayhew v. Gay Head,
13 Allen, 129; Third School Dist
V. Atherton, 12 Met. 105 ; Saxton v.
Nimms, 14 Mass. 315; Manning v.
Fifth Parish, 6 Pick, fi; Taylor v.
Henry, 2 Pick. 297; Pickering v.
Pickering (1840), 11 N. H. 141, 144;
Jordan v. School Dist (1854), 38
Ma 164; Moor v. Newfield (1826), 4
Me. 44 Parol evidence cannot be
admitted to show that a vote was
passed which the record does not
show. Orford v. Benton (1858), 36
N. H. 395, 403 ; Harris v. School Dist
(1853), 28 N. H. 58, 60. Nor is evi-
dence admissible of what the voters
intended to do or supposed they had
done. Adams v. Crowell (1867), 40
Vt 31, 34; Cameron v. School Dist
(1869), 42 Vt 507. The record of a
school district showed that "it was
voted that the district build a new
school-house: 16 for and 11 against
it." Evidence that seven who voted
in the afSrmative were not legal
voters in the district was properly re-
jected in replevin for property taken
by the tax collector. "The records
of the proceedings of municipal pub-
lic corporations cannot be collat-
erally attacked and overthrown by
evidence of this character." Eddy
V. Wilson (1871), 43 Vt 362. Cf.
Davis V. School Dist (1861), 43 N. H.
381, where counsel claimed to ap-
pear for a school district defendant
under authority of a vote of the dis-
trict The plaintiff offered evidence
that at a subsequent meeting the
authority was revoked. The court
admitted evidence that the vote of
revocation was passed by illegal
votes. These cases may perhaps be
reconciled on the ground that in the
former the question arose between
strangers to the proceedings, while
in the latter the dispute was between
the parties. Where, according to the
usual course of proceeding, the war-
rant is either recorded or preserved
in the oflSce of the town clerk, it can-
not be proved by parol unless a sufiB-
§§ 3Y9, 380.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 373
in an action against a town to recover a sum voted to the
plaintiff for injuries received by him while in the employ of
the town, parol evidence was admitted to show that the
amount voted was a mere gratuity and not supported by any
claim of legal liability against the town.'
§ 379. Doings of meetings not legally called. — Where a
meeting is not legally warned, all the officers that are chosen
hold their offices without authority of law, and a vote to raise
money is not binding upon the inhabitants and cannot be the
proper and legal foundation for the assessment of any tax.'
A person elected at such a meeting, though sworn into office,
can draw from that election no justification for acts done
under color of the office.' But his acts would be valid and
binding to the extent of the rule which applies to the doings
of officers d& facto.* "No one can rely upon a vote of a town
as giving him any rights against the town without proving a
sufficient notice or warning of the meeting at which it was
passed," * and an indictment against a person for illegal voting
at a town meetidg cannot be sustained unless the meeting was
legally warned.'
§380. Presumption in favor of ancient meetings. — No
presumption is indulged in favor of the essential regularity of
cient reason is shown fornotproduo- < School Dist v. Lord (1857), 44 Me.
ing the original or a certified copy. 374.
Brunswick v. McKean (1827), 4 Me. » Per Justice Gray In Bloomfleld v.
508. But it is not in the power of Charter Oak Bank (1887), 131 U. S.
a clerk to destroy the effect of the 121. A contract made with a school
action of a meeting by failing or re- district by a member thereof at a
fusing to record the proper papers to meeting not legally warned is bind-
show that the meeting was regularly ing upon neither party. School Dist
called and notified so long as clear v. Atherton (1846), 12 Met 105.
proof of those facts can be made estate v. Williams (1846), 25 Me.
aliunde. Marble v. McKenney (1873), 561. But after a decree of foreclos-
60 Me. 333. ure in favor of a town, a vote at a
• Matthews v. Westborough, 134 meeting not warned for that pur-
Mass. 555. pose extending the period of redemp-
2 Osgood V. Blake (1850), 31 N. H. tion is su£Scient in equity to prevent
' 651, 564 ; Grafton Bank v. Kimball the decree from becoming absolute
■ (1849), 20 N. H. 107. upon the day named. Daggett v.
• » Bearce v. Fossett (1852), 34 Me. Mendon (Vt, 1893), 24 Atl. Rep. 243.
575.
374r MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 381.
recent proceedings of town meetings.* But it i? otherwise
wliere from lapse of time there is a probability that the offi-
cers who made the record are no longer living, or have lost
a recollection of the facts so that no amendment can be made,
or where it is proved that such officers have deceased so that
the records cannot be corrected.^ After the lapse of thirty
years it was held that a jury might presume that a warrant
for a town meeting which was shown to have been properly
posted remained posted during the time required by law.'
The records of the proprietors of a town purporting to have
been made in 1728 contained the proceedings of a meeting
held at that time. It did not appear that there was any no-
tice for the meeting, nor did the records appear to be attested
by any clerk or recording officer, but they were produced by
the town clerk, who testified that he received them from his
predecessor in office together with the other records of the
town. They were held to be competent evidence to be sub-
mitted to a jury as to the doings of the meeting.*
§ 381. Notice of election.— Where both the time and place
of a general election are fixed by law the requirement of no-
tice is directory, and the election is not vitiated by the failure
1 Bloomfleld v. Charter Oak Bank borough v. Lancaster (1843), 14 N. H.
(1887), 131 U. S. 131 ; Cavis v. Robert- 383 (thirty-eight years sufficient),
son (1838), 9 N. H. 534, overruling a " It does not appear that the offl-
Bishop V. Cone, 3 N. H. 515. cers who made the record are dead,
2 Cavis V. Robertson, 9 N. H. 524 ; but it is a fair presumption that they
Gibson v. Bailey, 9 N. H. 168. It was have loss recollection of the fact,"
said in those cases that under such etc. Schoflf v. Gould (1872), 53 N. H.
circumstances it may be submitted 513, and cases there cited. " It is not
to a jury to presume from a defect- to be presumed that the meeting is
ive record of the election of a town not both legal and regular because
officer and from his having acted there is now no record showing that
under the appointment that the meet- it was so." Willey v. Portsmouth
ing was duly held, the proceedings (1857), 35 N. H. 303, 309. See, also,
of the town regular and the officer School Dist. v. Bragdon (1851), 33
duly sworn ; but this cannot be done N. H. 507, 514
wliere the proceedings are recent and * Adams v. Stanyan (1853), 24 N. H.
no reason is shown why the record 405, citing as to want of attestation,
cannot be amended if the truth will Sumner v. Lebec, 3 GreenL (Ma) 223.
warrant it Brownell v. Palmer, 33 The record of the choice of a person
Conn. 107 (twenty -five years suffl- as hog-reeve and field driver and
cient) ; State v. Taf t, 37 Conn. 93 proof of his service as such for one
, (fifteen years too short a time) ; Peter- year suffices for the presumption in
§ 381.]
MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS.
375
of the authorities to make the publication.^ But in the case of
special elections when either the time or place is not prescribed
by law, the provision for notice is mandatory * when notice is
necessary. An election called by an unauthorized person is
void. It has no greater validity than the unauthorized action
of a mass meeting would have.' But where notice.is to be given
by a board, a notice signed by the clerk in which it appears that
the election was ordered by the board is suificient.* Where the
statute confers upon the mayor of a city the power of pro-
claiming an election, it may be exercised in the mayor's ab-
sence by one whom the charter vests with the powers of
mayoralty in such a contingency," and the service of notice by
an officer de facto will not affect the validity of the election.*
question. Northwood v. Barrington
1838), 9 N. H. 369 (forty years).
1 Smith V. Crutcher (Ky., 1893), 18
S. W. Eep. 521 ; Paine on Elections,
§ 384, citing Carson -o. McPhetridge,
15 Ind. 337; Light v. State, 14 Kan.
489; People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 350;
People V. Porter, 6 Cal. 26 ; People v.
Weller, 6 Cal. 49 ;"People v. Brenhanir
3 Cal. 477; Cooley's Const. Lim. 759;
Bickey v. Hurlburt, 5 Cal. 843 ; State
V. Jones, 19 Ind. 421 ; s. C, 81 Am.
Dec. 408 ; People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich.
508; S. G, 86 Am. Dec. 70; City of
Lafayette v. State, 29 Ind. 318 ; Dishon
V. Smith, 10 Iowa, 313; Jones v.
Gridley, 2 Kan. 584 ; State v. Orvis, 30
Wis. 235 ; State v. Goetz, 33 Wis. 368 ;
People V. Martin, 12 Cal. 409 ; People
V. Boseborough, 1.4 CaL 180. See,
also. Commonwealth v. Smith, 132
Mass. 389; State v. Skirving, 19 Neb.
497. As to notice of vacancies to be
filled at a regular election, see Peo-
ple V. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 350 ; People v.
Weller, 11 Cal. 49; s. C, 70 Am. Dec.
754; People v. Crissey, 91 N. Y. 616;
Beal V. Ray, 17 Ind. 550 ; Bolton v.
Good, 41 N. J. L. 296 ; People v. Eos-
borough, 29 Cal. 415 ; People v. Porter,
6 Cal. 26 ; People v. Martin, 13 Cal.
409 ; Foster v. Scarfi, 15 Ohio St. 532.
a United States v. McKelden (1879),
MacArthur & Mackay, 162; Morgan
V. Gloucester City, 44 N. J. L. 187;
Kenfleld v. Irwin, 52 Cal. 104; Hub-
bard V. Williamstown, 61 Wis. 397 ;
People V. Crissey, 91 N. Y. 616 ; Had-
dox 13. Clarke County, 79 Va. 677.
Unless an election is fixed by law
there must be some notice though
none is required by the statute. Mo-
Pike u Pen (1872), 51 Mo. 63.
8 Force v. Batavia (1871), 61 111. 99.
< Smith V. Board County Comm'rs
(1891), 45 Fed. Eep. 725. See, also, Will-
iams V. People (1890), 132 111. 574, and
§351, supra An error in the procla-
mation must, in order to invalidate
the election, appear from proofs or
by necessary intendment to have so
affected the election as to have
changed the result On this point
the court will not indulge m specula-
tion or mere conjecture. In re Peti-
tion of Cleveland, 51 N. J. Law, 319 ;
S.-C., 52 N. J. Law, 188; 80 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 230. See, also, San
Luis County v. White (1890), 91 Cal.
483. where the clerk affixed a scroll
to the proclamation instead of a seal
required by statute.
s/n re Petition of Cleveland, 51
N. J. Law, 819; s. G, 52 N. J. Law,
188; 80 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 280.
6 Bird V. Merrick, L. & E. 115.
376
MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS.
[§ 382.
§ 382. Qualifications of Toters — Power to prescribe.— The
qualifications of voters are fixed by the constitutions or stat-
utes of the States, and the right of each State to define the
qualifications of its voters is complete and perfect, except so
far as it is controlled by the fifteenth article of the amend-
ments to the constitution of the United States, which provides
that " the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, «r previous condition of servi-
tude." ' But it is not competent for the legislature to add a
substantive qualification to those prescribed by the constitu-
tion, unless that instrument confers the power in express
terms or by necessary implication.'* Thus, where the consti-
tution requires residence in the State for a certain period, a
statute which requires residence in the ward, city or town-
ship is void.' And a provision in a village charter limiting
the right to vote to those who have resided within the village
for twenty days immediately preceding the election conflicts
with a constitution prescribing residence for no definite period.*
J Blair v. Eidgely, 41 Mo. 63 ; S. C,
97 Am. Deo. 248 ; Anderson v. Baker,
23 Md. 531; United States v. Reese,
92 U. S. 214 ; United States v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U. S. 542 ; Minor v. Hap-
perselt, 21 Wall. 162; Kinneen v.
Wells, 144 Mass. 497; S. C, 59 Am.
Eep. 105 ; Van Valkenburg v. Brown,
43 Cal. 43 ; s. C, 13 Am. Eep. 136 ;
Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. St 122 ; Rid-
ley V. Sherbrook, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 509 ;
United States v. Anthony, 11 Blatch.
(U. S. C. C.) 200 ; State v. Staten, 6
Cold. (Tenn.) 233. The State may also
regulate nominating conveintions and
caucuses. ; Leonard v. . Common-
wealth, 113 Pa. St. 607 ; In re House
Bill, 9 Colo. 634.
2 Page V. Hardin, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.)
648 ; Quinn v. State, 35 Ind. 485 ; s. C,
9 Am. Rep. 764; Rison v. Farr, 34
Ark. 161; s. C, 87 Am. Deo. 53;
Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189 ; Clay-
ton n Harris, 7 Nev. 64; State v.
Symouds, 57 He. 148 ; State v. Con-
ner, 22 Neb. 265 ; s. C, 3 Am. St Repk
367; 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 453;
Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass._ 497;
s. c, 59 Am. Rep. 105 ; St Joseph &a
R. Co. V, Buchanan County Coiirt, 39
Mo. 485 ; Barker v. People, 3 Cowen,
686 ; s. c, 15 Am. Dec. 322 ; People
V. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198; 21 Am.
Rep. 465 ; White v. Comm'r, 13 Ore-
gon, 317; s. c, 57 Am. Rep. 20, note
Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St 665
Daggett V. Hudson, 43 Ohio St 546
S. C, 54 Am. Rep. 833; State v. Con-
Btantine, 43 Ohio St 437; s. c, 51
Am. Rep. 833 ; State v. Tuttle, 53 Wis.
45 ; State v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71 ; State
V. Williams, 5 Wis. 308 ; Davies v.
McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369 ; State v. Staten,
6 Cold. (Tenn.) 233; United States v.
Slater, 4 Woods (U. S. C. C), 356;
Randolph x\ Good, 3 West Va. 551 ;
McCaflferty v. Guyer, 59 Pa. St 109.
' Quinn v. State, 35 Ind. 485 ; S. C,
9 Am. Rep. 754.
. «State V. Tuttie, 53 Wi8.45. See,
§ 383.]
MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS.
377
An act which restricts the right to vote to taxable inhabitants
is repugnant to a constitution which is silent respecting prop-
erty qualification.^
§ 383. Eegistration acts. — It is held by the decided weight
of authority that when the constitution is silent on the sub-
ject of registration it is competent for the legislature to re-
quire voters to be registered a reasonable time before the
election, or to be debarred of the right to vote.^ " The true
rule is that whenever a registration is ordered it should give
the voters an opportunity as near the day of election as prac-
ticable for qualifying themselves as electors. All the authori-
ties agree in holding that if the length of time between the
closing of the registration and the election is unreasonable,
the election should be held void." ' Accordingly a law which
also, People v. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198;
S. C., 21 Am. Rep. 465 ; Kinneen v.
Wells, 144 Mass. 497.
1 St. Joseph &c. E. Co. v. Buchanan
County Court, 39 Mo. 485. Of. Mc-
Mahon v. Mayor &c., 66 Ga. 217 ; S. C,
42 Am. Rep. 65 ; Buckner v. Gordon,
81 Ky. 665.
2Capen v. i'oster, 13 Pick. 485;
S. C 23 Am. Dec. 633 ; Hyde v. Brush,
34 Conn. 454 ; People v. Kopplekom,
16 Mich. 343 ; Edmunds v. Banbury,
28 Iowa, 267; S. C, 4 Am. Rep. 177;
People V. Laine, 33 Cal. 55 ; Webster
V. Byrnes, 34 Cal. 273 ; Byler v. Asher,
47 ni. 101 ; People v. Wilson, 63 N. Y.
188; Davis v. School Dist, 44 N. H.
398 ; Patterson v. Barlow, 60 Pa. St.
54; Auld v. Walton, 12 La. Ann. 129;
Harris v. Whitcomb, 4 Gray, 433;
Smith n City of Wilmington, 98 N. C.
343 ; Sutherland v. Goldsborough, 98
N. C. 49; S. C, 17 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 393 ; Duke v. Brown, 98 N. C.
123; McDowell v. Construction Co.,
98 N. C. 514; Woods v. Oxford, 97
N. C. 237 ; State v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71 ;
Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St 6d5 ;
Daggett V. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548 ;
S. a, 54 Am. Rep. 833; State v. Butts
(1884), 31 Kan. 537; In re Polling
Lists, 13 R. 1 729; People v. Hoff-
man, 116 111. 587 ; S. c, 56 Am. Rep.
793 ; Stephens v. Mayor (1890), 84 Ga,
630 ; s. c, 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
383; State v. Conner, 33 Neb. 265;
S. C., 3 Am. St Rep. 267 ; 17 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 453; McMahon v.
Mayor, 66 Ga. 217 ; S. C, 42 Am. Rep.
65; People v. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198;
Commonwealth v. McClelland, 83
Ky. 686. See, also, Kinneen v. Wells,
144 Mass. 497 ; S. c, 59 Am. Rep. 105 ;
Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.) 756 et
seq.; McCrary on Elections, § 95 et
seq.; Paine on Elections, § 840 et seq.;
Mechem on Public OfiSces and Offi-
cers, § 149. Contra, Page v. Allen, 58
Pa. St 338; Dells v. Kennedy, 49
Wis. 555 ; White v. Comra'rs, 13 Ore-
gon, 817 ; 54 Am. Rep. 832, note ; 12
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 485. State v.
Conner (1887), 33 Neb. 265, holds that
the voter cannot be deprived of the
right to register at any time before
the closing of the polls.
» Stephens v. Mayor (1890), 84 Ga.
630 ; s. c, 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
282. Laws regulating the exercise
of the right of suffrage must be rea-
378 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS, [§ 384.
allowed only seven days in the year for voters to register was
declared to be subversive of constitutional right and therefore
void.' And a statute providing that no person thereafter nat-
uralized should be entitled to be registered within thirty days
after such naturalization was open to the same objection,* but
an act fixing three weeks before the election, for the comple-
tion of the registry was sustained.'
§ 384. Place of election. — "Wibere a statute incorporating a
municipality enumerates the ofiicers to be chosen and pre-
scribes the qualifications of voters, but does not designate
any polling place, the voters have the implied right to supply
the oniission.* But if elections are required by law to be
held at fixed times and places these cannot be changed except
by direct legislative authority.'. Time "and place are of the,
substance of every election, and statutory provisions by which
they are definitely fixed are mandatory and must be obeyed.*
Where the polls were opened a,t a distance of three miles from
the place appointed without any just excuse the election was
void.' Chief Justice Thompson, of the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, expounded the law in point as follows : — " I will not
Bouable, uniform and impartial, and has been duly registered he continues
must be calculated to facilitate and' to have the right to vote until he loses
secure rather than to subvert or im- or is dispossessed of it according to
pede the exercise of the right to vote. law. Where the mayor and aldermen
Daggett V. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548 ; without authority ordered a new reg-
Monroe v, Collins, 17 Ohio St. 666, istration, the election was void.
687. Smith v. City of Wilmington, 98 N. C.
1 Daggett V. Hudson, 43 Ohio St 348.
548 ; S. C, 54 Am. Rep. 832. * State v. Burbridge (1888), 34 Fla.
2Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497; 113.
s. c, 59 Am. Rep. 105. This was be- ^Oity Council v. Youmans (1890),
cause the regulation was not uniform 85 Ga. 708, 713.
and impartial. SMcCrary on Elections (3d ed.),
3 People V. Hoffman, 116 111. 587 ; § 141 ; Paine on Elections, § 337.
S. C, 56 Am, Eep. 793. And ten days 'Heyfron v. Mahoney (1890), 9
was held reasonabla State v. Butts, Mont 497 ; Knowles v. Yates, 31 CaL
81 Kan. 537. For unreasonable regis- 93. See, also. Commonwealth v.
tration laws, see City of Owensborov. County Conim'i-s, 5 Eawie (Pa.), 75 ;
Hickman (Ky.), 14 S. W. Rep. 688 ; Juker v. Commonwealth, 30 Pa. St
Morris v. Powell, 135 Ind. 381 ; S. C, 484 ; Miller v. English, 31 N. J. Law,
35 N. E. Rep. 231 : Stephens v. Mayor, 817 ; Ex parte Robinson, 3 Pugsley,
84 Ga. 680. When an eligible person 389.
§ 385.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 379
say that in case of the destruction of a designated building on
th6 eve of an election, the election might not be held on the
same or contiguous ground as a matter of necessity — neoes-
sitas non hdbet legem. But then the necessity must be abso-
lute, discarding all mere ideas of convenience. ... To
move the place of an election three miles from that designated
by law or to a place more than half a mile distant therefrom
without authority or any absolute controlling circumstances
must render the election therein void." ' But the circum-
stances which do not affect the result when the place desig-
nated has been changed are shown in another case where the
polls were opened a short distance from and in plain view of
the place appointed, the owner of the house selected haying
objected to the use of it for that purpose, and no voter being
misled or deprived of his vote. The court held that the elec-
tion was legal.*
§ 385. The same subject continned. — A statute provided
that " whenever it shall become impossible or inconvenient to
hold a town meeting at the place designated therefor, the
town board of inspectors, after having assembled at or as near
as practicable to such p]ace and opened the meeting and be-
fore receiving any votes, may adjourn such meeting to the
nearest convenient place for holding the same." They were
also required to make proclamation of the adjournment and
to station a proper person at the door to notify electors as
they arrived. Polls were to be opened at town meetings at
9 o'clock. The record showed that a meeting was legally
called, and upon motion it was voted to adjourn to a certain
place where the board met pursuant to the adjournment and
c ailed the meeting to order at 9 o'clock. The court held that
the law would presume the first meeting to have been ppened
only a few minutes before 9 ; that whether the place was im-
possible or inconvenient and whether the adjourned meeting
was held at the nearest and most convenient place were mat-
ters solely for the judgment of the board ; and that a failure to
make proclamation or to station any one at the door to give
notice would not avoid" the election unless there was aflBrma-
1 Melvin's Case, 68 Pa. St. 338. 61 Miss. 556 ; Farrington u Turner,
2 Preston v. Culbertson, .58 Cal. 209 ; 53 Mich. 27 ; Wakefield v, Patterson,
in quattuorpedibua, Dale v. Irwin, 78 25 Kan. 709.
ID. 180. See, also, State v. Calhoun,
380 MEETINGS AOTJ ELBC3TI0NS. [§§ 386, 387.
tive proof that the electors were thereby kept from the meet-
ing.* The neglect to close the polls at the prescribed time is
not a fatal irregularity if the result of the election is not af-
fected.^ And an election was pronounced valid where the
closing of the polls was one hour premature, no elector being
thereby deprived of his right.'
§ 386. Popular elections — Plurality. — " It is the theory
and general practice of our government that the candidate
who has but a minority of the legal votes cast does not be-
come a duly elected officer. But it is also the theory and
practice of our government that a minority of the whole body
of qualified electors may elect to an office, when a majority
of that body refuse or decline to vote for any one for that
office. Those of them who are absent from the polls in
theory and practical result are assumed to assent to the ac-
tion of those who go to the polls." * Furthermore, it is not
necessary that a candidate for office shall have an absolute
majority of all the votes cast at a popular election. " At an
ellectiori, by common law, it is only necessary that there
should be a majority for one candidate over every other [any
other] candidate. There may be as many candidates as there
are electors, l6ss one, and the votes of two would carry the
election, however numerous the electors, if all the others voted
for separate candidates, and the vote of one would be a law-
ful election if no other elector voted.*
§ 387. The same subject continued — Majorities^ etc. — The
following expressions in statutory or constitutional provisions
as to an election have been held to mean a majority, two-thirds
1 Wisconsin Cent R. Co. v. Ashland pressed will of the majority of those
County (Wis., 1891), 50 N. W. Rep. voting, unless the law providing for
937. the election otherwise declares. Any
2 Holland v. Davies, 36 Ark. 446 ; other rule would be pi-oductive of tho
Knox County v. Davis, 63 IlL 405 ; greatest inconvenience, and ought
Cleland v. Porter, 74 Hi 76. not to be adopted unless the legis-
' People V. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67. lative will to that effect is clearly
* Per Folger, J., in People v. Clute, expressed." Cass County v. Johnston,
50 N. Y. 451, 461 ; Verbeck v. Scott, 95 U. S. 360, 369, per Waite, C. J.
71 Wis. 59; Rex v. Varlo, Cowp. 250; « Gosling v. Veley, 4 H. of L. Cas.
Field V. Field, 9 Wend. 394. "All 679, 740 (1853), per Martin, Baron;
qualified voters who absent them- Throop on Public Agents, § 189, cit-
selves from an election duly called -ing Paine on Elections, §§ 173, 174;
are presumed to assent to the ex- Naar on Elections, 147 ; • Cooley'a
§'387.]
MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS.
381
etc., as the case may be, of those actually voting, and not a ma-
'jority of all who might have voted: "a majority of such electr
ors," ' " two-thirds of such qualified voters," ^ " wishes of a ma-
jority of the members . . . expressed at a church election," '
" majority of the legal voters," * " two-thirds of the qualified
voters of the township voting at such election," ° "three-fifths
of the voters of said city," * " three-firths of the voters therein
voting," ' " two-thirds of the qualified voters," ' " majority of
the voters," * " majority of the legal voters." "•
Const Lim. (Sth ed.) 779. See, also,
State V. Green, 37 Ohio St. 237;
People V. Clute, 50 N. Y. 451, 461 ;
Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. 52
(1889) ; S. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 423 ; L. R A.
308. And especially Conrad i'. Stone
(1889), 78 Mich. 635, 639, cited in § 156,
supra, where the plurality rule was
applied to elections by delinite bodies,
and a fortiori that doctrine would
govern in popular elections. State
V. Wilmington (1840), 3 Harr. (Del.)
294, lays down a contraiy rule as
the common law, but Harrington, J.,
dissented, "as it would seem, with
reason," says Judge Dillon. Dillon
on Munic. Corp., § 377, n. A dictum in
State V. Fagau (1875), 43 Conn. 33, 35,
is squarely opposed to the text The
matter in issue was the validity of a
(popular) school district election. The
court said : — "Viewing the questions
raised in this case to be determined,
as we do, entirely by statute, it is
quite unnecessary to consider what
the rule of the common law may be
as to- the effect of a plurality vote, or
the necessity for a majority vote to
make a valid election. Our govern-
ment and our institutions rest on
the principle that controlling power
is vested in the majority. In the
absence of any provision by law to
the contrary, the will of any com-
munity or association, body politic or
corporate, is properly declared only
by the voice of the majority. "
» Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107 ;
Bayard v. Klinge, 16 Minn. 249; Ev-
erett V. Smith, 32 Minn. 53.
2 State V. Renick, 37 Mo. 270. See,
also. State v. Binder, 38 Mo. 450.
' Craig V. First Presbyt'n Church,
88 Penn. St 43.
* St Joseph Twp. V. Rogers, 16 Wall
644.
"■ Cass County v, Johnston, 95 U. S.
360.
6Yesler v. Seattle, 1 Wash. 308;
s. c, 25 Pac Rep. 1014.
' Metcalfe v. Seattle, 1 Wash. 297 ;
a C, 25 Pac. Rep. 1010; State v.
Snodgrass, 1 Wash. 305 ; s. C 35 Pac.
Rep. 1014.
8 Carroll County w Smith (1883), 111
IT. S. 556. Contra, State v. Sutter-
field, 54 Mo. 391; Southerland u
Goldsboro, 96 N. C. 49.
" Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Davidson
County Court 1 Sneed (Tenn.), 687 ;
People V. Wiant 48 111. 363 ; People v.
Warfleld, 20 111. 159; People v. Gar-
ner, 47 111. 346, holding that the vote
cast at a general election is prima
facie evidence of the number of legal
voters in the county ; Taylor v. Tay-
lor, 10 Minn. 107, to the same point ;
State V. Binder, 38 Mo. 450. Contra,
People V. Brown, 11 III 478; "a vote
of the majority of qualified voters
therein," Chester &o. R. Co. v. Cald-
well County, 72 N. C. 486.
1' Legal voter means a "qualified
elector " who does in fact vote. San-
t
382 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§§ 388, 389.
§ 388. Toting by ballot. — Where a statute provides that
the election of certain ofBcers at a town meeting shall be by
ballot if called for, this does not necessarily imply that they
must be voted for each upon a separate and single ballot and
in succession, one after another. It would be competent for
the meeting to direct by vote properly taken that all the offi-
cers to be elected, or a part of them as might be deemed ex-
pedient, be voted for together on Ihe same ballot in a manner
similar to that in which State and county officers are voted
for. This would give each voter the right and opportunity
to cast his vote for the very man of his choice for each office
by making up his ballot with the names of such men. But
this cannot be done where a ticket is nominated by a com-
mittee and the voters are required to accept or reject the
whole report. The privilege of voting for some of the nom-
inees and against the rest, apd for somebody else in their
stead — to scratch the ticket as 'the modern expression is —
cannot be lawfully denied to the voter. And although the
mode of voting on a ticket as an entirety may have been used
without objection in previous meetings, it does not become
binding upon any one. It is not a case for the loss of a right
by non-user or acquiescence or the gaining of a right by ad-
verse use.*
§ 389. The same subject cootinued. — At a village meet-
ing a ballot was taken for moderator. Many were present
besides lawful voters, who were mixed indiscriminately in the
crowd and were participating in the excitement and uproar
that characterized the scene. Tellers with hats made their
way through the crowd, and it was impossible to know
whether some voters, legal or illegal, did not deposit more
ford V. Prentice, S8 Wis. 358. " Pro- the legislature shall have no power
vided that a majority of," etc., " shall to remove a county seat, and that no
be present . . . and shall vote," county seat shall be removed unless
prevents action by less than a major- a majority of the electors vote for its
ity of the whola Point Pleasant Land removal, the legislature may pro-
Co. V. Trustees, 47 N. J. Law, 235 ; vide that there shall be no removal
Quaid V. Trustees, 49 N. J. Law, 607. unless two-thir'ds of the electors vote
See, also.an article by Irving Browne, for it Alexander v. People, 7 Cola
Esq., on " What Constitutes a Major- 155.
ity of Electors? " in 23 Alb. L. J. 44. > State v. Harris (1879), 52 Vt 216,
Under a constitutional provision that 326,
§ 390.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 383
than a single vote, or that a single voter did not put a vote
or votes into more than one hat. The court in condemning
the proceedings said : — " However proper such a mode of vot-
ing may be on some special occasions when the voters are few
and are well known and reliable men, and the excitement of
hostile interests is not operating to prompt to anything but
fair and legal ^voting, and when it would at once be manifest
if illegal votes should be cast, nothing that could be said upon
the subject could make more palpable the gross impropriety
of taking the vote as it was done in this case. It was but a
burlesque and a mockery of all sensible and sober ideas of a
ballot answerable to the lawful right of the citizen and to the
soundness with which the exercise of that right is hallowed
in the speech, at least,, of the demagogue, as well as of the in-
genuous citizen. It is of no avail to say that it was diflBcult
to take the vote in any other way. It would have been in
point and cogent to answer that it better not have been taken
at all than to be taken as it was. It is at the bottom of all
honest and just ideas of a proper vote that some mode should
be adopted by which it may be known by persons authorized
to determine a questioned right to vote what persons offer to
oast votes, or to vote by voice or by count, that the right of
any such may be challenged and properly determined, and
that in voting by ballot it may, with all practicable certainty,
be known whether more votes have been cast than there are
legal voters to cast them." '
§ 390. The Australian ballot and cumnlative voting. —
The Australian ballot system, as it is called, has been adopted
by statute in many of the States.^ The main feature of this
system is that each voter is provided with an official ballot.
• State V. Harris (1879), 52 Vt 316, moderator who is illegally chosen
232. The court held that quo war- presides at a meeting, and a distinct
' ranto lies against a modei-ator elected and contemporaneous protest is made,
by the vote of those who had no right' it is at least doubtful if the pro.ceed-
to vote, and that where the statute ings are of any validity whatever.
requires an election to be by ballot, See on this point, § 361, n. 6, supra.
"if called for," it is the right of a ^por an enumeration of the States
'single voter to have a ballot upon and a citation of the legislative acts,
his demand when heard and under- see Amer. Dig. Ann. 1891, p. 1417,
stood by the presiding officer. If a § 66.
384 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 391.
Upon this the names of the candidates are printed, and the use
of any other paper as a ballot is forbidden. Bat blank spaces
are left for the insertion of any names that may be desired.
These statijtes are not in conflict with the constitutional re-
quirement that " elections shall be free and equal," althougli
the privilege of having ballots printed at the expense of the
State is granted only when the number of those who support
a particular ticket is equal to a certain percentage of the whole
number of votes cast at a previous election.' An attempt has
been made in Ohio and Michigan to provide for minority rep-
resentation by statute in the absence of express constitutional
authority, and in New York there has been legislation sanc-
tioning cumulative voting in certain cases. The Supreme
Court of Ohio held that every eledtor is entitled to vote for
every candidate who is to be elected, and a law which denied
the right to vote for more than two of the persons to be chosen
was declared to be unconstitutional.' And this rule has been
followed in Michigan.' The question has been twice before
the Court of Appeals of New York, but that tribunal has found
a way of disposing of the cases without passing upon the con-
stitutionality of the law.* It is significant, however, that all
the other States which have authorized such voting have sub-
mitted it to the people for their adoption as part of their fun-
damental law, and it is not likely that it can be successfully
Introduced in any other way.
§ 391. Absolnte accuracy not required in a ballot. — Vot-
ing is usually required to be by ballot, but that method is not
imperative in the absence of such a requirement.* Voting by
proxy is not permitted, but a ballot deposited by another in
the voter's presence and at his request would not be rejected.*
The names of the persons voted for should be expressed with
' be Walt V. Lackawanna County * People v. Crissey, 91 N. T. 616 ;
(Pa., 1893), 24 Atl. Rep. 185 ; State v. People v. Kenney, 96 N. Y. 294.
McMillan (Mo., 1891), 18 S. W. Rep. sMechem on Public Offices and
784, Officers, § 190.
2 State V. Constantine, 43 Ohio St ^ Opinion of Judges, 41 N. H. B51 ;
437. See, also. Hays v. Common- s. c, 11 Am. Law Reg, 743 ; People
wealth, 83 Pa. St 518. v. Blodgett 13 Mich. 137; Clark v.
' Maynard v. Board of Canvassers Robinson, 88 IlL 498.
(1889), 84 Mich. 238.
§ 391.J
MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS.
385
reasonable certainty, but incorrect spelling will not vitiate a
ballot if the name is idem sonans. The rule was recently
stated by the Supreme Court of Illinois, as follows: — "A bal-
lot is indicative of the will of the voter. It is not required
that it should be nicely oi^ accurately written, or that the
name of the candidate voted for should be correctly spelled.
It should be read in the light of all the circumstances sur-
rounding the election and the voter, and the object should be
to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter,
if it can be determined with reasonable certainty. The bal-
lot should be liberally construed, and the intendments should
be in favor of a reading and construction which will render
the ballot effective rather than in favor of a conclusion which
will on some technical ground render it ineffective. At the
same time it is not admissible to show that something was
•intended which is contradictory of what was done, and if the
ballot is so defective as to fail to show any intention what-
ever, it must be disregarded." *
1 Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz (1891),
135 111. 591 ; S. C, 26 N. E. Rep. 704.
Accordingly, in that case, where the
plaintiff was a candidate and his
name, though properly pronounced
in four syllables, was sometimes
syncopate into two, it was held law-
ful to count for him ballots on
which the name was written re-
spectively : Behrenmeyer, Behrs-
meyer, Bauersmyer, Bernshmyer,
Benshniyer, Benshmyre, Benere,
Bensmyer, BemsmerS, Bornsmoer,
Berhensmeyer, Berlistmeyer, Ber-
ensmyer, Bernmyer, Bernsmier,
Behrensmier, Benmyr, Berenmyer,
Behmsmeyer, Berntsmire, Behrene,
Behrn, Benhmyer. Berhenmeyer and
Behrsyer. Considerable deviations
and omissions are allowed where
there is no other candidate of the
same name, such as the omission of
a middle letter. People v. Kennedy,
37 Mich. 67 ; State v. Gates, 43 Conn.
533 (a wrong middle letter. Cf.
Opinion of Judges, 88 Me. 597); or
S5
of a suflSx, People v. Cook, 14 Barb.
259 ; S. C, 59 Am. Dec. 451. Initials
of the first name are suiScient. At-
torney-General V. Ely, 4 Wis. 420;
People V. Ferguson, 8 Cowcn, 102;
People V. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409;
People V. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67 ; Chapman
V. Ferguson, 1 Barb. 267. Contra,
People V. Tisdale, 1 Dougl. 59;
People V. Higgins. 3 Mich. 233 ; S. c,
61 Am. Dec. 491; People v. Cicott,
16 Mich. 288 ; s. c, 97 Am. Dec 141.
See, also. Opinion of Judges, 64 Me.
596; Clark v. County Examiners,
126 Mass. 282. Common abbrevia-
tions of the first name are not fatal.
Regina v. Bradley, 3 El. & El. 684;
People V. Ferguson, 8 Cowen, 102;
Chumasero v. Gilbert, 26 111. 39; Gil-
ham V. Bank, 2 Scam. 245 ; Bank v.
Peel, 11 Ark. 750. Nor in one case
was its total omission. Talkington
V. Turner, 71 111. 284. But if there is
a radical departure the ballot must
be thrown out People v. Cicott, 16
Mich. 283; State v. Judge, 13 Ala.
386
MEETINGS AMD ELECTIONS.
[§ 392.
§ 392. Votes for ineligible candidates. — It is the rule in
England that if an ineligible candidate has a majority of valid
votes the person having the next highest number is not elected,
and there must be a new election. If the voter is ignorant of
the fact of disqualification,^ or of disqualification as a conclu-
sion of law,^ his vote is valid for the purpose of being counted,'
In the United States " the great current of authority sustains
the doctrine that the ineligibility of the majority candidate
does not elect the minority candijjate, and this without refer-
ence to the question as to whether the voters knew of the in-
eligibility of the candidate for whom they voted. It is consid-
ered that in such a case the votes for the ineligible candidate
are not void." * But the authorities are not entirely uniform.
Thus, in New York as in England knowledge is an element in
the case, but information of both fact and law must be brought
directly to the notice of the voter in order to render the vote
a nullity ; * while in Indiana it is held that voters are conclu-
805. See, also, on this subject, Faine
on Elections, §§ 540 et seq.; Mecbem
on Public Offices and Officers, §§ 199
et seq.
1 Gosling V. Veley, 7 AA & EL (N. a)
406 ; s. c, 4 H. of L. Gas. 679 ; Regina
V. Tewkesbury, 3 L. R Q. B. 629 ; Re-
gina V. Coaks, 3 El. & Bl. 249 ; Cla-
ridge v. Evelyn, 5 Bam. & Aid. 81 ;
R9X V. Monday, 3 Cowp. 530; Rex
V. Hawkins, 10 East, 211; Rez v.
Bridge, 1 M. & S. 76.
2 Regina v. Tewkesbury, 3 L. R. Q.
B. 629, holding that the maxim igno-
rantia legis non exeusat has no ap-
plication.
3 See, also, for the rule in Ireland,
In re Tipperaiy Eleo., 9 Ir. R. 0. L.
217 ; Regina v. Franklin, 6 Ir. R G
L. 333 ; Trench v. Nolan, 6 Ir. R C.
L. 464 ; s. a, 27 L. T. R 89. But the
next highest candidate is elected if
the ineligibility both as to fact and
law was known and notorious. King
V. Hawkins, 10 East, 211 ; King v.
Parry, 14 East, 540 ; Gosling v. Veley,
7 Q. B. 406 ; Rex v. Monday, 2 Cowpt
530; Rex v. Foxcroft, Burr. 1017;
Regina v. Coaks, 3 El. & B. 249;
Trench v. Nolan, 2 Moak, 711. See,
also, Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.) 780.
* Privett V. Bickford, 26 Kan. 52,
57 ; Crawford v. Dunbar, 53 CaL 36 ;
Saunders v. Haynes, 13 Cal. 145; In
re Corliss, 11 R I 638; State r. Smith,
11 Wis. 65; State v. Smith, 14 Wis.
497 ; People v. Molitor, 23 Mich. 341 ;
Hoskins v. Brantley, 57 Miss. 814 ;
Sublett V. Bedwell, 47 Miss. 266 ; s. C.,
12 Am. Rep. 338; Wood v. Bartling,
16 Kan. 109, 114; Barnum v. Gilman,
37 Minn. 466 ; State v. Gastineau, 20
La. Ann. 114; State v. BoaX, 46 Mo.
528 ; State v. Vail, 53 Mo. 97 ; Dryden
V. Swinburne, 20 West Va. 89; Com-
monwealth V. Cluley, 56 Pa St 270;
State V. Walsh, 7 Ma App. 142, where
the death of the majority candidate
before the polls were opened, though
it was known to the voters, did not
result in giving the election to the
next highest
6 People V. Qute, 60 N. T. 451.
§ 393.] MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 387
sively presumed to know of a candidate's constitutional dis-
qualification by reason of holding another office within the
election district, and the next highest candidate is elected.*
§393. Putting up offices at auction^ — Tax collector. —
The office of tax collector was set up at auction in a town
meeting and struck oflf to the lowest bidder, and the town
afterwards at the same meeting chose the same person col-
lector. It was held that the proceeding was illegal. The
court said : — " Of the impropriety of putting up any office at
auction I can entertain no doubt. . . . The direct tend^-
ency of such a practice is to introduce unsuitable persons
into public employment — to induce the electors to give their
suffrages to him who will work cheapest instead of him who
is best qualified. And if an office which is supposed to be
onerous and to deserve compensation may be offered to him
who is disposed to serve for the lowest wages, it is not appar*
ent why those to which some honor is attached may not be
offered to him who is willing to give most for the privilege
of executing them. The formality of an election may be had
afterwards in the one case as well as in the other. In fact,
the office of collector has, in one instance at least, been deemed
such an object of competition as. to produce an offer of a nom-
inal even if it was not an actual consideration duly paid. In
a case recently tried in another county the following was
among the records produced : — ' Voted, that the coUectorship
should be set up to the best bidder. J M agreed to
give one and a half mugs of toddy for the privilege of collect-
ing.' No evidence of the impropriety of setting up the office
at auction more conclusive than this would be desired or farr
nished. And there is no necessity for such a practice. The
town may fix upon a suitable compensation in the first in-
stance; or it may be left for such compensation to be after-
wards made as the services rendered shall appear to demand ;
and in either case there is no inducement to elect an unsuit-
able persan," *
1 Gulick V. New, 14 Ind 93. See, « Per Parker, J., in Tucker v. Aiken
also, Hatcheson v. Tilden, 4 Harr. & (1834), 7 N. H. 118, 129, 130. Biit the
Mca (Md.) 379; State v. Boal, 46 Mo, court lield that the collector was an
588. oflacer de facto. Bichardaon, 0. J.,
388 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. [§ 394
§ 394. City council as judge of election and qualification
of its members. — It is the settled doctrine in some juris-
dictions that where provision is made by statute for contest-
ing elections, the statutory proceeding is the exclusive rem-
edy .^ But the weight of authority is to the contrary, holding
that where common councils are made the judges of the elec-
tions and qualifications of their members the common-law
remedy of guo warranto is not prohibited unless the power of
the council is expressly declared^ to be final.^ And where
there is no such office as that which a claimant assumes to fill;
or there is no authority for his election thereto, the attempt
by him to exercise its functions is a mere usurpation. In such
a case a proceeding to contest his election is inapplicable and
inappropriate, and if the public exigencies demand it he may
be ousted by quo warramto; as, for instance, where a person
claims to be elected a member of a council from a ward which
has no legal existence,' or from a ward which is already fully
represented.'* In the latter case the court said : — " The Su-
preme Court cannot inquire whether the election was regu-
larly conducted, for that duty belongs to the branch of the
council in which the seat is claimed ; but they can decide the
question whether there was an office or vacancy to be filled." '
in a concurring opinion said: — "A pie v. Harshaw, 60 Mich. 200; Com-
coUector thus chosen is not fit to be monwealth v. Leech, 44 Pa. St 333.
trusted with the power to seize the Cf. Commonwealth v. Allen, 70 Pa.
goods and arrest the bodies of citi- St. 465.
zens, especially of citizens who did ^ McVeany v. Mayor &c., 80 N. Y.
not concur in the choice. And if an 185; People {;( Hall, 80 N. Y. 117;
action of trespass had been brought State v. Kempf, 69 Wis. 470 ; s. C., 17
against (the defendant) for taking Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 388 ; State v.
the goods mentioned ... he Gates, 35 Minn. 385 ; Board of Alder-
would probably have found it very Topn v. Darrow, 13 Colo. 460 ; s. C.,
difficult to show a legal defense." 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 343 ; People
S. c, p. 140. See, also. Proprietors v. Londoner, 13 Colo. 303; State v.
&c. V. Page (1838), 6 N. H. 183. Kraft (Ore.), 30 Am. & Eng. Corp.
1 State V. Marlow, 15 Ohio St 114; Cas. 337.
State V. Berry, 14 Ohio St 815 ; State ' State v. O'Brien, 47 Ohio St 464 ;
V. Berry, 47 Ohio St 333 ; State v. s. c, 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 361.
O'Brien, 47 Ohio St 464 ; s. C, 34 Am. * Commonwealth v. Meeser, 44 Pa.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 361; People v. St 341.
Metzker, 47 Cal. 534 (see, however, * Commonwealth v, Meeser, 44 Pa.
People V. Bingham, 83 CaL 338) ; Pec- St 841.
§ 395.]
MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS.
389
§ 395. Canyass and return and contest of elections. — "It
is well settled that the duties of canvassing officers and boards
are ministerial merely, and not judicial. Their duty is to
count the votes as cast, and they have no authority, unless
expressly granted, to hear evidence or to pass upon or correct
alleged errors, irregularities or frauds." ' Genuine and reg-
ular returns are to be accepted without question by the can-
vassers, whose function is simply to declare the apparent
result of the voting, and not to investigate or pass upon the
legality of the election." They may be compelled to act by
mandamus; ' and when they have completed their task their
powers are exhausted and they become funati officio.^ The
common-law remedy for a defeated candidate who wishes to
contest the finding and certificate of election is by an infor-
mation in the nature of a qno warranto; but where the stat-
ute prescribes the mode of procedure it is generally exclusive.'
' Mechem's Public Offices and Offi-
cers, § 208, citing People v. Van
Cleve, 1 Mich. 363 ; & a, 53 Am. Dec
69; People u Cicott, 16 Mich. 331;
& C, 97 Am. Dec. 141; Morgan v.
Quackenbush, 33 Barb. 73 ; Dalton v.
State, 43 Ohio St 653 ; s. c, 1 West
Kep. 773; Opinions of Judges, 58
N. H. 621 ; State v. Steers, 44 Mo. 223 ;
People u Van Slyck, 4 Cowon, 397 ;
Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 47 ; Dishon
V. Smith, 10 Iowa, 212; State v.
Cavers, 32 Iowa, 343; Attorney-
General V. Barstow, 4 Wis. 749 ; State
V. Rodman, 43 Mo. 256 ; State v. Har-
rison, 38 Mo. 540 ; Taylor v. Taylor,
10 Minn. 107; O'Fenall v. Colby, 3
Minn. 180; Leigh v. State, 69 Ala.
261 ; State v. Wilson (Neb.), 88 N. W.
Rep. 31 ; Maxwell v. Tolly, 36 S. C.
77; IS. E. Rep. 160.
2 Paine on Elections, § 603 ; Lewis
V. Comm'rs, 16 Kan. 103; State v.
Canvassers, 17 Fla. 39; Peebles v.
Comm'rs, 83 N. C. 385 ; State v. Steers,
44 Mo. 334, "They have no discre-
tion to hear and take proof as to
frauds, even if morally certain that
monstrous frauds have been perpe^
trated." Attorney-General v. Bar-
stow, 4 Wis. 567.
3 Brown v. Rush County (Kan.), 17
Pac. Rep. 304 ; Lewis v. Comm'rs, 16
Kan. 103; s. c., 33 Am. Rep. 375;
State V. County Comm'rs, 33 Kan.
364; State v. Wilson (Neb.), 38 N. W,
Rep. 31; State v. Hill, 10 Neb. 58;
Magee v. Supervisors, 10 Oal. 376;
Kisler v. Cameron, 39 Ind. 488 ; State
V. County Judge, 7 Iowa, 186 ; Clark
V. McKenzie, 7 Bush (Ky.), 533 ; At-
torney-General V. Board of Canvass-
ers, 64 Mich. 607 ; S. a, 31 N. W. Rep.
539; Commonwealth v. Ensminger,
74 Pa, St 479 ; Burke v. Supervisors,
4 W. Va. 371; Alderson v. Comm'rs
(West Va.), 8 S. E. Rep. 374.
< State V. Randall, 35 Ohio St 64.
5 See Paine on Elections, § 811;
Mechem's Public. Offices and Officers,
g 215 et seq.
CHAPTEE XII.
CONSOLIDATION AND REOECJANIZATION.
396. How effected.
397. Power of legislatura
898. Constitutionality of laws for
annexation.
399. Delegation of legislative
power. .
400. Illinois decisions.
401. Maryland decisions.
403. Michigan decisions.
403. Missouri and Tennessee decis-
ions.
404 Ruling as to Baltimore city.
405. Rule as declared in Washing-
ton.
406. Powers of cities under the
law.
407. The same subject continued.
408. What may be annexed — Gen-
eral rule.
409. The same subject continued —
Construction, of statutes.
410. The same subject continued.
411. Right of taxation as to an-
nexed lands.
413. Taxation for antecedent debts.
413. Remedy of tax-payer.
414 Effects of consolidation.
415. The same subject continued.
§ 416. Annexation
♦ Notice.
417. Mode of voting.
418. Jurisdiction and procedure
419. The same subject continued.
430. Reasonableness pf annexation.
431. Validity of annexation.
433. Procedure to test validity.
433. The same subject continued.
434 Special acts as to reorganiza-
tion.
435. Nebraska act
436. Effect of reorganization.
437. The same subject continued.
438. The same subject continued —
Decisions in California and
Tennessee.
439. Validity of reorganization —
Special case.
430. Invalid reorganization.
431. Property right passing to new
corpora tion._^
433. For what the reorganized cor-
poration becomes liable.
433. Further scope of the forego-
ing doctrine.
434 What are such liabilities.
435. Remedy of creditors of the
old corporation.
§ 396. How effected. — Municipal corporations may be con-
solidated by act of the legislature, or may extend their bounds
aries by annexation of territory adjacent by proper proceed-
ings according to the procedure named in the acts of the
legislature providing a mode in which this can be accom-
plished, and proper tribunals for hearing on the merits and
trial of the issues iiivolved between the parties desiring an-
nexation and those remonstrating against it. Beorganization
is accomplished by a new act of incorporation, in the form of
§1 307, S&8i} o€b*80eii«ltkot and keoe&ahizatios. 395^
a new charter from the legislature, or through the forms and
modes provided in general laws existent in many of the States
for the incorporation, reorganization, etc., of such corporations.
§ 397. Power of legislature. — The power to divide large
municipalities, to annul their old charters and to reorganize
them, and to consolidate small ones as well as to detach por-
tions of territory from one and annex it to another, to meet
the wishes of its residents or to promote the public interests,
as understood by it, is conceded to the legislature. This
power is full, in the absence of constitutional restriction.'
And the legislature by the passage of a general law prescribing
modes by which adjacent territory may be annexed to mu-
nicipal corporations does not surrender its power and obliga-
tion to enlarge or diminish the corporate limits of any town
or city whenever the public exigency demands that it should
be done.'
§ 398. Constitutionality of laws fof annexation. — Ques-
tions have frequently been made upon the constitutionality of
laws providing for the annexation of territory to municipal
corporations. Generally the laws have been upheld. The
principal cases will be herein referred to. That property
1 Mount Pleasant w. Beck with (1879); § 8, cl. 1, providing that " the legisla-
100 U. S. 514 ; Morgan v. Beloit, 7 ture shall have no power to suspend
Wall. 613; Thompson v. Abbott, 61 any general law for the benefit of
Mo. 176 ; Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr, individuals inconsistent with thegen-
1866 ; North Yarmouth v. Skillings, era! laws of the land." Cantwell, J.,
45 Me. 133; Girard v. Philadelphia, said: "... By these [general]
7 Wall. 1 ; S. C, 19 L. Ed. 53 ; Story laws the power to create or abolish,
on Constitution, §§1385, 1388; Dillon's enlarge or diminish, municipalities
Munic. Corp. 139 ; Cooley's Const, is reposed in the legislature. The
Lira. (6th ed.) 328 and cases cited in power of annexation by a prescribed
notes; True v. Davis (1889), 133 111. method was conferred on citizens
523 ; s. C, 23 N. E. Rep. 410 ; 6 L. R A. and freeholders concerned ; and at
366 ; Daly v. Morgan (1888), 69 Md. the same time the inherent power of
460 ; s. C, 16 AtL Rep. 387. annexation by special act was left in
2 Williams v. City of Nashville the legislature. The situation was as
(Tenn., 1891), 15 S. W. Rep. 364, that of two laws, co-existing, by
where a legislative act annexing ter- either of which the same result
ritory to Nashville was sustained as might be accomplished, and in whic];i
not inconsistent with the general laws resort to one will not be inconsistent
in respect to annexation, and not in with or a suspension of the other."
conflict with Const. Tena, art. 11,
392 CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§ 399.
brought by annexation within the corporate lipiits of a mu-
nicipal corporation will be subject to taxation to discharge its
pre-existing indebtedness is no constitutional objection to the
exercise of the power of compulsory annexation, this being a
matter, in the absence of special constitutional restrictions,
belonging wholly to the legislature to determine.' The Su-
preme Court of Ohio has held that proceedings to annex con-
tiguous territory to the corporate limits of a town, in pursuance
of their statute upon the subject, *kre not in contravention of
the provisions of the constitution of the State.^ The statutes
of Kansas conferring on cities of the second class power to ex-
tend their boundaries so as to include adjacent land that has
been subdivided into blocks and lots have been held not to be
unconstitutional because of the provision of the Constitution
of Kansas which gives the power to the legislature to confer
on the tribunals transacting county business such powers of
local legislation and administration as it may deem expedient,
as such povv'er is not exclusive, but can be conferred on other
local agencies.'
§ 399. Delegation of legislative power.— The laws for en-
larging the limits of municipal corporations have been fre-
quently assailed upon the ground that they amounted to a
delegation of legislative power and wete therefore repugnant
to the constitutions of the different States. The Supreme
Court of Kansas has held the First Class City Act (1887), which
provides that " any city of the first class may enlarge or ex-
tend its limits or area by an ordinance specifying with accu-
racy the new line or lines to which it is proposed to enlarge or
extend such limits or area," not to be such a delegation of
1 Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 WalL 1 ; ler v. Boston, 113 Mass. 200 ; St Louis
Elstoni;. CrawfordsvUle, 20Ind. 373; v. Eussell, 9 Mo. 503: St Louis v.
Edmunds v. Gookins, 20 Ind. 477; Allen, 13 Mo. 490; Smith v. McCar-
Morford u linger, 8 Iowa, 83; Bur- thy, 56 Pa. St 359; Nonis v. Smith-
linglon & M. R. Ck). v. Spearman, 13 ville, 1 Swan (Tenn.), 164 ; Wade v.
Iowa, 113; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Richmond, 18 Gratt (Va.) 583; 1 Dil-
Mon. (Ky.) 830; Lay ton v. New Or- Ion's Munic. Corp., § 348.
leans, 13 La. Ann. 515; Arnoult v. 2 powers v. Comm'rs, 8 Ohio St
New Orleans, 11 La. Ann. 54; Gor- 285.
ham V. Springfield, 21 Me. 59 ; Opin- s City of Emporia v. Smith (1889),
ion of Justices, 6 Cusli. 580 : Warren 43 Kan. 433 ; s. C, 33 Pac Rep, 616.
V. Charlestown, 3 Gray, 104 ; Chand-
§ 400.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. 393
legislative power to thie officers of a municipality as would
vitiate the act.' The Missouri act conferring on cities power
to extend their limits has been held not to be an unconstitu-
tional delegation of power .^ In a similar case in Nebraska it
was urged that a statute providing that, after a city council
has voted to annex any contiguous territory, the district court
shall, on -petition by the city and after notice to the owners of
such territory, determine the truth of the allegations of the
petition, and whether all or any part of such territory would
receive material benefit from annexation to the city, and
whether justice and equity require such annexation, and shall
enter a decree accordingly, was an attempt to invest the court
with extra-judicial powers — a legislative power. The court
held that, as a condition of such annexation, the questions re-
quired to be determined by the court were entirely of a judi-
cial character and it was properly invested with jurisdiction in
such matters.'
§ 400. Illinois decisions. — The act of the legislature of
Illinois amendatory of " An act to revise the law in relation to
township organization," so far as it attempted to change the
boundaries of cities and incorporated villages, has been held to
be in violation of the Illinois constitution, as embracing more
than one subject.* But the annexation of two or more cities,
iHurla V. City of Kansas City 'CityofWahoor. Dickinson (1888),
(Kan., 1891), 27 Pac. Rep. 143, an 23 Neb. 426; s. C, 36 N. W. Rep.
action to set aside the proceedings 813. The court innot giving assent to
by which the boundaries of Kansas Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 111. 152,
City, Kan , were extended to include relied upon by objectors to the law,
the original cities of Kansas City, conceded " that an arbitrary annexa-
Armourdale and Wyandotte and tion of territory to a city or town,
other contiguous territory, follo>ving where the benefits to be received by
CuUen V. City of Junction City, 48 the territory annexed are not con-
Kan. 629 ; S. C, 23 Pac. Rep. 652. sidered, can only be accomplished by
2 Kelly T. Meeks (1885), 87 Mo. 396. legislation, either by the legislature
See on same point, Stilz v. Indianap- itself or with a tribunal clothed with
olis, 55 Ind. 515 ; Taylor v. Fort power for that purpose, and that a
Wayne, 47 Ind. 274 ; People &c. v. court under our (Nebraska) constitu-
Bennett, 39 Mich. 451 ; Blanchard v. tion could not be clothed with such
Bissell, 11 Ohio St 96 ; People v. Car- legislative power."
penter. 34 N. Y. 86 ; Devore's Appeal, * Dolese v. Pierce (1888), 124 111. 140 ;
56 Pa. St. 163 ; Dillon's Munic. Corp., S. C, 16 N. E. Rep. 318, the court say-
g 183. ing : — " Under the title of the act of
394
CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION.
[§ 401.
incorporated towns and villages to each other, all of which are
indebted, the indebtedness of some being in excess of the
limit allowed by the constitution of Illinois, is not prohibited
by the section providing that no municipal corporation shall
become indebted to an amount " in the aggregate exceeding
five per cent, on the taxable property therein ; " and that any
such corporation incurring indebtedness " shall provide for the
collection of a direct tax " for the payment of the same.^
§ 401. Maryland decisions. — It was objected to a legislative
act in Maryland, which provided that until the year 1900 the
rate of taxation for city purposes on all taxable property within
the districts to be annexed to the city of Baltimore should
not exceed the existing rate in Baltimore county, that it con-
flicted with the article of the Declaration of Eights in the
1887, the legislature had the right to
provide, as it did, for the change of
township boundaries, but this right
did not carry with it, as an incident,
the power to change the boundaries
of cities and villages, unless the
change of the latter was necessar3'
to effectuate a change of the former,
or at least to promote such object
Nothing of this kind is pretended.
The only thing claimed — or which
can be truthfully claimed — is, that
there is some resemblance, or that
there are common characteristics, be-
tween townships and cities and vil-
lages. But this is equally true of all
corporate bodies. While townships
are regarded as municipal corpora-
tions, in the general sense of that
term, yet they stand upon a plane
altogether different from that occu-
pied by cities and villagea The latter
are possessed of a much higher order
of corporate existence than the for-
mer, and differ from them in many
essential particulars. They are, in
lavr and in fact, as distinct from one
another as any two artificial beings
could be, whatever their supposed re-
semblance may be. This is equally
so with respect to their organization
and jurisdiction. In the exercise of
the powers conferred upon them, they
act wholly independent of each other,
even where their jurisdiction extends
over the same people and territory.
. . . Looking at the act as a
whole, it is difficult to repel the con-
viction that it is nothing more than
a method of extending, almost indef-
initely, the limits of the great cities
of our State without consulting the
people living in them, or at least but
a small portion of them, and all this
without a word in the title of the act
to indicate such a purposa"
•True V. Davis (1889), 133 III. 533;
S. a, 33 N. E. Eep. 410; 6 L. E. A.
266, 367, where the court said : — " If,
then, there is no constitutional re-
striction upon annexation of munici-
palities, and no constitutional right
to exempt the property of tax-payers
from burdens other than debts con-
tracted by the municipality while
the property or person was within
its jurisdiction, it would seem inevi-
tably to follow that there is no con-
stitutional ground to object that the
burden of some tax-payers will be
larger in consequence of annexation
than it would otherwise have been."
§• 403.] CONSOtmATION AND EBGKSANIZATION. 395
Constitution of Maryland whicli declares that " every person
in the State, or person holding property therein, ought tb con-
tribute his proportion of public taxes for the support of the
government according to his actual worth in real or personal
property." The Supreme Court of the State sustained the
law over this contention, holding that the principle of equal-
ity in taxation is fully gratified by making local taxation equal
and uniform as to all property within the limits of the taxing
district, and that equality and uniformity, as between differ-
ent taxing districts, whether the district be an entire city or
parts of a city, is not required in local taxation.'
§ 402. Michigan decisions.— The Michigan act consolidat-
ing the two cities of Saginaw and East Saginaw, which com-
prised distinct representative districts, has been held not to
contravene that section of the constitution of Michigan which
provides for the division of the State into representative dis-
tricts and enacts that such division shall remain unaltered until
the return of another enumeration, which is to be had every
ten years, as the act expressly provides that it shall not change
in any respect the boundaries of the existing representative
districts, or the manner of electing representatives, and pre-
serves the old voting precincts intact.* Also that the fact that
• Daly V. Morgau (1888), 69 Md. Gillette v. City of Hartford, 31 Conn.
460, 468 ; a C, 16 Atl. Rep. 287, the 351 ; City of Henderson v. Lambert,
court saying:— "The effect of the 8 Bush (Ky.), 607; Benoist v, St.
provisions of the nineteenth section Louis, 19 Mo. 179 ; United States v.
is to make the territory annexed Memphis, 97 U. S. 393.
under it a separate taxing district, ^gmlth v. City of Saginaw (1890),
within the limits of the city as thus 81 Mich. 133 ; s. C, 45 N. W. Rep. 964 ;
extended, and the legislature itself, LocalActMich.,1889, No. 455. There-
exercising its reserved right of tax- lator in this application for a man-
ation, fixes for a limited period the damns relied upon People v. Holihan,
rate of assessment and taxation for 29 Mich. 116, to sustain his contention
local purposes within such district, that the act of consolidation was un-
Tbat it may exercise this power in- constitutional. The court thus dis-
stead of delegating it to the local tinguished the case cited : — " In Peo-
authorities is /well settled in this pie v. Holihan the legislature made
State." The court cite State v. May- no provision for preservmg the in-
hew, 3 Gill (Md.), 487 ; State v. Ster- tegrity of the representative district
ling, 30 Md. 503, and as sustaining from which the territory was de-
the same construction refer to Ter- tached, but, by the very terms of the
nil V. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. St. 355 ; act, the boundaries of two represent-
396 CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§ 403.
the act authorized and made it the lixfty of the council of the
consolidated city to issue bonds to raise money to purchase
a site for and erect a city hall, and provided that this require-
ment should not be abrogated without the assent of a major-
ity of the aldermen, and should be construed as in the nature
of a contract between the two cities, if unconstitutional, did
not afifeot the validity of the rest of the act. And further,
that where it appears that the consolidation of two or more
cities is for the interest of the inhabitants thereof, an act of
consolidation is not contrary to public policy, and does not
abridge the rights of citizens.
§ 403. Missouri and Tennessee decisions. — Kansas City,
Missouri, governed by a special charter under the constitutional
•provision relating to cities of a population of more than one hun-
dred thousand inhabitants, by an ordinance attempted to annex
a large adjacent territory including the city of Westport. In
a case involving the validity of this annexation ordinance it
was held that the ordinance was void ; that it was an amend-
ment to the charter, and the constitution of the State denied
the city the right thus to extend its limits without first sub-
mitting the proposition to and procuring the consent of throe-
fifths of its voters, which it had failed to do.^ The placing of
property within the corporate limits of a given town is not
a taking of private property, as the ownership remains un-
changed ; and a Tennessee statute providing for annexation of
land to the city of Ifashville was held not in conflict with the
fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States,
ative districts were changed, the tional provisions are fully satisfied
electors of one district transferred to when the legislative districts are pre-
another and the preservation of the served intact, and the territories
district made impossible." Further, united for 'municipal purposes only,
Grant, J., said: — "The power of the preserving to the electors the neces-
legislature to consolidate two mu- sary provisions for electing their rep-
nicipal corporations is not questioned, resentatives." Citing Bay Co. v. Bul-
In a new and growing State, cases lock, 51 Mich. 544 ; Stone v. City of
must often arise where it is for the Charlestown, 114 Mass. 314 ; Wade v,
interest of the people that territory City of Richmond, 18 Gratt. (Va.)
lying in different representative dis- 583 ; Opinion of the Judges, 33 Me.
tricts should, for the purpose of local 587.
self-government, be comprised in one i City of Westport v. Kansas Oily
municipality. . . . The constitu- (1890), 103 Mo. 141.
§ 404.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEOBGANIZATION. 397
which provides that " private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation," nor with the constitu-
tion of Tennessee, containing similar provisions.^ l^or was
s&,id act repugnant to the provisions of the constitution of
Tennessee providing that " no corporation shall be created or
its powers increased or diminished by special laws," as this
clause applies only to private corporations.^
§ 404. Ruling as to Baltimore city. — The act of Maryland
extending the limits of Baltimore city by including therein
parts of Baltimore county h^s been held not to violate the
constitution of Maryland, relating tb the organization of
new counties and the location of county seats, which pro-
vides that the lines of a county shall not be changed without
the consent of a majority of the voters of the territory
sought to be taken from one and added to another county.'
It was further held that the legislature of the State had the
power to extend the limits of a city by including therein
parts of the county adjoining, the city itself being a part of
the county.* In support of this holding Kobinson, J., said : —
" Counties are political divisions of the State, organized with
a view to the general policy of the State, and the functions
and powers exercised by them have reference mainly to such
policy. Besides, their representation in the General Assembly
is fixed by the constitution, and we can understand why it
was deemed proper to make some provision in regard to
the organizsetion of counties, and the annexation of part of
one county to another. Towns and cities, however, are or-
dinarily chartered at the instance, and mainly with reference
to the interest, convenience -and advantage, of persons resid-
ing within the particular locality incorporated. They are
chartered by the legislature, and their boundaries are fixed
by it, and the power to extend them, whenever in its judg-
ment the public interests require it, has been exercised by the
legislature from the earliest days of the colony, No reason
1 So held in Williams v. City of » Daly v. Morgan (1888), 69 Md 460 ;
Nashville (Tenn.), 15 8. W. Eep. 864. s. C, 16 Atl. Eep. 287.
2 Williams v. City of Nashville * Daly «. Morgan (1888), 69 Md. 460 ;
(Tenn.), 15 S. W. Eep. 364 s. C. 16 Atl. Bep. 287.
398 CONSOLIDATION AND EEOBGAHIZATION. [§§ 405, 406.
has been suggested why the Gonstitution should prohibit the
exercise of this power, and it would seem strange that it
should provide for the annexation of parts of one county to
another, and denj'- to the legislature the power to extend the
limits of a city, by including therein parts of an adjoining
county, even though such county should be a separate and in-
dependent territorial division of the State."
§405. Rule as declared in Washington.— The constitu-
tion of "Washington declares tlj^t municipal corporations shall
not be created by special laws, but the legislature, by general
laws, shall provide for their incorporation, organization, etc.
This does not prevent two existing municipal corporations, or
one existing corporation and an adjacent body whose incor-
poration was void, from being consolidated under a law au-
thorizing a special election on the question of consolidation.*
§ 406. Powers of cities nnder the laws.— A Florida statute
gave municipal authorities the power to extend their terri-
' State V. City of New Whatcom encourage nniformity it provides that
(Wash., 1891), 27 Pac. Rep. 1030, it be- existing cities and towns may, with-
ing held that the title, "An act pro- out legislative compulsion, drop their
viding for the organization, incorpo- special charters and take up the or-
ration and government of municipal ganization of their. respective classes
corporations," was sufficiently broad under such genei-al laws as may be
to cover provisions authorizing the enacted. To do this," he says, " is in
consolidation of two municipal corpo- no sense to destroy or disincorporate
rations and the holding of a special a city or town. The territory covered
election on the question. Further, that is to be the same. The name is con-
act of Washington, March 27, 1890 tinned and the people are identical
(Acts, p. 138), providing that "two or But when two existing corporations
more contiguous municipal corpora- are to be consolidated the prelimi-
tions may become consolidated into nary thing to be accomplished is the
one corporation after proceedings disincorporation of the old, and then
had as required in this section," and follows the incorporation of a new
authorizing a special election to be municipality, in which there must be
held on the question of consolidation, new territory, a new name (at least
applied to pre-existing corporations as to a part of the new territory) and
created by special charter, as well as new people. This operation . . .
to those organized under general in- may be accompanied by either a gen-
corporation laws. Stiles, J., says of eral or a special election, as the legis-
the constitutional provision, that "to lature may direct."
§ 406.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEORGANIZATION. 389
torial limits, and defined generally the powers and duties of
municipalities. Another statute established provisional gov-
ernments for cities vrhose charters were repealed for indebt-
edness, appointing commissioners with certain general powers,
and declared the defunct cities to be provisional municipali-
ties, " the boundaries of which shall be co-extensive with the
boundaries of such defunct cities and towns," giving to the
officers thereof the same powers vested in the officers of such
defunct cities under the act of 1869. It has been held that the
provisional municipalities had power to extend their territorial
limits.' Under the Indiana statutes the common council of a
city, while having authority, without the consent of the
owner, to annex territory, and extend its boundaries so as to
include lots platted adjoining it if the plat has been acknowl-
edged and properly recorded, cannot annex land of a married
woman, platted by her husband, without her authority and
knowledge, even though she may have erroneously supposed
it to be included in another plat before made by herself and
husband and duly acknowledged and recorded." The limits of
a city cannot be extended by vote of the electors thereof,
without the consent of the voters of the territory to be an-
nexed, under the Texas statutes.' The power to annex territory
is not affected by the fact that part of it is occupied as a rural
homestead ; nor by the fact of the territory being used for
agricultural and grazing purposes.* And it is immaterial that
it lies on several sides of a city, if the territory proposed to
be annexed by one proceeding comprises but one body of
land.®
' Saunders v. Provisional Munici- of a city accepting titles 17 and 18
pality of Pensacola (1888), 24 Fla. shall remain as fixed by the act of
326 ; S. C, 4 So. Rep. 801 ; Act Fla., incorporation, except that they may
Feb. 4, 1869 (McClel. Dig. 255, § 44), as be extended by additional territory
amended Fla. Laws, 1879, ch. 3161, whenever the majority of the quali-
§ 2. fled electors of said territory shall
2 City of Indianapolis v. Patterson indicate a desire to be included
(1887), 112 Ind. 344 ; S. a, 14 N. E. within the limits of the corporation.
Eep. 551 ; E. S. Ind. 1881, § 3195. * State v. City of Waxahachie
3 Lum V. City of Bowie (Tex., 1891), (Tex., 1891), 17 8. W. Rep. 848.
18 S. W. Rep. 142. Sayles' CivU St » State v. City of Waxahachie, cited
(Tex.), art 343, enacts that the limits in preceding note.
400 OONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§§ 407, 40S.
§ 407. The same subject continued. — A city of the first
class under the Kansas statute cannot extend its limits so as
to include unplatted territory of over five acres against the
protest of the owner thereof, unless the same is circumscribed
by platted territory that is taken into said city.* Under the
Nebraska statute providing that a city of the metropolitan
class may include within its corporate limits an area not to
exceed twenty-five square miles, including any township or
village organization within sucl^ limits, and that such organi-
zation shall thereupon cease and terminate, such a city cannot
divide the territory of a village and annex a portion thereof,
but it must include the entire village.^ Nor can it extend its
limits so as to include a city of the second class.' The Ke-
vised Statutes of Texas, providing for annexation of adja-
cent territory to the limits of a city, has been construed, and
it was held that by the words " to the extent of a half mile
in width " it was not intended to confine the authority to
make an annexation of territory to an area neither more nor
less than half a mile wide, but it was intended to limit the
area* of territory which might be added to a city to half a mile
wide.* And so long as the territories added are only a half
mile wide, their outer boundaries may be extended until they
intersect, though the corner thus formed is more than a half
mile from the original city limits.'
§ 408. What may he annexed — General rule.^^ If it does '
not appear that the territory as a whole should be annexed, it
is error to annex any part of it.' Such land must have great
value for urban purposes.' Land which evidence shows rep-
1 Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. City of part of thriving and aAibitious cities
Kansas City (1889), 43 Kan. 497 ; S. C, to extend the limits of the munici-
33 Pao. Eep. 633. pality beyond the urban population
2 Omaha v. South Omaha (Neb., and to subject to taxation persons
1891), 47 N. W. Rep. 1113 ; Comp. St. and property who neither need nor
Neb., ch. 12a, § 3. receive any protection from the city
3 Omalia v. South Omaha, cited in government."
preceding note. * State v. City of Waxahachie (Tex.,
* City of East Dallas v. State (1889), 1891), 17 S. W. Rep. 34&
73 Tex. 370 ; s. C, 11 S. W. Rep. 1030, 6 Vestal v. Little Rock (Ark., 1891),
the court deeming it reasonable to 16 S. W. Rep. 391.
presume an intention of the legisla- ' WoodruflE v. City of Eureka
ture to restrain " a tendency on the Springs (Ark., 1893), 19 S. W. Rep. 15,
§ 409.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. 401
resents a city's growtlji beyond its limits, and that it derives
its value from actual or prospective use for town purposes, is
a proper subject for annexation though a considerable part
thereof may be used for agricultural purposes.' Where sub-
urban property is platted into lots, and marked in such way
as to impress on it the character of urban property as distin-
guished from rural use, the fact that the lots are larger than
ordinary city lots will not exclude them from the operation of
the laws of Indiana authorizing a city to annex suburban ter-
ritory which has been platted into lots.*
§ 409. The same subject continued — Construction of
statutes. — Territory separated from a city by a navigable
river is " contiguous " within the meaning of a statute author-
izing municipal corporations to annex contiguous territory
lying in the same county.' Therefore an unincorporated town
on one side of an intervening river may be annexed to a city
on the other side, although at the time the only means of com-
munication are two toll-bridges and a number of small boats
operated by private persons for hire. The annexation of un-
platted land which is touched on two sides to its entire extent
by platted lands will not be set aside on appeal because it is
vacant, low, flat and wet and covered with timber, since itmay
have been needed for town purposes, and may have needed
organized I009.I government to reclaim it.'' As ordinarily the
territory of a municipal corporation is subdivided into lots
the court expressing a doubt as to 59 Ind, 396; City of Evansville v.
■whether annexation could be justi- Page, 23 Ind. 535 ; Edmunds v. Gook-
fied upon the. ground alone that the ins, S4 Ind. 169.
■city desired to establish, maintain ' Vogel v. Little Rock, 54 Ark. 335 ,
and preserve water-works upon it S. C., 15 S. W. Bep. 836.
1 Vogel V. City of Little Eock (Ark., * So held in Vestal v. Little Rock
1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 13, where an an-' (1891), 54 Ark. 321; S. G, 15 S. W.
nexation was held to be right and Rep. 891, a proceeding on the part
proper under the rule established in of the city under Mansf. Dig. Ark.,
Vestal V. City of Little Rock (1891), sec. 923, to annex contiguous terri-
■54 Ark, 321; s. C, 15 S. W. Rep. 891, tory; citing as to where there is aain-
and Same v. Same (Ark., 1891), 16 tervening river, Blanchard v. Bissell,
S. W. Rep. 391. 11 Ohio St 96, and Ford v. Incorpo-
2 Glover v. City of Terre Haute rated Town &c., 80 Iowa, 636 ; s. o.,
<Ind., 1891), 39 N. E. Rep. 413. See, 45 N. W. Rep. 1031.
also, Collins v. City of New Albany,
36
402 CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§ 410.
and blocks, and the residents therein do not depend on the
cultivation of the soil for a livelihood, it is not the policy of
the law to annex large tracts of agricultural lands to a village
or city unless under the circumstances such lands should be
subdivided and sold as village lots.' But the act of Pennsylva-
nia of April, 1876, authorizing the court of quarter sessions to
annex the lands of persons resident in one township or bor-
ough to another township or borough for school purposes,
does not authorize the annexation of land to a non-adjacent
township.*
§410. The same subject continned. — Under the act of
Pennsylvania of April 3, 1851, as amended by act of June 11,
1879,' providing for the annexation to a borough of " any lots,
outlots or tracts of land adjacent " thereto, on application of
the inhabitants of such land, annexation may be decreed if the
land of all the petitioners, taken as one tract, adjoins a borough,
though land not annexed may intervene between the borough
and some of the tracts.* A city of the first class in Kansas
has the power to extend and enlarge its boundaries so as to
include within it a continuous body of land lying contiguous
to the prior limits of said city, when the ordinance providing
for such extension is approved by the district court of the
county within which such city is situated. This extension
may include several tracts of land some of which adjoin the
city, and others adjoining those that do adjoin the city, so as
to form one contiguous body, the annexation ordinance being
approved by the district court in the manner and under the
conditions and requirements of the statute.* Where owners
have platted into blocks and lots their farming land adjacent
to a city in a manner to bring it within the laws of Kansas pro-
viding for it, such subdivision may be annexed by ordinance
1 Village of Harlington v. Luge 2 In re Heidler (1888), 123 Pa. St
(Neb., 1893), 50 N. W. Rep. 957, the 653; s. c., 16 Atl. Rep. 97.
court saying that " the principal ben- ' Purd. Dig., p. 199, § 20 et seq.
efit in this case would be to the vil- * In re Sadler, Appeal of Brinton
lage by adding to the taxable prop- (1891), 143 Pa. St 511 ; s. C,, 21 Atl.
erty therein, but this of itself i^ not Rep. 978.
sufficient" They reversed thejudg- ' So held in Hurla ». City "Of Kan-
ment of the district court as to all sas City (Kan., 1891), 37 Pac. Rep. 143.
the lands not subdivided into lots.
§ ill.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEQANIZATION. 403
to the oity.^ Agricultural land distant a half or three-quar-
ters of a mile from any settlement, to which no streets or
other city improvements extend, and which is not needed nor
at present adaptable for city uses, should not be annexed to
a city.^
§ 411. Bight of taxation as to annexed lands. — Land
within the limits of a city, annexed to it by legal, regular pro-
ceedings, although used only for agricultural and horticultural
purposes, is subject to be taxed for ordinary city revenues.' It
has been held that where a town incorporated, including within
its boundaries unplatted lands, was afterwards incorporated
as a city of the first class with the same boundaries, and
levied municipal taxes upon these unplatted lands, the then
owners of the lands who had paid the taxes could not main-
tain an action for the recovery of those taxes.* The owner
of land annexed to a city upon the finding of a court as pro-
vided for in a Nebraska statute cannot claim exemption from
taxation by the corporation which is provided for in another
section touching voluntary annexations.' But a person whose
iTilforduCity of Olathe(1890), 44 upon Land Co. v. Buffalo Co., 15
Kan. 721, following City of Emporia Neb. 605; s. C, 19 N. W. Eep. 711;
V. Smith, 43 Kan. 433. and especially upon Blanchard v.
2 So held in Vestal v. Little Rock Bissell, 11 Ohio St 96, where the
(1891), 54 Ark. 331 ; s. C, 15 S. W. Supreme Court of Ohio reversed
Eep. 891, citing People v. Bennett, 18 a decree of perpetual injunction
Am. Rep. Ill ; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 against the collection of municipal
B. Hon. (Ky.) 330 ; City v. Southgate, taxes upon lands annexed to the city
15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 491 ; Morford v. Un- of Toledo under a statute similar
ger, 8 Iowa, 83; New Orleans v. to the one in Nebraska; the Ohio
Michoud, 10 La. Ann. 763 ; Bradshaw court holding on review that " the
V. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16 ; County Com- territory so annexed was contiguous
miesioners v. The President, 51 Md. to the original city ; that such an-
465 ; 3 Dillon's Munic. Corp., § 795 and nexation might be ordered without
note ; Borough of West Philadelphia, the consent and against the remon-
5 Watts & S. 381 ; Kelly v. Meeks, 87 strance of a majority of the persons
Mo. 396. residing in the annexed territory ;
^Hurla V. City of Kansas City and the lands were liable to local
(Kan., 1891), 27 Pac. Eep. 143, follow- taxation on account of pre-existing
ing Mendehall v. Burton, 43 Kan. city debts."
570 ; s. c, 23 Pac. Rep. 558. sGottschalk v. Becher (Neb.,i 1891),
< McClay v. City of Lincoln (Neb., 49 N. W Rep. 715, the court thus dis-
1891), 49 N. W. Rep. 383, the court tinguishing the two sections : — "Ter-
relying, to sustain their judgment, ritory annexed voluntarilv under sec-
404
CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATIQN. [§§ 412, 413.
land has been annexed to a city under the first-mentioned stat-
ute, and become liable, by another section, to subdivision into
lots and blocks, with streets and alleys, and subject to taxa-
tion for the city's antecedent debts, and who has taken no
appeaWrom the judgment of annexation, cannot in another
action complain that the statute was unconstitutional in that
it authorized the taking of private property for public use
without compensation.! ,
§ 413. Taxation for antecedent indebtedness. — Property
included in the extended limits of a municipality becomes, in
the absence of legislation to the contrary, subject to taxation
for all municipal indebtedness existing before the limits were
extended.''
§ 413. Remedy of tax-payer. — An injunction will lie to
restrain taxes levied by a city on annexed territory where the
tion 95 may be so situated that, it
would be against equity to compelit
to share prior burdens. The policy of
the statute encourages annexation
and municipal accretion and wealth.
Territory can only be annexed undet
section 99 when the court shall find
that 'it would receive material bene-
fit,' or ' that justice and equity require
it' Upon such findings and result-
ing annexation the taxation must be
uniform under the constitution, arti-
cle 9, section 6."
1 Gottschalk v. Becher, cited in pre-
ceding note.
2Madry u Cox (1889), 73 Tex.. 538;
S. c, 11 S. W. Eep. 541, citing Lay ton v.
New Orleans, 13 La. Ann. 515, where
it wa? held that where the act annex-
ing additional territory (a city) pro-
vided that it should be subject to taxa-
tion to meet such debts only as had
been created by itself, a subsequent
act of the legislature might subject
property to a higher rate of taxation
than was necessary to meet such in-
debtedness, even though the tax thus
raised went to discharge indebted-
ness of the corporation to which it
was attached existing before the
consolidation. Also, United States
V. Memphis, 97 U. S. 289, where it
was held that an act subsequent to
the one annexing territory to a city
relieving the annexed territory from
taxation to meet the cost of paving,
the most of which was done after
annexation, and outside of the an-
nexed territory, was valid; the
court saymg, however, that the act
of annexation, though it might have
done so, not having exempted this
property from the tax, " the people
resident [therein] became at once en-
titled to a common ownership of the
city's property and privileges, sub-
ject to the same duties as those rest-
ing on others. Had the [subsequent]
act never been passed it must be con-
ceded that they would have been on
exact equality with all other ownei-s
Qf property in the city, equally en-
titled with them to all municipal
rights and privileges and equally
subject to all municipal burdens and
charges."
§ 414.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. 405
city has voted to extend its limits without the consent' of the
electors of the territory sought to be annexed.' The fact
that personal property of one who resides within territory
annexed by ordinance of a city extending its boundaries as
allowed by law has thus become subject to municipal taxation
does not justify an assault on his part upon the validity of
that ordinance.^ In an action to enjoin the collection of taxes
levied upon annexed suburban platted territory, the motive
of a city in annexing it cannot be inquired into.'
§ 414. Effect of consolidation.— The city of Philadelphia,
when it covered about two miles square, was made- by the will
of Stephen Girard trustee to administer the trusts of that
will. By various acts of the legislature qulminating in the
" Consolidation Act " of 1854, the twenty-eight municipal cor-
porations, comprising "districts," boroughs and townships,
making the residue of the county of Philadelphia, were brought
into one city. A bill was filed by testator's heirs alleging,
among other things, that the new city became incompetent to
act as a trustee. The dismissal of this bill was aflBrmed by
the Supreme Court of the United States, it being held that,
by the supplement to the act incorporating the city (commonly
called the " Consolidation Act " ), the identity of the corpora-
tion was not destroyed ; nor could the changes in its name,
the enlargement of its area or increase in the number of its
corporators affect its title to property held at the time of such
change. It was further held that the corporation, under its
iLumu City of Bowie (Tex., 1891), neglectful of its duty in extending
18 S. W. Eep. 143, the court distin- watex'-works, street improvements
guishing Brennan v. Bradshaw, 53 and lights into this portion of the
^Tex. 330, and Graham 1-. City of Green- city, and that by such neglect the
ville, 67 Tex. 63 ; & C, 3 S. W. Rep. 743, right to treat it as a part of the city
in that the validity of the existing cor- had been forfeited, though it had
porations in those cases was disputed, maintained a school therein; audit
and it seemed this could only be was contended that the purpose and
done by quo warranto proceedings, object of the city in making the an-
Here there is no question made as to nexation was simply to increase the
the validity of the corporation. revenues of the city by the taxation
2 City of PJattsburg v. Riley, 43 of this property. See, also, City of
Mo. App. 18. Logansport v. Seybold, 59 Ind. 225;
3 Glover v. City of Terre Haute Thornton, Municipal Laws, 3195,
(Ind., 18911, 39 N. E. Rep. 413, where it 8196, and notes.
was objected that the city had been
406
CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION.
[§ 415.
amended charter, had every capacity to hold and every power
iand authority necessary to execute the trusts of the will.^
§ 415. The same subject continued. — It has been held that
the effect of the provision of the Minnesota statute consolidat-
ing the cities of St. Anthony and Minneapolis, and that " all
ordinances and resolutions heretofore made ... by the
city council of . . . St. Anthony or by the common coun-
cil of . . . Minneapolis . % . shall be and remain in
force until altered, modified or repealed by the city council
of said city," was not to extend the ordinances of each city
over the new city, but to confine their operation within their
former territorial limits until changed by the new city coun-
cil.' A village lying within the limits of an incorporated town,
by annexation to an adjacent city, the limits of which are
coterminous with those of another town, does not become
part of the latter town.'
J Girard v. Philadelphia (1868), 7
Wall. 1. On page 14, as to the power
of the legislature in the premises,
Grier, J., says: "The legi^ature may-
alter, modify, or even annul the fran-
chises of a public municipal corpora-
tion, although it may not impose
burdens on it without its consent ; "
and continues, " In this case the cor-
poration has assented to accept the
changes, assume the burdens and
perform the duties imposed upon it ;
and it is diflScult to conceive how
they can have forfeited their right to
the charities which the law makes it
their duty to administer. The ob-
jects of the testator's charity remain
the same while the city, large or
small, exists ; the trust is an existing
and valid one, the trustee is vested
by law with the estate and the full-
est power and authority to execute
the trust" As to change of name or
enlargement of franchises not de-
stroying the identity of a municipal
corporation, see Luttrel's Case, 4
Eep. 88 ; Haddock's Case, Sir T. Ray-
mond, 439 ; s. a, 1 Vent 355.
2 Camp V. Minneapolis (1885), 33
Minn. 461 ; s. c, 23 N. W. Rep. 461.
3 City of East St Louis v. Rhein
(111., 1891), 28 N. E. Rep. 1089, the
coui-t conceding that the question of
annexing the village to the city had
been properly submitted to the voters
of the same, but the question of de-
taching a part of the town (embraced
in the village) and attaching it to the
other town had not been submitted
to the votere of the towns. The rul-
ing was based upon People v. Bray-
ton, 94 IlL 341 ; Dolese v. Pierce, 124
HI. 140; s. c, 16 N. K Rep. 218; Vil-
lage of Hyde Park v. City of Chi-
cago, 124 IlL 156; s. c, IS N. E. Rep.
223; Donuei-sberger v. Prendergast,
128 111. 329; s. C, 31 N. E. Rep. 1;
111. Laws 1887, 800; 3 Starr & C.
Anno. St (lU.) 522; Dl. Laws 1889,
66, 361 ; 3 Starr & C. Anno. St (DL)
2410 ; True v. Davis, 133 111. 523 ; s. C,
22 N. K Rep. 410.
§§ 416, 4:17.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. 407
§ 416. Annexation proceedings — Notice. — The rule in
Michigan is that the " notice in writing " to be posted on ap-
plication to detach territory from one township and attach
it to another may be printed, and the names attached printed
if properly authenticated.' The annexation of adjacent terri-
tory under the Nebraska statute is a judicial proceeding in
which the land-owner is entitled to all the rights of contra-
vention and appeal.^ Parties appearing and contesting the
proceedings for annexation of adjacent territory to a borough
on application of the inhabitants, in accordance with the Penn-
sylvania statute, after notice, cannot complain that the notice
was not in the form prescribed by the act.' The Iowa code
provides for the incorporation of a town or the annexation of
territory thereto by proceedings in the district court. It was
held that the code did not require that the notice of election
should be made of record. It was sufficient that the record
showed that notice was duly given. Also, that where all the
proceedings relating to the annexation of territory to an in-
corporated town were regular, and the town had assumed
unquestioned jurisdiction of the territory, the annexation was
not invalidated by the fact that the copies of the proceedings
filed in the office of the county recorder and of the secretary
of state, as required, were not certified to be correct copies ;
especially where the proper certificates were supplied even
after the sufficiency of the annexation was called in question
by actions commenced.*
§ 417. Mode of voting. — The Eevised Statutes of Illinois
give the county judge a discretionary power to submit the
question of annexation at either a special election called for
that purpose, or at any municipal election, or at any general
election, . . . to be holdeii in each of said incorporated
cities, towns or villages. That such a question was voted upon
( iPelton V. Ottawa County Super- Eep. 978, citing Incorporation of
visors, 52 Mich. 517; S. C, 18 N. W. Edgewood Borough, 130 Pa. St 349;
Rep. 345. S. C, 18 Atf. Rep. 646.
2 So held in Gottschalk v. Becher * Ford v. Town of North Des Moines
(Neb., 1891), 49 N. W. Rep. 715. (1890), 8& Iowa, 636; S. 0., 45 N. W.
3/ji re Sadler, Appeal of Brinton Rep. 1031.
(1891), 143 Pa. St 511 ; s. c, 31 AtL
408 CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§ 418.
in a village at its regular municipal election, and in the city
at its regular municipal election held on another day, has been
held not to invalidate the election.' The construction of the
Texas statutes as to the vote on questions, of annexation is
that the voters are allowed to express their preferences on
the subject by any method of voting which is satisfactory to
thefaiselves and to the city council, and that when it is shown
by the proper aflBdavit that a majority have favored annex-
ation the city council is authorized to receive the territory
of their residences into the city limits.^ A construction has
been placed upon the Arkansas statute providing that " when
any municipal corporation shall desire to annex any contigu-
ous territory thereto, lying in the same county, it shall be
lawful for the council to submit the question to the qualified
electors at least one month before the Annual election," to the
effect that the council was required to make an order at least
a month before the annual election for the submission of the
question at that election, and not to submit the question at
an election held one month before the annual election.'
§ 418. Jurisdiction and procedure. — By the laws in which
the legislatures of the different States have provided modes
for annexation of territory to the limits of municipal corpora-
tions, there is provision made for voluntary and involuntary
annexation in so far as the owners of the lands are concerned.
Therefore, a procedure and a jurisdiction for the trial of the
issues presented has been named, and the general rule is that
1 Vaiage of North Spnngfleld v -which was followed in State v. City
CSty of Springfield (111., 1893), 29 of Waxahachie (Tex., 1891), 17 S. W.
N. E. Eep. 849, where the annexa- Eep. 348, where a majority of the
tion proceedings were sustained, the- voters signed a paper which was
court further holding that the cor- presented to the city council on the
poration first voting would retain its affidavit of three of the number,
separate corporate existence untU a which stated, among other things,
majority of the voters of the other that the signers thereby "cast our
had declared in its favor, when the [their] votes " in favor of the annex-
consolidation would be completed ation, and described the territory,
and go into effect ' Vogel v. City of Little Bock
2 Graham v. City of Greenville, 67 (Ark., 1892), 19 & W. Eep. IS.
Tex. 62; s. a, a S. W. Rep. 743,
§ 419.] CONSOLIDATION AND EBOBGANIZATION. 409
there must be strict compliance with the requirements of the ,
statutes to make the annexation valid.' No part of a specified
territory can be annexed to a city without a public notice of
the hearing before the county court, as prescribed by statute,
even though a majority of the property holders of such terri-
tory voluntarily appear at the hearing and consent to the an-
nexation.^ The Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed the
court below in a proceeding for annexation of territory to a
city of the second class and dismissed the petition for the
reason that the record did not show that a resolution to an-
nex such territory had been adopted by the city council by a
two-thirds vote of all the members elect of such body, which
bystatute was the first step to be taken, and a condition prec&-
dent to the authority of the district court in the premises.'
§419. The same subject continned. — In an action to
annex territory to a village it must appear from the facts
stated in the petition that some portion of the territory sought
to be annexed will be benefited from the annexation ; and the
particular facts showing such benefits with justice and equity
of the relief sought must be alleged.* A petition for annexa-
tion in Pennsylvania must state that the land adjoins the
iMcFate's Appeal (1884), 105 Pa. St corded; this being especially true
333, where it was held, in a proceed- after lapse of time and proof that the
ing to restrain a borough from exer- persons residing thereon had after
cising jurisdiction over a section in- the time of such record acted as if
eluded in its enlarged limits, which the decree were valid,
enlargement was under the provis- ^Qunter v. City of Fayetteville
ions of act of April 1, 1834 (P. L. Pa. (Ark., 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 577, the
163), that the petition and decree court saying: — "This class of cases is
in the matter having been recorded anomalous, — the court acts upon the
in the recorder's office as required by territory as a whole, without the
the statute, the records of the court power of dividing it or of severing
of quarter sessions as to the annexa- any part," citing Vestal v. Little Rock,
tion of this land having been lost, the 54 Ark. 333 ; s. C, 15 S. W. Rep. 891,
record from the recorder's ofl3ce was and 16 S. W. Rep. 391.
evidence and could not be questioned. ' City of Seward v. Conroy (Neb.,
The presumption in such a case is 1891), 50 N. W. Rep. 339.
that the court required strict compli- * Village of Hartington v. Luge
ance with the provisions of the act (Neb., 1893), 50 N. W. Rep. 957.
before the decree was ma,de and re-
4:10 CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§ 419.
township to which the court is asked to annex it.* Annexa-
tion cases, when appealed from the county court to the circuit
court, should be tried de novo, and such proceedings had and
such judgment rendered as though that court had original
jurisdiction.^ The circuit court may therefore permit amend-
ments such as would be proper in the county court to the
petition in such cases to exclude part of the land included in
it. But such an amendment cannot be made in the Supreme
Court. The cause must be reminded to the circuit court, the
amendments made there and the case tried de novo? But
neither the court on its own motion, nor the attorney of the
corporation by leave, has the right to make such amendments
except upon terms that permit remonstrance to be fairly heard
upon the petition as amended.* Ifo ordinance of the council
of the city is necessary to empower the attorney to make
such amendment.' An ordinance of a city submitting to the
electors the question of annexation of contiguous territory,
which properly describes the land, is not rendered invalid by
reason of its omitting to recite that the land is contiguous."
Under the Pennsylvania statutes, in proceedings to annex ad-
jacent territory to a borough, no appeal on the merits lies to
the Supreme Court, and the expediency of such annexation
cannot be considered.' The statute of Arkansas probably never
intended an appeal in annexation cases, as it borrows its pro-
visions from States where the acts prescribed to be performed
by the county court are administrative purely, and where no
1 In re Heidler, 123 Pa. St 653 ; s. G, Springs (Ark., 1893), 19 S. W. Eep. 15.
16 Atl. Eep. 97. The court said : —"The fact, and not
2 Dodson V. Fort Smith, 33 Ark. the recital of contiguity, authorizes
,511,515. the council to act; and where the
' Vestal V. City of Little Bock fact exists there is nothing that re-
(Ark., 1891), 16 S. W. Rep. 291. quires that it appear by a recital
* Woodruff V. City of Eureka upon the records of the council. The
Springs (Ark., 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 15, council acts in a legislative, and not
remanding the case with directions to in a judicial, capacity ; and the rules
allow amendments upon such terms, which require that the jurisdiction
' Vogel V. City of Little Rock (Ark., of inferior courts shall appear of
1893), 19 S. W. Rep. 13 ; Woodruff v. record are not applicabla"
City of Eureka Springs (Avk., 1893), ' Appeal of Brinton, 142 Pa. St 611 ;
19 S. W. Rep. 15. S. a, 31 Atl. Rep. 978.
* Woodruff V. City of Eureka
§§ 420, 421.J CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. ' 411
appeal is allowed. But the right to appeal in that State is
well established.^
§ 430. Reasonableness of annexation. — The Supreme Court
of Missouri has held that the power of a city to annex by ordi-
nance contiguous territory to its limits is restricted to a reason-
able and proper exercise of such power .^ The Supreme Court
of Arkansas, after fully considering the various cases in dif-
ferent jurisdictions upon this subject, summed up their conclu-
sions in what may be styled an excellent rule to guide courts in '
the determination of applications for annexation. The court
said : — " That citj' limits may reasonably and prop^rly be ex-
tended so as to take in contiguous lands : (1) when they are
platted and held for sale or use as town lots ; (2) whether platted
or not, if they are held to be bought on the market and sold as
town property when they reach a value corresponding with
the views of the owner; (3) when they furnish the abode for
a densely-settled community, or represent the actual growth
of the town beyond its legal boundary ; (4) when they are
needed for any proper town purpose, as for the extension of
its streets, or sewer, gas or water system, or to supply places
for the abode or business of its residents, or for the extension
of needed police regulation ; and (5) when they are valuable
by reason of their adaptability for prospective town uses ; but
the mere fact that their value is enhanced by reason of their
nearness to the corporation would not give ground for their
annexation if it did not appear that such value was enhanced
on account of their adaptability to town use." ' But an ob-
jection that an extension of the limits of a town, otherwise
reasonable, is unreasonable in that it includes and subjects to
taxation for municipal purposes land lying along a river and
subject to overflow, will not be allowed in lowa.^
§421. Talidity of annexation. — Land of an owner who
had not platted and made a map of the same, but which had
iGuntei- V. City of Fayetteville 'Vestal v. Little Eock (1891), 54
(Ark., 1893), 19 S. W. Rep. 577 ; Dod- Ark. 321, 323 ; s. c, 15 S. W. Eepl 891.
son V. Fort Smith, 33 Ark. 508 ; Fore- ^ Ford v. Town of Des Moines (1890),
man v. Marianna, 43 Ark. 334 80 Iowa, 636 ; S. c, 45 N. W. Eep.
'■i Kelly V. Meeks (1885), 87 Mo. 396. 1031.
412 CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§ 422.
been included in a proposed addition to a city and platted by
another owning the most of this addition, has been held not
to have become a part of the city, although there was an or-
dinance of the city attempting to make the addition.' And
the fact that plaintiff had paid a municipal tax upon his lands
was held not to be a ratification on his part of the annexation
to the city, nor to estop him from denying the validity of the
annexation.* If plaintiff had acquiesced in the annexation
proceedings, stood by and without objection seen the city ap-
propriate money or make improvements upon the faith of the
validity of the proceedings by which the land was attempted
to be annexed to the city, it would have bound him. Where
a county seat in accordance with the laws of Kansas by an
election of citizens has been located in a town-site, the oflBcers
of the county have no right to remove the court-house and
records to an addition to said town-site which has been with
the original town-site incorporated as a city of the same name.'
§ 422. Procedure to test validity. — The property of an in-
corporated village being in the nature of a trust fund, which
the corporate authorities hold for the use of the public, any
unlawful interference with it calculated to inflict irreparable
injury upon the community presents a clear case for equi-
table relief. Therefore a bill for injunction as a mode of
testing the validity of an alleged law by which it was at-
teoipted to annex the village to the city and on which the lat-
ter relied to justify its usurpation of authority over the prop-
erty of the former has been approved.* A writ of certiorari to
quash an order of annexation of territory to a town or city,
1 Armstrong v. City of Topeka 'State v. Haiwi (1887), 36 Kan.
(1887), 36 Kan. 433 ; s. C, 13 Pac. Rep. 588 ; s. a, 14 Pac. Rep. 158, the court
843, reversing a refusal to restrain saying : — " An addition to a county
the defendant from opening a street seat is not, strictly speaking, a part
through plaintiff's land. Cf. City of of the original town-site ; " citing
Topeka v. 'Gillett, 33 Kan. 438. See State v. Smith, 46 Mo. 60.
Comp. L. Kan. 1879, ch. 78, § 1. * Villag^ of Hyde Park v. City of
2 Armstrong v. City of Topeka, 36 Chicago (1888), 124 111. 156; s. CL, 16
Kan. 433. See, also, Strosser v. City N. E. Rep. 333, citing City of Peoria
of Ft Wayne, 100 Ind. 443; Long- v. Johnston, 56 111. 63; Smith v.
worthy v. City of Dubuque, 13 Iowa, Bangs, 15 III. 399; People v. Whit-
86 ; Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 comb, 55 III 173 ; McCord v. Pike,
Ind. 557. 121 IlL 38&
§ 423.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. 413
which was granted upon the petition of owners of the an-
nexed territory, should be refused unless such owners or the
persons named in the petition as authorized to act for them
should be made parties. Laches in applying for the writ is
also ground for its refusal.^ The jurisdiction for testing the
validity of a reorganization of a municipal corporation in
Texas is in the district courts, and an information in .the nature
of a quo warranto against the oflBcers of the assumed reorgan-
ized corporation was allowed by the district judge.^ And
passing an ordinance of annexation, taliing steps preparatory
to levying a tax on the new territory, and recognizing it as a
ward of the city, are a suflBcient indication of the purpose to
exercise the corporate franchises of the city over the territory
to sustain such quo warranto to determine the validity of the
annexation.'
§ 423. The same subject continued. — Where a town is
made a part of a city by an unconstitutional act, equity may
restrain the city from exercising municipal jurisdiction over
it, and Interfering with its property in a manner calculated to
inflict on the community irreparable injury.* Under the Code
of Civil Procedure of California, which declares that an action
may be brought by the attorney-general in the name of the
people against any " person " who usurps or unlawfully exer-
cises any franchise, and the Police Code, declaring that the
word " person " should include a corporation as well as a nat-
ural person, it has been held that a municipal corporation
was a person within the meaning of said section ; and that
where such a corporation claimed the right to govern and tax
the inhabitants of territory claimed to have been annexed
1 Black V. BrinWey (1891), 54 Ark. tioipated in electing town oflScers. "
872; S. C, 15 S. W. Eep. 1030, the Great confusion would have arisen
court saying : — " It is fair to presume from the quashal of the order."
that jurisdiction had been assumed 3 State v. Dunson (1888), 71 Tex. 65 ;
over the annexed territory with Buford v. State (1888), 73 Tex. 183.
whatever of expense is necessarily' ' City of East Dallas u State (1889),
incident thereto, that taxes had been 73 Tex. 371 ; s. c, 11 S. W. Rep. 1030.
assessed and paid for municipal pur- * Village of Hyde Park v. City of
poses, and that the citizens residing Chicago, 134 111. 156 ; S. C, 16 N. E.
within the annexed territory had par- Rep. 333,
Hi CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§ 424.
to it, but which was not described as being in its boundaries
as named in its recognized charter, the right thus claimed was
a franchise in addition to and distinct from that of being a
corporation, and the exercise of such right was a usurpation
for which the attorney-general was authorized to bring an ac-
tion.* If a majority of the qualified electors vote for annexa-
tion, others cannot complain that the proceedings were kept
secret and put through in haste.^ One who delays eight
months in filing a petition to annul an order of annexation to
a town and offers no excuse for the delay cannot question its
legality.'
§ 424. Special acts as to reorganization. — The act of "Wash-
ington, entitled an " Act providing for the organization, classi-
fication, incorporation and government of municipal corpora-
tions," has been held sufiicient to include sections relating to
the enlargement and consolidation of municipal corporations.
Also that by implication it repealed a prior act providing for
extending the corporate limits of cities by modes prescribed
therein.* The provisions of the Utah statute entitled " An act
providing for the incorporation of cities, relating to municipal
government, and the mode of election of city officers," have
been held not applicable to an incorporated city the charter
of which provided for the manner of electing its officers, exist-
ing at the time the act went into effect, until it had become
re-incorporated under a section which provides that when the
common council call an election to determine whether the city
1 People ex rel. Att'y-Gen'l v. City the new act change of boundaries of
of Oakland (Cal., 1891), 28 Pac. Eep. a municipal corporation is effected
807. on a petition of one-fifth or more of
2 State V. City of Waxahachie (Tex., the electors of the municipality to
1891), 17 S. W. Eep. 348. the council which submits the ques-
3 Black V. Town of Brinkley, 54 tion to the electors within and with-
Ark. 372; S. C, 15 S. W. Rep. 1030. out the city, a majority of each body
* Board of Commissioners of King of electors being necessary to carry
County V. Davies (Wash., 1890), 24 annexation, and an abstract of the
Pac. Rep. 540, revereing the court vote being required to be sent to the
below and sustaining the board of secretary of State, and the annexed
commissioners in their refusal to act territory not being liable for the
under the repealed provision and debts of the old.
order an election as requested. By
§§ 4:25, 426.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. 415
shall be re-incorporated under the act they shall give notice of
the class to which the city will belong if re-incorporated.'
§ 425. Nebraska act. — It has been held that the statute of
Nebraska classifying cities within the State had the effect to
transform a village of the proper number of inhabitants into
a city of the second class — in other words, to reorganize it,
and a mandmnus was issued to the oflScers to divide the vil-
lage into wards under the law and provide for an election of
city officers.^ To make this statute effectual, it was not nec-
essary that the corporation accept its provisions.' In such
cases the village government must, from the nature of .the
case, continue until superseded by the city.
§ 426. Effect of reorganization. — The city of San Diego is
built around three sides of a bay, shaped like a horseshoe, and
was originally a pueblo, whose water-line was the bay. A
peninsula began near the mouth, and at one side of the bay,
running nearly in the "center, and more than half way up the
bay, around which the water for an indefinite distance was
called the " Ship's Channel." A special act re-incorporated the
city, with the same limits on the land side as before, but pro-
1 Watson V. Corey (Utah, 1889), 31 priate when applied to cities or vil-
Pac. Rep. 1089, aflBrming the quashal lages. They are severally political
of a mandamus to register a voter institutions erected to be employed in
otherwise than as a voter in the city the internal government of the State.
at large. There is no contract between the gov-
2 State V. Holden (1886), 19 Neb. ernment and the governed, for but
249 ; S. c, 27 N. W. Eep. 120. one party is concerned — the public ;
3 State V. Holden, 19 Neb. 249, — the and the inhabitants upon whom the
court saying that the rule which ap- powers and privileges are conferred
plies to private corporations in that are mere trustees, who hold and ex-
regard has no application to munici- ercise such powers for the public
pal corporations, unless the act of good. The only interest involved is
incorporation is made conditional, the public interest, and no other is
They then quote from People v. Mor- concerned in their creation, continu-
ris, 13 Wend. 337, as follows : — "The ance, alteration or renewal." Citing,
distinction between public and pri- also, Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266 ;
vate corporations is strongly marked, Warren v. Charleston, 2 Gray, 104 ;
and as to all essential pmposes they People v. President, 9 Wend. 851 ;
correspond only in name. We speak Dillon on Munic. Corp., § S3, and
of the erection of a town or county, notes.
and the term would be just aa appro-
416 CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§ 427.
vided that the " water-front line should be the ship's channel,"
and gave the city jurisdiction of the bay and of the sea for
one league from shore. A section of the act divided the peniij-
sula into wards- for voting purposes, and drew the boundary
line of one ward from one point to another across the mouth
of the bay ; thus including, practically, the whole peninsula.
Other sections restricted the elective franchise to residents of
the city, and authorized the city to acquire land outside of its
boundaries for municipal purposes only. It has been held that
the act included the peninsula within the city limits.^ A
Texas municipality, originally a town, but afterwards re-incor-
porated as a city by the legislature, with an extension of its
boundaries, has been held liable for bonds donated by the
town to a railroad company, in a proceeding to restrain the
collection of a city tax for payment of these bonds, on lands in
the enlarged limits. One contention was that the lands of
complainants were agricultural lands removed from the bene-
fits to be derived from municipal government, and therefore
improperly brought within the limits of the city. Upon this
it was held that whether this addition of territory was neces-
sary or proper was a question addressed to the legislature, and
not subject to review by the court.^
§ 427. The same subject continued. — A city which had
been incorporated with certain boundaries, afterwards, under
the general law of California allowing it in a certain pre-
scribed mode, was re-incorporated, the new charter naming
the same boundaries as did its original charter. Before the
adoption of this last charter in terms of law, there had been
proceedings to annex territory to the city under the general
law of the State providing a procedure for that purpose. It
was held in a quo warromto proceeding against the city inquir-
ing into its right to exercise municipal authority over this an-
nexed territory that the result of the annexation proceedings
was to amend its original charter as to its boundaries, and
1 City of San Diego v. Granniss rarily grauted. Cf, Norris v, CSty of '
(1889), 77 Cal. 511 ; s. a, 19 Pac. Rep. Waco, 57 Tex. 635 ; New Orleans v.
875. Clark, 95 U. S. 644; Kelly u City of
2 Madry u Cox (1889), 73 Tex. 538 ; Pittsburg, 85 Pa St 170 ; Martin v.
s. a, 11 S. W. Rep. 541, affirming the Dix, 53 Misa 53.
dissolution of the injunction tempo-
§ 428.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. 417
that the effect of the re-incorporation later with the original
boundaries was to supersede the amended as well as the orig-
inal charter, and that the city had no municipal authority
over the annexed district.^ The Florida statute entitled " An
act to provide for the incorporation of cities and towns and to
establish a uniform system of municipal government in this
State," provided " That all the powers and privileges conferred
in and by this act may be exercised by any city or town within
the limits of this State heretofore incorporated ; and it shall
be lawful for any previously incorporated city to reorganize
their municipal government under the provisions thereof by a
voluntary surrender of their charters and privileges and by an
organization under this act ; and upon a failure on the part of
any incorporated town or city to accept the provisions of this
act within nine months after its approval, all the acts vesting
such city or town with power are hereby repealed." This
last clause was construed by Woods, J., to provide merely for
a suspension of the powers of the municipal corporations
failing to reorganize under the act and not for a dissolution
of the corporation itself.'
§ 428. The same subject continued — Decisions in Cali-
fornia and Tennessee. — A statute of California upon the
organization, incorporation and government of municipal cor-
porations provides that any municipal Corporation organized
prior to January 1, 1880, may reorganize under its provisions.
The constitution of the State provides that " any city . . .
may frame a charter for its own government consistent with
and subject to the constitution and laws of this State," by
taking certain steps therein specified for preparing and pub-
lishing a proposed charter, which shall become effective when
1 People ex rel. Att'y-Cren'l v. City months after its passage did not put
of Oakland (CaL, 1891), 28 Fac. Kep. an end to its corporate existence,
807. and that its subsequent reorganiza-
2 Miner's Adm'r v. City of Pensa- tion under the first six sections of
cola (1875), 3 Woods (U. S. C. Ct), the act did not create a new but was
633, 640, where it was held that the merely the rehabilitation of an old
failure of the city of Pensacola to corporate body. Approved in Brough-
reorganize under the act within nine ton v, Pensacola, 93 U. S. 366, 370.
37
4:18 CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§ 429.
approved by the legislature ; and further, that municipal cor-
porations " shall not be created by special laws, but the leg-
islature, by general laws, shall provide for the incorporation,
organization and classification ... of cities and towns,"
etc. In a recent case it was held that since the act, although
a general law, was simply permissive, a city incorporated
thereunder might re-incorporate in the manner provided by
the constitution, and when the charter so framed was affirmed
by the legislature it supersede4 the old charter.' In a Ten-
nessee case, where a town had been incorporated by the legis-
lature, and afterwards a petition had been presented for a re-
incorporation and change of boundaries to the county court
and the prayer of the petition granted, a suit for a license fee
imposed under the ordinances of the town before the action
of the county court was defended on the plea that the effect of
the re-incorporation was a surrender of the old charter and a
dissolution of the same, and therefore the last corporation had
no power to collect the tax. It was held that to make the
surrender by the corporators of their charter of incorporation
effectual it was necessary that it be accepted by the govern-
ment and a record thereof be made. Hence, if the inhabit-
ants of the town, incorporated by an act of the legislature,
accepted the act of incorporation, and subsequently, in pursu-
ance of the re-incorporation act, were re-incorporated, with an
enlargement of the incorporated district, the charter granted
by the legislature was Jiot thereby surrendered.'
§ 429. Validity of reorganization — Special cases.— There
is in Tennessee, in the act which prescribes a mode by which
mui^icipal corporations which have been dissolved in any man-
ner may reorganize, a provision for a " petition of a majority
of the voters within the limits of such town or city at the iime
of the repeal or surrender of the charter." The Supreme
Court of the State has construed this provision and held that
the words " at the time of the repeal " merely define the limits
' People «, Bagley (1890), 85 CaL re-incorporation was held to be the
343 ; s. a, 24 Pac. Rep. 716, where the true council of the city of Stockton,
council elected under the charter of ^ Kori-is v. Mayor and Aldermen of
Smithville (1851), 1 Swan (Tenn.), 164.
§ 430.] CONSOLIDATION AND EE0E6ANIZATI0N. 419
of the town, and do not qualify the word " ivoters." ' And it
was held also that the motives of one of the petitioners for the
reorganization of a town into a taxing district could not affect
the rights of the other petitioners, if a majority of the voters,
nor could the motives of any of the petitioners be inquired
into under a bill filed to contest the legality of the reorganiza-
tion, nor his character be impeached.' A reorganization in
1887 of the territory of a town incorporated in 1859, under the
act of January 27, 1858, in Texas, was held to be void, as, in
the opinion of the court, the laws in force since the adoption
of the Eevised Statutes do not provide for the reorganization
of any municipal corporation by the acceptance of the general
law in lieu of a former charter, whereby the former corpora-
tion is practically dissolved in any manner other than that
prescribed in article 340 of the Kevised Statutes. Any effort
on the part of the inhabitants of territory within an existing
corporation otherwise than as so provided was held to be
without authority and of no legal effect. So, also, any effort
to increase the boundaries of such corporation otherwise than
as provided by existing statutes.'
§ 430. Invalid reorganization. — An invalid reorganization
of an incorporated town as a city cannot effect its corporate
existence.* A re-incorporation of a town by an adoption of
1 Pepper v. Smith, 15 Lea (Tenn.), vide that this may be done by a two-
551, where the reorganization of the thirds vote of the city council of such
town of Lynnville into the taxing city. A further change was made
district of Lynnville was held to be . . . that in the reorganization of
valid and in compliance with the a city the boundaries, as deterinined
law. by the former charter, remain, unless
2 Pepper v. Smith, 15 Lea (Tenn.), additional territory be added at the
551. desire of a majority of the qualified
» State V. Dunson (1888), 71 Tex. 65, voters residing within the territory
the court saying; — "The act of March to be added. Eev. Stats., arts. 343,
15, 1875, incorporated in the Revised 503." In Bnford v. State (1888), 72
Statutes, changed the method by Tex. 182, the re-incorporation of the
which a town or city already incor- town of Henderson was held void
porated might surrender its corporate upon this construction of the Revised
existence and re-incorporate under Statutes.
that general law (January 37, 1858). « Laird v. City of De Soto (1884),
The Revised Statutes, article 340, pro- 23 Fed. Rep. 481.
420 CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§ 431.
an article in the Texas statute ' by vote of electors was held
to be void. It could adopt that article only in the manner
prescribed therein " by a two-thirds vote of the city council." '
The organization of a town as a municipal corporation under
the act of Tennessee of 1869-70 superseded its organization
under the code. A repeal of that act, accepted and acquiesced
in, did not restore its old organization, but left it without
municipal organization.' It was held that a city having a
special charter did not by force t»f the act of Washington en-
titled " An act providing for the organization, classification,
incorporation and government of municipal corporations," be-
come re-incorporated thereunder.* A town in Texas was re-
incorporated in 1859, and its corporate organization kept up
at intervals till 1882. In 1887 steps were taken as for the
original incorporation of a city or town, with boundaries
larger than those of the original town. It was held that the
corporation created in 1859 could not be presumed to be dis-
solved by the failure to elect officers ; and that as the stat-
ute provides the only manner in which a city or town may
surrender its corporate existence and re-incorporate under the
general law, and that the boundaries of such a city shall remain
as they were fixed by the former charter, unless additional
territory be afterward annexed in the manner therein pre-
scribed, the proceedings had in 1887 did not create a corpora-
tion, nor dissolve the one previously existing.*
§ 431. Property rights passing to new corporation.—
Where a municipal corporation is legislated out of existence
and its territory annexed to other corporations, the latter, un-
J Sayles' Civil Statutes of Texas, BurJc v. State, 5 Lea (Tenn.,) 349, was
title 17, chapter 1, article 340. followed in this casa
2 Lum V. City of Bowie (Tex., 1891), * So held in Rohde v. Seavey
18 S. W. Rep. 143. (Wash. 1893), 29 Pao. Rep. 768, where
' So held in Buohs v. Town of it was determined that such a city,
Atliens (Tenn., 1891), 18 S. W. Rep. not having been re-incorporated as
400, in which the court further ruled provided for in the act, could not be
that as an attempted reorganization embraced within the classifications
afterwards was void for an irregu- of such act
l^rity the town could plead the in- ^ State v. Dunson (1888]^ 71 Tex. 65 ;
validity of its organization in de- 9 S. W. Bep^ 103.
fense of a suit brought on bonds.
§ 432.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATIOJil. 421
less the legislature otherwise provides, become entitled to all
its property and immunities, and severally liable for a propor-
tionate share of all its subsisting legal debts, and vested with
its power to raise revenue wherewith to pay them by levying
taxes upon the property transferred and the persons residing
therein.^ So, too, when a municipal corporation with fixed
boundaries is divided by law and a new corporation is created
by the legislature for the same general purposes but with new
boundaries embracing less territory, but containing substan-
tially the same population, the great mass of the taxable prop-
erty and the corporate property of the old corporation which
passes without consideration and for the same uses, the debts
of the old corporation fall upon the new corporation as the
legal successor, and powers of taxation to pay them, whichit
had at the time of their creation and which entered into the
contracts, also survive and pass into the new corporation.*
The right to a liquor tax levied but not collected by a town
previous to its annexation to a city is not transferred by this
annexation to the latter.'
§ 433. For what the reorganized corporation becomes lia-
l)le. — "Where an incorporated town is reorganized as a city,
the latter becomes liable for the debts of the former-.* In
•Mount Pleasanttt Beokwith (1879), * Laird v. City of De Soto (1884), 33
100 U. S. 514 Fed. Rep. 431. Miller, Justice, says : —
2 Mobile V. Watson (1886), 116 U.S. "If the city organization of 1877
389, holding the port of Mobile liable was absolutely void, the town of Do
for bonds issued by the city of Mo- Soto remained, and the city organi-
bile in aid of a railroad, and in the -zation now sued, which' was cre-
contract connected therewith the dis- ated by order of the county court
solved corporation had provided for after the dissolution of the first city
the payment of the same by levy of organization by the decree in quo
a certain tax. tvarranto, is the legitimate successor
3 So held in Tp. of Springwells v, of the town of De Soto which issued
County Treasurer (1885), 58 Mich, the bonds, being composed of the
240, the court saying : — " Detacliing same trustees and the same people,
part of a township does not affect and is only a change in the name of
the ownership of anything but lands, the corporation and in its mode of
All debts or rights incorporeal con- government ; " citing Broughton v,
tinue to be owned by the township Pensacola, 93 U. S. 866.
unless provision is made by law to
the contrary."
422 CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§ 433.
holding the city of Pensacola liable for the bonds issued by
the former city of Pensacola, which it was contended had
been dissolved by failure of the city to reorganize within nine
mouths after the approval of an act providing for a uniform
system of municipal government in the State of Florida,
Woods, Justice, concluded that the present city was the same
corporate body as that by which the bonds were issued ; reor-
ganized and clothed with a new charter and with new powers
and privileges, it is true, but stilithe same municipal corpo-
ration.' Where a town has been vacated by a county board
exercising legislative power in the mode prescribed by the law
of the State and its territory in part annexed to another, the
latter becomes liable for the debts of the former, — as, for in-
stance, for a sum due to an attorney for prosecuting an action
for the former town against the latter, the action being dis-
missed on the annexation.^ And it is not within the power of
a legislature, by the repeal of the charter of a municipal cor-
poration, to invade the rights of its creditors and cancel its
indebtedness. Such legislation impairs the obligation of con-
tracts and is unconstitutional.'
§ 433. Further reason of the foregoing doctrine. — A
change in the charter of a municipal corporation, in whole or
in part, by an amendment of its provisions, or the substitution
of a new charter in place of the old one, embracing substan-
tially the same corporators and the same territory, will not be
• Milner's Adm'r v. City of Pensa- supervisors had all the powers of the
cola (1875), 3 Woods (U. S. Cir. Ct), legislature in vacating towns.
632, 643. 8 Milner's Adm'r u City of Pensa-
2 Knight V. Ashland, 61 Wis. 233, cola (1875), 2 Woods (U. S. Cir. Ct),
the court saying : — " The general 632, 642, citing 1 Dillon on Munic.
power of the legislature to appor- Corp., § 114, where are cited in sup-
tion the property and the liabilities port of this view, Cooley's Const. Lim.
of a vacated town among the towns 290, 292 ; Curran v. Arkansas, 15
to which its territory is attached is How. 812 ; Thompson v. Lee County,
recognized by this court in Town of 3 WalL 327 ; Havemeyer v. Iowa
Depere v. Town of Bellevue, 31 Wis. County, 3 Wall. 294; 3 Kent's Com.
120, 125 ; Goodhue v. Beloit, 21 Wis. 307, note ; County Commissioners v.
636; LaPointe v. O'Malley, 47 Wis. Cox, 6 Ind. 403; Coulter u Robert-
833; Butternut u O'Malley, 50 Wis. son, 24 Miss. 278 ; Scatter v. Madison,
833." In the case in 47 Wis. 332, it 15 Wis. 30 ; Blake v. Railroad Co., 39
was held that the countv board of N. H. 435.
§ 434.] CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. 423
deemed, in the absence of express legislative declaration other-
wise, to affect the identity of the corporation, or to relieve it
from its previous liabilities, although different powers are pos-
sessed under the amended or now charter, and different offi-
cers administer its affairs.'
§434. What are such liabilities The word "debts" in
the Texas statute repealing the charter of East Dallas and an-
nexing its territory to the city of Dallas, placing the liability
for the debts of the former upon the latter, has been held to
include a liability for damages resulting from the tortious acts
of the municipal officers in removing a private dwelling and
tearing down a fence preparatory to taking the land for a
public street.* A law imposing political obligations, as, for
instance, the issuing of bonds for the purpose of building a
city hall, upon a municipal corporation, which by a subsequent
act of the legislature was specially abolished and the same
territory re-incorporated a city, with the same name even, is
not effectual to impose the same obligations upon the latter.'
The city of New Orleans has been held liable and burdened
1 Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 TJ. S. within the inhibition, yet it will not
266. Leading up to this conclusion, be admitted, where its legislation is
on page 269 Field, Justice, says : — susceptible of another construction,
" Although a municipal corporation, that the State has in this way sanc-
so far as it is invested with subordi- tioned an evasion of or escape from
nate legislative powers for local pur- liabilities, the creation of which is
poses, is a mere Instrumentality of authorized."
the State for the convenient admin- ^ijarberz;. City of East Dallas (Tex.,
istration of government, yet, when 1892), 18 S. W. Eep. 438, the court
authorized to take stock in a railroad saying : — "'Although in the nature of
company and issue its obligations a tort, the liability is a fixed one,
in payment of the stock, it is to that growing out of the exercise of power
extent to be deemed a private corpo- conferred upon the defendant by
ration, and its obligations are secured law, and although the law prescribed
by all the guaranties which protect the manner in which property may
the engagements of private individu- be condemned and taken for the use
als. The inhibition of the constitu- of a street"
tion, which presei-ves against the in- ' So held in Carey v. City of Duluth
terference of a State the sacredness (Mina, 1888), 36 N. W. Rep. 459, the
of contracts, applies to the liabilities court construing the language of the
of municipal corporations created by act charging the re-incorporated city
its permission ; and although the re- with responsibility for the " legal
peal or modification of the charter of debts, obligations and liabilities " of
a corporation of that kind is not the i former city to be "indicative
424: CONSOLIDATION AND EEOEGANIZATION. [§ 435.
with the contract obligations entered into by two cities with
a gas company prior to an act consolidating them with the city
of New Orleans.^ An attorney agreed to prosecute an action
of the town of L. against the town of A. for a certain sum,
which, also, he was to have if the action should be discontin-
ued without his consent. Pending the action L. was vacated
and A. made its successor, and A. obtained the discontinuance
of the action. It was held that A. was liable to the attorney
for the sum agreed upon.* «
§ 435. Remedy of creditors..— The remedy of creditors of
an extinguished municipal corporation is in equity against the
corporation succeeding to its property and powers.' A re-
organized municipal corporation, legal successor to one dis-
solved, is a proper party defendant in a suit to recover for
claims and obligations entered into by the dissolved corpora-
tion, and a judgment against the new corporation settles all
questions of its liability for the debts of the old.* The United
States circuit court, on a judgment obtained by a bondholder
against the' reorganized corporation on such a debt of the
dissolved one, ordered a peremptory Tnamdamus to be issued
to the officers of the former to levy a tax to raise money for
the payment of this judgment. This was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court of the United States.' Where judgment is re-
merely of a purpose to ti-ansfer to it Dousman v. Pres't &a of Town of
the pecuniary or legal responsibility Milwaukee (1839), 1 Pin. (Wis.) 81.
of the extinguished municipality in « Mobile v. Watson (1886), 116 U. S.
favor of those whose rights, spring- 289, where it was contended that as
ing from contract or tort, ought not the act chartering the new corpora-
to be cut off, rather than of a purpose tion made simply a provision for an
to require the new municipality, adjustment, through commissioners
whose charter was appai-ently com- to be appointed for the purpose, of
plete in itself, to perform whatever the claims against the dissolved cor-
poUtical duties had been by law poration, there was no power given
specifically imposed upon the former to the reorganized corporation to levy
city.'' such a tax. The court's 'reason for
iStatei). City of New Orleans (1889), such ruling was as follows: — "The
41 La. Ann. 91. remedies for the enforcement of such
' Knight V. Ashland, 65 Wis. 166. obligations assumed by a municipal
3 Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 corporation, which existed when the
U. S. 514. contract was made, must be left un-
* United States v. Port of Mobile impaired by the legislature, or if they
(1882), 13 Fed. Rep. 768. See, also, are changed a substantial equivalent
§ 435.]
CONSOLIDATION AND REOEGANIZATION.
425
covered against a municipal corporation wliioh is subsequently
dissolved and another created in its place, scire facias is the
proper proceeding to revive the judgment against its suc-
cessor. Such a case is distinguishable from scwe facias against
an heir to subject him to liability for his ancestor's debt. The
heir is not liable for the debt, but only the property in his
hands, while the successor of the municipal corporation is
liable, because it is the same debtor under a different name,
and scire facias lies against such successor although equity is
administering the assets of the former municipality.^
must be provided. Where the re-
source for the payment of the bonds
of a municipal corporation is the
power of taxation existing when the
bonds were issued, any law which
withdraws or limits the taxing powers
and leaves no adequate means for
the payment of the bonds is forl^id-
den by the constitution of the United
States and is null and void. Citing
Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 ;
Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S, 595;
Balls County Court u United States,
105 U. S. 733 ; Louisiana «. Pillsbury,
105 U. S. 291 ; Louisiana v. Mayor of
New Orleans, 109 U. S. 385. Cf. and
as supporting the doctrine: Com-
missioners of Limestone Country v.
Bather, 48 Ala. 433; Edwards v. Will-
iamson, 70 Ala. 145; Slaughter v.
Mobile County, 73 Ala. 134. See, also,
Wolff V. New Orleans, 108 U. S. 858,
868. Cf. Amy v. Selma, 77 Ala. 108,
where it was held that the Alabama
act of February 17, 1883, incorpo-
rating the same territory and inhab-
itants under another name, made the
new corporation the successor of
the dissolved one, and bound it to
the payment of the debts and to the
satisfaction of the liabilities of the
dissolved corporation, and made it a
necessary party to a bill iiled by the
commissioners appointed under the
act of 1883.
1 Grantland v. Memphis (1882), 13
Fed. Eep. 287.
CHAPTER XIII.
PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION.
(a) Paehtion.
i 436. Partition — General rule.
437. Validity of partition.
438. Kules as to division of coun-
ties and towns.
439. Procedure for division not ap-
plicable in vacating a town.
440. Indiana rules.
441. Michigan rules.
443. Bules as to severing territory.
448. Pennsylvania rule.
444 Constitutionality — Wisconsin.
445. Kulings as to constitution of
Wisconsin on division of
counties.
446. The same subject continued —
Uniformity of system of
govemmenb
447. Title of act
448. Florida decisions as to consti-
tutionality of acts.
449. Kansas decision.
450. How partition aSects officers.
451. Where unorganized territory
has been attached to a
county.
452. Settlement of inhabitants.
453. Territory severed from an old
to form a new corporation
is a part of the old until the
new is fully organized.
454. Some Wisconsin acts con-
strued.
455. Provisions of act as to county
sites.
456. Apportionment of liabilities.
457. Rules as to property and lia-
bilities.
458. The same subject continued.
► 459. A Wisconsin case on property
rights.
460. Rules as to apportionment,
liabilities and remedies.
461. Rules in North Carolina as to
settlement between new and
old counties.
462. Rules for adjustment of lia-
bilities.
463. Liabilities which fall upon the
portion severed.
464 Defenses to claims growing
out of partition.
465. Enforcement of obligations of
old and new.
466. Miscellaneous.
(6) Dissolution.
467. Dissolution — How effected in
general.
468. The same subject continued.
469. Surrender of charter.
470. The same subject continued.
471. Florida decisions on constitu-
tionality of acts to dissolva
472. Vacated towns.
473. This was no dissolution.
474 Effect of dissolution as to lia-
bilities and funds in hand.
475. Effect of dissolution upon lia-
bilities.
476. What does not affect liabil-
ities and remedies.
477. Repealing charters.
478. Tlie same subject cpntinued.
479. Receiver for a city,
480. The same subject continued.
481. Where such a receiver was
appointed.
§ 4:36.] ( PAETITION. 427
(a) Paetitioit.
§ 436. Partition — General rule.— The power to divide
counties and form new ones of portions of the old, to divide '
towns, and to sever territory from one municipal, corporation
^and attach to another, is not questioned. This power is lodged
in the legisl^itures of the States, but in corporations different
from coun,ties it in some cases is delegated by general law
to the ruling bodies of the counties of the State. It has been '
held in New York that a county may be divided by the legis-
lature into two or more counties by a mere majority vote, it
not being necessary that a bill for such purpose should receive
the assent of two-thirds of all the members.' Where, since
the passage of an act organizing a township, the supervisors
of the county out of which the township was formed have
undertaken to form two other townships out of that organized
by the legislature, without seeking a bill, and on a petition
not appearing on its face to be signed by any freeholders of
the township organized by the legislature, their action cannot
stand in the way of the legislative organization, or interfere
with the rights of an officer duly elected for such township.*
The word " town " as used in the constitution of Wisconsin
denotes a civil division composed of contiguous territory; and
under the power granted to county boards by the statute,
such a board cannot make a valid order changing the bound-
aries of a town so that it shall consist of two separate and
detached tracts of land.' Where a severance has been allowed
by order of court on an application, it may be held erroneous
if, under the circumstances, justice and equity did not require
it.* Provisions of a previous statute relating to severance of
territory have been held applicable alike to cities and towns
organized under the general incorporation law and those pre-
viously organized under special charter.* Such statutory pro-
visions are applicable to territory within the city or town
1 People V. Morrell (1839), 31 Wend. 'Chicago &c. By. Co. v. Town of
561. Oconto (1880), 50 Wis. 190.
2 So held in Attorney-General v. * Hosier v. Des Moines, 31 Iowa, 174,
Rice (1887), 64 Mich. 385; s. C, 31 s Whiting «. Mt. Pleasant, 11 Iowa,_
N. W. Rep. 203. 483.
428 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 437.
whether it is or is not laid (5ut into lots and blocks. If so laid
out, the severance would, it seems, operate as an extinguish-
ment of the rights of the corporation in the streets and alleys
of such portion.' Where the application for division of a town-
ship is properly made, the board of supervisors has no discre-
tion, and may be compelled by mandamus to make such divis-
ion.^ ,A new township formed out of an old one does not
become independent until its complete organization when the
officers elected for it enter upo» the discharge of their duties.*
In Iowa, upon the formation of a new township, no election
except that upon the question of formation of such township
can be held until after the 1st of January following'. Special
elections contemplated or authorized by law to be held prior
to that time must be held in the old or original township.*
§437. Talidityof partition.— The statute of New York
does not, it seems, require that the published copy of notice
of the application of twelve freeholders for the erection of a
new town shall contain the names of such applicants. It is
sufficient that the notice posted should be- thus described.
