l»
MjS
mS
fc»^H
m\
W^Mm:
^
1
w
::-'',[' -
1
i
i
ft'ji
1
!
f
Ff-
i
. i
1,
-!
"1
II
11
■
•■rfsil^
(IJornpU ICaui ^rl^onl Htbrary
Cornell University Library
K 681.T24 1897
V.I
A treatise on the law of evidence as adm
3 1924 022 020 485
Cornell University
Library
The original of this bool< is in
the Cornell University Library.
There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.
http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924022020485
A TREATISE
ON THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE
AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND;
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM SCOTCH, INDIAN, AMERICAN,
AND OTHER LEGAL SYSTEMS.
BY HIS HONOUE
THE LATE JUDGE FiTT iTAYLOE.
Nintf) lElritton.
(in pakt ee-weittten)
By G. PITT-LEWIS, Q.C.
SEttf) Notes as to American ILalw
By CHARLES F. CHAMBERLAYNB.
IN THREE VOLUMES.
Vol. I.
LONDON:
SWEET AND MAXWELL, Ltd., 3, CHANCERY LANE.
BOSTON, MASS. :
THE BOSTON BOOK COMPANY,
1897.
Copyright, 1897, ^^
By The Boston Book Company.
?Entorstt2 Press;
John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A.
PREFACE.
The American editor is completely excused from the
necessity of saying anything concerning the merits of
Judge Taylor's original work. A treatise which in Eng-
land and America has so long and so admirably stood the
tests of time and daily use among an exacting profession,
critical as to correctness of statement and fullness of
research, speaks for itself with sufficient distinctness.
The ninth English edition embodies many extensive
and painstaking improvements by G. Pitt Lewis, Esq.,
Q. C. Among others, mention may be made of the facts
that the original work, while benefited by many additional
cases, has been condensed, without sacrifice of essential
value; and that the range of citation for English and
Irish cases and for English legislation has been carried
down to a late day. The condensation referred to has
added clearness to the text. Many illustrations of prin-
ciple, which, though valuable in themselves, in earlier
editions somewhat impeded the flow of thought, have been
judiciously reduced to a proper position as foot-notes, in
condensed form and, so far as possible, in alphabetical
order. The English editor, thinking, to use his own lan-
guage, " that the true work of the editor of a law book is
to strive his best to render the work which he is editing
one that the author would have produced if writing at the
IV PEEFACB.
present day," has industriously and successfully labored to
that end.
The American editor, while not, it is hoped, neglecting
the valuable consideration suggested by his learned coad-
jutor, has proposed, as his primary object, a somewhat
different result : — namely, to give to the profession, so
far as conveniently possible within the limitations imposed
by the form of notes, such a statement of the modern law
of evidence as might be practically useful to the active
practitioner, and yet possess value to those who were
desirous of acquainting themselves with the fundamental
principles of the subject.
It has seemed necessary, in pursuing this object, that
many inviting by-paths of antiquarian research should
consciously be neglected, and the desire to follow the cur-
rent of authority up among the headsprings of our juris-
prudence should be repressed. The historical development
of the present rules of evidence has been noted only so far
as seemed fairly needed for a clear conception of the rules
themselves. The feeling has been strong that the changed
conditions of modern life have not failed to affect also the
development of this branch of the law, and that it there-
fore yearly grows more essential that, as the intricacy and
magnitude of matters submitted to judicial investigation
continues to increase, the rules of evidence under which
they must be determined should be simplified, both in
number and through being formulated with precision. In
many ways, statutory aud judicial, it is fairly to be said
that the law of evidence is tending in this direction.
The present work is intended as a contribution to the
same end.
The range of citation has necessarily embraced the entire
United States and the Province of Canada. So far as
PEEFACE. V
possible, leading cases have been cited in each jurisdiction.
