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^'^^'•'^>:M,
PAMPH LETS
Constitution of the United States,
Published during
Its Discussion by the People
1787-1788.
EpLTED
WITH NOTES and' A BIBLIOGRAPHY
BY
PAUL LEICESTER FORD.
BROOKLYN, N. Y.
1888.
—rj^fZT'i S
A.
%Z^%i^
PREFACE.
The English speaking people have been a race of pam-
phleteers. Whenever a question — religious, political, mili-
tary or personal — has interested the general public, it has
occasioned a war of pamphlets, which, however partisan and
transitory, were in a manner photographs of the public
opinion, and as such have been used and valued by students
and publicists.
The rarity and consequent difficulty of reaching this class
of literature has been, however, a great obstacle to its use as
sources of history. The name of pamphlet tells the purpose
of these little publications. Written hurriedly, to effect a
purpose for which there is not enough time or matter for a
more elaborate volume, they are thrown by after a brief cir-
culation and before a decade has passed, the edition has dis-
appeared, and if any are still in existence, they are only to be
found in the few public and private libraries which have taken
the trouble to secure these fugitive leaflets.
The recognized value of these tractates in England has
led to very extensive republications ; and the Harleian Mis-
cellany, the Soniers Tracts, the issues of the Roxburghe, Ban-
natyne, Maitland, Chetham, Camden and Percy societies and
the reprints of Halliwell, Collier, and M'CuIloch, not to men-
tion many minor collections, have placed several thousand of
them within the reach of every one. But in America few
attempts have been made to collect this kind of literature —
Peter Force reprinted a series of pamphlets on the early set-
tlement of the United States and a work of similar scope on
Canada,* containing reprints of the so called " Jesuit Rela-
tions " was printed under the patronage of the Canadian gov-
VI.
ernment. John Wingate Thornton and Frank Moore have
collected a number of the patriotic sermons preached before
and during the Revolutionary war. Franklin B. Hough repub-
lished a series of the funeral sermons and eulogies on the
death of Washington, and James Spear Loring did the same
for the orations delivered in Boston from 1770 to 1852.
Samuel G. Drake reprinted a collection of tracts relating to
King Philip's war, Joseph Sabin issued a series relating to
the propagation of the gospel among the New England
Indians, and William H. Whitmore edited, for the Prince
Society, a number relating to the governorship of Sir Edmund
Andros — but these are the only attempts worth mentioning
to systematically gather these leaflets of our history, and
which have singularly neglected those bearing on politics and
government, in which we have so largely originated the true
theories and methods.
When the student or historian comes to examine the
earlier pamphlet literature of our country he encounters the
greatest difficulty in their use. The lack of communication
between the colonies or states, with its consequent localiza-
tion of the pamphlet ; the small edition caused by the high
price of paper, which at that time was the costly element in
the production of books ; the little value attached by each
generation to the pamphlets of its own time ; the subsequent
wars, with the destruction and high price of old paper that
came with them, and the general disregard of historical
material that existed for many years after the stirring times
that occasioned these arguments, have all tended to make
these tracts almost impossible to consult ; and any one desir-
ing to examine the original editions of the thirteen pamphlets
contained in this volume would be compelled to visit the
public libraries in the cities of Washington, Philadelphia,
New York, Albany and Boston, while it would take a life
time of patient searching and waiting to collect them from
the second-hand booksellers and auction-rooms, at prices that
few would care to pay.
As the rarity of these pamphlets has caused their neglect,
so also has their anonymous publication. It was a time of
vu.
literary masks, and we often find, like the knights of old, that
when their masks were removed, they had concealed our ablest
statesmen, one of whom wrote of his anonymous pamphlet,
" If the reasoning in the pamphlet you allude to is just, it
will have its effect on candid and discerning minds; — if weak
and inconclusive, my name cannot render it otherwise," but it
is certain, whatever the effect at the moment, that more atten-
tion and care would have been given these works by succeed-
ing generations had they borne the name of one of the makers
of our nation, rather than the pseudonymous mask which gave
no clue to its authorship.
In America, we are too apt to forget the losing side of a
question. Few to-day know of the intense struggle that took
place over the ratification of our constitution, or realize that
the adoption of a government which has worked so success-
fully, met with the strongest opposition from such men as
Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, George Mason, George
Clinton, Samuel Chase, Elbridge Gerry, Albert Gallatin, James
Monroe and others, while many equally famous were either
neutral or gave it but lukewarm support. If the great fear
^and prediction of these men — that the general government
would entirely subvert the state governments, with a conse-
quent loss of personal freedom — has not been realized, it will
nevertheless be seen in the following pages that many of their
objections were embodied in the future amendments, and the
disregard of others has occasioned some of our most serious
national questions. If this collection presents a greater num-
ber of federal than anti-federal arguments, it is only in the
proportion in which the latter was overborne by the former,
both in men and writings.
Of all these partisan writings The Federalist has hitherto
been almost the only known argument of those which for nine
months kept the printers busy and the people in a turmoil,
though the twenty-nine editions of that work attest the value
and interest of that class of writings. That these essays
equal that great series is not claimed, but I believe, neverthe-
less, that they, by their simpler and more popular treatment
of the question, exerted quite as much influence as that
^'"''^^ vin. ^
"judicious and ingenious writer," who was "not well calcu-
lated for the common people," and therefore deserve in this
centennial year a place on the shelf of the publicist or
student, with that " political classic " of Hamilton, , Madison
and Jay.
PAUL LEICESTER FORD.
97 Clark Street,
Brooklyn, New York.
ERRATA.
Page 274, line i, for mine read mind.
" 275,
" 14, •
" 277,
" 8, •
" 396,
" 28, '
" 407.
" 38, ■
" 409.
" 31. '
" 409.
" 36, '
" 412,
" 21, '
" 424.
" 21, in
" 434.
" 37, fo
cause read clause.
Richard Harry Lee read Richard Henry Lee.
la substitute /
, substitute /
propounded read proposed.
Pilsner read Pelsue.
J. Lloyd read T. Lloyd,
insert / Philadelphia: after "A Citizen of Philadelphia."
37, for McClung read McClurg.
CONTENTS.
Page.
'Gerry, Elbridge. Observations on the New Constitution, and on the
Federal and State Conventions. By a Columbian Patriot . i
Webster, Noah. An Examination into the leading principles of the ,
Federal Constitution. By a Citizen of America .... 25
Jay, John. An Address to the People of the State of New York, on the
subject of the Constitution. By a Citizen of New York ... 67
Smith, Melancthon. Address to the People of the State of New York.
By a Plebeian 88
Webster, Pelatiah. The Weakness of Brutus exposed: or some
remarks in vindication of the Constitution. By a Citizen of Phila-
delphia 117
CoxE, Tench. An Examination of the Constitution of the United States
of America. By an American Citizen 134
Wilson, James. Speech on the Federal Constitution, delivered in Phila-
delphia .... 155
Dickinson, John. Letters of Fabius on the Federal Constitution . 163
Hanson, Alexander Contee. Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a
Federal Government. By Aristides ' 217
■^ Randolph, Edmund. Letter on the Federal Constitution . . . 259
^ Lee, Richard Henry. Observations of the System of Government
proposed by the late Convention. By a Federal Farmer . . . 277
/Mason, George. Objections to the Federal Constitution . . . 327 1
Iredell, James. Observations on George Mason's Objections to the
Federal Constitution. By Marcus 333
Ramsay, David. An Address to the Freemen of South Carolina on the
Federal Constitution. By Civis". 371
Bibliography of the Constitution, 1787-1788 381
Reference List to the history and literature of the Constitution, 1787-88. 427
Index 443
Observations / On the new Constitution, and on the
Federal / and State Conventions. / By a Columbian
Patriot. / Sic transit gloria Americana. / [Boston: 1788.]
12 mo., pp. 19.
Written by Elbridge Gerry, member of the Philadelphia
Convention from Massachusetts, and one of the number who
refused to sign the Constitution, for reasons given in his
letter to the presiding officers of the Massachusetts legislature
(Elliot I, 494). Gerry made himself conspicuous in the con-
test in Massachusetts over the ratification, and though not
elected to the State Convention, was requested by th'em to
attend and answer questions. His life, by James T. Austin,
(Boston, 1828), makes no mention of this pamphlet.
" E. G. has come out as a Columbian Patriot — a pitiful per-
formance. The author sinks daily in public esteem, and his
bantling goes unnoticed." — Rufus King to John Alsop, March
3d, 1788.
The first edition of this pamphlet was printed without a
title page, or imprint, and an examination of the Massachu-
setts newspapers shows it was never for sale ; making it prob-
able that it was printed for Gerry, and not for general circula-
tion. Greenleaf reprinted^ it in New York, for the [AntiJ
Federal Committee, who'\ distributed sixteen hundred and
thirty copies to the local county committees of that State.
" We have received yours by a- Columbian Patriot — a well
composed piece but in a style too sublime and florid for the
common people in this part of the country." — Albany Com-
mittee to N. Y. Committee, April 12th, 1788.
p. L. F.
TVyTANKIND may amuse themselves with theoretick systems
of liberty, and trace its social and moral effects on
ficiences, virtue, industry and every improvement of which the
human mind is capable ; but we can only discern its true value
by the practical and wretched effects of slavery ; and thus
dreadfully will they be realized, when the inhabitants of the
Eastern States are draggmg out a miserable existence, only on
the gleanings of their fields ; and the Southern, blessed with a
softer and more fertile climate, are languishing in hopeless
poverty ; and when asked, what is become of the flower of
their crop, and the rich produce of their farms — they may
answer in the hapless stile of the Man of La Mancha, — "The
" steward of my Lord has seized and sent it to Madrid."
Or, in the more literal language of truth, The exigencies of
government require that the collectors of the revenue should
transmit it to the Federal City.
Animated with the firmest zeal for the interest of this
country, the peace and union of the American States, and the
freedom and happiness of a people who have made the most
costly sacrifices in the cause of liberty, — who have braved the
power of Britain, weathered the convulsions of war, and waded
thro' the blood of friends and foes to establish their indepen-
dence and to support the freedom of the human mind ; I can-
liot silently [2] witness this degradation without calling on
them, before they are compelled to blush at their own servi-
tude, and to turn back their languid eyes on their lost liberties
— to consider, that the character of nations generally changes
at the moment of revolution. And when patriotism is dis-
countenanced and publick virtue becomes the ridicule of the
sycophant — when every man of liberality, firmness and pene-
tration who cannot lick the hand stretched out to oppress, is
deemed an enemy to the State — then is the gulph of despot-
ism set open, and the grades to slavery, though rapid, are
scarce perceptible — then genius drags heavily its iron chain
4 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY.
— science is neglected, and real merit flies to the shades for
security from reproach — the mind becomes enervated, and the
national character sinks to a kind of apathy with only energy
sufficient to curse the breast that gave it milk, and as an ele-
gant writer observes, " To bewail every new birth as an
" increase of misery, under a government where the mind is
" necessarily debased, and talents are seduced to become the
" panegyrists of usurpation and tyranny." He adds, " that
" even sedition is not the most indubitable enemy to the pub-
" lick welfare ; but that its- most dreadful foe is despotism
" which always changes the character of nations for the worse,
" and is productive of nothing but vice, that the tyrant no
" longer excites to the pursuits of glory or virtue ; it is not
" talents, it is baseness and servility that he cherishes, and the
"weight of arbitrary power destroys the spring of emulation."*
If such is the influence of government on the character and
manners, and undoubtedly the observation is just, must we
not subscribe to the opinion of the celebrated Abbi Mabl^ ?
"That there are disagreeable seasons in the unhappy situation
" of human affairs, when policy requires both the intention
" and the power of doing mischief to be punished ; and when
" the senate proscribed the memory of C<zsar they ought to
"have put Anthony to death, and extinguished the hopes of
" Octavius." Self defence is a primary law of nature, which
no subsequent law of society can abolish ; this primaeval prin-
ciple, the immediate gift of the Creator, obliges every one to
remonstrate against the strides of ambition, and a wanton lust
of domination, and to resist the first approaches of tyranny,
which at this day threaten to sweep away the rights for which
the brave sons of America have fought with an heroism
scarcely paralleled even in ancient republicks. [3] It may be
repeated, they have purchased it with their blood, and have
gloried in their independence with a dignity of spirit, which
has made them the admiration of philosophy, the pride of
America, and the wonder of Europe. It has been observed,
with great propriety, that " the virtues and vices of a people
"when a revolution happens in their government, are the,
" measure of the liberty or slavery they ought to expect — An.
* Helvitius.
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 5
" heroic love for the publick good, a profound reverence for
" the laws, a contempt of riches, and a noble haughtiness of
" soul, are the only foundations of a free government."* Do
not their dignified principles still exist among us? Or are
they extinguished in the breasts of Americans, whose fields
have been so recently crimsoned to repel the potent arm of a
foreign Monarch, who had planted his engines of slavery in
every city, with design to erase the vestiges of freedom in this
his last asylum. It is yet to be hoped, for the honour of
human nature, that no combinations either foreign or domestick
have thus darkned this Western hemisphere. — On these shores
freedom has planted her standard, diped in the purple tide
that flowed from the veins of her martyred heroes ; and here
every uncorrupted American yet hopes to see it supported by
the vigour, the justice, the wisdom and unanimity of the peo-
ple, in spite of the deep-laid plots, the secret intrigues, or the
bold effrontery of those interested and avaricious adventurers
for place, who intoxicated with the ideas of distinction and
preferment have prostrated every worthy principle beneath the
shrine of ambition. Yet these are the men who tell us repub-
licanism is dwindled into theory — that we are incapable of
enjoying our liberties — and that we must have a master.
Let us retrospect the days of our adversity, and recollect who
were then our friends ; do we find them among the sticklers
for aristocratick authority ? No, they were generally the same
men who now wish to save us from the distractions of anarchy
on the one hand, and the jaws of tyranny on the other ; where
then were the class who now come forth importunately urging
that our political salvation depends on the adoption of a sys-
tem at which freedom spurns ? — Were not some of them hidden
in the corners of obscurity, and others wrapping themselves in
the bosom of our enemies for safety? Some of them were in
the arms of infancy ; and others speculating for fortune, by
sporting with public money ; while a few, a very few of them
[4] were magnanimously defending their country, and raising a
character, which I pray heaven may never be sullied by aiding
measures derogatory to their former exertions. But the rev-
olutions in principle which time produces among mankind,
* Abbe Mable.
6 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY.
frequently exhibits the most mortifying instances of human
weakness ; and this alone can account for the extraordinary
appearance of a few names, once distinguished in the honour-
able walks of patriotism, but now found in the list of the Mas-
sachusetts assent to the ratification of a Constitution, which, by
the undefined meaning of some parts, and the ambiguities of
expression in others, is dangerously adapted to the purposes of
an immediate aristocratic tyranny; that from the difficulty, if
not impracticability of its operation, must soon terminate in
the most uncontrouled despotism.
All writers on government agree, and the feelings of the
human mind witness the truth of these political axioms, that
man is born free and possessed of certain unalienable rights —
that government is instituted for the protection, safety and
happiness of the people, and not for the profit, honour, or
private interest of any man, family, or class of men That
the origin of all power is in the people, and that they have an
incontestible right to check the creatures of their own creation,
vested with certain powers to guard the life, liberty and prop-
erty of the community : And if certain selected bodies of men,
deputed on these principles, determine contrary to the wishes
and expectations of their constituents, the people have an
undoubted rjglit to reject their decisions, to call for a revision
of their conduct, to depute others in their room, or if they
think proper, to demand further time for deliberation on mat-
ters of the greatest moment : it therefore is an unwarrantable
stretch of authority or influence, if any methods are taken to
preclude this peaceful and reasonable mode of enquiry and
decision. And it is with inexpressible anxiety, that many of
the best friends of the Union of the States — to the peaceable
and equal participation of the rights of nature, and to the glory
and dignity of this country, behold the insiduous arts, and the
strenuous efforts of the partisans of arbitrary power, by their
vague definitions of the best established truths, endeavoring
to envelope the mind in darkness the concomitant of slavery,
and to lock the strong chains of domestic despotism on a
country, which by the most glorious and successful struggles
is but newly emancipated from the spectre of foreign do-
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. /
minion. [5] But there are certain seasons in the course of
human affairs, when Genius, Virtue, and Patriotism, seems to
nod over the vices of the times, and perhaps never more
remarkably, than at the present period ; or we should not see
such a passive disposition prevail in some, who we must can-
didly suppose, have liberal and enlarged sentiments ; while a
supple multitude are paying a blind and idolatrous homage to
the opinions of those who by the most precipitate steps are
treading down their dear bought privileges; and who are
endeavouring by all the arts of insinuation, and influence, to
betray the people of the United States, into an acceptance of
a most complicated system of government ; marked on the v
one side with the dark, secret and profound intrigues, of the /
statesman, long practised in the purlieus of despotism ; and on
the other, with the ideal projects oi young ambition, with its \
wings just expanded to soar to a summit, which imagination ''
has painted in such gawdy colours as to intoxicate the inex-
perienced votary, and to send him rambling from State to State,
to collect materials to construct the ladder of preferment.
But as a variety of objections \.o^^ heterogeneous phantom,
have been repeatedly laid before the public, by men of the
best abilities and intentions ; I will not expatiate long on a
Republican yi3r»« of government, founded on the principles of \
monarchy — a democratick branch with the features of artistoc- ' ^
racy — and the extravagance of nobility pervading the minds ;
of many of the candidates for office, with the poverty of pea-
santry hanging heavily on them, and insurmountable, from
their taste for expence, unless a general provision should be
made in the arrangement of the civil list, which may enable
them with the champions of their cause to " sail down the new
pactolean channel." Some gentlemen, with laboured zeal, have\
spent much time in urging the necessity of government, from \
the embarrassments of trade — the want of respectability abroad /
and confidence of the public engagements at home : — These
are obvious truths which no one denies ; and there are few who
do not unite in the general wish for the restoration of public
faith, the revival of commerce, arts, agriculture, and industry,
under a lenient, peaceable and energetick government : But
8 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY.
the most sagacious advocates for the party have not by-
fair discusion, and rational argumentation, evinced the neces'
sity of adopting this many headed monster; of such motley
mixture, that its enemies cannot trace a feature of Democratick
or Republican [6] extract ; nor have its friends the courage to
denominate a Monarchy, an Aristocracy, or an Oligarchy, and
the favoured bantling must have passed through the short
period of its existence without a name, had not Mr. Wilson, in
the fertility of his genius, suggested the happy epithet of a
Federal Republic. — But I leave the field of general censure on
the secresy of its birth, the rapidity of its growth, and the fatal
consequences of suffering it to live to the age of maturity, and
will particularize some of the most weighty objections to its
passing through this continent in a gigantic size. — It will be
allowed by every one that the fundamental principle of a free
government is the equal representation of a free people
And I will first observe with a justly celebrated writer, "That
" the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the
" absolute rights which were vested in them by the immediate
" laws of nature, but which could not be preserved in peace,
" without the mutual intercourse which is gained by the insti-
'' tution of friendly and social communities." And when soci-
ety has thus deputed a certain number of their equals to take
care of their personal rights, and the interest of the whole com-
munity, it must be considered that responsibility is the great
security of integrity and honour ; and that annual election is
the basis of responsibility, — Man is not immediately corrupted,
but power without limitation, or amenability, may endanger
the brightest virtue — whereas a frequent return to the bar
of their Constituents is the strongest check against the cor-
ruptions to which men are liable, either from the intrigues of
others of more subtle genius, or the propensities of their own
hearts, — and the gentlemen who have so warmly advocated in
the late Convention of the Massachusetts, the change from
annual to biennial elections ; may have been in the same predic-
ament, and perhaps with the same views that Mr. Hutchinson
once acknowledged himself, when in a letter to Lord Hillsbor.
ough, he observed, "that the grand difficulty of making a
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 9
" change in government against the general bent of the people
" had caused him to turn his thoughts to a variety of plans, in
" order to find one that might be executed in spite of opposi-
" tion," and the first he proposed was that, " instead of annual,
"the elections should be only once in three years: " but the
Minister had not the hardiness to attempt such an innovation,
even in the revision of colonial charters : nor has any one ever
defended Biennial, Triennial or Septennial Elections, either in
the [7} British House of Commons, or in the debates of Pro-
vincial assemblies, on general and free principles : but it is
unnecessary to dwell long on this article, as the best political
writers have supported the principles of annual elections with
a precision, that cannot be confuted, though they may be
darkned, by the sophistical arguments that have been thrown
out with design, to undermine all the barriers of freedom.
2. There is no security in the profered system, either forX^
the rights of conscience or the liberty of the Press : Despotism -^
usually while it is gaining ground, will suffer men to think, say,
or write what they please ; but when once established, if it is
thought necessary to subserve the purposes, of arbitrary power,
the most unjust restrictions may take place in the first instance,
and an imprimator on the Press in the next, may silence the
complaints, and forbid the most decent remonstrances of an
injured and oppressed people.
3. There; are no well defined limits of the Judiciary Powers^^
they seem to be left as a boundless ocean, that has broken over /
the chart of the Supreme Lawgiver, " thus far shalt thou go
and no further " and as they cannot be comprehended by the
clearest capacity, or the most sagacious mind, it would be an
Herculean labour to attempt to describe the dangers with which
they are replete.
/(. The Executive and the Legislative are so dangerously
blended as to give just cause of alarm, and everything relative
thereto, is couched in such ambiguous terms — in such vague
and indefinite expression, as is a suiificient ground without any
objection, for the reprobation of a system, that the authors
dare not hazard to a clear investigation.
5. The abolition of trial by jury in civil causes. — This mode
lO OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY.
of trial the learned Judge Blackstone observes, "has been
" coeval with the first rudiments of civil government, that
" property, liberty and life, depend on maintaining in its legal
" force the constitutional trial by jury." He bids his readers
pauze, and with Sir Matthew Hale observes, how admirably
this mode is adapted to the investigation of truth beyond any
other the world can produce. Even the party who have been
disposed to swallow, without examination, the proposals of
the secret conclave, have started on a discovery that this essen-
tial right was curtailed ; and shall a privilege, the origin of
which may be traced to our Saxon ancestors — that has been a
part of the law of nations, even in the fewdatory systems of
France, [8] Germany and Italy — and from the earliest records
has been held so sacred, both in ancient and modern Britain,
that it could never be shaken by the introduction of Norman
customs, or any other conquests or change of government
shall this inestimable privilege be relinquished in America —
either thro' the fear of inquisition for unaccounted thousands
. of public monies in the hands of some who have been officious
in the fabrication of the consolidated system, or from the appre-
hension that some future delinquent possessed of more power
than integrity, may be called to a trial by his peers in the hour
of investigation.
6. Though it has been said by Mr. Wilson and many others,
that a Standing-Army is necessary for the dignity and safety
of America, yet freedom revolts at the idea, when the Divan,
or the Despot, may draw out his dragoons to suppress the
murmurs of a few, who may yet cherish those sublime princi-
ples which call forth the exertions, and lead to the best
improvements of the human mind. It is hoped this country
may yet be governed by milder methods than are usually dis-
/ played beneath the bannerets of military law.— Standing arm-
/ ies have been the nursery of vice and the bane of liberty from
\ the Roman legions to the establishment of the artful Ximenes,
\ and from the ruin of the Cortes of Spain, to the planting of
the British cohorts in the capitals of America :— By the edicts
of an authority vested in the sovereign power by the proposed
constitution, the militia of the country, the bulwark of defence.
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. II
and the security of national liberty if no longer under the con-
troul of civil authority ; but at the rescript of the Monarch, or
the aristocracy, they may either be employed to extort the
enormous sums that will be necessary to support the civil list
— to maintain the regalia of power — and the splendour of the
most useless part of the community, or they may be sent into
foreign countries for the fulfilment of treaties, stipulated by
the President and two-thirds of the Senate.
7. Notwithstanding the delusory promise to guarantee a
Republican form of government to every State in the Union
— If the most discerning eye could discoverany meaning at all
in the engagement, there are no resources left for the support
of internal government, or the liquidation of the debts of the
State. Every source of revenue is in the monopoly of Congress,
and if the several legislatures in their enfeebled state, should
against their own feelings be necessitated to attempt a dry tax
[9] for the payment of their debts, and the support of internal
police, even this may be required for the purposes of the gen-
eral government.
8. As the new Congress are empowered to determine their
own salaries, the requisitions for this purpose may not be very
moderate, and the drain for public moneys will probably rise
past all calculation : and it is to be feared when America has
consolidated its despotism, the world will witness the truth of
the assertion — " that the pomp of an Eastern monarch may
" impose on the vulgar who may estimate the force of a nation
" by the magnificence of its palaces ; but the wise man judges
" differently, it is by that very magnificence he estimates its
"weakness. He sees nothing more in the midst of this impos-
" ing pomp, where the tyrant sets enthroned, than a sumptuous
" and mournful decoration of the dead ; the apparatus of a
" fastuous funeral, in the centre of which is a cold and lifeless
"lump of unanimated earth, a phantom of power ready to
" disappear before the enemy, by whom it is despised ! "
9. There is no provision for a rotation, nor anything to^,
prevent the perpetuity of office in the same hands for life ; '
which by a little well timed bribery, will probably be done, to
the exclusion of men of the best abilities from their share in
12 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY.
the offices of government. — By this neglect we lose the advan-
tages of that check to the overbearing insolence of ofifice,
which by rendering him ineligible at certain periods, keeps
the mind of man in equiHbrio, and teaches him the feelings of
the governed, and better qualifies him to govern in his turn.
10. The inhabitants of the United States, are liable to be
draged from the vicinity of their own country, or state, to
answer the litigious or unjust suit of an adversary, on the most
distant borders of the Continent : in short the appelate juris-
diction of the Supreme Federal Court, includes an unwarrant-
able stretch of power over the liberty, life, and property of the
subject, through the wide Continent of America.
11. One Representative to thirty thousand inhabitants is a
very inadequate representation; and every man who is not lost
to all sense of freedom to his country, must reprobate the idea
of Congress altering by law, or on any pretence whatever,
interfering with any regulations for time, places, and manner
of choosing our own Representatives.
12. If the sovereignty of America is designed to be elective,
the surcumscribing the votes to only ten electors in this State,
[lo] and the same proportion in all the others, is nearly tanta-
mount to the exclusion of the voice of the people in the choice
j' of their first magistrate. It is vesting the choice solely in an
<i aristocratic junto, who may easily combine in each State to
'\ place at the head of the Union the most convenient instrument
for despotic sway.
13. A Senate chosen for six years will, in most instances,
be an appointment for life, as the influence of such a body
over the minds of the people will be coequal to the extensive
powers with which they are vested, and they will not only for-
get, but be forgotten by their constituents— a branch of the
Supreme Legislature thus set beyond all responsibility is
totally repugnant to every principle of a free government.
14. There is no provision by a bill of rights to guard against
the dangerous encroachments of power in too many instances
to be named : but I cannot pass over in silence the insecurity
in which we are left with regard to warrants unsupported by
evidence— the daring experiment of ^rsxyXXn^writs of assistance
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 1 3
in a former arbitrary administration is not yet forgotten in the
Massachusetts ; nor can we be so ungrateful to the memory of
the patriots who counteracted their operation, as so soon after
their manly exertions to save us from such a detestable instru-
ment of arbitrary power, to subject ourselves to the insolence
of any petty revenue officer to enter our houses, search, insult,
and seize at pleasure. We are told by a gentleman of too
much virtue and real probity to suspect he has a design to
deceive — " that the whole constitution is a declaration of
rights," — but mankind must think for themselves, and to many
very judicious and discerning characters, the whole constitution
with very few exceptions appears a perversion of the rights of
particular states, and of private citizens. But the gentleman
goes on to tell us, " that the primary object is the general gov-
" ernment, and that the rights of individuals are only incident-
" ally mentioned, and that there was a clear impropriety in
" being very particular about them." But, asking pardon for
dissenting from such respectable authority, who has been led
into several mistakes, more from his prediliction in favour of
certain modes of government, than from a want of understand-
ing or veracity. The rights of individuals ought to be the
primary object of all government, and cannot be too securely
guarded by the most explicit declarations in their favor. This
has been the opinion of the Hampdens, the Pyms, and [11]
many other illustrious names, that have stood forth in defence
of English liberties ; and even the Italian master in politicks,
the subtle and renouned Machiavel acknowledges, that no
republic ever yet stood on a stable foundation without satisfy-
ing the common people.
15. The difficulty, if not impracticability, of exercising the
equal and equitable powers of government by a single legisla-
ture over an extent of territory that reaches from the Missis-
sippi to the Western lakes, and from them to the Atlantic
Ocean, is an insuperable objection to the adoption of the new
system. — Mr. Hutchinson, the great champion for arbitrary
power, in the multitude of his machinations to subvert the lib-
erties in this country, was obliged to acknowledge in one of
his letters, that, " from the extent of country from north to
14 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY.
" south, the scheme of one government was impracticable."
But if the authors of the present visionary project, can by the
arts of deception, precipitation and address, obtain a majority
of suffrages in the conventions of the states to try the haz-
ardous experiment, they may then make the same inglorious
boast with this insidious politician, who may perhaps be their
model, that " the union of the colonies was pretty well broken,
" and that he hoped to never see it revewed."
1 6. It is an undisputed fact that not one legislature in the
United States had the most distant idea when they first
appointed members for a convention, entirely commercial, or
when they afterwards authorized them to consider on some
amendments of the Federal union, that they would without any
warrant from their constituents, presume on so bold and daring
a stride, as ultimately to destroy the state governments, and
offer a consolidated system, irreversible but on conditions that
the smallest degree of penetration must discover to be imprac-
ticable.
17. The first appearance of the article which declares the
ratification of nine states sufficient for the establishment of the
new system, wears the face of dissension, is a subversion of the
union of Confederated States, and tends to the introduction
of 'anarchy and civil convulsions, and may be a means of
involving the whole country in blood.
18. The mode in which this constitution is recommended
to the people to judge without either the advice of Congress,
or the legislatures of the several states is very reprehensible —
it is an attempt to force it upon them before it could be tho-
[12] roughly understood, and may leave us in that situation,
that in the first moments of slavery in the minds of the people
agitated by the remembrance of their lost liberties, will be like
the sea in a tempest, that sweeps down every mound of secur-
ity.
But it is needless to enumerate other instances, in which the
proposed constitution appears contradictory to the first princi-
ples which ought to govern mankind ; and it is equally so to
enquire into the motives that induced to so bold a step as the
annihilation of the independence and sovereignty of the thir-
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 1 5
teen distinct states. They are but too obvious through
the whole progress of the business, from the first shutting up
the doors of the federal convention and resolving that no
member should correspond with gentlemen in the different
states on the subject under discussion ; till the trivial proposi-
tion of recommending a few amendments was artfully ushered
into the convention of the Massachusetts. The questions that
were then before that honorable assembly were profound
and important, they were of such magnitude and extent, that
the consequences may run parallel with the existence of the
country ; and to see them waved and hastily terminated by
a measure too absurd to require a serious refutation, raises the
honest indignation of every true lover of his country. Nor
are they less grieved that the ill policy and arbitrary disposi-
tion of some of the sons of America has thus precipitated
to the contemplation and discussion of questions that no one
could rationally suppose would have been agitated among us,
till time had blotted out the principles on which the late revo-
lution was grounded ; or till the last traits of the many political
tracts, which defended the separation from Britain, and the
rights of men were consigned to everlasting oblivion. After
the severe conflicts this country has suffered, it is presumed
that they are disposed to make every reasonable sacrifice
before the altar of peace. But when we contemplate the
nature of men and consider them originally on an equal foot-
ing, subject to the same feelings, stimulated by the same pas-
sions, and recollecting the struggles they have recently made,
for the security of their civil rights ; it cannot be expected
that the inhabitants of the Massachusetts, can be easily lulled
into a fatal security, by the declamatory effusions of gentle-
men, who, contrary to the experience of all ages would per-
swade them there is no danger to be apprehended, from vesting
discretionary powers in the hands of man, which he may, or
may not abuse. The very suggestion, that [13] we ought to
trust to the precarious hope of amendments and redress, after
we have voluntarily fixed the shackles on our own necks
should have awakened to a double degree of caution. — This
people have not forgotten the artful insinuations of a former
l6 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY.
Governor, when pleading the unlimited authority of parliament
before the legislature of the Massachusetts ; nor that his argu-
ments were very similar to some lately urged by gentlemen
who boast of opposing his measures, " with halters about their
" necks."
We were then told by him, in all the soft language of insin-
uation, that no form of government, of human construction
can be perfect — that we had nothing to fear — that we had no
reason to complain — that we had only to acquiesce in their
illegal claims, and to submit to the requisition of parliament,
and doubtless the lenient hand of government would redress
all grievances, and remove the oppressions of the people : —
Yet we soon saw armies of mercenaries encamped on our plains
— our commerce ruined — our harbours blockaded — and our
cities burnt. It maybe replied that this was in consequence of
an obstinate defence of our privileges ; this may be true ; and
when the " ultima ratio" is called to aid, the weakest must fall.
But let the best informed historian produce an instance when
bodies of men were entrusted with power, and the proper
checks relinquished, if they were ever found destitute of inge-
nuity sulificient to furnish pretences to abuse it. And the
people at large are already sensible, that the liberties which
America has claimed, which reason has justified, and which
have been so gloriously defended by the swords of the brave ;
are not about to fall before the tyranny of foreign conquest :
it is native usurpation that is shaking the foundations of peace,
and spreading the sable curtain of despotism over the United
States. The banners of freedom were erected in the wilds of
America by our ancestors, while the wolf prowled for his prey
on the one hand, and more savage man on the other ; they
have been since rescued from the invading hand of foreign
power, by the valor and blood of their posterity ; and there
was reason to hope they would continue for ages to illumine
a quarter of the globe, by nature kindly separated from the
proud monarchies of Europe, and the infernal darkness of
Asiatic slavery. And it is to be feared we shall soon see
this country rushing into the extremes of confusion and vio-
lence, in consequence of the proceeding of a set of gentlemen,,
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 1 7
who disregard-[i4] ingthe purposes of their appointment, have
assumed powers unauthorized by anycommission, have unne-
cessarily rejected the confederation of the United States, and
annihilated the sovereignty and independence of the individ-
ual governments. — The causes which have inspired a few men
to assemble for very different purposes with such a degree of
temerity us to break with a single stroke the union of America,
and disseminate the seeds of discord through the land may be
easily investigated, when we survey the partizans of monarchy
in the state conventions, urging the adoption of a mode of
government that militates with the former professions and
exertions of this country, and with all ideas of republicanism,
and the equal rights of men.
Passion, prejudice, and error, are characteristics of human
nature ; and as it cannot be accounted for on any principles of
philosophy, religion, or good policy ; to these shades in the
human character must be attributed the mad zeal of some, to
precipitate to a blind adoption of the measures of the late fed-
eral convention, without giving opportunity for better infor-
mation to those who are misled by influence or ignorance into
erroneous opinions. Litterary talents may be prostituted,
and the powers of genius debased to subserve the purposes of
ambition or avarice ; but the feelings of the heart will dictate
the language of truth, and the simplicity of her accents will
proclaim the infamy of those, who betray the rights of the
people, under the specious, and popular pretence of justice,
consolidation, and dignity.
It is presumed the great body of the people unite in senti-
ment with the writer of these observations, who most devoutly
prays that public credit may rear her declining head, and
remunerative justice pervade the land; nor is there a doubt if
a free government is continued, that time and industry will
enable both the public and private debtor to liquidate their
arrearages in the most equitable manner. They wish to see
the Confederated States bound together by the most indis-
soluble union, but without renouncing their separate sovereign-
ties and independence, and becoming tributaries to a consoli-
dated fabrick of aristocratick tyranny. ^They wish to see
^.
1 8 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY.
government established, and peaceably holding the reins with
honour, energy, and dignity; but they wish for no federal city
whose '' cloud cap' t towers " may screen the state culprit from
the hand of justice; while its exclusive jurisdiction may [15]
protect the riot of armies encamped within its limits. — They
deprecate discord and civil convulsions, but they are not yet
generally prepared with the ungrateful Israelites to ask a King,
nor are their spirits sufficiently broken to yield the best of
their olive grounds to his servants, and to see their sons
appointed to run before his chariots — It has been observed by
a zealous advocate for the new system, that most governments
are the result of fraud or violence, and this with design to
recommend its acceptance — but has not almost every step
.towards its fabrication been fraudulent in the extreme ? Did
not the prohibition strictly enjoined by the general Conven-
/ tion, that no member should make any communication to his
Constituents, or to gentlemen of consideration and abilities in
the other States, bear evident marks of fraudulent designs ? —
This circumstance is regretted in strong terms by Mr. Martin,
a member from Maryland, who acknowedges " He had no
" idea that all the wisdom, integrity, and virtue of the States
" was contained in that Convention, and that he wished to
" have corresponded with gentlemen of eminent political char-
" acters abroad, and to give their sentiments due weight" —
he adds, " so extremely solicitous were they, that their pro-
" ceedings should not transpire, that the members were pro-
" hibited from taking copies of their resolutions, or extracts
"from the Journals, without express permission, by vote."
And the hurry with which it has been urged to the accept-
ance of the people, without giving time, by adjournments, for
better information, and more unanimity has a deceptive
appearance ; and if finally driven to resistance, as the only
alternative between that and servitude, till in the confusion of
discord, the reins should be seized by the violence of some
enterprizing genius, that may sweep down the last barrier of
liberty, it must be added to the score of criminality with which
the fraudulent usurpation at Philadelphia, may be chargeable.
Heaven avert such a tremendous scence ! and let us still
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 19
hope a more happy termination of the present ferment : — may
the people be calm and wait a legal redress ; may the mad
transport of some of our infatuated capitals subside ; and every
influential character through the States, make the most pru-
dent exertions for a new general Convention, who may vest
adequate powers in Congress, for all national purposes, with-
out annihilating the individual governments, and drawing
blood from every pore by taxes, impositions and illegal restric-
tions. — This step might [16] again re-establish the Union,
restore tranquility to the ruffled mind of the inhabitants,
and save America from the distresses, dreadful even in con-
templation. "The great art of governing is to lay aside
all prejudices and attachments to particular opinions, classes
or individual characters to consult the spirit of the people;
to give way to it ; and in so doing, to give it a turn capable
of inspiring those sentiments, which may induce them to relish
a change, which an alteration of circumstances may hereafter
make necessary." The education of the advocates for mon-
archy should have taught them, and their memory should
have suggested that " monarchy is a species of government
fit only for a people too much corrupted by luxury, avarice,
and a passion for pleasure, to have any love for their coun-
try, and whose vices the fear of punishment alone is able
to restrain ; but by no means calculated for a nation that is
poor, and at the same time tenacious of their liberty — ani-
mated with a disgust to tyranny — and inspired with the
generous feeling of patriotism and liberty, and at the same
time, like the ancient Spartans have been hardened by tem-
perance and manly exertions, and equally despising the fatigues
of the field, and the fear of enemies," and while they
change their ground they should recollect, that Aristocracy is
a still more formidable foe to public virtue, and the prosperity
of a nation — that under such a government her patriots become
mercenaries — her soldiers cowards, and the people slaves.
Though several State Conventions have assented to, and rati-
fied, yet the voice of the people appears at present strong
against the adoption of the Constitution. By the chicanery,
intrigue, and false colouring of those who plume themselves.
\J
20 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY.
more on their education and abilities, than their political,
patriotic, or private virtues — by the imbecility of some, and
the duplicity of others, a majority of the Convention of Mas-
sachusetts have been flattered with the ideas of amendments,
when it will be too late to complain While several very-
worthy characters, too timid for their situation, magnified the
hopeless alternative, between the dissolution of the bands of
all government, and receiving the proferred system in toto,
after long endeavouring to reconcile it to their consciences,
swallowed the indegestible panacea, and in a kind of sudden
desperation lent their signature to the dereliction of the hon-
ourable station they held in the Union, and have broken over
the solemn'compact, by which they were bound to support
their own excellent constitution till the period [17] of revision.
Yet Virginia, equally large and respectable, and who have done
honour to themselves, by their vigorous exertions from the
first dawn of independence, have not yet acted upon the ques-
tion ; they have wisely taken time to consider before they
introduce innovations of a most dangerous nature : her
inhabitants are brave, her burgesses are free, and they have a
Governor who dares to think for himself, and to speak his
opinion (without first pouring libations on the altar of popular-
ity) though it should militate with some of the most accom-
plished and illustrious characters.
Maryland, who has no local interest to lead her to adopt,
will doubtless reject the system 1 hope the same characters
still live, and that the same spirit which dictated to them a
wise and cautious care, against sudden revolutions in govern-
ment, and made them the last State that acceded to the inde-
pendence of America, will lead them to support what they so
deliberately claimed. Georgia apprehensive of a war with
the Savages, has acceded in order to insure protection.
Pennsylvania has struggled through much in the same manner,
as the Massachusetts, against the manly feelings, and the mas-
terly reasonings of a very respectable part of the Convention :
They have adopted the system, and seen some of its authors
burnt in effigy— their towns thrown into riot and confusion, and
the minds of the people agitated by apprehension and discord.
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 21
New-Jersey and Delaware have united in the measure, from
the locah'ty of their situation, and the selfish motives which
too generally govern mankind ; the Federal City, and the seat of
government, will naturally attract the intercourse of strangers
— the youth of enterprize, and the wealth of the nation to the
to the central States.
Connecticut has pushed it through with the precipitation of
her neighbour, with few dissentient voices ; — but more from
irritation and resentment to a sister State, perhaps partiality
to herself in her commercial regulatidns, than from a compre-
hensive view of the system, as a regard to the welfare of all.
But New York has motives, that will undoubtedly lead her
to rejection, without being afraid to appeal to the understand-
ing of mankind, to justify the grounds of their refusal to adopt
a Constitution, that even the framers dare not to risque to the
hazard of revision, amendment, or reconsideration, least the
whole superstructure should be demolished by more skilful and
discreet architects. 1 know not what part the Carolinas
[i8] will take ; but I hope their determinations will comport
with the dignity and freedom of this country — their decisions
will have great weight in the scale. But equally important
are the small States of New Hampshire and Rhode Island : —
New York, the Carolinas, Virginia, Maryland, and these two
lesser States may yet support the liberties of the Continent ; if
they refuse a ratification, or postpone their proceedings till the
spirits of the community have time to cool, there is little
doubt but the wise measure of another federal convention will
be adopted, when the members would have the advantage of
viewing, at large, through the medium of truth, the objections
that have been made from various quarters ; such a measure
might be attended with the most salutary effects, and prevent
the dread consequences of civil feuds. But even if some of
those large states should hastily accede, yet we have frequently
seen in the story of revolution, relief spring from a quarter
least expected.
Though the virtues of a Cato could not save Rome, nor the
abilities of a Padilla defend the citizens of Castile from falling
under the yoke of Charles ; yet a Tell once suddenly rose from
22 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY.
a little obscure city, and boldly rescued the liberties of his
country. Every age has its Bruti and its Decci, as well
as its Caesars and Sejani : — The happiness of mankind depends
much on the modes of government, and the virtues of the gov-
ernors ; and America may yet produce characters who have
genius and capacity sufificient to form the manners and correct
the morals of the people, and virtue enough to lead their
country to freedom. Since their dismemberment from the
British empire, America has, in many instances, resembled the
conduct of a restless, vigorous, luxurious youth, prematurely
emancipated from the authority of a parent, but without the
experience necessary to direct him to act with dignity or dis-
cretion. Thus we have seen her break the shackles of foreign
dominion, and all the blessings of peace restored on the most
honourable terms : She acquired the liberty of framing her
own laws, choosing her own magistrates, and adopting man-
ners and modes of government the most favourable to the
freedom and happiness of society. But how little have we
availed ourselves of these superior advantages : The glorious
fabric of liberty successfully reared with so much labor and
assiduity totters to the foundation, and may be blown away as
the bubble of fancy by the rude breath of military combina-
tions, and politicians of yesterday.
[ig] It is true this country lately armed in opposition to regal
despotism — impoverished by the expences of a long war, and
unable immediately to fulfil their public or private engage-
ments that appeared in some instances, with a boldness of spirit
that seemed to set at defiance all authority, government, or
order, on the one hand ; while on the other, there has been,
not only a secret wish, but an open avowal of the necessity of
drawing the reins of government much too taught, not only
for a republicanism, but for a wise and limited monarchy.
- But the character of this people is not averse to a degree of
subordination, the truth of this appears from the easy restora-
tion of tranquility, after a dangerous insurrection in one of the
states ; this also evinces a little necessity of a complete revplu-
ti3 of governmentlhroughout thejinion. But it is a repub-
lican principle that the majority should rule ; and if a spirit of
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 23
moderation should be cultivated on both sides, till the voice of
the people at large Could be fairly heard it should be held
sacred. — And if, on such a scrutiny, the proposed constitution
should appear repugnant to their character and wishes ; if
they, in the language of a late elegant pen, should acknowl-
edge that " no confusion in my mind, is more terrible to them
" than the stern disciplined regularity and vaunted police of
" arbitrary governments, where every heart is depraved by
" fear, where mankind dare not assume their natural characters,
" where the free spirit must crouch to the slave in ofifice, where
" genius must repress her effusions, or like the Egyptian wor-
" shippers, offer them in sacrifice to the calves in power, and
" where the human mind, always in shackles, shrinks from every
"generous effort." Who would then have the effrontery to
say, it ought not to be thrown out with indignation, however
some respectable names have appeared to support it. -But
if after all, on a dispassionate and fair discussion, the people
generally give their voices for a voluntary dereliction of their
privileges, let every individual who chooses the active scenes
of life strive to support the peace and unanimity of his country,
though every other blessing may expire — And while the states-
man is plodding for power, and the courtier practising the arts
of dissimulation without check — while the rapacious are grow-
ing rich by oppression, and fortune throwing her gifts into the
lap of fools, let the sublimer characters, the philosophic lovers
of freedom who have wept over her exit, retire to the calm
shades of contemplation, there they may look down with pity
on the inconsistency of human nature, the revolutions of states,
the rise of kingdoms, and the fall of empires.
An / Examination / into the / leading principles / of
the / Federal Constitution / proposed by the late / Con-
vention / held at Philadelphia. / With / Answers to the
principal objections / that have been raised against the
system. / By a Citizen of America. / — Ut patria sua
felicitate caeteris praestaret, efificit. / Xenoph. Lacedaem.
Resp. / Philadelphia : / Printed and sold by Prichard &
Hall, in Market Street, / the second door above Laetitia
Court. / M.DCC.LXXXVII.
8vo., pp. 55.
Written by Noah Webster. This is reprinted from his own
copy of the pamphlet, and the foot notes in brakets show his
corrections and additions.
"This is a hasty production, written at the request of
Mr. Fitzsimmons, of Philadelphia, a member of the Conven-
tion." — Indorsement by Noah Webster.
P. L. F.
TO
HIS EXCELLENCY
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Esq..
PRESIDENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA,
AND
MEMBER OF THE LATE CONVENTION,
HELD AT PHILADELPHIA FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DEVISING A CONSTITUTION FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
THE FOLLOWING REMARKS UPON THE SYSTEM
RECOMMENDED BY THAT CONVENTION,
ARE MOST HUMBLY INSCRIBED
BY
HIS EXCELLENCY'S
MOST OBEDIENT
HUMBLE SERVANT,
THE AUTHOR.
Philadelphia, )
October jo, 1787. )
/^F all the memorable aeras that have marked the progress
^"^ of men from the savage state to the refinements of lux-
ury, that which has combined them into society, under a wise
system of government, and given form to a nation, has ever
been recorded and celebrated as the most important. Legis-
lators have ever been deemed the greatest benefactors pf man-
kind — respected when living, and often deified after their
death. Hence the fame of Fohi and Confucius — of Moses,
Solon and Lycurgus — of Romulus and Numa — of Alfred,
Peter the Great, and Mango Capac ; whose names will be cel-
ebrated through all ages, for framing and improving constitu-
tions of government, which introduced order into society and
secured the benefits of law to millions of the human race.
This western world now beholds an sera important beyond
conception, and which posterity will number with the age of
Czar of Muscovy, and with the promulgation of the Jewish
laws at Mount Sinai, The names of those men who have
digested a system of constitutions for the American empire,
will be enrolled with those of Zamolxis and Odin, and cele-
brated by posterity with the honors which less enlightened
nations have paid to the fabled demi-gods of antiquity.
[6] But the origin of the AMERICAN REPUBLIC is distin-
guished by peculiar circumstances. Other nations have been
driven together by fear and necessity — the governments have
generally been the result of a single man's observations ; or
the offspring of particular interests. In the formation of our
constitution, the wisdom of all ages is collected — the legisla-
tors of antiquity are consulted — as well as the opinidns and
interests of the millions who are concerned. In short, it is an
empire of reason.
In the formation of such a government, it is not only the
right, but the indispensable duty of every citizen to examine
the principles of it, to compare them with the principles of
other governments, with a constant eye to our particular situ-
\'^
30 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
ation and circumstances, and thus endeavor to foresee the
future operations of our own system, and its effects upon
human happiness.
Convinced of this truth, I have no apology to offer for the
following remarks, but an earnest desire to be useful to my
country.
In attending to the proposed Federal Constitution, the
first thing that presents itself to our consideration, is the
jdivision of the legislative into two branches. This article has
so many advocates in America, that it needs not any vindi-
cation.* — But it has its opposers, among whom are some
respectable characters, especially in Pennsylvania ; for which
reason, I will state [7] some /of the arguments and facts which
incline me to favor the proposed division.
On the first view of men in society, we should suppose
that no man would be bound by a law to which he had not
given his consent. Such would be our first idea of political
obligation. But experience, from time immemorial, has proved
it to be impossible to unite the opinions of all the members of
a community, in every case ; and hence the doctrine, that the
opinions of a majority must give law to the whole State : a
doctrine as universally received, as any intuitive truth.
Another idea that naturally presents itself to our minds,
on a slight consideration of the subject, is, that in a perfect
government, all the members of a society should be present,
and each give his suffrage in acts of legislation, by which he
is to be bound. This is impracticable in large states ; and
even were it not, it is very questionable whether it would be
the best mode of legislation. It was however practised in the
free states of antiquity ; and was the cause of innumerable
evils. To avoid these evils, the moderns have invented the
doctrine of representation, which seems to be the perfection of
human government.
Another idea, which is very natural, is, that to complete
the mode of legislation, all the representatives should be col-
lected into one body, for the purpose of debating questions
and enacting laws. Speculation would suggest the ideal
* A division of the legislature has been adopted in the new constitution of
every state except Pennsylvania and Georgia.
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 3I
[8] and the desire of improving upon the systems of govern-
ment in the old world, would operate powerfully in its favor.
But men are ever running into extremes. The passions,
after a violent constraint, are apt to run into licentiousness ;
and even the reason of men, who have experienced evils from
th« defects of a government, will sometimes coolly condemn
the whole system.
Every person, moderately acquainted with human nature,
knows that public bodies, as well as individuals, are liable to
the influence of sudden and violent passions, under the oper-
ation of which, the voice of reason is silenced. Instances of
such influence are not so frequent, as in individuals ; but its
effects are extensive in proportion to the numbers that com-
pose the public body. This fact suggests the expediency of
dividing the powers of legislation between the two bodies of
men, whose debates shall be separate and not dependent on
each other ; that, if at any time, one part should appear to be
under any undue influence, either from passion, obstinacy,
jealousy of particular men, attachment to a popular speaker,
or other extraordinary causes, there might be a power in the
legislature sufficient to check every pernicious measure. Even
in a small republic, composed of men, equal in property and
abilities, and all meeting for the purpose of making laws, like
the old Romans in the field of Mars, a division of the body
into two independent branches, would be a necessary step to
■prevent the disorders, which arise from [9] the pride, irritability
and stubborness of mankind. This will ever be the case,
while men possess passions, easily inflamed, which may bias
their reason and lead them to erroneous conclusions.
Another consideration has weight : A single body of men
may be led astray by one person of abilities and address,
who, on the first starting a proposition, may throw a plausible
appearance on one side of the question, and give a lead to the
whole debate. To prevent any ill consequence from such a
circumstance, a separate discussion, before a different body of
men, and taken up on new grounds, is a very eligible expedient.
Besides, the design of a senate is not merely to check the
legislative assembly, but to collect wisdom and experience.
32 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
In most of our constitutions, and particularly in the proposed
federal system, greater age and longer residence are required
to qualify for the senate, than for the house of representa-
tives. This is a wise provision. The house of representatives
may be composed of new and unexperienced members —
strangers to the forms of proceeding, and the science of legis-
lation. But either positive institutions, or customs, which
may supply their place, fill the senate with men venerable for
age and respectability, experienced in the ways of men, and
in the art of governing, and who are not liable to the bias of
passions that govern the young. If the senate of Rhode
Island is an exception to this observation, it is a proof that
the mass of the people are corrupted, and that the senate
should be elected [lo] less frequently than the other house :
Had the old senate in Rhode Island held their seats for three
years ; had they not been chosen, amidst a popular rage for
paper money, the honor of that state would probably have
been saved. The old senate would have stopped the measure
for a year or two, till the people could have had time to
deliberate upon its consequences. I consider it as a capital
excellence of the proposed constitution, that the senate can
be wholly renewed but once in six years.
Experience is the best instructor — it is better than a thou-
sand theories. The history of every government on earth
affords proof of the utility of different branches in a legisla-
ture. But I appeal only to our own experience in America.
To what cause can we ascribe the absurd measures of Con-
gress, in times past, and the speedy recision of whole meas-
ures, but to the want of some check? I feel the most
profound deference for that honorable body, and perfect
respect for their opinions ; but some of their steps betray a
great want of consideration— a defect, which perhaps nothing
can remedy, but a division of their deliberations. I will in-
stance only their resolution to build a Federal Town. When
we were involved in a debt, of which we could hardly pay the
interest, and when Congress could not command a shilling,
the very proposition was extremely absurd. Congress them-
selves became ashamed of the resolution, and rescinded it
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 33
with as much silence as possible. Many other acts of that
body are equally reprehensible — but respect forbids me to
mention them.
[i i] Several states, since the war, have experienced the
necessity of a division of the legislature. Maryland was saved
from a most pernicious measure, by her senate. A rage for
paper money, bordering on madness, prevailed in their house
of delegates — an emission of ;£■. 500,000 was proposed ; a sum
equal to the circulating medium of the State. Had the sum
been emitted, every shilling of specie would have been driven
from circulation, and most of it from the state. Such a loss
would not have been repaired in seven years — not to mention
the whole catalogue of frauds which would have followed the
measure. The senate, like honest, judicious men, and the
protectors of the interests of the state, firmly resisted the
rage, and gave the people time to cool and to think. Their
resistance was effectual — the people acquiesced, and the honor
and interest of the state were secured.
The house of representatives in Connecticut, soon after the
war, had taken offence at a certain act of Congress. The
upper house, who understood the necessity and expediency of
the measure, better than the people, refused to concur in a
remonstrance to Congress. Several other circumstances gave
umbrage to the lower house ; and to weaken or destroy the
influence of the senate, the representatives, among other vio-
lent proceedings, resolved, not merely to remove the seat of
government, but to make every county town in the state the
seat of government, by rotation. This foolish resolution
would have disgraced school-boys — the senate saved the
honor of the state, by rejecting it with disdain — [12] and within
two months, every representative was ashamed of the conduct
of the house. All public bodies have these fits of passion,
when their conduct seems to be perfectly boyish ; and in these
paroxisms, a check is highly necessary.
Pennsylvania exhibits many instances of this hasty con-
duct. At one session of the legislature, an armed force is
ordered, by a precipitate resolution, to expel the settlers at
Wioming from their possessions — at a succeeding session, the
34 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
same people are confirmed in their possessions. At one ses-
sion, a charter is wrested from a corporation — at another,
restored. The whole state is split into parties — everything is
decided by party — any proposition from one side of the house,
is sure to be damned by the other — and when one party per-
ceives the other has the advantage, they play truant — and an
officer or a mob hunt the absconding members in all the
streets and alleys in town. Such farces have been repeated
in Philadelphia — and there alone. Had the legislature been
framed with some check upon rash proceedings, the honor of
the state would have been saved — the party spirit would have
died with the measures proposed in the legislature. But now,
any measure may be carried by party in the house; it then
becomes a law, and sows the seeds of dissension throughout
the state.*
£i 3] A Ihousaaid examples similar to the foregoing may
be produced, both in ancient and modern history. Many
plausible things may be said in favor of pure democracy —
many in favor of uniting the representatives of the people in
one single house — but uniform experience proves both to be
inconsistent with the peace of society, and the rights of free-
men.
The state of Georgia has already discovered such incon-
veniences in its constitution, that a proposition has been made
for altering it ; and there is a prospect that a revisal will take
place.
People who have heard and read of the European govern-
ments, founded on the different ranks of monarch, nobility and
people, seem to view the senate in America, where there is no
difference of ranks and titles, as a useless branch — or as a ser-
vile imitation of foreign constitutions of governmeut, without
the same reasons. This is a capital mistake. Our senates, it
* I cannot help remarking the singular jealousy of the constitution of
Pennsylvania, which requires that a bill shall be published for the considera-
tion of the people, before it is enacted into a law, except in extraordinary
cases. This annihilates^ the legislature, and reduces it to an advisory body.
It almost wholly supersedes the uses of representation, the most excellent im-
provement in modern governments. Besides the absurdity of constituting a
legislature, without supreme power, such a system will keep the state perpetu-
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 35
is true, are not composed of a different order of men ; but the
same reasons, the same necessity for distinct branches of the
legislature exists in all governments. But in most of our
American constitutions, we have all the advantages of checks
and balance, without the danger which may arise [14] from a
superior and independent order of men.
It is worth our while to institute a brief comparison be-
tween our American forms of government, and the two best
constitutions that ever existed in Europe, the Roman and the
British.
In England, the king or supreme executive officer, is
hereditary. In America, the president of the United States,
is elective. That this is an advantage will hardly be dis-.
puted.
In ancient Rome, the king was elective, and so were the
consuls, who were the executive officers in the republic. But
they were elected by the body of the people, in their public
assemblies ; and this circumstance paved the way for such ex-
cessive bribery and corruption as are wholly unknown in
modern times. The president of the United States is also
elective ; but by a few men chosen by the several legisla-
tures under their inspection separated at a' vast dis-
tance and holding no office under the United States.
Such a mode of election almost precludes the possibility of
corruption. Besides, no state however large, has the power
of chusing a president in that state ; for each elector must
choose at least one man, who is not an inhabitant of that State
to which he belongs.
The crown of England is hereditary — the consuls of Rome
were chosen annually — both these extremes are guarded
against in our proposed constitution. The president is not
ally embroiled. It carries the spirit of discussion into all quarters, without
the means of reconciling the opinions of men, who are not assembled to hear
each others' arguments. They debate with themselves — form their own opin-
ions, without the reasons which influence others, and without the means of
information. Thus the warmth of different opinions, which, in other states,
dies in the legislature, is diffused through the state of Pennsylvania, and be-
comes personal and permanent. The seeds of dissension are sown in the con-
stitution, and no state, except Rhode Island, is so distracted by factions.
36 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
dis- [15] missed from his office, as soon as he is acquainted
with business— he continues four years, and is re-eligible, if
the people approve his conduct. Nor can he canvass for his
office, by reason of the distance of the electors ; and the pride
and jealousy of the states will prevent his continuing too long
in office.
The age requisite to qualify for this office is thirty-five
years.* The age requisite for admittance to the Roman con-
sulship was forty-three years. For this difference, good rea-
sons may be assigned — the improvements in science, and
particularly in government, render it practicable for a man to
qualify himself for an important office, much earlier in Hfe^
than he could among the Romans ; especially in the early
part of their commonwealth, when the office was instituted.
Besides it is very questionable whether any inconvenience
would have attended admission to the consulship at an earlier
age. [f]
The powers vested in the president resemble the powers
of the supreme magistrates in Rome. They are not so exten-
sive as those of the British king; but in one instance, the
president, with concurrence of the senate, has powers exceed-
ing those of the Roman consuls ; I mean in the appointment
of judges and other subordinate executive officers. The prae-
tors or judges in Rome were chosen annually by the people.
This was a defect in the Roman government. [16] One half
the evils in a state arise from a lax execution of the laws ; and
it is impossible that an executive officer can act with vigor
and impartiality, when his office depends on the popular voice.
An annual popular election of executive officers is the sure
source of a negligent, partial and corrupt administration. The
independence of the judges in England has produced a cours^
of the most just, impartial and energetic judicial decisions, for
many centuries, that can be exhibited in any nation on earth.
In this point therefore I conceive the plan proposed in Amer-
ica to be an improvement on the Roman constitution. In all
* In the decline of the republic, bribery or military force obtained this
office for persons who had not attained this age — Augustus was chosen at the
age of twenty; or rather obtained it with his sword.
[t "Query."]
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER, 37
free governments, that is, in all countries, where laws govern,
and not men, the supreme magistrate should have it in his
power to execute any law, however unpopular, without haz-
arding his person or office. The laws are the sole guardians
of right, and when the magistrate dares not act, every person
is insecure.
Let us now attend to the constitution and the powers of
the senate.
The house of lords in England is wholly independent on [f]
the people. The lords spiritual hold their seats by office; and
the people at large have no voice in disposing of the ecclesias-
tical dignities. The temporal lords hold their seats by heredi-
tary right or by grant from the king : And it is a branch of
the king's prerogative to make what peers he pleases.
[17] The senate in Rome was elective ; but a senator held
his seat for life.*
[fof]
* I say the senate was elective — but this must be understood with some
exceptions; or rather qualifications. The constitution of the Roman senate has
been a subject of enquiry, with the first men in modern ages. Lord Chester-
field requested the opinion of the learned Vertot, upon the manner of chusing
senators in Rome; and it was a subject of discussion between Lord Harvey and
Dr. Middleton. The most probable account of the manner of forming the se-
nate, and filling up vacancies, which I have collected from the best writers on
this subject, is here abridged for the consideration of the reader.
Romulus chose one hundred persons, from the principal families in Rome,
to form a council or senate; and reserved to himself the right of nominating
their successors ; that is of filling vacancies. "Mais comme Romulus avoit lui
" mfime choisi les premiers senateurs il se reserva le droit de nommer a son
" gr§, leurs successeurs." — Mably, sur les Romains. Other well informed his-
torians intimate that Romulus retained the right of nominating the president
only. After the union of the Sabines with the Romans, Romulus added an-
other hundred members to the senate, but by consent of the people. Tarquin,
the ancient, added another hundred; but historians are silent as to the manner.
On the destruction of Alba by Hostilius, some of the principal Alban fam-
ilies were added to the senate, by consent of the senate and people.
After the demolition of the monarchy, Appius Claudius was admitted into
the senate by order of the people.
Cicero testifies that, from the extinction of the monarchy, all the members
of the senate were admitted by command of the people.
It is observable that the first creation of the senators was the act ot the
monarch; and the first patrician families claimed the sole right of admission
38 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
[1 8] The proposed senate in America is constituted on prin-
ples more favorable to liberty : The members are elective, and
by the separate legislatures : They hold their seats for six
years — they are thus rendered suflSciently dependent on their
constituents ; and yet are not dismissed from their ofifice as
soon as they become acquainted with the forms of proceeding.
It may be objected by the larger states, that the represen-
tation is not equal ; the smallest states having the privilege of
sending the same number of senators as the largest. To obvi-
ate this objection, I would suggest but two or three ideas.
I. If each state had a representation and a right in deciding
questions, proportional to its property, three states would
almost command the whole. Such a constitution would grad-
ually annihilate the small states ; and finally melt down the
whole United States into one undivided sovereignty. The
free states of Spain and the heptarchy in England, afford strik.
ing examples of this.
[19] Should it be said that such an event is desirable, I answer;
the states are all entitled to their respective sovereignties,
and while they claim independence in international jurisdic-
tion, the federal constitution ought to guarantee their sover-
eignty.
into the senate. " Les families qui descendoient des deux cent senateurs que
" Romulus avoit crees, — se crurent seules en droit d'entrer dans le senat." —
Mably
This right however was not granted in its utmost extent ; for many of the
senators in the Roman commonwealth, were taken from plebian families. For
sixty years before the institution of the censorship, which was A. U. C. 311, we
are not informed how vacancies in the senate were supplied. The most proba-
ble method was this ; to enrol, in the list of senators, the different magistrates;
viz., the consuls, praetors, the two quaetors of patrician families, the five tri-
bunes (afterwards ten) and the two sediles of plebian families: The office of
quaestor gave an immediate admission into the senate. The tribunes were ad-
mitted two years after their creation. This enrollment seems to have been a.
matter of course; and likewise their confirmation by the people in their comitia
or assemblies.
On extraordinary occasions, when the vacancies of the senate were numer-
ous, the consuls used to nominate some of the most respectable of the eques-
trian order, to be chosen by the people.
On the institution of the censorship, the censors were invested with full
powers to inspect the manners of the citizens, — enrol them in their proper
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 39
Another consideration has weight — There is, in all nations^
a tendency toward an accumulation of power in some point.
It is the business of the legislator to establish some barriers
to check the tendency. In small societies, a man worth
;^. 100,000 has but one vote, when his neighbors, who are
worth but fifty pounds, have each one vote likewise. To make
property the sole basis of authority, would expose many of the
best citizens to violence and oppression. To make the num-
ber of inhabitants [*] in a state, the rule of apportioning
powfer, is more epuitable ; and were the United States one
indivisible interest, would be a perfect rule for representation.
But the detached situation of the states has created some sep-
arate interests — some local institutions, which they will not
resign nor throw into the hands of other states. For these
peculiar interests, the states have an equal attachment — for the
preservation and enjoyment of these, an equal sovereignty is
necessary ; and the sovereignty of each state would not be
secure, had each state, in both branches of the legislature an
authority in passing laws, proportioned to its inhabitants.
3. But the senate should be considered as representing the
ranks according to their property, — make out lists of the senators and leave
out the names of such as had rendered themselves unworthy of their dignity
by any scandalous vices. This power they several times exercised ; but the
disgraced senators had an appeal to the people.
After the senate had lost half its members in the war with Hannibal, the
dictator, M. Fabius Buteo. filled up the number with the magistrates, with those
who had been honored with a civic crown, or others who were respectable for
age and character. One hundred and seventy new members were added at
once, with the approbation of the people. The vacancies occasioned by Sylla's
proscriptions amounted to three hundred, which were supplied by persons nom-
inated by Sylla and chosen by the people.
Before the time of the Gracchi, the number of senators did not exceed three
hundred. But in Sylla's time, so far as we can collect from direct testimonies,
it amounted to about five hundred. The age necessary to qualify for a seat in
the senate is not exactly ascertained ; but several circumstances prove it to
have been about thirty years.
See Vertot, Mably, and Middleton on this subject.
In the last ages of Roman splendor, the property requisite to qualify a
person for a senator, was settled by Augustus at eight hundred sestertia — more
than six thousand pounds sterling.
[* "Between states, and excluding negroes," added in author's copy.— p. l. f.}
40 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
confederacy in a body. It is a [20] false principle in the vulgar
idea of representation, that a man delegated by a particular
district in a state, is the representative of that district only ;
whereas in truth a member of the legislature from any town
or county, is the representative of the whole state. In pass-
ing laws, he is to view the whole collective interest of the
state, and act from that view ; not from a partial regard to the
interest of the town or county where he is chosen.
The same principle extends to the Congress of the United
States. A delegate is bound to represent the true local inter,
est of his constituents — to state in its true light to the whole
body — but when each provincial interest is thus stated, every
member should act for the aggregate interest of the whole
confederacy. The design of representation is to bring the
collective interest into view — a delegate is not the legislator
of a single state — he is as much the legislator of the whole
confederacy as of the particular state where he is chosen ; and
if he gives his vote for a law which he believes to be beneficial
to his own state only, and pernicious to the rest, he betrays
his trust and violates his oath. It is indeed difficult for a man
to divest himself of local attachments and act from an impar-
tial regard to the general good ; but he who cannot for the
most part do this, is not a good legislator.
These considerations suggest the propriety of continuing
the senators in office, for a longer period, than the representa-
tives. They gradually lose their partiality, generalize their
views, [21] and consider themselves as acting for the whole
confederacy. Hence in the senate we may expect union and
firmness — here we may find '^^ general good ikio. object of leg-
islation, and a check upon the more partial and interested acts
of the other branch.
These considerations obviate the complaint, that the repre-
sentation in the senate is not equal ; for the senators represent
the whole confederacy ; and all that is wanted of the members
is information of the true situation and interest of each state.
As they act under the direction of the several legislatures,
two men may as fully and completely represent a state, as
twenty ; and when the true interest of each state is known, if
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 41
the senators perform the part of good legislators, and act im-
partially for the whole collective body of the United States,
it is totally immaterial where they are chosen.*
[22] The house of representatives is the more immediate
voice of the separate states — here the states are represented
in proportion to their number of inhabitants — here the separ-
ate interests will operate with their full force, and the violence
of parties and the jealousies produced by interfering interests,
can be restrained and quieted only by a body of men, less
local and dependent.
It may be objected that no separate interests should exist
in a state ; and a division of the legislature has a tendency to
create them. But this objection is founded on mere jealousy,
or a very imperfect comparison of the Roman and British gov-
ernments, with the proposed federal constitution.
* It is a, capital defect of most of the state-constitutions, that the senators,
like the representatives, are chosen in particular districts, They are thus in-
spired with local views, and however wrong it may be to entertain them, yet
such is the constitution of human nature, that men are almost involuntarily
attached to the interest of the district which has reposed confidence in their
abilities and integrity. Some partiality therefore for constituents is always
expectable. To destroy it as much as possible, a political constitution should
remove the grounds of local attachment. Connecticut and Maryland have
wisely destroyed this attachment in their senates, by ordaining that the members
shall be chosen in the state at large. The senators hold their seats by the suf-
frages of the state, not of a district; hence they have no particular number of
men to fear or to oblige. — They represent the state; hence that union and firm-
ness which the senates of those states have manifested on the most trying occa-
sions, and by which they have prevented the most rash and iniquitous measures.
It may be objected, that when the election of senators is vested in the peo-
ple, they must choose men in their own neighborhood, or else those with whom
they are unacquainted. With respect to representatives, this objection does
not lie ; for they are chosen in small districts ; and as to senators, there is, in
every state, a small number of men, whose reputation for abilities, integrity
and good conduct will lead the people to a very just choice. Old experienced
statesmen should compose the senate ; and people are generally, in this free
country, acquainted with their characters. Were it possible, as it is in small
states, it would be an improvement in the doctrine of representation, to give
every freeman the right of voting for every member of the legislature, and the
privilege of choosing the men in any part of the state. This would totally
exclude bribery and undue influence ; for no man can bribe a state ; and it
would almost annihilate partial views in legislation. But in large states it may
be impracticable.
42 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
The house of peers in England is a body originally and
totally independent on [*] the people — the senate in Rome
was mostly composed of patrician or noble families, and after
the first election of a senator, he was no longer dependent on
the people — he held his seat for life. But the senate of the
United States can have no separate interests from the body of
the people ; for they live among them — they are chosen by
them — they must be dismissed from their place once in six
years and may at any time be impeached for mal-practices —
— their property is si- [23] tuated among the people, and with
their persons, subject to the same laws. No title can be
granted, but the temporary titles of ofifice, bestowed by the
voluntary election of the people ; and no pre-eminence can be
acquired but by the same means.
The separation of the legislature divides the power — checks
— restrains — amends the proceedings — at the same time, it
creates no division of interest, that can tempt either branch to
encroach upon the other, or upon the people. In turbulent
times, such restraint is our greatest safety — in calm times, and
in measures obviously calculated for the general good, both
branches must always be unanimous.
A man must be thirty years of age before he can be admit-
ted into the senate — which was likewise a requisite in the
Roman government. What property was requisite for a sen-
ator in the early ages of Rome, I cannot inform myself ; but
Augustus fixed it at six hundred sestertia — between six and
seven thousand pounds sterling. In the federal constitution,
money is not made a requisite — the places of senators are
wisely left open to all persons of suitable age and merit, and
who have been citizens of the United States for nine years ; a
_ term in which foreigners may acquire the feelings and acquaint
themselves with the interests, of the native Americans.
The house of representatives is formed on very equitable
principles; and is calculated to guard the privileges of the
people. The English [24] house of commons is chosen by a
small part of the people of England, and continues for seven
years. The Romans never discovered the secret of represen-
tation — the whole body of citizens assembled for the purposes
[»of]
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 43
of legislation — a circumstance that exposed their government
to frequent convulsions, and to capricious measures. The
federal house of representatives is chosen by the people qual-
ified to vote for state representatives,* and continues two
years.
[25] Some may object to their continuance in power two
years. But I cannot see any danger arising from this quarter.
On the contrary, it creates less trouble for the representatives,
who by such choice are taken from their professions and
obliged to attend Congress, some of them at the distance of
at least seven hundred miles. While men are chosen by the
people, and responsible to them, there is but little danger
from ambition or corruption.
If it should be said that Congress may in time become tri-
ennial, and even septennial, like the English parliaments, I
answer, this is not in their power. The English parliament
had power to prolong the period' of their existence — but Con-
gress will be restrained by the different legislatures, without
* It is said by some, that no property should be required as a qualification
for an elector. I shall not enter into a discussion of the subject; but remark
that in most free governments, some property has been thought requisite, to
prevent corruption and secure government from the influence of an unprinci.
pled multitude.
In ancient Rome none but the free citizens had the right of a suffrage in the
comitia or legislative assemblies. But in Sylla's time the Italian cities demanded
the rights of the Roman citizens; alledging that they furnished two-thirds of the
armies, in all their wars, and yet were despised as foreigners. Veil Paterc.
lib. 2. cap. 15. This produced the Marsic or social war, which lasted two
years, and caried off 300,000 men. Ibm. It was conducted and concluded by
Pompey, father of Pompey the Great, with his lieutenants Sylla and Marius.
But most of the cities eventually obtained the freedom of Rome; and were of
course entitled to the rights of suffrage in the comitia. "Paulatim deinde recip-
"iendo in civitatem, qui arma aut non ceperant aut deposuerant maturi&s,
"vires refectae sunt." Veil. Paterc. 2. 16.
But Rome had cause to deplore this event, for however reasonable it might
appear to admit the allies to a participation of the rights of citizens, yet the
concession destroyed all freedom of election. It enabled an ambitious dema-
gogue to engage and bring into the assemblies, whole towns of people, slaves
and foreigners ; — and everything was decided by faction and violence. This
Montesquieu numbers among the causes of the decline of the Roman greatness.
De la grandeur des Romains, t. 9.
Representation would have, in some measure, prevented the consequences;
44 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
whose constitutional concurrence, no alteration can be made
in the proposed system.
The fourth section, article i, of the new constitution
declares that "The times, places, and manner of holding elec-
" tions for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in
" each state by the legislature thereof ; but the Congress may
" at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to
" the places of chusing senators." Here let us pause What
did the convention mean by giving Congress power to make
regulations, prescribed by the legislatures ? Is this expression
accurate or intelligible ? But the word alter is very intelligi-
ble, and the clause puts the election of representatives wholly,
and [26] the senators almost wholly, in the power of Congress.
The views of the convention I believe to be perfectly
upright — They might mean to place the election of representa-
tives and senators beyond the reach of faction — They doubtless
had good reasons, in their minds, for the clause — But I see no
occasion for any power in Congress to interfere with the
choice of their own body — They will have power to suppress
insurrections, as they ought to have ; but the clause in Italics
gives needless and dangerous powers — I hope the states will
reject it with decency, and adopt the whole system, without
altering another syllable. [*]
The method of passing laws in Congress is much preferable
to that of ancient Rome or modern Britain. Not to mention
other defects in Rome, it lay in the power of a single tribune
but the admission of every man to a suffrage will ever open the door to corrup-
tion. In such a state as Connecticut, where there is no conflux of foreigners, no
introduction of seamen, servants, &c., and scarcely an hundred persons in the
state who are not natives, and very few whose education and connexions do
not attach them to the government ; at the same time few men have property
to furnish the means of corruption, very little danger could spring from admit-
ting every man of age and discretion to the privilege of voting for rulers But
in the large towns of America there is more danger. A master of a vessel may
put votes in the hands of his crew, for the purpose of carrying an election for a
party. Such things have actually taken place in America. Besides, the mid-
dle states are receiving emigrations of poor people, who are not at once judges
of the characters of men, and who cannot be safely trusted with the choice of
legislators.
[* These two paragraphs struck out in author's copy. — p. l. f.]
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 45
to obstruct the passing of a law. As the tribunes were popu-
lar magistrates, the right was often exercised in favor of lib-
erty ; but it was also abused, and the best regulations were
prevented, to gratify the spleen, the ambition, or the resent-
ment of an individual.
The king of Great-Britain has the same power, but seldom
exercises it. It is however a dangerous power — it is absurd
and hazardous to lodge in one man the right of controlling the
will of a state.
Every bill that passes a majority of both houses of Con-
gress, must be sent to the president for [27] his approbation ;
but it must be returned in ten days, whether approved by him
or not ; and the concurrence of two thirds of both houses passes
the bill into a law, notwithstanding any objections of the presi-
dent. The constitution therefore gives the supreme executive
a check but no negative, upon the sense of Congress.
The powers lodged in Congress are extensive ; but it is
presumed that they are not too extensive. The first object of
the constitution is to unite the states into one compact society,
for the purpose of government. If such union must exist, or
the states be exposed to foreign invasions, internal discord,
reciprocal encroachments upon each others property — to
weakness and infamy, which no person will dispute ; what
powers must be collected and lodged in the supreme head or
legislature of these states. The answer is easy : This legisla-
ture must have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters in which
the states have a mutual interest. There are some regulations
in which all the states are equally concerned — there are others,
which in their operation, are limited to one state. The first
belongs to Congress — the last to the respective legislatures. No
one state has a right to supreme control, in any a.ffair in which
the other states have an interest, nor should Congress interfere
in any affair which respects one state only. This is the gen-
eral line of division, which the convention have endeavored to
draw, between the powers of Congress and the rights of the
individual states. The only question therefore is, whether
the new constitution delegates to Congress any powers which
[28] do not respect the general interest and welfare of the
4.6 RXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
United States. If these powers intrench upon the present
sovereignty of any state, without having for an object the col-
lective interest of the whole, the powers are too extensive. But
if they do not extend to all concerns, in which the states have
a mutual interest, they are too ;iimited. If in any instance^
the powers necessary for protecting the general interest, inter-
fere with the constitutional rights of an individual state, such
state has assumed powers that are inconsistent with the safety
of the United States, and which ought instantly to be resigned.
Considering the states as individuals, on equal terms, entering
into a social compact, no state has a right to any power which
may prejudice its neighbors. If therefore the federal constitu-
tion has collected into the federal legislature no more power
than is necessary for the common defence and interest, it should
be recognized by the states, however particular clauses may
supersede the exercise of certain powers by the individual
states.
This question is of vast magnitude. The states have very
high ideas of their separate sovereignty; altho' it is certain,
that while each exists in its full latitude, we can have no Fed-
eral sovereignty. However flattered each state may be by its
independent sovereignty, we can have no union, no respecta-
bility, no national character, and what is more, no national
justice, till the states resign to one supreme head the exclusive
power of legislating, judging and executing, in all matters of a
general nature. Every thing of [29] a private or provincial
nature, must still rest on the ground of the respective state^
constitutions.
After examining the limits of the proposed congressional
powers, I confess I do not think them too extensive — I firmly
believe that the life, liberty and property of every man, and
the peace and independence of each state, will be more fully
secured under such a constitution of federal government, than
they will under a constitution with more limited powers ; and
infinitely more safe than under our boasted distinct sovereign-
ties. It appears to me that Congress will have no more power
than will be necessary for our union and general welfare ; and
such power they must have or we are in a wretched state. On
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 47
the adoption of this constitution, I should value real estate
twenty per cent, higher than I do at this moment.
I will not examine into the extent of the powers proposed
to be lodged in the supreme federal head ; the subject would
be extensive and require more time than I could bestow upon
it. But I will take up some objections, that have been made
to particular points of the new constitution.
Most of the objections I have yet heard to the constitution,
consist in mere insinuations unsupported by reasoning or fact.
They are thrown out to instil groundless jealousies into the
minds of the people, and probably with a view to prevent all
government ; for there are, in every society, some turbulent
geniuses whose importance [30] depends solely on faction.
To seek the insidious and detestable nature of these insinua-
tions, it is necessary to mention, and to remark on a few par-
ticulars.
1. The first objection against the constitution is, that the
legislature will be more expensive than our present confedera-
tion. This is so far from being true, that the money we actually
lose by our present weakness, disunion and want of government
would support the civil government of every state in the con-
federacy. Our public poverty does not proceed from the
expensiveness of Congress, nor of the civil list ; but from want
of power to command our own advantages. We pay more
money to foreign nations, in the course of business, and merely
for want of governtnent, than would, under an efficient govern-
ment, pay the annual interest of our domestic debt. Every
man in business knows this to be truth; and the objection can
be designed only to delude the ignorant.
2. Another objection to the constitution, is the division of
the legislature into two branches. Luckily this objection has
no advocates but in Pennsylvania ; and even here their num-
ber is dwindling. The factions that reign in this state, the
internal discord and passions that disturb the government and
the peace of the inhabitants, have detected the errors of the
constitution, and will some time or other produce a reforma-
tion. The division of the legislature has been the subject of
discussion in the beginning of this essay ; and will be deemed,
48 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
by nineteen-twentieths of [31] the Americans, one of the prin-
cipal excellencies of the constitution.
3. A third insinuation, is that the proposed federal gov-
ernment will annihilate the several legislatures. This is ex-
tremely disingenuous. Every person, capable of reading,
must discover, that the convention have labored to draw the
line between the federal 'and provincial powers — to define the
powers of Congress, and limit them to those general concerns
which must come under federal jurisdiction, and which cannot
be managed in the separate legislatures — that in all internal
regulations, whether of civil or criminal nature, the states
retain their sovereignty, and have it guaranteed to them by
this very constitution. Such a groundless insinuation, or
rather mere surmise, must proceed from dark designs or
extreme ignorance, and deserves the severest reprobation.
4. It is alledged that the liberty of the press is not guar-
anteed by the new constitution. But this objection is wholly
unfounded. The liberty of the press does not come within
the jurisdiction of federal government. It is firmly established
in all the states either by law, or positive declarations in bills
of right ; and not being mentioned in the federal constitution,
is not — and cannot be abridged by Congress. It stands on the
basis of the respective state-constitutions. Should any state
resign to Congress the exclusive jurisdiction of a certain dis-
trict, which should include any town where presses are already
established, it is in the power of the state to reserve [32] the
liberty of the press, or any other fundamental privilege, and
make it an immutable condition of the grant, that such rights
shall never be violated. All objections therefore on this score
are " baseless visions."
5. It is insinuated that the constitution gives Congress the
power of levying internal taxes at pleasure. This insinuation
seems founded on the eighth section of the first article, which
declares, that " Congress shall have power to lay and collect
" taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and pro-
" vide for the common defence and general welfare of the
" United States."
That Congress should have power to collect duties, imposts
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 49
and excises, in order to render them uniform throughout the
United States will hardly be controverted. The whole objec-
tion is to the right of levying internal taxes.
But it will be conceded that the supreme head of the states
must have power, competent to the purposes of our union, or
it will be, as it now is, a useless body, a mere expense, without
any advantage. To pay our public debt, to support foreign
ministers and our own civil government, money must be
raised ; and if the duties and imposts are not adequate to
these purposes, where shall the money be obtained ? It will
be answered, let Congress apportion the sum to be raised, and
leave the legislatures to collect the money. Well this is all
that is intended by the clause under consideration ; with the
addition of a fe- [33] deral power that shall be sufiScient to
oblige a delinquent state to comply with the requisition. [*]
Such power must exist somewhere, or the debts of the United
States can never be paid. For want of such power, our credit
is lost and our national faith is a bye-word.
For want of such power, one state now complies fully with
a requisition, another partially, and a third absolutely refuses
or neglects to grant a shilling. Thus the honest and punctual
are doubly loaded — and the knave triumphs in his negligence.
In short, no honest man will dread a power that shall enforce
an equitable system of taxation. The dis-honest are ever
apprehensive of a power that shall oblige them to do what
honest men are ready to do voluntarily.
Permit me to ask those who object to this power of taxa-
tion, how shall money be raised to discharge our honest debts
which are universally acknowledged to be just? jHave we
not already experienced the inefificacy of a system without
power? Has it not been proved to demonstration, that a vol.
untary compliance with the demands of the union can never
be expected ? To what expedient shall we have recourse ?
What is the resort of all governments in cases of delinquency?
Do not the states vest in the legislature, or even in the gov-
ernor and council, a power to enforce laws, even with the mil-
itia of the states ? And how rarely does there exist the neces-
sity of exerting such a power ? Why should such a power be
[* Last two sentences struck out in author's copy. — P. L. F.]
50 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
more dangerous in Congress than in a legislature? Why
should [34] more confidence be reposed in a member of one
legislature than of another? Why should we choose the best
men in the state to represent us in Congress, and the moment
they are elected arm ourselves against them as against tyrants
and robbers ? Do we not, in this conduct, act the part of a
man, who, as soon as he has married a woman of unsuspected
chastity, locks her up in a dungeon ? Is there any spell or
charm, that instantly changes a delegate to Congress from an
honest man into a knave — a tyrant ? I confess freely that I
am willing to trust Congress with any powers that I should
dare lodge in a state-legislature. I believe life, liberty, and
property is as safe in the hands of a federal legislature, organ-
ized in the manner proposed by the convention, as in the
hands of any legislature, that has ever been or ever will be
chosen in any particular state.
But the idea that Congress can levy taxes at pleasure is
false, and the suggestion wholly unsupported. The preamble
to the constitution is declaratory of the purposes of our union."
and the assumption of any powers not necessary to establish
justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general welfare, and to secure the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, will be unconstitutional,
and endanger the existence of Congress. Besides, in the very
clause which gives the power of levying duties and taxes, the
purposes to which the money shall be appropriated are speci-
fied, viz. to pay the debts and provide for the comm.on de- [35]
fence and general welfare of the United States* For these
purposes money must be collected, and the power of collection
must be lodged, sooner or later, in a federal head ; or the com-
mon defence and general welfare must be neglected.
The states in their separate capacity, cannot provide for
* The clause may at first appear ambiguous. It may be uncertain whether
we should read and understand it thus — " The Congress shall have power to
"lay and collect taxes, Iduties, imposts and excises in order to pay the debts," kc.
or whether the meaning is— "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
" taxes, duties, imposts and excises, and shall have power to pay the debts," &c.
On considering the construction of the clause, and comparing it with the pre-
amble, the last sense seems to be improbable and absurd. But it is not very
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 5 1
the common defence ; nay in case of a civil w^r, a state cannot
secure its own existence. The only question therefore is,
whether it is necessary to unite, and provide for our common
defence and general welfare. For this question being once
decided in the affirmative, leaves no room to controvert the
propriety of constituting a power over the whole United
States, adequate to these general purposes.
The states, by granting such power, do not throw it out
of their own hands — they only throw, each its proportion, into
a common stock — they merely combine the powers of the sev-
eral states into one point, where they must be collected, before
they can be exerted. But the powers are still in their own
hands ; and cannot be alienated, till they create a body inde-
pendent of them- [36] selves, with a force at their command,
superior to the whole yeomanry of the country.
6. It is said there is no provision made in the new consti-
tution against a standing army in time of peace. Why do not
people object that no provision is made against the introduc-
tion of a body of Turkish Janizaries ; or against making the
Alcoran the rule of faith and practice, instead of the Bible ?
The answer to such objections is simply this — no such provision
is necessary. The people in this country cannot forget their
apprehensions from a British standing army, quartered in
America ; and they turn their fears and jealousies against them-
selves. Why do not the people of most of the states apprehend
danger from standing armies from their own legislatures?
Pennsylvania and North Carolina, I believe, are the only states
that have provided against this danger at all events. Other
states have declared that " no standing armies shall be kept up
without the consent of the legislature." But this leaves the
power entirely in the hands of the legislature. Many of the
states however have made no provision against this evil. What
material; for no powers are vested in Congress but what are included under
the general expressions, oi providing for the common defence and general welfare
of the United States. Any powers not promotive of these purposes, will be
unconstitutional; — consequently any appropriations of money to any other pur-
pose will expose the Congress to the resentment of the states, and the members
to impeachment and loss of their seats.
52 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
hazards these states suffer ! Why does not a man pass a law
in his family, that no armed soldier shall be quartered in his
house by his consent ? The reason is very plain : no man will
suffer his liberty to be abridged, or endangered — his disposi-
tion and his power are uniformly opposed to any infringement
of his rights. In the same manner, the principles and habits,
as well as the power of the Americans are directly opposed to
standing armies ; and there is as little [37J necessity to guard
against them by positive constitutions, as to prohibit the
establishment of the Mahometan religion. But the constitu-
tion provides for our safety ; and while it gives Congress
power to raise armies, it declares that no appropriation of
money to their support shall be for a longer term than two
years.
Congress likewise are to have power to provide for organ-
izing, arming and disciplining the militia, but have no other
command of them, except when in actual service. Nor are
they at liberty to call out the militia at pleasure — but only, to
execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and
repel invasions. For these purposes, government must always
be armed with a military force, if the occasion should require
it ; otherwise laws are nugatory, and life and property inse-
cure.
7. Some persons have ventured to publish an intimation,
that by the proposed constitution, the trial by jury is abolished
in all civil cases. Others very modestly insinuate, that it is in
some cases only. The fact is, that trial by jury is not affected
in any case, by the constitution ; except in cases of impeach-
ment, which are to be tried by the senate. None but persons
in office in or under Congress can be impeached ; and even
after a judgment upon an impeachment, the offender is liable
to a prosecution, before a common jury, in a regular course of
law. The insinuation therefore that trials by jury are to be
abolished, is groundless, and beyond conception, wicked. It
must be wicked, because the circu- [38] lation of a barefaced
falsehood, respecting a privilege, dear to freemen, can proceed
only from a depraved heart and the worst intentions.