And an affidavit that a notice was left with another person
to be posted up, " which was done," has been construed as
a positive averment of the posting.' Where, in the partition
of a town, and forming a new one from a portion thereof,
the dividing line only was described in the act of the board
of supervisors, it has been held that the uncertainty was
cured by the reference in such act to the petition, etc., upon
which it was founded, and from which it appeared that the
new town was to lie south of the line of division, and by proof
aliunde that the place named in the act for holding the first
town meeting was south of such line.* The question whether
a town has been legally erected may be tested in an action
in the nature of quo warranto against one claiming to exer-
cise the office of supervisor of such town.' Where an act
1 McKean v. Mt Vernon, 51 Iowa, * Williams v. Poor, 65 Iowa, 410.
306 ; Way v. Center Point, 51 Iowa, » People v. Carpenter, 24 N. Y. 86.
708. ' People v. Carpenter, cited in the
2 Henry v. Taylor, 57 Iowa, 73. preceding note.
'Lamb v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 'People v. Carpenter, cited in the
89 Iowa, 333. iii-st note to this section.
§ 438.] PARTITION. 429
of supervisors or other officers authorized to divi&e municipal
corporations is attacked for irregularities or otherwise, the
burden of disproving a compliance with the conditions im-
posed by law as requisite to the exercise of the power is upon
those who would impeach it. The act of the officers is one
of a legislative character, in favor of the regularity of which
all presumptions are to be indulged.^ The Supreme Court of
Michigan has held that the legality of the division of a town-
ship, consisting of two governmental towns, cannot be raised
in an action attacking the validity of a tax on the ground that
the assessment rolls for the old township did not contain the
lands included in the new one.^
§ 438. Eules as to division of counties and towns. — An
act to create two counties, etc., which divided the territory of
two existing counties so that a large part of the one was cut
oflE and attached to the other to form one of these new coun-
ties, and the other new county was formed of the balance
left of the first, violated that provision of the constitution of
Idaho which declares that " no county shall be divided unless
a majority of the qualified electors of the territory proposed
to be cut off, voting on the proposition at a general election,
shall vote in favor of such division.' Where the constitution
of a State provides that no county shall be formed of an area
•less than a fixed number of square miles, a county board can-
not lawfully submit a proposition to divide a county where the
new counties would be less in area than the constitutional
limit.* A county board cannot lawfully submit to be voted
upon at the same election two propositions to erect from a
county two new counties when the territory described in one
proposition embraces a part of that included in another, under
a provision in a statute that on a proper petition the county
board shall submit to the electors of the county affected the
question of the division of the county.* An act of Tennessee
» People V. Cai-penter, 24 N. Y, 86. < State v. Armstrong (1890), 30 Neb.
2 Mills u Township of Richland, 73 493 ; s. c, 46 N. W. Rep. 618.
Mich. 100; s. c, 40 N. W. Rep. 183. estate v. Armstrong, cited in the
3 People V. George (Idaho), 26 Pac. preceding note,
Rep. 98a
430 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 438.
abolishing the county of James and restoring its territory to
the counties of Hamilton and Bradley, from which it was
formed, was held to be void under that article of the consti-
tution of Tennessee providing for the formation of new coun-
ties with the consent of the voters of the territory taken to
form such counties, and particularly prescribing how such new
counties may be established, but giving no authority to abolish
an old county entirely.* Where one town is set off by the leg-
islature from the territory of anther town, the boundary be-
tween them being a stream of water, the center of the stream
is the dividing line between the two.* Commissioners in pro-
ceedings to alter township lines are not restricted to the ap-
proval or rejection of the line established by the report of the
first commissioners who viewed. Nor are reviewers in such
proceedings required to go within any particular distance of
the proposed line, if they go near enough to get a view that
will enable them to form an intelligent opinion.' The consti-
tution of Nebraska, declaring that " no county shall be divided,
or have any part stricken therefrom, without first submitting
the question to a vote of the people of the county, nor unless
a majority of all the legal voters of the county voting on the
question shall vote for the same," is a restriction upon the
powers of the legislature to the extent named, but does not
prohibit a law requiring a three-fifths vote.* The auditor-
general of Michigan apportioned the State taxes for 1891 to a
county from which a part had been taken by an act passed May
21, 1891, but not to go into effect until October 2, 1891, and
with parts of other counties formed into a new county, without
reference to the new county, and applied for a writ of mcmda-
mus to compel the board of supervisors of that county to levy
the tax. It was held that the writ should be denied ; that the
auditor-general should separate the legalized valuation, and
apportion the taxes to the old county in proportion to the
1 James County v. Hamilton ship Line (Pa. Qr. Sess.), 8 Pa. Co. Ct
County (1890), 89 Tenn. 237 ; s. C, 14 Rep. 524.
S. W. Rep. 601. < State v. Nelson (Neb.), 51 N. W.
2 Flynn v. City of Boston (1891), 153 Rep. 648 ; State v. Pointer (Neb.), 51
Mass. 372; S. C, 26 N. K Rep. 868. N. W. Rep. 652.
s Exeter and Northmoreland Town-
§ 439.] PAETITION. 431
valuation of the property therein, after deducting the valu-
ation of the townships or parts of townships taken from that
county to form the new county.^ An act detaching certain
territory from a county and annexing it to an adjoining one,
which brought the line between the counties within less than
six miles of the court-house of the county from which the terri-
tory was detached, was held to be void as repugnant to the
constitution of Tennessee, which provides that the line of any
new county formed shall not approach the court-house of an
old county from which it may be taken nearer than eleven
miles." No appeal lies from a statutory proceeding for the
division of a township unless expressly allowed by statute.'
§ 439. Procedure for diyision not applicable in vacating
a town. — The Wisconsin statutes prescribe a procedure for
division of towns and for vacating towns. It has been held
that the only limitation upon the powers of the county board
in setting off, organizing, vacating and changing the bound-
aries of towns is. contained in the statute that a town shall not
be vacated unless a majority of the members elected to seats
therein shall so desire.*
1 Auditor-General v. Bd. of Super- ceeds to attach the territory thereby
visors of Menominee County (Mich.), left unorganized to certain organized
61 N. W. Rep. 483. towns adjacent thereto. It was the
2 Union County v. Enox County clear duty of the board to extend
(1890), 90 Tenn. 541 ; S. 0., 18 S. W. organized town government over
Bep. 254 such territory. Under existing laws
• In re Division of Valley Town- it is only through the machinery of
ship (Pa.), 23 Atl. Eep. 232. town government that property out-
^ State ex rel. v. Supervisors (1884), side of municipalities can be assessed
61 Wis. 278, in which it was con- for taxation, or taxed, or that elect-
tended that the provisions of the sec- tors not residing in municipalities
tion relating to the division of towns can exercise the right of suffrage.
applied to the case, and that a failure [There is] no good reason why pro-
to take the steps provided for in this vision may not be made in the same
section made the action of the ordinance for vacating a town and
county board void. The court held for extending the town government
this section not applicable in pro- over the unorganized territory which
ceedings to vacate a town. The constituted the vacated town, as well
court say that the ordinance can- as to make two ordinances to accom-
not be said "correctly [to be] one di- plish the same result. In either
viding the town of Dexter. It vacates case the provisions for attaching the
that town absolutely, and then pro- territory to organized towns are not
432 PAKTITIOK AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 440.
§ 440. Indiana rules. — The legislature may, on division
of a county, divide property of the same.' It has been held
in Indiana that the legislature may delegate the povrer to
organize new counties. Further, that their act of March,
1857, upon this subject was not in conflict with their consti-
tution ; that no legislative power was delegated by that act.*
Provisions for the establishment of boundaries of existing
counties and provisions for formation of new counties are
matters which may be properly embraced in the same act of the
legislature.' Under the act of March, 1857, a single county
containing 'the requisite area might be divided by its own
board of commissioners, acting through a single committee
of freeholders.* By the establishment of boundaries of a
new county, under provisions of supplementary act of March 5,
1859, it becomes simply an organized political body. The
jurisdiction of courts is not afiPected thereby. In such case
the courts of the old county continue to hold jurisdiction in
actions concerning real estate, situate within the boundaries
of the new county, until the time is fixed by the judge for hold-
ing the first term in the new county.' Change of boundaries
of two adjoining counties by boards of commissioners, subse-
quent to action of the assessors of townships of the county from
which a portion was detached, in making their enlistments and
returning their list of taxation to the auditor of the county,
and prior to the day when the rate of taxation was fixed, will
not affect the right of the county to collect against persons re-
siding in detached territory. If the old county was wrongfully
attempting to collect such taxes, the one having a part of its
territory attached to it is not a proper party to enjoin it. A
tax-payer should move in such matters.' A bill of revivor of a
operative — in the nature of things * Board of Commissioners of Jack-
cannot be — until the ordmance va- son Co. v. Spitler (1859), 13 Ind. 235 ;
eating the town has taken' effect. Haggard v. Hawkins (1860), 14 Ind.
See State ex rel. Hudd v. Timme, 54 299.
"VVts. 318. Hence, when that part of ' Haggard v. Hawkins (I860), 14
the ordinance which attached the Ind. 299.
territory once situated in the town * Haggard v. Hawkins (1860)^ 14
of Dexter to other towns became Ind. 299. ,
operative, there was no town of Dex- * Milk v. Kent (1877), 60 Ind. 226.
ter to divide." ' Board of Commissioners of Mor-
1 State V. Votaw (1846X 8 Blackf. gan Co. v. Board of Commissioners
(Ind.) 2. of Hendricks Co. (1869), 82 Ind. 234.
§ Ml.] FAETITIOK. i33
bill in chancery filed in an old county respecting land situate
in the old county at the time of decree should be filed in the
same county, notwithstanding by a change of boundaries the
land was afterwards in another county, for this latter county
had no jurisdiction of the cause, and a bill of revivor merely
continues the original suit.* And an action to foreclose a
mortgage when brought in the proper county cannot be de-
feated by a subsequent division of the county, as the division
of the county by commissioners would not be complete till a
court was so organized in the new county as to enable suits to
be instituted.^ A division of a county by commissioners in
such a case is a matter of proof.' It was not the intention
of the legislature to exclude other evidence as to whether
petitioners for formation of new counties formed a majority,
of the voters, in providing, as a mode of ascertaining that fact,
a reference to the number of votes cast at the last preceding
congressional election.*
§ 441. Michigan rules. — An act to organize a new county
out of parts of three old counties provided for an election
upon the formation of the new county by the eleptors of the
three counties " at the township meetings in said county" etc.
The new county organized under this act with the assent of
the voters of the parts of those counties embraced within its
boundaries was held to be properly organized, the act being
construed not to require that the question be submitted to the
voters of the whole of those counties from which it was or-
ganized, but only to those within the new county.* The con-
stitutional prohibition in Michigan against reducing any county
to less than sixteen townships is meant to prevent its unreason-
able reduction in size and to preclude the division of surveyed
townships, if convenience requires, in organizing new counties.
It was not violated where a county was left with fifteen whole
and two half townships.* Nor was the division of a township
by the act setting off a new county from an old one, where the
1 Arnold tt Styles (1831), 2 Blackf. < Allen v. Hosletter (1860), 18 Ind.
(Ind.) 391. 15-
2 Buckinghouse v. Gregg (1863), 19 » People v. Burns (1858), 5 Mich.
Ind. 401. 114.
3 Buckinghouse v. Gregg, cited in ^Bay County v. Bullock, 51 Mich,
preceding note. 644
28
434: PABTITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 441.
legislature passed an act impliedly recognizing its continued
existence in one of the counties and attaching the rest to a
township in the other county, a destruction of the township
organization.' An act purporting to organize a new county
out of territory detached from an old one, but which contains
no organized townships and makes provision for none, has been
held inoperative and void ; as without such townships there
can be no legal elections and me^s of organizing.* JSTor will
the subsequent passage of an act organizing a single township
in the new territory, leaving the remainder not provided for,
make the act effective.' The division of a single county at-
tached to an existing judicial district into two counties will,
unless otherwise provided, leave both counties within the same
district.* A board of supervisors cannot divide a township
except on a lawful application, of which due notice must be
given ; and when the application is to be made at a special
meeting of the board the notice should show when and where
the meeting will take place.* Certiorari lies on the relation of
a supervisor whose official rights are involved, to inquire into
the existence of a township where the action of the board of
supervisors in organizing it is subject to review. And on such
a certiorari to review the action of the board it is only neces-
sary to determine their jurisdiction and the legality of their
action.* But an information in the nature of a quo warranto
will not lie against an alleged township whose organization is
invalid on the face of the record. The rule is different as to
counties. The validity of the existence of counties, for in-
stance, where a new county has been formed from parts of
others, not acquiesced in by the public, can be inquired into by
quo warranto against officers or on the trial of indictments, and
even in civil controversies where necessary to justice.' It is
competent for the legislature in creating a new county out ot
1 Bay County v. Bullock, cited in of Supervisors of Gladwin County
the preceding note. (1879), 41 Mich. 647, where the pro-
2 People V. Maynard (1867), 15 Mich, ceedings to make a new township of
463. a part of an old one were quashed on
s People V. Maynard, cited in the review,
preceding note. * People ex rel. v. Board &c., cited
♦ People V. Maynard (1867), 15 Mich, in the preceding note.
463. ' People ex rel v. Board &&, cited
> People ex rel ScrafiFord v. Board in the second preceding nota
§ 442.] PARTITION, 435
territory taken from two old ones to enact that suits pending
on a certain date in any court in either of the old counties
shall be prosecuted to final judgment in the county where
commenced.^
§ 442. Rnles as to severing territory. — An act for the crea-
tion of a new county out of portions of two old ones provided
" that a portion of E. county and a portioirof S. county, hereby
proposed to be segregated, shall not be cut off unless the ques-
tion of segregation shall be first submitted to the vote of the
people of K. county, and also to the voters of that part of range
69 proposed to be detached from S. county, at a special elec-
tion called for that purpose. ... In case a majority of the
legal voters of said K. county, and of said range 69, voting
shall vote in favor of said segregation, then this act shall be
in full force and effect." It was held that a majority of the
aggregate vote cast in both counties was insufficient, but a
majority of each was necessary to the creation of the proposed
county .'■' Lands within the limits of a city, used wholly for
agricultural purposes, not benefited by their connection with
the city and not needed for city purposes, will be severed on
petition of the owners, and if not liable for municipal taxes the
severance cannot be conditioned on the payment of any part of
the municipal indebtedness.' A Texas act which amends and
is a part of a title of the Kevised Statutes provides for elections
to withdraw territory from corporate limits, but does not direct
the manner thereof. It was held that the act was not, there-
fore, invalid, but that the election in question should be held
as other elections provided for in the title.* The same act di-
rects that, upon a petition by fifty qualified voters of terri-
tory within the limits of a municipal corporation, the mayor
shall order an election to determine whether such territory
shall be allowed to withdraw from the municipality, provided
that such municipality be not thereby reduced to an area of
' So held in an ejectment ca33 > Evans v. Council Bluffs, 65 Iowa,
brought in the new county. Spalding 238.
V. Kelly (1887), 66 Mich. 693. ♦Sansom v. Mercer, 68 Tex. 488;
'Van Dusen v. Fridley (1889), 6 S. a, 5 a W. Rep. 62.
Dak. 322 ;. s. G, 43 N. W. Eep. 70a
436 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 443.
less than one square mile, or one mile in diameter around the
center of the original corporate limits. It .was held that where
there was no dispute that the requisite number of qjalified
voters had signed, and that the withdrawal in contemplation
would leave the requisite area, the act of ordering the election
involved no exercise of discretion, and mandamus would lie
against the mavor in case of refusal.^
§ 443. Pennsylvania rule. — A municipal corporation is
merely an agency instituted by the sovereign for the purpose
of carrying out in detail the objects of government — essen-
tially a revocable agency — having no vested right to any of its
powers or franchises, the charter or act of erection being in
no sense a contract with the State,: and therefore fully subject
to the control of the legislature, who may enlarge or diminish
its territorial extent or its functions, may change or modify
its internal arrangement, or destrby its very existence with
the mere breath of arbitrary discretion. Sio volo, sic jubeo,
that is all the sovereign authority need say. This much is
undeniable and has not been denied." The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held the power of an original borough supreme
over a portion of its territory which had been detached by
proceedings in the court of quarter sessions, and constituted a
part of a new borough erected in those proceedings, as there
was no power in the court in the manner employed to change
the limits of a borough. Under the act governing such changes
the procedure is by an application made for the purpose, signed
by a majority of the freeholders residing within the limits of
the borough; due notice must be given as directed by law,, and
it must be approved by the grand jury and confirmed by the
court. An omission to take these steps was fatal, and the new
borough was not properly formed as to the part it detached
from the original borough.'
' Sansom v. Mercer, 68 Tex. 488. vested rights of third parties, either
2 Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St enlarge or contract the boundaries of
169. boroughs; may consolidate several
8 Darby u Sharon Hill X18S6), 113 such corporations into one or divide
Pa. St 66, the court said : — " The leg- one into several. But it is incompe-
islature may by appropriate general tent for the court to dismember a bor-
laws to that effect, preserving the ough, except as they may be author-
§'i44.] PAKTITION. 437
§444. Constitutionality — Wisconsin. — Apart of a towu
had been detached by act of the legislature from one county
and annexed to another county. By legislative edict it was
restored to the former. In the meantime taxes had been col-
lected and paid to the county to which it was annexed. It
was contended that an act passed subsequently ordering the
treasurer of the latter county to pay over the taxes collected
and to assign titles to land bought in for such taxes to the
county from which the town was originally detached was un-
constitutional because it purported to create an indebtedness
from the first county to this second, which the legislature could
not do. The court conceded that the legislature was not
competent to create such an indebtedness, but overruled the
contention. They said : — " But if money had been paid by mis-
take, growing out of hasty legislation in annexing a town in
one county to another without making any provision as to the
efifect of the change, it would be competent for the legislature
to provide in what manner this mistake should be corrected." '
An act providing for the appointment of commissioners to ad-
just and settle the rights of the old and new counties is not a
conferring of judicial powers upon them where an appeal is
given from their decisions to the regularly constituted courts
of the State, which would make it repugnant to the consti-
tution of Wisconsin.- The division of existing towns and the
ized by law ; the charter of a munici- of quarter sessions in this respect
pal corporation grants privilege? and have just such powers as the legisla-
immunicies which are perpetual, and ture has given them."
their privileges and immunities are • Supervisors of Jackson Co. v. Su-
co-extensive with the corporate lim- pervisors of La Crosse Co. (1861), 13
its. Their responsibility as public Wis. 490, in which it was held that
a,?ents exists mainly in the perform- an action for the amount claimed
ance of acts for the public benefit, could not be sustained until the
but they have also a distinctly plaintiffs had submitted the claim to
legal personality ; they may make the defendants and it had been dis-
contracts, purchase property, create allowed. This act gave no additional
debts, borrow money, and they have remedy, unless perhaps a mandamus
a, right, to the extent of the limits to compel the treasurer to comply
fixed by their charter, to corporate with its provisions,
existence ; their rights and responsi- ^ Forest County v. Langlade County
bjlities are in this regard analogousfco (1890), 76 Wis. 605 ; s. C, 45 N. W. Rep.
those of private corporations, subject 598. Cf. Gough v. Dorsey, 37 Wis.
only to the action of the law-making 119. 131, 138; Gaston v. Babcock, 6
power, as we have stated. The courts Wis. 503, 507.
4:38 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 445.
creation of new towns by direct action of the legislature is not
the " enacting of any special or private law for incorporating
any town," within the meaning of the State constitution.*
§ Ho. Rnlings as to constitntion of Wisconsin on divis-
ion of counties. — The constitution of Wisconsin forbade the
division of a county with an area of nine hundred square miles
or less without submitting the question to a vote of the people
of the county and a majority of all the voters voting on the
same. It has been held that bodies of water, such as Lake
Michigan or a part thereof, lying within the boundaries of the
county, are to be computed. And the act for the formation
of a county from Washington county, which with the water
area had more than nine hundred square miles, was not repugr
hant to this section of the constitution.* The original surveys
of the United States government are not to be taken as con-
clusive by presumption of law. They may be rebutted and
impeached as to their correctness ; but, jprima faeie, they are to
be presumed to be correct until their accuracy has been prop-
erly impeached.' The accuracy of these surveys may be put in
issue by the pleadings, and be determined like other questions
of fact,* Where a county from which territory was detached
appeared by the United States surveys to contain just nine
hundred miles, the act forming a new county of the same was
only prima facie unconstitutional; but the burden was upon
those who supported the act to show that the county contained
more.* The provision to submit to a vote is not merely di-
rectory to the legislature; it is inhibitory and imperative."
An act which submitted tlie act itsdf to popular vote of the
electors of the county, but by its entire scope evidently in-
tended only to submit the question of division to popular
vote, was held valid notwithstanding the apparently uncon-
1 State V. Forest Couijjty, 74 Wis. * State v. Merriman (1857), 6 Wis.
610; S. a, 43 N. W. Rep. 551. 14
2 State V. Larrabee (1853), 1 Wis. s State v. Merriman, 6 Wis. 14
200. Followed in Perry v. State, 9 Wis. 19.
» State V. Merriman (1857), 6 Wis. « State v. Merriman (1857), 6 Wis.
14. See, also, Kane tt Parker, 4 Wis. 14. See, also. State v. Elwood, 11
123, 128; "Vroman v. Dewey, 23 Wis. Wis. 17.
530.
§ 446.] PARTITION. 4:39
stitutional delegation of legislative power by its, inaccurate
language J},nd to have provided constitutionally for a division
of the county.^ A county having originally less than nine
hundred square miles in area may have attached to it such a
part of one which can spare the territory, and if by this ad-
dition its area is thus increased to more than the area required
in this provision of the constitution, it can be divided to form
a part or the whole of a new county without submitting the
question to a vote.'
§ 446. The same subject continued — Uniformity of sys-
tem of government. — The creation or division of counties,
and the adjustment of the respective rights and liabilities of
the new and old counties as to the assets and debts of the lat-
ter, are not part of the system of county government which
by constitution of Wisconsin is required to be uniform.' To
make the town board in such a case also the county board of
a new county is no infringement of the rule of unity or the
rule of uniformity required by the constitution as to a system
of town and county government.^ Nor was an dct for dividing
a county into three towns in violation of the same constitu-
tional provision.*
§ 447. Title of act. — An act which expressed its object to
be to "incorporate" a certain township, but only mentioned
' State V. Elwood (1860), 11 Wis. 17. sity for a county. But a county ne-
2 State V. Cram (1863), 16 Wis. 343. cessitates a board of supervisors, and
' Forest County 7>. Langlade County if it contains but one town, then
(1890), 76 Wis. 605 ; s. C, 45 N. W. there can be but one chairman in
Rep. 598. Cf. Crawford Co. v. Iowa such town, and it would hardly be
Co., 3 Pin. (Wis.) 368 ; Milwaukee v. claimed that one person should con-
Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93 ; Morgan v. Be- stitute such board. [Where there are
loit City, 7 Wall. 613 ; Depc re I. Belle- several' towns in a new county the
vue, 31 Wis. 130; Mount Pleasant «. law here provided that the chairman
Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514 ; Knight v. of the supervisors of the different
Ashland, 61 Wis. 233; Schriber v. towns should constitute the county
Langlade, 68 Wis. 616, 629, 631 ; Yorty board.] It [the board of the town]
V. Paine, 62 Wis. 154, 161 ; Hall v. supplies a necessity, and is as nearly
Baker, 74 Wis. 118; State v. Forest uniform as practicable, and preserves
Co., 74 Wis. 610, 615. the unity of the system in "that it
* Cathcart v. Corastock (1883), 56 constitutes the county board from
Wis. 590. The court say : — " There town supervisors."
may be necessity for more chan one ^ Chicago &c. Ey. Co. v. Langlade
town, and yet there may be neces- County (1883), 56 Wis. 614 The
440
PAETITION AND DISSOLCTIOW.
[§447.
one of the townships from which it was to be taken, is not
repugnant to the' constitution of New Jersey, providing that
the object of an act must be expressed in its title, because of
its omission of the other township furnishing a portion of its
territory .1 As to the objection to the title not embracing all
the subject-matter of the bill, it was held that the title, " An
act to create and establish the county of Lake from portions of
Sumter and Orange counties," was broad enough to cover any
provision as to the location of tlffe county site or a change of
the same at any period or stage of the existence of the county.*
court say : — "It is the one s3-st8m
which is to be as nearly uniform as
practicable. It is that which is to
be protected against legislative en-
croachment This system which is to
be thus guarded is nothing more nor
less than the plan or scheme by
which the town and county are to be
governed. Within the limits of the
constitution this plan or scheme of
governing either town or county
may be changed by the legislature
without any interference with the
other. The mere fact that the legis-
' iature, in a given case, prescribes a
particular method of organizing new
towns and bringing them into the
one established system, does not nec-
essarily imply that the plan or
scheme of governing such new towns,
after they are thus brought into the
system, is to be any different from
that in other towns. The incipient
steps leading towards organization
should not be mistaken for the more
advanced stages. A town implies in-
ception and progression as well as
completed org;anization. The same
is true of a county. Induction into
the family of local governments is
quite a different thing from exercis-
ing the functions of such govern-
ment after having been thus in-
ducted. The one involves action prior
to reaching the system, the other
implies action after becoming a con-
stituent part of it. The unity and
uniformity required apply to the or-
ganization when completed rather
than the methods to bring about
such organization."
1 State V. Elvins (1867), 33 N. J.
Law, 363, the court saying : — "Any
statement in the title, as to the terri-
tory to be taken to fox-m the new
town, was unnecessary. Such state-
ment goes beyond the mere expres-
sion of the object of the statute, and
is a particularity which the constitu-
tion does not require."
2 County Comm'rs of Lake Co. v.
State ex rel. &c. (1888), 34 Fla. 363;
S. c, 4 So. Rep. 795, the court say-
ing : — " Provisions for such change,
whether from a temporary or a per-
manent, an original or a subsequent
location, are a part of the county
government established. Any pro-
vision relating to its organization or
government, though for use in the
future, is as much matter properly
connected with the establishment of
the county as are those relating to
the earliest stages of its existence.
The subject of the establishment of a
county, within the meaning of the
constitutional provision in question,
includes not merely what is neces-
sary to put it on its feet as a county,
but anything that may concern its
§ 448,] PARTITION. 441
§448. Florida decisions on constitutionality of acts ^A
section of the Florida statutes (providing for the incorporation,
of cities and towns) authorized the county commissioners to
prescribe new boundaries of an incorporated town, when, on
the petition of five registered inhabitants of the town setting
forth that " the boundaries of the town are of unreasonable
and unnecessary extent," it shall be found by the commission-
ers that the boundaries of such town " are extended beyond
necessary and useful limits, and include an undue amount of
vacant farming lands." Another section of the law authorized
the county commissioners to enlarge the boundaries of any
city or town on the application of the corporate authorities
thereof. This act has been held constitutional over an ob-
jection that it conferred judicial functions upon the county
commissioners.^ I^either was the grant of power to a board
of county commissioners of a new county, or a majority of
them, to locate the temporary county site a delegation of the
law-making pow€r ; nor was it prohibited by the constitution
of Florida in legislation organizing a new county." In an-
other case there was a contention that the legislature had
annulled and abrogated a contract between the county and
bondholders, by disrobing the county, without her consent, in
future existence or operation. Noth- judgment and discretion, adopting
ing is moi'e properly connected with such measures under the law as to
the subject of establishing a county them may seem conducive to the
than making provision for a change publicconvenienceand public needs."
of the county site in the future." At thfe same time the court held that
The court cited Cooley, Constitu- the power to sever a part of a town
tional Limitations, 144 ; Morford v. solely for the purpose of annexing it
Unger, 8 Iowa, 88 ; Whiting v. Mt. to another was not conferred by this
Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Bright v. act
McCuUough, 27 Ind. 233 ; Mayor &c. 2 County Comm'rs of Lake County
V. State, 30 Md. 112 ; SUte v. Union, v. State (1888), 24 Fla. 263 : s. c, 4 So.
33 N. J. Law, 350 ; Humboldt County Rep. 795, the court saying : — "Where
V. Churchill County Comm'rs, 6 Nev. the legislature has the power to do a
30. thing by law, and the constitution
1 City of Jacksonville v. L'Engle, has not prescribed the manner of do-
20 Fla 344, the court saying that, ing it, or the nature of the thing is
" like the powers to hear and deter- not such as to require that it be done
mine applications to lay out, open directly by the legislature, it may,
and discontinue roads, locate and through the provisions of its law, use
build bridges, and similar powers and any proper instrumentality for effect-
duties, they merely exercise such ing the result to be accomplished."
442 PAETITION- AOT> DISSOLUTION. [§ 449.
creating new counties from the territory composing the county
at the time of issuing the bonds. It was held that severing
a portion of the territory of a county by act of the legislature
was not a taking of " private property for public use without
a just compensation." '
§ 449. Kansas decision. — A Kansas statute, which was in-
tended in its language to make liable for bonds issued by an
original old township for building a bridge the people of a
new township which had before the building of the bridge
been detached from the old one, was held unconstitutional and
void, for that inasmuch as under the facts and circumstances
of the case such people were under no moral obligation to
assist in paying such bonds.'* A former act containing slightly
diflPerent provisions was held valid upon the theory that it
simply furnished a remedy for the enforcement of a pre-exist-
ing moral obligation.* A vote does not create any liability or
1 County Comm'rs of Columbia existing moral obligation should rest
County V. King (1869), 13 Fla. 451, upon such people to discharge such
the court not being able to " perceive liability. And in such a case though
how the State can be substituted as It is clearly within the province of the
the debtor, and liabletopay^the debts legislature, in the first instance, to
of the county, by the action of the determine the question whether such
legislature in changing her bound- a moral obligation exists or not, yet
aries." it is not exclusively within its prov-
2 Craft V. Loflnck (1885), 34 Kan. Ince. The determination of the ques-
305. The people of the old township tion finally devolves upon the court
had voted for the building of a The court distinguished cases where
bridge. Before it was done the new an act of 1873, chapter 143, had been
township was detached from it. interpreted. That act made detached
Afterwards the new township built territory liable only for bonds that
a bridge which was " an imperative had been "authorized and issued"
public necessity." The old township prior to the detachment of the terri-
built the one for which the bonds in tory ; while section 2 of the act of
this case were issued. It did not ap- 1883 made the detached territoi'y
- pear that this one was needed. The liable where only a vote authorizing
view of the court was that it is nee- the township to issue its bonds was
essary in order to enable the legisla- had prior to the detachment
ture by retrospective legislation to ^ Comm'rs of Sedgwick County v.
impose a legal liability upon the peo- Bunker, 16 Kan. 498. Cf. Comm'rs of
pie owning property in a portion of Ottawa Co. v. Nelson, 19 Kan. 234;
a township or otlier subdivision of Comm'rs of Marion Co. v. Comm'rs
the territory of a State where no such of Harvey Co., 36 Kan. 181 ; Chand-
liability existed before, that a pre- ler v. Reynolds, 19 Kan. 249.
§ 450.] PAETITION. 443
any contract, but merely gives authority to afterward create
such liability or contract.'
§ 450. How partition affects officers. — Where a county is
divided and two separate and distinct counties formed out of
it by act of the legislature, to one of which a new name is
given, whilst the other, it is declared, shall be and remain a
separate and distinct county by the nam,e of the county as it
existed previous to the division, judges of county courts ap-
pointed previous to the division who happen to reside in that
portion of the territory distinguished as a county with a new
name, under the operation of an act requiring judges of county
courts to reside within the counties for which they are ap-
pointed, lose their offices, and are no longer competent to act
under their commissions; those continuing in the portion
which retains the original name continue to the expiration of
their term.^ It seems that by express enactment the legisla-
ture might have continued these judges in office; but failing
to do that the office is gone.' On similar reasoning the Su-
preme Court of Ohio have held that the county commission-
ers of any of the counties from which a new county is formed
whose residences are thrown into the new county lose their
offices.* Where a town is divided by the incorporation of a
part of it as a new town, such new town remains in the same
judicial district as the old one, in the absence of anything to
the contrary in the statute incorporating it.* A provision in
1 Union Pac. Ey. Co. v, Comm'rs of county of Orleans from definite sub-
Davis Co., 6 Kan. 256. sisting towns of Ontario county, the
2 People V. Morrell (1839), 21 Wend, legislature had no power to abridge
563, the court distinguishing Ex the term of ofiice for which the sev-
parte McCoUum, 1 Cowen, 550, and eral justices had been appointed while
People V. Garey, 6 Cowen, 642, in the their towns belonged to Ontario. The
first of which the court held that a distinction was that in neither case
legislative organization of a new was there even a change in the name
county by combining several definite or territorial limits of the corpora-
subsisting towns of other counties, tions to which- the ofiices in question
anddeclaringthatthejusticesalready belonged; much less an actual dis-
appointed for those towns respect- solution of those corporations,
ively should bold for the residue of ' Cases cited in the preceding note,
their terms in the same towns, and * State ex rel. &c. v. Walker (1848),
relatively to the new county, was 17 Ohio, 135.
constitutional ; and the last holding 5 Commonwealth v. Brennan (1889),
lh:it on a similar erection of the 140 Mass. 63; s. a, 22 N. E. Rep. 628,
44i PAETITION AND DISSOLITTION. [§451.
an act annexing the larger portion of a village to a city that
the taxes in the annexed territory should be collected as if the
act had not been passed does not have the effect of re'taining a
former treasurer of the village in office for the purpose of col-
lecting the taxes.' "Where ja portion of a township is declared
by proclamation a city of the second class, the residue retains
its organization ; and the members of the township board are
still de facto officers at least, al^ough they reside within the
limits of the new city.* Under the statutes of Nebraska con-
cerning township organization, when, in a new town erected
by the county board, in the division of the county into towns
or townships, at the first meeting of said board, the offices of
the toyvn board as well as the town clerk are all vacant, it is
the duty of the county clerk to fill such vacancies as well as
all other vacancies in the offices of such town by appointment.'
Although commissioners living within the territory taken from
their county cease to be commissioners unless they remove to
parts of the county remaining unaffected by the division, still,
if before removal they appoint a county treasurer, their act
will be valid as that of de facto officers.*
§ 451. Where unorganized territory lias been attached to
a county. — The Nebraska statute* which provides for attach-
ing unorganized territory to the " nearest organized county di-
rectly east for election, judicial and revenue purposes" has been
construed, and it has been held that the unorganized county
did not thereby become a part of the organized one, but for
where it was held that a justice of tion of a new treasurer for the vil-
the peace with authority to issue lage had become necessary,
warrants in criminal cases anywhere 2 Walnut Township v. Jordan (1888),
within the district, whose residence 38 Kan. 563 ; S. cI, 16 Pac, Rep, 812.
fell within the new town, might con- * State v. Foraey (1887), 31 Neb.
tinue to issue warrants in such cases 233; s. C, 31 N. W. Kep. 802, where
as above.therein as well as elsewhere this particular township was formed
within the district of territory not theretofore constitut-
1 So held in Eetcham v. Wagner ing a precinct or town, and contain-
(March, 1892), 61 N. W. Rep. 281, a ing within its boundaries no person
case where the former treasurer re- elected as a town oflBcer at any elec-
sided in the portion of the village tion.
annexed to the city of Detroit, by * State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio, 143.
local act, 1891, Na 214, and an elec- " Compiled Stats, of Nebraska, ch.
18, § 146.
§ 451.] PAETITION. 4ri5
certain purpos,es therein named was placed under its care, and
that, therefore, after the organization of such unorganized ter-
ritory as a county and the qualification of its officers, taxes on
property in the county were payable to them and not to officers
of the county to which it was formerly attached.^ So, also,
where after the officers of an organized county have levied taxes
on property in an unorganized county attached thereto, and
before the taxes become due the unorganized county is organ-
ized, the taxes are payable to the treasurer of the new county.^
Garfield county which was created by laws of Kansas, 1887,
chapter 81, was by chapter 132 attached with other unorgan-
ized counties to Hodgeman county for judicial purposes ; chap-
ter 142 provided for district courts in Garfield county. These
acts were approved by the governor the same day. Chapter
132 was published March 11th, and repealed conflicting pro-
visions, and chapter 142 on March 10th. Upon -the question
of the legality of the detention of a prisoner by the sheritf of
that county, it was held that the several acts mupt be consid-
ered together, and that Garfield county was attached to
Hodgeman county for judicial purposes only until organized ;
after its organization courts should be held in Garfield county.'
By laws of Texas, 1856, page 41, Archer county was attached
to Clay county for judicial purposes. By the laws 'of 1866,
page 94, it was attached to Jack county " for judicial and
other purposes." By the laws of 1870, page 53, it was at-
tached to Montague county " for judicial purposes " only.
This last act was superseded by laws of 1874, page 53, chang-
ing the terms of court, which omitted the clause attaching
Archer to Montague. In 1879 (Laws 1879, p. 150) it was at-
tached to Clay " for judicial and other purposes." It was held
that, under the operation of the foregoing statutes. Archer
county was not attached to Clay for any purpose in August,
1 Fremont Sijc. R. Co. v. Brown State, and its oflScera become ame-
County (1886), 18 Neb. 516 ; s. C, 26 nable to the law for the faithful per-
N. W. Kep. 194 ; the court salying formance of their duty.''
that, " being an organized county, ^ Morse v. Hitchcock County (1886),
the ligament that bound it to the for- 19 Neb. 566.
msr county is severed by the force » jn re Hall (1888), 36 Kan. 670 ;
of the organization and it takes its a a, 17 Pac. Eep. 649.
place as one of the counties of the
446 PAETITION Aim DISSOLUTION. [§ 452.
1875, and that the registration in the latter county of a deed
of land situate in the former was not constructive notice."
§ 452. Settlement of inhabitants. — When part of the ter-
ritory composing a township is by the act of the legislature
formed into a new township, those persons who at the time
of separation had a legal settlement in the old township, and
resided en the territory so cut oflF, acquire ipso facto a legal
settlement in the new township." ♦The court said : — " This doc-
trine seems to flow from what may reasonably be presumed to
have been the object of the legislature in creating the new
township, viz.: that instead of the public relations previously
existing between the inhabitants and the old township, there
should be substituted similar relations between them and
the new township." ' This rule was adopted by statute in
Massachusetts as early as 1793, but the courts of that State
deemed it a principle of the common law deducible from the
nature of corporate rights and duties.* Chief Justice Shaw
speaks of the statute as " little more than an authoritative
declaration of rules which had been before established as the
rules by which persons had been held to acquire settlements." *
The New York court was divided on this question, but the
principle adopted in Massachusetts was approved by Chief
Justice Kent." In New Jersey a residence of ten consecutive
years in the same dwelling, begun while the dwelling-place is
in one township and ended after it has been comprised by act
of the legislature within the limits of another township, will
confer a legal settlement in the latter township by force of
the statute,^ which has been held to be retrospective.*
lAlford V, Jones (Tex.), 9 S. W. » Sutton «. Orange, 6 Met 484, 486.
Kep. 470. 'Washington v. Stanford, 3 Johns.
2 Overseer of Franklin Township v. 193. Cf. Stillwater o. Green, 9 N. J.
Overseer of Clinton Township (1888), Law, 59 ; Bethlehem v. Alexandria,
51 N. J. Law, 93; S. C, 16 Atl. Rep. 33 N. J. Law, 66.
184. ' Rev. Supp. N. J. 800 ; Overseer of
' Overseer &c. v. Overseer &c., cited Franklin Township v. Overseer of
in the preceding note. Lebanon Township, 51 N. J. Law, 93 ;
< Windham v. Portland, 4 Mass. 384, S. a, 16 Atl. Rep. 184.
390 ; Salem v. Hamilton, 4 Mass. 676, » Marlborough v. Freehold, 50 N. J.
678; Great Barrington v, Lancaster, Law, 509; Woodbridge v. Amboy, 1
14 Mass. 853, 356. N. J. Law, 246 (313).
§a 453, 454.]
PAETITION.
447
§ 453. Territory severed from an old to form a new corpo-
ration is a part of the old until the new is fully organized.
Where part of a town is detached from it and incorporated as
a city by an act of the legislature, which provides for an elec-
tion of city officers by a certain time, and the election is not
held, thus leaving the organization of the city in abeyance, it
continues to be a part of the town until the organization of
the city is completed.'
§454. Some Wisconsin acts construed. — An act of the
legislature provided for a division of a county by which the
territory of one town and fractions of other towns was erected
into a new county. The construction placed upon this act by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was that the original county
had jurisdiction for governmental purposes over the detached
territory only until the organization of the new county was
effected,, and that as it embraced but one complete town the
supervisors of that town became the board of supervisors of
thorizing the inhabitants to form by
the means provided a local govern-
ment was evidently intended for the
benefit of the inhabitants, and is pre-
sumed to have been made at their in-
stance and not upon the considera-
tion that the common good and policy
of the State demanded the establish-
ment of such local government and
the separation of the particular ter-
ritory for such purpose from the ju-
risdiction of county authority. Until
an organization by an election and
qualification of the number of per-
sons being the several integral parts
of the corporation, and forming the
political body provided for in the
lavFS, there could be in being no mu-
nicipal corporation or government;
and the condition of the inhabitants
within the limits named in the law
as to rights and duties would con-
tinue unchanged and unaSected by
the law authorizing them in a corpo-
rate capacity to exercise municipal
powera"
» State V. Button (1869), 25 Wis. 109,
the court holding that the act did not
propria vigore sever this part of
the town so completely as to make
the votes of its inhabitants in the
town illegal. The- court cite as sus-
taining their view, Haynes v. County
of Washington, 19 111. 66, where the
court said : — " Grants of corporate
powers for purposes of local munici-
pal government, such as belong to
towns and cities, are a delegation of
a portion of the general sovereignty
of the State designed to enable the
inhabitants of particular localities to
establish and maintain police regula-
tions and to advance their common
prosperity. A charter or act of in-
corporation is but evidence of the
powers delegated, and which powers
remain dormant or in abeyance until
in the mode pointed out in the .char-
ter the inhabitants for whose benefit
those powers are granted bring them
into life and exercise by an organiza-
tion of the local government Here
the law incorporating the town in au-
44:8 PAKTITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 455.
the new county, and the new county was at once an organized
county. Upon the organization of the new county the whole
of its territory became for the purposes of town government
one town ; and the organized town was in effect enlarged so
as to embrace the whole of such territory.^ This act was
not repugnant to the constitution, which was intended to
prohibit the enactment of any special or probate law for
incorporating any town or village ly special charter, or for
the amendment of such charts. This has no reference to
quasircoripor&tions like the towns which exist as political sub-
divisions' in this State.^ A new county having been formed
of a part of another, the same act providing for an appoint-
ment of officers for the new county by the governor, though
the suspension of the power of the people to elect their
own oificers might be invalid, the offices were properly cre-
ated and existed de jure, and the persons appointed thereto
having entered upon the duties of such offices were officers
de facto whose official action could not be questioned collater-
ally.»
§ 455. Provisions of act as to county sites. — In Florida
an act creating a new county has been held constitutional over
an objection that by its provisions it allowed the commissioners
of the new county to establish a temporary county seat and
af terw'ards order an election for a permanent county seat ; it
being urged that this amounted to a removal of the county
seat, and the constitution forbade removal of county seats ex-
cept by a general law.* The Supreme Court of Michigan has
1 Cathcart v. Comstock (1883), 56 tionment and levy of taxes made by
"Wis. 580, which sustained the author- their town Bupervisors so elected act-
ity of the supervisors of the town to ing as a county bpard was properly
levy and apportion taxes upon such made for the next 3'ear.
property as was situated in the origi- ^ Cathcart v, Comstock (1883), 56
nal town, and the sales of such prop- Wis. 590.
erty made by the county treasurer of '^ Chicago & N. W. Ey. Co v. Lang-
the new county, after he was elected, lade County (1883), 58 Wis. 614, action
as tothe period before an election of to set aside an assessment of taxes on
the other county officers. The elec- the ground of lack of authority of
tion of town officers for the town as the officers of a new county to assess,
enlarged by virtue of the statute etc.
afterwards was also held to have * County Comm'rs of Lake County
been proper, and assessment, appor- r. State (1888), 24 Fla, 263 ; a, c., 4
§ 456.] PARTITION. 449
also held that an election of a permanent county seat under
the provisions of the laws of Michigan organizing the county
of Iron, and naming a temporary county seat until the next
general election, when it provided for the election of a perma-
nent one, could not be regarded as the removal of a county
seat once established, and that the law was not unconstitu-
tional for not conforming to the requirements of the constitu-
tional provision for such removals.' But the Supreme Court
of West Virginia has held that the provisions of the statute
law of "West Virginia, prescribing the manner in which the
county seat of cmy county may be relocated by a vote of the
people at a general election, apply to all the counties in the
State, including those whose county seats were declared-per'
nianent in the special act of the legislature creating such
counties.'
§ 456. Apportionment of liabilities. — When a county, city
or town is divided and its territory reduced or set apart by
legislative authority, the legislature may make regulations
not only to apportion the property of the corporate body
among the new members or communities created, but to throw
the obligation to pay the debts of the entire body upon the
several parts in proportion to the taxable wealth of each.'
The Michigan statute relating to settlements between the re-
So. Rep. 795, the court holding that ganizing the county. The court
the proviso, " that in the forma- said : — " . . . The power to make
tion of new counties the county seat a county . . . necessarily includes
may be temporarily established by the power to create and do every-^,
law," qualifies CJonstitution, article 8, thing necessary and proper to its
section 4, that " the legislature shall perfect organization that is not pro-
have no power to remove the county hibited by other portions of the con-
seat of any county, but shall provide stitution, and a county site is, to say
by general law for such removal," the least, a proper, if not necessary,
so far as it was a limitation upon the element of county organization."
power of the legislature. By the ' Atfy-Genl v. Board of County
proviso there was reserved to the Canvassers (1887), 64 Mich. 607 ; S. c.','
legislature the power to establish for 31 N. W. Rep. 539.
the new county a temporary county ^ Welch v. County Court, 39 West
seat, which should not be subject to Va. 63 ; s. o., 1 S. K Rep. 337.
such limitation, but should be the 'Canova v. Commissioners &c.
county seat only until the permanent (1883), 18 Fla. 513. See where this is
county seat should be established in well considered. County Commissiori-
the manner provided by the act or- ers v. King, 13 Fla. 451, 473.
29
450 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 456.
spective boards of supervisors where two counties are formed
out of one has been held not to contemplate any other divis-
ion tjiSLTi of existing property and liabilities, nor provide for
the assumption by one county of the whole burden of State
taxation for both counties until the next equalization.^ And a
provision requiring State taxes to be levied for five years on
the basis of the last equalization, has been held not to mean
that when two counties are made out of one the old county
must bear the whole burden of S^te tax as before the division,
until the next equalization. The proportion which the assess-
ment rolls of the year when the last equalization was made, of
all the towns in the new county, bear to the aggregate assess-
ments of all the towns then in the old (undivided) county,
furnishes the rule of apportionment for the two counties until
the next equalization.^ The New Jersey act which divided
the township of Hackensack into the townships of Eidgefield,
of Englewood and of Palisades, and which declared that the in-
habitants of said townships should be liable to pay their just
proportions of the debts of the inhabitants of the township of
Hackensack, did not, propria vigore, make any single township
legally responsible for any particular debt, even though the
debt had been wholly contracted for work done within its
territorial limits.' The legislature has power to divide coun-
ties and towns at its pleasure, and to apportion the common
property and the common burdens in such manner as to it
may seem reasonable and equitable.* Where the General As-
1 Supervisors of Ontonagon County 14 Or. 897. See, also, Canova v.
V. SupervisoiB of Gogebic County Comm'rs of Bradford County, 18 Fla.
(1889), 74 Mich. 781; & c, 43 N. W. 513; Trinity County v. Polk County,
Eep. 170. 68 Tex. 331 ; Pulaski County v. Judge
• Supervisors &c,r. Supervisors &c., of Saline County, 37 Ark. 389; Super-
cited in the preceding note. visors of Chickasaw County v, 3u-
' So held in Vanderbeok v. Inhabit- pervisors of Sumner County, 58 Miss,
ants of Englewood (1877), 39 N. J. 619; Eagle v. Beard, 88 Ark. 497;
Law, 345, sustaining a nonsuit which State v. McFadden, 33 Minn. 40 ;
had been ordered in an action brought Askew v. Hale County, 54 Ala.
by one on a claim against Hacken- 639 ; Comm'rs Currituck County v.
sack township for work done on Comm'rs of Dare County, 79 N. C.
Engle street which became a part of 565 ; Comm'rs of Sedgwick County
Englewood. v. Bunker, 16 Kan. 498.
Morrow County y. Hendryx (1887),
§ i57.] PAETITIOIT. 451
sembly created a new county out of territory formerly be-
longing to other counties, and to compensate such counties
added territory to them from adjoining counties, it was com-
petent also to provide that the county receiving the accession
should levy an equitable proportion of the indebtedness of
the county from which such territory was taken.'
§ 457. Rules as to property and liabilities.— TTpon the
division of a municipal corporation and the organization of a
new one out of a portion of the old, in the absence of legis-
lative provision to the contrary, the old corporation owns all
the public property within its new limits and is responsible
for aU the debts of the corporation contracted before the act
of separation was passed. The new corporation has no claim
to any of the property except what falls within its boundaries
and to which the old corporation has no claim.* Where two
separate towns are created out of one, each in the absence of
any statutory regulation is entitled to hold in severalty the
public property of the old corporation which falls within its
limits.' If a town is divided and a part of its territory with
the inhabitants therein is incorporated into a new town, the
old town will retain all the property and be responsible for
the existing liabilities, unless there is some legislative provis-
ion to the contrary. But upon such division the legislature
has constitutional authority to provide that the property
owned by the original town shall be apportioned or held for
the use and enjoyment of the inhabitants of both towns, and
to impose upon each town the payment of a share of the cor-
porate debts.* An act creating a new county out of territory
formerly embraced in another county failing to provide for a
1 Putnam County v. Auditor of itants of Hampshire County v. In-
AUen County, 10 Ohio St 323. habitants of Franklin County, 16
2 Laramie County v. Albany Mass. 86, where the same doctrine is
'^Tanty, 92 U. S. 307; Bristol r. New reiterated. In support of second
Chesler, 3 N. H. 531. clause, see Brewster v. Harwich, 4
3 North Hempsted v. Hempsted, Mass. 278 ; Randolph v. Braintree, 4
3 Wend. 109 ; Hartford Bridge Co. v. Mass. 315 ; Harrison v. Bridgton, 16
East Hartford, 16 Conn. 149, 171. Mass. 16 ; Windham v. Portland, 4
< North Yarmouth v. Skillings Mass. 384; Minot v. Curtis, 7 Mass.
(1858), 45 Me. 133. In support of first 441 ; Brunswick v. Dunning, 7 Mass.
clause, see Inhabitants of Windham 445; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass.
V. Portland, 4 Mass. 384, and Inhab- 86.
452 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 458.
division of the school fund, the whole fund belonging to it be-
fore the division may be retained by the parent county.*
§ 458. The same subject continued. — Upon the formation
of a new county out of a portion of another, the debt of the
latter to the State was apportioned between the two, and each
issued certificates for its share. By the acts under which the
debt was originally incurred a railroad company for whose
benefit it was incurred was requifed to pay certain sums into
the State treasury to apply on the debt. It was held that the
sums paid by such company should be applied to the certifi-
cates of the two counties in proportion to the share of debt as-
sumed by each.* A general law providing for the apportion-
ment of debts and credits in all cases where new counties are
created does not deprive subsequent legislatures of the power
to provide otherwise as to counties created by them.' The
divided county has the same rights, duties and burdens as be-
fore in respect to the remaining territory, except as changed
by the legislature.* School districts are corporations for cer-
tain specified purposes and neither their rights nor their obli-
gations are affected by a change of their names or alteration
of their boundaries.' In the change of county lines whereby
territory is detached from one county and attached to another,
the , county acquiring the additional territory is not .entitled
to demand from the other any portion of the funds in its
treasury.^ If part of the territory of a town is separated from
it by annexation to another, or the creation of a new corpora-
tion, without any provision for contribution to the. debts of
the old town, and that retains all its property and franchises,
• Cook V. School District No. 12 school funds until they are accred-
(1889), 13 Colo. 453, the court holding ited to the several school districts,
that a making of the estimate of 2 state v. H^rshaw, 73 Wia 211;
what proportion of the school fund s. C, 40 N. W. Eep. 641.
of a county belongs to the several ' Forest County «. Langlade County
school districts by the county super-. (1890), 76 Wis. 605; s. a, 45 N. W.
intendent under General Statutes of Eep. 598.
Nebraska, section 3067, was not of * Attorney-General v. Fitzpatrick,
itself sufficient to vest in the sev- 2 Wis. 542.
eral school districts the ownership 6 School District u Macloon, 4 Wis.
of their respective shares ; therefore 79.
concluding that the counties and not ° Crawford Counter v. Marion
the school districts are owners of the County, 16 Ohio, 466.
§ 459,] PAK'nxiON. 45a
such detached portion is not liable therefor.' A county from
which territory is detached to form part of a new county is
entitled to deduct its existing indebtedness from the bridge
fund as well as other moneys previously collected and remain-
ing in its treasury at the time of the division, and the balance
only, after making the deduction, is required to be divided
between the old and new counties." If an equitable claim
exists against a new county in favor of an old county growing
out of its being erected from the latter, it is competent for
the legislature to create by law a board of commissioners to
ascertain, settle and report the amount due, and further, to
compel the board of supervisors of the county to levy a special
tax to pay the amount reported to be due.' It has been held
in California that a claim of an old county against k new one
formed out of it for the payment of its proportion of the debt
of tJie old is of an equitable nature only and it required leg-
islation to enable the old county to enforce it.* The act form-
ing the new county was held not to require the new county to
pay interest on its proportion of the debt of the old.*
§ 459. A Wisconsin case on property rights. — The towns
of Wisconsin by operation of the laws of the Territory became
the owners of lands which were held for the benefit of those
corporations. When the Territory became a State these rights
were preserved by the constitution and laws of the State.
The partitipn of a town and the annexation of a portion of its
territory to another municipality which was incorporated as a
city made no change in these rights. The town continued to
hold its title to this real estate. The legislature had an un-
doubted right to change the territorial limits of municipal
corporations, and to detach this territory from one and annex
it to another, and in so doing might provide for an equitable
division of the common property. But where this detaching
and annexation is done without providing for the disposal
1 Depere v. Bellevue, 31 Wia 120. * Beals v. Supervisors Amador Co.,
2 Fulton County V. Lucas County, 28 CaL 449.
2 Ohio St 508. " Beals v. Supervisors, cited in the
» People V. Alameda County, 26 preceding nota
CaL 641.
454 PAETITIOir AND DISSOETJnOIT. [§ 460.
of the land, under sach circumstances that the assent of the
town to part with its title cannot be presumed, it continues
the owner notwithstanding the separation. The legislature
has not the power, either directly or indirectly, to divest a
municipality of its private property without the consent of its
inhabitants.^
§ 460. Rules as to apportionment of liabilities and reme-
dies.— A village may be created out of the territory of a
city, and as between the city and the village the legislature
may apportion the existing indebtedness. But when the cor-
poration which created the debt is shorn of its population and
taxable property to such an extent that there is no reasonable
expectation of its meeting its present indebtedness, and it is
unable to do so, the creditors at least can enforce the propor-
tionate share of their obligations against the two corporations
carved out of one, both being liable to the extent of the prop-
erty set off to each respectively." Where a county has been
divided by an act of the legislature, one portion thereof re-
taining the former name, county seat, county organization,
county buildings and all other county property, and the other
portion being formed into new counties, the county retaining
I Town of Milwaukee v. City of Mil- merely private corporation or person,
waukee (1860), 13 Wis. 93. Dixon, Its rights of property once acquired,
C J., said : — " The difficulty about though designed and used to aid it in
the question is to distinguish between the discharge of its duties as a local
the corporation as a civil institution government, are entirely distinct
or delegation of merely political and separate from its powers as a
power, and as an ideal being en- political or municipal body. It might
dowed with the capacity to acquire sell its property, or the same might
and hold property for corporate or belostordestroyed, and yet its power
other purposes. In its political or of government would remain. In
governmental capacity it is liable at' its character of a political power, or
any time to be changed, modified or local subdivision of government, it is
destroyed by the legislature; but in a public corporation, but in its char-
its capacity of owner of property, de- acter of owner of property it is a
signed for its own or the exclusive private corporation, possessing the
use and benefit of its inhabitants, its same rights, duties and privileges as
vested rights of property are no more any other." See, also, Bailey v.
the subject of legislative interference Mayor &c. of New York, 3 Hill, 531.
or control, without the consent of * Brewis v. Duluth, 3 McC. (U. S.
the corporators, than those of a C. Ct.) 319.
§ 4:61.] PABTITIOK, 455
such name and organization is responsible and liable solely for
the entire indebtedness of the county at the time of such divis-
ion, and cannot bring an action for contribution against the
counties thus set off, unless specially authorized to do so by a
legislative provision.' Where a city was created out of a town
by an act of the legislature, which made the city and the town
liablp proportionately for the indebtedness of the town created
before the city and town were dissolved, it was held that the
apportionment of this liability between the town and the city
depending upon accounts and computations founded upon the
proper assessment roll, which could not be made in an action
at law, a bill in equity was the proper remedy to apportion
such indebtedness between the two municipalities, especially
as authority to tax for the payment of municipal liabilities, in
cases like this, was in the nature of a trust.* But where it
appears that the property left to the old corporation has in-
creased rapidly and is sufficient to meet the debt apportioned
to it, there is no legal or equitable reason for going behind the
legislative apportionment."
§ 461. Rules In North Carolina as to settlement between
new and old counties. — Whore a new county was created
providing that " that portion of the citizens and taxable prop-
erty taken from '' two other counties " and attached to the "
new county " shall not be released from their portion of the
outstanding public debts " of the two counties " contracted
before the passage of the act ; " and the matter to be adjusted
by the county commissioners of the three counties in such
manner and mode as might be agreed upon, and one of these
counties appointed a commissioner, but the new county took
no action whatever, it was held that the county appointing
a commissioner could maintain an action against the new
county to have an account taken to ascertain the indebtedness
at the passage of the act, and obtain judgment for the amount
found due as the new county's proportion, and for mcmdamua
•County Comm'rs v. County > Morgan v. Beloit, cited in the pre-
Comm'rs, 1 Wy. Ty. 140. ceding note.
2 Morgan v. Beloit (1868), 7 Wall.
613.
456 PAKTITION AKD DISSOLUTION. [§ 462.
to compel its county authorities to levyupon the -peopie and
property detached from the complainant county to pay said
judgment.' The interest and claims of the two counties from
which territory was detached against the new county being
several, it was not necessary to join the other county as a
party plaintiff.'' The following rulings were made upon the
merits : — The act created no change in the liability of the peo-
ple and property taken from the complainant county. It con-
tinued their liability just as it stood at the time of the sepa-
ration, and as if no separation had taken place. The court
established this rule for determination of the indebtedness of
the complainant county. Judgments rendered against it be-
fore the separation and paid after with money raised before
should be deducted. The total indebtedness at the time of
separation should be reduced by the balance of taxes collected
or collectible in the year before and on hand six months after
the separation, since such balance was applicable to the pay-
ment of indebtedness outstanding one year before the separa-
tion. But such indebtedness should not be reduced by the
amount of the taxes collected for the year before separation,
and applied to the current expenses for the six months after,
since those taxes were expressly designed by law for that pjir-
pose. Nor should it be reduced by an amount equal to the
Talue of certain lands held at the time of separation, in excess
of the needs of the county. The people detached had no
right to have such lands sold to pay the county debt, in the
absence of an appropriation to that purpose before the separ
ration.'
§ 462. Rules for adjustment of liabilities. — Power being
reposed in the commissioners of an old and a new county
formed from it to apportion the debt of the old between the
two, and to adjust and settle all matters of revenue proper to
be done on account of the formation of the new county, the
1 Comm'rs of Granville v, Comm'rs ' Comm'rs of Granville v. Comm'rs
of Vance, 107 N. C. 201 ; s. a, 12 S. K of Vance, cited in the preceding not&
Eep. 39, ' Comm'rs of Granville v, Comm'rs
of Vance, 107 N. C. 391.
§ 462.] PAETITION. 457
new county is liable for its share of the existing debt, without
making any deduction on account of cash in the treasury of
the old county, or of unpaid taxes due to it.^ And such new
county is liable in prcBsenti to the old county for its share of
the debt though part of the debt is not due.^ And claims
against the old county which are the subject of pending litigar
tion, and the validity of which is denied by that county, cannot
be included in the debt to be apportioned.' "Where, upon the
formation of a new town out of part of the territory of an old
one, a part of the indebtedness of the old town is prorated to
the new under Revised Statutes of Wisconsin, section 672, re-
quiring the new town to pay its proportion of the indebtedness
of the old, but the board divides this indebtedness according to
the assessment roll of the old town next preceding the last,
instead of according to the last one as required by that stat-
ute, whereby the new town is charged with less than it would
have been had the apportionment been made as required, the
new town cannot resist payment of its proportion on the
ground that the apportionment was not in accordance with
the statute.* Under the same statute, after an apportionment
of the debt, the old town can sue for the amount due from
the new town if it refuses to pay.' Where a new county in-
cluding a portion of an old one has been created under an act
which declared that the detached portion of the old county
should remain liable for the payment of certain old bonds of
the latter, and after the date of this act the old county had
refunded a portion of those bonds and issued new ones, it was
held that the new bonds were only evidence of the old debt,
1 Board of County Comm'rs of adjusted under act of Pennsylvania,
Cheyenne County v. Board of County June 1, 1887 (P. L. 385), which pro-
Comm'rs of Bent County, 15 Colo, vides for adjusting the liabilities for
330; S. C, 25Pac. Eep. 508. "all indebtedness" of a borough
2 Board of Comm'rs &o. v. Board when proceedings are commenced
of Comm'rs &c., 15 Colo. 330. for changing its limits. Appeal of
8 Case cited in the preceding note. Burgess &a of Darby, Appeal of
On the organization of a new bor- Grayson, 140 Pa. St 250 ; S. C, 31 Atl.
ough out of part of an old one which Eep. 394.
has a funded debt ander act of * Town of Ackley v. Town of Vilas
Pennsylvania, May 39, 1889 (P. L. (Wis.), 48 N. W. Eep. 357.
393), the rights and liabilities of the 'Town of Ackley v. Town of Vilas,
old borough and its creditors may be cited in the preceding note.
458 PABTrntarAHD ryiBSOLvrtfiBSfi- [§463.
and the detached portion of the old county still remained a
part of it for the payment of the bonds.^
§ 463. Liabilities which fall upon the portion severed. —
In the division of towns the legislature may apportion the
burdens between the two, and may determine the proportion
to be borne by each.^ A new count}' may be made liable for
a ratable proportion of the existing liabilities of the counties
out of which it is created under Bie constitution of Nebraska.'
Where territory, parts of two townships, was subjected to
certain incumbrances in its former relations, justice requires
that the same incumbrances should go with the territory when
taken for a new town.* A county created from a portion of
another has been held in Arkansas, in a proceeding to deter-
mine its pro rata indebtedness on account of liabilities of the
old county, as provided in the act creating it, to be liable for
its jpro rata of such portion of the bonds signed before the
division of territory for the purpose of building a court-house
and jail, as were absolutely negotiated and sold, as well as in-
terest from the date of negotiation. There was a contention
that as they had been all signed and placed in the hands of the
county commissioners the new county was bound for its share
of the whole. This the court overruled for the reason that
as long as they were in the hands of the old county's agents
unnegotiated they were the property of the county, and there
was no debt or liability." Under an act creating a new county,
A., out of parts of old counties, among which was B., and pro-
viding that the new county " shall pay its portion of the debts
of the counties respectively from which said county is formed,
J Montgomery County v, Menifee Counties (1886), 9 Colo, 639; a. G, 21
County Court CKy.), 18 S. W. Eep, Paa Rep. 478.
1031. * State v. Elvins (1867), 33 N. J. Law,
3 Sill V. Village of Coming, 15 N. Y. 363, holding an assessment upon the
297 ; Mayor v. State ex rel. the inhabitants of a portion of the new
Board of Police of Baltimore, 15 Md. town for a debt of the town from
376 ; City of Olney v. Harvey, 50 IIL which it was formed, of which these
453 ; Borough of Dunsmore's Appeal, prosecutors were not residents, valid.
53 Pa. St, 374. ' Hempstead County Court v. How.
' Opinion of Supreme Court in the ard County (1885), 51 Ark. 344 See,
Matter of the Establishment of New also, Phillips County v. Lee County,
34 Ark. 340.
§ 464.] PAKTmoiT. 459
said proportions to be determined by the assessed value of the
. . . property within its limits," the supervisors of the old
counties continued to be the auditing boards of the new as to
all pre-existing debts. It was also held that where bonds is-
sued by the supervisors of B. county for a debt existing at the
time of the creation of A. county were voluntarily paid off by
the officers of B. county without objection by A. county, the
latter was bound to contribute to B. her portion of the debts
thus paid.' "Where the only provision in a statute organizing
a new county from parts of others in reference to its liabili-
ties because of the territory detached is that the property
taken from these several counties respectively shall be subject
to taxation " for the jpro rata proportion of any debts " due
by the several counties, it subjects the county to a propor-
tionate liability for debts but not for contingent liabilities
arising out of a breach of duty.*
§ 464. Defenses to claims growing out of partition. —
Where a new county has been formed from another by an act
providing that it should issue '\\&jgro rata share of bonds for an
indebtedness of its parent county to a third from which it
was severed, for which it would receive its share of railroad
stock issued to the original county in exchange for its bonds
under the internal improvement laws of Florida, the deprecia-
tion of such railroad stock constitutes no valid reason for the
refusal on the part of the new county to pay its proportion
of the indebtedness.' Before a county from which a new one is
1 Chickasaw County Supervisors v. suit against it on account of the bonds
Clay County Supervisors (1885), 62 is a suit against the parts set off, and
Miss. 325. Where Carter county, Ken- a judgment against the county was
tucky, had issued bonds, and portions held to be payable out of taxes col-
of its territory had been taken to lected within the boundaries of the
form other counties by acts which original county. County of Carter
provided that the citizens and prop- v. Linton, 120 U S. 517; s. CL, 7 Sup.
erty within the old limits should re- Ct Rep. 650.
main liable to taxation for the pay- 2 Askew v. Hale County (1875), 54
ment of those bonds as though " this Ala. 639.
act had never been passed," the parts » Comm'rs of Baker Co. v. State
of the county set off to form other (1882), 18 Fla. 512, the court saying
counties which were interested in the that " the act . . . did not create
bonds remained for the purposes of an indebtedness and impose it upon
the debt a part of Carter county. A [the new] county, but intended that
460 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 464.
formed can proceed to compel the latter to issue bonds for its
fTO rata share of the bonded indebtedness of the former to the
one from which it was formed, it must appear that the plaint-
iff county has issued and delivered its bonds for the whole
amount to its parent county.' In the same case -the fact that
the new county was not a party to mandamus proceedings of
the original county against the parent county was held not
to afifect its liability; and it was not precluded by a judgment
in that case from shewing the^rue amount of its liability in
any proceedings of its parent county to compel the payment
of its pro rata share of the indebtedness to the original county.
The court ruled, however, that a mere answer that a sum
stated was not the correct amount was not sufficiently spe-
cific ; that a return to an alternative writ of mandamus should,
for the purpose of making an issue, set up a positive denial of
the facts, or should state other facts sufficient to defeat relator's
right. Under the Illinois statutes, providing that, when a por-
tion of one town is taken therefrom and added to a second
town, the second town shall bear a due proportion of the debts
of the first town, to be apportioned by the supervisors and as-
sessors of the two towns, a suit was brought for mandamus
to compel the supervisors and assessors of the town receiv-
ing the addition to comply with the law, but this action was
not commenced until more than ten years after the cause
accrued. It was held that there was no such trust made out
by the case as to prevent the bar of the statute of limitations."
This was a case simply involving private rights, a matter of
indebtedness between two corporations. No public rights were
involved or the rule would have been different.'
its due proportion of the debt [due which a proceeding to apportion the
from the county of -which it was indebtedness of the old and the new
formed to an original county from town formed from it, of the bonded
which this last was formed] should indebtedness of the former, was held
be paid by it as though there had barred by the statute of limitations,
been no division of the parent under which it should have been
county." begun within five years fron. the
1 Comm'rs of Baker County v. State time the right accrued.
(1883), 18 Fla. 512, reversing an order » People v. Town of Oran (1887), 121
granting a mandamus. 111. 650 ; s. C, 13 N. E. Eep. 726. See,
2 Peoples. Town of Oran (1887), 131 also. County of Piatt v. Goodell, 97
EL 650; S. a, 13 N. E. EepL 726, in IlL 84; School Directors v. School
§ 465.] PARTITION, 461
§ 465. Enforcement of obligations of old and new.— The
acts severing a part of a county and creating of it new coun-
ties with a provision that the new counties should compensate
the old county according to the relative and^ro^ato assessed
valuation of the property in the territory detached, it was
held neither necessary nor practicable to make the new coun-
ties parties in a proceeding against the old county to enforce
collection of its bonds.' A county had received in exchange
for its bonds, under the Internal Improvement Act of Florida,
an equivalent in shares of a railroad company. A new county
was formed afterwards of a part of its territory. The new
county issued its bonds, and upon delivery to the commission-
ers of the original county the latter duly assigned over to
its commissioners shares of this stock to equal the amount of
the new county's bonds. It was held that this assignment
transferred to the new county a proprietary interest in that
stock, and that the county could enforce its right to have
those shares transferred on the books of the railroad company
whenever it was desired.* And the proprietary rights of the
new county were not affected by the fact that the old county,
after the assignment, had voted the whole number of the shares
originally given to it for its bonds, which were still stand-
ing in its name. It had parted with its right of property and
the new county had gained it.' The acceptance by a new
county of its share of the railroad stock issued to the old
county from which it was severed in exchange for its bonds,
and the issuing of the bonds of the new to the old therefor,
fixed upon the new county the liability for its bonds, and the
Supreme Court of Florida ordered a peremptory mandamus
Directors, 105 HI. 653, in the first of corporationa, like private citizens,
which the rule is stated as " our [the may plead or have pleaded against
court's] understanding of the law is, them the statute of limitations."
that as respects all public rights, or ' County Commissioners v. King,
as respects property held for pubMc 13 Fla. 451.
use upon trusts, municipal corpora- ' State v. County Commissioners of
tions are not within the operation of Suwaunee County (1884), 31 Fla. 1.
the statute of limitations ; but in re- ' State v. County Commissioners of
gard to contracts or mere private Suwaunee County (1884), 31 Fla. 1.
rights the rule is different^ and such
462 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 466.
to the oflBcers of the new county to levy a tax to pay th6m.*
Where by the error of the auditor-general the whole tax,
after the division of its territory, has been paid by the old
county, its remedy is by an action at law against the new
county to recover the latter's proportionate share ; and not
by mcmdamus to compel a settlement between the respective
boards of supervisors.' The legislature has power, upon
the creation of a new county by division of an old one, to
make special provisions for adjusting the debts and credits be-
tween them, and the enforcement of their respective claims,
and they are not obliged to enforce such claims in the manner
prescribed in general statutes.' A township cannot divest it-
self of its liability to pay its indebtedness by altering its
boundaries and changing its name.* The obligation of a new
county to issue its bonds or to pay its debts in the manner
provided in the act creating the same is not affected or
controlled by subsequent constitutional or legislative enact-
ment. The obligation of the contract cannot be thus im-
paired."
§ 466. Miscellaneons. — When a new county is created out
of a part of an old county, the old county takes the county
property and becomes liable for the whole of the county in-
debtedness, in the absence of legislative provision to the con-
trary, and is therefore liable to pay the whole of the State
levy of taxes charged upon the whole county at the time of
the division.' An act of Texas authorized the organization
' State V. County Commissioners of * So held in Walnut Township v.
Suwannee County (1884), 31 Fla. 1. Jordan (1888), 38 Kan. 563; s. G, 16
The respondent in this case filed sev- Pac. Rep. 813, in which, after a city
eral defenses, and asked that the of the second class had heen pro-
issues be tried by a jury. The court claimed as to a portion of a township^
denied the motion, holding that the the city thereby detached from it
issues in such matters were triable was adjudged to be liable for its pro
only by the court rata of warrants issued by the origi-
2 So held in Supervisors of Ontona- nal township,
gon County v. Supervisors of Goge- * Commissioners' of Baker Countyv
bic County (Mich.), 49 N. W. Rep. V. State (1883), 18 Fla. 513.
170. « Gilliam County v. Wasco County
' Forest County v. Langlade (1887), 14 Or. 535 ; s, G, 18 Paa Repw
County, 76 Wis. 605 j s. a, 45 N. W. 334
Rep. 598.
§ 466.] PAETinoN. 4C3
of Eeeves county out of a portion of the territory of Pecos
county, but, owing to the delay of the commissioners and
judges of Pecos county, such organization was not perfected
until the lapse of several months, and meantime the inhab-
itants of that portion included in the new county paid taxes
into the treasury of Pecos county. It was held that the delay
of the officers of Pecos county to do their duty did not give
, Eeeves county the right to recover such taxes from Pecos
county.' In Wisconsin the county of M. was organized out
of territory theretofore embraced in the county of O., and it
was enacted that each county should be the exclusive owner
of all real property within its boundaries, and that the treas-
urer of O. county should, upon demand by the treasurer
of M. county, " assign to the county of M. all tax certifi-
cates in his office upon lands situated in the county of M."
It was held that the act itself did not pass to M. county the
legal title to tax certificates on lands in that county held
by O. county, but that the legal title remained in the latter
county until the assignment provided for was made.^ The
constitution of Colorado requires that each new county, on
its establishment, shall be made responsible for a ratable
proportion of the " then existing liabilities of the county
or counties " from which it is formed. Two counties were
carved out of an old one, under acts providing for the en-
forcement of this mandate and that " all county records
and other property " theretofore belonging to the old county
should remain its property. They further provided for a tri-
bunal to adjust and settle all matters of revenue proper to be
done on account of the formation of the new counties, and to
apportion the indebtedness of the old county. It was held
that the new counties were not entitled to any part of the
surplus funds of the old county.' On the division of a town-
ship into two townships, each is entitled to the public prop-
erty which falls within its territorial limits ; but, as to money
1 Reeves County v. Pecoa County, 2 Hall v. Baker (1889), 74 Wis. 118;
69 Tex. 177; 8. a, 7 S. W. Rep. 54, S. C. 43 N. W. Rep. 104.
upon the principle that a new county s Washington County v. Weld
organized out of a portion of the County (1889), IS Colo. 152 ; s. C, 80
territory of an old one is not entitled Pac. Rep. 273,
to any funds nor subject to any ob-
ligations of the latter.
464 PAETinoN Am) dissolution. [§ 467.
and choses in action, the respective claims must be adjusted
upon principles of equity, and the. new township is entitled to
a proportionate share of the funds realized from taxes, based
on the amount of taxable property in the territory taken
from the old township and the number of persons therein
against whom a poll-tax was assessed, while it should receive
a proportionate share of the special school fund, based on the
school enumeration of such territory.*
%
(h) DiSSOLDTIOW.
§ 467. Dissolution — How effected In general. — In Eng-
land a municipal corporation may be dissolved by an act of
parliament ; ^ by the loss of an integral part ; * by a surrender
of its franchises ; * or by forfeiture of its charter.' In the United
States the law is different in some respects. Incorporated
towns and cities being but arms and instrumentalities of the
State government, creatures of the legislature, and subject to
its control and will, it may, as it can establish, also abolish
them at its pleasure.' The Supreme Court of California say : —
" And as a city may, by legislative enactment, spring from the
iTowle V. Brown (1886), 110 Ind. Bewdley, 1 P. "Wms. 207; Banbury
65; s. c, 10 N. E. Rep. 626; follow- Case, 10 Mod. 346; Rex v. Tregony,
ing Johnson v. Smith, 64 Ind. 275. 8 Mod. 129 ; Colchester v. Seaber, 3
As to equity jurisdiction and adjust- Burr. 1870 ; Bacon v. Bobertson, 18
ment upon equitable principles, see How. 480; Smith v. Smith, 3 Des-
1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., §§ 173, 186, saus. (8. C.) 557.
189 ; Tartman v. State ex rel, 109 * Bex v. Osbourne, 4 East, 326 ;
Ind. 360; Mount Pleasant v. Beck- Rex v. Miller, 6 Term Rep. 277;
with, 100 U. S. 514. As to rights of Howard's Case, Hutton, 87 ; Grant
property in general, see 1 Dillon on on Corp. 306.
Munic. Corp., § 188 (3d ed.); North * Rex v. Grosvenor, 7 Mod. 199:
Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. Smith's Case, 4 Mod. 55; Bexv. Sand-
109; School Tp. of Allen v. School ers, 3 East, 119; Rex v. Kent, 13
Town of Macy, 109 Ind. 559. East, 220 ; Attorney-General v.
2 2 Kyd on Corp. 447 ; Coke Litt 176, Shrewsbury, 6 Beav. 220.
and note ; Rex v. Amery, 2 Term Rep. ^ Williams v. City of Nashville
515; Glover, 408; Angell & Ames (Tenn., 1891), 15 S. W. Rep. 364 See,
on Corp., § 767 ; 2 Kent's Com. 305 ; also, Luehrman v. Taxing Dist, 2
County Comm'rs v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403 ; Lea (Tenn.), 433, and authorities there
State V. Trustees &c., 5 Ind, 77. cited ; State v. Wilson, 12 Lea (Tenn.),
' Rex V. Morris, 3 East, 215 ; Rex 257 ; State v. Waggoner, 88 Tenn.
V. Stewart, 4 East, 17; Rex v. Pass- 393; s. a, 12 S. W. Rep. 731; Cooley's
more, 2 Term Bep. 341 ; Begina v. Const Lim. 330, 331.
§ 468.] DISSOLTTTloa. 4:65
body of the county, being the first subdivision of the territory
and political power of the State, there is no reason in law
why it may not be resolved back to its original elements, or
why the power that has called this political being into exist-
ence may not again destroy it. There is no limitation on the
power of the legislature in this respect, and economy and
convenience may often require that an act incorporating a
city should be repealed, and the inhabitants thereof placed in
their original situation." '
§ 468. The same subject continued. — There is no constitu-
tional restriction upon the power of the legislature to abolish
municipal and county organizations in Kansas, and the exist-
ence of the power is not disputed and cannot be doubted.^ A
municipal corporation is not dissolved by the failure to elect
oflBcers.' The existence of a corporation does not depend
upon the existence of ofiicers. The people have the right to
elect them but they are mere agents of the people. The cor-
poration might become dormant or be suspended by the re-
moval of all the people from it, but the failure to elect oflBcers
while the right or capacity to elect them remains will not dis-
solve a corporation.* Wilson, Justice, in a dissenting opinion,
discussing the power of a legislature to destroy a county, to
prevent a misapprehension of the opinion of the Illinois court
iPeople V. Hill(1859),7 Cal. 97, 103. expressly overruled in Blessing v.
2 So held in State v. Hamilton (1888), City of Galveston, 42 Tex. 659.
40 Kan. 333 ; s. C, 19 Pac. Rep. 733, " Dillon on Munio. Corp. (4th ed.),
approving and following State v. Os- § 166. See, also, Bacon v. Robertson,
borne (1887), 36 Kan. 530 ; s. c, 13 18 How. 480 ; Lowber v. Mayor &c., 5
Pac. Rep. 850. See, also. Division of Abb. Pr. 325 ; Clarke v. Rochester, 5
Howard Co., 15 Kan. 194 ; In re Hin- Abb. Pr. 107 ; Welch u. St. Genevieve,
kle, 31 Kan. 713 ; State v. Meadows, 1 1 Dill. 130 ; Philips v. Wickham, 1
Kan. 90; Duncombe v. Prindle, 13 Paige Ch. 590; Commonwealth v.
Iowa, 1 ; Dillon on Munic. Corp., CuUeiJ, 1 Harris (Pa.), 133 ; President
§§ 46, 65. V. Thompson, 20 111. 197 ; Rose v.
3 State V. Dunson (1888), 71 Tex. 65 ; Turnpike Co., 3 Watts (Pa.), 46 ; Peo-
f oUowed in Buf ord v. Texas (1888), 73 pie v. Wren, 5 111. 375 ; Brown v. In-
Tex. 183, in which case the court de- surance Co., 3 La. Ann. 177 ; Green
clined to follow Lea V. Hernandez, 10 Township, 9 Watts & S. (Pa.) 22;
Tex. 137, where such facts were held Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14
to evidence a civil death — a dissolu- How. 268 ; Muscatine Turnverein v.
tion of the corporation — although not Funck, 18 Iowa, 469 ; Schriber v.
Langdale, 66 Wis. 616.
30
466 PAKTITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 469.
in Coles v. County of Madison,* where such a power, by way
of- illustration, was conceded, says: — "The only manner that
occurs to my mind, by which a legislature can destroy a
county, is by annexing it to one or more organized counties.
No interregnum would then take place ; the government of
the county to which it was annexed would be extended over
and embrace it simultaneously with its annexation ; and thus
no evil or inconvenience would occur." ^ A municipal corpora-
tion is not dissolved by an annendment of its charter which
is unconstitutional in whole or in part, as to the election of
officers. As the offices previously existed dejure, the persons
holding them under the void law are de facto officers and
the organization continues.' The effect of a judgment of
ouster on an information in the nature of a quo warranto
against a municipal corporation and its officers is to immedi-
ately dissolve the corporation, whether it existed de jwre or
de facto, and work its dissolution, and take away all its rights,
liberties, privileges and franchises.* A dissolution in this
manner, as in the death of a natural person, operates as an
absolute revocation of all power and authority on the part of
others to act in its name or in its behalf.'
§ 469. Surrender of charter. — Judge Dillon thus states the
doctrine : — " Since all of our charters of incorporation come
from the legislature a municipal corporation cannot dissolve
itself by a surrender of its franchise. The State creates such
corporations for public ends, and they will and must continue
until the legislature annuls or destroys them or authorizes it
to be done.* As to the power of a municipal corporation to
surrender any of its franchises, for instance, the franchise of
collecting tolls on freight passing over a certain channel con-
necting another bay with the bay upon which the city was
situated, it has been considered an extremely doubtful power,
as not only the corporation but a large portion of the State's
1 Breese (IlL), 130. * Dodge u People (1885), 113 IlL
2 People V. Wren, 5 111. 869, 279. 491.
Holt, C, in Walnut Township v. Jor- 5 Dodge v. People, cited in the pre-
dan, 38 Kan. 563, 565, quotes this and ceding note.
highly commends the doctrine. * 1 Dillon on Munic Corp. (4th ed.),
3 Cole t;. President &c. of Village of §167. See, also. Id., §§ 37, 43, 54
Black River Falls (1883), 57 Wis. 110.
^i^OJ] DISSOLUTION, 4«T
population residing -without the city's limits as well as of the
commercial world were interested.^ Towns incorporated
under the 'general law of Missouri can be disincorporated only
in the manner therein authorized." A charter granted by the
legislature to a municipal corporation must be surrendered to
and accepted by the legislature. Where, therefore, a town
formerly incorporated was re-incorporated under a general
law, this was held not to amount to an effectual surrender of
the charter. It should have been accepted and a record made
of this fact. The action of the county court extending the
limits of the corporation in proceedings to re-incorporate was
a mere amendment of the charter.'
§470. The same subject continued. — The Ohio Kevised
Statutes provide the mode by which municipal corporations
may surrender their municipal powers. It has been held that
upon the presentation of a petition to the council for an elec-
tion upon the question of surrender it was the duty of the
council before taking action thereon to satisfy itself that it
contained the requisite number of qualified petitioners, and
for that purpose they might refer the same to a committee to
make the requisite examination. Before an election is ordered
petitioners may withdraw their names, and if thereby the num-
ber is reduced below the number required, the council should
refuse to order an election. Query, if an election had been
ordered, whether they could withdraw their names. In a
mo/ndamus to compel a council to order an election, whether
there has been a petition with the requisite number of sign-
ers presents an issue not of right triable by a jury, and an
appeal properly lies from the judgment of the common pleas
thereon.* In Ohio, an act " to provide for the organization
' Morris v. State (1885), 65 Tex. 53. solve the old corporation ; nor did
2 So held in Hambletnn v. Dexter the law authorize the incorporation
(1886), 89 Mo. 188, where the effect of of a new town out of a part of the
re-incorporation under this law was inhabitants and territory already in-
held not to have disincorporated the corporated.
old town, because there was no no- 3 Norris v. Mayor &c. of Smith-
tioe given as required by the law ; ville (1851), 1 Swan (Tenn.), 164.
neither did the order of the county * Dutten v. Village of Hanover
court attempt or undertake to dis- (1884), 42 Ohio St 315.
468 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 471.
of cities and incorporated villages," in its first section re-
pealing " all laws " then " in force for the organization or
government " of municipal corporations, was held not to anni-
hilate the old corporations ; it recreated them. It was a re-
organization, not a dissolution. Neither their corporate exist-
ence nor corporate identity were affected by it. Some of
them took, under its operation, a diflferent'legal designation —
as incorporated villages instead of towns; the particular mode
of their organization was somfewhat changed, and their pow-
ers, privileges, rights and duties were restricted, enlarged or
modified, but their territorial limits remained the same as
before ; legal obligations incurred by or to them remained un-
changed.' There is no method provided, under the Idaho
statutes defining the power of town trustees, whereby they
can dissolve the corporation or effect a disincorporation, and it
is not within their power to abandon such incorporation and
procure a re-incorporation. Therefore the acts done by a board
of trustees of a lawfully incorporated town in an attempt to
abandon or disincorporate such municipality, and set up a new
goveriiment, were held to be without authority of law, and
void.^
§ 471. Florida decisions on constitntionality of acts to
dissolve. — The Florida statute which provided a mode for
dissolution of municipal corporations owing bonded debts
was held unconstitutional in that its object was not solely to
dissolve, but manifestly to re-incorporate at once, and by this
mode of re-incorporation by vote of a certain number of bond-
holders and citizens leading up to an appointment of the offi-
cers of the municipality by the governor of the State, it
departed from, the usual rule as to such bodies, and was in
contravention of that provision of the constitution which pro-
vides that " the legislature shall establish a uniform system of
county, township and municipal government." ' " An act to
• Fosdick r. Village of Perrysbiirg the mayor of Fernandina appointed
(1863), 14 Ohio St. 473. by the governor under this act, and
2 People V. Bancroft (Idaho), 29 virtually holding that the attempted
Pac. Eep. 113. dissolution in the mode provided
' State V. Stark (1881), 18 Fla. 255, therein of the original city v?as void,
giving a judgment of ouster against the court especially wishing it under-
§ 4r72.] DISSOLUTION. 469
dissolve municipal corporations under circumstances therein
stated and to provide provisional governments for the same,"
providing that " whenever any city or town incorporated under
the general municipal corporation act . . . is indebted to
the amount of $200,000, and has defaulted and still defaults in
the payment of its interest account, the charter of such city
or town shall be, and is hereby declared to be, repealed and the
incorporation thereof dissolved," was held not to be a spe-
cial law within the prohibition of the constitution, but a gen-
eral law ; the fact that there may have been but one municipal-
ity of the class named at the time of the approval of the act
not of itself rendering the statute creating this class special
and unconstitutional.' •
§ 472. Tacated towns. — Where a town had recovered a
judgment in a suit and was afterwards vacated and abolished,
the ordinance providing that the town to which it was to be
attached should be the successor to the vacated town in its
actions at law, the ownership of such judgment became en-
stood that they " do not decide or when so organized to remain such,
hold that the legislature can, under but has expressly provided for sur-
the constitution, authorize the holders render of its franchises by any city or
of one-half of the bonds of an in- town. We are not satisfied that, hav-
debted municipal corporation to dis- ing the power to authorize one or
solve such corporation ; " nor to say maiiy to surrender its corporate ex-
" that the act, stripped of the discre- istence, it cannot for satisfactory
tion vested in the bondholders, would cause dissolve any one of them. The
be constitutional." legislature, in repealing or modifying
1 Ex parte Wells (1885), 31 Fla. 280, the charter of a municipality, is not
the court summmg up its conclusions creating rules for the regulation of
as follows : — " Unless there is a limit- future controversies between parties,
ation in the constitution restraining it is simply, as it were, shaping its
the legislature, it can at will dissolve own instrumentality. . . . Mu-
one city or many municipalities and iiicipal corporations can, independent
leave others in existence. It could, of constitutional limitations, be dis-
moreover, dissolve all existing mu- solved without violating the princi-
nicipalities and prevent the same pie suggested for petitioner." 1?he
communities from reorganizing, yet principle referred to was that "it
provide for others to incorporate, [the statute] does not prescribe a rule
. . . The legislature has not pre- of civil conduct," but deals only with
tended to either compel communities the past and present, and not with
to organize as municipalities, nor the future.
470 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 473.
tirely vested in the last town.^ It was contended also that the
board of supervisors of the county had no authority to make
any distribution of the property of the county, and that so
much of the ordinance abolishing this town and making the
one of which it was constituted a part of its successor as the
owner of this judgment was void. It was held that under
the constitution (which empowers the legislature to confer
upon boards of county supervisors " powers of a local legisla-
tive and administrative charact* "), when any subject of leg-
islation is intrusted to county boa.rds by general words in a
statute they acquire a right to pass any ordinance necessary
or convenient for the purpose of disposing of the whole sub-
ject so committed to them, and ijpr that purpose have all the
powers of the State legislature over that subject, unless the
statute restricts the power or directs its exercise in a certain
way.^ And when substituted in such suits the successor is
entitled to costs.'
§ 473. This was no dissolution. — The qualified electors of a
corporation in Texas elected a city council known to be in favor
of dissolution, which, at a regular meeting in the year of their
election, made a full, complete and permanent settlement of all
corporate business with a view to its dissolution, when they
resigned, after unanimously passing an ordinance declaring
the several municipal offices forever thereafter vacant. It
was held that the only law relating to the dissolution of mu-
nicipal corporations by their own action was the act author-
izing cities of a certain population to accept its provisions in
lieu of any existing charter by a two-thirds vote of the council,
and on compliance with certain requirements ; and that this
attempted dissolution by vote of the mayor and aldermen,
1 Supervisors of La Pointe v. O'Mal- rights of the old town in specified
ley^ 47 Wis. 333. property — in this case a judgment
2 Supervisors of La Pointe v. O'Mal- against third parties. The appeal in
ley, (1879), 47 Wis. 833, holding, also, this case was dismissed because the
that under Revised Statutes, section successor (Town of Butternut) had
670, the county board had pov/er to not been substituted and the appeal
abolish an existing town; attach dif- taken in its name.
ferent parts of its territory to other ^ Town of Butternut v. O'Malley
existing towns and provide that one (1880), ,50 Wis. 333.
of the latter should succeed to the
§ 474.] DISSOLUTION. 471
and a subsequent incorporation under laws relating to unin-
corporated towns and cities, was void.^ And being void, dis-
solution could not be presumed from acquiescence and lapse
of time. The court, on the argument that the dissolution of
the corporation should be presumed from the period of time
which had elapsed since the city had acted under its original
charter, said " that presumptions cannot be indulged in oppo-
sition to facts which show that the fact sought to be estab-
lished by presumption can have no existence." In a similat
case it was held that as a municipality could not at will aban-
don its special charter and reorganize under general laws, a
corporation under a special charter, whose officers had been
ousted, was not dissolved by its failure to elect new officers,
nor by an attempt to reorganize it under the general laws of
the State.2
§ 474. Effect of dissolution as to liabilities and fands in
hand. — "Where a road district has been incorporated from a
portion of a township with power to contract debts for cer-
tain purposes, and has done so, and is afterwards dissolved by
a repeal of its charter with a provision that the repeal should
not in any way impair any legal contracts which its board of
commissioners had made and which might remain unexecuted,
it has been held that it was the intention of the legislature to
impose upon the township committee the liabilities which 'the
commissioners had legitimately contracted within the scope
of their daties and for the object of their appointment. Such
are claims for compensation, etc., of surveyor and his assist-
ants, for services of a clerk and for sewer pipe for use in mak-
ing improvements.' The repeal of an act incorporating a
portion of a township as a polling district dissolves such a
government corporation and abolishes its officers. The result
is that any funds, raised by taxation for public purposes, in
the hands of its treasurer come immediately under the con-
trol of the legislature ; and in obedience to its direction by the
general laws applicable in such cases, it is the duty of that
1 Largen v. State (1890), 76 Tex. 323 ; » Township of Union «. Rader (1879),
S. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 161. 41 N. J. ILaw, 617.
2 Welch V. St Genevieve (1871), 1
Dill. 130.
472 PAETITION ASD DISSOLUnON. [§ 475.
treasurer to pay over to the proper officer of the township
from which this polling district was formed whatever he has
in hand.' An act of the legislature of Alabama to vacate and
annul the charter of and dissolve a municipal corporation was
held to operate a dissolution of the corporation — a withdrawal
from it of all governmental power which had been confided
to it, except so far as the act authorized the continued exer-
cise of such power ; but upon debts and liabilities which had
been created or contracted by tljp corporation in the exercise
of a power with which it had been clothed by the General As-
sembly it was without operation. These debts or liabilities were
not lessened in obligation nor extinguished; nor was it within
the competency of legislative power to lessen them in obliga-
tion or to extinguish them.^ The Supreme Court in Ifew Mexico
has construed its disincorporating act, as it may be styled, and
held that the effect of its sections providing for a settlement of
the debts of a disincorporated city was to make of the county
a mere auditing and collecting agent for the creditor of a de-
fendant municipal corporation empowered to make by special
tax out of the assets of the dead city, in the manner prescribed,
a sufficient amount to discharge all claims duly presented
and allowed, and not to transfer the liability of the city to
the county.'
§ 475. Effect of dissolution upon liabilities. — The legisla-
ture, in the exercise of its supreme power over municipal
corporations, may repeal their charters at any time, in its dis-
iHeckel v. Sandford (1878), 40 N. NewMexico, 1884, chapter 38, provides
J. Law, 180. for disincorporation of cities, and sec-
2 Amy V. Selma (1884), 77 Ala. 103. tion 3 declares that the commission-
3 Board of County Comm'rs of San ers of the county in which such cities
Miguel County v. Pierce (New Mex., are situated shall audit claims against
1893), 28 Pao. Rep. 612, where it such cities, and that persons having
was held that the plaintiff could not such claihis shall present them within
recover of the county because he had six months and not afterwards. See-
not followed the provisions of the tion 6 provides for publishing notice
disincorporating act in the presenta- to claimants and issuing warrants
tion of his claims, etc. ; and that the for amounts allowed. Section 9 pro-
claims were barred by reason of not videa that approved accounts shall be
having been presented within six presented within four months from
months from the time the city of Las the date of notice and not afterwards.
Vegas was disincorporated. Laws of
§ 475.] DISSOLUTION. 473
cretion. The only limitation on the operation of such a re-
peal is as to creditors, that it shall not operate to impair the
obligation of existing contracts, or deprive them of any rem-
edy for enforcing such contracts which existed when they
were made.' In a case, therefore, where a part of a township
had been incorporated for the purpose of laying out, opening
and improving streets, with full power through its commis-
sioners to ^borrow money, issue bonds, etc., but owning no
property, and debts had been incurred in accordance with the
statute incorporating it, and this charter was repealed and
the corporation thereby dissolved, the act of repeal was held
constitutional, inasmuch as it preserved the debts and im-
posed upon the authorities of the township the duties of the
commissioners of the dissolved corporation as to assessment, .
and other steps for compromise, adjustment and settlement
of those claims.'' Upon the contention that the act of the
legislature of Alabama dissolving the old corporation of " The
City of Selma " and re-incorpprating it as 'SSelma " was in
contravention of the constitution of the State, in that it im-
paired the obligation of contracts "by destroying or impairing
the remedy for their enforcement," the act was sustained, the
court stating its conclusion as follows : — An act to dissolve a
municipal corporation is not objectionable so far as it author-
izes the appointment of commissioners with authority to take
charge of, collect and control the assets of the dissolved cor-
poration, making of them the application required by law.
IN'or is it objectionable so far as it names a court and author-
izes the commissioners to apply on the equity side of that
court for , instruction, direction and protection in the per-
formance and discharge of their duties. ISTor is it objection-
able so far as in this respect it may be considered a grant of
jurisdiction to said court, nor in the mode of procedure which
it prescribes.' A township by act of the legislature was trans-
ferred into a city. By subsequent act of repeal the later cor-
1 Eader v. Southeasterly Road Dis- Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 ; Butz v. City of
trict (1873), 38 N. J. Law, 378 ; People Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575.
V. Morris, IB Wend. 335; State v. 2 Rader w Southeasterly Road Dig-
Brannin, 33 N. J. Law, 484; City of trict (1873), 38 N. J. Law, 373.
Paterson v. The Society &c., 34 N. J. 3 Amy v. Selma, 77 Ala. 103.
Law, 386 ; Von Hoffman v. City of
474 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 476.
poration was dissolved. It was held that the effect of the
dissolution of the city, it embracing the same inhabitants and
the same boundaries, was to revive the township municipal-
ity, to oast upon it the ownership of the municipal property,
and to make it liable for the debts of the city, and that the
suit was properly brought against the township for a debt in-
curred by the city.^ '
§ 476. What does not affect*liabilities and remedies.—
Even if a municipal corporation can forfeit its franchises by
non-user, such forfeiture will not operate to extinguish debts
of the corporation contracted before the forfeiture was in-
cutred or declared. Furthermore, if 6orporate creditors are
not made parties to the proceeding by which the forfeiture
is ascertained and declared, they are not bound by the judg-
ment of ouster. Municipal corporations cannot extinguish
their debts by changing their names or reorganizing under
new charters, or by failing to exercise their corporate powers.
A debt once contracted by a municipal corporation will sur-
vive as a debt against whatever corporate entity is subse-
quently created to take its place and exerdise its power of
local government over substantially the same people and ter-
ritory.^ The legislation of Tennessee, in repealing the charter
of cities and subsequently for compromise of their debts by
the "taxing districts" formed in their stead, and the attempts
(as generally construed) to force this by withholding the
1 Scaine v. Inhabitants of Belleville was the substitution of other instru-
(1877), 39 N. J. Law, 536, the court say- mentalities."
ing : — " The legal inference must be 2 Hill v. City of Kahoka (1888), 35
that it was the intention of the legisla- Fed. Eep. 33, holding the city of
ture,by the repeal of the city charter, Kahoka liable for bonds in aid of
not so much to abolish the govern- railroads issued by the town of Ka-
ment of the district in question, as to hoka, the charter of which had been
alter its form. The charter was re- forfeited for non-user, and the last
voked, but there was no interregnum, corporation formed of the same in-
fer the township organization in- habitants and territory. Following
stantly revived and took its place, the Brighton v. Fensauola, 93 TJ. S. 366 ;
repeal arid revival being accom- Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289;
pliaheA uno flafu. The object of the S. C, 6 Sup. Ct Eep. 398; Laird w
city charter was riot abandoned ; De Soto, 23 Fed. Rep. 431 ; People v.
that object was local government ; Murray, 73 N. Y. 535 ; the last as to
and to effect this the change made judgment of ouster not binding those
not parties.
§ 477.] DISSOLTJTION. 475
power to tax to meet the obligations of the dissolved corpo-
rations, has had much attention in the courts. It has been
held that any power of taxation, provided as a means of pay-
ing their debts, theretofore granted to the original municipali-
ties, devolved as readily as the obligation to pay them, and
by operation of the federal constitution, upon those success-
ors, notwithstanding the attempted statutory prohibition.
As a sequence a mandamus might be issued to the oflBcials
appointed for the general purposes of the local government, ;
who can exercise the power of taxation which was in the in-
habitants of the given territory and which was never taken
away, as they do all governmental po'wer of that local char-
acter.^ It was also held that where a State, with the delib-
erate purpose of obstructing a creditor, repeals a municipal
charter, whereby there is no organization to be sued, and the
creditor is disabled from proceeding, the time of such ob-
struction will be excluded from the limitation of the statute,
the legislative intention to suspend it being implied as in case
of war. Besides it may be set up as an equitable defense in
proceedings by mam.damus?
§ 477. Repealing charters. — The legislation of Tennessee
repealing the charters of municipal corporations and establish-
ing taxing districts was the most extensive in this direction
that has ever been resorted to in the United States. There
has been much litigation growing out of it and important de-
cisions made upon the questions raised in the various cases.
We will present here some of the most important rulings of
the Supreme Court of the State upon the constitutionality of
those acts. First on the title of the act. It was held that
" An act to repeal the charter of certain municipal corpora-
tions and to remand the territory and inhabitants thereof to
the government of the State " is not rendered unconstitutional
by a provision that the property used by such corporation
1 Devereaux v. City of Brownsville 533 ; United States v. Wiley, 11 Wall,
(1887), 39 Fed, Eep. 743; Loague v. 508, 513; Braun v. Sauevwein, 10
Taxing Dist of Brownsville (1887), 29 Wall. 218 ; Montgomery v. Hernan •
iFed. Eep. 743. dez, 13 Wheat 139, 134. As to equi-
2 Cases cited in the preceding note, table defense, Angell & Ames on
See, also, as to the effect of being dis- Corp. (11th ed.), g§ 715, 731; High,
abled to sue. Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall Extr. Eera. (3d ed.), g§ 14, 457 et seq.
476 PAETITIOK AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 478.
for municipal purposes is transferred to the custody and con-
trol of the State to remain public property for the uses to
which it has been hitherto applied.^ And " A bill to establish
taxing districts in this State and to provide the means of local
government for the same," which grants municipal franchises
to the communities within the territorial limits of the taxing
districts, and gives to the corporation thus created all the nec-
essary legislative, judicial and police powers of an incorporated
city, and contains specifications df offenses committed against
the corporation or by its oflioials with penalties and punish-
ments, contains only one subject within the meaning of the
constitution.^ An act which provides " that the several com-
munities embraced in the territorial limits of all such munici-
pal corporations in the State as have had or may have their
charters abolished, or as may surrender the same under the
provisions of the act, are hereby created taxing districts, in
order to provide the means of local government for the peace
and safety and general welfare of such district," and further
provides for the surrender of all charters of municipal corpo-
rations in the State to enable the communities within their
limits to be governed by the new act, is in form a general law
and cannot be held to be intended as a special law, even if the '
courts can inquire into the intention of the legislature, al-
though mainly framed or designed for a particular locality,
where the acts of the same session of the legislature show a
repeal of the charters of thirty-seven municipal corporations,
all of whose communities fall at once within the provisions of
the act.'
§ 478. The same subject continued. — The Supreme Court
of Tennessee held an act constitutional which repealed the
charter of a single municipal corporation, upon the principle
that municipal corporations are within the absolute control of
the legislature, and may be abolished at any time in its dis-
cretion.* They further held that an act which grants munici-
1 Luehriiian v. Taxing District of * Luehrman v. Taxing District Of
Shelby Co. (1879), 2 Lea (Tenn.), 435. Shelby County (1879), 3 Lea (Tenn.),
2 Luehrman v. Taxing District of 425. Cooper. J., gives this as the ob-
Shelby Co., 2 Lea (Tenn.), 425. vious reason : — " Being created as in-
'Luehrman v. Taxing District of strumentalities or arms of the gov-
Shelby Co. (1879), 3 Lea (Tenn.), 425. ernment, they cannot be continued
§ 479.] DISSOLUTION. 47 1
pal franchises to the communities within the territorial limits
of certain districts in order to provide the means of local gov-
ernment, and creates the " agencies and governing instrumen-
talities " of a municipal corporation, with the usual legislative,
executive and judicial powers, although it may style the crea-
tions " taxing districts," in reality organizes the people and
territory of the district into municipal corporations.' It was
competent for the legislature., in the act creating taxing dis-
tricts of these dissolved corporations, to provide for the ap-
pointment of provisional officers to hold for a reasonable
time, and not have them elected by the people of the district.
This was merely to put the new system in motion.^ So also the
legislature in this State could reserve to itself the right to
impose directly the necessary taxes for the support of mu-
nicipal corporations.'
§ 479. Receiver for a city. — The United States circuit court
on a bill filed by the bondholders of the city of Memphis ap-
pointed a receiver for the city, and ordered a surrender of the
property and assets of the city, and he asked an injunction after-
wards against the officer appointed under the laVvs of Tennes-
see for the taxing district of Shelby county to receive this
In that capacity whenever the public abolishment. And we may conceive
exigency, of which the legislature of cases where, by the vicissitudes of
alone is judge, demands that they trade, as in the case of old Sarum in
should cease to act," See, also, People England, and some of the mining
V. Morris, 13 Wend. 331 ; City of Mem- towns of California, the special re-
phis V. Memphis Water Works, 5 peal of a particular charter might be
Heisk. 495, 537 ; Governor u. McEwen, demanded by public policy when a
5 Humph. (Tenn.) 341 ; McCuUie v. general repeal would be a remedy
Mayor of Chattanoga, 3 Head, 817 ; worse than the disease."
Lynch v. Lafland, 4 Colo. 96. In an- i Luehrman v. Taxing District of
other place he speaks of the power Shelby County (1879), 8 Lea (Tenn.),
to repeal charters as follows : — " This 435.
is a power so essential to sovereignty ^ Luehrman v. Taxing District of
a,nd the preservation by the State of Shelby County (1879), 3 Lea (Tenn.),
its control over its instrumentalities 435. The court in the foregoing case
of local rale, that it cannot well be rely largely upon Judge Cooley's
considered as cut off except by a opinion in People v. Hurlbut, 34 Mich.
positive provision to that effect The 44.
restriction is against the powers of a ' Luehrman v. Taxing District of
corporation being ' diminished ' by Shelby County (1879), 3 Lea (Tenn.),
special laws, not against their entire 435,
478 PAETITION AND DISSOLUTION. [§ 479.
property and those assets in order that the same might be ad-
ministered by the court as a court of equity through its officer.
The Supreme Court of the TJnited States on appeal gave
the subject full consideraJtion. The court was agreed upon the
propositions which follow : — Upon the repeal of the charter of
a city, property held for public uses, such as public buildings,
streets, squares, parks, promenades, wharves, landing places,
fire-engines, hose and hose-carriages, engine-houses, engineer-
' ing instruments, and generally ^erything held for govern-
mental purposes, passes under the immediate control of the
State, the power once delegated to the city in that behalf hav-
ing been withdrawn.^' Nor could the decree of the court be-
low so far as it subjected to the payment of the debts of the
city the private property of all persons within its territorial
limits be sustained.^ But whatever property a municipal cor-
poration holds subject to the payment of its debts will, after
its dissolution, be administered for the benefit of the creditors
of such a corporation, and applied by a court of equity. Pri-
vate property of the corporation such as it holds in its own
right for profit or as a source of revenue not charged with
any public trust or use, and funds in its posseission unappro-
priated to any specific purpose, may be so administered. In
this respect the position of the extinct corporation is not dis-
similar to that of a deceased individual ; it is only such prop-
erty as is possessed free from any trust,' general or special, which
can go in liquidation of debts.' The majority of the court re-
versed th^ court below, and held that as it involved the power
of the court to levy taxes the appointment of the receiver could
not be sustained. It was their judgment that taxes levied ac-
cording to law before the repeal of a charter of a city other than
such as were levied in obedience to the special requirement of
contracts entered into under the authority of law, and such
as were levied under judicial direction for the payment of
judgments recovered against such city, cannot be collected
'Meriwether v. Garrett (1880), 102 President &c. u. City of Indianapo-
U. S. 473. See, also, SchafEer v. lis, 13 Ind. 620.
Cadwallader, 36 Pa. St. 136 ; City of • Meriwether v. Garrett, cited in
Davenport v. Peoria Marine & Fire the preceding note.
Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 376 ; Askins v. Com- ' Meriwether v. Garrett (1880), 102
monwealth, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 375 ; The U. S. 473.
§ 480.] DISSOLUTION. 479
through the instrumentality of a court of chancery at th« in-
stance of the creditors of the city.*
§ 480. The same subject continued. — Upon the contention
that the creditors of the city of Memphis would be remediless
if the federal courts did not come to their relief as to the taxes
levied before the repeal of its charter, Field, Justice, says: —
" But the conclusion does not follow. The taxes levied pur-
suant to writs of mandamus issued by the circuit court are
still to be collected, the agency only for their collection being
changed. The receiver appointed by the governor has taken
the place of the collecting officers of the city. The funds re-
ceived by him upon the special taxes thus levied cannot be
appropriated to any other uses. The receiver, and any other
agent of the State for the collection, can be compelled by the
, court, equally as the former collecting officers of the city, to
proceed with the collection of such taxes by the sale of prop-
erty or by suit, or in any other way authorized by law, and
to apply the proceeds upon the judgments." ^ Justices Strong,
Swayne and Harlan dissented, holding that the complainants
were entitled to some of the relief granted them in the decree.
A case was made in their opinion for the appointment of a re-
ceiver to take into the possession of the court those taxes
which had been levied by judicial direction for the payment
of judgments recovered against the city — taxes which had
been only partly paid. They placed this upon the principle
that a trust ha,d been created with which those taxes had^
been charged ; that the creditors were cestuis que trustent —
the city having only the naked title to this fund ; that the
city had been, in its neglect to collect and apply these taxes, a
faithless trustee, and the court, as in other cases of individual
trustees, in this of a municipal corporation as trustee, could
and should appoint another.' Further, Justice Strong said,
1 Meriwether tt Garrett (1880), 103 Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall.
U. S. 473. See, also, as to taxes and 107, 116; Heine v. Levee Cotnm'rs of
power of court to collect, City of New Orleans, 1 Woods, 347 ; Same v.
Augusta V. North, 57 Me. 393 ; City of Same, 19 Wall. 655.
Camden «. Allen, 26 N. J. Law, 398; 2 Meriwether v. Garrett (1880), 103
Perry v. Washburn, 30 CaJ. 318 ; Phil- U. S. 473, 530.
adelphia v. Greble, 38 Pa. St 339; SMeriwejiher v. Garrett (1880), 103
Howell V. Philadelphia, 38 Pa. St. 471; U. S. 473, 537. Justice Strong said,
480 PARTITION AND BISSOLtTTION. [§ 481.
on page 528 : — If the city, as contended, by the legislative
act of repeal of its charter " ceased to have any legal exist-
ence, . . . the ,case then became one of a trust without a
trustee, pre-eminently fit for equitable interference. A court
of equity will not permit a private trust to fail for want of a
trustee. And this rule is applicable to cases in which a munici-
pal corporation has been nominated the trustee." ' %
§ 481. Where such a receiver ♦was appointed. — There has
been an instance in which a receiver was appointed for a city,
a history of which we will give. When the city of Nashville,
Tennessee, had been in 1869 brought to the verge if not to a
state of bankruptcy by reckless issuing of money obligations
and wasteful mismanagement and fraudulent uses of its finances
on the part of its regularly elected oflScials, there was an at-
tempt to have a receiver appointed through a bill filed by citizens
and creditors. The first chancellor dismissed the application.
On a second application before another chancellor they were
more successful and a receiver was appointed. A third chan-
cellor, on application before him to discharge the orders of the
second chancellor, approved the action of his predecessor in
intervening to annul the operation of the charter of the city.
There was extended the old rule that in meeting emergencies
for which the law has provided no remedies, equity will interr
pose. Judge East, the chancellor, ascribed to the government
speaking of the city, "Its character authority. O^er its private obliga-
as [a municipal corporation] does not tions it has not." See, also, Bailey v.
aflfect the nature of its obligations to Mayor &c. of New York, 3 Hill, 531 ;
its creditors or its cestvis que trust. Small v. Inhabitants of Danville, 51
or impair the remedies they would Me. 359 ; Oliver v. Worcester, 102
have if the city was a common Mass. 489.
debtor or trustee. While as a mucici- i See, also, Girard v. Philadelphia, 7
pal corporation the city had public Wall. 1 ; Philadelphia «. Fox, 64 Pa. St
duties to perform, yet in contracting 169 ; Montpelieru. East Montpelier, 29
debts authorized by the law of its or- Vt. 12 ; Batesville Institute v. Kauff-
ganization, or in performing a pri- man, 18 Wall. 151, wherd it is said: —
vate trust, it is regarded by the law as " It is, however, within the power of
standing on the same footing as a a court of equity to decree and en-
private individual, with the same force the execution of the trust
rights and duties and with the same through its own officers and agents,
liabilities as attend such persons, without the intervention of a new
Over its public duties, it may be ad- trustee ; " citing Story's Eq. Jur. 976-
mitted, the legislature has plenary 1060.
§ 481.] DISSOLUTION. 481
of a city a twofold character : first, as an arm of the legislature^
secondly, as a private corporation, the creation of the legisla-
ture. Among other things he said : — "The functions of a mu-
nicipality are twofold : first, political, discretionary, legisla-
tive; secondly, ministerial. While acting within the sphere
of the former they are exempt from liability, inasmuch as the
corporation is a part of the government to that extent, and
its officers to the same extent are public oflBcers, and as such
entitled to the protection of this principle ; but within the
sphere of the latter (ministerial duties) they drop the badges
of governmental officers and become, as it were, the represent-
atives of a private corporation in the exercise of privajte
functions. The distinction between those legislative powers
which it holds for public purposes as a part of the government
of the country and those private franchises which belong to it
as a. creature of the law is well taken." The receiver ap-
pointed administered the affairs of the city, receiving its rev-
enues and disbursing the same to whomsoever entitled until
there was a change of administration, a restoration of home
rule, and the city's representatives by act of the legislature is-
sued bonds with which to compromise and settle the fraudulent
debt imposed upon it by a band of scheming conspirators J never,
however, in any of its actions conceding the justice or propri-
ety of paying one dollar of that debt. This ended the receiv-
ership of the city of Nashville.'
1 Lucius S. Merriam, Esq., in 25 Am. L Rev. S9&
81
CHAPTEK XIV.
ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS.
483. Introductory.
§506.
483. By-laws, ordinances and reso-
lution*
507.
484 Distinction between ordinance
and resolution.
508.
485. The same subject continued—
Illustrations.
509.
486. The province of ordinances.
487. Power to make ordinances.
510.
488. The same subject continued.
489. By whom the power is to be
511.
exercised.
490. Validity in respect of form —
513.
(a) Meeting of council.
491. (b) The same subject contin-
513.
ued.
498. (c) Quorum and votes.
514.
493. (d) The same subject contin-
ued.
494. (e) Mode of enactment.
515.
495. (f) The same subject contin-
ued.
516.
496. (g) The signing of the ordi-
nance.
517.
497, (h) The same subject contin-
5ia
ued.
498. (i) Publication of the ordi-
519.
nance — When mandatory.
499. 0 The same subject contin-
530.
ued — When directory.
531.
500. (k) The same subject contin-
533.
ued — Amendments and re-
533.
enactments.
601. (1) Manner of publication.
503. (m) The same subject contin-
534.
ued.
535.
503. (n) Time and proof of publi-
cation.
536,
504. (o) Title of the ordinance.
537.
505. (p) Record of the ordinance.
538.
Validity in respect of matter—
(a) Constitutionality.
(b) The same subject contii»-
ued.
(c) Consistency with statute
and charter.
(d) The same subject contin-
ued.
(e) Consistency with general
penal law.
(f) The same subject contin-
ued.
(g) Reasonableness of the or-
dinance.
(h) The same subject contin-
ued — Illustrations.
(i).The same subject contin-
ued — Reasonableness a
question of law,
(j) Vagueness of the ordi-
nance.
Motives of council not to be
impeached.
Construction of ordinances.
The same subject continued —
Ordinances void in part
Amendment and repeal — By
subsequent ordinance.
Repeal by act of the legislature.
Repeals by implication.
Power to impose penalties.
Mode of enforcement of ordi-
nances — By a purely civil
action.
Jurisdiction of proceedings.
Imprisonment in default of
payment of fine.
Imprisonment as a penalty.
Forfeitures.
The same subject continued.
§§ 482, 483.]
OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS.
483
^ 539. Cumulative fines and fines
for continuous and repeated
oflense&
530. Enforcement by complaint —
Nature of proceeding.
'•31. The complaint — General req-
uisites.
§ 533. The same subject continued —
Pleading.
533. Pleading further considered.
534. Proof of ordinances.
535. Right to trial by jury.
536. The same subject continued.
587. Certiorari and habeas corpus.
§ 482. Introductory. — The public corporation in its usual
acceptation, excluding the State and the federal government,
is for some purpose a miniature State. Its council represents
the State legislature and the ordinances of that council repre-
sent the statutes of the State. These ordinances, if valid,
have, as we shall see, upon those subject to the control of the
corporation, the same force and effect that the general stat-
utes of the State have upon the people at large. - It is easy
to see, therefore, the great importance of the subject which it
is proposed to discuss in this chapter. Of the cases concern-
ing pubUo corporations it is probable that those which relate
to municipal ordinances are more numerous than those which
touch upon any other single point.* The validity of the ordi-
nance is generally the point in question, and consequently by
far the greater portion of the chapter is devoted to the dis-
cussion of the various questions which determine the validity
of a particular ordinance. These questions are grouped under
two heads : — (1) Validity in respect of form, (2) validity in re-
spect of matter. It will be found that while an ordinance has,
if valid, the force and effect of a general law upon those per-
sons who are within the jurisdiction of the council, still the
powers of the council are naturally very much more circum-
scribed than are those of the legislature, and that an ordi-
nance must be most carefully examined both in respect of its
form and in respect of its matter before it can be pronounced
undoubtedly valid.
§ 483. By-laws, ordinances and resolations. — The by-
laws of a municipal corporation are usually known as ordi-
nances, while in the English cases and text-books the former
term is generally used.'' There is, therefore, little if any dis-
1 For a further treatment of the § 510 ; Bae. Abr., tit " By-law." See
subject see the chapter on The Po- SUmley on By-laws, ch. 1 ; per Parke,
LICE Power in Vol. 3, B., Gosling v. Veley, 19 L. J, (N. S.)
2 Beach on Private Corporations, Q. B. li}5.
484 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 484.
tinction between the by-laws and the ordinances of a municipal
corporation. The terras in their ordinary sense imply one
and the same thing.^ A resolution is generally of a more
special and temporary character than an ordinance, and re-
quires less solemnity of enactment.^
§ 484. Distinction between ordinance and resolution.—
All legislative and permanent apts regulating the affairs of
the corporation should be in the form of ordinances and not
in the form of resolutions. Thus, the issuing bonds to aid in
constructing a sewer would be a legislative proceeding such
as would have to be by ordinance.' But where a corporation
only desires to do some ministerial act a resolution is sufiB-
cient.* An ordinance may, however, be in the form of a reso-
lution, and if enacted with the formalities required by law in
the case of an ordinance will generally be valid and binding.'
In Louisiana it has been held that where there was a general
power to make ordinances and by-laws and no form in which
these should be enacted or passed was prescribed, an ordi.
nance containing a. prohibition and annexing a penalty was
valid, notwithstanding it purported by its terms to be a reso-
lution. In substance it was an ordinance and the form in
which it was passed did not make it void.* But in Missouri
1 it was decided that in the absence of an aflBrmative showing
that a resolution is passed with the same formalities, and noti-
fied to the public in the same manner as an ordinance, an act
which a municipal charter requires to be done bj-^ ordinance
cannot be done by resolution ; nor can a general ordinance au-
thorize it so to be done.'
1 Nat Bank of Commerce v. Town A resolution does not require the ap-
of Grenada (1800), 44- Fed. Rep. S62 ; proval of the mayor. Burlington v.
Bills V. City of Goshen (1890), 117 Ind. Dennison, 42 N. J. Law, 165.
221, 325. » Sower v. Philadelphia (1860), 35
s A resolution is an order of coun- Pa. St 331 ; Gas Co. v. San Francisco,
oil of a special and temporary char- 6 Cal. 190 ; Drake v. Railroad Co., 7
aoter ; an ordinance prescribes a Barb. 737 ; Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo.
permanent rule of conduct or gov- 880; Manufacturing Co. uSchell City,
ernment Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 21 Mo. App. 175.
Ohio St 96, 103 ; State v. Bayonne, 6 Municipality v. Cutting (1849), 4
35 N. J. Law, 335. La. Ann. 335.
' State V. Barnet 46 . N. J. Law, 62. ' City of Cape Girardean v. Fougeu,
* Quincy v. Railroad Co., 9'J 111. 21. 30 Mo. App. 551.
§ 485.] ORDINANCES AND BT-LAVTS. 480
§ 485. The same subject continued— Illustrations.— When
the charter of the municipality expressly requires a certain
act to be done by ordinance, it fs safer to use the form of an
ordinance rather than of a resolution.' To decide whether
a resolution is sufficient for any certain purpose, it is necessary
to consider the nature of the act sought to be authorized, the
language Qf the general laws and of the charter relating to
municipal ordinances, and the question whether the forraali-
,ties required in case of ordinances have been followed in pass-
ing and publishing the ordinance. It has been held in Penn-
sylvania that a new street could be opened by resolution.' In
New Jersey a resolution has been considered sufficient to
bind the corporation for the purchase of fire department ap-
paratus;' and for the construction of a sewer;* and for the
acceptance of a dedication.' In Iowa the amount of a license
previously authorized to be imposed has been allowed to be
' imposed by resolution.' In Indiana a resolution was suffi-
cient to authorize street improvements.' Resolutions have
been held sufficient by the courts of Illinois to direct munic-
ipal agents to make specified contracts and also to appoint
municipal agents.' A i-esolution confirming certain acts of
the city of San Francisco was held sufficient.* On the other
hand in New Jersey an ordinance has been held essential for
the following purposes, viz. : — for grading a street ; '" for alter-
ing the width of a street sidewalk;" and for appointing a
1 City of Central «., Sears (1875), 3 license fee from time to time as it
Colo. 588 ; Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. deems proper it may be flxed by res-
90 ; Paterson v. Barnet, 46 N. J. Law, olution. Arkadelphia Lumber Co. v.
63 ; Cross v. Morristown, 18 N. J. Eq. City of Arkadelphia (Ark., 1893), 19
305 ; Tfashville v. .Toney, 10 Lea, 643 ; S. W. Rep. 1053.
Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 533. 'Commissioners v. Silvers, 33 Ind.
2 Sower V. Philadelphia, 35 Pa. St 491 ; Indianapolis v. Imbery, 17 Ind.
336. 175.
' Green v. Cape May, 41 N. J. Law, « Alton v, Mulledy, 31 III. 76 ; Egan
45. V. Chicago, 5 111. Ap. 70.
* State V. Jersey City, 37 N. J. Law, » Gas Ca v, San Francisco, 6 Cal.
493. 190.
5 State V. Elizabeth, 37 N. J. Law, lo State v. City of Bayonne, 35 N. J.
433. ' Law, 335.
6 Burlington v. Insurance Co., 31 » Cross v. Mayor of Morristown, 18
Iowa, 103. Under an ordinance au- N. J. Eq. 305.
thorizing the city council to fix a
486 OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 486.
commissioner to assess damages.^ In Colorado the courts have
held that an ordinance was necessary in fixing the compen-
sation of city officers under the charter of the city.*
§ 486. The province of ordinances. — The by-laws of a
municipal corporation are in the nature of local laws passed
by the proper assembly or governing body of the corporation,
and thus valid ordinances havg the same effect within the
corporate limits and with respect to persons upon whom they
lawfully operate that an act of the legislature has upon the
people at large.' A municipal ordinance is a "local law pre-
scribing a general and permanent rule." * As the State has
all power necessarj' for the protection of the property, health
and comfort of the public, it can delegate its power in this
respect to local municipalities in such manner as may be
deemed desirable and the State may resume it when deemed
expedient. Therefore, legislation in respect to matters affect-
ing only certain localities and not affecting the people at large
in any considerable degree will be committed to a local mu-
nicipal government.* A municipality may under the authority
of its charter, or of the general law, or under its implied right
to pass by-laws, establish all suitable ordinances for admin-
istering the government of the city, the preservation of the
health of the inhabitants and the convenient transaction of
business within its limits, and for the performance of the gen-
' State V. Bergen, 33 N. J. Law, have the same eflfects within its lim-
39, 73. its as an act of parliament Hopkins
3 City of Central v. Sears, 3 Colo. v. Mayor of Swansea, 4 M. & W. 631,
588. See, also. Walker v. Evansville, 640.
33 Ind. 398. * Citizens' Gas & M. Co. v. Elwood
8 village of St Johhsbury v. (1887), 114 Ind. 333.
Thompson, 69 Vt. 801, 305; Des * Harmon «. City of Chicago, /W
Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 44 111. 400, 408. In this case it was held
Iowa, 508 ; Bearden v. Madison, 73 to come within the province of a by-
Ga. 184; St Louis v. Bofflnger, 19 law to declare dense smoke from any •
Mo. 13 ; State v. Tryon, 89 Conn. 183
Starr v. Burlington, 45 Iowa. 87
Jones V. Ins. Co., 2 Daly (N. Y.), 307
locomotive or boat to be a nuisance,
and to prescribe a penalty thei-efor.
This ordinance was held also not to
McDermott v. Board of Police, 5 impose such regulation on commerce
Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 433; Hiland v. Low- as to interfere with the constitutional
ell, 3 Allen, 407. In England a by- prerogative of congress to regulate
law lawfully passed has been held to commerca
§ 487.] ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 487
eral duties required by law of municipal corporations.' The
particular instances in which public corporations have seen fit
to exercise this power are, of course, innumerable. Many ex-
amples will be found under the subsequent discussion of the
validity of ordinances.'
§487. Power to make ordinances. — It is clearly estab-
lished that only the legislature of a State is empowered to
make laws; yet this proposition must be taken with the qual-
ification that the legislature is empowered to delegate to mu-
nicipal corporations the power to make by-laws and ordinances
regulating such subjects as fall within the proper province of
an ordinance. That such power can be lawfully delegated is un-
doubted.' The power of the corporation to pass by-laws is in
many English cases said to be derived from custom — ancient
and long-continued usage ripening into a prescriptive right
on the part of the municipal corporation.* But no such
ground can be urged in this country, where the power to pass
by-laws and ordinances proceeds entirely from legislation of
comparatively recent date.' Consequently there is in our
1 State V. Merrill (1853), 37 Me. 339. Cromwell's Case, Dyer, 322 ; Frank-
A city government has the right ud- lin v. Cromwell, Dal. 95 ; The Earl of
der the usual grant of power to regu- Exeterv. Smith, 2 Keb. 367 ; Cart. 177 ;
late the use and enjoyment of pri- Lambert v. Thornton, 1 Ld. Raym.
vate property in the city so as to 91 ; Scarling v. Criett, Moo. 75 ; The
prevent its proving pernicious to the Bricklayers v. The Plasterers, Palm,
citizens generally, and may, when 396. There were ancient assemblies
the use to which the owner devotes in Cornwall, termed stannary con-
his property becomes a nuisance, vocations, or parliaments, which
compel him to cease so to use it and claimed to make statutes or laws
punish him for refusal to obey. Louis- for the rule and government of the
ville City Railway Co. v. Louisville, miners in that district " Some of
8 Bush (Ky.), 415. their rules or ordinances were simply
2 See, also, the chapter on THE Po- declarations of the customs prevail-
:,ICE Power, infra, vol 2. ing in the district^ but others con-
»Hill w. Decatur, 32 Ga 203; Per- tained regulations as to the, modes
due V. Ellis, 18 Ga. 586 ; Markle v. of working, and as to the conduct of
Akron, 14 Ohio, 586 ; Metcalf v. St the persops engaged therein. They
Louis, 11 Mo. 103 ; In re Wall, 48 appear to have depended for valid-
Cal. 279 ; Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71. ity upon the ancient customs of the
* Commonwealth v. Stodder (1848), country." See Rogers v. Brunton, 10
2 Cush, 562, 568. For English cases Q. K 26 ; JIarris v. Wakeman, Say,
bearing on these customs the reader 254
is referred to 5 Co. 63; Hob. 213; s Commonwealth v. Stodder, 3
Davenant v. Hurdis, Moo. 584 ; Ld. Cush. 562, 575 ; Barling v. West
488 OBDINAirCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 488,
courts no occasion to inquire into these customs, their validity
and mode of proof.'
§ 488. The same subject continued. — This power of the
legislature to delegate limited powers of local legislation
to municipal corporations is not, however, so extended as to
permit the delegation of any power of general State legisla-
tion.^ " The power of municipal corporations to make by-
laws," says Judge Cooley, " is limited in various ways : — 1. It
is controlled by the constitution of the United States and of
the State. The restrictions imposed by those instruments
which directly limit the legislative power of the State rest
equally upon all the instruments of government created by the
State. If a State cannot pass an ex post facto law, or law impair-
ing the obligation of contracts, neither can any agency do so
which acts under the State with delegated authority. By-
laws, therefore, which in their operation would be ex post facto
or violate contracts, are not within the power of municipal
Corporations ; and w^hatever the people by the State constitu-
tion have prohibited the State government from doing, it can-
not do indirectly through the local governments. 2. Municipal
by-laws must also be in harmony with the general laws of
the State and with the provisions of the municipal charter.
Whenever they come in conflict with either, the by-law must
give way." ' There is, however, no constitutional objection
(1869), 39 Wis. 307; Taylor v. Pine 111. 113; Kansas City w Corrigan, 86
BluS, 34 Ark. 603 ; Napman v. Peo- Mo. 67. And citing under the second
pie, 19 Mich. 353. limitation, Wood v. Brooklyn, 14
1 Commonwealth v. Stodder, 8 Barb. 435 ; Mayor v. Nichols, 4 Hill,
Cush. 563, 568. 309 ; Petersburg v. Metzker, 21 la
2State w Hayes (1881), 61 N.H. 264, 205; Southport v. Ogden, 23 Conn.
314. 128; Andrews v. Insurance Co., 37
^Cooley's Const Lim. 338, 339, Me. 256 ; Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio St
citing under the first limitation, 439 ; Carr v. St Louis, 9 Mo. 191 ;
Stuyvesant v. Mayor, 7 Cow. 588; Commonwealth w. Erie &c. North. R.
Brooklyn Central R Co. v. Brooklyn Co., 27 Pa St 339 ; Burlington v.
City R. Co., 32 Barb. 358; Illinois Kellar, 18 Iowa, 59; Con well w.
Conference Female Colleger. Cooper, O'Brien, 11 Ind. 419; March v. Com-
25 IIL 148 ; Davenport &c. Co. v. monwealth, 12 B. Mon. 25 ; Baldwin
Davenporl, 13 Iowa, 229 ; Saving So- v. Green, 10 Mo. 410 ; Cowen v. W(est
ciety V. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St 175; Troy, 43 Barb. 48; State v. Georgia
Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Ga. 404; .Medical Society, 38 Ga. 608; Pester-
People u Chicago &c. Ry. Co., 118 field ». Vickers, 8 Cold. 305; Wirth
§ 489.]
ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS.
489
to state legislation authorizing a city council to empower a
particular board of officers who have charge of the whole or a
portion of the affairs of a certain department to make reason-
able police rules and regulations.'
§ 489. By whom the power is exercised. — The ordinances
which the municipality is thus empowered to make must be
adopted by the proper body and in the manner prescribed by
law. The legislative assembly of the corporation is usually a
select or representative body elected by the quahfied voters
of the corporation. This representative body is the agent of
the corporation and its authorized acts are the acts of the cor-
poration. Its members are not the municipal corporation or
a corporation of any kind.^ In many New England towns
the legislative body is not representative, but is composed of
all the citizens of the town, who meet in person and admin-
ister the public affairs of the town.' As the power of a public
V. Wilmington. 68 N. C. 21 See, also,
on this subject, Burgess &c. of Bor-
ough of Non-istown v. Citizens' Pass.
By. Co. (Pa. 1893), 33 Atl. Eep. 1063 ;
" Power of Municipal Coi'porations to
Make By-laws," 15 Sol. J. & Eep. 209
and 230 ; " Municipal Ordinances," by
Irving Browne, 27 Alb. L. J. 284.
An ordinance which is invalid for
want of power of the corporation to
enact it is legalized by a statute
which expressly recognizes it as
valid. State v. Starkey (Minn., 1892),
52 N. W. Rep. 24; Lennon v. New
York, 55 N. Y. 361; Logansport v,
Crockett, 64 Ind. 319; Truchelut v.
City Council, 1 Nott & McC. (S. C.)
227; State v. Union, 33 N. J. Law,
350 ; Bergen v. State, 32 N. J. Law,
490 ; State v. Newark, 84 N. J. Law,
236. Cf. State v. Plainfield, 38 N. J.
Law, 95.
1 Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148
Mass. 375, citing Brooklyn v. Bres-
lin, 57 N. Y. 591 ; Birdsall v. Clark,
73 N. Y. 73 ; State v. Paterson, 34 N. J.
Law, 163; Taunton v. Taylor, 116
Mass. 254; Sawyer v. State Board of
Health, 135 Mass. 182; Common-
wealth V. Young, 135 Mass. 626. And
recognizing as sound but not antag-
onistic to the foregoing. Day v.