But to many a practitioner without ready access to a large
law library such bountiful citations merely furnish a "feast
of Tantalus." To remedy this difficulty, so far as possible,
the point of the case cited has been given in the exact
language of the court. This not only furnishes a quotable
statement, but possesses the additional advantage that the
reader is not forced to rely wholly upon the ability of an
editor to catch and paraphrase the precise shade of mean-
ing intended by the court.
The plan of putting the entire collection of American
law relating to a particular topic at the end of the English
chapters on the same subject has been found acceptable in
practical use, and is continued in the present international
work. To afford still further opportunity for ready ref-
erence to American and Canadian law, a separate index
to subjects treated in the American notes and a separate
tabulation of cases therein cited have been prepared.
While it has not proved possible to embrace within the
present compass certain topics covered by well accepted
separate treatises, or by the statutes of the several juris-
dictions, it is hoped that the present work will prove of
material assistance to our busy profession in the prepara-
tion and trial of causes, and also be of value to those who
are interested in a consideration of the underlying prin-
ciples which affect the larger aspects of the subject.
CHARLES F. CHAMBEELAYNE.
Boston, January 19, 1897.
analtsjfjs.
PAKT I.
Nature and. Principles of Evidence,
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
Peeliminaey Observations 1-2
American Note : Definitions.
Evidence — Fact — Proof — Testimony — Cumula-
tive Evidence — Competent Evidence — Kele-
vancy — Legal Relevancy 2^-2'
CHAPTER II.
MATTEES JtTDlCIALLT NOTICED WITHOUT PkOOF .... 3-21
American Note: Judicial Notice.
Required Cognizance — Instances — Optional Cog-
nizance — Instances 21^-21'^°
CHAPTER III.
How Questions op Fact Tried — Eunctions of Judge
IN Jury Trials 22-52
American Note: Law and Fact.
Function of the Court — Construction of Writ-
ings — Negligence — Due Diligence — Probable
Cause — Preliminary Facts — Foreign Laws . 52^-52'"
ANALYSIS. VU
CHAPTER IV.
PAGE
The Grounds of Belief 53-68
CHAPTER V.
Presumptive Evidence 69-183
American Note: Presumptions.
Conclusive Presumptions — Instances .... 183''-183^°
Presumptions Proper — Instances 183"-183^''
PAET II.
Rules Governing the Production of Testimony.
CHAPTER I.
Production of Evidence governed by Pour Great Rules.
Rule I. — Evidence must correspond with Issues ; Vari-
ances ; Amendments 184-218
American Note : Relation of Pleading to Evidence.
Evidence de Bene — Relevancy — Auxiliary Facts 218^-218*
CHAPTER II.
Rule II. — Evidence must be confined to Points in Issue 219-257
American Note : Res inter Alios Actse.
Instances 257^-257=
Relaxation of Rule — Mental State — Tracing a
Constant Cause — Instances — Railroad Cases . 257^-257'^'
Character Evidence.
Civil and Criminal Cases — Exceptions — Charac-
• ter of "Witness — Proof 257=^-257''*
viii ANALYSIS.
CHAPTER III.
PAGE
Rule III. — Burthen of Proof lies on Paety who sub-
stantially ASSERTS THE AFFIRMATIVE : RiGHT TO
Begin and to Reply 258-276
American Note : Burden of Proof.
Double Meaning — Instances 276'-276"
CHAPTER IV.
Rule IV. — The Best Evidence must always be pro-
duced; Secondary Evidence (1) As to Documents,
Notices to Produce, &c. ; (2) As to Oral Evidence,
Depositions, &c 277-358
American Note : Best Evidence.
Early Rule — Modern Statement — Application to
Written Instruments 358i-358»*
PART III.
Certain Particular Descriptions of Evidence.
CHAPTER I.
Evidence Addressed to the Senses 359-365
American Note : Real Evidence.
Mixed Beal Evidence — Instances — Personal In-
juries — Compulsory Exhibition — Experiments
in and out of Court 3G5^-36b^'
CHAPTER II.
Hearsay is, as a General Rule, rejected 366-391
ANALYSIS. IX
PAGE
American Note : Bes GestsB.