8. It is also intimated as a probable event, that the federal
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 53
courts will absorb the judiciaries of the federal states. This is
a mere suspicion, without the least foundation. The jurisdic-
tion of the federal states is very accurately defined and easily
understood. It extends to the cases mentioned in the consti-
tution, and to the execution of the laws of Congress, respect-
ing commerce, revenue, and other general concerns.
With respect to other civil and criminal actions, the powers
and jurisdiction of the several judiciaries of each state, remain
unimpaired. Nor is there anything novel in allowing appeals
to the supreme court. Actions are mostly to be tried in the
state where the crimes are committed — But appeals are al-
lowed under our present confederation, and no person com-
plains ; nay, were there no appeal, every man would have
I'eason to complain, especially when a final judgement, in an
inferior court, should affect property to a large amount. But
why is an objection raised against an appellate jurisdiction in
the supreme court, respecting /aci as well as /aw f Is it less
safe to have the opinions of two juries than of one ? I sus-
pect many people will think this is no defect in the constitu-
tion. But perhaps it will destroy a material requisite of a
good jury, viz. their vicinity to the cause of action. I have no
doubt, that when causes were tried, in periods prior to the
Christian sera, before [39] twelve men, seated upon twelve
stones, arranged in a circular form, under a huge oak, there
was great propriety in submitting causes to men tn the vicinity.
The difficulty of collecting evidence, in those rude times, ren-
dered it necessary that juries should judge mostly from their
own knowledge of facts or from information obtained out of
court. But in these polished ages, when juries depend almost
wholly on the testimony of witnesses ; and when a complica-
tion of interests, introduced by commerce and other causes,
renders it almost impossible to collect men, in the vicinity
of the parties, who are wholly disinterested, it is no disadvan-
tage to have a cause tried by a jury of strangers. Indeed the
latter is generally the most eligible. \
But the truth is, the creation of all inferior courts is in the 1
power of Congress ; and the constitution provides that Con-
gress may make such exceptions from the right of appeals asy
54 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
they shall judge proper. When these courts are erected, their
jurisdictions will be ascertained, and in small actions. Congress
will doubtless direct that a sentence in a subordinate court
shall, to a certain amount, be definite and final. All objec-
tions therefore to the judicial powers of the federal courts
appear to me as trifling as any of the preceding.
9. But, say the enemies of slavery, negroes may be imported
for twenty-one years. This exception is addressed to the
quakers ; and a very pitiful exception it is.
[40] The truth is, Congress cannot prohibit the importation
of slaves during that period ; but the laws against the import-
ation into particular states, stand unrepealed. An immediate
abolition of slavery would bring ruin upon the whites, and
misery upon the blacks, in the southern states. The constitu-
tion has therefore wisely left each state to pursue its own
measures, with respect to this article of legislation, during the
period of twenty-one years.
Such are the principal objections that have yet been made
by the enemies of the new constitution. They are mostly
frivolous, or founded on false constructions, and a misrepre-
sentation of the true state of facts. They are evidently
designed to raise groundless jealousies in the minds of well
meaning people, who have little leisure and opportunity to
examine into the principles of government. But a little time
and reflection will enable most people to detect such mischiev-
ous intentions ; and the spirit and firmness which have distin-
guished the conduct of the Americans, during the conflict for
independence, will eventually triumph over the enemies of
union, and bury them in disgrace or oblivion.
But I cannot quit this subject without attempting to correct
some of the erroneous opinions respecting freedom and tyranny,
and the principles by which they are supported. Many people
seem to entertain an idea, that liberty consists in a power to
act without any control. This is more liberty than even the
savages enjoy. But in civil society, political liberty consists in
[41] acting conformably to a sense of a majority of the society. In
a free government every man binds himself to obey the public
voice, or the opinions of a majority ; and the whole society
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 55
engages to protect each individual. In such a government a
man is free and safe. But reverse the case ; suppose every
man to act without control or fear of punishment — every man
would be free, but no man would be sure of his freedom one
moment. Each would have the power of taking his neighbor's
life, liberty, or property ; and no man would command more
than his own strength to repel the invasion. The case is the
same with states. If the states should not unite into one
compact society, every state may trespass upon its neighbor,
and the injured state has no means of redress but its own
military force.
The present situation of our American states is very little
better than a state of nature — Our boasted state sovereignties
are so far from securing our liberty and property, that they,
every moment, expose us to the loss of both. That state
which commands the heaviest purse and longest sword, may at
any moment, lay its weaker neighbor under tribute ; and there
is no superior power now existing, that can regularly oppose
the invasion or redress the injury. From such liberty, O
*Lord, deliver us !
But what is tyranny ? Or how can a free people be de-
prived of their liberties? Tyranny is the exercise of some
power over a man, which is not warranted by law, or necessary
for the public safety. A people can never be deprived of
[42] their liberties, while they retain in their own hands, a
power sufficient to any other power in the state. This posi-
tion leads me directly to enquire, in what consists the power
of a nation or of an order of men ?
In some nations, legislators have derived much of their
power from the influence of religion, or from that implicit
belief which an ignorant and superstitious people entertain of
the gods, and their interposition in every transaction of life.
The Roman senate sometimes availed themselves of this
engine to carry their decrees and maintain their authority.
This was particularly the case, under the aristocracy which
succeeded the abolition of the monarchy. The augurs and
[» " O " changed to " good " in author's copy p. l. f.]
56 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
priests were taken wholly from patrician families* They
constituted a distinct order of men— had power to negative
any law of the people, by declaring that it was passed during
the taking of the auspices.f [1] This influence derived from
the authority of opinion, was less perceptible, but as tyranni-
cal as a military force. The same influence constitutes, at
this day, a principal support of federal governments on the
Eastern continent, and perhaps in South America. But in
North America, by a singular concurrence of circumstances,
the possibility of establishing this influence, as a pillar of gov-
ernment, is totally precluded.
[43] Another source of power in government is a military
force. But this, to be efficient, must be superior to any force
that exists among the people, or which they can command :
for otherwise this force would be annihilated, on the first
exercise of acts of oppression. Before a standing army can
rule, the people must be disarmed ; as they are in almost
every kingdom in Europe. The supreme power in America
cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword ; because the whole
body of the people are armed, and constitute a force superior
to any band of regular troops that can be, on any pretence,
raised in the United States. A military force, at the com-
mand of Congress, can execute no laws, but such as the people
perceive to be just and constitutional ; for they will possess
the power, and jealousy will instantly inspire the inclination,
to resist the execution of a law which appears to them unjust
and oppressive. In spite of all the nominal powers, vested in
Congress by the constitution, were the system once adopted
in its fullest latitude, still the actual exercise of them would
be frequently interrupted by popular jealousy. I am bold to
say, that ten just and constitutional measures would be re-
sisted, where one unjust or oppressive law would be enforced.
* " Quod nemo plebeius auspicia haberet, ideoque decemviros connubium
diremisse, ne incerta prole auspicia turbarentur. " Tit. Liv. lib. 4. cap. 6.
f Auguriis certe sacerdotisque augurum tantus honos accessit, ut nihil belli
domique postea, nisi auspicato, gereretur : concilia populi, exercitus vocati,
summa rerum, ubi aves non admisissent, dirimerentur. Liv. lib. i. cap. 37.
[Tf " The " and " of " struck out — " without " substituted in author's copy —
p. L. F.]
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 5/
The powers vested in Congress are little more than nominal ;
nay real power cannot be vested in them, nor in any body, but
in the people. The source of power is in the people of this
country, and cannot for ages, and probably never will, be re-
moved, [f].
In what then does real power consist? The answer is
short and plain — in property. Could [44] we want any proofs
of this, which are not exhibited in this country, the uniform
testimony of history will furnish us with multitudes. But I
will go no farther for proof, than the two governments already
mentioned, the Roman and the British.
Rome exhibited a demonstrative proof of the inseparable
connexion between property and dominion. The first form
of its government was an elective monarchy — its second, an
aristocracy; but these forms could not be permanent, because
they were not supported by property. The kings at first and
afterwards the patricians had nominally most of the power ;
but the people, possessing most of the lands, never ceased to
assert their privileges, till they established a commonwealth.
And the king^ and senate could not have held the reigns of
government in their hands so long as they did, had they not
artfully contrived to manage the established religion, and play
off the superstitious credulity of the people against their own
power. "Thus this weak constitution of government," says
the ingenious Mr. Moyle, speaking of the aristocracy of Rome,
" not founded on the true center of dominion, land, nor on any
" standing foundation of authority, nor rivetted in the esteem
" and affections of the people; and being attacked by strong
" passion, general interest and the joint forces of the people,
" mouldered away of course, and pined of a lingering con-
" sumption, till it was totally swallowed up by the prevailing
" faction, and the nobility were moulded into the mass of the
" people." * The people, notwithstanding [45] the nominal
authority of the patricians, proceeded regularly in enlarging
their own powers. They first extorted from the senate, the
right of electing tribunes, with a negative upon the proceed-
[t Last two sentences struck out in author's copy.— P. L. F.]
* Essay on the Roman government.
58 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
ings of the senate.* They obtained the right of proposing
and debating laws ; which before had been vested in the senate ;
and finally advanced to the power of enacting laws, without
the authority of the senate. f They regained the rights of
election in their comitia, of which they had been deprived by
Servius Tullius.:|: They procured a permanent body of laws,
collected from the Grecian institutions. They destroyed the
influence of augurs, or diviners, by establishing the tributa
comitia, in which they were not allowed to consult the gods.
They increased their power by large accessions of conquered
lands. They procured a repeal of the law which prohibited
marriages between the patricians and plebians.§ The Licinian
law limited all possessions to five hundred acres of land;
which, had it been fully executed, would have secured the
commonwealth. ||
The Romans proceeded thus step by step to triumph over
the aristocracy, and to crown their privileges, they procured
the right of being elected to the highest offices of the state.
By acquiring the property of the plebians, the nobility, several
times, held most of the power of the state ; but the people, by
reducing the interest of money, abolishing debts, or by forcing
[46] other advantages from the patricians, generally held the
power of governing in their own hands.
In America, we begin our empire with more popular priv-
ileges than the Romans ever enjoyed. We have not to
struggle against a monarch or an aristocracy — power is lodged
in the mass of the people.
On reviewing the English history, we observe a progress
similar to that in Rome — an incessant struggle for liberty from
the date of Magna Charta, in John's reign, to the revolution.
The struggle has been successful, by abridging the enormous
power of the nobility. But we observe that the power of 'the
people has increased in an exact proportion to their acquisi-
tions of property. Wherever the right of primogeniture is
established, property must accumulate and remain in families.
Thus the landed property in England will never be sufficiently
*Livy, 2. 33. fLivy, 3. 54- i Livy, 3. 33. §Livy, 4. 6, || Livy,
6. 35. 42. " Ne quis plus quingenta jugera agri possideret."
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. , 59
distributed, to give the powers of government wholly into the
hands of the people. But to assist the struggle for liberty,
commerce has interposed, and in conjunction with manufac-
turers, thrown a vast weight of property into the democratic
scale. Wherever we cast our eyes, we see this truth, that
property is the basis of power ; and this, being established as a
cardinal point, directs us to the means of preserving our
freedom. Make laws, irrevocable laws in every state, destroy-
ing and barring entailments ; leave real estates to revolve from
hand to hand, as time and accident may direct ; and no family
influence can be acquired and established for a series of
genera- [47] tions — no man can obtain dominion over a large
territory — the laborious and saving, who are generally the best
citizens, will possess each his share of property and power, and
thus the balance of wealth and power will continue where it
is, in the body of the people.
A general and tolerably equal distribution of landed prop-
erty is the whole basis of national freedom : The system of
the great Montesquieu will ever be erroneous, till the words
property or lands in fee simple are substituted for virtue,
throughout his Spirit of Laws.
Virtue, patriotism, or love of country, never was and never
will be, till mens' natures are changed, a fixed, permanent
principle and support of government. But in an agricultural
country, a general possession of land in fee simple, may be
rendered perpetual, and the inequalities introduced by com-
merce, are too fluctuating to endanger government. An
equality of property, with a necessity of alienation, constantly
operating to destroy" combinations of powerful families, is the
very soul of a republic — While this continues, the people will
inevitably possess both power and freedom; when this is lost,
power departs, liberty expires, and a commonwealth will
inevitably assume some other form.
The liberty of the press, trial by jury, the Habeas Corpus
writ, even Magna Charta itself, although justly deemed the
palladia of freedom, are all inferior considerations, when com-
pared with a general distribution of real property among
6o EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
[48] every class of people.* The power of entailing estates is
more dangerous to liberty and republican government, than
all the constitutions that can be written on paper, or even
than a standing army. Let the people have property, and
they will have power — a power that will for ever be exerted
to prevent a restriction of the press, and abolition of trial by
jury, or the abridgement of any other privilege. The liber-
ties of America, therefore, and her forms of government,
stand on the broadest basis. Removed from the fears of a
foreign invasion and conquest, they are [49] not exposed to
the convulsions that shake other governments ; and the prin-
ciples of freedom are so general and energetic, as to exclude
the possibility of a change in our republican constitutions.
But while property is considered as the basis of the free-
dom of the American yeomanry, there are other auxiliary sup-
ports ; among which is the information of the people. In no
-country, is education so general — in no country, have the body
of the people such a knowledge of the rights of men and the
* Montesquieu supposed virtue to be the principle of a republic. He de-
rived his notions of this form of government, from the astonishing firmness,
-courage and patriotism which distinguished the republics of Greece and Rome.
But this virtue consisted in pride, contempt of strangers and a martial enthusi-
asm which sometimes displayed itself in defence of their country. These
principles are neverfpermanent — they decay with refinement, intercourse with
other nations and increase of wealth. No wonder then that these republics
declined, for they were not founded on fixed principles ; and hence authors
imagine that republics cannot be durable. None of the celebrated writers
•on government seems to have laid sufficient stress on a general possession of
Teal property in fee-simple. Even the authors of the Political Sketches, in the
Museum for the month of September, seems to have passed it over in silence ;
although he combats Montesquieu's system, and to prove it false, enumerates
■some of the principles which distina:uish our governments from others, and
which he supposes constitutes the support of republics.
The English writers on law arid government consider Magna Charta, trial
■by juries, the Habeas Corpus act, and the liberty of the press, as the bulwarks
of freedom. All this is well. But in no government of consequence in Europe,
is freedom established on its true and immoveable foundation. The property
is too much accumulated, and the accumulations too well guarded, to admit
the true principle of republics. But few centuries have elapsed, since the body
of the people were vassals. To such men, the smallest extension of popular
privileges, was deemed an invaluable blessing. Hence the encomiums upon
trial by juries, and the articles just mentioned. But these people have never
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 6 1
principles of government. This knowledge, joined with a
keen sense of liberty and a watchful jealousy, will guard our
constitutions, and awaken the people to an instantaneous
resistance of encroachments.
But a principal bulwark of freedom is the right of election.
An equal distribution of property is the foundation of a repub-
lic ; hut popular elections form the great barrier, which, defends
it from assault, and guards it from the slow and imperceptible
approaches of corruption. Americans ! never resign that
right. It is not very material whether your representatives
are elected for one year or two — but the right is the Magna
Charta of your governments. For this reason, expunge that
clause of the new constitution before mentioned, which gives
Congress an influence in the election of their own body. The
time, place and manner of chusing senators or representatives
are of little or no consequence to Congress. The number of
members and time of meeting in Congress are fixed ; but the
choice should rest with the several states. [50] I repeat it —
reject the clause with decency, but with unanimity and firm-
ness. [*]
Excepting that clause the constitution is good [f] — it guar-
antees the fundamental principles of our several constitutions
— it guards our rights — and while it vests extensive powers in
Congress, it vests no more than are necessary for our union.
Without powers lodged somewhere in a single body, fully
competent to lay and collect equal taxes and duties — to adjust
been able to mount to the source of liberty, estates in fee, or at least but par-
tially ; they are yet obliged to drink at the streams. Hence the English jealousy
of certain rights, which are guaranteed by acts of parliament. But in America,
and here alone, we have gone at once to the fountain of liberty, and raised the
people to their true dignity. Let the lands be possessed by the people in fee-
simple, let the fountain be kept pure, and the streams will be pure of course.
Our jealousy of trial by jury, the liberty of the press, &c., is totally groundless.
Such rights are inseparably connected with \!ae. power and dignity of the people,
which rest on their property. They cannot be abridged. All other [free]
nations have wrested property and freedom from barons and tyrants ; we begin
our empire with full possession of property and all its attending rights.
[*Last three sentences struck out in author's copy.— P. L. F.]
r+ Revise to " The constitution is generally good.— p. l. p.]
62 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
controversies between different states — to silence contending
interests — to suppress insurrections — to regulate commerce —
to treat with foreign nations, our confederation is a cobweb —
liable to be blown asunder by every blast of faction that is
raised in the remotest corner of the United States.
Every motive that can possibly influence men ever to unite
under civil government, now urges the unanimous adoption of
the new constitution. But in America we are urged to it by a
singular necessity. By the local situation of the several states
a few command all the advantages of commerce. Those states
which have no advantages, made equal exertions for indepen-
dence, loaded themselves with immense debts, and now are
utterly W\ unable to discharge them ; while their richer neigh-
bors are taxing them for their own benefit, merely because they
can. I can prove to a demonstration that Connecticut, which
has the heaviest internal or state debt, in proportion to its
number of inhabitants, of any in the union, cannot discharge
its debt, on any principles of taxation ever yet practised. Yet
[51] the state pays in duties, at least '100,000 dollars annually,
on goods consumed by its own people, but imported by New
York. This sum, could it be saved to the state by an equal
system of revenue, would enable that state to gradually sink
its debt.* [f]
New Jersey and some other states are in the same situa-
tion, except that their debts are not so large, in proportion to
their wealth and population.
The boundaries of the several states were not drawn with
a view to independence ; and while this country was subject to
Great Britain, they produced no commercial or political incon-
veniences. But the revolution has placed things on a differ-
ent footing. The advantages of some states, and the disad-
vantages of others are so great — and so materially affect the
business and interest of each, that nothing but an equalizing
[T[ "utterly " struck out. — p. L p.]
*The state debt of Connecticut is about 3,500,000 dollars, its proportion
of the federal debt about the same sum. The annual interest of the whole
420,000 dollars.
[f Last three sentences, the following paragraph and foot note struck out
in author's copy. — p. l. f.]
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 63
system of revenue, that shall reduce the advantages to some
equitable proportion, can prevent a civil war and save the
national debt. Such a system of revenue is the sine qua non
of public justice and tranquillity.
It is absurd for a man to oppose the adoption of the con-
stitution, because he thinks some part of it defective or excep-
tionable. Let every man be at liberty to expunge what he
judges to be exceptionable, and not a syllable of the constitu-
tion [52] will survive the scrutiny. A painter, after executing
a masterly piece, requested every spectator to draw a pencil
mark over the part that did not please him ; but to his sur-
prise, he soon found the whole piece defaced. Let every man
examine the most perfect building by his own taste, and like
some microscopic critics, condemn the whole for small devia-
tions from the rules of architecture, and not a part of the best
constructed fabric would escape. But let any man take a com-
prehensive view of the whole, and he will be pleased with the
general beauty and proportions, and admire the structure.
The same remarks apply to the new constitution. I have
no doubt that every member of the late convention has
exceptions to some part of the system proposed. Their
constituents have the same, and if every objection must be
removed, before we have a national government, the Lord
have mercy on us.
Perfection is not the lot of humanity. Instead of censur-
ing the small faults of the constitution, I am astonished that
so many clashing interests have been reconciled — and so many
sacrifices made to the general interest ! The mutual conces-
sions made by the gentlemen of the convention, reflect the
highest honor on their candor and liberality ; at the same time,
they prove that their minds were deeply impressed with a con-
viction, that such mutual sacrifices are essential to our union.
They must be made sooner or later by every state ; or jealous-
ies, local interests and prejudices will unsheath the sword, and
some Caesar or Cromwell will avail himself [53] of our divisions,
and wade to a throne through streams of blood.
It. is not our duty as freemen, to receive the opinions of
any men however great and respectable, without an examina-
64 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
tion. But when we reflect that [*] some of the greatest men
in America, with the venerable Franklin and the illustrious
Washington at their head ; some of them the fathers and
saviors of their country, men who have labored at the helm
during a long and violent tempest, and guided us to the haven
of peace — and all of them distinguished for their abilities
their acquaintance with ancient and modern governments, as
well as with the temper, the passions, the interests and the
wishes of the Americans ; — when we reflect on these circum-
stances, it is impossible to resist impressions of respect, and
we are almost impelled to suspect our own judgements, when
we call in question any part of the system, which they have
recommended for adoption. Not having the same means of
information, we are more liable to mistake the nature and ten-
dency of particular articles of the constitution, or the reasons
on which they were admitted. Great confidence therefore
should be reposed in the abilities, the zeal and integrity of
that respectable body. But after all, if the constitution
should, in its future operation, be found defective or inconve-
nient, two-thirds of both houses of Congress or the application
of two-thirds of the legislatures, may open the door for
amendments. Such improvements may then be made, as
experience shall dictate.
[54] Let us then consider the New Federal Constitution, as
it really is, an improvement on the best constitutions that the
world ever saw. In the house of representatives, the people
of America have an equal voice and suffrage. The choice of
men is placed in the freemen or electors at large ; and the
frequency of elections, and the responsibility of the members,
will render them sufficiently dependent on their constituents.
The senate will be composed of older men ; arid while their
regular dismission from office, once in six years, will preserve
their dependence on their constituents, the duration of their
existence will give firmness to their decisions, and temper the
factions which must necessarily prevail in the other branch.
The president of the United States is elective, and what is
a capital improvement on the best governments, the mode
[*"The convention was composed of," added after " that, " by author. —
p. L. F.]
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 65
of chusing him excludes the danger of faction and corrup-
tion. [*] As the supreme executive, he is invested with power
to enforce the laws of the union and give energy to the fed-
eral •government.
The constitution defines the powers of Congress ; and every
power not expressly delegated to that body, remains in the
several state-legislatures. The sovereignty and the republican
form of government of each state is guaranteed by the consti-
tution ; and the bounds of jurisdiction between the federal
and respective state governments, are marked with precision.
In theory, it has all the energy and freedom of the British
and Roman governments, without their defects. In short, the
privilges of freemen are [55] interwoven into the feelings and
habits of the Americans ; liberty stands on the immoveable
basis of a general distribution of property and diffusion of
knowledge ; but the Americans must cease to contend, to fear,
and to hate, before they can realize the benefits of indepen-
dence and government, or enjoy the blessings, which heaven
has lavished, in rich profusion, upon this western world.
[* " This proves how little dependence can be placed on theory Twelve
years experience, or four elections demonstrates the contrary." — Note in
author's copy. — P. L. F.]
An / Address / to the / People / of the / State of
New- York / On the Subject of the / Constitution, /
Agreed upon at Philadelphia, / The 17th of September,
1787. / New-York: / Printed by Samuel Loudon, / Prin-
ter to the State. [1788].
Sm. 4to., pp. ig.
By John Jay, member of the New York State Convention.
The pamphlet has been partially reprinted in Elliot, I, 496.
" The good sense, forcible observations, temper and mod-
eration with which the pamphlet is written, cannot fail, I
should think, of making a serious impression upon the anti-
federal mind, where it is not under the influence of such local
views as will yield to no argument, no proof." — George Wash-
ington.
" I likewise send you a small pamphlet written by John
Jay about ten days since, and which has had a most astonishing
influence in converting anti-federalism to a knowledge and
belief that the new Constitution was their only political salva-
tion."— S. B. Webb, 27 April, 1788.
" This pamphlet contains a brief recapitulation of the most
striking arguments in favor of adopting the proposed Federal
Constitution. Several of the observations are new, and all are
penned with such moderation of temper, and sound judg-
ment, that they cannot fail to make an impression favorable
to the Constitution on minds which are open to conviction.
It is wished that every friend to good order and government
might ' receive this address with the same candor with which
it is written,' as it is believed the author's arguments against
appointing a new general Convention, for the purpose of
altering and amending the constitution, are altogether
unanswerable." [Noah Webster] in American Magazine for
April, 1788.
See Jay's Life of Jay, I, 362 ; The Federalist, LXXXV; and
the " Postcript " oi An Address to the People of the State of
New York. — By a Plebian, infra.
P. L. F.
Friends and Fellow Citizens :
'TpHERE are times and seasons, when general evils spread
general alarm and uneasiness, and yet arise from
causes too complicated, and too little understood by many, to
produce an unanimity of opinions respecting their remedies.
Hence it is, that on such occasions, the conflict of arguments
too often excites a conflict of passions, and introduces a
degree of discord and animosity, which, by agitating the public
mind dispose it to precipitation and extravagance. They who
on the ocean have been unexpectedly enveloped with tempests,
or suddenly entangled among rocks and shoals, know the
value of that serene, self-possession and presence of mind, to
which in such cases they owed their preservation ; nor will the
heroes who have given us victory and peace, hesitate to
acknowledge that we are as much indebted for those blessings
to the calm prevision, and cool intrepidity which planned and
conducted our military measures, as to the glowing animation
with which they were executed.
While reason retains her rule, while men are as ready to
receive as to give advice, and as willing to be convinced
themselves, as to convince others, there are few political evils
from which a free and enlightened people cannot deliver
themselves. It is unquestionably true, that the great body
of the people love their country, and wish it prosperity; and
this observation is particularly applicable to the people of a
free country, for they have more and stronger reasons for
loving it than others. It is not therefore to vicious motives
that the unhappy divisions which sometimes prevail among
them are to be imputed ; the people at large always mean well,
and although they may on certain oc- [4] casions be misled
by the counsels, or injured by the efforts of the few who ex-
pect more advantage from the wreck, than from the preserva-
tion of national prosperity, yet the motives of these few, are
70 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY.
by no means to be confounded with those of the community
in general.
That such seeds of discord and danger have been dissem-
inated and begin to take root in America, as unless eradicated
will soon poison our gardens and our fields, is a truth much to
be lamented ; and the more so, as their growth rapidly
increases, while we are wasting the season in honestly but
imprudently disputing, not whether they shall be pulled up,
but by whom, in what manner, and with what instruments, the
work shall be done.
When the king of Great Britain, misguided by men who
did not merit his confidence, asserted the unjust claim of binding
us in all cases whatsoever, and prepared to obtain our submis-
sion by force, the object which engrossed our attention,
however important, was nevertheless plain and simple, "What
shall we do ?" was the question — the people answered, let us
unite, our counsels and our arms. They sent Delegates to
Congress, and soldiers to the field. Confiding in the probity
and wisdom of Congress, they received their recommendations
as if they had been laws ; and that ready acquiesence in their
advice enabled those patriots to save their country. Then
there was little leisure or disposition for controversy respecting
the expediency of measures — hostile fleets soon filled our ports,
and hostile armies spread desolation on our shores. Union
was then considered as the most essential of human means
and we almost worshipped it with as much fervor, as pagans '
in distress formerly implored the protection of their tutelar
deities. That union was the child of wisdom — heaven blessed
it, and it wrought out our political salvation.
That glorious war was succeeded by an advantageous peace.
When danger disappeared, ease'^ tranquility, and a sense of
security loosened the bands of union ; and Congress and soldiers
and good faith depreciated with their apparent importance.
Recommendations lost their influence, and requisitions were
rendered nugatory, not by their want of propriety, but by
their want of power. The spirit of private gain expelled the
spirit of public good, and men became more intent on the
means of enriching and aggrandizing themselves, than of en*
ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 7 1
riching and aggrandizing their country. Hence the war-worn
veteran, whose re- [5] ward for toils and wounds existed in
written promises, found Congress without the means, and too
many of the States without the disposition, to do him justice.
Hard necessity compelled him, and others under similar cir-
cumstances, to sell their honest claims on the public for a
little bread; and thus unmerited misfortunes and patriotic
distresses became articles of speculation and commerce.
These and many other evils, too well known to require
enumeration, imperceptibly stole in upon us, and acquired an
unhappy influence on our public affairs. But such evils, Hke
the worst of weeds, will naturally spring up in so rich a soil;
and a good Government is as necessary to subdue the one, as
an attentive gardner or husbandman is to destroy the other —
Even the garden of Paradise required to be dressed, and while
men continue to be constantly impelled to error and to wrong
by innumerable circumstances and temptations, so long will
society experience the unceasing necessity of government.
It is a pity that the expectations which actuated the
authors of the existing confederation, neither have nor can be
realized: — accustomed to see and admire the glorious spirit
which moved all ranks of people in the most gloomy moments
of the war, observing their steadfast attachment to Union,
and the wisdom they so often manifested both in choosing
and confiding in their rulers, those gentlemen were led to
' flatter themselves that the people of America only required
to know what ought to be done, to do it. This amiable mis-
take induced them to institute a national government in such
a manner, as though very fit to give advice, was yet destitute
of power, and so constructed as to be very unfit to be trusted
with it. They seem not to have been sensible that mere
advice is a sad substitute for laws ; nor to have recollected that
the advice even of the allwise and best of Beings, has been
always disregarded by a great majority of all the men that
^ ever lived.
Experience iS a severe preceptor, but it teaches useful
] truths, and however harsh, is always honest — Be calm and
dispassionate, and listen to what it tells us.
72 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY.
Prior to the revolution we had little occasion to inquire or
know much about national affairs, for although they existed
and were managed, yet they were managed for us, but not by
us. Intent on our domestic concerns, our internal legislative
business, our agriculture, and our buying and selling, we were
seldom anxious about what passed or was [6] doing in foreign
Courts. As we had nothing to do with that department of
policy, so the affairs of it were not detailed to us, and we took
as little pains to inform ourselves, as others did to inform us
of them. War, and peace, alliances, and treaties, and com-
merce, and navigation, were conducted and regulated without
our advice or controul. While we had liberty and justice,
and in security enjoyed the fruits of our "vine and fig tree,"
we were in general too content and too much occupied, to be
at the trouble of investigating the various political combina-
tions in this department, or to examine and perceive how
exceedingly important they often were to the advancement
and protection of our prosperity. This habit and turn of
thinking affords one reason why so much more care was taken,
and so much more wisdom displayed, in forming our State
Governments, than in forming our Federal or national one.
By the Confederation as it now stands, the direction of
general and national affairs is committed to a single body of
men, viz. the Congress. They may make war, but are not
empowered to raise men or money to carry it on. They may
make peace, but without power to see the terms of it observed
— They may form alliances, but without ability to comply with
the stipulations on their part — They may enter into treaties
of commerce, but without power to enforce them at home or
abroad — They may borrow money, but without having the
means of repayment — They may partly regulate commerce,
but without authority to execute their ordinances — They may
appoint ministers and other officers of trust, but without power
to try or punish them for misdemeanors — They may resolve,
but cannot execute either with dispatch or with secrecy — In
short, they may consult, and deliberate, and recommend, and
make requisitions, and they who please, may regard them.
From this new and wonderful system of Government, it
ADDRESS BY. JOHN JAY. 73
has come to pass, that almost every national object of every
kind, is at this day unprovided for ; and other nations taking
the advantage of its imbecility, are daily multiplying commer-
cial restraints upon us. Our fur trade is gone to Canada, and
British garrisons keep the keys of it. Our shipyards have
almost ceased to disturb the repose of the neighborhood by
the noise of the axe and hammer; and while foreign flags fly
triumphantly above our highest houses, the American Stars
seldom do more than shed a few feeble rays about the humble
masts of river sloops and coasting schooners. The greater
part of our hardy seamen, are [7] plowing the ocean in foreign
pay; and not a few of our ingenious shipwrights are now build-
ing vessels on alien shores. Although our increasing agriculture
and industry extend and multiply our productions, yet they
constantly diminish in value; and although we permit all
nations to fill our country with their merchandises, yet their
best markets are shut against us. Is there an English, or a
French, or a Spanish island or port in the West-Indies, t«
which an American vessel ca-n carry a cargo of flour for sale ?
Not one. The Algerines exclude us from the Mediterranean,
and adjacent countries ; and we are neither able to purchase,
nor to command the free use of those seas. Can our little
towns or larger cities consume the immense productions of
our fertile country? or will they without trade be able to pay
a good price for the proportion which they do consume ? The
last season gave a very unequivocal answer to these questions
— What numbers of fine cattle have returned from this city to
the country for want of buyers ? What great quantities of
salted and other provisions still lie useless in the stores ? To
how much below the former price, is our corn, and wheat and
flour and lumber rapidly falling? Our debts remain undimin-
ished, and the interest on them accumulating — our credit
abroad is nearly extinguished, and at home unrestored — they
who had money have sent it beyond the reach of our laws,
and scarcely any man can borrow of his neighbor. Nay, does
not experience also tell us, that it is as difficult to pay as to
borrow ? That even our houses and lands cannot command
money — that law suits and usurious contracts abound — that
74 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY.
our farms sell on executions for less than half their value, and
that distress in various forms, and in various ways, is approach-
ing fast to the doors of our best citizens.
These things have been gradually coming upon us ever
since the peace — they have been perceived and proclaimed,
but the universal rage and pursuit of private gain conspired
with other causes, to prevent any proper efforts being made
to ineliorate our condition by due attention to our national
affairs, until the late Convention was convened for that purpose.
From the result of their deliberations, the States expected to
derive much good, and should they be disappointed, it will
probably be not less their misfortune than their fault. That
Convention was in general composed of excellent and tried
men — men who had become conspicuous for their wisdom and
public services, and whose names [8] and characters will be
venerated by posterity. Generous and candid minds cannot
perceive without pain, the illiberal manner in which some have
taken the liberty to treat them ; nor forbear to impute it to
impure and improper motives, zeal for public good, like zeal
for religion, may sometimes carry men beyond the bounds of
reason, but it is not conceivable, that on this occasion, it
should find means so to inebriate any candid American, as to
make him forget what he owed to truth and to decency, or
induce him either to believe or to say, that the almost unani-
mous advice of the Convention, proceeded from a wicked
combination and conspiracy against the liberties of their
country. This is not the temper with which we should receive
and consider their recommendations, nor the treatment that
would be worthy either of us or them. Let us continue
careful therefore that facts do not warrant historians to tell
future generations, that envy, malice and uncharitableness
pursued our patriotic benefactors to their graves, and that not
even pre-eminence in virtue, nor lives devoted to the public,
could shield them from obloquy and detraction. On the
contrary, let our bosoms always retain a sufficient degree of
honest indignation to disappoint and discourage those who
expect our thanks or applause for calumniating our most
faithful and meritorious friends.
ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 75
The Convention concurred in opinion with the people, that
a national government, competent to every national object, was
indispensibly necessary; and it was as plain to them, as it now
is to all America, that the present confederation does not
provide for such a government. These points being agreed,
they proceeded to consider how and in what manner such a
government could be formed, as on the one hand, should be
sufficiently energetic to raise us from our prostrate and dis-
tressed situation, and on the other be perfectly consistent with
the liberties of the people of every State. Like men to whom
the experience of other ages and countries had taught wisdom,
they not only determined that it should be erected by, and
depend on the people ; but remembering the many instances
in which governments vested solely in one man, or one body
of men, had degenerated into tyrannies, they judged it most
prudent that the three great branches of power should be
committed to different hands, and therefore that the executive
should be separated from the legislative, and the judicial from
both. Thus far the propriety of their work is easily seen and
understood, and therefore is thus far almost uni- [9] versally
approved — for no one man or thing under the sun ever yet
pleased every body.
^ The next question was, what particular powers should be
given to these three branches ? Here the different views and
interests of the different states, as well as the different abstract
opinions of their members on such points, interposed many
difficulties. Here the business became complicated, and pre-
sented a wide field for investigation ; too wide for every eye to
take a quick and comprehensive view of it.
It is said that "in a multitude of counsellors there is
safety," because in the first place, there is greater security for
probity ; and in the next, if every member cast in only his. mite
of information and argument, their joint stock of both will
thereby become greater than the stock possessed by any one
single man out of doors. Gentlemen out of doors therefore
should not be hasty in condemning a system, which probably
rests on more good reasons than they are aware of, especially
when formed under such advantages, and recommended ' by
so many men of distinguished worth and abilities.
76 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY.
The difficulties before mentioned occupied the Convention
a long time and it was not without mutual concessions that
they were at last surmounted. These concessions serve to
explain to us the reason why some parts of the system please
in some states, which displease in others ; and why many of the
objections which have been made to it, are so contradictory
and inconsistent with one another. -'It does great credit to
the temper and talents of the Convention, that they were able
so to reconcile the different views and interests of the different
States, and the clashing opinions of their members as to unite
with such singular and almost perfect unanimity in any plan
whatever, on a subject so intricate and perplexed. It shews
that it must have been thoroughly discussed and understood;
and probably if the community at large had the same lights
and reasons before them, they would, if equally candid and
uninfluenced, be equally unanimous.
It would be arduous, and indeed impossible, to comprise
within>the limits of this address, a full discussion of every
part of the plan. Such a task would require a volume, and
few men have leisure or inclination to read volumes on any
subject. The objections made to it are almost without
number, and many of them without reason — some of them
are real and honest, and others merely ostensible. There are
friends to [lo] Union and a national Government who have
serious doubts, who wish to be informed, and to be convinced;
and there are others who, neither wishing for union, nor any
national Government at all, will oppose and object to any
plan that can be contrived.
^^^We are told, among other strange things, that the liberty
of the press is left insecure by the proposed Constitution, and
yet that Constitution says neither more nor less about it, than
the Constitution of the State of New York does. We are told
that it deprives us of trial by jury, whereas the fact is, that it
expressly secures it in certain cases, and takes it away in none
— it is absurd to construe the silence of this, or of our own
constitution, relative to a great number of our rights, into a
total extinction of them — silence and blank paper neither
grant nor take away anything. Complaints are also made that
ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 77
the proposed constitution is not accompanied by a bill of
rights ; and yet they who would make these complaints, know
and are content that no bill of rights accompanied the Consti-
tution of this State. In days and countries, where Monarchy
and their subjects were frequently disputing about prerogative
and privileges, the latter often found it necessary, as it were
to run out the line between them, and oblige the former to.
admit by solemn acts, called bills of rights, that certain enum-
erated rights belonged to the people, and were not compre-
hended in the royal prerogative. But thank God we have no^
such disputes — we have ' no Monarchs to contend with, or
demand admission from — the proposed Government is to be
the government of the people — all its officers are to be their
officers, and to exercise no rights but such as the people com-
mit to them. The Constitution only serves to point out that
part of the people's business, which they think proper by it to
refer to the management of the persons therein designated —
those persons are to receive that business to manage, not for
themselves and as their own, but as agents and overseers for
the people to whom they are constantly responsible, and by
whom only they are to be appointed.
""^^^But the design of this address is not to investigate the
merits of the plan, nor of the objections to it. They who
seriously contemplate the present state of our affairs will be
convinced that other considerations of at least equal import-
ance demand their attention. Let it be admitted that this
plan, like everything else devised by man, has its imperfec-
tions : That it does not please every body is certain and ^
there is little [ii] reason to expect one that will. It is a
question of great moment to you, whether the probability of
your being able seasonably to obtain a better, is such as to.
render it prudent and advisable to reject this, and run the
risque. Candidly to consider this question is the design of .^
^this address.
^^As the importance of this question must be obvious to-
every man, whatever his private opinions respecting it may
be, it becomes us all to treat it in that calm and temperate
manner, which a subject so deeply interesting to the future
78 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY.
welfare of our country and prosperity requires. Let us there-
fore as much as possible repress and compose that irritation
in our minds, which toewarm disputes about it may have
excited. Let us endeavour to forget that this or that man, is
on this or that side ; and that we ourselves, perhaps without
sufificient reflection, have classed ourselves with one or the
other party. Let us remember that this is not a matter to be
regarded as a matter that only touches our local parties, but
as one so great, so general, and so extensive in its future con-
sequences to America, that for our deciding upon it according
to the best of our unbiassed judgment, we must be highly
responsible both here and hereafter.
The question now before us now naturally leads to three
enquiries : ,
1. Whether it is probable that a better plan can be ob-
tained ?
2. Whether, if attainable, it is likely to be in season ?
3. What would be our situation, if after rejecting this, all
our efforts to obtain a better should prove fruitless?
The men, who formed this plan are Americans, who had
long deserved and enjoyed our confidence, and who are as
much interested in having a good government as any of us
are, or can be. They were appointed to that business at a
time when the States had become very sensible of the derange-
ment of our national affairs, and of the impossibility of
retrieving them under the existing Confederation. Although
well persuaded that nothing but a good national government
could oppose and divert the tide of evils that was flowing in
upon us, yet those gentlemen met in Convention with minds
perfectly unprejudiced in favour of any particular plan. The
minds of their Constituents were at that time equally unbiased,
cool and dispassionate. All agreed in the necessity of doing
something, but no one ventured to say decidedly what pre-
cisely ought to be done — opinions were then fluctuating and
unfixed, and whatever might have been the wishes of a few
individuals, yet while the Convention deliberated, the people
remained in [12] silent suspence. Neither wedded to favourite
systems of their own, nor influenced by popular ones abroad,
ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 79
the members were more desirous to receive light from, than
to impress their private sentiments on, one another. These
circumstances naturally opened the door to that spirit of
candour, of calm enquiry, of mutual accommodation, and
mutual respect, which entered into the Convention with them,
and regulated their debates and proceedings.
The impossibility of agreeing upon any plan that would
exactly quadrate with the local policy and objects of every
State, soon became evident; and they wisely thought it better
mutually to concede, and accommodate, and in that way to
fashion their system as much as possible by the circumstances
and wishes of different States, than by pertinaciously adhering,
each to his own ideas, oblige the Convention to rise without
doing anything. They were sensible that obstacles arising
from local circumstances, would not cease while those circum-
stances continued to exist; and so far as those circumstances
depended on differences of climate, productions, and commerce,
that no change was to be expected. They were likewise
sensible that on a subject so comprehensive, and involving
such a variety of points and questions, the most able, the most
candid, and the most honest men will differ in opinion. The
same proposition seldom strikes many minds exactly in the
same point of light ; different habits of thinking, different
degrees and modes of education, different prejudices and
opinions early formed and long entertained, conspire with a
multitude of other circumstances, to produce among men a
diversity and contrariety of opinions on questions of difificulty.
Liberality therefore as well as prudence, induced them to
treat each other's opinions with tenderness, to argue without
asperity, and to endeavor to convince the judgment without
hurting the feelings of each other. Although many weeks
were passed in these discussions, some points remained, on
which a unison of opinions could not be effected. Here
again that same happy disposition to unite and conciliate,
induced them to meet each other ; and enabled them, by
mutual concessions, finally to complete and agree to the plan
they have recommended, and that too with a degree of
unanimity which, considering the variety of discordant
8o ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY.
^ views and ideas, they had to reconcile, is really astonishing.
Jhey tell us very honestly that this plan is the result of
accommodation — they do not hold it up as the best of all
possible ones, but only as [13] the best which they could unite
in, and agree to. If such men, appointed and meeting under
such auspicious circumstances, and so sincerely disposed to
conciliation, could go no further in their endeavors to please
every State, and every body, what reason have we at present
to expect any system that would give more general satis-
faction ?
^^uppose this plan to be rejected, what measures would
you propose for obtaining a better ? Some will answer, let us
appoint another Convention, and as everything has been said
and written that can well be said and written on the subject,
they w,ill be better informed than the former one was, and
consequently be better able to make and agree upon a more
eligible one.
■ This reasoning is fair, and as far as it goes has weight; but
it nevertheless takes one thing for granted, which appears very
doubtful; for although the new Convention might have more
information, and perhaps equal abilities, yet it does not from
thence follow that they would be equally disposed t.o agree.
The contrary of this position is the most probable. You must
have observed that the same temper and equanimity which
prevailed among the people on the former occasion, no longer
exists. We have unhappily become divided into parties; and
this important subject has been handled with such indiscreet
and offensive acrimony, and with so many little unhandsome
artifices and misrepresentations, that pernicious heats and
animosities have been kindled, and spread their flames far and
wide among us. When therefore it becomes a question who
shall be deputed to the new Convention; we cannot flatter
ourselves that the talents and integrity of the candidates will
determine who shall be elected. Federal electors will vote for
Fcederal deputies, and anti-Foederal electors for anti-Foederal
ones. Nor will either party prefer the most moderate of their
adherents, for as the most staunch and active partizans will be
the most popular, so the men most willing and able to carry
ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 8 1
points, to oppose, and divide, and embarrass their opponents,
will be chosen. A Convention formed at such a season, and
of such men, would be but too exact an epitome of the
great body that named them. The same party views, the
same propensity to opposition, the same distrusts and jealous-
ies, and the same unaccommodating spirit which prevail
without, would be concentred and ferment with still greater
violence within. Each deputy would recollect who sent [14]
him, and why he was sent; and be too apt to consider himself
bound in honor, to contend and act vigorously under the
standard of his party, and not hazard their displeasure by
prefering compromise to victory. As vice does not sow the
seeds of virtue, so neither does passion cultivate the fruits of)
reason. Suspicions and resentments create no disposition to
conciliate, nor do they infuse a desire of making partial and
personal objects bend to general union and the common good.
The utmost efforts of that excellent disposition were necessary
to enable the late Convention to perform their task; and
although contrary causes sometimes operate similar effects,
yet to expect that discord and animosity should produce the
fruits of confidence and agreement, is to expect "grapes from
thorns, and figs from thistles." y
~"--^ The States of Georgia, Delaware, Jersey, and Connecticut, ^
have adopted the present plan with unexampled unanimity;
they are content with it as it is, and consequently their depu-
ties, being apprized of the sentiments of their Constituents,
will be little inclined to make alterations, and cannot be other-
wise than averse to changes which they have no reason to think
would be agreeable to their people — some other States, tho'
less unanimous, have nevertheless adopted it by very respect-
able majorities ; and for reasons so evidently cogent, that even
the minority in one of them, have nobly pledged themselves
for its promotion and support. From these circumstances, the
new Convention would derive and experience difificulties
'unknown to the former. Nor are these the only additional
difificulties they would have to encounter. Few are ignorant
that there has lately sprung up a sect of politicians who teach
and profess to believe that the extent of our nation is too
82 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY.
, /great for the superintendance of one national Government,
' and on that principle argue that it ought to be divided into
two or three. This doctrine, however mischievous in its
tendency and consequences, has its advocates; and, should any
of them be sent to the Convention, it will naturally be their
poHcy rather to cherish than to prevent divisions ; for well
knowing that the institution of any national Government,
would blast their favourite system, no measures that lead to
it can meet with their aid or approbation.
Nor can we be certain whether or not any and what foreign
influence would, on such an occasion, be indirectly exerted,
nor for what purposes — delicacy forbids an ample discussion
of this question. Thus much [15] may be said, without error
or offence, viz. That such foreign nations as desire the pros-
perity of America, and would rejoice to see her become great
and powerful, under the auspices of a Government wisely
calculated to extend her commerce, to encourage her navigation
and marine, and to direct the whole weight of her power and
resources as her interest and honour may require, will doubt-
less be friendly to the Union of the States, and to the estab-
lishment of a Government able to perpetuate, protect and
dignify it. Such other foreign nation?, if any such their be,
who, jealous of our growing importance, and fearful that our
commerce and navigation should impair their own — ^who
behold our rapid population with regret, and apprehend that
the enterprising spirit of our people, when seconded by power
and probabihty of success, may be directed to objects not
consistent with their policy or interests, cannot fail to wish
that we may continue a weak and a divided people.
~^<rhese considerations merit much attention, and candid
men will judge how far they render it probable that a new
Convention would be able either to agree in a better plan, or
with tolerable unanimity, in any plan at all. Any plan forcibly
carried by a slender majority, must expect numerous oppon-
ents among the people, who, especially in their present temper,
would be more inclined to reject than adopt any system so
made and carried. We should in such case again see the press
teeming with publications for and against it ; for as the minority
ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 83
would take pains to justify their dissent, so would the majority-
be industrious to display the wisdom of their proceedings.
Hence new divisions, new parties, and new distractions would
ensue, and no one can foresee or conjecture when or how they
would terminate.
Let those who are sanguine in their expectations of a
better plan from a new Convention, also reflect on the delays
and risque to which it would expose us. Let them consider
whether we ought, by continuing much longer in our present
humiliated condition, to give other nations further time to per-
fect their restrictive systems of commerce, to reconcile their own
people to them, and to fence and guard and strengthen them
by all those regulations and contrivances in which a jealous
policy is ever fruitful. Let them consider whether we ought
to give further opportunities to discord to alienate the hearts
of our citizens from one another, and thereby encourage new
Cromwells to bold exploits. Are we cer- [16] tain that our
foreign creditors will continue patient, and ready to proportion
their forbearance to our delays? Are we sure that our
distresses, dissentions and weakness will neither invite hostility
nor insult ? If they should, how ill prepared shall we be for
defence! without Union, without Government, without money,
and without credit !
It seems necessary to remind you, that some time must
yet elapse, before all the States will have decided on the
present plan. If they reject it, some time must also pass
before the measure of a new Convention, can be brought
about and generally agreed to. A further space of time will
then be requisite to elect their deputies, and send them on to
Convention. What time they may expend when met, cannot
be divined, and it is equally uncertain how much time the
several States may take to deliberate and decide on any plan
they may recommend — if adopted, still a further space of
time will be necessary to organize and set it in motion: — In
the mean time our affairs are daily going on from bad to
worse, and it is not rash to say that our distresses are accum-
ulating like compound interest.
But if for the reasons already mentioned, and others that
84 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY.
we cannot now perceive, the new Convention, instead of
producing a better plan, should give us only a history of their
disputes, or should offer us one still less pleasing than the
present, where should we be then ? The old Confederation
has done its best, and cannot help us ; and is now so relaxed
and feeble, that in all probability it would not survive so violent
a shock. Then "to your tents Oh Israel !" would be the word-
Then every band of union would be severed. Then every
State would be a little nation, jealous of its neighbors, and
anxious to strengthen itself by foreign alliances, against its
former friends. Then farewell to fraternal affection, unsus-
pecting intercourse; and mutual participation in commerce,
navigation and citizenship. Then would arise mutual restric-
tions and fears, mutual garrisons, — and standing armies, and
all those dreadful evils which for so many ages plagued England,
Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, while they continued disunited,
and were played off against each other.
Consider my fellow citizens what you are about, before it
is too late — consider what in such an event would be your
particular case. You know the geography of your State, and
the consequences of your local position. Jersey and Connec-
ticut, to whom your impost laws have been [i 7] unkind — Jersey
and Connecticut, who have adopted the present plan, and
expect much good from it — will impute its miscarriage and all
the consequent evils to you. They now consider your opposi-
tion as dictated more by your fondness for your impost, than
for those rights to which they have never been behind you in
attachment. They cannot, they will not love you — they
border upon you, and are your neighbors; but you will soon
cease to regard their neighborhood as a blessing. You have
but one port and outlet to your commerce, and how you are
to keep that outlet free and uninterrupted, merits considera-
tion. — What advantage Vermont in combination with others,
might take of you, may easily be conjectured ; nor will you be
at a loss to perceive how much reason the people of Long
Island, whom you cannot protect, have to deprecate being
constantly exposed to the depredations of every invader.
These are short hints — they ought not to be more
ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 85
developed — you can easily in your own mind dilate and trace
them through all their relative circumstances and connections.
— Pause then for a moment, and reflect whether the matters
you are disputing about, are of suiificient moment to justify
your running such extravagant risques. Reflect that the
present plan comes recommended to you by men and fellow
citizens who have given you the highest proofs that men can
give, of their justice, their love for liberty and their country
of their prudence, of their application, and of their talents.
They tell you it is the best that they could form; and that in
their opinion, it is necessary to redeem you from those calam-
ities which already begin to be heavy upon us all. You find
that not only those men, but others of similar characters, and
of whom you have also had very ample experience, advise you
to adopt it. You find that whole States concur in the
sentiment, and among them are your next neighbors; both
whom have shed much blood in the cause of liberty, and have
manifested as strong and constant a predilection for a free
Republican Government as any State in the Union, and
perhaps in the world. They perceive not those latent
mischiefs in it, with which some double-sighted politicians
endeavor to alarm you. You cannot but be sensible that this,
plan or constitution will always be in the hands and power of
the people, and that [18] if on experiment, it should be found
defective or incompetent, they may either remedy its defects,
or substitute another in its room. The objectionable parts of
it are certainly very questionable, for otherwise there would
not be such a contrariety of opinions about them. Experience
will better determine such questions than theoretical argu-
ments, and so far as the danger of abuses is urged against the
institution of a Government, remember that a power to do
good, always involves a power to do harm. We must in the
business of Government as well as in all other business, have
some degree of confidence, as well as a great degree of caution.
Who on a sick bed would refuse medicines from a physician,
merely because it is as much in his power to administer deadly
poisons, as salutary remedies.
You cannot be certain, that by rejecting the proposed plan
86 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY.
you would not place yourself in a very awkward situation-
Suppose nine States should nevertheless adopt it, would you
not in that case be obliged either to separate from the Union,
or rescind your dissent ? The first would not be eligible, nor
could the latter be pleasant — ^A mere hint is sufficient on this
topic — You cannot but be aware of the consequences.
Consider then, how weighty and how many considerations
advise and persuade the people of America to remain in the
safe and easy path of Union; to continue to move and act as
they hitherto have done, as a band of brothers; to have confi-
dence in themselves and in one another ; and since all cannot
see with the same eyes, at least to give the proposed Consti-
tution a fair trial, and to mend it as time, occasion and
experience may dictate. It would little become us to verify
the predictions of those who ventured to prophecy, that /^ac^.-
instead of blessing us with happiness and tranquility, would
serve only as the signal for factions, discords and civil con-
tentions to rage in our land, and overwhelm it with misery and
distress.
Let us also be mindful that the cause of freedom greatly
depends on the use we make of the singular opportunities we
enjoy of governing ourselves wisely ; for if the event should
prove, that the people of this [19] country either cannot or
will not govern themselves, who will hereafter be advocates
for systems, which however charming in theory and prospect,
are not reducible to practice. If the people of our nation,
instead of consenting to be governed by laws of their own
making, and rulers of their own choosing, should let licentious-
ness, disorder, and confusion reign over them, the minds of
men every where, will insensibly become alienated from
republican forms, and prepared to prefer and acquiesce in
Governments, which, though less friendly to liberty, afford
more peace and security.
Receive this Address with the same candor with which it is
written; and may the spirit of wisdom and patriotism direct and
distinguish your councils and your conduct.
A citizen of New York.
Missing Page
Missing Page
An / Address / to the / People / of the / State of
New- York: / Showing the necessity of making / Amend-
ments / to the / Constitution, proposed for the United
Stages, / previous to its Adoption. / By a Plebeian. /
Printed in the State of New York ; / m.dcc.lxxx.viii.
8vo., pp. 26.
Written by Melancthon Smith of New York, a member
of the Continental Congress, (1785-88), and of the New York
State Convention, in which he opposed, but ultimately voted
for the ratification of the new Constitution.
"This address begins with several assertions that are
not fully proved. It declares that ' the advocates for the pro-
posed constitution, having been beaten off the field of argu-
ment, on its merits, have taken new ground — admit that it is
liable to well founded objections — that a number of its articles
ought to be amended — that if alterations do not take place a
door will be left open for an undue administration, and
encroachments on the liberties of the people — and many of
them go so far as to say, if it should continue for any
considersble period, in its present form, it will lead to a sub-
version of our equal republican forms of government.'
" These assertions, it is presumed are too general to be
true. Some friends (upon the whole) to the proposed govern-
ment, may have acknowledged all this ; but the -most enlight-
ened ones declare that, in their opinion, the constitution is as
little defective as can ever be obtained — that it is not liable to
well founded objections — that it will preserve our equal repub-
lican forms of government ; nay, that it is their only firm sup-
port, and the guarantee of .their existence — and if they con-
sent to the additions and alterations proposed by the Massa-
chusetts Convention, it is not so much because they think the
constitution will be better for them ; but because they think
these additions will reconcile the opposition and unite all par-
ties in a desirable harmony, without making the constitution
worse.
" The writer, to show the happy situation of the citizens of
this State, enquires, ' Does not every man sit under his own vine
and his own fig tree ? ' Yes, it may be answered, and under
the rich vines and fig trees of his neighbors too, ' having none
to make him afraid ? ' This was probably written before the
late riot : And if the inhabitants of this State are not afraid
of their neighbors, whose vines and fig trees they are enjoying,
they must be very ignorant or very insensible.
" ' Does not every one follow his own calling without impedi-
ment and receive the reward of his well earned industry f
The farmer and mechanic reap the fruits of their labor. The
merchant drives his commerce and none can deprive him of
the gain he honestly acquires.' Had the last assertion been
mere queries, the writer might have saved his reputation.
While the war-worn veteran is paid for his services, at a
fourth or fifth of their value ; while numbers of mechanics
have no employment ; whi^e commerce is restricted abroad,
and tender laws and depreciated paper money exist at home,
the public will not be disposed to believe themselves very
happy — no, not even in this State. In other States, where
riots and rebellion have violated private property, disturbed
government and end in bloodshed, the inhabitants will be
more incredulous, and wish for the adoption of the proposed
constitution." — [Noah Webster] in American Magazine for
April, 1788.
P. L. F.
Friends and Fellow Citizens,
nPHE advocates for the proposed new constitution, having
been beaten off the field of argument, on its merits,
have now taken new ground. They admit it is liable to well-
founded objections — that a number of its articles ought to be
amended ; that if alterations do not take place, a door will be
left open for an undue administration, and encroachments on
the liberties of the people ; and many of them go so far as to
say, if it should continue for any considerable period, in its
present form, it will lead to a subversion of our equal republican
forms of government. But still, although they admit this,
they urge that it ought to be adopted, and that we should
confide in procuring the necessary alterations after we have
received it. Most of the leading characters, who advocate its
reception, now profess their readiness to concur with those
who oppose, in bringing about the most material amendments
contended for, provided they will first agree to accept the
proffered system as it is. These concessions afford strong
evidence, that the opposers of the constitution have reason
on their side, and that they have not been influenced, in the
part they have taken, by the mean and unworthy motives of
selfish and private interests with which they have been illiberal-
ly charged. — As the favourers of the constitution seem, if their
professions are sincere, to be in a situation similiar to that of
Agrippa, when he cried out upon Paul's preaching — " almost
thou persuadest me to be a christian," I cannot help indulging
myself in expressing the same wish which St. Paul uttered on
that occasion, " Would to God you were not only almost, but
altogether such an one as I am." But alas, as we hear no
more of Agrippa's Christianity after this interview with Paul,
so it is much to [4] be feared, that we shall hear nothing of
amendments from most of the warm advocates for adopting
the new government, after it gets into operation. When the
government is once organized, and all the ofifices under it
92 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH.
filled, the inducements which our great men will have to
support it, will be much stronger than they are now to urge
its reception. Many of them will then hold places of great
honour and emolument, and others will then be candidates for
such places. It is much harder to relinquish honours or
emoluments, which we have in possession, than to abandon
the pursuit of them, while the attainment is held in a state of
uncertainty. — The amendments contended for as necessary to
be made, are of such a nature, as will tend to limit and abridge
a number of the powers of the government. And is it prob-
able, that those who enjoy these powers will be so likely to
surrender them after they have them in possession, as to
consent to have them restricted in the act of granting them ?
Common sense says — they will not.
When we consider the nature and operation of government,
the idea of receiving a form radically defective, under the
notion of making the necessary amendments, is evidently
absurd. '
Government is a compact entered into by mankind, in a
state of society, for the promotion of their happiness. In
forming this compact, common sense dictates, that no articles
should be admitted that tend to defeat the end of its institu-
tion. If any such are proposed, they should be rejected.
When the compact is once formed and put into operation, it
is too late for individuals to object. The deed is executed —
the conveyance is made — and the power of reassuming the
right is gone, without the consent of the parties. Besides,
when a government is once in operation, it acquires strength
by habit, and stability by exercise. If it is tolerably mild in
its administration, the people sit down easy under it, be its
principles and forms ever so repugnant to the maxims of
liberty. It steals, by insensible degrees, one right from the
people after another, until it rivets its powers so as to put it
beyond the ability of the community to restrict or limit it.
The history of the world furnishes many instances of a people's
increasing the powers of their rulers by persuasion, but I
believe it would be difficult to produce one in which the rulers
have been persuaded to relinquish their powers to [5] the
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 93
people. Wherever this has taken place, it has always been
the effect of compulsion. These observations are so well-
founded, that they are become a kind of axioms in politics ;
and the inference to be drawn from them is equally evident,
which is this, — that, in forming a government, care should be
taken not to confer powers whfch it will be necessary to take
back ; but if you err at all, let it be on the contrary side,
because it is much easier, as well as safer, to enlarge the
powers of your rulers, if they should prove not sufficiently
extensive, than it is too abridge them if they should be too
great.
It is agreed, the plan is defective — that some of the powers
granted, are dangerous — others not well defined — and amend-
ments are necessary. Why then not amend it ? why not
remove the cause of danger, and, if possible, even the appre-
hension of it? The instrument is yet in the hands of the
people ; it is not signed, sealed, and dehvered, and they have
power to give it any form they please.
But it is contended, adopt it first, and then amend it. I
ask, why not amend, and then adopt it ? Most certainly the
latter mode of proceeding is more consistent with our ideas
of prudence in the ordinary concerns of life. If men were
about entering into a contract respecting their private concerns,
it would be highly absurd in them to sign and seal an instru-
ment containing stipulations which are contrary to their
interests and wishes, under the expectation, that the parties,
after its execution, would agree to make alterations agreeable
to their desire. They would insist upon the exceptionable
clauses being altered before they would ratify the contract.
And is a compact for the government of ourselves and our
posterity of less moment than contracts between individuals ?
certainly not. But to this reasoning, which at first view
would appear to admit of no reply, a variety of objections are
made, and a number of reasons urged for adopting the system,
and afterwards proposing amendments. — Such as have come
•under my observation, I shall state, and remark upon.
I. It is insisted, that the present situation of our country
is such, as not to admit of a delay in forming a new govern-
94 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH.
ment, or of time sufficient to deliberate and agree upon the
amendments which are proper, without involving ourselves in
a state of anarchy and confusion.
[6] On this head, all the powers of rhetoric, and arts of de-
scription, are employed to paint the condition of this country,
in the most hideous and frightful colors. We are told, that
agriculture is without encouragement ; trade is languishing ;
private faith and credit are disregarded, and public credit is
prostrate ; that the laws and magistrates are contemned and
set at naught ; that a spirit of licentiousness is rampant, and
ready to break over every bound set to it by the governpient ;
that private embarrassments and distresses invade the house
of every man of middling property, and insecurity threatens
every man in affluent circumstances : in short, that we are in
a state of the most grievous calamity at home, and that we
are contemptible abroad, the scorn of foreign nations, and the
ridicule of the world. From this high-wrought picture, one
would suppose that we were in a condition the most deplorable
of any people upon earth. But suffer me, my countrymen,
to call your attention to a serious and sober estimate of the
situation in which you are placed, while I trace the embarrass-
ments under which you labor, to their true sources. What is
your condition ? Does not every man sit under his own vine
and under his own fig-tree, having none to make him afraid ?
Does not every one follow his calling without impediments
and receive the reward of his well-earned industry? The
farmer cultivates his land, and reaps the fruit which the
bounty of heaven bestows on his honest toil. The mechanic
is exercised in his art, and receives the reward of his labour.
The merchant drives his commerce, and none can deprive him
of the gain he honestly acquires ; all classes and callings of
men amongst us are protected in their various pursuits, and
secured by the laws in the possession and enjoyment of the
property obtained in those pursuits. The laws are as well
executed as they ever were, in this or any other country.
Neither the hand of private violence, nor the more to be
dreaded hand of legal oppression, are reached out to distress
us.
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 95
It is true, many individuals labour under embarrassments,
but these are to be imputed to the unavoidable circumstances
of things, rather than to any defect in our governments. We
have just emerged from a long and expensive war. During
its existence few people were in a situation to increase their
fortunes, but many to diminish them. Debts contracted
before the war were left unpaid [7] while it existed, and these
were left a burden too heavy to be borne at the commence-
ment of peace. Add to these, that when the war was over,
too many of us, instead of reassuming our old habits of frugal-
ity, and industry, by which alone every country must be
placed in a prosperous condition, took up the profuse use of
foreign commodities. The country was deluged with articles
imported from abroad, and the cash of the country has been
sent to pay for them, and still left us labouring under the
weight of a huge debt to persons abroad. These are the true
sources to which we are to trace all the private difficulties of
individuals: But will a new government relieve you from
these ? The advocates for it have not yet told you how it
will do it — And I will venture to pronounce, that there is but
one way in which it can be effected, and that is by industry
and economy ; limit your expences within your earnings ; sell
more than you buy, and everything will be well on this score.
Your present condition is such as is common to take place
after the conclusion of a war. Those who can remember our
situation after the termination of the war preceding the last,
will recollect that our condition was similar to the present, but
time and industry soon recovered us from it. Money was
scare, the produce of the country much lower than it has been
since the peace, and many individuals were extremely embar-
rassed with debts ; and this happened although we did not
experience the ravages, desolations, and loss of property, that
were suffered during the late war.
With regard to our public and national concerns, what is
there in our condition that threatens us with any immediate
danger ? We are at peace with all the world ; no nation men-
aces us with war ; nor are we called upon by any cause of suf-
ficient importance to attack any nation. The state govern-
96 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH.
ments answer the purposes of preserving the peace, and pro-
viding for present exigencies. Our condition as a nation is in
no respect worse than it has been for several years past. Our
pubhc debt has been lessened in various ways, and the west-
ern territory, which has been relied upon as a productive fund
to discharge the national debt has at length been brought to
market, and a considerable part actually applied to its reduc-
tion. I mention these things to shew, that there is nothing
special, in our present situation, as it respects our national
affairs, that should induce us to accept the prof- [8] fered sys-
tem, without taking sufficient time to consider and amend it.
I do not mean by this, to insinuate, that our government does
not stand in need of a reform. It is admitted by all parties,
that alterations are necessary in our federal constitution, but
the circumstances of our case do by no means oblige us to pre-
cipitate this business, or require that we should adopt a system
materially defective. We may safely take time to deliberate
and amend, without in the meantime hazarding a condition, in
any considerable degree, worse than the present.
But it is said that if we postpone the ratification of this
system until the necessary amendments are first incorporated,
the consequence will be a civil war among the states. On
this head weak minds are alarmed with being told, that the
militia of Connecticut and Massachusetts, on the one side,
and of New Jersey and Pennsylvania on the other, will attack
us with hostile fury ; and either destroy us from the face of
the earth, or at best divide us between the two states adjoin-
ing on either side. The apprehension of danger is one of
the most powerful incentives to human action, and is therefore
generally excited on political questions : But still, a prudent
man, though he foreseeth the evil and avoideth it, yet he
will not be terrified by imaginary dangers. We ought there-
fore to enquire what ground there is to fear such an event ? —
There can be no reason to apprehend, that the other states
will make war with us for not receiving the constitution pro-
posed, until it is amended, but from one of the following
causes : either that they will have just cause to do it, or that
they have a disposition to do it. We will examine each of
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 97
these : — That they will have no just cause to quarrel with us
for not acceding, is evident, because we are under no obliga-
tion to do it, arising from any existing compact or previous
stipulation. The confederation is the only compact now
existing between the states : By the terms of it, it cannot be
changed without the consent of every one of the parties to it.
Nothing therefore can be more unreasonable than for part of
the states to claim of the others, as matter of right, an acces-
sion to a system to which they have material objections.
No war can therefore arise from this principle, but on the
contrary, it is to be presumed, it will operate strongly the
opposite way. — The states will reason on the subject in the
following manner : On this momentuous question, every state
has an in- [9] dubitable right to judge for itself : This is
secured to it by solemn compact, and if any of our sister states
disagree with us upon the question, we ought to attend to
their objections, and accommodate ourselves as far as possible
to the amendments they propose.
As to the inclination of the states to make war with us,
for declining to accede, until it is amended, this is highly
improbable, not only because such a procedure would be most
unjust and unreasonable in itself, but for various other reasons.
The idea of a civil war among the states is abhorrent to the
principles and feelings of almost every man of every rank in the
union. It is so obvious to every one of the least reflection, that
in such an event we should hazard the loss of all things, without
the hope of gaining anything, that the man who should entertain
a thought of this kind, would be justly deemed more fit to be
shut up in Bedlam, than to be reasoned with. But the idea of
one or more states attacking another, for insisting upon alter-
ations upon the system, before it is adopted, is more extrava-
gent still ; it is contradicting every principle of liberty which
has been entertained by the states, violating the most solemn
compact, and taking from the state the right of deliberation.
Indeed to suppose, that a people, entertaining such refined
ideas of the rights of human nature as to be induced to wage
war with the most powerful nation on earth, upon a specula-
tive point, and from the mere apprehension of danger only,
98 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH.
should be so far lost to their own feelings and principles as to
deny to their brethren, who were associated with them in the
arduous conflict, the right of deliberation on a question of the
first importance to their political happiness and safety, is
equally an insult to the character of the people of America,
and to common sense, and could only be suggested by a vic-
ious heart and a corrupt mind.
The idea of being attacked by the other states, Vill appear
visionary and chimerical, if we consider that tho' several of
them have adopted the new constitution, yet the opposition
to it has been numerous and formidable. The eastern states
from whom we are told we have most to fear, should a civil
war be blown up, would have full employ to keep in awe those
who are opposed to it in their own governments. Massachu-
setts, after a long and dubious contest [lo] in their conven-
tion, has adopted it by an inconsiderable majority, and in the
very act has marked it with a stigma in its present form. No
man of candour, judging from their public proceedings, will
undertake to say on which side the majority of the people are.
Connecticut, it is true, have acceded to it, by a large majority
of their convention ; but it is a fact well known, that a large
proportion of the yeomanry of the country are against it : —
And it is equally true, that a considerable part of those
who voted for it in the convention, wish to see it altered. In
both these states the body of the common people, who always
do the fighting of a country, would be more likely to fight
against than for it : Can it then be presumed, that a country
divided among themselves, upon a question where even the
advocates for it, admit the system they contend for needs
amendments, would make war upon a sister state, who only
insist that that should be done before they receive it, which it
is granted ought to be done after, and where it is confessed
no obligation lies upon them by compact to do it. Can it, I
say, be imagined, that in such a case, they would make war on
a sister state ? The idea is preposterous and chimerical.
It is further urged we must adopt this plan because we
have no chance of getting a better. This idea is inconsistent
with the principles of those who advance it. They say, it
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 99
must be altered, but it should be left until after it is put in
operation. But if this objection is valid, the proposal of alter-
ing, after it is received, is mere delusion.
It is granted, that amendments ought to be made ; that the
exceptions taken to the constitution, are grounded on just
principles, but it is still insisted, that alterations are not to be
attempted until after it is received: But why not? Because
it is said, there is no probability of agreeing in amendments
previous to the adoption, but they may be easily made after it.
I wish to be informed what there is in our situation or circum-
stances that renders it more probable that we shall agree in
amendments better after, than before submitting to it ? No
good reason has as yet been given ; it is evident none can be
given : On the contrary, there are several considerations which
induce a belief, that alterations may be obtained with more ease
before than after its reception, and if so, every one must agree
[11] it is much the safest. The importance of preserving an
union, and of establishing a government equal to the purpose
of maintaining that union, is a sentiment deeply impressed on
the mind of every citizen of America. Vlt is now no longer
doubted, that the confederation, in its present form, is inade-
quate to that end : Some reform in our government must take
place : In this, all parties agree : It is therefore to be pre-
sumed, that this object will be pursued with ardour and perse-
verance, until it is attained by all parties. But when a govern-
ment is adopted that promises to effect this, we are to expect
the ardour of many, yea, of most people, will be abated ; —
their exertions will cease or be languid, and they will sit down
easy, although they may see that the constitution which pro.
vides for this, does not sufificiently guard the rights of the
people, or secure them against the encroachments of their
rulers. The great end they had in view, the security of the
union, they will consider effected, and this will divert their
attention from that which is equally interesting, safety to their
liberties. Besides, the human mind cannot continue intensely
engaged for any great length of time upon one object. As
after a storm, a calm generally succeeds, so after the minds of
a people have been ardently employed upon a subject, espec-
lOO ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH.
ially upon that of government, we commonly find that they
become cool and inattentive : Add to this that those in the
community who urge the adoption of this system, because
they hope to be raised above the common level of their fellow
citizens ; because they expect to be among the number of the
few who will be benefitted by it, will more easily be induced
to consent to the amendments before it is received than after-
wards. Before its reception they will be inclined to be pliant
and condescending ; if they cannot obtain all they wish, they
will consent to take less. They will yield part to obtain the
rest. But when the plan is once agreed to, they will be tena-
cious of every power, they will strenuously contend to retain
all they have got ; this is natural to human nature, and it is
consonant to the experience of mankind. For history affords
us no examples of persons once possessed of power resigning
4 it willingly.
The reasonings made use of to persuade us, that no altera-
tions can be agreed upon previous to the adoption of the sys-
tem, are as curious as they are futile. It is alledg- [12] ed,
that there was great diversity of sentiments in forming the
proposed constitution ; that it was the effect of mutual con-
cessions and a spirit of accommodation, and from hence it is
inferred, that farther changes cannot be hoped for. I should
suppose that the contrary inference was the fair one. If the
convention, who framed this plan, were possessed of such a
spirit of moderation and condescension, as to be induced to
yield to each other certain points, and to accommodate them-
selves to each other's opinions, and even prejudices, there is
reason to expect, that this same spirit will continue and prevail
in a future convention, and produce an union of sentiments on
the points objected to. There is more reason to hope for this,
because the subject has received a full discussion, and the
minds of the people much better known than they were when
the convention sat. Previous to the meeting of the conven-
tion, the subject of a new form of government had been little
thought of, and scarcely written upon at all. It is true, it was
the general opinion, that some alterations were requisite in
the federal system. This subject had been contemplated by
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. lOI
almost every thinking man in the union. It had been the sub-
ject of many well-written essays, and it was the anxious wish
of every true friend to America. But it was never in the con-
templation of one in a thousand of those who had reflected
on the matter, to have an entire change in the nature of our
federal government — to alter it from a confederation of states,
to that of one entire government, which will swallow up that
of the individual states. I will venture to say, that the idea
of a government similar to the one proposed, never efttered
the minds of the legislatures who appointed the convention,
and of but very few of the members who composed it, until
they had assembled and heard it proposed in that body : much
less had the people any conception of such a plan until after
it was promulgated. While it was agitated, the debates of the
convention were kept an impenetrable secret, and no Opportu-
nity was given for well informed men to offer their sentiments
upon the subject. The system was therefore never publicly
discussed, nor indeed could be, because it was not known to
the people until after it was proposed. Since that, it has been
the object of universal attention — it has been thought of by
every reflecting man — been discussed in a public and private
manner, in conversation and in print; [13] its defects have
been pointed out, and every objection to it stated ; able advo-
cates have written in its favour, and able opponents have writ-
ten against it. And what is the result ? It cannot be denied but
that the general opinion is, that it contains material errors,
and requires important amendments. This then being the
general sentiment, both of the friends and foes of the system,
can it be doubted, that another convention would concur in
such amendments as would quiet the fears of the opposers,
and effect a great degree of union on the subject ? — An event
most devoutly to be wished. But it is farther said, that there
can be no prospect of procuring alterations before it is acceded
to, because those who oppose it do not agree among them-
selves with respect to the amendments that are necessary. To
this I reply, that this may be urged against attempting alter-
ations after it is received, with as much force as before ; and
therefore, if it concludes anything, it is that we must receive
I02 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH.
any system of government proposed to us, because those who
object to it do not entirely concur in their objections. But the
assertion is not true to any considerable extent. There is a
remarkable uniformity in the objections made to the constitu-
tion, on the most important points. It is also worthy of
notice, that very few of the matters found fault with in it, are
of a local nature, or such as affect any particular state ; on the
contrary, they are such as concern the principles of general
liberty, in which the people of New Hampshire, New York
and Georgia are equally interested.
It would be easy to shew, that in the leading and most
important objections that have been made to the plan, there
has been and is an entire concurrence of opinion among writ-
ers, and in public bodies throughout the United States.
I have not time to fully illustrate this by a minute narra-
tion of particulars ; but to prove that this is the case, I shall
\ adduce a number of important instances.
\ It has been objected to that the new system, that it is cal-
culated to, and will effect such a consolidation of the States,
as to supplant and overturn the state governments. In this
the minority of Pennsylvania, the opposition in Massachusetts,
and all the writers of any ability or note in Philadelphia, New
York, and Boston concur. It may be added, that this appears
to have been the opinion of the Massachusetts convention,
and gave rise to that article in [14] the amendments proposed,
which confines the general government to the exercise only
of powers expressly given.
It has been said that the representation in the general leg-
islature is too small to secure liberty, or to answer the inten-
tion of representation. In this there is an union of sentiments
in the opposers.
The constitution has been opposed, because it gives to
the legislature an unlimited power of taxation both with
respect to direct and indirect taxes, a right to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises of every kind and descrip.
tion, and to any amount. In this there has been as general a
concurrence of opinion as in the former.
The opposers to the constitution have said that it is dan-
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. IO3
gerous, because the judicial power may extend to many cases -^
which ought to be reserved to the decision of the State courts,
and because the right of trial by jury is not secured in the
judicial courts of the general government, in civil cases. All
the opposers are agreed in this objection.
The power of the general legislature to alter and regulate
the time, place and manner of holding elections, has been
stated as an argument against the adoption of the system. It
has been argued that this power will place in the hands of the
general government, the authority, whenever they shall be
disposed, and a favorable opportunity offers, to deprive the
body of the people in effect, of all share in the government.
The opposers to the constitution universally agree in this'
objection, and of such force is it, that most of its ardent advo-
cates admit its validity, anci those who have made attempts
to vindicate it, have been reduced to the necessity of using
the most trifling arguipents to justify it.
The mixture of legislative, judicial, and executive powers
, in the senate ; the little degree of responsibility under which
the great ofificers of government will be held ; and the liberty
granted by the system to establish and maintain a standing
army without any limitation or restriction, are also objected
to the constitution ; and in these there is a great degree of
unanimity of sentiment in the opposers.
''From these remarks it appears, that the opponents to the
system accord in the great and material points on which they
wish amendments. For the truth of the as- [15] sertion, I
appeal to the protest of the minority of the convention of
of Pennsylvania, to all the publications against the constitu-
tion, and to the debates of the convention of Massachusetts-
As a higher authority than these, I appeal to the amendments
proposed by the Massachusetts ; these are to be considered
as the sense of that body upon the defects of the system,
i^nd it is a fact, which I will venture to assert, that a large
majority of the convention were of opinion, that a number of
additional alterations ought to be made. Upon reading the
articles which they propose as amendments, it will appear
that they object to indefinite powers in the legislature — to
I04 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH.
the power of laying direct taxes — to the authority of regulat-
ing elections — to the extent of the judicial powers, both a!s it
respects the inferior court and the appellate jurisdiction — to
the smallness of the representation, &c. — It is adn:iitted that
some writers have advanced objections that others have not
noticed — that exceptions have been taken by some, that have
not been insisted upon by others, and it is probable, that some
of the opponents may approve what others will reject. But
still these difference are on matters of small importance, and of
such a nature as the persons who hold different opinions will
not be tenacious of. Perfect uniformity of sentiment on so
great a political subject is not to be expected. Every sensible
man is impressed with this idea, and is therefore prepared to
make concessions and accommodate on matters of small im-
portance. It is sufiScient that we agree in the great leading
principles, which relate to the preservation of public liberty
and private security. And on^ these I will venture to afifirm
we are as well agreed, as any people ever were on a question
of this nature. I dare pronounce that were the principal
advocates for the proposed plan to write comments upon it,
they would differ more in the sense they would give the consti-
tution, than those who oppose it do, in the amendments they
would wish. I am justified in this opinion, by the sentiments
advanced by the different writers in favour of the constitution.
It is farther insisted, that six states have already adopted
the constitution ; that probably nine will agree to it ; in which
case it will be put in operation. That it is unreasonable to
expect that those states which have acceded [i6] to it will
reconsider the subject in compliance with the wishes of a
minority.
To perceive the force of this objection it is proper to
review the conduct and circumstances of the states which have
acceded it. It cannot be controverted, that Connecticut and
New Jersey were very much influenced in their determinations
on the questions, by local considerations. The duty of impost
laid by this state, has been a subject of complaint by those
states. The new constitution transfers the power of imposing
these duties from the state to the general government, and car-
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 105
ries the proceeds to the use of the union, instead of that of
those state. This is a popular matter with the people of those
states, and at the same time, is not advanced by the sensible
opposers to the system in this state as an objection to it.— To
excite in the minds of the people of these states an attachment
to the new system, the amount of the revenue arising from
our impost has been magnified to a much larger sum than it
produces; it has been stated to amount to from sixty to eighty
thousand pounds lawful money ; and a gentleman of high emi-
nence in Connecticut has lent the authority of his name to
support it. It has been said, that Connecticut pays a third of
this sum annually for impost, and Jersey nearly as much. It
has farther been asserted, that the avails of the impost were
applied to the separate use of the state of New York. By
these assertions the people have been grossly imposed upon,
for neither of them are true.
The amount of the revenue from impost for two years past,
has not exceeded fifty thousands pounds currency, per annum,
and a drawback of duties is allowed by law, upon all goods
exported to the beforementioned states, in casks or packages
unbroken.
The whole of this sum, and more, has been paid into the
federal treasury for the support of the government of the
union. All the states therefore have actually derived equal
benefit with the state of New York, from the impost. It may
be said, I know, that this state has obtained credit for the
amount, upon the requisitions of Congress : It is admitted,
but still it is a fact, that other states, and especially those who
complain, have paid no part of the monies required of them,
and have scarcely made an effort to do it. The fact therefore
is, that they have re- [17] ceived as much advantage from the
impost of this state as we ourselves have. The proposed consti-
tution directs to no mode, in which the deficiencies of states on
former requisitions, are to be collected, but seems to hold out
the idea, that we are to start out anew, and all past payments
be forgotten. It' is natural to expect, that selfish motives will
have too powerful an influence on men's minds, and that too
often, they will shut the eyes of a people to their best and
Io6 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH.
true interest. The people of those states have been persuaded
to believe, that this new constitution will relieve them from
the burden of taxes, by providing for all the exigencies of the
union, by duties which can be raised only in the neighbouring
states. When they come to be convinced, that this promise
is a mere delusion, as they assuredly will, by finding the con-
tinental tax-gatherer knocking at their doors, if not before,
they will be among the first to urge amendments, and perhaps
the most violent to obtain them. But notwithstanding the
local prejudices which operate upon the people of these states,
a considerable part of them wish for amendments. It is not
to be doubted that a considerable majority of the people of
Connecticut wish for them, and many in Jersey have the same
desires, and their numbers are increasing. It cannot be dis-
puted, that amendments would accord with the sentiments
of a great majority in Massachusetts, or that they would be
agreeable to the greater part of the people of Pennsylvania :
There is no reason to doubt but that they would be agreeable
to Delaware and Georgia — If then, the states who have already
ratified the constitution, are desirous to have alterations made
in it, what reason can be assigned why they should not cor-
dially meet with overtures for that purpose from any state,
and concur in appointing a convention to effect it ? Mankind
are easily induced to fall into measures to obtain an object
agreeable to them. In this case, the states would not only be
moved by this universal principle of human nature, but by the
strong and powerful motive of uniting all the states under a
form of government agreeable to them.
I shall now dismiss the consideration of objections made to
attempting alterations previous to the adoption of the plan,
but before I close, I beg your indulgence, while I make some
remarks on the splendid advantages which the advocates of
this system say are to be derived from it. — Hope and fear are
two of the most active principles of [i8] our nature : We have
considered how the latter is addressed on this occasion, and
with how little reason : It will appear that the promises it
makes, are as little to be relied upon as its threatenings. We
are amused with the fair prospects that are to open, when this
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 107
government is put into operation — Agriculture is to flourish,
and our fields to yield an hundred fold — Commerce is to
expand her wings, and bear our productions to all the ports in
the world — Money is to pour into our country through every
channel — Arts and manufactures are to rear their heads, and
every mecanic find full employ— Those who are in debt, are
to find easy means to procure money to pay them — Public
burdens and taxes are to be lightened, and yet all our public
debts are soon to be discharged. — With such vain and delusive
hopes are the minds of many honest and well meaning people
fed, and by th,ese means are they led inconsiderately to con-
tend for a government, which is made to promise what it can-
not perform ; while their minds are diverted from contemplat-
ing its true nature, or considering whether it" will not endanger
their liberties, and work oppression.
Far be it from me to object to granting the general govern-
ment the power of regulating trade, and of laying imposts and
duties for that purpose, as well as for raising a revenue : 'But
it is as far from me to flatter people with hopes of benefits to
be derived from such a change in our government which can
never be realized. Some advantages may accrue from vest-
ing in one general government, the right to regulate commerce,
but it is a vain delusion to expect anything like what is prom-
ised. The truth is, this country buys more than it sells : It
imports more than it exports. There are too many merchants
in proportion to the farmers and manufacturers. Until these
defects are remedied, no government can relieve us. Common
sense dictates, that if a man buys more than he sells, he will
remain in debt ; the same is true of a country. — And as long
as this country imports more goods than the exports
the overplus must be paid for in money or not paid at all.
These few remarks may convince us, that the radical remedy
for the scarcity of cash is frugality and industry. Earn much
and spend little, and you will be enabled to pay your debts,
and have money in your pockets ; and if you do not follow
[19] this advice, no government that can be framed, will relieve
you.
As to the idea of being relieved from taxes by this govern-
I08 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH.
ment, it is an affront to common sense, to advance it. There
is no complaint made against the present confederation more
justly founded than this, that it is incompetent to provide the
means to discharge our national debt, and to support the
national government. Its inefficacy to these purposes, which
was early seen and felt, was the first thing that suggested the
necessity of changing the government ; other things, it is truci
were afterwards found to require alterations ; but this was the
most important, and accordingly we find, that while in some
other things the powers of this government seem to be in some
measure limited, on the subject of raising money, no bounds
are set to it. It is authorised to raise money to any amount,
and in any way it pleases. If then, the capital embarrassment
in our present government arises from the want of money, and
this constitution effectually authorises the raising of it, how
are the taxes to be lessened by it ? Certainly money can only
be raised by taxes of some kind or other; it must be got either
by additional impositions on trade, by excise, or by direct
taxes, or what is more probable, by all together. In either
way, it amounts to the same thing, and the position is clear,
that as the necessities of the nation require more money than
is now raised, the taxes must be enhanced. This you ought
to know, and prepare yourselves to submit to. — Besides, how
is it possible that the taxes can be decreased when the
expences of your government will be greatly advanced ? It
does not require any great skill in politics, or ability at calcu-
lation to shew, that the new government will cost more
money to administer it, than the present. I shall not descend
to an estimate of the cost of a federal town, the salaries of
the president, vice-president, judges, and other great officers
of state, nor calculate the amount of the pay the legislature
will vote themselves, or the salaries that will be paid the innum-
erable and subordinate officers. The bare mention of these
things is sufficient to convince you, that the new government
will be vastly more expensive than the old : And how is the
money to answer these purposes to be obtained ? It is obvious,
it must be taken out of the pockets of the people, by taxes,
in some mode or other,
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. IO9
[20] Having remarked upon the arguments which have been
advanced, to induce you to accede to this government, with-
out amendments, and I trust refuted them, suffer me to close
with an address dedicated by the affection of a brother, and
the honest zeal of a lover of his country.
Friends, countrymen, and fellow-citizens.
The present is the most important crisis at which you
ever have arrived. You have before you a question big with
consequences, unutterably important to yourselves, to your
children, to generations yet unborn, to the cause of liberty
and of mankind ; every motive of religion and virtue, of private
happiness and public good, of honour and dignity, should urge
you to consider cooly and determine wisely.
Almost all the governments that have arisen among man-
kind, have sprung from force and violence. The records of \c
history inform us of none that have been the result of cool
and dispassionate reason and reflection : It is reserved for this
favoured country to exhibit to mankind the first example.
This opportunity is now given us, and we are to
exercise our rights in the choice of persons to represent us in
convention, to deliberate and determine upon the constitution
proposed : It will be to our everlasting disgrace to be indiffer-
ent on such a subject; for it is impossible, we can contemplate
anything that relates to the affairs of this life of half the
importance.
You have heard that both sides on this great question,
agree, that there are in it great defects ; yet the one side tell
you, choose such men .as will adopt it, and then amend it
while the other say, amend previous to its adoption.
I have stated to you my reasons for the latter, and I think
they are unanswerable. — Consider you the common people
the yeomanry of the country, for to such I principally address
myself, you are to be the principal losers, if the constitution
should prove oppressive ; When a tyranny is established,
there are always masters as well as slaves ; the great and
well-born are generally the former, and the middhng class the
latter — Attempts have been made, and will be repeated, to
no ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH.
alarm you with the fear of consequences; but reflect there are
consequences on both sides, and none can be apprehended
more dreadful, than entailing on ourselves and poste-[2i] rity
a government which will raise a.few to the height of human
greatness and wealth, while it will depress the many to the
extreme of poverty and wretchedness. Consequences are
under the controul of that ^1-wise and ykll-powerful ybeing,
whose providence conducts the affairs of all men : Our part is
to act right, and we may then have confidence that the conse-
quences will be favourable. The path in which you should
walk is plain and open before you ; be united as one man, and
direct your choice to such men as have been uniform in theif
opposition to the proposed system in its present form, or
without proper alterations : In men of this description you
have reason to place confidence, while on the other hand, you
have just cause to distrust those who urge the adoption of a
bad constitution, under the delusive expectation of making
amendments after it is acceded to. Your jealousy of such
characters should be the more excited, when you consider that
the advocates for the constitution have shifted their ground.