Green, 4 Cush. 433; Lowell v. Simp-
eon, 10 Allen, 88 ; In re Frazee, 63
Mich. 396.
2 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp. 270, and
cases cited.
3 For the Massachusetts statutes re-
lating to these towns see Gon. St 1860,
ch. XVIII and oh. XIX For an elabo-
rate discussion of the distinctions be-
tween towns and cities see the learned
opinion of Gray, C. J., in Hill v. Bos-
ton, 122 Mass. 344. This for;n of gov-
ernment afiEords an example of the
pure democracy which the increase
of population and the consolidation
of nations has made impracticable in
modern times. It is identical in prin-
ciple with the system of government
of Athens where all the free men met
in the ''xyoid, of the Teutonic ham-
let, where all freemen voted in the
folk-mote, and of many mediaeval
cities, in which every burgher voted
directly in public meeting on all
490 OEDINANCES AHD BY-LAWS. [§ 490.
corporation to pass ordinances emanates only from the legis-
lature, this power must be exercised strictly within the limits
prescribed by the general and special legislation on the sub-
ject.i
§ 490. Validity in respect of form — (a) Meeting of coun-
cil.— The ordinance must be passed at a legally convened
meeting of the legislative body. The subject of corporate
meetings is more fully discussed%elsewhere,'' but a few illus-
trations, bearing on the validity of ordinances may be given.
The provisions respecting New England town meetings are
peculiar and must be especially studied.' The councils of
ordinary cities and towns are, as has been stated, represent-
ative bodies, elected by the qualified voters of the corpora-
tion, and consisting of a number of members fixed by law.
It is the legislative agent of the corporation, and through
it only can the corporation take legislative action and be
bound. The legislative and corporate powers of a munici-
pality whose exercise is by the charter or constituent acts
committed to the council or governing body can be exercised
only at a corporate meeting duly held, and the corporate will
must be ascertained by vote and embodied in a, definite
form.* The meetings of such legislative municipal assemblies
are either (1) stated or regular meetings or (2) special meetings.'
The charter or some ordinance generally fixes the time for
holding regular or stated meetings, and the members are thus
charged with notice ; and no further or special notice is nec-
essary unless specially required by law. But notice of a special
meeting must, unless express provision to the contrary is
made by law, be given to each member entitled to be pres-
ent.* There are frequently provisions in charters or in ordi-
questioDs of public welfare. The de- ^ See the chapter on Public
mocracy of the New England form Boabds, supra.
of government is, however, far purer ' See the chapter on MEETINGS akd
than those mentioned ; for every ad ult Elections, supra.
votes, while in the other instances * Central Bridge Co. v. Lowell, 15
there was always a large slave popu- Gray, 106, 116.
lation which had no voice in the ' See, also, the chapter on Public
meeting. Boards, supra.
iHorr. & Bemis on Municipal Po- "See chapter on Public Boabds,
lice Or'dinances, in loco. supra. The provision of a city char-
ter-declaring that the mayor may
§ i91.J OKDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 491
nances relating to the calling of meetings of councils to the
efifect that upon assembly the mayor or other presiding officer
shall specially state to them when assembled the objects for
which they have been convened, and that their action shall
be confined to such object. So under a charter containing such
provisions it has been decided that statements in the opening
message that the mayor would propose other legislation, and
subsequent messages proposing other legislation not specifically
alluded to in the first message, would not authorize legislation
on such subjects ; ' and that the mayor could not enlarge the
scope of legislation by stating in his message calling such
session that " he was not averse to submitting any measure "
during the session, if deemed of public interest, and that an
ordinance passed at the submission of the mayor during th^
session was void.* The charter of Kansas City provides that,
" whenever a special session of the common council shall have
been called by the mayor, he shall state to them, when assem-
bled, the cause for which they have been convened, and their
action shall be confined to such cause or causes." It was held
that the common council had power, at a special session called
for the purpose of acting upon a special ordinance to pave a
street, to enact another ordinance for. paving the same street,
their action not being limited to the ordinance mentioned in
the mayor's message, but extending over the subject-matter
of the ordinance.'
§ 491. (b) The same subject continned. — The ordinance
must be passed by a council which has the legal author-
ity and right to pass such a by-law. Thus an ordinance
passed at a meeting of a county board of supervisors, held
pursuant to an act of the legislature which had b6en pre-
viously repealed, is void.* The meeting of the council at
which the ordinance is passed must be at the time prescribed
call special meetings of the council 2 city of St Louis v. Withaus, 16
" by causing notice to be left at the Mo. App. 347.
usual residence of each member " of ' Smith v. Tobener, 33 Mo. App.
tlie council does not prevent personal 601.
notice. Russell v. Wellington (Mass., < County of San Luis Obispo v.
1893), 31 N. E. Rep. 630. Hendricks, 71 CaL 343; s. a, 11 Pao.
' St Louis V. Withaus, 16 Mo. App. Rep. 683.
247.
492 OEDINANOES AHD BY-LAWS. [§ 49i!.
by law. Consequently under charter of the city of Eochester
in New York which provided that, at the next meeting of
the council after a disapproval by the mayor, it should pro-
ceed to reconsider the resolution disapproved, and, if it should
be passed by two-thirds of all the members, it should have
full force and effect notwithstanding the disapproval, the
courts decided that the council must consider the resolution
at the next meeting after the disM)proval comes in, and could
not postpone it until a subsequent meeting.^ The formal reg-
ularity of the meeting will be generally presumed ; as where in
Nebraska, on certificate of the conviction of a person for the
sale of liquor on Sunday, a resolution revoking his license di-
rected the marshal to notify the licensee of such revocation
" by the mayor and council," it was decided it need not other-
wise appear that the mayor was present, and that it would
not be presumed that he was not, as under the Nebraska stat-
, uteHtiis his official duty to preside at all meetings of the
council.' The provisions relating to New England town meet-
ings are peculiar. Thus it has been held in New Hampshire
that defendants in certain suits were not disqualified by inter-
est from voting in a town meeting called to take action on
said suits.* And that a vote at a meeting of citizens, called
under the New Hampshire statute^ authorizing the mayor
and aldermen to call a meeting on the written request of one
hundred legal voters, was merely advisory and did not control
the action of the city council.'
§ 492. (c) Quorum and votes. — Unless there be some spe-
cial provision by charter or law to the contrary, the common-
law rule as to quorums and majorities of bodies of definite
number obtains with reference to city councils. That is to
say, a majority of the whole number must be present to con-
stitute a legal quorum; and a majority of that quorum is
necessary to do any valid act.' So where a city charter does
1 Peck V. City of Eochester, 3 N. Y. » N. H. Gen. Laws, ch. 46, § la
SupL 873. SKelley v. Kennard, 60 N. H. 1.
2 Comp. St Neb., ch, 13, § 20. ' Regents &c. v. WilJiams. 9 Gill &
'Martin u- State (Neb.), 86 N. W. Johns. (Md.) 365; In re Willcocks, 7
Eep. 554, Maxwell, J., dissenting. Cow. (N. Y.) 403 : Buell v. BuckinK-
* Dorchester v. Youngman, 60 N. ham (1864), 16 Iowa, 384; Barnert v.
H.385. - Paterson, 48 N. J. Law, 395. See, also.
§ 492.]
ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS..
493
not prescribe the number of votes necessary to an election of
a presiding oiScer by the council, the votes of a majority of a
quorum elect.^ If the charter or statute contains no pro-
vision making a less or greater number than a majority of the
members a quorum, then the council has no power to declare
by ordinance that a number less or greater than the majority
shall constitute a quorum. The common-law rule must hold
unless superseded by the express provision of a statute or the
charter.^ If more than a quorum be present, and a majority
of the quorum vote in favor of a given measure, but not a
majority of those present, some members refraining from
voting at all, the preponderance of authority seems to be that
such vote is sufficient, although there are decisions to the con-
trary. So in Indiana it has been held that a resolution may
be legally adopted by the vote of three of the six members
of a city council, where the other three are present but re-
fuse to vote, as the vote of the majority of the quorum present
is effective.' In that case it is said : — *' If there is a sufficient
quorum present, a majority of those voting is sufficient." *
the chapter on Public Boards,
supra.
1 State V. Farr. 47 N. J. Law, 308.
^Heiskell v. Mayor &c. of Balti-
more, 65 Md. 125. In this case the
council declared two-thirds of the
members elected to be necessary for
a quorum, although there was no
provision of statute or charter on the
subject. It was decided that the or-
dinance was void on the ground
stated. See, also, Blackett v. Bliz-
zard, 9 Barn. & C. Sol"; Barnert v.
Paterson, 48 N. J. Law, 395.
s Rushville Gas Co. v. City of Eush-
ville, 121 Ind. 206 ; S. C, 23 N. E. Rep.
73. See §g 157, 288, 289, supra.
«Willcock remarks to the same
effect:— "After an election has been
properly proposed, whoever has a
majority of those who vote, the as-
sembly being suflScient, is elected,
although a majority of the entire
assembly altogether abstain from
voting, because their presence suf-
fices to constitute the elective body,
and if they neglect to vote it is their
own fault, and shall not invalidate
the act of the others, but be con-
strued as an assent to the determina-
tion of the majority of those who do
•vote." Willcock, Munic. Corp., part I,
§ 546. " Those who are present, and
who help to make up the quorum, are
expected to vote on every question,
and their presence alone is enough to
make the vote decisive and binding,
whether they actually vote or not
The objects of legislation cannot be
defeated by the refusal of any one to
vote when present If eighteen are
present and nine vote, all in the
affirmative, the measure ia carried,
the refusal of the other nine to vote
being construed as a vote in tho
affil^mative so far as any construction
is necessary.'' Horr. & Bemis on Mu-
nicipal Police Ordinances, § 48. See,
also. State v. Green, 37 Ohio St 227 ;
Launtz y. People, 113 111 137 ; County
494 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 493.
§ 493. (d) The same subject continued. — In a recent Ten-
nessee case, however, the contrary doctrine has been sus-
tained." In that case the aldermen of the city of Knoxville,
nine in number, and the mayor, constituted a board, the ma-
^jority of which had the power to elect a certain city oflBcial.
The mayor had no vote except in case of a tie vote among
the aldermen, in which case his vote was final. Eight alder-
men were present — a quorum undsr the statute — of whom
four voted for one Lawrence, three for another candidate,
and one cast a blank ballot. The mayor declared Lawrence
elected. The court reversed this decision, distinguishing be-
tween elections by an indefinite and a definite body of voters,
and holding that in the latter case the validity of the act de-
pends upon the concurrent votes of a majority of those pres-
ent. In the opinion delivered it was said: — "It appears
. . . that the rule is settled that a majority of a definite
body present and acting must vote for a candidate in order
to elect him, and that it is not sufficient that he receive a
plurality of votes cast, or a majority if blank ballots are ex-
cluded. His claim must not depend upon the negative char-
acter of the opposition, but upon the affirmative strength of
his own vote; that it is not sufficient that a majority were
not cast against him, to be elected. The majority must be
cast for him." With reference to the blank vote cast, and the
contention that.it should not, count at all, and that therefore
only seven ballots were cast, and a majority, four, elected
Lawrence, the court said: — "It is true that the blank vote
cannot be, in the technical sense, a ballot, but it is nevertheless
an act of negation, — affirmative in showing that another voter
acted, negative in determining the majority. It was one of
eight attempted to be cast with the purpose of not supporting
complainant, and is only to be counted in showing that he did
not get a majority, just as would have resulted had it been
an illegal vote, as being for two candidates or otherwise." '"
of Cass V. Johnston, 95 U. S. 369 ; St ' Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn.
Joseph Tp. V. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644; 58; s. c, 13 S. W. Rep. 422.
State V. Remick, 37 Mo. 370 ; Everett ^ Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn.
V. Smith, 23 Minn. 58; Oldknow v. 53; S. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 422. From
Wainwright, 2 BmT. 1017; King v. this view of the case, however, the
Bellringer, 4 Term R 810 ; Inhabit- chief justice dissented, following the
ants V. Steams, 21 Pick. 148. rule as stated in the preceding sec-
§ 493.] OllDINANCES AND BT-LAWS. 495
Where the law expressly requires a certain proportion of
votes in order to pass a measure, it cannot be reconsidered by
a less proportion.' There are very frequently special provis-
ions in the charter or in the statutes prescribing a certain
proportion of votes in order to pass any measure. These re-
quirements must be strictly observed. So, where the charter
of Hoboken provided that if, after the veto of an ordinance
by the mayor, two-thirds of the members of the common
council elected should pass the same, it should take effect as
a law, and under the charter eight members were elected, one
of whom died, it was held that it required the votes of six
members to pass an ordinance over the mayor's veto.'* Under
the Kansas statute giving a casting vote to the mayor when
the council is equally divided, and elsewhere saying that he
shall appoint by and with the assent of the council, on the
question of the confirmation of an appointment he has the
casting vote.' And under the IS'ebraska statutes* applying to
cities of the second class, of less than five thousand popula-
tion, and providing that " to pass or adopt any by-law, ordi-
nance, or resolution or order to contract, a concurrence of the
majority of the whole number of members elected to the
council or trustees shall be required;" and providing that
the mayor shall preside at all council meetings and have a
casting vote when the council is equally divided, and none
other, — an ordinance to redistrict the city, voted for by two
members of a council of four and by the mayor, is void.* The
tion, and citing Rushville Gas Co. v. if no other candidate is voted for."
City of Rushville, 121 Ind. 208. To Citing Hendrickson v. Decan, 1 Saxt
this same effect is the language used 577. See, also, §g 156, 157, supra.
in the American and English Ency- ' A resolution of a village council,
clopsedia of Law, vol. VI, p. 331 : — to adopt ■which the charter requh-es
" The only way to defeat the election a two-thirds vote, cannot be recon-
of a candidate at an election where sidered by a majority less than two-
the number of electors is indefinite, thirds. Whitney v. Village of Hud-
, or where the law does not require a son (Mich.), 87 N. W. Rep. 184 See
majority of all the members of a § 297 et seq. and § 366 et seq., supra,
body having a definite number, as ^ state v. City of Hoboken (N. J.),
opposed to a majority of those voting, 18 AtL Rep. 685.
is by voting for another candidate ; ' Carroll v. Wall, 35 Kan. 36.
and the fact that a majority enters a * Comp. St Neb. 1885, ch. 14, ai-t 1,
protest against the minority candi- § 76.
date, voted for at a regularly called » State v. Gray (Neb,, 1888), 86 N. W.
election, will not defeat the election Rep. 577.
496 OEDINANCKS AND BY-LAW8. [§ 494.
Florida Municipal Charter Act provides that a majority of the
members of the council shall be required to form a quorum
for the transaction of business. A rule of proceeding adopted
by a council prescribed that a proposed ordinance might be
passed on its first reading by a majority vote of the members-
present, and then placed on a second reading by a like vote,
and if passed on its second reading might then be read as passed
as a whole on such second reading, but no ordinance should be
put on its third reading at the same meeting at which it was
read the first time except by " unanimous consent of the coun-
cil." It was decided that the phrase quoted means all the
members who may be present at the time the action as to
putting the ordinance on its third reading is taken, whether
a bare quorum or more. It does not require that every mem-
ber of the council shall be present and consent.'
§ 494. (e) Mode of enactment. — The mode of enacting the
ordinance is generally prescribed in the charter or an ordi-
nance, and their requirements should be strictly complied with.
So where the charter prescribes that no by-law shall be passed
unless introduced at a previous meeting, the provision has
been held to be mandatory, and a by-law passed in violation
thereof to be void.* Where, however, a city charter requires
a resolution to lie over " at least four weeks after its introduc-
tion," a resolution introduced on Monday night may be acted
on on the fourth Monday thereafter.' The rules relating to
the passage of by-laws must be construed with reference to
the other provisions on the subject. Thus where a clause in
the charter of the city of Minneapolis provided that no or-
dinance should be passed at the same session at which it was
introduced except by the unanimous consent of all the mem-
bers of the council present, it was decided that this provision
did not require a unanimous vote upon the final passage of the
ordinance, bdt only unanimous consent that it be put to a
1 Atkins V. Philips (Fla., 1891), 8 So. was changed and the ordinance was
Bep. 439. passed. The court held that the or-
2 State V. Bergen, 33 N. J. Law, 39, dinance was void, as the name of the
in which case an ordinance for open- commissioner who was substituted
ing a street was introduced at one should have been laid over to a sub-
meeting, and at the next meeting the sequent met'ting.
name of one of the comm-ssioners ' Wright v. Forrestal, 65 Wis. 341.
§ 494.]
OKDINAUOES AND BY-LAWS.
497
vote for its passage, since the same section further provided
that all ordinances should be passed by an aflBrmative vote of
a majority of all the members, etc.* The charter frequently
prescribes that the ayes and noes shall be called and published
whenever the council votes on an improvement requiring a
tax, or on some similar subject. Such a provision has been
held in New York to be merely directory.^ And so although
the code of Iowa requires the yeas and nays to be taken and
recorded on the passage of an ordinance, it has been consid-
ered immaterial that the nays do not appear to have been
called where only five members of a council composed of eight
were shown by. the record to have been present, all of whom
voted in the affirmative.' In "Wisconsin it has been held that
this requirement has no application to motions to adjourn.'
But in many States the provision has been held mandatory,
and ordinances passed without due observance of the require-
ment are considered void.^ When such a provision is consid-
1 State V. Priester (Minn.), 45 N. W.
Rep. 713.
2 Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 9,
24, 29 (1844). It is to be noted that in
this case Mr. Justice Bronson dis-
sented, and the case was subsequently
reversed on other grounds in 3 Denio,
333. Mr. Justice Bronson's argument
against the decision of the other
judges is as follows : — "It is well
known that men acting in a body, es-
pecially when under the cover of cor-
porate privileges, will often do what
no one of them would be willing to
do if acting alone and upon his indi-
vidual responsibility. And they will
sometimes say aye, or permit a matter
to pass sub silentio, when they would
not venture to record their names in
favor of the measure. To guard
against such evils and protect the cit-
izens against the imposition of un-
necessary burdens, it was provided
that the ayes and noes should be
called and published whenever a vote
of the common council should be
taken on any proposed improvement
involving a tax or assessment upon
32
the citizens. The language is imper-
ative— the ayes and noes shall be
called when the particular mode in
which the corporation is to act is spe-
cially declared by its charter. I think
it can only act in the prescribed
forms. The contrary doctrine wants
the sanction of legal authority, and
is fraught with the most dangerous
consequences. It would place cor-
porations above the laws, and there
is reason tO fear that they would soon
become an intolerable nuisance." See,
also, Elmehdorf v. Mayor &c. of
New York, 35 Wend. 693 ; In, re
Mount Morris, Square, 3 Hill, 20; St.
Louis V. Foster, 52 Mo. 513 ; Indian-
apolis V. Jones, 29 Iowa, 283 ; § 295,
supra.
3 Incorporated Town of Bayard v.
Baker (Iowa), 40 N. W. Rep. 818.
* Green Bay v. Brauns, 50 Wis. 204
6 Cutler V. RussellviUe, 40 Ark. 105 ;
Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich.
104; Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90;
Tracy v. People, 6 Colo. 151 ; Rich v.
Chicago, 59 111. 386.
498 OEDINANOES AND BT-LAWS. [§ 495.
eted mandatory the proceeding must be entered on the jour-
nal or other record of the meeting, and the regularity of the
vote can be evidenced from no other source.^
§ 495. (f) The same subject continued. — These rules can
generally be suspended by a unanimous vote of the council
or by a vote of a large proportion of that body. By such sus-
pension the usual formalities of enactments are dispensed with
and the ordinance is passed more> speedily than the ordinary
procedure would allow. A statutory requirement that all
ordinances of a permanent nature shall be fully and distinctly
read on three different days unless three-fourths of the mem-
bers elected dispense with the rule is mandatory ; and where
the rule was dispensed with as to several of such ordinances
upon one and the same vote, which were thereupon passed by
a single vote, it was held to be a violation of the provision, the
latter being construed to require a separate suspension as to
each ordinance.'' Such suspension of the rules is sometimes
■presumed jorima facie to be regular from the record showing
that the rules were suspended without specifying the pro-
cedure of suspension.. So when it was provided by the charter
of a city that " no ordinance shall be passed until it shall have
been read in such board [of aldermen] at two several meet-
ings," etc., " unless this provision be suspended by a vote of
all members," etc., and the record showed that certain ordi-
nances were introduced " which were read and ordered to be
read a second time," etc., " the second reading being dispensed
with," etc., it was decided that the second reading was prop-
erly shown to be dispensed with, although it was not dis-
pensed with at a subsequent meeting, and although the record
of the subsequent meeting did not show that the second read-
ing had been dispensed with.' Statutory provisions as to pas-
1 Rich V. Chicago, 59 111. 286 ; Tracy ent days unless three-fourths of the
V. People, 6 Cola 151 ;■ Inre Carlton council vote to " dispense " with the
Street, 16 Hun (N. Y.), 497. See § 295, rules, an ordinatice is valid if passed
supra. by a three-fourths vote on a motion
2 Campbell tt City of Cincinnati to " suspend " the rules, there being
(Ohio, 1893), 31 N. E. Rep. 606. no substantial difference in the terme.
3 Nevin v. Roach (Ky*), 5 S. W. Rep. Incorporated Town of Bayard v.
546. And it is also held in Iowa that Baker (Iowa), 40 N. W. Rep. 818, con-
under a statute providing that an or- struing Code of Iowa, § 483.
dinance shall be read on three differ-
§ 496.] OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. 499
sage, where mere fbrmalities, are construed as directory when
the language of t^e provision permits.' Provision is often
made that no ordinance shall be passed without a certain pub-
lication beforehand. This provision has been held in many
cases to be mandatory, and an ordinance passed without such
prescribed publication is void.* The formalities of the passage
of an ordinance must be completed before the ordinance takes
effect.'
§ 496. (g) The signing of the ordinance. — The charter or
statute frequently contains provisions that every ordinance
must be signed by the mayor or other presiding oflBcer.
Whether in such a case the signature of the mayor is essential
to the validity of the ordinance or not depends chiefly upon
the language of the charter or act. If the charter or act make
the signature essential, the ordinance is void if unsigned; if
on the other hand the charter does not make the signature of
the presiding officer an essential condition precedent to the
validity of the ordinance, the provision has frequently been
regarded as directory. Thus an ordinance passed by the com-
mon council of the city of East Portland could not take effect
until approved by the mayor, and all proceedings had under
1 So where both houses adjourn on recammended its passage, instead of
the day a bill is presented to the preparing a new ordinance. Bara-
mayor, and the bill is signed by the brick v. Campbell (1890), 37 Ma App.
mayor, and filed in the city register's 460.
oflSce, it becomes a valid ordinance, ^ jjq when a statute prescribes that
though it is not returned to the house no assessment resolution shall be
in which it originated, as required by passed without previous publication
article 3, section 23, of the charter ; as for three days, a resolution passed
there is no provision in the charter without such publication is void,
which prescribes that no bill shall be- Addison Smith, In re, 52 N. Y. 526 ;
come an ordinance which shall not be In re PhiUips, 60 N. Y. 16; State v.
returned to the house in which it orig- Hoboken, 38 N. J. Law, 110 ; State v.
inated. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. Smith, 22 Minn. 218.
V. Hunt, 100 Mo. 22 ; s. c, 13 S. W. 3 if any essential step in the execu-
Eep. 98. And an ordinance of the tion of a new ordinance takes place
city of St Louis providing for street before it" becomes operative, no
improvement is not invalid because charge made in inmtum against a
the board of public improvements, property owner by virtue of the pro-
after submitting it to the municipal ceeding thereunder acquires any va-
assembly, by whom it was returned lidity. Keane v. Gushing, 15 Mo. App.
amended, adopted it as amended, and 96.
500 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 497.
such ordinance before its approval were held to be nullities.'
It has also been decided that under a city charter requiring
the mayor to " approve " of every vote, resolution, order, etc.,
of the common council in order to render it operative, the
approval must be in writing, and a resolution will not take
effect without the mayor's written approval, although it has
never been customary for him to express his approval affirm-
atively in writing of any action of the common council ex-
cept general ordinances." ♦
§ 497. (h) The same subject continued. — There are many
cases, however, where such a provision has been held direct-
ory only, and an ordinance otherwise legally passed has been
sustained although unsigned. An ordinance of a municipal
corporation that was actually passed by the council in the ex-
ercise of its authority, and in accordance with all legal require-
ments, and was duly promulgated and passed into execution,
was held in Louisiana not invalid because it was not signed
by the mayor or president of the council.' And a legislative
provision requiring the presiding officer of a municipal council
to sign all ordinances has been considered in the same State
directory merely.^ If the ordinance is signed by the proper
person, even although not expressly in the proper capacity,
1 Ladd V. City of East Portland appear that they were ever presented
(Or.), 33 Pac. Eep. 533. For another to him,
instaBce where signature is made es- 2 New York &c. R. Co. v. City of
sential by charter, see State v. Dis- Waterbury, 55 Conn. 19; s. C, 10
trict Court, 41 Mina 518; S. C, 43 AtL Rep. 162. To the same point,
N. W. Rep. 38.^ The charter of the Whitney v. City of Port Hmon
city of South St. Paul, Minn. (Sp. (Mich.), 50 N. W. Rep. 316. See, also.
Laws, 1887, ch. 1), provides that all Strikers. Kelly, 7 Hill, 9; Elmendorf
ordinances and resolutions shall, be- v. Mayor &o. of N. Y., 35 Wend. 693 ;
fore they take effect, be presented to Blanchard v. Bissell (1860), 11 Ohio
the mayor, and, if he approves St 96; In re Breaux's Bridge, 30
thereof, he shall sign the same; and La. Ann. 1105.
such as he shall not sign he shall re- 3 jicKenzie «. Wooley, 39, La. Ann.
turn to the common council. A res- 914 ; S. c,, 3 So. Rep. 138.
olution so returned can be passed by * Opelousas v. Andrus, 37 La. Ann.
a two-thirds vote of the council. It 699. In accordance with this prin-
was decided that resolutions of the ciple an ordinance, published in a
council in proceedings to assess real newspaper, which was authenticated
estate for street improvements were thus : — " In board of trustees finally
of DO effect where not approved and passed this 33d day of January, 1879.
signed by the mayor, and it did not J. H., President of the Board of
§ 498.]
0EDINAN0E8 AND BY-LAWS.
601
the validity of the ordinance will be sustained.' And where
a city ordinance authorized a suit for a penalty for carrying
concealed weapons on the written report ol the chief of po-
lice, a report signed with the chief's name by a subordinate is
considered sufficient.* If the signature is made essential, how-
ever, the defect is vital and cannot be cured by amendment.'
§498. (i) Publication of the ordinance — When mandjt-
tory. — An ordinance, bein^ a law, must be published in some
way in order to give notice to those affected thereby of its
existence. It is generally required by law that the ordinance
should be published, and the statutory or charter regulations
on this point should be closely followed in order to avoid any
question as to the validity of the ordinance. When there
was no requirement as to the publication of an ordinance of
an Alabama town except a constitutional provision that no
person should be punished but by virtue of a law established
and promulgated prior to the offense and legally applied, a
publication of seven days was held sufficient in the absence of
Trustees of the City of N. Attest : J.
N. W., Clerk,"— and the copy of
which as published contained the fol-
lowing addition : — " Published by
order of the board. J. N. W., Clerk,"
was decided in a California case to be
sufficiently authenticated. City of
Napa V. Easterby, 76 Cal. 322; S. G,
18 Pac. Eep. 253. To this eflEect see,
also. State v. Henderson, 38 Ohio St
644 ; Wain v. Philadelphia, 99 Pa. St
330; Kepner v. Commonwealth, 40
Pa. St 124; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 CaL
341; Creighton v. Manson, 37 Cal.
613 ; State v. Jersey City, 30 N. J.
Law, 93 ; State v. Hudson, 5 Dutch.
(N. J.) 475 ; Day v. Jersey City, 19
N. J. Eq. 412 ; Martindale v. Palmer
(1876), 53 Ind. 411.
iThus where Revised Statutes of
Missouri, 1879, section 4948, pro-
vided that no bill should become
an ordinance until signed by the
president of the board of aldermen
and the mayor, and section 4965 pro-
vided that the mayor should preside
at all meetings of the board of alder-
men, it was decided that an ordi-
nance which had been signed by the
mayor as such, and not by him as ex
officio president of the board of al-
dermen, was valid. Becker v. City
of Washington, 94 Mo. 375 ; s. C, 7
S. W. Rep. 391. A constitutional
provision that certain ordinances
shall obtain the concurrent approval
of the board of health is satislied by
such approval although it was at first
refused. Darcantel v. People's S. &
R Co. (La., 1892), 11 So. Rep. 839.
2 St Louis V. Vert, 84 Mo. 204.
s As where under the Indiana stat-
ute requiring ordinances to be signed
by the presiding officer, and attested
by the clerk, and to be recorded, the
defects cannot be remedied by a mo-
tion. Bills V. City of Goshen, 117
Ind. 221 ; S. C, 20 N. E. Rep. 115.
502 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 499.
proof of insufficiency of such publication. The court said : —
"The matter therefore is vested in the discretion of the
municipal governm«nt but not an arbitrary discretion. A
reasonable opportunity must be given to the public within the
corporate limits to be informed as to the ordinances they are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for their
violation." ' In general when the charter or general law re-
quires publication, it must be made according to the require-
ment, else the ordinance will bef void and no penalty can be
enforced under it.^ Thus under a provision in the general
town incorporation laws of Dakota which provided that
" every by-law, ordinance or regulation, unless in case of
emergency, shall be published in a newspaper in said town, if
one be printed therein, or posted in five public places, at least
ten days before the same shall take effect," a by-law passed
by the town trustees, but never published or posted, in a case
where no emergency is alleged or shown, was considered to
be of no force or effect, even as to such persons as had notice
of its passage by the trustees.'
§ 499. (j) The same subject continued — When directory.
But under a city charter providing that all ordinances passed
by the city council within thirty days after they become laws
should be published, but that the failure to publish should
not render void or affect the validity of any such ordinance,
unless delay raig'ht cause the ordinance to act retrospectively
on the rights of individuals, it was held in Missouri that an
ordinance went into effect from the date of passage and be-
came a law without publication.* And it has been decided in
1 Pitts V. Opelika, 79 Ala. 537. curring a debt for publication does
2 Meyer v. Fromm, 108 Ind. 208; not invalidate the ordinance. Eim-
Napa V. Easterby, 61 Cal. 509 ; Wain ble v. City of Peoria (111., 1893), 39 N.
«. Philadelphia, 99 Pa. St 330 ; Hig- E. Rep. 723.
ley V. Bunce, 10 Conn. 667 ; Barnert * Sweitzer v. Liberty, 88 Mo. 309.
V. Newark, 28 la 63; Schwartz v. So, also, under St Mass. 1850, ch. 184,
Oshkosh, 55 Wis. 490. § 20, an ordinance of the city of Lynn
' CTHare v. Town of Park Eiver need not be published, as a condition
(N. D., 1891), 47 N. W. Rep. 8S0; Na- precedent to its validity. It takes
tional Bank of Commerce v. Town effect upon its passage, if no time
of Orenada, 44 Fed. Rep. 263. The therein is limited or named. Corn-
mere factthat the city oflScials may monwealth v. McCafferty, 145 Mass.
have exceeded their authority in in- 384; s. a, 14 N. £, Rep. 451.
§ 500.] OEDINAITOES AND BY-LAWS. 603
Massachusetts that a requirement by ordinance that city or-
dinances shall be published two weeks successively in three
daily newspapers published in the city was directory; that it
contemplated publication after the enactment of the ordinance,
and that compliance with it was not a condition precedent to
the validity of the ordinance. The ordinance in question
prohibited any one from delivering an address on the Boston
common without permission of a committee of the common
council. The court, however, did not support their decision
sustaining the validity of the ordinance on this ground alone,
holding that the ordinance was a re-enactment or continuance
of an older ordinance, and that in such cases publication was
under the Massachusetts laws unnecessary .^
§ 500. (k) The same subject continued — Amendments and
re-enactments. — In considering the question whether publi-
cation is requisite to the validity of an ordinance, the decision
must generally be gathered from the language of the legisla-
tion relating to that subject.* As the object of publication is
of course to give notice of the ordinance to those who must
obey it, the importance of publication varies according to the
nature of the ordinance. Thus, publication of a police ordi-
nance restricting personal liberty should be strictly carried out,
while an administrative ordinance, even though directed to be
published, has been held valid in 'New Jersey before comple-
tion of the publication required by law.' In a recent Louisi-
1 Commonwealth v. Davis (1886), the last provision applied as well to
140 Mass. 485, 487. by-laws and ordinances " of a gen-
- So where section 25 of the Colo- eral or permanent nature "as to those
rado act concerning towns and cities imposing a fine, etc. National Bank of
provides that " all by-laws of a gen- Commerce v. Town of Grenada (1890),
eral or permanent nature, and those 44 Fed. Eep. 263, 266. And it was
imposing any fine, penalty or forfeit- further stated by Philips, J., quoting
nre, shall be published, . . . and from the opinion in Clark v. Janes-
it shall b*i deemed a sufficient de- ville, 10 Wis. 178, that " the object of
fcnse to any suit or prosecution for such provision for publication was
such fine, penalty or foi-feiture to the protection of the people by pre-
show that no such publication was venting their rights and interests
made," and enacts that "such by- frotti being aifected by laws which
laws and ordinances* shall not take they have no means of knowing."
effect and be in force until the ex- ' Stuhr v. Hoboken, 47 N. J. Law,
piration of five days after they have 148. In this case the city charter
been published," it was decided that forbade any change in the salaries of
504
ORDINANCES AND BT-LAWS.
[§ 501.
ana case it was decided that an ordinance ordering a vote of
the tax-payers on the question of a special tax, though supple-
mented by an amendment after it is advertised, would not be
vitiated thereby, provided the amendment did not materially
affect its essential parts.* Where an ordinance is a mere re-
enactment or combination of an older ordinance it is not nec-
essary, unless expressly required by law, that it should be re-
published.^
*
§ 501. (1) Manner of publication. — In considering the mode
of publication requisite in any particular case, reference must
be made to the general principles governing the interpretation
of statutes, since the manner of publication is almost always
regulated by legislation. "When alternative modes of publica-
tion are contemplated by the statute, and it is expressly pro-
vided that election between these modes must be made by the
corporation, an ordinance published by order of the town
clerk without election by the council as to the mode of publi-
cation is void.' But when the law did not expressly enjoin
municipal officers during their terms
of office ; and also required all ordi-
nances to be published twenty days
before taking eflfect An ordinance
was passed changing the salary of
one of the officers. After its enact-
ment but before the expiration of the
twenty days of publication a new in-
cumbent was elected. It was held that
he was entitled to the increased sal-
ary provided by the ordinance, and
that within the intent of the charter
the ordinance took effect as soon as
passed. This construction would not
perhaps be given in the case of a
police ordinance restricting personal
rights.
• McKenzie v. Wooley (La.), 3 So.
Rep. 128. This rule is sometimes ab-
rogated by statutory requirements, as
where in Indiana the courts declared
that if the defects may be supplied
by supplemental ordinance, the latter
must be published before it can take
efEect, the ordinance imposing a pen-
alty for its ' violation, and Bevised
Statutes of Indiana, 1881, section 3100,
requiring such a publication of every
penal by-law. Bills v. City of Goshen
(1888), 117 Ind. 221, 227; s. a, 20 N.
E. Rep. 115.
2 Commonwealth v. Davis (1886),
140 Mass. 485 ; Ex parte Bedell (1886),
20 Mo. App. 125, 130; St. Louis v.
Alexander, 23 Mo. 483, 509 ; St. Louis
V. Foster (1873), 53 Mo. 513; City of
Cape Girardeau v. Riler, 52 Mo. 524 ;
State V. Heidom, 74 Mo. 410. But
see, contra, Emporia v. Norton, 16
Kan. 236.
8 Higley v. Bunce (1835), 10 Conn.
485 ; s. c., 10 Conn. 567. This was an
ordinance of the town of Canaan.
The statute directed that publication
should be made in a newspaper
printed in the town, or in the town
nearest to such town in which a
newspaper was printed, or in some
other newspaper generally circulated
in the town where such by-law was
§ 502.] OEDINAITCES AND BY-LAWS. 505
upon the council the duty of designating the newspaper but
was silent upon that point, it was concluded in New York that
the clerk might properly designate the newspaper.' In Cali-
fornia the charter of a city required that ordinances be pub-
lished. An ordinance containing an order directing that the
ordinance be published once in a city newspaper, which publi-
cation was duly made, was held to be sufficiently published.^
§ 502. (m) The same subject continned. — Under the con-
stitution of Illinois, which provides that " all official writings
and the executive, legislative and judicial proceedings shall
be published in no other than the English language," it was
decided that the city of Chicago could not publish its ordi-
nances at the public expense in a German newspaper.' And
according to a recent decision in New Jersey, under a statu-
tory requirement that city ordinances shall be published in a
German newspaper, they must, in the absence of legislative
direction to the contrary, be printed in the English language,
since a statute or ordinance, as there declared, has no legal
existence except in the language in which it is passed.^ In
Missouri it was held, where the charter provided that all mu-
nicipal ordinances should be published in some newspaper pub-
lished in the city, that the provision was sufficiently complied
with by distributing printed copies of the ordinances with the
copies of a newspaper, and this although the copies were not
printed in the city.' It is not necessary that the publication
should be in a newspaper devoted entirely to current general
made, as the town should direct The ments " was held to have no applica-
ordinance in question was published tion to city ordinances. City of Pitts-
in a newspaper printed in a town burg v. Reynolds (Kan., 1893), 29 Pac.
nearest to Canaan, and which cir- Eep. 757.
culated generally in Canaan, but ' City of Chicago v. McCoy (IlL),
such publication was made by order 26 N. E. Rep. 363, Craig, J., dissent-
of the town clerk wholly without di- ing.
rection from the council. The court * "The publication of the transla-
held that the town council alone tion may be regarded as a proper ex-
could elect in what newspaper pub- planatory adjunct of the English
lication should be made. copy, but cannot be accepted as a
1 Zn re Durkin, 10 Hun, 269. legal substitute for it." State w City
2 Ik re Guerrero (1886), 69 Cal. 88, of Orange (N. J.), 22 Atl. Rep. 1004.
93. A statute relating to the print- 5 Ex parte Bedell, 20 Mo, App. 125,
ing of "legal notices and advertise- 180(1886).
§06 OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 503.
news. Newspapers devoted exclusively to legal news have
been held proper vehicles for the publication of ordinances.^
If publication in a newspaper printed and published in the
city is required, it is suificient if the newspaper be edited and
issued in the city, although its type and press work be done
elsewhere." Under a law requiring the publication of the or-
dinances of a city as an essential of their validity, maps and
books referred to in such ordinances need not be published.'
Where it is prescribed that the*publication shall be in a paper
of general circulation, it is not considered necessary in Illinois
that it be a local paper. Publication in a newspaper issued in
a city near at hand, and circulating generally in the corpora-
tion, is sufficient.*
§ 503. (n) Time andproof of publication. — The provisions
as to time and proof of publication are generally construed
with liberality by the courts. So where publication for one
week is required, a single insertion in a weekly newspaper is
sufficient." Where the law required that an ordinance be pub-
lished for twenty days before taking effect, it was decided in
New Jersey that the ordinance would take effect on the
twenty-first day after the first publication, and that it was
not necessary that twenty days should intervene between the
first and last publication.* Where publication for three weeks
was required in Indiana, the court considered publication for
twenty-one days to be necessary, and that three insertions in
a weekly paper, covering a period of fifteen days, did not suf-
fice.' In a California case it was decided that an ordinance
which provided for its publication for five successive days in
a daily newspaper was properly published by publication for
1 Kerr v. Hitt, 75 IlL 51 ; Kellogg if the newspaper had no general cir-
V. Corrico, 47 Mo. 157. See these culation in the corporation, such
cases for discussion of meaning of publication would be insufficient,
the term " newspaper " in this con- Haskell v. Bartlett, 34 Cal. 281.
nection. They hold that any period- ' State v. Hardy, 7 Neb. !J77 ; Com-
ical purveying news of interest to monwealth v. Mathews, 123 Mass.
any considerable class will suffice. 60 ; Hoboken v. Gear, 27 N. J. Law,
2 Boyer v. Hoboken, 44 N. J. Law, 265.
131. 6 Hoboken v. Gtear (1859), 27 N. J.
»Napa V. Easterby (Cal.), 18 Pac. Law, 265.
Rep. 253. '• Loughridge v. Huiftington (1877),
« Tisdale v. Minonk, 46 111. 9. But 66 Ind. 252, 260.
§ 503.] OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 507
five successive week-days, although a Sunday intervened on
which there was no issue of the paper .^ As to the proof of
publication of ordinances, the cases hold that where there is
prima faoie evidence of such publication the ordinance will
be sustained in the absence of rebutting evidence. So where
an ordinance was certijBed by the recorder as having been
passed by the council on a given day, and he testified that it
was published in a certain newspaper on a day named, the
publication was considered in an Indiana case sufficiently ;
proved, though the newspaper was not shown to be of a gen-
eral circulation in the town, as required by statute ; as that
fact would, it was said, be presumed, it being the officer's
duty to select such a newspaper.^ And likewise when the
record of an ordinance had a note appended thereto, stating;
among other things, that the ordinance was duly published,
and the date of its publication, the ordinance was decided to
be valid, unless it was shown that said ordinance was not pub-
lished, and the burden of such proof was held to rest on the
defendant.' Also where the county government act of Cali-
fornia provided that an ordinance of the board of supervisors
should be published once a week in some newspaper published
in the county, and that an order entered in the minutes should
he prima faoie proof that it had been duly published, it was
held that the statute did not require that an order for the
publication of an ordinance should be made; but if such order
was made, and a certain paper designated therein, the fact
i£'a;i)arfeFiske(1887), 73Cal. 125; sive days, . . . and shall take
s. C, 13 Pac. Eep. 310. So also in effect in ten days after their enact-
Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 340. In mept: provided, however, that the
Ohio publication in a newspaper common council may iix and pi-e-
printed only on Sunday suffices, scribe a different period, and that no
Hastings v. Columbus, 42 Ohio St ordinance shall take effect before
585. An ordinance of the city of one publication thereof." It was held
Detroit provided that it should take that the ordinance was in force at the
immediate effect, and was approved time of the act complained of. Peo-
August 2, 1889. The violation thereof pie v. Keir (Mich., 1890), 43 N. W.
by defendant occurred August 10, Eep. 1039.
1889. The provisions of the city '^ Incorporated Town of Bayard v.
charter relative to the publication of Baker (1889), 40 N. W. Rep. 818.
ordinances, and the time of their 3 Downing v. City of Miltonvale
taking effect, are that "all ordinances (Kan.), 14 Pac. Kep. 281.
shall be published for three sucoes-
508 OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 504.
that the ordinance was published in another paper in the
county did not invalidate it.*
§ 504. (o) Title of the ordinance.— The charter or the
general law often prescribes that an ordinance shall have
only one subject and that such subject shall be clearly ox-
pressed in the title of the ordinance. Provisions such as
these are commonly construed with considerable liberality.
So an ordinance which providad both for the grading and
paving of an alley was not considered invalid under the pro-
vision of the charter of the city of St. Louis, relating to the
passage of ordinances, which prohibited a bill from containing
more than one subject, which should be clearly expressed in
its title.^ And a section providing for the giving of danger
signals, and for the equipment of railroad cars, was held in
Missouri to be embraced in the title of an ordinance entitled
" An ordinance to regulate the speed within the city limits of
cars and locomotives propelled by steam." ' And where the
board of trustees of a city in California made an order direct-
ing certain work to be done on one of the streets, the lan-
guage used being, " The board order," etc., it was held, under
■ the charter of the city, which provided that the enacting
6lause of ordinances should be, ," The board of trustees of the
city of l^^. do hereby ordain as follows," and a statutory pro-
vision that the board might pass " by,-laws, resolutions and
ordinances," — the order referred to was valid, not being an
ordinance, and the charter provision concerning the enacting
clause being merely directory.* Bat on the contrary, under
the "Washington statute, which authorized the council of a
city, by ordinance, to submit to the voters a plan for the con-
struction of water, light and sewerage systems, "either or
both," it was decided that an ordinance on these subjects was
clearly authorized to be either single, double or triple ; and
1 County of San Luis Obispo v. * Weber v. Johnson, 37 Mo. App.
Hendricks, 71 Cal. 343; s. C, 11 Pac. 601.
Rep. 683. See, also, as to proof of ' Bergman v. St. Louis && R R.
, ordinances, Atchison v. King, 9 Co. (Mo.), 1 S. W. Rep. 384
Kan. 550; Prell v. McDonald (1871), < City of Napa u Easterby (Cal),
7 Kan. 436 ; Moss v. Oakland, 88 111. 18 Pac. Rep. 35a
109 ; Block v. Jacksonville (1865), 36
lU. 801.
§ 505.] OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. 509
hence it suspended the restriction imposed by the city charter
of Seattle, that " no ordinance shall contain more than one
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." ^ Also
an ordinance, the title of which was to prohibit animals from
running at large, but which also provided that no person
should keep a dog without paying a tax, and directing the city
marshal to kill dogs running at large whose owners had not
complied with this regulation and making the owner liable to
criminal prosecution for failure to comply therewith, was held
to be void under the provisions of the Kansas statutes, that
no ordinance should contain more than one subject, which
should be clearly expressed in the title.^ And an ordinance
of a city of the second class, whose title and body embraced
the two distinct subjects of extending the limits of the city,
and of appropriating funds to build a bridge, was considered
void under the Kansas statute providing that no ordinance of
such city should contain more than one subject, which should
be clearly expressed in its title ; and this though the latter
clause of the ordinance was of no effect because the council
had no authority to make the appropriation.' An ordinance
entitled " An ordinance controlling the keeping and use of
jacks, stallions and bulls," which prohibits the use of such
animals in public places, was thought in Iowa not to go beyond
the object and scope of its title.*
§ 605. (p) Record of the ordinance.— The same principles
apply in d'isoussing the necessity of recording ordinances that
have been set forth in connection with our treatment of their
signature by the mayor or other presiding ofHcer. If the
charter or other statute makes it essential that the ordinance
should be recorded in order to be valid, it is necessary that it
should be recorded. If, however, the language of the charter
or act, read in connection with the other legislation on the
subject, does not appear to make the recording of the ordi-
nance an essential prerequisite, the provisions relating thereto
1 Tesler v. City of Seattle (Wash.), 8 Missouri Pao. Ry. Co. v. City of
25 Pac. Eep. 1014. Wyandotte (Kan.), 23 Pac. Rep. 950.
2 Stebbins v. Mayer (Kan.), 16 Pac. * Incoi-porated Town of Bayard v.
Rep. 745. Baker, 76 Iowa, 220 ; s. a, 40 N. W.
Rep. 818.
510 OEDINANCES AND BT-LAWS. [§ 505.
are considered as directory only. Accordingly when a city
charter provided that all ordinances should be recorded, within
thirty days after their passage, in a book to be provided for
the purpose, " and to be kept by the mayor " for inspection,
•without charge, of all persons interested, and that they should
not be valid or in force until so recorded, it was decided
that an ordinance recorded in a book provided for the purpose,
and temporarily kept, at the mayor's request, in the city ofiBce
of the court-house, at a short dislJance from his office, because
he had no safe at his office, was valid.^ And when an incor-
porated town was changed into a city, and the statute pre-
scribed that the existing town ordinances should continue
valid, provided that they should be recorded within four
months thereafter, the provision has been considered merely
directory, and the town ordinances have been upheld although
unrecorded.^ But where a city charter required that all ordi-
nances should be recorded, and that no ordinance should be
carried into operation in less than two weeks after the same
should be so recorded, an unrecorded ordinance has been held
to be void.' Apart, however, from the validity of the ordi-
nance, the municipal records of the transactions of the munici-
pal council are the best evidence of those transactions.* It; is
therefore important that accurate and legible record be made
of every legislative act of the municipality. The recording
of an ordinance is, however, a purely ministerial act. It may be
performed by a subordinate or deputy, and a clerical error
will not operate so as to invalidate any ordinance properly
and legally enacted.' The neglect of a ministerial duty is not
deemed fatal to the validity pf municipal proceedings.* What-
ever is said as to the necessity of recording ordinances will
* Beaumont v. City of Wilkesbarre 44 ; Conboy v. Iowa City, 2 Iowa, 90.
(Pa.), 21 Atl. Rep. 888. Acts requiring record to be made of
2 Trustees of Academy v. Erie, 31 ordinances will usually be held dl-
Pa. St. 515 (1858) ; Ameytt Alleghany rectory, and failure to observe will
City, 24 How. 364. not invalidate the ordinance. Na-
' Verona's Appeal, 108 Pa. St 83. tlonal Bank v. Town of Grenada, 41
* Stewart v. Clinton, 79 Mo. 604 ; Fed. Rep. 87. See, also, Terre Haute
Parsonst!. Trustees, 44 Ga. 529; Baker &c. R. Ca v. Voelker, 129 El. 540;
V. Schofield, 58 Ga. 182. Ladd v. City of East Portland, 18 Greg.
6 Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11. Vt 402; 87; Western &c. R. Co. v. Young, 83
Railroad Co. v. Odum, 53 Tex. 343. Ga. 512.
* Stevenson v. Bay City, 26 Mich.
§§ 506, 507.] OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 511
apply equally well to the advisability of recording every reso-
lution or regulation which the council may make. But con-
tractual relations may be created by the mere passage of a
resolution, and will be unaffected by its record or non-record.^
§ 506. Validity in respect of matter — (a) Constitutional-
ity.— The power of a municipal council to enact by-laws being
delegated by the legislature cannot, of course, be more ex-
tensive than the power of the delegating body. Consequently
the by-laws or ordinances enacted by the council must not be
in contravention of the constitution of the United States or
of the State. Hence a by-law impairing the obligation of a
contract is void as being unconstitutional.^ And if an ordi-
nance is accepted, and thereby a contract is created, subse-
quent ordinances cannot impair its obligation.' So an ordi-
nance by which a license tax was imposed on owners of
tug-boats running between New Orleans and the Gulf of Mex-
ico was declared void as being a regulation^ of commerce
between the States.* But a penal ordinance of Chicago, pro-
nouncing steamboats emitting dense smoke to be a nuisance,
is reasonable and not unconstitutional as affecting vessels on
the Chicago river."
§507. (b) The same subject continued. — Likewise ordi-
nances giving the municipal authorities undue power in allow-
ing or withholding licenses to laundries, by which the Chinese
were discriminated against, have been held void as in contra-
vention of the fourteenth amendment.* A city ordinance of
St. Louis affixing a penalty for carrying concealed weapons
was not considered unconstitutional.' And a penalty for vio-
lating a town ordinance has been decided not to be a debt
1 Parr v. Village of Greenbush, 72 * Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. 8.
N. Y. 463. ' 69.
2 Illinois Conference Female Col- ' Harmon v. Chicago, 110 111. 400 ;
lege V. Cooper, 25 111. 148 ; Haywood S. C, 51 Am. Eep. 698.
V. Savannah, 12 Ga. 404; Saving So- 6Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S.
ciety V. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St 175 ; 356 ; In re Tie Loy, 26 Fed. Rep. 611.
Davenport &c. Co. v. Davenport, 13 Ordinances of similar character,
Iowa, 229. where reasonable, have been upheld.
8 People V. Chicago &c Ry. Co., 118 Soon Hing v. Crowley, 118 U. S. 703 ;
111. 113; Kansas City v. Corrigan, 86 Barbier v. Connolly, 118 U. S. 27.
Mo. 67. ' St Louis v. Vest, 84 Mo. 304.
i>12 OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 508.
within the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment
for debt.^ A Minnesota' city ordinance directing a certain
ofBcer to arrest and detain until the extinguishment of a fire
any person refusing to obey his directions was held unconsti-
tutional as depriving the sufferer of his liberty without pro-
cess of law or trial by jury.' And an ordinance of the city of
Shreveport in Louisiana giving to one sect a privilege which
it denied to another was held unconstitutional and void.' But
constitutional provisions securing freedom of religious wor-
ship were not designed to prevent the adoption of reasonable
rules and regulations for the use of streets and public places,
and a member of a religious organization while playing on a
cornet in a street parade and creating no disturbance is an
itinerant musician within the meaning of an ordinance relat-
ing to such persons and is not 'protected by the fact that his
act was done as a matter of religious worship only.^
§508. (c) Consistency with statute and charter. — As a
municipal corporation cannot enact valid laws in contraven-
tion of the constitution of the United States or of the State,
so it cannot enact laws contrary to the statute of the State.
For a legislature to delegate povi^ers which might be used in
hostility to the general laws of the State would be SLfelo de se
that might render all general legislation inoperative within
the limits of the corporation. Thus the ordinances of a city
council imposing upon the city solicitor the duties which are
required by statute to be performed by the receiver of taxes
were held in a recent New Jersey case to be unauthorized and
illegal.' In the same State, under a statute authorizing the
mayor " in his discretion ... to impose a fine not ex-
ceeding twenty dollars " for a certain offense, an ordinance
prescribing a fine of not less than three nor more than twenty
dollars for the same offense was held to be void, as an addi-
tional limitation of the mayor's discretion.' And in general
iHardenbrookv. Townof Ligonier, * Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148
95 Ind. 70, and cases there cited. Mass. 375.
2 Judson V. Reardon, 16 Minn. 431. 5 state v. City of Camden (N. J.), 11
'Shreveport v. Levy, 26 La. Ann. AtL Eep. 137.
671. 6]jaii,jig i,_ Borough of VinelauJ
(N. J., 1892), 29 N. E. Eep. 857.
§ 509.] ORDINANCES AND BY'LAWS. 513
all (Ordinances which irreconcilably conflict either with the
charter or with the State statutes are void.'
§ 509. (d) The same subject continned. — But the by-laws
of a municipal corporation, when authorized by its charter,
have the effect of a special law of the legislature, and super-
sede to a great degree the general law within the territorial
limits of suck corporation.^ This question is discussed in an
able and thorough opinion in a recent Yermont case where
the charter of a village granted to the village certain powers
of licensing eating-houses repugnant to the general statute in
force at the time of passage of the charter. The court said : —
" If the by-law is authorized by the charter it has the eflfect of
a special law of the legislature within the limits of the village
and supersedes the general law on the subject of victualing'
houses therein ; for the charter giving the village power to
pass the by-law inconsistent with and repugnant to the gen-
eral law operated to repeal the gener&,l law within the terri-
torial limits of the village on the principle that provisions of
different statutes which are in conflict with one another can-
not stand together ; and in the absence of anything showing a
different intent on the part of the legislature, general legis-
lation upon a particular subject must give way to later incon-
sistent special legislation upon the same subject." ' In Louis-
1 State V. Georgia Medical Society, bois v. Augusta, Dudley Rep. (Ga.)
38 Ga. 608 ; State v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 30.
574; Wirth i;. Wilmington, 68 N. C. ^viHageofSt. JohnsburyuThomp-
24 ; Flood v. State, 19 Tex. App. 584 ; son, 59 Vt 300 ; McPherson v. Che-
Bohmy u State, 21 Tex. App. 597; banse, 114111. 46; Covington u East
Wood V. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 435 ; St. Louis, 78 111. 548 ; State v. Dwyer,
Cowen r. West Troy, 43 Barb. 48; 31 Minn. 513; States. Clarke, 1 Dutch,
Mayor &c. of New York v. Nichols, 4 54 ; Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504 ;
Hill, 209 ; Mays w Cincinnati, 1 Ohio Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass.
St 368 ; Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio St 439 ; 221.
Carr v. St Louis, 9 Mo. 191 ; Baldwin 3 Village of St Johnsbury v. Thomp-
V. Green, 10 Mo. 410 ; Petersburg v. son, 59 Vt 300 ; citing 1 Dillon on
Metzker, 31 HI. 305; Southport v. Munic. Corp., § 88 ; 4 Kent Com. 466,
Ogden, 28 Conn. 138 ; Andrews v. In- note ; In re Snell, 58 Vt 207 ; State v.
surance Co., 37 Me. 356 ; White v. Morristown, 33 N. J. Law, 57 ; State
Bayonne, 49 N. J. Law, 311; Lozier v. Clarke, 25 N. J. Law, 54; Davies
V. Newark, 48 N. J. Law, 452 ; Volk v. Fairbarn, 3 How. 636 ; State v.
V. Newark, 47 N. J. Law, 117; Cape Clarke, 54 Mo. 17; Mark v. State, 97
Girardeau v. Eiley, 72 Mo. 330; Du- N. Y. 573.
33
514 OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 510.
iana, however, it has recently been decided that a grant of
power conferred by the legislature in the charter of a munici-
pal corporation, to pass and enforce ordinances to suppress
and punish the sale of adulterated drinks, was not recalled by
a subsequent general statute providing for the prosecution
of the same offense throughout the State.^ In many cases it
has been held that this power given by charter can be subse-
quently revoked by the legislature ; and at any rate both stat-
ute and ordinance may stand together if not fatally inconsist^
eht.^
§ 610. (e) Consistency with general penal law. — It would
seem to flow as a necessary consequence from the principles
enunciated in the last section that the corporation cannot
pass ordinances imposing further penalties for an act which
is already a penal offense under the general laws of the State ;
but on this question there is great and serious conflict of
opinion in the cases. It is the opinion of Judge Cooley that
the clear weight of authority is to the effect that an act may
be a penal offense under the laws of the State and that fur-
ther penalties, under proper legislative authority, may be
imposed for its commission by municipal by-laws, and the
enforcement of the one would not preclude the enforcement
of the other.' The arguments of those who hold that mu-
nicipal ordinances may impose further penalties for the com-
mission of acts already penal offenses under the general stat-
utes are set forth by Collier, C. J., in an Alabama case cited
by Judge Cooley, where a city ordinance imposed a fine foj
assault and battery committed within the city limits, and its
validity was questioned. He said: — "The object of the
power conferred by the charter and the purpose of the ordi-
nance itself was not to punish for an offense against the crim-
inal justice of the country, but to provide a mere police regu-
lation for the enforcement of good order and quiet within the
limits of the corporation. So far as an offense has been com-
mitted against the public peace and morals, the corporate
1 State V. Labatut (La,), 3 So. Rep. Mo. 94 ; St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61 ;
550. Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. 261 ; Elk
2 People V. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. Point v. Vaughn, 1 Dak. 113.
611 ; Mayor &c. of Mobile v. Allaire, ' Cooley's Const Lim. 839.
14 Ala. 400 ; St Louis v. Cafiferata, 24
§ 510.] OBDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. 516
authorities have no power to inflict punishment, and we are
not informed that they have attempted to arrogate it. It is
altogether immaterial whether the State tribunal has interfered
and exercised its powers in bringing the defendant before it
to answer for the assault and battery ; for whether he has
thus been punished or acquitted is alike unimportant. The
offense against the corporation and the State, we have seen,
are distinguishable and wholly disconnected, and the prosecu-
tion at the suit of each proceeds upon a different hypothesis :
the one contemplates the observance of the peace and good
order of the city ; the other has a more enlarged object in
view — the maintenance of the peace and dignity of the
State." ' There are many cases upholding the propositions
set forth in the last cited authority ; indeed the number of
American cases supporting this view far exceeds the number
of the cases which hold the contrary. Thus it has recenth^
been decided in New Jersey that certain acts which are in-
dictable as offenses against the State may also be by the legis-
lature constituted offenses against the police regulations of
municipalities so as to subject the offender to the mode of
trial incident to proceedings for the violation of ordinances,
and that where in such cases the legislature has not njade
special provision for a trial by jury it cannot be demanded as
matter of right.^ Conformably to these views it was held in
Missouri that although by the State statutes it was a misde-
meanor to cruelly beat any domestic animal, municipal corpo-
rations might prohibit the same act by ordinance and punish
offenders.' And in Arkansas, although carrying concealed
weapons, disturbing the peace, ansl selling liquor on Sunday
1 Mayor &o. of Mobile v. Allaire, 14 Cafferata, 24 Mo. 94 ; State v. Gordon,
Ala. 400. 60 Mo. 383 ; St Louis v. Schoenbusch,
estate V. City of Trenton (N. J., 95 Mo. 618; St Louis v. Bentz, 11
18 AtL Rep. 116. See, also, to Mo. 61 ; State v. Crummery, 17 Minn.
the same effect^ City of Indianapolis 72 ; State v. Oleson, 26 Minn. 507 ;
V. Huegle, 115 Ind. 581; Rogers w Elk Point t>. Vaughn, 1 Dak. Ter. 113;
Jones, 1 Wend. 261 ; Mclnerney v. Chicago Packing Co. v. Chicago, 88
City of Denver (Colo., 1892), 29 Pac. 111. 231 ; Hankins v. People, 106 111.
Rep. 516 ; Mayor &c. of New York v. 638 ; McRea v. Americus, 59 Ga. 168 ;
Hyatt, 3 E. D. Smith, 156 ; Polinsky Bloomfield w Trimble, 54 Iowa, 399.
V. People, 3 Hun, 390 ; People v. Ste- ^ city of St Louis v. Schoenbusch,
vans, 13 Wend. 341 ; Blatohford v. 95 Mo, 6ia
Moser, 15 Wend. 21S; St Louis v.
516 OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 511.
are each made offenses by statute, the power to prohibit the
same acts was considered to be given cities and towns by the
statute authorizing the passage of ordinances, not inconsistent
with the laws of the State, to suppress disorderly conduct,
provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote the pros-
perity, and improve the morals, order, comfort and conven-
ience of the corporation and its inhabitants.* Likewise in
Indiana the statute which prohibited towns or cities from
making acts punishable by ordinHnce which are made public
offenses and punishable by the State did not, it was held,
apply to an ordinance making it an offense to sell intoxicating
liquors within the limits of the city without first obtaining a
city license, on the ground, however, that such act was not an
offense against the State law."
§ 511. (f) The same subject continned, — With due defer-
ence to the weighty opinion of Judge Cooley, and to the mass
of authorities submitted by him in support of his opinion, to
the mind of the writer the cases holding the contrary view
though fewer in number are better considered, and more
truly founded on principle. In a Missouri case it was decided
that one who had been punished under a municipal ordinance
could not be afterwards indicted under the State law. The
court said: — "The constitution forbids that a person shall be
twice punished for the same offense. To hold that a party
can be prosecuted for an act under the State laws after he has
been punished for the same act by the municipal corporation
within whose limits the act was done would be to overthrow
the power of the General Assembly to create corporations to
aid in the management of the affairs of the State. For a
power in the State to punish after a punishment had been in-
flicted by the corporate authorities could only find a support
in the assumption that all the proceedings on the part of the
corporation were null and void. The circumstance that the
municipal authorities have not exclusive jurisdiction over the
acts which constitute offenses within their limits does not af-
iTown o£ Van Buren v. Wells 2 city of Frankfort «. Aughe (1888),
(Ark.), 14 S. W. Rep. 38. See, also, 114 Ind. 77.
State V. City of Trenton, 51 N. J. Iaw,
§ 611.] OEDINANCE8 AND BT-LAWS. 517
feet the question. It is enough that their jurisdiction is not
excluded. If it exists — although it maybe concurrent — if
it is exercised, it is valid and binding as long as it is a consti-
tutional principle that no man may be punished twice for the
same offense." ' The logic of these considerations seems to
show irresistibly that to permit the same act to be punished
under the general law and under an ordinance must either
lead to a violation of the constitution or must cause an elec-
tion to be made between the two, methods of procedure, so
that in case the act is punished under one provision the other
becomes inoperative and void. This would produce an anom-
alous condition of criminal procedure in such cases that could
hardly have been contemplated either by the legislature or
the city council. In a recent and well considered North Car-
olina decision it was held that an ordinance of a city or town
which made an act, which was punishable as a criminal offense
under the general law of the State, an offense against the
town, punishable by fine or imprisonment, was void.^ On the
same line authority given to a city in Oregon " to prevent and
restrain disturbances " was not thought to include the right
to take jurisdiction and punish for the crime of an assault
with a dangerous weapon.' It is not uncommonly provided
by statute that acts which are public offenses punishable by
statute shall not be punishable by city ordinance. In such
cases there is no question that such an ordinance is void.'
' state 17. Cowan, 39 Mo. 330. See, any statute, shall not be made pun-
also, Corvallis v. Carlile, 10 Oreg. ishable by any city ordinance, the
139 ; State v. Welch, 36 Conn. 316 ; wrongful interference with a police-
Menken u Atlanta, 78 Ga. 668 ; Jen- man in making an arrest, prohibited
kins V. Thomasville, 35 Ga. 145 ; Vason by an ordinance of the city of In-
V. Augusta, 38 Ga. 543 ; State v. Sa- dianapolis, is not punishable by that
rannah, 1 T. CT. P. Charl. 335 ; s. c, ordinance ; such act being made a
4 Am, Dec. 708 ; Slaughter v. People public offense, and punishable by sec-
(Mich.), 3 Doug. 334; State u. Keith, tion 10 of the metropolitan police
94 N. C. 933 ; Washington u Ham- act (Acts 1888, p. 89), providing that
mond, 76 N. C. 33, any person who shall, in any man-
2 State V. Keith, 94 N. C. 933. ner, interfere with or interrupt the
8 Walsh V. City of Union (Or., board of metropolitan polic6/ com-
1890), 11 Pac. Eep. 313. missioners in any act of theirs while
< So under Revised Statutes of In- in the legal discharge of their duties,
diana, 1881, section 1640, providing or of the police force, shall, upon
that any act made a public oflfense conviction, be fined, etc. City of In-
against the State, and punishable by dianapolis v. Huegle (Ind.), 18 N. K,
518
OEDDTANOES AND BY-LAWS.
[§ 512.
§ 512. (g) Eeasonalbleness of the ordinance. — It is a well-
settled principle that a municipal by-law or ordinance must
be reasonable. If it be not reasonable, the courts will decline
to enforce it, and it will be declared void as matter of law.'
Rep. 173. To the same effect is a
Califoraia case. Section 3 of ordi-
nance No. 192 of the city of Stock-
ton, California, malies it unlawful
for two or more persons to assemble,
be or remain in any room or place
for the purpose of smoking opium,
or inhaling the fumes thereof. Sec-
tion 307 of the State Penal Code de-
clares that every person who visits
or resorts to any place where opium,
or any of its preparations, is sold or
given a.way to be smoked at such
place, for the purpose of smoking
opium, or its said preparations, is
guilty of a misdemeanor, and punish-
able by fine or imprisonment It was
held that the ordinance, in so far as
it made criminal precisely the same
acts that were declared a crime by
the State law, was in conflict there-
with; and under Constitution, arti-
cle 11, section 11, limiting the power
of municipal corporations to the
passage of ordinances not in conflict
with general laws, was void, and that
persons accused of assembling in a
room for the purpose of smoking
opium therein could not be prose-
cuted thei-eunder. In re Sic (Cal.), 14
Pac. Rep. 405; Ex parte Solomon
(CaL, 1891), 37 Pac. Rep. 757 ; Exparte
Ah You, 88 Cal. 99.
•Atkinson v, Goodrich Transpor-
tation Co., 00 Wis. 141; Clason v.
Milwaukee, 80 Wis. 316 ; Barling v.
West, 29 Wis. 307 ; People v. Troop,
12 Wend. 183 ; Dunham v. Rochester,
5 Cow. (N. Y.) 463 ; People v. Roches-
ter, 44 Hun, 166 ; Mayor &c. of Co-
lumbia V. Beasley, 1 Humph. (Tenn.)
382 ; Mayor &o. of Memphis v. Win-
fl^ld, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 707 ; Long v.
Taxing District, 7 Lea, 184; White
V. Mayor &c. of Nashville, 2 Swan
(Tenn.), 364 ; State v. Mayor &c. of
Jersey City, 37 N. J. Law, 348;
Nicoulin v. Loweiy, 49 N. J. Law,
391 ; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Jersey
City, 47 N. J. Law, 286; Delaware
&c R. Co. V. East Orange, 41 N.
J. Law, 127; Kip v. Mayor &c. of
Paterson, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 298 ; Day-
ton V. Quigley, 29 N. J. Eq. 77; Chi-
cago V. Trotter (111.), 26 N. E. Rep.
359; Tugman v. Chicago. 78 111. 405;
Clinton v. Phillips, 58 IlL 102 ; In re
Frazee (1886), 63 Mich. 306 ; Fisher v.
Harrisburg, 3 Grant's Cas. 291 ; Com-
missioners V. Gas Co., 12 Pa, St. 318 ;
O'Maley v. Freeport, 96 Pa, St 24;
Knedler v. Norristown, 100 Pa. St
203 ; Commonwealth v. Robertson, 5
Cush. 438; Boston v. Shaw, 1 Met
130 ; Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray, 161 ;
Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick.
462; Commonwealth v. Davis, 140
Mass. 485 ; Commonwealth v. McCaf-
f erty, 145 Mass. 384 ; Commonwealth
V. Steffee, 7 Bush (Ky.), 161; Ex
parte Frank, 52 Cal. 606; Exparte
Chin Yan, 60 Cal. 78; State v. Free-
man, 38 N. H. 426; Baltimore v.
Radecke, 49 Md. 217; Kirkham v.
Russell, 76 Va. 956 ; Waters v. Leech,
3 Ark. 110; Davis v. Anita (1887), 73
Iowa, 325; State Center v. Baren-
stein, 66 Iowa, 349 ; Meyers v. Chi-
cago &c R. Co., 57 Iowa, 555 ; Gil-
ham V. Wells, 64 Ga. 193; Cape
Girardeau v. RUey, 73 Mo. 330. For
English cases see 2 Kyd on Corpo-
rations, 107; Davies v. Morgan, 1
Cromp. & J. 587; Chamberlain
of London v. Crompton. 7 D. &
R. 597; Clark v. Le Gren, 9 B. &
C. 53 ; Gosling v. Veley, 13 Q. B. 338;
Society of Scriveners v. Brooking, 3
§ 512.] OEDnrANOES and bt-laws. &19
But, as was said by Niblack, J., in an able opinion delivered
in a recent Indiana case : — " An ordinance cannot be held to
be unreasonable which is expressly authorized by the legisla-
ture. The power of a court to declare an ordinance unrea-
sonable and therefore void is practically restricted to cases in
which the legislature has enacted nothing on the subject-mat-
ter of the ordinance, and consequently to cases in which the
ordinance was passed under the supposed incidental power of
the corporation merely." ' So when the legislature expressly
authorizes the municipality to pass any certain ordinance, that
ordinance will be upheld, regardless of the opinion of the
court as to its reasonableness or unreasonableness.^ This prin-
ciple was fully discussed in a celebrated and extreme case in
Missouri. The charter of the city of St. Louis authorized the
city to regulate bawdy-houses. The court construed this pro-
vision to allow the passage of an ordinance licensing bawdy-
houses, and in discussing the reasonableness of such an ordi-
nance it was said : — " It is naked assumption to say that any
matter allowed by the legislature is against public policy.
The best indications of public policy are to be found in the
enactments of the legislature. To say that such a law is of un-
usual tendency is disrespectful to the legislature, who, no doubt,
designed to promote the morals and health of the citizens.,
Whether the ordinance in question is calculated to promote the
object is a question with which the courts have no concern." »
Q. B. 95 ; Elwood v, Bullock, 6 Q. B. Ind. 115 ; Chamberlain v. Evansvillcs
383. Id the last cited case an ordi- 77 Ind. 543 ; Brooklyn v. Breslin
nance imposing unreasonable restric- (1874), 57 N. T. 591; Breninger v.
tions on the licensing of booths was Belvidere, 44 N. J. Law, 350 ; State v.
held invalid. The reasonableness and Clarke (1836), 54 Mo. 17 ; Peoria v.
sufl&ciency o£ an ordinance is not to Calhoun (1863), 89 111. 317 ; St. Paul
be tested in all cases by its applica- v. Colter (1866), 13 Minn. 41 ; Haynes
tion to extreme cases. Coram iin- i: Cape May, 40 N. J. Law, 55 ; Die-
wealth V. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 383. trict of Columbia v. Waggaman, 1
Perhaps a proper construction might Mackey, 338. A reasonable penalty
not admit of their being included being prescribed in an ordinance, it
within it. Commonwealth v. Cutter, is not unconstitutional because the
(Mass., 1893), 39 N. E. Rep. 1140. See, statute under which it is enacted
alao. Walker v. City of Camden (111., does not limit the penalty the ordi-
, 39 N. E. Rep. 741. nance may im^pose. State v. Carpen-
1 Coal Float v. Jeffersonville, 113 ter, 60 Conn. 97.
Iiirl. 19. / 3 State t), Clarke, 54 Mo. 17, 36. See
•^ Coal Float v. Jeffersonville, 113 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 338.
520 OEDINANOES AMD BY-LAWS. [§ 513.
§ 513. (h) The same subject continued — Illustrations.—
The presumption is always in favor of the reasonableness of
the ordinance, and unless it is unreasonable on its face or is
proved to be so by proper evidence, the ordinance will be up-
held.^ Of course each case in which the reasonableness of an
ordinance is questioned must be decided on the facts of that
particular case. No general rule can be laid down defining
what ordinances are unreasonably and what ordinances are
not. But certain broad principles can be followed. Thus an
ordinance must not be so vague that its precise meaning can-
not be ascertained. This question is discussed in the succeed-
ing section. Also the ordinance must not be oppressive.^ It
must not be in restraint of trade.' It must not be contrary
to common right. Thus an ordinance of a Texas city forbid-
ding the renting of private property to lewd women, or to
any person for their use, was held to be a prescriptive denial
of shelter to that class, and mill and void as in contravention of
common rignt.* It must be impartial and general in its oper-
ation.' So far as it restricts the absolute dominion of an
owner over his property it should furnish a uniform rule of
action, and its application cannot be left to the arbitrary will
of the governing authorities." An ordinance which provides
1 Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala. 361 ; « State v. Tenant (N. C, 1893), 14
State V. Trenton (N. J.), 20 Atl. Rep. a E. Eep. 387, citing Newton v. Bel-
1076; Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 ger, 143 Mass. 598 ; City of Eichmond
Mass. 231. Of. St Louis v. Weber, v. Dudley (Ind.), 38 N. E. Eep, 312;
44 Mo. 547; St. Louis v. Knox, 6 Mo. Tick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356;
App. 247 ; Clason v. Milwaukee, 30 May v. People (Colo.), 27 Pac. Eep.
Wis. 316. 1010 ; Baltimore v. Eedecke, 49 Md.
2 Baltimore v. Eadeoke, 49 Md. 317 ; 217 : Anderson v. City of Wellington,
Mayor v. Winfield, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 40 Kan. 173 ; In re Frazee, 63 Mich.
707 ; St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547 ; 396 ; Tugman v. Chicago, 78 111. 405 ;
Comm'rs v. Gas Cc^ 13 Pa. St. 318. Village of Braceville v. Doherty, 30
3 Ingman w Chicago, 78 IlL 405 ; In lU. App. 645 ; Barthet v. City of New
re Frank, 53 Cal. 606 ; Caldwell w Al- Orleans, 34 Fed. Rep. 564; Bills v.
ton, 33 IlL 416; Borough of Sayre v. City of Goshen, 117 Ind. 331; Lake
Phillips (Pa., 1892), 34 Atl. Eep. 76. View v. Letz, 44 111. 81 ; Evansville v.
* Milliken v. City Council &c of Martin, 41 Ind. 145 ; Horr. & Bemis
Weatherford, 54 Tex. 388. See, also, on Munic. Police Ordinances, §13. See,
State V. Mottt 61 Mo.' 397, and cases also. State v. Webber, 107 N. C. 962 ;
cited post. State v. Hunter, 106 N. 0. 796.
» Municipality v. Blineau (1848), 3
La, Ann. 688.
§§ 514, 515.] OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. 621
that no person shall erect, add to, or generally change any
building without first obtaining the permission of the board of
aldermen, is void for the reason indicated.^
§ 614. (i) The same subject continued — Reasonableness
a question of law. — It is, of course, a question of law and not
of fact, foj* the court and not for the jury, whether any spe-
cific ordinance is so unreasonable as to be void.* This is the
well established doctrine of the cases in England as well as in
America, but the contrary view has been asserted in a Wis-
consin case where the validity of an ordinance intended to pro-
tect the city from inundation was called into question. The
court held that testimony relating to the reasonableness of
the ordinance could properly be presented to the jury." This
decision is anomalous, however, and is probably entitled to
but little weight.
§ 515. (j) Tagueness of the ordinance. — It is manifest that
an ordinance must be certain and definite in order to be rea-
sonable. Accordingly the courts have often held ordinances
void as being vague and indefinite.* An ordinance providing
that for certain oilenses the offender should pay not more
than fifty dollars or suffer imprisonment not to exceed one
month was held in North Carolina to be void for vagueness
and uncertainty .' And in the same State an ordinance pro-
viding that for certain disorderly conduct the offender might
be fined by the mayor not more than five dollars was also
1 State V. Tenant (N. C, 1893), 14 ware &c. R Co. v. East Orange, 41
S. E. Eep. 387. N. J. Law, 127 ; State v. Mayor &c.
z Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591 ; of Jersey City, 37 N. J. Law, 348 ;
Hudson V. Thorne, 7 Paige Ch. 361 ; Paxson v. Sweet, 18 N. J. Law, 196.
Dunham u Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; aCIason v. Milwaukee (1873), 30
Buffalo V. Webster, 10 Wend. 100 ; Wis. 316.
Austin V. Murray, 16 Pick. 121 ; Bos- * Tappan v. Young, 9 Daly (N. Y.).
ton V. Shaw, 1 Met 130; Common- 357; San Francisco &o. Factoiy v.
wealth V. Worcester, 3 Pick. 463; Brick wedel, 60 CaL 166; Becker v.
In re Vandine, 6 Pick. 187; Com- Washington, 94 Mo. 380; Common-
monwealth v. Stodder, 3 Cush. 562 ; wealth v. Eay, 140 Mass. 433 ; State
Comm'rs of Northern Liberties v. Center v. Barenstein, 66 Iowa, 349 ;
Gas Co., 13 Pa. St. 318 ; Kneedler v. Bills v. Goshen (Ind.), 30 N. E. Eep.
NorristovCn, 100 Pa. St. 368 ; Fisher v. 115 ; Helena v. Gray (Mont), 17 Pac.
Harrisburg (Pa.), 2 Grant's Cas. 291 ; Rep. 564.
Ex parte Frank, 53 Cal. 606 ; Dela- » State v. Crenshaw, 94 N. C. 877.
522 OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 516.
considered void for uncertainty.' But in an Alabama case
an ordinance which imposed a penalty not exceeding a fixed
sum was upheld as sufficiently certain.' In accordance with
these principles the weight of authority is that the amount
of the fine imposed by the ordinance must be fixed thereby
and cannot be left to the discretion of an officer.' An or-
dinance providing that no occupant of land abutting on a
private way shall suffer any filth to remain on that part of
the way adjoining his land is not open to the objection of in-
definiteness because it does not fix a time beyond which it
shall not be allowed to remain. The words " sufl'er to remain "
imply an opportunity to remove and a failure to do so.*
§ 616. Motives of council not to Ibe impeached. — A city
council being " a minature General Assembly and its author-
ized ordinances having the force of laws passed by the legisla-
ture of the State," ' it follows that when a municipal corpora-
tion passes an ordinance legislative in its character importing
no private contract or rights, the members of the corporation
enjoy the same prerogatives as members of a State legisla-
ture, and their conduct or motives in passing the ordinance
cannot be questioned by way of impeaching the validity of
the ordinance.* But in Ohio it has been held that this immu-
nity from impeachment for fraudulent motives or abuse of
1 State V. Cainan, 94 N. C. 883. a fine "not exceedinR 5Z." was 8U8-
And a town ordinance which pro- tained. Piper v. Chappell, 14 M. & W.
vided that "any person whose duty 624.
it shall be to make such alterations, ' State v. Zeigler, 32 N. J. Law, 269 ;
and who shall refuse to do so after Commissioners v. Harris (N. C), 7
due notice thereof, shall be fined a Jones' L. 281 ; State v. Crenshaw, 94
sum not exceeding five dollars, and N. C. 877 ; State v. Cainan, 94 N. C.
one dollar for each and every day he 883 ; State v. Clinton (N. J.), 21 Atl.
may neglect to make such repairs,'' Eep. 304.
was thought to leave the fine and * Commonwealth v. Cutter (Mass.,
penalty uncertain in amount and to 1892), 29 N. E. Rep. 1146.
be void. State v. Rice, 92 N. C. 421 ; » Taylor f. Carondelet (1855), 22
s. c, 2 S. E. Rep. 180. Mo. 105.'
2 Mayor &c. of Huntsville v. Phelps, * Villavaso v. Barthet, 39 La. Ann.
27 Ala. 55. So, also, under the En- 247, 258 ; s. C, 1 So. Rep. 599 ; Free-
glish statute authorizing an ordi- pOrt v. Marks, 59 Pa. St 253 ; Buell v.
nance imposing a fine of not more Ball, 20 Iowa, 282.
than five pounds, an ordinance fixing
§ 517.] OEDINANOES AND BT-LAWS. 523
power does not attach to all of the acts of a city council which
may assume the form of an ordinance; and that where the
city council was empowered to regulate the price of gas, and
under the colorable exercise of such power for a fraudulent
purpose passed an ordinance fixing the price of gas at a rate
at which they well knew that it could not be manufactured and
sold without loss, the motives of the council could be prop-
erly inquired into.* The officers of a municipal corporation are
of course exempt from personal liability for the passage of
any ordinance within their authority ; nor are they personally
liable for any ordinance not within their authority, for such
an ordinance is absolutely void.^
§ 517. Construction of ordinances. — The canons of con-
struction that are eipployed in the interpretation of statutes
are also used to determine the meaning of ordinances.' Pro-
visions that are essentially penal are strictly construed,* but
ordinary police regulations, even though a penalty be attached,
are not subjected to so close a scrutiny.* It is proper to con-
sider the title of the ordinance * and the mischief which it Avas
designed to remedy,' as also in doubtful cases a contempora-
' State V. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18 Md. 85 ; Zorger v. Greensburgh, 60
Ohio St. 263, 300, citing Davis v. The Ind. 1 ; Quinette v. St. Louis, 76 Mo.
Mayor &c. of New York, 1 Duer, 451. 403. Construction is a question of
But in the opinion in the Ohio case law. Pennsylvania Co. v. Frana, 13
tliere is a dictum that inquiry into 111. App. 91.
the motives of the council in passing * Paciflo v. Seifert, 79 Mo. 310 ;
an ordinance for purposes of police Krickle v. Commonwealth, 1 B. Mon.
regulation or municipal government (Ky.) 261 ; St Louis v. Goebel, 33 Mo.
would perhaps be incompetent; as 395.
the courts would have no jurisdiction " A reasonable construction is the
to impeach such an ordinance for rule. Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La.
such a reason. Judge Dillon adds Ann. 335; Rounds D.Mumford, 3 R. L
the great weight of his opinion to the 154; Commonwealth u. Robertson, 5
eSeci that the acts of municipal Cush. 488 ; Merriam v. New Orleans,
bodies, whether in the form of reso- 14 La. Ann. 318 ; Vintners' Co. v.
lutinns or ordinances, may be im- Passey, 1 Bui-r. 335 ; Poulters' Co. v.
peached for fraud at the instance of Phillips, 6 Bing. N. C. 314. Liberal
persons injured thereby. 1 Dillon on rules are applied to town by-laws.
Munic. Corp., § 311. Whitlock v. West, 26 Conn. 406.
2 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 313. « Martindale v. Palmer, 53 Ind. 411,
3 In re Yick Wo, 68 Cal 394 ; S. c, 'Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 Saw. 553,
58 Am. Rep. 13; State v. Kirkley, 29
524 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 518.
neons construction by the parties interested.' General words
and sweeping clauses are controlled by particular descriptions
preceding them.^ If an ordinance is susceptible of two con-
structions, that one must prevail which will preserve its validity
in preference to a construction that will render it invalid ; and
this must be done although the construction adopted may not
be the most obvious or natural or the literal one.' Thus, an
ordinance making it unlawful to ride a bicycle across a public
bridge is limited to the footways of the bridge ; otherwise it
would be void as against common right.* And an ordinance
providing that " no person shall drive or lead any horse or
cart or wheel-carriage on the footway or sidewalk of any
street " does not prohibit the carting of earth from excava-
tions across the sidewalk.'
§ 518. The same subject continued — Ordinances void in
part. — It is well settled that invalid provisions in an ordi-
nance do not necessarily render the ordinance totally void.
The rule to be applied is that if part of a law be void other
essential and connected parts are also void,* but where that
1 Wright V. Chicago &o. R. Co., 7 rng upon his own lot and would deny
111. App. 438 ; State v. Severance, 49 the right of an abutting owner of
Mo. 401. driving hia carriage from a stable."
2Sohultz V. Cambridge, 38 Ohio St. In re O'Keefe (1893), 19 N. Y. Supl.
659 ; Snyder v. North Lawrence, 8 676. See, also, Gilluly v. Madison, 63
Kan. 83; Keokuk &c. Ca v. Quinoy, Wis. 518; Ex parte Ah Lit, 26 Fed.
81 111. 433. Cf. IlL Cent E. Co. v. Eep. 513 ; Athens v. Georgia R. Co.,
Galena, 40 111. 844; St Louis v. 73 Ga. 800. Cf. Commonwealtli v.
Herthei, 88 Mo. 138. Curtis, 9 AUeii, 368.
3 Commonwealth v. Dow, 10 Met sjn. re Ah Toy, 45 Fed. Eep. 795;
383 ; Baltimore v. Hughes, 1 Gill & J. Eldora v. Burlingame, 62 Iowa, 33 ;
480; Newland v. Marsh, 19 111. 376; Cantril v. Sainer, 59 Icwa, 36; Her-
lowa Co. V. Webster Co., 21 Iowa, shoff v. Beverly, 45 N. J. Law, 388;
381 ; Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. Trowbridge v. Newark, 46 N. J. Law,
St 445 ; Eoosevelt v. Godar J, 52 140 ; State v. Mayor &o. of Hoboken,
Barb. 533; Colwell v. Landing Co., 38 N. J. Law, 1 10 ; Commonwealths.
19 N. J. Eq. 245 ; Bigelow v. Eail- Stodder, 3 Cush. 562 ; Commonwealth
road Co., 37 Wis. 478 ; Dow v. Norris, v. Dow, 10 Met 383 ; Fisher v. Mc-
4 N. H. 17 ; Inkster v. Carver, 16 Girr, 1 Gray, 1 ; Amesbury v. Bow-
Mich. 484 ; Cooley's Const Lim. 184. ditch &c. Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 596 ; Wai^
4 Swifts. City of Topeka (1890), 43 ren v. Mayor &c., 3 Gray, 84; Ex
Kan. 671. parte Christensen, 85 Cal. 208 ; State
» " If so construed," said the court v. Cainan, 94 N. C. 888 ; St Louis v.
",it would prevent a party from build- St Louis R Co., 14 Mo. App. 321 ; St
§ 519.]
OEDINANOES AND BT-LAWS.
525
part which is void is independent and no|; essentially connected
with the remainder the law will stand.' Thus, it was held
that where a statute authorized the mayor to impose a fine
of not more than $20 " in his discretion " for certain offenses,
an ordinance imposing a fine of not less than three nor more
than ten dollars, being void as to the fine, the whole enact-
ment was void and could not be treated as ordaining an
offenSe.^ But where the charter gave express power to pro-
hibit the sale of certain articles except at a public market, an
ordinance in pursuance thereof was valid, although it covered
some articles not included in the enumeration.'
§ 619. Amendment and repeal by subsequent ordinance. —
The power of a municipal corporation to enact ordinances in-
cludes by implication the power to amend or repeal them.*
Louis V. St Louis R Co., 89 Mo. 44 ;
Piqua V. Zimmerlin, 35 Ohio St 507 ;
Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. S37 ; Rau v.
Little Rock, 34 Ark. 303: Baker v.
Normal, 81 111. 108 ; Quincy v. Bull,
106 111. 337 ; Harbaugh v. Monmouth,
74 111. 367; State v. Chamberlin, 37
N. J. Law, 388.
'Staats V. Washington, 45 N. J.
Law, 318, 325 ; s. a, 46 N. J. Law,
309; Wilcox v. Hemming, 58 Wis.
144 ; s. C, 46 Am. Rep. 6a5 ; Pennsyl-
iVania R Co. v. Jersey City, 47 N. J.
Law, 286 ; State v. Hardy, 7 Neb. 377.;
State V. Kantler, 33 Minn. 69 ; State
V. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1; Cooper v.
District of Columbia, 4 MacArthur,
250 ; State v. Clark, 54 Mo. 17. When
it prohibits disjunctively two or
more acts, the invalidity of one part
does not aflfect the validity of the
others. Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50
111. 39. But the parts must be en-
tire and distinct from each other.
Municipality v. Morgan, 1 La. Ann.
Ill, 116 ; Rex v. Faversham Fisher-
men's Co., 8 Term Rep. 356; Will-
cook on Munic. Corp. 160, pi. 384.
2Landis v. Borough of Vineland
(N. J., 1893), 30 N. E. Rep. 357. The
argument was that the maximum
limit of ten dollars was opposed to an
inference that it was intended to cre-
ate an offense which might be pun-
ishable by a twenty-dollar fine. One
section of an ordinance making it
an offense to continue or allow the
qontinuance of a house of ill-fame for
two days after it shall have been so
adjudged under a prior void section,
the two are so connected that they
must fall together. State v. Webber,
107 N. C. 983 ; s. C, 13 S. E. Rep. 598.
'Shelton v. Mayor of Mobile, 30
Ala. 540. See, also. Eureka Springs
V. O'Neil (Ark., 1892), 19 S. W. Rep.
969.
« Welch V. Bowen, 103 Ind. 352;
Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 86 N. Y.
467; People v. Collins, 8 Mich. 347;
Rex V. Baird, 13 East, 367; Rex v.
Ashwell, 12 East, 33 ; Great Western
Ry. Co. V. North Cayuga, In re, 23
Upper Can. C. P. 28; Greeley v.
Jacksonville, 17 Fla. 174 ; Bloomer v.
StoUey, 5 McLean (U. S.), 158 ;' Rice
V. Foster, 4 Harr. (Del.) 479 ; Santo v.
State, 2 Iowa, 165 ; s. c, 63 Am. Dec.
487; In re MoUie Hall, 10 Neb. 537;
City Council v. Church, 4 Strobh.
(S. C.) 306. But where the record
showed that a motion changing cer-
526
OBDINANCES AND BY-LAWS.
[§ 519.
The general rul )s governing the amendment and repeal of
statutes are applied to the legislation of municipal corporsr
tions. An amendment of a void ordinance is inefifectaal to
create a valid and enforceable ordinance,^ but if only a part
of the original ordinance is invalid an amendment of that part
will stand.* A repealing ordinance may contain a clause ex-
cepting from its operation offenses committed and forfeitures
incurred previous to the repeal,' but if there be no reservation
all violations of the former ordinance are blotted out, as it
were, and the courts are also powerless to proceed further in
pending prosecutions.* Where a repealing ordinance is itself
repealed the original ordinance is restored to full force and
efficacy.' The power to amend and repeal is subject to the
qualification that it cannot; be exercised in such a way as to
impair private rights which have been acquired under a law-
ful ordinance.*
tain provisions was adopted and that
"the mayor was instructed to pre-
pare an ordinance covering said
changes," it was held not be in it-
self a complete legislative act. Jones
V. McAlpine, 64 Ala. 511.
1 Cowley V. Town of Eushville, 60
Ind. 327 ; Board of Clay County v.
Markle, 46 Ind. 96; Blakemore v,
Dolan, 50 Ind. 194; Ford v. Booker,
53 Ind. 395; State v. Kantler, 83
Minn. 69, 77.
2 State V. Kantler, 33 Minn. 69. An
amending ordinance which does not
attempt to amend the old by adding
to or taking from one of its sections,
but contains in full the section as it
was designed to be when amended,
sufficiently complies with a statutory
requirement that an amending ordi-
nance shall contain the ordinance or
part thereof which it attempts to re-
view or amend. Larkin v. Burling-
ton &o. Ry. Co. (Iowa, 1893), 52 N.
W. Rep. 480; Town of Decorah v.
Dunstan, 38 Iowa, 96.
3 City of Kansas v. White, 69 Mo.
26. See, also, Pardrige v. Village of
Hyde Park, 131 IlL 537.
*Day V. Clinton, 6 III App. 476;
Barton v. Gadsden, 79 Ala. 495. And
no subsequent ordinance or statute
can revive the offense by attempting
to limit the effect of the repeal. Kan-
sas City V. Clark, 68 Mo. 588. The
rule is not confined to penal ordi-
nances. Kaine v. Harty, 4 Mo. App.
357. A statute abrogating the com-
mon-law rule in relation to the repeal
of laws does not apply to municipal
ordinances. Naylor v. Galesbutg, 56
111. 285.
5 Mayor &c. c. Broadway &a R Co.,
97 N. T. 275, citing People v. Davis,
61 Barb. 450 ; Van Denburgh v. Green-
bush, 66 N. Y. 1. Day v. Clinton, 6
111. App. 476, cited 'n one text-book
to support the contrary proposition,
merely decides that the guilt of one
whose offense has been wholly ex-
purgated by the repeal of the law
creating it cannot be revived by a re-
peal of the repealing act,
6 Rex V. Baird, 13 East, 879 ; Rex v.
Ashwell, 12 East, 23; Bigelow v.
Hillman, 87 Me. 53 ; People v. O'Brien,
111 N. Y. 1 ; Nelson v. St Martin's
Parish, 111 N. Y. 716 ; Pond v. Negus,
§ 520.]
ORDINANCES AND BT-LAWS.
527
§ 520. Bepeal by act of the legislature. — " The legislature
cannot by express intendment repeal ordinandes, though a re-
peal may be effected by the passage of a general law that is
inconsistent with the ordinance." ' When a city of the second
class having lawful authority passed an ordinance to suppress
houses of prostitution, and while it was in full force a new
law for the government of cities of that class was passed con-
taining authority to the city council to " restrain, prohibit
and suppress " houses of prostitution, and the former act was
repealed without a saving clause, it was held that the new
act did not repeal existing ordinances.'' And as a general
rule an ordinance will not be deemed to be repealed b^' a stat-
ute unless they are irreconcilably inconsistent with each other.'
3 Mass. 230 ; S. C, 3 Am. Dec. 131 ;
Cunningham v. Almonte, 21 Upper
Can. C. P. 459 ; In re Great Western
R Ca, 23 Upper Can. C. P. 28 ; Louis-
iana u Pillsbury, 105 U. S. 278; Chi-
cago &c. R. Co. V. Minnesota Cent. R
Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 525 ; Terre Haute v.
Lake, 43 Ind. 480 ; State v. Graves,
19 Md 351; Baldwin v. Smith, 82
m. 162; People v. Chicago &c. R
Co., 18 111. App. 125 ; Gormley v. Day,
114 IlL 185; Quinoy v. Bull, 106 111.
337 ; Cape May &c. R Co. v. Cape
May, 35 N. J. Eq. 419 ; Reiflf v. Con-
ner, 10 Ark. 241 ; State v. City Clerk
&c., 7 Ohio St. 355 ; Koad in Augusta
Township, 17 Pa. St. 71, 75; Des
Moines u Chicago &c. R Co., 41 Iowa,
569 ; Burlington v. Burlington St R
Co., 49 Iowa, 144 ; s. C, 81 Am. Eep.
145; City Council of Charleston v.
Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. (S. C.)
306 ; Mayor &c. of Rome v. Lumpkin,
5 Ga. 447. But " no person can claim
immunity from proper police regu-
lation of his vested interests because
they were based upon the privileges
or under the protection of a munici-
pal ordinance." Horr & Bemis on
Munic. Police Ordinances, § 67, and
cases cited.
1 Horr & Bemis on Munic. Police
Ordinances, §§ 60, 61. A svacute reg-
ulating the taking up of stray ani"-
mals, and providing that nothing in
any municipal charter shall be con-
strued to authorize an ordinance
dealing with the subject in any other
manner, repeals an existing valid or-
dinance' of that description. Town
of Marietta v. Fearing, 4 OhiOj 427.
2 "There has been no attempt on
the part of the legislature to repeal
the law creating cities of the second
class and destroy the organization of
the same. It is true that a new act
has taken the place of the former
and continues the organization of
such cities with new and modified
powers. But this is very different
from an entire repeal. The doctrine
is well settled that a change in the
form of government of a community
does not ipso /acto abrogate pre-exist-
ing laws." In re Mollie Hall, 10 Neb.
537, citing Trustees v. Erie, 31 Penn.
St 515-517. See, also. Waring v.
Mayor &c. of Mobile, 24 Ala. 701.
3 Mayor &c. of New York v. Hyatt,
3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 156, holding
that a statute by which a violation
of the ordinances of New York was
declared a misdemeanor and punish-
able by fine or imprisonment did not
operate as a repeal of the penalty
given by those ordinances nor take
528 OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 621.
But where it is the evident design of the legislature to as-
sume the exclusive regulation of a subject which had been be-
fore permitted to be regulated by municipal ordinances, the
latter must yield, and such legislative intent will more readily
be inferred if the ordinance in question would otherwise be
unreasonable and oppressive.*
§ 521. Repeals by implication. — It has been laid down as
law that a general statute without negative words will not
repeal the particular provisions of a former statute unless the
two are plainly inconsistent.^ It is also a doctrine that a sub-
sequent statute revising the whole subject-matter of a former
one will operate as a repeal of it, though it contains no ex-
press words of repeal.' Both these rules are without doubt
as applicable to ordinances as to statutes.* Where th^ final
chapter of a revising ordinance recited a long list of ordinances
which were expressly repealed, the omission of certain ordi-
nances from the list was held to preserve them in full force,
although the title of the ordinance imported to comprise all
former enactments.'' The general ordinances of a city were
revised and consolidated for publication and were thus adopted
and re-enacted. An ordinance under which a prosecution had ,
been begun was re-enacted in substantially the same language
without any words of repeal or any clause saving pending
prosecutions. The effect of the re-enactment was declared to
away the right of the corporation to ' Burlington v. Estlow, 43 N. J.
prosecute a civil action for the pen- L*w, 13 ; Bartlett v. King, 13 Mass.
alty. See, also, March v. Common- 537 ; Deoorah v. Dunstan, 38 Iowa,
wealth, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 35 ; State v. 96 ; Goodenough v. Buttrick, 7 Mass.
Lahatut, 39 La. Ann. 516 ; Baldwin 140 ; Booth v. Town of Carthage, 67
V. Murphy, 83 111. 485 ; Quinette v. 111. 103 ; Commonwealth v. Cooley, 10
St Louis, 76 Mo. 403; Franklin v. Pick. 37; Ellis t). Page, 1 Pick. 43, 45 ;
Westfall, 37 Kan. 614; Chamberlain Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N. H. 395;
V. Evansville, 77 Ind. 543. Farr v. Brackett, 30 Vt 344.
1 Southport V. Ogden, 33 Conn. 128. * City of Providence v. Union R
2 Conley v. Supervisors &c., 2 West Co., 12 E. L 473 ; Booth v. Carthage,
Va. 416 ; Brown v. County Comm'rs, 67 111. 103.
31 Pa. St. 37 ; Bank of Louisiana v. * The case did not, however, turn
Farrar, 1 La. Ann. 49, 54 ; Lenz v. upon this circumstance alone. City
Sherrott, 36 Mich. 139 ; Croll v. Vil- of Providence v. Union E. Co., 12 R. L
lags of Franklin, 40 Ohio St 340; 473.
Barker v. Smith, 10 8. C. 326.
§ 522.]
0EDINAN0E8 AND BY-LAWS.
529
continue in force the provisions of the original ordinance and
not to abate or affect the prosecution.^
§532. Power to impose penalties. — Since an ordinance
without a penalty would be nugatory, a corporation that has
the power to pass the ordinance has an implied power to pro-
vide for its enforcement by proper and reasonable fines against
those who break it.* Thus, a power to " open, widen, . . .
and keep in repair streets," etc., and to pass ordinances neces-
sary to carry into effect the power granted, confers authority
to punish by fine any person who may obstruct a public
street.' And under a power to suppress bawdy-houses the
corporation has by implication and of necessity the power to
adopt proper means to accomplish it.* So, also, the power
to " restrain and prohibit " an act implies power to punish its
commission." But the right to impose fines cannot exist in
conflict with a reasonable interpretation of the charter ; and
although authority to " prevent " will support an ordinance
prohibiting under proper penalties," the general rule that all
La. Ann. 1110; Barter v. Common-
wealth, 3 Pa. 260 ; Fisher v. Harris-
burg, 2 Grant's Cas. (PL) 291 ; Mount
Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399;
Eeinhard v. Mayor &c. of N. Y., 3
Daly (N. Y.), 243 ; Horr & Bemis on
Munic! Ordinances, § 147. Contra,
Farnsworth v. Pawtucket, 13 B. L 83.
Such Anes must as a general rule be
paid into the treasury of the city,
town or other municipal corporation,
unless the law specifically directs
otherwise. People v, Sacramento, 6
CaL 433.
8 Toledo &C. Ry. Ca v. Chenoa, 43
UL 209.
* Which included the imposition of
a fine. Shreveport v. Boos, 35 La.
Ann. 1010. See, also, Amite City v.
Clements, 24 La. Ann. 27.
estate V. Grimes (Minn., 1892), 62
N. W. Rep. 42.
«City of Centerville v. Miller, 57
Iowa, 66; Respublica v. Duquet, 2
Yeates, 493.
•Junction City v. Webb (1890), 44
Kan. 71. Citing State v. Guraber, 37
Wis. 298 ; State v. Wish, 15 Neb. 448 ;
Kesler v. Smith, 66 N. C. 154; Fuller-
ton V. Spring, 3 Wis. 667; Scheftels
V. Tabert, 46 Wis. 439; Cheezen v.
State, 2 Ind. 149; Martindale v. Mar-
tindale, 10 Ind. 566 ; Cordell v. State,
22 Ind. 1 ; State v. Baldwin, 46 Conn.
134; Middleton v. Railroad Co., 26
N. J. Eq. 269; United Hebrew Ass'n
V. Benshimol, 130 Mass. 325 ; Lisbon
V. Clark, 18 N. H. 234
2 Village of Winooski v. Gokey,
49 Vt 283; Grover v. Huckins. 26
Mich. 476; Mason v. Shawneetown,
77 IlL 533; Korah v. Ottawa, 33 IlL
139; S. C. 83 Am. Dec. 255; Eyer-
man v. Blaksley, 78 Mo. 145 ; Inde-
pendence V. Moore, 32 Mo. 392 ; Tip-
ton V. Norman. 72 Mo. 380 ; Hooksett
v. Amoskeag &c. Co., 44 N. H. 105 ;
Mayor &c. of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala,
137) Trigally v. Memphis, 6 Coldw.
{Tenn.) 382; Shreveport v. Boos, 36
La. Ann. 1010; State v. Boneil, 42
34
530
OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS.
[§ 523.
doubtful grants must be resolved against the corporation has
been held to forbid the extension of the power " to abate "
nuisances to the enactment of ordinances prescribing a pun-
ishment for the maintenance of a nuisance.^ And where the
charter specifically enumerates various powers which the coun-
cil may render effectual by means of penal prosecutions, it is
an implied exclusion of the right to impose penalties in other
cases.*
§ 623. Mode of enforcement of ordinances — By a purely
civil action. — If the manner of enforcing ordinances is pre-
scribed by statute or charter it is a cardinal rule that no other
method can be resorted to.' In the absence of statutory pro-
visions, at common law the recovery of fines and penalties is
by an action of debt or assumpsit, and where these forms have
been abolished the remedy is by a civil action of the same nat-
ure;* and it is competent for the corporation to provide by
1 City of Knoxville v. Chicago &o.
R Co. (Iowa, 1891), 50 N. W. Eep. 61.
2 City of Grand Rapids v. Hughes,
15 Mich. 54, per. Cooley, J., citing
Child V. Hudson's E|ay Co., 2 P. Wms.
207; State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424.
3Ewbanlrs v. Ashley, 36 111. 177;
King V. Jacksonville, 3 111. 306 ; Israel
V. Jacksonville, 2 111. 290 ; Weeks v.
Forman, 16 N. J. Law, 237; Will-
iamson V. Commonwealth, 4 B. Hon.
(Ky.) 146; State v. Zeigler, 33 N. J.
Law, 262; Hart v. Mayor &c of Al-
bany, 9 Wend. 571; Mayor &a of
Newark v. Murphy, 40 N. J. Law, 145.
So, too, where a city council invested
by statute with authority to require
payment of license fees, and to pass
such ordinances as are necessary for
that purpose, enacts an ordinance
prescribing a penalty for failure to
pay a license, it is confined to that
mode of enforcement and cannot
maintain a suit to recover license
fees. City Council v. Ashley Phos-
phate Co. (S. C, 1891), 13 S. E. Rep.
845. See, also, Santa Cruz u Santa
Cruz R Co., 56 Cal. 143. Upon the
question, which has not been ex-
pressly decided, whether the remedy
provided by the English Municipal
Corporations Act of 1835, by distress
and imprisonment for non-payment
of fines, precludes the common-law
action of debt or assumpsit, see
Grant on Corp. 364; Rawlinson on
Corp. (5th ed.) 167; Bodwic v. Fen-
nell, 1 Wils. 238 ; Adley v. Reeves, 2
Maule & SeL 61.
*Ewbanks v. Ashley, 36 HI. 178
State V. Clinton, 53 N. J. Law, 329
State V. Passaic, 42 N. J. Law, 429
Israel v. Jacksonville, 2 UL 290
Coates V. Mayor &c. of New York, 7
Cowen, 585 ; Columbia v. Harrison, 2
Treadw. Const (S. C.) 215; Heeney
V. Sprague, 11 R L 456 ; Brookville
V. Gagle, 73 Ind. 117. Where the
charter prescribes that it shall be
sufficient to declare generally in debt,
it is not necessary to file a vrritten
declaration in the common-law form.
Deitz V. City of Central, 1 Colo. 328,
holdmg, also, that in such an action
a verdict of guilty is substantially re-
sponsive to the issue.
§ 524:.j OEDIHAHCES AND BT-LAWS. 531
I
ordinance for a recovery by an action of debt.^ The suit
should be brought in the name conferred upon the corporation
by its charter. Thus, if the "mayor and council of the
town," etc., constitute the corporate body, the names of the
individual officers should not be set out in the declaration.^
Several penalties may be included in the declaration and re-
covered in one suit ; ' but it has been held that when ordinances,
though relating to the same subject, are entirely different in
the specification of offenses and the amounts of the penalties,
each presents distinct causes of action, for the enforcement of
which separate suits must be brought.* It is not necessary,
as in actions on contract, to join all the defendants in interest.
The cause of action is assimilated to a case of tort in which
one or more of the offending parties may be sued.*
§ 524. Jurisdiction of proceedings.— If a special tribunal
is provided by law for the trial of proceedings based upon
municipal ordinances, as is usually the case in this country, that
tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction unless the legislature has
plainly indicated an intention to the contrary,' and the corpo-
ration cannot by ordinance create a court or confer upon it
a jurisdiction not expressly authorized by statute or charter.'
Of course, the charter itself cannot give power to a judicial
officer not recognized by the organic law ; but where the latter
1 Barter v. Commonwealth, 3 Pa. essaiy to join them, see Whitehall v.
253; Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Suit. Meaux, 8111. App. 182.
1858. See, also, Staats v. Washing- * Kensington v. Glenat, 1 Phila. 393.
ton, 45 N. X Law, 318. Butnotbydis- * Jacksonville v. Holland, 19 111.
tress and sale of goods. Willcock on 271.
Munic. Corp. 164-181 ; Adley v. * Horr & Bemis on Munic. Police
Reeves, 2 Maule & Sel. 60 ; 3 Wheat Ordinances, g 166. In the same sec-
Selw. 1178. tion it is said that " remedies under,
2 Powers V. Mayor and Council of ordinances will, however, never be
Decatur, 54 Ala. 214. See, also, allowed to fail for want of a tribunal,
Charleston v. Oliver, 16 S. C. 47 ; and if no special tribunal is provided,
Williamson v. Commonwealth, 4 B, actions to enforce penalties may be
Mon. 146; HirsohofEv. Beverly, 45 brought in the established courts of
N. J. Law, 288 ; Graves v. Colby, 9 the State." Citing Columbia v. Har-
Ad. & El. 356 ; Vintners' Co. v. Passey, rison, 2 C. C. (S. C.) 213.
1 Burr. 235. 'Staats v. Washington, 45 N. J.
s City of Brooklyn v. Cleves, 1 Hill Law, 318 ; Deel v. Pittsburgh, 3
& D. Sup. 231. But that it is not nee- Watts, 363 ; Barter v. Commonwealth,
3 Pa. St 353.
532 OEDINANCES AKD BY-LAWS. [§ 525.
vested all judicial authority in certain courts, including justices
of the peace, and a charter provided for the election of a jus-
tice of the peace, " to be denominated police judge," and de-
fined his jurisdiction, it was held that although the title was
unwarranted he was lawfully possessed of the powers of a
justice of the peace.' The invalidity of an ordinance is not an
objection that goes to the jurisdiction of the court.^ And it
is also well settled that a magistrate's personal interest in a
fine from the fact that he is a citizen of the municipality to
which it is payable is too remote to disqualify him to try the
action.' An objection to the jurisdiction on account of de-
fects in the process should be made at the earliest moment ;
it comes too late if made for the first time on appeal.*
§ 525. Imprisonment in default of payment of fine. — We
have seen that the power to impose pecuniary penalties is
deemed a necessary adjunct to the power to enact ordinances
unless restrained expressly or by fair implication, and that
their collection may be enforced by an action of debt or as-
sumpsit or an equivalent civil remedy. But as this sanction
would be futile against impecunious offenders, it is generally
provided that imprisonment may be inflicted in default of
payment of the fine and the costs of prosecution.* Only ex-
1 Deitz V. City of Central, 1 -Colo. Herdt, 40 N. J. Law, 264 And the
323. authority to imprison for non-pay-
i Woodruff V. Stewart, 63 Ala. 208. ment of fine includes the costs. Horr
'Deitz V. City of Central, 1 Colo. & Bemis on Munic. Ordinances,
323 ; Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 § 203. Contra, State v. Cantieny, 34
Pick. 462 ; Jonesborough v. MoKee, Minn. 1. A penalty accruing from a
2 Yerg. 167 ; Thomas v. Mt Vernon, breach of an ordinance of a munici-
9 Ohio, 290 ; Council v. Pepper, 1 pal corporation is not a debt within
Rich. 364 ; Queen v. Milledge, 4 Q. B. the meaning of a constitutional pro-
Div. 332 ; Queen v. Justices, 4 Q. B. vison which forbids imprisohment
Div. 533. It was formerly held other- for debt Hardenbrook v. Town of
wise in England. Hesketh v. Brad- Ligonier, 95 Ind. 70. Citing McCool
dock, 3 Burr. 1847. v. State, 33 Ind. 127; Lower v. Wal-
*Tisdale u Town of Minonk, 46 HI. lick, 25 Ind. 68; Turner v. Wilson,
9. See, also, Wiggins v. Chicago, 68 49 Ind. 581 ; Mollvain v. State, 87
111. 373. Ind. 602 ; Lane v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71 ;
* The costs are no part of the pen- Dunlop v. Keith, 1 Leigh, 430 ; Cald-
alty and are not conjputed in deter- well v. State, 55 Ala. 133 ; Hibbard v.
mining whether the jurisdictional Clark, 56 N. H. 155 : City of Camden
amount has been exceeded. State v. v. Allen, 26 N. J. Law, 398 ; Flora v.
§ 526.] OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. 633
press and precise authority will justify such imprisonment.'
Payment of fines cannot be coerced in that manner under a,
power to fine or imprison; ^ but where a charter conferi*ed the
power to enact ordinances with penalties, and provided that
upon conviction for a breach thereof and failure to pay the fine
the offender might be placed at labor for the city, it was held
that an ordinance requiring payment of a license tax on certain
occupations might lawfully annex a fine for violation of its pro-
visions, which might be enforced in the same manner as any
other ordinance.' In all cases the terms of the judgment
must be in exact conformity with the language of the statute
or charter relating to the penalty. Under authority to com-
mit to the county jail a commitment to any other prison is
void.* So, where the statute provided that imprisonments
should not exceed six months, a judgment that the defendant
should be confined in jail until such time as would at a cer-
tain rate per day make the amount of the fine and costs was
pronounced invalid."
§ 526. Imprisonment as a penalty. — The right to inflict'
imprisonment as a penalty for a violation of an ordinance
must be given by charter or statute, otherwise no such pen-
Sachs, 64 Ind. 155. Cf. Ex parte " It does not appear from the record
Eeed, 4 Cranch, 583 ; Philadelphia v. what amount of costs was taxed in
Duncan, 4 Phila. 145 ; Hall v. Corpo- this case, but it is argued by counsel
ration of Washington, 4 Cranch, 583. that when the fine and costs are
1 Brieswick v. Mayor &c. of Bruns- added together they could not be
wick, 51 Ga. 639 ; Burlington v. Kel- discharged in six months at the rata
lar, 18 Iowa, 59 ; City of London's Case, [prescribed by law]. It is enough to
8 Coke, 187 ; Clark's Case, 5 Coke, 64. say that such might be the eflfect,
* Brieswick v. Mayor &c. of Bruns- and if so the defendant at the end of
wick, 51 Ga. 639. Cf. Ex ■parte Green six months would be driven to an-
(Cal., 1893), 39 Pac. Eep. 783, where it other proceeding in order to obtain
was held by a divided court that his discharge^ We are of opinion the
under a power to impose a fine or judgment should have limited the
imprisonment, or both, a fine and imprisonment to six months, so that
imprisonment, and imprisonment in when that period should have ar-
default of payment of the fine, might rived the keeper of the prison would
be imposed in one sentence. have discharged the prisoner at
»Ex parte] City Council of Mont- once." See, also. In re Greystook, 13
gomery, 64 Ala, 463. Upper Can. Q. B. 458 ; Queen v. Gil-
< Merkee v. Rochester, 13 Hun. 157. bert, 3 Pug. & Bur. 619 ; Ex parte
8Kanouse v. Town of Lexington, Trask, 1 Pug. & Bur. 377.
13 III App. 318. The court said: —
534: OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 527.
alty can be legally annexed or enforced. The rule is that
they can only be enforced by a pecuniary penalty unless there
is some express act giving power to inflict other punishment.*
The power to imprison must be strictly construed. In a recent
case in Colorado it appeared that a city charter gave the coun-
cil power to enforce ordinances " by a proper fine, imprison-
ment, or other penalties." The question at issue was whether
this provision would sanction a fine and imprisonment. The
conclusion that it would not was based on the following argu-
ment : — "If the words ' other penalties ' were omitted, a
single offense could be punished by either fine or imprison-
ment, but not by both fine and imprisonment. Therefore, if
the council had power to provide for ' fine or imprisonment,'
such power must be conferred by the words ' other penalties.'
But this language was in our judgement employed in contra-
distinction to ' fines and imprisonments.' The expression is,
'or other penalties,' *. e., penalties other than fines or impris-
onments. To say that the phrase ' other penalties ' may in a
given case include ' fine and imprisonment,' together, whereas
it could not include either fine or imprisonment separately,
would be at least paradoxical. . . . The ' other penalties '
referred to are penalties that do not include either of the two
previously designated, such as revocation of licenses, forfeit-
ares, distress and sale, and the like." ^ Before the power to
imprison can be exercised there must be an appropriate by-
law and a trial and judicial ascertainment that such by-law has
been violated.'
§ 527. Forfeitures. — A municipal corporation cannot im-
pose a forfeiture of property without express authority. Such
an extraordinary power cannot be exercised under the gen-
eral power to make by-laws.* Where th^ only penalties which
1 City of Burlington v. Kellar, 18 ^ Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461.
Iowa, 59; Kinmundy v. Mahan, 78 * Taylor w. City of Carondelet, 33
111, 462; State u EufE, 80 La. Ann. Mo. 105. In Kirk v. Nowell, 1 Term
497. See, also, Clerk v. Tucket, 3 E. 124, Lord Mansfield held that
Lev. 281 ; S. c, 2 Vent 183 ; Adley v. such a power must be expressly
Beeves, 2 Maule & Sel. 60; Lee v. given, as otherwise it was against
■Wallis, 1 Kenyon, 295. Magna Charta; and Mr. Justice
s Mclnerney v. City of Denver BuUer also held the ordinance creat-
(Colo., 1893), 29 Pac. Eep. 516, 531. ing a forfeiture to be bad for the ad-
§ 528.]
OBDINANOES ASD BY-LAWS.
635
a town council was authorized to impose for violation of or-
dinances were fines not exbeeding $50, an ordinance declaring
that any retailer who should sell or give any spirituous liquors
to a slave without a written permit should forfeit his license
was held to be void. A distinction was urged by counsel be-
tween the forfeiture of a license and the forfeiture of goods
and chattels, but the court replied that the oppression and
aai-dship of a forfeiture does not depend on the nature but
the value of the thing forfeited. " It may be better for the
retailer," said Frost, J., " to have his stock in trade forfeited
than his license to retail. ... If the town council can
forfeit it for the offense of selling spirits to a slave, they may
declare it forfeited for any other offense ; and thus convert
a license to retail into a recognizance of the retailer for the
observance of all their by-laws." '
§ 528. The same subject continued. — When the power to
denounce a forfeiture of property is clear it must not be exer-
ditional reason that the act of parlia-
ment had prescribed in what manner
by-laws should be enforced, namely,
by fine or amerciament, and that
therefore the corporation was pre-
cluded from inflicting any other pun-
ishment. This case has been cited
by subsequent elementary writers as
establishing both these positions. 3
Kyd on Corp. 110; Willcook on
Munia Corp., p. 180, pL 449 ; Angell
& Ames on Corp., § 860. See, also.
Hart V. Mayor i&c of Albany, 9
Wend. 571 ; Clerk v. Tucket, 3 Lev.
381 ; Lee v. Wallis, 1 Kenyon, 293 ;
PhUlips V. Allen, 41 Pa. St. 4S1;
Heise v. Columbia, 6 Rich. 404 ; Rose-
baugh V. Saffln, 10 Ohio, 31 ; Cotter
V, Doty, 5 Ohio, 394; Kneedler v.
Norristown, 100 Pa. St 368; White
V. Talhnan, 26 N. J. Law, 67 ; Ber-
gen V. Clarkson, 6 N. J. Law 353 ;
Slessman v. Crozier, 80 Ind. 487;
Hampton v. Conroy, 56 Iowa, 498;
Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa, 378;
Varden v. Mount, 78 Ky. 86 ; Mayor
&C. of New York v. Ordrenan, 13
Johns. 133: Dunham v. Eochester,
5 Cowen, 463 ; Mayor &c. of. Mobile
V. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137; Cincinnati v.
Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 357; Wilcox
V. Hemming, 58 Wis. 144 ; Donovan
V. Vicksburg, 29 Miss. 347. But an
ordinance imposing a pecuniary pen-
alty and also a forfeiture may be
good as to the penalty and void as to
the forfeiture. Kneedler v. Korris-
town, 100 Pa. St 368.
'Heise v. Town C'ouacil, 6 Rich.
(S. C.) Law, 404, 415, 417. See, also,
Ridgeway v. West, 60 Ind. 371;
Staats V. Washington, 44 N. J. Law,
610. An ordinance pi'oviding that
upon a second conviction for viola-
tion of a Sunday closing of tippling-
houses law the defendant's license
and the money paid therefor shall
be forfeited and remain forfeited,
though upon appeal and trial de
novo he is, acquitted, is void for un-
reasonableness. Mclnerney v. City
of Denver (Colo., 1893), 39 Pac. Rept
516.
536 OEDINANOES AND BT-LAWS. [§ 528.
oised in contravention of constitutional provisions looking to
the security of property from condemnation without " due
process of law." Most of the cases in which the validity of
ordinances in this particular has been discussed were those
enacted for the impounding and sale of animals running at
large. " The cases agree," says Judge Dillon, " that when
the' power to denounce the forfeiture against such animals is
given there should be notice either actual or constructive, or
prior legal proceedings." ^ But •this alternative requirement
has afforded ground for much contention among the courts.
The law was laid down by the Supreme Court of Kansas as
follows: — "Where the law or an ordinance provides that the
owner of the cattle shall, in addition to the cost of taking
them up, impounding and keeping them, pay for the dam-
ages that they may do to private individuals while unlawfully
running at large, the question pt damages and the amount
thereof can be determined only by judicial investigation, and
generally in a suit between the parties interested." And it
will also be admitted that where fines or forfeitures, or any-
thing of a penal or criminal nature or character, is imposed,
the question of whether the owner of the stock is liable for
the same can only be determined by judicial investigation.*
But when nothing is attempted to be imposed upon the owner
of the stock as damages or penalty, but only the reasonable
cost of taking up, impounding and keeping the same, and
sufficient notice is provided for, and the ordinance is authorized
by the city charter, it is believed that no court has ever held
the law, or the ordinance found-ed thereon, to be unconstitu-
tional or invalid, although there may be no provision for a
judicial investigation, except the general remedies to deter-
mine whether the law or the ordinance has been complied
with, and although the notice provided for may not be a per-
sonal notice, but only a notice by publication or by posting." *
1 1 Dillon on Munio. Corp., § 348. field v. Longest, 6 Ired. (Law), 268
2 Bullock V. Geomble, 45 111. 318. Wilcox v. Hemming, 58 Wis. 144
s Pappen v. Holmes, 44 111. 360 ; Gosselihk v. Campbell, . 4 Iowa, 296
Willis V. Legnis, 45 111. 289. McKibben v. Fort Scott, 35 Ark. 352
« Gilchrist v. Schmidling (1873), Hellen v. Noe, 3 Ired. (Law), 498
12 Kan. 263, 272, quoted and ap- McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.)
proved in Fort Smith v. Dodson 483; Shaw v. Kennedy, Term Rep.
(1885), 46 Ark. 296. See, also, Whit- (N. C.) 158; Davies v. Morgan, 1 C. &
§ 529.] 0EDINAN0E8 AHD BY LAW^. 537
But the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declare that a judicial
investigation is essential to the validity of such proceedings.
" The constitution provides that the citizen shall not be de-
prived of his property except by the law of the land. The
meaning of the provision has generally been construed a law
that hears before condemning and arrives at a judgment for
the divestiture of the rights of property through what is ordi-
narily understood to be judicial process — general rules that
govern society in reference to the rights of property. This is
the general rule, and it is only in extreme cases, when the
preservation and repose of society or the protection of the
property rights of a large class of the community absolutely
require a departure, that the courts recognize any exception.
When, for instance, it becomes necessary to destroy private
property to prevent the spread of fire or pestilence in a city
or the advance of an army, the rule is silent, bending to an
overwhelming necessity." The court insists that the right to
proceed without citation and without hearing should not be
extended beyond the impounding of the animals. "When
that is done the necessity for summary and precipitate action
ceases and judicial proceedings looking to a forfeiture may
then properly begin." ^
§ 529. Cumulative fines and fines for continuous and re-
peated offenses. — A municipal corporation having power to
enforce ordinances by fines may distinguish between a first
and a second offfense, and mark that distinction by a gradation
of the penalty, provided the penalty in no case exceeds that
authorized to be imposed.* Where the acts are distinct repe-
titions of an offense and not merely a continuation of a mis-
conduct which may be treated as an 'enijirety the full penalty
may be inflicted in each case. Unlawful sales of liquor on
the same day may,' for instance, be punishable separately.'
J. B87 ; Grover v. Huckins, 26 Mich, leans, 18 La. Ann. 432) ; Cincinnati
476 ; Campau v. Langley, 39 Mich. v. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257.
451; Moore w State, 11 Lea (Tenn.), ^Staats v. Washington (1883), 45
85; Mayor &c. v. Lanham, 67 Ga. N. J. Law, 318, citing Butchers' Co.
753. V. Bullock, 2 Bos. & Pul. 434.
iVardentt Mount (1879). 78 Ky. 86, 8 Columbia v. Harrison, 2 C. C.
and cases there cited. See, also, in (S. C.) 216 ; Heise v. Columbia, 6
favor of this view, Lanfear v. Mayor, Rich. 404
4 La. 97 icf. Guillotte v. New Or-
538 OBDINAN0E8 AND BY-LAWS. [§ 530.
But where a person was charged in one complaint with one
hundred violations of an ordinance " prohibiting any person
from cutting down and making use of cedar and other trees,"
it was held to set forth only a single offense.' It was also
held that an ordinance imposing a fine of $125 on each hun-
dred pounds of gunpowder kept in store, the limit of power
to punish being $250, could not be enforced beyond the limit.*
So, too, an ordinance prescribing a penalty " of not less than
one dollar nor more than fiv6*dollars for every hour'" that a
person shall keep his wagon within the limits of a market
without the authority of the clerk of the market is in Viola-,
tion of a statute conferring power to pass reasonable by-laws
with penalties not exceeding $20 for one offense.'
§ 530. Enforcement by complaint — Nature of the pro-
ceeding.— There is great confusion among the authorities as
to the rules of procedure and evidence applicable to the prose-
cution of offenders against municipal ordinances by complaint.
The decisions are influenced in a great measure, but not wholly,
by local statutory or constitutional provisions.* But the code
of Wyoming civil procedure in all such actions is expressly
enjoined.' Substantially the same rule has been judicially
adopted in some other States, while in many jurisdictions they
are deemed to possess in whole or in part the characteristics
1 State V. Moultrieville, Rice (S. C), single continuous offense, and the
Law, 158. ordinance afiSxing a penalty which,
2 New York v. Odrenaux, 13 Johns, computed accoinling to its terms,
123. The court remarked that if a may exceed $30 for a single offense
contrary construction were to prevail upon one and the same day is void."
a penalty to the full amount might Commonwealth v. Wilkins (1876), 121
be repeated, not upon the offense it- Mass. 356. Cf. Horr & Bemis on
self but upon the quantity of the of- Munia Police Ordinances, § 153.
f ense, and that with equal propriety * These must be strictly followed so
the penalty might be imposed on far as they go. People v. Whitney's
every pound or on every grain. See, Point, 33 Hun, 508 ; and generally the
also, Chicago v. Qnim'by, 38 111. 374 ; case is controlled by the procedure
Hai't V. Mayor &c., 9 Wend. 571 ; which obtains in similar cases before
Stokes V. Corporation of New York, the same tribunal. People v. Cox,
14 Wend. 87 ; Marshall v. Smith, L. R. 76 N. Y. 47 ; Greeley v. Passaic, 43 N.
8 C. P. 416 ; Zylstra v. Charleston, 1 J. Law, 87.
Bay (S. C), 383 ; Crepps v. Durden, 6 Jenkins v. Cheyenne, 1 Wy. Ter.
Coyrp. 640. 387.
* " The offense thus punished is a
§ 531.]
OEDINAlfCES AND BY-LAWS.
539
of criminal prosecutions. A summary of the doctrine in va-
rious States is given in a recent and much-quoted treatise, and
the authorities there cited will be found in the note.*
§ 531. The complaint — General requisites. — At common
law no trial for any offense except contempts could ever bei
had without a written complaint.' It is a part of the technical
meaning of the term " complaint " that it is verified by the
oath or affirmation of the person who informs.' The cora-
• Horr & Bemis on Munic. Police
Ordinances, § 170. Alabama: Stricter
rules than in cifil cases. Mobile v.
Jones, 42 Ala. 630; Fuhrman v.
Huntsville, 54 Ala. 263. California:
Criminal Santa Barbara v. Sher-
man, 61 Cal. 57 ; People v. Johnson,-
30 Cal. 98. (For the rule in Colo-
rado, see the succeeding section.)
Georgia: Not criminal. Williams v.
Augusta, 4 Gra. 509 ; Floyd v. Eaton-
ton, 14 Ga. 354. Illinois: Not crim-
inal Quinoy v. Ballance, 30 111. 185 ;
Town of Jacksonville v. Holland, 19
m. 271 ; Lewiston v. Proctor, 33 111.
533. Indiana: Not criminal. Brook-
ville V. Gagle, 73 Ind. 117 ; Quigley v.
Aurora, 50 Ind. 28; Greenburg v.
Corwin, 58 Ind. 518 ; Goshen v. Crox-
ton, 34 Ind, 239; Commissioners u
Chissom, 7 Ind. 688; Miller v.
O'Reilly, 84 Ind. 168. Iowa: Not
criminal. Davenport v. Bird, 84 la.
524. Kansas: In some cases civil, in
others criminal. Neitzel v. Concor-
dia, 14 Kan. 446. Cf. Emporia v. Vol-
mer, 13 Kan. 622. Massachusetts:
Criminal. Commonwealth v. Wor-
cester, 8 Pick. 462 ; In re Goddard, 16
Pick. 504. Michigan: Not criminal.
Cooper V. People, 41 Mich. 403 ; Peo-
ple V. Detroit, 18 Mich. 445. Minne-
sota: Not criminal. State v. Lee, 37
Minn. 445. Missouri: Not criminal.
St Louis V. Vert, 84 Mo. 204; Ex
parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 895; Ex
parte Kiburg, 10 Mo. App. 442. Ne-
braska: Criminal. Brownville v.
Cook, 4 Neb. 103. New Hampshire:
Criminal. State v. Stearns, 31 N. H.
106. New Jersey: Not criminal. Bro-
phy V. Perth Amboy, 44 N. J. Law,
317 ; Kip V. Patterson, 26 N. J. Law,
298; Keeler v. Milledge, 24 N. J.
Law, 143. New York: Not criminal.
Wood V. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 431. See,
also, Buffalo v. Schliefer, 25 Hun,
275. Ohio: In some cases civil, in
others criminal. Cincinnati v.
Gwynne, 10 Ohio, 192; Markle v.
Akron, 14 Ohio, 586. See, also, Lar-
ney v. Cleveland, 34 Ohio St 599.
Wisconsin: The rule is now nearly
or quite the same as that in Colo-
rado. See the following section.
Platteville v. McKernan, 54 Wis. 487 ;
Platteville v. Bell, 43 Wis. 488; Fink
V. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 26 ; Oshkosh
V. Schwartz, 55 Wis. 483 ; Sutton v.
McConnell, 46 Wis. 269; Chafln v.
Waukesha County, 63 Wis. 463.
24 Blackstone's Com. 280; Bar-
bour's Cr. Law, 614; 1 Bishop Crim.
Proc, § 894; Chitty Cr. Law, 34;
Archbold's Cr. Prac & PI., p. 31, n. 1 ;
Allen V. Gray, 11 Conn. 95, 102;
Tracy v. Williams, 4 Conn. 107; Prell
V. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426; Campbell
V. Thompson, 16 Me. 117. On appeal,
city ordinances will not be presumed
to require a written complaint. Al-
ton V. Kirsch, 68 111. 261.
3 Campbell v. Thompson, 16 Me.
117, 120. A slight error in the jurat
will not vitiate the affidavit Chero-
kee V. Fox, 34 Kan. 16. If the charter
540
OBDINANOES AITS BT-LA.WS.
[§ 532.
plaint ought regularly to be entitled in behalf of the proper
party, which in most cases is the corporation;^ but mere
irregularities not affecting any substantial right of the de-
fendant, and where the record of the proceedings is sufficiently
full and specific to protect him against another prosecution
for the same offense, will be disregarded.^ There must be a
distinct allegation of the offense,' a reference to the ordinance
violated, and a conclusion.*
§ 532. The same subject continued — Pleading. — The pre-
cision required in common-law informations or indictments is
not required in affidavits for violation of municipal ordinances.
"It is sufficient if they set out with clearness the offense
charged, and the substance of that part of the ordinance
which has been violated, with a reference to the title, the
date and the section." * It is generally held sufficient to set
out the substance of the ordinance or the section of it which is
^Ueged to have been violated.^ But a simple charge of violat-
Baid: — "This much, however, it
requires an information by the city
attorney, a complaint made by a
deputy, though afterwards adopted
by him, is not suSBcient. Kansas City
V. Flanagan, 69 Mo. 23.
1 Williamson v. Commonwealth, 4
B. Mon. (Ky.) 148 ; Smith v. Marston,
6 Tex. 486 ; Webster v. Lansing, 47
Mich. 192. Any form of complaint
in this respect which is prescribed by
statute must be strictly obeyed.
State V. Zeigler, 33 N. J. Law, 262 ;
State V. Bartlett, 35 Wis. 287 ; Exeter
V. Starre, 3 Show. 158; Harris v.
Wakeman, Say, 254 ; Commonwealth
ti. Fahey, 5 Cush. 408.
2 State V. GrafiEmuUer, 26 Minn. 6 ;
Farrel v. London, 13 Upper Can. Q.
B. 343 ; Hershofif v. Beverly, 45 N. J.
Law, 288 ; Alton v. Kirsch, 68 111. 261 ;
SUte V. King, 37 la. 463.
3 Roberson v. Lambertville, 38 N. J.
Law, 69; Horr & Bemis on Munic.
Ordinances, § 173.
* See the following two sections.
^Keeler v. Milledge, 34 N. J. Law,
143, 145. Continuing, the court
ought to contain, for the office of the
complaint is not only to give the
magistrate jurisdiction, but event-
ually to apprise the party of what
offense he is charged with, and it an-
swers neither of these purposes with
certainty unless it contains these
particulars. I am inclined to think
this complaint is defective, inasmuch
as it does not give the date and the
section of the ordinance alleged to
have been violated ; but as it refers
to the ordinance relating to markets,
and gives the literal words of the
section, and as there is no pretense
that the defen'dant was sut^prised, I
should have some hesitation in re-
versing for this ciiuse alone." See,
also, Memphis v. O'Connor, 53 Mo.