Declarations Coustitutiug — Declarations, Facts in
the Res Gestae — Declarations, Fart of a Ees
Gestffi Fact — Instances — Spontaneity as a
Test — Narrative — Differences in American
Decisions — Privity 391^-391^^
Hearsay.
Objections — Reported Statements as Facts —
Instances 391^^-391=2
CHAPTER III.
First Exception to General Rule rejecting Hearsay-
Evidence AS to Matters op Public and General
Interest ... 392-412
American Note: Matters of Public and General
Interest.
Boundaries, Public and Private — Reputation. . 412^-412'^
CHAPTER IV.
Second Exception to General Rule rejecting Hear-
say-Evidence AS to Matters of Pedigree .... 413—427
American Note : Hearsay concerning Pedigree . 427^-427"
CHAPTER V.
Third Exception to General Rule rejecting Hear-
say-Evidence AS TO Ancient Possession 428-433
American Note: Hearsay concerning Ancient Pos-
session.
Corroboration 433M33^
CHAPTER VI.
Fourth Exception to General Rule rejecting Hearsay-
Evidence AFFORDED BY DECLARATIONS BY DECEASED
Persons against their Pecuniary or Proprietary
Interests 434-452
American Note : Declarations against Interest.
Not Admissions 452^-452^"
X ANALYSIS.
CHAPTER VII.
PAGE
Fifth Exception to General Rule rejecting Hear-
say-Evidence AFFORDED BY DECLARATIONS IN THE
Course of Office or Business 453-463
American Note : Shop Books 4631-463'
Books of Account 463'-4632*
Entries in Course of Business.
An Extended Development ....... 46325-463"
CHAPTER VIII.
Sixth Exception to General Rule rejecting Hear-
say-Evidence afforded by Dying Declarations . . 464-470
American Note: Dying Declarations.
Modern Restrictions 4701-4702"
CHAPTER IX.
Admissions 471-554
American Note: Admissions.
Silence — Compromise 554^-554"
CHAPTER X.
Confessions 555-588
American Note: Confessions.
Corroboration — Undue Influence — Instances . . 588^-588^'
AifALYSIS. XI
PART lY.
Special Rules of Law as to the Evidence in Certain
Particular Cases.
CHAPTEE I.
PAGE
Public Policy eequiees the Exclusion of Evidence on
Certain Matters, viz. :
(1) Communications during Marriage between
Husband and Wife: (2) Communications
with Professional Advisers : (3) Evidence of
Judicial Personages and of Counsel : (4) Mat-
ters which are State Secrets: (5) Indecent
Matters 589-622
American Note: Privileged Matters.
Marital Confideuce — Communications between
Attorney and Client — Secrets of State — Pub-
lic Justice — Grand and Petty Jurors — Sources
of Information — Matters against Decency • . 622^-622^'
CHAPTER II.
Certain Matters which are not Provable bt a Sin-
gle Witness, viz. :
(1) Treason: (2) Perjury: (3) Affiliation: (4)
Breach of Promise to Marry : (5) The Evi-
dence of Accomplices in Crime 623-635
American Note: Corroboration.
Treason — Perjury — Accomplices — Bastardy
and Seduction 635^-635^
XU AI^AiYSIS.
CHAPTER III.
PAGE
Certain Matters which are required to be Evidenced
BY Writing, viz. : 637-738
(1) At Common Law : '■
(2) By Certain Statutes."
American Note: Statutory Writings 738'
CHAPTEE IV.
The Admissibility of Parol Evidence to affect
Written Instruments 739-808
American Note: Parol Evidence Rule.