When men are uniform in their opinions, it affords evidence
that they are sincere : When they are shifting, it gives reason
to believe, they do not change from conviction. It must be
recollected, that when this plan was first announced to the
public, its supporters cried it up as the most perfect produc-
tion of human wisdom ; It was represented either as having no
defects, or if it had, they were so trifling and inconsiderable,
that they served only, as the shades in a fine picture, to set
off the piece to the greater advantage. One gentleman in
Philadelphia went so far in the ardour of his enthusiasm in its
favour, as to pronounce, that the men who formed it were as
really under the guidance of Divine Revelation, as was Moses,
the Jewish lawgiver. Their language is now changed; the
question has been discussed ; the objections to the plan ably
stated, and they are admitted to be unanswerable. The same
men who held it almost perfect, now admit it is very imper-
fect ; that it is necessary it should be amended. The only
question between us, is simply this : Shall we accede to a bad
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. Ill
constitution, under the uncertain prospect of getting it
amended, after we have received it, or shall we amend it
before we adopt it ? Common sense will point out which is
the most rational, which is the most secure line of conduct.
May heaven inspire you with wisdom, union, moderation and
firni- [22] ness, and give you hearts to make a proper estimate
of your invaluable privileges, and preserve them to you, to be
transmitted to your posterity unimpaired, and may they be
maintained in this our country, while Sun and Moon endure.
A Plebeian.
POSTCRIPT.
Since the foregoing pages have been put to the press, a
pamphlet has appeared, entitled, " An addresss to the people
of the state of New York, on the subject of the new iconstitu-
tion, &c." Upon a cursory examination of this performance
(for I have not had time to give it more than a cursory exam-
ination) it appears to contain little more than declamation and
observations that have been often repeated by the advocates
of the new constitution.
An attentive reader will readily perceive, that almost every-
thing deserving the name of an argument in this publication,
has received consideration, and, I trust, a satisfactory answer
in the preceding remarks, so far as they apply to prove the
necessity of an immediate adoption of the plan, without
amendments.
I shall therefore only beg the patience of my readers,
while I make a few very brief remarks on this piece.
The author introduces his observations with a short history
of the revolution, and of the establishment of the present
existing federal government. He draws a frightful picture of
our condition under the present confederation. The whole
of what he says on that head, stripped of its artificial colouring,
amounts to this, that the existing system is rather commend-
atory than coercive, or that Congress have not in most cases,
112 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH.
the power of enforcing their own resolves. This he calls " a
new and wonderful system." However " wonderful " it may
seem, it certainly is not " new." For most of \}ae. federal gov-
ernments that have been in the world, have been of the same
nature. The united Netherlands are governed on the same
plan. There are other governments also now existing, which
are in a similar condition with our's, with regard to several
particulars, on account of which this author denominates it
"new and wonderful." The king of Great Britain "may
make war, but has not power to raise money to carry it on."
He may borrow money, but it is without the means of repay-
ment, &c. For these he is dependent on his parliament.
But it is needless to add on [24] this head, because it is
admitted that the powers of the general government ought to
be increased in several of the particulars this author instances.
But these things are mentioned to shew, that the outcry
made against the confederation, as being a system new,
unheard of, and absurd, is really without foundation.
The author proceeds to depicture our present condition
in the high-wrought strains common to his party. 1 shall
add nothing to what I have said on this subject in the former
part of this pamphlet, but will only observe, that his imputing
our being kept out of the possession of the western posts, and
our want of peace with the Algerines, to the defects in our
present government, is much easier said than proved. The
British keep possession of these posts, because it subserves
their interest, and probably will do so, until they perceive
that we have gathered strength and resources sufficient to
assert our rights with the sword. Let our government be
what it will, this cannot be done without time and patience.
In the present exhausted situation of the country, it would be
madness in us, had we ever so perfect a government, to com-
mence a war for the recovery of these posts. With regard
to the Algerines, there are but two ways in which their rav-
ages can be prevented. The one is, by a successful war against
them, and the other is by treaty. The powers of Congress
under the confederation are completely competent either to
declare war against them, or to form treaties. Money, it is
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. II3
true, is necessary to do both these. This only brings us to this
conclusion, that the great defect in our present government, is
the want of powers to provide money for the public exigen-
cies. I am willing to grant reasonable powers, on this score, but
not unlimited ones ; commercial treaties may be made under
the present powers of Congress. I am persuaded we flatter
ourselves with advantages which will result from them, that
will never be realized. I know of no benefits that we receive
from any that have yet been formed.
This author tells us, " it is not his design to investigate
merits of the plan, nor of the objections made to it." It is
well he did not undertake it, for if he had, from the specimen
he has given, the cause he assumes would not have probably
gained much strength by it.
He however takes notice of two or three of the many
objections brought against the plan.
" We are told, (says he) among other strange things, that
" the liberty of the press is left insecure by the proposed con-
" stitution, and yet that constitution says neither more nor
"less [25] about it, than the constitution of the state of New
" York does. We are told it deprives us of trial by jury,
"whereas the fact is, that it expressly secures it in certain
" cases, and takes it away in none, &c. it is absurd to construe
" the silence of this, or of our own constitution relative to a
" great number of our rights into a total extinction of them ;
" silence and a blank paper neither grant nor take away any-
" thing."
It may be a strange thing to this author to hear the people
of America anxious for the preservation of their rights, but
those who understand the true principles of liberty, are no
strangers to their importance. The man who supposes the
constitution, in any part of it, is like a blank piece of paper,
has very erroneous ideas of it. He may be assured every
clause has a meaning, and many of them such extensive
meaning, as would take a volume to unfold. The suggestion,
that the liberty of the press is secure, because it is not in
express words spoken of in the constitution, and that the trial
by jury is not taken away, because it is not said in so many
114 ADDRESS BY MTELANCTHON SMITH.
words and letters it is so, is puerile and unworthy of a mair
who pretends to reason. We contend, that by the indefinite
powers granted to the general government, the liberty of the
press may be restricted by duties, &c. and therefore the con-
stitution ought to have stipulated for its freedom. The trial
by jury, in all civil cases, is left at the discretion of the gen-
eral government, except in the supreme court on the appelate
Jurisdiction, and in this I affirm ft is taken away, not by express,
words, but by fair and legitimate construction and inference ;;
for the supreme court have expressly given them an appelate
jurisdiction, in every case to which their powers extend (with
two or three exceptions) both as to law and fact. The court-
are the judges ; every man in the country, who has served as
a juror, knows, that there is a difference between the court
and the jury, and: that the lawyers in their pleadings make the
distinction, 'if the court, upon appeals, are to determine both'
the law and the fact,, there is no room for a jury,^nd the right
of trial in this mode is taken away.
The author manifests levity in referring to the constitution,
of this state, to shew that it was useless to stipulate for the
liberty of the press, or to insert a bill of rights in the constitu-
tion. With regjard to the first, ft is perhaps an inxperfection-
in our constitution that the liberty of the press is not
expressly reserved ; but still there was not equal necessity of
making this reservation in our State as |in the general Consti-
tution, for the common and statute law of England, and the
laws of the '[26] colony are established, in which this privflege-
is fully defined and secured. It is true, a bill of rights is not
prefixed to our constitution, as it is in that of some of the
states ; but still this author knaws, that marry essential right»
are reserved in the body of it - and I will promise, that every
opposer of this system will be satisfied,,if the stipulations that
they contend for are agreed to, whether they are prefixed^,
affixed, or inserted in the body of the constitution, and that
they will not contend which way this is done; if it be but
done. I shall add but one remark, and that is upon the hack-
neyed argument introduced by the author, drawn from the
character and ability of the framers of the new constitution.
5-
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. II^,^
The favourers of this system are not very prudent in bringing
this forward. It provokes to an investigation of characters,
which is an inviduous task. I do not wish to detract frbm
their merits, but I will venture to affirm, that twenty assem-
blies of equal number might be collected, equally respectable
both in _point of ability, integrity, and patriotism. Some of
the characters which compose- it I revere ; others I consider as
of small consequence, and a number are suspected of being
great public defaulters, and to have been guilty of notorious
peculation and fraud, with regard to public property in the
hour of our distress. I will not descend to personalities, nor
would I have said so much on the subject, had it not been in
self defence. Let the constitution stand on its own merits^
If it be, good, it stands not in need of great men's names to
support it. If it be bad, their names ought not to sanction it.
FINIS,
The Weakness of Brutus exposed : / or, some /
Remarks / in / Vindication of the Constitution / proposed
by the late / Federal Convention, / against the / Objec-
tions and gloomy Fears of that Writer / Humbly offered
to the Public, / By / a Citizen of Philadelphia. / Phila-
delphia, / Printed for, and to be had of John Sparhawk, in
Market- Street^ / near the Court House / m.dcc.lxxxvii.
i2mo., pp. 23.
Written by Pelatiah Webster, a Philadelphia merchant, and
author of a number of pamphlets on the finances and govern-
ment of the United States, most of which he reprinted in his
" Political Essays " in Philadelphia in 1791.
Brutus was the signature (of Thomas Treadwell, of Suf-
folk County, N. Y.?) to a series of sixteen newspaper essays in
the New York Journal, which were extensively copied through-
out the country. This is an answer to the first essay only,
and was published November 4th, 1787.
p. L. F.
nnHE long piece signed Brutus, (which was first published
in a New-York paper, and was afterwards copied into the
Pennsylvania Packet of the 26th instant) is wrote in a very
good stile ; the language is easy, and. the address is polite and
insinuating : but the sentiments, I conceive, are not only
unsound, but wild and chimerical ; the dreary fears and
apprehensions, altogether groundless ; and the whole tendency
of the piece, in this important crisis of our politics, very
hurtful. I have therefore thought it my duty to make some
animadversions on it ; which I here offer, with all due deference,
to the Author and to the Public.
His first question is. Whether a confederated government is
best for the United States f
I answer. If Brutus, or any body else, cannot find any
benefit resulting from the union of the Thirteen States ; if
they can do without as well as with the respectability, the
protection, and the security, which the States might derive
from that union, I have nothing further to say : but if that
union is to be supported in any such manner as to afford
[4] respectability, protection, or security to the States, I say it
must be done by an adequate government, and cannot be
otherwise done.
This government must have a supreme power, superior to
and able to controul each and all of its parts. 'Tis essential to
all governments, that such a power be somewhere existing in
it ; and if the place where the proposed Constitution has fixed
it, does not suit Brutus and his friends, I will give him leave
to stow it away in any other place that is better : but I will
not consent to have it annihilated ; neither will I agree to
have it cramped and pinched for room, so as to lessen its
energy ; for that will destroy both its nature and use.
The supreme power of government ought to be full,
definite, established, and acknowledged. Powers of government
too limited, or uncertain and disputed, have ever proved, like
I20 REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER.
Pandora's box, a most fruitful source of quarrels, animosities,
wars, devastation, and ruin, in all shapes and degrees, in all
communities, states and kingdoms on earth.
Nothing tends more to the honour, establishment, and
peace of society, than public decisions, grounded on principles
of right, natural fitness and prudence ; but when the powers
of government are too limited, such decisions can't be made
and enforced ; so the mischief goes without a remedy : dreadful
examples of which we have felt, in instances more than enough,
for seven years past.
[5] Further, where the powers of government are not definite
but disputed, the administration dare not make decisions on
the footing of impartial justice and right ; but must temporize
with the parties, lest they lose friends or make enemies-: and
of course the righteous go off injured and disgusted, and the
wicked go grumbling to ; for 'tis rare that any sacrifices of a
court can satisfy a prevailing party in the state.
'Tis necessary in States, as well as in private families, that
controversies should have a just, J/^^d^;', and effectual decision,
that right may be done before the contention has time to grow
up into habits of malignity, resentment, ill nature, and ill
ofifices. If a controversy happens between two states, must
it continue undecided, and daily increase, and be more and
more aggravated, by the repeated insults and injuries of the
contending parties, 'till they are ripe for the decision of the
sword? or must the weaker states suffer, without remedy, the
groundless demands and oppressions of their stronger neigh-
bours, because they have no avenger, or umpire of their
disputes ?
Or shall we institute a supreme power with full and effectual
authority to controul the animosities, and decide the disputes
of these strong contending bodies ? In the one proposed to
to us, we have perhaps every chance of a righteous judgment,
that we have any reason [6] to hope for ; but I am clearly of
opinion, that even a wrongful decision, would, in most cases,
be preferable to the continuance of such destructive contro-
versies.
I suppose that neither Brutus nor any of his friends would
REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. 121
wish to see our government embroiled abroad ; and therefore
will admit it necessary to institute some federal authority,
sufificient to punish any individual or State, who shall violate
our treaties with foreign nations, insult their dignity, or abuse
their citizens, and compel due reparation in all such cases.
I further apprehend, that Brutus is willing to have the
general interest and welfare of the States well provided for
and supported, and therefore will consent that there shall
exist in the states, an authority to do all this effectually ; but
he seems grieved that Congress should be the judges of this
general welfare ol the states. If he will be kind enough to
point out any other more suitable and proper judges, I will
consent to have them admitted.
Indeed I begin to have hopes of Brutus, and think he may
come right at last ; for I observe (after all his fear and tremb-
lings about the new government) the constitution he defines
and adopts, is the very same as that which the federal conven-
tion have proposed to us, viz. "that the Thirteen States
should continue thirteen confederated republics under the
direction and controul of a supreme [7] federal head, for
certain defined national purposes, only." Where we may
observe,
1. That the new Constitution leaves all the Thirteen States,
complete republics, as it found them, but all confederated
under the direction and controul of a federal head, for certain
defined national purposes only, i. e. it leaves all the dignities,
authorities, and internal police of each State in free, full, and
perfect condition ; unless when national purposes make the
controul of them by the federal head, or authority, necessary
to the general benefit.
2. These powers of controul by the federal head or author-
ity, are defined in the new constitution, as minutely as may
be, in their principle ; and any detail of them which may be-
come necessary, is committed to the wisdom of Congress.
3. It extends the controuling power of the federal head to
no one case, to which the jurisdiction or power of definitive
decision of any one state, can be competent. And,
4. In every such case, the controuling power of the federal
122 REPLY TO BRt/tUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER.
head, is absolutely necessary to the support, dignity, and
benefit of the national government, and the safety of individ-
uals ; neither of which can, by any possibility, be secured
without it.
All this falls in pretty well with Brutus's sentiments; for
he does not think that the new Constitution in its present
state so very bad, [8] but fears that it will not preserve its
purity of institution ; but if adopted, will immediately verge
to, and terminate in a consolidation, i. e. a destruction of the
state governments. For argument, he suggests the avidity of
power natural to rulers ; and the eager grasp with which they
hold it when obtained ; and their strong propensity to abuse
their power, and encroach on the liberties of the people.
He dwells on the vast powers vested in Congress by the
new Constitution, i. e. of levying taxes, raising armies, ap-
pointing federal courts, &c.; takes it for granted, that all these
powers will be abused, and carried to an oppressive excess ;
and then harangues on the dreadful case we shall be in, when
our wealth is all devoured by taxes, our liberty destroyed by
the power of the army, and our civil rights all sacrificed by
the unbounded power of the federal courts, &c.
And when he has run himself out of breath with this dreary
declamation, he comes to the conclusion he set out with, viz.
That the Thirteen States are too big for a republican govern-
ment, which requires small territory, and can't be supported
in more extensive nations ; that in large states liberty will soon
be swallowed up, and lost in the magnitude of power requisite
in the government, &c.
[9] If any conclusion at all can be drawn from this baseless
assemblage of gloomy thoughts, I think it must be against any
union at all ; against any kind of federal government. For
nothing can be plainer than this, viz. that the union can't by
any possibility be supported with success, without adequate and
effectual powers of government ?
We must have money to support the union, and therefore
the power of raising it must be lodged somewhere ; we must
have a military force, and of consequence the power of raising
and directing it must exist ; civil and criminal causes of na-
REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. 1 23
tional concern will arise, therefore there must be somewhere a
power of appointing courts to hear and determine them.
These powers must be vested in Congress ; for nobody pre-^
tends to wish to have them vested in any other body of men.
The Thirteen States have a territory very extensive, and
inhabitants very numerous, and every day rapidly increasing ;
therefore the powers of government necessary to support their
union must be great in proportion. If the ship is large the
mast must be proportionately great, or it will be impossible
to make her sail well. The federal powers must extend to
every part of the federal territory, i. e. to the utmost limits of
the Thirteen States, and to every part of them ; and must
carry with them, sufficient [10] authority to secure the ex-
ecution of them ; and these powers must be vested in Con-
gress, and the execution of them must be under their direction
and controul.
These powers are vast, I know, and the trust is of the
most weighty kind that can be committed to human direction ;
and the execution and administration of it will require the
greatest wisdom, knowledge, firmness, and integrity in that
august body ; and I hope they will have all the abilities and
virtues necessary to that important station, and will perform
their duty well ; but if they fail, the fault is in them, not in
the constitution. The best constitution possible, even a di-
vine one, badly administered, will make a bad government.
The members of Congress will be the best we can get ;
they will all of them derive their appointment from the
States, and if the States are not wise enough to send good and
suitable men, great blame, great sin will lie at their door. But
I suppose nobody would wish to mend this fault by taking
away the election of the people, and directing the appoint-
ment of Congress to be made in any other way.
When we have got the best that can be obtained, we ought
to be quiet and cease complaining. 'Tis not in the power of
human wisdom to do more ; 'tis the fate of human nature to
be imperfect and to err ; and [11] no doubt but Congress, with
all their dignity of station and character, with all their oppor-
tunities to gain wisdom and information, with all their induce-
124 REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER.
ments to virtue and integrity, will err, and abuse or misapply
their powers in more or less instances. I have no expectation
that they will make a court of angels, or be anything more
than men : 'tis probable many of them will be insufficient
men, and some of them may be bad men.
The greatest wisdom, care, and caution, has been used in
the mode of their appointment ; in the restraints and checks
under which they must act ; in the numerous discussions and
deliberations which all their acts must pass through, before
they can receive the stamp of authority; in the terrors of
punishment if they misbehave. I say, in all these ways the
greatest care has been used to procure and form a good Con-
gress.
The dignity and importance of their station and character
will afford all the inducements to virtue and effort, which can
influence a mind capable of their force.
Their own personal reputation, with the eyes of all the
world on them, — the approbation of their fellow citizens,
which every man in public station naturally wishes to enjoy,
— and the dread of censure and shame, all contribute very
forceable and strong inducements to noble, upright and
worthy behavior.
[12] The particular interest which every member of Congress
has in every public order and resolution, is another strong
mo live to right action. For every act to which any member
gives his sanction, if it be raising an army, levying a tax, in-
stituting a court, or any other act to bind the States, — such
act will equally bind himself, his nearest connections, and his
posterity.
Another mighty influence to the noblest principle of action
will be the fear of God before their eyes ; for while they %\\ in
the place of God, to give law, justice, and right to the States,
they must be monsters indeed if they do not regard his law,
and imitate his character.
If all this will not produce a Congress fit to be trusted,
and worthy of the public confidence, I think we may give the
matter up as impracticable. But still we must make ourselves
as easy as we can, under a mischief which admits no remedy^
REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. 125
and bear with patience an evil which can't be cured: for a
government we must have ; there is no safety without it ^
though we know it will be imperfect, we still must prefer it tcy
anarchy or no government at all. 'Tis the height of folly and
madness to reject a necessary convenience, because it is not a
perfect good.
Upon this statement of facts and principles, (for the truth
and reality of which, I appeal [13] to every candid man,) I beg
leave to remark,
1. That the federal Convention, in the constitution pro-
posed to us, have exerted their utmost to produce a Congress
worthy of the public confidence, who shall have abilities ade-
quate to their important duty, and shall act under every pos-
sible inducement to execute it faithfully.
2. That this affords every chance which the nature of the
thing will admit, of a wise and upright administration.
3. Yet all this notwithstanding, 'tis very possible that Con-
gress may err, may abuse, or misapply their powers, which no
precaution of human wisdom can prevent.
4. 'Tis vain, 'tisxhildish, 'tis contentious to object to a con-
stitution thus framed and guarded, on pretence that the com-
monwealth may suffer by a bad administration of it ; or to
withhold the necessary powers of government, from the su-
preme rulers of it, least they should abuse or misapply those
powers. This is an objection which will operate with equal
force against every institution that can be made in this world,
whether of policy, religion, commerce, or any other human
concern, which can require regulations : for 'tis not possible
to form any institution however necessary, wise and good,
whose uses may not be lessened or destroyed by bad man-
agement. 1
If Brutus, or any body else, can point out [14] any checks,
cautions, or regulations, which have been hitherto omitted,
which will make Congress more wise, more capable, moje dili-
gent, or more faithful, I am willing to attend to them. But
to set Congress at the head of the government, and object tO'
their being vested with full and sufficient power to manage all
the great departments of it, appears to me absurd, quite wild^
126 REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER.
and chimerical : it would produce a plan which would destroy
itself as it went along, would be a sort of counter position of
contrary parts, and render it impossible for rulers to render
those services, and secure those benefits to the States, which
are the only great ends of their appointment.
The constitution under Brutus's corrections would stand
thus, viz. Congress would have power to raise money, but must
not direct the quanity, or mode of levying it ; they might raise
armies, but must not judge to ^t. number oi soldiers necessary,
or direct their destination ; they ought to provide for the gen-
eral welfare, but must not be judges of what that welfare con-
sists in, or in what manner 'tis to be provided for ; they might
controul the several States, for defined national purposes, but
must not be judges of what purposes would come within that
definition, &c.
Any body with half an eye, may see what sort of adminis-
tration the constitution, thus corrected, would produce, e. g.
it would [15] require much greater trouble to leave the work
undone, than would be necessary to get it well done, under a
constitution of sufificient powers. If any one wishes to view
more minutely this blessed operation, he may see a lively
sample of it, in the last seven years practice of our federal
government.
5. Brutus all along sounds his objections, and fears on ex-
treme cases of abuse or misapplication of supreme powers,
which raay possibly happen, under the administration of a wild,
weak, or wicked Congress ; but 'tis easy to observe that all in-
stitutions are liable to extremes, but ought not to be fudged by
them ; they do not often appear, and perhaps never may ; but
if they should happen in the cases supposed, (which God
forbid) there is a remedy pointed out, in the Constitution itself.
'Tis not supposeable that such abuses could arise to any
ruinous height, before they would affect the States so much,
that at least two-thirds of them would unite in pursuing a
remedy in the mode prescribed by the Constitution, which
will always be liable to amendment, whenever any mischiefs
or abuses appear in the government, which the Constitution
in its present state, can't reach and correct.
REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. 1 27
6. Brutus thinks we can never be too much afraid of the
encroaching avidity of rulers ; but 'tis pretty plain, that how-
ever great the natural lust of power in rulers may be, the
jealousy of the people in giving it, is about [16] equal ; these
two opposite passions, will always operate in opposite directions
to each other, and like action and reaction in natural bodies,
will ever tend to a good ballance.
At any rate, the Congress can never get more power than
the people will give, nor hold it any longer than they will
permit ; for should they assume tyrannical powers, and make
incroachments on liberty without the consent of the people,
they would soon attone for their temerity, with shame and
disgrace, and probably with their heads.
But 'tis here to be noted, that all the danger does not arise
from the extreme of power in the rulers ; for when the ballance
verges to the contrary extreme, and the power of the rulers
becomes too much limited and cramped, all the nerves of
government are weakened, and the administration must una-
voidably sicken, and lose that energy which is absolutely
necessary for the support of the State, and the security of the
people. For 'tis a truth worthy of great attention, that laws
are not made so much for the righteous as for the wicked ;
who never fail to shelter themselves from punishment, when-
ever they can, under the defetts of the law, and the weakness
of government.
I now come to consider the grand proposition which
Brutus sets out with, concludes with, and interlards all along,
and which [17] seems to be the great gift of his performance,
viz. That a confederation of the Thirteen States into one
great republic is not best for them : and goes on to prove by
a variety of arguments, that a republican form of government
is not compatible, and cannot be convenient to so extensive a
territory as the said States possess. He begins by taking one
assumption for granted (for I can't see that his arguments
prove it at all) viz. That the Constitution proposed will
melt down and destroy the jurisdiction of the particular States,
and consolidate them all into one great republic.
I can't see the least reason for this sentiment ; nor the
128 REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER.
least tendency in the new Constitution to produce this effect.
For the Constitution does not suffer the federal powers to
controul in the least, or so much as to interfere in the internal
policy, jurisdiction, or municipal rights of any particular State:
except where great and manifest national purposes and inter-
ests make that controul necessary. It appears very evident
to me, that the Constitution gives an establishment, support,
and protection to the internal and separate police of each
State, under the superintendency of the federal powers, which
it could not possibly enjoy in an independent state. Under
the confederation each State derives strength, iirmness and
permanency from its compact with the other States. Like
a stave in a cask well bound with hoops, it [i8] stands firmer,
is not so easily shaken, bent, or broken, as it would be
were it set up by itself alone, without any connection with its
neighbours.
There can be no doubt that each State will receive from
the union great support and protection against the invasions
and inroads of foreign enemies, as well as against riots and
insurrections of their own citizens ; and of consequence, the
course of their internal administration will be secured by this
means against any interruption or embarrassment from either
of these causes.
They will also derive their share of benefit from the re-
spectability of the union abroad, from the treaties and alliances ,
which may be made with foreign nations, &c.
Another benefit they will receive from the controul of the
supreme power of the union is this, viz. they w'ill be restrained
from making angry, oppressive, and destructive laws, from
declaring ruinous wars with their neighbours, from fomenting
quarrels and controversies, &c. all which ever weaken a state,
tend to its fatal disorder, and often end in its dissolution.
Righteousness exalts and strengthens a nation ; but sin is a
reproach and weakening of any people.
They will indeed have the privilege of oppressing their
own citizens by bad laws or bad administration ; but the mo-
ment the mischief extends beyond their own State, and
[19] begins to affect the citizens of other States strangers.
REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. I29
or the national welfare, — the salutary controul of the supreme
power will check the evil, and restore strength and security,
as well as honesty and right, to the offending state.
It appears then very plain, that the natural effect and
tendency of the supreme powers of the union is to give
strength, establishment, and permanency to the internal
police and jurisdiction of each of the particular States ; not to
melt down and destroy, but to support and comfirm them all.
By what sort of assurance, then, can Brutus tell us that
the new Constitution, if executed, must certainly and infalli-
bly terminate in a consolidation of the whole, into one great
republic, subverting all the State authorities. His only argu-
ment is, that the federal powers may be corrupted, abused,
and misapplied, 'till this effect shall be produced. 'Tis true
that the constitution, like every other on earth, committed to
human management, may be corrupted by a bad administra-
tion, and be made to operate to the destruction of the very
capital benefits and uses, which were the great end of its in-
stitution. The same argument will prove with equal cogency,
that the constitution of each particular State, may be cor-
rupted in practice, become tyranical and inimical to liberty.
In short the argument proves too much, and therefore proves
nothing : [20] 'tis empty, childish, and futile, and a serious
proposal of it, is, I conceive, an affront to the human under-
standing.
But after all, supposing this event should take place, and
by some strange fatality, the several states should be melted
down, and merged in the great commonwealth, in the form
of counties, or districts ; I don't see why a commonwealth
mode of government, would not be as suitable and convenient
for the great State, as any other form whatever ; I cannot see
any sufficient ground or reason, for the position pretty often
and boldly advanced, that a republican form of government
can never be suitable for any nation of extensive territory,
and numerous population : for if Congress can be chosen by
the several States, though under the form and name of
counties, or election districts, and be in every respect, insti-
tuted as directed by the new constitution, I don't see but we
I30 REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER.
shall have as suitable a national council, as wise a legislative,
and as strong and safe an executive power, as can be obtained
under any form of government whatever ; let our territory be
ever so extensive or populous.
The most despotic monarch that can exist, must have his
councils, and officers of state ; and I can't see any one circum-
stance of their being appointed under a monarchy, that can
afford any chance of their being any wiser or better, than ours
may be. 'Tis true indeed, [21] the despot may, if he pleases,
act without any advice at all ; but when he does so, I conceive
it will be very rare that the nation will receive greater advan-
tages from his unadvised edicts, than may be drawed from
the deliberate acts and orders of our supreme powers. All
that can be said in favour of those, is, that they will have less
chance of delay, and more of secrecy, than these ; but I think
it probable, that the latter will be grounded on better infor-
■ mation, and greater wisdom ; will carry more weights and be
better supported.
The Romans rose, from small beginnings, to a very great
extent of territory, population, and wisdom ; I don't think
their constitution of government, was near so good as the one
proposed to us, yet we find their power, strength, and estab-
lishment, were raised to their utmost height, under a republi-
can form of government. Their State received very little
acquisition of territory, strength, or wealth, after their govern-
ment became imperial ; but soon began to weaken and
decay.
The Carthagenians acquired an amazing degree of strength,
wealth, and extent of dominion, under a republican form of
of government. Neither they or the Romans, owed their
dissolution to any causes arising from that kind of govern-
ment : 'twas the party rage, animosity, and violence of their
citizens, which destroyed them both ; it weakened them, 'till
the [22] one fell under the power of their enemy, and was
thereby reduced to ruin ; the other changed their form of
government, to a monarchy, which proved in the end, equally
fatal to them.
The same causes, if they can't be restrained, will weaken
REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER.
or destroy any nation on earth, let their form of government
be what it will ; witness the division and dissolution of the
Roman empire ; the late dismemberment of Poland ; the
intestine divisions, rage, and wars of Italy, of France, of
Spain, and of England.
No form of government can preserve a nation which can't
controul the party rage of its own citizens ; when any one citi-
zen can rise above the controul of the laws, ruin draws near.
'Tis not possible for any nation on earth, to hold their
strength and establishment, when the dignity of their gov-
ernment is lost, and this dignity will forever depend on the
wisdom and firmness of the officers of government, aided and
supported by the virtue and patriotism of their citizens.
On the whole, I don't see but that any form of govern-
ment may be safe and practicable, where the controuling
authority of the supreme powers, is strong enough to effect
the ends of its appointment, and at the same time, sufficiently
checked to keep it within due bounds, and limit it to the
objects of its duty ; and I think it appears, that the consti-
tution proposed to us, has all these qualities [23] in as great
perfection, as any form we can devise.
But after all, the grand secret of forming a good gov-
ernment, is, to put good men into the administration : for
wild, vicious, or idle men, will ever make a bad govern-
ment, let its principles be ever so good ; but grave, wise,
and faithful men, acting under a good constitution, will afford
the best chances of security, peace, and prosperity, to the
the citizens, which can be derived from civil police, under the
present disorders, and uncertainty of all earthly things.
Philadelphia, Nov. 4, 1787.
FINIS.
An / Examination / of the / Constitution / for the /
United States / of / America, / Submitted to the People /
by the / General Convention, / At Philadelphia, the 1 7th
Day of September, 1787, /and since adopted and rati-
fied/by the / Conventions of Eleven States, / chosen for
the purpose of considering it, being all / that have yet
decided on the subject. / By an American Citizen. / To
which is added, / A Speech / of the / Honorable James
Wilson, Esquire, / on the same subject. / Philadelphia : /
Printed by Zachariah Poulson, Junr. in Fourth- / Street,
between Market and Arch-Street./M.DCC.LXXXviii.
8vo., pp. 33.
" An American Citizen " was the pseudonym of Tench
Coxe, of Pennsylvania, a member of the Annapolis Conven-
tion and the Continental Congress, and author of a number of
pamphlets on the finances and commerce of the United States.
The four letters written over that signature were among the
first to appear in favor of the Constitution, and were re-
printed in many of the newspapers of the day.
I have seen three copies with "Tench Coxe, Esq.," inter-
lined on the title page in his own handwriting below " By an
American Citizen." P. L. F.
TO THE
CANDID READER
in^VERY person, who desires to know the true situation of
the United States of America, in regard to the freedom
and powers of their governments, must carefully consider
together the constitution of the state in which he lives and the
new constitution of fcederal or general government. The
latter alone is treated of in the following pages. The former,
it is presumed, are sufficiently understood by the citizens who
live under them.
NUMBER I.
On the Federal Government, and first on the safety of the
people, from the restraints imposed on the President.
TT is impossible for an honest and feeling mind, of any
nation or country whatever, to be insensible to the pres-
ent circumstances of America. Were I an East Indian, or a
Turk, I should consider this singular situation of a part of my
fellow creatures as the most curious and interesting. Inti-
mately connected with the country, as a citizen of the union,
I confess it entirely engrosses my mind and feelings.
To take a proper view of the ground on which we stand, it
may be necessary to recollect the manner in which the United
States were originally settled and [4] established. Want of
charity in the religious systems of Europe, and of justice in
their political governments, were the principal moving causes,
which drove the emigrants of various countries to the Amer-
ican continent. The Congregationalists, Quakers, Presby-
terians and other British dissenters, the Catholics of England
and Ireland, the Hugonots of France, the German Lutherans,
Calvinists and Moravians, with several other societies, estab-
lished themselves in the different colonies, thereby laying the
ground of that liberality in ecclesiastical affairs, which has
been observable since the late revolution. Religious liberty
naturally promotes corresponding dispositions in matters of
government. The constitution of England as it stood on paper,
was one of the freest, at that time, in the world, and the
American colonies considered themselves as entitled to the
fullest enjoyment of it. Thus, when the ill-judged discussions
of late times in England brought into question the rights of
this country, as it stood connected with the British crown,
we were found more strongly impressed with their import-
ance, and accurately acquainted with their extent, than the
wisest and most learned of our brethren beyond the Atlantic.
136 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE.
When the greatest names in parliament insisted on the power
of that body over the commerce of the colonies, and even the
right to bind us in all cases whatsoever, America, seeing that
it was only another form of tyranny, insisted upon the im-
mutable truth, that taxation and representation are insepara-
ble ; and, while a desire of harmony and other considerations
induced her into an acquiescence in the commercial relations
of Great Britain, it was done from the declared necessity of
the case, and with a cautious, full, and absolute saving of our
voluntarily-suspended rights. The parliament was persever-
ing, and America continued firm, till hostilities and open war
commenced, and finally the late revolution closed the contest
forever.
[5] It is evident, from this short detail, and the reflections
which arise from it, that the quarrel between the United
-States and the parliament of Great Britain did not arise so
much from objections to the form of government, though
^undoubtedly a better one by far is now within our reach, as
from a difference concerning certain important rights, result-
ing from the essential principles of liberty, which their consti-
tution actually preserved to all the subjects residing within the
realm. It was not asserted by America, that the people of
the island of Great Britain were slaves, but that we, though
possessed absolutely of the same rights, were not admitted to
>enjoy an equal degree of freedom.
When the declaration of independence compleated the
■separation between the two countries, new governments were
•necessarily established. Many circumstances led to the adop-
tion of the republican form, among which was the predilection
fof the people. In devising the frames of government, it may
have been difficult to avoid extremes opposite to the vices of
-that we had just rejected ; nevertheless, many of the state
constitutions we have chosen are truly excellent. Our mis-
fortunes have been, that in the first instance we adopted no
national government at all ; but were kept together by com-
mon danger only ; and that in the confusions of a civil war,
■we framed a fcederal constitution, now universally admitted to
(be inadequate to the preservation of liberty, property, and the
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 137-
union. The question is not, then, how far our state constitu-
tions are good, or otherwise — the object of our wishes is, to-
amend and supply the evident and allowed errors and defects-
of the foederal government. Let us consider awhile, that
which is now proposed to us — let us compare it with the so'
much boasted British form of government, and see how much
more it favours the people, and how completely it secures their
rights, remembering, at the same time, that we did not dis-
solve our connection [6] with that country so much on ac-
count of its constitution, as the perversion and mal-adminis-
tration of it.
In the first place, let us look at the nature and powers of
the head of that country, and those of the ostensible head of
ours.
The British king is the great bishop or supreme head of an
established church, with an immense patronage annexed. In
this capacity he commands a number of votes in the house of
lords, by creating bishops, who, besides their great incomes,
have votes in that assembly, and are judges in the last resort.
These prelates have also many honorable and lucrative places
to bestow, and thus from their wealth, learning, dignities,,
powers, and patronage, give a great lustre and an enormous
influence to the crown.
In America, our president will not only be without these
influencing advantages, but they will be in the possession of
the people at large, to strengthen their hands in the event of
a contest with him. All religious funds, honors and powers,,
are in the gift of numberless unconnected, disunited and con-
tending corporations, wherein the principle of perfect equal-
ity universally prevails. In short, danger from ecclesiastical
tyranny, that long standing and still remaining curse of the
people — that sacreligious engine of royal power in some
countries — can be feared by no man in the United States. In
Britain their king is for life — in America, our President will
always be one of the people at the end of four years. In that
country, the king is hereditary, and may be an ideot, a knave„
or a tyrant by nature, or ignorant from neglect of his educa-
tion, yet cannot be removed, for " he can do no wrong." This
138 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE.
is a favorite maxim of their constitution. In America, as the
President is to be one of the people at the end of his short
term, so will he and his fellow citizens remember, that he was
originally one of the people ; and he is created by their breath.
Further, he cannot be [7] an ideot, probably not a knave or
tyrant, for those whom nature makes so discover it before the
age of thirty-five, until which period he cannot be elected. It
appears, we have not admitted that he can do no wrong, but
have rather pre-supposed he may, and sometimes will do
wrong, by providing for his impeachment, his trial, and his
peaceable and complete removal.
In England the king has a power to create members of the
upper house, who are judges in the highest court, as well as
legislators. Our President not only cannot make members
of the Senate, but their creation, like his own, is by the people,
through their representatives : and a member of Assembly
may and will be as certainly dismissed at the end of his year,
for electing a weak or wicked Senator, as for any other blunder
or misconduct.
The king of England has complete legislative power, while
our President can only use it when the other servants of the
people are divided. But in all great cases affecting the na-
tional interests or safety, his modified and restrained power
must give way to the sense of two-thirds of the legislature.
In fact it amounts to no more, than a serious duty imposed
upon him to request both houses to re-consider any matter on
which he entertains doubts or feels apprehensions ; and here
the people have a strong hold upon him from his sole and
personal responsibility.
The President of the upper-ho.use (or the chancellor) in
in England, is appointed by their king, while our Vice-Presi-
dent, who is chosen by the people, through the electors and
the Senate, is not at all dependant on the President, but may
exercise equal powers on some occasions. In all royal govern-
ments, an helpless infant or an inexperienced youth may wear
the crown. Our President must be matured by the experi-
ence of years, and being born among us, his character at
thirty-five must be fully understood. Wisdom, virtue and
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 1 39
ac-[8] tive qualities of mind and body can alone make him the
first servant of a free and enlightened people.
Our President will fall very much short indeed of any
prince in his annual income, which will not be hereditary, but
the absolute allowance of the people, passing through the
hands of their other servants from year to year, as it becomes
necessary. There will be no burdens on the nation, to pro-
vide for his heir, or other branches of his family. It is prob-
able, from the state of property in America, and other
circumstances, that many citizens will exceed him in show
and expense, — those dazzling trappings of kingly rank and
power. He will have no authority to make a treaty, without
two-thirds of the senate, nor can he appoint ambassadors or
other great officers without their approbation, which will
remove the idea of patronage and influence, and of personal
obligation and dependence. The appointment of even the
inferior officers may be taken out of his hands by an act of
congress at any time ; he can create no nobility or titles of
honor, nor take away offices during good behaviour. His
person is not so much protected as that of a member of the
house of representatives ; for he may be proceeded against
like any other man in the ordinary course of law. He ap-
points no officer of the separate states. He will have no
influence from placemen in the legislature, nor can he pro-
rogue or dissolve it. He will have no power over the treas-
ures of the state ; and, lastly, as he is created through the
electors, by the people at large, he must ever look up to the
support of his creators. From such a servant, with powers so
limited and transitory, there can be no danger, especially
when we consider the solid foundations on which our national
liberties are immoveably fixed, by the other provisions of this
excellent constitution. Whatever of dignity or authority he
possesses, is a delegated part of their majesty and their
political omnipotence, transiently vested in him by the people
themselves, for their own happiness.
I40 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE.
[9] NUMBER II.
On the safety of the people, from the restraints imposed upon
the Senate.
We have seen that the late honorable convention, in des-
ignating the nature of the chief executive ofifice of the
United States, having deprived it of all the dangerous ap-
pendages of royalty, and provided for the frequent expiration
of its limited powers — As our president bears no resemblance
to a king, so we shall see the senate have no similitude to
nobles.
First, then, not being hereditary, their collective know-
ledge, wisdom, and virtue are not precarious, for by these
qualities alone they are to obtain their offices ; and they will
have none of the peculiar follies and vices of those men, who
possess power merely because their fathers held it before them,
for they will be educated (under equal advantages, and with
equal prospects) among and on a footing with the other sons
of a free people. If we recollect the characters, who have, at
various periods, filled the seats of congress, we shall find this
expectation perfectly reasonable. Many young men of
genius, and many characters of more matured abilities with-
out fortunes, have been honored with that trust. Wealth
has had but few representatives there, and those have been
generally possessed of respectable personal qualifications.
There have also been many instances of persons not emi-
nently endowed with mental qualities, who have been sent
thither from a reliance on their virtues, public and private —
As the senators are still to be elected by the legislatures of
the^states, there can be no doubt of equal safety and pro
priety in their future appointment, especially as no further
pecuniary qualification is required by the constitution.
[10] They can hold no other office civil or military under the
United States, nor can they join in making provision for
themselves, either by creating new places, or encreasing the
emoluments of old ones. As their sons are not to succeed
them, they will not be induced to aim at an increase or per-
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 141
petuity of their powers, at the expence of the liberties of the
people, of which those sons will be a part. They possess a
much smaller share of the judicial power than the upper house
in Britain, for they are not, as there, the highest court in civil
affairs. Impeachments alone are the cases cognizable before
them, and in what other place could matters of that nature
be so properly and safely determined ? The judges of the
fcederal courts will owe their appointments to the president
and senate, therefore may not feel so perfectly free from
favour, affection and influence, as the upper house who re-
ceive the power from the people, through their state repre-
sentatives, and are immediately responsible to those assem-
blies, and finally to the nation at large — Thus we see, when a
daring or dangerous offender is brought to the bar of public
justice, the people, who alone can impeach him by their im-
mediate representatives, will cause him to be tried, not by
judges appointed in the heat of the occasion, but by two-thirds
of a select body, chosen a long tirrie before, for various pur-
poses, by the collective wisdom of their State legislatures.
From a pretence or affectation of extraordinary purity and
excellence of character, their word of honour is the sanction
under which these high courts, in other countries, have given
their sentence — But with us, like the other judges of the
union, like the rest of the people, of which they are never to
forget they are a part, it is required that they be on oath.
No ambitious, undeserving or inexperienced youth can
acquire a seat in this house by means of the most enormous
wealth, or most powerful connections, till [11 J thirty years
have ripened his abilities, and fully discovered his merits to
his country — a more rational ground of preference surely than
mere property.
The senate, though more independent of the people, as to
the free exercise of their judgment and abilities, than the
house of representatives, by the longer term of their office,
must be older and more experienced men, and are vested
with less effective power ; for the public treasures, the sinews
of the state, cannot be called forth by their original motion.
They may indeed restrain the profusion or errors of the house
142 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE.
of representatives, but they cannot take any of the necessary
measures to raise a national revenue.
The people, through the electors, prescribe them such a
president as shall be best qualified to controul them.
They can only, by conviction or impeachment, remove and
incapacitate a dangerous ofificer, but the punishment of him
as a criminal remains within the province of the courts of law,
to be conducted under all the ordinary forms and precautions,
which exceedingly diminishes the importance of their judicial
powers. They are detached, as much as possible, from local
prejudices in favor of their respective states, by having a sep-
arate and independent vote, for the sensible and conscientious
use of which every member will find his person, honor and
character seriously bound — He cannot shelter himself, under
a vote in behalf of his state, among his immediate colleagues.
As there are only two, he cannot be voluntarily or involun-
tarily governed by the majority of the deputation — He will
be obliged, by wholesome provisions, to attend his public duty,
and thus in great national questions must give a vote, of the
honesty of which he will find it is necessary to convince his
constituents.
The senate must always receive the exceptions of the
president against, any of their legislative acts, which, without
{12] serious deliberation and sufficient reasons, they will sel-
dom disregard. They will also feel a considerable check from
the constitutional powers of the state legislatures, whose rights
they will not be disposed to infringe, since they are the bodies
to which they owe their existence, and are moreover to re-
main the immediate guardians of the people.
And lastly, the Senate will feel the mighty check of the
House of Representatives — a body so truly popular and
pure in its election, so intimately connected, by its interests
and feelings, with the people at large, so guarded against cor-
.ruption and influence — so much, from its nature, above all
apprehensions, that it must ever be able to maintain the high
ground assigned to it by the foederal constitution.
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 143
NUMBER III.
On the safety of the people, from the nature of the House
of Representatives.
In pursuing the consideration of the new fcederal consti-
tution, it remains now to examine the nature and powers of
the House of Representatives— the immediate delegates of
the people.
Each member of this truly popular assembly will be
chosen by about six thousand electors, by the poor as well as
the rich. No decayed or venal borough will have an un-
just share in their determinations — no old Sarum will send
thither a representative by the voice of a single elector*.
As we shall have no royal ministers to purchase votes, so
we shall have no votes for sale; for the suffrages of six
thousand enlightened and independent freemen are above
all price. When the increasing population of the
country shall render the body too [13] large at the
rate of one member for every thirty thousand persons,
they will be returned at the greater rate of one for
every forty or fifty thousand, which will render the electors
still more incorruptible. For this regulation is only designed
to prevent a smaller number than thirty thousand from hav-
ing a representative. Thus we see a provision follows, that
no state shall have less than one member, for if a new and
greater number than thirty thousand should hereafter be fixed
on, which should exceed the whole of the inhabitants of any
state, such state, without this wholesome provision, would
lose its voice in the House of Representatives — a circumstance
which the constitution renders impossible.
The people of England, whose House of commons is filled
with military and civil officers and pensioners, say their liber-
ties would be perfectly secured by triennial Parliaments.
With us no placeman can sit among the representatives of the
people, and two years are the constitutional term of their
existence. Here, again, lest wealth, powerful connections, or
n *This is the case with that British Borough.
/; I
144 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE.
even the unwariness of the people should place in this import-
ant trust an undeserving, unqualified or inexperienced youth,
the wisdom of the Convention has proposed an absolute inca-
pacity till the age of twenty-five. At twenty-one a young
man is made the guardian of his own interest, but he cannot,
for a few years more be intrusted with the affairs of the
nation. He must be an inhabitant of the state that elects
him, that he may be intimately acquainted with their partic-
ular circumstances — The house of Representatives is not, as
the senate, to have a President chosen for them from without
their body, but are to elect their speaker from their own
number — They will also appoint all their other ofificers. In
great state cases, they will be the grand inquest of the nation^
for they possess the sole and uncontroulable power of impeach-
ment. They are neither to wait the call, nor abide the proroga-
tions and dis- [14] solutions of a perverse or ambitious Prince>
for they are to meet at least once in every year, and to sit on
adjournments to be agreed on between themselves and the
other servants of the people. Should they differ in opinion,
the President, who is a temporary fellow-servant, and not
their hereditary master, has a mediatorial power to adjust it
for them, but cannot prevent their constitutional meeting
within the year. They can compel the attendance of their
members, that their public duty may not be evaded in times
of difificulty or danger — The vote of each representative can
be always known, as well as the proceedings of the house, that
so the people may be acquainted with the conduct of those in
whom they repose so important a trust. As was observed of
the Senators, they cannot make new offices for themselves,
nor increase, for their own benefit, the emoluments of old
ones, by which the people will be exempted from needless
additions to the public expences, on such sordid and mercen-
ary principles — ^They are not to be restrained from the firm
and plain language, which becomes the independent repre-
sentatives of freedom, for there is to be a perfect liberty of
speech. Without their consent, no monies can be obtained,
no armies raised, no navies provided. They, alone, can
originate bills for drawing forth the revenues of the union,
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. I4S
and they will have a negative upon every legislative act of
the other house. — So far, in short, as the sphere of fcederal
jurisdiction extends, they will be controulable only by the
people, and, in contentions with the other branch, so far as
they shall be right, they must ever finally prevail.
Such, my Countrymen, are some of the cautionary pro-
visions of the frame of government your faithful convention
have submitted to your consideration — such the foundations
of peace, liberty and safety, which have been laid by their
unwearied labors — They have guarded you against all ser-
vants but those "whom choice and common good ordain,"
against all masters, " save preserving Heaven."
[15] NUMBER IV.
The security for national safety and happiness, resulting
from other parts of the fcederal Government.
In considering the respective powers of the President,
the Senate and the House of Representatives, under the-
fcederal constitution, we have seen a part of the wholesome
precautions, which are contained in the new system. Let us
examine what further securities for the safety and happiness of
the people are contained in the general stipulations and
provisions.
The United States guarantee to every state in the union
a separate republican form of government. From thence it
follows, that any man or body of men, however rich or pow-
erful, who shall make an alteration in the form of government
of any state, whereby the powers thereof shall be attempted
to be taken out of the hands of the people at large, will stand
guilty of high treason ; or should a foreign power seduce or
over-awe the people of any state, so as to cause them to vest
in the families of any ambitious citizens or foreigners the
powers of hereditary governors, whether as Kings or Nobles,
that such investment of powers would be void in itself, and
146 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE.
every person attempting ' to execute them would also be
guilty of treason.
No religious test is ever to be required of any officer or
servant of the United States. The people may employ any
wise or good citizen in the execution of the various duties of
the government. In Italy, Spain, and Portugal, no protestant
can hold a public trust. In England every Presbyterian, and
other person not of their established church, is incapable of
holding an office. No such impious deprivation of the rights of
men can take place under the new foederal constitution. The
con- [16] vention has the honour of proposing the first public
act, by which any nation has ever divested itself of a power,
every exercise of which is a trespass on the Majesty of Heaven.
No qualification in monied or landed property is required
by the proposed plan ; nor does it admit any preference from
the preposterous distinctions of birth and rank. The office
of the President, a Senator, and a Representative, and every
other place of power or profit, are therefore open to the whole
body of the people. Any wise, informed and upright man, be
his property what it may, can exercise the trusts and powers
of the state, provided he possesses the moral, religious and
political virtues which are necessary to secure the confidence
of his fellow citizens.
The importation of slaves from any foreign country is,
by a clear implication, held up to the world as equally incon-
sistent with the dispositions and the duties of the people of
America. A solid foundation is laid for exploding the prin-
ciples of negro slavery, in which many good men of all parties
in Pennsylvania, and throughout the union, have already con-
curred. The temporary reservation of any particular matter
must ever be deemed an admission that it should be done
away. This appears to have been well understood. In ad-
dition to the arguments drawn from liberty, justice and re-
ligion, opinions against this practice, founded in sound policy,
have no doubt been urged. Regard was necessarily paid to
the peculiar situation of our southern fellow-citizens ; but they,
on the other hand, have not been insensible of the delicate
situation of our national character on this subject.
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 147
The people will remain, under the proposed constitution,
the fountain of power and public honour. The President, the
Senate, and the House of Representatives, will be the chan-
nels through which the stream [17] will flow— but it will flow
from the people, and from them only. Every office, religious,
civil and military will be either their immediate gift, or it will
come from them through the hands of their servants. And
this, as observed before, will be guaranteed to them under
the state constitution which they respectively approve ; for
they cannot be royal forms, cannot be aristocratical, but must
be republican.
The people of those states which have faithfully discharged
their duty to the union will be no longer subjected alone to
the weight of the public debts. Proper arrangements will
call forth the just proportion of their sister states, and our
national character will again be as unstained as it was once
exalted. Elevation to independence, with the loss of our
good name, is only to be conspicuous in disgrace. The liber-
ties of a people involved in debt are as uncertain as the liberty
of an individual in the same situation. Their virtue is more
precarious. The unfortunate citizen must yield to the opera-
tion of the laws, while a bankrupt nation too easy annihilates
the sacred obligations of gratitude and honour, and becomes
execrable and infamous. I cannot refrain from reminding my
fellow-citizens of our near approach to that deplorable situa-
tion, which must be our miserable condition, if the defects of
the old confederation remain without amendment. The pro-
posed constitution will cure the evil, and restore us to our
rank among mankind.
Laws, made after the commission of the fact, have been a
dreadful engine in the hands of tyrannical governors. Some
of the most virtuous and shining characters in the world have
been put to death, by laws formed to render them punisha-
ble, for parts of their conduct which innocence permitted, and
to which patriotism impelled them. These have been called
ex post facto laws, and are exploded by the new system. If
a time of public contention shall hereafter arrive, [18] the
firm and ardent friends to liberty may know the length to
148 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE.
which they can push their noble opposition, on the founda-
tion of the laws. Should their country's cause impel them
further, they will be acquainted with the hazard, and using
those arms which Providence has put into their hands, will
make a solemn appeal to " the power above."
The destruction of the ancient republics was occasioned in
every instance by their being ignorant of a great political
position, which was left for America to discover and and es-
tabhsh. Self-evident as the truth appears, we find no friend
to liberty in ancient Greece or Rome asserting, that taxation
and representation were inseparable. The Roman citizens,
proud of their own liberty, imposed, in the freest times of the
•commonwealth, the most grievous burdens on their wretched
provinces. At other times we find thousands of their citizens,
though residing within the walls of Rome, deprived of legis-
lative representatives. When America asserted the novel
truth, Great Britain, though boasting herself as alone free
among the modern nations, denied it by her legislature, and
endeavoured to refute it by her arms — the reasoning of
tyrants. But the attempt was vain, for the voice of truth was
heard above the thunders of the war, and reached the ears of
all nations. Henceforth the people of the earth will consider
this position as the only rock on which they can found the
temple of liberty, that taxation and representation are in-
separable. Our new constitution carries it into execution on
the most enlarged and liberal scale, for a Representative will
be chosen by six thousand of his fellow-citizens, a Senator by
half a sovereign state, a President by a whole nation.
The old foederal constitution contained many of the same
things, which from error or disingenousness are urged against
the new ones. Neither of them have a bill of rights, nor does
either notice the liberty of the press, because they are already
provided for by the [19] state constitutions ; and relating
only to personal rights, they could not be mentioned in a con-
tract among foreign states.
Both the old and new foederal constitutions, and indeed the
constitution of Pennsylvania, admit of courts in which no use
is made of a jury. The board of property, the court of ad-
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 149
miralty, and the high court of errors and appeals, in the state
of Pennsylvania, as also the court of appeals under the old
confederation, exclude juries. Trial by jury will therefore be
in the express words of the Pennsylvania constitution, " as
heretofore," — almost always used, though sometimes omitted.
Trials for lands lying in any state between persons residing in
such state, for bonds, notes, book debts, contracts, trespasses,
assumptions, and all other matters between two or more
citizens of any state, will be held in the state courts by juries,
as now. In these case the foederal courts cannot interfere.*
But when a dispute arises between the citizens of any state
about lands lying out of the bounds thereof, or when a trial is
to be had between the citizens of any state and those
of another, or the government of another, the private
citizen will not be obliged to go into a court con-
stituted by the state, with which, or with the citizens
of which, his dispute is. He can appeal to a disinter-
ested foederal court. This is surely a great advantage,
and promises a fair trial, and an impartial judgment. The trial
by jury is not excluded in these foederal courts. In all crimi-
nal cases, where the property, liberty or life of the citizen is at
stake, he has the benefit of a jury. If convicted on impeach-
ment, which is never done by a jury in any country, he cannot
be fined, imprisoned or punished, but only maybe disqualified
from doing public mischief by losing his office, [20] and
his capacity to hold another. If the nature of his offence,
besides its danger to his country, should be criminal in itself —
should involve a charge of fraud, murder or treason — he may be
tried for such crime, but cannot be convicted without a jury.
In trials about property in the foederal courts, which
can only be as above stated, there is nothing in the
new constitution to prevent a trial by jury. No doubt
it will be the mode in every case, wherein it is practi-
cable. This will be adjusted by law, and it could not be
* Trials between a state and its own Citizens, • and between Citizens of
the same state, involving questions concerning state laws that infringe this
constitution, may be carried by appeal, it is presumed, into a foederal
court.
I50 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE.
done otherwise. In short, the sphere of jurisdiction for the
foederal courts is limited, and that sphere pnly is subject to
the regulations of our foederal government. The known prin-
ciples of justice, the attachment to trial by jury whenever it
can be used, the instructions of the state legislatures, the in-
structions of the people at large, the operation of the foederal
regulations on the property of a president, a senator, a repre-
sentative, a judge, as well as on that of a private citizen, will
certainly render those regulations as favorable as possible to
property ; for life and liberty are put more than ever into the
hands of the juries. Under the present constitution of all
the states, a public ofificer may be condemned to imprisonment
or death on impeachment, without a jury; but the new foed-
eral constitution protects the accused, till he shall be con-
victed, from the hands of power, by rendering a jury the in-
dispensible judges of all crimes.
The influence which foreign powers may attempt to ex-
ercise in our affairs was foreseen, and a wholesome provision
has been made against it ; for no person holding an ofifiice
under the United States is permitted to enjoy any foreign
honours, powers or emoluments.
The apprehensions of the people have been excited, per-
haps by persons with good intentions, about the powers
of the new government to raise an army. Let us con-
sider this point with moderation and candour. As enemies
will sometimes insult us, invade our coun- [21] try and
capture our property, it is clear a power in our gov-
ernment to oppose, restrain or destroy them, is necessary
to our honor, safety and existence. The military should,
however, be regarded with a watchful eye ; for it is a profes-
sion that is liable to dangerous perversion. But the pow-
ers vested in the fcederal government do not go the length
which has been said. A standing army is not granted or in-
tended, for there can be no provision for its continuing three
years, much less for its permanent establishment. Two years
are the utmost time for which the money can be given. It
will be under all the restrictions which wisdom and jealousy
can suggest, and the original grant of the supplies must be
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 151
made by the House of representatives, the immediate dele-
gates of the people. The Senate and President, who also de-
rive their power from the people, appoint the officers ; and the
heads of the departments, who must submit their accounts to
the whole legislatiire, are to pay and provide them, as shall be
directed by the laws that shall contain the conditions of the
grant. The militia, who are in fact the effective part of the
people at large, will render many troops quite' unnecessary.
They will form a powerful check upoii the regular troops, and
will generally be sufficient to over-awe them— for our detached
situation will seldom give occasion to raise an army, though a
few scattered companies may often be necessary. But when-
ever, even on the most obvious reasons, an army shall be
raised, the several states will be called, by the nature of things,
to attend to the 'condition of the militia. Republican jeal-
ousy, the guardian angel of these states, will watch the
motions of our military citizens, even though they will be the
soldiers of a free people. There is a wide difference however
between the troops of such commonwealths as ours, founded
on equal and unalterable principles, and those of a regal gov-
ernment, where ambition and oppression are the profession of
the king.- In the first case, a military officer is the occasional
servant of the people, employed for their defence; in [22] the
secbnd, he is the ever ready instrument to execute the
schemes of conquest or oppression, with which the mind of
his royal master may be disturbed.
Observations have been made on the power given to the
foederal Government in regard to the elections of Represent-
tiveS'^ii'd Senators. The regulations of these elections are, by
the first part of the clause, to be prescribed by the "state legis-
latures, who are certainly the proper bodies, if they will always
execute the duty. But in case the union or the public safety
, should be endangered by an omission of this duty, as in the
case' of Rhode-Island, then the legislature of the United States
can name for the people a convenient time, and do other mat-
ters necessary to insure the free exercise of their right of elec-
tion. The exception, in regard to the places of chusing Sen-
ators, was made from due respect to the sovereignty of the
152 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE.
State legislatures, who are to elect the senators, and whose
place of meeting ought not to be prescribed to them by any
authority, except, indeed, as we always must, by the authority
of the people. This power given to the fcederal legislature is
no more than what is possessed by the governments of all the
states. The constitution of Pennsylvania permits two-thirds
of such cities and counties, as shall elect representatives, to
exercise all the powers of the General Assembly, " as fully
and amply as if the whole were present," should any part of
the state neglect or refuse to perform their duty in this par-
ticular. In short, it is a power necessary to preserve the social
compact of each state and the confederation of the United
States.
Besides the securities for the liberties of the people arising
out of the fcederal government, they are guarded by their
state constitutions, and by the nature of things in the separate
states. The Governor or President in each commonwealth,
the Councils, Senates, Assemblies, Judges, Sheriffs, Grand and
Pettit Juries, Officers of Militia, Clergy and Lay Ofificers of all
churches, state and county Treasurer, Prothonotaries, Regis-
ters, [23] Presidents and other officers of Universities, Colleges
and Academies, Wardens of ports and cities, Burgesses of
towns, Commissioners of counties. County Lieutenants, and
many other ofificers of power and influence, will still be chosen
within each state, without any possible interference of the
fcederal Government. The separate states will also choose all
the members of the legislative and executive branches of the
United States. The people at large in each state will choose
their fcederal representative, and, unless ordered otherwise by
state legislatures, may choose the electors of the President
and Vice-President of the Union. And lastly, the legislature
of the state will have the election of the senate, as they have
heretofore had of the Members of Congress. Let us then,
with a candor worthy of the subject, ask ourselves, whether
it can he feared, that a majority of the Representatives, each
of whom will be chosen by six thousand enlightened freemen,
can betray their country? — Whether a majority of the
Senate, each of whom will be chosen by the legislature of a
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 153
free, sovereign and independent state, without any stip-
ulations in favour of wealth or the contemptible dis-
tinctions of birth or rank, and who will be closely observed by
the state legislatures, can destroy our liberties, controuled as
they are too by the house of representatives ? or whether a
temporary, limited, executive ofificer, watched by the fcederal
Representatives, by the Senate, by the state legislatures, by
his personal enemies among the people of his own state, by
the jealousy of the people of rival states, and by the whole of
the people of the Union, can ever endanger our Freedom.*
[24] Permit me, my fellow-citizens, to close these observa-
tions by remarking, that there is no spirit of arrogance in the
new fcederal constitution. It addresses you with becoming
modesty, admitting that it may contain errors. Let us give
it a trial ; and when experience has taught its mistakes, the
* There is one grand operation of the new fcederal constitution, favor-
able to general liberty, which I do not remember to have heard from any
of its friends. It is well known, that in most of the states the members of
their Houses of Representatives are chosen in equal numbers from each
county, and in the eastern states, in equal numbers from each town, without
any regard to the number of taxable inhabitants, or the number of souls.
Hence it is very frequent for a county, with ten thousaud souls, to send only
the same number of members to the state house of representatives, as a county
with two thousand souls, by which each person in the least populous county
has five times as great a voice in electing representatives, as his fellow
citizen of the most populous county. This is clearly a departure from the
principles of equal liberty, and ought to be altered in the several states. I
speak the more plainly because our state constitution is free from that fault in
the formation of our house of Assembly. Now the new constitution expressly
declares, that the fcederal Representatives shall be in the proportion of one to
every thirty thousand, which accords with reason and the true principles of
liberty. This house, therefore, so far as national matters go, will remedy the
evil spoken of in the several states, and is one more great step towards the
perfection of equal liberty and genuine republicanism in America. It must
strongly recommend the fcederal constitution to the serious reflecting patriot,
even though he may formerly have had doubts, and it will suggest to the
several states the propriety of reconsidering that point in their respective con-
stitutions. Pennsylvania, though right in the principles on which her legislative
elections are and will be held, is less safe from the existence of this fault in the
adjoining sister states of Virginia, Maryland, Jersey, Delaware and New York,
and in others more remote.
154 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE.
people, whom it preserves absolutely all powerful, can reforrri
and amend them. That I may be perfectly understood, I
will acknowledge its acceptance by all the states, without
delay, is the second wish of my heart. The first is, that ouf
^^country may be virtuous and free.
An American Citizen.
SUBSTANCE OF AN ADDRESS
TO A
MEETING OF THE CITIZENS OF PHILADELPHIA,
DELIVERED, OCTOBER SIXTH, MDCCLXXXVJI,
BY THE HONORABLE
JAMES WILSON, Esquire,
ONE OF THE DE EGATES FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THE
LATE CONTINENTAL CONVENTION.
Mr. Chairman and Fellow Citizens^
"tTAVING received the honour of an appointment to repre-
sent you in the late convention, it is, perhaps, my duty
to comply with the request of many gentlemen, whose char-
acters and judgments I sincerely respect, and who have urged
that this would be a proper occasion to lay before you any
information, which will serve to elucidate and explain the
principles and arrangements of the con- [26] stitution that
has been submitted to the consideration of the United States.
I confess that I am unprepared for so extensive and so im-
portant a disquisition : but the insidious attempts, which are
clandestinely and industriously made to pervert and destroy
the new plan, induce me the more readily to engage in its de-
fence : and the impressions of four months constant attend-
ance to the subject, have not been so easily effaced, as to
leave me without an answer to the objections which have
been raised.
It will be proper, however, before I enter into the refuta-
tion of the charges that are alleged, to mark the leading dis-
crimination between the state constitutions, and the constitu-
tion of the United States. When the people established the
powers of legislation under their separate governments, they
IS6 SPEECH BY JAMES WILSOK.
invested their representatives with every right and authority
which they did not in explicit terms reserve : and therefore
upon every question, respecting the jurisdiction of the house
of assembly, if the frame of government is silent, the juris-
diction is efficient and complete. But in delegating fcederal
powers, another criterion was necessarily introduced; and the
congressional authority is to be collected, not from tacit im-
plication, but from the positive grant, expressed in the in-
strument of union. Hence, it is evident, that in the former
case, everything which is not reserved, is given : but in the
latter, the reverse of the proposition prevails, and every thing
which is not given, is reserved. This distinction being recog-
nized, will furnish an answer to those who think the omission
of a bill of rights, a defect* in the proposed constitution : for
it would have been superfluous and absurd, to have stipulated
with a foederal body of our own creation, that we should en-
joy those privileges, of which we are not divested either by
the intention or the act that has brought that body into
existence. For instance, the liberty of the [27J press, which
has been a copious subject of declamation and opposition ;
what controul can proceed from the foederal government, to
shackle or destroy that sacred palladium of national freedom?
If, indeed, a power similar to that which has been granted for
the regulation of commerce, had been granted to regulate
literary publications, it would have been as necessary to stip-
ulate that the liberty of the press should be preserved invio-
late, as that the impost should be general in its operation.
With respect, likewise, to the particular district of ten miles,
wliich is to be the seat of government, it will undoubtedly be
proper to observe this salutary precaution, as there the legis-
lative power will be vested in the president, senate, and house
of representatives of the United States. But this could not
be an object with the convention : for it must naturally de-
pend upon a future compact ; to which the citizens imme-
diately interested, will, and ought to be parties : and there is
no reason to suspect, that so popular a privilege will in that
case be neglected. In truth, then, the proposed system pos-
sesses no influence whatever upon the press ; and it would
SPEECH BY JAMES WILSON. IS7
have been merely nugatory, to have introduced a formal dec-
laration upon the subject ; nay, that very declaration might
have been construed to imply that some degree of power was
given, since we undertook to define its extent.
Another objection that has been fabricated against the
new constitution, is expressed in this disingenuous form — " the
trial by jury is abolished in civil cases." I must be excused,
my fellow citizens, if, upon this point, I take advantage of my
professional experience, ^o detect the futility of the assertion.
Let it be remembered, then, that the business of the fcederal
constitution was not local, but general— not limited to the
views and establishments of a single state, but co-extensive
with the continent, and comprehending the [28] views and
establishments of thirteen independent sovereignties. When,
therefore, this subject was in discussion, we were involved in
difficulties, which pressed on all sides, and no precedent could
be discovered to direct our course. The cases open to a jury,
differed in the different states ; it was therefore impracticable,
on that ground, to have made a general rule. The want of
uniformity would have rendered any reference to the practice
of the states idle and useless: and it could not, with any
propriety, be said, that " the trial by jury shall be as hereto-
fore :" since there has never existed any fcederal system of
jurisprudence, to which the declaration could relate. Besides,
it is not in all cases that the trial by jury is adopted in civil
questions : for causes depending in courts of admiralty, such
as relate to maritime captures, and such as are agitaited in the
courts of equity, do not require the intervention of that tri-
bunal. How, then, was the line of discrimination to be
drawn ? The convention found the task too difficult for them :
and they left the business as it stands — in the fullest confi-
dence, that no danger could possibly ensue, since the proceed-
ings of the supreme court are to be regulated by the congress,
which is a faithful representation of the people : and the op-
pression of government is effectually barred, by declaring that
in all criminal cases, the trial by jury shall be preserved.
This constitution, it has been further urged, is of a per-
nicious tendency, because it tolerates a standing army in the
158 SPEECH BY JAMES WILSON.
time of peace. Yhis has always been a popular topic of decla-
« mation: and yet I do not know a nation in the world, which
has not found it necessary and useful to maintain the appear-
ance of strength in a season of the most profound tranquility.
Nor is it a novelty with us ; for under the present articles
of confederation, congress certainly possesses this reprobated
power : and the exercise of it is proved at this [29] moment
by the cantonments along the banks of the Ohio. But what
would be our national situation, wh^re it otherwise? Every
principle of policy must be subverted, and the government
must declare war before they are prepared to carry it on.
Whatever may be the provocation, however important the
object in view, and however necessary dispatch and secrecy
may be, still the declaration must precede the preparation,
and the enemy will be informed of your intention, not only
before you are equipped for an attack, but even before you are
fortified for a defence. The consequence is too obvious to
require any further delineation ; and no man, who regards the
dignity and safety of his country, can deny the necessity of a
military force, under the controul, and with the restrictions
which the new constitution provides.
Perhaps there never was a charge made with less reason,
than that which predicts the institution of a baneful aris-
tocracy in the fcederal senate. This body branches into two
characters, the one legislative, and the other executive. In
its legislative character, it can effect no purpose without the
co-operation of the house of representatives : and in its ex-
ecutive character, it can accomplish no object, without the
concurrence of the president. Thus fettered, I do not know
any act which the senate can of itself perform : and such de-
pendence necessarily precludes every idea of influence and
superiority. But I will confess, that in the organization of
this body, a compromise between contending interests is dis-
cernible : and when we reflect how various are the laws, com-
merce, habits, population, and extent of the confederated
states, this evidence of mutual concession and accommodation
ought rather to command a generous applause, than to excite
jealousy and reproach. For my part, my admiration can only
SPEECH BY JAMES WILSON. 1 59
be equalled by my astonishment, in beholding so perfect a
system formed from such heterogenous materials.
[30] The next accusation I shall consider, is that which rep-
resents the foederal constitution as not only calculated, but de-
signedly framed, to reduce the state governments to mere
corporations, and eventually to annihilate them. Those who
have employed the term corporation, upon this occasion, are
not perhaps aware of its extent. In common parlance, in-
deed, it is generally applied to petty associations for the ease
and conveniency of a few individuals; but in its enlarged
sense, it will comprehend the government of Pennsylvania,
the existing union of the states, and even this projected sys-
tem is nothing more than a formal act of incorporation. But
upon what pretence can it be alleged that it was designed to
annihilate the state governments? For, I will undertake to
prove that upon their existence depends the existence of the
foederal plan. For this purpose, permit me to call your at-
tention to the manner in which the president, senate, and
house of representatives, are proposed to be appointed. The
president is to be chosen by electors, nominated in such man-
ner as the legislature of each state may direct ; so that if there
is no legislature, there can be no senate. The house of repre-
sentatives is to be composed of members chosen every second
year by the people of the several states, and the electors in
each state shall have the qualifications requisite to electors of
the most numerous branch of the state legislature — unless,
therefore, there is a state legislaturCj that qualification can-
not be ascertained, and the popular branch of the foederal
constitution must likewise be extinct. From this view, then,
it is evidently absurd to suppose, that the annihilation of the
seaprate governments will result from their union ; or, that,
having that intention, the authors of the new system would
have bound their connection with such indissoluble ties. Let
me here advert to an arrangement highly advantageous ; for
you will perceive, with- [31] out prejudice to the powers of
the legislature in the election of senators, the people at large-
will acquire an additional privilege in returning members to
the house of representatives — whereas, by the present cooc-
l6o SPEECH BY JAMES WILSON.
federation, it is the legislature alone that appoints the dele-
gates to congress. ^
The power of direct taxation has likewise been treated as
an improper delegation to the fcederal government ; but when
we consider it as the duty of that body to provide for the
national safety, to support the dignity of the union, and to
discharge the debts contracted upon the collective ^aith of the
states, for their common benefit, it must be acknowledged that
those, upon whom such important obligations are imposed,
ought, in justice and in policy, to possess every means requi-
site for a faithful performance of their trust. But why should
we be alarmed with visionary evils ? I will venture to pre-
I diet, that the great revenue of the United States must, and
\ always will, be raised by impost ; for, being at once less ob-
noxious, and more productive, the interest of the government
will be best promoted by the accommodation of the people.
• Still, however, the object of direct taxation should be within
reach in all cases of emergency ; and there is no more reason
to apprehend oppression in the mode of collecting a revenue
from this resource, than in the form of impost, which, by uni-
versal assent, is left to the authority of the fcederal govern-
ment. In either case, the force of civil constitutions will be
adequate to the purpose; and the dread of military violence,
which has been assiduously disseminated, must eventually
prove the mere effusion of a wild imagination, or a factious
spirit. But the salutary consequences that must flow from
thus enabling the government to relieve and support the
credit of the union, will afford another answer to the objec-
tions upon this ground. The state of Pennsylvania, particu-
larly, [32] which has encumbered itself with the assumption
of a great proportion of the public debt, will derive consider-
able rehef and advantage ; for, as it was the imbecility of the
present confederation, which gave rise to the funding law, that
law must naturally expire, when a complete and energetic
fcederal system shall be substituted — the state will then be
discharged from an extraordinary burden, and the national
creditor will find it to be to his interest to return to his orig-
inal security.
SPEECH BY JAMES WILSON. l6l
After all, my fellow-citizens, it is neither extraordinary
nor unexpected, that the constitution offered to your consid-
eration, should meet with opposition. It is the nature of man .
to pursue his own interest, in preference to the public g^ood ;
and I do not mean to make any personal reflection, when I
add, that it is the interest of a very numerous, powerful, and
respectable body, to counteract and destroy the excellent
work produced by the late convention. All the officers of
government, and all the appointments for the administration
of justice and the collection of the public revenue, which are
transferred from the individual to the aggregate sovereignty
of the states, will necessarily turn the stream of influence and
emolument into a new channel. Every person, therefore,
who either enjoys, or expects to enjoy a place of profit under
the present establishment, will object to the proposed inno-
vation? not, in truth, because it is injurious to the liberties of
his country, but because it effects his schemes of wealth and
consequence. I will confess, indeed, that I am not a blind
admirer of this plan of government, and that there are some
parts of it, which, if my wish had prevailed, would certainly
have been altered. But, when I reflect how widely men differ
in their opinions, and that every man (and the] observation
applies likewise to every state) has an equal pretension to
assert his own, I am satisfied that [33] any thing nearer to
perfection could not have been accomplished. If there are
errors, it should be remembered, that the seeds of reformation
are sown in the work itself, and the concurrence of two thirds
of the congress may at any time introduce alterations and
amendments. Regarding it, then, in every point of view, with
a candid and disinterested mind, I am bold to assert, that it is
the BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS EVER BEEN
OFFERED TO THE WORLD.*
* The candid Reader will suppose Mr. Wilson here means, that it is the
best form of foederal government, which has ever been offered to the world —
and it is surely true that the fcederal constitution, considered in due connexion
with the state constitutions, is the best form of government that has ever been
communicated to mankind.
FINIS.
The / Letters / of / Fabius, / in 1788, / on the Fed-
eral Constitution ; / . . . » / Copy-Right Secured. / From
the office of the Delaware / Gazette, Wilmington, / By
W. C. Smith. /1 797. /
8vo. pp. iv., 202 (l).
Written by John Dickinson, the " Pennsylvania Farmer,"
and member of the Annapolis and Philadelphia Conventions.
The Letters of Fabius were originally pubHshed in a Delaware
newspaper in 1788, and were not issued in pamphlet form till
1797, when they were reprinted as above, together with a
second series of letters " on the present situation of public
affairs," which are omited in this reprint. They were also in-
cluded in " The Political Writings of John Dickinson,"
printed in 1801.
P. L. F.
THE EDITOR TO THE PUBLIC.
'TpHE First Nine Letters in this Collection, published in
the beginning of the Year 1788, were occasioned by an
alarming hesitation of some States to ratify the Constitution
proposed by the Federal Convention in 1787.
They appeared separately in News-papers ; and have never
been published together, before the present Edition.
Some Notes are added of Extracts from " The Rights of
Man" published about three years after these Letters, contain-
ing similar sentiments, expressed with a remarkable resemblance
of Language, especially on the two great subject — the organi-
zation of a constitution from original rights, and the formation
of government from contributed rights, both of so much im-
portance in laying regular foundations of Civil Society, and
consequently in securing the advancement of human happi-
ness.
LETTER I.
*TPHE Constitution proposed by the Federal Convention
now engages the fixed attention of America.
Every person appears to be affected. Those who wish the
adoption of the plan, consider its rejection as the source of
endless contests, confusions, and misfortunes ; and they also
consider a resolution to alter, without previously adopting it,
as a rejection.
Those who oppose the plan, are influenced by different
views. Some of them are friends, others of them are enemies,
to The United States. [2] The latter are of two classes ;
either men without principles or fortunes, who think they
may have a chance to mend their circumstances, with im-
punity, under a weak government, or in public convulsions,
but cannot make them worse even by the last — or men who
have been always averse to the revolution ; and though at
first confounded by that event, yet, their hopes reviving with
the declension of our affairs, have since persuaded themselves,
that at length the people, tired out with their continued dis-
tresses, will return to their former connection with Great
Britain. To argue with these opposers, would be vain — The
tother opposers of the plan deserve the highest respect.
What concerns all, should be considered by all ; and indi-
viduals may injure a whole society, by not declaring their sen-
timents. It is therefore not only their right, but their duty,'
to declare them. Weak advocates of a good cause or artful
advocates of a bad one, may endeavour to stop such com-
munications, or to discredit them by clamour and calumny.
This, however, is not the age for such tricks of controversy.
Men have suffered so severely by being deceived upon sub-
jects of the highest import, those of religion and freedom,
that truth becomes infinitely valuable to them, not as a mat-
ter of curious speculation, but of beneficial practice — A spirit
1 66 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
of inquiry is excited, information diffused, judgment strength-
ened.
Before this tribunal of the people, let every one freely
speak, what he really thinks, [3] but with so sincere a rever-
ence for the cause he ventures to discuss, as to use the utmost
caution, lest he should lead any into errors, upon a point of
such sacred concern as the public happiness.
It is not the design of this address, to describe the present
derangement of our affairs, the mischiefs that must ensue
from its continuance, the horrors, of a total dissolution of the
union, or of the division of it into partial confederacies. Nor
is it intended to describe the evils that will result from pur-
suing the plan of another Federal Convention ; as if a better
temper of conciliation, or a more satisfactory harmony of de-
cisions, could be expected from men, after their minds are
agitated with disgusts and disappointments, than before they
were thus disturbed ; though from an uncontradicted asser-
tion it appears, that without such provocations, the difficulty
of reconciling the interests of the several states was so near
to insuperable, in the late convention, that after many weeks
spent in the most faithful labours to promote concord, the
members were upon the very point of dispersing in the utmost
disorder, jealousy and resentment, and leaving the states ex-
posed to all the tempests of passions, that have been so fatal
to confederacies of republics.
All these things, with observations on particular articles of
the constitution, have been laid before the public, and the
writer of this address means not to repeat what has been
already said. What he wishes, is to simplify [4] the subject,
so as to facilitate the inquiries of his fellow citizens.
Many are the objections made to the system proposed.
They should be distinguished. Some may be called local, be-
cause they spring from the supposed interests of individual
states. Thus, for instance, some inhabitants of large states
may desire the system to be so altered, that they may possess
more authority in the decisions of the government ; or some
inhabitants of commercial states may desire it to be so al-
tered, that the advantages of trade may center almost wholly
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 1 67
among themselves ; and this predilection they may think com-
patible with the common welfare. Their judgment being thus
warp'd, at the beginning of their deliberations, objections are
accumulated as very important, that, without this preposses-
sion, would never have obtained their approbation. Certain
it is, that strong understandings may be so influenced by this
insulated patriotism, as to doubt — whether general benefits
can be communicated by a general government.*
Probably nothing would operate so much for the correc-
tion of these errors, as the perusal of the accounts transmit-
ted to us by the ancients, of the calamities occasioned in
Greece by a conduct founded on similar mistakes. They are
expressly ascribed to this cause — that each city meditated a
part on its own profit and ends insomuch that those who
seemed to contend for union, could never relinquish their own
in- [5] terests and advancement, while they deliberated for the
public.
Heaven grant ! that our countrymen may pause in time —
duly estimate the present moment — and solemnly reflect —
whether their measures may not tend to draw down the same
distractions upon us, that desolated Greece.
They may now tolerably judge from the proceedings of
the Federal Convention and of other conventions, what are
the sentiments of America upon her present and future pros-
pects. Let the voice of her distress be venerated — and ad-
hering to the generous Virginian declaration, let them resolve
to " cling to Union as the political Rock of our Salvation."
FABIUS.
Philadelphia, )
April 10, 1788. j
• See some late publications.
1 68 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
[6] LETTER II.
But besides the objections originating from the before men-
tioned cause, that have been called local, there are other
objections that are supposed to arise from maxims of liberty
and policy. —
Hence it is inferred, that the proposed system has such
inherent vices, as must necessarily produce a bad administra-
tion, and at length the oppression of a monarchy and aris-
tocracy in the federal officers.
The writer of this address being convinced by as exact an
investigation as he could make, that such mistakes may lead
to the perdition of his country, esteems it his indispensable
duty, strenuously to contend, that — the power of the people
pervading the proposed system, together with the strong con-
federation of the states, forms an adequate security against
every danger that has been apprehended.
If this single assertion can be supported by facts and argu-
ments, there will be reason to hope, that anxieties will be
removed from the minds of some citizens, who are truly
devoted to the interests of America, and who have been
thrown into perplexities, by the mazes of multiplied and
intricate disquisitions.
The objectors agree, that the confederation of the states
will be strong, according to the system proposed, and so
strong, that many of them loudly complain of that strength.
On this part of the assertion, there is no dispute : But some
of the objections that have been published, [7] strike at an-
other part of the principle assumed, and deny, that the sys-
tem is sufficiently founded on the power of the people.
The course of regular inquiry demands, that these objec-
tions should be considered in the first place. If they are
removed, then all the rest of the objections, concerning un-
necessary taxations, standing armies, the abolishment of trial
by jury, the liberty of the press, the freedom of commerce,
the judicial, executive, and legislative authorities of the sev-
eral states, and the rights of citizens, and the other abuses of
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 169
federal government, must, of consequence, be rejected, if the
principle contains the salutary, purifying, and preserving quali-
ties attributed to it. The question then will be — not what
may be done, when the government shall be turned into a
tyranny ; but how the government can be so turned ?
Thus unembarrassed by subordinate discussions, we may
come fairly to the contemplation of that superior point, and
be better enabled to discover, whether our attention to it will
afford any lights, whereby we may be conducted to peace,
liberty, and safety.
The objections, denying that the system proposed is suffi-
ciently founded on the power of the people, state, that the
number of the federal trustees or officers, is too small, and
that they are to hold their offices too long,
One would really have supposed, that smallness of number
could not be termed a cause of danger, as influence must in-
crease with enlargement. If this is a fault, it will soon be
cor- [8] rected, as an addition will be often made to the num-
ber of the senators, and a much greater and more frequently,
to that of the representatives; and in all probability much
sooner, than we shall be able and willing to bear the expence
of the addition.
As to the senate, it never can be, and it never ought to be
large, if it is to possess the powers which almost all the ob-
jectors seem inclined to allot to it, as will be evident to every
intelligent person, who considers those powers.
Though small, let it be remembered, that it is to be created
by the sovereignties of the several states ; that is, by the per-
sons, whom the people of each state shall judge to be most
worthy, and who, surely, will be religiously attentive to mak-
ing a selection, in which the interest and honour of their state
will be so deeply concerned. It should be remembered too,
that this is the same manner, in which the members of Con-
gress are now appointed ; and that herein, the sovereignties
of the states are so intimately involved, that however a re-
nunciation of part of these powers may be desired by some
of the states, it never will be obtained from the rest of them.
Peaceable, fraternal, and benevolent as these are, they think,
the concessions they have made, ought to satisfy all.
I TO LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
That the senate may always be kept full, without the in-
terference of Congress, it is provided in the system, that if
vacancies happen by resignation or otherwise, during the re-
cess of the legislature of the state, the executive thereof may
make temporary appointments, until the [9] next meeting of
the legislature, which shall then fill up such vacancies.
As to the house of representatives, it is to consist of a num-
ber of persons, not exceeding one for every thirty thousand :
But each state shall have at least one representative. The
electors will reside, widely dispersed, over an extensive coun-
try. Cabal and corruption will be as impracticable, as, on
such occasions, human institutions, can render them. The will
of freemen, thus circumstanced, will give the fiat. The purity
of election thus obtained, will amply compensate for the sup-
posed defect of representation ; and the members, thus chosen,
will be most apt to harmonize in their proceedings, with the gen-
eral interests, feelings, and sentiments of the people.
Allowing such an increase of population as, from experi-
ence and a variety of causes, may be expected, the represent-
atives, in a short period, will amount to several hundreds, and
most probably long before any change of manners for the
worse, that might tempt or encourage our ruler to mal-admin-
istration, will take place on this continent.
That this house may always be kept full, without the in-
terference of Congress, it is provided in the system, that when
vacancies happen in any state, the executive authority thereof
shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.
But, it seems, the number of the federal ofificers is not
only too small : They are to hold their offices too long.
[10] This objection surely applies not to the house of repre-
sentatives, who are to be chosen every two years, especially if
the extent of empire, and the vast variety and importance of
their deliberations, be considered. In that view, they and
the senate will actually be not only legislative but also diplo-
matic bodies, perpetually engaged in the arduous talk of
reconciling, in their determinations, the interests of several
sovereign states, not to insist on the necessity of a compe-
tent knowledge of foreign affairs, relative to the states.
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 17I
They who desire the representatives to be chosen every
year, should exceed Newton in calculations, if they attempt
to evince, that the public business would, in that case, be bet-
ter transacted, than when they are chosen every two years.
The idea, however, should be excused for the zeal that
prompted it.
Is monarchy or aristocracy to be produced, without the
consent of the people, by a house of representatives, thus
constituted ?
It has been unanimously agreed by the friends of liberty,
that frequent elections of the representatives of the people, are
the sovereign remedy of all grievances in a free government. —
Let us pass on to the senate.
At the end of two years after the first election, one third
is to be elected for six years ; and at the end of four years,
another third. Thus one third will constantly have but four
years, and another but two years to continue in office. The
whole number at first will amount to [11] twenty-six, will be
regularly renovated by the biennial election of one third, and
will be overlooked, and overawed by the house of representa-
tives, nearly three times more numerous at the beginning,
rapidly and vastly augmenting, and more enabled to overlook
and overawe them, by holding their offices for two years, as
thereby they will acquire better information, respecting na-
tional affairs. These representatives will also command the
public purse, as all bills for raising revenue, must originate in
their house.
As in the Roman armies, when the Principes and Hastati
had failed, there were still the Triarii, who generally put
things to rights, so we shall be supplied with another re-
source.
We are to have a president, to superintend, and if he
thinks the public weal requires it, to controul any act of the
representatives and senate.
This president is to be chosen, not by the people at large,
because it may not be possible, that all the freemen of the
empire should always have the necessary information, for
directing their choice of such an officer; nor by Congress,
172 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
lest it should disturb the national councils ; nor by any one
standing body whatever, for fear of undue influence.
He is to be chosen in the following manner. Each state
shall appoint, as the legislature thereof may direct, a number
of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and repre-
sentatives, to which the state shall be entitled in Congress :
but no senator or representative, or person holding an office
of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed
an elector. As these elec- [12] tors are to be appointed, as the
legislature of each state may direct, the fairest, freest opening
is given, for each state to chuse such electors for this purpose,
as shall be most signally qualified to fulfil the trust.
To guard against undue influence these electors, thus
chosen, are to meet in their respective states, and vote by bal-
lot ; and still further to guard against it. Congress may de-
termine the time of chusing the electors, and the days on
which they shall give their votes — which day shall be the
same throughout the United States. All the votes from the
several states are to be transmitted to Congress, and therein
counted. The president is to hold his office for four years.
When these electors meet in their respective states, utterly
vain will be the unreasonable suggestions derived for partial-
ity. The electors may throw away their votes, mark, with
public disappointment, some person improperly favored by
them, or justly revering the duties of their office, dedicate
their votes to the best interests of their country.
This president will be no dictator. Two thirds of the re-
presentatives and the senate may pass any law, notwithstand-
ing his dissent ; and he is removable and punishable for mis-
behaviour.
Can this limited, fluctuating senate, placed amidst such
powers, if it should become willing, ever become able, to
make America pass under its yoke ? The senators will gener-
ally be inhabitants of places very distant one from another.
They can scarcely be acquainted till [13] they meet. Few of
them can ever act together for any length of time, unless
their good conduct recommends them to a re-election ; and
then there will be frequent changes in a body dependant upon
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 1 73
the acts of other bodies, the legislatures of the several states,
that are altering every year. Machiavel and Caesar Borgia
together could not form a conspiracy in such a senate, de-.
structive to any but themselves and their accomplices.