468; Commonwealth v. Rowe, 141
Mass. 79; State v. Dunbar, 43 La.
Ann. 836; State v. Baker (La., 1892),
10 So. Rep. 405 ; City Council v. Ash-
ley Phosphate Co. (S. C, 1891), ,13
S. E. Rep. 845.
*Kip V. Patterson, 26 N. J. Law,
§ 532.]
OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS.
541
ing an ordinance by a mere recital of the number of the sec-
tion is insufficient.' The complaint should state briefly but
clearly the acts done or omitted to be done which constitute
a violation of the ordinance, together with the time when and
place where the offense was committed.^ The general rule
undoubtedly is that it is sufficient to describe the offense in
the language of the ordinance ; ' but where the words of the
ordinance by their generality embrace within their litaral
terms cases which are not within their equity and, spirit or
298; Goldwaite v. City Council Sec,
50 Ala. 486 ; Case v. Mobile, 30 Ala.
538; Charleston v. Chur, 2 Bailey
(S. C), 164; Clevenger v. Rushville,
90 Ind. 258 ; Janes ville v. Milwaukee
&C. R Co., 7 Wis. 484 ; People v. Jus-
tices, 12 Hun, 65; City Council v.
Seeba, 4 Strobh. Law (S. C), 319;
O'Malia v. Wentwortb, 65 Me. 129.
In Ex parte Lane (1888), 76 Cal. 587,
a description of the oflfense, and a
reference to the section of the ordi-
nance, was held BuflScient. See, also,
to the same point, Faribault v. Wil-
son, 34 Minn. 254; Auburn v. Eld-
ridge, 77 Ind. 126; Huntington v.
Pease, 56 Ind. 305 ; Goshen v. Kern,
63 Ind. 468; Whitson v. Franklin, 34
Ind. 392 ; West v. Columbus, 20 Kan.
633; State v. Merritt, 83 N. C. 677;
State V. Cainan, 94 N. C. 880. In
some cases it has been held unnec-
essary to refer to the ordinance.
Rochester v. Upraan, 19 Minn. 108;
State V. Richards, 21 Minn. 47 ; Osh-
kosh V. Schwartz, 55 Wis. 483. See,
also, Information of Oliver, 21 S. C.
318, and contra, Winona v. Burke, 23
Minn. 354; Lewistou v. Fairfield, 47
Me. 481. But the prevailing rule is
that the courts will take judicial no-
tice of the charter, and the power to
make by-laws, but not of the by-laws
themselves. Case v. Mayor of Mobile,
30 Ala. 538 ; Goodrich v. Brown, 30
Iowa, 391 ; Garvin v. Wells, 8 Iowa,
386 (c/. Conboy v. Iowa City, 2 Iowa,
SO); Elizabethtown v. Lefler, 23 111.
90; Harker v. Mayor, 17 Wend. 199;
People V. Mayor &c. of N. Y., 7 How.
Pr. (N. T.) 81 ; Mooney v. Kennett,
19 Mo. 551 ; Cox v. St Louis, 11 Mo.
431; Austin v. Walton, 68 Tex. 507;
New Orleans v. Baudro, 14 La. Ann.
303; City of Miles City v. Kern
(Mont, 1892), 29 Pac. Rep. 720 ; Peo-
ple V. Buchanan, 1 Idaho, 681 ; Green
V. Indianapolis, 22 Ind. 193; Wheel-
ing V. Black, 25 West Va. 266 ; Gar-
land V. Denver, 11 Colo. 534 ; s. c, 19
Pac. Rep. 960. In Town of Mounds-
ville V. Velton, 35 West Va, 217 ; s. C,
13 S. E. Rep. 373, it is said to be " well
settled " that the courts of the mu-
nicipality will take judicial notice of
its ordinances without pleading or
proof, — citing Dillon on Munio.
Corp., § 413, and Wheeling v. Black,
25 West Va. 266. But c/. Horr &
Bemis on Munic Ordinances, § 174,
and Bishop on Stat Crimes (2d ed.),
§ 106, and cases cited; Downing v.
Miltonvale, 36 Kan. 740.
'City of Huntington v. Pease, 56
Ind. 305; City of Huntington v.
Cheesbro, 57 Ind. 74.
2 City of Huntington v. Pease, 56
Ind. 305; Memphis u O'Connor, 53
Mo. 468 ; Lippman v. South Bend, 84
Ind. 276; St Louis v. Fitz, 63 Mo.
583.
'St Louis V. Knox, 74 Mo. 79;
State V. Carpenter, 60 Conn. 97;
Commonwealth v. Cutter
1893), 39 N. E. Rep. 1146.
542 OEDINANOES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 533.
the obvious intention of the framers, the rules of good plead-
ing require all the circumstances and ingredients of the offense
to be set out.'
§533. Pleading further considered. — While some lati-
tude must be allowed in the construction of complaints
charging violations of ordinances, all the common safeguards
and requirements of criminal pleading ought not to be disre-
garded. A complaint for wilfMly refusing, as the agent of a
water company, to supply the complainant with water, a
tender being made in actual money for that purpose, which
does not state that the water company was under a legal ob-
ligation by ordinance to supply such water, and does not in
express words or by fair implication allege that the tender
was sufficient or was the amount of the legal or contract
price of the water supply desired, is bad. and should be
quashed on motion.^ But a general allegation that an ordi-
nance has been duly passed is sufficient without alleging that
every antecedent act requisite to its legal passage has been
done ; ' nor that the officers were duly elected and authorized
to pass the ordinance.* As a general rule exceptions need not
be negatived." If an offense be cumulative with respect to
the acts done, although any one of the acts be sufficient to
constitute the offense, the cumulative offense may be charged
without making the pleading bad for duplicity.* A complaint
for allowing swine to go upon the sidewalk is not objec-
1 State V. Goulding, 44 N. H. 384 ; * Hardenbrook v. Ligonier, 95 Ind.
State V. Beirce, 37 Conn. 319 ; Com- 70. See, also, Winooski v. Gokey, 49
monwealth v. Stark, 2 Cush. 556 ; Rex Vt 383 ; Janesville v. Milwaukee &c
V. Home, Cowp. 673, 683 ; State v. E. Co., 7 Wis. 484. Cf. Washington
Follet, 6 N, a 53; 3 Hawk. P. C, v. Frank, 1 Jones, 436.
ch. 35, §§ 111, 115; 3 Bac. Abr. 113; 'McGearu Woodruflf,33N. J. Law,
State V. Robinson, 39 N. H. 374 ; Rex 313 ; Lynch v. People, 16 Mich. 473 ;
V. Mason, 2 D. & E. 586; Davey v. Martinsville u Frieze, 83 Ind. 507.
Baker, 4 Burr. 3461 ; Rex v. Stading, « Commonwealth v. Curtis, 9 Allen,
1 Str. 497; Anthony v. State, 39 Ala. 368; State v. Haney, 2 Dev. & Bat
27 ; State v. Fleetward, 16 Miss. 448; 390, 403. See, also, Regina v. Bowers.
Horr & Bemis on Munic. Ordinances, 1 Denison, 33 ; Stevens v. Common-
§ 17b. wealth, 6 Met. 243 ; State v. Morton,
ajohnsonuCityof Winfleld(Kan., 27 Vt 310; Hinkle v. Common-
1893), 39 Pac. Rep. 559. wealth, 4 Dana (Ky.), 518.
'Becker v. City of Washington
(Mo.), 7 S. W. Rep. 391.
§ 534.]
OEDINANCES AND BY-LAWS.
543
tionable in describing a oontinuous street by the names of its
different parts.* Where the complaint is brought in the name
of the corporation, it is proper to conclude "contrary to the
form of the ordinance," etc. : - but when it is required to be
prosecuted in the name of the State, it ought to conclude con-
trary to the statute, or to both statute and ordinance.*
§ 534. Proof of ordinances — The method of proving or-
dinances is frequently provided for by statute ; * but where, the
matter is not thus regulated, the common-law rule requires
the production of the originals or the books in which they
are recorded.' If the regular enactment of the ordinance is
not questioned, it is not necessary to show that fact in addi-
tion to its production to sustain a conviction." But where it
becomes necessary to prove a compliance with all formalities,
none must be omitted which are requisite to its validity.'
1 Commonwealth v. Curtis, 9 Allen,
26a
2 Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt 282.
*HoiT & Bemis on Munic. Police
Ordinances, § 176. In a prosecution
for Tiolation of an ordinance under a
statute providing that "it shall be
sufficient to set forth the offense
fully, plainly, substantially and form-
ally, and no part of such ordinance
need be set forth," a conclusion
"against the revised ordinances of
said city in such case made and pro-
Tided," is sufficient to embrace an
amendment to a section included in
a volume entitled, " Revised Ordi-
nances." Commonwealth v. Oden-
weller (Mass., 1893), 30 N. E. Rep.
1022.
*Napman v. People, 19 Mich. 352;
St Louis V. St Louis R. Co., 89 Mo. 44
See, also. Downing v. Miltonvale, 36
Ean. 740.
'Chicago &C. R. Co. v. Engle, 76
DL 317; City Council v. Dunn, 1 Mc-
Cord (S. C), 333 ; Fitch v. Pinckard, 5
ni. 78 ; Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 446 ;
State V. King, 37 Iowa, 463 ; Barr v.
Auburn, 89 III. 361 ; Lindsay v. Chi-
cago, 115 IlL 120; Independence v.
Trouvalle, 15 Kan. 70. As to attesta-
tion and identification of the book,
see Town of Tipton v. Norman, 72
Mo. 380 ; Ottum wa v. Schaub, 53 Iowa,
515. Where there is no record the orig-
inal or a certified copy is admissible.
Pugh V. Little Rock, 35 Ark. 75;
Bailey v. State (Neb.), 47 N. W. Rep.
208 ; Kinghorn v. Kingston, 25 Up.
Can. Q. B. 180 ; Block v. Jacksonville,
36 111. 301.
6 Town of Flora w Lee, 5 HI. Ap. 629.
7 Willard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn.
347; Elizabethtown v. Lefler, 23 111.
90; Schott V. People, 89 111. 195. The
record-book is the best evidence of
the ordinance and cannot be contra-
dicted by parol. People v. Murray,
57 Mich. 396 ; Solomon v. Hughes, 24
Kan. 211 ; Lexington v. Headley, 5
Bush, 508 ; Ball v. Fagg, 67 Mo. 481 ;
Covington v. Ludlow, 1 Mete. (Ky.)
395 : St Louis v. Foster, 53 Mo. 513.
Cf. Knight V. Railroad Co., 70 Mo.
231 ; Barton v. Pittsburgh, 4 Brewst
373 ; Troy v. Atchison &c. R. Co., 11
Kan. 519. But it is generally held that
parol proof of publication is compe-
544 OEDrUANOES AND BY-LAWS. [§ 535.
§ 535. Bight to trial Iby jury Constitutional provisions
relating to trial by jury, being twice put in jeopardy, pro-
ceedings by indictment or information and the like, in crim-
inal cases, are generally held to have been adopted with refer-
ence to the procedure previously existing. If in a given class
of offenses trials without a jury were formerly the prevailing
rule, this rule is not abrogated by the constitution.^ Both in
this country and in England the transgrpssion of municipal
regulations enacted under th% police power for the purpose
of preserving the health, peace and good order, and otherwise
promoting the general welfare within cities and towns, have
for considerably more than a century been generally prose-
cuted without a jury.* It is certainly true that where the
judgment against the defendant entails a fine, even if it^ col-
lection may by virtue of the statute and ordinance be enforced
by imprisonment, the proceeding remains a civil action so far
as a jury trial is concerned, whether it be in the name of the
State or not.' And in a number of well-considered decisions
the same rule is held to apply where the judgment may in-
clude imprisonment in the first instance and not merely as an
alternative.* There is excellent authority for the proposition
tent Horr & Bemis on Manic. Police Denver (Colo., 1893), 29 Fac. £ep.
Ordinances, § 187, and oases there 516.
cited; Eldora v. Burlingame, 63 Iowa, * State v. Lee, 39 Minn. 153; City
23 ;Newhanu Aurora, 14 111. 364 ;Teft of Greeley v. Hamman (1888), 13
w. Size, 10 lU. 433. See, also. Raker Colo.94; £'a!jpar<eHollwedell,74Mo.
». Magnon, 9 111. App. 155 ; Schwartz 400; State v. Ely, 4 Oregon, 277;
V. Oshkosh, 55 Wis. 490; Village of State v. Conlin, 27 Vt 318; Wong v.
Betholto V. Conely, 9 111. App. 339. City of Astoria, 13 Oregon, 538 ; State
1 Cooley's Const Lim. (5th ed.) U Mobile, 20 La. Ann. 325 ; Byers v.
390, n. 3 ; Sedgwick on Stat and Commonwealth, 42 Pa. St 89 ; Shafer
Const Law, 487, n., 491, n., 497; v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331, and cases
State V. Gtenn, 54 Md. 573 ; Shafer cited in the preceding note,
u Mumma, 17 Md. 331 ; Williams «. 'Natal v. Louisiana (1890), 139
Augusta, 4 Ga. 607 ; Hull v. Mayor, U. S. 621 ; City of Oshkosh v.
72 Ga. 319 ; Ward v. Farwell, 97 HI. Schwartz, 55 Wi& 487; Platteville v.
593; Floyd v. Commissioners, 14 Ga. Bell, 43 Wis. 488; State v. Smith, 52
356; McGear u Woodruff, 83 N. J, Wis. 134; Chapin u Waukesha
Law, 315 ; Howe v. Treasurer, 87 County, 63 Wis. 463 ; Baldwin v. City,
N. J. Law, 145; State v. City of 68 111.418; J7a! parfe Hollwedell, 74
Topeka, 86 Kan. 76 ; Inwood u. State, Mo. 395; Horr & Bemis on Munic.
43 Ohio St 186 ; People v. McCarthy, Police Ordinances, § 181.
45How. Pr. 97; Ex parte Kihurg, 10 < McGear v. Woodruff, 33 N. J.
Mo. App. 447 ; Mclnerney v. City of Law, 315. In Hill v. Mayor, 73 Ga.
I 536.]
•OEDINANCES AND BY-IAWS.
545
that an ordinance providing for sMmmary proceedings with-
out a jury is in that respect void if the offense be also a stat-
abory misdemeanor pumisihable by indictment and jury trial.*
§ 536, The same subject continned. — It is believed that
no court has gone further in supporting summary convictions
than the Supreme Court of Colorado in a recent decision,
The defendant was prosecuted for violating an ordinance
regulating dram-shops. By general statute the act was made
a misdemeanor punishable by indictment or information^
trial by jury, etc., and it was strenuously insisted by counsel
for the defense that it does not follow, because an act might be
punishable under each of two different laws, that the procedr
ure might be different — that the defendant was at least en-
titled to trial by jury. The court decided that a summary
proceeding for violation of a municipal by-law is not neces-
sarily unconstitutional, though it be a statutory misdemeanor.
" The inquiry," said the court, " is not, was the act complained
of a public misdemeanor by statute or at the common law ?
314, the court said: — "If no man
could be fined or imprisoned for
violation of city police ordinances
except by a jury trial on indictment,
away would go all power in our mu-
nicipal authorities to preserve peace
and good order within their corpo-
rate limits." In affirming the same
doctrine the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado used the following vigorous
language : — " The public welfare de-
mands summary and speedy .prose-
cution of oflEenders against munici-
pal ordinances. To hold that unless
there be presentation by indictment,
trial by jury, and unless all the
other constitutional rights and priv-
ileges accorded to defendants in crim-
inal cases be extended to each and
every person charged with these
petty offenses, and imprisonment
could not follow conviction, would
be disastrous beyond measure to the
welfare of those living within cities
and towns, and would largely destroy
35
the usefulness of such corporations.'*
Per Justice Helrn, in City of Greeley
V. Ham man (1888), 13 Colo. 94.
1 Some of these cases declare, how-
ever, that if the defendant is entitled
on appeal to a trial by jury and there
be no unreasonable limitation con-
nected with the appeal, the constitu-
tional provisions are satisfied. See
In re Dana, T Ben. 4; Callan v. Wil-
son, 137 U. S. 540, confining this
qualification to petty offenses. Where
the defendant was required, as a
condition precedent to the right of
appeal, to execute a bond with ap-
proved sureties, not merely for his
appearance in the police court, but
also for the payment of any judg-
ment rendered on the appeal, and
likewise as a further condition to pay
all costs accrued in the police court,
the act would be unconstitutional in
cases where the right of trial by jury
exists. Mclnerney v. City of Denver
(Colo., 1893;, 39 Pac. Rep. 516.
546 OBDINANOES ANP BY-LAWS. [§ 537.
but does the offense charged belongs to a class of offenses that
were usuaWy proceeded against summarily? " '
§ 637. Certiorari and habeas corpus. — Where no appeal
is given by statute or charter from the decision of the munic-
ipal authorities, certiorari will issue for the purpose of a judi-
cial review of their action.' In the United States the office
of this writ has been extended beyond the practice in Eng-
iand, and it is used not only to review the decisions of courts,
properly so called, but also the proceedings of special tribu-
nals, commissioners, magistrates and officers of municipal
corporations exercising judicial powers, affecting the rights
or property of the citizen, when they act in a summary way,
or in a new course different from that of the common law.
The authorities are almost uniform in holding that mere leg-
islative or ministerial acts, as such, cannot be reviewed on cer-
tioroA-i? There is no ground for the remedy unless it be made
to appear that the plaintiff may suffer injury in case of non-
intervention.* And it must also appear that he has some
substantial interest in the subject-matter, on which the judg-
ment of the court can act effectively apd work advantage to
him.* Where the plaintiff was convicted on his plea of not
guilty and satisfied the judgment by paying the fine, he was
'Mclnerneyr. City of Denver (Colo., ti'ial is not de not;o, and conclusions
29 Pac. Eep. 516. The court of fact cannot he revised. Town of
also recognized the converse of the Camden v. Bloch, 65 Ala. 236. If
proposition, that is to say, that though there is a statutoiy remedy it is ex-
a particular offense may have been elusive. Montgomery v. Belscr, 53
unknown to the common or statu- Ala. 379; Intendant v. Chandler, 6
tory law before the adoption of the Ala. 297 ; Jackson v. People, 9 Mich.
constitution, yet if it clearly belongs 111 ; Taylor v. Americus, 39 Ga. 59 ;
to a class of oflfenses theretofore State v. Bill, 13 Ired. Law (N. C),
triable by jury the constitutional 378. Where the time for appeal has
guaranty applies. This is the doc- been allowed to expire, there is no
■trioe of the United States Supreme relief unless in special circumstances.
Court, where, however, it was held Beasley v. Beckley, 28 West Va. 81 ;
that a pei-son charged with conspir- Poe v. Machine Works, 24 West Va.
acy to prevent another from pursu- 517.
ing a lawful avocation was entitled ' /rare Wilson, 33 Minn. 145. Contra
to a jury trial. Callan v. Wilson, 137 in New Jersey. Camden v. Mulford,
U. S. 540. So, too, on a charge of 26 N. J. Law, 49 ; State v. Jersey
libeL In re Dana, 7 Ben. 14. City, 29 N. J. Law, 170.
8 Errors of law apparent on the * Davison v. Otis, 24 Mich. 23.
record may be reviewed, but the <> Colden v. Botta, 12 Wend. 334
537.]
OKDINANCES AND BY-LAWS.
647
9t entitled to a review of the proceedings.' It is not the
povince of the writ of habeas corpus to retry any questions
f fact upon which the findings of the court of original juris-
iotion must be presumed to have been based. Unless it
ppears as a matter of law that an ordinance is void, the
jmedy of review must be had by other appropriate prooeed-
1 People V. Leavitt, 41 Mich. 470.
he writ does not lie in favor of the
>Tporation after trial and acquittal,
ranston u Augusta, 61 Ga. 573. An
mtting owner may maintain cer-
orari to review an ordinance
langing the grade of a street in
ont of his property, and if the
lange of grade is justified only as
part of an entire scheme he may
question the legality of the scheme.
Read v. Camden (N. J., 1893), 24 Atl.
Rep. 549.
2 Question of reasonableness de-
pending on facts will not be thus
retried. In re Wright, 39 Hun, 357.
See, also. Madden v. Smeltz, 3 C. C.
Rep. (Ohio), 168.
CHAPTER Xy.
EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS,
§ 538. Powers of a municipal corpo-
ration generally.
B39. Delegation of powers.
840. The same subject continued.
541. Exercise of powers.
543. Mode of exercise.
643. Proceedings not reviewable.
544. The same subject continued.
545. Constitutionality of acts grant-
ing powers.
546. The same subject continued.
547. Validity of acts granting pow-
ers.
548. Power to " trade " should not
be granted.
549. Power of towns as to villages
within them.
550. Power to issue commercial
paper.
551. As to trusts.
553. Purchase at tax sales.
553. Granting exclusive franchises.
554. The same subject continued.
555. Contracts not exclusive.
556. Improvements generally.
557. Costs of Improvements.
558. Gas and water supply.
659. Natui'al-gas companies.
560. Establishment of electric plant
661. Public property.
563. The same subject continued.
563. Parks.
i mi. Wharves.
666. The same subject continued.
566. Markets.
567. The same subject continued.
568. Streets generally.
569. Construction of statutory pro-
visions.
570. Protection of streets.
571. Grading of streets.
573. Allowing the use of streets by
railroads.
673. The same subject continued.
674. Regulations as to railroads us-
ing streets.
675. The same subject continued.
576. Crossings of railways.
677. Sewers.
578. Fire limits.
579. Directions as to buildings.
680. Police power.
581. The same subject continued.
683. To promote health.
583. General welfare, eta
584. Licenses.
585. Occupationa
586. The same subject continued.
587. Public offenses.
588. The same subject continued.
589. Nuisances.
590. Holidays, etc.
691. Miscellaueoua
§ 538. Powers of a municipal corporation generally. —
The powers of a municipal corporation are those granted in ex-
press words by its charter or the general statutes under which
it is incorporated ; the powers necessarily or fairly implied in
or incident to the powers thus expressly granted, and the pow-
ers essential to the declared purposes of the corporation, not
§ 539.] EXPEESS COEPOEATE POWEES. 649
only convenient but indispensable.' These corporations being
mere instrumentalities of the States for the more convenient
administration of local government, their powers are such as
the legislature may confer, and these may be enlarged, abridged
or entirely withdrawn at its pleasure.^ Only silch powers and
rights can be exercised under municipal charters as are clearly
comprehended within their words, or derived therefrom by
necessary implication, regard being had to the object of the
grant. Any ambiguity or doubt arising out of the words used
by the charter must be resolved in favor of the public' It is
very doubtful whether the legislature can delegate to any
municipality or other corporate body the power to grant a
franchise, as the exercise of that power involves a high trust,
created and conferred for the benefit of those who granted it;
and as the trust is confided to the legislature it must remain
where it is vested until the constitution of the State is
changed.*
§ 539. Delegation of powers. — The legislature having dele-
gated some portion of its power to a municipal corporation,
the latter must hold those powers in subordination to the
general power. Such powers given for local purposes are re-
garded as trusts confided to the hands in which they are
placed, and are not subject to be delegated by the departments
in the control of which they are placed.' The Supreme Court
» Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), 67 Tex. 543; State v. Swift, 11 Neb.
§ 89; Richards v. Town of Clarks- 138.
burg, 30 West Va. 491 ; Parkersburg '■* Barnes v. District of Columbia
Gas Co. V. Parkersburg, 80 West Va. (1875), 91 XJ. S. 540.
435 ; Kelly v. Town of Milan, 31 Fed. 3 Minturn v. Larue (1859), 38 How.
Eep. 843 ; Cook Co. v. McCrea, 93 IlL 435, holding that the legislature may
336 ; Portland v. Schmidt. 13 Or. 17 ; grant exclusive control over ferries
Somerville v. Dickerman, 137 Mass. to a municipality, but that the char-
373 ; Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa, 378 ; ter of Oakland did not confer such
Richmond v. McGirr, 78 Ind. 193 ; exclusive privileges upon the city.
Oilman v. Milwaukee, 61 Wis. 588; * People's R Co. v. Memphis E. Co.,
Danville v. Shelton, 76 Va. 335 ; Smith 10 Wall. 50.
V. Newbern, 70 N. C. 14 ; Blake v. ^ Thompson v, Schermerhorn, 6
Walker, 33 S. C. 517; St Louis v. N. Y. 93; Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N. Y.
Bell Telephone Co., 96 Mo. 633 ; Eu- 73 ; S. C, 39 Am. Rep. 105 ; Brooklyn
faula t;. McNab, 67 Ala. 588; Parish v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591; Lyon v.
of Ouiehita v. Monroe, 43 La. Ann. Jerome, 26 Wend. 485 ; s. C, 37 Am.
783 ; Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., Dec. 271 ; Bibel v. People, 67 III. 175 ;
550
EXPEE8S OOKPOEATE P0WEE8.
[§ 540.
of New Jersey has sustained the power of the legislature to
authorize a municipal body to delegate the police powers which
it has received from the legislature to another quasi-mximcipal
body of its creation.^
§ 540. The same subject continued. — The legislature had
the constitutional rigjit to authorize the council of a city to
empower the board of police to make rules and regulations
respecting the use of the streats of Boston.^ The court
Kinmundy v. Mahan, 73 111. 462;
State V. Fiske, 9 E. I. 94; State v.
Trenton, 43 N. J. Law, 74 ; State v.
Newark, 47 N. J. Law, 117; Hitch-
cock V. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341 ; Schen-
ley ,t>. Com., 36 Pa. St 63 ; SUte v.
Bell, 34 Ohio St 194 ; Whyte v. Mayor
&c. of Nashville, 2 Swan, 364; Smith
V. Morse, 2 Cal. 534 ; Cooley on Const
Lim. 304; Sedgvrick on Stat and
Const Law, 164 ; Oakland v. Carpen-
tier, 13 Cal. 540, declaring an ordi-
nance giving the exclusive privilege
of laying out, constructing, etc.,
wharves within the city for thirty-
seven years, void as being a transfer
of the corporate powers of the board.
East St Louis v. Wehrung, 50 111. 38,
holding that prosecution could not be
maintained for a violation of an or-
dinance which attempted to delegate
the power of the city council to the
city treasurer by authorizing him to
grant licenses to retail liquor and to
Hx the amount to be paid for it See,
also, § 376 et seq., supra.
1 Riley v. Trenton, 51 N. J. Law,
498. which sustained the constitu-
tionality of " An act to establish an
excise department in cities in this
State." Rev. Supp. N. J. 695, 696. The
court said : — " The statutes, in ques-
tion do not authorize cities possessed
of certain police powers to erect
excise boards, who, when created,
shall, ipso facto, become the trans-
ferees of the powers previously pos-
sessed by the municipality itself ; still
less does it confer powers of this nat-
ure upon the municipality in the first
instance with permission to pass
them over to excise boards when
created. . . . The . . . act is
a grant of original powers to boards
of excise commissioners. Until such
boards are created there is no person
in whom the power can vest The
erection of these boards is intrusted
to the governing body of the mu-
nicipality which creates, but does not
delegate It gives vitality, nothing
more. . . . [It] is the simultaneous
extinguishment of similar powers
pre-existent in the municipality upon
the vesting of a more comprehensive
system of like powers intended by
the legislature to cover the whole
territory." See, also, Paul v. Glou-
cester County, 50 N. J. Law, 58.5.
'■^ Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148
Mass. 375, 383 ; s. C, 19 N. E. Rep.
334, where it was held that under
this power, delegated to the police
board by the council, the board was
empowered to require an itinerant
musician to take out a license and
pay a small fee therefor. See, also,
as to reasonableness of ordinance.
Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick.
463 ; Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray, 161 ;
Vandine, Petitioner, 6 Pick. 187;
Commonwealth v. Bean, 14 Gray, 52 ;
Commonwealth v. Curtis, 9 Allen,
366; Commonwea,lth v. McCafEerty,
145 Mass. 384 As to requiring a
license. Commonwealth v. Stodder, 8
541.] EXPEESS COEPOEATE POWERS. 651
lid: — "The several towns and cities are agencies of govern-
lent largely under the control of the legislature. The powers
nd duties of all the towns and cities, except so far as they
re specifically provided for in the constitution, are created
ad defined by the legislature, and we have no doubt that it
as the right in its discretion to change the powers and duties
•eated by itself and to vest such powers and duties in offi-
jrs appointed by the governor, if in its judgment the public
ood requires this, instead of leaving such oflicers to be elected
y the people or appointed by the municipal authorities." '
ounty oflicers authorized by law to contract for the building
f a court-house cannot delegate such authority to a private
idividual.''
§ 541. Exercise of powers. — Where a city council has
ower to act in a given case and the mode of action is not
rescribed by charter, it may proceed either by resolution or by
rdinance.' Where it is intended to pay for an electric plant
y the issuance and sale of city bonds, and the statute era-
owers the city to erect such a plant upon the approval of a
lajority of the voters of the city, it is proper to submit to vote
ae entire matter of erecting the plant and issuing the bonds
1 one proposition.* Under that provision of the same act
fhich provides that the city council may order the submission
f the question of electric lighting to a vote, or that the mayor
lay do so upon petition of a certain number of tax-payers,
le adopti®n of an ordinance providing for the erection of an
lectric plant is not a condition precedent to the submission
f the question. Though the issuance of the bonds at the
ush. 563, 573; Nightingale, Peti- 135 Mass. 188, 196; Commonwealth
oner, 11 Pick. 168 ; Pedrick v. Bai- v. Young, 135 Mass. 536 ; Brooklyn v.
ly, 13 Gray, 161 ; Commonwealth v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591 ; Birdsall v.
rooks, 109 Mass. 355. As to the fee, Clark, 73 N. Y. 73 ; State v. Paterson,
ommonwealth v. Stodder, 3 Cush. 34 N. J. Law, 163.
53; Welch v. Hotchkiss, 39 Conn. i Cominoitwealth v. Plaisted, 148
tO; Cooley's Const Lim. (5th ed.), Mass. 375; s. c, 19 N. E. Eep. 334.
13, n. ; 1 Dillon on Munio. Corp. (4th « Russell v- page, 66 Tex. 438; S. c,
}.), § 357. As to the legality and 1 S. W. Hep." 370.
ropriety of delegating such powers ' City of Crawfordsville v. Bradeu
) the pohce board or other boards, (Ind., 1891), 28 N. E. Rep. 849.
[yland v. Lowell, 3 Allen, 407 ; * Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v.
aunton v. Taylor, 116 Mass. 354, City of Newton (1890), 43 Fed. Hep.
30; Sawyer tt State Board of Health, 733. '
552 EXPEESS COEPOEATE POWEES. [§ 542.
time they were authorized by vote would have been in viola-
tion of the constitutional limitation as to amount of munici-
pal indebtedness allowed, yet, if when they were issued they
were not in excess, they are not void, no debt being created
until the bonds are issued. That such bonds were sold and
delivered before the ordinance providing for issuing them
took effect was no ground for enjoining their payment at the
suit of a tax-payeri A city, by^ranting the privilege to a
private corporation to erect an electric plant for the purpose
of lighting the same without any grant of exclusive rights, is
not estopped from erecting such a plant itself when power
has been granted it by statute to do so.^ That a natural-gas
company entered into business under an ordinance of a city
having power to regula^te its prices, silent on the subject of
rates, does not exempt it from the provisions of a subsequent
ordinance with reference thereto.^ The provisions of an ordi-
nance denying gas companies the right to carry on their busi-
ness unless they execute a bond, and declaring the execution
of the bond of itself a full acceptance of the ordinance with
all its requirements, is invalid as to a company already in busi-
ness under an ordinance requiring no such bond.' The power
to erect water-works under a statute which provides for the
approval of the voters of the city by a majority vote may be
exercised by the council passing an ordinance, in advance of
an election, prescribing the character of the water-works and
the tax to. be levied to meet its cost, and afterwards submit-
ting the question to the electors.* If a charter of a city re-
quires any sale or lease of its real estate to be made at public
auction to the highest bidder, an ordinance of its council mak-
ing a lease of any of such property to a corporation upon the
payment of a rent reservedvhas been held to be void and to
pass no title to the corporation;
5
1 Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Eep. 849, holding that the enforce-
City of Newton (1890), 4'3 Fed. Rep. ment of this void ordinance by prose-
733, for this and the preceding propo- cution of the company's employees
sitions. was properly enjoined.
2 City of Eushville v. Eushville * Taylor v. McFadden (lowA, 1S93),
Natural Gas Co. (Ind., 1891), 28 N. E. 50 N. W. Rep. 1070.
Rep. 849. ^ San Francisco &c. R. Ca t). Oak-
8 City of Rushville V. Rushville land, 43 Cal. 503w
Natural Gas Co. (Ind., 1891), 28 N. E.
§§ 542, 543.] EXPRESS ooepoeate powees. 553
§ 542. Mode of exercise. — The powers of a municipal cor-
poration, whether regarded as political or governmefatal, or
those of a mere private corporation, can be exercised only in
conformity with the provisions of its charter. The legislature
can impose such restrictions as it thinks proper, as in the case
cited it saw fit to require the formalities of legislation for
the disposition of the city property, for the imposition of
taxes, the regulation of the fire department and matters con-
nected with the general welfare of the city.' All contracts
made by a municipal corporation must conform to the mode
prescribed in its charter for making contracts.'' The provis-
ions of a statute authorizing an act by a municipal corpora-
tion must be strictly followed.' Where no method is pre-
scribed by law in which a municipality shall exercise its
powers, but it is left free to determine the method for itself,
it may act either by resolution or ordinance.* Bonds issued
by a corporation under the corporate seal, but w^ithout the
passage of a resolution authorizing the issue, have been held
void where the legislature authorized the issue " at such time
or times as the board of trustees may by resolution direct." '
Where t.he power to perform an act is in a municipal corpora-
tion, and in the execution thereof the prescribed form is not
followed, the corporation has the power to subsequently rat-
ify and confirm the informal act, so as to make it as binding
as if originally done in the proper manner.* Property of a
municipal*corporation can only be conveyed in the mode of
conveying its property particularly pointed out in its charter.'
§ 543. Proceedings not reviewable. — The action of a
county board of supervisors in borrowing money, and issuing
county bonds therefor, for the purpose of improving highways
in a town, is legislative and not judicial, and cannot be re-
viewed on certiora/ri? There need be no failure of justice if
iMcCracken v. San Francisco, 16 « McCoy v. Briant, 53 Cal. 248.
Cal. 591. * Lucas v. San Francisco, 7 Cal. 463.
'- Zottman v. San Francisco, 30 ' Holland v. San Francisco, 7 Cal.
Cal. 98. • 361. See § 248 et seq., supra.
' Glass V. Ashbury, 49 Cal. 571 ; Mc- 6 People v. Board of Supervisors of
Coy tt Briant, 53 Cal. 248. Queens Co. (1893), 133 N. Y. 468;
* Halsey v. Rapid Transit Co. (N. J., S. C, 30 N. E. Eep. 488, reversing 16
1890), 20 AtL Rep. 859. N. Y. Supl. 705, construing Laws
554 EXPEE8S OOEPOKATE POWEBS. [§ 543.
the power is wrongly used. Any aggrieved tax-payer could
arrest all proceedings.' Though the proceedings of county
commissioners in establishing highways may be irregular, as
the boards are usually composed of men unskilled in the law,
such irregularities not affecting the substantial rights of the
parties affected will be disregarded.* The New York statute
providing for the discontinuance of proceedings to open a
street on objection of abutting owners ' has been construed
not to apply to the opening of Ibreets of the first class, which
by provision of the act is to be whenever the board of street
opening shall think the public interest requires it, but only to
the opening of streets of the second and third classes, which
the act provides shall be on request of a certain proportion of
the owners of the frontage. It was held that the power to
discontinue was express and complete, and that the decision
was final and conclusive, not subject to review.* In determin-
ing what property would be benefited by an improvement,
and hence should be assessed, the action of the common coun-
cil of a city is conclusive.* Under the provision of the consti-
tution of 'Michigan* the legislature may confer upon boards
of supervisors the power to determine when there exist the
prerequisite facts authorizing a special election of the people
of the municipal corporation upon any question.^ Where a
N. Y., 1869, ch. 855, § 1. See, also, Peo- for in Revised Statutes of Indiana,
pie V. Mayor, 2 Hill, 9 ; In re Mount 1881, section 5095.
Morris Square, 3 Hill, 14 ; People v. ^ Consolidation Act, Laws of New
Board of Health, 33 Barb. 344 ; Peo- York, ch. 410, sec. 990.
pie V. Supervisors of Livingston Co., Vn re Alexander Avenue (N. Y.,
43 Barb. 233; affirmed. 84 N. Y. 516; 1892), 31 N. E. Eep. 316; dismissing
People V. Walter, 68 N. Y. 403; Peo- appeal from 17 N. Y. Supl. 933.
pie V. Jones, 112 N, Y. 597; s. C, 20 'Teegarden v. City of Eacine, 56
N. E. Eep. 577. Wis. 544; s. a, 14 N. W. Eep. 614
1 People V. Board of Supervisors of * Constitution of Michigan, article
Owens County, 132 N. Y. 468. See, 4, section 38, authorizes the confer-
also. Barker v. Town of Oswegatchie, ring upon boards of supervisors of
16 N. Y. Sapl. 727. Eemedies are pro- Buch powers of a local legislative
vided in Code of New York, sections and administrative character as the
1935, 1968 et seq., Laws N. Y. 1881, ch. legislature may deem proper.
531, as amended by Laws N. Y. 1887, 'Friesner v. Common Council of
ch. 673. • Town of Charlotte (Mich., 1892), 53
2 Fulton V. Cummings (Ind., 1893), N. W. Eep. 19, where it was held
30 N. E. Epp. 949. Proceedings for that a board of county supervisors
establishing highways are provided having examined a petition for a
§ 544.] EXPEESS COEPOEATE POWEES. 655
board of commissioners is required by statute to erect a
court-house where the same has not been done, and to keep
the county building in repair, and authorized to provide the
means to construct, complete or repair the court-house or
other public buildings whenever it shall be necessary to do
so, it is for them alone to determine whether an old court-
house should be replaced by a new one ; and in the absence of
an abuse of discretion amounting to fraud, they will not be
enjoined from carrying out their plans, though it may seem
to tax-payers that the old building is sufficient.'
§ 544. The same sulbgect continued. — The jurisdiction of
boards of supervisors in the exercise of their powers under the
provisions of the Iowa Code ^ has been held to be exclusive, and
an injunction will not lie to restrict the board in the exercise of
its power, even though the petition is an attempt to perpetrate
a fraud on the board (it containing in the case cited thousands
of names of persons who were not " legal voters " ). The board
has no power to investigate the alleged fraud, being bound
by the facts as they appear on the face of the proceedings.'
The court distinguished and held not applicable to this case sev-
eral cases cited in favor of the complainants.* In Mississippi
special election on local option and Herrick v. Carpenter, 54 Iowa, 340 ;
declared that the election had been s. C, 6 N. W. Eep. 574, as to the power
prayed for by the requisite number of the legislature to provide for reloca-
of electors, such declaration by them tion of county sites by a general law
was final, and that it was not com- and giving exclusive authority to
petent afterwards to show that a a special tribunal in such matters,
certain number of the petitioners 4 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law, 403;
were not qualified voters. Alexander v. People, 7 Colo. 156 ;
iKitchell V. Board of Comm'rs s. c, 3 Pac. Eep. 894; Dudley v.
and.), 34 N. E. Eep. 866. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 15; Heiser v.
2 Code Iowa, §§ 381, 387, regulate Mayor, 104 N. Y. 73; s. c, 9 N. E.
elections for the relocation of county Eep. 866; Phillips w Ash's Heirs, 63
sites and vest in the board of super- Ala, 418 ; Chandler v. Hanna, 73 Ala.
visors of counties full power to de- 391 ; Commonwealth v. Leech, 44 Pa.
termine the sufficiency of the peti- St. 333 ; Sedgwick on Stat, and Const,
tion, and to authorize the submission* Law, 94 ; Baker v. Board, 40 Iowa, 338.
of the question of relocation to a As to courts of equity interposing to
vote. control, see 1 High on Injunctions,
5 Luce V. Fensler (Iowa, 1893), 53 § 50 ; 2 High on Injunctions, § 1311 ;
N. W. Eep. 517, the court denying Hyatt v. Bates, 40 N. Y. 165.
the right to review a decision of the * Eice v. Smith, 9 Iowa, 570, where
bjard upon such matter. See, also, a vote to relocate the county seat
556 EXPEESS COEPOEA.TE POWEES. [§ 645.
the power of a board of supervisors over court-houses and
sites for court-houses is exclusive, and no court can interfere
with the exercise of this power so long as it is exercised only
unwisely and without discretion ; and the purchase of a site
for a court-house, the county having already a court-house
site, is not such a usurpation of power as will warrant the in-
terference of courts.^ Where the question of the necessity of
taking land for a road was setUed by a board of supervisors
it is not a question for the court to pass upon.^
§ 545. Constitutionality of acts granting powers. — An
Ohio statute providing that in any village in any county con-
taining a city of the first grade of the first class, in which no
sidewalks have already been constructed, etc., the council of
such village may construct, etc.,' was held not to be a suffi-
cient classification to satisfy the constitutional requirement
that laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation
throughout the State.* Upon this subject, Beasley, C. J., of
New Jersey, said that a law may be general in its provisions, and
may apply to the whole of a group of objects having charac-
teristics sufficiently manifest and important to make them a
class by themselves, and yet the marks of distinction on which
the classification is founded may be such that the law may be
in contravention of a constitutional provision prohibiting the
enactment of special laws which regulate the internal affairs
had been taken and the question in- in that case were in many respects
volved was the right of the county so unlike those here that they needed
judge to erect an expensive public no consideration,
building which was required to be at ' Eotenberry «. Board of Supervis-
the county seat, while the matter of ors, 67 Miss. 479 ; s. C, 7 So. Rep. 211.
location was in controversy. The 2 Butte County v. Boydstun, 68
question involved in Sweatt v. Fa- Cal. 189 ; s. C, 11 Pac. Rep. 781.
ville, 33 Iowa, 336, was whether the '"An act to authorize villages to
county seat had been relocated and levy special assessments for the con-
made under the revision of 1860 and struction and improvement of side-
not under the present law. The walks and to be supplementary to
question involved in this case was section 3328 of the Revised Statutes
not considered in that The case of and known as section 2328a." 88 Ohio
Sinnett v. Males, 38 Iowa, 35, arose Laws, 311.
under a statute which provided for * Const. Ohio, art. 3, sec. 36 ; Costello
the voting of a tax in aid of the con- v. Village of Wyoming (Ohio, 1893),
struction of a railway. The statute, 30 N. E. Rep, 613,
the facts and the principles involved
§ 546.] EXPEESS COEPOEATE P0WEE8. 557
of towns and cities.' The Minnesota court said : — " The true
practical limitation of the legislative power to classify is that
the classification shall be upon some apparent natural reason —
some reason suggested by necessity, by such a difference in
the situation and circumstances of the subjects placed in dif-
ferent classes as suggests the necessity or propriety of differ-
ent legislation with respect to them." ^ The New Jersey chief
justice said : — " The marks of distinction, on which the classiii-
cation is founded, must be such in the nature of things as will,
in some reasonable degree at least, account for or justify the
restriction of the legislation." ' The classification must be
just and reasonable, and not arbitrary.*
§ 646. The same subject continued. — It was held in Wis-
consin that where a city charter gave to every lot-owner a
right to compensation for injury resulting from change of
grade of a street, a legislative act which' undertook to suspend
and declare that provision * inapplicable to certain streets was
repugnant to the constitution of Wisconsin, which entitles
every person to a certain remedy in the law for all injuries he
may receive in his person, property or character; ^ also to the
constitution of the United States, amendment 14, section 1,
which declares that no State shall " deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws ; " ' also to the
1 State V. Hammer, 43 N. J. Law, (Wis., 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 95. The
435, 440. court considered this act special
2 Nichols V. Walter, 37 Minn. • 364, class legislation, and that such dis-
878 ; S. C, 33 N. W. Rep. 800, 803. criminate exercise of arbitrary legis-
' State u Hammer, 43 N.J. Law, lative power was void. See, also, Bull
435, 440. ■y- Conroe, 13 Wis. 333 ; Durkee v.
^.Bronson v. Oberlin, 41 Ohio St Janesville, 38 Wis. 464 ; Hincks r. Mil-
476. waukee, 46 Wis. 559 ; S. C, 1 N. W.
5 Laws of Wisconsin of 1891, chap- Rep. 330 ; Culbertson v. Coleman, 47
tei 354, entitled " An act to authorize Wis. 193 ; s. C, 3 N. W. Rep. 134 ;
the city of Milwaukee to change the Hughes v. City of Fond du Lac, 73
grade of streets," which amended Wis. 383 ; S. C, 41 N. W. Rep. 407 ;
a law providing that the owner of City of Janesville v. Carpenter, 77
any lot affected or injured thereby Wis. 303; s. C, 46 N. W. Rep. 138;
should be "entitled to compensation" Wilder v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co., 70
by authorizing the common council Mich. 383 ; s. C, 38 N. W. Rep. 390 ;
of that city to change the grade of State v. Sheriff of Ramsey Co.
certain streets in designated wards (Minn.), 51 N. W. Rep. 113.
" without paying for any injuiy or ' Anderton v. City of Milwaukee
dartiage thereby occasioned." (Wis., 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 95. The
8 Anderton v. City of Milwaukee court said:— "It [this act] attempts to
558
EXPEESS COEPOEATE POWERS. [§§ 547, 648.
State constitution, on the ground that it was a local act and
related to a subject not expressed in its title.'
§ 547. Validity of acts granting powers. — In exercising
the power to levy assessments upon property owners for im-
provements the tax proceedings required by the charter must
be regarded, when taken together, as " due process of law,"
within the principles sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the
United States.^
§ 548. Power to " trade " should not be granted. — The
justices of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts have given an
opinion to the General Court that the legislature cannot author-
ize a city to buy coal and wood as fuel and sell them to its
inhabitants. Parker, J., modified his assent to this so far
as to say it might if the necessities of society as now or-
ganized could be met only by the adoption of such measures.
make an arbitrary classification and
distinction in regard to such an estab-
lished grade between lots similarly
situated and subject to the same or
substantially the same conditions,"
and therefore violates the United
States Constitution amendment. Cf.
Scott V. City of Toledo, 36 Fed. Rep.
385.
lAnderton v. City of Milwaukee
(Wis., 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 95. See, also,
Durkee v. Janesville, 36 Wis. 697;
Improvement Co. v. Arnold, 46 Wis.
314 ; S. a, 49 N. W. Rep. 971.
^Meggett V. City of Eau Claire
(Wis., 1893), 51 N. W. Rep. 566, holding
the charter not repugnant to Amend.
Const. U. S., art 14, § 1. See, also,
as to power of legislature to author-
ize, Warner v. Enox, 50 Wis. 484 ;
s. a. 7 N. W. Rep. 872 ; Weeks v.
City of Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 243;
Soens V. Racine, 10 Wis. 271 ; Lums-
den V. Cross, 10 Wis. 383 ; State v.
Portage, 13 Wis. 562 ; Bond v. Keno-
sha, 17 Wis. 384; Blount v. Janes-
ville, 81 Wis. 648 ; May v. Holdridge,
33 Wis. 93; Mills v. Charleton, 29
Wis. 400 ; Evans v. Sharp, 29 Wis.
564; Dill v. Roberts, 30 Wis. 178;
Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wia 336,
247 ; Johnson v. Milwaukee, 40 Wis,
315. As to "due process of law,"
Hagar V. Reclamation Dist, 111 U. S.
701 ; s. a, 4 S. Ct Rep. 668 ; Ken-
tucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S.
331; s. C, 6 S. Ct. Rep. 57; Spencer
V. Merchant, 135 U. S. 345 ; s. C, 8 S.
Ct Rep. 931; Palmer v. McMahon,
133 0. S. 668; s. c, 10 S. Ct Rep.
334; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316;
S. 0.; 11 S. Ct Rep. 835 ; Fass v. See-
hawer, 60 Wis. 535; 19 N. W. Rep.
533; Baldwin v. Ely, 66 Wis. 188-
191; s. c 28N.W.Rep.393; Murphy
V. Hall, 68 Wis. 210; S. C, 31 N. W.
Rep. 754 ; Davidson v. New Orleans,
96 U. S. 97, 104. In Lent v. Tillson,
140 U. S. 316, the court said : — " But
errors in the mere administration of
the statute [granting the power to
widen a street], not involving juris-
diction of the subject and of the
parties, could not justify this court,
in itB re-examination of the judg-
ment of the State court upon writ
of error, to hold that the State had
de^n-ived or was about to deprive the
plaintiffs of their property without
' due process of law.' "
§ 548.J
EXPRESS COEPOEATB POWEES.
559
Holmes, J., dissented tipon the ground that the purpose was
no less prblio when the article (proposed to be furnished the
public) is wood or coal than when it is water or gas or elec-
tricity or education, to say nothing of cases like the support
of paupers or the taking of land for railroads or public mar-
kets.* The principle which controlled the majority of the court
was that if this bill was passed it would authorize a carrying
on of business which must be with money raised by taxation,
and the legislature could authorize a city or town to tax its
inhabitants only for public purposes.^ The court sanction the
1 Opinion of the Justices, In re
House Bill No. 519 (Mass., 1893), 30
N. E. Rep. 1142.
2 Kingman v. City of Brockton, 153
Mass. 255; s. C, 26 N. E. Rep. 998;
Opinion of the Justices, 150 Mass.
592; s. c, 24 N. E Rep. 1084; Mead
V. Acton, 139 Mass. 341 ; S. c, 1 N. E.
Rep. 413; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass.
454: State v. Osawkee Tp., 14 Kan.
418 ; Mather v. City of Ottawa, 114
IlL 659 ; S. C, 3 N. E. Rep. 216 ; Loan
Ass'n V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 ; Cole
V. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1 ; S. C, 5 S. Ct
Rep. 416 ; Ottawa v. Corey, 108 U. S.
110 ; s. c, 3 S. Ct Rep. 361 ; Attorney-
General V. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400 ;
State V. Eau Claire, 40 Wis. 533;
Allen V. Jay, 60 Me. 134 ; Opinion of
the Judges, 58 Me. 590. The court
said : — " Up to the present time, how-
ever, none of the purposes for which
cities and towns have been author-
ized to raise money hsis included any-
thing in the nature of what is com-
monly called "trade" or "commer-
cial business." Instances can be
found of some very curious legisla-
tion by towns in the colonial and
provincial times, some of which
would certainly now be thought to
be beyond the powers of towns un-
der the constitution. Whatever the
theory was, towns, in fact, under the
colony charter, and for some time
under the province charter, often
acted as if their powers were limited
only by the opinion of the inhabit-
ants as to what was best to be done.
This was the result of their peculiar
situation and condition, and the pow-
ers of towns or of the General Court
were not much considered. The ex-
ercise of these extraordinary powers,
however, gradually died out." The
only instance referred to of a town
purchasing articles for its inhabitants
is that of Boston, in March, 1713-14,
voting to lay in a stock of grain to
the amount of five thousand bushels
of corn, and to store it in some con-
venient place, and it was left to the
selectmen to dispose of it as they saw
fit. This followed the prohibition by
the General Court of the exportation
of grain on account of its scarcity in
the fall of 1713. Of this the court
said : — " It is apparent that the origi-
nal purpose was to provide against a
fa.mine, and that it was not the in-
tention of the town to assuTne the
business of buying and selling all the
grain which the inhabitants needed,
but of keeping such an amount in
store as was necessary in order that
small quantities might be obtained,
particularly by the poorer inhabit-
ants, at what the selectmen, or a
committee of the town, or the town
itself, deemed reasonable prices. On
May 25, 1795, the town voted to sell
the granary. This action of the town
of Boston was an exception to the
usages- of towns, and it appears from
the reports of committees that before
the Revolution it had come to be con-
M)0 EXPRESS COEPOEATB P0WEE8. [§ 549.
rule as expressed in another opinion, that " it must often be a
question of kind and degree whether the promotion of the in-
terests of many individuals in the same community constitutes
a public service or not.^
§ 549. Power of towns as to villages within them. — A
Wisconsin statute provided that " all powers relating to vil-
lages and conferred upon village boards by the provisions of
chapter 40 of the Revised Statutes and all acts amendatory
thereof, excepting those the exercise of which would conflict
with the provisions of law relative to towns and town boards,
are hereby conferred upon towns and town boards of towns
containing one or more unincorporated villages having each
■a population of not less than one thousand inhabitants, and
are made applicable to such unincorporated village or villages,
and may be exercised therein when directed by a resolution
of the qualified electors of the town at the last preceding an-
nual town meeting."^ This act was held not void for uncer-
tainty, as the powers granted to the town boards are defined
by the act therein referred to as governing villages. ISTor was
it void for attempting to incorporate a village or villages by a
special act. It did not incorporate a village as a separate mu-
nicipality; it simply enlarged the powers of town boards. Nor
did it violate the Constitution, article 11, section 3. Even
though the legislature may in its discretion enforce the incor-
poration of communities as cities or villages, under proper
limitations, this power does not deprive the legislature of the
power to legislate for the control and government of such
communities before it is deemed wise to incorporate them.'
Nor did it violate the section of the constitution providing
that " the legislature shall establish but one sj'stem of town
and county government." * It was held that the exercise of
sidered as of doubtful expediency, court said: — [Thislaw]"isanamend-
and during the Revolution, or not ment of the laws concerning towns
long after, it was discontinued." and the government thereof. Like
1 Opinion of Justices, 150 Mass. 593 ; many other laws of the State, it
S. C, 34 N. E. Rep. 1084. provides for the exercise of different
2 Laws Wis. 1888, ch. 393. powers by the boards of different
' Land, Log & Lumber Ca v. towns, when there is anything in a
Brown (1889), 73 Wis.' 394; S. C, 40 N. town which calls for the exercise of
W. Rep. 483. , such different or additional powers.
*Land, Log & Lumber Co. v. The act is as general as any other
Brown, cited in preceding note. The general act It provides for the exer-
§ 550.]
EXPRESS COEPOEATE POWERS.
561
the power under this act by the town board in providing for
water-works, protection against fire and making police regula-
tions for a village within the limits of the town was proper and
fuUy authorized. An objection was made to this that the law
should be declared void under some supposed rule of public
policy forbidding taxation of persons for purposes of expendi-
ture which would not benefit their property. The court over-
ruled this objection.'
§ 550. Power as to issue of commercial paper. — Charter
power to borrow money " for general purposes " " on the
credit" of a city only includes authority to borrow money for
ordinary governmental purposes, such as are generally carried
out with revenues derived from taxation ; and the presump-
tion is that the power was intended to confer the right
to borrow money in anticipation of the receipt of taxes.'
]!^either does this charter power include the power to issue
and sell negotiable bonds, nor can such power be inferred
from the provision that " bonds of the city shall not be sub-
ject to tax under this act," ' The court relies mainly for the
cise of the additional powers in all
toTCns in which villages are situated
having a given number of inhabit-
ants. It is not subject to the criti-
cism that though general in form it
is special in fact, as it is a matter of
public notoriety that there are and
have been several towns in the State
to which the act can be applied."
..." Such act is not a violation
of the system of town government,
but a part of the system, in order to
adapt the system to the peculiar
wants of certain towns in the State."
As to constitutionality of laws ap-
plying to cities and towns on the
basis of population, situation, etc., as
being local and special laws, see
State V. Circuit Court (N. J.), 15 Atl.
Rep. 373 and note ; Water Works Co.
V. Water Co. (N. J.), 15 Atl. Rep. 581 ;
Frost V. Cherry (Pa.), 15 Atl. Rep.
782.
.'Land, Log & Lumber Co. v.
36
Brown, 73 Wis. 394 These princi-
ples controlled the ruling. The vil--
lage was not by the act made a sep-
arate village, but remained a part of'
the town. The town constituted the-
taxing district, and the legislature
had full power to establish taxing dis-
tricts, and the courts cannot question'
the justice or injustice of the limits
thereof when fixed by the legisla-
ture. See, also, Teegardenv. Racine, 56
Wis. 545 ; Dickson v. Racine, 61 Wia
545, 549; T. B. Scott Lumber Co., v.
Oneida Co., 73 Wis. 158; State v.
Sauk Co., 70 Wis. 485.
^City of Brenham v. German-
American Bank (U. S.. 1893), 13 S. Ct
Rep. 559, reversing 35 Fed. Rep. 186.
3 St. Laws Tex. 1873, ch. 3, art 3,,
§ 3; City of Brenham v. German-'
American Bank, 13 S. Ct Rep. 559;
overruling Rogers v. Burlington, 3
Wall. 654, and Mitchell v. Burling-
ton, 4 WalL 370.
562
EXPEE88 OOBPOEATE POWEES.
[§ 550.
correotness of its conclusion upon a case in which it was held
that the implied power of a municipal corporation to. borrow
money to enable it to execute the power expressly conferred
upon it by law, if existing at all, did not authorize it to create
and issue negotiable securities to be sold in the market and to
be taken by the purchaser freed from the equities that might
be set up by the maker.^ The provision in the charter of
Chattanooga, Tenn., that the corporatioii " shall have full
power to borrow money on its bAids," etc., did not authorize
it to issue warrants on the treasurer or city scrip for the pur-
pose of raising money for the ordinary expenses of the cor-
poration.*
pose is expressly given or necessarily
implied for the execution of other
express powers, has been affirmed in
repeated decisions of this court." See,
also, Concord v. Bobinson, 131 IT. S.
165; S. C 7 a Ct. Rep. 937; Norton
i\ Dyersburg, 137 U. S. 160 ; s. G, 8 S.
Ct. Rep. 1111. The case of Dwyer v.
Hackworth, 57 Tex. 245, was distin-
guished by the court's referring to
the fact that the Supreme Court of
Texas, while reversing the court lie-
low, said that it could not enjoin the
collection of the taxes on the ground
of the invalidity of these same bonds
without making the holders of those
bonds parties to the suit^ and citing
Board v. Railway Co., 46 Tex. 316 ;
and then the United States Supreme
Court say; — " There was, therefore, no
adjudication in that case as to the
validity of the bonds, and the remark
of the court that the city borrowed
money by selling its bonds to the
amount of $15,000 is of no force on
the question of the validity of the
bonds," and cite Lewis v. City of
Shreveport, 108 U. S. 283 ; S. C 2 S.
Ct Rep. 634.
2 Colbum V. Mayor of Chattanooga
(Tenn.), 17 Am. L. Reg. 191, the court
ordering perpetual injunction against
the officers issuing such paper. The
court said : — " If there be not money
1 Merrill v. Monticello, 138 U. S.
673; S.C., 11 S. Ct, Rep. 441. The
court further said :— " It is admitted
that the power to borrow money, or
to incur indebtedness, carries with it
the power to issue the usual evidences
of indebtedness by the corporation
to the lender or other creditor.
Such evidences may be in the form
of promissory notes, warrants, and
perhaps, most generally, in that of a
bond. But there is a marked legal
difference between the power to give
a note to a lender for the amount of
money borrowed, or to a creditor for
the amount due, and the power to
issue for sale, in open market, a bond,
as a commercial security, with im-
munity in the hands of a. bona fide
holder for value from equitable de-
fenses." The court cited and ap-
proved Police Jury v. Britton, 15
Wall. 566; Claiborne County v.
Brooks, 111 U. S. 400; s. C, 4 S. Ct
Rep. 489 ; Kelley v. Milan, 137 U. S.
139 ; s. a, 8 S. Ct Rep. 1101 ; Young
V. Clarendon Township, 133 U. S. 340 ;
8. a 10 S. Ct Rep. 107; Hill v. Mem-
phis, 134 U S. 198, 203; S. G, 10 S. Ct
Rep. 562. In this last case the court
said: — "The inability of municipal
corporations to issue negotiable paper
for their indebtedness, however in-
curred, unless authority for that pur-
§ 551.}
EXPEES8 OOEPOEATK POWERS.
563
§551. As to trusts. — In the absence of an express grant
of power, a municipal corporation cannot accept and hold
property upon a purely private trust.' Under its charter
power to "receive in trust and control for the purpose of such
trust all money or other property ... bestowed upon
such corporation . . . for the general purposes of educa-
tion," it has been held that the city of Baltimore could take
in trust property given it by will " to establish a chair in the
McDonogh Educational Fund and Institute, ... to pro-
mulgate such a course of instruction in said institute as will
aid in the practical application of the mechanical arts, . . .
to give boys in that institution such useful and practical me-
chanical education as will enable them to gain a livelihood by
skilful manual labor." ' Aside from this provision in its latest
charter, the court declared that according to the great weight
of authority the corporation would seem to be entirely capa-
ble of tiaking property in trust for purposes germane to the
objects of the corporation or which would promote, aid or as-
sist in carrying out or perfecting those objects.' There is no
in the treasury, then the corporation
should borrow as provided in the
charter or by existing law, or they
should levy and collect such tax as
is necessary to raise virhatever sum is
needed, and if they can neither bor-
row nor raise the money by taxation
to meet their-expenditures, then they
should cease their expenditures until
they can thus realize according to
law."
1 In re Franklin's Estate, Appeal of
Gillespie (Pa., 1893), 34 AtL Rep. 636.
T.he court, naifl: — "^ Instances are not
wanting in which municipal corpo-
rations have executed trusts commit-
ted to them by private persons, ger-
mane to the objects of the corpora-
tion, and they have been upheld for
that reason." See, also, Philadel-
phia V. Fox, 64 Pa. St 169, comment
of Sharswood, J., on Gloucester v.
Osborn, 1 H. L. Gas. 385, in which
it was said that a municipality may
take and hold for purposes alto-
gether private. Mayor v. Elliott, 8
Rawle, 170.
^Barnum v. Baltimore (1884), 63
Md. 375.
'3 Kent Com. 380; 3 Dillon on
Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 716. See, also,
Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Johns. 433
Green v. Rutherford, 1 Ves. 463
Trustees &c. v. King, 13 Mass. 546
Pickering v. Shotwell, 10 Barr, 37
Chambers v. St Louis, 39 Mo. 543
McDonough Will Case, 15 How. 367
McDonongh's Case, 8 La. Ann. 171
Girard's Will, 3 La. Ann. 898; Vidal
V. Girard's Ex'r, 3 How. 137; Gi-
rard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1 ; Perin
V. Carey, 34 How. 465 ; Bell County
V. Alexander, 33 Tex. 850 ; Columbia
Bridge v. Kline, Bright, 330 ; Miller
V. Lerch, 1 Wall Jr. 310; Webb v.
Neal, 5 Allen, 575.; Oxford &c. Society
V. Society, 55 N. H, 463 ; Sargent v.
Cornish, 54 N. H. 18 ; Cresson'B Ap-
peal, SO Pa. St 437.
664 • BXPEESS OOEPOEATB P0WEE8. [§ 552.
statute law of New York which can be construed to give a
municipal corporation the right to hold lands in trust for pious
uses or for religious purposes,' A municipal corporation can-
not, in the absence of statute, accept a testamentary trust to
establish and maintain a poor-house for the support of the
poor of the county.*
§ 552. Purchase at tax sales. — A city having power under
its charter to purchase property*vithin or without its borders
can purchase land for non-payment of taxes levied by the
city.' Where a statute gives the power to make such pur-
chase, a municipality must strictly pursue its statutory au-
thority. It is confined to the express provision of the statute
conferring the power ; and where there is no authority for it
to purchase jointly with another person, a tax deed, from
which it appears that land was sold to the municipality and a
private individual, has been held void.* So, where a city
charter limits to fiftj' years the terms for which lands should
be sold to the city for taxes and the city took such land for
nine hundred years, the title was held to be void; but if the
tax was lawful, the land-owner must pay the tax with interest
as the condition of a decree in his favor in a proceeding to set
aside or annul the deed.* Per contra: — It has been said by the
Supreme Court of Illinois that since municipal corporations
can only exercise such powers as are expressly conferred, or as
1 Village of Coming v. Rector &c. ' Keller v. Wilson (Ky., 1890), 14
of Christ Church, 33 N. Y. St Rep. S. W. Rep. 333. The court said:—
•ree; s. c, ll N. Y. Supl. 763. In Be "This [the provision in the charter]
tJnderhiU's Will (1888), 3 N. Y". Supl. should be construed to mean for gov-
205 ; s. G, Dem. Sur. 466, it was held ernmental purposes ; but in purchas-
that a town cannot receive a bequest ing it for its taxes it was executing
to be devoted under certain condi- such a purpose, and, in our opinion,
tions to the erection of a town hall, no valid distinction can be drawn
inasmuch as section 3 of Revised between a purchase by the city at a
Statutes of New York, page 337, pro- sale for taxes under a levy by its
vides that no town shall possess or ex- collecting officer and under a de-
ercise any corporate powers except cretal sale for a like purpose."
as enumerated, and section 1 limits < Sprague v. Coenen, 30 Wis. 309.
the power of towns in purchasing ' Baldwin v. City of Elizabeth, 43
and holding lands or personal prop- N. J. Eq. 11. See, also, In re Report
erfcy to such as may be necessary to of Com'rs of Adjustment, 49 N. J.
the exercise of corporate or adminis- Law, 388 ; s. a, 33 Am. & Eng, Corp.
trative powers. Caa 484.
* City Council v. Walton, 77 Ga. 517.
§ 553.] EXPKESS OOKPOEATE POWEES. S6ft
arise by implication from general powers granted, the charter
power of a corporation to buy and hold real property should
be understood to include purchases made in the ordinary way,
and not a tax sale.' In Indiana it has also been held that there
could be no purchase at a sale for taxes due by the corporation
without express power conferred by statute, and that it could
not bind itself by an agreement to warrant the title of a pur-
chaser at such sale.^ Such a sale -to a corporation had before
been held void in Wisconsin.' A power to sell lands for taxes
imposed upon such lands does not authorize selling of lands
for taxes imposed upon the owners or occupants merely, and
not upon their lands.*
§ 653. Granting exclnsive franchises. — A village has no
power to grant an exclusive franchisp so as to disable itself
for the period of thirty years from establishing for itself a
system of water-works, under a power to provide for and
control the erection of water-works, and to grant the right to
one or more private companies to erect water-works to sup-
ply such village and the inhabitants with water, etc.* The
1 City of Champaign v. Harmon, izing the same. They are interme-
93 m. 491. diate agencies between the State and
2 City of Logansport v. Humphrey, the people, created for civil and po-
84 Ind. 467. litical purposes ; and whilst it would
'Knox V. Peterson, 31 Wis. 247. be competent for counties to buy
In Bruck v. Broesigks, 18 Iowa, 893, and hold real estate as a means to
Lowe, J., hae given the following an end in effecting or carrying out
reason for denying such powers to the objects of their creation, it would
counties and municipal corporations not be within the scope of their pow-
generally: — "The relations which ers to buy and sell delinquent lands
counties or municipal corporations at tax sales as a mere pecuniary
sustain to the State and their own operation."
inhabitants is of a fiduciary nature. * Sharp v. Speir (1843), 4 Hill, 76.
The duties required and the responsi- * Long v. City of Duluth (Minn.,
I Uities imposed in the matter of as- 1893), 51 N. W. Rep. 913. The court
sessing and collecting taxes are such said : — "If there is any ambiguity or
as to render it inexpedient, not to reasonable doubt, arising from the
say unwise, and against the purpose terms used by the legislative or grant-
and the policy of the revenue law of ing body, as to whether an exclusive
the code of 1851 (under which the lan^ franchise has been conferred or au-
in controversy was sold for taxes), thorized to be conferred, the doubt
to allow counties to traffic in the is to be resolved against the corpora-
purchase and sale of tax titles in the tion or individual claiming such a
absence of an express statute author- grant. Public policy does not per-
666 EXPBESS OOBFOI^ATS POWEBS. [§ 553.
fact that the law in another section pi'ovides that every grant
to a private company of the right to erect water-worfes shall
proyide for the sale of such works to the village after fifteen
years does not affect this construction of the law, as it merely
requires that the right to purchase shall be a condition of
the grant, but imposes no requirement or duty to purchase,
and does not justify the inference that the village could only
provide itself with water«works by purchasing from tho
company.' A water company was incorporated in 1860 to
supply the borough of Easton with water. In 1867 the
borough was authorized to construct water-works and to pur-
chase the works of any existing company. This authority
became effectual in 1881, being approved bj' a popular vote.
The water company in the meanwhile had accepted the bene-
fits of an act of 1874: which declared that "the right to have
and enjoy the franchises and privileges of such incorporation
within the district or locality covered by its charter shall be
an exclusive one, and no other company shall be incorporated
for that purpose " until the corporation should have realized
profits to a specified amount. It was held that the franchise
was exclusive only as respects other companies, and that the
mit an unnecessary inference of an- chise granted by the city under its
thority to make a contract inoon- charter powers. GaS Light Co. v.
sistent with the continuance of the Middletown, 59 N. Y. 228, holding
sovereign power and duty to make that a legislative act authorizing
such laws as the public welfare may a town to cause its streets to be
requira" On this point see, also, Nash lighted with gas and to enter into a
V, Lowry, 37 Minn. 361, 263; S. C, 33 contract with the gas company for
N. W. Rep. 787 ; Charles River Bridge that purpose did not confer power to
ttWarren Bridge, 11 Pet 420, 443, 444 ; make an absolute contract for a term
Minturn v. Larue, 28 How. 485 ; of years ; that the legislature could
Wright V. Nagle, 101 TJ. S. 791, 796 ; not thus be deprived of its p6\^3r to
Fanning v. G-regoire, 16 How. 524, subsequently legislate upon the sub-
where it was held that the earlier ject, and its repeal of the authority
grant of a ferry franchise was not to light with gas was effectual to
exclusive, and, although "no court terminate the contract so made,
or board of county comralssioners" Water Co. v. City of Syracuse, 116
[they having been prohibited by the N. Y. 167 ; S. C, 23 N. E. Rep. 381.
act granting the first] could sul>se- i Long v. City of Duluth (Minn.,
quently grant another franchise, the 1893), 51 N. W. Rep. 913. See, also,
legislature could do it, or empower Water Co. v. City of Syracuse, 116
the city of Dubuque to do so, thus N. Y. 167, 187 ; S. c., 32 N. E. Rep. 381.
sustaining a subsequent ferry frau-
§ 554.] EXPRESS COEl'OEATE POWESS. 567
borough was not prohibited from supplying water by works
constructed by itself, even though that might impair the
value of the franchise of the water company.^
§ 554. The same subject continned. — It was held that
the granting of the exclusive privilege of supplying a city
with water "from the Three-mile Creek" did not prevent
a subsequent grant of a right to supply water from an-
other source.^ Under authority to a municipal corporation to
cause its streets to be lighted and to make reasonable regula-
tions with reference thereto, it is empowered to enter into
a contract to accomplish that end, but it has no authority to
thus confer an exclusive right to furnish gas for a period
of thirty years.' A city was empowered by its charter to
provide itself with water, and was deemed to be authorized
to do so by contract. A water company was expressly au-
thorized to contract with the city for that purpose, and a
contract was entered into which the court deemed to have
been intended tb confer an exclusive Hght upon the company
for a period of twenty-five years. It was held that the city
had no such power,* The fact that a water company is re-
quired, when requested, to furnish water to a city for the
extinguishment of fires, etc., and that such request has been
made, and contracts entered into for that purpose between
the company and a city, do not constitute a contract binding
the city perpetually while the company retains its charter
and preventing the city from making contracts with others.
The city could bind itself by such contracts only as it was
authorized by statute to make. It has no power to grant ex-
clusive privileges to put mains, pipes and hydrants in its
streets, nor can it lawfully, by contract, deny to itself the
right to exercise the legislative powers vested in its commpn
council.*
' Lehigh Water Conipany'8 Appeal, * Syracuse Water Co. v. City of
102 Pa. St. 515. Syracuse, 116 N. Y., 167; s. C, 23 N.
2 Stein V. Water Supply Co., 34 R Rep. 381, sustaining the power of
Fed. Rep. 145. the city to authorize another water
' Gas Light Co. v. City of Saginaw, company to construct, maintain and
28 Fed. Rep. 539. operate water-works in the city, but
* City of Brenham v. Water Com- not denying th^ right of the com-
pany, 67 Tex 543 ; S. C, 4 S. W. Rep. pany first receiving the contract con-
l43. tinning to furnish. See, also, Lehigh
568
EZPBESS OOBFOBATE FOWEBS.
[§
§ 555. Contracts not exclusire. — A city has poorer to
contract for a supply of gas or water for a stated period of
time extending beyond the tenure of office of the individual
members of the common council making such contract.' A
contract' by ordinance to pay for twenty-five years for the
gas furnished by the lamps provided for therein and by
those afterwards directed was upheld. The ordinance was
construed to be a grant so far as it conferred upon the gas
company the right to lay its maiits and pipes in the public
streets. But it was held that in that far it was in the nature
of a license and not exclusive.^ Nor was a monopoly of sup-
plying the city with gas for street lighting given by such con-
tract, there being nothing in the ordinance preventing the
city from taking gas from others.' Had the ordinance con-
tained a provision by which the city agreed to take gas from
Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 391 ;
Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica & S. R
Co., 6 Paige, 554; Oswego Falls
Bridge Co. v. Fish, 1 Barb. Ch. 547 ;
Thompson v. N. Y. &c. R Co., 3
Sand. Ch. 625; Auburn &c. Plank
Road Co. V. Douglass, 9 N. Y. 444,
453 ; Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith,
30 N. Y. 44, 61 ; Power v. VUlage of
Athens, 99 N. Y. 592; Dermott v.
State, 99 N. Y. 107; Milhan i;. Sharp,
27 N. Y. 611 ; New York v. Second
Ave. R Co., 32 N. Y. 261 ; Gale v.
Village of Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344 ;
S. C, 9 Am. Rep. 80 ; Logan v. Payne,
43 Iowa, 524; S. a, 22 Am. Eep. 261 ;
Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Bes
Moines, 44 Iowa, 505 ; s. C, 24 Am.
Rep. 756 ; Norwich Gas Light Co. v.
Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19;
State V. Coke Company, 18 Ohio
St 263; Gas Co. v. Parkersburg, 30
West Va. 435; S. C, 4 S. E. Rep. 650.
In Birmingham & Pratt Mines St
Ry. Co. V. Birmihgton St R Co.
(1885), 79 Ala. 465, it was held that
neither the charter of the city of
Birmingham nor the general stat-
utes conferred on that corporation
the power to grant, by ordinance in
the nature of a contract, the ex-
clusive franchise in perpetuity of
running a street railway through cer-
tain designated streets and avenues ;
and further, that if such power were
granted to the corporation by its
charter or public statute, it would be
violative of the constitutional pro-
vision (Const Ala., art 1, § 23)
against the passage of any law
"making any irrevocable grant of
special privileges or immunities."
City of Chicago v. Rumpflf, 45 111.
90 ; Davis v. Mayor of New York, 14
N. Y. 506.
1 City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas
Light Co. (Ind., 1893), 31 N. E. Rep.
573. See, also. City of Indianapolis r.
Indianapolis &c. Co., 66 Ind. 396 ; City
of Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1.
2 City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas
Light Co. (Ind., 1893), 31 N. E. Rep.
573. See, also, Crowder v. Town of
Sullivan (Ind.), 28 N. E. Eep. 94; City
of Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas
Ca (Ind.), 38 N. E. Rep. 853.
' City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas
Light Co., cited in the preceding note.
Cf. Citizens' Gas &a Co. v. Town of
Elwood, 114 Ind. 333; & a, 16 N. E.
Rep. 634.
§ 656.] EXPEBSS OOBPOEATE POWEES. 569
no other company, or prohibiting any other company from en-
gaging in the business of making and selling gas, the cases
mentioned in the note would be in point.' The arrangement
provided by the ordinance being purely a business matter
there was no surrender by the council of any legislative
power.* The statute which authorized the common councils
of cities to contract for light for its streets and alleys for a
period not exceeding ten years did not affect this contract.
By the same act existing contracts, except such as conferred
exclusive privileges, were declared valid. This one was held
not to be exclusive.'
§ 556. Improvements generally. — The charter of a city
provided that, if sidewalks are not built within the prescribed
period of time after notice, the city council may order the
same to be done "at the expense of the lots adjoining." It
has been held that a resolution of the council, after the expi-
ration of the time fixed by the notice, directing the city
recorder to advertise for bids to furnish the material and
construct the walk, was a sufficient compliance with the charter
provision. It was not necessary that they should have di-
rected that the walks be built " at the expense of the lots "
adjoining.* A provision in a city charter that the expense
of constructing sidewalks in a certain contingency should be
assessed against the " lots and parcels of land adjoining said
sidewalks " was held to conform to the State constitution,
which authorized and provided that such assessments might
be made " upon the property fronting upon such improve-
ments." • Under the Code of North Carolina, relative to
towns and cities, providing that the commissioners or alder-
1 Davenport v, Kleinschmidt, 6 Co. v. City of New Orleans, 43 La.
Mont 503 ; S. C, 13 Pac Eep. 249, Ann. 188 ; S. C, 7 So. Eep. 559.
and cases collected in In re Union * City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas
Ferry Co., 98 N. Y. 139, 150. Light Co., cited in preceding note.
2 City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas See, also, cases supra. Louisville Gas
Light Co. (Ind., 1892), 31 N. E. Eep. Co. v. Citizens' Gas Light Co., 115
573, as to its being purely a business U. S. 683 ; s. C, 6 S. Ct. Eep. 265.
power. See, also, in addition to cases * Scott County v. Hinds (Minn.,
aupra, Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), 1893), 53 N. W. Eep. 523.
§§ 608, 609 ; New Orleans Gas Light ' Scott County v. Hinds (Minn:,
1893), 53 N. W. Eep. 533.
570 BXPEBSS COIHPOHA.TE POWEES. [§ 557»
men may cause necessary improvements to be raade^ and
"apportion them equally among the inhabitants by assess-
ments," a city authorized by its charter to charge abutting
owners with the cost of improvements may apportion them
according to the front-foot rule, though the charter is silent as
to the method of apportionment.' An amendment to the
charter of a city providing that the common council should
not take stock "in any public improvement, or effect a loan
for any purpose, without first obtaining 'the consent of the
people at an election held for that purpose," cannot be ex-
tended to improvements other than municipal in their charac-
ter. The legislature did not intend to invest the city with au-
thority to embark in speculative enterprises of improvement.^
For like reasons a city charter was construed not to authorize
the levying and collection of a tax for making a survey of a
railroad route from that city to another.' It has been held that
although an act empowering a county to improve the naviga-
tion of a navigable stream, and to issue bonds, the proceeds of
which were to be applied for such purpose, might not provide
any means or method for paying the principal and interest
on the bonds, such fact was not a good objection to the valid-
ity of the act or to the issue of the bonds thereunder, nor was
the fact that such provision might not be otherwise made.*
§ 657. Cost of improvements. — When municipal corpora-
tions seek to impose upon property owners the burden of
the cost of street improvements, and to hold the property of
abutting owners liable therefor, the statute or charter author-
izing such improvements to be made must be strictly pursued.'
1 City of Ealeigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. meet the requirements of thia case.
33 ; s. c, 14 S. B. Eep. 531. It was not a work which the charter
, 2 Low V. Marysville, 5 Cal. 314, authorized.
where it was held the city under that * Stockton v, Powell (Fla.), 10 So.
provision had no power to subscribe Rep. 688.
to stock in a steam navigation com- & Mason v. City of Sioux Falls (So.
pany. Dak., 1893), 51 N. W. Rep. 770 ; 3 Destj-,
'Douglas V. Placerville, 18 Cal. Tax'n, 1341; 3 Dillon on Munic.
643. That a railroad extending from Corp., § 769 ; 1 Blackwell on Tax
the city was as much of a means of Titles, § 612 ; Merritt v. Village of
municipal benefit as a street in the Port Chester, 71 N. Y. 309 ; Hewes v.
city, gas or water-works does not Eeis, 40 CaL 3S5 ; McLauren v. City
§ 5&8.] EXPRESS OOBPOBATE POWEE8. 57 1
Under the Dakota statute, which grants the powers in this
respect to cities, the resolution adopted and published must
specifically designate the work declared necessary to be done,
and property owners and the property will only be liable for
the cost of such improvements as are so specifically designated
in the resolution and published in the ofiioial paper.' But
owners of property abutting upon a street that has been used
by the public as a street for a number of years cannot defeat
the city in enforcing the collection of street assessments for
the cost of improving such street on the ground that the title
to such street or some part of it is not in the city.*
§658. Gas and water supply.^ — A charter of an electric
light company authorizing it to " furnish any city ....
with gas, . . . etc.," and the charter of a city giving it
power to control and its board of councilraen power " to con-
struct, maintain and operate gas and water-works, and to pass
all ordinances necessary to regulate the same, " have been held
to authorize a contract between the two as to lighting the city
by gas, electricity, or any other mode.' Under the power to
make all needful police regulations for the welfare, conven-
ience and safety of its citizens, the power to light the streets
of a city may be lawfully exercised and the council may pur-
of Grand Forks (Dak.), 43 N. W. Bep. Corp., § 638 and cases cited ; 2 Green-
710; White v. Stevens, 67 Mich. 33; leaf on Evidence, § 662. As to estop-
a a, 34 N. W. Rep. 255 ; Hoy t u. City pel of owner of land. Holmes v. Vil-
of Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39; Pound v. lage of Hyde Park, 121 111. 138; s. C.,
Chippewa County, 43 Wis. 63. 13 N. E. Kep. 540; Village of Hyde
I Mason n City of Sioux Falls (So. Park v. Borden, 94 111. 26, laying down
Dak, 1892), 51 N. W. Rep. 770. this rule as to evidence required on
3 Mason v. City of Sioux Falls (So. the part of the city : — •' It is sufScient
Dak., 1892), 51 N. W. Bep. 770. See, for the city to show that the street,
also, as to uses of the street by the avenueoralleysoughttobeimproved
city, and what amounts to a dedica- is one that has, for a considerable
tlon, Elliott on Roads and Streets, 92, length of time, been used as a public
126 ; City of Cincinnati v. White's Les- street and is such property as can be
sees, 6 Pet 431 ; Jarvis v. Dean, 3 appropriated by the city, and is, in
Bing. 447 ; Case v. Favier, 12 Minn, the language of Chief Justice Shaw
89; Hobbsw Inhabitants of Lowell, 19 in the Massachusetts case supra, a
Pick. 400 ; City of Chicago v. Wright, street de facto."
69 111. 318 ; Cemetery Ass'n v. Menin- 3 City of Newport v. Newport
ger, 14 Kan. 312; 2 Dillon on Munic. Light Co. (Ky.), 12 S. W. Rep. 1040.
572 BXPEESS OOEPORATB P0WEE8. [§ 558.
chase and operate an electric light plant for that purpose.'
Authority in a city to make a permanent and exclusive con-
tract with a water company to build water-works and supply
it with water cannot be implied from the general power con-
ferred by its charter to contract for the needs of the munici-
pality.^ The city of New Orleans was held to have the power to
contract for a water supply under the provisions of its charter ;
and having this power to contract, it was held that the price, the
kind of water, and the amount, w^e matters of legislative dis-
cretion vested in the city council ; and that when the city con-
fined itself within the limits of its power to contract, this legal
discretion exercised by the city council would not be inquired
into by the courts, in the absence of fraud and corrupt and
extravagant legislation.' Under the General Statutes of Kan-
sas, cities of the second class have the right to provide for
supplying themselves and their inhabitants with water by
granting the privilege of furnishing water to a person, natural
or artificial.* A charter which enumerates among the powers
of a city one " to provide the city with water by water-works "
authorizes the corporation to furnish the inhabitants of the
city with water.* Power conferred by the legislature upon
a common council to prescribe regulations for the laying of
gas pipes through the streets cannot be delegated ; and a res-
olution authorizing all companies to lay pipes upon such con-
iMauldin v. City Council of Tenn. 464; S. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 934
Greenville, 33 S. C. 1 ; S. C., 11 S. K. The court said : — [In exercising its
Bep. 434 authority the city could not be held
2 Greenville Water Works Co. v. to be] " engaging in a private enter-
City of Greenville (Miss.), 7 So. Rep, prise or performing a municipal
409. function for a private end. It is the
' Conery v. New Orleans Water use of corporate property for corpo-
Works Co, (1889), 41 La. Ann. 910 ; rate purposes in the sense ' of the
S. c, 7 So. Rep. 8. See, also, Mayor &c, revenue law of 1887," and, therefore,
of Rome v. Cabot, 38 Ga. 50 ; Wells it may not be liable for a privilege
V. Atlanta, 43 Ga. 76; Watson v. tax. See, also, as to liability for taxes,
Turnbull, 34 La. Ann. 856 ; Pickles Town of West Hartford v. Board of
V. Dry Dock Co., 38 La. Ann. 413. Water Company of the City of Eart-
^ Burlington Water Works Co. v. ford, 44 Conn. 361; City of Rochester
City of Burlington (1890), 43 Kan. v. Town of Rush, 80 N. Y. 303; City
735 ; S. C 33 Pac. Rep. 1068. See, also, of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1
Wood V. Water Works Co., 33 Kan. Duvall (Ky.), 395 ; In the Matter of
590, 597. the Appeal of Des Moines Water
6 Smith V. Nashville (1889), 88 Company, 48 Iowa, 334
§ 559.] EXPKESS COEPOEATE POWERS. 573
ditions as may be prescribed by the mayor, comptroller and
commissioner of public works confers no authority on the
latter and their permits are void.'
§669. Natural-gas companies. — "An act empowering cities
and towns within the State ... to regulate the supply,
consumption and distribution of natural gas therein, and de-
claring an emergency," has been held to authorize, not merely
such regulations as conduce to safety, but to confer full power
to regulate the supply, distribution and consumption of nat-
ural gas, including the power to fix reasonable maximum rates
that may be charged to consumers.* Where an owner of prop-
erty devotes it to a use in which the public have an interest,
he must to the extent of the interest thus acquired by the
public submit to the control of such property by the public
for the common good.' The Supreme Court of Ohio, apply-
ing the doctrine just stated on the subject of regulating prices,
said : — " Because prior to any legislation on the subject it (a
gaslight company) may have possessed the common-law right
of fixing its own prices, it does not place it beyond the reach
of any legislative control on the subject whenever in the in-
terest of the public good it becomes necessary that such con-
1 Anderson v. Equitable Gas Light may be able to reach and control
Co. (1884), 12 Daly, 462 ; S. C, Cin. them in the exercise of their implied
Weekly L. Bui. 137. See, also, Thomp- police powers. To give to the stat-
Bon V. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 93 ; Tap- ute such construction would be to
pan V. Young, 9 Daly, 357 ; Birdsall v. say that after such franchises have
Clark, 73 N. Y. 73 ; Matter of Blank, been acquired, no matter what con-
73 N. Y. 388 ; Index, tit Delegation duct their holders may be guilty of
of Powers. tending to the discomfort or incon-
2 City of Rushville v. Rushville venience of the citizen, and no mat-
Natural Gas Co. (Ind., 1891), 28 N. E. ter how extortionate they may be,
Eep. 853. This construction was unless their acts tend to endanger
based upon the title and the inten- the safety, or otherwise come within
tion of the legislature. The court the purview of the inherent police
said : — " We cannot think that it powers of the municipality, there is
was the purpose of the legislature to no remedy, as the legislature has left
leave municipal corporations abso- them independent of municipal su-
lutely without power of control or pervision."
regulation over the holders of such ' Munn v. Illinois, 94 IT. ' S. 113 ;
franchises (using the streets for the Hockett v. State, 105 Ind. 250 ; s. C,
supply of natural gas), except aa they 5 N. E. Eep. 178.
574 EXFEESS COEPOEATE POWEES. [§ 560.
trol should be had." ' The only restriction upon the right to
fix maximum prices which follows the right to control, and
which is delegated by statute to the municipality, is some
provision in the, charter or grant of the license which amounts
to a contract.* Where a corporation fails to have a stipnla^
tion from the municipality reserving to itself the right to
regulate its charges, or otherwise contracts for a restraint
of the powers of the city, it acts in full view of the power of
the city to regulate its prices by fixing a maximum and is
bound by an ordinance on the subject.' A provision in an or-
dinance that natural-gas compaines shall supply all individuals
along their lines requiring it, on payment or reasonable secu-
rity, is valid, and within the power of a city to impose by or-
dinance.*
§ 560. Establishment of electric plant.— Under a general
authority to establish electric light plants a city may erect an
eldctric plant for the purpose of furnishing light to its inhab-
itants in their stores and houses as well as for lighting the
streets and public places of the city.' In upholding a similar
power in a city under a statute,* the Supreme Court of In-
diana said: — "There can be little or no doubt that the power
lCityofZane8villei',GasLightCo., city, but may furnish the same for
47 Ohio St 1 ; S. &, 23 N. R Eep. 55. private use ; and the statutes of Iowa
2Munn V. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; now place' electric light plants in the
EallvFay Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155 ; same category."
Peik V. Railway Co., 94 U. S. 164. »Elliott's Supp. Ind., 1889, § 794
'City of Eushville v. Eushville et sequuniur. Section 794 provides
Natural Gas Co. (Ind), 38 N. E. Eep. that the common council of a city
849. shall have power to light its streets
* City of Eushville v. Eushville arid public places with electric light
Natural Gas Co. (Ind.), 28 N. E. Eep. and may contract with individuals
849. or corporations for supplying such
6 So held in Thomson-Houston light Section 795 provides for the
Electric Co. v. City of Newton (1890), erection in the streets of necessary
43 Fed. Eep. 733. The court said : — poles and appliances for supplying
" It has been the uniform rule that electric light to the inhabitants of
a city in erecting gas-works or water- the city. Section 798 provides for
works is not limited to furnishing the appropriation of lands and rights
gas or water for use only upon the of way by corporations engaged in
streets and other public places of the lighting the city or the public ana
§ 560.]
BXPEE88 OOKPOEATE POWEKS.
575
to light the streets and public places of a city is one of its
implied and inherent powers, as being necessary to properly
protect the lives and property of its inhabitants, and as a
check on immorality.'" Incidental to the ordinary powers
of a municipal corporation, and necessary to a proper exercise
of its functions, is the power of enacting sanitary regulations
for the preservation of the lives and health of those residing
within its corporate limits.* " It follows " [from this princi-
ple], continued the court in the Indiana case, " that to con-
cede to municipal corporations the possession of such pow-
ers does not involve any extension, either by intendment or
implication, of the powers expressly conferred by statute;
but that by the act authorizing the organization of the cor-
poration, the legislature expressly delegates to the munici-
pality the power to take such steps as are necessary to pre-
serve the health and safety (and we will add the property) of
its inhabitants. The inference of the delegation of such
powers follows inevitably and irresistibly, because their exer-
cise is necessary to the accomplishment of the objects of the
incorporation." '
private places for the inhabitants
with electric light Of such power the
court, in City of Crawfordsville v.
Braden (Ind.), 28 N. E. Rep. 84,9, said :
"The so-called inferred or inherent
police powers of such corporations
are as much {lelegated power as are
those conferred in express terms, the
inference of their delegation growing
out of the fact of the creation of the
corporation, and the additional fact
that the corporation can only fully
accomplish the objects of its creation
by exercising such power. Special
charters as well as general statutes
for the incorporation of cities and
tovins usually contain a specific
enumeration of powers granted to
and which may be exercised by such
corporations. In many cases the
powers thus enumerated are such as
would be implied by the mere fact of
the incorporation. Where powers
are thus enumerated in a statute
which would belong to the corpora-
tion without specific enumeration,
the specific statute is to be regarded,
not as the source of the power, but
as merely declaratory of a pre-exist-
ing power, or rather of a power
which is inherent in the very nature
of a municipal corporation, and
which is essential to enable it to ac-
complish the end for which it was
created. And the enumeration of
powers, including a portion of those
usually implied, does not neoessai'ily
operate as a limitation of corporate
powers, excluding those not enumer-
ated." See, also, Clark v. City of South
Bend, 85 Ind. 376; Bank v. Sarlls
(Ind.), 28 N. E. Rep. 434.
1 City of Crawfordsville v. Braden
(Ind.), 38 N. E. Rep. 849.
2 City of St. Paul v. Laidler, 3
Minn. 190.
' City of Crawfordsville v. Braden
(Ind.), 28 N. E Rep. 849. This court
576 BXPBESS OOEPOEATB P0WEE8. [§ 561.
§ 561. Public property. — A patent was issued by the
State of Illinois to the county commissioners conveying all
the lots in a certain block known as the " Public Square "
at Ottawa, on which a statute had directed the public build-
ings should be erected, " to aid in the erection of public build-
ings." It was held that the county commissioners, after using
as much of such block for public buildings as they deemed
necessary, might sell and convey the rest of it for the purpose
of raising money to pay for such buildings.' Under an act
authorizing a county to issue bonds for a building for a court-
house, it has no authority to issue bonds for the erection of a
jail and court-house combined which is to be permanently
used as a jail and is to be used as a court-house only until a
separate court-house should be built.^ A statute authoriziiig
the supervisor of a county to cause the commons to be sur-
veyed and platted, and to lease the same for ninety-nine
years, was held to apply to leases in possession only, and not
in reversion or futuro; and a subsequent act giving to the
person entitled to any portion of such title by an existing
lease the right to acquire the fee by paying a certain sum,
vested in the lessee a property right which could not be dis-
turbed or abridged by any future lease to another.' Under
authority " to prevent and extinguish fires," a town may
erect a fire-engine house, and, under its general authority to
provide a suitable place for town business, may provide for
a public hall over said house.^
referred to the Iowa statute involved Mo. 503, where it was contended that
in Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. the municipal corporation should be
City of Newton, 42 Fed. Rep. 723, relieved from a condition to erect
swpra, and said: — "It will be ob- structures of certain kinds upon
served that this [that] statute does realty conveyed to it, and thus avoid
not in terms confer any power not, in a restoration of the property to the
our opinion, as above stated, included grantor on the ground of lack of
among the implied powers of mu- power to perform the condition. See,
nicipal corporations." also, as to the power to erect the hall,
1 Lyman v. Gedney, 114 111. 388; State v. Haynes, 72 Mo. 377 ; Ketchum
S. C, 29 N. E. Eep. 282. v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356; Allen v.
2 Nolan County v. State (Tex.), 17 Taunton, 19 Pick. 488 ; Hardy v.
S. W. Eep. 823. Waltham, 3 Met 163; Richardson v.
SRutz V. Kehr (IlL), 29 N. E. Rep. Boston, 24 Hun, 188; Board &c. St
553. Louis Public Schools v. Woods, 77
« Clarke v. Brookfield (1884), 81 Mo. 197.
§ 562.] EXPRESS OOKPOEATB POWERS. 577
§ 562. The same subject continued. — The Code of Iowa
authorizes cities and towns to acquire lands for various mu-
nicipal purposes, and provides that they shall have power " to
dispose of and convey such lands if deemed unsuitable for the
purposes for which they were purchased;" and also author-
izes the purchase by a city of lands sold under execution,
when the city has any interest in the proceeding, and em-
empowers the corporation " to dispose of the property," or of
any real estate or any interest therein, " in such manner and
upon such terms as the city council shall deem just and proper."
The provisions have been held not to confer upon a city the
authority to donate land and buildings to the county in which
they are situate in order to induce a relocation of the county
seat in such city. Such authority could only exist by legisla-
tive grant.' So a statute declaring that when a piece or parcel
of land held for public use shall not be needed for public use
the land may be sold by the city, has been construed to refer to
such property as is held by a city in full use and ownership, as
the commons, in this instance, acquired by confirmation under
various acts of congress, and not to apply to property which
has been dedicated by the owner to the public use.^ A deed
of a homestead to a county is not invalid because the land was
not acquired for any public purpose, such as a site for a court-
house, jail, etc. This holding was in Texas, where the stat-
utes ' recognize the rights of counties to take title to and en-
joy real estate without any limitation as to the purpose for
which it shall be used.* The legislature may regulate the use
of any property dedicated to a public use in a city, or promote
its improvement, but cannot divert or subject it to any use
clearly inconsistent with the contract of dedication. The
property or easement which a city has in its streets or public
places is not private property in the sense that it cannot be
taken for a public use except upon just compensation ; but it
is public, and the power of regulating the use thereof, as such,
resides in the legislature. The power is not, however, abso-
1 Brookman v. City of Creston, ' Rev. Stat Tex., arts. 680-682.
79 Iowa, 587 ; s. a, 44 N. W. Rep. 833. * Scalf v. Collin County (Tex.), 16
2 Cummings v. City of St. Louis, 90 S. W. Rep. 314
Mo. 259 ; S. C, 2 8. W. Rep. 130.
37
578 EXPRESS COEPOEATE P0WJSE3. [§§ 563, 664.
lute, but is limited as above stated.^ The authority of a munici-
pality as such to donate the right of way for a railroad com-
pany other than through its streets, and appropriate money
to pay for such right of way, does not exist under the consti-
tution of Texas.''
§ 563. Parks. — An act providing that cities acting under
special charters may provide for the election of park commis-
sioners who shall have exolasiv#power over public parks, and
authorizing the councils of such cities to submit to a vote the
question whether there shall be levied a tax for the purpose
of purchasing real estate for parks and their improvement,
has been held in Iowa not to divest the common council of
the cities of power under the code, when such commissioners
have not been elected, to " purchase or condemn and pay for
out of the general fund lands for the use of public squares,
streets and parks," and the necessity therefdr is to be deter-
mined solely by the city.' A Minnesota statute providing for
a system of public parks and parkways in Minneapolis was
construed not to authorize the board created by it to vacate
or close or exclude any class of vehicles from any street except
such as might run through any tract of lands taken for a park,
and it could not acquire that power over a street by merely
widening it by acquiring title to a strip on each side.* But
authority " to make rules for the use and government " of a
park will sustain a rule forbidding all persons " to make ora-
tions, harangues or loud outcries " therein.*
§ 564. Wharves. — A municipal corporation may, unless re-
stricted by positive law, dedicate property irrevocably to public
1 Portland &c. B. Co. v. City of 9, and art 11, sec. 3. So held in
Portland (1886), 14 Or. 188 ; S. c, 13 City of Cleburne v. Gulf &c. R Co., 66
Pac. Rep. 265, where a license by the Tex. 457 ; s. a, 1 S. W. Rep. 348.
legislature to a railroad company to ^Inre City of Cedar Bapids (Iowa,
use a levee or public landing for oer- 1892), 51 N. W. Rep. 1142.
tain property was sustained as being * State v. Waddell (Minn., 1892), 52
in aid of the use to which this prop- N. W. Rep. 213.
erty had been dedicated by the ^ Commonwealth v. Abrahams
grantor to the city. (Mjass., 1893), 80 N. B. Rep. 79.
2 Const, of Texas, 1875, art 10, sec.
§ 565.] EXPEESS OOEPOKATE P0WEB8. 579
uses.' It may, under its power to regulate wharves, authorize
the erection of a public grain elevator upon a wharf so dedi-
cated to public uses.^ But it cannot, without express authority
from the legislature, by ordinance surrender lo a private cor-
poration its control of a public wharf for a fixed term, ner
the right to regulate prices chargeable for such use.' A power
to regulate them does not include the power to surrender con-
trol of them.* Authority conferred by charter upon a city
" to purchase and hold real, personal and mixed property,
and to dispose of the same for the benefit of the city," is lim-
ited to the purchase of such property as may be necessary for
the purposes of the corporation, such as the house for the
public offices and furniture to fit them up. It does not em^
brace power to subscribe for railway stocks or to any other
work of internal improvement. To do this, special authority
from the legislature is required."
§ 565. The same subject continued. — A municipal corpo-
ration having, by its charter, an exclusive right to make
wharves on the banks of a navigable river upon which it is
situated, collect wharfage and regulate wharfage rates, can,
consistently with the constitution of the United States, charge
and collect from the owner of enrolled and licensed steam-
boats, which move and land at a wharf constructed by it,
wharfage proportioned to their tonnage.*
' Illinois &c. Canal Co. v. St Louis cannot abridge its own legislative
(1873), 3 Dill. 70 ; Public Schools v. power."
Risley, 40 Mo. 356 ; Schools v. Eisley, » City of "Wheeling v. Baltimore, 1
10 Wall. 91. Hughes, 90.
* Illinois &c. Canal Co. u. St Louis « Packet Company v. Keokuk (187.7),
(1872), 3 Dill. 70. 95 U. S. 80. The court said : — "It
3 Illinois &o. Canal Co. v. St Louis is a tax or duty that is prohibited
(1873), 3 Dill. 70. [by the constitution] ; something im-
■• Illinois &e. Canal Co. v. St Louis posed by virtue of sovereignty, not
(1873), 3 Dill. 70. See, also, Davis v. claimed in right of proprietorship.
Mayor &c. of New York, 14 N. Y. 506, Wharfage is of the latter character;
533; Milhan v. Sharp, 37 N. Y. 611; Providing a wharf to which vessels
Goslyn ■!;. Corporation of Georgetown, may make fast, or at which they
6 Wheat 593, 597, where, in the Ian- may conveniently load or unload,'is
guage of Chief Justice Marshall, it is rendering them a service. The char'
lield that a municipal " corporation acter of the servico is the same
580
BXPEESS COEPOEATE POWEES.
[§ 566.
§ 566. Markets. — An ordinance prohibiting the keeping of
a' private market within six blocks of a public market is a
valid exercise of the power to " regulate " private markets.*
The authority of a city to provide for the inspection and to
regulate the sale of meats and other things does not give
power to tax for revenue the occupation of selling them, but
justifies such fees and charges as will cover the expense of in-
spection and police supervision.* And under such authority a
city may prohibit the sale of sufth articles except at markets
duly established under its power to establish and regulate
markets.'
whether the wharf is built and of-
fered for use by a State, a muniojpal
corporatioD or a private individual ;
and when compensation is demanded
for the use of the wharf, the demand
is an assertion, not of sovereignty,
but of a right of property." Cf.
Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 WalL 577,
where the court carefully guarded
the right to exact wharfage. Any law
or ordinance savoring of a tax on ton-
nage, though ostensibly passed to col-
lect wharfage, has been held prohib-
ited. See, also, Northwestern Packet
Co. V. St. Paul, 3 Dill. 454, where an
ordinance imposing a wharfage tax
each trip upon every boat and vessel
loading or anchoring, etc., was held
in conflict with the constitution and
void. Nelson, J., said : — " It is not a
charge for the use of a wharf, but
for the privilege of arriving at and
departing from the port." Steam-
ship Company v. Port Wardens, 6
Wall. 31, where the statute imposing
a tax upon every ship entering the
port was held to be void, as "a regu-
lation of commerce and a duty of
tonnage," — "a sovereign exaction,
not a charge for compensation."
Peete u Morgan, 19 Wall. 581. hold-
ing a tax of the same character void.
Northwestern Union Packet Co. v.
City of Louisiana, 4 Dill. 17, n. ; Ken-
nedy V. Corporation of Washington,
3 Cr. C. C. 595, where it was held
that the making of rules for the reg-
ulation of private wharves was dis-
cretionary, and that the commission-
ers could not be compelled to exercise
the power.
1 Natal V. State, 139 U. S. 631 ; s. a,
11 S. Ct. Rep. 636 ; affirming 42 La.
Ann. 613 ; s. C. 1 So. Rep. 923. The
court said : — " By the law of Louisi-
ana, as in States where the common
law prevails, the regulation and con-
trol of markets for the sale of pro-
visions, including the places and the
distances from each other at which
they may be kept, are matters of mu-
nicipal police, and may be intrusted
by the legislature to a city council to
be exercised as in its discretion the
public health and convenience may
require." Morans v. Mayor, 3 La. 217 ;
First Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La.
Ann. 335 ; New Orleans v. Stafford,
27 La. Ann. 417 ; Bush v. Seabury, 8
Johns. 419; Buffalo v. Webster, 10
Wend. 99; Nightingale's Case, 11
Pick. 168 ; Commonwealth v. Rice, 9
Met. 353.
2 City of Jacksonville v. Ledwitb
(Fla.), 7 So. Rep. 885.
' City of Jacksonville v, Ledwith
(Fla.), 7 So. Rep. 885.
§ 567.] .EXPEESS OOEPOKATE P0WBE8. 581
§ 567. The same subject continued.— A municipal corpo-
ration has the power to contract with an individual, to au-
thorize him to build a market-house, rent stalls and collect
dues during a specified period, with the consideration that
the land, which is his property, and the improvements upon
it, shall be conveyed to the city, and that the same, at the ex-
piration of the term, shall be turned over absolutely in good
order to the corporation.^ An act which gives to cities power
" to provide for and regulate the inspection of meats, poul-
try," etc., and " to do all acts and make all regulations which
may be necessary or expedient for the promotion of health or
the suppression of disease," does not confer power to establish
a public slaughter-house for the purpose of securing proper in-
spection of fresh meats.* Although under the special provis-
ions of the statute, incorporated towns have power to prohibit
slaughter-houses or any unwholesome business or establish-
ment within the incorporation, and the common council by
appropriate ordinance may regulate the location of any un-
wholesome business, and may cleanse, abate or remove- the
same.' The establishment and regulation of markets is the
exercise of the police power of a city for the preservation of
the health of its citizens.* But the legislature has not given
to the city of New Orleans power to establish a market ba-
zaar as distinguishable from a market.* Under a charter
which confers authority upon a city " to regulate the erec-
1 State V. Natal (1889), 41 La. Ann. health did not enlarge the power
887 ; s. C, 6 So. -Rep. 723. The court conferred by the special provisions
based this decision on the city's of the statute which followed it, and
charter giving it all the power nee- the special powers conferred alone
essary for a proper administration should be exercised. State v. Ferge-
of a municipal government, and its son, 33 N. E. 427 ; 1 Dillon on Munic.
recognized rights of establishing Corp. (2d ed.), § 250 ; City of Cairo w
public markets. Morans v. Mayor, Bross, 101 IlL 475.
2 La. 217 ; Cougot v. New Orleans, 16 > Huesing v. City of Eock Island
La. Ann. 21 ; Weymouth v. City, 40 (1889), 128 111. 465; S. C, 21 N. E.Eep;
La. Ann. 844. 558.
• Huesiilg tt City of Eock Island * New Orleans v. Morris, 3 Woods,
(1889), 128 111. 465 ; S. C, 21 N. E. Eep. 103.
558, reversing s. c, 25 111. App. 600,— *New Orleans V. Morris, 3 Woods,
the court holding that the general 103.
provision as to the promotion of
582 EXPRESS COKPOEATE POWEES. £§ 568.
tion, use and cdntinpance of market-houses," the city has
power to pass an ordinance prohibiting the sale of fresh meats
outside the market-house;' The exclusive police power over
ishe whole suhject of slaughtering animsils within its corporate
limits is delegated by the constitution of Louisiana ^ to the
city of New Orleans, subject to no limitation except that im-
posed by the article of the constitution itself.'
§ 568. Streets generally. — Lan'Hs used as a private cemetery
may be seized by a city under authority to enter on and con-
demn " any and all lands." * It would not have been author-
ized to take lands previously taken and devoted to a public
purpose.' The cemeteiy land was devoted to a private and
not a public use.' The construction of a sewer in a public
street, if done in a lawful manner, is authorized; sewerage
being one of the legitimate uses to which public streets may
be devoted.' The word " building," used in a statute author-
izing cities to improve streets by "macadamizing, building,"
etc., includes " paving," and such cities are not thereby re-
stricted to macadamizing their streets, but may pave them
Wiith asphalt." The provisions of a city charter as to the re-
moval of obstructions from its streets gave comprehensive
powers of quasi-legislative character to the common council,
and extended :to the cutting down and removal of shade trees
Wihich had been igrowing on the sidewalks.' A city has
inherent power to construct or reconstruct sewers of all
1 Ex parte Canto, 21 Tex. App.-61 ; *ln re Deansville Cemetery Ass'n,
8. t&, ■\T.-B. W. Rep. 155. 66 N. Y. 569.
i*jGonst. La., art. .SiS, ifelates to '' Elater-u. City of Springfield (Ohio,
Te£,u}a,tiog<tbe slaughter of live ani- 1893), 30 N. :E. Rep. 274.
male. 'Morse v. City of 'Westport (Mo.,
».Darcaiitel v. People's SlauRhter 1893), 19 S. W. Rep. 881.
Hoase and Refrigerating "Co. (La., 9 Ohaae v. -City of Oshkosh (Wis.,
1893), 11 'So. Rep. 239. , 1893),^13I. W. Hep. 560. The court
<^w re St. .John's Cemetery (K. Y., said :-:-";&. .permanent obstruction,
1893), 31 N. E. Rep. 103, affirming such as trees standing within a side-
S. CI, 1'6 N. Y. Supl. 894. walk or -traveled street, or stone gol-
67n re New York &c. Ry. Co., umns which may interfere with
99 N. Y. 13.; B. C, 1 N. E. Rep. 27; public travel, constitutes per se a
Transit Co. v. Mayor, 188 N. Y. 510 ; public 'nuisance, and may be sum-
s. a, 28 N. E. Rep. 525. maifily removed by direstion of the
§569.],
EXPHESS OOEPOEATB POWEES.
583
kinds and to pay therefor out of the general revenue of the
city.i
§ 669. Construction of statutory provisions. — A recent
Pennsylvania statute relative to laying out and opening streets*
has been construed to be an affirmative act, conferring addi-
tional and cumulative powers on municipalities of all grades,
but repealing no prior statute expressly, nor any portion
thereof by implication, " unless the system provided by it is so
inconsistent with that previously existing as to make it ini-
praoticable for them to stand together." ' In the case cited
it was held that the power exercised in passing the ordinance
common council." See, also, State i>.
Leaver, 62 Wis. 393; s. c, 29 N. W.
Rep. 576.
1 Com. V. George (Pa., 1893), 34 Atl.
Rep. 59. This act was not repealed
by (P. L. Pa., 1891, 75) act of May 16,
1891, as there is nothing inconsistent
with' the former act in its provisions.
In In re Private Road in Borough of
Huntingdon, Appeal of Huntingdon
& B. T. R Co. (Pa., 1892), 24 Atl. Rep.
189, it was held that the act of April
3, 1851 (Brightly, Purd. Dig. Pa. 203
et seq.), giving boroughs power " to
survey, lay out, enact and ordain
such roads, streets, lanes, alleys, etc.,"
" as they may deem necessary," and
all "needful jurisdiction over the
same, has been held not to repeal, as
to boroughs, the act of June, 1836
(Brightly, Purd. Dig. Pa. 1499), which
authorizes courts of quarter sessions
to lay out, upon the petition of one
or more persons, " a road from their
respective dwellings or plantations to
a highway or place of necessary pub-
lic resort, or to any private way lead-
ing to a highway."
3 May 16, 1891, P. L. Pa. 75, in rela-
tion to laying out, opening, etc., of
streets, etc., in the several munici-
palities of the commonwealtli.
'Appeal of Borough of Hanover
(Pa., 1893), 34 Atl. Rep. 669, holding
the act of April 3, 1851 (P. L. 320),
which authorizes borough councils of
their own motion to pass ordinances
for widening streets, to be unrepealed ;
following Hand v. Fellows (Pa.), 23
Atl. Rep. 1126 ; McCall v. Coates, (Pa.),
33 Atl. Rep. 1137. The court said : —
" In the task of steering through con-
stitutional restrictions, well meant,
but destructive of necessary govern-
mental powers, the legislature had
found it difficult to construct statutes
conferring powers and modes of pro-
cedure suitable to all the diverse
needs, situations and wishes of the
multitude of municipal organiza-
tions in the State. In the efifort some
well intended acts had come to
naught, and others had been shorn
of sections that left inconvenient
gaps here and there in the whole
system. It was to fill these gaps, to
support the casus oniissi, and to sup-
plement powers doubtful or defect-
ive, that the act of 1891 was passed.
It took away no power in any mu-
nicipality that existed before nor
interfered with any mode of its ex-
ercise, except where there is an irre-
concilable repugnancy."
584 EXPEESS OOBPOEATE POWERS. [§ 570.
under the former statute remained, but the proceedings to
carry out the improvement might be under the later stat-
ute.* Where a city charter requires the board of public works
to preSpare a general plan of laying out into streets and alleys
all of the city not already laid out, a provision that " no pri-
vate plan shall be allowed . . . which does not conform
thereto, and no plat shall hereafter be recorded, or be of any
validity, unless before such record the approval of such board
shall be duly indorsed thereon," ^idoes not empower the board
.to refuse to approve a plat without a dedication by the owner
of the land platted of a portion of his land for the extension
of certain streets.^ And where the plat does not interfere with
the general plan established for streets, a writ of mandamus
will be granted on petition of such owner, compelling the
board to indorse its approval.' An act providing for the con-
sent of the municipal authorities as a condition precedent to
the incorporation of a company to supply the city with water
was construed to require a consent to the formation of a com-
pany by the very persons and in the manner proposed. The
consent could be given by ordinance and might be wholly
refused, but would be defective if given in general terms,* and
permission might be granted to more than one company.*
§ 670. Protection of streets. — The council of the city of
Kingston had the authority, under the provisions of its char-
ter giving the council powers of commissioners of highways,
" to lay out, make and open streets . . . and cause the
same to be repaired ; ... to cause any street ... to
1 Appeal of Borough of Hanover » Atlantic City Water Co. v. Con-
(Pa., 1893), 34 AtL Rep. 669. sumers' Water Co., 51 N. J. L. 430;
*Van Husan v. Hearaes (Mich., s. C, 17 Atl. Eep. 834 See, also,
1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 18. The court Charles River Bridge v. Warren
said : — " The power conferred goes Bridge, 11 Pet 430 ; Mohawk Bridge
no further than to prevent land-own- Co. v. Utica & Schenectady Bridge
ers from laying out streets contrary Co., 6 Paige, 554 ; Bridge Co. v. Ho-
to the general plan." hoken Land & Improvement Co., 2
'Van Husan v. Heames (Mich., Beas, 81 ; Delaware & Raritan Canal
1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 18. Co. v. Raritan & Delaware Bay R.
< State V. City of Plainfield (N. J., Co., 1 G E. Green, 331.
1893), 34 Atl. Rep. 493.
§ 570.] EXPEESS OOEPOEATB POWEES. 585
be graded, paved or repaired ; " to pi-escribe " of what mate-
rials " the same shall consist, and its power to pass ordinances
for the purpose of executing the foregoing and other powers
conferred upon it, authorize4 an ordinance prohibiting any
person from drawing a load weighing from two and one-half
to five tons over any paved street of a city.^ Under a power
to make ordinances to prevent encroachments on and obstruc-
tions to the city streets and to regulate the use of streets and
sidewalks for signs, awnings and other purposes, the council
may by ordinance authorize the erection and maintenance of
awnings over the sidewalks.^ An ordinance which purports to
grant permission to erect poles and stretch wires in a public
street as a part of a system of electrical railroading is illegal.'
The laying out of drives, etc., along any beach within a city's
limits, which is flowed by ocean tides, whether a beach of the
ocean proper or of an outlet, is authorized by a statute pro-
viding that cities located on " or " near the ocean, and em-
bracing within their • limits any " beach " or ocean front, to
lay out streets, drives or walks " along the beach or ocean
front." * A common council has no power or authority to au-
thorize the permanent possession of a public highway, street
or alley for private purposes.* The court said : — " The erec-
tion of a structure of the character and permanency described
in the complaint, for purely private purposes, upon or across
the public streets, alleys, highways or wharves of a city, is
unlawful, and such as the common council cannot authorize
and should not tolerate. Where a street or other public
way is used for public purposes, such as for street railways
or other improved methods of travel, the common councils
1 Peoples tt Wilson, 16 N. Y. Supp. 'State v. Inhabitants of Trenton
683. (N. J.), 23 Atl. Rep. 281 ; State v. City
2 Hoey V. Gilroy, 129 N. T. 132 ; a C, of Newark (N. J.), 23 Atl. Rep. 284.
29 N. E. Rep. 85, reversing 14 N. Y. * State v. Wright (N. J.), 23 Atl. Rep.
Supp. 159. It is not authorized by 116.
Supp. Rev. N. J. 869, § 30, which em- « Adams v. Ohio Falls Car Ca
powers street railways, with the con- (Ind., 1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 57. Cf.
sect of municipal authorities, to use State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185; Sims
electric or chemical motors or grip v. City of Frankfort, 79 Ind. 446 ; EI-
cables as the propelling power of its liott, Roads & Streets, 490 ; Pettis v.
cars instead of horses. Johnson, 56 Ind. 139,
586 EXPEESS COBPOEATE POWEEB. [§ 571.
have authority to permit permanent structures to be placed
on the streets, but they have no such power when the pur-
pose is strictly private and the public in no manner served." ^
§ 571. Grading of streets. — An act authorizing a city
council to fix the district benefited by a local improvement
and to apportion and assess the benefits is not open to the
objection that it confers an arbitrary power on the council.^
This form of taxation has beeft repeatedly held valid and the
discretionary power is properly lodged in the council.' Where
in the exercise of its power a city has changed the grade in
a street to the damage of the property upon which it abuts,
on a trial of an appeal by the owner from the assessment of
damages the city should not be allowed to plead irregulari-
ties in its proceedings to defeat the owner's claim for fair
damages.* A city council having general authority to estab-
lish the grades of streets may, under peculiar circumstances,
fix the grade for one side of a street on a materially different
level or plane from that of the other side; and if this ren-
ders it incidentally necessary to construct a retaining wall
along the center of the street, to support the earth on the
higher grade, that may be done. Such an exercise of public
rights is not an infringement of the rights of an adjacent
proprietor whose property may be injured thereby.' A-right
to lay pipes in the streets of a city is subordinate to the
power of the city to establish grades and grade the streets.*
A statute conferring upon cities the power to change grades
of streets, whereby railroads entering said cities may relo-
1 Adams v. Ohio Falls Co. (Ind, Soa&c. v. City of Omaha (Neb., 1892),
1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 57. For illustra- 53 N. W. Itep. 829.
tion of this distinctioii, see Mikesell ^ Yanist v. City of St Paul (Minn.,
V. Durkee, 31 Kan. 509; s. C, 9 Pac. 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 925. See, also.
Rep. 378. O'Brien v. City of St Paul, 25 Minn.
s Beecher v. City of Detroit (Mich., 831, 834 ; Henderson v. City of Min-
1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 781. neapoUs, 33 Minn. 319 ; fi. C, 20 N. W.
' Beecher v. City of Detroit (Mich., Rep. 323.
1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 731. See, also, » Still skater Water Co. v. City of
City of Detroit v. Daly, 68 Mich. Stillwater (Minn., 1892), 532f.W. Rep.
509 ; S. 0., 37 N. W. Rep. 11. 893.
* Second Congregational Church
§ 572.] EXPRESS COBPOEATE POWERS. 687
cate, change or elevate their railroads, has been held not to
be limited to railroads in existence at the time of the passage
of the act.' But under that act a change of grade must be
confined to saoh limits as are necessary for the accomplishment
of its purpose.*
§ 572. Allowing the use of streets by railroads. — A city
council has no power to condemn land for a street for the ex-
press purpose of giving a railroad company the use of a street ;
in such manner as to exclude all other travel therefrom.' The
power conferred on the common council by the charter of
Buffalo * " to permit the track of a railroad to be laid in,
along or across any street or public ground " is subject to the
qualification that no property rights of abutting owners are
thereby invaded, even incases where the city has acquired the
fee of the street in which it authorizes such track to be laid.'
The laws of Kentucky allow municipal corporations to grant
rights of way over the public streets and alleys only on condi-
tion that the use of the easement shall not obstruct or " un-
reasonably " impede the passage of persons or vehicles. It
has been held that the fact that while cars are passing along
a railroad laid in a public alley, four hundred feet long and
sixteen feet wide, the passage of vehicles drawn by horses is
totally prevented, though for only a few minutes at a time,
renders the use of the alley by the railroad company an " un-
reasonable " obstruction.'
1 state V. City of Bayonne (N. J.), Co. v. City of Louisville, 8 Bush,
23 Atl. Bep. 648. 4:19.
2 State V. City of Bayonne (N. J.), <Laws N. Y. 1-870, ch. 519, tit. 3,
23 Atl. Rep. 648. § 19.
SLigarei). City of Chioago(IlL 1891), » Keining v. New York, L. E. & W.
28 N. E. Eep. 934. See, also, Moses E. Co.. 128 N. Y. 157; s. C, 28 N. E.
V. Railroad Co., 21 111. 516; Stack v. Eep. 640, aflBrming 13 N. Y. St Eep.
City of East St. Louis, .85 111.377; 238.
CinalCo. V. Garrity, 115 111. 155 ; a C, " Commonwealth v. City of Frant-
3 N. E. ' Eep. 448; City of Olney v. fort (Ky.), 17 S. W. Eep. 132, hold-
WTiarf, 115 III. 523 ; s. c, 5 N. E. Eep. iog that the city had no authority
366 ; Dubach v. Eailroad Co., 89 Mo. to grant the right to a railroad com-
486; S. C 1 8. W. Eep. 86; Eailway pany to use such an alley for a
branch railroad.
588 EXPBESS OOEPOEATB FOWEES. [§§ 573, 574.
§ 673. The same subject continued. — A statute ' author-
izing the common council to discontinue and close a portion
of Liberty street in the city of Schenectady for the purposes
of a railroad depot " to the passage of vehicles, horses and
cattle " has been held sufficient authority for an ordinance of
the council authorizing the railroad company to construct
and maintain an iron foot-bridge for pedestrians over the rail-
road track on the discontinued portion of the street and to
close the surface of the street to pedestrians by the erection
of a fence." An order of the board of public works requiring
a railroad company which, under legislative permission, laid
its tracks in a city and continuously used them for eighteen
years, to remove its tracks on twenty-five days' notice, has
been held beyond its authority, though a statute, passed after
the construction of the tracks, empowered the city council to
"direct and control railroad tracks" within the city.' It is
competent for the legislature to give a board of trustees of an
incorporated town power to grant the use of its streets to a
railroad for a side-track. And when once granted it is not
revocable at the mere pleasure of the board, but there must
be failure on part of the road to comply with the terms of the
grant before the privilege can be recalled.* Cities and villages
incorporated under the general incorporation law of Illinois are
made the representatives of the State with respect to the con-
trol of streets and highways and bridges within their limits,
and are invested with power to lay out, alter or vacate streets,
regulate the use of the same, and to construct and keep in re-
pair bridges, viaducts, etc., and regulate the use thereof. And
where the city has the right to bridge a river it may empower"
a railroad company to do so."
§ 574. Regulations as to railroads using streets. — A mu-
nicipal corporation may regulate within its limits the running
and stopping of cars propelled by steam by virtue of its power
iLaws of New York, 1884, ch. 187. *Town of Areata v. Areata & M.
2 Weinckle v. New York &c. R. Co., R. Co., 92 CaL 639 ; s. C, 28 Pac. Rep.
15 N. Y. St Rep. 689. 676.
'Sinnott v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. 'McCartney v. Chicago &c. R Ca
Co. (Wis.), 50 N. W. Rep. 1097. (1884), 112 III 611.
§ 5t5J] ■ EXPKESS COEPOEATE POWEES. 589
over the streets and to protect the safety of citizens and their
property.' But it has been held that in the absence of a legis-
lative grant of power to that end the police juries of Louisi-
ana have no authority to prohibit by ordinance the running
of railroad trains through the villages of their parish at a
greater speed than six miles an/ hour.^ A charter which gives
the mayo^ and council authority to lay out streets and pass
all ordinances respecting them, and to make any other regu-
lation that shall appear to them necessary and proper for the
security, welfare and interest of the city, confers no authority
to make a contract to obtain the right of way through
the city for a railway.' The power to grade and improve
streets is a legislative power and a continuing one unless there
is some special restraint imposed in the charter of the corpo-
ration.* The power granted to a city to " regulate the use of
streets " has been held to extend to public uses only, and not
to authorize an ordinance permitting a private corporation to
build a railroad track and run trains across streets of the city
for the transaction of its business.' The charter of a city
authorizing the adoption of ordinances to prevent the incum-
bering of streets with carriages authorizes an ordinance to
prevent the obstruction of streets by railroad cars.*
§ 675. The same subject continued. — A statute which
gave authority to the mayor and council of a city to permit
and sanction encroachments upon its streets for a fair and
reasonable compensation paid in money into the city treasury
was held not to empower the city authorities to grant a rail-
road company a block of land eighty feet wide and four hun-
dred and eighty feet long in one of the city streets.' Nor
did they have the power to make a donation of ten acres of
I Merz V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (Mo.), * Estes v. Owen, 90 Mo, 113 ; S. C, 3
1 S. W. Eep. 383. S. W. Rep, 133.
^ State V. Miller (1889), 41 La. Ann. ^ Glaessner v. Anheuser-Busch
53 ; s. a, 7 So. Rep. 673. These police Brewing. Ass'n, 11 Mo. 508 ; s. C, 13
juries have no general grant of police S, W. Rep. 707.
power. ".City of Duluth v. Mallet (1890), '48
» Covington & Macon R. Co. v. City Minn. 304 ; s. C, 45 N. W. Eep. 154.
of Athens (1890), 85 Ga. 367; S. C, 11 'Daly v. Georgia &c. R. Co. (1888)^
8. B. Rep. 663. 80 Ga. 793; s. c, 7 S. E. Rep. 146.
590
EXPEESS OOBPOEATB POWEES.
[§ 576.
land of the city commons to a railroad corporation, and after-
wards grant to such corporation large encroachments upon
a street of the city, the consideration therefor being the re-
turn of this ten acres of land to the city.^ Nor did the gen-
eral clause in the charter of the city, giving it power to con-
'trol its streets, authorize the grant to a railroad company of
the privilege of laying its tracks along its streets.^
§ 576. Crossings of railways.*- An act declaring that " the
city council shall have power by condemnation or otherwise
to extend any street over or across any railroad track, right
of way, or land of any railroad company," gives the power
to extend streets across a railroad track, even though such
extension would subject the railroad company to great incon-
venience and hindrance in the operation of its road ; also to
extend a street across a railroad " yard " consisting merely of
a collection of tracks.' And a court of equity will not com-
The court construed the act to allow
the grant of " small encroachments
to property holders along the whole
length of the street and on both
sides thereof in order to narrow the
street. . . . Such a grant as this
was not an encroachment, but a
dedication of the major part of the
street for purposes entirely foreign
to the object for which the street
was laid out" This was an obstruc-
tion, a nuisance, not an encroach-
ment.
1 Daly V. Georgia &c. R Co. (1888),
80 Ga. 793; S. C., 7 S. B. Rep. 146.
The legislative intention could not he
thus circumvented.
2 Daly V. Georgia &c. E. Co. (1888),
80 Ga. 793 ; S. C, 7 S. E. Rep. 146 ; 3
Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 734 See,
also. State v. Corrigan St. Ry. Co., 85
Mo. 363; Hirschman v. Paterson
Horse R. Co., 17 N. J. Eq. 75 ; Jei-^ey
City &c. R. Co. V. J. C. &c. R. Co.,
30 N. J. Eq. 69 ; 3 Wood's Ry. Law,
§ 373; Kavanagh v. Mobile &a R.
Co. (1886), 78 Ga. 371; Eichels v.
Evan.sville Street Ry. Co., 78 Ind. 361 ;
s. c, 41 Am. Rep. 561 ; Davis v. East
Tenn. &c. R. Co. (Ga., 1891), 13 S. E.
Rep. 567 ; Cooley's Const. Lim. 556 ;
Elliott V. Fair Haven &c. R. Co., 33
Conn. 579 ; Cincinnati &c. Street R.
Co. V. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 533 ;
Hobart v. Milwaukee City R. Co., 37
Wis. 194; s. C, 9 Am. Rep. 461;
Att'y Gen'l v. Metropolitan R. Co.,
135 Mass. 515; s. c„ 38 Am. Rep. 304;
Brown v. Duplassis, 14 La. Ann. 843 ;
Sav. & Thunderbolt R Co. v. May
&c., 45 Ga. 603 ; Peddicord v. Balti-
more &c. R Co. 34 Md., 463 ; Hiss v.
Baltimore &c. R Co., 53 Md. 343;
s. c, 36 Am. Rep. 371 ; Stanleys City
of Davenport, 54 Iowa, 463 ; s. G, 37
Am. Rep. 316.
s Illinois Cent. R Co. v. City of
Chicago (El., 1893), 30 N. K Rep.
1044. See, also, Illinois Cent. R Co.
V. City of Chicago (111.), 28 N. E. Rep.
740; Chicago &c. Rj-. Ca u City of
Chicago (III.), 29 N. E. Rep. 1109.
§ 576.]
EXPEESS COEPOEATE POWEES.
591
pel the city to extend the street aoi'oss the track by means of
a viaduct for the convenience of the railroad company, since
under the statute the city council has the option, in its dis-
cretion, of creating a crossing at grade or above grade, and its
discretion should not be interfered with by the courts,' The
rule in such cases is that in the exercise of the power of the
municipal corporation in this respect there should be no un-
reasonable impairment of the usefulness of the railroad right
of way.^ The governing authorities of a municipal corpo-
ration may, in furtherance of the object of a statute empow-
ering them to alter streets which were to be crossed by railroads
looking generally to the safety of life of citizens, vacate any
street or any part of a street, and change the grade upon any
street or part of a street without the consent of abutting own-
ers. They may^ also construct bridges as parts of streets to
As to the "yard," Delaware & H. C.
Co. V. ViUage of Whitehall, 90 N. Y.
21.
1 Illinois Cent R Co. v. City of
Chicago (111, 1893), 30 N. E. Rep.
1044. See, also, Lake Shore &c. By.
Co. V. Chicago &c. E. Co., 97 111. 506 ;
Curry v. Mt Sterling, 15 111. 320;
Railroad Co. v. Town of Lake, 71 111.
333 ; Durham v. Hyde Park, 75 111.
371 ; Brush v. City of Carbondale, 78
111. 74; Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 111.
237 ; 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th
ed.), § 95 ; Lewis on Eminent Domain,
§ 338 ; Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S.
403; Railroad v. Wilfcse, 116 111. 449;
s. C, 6 N. E. Rep. 49 ; People v. New
York Cent &c. E. Co., 74 N. Y. 303;
Railway Co. v. City of Faribault, 33
Minn. 167; National D. R. Co. v.
Central R Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 755 ; Na-
tional D. &c. Ry. Co. V. State (N. J.),
21 Atl. Rep. 570 ; Struthers v. Rail-
way Co., 87 Pa. St 283; Central Ry.
Co. V. State, 33 N. J. Law, 220; 3
Wood's Railway Law, p. 981 ; Elliott,
Roads & Streets, p. 598 ; Railroad Co.
V. Bentley, 64 111: 438 ; People v. Chi-
cago (fee. R Co., 67 III. 118; Railroad
Co. V. City of Dayton, 23 Ohio St 510 ;
Johnston v. Railroad Co., 10 R. I. 365 ;
People V. Boston & A. R. Co., 70 N. Y.
569; Drexel v. Town of Lake, 127 III.
54; s. c, 20 N. E. Rep. 38, where the
question to be determined by the
trustees of the town was, which one
of two modes of carrying off the sew-
erage of a district should be adopted
as the best and most expedient mode,
and the court said : — " The choice of
expedients is within the legislative
discretion of the trustees of the
town — a discretion with which the
courts will not interfere unless
clearly abused."
2 3 Wood's Railway Law, § 271,
p. 975, note 3, and cases ; Common-
wealth V. Erie &c. R Co., 27 Pa. St
339 ; People v., Dutchess &c. R Co.,
58 N. Y. 152; Johnston v. Railroad
Co., 10 R L 365 ; Railroad Co. v. Mof-
fltt, 75 III. 524; City of Bridgeport
V. New York & N. H. R Co., 36 Conn.
355 ; 2 Wood's Railway Law, § 371,
p. 981, note 1 ; People v. Boston &
A. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 569 ; State v. St
Paul &c. Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 131 ; s. C,
28 N. W. Rep. 3.
592 EXPEESS OOEPOEATE POWERS. [§ 577.
carry the public way above intersecting railroads.' The council
of a borough organized under an act conferring powers to
be exercised by ordinance has no right, by a mere resolution,
to enter into a contract by which the public moneys are to be
expended, and borough bonds are to be issued, to pay for
grading and filling a street.^ A resolution by the common
council of a city authorizing a person to grade a portion of a
street and build a bridge thereon across a private canal has
been held invalid. Such authorization should have been by
ordinance.'
§ 677. Sewers. — A complaint in an action to set aside a
special assessment to pay for the construction of a sewer and
a pavement on the street in front of plaintifif's land was held,
insufficient, as it alleged facts which only showed mere irregu-
larities and failures to comply with some minor statutory re-
quirements and did not allege an offer to pay the amount of such
assessments justly chargeable to plaintiff's property.* In Penn-
sylvania it has been held that a lot-owner cannot defend
against an assessment under the front-foot rule, for the con-
struction of a sewer in front of his lot, on the ground that such
sewer was neither a private benefit to him or his property nor
a matter of necessity to the public* It is not enough for the
complaint to allege in direct terms the inequality and injustice
iBead v. City of Camden (N. J., of Harrisburg ». McCormick, 139 Pa.