Limitations applied — Receipts — Bills of Lading
— Bills of Parcels — Collateral Agreements —
Scope misunderstood — Mortgages and Trusts
— Duress — Illegality — Incapacity — Fraud —
Consideration — Mistake — Incomplete Deliv-
ery — Discharge, Waiver, Modification, etc. . 808^-808^'
■^ By Common Law, " writing " was, in general, equivalent to a deed. The prin-
cipal matters required by the Common Law to be " in writing " (that is by deed) are :
— (a) Grants or Demises of Incorporeal Rights: (b) Gifts of Personalty unaccom-
panied by delivery, whether inter vivos or mmiis causa: (c) Appointments of Agents
to execute Deeds : (d) Contracts with Corporations : and (e) Powers of Attorney
for the Execution of Deeds.
2 The principal matters required by Statute to be evidenced by writing are as
follows: — (a) Sales of Ships or Shares in Ships: (b) Certain dealings with Real
Property (including Leases for more than Three Years) : (c) Or matters falling
within the Statute of Frauds, such as Assignments or Surrenders of Realty, Special
Promises by Executors or Administrators, Guarantees, Agreements in consideration
of Marriage, Contracts for Interests in Lands, Agreements not to be performed within
a Year, and Sales of Goods for £10, or upwards : (d) Wills and Codicils and Revo-
cations or Revivals thereof : (e) Acknowledgments (other than by part payment) of
Debts or Incorporeal Rights which have become Statute-barred : (f ) Acceptances :
(g) Contracts under the Truck Act : (h) Or under the Merchant Shipping Act :
(i) Documents governed by various other Acts: Or (j) Documents requiring Inrol-
ment or Registration, such as Warrants of Attorney or Cognovits, Bills of Sale,
Grants of Annuities, &c.
ANALYSIS. xm
PART Y-
Instruments of Evidence.
CHAPTER I.
Witnesses, and the Means of Procuring their At-
tendance 809-873
CHAPTER II.
The Competency of Witnesses 874-910
American Note : Competency of Witnesses.
Mental Derangement — Youth — Intoxication —
Atheism — Policy of Law — Judges — Attor-
ney taking the Stand — Husband and Wife —
Infamous Crime — Testamentary Witnesses —
Functions of Court and Jury 910^-910^
CHAPTER III.
The Examination of Witnesses — including the tak-
ing OF Affidavits — before an Examiner, or on
Commission 911-978
American Note : Memoranda refreshing Memory.
Primary Recollection — Secondary Recollection . 978^-978'''
Separation of Witnesses.
Consequences of Disobedience 978^'-978^
Examination of Witnesses.
Direct Examination — Scope 9 78^-9 78'^
Cross Examination — Scope — Impeachment
— Contradictory Statements 978'M78^'
Subsequent Examinations 978^^-978^'
XIV ANALYSIS.
CHAPTER IV,
PAGE
Matters Evidenced by Public Documents .... 979-1179
American Note : Public Documents-
Proof— Relevancy 11791-1179^°
CHAPTER V.
Matters Evidenced by Private Writings . . . 1180-1229
American Note: Private Writings.
Production — Proof of Execution — Attested
Writings — Exceptions — Unavailable Wit-
ness— "Own Claim "— Ancient Documents
— Proof of Contents 1229^-1229^'
Proof of Handwriting.
Witnesses — Correspondence, etc. — " Com-
parison of Hands " — Conflict of Authority
— Ancient Documents — Documents in the
Case — Province of Court and Jury — Let-
ters in Reply 1229^^229"
PAET VI.
Some General Rules as to the Admission
or Rejection of Evidence at the Trial,
and as to the Admissibility of Further
Evidence on Appeal 1230-1234
( ^v )
BY WHICH VABIOtrS lEISH, SCOTCH, Am) AMEEIOAN ATJTHOBITrES
ARE CITED m THIS TREATISE. '
NoXB. — Moat of the American Reports are to he found in the respective Libraries
of the Inner and Middle Temples. But some few of them are only to he
obtained at the British Museum. The letters A., B., C, D., appended to the
American Reports, denote the relative estimation in which those Reports are
held by the prof ession in general, out of the particular State where the decisions
were pronounced : A. marking the highest degree of excellence. A very eminent
American jurist kindly fv/rnished the Author with this guide.
ABBBEVIATIONS. NAME OP -WOEK, ETO.