It is essential to every good government, that there should
be some council, permanent enough to get a due knowledge
of affairs internal and external ; so constituted, that by some
deaths or removals, the current of information should not be
impeded or disturbed ; and so regulated, as to be responsible
to, and controulable by the people. Where can the authority
for combining these advantages, be more safely, beneficially,
or satisfactorily lodged, than in the senate, to be formed ac-
cording to the plan proposed ? Shall parts of the trust be
committed to the president, with counsellors who shall sub-
scribe their advices ?* If assaults upon liberty are to be '
guarded against, and surely they ought to be with sleepless
vigilance, why should we depend more on the commander in
chief of the army and navy of The United States, and of the
militia of the several states, and on his counsellors, whom he
may secretly influence, than of the senate to be appointed by
the persons exercising the sovereign authority of the several
states? In truth, the [14] objections against the powers of
the senate originated from a desire to have them, or at least
some of them, vested in a body, in which the several states
should be represented, in proportion to the number of inhabr
itants, as in the house of representatives. This method is un-
attainable, and the wish for it should be dismissed from every
mind, that desires the existence of a confederation.
What assurance can be given, or what probability be as-
signed, that a board of counsellors would continue honest,
longer than the senate ? Or, that they would possess more
useful information, respecting all the states, than the senators
of all the states? It appears needless to pursue this argu-
ment any further.
How varied, balanced, concordant, and benign, is the sys-
tem proposed to us ? To secure the freedom, and promote
the happiness of these and future states, by giving the will of
the people a decisive influence over the whole, and over all the
• See late publications.
J 74 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
parts, with what a comprehensive arrangement does it em-
brace different modes of representation, from an election by a
county to an election by an empire ? What are the compli-
cated ballot, and all the refined devices of Venice for main-
taining her aristocracy, when compared with this plain-dealing
work for diffusing the blessings of equal liberty and common
prosperity over myriads of the human race ?
All the foundations before mentioned, of the federal gov-
ernment, are by the proposed system to be established, in the
most clear, strong, [15] positive, unequivocal expressions, of
which our language is capable. Magna charta, or any other
law, never contained clauses more decisive and emphatic.
While the people of these states have sense, they^ will under-
stand them ; and while they have spirit, they will make them
to be observed.
FABIUS.
[16] LETTER III.
The writer of this address hopes, that he will now be
thought so disengaged from the objections against the princi-
ple assumed, that he may be excused for recurring to his as-
sertion, that — the power of the people pervading the proposed
system, together with the strong confederation of the states,
will form an adequate security against every danger that has
been apprehended.
It is a mournful, but may be a useful truth, that the liberty
of single republics has generally been destroyed by some of
the citizens, and of confederated republics, by some of the
associated states.
It is more pleasing, and may be more profitable to reflect,
that, their tranquility and prosperity have commonly been
promoted, in proportion to the strength of their governinent
for protecting the worthy against the licentious.
As in forming a political society, each individual contrib-
utes some of his rights, in order that he may, from a common
stock of rights, derive greater benefits, than he could from
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 17S
merely his own ; so, in forming a confederation, each political
society should contribute such a share of their rights, as will,
from a common stock of these rights, produce the largest quan-
tity of benefits for them.
But, what is that share ? and, how to be managed ? Mo-
mentous questions ! Here, flattery is treason ; and error,
destruction.
[17] Are they unanswerable? No. Our most gracious
Creator does not condemn us to sigh for unattainable blessed-
ness : But one thing he demands — that we should seek for
happiness in his way, and not in our own.
Humility and benevolence must take place of pride and
overweening selfishness. Reason, rising above these mists,
will then discover to us, that we cannot be true to ourselves,
without being true to others — that to love our neighbours as
ourselves, is to love ourselves in the best manner — that to give,
is to gain — and, that we never consult our own happiness
more effectually, than when we most endeavour to correspond
with the divine designs, by communicating happiness, as much
as we can, to our fellow-creatures. Inestimable truth ! suffi-
cient, if they do not barely ask what it is, to melt tyrants into
men, and to soothe the inflamed minds of a multitude into
mildness — Inestimable truth ! which our Maker in his provi-
dence, enables us, not only to talk and write about, but to
adopt in practice of vast extent, and of instructive example.
Let us now enquire, if there be not some principle, simple
as the laws of nature in other instances, from which, as from
a source, the many benefits of society are deduced.
We may with' reverence say, that our Creator designed
men for society, because otherwise they cannot be happy.
They cannot be happy without freedom ; nor free without se-
curity ; that is, without the absence of fear ; nor thus secure,
without society. The con- [18] elusion is strictly syllogistic —
that men cannot be free without society. Of course, they
cannot be equally free without society, which freedom pro-
duces the greatest happiness.
As these premises are invincible, we have advanced a con-
siderable way in our enquiry upon this deeply interesting sub-
176 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
ject. If we can determine, what share of his rights, every in-
dividual must contribute to the eommon stock of rights in form-
ing a society, for obtaining equal freedom, we determine at
the same time, what share of their rights each political society
must contribute to the common stock or rights in forming a
confederation, which is only a larger society, for obtaining
equal freedom : For, if the deposite be not proportioned to
the magnitude of the association in the latter case, it will
generate the same mischief among the component parts of it,
from their inequality, that would result from a defective con-
tribution to association in the former case, among the com-
ponent parts of it, from their inequality.
Each individual then must contribute such a share of his
rights, as is necessary for attaining that security that is essen-
tial to freedom ; and he is bound to make this contribution
by the law of his nature, which prompts him to a participated
happiness ; that is, by the command of his creator ; therefore,
he must submit his will, in what concerns all, to the will of all,
that is of the whole society. What does he lose by this sub-
mission ; The power of doing [19] injuries to others — and the
dread of suffering injuries from them. What does he gain by
it ? The aid of those associated with him, for his relief from
the incommodities of mental or bodily weakness — the plea-
sure for which his heart is formed — of doing good — protection
against injuries — a capacity of enjoying his undelegated rights
to the best advantage — a repeal of his fears — and tranquility
of mind — or, in other words, that perfect liberty better de-
scribed in the Holy Scriptures, than any where else, in these
expressions — " When every man shall sit under his vine, and
under his fig-tree, and none shall make him afraid."
The like submission, with a correspondent expansion and
accommodation, must be made between states, for obtaining
the like benefits in a confederation. Men are the materials of
both. As the largest number is but a junction of units — a
confederation is but an assemblage of individuals. The aus-
picious influence of the law of his nature, upon which the
happiness of man depends in society, must attend him in con-
federation, or he becomes unhappy ; for confederation should
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. \^^
promote the happiness of individuals, or it does not answer
the intended purpose. Herein there is a progression, not a
contradiction. As man, he becomes a citizen ; as a citizen, he
becomes a federalist. The generation of one, is not the de-
struction of the other. He carries into society his naked
rights : These thereby improved, he carries still forward into
confederation. If that sacred law before mentioned, is not
here [20] observed, the confederation would not be real, but
pretended. He would confide, and be deceived.*
* " The error of those who reason by precedent, drawn from antiquity,
respecting the rights of man, is, that they do not go far enough into antiquity.
They do not go the whole way. They stop in some of the intermediate stages
of an hundred or u. thousand years, and produce what was then done, as a
rule for the present day. This is no authority at all. If we travel still further
into antiquity, we shall find a direct contrary opinion and practice prevailing ;
and if antiquity is to be authority, a thousand such authorities may be pro-
duced, successively contradicting each other : but if we proceed on, at last we
shall come out right : We shall then come to the time when man came from
the hand of his Maker. What was he then ? Man. Man was his high and
only title, and a higher cannot be given him We are now got at the
origin of man, and at the origin of his rights. Every history of the crea-
tion, and every traditionary account, whether from the lettered or unlettered
world, however they may vary in their opinion or belief of certain particulars,
all agree in establishing one point, the unity of man ; by which I mean that
man is all of one degree, and consequently that all men are born equal, and
with equal natural rights. By considering man in this light, it places him in a
close connection with all his duties, whether to his Creator, or to the creation,
of which he is a part ; and it is only where he forgets his origin, or, to use a
more fashionable phrase, his birth and family, that he becomes dissolute.
" Hitherto we have spoken only (and that but in part) of the natural rights of
man. We have now to consider the civil rights of man, and to shew how the
one originates out of the other. — Man did not enter into society, to become
worse than he was before, nor to have less rights than he had before, but to
have those rights better secured. His natural rights are the foundation of all
his civil rights. But in order to pursue this distinction with more precision, it
will be necessary to mark the different qualities of natural and civil rights.
" A few words will explain this. Natural rights are those which appertain
to man in the right of his existence— civil rights are those which appertain to
man in right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has for its
foundation some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to unite his in-
dividual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all
those which relate to security and protection.
" From this short review it will be easy to distinguish between that class of
natural rights which man retains after entering into society, and those which
178 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
[21] The dilemma is inevitable. There must either be one
will, or several wills. If but one will, all the people are con-
cerned : if several wills, few comparatively are concerned. Sur-
prizing ! that this doctrine should be contended for by those,
who declare, that the constitution is not founded on a bottom
broad enough ; and, though the whole people of the United
States are to be ^r^^/j/ represented in it in three different modes
of representation, and their servants will have the most ad-
vantageous situations and opportunities of acquiring all re-
quisite information for the welfare of the [22] whole union,
yet insist for a privilege of opposing, obstructing, and con-
founding all their measures taken with common consent for
the general weal, by the delays, negligences, rivalries, or other
selfish views of parts of the union.
Thus, while one state should be relied upon by the union
for giving aid, upon a recommendation of Congress, to an-
other in distress, the latter might be ruined ; and the state re
lied upon, might suppose, it would gain by such an event.
When any persons speak of a consideration, do they, or do
they not acknowledge, that the whole is interested in the
safety of every part — in the agreement of parts — in the rela-
tion of parts [23] to one another — to the whole — or, to other
societies ? If they do — then, the authority of the whole, must
be co-extensive with its interests — and if it is, the will of the
whole must and ought in such cases to govern ; or else the
whole would have interests without an authority to manage
them — a position which prejudice itself cannot digest.
If they do not acknowledge, that the whole is thus inter-
ested, the conversation should cease. Such persons mean not
a confederation, but something else.
he throws into common stock as a member of society. The natural rights which
he retains, are all those in which the power to execute is as perfect in the indi-
vidual as the right itself. — The natural rights which are not retained, are all
those in which, though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to exe-
cute them is defective : they answer not his purpose — those he deposits in the com-
mon stock of society, and takes the arm of society, of which he is a part, in
preference and in addition to his own. Society grants him nothing. Every
man is a proprietor in society, and draws on the capital as a matter of right." —
" Rights of Man," 1791, page 30, 31.
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 1 79
As to the idea, that this superintending sovereign will must
of consequence destroy the subordinate sovereignties of the
several states, it is begging a concession of the question, by
inferring, that a manifest and great usefulness must necessarily
end in abuse ; and not only so, but it requires an extinction
of the principle of all society: for the subordinate sovereign-
ties, or, in other words, the undelegated rights of the several
states, in a confederation, stand upon the very same founda-
tion with the undelegated rights of individuals in a society,
the federal sovereign will being composed of the subordinate
sovereign wills of the several confederated states. As some
persons seem to think, a bill of rights is the best security of
rights, the sovereignties of the several states have this best
security by the proposed constitution, and more than this best
security, for they are not barely declared to be rights, but are
taken into it as component parts for their perpetual preserva-
tion — by themselves. In short, the government of each state
is, and is to be, [24] sovereign and supreme in all matters that
relate to each state only. It is to be subordinate barely in
those matters that relate to the whole ; and it will be their
own faults if the several states suffer the federal sovereignty
to interfere in things of their respective jurisdictions. An in-
stance of such interference with regard to any single state,
will be a dangerous precedent as to all, and therefore will be
guarded against by all, as the trustees or servants of the sev-
eral states will not dare, if they retain their senses, so to vio-
late the independent sovereignty of their respective states,
that justly darling object of American affections, to which they
are responsible, besides being endeared by all the charities of
life.
The common sense of mankind agrees to the devolutions
of individual wills in society ; and if it has not been as uni-
versally assented to in confederation, the reasons are evident,
and worthy of being retained in remembrance by Americans.
They were want of opportunities, or the loss of them, through
defects of knowledge and virtue. The principle, however,
has been sufficiently vindicated in imperfect combinations, as
their prosperity has generally been commensurate to its opera-
tion.
l8o LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
How beautifully and forcibly does the inspired Apostle
Paul, argue upon a sublimer subject, with a train of reasoning
strictly applicable to the present ? His words are — " If the
foot shall say, because I am not the hand, I am not of the
body ; is it therefore not of the body ? and if the ear shall
say, because I am [25] not the eye, I am not of the body; is
it therefore not of the body?" As plainly inferring, as could
be done in that allegorical manner, the strongest censure of
such partial discontents and dissentions, especially, as his
meaning is enforced by his description of the benefits of union
in these expressions — " But, now they are many members,
yet but one body : and the eye cannot say to the hand, I have
no need of thee."
When the commons of Rome upon a rupture with the
Senate, seceded in arms at the Mons sacer, Menemius Agrip-
pa used the like allusion to the human body, in his famous
apologue of a quarrel among some of the members. The un-
polished but honest-hearted Romans of that day, understood
him, and were appeased.
Another comparison has been made by the learned, between
a natural and a political body ; and no wonder indeed, when
the title of the latter was borrowed from the resemblance. It
has therefore been justly observed, that if a mortification
takes place in one or some of the limbs, and the rest of the
body is sound, remedies may be applied, and not only the
contagion prevented from spreading, but the diseased part or
parts saved by the connection with the body, and restored to
former usefulness. When general putrefaction prevails, death
is to be expected. History sacred and profane tells us, that,
corruption of manners sinks nations into slavery.
FABIUS.
LETTi;jlS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. l8l
[26] LETTER IV.
Another question remains. How are the contributed
rights to be managed? The resolution has been in great
measure anticipated, by what has been said concerning the
system proposed. Some few reflections may perhaps finish
it.
If it be considered separately, a constitution is the organiza-
tion of the contributed rights in society. Government is the
exercise of them. It is intended for the benefit of the gov-
erned ; of course can have no just powers but what conduce
to that end : and the awfulness of the trust is demonstrated
in this — that it is founded on the nature of man, that is, on
the will of his Maker, and is therefore sacred. It is then an
offence against Heaven, to violate that trust.*
[27] If the organization of a constitution be defective, it may
be amended,
A good constitution promotes, but not always produces a
good administration.
* " We have now traced Man from a natural individual to a member of
society Civil power, properly considered as such is made up of the aggre-
gate of that class of the natural rights, which become defective in the indi-
vidual in point of power, and answers not his purpose ; but when collected into
a focus, becomes competent to the purpose of every one. Let us now apply
those principles to government,
"Individuals themselves, each in his own personal and sovereign right, en-
tered into a compact with each other, to produce a government ; and this is the
only mode in which governments have a right to arise, and the only principle
on which they have a right to exist.
" A constitution is not a thing in name only, but in fact. — It has not an ideal
but a real existence, and wherever it cannot be produced in a visible form,
there is none. A constitution is a thing antecedent to a government ; and a
government is only the creature of a constitution. — A constitution of a country
is not the act of its government, but of the people constituting a government.
It is the body of elements to which you can refer, and quote article by article ;
and which contains the principles on which the goverriment shall be established,
the manner in which it shall be organized, the powers it shall have, the mode
of election, the duration of parliaments, or by what other name such bodies
may be called, the powers which the executive part of the government shall
have ; and, in fine, every thing that relates to the complete organization of a
civil government, and the principles on which it shall act, and by which it shall
be bound."—" Rights of Man," page 35, 36.
1 82 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
The government must never be lodged in a single body.
From such an one, with an unlucky composition of its parts,
rash, partial, illegal, and when intoxicated with success, even
cruel, insolent and contemptible edits, may at times be ex-
pected. By these, if other mischiefs do not follow, the na-
tional dignity may be impaired.
[28] Several inconveniences might attend a division of the
government into two bodies, that probably would be avoided
in another arrangement.
The judgment of the most enlightened among mankind,
confirmed by multiplied experiments, points out the propriety
of government being committed to such a number of great
departments, as can be introduced without confusion, distinct
in ofifice, and yet connected in operation. It seems to be
agreed, that three or four of these departments are a compe-
tent number.
[29] Such a repartition appears well calculated to express
the sense of the people, and to encrease the safety and repose
of the governed, which with the advancement of their happi-
ness in other respects, are the objects of government ; as there-
by there will be more obstructions interposed ; against errors,
feuds, and frauds, in the administration, and the extraordi-
nary interference of the people need be less frequent. Thus,
wars, tumults, and uneasinesses, are avoided. The depart-
ments so constituted, may therefore be said to be balanced.
But, notwithstanding, it must be granted, that a bad admin-
"What is a constitution? it is tlie form of government, delineated by the
mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles or fundamental
laws are established. The constitution is certain and fixed ; it contains the
permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land ; it is para-
mount to the power of the legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by
the authority that made it. — What are legislatures ? creatures of the constitu-
tion, they owe their existence to the constitution — they derive their powers
from the constitution. — It is their commission, and therefore all their acts must
be conformable to it, or else void. The constitution is the work or will of the
people themselves, in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity. Law is
the work or will of the legislature in their derivative capacity."
Judge Patterson's charge to the Jury in the Wioming case of Vanhorne's
lessee against Dorrance ; tried at the circuit-court for the United States, held
at Philadelphia, April term, 1795.
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 1 83
istration may take place.— What is then to be done ? The
answer is instantly found — Let the Fasces be lowered before
— the supreme sovereignty of the people. // is their duty to
watch, and their right to take care, that the constitution be pre-
served ; or in the Roman phrase on perilous occasions — to pro-
vide, that the republic receive no damage.
Political bodies are properly said to be balanced, with re-
spect to this primary origination and ultimate destination, not
to any intrinsic or constitutional properties.* It [30] is the
power from which they proceed, and which they serve, that
truly and of right balances them.f
But, as a good constitution not always produces a good
administration, a defective one not always excludes it. Thus
in governments very different from those of United America,
general manners and customs, improvement in knowledge,
and the education and disposition of princes, not unfre-
quently soften the features, [31] and qualify the defects.
Jewels of value are substituted, in the place of the rare
and genuine orient of higest price and brightest lustre :
and though the sovereigns cannot even in their ministers, be
brought to account by the governed, yet there are instances
of their conduct indicating a veneration for the rights of the
* Constitutional properties are only, as has been observed at the beginning
of this letter, parts in the organization of the contributed rights. As long as
those parts preserve the orders assigned to them respectively by the constitu-
tion, they may so far be said to be balanced : but, when one part, without
being sufficiently checked by the rest, abuses its power to the manifest
danger of public happiness, or when the several parts abuse their respective
powers so as to involve the commonwealth in the like peril, the people must
restore things to that order, from which their functionaries have departed. If
the people suffer this living principle of watchfulness and controul to be extin-
guished among them, they will assuredly not long afterwards experience that
of their "temple," "there shall not be left one stone upon another, that shall
not be thrown down."
f When the controuling power is in a constitution, it has the nation for its
support, and the natural and the political controuling powers are together.
The laws which are enacted by the governments, controul men only as
individuals, but the nation, thro' its constitution controuls the whole govern-
ment, and has a natural ability to do so. The final controuling power, there-
fore, and the original constituting power, are one and the same power. — " Rights
of Man," 1792. part 2d, b. 4. page 42.
1 84 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
people, and an internal conviction of the guilt that attends
their violation. Some of them appear to be fathers of their
countries. Revered princes ! Friends of mankind ! May-
peace be in their lives — and in their deaths — Hope.
By this superior will of the people, is meant a reasonable,
not a distracted will. When frenzy seizes the mass, it would
be equal madness to think of their happiness, that is, of their
freedom. They will infallibly have a Philip or a Caesar, to
bleed them into soberness of mind. At present we are cool ;
and let us attend to our business.
Our goverment under the proposed confederation, will be
guarded by a repetition of the strongest cautions against ex-
cesses. In the senate the sovereignties of the several states
will be equally represented ; in the house of representatives,
the people of the whole union will be equally represented ;
and, in the president, and the federal independent judges, so
much concerned in the execution of the laws, and in the de-
termination of their constitutionality, the sovereignties of the
several states and the people of the whole union, may be con-
sidered as conjointly represented.
[32] Where was there ever and where is there now upon
the face of the earth, a government so diversified and at-
tempered ? If a work formed with so much deliberation, so
respectful and affectionate an attention to the interests, feel-
ings, and sentiments of all United America, will not satisfy,
what would satisfy all United America ?
It seems highly probable, that those who would reject this
labour of public love, would also have rejected the Heaven-
taught institution of trial by jury, had they been consulted
upon its establishment. Would they not have cried out, that
there never was framed so detestable, so paltry, and so tyran-
nical a device for extinguishing freedom, and throwing un-
bounded domination into the hands of the king and barons,
under a contemptible pretence of preserving it ? " What !
Can freedom be preserved by imprisoning its guardians ? Can
freedom be preserved, by keeping twelve men closely confined
without meat, drink, fire, or candle, until they unanimously
agree, and this to be innumerably repeated ? Can freedom be
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 1 85
preserved, by thus delivering up a number of freemen to a
monarch and an aristocracy, fortified by dependant and obe-
dient judges and officers, to be shut up, until under duress
they speak as they are ordered ? Why cannot the twelve
jurors separate,* after hearing the evidence, return to their
respective homes, and there take time,* and think of the mat-
ter at their ease ?* Is there not a variety of [33] ways, in which
causes have been, and can be tried, without this tremendous,
unprecedented inquisition ? Why then is it insisted on ; but
because the fabricators of it know that it will, and intend that
it shall reduce the people to slavery ? Away with it — Free-
men will never be enthralled by so insolent, so execrable, so
pitiful a contrivance."
Happily for us our ancestors thought otherwise. They
were not so over-nice and curious, as to refuse blessings, be-
cause, they might possibly be abused.
They perceived, that the uses included were great and mani-
fest. Perhaps they did not foresee, that from this acorn, as it
were, of their planting, would be produced a perpetual vegeta-
tion of political energies, that " would secure the just liberties
of the nation for a long succession of ages,* and elevate it to
the distinguished rank it has for several centuries held. As to
abuses, they trusted to their own spirit for preventing or cor-
recting them :. And worthy is it of deep consideration by
every friend of freedom, that abuses that seem to be but
" trifles,"f may be attended by fatal consequences. What can
be " trifling," that diminishes or detracts from the only defence,
that ever was found against " open attacks and secret machina-
tions T'X This establishment originates from a knowledge of
human nature. With a superior force, wisdom, and benevo-
lence uni- [34] ted, it rives the difficulties concerning adminis-
tration of justice, that have distressed, or destroyed the rest of
mankind. It reconciles contradictions — vastness of power,
with safety of private station. It is ever new, and always the
same.
* See late publications against the Federal Constitution.
* Blackstone, III. 279 f Idem, IV. 350. % Idem, III. 381.
I86 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
Trial by jury and the dependence of taxation upon reprer
sentation, those corner stones of Hberty, were not obtained by
a bill of rights, or any other records, and have not been and
cannot be preserved by them. They and all other rights must
be preserved, by soundness of se^ise and honesty of heart. Com-
pared with these, what are a bill of rights, or any characters
drawn upon paper or parchment, those frail remembrances ?
Do we want to be reminded, that the sun enlightens, warms,
invigorates, and cheers ? or how horrid it would be, to have his
blessed beams intercepted, by our being thrust into mines or
dungeons? Liberty is the sun of society. Rights are the
beams.*
[35] " It is the duty which every man owes to his country,
his friends, his posterity, and himself, to maintain to the utmost
of his power this valuable palladium in all its rights ; to restore
to its its ancient dignity, if at all impaired by the different
value of property, or otherwise deviated from its first institu-
tion ; to amend it, wherever it is defective ;* and above all to
guard with the most jealous circumspection against the new
and arbitrary methods of trial, which, under a variety of plausi-
ble pretences, may in time imperceptibly undermine this best
preservative of liberty. "f Trial by Jury is our birth-right ; and
tempted to his own ruin, by some seducing spirit, must be the
man, who in opposition to the genius of United America, shall
dare to attempt its subversion.
In the proposed confederation, it is preserved inviolable in
criminal cases, and cannot be altered in other respects, but when
United America demands it.
There seems to be a disposition in men to find fault, no dif^
* Instead of referring to musty records and mouldy parchments to prove
that the rights of the living are lost, " renounced, and abdicated for ever," by
those who are now no more. M. de la Fayette, in his address to the national
assembly, applies to the living world, and says — " Call to mind the sentiments
which nature has engraved in the heart of every citizen, and which take a new
face when they are solemnly recognized by all. For a nation to love liberty,
it is sufficient that she knows it ; and to be free, it is sufficient that she wills
it," — "Rights of Man" page 11.
*See an enumeration of defects in trials by jury. Blackstone, III. 381.
fidem, IV. 350.
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 187
ficult matter, rather than to act as they ought. The works of
creation itself have been objected to : and one learned prince
declared, that if he had been consulted, they would have been
improved. With what book has so much fault been found, as
with the Bible ? Perhaps, principally, because it so clearly and
strongly enjoins men to do right. How many, how plausible
objections have been [36] made against it, with how much ar-
dor, with how much pains ? Yet, the book has done more good
than all the books in the world ; would do much more, if duly
regarded ; and might lead the objectors against it to happiness,
if they would value it as they should.
When objections are made to a system of high import,
should they not be weighed against the benefits ? Are these
great, positive, immediate ? Is there a chance of endangering
them by rejection or delay ? May they not be attained without
admitting the objections at present, supposing the objections to
be well founded? If the objections are well founded, may
they nbt be hereafter admitted, without danger, disgust, or in-
convenience ? Is the system so formed, that they may be thus
admitted ? May they not be of less efficiency, than they are
thought to be by their authors ? are they not designed to hin-
der evils, which are generally deemed to be sufficiently pro-
vided against ? May not the admission of them prevent bene-
fits, that might otherwise be obtained ? In political affairs, is
it not more safe and advantageous, for all to agree in measures
that may not be best, than to quarrel among themselves, what
are best ?
When questions of this kind with regard to the plan pro-
posed, are calmly considered, it seems reasonable to hope, that
every faithful citizen of United America, will make up his
mind, with much satisfaction to himself, and advantage to his
country.
FABIUS.
1 88 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
LETTER V.
[37] It has been considered, what are the rights to be con-
tributed, and how they are to be managed ; and it has been
said, that republican tranquility and prosperity have com-
monly been promoted, in proportion to the strength of gov-
ernnment for protecting the worthy against the licentious.
The protection herein mentioned, refers to cases between
citizens and citizens, or states and states : But there is also a
protection to be afforded to all the citizens, or states, against
foreigners. It has been asserted, that this protection never
can be afforded, but under an appropriation, collection, and
application, of the general force, by the will of the whole com-
bination. This protection is in a degree dependent on the
former, as it may be weakened by internal discords and espec-
ially where the worst party prevails. Hence it is evident, that
such establishments as tend most to protect the worthy against
the licentious, tends most to protect all against foreigners.
This position is found to be verified by indisputable facts,
from which it appears, that when nations have been, as it
were, condemned for their crimes, unless they first became
suicides, foreigners have acted as executioners.
This is not all. As government is intended for the happi-
ness of the people, the protection of the worthy against those
of contrary characters, is calculated to promote the end of
legitimate government, that is the general welfare ; [38] for
the government will partake of the qualities of those whose
authority is prevalent. If it be asked, who are the worthy,
we may be informed by a heathen poet —
" Vir bonus est quis?
" Qui consulta patrum, qui leges juraque servat."*
The best foundations of this protection, that can be laid
by man, are a constitution and government secured, as well as
can be, from the undue influence of passions either in the
people or their servants. Then in a contest between citizens
and citizens, or states and states, the standard of laws may be
displayed, explained and strengthened by the well-remembered
* He who reverses the constitution, liberties and laws of his country.
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 1 89
sentiments and examples of our fore-fathers, which will give
it a sanctity far superior to that of their eagles so venerated
by the former masters of the world. This circumstance will
carry powerful aids to the true friends of their country, and
unless counteracted by the follies of Pharsalia, or the acci-
dents of Philippi, may secure the blessings of freedom to
succeeding ages.
It has been contended that the plan proposed to us, ade-
quately secures us against the influence of passions in the
federal servants. Whether it as adequately secures us against
the influence of passions in the people, or in particular states,
time will determine, and -may the determination be propituous.
[39] Let us now consider the tragical play of the passions
in similar cases ; or, in other words, the consequences of their
irregularities. Duly governed, they produce happiness.
Here the reader, is respectfully [requested, to assist the
intentions of the writer, by keeping in mind, the ideas of a
single republic with one democratic branch in its government,
and of a confederation of republics with one or several demo-
cratic branches in the government of the confederation, or in
the government of its parts, so that as he proceeds, a com-
parison may easily run along, between any of these and the
proposed plan.
History is entertaining and instructive ; but if admired
chiefly for amusement, it may yield little profit. If read for
improvement, it is apprehended, a slight attention only will
be paid to the vast variety of particular incidents, unless they
be such as may meliorate the heart. A knowledge of the
distinguishing features of nations, the principles of their gov-
ernments, the advantages and disadvantages of their situations,
the methods employed to avail themselves of the first, and to
alleviate the last, their manners, customs, and institutions, the
sources of events, their progresses, and determining causes,
may be eminently useful, tho' obscurity may rest upon a
multitude of attending circumstances. Thus one nation may
become prudent and happy, not only by the wisdom and suc-
cess, but even by the errors and misfortunes of another.
[40] In Carthage and Rome, there was a very numerous
igo LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
senate, strengthened by prodigious attachments, and in a great
degree independent of the people. In Athens, there was a
senate strongly supported by the powerful court of Areopagus.
In each of these republics, their affairs at length became con-
vulsed, and their liberty was subverted. What cause produced
these effects? Encroachments of the senate upon the autho-
rity of the people ? No ! but directly the reverse, according
so the unanimous voice of historians ; that is, encroachments
of the people upon the authority of the senate. The people
of these republics absolutely laboured for their own destruc-
tion; and never thought themselves so free, as when they were
promoting their own subjugation. Though even after these
encroachments had been made, and ruin was spreading around,
yet the remnants of senatorial authority delayed the final cat-
astrophe.*
[41] In more modern times, the Florentines exhibited a
memorable example. They were divided into violent parties ;
and the prevailing one vested exorbitant powers in the house
of Medici, then possessed, as it was judged, of more money
than any crowned head in Europe. Though that house en-
gaged and persevered in the attempt, yet the people were
never despoiled of their liberty, until they were overwhelmed
by the armies of foreign princes, to whose enterprizes their
situation exposed them.
Republics of later date and various form have appeared.
Their institutions consist of old errors tissued with hasty
inventions, somewhat excusable, as the wills of the Romans,
made with arms in their hands. Some of them were con-
densedf, by dangers. They are still compressed by them into
* The great Bacon, in enumerating the art by which Csesar enslaved his
country, says — " His first artifice was to break the strength of the senate, for
while that remained safe, there was no opening for any person to immoderate
or extraordinary power. ' Nam initio sibi erani frangendce senatus opes et au-
Uritas qua salva nemini ad, immodica et extra ordinaria imperia aditus erat.'
BoEsuet, bishop of Meaux, takes notice in his universal history, that the in-
famous Herod, to engross authority, attacked the Sanhedrim, which was in a.
manner the senate, where the supreme jurisdiction was exercised."
f " If we consider what the principles are that first condense man into
society, and what the motive is that regulates their mutual intercourse after-
wards, we shall find, by the time we arrive at what is called government, that
nearly the whole of the business is performed by the natural operation of the
parts upon each other." — Rights of Man.
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 191
a sort of union. Their well-known transactions witness, that
their connection is not enough compact and arranged. They
have all suffered, or are suffering through that defect. Their
existence seems to depend more upon others, than upon them-
selves. There might be an impropriety in saying more, con-
sidering the peculiarity of their circumstances at this time.
[42] The wretched mistake of the great men who were
leaders in the long parliament of England, in attempting, by
not filling up vacancies, to extend their power over a brave
and sensible people, accustomed to popular representation, and
their downfal, when their victories and puissance by sea and
land had thrown all Europe into astonishment and awe, shew,
how difficult it is for rulers to usurp over a people who are
not wanting to themselves.
Let the fortunes of confederated republics be now consid-
ered.
" The Amphictionic council," or "general court of Greece,"
claims the first regard. Its authority was very great : But,
the parts were not sufficiently combined, to guard against the
ambitious, avaricious, and selfish projects of some of them ; or,
if they had the power, they.dared not to employ it, as the
turbulent states were very sturdy, and made a sort of partial
confederacies.*
[43] " The Achaean league " seems to be the next in dignity.
It was at first, small, consisting of few states : afterwards, very
* When Xerxes invaded Greece with the largest host and the greatest fleet
that ever were collected, events occurred, which being preserved in history,
convey to us a very affecting and instructive information.
While the danger was at some distance, the states of Greece looked to re-
mote friends for assistance. Disappointed in these speculations, tho' the vast
armaments of their enemies were constantly rolling towards them, still there
was no firmness in their union, no vigor in their resolutions.
The Persian army passed the Hellespont, and directed its march westward.
It was then decided, that Thessaly was the frontier to be first attacked.
The Thessalians, than whom no people had been more forward in the com-
mon cause, hastened a remonstrance to Corinth, urging that unless they were
immediately and powerfully supported, necessity would oblige them to make
terms with the invaders.
This reasonable remonstrance roused the sluggish and hesitating councils
192 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICINSON.
extensive, constituting of many. In their diet or Congress,
they enacted laws, disposed of vacant employments, declared
war, made peace, entered into alliances, compelled every state
of the union to [44] obey its ordinances, and managed other
affairs. Not only their laws, but their magistrates, council,
judges, money, weights and measures, were the same. So
uniform were they, that all seemed to be but one state. Their
chief officer called Strategos, was chosen in the Congress by a
majority of votes. He presided in [45] the Congress, com-
manded the forces, and was vested with great powers, espec-
ially in time of war : but was liable to be called to an account
by the Congress, and punished, if convicted of misbehaviour.
The states have been oppressed by the kings of Macedon,
and insulted by tyrants. " From their incorporation," says
Polybius, "may be dated the birth of that greatness, that by a
constant augmentation, at length arrived to a marvellous
height of prosperity. The same of their wise laws and mild
government reached the Greek colonies in Italy, where the
Grotoniates, the Sybarites, and the Cauloniates, agreed to
adopt them, and to govern their states conformably."
Did the delegates to the Amphictionic council, or to the
Congress of the Achaean league destroy the liberty of their
country, by establishing a monarchy or an aristocracy among
themselves ? Quite the contrary. While the several states con-
of the confederacy. A body of foot was dispatched who soon occupied the
valley of Tempe, the only pass from Lower Macedonia, into Thessaly.
In a few days, these troops being informed that there was another pass
from Upper Macedonia, returned to the Corinthian Isthmus.
The Thessalians thus deserted made their submission.
" This retreat from Tempe appears to have been a precipate measure,
rendered necessary by nothing so much as by the want of some powers of
government extending over the several states which composed the confeder-
acy." — Mitford's History of Greece.
With diminished forces, the defence of the confederates was now to be
contracted. But in the conduct even of this business daily becoming more ur-
gent, we find them laboring under the defects of their confederation.
" Destitute of any sufficient power extending over the whole, no part could
confide in the protection of the whole, while the naval superiority of their enemy
put it in his choice, where, when, and how to make his attacks ; and therefore
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 193
tinned faithful to the union, they prospered. Their affairs were
shattered by dissensions, emulations, and civil wars, artfully
and diligently fomented by princes who thought it their inter-
est ; and in the case of the Achsean league, partly, by the folly
and wickedness of Greeks not of the league, particularly the
iEtolians, who repined at the glories, that constantly attended
the banner of freedom, supported by virtue and conducted by
prudence. Thus weakened, they all sunk together, the envied
and the envying, under the domination, first of Macedon, and
then of Rome.
[46] Let any man of common sense peruse the gloomy but
instructive pages of their mournful story, and he will be con-
vinced, that if any nation could successfuly have resisted those
conquerors of the world, the illustrious deed had been achieved
by Greece ; that cradle of republics, if the several states had
been cemented by some such league as the Achaean, and had
honestly fulfilled its obligations.
It is not pretended, that the Achaean league was perfect,
or that they were not monarchical and aristocratical factions
among the people of it. Every concession of that sort, that
can be asked, shall be made. It had many defects ; every one
of which, however, has been avoided in the plan proposed to
us.
With all its defects, with all its disorders, yet such was the
life and vigor communicated through the whole, by the popu-
lar representation of each part, and the close combination of
each republic seems to have been anxious to reserve its own strength for future
contingencies.
Their generous hearts all beat at the call of freedom ; but their efforts
were embarrassed and enfeebled by the vices of their political constitution, to
their prodigious detriment, and almost to their total destruction. For these
vices, the ardor of heroism united with love of country could not compensate.
These very vices therefore, may truly be said to have wasted the blood of pa-
triots, and to have betrayed their country into the severest calamities.
\iwe shall hereafter by experience discover any vices in our conslHution,
let us hasten with prudence and a fraternal affection for each other, to correct
them. We are all embarked in the same vessel, and equally concerned in re-
pairing any defects.
194 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
all, that the true spirit of republicanism predominated, and
thereby advanced the happiness and glory of the people to so
pre-eminent a state that our ideas upon the pleasing theme
cannot be too elevated. Here is the proof of this assertion.
When the Romans had laid Carthage in ashes ; had reduced
the kingdom of Macedon to a province ; had conquered Anti-
ochus the great, and got the better of all their enemies in the
East ; these Romans, masters of so much of the then known
world, determined to humble the Achaean league, because as
history expressly informs us, "their great power began to raise
no small jealousy at Rome." — Polybius.
[47] What a vast weight of argument do these facts and
circumstances add to the maintenance of the principle con-
tended for by the writer of this address ?
FABIUS.
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. I95
[48] LETTER VI.
Some of our fellow-citizens have ventured to predict tbe
future state of United America, if the system proposed to us,
shall be adopted.
Though every branch of the constitution and government
is to be popular, and guarded by the strongest provisions, that
until this day have occurred to mankind, yet the system will
end, they say, in the oppressions of a monarchy or aristocracy
by the federal servants or some of them.
Such a conclusion seems not in any manner suited to the
premises. It startles, yet, not so much from its novelty, as
from the respectability of the characters by which it is drawn.
We must not be too much influenced by our esteem for
those characters : But, should recollect, that when the fancy is
warmed, and the judgment inchned, by the proximity or pres-
sure of particular objects, very extraordinary declarations are
not unfrequently made. Such are the frailties of our nature,
that genius and integrity sometimes afford no protection
against them.
Probably, there never was, and never will be, such an
instance of dreadful denunciation, concerning the fate of a
country, as was published while the union was in agitation
between England and Scotland. The English were for a joint
legislature, many of the Scots for separate legislatures, and
urged, that they should be in [49] a manner swallowed up and
lost in the other, as then they would not possess one eleventh
part in it.
Upon that occasion lord Belhaven, one of the most distin-
guished orators of the age, made in the Scottish parliament a
famous speech, of which the following extract is part :
" My lord Chancellor,
" When I consider this affair of an union between the two
nations, as it is expressed in the several articles thereof, and
now the subject of our deliberation at this time, I find my
mind crowded with a variety of very melancholy thoughts,
and I think it my duty to disburthen myself of some of them,
196 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
by laying them before and exposing them to the serious con-
sideration of this honourable house.
"I think, I see a free and independent kingdom delivering
Hp that, which all the world hath been fighting for since the
days of Nimrod ; yea, that, for which most of all the empires,
kingdoms, states, principalities, and dukedoms of Europe, are
at this very time engaged in the most bloody and cruel wars
that ever were ; to wit, a power to manage their own affairs
by themselves, without the assistance aud council of any other.
" I think I see a National Church, founded upon a rock,
secured by a claim of right, hedged and fenced about by the
strictest and pointedest legal sanctions that sovereignty could
contrive, voluntarily descending into a plain upon an equal
level with Jews, Paptists, Soci- [50] nians, Armenians, and
Anabaptists, and other Sectaries, &c.
" I think I see the noble and honorable peerage of Scotland,
whose valiant predecessors led against their enemies upon
their own proper charges and expences, now divested of their
followers and vassalages, and put upon such an equal foot
with their vassals, that I think, I see a petty English excise-
man receive more homage and respect, than what was paid
formerly to their quondam Mackallamors.
" I think, I see tht present peers of Scotland, whose noble
ancestors, conquered provinces, over-run countries, reduced
and subjected towns and fortified places, exacted tribute
through the greatest part of England, now walking in the
court of requests, like so many English Attornies, laying aside
their walking swords when in company with the English Peers,
lest their self-defence should be found murder.
" I think, I see the honorable Estate of Barons, the bold
assertors of the nations rights and liberties in the worst of
times, now setting a watch upon their lips and a guard upon
their tongues, lest they be found guilty of scandalum magna-
tum.
"I think I see the royal State of Boroughs, walking their
desolate streets, hanging down their heads under disappoint-
ments ; worm'd out of all the branches of their old trade, uncer-
tain what hand to turn to, necessitated to become [5 1] appren-
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. I97
tices to their unkind neighbors, and yet after all finding their
trade so fortified by companies and secured by . prescriptions,
that they despair of any success therein.
" I think, I see our learned Judges laying aside their prac-
tiques and decisions, studying the common law of England,
gravelled with certioraries, nisi priuses, writs of error, ejectiones
Jirmce, injunctions, demurrers, &c. and frighted with appeals
and avocations, because of the new regulations, and rectifications
they meet with.
" I think, I see the valiant and gallant soldiery, either sent
to learn the plantation trade abroad, or at home petitioning
for a small subsistence, as the reward of their honourable ex-
ploits, while their old corps are broken, the common soldiers
left to beg, and the youngest English corps kept standing.
" I think, I see the honest industrious tradesman loaded
with new taxes and impositions, disappointed of the equiva-
lents, drinking water in place of ale, eating his saltless pottage,
petitioning for encouragement to his manufactories, and an-
swered by counter petitions.
" In short, I think I see the laborious ploughman, with his
corn spoiling upon his hands /(?r want of sale, cursing the day
of his birth ; dreading the expence of his burial, and uncertain
whether to marry or do worse.
"I think I see the incurable difficulties of landing men,
fettered under the golden chain of equivalents, their pretty
daughters petition- [52] ing for want of husbands, and their
sons for want of employments.
" I think I see our mariners delivering up their ships to
their Dutch partners, and what through presses and necessity
earning their bread as underlings in the English navy. But
above all, my lord, I think, I see our ancient mother Caledonia,
like Csesar, sitting in the midst of our senate, ruefully looking
round about her, covering herself with her royal garment,
attending the fatal blows and breathing out her last with a
Et tu quoque mi fili.
" Are not these, my lord, very afflicting thoughts ? And
yet they are the least part suggested to me by these dishonor-
able articles. Should not the considerations of these things
198 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
vivify these dry bones of ours? Should not the memory of
our noble predecessors' valor and constancy rouse up our
drooping spirits ? Are our noble predecessors' souls got so far
into the English cabbage-stalks and cauliflowers, that we
should shew the least inclination that way ? Are our eyes so
blinded ? Are our ears so deafened ? Are our hearts so hard-
ened ? Are our tongues so faultered ? Are our hands so fet-
tered ? that in this our day, I say, my lord, that in this our
day, we should not mind the things that concern the very
being and well being of our ancient kingdom, before the day
be hid from our eyes.
"When I consider this treaty as it hath been explained,
and spoke to, before us these three weeks by past; I see the
English constitution remaining firm, the same two houses of
Par- [53] liament, the same taxes, the same customs, the same
excises, the same trading companies, the same municipal laws
and courts of judicature ; and all ours either subject to regula-
tions or annihilations, only we are to have the honor to pay
their old debts, and to have some few persons present for wit-
nesses, to the validity of the deed, when they are pleased to
contract more."*
Let any candid American deliberately compare that trans-
action with the present, and laying his hand upon his heart,
solemnly answer this question to himself — Whether, he does
not verily believe the eloquent Peer before mentioned, had
ten-fold more cause to apprehend evils from such an unequal
match between the two kingdoms, that any citizen of these
states has to apprehend them from the system proposed?
Indeed not only that Peer, but other persons of distinction^
and large numbers of the people of Scotland were filled with
the utmost aversion to the union ; and if the greatest diligence
and prudence had not been employed by its friends in remov-
ing misapprehensions and refuting misrepresentations, and by
the then subsisting government for preserving the public
peace, there would certainly have been a rebellion.
Yet, what were the consequences to Scotland of that dreaded
*See objections against the Federal constitution, very similar to those
made in Scotland.
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 1 99
union with England ? The cultivation of her virtues and the
correction of her errors — The emancipation of one [54] class
of her citizens from the yoke of her superiors — A relief of
other classes from the injuries and insults of the great — Im-
provements in agriculture, science, arts, trade, and manufac-
tures — The profits of industry and ingenuity enjoyed under
the protection of laws- — peace and security at home, and
encrease of respectability abroad. Her Church is still eminent
— Her laws and courts of judicature are safe — Her boroughs
grown into cities — Her mariners and soldiery possessing a
larger subsistence than she could have afforded them, and her
tradesmen, ploughmen, landed men, and her people of every
rank, in a more flourishing condition, not only than they ever
were, but in a more flourishing condition, than the clearest
understanding could, at the time, have thought it possible for
them to attain in so short a period, or even in many ages.
England participated in the blessings. The stock of their
union or ingraftment, as perhaps it may be called, being
strong and capable of drawing better nutriment and in greater
abundance, than they could ever have done apart,
" Ere long, to Heaven the soaring branches shoot,
"And wonder at their height, and more than native fruit."
FABIUS.
200 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
[55] LETTER VII.
Thus happily mistaken was the ingenious, learned, and
patriotic lord Belhaven, in his prediction concerning the fate of
his country ; and thus happily mistaken, it is hoped, some of
our fellow-citizens will be, in their prediction concerning the
fate of their country.
Had they taken large scope, and assumed in their proposition
the vicissitude of human affairs, and the passions that so often
confound them, their prediction might have been a tolerably
good guess. Amidst the mutabilities of terrestrial things, the
liberty of United America may be destroyed. As to that
point, it is our duty, humbly, constantly, fervently, to implore
the protection of our most gracious maker, " who doth not
afflict willingly nor grieve the children of men," and inces-
santly to strive, as we are commanded, to recommend our-
selves to that protection, by " doing his will," diligently exer-
cising our reason in fulfilling the purposes for which that and
our existence were given to us.
How the liberty of this country is to be destroyed, is an-
other question. Here, the gentlemen assign a cause, in no
manner proportioned, as it is apprehended, to the effect.
The uniform tenor of history is against them. That holds
up the licentiousness of the people, and turbulent temper of
some of the states, as the only causes to be dreaded, not the
conspiracies of federal ofificers. There-[56] fore, it is highly pro-
bable, that, if our liberty is ever subverted, it will be by one
of the two causes first mentioned. Our tragedy will then have
the same acts, with those of the nations that have gone before
us ; and we shall add one more example to the number already
too great, of people that would not take warning, not, " know
the things which belong to their peace." But, we ought not to
pass such a sentence against our country, and the interests of
freedom : Though, no sentence whatever can be equal to the
atrocity of our guilt, if through enormity of obstinacy or base-
ness, we betray the cause of our posterity and of mankind, by
providence committed to our parental and fraternal care.
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 20I
There is reason to believe, that the calamities of nations are
the punishments of their sins.
As to the first mentioned cause, it seems unnecssary to say
any more upon it.
As to the second, we find, that the misbehaviour of the
constituent parts acting separately, or in partial confederacies,
debihtated the Greeks under The Amphictionic Council, and
under The Achaean League. As to the former, it was not
entirely an assembly of strictly democratical repubHcs. Be-
sides, it wanted a suiificiently close connection of its parts.
After these observations, we may call our attention from it.
'Tis true. The Achaean League was disturbed by the mis.
conduct of some parts, but it is as true, that it surmounted
these difificulties, and wonderfully prospered, until it was dis-
solved in the manner that has been described.
[57] The glorious operations of its principles bear the
clearest testimony to this distant age and people, that the wit
of man never invented such an antidote against monarchical
and aristocratical projects, as a strong combination of truly
democratical republics. By strictly or truly democratical re-
publics, the writer means republics in which all the principal
officers, except the judicial, are from time to time chosen by
the people.
The reason is plain. As liberty and equality, or as well
termed by Polybius, benignity, were the foundations of their
institutions, and the energy of the government pervaded all
the parts in things relating to the whole, it counteracted for
the common welfare, the designs hatched by selfishness in
separate councils.
If folly or wickedness prevailed in any parts, friendly
offices and salutary measures restored tranquiHty. Thus the
pubhc good was maintained. In its very formation, tyrannies
and aristocracies submitted, by consent or compulsion. Thus,
the Ceraunians, Trezenians, Epidaurians, Megalopolitans, Ar-
gives, Hermionians, and Phlyayzrians were received into the
league. A happy exchange ! For history informs us, that so
true were they to their noble and benevolent principles, that,
in their diet, " no resolutions were taken, but what were equally
202 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
advantageous to the whole confederacy, and the interest of each
part so consulted, as to leave no room for complaints /"
[58] How degrading would be the thought to a citizen of
United America, that the people of these states, with institu-
tions beyond comparison preferable to those of The Achaean
league, and so vast a superiority in other respects, should not
have wisdom and virtue enough, to manage their affairs, with
as much prudence and affection of one for another as these
ancients did.
Would this be doing justice to our country ? The com-
position of her temper is excellent, and seems to be acknowl-
edged equal to that of any nation in the world. Her prudence
will guard its warmth against two faults, to which it may be
exposed — The one, an imitation of foreign fashions, which
from small things may lead to great. May her citizens aspire
at a national dignity in every part of conduct, private as well
as public. This will be influenced by the former. May sim-
plicity be the characteristic feature of their manners, which,
inlaid with their other virtues and their forms of government,
may then indeed be compared, in the Eastern stile, to " apples
of gold in pictures of silver." Thus will they long, and may
they, while their rivers run, escape the contagion of luxury —
that motley issue of innocence debauched by folly, and the
lineal predecessor of tyranny, prolific of guilt and wretched-
ness. The other fault, of which, as yet, there are no symptoms
among us, is the thirst of empire. This is a vice, that ever has
been, and from the nature of things, ever must be, fatal to re-
publican [59] forms of government. Our wants, are sources
of happiness : our irregular desires, of misery. The abuse of
prosperity, is rebellion against Heaven ; and succeeds accord-
ingly.
Do the propositions of gentlemen who object, offer to our
view, any of the great points upon which, the fate, fame, or
freedom of nations has turned, excepting what some of them
have said about trial by jury ; and which has been frequently
and fully answered ? Is there one of them calculated to regu-
late, and if needful, to controul those tempers and measures of
constituent parts of an union, that have been so baneful to the
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 203
weal of every confederacy that has existed ? Do not some of
them tend to enervate the authority evidently designed thus
to regulate and controul? Do not others of them discover a
bias in their advocates to particular connections, that if in-
dulged to them, would enable persons of less understanding
and virtue, to repeat the disorders, that have so often violated
public peace and honor? Taking them altogether, would they
afford as strong a security to our liberty, as the frequent elec-
tion of the federal officers by the people, and the repartition
of power among those officers, according to the proposed
system ?
It may be answered, that, they would be an additional se-
curity. In reply, let the writer be permitted at present to re-
fer to what has been said.
The principal argument of gentlemen who object, involves
a direct proof of the point contended for by the writer of this
address, and as [60] far as it may be supposed to be founded,
a plain confirmation of Historic evidence.
They generally agree, that the great danger of a monarchy
or aristocracy among us, will arise from the federal senate.
The members of this senate, are to be chosen by men exercis-
ing the sovereignty of their respective states. These men there-
fore must be monarchically or aristocratically disposed, before
they will chuse federal senators thus disposed ; and what merits
particular attention, is, that these men must have otjtained an
overbearing influence in their respective states, before they
could with such disposition arrive at the exercise of the sover-
eignty in them : or else, the like disposition must be prevalent
among the people of such states.
Taking the case either way, is not this a disorder in parts of
the union, and ought it not to be rectified by the rest ? Is it
reasonable to expect, that the disease will seize all at the same
time ? If it is not, ought not the sound to possess a right and
power, by which they may prevent the infection from spread-
ing? And will not the extent of our territory, and the number
of states within it, vastly increase the difficulty of any politi-
cal disorder diffusing its contagion, and the probability of its
being repressed ?
204 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
From the annals of mankind, these conclusions are dedu-
cible — that confederated states may act prudently and hon-
estly, and apart foolishly and knavishly ; but, that it is a defi-
ance [6i] of all probability, to suppose, that states conjointly
shall act with folly and wickedness, and yet separately with
wisdom and virtue. /
FABIUS.
[62] LETTER VIII.
The proposed confederation offers to us a system of diver-
sified representation in the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments, as essentially necessary to the good government
of an extensive republican empire. Every argument to re-
commend it, receives new force, by contemplating events,
that must take place. The number of states in America will
increase. If not united to the present, the consequences are
evident. If united, it must be by a plan that will communi-
cate equal liberty and assure just protection to them. These
ends can never be attained, but by a close combination of the
several states.
It has been asserted, that a very extensive territory cannot
be ruled by a government of republican form. What is meant
by this proposition ? Is it intended to abolish all ideas of
connection, and to precipitate us into the miseries of division,
either as single states, or partial confederacies ? To stupify
us into despondence, that destruction may certainly seize us ?
The fancy of poets never feigned so dire a Metamorphosis, as
is now held up to us. The .^Egis of their Minerva was only
said to turn men into stones. This spell is to turn " a band of
brethren," into a monster, preying on itself, and preyed upon
by all its enemies.
If hope is not to be abandoned, common sense teaches us
to attempt the best means of preservation. This is all that
men can do, and [63] this they ought to do. Will it be said.
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 205
that any kind of disunion, or a connection tending to it, is
preferable to a firm union ? Or, is there any charm in that
despotism, which is said, to be alone competent to the rule of
such an empire ? There is no evidence of fact, nor any de-
duction of reason, that justifies the assertion. It is true, that
extensive territory has in general been arbitrarily governed ;
and it is as true, that a number of republics, in such territory,
loosely connected, must inevitably rot into despotism.
It is said — Such territory has never been governed by a
confederacy of republics. Granted. But, where was there
ever a confederacy of republics, in such territory, united, as
these states are to be by the proposed constitution ? Where
was there ever a confederacy, in which, the sovereignty of each
state was equally represented in one legislative body, the peo-
ple of each state equally represented in another, and the sov-
ereignties and people of all the states conjointly represented,
possessed such a qualified and temperating authority in mak-
ing laws ? Or, in which the appointment to federal offices
was vested in a chief magistrate chosen as our president is to
be ? Or, in which, the acts of the executive department were
regulated, as they are to be with us ? Or, in which, the federal
judges were to hold their offices independently and during
good behaviour? Or, in which, the authority over the militia
and troops was so distributed and controuled, as it is to be
with us ? Or, in which, the people were so drawn together by
religion, blood, language, manners and [64] customs, undis-
turbed by former feuds or prejudices ? Or, in which, the
affairs relating to the whole union, were to be managed by an
assembly of several representative bodies, invested with differ-
ent powers that became efficient only in concert, without their
being embarrassed by attention to other business? Or, in
which, a provision was made for the federal revenue, without
recurring to coercion against states, the miserable expedient,
of every other confederacy that has existed, an expedient
always attended with odium, and often with a delay produc-
tive of irreparable damage ? Where was there ever a confed-
eracy, that thus adhered to the first principle in civil society ;
obliging by its direct authority every individual, to contribute.
2o6 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
when the public good necessarily required it, a just proportion
of aid to the support of the commonwealth protecting him —
without disturbing him in the discharge of the duties owing
by him to the state of which he is an inhabitant ; and at the
same time, so amply, so anxiously provided, for bringing the
interests, and even the wishes of every sovereignty and of
every person of the union, under all their various modifica-
tions and impressions, into their full operation and efficacy
in the national councils ? The instance never existed. The
conclusion ought not to be made. It is without premises. So
far is the assertion from being true, that " a very extensive
territory cannot be ruled by a government of a republican
form," that such a territory cannot be well-ruled by a govern-
ment of any other form.
[65] The assertion has probably been suggested by reflec-
tions on the democracies of antiquity, without making a
proper distinction between them and the democracy of The
United States.
In the democracies of antiquity, the people assembled
together and governed personally. This mode was incom-
patible with greatness of number and dispersion of habitation.
In the democracy of The United States, the people act by
their representatives. This improvement collects the will of
millions upon points concerning their welfare, with more ad-
vantage, than the will of hundreds could be collected under
the ancient form.
There is another improvement equally deserving regard,
and that is, the varied representation of sovereignties and
people in the constitution now proposed.
It has been said, that this representation was a mere com-
promise.
It was not a mere compromise. The equal representation of
each state in one branch of the legislature, was an original sub-
stantive proposition, made in convention, very soon after the
draft offered by Virginia, to which last mentioned state Uni-
ted America is much indebted not only in other respects, but
for her merit in the origination and prosecution of this mo-
mentous business.
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 20/
The proposition was expressly made upon this principle,
that a territory of such extent as that of United America,
could not be safely and advantageously governed, but by a
combination of republics, each retaining all the rights of su-
preme [66] sovereignty, excepting such as ought to be con-
tributed to the union ; that for the securer preservation of
these sovereignties, they ought to be represented in a body
by themselves, and with equal suffrage ; and that they would
be annihilated, if both branches of the legislature were to be
formed of representatives of the people, in proportion to the
number of inhabitants in each state.*
The principle appears to be well founded in reason. Why
cannot a very extensive territory be ruled by a government of
republican form? They answered, because its power must
languish through distance of parts. Granted, if it be not a
" body by joints and bands having nourishment ministered
and knit together." If it be such a body, the objection is re-
moved. Instead of such a perfect body, framed upon the
principle that commands men to associate, and societies to
confederate ; that, which by communicating and extending
happiness, corresponds with the gracious intentions of our
maker towards us his creatures ? what is proposed ? Truly,
that the natural legs and arms of this body should be cut off.
because they are too weak, and their places supplied by
strongest limbs of wood and metal.
[67] Monarchs, it is said, are enabled to rule extensive ter-
ritories, because they send viceroys to govern certain districts ;
and thus the reigning authority is transmitted over the whole
empire. Be it so : But what are the consequences ? Tyranny,
while the viceroys continue in submission to their masters, and
the distraction of civil war besides, when they revolt, to which
they are frequently tempted by the very circumstances of their
situation, as the history of such governments indisputably
proves.
^Justice Blackstone argues in like manner, after admitting the "expedi-
ency" of titles of nobility. "It is also expedient that their owners should
form an independent and separate branch of the legislature "—otherwise
"their privileges would soon be borne down and overwhelmed." — Comment.
2. 157-
208 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
America is, and will be, divided into several sovereign
states, each possessing every power proper for governing
within its own limits for its own purposes, and also for acting
as a member of the union.
They will be civil and military stations, conveniently
planted throughout the empire, with lively and regular com-
munications. A stroke, a touch upon any part, will be im-
mediately felt by the whole. Rome famed for imperial arts,
had a glimpse of this great truth ; and endeavoured, as well as
her hard-hearted policy would permit, to realize it in her col-
■onies. They were miniatures of the capital : But wanted the
vital principal of sovereignty, and were too small. They were
melted down into, or oyerwhelmed by the nations around them.
Were they now existing, they might be called curious automa-
tons — something like to our living originals. These, will bear
a remarkable resemblance to the mild features of patriarchal
government, in which each son ruled his own household, and
in other matters the whole family was directed by the common
ancestor.
[68] Will a people thus happily situated, ever desire to ex-
change their condition, for subjection to an absolute ruler; or
can they ever look but with veneration, or act but with defer-
ence to that union, that alone can, under providence, preserve
them from such subjugation ?
Can any government be devised, that will be more suited
to citizens, who wish for equal freedom and common prosper-
ity; better calculated for preventing corruption of manners ;
for advancing the improvements that endear or adorn life ; or
that can be more conformed to the understanding, to the best
affections, to the very nature of man ? What harvests of hap-
piness may grow from the seeds of liberty that are now sow-
ing? The cultivation will indeed demand continual attention,
unceasing diligence, and frequent conflict with difficulties:
but, to object against the benefits offered to us by our Creator,
by excepting to the terms annexed, is a crime to be equalled
only by its folly.
Delightful are the prospects that will open to the view of
United America — her sons well prepared to defend their own
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 209
happiness, and ready to relieve the misery of others— her fleets
formidable, but only to the unjust — her revenue sufficient, yet
unoppressive— her commerce affluent, but not debasing— peace
and plenty within her borders — and the glory that arises from
a proper use of power, encircling them.
Whatever regions may be destined for servitude, let us
hope, that some portions of this land may be blessed with
liberty; let us be con- [69] vinced, that nothing short of such an
union as has been proposed, can preserve the blessing ; and
therefore let us be resolved to adopt it.
As to alterations, a little experience will cast more light
upon the subject, than a multitude of debates. Whatever
qualities are possessed by those who object, they will have
the candor to confess, that they will be encountered by op-
ponents, not in any respect inferior, and yet differing from
them in judgment, upon every point they have mentioned.
Such untired industry to serve their country, did the dele-
gates to the federal convention exert, that they not only
laboured to form [the best plan they could, but, provided for
making at any time amendments on the authority of the people,
without shaking the stability of the government. For this
end, the Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to the constitu-
tion, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of
the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amend-
ments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and
purposes, as part of the constitution, when ratified by the
legislatures of three-fourths of the several' states, or by con-
ventions in three-fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of
ratification may be proposed by Congress.
Thus, by a gradual progress, we may from time to time
introduce every improvement in our constitution, that shall be
[70] suitable to our situation. For this purpose, it may perhaps
be advisable, for every state, as it sees occasion, to form with
the utmost deliberation, drafts of alterations respectively
required by them, and to enjoin their representatives, to
employ every proper method to obtain a ratification.
In this way of proceeding, the undoubted sense of every
2IO LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
state, collected in the coolest manner, not the sense of indi-
viduals, will be laid before the whole union in congress, and
that body will be enabled with the clearest light that can be
afforded by every part of it, and with the least occasion of
irritation, to compare and weigh the sentiments of all United
America ; forthwith to adopt such alterations as are recom-
mended by general unanimity ; by degrees to devise modes of
conciliation upon contradictory propositions ; and to give the
revered advice of our common country, upon those, if any
such there should be, that in her judgment are inadmissible,
because they are incompatible with the happiness of these
states.
It cannot be with reason apprehended, that Congress will
refuse to act upon any articles calculated to promote the com-
mon welfare, though they may be unwilling to act upon such
as are designed to advance partial interests : but, whatever
their sentiments may be, they must call a convention for pro-
posing amendents, on applications of two-thirds of the legis-
latures of the several states.
May those good citizens, who have sometimes turned their
thoughts towards a second [71] convention, be pleased to con-
sider, that there are men who speak as they do, yet do not
mean as they do. These borrow the sanction of their re-
spected names, to conceal desperate designs. May they also
consider, whether persisting in the suggested plan, in prefer-
ence to the constitutional provision, may not kindle flames of
jealousy and discord, which all their abilities and virtues can
never extinguish.
FABIUS.
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 2X1
[;2] LETTER IX.
When the sentiments of some objectors, concerning the
British constitution, are considered, it is surprising, that they
should apprehend so much danger to United America, as, they
say, will attend the ratification of the plan proposed to us, by
the late federal convention.
These gentlemen will acknowledge, that Britain has sus-
tained many internal convulsions, and many foreign wars, with
a gradual advancement in freedom, power, and prosperity.
They will acknowledge, that no nation has existed that ever
so perfectly united those distant extremes, private security of
life, liberty, and property, with exertion of public force — so
advantageously combined the various powers of militia, troops,
and fleets — or so happily blended together arms, arts, science,
commerce, and agriculture. From what spring has flowed this
stream of happiness? The gentlemen will acknowledge, that
these advantages are derived from a single democratical branch
in her legislature. They will also acknowledge, that in this
branch, called the house of commons, only one hundred and
thirty-one are members for counties : that nearly one half of
the whole house is chosen by abouf five thousand seven hun-
dred persons, mostly of no property ; that fifty-six members
are elected by about three hundred and seventy [73] persons,
and the rest in an enormous disproportion* to the numbers of
inhabitants who ought to vote.f
Thus are all the miUions of people in that kingdom, said
to be represented in the house of commons.
Let the gentlemen be so good, on a subject so familiar to
them, as to make a comparison between the British constitu-
tion, and that proposed to us. Questions like these will then
*No member of parliament ought to be elected by fewer than the
majority of 800, upon the most moderate calculation, according to Doctor
Price.
f By the constitution proposed to us, a majority of the house of repre-
sentatives, and of the senate, makes a quorum to do business : but, if the
writer fs not mistaken, about a fourteenth part of the members of the house
<sf commons, makes a quorum for Ihat purpose.
212 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
probably present themselves : Is there more danger to our
liberty, from such a president as we are to have, than to that
of Britons from an hereditary monarch with a vast revenue —
absolute in the erection and disposal of offices, and in the ex-
ercise of the whole executive power — in the command of the
militia, fleets, and armies, and the direction of their operations
■ — in the establishments of fairs and markets, the regulation of
weights and measures, and coining of money — who can call
parliaments with a breath, and dissolve them with a nod — who
can, at his will, make war, peace, and treaties irrevocably bind-
ing the nation — and who can [74] grant pardons and titles of
nobility, as it pleases him ? Is there more danger to us, from
twenty-six senators, or double the number, than to Britons,
from an hereditary aristocratic body, consisting of many hun-
dreds, possessed of enormous wealth in lands and money —
strengthened by a host of dependants — and who, availing
themselves of defects in the constitution, send many of these
into the house of commons — who hold a third part of the
legislative power in their own hands — and who form the
highest court of judicature in the nation ? Is there more dan-
ger to us, from a house of representatives, to be chosen by all
the freemen of the union, every two years, than to Britons,
from such a sort of representation as they have in the house
of commons, the members of which, too, are chosen but every
seven years ? Is there more danger to us, from the intended
federal officers, than to Britons, from such a monarch, aristo-
cracy, and house of commons together? What bodies are
there in Britain, vested with such capacities for enquiring into,
checking, and regulating the conduct of national affairs, as our
sovereign states ? What proportion does the number of free
holders in Britain bear to the number of people ? And what
is the proportion in United America ?
If any person, after considering such questions, shall say,
there will be more danger to our freedom under the proposed
plan, than to that of Britons under their constitution, he must
mean, that Americans are, or will be, beyond all comparison,
inferior to Britons in under- [75] standing and virtue ; other-
wise, with a constitution and government, every branch of
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 21 3
which is so extremely popular, they certainly might guard
their rights, at least at well, as Britons can guard theirs, under
such political institutions as they have ; unless the person has
some inclination to an opinion, that monarchy and aristocracy
are favourable to the preservation of their rights. If he has,
he cannot too soon recover himself. If ever monarchy or
aristocracy appears in this country, in must be in the hideous
form of despotism.
What an infatuated, depraved people must Americans be-
come, if, with such unequalled advantages, committed to their
trust in a manner almost miraculous, they lose their liberty ?
Through a single organ of representation, in the legislature
only, of the kingdom just mentioned, though that organ is
diseased, such portions of popular sense and integrity have
been conveyed into the national councils, as have purified
other parts, and preserved the whole in its present state of
healthfulness. To their own vigour and attention, therefore,
is that people, under providence, indebted for the blessings
they enjoy. They have held, and now hold the true balance in
their government. While they retain their enlightened spirit,
they will continue to hold it; and if they regard what they
owe to others, as well as what they owe to themselves, they
will, most probably, continue to be happy.*
[76] They know, that there are powefs that cannot be ex-
pressly limited, without injury to themselves ; and their mag-
* If to the union of England and Scotland, a just connection with Ireland
be added, ecclesiastical establishments duly amended ; additions to the peer-
age regulated, and representation of the commons properly improved, it is to
be expected, that the tranquility, strength, reputation, and prosperity of the
empire will be greatly promoted, the monarchy will probably change into a
republic, if representation in the house of commons is not encreased by
additions from the counties and great trading cities and towns, without this
precaution, an increase of the peerage seems likely to accelerate an altera-
tion. These two measures should have, it is apprehended, in such a govern-
ment and in such a progress of human affairs, a well-tempered co-operation.
The power of the crown might thereby become more dignified, moderated,
and secured.
The discussion of this subject would embrace a very great number of
considerations ; but the conclusion seems to approach as near to demon-
stration, as an investigation of this kind can do.
214 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
nanimity scorns any fear of such powers. This magnanimity
taught Charles the first, that he was but a royal servant ; and
this magnanimity caused James the second's army, raised,
paid, and kept up by himself, to confound him with huzzas for
liberty.
They ask not for compacts, of which the national welfare,
and, in some cases, its existence, may demand violations.
They despise such dangerous provisions against danger.
They know, that all powers whatever, even those that,
according to the forms of the con- [jy] stitution, are irresisti-
ble and absolute, of which there are many, ought to be exer-
cised for the public good ; and that when they are used to the
public detriment, they are unconstitutionally exerted.
This plain text, commented upon by their experienced in-
telligence, has led them safe through hazards of every kind :
and they now are, what we see them. Upon the review, one
is almost tempted to believe, that their insular situation, soil,
climate, and some other circumstances, have compounded a
peculiarity of temperature, uncommonly favourable to the
union of reason and passion.
Certainly, 'tis very memorable, with what life, impartiality,
and prudence, they have interposed on great occasions ; have
by their patriotism communicated temporary soundness to
their disordered i"epresentation ; and have bid public confu-
sions to cease. Two instances out of many may suffice. The
excellent William the third was distressed by a house of com-
mons. He dissolved the parliament, and appealed to the peo-
ple. They relieved him. His successor, the present king, in
the like distress, made the same appeal ; and received equal
relief.
Thus they have acted : but Americans, who have the same
blood in their veins, have, it seems, very different heads and
hearts. We shall be enslaved by a president, sen^itors, and
representatives, chosen by ourselves, and continually rotating
within the period of time assigned for the continuance in
office of members inthe house of commons? 'Tis strange :
but, we are told, 'tis true. It may be so. As we [78J have
our all at stake, let us enquire, in what way this event is to
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 215
be brought about. Is it to be before or after a general cor-
ruption of manners ? If after, it is not worth attention. The
loss of happiness then follows of course. If before, how is it
to be accomplished ? Will a virtuous and sensible people
choose villains or fools for their ofificers ? Or, if they should
choose men of wisdom and integrity, will these lose both or
either, by taking their seats ? If they should.will not their places
be quickly supplied by another choice ? Is the like derange-
ment again, and again, and again, to be expected ? Can any
man believe, that such astonishing phaenomena are to be looked
for? Was there ever an instance, where rulers, thus selected
by the people from their own body, have, in the manner ap-
prehended, outraged their own tender connexions, and the in-
terests, feelings, and sentiments of their affectionate and con-
fiding countrymen ? Is such a conduct more likely to prevail
in this age of mankind, than in the darker periods that have
preceded ? Are men more disposed now than formerly,
to prefer uncertainties to certainties, things perilous and in-
famous to those that are safe and honorable ? Can all the
mysteries of such iniquity, be so wonderfully managed by
treacherous rulers, that none of their enlightened constitu-
ents, nor any of their honest associates, acting with them in
public bodies, shall ever be able to discover the conspiracy,
till at last it shall burst with destruction to the whole federal
constitution ? Is it not ten thousand times less probable, that
such [79] transactions will happen, than it is, that we shall be
exposed to innumerable calamities, by rejecting the plan pro-
posed, or even by delaying to accept it ?
Let us consider our affairs in another light. Our differ-
ence of government, participation in commerce, improvement
in policy, and magnitude of power, can be no favourite objects
of attention to the Monarchies and Sovereignties of Europe.
Our loss will be their gain — our fall, their rise — our shame,
their triumph. Divided, they may distract, dictate, and
destroy. United, their efforts will be waves dashing them-
selves into foam against a rock. May pur national character
be— an animated moderation, that seeks only its own, and will
not be satisfied with less.
2l6 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON.
To his beloved fellow-citizens of United America, the
writer dedicates this imperfect testimony of his affection, with
fervent prayers, for a perpetuity of freedom, virtue, piety, and
felicity, to them and their posterity.
FABIUS.
Remarks / on the / Proposed Plan / of a / Federal
Government, / Addressed to the Citizens of the / United
States of America, / And Particularly to the People of
Maryland, / By Aristides. / " As a confederated govern-
ment is composed of petty re- / " publics, it enjoys the
internal happiness of each ; and with / " regard to its
external situation, by means of the associa- / " tion, it
possesses all the advantages of extensive monarchies." /
Mont. Sp. of Laws, B. 9, Ch. i. / Annapolis ; / Printed
by Frederick Green, Printer to the State.
8vo., pp. 42.
Written by Alexander Contee Hanson, a member of the
Maryland State Convention, and Chancellor of Maryland from
1789 till his death in 1806. Both Drake and Lanman have
confused Hanson and his son in their sketches of him, and the
best account is given in Hanson's Old Kent.
" These remarks are not all original, but they are very
judicious, calculated to remove objections to the proposed plan
of government." [Noah Webster.] in American Magazine.
P. L. F.
To GEORGE WASHINGTON, Esquire.
Not as a Tribute to the Worth, which no Acknowledge^
meat, or Distinctions, can reward ; but to do himself an
Honour, which, by labouring in the same Common Cause, he
flatters himself, in some Degree, he hath deserved ; the Author
begs Leave to inscribe the following imperfect Essay.
TT is my intention, with all possible plainness, to examine
the proposed plan of a Federal Government. Its enemies
and its advocates have laid particular stress on the names,
wherewith it is subscribed. As one side would obtain your
implicit assent, by a reference to characters, and as the other
would defeat measures by exciting your jealousy of men, per-
mit me, in the first place, to make some general observations
on the persons who composed the late memorable convention.
In general, they had been distinguished by their talents
and services. They were not principally the men to whom
the idea of the convention first suggested itself, and it is
notorious that, in general, they accepted their appointments
with reluctance. It would seem, however, according to some-
vague insinuations, that, no sooner did they find themselves
convened, than their natures changed; and fatally have they
combined for the destruction of your liberties. Now this alto-
gether shocks my faith. I should sooner imagine that the
sacredness of the trust, the unparalleled grandeur of the occa-
sion, and the fellowhip of the great and good, might have
elevated the soul of the most abandoned wretch, had it been
possible for such to obtain a seat in that illustrious assemblage.
If those, who would inspire suspicion and distrust, can sug-
gest any precise idea, it must be this, that the members of the
convention will be elected into the first federal congress, and
there combining again will compose a body capable of bearing
down all opposition to their own aggrandisement.
By their scheme, however, thus deeply concerted, the house
of representatives is to be chosen by the people once in [6] two
years ; and if they have acted so as to warrant any reasonable
apprehension of their designs, it will be easy at any time, to
prevent their election. The truth is, that very few of them
either wish to be elected, or would consent to serve, either in
that house, or in the senate. I have exercised my imagination
to devise in what manner they or any other men, supposing
Missing Page
Missing Page
222 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
them to bear full sway in both houses, could erect this imagin-
ary fabric of power. T request any person to point out any
law, or system of laws, that could be possibly contrived for
that purpose, obtain the final assent of each branch, and be
carried into effect, contrary to the interests and wishes of a
free, intelligent, prying people, accustomed to the most un-
bounded freedom of inquiry. To begin by an attempt to
restrain the press, instead of promoting their designs, would be
the most effectual thing to prevent them.
I am apprized of the almost universal disposition for the
increase and abuse of authority. But if we 'are to withhold
power because there is a possibility of its perversion, we must
abolish government, and submit to those evils, which it was
intended to prevent. The perfection of political science con-
sists chiefly in providing mutual checks amongst the several
departments of power, preserving at the same time, the depend-
ance of the greatest on the people. I speak with reference to a
single government. The necessity of another species of gov-
ernment, for the mutual defence and protection of these
American states, no man of sense and honesty, that I know of,
has ever yet denied.
The convention had the above principle constantly in their
view. They have contrived, that it shall be extremely difficult,
if not altogether impracticable, for any person to exceed or
abuse his lawful authority. There is nothing in their plan like
the cloathing of individuals with power, for their own gratifica-
tion. Every delegation, and every advantage that may be
derived to individuals, has a strict reference to the general
good.
To examine their constitution, by article and section,
would be a painful and needless undertaking. I shall endeavor
to answer such objections, as I have already heard, to antici-
pate others ; to point out some advantages not general- [7] ly
known ; and to correct certain errors, with respect to construc-
tion. When the convention was appointed, I much feared
that the numerous seeds, and principles of discord amongst the
states, would, for ever, prevent them from agreeing to any
efficient system whatever. I apprehended, in particular, that
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 223
the dispute about representation would be the rock, on which
the vessel containing all our hopes would be dashed. When,
therefore, I discerned that equitable compromise between the
larger and lesser states, my anxiety was instantly removed,
and my soul enlightened by a sudden ray.
How then was I, some months after, disgusted at the repeti-
tion, of the arguments respecting the inequality of representa-
tives in the first branch. We were told, that the minority in
convention reasoned on first principles, that, as all men, in a
state of nature, are equal with respect to rights, so also are
equal all separate and distinct states ; — that, when individuals
form a free government, they must all have equal suffrage,
either in framing laws by themselves, or in choosing represent-
atives, although one man be ten times stronger, richer, or wiser
than another ; so also, when several states unite, for common
convenience, they must meet on terms of perfect equality,
although one be ten times more wealthy, expensive and popu-
lous than another; — that, under our present compact, the states
are equal, and that no injury has resulted from the equality.
To these arguments, we may imagine, was opposed some-
thing like the following : " You talk of first principles, and, at
the same time, would let 180,000 free inhabitants of Maryland
have no more to do in the choice of representatives than only
30,000 inhabitants of Delaware. Do you propose, that these
30,000 shall bear an equal part of burthens and impositions ?
As to no injury having resulted from the equality, as you call
it, under the articles of confederation, we think the reverse ;
and that this pretended * equality was a poison, which per-
va-ded all our affairs." [8]
The anticipation of arguments like these had raised those
apprehensions of an irreconcilable difference. It were needless
* Against what is called equality in representation, the great Montesquieu
seems to have declared by the strongest implication. In his Spirit of Laws, b.
eh. 2, he says, that the confederate republic of Lycia contained twenty-three
associated towns : that, in the common council, the larger towns had three
votes, the middling towns two, and the lesser only one ; that they contributed
to the common expence according to the proportion of suffrages ; and, that
were he to give the model of an excellent confederate republic, it should be
that of Lycia. Could the immortal spirit of Montesquieu revisit the earth, and
224 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
to repeat more. Had an angel been the umpire, he could pro-
pose no expedient more equitable and more politic, not only as
a compromise, but to establish such a decided difference be-
tween the two branches of congress, as will make them, indeed,
two distinct bodies, operating by way of mutual balance and
check.
By this expedient, is safety secured to the lesser states, as
completely as if the senate were the only legislative body. It
is possible (if such a thing can be devised) that, from the in-
equality in the iirst branch, propositions will be made to give
the larger states some advantage over the lesser ; but the equal-
ity in the senate will, for ever, preclude its adoption. It is
well worthy of remark, that not more than three of the thir-
teen are, at present, deemed larger states, in the peculiar sense
of the word. There is no reason for supposing, in the federal,
like a state, legislature, the senate will be intimidated or overawed,
by the more numerous branch. A demagogue may declaim,
rave, menace and foam, with as little impression as the roaring
billows produce upon the solid [9] beach. Were it not for this
equality in one, and inequality in the other, a jealousy might
be entertained of too perfect a coincidence of sentiment.
The convention has been censured for an excess of its
authority. But with no other power was it invested, than is
possessed by every free citizen of the states. Its office was to
advise, and no further has it proceeded. Had it been even
invested with full powers to amend the present compact, their
proposed plan would not have exceeded their trust. Amend-
ment, in parliamentary language, means either addition, or
diminution, or striking out the whole, and substituting some-
thing in its room. The convention were not limited. The
states did not tell them, this article must stand, this must be
behold the model now offered to America, how quickly would his favorite
republic sink in his estimation. In a new quarter of the globe scarcely heard
of by the greatS part of Europeans in his day, and since the commencement
of the present century, he would see men who have attained a perfection in the
science most conducive to human happiness, in that study which was the
principal occupation of his life, in which his predecessors had acquired only a
few glimmering lights, and of which it was reserved for him to develope most
of the true iirst principles.
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 22$
Struck out, and this may be altered. The avowed object of a
convention was to consult on the additional power necessary
to be vested in congress. But the members of this convention
perceiving, from the experience of these states, from the his-
tory of ancient and modern states, and, I may add, from the
principles of human nature, that the same body of men ought
not to make and execute laws ; and that one body alone ought
not to do the first, have separated the executive, so far as was
proper, from the legislative ; and this last they have divided
into two branches, composed of different materials, distinct
from, and totally independent of, each other.
The house of representatives* is to be the immediate choice
of the people, and one man is to represent 30,000 souls. In an
affair of so much importance, and in districts containing so
many suffrages, it is not to be supposed, that a worthless char-
acter will succeed by those arts, which have, sometimes, pre-
vailed in county elections. It is to be expected, that, in gen-
eral, the people will choose men of talents and character.
Were they even so inclined, they can choose none but of ripe
age, who have been, at least, seven [10] years citizens of the
United States, and, at the time of election, residents of the
respective state. Whatever laws shall be proposed, or assented
to by these men, are to bind themselves, their' children, and
their connections. If a single man, or a party, shall propose a
measure, calculated to promote private interest, at the expense
of public good, is it conceivable, that the whole house will be
brought into the measure ? Suppose it should. The measure
cannot be adopted into a law, without the concurrence of an-
other house, consisting of men still more select, possessing
superior qualifications of residence and age, and equally bound
by the laws. After gaining the assent of the senate, the bill
must be submitted to the objections of the president. He is
not in any manner dependent on the legislature, which can, in
no manner, punish him, except for some crime known to the
* Whether the state of Maryland shall be divided into six districts, for
each to choose one man, or the people at large give their suffrage for the whole
six, is hereafter to be settled by the assembly. The latter mode, on a variety
of occasions, would be preferable.
226 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
laws. He is elected by persons chosen for that special pur-
pose. He receives a compensation, which cannot be diminished
or increased, during his continuance in office. The term of his
commission is limited to four years, unless he shall have acted
so as to merit the people's favour. From the mode of his
election, it is impossible he can intrigue to advantage; and,
from the nature of other things, he will never succeed by
bribery and corruption. Like any other individual, he is liable
to punishment. Finally, at the expiration of his office, he
returns into the mass of the people.
In spite of all these circumstances, an idea is gone forth
amongst the enemies of the plan, and they labour to impress
it on your minds, that whatever power may be exercised by
these delegates of the people, will be used contrary to the in-
terests of their constituents. This is a supposition, so repul-
sive to my mind, that I wonder any man of the least gener-
osity, or reflection, can possibly adopt it. The assembly of
Maryland, with respect to internal regulations, is almost om-
nipotent. And yet, is there a man who supposes the assembly
would, intentionally, pass laws injurious to the people? Why
then should we distrust the federal assembly, chosen for a
short term, bound by the same ties, and selected on account of
their talents and patriotism ?
But, say the objectors, although we might probably con-
fide with safety in congress, it is not consistent with pru- [ii]
dence, without a manifest necessity, to empower any men to
do us an injury.
Whenever the proposed plan delegates authority, which
you imagine might safely be denied, be assured, that a little
reflection will suggest abundant reason for granting it. At the
same time you may be convinced, that, as some powers were not
intended to be exercised, so they never will be exercised, with-
out absolute necessity.
I have been amused by the writings of an avowed friend to
the plan. "Let no man," says he, "think of proposing
amendments. Should each person object, and should his
objections prevail, not a title of the system will be left. You
are to accept the whole, or reject the whole." After speaking
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 22/
in this very sensible way, he advises the states to reject, with
unanimity and firmness, the following provision.
" Art. I, sect. 4. The times, places, and manner of holding
" elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed
" in each state, by the legislature thereof ; but the, congress may,
" at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as
"to the places of choosing senators."
Can this writer imagine, that congress will presume to use
this power, without the occurrence of some one or more of the
cases, the contemplation whereof induced the convention to
create it. These are the cases of invasion by a foreign power;
of neglect, or obstinate refusal, in a state legislature; of the
prevalance of a party, prescribing so as to suit a sinister
purpose, or injure the general government. Others might
perhaps occur in the convention. But these may suffice to
evince the propriety of such a power in the federal head. It
was never meant, that congress should at any time interfere,
unless on the failure of a state lagislature, or to alter such
regulations as may be obviously improper. The exercise of
this power must at all times be so very invidious, that congress,
will not venture upon it without some very cogent and
substantial reason. Let congress, even officiously, exert every
power given by this clause, the representatives must still be
chosen by the people, and the senate by the state legislatures.
The provision cannot by any possibility admit of a different
construction. [12]
Should the bare appointment to congress have the magic
to pervert the tempers and principles of men, I perceive not
the temptation for abusing this, or any other of their powers.
There are bad men to be found at times, in every numerous
assembly. But, under all circumstances, I predict, that, in
congress, their party will be small. Should there be thither
sent the most prostituted character, that ever acted, like a
pest, to his own state; should he possess talents superior to the
rest, I should have little dread of his influence, unless I could
suppose, that a majority of like characters may be chosen.
Even then, I repeat it — they will be under no temptation
sufficient to influence a sensible mind; and no man of ripe age
was ever yet wicked for the sake of wickedness alone.
228 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
You have heard, that, by the privilege of nominating
persons to office, the president will find the congress obse-
quious enough to pass any laws, he shall think fit to propose.
It is incumbent on the authors of this suggestion to show some
interest in the president, inducing him to propose prejudicial
measures. I have remarked, that under the constitution, his
salary can be neither augumented nor curtailed, during his
commission; and, to change the constitution, is not in the
power of congress. Should he, however, devise, and endeavour
to procure, some dangerous act of the body, can we conceive,
that this lure will be powerful enough to corrupt a majority in
each house. No member can be appointed to an office,
created, or of which the profits shall be increased, during the
time for which he was elected. And the expectation of such,
as may fall vacant, within four years, will hardly corrupt even
the smallest number, that can, in any possible case, be a
majority, in the two houses. To make the members of each
house ineligible to any other office whatever, would be even
impolitic, on account of its precluding these states from the
services perhaps of its best men. And it would be unjust to
deny men the possibility of benefits, which might be attained
by others less deserving.
In ascertaining and defining this obvious principle, the con-
vention evidently pursued this obvious principle, that all [13]
things, which concern the union in general, should be regu-
lated by the federal head ; and that each state legislature
should regulate those things, which concern only its own inter-
nal government, together with the separate interests of its
citizens. The enemies of the proposed constitution have
deemed it material to shew, that such a one never existed be-
fore. It dees not indeed agree with definitions in books, taken
from the Amphyctyonic council, the United Netherlands, or
the Helvetic body. They would therefore infer, that it is
wrong. This mode of reasoning deserves not a serious refuta-
tion. The convention examined those several constitutions, if
such a thing they can be called. It found them either woefully
defective, as to their own particular object, or inapplicable to
ours. Peradventure, our own articles of confederation, in
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 229
theory, appear more perfect than any of them. These articles
were made according to rule; the legislative and executive
authorities being vested in one assembly. The extreme caution
of its framers to secure the independence of the several states,
on account of its principle, was much to be commended. But
experience having fully demonstrated this constitution to be
inadequate to the purposes for which it was framed, and a
general conviction of its defects having occasioned the conven-
tion, it is astonishing, that attempts are now made to prefer
still a theory, not founded on the nature of things, but derived
merely from a few deplorable examples. If two branches in a
state legislature be proper, why, in the name of common sense,
are they not so in a confederate legislature ? — Many instances
of hasty unadvised proceedings of congress, as a legislature,
have by other writers been adduced ; and so long as mankind
shall remain under the influence of passion or interest, there
will be such proceedings in every numerous assembly of men.
It is universally, by good writers, agreed, that where any
one political body possesses full powers, legislative and execu-
tive, whether it be a single man, or a select few, or a numerous
assembly, it matters not ; — the government must, in a short
time, become despotic. That in a free government, therefore,
the legislative and executive ought to be ever distinct and sep-
arate, is a position in the Maryland de- [14] claration of rights.
This hackneyed principle, has been urged, with great confidence,
against constituting the senate a council to the president. It
has been urged too, even by the men who would have the
whole power of the federal government centred in a single
assembly. I mean the men who insist that the convention
ought to have done no more than advise in what manner the
powers of the present congress should be increased. Let us
understand the principle in its proper extent. It does not fol-
low, that a body, whose assent is required, in making laws, but
who cannot, by themselves, do any legislative act, may not be
a fit council to the supreme executive magistrate, deriving his
authority, like them, from the people, in no manner dependent
on them, or the immediate of the people, for any private
advantage, and possessed of no share in legislation, except
that of offering his advice.
230 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
The objection to this part of the constitution, I confess, at
first, appeared formidable. The reasons which I now conjec-
ture to have influenced the convention, did not then occur.
But I have long adhered to a maxim, which , I warmly recom-
mend to others — never to condemn, absolutely, even within
myself, any one kind, until I can hit upon some other kind
which I conceive better. As no human institution can possess
absolute perfection, it is an easy matter to espy some fault or
defect in almost everything, which the wit of man can contrive,
or at least, to reason plausibly against it. But this faculty of
finding faults is by no means sufificient to constitute the politi-
cian or statesman. I deliberated what kind of council might
be preferable, under all circumstances, to the senate. The
plainest thing in nature ! Exclaims he, who solves all difficul-
ties at once. Why not appoint a body to act as council and
nothing else ?