1893), 34 Atl. Rep. 549. See, also, St 313 ; s. C, 18 Atl Rep. 126 ; Ches-
State V. City of Elizabeth (N. J., 1893), ter City v. Black, 133 Pa. St 570 ; s. C,
34 Atl. Rep. 495. 19 Atl. Rep. 376. See, also, as to
^ State V. Mayor &c. of Brigonetine power to construct sewers, etc., Ham-
Borough (N, J., 1893), 34 AtL Rep. mett v. City, 65 Pa. St 146; Pen-
481. nock V. Hoover, 5 R. 391 ; Northern
s State V. Mayor &c. of Ba3'onne Liberties v. St John's Church, 13 Pa.
(N. J., 1893), 34 Atl. Rep. 448. See, St' 104; City v. Wistar, 35 Pa. St
also, Packard v. Railway Co., 48 N. J. 437 ; Commonwealth v. Woods, 44
Eq. 281; s. G, 33 Atl. Rep. 237; Pa. St 113; Magee v. Common-
State V. Lambertville, 45 N, J. L. 379, wealth, 46 Pa. St 358 ; Wray v.
283. Mayor &c. of Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. St
* Meggett V. City of Eau Claire 365 ; Stroud v. The City, 61 Pa. St
(Wis., 1893), 51 N. W. Rep. 566. 255 ; Lipps v. The City, 38 Pa. St 503 ;
5 Michener v. Philadelphia, 118 Pa. City v. Tryon, 85 Pa. 'St 401 ; Brient-
St 535 ; s. c, 13 Atl. Rep. 174; City nail v. The City, 103 Pa. St 156.
§ 57S.] EXPRESS COEPOEA.TE POWERS. 693
of such assessment; it must also allege facts showing such in-
equality and injustice or going to the groundwork of the as-
sessment.* Nor could the plaintiff limit his liability to the
improvement of that portion of the street immediately in
front of his property, and then only to the extent it was bene-
fited. The city was empowered by its charter to apportion
the entire cost of the sewer and pavement respectively upon
that street among the several lots fronting thereon, under the
front-foot rule.'
§ 678. Fire limits. — A provision in a charter to prevent
the reconstruction in wood of old buildings within certain
limits does not include the power to prevent the repairing
with shingles the roof of buildings originally covered with
similar materials.' And an ordinance establishing fire limits
is not inconsistent with the general laws of Georgia.* Power
by charter to pass ordinances necessary for the preservation
of the health, good order, etc., of the town, authorizes an or-
dinance limiting the maximum quantity of land lawful to be
cultivated within the corporate limits." And an ordinance
1 Pratt V. Lincoln County, 61 Wis. 169; s. a, 10 8. E. Rep. 600, as Code
68; S, C, 20 N. W. Rep. 726; Fifield of Georgia, section 786, expressly
V, Marinette County, 62 Wis. 532; authorizes mayors and councils of
S. C, 23 N. W. Rep. 705 ; Wisconsin towns and villages " to make regula-
Central R Co. v. Ashland County tions for guarding against danger or
(Wis.), 50 N. W. Rep. 939, 940. See, damage by fire," See, also, 1 Dillon
also. Railroad Co. v. Lincoln County, on Munic. Corp., §§ 145, 405, note ;
67 Wis. 478; S. C., 30 N. W. Rep. 619; Horr & Bemis on Munic. Police Or-
CanBeldw. Bayfield County,, 74 Wis. dinances, §§ 223, 223; Wadleigh v.
64 ; s. C, 41 N. W. Rep. 437, and 43 Oilman, 13 Me. 403 ; Mayor &c. of
N. W. Rep. 100 ; Canal Co. v. Outa- Monrbe v. Hofifmah, 29 La. Ami. 651 ;
gamie County, 76 Wis. 588 ; S. C, 45 Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575 ;
N. W. Rep. 536, — this last approved dictum of Shaw, C. J., in Comraon-
aad sanctioned in Farrington v. In- wealth v. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55, 58 ;
vestment Co. (N. Dak.), 45 N.W. Rep. Charleston v. Reed, 27 West Va.
194 ; Avout v. Flynn (So. Dak.), 49 681 ; Williams v. City Council of
N. W. Rep. 17. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509 ; Kneedler v. Nor-
* Pratt V. Lincoln County, 61 Wis. ristown, 100 Pa. St 368; Troy v.
63. See, also. State v. City of Por- Winters, 2 Hun, 63 ; Pye v. Peterson,
13 Wis. 563. 45 Tex. 313; S. C 23 Am. Rep.
"State V. Sohuchardt, 43 La. 49; 608.
e. C, 7 So. Rep. 67. »Town of Summerville v. Pressley
4 Ford V. Thrailkill (1890), 84 Ga. (1889), 33 S. C. 56; s. C, 11 8. E. Rep.
594 KXPEE88 OC'SPOEATE FOWEE8. [§ 579.
imposing a proper and reasonable restriction upon the enjoy-
ment of property to prevent its becoming injurious to public
health is a legal exercise of the police po^\'er of the State
which it is competent for the legislature to delegate by char-
ter to the municipal authorities ; • also to compel a railway
company to water its tracks so as to lay the dust.* A munic-
ipal corporation cannot control the owners of property in the
mode or manner of constr-acting their buildings, within cer-
tain designated limits, in the absence of express legislative
authority.' The grant to a municipal corporation of power
to provide for the prevention and extinguishment of fires nec-
essarily implies the right to establish fire limits and prohibit
the erection of wooden buildings therein.* A statute giving
power to commissioners of a town to pass " such ordinances
as they may deem necessary and beneficial for said town "
confers on them authority by ordinance to prohibit any per-
son erecting any building within the limits of the town with-
out a permit from them."
§ 579. Directions as to buildings.— Ordinances relating
to fire limits, enacted without authority, may be expressly
validated by a subsequent revision of the charter.* An ordi-
nance of a city imposing a penalty on persons erecting a
certain class of buildings made of combustible materials
within certain fire limits, declaring such buildings nuisances,
and giving the council power to tear them down, has been
held not void where the city charter empowered the city
545. See^ also, aa to- the power to *City & Suburban Ry. Co. v. City
regulate, restrain and suppress par- of Savannah (1886), 77 Ga. 731.
ticular kinds of business, 1 Dillon on 3 State v. Schuchardt, 43 La. 49;
Muni& Corp. (3d ed.),§144; Harrison s. C, 7 So. Eep. 67.
V. Baltimore, 1 Gill, 364 ; City Council * Hubbard v. Town of Medford(Or.),
V. The Baptist Church, 4 StroU 310 ; 35 Pac. Rep. 640. See, also, City of
State V. City of Charleston, 10 Rich. Olympia v. Mann, 1 Wash. St 389;
503. , S. C, 35 Pac. Rep. 337,
• Town of Summerville v, Pressley * Comm'ra of Easton v. Covey (Md.),
(1889), 33 S. C. 56; S. a, 11 a R Rep. 23 Atl. Rep. 366. And it is within
545. See, also, Dillon on Munic. Corp., their discretion to refuse a permit
§146; Com.n Alger, 7 Cush. 85. SBunner v. Downs, 17 N. Y. St
Bep. 633w
§ 580.] EXPRESS COEPOBATE POWEES. 595
to prohibit such buildings and to provide for their removal.^
The charter of a city authorizing the making of ordinances
" to prescribe the limits within which wooden buildings shall
not be erected " pertains to the future, and an ordinance
made thereunder prohibiting, without the council's permission,
the erection of " any building constructed in whole or in part
of wood" within certain limits, refers to buildings to be erected
in the future, and not to buildings in existence and erected
by such permission.* A city has power to pass an ordinance
prohibiting the blasting of rook with explosive compounds
under a statute providing that towns may make b5'-laws to
protect persons from dangers incident to the maintenance,
occupation or use of buildings on streets.'
§ 680. Police power. — tinder a city charts giving the
council power to pass all ordinances necessary for the due ad-
ministration of justice and the better government thereof,
and " to cause the removal or abatement of any nuisance,"
the passage of an ordinance requiring a street-car company
to put " a driver and conductor" on each car is a proper ex-
ercise of the city's police power, and not an impairment of
the company's rights ; not being unreasonable or oppressive.*
And a provision in such an ordinance, requiring the police to
cause every car not provided with a " driver and conductor "
to be returned to the stable, is not an attempt at enforcement
without* trial, but merely a means of preventing a nuisance
» Baxter v. City of Seattle (Wash.), E. E. of Brooklyn, 112 N. Y. 61, 75;
28 Pac. Eep. 537. s. G, 19 N. R Eep. 664 ; People v.
2 City of Buffalo v. Chadcayne Otis, 90 N. Y. 48, 52 ; Stuart v. Pal-
(N. Y, 1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 443, hold- mer, 74 N. Y.' 183 ; Detroit v. Planli-
ing that the defendant, who had a road Co., 43 Mi(ih. 140 ; s. C, 5 N. W.
permit from the city council to erect Rep. 275.
frame buildings within the fire lim- ' Commonwealth v. Parks (Mass.,
its, and had made contracts and in- 1892), 30 N. E. Rep. 174 The court
curred liabilities thereon before a said: — "Such prohibition is not such
rescission of such permit, acquired a a taking of property as to be beyond
private property right of which he the police power," under Miller v.
was entitled to protection. AfHrm- Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 647 ; s. c., 26
ing 7 N. Y. SupL 501. See, also, N. K Rep. 150.
People V. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1-62; * South Covington &c. Ry. Co. v.
s. C, 18 N. E. Rep. 692 ; In re Union Beny (Ky.), 18 & "W. Rep 1026.
596
EXPRESS COEPOKATE P0WEE8.
[§ 680.
by blockading travel.' Acts of a territorial legislature em-
powering coiuity commissioners to grant ferry licenses and
regulate the ferries have been upheld as containing a valid
exercise of police power .^ An ordinance of a town to pro-
hibit peddling within the corporate limits without a license
is within the police power, and is not void as discriminating
in favor of citizjens of the town, since it applies to all persons
alike, whether they reside in thg town or elsewhere.*
'South Covington &c. Ry. Co. v.
Berry (Ky.), 18 a W. Rep. 1026. See,
also, Railroad Ca v. Richmond, 96
U. S. 521, where it was said an ordi-
nance as to running cars in the
streets "was a mere regulation of
the use of its [the railroad com-
pany's] property in the city, and not
a 'taking' within the meaning of
the constitutional prohibition."
* Evans v. Hughes County, 6 Dak.
102; s. C, 50 N. W. Rep. 720. Nor
are such acts repugnant to the Re-
vised Statutes of the United States,
section 1889, which provides that the
legislative assemblies of the several
Territories shall not grant private
charters or special privileges. In Com-
monwealth V. Page (Mass.), 29 N. E.
Rep. 513, a rule of the board of police
of Boston, providing that no person
shall use " any hackney carriage un-
less he is licensed thereto by the
board," and that every vehicle " used
for the conveyance of persons for
hire from place to place within the
city, except a horse-car, shall be
deemed a hackney carriage," has
been held to be sL reasonable exei'cise
of the authority conferred on the
board, under various acts which
placed the power in their hands, to
act under Pub. St ch., 38, §25, em-
powering the mayor and aldermen
of a, city to regulate all vehicles used
therein. This rule was also held to
apply to all vehicles used in the city
for the conveyance of persons for
hire, whether the vehicles stood in
public places or in the stables of their
owners.
' Martin v. Town of Rosedale (Ind.),
39 N. R Rep. 410. See Elliott's Supl.
Ind.. § 826, pursuant to which it was
passed. In Commonwealth v. Cutter
(Mass.),39N.E. Rep. 1146, an ordinance
by the city of Boston, providing that
"no owner or occupant of land abut-
ting on a private way, and having
the right to use such way, shall
suffer any fllth," etc., to remain on
that part of the way adjoining such
land, was held to be authorized as a
proper exercise of police power, under
Pub. St., ch. 27, § 15, which provides
that towns may make by-laws for
preserving peace and good order
within their limits, and St 1854, ch.
448, § 35, which gives the city council
of Boston " power to make all suoh
needful and salutary by-laws and or-
dinances ... as towns . . .
have power to make and - estab-
lish." See, also, as to the power of
cities and towns to adopt ordinances
and by-laws for the preservation and
promotion of the health of their in-
habitants, as an exercise of police
power. Commonwealth v. Patch, 97
Mass. 231 ; Commonwealth v. Curtis,
9 Allen, 266 ; Vandine, Petitioner, 6
Pick. 187 ; 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp.
(Sd ed.), p. 369.
§ 581.J EXPEESS OOEPOEATE P0WEE8. 597
§ 581. The same subject continued.— Applying the pro-
vision of the constitution of California which authorizes the
city and county of San Francisco to make and enforce within
its limits such police regulations as are not in conflict with
general laws, the Supreme Court of California has held an or-
dinance of the city prohibiting the sale of pools, etc., on horse
races, "^except within the inclosure of a race-track where such
trial or contest is to take place," to be valid ; for though its
incidental effect may be to confer special privileges on the
owners of race-tracks, its purpose is to restrain gambling of
the character mentioned, which is a proper subject of police
regulation.' Nothing passes by a grant of power to a munici-
pal corporation to establish and regulate ferries across a nav-
igable stream but what is granted in clear and explicit terms.
Power conferred on a municipality " to lay out, make, open,
widen, regulate and keep in repair all . . . ferries,
. . . " does not include the power to confer upon any indi-
vidual the exclusive right to keep and operate a ferry. If by
such a grant power to establish ferries is conferred at all, such
power is held by the trustees of the city as a public trust, to be
exercised as the public good may require.^ Where the only
legislative authority conferred by the charter of a city with
reference to billiard saloons and pool rooms is to license such
places by ordinance, the power to license is to be construed as a
power to regulate, and the city council may impose such rear
sonable terms and conditions as may be necessary to make the
license issued eflBcaoious as a police regulation ; but in the ab-
sence of further authority to regulate or control such places,
the council would not be authorized, as against existing licenses
at least, to impose new or additional conditions not required
or contemplated under the original ordinance, or to provide and
enforce penalties for the violation' thereof.' Where a corpo-
ration is authorized to enact ordinances to prohibit practices
which are against good morals, or contrary to public decency,
and its legislative body determines that any particular prac-
tice, such as the uttering of profane language, is against good
i^a;jBar<efuttle(Ca].),27Pao.Rep. s. c, 44 N. "W. Bep. 251. See, also,
933. People v. Meyers, 95 N. Y. 233 ;
2 Minturn v. Larue, 1 McAl. 870. Schwuchow w Chicago, 68 111. 444 ;
3 State V. Pamperin, 42 Minn. 330 ; Gilham v. Welly, 64 Ga. 193.
598 EXPEESS CORPOBATE POWEES. [§§ 582, 583.
morals, and prohibits it, its decision is final and will not be re-
viewed.' An ordinance enacting that it shall not be lawful for
any horse-railroad company to run any car without having an
agent, in addition to the driver, to assist in the control of the
car and passengers, and to prevent accidents and disturbances
of the good order and security of the streets, is a reasonable
regulation and a valid exercise of the general police power
vested in a city by its charter.'
§582. To promote health.— Under the general police
power the legislature may delegate to a" municipality the au-
thority to pass ordinances for the preservation of the health
or the promotion of the comfort, convenience, good order and
general welfare of its citizens, provided, always, that they are
not in conflict with the provisions of the Federal and State
constitutions, framed for the protection of the citizens in the
enjoyment of equal rights, privileges and immunities.' A mu-
nicipality authorized by the legislature to pass any ordinance
in the nature of a police regulation that is consistent with the
laws of the land may prohibit the exposing of any produce,
merchandise, cooked provisions, poultry, fruit, vegetables or
other commodities on the space between stores and the side-
walk, as well as upon the sidewalk.*
§ 683. General welfare, etc. — A general statute empower-
ing city councils " to enact and make all such ordinances, by-
laws, rules and regulations not inconsistent with the laws of
the State as may be expedient for maintaining the peace, good
1 Ex parte Delaney, 43 CaL 478. mode them in x>assing by a way left
! State V. Inhabitants of Trenton open for them by the owner, or might
(N. J.), 30 AtL Rep. 1076, See, also, frighten horses attached to vehicles
§ 580, supra. diven along the streets, would be suf-
3 State V. Moore, 104 N. C. 714 ; ficient to warrant the enactment un-
State v: Pendergrass, 106 N. C. 664. der the general authority to prohibit
estate V. Summerfleld, 107 N. C. nuisances, protect health and pre-
895 ; S. C, 13 S. E. Eep. 114. The court vent individuals from so using their
said : — " The fact that produce, mer- own property as to subject others to
cliandise, meats, etc., exposed in serious and unnecessary inconven-
front of stores might, in the opinion ience or danger. See, also, State v.
of the commissioners, based on rea- Stovall, 103 N. C. 416 ; Intendant t>.
sonable grounds, endanger the health Sorrell, 1 Jones, 49 ; Cooley Const,
of the citizens of the town or incom- Lim., *58.
§ 583.] EXPRESS COEPOEATE F0WBE3. 599
government and welfare of the city and its - trade and com-
merce " authorizes the enactment of an ordinance regulating
the sale of cider by prohibiting such sales in less quantities
than a gallon, and forbidding it to be drntik on the premises.'
Neither was such ordinance unconstitutional as violating pri-
vate rights or unreasonably or improperly restraining trade.'
The general welfare clause has been held to confer power
uvon a city conncil to prohibit the keeping open of stores,
shops and other places of business on Sunday.' Under it an
ordinance to prevent the keeping of a, bawdy-house has been
held valid ; * also an ordinance prohibiting saloons, restaurants
and other places of public fentertainment being kept open after
10 o'clock at night.* So under it a municipality may fix the
time or places of holding public markets for the sale of food.*
The establishment of a by-law imposing a penalty for mutilat-
ing any ornamental tree planted in any of the streets or public
places of a city has been held within the authority to pass such
ordinances as " shall be needful to the good order of the city." '
Under the power to make regulations which may be necessary
or expedient for the promotion of health or the suppression
of disease an incorporated city has the right to require sellers
of meats to take out licenses.^
• Monroe u City of Lawrence (1890), 'City of St Louis v. Cafferata» 24
44 Kan. 607; S. C., 24 PacEep. Mo. 94.
1113. Thecourtsaid:— "Instead of « The State v. Williams, 11 S.G 288.
specifically defining every regulation SThe State v. Freeman, 38 N. E.
which might be necessary to the 426.
health, safety, peace and convenience 'Wartman v. City of Philadelphia,
of the public, the legislature enacted 33 Pa. St 202.
the general welfare clause; and it 'State «. Merrill, 37 Me. 329.
seems to us that it furnishes suflS- * Kinsley v; City of Chicago, 124 IlL
cient authority for the council to 359. See, also, Williams v. Augusta,
pass an ordinance so clearly in the 4 Ga. 509 ; Matter of Yick Wo, 68 Cal.
interest of peace, good order and 294; St Louis v. Schoenbusch, 95
health as the one in question." Mo. 618 ; Mayor v. Williams, 15 N. Y.
3Monroe5ii.Cityof'Lawfence(1890),. 502; State) v. Welch, 36 Conn. 215;
44 Kan. 607; s. a, 24 Pac. Rep. 1113. Commonwealth v. McCafferty, 145
See, also, Powell v. Commonwealth, Mass. 384; s. c, 14 N. E. Hep. 453;
127 U. 8. 678; Stokes v. City of New Commonwealth v. Davis, 140 Mass.
York, 14 Wend. 88 ; Mobile v. Yuille, 485 ; s. C., 4 N. E. Rep. 577 ; Dillon on
80 Ala. 137; State v. Campbell, 13 Muniu Corp. (4th ed.), §§ 396-407.
AtL Rep. 585 and note.
600 EXPEESS COEPOEATE P0WEE8. [§§ 584r, 585.
§ 684. To license. — A contract between a council and a
corporation for the extension of pipes into the municipal terri-
tory from a neighboring city, which leaves for an indefinite
period to other parties the regulation of the price to be paid
or the quantity or quality of gas to be furnished, and which
confers exclusive rights, has been held to be unauthorized,
under a statute which prohibits the granting of exclusive
privileges.' The general legislation of 1887 in Minnesota, reg-
ulating the sale of intoxicating^iquors, although applicable to
cities, has been held not to have had the effect of repealing by
implication existing municipal ordinances upon the subject, or
the charter power to enact ordinances not inconsistent with
the general law.* An act giving a city power to assess a license
tax upon all persons carrying on " any business, trade or pro-
fession " within the city authorizes the assessment of a tax for
retailing cigars, although the cigars are sold in connection with
a grocery business and the grocer has taken out a general
license for such business.' A city ocdinance declaring it a
misdemeanor punishable by fine to keep stallions, etc., within
the city limits for service has been held invalid.* The board of
county supervisors has authority to appoint a license col-
lector under a valid ordinance referring to the selling of liq-
uor at retail.*
§ 685. Occupations. — A power to license and regulate hack
owners and drivers, and to prohibit unlicensed persons and vehi-
I Cincinnati Gas Light Ca». Avon- Minn. 418; S. G, 45 N. W. Eep.
dale (1885), 43 Ohio St 257. 719.
2 State V. HarrU (Minn., 1893). 52 'City of Mobile v. Craft (Ala.), 10
N. W. Kep. 387. Thecourt said, in So. Rep. 534.
additiop to " repeals by iaiplication '' *Ex parte Robinson (Tex.), 17 S. W.
not being " favored : " — "Thisprincl- Rep. 1057, as such keeping was
pie has peculiar force from the fact not a nuisance per se and its prohibi-
that the laws, the implied repeal of tion not authorized either by Revised
which is in question, were principally Statutes of Texas, articles 403, 408,
special laws, enacted to meet the empowering cities to abate nuisances,
needs of particular localities, while or by article 383, empowering cities
the repealing act was general, and to "regulale" occupations and call-
not thus particular." See, also, ings.
Moore v. City of Minneapolis, 43 > Amador County v. Kennedy, 70
CaL 458; s, c., 11 Pac. Rep. 75a
§'586.] BXPEE9S COEPOEATE POWEES. 601
cles from engaging in such capacities warrants the imposition
of a reasonable pecuniary penalty for a violation of an ordi-
nance requiring such a license.' A similar power in a charter
extending to public grounds and spaces has been held to au-
thorize the enactment of an ordinance forbidding farmers,
hacksters, peddlers, etc., from standiiig with their vehicles and
carts on the streets adjacent to the city market, within five
hundred feet of such market.^ But provisions conferring pow-
«rs to license persons in such lines of business have been held
to apply only to those who are engaged in business as carriers
of persons or property for hire, and not to those who, not being
engaged in such business, merely hire out teams and vehicles
to those who have property to transport, the hirer himself
using and controlling the team and vehicle.' Under a power
granted to a city to regulate hackmen, porters, etc., a city
may by ordinance prohibit their soliciting custom at the depot
or on the platform of any railroad within its corporate lim-
its.*
§ 586. The same subject continued. — An ordinance re-
quiring pawnbrokers to take out licences is not authorized
by a statute empowering the council to pass ordinances not
inconsistent with the laws of the State and necessary to carry
out the objects of the corporation.' But all the authorities
agree that the business of the pawnbroker is a proper matter
for regulation by the police power." Under it, a city council
may forbid the keeping or storing of petroleum, naphtha, ben-
zine, gasoline, or any inflammable or explosive oils, within the
corporate limits in quantities greater than five barrels at a time,
iHaynesu. City of Cape May (1889), exact that they should take out a
53 N. J. Law, 180 ; s. a, 19 Atl. Rep. license must be expressly conferred
176. by statute ; it not being unlawful to
2 People V. Keir, 78 Mich. 98 ; s. C, conduct such business, and there
r43.N. W. Rep. 1039. being no power to prohibit it in the
' State V. Robinson (1889), 43 Minn, council, they could not require of
107. him a license as a condition prece-
* City of Chillicothe v. Brown dent to carrying on the business.
(1889), 38 Mo. App. 609. 6 Shuman v. The City of Fort
sShuman v. City of Fort Wayne Wayne (1890), 137 Ind. 109;s. C, 30
(1890), 137 Ind. 109 ; s. c, 36 N. E. N. E. Rep. 5c J. See, also, Van Baalen
Bep. 560, the court putting the ruling v. People, 40 Mich. 358 ; Launder v.
upon the principle that the right to City of Chicago, 111 UL 391.
602 EXPEESS COEPOEATB POWEES. [§ 687.
except by permission as in the ordinance provided.' /. statute
empowering city councils to regulate the use of the public
streets does not authorize an ordinance that no processions
shall be allowed upon the streets until a permit shall be ob-
tained from the superintendent of police, leaving the issuance
of such permits to his discretion, since the power conferred
upon the council cfmnot be delegated by them.* Nor was such
an ordinance authorized by the grant of power in the general
incorporation act " to regulate and prohibit the exhibition or
carrying of banners ; ... to declare what shall be a nui-
sance and abate the same ; ... to prevent and suppress
riots, routs, afErays, noises, disturbance, disorderly assemblies
in any public or private place.' An incorporated town has
power, under a statute authorizing it "to provide for the
measuring or weighing of hay, coal," etc., to grant to indi-
vidual dealers the right to set scales in the public streets in
front of their places of business in such a way as not to be an
obstruction to travel.* In Iowa the board of supervisors may
employ counsel to institute an action in behalf of the county,
and their right to do so is not dependent on the consent of
the county attorney." County supervisors in Michigan have
no authority, by resolution, to vote the sheriff a salary in lieu
of all statutory fees for services rendered the county, and in-
clude such salary in the yearly tax levy.'
§ 587. Public offenses. — An ordinance imposing a fine of
$25 for the use of " any abusive or indecent language, curs-
• City of Richmond v. Dudley (1891), State v. Mahner (La.), 9 So. Eep. 480 ;
139 Ind. 112; S. C., 26 N. E. Eep. City of Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass.
184 The court said : — " The danger 598.
to be apprehended to life and prop- ' Trotter v. City of Chicago, 33 IlL
erty from the storing of inflamma- App. 206, affirmed in 26 N. E. Rep.
ble or explosive substances in large 359. See, also. Matter of Frazee, 63
quantities within the limits of a city Mich. 396 ; Anderson v. City of Well-
is so great as to invite legislative ington, 40 Kan. 173.
control of the same by the city gov- * Incorporated Town of Spencer v.
ernment." Andrew (Iowa), 47 N. W. Rep. 10D7.
2 City of Chicago v. Trotter (111.), 26 » Taylor County v. Standley (Iowa),
N. E. Rep. 359. See, also. Bills v. City 44 N. W. Rep. 911,
of Goshen. 117 Ind. 221 ; Mayor v. « Hewitt v. White (Mich.), 43 N. W.
Eadeoke, 49 Md. 217 ; Barthet v. City Rep. 1043.
of New Orleans, 24 Fed. Rep. 563;
§ 588,] BXPEESS COEPOBATE FOWEES, 603
ing, swearing, or any loud or boisterous talking, holloaing, or
any other disorderly conduct," is reasonable and authorized
under a statutory power to abate nuisances.' But the same
provision would not authorize an ordinance making it an
offense for the occupant or owner of any room to suffer or al-
low prostitution therein, or males and females to cohabit
therein without being lawfully married.^ Authority to suppress
bawdy-houses does not include power to provide by ordinance
that " circumstances from which it may reasonably be inferred
that any house is frequented by disorderly persons or persons
of notoriously bad character shall be sufficient to establish that
such house is a disorderly house or house of ill-fame." ' An
ordinance making a mere private trespass on land penal is not
authorized by a statute which confers on the common council
authority to " declare what shall be considered nuisances in
the . . . lots and places in said borough and remove all
obstructions," etc.*
§ 688. The same snbject continned. — Ordinances prohit»it-
ing the carrying of concealed weapons, disturbing the peace
and selling liquor on Sunday are not " inconsistent with the
laws of the State," although the prohibited acts are made
offenses by general statute.* Authority given to a city " to
1 state V. Earnhardt, 107 N. C. 789 ; cities not inconsistent with the laws
a a, 13 S. E. Rep. 426. See, also, of the State, to suppress disorderly
State V. Cainan, 94 N. C. 883 ; State v. conduct, provide for the safety, pre-
McNinch. 87 N. C. 567 ; State v. Mer- serve the health, promote the pros-
ritt, 83 N. C. 677. perity, and improve the morals,
2 State V. Webber, 107 N. C. 962 ; order, comfort and convenience of
a C, 13 S. E. Rep. 598. the corporation and its inhabitants.
'State V. Webber, 107 N. C. 963; Town of Van Buren v. Wells (1890),
a a, 13 S. E. Rep. 598. The court 53 Ark. 368; 14 S. W. Rep. 88. The
said this would be prescribing new court said: — "The only limitation
rules of evidence. See, also, City of upon this power is that the by-laws
Charlton v. Barker, 54 Iowa, 360 ; and ordinances must ' not be incon-
Dorst V. People. 51 III. 386; City of sistent with the laws of the State.' The
Mt Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399 ; ordinances in question do not fall
Wood on Nuisances, g§ 740, 741 ; 1 within the limitation, and are whole-
Dillon on Munic. Corp., §§ 309, 310. some provisions for the prosecution
* Bregguglia v. Lord (N. J.), 80 Atl. [promotion?] and improvement of the
Rep. 1082. order and morals of the inhabitants
6 Mansf. Dig. Ark., § 764, which au- for whose benefit they were designed,
thorizes the passage of ordinances by and a proper exercise of the power
604
EZPBEBS OOBFOSATE FOWEBS.
[§ 589.
prevent and restrain disturbances" does not include the right
to take jurisdiction and punish for the crime of an assault with
a dangerous weapon.^ The power given a city council to re-
strain and prohibit all descriptions of gambling and fraudu-
lent devices and practices authorizes an ordinance prohibiting
the keeping or setting up of any gambling device designed, to
be used in gambling, and imposing a penalty for its violation.^
§ 589. Nuisances. — Under a power in a charter to define
and abate nuisances a city was held authorized to declare by or-
dinance the running at large of domestic animals a nuisance;*
and this power was not abrogated by a statute providing
that it should be lawful for • stock to run at large where the
inhabitants of the county adopted the stock law, which was
done in the county where the city was situated. Under au-
thority to maintain the public health and to suppress all nui-
sances the city of New Orleans has been held empowered to
351 ; Williams v. Warsaw, fiO Ind.
457 ; Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331 ;
Wayne County v. Detroit, 17 Mich.
399; State ■». Oleson, 36 Minn. 507;
State V. Lee, 39 Minn. 445 ; Linneus
V. Duskey, 19 Mo. App. 20 ; City of
Kansas v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588 ; Ex parte
HoUwedell, 74 Mo. 395 ; St. Louis v.
Vert, 84 Mo. 304 ; Ho))ve v. Treasurer
of Plainfield, 37 N. J. Law. 145 ; State
V. Bergman, 6 Or. 341 ; Greenwood v.
State, 6 Bax. 567; State v. Shelby, 16
Lea, 340; United States v. Holly, 8
Cr. G. C. 656. On similar principle.
Fox V. State of Ohio, 5 How. 432;
Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 19; Briz-
zolari v. State, 37 Ark. 364; Bishop
on Statutory Crimes (Ist ed.), § 38.
1 Walsh V. City of Union (1886), 13
Or. 589; S. C, 11 Pae. Rep. 318.
estate V. Grimes (Minn., 1893), 52
N. W. Rep. 43, holding a "stock
clock" under the evidence to be a
gambling device.
8 City of Quincy v. O'Brien (1886),
34 111. App. 591. See, also, Roberts v.
Ogle, 30 m. 459; Seely v. Peters, 5
Gilm. 130.
conferred." See, also. Mayor v. Al-
laire, 14 Ala. 400; Bloomfield v.
Trimble, 54 Iowa, 399; St Louis v.
Bentz, 11 Mo. 61 ; St Louis v. Cafifer-
ata, 34 Mo. 94 ; State v. Williams, 11
S. C. 388 ; Hamilton v. State, 3 Tex.
App. 643; McLaughlin v. Stephens,
3 Cr. C. C. 148 ; United States v. Wells,
3 Cr. C. C. 43; City of St Louis v.
Schoenbush, 95 Mo. 618; s. c, 8
S. W. Rep. 791 ; State v. Beattie, 16
Mo. App. 143 ; Brownville v. Cook, 4
Neb. 101. The court further approved
the doctrine laid down by Judge
Cooley that " an act may be a penal
offense under the laws of the State,
and further penalties, under proper
legislative authority, be imposed for
its commission by municipal by-
laws, and the enforcement of the one
would not preclude the enforcement
of the other," of which the author
says : — " Such is the clear weight of
authority, though the decisions are
not uniform." Cooley's Const Lim.
(6th ed.), p. 339 ; Hughes v. People, 8
Colo. 536 ; Wragg v. Penn Township,
94 UL 11 ; Ambrose v. State, 6 Ind.
§ 590.] EXPEESS CORPORATE POWERS. 605
pass an ordinance prohibiting smoking in street cars under
penalty of fine and imprisonment.' A provision in the charter
of a city empowering the mayor and council to abate nui-
sances public and private, and to pass all ordinances they may
deem necessary for preserving the good order and good gov-
ernment of the city, confers on them by necessary implication
authority to establish fire limits.^ But a city has no authority
to pass an ordinance imposing a fine for the maintenance of a
nuisance under a statute providing that incorporated towns
shall have power to prevent injury or annoyance from any-
thing dangerous, offensive or unhealthy, and t^ cause any
nuisance to be abated.'
§ 690. Holidays^ etc. — It was held that a statute author-
izing a " town " to raise money by taxation " for the purpose
of celebrating any centennial anniversary of its incorporation "
referred to the act which was the beginning of its corporate
existence, whether as a district or as a town.'' A city council
may appropriate money for public concerts by a band under
a statute authorizing the city council ^of the city in a man-
ner specified to appropriate money, not exceeding a certain
amount, for armories, for the celebration of holidays, " and
for other purposes."*
1 State V. Heidenhain (1890), 42 La. R. Co. (Iowa), 50 N. W. Rep. 61. In
Ann. 483; S. C., 7 So. Rep. 631. The Burdette v. Allen (West Va.), 13 S. E.
court said : — " The city council of Rep. 1013, it was held that under code
New Orleans is to a hmiled extent (W. Va.), ch. 47, § 28, empowering
clothed with legislative authority and the council of a city to prevent cattle
it is vested with that discretion from going at large in the city, and
within its powers common to all leg- section 29, empowering the passage of ,
ialative bodies. Within the exercise needful ordinances and prescriptions
of this legislative discretion it has the of tines and penalties to carry the first
authority to determine what is anni- grant of power in to effect, the council
sance and to enact the necessary or- could provide for the taking up and
dinances to suppress it." See, also, impounding of cattle found running
Kennedy v. Phelps, 10 La. Ann. 337 ; at large in the public streets, and for
City of Monroe v. Gerspach, 33 La. selling them to pay charges.
Ann. toil. * Hill v. . Easthampton (1886), 140
2 Ford V. Thrailkill (1890), 84 Ga. 69 ; Mass. 381.
S. C, 10 S. E. Rep. 600. Under " such ' Hubbard v. Taunton, (1886), 140
general welfare " clauses, said the Mass. 467. The court said :— " The
court word " other " implies that the oele-
' City of Knoxville v. Chicago &c. bration of holidays is a public pur-
606 BXPEESS COEPORATE POWEES. [§ 591.
§ 591. Miscellaneoas. — Under the power to " regulate " a
city council may prohibit " the burial of the dead " within the
city limits.' A city charter authorizing the city " to erect,
repair and regulate public wharves and docks, and fix the rates
of wharfage thereat," has been held not to give the city
power to create a harbor or to improve one by obtaining an
increased supply of water.* The power to fill up slips is not
given to cities by an act authorizing cities to construct and
keep in repair canals and slips for the accommodation of com-
merce.' County commissioners are not empowered to order-
the payment of attorney's fees for services rendered to the
petitioners for gravel roads under a statute which provided
that " the cost and expense of the preliminary survey, pro-
ceedings and report of the improvement shall be paid out of
the county treasury, and be refunded, as well as all other
amounts advanced by the county for the preliminary expense
of such improvement." * Although the statute provides for
the election of a city attorney, the mayor and council of a
municipal corporation may employ counsel to commence and
prosecute suits for violations of city ordinances in case of va-
cancy in the ofiice of city attorney.*
pose within the meaning cf the act, ^ Spenglei- v. Trowbridge (1834), 62
and indicates that purposes which are Miss. 46, where it was held, that the
public only in that sense are included payment from the city treasury of
within its scope ; although they look money for expenses of persons to go
rather more obviously to increasing to Washington city to influence con-
the picturesqueness and interest of gressional action to that end should
life than to the satisfaction of rudi- have been enjoined,
mentary wants, which alone we gen- ' Ligare v. City of Chicago (111.), 28
erdlly recognize as necessaiy." N. E. Rep. 934.
I People V. Pratt, 139 N. Y., 68 ; S. C, * Board of Commissioners of Rugh
39 N. K Rep. 7. See, also, Cronin v. Co. v. Cole (Ind.), 38 N. E. Eep. 773.
People, 83 N.Y. 318; Brick Presbyte- 'City of Roodhouse v. Jennings
rian Church v. Mayor &c., 5 Cow. (1887), 89 lU. App^ 50,
538; Coates v. Mayor &c., 7 Cow.
585 ; In re Ryers, 73 N. Y. 1.
CHAPTEE XVl.
ULTRA VIREa
693, General statement of the rule.
593. Purchase of land for use of a
railroad.
594. Illustrations of the general
rule.
595. Grant of power to regulate
highways construed.
596. Contracts for exclusive privi-
leges in highways.
597. Strictly official duties not to be
confided to non-official per-
sons.
598. Police ordinances — Wooden
buildings.
599. The same subject continued —
Railroad crossings.
600. The same subject continued —
Markets, etc.
601. Donations.
602. The same subject continued.
603. Subscription to stock of rail-
roads.
604 City council as judge of elec-
tions.
605. Governing authorities of
school districts.
606. The same subject continued.
607. Purchase of real estate for
school purposes — Texas rul-
ing.
608. Condemnation of land outside
of territorial limits.
609. Diversion of lands dedicated
to public uses.
610. Sale of real estate — Prescribed
mode controls.
611. Appropriations for highways
and school buildings.
§ 613. Power to purchase really doe*
not authorize giving notes.
613. Work on public buildings, etc.
614. Issuing of bonda
615. The same subject continued —
Municipal aid.
616. The same subject continued —
Public improvements.
617. Contracts abrogating control
of streets.
618. General legislation — OflEersof
rewards,
619. Contracts for water supply.
630. The same subject continued.
631. Contracts for lighting streets.
633. Grant of exclusive privileges.
633. Curative legislation.
634. Ratification.
625. Estoppel.
626. Purchasers of bonds are bound
to take notica
627. Corporations may contest ul-
tra vires contracts.
628. Liability upon ultra vires con-
tracts.
639. The same subject continued.
630. Ultra vires, when not a de-
fense to actions by the cor-
poration.
631. Tax-payers' resistance,
633. Tax-payers' suits.
633. The same subject continued.
634. Suits to restrain the enforce-
ment of contracts.
635. Injunction the proper rem-
edy.
636. The same subject continued.
§ 592. General statement of the rule. — Acts of municipal
corporations which are dene without power expressly granted,
608
ULTEA VIEES.
[§ 592.
or fairly to be implied from the powers granted or incident
to the purposes of their creation, are ultra vires. So, also, acts
of the officers of such corporations which are done without
the prescribed preliminaries to action, which are conditions
precedent to their being authorized. So, also, are the acts
which are specially prohibited to them by statute, or where
for special reasons the power to do such acts in general is
withdrawn from them in particular instances. It was held
that there was no power in a. city council to authorize one
whose term as mayor had expired to sign bonds as of a date
durins: his term of office.*
1 Coler V. Cleburne (1889), 131 U. S.
162; s. G, 9 a Ct Rep. 720. The
statute provided that the bonds
should be signed by the mayor.
" This clearly means that they shall
be signed by the person who is mayor
of the city when they are signed, and
not by any other person," said Jus-
tice Blatchford. In State v. Mayor
&a of Jersey City (N. J.. 1892), 24
Atl. Rep. 571, it was held that a reso-
lution of the board of aldermen to
publish, under a statute requiring it,
the names, residences and places of
business of persons applying for li-
censes to sell liquors, in a German
newspaper, was void. The presump-
tions in such a case, where there is no
express intimation in the statute as
to the language in which the notice
is to be given or the newspaper is to
be printed, that the legislature de-
signed the notice is to be published
in the same language as the news-
paper itself (see State v. Mayor &c.
(N. J.), 22 Atl. Rep. 1004), and that
the notice was to be given in the or-
dinary language of the State (see
Road in Upper Hanover, 44 Pa. Sfe
277), arise and require the notice to
be given in English, in a newspaper
printed in the same tongue. The
court also sustained a tax-payer's
right to intervene by certiorari to
•prevent this as an illegal expenditure
of municipal funds, deflciencies in
which must be made up by general
taxation. In Citizens' Gas and Min-
ing Co. V. Town of Elwood (1887).
114 Ind. 332; a c, 16 N. E. Rep. 624,'
it was held that the Indiana act of
1887, page 36, with reference to nat-
ural-gas companies, forbade the grant
of special privileges by special con-
tract or license to any company;
and that under the rules of common
law as well as under the provisions
of the statute, the subject of supply-
ing towns and cities with natural gas
must be regulated by a general ordi-
nance, and that the ordinance must
not unfairly discriminate between
competing con)panies. The ordi-
nance must be general in its nature
and impartial in its operation. See,
also, Graffty v. City of Rushvllle, 107
Ind. 502; White v. Mayor, 2 Swan.
364 ; City of Chicago v. Rumpfif, 4,1
IlL 90 ; Tugman v. City of Chicago,
78 111. 405; Ex parte Frank, 52 C*l.
606; 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp. 323.
In State v. Baxter (1887). 50 Ark. 447 ;
S. C, 8 S. W. Rep. 188, it was held
that under Mansfield's Digest of Ar-
kansas, section 1407, allowing county
courts to dispose of real and personal
property belonging to the county
and appropriate the proceeds to the
county's use, such courts are trustees
of the county ; and where it appears
that land donated by congress tQ a
county for public buildings was
§ 693.]
ULTBA TIBE3.
609
§ 593. Purchase of land for use of a railroad. — The pur-
chase of land by a town for the use of a railroad for right of
way, though ostensibly for a public street, is ult/ra vires, and
the purchase price cannot be collected by one having knowl-
edge of the facts and aiding in the transaction.^
leased by such court for ninety-nine
years, without regard to the statute
requiring that sales of county lands
should be by a commissioner ap-
pointed by the county court, and
without advertising that the land
was to be leased to persons paying
an inadequate consideration therefor,
such lease may be set aside by the
county on the ground of fraud. See,
also, Andrews v. Piatt, 44 CaL 317 ;
United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet 729.
iStrahan u Town of Malvern
(1889), 77 Iowa, 454; s. C, 43 N. W.
Eep. 369. In Huesing v. City of Eock
Island (1889), 128 111. 465; S. a, 31
N. E. Eep. 558, It was held that while
under paragraphs 83 and 84 of sec-
tion 1, article 5, of the general incor-
poration law of Illinois, there was
conferred upon cities and villages
power to prohibit slaughter-houses
or any unwholesome business or es-
tablishments within the incorpora-
tion, and the common council may
regulate by appropriate ordinance
the loQation of unwholesome busi-
ness, and may cleanse, abate or re-
move the same, this power did not
authorize appropriating public funds
for the erection and maintenance of
a public slaughter-house. In City of
StL Louis V. Bell Telephone Co. (1888),
96 Mo. 623; S. C, 10 S. W. Eep. 197,
it was held that the power to regu-
late charges for telephone service
was neither included in nor inci-
dental to the power to regulate the
uses of the streets; and that while
the city, under that provision of its
charter which gave the mayor and
assembly power to license, tax and
39
regulate "telegraph companies as
corporations, etc and all
other business, trades, avocations or
professions whatever," had the power
to make police regulations as to the
mode in which the business of tele-
phone companies shall be exercised,
it did not derive therefrom any
power to pass the ordinance regulat-
ing charges for the service; nor
could it do the same under the gen-
eral welfare clause of its charter as to
maintaining peace, good government,
health or welfare of the city. See,
also, St Louis v. McLaughlin, 49 Mo.
563 ; City of St Louis v. Herthel, 88 Mo.
128. In Tilyon v. Town of Gravesend
(1887), 104 N. Y. 356; S. C 10 N. K
Eep. 542, 543, it was shown that a
resolution was passed at a town
meeting providing that the common
lands of the town should be let only
at public auction after notice, and
that no lot should be let at a time
more than one year prior to the ex-
piration of any existing lease thereon,
and provided for compensation to be
made by incoming to outgoing ten-
ants in case a lot previously under
lease should be let to another than
the former lessee. A later resolu-
tion amended the former one by
adding thereto that the commission-
ers were " also authorized to renew
any existing lease . . . upon terms
as they may deem most advanta-
geous for said town." It was held that
the amendment did not authorize the
renewal of a lease before the last
year of the unexpired lease. In Mill-
saps t>. Monroe (1885), 37 La. Ann. 641,
it was held that in the absence of
61 '^ ULTRA VIEE?. [§^94.
§ 594. Illustrations of the general rule. — In Ohio a mu-
nicipal corporation has no power to borrow money except in
conformity with the statute which provides that " all bonds
issued under authority of this chapter shall express upon their
face the purpose for which they were issued and under what
ordinance," and that such bonds shall be advertised and sold
at auction to the highest bidder. Therefore a contract by a
city- to levy an assessment to repay money advanced Toy an in-
dividual has been held to be voiA' A municipal corporation
organized under the general statutes of Alabama has been held
not liable in an action against it for services rendered as cap-
tain of a quarantine guard under a contract made with the
intendant.' A municipal corporation cannot any more than
any other corporation or private person escape the taxes due
on its property, whether acquired legally or illegally, and it
cannot make its want of legal authority to engage in a par-
ticular transaction or business a shelter from the taxation
imposed by the government on such business or transaction
by whomsoever conducted.' In New Hampshire it has been
held that as a town has possession of the volumes of New
Hampshire Keports, Statutes, Pamphlet Laws, and other books
and documents by law distributed to the several towns for the
Bpecial authority given in its charter was It incident to the power granted
or by statute a municipal corporation or the objects and purposes of the
had no power to lease a ferry. Mu- corporation. Therefore, the contract
nicipal corporations cannot legally of employment of a guard was an
contract debts for Imaginary neces- act ultra vires, and not binding upon
sities or real conveniences. They are the town ; and an attempt to ratify
not permitted to exercise powers not the contract of the intendant was
specially delegated to them in their also futila
charters unless such powers are inci- ' Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118
dent to those granted or flow from U. S. 256 ; & c, 6 S. Ct Eep. 1055,
them by necessary implication. See, an action instituted by the city to re-
also, Lisso v. Red Eiver, 29 La. Ann. cover taxes which it claimed to have
493. p&id under protest to a collector of
1 Mt Adams &o. Inclined Ry. Co. United States internal revenue
V. City of Cincinnati, 25 Wkly. Law taxes on account of liquors distilled
Bull. 91. by the city ; the city basing its
'New Decatur v. Berry (1890), 90 right to recover upon the- claim that
Ala. 433 ; S. G, 7 So. Rep. 838. These as it had no power to engage in this
general statutes neither gave the business it was not legally bound to
town authorities expressly the power pay the taxes. See, also, McCready
to make quarantine regulations, nor v. Guardians &c., 9 Serg. & R. 94.
could such power be implied ; neither
§ 595.]
ULTRA. VniBS.
611
use of its inhabitants, and to enable them and its officers to
become informed of the laws and official business of the State,
it has no power nor can its selectmen lawfully make any dis-
position or use of the books inconsistent with that object.'
§ 595. Grant of power to regulate highways construed.
A city has no power through its city council to prohibit circu-
lating, distributing or giving away circulars, hand-bills or ad-
vertising cards of any description in or upon any of its public
streets or alleys, as it is neither expressly conferred nor to be
fairly implied from a charter providing for cleaning the high-
ways, for the prevention of obstructions thereon, and con-
ferring power to regulate their use.''
V. Hammond (1889), 40 Minn. 43;
S. C, 41 N. W. Rep. 343, an ordi-
nance of a city imposing a penalty
upon " any person who commits any
act of lewdness or indecency within
the limits of said city " was lield to
be v<Hd as in excess of the power
vested in the city council by the city
charter. Tlie power to enact this
ordinance, it was claimed, was con-
ferred by the section which author-
ized the passage of ordinances "for
the government and good order of
the city, for the suppression of vice
and intemperance, and for the pre-
vention of crime ; " and "to prevent
open or notorious drunlsenness and
obscenity in the streets or public
places of this city." The court
said : — " [These sections of the char-
ter refer] only to such [acts] as may
affect the public peace, decency and
good order; and do not authorize
punishment for private conduct, how-
ever reprehensible it may be in the
matter of morals." In State v. Mayor '
&c. of Jersey City, 53 N. J. Law, 65 ;
S. C, 18 Atl. Rep. 586, it was held that
the common council of that city,
under its power to pass ordinances to
regulate or prevent the use of streets
for any other purposes than public
travel, had no power by ordinance to
confer upon a railroad t-ompany a
1 Litchfield u Parker (1887), 64
N. a 443 ; s. a, 14 Atl. Rep. 725,— an
action to test the right of an attorney
in another town to retain those books
for bis own use by an arrangement
he had made with the selectmen. In
City of Fort "Wayne v. Shoaff, 106
Ind. 66 ; S. G, 3 West Rep. 320, it was
held that the common council of the
city had no jurisdiction to assess the
cost of improving property owned
by the city for market purposes upon
adjoining property owners, the juris-
diction in such matters extending
only to streets and alleys, and not to
property owned by the city for other
municipal purposes. Therefore the
pro jcedings here were void, and in-
juncii^ n was the appropriate remedy.
See, also. Goring v. McTaggart, 93 Ind.
300; Wilson v. Poole, 33 Ind. 443.
2 People V. Armstrong, 73 Mich.
388. In State v. Johnson (1891), 41
Minn. Ill ; S. C, 42 N. W. Rep. 786,
it was held that a charter which au-
thorized the city council by the
proper ordinance to restrain the run-
ning at large of cattle and other
doniestic animals within the city
limits did not authorize an ordinance
providing a penalty for trespasses
committed by herdsmen and stock-
owners in lierrling their cattle upon
1 he lands of private owners. In State
612
ULTRA YIBKS.
[§ 596.
§ 596. Contracts for exclusive priTileges in highways. —
A municipal corporation can bind itself only by such contracts
as it is by statute authorized to make. It has no power to
grant exclusive privileges to put mains, pipes and hydrants
in its streets, nor can it lawfully by contract deny to itself the
right to exercise the legislative powers vested in its corkimon
council.' Public policy will not permit the inference of au-
thority to make a contract inconsistent with the continuously
operative duty to make such by-laws, rules and regulations as
the public interest or welfare of a city may require.^
right to occupy exclusively twelve
feet of a street by the erection there-
on of a freight platform and roof.
This was an appropriation ^f the pub-
lic highway to private interests, of
which Justice Van Syckle, in State
V. Inhabitant of Trenton. 36 N. J.
Law, 29, thus speaks : — " An appro-
priation of [streets] to private indi-
vidual uses, from which the public
derived no convenience, benefit or
accommodation, is not a regulation
but a perversion of them from their
lawful purposes, and cannot be re-
garded as an execution of the trust
imposed in the city authorities." So
in Metropolitan Co. v. Newton, 4
N. J. SupL 593, it was held that the
common council had no power to
appropriate any portion of any street
to private use to the exclusion of
the public, and a license from the
council to use and occupy a street
for amusement purposes was void.
i Syracuse Water Co. v. City of
Syracuse (1889), 116 N. Y. 167; S. &,
83 N. E. Eep. 381; 5 L. E. An. 546;
26 N. Y. St Rep. 364 ; 29 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 307.
2 Milhan v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611 ; New
York V. Second Av. R. Co., 33 N. Y.
261 ; Richmond Co. Gas Light Co. v.
Middletown, 59 N. Y. 238: Gale v.
Village of Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344 ;
S. G, 9 Am. Rep. 80 ; Logan v. Pyne,
43 Iowa, 534 ; S. C, 33 Am. Rep. 361 ;
Dea Moines Gas Co. v. City* of
Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 505; S. C, 34
Am. Rep. 756; Norwich Gras Light
Co. V. Norwich City Gas Co., 85
Conn. 19. In School Dist v. Sulli-
van (Kan., 1893), 39 Tac. Rep. 1141,
it was held that a contract for
building a school-house, void because
made by only one member of the
school board, may be ratified and
made binding by the action of the
school district in completing the
building left unfinished by an ab-
sconding contractor, by the furnish-
ing the same witlt seats, desks and
other necessary school-house furni-
ture, by occupying the same for
school purposes and by insuring the
same. In Widner v. State vl887), 49
Ark. 173; S. G, 4 S. W. Rep. 657, it
was held that the school directors
have no power to authorize the cut-
ting of timber from school lands.
In Fluty V. School Dist (1886), 49
Ark. 94; S. C, 4 S. W. Rep. 378, a
contract made with the directors of
the school district for building a
school-house under authority con-
ferred at a special meeting of the
electors of the district held in June
was held to be not void, and that no
recovery could be had upon it be-
cause they had no power to baild a
school-house under the statutes un-
less authorized to do so by the an-
nual nieeting on the third Saturday
in May. Mansf. Dig. Ark., §§ 6197,
6199, 6210, 6313, 6333. See, also, Ar-
§ 597.]
ULTEA VIEE8.
613
§ 697. Strictly official dnties not to he confided to non-
offlcial persons.— A contract made by a municipal corpora-
tion with one of its officers for the collection of taxes in arrears
during an indefinite period, under terras which are onerous
to the corporation, is uUrm wes when the corporation relieves
one of its officers from the duty of collection, which is one of
his functions without additional pay.^ A city charter author-
ized the council to make ordinances for certain purposes, and
to " make any other by-laws and regulations which may seem
for the well-being of said city," with " power to provide for
the appointment or election of all necessary officers for the
good government of the city not otherwise provided for," etc.
It was held that a city council could not deprive a board of
supervisors of the power of determining when they would
choose one of themselves clerk of the board.''
genti V. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255 ;
B. a, Field's Ultra Vires, 353. In
Everts v. Rose Grove Dist Tp. (1889),
77 Iowa, 37; s. Q, 41 N. W. EepL 478,
it was held that if a school board ex-
ceeded its powers in making a con-
tract the action of the electors in
authorizing a settlement of the con-
troversy gi'owing out of it was a
ratification of their act, and the direc-
tion of a verdict against the district
for the amount agreed to be paid by
the compromise settlement was sus-
tained. In Buchanan v. School Dis-
trict (1887), 25 Mo. App. 85, the court
held that the directors of a school
district of a town, incorporated un-
der the school law, should be en-
joined from changing the site of a
school-house or from building a new
school-house on a new site without
having first obtained the sanction of
the voters at an election held there-
for under the law, that being the
sole mode in which it could be done.
See, also, Newmeyer v. Eailroad, 53
Mo. 83 ; Eanney v. Bader, 67 Mo. 476,
479; Ruby v. Shain, 54 Mo. 207.
1 Gurley v. New Orleans (1889), 41
La. Ann. 75 ; s. C, 5 So. Rep. 659.
"Weeks v. Dennett (1883), 63 N. H. 2.
This incidental power was left to the
discretion of the board of assessors by
the legislature and cannot be con-
trolled by the city. In Diokerson
Hardware Co. v. Pulaski County
(Ark., 1893), 18 S. W. Rep. 463, it was
held that the county was not liable on
an order of the county judge guaran-
tying payment for goods to be sold a
person who had a contract for the
consti-uction of a turnpike for the
county. He had uo power to give
such a guaranty. In Sexton v. County
of Cook (1885), 114 111. 174; s. c, 38
N. E. Rep. 608, it was held that where
a county board, in the exercise of the
power which it has to clothe its offi-
cers, or agents, or committees, by res-
olution or vote, with power to act for'
it, by resolution, directed a party to
build so much of the dome of a court-
house in process of' erection as was
necessary to inclose the building, un-
der the architect's supervision and
subject to his valuatipn of the same,
the architect , under this resolution
had authority only to supervise the
work directed to be done and make a
schedule of prices for the same, and
Ui
ULTBA VIBES.
t§S98.
§ 598. Police ordinances — Wooden buildings. — An ordi-
nance of a city prohibiting the owners of a wooden building
within the fire limits from repairing the roof with the same
materials with which it was covered at the date of the passage
of the ordinance has been held void, as being ultra vires, and
not enforceable.^
that any order of the architect, for
work outside of the terms of the
resolation was not binding on the
county. Dillon on Munic. Corp., §450;
Eice V. Plymouth County, 43 Iowa,
136 ; Bouton v. HcDonough County,
84111. 384.
1 State V. Schuchardt, 42 La. Ann.
49; S. a, 7 So. Rep. 67. The court
said : — " Now the power in a munici-
pal corporation to control the owners
of propei'ty within its limits in using
or building their property in the mdn-
ner different from their inclination,
desire or convenience, cannot be
ranked among the implied and inci-
dental powers which Buch corpora-
tions may exercise iu the absence of
express legislative mandate. It is a
useful power, presumably necessary
to provide for the greatest good of the
greatest number ; but it is at thesame
time a power in derogation of com-
mon right, and unless it be expressly
conferred it will never be presumed
to exist." See, also. Successor of Ir-
win, 33 La. Ann. 68. In. Coonley v.
0% of Albany (1890), 57 Htm, 337;
s. c, 32 N. Y. St Eep. 411 ; 10 N. Y.
Supl. 512, it was held that an ordi-
nance of the city council with refer-
ence to boats sunken at the dock,
wharf, slip or anywhere in the Hud-
son river opposite the city of Albany,
80 far as it authorized a sale of the
boat in a certain contingency was
ultra vireSi as the city was oaly au-
thorized to enforce its ordinances by
ordinary penalties for their violation.
See, also. Hart v. Mayor &c. of Albany,
9 Wend. 571. In Hoey v. Gllroy (1891),
37 N. Y. St Eep. 754; S. C, 14 N. Y.
Supl. 159, an iron awning one hun-
drea and ten feet long, supported by
iron pillars placed along the inside of
the curbstone, the roof being ten feet
above the sidewalk, was held to be
essentially a permanent structure, and
an unlawful encroachment upon the
highway, as the common council of
the city of New York had no power
under the consolidation act to au-
thorize the erection or maintenance
of such a structure. In Trenor v.
Jackson, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)124, Mon-
ell, J., said : — " It is claimed that the
power given by the charter to pass
ordinances for the regulation of the
use of the sidewalks for awnings, etc.,
necessarily implies a power to allow
or permit the continuance of awnings
by individuals for private pui-poses.
The difiiculty in the position is that,
even if it was competent for the leg-
islature to give such power, it is not
given in express terms, and being
subversive of clear public right it
cannot and should not be implied.
It is, I think, very clear that a trust,
created by law for a strictly public
purpose, cannot be diverted from
such purpose and converted into a
private use. But, even if it can be
at all, it must be done by express
enactment and never can be inferred
from or as being incidental to other
powers." See, a'so. People v. Mallory,
46 How. 281 ; Kingsland v. Slayor, 110
N. Y. 569; s. a, 18 N. Y. St Eep.
701 ; People v. Baltimore &c. E. Co.,
117 N. Y. 150; S. C, 27 N. Y. St Rep.
153 ; Farrell v. Mayor &c. (1888), 20
§ 599.]
VLTEU. VIBES.
616
§ 599. The same subject continued — Railroad crossings.
A municipal corporation has not the power by ordinance to
compel a railroad company to maintain at a street crossing
within the corporate limits a watchman for the purpose of
giving warning to passers-by of the approach of trains.'
N. Y. St. Rep. 13 ; s. 0., 5 N. Y. Supl.
673; affirmed in 33 N. Y. St Rep.
469; People v. Mayor, 18 Abb. N. 0.
123; Ely v. Campbell, 59 How. Pr.
333; People v. Mayor, 59 How. 377;
Story V. Railroad Co., 90 N. Y. 122 ;
Lahr v. Railroad Co., 104 N. Y. 268.
In Turner v. Mayor &c. of Forsyth
(1887), 78 Ga. 683; s. C, 3 S. E. Rep.
C49, it was held that after the pas-
sage of an act prohibiting the sale of
spirituous or malt liquors in the
county in which the city was situate,
a section of which provided " that
the provisions of this act shall not
prevent practicing physicians fur-
nishing liquors themselves as medi-
cines to the patients Under treatment
by them," the mayor and council of
the town had no authority to pass
an ordinance directing that all physi-
cians practicing medicine therein
should make monthly returns to the
council, giving a monthly statement
of their business, and for whom they
furnished liquor, and providing a
penalty for failing to comply with
such ordinances. All power under
the charter of the town as to regu-
lating the liquor traffic was taken
from it by the general law prohibit-
ing its sale. Besides, its power under
the charter to regulate barrooms and
saloons did not include the power
to regulate physicians and require re-
turns from them as to their practice
and to whom they furnished liquors.
At the same time the court held
there was no error in refusing the
writ of prohibition, as there was a
remedy by a defense before the
mayor and council, and if adverse to
the petitioners a writ of certiorari
was their right to review the casa
1 Ravenna v. Pennsylvania Ca
(1887), 45 Ohio St. 118; s. c, 13 N.
E. Rep. 445, this not being a power
which may be implied as essential to
carry into effect those expressly
granted, and not being expressly
granted to the corporation. In Grand
Rapids Electric Light & Power Co. v.
Grand Rapids Electric Light Co.
(1888), 38 Fed. Rep. 659, it was held
that an ordinance granting exclusive
use of the streets for wires and poles
for electric lights for fifteen years was
ultra vires and void. The city Charter
which gave the council power to
make, amend and repeal any ordi-
nance deemed desirable for lighting
the streets and taking charge of them
did not confer in express terms ex-
clusive power over them, and it did
not give the city, by implication, con-
trol of the streets to the exclusion of
the sovereign power of the State. In
James v. City of Darlington (1888), 71
Wis. 173; s. C. 36 N. W. Rep. 834, an
ordinance vacating a street at a cerr
tain point without first having a pe-
tition of the lot-owners at that point
in favor of it, and posting notice as
required by the statute conferring
the power to vacate streets, was held
to be invalid and ineffectual; that
without those preliminary steps there
was no jurisdiction or power in the
council to vacate the street In City
of Burlington v. Dankwardt (1887),
73 Iowa, 170 ; S. C, 34 N. W. Rep. 801,
it was held that the passage of an
ordinance to prevent the peddling of
meats in the streets of the city was
616
ULTEA VIEES.
[§ 600.
§ 600. The same subject continued — Markets^ etc. — Tin-
der a statute granting to the mayor and council the " power
to erect and regulate markets," and providing that "the
mayor and city council may lease, sell or dispose of the stalls
and stands in any market in any manner and for any term
they may think proper," the governing power of a city can-
not set apart by ordinance a certain portion of the market
for the sale of any class of products — as various kinds of
fish — and require a license fee t« be paid by every one before
engaging in that business in the market.' An ordinance of
beyond the powers of the city authori-
ties — they not being entitled to go
uses of buildings and other structures
beyond the power given by stat-
ute to' establish and regulate markets.
In City of St. Paul v. Gilfillan (1886),
86 Minn. 298 ; s. a, 31 N. W. Eep. 49,
it was held that an ordinance passed
by the city council, declaring the
emission of dense smoke from smoke-
stacks and chimneys a public nui-
sance, was unauthorized and void, as
the charter of the city conferred no
power upon the city council to de-
clare what acts or omissions should
constitute a nuisance. Harmon v.
City of Chicago, 110 111. 400, 411, dis-
tinguished. In City of Newton v.
Belger (1887), 143 Mass. 598; S. C, 10
N. E. Rep. 464, it was held that in
passing an ordinance that "no per-
son shall erect, alter or rebuild, or es-
lentially change any building or any,
part thereof, for any purpose other
than a dwelling-house, without first
obtaining in writing a permit from
the board of aldermen, the applica-
tion for such permit shall specify the
location and size of the buildings the
material of which it is to be con-
structed, and the use for which it is
intended," the governing authorities
exceeded the powers conferred upon
the city by the legislature and im-
posea unauthorized restrictions upon
the right of the citizen to the use of
his property. The ordinance was
broader in its scope than the statute
that any city or town except Boston
"may, for the prevention of fire and
the preservation of life, by ordi-
nances or by-laws not repugnant to
law and applicable throughout the
whole or any defined part of its ter-
ritory, regulate the inspection, mate-
rials, construction, alteration and
within its limits," under which stat-
ute it was claimed the city had such •
power.
» State V. Rowe (1890), 73 Md. 548;
S. C, SO Atl. Rep. 179. This was an
efifort to raise revenue under the guise
of exercising the police power, and
the ordinance was, therefore, void.
Under the rule in Van Sant v. Harlem
Stage Co., 59 Md. 334, which was tliat
" if under the guise of licensing and
regulating, the municipal corporation
should attempt to raise revenue or
clearly violate the rule requiring a
reasonable exercise of its powers, the
courts will declare such ordinances
unlawful and void," the court in
State V. Rowe, supra, construed the
statutes to give to the city authori-
ties as the owners of the market
houses the power only of selling and
leasing the stalls in their buildings as
they may judge best ; and the power
to regulate the markets to intend to
give reasonable police powers with
reference thereto. The taxing power
§ 601.]
ULTEA TIEB8.
617
a city to compel a bridge company to sell one hundred tickets
for $1 according to its contract with the corporation was held
void as not relating to the morals, health or safety of the
people.' A provision in an act of a legislature conferring the
power on a city council to "license, tax and regulate grocers,
merchants, retailers," etc., confers no power to prohibit the
sale of liquors.*
§ 601. Donations. — A county has no power to donate its
lands to a railroad company in consideration of its construct-
ing a railroad through the county. And the legislature having
no power to authorize such a donation in the first instance
cannot by a subsequent statute validate a conveyance of lands
in pursuance of such a donation.' A town council has no power
to appropriate funds of the town to aid in building a county
belongs to the legislature, and it will
not be held as conferred on a munic-
ipal corporation unless it be by ex-
press and unequivocal language, or
by necessary implication.
1 City of Newport v. Newport &
Cin. Bridge Co. (Ky., 1890), 8 L. E.
An. 484; S. C, 29 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 491 ; 13 S. W. Rep. 730. Passing
the ordinance was not an exercise
of police power but related merely
to a contract in respect to a financial
matter.
^ Ex parte Reynolds (1888), 87 Ala.
138; S. a, 6 So. Rep. 335; 29 Am. &
. Eng. Corp. Cas. X. See, also, Miller v.
Jones, 80 Ala, 89.
3 Ellis V. Northern Pacific R Co.
(1890), 77 Wis. 114; s. a, 45 N. W.
Kep. 811. See, also. Whiting v. Sheb.
&0. K. Co., 25 Wis. 167, holding that
the power of taxation could not be
exerted to raise money for the pur-
pose of donating it to a railroad com-
pany, even when the legislature au-
thorized it Approved in Philips v.
Albamy, 28 Wis. 340 ; Rogan v. Wa-
tertown, 30 Wis. 260 ; Bound v. Wis-
consin Cent R. Co., 45 Wis. 543. The
court in Ellis v. Northern Pacific R.
Co., supra, referring to the Whiting
case, said : — " In that case the county
authorities were restrained from is-
suing negotiable securities, which
created a county debt to be paid by
taxation, though the court had, upon
the strength of adjudications else-
where, sustained the validity of mu-
nicipal subscriptions to the stock of
railroad corporations. But such sub-
scriptions were sustained polely on
the ground that their validity had
been affirmed by many of the highest
and most respectable courts in the
land, and such vast pecuniary inter-
ests had become involved and were
dependent upon these decisions that
the court felt bound to follow them
while regarding as unsound the
principle which they laid down. And
while the distinction between a stock
subscription ard the donation or
other appropriation of public money
or corporate property to a railroad
corporation is not very distinct and
obvious, yet we are unwilling to ex-
tend a bad rule of law a particle be-
yond where the courts had carried
it and shall therefore adhere to the
doctrine of the Whiting case."
618
ULTRA YIBES.
[§ 602.
court-house therein.' A town cannot ratify and validate what
it has previously done without authority, and what is abso-
lutely void for that reason.' It is not within the power of a
city to bind itself by contract either to forbear to impose
taxes or to impose them under certain given limitations or on
certain conditions.*
§ 602. The same subject continued. — A city has no power
to convey its real estate to the*county in which it is located,
in consideration of the location of the county seat in such city.*
A municipal corporation cannot incur a liability and leyy and
collect taxes on the property of the citizen to aid in the devel-
opment of mere private enterprises.'
1 Russell V. Tate (1889), 52 Ark. 541 ;
a C, 13 S. W. Rep. 130; 7 L, R. An.
180.
2Dullanty v. Vaughn, 77 Wis. 38;
S. C, 45 N. W. Rep. 1128.
> Augusta Factory v. City Council of
Augusta (1889), 83 Ga. 734; S. c, 10
S. E. Rep. 359. See, also, State v. Han-
nibal &C. R. Ca, 75 Mo. 208 ; Mack v.
Jones, 21 N. H. 393: Cooley oi) Taxa-
tion, 200; Desty on Taxation, 466.
In Gray u Baynard (1883), 5 Del. Ch.
499, it was held that while the legis-
lature had conferred upon the city
council of Wilmington very full
powers touching its public streets, it
was not competent for the city coun-
cil to authorize the erection of a pri-
vate building in such a manner as to
create a public nuisance. In Town-
ship of Snyder v. Bov.iird (1888), 122
Pa. St 442; s. G, 15 AtL Rep. 910; 22
W. N. C. 563, it was held that the
supervisors of a township have no
power to give to the assignee of a
town^ip order a new order in his
own name as a substitute for the old
one. Leasnre v. Mahoning Town-
ship, 8 West Rep. 551. In State v. Har-
ris, (1888), 96 Mo. 29, it -was held that
a subscription to stock of a railroad
company by a county court for the
county, where it appeared that two-
thirds of the qualified voters of the
county, at a regular or special elec-
tion, had not assented to such sub-
scription, which was required by
General Statutes of Missouri, 1865,
page 338, section 17, to authorize
such subscription, was without au-
thority and void. County courts in
this State are only the agents of the
counties.
*Brockman v. City of Creston
(1890), 79 Iowa, 587; S. G, 44 N. W.
Rep. 822 ; 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
69. The rule is thus stated by the
Iowa court :— " [Cities] have power to
dispose of their real property for pur-
poses authorized by law and for no
other purpose. The purpose of the
disposition of lands determines the
question of authority. A city may
sell its lands when its interests re-
quire that they be sold ; but it pos-
sesses no authority to give away, or
to convey without consideration, or
for a purpose which it has no au-
thority to advance, any of its prop-
erty." See, also. District Township
V. Thomas, 59 Iowa, 50.
5 Mather v. City of Ottawa (IlL,
1885), 2 West Rep. 46, holding that
the city had no power to incur a debt
§ 603.]
ULTRA. VIEES.
619
§ 603. Subscribing to stock of railroads. — Acts authoriz-
ing appropriations by towns and cities as aid to railroad cor-
porations in consideration of their constructing the roads
through their limits if approved by a majority of the electors
of the town or city, but also requiring the authorities of the
corporation " to levy and collect a tax and make such provis-
ions as may be necessary and proper for the prompt payment
of the appropriation," neither expressly nor by implication
invest such corporations with the power to issue commercial .
paper in payjnent of an appropriation so voted.' The adop-
tion of the constitution of 1870 in Illinois, which provides
that " no county, city, township or other municipality shall
ever become subscriber to the capital stock of any railroad or
private corporation, or make donations to or loan its credit in
aid of such corporations," withdrew from municipal corpo-
and issue bonds, and levy- and collect
taxes for the payment of bonds is-
sued to raise money to build a dam
across a river witliin its limits, for
the purpose of introducing the water
of such river into the city, with the
view of developing the natural advan-
tages of the city for manufacturing
purposes. See, also, as to such power
being confined to corporate purposes,
Johnson v. Campbell, 49 111. 316 ; Har-
ward V. St Clair &c. Drainage Co., 51
111. 130 ; Madison County v. People, 58
ni. 456 ; People v. Du Puyt, 71 111. 653.
In Johnson v. Stark County (1860),
34 111. 75, the court said:— "All will
perceive that the building of our
court-houses, jails, poor-houses, the
opening and keeping in repair of
common highways, and the erection
and maintenance of bridges, by
which they are rendered useful to the
people,' are 'county purposes' for
whic'h the people of the county may
be taxed ; and that the erection of
hotels, mercantile, manufacturing,
trading and banking hou8es,aItbough
of great importance to the prosperity
of the community, are not such pur-
poses as were contemplated by the
constitution. These are properly re-
garded as matters of individual en-
terprise and cannot, in any reason-
able or just sense, be regarded as
public or county purposes." Bissell
V. Kankakee, 64 111. 249, holding city
bonds issued to aid a company so as
to enable it to embark in the man-
ufacture of linen fabrics in the city
to be void. English v. People, 96 Dl.
S66, holding that a city tax levied to
pay bonds issued in aid of a manu-
facturing company could not be en-
forced. Ohio VaL L Works v.
Moundsville, 11 W, Va. 1 ; Loan
Asso. V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655. In
Ottawa V. Carey, 108 U. S. 110; s. c,
27 L. Ed. 669, the bonds were held
to be void.
1 Concord v. Robinson (1886), 121
U. S. 165 ; a a, 7 S. Ct Rep. 987,
holding bonds issued by the town
invalid. See, also, Claiborne Co. v.
Brooks, 111 U. S. 400, 406; Wells v.
Supervisors, 103 U. S. 635, 631, 632 ;
Ogden V. County of Daviess, 103 U. S.
634, 639.
620
ULTBA VIBES.
[§ 604-
rations all power to subscribe to stock or make donations ex-
cept in cases where they had before its adoption, as the law
then existed, been authorized to do so by a vote of the peo-
ple of such municipalities. In that case they could complete
the matter.^
§ 604. City conncil as judge of elections. — A statute de-
scribing the duties and powers of a city council, declaring that
it shall " be the judge of the elfection and qualification of its
own members," does not confer upon such council the power
to hear and determine a contest of an election for the city
marshalship ; nor does it include the power to enact ordinances
for such purpose.*
1 Concord v. Robinson (1886), 131
U. S. 165; S. C, 7 S. Ct Rep. 937.
See, also, Middleport v. Mtna Life
Ins. Co., 82 111. 563, 568 ; Asplnwall
V. County of Daviess, 23 How. 364 ;
■W^adsworth o. Supervisors, 103 U. S.
534. In Hardin County v. Louis-
ville & N. E. Co. (Ky., 1891), 17
S. W. Kep. 860, it was held that the
presence of one of the sinking fund
commissioners of the county at a
meeting of the stockholders of the
railroad corporation, when a resolu-
tion was passed declaring a stock
dividend for the purpose of stopping
interest on payment of stock sub-
scriptions, and his action in voting
for the resolution being unauthor-
ized either by statute, by the county
court or by the county commission-
ers, did not estop the county fi»m
demanding interest on a stock sub-
scription it had made up to the time '
when a cash dividend was declared.
2Vosburg V. McCrary (1890), 77
Tex. 568; s. C, 14 S. W. Rep. 195.
This last was claimed under Revised
Statutes of Texas, 343, that muni6ipal
corporations "may ordain and es-
tablish such acts, laws, regulations
and ordinances not inconsistent with
the constitution and laws of this
State as may be needful for the gov-
ernment, interest, welfare and good
order of said body politic; " and sec-
tion 418, that " the city council shall
have power to pass, publish, amend
or repeal all ordinances, rules and
police regulations not contrary to the
constitution of this State for the
good government, peace and order
of the city and the trade and com-
merce thereof, that may be necessary
or proper to carry into effect the
powers vested by this title in the
corporation, the city government or
in any department or oflScer thereof."
To this the court said : — "The power
of a municipal corporation or of a
city council cannot exceed that con-
ferred by the charter and all ordi-
nances must be in subordination
thereto. Ordinances when author-
ized by the charter are but munici-
pal laws intended to regulate and
provide for the orderly exercise of
powers conferred by the charter."
In Gregory v. Mayor &c. of New
York (1889), 113 >f. Y. 416; s. G, 22
N. Y. St. Rep. 703, it was held that
the power of a board of commission-
ers to remove emploj^ees did not in-
clude the power to suspend indefi-
nitely and without pay. The posi-
§ 605.]
ULTBA VIBES.
621
§ 605. Governing authorities of school districts. — Town
trustees having authority to " build or otherwise provide suit-
able houses, furniture, apparatus and other articles and edu-
cational appliances necessary for the thorough organization
and efficient management " of schools, cannot purchase, at the
expense of the township, text-books for the use of the pupils
attending the public schools of the township.'
tion of the court was, that there is
nothing in the power to remove or
expel which necessarily and in all
cases includes the power to suspend,
and the latter power may not be
implied from the mere grant of the
former. Shannon v. Portsmouth, 54
N. H. 183, distinguished. See, also.
State V. Lingo, 26 Mo. 496 ; State v.
Chamber of Commerce of Milwau-
kee, 20 Wis. 63 ; State v. Jersey City,
25 N. J. Law, 536.
' Honey Creek School Township v.
Barnes (1889), 119 Ind. 213; S. C, 21
N. E. Rep. 747, in which Jackson
School Township v. Hadley, 59 Ind.
534, where the indebtedness was for
Webster's Dictionaries, is distin-
guished. In State v. City of Bayonne
{N. J., 1887), 8 Ati. Rep. 114, it was
held that school-houses were not in-
cluded in the expression "public
buildings " in section 79 of the char-
ter of Bayonne, which authorizes the
mayor and council to purchase
sites, markets, public buildings and
wharves, and to erect suitable build-
ings or wharves, or other structures
or improvements on said sites and
for said purposes, or for the purpose
of purchasing sites for school-houses,
to issue bonds; therefore, a resolu-
tion to issue bonds to enlarge a school-
house was illegal. In Roseboom v.
JeflEerson School Tp. (1889), 129 Ind.
377; S. a, 23 N. B. Rep. 796, it was
held that a contract made by a town-
ship trustee for building a school-
house beyond the fund in hand, and
that to be derived from the tax levy
for the year, without an order from
the board of county commissioners,
was without authority. See, also, Mid-
dleton V. Greeson (1885), 106 Ind. 18.
In Briggs v. Borden (1888), 71 Mich.
87; s. c, 38 N. W. Rep. 712, the ac-
tion of school inspectors in the de-
struction by division of a school dis-
trict and attaching the parts toother
districts, without having obtained
the consent of a majority of the resi-
dent tax-payers of the district, which
was required by Howell's Statutes of
Michigan, section 5041, before such
division could be made, was decreed
to be null and void for lack of au-
thority. See, also, Doxey v. Inspect-
ors, 67 Mich. 601, 604; s. C, 85
N. W. Rep. 170, 172. In Dartmouth
Sav. Bk. V. School Districts (Dak.),
43 N. W. Rep. 832, it was held that
a petition by a majority of the
districts affected being a condition
precedent to the establishment of a
new district, the formation of a new
district by. the county superintend-
ent, under Dakota Police 'Code of
1877, chapter 40, relating to the di-
vision of school districts and rear-
rangement of their boundaries, with-
out such a petition, would be beyond
his authority. Also, that districts
which are its successors would not
be estopped to deny the incorpora-
tion of their predecessor by showing
a failure to prevent such a petition
in an action upon a bond of this
predecessor. Farmers' & M. Nat
622
ULTEA VIBES.
[§ 606.
§ 606. The same subject continued. — Under an act con-
ferring power on school trustees to lay out roads, streets and
alleys, the power of school trustees was confined to cases
where they laid out school lands into town or village lots. In
other cases they had no power to lay out roads or to appro-
priate or dedicate any part of such land for public high-
ways.^
Bk. V. School Dist. (Dak), 42 N. W.
Rep. 767, where the court held that
the power to select a site for a
school-house belonged alone to the
legal voters of the district, under the
Dakota statutes, and until they have
selected it by vote the district board
has no authority whatever to ac-
quire the site or erect a school-house.
And in this case the school district
was held not to be liable on warrants
issued without authority by the board
of directors for the purchase of a-
school site.
iSeeger v. Mueller (1890), 133 111.
86 ; s. C 34 N. E. Rep. 513, affirming
28 111. App. 28, holding that any at-
tempt of the school trustees to lay
out a road was vJtra vires and void.
The court said: — "The power
granted by [these] sections [of thfe
act] to trustees of schools will not be
extended by implication, but in de-
termining their extent and scope a
strict interpretation will be adopted.
The thirtieth section of [the] act de-
clares trustees of schools bodies cor-
porate and politic, thus constituting
them municipal or guast-municipal
corporations, and the same rule of in-
terpretation should apply to the stat-
ute from which they derive their
powers which obtains in case of other
municipal corporations. Such bodies
act wholly under a delegated author-
ity, and can exercise no powers which
are not in express terms or by fair
implication conferred upon them."
See, also, Buchanan v. School Dis-
tftct, 25 Mo. App. 85; Thompson v.
Lee County, 8 Wall. 337 ; Minturn v.
Larue, 33 How. 435. Revised Statutes
of Maine, chapter 11, section 1, for-
bids the alteration of school districts
except upon the recommendation of
municipal and school officers. In
Parker v. Titcomb (1889), 83 Me. 180;
S. c, 19 Atl. Rep. 163, it was held that
an attempt, in the absence of such rec-
ommendation, to alter by uniting or
disuniting, Vvas ultra vires. In State v.
Compton (Neb., 1890), 44 N. W. Rep.
660, it was held that the presentation
of a petition in writing duly signed
to a county superintendent of schools
being necessary to give him jurisdic-
tion to detach a part of the territory
of a school district and attach the
same to an adjoining district, a change
of the boundaries of districts in that
respect without such petition was
without authority. The court said : —
"The duties of superintendents are
alone those prescribed in the statute.''
See, also. State v. Dodge County, 30
Neb. 595; S. C., 81 N. "W. Rep. 117.
In this last case it was held that the
board of equalization of taxes of a
county possessed no powers save
those conferred by statute, and that
the filing of a complaint was neces-
sary to give it jurisdiction to increase
the valuation of a tax-payer's prop-
erty, and unless this appeared upon
the face of the proceedings there
was DO authority to act. People v.
Flint, 39 Cal. 670 ; People v. Goldtree,
44 Cal. 333. In Black v. Cornell (1888),
§§ 607, 608.]
ULTEA VIEES.
623
§607. Purchase of real estate for school purposes —
Texas ruling. — An incorporated town in Texas exceeds its
powers by contracting to issue its bonds in the purchase of
grounds for public free school purposes. Should such a town
afterwards, by adopting the provisions of the statutes, become
under general law a city, the purchase of such grounds would
not be ratified by this act of adoption of the permission of the
statute and becoming a city.'
§ 608. Condemnation of land outside of territorial limits.
Proceedings by a village to condemn land outside of its ju-
risdiction are unlawful unless the village charter expressly
gives the power to do so. A power cannot be implied where
by the proceedings it is proposed to take land against the will
of the owners.^
30 Mo. App. 641, it was held that no
power exists in a board of public
school directors, without authority
from the voters of the district, to
rent buildings or, rooms separate
from the district school-house, and
to employ teachers for a supplemental
school therein. Seibert v. Botts, 57
Me. 430. In Board of Education v.
Roehr (1887), 33 111. App. 629, it was
held that a school district having be-
come organized under Revised Stat-
utes of Dlinois, chapter 122, section
80, the board of education had no
power to enter into a contract for the
erection of a school-house without a
petition of a majority of the voters
of a district
iWaxahachie v. Brown (1887), 67
Tex. 519 ; s. c., 4 S. W. Rep. 207. See,
also, Robertson v. Breedlove, 61 Tex.
316, where it was held that commis-
sioners' courts, though charged with
the duty of providing court-houses,
could not issue bonds for that purpose
in absence of an express legislative
grant. In Waxahaohie v. Brown, su-
pra, the court said : — " The power
to borrow money or to create debt is
not a necessary incident of the
power to buy grounds and build
school-houses, and hence should not
be implied against the spirit and pol-
icy so clearly manifested by contem-
poraneous legislation as well as by
the organic law in force at the time
this legislation was enacted." It was
also held that the city had no power
to ratify a purchase involving the is-
suance of bonds in contravention of
the authority of the town when the
contract was -made, and which, if
ratified, would involve the issuance
of bonds in excess of the amount the
city could lawfully issue.
SHougton V. Huron Copper Min. Co.
(1885), 57 Mich. 547; s. C., 34 N. "W.
Rep. 820. See, also, Dillon on Munic,
Corp., § 469; Cooley's Const Lim.
528-541 ; Kroop v. Forman, 31 Mich.
144 ; Detroit Sharp Shooters' Ass'n v.
Highway Com'rs, 84 Mich. 36 ; Pow-
ers'Appeal, 29 Mich. 604; Spechttt
Detroit, 20 Mich. 168. In Wright v.
Town of Victoria (1849), 4 Tex. 375,
it was held that citizens who had
purchased of the corporation lots
upon the faith of an ordinance pur-
porting to make a dedication of the
timbered lands to the free and com-
624
ULTEA VIBES.
.[§ 609.
§ 609. Diversion of lands dedicated to public nses. — The
authorities of a municipal corporation cannot lawfully appro-
priate to other uses land which has been dedicated by the
owner as a street ; nor can they divert it to uses and purposes
foreign to those for which it was dedicated ; nor is it within
the power of the legislature to authorize such a disposal or
diversion of it.*
mon use of the citizens were not
entitled to an injunction to restrain
the sale of such timbered lands,
which the corporation by act of the
legislature had been empowered to
sell, and use the proceeds for erection
of public buildings, school-houses,
etc., for the reason that the corpora-
tion had no power tO: dedicate these
timbered lands so as to restrain a
a future sale under the powers given
in the statute. Kings Co. Fire Ins.
Co. V. Stevens, 101 N. Y. 411 ; Eoper
V. MoWhorter, 77 Va. 314. In Searcy
V. Yarnell, 47 Ark. 269, where a con-
tract of sale bad been executed, the
corporation was held estopped from
setting up the plea of ultra vires.
As to disposal of property dedicated
to public uses in violation of trusts
upon which it is held, or without
legislative authority, see Reynolds v.
Stark Co., 5 Ohio, 204; Meriwether
V. Garrett, lOS U. S. 472; Augusta u
Perkins, 3 B. Mon. 437 ; Alves' Ex'r
V. Henderson, 16 B. Mon. 131, 168;
Bowlin V. Furman, 28 Mo. 427 ; Ken-
nedy V. Covington, 8 Dana, 50 ; New-
ark V. Elliott, 5 Ohio St. 113 ; Ransom
V. Boal, 39 Iowa, 68 ; Still v. Lansing-
burgh, 16 Barb. 107; Knox, County
V. McCombs, 19 Ohio St. 320 ; Phila-
delphia V. Phil. &c. R Co., 58 Pa. St.
253 ; Holladay v. Frisbie, 15 Cal. 630 ;
Shannon v. O'Boyle, 51 Ind. 565;
Matthews u Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115;
Lord V. Oconto, 47 Wis. 386 ; Warren
Co Supervisors v, Patterson, 56 111.
111.
« Packet Co. v. Sorrels (1887), 50
Ark. 466; In re John and Cherry
Streets, 19 Wend. 659; Warren v.
Mayor of Lyons, 22 Iowa, 351; Le
Clerq v. Gallipolis, 7 Ohio, 354 ; Meth.
E. Church v. Hoboken, 33 N. J. Law,
13 ; Augusta v. Perkins, 3 B. Mon. 437 ;
Buckner v. Augusta, 1 A. K. Marsh.
9; Alves' Ex'r v. Henderson, 16 B.
Mon. ISl, 168 ; Police Jury v. McCor-
mack, 33 La. Ann. 624 ; Matthews v.
Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115; Kennedy v.
Covington, 8 Dana, 50 ; Rutherford
V. Taylor, 38 Mo. 315; Price v.
Thompson, 48 Mo. 363 ; Alton v. IlL
Transp. Co., 13 III. 60 ; San Antonio
V. Lewis, 15 Tex. 388 ; New Orleans
V. United States, 10 Pet 734 ; Ran-
som V. Boal, 29 Iowa, 68 ; Branham
V. San Jose, 24 Cal. 585; Brooklyn
Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45
N. Y. 234 ; Jacksonville v. Jackson-
ville Ry. Co., 67 111. 540; Cromwell v.
Connecticut Brown Stone Q. Co., 50
Conn. 470; West Carroll Parish v.
Gaddis, 34 La. Ann. 938 ; CummingS
u St. Louis, 90 Mo. 359 ; Hale v. Bur-
nett, 15 Cal. 580; San Francisco v.
Canavan, 42 CaL 541 ; Pickett v. Has-
tings, 47 Cal. 269; Commonwealth
V. Rush, 14 Pa. St 186; Common-
wealth V. Alburger, 1 Whart 469;
Van Wert Bd. of Ed. «. Edson, 18
Ohio St 231 ; Seebold v. Shitler, 34
Pa. St 133; Ind. & B. E. Co. v. In-
dianapolis, 13 Ind. 630; Newark v.
Stockton, 44 N. J. Eq. 179; New Or-
leans &c. R. Co. V. New Orleans, 26
La. Ann. 478 ; S. C, 36 La. Ann. 517 ;
Franklin Co. Comm'rs v. Lathrop, 9
Kan. 453 ; Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn.
§ 610.] ULTRA VIRES. 625
§ 610. Sale of real estate — Prescribed mode controls.—
The cases in California which involved the sale of real estate
of the city under an invalid ordinance necessitated rulings upon
various points pertinent to the subject we are now considering.
The legislature had restricted the governing authorities in the
charter to a sale of such property by ordinance or resolution
authorizing it, the only mode of city legislation, and prescribed
how many votes should be required to pass such ordinance.
The power of the legislature to prescribe a mode was sustained
by the court, and the ordinance was held void because it was
not adopted by a proper vote ; in short there was no power
to sell because the necessary steps to give such power had
not been taken. The sales were therefore held never prop-
erly made and that no title to the purchasers passed from
the city. The court held the city, inasmuch as it had through
its oflBcers received the money of these purchasers paid upon
their contracts of purchase, and used the same for corporate
municipal purposes, liable in actions for its recovery to re-
turn it. Field, C. J., said : — " [The facts] show an appro-
priation of the proceeds, and the liability of the city arises
from the use of the moneys or her refusal to refund them after
their receipt. The city is not exempted from the common
obligation to do justice which binds individuals. Such obligar
tion rests upon all persons whether natural or artificial. If
the city obtain the money of another by mistake, or without
168. As to power of municipal cor- Hoodley v. San Francisco, 50 Cal.
poration to alien public places with 275, where the court said of this
the consent of the legislature, see same square : — " It was granted to
Hebert v. DeValle, 37 111. 448 ; Bell v. the city for public use and is held
Ohio &c. R Co., 25 Pa. St. 161 ; s. c, for that purpose only. It cannot be
1 Grant Cas. 105 ; Phil. & Trenton R. conveyed to private persons, and is
Co., In re. 6 Whart 26 ; Hart v. Bur- effectually withdrawn from com-
nett, 15 CaL 580 ; Payne v. Treadwell, merce ; and the city having no au-
16 Cal. 332, distinguished in Grogaii thority to convey the title, private
V. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590, 614 In persons are virtually precluded from
City and County of San Francisco v. acquiring it" Approved and fol-
Itsell (1889), 80 Cal. 57 ; S. C, 33 Pac. lowed in Sawyer v. San Francisco, 50
Kep. 74, it was held that the city held Cal. 375, and in Hoadley v. San
its public squares in trust for the Francisco, 70 Cal. 324, which was af-
public, and the municipal authorities firmed on writ of en-or in Hoadley
had no authority to dispose of them v. San Francisco (1887), 134 U. 8.
by way of compromise or otherwise. 646.
40
ULTEA VIEE8. [§ 611.
authority of law, it is her duty to refund it, from this general
obligation. If she obtain other property which does not be-
long to her, it is her duty to restore it, or if used, to ren-
der: an equivalent therefor, from the like obligation.^ The
legal liability springs from the moral duty to make restitution.
And we do not appreciate the morality which denies in such
cases any rights to the individual whose money or other prop-
erty has been thus appropriated. The law countenances no
such wretched ethics: its comnfand always is to do justice."*
It wias also held that where an authority to do any particular
act on the part of the corporation could only be conferred by
ordinance, a ratification of such an act could only be by ordi-
nance. And further, that even if the city would be estopped
from denying the sale, and from asserting title to the prop-
erty sold, it did not follow that the purchasers would be
estopped from claiming a return of the money they paid. The
general doctrine of estoppel in pais is not applicable to
these purchasers, they not being wrong-doers. The sale of the
city's property here being without authority and void, these
purchasers were not required to surrender possession of the
property before they could maintain an action to recover
back the purchase-money. The rule as to rescission does not
apply. The contract being void, there was nothing to rescind ;
no rights were acquired, and there were in consequence no
rights to restore. '
§ 611. Appropriations for highways and school buildings.
Town supervisors have no authority to appropriate or expend
in the construction or repair of highways any funds raised
for ordinary town charges.* 'Eov have the electors of a town
power to appropriate any sum for such construction or repair
1 Argenti v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. < Aldrich v. Collins (So. Dak., 1893),
283. 52 N. W. Rep. 854. As the constitu-
2 Pimental v. San Francisco (1863), tion, article 10, section'3, provides that
21 Cal. 351, 361, 862. funds raised " by taxation, loan or as-
'McCracken v. San Francisco sessment for one purpose shall not be
(1860), 16 Cal. 591 ; Grogan v. San diverted to any other," the acts of
Francisco (1861), 18 Cal. 590 ; Satter- the board in this case making such
lee V. San Francisco, 23 Cal. 214 ; appropriations were held to be illegal
Herzo v. San Francisco, 33 Cal. 184 ; and void.
liOttrnan v. San Francisco, 20 Cal.
102; People v. Sv^ift, 31 Cal. 28.
§ 612.]
ni.TBA VIEES.
627
of highways, except when they have voted to raise the sum by
taxation. The power to appropriate is limited to the sum
voted to be raised. They have no control over any other fund
for that purpose.'
§ 612. Power to purchase realty does not authorize giv-
ing notes. — While a county in Nebraska is empowered by
statute to purchase realty for ^ poor-farm, it is beyond the
power of the governing authorities of the corporation to give
1 Aldrich w Collins (So. Dak., 1892),
63 N. W. Eep. 854, holding that a
resolution adopted by the electors at
their annual town meeting to keep
all the funds of the town in one
general fund was without authority
of law and void. In Brown v. School
Dist No. 6 (1886), 64 N. H. 303; s. C,
10 AtL Eep. 119, a vote of a school
district to raise money for the erec-
tion of a school-house upon a lot
other than the one designated by the
county commissioners upon a proper
appeal from the action of the district
was held to be unauthorized and
void. The court said : — "If the
school district were permitted to ab-
rogate or discontinue a location made
by the commissioners, which would
be a refusal to procure the land
designated, and to build a school-
house upon it, they could nullify the
statutes designed to compel the pur-
chase of the land located for a lot
by the commissioners and the build-
ing upon it of a school-house." See,
also, Holbrook v, Faulkner, 65 N. H.
311, 315, 316; Blake v. Orford, 64 N.
H. 299, where it was held that such a
tax would be abated on petition of
the tax-payers of the district. In
Andrews v. School Dist. No. 4 fl887).
37 Minn. 96; S. a, 33 N. W. Eep. 217,
it was held that where goods were
received under a contract made by
the trustees in a manner unauthorized
and which would not bind the dis-
ti-ict, and used for the benefit of the
district under such circumstances
and for such length of time as to
raise the presumption that it was
with the common consent of the dis-
trict, the law would impose on the
district the obligation to pay for
them. In Town of Winamao v.
Huddleston (Ind., 1892), 81 N. E. Eep.
581, it was held that a town could
not issue bonds to procure funds
with which to rebuild a school-house,
where the bonds, if issued, would
create an indebtedness in excess of
two per cent of the taxable value of
the property within the town limits,
to which limit of taxation it is re-
stricted by the constitution of In-
diana, article 13, section 1. The
court said : — " The debt created by
a bond executed by a public cor-
poration is not an obligation payable
out of a specific fund, but is a con-
tract to pay money generally." This
case is not within the doctrine of
Quill V. City of Indianapolis, 124 Ind.
292; s. c, 23 N. E. Eep. 788; Strieb
V. Cox, 111 Ind. 299; S. C, 12 N. E.
Eep. 481 ; Board v. Hill, 115 Ind. 316 ;
& C, 16 N. E. Eep. 156. These bonds
would create a debt, this case radi-
cally differing from City of Valpa-
raiso V. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1. That
there was a provision or promise to
levy taxes to pay these bonds was no
reason why the constitutional restric-
tion would not apply.
528
UXTEA VIEE3.
[§ 613.
promissory notes and mortgages of the land to secure their
payment.' The United States Supreme Court accepted this
as a correct ruling upon the statute as to the purchase of a
poor-farm for a county, but held that parties who had sold
such to a county for a cash payment and notes with mortgages
for the deferred payments, upon th^ failure of the county to
meet these notes were entitled to have the contract of pur-
chase rescinded and the property reconveyed to them.*
§ 613. Work on public buildings^etc.— The people of a county
voted seventy-five thousand dollars to build a court-house,
and a contract was entered into by a contractor to build it
by the plans and specifications for that sum. Changes were
made in the plans by which the cost was much increased in
•Stewart v. Otoe County, 2 Neb.
177. The court said : — " The statutes
provide the only security that can be
^iven. The public faith is pledged,
and a tax not exceeding one per
cent, may be levied upon all the
taxable property of the county an-
nually, and when collected paid to
the person entitled thereto by an or-
der upon the treasurer of the county, .
payable out of that special fund."
, 2 Chapman v. County of Douglas
(1883), 107 U. S. 348. The court said : —
" The agreement, ... so far as
it relates to the time and mode of
payment, is void; but the contract
for the sale itself has been executed
on the part of the vendor by deliveiy
of the deed, and his title at law has
actually passed to the county. As the
agreement between the parties has
failed by reason of the legal disabil-
ity of the county to perform its part,
according to its conditions, the right
of the vendor to rescind the contract
and to a restitution of his title would
seem to be as clear as it would be just,
unless some valid reason to the con-
trary can be shown." See, also. Marsh
V, Fulton County, 10 Wall. 676, 684 ;
Louisiana v. Wood, 103 U. S. 394;
Miltenberger v. Cooke, 18 Wall. 431.
Further on the court said: — "The
purchase itself . . . was expressly
authorized. The agreement for defi-
nite times of payment and for secu-
rity alone was not authorized. It was
not illegal in the sense of being pro-
hibited as an offense ; the power in
that form was simply withheld. The
policy of the law extends no further
than merely to defeat what it does
not permit and imposes upon the
parties no penalty. It , thus falls
within the rule stated in Pollock
on Contracts," 264. See, also, as
to the application of this principle,
Morville v. Amerioap Tract Society,
133 Mass. 139, 137; Hitchcock v. Gal-
veston, 96 U. S. 341, 350, which al-
lowed a recovery for the value of the
benefit conferred upon the munici-
pal corporation, notwithstanding the
contract to pay in bonds was held to
be illegal and void. The court said : —
" It matters not that the promise was
to pay in a manner not authorized
by law. If payment cannot be made
in bonds because their issue is ultra
vires, it would be sanctioning rank
injustice to hold that payment may
not be made at alL Such is not the
law."
§ 614.]
ULTEA VIBES.
629
some respects, but no corresponding changes were made to
decrease the cost in other respects. It was held in such a
case that all the agreements whereby the total cost of the
work was to exceed the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars
were in excess of the authority of the supervisors, and there-
fore void, and there could be no recovery upon them ; and
that the case was not altered by the fact that the people
afterwards voted an additional sum to complete the building
which the contractor failed to finish under his contract.'
Boards of supervisors have no power to construct bridges
over navigable lakes, no such power having been conferred
upon them by statute.*
§ 614. Issuing of bonds. — Where there is a total want of
power under the law in the officers or board who issue bonds
of a municipal corporation, the bonds will be void in the hands
of innocent holders. There is a distinction between irregu-
larities in the exercise of the power conferred and the total
'King V. Mahaska County (1888),
75 Iowa, 329. In County of Lancas-
ter V. Fulton (1889), 138 Pa. St. 481 ;
S. a, 18 Atl. Eep. 384 ; 24 W. N. C. 401,
a contract made by the commission-
ers of a county, to give to the county
solicitor, whose salary is fixed by
law, an additional compensation for
services to be rendered by him ly-
ing within the sphere of his official
duties as prescribed by statute, was
held to be ultra vires; and that being
in its effect evasive and subversive
of law, and contrary to public policy,
it was void, irrespective of intent, and
was, therefore, incapable of being
ratified after the expiration of the
solicitor's term. Hunter i\ Nolf, 71
Pa, St. 282 ; Chester County v. Bar-
ber, 97 Pa. St. 455.
2 Snyder v. Foster (1889), 77 Iowa,
638; S. a, 42 N. "W. Eep. 506. The
court said : — " It is true that boards
of supervisors have power to provide
for the erection of all bridges ' which
may be necessar5', and which the
public convenience may require,
within their respective counties,'
but they can provide for the erection
of such bridges only in public high-
ways. They may establish highways
only 'as provided by law.' But
the law does not authorize the es-
tablishment of a highway until the
right to use the land over which it
is to pass for that purpose has been
obtained. In this case the State
holds the title to the bed of the lake
for the use and benefit of Its citizens.
It has noli by express statute, au-
thorized any obstruction of such use."
See, also, as to how far powers con-
ferred may be extended by implica-
tion, Hickok V. Hine, 23 Ohio St
523; Inhabitants of Charlestown v.
County Comm'rs, 3 Met 202 ; Com-
monwealth V. Coombs, 2 Mass. 492;
Inhabitants of Springfield v. Railway
Co., 4 Cush. 71; Att'y Gen. v. Ste-
vens, 1 Saxt (N. J.) Ch. 869 ; s. C, 8
Am. Dec. 531.
630
ULTKA TIBES.
[§ 614.
want of power to do the act, the distinction being between
questions of fact and questions of law. If it is a question of
fact and the board of officers are authorized by law to deter-
mine the 'fact, then their determination is final and conclusive.
And. although it may be contrary to the fact, yet if recited in
the bond that the necessary and proper steps required by law
to be taken had been taken, then the municipality is estopped
from denying that they were teken.^ But all persons are
presumed to know the law, and if the law creates conditions
jsrecedent upon which the right to act at all depended, and
these conditions were not complied with, and the law ap-
pointed no board or officer to determine that fact, then there
cannot be an innocent holder of such bonds.^ Where a bond
upon its face does not show authority on the part of the town-
ship to issue it, the doctrine of honafide holder does not apply,
but the holder takes it subject to the defense of entire illegal-
ity.' '
iSpitzer v. Village of Blanchard
(1890), 82 Mich. 234; S. C, 46 N. W.
Rep. 400; Dixon Co. u Field, 111
U. S. 89 ; S. C, 4 S. Ct Rep. 315.
2 Bernard D. Township of Morrison,
133 U. S. 523 ; s. c, 10 S. Ct Rep. 333.
' Bogart V. Township of La Motte
(1890), 79 Mich. 394; s. &, 44
N. W. Rep. 612. And a municipal
corporation cannot ratify or be es-
topped by an act void in its inception
and wholly ultra vires. Highway
Comm'rs v. Van Dusan, 40 Mich. 429.
In Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654,
the court held that when the power
was shown in the municipal corpora-
tion to issue the bond, but there
were irregularities in its execution,
the coi'poration might be estopped
to deny that the power was properly
executed. In Town of Hackettstown
V. Swackhamer (1874), 37 N. J. Law,
191, it was held that municipal cor-
porations in the absence of a specific
grant of power do not in general
possess the capacity to borrow
money; and a note given by such
corporation for an unauthorized loan
cannot be enforced even though the
money borrowed has been expended
for municipal purposes. In Ports-
mouth Savings Bank v. Village of
Ashley (Mich., 1893), 52 N. W. Rep.
74, it was held that the village was
not bound to pay water-woi-ks bonds,
the signing of which by the presi-
dent and clerk had been authorized
by resolution of the village council,
but which were delivered by the
president without any authority
conferred by resolution. The public
can act only through authorized
agents, and it is not bound until all
who are required to participate in
what is to be done have performed
their respective duties. Brown v. Bon
Homme County (Dak.), 46 N. W.
Rep. 173. The Michigan court alsO
said : — " The statute of this State in
reference to the issuing of the water-
works bonds vests that power in the
village council, and until that body
has met at a legal meeting and voted
to issue the bonds or authorized their
§ 615.J
TTETEit VIBES.
&31
§ 615. The same subject continued — Municipal aid. — A
municipal corporation cannot create a debt and issue nego-
tiable bonds representing it in order to pay for a subscription
to a railway corporation under a power conferred by the leg^
islature upon it to subscribe for stock in that corporation.'
Seven-year bonds issued by a township board, bearing inter-
est, in lieu of township orders which were payable on pre-
sentation, have been held void.* The power of township boards
in Michigan to audit and allow claims and issuing obligations
ends with issuing orders for what they allow to be signed by
the clerk and countersigned by the chairman."
issue, one of the essential require-
ments of the statute has not been
complied with; and these bonds
being issued without such direction
are not binding against the i^illage."
1 Hill V. Memphis (1889), 134 U. S.
198; S. C 33 L. Ed. 887; 10 S. Ct
Rep. 562 ; 7 R. R Corp. L. J. 470 ; 39
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 135. All
grants of power of this kind must be
construed strictly. Under a grant
like this the corporation might give
written evidence of the subscriptions,
but that only. The rule for munici-
pal corporations differs from that of
private corporations. Private corpo-
rations created for private purposes
may contract debts in connection with
their business, and issue evidences of
them in such form as may best suit
their convenience. But municipal
corporations, being established for
purposes of local government, in the
absence of specific delegation of
power cannot engage in undertak-
ings not directed immediately to the
acrumplishment of those purposes.
The provisions in the general rail-
road law of Missouri, which went into
effect January 1, 1866, respecting the
loan of nmnicipal credit to a railroad
company, and the act of the State of
March 24, 1868, respecting the fund-
ing of the debts of municipalities,
are to be construed in subordination
to the provisions of the constitution
of the State then in force, prohibit-
ing the legislature authorizing any
town to loan its credit to any corpo-
ration except with the assent of two-
thirds of the qualified voters at a
regular or special election.
2 Bogart V. Township of La Motte
(1890), 79 Mich. 294; S. C, 44 N. W.
Eep. 612, for neither townships of this
State nor their oflBcers have any
power to borrow money or to issue
bonds except that power isconfen-ed
upon them by act of the legislatura
s Comp. L. Mich., § 708. Asto the
rule of strictly construing acts grant-
ing corporate powers involving the
imposing of public burdens, see 1 Dil-
lon on Munic. Corp., §§ 507-509;
Starin v. Town of Genoa, 23 N. Y.
439 ; Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall.
566; Gause v. City of Clarksville, 5
Dill. 165. In Newport v. Newport
Gas Light Co., 84 Ky. 166, it was held
that when a municipal corporation
has the power, express or implied, to
contract with others to furnish its
inhabitants with the means of ob-
taining gas at their own expense, it
has the power to make a contract
granting to a corporation the exclu-
sive rights to the use of its streets for
that purpose for a term of years.
This opinion rested upon this, among
other grounds, that the power given
632
ULTRA VIBES.
[§ 616.
§ 616. The same subject continued — Public improve-
mentSt — While police juries may contract for improvements
which they are authorized to make to be paid out of the taxes
which they are authorized to levy for parochial expenses, and
which are set apart Tor this special improvement, they can-
not issue any promissory note, draft or warrant in advance
to cover this amount which may go into the treasury. It
must be there before the warrant issues, unless by legislative
authority they are authorized t^ issue the same in advance.'
A town in Indiana had issued its negotiable bonds to a certain
amount, the proceeds of which were to be used in the construc-
tion of a school-house, and sold them in open market. When
they matured there was a new issue of similar bonds and
they were also sold in open market. The Supreme Court of
the TJnitied States held the new issue to be void for want of
authority, and that the municipality was not estopped from
setting up that defense.^
\
the inuuicipality to provide for light-
ing the city included the power to
grant that exclusive right
1 Snelling v. Joffrion (1890), 42 La.
Ann. 886; s. c, 8 So. Rep. 609, in
vrhich the court sustained the rights
of tax-payers to maintain the action
to annul the contract so far as to pre-
vent the issuing of evidences of in-
debtedness against a fund not yet in
the parish treasury, this being pro-
hibited by express legislative author-
ity. La. Act 1877, No. 30, § 5 ; Breaux
V. Parish of Iberville, 33 La. Ann.
333 ; Sterling v. Parish of West Feli-
ciana, 36 La. Ann. 59. See, also, New-
gi-ass V. City of New Orleans (1890),
43 La. Ann. 163. The court would
not interfere with the discretion of a
police jiiry so as to dictate what par-
ticular contract should or should not
be made. Gas Light Co. v. New Or-
leans, 41 La. Ann. 91 ; Carey v. Water-
works Co., 41 La. Ann. 910.
2 Merrill v. Monticello (1890), 138
U. S. 673; s. C, 11 S. Ct. Eep. 411.
The implied power of a municipal
corporation to borrow money to en-
able it to execute the powers ex-
pressly conferred upon it by law, if it
exists at all, does not authorize; it to
create and issue negotiable securities
to be sold in the market and to be
taken by a purchaser freed from
equities that might be set up by the
maker. To borrow money and to give
a bond or obligation therefor which
may circulate in the market as a ne-
gotiableeecurity freed from any equi-
ties that may be set up by the maker
of it are essentially different transac-
tions in their nature and legal effect.
See, also. Marsh v. Fulton County, 10
Wall. 678 ;^ast Oakland v. Skinner, 94
U. S. 355 ; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 103
U. S. 378; Dixon County v. Field,
111 U. S. 83 ; Hayes v. Holly Springs,
114 U. S. 130 ; Davies County v. Dick-
inson, 117 U. S. 657;.Gause v. Clarks-
ville, 5 Dill. 165 ; Hopper v. Coving-
ton, 118 U. S. 148, 151 ; McCracken w
City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591,
619 ; Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall.
506; Mayor v. Bay, 19 Wall. 468;
§§ 617, 618.]
ULTEA VIEES.
633
§ 617. Contracts abrogating control of streets. — The lay-
ing out and opening streets by the common council of a city
being the exercise of its legitimate functions, any Contract
made by the city with an individual or corporation, by which
it agrees that it will not in the future open or extend a street
in any particular place or part of the city, is an abrogation of
its legislative powers and uli/i^a vires} A contract by a city
to straighten the course of a large stream running in a zig-zag
direction through it has been held not to be ultra vires?
§ 618. General legislation — OlTers of rewards. — The con-
tracts of municipalities obtain validity only by force of the law
authorizing their making. There is no authority for contracts
Claiborne County v. Brooks, 111 U. S.
400, 406, where it was held that the
statutes of Tennessee which conferred
upon counties in that State power to
erect a court-house, jail and other
necessary county buildings did not
authorize the issue of commercial
paper as evidence of or security for a
debt contracted for the construction
of such a building. Young v. Clar-
endon Township, 133 U. S. 340, 347;
Kelleyi'. Milan, 127 U. B. 139; Hill v.
Memphis, 134 U. S. 198, 203.
1 Matter of Opening of First Street
(1887), 66 Mich. 42; s. C, 88 N. W.
Rep. 15. See, also, Gale v. Village of
Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; Toledo
&c. Ry. Co. V. Detroit &c. R. Co., 63
Mich. 564; Milhau v. Sharp, 37 N. Y.
611 ; Coleman v. Second Ave. E. Co.,
38 N. Y. 201 ; Hood v. Lynn, 1 Allen,
103 ; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19 ;
State V. Hudson Tunnel R. Co., 88
N. J. Law, 548; Newcastle R. Co.
V. Peru &c. R. Co., 3 Ind. 464- Brim-
mer V. Boston, 103 Mass. 19 ; Trustees
of Belfast Academy v. Salmond, 11
Me. 109 ; West River Bridge Co. v.
Dix, 6 How. 507; Dillon on Munic.
Corp., § 567 ; Davis v. Mayor, 14 N. Y.
506, 532; People's R. Co. v. Memphis
R Co., 10 Wall. 38.
2McGuire v. City of Rapid City
repair and prevent obstructions in
its streets. In Benton v. Hamilton
(1886), 110 Ind. 294; s. C, 11 N. E.
Rep. 338, a contract between a town
treasurer and the town for the im-
provement by the former of a public
street was void under the Revised
Statutes of Indiana, 1881, section 2049,
which prohibited it ; and it was fur-
ther held that contracts by a munici-
pal corporation with one of its own
oflBcers, by which a burden is imposed
on property owners, are opposed to
the policy of the law. In Lyddy v.
Long Island City (1887), 104 N. Y. 218 ;
S. 0., 10 N. E. Rep. 155, a contract
with an attorney made with the au-
thorities of a city for professional
services was void, as the amended
charter of the city (N. Y. Laws 1871,
ch. 461) placed the common council
under an absolute disability to create
any debt or liability on the part of
the city for legal services ; also, that,
having no authority to create a lia-
bility against the city by express
(1889), 6 Dak. 346, the court holding
such power in the city to arise from
its power to drain, improve, keep in
contract, it could not legalize such a
claim by acknowledgment, ratifica-
tion or otherwl^j.
634
ULTEA VIEES.
[§ 619.
that the law does not empower the governing boards to enter
into,' In holding that a county court in Oregon had no power
to order the offer of a reward for information leading to a con-
viction of bribery at a coming election, the court said : — " The
county courts, in the management of county affairs, have no
power except that which is expressly given them by statute,
or which is necessary to carry out those so given them. They
have no authority to legislate. Their province is to adminis-
ter the law as the legislature has directed.?' '^
§ 619. Contracts for water supply. — An act, the material
parts of which are quoted in the note,' for the annexation of a
town to a city, was held to give to the city a power to pur-
chase the property and franchises of the water-works company,
but by the terms of the act that right expired with the ex-
1 Therefore a contract let by a
board of commissioners of a county,
for the care of the " poor," at a cer-
tain price per capita, and for the
care of the " sick and infirm " at an-
other price per capita, was held to
be void in Lebcher v. Comm'rs of
Custer County (1890), 9 Mont 315;
s. c, 33 Pac. Rep. 713, as the law-
only authorized a contract for the
care of such persons as were poor
and therewith sick and infirm. See,
also. Parr v. Village of Greenbush, 73
N. Y. 463 ; Head v. Providence Ins.
Co., 3 Cranch, 137; Bonestell v.
Mayor, 23 N. Y. 163; Foster v. Cole-
man, 10 Oal 379; Trottman v. San
Francisco, 30 Cal. 96 ; s. c, 81 Am.
Dec. 96 ; Argenti v. San Francisco, 16
CaL 256 ; City of Alton v. County of
Madison, 31 111. 115 ; Dillon on Munic.
Corp., § 381 ; Thomas v. Richmond,
13 Wall. 349 ; Clark v. Des Moines, 19
Iowa, 309; Loker v. Brookline, 13
Pick. 348; Philadelphia u Flanigan,
47 Pa. St. 27 ; Johnson v. Santa Clara
County, 28 CaL 545.
2 Mountain v. Multnomah County
(1888), 16 Or. 379; s. c, 18 Pac, Rep.
464. They have no powers except
those granted and defined by law,
and like other agents must pursue
their authority and act within the
scope of their power. See, also, Wol-
cott V. Lawrence County, 26 Mo. 272 ;
Book V. Earl, 87 Mo. 246 ; Sturgeon
V. Hampton, 88 Mo. 203; State v.
Brossfield, 67 Mo. 331 ; Webb v. La
Fayette County, 67 Mo. 353; Ranney
V. Baden, 67 Mo. 476 ; State v. Walker,
85 Mo. 41. '
' Laws of New York, 1886, chapter
335, section 5, reads, "The mayor,
comptroller and auditor of the city
. . . are hereby authorized . . .
to purchase the reservoir, , . .
and all other property, of [a water-
works company] . . , when and
at such price as may be agreed upon,
. , . and in case said parties shall
be unable to agree upon a price for
the purchase, . . . then in that case
the power to acquire said property
and franchises by the right of emi-
nent domain is hereby expressly
delegated to said city, . . . and
the said ofBcers in the name of and
for said city within two years there-
after may proceed to acquire . . ."
§ 620.]
ULTRA VIEES.
635
piration of the two years.' Any contract by a city council
with a private corporation, impairing the exercise of its power
and duty to keep the streets in repair, safe and convenient
for public use, is void as against public policy .'^ Upon a con-
tentiou that a contract by a city with a water company, in
extending through a period of twenty-one years and depriving
subsequent city councils of legislative control over the matter
embraced in it, was ultra vires, it was held that the objection
did not require that the contract should be held void, but
only voidable so far as it was executory.'
§ 620. The same subject continued. — Authority to make
a permanent and exclusive contract with a water company to
build water-works and supply a city with water cannot be
implied from the general power conferred by its charter to
contract for the needs of a municipality.*
J Zeigler v. Chapin (1891), 126 N.
Y. 343; s. C, 27 N. E. Eep. 471, af-
firming 59 Hun, 214 ; a C, 13 N. Y.
Supl. 783, in which case the court
lield the action of a tax-payer to
annul a contract which had been en-
tered into by the city authorities for
the purchase of this property, on the
ground that thg contract having
been made after the two years had
expired was illegal and void, there
being no power in the city author-
ities to make it, was maintainable,
and that the injunction restraining
the officials from carrying out the
contract pending the litigation was
properly granted.
2 City Council of Montgomery v.
Capital City Water Co. (Ala., 1891), 9
So. Rep. 339. The court said:— "If
conceded that the city council has
authority to contract for a supply of
water for fire and sanitary purposes,
yet the city council has no power, in
the absence of legislative authority,
t3 make contracts or pass ordinances
relinquishing or abandoning the leg-
islative or governmental powers or
divesting the corporation of its legis-
lative discretion, or disabling it to
perform its public duties." 1 Dillon
on Munic. Corp., § 97.
' Carlyle Water, Light & Power Co.
V. City of Carlyle (1888), 31 111. App.
325 ; City of East St. Louis v. East
St Louis a, L. & C. Co., 98 III 415 ;
Decatur Gas Light & Coke Co. u
City of Decatur, 24 III. App. 544.
* Greenville Water Works Co. v.
City of Greenville (Miss., 189U), 7
So. Rep. 409. In City of Brenham v.
Brenham Water Company (1887), 67
Tex. 542 ; s. C, 4 S. W. Rep. 143, it
was held that the city had no power
to grant to this water company an
exclusive privilege of supplying it
with water for twenty-five years, it
not being expressly granted to it, and
for the further reason that the power
of a city government to make such
a contract as would disable it from
controlling in future, as it might
deem best, municipal aflairs to which
it refers, cannot be implied from the
express delegation of power to con-
tract regarding the particular subject-
matter. Ths ruling was based up )n
the general principle that poweis
636
TILTEA VIEES.
[§ 621.
§621. Contracts for lighting streets. — Cities and towns
in Massachusetts have been held to have r j authority under
the statutes to erect and maintain works for the manufacture
and distribution of electric light for lighting the public streets
or for this and the additional purpose of furnishing light to
their inhabitants.' A city has no power to loan the moneys
are conferred on municipal corpora-
tions for public purposes, and they
can neither be delegated nor bar-
tered away. Such corporations have
no power either to cede away or em-
barrass their legislative or govern-
mental powers, either through the
agency of by-laws or contracts with
others, so as to disable them from
the performance of their public du-
ties. Applying these principles, the
contract here would have the effect
not only to embarrass the city gov-
ernment in the exercise of the power
conferred on it but to withdraw
from it the right to provide water in
any other authorized way for public
purposes and for the inhabitants of
the city, which was the sole purpose
for which the power to erect, main-
tain and regulate water-works was
given to it Tliis would result from
the exclusive right which, from the
terms of the ordinance, it intended
to confer. In Waterbury v. City of
Laredo (1887), 68 Tex. 565; s. C, 5
S. W. Eep. 81, it was held that a con-
tract between the city and an attor-
ney, which gave to him annually for
twenty years one-third of the rents
of the ferry privileges and ferries or
of any bridge or bridges built across
the Rio Grande river at that point,
the contract being declared to be ir-
revocable, and which mutually bound
the contracting parties to do no act
and to enter into no engagement or
contract that would interfere with
its terms, in connection with certain
suits he had conducted pertinent to
this ferry, for which he had been
reasonably compensated, was in con-
IrEivention of public policy and not
enforceable. It would, if enforced,
place it beyond the power of the city
to establish a free ferry or to charge
such tolls only as would defray the
expenses of operating the franchise
if it so desired. In City of Cleburne
V. Brown (1889), 73 Tex. 443; s. C, 11
S. W. Eep. 404, it was held that a
contract between the city and a
water and ice company, which, if
carried out, would have amounted
to a loan by the city of its credit to a
private corporation, was ultra vires.
It had not the power to do it under
the constitution of Texas, article 11,
section 3.
'Spaulding v. Inhabitants of Pea-
body (1891), 153 Mass. 129; s. c, 10
L. Rep. Anno. 397 ; 26 N. E. Eep. 431 ;
38 Am. & Eng. Coi-p. Cas. 638. Such
a power cannot be implied as an in-
cident to power expressly granted
them to erect and maintain street
lamps — at least where it has been
the custom of the legislature to spe-
cifically define from time to time the
purposes for which towns may raise
money by taxation of their inhabit-
ants. See, also, as to construing
strictly all such statutes, Minot v.
West Roxbury, 113 Mass. 1 ; Coolidge
V. Brookline, 114 Mass. 592 ; Connolly
V. Beverly, 151 Mass. 437 ; Anthony v.
Adams, 1 Met 384. The legislature
of Massachusetts has since this de-
cision enacted "an act to enable
cities and towns to manufacture and
distribute gas and electricity." Mass.
St 1891, ch. 370, approved June 4> 1891.
§ 622.]
ULTEA VIEES.
637
arising from a sale of bonds issued to construct water-works.'
The treasurer being by law the proper custodian of such
moneys, his bondsmen, in such a case, could maintain a suit to
restrain his carrying out the order of the city council, as it
would be a misappropriation of the fund.*
§ 622. Grant of exclusiye privileges The powers of mu-
nicipal corporations are limited to the express terms of the
grant and will not be extended by inference. A municipal
corporation can confer exclusive privileges for the prosecution
of business only under an express grant of power from the
legislature. Monopolies being prejudicial to the public wel-
fare, the courts will not infer grants thereof, but will refuse
to presume the existence of legislative intention in conflict
with public policy.'
1 City of Bonham v. Taylor (Tex.,
1891), 16 S. W. Rep. 555; s. C, 33
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 647. The
court said : — " Municipal corpoi-a-
tions existing under the general law-
have power to raise funds for special
purposes, enumerated in the statute,
and to use such funds for the' pur-
poses for which they were raised,
tout we know of no power conferred
on them to become money lenders
except of a sinking fund raised to
meet the payment of a debt" It was
contended that Revised Statutes of
Texas, article 370, which declares that
"the city council shall have the
management and control of the
finances and other property, real,
personal and mixed, belonging to the
corporation," conferred on the city
the power to lend the special fund
raised for constructing the water-
vporks. This contention was over-
ruled, the court holding that the stat-
ute meant a control in accordance
with law and not in violation of law,
and as to article 430, which gave to
the city power to appropriate money
raised to enumerated purposes, this
was not one of them. Nor would
article 424, which relates to the in-
vestment of a sinking fund, apply.
The money in question was not the
sinking fund, which the city would
have power to lend, for the entire
fund was money borrowed, and not
money raised by taxation for a sink-
ing fund.
2 City of Bonham v. Taylor (Tex.,
1891), 16 S. W. Rep. 555 ; s. c, 33
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 647.
3 liOgan V. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524 ; S. c,
22 Am. Rep. 261. In Brenham v.
Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex. 543, the
court considered a grant to a water
company of the right and privilege,
for the term of twenty-five years,
of furnishing the city with water,
and thus summed up their conclu-
sion:—"We do not wish to be
understood to hold that a municipal
corporation has no power in any
event to contract for such things as
are consumed in their daily' use, for
a period longer than the oflflcial term
or' the officers who make the con-
tract ; Lat we do intend to be under-
stood to hold that such corporations
have no power to make contracts
continuous in character in reference
638
QLTEA VIEES.
[§ 623.
§ 623. Curatire legislation.— The United States Supreme
Court have held and adhered to it that where municipal cor-
porations have issued evidences of indebtedness, which at the
time of issue were unauthorized, it was in the power of the
legislature to validate their issue by curative legislation.^
to such things or any others, by
which they will be, in effe-ct, pre-
cluded from exercising, from time
to time, any power, legislative in
character, conferred upon them by
law." In Gale v. Kalamazoo. 23
Mich. 344; s. c, 9 Am. Rep. 80, in
which a contract to build and con-
trol a market-house for the period of
ten years was held to be void be-
cause it created a monopoly, Judge
Cooley said : — "It is impossible to
predicate reasonableness of any con-
tract by which the governing au-
thority abdicates any of its legisla-
tive powers, and precludes itself from
meeting in the proper way the emer-
gencies that may arise. Those pow-
ers are conferred in order to be
exercised again and again, as may
be found needful or politic; and
those who hold them in trust to-day
are vested with no discretion to cir-
cumscribe their limits or diminish
their efficiency, but must transmit
them unimpaired to their successors.
This is one of the fundamental max-
ims of government, and it is impos-
sible that free government with
restrictions for the protection of in-
dividual or municipal rights could
long exist without its recognition."
In Davenport v. Eleinschmidt, 6
Mont 503, it was held that a city
council has no authority to grant to
any person a monopoly even where
no express prohibition is found in
the charter or other acts of the legis-
lature. In Minturn v. Larue, 23 How.
435, Justice Nelson gives this rule of
construction of grants by the legis-
lature to corporations : — " that only
such powers and rights can be ex-
ercised under them as are clearly
^mprehended within the words of
me act, or derived therefrom by nec-
essary implication, regard being had
to the objects of the grant. Any
ambiguity or doubt arising out of
ttie terms used by the legislature
must be resolved in favor of the pub-
lic." In Richmond County Gas Light
Co; V. Middletown, 59 N. Y. 228, the
New York Court of Appeals held
that there was uo power conferred
upon the town auditors to contract
with a gas company to light the
streets of the town for five years.
In Chicago v. RumpfiF, 45 111. 90, a
right to do all slaughtering of ani-
mals ip Chicago for a specified
period was held to be void, because
creating a monopoly.
> Bolles V. Brimfield (1886), 120 IT. a
759; s. a, 7 S. Ct Rep. 736; Grenada
Co. Supervisors v. Brogden, 1 13 U.'S.
361, 263, the court saying in this
case: — "Since what was done in
this case by the constitutional major-
ity of qualified electors and by the
board of supervisors of the county
would have been legal and binding
upon the county had it been done
under legislative authority previously
conferred, it is not perceived why
subsequent legislative ratification is
not, in the absence of constitutional
restrictions upon such legislation,
equivalent to original authority."
Thompson v. Perrine, 103 U. S. 806,
815 ; Ritchie v. Franklin, 23 Wall. 67 ;
Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall.
837, 330; City v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477,
485; Campbell v. City of Kenosha, 5
§ 624.]
ULTEA VIEES.
639
§ 624. Ratification. — Corporate ratification, without au-
thority from the legislature, cannot make a municipal bond
valid which was void when issued for want of legislative power
to make it." An act performed by a public corporation in
Wall. 194; Otoe County «. Baldwin,
111 U. S. 1, 15 ; St Joseph Township
V. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644, 663 ; Ander-
son V. Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 356;
U. S. Mortgage Co. v. Gross, 93 III.
483, 494, where the court said: —
" Unless there be a constitutional in-
hibition, a legislature has power,
when it interferes with no vested
right, to enact retrospective statutes
to validate invalid contracts or to
ratify and confirm any act it might
lawfully have authorized in the first
instance." In Katzenberger v. Aber-
deen (1886), 121 U. S. 173; S. C, 7
S. Ct. Eep. 947, it was held that when,
by reason of a change in the consti-
tution of a State, its legislature had
no constitutional authority to au-
thorize a municipal corporation to
issue negotiable bonds, it could not
validate an issue of bonds by such a
corporation made before the change
in the constitution, and when the
legislature had such power. The
court was controlled by Sykes v.
Mayor of Columbus, 55 Miss. 115,
where Chief Justice Sinirall said
about this attempted curative act: —
"The act of 1872 is not relied on to
waive mere Irregularities in the exe-
cution of the power, but as confer-
ring power by retrospective opera-
tion. If the bonds are obligatory on
the city of Columbus, they became
BO for the first time by virtue of this
statute. The legislature of 1873 could
not by relation put itself back to
1869 and exercise power not denied
or restricted by the constitution of
1833. The measure of its power was
the constitution of December, 1869,
and it could not ratify an act pre-
viously done if at the date it pro-
fessed to do so it could not confer
power in the first instance. It could
authorize a municipal loan condi-
tionally. In order to ratify and le-
galize a loan previously made, it was
bound by the constitutional limita-
tion of its power." This doctrine was
assented to in Grenada County Su-
pervisors V. Brogden, 113 U. S. 371.
1 Lewis V. City of Shreveport (1882),
108 U. S. 282, which held bonds of
the city issued to grant pecuniary aid
to a railroad without legislative au-
thority void as beyond the power of
the city to issue, and, as they bore
evidence on their face of the purpose
for which they were issued, void in
the hands of bona fide holders. The
holder of the bonds insisted that as
the city had employed agents to sell
these bonds, and its law officer had
given an opinion in favor of their
validity, and that they had been rec-
ognized in ofiicial statements as
binding obligations, and that taxes
had been levied to pay principal or in-
terest, this amounted to a ratification.
The court held that it matters not
that such things had been done. Ot-
tawa V. Cary, 108 U. S. 110. See,-also,
as to the inability of subsequent acts
of a corporation to make an ultra
vires contract eflfective, Sault Ste.
Marie Co. v. Van Dusen, 40 Mich. 429 ;
Jefferson County v. Arrighi, 54 Miss.
668; Nash v. St. Paul, 11 Minn. 174;
Hague V. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 538 ;
Brady v. Mayor, 30 N. Y. 312; Bryan
V. Page, 51 Tex. 332; Peterson v.
Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449 ; Cowen v. West
Troy, 43 Barb. 48 ; Brown v. Mayor,
63 N. Y. 239 ; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2
Denio, 110 ; McDonald y. Mayor, 68
N. Y. 23; Smith v. Newburgh, 77
640
ULTEA TIEE8.
[§ 625.
violation of the terms of a statute cannot be validated by a sub-
sequent ratification by the corporation.' An act of a munici-
pal corporation, void for want of authority to do it, cannot be
validated by an estoppel incurred by the corporation ; other-
wise all limitations on the power of such corporation imposed
by the legislature for the public good might be evaded at the
mere volition of the corporation.^
§ 625. Estoppel. — In general, a municipal corporation is
not estopped from denying the validity of a contract with its
officers, when there has been no authority for making such a
contract. The doctrine of ultra vires is applied with greater
strictness to municipal bodies than to private corporations.'
cannot be evaded by estoppel. North-
ern Bank v. Porter, 110 U. S. 608, 619.
s Newberry v. Fox (1887), 37 Minn.
141 ; s. C, 33 N. W. Eep. 333, which
held a contract for making certain
street improvements made by the
municipal officers in the first inr
stance without haVing called upon
the adjacent proprietor to make
them, and a default upon his part,
which the charter required, to have
been unauthorized; also that the
contracting party could not recover
after he performed the contract, he
not having been misled as to any
fact. He was legally chargeable with
notice of the restricted power of the
municipal authorities under the char-
ter. See, also, as to being charge-
able with notice, McDonald v. Mayor,
68 N. Y. 28 ; Schumm v. Seymour, 24
N. J. Eq. 143. As to applying the doc-
trine of ultra vires, Mayor v. Roy, 19
Wall. 468; Brady v. Mayor of New
York, 30 N. Y. 312 ; Hague v. City of
Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 527 ; 1 Dillon
on Munic Corp., § 457 ; Nash v. City
of St Paul, 8 Minn. 172; Concord v.
Robinson, 121 U. S. 165, 170; Crow v.
Oxford, 119 U. S. 215 ; Lyddy v. Long
Island City, 104 N. Y. 218 ; S. a, 10
N. E. Rep. 155 ; Donovan v. City of
New York, 33 N. Y. 291, 293.
N. Y. 130; Green v. Cape May, 41
N. J. Law, 45 ; Taymouth v. Koehler,
35 Mich. 22; Marsh u Fulton Co.,
10 Wall. 676 ; Horton v. Thompson,
71 N. Y. 513 ; Scott v. Shreveport, 20
Fed. Rep. 714 ; San Diego Water Co.
V. San Diego, 59 Cal. 517 ; Bank v.
Statesville, 84 N. C. 169; City of La-
redo V. Macdonell, 52 Tex. 511. As
to effect of use of a school-house
which has been constructed at an
expense beyond the authority reposed
in the building committee by the vote
of the district, or similar cases as a rat-
ification, Wilson V. School District,
32 N. H. 118 ; Kingman v. School Dis-
trict, 2 Cush. 425; Davis v. School
District, 24 Me. 349 ; Lane v. School
District, 10 Met 462; Chaplin v. Hill,
24 Vt 628 ; Fisher v. School District,
4 Cush. 494; Taft v. Montague, 14
Mass. 283 ; Keyser v. School District,
35 N. H. 477 ; Pratt v. Swanton, 15
Vt 147.