Addis Addison's Reports, Pennsylvania, 1791 — 1799. 1 vol. (0.)
Aik Aiken's Reports, Vermont, 1826—1827. 2 vols. (B.)
A. K. Marst A. K. MarshaU's Rep., Kentucky, 1817—1821. 3 vols. (D.)
Ale. & Nap Aloook & Napier's Reports, King's Bench, Ireland. 1 vol.
Alison, Or. L Alison's Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland.
Alwon, Praot. of \ j^ison's Practice of the Criminal Law of Scotland.
Cr. L )
Am. Deo American Decisions (Select Cases from various American State
Courts), San Francisco, 1700— 1S44. 40 vols.
Am. Ed American edition.
Am. Jur American Jurist. Boston.
Am. Rep American Reports (Selected from the Decisions of the Courts
of last resort in the several States of America), Albany,
1869—1887. 60 vols.
Am. St. Rep American State Reports (a continuation of Anierican Reports),
1887—1895. 42 vols. (Series stUl current.)
Anthon Anthon's Nisi Pr. Rep., New York, 1808—1818. 1 vol. (D.)
Applet Appleton's Reports, Maine, from 1841. 1 vol. (C.)
Arm. M. & 0 Armstrong, Macartney & Ogle's Rep., Nisi Pr., Irel. 1 vol.
Arm. & T Armstrong & Trevor's Rep. of R. v. O'Connell, Dub., 1844.
Bail Bailey's Reports, South Carolina, 1828—1832. 2 vols. (B.)
Ball & B ,, Ball & Beatty's Reports, Chancery, Ireland. 2 vols.
Batty Batty's Reports, King's Bench, Ireland. 1 vol.
Bay Bay's Reports, South Carolina, 1783—1804. 2 vols. (B.C.)
Bell, Dig BeU's Digest of the Laws of Scotland.
Bibb Bibb's Reports, Kentucky, 1808—1817. 4 vols. (D.)
Binn Binney's Reports, Pennsylvania, 1799 — 1814. 6 vols. (A.)
Bland, Ch Bland's Chancery Rep., Maryland, 1811—1830. 2 vols. (0.)
Blaokf Blackford's Reports, Indiana, 1817—1838. 4 vols. (CD.)
Browne Browne's Reports, Pennsylvania, 1806 — 1814. 2 vols. (C.)
Burnet, Cr. L. . . Burnet on Criminal Law of Scotland.
' A list of the ordinary abbreviations used in English law is commonly known,
and can, at any rate, be found in the catalogues of many law publishers.
XVI ABBREVIATIONS, ETC.
ABBEBVIATIONS. NAME OF -WOEK, ETO.
Caines Caines's Eeporte, New York, 1803—1806. 3 vols. (A.)
City Hall Eeo. . . New York Recorder, containing Reports of Cases in City Courts
from 1816 to 1821. 6 vols.
Com Commonwealth.
CoukUn's Pr Conklin's Practice of Cts. of United States, New Tork, 1842.
Conn Connecticut Reports, by T. Day, 18U— 1848. 15 vols. (B.)
Const. R Constitutional Rep., S. Carolina, 1812—1816. 2 vols. (B.C.)
Oonst.U.S.Amend. Amended Constitution of the United States.
Cooke & Ale Cooke and Alcock's Rep., King's Bench, Ireland. 1 vol.
Cooke Cooke's Reports, Tennessee, 1811—1814. 1 vol. (D.)
Coweu Cowen's Reports, New Tork, 1823—1828. 9 vols. (A.)
Coxa Coxe's Reports, New Jersey, 1790—1796. 1 vol. (C.)
Cranch Cranch's Rep., Sup. Ct. of U.S., 1800—1815. 9 vols. (A.)
Crawf.&D.,Abr.O. Crawford and Dix's Abridged Cases in Ireland. 1vol.
Crawf. & D., C. C. Crawford and Dix, Irish Circuit Reports. 3 vols.
Cush Cushing's Rep. Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 9 vols.