One reason, and that not very unpopular, is the great addi-
tional expence. However, this reason I deem the lightest of
all ; and the general proposition involves a great variety of
■other considerations.
It' is essential to a council, that the members be free, as
possible, from all bias, or improper influence. This separate
and distinct council must be elected by the people, or [15] by
special electors ; by the legislature, or by one of its branches ;
or by some department ; or by the president.
That the people should either make laws to bind them-
selves, or elect persons, without whose consent, no laws shall
be made, is essential to their freeedom. But universal experi-
ence forbids, that they should immediately choose persons for
the execution of the laws. Shall the legislature then, or the
senate, or the house of representatives, have this appointment?
A council thus chosen would be dependent on its electors ;
and it would be the same thing in many respects, as if the leg-
islature should execute its own laws. Can you believe, that a
council, chosen annually, or once in two or three years, would
dare to pursue, in all cases, the dictates of its own judgment,
contrary to the known will of those, who will soon have an
opportunity of removing them ? Would they not be emulous
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 23 1
to please leading men ; and there not be opened, at every
period of election, a fine field for intrigue and cabal ? There
would be one way only of rendering a council, thus chosen,
independent of their electors ; and that is, the choosing them
for life, with salaries, not to be augmented or diminished.
Against choosing an executive for life the reasons are
weighty indeed. Should they then hold their commissions
during good behaviour, there must be some tribunal to deter-
mine on that good behaviour ; and what body it can be, except
the congress, would be difficult to decide. Besides good
behaviour in a member of council is not determinable, like
that of a judge, which has relation to the laws, and things
universally known. In the office of the former, there is much
left to discretion, that I cannot conceive with what propriety
he can hold it on the condition of good behaviour. There can
be no sure criterion, and the~ decision must therefore unavoid-
ably depend on the discretion or mere opinion of his judges,
founded on no established principles whatever.
A council, chosen by the president himself, would probably
consist of creatures devoted to his will. I can discern no rea-
son, wherefore any officer of the government [16] should
make the appointment. There remains then only the people's
choosing electors, and placing the council of the president on
the same footing with himself. Here occurs the objection of
expence ; and here again would arise the controversy respect-
ing equality of representation.
The senate, will, in all human likelihood, consist of the
most important characters, men of enlightened minds, mature
in judgment, independent in their circumstances, and not de-
riving their principal subsistence from their pay, as probably
would the members of a board, distinct and separate from all
other public employments.
I am not, therefore, barely reconciled to the article in ques-
tion. It commands my warmest admiration, and entire ap-
plause.
Is there any power improperly trusted to that select assem-
bly, in which all the states have equal interest, and to which
they will assuredly make a determined point of sending their
232 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
best men ? It is this equality, almost as much as any other
circumstance, which recommends it as an executive council.
The senate are to try impeachments. By their advice only,
may the president make treaties, appoint ambassadors, minis-
ters, counsels, judges of the supreme court, and officers, not
otherwise provided for in the constitution. Let us reflect,
whether these things could be better done, by any other body,
and whether it be proper for any one man (suppose even the
saviour of his country to be immo/tal) to have the appoint-
ment of all those important officers. It has always appeared
to me, that neither one man, nor many men, should possess this
transcendant authority, in a repubhc. A single man, in high
power, if he always means right, can with difficulty discern the
true characters of men. Continual efforts are made to impose
on his judgment. But, indeed, a single vs\2L'n generally confers by
favour. In a large assembly there is perhaps equal partiality ;
and elections are conducted by intrigue and cabal. A select
assembly is open to direct application ; and although each may
be supposed to entertain his partialities, he cannot recommend
his favourites, without pointing out their essential qualifica-
tions and becoming, in some measure, responsible for their
conduct. It is here, that characters are most fairly [17] inves-
tigated, and appointments are most deliberately made. I appeal
to universal experience, whether these remarks be not founded
on fact, and whether the most judicious appointments have not
been made by small select assemblies. I confess, that the num-
ber of the senators for this purpose only is excessive. But I
can confidently rely on the extraordinary selection to compen-
sate for the excess.
The power of the president is alarming peculiarly to that
class, who cannot bear to view others in possession of that
fancied blessing, to which, alas ! they must themselves aspire in
vain. They tell you, this supreme magistrate, although he be
called the modest name of president, and elected for only four
years, will, in every essential, be an emperor, king, or stadt-
holder at least ; and that his dignity in a few years, will become
hereditary. Let us examine the foundation of this alarming
prediction.
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 233
Before this appointment can be entailed, and before even
the term can be enlarged, the constitution must be changed,
by consent of the people. By what method, then, shall the
president effect this alteration ? Every citizen in the union
will be a censor on his conduct. Not even his person is par-
ticularly protected; and the means of oppression are little
in his power. Let the jealousy of the people once take the
alarm, and, at the expiration of his term, he is dismissed, as
inevitably as light succeeds to darkness. The election of a
president is not carried on in a single assembly, where the sev-
eral arts of corruption may be essayed. He is elected by per-
sons chosen on the same day, in thirteen different assemblies,
in thirteen different states. An elective monarchy has long
been severely reprobated. But had the countries, where it
prevailed, enjoyed regulations like these, they would perhaps,
at this time, be preferred to the rules of hereditary succession,
which have so often placed fools and tyrants on the throne.
It seems, however, that the president may possibly be con-
tinued for life. He may so, provided he deserve it. If [18]
not, he retires to obscurity, without even the consolation of
having produced any of the convulsions, attendant usually on
grand revolutions. Should he be wicked or frantic enough to
make the attempt, he atones for it, with the certain loss of
wealth, liberty or life.
I return to the powers of congress. They are almost uni-
versally admitted to be proper for a federal head, except only
the sweeping clause, and the power of raising fleets and armies,
without any stint or limitation, in time of peace. The clause
runs thus : —
Art. I, sec. 8, par. the last. " To make all laws, which
shall be necessary and be proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this con-
stitution, in the government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof."
It is apprehended, that this sweeping clause will afford pre-
text, for freeing congress from all constitutional restraints.
I will not here again insist on the pledge we enjoy, in the
common interest, and sure attachment of the representatives
234 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
and senate ; setting aside the little probability of a majority in
each branch lying under the same temptation. Consider the
import of the words.
I take the construction of these words to be precisely the
same, as if the clause had preceded further and said, " No act
" of congress shall be valid, unless it have relation to the fore-
" going powers, and be necessary and proper for carrying them
" into execution." But say the objectors, " The congress, being
" itself to judge of the necessity and propriety, may pass any
" act, which it may deem expedient, for any other purpose."
This objection applies with equal force to each particular
power, defined by the constitution ; and, if there were a bill of
rights, congress might be said to be the judge of that also.
They may reflect however, that every judge in the union,
whether of federal or state appointment, (and some persons
would say every jury) will have a right to reject any act,
handed to him as a law, which he may conceive repugnant to
the constitution.
It may nevertheless strike you at first view, that a pro-
vision, so obviously apt to excite distrust, might have well
[19] been omitted. So indeed it might, were there a possibil-
ity of providing every thing, necessary and proper, for carry-
ing into effect the various powers, intended to be conferred.
Without this general clause, it were easy to suppose cases,
wherein a particular clause might be incompetent to its own
purpose.
For want of some plain and obvious distinctions, there has
been vented so much senseless clamour against standing
armies, that they are become a political bugbear. A limited
monarch, with the means of maintaining, at all times, an army
devoted to his will, might soon trample on the natural and
civil rights of his subjects. Could the present congress find
means of augmenting the force, which it now maintains,
which of you, on that account, would experience the slightest
anxiety ? Which of all the European powers is destitute of
an army ? Which of them if they were free, could be secure
of remaining so without a standing force ? I might go fur-
ther, and demand, whether any of them have lost their liber-
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 235
ties, by means of a standing army? The troops, continually
kept up in Great Britain, are formidable to its neighbors, and
yet no rational Englishman apprehends the destruction of his
rights. It is true, that he knows, these troops cannot be
maintained, without the consent of his representatives, annu-
ally obtained. But the necessity of an army he readily con-
ceives ; and the number he leaves to the discretion of parlia-
ment. Ought then an American to have greater fears of a
president, than an Englishman has of his king ? Or may he
not trust his representatives and the senate, with as much con-
fidence, as the Englishman reposes in the commons and
lords ?
Let the federal head be constituted as it may, there can be
no perfect security, without both a land force, and naval arma-
ment. It is impossible to say how much will, at all times of
peace, be sufficient. We have the same security against the
abuse of this, as of any other authority. The expenses of an
army might indeed raise fears of a different kind, — that we
shall not be able to maintain force enough for the most proper
occasion.
Suppose a limitation in time of peace. What then is to be
done on the prospect of a war? Should you make the [20]
distinction between profound peace and a threatened war, who
is there, but congress, to determine on the exigency ? If you
make no distinction, then it will be expedient to declare war,
at the instant in which the danger shall be conceived, in order
that it may be lawful to prepare for only a just defence. In
fine, I consider this grand objection, as a mere pretext for ter-
rifying you, like children, with spectres and hobgoblins. It
may be material here to remark, that although a well regulated
mihtia has ever been considered as the true defence of a free
republic, there are always honest purposes, which are not to be
answered by a militia. If they were, the burthen of the militia
would be so great, that a free people would, by no means, be
willing to sustain it. If indeed it be possible in the nature of
things, that congress shall, at any future period, alarm us by an
improper augmentation of troops, could we not, in that case,
depend on the militia, which is ourselves. In such a case it
236 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
would be ridiculous to urge that the federal government, is
invested with a power over the whole militia of the union.
Even when congress shall exercise this power, on the most
proper occasions, it is provided in the constitution, that each
state shall ofificer and train its own militia.
The objections against the judiciary are probably more sin-
cere. The article has been generally misconceived, or misrep-
resented ; and after bestowing much attention, I am not certain
that I fully comprehend it. I am, however, at length satisfied,
that no rational construction can be given to this part of the
proposed plan, either to warrant a rejection of the whole, or to
place matters on a worse footing, than they are at present.
The judiciary power is to be vested in one supreme court,
fixed at the seat of government, with the ease and convenience
of the people, the congress may hereafter appoint inferior
courts in each of the states. The jurisdiction of this supreme
court is to be partly original, and partly appellate. With
respect to the extent of either, there can be no possible doubt,
as there is neither ambiguity nor uncertainty in the relative
expressions. [21].
The original jurisdiction of the supreme court extends: —
1. To all cases, in which may be concerned an ambassador,
any public minister, or a consul.
2. To all cases whatever, in which a state may be a party.
— This second division maybe branched into i. Cases between
the United States, and one or more of the individual states.
3. Cases between two or more states. 3. Cases between a
state and its own citizens. 4. Cases between a state, and the
citizens of another state. 5. Cases between a state, and a for-
eign state. 6. Cases between a state, and the citizens, or sub-
jects of a foreign state.
The appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court extends: —
I. To all cases whatever between parties of every kind, in
law and equity, arising under this constitution, and the laws of
congress, passed agreeably thereto, and to treaties already, or
hereafter to be, made.
2. To all cases of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.
3. To all cases, in which the United States shall be a party.
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 237
4. To all cases between citizens of different states.
' 5. To all cases between citizens of the same state, claiming
lands under the grants of different states.
6. To all cases between citizens of a state, and foreign
states, or their citizens or subjects.
One doubt arising on the judiciary article is, whether in
these cases of appellate jurisdiction, the appeal lies both from
the state courts, and the inferior federal courts, or only from
the former, or only from the latter.
Another doubt is, whether the inferior courts are to be
branches of the supreme court, constituted for convenience,
and having equal jurisdiction, both original and appellate,
with the supreme court, or whether the inferior courts are to
be confined to an original jurisdiction in those cases, wherein
the supreme court has appellate jurisdiction.
I shall not presume to decide absolutely on the genuine
construction of an article, which is said to have caused much
private debate and perplexity. I am however fully persuaded,
that, as the article speaks of an original and appellate jurisdic-
tion, of a supreme court, and inferior courts ; and, as there is
no intimation of appeals from the several [22] state tribunals,
the inferior federal courts are intended to have original juris-
diction in all cases, wherein the supreme court has appellate
jurisdiction ; and the appeal lies only from them. I can,
almost, with confidence, maintain, that, as there is no express
clause, or necessary implication, to oust the jurisdiction of
state courts, an action, after the adoption of the plan, may be
instituted in any court, having, at this time, a jurisdiction.
And if an action be brought in a state court, I do not, at pre-
sent, perceive, that it can, in any manner, be transferred to the
supreme or inferior federal court.
According then to the best of my judgment the affair
stands thus. The supreme federal court will have an exclu-
sive original jurisdiction in all cases relative to the rights of
ambassadors, other ministers, and consuls; because, as I
humbly conceive, the several state governments have at this
time nothing to do with these cases. With respect to the
cases, in which a state may be party, the supreme federal
238 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
court, and the several state courts, will have, I conceive, con-
current original jurisdiction, provided a state may, at this time,
institute an action in its own name, in the courts of another
state. The inferior federal courts, and the state courts, will, I
conceive, have concurrent original jurisdiction in all the enu-
merated cases wherein an appeal lies to the supreme court,
except only the cases created by or under the proposed constitu-
tion, in which, as they do not now exist, the inferior federal
courts will have exclusive jurisdiction. From the state inferior
courts, I further apprehend, that an appeal will lie, in all cases,
to their own high courts of appeal, as heretofore.
A choice of jurisdictions has been ever esteemed a valuable
right, even where there are both of the same kind. The pur-
pose of extending so far the jurisdiction of the federal judi-
ciary, is to give every assurance to the general government, of
a faithful execution of its laws, and to give citizens, states,
and foreigners, an assurance of the impartial administration of
justice. Without the salutary institution, the federal govern-
ment might frequently be obstructed, and its servants want
protection. It is calculated not as an engine of oppression,,
but to secure the blessings of peace and good [23] order.
The provisions respecting different states, their citizens, and
foreigners, if not absolutely necessary, are much to be ap-
plauded. The human mind is so framed, that the slightest
circumstance may prevent the most upright and well known
tribunal from giving complete satisfaction ; and there may
happen a variety of cases, where the distrust and suspicion
may not be altogether destitute of a just foundation.
On these principles, an appeal as to fact is no less proper,
than the appeal from judges of law. A jury, whose legal
qualifications are only property and ripe age, may more proba-
bly incur the imputation of weakness, partiality, or undue in-
fluence. But in regard to appeals, it is very material to re-
mark, that congress is to make such regulations and excep-
tions, as upon mature deliberation, it shall think proper. And
indeed, before such regulations and exceptions shall be made,
the manner of appeal will not be ascertained, Is it then to be
presumed, that, in making regulations and exceptions, this
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 239
appellate jurisdiction shall be calculated as an engine of
oppression, or to serve only the purpose of vexation and
delay.
As the rod of Aaron once swallowed up the rods of the
Egyptian magi, so also is it feared, that these federal courts,
will, at length, swallow up the state tribunals. A miracle, in
one case, is as necessary, as in the other.
But let not the officers of state courts be overmuch
alarmed ! The causes, which, by possibility, may be* insti-
tuted in the federal courts bear no comparison to the rest.
[24] In the course of ten years, not one action, that I know
of, in Maryland, has concerned either another state, or an am-
bassador, consul, or other minister. It is hoped, that actions
by foreigners, will, in a few years, become much rarer than at
any time heretofore, and these may still be determined in the
state courts. [25]
A gentleman, as it is conjectured, in the law department of
a neighboring state, has been pleased to infer, that fictions,
similar to those in the king's bench and exchequer of Eng-
land, will be contrived, to draw causes into the federal courts.
He seems not aware, that, even in England, the established
fictions of law are not of modern date. They were ingenious
devices, to remedy defects in the common law, without the aid
* The importance of having the western territory determined a common
stock, needs only to be mentioned, to excite attention.
As the articles of confederation contain no provision, for adjusting the dis-
pute between the United States, and particular states, Maryland, for a long
time, refused her ratification. An adequate provision is made by the proposed
plan. That the United States will assuredly institute actions against two of
the states, setting up claims equally wild and extensive, may appear from the
following statement.
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland,
have been always interested in making good the common claim ; as they never
laid any particular claim to the territory in question.
Massachusetts, if the province of Maine be separate, is likewise become in-
terested in the common claim.
Connecticut, and New York, have both made cessions, which congress has
accepted. These two are therefore become interested.
Pennsylvania, although very extensive, has her limits ascertained. She
likewise is interested.
240 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
of parliament. The fundamental principle however, with re-
spect to their adoption, was, that they consist with equity, and
be requisite for the advancement of justice. Now every man,
who would establish over his cause a jurisdiction in a fed-
eral court, must shew, that such cause comes under the de-
scription of the constitution. If he do not, there will be
wanting that equity, which is the support of legal fiction.
But can any man seriously imagine, that fiction will be per-
niitted, to give the judges a power of legislation, denied to
congress itself? Wherefore should the judges, holding their
commissions during good behaviour, be guilty of such gross
falsehood, perjury, and breach of trust ? Would there not be
a general revolt against such barefaced impudent innovations.
Away then with your trumpery of fictions ! Accuse not the
illustrious members of the convention of having in their con-
templation such sophistry, pettifogging and chicane ! But
another fear is, that whatever actions may be instituted in the
federal courts will there seek an admission, on account of a
more speedy decision. That man alone, " on whose brow
shame is ashamed to sit," will avow his opposition to a more
speedy administration of justice.
The institution of the trial by jury has been sanctified by
the experience of ages. It has been recognised by the consti-
Virginia, having made a cession to congress, has since relinquished a part
of the reserved lands, or at least offered independence, to Kentucky.
North Carolina, having once made a cession, thought proper, in the om-
nipotence of her destined sovereignty, to repeal the act. Will not the cession
be determined valid, and the repeal void ?
South Carolina also, it is said, has ceded part of that territory, which
lately she disputed with Georgia. In this case the United States have their
claim fortified.
But Georgia, the weakest of all, lays claim to an immense tract of country.
In this territory there are warlike and independent tribes of the aborigines,
now carrying terror and desolation towards the heart of the country occupied
by the whites. It is expected, that this circumstance, with a consciousness of
the weak foundation of her claims, will dispose Georgia to give up without a
suit, and consent to be circumscribed within narrower limits, so soon as a
proper tribunal shall have power to enter upon a rational investigation.
N. B. — For the above statement I am principally indebted to a member of
the late continental convention, and who for a considerable time, was a mem-
ber of congress, a gentleman of established honour and accuracy.
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 241
tution of every state in the union. It is deemed the birthright
of Americans ; and it is imagined, that liberty cannot subsist
without it. The proposed plan expressly adopts it, for the
decision of all criminal accusations, except impeachment ; and
is silent with respect to the determination of facts in civil
causes.
The inference, hence drawn by many, is not warranted by
the premises. By recognising the jury trial in criminal cases,
the constitution effectually provides, that it shall pre- [26] vail,
so long as the constitution itself shall remain unimpaired and
unchanged. But, from the great variety of civil cases, arising
under this plan of government, it would be unwise and impoli-
tic to say aught about it, in regard to these. Is there not a
great variety of cases, in which this trial is taken away in each
of the states? Are there not many more cases, where it is
denied in England ? For the convention to ascertain in what
cases it shall prevail, and in what others it may be expedient
to prefer other modes was impracticable. On this subject a
future congress is to decide ; and I see no foundation under
Heaven for the opinion that congress will despise the known
prejudices and inclination of their countrymen. A very in-
genious writer of Philadelphia has mentioned the objections
without deigning to refute that, which he conceives to have
originated in " sheer malice."
I proceed to attack the whole body of anti-federalists in
their strong hold. The proposed constitution contains no bill
of rights.
Consider again the nature and intent of a federal republic.
It consists of an assemblage of distinct states, each completely
organized for the protection of its own citizens, and the whole
consolidated, by express compact, under one head, for the gen-
eral welfare and common defence.
Should the compact authorize the sovereign, or head to do
all things it may think necessary and proper, then there is no
limitation to its authority ; and the liberty of each citizen in
the union has no other security, than the. sound policy, good
faith, virtue, and perhaps proper interests, of the head.
When the compact confers the aforesaid general power,
242 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
making nevertheless some special reservations and exceptions,
then is the citizen protected further, so far as these reserva-
tions and exceptions shall extend.
But, when the compact ascertains and defines the power
delegated to the federal head, then cannot this government,
without manifest usurpation, exert any power not expressly,
or by necessary implication, conferred by the compact.
This doctrine is so obvious and plain, that I am amazed
any good man should deplore the omission of a bill of rights.
[27] When we were told, that the celebrated Mr. Wilson
had advanced this doctrine 'in effect, it was said, Mr. Wilson
would not dare to speak thus to a CONSTITUTIONALIST. With
talents inferior to that gentleman's, I will maintain the doc-
trine against any CONSTITUTIONALIST who will condescend to
enter the lists, and behave like a gentleman.
It is, however, the idea of another most respectable charac-
ter, that, as a bill of rights could do no harm, and might quiet
the minds of many good people, the convention would have
done well to indulge them. With all due deference, I appre-
hend, that a bill of rights might not be this innocent quieting
instrument. Had the convention entered on the work, they
must have comprehended within it everything, which the citi-
zens of the United States claim as a natural or a civil right.
An omission of a single article would have caused more dis-
content, than is either felt or pretended, on the present
occasion. A multitude of articles might be the source of
infinite controversy, by clashing with the powers intended to
be given. To be full and certain, a bill of rights might have
cost the convention more time, than was expended on their
other work. The very appearance of it might raise more
clamour than its omission, — I mean from those who study
pretexts for condemning the whole fabric of the constitution.
■ — "What ! (might they say) did these exalted spirits imagine,
" that the natural rights of mankind depend on their gracious
" concession. If indeed they possessed that tyrannic sway,
" which, the kings of England had once usurped, we might hum-
" bly thank them for their magna charta, defective as it is. As
" that is not the case, we will not suffer it to be understood^
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 245
" that their new-fangled federal head shall domineer with the
"powers not excepted by their precious bill of rights. What !
" if the owner of 1,000 acres of land thinks proper to fell one
" half, is it necessary to take a release from the vendee of the
"other half? Just as necessary is it for.^the people to have a
"grant of their natural rights from a government which derives
" everything it has, from the grant of the people." [28]
The restraints laid on the state legislatures will tend to
secure domestic tranquiUty, more than all the bills, or declara-
tions, of rights, which human policy could devise. It is very
justly asserted, that the plan contains an avowal of many
rights. It provides that no man, shall suffer by expost facto
laws or bills of attainder. It declares, that gold and silver
only shall be a tender for specie debts ; and that no law shall
impair the obligation of a contract.
I have here^perhaps touched a string, which secretly draws
together many of the foes to the plan. Too long have we
sustained evils, resulting from injudicious emissions of paper,
and from the operation of tender laws. To bills of credit as
they are now falsely called, may we impute the entire loss of
confidence between men. Hence it is, that specie has, in a
great degree, ceased its proper ofifice, and been confined to
speculations, baneful to the public, and enriching a few enter-
prising sharp-sighted men, at the expence not only of the
ignorant, slothful, and needy, but of their country's best
benefactors. Hence chiefly are the bankruptcies throughout
America, and the disreputable ruinous state of our commerce.
Hence is it principally, that America hath lost its credit abroad,
and American faith become a proverb. The convention plainly
saw, that nothing short of a renunciation of the right to emit
bills of credit could produce that grand consummation of pol-
icy, the RESTORATION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FAITH.
Were it possible for the nations abroad to suppose Great
Britain would emit bills on the terms whereon they have
issued in America, how soon would the wide arch of that
mighty empire tumble into ruins ? In no other country in the
universe has prevailed Ithe idea of supplying, by promissory
notes, the want of coin, for commerce and taxes. In America,
244 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
indeed, they have heretofore served many valuable purposes.
It is this consideration, which has so powerfully attached to
them many well meaning honest citizens ; and they talk of
gratitude to paper money, as if it were a sensible benefactor,
entitled to the highest rank and distinction ; and as if, to
abandon it, would be a deadly sin. But when everything
demonstrates the season to be past ; when the credit of Amer-
ica, in all places, depends on the security she shall give to [29]
contracts, it would be madness in the states to be tenacious
of their right. So long as Europe shall believe we regard not
justice, gratitude and honour, so long will America labour
under the disadvantages of an individual, who attempts to
make good his way through the world with a blasted reputa-
tion. To the man, who shall say, " it is of no consequence to
"consult national honour," I only answer thus, — "If thy soul
" be so narrow and depraved, as to believe this, it were a need-
" less attempt to cure thee of thy error."
On this subject there is no necessity for enlarging, to the
people of my native state ; their conduct on a recent occasion
having acquired them great and deserved applause. Is it nec-
essary to enlarge on the propriety of giving more efficient
powers to a federal head ? At this moment, congress is little
more than a name, without power to effect a single thing,
which is the object of a confederate republic. Reflect on the
recent period, when, in a sister state, a numerous body of her
frantic citizens appeared armed for the destruction of a govern-
ment, framed by the people. When that unhappy state was
devoted to the miseries of a civil war, did congress even dare
to interpose ? Conscious of its inability to protect, it could
only await the result, in silence and in terror. It indeed ven-
tured to make application to the states for a small body of
troops, under the poor pretext of another, and a necessary,
destination. But, notwithstanding the universal contagion of
the alarm, did the states, on that occasion, comply with the
requisition ? Suppose even an invasion by a foreign power, —
in what manner could congress provide for its own defence ?
In the contemptible light in which America has lately stood,
is it reasonable to expect she will be suffered to remain long in
REMARICS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 245
peace ? The distance between the two continents is the only
circumstance on which we can rely. All Europe is now in sus-
pence ; and the result of your deliberations will instruct her in
the part she shall act.
With amazement, her nations contemplate a scene, of
which the world is too young to furnish a parallel. We as-
sembled our sages, patriots, and statesmen, to consult what
mode of government is capable of producing the greatest
sum [30] of general good, with the least mixture of general,
and partial evil. Not that each individual in this august as-
sembly was expected to offer a system ; but that the product
of their joint wisdom should be referred to the several states,
to be adopted, or rejected, as the great body of the people
shall determine on a free and full deliberation.
As the occasion was unparalleled so also is the plan, which,
after many months of painful investigation, is submitted, with
an unanimity, also unparalleled.
If there be any man, who approves the great outlines of the
plan, and, at the same time, would reject it, because he views
some of the minute parts as imperfect, he should reflect, that,
if the states think as he does, an alteration may be hereafter
effected, at leisure. When the convention determined, that
the whole should be received, or the whole fail, they did not
on an arrogant conceit of their own infallibility, but on the
soundest principles of policy and common sense. Were each
state legislature, or convention, to take it up, article by article,
and section by section, with the liberty of adopting some, and
rejecting the rest, in all probability, so small a part would be
approved by nine states, on the narrow view which each has
of the subject, and attached as each is to its own supposed
interest, that, in its mutilated condition, it would be worse
than the present confederation. For thirteen different assem-
blies, in that way, to approve so much of any plan whatever,
as might merit the name of system, the convention well knew
to be impossible. Were there any one body oi men, invested
with full power, in behalf of the whole United States, to con-
sider, and amend the plan, then would it be proper to debate
it by sections, in the same manner as it was originally debated.
246 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
With a view to defeat totally the plan, another general
convention is proposed ; not with the power of giving a fin-
ishing hand to a constitution ; but again to consider objec-
tions, to strike out, to add, and again to make their report to
the several states.
In this way, there can never be an end. We must at last
return to this, — that whatever is agreed on, by the assembly
appointed to propose, must be either adopted in the whole, or
in the whole rejected. [31]
The idea of a new convention is started by some men,
with the vain expectation of having amendments made to
suit a particular state, or to advance their own selfish views.
Were this fatal idea adopted, I should bid a last adieu to that
elevated hope, which now inspires me, of living under the
happiest form of government which the sun ever beheld.
Recollect again and again, that almost every state in the
union made a determined point of delegating its first charac-
ters to this grand convention. Reflect upon the time spent
in the arduous work, and the sacrifices which those distin-
guished persons made to their country. Should the same
men be deputed again, would they not, think you, with the
same unanimity, subscribe and recommend the same plan ?
So far as I have been informed, those members, who, in the
progression of the plan, had opposed certain parts, and yet
afterwards subscribed cheerfully to the whole, have, with the
candour which becomes them, acknowledged their errors in
debate. Even an illustrious character, who was of the minor-
ity, consisting only of three, I have been told, has since
regretted his refusal.
Suppose then a second convention, with a different choice
of delegates. These too would either speedily subscribe, or
they might propose some other system, to be debated, para-
graph by paragraph, in thirteen different assembhes ; and then
there would be the same probability of a mutilated plan ; or
they would propose something, to be adopted or rejected in the
whole ; and there would be the same necessity of another con-
vention. Besides, as the second convention, if it consist of
different men, must inevitably be inferior to the first, there is
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.. 24/
little probability that their work will be superior. Never
again, in an assembly constituted as that was, will there be
found the same liberality of sentiment, " the same spirit of
amity, and the same mutual deference and concession."
If it be contended, that the second, being possessed of the
various objections from the several states, must be better able
to determine, I would ask, what conduct this second conven-
tion should adopt ? Are they to take the proposed plan, and
strike out every thing objected to by nine states ? Or may
they likewise adopt and recommend the entire plan? In
short, to [32] appoint a second convention, merely to consult
and propose, would be the most absurd expedient, that ever,
in a matter of this amazing magnitude, was proposed. Does
any man then entertain the thought of another kind of con-
vention, invested with full powers to consult, amend, adopt,
and confirm? A scheme like this was never yet, I trust, in
agitation. But, if it were, I would propose this single ques-
tion. Whether is it better to amend, before it be tried, that
plan, which may be termed the result of the wisdom of Amer-
ica, or leave it to be amended, at leisure, as mature experi-
ence shall direct ?
Although a very great variety of ostensible objections have
been publicly offered, the real and sincere objections are hardly
ever disclosed in private. There is a class, opposed to the
union of thirteen different states, and the reason they assign, is
the vast extent of our territory. Let us consider well their
objection.
To consolidate the whole thirteen states into a single
organization, was out of the convention's contemplation, — for
two unanswerable reasons. In the first place, they were satis-
fied, that not one of the states would renounce its sovereignty.
In the next place, they considered, that, in a single govern-
ment, with a great extent of territory, the advantages are
most unequally diffused. As the extreme parts are scarcely
sensible of its protection, so are they scarcely under its domi-
nation. It is generally agreed, that a great extended nation
can long continue under no single form of government, except
a despotism into which, either a republic, or a limited mon-
248 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
archy, will be certain to degenerate. And hence, if I under-
stand the man who styles himself a Centinel, he insinuates,
that, if these states will persist in remaining under one head,
they must soon fall under the dominion of a despot. But, my
fellow-citizens, in a confederate republic, consisting of distinct
states, completely organized within themselves, and each of no
greater extent than is proper for a republican form, almost all
the blessings of government are equally diffused. Its protec-
tion extends to the remotest corner, and there every man is
under restraint of laws. [33]
A true federal republic is always capable of accession by
the peaceable and friendly admission of new single states. Its
true size is neither greater nor less than that, which may com-
prehend all the states, which, by their contiguitv, may become
enemies, unless united under one common head, capable of recon-
ciling all their differences. Such a government as this, excels
any single government, extending over the same territory, as
a band of brothers is superior to a band of slaves, or as thir-
teen common men, for the purposes of agriculture, would be
superior to a giant, enjoying strength of body equal to them all.
The idea of a balance has long influenced the politics of
Europe. But how much superior to this almost impracticable
balance would be a general league, constituting a kind of fed-
eral republic, consisting of all the independent powers of
Europe, for preventing the impositions and encroachments of
one upon another ! A true and perfect confederate government,
however, in her situation, is not to be attained ; although the
great soul of Henry T)HE Fourth is said to have conceived
the idea.
Shall America the|i form one grand federal republic ? Or
shall she, after experiencing the benefits of even an imperfect
union, and when a uni[on the most perfect is requisite for her
permanent safety ; — shall she, in this situation, divide into thir-
teen contemptible single governments, exposed to every insult
and wrong from abroad, and watching each other's motions,
with all the captiousness of jealous rivals ? Or shall she divide
into two or more federal republics, actuated, by the same ma-
lignant dispositions ? In either of these cases, after struggling
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 249
through infinite toils, difficulty, and danger, should the thirteen
single states be, at last, delivered from foreign foes, they will
fall upon each other ; and no man can predict, what forms of
government, or division of territory, shall finally obtain .
Two or three federal republics might possibly retain their in-
dependence. But they would be in the same situation, with
respect to each other, as France, England, and Spain, scarcely
ever free from war ; practicing the arts of dissimulation and
intrigue ; in vain striving to impose, by endless negotiation ;
and, after all, relying only on the immense naval and land
forces, which they continually maintain. [34]
Let us then, my countrymen, embrace those blessings
which Providence is ready to shower on us. Open and extend
your views ! Let the prospect comprehend the present and
future generations, yourselves, your children, your relatives,
your fellow-citizens, dwellers on the same continent, and in-
habitants of the whole terraqueous globe.
With the prospect of my country's future glory, presented
to my glowing imagination, it is difficult to resist the strong
impulse of enthusiasm. But it is neither my talent, nor desire,
to mislead. I wish only to impress the genuine advantages
of the proposed plan ; and, if possible, to rouse every man
from that supineness, into which he is lulled by the present
deceitful calm. To acquit themselves, like men, when visible
danger assails ; and, when it is repelled, to sink like savages,
into indolence, is said to he characteristic of Americans. I
am not, however, one of those, who imagine a necessity for
embracing almost any scheme, which the convention might
have devised, for giving to the union more efficient powers.
Had the plan, they have proposed, contained the seeds of
much, though distant, evil, perhaps a faithful patriot might
address you thus :
" Let us not, my friends, in a fit of unmanly apprehension,
" betray that immense charge, with which Americans, at this
" day are entrusted ! Let us confide in the wisdom of our great
" men, with the assistance of Heaven, to establish yet our
" safety and happiness ! Let us, in the meantime, sustain all
" our evils, with resignation and firmness. Let us hope, that
250 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
" no foreign power, or lawless internal combinations, shall do
" us a mighty injury ! Let us be frugal, economical, industri-
'■ ous ! Let us suspend the cruel collection of debts ! Let
" commerce continue to droop ! Let us awhile submit even to
" infamy ; and turn a callous ear to the indignant reproaches
'• of our late faithful and affectionate servants, friends and
" benefactors."
To this purpose might a man plausibly declaim ; provided
the proposed plan contained many and great faults ; provided
it were not calculated to promote the general good, without
violating the just rights of a single individual ; and provided it
were not the best, which, under all circumstances, could be
reasonably expected. It was the parting declaration of [35]
the American NESTOR, to his exalted fellow-labourers, that
"he would subscribe, because he thought it good, and because
" he did not know, but it was the best that could be contrived."
My own declaration, which would be the same, were I now
standing on the verge of eternity, is, that if the whole matter
were left to my discretion, I would not change a single part.
On reflection, I was pleased with the conduct of the Virginia
and Maryland assemblies, in appointing distant days for the
meeting of their state conventions. Not that I greatly ad-
mired the supposed motive ; but because I sincerely wished
every man might have time to comprehend and weigh the
plan, before the ultimate decision of these two states should
be pronounced. The longer it is contemplated, after it is
understood, the greater, I am persuaded, will be the approba-
tion of those, who wish the public good, and to whose private
views and expectations, nothing, which tends to promote that
good, can be greatly detrimental.
But alas ! My fellow citizens, on the adoption of this fatal
plan, and when every part of the great complicated machine
shall be put in motion, the lustre of our state assemblies will
be diminished by the superior splendour of the federal head.
This single consideration, although many hesitate to avow it,
will cause more opposition, than all the rest united. Weigh
well the objection. If ever it be material to inquire, by whom
reasons are adduced, it is on this peculiar occasion.
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 251
From the objection itself, may perhaps be discerned the
danger we are opposed to, from the secret views and selfish
considerations of the objector.
What at this moment to the nations abroad is the state of
Maryland ? The poor member of a defenceless system of
petty republics. In what light is she viewed by her sister
states ? Whatever rank she now possesses, will remain after
the great alteration of the system. They will all rise or fall in
the proportion which now exists. What then are the powers
an individual state will lose ? She will no longer be able to
deny congress that, which congress, at this moment, has a
right to demand. She will have no power to enter into a
treaty, alliance, or confederation. She shall, in time of war,
grant no letters of marque and reprisal. She shall [36] coin
no money, emit no bills of credit, nor make any thing but
gold and silver a tender in payment of debts. She shall pass
no bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of a contract. She shall grant no title of nobility.
She shall not, without consent of congress, lay any duty on im-
ports or exports, except what may be necessary for executing
her inspection laws. She shall not, without consent of congress,
lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or* ships of war, in
time of peace ; enter into any agreement, or compact, with
another state, or with a foreign power; or engage in war,
unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger, as will
not admit of delay.
Of the several powers, from which an individual state is thus
restrained, some are improper to be used at all ; others belong
not even now to the individual states ; and the rest are strictly
proper for only the federal head. The aversion from ceding
them to congress, is just as reasonable as in a state of nature
would be the reluctance of an individual to relinquish any of
his natural rights, upon entering into a state of society. The
principle, on which, at length, he surrenders, is the necessity
of every one's making a cession of some rights, to enable the
* The advantage derived from this to the southern states, is easily per-
ceived. Have not serious apprehensions been entertained on account of the
vast superiority of the eastern states by sea ?
252 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
sovereign to protect the rest. Each state is fully sensible,
that she cannot protect herself ; and yet she would enjoy the
advantages of an union, without making the necessary contri-
butions. To discern how preposterous is the idea, requires
not more than a moment's reflection.
For the honour of my countrymen, I hope this extreme
reluctance to surrender power is confined to those, whose am-
bition, or private interest, would have all things subservient to
the omnipotence of assembly. In the few years that the
state constitutions have endured, has not everyone seen preg-
nant proofs of the vain love of domination ? Has he not also
seen decisive marks of overbearing secret influence ? Where
are the instances 'of exalted patriotism? But I forbear. [37]
Far from me is the wish to cast wantonly one stinging or disa-
greeable reflection. The subject naturally required the gen-
eral remark, and I hope, this short hint may be excused.
Is there a possible advantage to be derived to the public,
from a single state's exercising powers proper only for the
federal head ; suppose even each state should use them pro-
perly and alike ; which, in the nature of things, is not to be
expected ? If there be men, who delight in parliamentary
warfare ; who choose a fair wide field for displaying their
talents ; who wish to see every servant of the public prostrate
before them ; whose ears soothed by humble supplication ;
they may still enjoy rich sources of gratification. Are not the
regulations of property, the regulations of the penal law, the
protection of the weak, the promotion of useful arts, the whole
internal government of their respective republics ; are not
these the main objects of every wise and honest legislature ?
Are not these things still in their power ; and, whilst free from
invasion or injuries abroad, are not these almost the only
things, in which sovereignty is exercised ?
That the state legislatures will soon " drop out of sight,"
is an idea most extravagant and absurd ; because, in addition
to the importance of their duties, the very existence of the
congress depends upon them. That they will; at least, dwin-
dle into something like city corporations, is an apprehension,
founded on no better principle. May the Ruler of the uni-
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 253
verse inspire them with wisdom to discharge those numerous
and extensive duties, which they will find remaining. To do
this, as they ought, will be far preferable to the* breaking all
useful national measures, and marring the concerns of a con-
tinent. To do this, as they ought, will afford more true pleas-
ure to a good mind, than the carrying, by consummate eloquence
and address, the most interesting federal measure, which can-
not be contrived by an enlightened honest politician, in a state
assembly, possessing all its darling sovereignties !
You have been assured, that, soon as this fatal plan shall
[38] succeed, an host of rapacious collectors will invade the
land ; that they will wrest from you the hard product of your
industry, turn out your children from their dwellings, perhaps
commit your bodies to a jail ; and your own immediate repre.
sentatives will have no power to relieve you. This is the mere
phrenzy of declamation, the ridiculous conjuration of spectres
and hobgobblins !
To the five per cent, impost most of the states have more
than once given their assent. This is the only tax which con-
gress wishes immediately to impose. Of the imposition of
assessment, capitation, or direct taxes of any kind, the con-
gress entertains no idea at present ; and although it be proper
for the federal head to possess this power in reserve, nothing
but some unforeseen disaster will ever drive them to such in-
eligible expedients. Setting aside the immediate advantages
of revived credit and trade, and the increased value of your
property and labour, you will be delivered, in a great measure,
from that load of direct taxation, which has been so unequally
borne, and produced so little substantial good.
Permit me to demand, what mighty benefit has resulted
from the exercise of those sovereign rights, that, in general,
you should be loth to resign them ? Has not a perpetual
clamour been kept up (it matters not whether justly or other-
wise) concerning the enormous impositions on the people?
And what are the advantages derived to the people of the
respective states, to the union, or to meritorious individuals ?
* Is it possible to reflect, witbput indignation, on the fate of the five per
cent, impost scheme ?
254 REMARKS BV ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
Has not the far greater part of a state's internal expences been
owing to the extreme length of sessions? Have not these
sessions been consumed in disgusting altercation, and in pass-
ing laws, serving to little better purpose, than to swell the
statute book, encourage a negligence of duty, and obstruct
the administration of justice ?
To trace each real and ostensible objection up to its proper
course, would be a task equally invidious, irksome and unnec-
essary. The characters of the principal advocates and oppo-
nents are well known. To him who declines not a public
avowal of his sentiments, some credit is due, for his candour;
and he is entitled to your patient attention. But, he that pre-
fers a secret corner, for dealing forth his ob- [^9] jections, and
expositions, should be heard with caution and distrust. It is
in a land of slavery alone, where truth shuns the open day. —
Each side has imputed to the other illiberal and selfish motives.
Consider then the particular interests of each ; and bear this in
your minds, that an interest may be either honourable and
praiseworthy, or directly the reverse.
You have been told that the proposed plan was calculated
peculiarly for the rich. In all governments, not merely des-
potic, the wedthy must, in most things, find an advantage,
from the possession of that, which is too much the end and
aim of mankind. In the proposed plan, there is nothing
like a discrimination in their favour. How this amazing ob-
jection is to be supported, I am at a loss to conjecture. Is it
a just cause of reproach, that the constitution effectually se-
cures property ? Or would the objectors introduce a general
scramble ? In eligibility to office, in suffrage, and in every
other civil right, men are all on terms of perfect equality.
And yet, notwithstanding this just equality, each man is to
pay taxes in proportion to his ability, or his expences.
A still more surpassing objection remains to be considered.
"This new constitution, so much bepraised, and admired, will
" commence in a moderate aristocracy. To a corrupt and op-
" pressive one the transition is easy, and inevitable, unless
" some Caesar, or a Cromwell, in their stead, shall make a seiz-
" ure of their liberties. As to the house of representatives,
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 255
" they will either be insignificant spectators of the contest
"between the president and the senate, or their weight will be
"thrown in to one of the scales."
No man, indeed, has exactly used these words ; but they
contain the sum and scope of several recent publications.
In the course of my remarks, I have already said enough
to expose the futility of certain objections, which are ushered
to the world, under the auspices of a pair of honourable names.
Notwithstanding the care and pomposity, with which they are
circulated, it is not worth while to draw invidious comparison.
One gentleman, whose name is thus freely used, I think, calls
the house of representatives a mere [40] shred, or rag of rep-
resentation. Does he consider the distinction between the
objects of a confederate republic, and of a single government?
It is a poor return for that singular respect which the conven-
tion paid to the majesty of the people, in contriving, that con-
gress shall not only be a representation of states, as heretofore,
but also an immediate representation of- the people. Were 5,
10, or even 20,000, the ratio proposed, then peradventure the
honourable objector might clamour about the expence of a
mobbish legislature.
The fact is, that the new government, constructed on the
broad- basis of equality, mutual benefits, and national good,. is
not calculated to secure a single state all her natural advan-
tages at the expence of the natural and acquired advantages
of her respectable brethren of New England.
His real objection against constituting the senate an exec-
utive council arises, I conceive, from the equality of represen-
tation. As to the trite maxim, that the legislative and exec-
utive ought ever to be distinct and separate, I would, in
addition to my foregoing observations on this head, refer him
to Montesquieu's chapter on the English government. I could
wish, the writings of that great man, and of Judge Blackstone,
so often either copied, or cited for conclusive authority, were
better understood. Should a second, or a third convention,
be obtained, the aforesaid honourable gentlemen can never be
fully indulged in their main object of a proportionate repre-
sentation.
256 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.
The examples of a genuine aristocracy are rare. They
were founded in times of profound ignorance, and when the
mass of property was in the hands of a few, whilst the rest
pined in want and wretchedness. One European aristocratic
government, if such it can be called, has grown out of the orig-
inal defective form, the offspring of necessity, and commenced
amidst the horrors of a civil war. Although the people of
that country fought, and intended, to be free, their compact
of government never was complete ; they did not attend to
the principle of rotation, and checks ; and a genuine represen-
tation did never there prevail.
An aristocracy can perhaps subsist with only a moderate
extent of territory and population, But it is a farce to talk
of an aristocracy ; when there are two branches, so dif- [41]
ferently formed ; when the members of each are chosen for a
reasonable term ; and when their reappointment depends on
the good opinion of their countrymen. It is not in nature, that
a man with the least portion of common sense can believe the
people of America will consent to such a deplorable change in
their constitution, as shall confine all power to a few noble
families, or that, without their consent, the change will be
effected, by internal policy, or force.
Whilst mankind shall believe freedom to be better than
slavery ; whilst our lands shall be generally distributed, and
not held by a few insolent barons, on the debasing terms of
vassalage ; whilst we shall teach our children to read and write ;
whilst the liberty of the press, that grand palladium, which
tyrants are compelled to respect, shall remain ; whilst a spark
of public love shall animate even a small part of the people ;
whilst even self-love shall be the general ruling principle ; so
long will it be impossible for an aristocracy to arise from the
proposed plan. — Should Heaven, in its wrath, inflict blindness
on the people of America ; should they reject this fair offer of
permanent safety and happiness ; to predict what species of
government shall at last spring from disorder, is beyond the
short reach of poHtical foresight.
Believe me, my fellow citizens, that no overweening self
conceit, no vain ambition, no restless meddling spirit, has pro-
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 257
duced this address. Long had I waited to see this vast ques-
tion treated, as it deserves ; and the publication disseminated
in my native state. Many judicious observations had appeared
in newspapers and handbills. But no publication, that I have
seen, has gone fully into the merits, considered the objections,
and explained that, which is doubtful and obscure. On this
account I, at length, made the attempt. That my performance
is equal to my wishes, I can by no means believe. I have,
however, a consolation in reflecting, that it will be difficult for
any man to demonstrate, that, in this business, I have a partic-
ular interest. In many of my remarks, I have been anticipated
by writings, which I have seen ; and I have collected ma- [42]
terials, wherever I could find them. Could I be convinced,
that I have said nothing, which had not before been said or
thought by thousands, the reflection would yield far less mor-
tification than pleasure.
ARISTIDES.
Annapolis, January ist, 1788.
Letter on the Federal Constitution, October i6, 1787,
By Edmund Randolph [Richmond: Printed by Augustin
Davis, 1787.]
16 mo. pp. 16.
Edmund Randolph was a member of the Annapolis, Phila-
delphia, and Virginia Conventions, in all of which he took a
prominent though equivocal position. His letter on the Con-
stitution was widely circulated in the newspapers, and was
printed in pamphlet form as above, a copy of which is in the
Library of Congress, but cannot be found, so I am compelled
to give the title from Sabin's Dictionary of Books relating to
America.
" I do not know what impression the letter may make.in
Virginia. It is generally understood here that the arguments
contained in it in favor of the Constitution are much stronger
than the objections which prevent his assent. His arguments
are forcible in all places, and with all persons. His objections
are connected with his particular way of thinking on the sub-
ject, in which many of the adversaries to the Constitution do
not concur." Madison to Washington, Jan. 25, 1788.
P. L. F.
Richmond, Oct. lo, 1787.
The Honorable the Speaker of the House of
Delegates :
Sir, —
The constitution which I enclosed to the general assembly
in a late official letter, appears without my signature. This
circumstance, although trivial in its own nature, has been ren-
dered rather important to myself at least by being misunder-
stood by some, and misrepresented by others. — As I disdain
to conceal the reasons for withholding my subscription, I have
always been, still am, and ever shall be, ready to proclaim
them to the world. To the legislature, therefore, by whom I
was deputed to the federal convention, I beg leave now to ad-
dress them ; affecting no indifference to public opinion, but
resolved not to court it by an unmanly sacrifice of my own
judgment.
As this explanation will involve a summary, but general
review of our federal situation, you will pardon me, I trust,
although I should transgress the usual bounds of a letter.
Before my departure for the convention, I believed, that
the confederation was not so eminently defective, as it had
been supposed. But after I had entered into a free communi-
cation with those who were best informed of the condition
and interest of each State ; after I had compared the intelli-
gence derived from them with the properties which ought to
characterize the government of our union, I became persuaded,
that the confederation was destitute of every energy, which
a constitution of the United States ought to possess.
For the objects proposed by its institution were, that it
should be a shield against foreign hostility, and a firm resort
against domestic commotion ; that it should cherish trade, and
promote the prosperity of the States under its care.
But these are not among the attributes of our present
262 LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH.
union. Severe experience under the pressure of war — a ruin-
ous weakness manifested since the return of peace ; and the
contemplation of those dangers, which darken the future pros-
pect, have condemned the hope of grandeur and of safety
under the auspices of the confederation. ^
In the exigencies of war, indeed, the history of its effects
is but short ; the final ratification having been delayed until
the year 1781. But however short, this period is distinguished
by melancholy testimonies of its inability to maintain in har-
mony, the social intercourse of the States, to defend congress
against encroachments on their rights, and to obtain by requis-
itions, supplies to the federal treasury, or recruits to the federal
armies. I shall not attempt an enumeration of the particular
instances ; but leave to your own remembrance and the records
•of congress the support of the assertions.
In the season of peace too, not many years have elapsed ;
and yet each of them has produced fatal examples of delin-
quency, and sometimes of pointed opposition to federal duties.
To the various remonstrances of congress, I appeal, for a
gloomy, but unexaggerated narrative of the injuries which our
faith, honor and happiness, have sustained by the failure of
the States.
But these evils are past ; and some may be led by an
honest zeal to conclude that they cannot be repeated. Yes,
sir, they will be repeated as long as the confederation exists,
and will bring with them other mischiefs springing from the
same source, which cannot yet be foreseen in their full array
^of terror.
If we examine the constitution and laws of the several
States, it is immediately discovered that the law of nations is
unprovided with sanctions in many cases, which deeply affect
public dignity and public justice. The letter however of the
confederation does not permit congress to remedy these
defects, and such an authority, although evidently deducible
from its spirit, cannot without violation of the second article, -
be assumed. Is it not a political phenomenon, that the head
of the confederacy should be doomed to be plunged into war,
from its wretched impotency to check offences against this
LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 263
law ; and sentenced to witness in unavailing anguish the in-
fraction of their engagements to foreign sovereigns ?
And yet this is not the only grevious point of weakness.
After a war shall be inevitable, the requisitions of congress for
quotas of men or money, will again prove unproductive and
fallacious. , Two causes will always conspire to this baneful
consequence.
I. No government can be stable, which hangs on human j a
inclination alone, unbiassed by the coercion ; and 2, from the ■'
very connection between States bound to proportionate con-
tributions, jealousies and suspicions naturally arise, which at
least chill the ardor, if they do not excite the murmurs of the
whole. I do not forget indeed, that by one sudden impulse
our part of the American continent has been thrown into a
military posture, and that in the earlier annals of the war, our
armies marched to the field on the mere recommendations of
congress. But ought we to argue from a contest, thus signal-
ized by the magnitude of its stake, that as often as a flame
shall be hereafter kindled, the same enthusiasm will fill our
legions, or renew them, as they may be filled by losses ?
If not, where shall we find protection ? Impressions, like
those, which prevent a compliance with requisitions of regular
forces, will deprive the American republic of the services of
militia. But let us suppose that they are attainable, and ac-
knowledge as I always shall, that they are the natural support
of a free government. When it is remembered, that in
their absence agriculture must languish ; that they are not
habituated to military exposures and the rigour of military
discipline, and that the necessity of holding in readiness suc-
cessive detachments, carries the expense far beyond that of
enlistments — This resource ought to be adopted with caution.
As strongly too, am I persuaded, that the requisitions for '
money will not be more cordially received. For besides the
distrust, which would prevail with respect to them also ; be-
sides the opinion, entertained by each state of its own liberal-
ity and unsatisfied demands against the United States; there
is another consideration not less worth of attention — the first
rule for determining each quota of the value of all lands
264 LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH.
granted or surveyed, and of the buildings and improvements
thereon. It is no longer doubted that an equitable, uniform
mode of estimating that value is impracticable ; and therefore
twelve States have substituted the number of inhabitants
under certain limitations, as the standard according to which
money is to be furnished. But under the subsisting articles of
the union, the assent of the thirteenth State is necessary, and
has not yet been given. This does of itself lessen the hope of
procuring a revenue for federal uses ; and the miscarriage of
the impost almost rivets our despondency.
Amidst these disappointments, it would afford some con-
solation, if when rebellion shall threaten any State, an ultimate
asylum could be found under the wing of congress. But it is
at least equivocal whether they can intrude forces into a State,
rent asunder by civil discord, even with the purest solicitude
for our federal welfare, and on the most urgent entreaties of
the State itself. Nay the very allowance of this power would
be pageantry alone, from the want of money and men.
' To these defect of congressional power, the history of man
has subjoined others not less alarming. I earnestly pray
that the recollection of common sufferings, which termi-
nated in common glory, may check the sallies of violence, and
perpetuate mutual friendship between the States. But I can-
not presume, that we are superior to those unsocial passions,
which under like circumstances have infested more ancient
nations. I cannot presume, that through all time, in the
daily mixture of American citizens with each other, in the
conflicts for commercial advantages, in the discontents which
the neighborhood of territory has been seen to engender in
other quarters of the globe, and in the efforts of faction and
intrigue — thirteen distinct communities under no effective
superintending control, (as the United States confessedly now
are, notwithstanding the bold terms of the confederation) will
avoid a hatred to each other deep and deadly.
In the prosecution of this enquiry, we shall find the general
prosperity to decline under a system thus unnerved. No
sooner is the merchant prepared for foreign ports, with the
treasures which this new world kindly offers to his acceptance,
LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 265
than it is aunounced to him, that they are shut against Amer-
ican shipping, or opened under oppressive regulations. He
urges congress to a counter-poHcy, and is answered only by a
condolence on the general misfortune. He is immediately
struck with the conviction, that until exclusion shall be op-
posed to exclusion, and restriction to restriction, the American
flag will be disgraced. For who can conceive, that thirteen
legislatures, viewing commerce under different regulations,
and fancying themselves discharged from every obligation to
concede the smallest of their commercial advantages for the
benefit of the whole, will be wrought into a concert of action
and defiance of every prejudice ? Nor is this all : Let the
great improvements be recounted, which have enriched and
illustrated Europe : Let it be noted, how few those are, which
will be absolutely denied to the United States, comprehending
within their boundaries, , the choicest blessings of climate,
soil and navigable waters ; then let the most sanguine patriot
banish, if he can, the mortifying belief that all these must
sleep, until they shall be roused by the vigor of a national
government.
I have not exemplified the preceding remarks by minute
details ; because they are evidently fortified by truth, and the
consciousness of the United States of America. I shall, there-
fore, no longer deplore the unfitness of the confederation to
secure our peace ; but proceed with a truly unaffected distrust
of my own opinions to examine what order of powers the gov-
ernment of the United States ought to enjoy ? How they
ought to be defended against encroachments ? Whether they
can be interwoven in the confederation, without an alteration
of its very essence, or must be lodged in new hands ? Show-
ing, at the same time, the convulsions which seem to await us,
from a dissolution of the union or partial confederacies.
To mark the kind and degree of authority which ought to
be confided to the government of the United States, is no
more than to reverse the description which I have already
given, of the defects of the confederation.
From thence it will follow, that the operations of peace and
war will be clogged without regular advances of money, and
266 LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH.
that these will be slow indeed, if dependent on supplication
alone. For what better name do requisitions deserve, which
may be evaded or opposed without the fear of coercion ? But
although coercion is an indispensable ingredient, it ought not
to be directed against a State, as a State ; it being impossible
to attempt it except by bldckading the trade of the delinquent,
or carrying war into its bowels. Even if these violent schemes
were eligible, in other respects, both of them might, perhaps,
be defeated by the scantiness of the public chest ; would
be tardy in their complete effect, as the expense of the
land and naval equipments must be first reimbursed ; and
might drive the proscibed State into the desperate resolve of
inviting foreign alliances. Against each of them lie separate
unconquerable objections. A blockade is not equally applica-
ble to all the States, they being differently circumstanced in
commerce and in ports ; nay an excommunication from the
privilege of the union would be vain, because every regulation
or prohibition may be easily eluded under the rights of Amer-
ican citizenship, or of foreign nations. But how shall we speak
of the intrusion of troops ? Shall we arm citizens against citi-
zens, and habituate them to shed kindred blood ? Shall we
risk the inflicting of wounds which will generate a rancour
never to be subdued? Would there be no room to fear, that
an army accustomed to fight for the establishment of authority,
would salute an emperor of their own ? Let us not bring these
things into jeopardy. Let us rather substitute the same pro-
cess by which individuals are compelled to contribute to the
government of their own States. Instead of making requisi-
tions to the legislatures, it would appear more proper that
taxes should be imposed 'by the federal head, under due modi-
fications and guards ; that the collectors should demand from
the citizens their respective quotas, and be supported as in the
collection of ordinary taxes.
It follows, too, that, as the general government will be re-
sponsible to foreign nations, it ought to be able to annul any
offensive measure, or enforce any public right. Perhaps among
the topics on which they may be aggrieved or complain, the
commercial intercourse, and the manner in which contracts
LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 267
are discharged, may constitute the principal articles of
clamor.
It follows, too, that the general government ought to be
the supreme arbiter for adjusting every contention among the
States In all their connections, therefore, with each other,
and particularly in commerce, which will probably create the
greatest discord, it ought to hold the reins.
It follows, too, that the general government ought to pro-
tect each State against domestic as well as external violence.
And lastly, it follows, that through the general government
alone, can we ever assume the rank to which we are entitled
by our resources and situation.
Should the people of America surrender these powers, they
can be paramount to the constitutions and ordinary acts of
legislation, only by being delegated by them. I do not pre-
tend to affirm, but I venture to believe, that if the confedera-
tion had been solemnly questioned in opposition to our con-
stitution, or even to one of our laws, posterior to it, it must
have given away. For never did it obtain a higher ratification,
than a resolution of assembly in the daily form.
This will be one security against encroachment. But an-
other not less effectual is, to exclude the individual States
from any agency in the national government, as far as it may
be safe, and their interposition may not be absolutely neces-
sary.
But now, sir, permit me to declare, that in my humble
judgment, the powers by which alone the blessings of a gen-
eral government can be accomplished, cannot be interwoven
in the confederation, without a change in its very essence,
or, in other words, that the confederation must be thrown
aside. This is almost dernonstrable from the inefficacy of
requisitions, and from the necessity of converting them into
acts of authority. My suffrage, as a citizen, is also for addi-
tional powers. But to whom shall we commit those acts of
authority, these additional powers ? To congress ? When I
formerly lamented the defects in the jurisdiction of congress,
I had no view to indicate any other opinion, than that the
federal head ought not to be so circumscribed. For free
268 LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH.
as I am at all times to profess my reverence for that body,
and the individuals who compose it, I am yet equally
free to make known my aversion to repose such a trust in a
tribunal so constituted. My objections are not the visions of
theory, but the results of my own observations in America,
and of the experience of others abroad, i. The legislative
and executive are concentred in the same persons. This,
where real power exists, must eventuate in tyranny. 2.
The representation of the States bears no proportion to their
importance. This is an unreasonable subjection of the will of
the majority to that of the minority. 2. The mode of election
and the liability of being recalled, may too often render the
delegates rather partizans of their own States than representa-
tives of the union. 4. Cabal and intrigue must consequently
gain an ascendancy in a course of years. 5. A single house of
legislation will sometimes be precipitate, perhaps passionate.
6. As long as seven States are required for the smallest, and
nine for the greatest votes, may not foreign influence at some
future day insinuate itself, so as to interrupt every active ex-
ertion ? 7. To crown the whole, it is scarce within the verge
of possibility, that so numerous an assembly should acquire
that secrecy, dispatch, and vigour, which are the test of excel-
lence in the executive department.
My inference from these facts and principles, is, that the
new powers must be deposited in a new body, growing out of
a consolidation of the union, as far as the circumstances of the
State will allow. Perhaps, however, some may meditate its dis-
solution, and others partial confederacies.
The first is an idea awful indeed, and irreconcilable with a
very early, and hitherto uniform conviction, that without union,
we must be undone. For, before the voice of war was heard,
the pulse of the then colonies was tried, and found to beat
in unison. The unremitted labor of our enemies was to
divide, and the policy of every congress to bind us together.
But in no example was this truth more clearly displayed, than
in the prudence with which independence was unfolded to the
sight, and in the forbearance to declare it, until America
almost unanimously called for it. After we had thus launched
LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 269
into troubles, never before explored, and the hour of heavy-
distress, the remembrance of our social strength not only for-
bade despair, but drew from congress the most illustrious rep-
etition of their settled purpose to depise all terms, short of in-
dependence.
Behold, then, how successful and glorious we have been,
while we acted in fraternal concord. But let us discard the
illusion, that by this success, and this glory, the crest of dan-
ger has irrecoverably fallen. Our governments are yet too
youthful to have acquired stability from habit. Our very
quiet depends upon the duration of the union. Among the
upright and intelligent, few can read without emotion the
future fate of the States, if severed from each other. Then
shall we learn the full weight of foreign intrigue. Then shall
we hear of partitions of our country. If a prince, inflamed by
the lust of conquest, should use one State as the instrument
of enslaving others — if every State is to be wearied by perpet-
ual alarms, and compelled to maintain large military establish-
ments — if all questions are to be decided by an appeal to arms,
where a difference of opinion cannot be removed by negocia-
tion — in a word, if all the direful misfortunes which haunt the
peace of rival nations, are to triumph over the land, for what
have we to contend? why have we exhausted our wealth?
why have we basely betrayed the heroic martyrs of the federal
cause.
But dreadful as the total dissolution of the union is to my
mind, I entertain no less horror at the thought of partial con-
federacies. I have not the least ground for supposing that an
overture of this kind would be listened to by a single
State, and the presumption is, that the politics of the greater
part of the States, flow from the warmest attachment to an
union of the whole. If, however, a lesser confederacy could be
obtained by Virginia, let me conjure my countrymen well to
weigh the probable consequences, before they attempt to form it.
On such an event, the strength of the union would be
divided in two, or perhaps three parts. Has it so increased
since the war as to be divisible — and yet remain sufificient for
our happiness ?
270 LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH.
The utmost limit of any partial confederacy, which Virginia
could expect to form, would comprehend the three southern
States, and her nearest northern neighbour. But they, like
ourselves, are diminished in their real force, by the mixture of
of an unhappy species of population.
Again, may I ask, whether the opulence of the United
States has been augmented since the war? This is answered
in the negative, by a load of debt, and the declension of trade.
At all times must a southern confederacy support ships of
war, and soldiery? As soon would a navy move from the for-
est, and a army from the earth, as such a confederacy, indebted,
impoverished in its commerce, and destitute of men, could, for
some years at least, provide an ample defence for itself.
Let it not be forgotten, that nations which can enforce
their rights, have large claims against the United States, and
that the creditor may insist on payment from any of them.
Which of them would probably be the victim ? The most
productive and the most exposed . When vexed by reprisals
of war, the southern States will sue for alliance on this contin-
ent or beyond sea. If for the former, the necessity of an union
of the whole is decided ; if for the latter, America will, I fear,
re-act the scenes of confusion and bloodshed, exhibited among
most of those nations, which have, too late, repented the
folly of relying on auxiliaries.
Two or more confederacies cannot but be competitors for
power. The ancient friendship between the citizens of Amer-
ica, being thus cut off, bitterness and hostility will succeed in
its place ; in order to prepare against surrounding danger, we
shall be compelled to vest some where or other, power ap-
proaching near to military government.
The annals of the world have abounded so much with
instances of a divided people being a prey to foreign influence,
that I shall not restrain my apprehensions of it, should our
union be torn asunder. The opportunity of insinuating it, will
be multiplied in proportion to the parts into which we may be
broken.
In short, sir, I am fatigued with summoning up to my im-
agination the miseries which will harass the United States, if
LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 2/1
torn from each other, and which will not end until they are
superseded by fresh mischiefs under the yoke of a tyrant.
I come, therefore, to the last, and perhaps only refuge in
our difficulties, a consolidation of the union, as far as circum-
stances will permit. To fulfil this desirable object, the consti-
tution was framed by the federal convention. A quorum of
eleven States, and the only member from a twelfth have sub-
scribed it ; Mr. Mason, of Virginia, Mr. Gerry, of Massachu-
setts, and myself having refused to subscribe.
Why I refused, will, I hope, be solved to the satisfaction
of those who know me, by saying, that a sense of duty com-
manded me thus to act. It commanded me, sir, for believe
me, that no event of my life ever occupied more of my reflec-
tion. To subscribe, seemed to offer no inconsiderable gratifi-
cation, since it would have presented me to the world as a fel-
low laborer with the learned and zealous statesmen of America.
But it was far more interesting to my feelings, that I
was about to differ from three of my colleagues, one of whom
is, to the honor of the country which he has saved, embosomed
in their affections, and can receive no praise from the highest
lustre of language ; the other two of whom have been long
enrolled among the wisest and best lovets of the common-
wealth ; and the unshaken and intimate friendship of all of
whom I have ever prized, and still do prize, as among the
happiest of all acquisitions. — I was no stranger to the reigning
partiality for the members who composed the convention, and
had not the smallest doubt, that from this cause, and from the
ardor of a reform of government, the first applauses at least
would be loud and profuse. I suspected, too, that there was
something in the human breast which for a time would be apt
to construe a temperateness in politics, into an enmity to the
union. Nay, I plainly foresaw, that in the dissensions of par-
ties, a middle line would probaby be [interpreted into a want
of enterprise and decision. — But these considerations, how
seducing soever, were feeble opponents to the suggestions of
my conscience. I was sent to exercise my judgment,, and to
exercise it was my fixed determination ; being instructed by
even an imperfect acquaintance with mankind, that self appro-
272 LETTER. BY EDMUND RANDOLPH.
bation is the only true reward which a political career can be-
stow, and that popularity would have been but another name
for perfidy, if to secure it, I had given up the freedom of
thinking for myself.
It would have been a peculiar pleasure to me to have as-
certained before I left Virginia, the temper and genius of my
fellow citizens, considered relatively to a government, so sub-
stantially differing from the confederation as that which is
now submitted. But this was, for many obvious reasons, im-
possible ; and I was thereby deprived of what I thought the
necessary guides.
I saw, however, that the confederation was tottering
from its own weakness, and that the sitting of a convention
was a signal of its total insufficiency. I was therefore ready
to assent to a scheme of government, which was proposed, and
which went beyond the limits of the confederation, believing,
that without being too extensive it would have preserved our
tranquility, until that temper and that genius should be col-
lected.
But when the plan which is now before the general assem-
bly, was on its passage through the convention, I .moved, that
the State conventions should be at liberty to amend, and that
a second general convention should be holden, to discuss the
amendments, which should be suggested by them. This mo-
tion was in some measure justified by the manner in which the
confederation was forwarded originally, by congress to the
State legislatures, in many of which amendments were pro-
posed, and those amendments were afterwards examined in
congress. Such a motion was doubly expedient here, as the
delegation of so much power was sought for. But it was neg-
atived. I then expressed my unwillingness to sign. My rea-
sons were the following :
I. It is said in the resolutions which accompany the con-
stitution, that it is to be submitted to a convention of dele-
gates chosen is each State by the people thereof, for their
assent and ratification. The meaning of these terms is allowed
universally to be, that the convention must either adopt the
constitution in the whole, or reject it in the whole, and is pos-
LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 273
itively forbidden to amend. If therefore, I had signed, I
should have felt myself bound to be silent as to amendments,
and to endeavor to support the constitution without the cor-
rection of a letter. With this consequence before my eyes,
and with a determination to attempt an amendment, I was
taught by a regard for consistency not to sign.
2. My opinion always was, and still is, that every citi-
zen of America, let the crisis be what it may, ought to have a
full opportunity to propose, through his representatives, any
amendment which in his apprehension, tends to the public wel-
fare. By signing, I should have contradicted this sentiment.
3. A constitution ought to have the hearts of the people on'
its side. But if at a future day it should be burdensome after
having been adopted in the whole, and they should insinuate
that it was in some measure forced upon them, by being con-
fined to the single alternative of taking or rejecting it alto-
gether, under my impressions, and with my opinions, I should
not be able to justify myself had I signed.
4. I was always satisfied, as I have now experienced, that
this great subject would be placed in new lights and attitudes
by the criticism of the world, and that no man can assure hini-
self how a constitution will work for a course of years, until at
least he shall have heard the observations of the people at
large. I also fear more from inaccuracies in a constitution,
than from gross errors in any other composition ; because our
dearest interests are to be regulated by it ; and power, if loosely
given, especially where it will be interpreted with great
latitude, may bring sorrow in its execution. Had I signed
with these ideas, I should have virtually shut my ears against
the information which I ardently desired.
5. I was afraid that if the constitution was to be submitted
to the people, to be wholly adopted or wholly rejected by
them, they would not only reject it, but bid a lasting farewell
to the union. This formidable event I wished to avert, by
keeping myself free topropose amendments, and thus, if possi-
ble, to remove the obstacles to an effectual government. But
it will be asked, whether all these arguments, were not be well
weighed in convention. They were, sir, with great candor.
274 LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH.
Nay, when I called to mine the respectability of those, with
whom I was associated, I almost lost confidence in these
principles. On other occasions, I should cheerfully have
yielded to a majority ; on this the fate of thousands yet un-
born, enjoined me not to yield until I was convinced.
Again, may I be asked, why the mode pointed out in
the constitution for its amendment, may not be a sufficient
security against its imperfections, without now arresting it in
its progress? My answers are — i. That it is better to amend,
while we have the constitution in our power, while the pas-
sions of designing men are not yet enlisted, and while a bare
majority of the States may amend than to wait for the uncer-
tain assent of three fourths of the States. 2. That a bad feat-
ure in government, becomes more and more fixed every day.
3. That frequent changes of a constitution, even if practicable,
ought not to be wished, but avoided as much as possible. And
4. That in the present case, it may be questionable, whether,
after the particular advantages of its operation shall be dis-
cerned, three fourths of the States can be induced to amend.
I confess, that it is no easy task, to devise a scheme which
shall be suitable to the views of all. Many expedients have
occurred to me, but none -of them appear less exceptionable
than this ; that if our convention should choose to amend,
another federal convention be recommended : that in that
federal convention the amendments proposed by this or any
other State be discussed ; and if incorporated in the constitu-
tion or rejected, or if a proper number of the other States
should be unwilling to accede to a second convention, the con-
stitution be again laid before the same State conventions, which
shall again assemble on the summons of the executives, and it
shall be either wholly adopted, or wholly rejected, without a
further power of amendment. I count such a delay as nothing
in comparison with so grand an object ; especially too as the
privilege of amending must terminate after the use of it once.
I should now conclude this letter, which is already too
long, were it not incumbent on me, from having contended
for ainendments, to set forth the particulars, which I conceive
to require correction. I undertake this with reluctance : because
LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 275
it is remote from my intentions to catch the prejudices or pre-
possessions of any man But as I mean only to manifest that I
have not been actuated by caprice, and now to explain every
objection at full length would be an immense labour, I shall
content myself with enumerating certain heads, in which the
constitution is most repugnant to my wishes.
The two first points are the equality of suffrage in the senate,
and the submission of commerce to a mere majority in the
legislature, with no other check than the revision of the presi-
dent. I conjecture that neither of these things can be corrected;
and particularly the former, without which we must have risen
perhaps in disorder.
But I am sanguine in hoping that in every other justly
obnoxious cause, Virginia will be seconded by a majority of
the States. I hope that she will be seconded, i. In causing
all ambiguities of expression to be precisely explained. 2. Tn
rendering the president ineligible after a given number of
years. 3. In taking from him the power of nominating to the
judiciary offices, or of filling up vacancies which may there
happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commis-
sions which shall expire at the end of their next sessions. 4.
In taking from him the power of pardoning for treason at least
before conviction. 5. In drawing a line between the powers
of congress and individual States; and in defining the former,
so as to leave no clashing of jurisdictions nor dangerous dis-
putes ; and to prevent the one from being swallowed up by
the other, under cover of general words, and implication. 6.
In abridging the power of the senate to make treaties supreme
laws of the land. 7. In incapacitating the congress to deter-
mine their own salaries. And 8. In limiting and defining the
judicial power.
The proper remedy must be consigned to the wis-
dom of the convention ; and the final step which Virginia
shall pursue, if her overtures shall be discarded, must also rest
with them.
You will excuse me, sir, for having been thus tedious. My
feelings and duty demanded this exposition ; for through no
other channel could I rescue my omission to sign from mis-
2/6 LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH.
representation, and no more effectual way could I exhibit to
the general assembly an unreserved history of my conduct.
I have the honor, sir, to be with great respect, your most
obedient servant,
EDMUND RANDOLPH.
Observation / leading to a fair examination / of the /
system of government, / proposed by the late / Con-
vention; / and to several essential and neces- / sary alter-
ations in it. / In a number of / Letters / from the /
Federal Farmer to the Republican. [New York:] Printed
[by Thomas Greenleaf ] in the year M,dcc,lxxxvii.
8vo. pp. 40.
Written by Richard IlaiTy . Lee, who was appointed a
member of the Philadelphia Convention, but declined to serve.
He was one of the foremost in opposition to the Constitution,
both in the Continental Congress and before the people, and
was the subject of numerous attacks in the press.
The " Letters of the Federal Farmer " was one of the
most popular of arguments against the new government, "four
editions (and several thousands) of the pamphlet. . .being in a
few months printed and sold in the several states," which
induced Lee to write "an additional number of Letters," but
it is largely repetitions of the first, and I have therefore
omitted its republication. A short review will be found in the
American Magazine for May, 1788, and an elaborate reply by
Timothy Pickering in Pickering's Life of Pickering, II, 352.
P. L. F.
Dear Sir,
LETTER I.
October 8th, 1787.
TV/TY letters to you last winter, on the subject of a well bal-
anced national government for the United States, were
the result of a free enquiry ; when I passed from that subject
to enquiries relative to our commerce, revenues, past adminis-
tration, &c. I anticipated the anxieties I feel, on carefully
examining the plan of government proposed by the conven-
tion. It appears to be a plan retaining some federal features ;
but to be the first important step, and to aim strongly at one
consolidated government of the United States. It leaves the
powers of government, and the representation of the people,
so unnaturally divided between the general and state govern-
ments, that the operations of our system must be very uncer-
tain. My uniform federal attachments, and the interest I have
in the protection of property, and a steady execution of the
laws, will convince you, that, if I am under any bias at all, it is
in favor of any general system which shall promise those ad-
vantages. The instability of our laws increases my wishes for
firm and steady government ; but then, I can consent to no
government, which, in my opinion, is not calculated equally to
preserve the rights of all orders of men in the community.
My object has been to join with those who have endeavoured
to supply the defects in the forms of our governments by a
steady and proper administration of them. Though I have
long apprehended that fraudalent debtors, and embarrassed
men, on the one hand, and men, on the other, unfriendly to
republican equality, would produce an uneasiness among the
people, and prepare the way, not for cool and deliberate reforms
in the governments, but for changes calculated to promote the
interests of particular orders of men. Acquit me, sir, of any
agency in the formation of the new system ; I shall be satisfied
280 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
with seeing, if it shall be adopted with a prudent administra-
tion. Indeed I am so much convinced of the truth of Pope s
maxim, that " That which is best [4] administered is best,"
that I am much inclined to subscribe to it from experience. I
am not disposed to unreasonably contend about forms. I
know our situation is critical, and it behoves us to make the
best of it. A federal government of some sort is necessary.
We have suffered the present to languish ; and whether the
confederation was capable or not originally of answering any
valuable purposes, it is now but of little importance. I will
pass by the men, and states, who have been particularly instru-
mental in preparing the way for a change, and perhaps, for
governments not very favourable to the people at large. A
constitution is now presented which we may reject, or which
we may accept with or without amendments, and to which
point we ought to direct our exertions is the question. To
determine this question with propriety; we must attentively
examine the system itself, and the probable consequences of
either step. This I shall endeavour to do, so far as I am able,
with candor and fairness ; and leave you to decide upon the
propriety of my opinions, the weight of my reasons, and how
far my conclusions are well drawn. Whatever may be the
conduct of others, on the present occasion, 1 do not mean
hastily and positively to decide on the merits of the constitu-
tion proposed. I shall be open to conviction and always dis-
posed to adopt that which, all things considered, shall appear
to me to be most for the happiness of the community. It
must be granted, that if men hastily and blindly adopt a sys-
tem of government,'they will as hastily and as blindly be led to
alter or abolish it ; and changes must ensue, one after another,
till the peaceable and better part of the community will grow
weary with changes, tumults and disorders, and be disposed to
accept any government however despotic, that shall promise
stability and firmness.
The first principal question that occurs, is. Whether, con-
sidering our situation, we ought to precipitate the adoption of
the proposed constitution ? If we remain cooi and temperate,
we are in no immediate danger of any commotions ; we are in
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H.LEE. 28 1
a state of perfect peace, and in no danger of invasions ; the
state governments are in the full exercise of their powers ; and
our governments answer all present exigencies, except the reg-
ulation of trade, securing credit, in some cases, and providing
for the interest, in some instances, of the public debts ; and
whether we adopt a. change three or nine months hence, can
make but little odds with the privatecircumstances of individ-
uals ; their happiness and prosperity, after all, depend princip-
ally upon their own exertions. We are hardly recovered from
a long and distressing war : The farmers, fishmen, &c. have not
fully repaired the waste made by it. Industry [5] and frugal-
ity are again assuming their proper station. Private debts are
lessened, and public debts incurred by the war have been, by
various ways, diminished ; and the public lands have now be-
come a productive source for diminishing them much more. I
know uneasy men, who with very much to precipitate, do not
admit all these facts ; but they are facts well known to all men
who are thoroughly informed in the affairs of this country. It
must, however, be admitted, that our federal system is defec-
tive, and that some of the state governments are not well ad-
ministered ; but, then, we impute to the defects in our govern-
ments many evils and embarrassments which are most clearly
the result of the late war. We must allow men to conduct on
the present occasion, as on all similar one's. They will urge a
thousand pretences to answer their purposes on both sides.
When we want a man to change his condition, we describe it
as wretched, miserable, and despised ; and draw a pleasing pic-
ture of that which we would have him assume. And when we
wish the contrary, we reverse our descriptions. Whenever a
clamor is raised, and idle men get to work, it is highly neces-
sary to examine facts carefully, and without unreasonably sus-
pecting men of falshood, to examine, and enquire attentively,
under what impressions they act. It is too often the case in
political concerns that men state facts not as they are, but as
they wish them to be ; and almost every man, by calling to
mind past scenes, will find this to be true.
Nothing but the passions of ambitious, impatient, or dis-
orderly men, I conceive, will plunge us into commotions, if
282 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE»
time should be taken fully to examine and consider the sys-
tem proposed. Men who feel easy in their circumstances, and
such as are not sanguine in their expectations relative to the
consequences of the proposed change, will remain quiet under
the existing governments. Many commercial and monied
men, who are uneasy, not without just cause, ought to be re-
spected ; and by no means, unreasonably disappointed in their
expectations and hopes ; but as to those who expect employ-
ments under the new constitution ; as to those weak and
ardent men who always expect to be gainers by revolutions,
and whose lot it generally is to get out of one difficulty into
another, they are very little to be regarded ; and as to those
who designedly avail themselves of this weakness and ardor,
they are to be despised. It is natural for men, who wish to
hasten the adoption of a measure, to tell us, now is the crisis
— now is the critical moment which must be seized or all will
be lost ; and to shut the door against free enquiry, whenever
conscious the thing presented has defects in it, which time and
investigation will probably discover. This has been the cus-
tom of tyrants, [6] and their dependants in all ages. If it is
true, what has been so often said, that the people of this
country cannot change their condition for the worse, I pre-
sume it still behoves them to endeavour deliberately to change
it for the better. The fickle and ardent, in any community are
the proper tools for establishing despotic government. But it
is deliberate and thinking men, who must establish and se-
cure governments on free principles. Before they decide on
the plan proposed, they will enquire whether it will probably
be a blessing or a curse to this people.
The present moment discovers a new face in our affairs.
Our object has been all along, to reform our federal system,,
and to strengthen our governments — to establish peace, order
and justice in the community — but a new object now presents.
The plan of government now proposed is evidently calculated
totally to change, in time, our condition as a people. Instead
of being thirteen republics, under a federal head, it is clearly
designed to make us one consolidated government. Of this, I
think, I shall fully convince you, in my following letters on
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 283
this subject. This consolidation of the states has been the ob-
ject of several men in this country for some time past. Whether
such a change can ever be effected, in any manner ; whether
it can be effected without convulsions and civil wars ; whether
such a change will not totally destroy the liberties of this
country — time only can determine.
To have a just idea of the government before us, and to
shew that a consolidated one is the object in view, it is neces-
sary not only to examine the plan, but also its history, and
the politics of its particular friends.
The confederation was formed when great confidence was
placed in the voluntary exertions of individuals, and of the
respective states ; and the framers of it, to guard against usurp-
ation, so limited, and checked the powers, that, in many re-
spects, they are inadequate to the exigencies of the union.
We find, therefore, members of congress urging alterations in
the federal system almost as soon as it was adopted. It was
early proposed to vest congress with powers to levy an im-
post, to regulate trade, &c. but such was known to be the cau-
tion of the states in parting with power, that the vestment
even of these, was proposed to be under several checks and
limitations. During the war, the general confusion, and the
introduction of paper money, infused in the minds of people
vague ideas respecting government and credit. We expected
too much from the return of peace, and of course we have
been disappointed. Our governments have been new and un-
settled ; and several legislatures, by making tender, suspension,
and paper money laws, [7] have given just cause of uneasiness
to creditors. By these and other causes, several orders of men
in the community have been prepared, by degrees, for a change
of government ; and this very abuse of power in the legisla-
tures, which in some cases has been charged upon the demo-
cratic part of the community, has furnished aristocratical
men with those very weapons, and those very means, with
which, in great measure, they are rapidly effecting their
favourite object. And should an oppressive government
be the consequence of the proposed change, prosperity
may reproach not only a few overbearing, unprincipled
284 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
men, but those parties in the states which have misused their
powers.
The conduct of several legislatures, touching paper money,
and tender laws, has prepared many honest men for changes in
government, which otherwise they would not have thought of
— when by the evils, on the one hand, and by the secret insti-
gations of artful men, on the other, the minds of men were be-
come sufificiently uneasy, a bold step was taken, which is
usually followed by a revolution, or a civil war. A general
convention for mere commercial purposes was moved for — the
authors of this measure saw that the people's attention was
turned solely to the amendment of the federal system ; and
that, had the idea of a total change been started, probably no
state would have appointed members to the convention. The
idea of destroying ultimately, the state government, and form-
ing one consolidated system, could not have been admitted
a convention, therefore, merely for vesting in congress
power to regulate trade was proposed. This was pleasing to
the commercial towns ; and the landed people had little or no
concern about it. September, 1786, a few men from the mid-
dle states met at Annapolis, and hastily proposed a convention
to be held in May, 1787, for the purpose, generally, of amend-
ing the confederation this was done before the delegates
of Massachusetts, and of the other states arrived still not
a word was said about destroying the old constitution, and
making a new one — The states still unsuspecting, and not
aware that they were passing the Rubicon, appointed mem-
bers to the new convention, for the sole and express purpose
of revising and amending the confederation and, probably,
not one man in ten thousand in the United States, till within
these ten or twelve days, had an idea that the old ship was to
be destroyed, and he put to the alternative of embarking in the
new ship presented, or of being left in danger of sinking — The
States, I believe, universally supposed the convention would
report alterations in the confederation, which would pass an
examination in congress, and after being agreed to there,
would be confirmed by all the legislatures, [8] or be rejected,
Virginia made a very respectable appointment, and placed at
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 28$
the head of it the first man in America. In this appointment
there was a mixture of political characters ; but Pennsylvania
appointed principally those men who are esteemed aristocrat-
ical. Here the favourite moment for changing the government
was evidently discerned by a few men, who seized it with ad-
dress. Ten other states appointed, and tho' they chose men
principally connected with commerce and the judicial depart-
ment yet they appointed many good republican characters —
had they all attended we should now see, I am persuaded, a
better system presented. The non-attendance of eight or
nine men, who were appointed members of the convention, I
shall ever consider as a very unfortunate event to the United
States. Had they attended, I am pretty clear that the re-
sult of the convention would not have had that strong ten-
dency to aristocracy now discernable in every part of the plan.
There would not have been so great an accumulation of pow-
ers, especially as to the internal police of this country in a
few hands as the constitution reported proposes to vest in
them — the young visionary men, and the consolidating aris-
tocracy, would have been more restrained than they have
been. Eleven states met in the convention, and after four
months close attention presented the new constitution, to be
adopted or rejected by the people. The uneasy and fickle
part of the community may be prepa.red to receive any form
of government ; but I presume the enlightened and substantial
part will give any constitution presented for their adoption a
candid and thorough examination ; and silence those designing
or empty men, who weakly and rashly attempt to precipitate
the adoption of a system of so much importance — We shall
view the convention with proper respect and, at the same
time, that we reflect there were men of abilities and integrity
in it, we must recollect how disproportionately the democratic
and aristocratic parts of the community were represented
Perhaps the judicious friends and opposers of the new consti-
tution will agree, that it is best to let it rely solely on its own
merits, or be condemed for its own defects.
In the first place, I shall premise, that the plan proposed is
a plan of accommodation — and that it is in this way only, and
286 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
by giving up apart of our opinions, that we can ever expect to
obtain a government founded in freedom and compact. This
circumstance candid men will always keep in view, in the dis-
cussion of this subject.
The plan proposed appears to be partly federal, but prin-
cipally however, calculated ultimately to make the states one
consolidated government.
The first interesting question, therefore suggested, is, how
[9] far the states can be consolidated into one entire govern-
ment on free principles. In considering this question exten-
sive objects are to be taken into view, and important changes
in the forms of government to be carefully attended to in all
their consequences, The happiness of the people at large
must be the great object with every honest statesman, and he
will direct every movement to this point. If we are so situated
as a people, as not to be able to enjoy equal happiness and
advantages under one government, the consolidation of the
states cannot be admitted.
There are three different forms of free government under
which the United States may exist as one nation ; and now is,
perhaps, the time to determine to which we will direct our
views. I. Distinct republics connected under a federal head.
In this case the respective state governments must be the
principal guardians of the peoples rights, and exclusively
r:gulate their internal police; in them must rest the balance
of government. The congress of the states, or federal head,
must consist of delegates amenable to, and removable by the
respective states : This congress must have general directing
powers ; powers to require men and monies of the states ; to
make treaties ; peace and war ; to direct the operations of
armies, &c. Under this federal modification of government,
the powers of congress would be rather advisary or recom-
mendatory than coercive. 2. We may do away the federal
state governments, and form or consolidate all the states into
one entire government, with one executive, one judiciary, and
one legislature, consisting of senators and representatives col-
lected from all parts of the union : In this case there would
be a compleat consolidation of the states. 3. We may con-
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER, BY R. H. LEE. 287
soldate the states as to certain national objects, and leave them
severally distinct independent republics, as to internal police
generally. Let the general government consist of an execu-
tive, a judiciary, and balanced legislature, and its powers ex-
tend exclusively to all foreign concerns, causes arising on the
seas to commerce, imports, armies, navies, Indian affairs, peace
and war, and to a few internal concerns of the community; to
the coin, post-ofRces, weights and measures, a general plan for
the militia, to naturalization, and, perhaps to bankruptcies, leav-
ing the internal police of the community, in other respects,
exclusively to the state governments ; as the administration
of justice in all causes arising internally, the laying and col-
lecting of internal taxes, and the forming of the militia accord-
ing to a general plan prescribed. In this case there would be
a compleat consolidation, quoad certain objects only.
Touching the first, or federal plan, I do not think much
can be said in its favor : The sovereignity of the nation,
without [10] coercive and efficient powers to collect the strength
of it, cannot always be depended on to answer the purposes of
government ; and in a congress of representatives of foreign
states, there must necessarily be an unreasonable mixture of
powers in the same hands.
As to the second, or compleat consolidating plan, it de-
serves to be carefully considered at this time by every Ameri-
can : If it be impracticable, it is a fatal error to model our
governments, directing our views ultimately to it.
The third plan, or partial consolidation, is, in my opinion,
the only one that can secure the freedom and happiness of this
people. I once had some general ideas that the second plan
was practicable, but from long attention, and the proceedings
of the convention, I am fully satisfied, that this third plan is
the only one we can with safety and propriety proceed upon.
Making this the - standard to point out, with candor and fair-
ness, the parts of the new constitution which appear to be im-
proper, is my object. The convention appears to have pro-
posed the partial consolidation evidently with a view to collect
all powers ultimately, in the United States into one entire
government ; and from its views in this respect, and from the
288 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
tenacity of the small states to have an equal vote in the sen-
ate, probably originated the greatest defects in the proposed
plan.