1 Platter v. Elkhart County (Ind.,
1885), 1 West Rep. 235.
2Hoey V. Gilroy (1891), 37 N. Y. St
Eep. 754 ; s. c., 14 N. Y. SupL 159 ; Pet-
erson V. Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449, 454, hold-
ing that no sort of a ratification can
, make good an act without corporate
authority. N. Y. &c. R Co. v. Van
Horn, 57 N. Y. 473, that a statute
§ 626.]
ULTRA VIEE8.
641
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, with reference to this doc5-
trine, said : — "A different rule of law would, in effect, vastly
enlarge the power of public agents to bind a municipality by
contracts, not only unauthorized but prohibited by the law. It
would tend to nullify the limitations and restrictions imposed
with respect to the powers of such agents; and to a danger-
ous extent expose the public to the very evils and abuses which
such limitations are designed to prevent." ^
§626. Purchasers of bonds are bound to take notice. —
The power of a municipal corporation to issue coupon bonds
is derived from the legislative authority of the State, and the
laws conferring such power form a part of the bonds them-
selves. Accordingly, every person dealing with such corpo-
ration must, at his peril, take notice of the existence and terms
of the law by which it is claimed the power to issue such
bonds is conferred.^
1 Nash V. City of St Paul, 8 Minn.
172. In State v. Atlantic City (1887),
49 N. J. Law, 558; S. C, 9 AtL Rep.
759, where the city had entered into
a contract with a water-works com-
pany for a supply of water, and
after some delay an action was
brought by the company to enforce
its contract, it was held that neither
the city nor a tax-payer was estopped
from contesting the authority of the
city to enter into such contract, and
that the writ of certiorari was prop-
erly allowed, it having been applied
for within a reasonable time after it
bad become- apparent that by the
proceedings a burden might be im-
posed on the tax-payers. See, also.
State V. Newark, 80 N. J. Law, 303;
State V. Hudson, 39 N. J. Law, 475 ;
State V. Hudson, 39 N. J. Law, 115;
State V. Water Coram'rs, 30 N. J. Law,
347 ; State v. Paterson, 36 N. J. Law,
159 ; State v. Trenton, 36 N. J. Law,
499 ; State v. Perth Amboy, 38 N. J.
Law, 425; Haines v. Campion, 8
Harr. 49; State v. Blake, 35 N. J.
41
Law, 208 ; Bonne v. Logan, 43 N. J.
Law, 431. When, however, a munic-
ipal corporation had power to bor-
row money if certain facts existed,
and the legislature had manifested
an intention to invest certain offl- ,
cials or agents with authority to de-
termine the existence of such facts,
and they have solemnly asserted
their existence, the corporation has
been held to be estopped f roih con-
testing its obligations when in the
hands of those who loaned thereon
in good faith and without knowl-
edge of the lack of power, on the
ground that the facts did not exist
Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Eliza-
beth, 42 N. J. Law, 235.
2 Nat Bank v. City of St Joseph
(1887), 31 Fed. Rep. 316. In this case it
was a condition of these bonds that
interest should cease upon a tender
of the principal by the governing au-
thorities of the city at any time.
And the court held that it was be-
yond the power of the mayor and
councilmen to curtail or impair the
642
ULTBA VIEES.
[§ 627.
§ 627. Corporations may contest nitra Tires contracts. —
"Where contracts are not authorized by the charter or by other
legislative act, and are clearly without the scope of the power
of the corporation, and therefore void, in actions therein the
corporation may interpose the plea of ultra vires, setting up
as a defense its own want of power to enter into the con-
tract.' The acts of oiBcers cannot bind the local public by
estoppel^ where the officers performing these acts cannot bind
them by a direct contract.^ A %iunicipal corporation incurs
effect of this condition by issuing
bonds of a different tenor. See, also,
Anthony v. Jasper Co., 101 U. S. 693,
697 ; Ogden i). Daviess County, 103
U. S. 634 ; Northern Bank v. Porter
Township, 110 U. S. 608, 618; s. G, 4
Sup. Ct Eep. 254. In Duke v. Brown
(1887), 96 N. C. 137 ; s. a, 1 S. E. Eep.
937, It was held that where there is
an inherent constitutional defect in
the statute authorizing the issue of
municipal bonds, a purchaser of the
bonds takes them with notice of their
illegal origin, for purchasers must in-
quire into the authority by which the
bonds are issued, and are held to no-
tice of any defect therein. See, also,
as to the duty of persons to take notice
of the scope of power of officers in
coutractihg for municipalities. Mayor
&C. V. Eschbach, 18 Md. 376 ; Mayor
&c. u. Reynolds, 30 Md. 1 ; Mayor &c.
V. Kirkley, 29 Md. 85 ; Horn v. Mayor
&c., 30 Md. 318 ; Mayor &c v. Mus-
grave, 48 Md. 373 ; Leavenworth v.
Rankin, 2 Kan. 357; Wyandotte v.
Zeitz, 21 Kan. 649; Bridgeport v.
Housatonic R. Co., 15 Conn. 475, 493 ;
Hayes v. Covington, 21 Miss. 408;
Taft V. Pittsford, 28 Vt 386 ; Mont-
gomery City Council v. Mont. & W.
Pt R. Co., 31 Ala. 76 ; Hodges v. Buf-
falo, 2 Denio, 110; Dill v. Wareham,
7 Met. 438 ; Branham v. San Jose, 34
Cal. 583, 603; McCoy «. Brant. 53
Cal. ^7 ; Wallace v. San Jose, 39 CaL
180; State v. Mayor, 39 Md. 85, 111;
State V. Haskell, 20 Iowa, 376 ; Peo-
ple V. Baraga, 39 Mich. 554 ; Neely v.
Yorkville, 10 S. C. 141 ; C/aycraf t v.
Selvage, 10 BUsh, 696 ; Treadway
V. Schnauber, 1 Dak. 236 ; Laycock
V. Baton Rouge, 35 La. Ann. 475;
Keating v. Kansas, 84 Mo. 415.
1 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 457 ;
Cheeney v. Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53;
BuiTill V. Boston, 3 Cliff. 590 ; Mar-
tin V. Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 545 ; Norwich
Overseers &c. v. New Berlin &c.,
18 Johns. 383; Seibrecht v. New Or-
leans, 13 La. Ann. 496; Loker v.
Brookline, 13 Pick. 343, 348 ; Phila-
delphia V. Flanigen, 47 Pa. St. 31 ;
Cuyler v. Rochester, 13 Wend. 165;
Albany v. Cunliff, 3 N. Y. 165; Hal-
stead v. New York, 8 N. Y. 430;
Brown v. Utica, 3 Barb. 104; Cor-
nell «. Guilford, 1 Denio, 510; Boy-
land V. Mayor &o., 1 Sandf. 37 ; Vin-
cent V. Nantucket, 13 Cush. 103, 105 ;
Stetson V. Kempton, 13 Mass. 372;
Parson v. Inhabitants of Goshen, 11
Pick. 396; Wood v. Lynn, 1 Allen,
108 ; Spalding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71 ;
Mitchell V. Rockland, 45 Me. 496;
Tippecanoe Co. Comm'rs v. Cox, 6
Ind. 403 ; Inhabitants v. Weir, 9 Ind.
234 ; Appleby v. New York, 15 How.
Pr. 438; Brady v. New York, 30
N. Y. 313 ; Estep v. Keokuk County,
18 Iowa, 199; Maupin v. Franklin
County, 67 Mo. 327 ; Lincoln u. Stock-
ton, 75 Me. 141.
2 Platter v. Elkhart County (Ind.,
1885), 1 West. Rep. 235. A public
corporation, such as a county or a
§ 628.]
TJLTEA VIEES.
643
no liability for work done under a void contract, and wiiere
there is no guaranty on its part that the forms of law have
been complied with, and its officers, without authority, at-
tempt to contract, those dealing with it must see to it that
its agents have power to act.'
§ 628. Liability upon ultra vires contracts. — Where a con-
tract is void because of the express declaration of a statute,
or because prohibited in terms, the retention by a municipal-
ity of the fruits of such a contract will not subject it to liabil-
ity, .cither under the contract or upon a quantum meruit?
1S.O estoppel can ordinarily arise from the act of a municipal
corporation or officer done in violation of or without authority
of law. Every person is presumed to know the nature and
extent of the powers of municipal officers and therefore can-
not be deemed to have been deceived or misled by acts done
without legal authority.'
city, is composed of the inhabitants
of a locality, and the ofScers are not
agents in the strict sense of the term,
but are persons acting in an official
capacity. See, also, Baumgai-tner v.
Hasty, 100 Ind. 575; s. c, 50 Am.
Rep. 820 ; Strosser v. City, 100 Ind.
443 ; City v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1 ; S. a,
49 Am. Rep. 416.
1 Daly V. San Francisco (1887), 73
Cal. 154 ; s. C, 13 Pac. Rep. 331. The
Supreme Court of the United States
have thus stated the rule : — " Indi-
viduals as well as courts must take
notice of the extent of authority con-
ferred by law upon a person acting
in an official capacity." See, also,
Union School Tp. v. First Nat Bank
(Ind., 1885), 1 West. Rep. 107; Reeve
School Tp. V. Dodson, 98 Ind. 497;
Ajct V. Johnson School Tp., 90 Ind.
101 ; Pine Civil Tp. v. Huber Mfg. Co.,
83 Ind. 131 ; Cummins v. Seymour,
-79 Ind. 491; Driftwood &c. Co. v.
Board, 73 Ind. 334 ; Murphy v. City
of Louisville, 9 Bush, 189.
' GuOse River Bank v. Willow Lake
School Tp. (No. Dak., 1890), 44 N. W.
Rep. 1003; Dickinson v. City of
Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y. 65 ; McBrien
V. City of Grand Rapids, 33 N. W.
Rep. 206 ; Tube Works Co. v. City of
Chamberlain (Dak.), 37 N. W. Rep.
763.
aSeeger v. Mueller (1890), 133 111.
86 ; s. c, 24 N. E. Rep. 513, where the
rule was applied in a case in which
purchasers of school lands claimed
an easement of a right of way, over
roads laid out by school ti:ustees,
which laying out of roads waS' held
to be ultra vires and void. In King
V. Mahaska County (1888), 75 Iowa,
329, it was held that, where the work
done under additional and void con-
tracts in the erection of a court-
house had been paid for in the pe-
riodical estimates of an architect,
and afterwards the. contractor
brought an action against the county
for a lai'ge sum of money, involving
all the transactions between the par-
ties, based on the several contracts,
the county was not concluded, by
such payments, from insisting that
the additional contracts were illegal
644 TJLTEA TIKES. [§ 629.
§ 629. The same subject continued. — In a case where the
United States Supreme Court held' that under the charter
power of a city it was vested with power to cause sidewalks
to be erected, and could delegate its power to the mayor and
chairman of the committee on streets and alleys, to make, in
its behalf and pursuant to its directions, a contract for doing
the work, there was an objection that it had not the power to
pay for the work done under this contract in bonds and that
there should be no recovery against the city for that reason.
The court, as the issue of bonds was not prohibited by any
statute, said : — "At most the issue was unauthorized. At
most there was a defect of power. The promise to give bonds
to the plaintiffs in payment of what they undertook to do
was therefore, at farthest, only ultra vvresj and in such a case,
though the specific performance of an engagement to do a
thing transgressive of its corporate power may not be en-
forced, the corporation can be held liable on its contract. Hav-
ing received benefits at the expense of the other contracting
party, it cannot object that it was not empowered to perform
what it promised in return, in the matter in which it promised
to perform.^
and that all the money paid should within the letter of their grant" But
be regarded as paid on the amount in Scofield v. City of Council Bluffs
named in the original contract. Long (1886), 68 Iowa, 695, it was held that
V. Boone County, 36 Iowa, 60, dis- where a city, pursuant to a contract,
tinguished. In Trustees of Belleview in payment for work in grading
V. Hohn (1884), 82 Ky. 1, an action to streets issued certificates of assess-
recover for work done on streets ment upon the owners of abutting
under a contract in which the con- lots, it impliedly agreed that they
tractor bound himself not to look to were valid, and upon it being shown
the city for payment, but to the that they were not valid, because the
property owners whose lots abutted city had no power to assess the cost
upon the street, it was held that the of such grading upon the abutting
corporation could not be held liable lot-owners, the contract could not be
upon implied promises by reason of set aside, and the city was held liable
benefits received. The court said : — for the contract price of the work,
" This refusal to hold corporations and not onl3' for the reasonable value
liable is done for the protection of thereof. Bucroft v. City of Council
the inhabitants of the corporation Bluffs, 63 Iowa, 646.
and because the only power the cor- ' Hitchcock v. Galveston (1877), 96
poration has is from the law creating U. S. 341. The court referred with
it, and instead of recognizing a more approval to State Board of Agrioult-
liberal rule the courts are inclined ui'e v. Citizens' Street Railway Co.,
to hold corporations and their agents 47 Ind. 407, holding that "although
§;630.]
ULTB4. VIBES.
645
,§ 630. Ultra vires^ when not a defense to actions by the
corporation. — One who has, made a contract with a city which
is ultra vires on its part, as, for instance, for the working of
the city's convicts sentenced to the workhouse, and reaped the
.benefits of such contract, cannot defend in an action for their
work rendered for him under the contract on the ground that
the contract was against public policy or that it was not within
the power of the city to enter into it.' Where a municipal cor-
poration has made a contract with an individual and it has
been executed, and nothing remains to be done except for him
there may be a defect of power in
a corporation to make a contract, yet
if a contract made by it is not in vio-
lation of its charter, or of any statute
prohibiting it, and the corporation
has by its promise induced a party
relying on the promise and in execu-
tion of the contract to expend money
and perform his part thereof, the cor-
poration is liable on the contract See,
also, substantially to the same effect,
Allegheny City v. McClurkin, 14 Pa.
St 81, and more or less in point, Ma-
ker V. Chicago, 38 IlL 366 ; Oneida
Bank v. Ontario Bank, 21 N. Y. 490 ;
Argenti v. City of San Francisco, 16
Cal. 256 ; Silver Lake Bank v. North,
4 Johns. Ch. 370. The court, in
Hitchcock V. Galveston, supra, held
that the contract remained in force
BO far as it was in other respects law-
ful, and that the action' for damages
for breach of the same was main-
tainable. East St. Louis v. East St
Louis Gas L. &'C. Co., 98 111. 415;
Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415 ; 3
Parsons on Contracts, 790 ; Field on
Corp., § 278, par. 8; Bridge Co. v.
Frankfort 18 B. Mon. 41 ; San Fran-
cispo Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 CaL
453.
iCity of St Louis v. Davidson
(1890), 102 Mo. 149. The city could
successfully interpose the plea of
ultra vires if sued upon such a con-
tract but tl>e other party cannot
plead its disability. The charter of
this city, while not permitting such
a contract does not prohibit it;
therefore the contract tliough ultra
vires was not unlawful. This dis-
tinction is sanctioned by the authori-
ties. 2 Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th
ed.), § 936 ; McDonald w. Mayor, 68 N. ,
Y. 23 ; Bigelow on Estoppel (5th ed.),
465, 685 ; Oregonian By. Co. v. Rail-
road, 10 Saw. 464 See, also. Mayor v.
Harrison, 30 N, J. Law, 73, where a
collector of assessments for street;
improvements and his sureties
sought to defend an action on his
bond upon the ground that the act
of the council of the municipality in
creating the office and his appoint-
ment to it was ultra vires and void ;
it was held that there was no power ■
in the common council to create the
oflSce, but that the appointee was ,
estopped from denying the validity
of the ordinance. Middleton v. City ,
of Elkhart 130 Ind. 166, was decided
on the same principle ; also Hender-
sonville v. Price, 96 N. C. 423 ; City of
Burlington v. Gilbert 31 Iowa, 356 ;
Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415 ;
Ferguson v. Landram, 5 Bush, 330 ;
Mayor /y. Sonneborn, 113 N. Y. 423 j
Commonwealth v. Wolbert 6 Bin-
ney, 393 ; Postmaster-General v. Rice,
Gilpin, 554 ; Ryan v. Martin, 91 N. 0.
464.
646
ULTRA VIEES.
[§031.
to pay the last instalment of the price agreed upon for the
privilege accorded him, and he has reaped all the benefits he
had proposed to himself in making the contract, the doctrine
of vMra vires does not apply.'
§ 631. Tax-payers' resistance. — The courts generally now
rebognize the rights of property holders or taxable inhabitants
to resort to judicial authority to restrain municipal corpora-
tions and their officers from translfiending their lawful powers
or violating their legal duties in any unauthorized mode which
will increase the burden of taxation, or otherwise injuriously
affect tax-payers and their property ; such as an unwarranted
appropriation and squandering of corporate funds or unjusti-
fiable disposition of corporate property; an illegal levy and
collection of taxes not due or exigible, etc'
'Town of Monticello v. Cohn
(1886), 48 Ark. 354 ; S. c, 3 S. W. Eep.
130, an action on a bond giiren by
defendant to the corporation for a
privilege, and it was held he could
not plead the want of corporate
power to make the contract Nat.
Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621 ; Par-
ish V. Wheeler, 23 N. Y. 494; Whit-
ney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N. Y.
63; Pook V. Lafayette Building
AsB'n, 71 liid 357 ; Weber «, Agricult-
ural Society, 44 Iowa, 239; Helena
u Turner, 36 Ark. 577.
2 Handy v. City of New Orleans
(1887), 39 La. Ann. 107; s. C, 1. So.
Eep. 593, sustaining an action based
upon charges that the city had in ex-
cess of its powers and in violation of
prohibitory provisions in its charter
passed an ordinance under which a
contract of lease of public wharves
was ientered into. Followed and ap-
proved in Conery v. New Orleans
Water-works Co. (1887), 39 La. Aim.
770 ; s. C, 3 So. Rep. 555. As to the sub-
ject-matter and amount involved in
giving jurisdiction to the court the
tax-payer stands in judgment for the
whole community, irrespective of the
distributive interest he may have in
the matter at issue. Pro hoc vice, he
is considered as the payer of all taxes.
See, also, Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101
U. S. 601 ; Gifford v. Railroad Co., 10
N. J. Eq. 171; Baltimore v. Gill, 31
Md. 375 ; Wade v. Eichtnond, 18 Gratfc
563; Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. St. 338
New London v. Brainard, 33 Conn.
553 ; Harvey v. Indianapolis, 33 Ind.
344 ; Barr v. Deniston, 19 N. H. 170
Stevens v. Railroad Co., 29 Vt 546
Webster v. Harrington, 33 Conn.
131 ; Terrell v. Sharon, 34 Conn. 105
Merrell v. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126
Normand v. Coe, 8 Neb. 18 ; Oliver v.
Keightley, 34 Ind. 514; Drake v.
Phillips, 40 lUi 388; Grant v. Daven-
port, 36 Iowa, 396 ; Douglas v. Placer-
ville, 1 8 Cal. 643 ; Smith v. Magourick,
44 Ga. 163; Newmeyer v. Missouri
&c. R. Co., 53 Mo. 81 : Wright v.
Bishop, 88 111. 303 ; Rice v. Smith, 9
Iowa, 570; Place v. Providence, 12
R. I. 1; Allison v. Railway Co., 9
Bush, 247 ; Bound v. Railroad Co., 45
Wis. 543; ElytOn Land Co. w Ayres,
63 Ala. 413 ; Boyle v. City of New Or-
leans, 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 329 ;
White V. County Comm'rs, 13 Oregon,
§632.]
ULTEA VIBES.
647
§ 633. Tax-payers' suits.— Tax-payers may maintain suits
against towns and their officers to prevent or remedy misap-
plication of town funds, their relations to the municipality
being analogous to those of stockholders to a private corpora-
tion.' And chancery has power in such cases to grant affirm-
ative as well as injunctive relief.^ Where nothing has been
done further than the adoption by the common council of a city
of a resolution that the mayor and city clerk take immediate
steps to let a contract for the construction of water-works for
the city, a court of equity will not interfere at the suit of tax-
payers to enjoin the threatened enforcement of such resolution,
even though its adoption by the council was ultra vires and
therefore unauthorized.'
317 ; S. C, 13 Am. & Eng. Corpi Cas.
485; Whelen's Case, 108 Pa. St 163;
s. G, 11 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. ITif
City of Delphi v. Sturgman, 104 Ind.
343 ; S. C, 11 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
37 ; City of Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97
Ind. 1 ; s. &, 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
626; Roper v. McWhorter, 77 Va.
214 ; s. c, 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
360 ; Stocket v. New Albany, 3 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 85 ; Ayer v. Law-
rence, 59 N. Y. 192; Flagg v. St
Charles, 27 La. Ann. 319 ; Babington
V. St Charles, 37 La. Ann. 331 ; Stev-
enson V. Weber, 29 La. Ann. 105;
Tax-payers' Ass'n v. City of New Or-
leans, as La. Ann. 567 ; Saloy v. City
of New Orleans, 33 La. Ann. 79;
Rivet V. City, 35 La. Ann. 134.
1 Russell V. Tate (1889), 53 Ark.
541 ; s. C, 13 S. W. Rep. 160 ; 7 L. R.
An. 180 ; Jacksonport v. "Watson, 33
Ark. 704 ; Crampton v. Zabriski, 101
U. S. 601 ; 2 Dillon on Munic. Corp.
914, 915 ; Blakie v. Staples, 13 Grant
(Canada), 67, cited in note on p. 903,
2 Dillon on Munic. Corp.
2 3 Story Eq. Jur. 1253; Frost v.
Belmont, 6 Allen, 152 ; Citizens' Loan
Ass'n V. Lyon, 29 N. J. Eq. 110 ; Att'y-
Gen. V. Poole, 1 Craig & Ph. 17 ; Peo-
ple V. Fields, 58 N. Y. 491 ; Att'y-Gen.
V. Boston, 123 Mass. 460 ; Att'y-Gen.
V, Dublin, 1 Bligh, 312 ; 2 Dillon on
Munic. Corp., 909-912. In Appeal of
Tarbell ^1889), 129 Pa. St 146 ; s. c,
18 Atl. Rep. 758, the court held it
proper to restrain by injunction a
board of school directors from appro-
priating money to the erection of a
school building upon lands conveyed
to a county in trust " to be appropri-
ated to the use of the public build-
ings of the county, an academy and
church or churches," until the title to
the ground on which the buildings
might lawfully be erected should
have been acquired.
3 Pedrick v. City of Rlpon (1889), 73
Wis. 622 ; s. c, 41 N. W. Rep. 705. See,
also, Judd V. Fox Lake, 28 Wis. 583 ;
West V. Ballard, 32 Wis. 168; Nevil
V. Clifford, 55 Wis. 161 ; Roe v. Lin-
coln Co., 56 Wis. 66 ; Giekey v. Mer-
rill, 67 Wis. 459; Sage v. Fifield, 68
Wis. 546. In Snyder v. Foster (1889),
77 Iowa, 638 ; S. C, 42 N. W. Rep. 506,
a tax-payer, it was held, could main-
tain an action to prevent the county
officers paying out money on a con-
tract for the erection of a bridge
which the county had no legal au^
thority to erect 2 High on Injunc-
tions, § 1560. Hospers v, Wyatt, 63
048
UI-TP4 VIEES.
[§§ 633, 634.
§ 633. The same subject continued. — Where a city is at-
tempting to dispose of public property without authority of
law, one who has property liable to taxation in the city may
maintaiti an action to restrain such disposition, though he be
not a resident of the city.^ And the court cannot inquire into
the motives of the prosecutor of such a suit, nor deny him re*
lief because his interest as a tax^payer is inconsiderable, Nor
need he defer his action until a tax has actually been levied
upon his property by reason of the wrongful disposition of
the property of the city. He may have the preventive rem-
edy by injunction as soon as damage is threatened by the un-
lawful act.'
§ 634^. Suits to restrain the enforcement of contracts. —
The Supreme Court of New Jersey having decided that the
Iowa, 265; Cornell College v. Iowa
County, 32 Iowa, 620; Carthan v.
Lang, 69 Iowa, 384 In Briggs v.
Borden (1888), 71 Mich. 87; a C, 38
N. W. Rep. 712, the right of a resi-
dent tax-payer of a school district
which the township board of school
inspectors, acting without jurisdic-
tion, had attempted to divide and par-
cel out, to other districts, to file a bill
to restrain the sale of the school-house
and other property of the original
district, was sustained: the court
said : — " If the school inspectors are
permitted to take this last step in the
destruction of the district, the mis-
chief and damage to him may be ir-
reparable."
iBrockman v. City of Creston
(1890), 79 Iowa, 587; S. C, 44 N. W.
Rep. 822. As to residence or citizen-
ship of person whose interests were
about to be prejudiced by action of
municipal corporation, not being es-
sential to authorize an action to re-
strain, see, also, Brandirff v. Harrison
County, 50 Iowa, 164; Olmstead v.
Board, 24 Iowa, 33; Litchfield v.
Polk County, 18 Iowa, 70. In Brock-
man V. City of Creaton, supra, the
court explain their ruling thus : —
"It must be remembered that the
doctrine we recognize is not based
upon the right of the property owner
or tax-payer, resident or non-resident,
to dictate and control the adminis-
tration of the city government and to
nullify by proceedings in the court
the lawful acts of the city oflScers,
legislative or executive, done in the
administration of the city's affairs,
for the reason that the proposed acts
of the city do not promote its interest
or are against public policy. The,
foundation of the doctrine is the in-
terference with the rights of the tax-
payer in the increase of the burden of
taxation, or the liability thereto, by
misappropriating the property of the
city, which may demand the levy of
taxes to acquire other property in its
place ; or the property, having been
acquired through taxation, its dis-
position would be in effect a misap-
propriation of taxes, which may oc-
casion levies to take the place of the
misapplied tax."
2 Brockman v. City of Creston
(1890), 79 Iowa, 589; S. &, 44 N. W.
Rep. 822.
I 634.] ULTBA VIBES. 649
resolution of a board of freeholders for the purchase of and
payment for land on which to erect a court-house by the issue
of bonds was illegal for the lack of authority in them, and the
vendor having brought suit on the bonds, the United States
Supreme Court sustained an action of tax-payers for restraining
the prosecution of the action, and^to enjoin the board from pay--
ing the bonds, and to direct a reconveyance of the land and a
surrender of the void bonds, holding they were entitled to the
relief prayed for.' A tax-payer of a city has sufficient inter-
est in the subject-matter to sue to enjoin the consummation
of an illegal contract by the city with a bank, by w^hich it is
proposed to take the public moneys out of the hands of the
legal custodian of them, and deposit them in a bank as a loan
at interest.- But it has been held that a person suing under
a statute which provided that any tax-payer might institute a
suit for an injunction to restrain the execution of a contract
by a municipal corporation in contravention of its powers in
case of the failure of the public prosecutor to institute such
suit could not complain that the owners of a majority of the
frontage of lots on the proposed line of a street railroad, the
franchise of which, granted by the city, plaintiff attacked as
illegal, had not given their written consent thereto, he not
being an owner of any such lots.' A contract for paving a
street awarded to contractors for a " vulcanite asphalt pave-
ment," a kind neither called for in the ordinance of the city
council nor even hinted at in the advertisement inviting bids,
and where' the parties proposing to bid were instructed to pre-
pare their own specifications and submit them with their re-
spective bids, has been held illegal, null and void as beyond
the power of the council to make, as they did not comply
with the statutes for letting such contracts to the lowest
bidder.^
1 Cranopton v. Zabriskie (1879), 101 » Simmons v. City of Toledo (1889), 5
U. 8. 601 ; Clark v. Saline County, Ohio Cir. Ct R. 124.
9 Neb. 516; Pimental v. City of San *Marzet r. Pittsburgh (1890), 137
Francisco, 21 Cal. 362; Argenti v. Pa. St 548; S. a, 20 Atl. Rep. 693;
San Francisco, 16 Gal. 282 ; Parkers- 27 W. N. C. 73. And a property
burg o. Brown, 106 U. S. 487. owner on the street which was to be
^Yarnell v. City of Los Angeles paved has a right to maintain a suit
(1891), 87 Cal. 603; s. C, 25 Pac. Eep. to enjoin the prevention of the work,
767. though it be conceded that the bill
650
ULTBA TIBES.
[§§ 635, 636.
§ 635. Injunction tlie proper remedy. — A contract made
in the name of a city not in the mode and manner and upon
the conditions prescribed by the ordinance is void, as a com-
pliance with those conditions by the governing power of
the city is essential to the exercise of the power conferred.*
Where city authorities undertake to make a contract without
the lawful power to make it, and the contract, if made, will
increase the burden of taxation, tax-payers constitute a spe-
cial class, having a special interest in the subject-matter dis-
tinct from that of the general public. In all such cases in-
junction is, upon obvious principles, the most convenient and
appropriate remedy.^
§ 636. The same subject continued. — But a tax-payer can-
not have a contract of purchase of property for the county
set aside as being ultra vires, and the treasurer enjoined
from paying warrants issued for the residue of the purchase-
money, his action being against the county treasurer and
affect injuriously the rights and
■was filed by him as a cover for an
unsuccessful bidder for such con-
tract
1 Mayor &c. of Baltimore v. Key-
ser (1890), 73 Md. 106. The court
said : — '• They had no power to make
a contract without advertising for
proposals, nor had they any power
to make a contract without opening
all the proposals filed within the
time designated, nor had they any
power to award the contract to any
one other than the lowest responsi-
ble bidder."
2 Mayor &a of Baltimore v. GUI,
31 Md. 895. In a later case, St
Mary's Industrial School v. Brown,
'45 Md. 810, 836, an injunction -was
held to be the proper remedy when-
ever it appears that municipal
corporations and their officers are
"acting ultra vires or are assum-
ing or exercising a power over the
property of the citizen, or over cor-
porate property or funds, which the
law does not confer upon them, and
where such unauthorized act may
property of the parties complaining."
The cases were approved and fol-
lowed in Mayor &a of Baltimore v.
Keyser (1890), 73 Md. 106, where,
after holding that the mayor and
aldermeii had no power to make a
contract for lighting a portion of the
city except in the mode and manner
prescribed by law, and sustaining
the tax-payers' right to an injunc-
tion, the court said that the complain-
ants "have a right to require that
the- money they have contributed
for the public benefit shall be spent
only for the purposes and in the
manner authorized by law, and that
every security designed to protect its
proper expenditure shall be faith-
fully observed. This right is a vital
one to them, and they are required
to allege no other injury than that
it is about to be violated. They wUl
be injured if the violation is per-
mitted by the act of violation alone."
See, also, Talcott v. City of Buffalo,
57 Hun, 43.
§ 636.]
ULTEA VIKE8.
661
the supervisors and the county not a party, for the reason that
such a decree would be inequitable while the county is allowed
to retain the property, and its title could not be disturbed in
such an action.^ Where the consideration received by a cor-
poration under an ultra vires contract can be restored, a
court of equity will not relieve the corporation as against the
contract, without providing for a restoration of the consid-
eration.^
1 Turner v. Crozen (1866), 70 Iowa,
a03.
■J Turner v. Crozen (1886), 70 Iowa,
203, in which case the court held that
the county should not be relieved
from its contract for the purchase of
a poor-farm, which purchase was ul-
tra vires, without a reconveyance to
the vendor. The court thus distin-
guished a class of cases : — " We are
aware that there is a class of cases
where courts of equity declare a con-
tract ultra vires, and grant relief in
favor of a corporation, without any
decree for the restoration of the con-
sideration received by the corpora-
tion. This is so where municipal
funds have been issued in excess of
the constitutional limit of indebted-
ness, and the money obtained thereon
has been expended. Cou rts of equity
decree the cancellation of such bond,
or enjoin payment without decree-
ing repayment to the bondholders of
the money received by the corpora^
tion on the bond. But this results
from the necessity of the case. If the
courts should decree repayment,
the very object of the constitutional
provision would be defeated." See,
also, Pratt v. Short, 53 How. Pr. 506 ;
Leonard u City of Canton, 35 Miss.
189 ; Moore v. Mayor Sec, 73 N. Y.
338; Lucas Co. v. Hunt, 5 Ohio, 488.
In Nance v. Johnson (Tex., 1893), 19 S.
W. Rep. 559, it was held that tax- '
payera could not maintain a suit to
enjoin the payment of the school
fund to a teacher under a contract
made with him by the school trust-
ees, on the ground that the trustees
had no authority to make such a con-
tract with him, as his school was a
sectai'ian one, unless they had ex-
hausted the remedies allowed them
under the law of appeal from the
school trustees to the superintendent
of public instruction, and from him
to the State board of education, un-
der Sayles Civil Statutes of Texas,
article 3715. In Town of Winamac
V. Huddleston (Ind., 1893), 31 N. E.
Rep. 509, a tax-payer's action for in-
junction to restrain the issue of
bonds of a school district which were
about to be issued without authority
was sustained, as there was no other
remedy of equal power of efficiency,
the case coming within the rule in
Watson V. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74;
Denny v. Denny, llSInd. 33; s. C, 14
N. E. Rep. 593 ; Bishop v. Moorman,
98 Ind. 1 ;. English v. Smock, 34 Ind.
115, 134; S. c, 7 Am. Rep. 215; Elson
V. O'Dowd, 40 Ind. 300, 303 ; Clark v.
Jeffersonville &c. R. Co., 44 Ind. 248 ;
Thatcher v. Humble, 67 Ind. 444;
Spicer v. Hoop, 51 Ind. 365, 370 ; Bon-
nell V. Allen, 53 Ind. 130.
CHAPTER XVII.
IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN.
(o) Implied Powbes.
i 637. General statetuent of the rula
638. Compromise of claims.
639. The same subject continued —
Application of the rule in
Iowa.
640. The dissenting opinion in the
Iowa case.
641. Compromise of ultra vires
claims.
643. Submission to arbitration.
643. Employment of attorneya
644. Power to hold property in
trust.
645. Acquisition of property for
other than municipal pur-
poses
646. The same subject continued —
Erecting public buildings.
647. Power to indemnify ofBcers.
648. The same subject continued,
649. Offers of rewards.
650. The same subject continued —
The power generally denied.
651. The same subject continued —
The foregoing rule qualified.
652. Expenditures in obtainiug or
opposing legislation.
(6) Eminent Domain.
653. Nature and definition.
654. The same subject continued —
Constitutional limitation.
655. What property may be taken.
656. Quantity of estate.
657. What constitutes a taking.
658. The same subject continued —
The leading case.
) 659, The same subject continued —
Constitutional amendments.
66,0.. Property already appropriated
to public use.
661. The same subject continued.
662. Change of grade.
668. Change of use — Additional
use.
664. Thesame subject continued —
Electric railways.
665. Grant of power to municipal
corporations.
666. Public use and necessity of
appropriation, by whom de-
termined.
667. Legislatit'e declaration con-
clusive;
668. Public use as respects munici-
palities — Parks and streets.
669. The same subject continued —
Water, gas, eta
670. The same subject continued —
Cemeteries, sewers, etc.
671. The same subject continued —
Leasing for public use.
672. The same subject continued —
Ornamental purposes.
673. Notice of proceeding — Neces-
sity for.
674. Parties entitled to notice.
675. Service of notice.
676. Treaty with the owner.
677. The application or petition.
678. The tribunal
679. Eight to jury trial.
680. Eight. to abandon proceedings.
681. Damages upon discontinuance
of proceedings.
§ 637.]
IMPLIED POWEES.
653
i 682. Cornpensation,
683. Elements in estimating com-
pensation.
684. Tlie same subject continued.
685. Benefits.
686. Payment
687. Review of proceedings — Cter-
tiorari.
688. The same subject continued —
Appeal.
(a) Implied Powees.
§ 637. General statement of the rule. — The powers of
public corporations are either express or implied. " The former
are those which the legislative act under which they exist
confers in express terms ; the latter are such as are necessary
to carry into effect those which are expressly granted and
which must therefore be ' presumed to have been within the
intention of the legislative grant. . . . But without being ex-
pressly empowered so to do they may sue and be sued ; ^ may
have a common seal; may purchase and hold lands and other
property for corporate purposes and convey the same ; may
make by-laws whenever necessary to accomplish the design
of the incorporation and enforce the same by penalties; may
enter into contracts to effectuate the corporate purposes. Ex-
cept as to these incidental powers, which need not be though
they usually are mentioned in the charter, the charter itself,
or the general law under which they exist, is the measure of
the authority, to be exercised. And the general disposition
of the courts of this country has been to confine municipali-
ties within the limits that a strict construction of the grants
of powers in their charters will assign to them ; thus applying
substantially the same rule that is applied to charters of pri-
vate incorporations." *
1 " I have no doubt of the right of
the school district as a body corpo-
rate to interfere and ask the aid of
equity to prevent the consummation
of an illegal and void apportionment
and creation of a debt against it by
the collection of the same out of the
taxable property virithin its limits."
Morse, J., in School Dist. v. School
Dist, (1886), 63 Mich. 51, 58. Courts
take judicial notice of the powers
and capacities of public corporations,
and in actions by them it is not nec-
essary to allege a legal capacity to
sue. Janesville v. Milwaukee &c. R.
Co., 7 Wis. 484
2 Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.) 231.
"' A municipal corporation possesses
not only the powers specifically con-
ferred upon it by its charter, but
also such as are necessarily incident
to or may fairly be implied from
those powers, including all that are
essential to the declared object of its
existence." Village of Carthage v.
Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268, 271, citing
654
IMPLIED POWEES AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§§ 638, 639.
§ 638. Compromise of claims. — It is well settled that mu-
nicipal corporations have the power to effect the compromise
of claims in favor of or against them. This is a corollary to
the right to sue and be sued.^ They may compromise doubt-
ful controversies in which the corporation is a party either as
plaintiff or defendant. A judgment in favor of a city is not
to be regarded as final while the right of appeal exists ; and
at any time before the period in which to appeal expires, the
city council may lawfully compwemise the case and settle the
claim by the acceptance of a less sum than that of the judg-
ment.^ A fortiori the proper authorities may settle a suit
in which judgment has been rendered in favor of the plaintiff
corporation, but from which the defendant has appealed.'
§639. The same subject continued — Application of the
rule in Iowa. — A more radical doctrine in favor of the power
to compromise is declared by the Supreme Court of Iowa. By
statute in that State county supervisors are " to represent their
respective counties and to have the care and management of
and probably no right to discharge a
debt without payment which may be
held against parties who are solvent
and responsible where no controversy
exists in regard to the validity and
binding effect of the Indebtedness.
This point is discussed in the follow-
ing two sections.
' Town of Petersburg v. Mappin, 14
111. 193 ; s. C, 56 Am. Dec. 501, where
the town accepted payment of the
costs in full settlement of the judg-
ment Here, also, the court said that
public oflScers could not, under the.
pretense of satisfaction, discharge a
debt due the corporation without
payment "The law vests them
with a discretion in such matters
which they are to exercise .for
the best interests of the corpora-
tion. Settlement of an existing con-
troversy, if made in good faith, binds
the corporation, but if collusively
made it is not obligatory." S. c.,
p. 195. Cf. § 703, n. 1, infra.
Le Couteulx v. City of Buffalo, 33
N. Y. 333; Ketchum v. City of Buf-
falo, 14 N. Y. 356 ; Buffalo &c. R. Co.
V. City of Buffalo, 5 Hill, 309; 1 Dil-
lon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 89 ;
Angell & Ames on Corp. 346, 364 ;
a Kyd on Corp. 149. See, also, 15
Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, 1040.
1 People V. San Francisco, 27 Cal.
655; People v. Coon, 35 Cal. 648;
Bailey ville v. Lowell, 30 Me. 178 ; Au-
gusta V. Leadbetter, 16 Me. 45 ; State
V. Martin, 37 Neb. 441 ; S. C, 43 N. W.
Rep. 344 ; Grimes v. Hamilton County,
37 Iowa, 390 ; Mills County v. Bur-
lington- &c. R Co., 47 Iowa, 66;
Hall u Baker (Wis., 1889), 37 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 308 ; Artz v. Chicago
&c. R. Co., 34 Iowa, 153.
2 Agnew V. Brail (1888), 134 111. 813 ;
S. C, 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 134.
But the court said that the council
had no power to sell or in any man-
ner to dispose of the property of the
corporation without consideration;
§ 640.] IMPLIED P0WEE8. 655
the property and business of the county." Upon an applica-
tion for a writ of certiorari to test the power of the supervis-
ors to settle a judgment in its favor for less than the amount
recovered it was alleged and admitted by demurrer that the
judgment debtor was perfectly solvent. The court sustained
the action of the board. Premising that the power to compro-
mise a claim before it has ieen reduced to a judgment is un-
questionable and after judgment when the debtor's solvency
is doubtful, Adams, 0. J., continued: — "It is true that in the
case at bar the plaintiflF avers that the judgment debtor was
solvent. But that averment is immaterial. We cannot go
into any such question of fact in this action. The question
before us is one of jurisdiction. If the board can make a
compromise with an insolvent judgment debtor it must be
allowed to judge for itself in any given case as to whether the
debtor is insolvent or not, and an error made in this respect,
however great, would not affect its jurisdiction." ^
§ 640. The dissenting opinion in the Iowa case. — But in
a dissenting opinion. Beck, J., uses the following vigorous
language: — "My brethren insist that the defendants satisfied
the judgment in the exercise of their power to compromise
an action to which the county is a party. . . . But an in-
superable objection to this position is that the defendants did
not compromise the action for the very best of reasons — no
action in fact was pending. There had been an action, but a
judgment had been rendered therein. If there was a ' compro-
mise ' it was not of an action, but of a valid undisputed claim
1 Collins V. Welch (1883), 58 Iowa, condition of the judgment debtor is.
73, 73; S. C, 43 Am. Eep. 111. The such that the board is unable to dis-
opinion proceeds as follows : — " It is cover any way of collecting any part
true that where a claim has been re- of the judgment. The board should
duced to judgment all questions per- have the power to accept a part in
taining to the rightfulness of the satisfaction of the whole if in its
claim have been adjudicated. But judgment the best interests of the
questions may arise subsequent to the county would thereby be promoted,
rendition of the judgment, and where All rules of business conduct by which
they are of such a character as to the prudent person is governed are
render a compromise expedient it is applicable to a county in the man-
manifest that the board ought to agement of its affairs under similar
have the power to make it Sup- circumstances."
pose, for instance, that the financial
656 IMPLIED POWEES AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 641.
upon a judgment. In the case which is cited * there was an
action against the county which it resisted and litigation was
pending. There could well be a compromise in that case ; in
this case there was no pending litigation and no dispute as to
the Validity of the county's claim on the judgment. In my
judgment the canceling of the judgment upon the payment
of a part only cannot be called a compromise. ... It
would be just as improper to apply the word to such a trans-
action as to say that in a distribution of alms a compromise is
made with the mendicant." Further on in combating the posi-
tion of the majority of the court that if the board had juris-
diction their action could not be reviewed on questions of
fact, he continued : — "I have heard much that has been writ-
ten upon the subject of the jurisdiction of courts, but this doc-
trine is new to me. I have always understood the rule to be
that the jurisdiction of courts (I have never understood that
the board of supervisors is higher than the courts) may al-
ways be inquired into whenever their judgments are brought
in question. It is true that their decisions upon questions of
process whereby they obtained jurisdiction cannot be collat-
erally assailed. But if upon the face of the record of a judg-
ment it appears that jurisdiction is wanting the judgment is
void and will be so regarded, both collaterally and on direct
attacks." " In the author's view the dissenting opinion is the
sounder and safer.
§ 641. Compromise of ultra vires claims. — The right to
compromise disputed claims came into conflict with the doc-
trine of ultra vires in a recent case in Massachusetts in such
a way -as to afford ground for a vigorous contest. The de-
fendant, a ^■Mfflsi-corporation called a fire district, was created
by the legislature and invested with certain express and ample
powers for the extinguishment of fires within its limits. The
district established an electric fire-alarm system, one of the
wires of which ran into the house where the plaintiff lived,
and during a thunder-storm she was injured by electricity
conducted into the house by means of the wire. It was not
controverted that the! establishment of the fire-alarm system
1 Grimes v. Hamilton County, 37 * Collins v. Welch, 58 Iowa, 73.
Iowa, 290.
§ 6i2.] IMPLIED P0WEE8. 66T
was within the defendant's authority. The plaintiff sued the
defendant and obtained a verdict with substantial damages in
the superior court under instructions from the presiding jus-
tice authorizing it to be rendered. Exceptions were taken, and
before they were argued in the appellate court the defendant
passed a vote appropriating a sum less than the verdict to be
paid in compromise of the action and claim, which the plaint-
iff accepted and afterward brought suit to recover. The de-
fendant contended that it was not liable in the first instance
for any negligence of the fire department or of its members,
and that it was wholly beyond its power to assume liability
therefor by a compromise of the plaintiff's claim. " This latter
objection," said the court, " is clearly untenable, and we have
therefore no occasion to consider the former P The court also
declared that whether the result of a litigation depends chiefly
upon the ascertainment of the facts by the verdict of a jury,
or upon the determination of the rules of law found applicable
by the court, in either case the uncertainty is one upon which
compromises rest and are upheld by the law.'
§ 642. Submission to arbitration. — The authorities fully
sustain the proposition that a municipal corporation may, un-
less restricted by its charter, submit a disputed claim against
it to arbitration.^ The governing body of the corporation is
1 Prout V. Pittsfield Fire District Agnew v. Brail, 134 111. 313 ; Super-
(1891), 154 Mass. 450, citing to the visors v. Bowen, 4 Lans. (N. Y.) 24,
proposition that the power to sue 30, 31 ; Supervisors v. Birdsall, 4
and be sued is inherent, Rumford Wend. 453 ; Dillon on Munic. Corp.,
School Dist. V. Wood, 13 Mass. 193
Stebbens v. Jennings, 10 Pick. 172, 188
Linehan v. Cambridge, 109 Mass. 212
§§ 30, 477, 478.
^ Paret v. Bayonne, 39 N. J. Law,
559 ; Kane v. City of Fond du Lac,
2 Kent's Commentaries, 377, 278, 283, 40 Wis. 495 ; Brady v. Mayor &c.
284 and notes ; Angell & Ames on of Brooklyn, 1 Barb. 584 ; Shawnee-
Coiporations, §§ 23, 24, 78 ; Dillon on town v. Bakt^r, 85 111. 563 ; Buck-
Munic. Corp., §g 31, 22. And that the land v. Conway, 16 Mass. 396 ; Inhab-
power of compromise is incident to itants of Boston v. Brazer, 11 Mass.
the liability to be sued, Cushing v. 447 ; Dix v. Town of Dummerstown,
Stoughton, 6 Cush. 389 ; Drake v. 19 Vt. 273 ; Remington v. Harrison
Stoughton, 6 Cush. 393 ; Matthews w Coimty Court, 13 Bush (Ky.), 148;
Westborough, 131 Mass. 521 ; s. C, 134 In re Arbitration between Eldonand
Mass. 555 ;Medwayv.Milford, 21 Pick. Ferguson Townships, 6 Upper Can.
349, 359; Bean v. Jay, 23 Me. 117; L. J. 270; District Tp. of Walnut
Petersburg v. Mappin, 14 111. 193 ; v. Rankin, 70 Iowa, 65, which was a
43
658 IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 643.
the proper agent to exercise this power, and it may intrust
the city attorney with the selection of the arbitrators.^ It
will be assumed that the attorney of the corporation may
in virtue of his retainer consent to a reference of a cause,
though he had no authority under seal to appear or to consent
to a reference, and after award made it will not be set aside on
the supposed want of authority in the attorney to consent to
a submission.* If a statute shqjild direct an ascertained sura
of money to be paid to an ascertained person by the authori-
ties of a township or other political precinct, mam,dcmiu8 might
be used to coerce such payment in case of default ; but the
report of a statutory referee, confirmed by the court, is in no
better legal position than an award made by arbitrators, and
the remedy must be an ordinary action.*
§ 643. Employment of attorneys. — A municipal corpora-
tion may without express authority, unless especially restricted,
employ an attorney to attend to the corporate interests and
to prosecute and defend actions brought by or against the
municipality.* But it cannot make a valid contract for ,the
case of a claim in favor of a town 'Elinendorf v. Board of Finance,
against its treasurer, and where the 41 N. J. Law, 135.
court said that an arbitration of dif- < Lewis v. Mayor &c., 9 C. B. (N. S.)
ferences is just as legitimate a mode 401 ; Sherman v. Carr, 8 R L 431 ;
of settlement as by action. "All per- Smith u Mayor &c., 13 Cal. 531;
sons " in a statute relating to arbitra- Hornblower u Duden, 35 CaL 664;
tion includes municipal corporations, Thatcher t). Comm'rs, 13 Kan. 183;
Springfield v. Walker, 43 Ohio St Ellis v. Washoe County, 7 Nev. 291 ;
543. See, also. Smith v. Philadelphia, Clarke v. Lyon County, 8 Nev. 181 ;
13 Phila. (Pa.) 177. Wilhelm v. Cedar County, 50 Iowa,
> Kane v. City of Fond du Lao, 40 254 ; Mt Vernon v. Patton, 94 111. 65 ;
Wis. 495. It was held in that case Roper v. Laurienburg, 90 N. C. 427 ;
that an alderman who had been act- S. C, 7 Am. & Ebg.' Corp. Cas. 130 ;
ive in the council in endeavoring to CuUen v. Carthage, 103 Ind. 196 ; s. G,
procure payment of plaintiEE's claim 14 Am. .& Eng. Corp. Cas. 256; 53
against the city was not thereby ren- Am. Rep. 504; Bvuce v. Dickey, 116
dered incompetent to act as an ar- 111. 527 ; State v. Heath, 20 La. Ann.
bitrator. At any rate the city, hav- 172 ; S. C, 96 Am. Dec. 390. County
ing notice of his conduct, could not commissioners acting in behalf of
object after award made. the county possess this power. Ellis
«Paret v. Bayonne, 39 N. J. Law, v. Washoe County, 7 Nev. 291; Jack
559 ; Faviell v. Railway Co., 3 Exch. v. Moore, 66 Ala. 184 ; Huffman v.
344 ; Alexandria Coal Co. v. Swann, Cohim'rs, 23 Kan. 281. But their ac-
6 How. 83. tion must be taken at a legal session
§ 644.]
IMPLIED POWERS.
659
employment of an attorney to file a bill in which it seeks to
destroy its corporate existence.^ And there is no implied
power to employ attorneys to conduct or assist in conducting
criminal prosecutions.^ And where the law has provided an
oflBcer whose duty it is to attend to all the legal business of a
county it has been held that the 'county cannot employ coun-
sel.' Counsel may be employed not only in suits in which
the corporation is a party on the record, but in those in which
it may be a party in interest.*
§ 644. Power to hold property in trust. — Municipal cor-
porations may not only take and hold property in their own
the fines it may employ an attorney
to assist the State's attorney. Peo-
ple V. Warren, 14 111. App. 296.
' Brome v. Cuming County (Neb.,
1891), 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 481.
See, also, Platte County v. Gerard, 13
Neb. 244 ; Cuming County v. Tate, 10
Neb. 193 ; Ramson v. Mayor &c., 34
Barb. 326 ; Clough v. Hart, 8 Kan.
487 ; State v. Paterson, 40 N. J. Law,
186. Cf. Hugg V. Camden, 39 N. J.
Eq. 6.
* Ellis V. Washoe County, 7 Nev.
291 ; Thatcher v. Comm'rs, 18 Kan.
182 ; Smith v. Mayor &c., 13 Cal. 581 ;
Hornblower v. Duden, 85 Cal. 664 ;
Jack V. Moore, 66 Ala. 184 ; Curtis v.
Gowan, 34 111. App. 516; Doster v.
Howe, 28 Kan. 353; Gushing v.
Stoughton, 6 Cush. 389. As to what
does not constitute a sufficient in-
terest, see Halstead v. Mayor &o., 3
N. Y. 480; Smith v. Nashville, 4 Lea
(Tenn.), 69. A town has power to
employ counsel to defend an action
for false imprisonment brought
against the town marshal by a per-
son arrested by him for violating a
town ordinance. CuUen v. Carthage,
103 Ind. 196; S. C., 53 Am. Eep. 504;
14 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 256. See,
also, Roper v. Laurienburg, 90 N. C.
437 ; S. C, 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
130.
of the board. McCabe v. Comm'rs,
46 Ind. 880 ; Comm'rs v. Ross, 46 Ind.
404 ; Butler v. Charlestown, 7 Gray,
13; Thatcher v. Comm'rs, 13 Kan.
183. See, also, Bryan v. Page, 51
Tex. 533; S. C, 32 Am. Eep. 637;
Carroll v. St Louis, 12 Mo. 444. And
they cannot contract for services for
a period beyond the time when by
operation of law the board will be
reorganized. Board &c. v. Taylor
(1889), 138 Ind. 148; S. G, 80 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 394» Nor for an un-
reasonably large contingent fee.
Chester County v. Barber, 97 Pa. St
455. Counsel may be employed to
attend to corporate interests outside
of the territorial limits of the corpo-
ration or in another State. Memphis
V. Adams, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 518 ; a C,
24 Am. Eep. 331. Employment by a
mayor alone was sustained in an ex-
treme case. Louisville v. Murphy
(Ky., 1887), 18 Am. «fc Eng. Corp. Caa
421,
1 Daniel v. Mayor, 11 Humph.
(Tenn.) 583.
2 Hight V. Comm'rs, 68 Ind. 675. Not
even against an official indicted for
embezzling corporate funds. Comm'rs
V, Ward, 69 Ind. 441 ; Montgomery v.
Jackson County, 22 Wis. 69 ; State v.
Franklin County, 21 Ohio St 648.
But where a town has an interest in
660
IMPLIED POWEES AND EMINENT DOMAIN.
[§ 645.
right by direct gift, conveyance or devise,' but they are capa-
ble, nnless specially restrained, of taking property, real and
personal, in trust for purposes not foreign to their institution,
and not incompatible with the objects of their organization.''
Its capacity to take and execute trusts of this kind is not
limited to objects technically denominated charities or pious
uses, or to religious or educational purposes, and is circum-
scribed by no other limitationslhan such as should exclude
inconsistent, incompatible and improper objects. Thus, it has
been held that a town is capable of holding in trust a snm of
money, the income to be invested yearly in the purchase and
use for display of United States flags.'
§ 645. Acquisition of property for other than municipal
purposes. — In an action of ejectment by a town it adduced evi-
dence of possession for more than twenty years in proof of title.
It appeared, however, that the premises were not used for mu-
nicipal purposes, but were part of a larger tract which was for
1 Sargent v. Cornish, 54 N. H. 18 ;
McDopough V. Murdoch, lo How.
367; 3 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § CS6,
and cases there cited; 15 Am. &
Eng. Encyc. Law, p. 1060, and cases
cited.
2Vidal V. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How.
137; Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465;
Trustees v. Peaslee, 15 N. H. 331;
Chapin v. School District, 35 N. H.
445 ; The Dublin Case, 38 N. H. 459-
Education is not an incongruous
element in municipal affairs, and be-
quests for that purpose are valid so
far as the capacity to hold is con-
cerned. Maynard v. Woodward, 36
Mich. 433 ; Hathaway v. Sackett, 33
Mich. 97; Yates v. Yates, 9 Barb.
334; Bell County v. Alexander, S3
Tex. 350 ; Richmond v. State, 5 lud.
834; First Parish &c. v. Cole, 3 Pick.
233 ; Christy v. Ashtabula County, 41
Ohio St 511 ; Barnum v. Mayor &c.
of Baltimore, 62 Md. 275. Bequest
for thii relief of the poor : Board of
Comm'rs v. Rogers, 55 Ind. 2C7;
Craig V. Secrist, 54 Ind. 419. For a
hospital : Mayor &c. v. Elliott, 3 Rawle,
170. For highways and bridges:
Town of Hamden v. Rice, 24 Conn.
349. For a town building: Cogge-
Bhall V. Pelton, 7 Johns. Ch. 292. For
purchase of fire-engines: Wright v.
Linn, 9 Pa. St 433.
8 Sargent v. Cornish, 54 N. H. 18.
The court there said that it seems to
be impossible to prescribe in definite
terms the almost innumerable ob-
jects of a liberal bounty with which
a town might be advantageously and
happily endowed, directly or in trust
In this case it was held if a city vio-
lates or abuses its power to purchase
property it is a matter solely between
it and the State. Courts will not de-
termine the question of misuser by
declaring void conveyances made in
good faith. Chambers v. City of St
Louis, 29 Mo. 543. See, also, Inhab-
itants of Worcester v. Eaton, 13 Mass.
371 ; Holt€n v. Board of Comm'rs, 55
Ind. 194
§ 64:6.] IMPLIED POWEES. 661
most of the time in the occupation of tenants of the town.
The defendants contended that the town could not acquire
title by possession for any other than municipal purposes and
requested the court so to charge, and the court refusing to do
so they excepted. " The cases cited in support of these excep-
tions," said Durfee, C. J., "do' not goto the point that a town
cannot aoquire land by possession for other than municipal
purposes, but only to the point that it is ult/ra vires for a town
to purchase land for other than such purposes. We think this
quite a different thing; for a town cannot purchase land with-
out expending its moneys, and it has no right to expend its
moneys, raised by taxation or otherwise for municipal pur-
poses, for other purposes. The acquirement of land by pos-
session does not involve an expenditure any more than does
the acquirement of land by deed of gift or bj'' devise ; and it
has been decided that a gift or devise of land to a town is
good even though the land be given or devifeed in general
terms, and be accepted without any intent to use it strictly
for municipal purposes." '
§ 646. The same subject continued — Discretion in erect-
ing public buildings. — The validity of appropriations for the
purpose of erecting or repairing public buildings is sometimes
contested in the courts on the ground that the contemplated
accommodations exceed the actual needs of the corporation and
are to be rented in part to private individuals. The distinc-
tion drawn in the authorities is this: — If the primary object
of a public expenditure is to subserve a public municipal pur-
pose, the expenditure is legal notwithstanding it also involves
as an incident an expense which, standing alone, would not be
lawful. But if the primary object is to promote some private
end, the expenditure is illegal even though it may incidentally
serve some public purpose.^ It is proper in constructing build-
iNewShoreham v. Ball, 14 R. I. a mere pretense to cooceal a private
566, citing Worcester v. Eaton, 13 purpose, of course the expenditure is
Mass. 371 ; Sargent % Cornish, 54 N. H. illegal and fraudulent" A town hall
18; Dillon on Munic. Corp., g 437. was fitted up with theatrical appa-
2 Bates V. Bassett (Vt, 1888), 15 Atl. ratus and part of the building was
Rep. 200. " This is the test," said the rented as a postoffice. The court
court in that case, " where good faith sustained a tax to defray the expense.
is exercised in making the expendi- See, also, Worden v. New Bedford,
ture. If a public purpose is set up as 131 Mass. 23 ;. Camden v. Village Cor-
662
IMPLIED POWEBS AND EMINENT DOMAIN.
[§ 647.
ings to make suitable provision for prospective wants.* Pro-
ceedings in raising and expending money within the limits of
the corporate powers in these particulars will not be collater-
ally impeached and held void because in the opinion of a court
and jury a less sum would have answered the immediate neces-
sities of the corporation or the money might have been more
judiciously and economically expended.^
§ 647. Power to indemnify officers. — A municipal corpo-
ration may legally indemnify an officer acting in good faith
for a loss incurred in the discharge of his official duties. Thus,
the court refused to enjoin a town from indemnifying one of
its officers for his expenses in successfully resisting a suit for
damages for malicious prosecution in procuring, by the direc-
tion of the town council, the arrest of the plaintiff on a charge
of obtaining public moneys by false pretenses, the plaintiff
having been acquitted upon the trial.' So, also, where the
mayor of a city, in the execution of a law conferring certain
poration, 77 Me. 530 ; City of Jackson-
ville V. Ledwith, 26 Fla. 163 ; s. &, 7
So. Rep. 885 ; Bell v. Platteville, 71
Wis. 139; s. G, 86 N. W.-Rep. 831;
Eonrad v. Rogers, 70 Wis. 492 ; s. c.,
36 N. W. Rep. 261 ; Ely v. Rochester,
26 Barb. 133; Reynolds v. Mayor, 8
Barb. 597 ; Poillon v. Brooklyn, 101 N.
Y. 132. In Attorney-General v. Eau
Claire, 37 Wis. 400, it was held that
the legislature could not authorize
the erection of a dam across the river
at the expense of the city "for the
purpose of leasing water-power for
private purposes " merely ; yet, upon
subsequent amendment of the act, it
was in effect held that as the city bad
lawful authority to erect the dam " for
tlie purpose of water-works for the
city," it might as incident thereto
leasa for private purposes any excess
of water-power not required. Attor-
ney-General V. Eau Claire, 40 Wis.
533 ; Green Bay Canal Co. v. Water
Power Co., 70 Wis. 635 ; s. C, 35 N.
W. Rep. 529, 36 N. W. Rep. 828.
1 Greenbanks v. Boutwell (1870), 43
Vt 207 ; French v. Quincy, 3 Allen, 9.
2 Eddy V. Wilson, 43 Vt 362;
Greeley v. People, 60 111. 19 ; Spauld-
ing V. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71 ; Torrent v.
Muskegon, 47 Mich. 115.
'This was within the power con-
ferred by the statute to raise money
for " town purposes." State v. Ham-
monton (1876), 38 N. J. Law, 430;
a C, 20 Am. Bep. 404, citing King v.
Inhabitants of Essex, 4 Term R. 591 ;
Attorney-General v. Mayor, 2 Mylne
& Cr. 406; Regina v. litchfleld, 4
Q. B. 893 ; Regina v. Stamford, 4 Q. B.
900, n. a; Lewis v. Mayor &c., 9 C. B.
(N. S.) 401 ; Regina v, Bridgewater,
10 Ad. & El. 281 ; Regina v. Para-
more, 10 Ad. & EL 286 ; Nelson v. MU-
ford, 7 Pick. 18 ; Bancroft v. Lynn-
field, 18 Pick. 566 ; Fuller v. Groton,
11 Gray, 340, where the members of
a school committee were sued for
libel because of some statements
made in their ofBcial report to the
town. For their expenses in success-
fully defending themselves the town
voted an indemnity and the court
held that it had a right to do so.
Hadsel v. Hancock, 8 Gray, 526;
§ 648.] IMPLIED powEEa. 663
powers upon him, and in good faith but in excess of his au-
thority, trespassed upon the rights of a citizen, who sued for
false imprisonment and recovered a verdict, it was pro-
nounced to be a " legitimate duty " and a " usual and ordi-
nary expense " for the city to reimburse him.'
§ 648. The same subject continued. — But in order to jus-
tify an expenditure of money in indemnifying an officer three
things must appear: — First, the officer must have been acting
in a matter in which the corporation had an interest ; second,
he must have been acting in the discharge of a duty imposed
or authorized by law ; and third, he must have acted in good
faith.^ In two Connecticut cases the enforcement of this rule
resulted in a denial of the right to indemnify. The common
council of the city of Bridgeport, under authority of the city
charter, enacted a by-law with regard to wharves, and the
anchoring, moving and mooring of vessels in the harbor, and
appointed an officer called a superintendent of wharves to
discharge the duty provided for in the by-law. The perform-
ance of his duties was not enforced by a penalty, and he acted
only upon application of parties interested and at their ex-
pense. While acting in good faith he ordered a vessel lying
at a wharf to be hauled astern to make more room for an-
other at an adjoining wharf; and was sued for damages by the
owner of the wharf. It was decided that the city had no
sufficient interest in the matter to sustain a vote of indemnity
State V. Freeholders &c., 3'7 N. J. less and overbearing, still it would
Law, 254 Cf. Hotchkiss v. Plunkett, seem to be the wisest course to leave
60 Conn. 230, cited in the foUowihg the matter of indemnification to
section. the discretion of those who repre-
• Sherman v. CaiT (1867), 8 R. 1 431. sent the interests of the city. " We
The court said that the opposite rule know of no case," continued the
would tend to make an officer too court, "in wnich, while the officer
cautious if not too timid in the exer- continues to act in behalf of the
cise of his powers — "powers which community and not In his own be-
must be frequently exercised for the half, it is held that the community
protection of society before and not cannot indemnify, him.'' s. c, p. 434.
after a thorough investigation of the See, also. Nelson v. Mllford, 7 Pick,
case in which he is called upon to 18, quoted at length in Cooley's Const
act ; " and that, although it may be Lim. (6th pd.) 258.
urged that if the officer has the right '■' Hotchkiss v. Plunkett (1891), 60
to fall back on the city treasury there Conn. 330.
is danger that he will become reck-
664 IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 649.
for his expenses in defending the suit. " He is not the agent
or servant of the city," said the court, "nor subject to its
control, and it is not responsible for his oflBcial negligence,
misconduct or delinquency, nor benefited by his oificial fidel-
ity. With respect to his oflBcial character and obligation the
city has no duty to perform, no rights to defend, no interest
to protect, and no pecuniary or corporate concern in the sub-
ject-matter connected with his oflHcial duty. Want of inter-
est involves the wadt of power aftd is necessarily fatal to the
claims of the city." ' And where the members of a board of
education of a school district were sued for an injury to the
business reputation of the plaintiffs by their refusal to enter-
tain-a bid ofifered by the plaintiffs for furnishing stationery
for the district on the ground that they had sometime before
dealt dishonestly with the district, the money of the district
could not be used for the defense of the suit.*
§ 649. Offers of rewards. — The question whether towns,
cities or counties have the implied power to bind themselves
by offers of reward for the arrest and conviction of criminals
has been considered in several cases, and the conclusion sup-
, ported by the weight of authority is adverse to the existence
of such a power. One of the earliest cases involving this point
arose in Massachusetts, and Chief Justice Shaw there held
' Gregory v. Bridgeport (1874), 41 32 Conn. 553 ; Webster v. Harwinton,
Conn. 76 ; S. C, 19 Am. Eep. 485, 33 Conn. 131.
citing Merrill «. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 2 Andrews, C. J., pointedly re-
136 ; Gove v. Epping, 41 N. H.. 539 ; marked that there was no duty a.u-
Halstead v. Mayor &o., 3 Comstock thorized or imposed to make charges
(N. Y.), 430 ; Martin v. Mayor &c., 1 of dishonesty and cheating. Hotch-
Hill, 545 ; Hodges v. City of Buffalo, kiss v. Plunkett (1891), 60 Conn. 230.
2 Denio, 110 ; Vincent v. Nantucket, See, also, Fuller v. Groton (1858), 11
13 Cush. 105 ; Stetson v, Kempton, Gray, 840. A corporation cannot ap-
13 Mass. 373 ; Nelson v. Milford, 7 propriate money to pay the 30sts of
Pick. 18 ; Fuller v. Groton, 11 Gray, an ofHcial who has been prosecuted
340 ; Babbitt v. Savoy, 8 Cush. 580 ; for oflScial misconduct, although he
Bancroft v. Lynnfield, 18 Pick. 586 ; be acquitted. People v. Lawrence, 6
Tash u Adams, 10 Cush. 353 ; Claflm Hill, 244; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45
V. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 503 ; Hood v. N. H. 126 ; Butler v. Milwaukee, 15
Mayor &c., 1 Allen, 108 ; Briggs v. Wis. 493 ; Smith v. Nashville, 4 Lea
Whipple, 6 Vt 94; Baker v. Wind- (Tenn.), 69, 73. See, also, Halstead v.
ham, 13 Me. 74; Fisk v. Hazard, 7 Mayor &c., 3 N. Y. 430.
E. L 438 ; Brainard v. New London,
§ 650.] IMI'L,1KD P0WEE8. 665
that a statute limiting the power of the mayor and aldermen
in offering rewards to a certain amount did not operate to re-
strain the city council, as the representatives of the whole body
of the people, from offering a greater amount for the appre-
hension and conviction of &,ny person who should set fire to a
building with felonious intent.' The courts wherein this power
has been denied to municipalities do not attempt to cope with
this case as a direct opposing authority, nor does it seem to
the author that they parry the force of it satisfactorily. Some
of them take no notice of it whatever, while it has been 'said
not to be applicable because the Massachusetts statute conferred
the power to ofifer rewards.^ And again, that as the reward was
for the detection of persons who should thereafter be guilty of
the crime of arson within the limits of the city, it was " a sim-
ple police measure, as legitimate as the employment of police
to guard the inhabitants and their property against violators
of the law." ' But the learned chief justice did not rest his
decision upon either of these grounds or refer to them in any
manner. In Pennsylvania it was held to be within the legit-
imate province of the burgesses of a town to oCFer rewards for
the detection of offenders against the general safety of its in-
habitants (incendiaries in that case). The court said : — " The
burgesses . . . are a part of the public police. It is
therefore the State by one of its departments that offers a re-
ward for the detection and conviction of an unknown offender
against its laws." *
§ 6&0. The same subject continued — The power generally
denied. — But, with the exceptions noted in the preceding sec-
tion, the decisions are unanimous, and the purely implied
power to tax the inhabitants for the apprehension of criminals
is not only denied,* but charter provisions are strictly con-
iCrawshaw v. Eoxbury (1856), 7 equally within the province of the
Gray, 374 State in administering its criminal
2 Hawk V. Marion County (1878), 48 laws.
Iowa, 473, 474. < Borough of York v. Foraoht (1854),
8 Patton V. Stephens (1878), 14 Bush 23 Pa. St 391, 393.
(Ky.), 324. But it is evident that, » Gale v. South Berwick (1863), 51
whether the ofifer is antecedent or Me. 174. "We have been unable to
subsequent to the commission of the find any case overturning the case of
offense, the service to be paid for is Gale v. South Berwick." Baker v.
IMPLIED POWEKS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 651.
strued so as to exclude it. Thus, an article in the charter of
the city of Covington providing. that " the council shall have
power to pass any needful by-laws and ordinances for the due
and effectual administration of right and justice
They may legislate upon all subjects which the good govern-
ment of said city shall require, unless restrained by the terms
of the charter or constitution of the State, notwithstanding
the legislature may have enacted laws relating to the same,"
confers no authority to offer a reVard for the arrest of the city
treasurer, who had been indicted for forgery and for the em-
bezzlement of the funds of the city.* " It is not a matter in
which the local: public have an exclusive or peculiar interest,"
said the court, " as distipguished from the general public. The
offender when arrested must be tried under the laws of the
State by the judiciary of the State. . . . No power can be
implied in favor of a corporation which does not pertain to
matters of a local character, matters which peculiarly concern
the local public, and without which those local affairs commit-
ted by the State to the corporation cannot be properly at-
tended to." *
§ 651. The same subject continued — The foregoing rule
qualiQed. — Where it was provided by statute that counties
"may acquire and hold property and make all contracts
necessary or expedient for the management, control and im-
provement of the saiae," it was conceded that the county
had no power to offer a reward for the arrest of persons
charged with the commission of crime, but held that the
City of Washington (1870), 7 D. C. The charter gave the common coun-
134, 140; Hawk v. Marion County oil power by a, two-thirds vote to
(1878), 48 Iowa, 472 ; Boai'd of Comm'rs offer rewards. It was held that, even
V. Bradford (1880), 73 Ind. 455 ; s. G, assuming that there was an implied
37 Am. Rep. 174 ; Hight v. Board &c., power, it could not oe exercised ex-
68 Ind. 575 ; Board &c. v. Ward, 69 cept in the manner pointed out.
Ind. 441. See, also, Lee v. Trustees Loveland v. Detroit (1879), 41 Mich.
&c., 7 Dana (Ky.), 28. 837. See, also. Stamp v. Cass County
iPattonv.Stephens(1878), 14 Bush (1883), 47 Mich. 330. "Whether a re-
(Ky.), 324. ward might not be binding if it re-
2 Pa tton «. Stephens, 14 Bush (Ky.), lated merely to offenses against
334, 328. If the power be doubtful municipal ordinances, gucere. Mur-
the court should decide against it phy v. Jacksonville (1881), 18 Fla.
Hanger v. City of Des Moines (1876), 318.
52 Iowa, 193 ; S. C, 35 Am. Rep. 266.
§ 652.] I IMPLIED POWEES. 667
board of supervisors might offer a reward for the recovery of
money which had been stolen from the count3\ " Of neces-
sity it seems to us that this power must exist," said the court ;
" otherwise, when a county treasury is robbed, the county au-
thorities must fold their hands and remain passive until the
thief repents and voluntarily returns the money, or rely on the
exertions of the individual citizen to work and labor for the
recovery of the money without hope of pay or pecuniary re-
ward. If the latter discovered the money under such circum-
stances, the temptation to divide with the thief instead of the
county would be great." *
§ 653. Expenditures in obtaining or opposing legislation.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut decided in a recent case
that a town has the power to employ and pay counsel to op-
pose before the General Assembly a petition to divide its ter-
ritory, made by certain individuals seeking to promote their
own interests, and not by the State from motives of policy. The
chief justice dissented, and the majority opinion concedes
that the conclusion of the court is in conflict with the views
expressed in Maine and Massachusetts.^ In the latter State it
iHawk V. Marion County (1878), Putnam Ins. Co., 16 Minn. 408;
48 Iowa, 472, 475, holding also that if Warner v. Grace, 14 Minn. 487 ; Gill-
only a part of the stolen money is re- more v. Lewis, 13 Ohio, 281 ; Means '
covered the party through whose v. Hendershott, 24 Iowa, 78 ; Thorn-
agency the recovery has been efiEected ton V. Missouri Pac. R Co., 43 Mo.
is entitSed to ajpro rata share of the App. 58. See, also, Morris v. Kasling
reward. Under the Revised Statutes (Tex.), 15 S. W. Rep. 336.
of Illinois, chapter CO, section 15, pro- 2 Parrel v. Town of Derby, 58 Conu.
viding that county boards may offer 234 ; s. C, 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
rewards for the arrest and convic- 391. " Had the State of its own mo-
tion of any person guilty of stealing tion, by reasons of public policy, taken
" any horse, mare," etc., " or any steps to change the boundaries of the
other property exceeding $50 in town or abolish it altogether, the case
value," the limitation as to value ap- presented would have been a very-
plies only to property other than different one ; but the attack was not
that specified. Butler v. County of made by the State from motives of
McLean, 33 111. App. 397. When the policy, and in the interest of good
offer of a reward is authorized, an government, but was made by cer-
officer cannot recover it if his serv- tain parties who sought thereby to
ices are only in the line of his duty, promote their own interests. The
Pool V. Boston, 5 Cush. 219 ; Stamper attack was not directed alone against
V. Temple, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 113 ; other individuals who differed from
Kick V. Merry, 23 Mo. 72 ; Day v. them but against the town as welL
668 IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 663.
was held that a town has no implied authority to incur ex-
pense in opposing before the legislature a proposition to annex
it to another town.^ The same court had previously denied
the validity of a contract to pay for services of " lobby mem-
bers " in procuring the passage of a charter of incorporation.'^
In Maine, also, a town cannot legally raise and expend money
either for services of members of the " third house " in oppoo-
ing a division of the town,' or of attorneys who appear before
a committee for the same purpose.* A city has no authority
to appropriate money to obtain legislative permission to build
a bridge across a navigable river,' or to procure the passage
of an unconstitutional act.'
(b) Eminent Domain.
§ 653. Nature and definition. — The right of eminent dor
main has been defined to be " that superior right of property
pertaining to the sovereignty by which the private property
acquired by its citizens under its protection may be taken or
its use controlled for the public benefit without regard to the
wishes of its owners. More accurately it is the rightful au-
thority which exists in every sovereignty to control and regu-
The end sought involved not only a counsel to oppose its division before
dismemberment of the town in re- a committee of the legislature. Con-
spect to territory and population, but nolly v. Beverly (1890), 151 Mass. 437.-
also a division of its corporate prop- ^ Frost v. Inhabitants of Belfast,
erty, a reduction of its grand list, an 6 Allen, 152, on the ground that se-
apportionment of its debts, liabilities cret attempts to secure votes, etc., are
and burdens as to highways, bridges, not a legal consideration,
paupers and the like." ' Frankfort v. Winterport, 54 Me.
1 Coolidge V. Inhabitants of Brook- 350.
line, 114 Mass. 593. In Minot v. In- <Westbrookv. Inhabitants of Deer-
habitants of West Roxbury, 113 Mass. ing, 63 Me. 231. ,
1 ; S. a, 17 Am. Dea 52, it was held * Henderson v. Covington, 14 Bush
that a town could not legally ap- (Ky.), 313.
propriate money to pay for the ex- * Mead v. Inhabitants of Acton, 189
penses of a committee directed by Mass. 241 ; S. C, 8 Am. & Eng. Corp.
vote to petition the legislature for Cas., 545. In Baohelder u Epping,
annexation to another town. But 38 N. H. 354, the plaintiS recovered
under a statute authorizing the em- for services as a member of a com-
ployment of counsel by " any town mittee appointed to apply to the leg-
interested in a petition to the legisla- islature to have a term of court
ture" to represent it at hearings holden annually in the defendant
thereon, a town may employ and pay town.
§ 654.J
EMINENT DOMAIN.
late those rights of a public nature which pertain to its citi-
zens in common, and to, appropriate and control individual
property for the public benefit, as the public safety, necessity,
convenience or welfare may demand." ' It is a necessary and
inherent attribute of sovereignty in the State, which does not
depend upon constitutional provisions for its existence.'* All
grants of property by the State are subject to the implied
condition that it may be resumed by an exercise of the right
of eminent domain, and a contract renouncing this power is
not covered by the constitution of the United States prohibit-
ing legislation that impairs the obligation of contracts.'
§ 654. The same subject continued — Constitutional lim-
Itations. — The provision in the constitution of the United
States that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation is a restriction only upon thie power
of the federal government and not a limitation of the power
iCooley's Const Lim. 640, citing
Vattel, ch. 20, § 34; Bynkershoek,
lib. 3, ch. 15 ; Angell on Watercourses,
§ 457; 3 Kent, 338-340; Eedfleld
on Eailways, ch. 11, § 1 ; Waples,
Pro. in Eem, § 242 ; Pollard's Lessee
V. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Beekman v.
Saratoga &c. E. Co., 3 Paige, 45.
2 Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63 ;
Noll V. Dubuque &c. E. Co., 33 Iowa,
66; Ealeigh &c. R Co. v. Davis, 2
Dev. & Bat Law (N. C), 451 ; Brown
V. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227 ; United States
V. Jones, 109 U. S. 513; People v.
Mayor &c. of New York, 32 Barb.
102; Lewis on Eminent Domain,
ch. L The right which is denomi-
nated the eminent domain is dis-
tinguished from the police power, in
tl.tt the former is a taking of prop-
erty and the latter a regulation of the
use of it Philadelphia v. Scott, 81
Pa. St 80 ; King v. Davenport, 98
III. 305; Bass v. State, 34 La. Ann.
494 : Hine v. New Haven, 40 Conn.
478: Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass.
315 ; People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330 ;
Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cowen, 349.
It is also distinct from the common-
law right to destroy property to
prevent a public calamity, such as
the spread of fire or ravages of pes-
tilence. Eussell V. Mayor &c. of
New York, 2 Denio, 461 ; American
Print Works v. Lawrence, 21 N. J.
Law, 248; Field v. Des Moines, 39
Iowa, 575. And from taxation. Peo-
ple V. Mayor &c. of Brooklyn, 4
N. Y. 419, where the two rights are
contrasted. And from assessments
for local' improvements. Nichols v.
City of Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189;
State V. Blake, 36 N. J. Law, 443 ;
Chambers v. Saterlee, 40 Cal. 497;
Matter of Lawrence Street, 4 E. I.
230. And from the war power. Lewis
on Eminent Domain, § 8 and cases
there cited.
' Cooley on Const Lim. 339, where
the author says that if such an agree-
ment were held to be valid the only
effect would be to require that com-
pensation be made for its violation.
6Y0
IMPLIED POWEES AND EMINENT DOMAIN.
[§ 655.
of the States.* But this provision is now a part of the organic
law of every State except North Carolina.^
§ 655. What property may be taken. — " Every species of
property vrhich the public need may require and which gov-
ernmeiit cannot lawfully appropriate under any other right
is subject to be seized and appropriated under the right of
eminent domain." ' Land, timber, stone and gravel with which
to make or improve the public ^igh ways,* streams of water,'
a prescriptive right to pollute a water-course,^ a right to use
the water of a stream for irrigation,' and all corporate prop-
erty and corporate franchises.'
1 Barrow v. Baltimore, 7 Peters, 243 ;
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall.
166; Cairo &c. R. Co. u. Turnt-r, 31
Ark. 494 ; Johnson v. Rankin, 70 N. C.
550 ; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84;
Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53 ; Young v.
McKenzie, 3 Ga. 81. But to constitute
"due process of law" within the
meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment it is believed that the decided
cases "require compensation, notice
and procedure conformable to law."
Elliott on Roads and Streets, 143;
Scott V. City of Toledo, 36 Fed. Rep,
885. As to the constitutional guar-
anty of trial by jury, see § 679, infra.
2 The constitutional provisions in
the different States are given in ex-
tenso in Lewis on Eminent Domain,
page 37, note. Previous to the adop-
tion of these limitations It was held
in many jurisdictions that the prop-
erty of the citizen was secured from
seizure without compensation by
fundamental principles of natural
justice which were supposed to in-
here in the constitution. The Chesa-
peake &c. Canal Co., 1 Md. Ch. 248 ;
Bradshaw v. Rogers, 20 Johns. 103.
But this opinion was not univei:sal
and is opposed to the later cases and
the views of standard authors. Wi-
nona &c. R. Co. V. Waldron, 11 Minn.
515 ; Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts,
63; Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 10;
Cooley's Const. Lim. 87.
» Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.) 646 ;
Elliott on Roads and Streets, 164;
Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 362.
* WheeJock v. Young, 4 Wend. 647 ;
Bliss V. Hosmer, 15 Ohio, 44; Wat-
kins V. Walker, 18 Tex. 585; Arnold
V. Hudson, 55 N. Y. 661; Lyon v.
Jerome, 15 Wend. 569; Jerome v.
Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315. Buildings
may be removed or destroyed to
make way for public improvements,
and a dwelling-house is no more ex-
empt than any other species of prop-
erty, Wells V. Somerset &o. R Co.,
47 Me. 345 ; nor a pier. Matter of
Union Ferry, 98 N. Y. 139. Toll-
bridges, turnpikes and ferries may
be taken. Northampton Bridge Case,
116 Mass. 442 ; In re Towanda Bridge
Co., 91 Pa. St. 216; Armington v.
Barnett, 15 Vt. 745 ; Sullivan v'. Board
of Supervisors, 58 Miss. 790.
» Gardner v. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch.
163; Reusch v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 57
iowa, 687.
6 And this without taking the land
along it. Martin v. Gleason, 139 Mats.
183; s. c, 39 N. E. Rep. 664.
' And this may be separated from
the land in connection with which it
ripened. Strickler v. City of Colo-
rado Springs, 16 Colo. 61; a C, 26
Pac. Rep. 313.
6 West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6
How. 507; Central Bridge Corpora-
tion V. Lowell, 4 Gray, 474; In it
§ 656.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
671
§656. Quantity of estate. — It is competent for the legis-
lature to determine the extent of the estate which shall be
taken for public use.' It may authorize the condemnation of
the absolute fee-simple ; ^ and if the public necessity for which
authority to appropriate land is given be of a permanent nat-
ure, the legislative intent to seize the fee may be implied.' But
ordinarily express authority is required to deprive the owner
of the fee,* and statutes will be strictly construed so as to
limit the estate taken to an easement if possible.*
izing the taking, on the express
ground of expediency, of more land
than is necessary for the purpose
specified, was held unconstitutional
in Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511.
3 Holt V. Somerville, 137 Mass. 408,
case of a public park ; De Varaigne
V. Fox, 2 Blatchf. 95, an almshouse.
See, also, Brooklyn Park v. Arm-
strong, 45 N. Y. 234 ; Tiflft v. Buffalo,
83 N. Y. 204. A statute entitled "to
enable "a city "to abate a nuisance
and for the preservation of the public
health " authorized the city " to pur-
chase or otherwise take the lands"
within a large district, provide for
payment to the owners for damages,
and directed the city "to raise the
grade of the territory so taken or
purchased with reference to a com-
plete drainage thereof so as to abate
the present nuisance and to preserve
the health of the city." It was held
that the fee of lands taken under this
act vested in the city as absolute
owner, and that the statute was not
unconstitutional either as an attempt
to exercise judicial power or as au-
thorizing the taking of a greater in-
terest than was necessary. Dingley
V. City of Boston, 100 Mass. 544.
* Clark V. Worcester, 125 Mass. 326 ;
Board v. Beckwith, 10 Kan. 603.
5 Kellogg V. Malin, 50 Mo. 496;
United States v. Harris, 1 Sumner,
21 ; In re Conim'r of Public Works,
10 N. Y. Supl. 705 ; Quimby v. Ver-
mont Cent R. Co., 28 Vt 387; Wash-
Twenty-second Street, 15 Phila. 409 ;
Piscatauqua Bridge v. New Hamp-
shire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35 ; Common-
wealth V. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 66
Pa. St 41 ; s. G, 5 Am. Rep. 329. Of.
Central City Horse Ry. Co. v. Fort
Clark Horse Ry. Co., 87 111. 533.
1 It is the exclusive judge. Brook-
lyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45
N. Y. 234; Wyoming Coal Co. v.
Price, 81 Pa. St 156; United States
V. Harris, 1 Sumner, 21. Cf. Jack-
son V. Rutland &c. Co., 25 Vt 150 ;
Barclay v. Howell's Lessees, 6 Pet
498. But the power to decide may be
delegated. Powers' Appeal, 29 Mich,
504 ; Rensselaer &c. Co. v. Davis, 43
N. Y. 137; Embury v. Conner, 3
N. Y. 511 ; In re Comm'r of Public
Works, 10 N. Y. Supl. 705.
2 Haldeman v. Penn. R Co., 50 Pa.
St 425; Ferree v. School Dist, 76
Pa. St 376 ; Bachler's Appeal, 90 Pa.
St 307; Hey wood v. New York, 7
N. Y. 314; Washington Cemetery «.
Prospect Park &c. R, 68 N. Y. 591 ;
In re City of Buffalo, 64 N. Y.
547; Indianapolis Water-Works Co.
V Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364; Canal Co.
V. \ 'omm'rs of Drainage, 26 La. Ann.
740 Elliott on Roads and Streets,
173. In such a case the weight of
authority is that there is no i-everter
upon a cessation of public use. Ma-
lone V. Toledo, 28 Ohio St 643 ; Heard
V. Brooklyn, 60 N. Y. 243 ; Heath v.
Barmore, 50 N. Y. 303 ; 3 Dillon on
Munic. Corp., § 589. An act author-
672
IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§§ 657, 658.
§ 657. What constitutes a taking It was formerly held
in substance that to constitute a taking within the meaning
of the constitution there must be an actual physical appro,
priation of the property, or a divesting of title.' But the
later authorities, by adopting a more liberal construction of
the term " property," ^ include all the rights which pertain to
the ownership of things real and personal.'
§ 658. The same subject coittinued — The leading case. —
The leading case wherein the later doctrine is expounded is
Eaton V. Boston &o. K. Co., decided by the Supreme Court
of 'New Hampshire in 1872.* A railroad corporation con-
structed its road across Eaton's farm. Damages were as-
ington Cemetery v. Prospect Park
E. Co.,, 68 N. Y. 691. Cf. Page v.
O'Toole, 144 Mass. 303 ; Edgerton v.
Huflf, 26 Ind. 35 ; City of Logansport
V. Shirk. 88 Ind. 568. Where an ease-
ment only is taken the owner retains
the right to enjoy the property so far
as it is susceptible of use without in-
terfering with the paramount right of
the public. Village of Brooklyn v.
Smith, 104 111. 429; Goodtitle v.
Alter, 1 Burr. 133; Elliott on Roads
and Streets, 177 and cases cited
1 Sedgwick on Const Law (2d ed.),
456-458 ; Lewis on Eminent Domain,
§57.
2 "The earlier cases as to what con-
stitutes a taking were based upon a
i-adically defective interpretation of
the constitution, which not only de-
nied the right to compensation in
many cases where it ought to be
given, but greatly embarrassed the
property-owner in obtaining it in
those cases in which it was con-
ceded to be dua These early cases
attacked the question wrong end
first, so to speak, through the word
taken instead of through the word
property. It is only by having a
clear and correct conception of the
idea of property that a uniform,
consistent and just application of
the constitution can be made to the
many complicated and varied cases
which come up for adjudication."
Preface to Lewis on Eminent Do-
main, I.
' Arnold V. Hudson River Co., 55
N. Y. 661 ; Eaton v. Boston &c. R.
Co. (1872), 51 N. H. 504 ; Thompson
V. Androscoggin River Imp. Co., 54
N. H. 545 ; Smith v. City of Roches-
ter, 92 N. Y. 463; Matter of Hamil-
ton Avenue. 14 Barb. 405. But the
damage must be of such a nature as
to give a cause of action on common-
law principles. A jail may be obnox-
ious to those who live or do business
near it, but the special damage in such
case is incidental to what the gen-
eral interest of the community re-
quires and becomes damnum absque
injuria. Burwell v. Comm'rs of
Vance County. 93 N. C. 73; Wehn v.
Comm'ra of Gage County. 5 Neb.
494. Disturbing the right to lateral
support of land is a taking. O'Brien
V. St. Paul, 25 Minn. 331 ; Buskirk v.
Strickland, 47 Mich. 389; Richard-
son V. Central R Co., 25 Vt 465. So,
too, depriving the owner of the use
of a non-navigable stream. Smith
V. City of Rochester, 93 N. Y. 463 ;
Yates V. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497.
« 51 N. H. 504.
§ 658.] EMINENT DOMAIN. 673
sessed under the statute arid paid to Eatoii, who released the
corporation from damages on account of the laying out of the
road over his land. Northerly of the farm there was a ridge
of land completely protecting the farm from the effect of
floods and freshets in a neighboring river. Through this
ridge the corporation, in constructing its road, made a deep
cut^ and the waters of the river in times of flood carried sand,
gravel and stones upon Eaton's land. It was held that, even
if the corporation had constructed the road with due care and
prudence, Eaton could recover the damage caused him by
cutting away the ridge. The court said: — "The constitu-
tional prohibition (which exists in inost, or all, of the States)
has received in some quarters a construction which renders
it of comparatively little worth, being interpreted much as if
it read : — ' No person shall be divested of the formal title to
property without compensation, but he may, without com-
pensation, be deprived of all that makes the title valuable.'
. . . In a strict sense, land is not * property,' but the sub-
ject of property. The term ' property,' although in common
parlance frequently applied to a tract of land or a chattel, in
its legal signification ' means only the right . . . over a
determinate thing.' ' Property is the right of any person to
possess, use, enjoy and dispose of a thing.' ^ If property in
land consists in certain essential rights, and a physical inter-
ference with the land substantially subverts one of those
rights, such interference 'takes' jjro tcmto the owner's 'prop-
erty.' The right of indefinite user (of using indefinitely) is
a,n essential quality or attribute of absolute property, without
which absolute property can have no legal existence. This
right of user necessarily includes the right and power of ex-
cluding others from using the land. From the very nature-
of these rights of user and of exclusion, it is evident that they
cannot be materially abridged without ipso facto taking the
owner's ' property.' If the right of indefinite user is an essen-
tial element of absolute property or complete ownership,
v/hatever physical interference annuls this right takes ' prop-
erty ' — although the owner may still have left to him valu-
1 Citing Selden, J., in Wynehamer stone Com. 138 ; 3 Austin on Juris-
V. People, 13 N. Y. 378, 433 ; 1 Black- prudence (3d ed.), 817, 818.
43
674 IMPLIED POWEES AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 659.
able rights (in the article) of a more limited and cironmsoribed
nature. He has not the same property that he formerly had.
His absolute ownership has been reduced to a qualified own-
ership. ... If the claim set up by the defendants in
this case is well founded, an easement is already vested in
them. An easement is property, and is within the protection
of the constitutional prohibition now under consideration.
If the defendants have acquired this easement, it cannot be
taken from them, even for pubSc use, without compensation.
But the right acquired by the defendants is subtracted from
the plaintiff's ownership of the land. Whatever interest the
defendants have acquired in this respect the plaintiff has
lost. If what they have gained is property, then what he has
lost is property." '
§ 659. The same subject continned ^- Constitutional
amendments. — The narrow construction placed by some of
the courts upon the words " property " and " taken " caused
the amendment of the constitutions bf many of the States so
that damiage to private property taken for public use should
be compensated.^ Judge Dillon sums up the effect of these
amendments as follows : — " It may perhaps be premature to
affirm that the meaning of the word " damaged," as used in
the recent constitutional amendments, is absolutely confined to
1 Eaton V. Boston && R Co., 51 Fed. Eep. 394. Georgia : Atlanta v.
N. H., 504, 511, 515. This case was Green, 67 Ga .388. Illinois : Eigney
approved in Thompson v. Androscog- v. Chicago, 103 111. 64 ; Chicago v.
gin Elver Imp. Co., 54 N. H. 545. Taylor, 135 U. S. 161; Chicago u
See, also, Grand Eapids Booming Co. Union Bldg. Ass'n, 103 111. 379; City
V. Jarvis, 30 Mich. 380 ; Lewis on of Olney v. Wharf, 115 111. 519. Mis-
Eminent Domain, ch. Ill ; Elliott on souri : McElroy v. Kansas City, 81
Eoadsand Streets, ch. VIII ; Cooley's Fed. Eep. 357 ; Sheehy v. Kansas City
Const Lim. (6th ed.) 666 et seq.; Dil- Cable Ey, Co., 94 Mo. 575. Nebraska :
Ion's Munie. Corp. 5876. Schalle v. Omaha, 33 Neb. 335. Penn-
'^ Such amendments have been sylvania : Hendrick's Appeal, 103 Pa.
adopted in the following States and St. 358 ; Chester County v. Brower,
construed in the cases cited : -^ Ala- 117 Pa. St 647 ; O'Brien v. Pennsyl-
bama : City of Montgomery v. Town- vania &o. E Co., 119 Pa. St 184 ;
send, 84 Ala. 478. Arkansas : Hot Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Marchant, 119
Springs E. Co. v. Williamson, 45 Ark. Pa. St 541. Texas : Bounds v. Kirven,
439. California: Reardon v. San 63 Tex. 159. West Virginia: Hutch-
Francisco, 66 Cal. 493. Colorado: inson v. Pai-kersburg, 35 West Va.
MoUandin v. Union Pac. Ey. Co., 14 336.
§ 660.] EMINENT DOMAIN. 675
cases where the common law would have given a remedy for
injuries to property or property rights, if the legislative au-
thority to do the act which caused the damage had not, aside
from such constitutional amendment, deprived, or been previ-
ously construed to deprive, the owner of his right to compen-
sation therefor ; and yet such is, in our judgment, its main, if
not exclusive, purpose and effect." ^
§ 660. Property already appropriated to public use. —
It is^ well-established rule that property already appropriated
in the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot
be taken for another public use which will wholly defeat or
supersede the former use, unless the power to make such sec-
ond appropriation be given expressly or by necessary implica-
tion.* A further exposition of the rule was given by Folger, J.,
of the Court of Appeals of New York, as follows : — " An impli-
cation is an inference of something not directly declared, but
arising from what is admitted or expressed. In determining
whether a power generally given is meant to have operation
upon lands already devoted by legislative authority to a public
purpose, it is proper to consider the nature of the prior public
work, the public use to which it is applied, the extent to
which that use would be impaired or diminished by the taking
of such part of the land as may be demanded by the subse-
quent public use. If both uses may not stand together with
some tolerable interference, which may be compensated for
by damages paid; if the latter use, when exercised, must
supersede the former, it is not to be implied from a general
power given, without having in view a then existing and par-
ticular need therefor, that the legislature meant to subject
lands devoted to a public use already in exercise to one which
12 Dillon's Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), make a second seizure." City of
§ 587. Seymour v. JeSersonville &c. R. Co.
2 Railroad Co. v. Dayton, 33 Ohio (1890), 136 Ind. 466 ; s. C, 26 N. E.
St 510 ; Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. Belle Rep. 138, citing Lake Shore &c. R.
Centre (Ohio, 1891), 37 N. E. Rep. Co. v. Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 116 Ind.
464. " It is settled beyond contro- 578 ; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. North,
versy that land already appropriated 103 Ind. 486 ; McDonald v. Payne, 114
to a public use cannot be appropri- Ind. 359 ; Elliott on Roads and Streets,
ated to another public use unless the 167, notes 2 and 4.
statute clearly confers authority to
676 IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 661.
might thereafter arise. A legislative intent that there should
be such an effect will not be inferred from a gift of power
made in general terms. To defeat the attainment of an im-
portant public purpose to which lands have already been sub-
jected the legislative Intent must unequivocally appear. If an
implication is to be relied upon, it must appear from the face
of the enactment, or from the application of it to the particu-
lar subject-matter of it, so that by reasonable intendment
some especial object sought to %e attained by the e:^ercise of
the power granted could not be reached in any other place or
manner." '
§ 661. The same subject continued. — Ordinarily a high-
way or railroad cannot be laid out longitudinally over a pre-
viously established railroad or highway by virtue of general
statutory powers or without special authority from the legis-
iature.^ On the other hand, in the absence of special regula-
tions and by virtue of a general authority to layout such
roads, necessary crossings can be made.' It was held that
under a general authority county commissioners might take a
strip of land from a school-house lot for a needed town way,
where the use of the lot for school purposes, though consid-
erably impaired, would not be wholly prevented.* There are
cases in which it would seem that lands used for a burying
ground have been taken by the municipal authorities for high-
way purposes, but whether they were taken under a general
1 In re City of Buffalo, 68 N. T. 36 N. J. Law, 181 ; Tuckahoe Canal
167. It was held in that case that v. Tuckahoe R. Co., 11 Leigh (Va.),
under a general power a city could 43. Express authority to cross rail-
not excavate a canal across several road tracks does not extend to land
railroad tracks and a railroad yard used for depot purposes. Prospect
where there were numerous tracks, Park &c. R. Co. v. Williamson, 9i
turn-outs and switches. See, also. In N. Y. 552 ; Albany &o. R Co. v.
re Boston & Albany R. Co., 53 N. Y. Brownell, 24 N. Y. 345.
574 * Easthampton v. County Comm'rs,
2 West Boston Bridge Co. v. County 154 Mass. 424. Authority to take
Comm'rs, 10 Pick. 270, 373 ; Spring- land for another public use may rest
field V. Connecticut River R Co., 4 on necessary implication. In re Ap-
Cush. 63, 71 ; Boston & Maine R. Co. plication of Mayor &c. of New York
«; Lowell &C. R. Co., 134 Mass. 368, (N. Y. Ct App., October, 1893), re-
371. ported in the New York Law Jour-
»St. Paul &c. Co. V. Minneapolis, nal, Oct. 27, 1893.
35 Minn. 141 ; State v. Easton R. Co.,
§§ 662, 663.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
677
or special authority does not appear.* In Connecticut it was
held that land already in use as a cemetery could not be
taken for a highway without clear legislative authority.*
§ 663. Change of grade. — At common law a municipal cor-
poration is not liable for injuries resulting from changing the
grade of a high way.' But a recovery may be had for injuries ,
which result from the negligent manner in which the work is
performed.* And in many States there are statutory or con-
stitutional provisions giving a right of action for a substantial
injury without regard to negligence.'
§ 663. Change of use — Additional use. — It is clear that
where the owner of the property condemned retains the fee,
he is entitled to additional compensation in a new proceeding,
if an additional burden is cast upon the land.* " It is difficult
1 In the Matter of Albany Street,
11 Wend. 149; In the Matter of Beek-
man Street, 4 Bradf. 503.
2 Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v. City
of New Haven, 43 Conn. 234.
' Simmons v. Camden, 36 Ark. 376 ;
a C, 7 Am. Rep. 630 ; Burr v. Leices-
ter, 131 Mass. 341 : Snow v. Province-
town. 109 Mass. 133 ; Brown v. LcweH,
8 Met. 173 ; Callander v. Marsh, 1 Pick.
418 ; Alden v. Minneapolis, 34 Minn.
357; Lee v. Minneapolis, 23 Minn. 13;
Shaw V. Crocker, 42 Cal. 435 ; Fellowes
V. New Haven, 44 Conn. 340 ; s. C,
36 Am. Rep. 447 ; Dorman v. Jackson-
ville, 13 Fla. 538 ; Fuller v. Atlanta,
66 Ga. 80 ; Thomson v. Boonville, 61
Mo. 282 ; Nebraska City v. Lanipkin,
6 Neb. 27 ; Hendershott v. Ottumwa,
46 Iowa, 658; Nevins v. Peoria, 4t
III. 502 ; Terre Haute v. Turner, 36
Ind. 532 ; Keasy v. Louisville, 4 Dana
(Ky.), 154; Hoyey v. Mayo, 43 Me.
322; Tyson v. Milwaukee, 50 Wis. 78 <
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S.
635; People v. Green, 64 N. Y. 606;
Pusey V. City of Allegheny, 98 Pa. St.
522; Humes v. Mayor, 1 Humph.
(Tenn.) 403. In Ohio the rule is dif-
ferent Keatingr. Cincinnati, 38 Ohio
St 141 ; Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio,
159 ; Dodson v. Cincinnati, 34 Ohio St
376.
* Dorman v. Jacksonville, 13 Fla.
588 ; City of Aurora v. Reed, 57 111.
30 ; Cotes v. Davenport 9 Iowa, 337 ;
Elliott on Roads and Streets, 336.
5 Dalzell V. Davenport, 18 Iowa, 437 ;
Columbus V. Woolen -Mills Go., 38
Ind. 435 ; Burr v. Leicester, 131 Mass.
341 ; Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 336 ;
Crossett v. Janes ville, 38 Wis. 420.
" A case of this character does not
stand upon the common law, and
therefore is not within the rule that
an action will lie where there is an
invasion of a right, although no sub-
stantial injury is shown ; for it is of
the essence of the statutory right that
it should affirmatively appear that
the complaining property owner has
sustained substantial damages.'' El-
liott on Roads and Streets, 845 and
cases cited.
6 " The soil cannot be devoted to a
different use, whether more or less on-
erous, without a new condemnation
and compensation paid." Lewis on
Eminent Domain, § 140.
678
IMPLIED POWEES AND EMINENT DOMAIN.
[§ 663.
to determine what shall be considered an additional burden
entitling the owner of the fee to the protection of the consti-
tutional provision limiting the right of eminent domain. If
the new use is radically distinct and different from the former,
there must be a new assessment of compensation; and the de-
cided weight of authority is that constructing an ordinary
railroad on a street or road is a change of use, entitling the
owner of the soil to compensation." * But where the use is not
1 Elliott on Roads and Streets, 160, to the original use, but that special
where the authorities on both sides
are collected, and the prevailing rule
vindicated by the authors. Part of
a highway cannot be used for a mar-
ket house without compensation to
the owner of the fee. "Land taken
and applied for the ordinary purposes
of a street would often be an im-
provement of the adjacent property ;
an appropriation of it to the uses of
a market would, perhaps, as often be
destructive of one half of the value
of such property." State v. Lavanac,
34 N. J. Law, 201, 305. See, also,
Lutterloh v. Town of Cedar Keys, 15
Fla 306; State v. Mobile, 5 Porter
(Ala.), 279; Savannah v. Wilson, 49
Ga. 476. So with a ferry landing
upon a highway. Prosser v. Davis,
18 Iowa, 367; Chambers v. Farry,
1 Yeates, 167; Haight v. Keokuk,
4 Iowa, 199; Chess v. Manown, 3
Watts, 319. Of. Hudson v. Cuero Land
& Emigration Co;, 47 Tex. 56. And
generally where telegraph or tele-
phone lines are put up on the high-
way. But the question of damage is
one of fact. Lewis on Eminent Do-
main, § 181. In Julia Bldg. Ass'n v.
Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo. 258, and Pierce v.
Drew, 186 Mass. 75 (two judges dis-
senting), it is held that the erection
of telegraph and telephone poles is
not an additional servituda And in
•Consumers' Gas & Electric Light Co.
,v. Congress Spring Co., 15 N. Y.
Supl. 624, that poles and wires for
electric lights are^merely ancillary
and peculiar circumstances might
give a right to compensation. For
cases holding that the use of a high-
way for a telegraph liue will entitle
the abutting owner to additional
compensation, see Dusenbury v.
Mutual Tel. Co., 11 Abb. N. C. 440 ;
Atlantic &c. TeL Co. t'. Chicago &c.
R. Co., 6 Biss. 158; Board of Trade
Tel. Co. V. Barnett, 107 111. 507. As
to elevated railroads, it was held by
a majority of the justices of the New
York Court of Appeals that an abut-
ting owner, even if he does not own
the fee of any part of the street, has
such a property as to be entitled to
additional compensation. Story v.
New York Elevated Railroad, 90 N.
Y. 123. That the city cannot authorize
the use of a street for a hack stand
as against an abutting owner, see
McCaffrey v. Smith, 41 Hun, 11*1. In
Attorney-Gen'l v. Metropolitan R Co.,
125 Mass. 515, and Lockhart v. Rail-
way Co., 139 Pa. St 419, 423, a horse
railroad was held not to be a new
servitude if the use of the highway be
reasonable. To the same point, 2
Dillon's Munic. Corp., § 732 ; Cincin-
nati &c. R. Co. V. Cummingsville, 14
Ohio St. 533 ; Detroit City Ry. Co. v.
Mills, 85 Mich. 634, 654, and cases
there cited; Taggart v. Newport
Street R. Co. (1890), 16 E. I. 668.
While it is recognized that the
proper and contemplated use of a
highway is not to be deemed limited
to such vehicles as are in use at the
§ 6G4.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
679
essentially changed there is no new taking in the constitu-
tional sense.'
§ 664. The same subject continued — Electric railways. —
The question whether electric railways shall be placed in the
same category as horse railroads or in that of steam railroads
has been earnestly debated in several recent cases. So far as
the bare weight of authority can silence contention, it must
be declared that a change in the motive power from horses
to electricity, applied by means of the overhead wire system,
is not a radical and substantial departure in the occupancy of
the highway and does not constitute a new and additional
burden. This is the law in Pennsylvania,^ New Jersey,' Mich-
igan * and Khode Island.* In the Pennsylvania case the court
said : — "The proposed construction here is no more illegal by
reason of its effects upon the owners of property, so far as
actual interference with their rights to use the streets is con-
cerned, than so many lamp posts, and if compensation could
not be compelled for the ground taken by them, neither should
time, it is considered to be too great
an extension to hold that it embraces
its use for a steam railway. At this
point the line has been drawn by a
p^reat weight of judicial decision.
Williams v. N. Y. Cent R. Co., 16 N.
Y. 97 ; Wager v. Troy Union R. Co.,
25 N. Y. 526; Imlay v. Union Branch
E. Co., 26 Conn. 249, 255; Sherman
V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 40 Wis. 645;
Kucheman v. Chicago &c. R Co., 46
Iowa, 366 ; Kaiser v. St Paul &c. R
Co., 22 Minn. 149 ; Southern Pac. R.
Co. V. Reed, 41 CaL 256.
1 Changing a highway into a turn-
pike. Benedict v. Goit, 3 Barb. 459 ;
Carter v. Clark, 89 Ind. 288 ; Wright
V. Carter, 27 N. J. Law, 76. Contra,
Cape Girardeau Road v. Renfroe,
58 Mo. 265. Use of city or village
streets for sewers and drains, water
pipes, gas pipes, steam and electricity.
Lewis on Eminent Domain, g 127 et
seq. The same writer points out
(§ 140) a distinction between cases
where the public holds a qualified fee
in lands and those where the fee is '
absolute. In the latter case a' change
of use gives no claim to compensation.
"Thus lands taken for an asylum,
jail or school-house are usi!ially held
by a fee-simple absolute, while lands
acquired for streets and public
grounds, though held in fee, are
nevertheless held in trust for the iise
specified."
2Lockhart v. Railway Co. (1891),
139 Pa. St 419.
s Halsey v. Rapid Transit Street Ry.
Co. (1890), 47 N. J. Eq. 380; s. C, 20
Atl. Rep. 859.
< Detroit City Ry. v. Mills (1891), 85
Mich. 634. The same doctrine was
announced by the Cuyahoga county,
Ohio, court of common pleas in Pel-
ton V. Railroad Co. (1889), 33 Weekly
Law Bui. 67.
0 Taggart v. Newport Street Ry. Ca
(1890), 16 R. L 66a
€80 IMPLIED POWEES AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 664.
it be for the posts supporting the wires in this case." * And
Grant, J., delivering the opinion in the Michigan case, said : —
"These poles used by the complainant [the railway company]
are a necessary part of its system. When they do not inter-
fere with the owner's access to and the use of his land, we see
no reason why they should be held to constitute an additional
servitude. Certainly they constitute no injury to his rever-
sionary interest. To constitute an additional servitude, there-
fore, they must be an injury to tke present use and enjoyment
of his land. But they do not obstruct his light or his vision
as do the structures of an elevated railroad. Neither they
nor the cars they assist in moving cause the noise, steam,
smoke and dirt which are produced by steam cars. They do
not interfere with his going and coming at his pleasure when
placed as they can and must be so as to give him free access.
Wherein then is he injured? If it be said that they are un-
sightly and therefore offend his taste, it can well be replied
that they are no more so than the lamp-post or the electric
tower. It is as necessary that rapid transit be furnished to a
crowded city as it is that light should be furnished to its
streets. Public convenience and necessity must control in ^,11
such cases." ^
1 Lockhart v. Eailvstay Co., 139 Pa. structed and operated would be a
St. 419, 425, public nuiRance and the courts should
2 Detroit City Ry. Co. v. Mills, 85 abate it 3. The complaiuaiit's road-
Mich. 634, 657. But the scope of the bed and track must be built substan-
decision was limited by the enuncia- tially with the level of the street so
tion of the following general prin- as to permit vehicles to cross without
ciples : — " 1. The complainant cannot difficulty. 4. The poles must be so
lawfully construct and operate its placed as not to interfere with the
road in a street too narrow to admit right of ingress and egress to abut-
the passage of its cars and other ve- ting property." And the doctrine
hides at the same time, nor so con- seems, also, to be confined to the use
struct it as to interfere with the rights of city streets as distiflguished from
of the general public in the street, covmtry roads. See S. C, pp. 653, 654,
Grand Rapids St. Ry. Co. v. West and Lodihart v. Railway Co., 139 Pa.
Side St. Ry. Co., 48 Mich. 433. 3. Nor St 419, 424. In the opinion deliv-
in a street, though of sufficient width, ered in the Michigan case Long, J.,
if its condition be such that the opera- concurred, and Champlin, C. J., gave
tipp of the railway will result in the a qualified assent, but McGrath and
practical exclusion of others from the Morse, JJ., entered an emphatic pro-
use of the street A railway so con- test
§ 665.] EMINENT DOMAra. 681
§ 665. Grant of power to municipal corporations. — The
right of eminent domain is one which lies dormant in the
State until legislative action is had pointing out the occasion,
mode, conditions and agencies for its exercise.' The legisla-
ture may delegate authority to private or to municipal corpo-
rations to take property by eminent domain,^ but the power
must be given in express terms or by necessary implication.'
Statutes conferring the right are to be strictly construed.^ A
provision that the common council may enforce ordinances
"to construct and regulate sewers," etc.," and provide for
the payment of the cost of constructing the same," does not
confer the power to condemn property by eminent domain.*
And power to open, extend or straighten streets and alleys
does not authorize the condemnation of land for the purpose
of widening a street.' It has been held, however, that power
" to build and keep in repair county buildings," ..." and
in case there are no public buildings, to provide suitable
rooms for county purposes," gives the right to acquire land by
eminent domain.^ When the power is clear and the contem-
plated use in a particular case is public, the courts will not
inquire into the necessity or propriety of the exercise of the
right, or investigate the motives of the municipal authorities.*
•Dyckman v. Mayor &c., 5 XT. Y. ion for compensation the procedure
434 ; Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th ed.) cannot be sustained. Chaffee's Ap-
648; Allen v. Jones, 47 Ind. 438; peal, 56 Mich. 244; In re Widening
Railroad Co. v. Lake, 71 111. 333. A of Burnish Street (Pa.), 21 Atl. Rep.
strict compliance must be had with 500.
all the provisions of the law or the * Alexandria & W. R. Co. v. Alex-
proceeding will be ineffectual. Cool- andria & F. R. Co., 75 Va. 780 ; Wash-
ey's Const. Lira. (6th ed.) 649 and ington Cemetery v. Prospect Park
cases cited; Weckler v., Chicago, 61 &c. R. Co., 68 N. Y. 591 ; Chamber-
Ill. 142 ; 2 Dillon on Munic, Corp. (4th Iain v. Elizabethport Steam Cordage
ed.), § 605. Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 43 ; Leeds v. Rich-
2 People V. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595; mond, 102 Ind. 373.
Commonwealth v. Charlestown, 1 5 Allen v. Jones, 47 Ind. 442.
Pick. 180 ; 2 Dillon on Munic. Corp. ^ Chaffee's Appeal, 56 Mich. 244.
(4th ed.), § 603. See, also. People v. City of Roches-
' Harwinton v. Catlin, 19 Conn, ter, 50 N. Y. 525 ; East St. Louis v.
530 ; Baldwin v. Bangor, 36 Me. 518 ; St. John, 47 111. 463.
State V. Bishop, 39 N. J. Law, 236 ; ' Supervisors v. Garrell, 30 Gratt
Gallup V. Woodstock, 29 Vt. 347. 484.
When the statute makes no provis- « Dunham v. Village of Hyde Park,
682
IMPLIED POWEES AND EMINENT DOMAIN.
[§ 666.
§ 666. Public use and necessity of appropriation^ by whom
determined. — " The question, what is a public use, is always
one of law. Defeirence will be paid to the legislative judg-
ment as expressed in enactments for an appropriation of prop-
erty, but it will not be conclusive." ' But the necessity and
expediency of the exercise of the right of eminent domain is
a political question, which is to be determined exclusively by
the legislature.*
75 111. 371. Unless, as the court inti-
mated, the case shows manifest in-
justice, oppression and gross abuse
of powers. Townsend v. Hoyle, 30
Conn. 1, 9 ; Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb.
410; Stout V. Freeholders, 25 N. J.
Law, 202.
' Cooley's Const Lim. (6th ed.) .660 ;
Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 551 ;
Loughbridge •;;. Harris, 42 Ga. 500 ;
Chicago &c. R Co. v. Lake, 71 111.
333 ; Water-works Co. v. Burkhart, 41
Ind. 864; Bankhead v. Brown, 35
Iowa, 540; Scudder v. Trenton &c.
Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694; S. C, 23 Am.
Dec. 756; Beekman v. Railroad Co.,
3 Paige, 45 ; S. C, 33 Am. Dec, 679
and note ; In re Deansville Cemetery
Association, 66 N. Y. 569; s. a, 23
Am. Rep. 86 ; In re Union Ferry Co.,
98 N. Y. 139 ; In re Niagara Falls &o.
Ry. Co., 108 N. Y. 375 ; Eyerson v.
Brown, 35 Mich. 333 ; s. C, 24 Am.
Eep. 564; JnreSt Paul &c. Ry. Co.,
34 Minn. 227 ; Savannah v. Hancock,
91 Mo. 54 ; McQuillen v. Hatton, 43
Ohio St. 303 ; Harding v. Goodlet, 3
Yerg. 40; s. c, 34 Am. Dec. 546;
Tyler v. Beachev, 44 Vt 648.
2 United States' v. Harris, 1 Sumn.
21, 43 ; De Varaigne v. Fox, 2 Blatch.
95 ; Dingley v. Boston, 100 Mass. 558 ;
Haverhill Bridge Proprietors v.
Compi'rs, 103 Mass. 120 ; s. G, 9 Am.
Rep. 518; Hingham &c. Co. v.
County cf Norfolk, 6 Allen, 353;
Talbot V. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417 ; In
re Wellington, 16 Pick. 87 ; s. c, 36
Am. Dec, 631 ; In re Deansville Cem-
etery Association, 66 N. Y. 572 ; s. c,
23 Am. Rep. 86 ; Harris v. Thompson,
9 Barb. 350 ; People v. Smith, 31 N. Y.
595 ; Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Arm-
strong, 45 N. Y. 334; Hey ward v.
Mayor &c., 7 N. Y. 335; Varick v.
Smith, 5 Paige, 137, s. a, 38 Am.
Dec. 417 ; Coster v. Tidewater Co., 18
N. J, Eq. 67 ; Scudder v. Trenton &c
Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 694 ; s. C, 33 Am. Dec.
756; Concord R Co. v. Greeley, 17
N. H. 47 ; Smedley v. Irwin, 51 Pa.
St 445 ; Pittsburgh v. Scott, 1 Pa. St
309; Sadler w Langham, 34 Ala 337;
Aldridgeu Tuscumbia R Co., 3 Stew,
& P. (Ala.) 199 ; s. O., 23 Am. Dec.
307; New Central Coal Co. v.
George's &c. Co., 37 Md. 537; Ander-
son V. Tuberville, 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 150 ;
Memphis Freight Co. v. Mayor &c.,
4 Cold. (Tenn.) 419; Challis v. Atchi-
son, 16 Kan. 117 ; Parksham v. Jus-
tices, 9 Ga. 341 ; Ford v. Chicago &c.
R Co., 14 Wis. 609 ; Tait's Ex'r v.
Centr. Lunatic Asylum, 84 Va. 271 ;
S. a, 4 S. E. IJep. 697 ; ShoU v. German
Coal Co., 118 III. 427; In re Union
Ferry Co., 98 N. Y. 139 ; Stockton &c.
R Co. V. City of Stockton, 41 Cal. 147 ;
Napa &a R. Co. v. Napa County, 30
Cal. 437 ; County Court v. Griswold, 58
Mo. 175 ; Lewis on Eminent Domain,
163, 338. But it is competent for the
State to delegate the authority to ad-
judicate upon the question to the tri-
bunal which has cognizance of the
proceeding for appropriation. Coo-
§ 667.] EMINENT DOMAIN. 683
§ 667. Legislative declaration conclusive. — Conceding
that the determination by the legislative authority that a
certain appropriation of property is for a public use may be
supervised, and in cases of gross error or extreme wrong con-
trolled by the judgment of the courts, the rule is qualified in
a very important particular by a recent decision of the Court
of Appeals of New York. The legislature made an appro-
priation for the purpose of extending a public canal by dredg-
ing a private mill-race which drew its supply of water from ;
one side of the canal.* The plaintiff, who was the owner of a
race on the other side, complained that the volume of water
to which he was entitled would be diminished, and he suc-
cessfully assailed the validity of the act in the trial court by
showing upon the testimony of witnesses that the improve-
ment could not benefit the canal, but would benefit the prop-
erty of the owner of the race which was to be enlarged. But
the Court of Appeals sustained the act, reversing' the judg-
ment of the court below. O'Brien, J., premising that the
purpose of the work, so far as it appeared on the face of the
statute, was public and not private, continued as follows: —
" The expenditure may in fact be improvident and the work
may prove to be useless to the public, but the legislature, as
the depositary of the sovereign powers of the people, must
necessarily be the judge of the propriety and utility of mak-
ing it. If it were otherwise, every appropriation of money
by the legislature could be assailed in the courts, at the suit of
private individuals, on the ground that they are useless and
intended for a purpose other than is plainly expressed, in order
to evade some provision of the organic law. The judicial de^
partment cannot institute an inquiry concerning the motives
and purposes of the legislature, in order to attribute to it a
ley's Const Lim. (6th ed.) 663, citing Road v. Dennis, 67 Mo. 438. See,
(among other cases) In re New York also, Rensselaer v. Davis, 43 N. Y.
&c. R Co., 66 K. Y. 407 ; In re St. 137 ; Milwaukee &c. R. Co. v. Fari-
Paul &c. Ry. Co., 84 Minn. 227 ; 01m- bault, 23 Minn. 167 ; Lecoul v. Police
jsted V. Proprietors &c., 46 N. J. Law, Jury, 20 La. Ann. 808.
495 ; Tracy v. Elizabethtown &o. R. ' The ostensible purpose of the im-
Co., 80 Ky. 259 ; Spring Valley Water provement was to permit navigation
Works V. San Mateo Water Works, by boats from the canal to a public
64 Cal. 123; Cape Girardeau &c. street.
684: IMPLIED POWEKS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 668.
design contrary to that clearly expressed or fairly implied in
the bill, without disturbing or impairing in some measure the
powers and functions assigned by the constitution to each de-
partment of the government. The courts cannot determine,
upon the testimony of witnesses, that the purpose of the
legislature was to appropriate public money for the benefit of
an individual, when it has expressed its purpose in the bill
itself to be the enlargement or improvement of the canal.
They must assume that the legisf^ure acted in good faith and
meant just what it said, though it may be possible to show,
outside of the language and terms of the bill, that in fact all,
or the larger part, of the benefits following the expenditure
may or will be reaped by a few individuals. . . . Eeason
and authority as well as the fitness of things demand that
when an act of the legislature appropriating money is assailed
upon the ground that the purpose of such appropriation is
local or private and not public, the question shall be deter-
mined by the language and general scope of the act." ^
§ 668. Public uses as respects municipalities — Parks
and streets. — Municipalities may be authorized to con-
demn private property for public roads and streets,'' public
1 Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co, v. nolds v. Reynolds, 15 Conn. 83;
Shanahan (1891), 138 N. Y. 345, 358. O'Reiley v. Kankakee County, 83
The language of the court, as quoted Ind. 169 ; Dorgan v. Boston, 94 Mass.
in the text, had direct reference to 333 ; Watson v. South Kingston, 5
the contention that the purpose of R. I. 563 ; Seaman v. Hicks, 8 Paige,
the bill was local and private, requir- 65 ; Elliott on Roads and Streets, 146,
ing the assent of two-thirds of the 147; Coster v. Tide Water Co., 18
members of each house, which it did N. J. Eq. 54 ; Savannah v. Hancock,
not receive, and in another part of 91 Mo. 54 ; United States v. Railroad
the opinion it was shown that the Bridge Co., 6 McLean, 517. Land
plaintiff, under the facts proved in cannot be appropriated for private
the case, had no right to the water ways. Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala.
which would be diverted from him. 311 ; Roberts v. Williams, 15 Ark. 43 ;
But the doctrine would seem to be Nesbit v. Trumbo, 89 111. 110 ; Bank-
necessarily applicable to a bill for head v. Brown, 35 Iowa, 540 ; Dickey
the appropriation of private piop- v. Tennison, 27 Mo. 373; Taylor v.
erty, and the court evidently so re- Porter, 4 Hill, 140 ; s. G, 40 Am. Dec.
garded the matter. 274. Cf. Brewer v. Bowman, 9 Ga,
2 Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 811 ; 37 ; Robinson v. Swope, 13 Bush,
Sherman v. Buick, 33 Cal. 241 ; Rey- 31. " Itis not the amount of travel,
§ 669.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
C85
parks ' and public squares.^ But land cannot be taken for pri-
vate roads. Dillon, C. J., delivering the opinion of the Su-
preme Court of Iowa, said : — " Wherever, by any well-consid-
ered decision, private roads have been sustained, it was because
they were regarded as public in their character ; and if prop^
erly so regarded, I'aw^s authorizing their establishment would
doubtless be valid." ' In Vermont it was held, that pent roads
are not necessarily and essentially private.* And where land
is condemned for a public square it is immaterial whether it is
intended to be traveled upon or not, and it is no objection
that damages are to be assessed upon the owners of adjoining
property, be they few or many."
§ 669. The same subject continued — Water, gas, etc. —
So, also, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain pri-
vate property may be taken for the purpose of supplying
the extent of the use of a highway
by the public, that distinguishes ■ it
from a private way or road. It is
the right to so use or travel upon it,
not its exercise." Wild v. Deig. 43
Ind. 455, 461. But it may be a public
road though maintained at private ex-
pense. Denham v. County Comm'rs,
108 Mass. 303; Davis v. Smith, 130
Mass. 113 ; Shaver v. Starrett, 4 Ohio
St 494; Perrine v. Farr, 38 N. J.
Law, 356; Procter v. Andover, 43
N. H. 348. See, also, Copeland v.
Packard, 16 Pick. 317 ; Crockett v.
Boston, 5 Cush. 182 ; Parks v. Boston,
8 Pick. 218. Power to narrow a
street may be given, but the ease-
ment of the abutting owners in the
street as it exists must be paid for.
Town of Rensselaer v. Leopold, 106
Ind. 29. Highways may be laid out
for pleasure driving. Higginson v.
Nahant, 11 Allen, 530; Petition of
Mount Washington Eoad Co., 35
N. H. 135; Lewis on Eminent Do-
main, § 175.
' South Park Comm'rs v. Williams,
51 HI. 57; In re Central Park Ex-
tension, 16 Abb. Pr. 56 ; Philadelphia
V. Germantown Pass. R. Co., 10 Phila.
(Pa.) 165. Land for a park may be
condemned outside the city limits
and conveniently near thereto. Mat-
ter of Mayor of New York, 99 N. Y.
569 ; Mayor v. Park Comm'rs, 44 Mich.
603. In St. Louis County Court v.
Griswold, 58 Mo. 175, it was held that
a county might be empowered to
take land for a park near to but out-
side of the limits of the city of St
Louis, and create a county debt
therefor. Nor was the act void for un-
certainty because the title to the land
was to vest in "the people of the
counts'.'' As to the rights of a land-
owner whose premises front on a
public park to enjoin its use for other
than public purposes, see Morris v.
Sea Girt Land Improvement Co., 38
N. J. Eq. 304 and note.
2 Owners &c. v. Mayor &c. of Al-
bany, 15 Wend. 374.
' Bankhead v. Brown, 35 Iowa, 540,
549.
* Warren v. Bunnell, 11 Vt 600. '
' Owners &c. v. Mayor &c of Al-
bany, 15 Wend. 874.
686
IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN.
[§ 670.
the inhabitants with water ' and gas ^ for public school build-
ings,' markets,* and almshouses.*
§ 670. The same subject continued — Cemeteries, sewers,
etc. — Lands may also be condemned for the purpose of a pub-
lic cemetery.' In this instancfe the land is deemed to be taken
,for public use, if all the public have a right of burial there,
even though^the privilege must be paid for and thus operate
practically to exclude some persons.' But it is otherwise if
the public have not and cannot acquire the right of sepulture.'
The construction of drains and sewers and levees is a public
purpose.' But drainage laws which permit the taking of prop-
1 Burden v. Stein, 37 Ala. 104, 116;
Cummings v. Peters, 56 Cal. 593 ; Lake
&c. Water Co. v. Conti-a Costa Co., 67
Cal. 659; St. Helena Water-works
V. Forbes, 63 Cal. 183; Lombard v.
Stearns, 4 Cush. 60 ; Ham v. Salem,
10 Mass. 350; Wayland v. County
Comm'rs, 4 Gray, 500; Bailey v.
Woburn, 136 Mass. 416; Tyler v.
Hudson, 147 Mass. 609; Martin v.
Gleason, 139 Mass. 183; Matter of
New Eochelle Water Co., 46 Hun,
535 ; Gardner v. Village of Newburgh,
3 Johns. Ch. 163; Stamford Water
Co. V. Stanley, 39 Hun, 434; In re
Middletown Village, 83 N. Y. 196;
In re Rochester Water Comm'rs, 66
N. Y. 413; Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md.
444 ; Kane v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore,
15 Md. 340; Eiche v. Bar Harbor
Water Co., 75 Me. 91; Thorn v.
Sweeney, 13 Nev. 351 ; State v. Eau
Claire, 40 Wis. 533. For this purpose,
also, authority may be given to con-
demn property situated at a distance
from the city. New York v. Bailey,
3 Denio, 433, 446. Compensation
must be made to those who own the
right to use the water. Emporia v.
Soden, 35 Kan. 588.
2 Bloomfleld &c. Natural Gas Light
Co. V. Richardson, 63 Barb. 437. See,
also. In re Deering, 93 N. Y. 361;
Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber, 3 R. 1.
15 ; Johnston v. People's Natural Gas
Co. (Pa.), 5 Cent Rep. 564.
' ChamberUn v. Morgan, 68 Pa. St
168; Long u Fuller, 68 Pa. St 170;
Township Board v. Hackman, 48 Mo.
343 ; Williams v. School District 33
Vt 371.
* Matter of Application of Cooper,
38 Hun, 515.
5 Hay ward v. Mayor &c. of New
York, 8 Barb. 486. And public build-
ings of all kinds. Lewis on Eminent
Domain, § 174.
6 Evergeen Cemetery Association v.
Beecher, 53 Conn. 551 ; Balch v.
County Comm'rs, 103 Mass. 106;
Edgeoumbe v. Burlington, 46 Vt 318.
' Evergreen Cemetery Association.
V. Beecher, 53 Conn. 551.
8 Evergreen Cemetery Association
V. Beecher, 53 Conn. 551 ; Matter of
Deansville Cemetery Association, 66
N. Y. 569.
sPatteraon v. Baumer, 43 Iowa,
477 ; Sessions v. Crunkilton, 30 Ohio
St 349 ; Zimmerman v. Canfield, 43
Ohio St 463 ; s. a, 9 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 383 ; Hildreth v. Lowell, 11
Gray, 345; People v. Nearing, 37
N. Y. 306; Norfleet v. Cromwell, 70
N. C. 634; s. C., 16 Am. Rep. 787;
. Hartwell v. Armstrong, 19 Barb. 166 ;
Burk V. Ayws, 19 Hun, 17 ; Matter of
Ryers, 73 N. Y. 1 ; Dingley v. Boston,
§ 6T1.] EMINENT DOMAIN. 687
erty for the chief object of promoting private interests are
unconstitutional.*
§671. The same subject continued — Leasing for public
use. — In a recent case decided by the New York Court of
Appeals,^ it was urged that the provisions of the New York
statute ' authorizing the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of
the city of New York to acquire water-front property, in-
cluding piers and bulkheads, were unconstitutional, upon the
ground that they contemplated an appropriation to the sole
use of special kinds of commerce or Of steamboats, and also a
lease of certain piers and rights of wharfage to a particular
steamship line to the exclusion of all others, thus constituting
what was contended to be a private and not a public use.
Peckham, J., delivering the opinion of the court, conceding
that an interest may be of a public nature when the use may
tend incidentally to benefit the public in some collateral way,
in which case the right to take property in invitum does not
exist, proceeded to show that property may rightfully, under
certain circumstances, be devoted to a special and particular
public use, and yet the entire public be permitted to use it or
100 Mass. 544; Bancroft u Cam- sought and attained, and private
bridge, 126 Mass. 438. benefit also found, is not improbable,
ijenal v. Green Island Draining So it is when private property is
Co., 12 Neb. 163 ; Cypress Pond Drain- taken for the public use of a lailroad,
ing Co. V. Hooper, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 350 ; and in quite as great degree ; but in
Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood County, such case the private interest pro-
8 Ohio St 338 ; Paterson v. Bau- moted is said to be incidental. And
mer, 48 lowav 477. Cf. Seely v. Se- though the works authorized to effect
bastian, 4 Oregon, 35 ; Anderson v. this public purpose are in any case
Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind. 199 ; Pool not extended beyond a particular,
V. Trexler, 76 N. C. 297. In discussing and it may be a small, district, the
a drainage act the Court of Appeals purpose is the same and is public."
of New York (Folger, J.) said:— Matter ofEyers, 72N. Y. 1,8. The
" Drainage acts of the legislature not constitutionality of these acts is
having in view the public health treated at length, and the authorities
solely have been recognized and ac- collated oy States, in Lewis on Emi-
quiesced in by the courts. But we nent Domain, g 188 et seq.
wish to be distinctly understood that 2 Jn re Application of Mayor &c.
we sustain this act as constitutional of New York (N. Y. Ct App., Ooto-
solely for that it plainly has for its ber, 1892), reported in the New York
purpose the preservation and promo- Law Journal, October 27, 1893.
tion of the public health. . . . » Ch. 574, Laws of 1871.
That the public purpose may be
688 IMPLIED POWEBS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 672.
have access to it only in a very restricted manner. Applying
these well recognized principles to the case in hand, he con-
tinued:— "We must consider the nature of the property
which is to be so used or leased, and the object and piirpose
of such use must be viewed in connection with the whole of
the property of like nature under the control and ownership
of the city. . . . The circumstances surrounding the case
must be viewed in all aspects. The act plainly contemplates,
through all its provisions, the fiict that there will always re-
main under the direct control and possession of the city suffi-
cient piers and docks for the accommodation of all the com-
merce which may seek our port, and which has no special
pier or dock leased to the owner of the vessel desiring dock
facilities." The act was unanimously pronounced constitu-
tional.^
§ 672. The same subject continued — Ornamental pur-
poses.— Bynkershoek is quoted by Chancellor Kent- as in-
sisting " that private property cannot be taken on any terms
without consent of the owner for purposes of public orna-
ment or pleasure." And Judge Dillon sa^^s that " if it be ad-
mitted or shown in any given case that the ornamental pur-
pose is not associated with any useful purpose, it would seem
to be true that it is inconsistent with the respect in which all
enlightened governments hold private property to. say that it
can be compulsoriiy taken from the owner." ' No case seems
'The opinion continues: — "Con- already stated, the use is a public
sidering the large extent of the prop- one. The use is public while the
erty of this description owned and to property is thus leased, because it
be owned by the city, together with fills an undisputed necessity existing
the fact that there is no absolute di- in regard to these common carriers
rection to the city to lease the small- by water, who are themselves en-
est portion thereof to any one, we gaged in fulfilling their obligations
became at once convinced that the to the general public r obligations
leasing which will be actually carried which could not otherwise be prop-
on under this mere permission will erly or effectually performed. And
amount to no more than a special in filling the necessity for such ac-
regulation of the manner in which a commodations the city or State is
comparatively small portion of the only performing its public duty.''
whole property of this nature owned ^ Gardner v. Village of Newburgh,
by the city shall be used for the 3 Johns. Ch. 161, 165.
legitimate ends of commerce. ... '2 Dillon on Munic. Corp., § 699,
When used by lessees under the facts where the author also remarks that
§ 673.] EMINENT DOMAIN.
to have been adjudicated in which the contemplated purpose
was wholly dissociated from any recognized "useful" pur-
pose. But the doctrine to be applied has been distinctly de-
clared by the Supreme Court in Vermont. The commissioners
in a proceeding to lay out a highway adjacent to a court-
house and town hall reported that they established the road
upon the ground of a general public necessity and convenience
which they considered almost indispensable for the use of the
court-house and town hall, etc., taking into account in part
" the looks " as well as the convenience and necessity ; but
that " for the purpose of embellishment alone or mainly " they
should not have established the road. The decision of the
county court rejecting this report was reversed upon appeal.