Independent of the opinions of many great authors, that
a free elective government cannot be extended over large ter-
ritories, a few reflections must evince, that one government
and general legislation alone never can extend equal benefits
to all parts of the United States: Different laws, customs,
and opinions exist in the different states, which by a uniform
system of laws would be unreasonably invaded. The United
States contain about a million of square miles, and in half a
century will, probably, contain ten millions of people ; and
from the center to the extremes is about 800 miles.
Before we do away the state governments or adopt meas-
ures that will tend to abolish them, and to consolidate the
states into one entire government several principles should be
considered and facts ascertained : These, and my examina-
tion into the essential parts of the proposed plan, I shall pur-
sue in my next.
Your's, &c.
THE FEDERAL FARMER.
[II] LETTER IL
October 9, 1787.
Dear Sir,
The essential parts of a free and good government are a
full and equal representation of the people in the legislature,
and the jury trial of the vicinage in the administration of
justice — a full and equal representation, is that which pos-
sesses the same interests, feelings, opinions, and views the peo-
ple themselves would were they all assembled — a fair represen-
tation, therefore, should be so regulated, that every order of
men in the community, according to the common course of
elections, can have a share in it — in order to allow professional
men, merchants, traders, farmers, mechanics, &c. to bring a
just proportion of their best informed men respectively into
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 289
the legislature, the representation must be considerably num-
erous — We have about 200 state senators in the United States.
and a less number than that of federal representatives cannot,,
clearly, be a full representation of this people, in the affairs of
internal taxation and police, were there but one legislature for
the whole union. The representation cannot be equal, or the
situation of the people proper for one government only — if
the extreme parts of the society cannot be represented as fully
as the central — It is apparently impracticable that this should
be the case in this extensive country it would be impossi-
ble to collect a representation of the parts of the country five,
six, and seven hundred miles from the seat of government.
Under one general government alone, there could be but
one judiciary, one supreme and a proper number of inferior
courts. I think it would be totally impracticable in this case
to preserve a due administration of justice, and the real bene-
fits of the jury trial of the vicinage there are now supreme
courts in each state in the union, and a great number of county
and other courts subordinate to each supreme court most
of these supreme and inferior courts are itinerant, and hold
their sessions in different parts every year of their respective
states, counties and districts — with all these moving courts,
our citizens, from the vast extent of the country, must travel
very considerable distances from home to find the place where
justice is administered. I am not for bringing justice so near
to individuals as to afford them any temptation to engage in
law suits ; though I think it one of the greatest benefits in a
good government, that each citizen should find a court of jus-
tice within a reasonable distance, perhaps, within a day's travel
of his [12] home; so that, without great inconveniences and
enormous expense, he may have the advantages of his wit-
nesses and jury — it would be impracticable to derive these ad-
vantages from one judiciary the one supreme court at most
could only set in the centre of the union, and move once a
year into the centre of the eastern and southern extremes of
it — and, in this case, each citizen, on an average, would travel
150 or 200 miles to find this court that, however, inferior
courts might be properly placed in the different counties, and
290 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
districts of the union, the appellate jurisdiction would be in-
tolerable and expensive.
If it were possible to consolidate the states, and preserve
the features of a free government, still it is evident that the
middle states, the parts of the union, about the seat of govern-
ment, would enjoy great advantages, while the remote states
would experience the many inconveniences of remote prov-
inces. Wealth, ofifices, and the benefits of government would
collect in the centre : and the extreme states ; and their prin-
cipal towns, become much less important.
There are other considerations which tend to prove that
the idea of one consolidated whole, on free principles, is ill-
founded the laws of a free government rest on the confi-
dence of the people, and operate gently — and never can ex-
tend the influence very far if they are executed on free
principles, about the centre, where the benefits of the govern-
ment induce the people to support it voluntarily ; yet they
must be executed on the principles of fear and force in the
extremes This has been the case with every extensive re-
public of which we have any accurate account.
There are certain unalienable and fundamental rights,
which in forming the social compact, ought to be explicitly
ascertained and fixed — a free and enlightened people, in form-
ing this compact, will not resign all their rights to those who
govern, and they will fix limits to their legislators and rulers,
which will soon be plainly seen by those who are governed, as
well as by those who govern : and the latter will know they
cannot be passed unperceived by the former, and without giv.
ing a general alarm These rights should be made the basis
of every constitution ; and if a people be so situated, or have
such different opinions that they cannot agree in ascertaining
and fixing them, it is a very strong argument against their at-
tempting to form one entire society, to live under one system
of laws only. 1 confess, I never thought the people of these
states differed essentially in these respects ; they having de-
rived all these rights from one common source, the British
systems ; and having in the formation of their state constitu-
tions, discovered that their ideas [13] relative to these rights
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 29I
are very similar. However, it is now said that the states differ
so essentially in these respects, and even in the important arti-
cle of the trial by jury, that when assembled in convention,
they can agree to no words by which to establish that trial, or
by which to ascertain and establish many other of these rights^
as fundamental articles in the social compact. If so, we pro-
ceed to consoHdate the states on no solid basis whatever.
But I do not pay much regard to the reasons given for not
bottoming the new constitution on a better bill of rights. I
still believe a complete federal bill of rights to be very practi-
cable. Nevertheless I acknowledge the proceedings of the
convention furnish my mind with many new and strong rea-
sons, against a complete consolidation of the states. They
tend to convince me, that it cannot be carried with propriety
very far — that the convention have gone much farther in one
respect than they found it practicable to go in another ; that
is, they propose to lodge in the general government very ex-
tensive powers — powers nearly, if not altogether, complete and
unlimited, over the purseVand the sword. But, in its organiza-
tion, they furnish the strongest proof that the proper limbs,
or parts of a governmrent, to support and execute those powers
on proper principles (or in which they can be safely lodged)
cannot be formed. These powers must be lodged somewhere
in every society ; but then they should be lodged where the
strength and guardians of the people are collected. They can
be wielded, or safely used, in a free country only by an able
executive and judiciary, a respectable senate, and a secure, full,
and equal representation of the people. I think the principles
I have premised or brought into view, are well founded — I
think they will not be denied by any fair reasoner. It is in
connection with these, and other solid principles, we are to
examine the constitution. It is not a few democratic phrases,
or a few well formed features, that will prove its merits ; or a
few small omissions that will produce its rejection among men of
sense ; they will enquire what are the essential powers in a
community, and what are nominal ones ; where and how the
essential powers shall be lodged to secure government, and to
secure true liberty.
292 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
In examining the proposed constitution carefully, we must
clearly perceive an unnatural separation of these powers from
the substantial representation of the people. The state gov-
ernment will exist, with all their governors, senators, represen-
tatives, officers and expences ; in these will be nineteen twen-
tieths of the representatives of the people ; they will have a
near connection, and their members an immediate intercourse
with the people ; and the probability is, that the state govern-
ments will possess the [14] confidence of the people, and be
■considered generally as their immediate guardians.
The general government' will consist of a new species of
executive, a small senate, and a very small house of represen-
tatives. As many citizens will be more than three hundred
tniles from the seat of this government as will be nearer to it,
its judges and officers cannot be very numerous, without mak-
ing our governments very expensive. Thus will stand the
state and the general governments, should the constitution be
adopted without any alterations in their organization ; but as
to powers, the general government will possess all essential
■ones, at least on paper, and those of the states a mere shadow
of power. And therefore, unless the people shall make some
■great exertions to restore to the state governments their
powers in matters of internal police ; as the powers to lay and
collect, exclusively, internal taxes, to govern the militia, and
to hold the decisions of their own judicial courts upon their
own laws final, the balance cannot possibly continue long ; but
the state governments must be annihilated, or continue to
exist for no purpose.
It is however to be observed, that many of the essential
powers given the national government are not exclusively
given ; and the general government may have prudence enough
to forbear the exercise of those which may still be exercised
.by the respective states. But this cannot justify the impro-
priety of giving powers, the exercise of which prudent men
will not attempt, and imprudent men will, or probably can,
exercise only in a manner destructive of free government.
The general government, organized as it is, may be adequate
to many valuable objects, and be able to carry its laws into
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 293
execution on proper principles in several cases ; but I think
its warmest friends will not contend, that it can carry all the
powers proposed to be lodged in it into effect, without calling
to its aid a military force, which must very soon destroy all
elective governments in the country, produce anarchy, or es-
tablish despotism. Though we cannot have now a complete
idea of what will be the operations of the proposed system,
we may, allowing things to have their common course, have a
very tolerable one. The powers lodged in the general gov-
ernment, if exercised by it, must intimately effect the internal
police of the states, as well as external concerns ; and there is
no reason to expect the numerous state governments, and
their connections, will be very friendly to the execution of
federal laws in those internal affairs, which hitherto have been
under their own immediate management. There is more rea-
son to believe, that the general government, far removed from
the people, and none of its members elected oftenerthan once
in two years, will be forgot [15] or neglected, and its laws in
many cases disregarded, unless a multitude of officers and
military force be continually kept in view, and employed to
enforce the execution of the laws, and to make the govern-
ment feared and respected. No position can be truer than
this. That in this country either neglected laws, or a military
execution of them, must lead to a revolution, and to the
destruction of freedom. Neglected laws must first lead to
anarchy and confusion ; and a military execution of laws is
only a shorter way to the same point — despotic government.
Your's, &c.
THE FEDERAL FARMER.
294 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
LETTER III.
October loth, 1787.
Dear Sir,
The great object of a free people must be so to form their
government and laws, and so to administer them, as to create
a confidence in, and respect for the laws ; and thereby induce
the sensible and virtuous part of the community to declare in
favor of the laws, and to support them without an expensive
military force. I wish, though I confess I have not much
hope, that this may be the case with the laws of congress
under the new constitution. I am fully convinced that we
must organize the national government on different principals,
and make the parts of it more efficient, and secure in it more
effectually the different interests in the community ; or else
Leave in the state governments some powers proposed to be
lodged in it — at least till such an organization shall be found
to be practicable. Not sanguine in my expectations of a good
federal administration, and satisfied, as I am, of the impracti-
cability of consolidating the states, and at the same time of
preserving the rights of the people at large, I believe we ought
still to leave some of those powers in the state governments,
in which the people, in fact, will still be represented — to define
some other powers proposed to be vested in the general gov-
ernment, more carefully, and to establish a few principles to
secure a proper exercise of the powers given it. It is not my
object to multiply objections, or to contend about inconsidera-
ble powers or amendments. I wish the system adopted with
a few alterations ; but those, in my mind, are essential ones ;
if adopted without, [16] every good citizen will acquiesce,
though I shall consider the duration of our governments, and
the Hberties of this people, very much dependant on the
administration of the general government. A wise and honest
administration, may make the people happy under any gov-
ernment ; but necessity only can justify even our leaving open
avenues to the abuse of power, by wicked, unthinking, or am-
bitious men, I will examine, first, the organization of the pro-
posed government, in order to judge; 2d, with propriety.
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 29S
what powers are improperly, at least prematurely lodged in it.
I shall examine, 3d, the undefined powers; and 4th, those
powers, the exercise of which is not secured on safe and proper
ground.
First. As to the organization the house of representa-
tives, the democrative branch, as it is called, is to consist of 65
members : that is, about one representative for fifty thousand
inhabitants, to be chosen biennially the federal legislature
may increase this number to one for each thirty thousand in-
habitants, abating fractional numbers in each state. Thirty-
three representatives will make a quorum for doing business,
and a majority of those present determine the sense of the
house. 1 have no idea that the interests, feelings, and opi-
nions of three or four millions of people, especially touching
internal taxation, can be collected in such a house. In the
nature of things, nine times in ten, men of the elevated classes
in the community only can be chosen Connecticut, for in-
stance, will have five representatives not one man in a
hundred of those who form the democrative branch in the
state legislature, will, on a fair computation, be one of the
five. — The people of this country, in one sense, may all be
democratic ; but if we make the proper distinction between
the few men of wealth and abilities, and consider them, as we
ought, as the natural aristocracy of the country, and the great
body of the people, the middle and lower classes, as the demo-
cracy, this federal representative branch will have but very lit-
tle democracy in it, even this small representation is not
secured on proper principles. The branches of the legisla-
ture are essential parts of the fundamental compact, and ought
to be so fixed by the people, that the legislature cannot alter
itself by modifying the elections of its own members. This,
by a part of Art. i, Sect. 4, the general legislature may do, it
may evidently so regulate elections as to secure the choice of
any particular description of men. It may make the whole
state one district — make the capital, or any places in the state,
the place or places of election — it may declare that the five
men (or whatever the number may be the state may chuse)
who shall have the most votes shall be considered as chosen.
296 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H, LEE.
-In this [17] case it is easy to perceive how the people who
live scattered in the inland towns will bestow their votes on
different men— and how a few men in a city, in any order or
profession, may unite and place any five men they please
highest among those that may be voted for and all this
may be done constitutionally, and by those silent operations,
which are not immediately perceived by the people in general.
1 know it is urged, that the general legislature will be dis-
posed to regulate elections on fair and just principles : This
may be true — good men will generally govern well with almost
any constitution : but why in laying the foundation of the
social system, need we unnecessarily leave a door open to im-
proper regulations? — This is a very general and unguarded
clause, and many evils may flow from that part which author-
ises the congress to regulate elections. Were it omitted,
the regulations of elections would be solely in the respective
states, where the people are substantially represented ; and
where the elections ought to be regulated, otherwise to secure
a representation from all parts of the community, in making the
constitutions, we ought to provide for dividing each state into
a proper number of districts, and for confining the electors in
each district to the choice of some men, who shall have a per-
manent interest and residence in it ; and also for this essential
object, that the representative elected shall have a majority of
the votes of those electors who shall attend and give their
votes.
In considering the practicability of having a full and equal
representation of the people from all parts of the union, not
only distances and different opinions, customs and views, com-
mon in extensive tracts of country, are to be taken into view
but many differences peculiar to Eastern, Middle, and Southern
States. These differences are not so perceivable among the
members of congress, and men of general information in the
states, as among the men who would properly form the demo-
cratic branch. The Eastern states are very democratic, and
composed chiefly of moderate freeholders ; they have but few
rich men and no slaves; the Southern states are composed
chiefly of rich planters and slaves ; they have but few
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 297
moderate freeholders, and the prevailing influence, in them is
generally a dissipated aristocracy: The Middle states partake
partly of the Eastern and partly of the Southern character.
Perhaps, nothing could be more disjointed, unweildly and
incompetent to doing business with harmony and dispatch,
than a federal house of representatives properly numerous for
the great objects of taxation, &c. collected from the federal
states ; whether such men would ever act in concert ; whether
they would not worry along a few years, and then be the
means of [18] separating the parts of the union, is very prob-
lematical? View this system in whatever form we can,
propriety brings us. still to this point, a federal government
possessed of general and complete powers, as to those national
objects which cannot well come under the cognizance of the
internal laws of the respective states, and this federal govern-
ment, accordingly, consisting of branches not very numerous.
The house of representatives is on the plan of consolidation,
but the senate is entirely on the federal plan ; and Delaware
will have as much constitutional influence in the senate, as the
largest state in the union : and in this senate are lodged legis-
lative, executive and judicial powers : Ten states in this
union urge that they are small states, nine of which were pres-
ent in the convention. — They were interested in collecting
large powers into the hands of the senate, in which each state
still will have its equal share of power. I suppose it was im-
practicable for the three large states, as they were called, to
get the senate formed on any other principles : But this only
proves, that we cannot form one general government on equal
and just principles — and proves, that we ought not to lodge
in it such extensive powers before we are convinced of the
practicability of organizing it on just and equal principles.
The senate will consist of two members from each state,
chosen by the state legislatures, every sixth year. The clause
referred to, respecting the elections of representatives, em-
powers the general legislature to regulate the elections of sena-
tors also, " except as to the places of chusing senators." — There
is, therefore, but little more security in the elections than in
those of representatives : Fourteen senators make a quorum
298 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
for business, and a majority of the senators present give the
vote of the senate, except in giving judgment upon an im-
peachment, or in making treaties, or in expelling a member,
when two-thirds of the senators present must agree — The
members of the legislature are not excluded from being
elected to any military ofifices, or any civil ofifices, except
those created, or the emoluments of which shall be increased
by themselves : two-thirds of the members present, of either
house, may expel a member at pleasure. The senate is an
independant branch of the legislature, a court for trying im-
peachments, and also a part of the executive, having a nega-
tive in the making of all treaties, and in appointing almost all
officers.
The vice president is not a very important, if not an
unnecessary part of the system — he may be a part of the sen-
ate at one period, and act as the supreme executive magistrate
at another The election of this officer, as well as of the
president of the United States seems to be properly secured ;
but [19] when we examine the powers of the president, and
the forms of the executive, we shall perceive that the general
government, in this part, will have a strong tendency to aris-
tocracy, or the government of the few. The executive is, in
fact, the president and senate in all transactions of any import-
ance ; the president is connected with, or tied to the senate ;
he may always act with the senate, but never can effectually
counteract its views : The president can appoint no officer,
civil or military, who shall not be agreeable to the senate; and
the presumption is, that the will of so important a body will
not be very easily controuled, and that it will exercise its
powers with great address.
In the judicial department, powers ever kept distinct in well
balanced governments, are no less improperly blended in the
hands of the same men — in the judges of the supreme court
is lodged the law, the equity and the fact. It is not necessary
to pursue the minute organical parts of the general govern-
ment proposed. — There were various interests in the conven-
tion, to be reconciled, especially of large and small states ; of
carrying and non-carrying states ; and of states more and
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. i^EE. 299
states less democratic — vast labour and attention were by the
convention bestowed on the organization of the parts of the
constitution offered ; still it is acknowledged there are many-
things radically wrong in the essential parts of this constitution
— but it is said that these are the result of our situation : On
a full examination of the subject, I believe it ; but what do the
laborious inquiries and determination of the convention prove ?
If they prove any thing, they prove that we cannot consolidate
the states on proper principles : The organization of ,the
government presented proves, that we cannot form a general
government in which all power can be safely lodged ; and a
little attention to the parts of the one proposed will make it
appear very evident, that all the powers proposed to be
lodged in it, will not be then well deposited, either for the
purposes of government, or the preservation of liberty. I will
suppose no abuse of power in those cases, in which the abuse
of it is not well guarded against — I will suppose the words
authorizing the general government to regulate the elections
of its own members struck out of the plan, or free district
elections, in each state, amply secured. — That the small repre-
sentation provided for shall be as fair and equal as it is
capable of being made — I will suppose the judicial department
regulated on pure principles, by future laws, as far as it can be
by the constitution, and consist with the situation of the
country — still there will be an unreasonable accumulation of
powers in the general government if all be granted, enumer-
ated in the plan proposed. The plan does not present a
well balanced government : The senatorial [20] branch of the
legislative and the executive are substantially united, and the
president, or the state executive magistrate, may aid the sen-
atorial interest when weakest, but never can effectually support
the democratic, however it may be opposed ; — the excellency,
in my mind, of a well-balanced government is that it consists
of distinct branches, each sufficiently strong and independant
to keep its own station, and to aid either of the other branches
which may occasionally want aid.
The convention found that any but a small house of repre-
sentatives would be expensive, and that it would be impractic-
300 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
able to assemble a large number of representatives. Not only
the determination of the convention in this case, but the situ-
ation of the states, proves the impracticability of collecting, in
any one point, a proper representation.
The formation of the senate, and the smallness of the house,
being, therefore, the result of our situation, and the actual
state of things, the evils which may attend the exercise of
many powers in this national government may be considered
as without a remedy.
All officers are impeachable before the senate only — before
the men by whom they are appointed, or who are consenting
to the appointment of these officers. No judgment of convic-
tion, on an impeachment, can be given unless two thirds of
the senators agree. Under these circumstances the right of im-
peachment, in the house, can be of but little importance ; the
house cannot expect often to convict the offender ; and,
therefore, probably, will but seldom or never exercise the
right. In addition to the insecurity and inconveniences at-
tending this organization beforementioned, it may be observed,
that it is extremely difficult to secure the people against the
fatal effects of corruption and influence. The power of mak-
ing any law will be in the president, eight senators, and seven-
teen representatives, relative to the important objects enum-
erated in the constitution. Where there is a small representa-
tion a sufficient number to carry any measure, may, with ease,
be influenced by bribes, offices and civilities ; they easily form
private juntoes, and out-door meetings, agree on measures,
and carry them by silent votes.
Impressed, as I am, with a sense of the difficulties there are
in the way of forming the parts of a federal government on
proper principles, and seeing a government so unsubstantially
organized, after so arduous an attempt has been made, I am
led to believe, that powers ought to be given to it with great
care and caution.
In the second place it is necessary, therefore, to examine the
extent, and the probable operations of sonie of those ex- [21]
tensive powers proposed to be vested in this government.
These powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, respect
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. Joi
internal as well as external objects. Those respecting exter-
nal objects, as all foreign concerns, commerce, impost's, all
causes arising on the seas, peace and war, and Indian affairs,
can be lodged no where else, with any propriety, but in this
government. Many powers that respect internal objects
ought clearly to be lodged in it ; as those to regulate trade
between the states, weights and measures, the coin or current
monies, post-offices, naturalization, &c. These powers may be
exercised without essentially effecting the internal police of
the respective states : But powers to lay and collect internal
taxes, to form the militia, to make bankrupt laws, and to
decide on appeals, questions arising on the internal laws of
the respective states, are of a very serious nature, and carry
with them almost all other powers. These taken in connec-
tion with the others, and powers to raise armies and build
navies, proposed to be lodged in this government, appear to
me to comprehend all the essential powers in this community,
and those which will be left to the states will be of no great
importance.
A power to lay and collect taxes at discretion, is, in itself,
of very great importance. By means of taxes, the govern-
ment may command, the whole or any part of the subject's
property. Taxes may be of various kinds ; but there is a
strong distinction between external and internal taxes. Ex-
ternal taxes are import duties, which are laid on imported
goods ; they may usually be collected in a few seaport towns,
and of a few individuals, though ultimately paid by the con-
sumer; a few officers can collect them, and they can be carried
no higher than trade will bear, or smuggling permit — that in
the very nature of commerce, bounds are set to them. But
internal taxes, as poll and land taxes, excises, duties on all
written instruments, &c. may fix themselves on every person
and species of property in the community ; they may be car-
ried to any lengths, and in proportion as they are extended,
numerous officers must be employed to assess them, and to
enforce the collection of them. In the United Netherlands
the general government has compleat powers, as to external
taxation ; but as to internal taxes, it makes req^uisitions on the
302 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
provinces. Internal taxation in this country is more import-
ant, as the country is so very extensive. As many assessors
and collectors of federal taxes will be above three hundred
miles from the seat of the federal government as will be less.
Besides, to lay and collect taxes, in this extensive country,,
must require a great number of congressional ordinances, im-
mediately operating upon the body of the people ; these must
continually interfere with the state laws, [22] and thereby pro-
duce disorder and general dissatisfaction, till the one system of
laws or the other, operating on the same subjects, shall be
abolished. These ordinances alone, to say nothing of those
respecting the milita, coin, commerce, federal judiciary, &c. &c.
will probably soon defeat the operations of the state laws and
governments.
Should the general government think it politic, as some ad-
ministration (if not all) probably will, to look for a support in
a system of influence, the government will take every occasion
to multiply laws, and ofhcers to execute them, considering
these as so many necessary props for its own support. Should
this system of policy be adopted, taxes more productive than
the impost duties will, probably, be wanted to support the
government, and to discharge foreign demands, without leav-
ing any thing for the domestic creditors. The internal sources
of taxation then must be called into operation, and internal
tax laws and federal assessors and collectors spread over this
immense country. All these circumstances considered, is it
wise, prudent, or safe, to vest the powers of laying and collect-
ing internal taxes in the general government, while imperfectly
organized and inadequate ; and to trust to amending it here-
after, and making it adequate to this purpose? It is not only
unsafe but absurd to lodge power in a government before it is
fitted to receive it ? It is confessed that this power and
representation ought to go together. Why give the power
first ? Why give the power to the few, who, when possessed
of it, may have address enough to prevent the increase of repre-
sentation ? Why not keep the power, and, when necessary,
amend the constitution, and add to its other parts this
power, and a proper increase of representation at the same
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 303
time ? Then men who may want the power will be under
strong inducements to let in the people, by their represent-
atives, into the government, to hold their due proportion of
tWIs power. If a proper representation be impracticable, then
we shall see this power resting in the states, where it at
present ought to be, and not inconsiderately given up.
When I recollect how lately congress, conventions, legisla-
tures, and people contended in the cause of liberty, and care-
fully weighed the importance of taxation, I can scarcely
believe we are serious in proposing to vest the powers of lay-
ing and collecting internal taxes in a government so imper-
fectly organized for such purposes. Should the United States
be taxed by a house of representatives of two hundred
members, which would be about fifteen members for Con-
necticut, twenty-five for Massachusetts, &c. still the middle
and lower classes of people could have no great share, in fact,
in taxation. I am aware it is said, that the representation
proposed by the new [23] constitution is sufficiently numer-
ous ; it may be for many purposes ; but to suppose that this
branch is sufficiently numerous to guard the rights of the
people in the administration of the government, in which the'
purse and sword is placed, seems to argue that we have forgot
what the true meaning of representation is. I am sensible
also, that it is said that congress will not attempt to lay and
collect internal taxes ; that it is necessary for them to have
the power, though it cannot probably be exercised. 1
admit that it is not probable that any prudent congress will
attempt to lay and collect internal taxes, especially direct
taxes : but this only proves, that the power would be improp-
erly lodged in congress, and that it might be abused by
imprudent and designing men.
I have heard several gentlemen, to get rid of objections to
this part of the constitution, attempt to construe the powers "
relative to direct taxes, as those who object to it would have
them ; as to these, it is said, that congress will only have
power to make requisitions, leaving it to the states to lay aud
collect them. I see but very little colour for this construction,
and the attempt only proves that this part of the plan cannot
304 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
be defended. By this plan there can be no doubt, but that
the powers of congress will be complete as to all kinds of
taxes whatever — Further, as to internal taxes, the state
governments will have concurrent powers with the genefal
government, and both may tax the same objects in the same
year ; and the objection that the general government may
suspend a state tax, as a necessary measure for the promoting
the collection of a federal tax, is not without foundation.
As the states owe large debts, and have large demands upon
them individually, there clearly will be a propriety in leaving
in their possession exclusively, some of the internal sources
of taxation, at least until the federal representation shall be
properly encreased : The power in the general government to
lay and collect internal taxes, will render its powers respecting
armies, navies and the militia, the more exceptionable. By
the constitution it is proposed that congress shall have power
" to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money
to that use shall be for a longer term than two years ; to pro-
vide and maintain a navy ; to provide for calling forth the
militia to execute the laws of the union ; suppress insurrec-
tions, and repel invasions : to provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining the militia ; " reserving to the states the right
to appoint the officers, and to train the militia according to the
discipline prescribed by congress ; congress will have unlimited
power to raise armies, and to engage officers and men for any
number of years ; but a legislative act applying money for
their support can have operation for no longer term than two
years, and if a subsequent congress do [24] not within the two
years renew the appropriation, or further appropriate monies
for the use of the army, the army will be left to take care of
itself. When an army shall once be raised for a number of
years, it is not probable that it will find much difficulty in get-
ting congress to pass laws for applying monies to its support. I
see so many men in America fond of a standing army, and
especially among those who probably will have a large share in
administering the federal system; it is very evident to me, that
we shall have a large standing army as soon as the monies to
support them can be possibly found. An army is not a very
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 305
agreeable place of employment for the young gentlemen of
many families. A power to raise armies must be lodged some
where ; still this will not justify the lodging this power in a
bare majority of so few men without any checks ; or in the
government in which the great body of the people, in the
nature of things, will be only nominally represented. In the
state governments the great body of the people, the yeomanry,
&c. of the country, are represented : It is true they will
chuse the members of congress, and may now and then chuse
a man of their own way of thinking ; but it is not impossible
for forty, or thirty thousand people in this country, one time
in ten to find a man who can possess similar feelings, views, and
interests with themselves : Powers to lay and collect taxes and
to raise_ armies are of the greatest moment ; for carrying them
into effect, laws need not be frequently made, and the yeomanry,
&c. of the country ought substantially to have a check upon
the passing of these laws ; this check ought to be placed in the
legislatures, or at least, in the few men the common people of
the country, will, probably, have in congress, in the true sense
of the word, " from among themselves." It is true, the yeo-
manry of the country possess the lands, the weight of property,
possess arms, and are too strong a body of men to be openly
offended — and, therefore, it is urged, they will take care of
themselves, that men who shall govern will not dare pay any
disrespect to their opinions. It is easily perceived, that if they
have not their proper negative upon passing laws in congress,
or on the passage of laws relative to taxes and armies, they
may in twenty or thirty years be by means imperceptible to
them, totally deprived of that boasted weight and strength :
This may be done in a great measure by congress, if disposed
to do it, by modelling the militia. Should one fifth or one
eighth part of the men capable of bearing arms, be made a select
militia, as has been proposed, and those the young and ardent
part of the community, possessed of but little or no property,
and all the others put upon a plan that will render them of no
importance, the former will answer all the purposes of an [25]
army, while the latter will be defenceless. The state must
train the militia in such form and according to such systems
306 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
and rules as congress shall prescribe : and the only actual influ-
ence the respective states will have respecting the militia will
be in appointing the officers. I see no provision made for call-
ing out theposse comitatus for executing the laws of the union,
but provision is made for congress to call forth the militia for
the execution of them — and the militia in general, or any-
select part of it, may be called out under military officers, in-
stead of the sheriff to enforce an execution of federal laws, in
the first instance, and thereby introduce an entire military ex-
ecution of the laws. I know that powers to raise taxes, to
regulate the military strength of the community on some uni-
form plan, to provide for its defence and internal order, and
for duly executing the laws, must be lodged somewhere ; but
still we ought not so to lodge them, as evidently to give one
order of men in the community, undue advantages over others;
or commit the many to the mercy, prudence, and moderation
of the few. And so far as it may be necessary to lodge
any of the peculiar powers in the general government, a more
safe exercise of them ought to be secured, by requiring the
consent of two-thirds or three-fourths of congress thereto —
until the federal representation can be increased, so that the
democratic members in congress may stand some tolerable
chance of a reasonable negative, in behalf of the numerous,
important, and democratic part of the community.
I am not sufficiently acquainted with the laws and internal
police of all the states to discern fully, how general bankrupt
laws, made by the union, would effect them, or promote the
public good. I believe the property of debtors, in the several
states, is held responsible for their debts in modes and forms
very different. If uniform bankrupt laws can be made without
producing real and substantial inconveniences, I wish them to
be made by congress.
There are some powers proposed to be lodged in the gen-
eral government .in the judicial department, I think very un-
necessarily, I mean powers respecting questions arising upon
the internal laws of the respective states. It is proper the fed-
eral judiciary should have powers co-extensive with the federal
legislature— that is, the power of deciding finally on the laws
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 30/
of the union. By Art. 3, Sec. 2. the powers of the federal
judiciary are extended (among other things) to all cases be-
tween a state and citizens of another state — between citizens
of different states — between a state or the citizens thereof, and
foreign states, citizens or subjects. Actions in all these cases,
except against a state government, are now brought and fin-
ally [26] determined in the law courts of the states respectively
and as there are no words to exclude these courts of their juris-
diction in these cases, they will have concurrent jurisdiction
with the inferior federal courts in them ; and, therefore, if the
new constitution be adopted without any amendment in this
respect, all those numerous actions, now brought in the state
courts between our citizens and foreigners, between citizens of
different states, by state governments against foreigners, and
by state governments against citizens of other states, may also
be brought in the federal courts ; and an appeal will lay in
them from the state courts or federal inferior courts to the
supreme judicial court of the union. In almost all these cases,
either party may have the trial by jury in the state courts ;
except paper money and tender laws, which are wisely guarded
against in the proposed constitution ; justice may be obtained
in these courts on reasonable terms ; they must be more com-
petent to proper decisions on the laws of their respective
states, than the federal states can possibly be. I do not, in
any point of view, see the need of opening a new jurisdiction
in these causes — of opening a new scene of expensive law suits,
of suffering foreigners, and citizens of different states, to drag
each other many hundred miles into the federal courts. It is
true, those courts may be so organized by a wise and prudent
legislature, as to make the obtaining of justice in them tolera-
bly easy ; they may in general be organized on the common law
principles of the country : But this benefit is by no means se-
cured by the constitution. The trial by jury is secured only
in those few criminal cases, to which the federal laws will ex-
tend — as crimes committed on the seas, against the laws of
nations, treason and counterfeiting the federal securities and
coin : But even in these cases, the jury trial of the vicinage is
not secured — particularly in the large states, a citizen may be
308 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
tried for a crime committed in the state, and yet tried in some
states 500 miles from the place where it was committed ; but
the jury trial is not secured at all in civil causes. Though the
convention have not established this trial, it is to be hoped
that congress, in putting the new system into execution, will
do it by a legislative act, in all cases in which it can be done
with propriety. Whether the jury trial is not excluded the
supreme judicial court is an important question. By Art. 3,
Sec. 2, all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consuls, and in those cases in which a state shall be party,
the supreme court shall have jurisdiction. In all the other
cases beforementioned, the supreme court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exception, and
under such regulations as the congress shall make. By court
is understood a court consisting of judges ; and the [37] idea
of a jury is excluded. This court, or the judges, are to have
jurisdiction on appeals, in all the cases enumerated, as to law
and fact ; the judges are to decide the law and try the fact,
/ and the trial of the fact being assigned to the judges by the
j constitution, a jury for trying the fact is excluded ; however,
under the exceptions and powers to make regulations, congress
I may, perhaps, introduce the jury, to try the fact in most nec-
essary cases.
There can be but one supreme court in which the final juris-
diction will centre in all federal causes — except in cases where
appeals by law shall not be allowed : The judicial powers of
the federal courts extend in law and equity to certain cases :
and, therefore, the powers to determine on the law, in equity,
and as to the fact, all will concentrate in the supreme court: —
These powers, which by this constitution are blended in the
same hands, the same judges, are in Great-Britain deposited in
different hands — to wit, the decision of the law in the law
judges, the decision in equity in the chancellor, and the trial
of the fact in the jury. It is a very dangerous thing to vest in
the same judge power to decide on the law, and also general
powers in equity ; for if the law restrain him, he is only to step
into his shoes of equity, and give what judgment his reason or
opinion may dictate ; we have no precedents in this country,
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 309
as yet, to regulate the divisions in equity as in Great Britain ;,
equity, therefore, in the supreme court for many years will be
mere discretion. I confess in the constitution of this supreme
court, as left by the constitution, I do not see a spark of free-
dom or a shadow of our own or the British common law.
This court is to have appellate jurisdiction in all the other
cases before mentioned : Many sensible men suppose that
cases before mentioned respect, as well the criminal cases as
the civil ones mentioned antecedently in the constitution, if
so an appeal is allowed in criminal cases — contrary to the
usual sense of law. How far it may be proper to admit a for-
eigner or the citizen of another state to bring actions against
state governments, which have "failed in performing so many,
promises made during the war is doubtful : How far it may be
proper so to humble a state, as to oblige it to answer to an in-
dividual in a court of law, is worthy of consideration ; the
states are now subject to no such actions ; and this new juris-
diction will subject the states, and many defendants to actions,
and processes, which were not in the contemplation of the par-
ties, when the contract was made ; all engagements existing
between citizens of different states, citizens and foreigners,
states and foreigners ; and states and citizens of other states
were made the parties contemplating the remedies then exist-
ing on the laws of the states [28] and the new remedy pro-
posed to be given in the federal courts, can be founded on no
principle whatever.
Your's, &c,
THE FEDERAL FARMER.
3IO LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
LETTER IV.
October 12th, 1787.
Dear Sir,
It will not be possible to establish in the federal courts the
jury trial of the vicinage so well as in the state courts.
Third, there appears to me to be not only a premature de-
posit of some important powers in the general government —
but many of those deposited there are undefined, and may
be used to good or bad purposes as honest or designing men
shall prevail. By Art. i, Sec. 2, representatives and direct
taxes shall be apportioned among the several states, &c.
same art. sect. 8, the congress shall have powers to lay and
collect taxes, duties, &c. for the common defence and general
welfare, but all duties, imposts and excises, shall be uni-
form throughout the United States : By the first recited clause,
direct taxes shall be apportioned on the states. This seems
to favour the idea suggested by some sensible men and writers
that congress, as to direct taxes, will only have power to make
requisitions ; but the latter clause, power to lay and collect
taxes, &c. seems clearly to favour the contrary opinion, and,
in my mind, the true one, the congress shall have power to tax
immediately individuals, without the intervention of the state
legislatures, in fact the first clause appears to me only to pro-
vide that each state shall pay a certain portion of the tax, and
the latter to provide that congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes, that is to assess upon, and to collect of the indi-
viduals in the state, the states quota ; but these still I consider
as undefined powers, because judicious men understand them
differently.
It is doubtful whether the vice-president is to have any
qualifications ; none are mentioned ; but he may serve as pres-
ident, and it may be inferred, he ought to be qualified there-
fore as the president ; but the qualifications of the president
are required only of the person to be elected president. By
art. 2, sect. 2, " But the congress may by law vest the appoint-
ment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 31I
president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of the
departments:" Who are inferior officers? May not a congress
disposed to vest the appointment of all ofificers in the presi-
dent, [29] under this clause, vest the appointment of almost
every officer in the president alone, and destroy the check
mentioned in the first part of the clause, and lodged in the
seriate. It is true, this check is badly lodged, but then some
check upon the first magistrate in appointing officers, ought it
appears by the opinion of the convention, and by the general
opinion, to be established in the constitution. By art. 3, sect.
2, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction as to law
and facts with such exceptions, &c. to what extent is it in-
tended the exceptions shall be carried Congress may carry
them so far as to annihilate substantially the appellate juris-
diction, and the clause be rendered of very little importance.
4th. There are certain rights which we have always held
sacred in the United States, and recognized in all our consti-
tutions, and which, by the adoption of the new constitution in
its present form, will be left unsecured. By article 6, the pro-
posed constitution, and the laws of the United States, which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or
which shall be made under the authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the land ; and the judges in every
state shall be bound thereby ; anything in the constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
It is to be observed that when the people shall adopt the
proposed constitution it will be their last and supreme act ; it
will be adopted not by the people of New Hampshire, Massa-
chusetts, &c., but by the people of the United States ; and
wherever this constitution, or any part of it, shall be incompati-
ble with the ancient customs, rights, the laws or the constitutions
heretofore established in the United States, it will entirely
abolish them and do them away : And not only this, but the
laws of the United States which shall be ; made in pursuance
of the federal constitution will be also supreme laws, and
wherever they shall be incompatible with those customs,
rights, laws or constitutions heretofore established, they will
also entirely abolish them and do them away.
312 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
By the article before recited, treaties also made under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law : It
is not said that these treaties shall be made in pursuance of
the constitution — nor are there any constitutional bounds set
to those who shall make them : The president and two-thirds
of the senate will be empowered to make treaties indefinitely,
and when these treaties shall be made, they will also abolish all
laws and state constitutions incompatible with them. This
power in the president and senate is absolute, and the judges
will be bound to allow full force to whatever rule, article or
thing the president and senate shall establish by treaty, whether
it be [30] practicable to set any bounds to those who make
treaties, I am not able to say ; if not,it proves that this power
ought to be more safely lodged.
The federal constitution, the laws of congress made in pur-
suance of the constitution, and all treaties must have full force
and effect in all parts of the United States ; and all other laws,
rights and constitutions which stand in their way must yield :
It is proper the national laws should be supreme, and superior
to state or district laws ; but then the national laws ought to
yield to unalienable or fundamental rights and national
laws, made by a, few men, should extend only to a few national
objects. This will not be the case with the laws of congress:
To have any proper idea of their extent, we must carefully
examine the legislative, executive and judicial powers proposed
to be lodged in the general government, and consider them in
connection with a general clause in art. i, sect. 8, in these
words (after enumerating a number of powers) " To make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into ex-
ecution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by
this constitution in the government of the United States, or
in any department or officer thereof." The powers of this
government as has been observed, extend to internal as well
as external objects, and to those objects to which all others
are subordinate ; it is almost impossible to have a just concep-
tion of their powers, or of the extent and number of the laws
which may be deemed necessary and proper to carry them into
effect, till we shall come to exercise those powers and make
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 313
the laws. In making laws to carry those powers into effect, it
is to be expected, that a wise and prudent congress will pay-
respect to the opinions of a free people, and bottom their laws
on those principles which have been considered as essential
and fundament.al in the British, and in our government : But a
congress of a different character will not be bound by the con-
stitution to pay respect to those principles.
It is said that when people make a constitution, and dele-
gate powers, that all powers are not delegated by them to
those who govern, is reserved in the people ; and that the peo-
ple, in the present case, have reserved in themselves, and in
their state governments, every right and power not expressly
given by the federal constitution to those who shall administer
the national governnrient. It is said, on the other hand, that
the people, when they make a constitution, yield all power not
expressly reserved to themselves. The truth is, in either case,
it is mere matter of opinion, and men usually take either side
of the argument, as will best answer their purposes : But the
general [31] presumption being, that men who govern, will in
doubtful cases, construe laws and constitutions most favourably
for increasing their own powers ; all wise and prudent people,
in forming constitutions, have drawn the line, and carefully
described the powers parted with and the powers reserved.
By the state constitutions, certain rights have been reserved in
;the people ; or rather, they have been recognized and estab-
lished in such a manner, that state legislatures are bound to
respect them, and to make no laws infringing upon them. The
state legislatures are obliged to take notice of the bills of
rights of their respective states. The bills of rights, and the
state constitutions, are fundamental compacts only between
those who govern, and the people of the same state.
In the year 1788 the people of the United States made a
federal constitution, which is a fundamental compact between
them and their federal rulers ; these rulers, in the nature of
things, cannot be bound to take notice of any other compact.
It would be absurd for them, in making laws, to look over
thirteen, fifteen, or twenty state constitutions, to see what
rights are established as fundamental, and must not be in-
3 14 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R.' H. LEE.
fringed upon, in making laws in the society. It is true, they
would be bound to do it if the people, in their federal com-
pact, should refer to the state constitutions, recognize all parts
not inconsistent with the federal constitution, and direct their
federal rulers to take notice of them accordingly ; but this is
not the case, as the plan stands proposed at present ; and it is
absurd, to suppose so unnatural an idea is intended or implied.
I think my opinion is not only founded in reason, but I think
it is supported by the report of the convention itself. If there
are a number of rights established by the state constitutions,
and which will remain sacred, and the general government is
bound to take notice of them — it must take notice of one as
well as another ; and if unnecessary to recognize or establish
one by the federal constitution, it would be unnecessary to
recognize or establish another by it. If the federal constitu-
tion is to be construed so far in connection with the state con-
stitution, as to leave the trial by jury in civil causes, for in-
stance, secured ; on the same principles it would have left the
trial by jury in criminal causes, the benefits of the writ of
habeas corpus, &c. secured ; they all stand on the same foot-
ing ; they are the conimon rights of Americans, and have been
recognized by the state constitutions : But the convention
found it necessary to recognize or re-establish the benefits of
that writ, and the jury trial in criminal cases. As to expost
facto laws, the convention has done the same in one case, and
gone further in another, It is a part of the com- [32] pact
between the people of each state and their rulers, that no
expost facto laws shall be made. But the convention, by Art.
I, Sect. 10, have put a sanction upon this part even of the
state compacts. In fact, the 9th and loth Sections in Art. i,
in the proposed constitution, are no more nor less, than a par-
tial bill of rights ; they establish certain principles as part of
the compact upon which the federal legislators and ofiScers can
never infringe. It is here wisely stipulated, that the federal
legislature shall never pass a bill of attainder, or expost facto
law ; that no tax shall be laid on articles exported, &c. The
establishing of one right implies the necessity of establishing
another and similar one.
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 315
On the whole, the position appears to me to be undeniable,
that this bill of rights ought to be carried farther, and some
other principles established, as a part of this fundamental
compact between the people of the United States and their
federal rulers.
It is true, we are not disposed to differ much, at present,
about religion ; but when we are making a constitution, it is to
be hoped, for ages and millions yet unborn, why not establish
the free exercise of religion, as a part of the national compact.
There are other essential rights, which we have justly under-
stood to be the rights of freemen ; as freedom from hasty and
unreasonable search warrants, warrants not founded on oath,
and not issued with due caution, for searching and seizing
men's papers, property, and persons. The trials by jury in
,civil causes, it is said, varies so much in the several states, that
no words could be found for the uniform establishment of it.
If so, the federal legislation will not be able to establish it by
any general laws. I confess I am of opinion it may be estab-
lished, but not in that beneficial manner in which we may
enjoy it, for the reasons beforementioned. When I speak of
the jury trial of the vicinage, or the trial of the fact in the
neighborhood, I do not lay so much stress upon the circum-
stance of our being tried by our neighbours : in this enlightened
country men may be probably impartially tried by those who
do not live very near them : but the trial of facts in the neigh-
bourhood is of great importance in other respects. Nothing
can be more essential than the cross examining witnesses, and
generally before the triers of the facts in question. The com-
mon people can establish facts with much more ease with oral
than written evidence ; when trials of facts are removed to a
distance from the homes of the parties and witnesses, oral evi-
dence becomes intolerably expensive, and the parties must
depend on written evidence, which to the common people is
expensive and almost [33J useless; it must be frequently taken
ex porte, and but very seldom leads to the proper discovery of
truth.
The trial by jury is very important in another point of
view. It is essential in every free country, that common.
3l6 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
people should have a part and share of influence, in the judi-
cial as well as in the legislative department. To hold open to
them the offices of senators, judges, and offices to fill which an
expensive education is required, cannot answer any valuable
purposes for them ; they are not in a situation to be brought
forward and to fill those offices ; these, and most other offices
of any considerable importance, will be occupied by the few.
The few, the well born, &c. as Mr. Adams calls them, in judi-
cial decisions as well as in legislation, are generally disposed,
and very- naturally too, to favour those of their own descrip-
tion.
The trial by jury in the judicial department, and the col-
lection of the people by their representatives in the legislature,
are those fortunate inventions which have procured for them,
in this country, their true proportion of influence, and the wis-
est and most fit means of protecting themselves in the com-
munity. Their situation, as jurors and representatives, enables
them to acquire information Hnd knowledge in the affairs and
government of the society ; and to come forward, in turn, as
the centinels and guardians of each other. I am very sorry
that even a few of our countrymen should consider jurors and
representatives in a different point of view, as ignorant, trouble-
some bodies, which ought not to have any share in the con-
cerns of government.
I confess I do not see in what cases the congress can, with
any pretence of right, make a law to suppress the freedom of
the press ; though I am not clear, that congress is restrained
from laying any duties whatever on printing, and from laying
duties particularly heavy on certain pieces printed, and perhaps
congress may require large bonds for the payment of these
duties. Should the printer say, the freedom of the press was
secured by the constitution of the state in which he lived, con-
gress might, and perhaps, with great propriety, answer, that
the federal constitution is the only compact existing between
them and the people ; in this compact the people have named
no others, and therefore congress, in exercising the powers
assigned them, and in making laws to carry them into execu-
tion, are restrained by nothing beside the federal constitution,
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 317
any more than a state legislature is restrained by a compact
between the magistrates and people of a county, city, or town
of which the people, in forming the state constitution, have
taken no notice.
It is not my object to enumerate rights of inconsiderable
[34] importance ; but there are others, no doubt, which ought
to be established as a fundamental part of the national system.
It is worthy of observation, that all treaties are made by
foreign nations with a confederacy of thirteen states — that the
western country is attached to thirteen states — thirteen states
have jointly and severally engaged to pay the public debts. —
Should a new government be formed of nine, ten, eleven, or
twelve states, those treaties could not be considered as binding
on the foreign nations who made them. However, I believe
the probability to be, that if nine states adopt the constitution,
the others will.
It may also be worthy our examination, how far the pro-
vision for amending this plan, when it shall be adopted, is of
any importance. No measures can be taken towards amend-
ments, unless two-thirds of the congress, or two-thirds of the
legislature of the several states shall agree. — While power is in
the hands of the people, or democratic part of the community,
more especially as at present, it is easy, according to the gen-
eral course of human affairs, for the few influential men in the
community, to obtain conventions, alterations in government,
and to persuade the common people that they may change for
the better, and to get from them a part of the power : But
when power is once transferred from the many to the few, all
changes become extremely difficult ; the government, is this
case, being beneficial to the few, they will be exceedingly
artful and adroit in preventing any measures which may lead
to a change; and nothing will produce it, but great exertions
and severe struggles on the part of the common people.
Every man of reflection must see, that the change now pro-
posed, is a transfer of power from the many to the few, and
the probability is, the artful and ever active aristocracy, will
prevent all peaceful measures for changes, unless when they
shall discover some favorable moment to increase their own
3l8 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H, LEE.
influence. I am sensible, thousands of men in the United
States, are disposed to adopt the proposed constitution,,
though they perceive it to be essentially defective, under an
idea that amendments of it, may be obtained when necessary.
This is a pernicious idea, it argues a servility of character
totally unfit for the support of free government .; it is very re-
pugnant to that perpetual jealousy respecting liberty, so abso-
lutely necessary in all free states, spoken of by Mr. Dickinson. —
However, if our countrymen are so soon changed, and the
language of 1774, is become odious to them, it will be in vain,
to use the language of freedom, or to attempt to rouse them
to free enquiries : But 1 shall never believe this \s the case
with them, whatever present appearances may be, till I shall
have very strong evidence indeed of it.
Your's, &c.
THE FEDERAL FARMER.
[35] LETTER V.
October isth, 1787.
Dear Sir,
Thus I have examined the federal constitution as far as a
few days leisure would permit. It opens to my mind a new
scene ; instead of seeing powers cautiously lodged in the
hands of numerous legislators, and many magistrates, we see
all important powers collecting in one centre, where a few
men will possess them almost at discretion. And instead of
checks in the formation of the government, to secure the
rights of the people against the usurpations of those they
appoint to govern, we are to understand the equal division of
lands among our people, and the strong arm furnished them
by nature and situation, are to secure them against those
usurpations. If there are advantages in the equal division of
our lands, and the strong and manly habits of our people, we
ought to establish governments calculated to give duration to
them, and not governments which never can work naturally^
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 319
till that equality of property, and those free and manly habits
shall be destroyed ; these evidently are not the natural basis,
of the proposed constitution. No man of reflection, and
skilled in the science of goverment, can suppose these will
move on harmoniously together for ages, or even for fifty
years. As to the little circumstances commented upon, by
some writers, with applause — as the age of a representative, of
the president, &c. — they have, in my mind, no weight in the
general tendency of the system.
There are, however, in my opinion, many good things in
the proposed system. It is founded on elective principles,,
and the deposits of powers in different hands, is essentially
right. The guards against those evils we have experienced in
some states in legislation are valuable indeed ; but the value
of every feature in this syste^n is vastly lessened for the want
of that one important feature in a free government, a repre-
sentation of the people. Because we have sometimes abused
democracy, I am not among those men who think a democratic
branch a nuisance ; which branch shall be sufficiently numer-
ous to admit some of the best informed men of each order in,
the community into the administration of government.
While the radical defects in the proposed system are not so
soon discovered, some temptations to each state, and to many
classes of men to adopt it, are very visible. It uses the demo-
cratic language of several of the state constitutions, particularly
that of Massachusetts ; the eastern states will receive advan-
tages so far as the regulation of trade, by a bare majority, is
committed to it: Connecticut and New Jersey will receive
their share of a [36] general impost ; The middle states will
receive the advantages surrounding the seat of government ;.
The southern states will receive protection, and have their
negroes represented in the legislature, and large back coun-
tries will soon have a majority in it. This system promises a
large field of employment to military gentlemen, and gentle-
men of the law ; and in case the government shall be executed
without convulsions, it will afford security to creditors, to the
clergy, salary-men and others depending on money payments.
So far as the system promises justice and reasonable ad-
320 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
vantages, in these respects, it ought to be supported by all
honest men ; but whenever it promises unequal and improper
advantages to any particular states, or orders of men, it ought
to be opposed.
I have, in the course of these letters observed, that there
are many good things in the proposed constitution, and I have
endeavored to point out many important defects in it. I have
admitted that we want a federal system — that we have a
system presented, which, with several alterations may be
made a tolerable good one — I have admitted there is a well
founded uneasiness among creditors and mercantile men. In
this situation of things, you ask me what I think ought to be
done ? My opinion in this case is only the opinion of an indi-
vidual, and so far only as it corresponds with the opinions of
the honest and substantial part of the community, is it en-
titled to consideration. Though I am fully satisfied that the
state conventions ought most seriously to direct their exer-
tions to altering and amending the system proposed before
they shall adopt it — yet I have not sufiSciently examined the
subject, or formed an opinion, how far it will be practicable
for those conventions to carry their amendments. As to the
idea, that, it will be in vain for those conventions to attempt
amendments, it cannot be admitted ; it is impossible to say
whether they can or not until the attempt shall be made ; and
when it shall be determined, by experience, that the conven-
tions cannot agree in amendments, it will then be an import-
ant question before the people of the United States, whether
they will adopt or not the system proposed in its present
form. This subject of consolidating the states is new: and
because forty or fifty men have agreed in a system, to suppose
the good sense of this country, an enlightened nation, must
adopt it without examination, and though in a state of pro-
found peace, without endeavouring to amend those parts they
perceive are defective, dangerous to freedom, and destructive
of the valuable principles of republican government — is truly
humiliating. It is true there may be danger in delay ; but
there is danger in adopting the system in its present form ;
•and I see the danger in either case will arise principally from
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R.H.LEE. 321
the conduct and views of [37] two very unprincipled parties
in the United States — two fires, between which the honest
and substantial people have long found themselves situated.
One party is composed of little insurgents, men in debt, who •
want no law, and who want a share of the property of others ;
these are called levellers, Shayites, &c. The other party is
composed of a few, but more dangerous men, with their servile,
dependents ; these avariciously grasp at all power and prop- •
erty ; you may discover in all the actions of these men, an
evident dislike to free and equal government, and they will go
systematically to work to change, essentially, the forms of
government in this country ; these are called aristocrats,
m ites, &c. &c. Between these two parties is the weight
of the community ; the men of middling property, men not in
debt on the one hand, and men, on the other, content with
republican governments, and not aiming at immense fortunes,
offices, and power. In 1786, the little insurgents, the levellers,
came forth, invaded the rights of others, and attempted to
establish governments according to their wills. Their move-
ments evidently gave encouragement to the other party,
which, in 1787, has taken the political field, and with its
fashionable dependants, and the tongue and the pen, is en- ■
deavoring to establish in a great haste, a politer kind of gov-
ernment. These two parties, which will probably be opposed
or united as it may suit their interests and views, are really
insignificant, compared with the solid, free, and independent
part of the community. It is not my intention to suggest,
that either of these parties, and the real friends of the pro-
posed constitution, are the same men. The fact is, these
aristocrats support and hasten the adoption of the proposed
constitution, merely because they think it is a stepping stone
to their favorite object. I think I am well founded in this
idea ; I think the general politics of these men support it, as
well as the common observation among them, That the
proffered plan is the best that can be got at present, it will do
for a few years, and lead to something better. The sensible
and judicious part of the community will carefully weigh all
these circumstances ; they will view the late convention as
322 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
a respectable body of men — America probably never will see
an assembly of men, of a like number, more respectable. But
the members of the convention met without knowing the
sentiments of one man in ten thousand in these states respect-
ing the new ground taken. Their doings are but the first
attempts in the most important scene ever opened. Though
each individual in the state conventions will not, probably, be
so respectable as each individual in the federal eonvention,
yet as the state conventions will probably consist of fifteen
hundred or two thousand men of abilities, and versed in the
science of government, [38] collected from all parts of the
community and from all orders of men, it must be acknowl-
edged that the wetght of respectability will be in them — In
them will be collected the solid sense and the real political
character of the country. Being revisers of the subject, they
will possess peculiar advantages. To say that these conven-
tions ought not to attempt, coolly and deliberately, the re-
vision of the system, or that they cannot amend it, is very
foolish or very assuming. If these conventions, after examin-
ing the system, adopt it, I shall be perfectly satisfied, and
wish to see men make the administration of the government
an equal blessing to all orders of men. I believe the great
body of our people to be virtuous and friendly to good gov-
ernment, to the protection of liberty and property; and it is
the duty of all good men, especially of those who are placed
as sentinels to guard their rights — it is their duty to examine
into the prevailing politics of parties, and to disclose them —
while they avoid exciting undue suspicions, to lay facts before
the people, which will enable them to form a proper judg-
ment. Men who wish the people of this country to determine
for themselves, and deliberately to fit the government to their
situation, must feel some degree of indignation at those
. attempts to hurry the adoption of a system, and to shut the
door against examination. The very attempts create suspi-
cions, that those who make them have secret views, or see
some defects in the system, which, in the hurry of affairs, they
expect will escape the eye of a free people.
What can be the views of those gentlemen in Pennsylvania,
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 323
who precipitated decisions on this subject ? What can be the
views of those gentlemen in Boston, who countenanced the
Printers in shutting up the press against a fair and free investi-
gation of this important system in the usual way. The mem-
bers of the convention have done their duty why should
some of them fly to their states — almost forget a propriety of
behaviour, and precipitate measures for the adoption of a
system of their own making? I confess candidly, when I
consider these circumstances in connection with the un-
guarded parts of the system I have mentioned, I feel disposed
to proceed with very great caution, and to pay more attention
than usual to the conduct of particular characters. If the
constitution presented be a good one, it will stand the test
with a well informed people : all are agreed that there shall
be state conventions to examine it ; and we must believe it
will be adopted, unless we suppose it is a bad one, or that
those conventions will make false divisions respecting it. I
admit improper measures are taken against the adoption of
•the system as well for it all who object to the plan pro-
posed ought to point out the defects [39] objected to, and to
propose those amendments with which they can accept it, or
to propose some other system of government, that the public
mind may be known, and that we may be brought to agree
in some system of government, to strengthen and execute
the present, or to provide a substitute. I consider the field
of enquiry just opened, and that we are to look to the state
conventions for ultimate decisions on the subject before us; it
is not to be presumed, that they will differ about small amend-
ments, and lose a system when they shall have made it sub-
stantially good ; but touching the essential amendments, it is
to be presumed the several conventions will pursue the most
rational measures to agree in and obtain them ; and such de-
iects as they shall discover and not remove, they will probably
notice, keep them in view as the ground work of future
amendments, and in the firm and manly language which every
free people ought to use, will suggest to those who may here-
after administer the government, that it is their expectation,
►that the system will be so organized by legislative acts, and the
324 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE.
government so administered, as to render those defects as
little injurious as possible. Our countrymen are entitled to
an honest and faithful government ; to a government of laws
and not of men ; and also to one of their chusing — as a citizen
of the country, I wish to see these objects secured, and
licentious, assuming, and overbearing men restrained ; if the
constitution or social compact be vague and unguarded, then
we depend wholly upon the prudence, wisdom and moder-
ation of those who manage the affairs of government ; or
on what, probably, is equally uncertain and precarious, the
success of the people oppressed by the abuse of government,
in receiving it from the hands of those who abuse it, and
placing it in the hands of those who will use it well.
In every point of view, therefore, in which I have been
able, as yet, to contemplate this subject, I can discern but one
rational mode of proceeding relative to it : and that is to ex-
amine it with freedom and candour, to have state conventions
some months hence, which shall examine coolly every article,
clause, and word in the system proposed, and to adopt it with
such amendments as they shall think fit. How far the state
conventions ought to pursue the mode prescribed by the
federal convention of adopting or rejecting the plan in toto, I
leave it to them to determine. Our examination of the sub-
ject hitherto has been rather of a general nature. The re-
publican characters in the several states, who wish to make
this plan more adequate to security of liberty and property,
and to the duration of the principles of a free government,
will, no doubt, collect their opinions to certain points, and
accurately define those [40] alterations and amendments they
wish ; if it shall be found they essentially disagree in them,
the conventions will then be able to determine whether to
adopt the plan as it is, or what will be proper to be done.
Under these impressions, and keeping in view the improper
and unadvisable lodgment of powers in the general govern-
ment, organized as it at present is, touching internal taxes,
armies and militia, the elections of its own members, causes
between citizens of different states, &c. and the want of a
more perfect bill of rights, &c. I drop the subject for the
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 325
present, and when I shall have leisure to revise and correct
my ideas respecting it, and to collect into points the opinions
of those who wish to make the system more secure and safe,
perhaps I may proceed to point out particularly for your
consideration, the amendments which ought to be ingrafted
into this system, not only in conformity to my own, but the
deliberate opinions of others — you will with me perceive, that
the objections to the plan proposed may, by a more leisure
examination be set in a stronger point of view, especially the
important one, that there is no substantial representation of
the people provided for in a government in which the most
essential powers, even as to the internal police of the country,
is proposed to be lodged.
I think the honest and substantial part of the community
will wish to see this system altered, permanency and consist-
ency given to the constitution we shall adopt ; and therefore
they will be anxious to apportion the powers to the features
and organizations of the government, and to see abuse in the
exercise of power more effectually guarded against. It is
suggested, that state officers, from interested motives will
oppose the constitution presented 1 see no reason for this,
their places in general will not be effected, but new openings
to offices and places of profit must evidently be made by the
adoption of the constitution in its present form.
Your's, &c.
THE FEDERAL FARMER.
To the Republican.
The Objections of the / Hon. George Mason, / to
the proposed Foederal Constitution. / Addressed to the
Citizens of Virginia. / / Printed by Thomas
Nicholas.
Folio, Broadside.
George Mason was a member of the Federal Convention,
but refused to sign the Constitution, and was a leader of the
opposition to its ratification in the Virginia Convention.
" I take the liberty to enclose to you my objections to the
new Constitution of government, which a little moderation
and temper at the end of the convention might have re-
moved.... You will readily observe, that my objections are
not numerous (the greater part of the enclosed paper contain-
ing reasonings upon the probable effects of the exceptionable
parts), though in my mind some of them are capital ones."
Mason to Washington, October 7th, 1787.
Madison's letter to Washington of October i8th, 1787,
contains a cursory answer to Mason's "Objections," and a
more elaborate one by James Iredell is printed in this volume.
P. L. F.
npHERE is no declaration of rights: and the laws of the
■*■ general government being paramount to the. laws and
constitutions of the several states, the declarations of rights, ,'
in the separate states, are no security. Nor are the people
secured even in the enjoyment of the benefit of the common
law, which stands here upon no other foundation than its
Jiaving been adopted by the respective acts forming the con-
stitutions of the several states.
In the House of Representatives there is not the sub-
stance, but the shadow only of representation; which can
never produce proper information in the legislature, or inspire
confidence in the people. — The laws will, therefore, be gener-
ally made by men little concerned in, and unacquainted with
their effects and consequences.*
The Senate have the. power of altering all money-bills, and
of originating appropriations of money, and the salaries of
the officers of their appointment, in conjunction with the
President of the United States — Although they are not the
representatives of the people, or amenable to them. These,
with their other great powers, (viz. their powers in the appoint-
ment of ambassadors, and all public officers, in making trea-
ties, and in trying all impeachments) their influence upon, and
connection with, the supreme executive from these causes,
their duration of office, and their being a constant existing
body, almost continually sitting, joined with their being one
complete branch of the legislature, will destroy any balance in
the government, and enable them to accomplish what usurpa-
tions they please, upon the rights and hberties of the people.
The judiciary of the United States is so constructed and
extended, as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the sev- /
* This objection has been in some degree lessened, by an amendment, often
before refused, and at last made by an erasure, after the engrossment upon
parchment, of the word forty, and inserting thirty, in the third clause of the
second section of the first article.
33 O OBJECTIONS OF GEORGE MASON.
eral states ; thereby rendering laws as tedious, intricate, and
expensive, and justice as unattainable' by a great part of the
community, as in England ; and enabling the rich to oppress
and ruin the poor.
The President of the United States has no constitutional
council (a thing unknown in any safe and regular government.)
he will therefore be unsupported by proper information and
advice ; and will generally be directed by minions and favor-
ites — or he will become a tool to the Senate — or a council of
state will grow out of the principal ofificers of the great depart-
ments — the worst and most dangerous of all ingredients for
such a council, in a free country ; for they may be induced to
join in any dangerous or oppressive measures, to shelter them-
selves, and prevent an inquiry into their own misconduct in
office. Whereas, had a constitutional council been formed (as
was proposed) of six members, viz., two from the eastern, two
from the middle, and two from the southern states, to be ap-
pointed by vote of the states in the House of Representatives,
with the same duration and rotation of ofifice as the SenatCj
the executive would always have had safe and proper informa-
tion and advice ; the president of such a council might have
acted as Vice-President of the United StdXes; pro tempore, upon
any vacancy or disability of the chief magistrate ; and long
continued sessions of the Senate, would in a great measure
have been prevented. From this fatal defect of a constitutional
council, has arisen the improper power of the Senate, in the
appointment of the public officers, and the alarming depend-
ence and connexion between that 'branch of the legislature
and the supreme executive. Hence, also, sprung that un-
necessary officer, the Vice-President, who, for want of other
employment, is made President of the Senate ; thereby
dangerously blending the executive and legislative powers ;
besides always giving to some one of the states an unnecessary
and unjust pre-eminence over the others.
The President of the United States has the unrestrained
power of granting pardon for treason ; which may be some-
times exercised to screen from punishment those whom he
had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby pre-
OBJECTIONS OF GEORGE MASON. 33 1
vent a discovery of his own guilt. By declaring all treaties
supreme laws of the land, the executive and the Senate have, in
many cases, an exclusive power of legislation, which might
have been avoided, by proper distinctions with respect to
treaties, and requiring the assent of the House of Represen-
tatives, where it could be done with safety.
By requiring only a majority to make all commercial and
navigation laws, the five southern states (whose produce and
circumstances are totally different from those of the eight
northern and eastern states) will be ruined : for such rigid and
premature regulations may be made, as will enable the mer-
chants of the northern and eastern states not only to demand
an exorbitant freight, but to monopolize the purchase of the
commodities, at their own price, for many years, to the great
injury of the landed interest, and the impoverishment of the
people : and the danger is the greater, as the gain on one side
will be in proportion to the loss on the other. Whereas, re-
quiring two-thirds of the members present in both houses,
would have produced mutual moderation, promoted the gen-
eral interest, and removed an insuperable objection to the
adoption of the government.
Under their own construction of the general clause at the
end of the enumerated powers, the Congress may grant
monopolies in trade and commerce, constitute new crimes,
inflict unusual and severe punishments, and extend their
power as far as they shall think proper; so that the state
legislatures have no security for the powers now presumed to
remain to them ; or the people for their rights. There is no
declaration of any kind for preserving the liberty of the press,
the trial by jury in civil cases, nor against the danger of
standing armies in time of peace.
The state legislatures are restrained from laying export
duties on their own produce — the general legislature is re-
strained from prohibiting the further importation of slaves for
twenty odd years, though such importations render the United
States weaker, more vulnerable, and less capable of defence.
Both the general legislature, and the state legislatures are
expressly prohibited making ex post facto laws, though there
332 OBJECTIONS BY GEORGE MASON.
never was, nor can be, a legislature, but must and will make
such laws, when necessity and the public safety require them,
which will hereafter be a breach of all the constitutions in the
union; and afford precedents for other innovations.
This government will commence in a moderate aristocracy ;
it is at present impossible to foresee whether it will, in its
operation, produce a monarchy, or a corrupt oppressive
aristocracy ; it will most probably vibrate some years between
•the two, and then terminate in the one or the other.
GEO. MASON.
[Answers to Mr. Mason's objections to the new Con-
stitution, recommended by the late Convention. By
Marcus. Newbern : Printed by Hodge and Wills,
1788.]
By James Iredell, member of the first North Carolina
Convention. This argument was originally published in the
State Gazette of North Carolina, and was republished in
pamphlet form, together with pieces by Archibald Maclaine
and William R. Davie. The most careful search has not
enabled me to find the pamphlet, so I am forced to reprint
the "answers " from McRee's Life of James Iredell, a work
of considerable rarity; and in consequence the above title is
certainly not that of the pamphlet.
" I have read with great pleasure your answer to Mr.
Mason's objections ; and surely every man who read them,
and on whom Mr. Mason's observations, or indeed the argu-
ments of those in opposition in general have had any effect,
must be convinced that the objections to the constitution are
without foundation." Wither spoon to Iredell, April 3, 1788.
p. L. F.
I. Objection.
" There is no declaration of rights, and the laws of the gene-
ral government being paramount to the laws and constitutions
of the several States, the declarations of rights in the separate
States are no security. Nor are the people secured even in the
enjoyment of the benefit of the common law, which stands here
upon no other foundation than its having been adopted by the
respective acts forming the Constitutions of the several States."
Answer.
I. As to the want of a declaration of rights. The introduc-
tion of these in England, from which the idea was originally
taken, was in consequence of usurpations of the Crown, con-
trary, as was conceived, to the principles of their government.
But there no original constitution is to be found, and the
only meaning of a declaration of rights in that country is, that
in certain particulars specified, the Crown had no authority to
act. Could this have been necessary had there been a consti-
tution in being by which it could have been clearly discerned
whether the Crown had such authority or not? Had the
people, by a solemn instrument, delegated particular powers
to the Crown at the formation of their government, surely the
Crown, which in that case could claim under that instrument
only, could not have contended for more power than was con-
veyed by it. So it is in regard to the new Constitution here :
the future government which may be formed under that
authority certainly cannot act beyond the warrant of that
authority. As well might they attempt to impose a King
upon America, as go one step in any other respect beyond
the terms of their institution. The question then only is,
whether more power will be vested in the future government
than is necessary for the general purposes of the union. This
may occasion a ground of dispute— but after expressly de-
336 ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
fining the powers that are to be exercised, to say that they
:shall exercise no other powers (either by a general or particular
■enumeration) would seem to me both nugatory and ridiculous.
As well might a Judge when he condemns a man to be
iianged, give strong injunctions to the Sheriff that he should
/not be beheaded.*
2, As to the common law, it is diiificult to know what is
uneant by that part of the objection. So far as the people are
now entitled to the benefit of the common law, they certainly
iwill have a right to enjoy it under the new Constitution until
^altered by the general legislature, which even in this point has
.5ome cardinal limits assigned to it. What are most acts of
Assembly but a deviation in some degree from the principles
■of the common law? The people are expressly secured (con-
-trary to Mr. Mason's wishes) against ex post facto laws ; so
ithat th£ tenure of any property at any time held under the
principles of the common law, cannot be altered by any
future act of the general legislature. The principles of the
•common Jaw, as they now apply, must surely always hereafter
.apply, except in those particulars in which express authority
as given iby this constitution ; in no other particulars can the
Congress have authority to change it, and I believe it cannot
be shown that any one power of this kind given is unneces-
sarily given, or that the power would answer its proper purpose
if the legislature was restricted from any innovations on the
principles of the common law, which would not in all cases
suit the vast variety of incidents that might arise out it.
II. Objection.
" In the House of Representatives there is not the sub-
stance, but the shadow only of representation ; which can
never produce proper information in the legislature, or inspire
* It appears to me a very just remark of Mr. Wilson's, in his celebrated
■speech, that a bill of rights would have been dangerous, as implying that with-
out such a reservation the Congress would have had authority in the cases
^enumerated, so that if any had been omitted (and who would undertake to
recite all the State and individual rights not relinquished by the new Constitu-
<tion?).they might have been considered at the mercy of the general legislature.
ANSWER TO MASON S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 337
confidence in the people ; the laws will therefore generally be
made by men little concerned in, and unacquainted with their
effects and consequences."
Answer.
This is a mere matter of calculation. It is said the weight
of this objection was in a great measure removed by altering
the number of 40,000 to 30,000 constituents. To show the
discontented nature of man, some have objected to the number
of representatives as being too large. I leave to every man's
judgment whether the number is not sufificiently respectable,
and whether, if that number be sufificient, it would have been
right, in the very infancy of this government, to burthen the
people with a great additional expense to answer no good
purpose.*
III. Objection.
" The Senate have the power of altering all money bills,
and of originating appropriations of money, and the salaries
of the officers of their own appointment, in conjunction with
the President of the United States ; although they are not the
representatives of the people or amenable to them. — These,
with their other great powers (viz. their powers in the appoint-
ment of Ambassadors, and all public officers, in making trea-
ties and trying all impeachments) their influence upon and
connection with the supreme Executive, from these causes,
their duration of office, and their being a constant existing
body almost continually sitting, joined with their being one
complete branch of the legislature, will destroy any balance in
the government, and enable them to accomplish what usurpa-
tions they please upon the rights and liberties of the people."
* I have understood it was considered at the Convention, that the propor-
tion of one Representative to 30,000 constituents, would produce at the very
first nearly the number that would be satisfactory to Mr. Mason. So that I
presume this reason was wrote before the material alteration was made from
40,000 to 30,000, which is said to have taken place the very last day just before
the signature.
338 ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
Answer.
This objection, respecting the dangerous power of the
Senate, is one of that kind which may give rise to a great deal
of gloomy prediction, without any solid foundation : An
imagination indulging itself in chimerical fears, upon the dis-
appointment of a favorite plan, may point out danger arising
from any system of government whatever, even if angels were
to have the administration of it ; since I presume none but
the Supreme Being himself is altogether perfect, and of course
every other species of beings may abuse any delegated por-
tion of power. This sort of visionary scepticism therefore will
lead us to this alternative, either to have no government at all,
or to form the best system we can, making allowance for
human imperfection. In my opinion the fears as to the
power of the Senate are altogether groundless, as to any
probability of their being either able or willing to do any im-
portant mischief. My reasons are,
1. Because, though they are not immediately to represent
the people, yet they are to represent the representatives of the
people who are annually chosen, and it is therefore probable
the most popular, or confidential, persons in each State, will
be elected members of the Senate.
2. Because one-third of the Senate are to be chosen as
often as the immediate representatives of the people, and as
the President can act in no case from which any great danger
can be apprehended without the concurrence of two-thirds, let
us think ever so ill of the designs of the President, and the
danger of a combination of power among a standing body
generally associated with him, unless we suppose every one of
them to be base and infamous (a supposition, thank God, bad
as human nature is, not within the verge of the slightest
probability), we have reason to believe that the one-third
newly intro.duced every second year, will bring with them
from the immediate body of the people, a sufficient portion of
patriotism and independence to check any exorbitant designs
of the rest.
3. Because in their legislative capacity they can do nothing
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 339
without the concurrence of the House of Representatives, and
we need look no farther than England for a clear proof of the
amazing consequence which representatives of the people
bear in a free government. There the King (who is heredi-
tary, and therefore not so immediately interested, according
to narrow views of interest which commonly govern Kings, to
consult the welfare of his people) has the appointment to
almost every ofifice in the government, many of which are of
high dignity and great pecuniary value, has the creation of
as many Peers as he pleases, is not restricted from bestowing
places on the members of both houses of Parliament, and has
a direct negative on all bills, besides the power of dissolving
the Parliament at his pleasure. In theory would not any one
say this power was enormous enough to destroy any balance
in the constitution? Yet what does the history of that
country tell us ? — that so great is the natural power of the
House of Commons (though a very imperfect representation
of the people, and a large proportion of them actually pur-
chasing their seats) that ever since the revolution the Crown
has continually aimed to corrupt them by the disposal of places
and pensions ; that without their hearty concurrence it found
all the wheels of government perpetually clogged ; and that
notwithstanding this, in great critical emergencies, the mem-
bers have broke through the trammels of power and interest,
and by speaking the sense of the people (though so imper-
fectly representing them) either forced an alteration of meas-
ures, or made it necesary for the Crown to dissolve them. If
their power, under these circumstancrs, is so great, what
would it be if their representation was perfect, and their
members could hold no appointments, and at the same time
had a security for their seats ? The danger of a destruction
of the balance would be perhaps on the popular side, notwith-
standing the hereditary tenure and weighty prerogatives of the
Crown, and the permanent station and great wealth and
consequence of the Lords. Our representatives therefore
being an adequate and fair representation of the people, and
they being expressly excluded from the possession of any
places, and not holding their existence upon any precarious
340 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
tenure, must have vast influence, and considering that in every
popular government the danger of faction is often very seri-
ous and alarming, if such a danger could not be checked in its
instant operation by some other power more independent of
the immediate passions of the people, and capable therefore of
thinking with more coolness, the government might be de-
stroyed by a momentary impulse of passion, which the very
members who indulged it might for ever afterwards in vain
deplore. The institution of the Senate seems well calculated
to answer this salutary purpose. Excluded as they are from
places themselves, they appear to be as much above the
danger of personal temptation as men can be. They have no
permanent interest as a body to detach them from the general
welfare, since six years is the utmost period of their existence,
unless their respective legislatures are sufficiently pleased
with their conduct to re-elect them. This power of re-election
is itself a great check upon abuse, because if they have ambi-
tion to continue members of the Senate they can only gratify
this ambition by acting agreeably to the opinion of their con-
stituents. The House of Representatives, as immediately
representing the people, are to originate all money bills. This-
I think extremely right, and it is certainly a very capital
acquisition to the popular representative. But what harm can
arise from the Senate, who are nearly a popular representative
also, proposing amendments, when those amendments must
be concurred with by the original proposers ? The wisdom of
the Senate may sometimes point out amendments, the pro-
priety of which the other House may be very sensible of,
though they had not occurred to themselves. There is no
great danger of any body of men suffering by too eager an
adoption of any amendment proposed to any system of their
own. The probability is stronger of their being too tenacious
of their original opinion, however erroneous, than of their
profiting by the wise information of any other persons what-
ever. Human nature is so constituted, and therefore I think
we may safely confide in the free admission of an intercourse
of opinion on the detail of business, as well as to taxation as^
to other points. Our House of Representatives surely could
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 341
not have such reason to dread the power of a Senate circum-
stanced as ours must be, as the House of Commons in Eng-
land the permanent authority of the Peers, and therefore a
jealousy, which may be well grounded in the one case would
be entirely ill-directed in the other. For similar reasons I
dread not any power of originating appropriations of money
as mentioned in the objection. While the concurrence of the
other House must be had, and as that must necessarily be the
most weighty in the government, I think no danger is to he-.
apprehended. The Senate has no such authority as to awe or-
influence the House of Representatives, and it will be as neces-
sary for the one as for the other that proper active measures-,
should be pursued : And in regard to appropriations of
money, occasions for such appropriations may, on account of
their concurrence with the executive power, occur to the-
Senate, which would not to the House of Representatives, and.
therefore if the Senate were precluded from laying any sucht
proposals before the House of Representatives, the govern-
ment might be embarrassed ; and it ought ever to be remem-
bered, that in our views of distant and chimerical dangers we
ought not to hazard our very existence as a people, by pro-
posing such restrictions as may prevent the exertion of any
necessary power. The power of the Senate in the appoint-
ment of Ambassadors, &c., is designed as a check upon the
President. They must be appointed in some manner. If the
appointment was by the President alone, or by the Presi-
dent and a Privy Council (Mr. Mason's favorite plan), an
objection to such a system would have appeared much
more plausible. It would have been said that this was ap-
proaching too much towards monarchical power, and if this
new Privy Council had been like all I have ever heard of, it
would have afforded little security against an abuse of power
in the President. It ought to be shown by reason and proba-
bility (not bold assertion) how this concurrence of power with
the President can make the Senate so dangerous. It is as
good an argument to say that it will not as that it will.* The
* If seems by the letter which has been published of Mr. Elsworth and Mr.
Sherman, as if one reason of giving a share in these appointments to the Senate
■was, that persons in what are called the lesser States might have an equal
342 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
power of making treaties is so important that it would have
been highly dangerous to vest it in the Executive alone, and
would have been the subject of much greater clamor. From
the nature of the thing, it could not be vested in the popular
representative. It must therefore have been provided for
with the Senate's concurrence, or the concurrence of a Privy
Council (a thing which I believe nobody has been mad enough
to propose), or the power, the greatest monarchical power that
can be exercised, must have been vested in a manner that
would have excited universal indignation in the President
alone. — As to the power of trying impeachments: — Let Mr.
Mason show where this power could more properly have
been placed. It is a necessary power in every free govern-
ment, since even the Judges of the Supreme Court of Judica-
ture themselves may require a trial, and other public officers
might have too much influence before an ordinary and common
court. And what probability is there that such a court, act-
ing in so solemn a manner, should abuse its power (especially
as it is wisely provided that the sentences shall extend only
to removal from office and incapacitation) more than any other
court ? The argument as to the possible abuse of power, as I
have before suggested, will reach all delegation of power, since
all power may be abused when fallible beings are to execute
it ; but we must take as much caution as we can, being careful
at the same time not to be too wise to do any thing at all. —
The bold assertions at the end of this objection are mere
declamation, and till some reason is assigned for them, I shall
take the liberty to rely upon the reasons I have stated above,
as affording a belief that the popular representative must for
ever be the most weighty in this government, and of course
that apprehensions of danger from such a Senate are altogether
ill-founded.
IV. Objection.
" The judiciary of the United States is so constructed and
extended, as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the sev-
chance for such appointments, in proportion to their merit, with those in the
larger, an advantage that could only be expected from a body in which the
States were equally represented.
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 343
eral States ; thereby rendering law as tedious, intricate and
expensive and justice as unattainable by a great part of the
community, as in England ; and enabling the rich to oppress
and ruin the poor."
Answer.
Mr. Mason has here asserted, " That the judiciary of the
United States is so constructed and extended, as to absorb
and destroy the judiciaries of the several States." How is
this the case? Are not the State judiciaries left uncontrolled
as to the affairs of that State only ? In this, as in all other
cases, where there is a wise distribution, power is commensur-
ate to its object. With the mere internal concerns of a State')
Congress are to have nothing to do : In no case but where the
Union is in some measure concerned, are the federal courts to
have any jurisdiction. The State Judiciary will be a satellite
waiting upon its proper planet : That of the Union, like the
sun, cherishing and preserving a whole planetary system.
In regard to a possible ill construction of this authority, we
must depend upon our future legislature in this case as well
as others, in respect to which it is impracticable to define every
thing, that it will be provided for so as to occasion as little /
expense and distress to individuals as can be. In parting
with the coercive authority over the States as States, there must
be a coercion allowed as to individuals. The former power no
man of common sense can any longer seriously contend for ; the
latter is the only alternative. Suppose an objection should be
made that the future legislature should not ascertain salaries,
because they might divide among themselves and their officers
all the revenue of the Union.* Will not every man see how
* When I wrote the above, I had not seen Governor Randolph's letter.
Otherwise, I have so great a respect for that gentleman's character I should
have treated with more deference an idea in some measure countenanced by
him. One of his objections relates to the Congress fixing their own salaries.
I am persuaded, upon a little reflection, that gentleman must think this is one
of those cases where a trust must unavoidably be reposed. No salaries could
certainly be fix6d now so as to answer the various changes in the value of
money that in the course of time must take place. And in what condition
would the supreme authority be if their very existence depended on an inferior
power ! An abuse in this case too would be so gross that it is very unlikely
to happen, but if it should it would probably prove much more fatal to the
authors than injurious to the people.
344 ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
irrational it is to expect that any government can exist which
is to be fettered in its most necessary operations for fear of
abuse ?
V. Objection.
" The President of the United States has no constitutional
Council (a thing unknown in any safe and regular govern-
ment), he will therefore be unsupported by proper informa-
tion and advice, and will generally be directed by minions and
favorites — or he will become a tool to the Senate — or a
Council of State will grow out of the principal officers of the
great departments ; the worst and most dangerous of all
ingredients for such a Council in a free country, for they may
be induced to join in any dangerous or oppressive measures,
to shelter themselves, and prevent an inquiry into their own
misconduct in ofifice : Whereas, had a constitutional Council
been formed (as was proposed) of six members, viz., two from
the eastern, two from the middle, and two from the southern
States, to be appointed by a vote of the States in the House
of Representatives, with the same duration and rotation of
ofifice as the Senate, the Executive would always have had
safe and proper information and advice : The President of such
a Council might have acted as Vice-President of the United
States, pro tempore, upon any vacancy or disability of the
Chief Magistrate, and long-continued sessions of the Senate
would in a great measure have been prevented. From this
fatal defect of a constitutional Council has arisen the improper
power of the Senate, in the appointment of public officers,
and the alarming dependence and connection between that
branch of the legislature and the Supreme Executive. Hence
also sprung that unnecessary and dangerous officer, the Vice-
President, who for want of other employment, is made
President of the Senate ; thereby dangerously blending the
Executive and Legislative powers ; besides always giving to
some one of the States an unnecessary and unjust pre-emin-
ence over the others."
Answer.
Mr. Mason here reprobates the omission of a particular
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 345
Council for the President, as a thing contrary to the example
of all safe and regular governments. Perhaps there are very
few governments now in being deserving of that character, if
under the idea of safety he means to include safety for a
proper share of personal freedom, without which their safety
and regularity in other respects would be of little consequence
to a people so justly jealous of liberty as I hope the people in
America ever will be. Since however Mr. Mason refers us to
such authority, I think I cannot do better than to select for
the subject of our inquiry in this particular, a government
which must be universally acknowledged to be the most safe
and regular of any considerable government now in being
(though I hope America will soon be able to dispute that pre-
eminence). Every body must know I speak of Great Britain,
and in this I think I give Mr. Mason all possible advantage,
since in my opinion it is most probable he had Great Britain
principally in his eye when he made this remark, and in the
very height of our quarrel with that country, so wbdded were
our ideas to the institution of a Council, that the practice was
generally if not universally followed at the formation of our
governments, though we instituted Councils of a quite differ-
ent nature, and so far as the little experience of the writer
goes, have very little benefited by it. My inquiry into this
subject shall not be confined to the actual present practice of
Great Britain ; I shall take the liberty to state the Constitu-
tional ideas of Councils in England, as derived from their
ancient law subsisting long before the Union,, not omitting
however to show what the present practice really is. By the
laws of England * the King is said to have four Councils, —
I, The High Court of Parliament ; 2, The Peers of the realm ;
3, His Judges ; 4, His Privy Council. By the first, I presume
is meant, in regard to the making of laws ; because the usual
introductory expressions in most acts of Parliament, viz., " By
the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and
consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons,"
&c., show that in a constitutional sense, they are deemed the
*See Coke's Commentary upon' Littleton, no. i. Blackstone's Commen-
tary, 227 and seq.
346 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
King's laws, after a ratification in Parliament. The Peers of
the realm are by their birth hereditary Counsellors of the
Crown, and may be called upon for their advice, either in time
of Parliament, or when no Parliament is in being : They are
called in some law books Magnum Concilium Regis (the King's
Great Council). It is also considered the privilege of every
particular Peer to demand an audience of the King, and to lay
before him anything he may deem of public importance. The
Judges, I presume, are called " Council of the King," upon the
same principle as the Parliament is, because the administration
of justice is in his name, and the Judges are considered as his
instruments in the distribution of it. We come now to the
Privy Council, which I imagine, if Mr. Mason had any particular
view towards England when he made this objection, was the
one he intended as an example of a Constitutional Council in
that kingdom. The Privy Council in that country is undoubt-
edly of very ancient institution, but it has one fixed property
invariably annexed to it, that it is a mere creature of the
Crown, dependent on its will both for number and duration,
since the King may, whenever he thinks proper, discharge any
member, or the whole of it, and appoint another.* If this
precedent is of moment to us, merely as a precedent, it should
be followed in all its parts, and then what would there be in
the regulation to prevent the President being governed by
" minions and favorites ? " It would only be the means of riv-
eting them on constitutional ground. So far as the precedents
in England apply, the Peers being constitutionally the Great
Council of the King, though also a part of the legislature,
we have reason to hope that there is by no means such a
gross impropriety as has been suggested in giving the Senate,
though a branch of the legislature, a strong control over the
Executive. The only difference in the two cases is, that the
Crown in England may or may not give this consequence to
the Peers at its own pleasure, and accordingly we find that for
a long time past this great Council has been very seldom con-
sulted ; under our constitution the President is allowed no
option in respect to certain points wherein he cannot act with-
* I. Blackstone's Commentaries, 232.
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 347
out the Senate's concurrence. But we cannot infer from any
example in England, that a concurrence between the Ex-
ecutive and a part of the legislative is contrary to the maxims
of their government, since their government allows of such a
concurrence whenever the Executive pleases. The rule, there-
fore, from the example of the freest government in Europe,
that the Legislative and Executive powers must be altogether
distinct, is liable to exceptions ; it does not mean that the
Executive shall not form a part of the Legislative (for the
King, who has the whole Executive authority, is one entire
branch of the legislature, and this Montesquieu, who recognizes
the general principle, declares is necessary) ; neither can it
mean (as the example above evinces) that the Crown must
consult neither House as to any exercise of the Executive
power. But its meaning must be, that one power shall not
include both authorities. The King, for instance, shall not
have the sole Executive and sole Legislative authority also.
He may have the former, but must participate the latter with
the two Houses of Parliament. The rule lalso would be in-
fringed were the three branches of the legislature to share
jointly the Executive power. But so long as the people's rep-
resentatives are altogether distinct from the Executive autho-
rity, the liberties of the people may be deemed secure. And
in. this point surely, there can be no manner of comparison
between the provisions by which the independence of our
House of Representatives is guarded, and the condition in
which the British House of Commons is left exposed to every
species of corruption. But Mr. Mason says, for want of a
Council, the President may become "a tool of the Senate."
Why ? Because he cannot act without their concurrence.
Would not the same reason hold for his being "a tool to the
Council," if he could not act without their concurrence, sup-
posing a Council was to be imposed upon him without his own
nomination (according to Mr. Mason's plan)? As great care
is taken to make him independent of the Senate as I believe
human precaution can provide. Whether the President will
be a tool to any persons will depend upon the man, and the
same weakness of mind which would make him pliable to one
348 ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
body of control, would certainly attend him with another. But
Mr. Mason objects, if he is not directed by minions and favorites,
nor becomes a tool of the Senate," a Council of State will grow
out of the principal officers of the great departments ; the
worst and most dangerous of all ingredients for such a Coun-
cil in a free country ; for they may be induced to join in any
dangerous or oppressive measures, to shelter themselves, and
prevent an inquiry into their own misconduct in ofifice." I beg
leave to carry him again to my old authority, England, and
ask him, what efficient Council they have there but one formed
of their great officers. Notwithstanding their important Con-
stittitional Council, everybody knows that the whole move-
ments of their Government, where a Council is consulted at
all, are directed by their Cabinet Council, composed entirely of
the principal officers of the great departments ; that when a
Privy Council is called, it is scarcely ever for any other purpose
than to give a formal sanction to the previous determinations
of the other, so much so that it is notorious that not one time in
a thousand one member of the Privy Council, except a known
adherent of administration, is summoned to it. But though
the President under our constitution may have the aid of the
^'principal officers of the great departments," he is to have
this aid, I think, in the most unexceptionable manner possible.
He is not to be assisted by a Council summoned to a jovial
dinner perhaps, and giving their opinions according to the nod
of the President ; but the opinion is to be given with the ut-
most solemnity in writing. No after equivocation can explain
it away. It must for ever afterwards speak for itself, and
commit the character of the writer, in lasting colors, either
of fame or infamy, or neutral insignificance, to future ages, as
well as the present. From those written reasons, weighed
with care, surely the President can form as good a judgment,
as if they had been given by a dozen formal characters, care-
lessly met together on a slight appointment ; and this further
advantage would be derived from the proposed system (which
would be wanting if he had constitutional advice to screen
him), that the President must be personally responsible for
•everything — for though an ingenious gentleman has proposed,
ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 349
that a Council should be responsible for their opinions, and the
same sentiment of justice might be applied to these opinions
of the great officers, I am persuaded it will in general be
thought infinitely more safe, as well as more just, that the
President who acts should be responsible for his conduct, fol-
lowing advice at his peril, than that there should be a danger
of punishing any man for an erroneous opinion which might
possibly be sincere. Besides the morality of this scheme,
which may well be questioned, its inexpediency is glaring,
since it would be so plausible an excuse and the insincerity
of it so difficult to detect, the hopes of impunity this avenue
to escape would afford would nearly take away all dread of
punishment. As to the temptation mentioned to the officers
joining in dangerous or oppresssve measures to shelter them-
selves, and prevent an inquiry into their own misconduct in
office, this proceeds upon a supposition that the President and
the great officers may form a very wicked combination to in-
jure their country, a combination that in the first place it is
utterly improbable, in a strong respectable government should
be formed for that purpose, and in the next, with such a gov-
ernment as this constitution would give us, could have little
chance of being successful, on account of the great superior
strength and natural and jealous vigilance of one at least, if
not both the weighty branches of legislation. This evil, how-
ever, of the possible depravity of all public officers, is one that
can admit of no cure, since in every institution of government
the same danger in some degree or other must be risked ; it
can only be guarded against by strong checks, and I believe
it be difficult for the objectors to our new Constitution
to provide stronger ones against any abuse of the Exec-
utive authority then will exist in that. As to the Vice
President, it appears to me very proper he should be chosen
;much in the same manner as the President, in order that the
: States may be secure, upon any accidental loss by death or
'Otherwise of the President's service, of the services in the
same important station of the man in whom they repose their
second confidence. The complicated manner of election
-wisely prescribed would necessarily occasion a considerable
350 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
delay in the choice of another, and in the mean time the
President of the Council, though very fit for the purpose of
advising, might be very ill qualified, especially in a critical
period, for an active Executive department. I am concerned
to see, among Mr. Mason's other reasons, so trivial a one as
the little advantage one State might accidentally gain by a
Vice President of their country having a seat, with merely a
casting vote, in the Senate. Such a reason is utterly un-
worthy of that spirit of amity, , and rejection of local views,
which can alone save us from destruction. It was the glory of
the late Convention, that by discarding such they formed a
general government upon principles that did as much honor to
their hearts as to their understandings. God grant, that in all
our deliberations, we may consider America as one body, and
not divert our attention from so able a prospect to small con-
siderations of partial jealousy and distrust. It is in vain to
expect upon any system to secure an exact equilibrium of
power for all the States. Some will occasionally have an
advantage from the superior abilities of its members ; the field
of emulation is however open to all. Suppose any one should '
now object to the superior influence of Virginia (and the
writer of this is not a citizen of that State), on account of the
high character of General Washington, confessedly the great-
est man of the present age, and perhaps equal to any that has
existed in any period of time ; would this be a reason for
refusing a union with her, though the other States can scarcely
hope for the consolation of ever producing his equal ?
VI. Objection.
" The President of the United States has the unrestrained
power of granting pardons for treason ; which may be some-
times exercised to screen from punishment those whom he had
secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby prevent
a discovery of his own guilt."
Answer.
Nobody can contend upon any rational principles, that a
power of pardoning should not exist somewhere in every gov-
ANSWER TO MASONS OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 35 1
ernment, because it will often happen in every country that
men are obnoxious to a lawful conviction, who yet are entitled,
from some favorable circumstances in their case, to a merciful
interposition in their favor. The advocates of monarchy have
accordingly boasted of this, as one of the advantages of that
form of government, in preference to a republican ; neverthe-
less this authority is vested in the Stadtholder in Holland, and
I believe is vested in every Executive power in America. It
seems to have been wisely the aim of the late Convention, in
forming a general government for America, to combine the
acknowledged advantages of the British constitution with
proper republican checks to guard as much as possible against
abuses, and it would have been very strange if they had omit-
ted this, which has the sanction of such great antiquity in that
country, and if I am not mistaken, a universal adoption in
America.* Those gentlemen who object to other parts of the
constitution as introducing innovations, contrary to long ex-
perience, with a very ill grace attempt to reject an experience
so unexceptionable as this, to introduce an innovation (per-
haps the first ever suggested) of their own. When a power is
acknowledged to be necessary, it is a very dangerous thing to
* I have since found that in the constitutions of some of the States there are
much stronger restrictions on the Executive authority in this particular than I
was aware of. In others the restriction only extends to prosecutions carried
on by the General Assembly, or the most numerous branch of legislature, or a
contrary provision by law; Virginia is in the latter class. But when we con-
sider how necessary it is in many cases to make use of accomplices to convict
their associates, and what little regard ought in general to be paid to a guilty
man swearing to save his own life, we shall probably think that the jealousies
which (by prohibiting pardons before convictions) even disabled the Executive
authority from procuring unexceptionable testimony of this sort, may more
fairly be ascribed to the natural irritation of the public mind at the time when
the constitutions were formed, than to an enlarged and full consideration of
the subject. Indeed, it could scarcely be avoided, that when arms were first
taken up in the cause of liberty, to save us from the immediate crush of arbi-
trary power, we should lean too much rather to the extreme of weakening than
of strengthening the Executive power in our own government. In England,
the only restriction upon this power in the King, in case of Crown prosecutions
(one or two slight cases excepted) is, that his pardon is not pleadable in bar of
an impeachment. But he may pardon after conviction, even on an impeach-
ment; which is an authority not given to our President, who in case of impeach-
ments has no power either of pardoning or reprieving.
352 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
prescribe limits to it, for men must have a greater confidence
in their own wisdom than I think any men are entitled to,
who imagine they can form such exact ideas of all possible
contingencies as to be sure that the restriction they propose
will not do more harm than good. The probability of the
President of the United States committing an act of treason
against his country is very slight ; he is so well guarded by
the other powers of government, and the natural strength of
the people at large must be so weighty, that in my opinion
it is the most chimerical apprehension that can be enter-
tained. Such a thing is however possible, and accordingly he
is not exempt from a trial, if he should be guilty or supposed
guilty, of that or any other offence. I entirely lay out of the
consideration of the probability of a man honored in such a
manner by his country, risking like General Arnold, the dam-
nation of his fame to all future ages, though it is a circum-
stance of some weight in considering whether for the sake of
such a remote and improbable danger as this, it would be pru-
dent to abridge this power of pardoning in a manner alto-
gether unexampled, and which might produce mischiefs the full
extent of which it is not perhaps easy at present to foresee.
In estimating the value of any power it is possible to bestow
we have to choose between inconveniences of some sort or
other, since no institution of man can be entirely free from all.
Let us now therefore consider some of the actual inconve-
niences which would attend an abridgment of the power of
the President in this respect. One of the great advantages
attending a single Executive power is the degree of secrecy
and dispatch with which on critical occasions such a power can
act. In war this advantage will often counterbalance the want
of many others. Now suppose, in the very midst of a war of
extreme consequence to our safety or prosperity, the President
could prevail on a gentleman of abilities to go into the enemy's
country, to serve in the useful, but dishonorable character of a
spy. Such are certainly maintained by all vigilant govern-
ments, and in proportion to the ignominy of the character,
and the danger sustained in the enemy's country, ought to be
his protection and security in his own. This man renders very
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 353
useful services ; perhaps by timely information, prevents the
destruction of his country. Nobody knows of these secret
services but the President himself ; his adherence however to
the enemy is notorious : he is afterwards intercepted in en-
deavoring to return to his own country, and having been per-
haps a inan of distinction before, he is proportionably obnox-
ious to his country at large for his supposed treason. Would
it not be monstrous that the President should not have it in
his power to pardon this man ? or that it should depend upon
mere solicitation and favor, and perhaps, though the President
should state the fact as it really was, some zealous partisan,
with his jealousy constantly fixed upon the President, might
insinuate that in fact the President and he were secret traitors
together, and thus obtain a rejection of the President's appli-
cation. It is a consideration also of some moment, that there
is scarcely any accusation more apt to excite popular prejudice
than the charge of treason. There is perhaps no country in
the world where justice is in general more impartially adminis-
tered than in England, yet let any man read some of the trials
for treason in that country even since the revolution ; he will
see sometimes a fury influencing the judges, as well as the
jury, that is extremely disgraceful. There may happen a case
in our country where a man in reality innocent, but with
strong plausible circumstances against him, would be so ob-
noxious to popular resentment, that he might be convicted
upon very slight and insufKcient proof. In such a case it
would certainly be very proper for a cool temperate man of
high authority, and who might be supposed uninfluenced by
private motives, to interfere and prevent the popular current
proving an innocent man's ruin. I know men who write with
a view to flatter the people, and not to give them honest in-
formation, may misrepresent this account as an invidious im-
putation on the usual impartiality of juries. God knows no
man more highly reverences that blessed institution than I do ;
I consider them the natural safeguard of the personal liberties
of a free people, and I believe they would much seldomer err
in the administration of justice than any other tribunal what-
ever. But no man of experience and candor will deny the
354 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
probability of such a case as I have supposed sometimes,
though rarely, happening ; and whenever it did happen, surely
so safe a remedy as a prerogative of mercy in the Chief Magis-
trate of a great country ought to be at hand. There is little
danger of an abuse of such a power, when we know how apt
most men are in a republican government to court popularity
at too great an expense, rather than do a just and beneficient
action in opposition to strong prevailing prejudices among the
people. But says Mr. Mason, "The President may sometimes
exercise this power to screen from punishment those whom he
had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby pre-
vent a discovery of his own guilt." This is possible, but the
probability of it is surely too slight to endanger the conse-
quences of abridging a power which seems so generally to
have been deemed necessary in every well regulated govern-
ment. It may also be questioned, whether supposing such a
participation of guilt, the President would not expose himself
to greater danger by pardoning, than by suffering the law to
have its course. Was it not supposed, by a great number of
intelligent men, that Admiral Byng's execution was urged on
to satisfy a discontented populace, when the administration,
by the weakness of the force he was entrusted with, were per-
haps the real cause of the miscarriage before Minorca ? Had
he been acquitted, or pardoned, he could have perhaps ex-
posed the real fault : as a prisoner under so heavy a charge
his recrimination would have been discredited, as merely the
effort of a man in despair to save himself from an ignominious
punishment. If a President should pardon an accomplice,
that accomplice then would be an unexceptionable witness.
Before, he would be a witness with a rope about his own neck,
struggling to get clear of it at all events. Would any men of
understanding, or at least ought they to credit an accusation
from a person under such circumstances ? *
* The evidence of a man confessing himself guiltv of the same crime is
undoubtedly admissable, but it is generally, and ought to be always received
with great suspicion, and other circumstances should be required to corroborate
it.
ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 355
VII. Objection.
" By declaring all treaties the supreme law of the land, the
Executive and the Senate have, in many cases an exclusive
power of legislation ; which might have been avoided by
proper distinctions with respect to treaties, and requiring the
assent of the House of Representatives, where it could be
done with safety."
Answer.
Did not Congress very lately unanimously resolve, in adopt-
ing the very sensible letter of Mr. Jay, that a treaty when
once made pursuant to the sovereign authority, ex vi termini
became immediately the law of the land ? It seems to result
unavoidably from the nature of the thing, that when the con-
stitutional right to make treaties is exercised, the treaty so
made should be binding upon those who delegated authority
for that purpose. If it was not, what foreign power would
trust us ? And if this right was restricted by any such fine
checks as Mr. Mason has in his imagination, but has not
thought proper to disclose, a critical occasion might arise,
when for want of a little rational confidence in our own gov-
ernment we might be obliged to submit to a master in an
enemy. Mr. Mason wishes the House of Representatives to
have some share in this business, but he is immediately sensi-
ble of the impropriety of it, and adds " where it can be done
with safety." And how is it to be known whether it can be
done with safety or not, but during the pendency of a nego-
tiation ? Must not the President and Senate judge whether it
can be done with safety or not ? If they are of opinion it is
unsafe, and the House of Representatives of course not con-
sulted, what becomes of this boasted check, since, if it
amounts to no more than that the President and Senate may
consult the House of Rrepresentatives if they please, they
may do this as well without such a provision as with it.
Nothing would be more easy than to assign plausible reasons,
after the negotiation was over, to show that a communication
was unsafe, and therefore surely a precaution that could be so
easily eluded, if it was not impolitic to the greatest degree,
356 ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
must be thought trifling indeed. It is also to be observed,
that this authority, so obnoxious in the new Constitution
(which is unfortunate in having little power to please some
persons, either as containing new things or old), is vested in-
definitely and without restriction in our present Congress, who
are a body constituted in the same manner as the Senate is to
be, but there is this material difference in the two cases, that
we shall have an additional check, under the new system of a
President of high personal character chosen by the immediate
body of the people.
VIII. Objection.
" Under their own construction of the general clause at the
end of the enumerated powers, the Congress may grant mon-
opolies in trade and commerce, constitute new crimes,, inflict
unusual and severe punishment, and extend their power as far
as they shall think proper; so that the State Legislatures
have no security for the powers now presumed to remain to
them : or the people for their rights. There is no declaration
of any kind for preserving the liberty of the press, the trial by
jury in civil causes, nor against the danger of standing armies
in time of peace."
Answer.
The general clause at the end of the enumerated power is
as follows : —
" To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other
powers vested by this Constitution in the United States, or in
any department or office thereof."
Those powers would be useless, except acts of legislation
could be exercised upon them. It was not possible for the Con-
vention, nor is it for any human body, to foresee and provide
for all contingent cases that may arise. Such cases must there-
fore be left to be provided for by the general Legislature as
they shall happen to come into existence. If Congress, under
pretence of exercising the power delegated to them, should
in fact, by the exercise of any other power, usurp upon the
rights of the different Legislatures, or of any private citizens.
ANSWER' TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 357
the people will be exactly in the same situation as if there
had been an express provision against such power in partic-
ular, and yet they had presumed to exercise it. It would be
an act of tyranny, against which no .parchment stipulations
can guard ; and the Convention surely can be only answerable
for the propriety of the powers given, not for the future vir-
tues of all with whom those powers may be intrusted. It does
not therefore appear to me that there is any weight in this
objection more than in others. But that I may give it every
fair advantage, I will take notice of every particular injurious
act of power which Mr. Mason points out as exercisable by
the authority of Congress under this general clause.
The first mentioned is, " That the Congress may grant mo-
nopolies in trade and commerce." Upon examining the con-
stitution I find it expressly provided, " That no preference
shall be given to the ports of one State over those of an-
other ;" and that " citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."
These provisions appear to me to be calculated for the very
purpose Mr. Mason wishes to secure. Can they be consistent
with any monoply in trade and commerce ?* I apprehend
therefore, under this expression must be intended more than
is expressed, and if I may conjecture from another publica-
tion of a gentleman of the same State and in the same party
of opposition, I should suppose it arose from a jealousy of the
eastern States very well known to be often expressed by some
gentlemen of Virginia. They fear, that a majority of the
States may establish regulations of commerce which will give
great advantage to the carrying trade of America, and be a
means of encouraging New England vessels rather than Old
England. Be it so. No regulations dan give such advantage
to New England vessels, which will not be enjoyed by all
* One of the powers given to Congress is, "To promote tlie progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." I am con-
vinced Mr. Mason did not mean to refer to this clause. He is a gentleman of
too much taste and knowledge himself to wish to have our government estab-
lished upon such principles of barbarism as to be able to afford no encourage-
ment to genius.
358 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
Other American vessels, and many States can build as well as
New England, though not at present perhaps in equal propor-
tion* And what could conduce more to the preservation of
the Union than allowing to every kind of industry in America
a peculiar preference ! Each State exerting itself in its own
way, but the exertions of all contributing to the common
security, and increasing the rising greatness of our country !
Is it not the aim of every wise country to be as much the car-
riers of their own produce as they can be ? And would not
this be the means in our own of producing a new source of
activity among the people, giving to our fellow-citizens what
otherwise must be given to strangers, and laying the founda-
tion of an independent trade among ourselves, and of gradu-
ally raising a navy in America which, however distant the
prospect, ought certainly not to be out of our sight. There is
no great probability however that our country is likely soon to
enjoy so glorious an advantage. We must have treaties of
commerce, because without them we cannot trade to other
countries. We already have such with some nations ; we have
none with Great Britain, which can be imputed to no other
cause but our not having a strong respectable government to
bring that haughty nation to terms. And surely no man, who
feels for the honor of his country, but must view our present
degrading commerce wjth that country with the highest indig-
nation, and the most ardent wish to extricate ourselves from
so disgraceful a situation. This only can be done by a pow-
erful government which can dictate conditions of advantage
to ourselves, as an equivalent for advantages to them ; and
this could undoubtedly be easily done by such a government,
without diminishing the value of any articles of our own pro-
duce ; or if there was any diminution it would be too slight to
* Some might apprehend, that in this case as New England would at first
have the greatest share of the carrying trade, the vessels of that country might
demand an unreasonable freight. But no attempt could be more injurious to
them as it would immediately set the Southern States to building, which they
could easily do, and thus a temporary loss would be compensated with a lasting
advantage to us ; the very reverse would be the case with them. Besides, that
from tliat country alone there would probably be competition enough for freight
to keep it on reasonable terms.
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 359
be felt by any patriot in competition with the honor and
interest of his country.
As to the constituting of new crimes, and inflicting unusual
and severe punishment, certainly the cases enumerated wherein
the Congress are empowered either to define offences, or pre-
scribe punishments, are such as are proper for the exercise of
such authority in the general Legislature of the Union. They
only relate to " counterfeiting the securities and current coin
of the United States," to "piracies and felonies committed on
the high seas, and offences against the law of nations," and to
"treason against the United States." These are offences im-
mediately affecting the security, the honor or the interest of
the United States at large, and of course must come within
the sphere of the Legislative authority which is intrusted
with their protection. Beyond these authorities. Congress
can exercise no other power of this kind, except in the enact-
ing of penalties to enforce their acts of legislation in the cases
where express authority is delegated to them, and if they
could not enforce such acts by the enacting of penalties those
powers would be altogether useless, since a legislative regula-
tion without some sanction would be an absurd thing indeed.
The Congress having, for these reasons, a just right to autho-
rity in the above particulars, the question is, whether it is prac-
ticable and proper to prescribe limits to its exercise, for fear
that they should inflict punishments unusual and severe. It
may be observed, in the first place, that a declaration against
"cruel and unusual punishments " formed part of an article in
the Bill of Rights at the revolution in England in 1688. The
prerogative of the Crown having been grossly abused in some
preceding reigns, it was thought proper to notice every grievance
they had endured, and those declarations went to an abuse of
power in the Crown only, but were never intended to limit the
authority of Parliament. Many of these articles of the Bill of
Rights in England, without a due attention to the difference
of the cases, were eagerly adopted when our constitutions
were formed, the minds of men then being so warmed with
their exertions in the cause of liberty as to lean too much
perhaps towards a jealousy of power to repose a proper con-
36d answer to mason's objections by IREDELL.
fidence in their own government. , From these articles in
the State constitutions many things were attempted to be
transplanted into our new Constitution, which would either
have been nugatory or improper. This is one of them. The
expressions " unusual and severe " or " cruel and unusual "
surely would have been too vague to have been of any conse-
quence, sincethey admit of no clear and precise signification. If
to guard against punishments being too severe, the Convention
had enumerated a vast variety of cruel punishments, and pro-
hibited the use of any of them, let the number have been ever
so great, an inexhaustible fund must have been unmentioned,
and if our government had been disposed to be cruel their in-
vention would only have been put to a little more trouble. If
to avoid this difficulty, they had determined, not negatively
what punishments should not be exercised, but positively what
punishments should, this must have led them into a labyrinth
of detail which in the original constitution of a government
would have appeared perfectly ridiculous, and not left a room
for such changes, according to circumstances, as must be in
the power of every Legislature that is rationally formed.
Thus when we enter into particulars, we must be convinced
that the proposition of such a restriction would have led to
nothing useful, or to something dangerous, and therefore that
its omission is not chargeable as a fault in the new Constitu-
tion. Let us also remember, that as those who are to make
those laws must themselves be subject to them, their, own in-
terest and feelings will dictate to them not to make them un-
necessarily severe ; and that in the case of treason, which usu-
ally in every country exposes men most to the avarice and
rapacity of government, care is taken that the innocent family
of the offender shall not suffer for the treason of their rela-
tion. This is the crime with respect to which a jealousy is of
the most importance, and accordingly it is defined with great
plainness and accuracy, and the temptations to abusive prose-
cutions guarded against as much as possible. I now proceed
to the three great cases : The liberty of the press, the trial by
jury in civil cases, and a standing army in time of peace.
The liberty of the press is always a grand topic for decla-
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 361
mation, but the future Congress will have no other authority
over this than to secure to authors for a limited time an ex-
clusive privilege of publishing their works. — This authority
has been long exercised in England, where the press is as free
as among ourselves or in any country in the world ; and surely
such an encouragement to genius is no restraint on the liberty
of the press, since men are allowed to publish what they
please of their own, and so far as this may be deemed a re-
straint upon others it is certainly a reasonable one, and can be
attended with no danger of copies not being sufficiently
multiplied, because the interest of the proprietor will always
induce him to publish a quantity fully equal to the demand.
Besides, that such encouragement may give birth to many ex-
cellent writings which would otherwise have never appeared.*
If the Congress should exercise any other power over the
press than this, they will do it without any warrant from this
constitution, and must answer for it as for any other act of
tyranny.
In respect to the trial by jury in civil cases, it must be
observed it is a mistake to suppose that such a trial takes
place in all civil cases now. Even in the common law courts,
such a trial is only had where facts are disputed between the
parties, and there are even some facts triable by other meth_
ods. In the Chancery and Admiralty Courts, in many of the
States, I am told they have no juries at all. The States in
these particulars differ very much in their practice from each
other. A general declaration therefore to preserve the trial by
jury in all civil cases would only have produced confusion, so
that the courts afterwards in a thousand instances would not
have known how to have proceeded. — If they had added, " as
heretofore accustomed," that would not have answered the pur-
pose, because there has been no uniform custom about it. — If
therefore the Convention had interfered, it must have been by
entering into a detail highly unsuitable to a fundamental con-
stitution of government ; if they had pleased some States they
* If this provision had not been made in the new constitution no author
could have enjoyed such an advantage in all the United States, unless a similar
law had constantly subsisted in each of the States separately.
362 ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
must have displeased others by innovating upon the modes of
administering justice perhaps endeared to them by habit, and
agreeable to their settled conviction of propriety. As this was
the case it appears to me it was infinitely better, rather than
endanger everything by attempting too much, to leave this
complicated business of detail to the regulation of the future
Legislature, where it can be adjusted coolly and at ease, and
upon full and exact information. There is no danger of the
trial by jury being rejected, when so justly a favorite of the
whole people. The representatives of the people surely can
have no interest in making themselves odious, for the mere
pleasure of being hated, and when a member of the House of
Representatives is only sure of being so for two years, but
must continue a citizen all his life, his interest as a citizen, if
he is a man of common sense, to say nothing of his being a
man of common honesty, must ever be uppermost in his mind-
We know the great influence of the monarchy in the British
government, and upon what a different tenure the Commons
there have their seats in Parliament from that prescribed to
our representatives. We know also they have a large standing
army. It is in the power of the Parliament, if they dare to
exercise it, to abolish the trial by jury altogether. But woe be
to the man who should dare to attempt it. It would undoubt-
edly produce an insurrection, that would hurl every tyrant to
the ground who attempted to destroy that great and just favor-
ite of the English nation. We certainly shall be always sure
of this guard at least upon any such act of folly or insanity in
our representatives. They soon would be taught the conse-
quence of sporting with the feelings of a free people. But
when it is evident that such an attempt cannot be rationally
apprehended, we have no reason to anticipate unpleasant
amotions of that nature. ■ There is indeed little probabiHty
that any degree of tyranny which can be figured to the most
discolored imagination as likely to arise out of our government,
could find an interest in attacking the trial by jury in civil
cases ;— and in criminal ones, where no such difficulties inter-
vene as in the other, and where there might be supposed
temptations to violate the personal security of a citizen, it is
sacredly preserved.
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 363
The subject of a standing army has been exhausted in so
masterly a manner in two or three numbers of the Federalist
(a work which I hope will soon be in every body's hands) that
but for the sake of regularity in answering Mr. Mason's objec-
tions, I should not venture upon the same topic, and shall
only presume to do so, with a reference for fuller satisfaction to
that able performance. It is certainly one of the most delicate
and proper cases for the consideration of a free people, and so
far as a jealousy of this kind leads to any degree of caution not
incompatible with the public safety, it is undoubtedly to be
commended. Our jealousy of this danger has descended to us
from our British ancestors ; in that country they have a Mon-
arch, whose power being limited, and at the same time his pre-
rogatives very considerable, a constant jealousy of him is both
natural and proper. The two last of the Stuarts having kept
up a considerable body of standing forces in time of peace for
the clear and almost avowed purpose of subduing the liberties
of the people, it was made an article of the bill of rights at the
revolution, "That the raising or keeping a standing army
within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with the con-
sent of Parliament, is against law ; " but no attempt was made,
or I dare say even thought of, to restrain the Parliame-Ht from
exercise of that right. An army has been kept on foot annu-
ally by authority of Parliament, and I believe ever since the
revolution they have had some standing troops ; disputes have
frequently happened about the number, but I don't recollect
any objection by the most zealous patriot, to the keeping up
of any at all. At the same time, notwithstanding the above
practice of an annual vote (arising from a very judicious cau-
tion), it is still in the power of Parliament to authorize the
keeping up of any number of troops for an indefinite time,
and to provide for their subsistence for any number of years.
Considerations of prudence, not constitutional limits to their
authority, alone restrain such an exercise of it — our Legisla-
ture however will be strongly guarded, though that of Great
Britain is without any check at all. No appropriations of
money for military services can continue longer than two
years. Considering the extensive services the general govern-
364 ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
ment may have to provide for upon this vast continent, no
forces with any serious prospect of success could be attempted
to be raised for a shorter time. Its being done for so short a
period, if there were any appearance of ill designs in the gov-
ernment, would afford time enough for the real friends of their
country to sound an alarm, and when we know how easy it is
to excite jealousy of any government, how diiificult for the
people to distinguish from their real friends, those factious
men who in every country are ready to disturb its peace for
personal gratifications of their own, and those desperate ones
to whom every change is welcome, we shall have much more
reason to fear that the government may be overawed by
groundless discontents, than that it should be able, if contrary
to every probability such a government could be supposed
willing, to effect any designs for the destruction of their own
liberties as well as those of their constituents ; for surely we
ought ever to remember, that there will not be a man in the
government but who has been either mediately or immediately
recently chosen by the people, and that for too limited a time
to make any arbitrary designs consistent with common sense,
when every two years a new body of representatives with all
the energy of popular feelings will come, to carry the strong
force of a severe national control into every department of
government. To say nothing of the one-third to compose the
Senate coming at the same time, warm with popular senti-
ments, from their respective assemblies. Men may be sure to
suggest dangers from any thing, but it may truly be said that
those who can seriously suggest the danger of a premeditated
attack on the liberties of the people from such a government
as this, could with ease assign reasons equally plausible for
mistrusting the integrity of any government formed in any
manner whatever ; and really it does seem to me, that all their
reasons may be fairly carried to this position, that inasmuch
as any confidence in any men would be unwise, as we can give
no power but what may be grossly abused, we had better give
none at all, but continue as we are, or resolve into total
anarchy at once, of which indeed our present condition falls
very little short. What sort of a government would that be
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 365
which, upon the most certain intelligence that hostilities were
meditated against it, could take no method for its defence till
after a formal declaration of war, or the enemy's standard was
actually fixed upon the shore ? The first has for some time
been out of fashion, but if it had not, the restraint these gen-
tlemen recommend, would certainly have brought it into dis-
use with every power who meant to make war upon America.
They would be such fools as to give ustheonly warning we had
informed them we would accept of, before we would take any
steps to counteract their designs. The absurdity of our being
prohibited from preparing to resist an invasion till after it had
actually taken place* is so glaring, that no man can consider it
for a moment without being struck with astonishment to see
how rashly, and with how little consideration gentlemen, whose
characters are certainly respectable, have suffered themselves
to be led away by so delusive an idea. The example of other
countries, so far from warranting any such limitation of power,
is directly against it. That of England has already been
particularly noticed. In our present articles of confederation
there is no such restriction. It has been observed by the Fed-
eralist, that Pennsylvania and North Carolina appear to be the
only States in the Union which have attempted any restraint
of the Legislative authority in this particular, and that their
restraint appears rather in the light of a caution than a pro-
hibition; but notwithstanding that, Pennsylvania had been
obliged to raise forces in the very face of that article of her
bill of rights. That great writer from the remoteness of his
situation, did not know that North Carolina had equally vio-
lated her bill of rights in a similar manner. The Legislature
* Those gentlemen who gravely tell us that the militia will be sufficient for
this purpose, do not recollect that they themselves do not desire we should rely
solely on a militia in case of actual war, and therefore in the case I have sup-
posed they cannot be deemed sufficient even by themselves, for when the enemy
landed it would undoubtedly be a time of war, but the misfortune would be,
that they would be prepared ; we not. Certainly all possible encouragement
should be given to the training of our militia, but no man can really believe
that they will be sufficient, without the aid of any regular troops, in time of
foreign hostility. A powerful militia may make fewer regulars necessary, but
will not make it safe to dispense with them altogether.
366 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
of that State in November, 1785, passed an act for raising 200
men for the protection of a county called Davidson county
against hostilities from the Indians ; they were to continue
for two years from the time of their first rendezvous, unless
sooner disbanded by the Assembly, and were to be subject
to the same " rules with respect to their government as were
established in the time of the late war by the Congress of the
United States for the government of the Continental army."
These are the very words of the act. Thus, from the exam-
ples of the only two countries in the world that I believe ever
attempted such a restriction, it appears to be a thing incom-
patible ^yith the safety of government. Whether their restric-
tion is to be considered as a caution or a prohibition, in less
than five years after peace the caution has been disregarded,
or the prohibition disobeyed.* Can the most credulous or
suspicious men require stronger proof of the weakness and
impolicy of such restraints ?
IX. Objection.
" The State Legislatures are restrained from laying export
duties on their own produce."
Ansaver.
Duties upon exports, though they may answer in some
particulars a convenience to the country which imposes them,
are certainly not things to be contended for, as if the very being
of a State was interested in preserving them. Where there is
a kind of monopoly they may sometimes be ventured upon,
but even there perhaps more is lost by imposing such duties,
than is compensated for by any advantage. Where there is
not a species of monopoly, no policy can be more absurd.
The American States, are so circumstanced that some of the
States necessarily export part of the produce of neighboring
* I presume we are not to be deemed in a, state of war whenever any
Indian hostilities are committed on our frontiers. If that is the case I don't
suppose we have had six years of peace since the first settlement of the country,
or shall have for fifty years to come. A distinction between peace and war
would be idle indeed, if it can be frittered away by such pretences as those.
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 367
ones. Every duty laid upon such exported produce operates
in fact as a tax by the exporting State upon the non-exporting
State. In a system expressly formed to produce concord
among all, it would have been very unwise to have left such
a source of discord open ; and upon the same principle, and to
remove as much as possible every ground of discontent, Con-
gress itself are prohibited from laying duties on exports,
because by that means those States which have a great deal of
produce to export would be taxed much more heavily than
those which had little or none for exportation.
X. Objection.
" The general Legislature is restrained from prohibiting
the further importation of slaves for twenty odd years, though
such importation renders the United States weaker, more vul-
nerable; and less capable of defence."
Answer.
If all the States had been willing to adopt this regulation,
I should as an individual most heartily have approved of it,
because even if the importation of slaves in fact rendered us
stronger, less vulnerable and more capable of defence, I should
rejoice Jn the prohibition of it, as putting an end to a trade
which has already continued too long for the honor and
humanity of those concerned in it. But as it was well known
that South Carolina and Georgia thought a further contin-
uance of such importations useful to them, and would not
perhaps otherwise have agreed to the new constitution, those
States which had been importing till they were satisfied, could
not with decency have insisted upon their relinquishing ad-
vantages themselves had already enjoyed. Our situation
makes it necessary to bear the evil as it is. It will be left to
the future legislatures to allow such importations or not. If
any, in violation of their clear conviction of the injustice of
this trade, persist in pursuing it, this is a matter between God
and their own consciences. The interests of humanity will,
however, have gained something by the prohibition of this in-
human trade, though at a distance of twenty odd years.
368 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
XI. Objection.
" Both the general Legislature and the State Legislatures,
have expressly prohibited making ex J>osi facto laws, though.
there never was, nor can be, a legislature but must and will
make such laws, when necessity and the public safety require
them ; which will hereafter be a breach of all the constitutions
in the Union, and offer precedents for other innovations."
Answer.
My ideas of liberty are so different from those of Mr.
Mason, that in my opinion this very prohibition is one of the
most valuable parts of the new constitution. Ex post facto
laws may sometimes be convenient, but that they are ever ab-
solutely necessary I shall take the liberty to doubt, till that
necessity can be made apparent. Sure I am, they have been
the instrument of some of the grossest acts of tyranny that
were ever exercised, and have this never failing consequence,
to put the minority in the power of a passionate and unprin-
cipled majority, as to the most sacred things, and the plea of
necessity is never wanting where it can be of any avail. This
very clause, I think, is worth ten thousand declarations of rights,
if this, the most essential right of all, was omitted in them.
A man may feel some pride in his security, when he knows
that what he does innocently and safely to-day in accordance
with the laws of his country, cannot be tortured into guilt and
danger to-morrow. But if it should happen, that a great and
overruling necessity, acknowledged and felt by all, should
make a deviation from this prohibition excusable, shall we not
be more safe in leaving the excuse for an extraordinary exer-
cise of power to rest upon the apparent equity of it alone,
than to leave the door open to a tyranny it would be intoler-
able to bear ? In the one case, every one must be sensible
of its justice, and therefore excuse it ; in the other, whether its
exercise was justjfor unjust, its being lawful would be sufficient
to command obedience. Nor would a case like that, resting
entirely on its own bottom, from a conviction of invincible
necessity, warrant an avowed abuse of another authority,
where no such necessity existed or could be pretended.
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 369
I have now gone through Mr. Mason's objections ; one thing
still remains to be taken notice of, his prediction, which he is
pleased to express in these words : " This government will com-
mence in a moderate aristocracy ; it is at present impossble to
foresee, whether it will in its operation produce a monarchy,
or a corrupt, oppressive aristocracy ; it will most probably
vibrate some years between the two, and then terminate in the
one or the other." From the uncertainty of this prediction,
we may hope that Mr. Mason was not divinely inspired when
he made it, and of course that it may as fairly be questioned
as any of his particular objections. If my answers to his ob-
jections are, in general, solid, a very different government will
arise from the new constitution, if the several States should
adopt it, as I hope they will. It will not probably be too
much to flatter ourselves with, that it may present a spectacle
of combined strength in government, and genuine liberty in
the people, the world has never yet beheld. In the meantime,
our situation is critical to the greatest degree. Those gentle-
men who think we may at our ease go on from one convention
to another, to try if all objections cannot be conquered by
perseverance, have much more sanguine expectations than I
can presume to form. There are critical periods in the fate of
nations, as well as in the life of man, which are not to be neg-
lected with impunity. I am much mistaken if this is not such
a one with us. When we were at the very brink of despair,
the late excellent Convention with a unanimity that none
could have hoped for, generously discarding all little consider-
ations formed a system of government which I am convinced
can stand the nicest examination, if reason and not prejudice
is employed in viewing it. With a happiness of thought,
which in our present awful situation ought to silence much
more powerful objections than any I have heard, they have
provided in the very frame of government a safe, easy and
unexceptionable method of correcting any errors it may be
thought to contain. Those errors may be corrected at leisure;
in the mean time the acknowledged advantages likely to flow
from this constitution may be enjoyed. We may venture to
hold up our head among the other powers of the world. We
370 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL.
may talk to them with the confidence of an independent peo-
ple, having strength to resent insults ; and avail ourselves of
our natural advantages. We may be assured of once more
beholding justice, order and dignity taking place of the present
anarchical confusion prevailing almost every where, and draw-
ing upon us universal disgrace. We may hope, by proper
exertions of industry, to recover thoroughly from the shock of
the late war, and truly to become an independent, great and
prosperous people. But if we continue as we now are, wrang-
ling about every trifle, listening to the opinion of a small
minority, in preference to a large and most respectable major-
ity of the first men in our country, and among them some of
the first in the world, if our minds in short are bent rather on
indulging a captious discontent, than bestowing a generous
and well-placed confidence in those who we have every reason
to believe are entirely worthy of it, we shall too probably
present a spectacle for malicious exultation to our enemies,
and melancholy dejection to our friends ; and the honor, glory
and prosperity which were just within our reach, will perhaps
be snatched from us for ever.
MARCUS.
January, 1788.
An / Address / to the / Freemen / of / South Caro-
lina, / on the subject of the / Federal Constitution, /
Proposed by the Convention, which met in / Philadelphia,
May, 1787. / Charleston, / Printed by Bowen and Co.,
No. 31, Bay.
16 mo., pp. 12.
Written by Dr. David Ramsay, member of the Continen-
tal Congress and of the South Carolina State Convention
which ratified the Constitution.
Friends, Countrymen, and Fellow Citizens :
"XTOU have, at this time a' new federal constitution proposed
for your consideration. The great importance of the
subject demands your most serious attention. To assist you
in forming a right judgment on this matter, it will be proper
to consider,
1st. It is the manifest interest of these states to be united.
Internal wars among ourselves, would most probably be the
consequence of disunion. Our local weakness particularly
proves it to be for the advantage of South Carolina to
strengthen the federal government ; for we are inadequate to
secure ourselves from more powerful neighbours. [4]
2d. If the thirteen states are to be united in reality, as well
as in name, the obvious principle of the union will be, that the
congress, or general government, should have power to regu-
late all general concerns. In a state of nature, each man is
free, and may do what he pleases : but in society, every indi-
vidual must sacrifice a part of his natural rights ; the minority
must yield to the majority, and the collective interest must
controul particular interests. When thirteen persons consti-
tute a family, each should forego everything that is injurious
to the other twelve. When several families constitute a par-
ish, or county, each may adopt what regulations it pleases with
regard to its domestic affairs, but must be abridged of that
liberty in other cases, where the good of the whole is con-
cerned.
When several parishes, counties, or districts, form a state,
the separate interests of each must yield to the collective in-
terest of the whole. When several states combine in one
government, the same principles must be observed. These
relinquishments of natural rights, are not real sacrifices : each
person, county, or state, gains more than it loses, for it only
gives up a right of injuring others, and obtains in return aid
and strength to secure itself in the peaceable enjoyment of all
remaining rights. If then we are to be an united people, and
374 ADDRESS BY DAVID RAMSAY.
the obvious ground of union must be, that all continental con-
cerns should be managed by Congress — let us by those princi-
ples examine the new constitution. Look over the 8th sec-
tion, which enumerates the powers of Congress, and point out
one that is not essential on the before recited principles of
union. The iirst is a power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the [5]
common defence and general welfare of the United States.
When you authorised Congress to borrow money, and to
contract debts, for carrying on the late war, you could not in-
tend to abridge them of the means of paying their engage-
ments, made on your account. You may observe that their
future power is confined to provide common defence and general
welfare of the United States. If they apply money to any
other purposes, they exceed their powers. The people of the
United States who pay, are to be judges how far their money
is properly applied. It would be tedious to go over all the
powers of Congress, but it would be easy to show that they
all may be referred to this single principle, " that the general
" concerns of the union ought to be managed by the general
" government." The opposers of the constitution cannot
show a single power delegated to Congress, that could be
spared consistently with the welfare of the whole, nor a single
one taken from the states, but such as can be more advantage-
ously lodged in the general government, than in that of the
separate states.
For instance, the states cannot emit money : This is not
intended to prevent the emission of paper money, but only of
state paper money. Is not this an advantage ? To have thir-
teen paper currencies in thirteen states is embarrassing to
commerce, and eminently so to travellers. It is therefore,
obviously our interest, either to have no paper, or such as will
circulate from Georgia to New Hampshire. Take another in-
stance— -the Congress are authorized to provide and maintain
a navy. — Our sea-coast, in its whole extent needs the protec-
tion thereof; but if this was to be done [6] by the states, they
who build ships, would be more secure than they who do not.
Again, if the local legislatures might build ships of war at
ADDRESS BY DAVID RAMSAY. 375
pleasure, the Eastern would have a manifest superiority over
the Southern states. Observe, how much better this business
is referred to the regulations of Congress. A common navy,
paid out of the common treasury, and to be disposed of by the
united voice of a majority for the common defence of the
weaker as well as of the stronger states, is promised, and will
result from the federal constitution. Suffer not yourselves to
be imposed on by declamation. Ask the man who objects to
the powers of Congress two questions, is it not necessary that
the supposed dangerous power should be lodged somewhere ?
And secondly, where can it be lodged, consistently with the
general good, so well as in the general government ? Decide
for yourselves on these obvious principles of union.
It has been objected, that the eastern states have an
advantage in their representation in Congress. Let us exam-
ine this objection — the four eastern states send seventeen
members to the house of representatives, but Georgia, South-
Carolina, North-Carolina and Virginia, send twenty-three. The
six northern states send twenty-seven, the six southern thirty-
In both cases, we have a superiority ; — but, say the objectors,
add Pennsylvania to the northern states, and there is a major-
ity against us. It is obvious to reply, add Pennsylvania to the
southern states, and they have a majority. The objection
amounts to no more than that seven are more than six. It
must be known to many of you, that the Southern states,
from their vast extent of uncultivated country, are daily re-
ceiving new settlers ; but in New England their country is [7]
so small, and their land so poor, that their inhabitants are con-
stantly emigrating. As the rule of representation in Congress
is to vary with the number of inhabitants, our influence in the
general government will be constantly increasing. In fifty years,
it is probable that the Southern states will have a great ascend-
ency over the Eastern. It has been said that thirty-five men,
not elected by yourselves, may make laws to bind you. This
objection, if it has any force, tends to the destruction of your
state government. By our constitution, sixty-nine make a
quorum ; of course, thirty-five members may make a law to
bind all the people of South-Carolina. — Charleston, and any
27^ ADDRESS BY DAVID RAMSAY.
one of the neighboring parishes send collectively thirty-six
members ; it is therefore possible, in the absence of all others,
that three of the lower parishes might legislate for the whole
country. Would this be a valid objection against your own
constitution ? It certainly would not — neither is it against the
proposed federal plan. Learn from it this useful lesson — insist
on the constant attendance of your members, both in the state
assembly, and Continental Congress ; your representation in
the latter, is as numerous in a relative proportion with the
other states as it ought to be. You have a thirteenth part in
both houses ; and you are not, on principles of equality, en-
titled to more.
It -has been objected, that the president, and two-thirds of
the senate, though not of your election, may make treaties
binding on the state. Ask these objectors — do you wish to
have any treaties ? They will say yes. Ask then who can be
more properly trusted with the power of making them, than
they to whom the convention have referred it ? Can the state
legislature ? They would con- [8] suit their local interests. —
Can the Continental House of Representatives ? When sixty-
five men can keep a secret, they may. — Observe the cautious
guards which are placed round your interests. Neither the
senate nor president can make treaties by their separate au-
thority. — They must both concur. — This is more in your
favour than the footing on which you now stand. The dele-
gates in Congress of nine states, without your consent, can
now bind you ; by the new constitution there must be two-
thirds af the members present, and also the president, in
whose election you have a vote. Two-thirds are to the whole,
nearly as nine to thirteen. If you are not wanting to your-
selves by neglecting to keep up the state's compliment of sen-
ators, your situation with regard to preventing the controul of
your local interests by the Northern states, will be better under
the proposed constitution than it is now under the existing
confederation.
It has been said, we will have a navigation act, and be
restricted to American bottoms, and that high freight will be
the consequence. We certainly ought to have a navigation
ADDRESS BY DAVID RAMSAY. 377
act, and we assuredly ought to give a preference, though not a
monopoly, to our own shipping.
If this state is invaded by a maritime force, to whom can
we apply for immediate aid ? — To Virginia and North-Caro-
lina? Before they can march by land to our assistance, the
country may be overrun. The Eastern states, abounding in
men and in ships, can sooner relieve us, than our next door
neighbours. It is therefore not only our duty, but our interest
to encourage their shipping. They have sufficient resources
on a few months notice, to furnish tonnage enough to carry off
all your exports ; and they can afford, and doubtless will un-
dertake [9] to be your carriers on as easy terms as you now
pay for freight in foreign bottoms.
On this subject, let us consider what we have gained, also
what they have lost, by the revolution. We have gained a
free trade with all the world, and consequently a higher price
for our commodities ; it may be said, and so have they. But
they who reply in this manner, ought to know, that there is an
amazing difference in our favour ; their country affords no
valuable exports, and of course the privilege of a free trade
is to them of little value, while our staple commodity com-
mands a higher price than was usual before the war. We have
also gained an exemption from quit-rents, to which the eastern
states were not subjected. Connecticut and Rhode Island
were nearly as free before the revolution as since. They
had no royal governor or councils to controul them, or to legis-
late for them. Massachusetts and New Hampshire were much
nearer independence in their late constitution than we were.
The eastern states, by the revolution, have been deprived of a
market for their fish, of their carrying trade, their ship-build-
ing, and almost of every thing but their liberties.
As the war has turned out so much in our favour, and so
much against them, ought we to grudge them the carrying of
our produce, especially when it is considered, that by encour-
aging their shipping, we increase the means of our own de-
fence ? Let us examine also the federal constitution, by the
principles of reciprocal concession. We have laid a foundation
for a navigation act. This will be a general good ; but par-
378 ADDRESS BY DAVID RAMSAY.
ticularly so to our northern brethren. On the other hand, they
have agreed to change the federal rule of paying the conti-
nental debt, according to the value of land, as laid down in
the confede- [lo] ration, for a new principle of apportionment,
to be founded on the numbers of inhabitants in the several
states respectively. This is an immense concession in our
favour. Their land is poor; cur's rich ; their numbers great ;
our's small; labour with them is done by white men, for whom
they pay an equal share ; while five of our negroes only count
as equal to three of their whites. This will make a difference
of many thousands of pounds in settling our continental ac-
counts. It is farther objected, that they have stipulated for a
right to prohibit the importation of negroes after 21 years.
On this subject observe, as they are bound to protect us from
domestic- violence, they think we ought not to increase our
exposure to that evil, by an unlimited importation of slaves.
Though Congress may forbid the importation of negroes after
21 years, it does not follow that they will. On the other hand,
it is probable that they will not. The more rice we make, the
more business will be for their shipping ; their interest will
therefore coincide with our's. Besides, we have other sources
of supply — the importation of the ensuing 20 years, added to
the natural increase of those we already have, and the influx
from our northern neighbours, who are desirous of getting rid
of their slaves, will afford a sufficient number for cultivating
all the lands in this state.
Let us suppose the union to be dissolved by the rejection
of the new constitution, what would be our case ? The united
states owe several millions of dollars to France, Spain, and
Holland. If an efficient government is not adopted, which
will provide for the payment of our debt, especially of that
which is due to foreigners — who will be the losers ? Most cer-
tainly the southern states. Our ex-[iij ports, as being the
most valuable, would be the first objects of capture on the
high seas, or descents would be made on our defenceless coasts,
till the creditors of the United States had paid themselves at
the expense of this weaker part of the union. Let us also
compare the present confederation with the proposed constitu-
ADDRESS BY DAVID RAMSAY. 379
tion. The former can neither protect us at home, nor gain us
respect abroad ; it cannot secure the payment of our debts,
nor command the resources of our country, in case of danger.
Without money, without a navy, or the means of even sup-
porting an army of our own citizens in the field, we he at the
mercy of every invader ; our sea-port towns may be laid under
contribution, and our country ravaged.
By the new constitution, you will be protected with the
force of the union, against domestic violence and foreign in-
vasion. You will have a navy to defend your coast. — The re-
spectable figure you will make among the nations, will so far
command the attention of foreign powers, that it is probable
you will soon obtain such commercial treaties, as will open to
your vessels the West-India islands, and give life to your ex-
piring commerce.
In a country like our's, abounding with free men all of one
rank, where property is equally diffused, where estates are held
in fee simple, the press free, and the means of information
common, tyranny cannot reasonably find admission under any
form of government ; but its admission is next to impossible
under one where the people are the source of all power, and
elect either mediately by their representatives, or immediately
by themselves the whole of their rulers.
Examine the new constitution with candor and liberality.
Indulge no narrow prejudices to the disadvantage of your
brethren of the [12] other states ; consider the people of all
the thirteen states, as a band of brethren, speaking the same
language, professing the same religion, inhabiting one undi-
vided country, and designed by heaven to be one people.
Content that what regards all the states should be managed by
that body which represents all of them ; be on your guard
against the misrepresentations of men who are involved in
debt ; such may wish to see the constitution rejected, because
of the following clause, "no state shall emit bills of credit,
make any thing but gold and silver coin, a tender in payment
of debts, pass any expost facto law, or law impairing the obli-
gation of contracts." This will doubtless bear hard on
debtors who wish to defraud their creditors, but it will be real
380 ADDRESS BY DAVID RAMSAY.
service to the honest part of the community. Examine well
the characters and circumstances of men who are averse to
the new constitution. Perhaps you will find that the above
recited clause is the real ground of the opposition of some of
them, though they may artfully cover it with a splendid pro-
fession of zeal for state privileges and general liberty.
On the whole, if the proposed constitution be not calcu-
lated to better your country, and to secure to you the bless-
ings for which you have so successfully contended, reject it :
but if it be an improvement on the present confederation, and
contains within itself the principles of farther improvement
suited to future circumstances, join the mighty current of fed-
eralism, and give it your hearty support. You were among
the first states that formed an independent constitution ; be
not among the last in accepting and ratifying the proposed
plan of federal government ; it is your sheet anchor ; and
without it independence may prove a curse.
CIVIS.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AND
REFERENCE LIST
OF THE
HISTORY ANiD LITERATURE
OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
1787-1788.
NOTE.
The titles in the following list are arranged alphabetically, by the authors or
;ditors names if known, or by the first word of the title, omitting participles,
urith the exception of the editions of the Constitution, which are brought to-
gether under that head, and the debates and journals of the State Conven-
iens, which are placed under each State.
The initials which precede the numbers at the end of the description, indicate
:ertain public libraries in which the work may be consulted.
A. signifies Astor Library.
A. A. S. " Am. Antiquarian Society Library,
Boston Public Library.
' Boston Athenaeum Library.
British Museum Library.
* Library of Congress.
' Library of Harvard University.
' Mass. Historical Society Library.
' N. Y. Historical Society Library.
' Library Company of Philadelphia.
' Penn. Historical Society Library.
' New York State Library.
' Department of State Library.
' A line omitted in the title.
' Two or more lines omitted in the title.
-|- ' ' That what is omitted is already sufficiently given in title
of previous edition.
The numbers attached to certain titles in the reference list are' cross refer-
erences to the same title in the bibliography.
I am under obligation to Mr. C. A. Cutter, Mr. W Eames, Mr. William
Kelby, Mr. E. M. Barton and Mr. Bumford Samuels, for aid in compiling this
list.
B.
B.
A.
B.
M.
C.
H.
M.
N.
P.
P.
H. S.
S.
S.
D.
' -
•
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
iccount of the Grand Federal Procession. See Nos. 77-8.
Additional number of Letters. See No. 90.
The/ Address and Reasons of Dissent / of the/ Minority of
;he Convention, / Of the State of Pennsylvania, to their Con-
stituents. [Colophon] Philadelphia: Printed by E. Oswald,
it the Coffee House.
Folio, pp. (3) A. A. S. I
Reprinted in Carey's American Museum, ii, 536, and answered by Noah
iATebster's "To the Dissenting members of the late Convention of Pennsyl'
iz.n\.a.," in his " Collection of Essays. . . . Boston: 1790," page 142.
Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Con-
/ention of the State of Pennsylvania, to their Constituents.
Thiladelphia : 1787. J
8vo. pp. 22. B. A. 2
Title from Sabin's Dictionary of Books relating to America. See No. 108.
Address / to the / Citizens of Pennsylvania. / Calculated to
ihew the Safety, — Advantages — and Necessity of adopting the
Droposed Constitution of the / United States. / In which are
ncluded answers to the objections that have been made to
t./ [Colophon] Philadelphia: Printed by Hall and Sellers.
Folio, pp. (4) N. 3
A Federalist compilation, containing
Reply to the Address of the seceding members of the Pennsylvania
Legislature.
To the Freemen of Pennsylvania [in reply to the Address of the seced-
ing members], by Federal Constitution.
Speech of James Wilson, October 6th, 1787.
Examination of the Federal Constitution, by An American [Tench
Coxe.]
Circular Letter from the Federal Convention.
Address to the Freemen of S. C. See Nos. 114-15.
Address to the People of N. Y. See Nos. 83-4 and 120-21.
American Citizen. See Nos. 3, 21-2.
Aristides. See Nos. 74-5.
386
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Articles. See No. 6.
Baldwin {Simeon).
An / Oration / pronounced before the / Citizens of New-
Haven,/ July 4th, 1788;/ in commemoration of the / Declara-
tion / of/ Independence / and establishment of the Constitu-
tion/ of the / United States of America. / By Simeon Bald-
win, Esquire,/ New Haven. / Printed by J. Meigs, / M,DCC,-
LXXXVIII.
8vo. pp. 16. 4
Bancroft {George).
History/ of the/ Formation of the Constitution/ of the/
United States of America. / By George Bancroft. / In two
volumes, / Vol. I./ New York : / D. Appleton and Company,
/ I, 3, and 5 Bond Street,/ 1882.
2 Vols., 8vo. pp. xxiv, 520— xiv, 501 (2). 5
Each volume contains not only Mr. Bancroft's History, but a series of hither-
to unpublished "Letters and Papers," adding greatly to the value of the work.
In 1885 a one volume edition was published, from the same plates, but omitting
these documents — pp. xxii., 495,
Reviewed by B. F. De Costa, in the Mag. of Am. Hist., viii, 669; and in
The Nation, xxxiv, 524 and xxxvi, 127.
Bryan, Samuel. See No. io8.
Centinel. See No. io8.
Childs, Francis. See No. 103".
Citizen of America. See Nos. 130-31.
Citizen of New York. See No. 83.
Citizen of Philadelphia. See Nos. 132-4.
Civis. See Nos. 82, 1 14-15.
Columbian Patriot. See Nos. 6g-yi.
Constitution.
In the following list of editions, I have only attempted to include such as
were published during the discussion of the Constitution, prior to its ratifica-
tion, and so conscious am I of its imperfections, that I should omit it altogether,
were it not that no such list has ever been attempted, and this may make the
task an easier one to some future bibliographer. It is almost certain that the
Federal Convention, the Continental Congress, and each of the states printed
public official editions, (of which, excepting Massachusetts, New York, and pos-
sibly Pennsylvania, I have been unable to trace copies) while the editions
printed for the use of the people were undoubtedly numerous. The list includes
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 387
every edition that I could find, in any bibliographies or library catalogues that
I have examined, except the "Portsmouth, N. H. 1787" given in the Library
of Congress catalogue, which cannot now be found. 1 have also included the
two drafts (Nos. ig and 20) used by the Convention, which, though not prop-
erly editions of the Constitution, nevertheless seemed best classed among
them. The arrangement is alphabetical, by the first word of the title or caption
participles excepted.
See also — View of the Proposed Constitution. No. 125.
Constitution. New York. 1787.
Articles agreed upon by the Federal Convention of^ the
United States of / America, his Excellency, General Washing-
ton, Esq., President, /... ./New York: Printed by J. M'Lean,
No. 41, Hanover Square [1787].
Folio, pp. 4. Ni 6
Constitution. Albany. 1788.
De/Constitutie, / eenpariglyk gea ecordeerd by de / Algem
eene Conventie,/ gehonden in de / Stad von Philadelphia, / in
't Jaar 1787: /en gesubmitteer aan hit/Volk de Vereenigde
Staaten / van Noord — Amerika : / Zynde van ses derzelvir
Staaten alreede /geadopteerd, namentlyk, / Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Nieuw-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware en Georgia
/ Vertaald door Lambertus de Ronde, V. D. M. / Gedrukt by
Ordervan de Federal Committee, in de Stad van Albany,/Door
Charles R. Webster, in zyne Vrye Boek- / Druking, No. 36,
Staat-Straat, na by de / Engelsehe Kirke in dezelvde Stad, 1788.
Sq. i2mo. pp. 32, B. 7
Constitution. Boston. 1787.
The /Constitution /or Frame of / Government, / For the
United States of/ America,/ as reported by the Convention
of Delegates, from the / United States, begun and held at Phil-
adelphia on the / first Monday of May, 1787, and continued by
Adjournments to / the seventeenth Day of September follow-
ing — [Colophon at p. 16] Printed by Thomas and John Fleet,
in Boston.
^ 8vo. pp. 20 M. 8
Includes the resolves of the Continental Congress and the Massachusetts
General Court. Sabin gives a copy " i2mo. pp. 16," but it is this edition,
lacking the last four leaves, or the " resolves."
Constitution. Boston. 1787.
The / Constitution / or Frame of /Government, /for the/
388 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
United States/ of/ America. / As reported by the Conven-
tion of Delegates, from / the United States, begun and held
at Philadel-/phia, on the first Monday of May, 1787, and con-
tinued/by adjournments to the seventeenth Day of Septem-
ber fol-/ lowing. — Which they resolved should belaid before
the /United States in Congress assembled ; and afterwards be
/ submittted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each
State, /by the People thereof, under the recommendation of
its Le-/ gislature, for their Assent and Ratification / Together
with the Resolutions of the General Court of the /Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, for calling said Convention, agreea-/
ble to the recommendation of Congress. / Published by order
of Government./ Printed at Boston, Massachusetts, By
Adams & Nourse, / Printers to the Honourable the General
Court. / M,DCC,LXXXVII.
8vo. pp. 32, C. M., A. A. S. 9
Constitution. Philadelphia. 1787.
The /Constitution /proposed for/ The Government of the
United States of /America, by the Foederal Conven-/tion,
held at Philadelphia, in the /Year One Thousand Seven Hun-
dred / and Eighty-seven. / To which is Annexed, / The Ratifi-
cations thereof by the Dele- / gates of Pennsylvania in the /
State Convention. / Philadelphia: Printed by Hall & Sellers.
/ M,DCC.LXXXVII.
8vo. pp. 24. C. 10
Constitution. Philadelphia. 1787.
The /Constitution /as formed for the /United States /by
the/ FcEderal Convention, / Held at Philadelphia, / In the year
1 787, / With the Resolves of / Congress,/ and of the /Assembly
of Pennsylvania / thereon. / Philadelphia : / Printed by T.
Bradford, / in Front-Street, four doors below the Coffee House
/m,dcc,lxxxvii.
i2mo. pp. 16. C. H. S. II
Constitution. Richmond. 1787 or 8.
The /Federal Constitution /for the United States of Amer-
ica, &c. [Colophon] Richmond: Printed by Augustin Davis.
4to. pp. II. 12
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 389
Constitution. London. 1787.
Plan / of the / New Constitution / for the / United States
of America, /Agreed upon in a /Convention of the States/
with /a Preface by the Editor./ London:/ Printed for J.
Debrett, Piccadilly./ M.DCCLXXXVII.
8vo. pp. (2) 30,8, 13
Constitution. Boston. 1787.
(i) Proceedings/ of the /Federal Convention. / [Colophon
at p. 16] Printed by Thomas and John Fleet, in Boston.
Svo. pp. 20. P 14
The Constitution, with the resolutions, etc., of the Massachusetts General
Court. See No. 8.
Constitution. Philadelphia. 1787.
Proceedings / of the/ Federal Convention. / Held at/ Phil-
adelphia/in the Year 172,7./ And the Twelfth Year /of/
American Independence. / Philadelphia : / Printed by T. Brad-
ford, / in Front-street, four doors below the Coffee-House /
M,DCC,LXXXVII
Svo. pp. 15. C. 15
Constitution. Philadelphia. 1 787.
Results / of the Deliberations / of the / Federal Convention.
/In Convention, Sept. 17, 1787 [Philadelphia :? 1787].
8vo. pp. 16. P. H. S. 16
Constitution. New York. \7%7.
Supplement to the Independent Journal,, / Saturda-y, Sep-
tember 22, 1787. / Copy of the Result of the Dehberations of
the /Federal Convention/ In Convention, September 17, 1787,
/ [New York : J. M'Lean. 1787].
Folio, pp. 4. S. L. 16*
Constitution. Hartford. 1787.
We the People/ of the United / States, /.•..../...
do ordain and esta- / blish this Constitution for the United
States of / America. / Hartford : / Printed and sold by
Nathaniel Patten. / M,DCC,LXXXVII.
Sq. i6mo. pp. 16. P. H. S. 17
Constitution. Poughkeepsie. 1 788.
We the People of the United States, in order to form a /
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
390 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Tran- / quillity, provide for the common Defense, promote
the ge- / neral Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty
to ourselves / and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitu- / tion for the United States of America. [Pough-
keepsie: Nicholas Power, 1788.]
4to. pp. 20, S. 18
The official edition printed for the use of the New Yotk Convention. The
text is only printed on one side of page, to page 17 — after that on both sides.
Constitution. Philadelphia. 1 787.
We, the People of the United States in order to form / a
more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tran-
quility, provide / for the common defense, promote the gen-
eral welfare, and secure the blessings / of liberty to ourselves
and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the / United States of America. . . .
Folio, 4 11. S. D., C. M. 19
The " Report" of the "Committee on style and arrangement" of the Fed-
eral Convention, brought in September 13th, 1787. It was printed for the use
of the members only and with the utmost secrecy.
Constitution. Philadelphia. 1787.
We the People of the States / of New-Hampshire, Massa-
chusetts, / Rhode Island and Providence Plan- / tations, Con-
necticut, New York, New Jersey, Penn- / sylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North-Caro- / lina, South-Carolina, and
Georgia, do ordain, declare / and establish the following Con-
stitution for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity.
Folio, 7 11. S. D., C, M. 20
The "Report" of the "Committee of five," of the Federal Convention,
brought in August 6th, 1787. Printed only for the use of the members, as a
basis for a continuation of the discussion. Both these last two editions, it is
needless to say, are of the greatest rarity, the number printed being probably
not over sixty copies, and as confidential documents, were saved by few of the
members. The Department of State possesses Washington's copy of No. 19,
and David Brearly's and James Madison's copies of both drafts. The Library
of Congress possesses William Samuel Johnson's copies, and the Massa-
chusetts Historical Society has those of Elbridge Gerry, All of these contain
Mss. alterations by their respective owners, and George Mason's copy of No.
19 in the possession of Miss Kate Mason Rowland of Virginia, contains not
only alterations, but the objections of Mason to the Constitution, in his own
handwriting. What are apparently the original Mss. compilations from which
these drafts were printed are in the Wilson Papers, now in the Pennsylvania
jHiBtorical Society.
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 391
ICoxe {Tenc/i)].
An / Examination / of the/ Constitution / for the / United
States / of / America, / Submitted to the People / by the /
General Convention, / at Philadelphia, the 17th Day of Sep-
tember, 1787, / and since adopted and ratified / by the / Con-
ventions of Eleven States, / chosen for the purpose of consid-
ering it, being all / that have yet decided on the subject. /
By an American Citizen. /To which is added, /a Speech / of
the/ Hon. James Wilson, Esquire./ on the same subject. / Phil-
adelphia : / Printed by Zachariah Poulson, Junr. in Fourth/
Street, between Market and Arch-Streets. / M.DCC.LXXXVIII.
8vo. pp. 33. P. 21
Reprinted in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution and in No. 3, and the Let-
ters by "An American Citizen " are printed in No. gg, and in Carey's American
Museum, ii, pp. 301 and 387.
Coxe {Tench).
[An Examination of the Constitution. Reprinted, Brook-
lyn, N. Y. : 1887.]
SVO. pp. 22. 32
A few copies separately printed from No, 68.
Curtis {George Ticknor).
History / of the / Origin, Formation, and Adoption / of
the / Constitution of the United States ; /with /notices of its
principal framers. / By / George Ticknor Curtis. / In two
volumes. / Volume I. / New York : / Harper and Brothers,/
Franklin Square. / 1854 [-8].
2 Tols., 8vo. pp. xxxvi, 518 — xvi, 663. 23
This work, which is by far the best history of our Constitution, has been for
several years out of print, and is difficult to procure in second hand condition.
There are issues with different dates. It was reviewed, by C. C. Smith, in The
Christian Examiner, Iviii, 75, Ixv, 67 ; in The Methodist Review, xv, 187 ; in
The American Quarterly Church Review, xv, 541 ; and in The North American
Review, Ixxx, 25g. by A. P. Peabody.
[Davie {William Richardson and others) ].
[An Address to the People of North Carolina, by Publicola,
Answer to George Mason's Objections to the new Constitution
recommended by the late Convention, by Marcus, etc. New-
bern : Printed by Hodge and Wills. 1788.]
pp. 24
392 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
A hypothetical title of a tract frequently alluded to in McRee's Life of James
Iredell, but which I have been able to find no other trace. William R. Davie
wrote Publicola, James Iredell wrote Marcus, and Archibald Maclaine appar-
ently contributed as well. See No. 8i.
Debates of the State Conventions {Elliot). See Nos. 27-30.
Decius's Letters. See Nos. 100 and 105.
[^Dickinson {John) J.
The / Letters / of / Fabius, / in 1788, / on the Federal
Constitution, / and / in 1797, /on the present situation /of/
public affairs. / Copy-Right Secured. / From the office of
the Delaware / Gazette, Wilmington, / by W. C. Smyth. /
1797.
8vo. pp. IV, 202 (i). H. 25
Reprinted in Political Writings of John Dickinson, and the first series is in
Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution.
See Washington's Writings, xi, 354.
The first series of Fabius were also printed in The New Hampshire Gazette,
from which Mr. Dawson reprinted a single number in the The Historical Maga-
zine, xviii, 359 ; apparently under the impression that it was an original New
Hampshire essay.
Dickinson {John).
[The Letters of Fabius, Brooklyn, N. Y. ; 1888].
8vo. pp. 54. 26
A few copies separately printed from No. 68.
Examination into the leading principles. See Nos. 130-1.
Examination of the Constitution. See Nos. 21-2.
Fabius. See Nos. 25-6.
Federal Constitution. See No. 12.
Federal Farm.er. See Nos. 86-90.
Elliot {Jonathan). First edition.
The / Debates, / Resolutions, and other Proceedings, / in /
Convention,/ on the adoption of the/ Federal Constitution,/
as recommended by the /General Convention at Philadelphia,/
on the 17th of September, 1787:/ With the yeas and nays on
the decision of the / main question. / Collected and revised,
from contemporary publications, / by Jonathan Elliot. / /
/ Washington, / Printed by and for the Editor, / on the
Pennsylvania Avenue. / 1827 [-30].
3 vols., 8vo. 27
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 393
" Volume I. / Containing the Debates in Massachusetts and New Yorlc."
pp. viii, 358, *8.
" Volume 11. / Containing the Debates in the Commonwealth of Virginia.''
pp. viii, 33-487.
"Volume III. / Containing the Debates in the States of North Carolina and
Pennsylvania." pp, (8), 17-322.
The star leaves in Volume I. were originally issued in Volume III., and are
sometimes found bound in that volume. They are a fragment of the debates
in the New York Convention.
An additional volume was issued in 1830, with the following title:
Journal / and / Debates of the Federal Convention, / Held at Philadelphia,
from Mav 14, to September 17, 1787 / with the / Constitution / of the / United
States, / illustrated by the opinions of twenty / successive Congresses, / and
a / Digest of Decisions in the Courts of the Union, / involving constitutional
principles: / thus shewing / the rise, progress, present condition, and practice /
of the Constitution, / in the / National Legislature and Legal Tribunals of the
Republic. / With / full indexes on all subjects embraced in the Work. / By
Jonathan Elliot. / Volume IV. / (Supplementary to the State Constitutions, in
3 Vols, on adopting the Federal Constitution) / Washington, / Printed and sold
by the Editor, / on the Pennsylvania Avenue, / 1830. /
8vo. pp. (8), 272, 404, (4). 28
Reviewed by Jared Sparks in the North American Review, xxv. 249.
Elliot {Jonathan). Second Edition.
The / Debates / in the several / State Conventions, / on
the adoption of the / Federal Constitution, / as recommended
by the / General Convention at Philadelphia, / in / 1787. /
Together with / the Journal of the Federal Convention,
Luther / Martin's Letter, Yates' Minutes, Congressional /
Opinions, Virgina & Kentucky Resolutions of 'g6-'gg, / and
other illustrations of the Constitution. / In four volumes —
Volume I. / Second Edition, / with considerable additions, /
collected and revised from contemporary publications, / by
Jonathan Elliot. / Published under the Sanction of Congress.
Washington : / Printed by and for the Editor, / on the Penn-
sylvania Avenue. / 1836.
4 vols. 8vo. 29
I. pp. vii, (3), xix-xxxii, 33-*79, 73-551-
II. pp.
III. pp.
IV. pp. (4), vii-xvi, 33-662, xvi.
Elliot {Jonathan). [Third] Edition.
The / Debates / in the several / State Conventions, / on
394 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
the adoption of the / Federal Constitution, / as recommended
by the / General Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787. /
together with the / Journal of the Federal Convention, /
Luther Martin's Letter, / Yates' Minutes, / Congressional
Opinions, / Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 'qS-'qq, /
and / other illustrations of the Constitution. / In Four
Volumes. / Vol. I. / Second Edition, with considerable
additions. / Collected and Revised from contemporary pub-
lications, / by Jonathan Elliot. / Published under the sanc-
tion of Congress. / Washington : Printed for the Editor. /
1836.
4 vols. 8vo. 30
I. pp. xvi, 508 Ante-Constitutional History, Journal of Convention, Martin's
Genuine Information, Yates' Minutes, Ratifications and Amendments,
Official letters of Delegates, Partizan arguments, and private letters.
II. pp. xi, 556. Debates in the Conventions of Massachusetts, Connecticut,
(fragmentary). New Hampshire, (fragmentary). New York, and Pennsyl-
vania (fragmentary.) Account of Maryland and Harrisburg Conventions.
III. pp. xi, 663. Debates in the Virginia Convention.
IV. pp. xii, 639. Debates in the (first) North Carolina Convention and in the
Legislature and and Convention (fragment) of South Carolina, Opinions
on Constitutional questions, 1789-1836.
In 1845 a supplementary volume was added, with the following title :
Debates / on the / adoption of the Federal Constitution, / in the Convention
held at Philadelphia, / in / 1787; / with a diary of the debates of / the Con-
gress of the Confederation; / as reported / By James Madison, / a member,
and deputy from Virginia. / Revised and newly arranged / By Johnathan
Elliot. / Complete in one volume. Vol. V. / Supplementary to Elliot's
Debates. / Published under the sanction of Congress. / Washington: / Printed
for the Editor. / 1845.
8vo. pp. xxii, 641. 31
Elliot's Debates (especially this edition), in spite of its imperfections, is the
great store house of American constitutional history. It is almost impossible
to exaggerate its importance, and though Nos. 92 and gg have rendered the por-
tion relating to Massachusetts and Pennsylvania of little value, the remaining
contents are only to be found in contemporary publications of greater or lesser
rarity.
In 1858 the plates passed into the hands of J. B. Lippincott & Co., who have
printed several issues, with change of date only.
The Fcederalist. No. L To the People of the State of
New York. . . .[signed] Publius.
32
This is the heading to the first of the series of eighty-five essays, now known
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 395
as the The Federalist, and was first published October 27, 1787. With occa-
sional breaks in its regularity, it continued to be published by at least two New
York newspapers until August 16, 1788.
Nos. 1-7, II, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 26, 31. 33, 35, 37-8, 55, 65, 71, and 76 first
appeared in The Independent Journal. Nos. 8, 12, 16, 18, 20, 22, 27, 29, 30,32,
56, 64, 70, 72 and 75 first appeared in The New York Packet. Nos. 10 and
36 first appeared in The Daily Advertiser, Nos. 9, 14, 23-5, and 34 appeared
simultaneously in two or more papers. Nos. 77-85 first appeared in the first
edition in book form. The first publication of the remaining essays I have not
been able to find.
Jay wrote Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 64; Madison, Nos. 10, 14, 37 to 48 inclusive;
Nos. 18, 19 and 20 are the joint work of Madison and Hamilton; Nos. 49 to 58,
62 and 63 are claimed by both Madison and Hamilton; the rest of the numbers
are by Hamilton. The authorship of the 12 numbers clamed by both Madison
and Hamilton are fully discussed by Mr. Lodge in The Proceedings of the Amer-
ican Antiquarian Society for 1882, and Volume ix of The Works of Hamilton;
by Mr. Dawson and Mr. J. C. Hamilton in the introductions to their respective
editions of The Federalist ; by Mr. Rives in his History of the Life and Times of
James Madison; by Mr. Bancroft, in the History of the Formation of the Consti-
tution, ii, 236; and in The Historical Magazine, viii, 305.
"He is certainly a judicious and ingenious writer, though not well calculated
for the common people. — Maclaine to Iredell, March 4, 1788.
" In a series of essays in the New York Gazettes, under title of Fedaralist, it
[the Constitution] has been advocated with great ability. Washington to Luzerne,
Feb. 7, 1788.
" The Federalist, as he terms himself, or Publius, puts me in mind of some
of the gentlemen of the long robe when hard pressed, in a bad cause, with a
rich client. They frequently say a good deal, which does not apply; but yet if
it will not convince the judge and jury, may perhaps, help to make them forget
some part of the evidence — embarass their opponents, and make the audience
stare." N. Y. Journal, Feb. 14, 1788.
" It would be difficult to find a treatise, which, in so small a compass, con-
tains so much valuable political information, or in which the true principles of
republican government are unfolded with such precision." American Magazine
for March, 1788.
See also,
A / List of Editions / of / " The Federalist." / By / Paul Leicester Ford, /
Brooklyn, N. Y., / 1886. 8vo, pp. 25.
The Federalist. New York. 1788.
The / Federalist : / A Collection / of / Essays, / written in
Favour of the / New Constitution, / as agreed upon by the
Federal Convention, / September 17, 1787. / In Two Vol-
umes. / Vol. I. / New York : / Printed and Sold by J. and
A. M'Lean, / No. 41, Hanover-Square. / M,DCC,LXXXVin.
z.vols. i2mo, pp. vi, 22X^vi, 394. C, P., N., B.A. 33 ,
396 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
The first edition in book form. It is difficult to find in uncut condition, or on
thick: paper. Ordinary copies were priced by Leon at $30, and Hawkins' copy
sold for $48.
Reviewed in The American Magazine, 1788. 260, 327, 423, 503.
The Federalist. Paris. 1792.
Le F6d6raliste, / ou / Collection de quelques Ecrits en
faveur de / la Constitution proposee aux Etats-Unis / de /
FAm^rique, par la Convention convoqu6e/ en 1787 ; / Publics
dans les Etats-Unis de I'Amdrique par / MM. Hamilton, Mad-
isson et Gay, / Citoyens de I'fitat de New York. / Tome
Premier. / A Paris, / Chez Buisson, Libraire, rue Haute-
feuille, / No. 20. / 1792.
2 vols., Svo. pp. lii, 366 — (4), 511. 34
2 vols., Svo. pp. (5), xxii-Iii, 366 — (4), 511. S.
The two variations noted above are identical as to matter and composition,
with the exception of the introduction, which is omitted in the second.
Translated by Trudaine de la Sabliere, who added an Introduction, and
Notes, most of which are merely explanatory of such parts of the text as
would be unintelligible to the French reader.
" Both issues of this first French edition are of the utmost rarity. I have
heard of but one example of the first issue, the imperfect copy in the library of
Harvard College, referred to by Mr. Dawson. The second is almost equally
rare. There is one copy in the New York State Library (mentioned by Mr.
Dawson), another in the library of Yale College, and a third was sold at auc-
tion not long since, in Boston for twenty-five dollars a volume." Mr. Lodge's
Introduction to The Federalist.
The Federalist. Paris. 1795.
Le F^d^raliste, / ou / Collection de quelques Ecrits en fav-
eur / de la Constitution proposee aux Etats-Unis / de la
I'Am^rique, par la Convention convoqu^e / en 1788 ;/ Publics
dans les Etats-Unis de I'Am^rique par / MM. Hamilton, Mad-
isson et Jay. / Citoyens de I'Etat de New York. / Seconde
Edition. / Tome Premier, /A Paris, / Chez Buisson, Librarie,
rue Hautseuille, No. 20. / An 36. de la Republique.
2, vols., Svo. pp. (5), xxii-lii, 366 — (4), 511. 35
A reissue with new titles of the second issue of No. 34.
The Federalist. New York. I7gg.
The / Federalist : / A Collection of / Essays, / written in
favour of the / new Constitution, / as agreed upon by the /
Federal Convention, /September 17, 1787. / In Two Volumes.
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 397
/ Vol. I. / New- York : / Printed and sold by John Tiebout, /
No. 358 Pearl-Street. / 1799.
2 vols., i2mo. pp. vi, 227 — vi, 384. 36
Of the first edition of The Federalist a few copies remain unsold, which passed
into the hands of John Tiebout, who reissued it with new titles only.
" It is said that in the year 1799, a new edition of The Federalist, the fifth in
book-form, was published by John Tiebout. . . The most diligent search has
been made for a copy of that edition, but without finding it or obtaining any
other information concerning it. It is not in any of the principal public libraries,
nor. so far as can be learned, is a copy of it in any private library in this part of
the country. The newspapers of that period — both Fcederal and Republican —
have been carefully examined, with the hope of |finding the Proposals for its
publication; personal enquiries have been made of Mr. Tiebout's sons, and of
several of the older inhabitants of the city; and those whose intimate knowledge
of books entitles them to the respect of every student have been applied to on
the suject; yet no trace whatever, beyond the single allusion above referred to,
has been obtained from any quarter concerning this or any other edition of The
Federalist irom the press of John Tiebout." Mr. Dawson's Introduction to The
Federalist, Ixvii
" Mr. Dawson, after the most exhaustive research, failed to find a copy, and
only heard of one, or what appeared to be one, in the collection of Mr. Force,
while his own volume was passing through the press, and he was therefore
compelled to leave the existence of such an edition largely a matter of conjec-
ture. This gap is now filled. There is a copy of this edition, probably unique,
for the Force copy has disappeared, in the Long Island Historical Society."
Mr. Lodge's Introduction to The Federalist.
This copy mentioned by Mr. Lodge is however, imperfect, there being but
one volume.
The Federalist. New York. 1802.
The / Federalist, / on the New Constitution. / By Publius. /
Written in 1788. / To which is added, / Pacificus, / on the
Proclamation of Neutrality. / Written in 1793. / Likewise,/
The Federal Constitution, / with all the Amendments. /
Revised and Corrected. / In Two Volumes. / Vol. I. /
Copy-right secured. / New- York : / Printed and sold by
George F. Hopkins, / At Washington's Head. / 1802.
2 vols., 8vo pp. viii, 317, (i) — v, 351. C, H., N. 37
Mr. Dawson hazards the guess that this edition was edited by William Cole-
man, but by Mr. Hopkins statement, he appears in error.
" Mr. Hopkins informed me to-day that this edition was in the first instance
corrected by John Wells, who compared it with the original edition, published
by McLean [sic] in 1788, and 'that it was subsequently revised by my father, at
whose casual suggestion Pacificus was printed with it." Memoranda by J. C.
Hamilton, Feb. 6, 1847.
From the "prefatory remarks " prefixed to the Washington edition, it would
398 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
appear that Mr. Jay also revised in this edition the numbers contributed by
him. See No. 41.
" In the year 1802, Mr. Hopkins, printer, of this city, intending to publish a
new edition of The Federalist, took this opportunity to apply to Gen. Hamil-
ton, and solicit him to correct and revise the numbers, and, so far succeeded,
as to obtain his consent to assist in the revisal, provided a gentleman of com-
petent literary talents would undertake to make the first verbal corrections, for
the original idea was to be strictly adhered to : — He then examined the whole
with his own eye, previous to its being committed to the press, and saw that it
was free from literary blemishes." William A. Coleman in the A'. V. Evening
Post, March 25, 1817.
The Federalist. New York. 1810.
The / Federalist, / on the New Constitution ; / written in
1788, /by Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Jay, and Mr. Madison./ To
which is added, / Pacificus, / on the Proclamation of Neutral-
ity ; / written in 1793, /by Mr. Hamilton./ A new edition,
with the Names and Portraits of the several Writers. / In
Two Volumes. / Vol. I. / New- York : / Published by Wil-
liams & Whiting, / at their Theological and Classical Book-
store, / No. 118, Pearl-Street./ Printed by J. Seymour./
1 8 10.
2 vols., 8vo. pp. iv, 368, 2 portraits — iv, 368, portrait. 38
A separate edition of volumes ii. and iii. of the " Works of Hamilton'' as
edited by John Wells, in 1810. It is identical in matter with No. 37, with the
addition of the names of the authors from "a private memorandum in his
(Hamilton's) own handwriting.''
The Federalist. Philadelphia, 1817.
The / Federalist, / on the New Constitution ; / written in
1788, /by Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Jay, and Mr. Madison,/ A
New Edition, / with the Names and Portraits of the several
Writers. / Philadelphia : / Published by Benjamin Warner,
No. 147, Market Street. / William Greer. Printer. Harris-
burg. / 1 8 17.
8vo. pp. 477, 3 portraits.
The first single volume edition. It follows the iSio edition in text. 39
The Federalist. Philadelphia. 18 18.
The / Federalist, / on the New Constitution ; / written in
1788,/ by Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Jay, and Mr. Madison./ A
New Edition, / with the Names and Portraits of the several
Writers. / Philadelphia : / Published by Benjamin Warner,
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 399
No. 147, Market Street, / and sold at his stores, Richmond,
Virginia, / and Charleston, South Carolina. / 18 18.
8vo, pp, 504, 3 portraits. B. 40
, Printed from the same forms as No. 39, with the addition of an appendix
containing the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.
The Federalist. Washington. 1818.
The / Federalist, / on / the New Constitution, / written in /
the Year 1788, /by/ Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr.
Jay, / with / an Appendix, / Containing / the Letters of
Pacificus and Helvidius, / on the / Proclamation of Neutrality
of 1793;/ Also, the / Original Articles of Confederation, /
and / the Constitution of the United States, / with the /
Amendments made thereto. / A New Edition. / The Num-
bers written by Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. / City of
Washington : / Printed and published by Jacob Gideon,
Jun. / 1818.
8vo, pp. 671. 41
"The present edition of the Federalist contains all the numbersof that work,
as revised by their authors, and is the only one to which the remark will apply.
Former editions, indeed, it is understood, had the advantage of a revisal from
Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Jay, but the numbers written by Mr.- Madison still re-
main in the state in which they originally issued from the press, and contain
many inaccuracies. The publisher of this volume has been so fortunate as to
procure from Mr. Madison the copy of the work which that gentleman had
preserved for himself, with corrections of the papers of which he was the
author, in his own hand." Prefatory remarks by Jacob Gideon, Jr.
Mr. Madison claims the authorship, in this edition, of Nos. 18, ig and 20,
which Hamilton had given as their joint work; and 49 to 58, 62 and 63, which
Mr. Hamilton had claimed for himself. In spite of the research and study
devoted to the dispute, it is to-day impossible to give the authorship to either
with any certainty.
The Federalist, Washington, 1821.
The / Federalist, / on / the New Constitution, / Written in
/ the Year 1788, / by/Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Jay,
/ with / an Appendix, / Containing / the Letters of Pacificus
and Helvidius,/ on the / Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793 ;
/ Also, the / Original Articles of Confederation, / and / the
Constitution of the United States, / with the / Amendments
made thereto. / A New Edition. / The Numbers written by
400 BIBLIOGRAPHY,
Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. / City of Washington : /
Printed and published by Jacob Gideon, Jun. / 1821.
8vo. pp. 671. 42
A reissue of No. 41 with new titles only. It is not in Mr. Dawson's list of
editions.
The Federalist. Hallo-well. 1826.
The / Federalist, / on the New Constitution, / Written in /
the Year 1788, / by/ Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Jay :/
With / an Appendix, / Containing / the Letters of Pacificus
and Helvidius, / on the / Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793 ;
/ Also, the / Original Articles of Confederation, / and the /
Constitution of the United States, / with the / Amendments
made thereto. / A New Edition. / The Numbers written by
Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. / Hallowell, (Me.) : /
Printed and published by Glazier & Co. / 1826.
8vo. pp. 582. H. 43
A reprint of Gideon's edition of 1818.
The Federalist. Philadelphia. 1826.
The / Federalist, / on the New Constitution, / written in
the year / 1788, / by / Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison and Mr.
Jay : / With / an Appendix, / containing / The Letters of
Pacificius and Helvidius / on the Proclamation of Neutrality
of 1793 ; / Also the / Articles of Confederation, / and the /
Constitution of the United States, / with the amendments
made thereto. / A New Edition. / The numbers written by
Mr. Madison corrected by himself. /Philadelphia : / Published
by McCarty and Davis, / 171 Market-street. / 1826.
8vo. pp. 582. 44
Identical with No. 43, excepting title page. It is not in Sabin's or Dawson's
lists, or in Ford's List of editions of "The Federalist."
The Federalist. Hallowell. 1831.
The / Federalist / on / the New Constitution,/ written in
the Year 1788, / by / Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr.
Jay : / With / an Appendix, / Containing / the Letters of
Pacificus and Helvidius, / on the / Proclamation of Neutrality
of 1793 ; / also, the / Original Articles of Confederation, and
the Con- / stitution of the United States, / with the Amend-
ments made thereto. / A New Edition. / The Numbers writ-
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 4OI
ten by Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. / Hallowell : /
Printed and published by Glazier, Masters & Co. / 1831.
8vo. pp. 542. 45
Not in Mr. Sabin's Dictionary of Books relating to America, and Mr. Dawson,
who had heard of such an edition, was unable to find a copy.
The Federalist. Washington. 1831.
The / Federalist, / on / The New Constitution, / written
in / the Year 1788, / by / Alexander Hamilton, James Madi-
son and John Jay, / With an Appendix, / Containing the
Original Articles of Confederation ; the / Letter of General
Washington, as President of the / Convention, to the Presi-
dent of Congress ; the Consti- / tution of the United States,
and the Amendments to /the Constitution./ A New Edition,
/ with a Table of Contents, / and / a copious Alphabetical
Index. / The Numbers written by Mr. Madison corrected by
Himself. / Washington : / Published by Thompson &
Homans. / Way & Gideon, Printers. / 1831.
i2mo. pp. vii, 3-420. C. 46
The first edition with an index, prepared by Phillip R. Fendall.
The Federalist. Hallowell. 1837.
The / Federalist, / on / the New Constitution, / written in
the year 1788, / by / Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr.
Jay : / with / an Appendix, / Containing / the Letters of
Pacificus and Helvidius / on the / Proclamation of Neutrality
of 1793 ; / also, / the Original Articles of Confederation, and
the / Constitution of the United States, / with the Amend-
ments made thereto. / A New Edition. / The Numbers
written by Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. / Hallowell : /
Glazier, Masters & Smith. / 1837.
8vo. pp. 500. A., C. 47
The Federalist. Rio de Janiero. 1840.
O Federalista, publicado em inglez por Hamilton, Madis-
son e Jay, cidadaos de Nova-York, e tradizi^o em portuguez
por . . . Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Imperial e Const, de J. Ville-
neuve & Ca. 1840.
3 vols. 8vo. pp. 244 — 285 — 246. 48
Title from Mr. Sabin's Dictionary of Books relating to America. It is
Unknown to Mr. Dawson, and I have been unable to find a copy. From the
402 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
misspelling of Madison's name, it is apparently a translation of the Paris edi-
tion, No. 34.
The Federalist. Hallow ell. 1842.