Eedfield, C. J., said : — " If it appeared upon the face of the
report that the prevailing ground with the commissioners in
establishing the highway was that of ornament and improve-
ment of the court-house grounds, we should regard it as an
insufficient basis upon which to lay the highway, and as equiv-
alent to a report against its being laid. But in the present
case we understand the prevailing motive in laying out the
road was the public convenience and private necessity, and'
the matter of ornament merely incidental and accessory. Ini
that view ... it does not seem to us objectionable." '
§ 673. Notice of proceeding — Necessity for. — The phrase
" due process of law," in the fourteenth amendment of the
federal constitution, is held to require notice to the owners
of land which it is sought to appropriate by condemnation!
proceedings. " Due process of law," said the Court of Ap-
peals of ISTew York, " requires an orderly proceeding adapted
to the nature of the case, in which the citizen has an oppor-
" it would be an extreme case where which may induce people to travel
a purpose was wholly ornamental on it are immaterial, and that pleas-
and not at all useful." ure travel may be accommodated as
1 Woodstock V. Gallup, 38 Vt 587, well as business travel. "Streets
590. See, also, West River Bridge may be widened and court-yards
Co. V. Dix, 6 How. 545. In Higgin- left which are for ornament and not
son V. Nahant, 11 Allen, 530, it was open to public travel" Mills oa
held that where there is a sufficient Eminent Domain, § 18, citing Bush-
amount of travel to warrant the lay- wick Ave., 48 Barb. 9.
ing out of a highway, the reasons
44
690
IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN.
[§ 674.
tunity to be heard, and to defend, enforce and protect his
rights. A hearing or an opportunity to be heard is absolutely
essential. We cannot conceive of due process of law without
this." ' But it is not needful that the statute should provide
for personal and individual notice, as distinguished from pub-
lic and general notice giv^ by advertisements in newspapers.*
And the propriety of taking private property for a public use
is not strictly a judicial question, and the parties interested
have no constitutional right to n»tice of proceedings to deter-
mine whether it shall be taken or not.'
§ 674r. Parties entitled to notice. — In proceedings to con-
demn land the statute generally provides that notice shall be
given to the " owners," which is construed to include those
who have vested estates appearing of record,* but not those
1 Stuart V. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183;
Campbell v. Dwlggins, 83 Ind. 473 ;
Harbeok v. Toledo, 11 Ohio St 319:
Lake Shore &a Co. v. Cincinnati &o.
Co., 116 Ind. 578; Molett v. Keenan,
23 Ala. 484 ; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23
Conn. 189 ; Matter of Village of Mid-
dletown, 82 N. Y. 196 ; Langford v.
Comm'rs, 16 Minn. 375; Darlington
V. Commonwealth, 41 Pa, St 68;
Baltimore v. Bouldin, 38 Md. 828;
Kidder v. Peoria, 39 III. 77. The case
of Swan V. Williams, 3 Mich. 437,
holding that no notice is required, is
pronounced by Messrs. Elliott to be
absolutely unsound. Elliott on Roads
and Streets, 150, n. On page 151 the
learned and discriminating authors
maintain that some provision for no-
tjice is absolutely essential to the con-
stitutionality of a law conferring tho
power to condemn, and must be so
declared though the property owner
actually appears before the apprais-
■ers; and they hold to the dissenting
'Opinion in Kramer v. Cleveland, 5
Ohio St 140.
2 Matter of Petition of De Peyster,
80 N. Y. 565; In re Empire City
Bank, 18 N. Y. 199; Starbuck v.
Murray, 5 Wend. 148 ; s. C, 31 Am.
Dec. 173; Davies v. Los Angeles
(1890), 86 Cal. 37; S. C, 34 Pac. Rep.
771; Polly v. Saratoga, 9 Barb. 449;
Owners &c. v. Albany, 15 Wend. 374 ;
Wilson V. Hathaway, 43 Iowa, 178 ;
followed in State v. Chicago &c. Ey.
Co., 80 Iowa, 586 ; Mason v. Messen-
ger, 17 Iowa, 261; Cupp v. Seneca
County, 19 Ohio St 173 ;~ Wilkin v.
St Paul, 16 Minn. 271; Palmyra v.
Morton, 25 Mo. 593 ; Nations v. John-
son, 24 How. 195.
' People V. Smith, 31 N. Y. 595, dis-
tinguishing such cases from the
process for arriving at the amount
of compensation. George's Creek Coal
Co. V. New Central, 40 Md. 435; El-
liott on Roads and Streets, 158.
* Gerrard v. Omaha &c. R Co., 14
Neb. 370 ; Parks v. City, 15 Pick. 198 ;
Shelton v. Derby; 37 Conn. 414; Har-
risburg v. Crangle, 3 Watts & S. 460 ;
New Orleans R. Co. v. Frederic, 46
Miss. 1 ; Philadelphia .Sfcc. R. Co. v. Will-
iams. 54 Pa. St 103 ; Elliott on Roads
and Streets, 235 and cases there cited.
Mortgagees are necessary parties.
Wilson V. European &c. R. Co., 67 Me.
358; Sherwood v. City, 109 Ind. 411 ;
Severin v. Cole, 38 Iowa, 468 ; Hagar
V. Brainard, 44 Vt 394 ; Cool v. Crom-
met, 13 Me. 350 ; Parker's Case, 36
N. H. 84 ; Astor v. Hoy t, 5 Wend. 603 ;
§ 675.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
691
whose interest consists of a mere lien, or contingent or incho-
ate estate. Under this rule a judgment creditor ' and the
holder of a contingent dower interest have no such substan-
tial right as to be entitled to notice.^
§ 675. Service of notice. — The notice, if so directed, must
be to the owner by name.' But it need not be personally
served on him,* although if sent by mail, and by reason of im-
proper addressing it never reaches the person for whom it is
intended, the proceeding as to him is of no effect.' Where
several commissioners published a notice that lands were
about to be taken for a railroad and that they would meet on
a dav named to lav out the route and assess damages, and the
notice was directed, '• To all persons owning land on the line
of the railroad, as the same is now or may be located through
section 23, township 11, range 25, in the county of Wyan-
dotte and State of Kansas," the United States Supreme Court
held it to be suflBcient notice to any one owning a quarter-
Mutual L. Ins. Co. V. Easton &c. R.
Co., 38 N. J. Eq. 132. And tenants
in common. Grand Rapids &c. R
Co: V. Alley, 34 Mich. 16. Of. Bow-
man V. Venice &c. R Co., 103 111. 459.
And both landlord and tenant
Voegtly V. Pittsburgh &c. R Co., 3
Grant's Cas. (Pa) 243 ; 6 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. of Law, 609. The trustee rep-
resents his cestui que trust. Hawkins
V. County Comm'rs, 2 Allen, 354;
State V. Orange, 32 N. J. Law, 49. As
to w^ver of insufficiency in the
notice by appearance without objec-
tions, see Harrington v. Wafford,
46 Wis. 31 ; Morrow v. Weed, 4
Iowa, 77; People v. Hagar, 53 Cal.
171 ; Delany v. Gault, 30 Pa. St. 65 ;
Muncy u Joest, 74 Ind. 407 ; Headrick
uWhittemore, 105 Mass. 33. In Will-
iams V. Hartford &c. R Co., 13 Conn.
397, a notice was sent on the day pre-
vious to the appraisal to the owner,
who lived in close proximity to the
place. He sent a wi-itten protest but
not asking for delay. The notice was
held BufiScient. " If the facts are such
as to impart notice that the person in
possession has a proprietary claim to
the land or color of title, then he
should be made a party." Elliott on
Roads and Streets, 338 and cases
cited.
1 Gimbel v. StxAte, 59 Ind. 446 ; Wat-
son V. N. Y. &c. R Co., 47 N. Y. 157.
- Moore v. Mayor, 4 Sandf. Ch. 456 :
Jackson v. Edwards, 7 Paige, 386;
City V. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 390 ; Dun-
can V. Terre Haute, 85 Ind. 104. See,
also, Siniar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 398.
'Birge v. Chicago &c. R Co., 65
Iowa, 440.
* Harper v. Lexington &c, R. Co., 3
Dana (Ky.), 227.
" Morgan v. Chicago &o. R Co., 36
Mich. 428. The substance of the no-
tice must be such as the statute re-
quires and must be given in the mode
prescribed, and if proceedings are not
begun at the time designated a new
notice must be issued. These and
all other matters relating to the con-
demnation of land for roads and
streets are carefully and thoroughly
treated in Elliott on Roads and
Streets,
693 IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 676.
section in section 23 that some of his land might be taken.'
It was further held that a non-resident owner was concluded
by such publication as well as a resident owner.^ Where the
form of the notice is matter of detail in the enabling act, the
provisions must be carefully carried out. Thus if the law
says the notice must state the time when the commissioners
will begin condemnation proceedings and it fails to show the
time, the proceedings will be held void ; ' or if the law directs
the notice to be served, in case*of a corporation, on its presi-
dent, or some other named oflBcer, service on any other official
is not legal service.*
§ 676. Treaty with the owner. — The owner of property
has no constitutional right to an opportunity to sell' and a
failure to agree as a preliminary to proceedings to condemn.'
But it has been held that if the statute authorizes a seizure
only in case no agreement can be made with him, the proceed-
ings are fatallv defective if thev fail to show that this condi-
tion has been fulfilled.* According to some authorities proof
of the fact is deemed to be waived by proceeding to trial
without objection,' while others declare that the objection
iHulingu Kaw Valley Ey. & Imp. "Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids
Co., 130 U. a 559. &c. R. Ck)., 58 Mich. 641.
2 See, also, Harvey u Tyler, 3 "Wall. 6 Graf v. City of St Louis, 8 Mo.
325; Secombe v. Raih'oad Co., 33 A pp. 563, citing Kansas City &a R.
Wall. 108 ; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. Co. v. Campbell, 63 Mo. 585 ; Moses
S. 714 ; McMillan v. Anderson. 95 U. v. St Louis Sectional Dock Co., 84
S. 37 ; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 Mo. 243 ; reversing s. G, 9 Mo. App.
U. S. 97, 105; Hagar v. Reclamation 571. See, also, to the same point, State
tMstrict 111 TJ. S. 701 : Boom Co. v. v. Trenton, 36 N. J. Law, 499 ; Mat-
Patterson, 98 U. a 403, 406. ter of Opening House Ave., 67 Barb.
'Missouri Pao. Ry. Ca v. House- 350; Matter of Marsh, 71 N. Y. 315;
man, 41 Kan. 300. Powers v. Railroad Co., 33 Ohio St
<St Paul &c. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota 439; Arnold u Village of Decatur, 39
&C. Ry. Co., 36 Minn. 85 ; Ackerman Mich. 77 ; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 19
V. HuflP, 71 Tex. 317. See, also, Corey Cal. 47 ; Morseman v. Ionia, 33 Mich.
V. Chicago &c. Ry. Co., 100 Mo. 283. 383. Cf. ^tna Mills v. Waltham, 126
Any local rule, statutory or judicial, Mass. 422 ; Ney v. Swinney, 36 Ind.
that notice is ineflfectual unless per- 454 In Hall v. People, 57 HI. 307,
Bonally served on all resident owners such a provision was held directory
must be strictly followed. Mulligan in a collateral proceeding.
V. Smith, 59 CaL 306 ; State v. Fond ' Taylor v. Clemson, 11 Clark &. F.
duLao, 43 Wis. 287; Kundingerr. 610; President &a v. Diffebach, 1
Saginaw, 69 Mich. 365. Yeates, 367.
§ 6YY.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
693
may be taken at any stage of the case, even after award.*
There must be a genuine effort to effect an agreement,* but
" the attempt need not be prosecuted further than to develop
the fact that an agreement is impossible;" ' and if the owner
is under a legal disability to contract, the statute has no ap-
plication.* If the petition states the inability to agree, it need
not recite the circumstances,' unless the statute so requires."
§ 677. The application or petition. — The statute some-
times grants power to the municipal authorities to initiate
proceedings to condemn land of their own motion, but more
generally it is provided that this shall be done upon applica-
tion or petition. In the latter case a sufficient application is
absolutely essential to confer jurisdiction.' The petition should
be in substantial conformity with the statute, but technical
accuracy is not requisite.' If, however, it is provided that
the petition must be signed by a certain number of persons
with prescribed qualifications, this is a jurisdictional require-
ment, and if the record fails to show affirmatively the exist-
ence of the fact, the proceedings will, when attacked directly,
• Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 301
and cases there cited.
2 Lane v. Saginaw, 53 Mich. 442.
' Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 303,
citing Matter of the Village of Mi^-
dleton, 82 N. Y. 196
* Lane v. Saginaw, 53 Mich. 442.
See, also. President &c. v. Dififebach,
1 Yeates, 367.
5 Bowman v. Venice &c. R Co., 103
III. 459 ; Matter of Lockport &o. R.
Co., 77 N. Y. 557.
6 See Matter of Marsh, 71 N. Y. 315.
" State V. Morse, 50 N. H. 9. It was
held in that case, however, that al-
though the record of the layitig out of
a highway disclosed no application,
yet, the record being ancient, such
an application might be presumed by
the jury, in connection with user
even for less than twenty years.
Oliphant v. Coram'rs of Atchison
County, 18 Kan. 386; Common-
wealth V. Peters, 3 Mass. 229 ; State
V. Otoe, 6 Neb. 139 ; People v. Judge
&c., 40 Mich. 64; State v. Berry, 13
Iowa, 58. The municipal authori-
ties cannot delegate the power con-
fided to them. Oliphant v. Comm'rs,
supra. Rut they may appoint a com-
mittee to report on expediency. Dor-
man V. Lewlston, 81 Me. 411.
8 The use of the word " road " in-
stead of highway is not fatal. Wind-
ham V. Comm'rs, 26 Me. 406. See,
also, Dickinson County v. Hogan, 39
Kan. 606; Dorman v. Lewiston, 81
Me. 411. Nor is it necessary that
those authorized to judge of the
necessity and convenience of ways
shall use technical terms in their ad-
judication and location, provided
their intention is manifest, and they
have jurisdiction of the subject.
Windham v. Coram'rs, 36 Me. 406.
" Public convenience and necessities
of the city" is equivalent to the
statutory phrase, " common conven-
ience and necessity." Dorman v,
Lewiston, 81 Me. 411.
694
IMPLIED POWEKS AND , EMTSrENT DOMAIN.
[§678.
as by petition in error, be held void.' If attacked collater-
ally, it may be proved by evidence aliunde that the petition-
ers are duly qualified.^ There is no jarisdiction to act unless
the petition contains substantially all that the statute declares
shall be inserted in it. Thus a statement that in the opinion
of the petitioners the improvement asked for should be made
is not an averment that in their opinion public interests re-
qjiire it.' But the law looks to the substance rather than to
the form, and if there is a substantial compliance with every
essential condition it is sufficient.* In the case of a proposed
highway it is the practice to state at least the termini with
reasonable and approximate detiniteness,' and it should ap-
pear affirmatively that it is within the territorial jurisdiction
of the tribunal;* and an averment of necessity for the taking
is generally deemed jurisdictional.''
§678. The tribunal. — ITo appropriation of land can be
made unless the statute provides a tribunal for the assess-
ment of damages.' But while the legislature must provide an
iQliphanfc'y. Comm'rs of Atchison
County, 18 Kan. 386 ; Early v. Ham-
ilton, 75 Ind. 376 ; Board v. Mulilen-
backer, 18 Kan. 139; Conway v.
Ascherman, 94 Ind. 887.
2 Oliphant v. Comm're of Atchison
County, 18 Kan. 386; WiUis v.
Sproule, 13 Kan. 257; Robinson v.
Eippey, 111 Ind. 113; Austin u Allen,
6 Wis. 134.
»/n re Grove Street, 61 Cal. 438.
* Matter of Comm'rs of Washing-
ton Park, 53 N. T. 131, where an an-
nexed schedule, referred to in the
petition, was deemed a part of it
5 Hayford v. County Comm'rs, 78
Me. 153; Pembroke v. County
Comm'rs, 13 Cush. 351, in both of
which cases the petition was fatally
defective on this point See, also,
generally, on sufficiency of descrip-
tion, Hyde Park v. Norfolk, 117
Mass. 416; Smith v. Weldon, 78 Ind.
454 ; Jackson v. Rankin, 67 Wis. 285 ;
Clement v. Burns, 43 N. H. 609;
Windsor v. Field, 1 Conn. 279 ; Hen-
line V. People, 81 111. 269 ; Sumner v.
Comm'rs, 37 Me. 112; Mossman v.
Forrest, 27 Ind. 233 ; Toledo &c. E.
Co. V. Munson, 57 Mich. 42 ; West v.
West &c. R Co., 61 Miss. 536 ; Wat-
son V. Crowsore, 93 Ind. 220.
6 Elliott on Roads and Streets, 254.
' Colville V. Judy, 73 Mo. 651 ; In
re Road in Sterrett Twp., 114 Pa. St
627 ; Brown v. Rome &c. R Co., 86
Ala. 206 ; Harvey v. Helena, 6 Mont
114; Leath v. Summers, 8 Ired. (Law),
108. Formal objections should be spe-
cific and pi-omptly made. Meranda
n Spurlin, 100 Ind. 380; Worcester
V. Keith, 5 Allen, 17 ; Carr v. State,
103 Ind. 548 ; Bachelor v. New Hamp-
ton, 60 N. H. 207 ; Wells v. Rhodes,
114 Ind. 467. As to allowance of
amendment, see Young v. Lacouia,
59 N. H. 534 ; Russell v. Turner, 62
Me. 496; Cool man v. Fleming, 83
Ind. 117; Elliott on Roads and
Streets, 256, and cases cited.
8 Ames V. Lake Superior &e. Ca,
31 Minn. 241 ; Penn. R. Co. v. Heister,
8 Barr, 445.
679.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
695
impartial tribunal to ascertain the amount of compensation '
and give the parties interested an opportunity to be heard
before such tribunal, it may determine what the tribunal shall
be — whether a jury, a court without a jury, or commissioners
selected by the court.^ The tribunal must, however, be one
of a judicial nature, though not necessarily a court or a body
exercising judicial functions only ; ' and the weight of authority
is that jurisdiction must appear upon the face of the record.*
§ 679. Right to jury trial. — The constitutional provision
which declares that the right of trial by jury shall remain in-
violate has no relation to proceedings for the condemnation
of private property by eminent domain.' But some of the
1 What shall be a " just compensa-
tlon" can be determined only by
some impartial agency. The parties
who take the land cannot be allowed
to determine it. Hessler v. Drainage
Comm'rs, 53 111. 105 ; Powers w Bears,
12 Wis. 214; Lumsden v. Milwau-
kee, 8 Wis. 485. Cf. Floumoy v.
City, 17 Ind. 169 ; McMicken v. Cin-
cinnati, 4 Ohio St. 394, where the
rule is relaxed in cases where an ap-
peal is allowed. The legislature can-
not prescribe a schedule of prices.
Cunningham v. Campbell, 33 Ga. 625.
A person ought not to be appointed
to review damages in laying out a
road who has formed or expressed
an opinion upon the subject with a
knowledge of the facts, and the as-
sessment made under such appoint-
ment will be set aside on certiorari;
no person, however, who knew of
such objection at the time of the ap-
pointment and did not make it then
will be allowed to take advantage of
it upon certiorari. Inhabitants of
Eeadington v. DiUey, 24 N. J. Law,
209.
2 Ames V. Lake Superior &c. R. Co.,
21 Minn. 341. The legislature may
confer upon the board of supervisors
of one county the power to lay out a
road in another county. People v.
Lake County, S3 Cal. 487; United
States V. Jones, 109 U. S. 518. The
tribunal should be composed of dis-
interested persons. As to disqualifi-
cation by relationship to parties, see
Clifford V. Comm'rs, 59 Me. 262. The
interest of a general tax-payer may
be disregarded. State v. Crane, 36
N. J. Law, 894; Bradley v. Frank-
fort, 99 Ind. 417 ; Chase v. Rutland,
47 Vt. 393. But the disqualification
by direct interest has its origin in the
fundamental nature of law. State v.
Crane, 36 N. J. Law, 394. supra; El-
liott on Roads and Streets, 217. Cf.
Mayor &c. v. Long, 31 Mo. 369;
Foot V. Stiles, 57 N. Y. 899. Selection
by lot is not an appointment by the
court. Menges v. City of Albany, 56
N. Y. 374.
'■> State V. Macdonald, 26 Minn. 445 ;
Doctor V. Hartman, 74 Ind. 321;
White V. Conover, 5 Blackf. 462;
State V. Richmond, 6 Foster (N. H.),
235 ; Shue v. Comm'rs, 41 Mich. 638.
< Elliott on Roads and Streets, 218
et seq., where the authorities are ex-
amined.
" The reason is that the right in
such cases did not exist at common
law. Beekman v. Saratoga &c. R.
Co., 3 Paige Ch. 45; s. c, 22 Am.
Deo. 679; Willyard v. Hamilton, 7
696
IMPLIED P0WEE8 AND EMINENT DOMAIN.
[§ 679.
constitutions secure tlie right in this class of cases in express
terms.* Arid where the word " jury " is used it is construed
to denote ex vi termini a body of twelve men acting substan-
tially through the accustomed forms by which the powers of
a jury are exercised.^ It is generally held in interpreting
these provisions that if a jury trial may be had in an appellate,
court, it is no objection that the preliminary hearing is before
a tribunal without a jury.* And a jury may be waived by
agreement of the parties interesfJfed.*
Ohio (Part II), 111 ; s. C, 30 Am. Dec.
195 ; Montgomery S. R. Co. v. Sayre,
73 Ala. 443; Heyneman v. Blake. 19
Cal. 579; Scudder v. Trenton Del.
Falls Co., 1 Saxt. Ch. 694; s. C, 23
Am. Dec. 756 ; Backus v. Lebanon,
11 N. H. 19; S. C, 35 Am. Dec. 466;
Bruggerman v. True, 35 Minn. 123 ;
Copp V. Henniker, 55 N. H. 189;
Hymes v. Aydelott, 20 Ind. 431;
Drbnberger v. Reed, 11 Ind. 420;
Lipes V. Hand, 104 Ind. 503; City of
Kansas v. Hill, 80 Mo. 523 ; Kendall
V. Post 8 Ora 161 ; Warts v. Hoag-
land, 114 U.S. 606; Missouri Pac. E.
Co. V. Hunes, 115 U. S. 512; People
V. Smith, 21 N. T. 595; Hood v.
Finch, 8 Wis. 381 ; Ligat v. Common-
wealth, 19 Pa. St 456 ; Virginia &c.
R. Co. V. EUiott, 5 Nev. 358; Ander-
son V. Caldwell, 91 Ind. 451; Kim-
ball V. Board of Supervisors, 46 Cal.
19. Contra, Kramer v. Cleveland &c.
E. Co., 5 Ohio St 140 ; Rhine v. Mc-
Kinney, 53 Tex. 354 ; Henderson v.
Nashville E. Co., 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 173.
See, also, Lewis on Eminent Domain,
g 811. " The proceeding for the ascer-
tainment of the value of the property
and consequent compensation to be
made is merely an inquisition to es-
tablish a particular fact as a prelim-
inary to the actual taking; and it
may be prosecuted before commis-
sioners or special boards, or the
courts, with or without the interven-
tion of a jury, as the legislative power
may designate. AU that is required
is that it shall be conducted in some
fair and just manner, with oppor-
tunity to the owners of the property
to present evidence as to its value,
and to be heard thereon." Justice
Field in United States v. Jones, 109
U. S. 513, 519.
1 WiUiams v. Pittsburgh, 83 Pa. St
71 ; Mitchell v. Illinois &c. R Co., 68
111. 286 ; Weber v. County of Santa
Clara, 59 Cal. 265 ; Louisville && R.
Co. V. Dryden, 39 Ind. 393; Paul v.
Detroit, 32 Mich. 108 ; Ipsom v. Mis-
sissippi &c. R Co., 36 Miss. 300.
2 Clark V. City of Utica, 18 Barb.
451. Unanimity is necessary to a
legal verdict Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio
St 167 ; Whitehead v. Arkansas &c.
R Co., 28 Ark. 460 ; Des Moines v.
Layman, 21 la. 158 ; Mitchell v. Illi-
nois &c R Co., 68 Dl. 386 ; Cooley's
Const Lim. (4th ed.) 394. Cf. Cruger
V. Hudson River R Co., 12 N. Y. 190 ;
McManus v. McDonough, 107 Bl. 95.
3 Stewart v. Baltimore, 7 Md. 500 ;
Hapgood V. Doherty, 8 Gray, 373;
Thorp ?'. Witham, 65 la. 566 ; Max-
well V. Board, 119 Ind. 30; Lamb v.
Lane, 4 Ohio St 167; Reckner v.
Wai-ner, 33 Ohio St 375 ; Atlanta v.
Central R Co., 53 Ga. 130. A bond
may be required by statute on ap-
peal. Lewis on Eminent Domain,
g 312. and cases cited.
< Chicago &C. Ry. Co. v. Hock, 118
m. 587.
§§ 680, 681.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
697
§ 680. Right to abandon proceedings. — In the absence of
statutory provisions requiring proceedings once begun to be
prosecuted to completion, it is almost universally held that
the party instituting them has a right to withdraw at any
time before the compensation is determined, that is, before
the confirmation of the commissioner's report.' And although
it is held in New York that " the order of confirmation oper-
ates as a judgment binding both paf ties," ^ the prevailing rule
is that the public authorities have a reasonable time to decide
whether to accept the land or other property at the price
fixed or to discontinue the proceedings.*
§ 681. Damages upon discontinuance of proceedings. —
Upon a discontinuance the land-owner is entitled to recover
his legal costs, at any rate, and probably other legitimate ex-
1 Elkhart v. Simonton, 71 Ind. 7 ;
Brokaw v. City of Terre Haute, 97
Ind. 451 ; Chicago &c. Co. v. Swinney,
97 Ind. 586; Hunting v. Curtis, 10
Iowa, 152; Corbin v. Cedar Rapids
&c Co., 66 Iowa, 73 ; Graflf v. Balti-
more, 10 Md. 544; Black v. Mayor,
50 Md. 235; Clarke v. Manchester,
56 N. H. 502 ; Why te v. City of Kan-
sas, 22 Mo. App. 409 ; Joseph v. Ham-
ilton, 43 Mo. 282; Stiles v. Middle-
sex, 8 Vt. 486; HuUin v. Second
Municipality, 11 Rob. (La.) 97; Ap-
plication for Widening &c., 4 Rob.
(La.) 357; Stevens v. Danbury, 58
Conn. 9 ; O'Neil v. Freeholders, 41 N.
J. Law, 161 ; Chesapeake &c. R. Co.
V. Bradford, 6 West Va. 620. In New
York it is held that the court may
impose conditions. Matter of Wav-
erly Water Works, 85 N. Y. 478. See,
also, Beekman Street, 20 Johns. 269 ;
Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 655.
It would seem to be reasonable to
require a party to make his election
within the time allowed for filing
objections to the report. Crume v.
Wilson, 104 Ind. 583; People u. Com-
mon Council of Syracuse, 78 N. Y.
56. In England, after notice of in-
tention to take, even before the price
is ascertained, the proprietor acquires
the right to insist upon fulfillment
of the award when made. Queen v.
Birmingham &c. Ry. Co., 6 Ry. Cas.
628 ; s. C, 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 376 ; King
V. Market St. Comm'rs, 4 Barn. &
Ad. 335; Stone v. Commercial Ry.
Co., 4M. & C. 133; Walker u. East-
ern Counties Ry. Co., 6 Harr. 594 ;
Tawney v. Lynn &c. Ry. Co., 6 L. J.
(N. S.) Eq. 382.
2 Matter of Rhinebeck &c. R. Co.,
67 N. Y. 243. See, also, Drath v. B. &
M. R Co., 15 Neb. 365.
8 O'Neil V. Freeholders &c., 41 N. J.
Law, 161 ; Mabon v. Halsted, 39 N. J.
Law, 640 ; Merrick v. Baltimore, 43
Md. 219 ; Mayor &c. of Baltimore v.
Musgrave, 48 Mo. 272; Joseph v.
Hamilton, 48 Mo. 282; People v.
Hyde Park, 117 111. 462; Wilkinson
V. Bixter, 88 Ind. 574; Carson v.
Hartford, 48 Conn. 68 ; State v. Mills,
29 Wis. 322. There should be no un-
reasonable delay. Baltimore &c. Co.
V. Nesbit, 10 How. 395. See, also,
Williams v. New Orleans R. Co., 60
Miss. 689. But, in favor of the prop-
erty owner, an unreasonable delay
may constitute an abandonment by
implication. Bensley v. Mountain
698
IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN.
[§ 681.
penses,' which in one case were held not to include counsel
fees.^ " If, pending proceedings, possession has been taken of
the property sought to be condemned, the abandonment of
such proceedings renders such possession wrongful from the
beginning, and a suit will lie for any damages occasioned by
the entry and possession." ' In many cases the owner is kept
in suspense for a considerable period before the election to
discontinue is made, during which time he is unable to dis-
pose of his property, deems it injbdicious to improve it, or is
otherwise deprived of the beneficial use of it. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana declared that the fact of great delay and
abandonment of the suit vi as prima facie evidence that it was
unnecessary and gave judgment for damages.* The same doc-
trine was laid down by the Court of Appeals of Maryland,*
and subsequently affirmed with the qualification that the de-
lay must be culpable or unreasonable, which is a question of
fact for the jury.* Further than this the courts are not dis-
posed to go.^
Lake Water Co., 13 Cal. 306. For
other cases of constructive abandon-
ment, see Mabon v. Halsted, 39 N. J.
Law, 640; Breeae v. Poole, 16 IlL
App. 551. Costs of discontinuance,
'i North Missouri R Co. v. Lackland,
25 Md. 515. The right to abandon
proceedings is frequently regulated
by statute, and many cases con-
struing these provisions are cited in
Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 356.
1 Carson v. City of Hartford, 48
Conn. 68; Graff v. Mayor &c. of
Baltimore, 10 Md. 544; State v.
Graves, 19 Md. 351 ; Gear v. Dubuque
& C. R Co., 20 Iowa, 523 ; McLaugh-
lin V. Municipality, 5 La. Ann. 504
See, also, Martin v. Mayor, 1 Hill,
545; Felton f. Milwaukee, 47 Wis.
494 ; Leisse v. St. Louis &c. R Co.,
73 Mo. 561 ; North Missouri &c. R Co.
V. Lackland, 35 Mo. 515; State v.
Waldron, 17 N. J. Law, 369.
2 Bergman v. St Paul &o. R Co.,
31 Minn. 583.
' Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 658,
citing Pittsburg &c. R Co. v. Swin-
ney, 97 Ind. 586 ; Hullin v. Second
Municipality of New Orleans, 11 Eob.
(La.) 97; Van Valkenburg v. Mil-
waukee, 43 Wis. 574
^McLaughlin v. Municipality, 5
La. Ann. 504 Where the proceed-
ings are rightfully discontinued,
after award made, the land-owner's
remedy, if he has any, is by a special
action for damages and not by man-
damus or other action to collect the
amount State v. Graves, 19 Md.
351 ; Milliard v. Lafayette, 5 La. Ann.
112; In re Canal St, 11 Wend. 155.
* Norris v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore,
44 Md. 598, holding that the measure
of damages is interest upon tlie mar-
ket value of the property for the
time the delay was without justifia-
ble excuse.
6 Black V. Mayor &a of Baltimore,
50 Md. 335. To the same effect, see
Leisse v. St Louis &c R Co., 2 Mo.
App. 105 ; s. c, 5 Mo. App. 585 ; 72
Mo. 561. See, also. White v. City of
Kansas, 23 Mo. App. 49.
'Carson v. \jity of Hartford, 48
§ 682.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
699
§ 682. Compensation. — Pecuniary compensation must be
paid to the person whose property is taken, the amount of
which is fixed by inquest before a jury or before commission-
ers. The compensation must be the full reasonable value of
the interest appropriated, and the measure of damages is the
market value.^ In estimating the market value speculative
considerations do not have weight unless, in exceptional cases,
the probable increase in value from whatever cause can be
very clearly proven. But improvements on the property
taken may not be disregarded.^ The market value is usually
calculated at what the property would " bring in the hands of
a prudent seller at liberty to fix the time and the conditions
of the sale." ' And considerations of association or affection
are not admitted. In Massachusetts the court held that it
Conn. "68; Bergman. u. St. Paul &c.
K. Co., 31 Minn. 533; Van Valken-
burg V. Milwaukee, 43 Wis. 574 ; Fel-
ton V. Milwaukee, 47 Wis. 494. Mar-
tin V. Mayor &c of Brooklyn, 1 Hill,
545, decides that there is no ac-
tion even for unreasonable delay.
Where the proceedings are aban-
doned after award made and subse-
quently recommenced, it has been
held that the first award is binding
and a bar to the new proceedings.
Bogers v. St Charles, 3 Mo. App. 41.
See, also, Hupert v. Anderson, 35
Iowa, 578. Many statutes now give
a right to recover damages upon
abandonment The expression,
" trouble and expense," is construed
in Whitney v. Lynn, 133 Mass. 338.
See, also, Stafford v. Albany, 7 Johns.
541.
1 Hill V. Railroad Co., 5 Denio, 306 ;
In re Furman St, 17 Wend. 649;
Lawrence v. Boston, 119 Mass. 136;
BurtuBrigham, 117 Mass. 307; Cobb
V. Boston, 113 Mass. 181 ; Fall River
Works V. Fall River, 110 Mass. 428;
Edmunds v. City of Boston, 108 Mass.
E35 ; King v. Minneapolis Union Ry.
Co., 33 Minn. 334 : Jones v. New Or-
leans &c. R Co., 70 Ala. 337; Cohpn
V. St Louis &c. R. Co., 34 Kan. 158;
St. Louis &c. R Ca v. Anderson, 39
Ark. 167 ; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Ja-
cobs, 110 111. 414 ; Jacksonville &c. R.
Co. V. Walsh, 106 111. 353; Sidener v.
Essex, 33 Ind. 201 ; Comm'rs v. Rail-
road Co., 63 Iowa, 397 ; Bangor &c. i
R. Co. V. McComb, 60 Me. 390 ; Rail-
road Co. V. Whalen, 11 Neb. 585;
Virginia &c. R Co. v. Elliott, 5 Nev.
358 ; Pittsburgh &c. R Co. v. Rose, 74
Pa. St 363 ; Howard v. Providence,
6 R I. 514 ; Chapman v. Oshkosh &c.
R Co.. 33 Wis. 639 ; Memphis v. Bol-
ton, 9 Heisk. 508 ; Ontario &c. R Co.
V. Taylor, 6 Ont Rep. Q. B. Div. 838 ;
Penny v. Penny, 37 L. J. Ch. 340.
Witnesses acquainted with the mar-
ket value may testify to their opin-
ion, though it is said to be the pre-
vailing rule that a witness cannot be
asked how much damages a party has
suffered. Elliott on Roads and Streets,
107, and cases cited.
2 Jacksonville &c. Ry. Co. v. Walsh,
106 111. 353 ; Lafayette &c. Ry. Co. v.
Winslow, 66 111. 319.
'6 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law,
p. 568, citing, among other cases, Law-
rence V. Boston, 119 Mass. 136; Mem-
phis V. Bolton, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 508 ;
Tufts V. Charlestown, 4 Gray, 537;
Cobb V. Boston, 113 Mass. 181.
700 IMPLIED POWEES AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 683.
was not competent to take into account what the owner would
give rather than be turned out of his property.' Nor can the
fact that the particular lot is absolutely indispensable to the
project of the corporation be made an element in its value.''
But of course the purpose to which property has been put
and in view of which improvements have been made is very
justly a factor in the case.'
§ 6S3. Elements in estimating compensation. — The state-
ment that the indispensability of the property to the taker's
purposes is not to afifect the amount of compensation must be
taken with the qualification that where property is found in
every way suitable and he seeks to condemn it, although other
property could be obtained not quite so conveniently situated,
the owner is entitled to the benefit of the suitability in esti-
mating its value. In the case of Mississippi &o. Boom Co. v.
Patterson,* the plaintiff, a boom construction company, en-
titled by law to enter upon and occupy lands necessary to
properly conduct its business, sought to acquire a chain of
islands in the Mississippi river, very well fitted to form, by
connecting their shore line, a boom of great dimensions. The
result of the original proceedings was an award of $3,000,
from which both parties appealed. Upon a second appraise-
ment the jury assessed the value of the property at $300, but
in view of its adaptability for boom purposes they found a
further and additional value of $9,058.33. The company con-
tended that the $300 appraisal was all it could be made to
pay. Mr. Justice Field, for the court, said : — " In determin-
ing the value of land appropriated for public purposes the same
considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property be-
tween private parties. The inquiry in such cases must be,
what is the property worth in the market, viewed not merely
with reference to the uses to which it is at the time applied,
but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted ;
that is to say, what is its worth from its availability for valu-
iTufts?;. Charlestown, 4Gray,537. R. Co., 37 Wis. 98; Chicago &c. k
2 Virginia &c. R. Co. v. Elliott, 5 Co. v. Jacobs, 110 III. 414; Robb v.
Nev. 358; Penny v. Penny, 37 L. J. Maysville &c. E. Co., 3 Met. 117;
Ch. 840. King v. Minneapolis R. Co., 33 Minn.
8 Michigan &c. Ry. Co. v. Barnes, 334.
44 Mich. 233 ; Price v. Milwaukee &c * 98 U. S. 408.
§684.] KM INENT DOMAIN. 701
able uses. Property is not to be deemed worthless because
the owner allows it to go to waste, or to be regarded as value-
less because he is unable to put it to any use. Others may be
able to use it, and make it subserve the necessities or conven-
iences of life. Its capability of being made thus available gives
it a market value which can be readily estimated." . . .
The learjied justice goes on to show the adaptability of the
islands to the company's purposes, and adds : — " Their adapt-
ability for boom purposes was a circumstance, therefore, which
the owner had a right to insist upon as an element in estimat-
ing the value of his lands." ^
§ 684. The same subject continued. — Some oases go even
further and hold that the owner is entitled to the highest
price the property will bring for the use to which it may most
advantageously be applied.- Judge Cooley expresses himself
on the subject of compensation as follows : — " The principle
upon which the damages are to be assessed is always an im-
portant consideration in these cases, and the circumstances of
different appropriations are sometimes so peculiar that it has
been found somewhat difficult to establish a rule that shall
always be just and equitable. If the whole of a man's estate
is taken there can generally be little difficulty in fixing upon
the measure of compensation ; for it is apparent that in such
a case he ought to have the whole market value of his prem-
ises, and he cannot reasonably demand more. The question
is reduced to one of market value, to be determined upon the
testimony of those who have knowledge upon that subject or
whose business or experience entitles their opinion to weight.
It may be that, in such a case, the market value may not seem
to the owner an adequate compensation, for he may have rea-
sons peculiar to himself, springing from association or other
cause, which make him unwilling to part with the property
on the estimate of his neighbors ; hui such reasons a/re inca-
pable of hemg taken into account in legal proceedings where the
iSee, also, In re Furman St, 17 ^In re Furman Street, 17 Wend.
Wend. 669 ; Goodwin v. C, & W. 669 ; King v. Minneapolis &c. E. Co.,
Canal Co., 18 Ohio St 169 ; Yanoy v. 83 Minn. 324. See, also, as to re-
Harrison, 17 Ga. 30. That no allow- covery for incidental injuries to re-
ance is to be made for the good-will maining land, Elliott on Eoada and
of a business, see Edmunds v. Bos- Streets, 193, 104.
ton, 108 Mass, 535.
702 IMPLIED P0WEE8 AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 685.
question is one of compensation in money, inasmuch as it is
manifestly impossible to measure them by any standard for
estimating values which is applied in other cases and which
necessarily measures the worth of property by its value as an
article of sale, or as a means of producing pecuniary returns." '
§ 685. Benefits. — There is a wide difference of opinion
among the courts upon the question AV^hether the damages for
the land taken may be offset either wholly or partly by the
benefits that accrue to the resiaue. It is said in a standard
treatise that the authorities range themselves under these
heads : — " 1st. Those holding that benefits cannot in any case
be set off against the injury sustained by the land-owner.^
2d. Those holding that special benefits may not be set off
against the value of the land actually seized, but may be set
off against incidental injuries sustained by the land-owner.'
3d. Those holding that special benefits may be set off against
the value of the land as well as against incidental injuries." *
In all cases the benefits claimed must be special to the partic-
ular parcel affected * and of a kind not common to the public
at large.* In several States there are statutory or constitu-
tional provisions forbidding a deduction on account of bene-
fits. In declaring the construction of such an inhibition the
Court of Appeals of New York said : — " Whatever land is taken
must be paid for by the railroad company at its full market
value, and from such value no deduction can be made, although
the remainder of the land-owner's property may be largely
1 Cooley's Consf. Lim. (6th e(J.) 646, v. State, 5 Blackf. 384; Putnam v.
647. Douglas County, 6 Oregon, 338 ; s. a,
2 Elliott on Roads and Streets, 188, 25 Am. Rep. 537 ; Root's Case, 77 Pa.
189, citing, among other cases. New St 376: Nichols v. Bridgeport, 28
Orleans &c. E. Co. v. Mayo, 39 Miss. Conn. 189. See, also, 6 Am. & Eng.
374; Memphis v. Bolton, 9 Heisk. Encyc. of Law, p. 581.
(Tenn.) 508 ; Israel v. Jewett, 29 la. ' Lexington v. Long, 31 Mo. 369 ;
475 ; Savannah v. Hartridge, 37 Ga. Paducah v. Memphis &c. Co., 13
113. Heisk. (Tcnn.) 1; Selma v. Rome &c.
' Citing, among other cases, Rob- Co., 45 Ga. 180 ; Koestenbader v.
bins V. Milwaukee &c. Co., 6 Wis. Price, 41 Iowa, 204.
636 ; Shipley v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., « Comm'rs of Asheville v. Johnston,
34 Md. 386 : City Council of Augusta 71 N. C. 898 ; Meacham v. Fitchburg
V. Marks, 50 Ga. 612 ; Shawneetown R Co., 4 Cush. 291 ; Springfield v.
V. Mason, 82 111. 837 ; Sutton v. Louis- Schmook, 68 Mo. 394 ; Lipes v. Hand,
ville, 5 Dana, 38. 104 Ind. 503; Penrice v. Wallis, 37
* Citing, with other cases, M'Intyre Miss. 173.
§ 686.] EMINENT DOMAIN. 703
enhanced in value as a result of the operation of the railroad.
But in eonsidermg the question of damages to the remainder of
the land not taken, the commissioners must consider the effect
of the road upon the whole of that remainder, its advantages
and disadvantages, benefits and injuries, and if the result is
beneficial there is no damage and nothing can be awarded." '
§ 686. Payment. — Where the constitution does not pro-
vide that payment must be made before the property is taken,
it need not be giveii in all cases concurrently in point of time
with the actual exercise of the right of eminent domain. It
is enough if an adequate and certain remedy is provided
whereby the owner of such property may compel payment of
his damages.^ A remedy contingent upon the realization of a
fund from taxation for benefits within a limited assessment
district does not meet the requirements of the law.' And it
is a gross violation of constitutional right to compel the
owner of property to resort to -a lawsuit in order to recover.^
Judge Cooley says : — " The land should either be his or he
should be paid for it. Whenever, therefore, the necessary
steps have been taken on the part of the public to select the
property to be taken, locate the public work, and declare
the appropriation, the owner becomes absolutely entitled to
the compensation, whether the public proceed at once to oc-
cupy the property or not. If a <!treet is legally established
over the land of an individual, he is entitled to demand pay-
ment of "his damages without waiting for the street to be
opened." * But where a town was authorized to borrow
1 Newman v. Metropolitan &c. Ry. Lafayette v. Schultz, 44 Ind. 97 ;
Co., 118 N. Y. 618. See, also, Shipley Comm'rs v. Durham, 43 111. 86.
V. Baltimore &c. R Co., 34 M4 336 ; * Even though it be mandamus to
Wilson V. Eockford &c. E. Co., 59 compel the appointment of com mis-
Ill. 273. sioners of appraisal. Shepardson v.
2 Matter of Petition of United Milwaukee &c. R Co., 6 Wis. 605;
States, 96 N. Y. 237 ; Bloodgood V. M. Norton v. Peck, 3 Wis. 714. See,
& H. E Co., 18 Wend. 9 ; Lyon v. also, Walther v. Warner, 25 Mo. 277 ;
Jerome, 26 Wend. 485; People v. Henry v. Dubuque, 10 Iowa, 540;
Hayden, 6 Hill, 359; Eexford v. Wallace v. E!arlenoweski, 19 Barb.
Knight, 11 N. Y. 308. Cf. 2 Kent's 118.
Com. 339, n. 6 Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 696,
'Sage V. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 189; citing Philadelphia i'. Dickson, 88 Pa.
Chapman v. Gates, 54 N. Y. 140j St. 247 ; Philadelphia v. Dyer, 41 Pa.
704 IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. [§ 6S7.
money by the issue of its bonds, to meet any deficiency in
local assessments, and enable payment to be more readily
made, the Court of Appeals of New York held that the pro-
vision furnished adequate security.^ Where the statute pro-
vides a remedy not obnoxious to the objections suggested, it
is only by that means that payment may be enforced.' If
there be no statutory provision the owner may of course have
an action for his money.'
*
§ 687. Review of proceedings — Certiorari. — Where the
proceedings are merely erroneous the remedy is usually by
ceHiorari or appeal.* A writ of certiora/ri (when not auxiliary
to any other process) is in the nature of a writ of ek-ror, ad-
dressed to an inferior court or tribunal whose procedure is
not according to the course of the common law. After the writ
has been issued and the record certified in obedience to it, the
court is bound to determine upon an inspection of the whole
record whether the proceedings are legal or erroneous ; but
the granting of the writ in the first instance is not a matter
of right and rests in the discretion of the court, and the writ,
will not be granted unless the petitioner satisfies the court
St 463 ; Hallock v. Franklin County, v. Essex County Comm'rs, 3 Met.
2 Met 558; Blake v. Dubuque, 13 380; Railroad Co. v. Smith, 6 Ind
Iowa, 66 ; Higgins v. Chicago, 18 111. 349 ; Bailroad Co. v. Connolly, 7 Ind,
376 ; Hampton v. Coffin, 4 N. H. 517 ; 32 ; Railway Co. v. Oakes, 20 Ind. 9
Harrington v. County Comm'rs, 22 Mills on Eminent Domain, §g 87, 88 ;
Pick. 363. See, also, Chicago v. Bar- Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 608.
bian, 80 111. 482 ; Elliott on Roads and ' Jamison v. Springfield, 53 Mo.
Streets, 309. Title does not vest until 224 If the property be taken with-
payment New Oi-leans v. Lagarde, out payment he may maintain eject-
10 La. Ann. 150 ; Gillan v. Hutchin- ment in Iowa and Mississippi Dan-
son, 10 Cal. 153. Preliminary sur- iels v. Railroad Co., 35 Iowa, 139 ;
veys are not a taking. Cushman v. Memphis &c. R. Co. v. Payne, 37
Smith, 34 Me. 347 ; Orr v. Quimby, Miss. 700. Contra in Arkansas. Cairo
54 N. fl. 596 ; Steuart v. Mayor &o., 7 &c. R. Co. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 459.
Md. 516. * Farmington River Water Power
1 In the Matter of Church, 93 N. Y. Co. v. County Comm'rs, 113 Mass.
1. The Messrs. Elliott, whose opin- 306. Injunction is not the appropri-
ion is always entitled to weight, do ate remedy. State v. Hanna, 97 Ind.
not think this doctrine ought to pre- 469 ; Buckley v. Drake, 41 Hun, 384 ;
vail. Elliott on Roads and Streets, Thorp v. Witham, 65 Iowa, 566. Nor
183. mandamus to compel appointment
2 Calking v. Baldwin, 4 Wend. 667 ; of new commissioners. State v. Long-
Brown V. Beatty, 34 Miss. 337 ; Dodge street, 88 N. J. Law, 812.
§ 687.] EMINENT DOMAIN. 705
that substantial justice requires' it.' The writ lies only to cor-
rect errors in law and not to revise a decision of a question of
fact upon the evidence introduced at the hearing in the infe-
rior court, or to examine the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the finding, unless objection was taken to the evi-
dence for incompetency so as to raise a legal question.' When-
ever the case was within the- jurisdiction of the inferior
tribunal, the petitioner for a, writ of certiorari cannot be per-
mitted to introduce evidence or to contradict or vary its state-
ment, in its record or return, of its proceedings or decision.'
It is only where extrinsic evidence has been introduced, at
the hearing upon the petition, in support of the decision be-
low, and by way of showing that substantial justice does not
require the proceedings to be quashed, that like evidence may
be introduced bj'' the party petitioning for the writ, and then
upon the same point only.* The writ must be addressed to
the court having the custody and control of the record of the
proceedings sought to be quashed.' It can only be granted
after notice and opportunity to show cause against it, and if
granted without such notice will be quashed as improvidently
issued.* When the proceedings were before county commis-
1 Farmington Eiver Water Power 478. Petitioner must show a special
Co. V. County Comm'rs, 112 Mass. interest: Parnell v, Comm'rs, 34 Ala.
306; Commonwealth v. Sheldon, 3 378.
Mass. 188; Sa;parie Weston, 11 Mass. 2 Hay ward's Case, 10 Pick. 858;
417 ; Lees v. Child, 17 Mass. 351 ; Free- Nightingale's Case, 11 Pick. 168 ;
town «. County Comm'rs, 9 Pick. 46; Stratton v. Commonwealth, 10 Met.
Rutland v. County Comm'rs, 30 Pick. 317 ; Cobb v. Lucas, 15 Pick. 1.
71 ; Gleason v. Soper, 34 Pick. 181 ; ' Pond v. Medway, Quincy (Mass.),
Marblehead v. County Comm'rs, 5 193; Charlestownw County Comm'rs,
■Gray, 451, 453; Ex parte Hitz, 111 109 Mass. 270; Mendon v. County
U. S. 766 ; Pickford v. Mayor &c. of Comm'rs, 5 Allen, 13.
Lynn, 98 Mass. 491 ; Charlestown v. * New Salem, Petitioner, 6 Pick.
•Comm'rs, 109 Mass. 270 ; Petition of 470 ; Stone v. Boston, 2 Met 220, 238.
Landaff, 34 N. H. 163 ; Tiedt v. Cars- See, further, as to the practice upon
tensen, 61 Iowa, 334 ; Keys v. Marin hearing of petition for certiorari,
County, 43 Cal. 252; Boston &c. R Farmington River Water Power Co.
Co. V. Folsom, 46 N. H. 64. Eequi- v. County Comm'rs, 113 Mass. 206,
•sites of petition for certiorari: Cham- 315.
bers V. Lewis, 9 Iowa, 533 ; Vapder- * Commonwealth v. Winthrop, 10
tolph V. Highway Comm'rs, 50 Mich. Mass. 177.
330 ; Richardson v. Smith, 59 N. H. e Commonwealth v. Downing, 6
517 ; Stokes v. Early, 45 N. J. Law, , Mass. 73.
45
706
IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN.
[§ 688.
sioners, notice of the petition should be given to them, the
answer or return to the petition must be the joint act of the
whole present board, and the separate answer of one commis-
sioner cannot be received.^
§ 688. The same subject continued — Appeal. — The right
of appeal is purely statutory.* The legislature has authority
to deny an appeal and to make the decision of the inferior
tribunal final and conclusive, or, i^ appeal is allowed, to declare
what questions shall be and what questions shall not be tried
on appeal.' Ordinarily only parties to the proceedings have
the right of appeal.* Notice must be given and served as the
statute provides.' The practice in the appellate court is gen-
erally regulated by statu;te, but in respect of matters not in-
cluded in the statutory provisions, the general rules of practice
in similar cases are adopted." The appeal operates to vacate
the decision appealed from,' and the case is usually tried de
novo in the appellate court.'
1 Plymouth v. County Comm'rs, 16
Gray, 341.
2 Sims V. Hines, 131 Ind 534.
3 Matter of State Reservation, 103
N. Y. 734; Appeal of Houghton, 43
Cal. 35; Sims v. Hines, 121 Ind. 534;
State V. Mayor &c., 29 N. J. Law,
441; Ricketts v. Village of Hyde
Park, 85 111. 110; Southern R Co. v.
Ely, 95 N. C. 77 ; Murray v. Tucker,
10 Bush (Ky.), 340; Dougherty v.
Miller, 36 Cal. 83; Emery v. Brad-
ford, 39 Cal. 75; Faiss u Seehawer,
60 Wis. 535. Statutes giving appeals
are liberally construed so as to em-
brace condemnation proceedings if
possible. Howard v. Shaw, 136 111.
58 ; Yelton v. Addison, 101 Ind. 58.
<Canyonville &c Road Co. v.
County of Douglass, 5 Oregon, 380 ;
Barr v. Stevens, 1 Bibb, 293; Spauld-
ing V. Milwaukee &c. Ry. Ca, 67
Wis. 804. "Person" includes corpo-
rations. People u May, 37 Barb. 338.
6 People V. Lawrence, 54 Barb. 589 ;
Comm'rs &c. v. Claw, 15 Johns. 587 ;
Klein v. St Paul &a Ry. Co., 30
Minn. 451 ; Waltmeyer u Wisconsin
&C. Ry. Co., 64 Wis. 59. Appearance
for the purpose of moving to dismiss
is not a waiver of notice. Spurrier
V. Wirtner, 48 Iowa, 486. See, also.
People V. Osbom, 30 Wend. 186.
6 Elliott on Roads and Streets, 272,
and cases there cited ; Lewis on Em-
inent Domain, § 540.
^Minneapolis v. Northwestern R.
Co., 33 Minn. 453.
8 Hardy v. McKinney, 107 Ind. 364 ;
Blize V. Castlio, 8 Mo. App, 290. See,
also, Rawlings v. Beggs, 85 Ky. 351 ;
Kirkpatrick v. Taylor, 118 Ind. 839 ;
Davis V. "^ixsQX, 1 Duer (N. Y.), 451.
CHAPTEE XVIII.
CONTRACTS.
689. How coDtracts are made.
690. The same subject ooptinued.
691. Authority of agents and for-
mality of execution.
693. Compliance with prescribed
formalities.
693. Informal distinguished from
ultra vires contracts.
694 PoiBrer to relieve a contractor
in case of hardship.
695. Ratification of contract
696. The same subject continued.
697. Mandatory provisiona
698. Contracts let to bidders.
699. The same subject continued.
700. Plans and specifications.
701. The same subject continued.
703. Forfeiture of contracts.
703. The same subject continued.
§ 704. Right of set-oflE in foreclosure
of mechanics' liens.
705. Recovery against the corpora-
tion upon a quantum meruit.
706. Actions by corporations on
contracts — Estoppel to deny
validity.
707. Failure of specified means
of payment — Implied con-
tract
708. Rights of property owners in
respect of contracts for im-
provements.
709. Fiduciary position of officers —
Improvident contracts.
710. Action by assignee of con-
tractor— Pleading.
711. Miscellaneous rulings.
§ 689. How contracts are made. — A detailed and exhaust-
ive discussion of a subject so comprehensive as municipal con-
tracts cannot with propriety be reduced to the limits of a
single chapter. The topic must be mainly and necessarily
treated under specific heads. The following chapter is there-
fore confined to a statement of some of the general principles
that pertain to the power to contract and its mode of exer-
cise. A common council of a municipal corporation vested i
with full power over a subject, the mode of exercise of such
power not being limited by the charter, may exercise it in any
manner most convenient. In such cases the corporation may
act by its oiEcers or properly authorized agents, and make
contracts to carry into effect the granted powers, the same as
individuals.'
1 Beers v. Dallas City (1888), 16 Or. by the street commissioner, on the
334, holding the city liable for work principle that unless prohibited by
done on a sewer by persons employed charter, a municipal corporation is
708
CONTEACTS.
[§ 690.
§ 690. The same subject continued. — A power to contract,
derived from statutes which provide that the board " of trust-
ees (of a town) shall have power to pass by-laws and ordi-
nances," to do various acts and perform certain functions, can
only be exercised in such manner as is therein prescribed.^
liable when a person is employed for
it by one assuming to act in its be-
half, and such person renders the
services according to the agreement
with the linowledge of its officers,
and without notice that it is not I'ec-
ogniz^d as valid and binding. It was
■further held that the provisions of
the charter as to contracting by or-
dinance or in writing did not apply
to cases where the council was di-
rectly authorized to do the work
without the formality of entering
into an express contract Fister v.
La Rue, 15 Barb. 323 ; Pixley tJ. West-
ern Pacific E. Co., 33 Cal. 183 ; Starkey
V. City of Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 203 ;
City of Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33 Ohio
St 336 ; Salomon v. United States, 19
Wall. 17. In City of Logansport v.
r»ykeman (1888), 116 Ind. 15, it was
held that in the transaction of mere
matters of business, such as the pur-
chase of goods necessary for the wel-
fare of a municipal corporation, or
the employment of persons or agen-
cies to perform service for or protect
the interests of the municipality, a
formal ordinance, by-law or resolu-
tion was not necessary, nor was it
essential that contracts of that char-
acter be in writing. City of Indian-
apolis V. Indianapolis Gaslight Co.,
66 Ind. 896 ; Leeds v. City of Rich-
mond, 103 Ind. 372 ; Bank of Colum-
bia V. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299;
Township of Norway v. Township of
Clear Lake, 11 Iowa, 506. In City
of McPherson v. Nichols (Kan.,
1893), 29 Pac. Rep. 679, it was held
that the city was liable for the use
of plaintiffs house as a pest-house.
and for her services in attending
small-pox patients, and for property
destroyed by the city authorities, upon
tlfeir contract with her to pay for
the same. There was power in the
city, through and under proper ordi-
nances and by its proper agents, to
make a contract of this kind in eveiy
particular under the general powers
to enact such ordinances as the au-
thorities deemed expedient for the
preservation of the health of the in-
habitants, under General Statutes of
Kansas, 1889, paragraphs 777, 787, sec-
tion 31, and paragraphs 817, 818, as to
health, disease, hospitals, contagions,
quarantine I'egulations, etc. The court
presumed that there were such ordi-
nances passed and that they gave to
the mayor and other officers of the
city and to others acting under them
all the power that such persons at-
tempted to exercise.
iRumsey Manuf. Co. v. Inhabit-
ants of Schell City (1886), 21 Mo. App.
•175, holding a contract for purchase
of a flre-engine void because there
was no ordinance passed authorlzmg
its purchase. Stewart v. City of
Clinton, 79 Mo. 603 ; Werth v. City of
Springfield, 78 Mo. 107. In Inhabit-
ants of Schell City v. Rumsey Manuf.
Co. (1890), 39 Mo. App. ,264, it was
held that as this contract was void in
its inception, as held in the case
supra (21 Mo. App. 175), there could
be no recovery on an implied promise
by the corporation to pay for this fire-
engine. But the decision was put upon
the8tatute(Rev. Stats. Mo., 1879, § 5360)
which provides that "no county, . . .
village . . . shall be bound or
§ 691.]
OONTEAOTS-
709
§ 691. Authority of agents and formality of execution.—
Municipal corporations act or contract in the manner and
form prescribed by law or by their charters.' Municipal offi-
cers have no general authority to bind the municipality. The
authority of a municipality's agents is special.^
held liable upon any contract, unless
the same shall be within the scope of
its powers and expressly authorized
by law, nor unless such liability shall
be upon a consideration wholly to be
performed and executed subsequent
to the making of the contract, nor
unless the contract including the con-
sideration shall be in writing, and
dated when made and subscribed by
the parties thereto, or their agents
authorized by law or duly appointed
and authorized In writing." Wool-
folk V. Randolph County, 83 Mo. 501.
In Crutchfield v. City of Warrens-
burg (1888),V 30 Mo. App. 456, the
court aiBrmed the judgment in favor
of the city in an action brought
by an attorney for professional
services, rendered in a case of the
city's at the request of the mayor
and the incoming city attorney,
on the ground that this could not
bind the city without an ordinance
or writing under the statute to au-
thoriza Thrush v. City of Cameron,
21 Mo. App. 391 ; Board of Comm'rs
of Cass Co. V. Ross, 46 Ind. 404; Mc-
Donald V. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 33. If a
majority of the board had sanctioned
"it, it would not be binding on the
city. Butler v. City of Charlestown,
7 Gray, 15, 16. At the same time it
was held that the municipality could
,oot recover back money paid on ac-
count of this fire-engine on the
ground of mistake, as it was money
voluntarily paid. Skinner v. Hen-
derson, 10 Mo. 205; Union Sav.
^s'n V. Kehlor, 7 Mo. App. 165;
Wolf V. Marshall, 53 Mo. 171; Bu-
hanon v. Satlein, 9 Mo. App. 564;
Vestlake v. St. Louis, 77 Mo. 47;
Snelson v. State, 1ft Ind. 29 ; Super-
visors of Onondaga v. Briggs, 2
Denio, 26.
1 Condran v. City of New Orleans
(La., 1891), 9 So. Rep. 81 ; Burchfleld
V. City of New Orleans (1890), 43 La.
Ann. 335 ; S. C, 7 So. Rep. 448, hold-
ing the commissioner of public works
of the city to have no authority to
contract for materials for the city
and to determine the price to be paid
therefor or the quantity to be pro-
cured. The court based its constnao-
tion of the powers of this officer upon
the doctrine as declared by Judge
Dillon: — '"JThe general principle of
law is settled beyond controversy
that the agents, officers, or even city
council of a municipal corporation
cannot bind the corporation by any
contract which is beyond the scope
of its powers or entirely foreign to
the purposes of the corporation, or
which (not being in terms authorized)
is against public policy. This doc-
trine grows out of the nature of such
institutions arid rests upon reasonable
and solid grounds. The inhabitanta
are the corporators, and the officers
are but the public agents of the cor-
poration. The duties and powers of
the officers or public agents of the
corporation are prescribed by statute
or charter, which all persons not only
may know, but are bound to know.
Dillon on Munic. Corp., S§ 457, 464,
733; Fox v. Sloo, 10 La. Ann. 11.
2 Ross V. City of Philadelphia (1886),
115 Pa. St. 223 ; s. C, 8 Atl. Rep. 398.
In Wells V. Pressey (Mo., 1891), 16
S. W. Rep. 670, a lease purporting on
its face to be " made by and between
the trustees of the town of of
no
00NTBACT3.
[§§ 692, 693.
§692. Compliance with prescribed formalities.— Where
a statute or a charter binding on a municipality has committed
a class of acts to particular officers or agents other than the
governing body, or where it has prescribed certain formalities
as conditions to the performance of any description of corpo-
rate business, the proper functionaries must act and the desig-
nated forms must be observed ; and generally no act of recog-
nition can supply a defect in these respects. It requires the
act of the same body to ratify as*to contract in the first in-
stance, and it must be done by the same formal mode of rec-
ord.*
§ 693. Informal distinguished from ultra vires contracts.
A corporation will be held liable upon a contract under some
circumstances although it has not conferred upon the persons
through whom the contract was made in a formal manner —
by ordinance, for instance — authority to contract.*
clerk of the board of trustees, who
was authorized thereto by ordinanca
The attesting clause is nearly in the
language required by law. Angell
& Ames on Corp., § 235."
1 Crutchfieldn City of Warrensburg
(1888), 30 Mo. App. 456, in which case
it was held that an attorney who had
rendered services to the city on request
of the mayor and incoming city at-
torney was not entitled to recover on
a guantum meruit, on an implied
promise from the city, when he had
sued as on a contract which was not
in writing and passed by an ordi-
nance as required under the Missouri
statutes. Chase v. Kailroad, 97 N. Y.
389 ; Keating v. City of Kansas, 84
Mo. 419; McDonald v. Mayor* 68
N. Y. 33 ; Peterson v. Mayor, 17 N. Y,
449 ; Johnson v. School Dist, 67 Mo.
831.
2 Ward V. Town of Forest Grove
(Or.. 1891), 35 Pac. Rep. 1030, in which
a physician who had upon a contract
of employment by a committee ren-
dered services to persons afSicted
with small-pox within the limits of
the first part, and of the second
part," and concluding, "In witness
whereof the said parties have ' ex-
ecuted this indenture ; that is to say,
the party of the first part by affixing
its corporate seal and the signature of
the chairman of the board of trustees,
and the party of the second part by
affixing her own hand and seal.
. By order of the board. Signed,
, chairman," was held to be
so executed as to bind the town, over
the objection that it purported on its
face to be the individual act of the
chairman and not that of the town.
McDonald v. Schceider, 37 Mo. 405,
where a lease authorized by the board
of trustees of a town, executed in the
name of the trustees, signed by the
clerk of the board with the corporate
seal attached, was involved. The
court said, through Bcott, Judge : —
" We do not see the force of the ob-
jections to the deed of lease made by
the trustees of the town of St. Charles.
It is under the seal of the corpora-
tion. The common seal is proved.
It is also shown it was affixed by the
§ C9i.]
OONTEAOTS.
711
§ 694. Power to relieve a contractor in case of hardship.
If a municipal corporation has obtained a contract which by
mistake or a change of circumstances it deems to operate
oppressively upon the other party, an agreement to make an
additional compensation or to modify or annul it is not in-
a town with the knowledge of its
officers, and without notice that his
contract of employment was not rec-
ognized as valid and binding, was
held to be entitled to recover for his
services. See, also, Gas Co. v. San
Francisco, 9 Cal. 469, in which Field,
J., said : — " The obligation to do jus-
tice rests equally upon it [the corpo-
ration] as upon an individual. Jt can-
not avail itself of the property or
labor of a party, and screen itself
from responsibility under the plea
that it never passed an ordinance on
the subject. As against individuals
the law implies a promise to pay in
fiuoh cases, and the implication ex-
tends equally against corporations."
In Fister v. La Rue, 15 Barb. 323, the
court said: — "It is well settled, at
least in this country, that when a
person is employed for a corporation
by one assuming to act in its behalf,
and goes on, renders the services ac-
cording to the agreement, with the
knowledge of its officers, and with-
out notice that the contract is not
recognized as valid and binding,
such corporation will be held to
have sanctioned and ratified the con-
tract and be compelled to pay for the
services according to the agreement
Having availed itself of the services
and received the benefits, it is bound
in conscience to pay, and will not be
heard to say that the original agree-
ment was made by a person not
legally authorized to contract" Tyler
«. Ti-ustees, 14 Or. 485 ; s. C, 13 Pac.
Rep. 329 ; Beers v. Dallas City, 16 Or.
334; s. C, 18 Pac. Kep. 183. In Ward
V. Town of Forest Grove, supra, the
court placed its decision upon this
ground ; — " This is not a CEise where
the officers of the corporation .have
exceeded their authority ; nor is it a
case where the mode of contracting
is specially prescribed and limited
by the charter. Here the power to
make all needful rules and regula-
tions for the care of and attention to
persons within the corporate limits
afflicted with small-pox or other con-
tagious diseases, which necessarily
include contracts for medical attend-
ance, is fully and plainly conferred ;
and although a particular form is
prescribed which shall be the evi-
dence of the exercise of such power,
the absence of this evidence does not
destroy the power." See, also, Cin-
cinnati V. Cameron, 33 Ohio St 336.
As to contracts which corporations
have the incidental power to make
independently of any statute in order
to execute powers expressly con-
ferred and carry out the purposes of
their being, not being void, merely
because there is no written evidence
of them, or because of the absence of
some mere formality, see Rossw City
of Madison, 1 Ind. 381 ; s. C, 48 Am.
Dec. 361 ; School Town of Princeton
V. Gebhart, 61 Ind. 187; State v.
Hauser, 63 Ind. 152, 182 ; McCabe v.
Board &o., 46 Ind. 380 ; City of Terra
Haute V. Terre Haute Water-Works
Co., 94 Ind. 305; White v. State, 69
Ind. 373; City of Logansport v.
Crockett, 64 Ind. 319; Langdon v.
Town of Castleton, 30 Vt 285.
712
CONTKACTS.
[§§ 695, 696.
valid.' This principle is fully illustrated in the case cited in
the note.^ i
§ 695. Ratification of contracts. — A contract which has
been rendered void by non-compliance with a condition as to
the time within which work was to be completed may be
validated by a subsequent ordinance ratifying and approving
all forfeited contracts of that kind.' But a revival of a con-
tract by such a ratifying ordinance being an act of grace, the
contractor must accept it subjeof to such terms as may be
imposed.*
§ 696. The same subject continued. — A municipal corpo-
ration may ratify the unauthorized acts and contracts of its
agents and officers which the corporation might legally have
authorized in the first instance, subject to exception where
iSo stated by Judge Dillon in 1
Dillon on Munic. Corp. (3d ed.),§ 477.
2 Marshall v. Allegheny City, 59 Pa.
St 455, where a contract was entered
into by the city for the grading of a
street at a certain price per yard.
The work was suspended by reason
of a great advance in the price of
labor, and it was shown that to com-
plete the contract at the price named
in it would involve a loss to the con-
tractor of $40,000. A new contract
made with this contractor by the city
at an advanced price was held to be
within its power. The effect of this
decision was that a city could afiford
to be just, this side of generosity.
3 City V. Hays (1881), 93 Pa. St 72.
The court declared this rule on the
doctrine that although%an agent of
the city exceeded his authority, as
the contract was one which the city
might hare authorized, it could
waive the irregularity and adopt the
contract after it was made. It was
also held that the question of adop-
tion was one exclusively for the city,
and with which a citizen has noth-
ing to do ; defendant, a citizen, con-
tending that the city had no power,
right or authority as against him to
ratify an utterly void contract and
thereby to impose upon his propert:y
a lien to which it was not previously
subject McKnight v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 91 Pa. St 273, foUowed ; City
of Philadelphia v. Phil. &c. E. Co.,
88 Pa. St 314, distinguished.
< Philadelphia v. Jewell (1890), 135
Pa. St 329, in which case it was held
that by reasonable implication the
reviving ordinance imposed a con-
dition that the price of the work to
be done thereafter should be that
fixed by a certain ordinance adopted
in the meantime ; at all events, the city
could not then impose upon property
owners a higher rate than could have
been imposed by a new contract As
to ratification of a contract author-
ized to be made without any particu-
lar or prescribed conditions or for-
malities, see Cullen v. Town of Carth-
age, 103 Ind. 190 ; s. c, 53 Am. Rep.
504 ; Bass Foundry & Machine Works
V. Board &&, 115 Ind. 234; Corpora-
tion of BluSton V. Studabaker, 100
Ind. 129.
§ 697.]
CONTEAOTS.
713
the mode of contracting operates as a limitation upon the
power to contract.^
§ 697. Mandatory proTisions. — A contract for work done
for a city is not binding upon it unless all mandatory provis-
ions of the law are complied with,^
1 Davis V. Mayor &c. of City of
Jackson (1886X 61 Mich. 530 ; S. C, 28
K. W. Eep. 536 ; 1 Dillon on Munic.
Corp., § 463; People u Swift, 31 CaL
26 ; Blen v. Bear River Ca, 20 CaJ.
603; San Francisco Gas Co. v. San
Francisco, 9 Cal. 458 ; Hoy t v. Thomp-
son, 19 N. Y. 207, 218 ; Clarke V. Lyon
County, 8 Nev. 181 ; Howe v. Keeler,
37 Conn. 538 ; Emerson v. Newberry,
13 Pick. 377; Hodges v. Buffalo, 3
Denio, 110; s. C, 5 Denio, 567; Peo-
ple «. Flagg, 17 N. T. 584; s. O., 16
How. Pr. 36 ; Brady v. Mayor &c., 20
N. Y. 313; Delafield v. State of IIU-
nois, 2 Hill, 159, 176 ; s. c, 8 Paige,
531; 26 Wend. 193; Mills v. Gleason,
11 Wis. 470; S. C, 8- Am. Law Reg.
698 ; Dubuque Female College v. Du-
buque, 13 Iowa, 555; Merrick v.
Plank Road Co., 11 Iowa, 74; De-
troit V. Jackson, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 106 ;
Crawshaw v. Roxbury, 7 Gray, 874;
Burrill v. Boston, 3 Cliff. 590; Al-
bany Nat Bk. V. Albany, 93 N. Y.
363; Galveston v. Morton, 53 Tex.
409; Strang v. Dist. of Columbia, 1
Mackey, 365; Town of Durango v.
Pennington, 8 Colo. 257; Town of
Bruce v. Dickey, 116 111. 537 ; Moms
County V. Hinchman, 31 Kan. 739;
Lincoln v. Stockton, 75 Me. 141 ;
Schmidt v. County of Stearns, 34
Minn. 113 ; Kingsley v. Norris, 60 N.
H. 131.
2 Sullivan v. City of Leadville
(1888), 11 Colo. 488; Town of Du-
rango V. Pennington, 8 Colo. 357,
360, where the settled law was an-
nounced that " a party dealing with
a municipal body is bound to see to
it that all mandatoiy provisions of
the law are complied with, and if he
neglects such precaution he becomes
a mere volunteer and must suffer
the consequences." Tracey v. Peo-
ple, 6 Colo. 151. In City of New
Orleans v. Great So. Tel. Co. (1888),
40 La. Ann. 41 ; S. C, 3 So. Eep. 533,
it was held that the municipal ordi-
nance granting to this corporation
authority to construct and maintain
telephones in the streets without
any limitation as to time and for
consideration stipulated, when ac-
cepted and acted on by the grantee
by a compliance with all its condi-
tions and the construction of a valu-
able and expensive plant, acquired
thereby the features of a contract
which the city could not thereafter
abolish or alter in its essential terms
without the consent of the grantee ;
and that the imposition of new and
burdensome considerations was a
violation of such contract; further,
a proviso in that ordinance to the
effect that "the acts and doing of
the company imder this ordinance
shall be subject to any ordinance or
ordinance^ that may be hereafter
passed by the city did not convert
the grant into a mere revocable per-
mit On the contrary it assumed
that the ordinance was to continue
in full force and effect, and recog-
nized the rights of the grantee to do
and to act under and in accordance
with it, and only subjected such
"acts and doings " to future munici-
pal regulations not inconsistent with
the ordinance itself. Dartmouth
College Case, 4 Wheat 518. ^
7M
dONTBAOTS.
[§ 698.
§ 698. Contracts let to bidders. — Where a charter of a
municipal corporation provides that all contracts for work and
supplies above a certain amount shall be let to " the lowest re-
sponsible bidder giving adequate security," in letting contracts
this provision is mandatory to the governing authorities. To
relieve themselves from its force they must act upon facts after
receiving the bids and make an adjudication that the persons
making lower bids than the one with whom they contract are
not responsible. If there is nftt such a showing as to their ac"
tion they cannot make a contract for the work with one who
is plainly a higher bidder. An arbitrary determination to ac-
cept the bid of a higher bidder, without any facts justifying
it, cannot have the effect of a judicial determination which is
final and conclusive upon the courts. The courts must treat
such letting of a contract as a violation of law.*
1 People V. Gleason (N. T., 1890), 25
N. E. Rep. 4, reversing 4 N. Y. SupL
383, holding that a mandamus would
not He to compel the mayor of a city
to sign warrants in payment for work
done by a contractor under a con-
tract let to him by the common
council when his bid was notoriously
higher than others and no showing
made that the lower bids were made
by parties not responsible. Earl, J.,
speaking for the Court of Appeals of
New York, referring to the provision
in the charter, said : — " This provis-
ion was inserted in the chai'ter un-
doubtedly to prevent favoritism, cor-
ruption, extravagance and improvi-
dence in the procurement of work
and supplies for the city, and it
should be so administered and con-
strued as fairly and reasonably to
accomplish this purpose. If con-
tracts for work and supplies can be
arbitrarily let, subject to no inquiry
or impeachment, to the highest in-
stead of the lowest bidder under such
a provision as is found in this char-
ter and substantially in the charters
of all the other cities of the State, then
the provision can always be nullified.
and will serve no useful purposa"
See as to such contracts being void
and not justifying a recovery for
work done under them, Brady v.
Mayor, 20 N. Y. 812 ; McDonald v.
Mayor, 68 N. Y. -28 ; Dickinson v. City
of Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y. 65. The
court also held in People v. Gleason,
supra, that, the claim being funda-
mentally illegal, the common coun-
cil had no jurisdiction to audit and
allow it or give it any vitality.
Brady v. Ellis, 59 N. Y. 620; Lyddy
V. Long Island City, 104 N. Y. 318;
S. C, 10 N. E. Rep. 155. They also
distinguished Gas Light Co. v. Don-
nelly, 93 N. Y. 557. There it was
held that the common council acted
judicially in determining which of
several bids it would accept, and
that the members of the council
could not be made liable in a civil ac-
tion brought by a party who claimed
that he was the lowest responsible
bidder to secure damages because
his bid was not accepted. The plaint-
iff was defeated by the application
of the rule of the absolute immunity
of judicial officers from responsi-
bility in a civil or criminal proseou-
§§ C9^. 700.] CONTEAOTS. 715
§ 699. The same subject continued. — A municipal corpo-
ration can defend against an action upon a contract which has
been let to the lowest bidder, and the mandatory provisions
of its charter apparently complied with, on the ground that by
fraudulent collusion between the contractor and the city offi-
cers the contract was intentionally let to one who was actu-
ally, though not apparently, the highest bidder.^ A city that
has granted a party the right for a specified time to erect
water-works and supply the city with water for public and.,
private use is not estopped by a resolution of the city coun-
cil reciting that the water-works stood the test required by
the ordinance, which by its terms, when accepted by the other
party, constituted the contract between the parties, from
maintaining an action to rescind the contract, the works prov-
ing inadequate, against a corporation to whoni the contract
bad been assigned and holders of bonds issued by such cor-
poration who had purchased subsequent to the passage of the
resolution.'
§ 700. Plans and specifications. — As a general rule, where
contracts have been let by a municipality with specifications
tion for their action, however erro- his bid are admissible. It is also ad-
neous, or even malicious ; but that missible to prove that estimates made
rule of immunity was applicable only by the contractor, and upon which
to them, and could not be properly he was paid, of the amount and value
invoked in favor of the relator, the of materials furnished by him from
contractor. time to time under the contract, were
1 Nelson V. Mayor of the City of grossly in excess of the true amount
New York (1889), 5 N. Y. SupL 689. and value. In order to prove the in-
Daniels, J., said: — "Where parties accuracy of such estimates state-
in this manner join together to evade ments made by plaintiff's book-
and disregard the obligations and keeper and taken from his books,
duties of public oflBcers and the plain showing the amount of material fur-
mandates of statutory provisions, nished under the contract, are ad-
the contract resulting from their acts missible in evidence, though also
and combination is not only fraudu- containing other items, when the
ulent, but it is unlawful, and upon aggregate value of all the items in
such an unlawful agreement no ac- such statements is les? than the
tion can be maintained for indemnity amount given in such estimates.
by either of the parties." See, also, * city of Galesburg v. Galesburg
People V. Stephens, 71 N. Y. 527, 558. Water Co. (1888), 34 Fed. Eep. 675,
In support of such defense cards in afBrmed in Farmers' Loan & Trust
which the contractor offered to sell Co. V. Galesburg (1890), 133 U. S. 156 ;
material like that furnished the city S. C, 10 S. Ct. Eep. 316.
at lower prices than those named in
716
00NTEACT8.
[§ 701.
and plans, they must be conformed to, but there may arise
circumstances which would relieve the contractor from a lit-
eral compliance therewith.*
§ 701. The same subject continued. — The terms of a con-
tract, so far as regards the specifications and plans, usually
provide for an arbitrament between the contractor and the
municipality as to a compliance with them. But a decision
of the arbitrator is not in ev#ry case binding upon the con-
tractor.*
' Brady v. Mayor &c. of New York
(N. Y., 1892), 30 N. E. Eep. 757, in
which it was held that a contract
for grading a street, empowering the
commissionerB of public works to
designate when the w^ork should
commence, suspend work, order it to
be begun again, consent to its being
sublet or assigned or declare the con-
tract null and re-award it, and the
plaintiff covenanting to complete the
work to the satisfaction of the com-
missioners, and in substantial accord-
ance with the specifications and plan,
a literal compliance with the specifi-
cations and plan was not required ;
also, that where, in accordance with
the contract, the surveyor, inspector
and superintendent of street im-
provements certified that the work
was completed, and the commis-
sioners of public works accepted it,
the city was bound by their decision
in the absence of fraud or mistake.
See, also. Mulholland v. Mayor, 113
N. Y. 681 ; a C, 20 N. E. Rep. 856.
2 City of Galveston v. Devlin (Tex.,
1892), 19 S. W. Eep; 395. In an action
against the city for an amount al-
leged to be due the contractor for
extra work and material in the con-
struction of a hospital under a con-
tract with the city building commit-
tee, as the evidence showed that
when the contract was made with
the contractor the committee had
not expended the amount donated
for this purpose, by an amount more
than covering the amount claimed in
this action, it was held proper to re-
fuse an instruction to the jury as to
the power of the building committee
to contract an indebtedness being
limited to the amount donated by
the ordinance of the city creating
that committee, and that all persons
dealing with that committee were
bound to know the extent of its au-
thority. It was also held that where
the original contract in such a case
provided that, in case of any dispute
between the architect and the con-
ti-actor as to the meaning of the plans
and specifications, or as to what is
extra work, the same shall be decided
by the architect and hjs decision
shall be final ; but on disputes arising
the committee made a supplemental
contract, which, though making the
architect the final interpreter of the
plans and specifications, provided
that, in the event of a difference be-
tween him and the contractor, the
latter shaU " under protest " complete
the work under the architect's inter-
pretations, leaving the contractor's
rights as to such work done under
protest open without impairment
until after the full completion of
the contract, — the contractor, in an
action based on the supplemental
contract for extra work done and
materials furnished^ was not bound
by the architect's decision that such
§§ 702, 70a.] 00NTBAOT8. 71T
§ 702. Forfeiture of contracts. — A commissioner of pub-
lic works of a city made a sewer contract with this provision :
that the contractor should commence the work " on such day
and at such place or places as the said commissioner may des-
ignate, and progress therewith so as to complete the same in
accordance with this agreement on or before the expiration of
twenty-three days thereafter." The contract, a highly penal
one, gave the commissioner power for unnecessary delay to
stop the work, complete it by others and charge the contractor
with any excess of cost. It was held that as the contractor
had never been set in motion by an oiBcial designation of the
time when the work should commence, and was therefore not
in default for " unnecessary delay," the commissioner had no
right to abrogate the contract.^
§ 703. The same subject continued. — Where a municipal-
ity under a plan of advertising for bids for work to be done
has accepted a bid made by a contractor and he makes a de-
posit as required to guaranty good faith on his part, and the
contractor wilfully fails to perform the contract, the deposit
is forfeited to the corporation, and its governing board is not
authorized to refund it.^
work and materials were required by was taken from the contractor and
the plans and specifications. It was relet and its cost proved to be in ex-
also held, in the same case, that in an cess of the original bid, then the con-
action on such a building contract tractor must pay "on notice from
the petitiout was sufficient if it al- the commissioner (the amount) of the
leged the execution of the contract, excess so due," was a defense to an
the performance by plaintiff of work action brought to recover such ex-
under it, the acceptance thereof by cess, and good ground for a nonsuit.
the city and the amount due there- ^ Mutchler v. Easton City (1891), 9
for, though it did not expressly aver Pa. Co. Ct 613. The court admitted
a, promise by the city to pay for the that a city might remit a fine or for-
work, since the contract includes the feiture in a proper case — as when
promise and the allegation of one there is an element of hardship, op-
was the averment of the other. pression or something else which
1 Mayor &o. v. Eeilly (1891), 59 Hun, would render it unjust or inequi-
501 ; S. a, 13 N. Y. SupL 521, an ac- table to enforce the penalty or for-
tion on the bond of the contractor feiture. See, jalso, Barren's Case,
and sureties for the faithful perform- L. R. 10 Ch. App. 513. See § 638 et
ance of the contract. It was also seq., supra. In Village of Morgan
held in this case that the fact that no Park v. Gahan (1890), 85 111. App.
notice was given under a provision 646, a judgment in favor of con-
of the contract that in case the work tractors whose bid had been accepted
718
CONTEACTS.
[§§ lOi, 705.
§ 704. Rightof set-off in foreclosure of mechanics' liens. —
A municipality may claim as a set-off in final settlement of what
is due to a contractor in an action to foreclose mechanics'
liens as against the contractor upon moneys in the hands of
the corporation unpaid upon a contract for public improve-
ments, the amount expended in completing the contract in
case there be a forfeiture by the contractor.*
§ 705. RecoTery against the corporation upon a qnantnm
meruit. — Contracts not made with the proper authority rep-
resenting the municipality cannot be enforced, although the
claimant under the contract has a right of action in a suit
upon a quantum meruit? But where services have been com-
and complete the contract and de-
duct the cost of the same from any
unpaid money due the contractor.
It was also held that the city engi-
neer's report, that the time had
elapsed and the contractor had neg-
lected to perform his contract, was
suflScient to justify a forfeiture,
which was done by resolution and
notice given the contractoi'. It was
further held that the forfeiture con-
templated by the contract applied
only to the contractor ; and that upon
forfeiture the city had the right to go
on and complete the contract, not
simply remedying the defects pointed
out in the report of the city engineer,
but in all respects wherein the work
was not completed according to the
terms of the contract And it was
not requisite to specify in the reso- ,
lution declaring the forfeiture all the
grounds for it, but sufficient to spec-
ify one tenable ground.
2 Condron v. City of New Orleans
(La., 1891), 9 So. Eep. 31, in which it
was determined that there could be
no recovery in a suit upon the con-
tract for shells delivered upon an
order of the commissioner of pub-
lic works, as he had no right, inde-
pendently of the council's authority,
to enter into contracts and bind the
on a local improvement for a deposit
they had made as required by the
terms of the ordinance was affirmed
upon these rulings: — That an ad-
vertisement by a village for bids for
work on a local improvement to be
paid for by special assessment, while
it charges the bidders with notice of
the ordinance providing for the im-
provement in question, does not
affect them with notice of a sub-
sequent ordinance providing the
method in which the special assess-
ment may be levied ; and where an
ordinance providing for a local im-
provement declares that it shall be
paid for by special assessment, the
passage of a subsequent invalid or-
dinance providing that the assess-
ment shall be paid in ten annual in-
stalments is such an attempt to
change the proposed contract as will
justify a bidder in refusing to exe-
cute it.
1 Powers V. City of Yonkers (1889),
114 N. Y. 145 ; S. C, 21 N. E. Eep. 132.
The terms of the contract involved
in this case were that upon a report
of the city engineer of refusal or
neglect of the contractor to put to
work a sufficient force to promptly
linish up the work by the time stated,
the council could declare it forfeited
§ 706.]
CONTEACTS.
719
pletely performed for and at the request of a municipal cor-
poration made through its officials, and have been accepted
and received by it, the corporation is then under legal and
moral obligation to pay for such services whatever they may
be reasonably worth, notwithstanding irregularities interven-
ing in the original employment.'
§ 706. Actions Iby corporations on contracts — Estoppel
to deny validity. — One who has had full benefit of a contract
made by a municipal corporation for use of its property is es-
topped thereby in an action by the corporation against him
from questioning its validity.^
city to the payment of large amounts.
See, also. Hill u Bailroad Co., 11
La. Ann. 293. It was further held
that, having declared upon a con-
tract, the plaintiff could not recover
on a quantum meruit. Mitchell v.
Cuvell, 11 La. Ann. 253 ; Bright v. As-
sociation, 33 La. Ann. 59. In Keller
V. Wilson (Ky., 1890), 14 S. W. Rep.
383, it was held that a city's attorney
in the collection of back taxes, in the
absence of special authority, could
not bind the city by an agreement
that the land bought in at tax sale
should be rented and, when the taxes
were paid by the rents received, the
land should be returned to the for-
mer owner.
1 City of Ellsworth v. Eossiter (1891),
-46 Kan. 337; a a, 36 Pac. Eep. 674.
See, also, Butler v. Comm'rs of Neosho
Co., 15 Kan. 178; Brown v. City of
Atchison, 39 Kan. 37; Salomon v.
United States, 19 Wall. 17; Comm'rs
of Leavenworth County v. Brewer,
9 Kan. 307; Huffman u Comm'rs of
Greenwood County, 28 Kan. 381.
2 Mayor &c. of New York v. Sonne-
born (1889), 113 N. Y. 438; S. G, 31
N. E. Eep. 131, an action by the city
to recover rent for lease of a pier, in
which the lessee attempted to defend
on the ground that the lease was not
made in terms of the statute relating
to such matters, which provides that
all "leases other than for districts ap-
propriated by said board to special
commercial interests shall be made
at public auction to the highest bid-
der." See, also, Whitney Arms Co.
V. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 63; Rider Life
Raft Co. V. Eoach, 97 N. Y. 378. In
City of New Orleans v. Crescent City
R Co. (1889), 41 La. Ann. 904, it was
held that a municipal corporation
which had contracted that a bonus
should be paid by a company to
which it had granted street railroad
privileges in lieu of taxes could not,
after agreeing to remit the bonus and
to receive taxes in place, and after
collecting such taxes, sue to recover
the bonus, however true it may be
the immunity from taxes was illegal.
It could not claim both. See, also,
New Orleans v. St. Charles R Co., 38
La. Ann. 597 ; New Orleans v. Sugar
Shed Co., 35 La. Ann. 548 ; New Or-
leans V. Water Works Co., 36 La. Ann.
483. In City of New Orleans v. Fire-
men's Charitable Ass'n (1891). 43 La.
Ann. 447 ; S. c, 9 So. Eep. 486, it was
held that the city could not recover
sums of money paid on a contract
with the association for extinguish-
ing fires in a certain district because
the contractor adopted a more eco-
nomical mode than that stipulated in
720
CONTRACTS.
[§§ 707, 707.
§ 707. Failure of specified means of payment — Implied
contract. — A contract duly authorized by law, made by a
municipal corporation for useful improvements, and duly ex-
ecuted by the contractor, is enforceable against the corpora-
tion as a debt for which it is liable, if the means of payment
provided in the contract should fail through subsequent events
not due to the laches or fault of the contractor.^
§ 708. Rights of property owners in respect of contracts
for improvements. — Contracts for improvements — as for
paving, — lawfully made at the discretion of municipal au-
thorities, are binding upon the land-owners charged with the
payment of the price of the paving, though injudiciously
made.* But these owners are entitled to have such contracts
performed substantially in all things according to their terms ;
and the authorities have no power to dispense with such per-
formance to the gain of the contractor and the loss of the
property owners.' And when a property owner has had
the contract; since the essential ele-
ment of the contract was the extin-
guishment of the fires and not the
mode of performance.
iCole V. City of Shreveport (1889;,
41 La. Ann. 839, affirming a judg-
ment in favor of the contractors for
a balance due on a paving contract
which was made with the under-
standing that the ownei-s of land
fronting on the street were bound for
a portion of the cost, and the city
guaranteeing the payment of the
same by appropriation of wharfage
dues which by legislation afterwards
it could not use in that way. The
court approved and followed Hitch-
cock V. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341. In
O'Brien v. Mayor && of New York
(1893), 19 N. y. SupL 793, it was held
that, as the "aqueduct commission-
ers" were appointed by the State,
they had no authority to bind the
city, as its agents, further than was
expressly authorized by the act which
created the body and prescribed its
duties. So where under a contract
awarded by them payment was to be
made on the certificate of the engi-
neer as to the amount of the work
and the value thereof, no recovery
could be had for work done in reli-i
ance merely on the parol assurance
of the engineer that such was within
the contract, but only for work done
on his certificate. Affirming 15 N. Y.
SupL 520 ; Byron v. Low, 109 N. Y.
391 ; s. C, 16 N. E. Eep. 45; Sweet v.
Morrison, 116 N. Y. 32; s. c, 22 N. E.
Eep. 376 ; Phelan v. Mayor, 119 N. Y.
86; s. c, 33 N. E. Rep. 175 ; President
n Coal Co., 50 N. Y. 266.
2 Pepper v. City of Philadelphia
(1886), 114 Pa. St 96.
'Pepper v. City of Philadelphia
(1886), 114 Pa. St 96, which sustained
the right of a property holder to de-
fend, in an action to recover on as-
sessment bills, although not a nominal
party to the contract In Schumm
V. Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq. 143, it was
held that if municipal authorities are
about to accept and pay under a
contract for what in substantial and
§§ 709, 710.]
CONTEACTS.
721
certain rights conceded to him, either by statute or by mu-
nicipal ordinance, he may assert them against the city itself
as well' as against the contractor to whose use the city sues;
this though the right of the city to order, in this instance, the
paving of its streets, to determine the kind of pavement, the
manner of doing it, the terms of the contrstct, etc., was inde-
pendent of the property owner's consent.'
§ 709. Fiduciary position of ofiScers — Improvident con-
tracts.— Although a mere error in judgment as to price on a
proposed purchase by a municipality may not suffice to sus-
tain a tax-payer's action provided for by New York statutes,
yet an excessive valuation so large as to indicate that the
officers of the corporation acting in the matter are not exer-
cising the same fidelity, care and caution as would be ex-
pected of an individual purchasing for himself with his own
money will sustain an action to enjoin the purchase.^
§ 710. Action by assignee of contractor — Pleading. — The
complaint, in an action against a municipal corporation upon
important respects has not been per-
formed, property owners may have
a remedy in equity to enjoin the
wrongful payments.
1 Philadelphia v. Jewell (1890). 135
Pa. St. 339. As to power of city to
name the terms of contract inde-
pendent of proijei'ty owner's consent,
Pliiladelphia v. Brooke, 81 Pa. St 23 ;
Philadelphia v. Burgin, 50 Pa. St
539 ; Hutchinson v. Pittsburg, 72 Pa.
St. 330. As to property owner's right
to defend, Eeilly v. Philadelphia, 60
Pa. St 467.
2 Winkler v. Summers (1888), 23
Abb. N. C. 80 ; S. 0., 5 N. Y. Supl. 733,
a case for injunction against thepur-
chase of a site for a school-house. It
■was also held that the resolution o£
the common council confiding to the
comptroller the duty of purchasing
the site, but at a price not to exceed
$11,000, was not a contract of pur-
chase on the part of the city ; nor
was the verbal assent of the comp-
46
troller to take the property at the
price named by the seller a contract
such as the statute required to bind
either party ; and the delivery of a
deed to the law oflScer of the corpora-
tion in addition did not amount to
an execution of the contract such as
to preclude an injunction. It was
further held that, the comptroller
having mei'ely asked the owner what
he would take and the owner de-
manding the sum fixed by the reso-
lution as a maximum limit, his ac-
cepting the offer without eifort to
bring down the price to a more rea-
sonable figure was conduct against
which relief should be given by in-
junction at suit of a tax-payer.
Argus Co. V. Mayor &c. of Albany,
55 N. Y. 495 ; s. C, 14 Am. Kep. 296,
affirming 7 Lans. (N. Y.) 364 ; Hersee
V. City of Buffalo, 1 Buff. Super. Ct
(Sheld.) 445; Note on Tax-payers'
Actions, 22 Abb. N, C. 86.
722 CONTRACTS. [i'^H-
a contract made by its governing authorities, need not state
the names of the members of such board, as they are neces-
sarily known to and readily ascertainable by the corporation.
And an allegation in a complaint that the corporation, for in-
stance the city, by its board of public works, made certain
changes in the original contract, and required certain extra
work, is sufficiently definite without stating by what mem-
bers of the board those acts were done. ^Nor is it necessary
to set out in such a complaint %hat changes were made, and
what extra work required, when the items sufficiently appear
in bills of particulars filed with and as a part of the complaint.
And it is not necessary in a complaint against a corporation
for the amount due on a contract, for instance, for the con-
struction of a sewer, to set forth the plans and specifications
of the work; it is sufficient to refer to them therein, they
being presumably in the possession of the corporation. A
general allegation in a complaint that the original contractor,
with the consent of his sureties and of the board of public
works, " assigned the contract to plaintifiF, together with all
his claims for money earned and to be earned under it, and for
and on account of said extra work and materials ; that accord-
ingly, in the completion of the sewer under the contract,
plaintiff assumed in every respect the position and situation
of " such contractor, is sufficiently definite as to such assign-
ment and substitution. And such an assignee need not state
in his complaint for the amount due on the contract, the part
performed by the original contractor separately from that
performed by himself as the substituted contractor. And if
the plaintiff has before suit submitted to arbitrament of the
board of public works the question of what is due him, and
has not been fairly dealt with, allegations of facts showing
bad faith and unworthy motives on the part of the members
of the board are necessary to show that the plaintiff is not
bound by their determination.''
§ 711. Miscellaneous rulings. — "When an ordinance of a
municipality fixes a limit of time within which work is to be
finished under all contracts — as for paving streets — as a con-
dition upon which the validity of the contract will be deter-
» Burnham v. City of Milwaukee, 69 Wis. 379 ; s. c, 34 N. W. Eep. 389.
§ 711.]
CONTRACTS.
723
mined, and a contract is entered into for such work with a
stipulation that it shall be finished in accordance with all the
ordinances relating to that class of work, this condition will
be considered as written in the contract.'
'Philadelphia v. Jewell (1890), 135
Pa. St 329, holding that such a con-
tract, after failure to complete the
work in two years from its date,
might have been treated as void by
the city. In Newbold u Glenn (1887),
67 Md. 489 ; S. G, 10 Atl. Eep. 242, the
court declined to hold that the mere
failure of the authorities of the city
to observe the requirements of a
statute as to advertising a sale of
city real estate would, in itself, in-
validate the deed made by the city
to a purchaser of such property. The
property here was sold for its full
value and there was no intimation of
fraud or bad faith on the part of the
authorities. In Dausch v. Crane (Mo.,
1892), 19 S. W. Eep.. 61, the court
held that where a resolution of a
board of aldermen, passed pursuant
to an act of the territorial legislature
of Missouri authorizing the mayor of
St. Louis to compromise with the
claimants of certain commons by
conveying to them the lands claimed
at a certain price, and the mayor had
executed a deed of conveyance under
the authority given him by the reso-
lution, its validity was not aSected
by a subsequent resolution of the
board of aldermen repudiating the
deed, and declaring that it was made
without authority.
CHAPTER XIX.
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL.
i 713b Legislative control subject to
limitations.
713. Powers that the State cannot
relinquish.
714 Impairment of legislative
grants. '
715. The same subject continued.
716. Remission of forfeitures.
717. Property held for public use.
718. Tenure of office of municipal
oflBcers.
719. Agencies of municipal admin-
istration.
-730. Diversion of funds.
§ 721. The same subject continued —
Public interest paramount
to private right
722. Application of revenues.
723. The same subject continued.
724. Impairment of obligations to
individuals.
725. The same subject continued.
726. Impairment of remedies
against the corporation.
727. The same subject continued —
Control of taxing power
limited.
728. Vacating assessment of dam-
ages.
739. The rule summarized.
§ 712. Legislative control subject to limitations.— The
subject of legislative control, so far as the latter operates upon
and through the charter, has been discussed in another chap-
ter,' and the general rule affirming the supremacy of the leg-
islature over its instrumentalities of government finds appli-
cation in numerous instances throughout this work. As
regards matters of general concern and duties which the peo-
ple of cities or other municipal corporations owe to the State
at large, the control- of the State is complete, and no discre-
tionary authority is vested in such corporations. But these
corporations, though made use of in State government and in
that character subject to State control, have other objects and
purposes peculiarly local, in which the State at large, except
in conferring the power and regulating its exercise, is legally
no more concerned than it is in the individual and private
concerns of its several citizens. And as regards property
rights and matters of exclusively local concern, the State has
1 Amendment, Repeal ant> Forfeiture of Charter, ch. IV, 'supra.
§ 713.]
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL.
725
no right to interfere and control by compulsory legislation
the action of municipal corporations.'
I
§ 713. Powers that the State cannot relinqnjlsh. — Justice
Swayne, speaking upon this subject for the United States
Supreme Court, said : — " The legislative power of a State, ex-
cept so far as restrained by its own constitution, is at all
times absolute with respect to all offices within its reach. It
may at pleasure create or abolish them or modify their duties.
It may also shorten or lengthen the term of service. And it
may increase or diminish the salary or change the mode of
compensation.* The police power of the States, and that with
respect to municipal corporations, and to many other things
that might be named, are of the same absolute character.' In
all these cases there can be no contract and no irrepealable
law, because they are ''governmental subjects," and hence
within the category before stated. They inwolYepubUo inter-
ests, and legislative acts concerning them are necessarily ^i^&^'o
' People &a v. Common Council of
Detroit (1873), 28 Mich. 238; S. C, 15
Am. Rep. 2U3, a well-considered case
refusing a mandamus to compel the
common council of the city to order
the issuing of bonds to purchase lands
for a park contracted for by a board
of park commissioners under an act
of the legislature supposed to have
enlarged the powers of this board so
far as to authorize them to make a
purchase of lands for the city; in
other words, to give them a power of
taxation ; the court holding that while
it was within the legislative power
to take away as it did from a citi-
zens' meeting, where it was formerly
located under a prior act, the right to
decide for the city upon the purchase
of a public park, and to lodge it with
some other proper agent or repre-
sentative of the local community,
the State had no authority to confer
such functions upon its own agents,
nor by legislative amendment en-
larging their powers upon these park
commissioners, who were originally
State appointees and had become rep-
resentatives of the city only to the ex-
tent that their authority was recog-
nized under the original statute by
the representatives of the city, which
conferred upon them no such power.
See " Legislative Control of Municipal
Corporations," by W. P. Wade, Esq., 8
Cent. L. J. 3 ; and as to compulsoiy
legislation. People v. Mahaney, 13
Mich. 481 ; Bay City v. State Treasurer,
23 Mich. 303. As to the private rights
of corporations as distinguished from
public. Small v. Danville, 51 Me. 362 ;
Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St 180;
Western College v. Cleveland, 12
Ohio St 375 ; San Francisco Gas Co.
V. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453 ; Oliver
V. Worcester, 102 Mass. 499.
2 See Butler v.- Pennsylvania, 10
How. 402.
3 See Cooley's Const. Lim., pp. 238,
342; The Regents v. Williams, 4 GiU
& J. 321.
726 LEGISLATIVE CONTBOL. [§ T14.
laws. Every succeeding legislature possesses the same juris-
diction and power with respect to them as its predecessors.
The latter have the same power of repeal and modification
which the former had of enactment — neither more nor less.
All occupy in this respect a footing of public equality. This
must necessarily be so in the nature of things. It is vital to
the public welfare that each one should be able at all times to
do whatever the varying circumstances and present exigen-
cies touching the subject invol^d may require. A different
result would be fraught with evil. All these considerations
apply with full force to the times and places of holding courts.
They are both purely-public things, and the laws concerning
them must necessarily be of the same character. If one may
be bargained about so may the other. In this respect there is
no difference in principle between them."*
§ 714. Impairment of legislative grants. — A legislative
grant is an executed contract, and as such is within the clause
of the constitution of the United States which prohibits the
States from passing any law impairing the obligation of con-
tracts. It cannot, therefore, be destroyed and the estate be
divested by any subsequent legislative enactment.* "And
though a municipal corporation is the creature of the legisla-
ture, yet when the State enters into a contract with it, the
subordinate relation ceases, and that equality arises which
exists between all contracting parties. And however great
1 Newton v. Commissioners (1879), Trhicbthelndiana court said: — "The
100 n. S. 548, an action to restrain establishment of the time and place
the removal of a county seat, in of holding courts is a matter of gen-
which case the court applied the eral legislation, respecting which the
principles of the text and held that a act of one session of the Greneral As-
law establishing a county seat of a sembly cannot be binding on an-
county in a town upon condition that other." Adams u County of Logan, 11
the citizens of the town should give IlL 336 ; Bass v. Fontleroy, 11 Tex. 698.
a boiid in a fixed sum for building a ^ Grogan v. San Francisco (1861), 18
court-house, the condition precedent CaL 590, holding it not in the power
having been complied with, was not a of the legislature to divest property
contract which would disable the leg- which is not held in trust for pub-
islature subsequently to legislate for lie municipal purposes. See, also,
it< lemova to another town. See. also, Benson v. Mayor && of New York,
Armstrongs Comm'rs, 4 Biackf. 208 ; 10 Barb. 245.
El well V. Tucker, 1 Biackf. 285, in
§ 715.]
LEGISLATIVE OONTEOL.
727
the control of the legislature over the corporation, it can be
exercised only in subordination to the principle which secures
the inviolability of contracts." ^
§ 715. The same subject continue^. — The Supreme Court
of the United States sustained a statute of Connecticut which
discontinued a ferry in which a town had a half-interest on
the ground that there was no contract between the State and
the town by which the latter could claim a permanent right
to the ferry, the nature of the subject-matter of the grant and
the character of the parties to it both showing that it was not
such a contract as was beyond the interference of the legis-
lature.^
1 Field, C. J., in Grogan v. San
Francisco (1861), 18 Cal. 580, 613. In
Spaulding v. Andover (1873), 54 N. H.
38, an act which declared a por-
tion, of a fund vchich had been as-
signed to a town " to belong to and
be the property of " certain individ-
uals was held to be invalid as violat-
ing a contract between the State and
the town which was the effect of a
statute under which the State issued
bonds and assigned to the town its
portion "to be devoted exclusively
toward the reimbursement of the
expenditures incurred by the town
for war purposes during the rebell-
ion." The court said : — " [The as-
signment of these bonds] was an un-
qualified and unincumbered grant
[of the same to the town], possessing
all the incidents of an executed and
iri-evooable contract."
2 Town of East Hartford v. Hart-
ford Bridge Co. (1850), 10 How. 611.
Woodbury, Justice, said : — " . . .
the doings of the legislature must be
considered rather as public laws than
as contracts. They related to public
interests. They changed as those in-
terests demanded. The grantees like-
wise, the towns being mere organiza-
tions for public purposes, were liable
to have their public powers, rights
and duties modified or abolished at
any moment by the legislature. They
are incorporated for public and not
private objects. They are allowed to
hold privileges, or property only for
public pui-poses. The members are
not shareholders nor joint partners
in any corporate estate which they
can sell or devise to others, or which
can be attached and levied on for
their debts. Hence, generally, the
doings between them and the legis-
lature are in the nature of legislation
rather than compact, and subject to
all the legislative conditions just
named, and therefore to be consid-
ered as not violated by subsequent
legislative changes. It is hardly pos-
sible to conceive the grounds on
which a different result could be vin-
dicated without destroying all legis-
lative sovereignty and checking most
legislative improvements and amend-
ments, as well as supervision over its
subordinate public bodies. Thus to
go a little into details, one of tlie
highest attributes of a legislature is
to regulate public matters with all
public bodies, no less than the com-
munity, from' time to time, in the
manner which the public welfare
may appear to demand. It can neither
devolve these duties permanently on
728
LEGISIATIVK CONTKOL.
[§ 716.
§ 716. Bemission of forfeitures. — A county does not,
nor do any of its citizens or its governing authorities acquire
aright of property or any separate or private interest in a
forfeiture named in an act of the legislature authorizing a
subscription by the State to the stock of a private corpora-
tion, if the corporation fails to do a certain thing, though the
act declares it for the use of the county. A proviso of that
kind in an act of the legislature is a measure of State policy
which the State has a right to change if the policy is after-
wards discovered to be erroneous.^
other public bodies, nor permanently
suspend or abandon them itself, with-
out being usually regarded as un-
faithful, and, indeed, attempting
what is wholly beyond its constitu-
tional competency. It is bound, also,
to continue to regulate such public
matters and bodies, as much as to
organize them at first. Where not
resti'ained by mei'e constitutional
provision, this power is inherent in
its nature, design and attitude, and
the community possess as deep and
permanent interest in such power re-
maining in and being exercised by
the legislatm-e when the public prog-
ress and welfare demand it, as in-
dividuals or corporations can in any
instance possess in restraining it."
See, also, remarks o£ Taney, C. J., in
Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge. 11 Peters, 420, 547, 548.
1 State V. Baltimore & Ohio R Co.
(1845), 3 How. 534, in wliich it was
urged that the county had acquired
a beneficial right to the $1,000,000
named in the act by reason of the
failure of the railroad company to
construct their road through the
county ; that its right was a vested
right; in short, that it was a con-
tract, and that the legislature had no
power by a subsequent act to re-
lease the corporation from its pay-
ment and order a discontinuance of
the suit which the county had insti-
tuted for the amount The Supreme
Court of the United States held that
it was a penalty inflicted upon the
corporation as a punishment for dis-
obeying the law, and the assent of
the company to it, as a supplemental
charter, was not sufficient to de-
prive it of the character of a penalty.
A clause of forfeiture in a law is to
be construed differently from a simi-
lar clause in an engagement between
individuals. A legislatijre can im-
pose it as a punishment, but individ-
uals can only make it a matter of
contract. The legislature has a right
to remit a penalty imposed by law.
In HoUiday v. People (1848), 10 111.
214 it was held that the legislature
might, after verdict, release a pen-
alty in a popular action brought for
the benefit of a county, a county be-
ing a public corporation subject
completely to the control of the leg-
islature, and the acts of the executive
pursuant to the provisions of the
constitution. See, also. Coles v.
County of Madison, Breese (111.), tl5 ;
Conner v. Bent, 1 Mo. 235. In the
latter case it was held that the legis-
lature was competent to relieve from
a forfeiture, even where, the money
was going to a county, and that
after judgment; also, tha,t where
money accrues to a county (this was
an action for money collected as
district taxes claimed not to have
§§ 717, 718.] LEvJISLATIVE COHTEOL. 729
k
§ 717. Property held for public uses. — It is within the
power of the legislature to relieve a city or other municipal
corporation frona the trust to hold real property condemned
or purchased for a public use only, and to authorize it to sell
and convey the same.' So, also, the legislature may sanction
a sale of such property, a change in its character from realty
to persopalty, and the devotion of the avails of such a sale to
general or special purposes.^ The legislature having declared
in a prior act authorizing the purchase of lands for a public
use by a municipality that the holders of the bonds issued and
sold by it to pay for such lands should have a lien upon the
lands to secure the payment of the bonds, it cannot by a sub-
sequent act empower the municipality to sell such lands and
make a title freed from the lien of such bondholders. The se-
curity cannot be taken away without impairing the obligation
of the contract, which is not one between the corporation and
the State, but between the creditor of the one part^ and the
corporation and the State of the other part*
§ 718. Tenure of office of municipal officials. — It has been
held in Kentucky that the provisions of the State constitution
as to courts of cities and the election of judges was never in-
tended to take from the legislature the power to enlarge the
boundaries of towns in existence at the time of the adoption
of the constitution, or to alter or abolish the courts therein,
when the law-making power should deem it for the benefit of
the inhabitants.*
been paid over), it cannot be said to McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wall. 143 ; Wa-
be so vested as to prevent the con- bash &c. Co. v. Beers, 3 Black, 448.
tvol of the legislature, as the legisla- * Boyd v. Chambers (1S79), 78 Ky.
ture has power over the counties and 140, in which the right to the office of
all things that belong to them in a city judge elected in accordance
that capacity simply as such. with the terms of a new charter of a
1 Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Arm- city re-incorporated was sustained
strong tl871), 45 N. Y. 234 ; S. C, 6 over the claims of one elected when
Am. Rep. 70. See, also, Nioollw. New the provisions of the constitution
York & E. R. Co., 13 N. Y. 131. governed in the matter. The Court
2 De Varaigne v. Fox, 3 Blatchf. 95. of Appeals said : — " Cities and-towns
, ' Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Arm- are mere creatures of the legislature,
strong (1871). 45 N. Y. 334; S. c, 6 and the power exists in that depart-
Am. Rep. 70. See, also, Curran v. ment of the State government not
State of Arkansas, 15 How. 304-314 ; only to abolish the courts, but to de-
730
LEGISLATIVE OONTEOL.
[§ 719.
§ 719. Agencies of mnnicipal administration. — Although
the power, under its charter and subsequent legislation, has
been placed in the governing authorities of a municipal cor-
poration to appoint the officers of any department of its gov-
ernment, there remains in the legislature the power, to be
exercised whenever it deems that the public welfare requires
it, to create by legislative enactment a board for the govern-
ment of that particular department, to appoint the members
of the board, and to define its duties and delegate to it the
powers necessary to the administration of that department.*
That the constitution of a State mentions and recognizes any
yjarticular municipal corporation does not make the charter
of that corporation a constitutional charter so as to place it
beyond thd reach of legislative power.* The doctrine that
there is a fundamental principle, of right and justice, inherent
in the nature and spirit of the social compact, that rises above
Btroy the existence of the corporation
by a repeal of its charter. These in-
ferior courts not being the creatures
of the constitution, it was never in-
tended to deprive the legislature of
the power to regulate and control by
proper legislation all the machinery
necessary to the existence of such
municipalities." Again they said : —
' " And when its [the city's] charter
has been repealed and a new and dis-
tinct act of incorporation obtained
[which was done here], it is the crea-
tion of a new city government, with
its civil and police jurisdiction as
well as the manner of electing all Its
officers controlled by its charter,
when not in violation of the consti-
tution." In Rutgers v. Mayor &o. of
Ne%v Brunswick (1884), 43 N. J. Law,
51, it was held to be in the power
of the legislature of New Jersey to
enact a law which was supplemental
to an act which had established a
district court in cities having fifteen
thousand inhabitants. The supple-
mental act changed the former by
substituting twenty thousand inhab-
itants. The ground of the ruling
was that district courts are inferior
courts, which the legislature could
establish, alter or abolish at its dis-
cretion, as the public good might re-
quire; and if in its discretion the
court was abolished, the term of serv-
ice of its officers was thereby ter-
minated. The effect of the supple-
mental act, as the city did not have
twenty thousand inhabitants, was to
abolish the court and terminate the
term of office of the relator, who ap-
plied for mandamus to compel the
payment of his salary as district
judge after the passage of the sup-
plemental act
1 Mayor &o. of Baltimore v. State
(1860), 15 Md. 376.
2 Mayor &c. of Baltimore v. State
(1860), 15 Md. 376. This ruling was
based upon the doctrine that the
power to govern belongs to the peo-
ple, and it is their duty to exercise it
for the common good, and being un-
der that obligation, it is not to be as-
sumed that they have impaired the
means of performing the duty by
parting with the power to any divis-
ion of the body politic.
g§ 720, 721.] LEGISLATIVE OONTEOL. 731
and restrains the power of legislation, cannot be applied to
the legislature when exercising its sovereignty over public
charters, granted for the purpose of government.'
§ 720. Diversion of funds. — It was urged in an Illinois
case that money appropriated by an act to establish and main-
tain a general system of internal improvements to the differ-
ent counties through which no railroad or canal was provided
to be made, when received by the county, became its property
for the use of the inhabitants thereof and was beyond legisla-
tive control. The Supreme Court held that this money Avas
subject to legislative control, and until definitely appropriated
it might be resumed or diverted at the will of the legislature.'
§ 721. The same subject continned — Public interest para-
mount to private right. — A municipal officer has no vested
right of property in any portion of a fund of the corporation
which is set apart as a fund for the relief of disabled or retir-
ing officers of the class to which he belongs, which results
from an authority given to the treasurer of the corporation
by statute fixing the compensation of such officers, and to re-
tain a certain amount from the compensation for this purpose.
The effect of the provisions of such a statute is an appropria-
tion by the State each month to the creation of the fund for
1 Mayor &c. of Baltimore v. State grant may be made to a public cor-
(1860), 15 MA 376. poration for purposes of private ad-
2 County of Richland v. County of vantage, and although the public
Lawrence (1850), 13 111. 1. The court may also derive a common beneBt
said : — " There was no contract here therefrom, yet the corporation stands
between the State and Lawrence on the same footing as respects such
county, either at the time the appro- grants as would any body of persons
priation was made or when the uponlwhom like privileges were con-
county received the money. The ferred. Public or municipal corpora-
county was the mere agent of the tions, however, which exist only for
State for the disbursement of a cer- public purposes and possess no power
tain amount of the money of the except such as are bestowed upon
State as she directed. That the State them for public political purposes,
may make a contract with or a grant are subject at all times to the control
to a public municipal corporation, of the legislature, which may alter,
which it could not subsequently im- modify or abolish them at pleasure."
pair or resume, is not denied ; but 3 Kent's Cdm. 305 ; Bailey v. City of
in such case the corporation is to be New York, 3 Hill, 531.
regarded as a private company. A
732
LEGISLATIVE CONTEOL.
[§§ 722, 723.
the purposes designated in the statute, and until used for
these purposes it can be transferred to other parties and ap-
plied to different purposes by the legislature.^
§ 722. Application of revenues. — The revenues of a county
are not the property of the county in the sense in which the
revenue of a private corporation is regarded ; and the power
of the legislature to direct its application is plenary. A county
being a public corporation, whi«h exists only for public pur-
poses, connected with the administration of the State govern-
ment, it follows that such a corporation, and of course its
revenue, is subject to the control of the legislature, and when
the legislature directs the application of its revenue to a par-
ticular purpose, or its payment to any party, a duty is im-
posed and an obligation created upon the county.*
§ 723. The same subject continued. — The power of ap-
propriation which a legislature can exercise over the reve-
iPennie v. Eeis (1888), 133 U. S.
464. Field, Justice, said : — '• The di-
rection of the State, that the fund
should be one foi- the benefit of the
police officer or his representative
under certain conditions, was subject
to change or revocation at any time
at the will of the legislatui-e. There
was no contract on the part of the
State that its disposition should al-
ways continue as originally provided.
Until the particular event should
happen upon which the money or a
part of it was to be paid, there was
no vested right in the officer to such
payment. His interest in the fund
was until then a mere expectancy
treated by the law and liable to be
revoked or destroyed by the same
authority."
2 Boayd of Supervisors of Sangamon
County V. City of Springaeld (1872),
63 111. 66. In People &c. v. Power
(1860), 25 111. 187, the Supreme Court
of Illinois sustained the validity of
an act of the legislature which pro-
vided that the county in which a city
was situated, out of taxes collected
as ordered by the act, should pay
over to the city certain portions of
the revenue realized from the taxea
It was especially urged before the
court that the legislature could not
control the revenue of a county, such
revenue being the property of the
counties, not to be taken from them
without their consent, and to be
used and appropriated in such man-
ner only as the county courts of
the respective counties might direct;
that to do so would violate the con-
stitutional provisions as to laws im-
pairing the obligation of contracts.
Upon this point the court said: —
" The whole State has an interest in
the revenue of a county, and for the
public good the legislature must
have the power to direct its applica-
tion. The power conferred upon a
county to raise a revenue by taxation
is a political power, and its applica-
tion, when collected, must necessa-
rily be within the control of the legis-
lature for political purposes.''
§ 724.]
LEGISLATIVE CONTEOL.
733
nues of the State for any purpose, which it may regard as
calculated to promote the public good, it can exercise over
the revenues of a county, city or town, for any purpose con-
nected with the present or past condition except as such reve-
nues may, by the law creating them, be devoted to special
purposes.'
§ 724. Impairment of obligations to individuals. — The
implied contract which is deemed to arise out of the accept-
ance of a charter by a municipal corporation is a contract be-
tween the city and the State, and not between the city and
individuals, and is not "Impaired" by a statute exempting
the corporation from liability for torts.^ An act of the legis-
lature establishing a board of public works for a city cannot
be held invalid on the ground that it divests old boards, or
1 This mile was declared by Field,
J., in Blanding v. Burr (1859), 13 Cal.
343, 351. See, also, Town of Guil-
ford V. Board of Supervisors, 13
N. Y. 143 ; People v. Mayor of Brook-
lyn, 4 Comst. (N. Y.) 419 ; Thomas v.
Leland, 24 Wend. 65 ; Shaw v. Den-
nis, 5 Gil. 415 ; City of Bridgeport v.
Housatonic R. Co., 15 Conn. 492;
Inhabitants of Norwich v. County
Comm'rs of Hampshire, 18 Pick. 60 ;
Truchelut v. City Council of Charles-
ton, 1 Nott & McC. 227 ; Wilson v.
Leland, 2 Peters, 661, 662 ; Morris v.
People, 3 Denio, 392; Grant v.
Courier, 24 Barb. 237; Benson v.
Mayor of Albany, 24 Barb. 248;
Clark V. City of Rochester, 24 Barb.
446; Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila-
delphia, 21 Pa. St. 147 ; Moers v. City
of Reading. 21 Pa. St. 188; Cass v.
Dillon, 2 Ohio, 613 ; Railroad Co. v.
Comm'rs of Clinton Co., 1 Ohio St
89; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 337:
People V. Mayor of New York, 25
Wend. 681; People v. Draper, 25
Barb. 344 ; State v. Baltimore &c. R
Co., 12 Gill & J. (Md.) 436; Crelgh-
ton V. San Francisco (1871), 42 Cal.
446, in which it was held that the
power of the legislature to appropri-
ate the moneys of municipal cor-
porations in payment of claims, as-
certained by it to be equitably due
to individuals, though such claims
be not enforceable in the courts, de-
pends largely upon the legislative
conscience and will not be inter-
fered with by the judicial depart-
ment, unless in exceptional cases.
People V. San Francisco, 11 Cal. 206 ;
People V. Haws, 37 Barb. 440; Still-
well V. Mayor of New York, 19 Abb.
Pr. 376; Hobart v. Supervisors, 17
Cal. 31 ; People v. Pacheco, 27 Cal.
209 ; People v. Stewart, 28 Cal. 395 ;
Beals V. Amador County, 35 Cal.
032; Davidson v. Mayor of New
York, 27 How. Pr. 342.
2 Gray v. City of Brooklyn (1869),
10 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 186. The section
of the act, amendatory of the char-
ter of the city, under consideration,
which exempted the city from lia-
bility for non-feasance, etc., of city
oflScers, was held constitutional ; and
the court further said the section
was intended, not to divest persons
affected thereby of their rights, but
to change and limit their remedies.
734
LEGISLATIVE CONTEOL,
[§ 725.
the city corporation, or the common council, of the title to
property, and transfers it to and vests it in such a board of
public works.'
§ 725. The same subject continued. — If a contract when
made is valid under the constitution and laws of a State, as
they have been previousl}' expounded by its judicial tribunals,
and as they were understood at the time, no subsequent ac-
tion by the legislature or the judiciary will be regarded by
the United States Supreme Court as establishing its invalid-
ity.'
1 People V. Hurlbut (1871), 24 Mich.
44, 73, Christiancy, J., saying : —
" All those' previous boards and the
city corporation itself held whatever
property they did hold in the right,
and for the public benefit, of the
city, as a public trust for municipal
purposes ; and it was clearly compe-
tent for the legislature to transfer it
to another public board, to be held
in the same manner, for the game pub-
lic use and benefits." In Western Sav-
ing Fund Society v. City of Philadel-
phia (1858), 31 Pa. St. 185, the Supreme
Court of the State of Pennsylvania
affirmed the granting of an injunc-
tioQ on complaint of the society to
restrain the city from an election of
a number of trustees of a loan fund
in accordance with an act passed by
the legislature, which the court held
not to be in the power of the legis-
lature, as it impaired a contract
made by the city, with reference to
the organization of a gas-works com-
pany, on the principle that whenever
a municipal corporation engages in
things not public in their nature it
acts as a private individual, — no
longer legislates, but contracts, —
and is as much bound by its engage-
ments as a private person.
ZQlcott V. Supervisors (1873), 16
Wall. 678, in which the court applied
the principles stated in the text, and
held an act of the legislature of
Illinois, authorizing a vote of the peo-
ple of a particular county upon the
questipn whether they would aid
the building of a certain railroad,
and, if they Voted in favor of aiding,
authorizing the issue of county orders
for money to aid in the building to
have been a proper exercise of legis-
lative authority, and the county
charged on such orders issued by it
and given to the road by way of do-
nation. See, also, Chicago v. Shel-
don, 9 Wall. 50 ; Louisiana v. Pills-
bury, 105 U. S. 278; County of
Livingston v. Darlington, 101 U. S.
407 ; Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3
Wall. 294 ; Thomson v. Lee County,
3 Wall. 327 : Gelpcke v. City of Bu-
bnque, 1 Wall. 175; Butz v. City of
Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575; Mitchell v.
Burlington, 4 Wall. 270. In Burton
V. Town of Koshkonong (1880), 4 Fed.
Eep. 373, it was held that if a statute
which provided against interest upon
interest was intended and did operate
so as to affect the rate of interest
upon coupons of the bonds of this
town, a contract made before its
passage, it would be such a change
in the remedy as practically to cut
off a portion of the cause of action or
render the contract of less available
worth, and was as much within the
constitutional provision inhibiting
§^ 726, 727.]
LEGISLATIVE CONTEOL.
735
§ 726. Impairment of remedies against the corporation.
If a municipality enter into a contract under a supposed
power to pay for improvements ^y an assessment upon prop-
erty owners presumably benefited by such improvements, and
upon its afterwards appearing that there was no such power
in the corporation, the legislature should pass a statute em-
powering the municipality to levy a tax to pay for such im-
provements, a contractor who has reduced his claim for such
work to judgment against the corporation has a vested right
under that statute to a remedy to compel the corporation to
levy such a tax that the legislature cannot take away by sub-
sequent legislation, under the constitutional provision prohib-
iting legislation which would impair contracts.'
§ 727. The same subject continued — Control of tax-
ing power limited. — The Supreme Court of the United States
upon this subject has said : — " The argument in support of the
act [a statute of Louisiana authorizing the " premium bond "
plan for settling the bonded and floating debts of the city of
laws impairing the obligation of con-
tiacts as if it i affected the contract
directly, and judgment was given for
the plaintiff. In United States v.
Lincoln County (1379), 5 Dill. 184, it
was held that an act of the legisla-
ture, if it applies to county bonds
issued before its passage, and takes
away the power from the' county
court to levy taxes to pay these
bonds, and as a result the right of
the holder of a judgment based upon
such bonds to compel a levy of a tax
by mandamus to the county court, it
was in conflict with the constitution
as to impairing the obligation of con-
tracts.
1 Memphis v. United States (1877),
97 U. S. 393. See, also. Von Hoffman
V. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535. In
Lansing v. County Treasurer, 1 DilL
628, a statute of Iowa which discrim-
inated specially against taxes levied
to pay judgments on bonds issued by
municipal corporations in aid of rail-
roads was, in. view of the laws in
force when the bonds were issued,
held to be unconstitutional and void
as impairing the obligation of con-
tracts. In Pereles v. City of Water-
town (1874), 6 Biss. 79, a Wisconsin
statute of limitations so far as it af-
fected municipal bonds issued before
its passage was held to be unconsti-
tutional and void, Hopkins, J., held
that in passing a statute of limita-
tions the legislature must allow a
reasonable time within which to
prosecute existing causes of action ;
and as to what constitutes such rea-
sonable time the legislature was not
the exclusive autliority. The period
fixed by the legislature is subject to
review by the court, and if they
deem it unreasonable they will disi-e-
gard it as impairing the obligation of
contracts. A limitation to one year
in municipal bonds issued for nego-
tiation in a foreign market the judg,e
regarded as clearly unreasonable and
unconstitutiont^l. It amounted to a
destruction of the contract
736 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. [§ 727.
New Orleans] is substantially this : — That the taxing power be-
longs exclusively to the legislative department of the govern-
ment, and when delegated to a municipal corporation may,
equally with other powers of the, corporation, be revoked or
restricted at the pleasure of the legislature. It is true that
the power of taxation belongs exclusively to the legislative de-
partment, and that the legislature may at any time restrict or
revoke at its pleasure any of the powers of a municipal cor-
poration, including among othefs that of taxation, subject,
however, to this qualification, which attends all State legisla-
tion, that its action in that respect shall not conflict with the
prohibitions of the constitution of the United States, and,
among other things, shall not operate directly upon contracts
of the corporation, so as to impair their obligation by abro-
gating or lessening the means of their enforcement. Legisla-
tion producing this latter result, not indirectly as a conse-
quence of legitimate measures taken, as will sometimes hap-
pen, but directly by operating upon those means, is prohibited
by the constitution, and must be disregarded — treated as if
never ena,cted — by all courts recognizing the constitution as
the paramount law of the land. This doctrine has been re-
peatedly asserted by this court when attempts have been
made to limit the power of taxation of a municipal body, upon
the faith of which contracts have been made, and by means of
which alone they could be performed. So long as the cor-
poration continues in existence the court has said that the con-
trol of the legislature over the power of taxation delegated to
it is restrained to cases where such control does not impair
the obligation of contracts made upon a pledge, expressly or
impliedly given, that the power should be exercised for their
fulfillment. However great the control of the legislature over
the corporation while it is in existence, it must be exercised in
subordination to the principles which secure the inviolability
of contracts." '
I Wolff V. New Orleans (1880), 103 it was held that a statute of Ar-
U. S. 358. See, also. Von Hotf man kansas which was passed by the leg-
V. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535. In islature after the institution of this
-National Bank v. Sebastian County suit in the federal court, declaring
(1879), 5 Dill. 414. an action by the counties no longer bodies corporate
bank upon county warrants issued and suable upon their contracts, be-
by the county in a regular manner, ing evidently intended to deprive
§§ 728, 729.]
LEGISLATIVE OONTEOL.
737
§ 728. Yacating assessments of damages. — The effect of a
law which empowers a municipality to condemn property in
the broadening of its streets, upon that being done and a com-
mission appointed in the law assessing and fixing the compen-
sation to the land-owner, is not to divest the owner at once of
his property and to vest in him a right to the amount fixed as
his compensation, such that the legislature may not provide
for a vacating of an order of confirmation of the report of.the
commission in the matter, and submit to the court whether
or not there had been error, mistake, irregularity and illegal
acts in. the proceedings.'
§ 729. The rule summarized. — A municipal corporation,
being a mere agent of the State, stands in its governmental or
parties of the right to sue counties
in the federal court, impaired the
obligation of a contract ; and Parker,
Judge, extracted from the case of
Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, as
to what constitutes the obligation of
a contract, as follows : — " The obliga-
tion of a contract includes evei-y-
thing within its obligatory scope.
Among these elements nothing is
more important than the means of
enforcement. This is the breath of
its vital existence. Without it the
contract, as such, in the view of the
law, ceases to be, and falls into the
class of 'those imperfect obliga-
tions,' as they are termed, which de-
pend for their fulfillment upon the
will and conscience of those upon
whom they rest. The ideas of right
and remedy are inseparable."
1 Garrison v. City of New York
(1874), 21 Wall. 190, in which it was
held that in the proceeding to con-
demn property for public use there is
nothing in the nature of a contract
between the owner and the State or
corporation which the State in virtue
of her right of eminent domain au-
thorizes to take the property ; all that
the constitution of the State or of the
47
United States or justice requires in
such cases being that a just compen-
sation shall be made to the owner ;
hisproperty can then be taken without
his assent. The court said : — " The
proceeding to ascertain the benefits
or losses which will accrue to the
owner of the property when taken
for public use, and thus the compen-
sation to be made to him, is in the
nature of an inquest on the part of
the State, and is necessarily under
her control. It is her duty to see
that the estimates made are just, not
merely to the individual whose prop-
erty is taken but to the public who is
to pay for it And she can to that
end vacate or authorize the vacation
of any inquest taken by her direc-
tion to ascertain particular facts for
her guidance, where the proceeding
has been irregularly or fraudulently
conducted or in which error has in-
tervened and order a new inquest,
provided such methods of procedure
be observed as will secure a fair hear-
ing from the parties interested in the
property." See, also. In the Matter
of Widening Broadway, 61 Barb. 483 ;
S. a, 49 N. Y. 150.
T38
LEGISLATIVE CONTEOL.
[§ 729.
public character in no contract relation with its sovereign, at
whose pleasure its charter may be amended, changed or re-
voked without the impairment of any constitutional obliga-
tion; but such a corporation in respect of its private or
proprietary rights and interests may be entitled to constitu-
tional protection.! It was held by the Supreme Court of the
United States that a municipal corporation could not claim
tha,t a contract between it and a private corporation had been
impaired by a subsequent act dt the legislature, where this
contract, which was in reality one between the State and
the private corporation, . had been adjudged in the State
courts to be ultra vires; also, that as the city had repudiated
its contract by bringing suit against the private corporation
for its taxes, it was estopped from the claim of impairment of
the contract by subsequent legislation when such legislation
was rendered necessary by or at least was the natural out-
growth of its own repudiation of the contract.^
municipal corporation is not private
property or a vested rigbt of property
in its hands, but the conferring of
such power is an exercise by the
legislature of a public and govern--
mental power which cannot be im-
parted in perpetuity, and is always
subject to revocation, modification
and control, and is not the subject
of contract In Essex Public Road
Board v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334, it
was held that an executive agency
created by a State for the purpose of
improving public highways, and em-
powered to assess the cost of their im-
provement upon adjoining lands and
to purchase such lands as were delin-
quent in the payment of the assess-
ment, did not by such purchase ac-
quire a contract right in the land so
bought which the State could not
modify without violating the pro-
visions of the constitution of the
United States.
2 New Orleans v. New Orleans
Water-works Co. and Conery v. New
Orleans Water-works Co., 143 U. S.
79 ; s. C, 13 S. Ct Rep. 142.
I This doctrine, first declared in
Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat
518, 660, 661, restated in East Hart-
-ford V. Hartford Bridge Company, 10
How. 511, 533, 584, has been reiter-
ated in New Orleans v. New Orleans
Water- works Co., and Conery «. New
Orleans Water-works Co. (1891), 143
U. S. 79; S. C, 13 S. Ct Rep. 143; in
which case the city had under an act
of the legislature made a contract
for a supply of water with the water-
works company, and it was urged by
the city that a subsequent act of the
legislature which required the city to
make a proper compensation to the
company for water furnished, or the
company should not be compelled to
deliver the water to the city, impaired
the first contract In Laramie County
V. Albany County, 93 U. S. 807, 311,
it was held that the legislature had
power to diminish or enlarge the
area of a county whenever the public
convenience or necessity required it
In Williamson v. New Jersey, 130
U. S. 189, 199, it was held that the
power of taxation on the part of a
CHAPTEE XX.
TORTS AND CRIMES.
730.
Torts by the sovereign power.
§753.
731.
The State not liable for ofiSoers'
torts — No respondeat supe-
753.
rior.
754
733.
Suita against United States —
755.
Court of claims.
756.
783.
Suits against New York —
Board of claims.
757.
734
Counties, etc as divisions of
the State.
758.
735.
Tlie same subject continued.
736.
Non-liability of New England
towns.
759.
737.
Liability of New England
towns.
760.
738.
Liability of towns, etc., as to
761.
special dutiea
763.
739.
Non-liability of school districts
and drainage districts.
763.
740.
Non-liability for separate
boards and bodies.
764
741.
Non-liability for torts of inde-
pendent oflBcers.
765.
743.
The same subject continued —
Who are independent ofiS-
766.
oers.
743.
The same subject continued —
Applied in New York city, eta
767.
744.
Non-liability for firemen.
768.
745.
Non-liability for police.
769.
746.
Liability for acts of mobs.
770.
747.
Private interests must yield to
public,
771.
748.
The same subject continued —
Destroying buildings to
773.
check fire.
749.
Non-liability for negligence in
public service.
773.
750.
Non-liability as to jails.
774
751.
Non-liability as to hospitals.
775.
Non-liability as to fire-works.
Liability as to city wells and
water.
Non-liability to trespassers.
Liability for nuisances.
Municipal liability in general.
Chartered cities, etc., distin-
guished from counties, etc. —
The conflict.
Municipal liability in exercise
of private powers.
Liability commensurate with"
duty.
Municipal liability as to water
front
Liability for fright of horse.
Municipal liability for acts of
ofiScers and agents.
Not liable for ultra vires acts
of oflBcers.
Non-liability in the exercise of
discretionary powers.
The same subject continued —
New York and Georgia rula
The same subject continued —
Drainaga
Non-liability for errors of
judgment.
Liability for trespass.
Liability for waste.
Liability after notice — Im-
plied notice.
The same subject continued —
Statutory notice.
The same subject continued —
New York decisiona
Impeaching legislative acta
for fraud.
Indictment for torts.
Not indictable for felony.
740
TOETS AND CEIMES.
[§ 730.
§ 730. Torts Iby the sovereign power. — While the maxim,
that the king can do no wrong, is deemed not to apply to the
United States or the several States' in their character of
public , corporations,^ it is obvious enough on general princi-
ples that they should not be subject to prosecution in the
courts of their own creation for such wrongs as they may
commit,' without their consent to such prosecution duly ex-
pressed by statute.^ The liabilities of the State, being created
only by its legislature, may be* revoked by the same body
Avhenever the public interest requires.* The legislature of a
State may keep within the letter of the constitution and bill
of rights to which it is subject, and yet with impunity pass
laws which are unjust and oppressive to individuals.' In some
European countries an innocent man who is punished for
crime through judicial errors may have reparation therefor
from the State, but not in this country. This seems to be a
..penalty which one has to pay for belonging to civilized so-
ciety.'
1 Langford v. United States, 101
U.S. 341.
.. 2 United States v. Hillegas, 3
Wash. C. C. 73. While generally the
word corporation as used in statutes
does not include a State, yet in its
more extensive meaning, both the
United States and the several States
may be termed corporations. Geor-
gia V. Atkins, 35 Ga. 315.
3 "We consider it to be a funda-
mental principle that the govern-
ment cannot be sued except by its
own consent, and certainly no State
can pass a law which would have any
validity for making the government
suable in its courts." Carr v. United
States, 98 U. S. 433; United States
V. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 204; The Siren,
7 Wall 153; The Davis, 10 Wall. 15.
" The State is not liable for the neg-
ligence or misfeasance of its agents
unless such liability has been volun-
tarily assumed by it by legislative
enactment" Lewis v. State of New
York, 96 N. Y. 71 ; People v. Denni-
son, 84 N. Y. 373.
*Carr v. United States, 98 U. S.
483, 437.
5 Ex parte State, 53 Ala. 331 ; Van-
dyke V. State, 34 Ala. 81 ; Beers v.
State, 20 How. (U. S.) 537. See, also,
Chisholm v. State, 2 Dallas, 419;
Hollingsworth v. State, 3 Dallas, 378 ;
Platenius v. State, 17 Ark. 518.
6 In Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y.
509, the Civil Damages Act of 1873
was upheld as constitutional in spite
of its "sweeping character," and An-
drews, J., said : — " We come back to
the proposition that no law can be
pronounced invalid for the reason
simply that it violates our notions of
justice, is oppressive and unfair in
its operation, or because in the opin-
ion of some or all of the citizens of
the State, it is not justified by public
necessity." See, also. Mobile County
V. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691. 704
7 This apparent injustice is consid-
ered in 36 Am. L. Rev. 555, and the
N. Y. Law Journal of September 81,
1893.
§§ 731, 732.]
TOETS AND 0EIME8.
7*t
§731. The State not liable for offlcersUorts — No re-
spondeat superior. — In respect to its contracts the. State is
equally liable with individuals ; ' and is restrained by the con-
stitution from making laws to impair the obligation of its con-^
tracts.* But governments, federal or State, do not hold them-
selves liable to individuals for their officers' misfeasance,
laches, or unauthorized exercise of power,' for such liability
would involve them in endless embarrassments.* The State
is not liable for the tortious acts of its agents except by force
of statute.*
§732. Suits against United States — Court of claims. —
The United States has not generally consented to be sued in
the federal court of claims in cases sounding in tort or for
war claims,* and is not liable for the tort of its officers in
forcibly taking private land for public use.' That court is
prohibited from exercising jurisdiction in congressioiial cases '
if the claim be for destruction of or damage to property by
the army, or if it, be barred by the acts of 1873 or 1879.*
Wend. 570; Seymour v. Van Slyke,
8 Wend. 403, overruling People v.
Jansen, 7 Johns. 333.
5 Lewis V. State of New York, 96
N. Y. 71 ; Clodfelter v. State, 86 N. a
51, where the court said : — '• That the
doctrine of respondeat*superior ap-
plicable to the relation of principal
and agent does not prevail against
the sovereign in the necessary em-
ployment of public agents is too well
settled upon authority and practice
to admit of controversy."
« Act of 1887, 24 Stat. , ch. 359. In
United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196,
305, Miller, J., says : — " Congress has
created a court in which it has au-
thorized suits to be brought against
the United States, but has limited
such suits to those arising on con-
tracts, with a few unimportant ex-
ceptions."
7 Langford v. United States, 101 U.
S. 341. See United States v. Great
Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645.
SActof MarchS, 1883.
'Burke v. United States, 81 Ct 01.
iDanoMs v. State, 89 N. Y. 36, 44;
People V. Stephens, 71 N. Y. 549.
2 Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
4 Wheat. 519; Fletcher v. Peck, 6
Cranch, 87, 137 ; New Jersey v. Wil-
son, 7 Cranch, 164
'Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall.
269.
* Story on Agency, § 319. In United
States V. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat 720,
735, Story, J., said: — "The general
principle is that laches is not im-
putable to the government ; and this
maxim is founded not in the notion
of extraordinary prerogative, but
upon a great public policy. The gov-
ernment can transact its business
only through its agents ; and its fiscal
opei'ations are so various, and its
agencies so numerous and scattered,
that the utmost vigilance would not
save the public from the most serious
losses, if the doctrine of laches can
be applied to its transactions.'' See,
also. United States v. Van Zandt, 11
Wheat 186 ; United States v. Nichols,
12 Wheat 505 ; People v. Russell, 4
742 TOUTS AND 0EIME8. [§ 732.
When congress by special legislation refers a claim of which
the court has not jurisdiction it must be held that the first
purpose of congress is to confer jurisdiction, and, aJso, that
the court is to render substantial justice if upon ordinary
principles of law the claimant is entitled to it ; ' but where a
private act of congress submits the question whether the gov-
ernment is liable for certain alleged acts of its officers, the
liability must be deemed to be the legal liability which an
ordinary body corporate, such* as a municipal corporation,
would be subject to for similar acts of its agents.^ That con-
gress has by several special acts provided for payment of sev-
eral claims on which claimants could not have recovered in
the court of claims in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
is no reason why the TTnited States should be held liable in
that court on a like claim which congress has not provided
for." A .statute authorizing the court of claims to render
judgment on claims for property taken in 1857 for the LFnited
States by Colonel Johnson, while in command of the Utah ex-
pedition, was held not to authorize that court to give judgment
for losses caused by the refusal of the colonel to permit claim-
ants' trains to proceed without delay.* Though the United
States be not responsible for the trespass of ofiicers who
illegally seize the property of a citizen, yet if the proceeds
pass into the treasury the government will be liable on im-
plied contract to account to the owner therefor, and the court
of claims has jurisdiction.* In congressional cases the claim-
ant in the court of claims must prove his loyalty, and it is
not always clear whether it is the personal representative, or
the heir, or the creditor of a deceased whose loyalty must be
proved.' A claim must be dismissed if the claimant " sus-
tained the late rebellion." '
817; Myers v. United States, 23 Ct 4 United States v. Irwin, 137 U. a
CI. 80 ; Nelson v. United States, 33 135.
Ct CI. 159. See Beasley V. United 6 Thayer a United States, 30 Ct CI.
States, 31 Ct Ci. 335. 137.
1 Cumming v. United States, 33 Ct * Compare Newman v. United
CI. 344 ' States, 31 Ct CI. 205, with Randolph
scumming v. United States, 23 Ct v. United States, 21 Ct CI. 283.
CI. 344 ' Hart v. United States, 118 U. a
» United States v. McDougall, 131 63.
U. a 89.
§§ 733, 734.J
TOBTS AND OBIMES.
Y43
§ 733. Suits against New York— Board of claims. — In
Xew York a board of claims has been established to hear
and determine "all private claims against the State of New
York;"' and the State may become liable for an authorize 1
trespass by its agents and officers on private lands; ^ but un-
der the statute establishing the board of claims and the stat-
ute of 1876 creating the board of audit,' the State is not
generally liable for the negligence or misfeasance of its agents,
because the State has not by its legislature assumed such a
liability.^ In North Carolina, too, it is held that the State is
not rendered liable for the torts of its officers while adminis-
tering the functions of government by the constitutional
provision which confers jurisdiction on the State Supreme
Court "to hear claims against the State."* A similar rule
prevails in Alabama.'
§ 734. Counties, etc., as divisions of the State. — Coun-
ties, towns, and, in some States, cities, in the exercise of the
governmental functions delegated to them by the State, are
1 L 1884, ch. 85, § 1 ; L. 1883, ch. 205 ;
L. 1888, ch. 435.
3 Coleman v. State (1893), 47 N. Y.
St Rep. 609, where on appeal
from the board of claims it was
decided by the Court of Appeals that
" for the injury caused by entering
upon this strip of land by the State
it was liable and the board erred in
refusing the claimant any relief.
The entry of the State upon the land
and its direction to the contractor to
excavate and remove the stone there-
from being wrongful, a trespass, it
became liable for all trespasses com-
mitted by the contractor with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the
agents of the State in executing
the contract"
3L.1876, ch. 444.
< Lewis V. State of New York, 96
N. Y.-71, where a prisoner in the
State reformatory having been in-
jured by a defective ladle which the
overseer compelled him to use, Dan-
forth, J., said ; — " The claimant must
fail unless the doctrine of respondeat
superior can be applied to the State
and the State made liable for the
negligence or misfeasance of its
agents in like manner as a natural
person is responsible for the acts of
his servants. We are aware of no
principle of law or of any adjudged
case which makes that application
except where the State by its legisla-
ture has voluntarily assumed it"
»CIodfelter v. State, 86 N. C. 51,
« State V. Hill, 54 Ala. 67, where it
was held that section 2534 of the
Revised Code was only intended to
afford to persons who had claims
against the State a mode of ascer-
taining whether or not they were
well founded, and if they were what
sum was due to them; but not to
create a liability on the part of the
State where it did not exist already
under the laws.
744
TOHTS AND CRIMES.
[§ 734.
not liable for the misfeasance or negligence of their oiEcers ;
thus a county is not liable for the negligence of commission-
ers in selecting an incompetent physician for the care of the
poor.^ In Alabama a county, being deemed an agency of the
State, and as exercising a quasi-legislsitive authority over
highways, is not liable at common law in damages for any
negligence in respect to them,^ but such liability must be spe-
cially defined by statute.' In Virginia a county as a political
subdivision of the State is not sii|)ject to suit, except as per-
mitted by statute, and such permission may be withdrawn at
the pleasure of the legislature ; * and the same rule exists in
Georgia, though the code makes every county a corporation
with the right to sue and be sued. In a particular case, how-
ever, the code provides that a county may be sued for neglect
1 In Summers v. Daviess Obunty
Comm'rs, 103 Ind. 263 ; s. C, 53 Am.
Rep. 513, the court said : — " There is
no more reason for holding counties
liable for the negligence of the com-
missioners in the exercise of the gov-
ernmental functions delegated to
them than there is for holding cities
liable for the acts of their firemen or
police officers, or for holding coun-
ties and townships liable for the torts
of sheriflfs and constables. In pro-
viding for the care of the poor, a
police povrer virhich resides primar
rily in the sovereignty is exercised,
and neither the sovereign nor the
local governing body to whom such
a po<v.er is delegated is responsible
for the misfeasance of its officers."
See, also, City of Lafayfette v. Tim-
berlake, 88 Ind. 330; Faulkner v.
City of Aurora, 85 Ind. 130 ; Robin-
son V. City of Evansville, 87 Ind. 334 ;
Brinkmeyer v. City of Evansville, 39
Ind. 187. And in Bryant v. St. Paul,
33 Minn. 389 ; s. c, 53 Am. Rep. 31 ;
31 Cent li. J. 33, it was held that
the city was not liable for the mis-
feasance of the board of health
selected by the city.
2 Askew V. Hale County, 64 Ala,
639; Mitchell v. Tallapoosa County,
30 Ala. 180; Van Eppes v. Mobile
County, 35 Ala. 460.
3 Barbour County v. Horn, 48 Ala.
649. Under the Alabama Code
(§ 1203) an action lies against a
county to recover damages sustained
from the fall of a bridge, after the
expiration of the period covered by
the builder's guaranty, though no
toll was charged. Barbour County
V. Brunson, 36 Ala. 363.
* Fry V, Albemarle County, 86 Va-
195 ; Hunsaker v. Borden, 5 Cal. 388 ;
Sharp V. Contra Costa County, 34
Cal. 384 Plaintiff, the employee of
an independent contractor, engaged
in building a bridge^ on a county
road, was injured by the negligent
explosion of a charge of dynamite
by the agents of defendant county
while blasting and building an ap-
proach to the bridge. It was held, in
an action for damages, that counties
are not liable for the torts of their
officers acting within the line of
their authority, unless made so by
statute. Smith v. Board County
Comm'rs Carlton County, 46 Fed.
Rep. 340.
§ 735.}
TOBTS AND OEIMES.
U6
to keep bridges in repair, where the required bond is not
taken from the bridge contractor.^ In Connecticut counties
have no organization and cannot be sned.^ The doctrine of
respondeat superior is not applicable to counties, because there
is no relation of master and servant between them and their
officers, whose office and duties are created by the legislature.'
§ 735. The same subject continued. — In Illinois a county
is not liable, in damages, for loss of life caused by not keep-
ing a bridge in repair,* or for personal injury caused by the
negligent construction of a court-house.* In Iowa it is
held that no claim is a "just claim" against a county, within
the meaning of the code provision, unless the law somewhere
either requires or authorizes its payment by the county." In
"No reason is perceived why a
county should be held to respond in
damages for the negligence of its
officers while acting in the discharge
of public corporate duties enjoined
upon them by the laws of the State.
Counties are but local subdivisions of
the State clothed with but few cor-
porate powers and these not of a pri-
vate character. ... In fact the
powers and duties of counties bear
such a due analogy to the govern-
mental functions of the State, that as
well might the State be held respon-
sible for the negligent acta of its
ofiicers as counties. But it is said
that the alleged negligence was
affirmative in character, imputed to
the county Itself. The author! f'"s,
however, do not seem to make i di -
tinction between the negligence oi a
town or county in failing to observe
a duty and the performance of that
duty in a negligent manner."
6 Turner v. Woodbury County, 57'
Iowa, 440; Foster v. Clinton County,
51 Iowa, 541. A county is not liable in
damages for a personal injury caused
by the defective construction of its'
court-house, or the failure to prop-
erly light it at night. Kinoaid v.'
Hardin County, 53 Iowa, 430. But a'
1 Scales V. Chattahoochee County,
41 Ga. 225.
award v. Hartford County, 13
Conn. 404.
' Fry V. Albemarle County, 86 Va,
195, where the court said : — "No suit
can be maintained against the county
upon the principles of respondeat
superior because the relation of mas-
ter and servant did not exist ; such
officers are gwasi-publio officers of
the State. For although the officer
in charge was appointed by the
countj', yet the office and duties in-
cident to it were created by an act
of the legislature for the general
public welfare, the public roads of
Albemarle county being highways of
the commonwealth for the common
benefit of all the people of the State."
See the application of respondeat
superior to municipal corporations in
Maximilian v. New York, 62 N. Y.
160.
< White V. Bond County, 58 III. 297.
See, also, Town of Waltham v. Kem-
per, 55 III. 346 ; Eussell v. Town of
Steuben, 57 111. 35 ; Hedges v. Madi-
son County, 1 Gilm. 567 ; overruling
South Ottawa v. Foster, 20 111. 296.
* Hollenbeck v. Winnebago County,
85 111. 151, where the court said : —
T46
TOETS AND OBIMBg.
[§ 736.
Iowa a county is under the same obligation of reasonable
care and diligence to keep its bridges safe as a municipal cor-
poration is to keep its streets safe.' In Missouri a county
created by the legislature for purposes of public policy is not
responsible for the neglect of prescribed duties, unless made
so by statute.^
§ 736. Non-liability of New England towns. — New Eng-
land towns, as involuntary political divisions of the State
established for purposes of government, have the same ex-
emption as counties, and are not liable to individuals for neg-
lect of the pOblic duties enjoined upon them, unless made
subject to action by statute.' It is to be observed, however,
county is liable for a defective county
bridge, because in respect to it a
special authority is conferred at the
county's request Kihoaid v. Hardin
County, 53 Iowa, 430 ; Wilson v. Jef-
ferson County, 13 Iowa, 181 ; Huston
V. Iowa County, 43 Iowa, 456.
1 Weirs v. Jones County, 80 Iowa,
351, where the rule was applied to
barricading dangerous places. Com-
pare So{)er V. Henry County, 36
Iowa, 369, with Cook v. Anamosa
City, 66 Iowa, 438; Koester v. Ot-
tumwii, 34 Iowa, 43; Elatt v. Mil-
waukee, 53 Wis. 300.
2 Eeardon v. St Louis County, 36
Mo. 555 ; Ray County v. Bentley, 49
Mo. 336.
3 Hill V. Boston, 133 Mass. 344. In
the leading case of Eastman v. Mere-
dith, 36 N. H. 384, the townhouse was
BO imperfectly constructed that the
flooring gave way at the annual town
meeting, but it was held that a voter
injured thereby could not recover
damages against the town because,
as Perley, C. J., said, "Towns are in-
voluntary territorial and politipal di-
visions of the State, like counties,
established for purposes of govern-
ment and municipal regulation. It
is chiefly through this organization
of towns that the people exercise the
sovereign power of government ; and
the plaintifl's claim is for damages
which he has suffered from neglect
of the town to provide him a safe
place for the exercis^ of his public
rights as a citizen of the town and
State. . . . There is a great weight
of authority to' show that towns in
New England are not liable to a civil
action in' a case like this. In Biddle
V. The Locks and Canals, 7 Mass. 169,
187, the case of Eussell v. The Men of
Devon, 3 T. R. 667, is cited as an au-
thority applicable to towns and coun-
ties in Massachusetts ; and in Mower
V. Leicester,' 9 Mass. 350, it was held
that towns are not liable to a civil
action for neglect to perform public
duties imposed on them, unle.ss the
action were given by some statute,
and Russell v. The Men of Devon was
again recognized as applicable to the
case of towns. The Merchants' Bank
V. Cook, 4 Pick. 114 ; Tisdale v. Nor-
ton, 8 Met 393; Holman v. Town-
send, 13 Met 300, and Brady v. Lowell,
3 Cushing, 134, are to the same point
In Adams V. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Greenl.
861. Mellen, C. J., cites from Riddle
V. The Locks and Canals the remarks
of Parsons, C. J., on this subject, and
adds, 'No private action, unless
given by statute, lies against qua.^i-
§ 737.]
TOBTS A^m OBIMES.
747
that from a very early period Massachusetts towns have been
made liable by statute for defects in their- highways and
bridges.^
§ 737. Liability of New York towns.— In New York, prior
to 1881, in distinction from chartered cities and villages, no
corporate duty rested upon towns, either at common law or
corporations for breach of a corpo-
rate duty.' And other cases in Maine
would seem to show that the rule as
above stated is well established in
that State. Hooper v. Emery, 14
Me. 377; Reed v. Belfast, 20 Me.
248; Sanford v. Augusta, 32 Ma
536. We understand the same rule
to prevail in Vermont In Baxter v.
The Winooski Turnpike, 33 Vt. 123,
Bennet, J., in delivering the opinion
of the court, says, 'I take it to be
well settled that if the statute had
not- given the action, no individual
who had sustained a special damage
through neglect of the town to re-
pair their roads could maintain a
suit It may be said that where an
individual sustains an injuiy by the
neglect or default of another, the law
gives a remedy; but that principle
does not apply where the public are
concerned.' And the same general
doctrine is affirmed in Hyde v. Jar
maica, 27 Vt 443. In Connecticut it
is held that no action will lie for in-
juries caused by defects in a high-
Avay, unless given by statute. Ched-
sey V. Canton, 17 Conn. 475. In
Farnum v. Concord, 2 N. H. 393,
Richardson, C. J., says, 'No action
lies at common law against towns
for damages sustained tlirough de-
fects in highways.' He cites, as
authorities for his position, Mower v.
Leicester and Russell v. The Men of
Devon, and after quoting the pro-
vision of our statute which gives an
action for special damages caused by
insufficiency of highways, he adds.
'And the question is, whether any
damage has happened to the plaintiff
in this case by means of the insuffi-
ciency or want of repairs of the high-
way in question, within the intent
and meaning of this statute.' The
right to recover against the town is
thus placed entirely on the statute.
There is certainly no such exact re-
semblance between counties in Eng-
land and our towns as will make all
the reasons upon which the court in
Russell V. The Men of Devon placed
their decision applicable to towns in
this State. Counties in England are,
however, territorial and political di-
visions of the country, as counties
and towns are here; and they are
guasi-corporations so far as to be
liable to public prosecution for neg-
lect to perform their public du-
ties. . . . And the doctrine of
that case has been adopted and ap-
plied to towns in numerous instances
by judges who must certainly be
reckoned among the most eminent
jurists that New England has pro-
duced: By Parsons and Shaw in
Massachusetts, by Mellen and Shep-
ley in Maine, and by our own learned
Chief Justice Richardson in this
State; and no men in the countiy
have been more familiarly acquainted
with the whole legal history of towns
in New England, and all the tradi-
tions of the law in relation to them."
1 Mass. Colonial Stats. (1648) ; Gen.
Stats., ch. 44, §§ 1, 23. See Hill v.
Boston, 133 Mass. 344.
748
XOBTS AND CBIMES.
[§738,
by statute, in respect to the care or regulation of highways,
and there was therefore no liabihty upon towns to respond in
damages for neglect to keep highways in repair.' By the act
of 1881 the liability of towns was made co-extensive with that
of highway commissioners of towns, and the liability of these
officers is only a limited responsibility — arising out of their
negligence and to the extent that they are p6ssessed of or
have the power to obtain means to make necessary repairs.^
While under the act of 1881 the 4iuty of repair still rests on
the highway commissioners, the civil liability for injury re-
sulting from the neglect of that duty is transferred to tho
town.' And that statute is not unconstitutional because it
makes a town liable for the neglect of its highway commis-
sioners.*
§ 738. Liability of towns, etc., as to special duties. — This
rule of exemption from liability applies to counties and towns
only when acting in their public character and in respect to.
their public and involuntary duties in distinction from their,
special and voluntary duties.' The distinction has been often
1 Monk V. New Utrecht, 104 N. Y.
553; People ex rel. Van Keuren v.
Town Auditors, 74 N. Y. 310.
2 Clapper v. Waterford, 131 N. Y.
382. In Monk v. New Utrecht, 104
N. Y. 553, Ruger, C. J., said: —
" Neither at common law nor by the
statute were towns under any legal
liability to respond in damages even
to persons injured by defects in the
highways, until after the enactment
of chapter 700 of the laws of 1881.
. By this act of 1881 it was
provided that towns should there-
after be liable for such injuries in
cases where the commissioners of
highways of said towns are now by
law liable therefor. It is seen that
the liability of the towns is thus made
co-extensive with that of commis-
sioners of highways iu towns. No
absolute liability for such injuries
was ever imposed by law upon such
ofllcers, but only A limited responsi-
bility arising out of their negligence
to the extent only that they were
possessed of or had power to obtain
means to make necessary repaira"
Hines v. Lockport City, 50 N. Y. 336 ;
Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113.
3 Bryant v. Town of Randolph, 133
N. Y. 70.
* Taylor v. Town of Constable, 15
N. Y. Supl. 795.
5 Thus in Hannon v. Bt. Louis
County, 63 Mo. 313, where the county
made a contract for laying watei^
pipe to the county asylum, the work
being done under the supervision of
the county engineer, and while a
trench was being dug it caved in and
killed one of the workmen, it was
held that the duty in which the
county was engaged was not one im-
posed by general law on all counties,
but a self-imposed one ; that quoad
hoc the county was a private corpo-
ration engaged in a private enter-
§ 738.]
TOETS AND 0EIME8.
749
observed between the liability of towns and cities for neglect
to perform public duties growing out of the powers which
they exercise under the general law, and this liability when
the duty arises from some special power conferred on a par-
ticular town or city ; ' in the exercise of these special powers a
city is a corporate legal individual and liable for injuries to
third persons resulting from the neglect of corporate ofiBcers
and agents.^ In Kentucky a county, being held to be a cor-
poration as well as a political division of the State, may be
sued for the infringement of a patent ; ' but a county is not lia-
ble where the county authorities are not privy to the infringe-
ment.*
prise, and governed by the same
rules as to its liability. And Metcalf,
J., in Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 Gray,
541, speaking of the rule established
in Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 347,
that a private action cannot be main-
tained against a g«asi-corporation
for neglect of corporate duty unless
the action be given by the statute,
adds : — " This rule of law, however, is
of limited applicatiou. It is implied
in the case of towns only to the neg-
lect or omission of a town to perform
those duties which are imposed on
all towns without their corporate as-
sent, and not to the neglect of those
obligations which a town incura
when a special duty is imposed on it
with its consent express or implied,
or a special authority is conferred on
it at its request. In the latter case
a town is subject to the same liabili-
ties for the neglect of those special
duties to which private corporations
would be if the same duties were im-
posed or the same authority con-
ferred on them, including their lia-
bility for the wrongful neglect as
well as the wrongful acts of their
officers and agents."
iNew York v. Furze, 3 Hill, 613;
Bailey v. New York, SHill, 531.
^ Lloyd V. New York, 5 N. Y. 369.
' May V. Logan County, 30 Fed, Rep.
350 ; May v. Mercer County, 30 Fed.
Rep. 246. In the latter case Barr, J.,
said : — " There are many cases which
hold that counties cannot be sued at
all, — this will of course depend upon
the nature and character of the subdi-
visions called counties, in the respect-
ive States, — and some that they can-
not be sued for torts; but assiming
that a county is a corporation and
may sue and be sued for its contracts
made within the scope of the author-
ity given them, there is only one case
known to me which holds that a
county is not liable for the infringe-
ment of a patent right by its use, and
that is Jacobs v. Hamilton County, 1
Bond, 500. . . . This case has, how-
ever, not been followed." A city is lia-
ble in its corporate capacity for the in-
fringement of apatent(Munson v. New
York, 3 Fed. Rep. 339), though it was
by the separately incorporated fire de-
partment (Brickillw New York, 7 Fed.
Rep. 479), on the ground that ■ any
gains from such infringement must
be in the general treasury of the city.
* A contract for building a county
jail provided for a patent lock device,
which was put in by the contractiT
without authority from the owner
of the patent. In less than two years
after the county took possession of
the jail the patent expired, and in the
760
TOETS AND CEIME8.
[§ 739.
§ 739. Non-liaMlity of school districts and drainage dis-
tricts.— The management of the public schools is a branch
of the State government, and school districts, as part of the
State educational system, are on the same footing as counties
and towns in respect to liability to individuals for the breach
of official duty by their officers.* In Ohio it has been held
that a corporate board of education is not liable to a pupil at
a common school injured through the board's negligence.^ In
Illinois a drainage district form€)d under the statute of 1879
is not a private but a public corporation, and is not liable for
the negligent or tortious acts of its commissioners.'
meantime the look device was uot
used. The county a,uthorities knew
nothing of the contractor having put
in the lock without authority fi-om
the patentee. It was hold that the
county was not liable in tort for in-
fringement of the patent. May v.
County of Juneau, 30 Fed. Eep. 241.
1 Bank v. Brainerd School Dist.
(Minn.), 51 N. W. Rep. 814, where the
court said : — "The board of education
is a corporation which holds and
manages the property in its control
as trustee for the district for a public
purpose. It is made its duty to keep
and take care of the property of the
district, but this is a duty it owes to
the district and not to individuals,
and is a duty imposed for the public
benefit, with no consideration or
emolument to the corporation ; and
it is given a corporate existence solely
for the exercise of this public func-
tion. It is organized for educational
purposes, not for the benefit or pro-
tection of property or business inter-
ests." See, also. Board v. Moore, 17
Minn. 417. Nor is a right of action
against a school district for such
negligence given by section 117, chap-
ter 36, General Statutes of 1878, which
authorizes action^ to be brought
against trustees in their official ca-
pacity for an injury to the rights of
plaintiff arising from some act or
omission of the ofiScers or of the dis-
trict Bank'i;. Brainerd School Dist,
supra.
2 Finch V. Board of Education, 80
Ohio St 37, where it was said: —
" Whether we consider the language
of the statutes aSecting this question
of defendant's liability, applying to
them the rules of construction indi-
cated by the very narrow range of
objects and purposes in the organiza-
tion of defendant as a corporation,
or looking to the general policy of
our State common-school system, we
ai-e of opinion no action sounding in
tort was ever contemplated." And
in Bigelow v. Kandolpfa, 14 Gray,
541, it was held that a "town which
has assumed the duties of school dis-
tricts is not liable for an injury sus-
tained by a scholar attending the
public school from a dangerous ex-
cavation in the school-yard owing to
the negligence of the town oflScers."
' Elmore v. Drainage Comm'rs, 135
111. 269, where the court said: —
" The non-liability of the public
gwasi-corporation, unless liability is
expresly declared, is usually placed
on these grounds: that the corpo-
rators are made such nolens volens;
that their powers are limited and
specific, and that no corporate funds
are provided which can without ex-
press provision of law be appropri-
ated to private indemnification."
§§ 740, 741.]
TOETS AND OBIMES.
751
§ 740. Non-liability for separate boards and bodies.— A
city is not liable for the torts or negligence of a board of health
in the discharge of its duties, where such board is constituted a
separate body by the city charter, and it is not material
whether its members are appointed directly by the State or
by the city government in pursuance of the charter.' The
board of revision and correction of assessments in New York
city being independent public oflScers acting not for the
peculiar benefit of the city, but for the public good, the city
is not liable for their negligent discharge of duty ; ^ and the
city is similarly exempt as to the negligence of its commis-
sioners of public instruction,' and as to the negligence of its
commissioners of charities and correction.*
§ 741. Non-liability for torts of independent oiiicen.^A
municipal corporation is not liable for the torts or negligence
of an officer whom it is required by law to appoint for the
performarce of a public duty laid upon the officer, and from
which it derives no special benefit.' A village is not liable for
1 Bryant v. St. Paul, 33 Minn. 389,
where the court said : — " The duty ia
imposed by the legislaf^ure upon the
board of health, under the police
power, to be exercised for the bene-
fit of the public generally. It is one
in which the city corporation has no
particular interest; and as respects
an agency tlius erected for the public
service, the city should not be held
liable for the manner in which such
service is performed by the board.
. , . The duties of such officers
are not of that of municipal or cor-
porate duties with which the corpora-
tion is charged in consideration of
charter privileges, but are police or
governmental functions, which could
be discharged equally, well through
agents appointed by the State, though
usually associated with and ap-
pointed by the municipal body." See,
also. New York &c. Saw Mill Co. v.
Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 580; Jones v.
New York, 9 N. Y. St. Rep. 247.
2 Tone V. New York, 70 N. Y. 157;
followed in Heiser v. New York, 104
N. Y. 68.
» Ham V. New York, 70 N. Y. 459.
* Where, as in New York, the State
courts hold that a city is not liable
for. in juries arising from the negli-
gence of the employees of ajjnunici-
pal board, a libel against a steamboat
owned by the city and negligently
responsible for a collision must be
dismissed without costs. Haight v.
New York, 24 Fed. Rep. 93.
'New York &c. Saw Mill Co. v.
Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 580, where both
the dock commissioners and common
council were to be regarded as agents
of the State, not of the city, and
therefore the city not liable for their
torts or omissions. The duties im-
posed on the commissioners of public
charities and corrections for the city
of New York by the statutes of 1860
and 1870 are public in their charac-
ter and from them no special benefit
Y52
TORTS AND CRIMES.
[§ 742.
the negligence of its trustees and commissioners if under the
village charter they are independent public officers.*
§ 742. The same subject continued — Who are independ-
ent oiBcers. — It has been held upon high authority that
whether an officer or board existing under a municipal char-
ter is to be deemed independent or not does not much depend
upon the means by which such officers are placed in their po-
sition,— whether they are elect^j^ by the people of the munic-
ipality or appointed by the governor of the State or the
president of the United States, as the people are the recog-
nized source of all authority, State and municipal ; it rather
depends upon the nature of the powers conferred upon these
officers and boards.^ A State officer must derive his powers
from and execute them in obedience to a State law.'
to the city is derived ; and such oflB-
cers, though appointed by the city,
are not its agents or servants and
therefore the city was held not liable
where the commissioners' employee
caused death by the negligent driv-
ing of an ambulance belonging to
the city. Maximilian v. New York
City, 63 N. Y. 160. Where the driver
of a city wagon employed by the
board of public works to cart refuse
and ashes to a public dumping-place
by his negligence killed a man while
making a dump, it was held that the
city was not liable. Condict v. Jersey
City, 46 N. J. Law, 157. See, also,
Wallace v. Menasha, 49 Wis. 79, 85 ;
Hayes v. Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 318.
1 Where the charter of a village
makes it a highway district of a
neighboring town, and provides that
the highway taxes shall be paid to
the treasurer to be expended in main-
taining the streets, which shall be
under the charge of a commissioner
appointed by the trustees, such trust-
ees and commissioner ai-e not the
agents of the village In the premises,
but are public ofiBcers, and the village
is not liable for their negligence.
Bates V. Village of Eutland, 67 Vt.
178 ; s. c, 20 Atl. R^. 378, where the
court said : — " The defendant was en-
gaged in the public work of repair-
ing its streets. The officers by whom
the work was being performed were
for this purpose public officers, and
for their negligent acts an action does
not lie against the defendant" See,
also, Wilkins v. Rutland, 61 Vt 386 ;
S. c, 17 AtL Eep. 735 ; Walsh v. Rut-
land, 56 Vt 228 ; Weller v. Burling-
ton, 60 Vt 28. Where the trustees of
a New York village are made by its
charter highway commissioners they
are to be regarded, in respect to that
function, not as independent officers
but as corporate agents, so as to make
the village civilly responsible for their
acts or omissions according to the
law of master and servant Conrad
V. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158.
2 The act of congress of 1871 (16 Stat
419) created a municipal corpora-
tion called the District of Columbia;
it provided for the appointment of a
governor and for a legislative as-
sembly for the district ; it created a
3 State V. Valle, 41 Mo. 29.
§ T43.]
TOETS AND CRIMES.
Y53
§743. The same subject continued — Applied in New
York city, etc. — The park commissioners of New York city
are not independent public ofBcers, but act for the city, and
the city is liable for their negligence within the rule as to
municipal liability for an officer's neglect ; ' and this is also true
board of public works to consist of
the governor and four others to be
appointed by the president by and
with the consent of the senate ; such
board to have entire control of the
streets, and to disburse all moneys
therefor, and to make reports to the
legislative assembly of the District
and to the governoi-, who was di-
rected to lay the same before the
president to be by him transmitted
to congress. It was held in Barnes
V. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540,
that the board of public works was
not an independent body acting for
itself but a part of the corporation,
and that the District was responsible
to an individual injured through the
defective condition of the streets of
Washington. Hunt, J., speaking for
the majority of the court, said: —
"We have already endeavored to
show that it is quite immaterial, on
the question whether this board is a
municipal agency, from what source
the power comes to those ofBcers,
whether by appointment of the presi-
dent or by the legislative assembly,
or by election. This board is in-
vested with the entire control and
regulation of the repair of the streets
and all other works which may be
intrusted to their charge by tire legis-
lative assembly or congress. It is to
be noticed here that the municipal
corporation as represented by the
legislative assembly may impose
upon this board such other duties as
they think proper. . . . The board
is required to make a report of their
transactions during the preceding
year to each branch of the legisla-
48
tive assembly and also to the presi-
dent to be placed before congress by
him. This duty is also an indication
of their subordination equally to
congress and to the legislative as-
sembly. The powers given to this
board are not of a chai aoter belong-
ing to independent officers, but rather
those which indicate that it is the
representative of the municipal cor-
poration. ... In the case before
us we think that congress intended
to make the board a portion of the
municipal corporation. . . . Names
are not things. Perhaps there is no
restriction on the power of congress
to create a State within the limits of'
the District of Columbia; but it does
not make an organization a State to
call its mayor a govei-nor, or its com-
mon council a legislative assembly, or
its superintendent of streets a board
of public works, especially when
the statute by which they are cre-
ated opens with a declaration of its
intention to create a municipal cor-
poration. We take the body thus
organized to be a municipal corpora-
tion and that its parts are composed
of the members referred to; and wt
hold, therefore, that the proceedings
by that body, in the repair and im-
provement of the street out of which
the accident arose are the proceed-
ings of the municipal corporation."
In Ihe foregoing decision, Bailey v.
Mayor, 3 Hill, 531, affirmed 3 Denio,
431, was relied on as a leading au-
thority. But see Hill v, Boston, 123
Mass. 333.
'Ehrgott V. New York, 96 N. Y.
264, where Earl, J., said:— "To de-
764
TOETS AND CRIMES.
[§ 744.
of the street-cleaning commissioners under the city consolida-
tion act of 1882 in the performance of the duty of removing
refuse from the streets,* and probably also as to the aqueduct
commissioners appointed under the act of 1883 for supplying
the city of ^ew York with additional water.^
§ 744. Non-liability for firemen. — Members of a fire de-
partment, as oiEcers charged with a public service, are not
the agents or servants of the cit^ which appoints them, and
the city is, therefore not liable for their negligent discharge
of oflBcial duty ; ' nor is it liable for negligence in the perform-
termiDe whether there is municipal
responsibility the inquiry must be
whether the department whose mis-
feasance or nonfeasance is com-
plained of is a part of the machinery
for carrying on the municipal gov-
ernment, and whether it was at the
time engaged in the disoliarge of a
duty, or charged with a duty prima-
rily resting upon tlie municipality.
For these views the cases of Mayor
&c. V. Bailey, 3 Hill, 538 ; s. C, 3 Denio,
433, and Barnes v. District of Co-
lumbia, 91 U. S. 540, are ample au-
thority, and the case of Richards v.
Mayor &c., 16 J. & Sp. 315, is a pre-
cise authority." Detroit park com-
missioners selected by the legislature
are not city officers. People v. De-
troit, 28 Mich. 328.
1 Engle V. New York, 40 Fed. Rep.
51 ; Barney Dumping Boat Co. v.
New York, 40 Fed. Rep. 50.
2 People ex rel. Regan v. Civil Serv-
ice Boards, 17 Abb. N. C.^64
■3 Smith V. Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506.
A city is not responsible for the torts
of its firemen. Hies v. Erie City, 135
Penn. Sfc 144 ; Knight v. Philadelphia,
15 W. N. C. 807; Fire Ins. Patrol v.
Boyd, 120 Penn. St. 624. A city is
not liable for the negligent driving
of a member of its fire department
in going to a fire, though the depart-
ment be under its direct control, man-
agement and operation, and the mem-
bers of it be employed and paid by
the city. Alexander v. City of Vicks-
burg, 68 Miss. 564 ; S. C, 10 So. Rep. 62.
In SayeS v. Cshkosh, 33 Wis. 314,
Dixon, C. J., said: — "The grounds
of exemption from liability are that
the corporation is engaged in a pub-
lic service in which it has no particu-
lar interest, . . . but which it is
bound to see performed in pursuance
of a duty imposed by law for the
general welfare; that the members
of the fire department, though ap-
pointed by the city corporation, are
not, when acting in the dischai-ge of
their duties, servants or agents of the
city, but they act rather as public
officers charged with a public service
for whose negligence or misconduct
in the discharge of official duty no-
action will lie against the city unless,
expressly given." In Fisher v. Bos-
ton, 104 Mass. 87, Gray, J., said : —
"Nor is it material that in Boston a,
fire department has been established
and is regulated under a special stat-
ute accepted by the city council. St
1850, ch. 263. The engineers and
members of that department are no-
less public officers and no more agents
of the city than firewards and simi-
lar officers under the general statutes.
In the loading case of Haflford v. New
Bedford, 16 Gray, 297, the fire depart-
§ 745.]
TOETS AND OEIMES.
755
ance of a public duty imposed by law to a member of its fire de-
partment injured by reason of a defective brake on an engine.'
The fire commissioners of the city of New York being public
officers and not its agents, it is not liable for their wrongful
dismissal of a fireman."'
§745. Non-liability for police. — Municipal corporations
are not liable-for the torts or negligence of policemen because
the duties of those officers are of a public nature and their ap-
pointment is devolved by the legislature on cities, towns and
boroughs as a convenient mode of exercising a public func-
tion ; ' thus a borough was held not liable where a policeman
stood by and made no efPort to stop the firing of cannon on a
public street.* And a city is not liable for an illegal arrest
and imprisonment by the police," or for their unnecessary vio-
lence,' or for their accidental shooting of a citizen.' A city is
ment, for the negligence of whose
members the city was held not to be
liable to an action, was established
and regulated and its officers and
miembers appointed under a similar
special statute. . . . However ap-
pointed or elected such persons are
public officers who perform duties
imposed by law for the benefit of all
the citizens, the performance of
which the city or town has no con-
trol over and derives no benefit from
in its corporate capacity. The acts
of such officers are their own official
acts and not the acts of the municipal
corporation or its agents."
1 Wild u Paterson, 47 N. J. Law,
406. And it makes no difference that
the injury occurred while a fire tower
was being tested preparatory to its
purchase by the city. Thompson v.
New York, 53 N. Y. Super. Ct. 427.
2 Terhune v. New York, 88 N. Y.
247, 251.
' Perkins v. New Haven, 53 Conn.
214. In Iowa it has been repeat-
edly derided that as the police reg-
ulations of a city are not made and
enforced in the interest of the city
in its corporate capacity, but in the
interest of the public, it is not liable
for the acts of its officers in enforc-
ing such regulations. Ogg v. Lans-
ing, 35 Iowa, 495 ; Colwell v. City ot
Boone, 51 Iowa, 687.
* Borough of Norristown v. Fitz-
patrick, 94 Penn. St. 121. See, also,
Elliott V. Philadelphia, 75 Penn. St.
347, where a horse in the custody of
a policeman was killed through his
negligence. Policemen do not de-
rive their powers and duties froM
the city or town which appoints
them but from the law (Buttrick v.
Lowell, 1 Allen, 173), and are not the
city's servants. Kimball v. Boston,
1 Allen, 417 ; People v. Shepard, 30
N. Y. 285 ; Burch v. Hardwicke, 30
Gratt. 24.
5 Harris v. Atlanta, 62 6a. 390;
Cook V. City of Macon, 54 Ga. 468.
6 Colwell V. City of Boone, 51 Iowa,
687. See, also, McElroy v. City of
Albany, 65 Ga. 387. A complaint in
a suit against a city which alleges
that a policeman of the city arrested
' Culver V. Streator, 180 111. 238.
766
TOETS AND OEIMES.
[§ 746.
not liable to one who is injured while aiding, at their request,
its police to make an arrest.^
§ 746. Liability for acts of mobs. — Municipal liability for
injury to person or property caused by a mob does not exist
at common law,^ and does not rest upon contract between the
city and the sufferer, but is wholly statutory.' It is well set-
tled that a statute creating such a liability is not unconstitu-
tional.* Under the Pennsylvani^mob laws of 1841 and 1849
it is held that the fact that the authorities are unable to quell
has been held that there is no corpo-
rate liabiUty for the acts of a mob
although the charter contains this
provision as to the duties of council, —
that it shall be their duty to regulate
the police of the city, preserve the
peace, prevent riots, disturbances and
disorderly assemblages. Western Col-
lege V. City of Cleveland, 12 Ohio
St. 375." See, also, Morristown v.
Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. St 121 ; Campbell
V. City of Montgomery, 53 Ala. 527.
'Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109
U; S. 285. So a city which has failed
to pi'ohibit the firing of cannon in its
public parks, or given its legislative
sanction to such firing on certain
conditions, is not liable for injuries
to individuals caused by such firing
if there is no statute giving an action
therefor. Lincoln v. Boston, 148 Mass.
578.
* Darlington v. New York, 31 N. Y.
164. "Statutes of this general char-
acter have existed in England from
the earliest period. It was one of
the Institutions of Canute the Dane,
which was recognized by the Saxon
laws, that when any person was
killed and the slayer had escaped,
the ville should pay forty marks for
his death; and if it could not be
raised in the ville, then the hundred
should pay it" The English mob
and riot statutes are referred to iJy
counsel in the case last cited, at page
173.
plaintiff for a supposed violation of
a city ordinance, without a warrant,
and without aflSdavit made as re-
quired by law : that plaintiff had not
violated the ordinance ; and that the
policeman was incompetent, to the
knowledge of the city, — states no
cause of action. Rusher v. City of
Dallas (Tex.), 18 S. W. Eep. 333.
iCobb V. Portland, 55 Me. 381,
where the court said: — "But the
plaintiff was not the servant of the
city nor was the policeman whom
he assisted. Both were acting under
the authority of the State as the
conservators of the public peace — the
peace of the State, not the peace of
the city of Portland alone. It is true
they derived their authority from
the city, but that was done by act
of the legislature as a matter of con-
venience. . . . The obligation de-
volved by statute upon the city to
appoint police officers . . . confers
no particular interest, benefit or ad-
vantage upon it in its corporate ca-
pacity and creates no liability on its
part for the acts of those officers."
2 Robinson v. Greenville Village, 42
Ohio St 635, where Okey, J., said : —
" Thus, with respect to the power to
suppress riots and assemblages of dis-
orderly persons, it has been uniformly
held that the corporation is a mere
agency of the State, and not liable
for negligence in the performance of
such duties. Upon this principle it
§ 747.] TOETS AND CEIMES. 757
a riot, and that the property injured is in transitu and belongs
to non-residents, does not limit the county's liability for dam-
ages.* Under the New Tork mob laws a city is liable for
goods carried away bj' a mob as well as for those destroyed
on the premises ; and it is not a good defense for the city that
the crowd at first collected to see a fire, if it afterwards united
in unlawful conduct.^ And the fact that plaintiff keeps a dis-
orderly house is not a good defense.' If a building is not a
nuisance joer se, the town may be liable for its destruction by
a mob, though under conditions its erection be prohibited.*
§ 747. Private interests must yield to public. — As public
accommodation must prevail over private interests, a city is
not liable for a private injury which is incidental to an au-
thorized public improvement, for example, for raising or low-
ering the grade of a street under authority of law, though an
abutting owner's house may thereby be left standing high
above the grade or in a hollow below it. The individual can
have no compensation for the inconveniences which fairly re-
sult from the making of needed public improvements, as he is
supposed to be recompensed by the enhancement of the gen-
eral welfare." The rule just laid down is well illustrated in
1 Allegheny County v. Gibson, 90 the individuals who happen to suf-
Pa. St 397. fer. But if there be no such power
2 Solomon v. City of Kingston, 24 the parties are without remedy, pro-
Hun, 562 ; Sarles v. New York, 47 vided the commissioners do not ex-
Barb. 447. ceed their jurisdiction. Some indi-
' Ely V. Niagara County, 36 N. Y. viduals suffer an inconvenience
297. under all these acts of parliament,
* Brightman v. Bristol, 65 Me. 426. but the interests of individuals must
sVidalat v. New Orleans, 43 La. give way to the accommodation of
Ann. 1121 ; Hembling v. Big Eapids the public." See, also, Boulton v.
(1891), 89 Mich. 1 ; City of rontiac'v. Crowther, 2 Barn. & C. 703; The
Carter, 33 Mich. 164. In Cast Plate King v. Comm'rs, 8 Barn. & C. 355 ;
Mfrs. V. Meredith, 4 T. R. 794, Lord Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 418 ;
Kenyon thus states the reasons which Smith v. Washington City, 20 How.
preclude a private remedy in such 185. In Glasgow v. St. Loais, 107
cases: — "If this action could be Mo. 198, it was held that an owner
maintained every turnpike, paving had no redress by injunction or dam-
and navigation act would give rise ages for the vacating of a street
to an infinity of actions. If the leg- upon which he did not abut ; as
islature think it necessary, as they do there was no physical interference
in many cases, they enable the com- with his property or any easement
missioners to award satisfaction to thereof, the inconvenience he suf-
758 TOETS AND CSIMES. [§ 74:7.
the case of the Brooklyn, bridge. The Brooklyn bridge over
the East river, being erected by the two cities under author-
ity derived from congress and the New York legislature, can-
not be abated as a public nuisance, and the public benefit from
it far outweighs any inconvenience to individuals by inter-
fering with navigation.' Acts done in the proper exercise of
governmental powers and not directly encroaching upon pri-
vate property, though impairing its use, are held not to be a
taking within the constitutional psovision.^ And a lot-owner
who has petitioned for a public improvement and has had his
day in court on a review of the assessment therefor, and has
failed to exercise his right to appear befpre the city council to
claim damages therefor, is thereby estopped to recover dam-
ages in an independent action.' Mere non-resistance to a pro-
jected improvement or the joining in a petition for it does
not estop a lot-owner from claiming compensation for an in-
jury caused by it;* but the active promotion and superin-
tendence of the improvement may amount to such estoppel.'
The remedy of a person claiming to be unfairly assessed for a
local improvement is to apply to the statutory tribunal vested
with the power of review ; and where no constitutional ob-
jection is raised or fraud charged, the inquiry in such a case
will be limited to the question whether the municipal author-
ities have acted within their powers.^
fered with others did not entitle is liable if in so changing a grade
him to relief under the clause of the it removes the lateral support of an
constitution " that private property abutting lot. Ayer v. St. Paul, 37
shall not be taken or damaged for Minn. 457; Nichols v. Duluth, 40
public use without just compensa- Minn. 389.
tion." See § 663, supra. 3 Hembling v. Big Rapids, 89 Mich.
1 Miller v. New York, 109 U. S. 1; Brown w Big Eapids, 83 Mich.
385. See, also, Escanaba Company 101 ; Lumber Co. v. Crystal Falls, 60
V, Chicago, 107 U. S. 678 ; Gilman v. Mich. 570 ; Comstock v. Grand Eap-
Philadelphia, 3 "Wall. 718. ids, 54 Mich. 641 ; Williams v. Sagi-
^Atwater v. i 'anandaigua, 134 N. naw, 51 Mich, 130.
y. 603; Transportation Co. v. Chi- * Jones v. Bangor Borough (1893),
cago, 99 U. S. 635, 641. A city is not 144 Penn. St. 638.
liable unless made so by statute or 5 Bidwell v. Pittsburgh, 85 Penn. St
charter for consequential injuries to 413. And see Dewhurst v. Allegheny
property adjacent to a public street City, 95 Penn. St. 437 ; McKnight v.
caused by a change lawfully made Pittsburgh, 91 Penn. St 373.
of the grade of a street. Henderson « Kansas City Grading Co. v.
t>. Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 319; Lee Holden (1891), 107 Mo. 305.
V. Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 18. But
§§ 748, 749.] TOKTS and crimes. 759
§ 748. The same subject continued — Destroying build-
ings to check fire. — Unless made so by statute a city is not
liable to individuals for the necessary destruction of buildings
in order to prevent a conflagration.^ Such a destruction of
private property is not a taking for public use entitling the
owner to compensation.^ In Pennsylvania the mayor of a
city is by virtue of his ofiicial position justified in demolish-
ing a wooden building which is dangerous to the public
safety.'
§ 749. Non-liability for negligence in public service. —
Where a city, under the authority of a general law, under-
takes a work for the sole use and benefit of the public, it is
not liable for an injury caused by the negligent or defective
performance of such work by its agents or servants, unless
some statute either directly or by implication gives a private
remedy for such injury.* This rule has been applied against
a traveler injured by negligent blasting while excavating the
foundation of a public school-house ; ' and against a child in-
jured by reason of an unsafe stair-case of a school-house and
a dangerous excavation in a school-house yard.* The same
rule has been applied in favor of cities in respect to town-
houses and court-houses ; ' and in respect to public grounds
1 In Bowditch v. BostoD, 101 U. S. creating the liability, no action can
16, Swayne, J., said : — "In order to be maintained against a municipal
charge the city, the remedy ibeing corporation for an injury arising
given by statute only, the case must from the neglect of a public oorpo-
be clearly within the statute. The rate duty from the performance of
city is responsible by force of the which the corporation receives no
statute only, and such responsibility special benefit, pecuniai'y or other-
is limited to the cases specially con- wise." Allen, J., in Clark v. Man-
templated." See, also, Taylor v. Ply- Chester, 63 N. H. 577. See, also,
mouth, 8 Met 465 ; Field v. Des Edgerly v. Concord, 63 N. H. 8.
Moines, 39 Iowa, 575. As to the 5 Howard v. Worcester, 153 Mass.
statutory liability of the city of New 426.
York in such a case, see New York 6 Hill v. Boston, 132 Mass. 344 ; Big-
V. Lord, 18 "Wend. 126 ; Russell v. elow v. Randolph, 14 Gray, 541 ; Sul-
New York, 2 Denio, 461. livan v. Boston, 126 Mass. 540. See,
2 Stone V. New York, 35 Wend, also, Nixon v. Newport, 13 R. I. 454.
157, 174; Russell v. New York, 3 'Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H.
Denio, 461. 384; Hamilton Comm'rs v. Mighels, 7
3 Fields V. Stokley, 99 Penn. St 305. Ohio St 109. A county is not liable
* Howard i;. Worcester, 153 Mass. for injuries caused by its neglect to
426. " In the absence of a statute provide a' railing around a veranda
760 TOETS AND CBIMES. ' [§ 750.
like Boston Common.' And it makes no material difference
in the application of the rale whether the injury is caused by
a negligent act done in the direct performance of the public
work or is received after the completion of the work.^ As an
apparent exception to the foregoing general rule, cities and
towns have been held liable for injuries caused by the negligent
construction of roads and bridges.' In Texas where a city
established a place for the burial of carcasses and garbage in
order to improve its sanitary condition, it was held not to be
liable to an individual for sickness produced thereby, as the
intended improvement was in the interest of the public and
the execution of it was not attended with negligence ; but the
court added that if the acts done had been for the city's pri-
vate advantage it would have been liable for the injury irre-
spective of the question of negligence.* Though a municipal
work be made and maintained for a time for a public purpose,
yet if such purpose be abandoned and it be used for a private
purpose, the city becomes liable for negligence in such case
as any other private corporation would be.*
§ 750. Non-lialt)ility as to jails. — A county is not liable
to a prisoner for injury to his health caused by failure of the
supervisors to keep the county jail in a sanitary condition ; *
on the second floor of the court-house, which relate to the construction of
■where no liability is imposed by stat- roads and bridges, it is to be inferred
ute. Shepard v. Pulaski County (Ky.), that the legislature intended to recog-
18 S. W. Rep. 15. nize the existence of a liability for
1 Steele v. Boston, 128 Mass. 583 ; the consequences of negligence in
Oliver v. Worcester, 103 Mass. 489 ; the performance of the work." Allen,
Clark V. Waltham, 138 Mass. 567; J., in Howard u Worcester, 153 Mass.
Veale v. Boston, 135 Mass. 187. 436.
« Howard v. Worcester, 153 Mass. 'Fort Worth u Crawford, 64 Tex.
436 ; Findley v. Salem, 137 Mass. 171 ; 203 ; s. G, 53 Am. Rep. 753.
Lincoln v. Boston, 148 Mass. 578 ; * Clark v. Manchester, 62 N. H. 577.
Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87 ; Haf- « A person confined for nearly four
ford V. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297. months in a county jail under an in-
8 See Lawrence v. Fairhaven, 5 dictraent for forgery, which was then
Gray, 110; Deane v. Randolph, 133 dismissed, cannot recover from the
Mass. 475 ; Waldron v. Haverhill, 148 county for injuries to his health,
Mass. 583. " These cases, however, caused by the negligent failure of the
rest on grounds which take them out board of supervisors to keep the jail
of the general rule, and in the last in a healthy condition. Lindley «.
resort it must be properly considered Polt County (Iowa), 50 N.W. Rep. 975.
that, taking all the statutes together The care and control of prisons being
750.]
TOKTS AND OEIMES.
761
nor for assaults upon him by violent and intoxicated fellow-
prisoners with whom the police had negligently confined him.'
In Kentucky such liability' is imposed upon members of the
countj' court instead of upon the county.' In Georgia a
county is not responsible for the tort of one of the guards in
unlawfully beating a convict, nor for the negligence of the
other guards in not protecting him from such beating;' nor
is a city liable for a tort committed by one of its convicts on
the person of another.* In Virginia chartered towns and
cities are not deemed political divisions of the State, as coun-
ties aro, and their liability for unhealthy jails is the same in
principle as for defective streets and sewers." In Kansas a
within the " police power," a county
is not liable for the failure of its of-
ficers to keep the county jail in a
healthy condition. White v. Bpard
(Ind.), 28 N. E. Rep. 846, followed ;
Greene County v. Boswell (Ind.),
30N.E.Rep.534. A convict in the Al-
bany penitentiary alleged that he lost
his hand through the negligence of
the county in compelling hin:i to ap-
proach a circular saw; a demuiTer
that the complaint did not state suf-
ficient facts was sustained on the
ground that the county while en-
gaged in the public duty of building
and managing the penitentiary was
not a corporation but a mere instru-
mentality" selected by the State. Ala-
mango V. Albany County, 35 Hun,
551.
• A city is not liable for personal
injuries sustained by one prisoner at
the hands of another confined in the
same cell of the city prison, though
the police officer who arrested the in-
jured prisoner, and put him in prison,
may have been guilty of negligence
in confining him with an intoxicated
fellow-prisoner, who was on that ac-
count violent and dangerous. Wilson
ttCity of Macon (Ga.), 14 S. E. Rep. 710.
Where one is confined in a city jail
on a criminal charge, and is assaulted
by other prisoners confined in the
same room, he cannot hold the city
liable for such assault, on the ground
of the negligence of its officers in not
taking proper measures to protect
hi.m. Davis i\ City of Knoxville
(Tenn.), 18 S. W. Rep. 354
" General Statutes Kentucky, chap-
ter 28, article 17, section 4, which
provides that the county court shall
cause a secui'e county jail to be
erected and kept in repair, and upon
a failure so to do each member of
the court whose name does not ap-
pear recorded in favor thereof shall
be liable to a fine, and shall be liable
in a civil action for all damage sus-
tained by any person by reason
thereof, does not authorize an action
against the county for injuries caused
by a defective jail. Hite v. Whitley
County Court (Ky.), 15 S. W. Rep. 57.
' Hammonds v. Richmond County,
73 Ga. 188.
* Doster v. Atlanta, 73 Ga. 233.
6 Code Virginia, 1887, section 937,
provides that every town having no
jail of its own may use the county
jail. Sections 938-930, applicable
only 'to counties and cities, provide
that the jailer shall keep the jail al-
ways clean, that jails shall be in-
spected under direction of the county
coui't, and that the jailer may be
summarily punished for failure in his
T62
TOBTS AND CBIMES.
[§751.
city is not liable for the bad condition of its prison in the
absence of some statutory requirement to keep it in a proper
condition.*
§ 751. Non-liability as to hospitals. — ^Where a city is,
under its charter, a municipal government as well as corpora-
tion, and receives legislative powers in respect to the public
health, it is not liable for the negligence or misconduct of the
superintendent, nurses or attendants of its hospitals.'' A cor-
poration established for the maintenance of a public charitable
hospital, which has exercised due care in the selection of its
agents, is not liable for injury to a patient caused by their
negligence, nor for the unauthorized assumption of one of the
attendants to act as a surgeon, even though the patients be
required to pay board.'
duty. It was held that a town which
used a jail of its own was liable for
injuries to the health of a prisoner
caused by its filthy condition ; since,
under section 937 and a special pro-
vision of its charter, it might have
used a county jail, subject to inspec-
tion and control. Edwards v. Town
of Pocahontas, 47 Fed. Eep. 368.
1 Though the General Statutes of
Kansas, 1889, paragraph 1013, pro-
vides that, in a city of the third class,
the chief of police shall have power
" to keep all persons arrested in the
city in the 6ity prison, county jail,
or other proper place," and paragraph
3553, that "all prisoners shall be
treated with humanity," the city is
not liable for injuries resulting from
the confinement of a prisoner with-
out bedding in a filthy and unin-
habitable city prison. City of New
Kiowa V. Craven (Kan.), 36 Pac. Eep.
436.
2 Benton v. Boston, 140 Mstes. 18.
In City of Richmond v. Long, 17
Gratt 375, the city was held not to be
liable for the death of a slave who,
after being admitted to the city hos-
pital, was negligently allowed to es-
cape therefrom and die from expos-
ure. After a thorough review of the
facts and authorities Rives, J., said : —
"If this recovery could be made I
do not perceive why by parity of
reason the State should not be held
liable through its public functionaries
in civil actions at the suit of indi-
viduals for losses or tofts occurring
in the management of its depart-
ments and publiC' institutions under
its immediate control and super-
vision. It cannot be denied that in
the municipal government of this
city the council occupies towards its
hospital relations quite similar to
those of the General Assembty to-
wairds its asylums for the insane, the
blind, and deaf mutes.''
' McDonald v. Mass. Gen'l Hospital,
130 Mass. 433, where Devens, J., said : —
"Where actions have been brought
against commissioners of public
works, serving gratuitously, for neg-
ligence in carrying on the work, by
which injury , has occurred, it has
been held that they were not liable
if proper care had been used by them
in selecting those who were actually
to perform the work. HoUiday v. St
§ 752.]
TORTS AND OBIMES.
763
§ 752. Non-liability as to fire-worts. — The Massach,usetts
rule that cities or towns are not liable for negligence in mat-
ters of public service,whether the statutes require such service
or only permit it, is deemed to exempt a city from liability
to persons injured through the negligent discharge of author-
ized fire-works.^ In States like New Jersey and New York,
where the discharge of fire-works in the streets is deemed a
public nuisance,^ the licensing of such a nuisance by the city
without the authority of statute I'enders it liable for a conse- .
quent injury to individuals;' though merely negatively per-
mitting it does not render it so liable, as a city is not
responsible for the action or non-action of its police, as shown
elsewhere.^
been entered upon, there is no good
reason why a liability to a private
action should be imposed when a
town voluntarily enters upon such a
beneficial work, and withheld when
it performs the service under the re-
quirement of au imperative law.
. . . It is well known that many
towns in Massachusetts, not bound to
do 'so, voluntarily maintain high
schools. It is not to be supposed
that the legislature have intended to
make such towns liable to private ac-
tions when towns required to main-
tain high schools would be exempt.
On the other hand, it has been rec-
ognized in numerous cases in this
State and elsewhere that the ques-
tion of the liability of towns does not
rest upon this distinction. Clark v.
Waltham, 128 Mass. 567; Fisher v.
Boston, 104 Mass. 87 ; Hafford v. New
Bedford, 16 Gray, 297; Bigelow v.
Randolph, 14 Gray, 541 ; Eastman v.
Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; Wixon v.
Newport, 13 R I. 454." See, also.
Beach on Contributory Negligence
(2d ed.), §§ 259, 413.
2 Jenne v. Sutton, 43 N. J. Law, 257 ;
Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb. 218.
3 Spies V. Brooklyn, 18 N. Y. SupL
170, and cases cited.
4 Hill V. Charlotte, 73 N. O. 55 j
Norristown v. Fitzpatrick, 94 Fenn.
Leonards, 11 Q B. (N. S.) 193." See,
also, Gooch v. Association &c., 109
Mass. 558 ; Heriot's Hospital v. Ross,
13 CI. & F. 507.
iTindley v. City of Salem, 137
Mass. 171, where it was held that a
city which undertakes the celebra-
tion of a holiday (July 4), under the
authority of the Public Statutes,
chapter 38, section 13 (which pro-
vides that the city council may ap-
propriate money for such a purpose),
exclusively for the gratuitous amuse-
ment of the public, is not liable to an
action by one who sustains personal
injuries through the negligence of
city servants in discharging fire-
works for the purposes of the cele-
bration. After specifying a great
number of different cases as to some
of which rfties were required by
statute, and as to others which were
only authorized to do certain things,
Allen, J., said : — " In all of these
cases the duty is imposed or the au-
thority conferred for the. general
benefit. The motive and the object
are the same, though in some in-
stances the legislature determines
finally the necessity or expediency,
and in others it leaves the necessity
or expediency to be determined by
the towns themselves. But when de-
termined, and when the service has
V64
TOETS AND OEIMES.
[§ 753.
§ 753. Liability as to city wells and water. — A municipal
corporation is bound to use reasonable diligence to keep its
wells for the gratuitous use of the public in repair,' and, on
notice that their water is unwholesome, to protect the public
health by closing or purifying them ; but it is not an insurer
of the quality of their water, or liable to a person injured by
using it without proof of wilful misconduct or culpable neg-
lect. The city is not bound from time to time to test the
purity of such water by a chemical examination.^ As the
powers granted by the acts for supplying New York, city with
pure water were intended for the private advantage of the
city, the city was held liable for the unskilful construction of
a Croton river dam by the employees of the water commis-
sioners, who, though appointed by the State, were agents of
the city.' Doubtless a city may be liable for causing or neg-
ligently permitting its sewage and filth to percolate into its
wells or other water supply.* A city is not liable in damages
St 131 ; Ball v. Town of Woodbine, 61
Iowa, 83 ; s. C, 47 Am. Eep. 805 ; Rob-
inson V. Greenville, 43 Ohio St. 635 ;
§ 745, supra. In Little v. City of
sufficient if it be held to the respon-
sibility of keeping the wells and
pumps in order and clean, and if it
be made liable for any injury result-
Madison, 49 Wis. 605, it was held ing from the use of impure waters
that a city license to exhibit wild
animals, specifying no place for such
exhibition, is a license to exhibit in
some suitable place, and the fact that
the licensee makes the exhibition in a
public street, and is permitted to do
so by the negligence of city officers,
does not render the city liable for in-
juries resulting therefrom.
1 McCarthy v. Syracuse, 46 N. Y.
194
2Danaher v. Brooklyn, 119 N. Y.
241, where Earl, J., said : — " The city
has its public water supply by run-
ning water in addition to these wells.
The wells are furnished and kept for
public use by the city. It was un-
doubtedly the duty of the city to
keep the wells and pumps in good
order and to keep the wells properly
cleaned out so that they would not
become contaminated by anything
that might be thrown into them.
, . . The burden upon the city is
from the wells after it has had no-
tice of their dangerous qualities and
an opportunity to remove the dan-
ger. The higher degree of diligence
(that is, testing by chemical exami-
nation) as to water apparently pui-e
and wholesome, agreeable to the taste
and in common use by the public
without complaint, would be unrea-
sonable."
3 Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill, 531.
The village of liutland maintains a
water system for the double purpose
of furnishing the inhabitants with a
supply for private purposes and pro-
viding against fire. It was held that
as to that portion of the system sup-
plying individuals for hire, the vil-
lage was liable for any negligence in
its construction or maintenance. Wil-
kins V. Rutland, 61 Vt. 336.-
< Ballard v. Tomlinson, L. R 39
Ch. D. 115: Rex v. Medley, 6 Car. &
P. 393; Charles v. Hinckley Local
§ 754.]
TOETS AND OBIMES.
763
for so negligently constructing a sewer as to cut off water
from the spring of an abutting land-owner, which otherwise
would supply the spring by percolation through the soil of
the street, because the owner has no absolute right to such
percolating water,^ unless such right has been conferred or
damages for interference with it awarded by statute.^
§ 754. Non-liability to trespassers. — A municipal corpora-
tion is not liable to a trespasser who goes, without license or
invitation, upon its land, though unmolested, for mere pleas-
ure or to gratify curiosity, and there meets with an injury
through the corporation's negligent management of its prop-
erty ; and no distinction is made in favor of an infant child
so receiving an injury.' In such a case the municipality owes
no special duty to a child straying from its parents, and the
duty of protecting it is not shifted from its parents to the
municipality because it chances to escape from tlieir care.*
This is the general rule applicable to those who trespass on
Board, 53 L. J. N. S. 554; Brown v.
niius, 27 Conn. 84. In Goldsmid v.
Tunbridge Wells Comm'ra, L. R 1
Eq. 161, an injunction was granted
to restrain commissioners for drain-
ing a town from causing the sewage
to be discharged into a stream pass-
ing through the plaintiff's land, and
feeding a lake there, as the pollution
of the water perceptibly increased as
new houses contributed their sewage
to the stream.
' Elster V. City of Springfield (Ohio,
1892), 30 N. B. Rep. 374
2 Trowbridge v. Brookline, 144
Mass. 139, where the court said : —
"In exercising its rights the town
acta, not under the title of the
owner, but by virtue of the authority
given by the statute, and under the
obligation imposed by the statute to
pay all damages occasioned thereby.
The petitioner had a right to collect
and keep the water in her well, and
depriving her of it so as to injure
her land was a damage to her. It
is no answer that other land-owners
had the same right in respect to their
lands, and that, if the petitioner's
damages had been in consequenofe of
the exercise of those rights in his
land by a land-owner, she cou'd not
have recovered damages from him.
The respondent's rights in the land,
and its authority to do the act which
caused the damage, are given by the
same statute which gives a remedy
to the petitioner to recover damages."
See, also, Watuppa Reservoir v. Fall
River, 134 Mass. 267.
3 Clark V. Manchester, 62 N. H. 577,
where the court said that "the owner
of land, for whatever purpose it may
be used, is under no obligation to
keep his premises in a sate condition
for the prevention of injuiy to tres-
passers and persons intruding with-
out license or invitation express or
implied." See, also, Levery v. Nicker-
son, 120 Mass. 306 ; Hargreaves v. Dea-
con, 25 Mich. 1 ; Beach on Contrib-
utory Negligence (2d ed.), § 50.
* Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Penn.
St 144.
766
TOETS AND CEIMBS.
[§ 755.
private lands, and there is no reason why municipal corpora-
tions should not have the benefit of it; ^ but of course it has
no application to public highways, where all have a right to
be, nor can it be invoked by a city which is itself either di-
rectly or indirectly a trespasser upon such highways.^
§755. Liability for nnisances. — A municipal corporation
must not use its property in such a manner as to injure the
property of others, and, unless smthorized by statute, cannot
justify a trespass or nuisance on the ground that it is acting
for the public benefit,' for in general it has no more right than
iBeok V. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283;
Pierce v. Whitcomb, 48 Vt. 127. See,
also, Barrell v. Black, 56 Me. 498;
Carleton v. Franconia &c. Steel Co.,
99 Mass. 216.
2 Tobin V. Portland &c. R. Co., 59
Me. 183, 188. See, also, Beach on Con-
tributory Negligence (2d ed.), § 256.
3 Thus in Miles v. City of Worcester
(1891), 154 Mass. 511, which was an
action in tort for damages occasioned
by the encroachment on plaintiff's
land of a wall built by the city in
adapting a lot of land to school-
house purposes, the continuance of
the wall on plaintiff's land was held
to be a nuisance for which the city
was responsible. Allen, J., said : —
"The defendant suggests that it is
not liable because the wall was built
and maintained solely for the public
use and under the requirement of
general laws ; and that the case can-
not be distinguished in principle
from the line of cases beginning with
Hill V. Boston, 123 Mass. 344, and
ending with Howard v. Worcester,
153 Mass. 436. We are not aware,
however, that a private nuisance to
propei-ty can be justified or excused
on that ground. The verdict shows
a continuous occupation of the
plaintiff's land by the encroachment
of defendant's wall. The question of
negligence in the building of the wall
is not material. The erection was
completed and was accepted by the
defendant, and is now in the defend-
ant's sole charge, and if it is a nui-
sance the defendant is responsible.
. . . The public use and the gen-
eral benefit will not justify such a
nuisance to the property of another."
The rule of liability for nuisances
and for the invasion of property was
thus laid down in Eastman v. Mere-
dith, 36 N. H. 385, 395:— "Towns
and other municipal corporations, in-
cluding counties in this State, have
power, for certain purposes, to hold
and manage property, real and per-
sonal ; and for private injuries caused
by the improper management of
their property, as such, they have
been held to the general liability of
private corporations and natural per-
sons that own and manage the same
kind of property. Bailey v. New
York, 8 Hill, 541. . . . So if a
town or city maintain an erection or
structure which is a private nuisance,
and causes a special damage, or in
the performance of an authorized
act invade any right of property, the
corporation has been held liable to a
civil action. Thayer v. Boston, 19
Pick. 511 ; Akron v. McComb, 18
Ohio St. 229 ; Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10
Ohio, 159."
§ 756.]
TOETS AND CRIMES.
767
a natural person to create or maintain a nuisance.' A city
which acquires land on which a nuisance exists becomes liable
to others injured by its continuance -if it suffers the nuisance
to continue after notice of its existence, and a request to re-
move it.'
§ 756. Municipal liability in general. — Corporations in
general are liable to actions for torts as individuals are,' and
this rule is applicable to municipal corporations for torts com-
mitted under their authority.* A municipal corporation is
liable for injuries to individuals resulting from any neglect or
omission of duty in keeping its streets in reasonably safe con-
1 Harper v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365 ;
Young V. Leedom, 67 Penn. St 851 ;
Pittsburg V. Grier, 23 Penn. St 54 ;
Delraonico v. New York, 1 Sandf.
223. A city which lets for hire a
building erected for municipal pur-
poses is liable for an injury caused by
a defect or want of repair in the
building or for negligence of its
agents in the management of the
building in the same manner as a
private owner would be. Worden v.
New Bedford, 181 Mass. 23. In
Noonan v. Albany, 79 N. Y. 470,
Andrews, J., said: — "A municipal
corporation has no greater right than
an individual to collect the surface
water from its lands or streets into
an artificial channel and discharge it
upon the lands of another, nor has
any immunity from legal responsi-
bility for ei'ecting or maintaining
nuisances. See, also, Byrnes v. Co-
hoes, 67 N. Y. 304. The negligent
construction of a gutter by a munici-
pality, or its negligent failure to keep
the' same in repair, caused surface-
water to flood a lot upon which it
would not otherwise have flowed. It
was held that the municipality was
liable for the consequent damages, al-
though such lot was below the grade
of the street Gilluly v. Madison, 63
Wis. 518 : S. C, 53 Am. Eep. 299.
2 Nichols V. Boston, 98 Mass. 39;
McDonough v. Oilman. 3 Allen, 264.
And after acceptance of an unsafe
party-wall built by another, a city
would probably be liable to the 'ad-
joining owner for an injtiry caused
by its fall. Gorham v. Gross, 125
Mass. 282. And see Khron v. Brock,
144 Mass. 516; Bryant v. Town of
Randolph, 14 N. Y. Supl. 844. A
city empowered, for sewerage pur-
poses, to change, widen and deepen
the channel of a brook, may be liable
for so performing the work as to
create au unnecessary nuisance.
Morse v. Worcester, 139 Mass. 389.
5 In Reed v. Home Savings Bank,
130 Mass. 443, the court s^id : — " It is
too late to discuss the question
whether a corporation can commit a
trespass or is liable to an action on
the case or subject generally to ac-
tions for torts as individuals are.
The reports for a, quarter of a cen-
tury show that a large proportion of
actions of this nature both for non-
feasance and misfeasance are against
corporations. By the great weight
of modern authority a corporation
may be liable, even where a fraudu-
lent or malicious intent is necessary
to be proved, the fraud or malice df
its authorized agents being impu-
table to the corporation, as in actions
for fraudulent representations, for
libel or for malicious pi'osecution."
4 Salt Lake City u Hollister, 118
U. S. 356.
768
TOBTS XSD CBIMES.
[§ 757.
ditlon for use in the usual mode.' And this is the rule in
England, even where the duty is not expressly imposed by
statute.*
§ 757. Chartered cities, etc., distinguished from counties,
etc. — The conflict. — In many of the States a distinction is
made between the liabilitj'^ of such purely municipal corpora-
tions as chartered towns, cities and villages, and the non-liabil-
ity of counties and towns as pftlitical divisions of the State,
and the former are held quite strictly to the performance of
their duties and responsible in damages for neglecting them.'
If the charter granted to a city or town at its request enables
it to derive benefit in its corporate capacity in the way of rent
» Clemence v. Auburn, 66 N. Y. 334 ;
Diveny v. Elmira, 51 N. Y. 506 ; Hines
V. Lockport, 50 N. Y. 236 ; Barton t). Syr-
acuse, 86 N. Y. 54 ; Conrad v. Ithaca,
16 N. Y. 159 ; Hutson v. New York, 9
N. Y. 168. See the following section.
2 In Bathurst v. MacPlierson, L. E.
4 App. Cas. 256, defendants were
held liable for neglect to repair a
barrel drain which they had made,
and the sole control and manage-
ment of which had been vested in
them by statute ; following Hartnall
17. Eyde Comm'rs, 4B. & S. 861. "In
their lordships' opinion no substan-
tial distinction can be taken between
that case and the present, in which
the duty for the reasons above stated
had been found to exist though not
expressly imposed by statute." In
Blackmore v. Vestry &o., L. E. 9
Q. B. D. 451, the defendants as the
body authorized by statute to water
the streets were held liable for the
slippery condition of an iron flap
which they had placed in the street,
though they might not have been
liable as highway surveyors. See,
also. White v. Hindley Local Board,
L. R. 10 Q. B. 219.
' Thus in Hamilton County v. Mig-
hels, 7 Ohio St, 109, the court says : —
" A municipal corporation proper is
created mainly for the interest, ad-
vantage and convenience of the lo-
cality and its people; a county or-
ganization is created almost exclu-
sively with a view to the policy of
the State at large." In Edwards v.
Town of Pocahontas, 47 Fed. Eep.
268 : — " The distinction between the
liability of a municipal coi'poration
called into existence either at the di-
rect solicitation or by the free con-
sent of the persons composing it for
the promotion of their own local and
private advantage and convenience,
and that of counties or other political
divisions of a State, established by
general laws, for the negligent con-
duct of their oflScers and agents, is
clearly defined. The principle upon
which the distinction rests is that
counties are arbitrary political divis-
ions of a State, and the govern-
mental powers they exercise are im-
posed upon them by general laws,
while municipal corporations act vol-
untarily in their assumption of a part
of the sovereignty of the State in
their exercise of self-government," —
citing, also, Oooley, Const Lim. {8d
ed.) pp. 247, 248. See, also, Oliver v.
Worcester, 102 Mass. 489 ; Galveston
V. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118, and cases
cited. In Barnes v. District of Co-
lumbia, 91 U. S. 540, the District was
held to be liable to an individual who
§ 757.]
TORTS AND CHIMES.
769
or tolls from the public Works it is required to construct, it is
deemed reasonable it should be liable as other corporations are
for any injury caused by its negligence.^ But in Arkansas
and California this distinction is not observed, and incorpo-
rated cities are held to no stricter liability than counties, un-
less such liability is imposed by statute.^ Nor is the distinc-
tion before adverted to recognized in South Carolina,' nor in
Michigan,* nor in New Jersey," nor in Massachusetts, Maine
and Connecticut, in respect to highways."
Black, 590 ; Weightman v. Washing-
ton, 1 Black, 39.
2 Thus in Arkadelphia v. Windham
(188fi), 49 Ark. 139, the court said: —
"We think the streets of a town or
city like all other roads are public
highways ; that the duty of keeping
them in repair is to the public, not to
private individuals ; and that no civil
action arises from an injury resulting
from a neglect to keep them in re-
pair. Ip the absence of a statute
there is no difference between the
liability of an incorporated town or
city and a county in such cases.
Such a distinction would be contrary
to every principle of fairness, reason
and justice.'' In California cities are
deemed like counties mere instru-
ments of the government and not
liable for injuries sustained by indi-
viduals through neglect of city offi-
cers to keep the streets in repair.
Winbigler v. Los Angeles City, 45
Cal. 36, where the decisions in Hoff-
man V. San Joaquin County, 31 Cal.
436, and Crowell v. Sonoma County,
25 Cal. 313, were followed.
'Young V. Charleston, 30 S. C. 116.
4 Detroit v. Blakeley, 21 Mich. 84 ;
MoCutcheon v. Homer, 43 Mich. 483 ;
Detroit v. Putnam, 45 Mich. 265.
s Pray v. Jersey City, 33 N. J. Law,
394 ; .Strader v. Sussex, 18 N. J. Law,
108; Callahan v. Morris, 30 N. J.
Law, 161 ; Livermore v. Camden, 31
N. J. Law, 508.
6 French v. Boston, 139 Mass. 592;
fell into an excavation caused by a
change of grade in the city of Wash-
ington, which the District permitted
a certain railroad to maka The Dis-
trict as a chartered municipal corpo-
ration had acted by a board of public
works appointed under the charter
or act of congress by the president
and confirmed by the senate. Hunt,
J., speaking for the majority of the
court, said : — " The powers given to
this board are not of a character be-
longing to independent oflBcers, but
rather those which indicate that it is
the representative of the municipal
corporation. Notwithstanding these
features, and that we find this power
given by the act which creates the
municipality, and that this is one of
the powers ordinarily belonging to a
municipal government, and though
the manner of its bestowal and the
selection of the agents who exercise
it are similar to that of the other ap-
pointees and agents of the municipal
corporation, it is still contended that
no liability exists on the part of the
corporation to compensate the plaint-
iff for his injuries. . . . The au-
thorities establishing the contrary
doctrine that a city is responsible
for its mere negligence are so numer-
ous and so well considered that the
law must be deemed to be settled in
accordance with them.''
• Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489,
500; Weet v. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161,
note; Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2
49
770
TOBTS AND OEIMES.
[§ 758.
§ 758. Municipal liability in exercise of private powers.
In the exercise of its private powers a municipality is liable
for torts to the same extent as a private corporation.^ These
private powers relate, for example, to the corporate property
of a city held and managed by it for its own immediate profit,
though ultimately inuring to the public benefit.^ In New Hamp-
shire where a city had ceased to use a reservoir for the public
purpose of extinguishing fires, and was filling it up in order to
use it for a private purpose, it was held to be liable as an in-
dividual would be.' Under a charter requiring a city " to pre-
serve peace and good order, securing persons and property
from violence, danger or destruction," it is not enough to pass
an ordinance against " coasting " on the streets, but the city
Hill V. Boston, 123 Mass. 344. In the
last case Gray, C. J., said : — '* In this
commonwealth an act of the legisla-
ture changing a town into a city has
never been considered as enlarging
civil remedies for neglect of corpo-
jrate duties; and it has constantly
been held that a city like a town is
not liable to an action for a defect in
a highway, except so far as the right
to maintain such an action has been
given clearly by statute. Brady v.
Lowell, 3 Cush. 121; Harwood v.
Lowell, 4 Cush. 310 ; Hixon v. Lowell,
13 Gray, 59 ; Oliver v. Worcester, 103
Mass. 489. The same view has been
taken in other New England States
and in New Jersey, Michigan and
California. Morgan v. Hallowell, 57
Me. 375; Jones v. New Haven, 34
Conn. 1, 13 ; Hewison v. New Haven,
37 Conn. 475."
1 Maximilian v. New York, 63 N. Y.
160, 164. " There are two kinds of
duties imposed on a municipal corpo-
ration: one is of that kind which
arises from the grant of a special
power in the exercise of which the
municipality is as a legal individual ;
the other is of that kind which arises
or is implied from the use of political
rights under the general law, in the
exercise of which it is as asovereign.
... In the exercise of the former
power, and under the duty to the
public which the acceptance and use
of the power involves, a municipality
is like a private corporation and is
liable for a failure to use its power
well, or for an injury caused by using
it badly." In Smith v. Rochester, 76
N. Y. 506, Miller, J., says:— "The
docti'ine is well settled that munici-
pal corporations are within the oper-
ation of the general rule of law that
the superior or employer must an-
swer civilly for the negligence of an
agent or servant in the course of
their employment by which another
is injured."
^ In OUver v. Worcester, 102 Mass.
489, Gray, J., thus speaks of the pri-
vate powers of a city as distinguished
from their public duties : — " The dis-
tinction is well established between
the responsibilities of towns and cit-
ies for acts done in their public ca-/
pacity, and for acts done in what
may be called their private character
in the manajgement of property or
rights voluntarily held by them for
their own immediate profit or ad-
vantage as a corporatiota, althougli
inuring of course ultimately to tho
benefit of the public."
» Clark V. Manchester, 63 N. H. 577.
§ 759.] TOETS AND 0EIME8. 771
must also use reasonable care and diligence to enforce it ; ^ but
in Indiana a city is not liable for failing to enforce its ordi-
nances against coasting.*
§ 759. Liability commensnrafe with duty.— The liability
of a city, town or township in respect to public roads or high-
ways is commensurate with the duty ep joined by law, and
therefore in each case the inquiry is as to the extent of such
duty.' Where there is no duty, there is no liability.* The
terms duty, diligence, vigilance and negligence are relative.
There is no negligence in failing to guard against a very un-
likely possibility. Thus a highway running through a sparsely
settled town does not require the same attention as a thronged
thoroughfare in a populous city ; ' and in a city it is not neg-
ligence not to guard against an accident which could not be
expected or foreseen.* A power conferred on city authorities
to superintend or repair the streets imposes the duty to exer-
cise the power when necessary.' Thus a town or township
charged with the care of a bridge is liable for injury caused
by Ifeaving its abutments unguarded.' The District of Co-
lumbia is liable for injuries ai:;ising from neglect of its streets
1 Taylor v. Cumberland, 64 Md. 68. » Glasier v. Town of Hebron, 131
2 City of Lafayette v. Timberlake, N. Y. 447.
88 Ind. 330. •■ A conclusion which 6 Hubbell u Tonkers, 104 N. Y. 434.
would make a city liable for the acts ' Requa v. Rochester, 45 N. Y. 129 ;
of coasters can only be reached by Hutson v. New York, 9 N. Y. 163 ;
assuming that municipal corpora- New York v. Furze, 3 Hill, 612. As
tions are liable for a failure to exe- Earl, C. J., said in People v. Meakim,
cute the statutes of the State or the 133 N. Y. 214^ 220:— "It is not ex-
ordinances of the corporation, and pressly provided in the statute that
this assumption cannot be made un- they shall proceed and make a deter-
less settled principjes are disregarded, mination of the matter within any
. . . Making and enforcing ordi- particular time ; and indeed there is
nances regulating the use of streets no express provision that they shall
brings into exercise governmental make any determination whatever,
and not corporate powers, and the au- But that they shall is necessai-ily im-
thorities are well agreed that for a plied in the statute ; and what is nec-
failure to exercise legislative, judi- essarily implied is as much a part of
cial or executive powers of govern- the statute as if it were specially ,
ment there is no liability." written therein."
'Plymouth Township v. Graver, 8 paltonw Upper Tyrone Township,
125 Penn. St 24 137 Penn. St 18 ; Corbalis v. Newberry
* Monk V. New Utrecht, 104 N. Y. Township, 132 Penn. St 9 ; Plymouth
553. Township v. Graver, 125 Penn. St
772 TOKTS Am> CEIME8. [§§ 760, 761.
in the city of Washington.' In Michigan a city is not liable
for failure to keep its sidewalks in repair ; ' but in Ohio a city
is so liable, and is not relieved from such liability by giving a
pecHUt to individuals to occupy the streets under conditions.'
§ 760. Mnnicipal liability as to water front.— The State
may impose a public duty upon a particular county or city
upon the assumption of its being more beneficially interested
therein than other portions of tl^ State;* for example, may
require it to keep the waters along its front in a naviga-
ble condition ; but such a duty does not exist at common
law in this country,' except where the city is in control of
and receives a revenue from wharves." But a city is liable
in damages for obstructing navigable waters by discharging
the dirt from its sewers into them, to the individual thereby
peculiarly injured.'
§ 761. Liability for fright of horses. — Where a horse at-
tached to a cart was frightened by a hole negligently left by
a city in a pier belonging to it and backed against a rotten
string-piece which broke and the horse and cart were lost, the
city was held to be liable in the absence of proof that the
horse was vicious or unusually excitable,* though the result
34. A town is liable for allowing a ' District of Columbian. Woodbury,
highway at a railroad crossing to re- 136 U, S. 450.
main for years in a dangerous condi- * Detroit v. Osborne, 135 IT. S. 492.
tion, though it was at first rendered * Cleveland v. King, 132 U. S. 295.
dangerous by the railroad company. * Mobile County v. Eimball, 103 U.
Bryant v. Town of Randolph, 14 N. Y. S. 691 ; Winpenny v. Philadelphia, 65
Supl. 844. In Plymouth Township Pepn. St 135.
tt. Graver, 125 Penn. St 24, it was » Winpenny v. Philadelphia, 65
held that •' whether the danger arises Penn. St 135 ; Coonley v. Albany, 133
from an imperfection in the road N. Y. 145.
itself, or from an excavatipn In it * Pittsburg v. Grier, 23 Penn. St 54.
outside the traveled route, or from 'Bray ton v. Fall River, 113 Mass.
the existence of a declivity or stream 218 ; Haskell v. New Bedford, 108
of water at the roadside, or from a Mass. 308; Boston Mills ti. Cambridge,
railroad upon which locomotives and 117 Mass. 896 ; Franklin Wharf Co. v.
trains of cars are accustomed to pass, Portland, 67 Me. 46; Emory v. Low-
if there is a concurrence of circum- ell, 104 Mass. 13 ; Gerrish v. Brown,
stances which render the road a place 61 Me. 256.
of peril to the traveler, the,township * Macauley v. New York, 67 N. Y.
is held to do whatever is reasonable 603.
and practicable to avert the danger
which threatens.''
§ 762.] TOETS AND CRIMES. T73
might have been different if the place had not been exposed
and dangerous.^ The Massachusetts rule is that if a horse,
while uncontrollable by reason of fright, disease or vicious-
ness, comes upon a defect in a highway, the town is not liable
for the injury unless it would have occurred if the horse
had not been uncontrollable ; but a horse which merely shies
is not considered uncontrollable.- It is certainly reasonable
that a city should be held not liable for an injury caused by a
frightened horse on its streets, where the city was not the
cause of the fright."
§ 762. Municipal liability for acts of officers and agents. —
A municipal corporation is not liable for the acts of its officers
and agents unless previously authorized or subsequently rati-
fied by it, or unless done in good faith in pursuance of a gen-
eral authority to act for it in the matter to which they relate.*
So a city is not liable to an action by one whose property has
been wrongfully seized by a tax collector without authority
of law, where the city has neither authorized nor ratified the
act ; and it is not a ratification to receive the money in igno-
rance of the tort, nor is authority conferred by a resolution
to hold the collector harmless if he proceeds according to law.'
iHubbell V. Yonkers, 104 N. Y. such suit If it was maliciously
434 brought by Newell it was not brought
2 Titu0 V. Northbridge, 97 Mass. in good faith, which is essential to
258 ; Horton v. Taunton, 97 Mass. render the city liable as for an act
266 ; Fogg v. Nahant, 98 Mass. 578. done in pursuance of a general au-
See, also, Beach on Contributory thority to act for it under the rule
Negligence (4th ed.), § 245, and nu- stated above." See, also, Donnelly v.
merous cases there cited. Tripp, 12 E. L 97, where the city coun-
'Cole u Newburyport, 129 Mass. cil of Providence having directed the
691 highway commissioners to cut down
* Thus in Horton v. Newell (R L, a certain street, provided the adjoin-
1893), 23 Atl. Rep. 910, which was an ing owners agreed not to make a
action of trespass on the case against claim for damages, and by inadver-
the city treasurer of the city of Paw- tence the cutting down was done
tucket for a malicious suit against the without such agreement by the own-
plaintiff brought by the city tax col- ers, it waa held that the city was not
lector, the demurrer was sustained liable. See Mulcairns v. Janesville,
on the following grounds stated by 67 Wis. 24.
the court: — "The declaration does SEverson v. Syracuse, 100 N, Y.
not allege that the city of Pawtucket 577. So in Wallace v. Menasha, 48
authorized the suit by Newell in his Wis. 79, the city was held not to be
capacity as tax collector, complained liable for the act of its treasurer in
of as malicious, or that it has ratified seizing and selling the chattels of
774
TOETS AND CEIMBS.
[§§ 763, 764.
A complaint in an action of tort against a municipality is de-
murrable unless it shows that the wrongful act was not done
by an independent officer and was done by an officer while in
the performance of some duty of a corporate nature^
§ 763. Not liable for ultra Tires acts of officers, etc. — A.
muMcipal corporation is not liable for the negligence of its
agent or servant in the course of his employment unless the
act complained of was within the icope of the corporate pow-
ers.*
§ 764. Non-liaMljty in the exercise of discretionary pow-
ers.— A municipal corporation is not liable for the neglect to
exercise a power or perform a duty which is discretionary or
judicial in its character. This rule has been applied where a
one person for the delinquent taxes
of another. In Butfalo &c. Turn-
pike Co. V. Buffalo, 58 N. Y. 639, the
city was held liable because it author-
ized the acts complained of through
its common council, but that it was
immaterial whether the acts of the
common council were to be regarded
as those of defendant or as those of its
agents. It was liable, the tortious acts
being, in the course of the agency.
- Lee V. Village of Sandy Hill, 40 N. Y.
443. <
lA municipal corporation is not
generally liable for the wrongful act
of an officer, and in order to hold it
liable it must be made to appear that
such officer was not an independent
public officer, and that the wrong
complained lof was done by such offi-
cer while in tiie legitimate exercise
of some duty of a corporate nature,
which, was devolved upon him bylaw
or by the direction of the corpora-
tion. Caspary v. City of Portland
(1890), 19 Oregon, 496; S. C, 24 Pac.
Eep. 1036.
2 Smith V. City of Rochester, 76 N.
Y. 506, where one of defendant's
hose carts while carelessly driven on
the street in celebrating the centen-
nial anniversary ran over plaintiff ;
it was held that as the calling out
the hose cart for such a' purpose was
not authorized the city was not lia-
ible, and that the fact of the city own-
ing the cart and horses did not make
it responsible for the negligence of
its servants having control of them
and when using them in a serv-
ice not of a public nature and
not authorized by law. Miller, J.,
said: — "If the corporation had
power to order the driver of the
hose cart, it could only do so in ac-
cordance with the statute granting
such power, and if it had no such
power, the order was clearly void,
and the corporation was not liable
for the consequences arising from
its being carried into effect" See,
also, the similar case of Morri-
son V. City of Lawrence, 98 Mass>
219, where the city was- held not to
be liable for the negligent firing of a
rocket by its servant under a defect-
ive resolution authorizing the cele-
bration of the Fourth of July. See,
also, the general rule as expressed by
Shaw, C. J., in Thayer v. Boston, 19
Pick. 516,
§ 76i.J
TOBXS AND OBIMES.
775
city failed to provide suiBcient drainage of an individual's
premises.^ The sanie rule is applied where the manufacture
and sale of fire-works within city limits is left to the legisla-
tive authority of the common council.' In Indiana it is held
that a municipal corporation is not liable, either for a failure to
exercise or a negligent exercise of legislative or judicial pow-
ers.' In other words, the general rule is that a municipal cor-
> Mills V. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489,
where Denio, C. J., said : — " It is not
the law that a municipal corporation
is responsible in a private action for
not providing su£9cient sewerage for
every or any part of the city or vil-
lager The duty of draining the streets
is one requiring the exercise of de-
liberation, judgment and discretion.
... It admits of a choice of
means, and the determining of the
order of time in which improvements
shall be made. It involves also a
variety of prudential considerations
relating to the burdens which may
be discreetly imposed at a given time
and the preference which one local-
ity may claim over another." See,
also, Wilson v._ New York, 1 Denio,
595; Cole v. Medina, 37 Barb. 318;
Cavanagh v. Brooklyn, 33 Barb. 333 ;
Radcliflf V. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195. In
Edgerly v. Concord, 63 N. H. 8, the
city was held not liable to a traveler
for an injury caused by his horse
taking fright at a stream of water
thrown from a hydrant by firemen
testing its capacity in the presence
of the mayor and city council, who
are engaged in determining the most
suitable location for the erection of
an engine-bouse for a steam fire-
engine. Allen, J., said : — "As a part
of the governmental machinery of
the State, municipal corporations
legislate and provide for the custom-
ary local conveniences of the people,
and in exercising these discretionary
functions the corporations are not
called upon to respond in damages to
individuals, either for omissions to
act, or for the mode of exercising
powers, and to be exercised at discre-
tion for the public good. For inju-
ries arising from the corporation's
failure to exercise its public legisla-
tive and police powers and from the
manner of executing those powers,
there is no remedy against the mu-
nicipality; nor can an action be main-
tained for damages resulting from
the failure of its officers to discharge
properly and effectually their offi-
cial duties." Citing Eastman v.
Meredith, 36 N. H. 384; Ray v. Man-
chester, 46 N. H. 59, 60; Hardy v.
Keeue, 53 N. H. 370, 377; Thayer v.
Boston, 19 Pick. 511 ; HafiFord v. New
Bedford, 16 Gray, 297; Fisher v.
Boston, 104 Mass. 87; Hill v. Bos-
ton, 122 Mass. 344; Barbour v.
Ellsworth, 67 Me. 294 ; Judge v.
Meriden, 38 Conn. 90 ; Jewett v. New
Haven, 38 Conn. 368 ; Hutchinson v-
Concord, 41 Vt 271 ; Grant u Erie,
69 Pa. St 420 ; Davis v. Montgomery,
51 Ala. 139.
2McDade v. Chester City, 117 Pa.
St. 415. See, also, Lehigh Co. v. Hof-
fort, 116 Pa St 119; Carr v. North-
ern Liberties, 35 Pa. St 330 ; Easton
V. Neff, 103 Pa. St 474.
* Anderson City v. East, 117 Ind.
136 ; Wheeler v. Plymouth City, 116
Ind. 158 ; Dooley v. Town of Sullivan,
113 Ind. 451; Terre Haute v. Hud-
nut, 113 Ind. 543; Faulkner v. Au-
rora City, 85 Ind. 130; Lafayette
City V. Timberlake, 88 Ind. 330.
176 TOETS AND 0EIME8. [§§ 765, 766.
poration is liable only for omission or negligence in respect to
its ministerial duties.*
§ 765. The same subject continued — New Tort and Geor-
gia rule. — The rule laid down in the preceding section has
been consistently applied in New York, where a power to pass
ordinances for the raising or demolishing of public build-
ings which by reason of fire might become dangerous, being
deemed to be one of local legislation, it was held that the
failure to exercise it did not make a city liable for a death
caused by the fall of a dangerous wall.' A city is not liable
for the failure of its common council, in the exercise of its
\discretionary power, to pass and enforce a necessary resolution,
though such failure involves an error of judgment.' A city is
not liable for its neglect to exercise its quasi-jndicial and dis-
cretionary power of improving a sidewalk which is strongly
constructed and in good repair but defective in its plan by its
slope being too great.*
§ 766. The same subject continued — Drainage. — The du-
ties of municipal authorities in adopting a general plan of drain-
age and determining when and where sewers shall be built, of
what size and at what level, being of a quasi-jndioial character,
as involving the exercise of a large discretion and considera-
tions of public health and convenience, are not subject to re-
' Agnew V. Corunna City, 55 Mich, on the ground that the growth of
438 ; MacArthur v. Saginaw, 58 Mich, weeds and grass was too luxuriant
359; Kiley v. Kansas City, 87 Mo. for comfort, health and good appear-
103 ; Hubbell v. Viroqua City, 67 ance, one who was gored by a cow
Wis. 343 ; Robinson v. Greenville, 43 running at large in the streets was
Ohio St 635; Hinesv. Charlotte City, held not to have a cause of action
73 Mich. 378 ; S. C, 40 N. W. Rep. 333 ; against the city. Rivers v. Augusta,
Hitchins v. Frostburg, 68 Md. 100. 65 Ga. 876. See, also, Forsyth v. At-
2 Cain V. Syracuse, 95 N. Y. 83. lanta, 45 Ga. 153; Duke V.Rome, 20
In Georgia it is held there is no Ga. 635.
sound distinction as to such liability » Cain v. Syracuse, 95 N. T. 83. See,
between a failure to pass an ordi- also, Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 161 ;
nance in the first instance and its re- McCarthy w Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194 ;
peal or suppression. Thus where a Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94 N. Y. 37; Peo-
oity council passed an ordinance pie v. Albany, 11 Wend. 539.
forbidding the running of cattle at * Urquhart v. Ogdensburg, 91 N. Y.
large in the streets, but subsequently 67 ; Hines v. Lockport, 50 N. Y. 338.
suspended its operation indefinitely
§ 767.] TOETS AND OEIMES. 777
vision by oourfe and jury in a private action for not sufficiently
draining a particular lot of land.* But the construction and
repair of sewers, after the adoption of the general plan, are
ministerial duties, for the negligent performance of which the
municipality which has constructed and owns them may be
liable to a person whose property is thereby injured.'' And a
city may be liable by virtue of a special contract to pay any
damages caused by the construction of a sewer.' A city is
liable in case for the damage caused an individual land-owner
by discharging a public sewer upon his land and into his mill-
pond, where the right to do so has not been acquired in some
way known to the law.* A city is not liable for damage in-
curred by reason of the gutters being insufScient on an
extraordinary occasion."
§ 767. Non-liability for errors of judgment. — A munici-
pal corporation having limited legislative powers delegated by
the State is not liable to individuals for losses consequent on
its having misconstrued the extent of its powers," or for error
of judgment in the exercise of such powers resulting in an
1 Johnson u. District of Columbia, keep the sewer in repair. Kranz i>
118 U. S. 19; Mills v. Brooklyn, 83 Baltimore, 64 Md. 491.
N. Y. 489 ; Wilson v. New York, 1 'A city with power to construct a
Denio, 595 ; Child v. Boston, 4 Allen, sewer is liable to the owner of prop-
41. erty injured by the negligent man-
2 Barton v. Syracuse, 36 N. Y. 54. ner in which a contractor conducted
While a municipal corporation may the work, where the city contracted
not be liable for damage sustained with the owner of the property for a
from its neglect to provide a sewer, right of way, and agreed to pay all
it is liable if it provides one so inad- damages occasioned by the construc-
equate that it overflows and dis- tion. Leeds v. Richmond, 102 Ind.
charges sewerage on the land of an 372.
individual. Payment by such per- ■* Vale Mills v. Nashua, 68 N. H. 186.
son of an assessmeiit for the con- » Wright v. Wilmington, 92 N. C.
struction is not an assent to the dis- 156,
charge on his land. Seifert v. Brook- 6 The common council of Alex-
lyn, 15 Abb. (N. Y.) N. C. 97 ; Van andria granted a license to carry on
Rensselaer v. Albany, 15 Abb. (N. Y.) the business of auctioneer which
N. C. 457. Where a city utilized a was ultra vires. The town was held
stream as a common sewer for more not responsible for losses sustained
than twenty years, repairing it, arch- by individuals from the frauds of the
ing it, etc., it was held liable for in- auctioneer. Fowle v. Alexandria, 3
juries sustained from its neglect to Pet 398. ^
778
TOBTS AND OBIMES.
[§ 768.
ordinance which is unconstitutional.^ In the case last cited
the action of the city in adopting the ordinance in question
was a legislative act and the exercise of a right of sover-
eignty primarily belonging to the State but delegated to the
city, and the United'States circuit court held that for errors
of judgment in the exercise of such ppwers cities are not liable
in their corporate capacity. ' Where acts done are beyond the
authority and power of the city to do, it is not responsible
for damages resulting from worl? done negligently or other-
wise, under the supposed authority of illegal and void votes
of the city council,^ but the liability, if any, rests upon the
individuals who performed those acts.'
§ 768. Liability for trespass. — The State itself cannot in-
trude upon private property without the authority of a stat-
ute, and a municipal corporation, though acting for and under
contract with the State, cannot justify a trespass on private
land on the ground that such trespass is necessary to the per-
formance of the contract.* Though, if an act be done under
1 One who has served out in prison
a fine imposed for the violation of an
unconstitutional municipal ordinance
has no right of action against the
city for false imprisonment Tres-
cott V. Waterloo, 26 Fed. Eep. 592.
See, also, Buke v. Eome, 20 Ga. 635 ;
Ogg V. Lansing, 35 lov^a, 495.
^Cavanagh v. Boston, 139 Mass.
426 ; Spring v. Hyde Park, 137 Mass.
554; Lemon v. Newton, 134 Mass.
476 ; Gushing v. Bedford, 125 Mass.
526.
8 Brigham v. Edmunds, 7 Gray, 359.
See, also, Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick.
184, 194.
<Iu St. Peter v. Denison, 58 N. T.
4^6, It was held that the casting of
stone and earth by blasting from the
bed of the canal upon the land of an
adjoining owner by a contractor
with the State engaged in the work
of the Erie canal enlargement was a
trespass, and although the work was
done without negligence he was
liable for the resulting damage.
Folger, J., said:— "The State could
not intrude upon the lawful posses-
sion of a citizen, save in accordance'
with law. Unless authorized by law
so to do, the casting of stone from
the bed of the canal upon the adjoin-
ing land either by the State or an in-
dividual was a trespass. Hay v.
Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159. The defend-
ant, claims that he was authorized by
law in that he was, as the servant of
the State, in the exercise of the right
of eminent domain belonging to his
principal. The State cannot ordi-
narily exercise that right save in ac-
cordance with a special act of the
legislature, or through the consti-
tuted authorities by virtue of some
general statute. . . . Nor can the
defendant protect himself from lia-
bility for that his act of blasting out
the rocks with gunpowder was nec-
essary, and hence that the effects of
it upon the adjoining premises were
§ 768.]
TOETS AND OEIMES.
779
authority of law, and in a proper manner, a municipal corpo-
ration is not liable for consequential damages to the property
not invaded by it,* yet if it have no statutory right to enter
upon private property it is liable in damages for such trespass,
though unattended with negligence.* And if it have such
statutory right it may be liable for an injury caused by negli-
gent performance,'
was emptied into the mill raqe along
a given street, aiid in times of iieavy ;
rains a larger quantity of mud, sand
and debris was thus carried into the
race near the mill, it was held that
the city was not liable for the in-
jury caused by these obstructions.
The court speaking of such conse-
quential damages said: — "Property
thus injured is not in the constitu-
tional sense taken for public use.
This doctrine was long since an-
nounced, after the most cai'eful 'con-
sideration by courts of the highest
authority. Collender v. Marsh, 1
Pick. 418; O'Connor v. Pittsburg, 18
Penn. St. 187. It was al?o approved
in the leading cases of Goszler v.
Georgetown, 6 Wheat 595, and
Smith V. Washington, 30 How. 135.
These authorities have since been
followed by the decisions of almost
every State of the Union where the
question has arisen, and in fact to
such an extent that even the citation
of the cases has become burden-
some." Contra, Crawford v. Village
of Delaware, 7 Ohio St 459.
2Tremain v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y.
163; Pixley v. Clark, 35 N. Y. 530.
'Perkins v. Lawrence, 136 Mass.
305, where Allen', J., said:— "The
plaintiff in his opening stated that
the injury of which he complains
was caused by the negligence of de-
fendant's servants, and so brought
his case directly within the authority
of Hand v. Brookline, 126 Mass. 324,
where the town was held liable for
an injury to the plaintiffs' property
an unavoidable result of a necessary
act The case of Hay v. Cohoes Co.,
supra, shows that unless there is a
right to the use of the adjacent lands
for the purposes of the work, it mat-
ters not that the mode adopted of
carrying on the work was neces-
sary." Where a city takes possession
of private lands and constructs a
street and street railway thereon in
the absence and without the knowl-
edge or acquiescence of the owner,
the owner can maintain an action
for the recovery thereof despite the
public use. Green v. Tacoma City
(1893), 61 Fed. Eep. 633.
' Radcliff V. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195 ;
Bellinger v. N. Y. Central E. Co., 23
N. Y. 43. In Atwater v. Canandaigua
Village, 134 N. Y. 603, the village
while building a bridge under statu-
tory authority erected a coffer-dam
in the outlet of a lake, which was
necessary for the work, which ob-
structed the flow of water from the
lake, and caused it to remain on
plaintiff's land and deprived him of
its beneficial use for one season. It
was held that as the work was prop-
erly and expeditiously done there
was not a taking of plaintiff's prop-
erty and that the village was not lia-
ble for the damages. In Cumber-
land V. Willison, 50 Md. 138, the city
in the exercise of powers conferred
by statute, and with reasonable care
and skill, having changed the natural
flow of surface water which usually
found its way into a mill race in the
city, so that a larger flow than usual
780 TOETS AIJD CEIMES. " [§§ 769, 770.
§769. liability for waste.— The provision of the Kew
York Code of Procedure authorizing an action by a tax-payer
against the municipal governing body to prevent " waste or
injury to " municipal property is confined to cases where the
acts complained of are without power or where corruption or
fraud is charged.* But the courts may interfere by injunc-
tion to restrain municipal authorities where their threatened
action will produce irreparable injury, and consists in the ille-
gal disposition of public properttf by devoting it to private
uses ; and disobedience to such injunction is punisl^able as a
criminal contempt.* And under the New York statute of
1872 a tax-payer may maintain an equitable action against
the town board of auditors to vacate the audit of an illegal
claim on the ground that such audit is without authority or
fraudulent and collusive, and also to restrain the collection of
a tax therefor.'
§770. liiability after notice — Implied notice. — Munici-
pal authorities do not escape liability by acting only when
they have actual notice; when a city structure or street has
been out of repair so long that by reasonable diligence they
could have notice of its condition, such notice may be im-
puted to them.* In such cases, and in particular where the
through neglect in the construction council in resect thereto were ille-
of water-works which the town had gal, and it was held on appeal that the
^ been authorized by a special statute, demurrer to the complaint should
voluntarily accepted, to construct have been sustained because there
and to receive profits from ; and the was no averment that the common
case is distinguishable from one council did not have, under the city
where the work was done in a rea- charter, power to provide for the
sonable, proper and skilful manner, lighting of the streets as in its dlscre-
as in Hall v. Westfield, 133 Mass. 438, tion might seem best, and no charge
in which CEise the damage can be of fraudulent or corrupt action of the
reco vered only in the mann er pointed authorities,
out by statute." * People v. Negus, 90 N. Y. 403.
1 Talcott V. Buffalo, 125 N. Y. 280, 3 Osterhaudt v. Prigney, 98 N. Y.
an action by a tax-payer, against 222. See, also, Ayers v. Lawrence,
the city where it was charged that 59 N. Y. 192 ; Metzger v. Attica E.
by the substitution of electric lights Co., 79 N. Y. 171.
for gas the expense of lighting < Pomfrey v. Saratoga Springs, 104
would be iuci-eased without any cor- N. Y. 459. Where a displacement of
responding benefit to the city or citi- a stone in a highway hns continued
zens, and that the ofiBcial acts of the for such a time as to imply notice to
§770.]
TOETS AND OEIMES.
781
street has been obstructed by the unauthorized act of other
than city officers, what lapse of time will justify the imputa-
tion of negligence for not discovering the defect or obstruc-
tion is a question for the jury.^ If a city omits to act with
reasonable diligence after notice of an unlawful obstruction
in the street which is dangerous in fact, it is liable for the
injury thereby caused, though it has not by actual inspection
ascertained its dangerous character,^ and though it has in-
structed its subordinates to ascertain the facts and report.'
No notice is necessary to render a city liable for an injury
caused by the act of itself, or of an authorized officer or
agent.* This subject of notice is treated at length in the
chapter on " Highways." '
the city corporation, and its subordi-
nates have bad actual notice, their
failure to report it and their opinion
that it was not dangerous do not
shield the city from liability. Good-
fellow V. New York, 100 N. Y. 15.
In Weed v. Ballston Spa Village, 70
N. Y. 339, it was held that actual no-
tice was not necessary to render the
municipality liable for an unauthor-
ized excavation if it had continued
so long as to be notorious and to
justify the presumption that it was
known to the agents charged with
the duty of street repair. See, also,
Eequa M Rochester, 45 N. Y. 130;
Diveny v. Elmira, 51 N. Y. 506;
Hume V. Mayor, 47 N. Y. 639. Evi-
dence of the defective condition of a
sidewalk a few days before the acci-
dent whereby plaintiff was injured
is admissible in his action against the
city. Nor is actual notice to the city
of the defect required to be shown
if the defect had existed for a con-
siderable time. Chicago v. Dalle, 115
111. 386.
iRehberg v. New York, 91 N. Y.
137 ; Hume v. Mayor, 47 N. Y. 640 ;
74 N. Y, 364; Steflfan v. Buffalo, 21
N. Y. W. Dig. 289 ; Turner v. New-
burgh, 109 N. Y. 801 ; Kunz v. Tracy,
16 N. Y. St Rep. 459. Evidence that
one of the village trustees lived op-
posite to the place where the defect
was and had to pass it daily is suf-
ficient to sustain a finding that the
village trustees had notice of the de-
fect. O'Reilly v. Sing Sing, 15 N. Y.
St. Rep. 905. See, also, Higgins r.
Salamanca Village, 6 N. Y. St. Rep.
119. That a sidewalk was inspected
by a municipal oflHcer shortly before
an accident and was considered by
him in a satisfactory condition is not
a defense for the corporation, and it
is a proper question whether the
trustees used reasonable diligence to
discover whether the walk was out
of repair. Stebbins v. Oneida Vil-
lage, 33 N. Y. St Rep. 703.
2Rehberg v. New York, 91 N. Y.
137.
'Goodfellow V. New York, 100 N.
Y. 16. A city is liable for an injury
caused by a hydrant which its offi-
cers have allowed to stand within
the limits of a sidewalk after notice
of its existence and time to remove
it King V. Osbkosh, 75 Wis. 517.
*Ii a, defect in a street be caused
by accident or by the wrongful and
» In vol 3.
782
TOETS AND OEIMES.
[§ 771.
§ 771. The same subject continned — Statutory notice. —
In many of the States it is provided by statute that actions.
for torts and negligence shall not be maintainable against
municipal corporations unless a required notice of the injury
and of the claim for damages be given within a time speci-
fied.' Under the charier of St. Paul, in Minnesota, a person
" bereft of reason," by an injury received, is excused from
giving such notice ; ' and the time limited for commencing ac-
tions against that city for injuries i^aused by its negligence is
not applicable to statutory actions by the personal representa-
tives of a deceased person for negligence causing his death.*
The charter provisions in respect to notice to cities in cases of
torts, and to other requisites preliminary to actions against
them, are quite varied and require careful attention.* Under
the charter of Appleton city the determination of Ihe council'
unauthorized act of a third person
the liability of the corporation does
not begin until it has notice of the
defect, or until the defect has existed
for such a lengthr of time that igno-
rance of its existence is inexcusable ;
but if it be occasioned by the act of
the corporation itself, or by the act
of a person authorized by the corpo-
ration to make any use of the street
which results in producing the de-
fect, the corporation -will be liable
without nbtice. Russell v. Colum-
bia, 74 Mo. 480. A village, though
not liable for the defective construc-
tion of a drain by its trustees, acting
as public officers, is liable for suffer-
ing the drain to continue in a de-
fective condition after notice. Whip-
ple V. Fair Haven, 63 Vt. 221. See
Weller v. Burlington, 60 Vt. 28,
where the city was not liable for the
negligence of the trustees acting as
public officers. And to the same ef-
fect. Bates V. Rutland Village, 63 Vt
178.
iThe provision of the special Min-
nesota law of 1881 incorporating the
city of Minneapolis, that no action
shall be maintained against the city
" on account of any injuries received
by means of any defect in the condi-
tion of any bridge, street, etc., unless
notice is given within thirty days
stating the place and time of its oc-
currence, and that the person so in-
jured will claim damages from th&
city for such injury, applies to injuries,
to property as well as to person.
Nichols V. Minneapolis, 30 Minn. 545.
See, also. Powers v. St. Paul, 36 Minn.
87 ; Pye v. Mankato, 38 Minn. 536.
2 Ray V. St Paul, 44 Minn. 340.
3 May lone v. St Paul, 40 Minn. 406.
And see Clark v. Manchester, 63 N. H.
577.
* In Wisconsin it is provided by the
Antigo city charter that no action in
tort shall lie against the city unless a
statement of the wrong shall be pre-
sented to the common council within
sixty days ; and it is held that under
this and connected provisions of the
charter there is a right of action
after presenting the statement to the
council, but no right of appeal froia
the council's determination. Vogel
V. Antigo City (Wis.), 51 N. W. Rep.
1008.
§ 771.]
TORTS AND OEIMES.
783
is a bar to an action but not to an appeal, and the objection
that the claim has not been presented to the common council
must be taken by demurrer or answer or it is waived.* It is
enough that such notice be in substantial compliance, as to
form and service, with the statutory requirement.^ The Yer-
mont statute requires notice of " the place " where the injury
was received ; and where there was no controversy or dispute
upon the trial as to the place or as to the prominent surround-
ing objects, or any of the facts bearing upon the question, it
was held to be a question of law for the court and not a
proper subject for the jury whether the notice contained a
suflBciently accurate description.' Ample opportunity to ac-
the question to the jury the judg-
ment would not have been reversed
if the jury had decided correctly.
The degree of certainty which satis-
fies the statute was expounded to the
jury in the trial court to be a de-
scription " with as much particulai--
•ity and minuteness as a person of
common business capacity in the
exercise of such care and prudence
as such persons generally use in their
own affairs, would ordinarily use to
inform another person of like capac-
ity of the place where the accident
happened." This was held to be er-
roneous because it "leaves out of
sight the-f act that the party is legally
bound to give notice of the place
where the accident happened; that
the party to whom the notice is
given has an interest and an object
in knowing the place ; that he has a
legal right to the information, and
that the obje^st of the notice is to en-
able the party to whom it is given,
readily to find the place." See, also,
on suflSciency of notice under this
statute, Read v. Calais, 48 Vt. 7 ; Pur-
rington v. Warren, 49 Vt. 19 ; Boyd
V. Eeadsboro, 53 Vt 522; Perry v.
Putney, 52 Vt. 533 ; Law v. Fairfield,
46 Vt 425 ; Bean v. Concord, 48 Vt
30.
iSheel V. Appleton City, 49 Wis.
185. The charter provision of Mad-
ison city that no action shall be
maintained against it "upon any
'claim or demand" until it shall first
have been presented to the common
council for allowance does not in-
clude actions for personal torts. Kel-
ley V. Madison City, 43 Wis. 638.
3 Harder v. Minneapolis, 40 Minn.
446 ; Clark n Austin City, 38 Minn.
487. In McDonald v. City of Troy
(1891), 36 N. Y. St Rep. 704, plaint-
iflE's attorney prepared the claim,
presented a copy to the comptroller,
said he had the original with him,
and asked if that was all he wanted,
and was answered, "Yes." It was held
a substantial compliance with the de-
fendant's charter, as the comptroller
had obtained the notice the law con-
templated. The statement required
by the Nevfr Hampshire General Laws,
chapter 75, section 7, of the exact
place where damages to a traveler on
a highway is received, is sufficient if
upon the information contained in it
and by the exercise of reasonable dil-
igence the offlcere of the town can
find the place, Carr v. Ashland, 63
N. H. 665.
»Holcomb V. Danby, 51 Vt 428.
It was said, however, that although
the trial court erred in submitting
784 TOETS AND CEIMES. [§§ 772, 773.
quire notice is not actual notice.' A charter provis'on that a
city shall not be liable for the defective condition of a street
unless it be shown that the ward alderman knew of it does
not apply to an obstruction placed in the street by a city serv-
ant while repairing it.*
§ 772. The same subject continued — New York decisions.
The New York statute of 1886 prohibiting actions against
municipal corporations, for personal injuries, unless the no-
tice therein prescribed shall have been filed with the corpo-
ration counsel within six months after the cause of action ac-
crued, and requiring such actions to be brought within one
year, is constitutional and valid.' The provision of the Buf-
falo charter, requiring the claim to have been made forty days
before action brought, is a condition precedent, and in an ac-
tion against the city for a tort the complaint must allege the
presentation of the cjaim to the common council and the ex-
piration of forty days thereafter before the commencement
of the action.* Under the statute of 1881 (ch. 183), the city of
Cohoes is not liable for personal injuries from unsafe side-
walks, etc., unless actual notice of the danger has been given
to the common council or street superintendent at least twenty-
four hours before the injury, and therefore opportunity to
acquire notice of the danger is not enough to create such lia-
bility.*
§ 773. Impeacliing municipal legislative acts for fraud. —
The rule that courts will not inquire into the motives of the
legislature in enacting a law even where fraud and corruption
are charged is relaxed in respect to municipal bodies, and the
legislative acts of municipal councils or assemblies mav be
impeached for fraud at the instance of persons thereby in-
jured.' Starting, however, with the presumption that munic-
ipal legislative acts have been adopted under good motives
1 MoNally v, Cohoes City, 53 Hun, 410 ; Gray v. Brooklyii, 10 Abb. Pr.
203. N. ai86.
2 Adams v. Oshkosh, 71 Wis. 49. 'Reining v. Buffalo, 103 N. Y. 308.
sMertz v. Brooklyn, 33 N. T. St SMcNallyw. Cohoes, 53 Hun, 203.
Eep. 577; affirmed, 128 N. Y. 017. 'Glasgow «. St Louie, 107 Mo. 198;
See, also, Reining t>. Buffalo, 103 N. Cooley, Const Lim. (5th ed.) 335.
Y. 308; "Wheeler v. Jackson, 41 Hun,
§ 774.]
TOETS AND CEIME8.
785
and on sufficient information,' a city is not liable for its
neglect to pass just and reasonable ordinances in respect to
matters left to the discretion of, its council ; ^ nor for its.
neglect to enforce them if no statutory liability has been im-
posed.' Where a subject-matter is intrusted to a town or
city for legislative or judicial action, the duty is essentially
discretionary, and no person can claim damages for its non-
performance.*
§ 114:. Indictment for torts. — A municipal corporation is»
indictable at common law for creating a public nuisance ; * but
1 New York &c. E. Co. v. New York,
1 Hilt 563 ; Millian v. Sharp, 15 Barb.
193 ; Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 283.
2 In McDade v. Chester City, 117
Penn. St 414, the city council had
legislative authority to limit or pro
hibit wholly the making and sale of
fire-works within the corporate lim-
its ; but in an action for damages by
one who was injured while aiding to
extinguish a fire in a fire-works fac- ^
tory, it was held that the power to
prohibit imposed no absolute duty to
prohibit fire-works, and that the city
was not liable for the failure of the
council to exercise its power. See,
also, Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35
Penn. St 330 ; Hill v. Charlotte, 73
N. C. 55 ; Rivers v. Augusta, 65 Ga.
376.
» Hines v. Charlotte City, 73 Mich.
378 ; s. C, 40 N. W. Eep. 333, where tlie
city having by ordinance established
fire limits was held not responsible
for loss by fire starting in a wooden
building within such limits and in
violation of the ordinance, though the
city had notice that the building was
about to be erected and took no steps
to prevent it The court said :— " The
rule is well established, however, not
only in this State but in most of the
States, that simply as municipal cor-
porations, apart from any contract
theory, no public bodies can be made
60
responsible for ofl^cial neglect in-
volving no active misfeasance. It is
only where corporations ]iave been
guilty of some positive mischief pro-
duced by active misconduct that they
have been held liable, and not from
mere non-feasance, or for errors of
judgment Municipal corporations,
under their charters and ordinances,
do not become insurers of the prop-
erty within their, corporate limits
from destruction by reason of the
neglect or refusal of their officers to
enforce their ordinances. St John
Village V. McFarlan, 33 Mich. 73."
See, also, Stillwell v. New York, 17
Jones & Sp.. 360; affirmed, 96 N. Y.
649; Griffin v. Mayor, 9 N. Y, 466;
Lorillard v. Town of Monroe, 11 N.
Y. 393; Wheeler v. Plymouth City,
116 Ind. 158; s. C, 18 N. E. Rep. 632.
It is also sometimes provided, as in
the Albany charter (L. 1883, ch. 298,
title 3, § 44), that a city shall not be
liable in damages for an omission to
pass. or enforce ordinances. See Coon-
ley V. Albany, 133 N. Y. 145, 153.
< Lehigh County v. Hoffort, 116
Penn. St 119.
6 Brayton v. Fall River, 113 Mass.
218, 3|7, where the court said:— "If
the sewers are so built or managed
as to create a public nuisance, the
defendants are indictable." See^ also,
Eastman v. Meredith, 3G N. H. 28^
786
TOETS AND CEIME8.
[§ 774.
perhaps not for not abating a nuisance created by another.'
In some States a municipal corporation is indictable at com-
mon law for negflecting the public health and public streets," and
for misfeasance as well as non-feasance.' Where the duty of
keeping in repair the highways and bridges is imposed by
statute upon the towns in which they are located, an informa-
tion will lie against a town for failing to repair a bridge either
built or adopted by it.'' In England the rule has repeatedly
been laid down that where an indictment can be maintained
against a corporation for a public injury an action on the case
can be maintained for a special damage thereby done to an
individual ; ' and the ground both of the indictment and of the
private action is deemed to be the breach of a covenant en-
tered into by the corporation upon a consideration received
from the sovereign power." In New Jersey when the neg-
389; People v. Adsit, 3 Hill, 619. In
People V. Albany, 11 Wend. 539, the
mayor, aldermen, etc., of the city
were indicted for not cleansing a
foul bam cpnnected with the river
and a verdict obtained at general
sessions. On appeal to the Supreme
doni't. Nelson, J., said : — " It is well
settled that when a corporation are
bound to repair a highway or nav-
igable river they are liable to indict-
ment for neglect of their duty. An
indictineiit and information are the
only remedies to which the public
can resort for a redress of their griev-
ances in this respect"
' ' State V. Burlington, 36 Vt 531.
- Hamar v. Covington, 3 Met (Ky.)
494; Hill v. State, 4 Sneed (Tenn.),
443 ; Crowell v. Bristol, 5 Lea (Tenn.),
685; State v. Shelby ville, 4 Sneed,
176 ; State v. Whittingham, 7 Vt 390.
' In Commonwealth v. Proprietors
of New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339,
it was held that a corporation could be
indicted for a misfeasance as well
ae a non-feasance, and Bigelow, J.,
sai^ : — " Corporations cannot be in-
dicted for offenses which derive their
criminality' from evil intention, or
which consist in a violation of those,
social duties which appertain to men
and subjects. But beyond this there
is no good reason for their exemption
from the consequences of unlawful
and wrongful acts committed by
their agents in pursuance of author-
ity derived from them."
<Town of Saukville v. State, 69
Wis. 178 ; Byron v. State, 35 Wis. 313 ;
State V. Campton, 2 N. H. 513 ; State
V. Gorham, 37 Me. 451 ; Davis v. Ban-
gor, 42 Me. 523 ; State v. Portland, 74
Me. 368.
'McKinnon v. Penson, 8 Ex. 327;
Hartnall v. Ryde Comm'ra, 4 B. & S.
361. Referring to the last case in
Bathurst v. MacPherson, L. R. 4 App.
Cas. 356, the court said : — " It was
there held that the statute creating
the commissioners having expressly
imposed upon them the obligation of
repairing the roads, they were liaoie
not only to be indicted for a breauh
of that duty, but to be sued by any-
body who could show that by reason
of such breach of duty he had sus-
tained particular and special dam-
age."
«In West V. Brockport Village, 16
§ 775.] TORTS AND CRIMES. 787
*
leot of a public duty results in a public injury an individual
cannot bring an action for his particular loss, the only rem-
edy being indictment for the public wrong.^ For an offense
which is statutory only, the indictment is defective if it omits
the words " against the form of the statute."^ Under the
New York Penal Code a public officer " upon whom am'^ duty
is enjoined by law who wilfully neglects to perform that duty
is guilty of a misdemeanor " and indictable therefor.' The
Maine rule, and probably the general rule, is that the same
proof is required to sustain an indictment against a city for
neglect of its streets as to obtain a recovery of damages.*
§ 775. Not indictable for felony. — The State, counties,
towns, cities and villages cannot be indicted for a felony,* but
their officers are often declared by statute to be guilty of
felony for false audits, falsifying accounts, embezzlements,
etc' In New York a corporation may be fined for contempt
of court in an amount to cover the complainant's costs and ex-
penses and also his damages for loss or injury thereby caused in
N. Y. 161, 163, Selden, J., said : — nicipal corporation for non-repair of
" The principle which really lies at the a highway was held bad for this omis-
basis of the; case of Hurley v. Lyme sion. Lord Coleridge said :— " This
Regis, 5 Bing. 91, and of the series of appears to have been decided in sev-
English cases upon the authority of eral cases ; and we think it is applica-
which that case was decided, is ble to a case like the present, where
this : — That whenever an individual a criminal neglect of duty is charged
or corporation, for a consideration upon a corporation who in the ab-
received from the sovereign power, sence of a statute would not be liable
has become bound by covenant or to be indicted for the non-repair of a
agreement, either express or implied, highway."
to do certiiin things, such individual ^So held as to an excise commis-
or corporation is liable in case of sioner. People v. Meakim, 133 N. Y.
neglect to perform such covenant, 214.
not only to a public prosecution by in- * Davis v. Bangor, 43 Me. 523.
dictment, but to a private action at 5 Commonwealth v. Proprietors of
the suit of any person injured by New Bedford Bridge, 3 Gray, 839,
such neglect" where Bigelow, J., said :— " Cprpora-
1 Jersey City v. Kieman, 50 N. J. tions cannot be indicted for offenses
Law, 346 ; Livermore v. Camden, 31 which derive their criminality from
N.J. Law, 507; Cooley v. Essex, 27 evil intention. They cannot be guilty
N. J. Law, 415 ; Sussex v. Strader, of treason or felony, of perjury or of-
18 N. J. Law, 108. fenses against the person."
2 In Queen v. Poole, L. R 19 Q. B. "N. Y. Pen. Code, §§ 164-167, 470.
D. 603, an indictment against a mu-
788 TOETS AND OEIMES. [§ 775.
cases where he has no action therefor.' In the State of New
York a common carrier corporation is guilty of a misdemeanor
in employing intemperate persons after notice that they are
such,' and is guilty of a misdemeanor for the unlicensed selling
of intoxicants to its passengers.'
1 Code of Procedure, § 2284. 'L. 1893, ch. 401, § 30.
»L. 1892, ch. 401, § 39.
(end of volume one.)
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