The / Federalist, / on / the New Constitution, / Written
in 1788, / by / Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Jay: /
With / an Appendix, / Containing / the Letters of Pacificus
and Helvidius /on the / Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793 ; /
also, / the Original Articles of Confederation,/ and the / Con-
stitution of the United States. / A New Edition. / The
Numbers written by Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. /
Hallowell : / Glazier, Masters & Smith. / 1842.
8vo. pp. 484, 49
Reviewed by J. Parker, in the North American Review, xciv, 435.
The Federalist. Washington. 1845.
The / Federalist, / on /the New Constitution, /Written in
/the Year 1788, /by/ Alexander Hamilton, James Madison,
and John Jay, / With an Appendix,/ Containing / the Orig-
inal Articles of Confederation ; the Letter of General Wash-/
ington, as President of the Convention, to the President of
Con- / gress ; the Constitution of the United States ; the
Amend- / ments to the Constitution ; and the Act of Congress
in / Relation to the election of President, passed / January
23, 1845. / Sixth Edition,/ with / a Copious Alphabetical In-
dex. / The numbers written by Mr. Madison corrected by
Himself./ Washington: / Printed by J. & G. S. Gideon. / 1845.
8vo. pp. (2), V, (l), 3gl. 50
Neither in Mr. Dawson's nor Mr. Sabin's lists of editions.
The Federalist. Philadelphia. 1847.
The / Federalist, / on / the New Constitution, / Written in
/ the Year 1788,/ by /Alexander Hamilton, James Madison,
and John Jay. / With an Appendix, / Containing / the Let-
ters of Pacificus and Helvidius on the Proclamation of Neu- /
trality of 1793; the Original Articles of Confederation; the
Let- / ter of General Washington, as President of the Conven-
tion, to the President of Congress; the Constitution of the
/ United States ; the Amendments to the Constitution ; / and
the Acts of Congress in Relation to the Elec- / tion of
President, passed January 23, 1845. / Sixth edition, / with / a
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 403
Copious Alphabetical Index. / The Numbers written by Mr.
Madison corrected by Himself. / Philadelphia : / R. Wilson
Desilver, 18 South Fourth Street, / 1847.
8vo. pp. (2), V, 392, 102. B. M., 51
The '■ Letters of Pacificus and Helvidius," has a separate title-page and
pagination, and is often found as a separate work.
The Federalist. Washington. 1847.
The Federalist, on the New Constitution Washington:
J. & G. S. Gideon 1847.
8vo. pp. 52
Title quoted by Sabin from " Mr. Bartlett's List."
The Federalist. Hallowell. 1852.
The / Federalist, / on / the New Constitution, / Written in
1788. / hy / Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Jay: /
With / an Appendix, / Containing the / Letters of Pacificus
and Helvidius / on the/ Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793 ;/
Also, / the Original Articles of Confederation, / and the /
Constitution of the United States. / New Edition : / The
Numbers written by Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. /
Hallowell : / Masters, Smith, & Company. / 1852.
8vo. pp. 496. 53
The Federalist. Hallowell. 1857.
The / Federalist, / on the / New Constitution, / Written
in 1788, / by / Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Jay : /
With / an Appendix, / Containing Letters of / Pacificus and
Helvidius / on the / Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793 ; /
Also, / the Original Articles of Confederation, / and the
Constitution of the United States. / New Edition : / The
Numbers written by Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. /
Hallowell : / Masters, Smith, & Co. / 1857.
Svo. pp. 496. B. 54-
The Federalist. New York. 1863.
The Foederalist : / A / Collection of Essays, Written in
Favor / of the New Constitution, as / agreed upon by / the
Fcederal Convention, / September 17, 1787. / Reprinted
from the Original Text. / with an / Historical Introduction
and Notes, / By Henry B. Dawson. / In Two Volumes^ /
404 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Vol. I. / New York: / Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street, /
London : Sampson Low, Son & Co. / 1863.
8vo. pp. cxlii, (2), 615, portrait. 55
All ever printed. This volume contains the text of The Federalist, entire,
and an Introduction, containing a history of the origin, original publication,
the controversy over the disputed numbers, and a bibliographical list of edi-
tions, all being treated with great thoroughness. It was Mr. Dawson's inten-
tion to give, in the second volume, the alterations which had been made in the
text of the various editions, and MSS. notes from copies of the work which had
belonged to the authors and other statesmen. The Introduction gave orfense
to the Hamilton and Jay families, and occasioned the following pamphlets :
Correspondence / between / John Jay and Henry B. Dawson, / and
between / James A. Hamilton and Henry B. Dawson, / concerning / The
Federalist. / New York :/ Printed by J. M. Bradstreet & Son./ 1864.
Svo. and 4to. pp. 48, covers. 56
Of the 4to. edition only 25 copies were printed. The title on the cover reads
Current Fictions tested by Uncurrent Facts. Mr. Dawson advertised Current
Fictions No. II., but it was never printed.
New Plottings in Aid of the Rebel Doctrine of / State Sovereignty. / Mr.
Jay's Second Letter / on / Dawson's Introduction to the Federalist, / Expos-
ing its Falsification of the History of the Constitution ; its / Libels on
Duane, Livingston, Jay and Hamilton ; and / its relation to recent efforts
by Traitors at home, and / Foes abroad, to maintain the Rebel Doctrine of
State / Sovereignty, for the subversion of the Unity of / the Republic and
the Supreme Sovereignty of / the American People / / New York: /
A. D. F. Randolph. / 1864. / Svo. pp. 54, viii, covers. 57
[Same.] New York: / American News Company, 121 Nassau street. / Lon-
don:/ Trubner & Company, 60 Patermoster Row. / 1864./ Svo, pp. 54.
vii, covers. 58
[Same.] London: Samson Low . . . 1S64. Svo. pp. 50. 59
All three editions were suppressed by Mr. Jay, and the bulk of the copies
burnt. See Current Fictions, p. 26.
This edition is reviewed by H. W. Torrey in The North American Review,
cxcviii, 586 ; and by Historicus in The New York Times, Feb. 17, 1864.
The Federalist. New York. 1864.
The Foederalist : / A / Collection of Essays, Written in
Favor / of the New Constitution, as / agreed upon by / the
Fcederal Convention, / September 17, 1787. / Reprinted
from the Original Text. / With an / Historical Introduction
and Notes, / By Henry B. Dawson. / In Two Volumes. /
Vol. I. / New York : / Charles Scribner & Co. .../.. . 1864.
Svo. pp. cxlii, (2), 615, portrait. 60
The Federalist. Morrisania. 1 864.
The Foederalist: / A Collection of Essays, written in
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 40S
Favor / of the New Constitution, as agreed / upon by the
FcEderal Conven- / tion, September 17, 1787. / Reprinted
from the Original Text, / with an / Historical Introduction
and Notes / By Henry B. Dawson. / In Two Volumes. /
Vol. I. / Morrisania, N. Y. : / 1864.
Royal 8vo. pp. cxlii, (2), 615, portrait. 61
Printed from the same plates as the New York editions of 1863 and 1864.
250 copies printed.
The Federalist. Philadelphia. 1865.
The / Federalist : / A Commentary / on the / Constitution
of the United States. / A Collection of Essays, / By Alex-
ander Hamilton, / Jay, and Madison. / Also, / The Con-
tinentalist, and other Papers, / By Hamilton. / Edited by /
John C. Hamilton,/ Author of " The History of the Republic
of the United States." / Philadelphia : / J. B. Lippincott &
Co. / 1864.
8vo. pp. clxv, (i), 659, vi, portrait. B. A. 62
Many reissues, with a change of date only.
Contains an " Historical Notice," which is an endeavor to prove Hamilton
the author of the doubtful numbers ; in fact, the whole tendency is to magnify
Hamilton's part of the work, even the names of the other authors being printed
in much smaller type on the title page.
The alterations in the text made by the different editions is added, as also the
papers signed " Philo-Publius "' by William Duer.
Reviewed by Mr. Horace Binney in the following:
A Review of Hamilton's Edition of the Federalist. Philadelphia : 1864.
Svo. pp. 8. 63
The Federalist. Philadelphia. 1865.
The / Federalist : / A Commentary / on the / Constitution
of the United States. / A Collection of Essays / By Alex-
ander Hamilton, / Jay, and Madison. / Also, / The Contin-
entalist, and other Papers, / By Hamilton. / Edited by John
C. Hamilton, / Author of " The History of the Republic of
the United States." / Vol. I. / Philadelphia : / J.B. Lippincott
& Co./ 1865.
2 vols. Rl. 8vo. pp. clxv, (i), 242. — (2), 243-659, vi, portrait. 64
From the same plates as No 62, but divided into two volumes, and printed
on larger and finer paper. 100 copies only printed.
The Federalist. New York. 1876.
University Edition, / The Federalist : / A / Collection of
406 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Essays, written in Favor / of the New Constitution, as /agreed
upon by / Federal Convention,/ September 17, 1787 /Re-
printed from the Original Text / under the Editorial Super-
vision of / Henry B. Dawson. / New York : / Scribner, Arm-
strong and Co. / 1876.
8vo. pp. ivi, 615. 65
Also issues with no date. A cheap edition from the plates of No. 55, with
the omission of the Introduction, a short Preface taking its place.
The Federalist. New York. 1 886.
The Works / of / Alexander Hamilton / Edited by / Henry
Cabot Lodge / / Vol. IX. / New York & London / G.
P. Putnam's Sons/ The Knickerbocker Press/ 1886.
8vo. pp. xlv, 598. 66
Federal Republican. See No. iig.
Ford {Paul Leicester).
A List of the Members of the Federal Convention of 1787.
By Paul Leicester Ford. Brooklyn, N. Y.: 1888.
67
100 copies privately printed.
" In i8ig, when John Quincy Adams, by direction of Congress, edited and
published the Journal of the Federal Convention, he drew up ... a list of the
members . . . This list was accepted and republished by Elliot, ... by Curtis
and more recently in the Official Programme of the Constitutional Centen-
ial, and no additions are promised in the forthcoming memorial of that celebra-
tion — Thus this list prepared in 1819, has become a fixture . . . There are, how-
ever, several omissions and by reference to original documents, acts, etc., I
have increased the list to seventy-four. To this I have added, in such cases as
I have been able, the reasons of members for declining the appointment, and
non-attendance of such as failed to be present in the Convention ; the day of
arrival of attending members; the absence of attending members; the date of
leaving of those who failed to sign the Constitution, with their reasons, and the
part the non-attending and non-signing members took in their own States in
support or opposition to the ratification." Extract from preface.
Ford {Paul Leicester).
Pamphlets /on the /Constitution of the United States/
Published during /its discussion by the People / 1 787-1 788. /
Edited / with notes and a bibliography / by / Paul Leicester
Ford./ Brooklyn, N. Y.: / 1888.
8vo, pp. 68
Includes reprints of the following pamphlets, and a bibliography and refer-
ence list to the literature relating to the formation and adoption of the Consti-
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 407
[Gerry (Elbridge)]. Observations on the New Constitution, and on the
Federal and State Conventions. By a Columbian Patriot.
[Webster (Noah)]. An Examination into the leading principles of the
Federal Constitution. By a Citizen of America.
[Jay (John)]. An Address to the People of the State of New York. By
a Citizen of New York.
[Smith (Melancthon)]. Address to the People of the State of New York.
By a Plebeian.
[Webster (Pelatiah)]. The Weakness of Brutus exposed: or some re-
marks in vindication of the Constitution. By a Citizen of Philadelphia.
[Coxe (Tench)]. An Examination of the Constitution of the United States
of America. By an American Citizen.
Wilson (James). Speech on the Federal Constitution, delivered in Phila-
delphia.
[Dickinson (John)]. Letters of Fabius on the Federal Constitution.
[Hanson (Alexander Contee)]. Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a
Federal Government. By Aristides.
Randolph (Edmund). Letter on the Federal Constitution.
[Lee (Richard Henry)]. Observations on the System of Government
proposed by the late Convention. By a Federal Farmer.
Mason (George). Objections to the Federal Constitution.
[Iredell (James)]. Observations on George Mason's Objections to the
Federal Constitution. By Marcus.
[Ramsay (David)]. An Address to the Freemen of South Carolina on the
Federal Constitution.. By Civis.
l^Gerry {Elbridge)].
Observations / On the new Constitution, and on the Federal /
and State Conventions. / By a Columbian Patriot. /
[Boston: 1788.]
i2mo. pp. 19. C, M., B. A. 6g
The above title is merely a caption on the first page. It is not advertised in
any Massachusetts paper that I have been able to find, and was probably
printed for Gerry for limited circulation only. It is reprinted in Ford's
Pamphlets on the Constitution, and as below.
[Gerry {Elbridge.)]
Observations / on the / New Constitution, / and on the /
Foederal and State Conventions. / By a Columbian Patriot /
. . ., Boston Printed, New York Re-printed, / M,DCC.LXXXVIII.
8vo. pp. 22. N., C, S. 70
Printed by Thomas Greenleaf, in the N. Y. Journal, and reprinted, from the
same forms, for the " New York'[Anti] Federal Committee," who distributed
1630 copies among the county committees in the State.
408 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Gerry {Elbridge).
[Observations on the New Constitution. Brooklyn, N. Y.:
1887].
8vo. pp. 23. 71
A few copies separately printed from No. 68.
Hall, Aaron.
An / Oration, / delivered at the Request / of the / Inhabit-
ants of Keene, June 30, 1788; /To Celebrate the Ratification /
of the / Federal Constitution / by the / State of New-Hamp-
shire. / By Aaron Hall, M. A. / Member of the late State
Convention. / Keene: State of New-Hampshire: / Printed by
James D. Griffith. / M,DCC,Lxxxviii.
Svo. pp. 15. B. A. 72
Hamilton {Alexander'). See also Nos. 32-66.
Propositions/ of Col. Hamilton, of New York, / In Conven-
tion for Establishing a Consti- /tutional Government for the/
United States. / Also / a Summary of the Political Opinions
of/ John Adams,/ / Pittsfield : Printed by Phineas
Allen. 1802.
Svo. pp. 32. N. 73
[Hanson (Alexander Conlee)].
Remarks / on the / Proposed Plan / of a / Federal Govern-
ment, / Addressed to the Citizens of the / United States
of America, / and Particularly to the People of / Maryland, /
By Aristides. /.../.../.../.../.../ An-
napolis ; / Printed by Frederick Green, / Printer to the State.
Svo. pp. 42. N., P. H. S., M. 74
Reprinted in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution.
Hanson (Alexander Contee).
[Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a Federal Government.
Brooklyn, N. Y. : 1888].
Svo. pp. 39. 75
A few copies separately printed from No. 68.
Hitchcock (Enos).
An / Oration: / delivered July 4, 1788, / at the request of
the Inhabitants / of the / Town of Providence, / in / celebra-
tion / of the / Anniversary / of / American Independence, /
and of / the accession of nine States / to the / Federal Con-
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 4O9
stitution. / By Enos Hitchcock, A. M. / Providence : / Printed
by Bennett Wheeler.
8vo. pp. 24. 76
\Hopkinson {Francis) ].
Account / of the / Grand Federal / Procession, / Philadel-
phia, July 4, 1788. / To which is added, / a / Letter / on the
/ same Subject. / . . . / [Philadelphia :] M. Carey, Printer.
[1788.]
8vo. pp. (2), 22. 77
Appeared originally in Carey's American Museum, iv, 57, and the same forms
were used to print this edition. Only the "Account" and Wilson's speech are
reprinted in Hopkinson's Miscellaneous Essays, ii, 349, showing that the " Let-
ter" is not by him.
\Hopkinson (Francis) ].
Account / of the / Grand Federal / Procession, / Philadel-
phia, July 4, 1788. / . . . / To which is added, / Mr. Wlson's
[Sic] Oration, / and a / Letter / on the / Subject of the Pro-
cession. / [Philadelphia: M. Carey. 1788.]
8vo. pp. (2), 22. 78
An / Impartial / Address, /to the / Citizens /of the / City
and County of Albany : / or, the / 35 Anti-Federal Objec-
tions / refuted. / By the Federal Committee / of the City of
Albany. / Printed by Charles R. Webster, at / his Free Press,
No. 36, State-street, near / the English Church, Albany.
i2mo, pp. 28 S. 79
Interesting Documents, / Containing: / An Account of the
Federal Procession, &c. July 23, 1788. / Sketch of the Pro-
ceedings of the Convention of the State of New York, which
adopted the Constitution 2 days after the Procession. / The
Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between Thir-
teen United States, as propounded by the Congress of the
United States, 17th Nov. 1777, and approved by this State;
Feb. 6, 1778. / The Constitution of the U. S. with all its
Amendments. / The Constitution of the State of New-York,
with its Amendments. /The Declaration of Independence, New
York. / Published by John S. Murphy, Southwick & Pilsner,
Print. 9 Wall St. 18 19.
i2mo. pp. 128 N. 80
4IO BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Introduction. See No loS-
Iredell {James.) See also No. 24.
Answers to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitu-
tion, recommended by the late Convention at Philadelphia.
By Marcus. [Brooklyn, N. Y. : 1888.]
8vo. pp. 38. 81
Printed in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution, from which a few copies were
separately printed as above. The original tract is described in No. 24.
\Jackson {Jonathan) J.
Thoughts / upon the / Political Situation / of the / United
States of America, / in which that of / Massachusetts / Is more
particularly considered. / With some / Observations on the
Constitution / for a / Federal Government. / Addressed to
the People of the Union. / By a Native of Boston. / . . . /
.../.../ Printed at Worcester, Massachusetts, / by Isaiah
Thomas. MDCCLXXXViii.
8vo. pp. 209. M., B. A., S. 82
Signed at end " Civis." The authorship of this pamphlet is also frequently
given to G. R. Minot, but both Sabin and Gushing give it as above. Reviewed
in TheAmerican Magazine, 744 and 804.
[Jay {John)]. See also Nos. 32-66.
An / Address / to the / People / of the / State of New-
York / On the Subject of the Constitution, / Agreed upon at
Philadelphia, / the 17th of September, 1787. / New-York: /
Printed by Samuel London, Printer to the State.
4to. pp. 19. ' N., B. A., C. S. 83
Reprinted in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution.
Jay {John).
An Address to the People of the State of New York, on
the Subject of the Constitution. [Brooklyn, N. Y. : 1887.]
8vo. pp. 20. 84
A few copies separately printed from No. 68.
Journal, / Acts and Proceedings, / of the Convention, /
assembled at Philadelphia, Monday, May 14, and dis- / solved
Monday, September 17, 1787, /which formed / The Constitu-
tion of the United States, / Published under the direction of
the President of the United States, conformably to a / Res-
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 4II
olution of Congress of March 27, 1818. /Boston: /Printed
and Published by Thomas B. Wait. / 18 19.
8vo. pp. 510. N., P., B., H. 85
Edited by John Quincy Adams. Reviewed in the Southern Review, ii, 432,
and in Taylor's New Views of the Constitution. Washington : 1823. See also
No. 28.
[^Lee {Richard Henry) ].
Observations / leading to a fair examination / of the / Sys-
tem of Government, / proposed by the late / Convention ; /
and to several essential and necessary / alterations in it. / In
a number of / Letters / from the / Federal Farmer to the
Republican. / Printed in the Year M,DCC,LXXVII.
8vo. pp. 40. A. A. S. 86
The Letters of a Federal Farmer, was, to the Anti-Federalists, what The Fed-
eralist was to the supporters of the Constitution. Reprinted in Ford's Pam-
phlets on the Constitution.
[Lee {Richard Henry) J.
Observations / leading to a fair examination / of the / Sys-
tem of Government, / proposed by the late / Convention ; /
and to several essential and neces- / sary alterations in it. /
In a number of / Letters / from the / Federal Farmer to the
Republican. / Printed [in New York, by Thomas Green-
leaf] in the Year M,DCC,LXXXVII.
8vo. pp. 40. B. A., H., A. A. S., N., C. 87
\_Lee {Richard Henry) ].
Observations / leading to a fair examination / of the / Sys-
tem of Government ; / proposed by the late / Convention ; /
and to several essential and necessary / alterations in it. / In
a number of / Letters / from the / Federal Farmer to the
Republiean. / Reprinted [in New York by Thomas Green-
leaf] by order of a Society of Gentlemen. / M.DCC.LXXXVII.
8vo. pp. 40. A. A. S. 88
Lee {Richard Henry).
Observations leading to a fair examination of the System of
Government, Proposed by the late Convention. [Brooklyn,
N. Y.: 1888.]
8vo. pp. (2), 47. 89,
A few copies separately printed from No. 68.
412 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
\_Lee {Richard Henry) ].
An / Additional number / of / Letters / from the / Federal
Farmer / to the / Republican ; / leading to fair examination /
of the / System of Government, / proposed by the late / Con-
vention ; / to several essential and neces- / sary alterations in
it ; / And calculated to Illustrate and Support the / Principles
and Positions / Laid down in the preceding / Letters. /
Printed [in New York by Thomas Greenleaf] in the year
M,DCC,LXXXVIII.
8vo. pp. [4i]-j8i. B. a., H., C. go
Letters of Fabius. See Nos. 25-6.
Lloyd, Thomas. See Nos. gi-i 10.
Maclaine, Archibald. See No. 24.
M'Kean {Thomas), and Wilson {James).
Commentaries / on the / Constitution / of the / United
States of America, / with that Constitution prefixed, / In
which are unfolded, / the / Principles of Free Government, /
and the Superior / Advantages of Republicanism Demon-
strated. / By James Wilson, L.L.D. / / and
Thomas M'Kean, L.L.D. / . . . / The whole extracted
from Debates published in Philadelphia by / J. Lloyd. /
London:/ Printed for J. Debrett, opposite Burtington-House,
Piccadilly ; / J. Johnson's, St. Paul's Church Yard ; and J. S.
Jordan, / No. 166 Fleet Street. / 1792.
8vo. pp. (2), 5—23. 25—147, (i). 91
This is a reissue of the remainder of the edition of Lloyd's Debates in the
Convention of Pennsylvania (No. no) with a new title and pp. 20-23, which
were printed in England.
McMaster (John Bach), and Stone {Frederick D).
Pennsylvania/ and the/ Federal Constitution/ 1787-1788/
Edited by / John Bach McMaster / and / Frederick D. Stone /
Published for the Subscribers by / The Historical Society of
Pennsylvania / 1888
8vo. pp. viii, 803, 15 portraits. 92
A most valuable volume, including a history of the struggle over the ratifi-
cation, the debates in the convention, now for the first time collected, sketches
of the Pennsylvania members of the Federal Convention, and of the Pennsyl-
vania Convention, and the letters of Centinel.
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 413
Madison {James). See Nos. 31-66.
. The / Papers / of / James Madison, / purchased by order
of Congress ; / being / his Correspondence and Reports of
Debates during / the Congress of the Confederation / and /
his Reports of Debates / in the / Federal Convention ; / now
published from the original manuscripts, depos- / ited in the
Department of State, by direction of / the joint library com-
mittee of Congress, / under the superintendence / of / Henry
D. Gilpin. / Volume I. / Washinton : / Lantree & O'Sullivan. /
1840.
3 vols. 8vo. pp. (2) !x, 580, xxii, (2), xxii, (2), (58i)-l242, (2), xiv, (2),
(i243)-i624, ccvlvi, 16 11. 93
Also issues with change of date in New York and Mobile and Boston. The
whole of these three volumes were also embodied in the fifth volume of Elliot
(No. 31), but this edition is much preferable from the larger type.
Reviewed in The Democratic Review, v, 243 ; vi, 140, 337: in The Amer-
ican Church Review xv, 541, and by C, F. Adams in The North American
Review, liii, 41.
Marcus. See Nos. 24 and 81.
Martin {Luther').
The / Genuine Information,/ delivered to the/ Legislature
of the State of / Maryland, / Relative to the Proceedings /
of the / General Convention, / Lately held at Philadelphia ; /
By / Luther Martin, Esquire, / Attorney-General of Mary-
land, / and / One of the Delegates in the said Convention. /
Together with / A Letter to the Hon. Thomas C. Deye /
Speaker of the House of Delegates, / An Address to the
Citizens of the United / States, / And some Remarks relative
to a Standing / Army, and a Bill of Rights. / . . . / Phila.
delphia ; / Printed by Eleazer Oswald, at the Coffee-House. /
M,DCC,LXXXVin.
8vo. pp. viii, 93. 94
By direction of the Legislature of Maryland, Mr. Martin reported the pro.
ceedings of the Federal Convention to them. It is a work of the greatest
value from the inside light that this member, and opposer of the Constitution,
sheds on this secret history of the Convention, but must be taken as a partizan
statement. It is reprinted in Elliot and in Nos. 13S-42,
Mason {George).
The Objections of the / Hon. George Mason, / to the pro.
414 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
posed Fcederal Constitution. / Addressed to the Citizens of
Virginia. / / Printed by Thomas Nicolas [in Rich-
mond : 1787 or 8].
Folio. Broadside. S. 95
Reprinted in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution and ' ' extracts " are given
in Elliot, i.
Mason {George).
[The objections of the Hon. George Mason, to the proposed
Foederal Constitution. Brooklyn, N. Y. : 1888].
8vo. pp. 6. 96
A few copies separately printed from No. 68.
Massachusetts Debates. Boston : 1788.
Debates, / Resolutions and other Proceedings, / of the /
Convention / of the / Commonwealth of Massachusetts, /
Convened at Boston, on the 9th of January, 1788, / and con-
tinued until the 7th of February follow- / ing, for the purpose
of assenting to and ratify- / ing the Constitution recom-
mended by the / Grand Federal Convention. / Together with
/ The Yeas and Nays on the / Decision of the Grand Ques-
tion. / To which / The Federal Constitution / is prefixed. /
Boston : / Printed and sold by Adams and Nourse, in Court-
Street ; and / Benjamin Russell, and Edmund Freeman, in
State-Street. / M,DCC,LXXXVIII.
8vo. pp. 219. C, M., B. A. 97
Reported by Benjamin Russell, printer of The Massachusetts Centiitel. His
own account is given in Buckingham's Specimens of Newspaper Literature, ii,
49.
Massachusetts Debates. Boston: 1808.
Debates, / Resolutions and other proceedings / of the /
Convention / of the / Commonwealth of Massachusetts. /
Convened at Boston, on the 9th of January, / 1788, and con-
tinued until the 7th of Februa- / ry following, for the purpose
of assenting / to and ratifying the Constitution recom- /
mended by the grand Federal Convention. / Together with
the / Yeas and Nays / on / the decision of the grand ques-
tion. / To which / The Federal Constitution is prefixed ; / and
to which are added, / the Amendments / which have been
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 415
made therein. / Boston : / Printed and sold by Oliver &
Monroe, / and Joshua Gushing, State-Street, / 1808.
Jzmo. pp. 236. H. 98
Massachusetts Debates. Boston: 1856.
Debates and Proceedings / in the / Convention / of the /
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, / held in the year / 1788, /
and which finally ratified the / Constitution of the United
States. / Printed by authority of Resolves of the Legisla-
ture, 1856. / Boston : / William White, / Printer to the Com-
monwealth. / 1856.
8vo. pp. (16), 442. g9
Edited by Bradford K. Pierce and Charles Hale. It contains not only the
debates as printed in the two former editions, but the ante and post proceed-
ings of the General Court; Gerry's official letter; the Journal of the Conven-
tion; Judge Parsons " Minutes " of the debates; an account of the reception of
the news of the ratification, and of the procession which followed; the "Let-
ters of an American;" Speeches of Franklin in the Federal Convention, and
Wilson in the Pa. Convention; 4 " Letters of Brutus," and a series of personal
letters relating to the proceedings in Massachusetts, mostly taken from Spark's
Writings of Washington.
It is a most valuable volume for the history of the struggle over ratification
in Massachusetts, but it is a little strange that the editors should pass over the
essays on the Constitution from Massachusetts pens and select the letters
of "An American" and of "Brutus" — the first a Pennsylvania series, by
Tench Coxe, and the second by a New York writer.
Minot, George R. See No. 82.
Minutes of the Convention. See Nos. 101-2 and 1 1 1.
[^Montgomery, /antes'].
Decius's / Letters / on the / Opposition / to the / New
Constitution / in / Virginia, / 1789. / Richmond : / Printed
by Aug. Davis,
8vo. pp. 134. C. 100
" Written by Dr. Montgomery, except the dedication, which was by John
Nicholas, of Albemarle. MS. notes by John Nicholas." MS. note by Jeffer-
son, in his own copj' now in the Congressional Library.
This volume includes, not only the Letters signed Decius, contributed to the
Virginia Independent Chronicle, between December, 1788 and July, 1789, but
also many answers to the same, signed "Juvenal," " Philo Pat. Pat. Patria,"
" Anti Decius," " Honestus,'' and others.
It is a most scathing attack on the Anti-Federalists in Virginia, and especially
on their leader, Patrick Henry. Perhaps nothing illustrates better the rarity
4l6 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
and diflSculty of finding the pamphlets of this period than the fact that Mr.
Tyler, so well read in American literature, has in his Life of Patrick Henry,
entirely overlooked this most plain spoken laying bare of the motives and
actions of Henry, of which I have been able to discover only a single (imper-
fect) copy.
I have been able to find nothing concerning Dr. Montgomery, except that he
was a member of the Virginia Convention. The so called third edition is
nnder John Nicholas — No. 105.
Native of Boston. See No. 82.
New Jersey Journal.
Minutes / of the / Convention / of the / State of New-
Jersey, / Holden at Trenton the nth Day of December 1787./
Trenton : / Printed by Isaac Collins, Printer to the State. /
M,DCCC,LXXXVIII.
4to. pp. 31. p. H. S. lai
750 copies printed.
New Jersey Journal.
Minutes / of the / Convention / of the / State of New
Jersey, / Holden at Trenton the nth Day of December 1787.
/ Trenton : / Printed by Isaac Collins, Printer to the State. /
M,DCC,LXXXVIII. / Trenton — Reprinted by Clayton L.
Traver, mdccclxxxviii.
4to. pp. 31. 102
New York Debates.
The /Debates / and / Proceedings / of the / Convention /
of the / State of New-York, / Assembled at Poughkeepsie, /
on the 17th June, 1788. / To deliberate and decide on the
Form of Federal Govern- / ment recommended by the Gen-
eral Convention at / Philadelphia, on the 17th September,
1787. / Taken in shorthand. / New-York: / Printed and sold
by Francis Childs. / M,DCC,LXXXVIII.
8vo. pp. (2), 144. N. S. 103
From a letter in the Lamb papers (N. Y. Historical Soc.) it appears probable
that at least Hamilton, Jay and Lansing revised their speeches, though Francis
Childs, the reporter, virtually, in his preface, says that no such revision took
place. It is reprinted in Elliot, ii.
New York Journal.
Journal / of the / Convention / of the / State of New-
York, / Held at Pougheeepsie, in Dutchess County, the 17th
of June, 1788. / Poughkeepsie : / Printed by Nicholas Power,
a few rods East from the Court-house. [1788.]
4to. pp. 86. S. 104
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 417
\Nicholas {John) ] .
[i title] Introduction / and Concise View of / Decius's Let-
ters, / With the Title-page, and the Substance and contents of
the whole work, / Hereafter to be published at full length in a
volume / . . .
Decius's Letters, / on the / opposition to the / Federal
Convention, / in Virginia: / Written in 1788 and 1789. / The
Third Edition. / With / a new Introduction, / and addi-
tional pieces and notes, / on the / Principles and Operation of
Party Spirit since. / With an Appendix, / consisting of /.
Various Interesting Letters, &c. / from Washington, Jeffer-
son, Madison, / and other High Characters, / in support of
the last Letters; / Written in 1818. / Richmond: / Published
by the Author. / Printed at the office of the Virginia Patriot.
/ 1818
8vo. pp. 48. B. A. 105
" Written by John Nicholas, Esqr. formerly a member of Congress (rOm
Virginia now resident in the State of New York. Boston 25 Sept i8i8 W. S.
Shaw Sec. Bost. Athen."
Mr. Shaw probably derived his note given above, from John Adams, whose
copy this was.
The first edition (No. 100) is referred by Jefferson, apparently on Nicholas'
own authority to Dr. Montgomery, so that we seemingly have Jefferson givihg
the authorship to Montgomery, and Adams giving it to Nicholas. They may
both be right, however, for the above pamphlet is merely the prospectus of a
new edition, and therefore might be written by an entirely different man than
the author.
The prospectus was issued immediately after the appearance of Wirt's Life
of Patrick Henry, with the avowed purpose of neutralizing that rose-colored
narrative. It was never however, carried further than the prospectus.
North Carolina Amendments.
State of North Carolina : / In Convention, August i, 1788.
Folio. 1 1. S. 106
The Declaration of Rights, and Amendments, of the first Convention of
North Carolina.
North Carolina Debates.
Proceedings / and / Debates / of the / Convention / of /
North-Carolina, / Convened at Hillsborough on Monday the
2ist Day / of July, 1788, for the Purpose of deliberating /
and determining on the Constitution recom- / mended by the
General Convention at Philadel- / phia the 17th Day of Sep-
418 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
tember 1787. / To which is prefixed / The Federal Constitu-
tion. / Edentown : / Printed by Hodge & Wills, Printers to
the State. / m,DCC,lxxxix.
8vo. pp. 280. N., C, S., A. A. S. 107
Reported by David Robertson. 1000 copies printed at the expense of a few
Federalists for distribution among the people. Reprinted in Elliot, iv, i. The
debates of the second Convention are only to be found, in fragmentary condi-
tion, in the North Carolina paper.s of that date.
Observations leading to. See Nos. 86-9.
Observations on the New Constitution. See Nos. 69-71.
Observations / on the / Proposed / Constitution / for the /
United States of America. / clearly shewing it to be a com-
plete System / of / Aristocracy and Tyranny, and / Destruc-
tfve / of the / Rights and Liberties / of the / People. /
Printed in the State of New-York, / M,DCC,LXXXVIII.
8vo. pp. 126. S., B., B. A. 108
An Anti-Federal compilation, containing :
Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of
Pennsylvania. (No. 2 infra.)
Letter of Edmund Randolph (No. 116 infra.)
Letters of Centinel.
The Constitution.
Two hundred and twenty-five copies were distributed by the New York Anti-
Federal committee to the local county committees of the State.
The " Letters of Centinel," were by Samuel Bryan, of Philadelphia, and
appeared originally in The Independent Gazetteer of that city. The letters were
exceedingly personal, and especially severe on Washington and Franklin, so it
is rather amusing to find Bryan writing to George Clinton in 1790 and request-
ing that he use his influence with Washington to obtain for his father a judge-
ship in the new government, and using his authorship of the letters as the
reason for Clinton's furthering his request.
Order of Procession, / In Honor of the Establishment of
the Constitution of the United States. / To parade . . . Friday
the 4th of July, 1788. / Philadelphia : / Printed by
Hall and Sellers.
Folio. I 1. 109
Pennsylvania Debates.
Debates / of the / Convention, / of the / State of Pennsyl-
vania, / on the /Constitution,/ proposed / for the / Govern-
ment / of the / United States. / In Two Volumes. / Vol. I /
Taken accurately in Short-Hand, by / Thomas Lloyd, / . . .
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 415
/ . . . / Printed by Joseph James, / in Philadelphia, A. D.
M.DCC.LXXXVIII.
8vo. pp. 147. (2II.) no
All ever published, being only the speeches of M'Kean and Wilson, on the
Federal side of the argument. It is reviewed in The American Magazine, 262.
See Nos. r-2, and ga.
Pennsylvania Journal.
Minutes / of the / Convention / of the / Commonwealth /
of / Pennsylvania, / which commenced at Philadelphia, on
Tuesday, the / Twentieth Day of November, One Thousand
/ Seven Hundred and Eighty-Seven, / for the purpose of /
Taking mto Consideration the Constitution framed by / the
late Foederal Convention for the United States of America. /
Philadelphia : / Printed by Hall and Sellers, in Market-street.
/ M,DCC,LXXXVII.
Folio, pp. 28. P. H S., H. Ill
Pennsylvania Resolution.
[Resolution of the Pennsylvania General Assembly, Septem-
ber 29, 1 787. J
112
The resolve for holding a Convention to discuss the Constitution. 3000
copies ordered to be printed, 1000 of which were to be in German.
Pinckney {Charles).
Observations / on the / Plan of Government / submitted to.
/ Federal Convention, / In Philadelphia, on the 28th of May,
1787. / By the Hon. Charles Pinckney, Esq. L.L.D. / Delegate
from the State of South-Carolina. / Delivered at different
Times in the course of their Discussions. / New York: —
Printed by Francis Childs [1787]
4to. pp 27. B. A., N., M., A., 113
This is really the speech of Pinckney, introducing his draft of a constitution
in the Convention, May 2g, 1787, which for some reason was omitted by both
Yates and Madison in their minutes. Though it does not include the proposed
draft, it nevertheless enables one to form a clear idea of what it was, and
proves that the draft furnished by Pinckney at the request of J. Q. Adams,
for publication in the Journal, and from that generally copied into other
places, to be fictitious in both form and substance.
Plan of the New Constitution. See No. 13.
Plebeian {A). See Nos. 120-1.
Proceedings of the Federal Convention. See Nos. 14-5.
420 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
[^Ramsay {David)].
An / Address / to the / Freemen / of / South Carolina, / on
the Subject of the / Federal Constitution, / Proposed by the
Convention, which met in / Philadelphia, May, 1787. / Char-
leston, / Printed by Bowen and Co., No. 31, Bay.
i6mo. pp. 12. C. 114
Signed Civis. Reprinted in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution.
Ramsay {David).
[An Address to the Freemen of South Carolina, on the Sub-
ject of the Federal Constitution. Brooklyn, N. Y.: 1888].
8vo. pp. 10. 115
A few copies separately printed from No. 68.
Randolph {Edmund).
Letter on the Federal Constitution, October 16, 1787. By
Edmund Randolph. [Richmond : Printed by Augustin Davis.
1787.J
i6mo. pp. 16. ti6
Reprinted in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution and in No. 108.
Randolph {Edmund).
[Letter on the Federal Constitution, October 16, 1787. By
Edmund Randolph. Brooklyn, N. Y.; 1888.]
8vo. pp. 18. 117
A few copies separately reprinted from No. 68.
The / Ratifications / of the / New Fcederal Constitution, /
together with the Amendments, / proposed by the / Several
States./ . . . / Richmond ; / Printed by Aug. Davis / m,dcc,-
LXXXVIII.
i2mo. pp. (4), 32. A. A. S. irS
Remarks on the Address. See No. 132
Remarks on the proposed See Nos. 74-5-
Result vf the Debates. See No. 16.
A Review of the Constitution Proposed by the late Conven-
tion, Held at Philadelphia, 1787. By a Federal RepubHcan.
Philadelphia: Printed by Robert Smith and James
Prang. 1787.
8vo. pp. 39. iig
A copy was sold in the O'Callaghan sale, (lot 668), and a copy is mentioned
in the Bowdoin College Library Catalogue, which cannot now be found. O'-her-
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 42 1
wise I have seen no mention of this pamphlet except in the original adver-
ments, from which the above title is taken.
Robertson, David. See Nos. 107 and 127-8.
Russell, Benjamin. See Nos. 97-8.
Secret Proceedings. See Nos. 1 58-42.
\_S'mith (Melancthon)].
An / Address / to the / People / of the / State of New-York :
/ Showing the Necessity of Making / Amendments / to the /
Constitution, proposed for the United States,/ previous to its
/ Adoption. / By a Plebeian, / Printed [by Robert Hodge, in
New York] in the State of New York, / M,DCC,LXXXVlii.
8vo. pp. 26. B. A., A. A. S. 120
Reprinted in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution.
Smith {Melancthon).
[An Address to the People of the State of New York :
Shewing the Necessity of making Amendments to the Con-
stitution. Brooklyn, N. Y, 18S8}.
8vo. pp. 27. 12i
A few copies separately printed from No. 68,
South Carolina
Debates / which arose in the / House oi Representatives /
of South Carolina, / on the Constitution framed for the /
United States, / by a Convention of Delegates, / Assembled
at Philadelphia. / Charleston : / Collected by R. Haswell, and
published at the City Gazette / Printing Office, No. 47, Bay. /
M,DCC,XXXVIII.
4to. pp. 55. B. A. 122
South Carolina.
Debates / which arose in the / House of Representatives /
of / South-Carolina, / on the Constitution framed for the
United States, / by a / Convention of Delegates assembled at
Philadelphia. /Together with such /notices of the Convention
/ as could be procured. /.../.../.../.../ Charles-
ton : / Printed by A. E. Miller, / No. 4 Broad Street. / 1831.
8vo. pp. (4), 95- M. 123
The first edition of Elliot's Debates contained nothing relating to South
Carolina, and this volume was prepared by some citizen of the State to piece
out the omission. In the later editions of Elliot, he reprinted this volume
entire.
422 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
State of North Carolina. See No. io6.
Stone, Frederick D. See No. 92
Supplement to the Independent Journal. See No. 16.
Thoughts upon the Political. See No. 83
Tucker {John Randolph).
The History / of the / Federal Convention of 1787 and its
Work. / An Address / delivered before the graduating classes
/ at the / Sixty-third Anniversary / of the / Yale Law School,
/ on / June 28th, 1887 / by / Hon. John Randolph Tucker,
LL.D. / New Haven : / Published by the Law Department of
Yale College. 1887.
8vo. pp. 54. H. 124
A / View / of the / Proposed Constitution / of the / United
States, / as agreed to by the / Convention / of Delegates from
several States at Philadelphia, the 17th Day of Septem-
ber,/ 1787 — Compared with the present Confederation. /With
sundry Notes and Observations. / Philadelphia : / Printed by
R. Aitken & Son, at Popes Head /in Market Street. / M.DCC-
LXXXVII.
8vo. pp. 37. B. A., N., B. 125
A comparison in parallel columns between the Articles of Confederation,
and the proposed Constitution, with anti-federal notes.
Virginia. Act calling Convention.
Virginia, to wit: / General Assembly begun and held at the
Capitol in the city of / Richmond on Monday the fifth day of
October, in the year /of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred
and eighty seven / An Act / concerning the convention to be
held /in June next./ Passed December 12th, 1787.
Folio. Broadside. S. 126
Virginia. Debates. 1 788-9.
Debates / and other / Proceedings / of the / Convention /
of/ Virginia, /Convened at Richmond, on Monday the 2d day
of / June, 1788, for the purpose of deliberating on the / Con-
stitution recommended by the Grand Federal / Convention. /
To which is prefixed, / the / Federal Constitution. / Peters-
burg: / Printed by / Hunter and Prentis. / M,DCC,LXXXVni.
3 vols. 8 vo. pp. 194; 195; 228. N., C, B. A., 127
The imprints of volumes II. and III. vary slightly from the above, being 4-
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 423
/Federal Constitution ./ Volume II. [III]. Petersburg: /Printed by William
Prentis, / m.dcc.lxxxix. /
Printed without being proof read. In 1805 it was already described as a
rare book, and at present is only equalled in rarity in the state debates, by
those of North Carolina. Volumes two and three are of much greater rarity
than the first.
Virginia. Debates. Richmond. 1805.
Debates / and other / Proceedings / of the / Convention of
Uirginia, [sic] convened at Richmond, on Monday the second
day of June, / 1787, for the purpose of deliberating on the
Con- / stitution recommended by the grand / Federal Conven-
tion. / To which is prefixed / the Federal Constitution. /
Taken in short hand, / by David Robertson — of Petersburg. /
Second Edition. / Richmond : / Printed at the Enquirer-Press
/ for Ritchie & Worsley and Augustine Davis. / 1805.
8vo. pp. viii, 477. N., C, A. A. S. 128
This edition was corrected and compared with a portion of the original sten-
ographic notes, by the reporter.
Virginia Journal.
Journal / of the / Convention / of / Virginia ; / held in the
/City of Richmond, / on the / First Monday in June, /in the
Year of our Lord One thousand seven hundred and / eighty-
eight. / Richmond : / Printed by Thomas W. White, / Main-st.
opposite the Bell Tavern.-/ 1827.
8vo. pp. 39. B. A., P. 129
Weakness of Brutus. See No. 112,-4..
[ Webster {Noah)].
An / Examination / into the / leading principles /of the /
Federal Constitution / proposed by the late / Convention /
held at Philadelphia. / With / Answers to the principal objec-
tions / that have been raised against the system. / By a Citi-
zen of America. /.../.../ Philiadelphia : / Printed and
sold by Prichard & Hall, in Market Street, / the second door
above Laetitia Court. / M.DCC.LXXXVII.
8vo. pp. 55. C.. B. A., P., H. 130
Reprinted, from the Author's annotated copy, in Ford's Pamphlets on the
Constitution.
Webster, Noah.
424 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
[An Examination into the leading principles of the Federal
Constitution. Brooklyn, N. Y. : 1887.]
8vo. pp. 41, 131
A. few copies separately printed from No. 68.
[WedsUr {PelatiaK)\.
Remarks / on the / Address of Sixteen Members / of the /
Assembly of Pennsylvania, / to their / Constituents, / Dated
September 29, 1787. /With some Strictures on the Objections
to the / Constitution, / Recommended by the late Federal
Convention, / Humbly offered to the Public / By a Citizen of
Philadelphia. /. Philadelphia: / Printed by Eleazer Oswald, at
the Coffee-House. / M,DCC,LXXXVli.
Bvo. pp. 28. B. A., M. 132.
Also (abridged) in Webster's Political Essays, and (entire) in No. 92.
[ Webster {Pelatiah)~\.
The Weaknesses of Brutus exposed : / or some / Remarks /
in / Vindication of the Constitution / proposed by the late /
/ Federal Convention, / against the / Objections and gloomy
Fears of that Writer. / Humbly offered to the Public. / By /
A Citizen of Philadelphia. / Printed for and to be had of John
Sparhawk, Market-street, / near the Court House / M.DCC-
LXXXVII.
Bvo. pp. 23. B. A., A. A. S., M. 133
Reprinted in Webster's Political Essays, and in Ford's Pamphlets on the Con-
stitution. In reprinting this pamphlet I suggested, with a question mark, that
Brutus was written by Thomas Tredwell, having found that he used that sig-
nature to a newspaper essay published in 1789. I have since concluded that
they were from the pen of Robert Yates, member of the Federal Convention
from New York.
Webster {Pelatiak).
[The Weakness of Brutus exposed : or some Remarks in
Vindication of the Constitution proposed by the late Federal
Convention. Brooklyn, [N. Y. : 1888.]
8vo. pp. 15. 134
A few copies separately printed from No. 68.
We the People. See Nos. 1 7-20.
Williamson {Hugh).
Address to the Freemen of Edentown and the County of
Chowan, etc. on the New Plan of Government.
8vo. 135
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 425
Title from the N. Y. Historical Society Catalogue, but an examination shows
it to be merely a newspaper clipping mounted on sheets of writing paper.
Wilson {James). See No. 91.
Substance of an Address / to a / meeting of the Citizens of
Philadelphia, / delivered, October sixth, mdcclxxxvii, / by
the honorable / James Wilson, Esquire, one of the delegates
from the State of Pennsylvania to the /late Continental Con-
vention. [Brooklyn, N. Y. : 1888.]
8vo. pp. 7. 136
A few copies separately printed from No. 68.
" Mr. Wilson's speech is read with much approbation here by one party; the
other party see nothing but nonsense in it. "
" It has varnished an iron trap."
Wilson {James).
The Substance/ of a/ Speech /delivered by / James Wil-
son, Esq. / Explanatory of the general Principles of the pro-
posed / Federal Constitution ; / Upon a Motion made by the
/ Honorable Thomas McKean, / in the Convention of the
State of Pennsylvania. / On Saturday the 24th of November,
1787./ Philadelphia: /Printed and Sold by Thomas Bradford,
in Front-Street, / four Doors below the Coffee-House, MDCC-
LXXXVII.
8vo. pp. 10. 137
Reported by Alexander J. Dallas, Editor of T/ie Pennsylvania Herald.
Thomas Lloyd charged Dallas in a communication to the papers, with misrep-
resenting what Wilson had said.
Yates {Robert). Secret Proceedings. Albany. 1821
Secret / Proceedings and Debates / of the / Convention /
assembled at Philadelphia, in the Year 1787, for the purpose/
of forming the / Constitution / of / the United States of
America. / From the Notes taken by the late Robert Yates,
Esq. Chief/ Justice of New-York, and copied by John Lansing,
Jun. / Esq. late Chancellor of that State, Members / of that
Convention. / Including /" The Genuine Information," laid
before the Legislature of / Maryland, by Luther Martin, Esq.
then Attorney Gen- / eral of that State, and a member of the
same / Convention. / Also, / other Historical Documents rela-
tive to the Federal Compact / of the North American Union.
/ Albany : / Printed by Webster and Skinners, / at their Book-
426 BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Store, in the White House, corner of State and Pearl Streets./
1821.
8vo. pp. 308. 138
An outline of Yate's Minutes appeared in Hall's American Law Journal, iv,
563, 1813.
Yates was a member of the Federal Convention and though his memoranda
only is to July 5, at which time he left the Convention, it is only second to
Madison's Debates in importance. It is noticed in Taylor's New Views of the
Constitution.
This first edition is by no means a common volume.
Yates {Robert). Secret Proceedings. Washington. 1836.
Secret / Proceedings and Debates / + / Washington : /
Printed for G. Templeman, / Bookseller and Stationer, Penn-
sylvania Avenue. / 1839.
8vo. pp 308. 139
Yates {Robert). Secret Proceedings. Richmond. 1 839
Secret / Proceedings and Debates / + / Richmond, Va. /
Published by Wilbur Curtiss. / 1839.
8vo. pp. xi, 335.
Yates {Robert). Secret Proceedings. Louisville. 1 844
Secret / Proceedings and Debates / + / Louisville, Ky. /
Published by Alston Mygatt. / 1844.
8vo. pp. xi, 335. 140
Also copies dated 1845.
Yates {Robert). Secret Proceedings. Cincinnati.
Secret / Proceedings and Debates, / + / Cincinnati. / Pub-
lished by Alston Mygatt. / [184—?]
8vo. pp. xi, 335. 141
REFERENCE LIST.
General Works — Histories.
Allen (T.) Facts ... in the origination of the American
Union (new Series). Boston : 1870.
Bancroft (G.) History of the Constitution. No. 5.
Cocke (W. A.) Constitutional History of the U. S. Phila. :
1858.
CofHn (C. C.) Building the Nation. N. Y. : 1883.
Curtis (G. T.) History of the Constitution. No. 23.
Elliot (J.) Debates in the several State Conventions. No.
30.
Frothingham (R.) Rise of the Republic of the United-
States. Boston: 1872.
Hildreth (R.) History of the U. S. (ist series, iii). N. Y. :
1852.
McMaster (J. B.) History of the People of the U. S. (i).
N. Y.: 1883.
McMaster (J. B.) Making a Government, in The [Philadel-
phia] Press. Sept. 15, 1887.
Miller (S. F.) Oration at the 100 Anniversary of the Consti-
tution. Phila.: 1887.
Patton (J. H.) Concise History of the American People.
N.Y.: 1882.
Porter (L. H.) Outlines of the Constitutional History of the
U.S. N. Y. : 1883.
Schouler (J.) History of the U. S. (i). N. Y. : 1881.
Sterne (S.) Constitutional History ... of the U. S. N. Y. :
1883.
Thorpe (F. N.) Origin of the Constitution, in Mag. of Am.
Hist, xviii, 130.
428 REFERENCE LIST.
Towle (N. C.) History and Analysis of the U. S. Constitu-
tion. Boston : v. d.
Von Hoist (H.) Constitutional and Political History of the
U. S. (i). Chicago : 1876.
Winsor (J.) Narrative and Critical History of America, (vii).
Boston: li
General Works — Printed documentary sources.
Ames (F.) Works of . . . Boston: 1809.
Ames (F.) Works of . . . edited by S. Ames. Boston :
1854.
Belknap Papers. (Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll. 5th series, ii and
iii). Boston: 1877.
Diplomatic Correspondence of the U. S. 1 783-1 789. Boston :
1837-
Franklin (B.) Works of . . . edited by J. Sparks. Boston :
1840,
Franklin (B.) Works of . . . edited by J. Bigelow. N. Y. :
1887.
Hamilton (A.) Works of . . . edited by J. C. Hamilton. N.
Y. : 1850.
Hamilton (A.) Works of . . . edited by H. C. Lodge. N.
Y.: 1885.
J^y (J-) Writings of . . . edited by H. P. Johnson, (in prep-
aration). N. Y. :
Leake (J. Q.) Life and Times of John Lamb. Albany:
1857-
Letters and Papers illustrating the formation of the Constitu-
tion, in No. 5.
McRee (G. J.) Life of James Iredell, (ii). N. Y. : 1858.
Madison (J.) Papers of . . . No. 93.
Madison (J.) Letters and other writings. Phila. : 1865.
Morris (G.) Writings of. (in preparation). N. Y. :
Washington (G.) Writings of . . . edited by J. Sparks.
Boston: 1837.
Washington (G.) Writings of . . . edited by W. C. Ford.
N.Y.: \i
REFERENCE LIST. 429
General Works — Periodicals.
New Hampshire.
Freemans Oracle and N. H. Advertiser, [Exeter],
N. H. Gazette and the General Advertiser. [Exeter],
N. H. Mercury. [Portsmouth].
N. H. Recorder and Weekly Advertiser. [Keene].
N, H. Spy. [Portsmouth].
Massachusetts.
American Herald. [Worcester].
Berkshire Chronicle.
Boston Gazette.
Cumberland Gazette. [Portland, Me].
Essex Journal. [Salem].
Hampshire Chronicle. [Springfield].
Hampshire Gazette. [Northampton],
Hampshire Herald. [Springfield].
Independent Chronicle. [Boston].
Massachusetts Centinel. [Boston].
Massachusetts Gazette. [Boston].
Massachusetts Spy. [Worcester].
Salem Mercury.
Western Star. [Stockbridge].
Rhode Island.
Newport Herald.
Providence Gazette.
United States Chronicle. [Providence].
Connecticut.
American Mercury. [Hartford].
Connecticut Courant. [Hartford].
Connecticut Gazette. [New London].
Connecticut Journal. [New Haven].
Middlesex Gazette. [Middletown].
New Haven Chronicle.
New Haven Gazette.
Norwich Packet.
Weekly Monitor. [Litchfield].
New York.
Albany Gazette. •
Albany Register.
American Magazine. [New York.]
Goshen Repository.
Hudson Gazette.
Independent Journal. [New York].
New York Daily Advertiser. [New York],
New York Journal. [New York].
430 REFERENCE LIST.
New York Museum. [New York].
New York Packet. [New York].
Northern Centinel or Lansingburg Advertiser.
Poughkeepsie Journal.
New Jersey.
Brunswick Gazette. [New Brunswick].
New Jersey Gazette. [Trenton].
New Jersey Journal. [Elizabethtown],
Pennsylvania.
American Museum. [Philadelphia].
Freemen's Journal. [Philadelphia].
Independent Gazetteer. [Philadelphia].
Pennsylvania Gazette. [Philadelphia].
Pennsylvania Herald. [Philadelphia],
Pennsylvania Journal. [Philadelphia].
Pennsylvania Mercury. [Philadelphia].
Pennsylvania Packet. [Philadelphia].
Pittsburg Gazette.
Delaware.
Wilmington Courant.
Wilmington Gazette.
Maryland.
Maryland Chronicle. [Frederick].
Maryland Gazette. [Annapolis].
Maryland Gazette. [Baltimore].
Maryland Journal. [Baltimore].
Virginia.
The Norfolk and Portsmouth Chronicle.
Virginia Gazette. [Winchester],
Virginia Gazette and Petersburg Advertiser.
The Virginia Gazette and Weekly Advertiser. [Richmond].
The Virginia Herald and Independent Advertiser.
Virginia Independent Chronicle. [Richmond].
The Virginia Journal and Alexandria Advertiser.
North Carolina.
North Carolina Chronicle. [Fayettville].
State Gazette of North Carolina. [Newberne & Edentown],
South Carolina,
The Columbian Herald or the Independent Courier, [Charleston],
City Gazette, or Daily Advertiser, [Charleston],
State Gazette of South Carolina, [Charleston],
South Carolina Weekly Chronicle,
Georgia.
Augusta Chronicle.
Georgia Gazette. [Savannah].
REFERENCE LIST. 43 1
General Works — Biographies.
See under " Federal Convention — Biographies of attending members " and
" Contests in the States."
Federal Convention — Histories.
Anecdotes of the Federal Convention, in Living Age, xxv,
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INDEX
Adams, Charles Francis, 413.
Adams, John, cited, 316.
Adams, J. Q., 406; 411.
Address to the people of the State of
New York, 67; 87; iii.
Agriculture, diminished values of pro-
ducts of, 73.
Albany, committee of, i; address to the
citizens of, 409.
Algerines, method of obtaining peace
with the, 112.
Amendments, see Constitution.
American Citizen, An, pseudonym of T.
Coxe, 134; 391.
Appointment, powers of, 311; 339.
Appointing power, necessity of check
on President's, 341.
Aristides, pseudonym of A. C. Han-
son, 217; 408.
Aristocracy, {see also Monarchy.) 17;
285; 332; natural, in the U. S., 295;
party of, in the U. S., 321; rarity of,
genuine, 256.
Army, Standing, dangers of, 10; 150;
discussion of, 363; impossibility of in
America, 56; lack of restrictions on,
51; 103; 365; necessity of, 157; 235;
powers 01 congress over, 150; 303;
restriction of, by North Carolina,
365; restriction of, by Pennsylvania,
365; unnecessary fear of, 234.
Arnold, Benedict, 352.
Articles of Confederation, see Confeder-
ation,
Attainder, Bills of, forbidden, 314.
Austin. James T.. i.
Baldwin, Abraham, biographies of, 432.
Baldwin, Simeon, Oration of, 386.
Bancroft, George, History by, 386.
Bankrupt laws, necessity of uniform,
306.
Belhaven, Lord, quotation from speech
of, 195.
Bills of Rights, 73; 114; 229; 329;
adoption of, 359; necessity of, 75;
315 ; unnecessary in constitution,
241; 335.
Blackstone, Judge, cited, 10.
Blair, John, biographies of, 432.
Brearly, David, 390 ; biographies of,
432.
Brutus, pseudonym to newspaper essay,
118; 424.
Bryan, Samuel, 418,
Butler, Pierce, biographies of, 432.
Byng, admiral, 354.
Cabinet, dangers of, 330.
Carolinas, the, importance of their de-
cision on the constitution, 21.
Carroll, Daniel, biographies of, 432.
Caucus, dangers from, 300.
Centinel, cited, 248 ; pseudonym of
Samuel Bryan, 418.
Citizen of America, pseudonym of N.
Webster, 25; 423
Citizen of New York, pseudonym of
John Jay, 67; 410.
Citizen of Philadelphia, pseudonym of
P. Webster, 118; 424.
Civil list, 7.
Civil service, 189; want of rotation in,
II.
Civis, pseudonym of Jonathan Jackson,
410; pseudonym of' David Ramsay,
380; 420.
Clinton, George, 418.
Clymer, George, biographies of, 432.
Columbian Patriot, pseudonym of E.
Gerry, i; 407.
Commerce, {see also, Navigation, Ship-
ping, Treaties.) 73; 265; 357; condi-
tion of, 358; control of, by a few
states, 62; impositions on, 264; im-
proper power to enact laws relating
to> 3311 powers of congress over, 357;
right of English parliament over col-
onial, 136; should not be submitted to
a mere majority of congress, 275;
wretched condition of, 265.
Confederation {see also. Congress, Con-
tinental, United States government.)
compared with constitution, 148; 379;
defective nature of, 136; 228; 261;
dissolution of, 268; feebleness of, 272;
444
INDEX.
government under the, 72; history of,
262; 283; impossibility of suitably
amending, 267; necessity of amend-
ing, 96; 136; positions of the states
under, in reference to the new consti-
tution, 97; 267.
Confederacies, separate, 120; 127; 204;
247; 26g; southern, 270; evils of,
278.
Congress, Continental {see also Confed-
eration, Impost, Paper Money,") 156; ab-
surd measures of, 32; bad constitution
of, 267; lack of power of, 78; merging
of powers in, 268; misrepresentation
in, 267; omitted in consideration of
new government, 14; origin of, 70;
powers of, 70 ; 72; 374: power to
amend constitution, 284; proposition
to vest with impost, 283; requisitions
of, 263; unsuitable to lodge powers
in, 267.
Congress, (see also. Armies, Commerce,
Constitution, Election, Judiciary, Jury,
Impost, Paper Money, Press, Represen-
tation, Representatives, Senate, Treat-
ies, United States government.') 33;
107; abuse of powers of, 122; attend-
ance in, 376; binding effects of acts
of on its own members, 124; checks
on, 125 ; definition of necessary
powers, 45; delegates to, 40; division
into two branches, 30 ; extensive
powers of, 45; 122; 233; formed of
the best men, 123; great expense of,
47; interference of with states, 46;
length of term, 170; limited powers
of, to deal with common law, 336;
members of, remarks on, 123; method
of passing laws, 44; necessary powers
only given to, 173; 374; necessity of
a line between states and, 273; objec-
tion to two branches in, 47; powers
-conceded by anti-federalists to, 126.;
powers of, limited to what the people
allow, 127; powers of taxation of 49;
303 ; powers over elections, 44 ;
powers over printing, 316; powers to
define and punish crime, 359; powers
to grant monopolies, 357; power to
provide for the general interest and
welfare, 121; probable misuse of their
power, 123; representation in, 12;
289; right of the people lo control
delegates to, 6; to determine their
own salaries, 11; unnecessary power
over elections, 61.
Connecticut, adopted from local causes,
104; adoption of the constitution by,
98; and the constitution, 439; con-
struction of Senate of, 41; disagree-
ment in legislature of, 33; hostile
feelings towards New York, 84; 96;
imports of, from New York, 62; legis-
lative action on act of Congress, 33;
probable refusal to attend second con-
vention, 8l; reasons for her ratifica-
tion, 21; representation in House of
Representatives, 293.
Constitution, (see also Army, Bills of
Rights, Congress, Continental Con-
gress, Conventions, Elections, Judi-
ciary, Jury, Malitia, Navy, Press,
Ratif cation. Representation, Represeti-
tatives. Senate, United States govern-
ment.)
— Adoption of, danger of delay in, 93;
necessity of. 62; should not be pre-
cipitate in, 280.
— Advantages of, 61; 64; 319; control
over states clearly defined, 121; di-
verse representation in, 204; increase
of values if adopted, 47 ; mutual
checks in the departments of govern-
ment as, 222; no qualification in
wealth or birth under, 146; plan of
accomodation, 80; 285; security in,
from federal servants, l8g.
— Amendments to, 15; 34; 103; adop-
tion before making, 93; agreement
in, 102; dangers of, 226; difficulty of
agreeing to, prior to adoption, 99
245; methods for obtaining, iii; 317
necessity of, prior to adoption, 99
loi; 274; necessity of, 93; 106; 273
324; power of making, 209; state con-
ventions should make, 322; unreason-
ableness of, 104. ^
— Compared with other constitutions,
compared with articles of confedera-
tion, 14S; 379; compared with Roman
and English, 35; compared with Great
Britain, 137; difference between the
state constitutions and the, 155.
— Defects of, 318; a consolidated fabric
of aristocratic tyranny, 17; agreement
in, 93; a heterogeneous phantom, 7;
complicated nature of,' 7; contains no
feature of democracy or republican-
ism, 8; designed for the rich, 254;
executive and legislative powers dan-
gerously blended in, 9; ignorance of
the people in its formation, 284; im-
practicable over so vast a territory,
13; impossibility of suiting all, 63;
lack of declaration of rights in, 73;
329; neither federal nor national, 279;
unequal advantages enjoyed by differ-
ent localities, 298; want of title, 8.
INDEX.
445
— Powers of, 156; amount delegated
by, 313; divisions of, 75; fundamental
rights of, 313; general clauses of,
233; 312; 331; general, 356; guaran-
tee against ex post facto laws, 147;
314; 332; 368.
— Ratification of, see ratification.
— Tendencies of; consolidatiner, 14;
102; 121; 127; 129; 2S2; 286; 289;
294; 299; 320; dangers of corruption
of, 129; construction with reference
to state constitutions, 159 ; 314;
founded on monarchy and aristocracy,
7; guarded against excesses, 184;
liable to result in monarchy, 195;
partly federal but tending towards
consolidation, 286; possibility of end-
ing in tyranny, 169; probable en-
croachments under, 122; will end in
monarchy or aristocracy. 254; 2S5.
— Absurd prospects in case of adop-
tion, 106; character of the supporters
of, 5; classes interested in. 283; di-
vision of legislature into two branches,
30; documentary sources of the his-
tory of the adoption of, 428; editions
of, 386; general histories of the, 427;
partizan pamphlets pro and con, 437;
possibility of obtaining a better, 78;
sources of objections to, 166.
Conventions, ease in obtaining, 317.
Convention, Annapolis, 284.
Convention, Federal, (see also Constitu-
tion, States.) 271; 285; biographies of
attending members of, 432; charac-
ter of members, 114; composition of
74; compromises in, 76; 158; dangers
of discord in, 222; debates and pro-
ceedings of, 431; diverse interests in,
166; drafts and plans of constitutions
in, 431; histories of, improper se-
cresy of, 15; 18; journal of, 410; list
of members of, 406; local interest in,
75; members of, 221; non-attendance
of members, 285; not limited, 224;
opinion of, 74; origin of, 284; quality
of the delegates of, 285; secrecy in
proceedings, loi; unauthorized pow-
ers assumed by, 14; 16; 224; want of
authority, loi.
Convention, Second, 21; 210; 272; evils
of, 166; great delay in obtaining, 83;
impossible to agree upon a better
plan, 82; necessity of, 19; 274; possi-
bility of a successful, 80; 246; proba-
bility that the states which have al-
ready ratified will refuse to at-
tend, 81.
Conventions, State, {see also each State
and Ratification;) 17; 274; ratifications
against the wish of the people, 19;
should be allowed to amend constitu-
tion, 272; 322; value of, 322.
Council, {see also Executive,) necessity
of, 230; objections to, 341.
Courts, see Judiciary.
Coxe, Tench, pamphlet by, 134; 391.
Curtis, G. T., History by, 391.
Dallas, A J., 425.
Davie, W. R., biographies of, 433;
pamphlet by, 333; 391.
Dawson, H. B., editor of The Federal-
ist, 404; correspondence about The
Federalist, 404.
Debt, federal, change of system for
paying, 378, condition of, 95; equal-
ization of, 147; failure to meet, 73;
probable treatment of, [05; responsi-
bility of, 317.
Decius, pseudonym of J. Montgomery,
415; 417.
Declaration of Rights {see Bill of
Rights).
De Costa. B F. . review by, 386.
Delaware and the constitution, 433;
probable refusal to attend second con-
vention, 81; representation of, 223;
selfish motives in adopting the consti-
tution, 21.
Democracy, disapproval of, 319.
Despotism, methods of, 9.
Dickinson, John, biographies of, 433;
cited, 31B; pamphlet by, 163; 392.
Duties, see Export, Import, Taxation.
Eastern States, see Stales. Eastern.
Elections, {see also Constitution, Congress.,
Representatives, House of. Senate.)
biennial found by Massachusetts, 8;
control of, by congress, 103; ijiy
227; 295; frequency of, 8; 11; 13;
great barrier to corruption, 61 ; prob-
able misuse of the power granted
over, 103.
Elliot, Jonathan, debates of, 392.
Ellsworth, Oliver, biographies of, 433;
cited, 341.
English Constitution, see Great Britain.
Entail, dangerous to liberty,6o.
Executive, {see also Appointment, Consti-
tution, Impeachment, Pardon, Treaty,
Vice President.)
— Council, 230; 330; lack of, 333; ob-
jections to, 345; unnecessary, 346;
— National, 64; advantage of single,
352; American compared with Eng-
lish, 137; composition of, 225; elec-
446
INDEX.
tion of, 35; 171; 298; entailment of,
233; exclusion of the people in the
choice of, 12; nominating power of,
228; pardoning power of, 275; 338;
351; powers of, 36; 171; 225; 232;
requisite age of, 36; should be ineligi-
ble after a certain time, 275; should
not |ill vacancies, 275; should not
nominate judiciary offices, 275; small
probability of treason of, 352; terra
of, 231; tool of the Senate, 330; veto
power of, 45
— State, (see also State,) restrictions on,
351-
Export duties, restraint on, 331; restric-
tion of states from, 366.
Ex post facto laws, desirability of re-
strictions on. 368 ; guarantee against,
147; 314; 336; restraint from, 332.
Fabius, pseudonym of John Dickinson,
163; 392.
Federal administration, 394.
Federal city, advantage to middle
states, 319; jurisdiction of, improp-
erly used, 18; resolution for, by the
continental congress, 32.
Federal convention, see Convention, Fed-
eral,
Federal Constitution, pseudonym, 385.
see Constitution, Federal.
Federal Farmer; pseudonym of Richard
Henry Lee, 277; 411.
Federalist, The, authorship of, 395;
list of editions, 394; opinions con-
cerning, 395; original publication of,
395-
Federal Republican, A, 420.
Federal Republic, title invented by
James Wilson, 8.
Federal requisitions, 105.
Few, William, biographies of, 433.
Fitzsimons, Thomas, 25; biographies
of, 433-
Ford. P. L., list of editions of The
Federalist, 395; list of members of
federal convention, 406.
Foreign affairs, indifference to, 72.
Foreign goods, excessive importation
of, 95-
Franklin, Benjamin, 27; 64; biographies
of, 433-
Fur trade, loss of, 73.
Georgia, accession of, to insure protec-
tion, 20; amendment of constitution
of, 34; and the constitution, 441;
probable refusal to attend second
<:onvention, 81.
Gerry, Elbridge. biographies of, 433;
failure to sign constitution, 271 ;
pamphlet by, x ; 407.
Gilman, Nicholas, biographies of, 433.
Gorham, Nathaniel, biographies of,
433-
Greenleaf, T., i.
Great Britain, House of Commons, 42;
143; 211; constitution of, compared
with the American, 35; 137; House
of Peers of, 42 ; paper money would
destroy the credit of, 243; Privy
Council of, 345; right of the colonists
to constitution of, 135; standing army
of, 235; union of, 195; 213.
Government, {see also under each coun-
try,) dangers of all strong, 131; effect
on character and manners, 5 ; ele-
ments of, 263, instituted for protec-
tion and happiness, 6; must not be
lodged in a single body, 182; nature
of, 92; origin of, 174; primary prin-
ciples of, 373 ; the result of fraud or
violence, 18.
Hale, Charles, 415.
Hale, Sir Mathew, cited, 10.
Hall, Aaron, 408.
Hamilton, Alexander, biographies of,
433; The Federalist, 395; proposi-
tion in convention, 408.
Hamilton, J. A., correspondence about
The Federalist, 404.
Hamilton, J. C, editor of The Feder-
alist, 405.
Hanson, Alexander Contee, pamphlet
by, 217; 408.
Helvitius, cited, 5.
Henry, Patrick, attack on, 415; 417.
Hillsborough, Lord, 8.
Hitchcock, Enos, 408.
Hopkinson, Francis, 409.
Hutchinson, Gov. T., recommends trien-
nial elections, 8; 13.
Impeachment, (see also Constitution,
Executive, Senate), 342; improperly
lodged with senate, 300.
Imports, 62; foreign, 95.
Impost, (see also Congress, Taxation),
104; 283; Connecticut and New Jersey
share of, 319; general acceptance of
the five per cent., 253; the great
source of revenue in the U. S., 160.
Imprimatur, danger of, 9.
IngersoU, Jared, biographies of, 433.
Insurgents, party of, in the U. S., 321.
Iredell, James, pamphlet by, 327; 333;
392; 410.
INDEX.
447
Jackson, Jonathan, 410.
Jay, John, pamphlet by, 67; 410; reply
to his pamphlet, 11 1; The Federalist,
395-
Jay, John, (Jr.) correspondence about
The Federalist, 404.
Johnson, W. S., 3qo; biographies of,
433-
Judiciary, National {see also Appoint-
ment, Executive, Jury, Senate,) 275;
analysis of, 343 ; appellate jurisdiction
of, 12; 236; 308; 311; coersive powers
of, 343; dangers from jurisdiction as
to both law and fact, 308 ; discussion
of. 236; impossibility of trial by jury
in, 310; necessity of national, 122;
power to decide law and fact, 114;
powers of, 53; 149; 236; 298; 306;
want of limitation in, 9; 102.
Judiciary, State, {see also Jury, State,)
289; 307; absorption of by national,
53; 329; position under constitution,
343-
Jury, Trial by, absence in state courts,
361; discussion of, 157; impracticable
in national courts, 289; necessity of,
1S4; 315; not altered by constitution,
148; not a universal practice, 361; not
secured in civil cases, 9; 103; 114;
307 ; reply to insinuations concetning,
52; should be left to wisdom of con-
gress, 362; the birthright of Ameri-
cans, 241; under Pennsylvania consti-
tution, 148.
King, Rufus, biographies of, 434; on
Elbridge Gerry, i.
Land, isee also Western Territory), de-
cline in the price of, 74.
Langdon, John, biographies of, 434.
Lansing, John, 425; biographies of, 4.34.
Law, {see also Congress, Constitution,
' Judiciary, Ex post facto. Treaties),
multiplication of, 302; necessity of
supreme, 312; people entitled to com-
mon, 336.
Lee, Richard Henry, pamphlet by, 277;
.411.
Legislature, see Congress and State Legis-
latures.
Livingston, William, biographies of,
434- , „
Lloyd, Thomas, 412; 41S.
Lodge, H. C, editor of The Federalist,
406.
Mable, Able, cited, 4.
M'Henry, James, biographies of, 434.
McClurg, James, biographies of, 434.
M'Kean, Thomas, speeches of, 412.
Maclaine, Archibald, pamphlet by, 333;
392; 412; opinion of The Federalist,
395-
MacMasler, John Bach, 412.
Madison, James, 327; 390; biographies
of. 434; debate of. 394; 413; quota-
tion from, 259; The Federalist, 395.
Marcus, pseudonym of James Iredell,
333; 391; 410.
Martin, Luther, biographies of, 434;
cited, 18; Genuine Information of,
413; 425.
Maryland and the constitution, 440;
construction of senate of, 41 ; declara-
tion of rights, 229: delay in appoint-
ing convention, 250; local actions in
courts of, 239; method of electing
federal representatives, 225; omnipo-
tence of legislature of, 226; position
toward Europe, 251; position under
new constitution, 251; probable rejec-
tion of the constitution by, 28; pro-
posed emission of paper money, 33;
representation of, 223; resistance of
the people to paper money, 244.
Mason, George, 390; biographies of,
434 ; failure to sign constitution,
271; pamphlet by, 327; 413; reply to,
2S5; 333: 391-
Massachusetts, 13; adoption of the con-
stitution by, 98; ambiguous express-
ions in ratification of, 6; amendments
of the convention of, 15; 103; and
the constitution, 438; debates in the
convention, 414; hostile feeling to-
wards New York, 96; means used to
obtain ratification of, 19; ratification
by, 6.
'Mediteranean, exclusion of Americans
from, 73.
Mercer, J. F., biographies of^ 435.
Mifflin, Thomas, biographies of, 435.
Militia, congressional power over, 52;
305 ; necessary general powers over,
122; 306; no longer under civil con-
trol, 11; subject to president and
senate, 11.
Minot, G. R., 410-
Monarchy, {see also Aristocracy), 7; ad-
vocates for, 19; dangers of, 195;
254; 285; partizans of, in the state
conventions, 17; spirit of, in Amer-
ica, 5.
Money, (see also Paper Money, Represent-
atives, Senate, Taxation), power to
raise, necessary to general govern-
ment, 122; scarcity of, 73; 113.
448
INDEX.
Monopolies, congressional power to
grant, 357-
Montesquien, cited, 59.
Montgomery, J., pamphlet by, 415;
417.
Morris, Robert, biographies of, 435.
Morris, Gouverneur, biographies of,
435-
Native of Boston, pseudonym of J.
Jackson, 410.
Navigation laws, necessity of, 377.
Navy, power of congress to form, 374;
will be obtained by constitution, 379.
New England, commerce of. 357.
New Hampshire and the constitution,
438.
New Jersey, adopted from local causes,
104; and the constitution, 439; hos-
tile feelings towards New York, 84;
96, imports of, from New York, 62;
journal of the convention of, 416;
probable refusal to attend second
convention, 81; selfish motives in
adopting the constitution, 21.
New York, address to the people of,
67; 87; iii; and the constitution, 439;
anti-federal committee of, i; consti-
tution of, 114; dangers from contigu-
ous states, 96; debates of the conven-
tion of, 416; failure to guarantee
liberty of the press in constitution of,
76; ill feeling towards, of New Jersey
and Connecticut, 84; imports for
other states, 62; imports, 104; journal
of the convention of, 416; lack of
bill of rights, 114; position, in case
nine states ratify. 86; undoubted re-
jection of constitution by, 21.
North Carolina and the constitution,
441; debates in the convention of,
417; forbids standing army in time of
peace, 51; 365.
Nicholas, J., 415; 417-
Paine, Thomas, The Rights of Man,
164.
Paper money, 33; baneful effects oi,
243; conduct of the state legislatures
concerning, 244; 284; congress not
restricted from issuing, 374; only the
states restricted in issuing, 374; re-
nunciation of the right to issue, 243;
the secret reason of opposition to the
constitution, 243.
Pardon, {see also Executive,) power of
executive to, 351.
Parker, I., review of The Federalist,
402.
Paterson, William, biographies of,
435-
Peabody, A. P., review by, 391.
Pennsylvania, 33; address to the citi-
zens of, 385; and the constitution,
412; advantages from new constitu-
tion, 161; aristocratic delegates in
Federal convention from, 285; de-
bates in convention of, 418; dissent
of minority of convention, 102; 385;
forbids standing army in time of
peace. 51; 365; general assembly un-
der her constitution 152; hasty con-
duct due to construction of legisla-
ture, 33; hostile feeling towards New
York, 96; journal of the convention
of, 419; legislature of, 34; opposition
to division of congress, 30; ratifica-
tion by, 20; trial by jury under con-
stitution of, 148.
People, desire for union of the, 17;
equal representation necessary in free
government, 168; 288; position in
adoption of constitution, 311; real
power with the, 6; 57; 147; true in-
fluence of, 60; 168; 316.
Pickering, Timothy, Life of, cited, 277.
Pierce, B. K., 415.
Pinckney, Charles, biographies of,
435; pamphlet by, 419.
Pinckney, Charles C, biographies of,
435-
Plebeian, pseudonym of Melancthon
Smith, 67; 87; 421.
Police, internal, 292.
President, see Executive.
Press, Liberty of, 9; 76; congress with-
out power over, 361; failure to guar-
antee liberty of, 9; 48; 76; 113; need-
less to guarantee, 156 ; powers of
congress over, 316; power to tax,
114.
Printers, refusal of, to print against the
constituion, 323.
Production, difficulty in disposing of
surplus, 73.
Property, equal distribution of, the
foundation of a. republic, 61; the
basis of freedom, 60; the real power,
57-.
Publicola, pseudonym of W. R. Davie,
391.
Quakers, influenced by slave trade, 54.
Ramsay, David, pamphlet by, 371; 421.
Randolph, Edmund, biographies of,
435 ; cited, 343; failure to sign con-
stitution, 261; 271; independence of,
INDEX.
449
20; 271; motion of. 272; pamphlet
by, 259; 418; 420.
Ratification of the constitution, (see also
Conventions, and each state,) 420 ; cele-
brations of the ratifications of, 441;
improperly hurried, 18 ; influences
that cause opposition to, 165; methods
used to aid acceptance, 7; of nine
states improper, 14; probability of,
by each state, 20 ; probability of nine
states agreeing to, 104; submittal to
state legislatures and coventions,
272.
Read, George, biographies of, 436.
Religion, free exercise of, should be
guaranteed, 315.
Religious sentiment of America, 135,
Religious test, none required, 146.
Representation {see also. Congress, Con-
stitution,) 8; 12; 289; and taxation
inseparable, 148; advantages of east-
ern states in, 375; basis for, 263; by
wealth or population, 39; direct taxa-
tion apportioned by, 310; equality of
the states in, 206; inadquacy of, 12;
300; 303; inequality in, 223; improve-
ment of, in constitution, 206; origin
of, 30; possibilities of equal, 296; in
the constitution a compromise, 206;
superior in state governments, 293;
too small to secure liberty, 102; treble
method in, 178.
Representatives, House of {see Congress,
Constitution, Representation, Senate,
Treaties^ 293; comparison with house
of commons, 42; 143; composition
and powers of, 143; 170; 225; 295;
difficulties in formation of, 297; elec-
tion of members of federal conven-
tion to, 221; expense of, 299; money
bills in, 340 ; no state to have less
than one member in, 143; proportion
of members to population, 143; quali-
fications of, 144; reply to Mason's
opinion of, 255; representation in,
12; 337; shadow of representation in,
329; share in treaties, 355; 376; term
of, 43 ; the seat of local interests and
parties, 41; the voice of the separate
states, 41 .
Republics, constitution of ancient, 189.
Revenue {see also Impost, Taxation,) all
sources of, subject to general govern-
ment, 11; necessity of equalizing, 62.
Revolutionary war caused by a differ-
ence concerning rights, 136.
Rhode Island and the constitution,
438; failure to choose representa-
tives, 151; senate of, 32.
Robertson, David, 418; 422,
Rome, colonies of, 208 ; constitutior*
compared with proposed constitution,
35 ; senate of. 42,
Rowland, Kate M., 390.
Russell, Benjamin, report of debates,
414.
Rutledge, John, biographies of, 436.
Sabliere, T. de la, editor of The Feder-
alist, 396;
Sarum, English borough of, 143.
Senate, (see also Congress, Constitution,
Executive, Representation, Treaties^ a
compromise between contending in-
terests, 158; advantages of, 30; ap-
pointing power of, 341 ; a restraint on
the House of Representatives, 141 ;
aristocratic tendencies in, 158; com-
pared with Roman and English sen-
ates, 371 J 148; composition and
powers of, 37: 140; 297; 338; con-
servative nature of, 340; constitution
of ancient, 189; dangers frqm, 172;
203; dangerous powers of, 173; 297;
329; detached from local prejudices,
142; equal sufrage in, 38; 40: 207;
275; federal formation of, 297; fre-
quency of election of, 338; House of
Representatives a check on, 338; irres-
ponsibility of, 12; length of term, 12;
170; mixture of functions in, 103; 229;
231: 299; money bills in, 340; neces-
sity to be small, 169; power to remove
officers, 142; qualifications for, 42;
141 ; reply to Mason's objections to,
255; representation in the, 40; 206;
the representatives of state sovereign-
ties, 169; 224; uselessness of the, 34;
useless power of impeachment, 300;
vacancies in, 170.
Sherman, Roger, biographies of, 436;
cited, 341.
Shipping, {see also Commerce^ 73; cessa-
tion of, 73; decline of, 73; necessities
of encouraging, 377.
Slavery, abolition of, would bring ruin,
54; legislation left to the states, 54.
Slaves, representation of, 319.
Slave trade, desire of South Carolina
and Georgia for continuance of, 367;
foundation for prevention of, 146; in-
terest of the eastern states to allow,
378; lack of restriction on, 54; neces-
sity of the evil of, 367; power to pro-
hibit after twenty-one years, 378;
weakening effect of, 331.
Smith, C. C, review by, 391.
450
INDEX.
Smith, Melancthon, pamphlet by, 67;
87; 421.
South Carolina, address to the freemen
of, 371; and the constitution, 440;
debates of legislature, 421 ; local weak-
ness of, 373; protection of, 377.
Southern confederacy, {see also Confeder-
acy^ proposition for, 270.
Southern states, see States.
Spraight, R. D.,, biographies of, 436.
State Conventions, see Conventions,
State,
State Legislatures, (see also Constitution
and each stated absorption of, 48; 252;
a check on senators, 142; control of
commerce, 265; division of, 30; 32;
33; misbehaviour of, 254; omitted in
consideration of constitution, 14; re-
straints on, 243.
State Sovereignty, see Congress, Consti-
tution, States.
States, (see also Congress, Constitution,
Judiciary, Juty, Representation, Sen-
ate, United States government, and
each state,) a. check on the general
government, 126; 152; all necessary
for present exigencies, 96; Bills of
Rights in constitutions, 359; bound-
aries of, 62; cases between citizens
and, 3(37; civil war during the, 97;
^64; 373; constitution of, 286; 289;
294; 299; 320; constitutional control
of, 46; 120; 129; 145; 292; constitu-
tions and laws of, 262; contention
•between, adjusted by general govern-
ment, 120; 267; controversies between
the, in the convention, 297; delusory
promise to guarantee republican gov-
ernment to, 11; differences in the
governments of, 291; dissolution of,
268; embarrassment of all issuing
'paper money, 374; excluded from all
agency in national government, 267;
failure to seciTre liberty and property,
55; interest of, to unite, 373; juris-
diction of, as opposed to national, 48;
-t)T, 121; 267; 275; 314; necessity of
coercive power against, 266; partial
confederacies of, 120; 127; 204: 247;
269; 270; 278; power over their own
citizens, 128; protected from each
other, 128; rebellion in, 264; reserva-
tions in constitutions of, 313; separate
interests of, 39; sovereignty of, 11;
14; 38; 46; 179; 207; 379.
— Eastern, 357; advantages from
new constitution, 319; advantages of
encouraging the shipping of, 377;
future miserable condition of, 3; loss
of, by revolution, 377; loss of mar-
kets by, 377; representation of, 375.
— Southern, advantages of navy to,
374; advantages to, of union, 319;
374 ; danger to, from commercial
laws, 331; future hopeless poverty of,
3; gain of, by revolution, 377; posi-
tion of, if constitution is rejected,
378; probable ascendency over east-
ern, 375; representation of, 375.
Stone, Frederick D., 412.
Strong, Caleb, biographies of, 436.
Taxation, absorption of production by
national, 3; and representation in-
separable, 148; 186; certainty of in-
crease under proposed government,
108; direct, 160; 253; 310; internal,
48; 302; laws of, interfering with
state laws, 302 ; method of collection,
49; 253; 310; powers of congress
over, 48; I02; 301; 303; relief from,
106; 108.
Tender laws, conduct of the state legis-
latures concerning, 284.
Territories, see Constitution, Western
Territory.
Trade, (see also Commerce, Treaties,) 73;
379; balance against the U. S., 107;
congressional power over, 107; ne-
cessity of government to, 7; regula-
tion of, approved by the eastern
states, 319.
Treatieis, (see also Commerce, Congress,
Executive, Representatives, Senate,)
dangers arising from, 312; dangers
of making them the supreme law,
311, necessity of commercial, 358;
of the confederation not binding un-
der, 317; power of Executive and
Senate in, 376; powers to make, 356;
safer in new government than under
the confederation, 376; should not be
trusted to House of Representatives,
376; the supreme law of the land,
355; undue influence of Executive
and Senate in, 331.
Tucker, J. R., History of the Conven-
tion, 422.
Tyler, M. C, 416.
Union, not possible without adequate
power, 122; true friends of opposed
to constitution, 7,
United States, condition of, 94; 281;
credit of, 244; extension of, 203;
future additions to, 248; future of,
208; is it too large for one, 13; 122;
127; 204; 247; necessity o£ supreme
INDEX.
451
government for, lig; neglect of laws
of, 293; opulence of, 270; parties in,
321; position if constitution is re-
jected, 378; suitable government for,
119; 127; 286.
United States, Government of, a moder-
ate aristocracy, 332; checks on, 152;
composition of, 292; control over the
states, 120; 129; 145; 292; dangers of
weak, 119; division of, 228; great in-
crease in cost predicted, 108; institu-
tion of, after the separation from
England, 136; lack of, during the
revolution, 136 ; necessary conces-
sions in order to form, 265; necessary
conditions of, 289; necessary powers
of, 120; 129; 287; 301; necessity of,
2S0; not restricted from issuing paper
money, 374; powers must be equal to
territory, 123; responsibility to foreign
nations, 266; separate functions of,
225; tendency of, 369; unreasonable
accumulation of powers in, 299; want
of independence in departments of,
103; 229.
Vermont, probable combination with
New Jersey and Connecticut in oppo-
sition to New York. 84.
Veto power, see Executive.
Vice-President, {see also Executive^
method of selection, 330: 349; posi-
tion in Senate, 350; qualifications of,
310; necessary, 298,
Virginia, alterations wished by, in con-
stitution, 275; and the constitution,
441; debates in convention of, 422;
delay in appointing convention, 250;
delegates to federal convention, 284;
hesitation of, to ratify, 20 ; journal of
convention of, 423; possibility of her
obtaining a partial confederacy, 269.
Warrants, insecurity from, 12; protection
from, 315.
Washington, George, 64; 67; 390; bio-
graphies of, 436; dedication to, 218;
letters to, 327; opinion of, 350; opinion
of The Federalist, 395.
Webb, S. B., 67.
Webster, Noah, pamphlet by, 25; 423;
reply to minority of Pa. convention,
385; review by, 67; 87; 217.
Webster, Pelatiah, pamphlet by, Ii8;
424.
Wells, John, editor of The Federalist,
397.
Western posts, method of obtaining, 96.
Western Territory, claims of the states
to, 239; question of ownership, 317.
West Indies, exclusion of American ves-
sels from, 73 ; will be opened to trade
by new government, 379.
Williamson, Hugh, 424; biographies of,
436.
Wilson, James, 242 ; 390 ; 412 ; bio-
graphies of, 436; cited, 336; invents
title of " Federal Republic," 8; speech
of. 134; 155; 385; 425-
Witherspoon, D., quotation from letters
of. 333-
Writs of Assistance in Massachusetts, 13.
Wyoming, action of Pennsylvania legis-
lature in reference to, 33.
Wythe, George, biographies of, 437.
Yates, Robert, 425; 424; biographies of,
437-
FINIS
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