Dall Dallas's Reports. Supreme Courts of United States, and
Pennsylvania, 1790—1806. 4 vols. (A.)
Dane, Abr Dane's Abridgment, United States.
Day Day's Reports, Connecticut, 1802—1810. 5 vols. (B.)
Deane, Verm. R. . . Deane's Reports, Supreme Court of Vermont. 3 vols.
Dev Devereux's Rep., North Carolina, 1826—1834. i vols. (B.)
Dev. & B Devereux and Battle's Rep., North Carolina, 1834 — 1840.
4 vols. (B.)
Dickson, Ev Dickson on Evidence in Scotland. 2 vols. Edinburgh, 1855.
Drury, Ch. R Drury's Irish Chancery Rep. , temp. Sugden, Ch. 1 vol.
Dru. & War Drury and Warren's Reports, Chancery, Ireland, i vols.
Ersk. Inst Erskine's Institutes of the Law of Scotland.
Eairf Pairfield's Reports, Maine, 1833—1835. 3 vols. (B.)
Fox & Sm Eox and Smith's Reports, King's Bench, Ireland. 2 vols.
Gall GaUison's Reports, United States, 1st Circuit Court, 1812 —
1815. 2 vols. (A.). Judge Story's Decisions.
Gill. & J GUI and Johnson's Rep., Maryland, 1829—1840. 10 vols. (B.)
Glassf. Bv Glassford on Evidence, Edinburgh, 1820.
Gr. Ev Greenleaf on Evidence.
Gray Gray's Reports, Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 2 vols.
Greenl Greenleaf's Reports, Maine, 1820—1832. 9 vols. (B.)
Halst Halstead's Reports, New Jersey, 1821 — 1831. 7 vols. (0.)
Har. & G Harris and Gill's Rep., Maryland, 1826 — 1829. 2 vols. (B.)
Har. & M'Hen. .. Harris and M-Henry's Rep., Maryland, 1790 — 1799. 4 vols.
Hardin Hardin's Reports, Kentucky, 1805 — 1808. 1 vol. (D.)
Harr. & J Harris and Johnson's Reports, Maryland, 1800 — 1826 7 vnla
(B.)
Hawks Hawks' Reports, North Carolina, 1820—1826. 4 vols. (C.)
Hayes Hayes' Reports, Exchequer, Ireland. 1 vol.
Hayes & Jon Hayes and Jones' Reports, Exchequer, Ireland. 1 vol.
ABBREVIATIONS, ETC. XVU
ABBEEVIATIONS. NAilB OP WOEK, ETC.
Hayw Haywood's Reports, North Carolina, 1789—1806. (0.)
Hen. & Munf Henuing and Munford's Rep., Virginia, 1806—1809. 4 vols. (C.)
Heisk Heiskell, Tennessee, 1870—1874. 12 vols.
Hill, S. Car. R. . . Hill's Reports, South Carolina, 1833—1835. 2 vols. (B.C.)
HiU, N. T. R. . . Hill's Reports, New York, 1841—1842. 3 vols. (B.)
Howard, S. Ct. E. Howard's Rep., United States, Sup. Ct., from 1843. (A.)
Hume, Com Hume's Commentaries on Criminal Law of Scotland.
Humph Humphrey's Reports, Tennessee, 1839 — 1841. 2 vols. (D.)
Iredell Iredell's Reports, North Carolina, 1840—1841. 1 vol. (C.)
Ir. C. L. R Irish Common Law Reports, 1849 — 1866. 17 vols. Formerly
cited by Author as " Ir. Law R. N. S."
Ir. Ch Irish Chancery Reports, 1850 —1866. 17 vols. Formerly cited
by Author as " Ir. Eq. R. N. S."
Ir. dr. R Irish Circuit Reports. 1 vol.
Ir. Eq. Rep Irish Equity Reports, 1838—1850. 13 vols.
Ir. L. T. Rep. . . Irish Law Times Reports.
Ir. L. R Irish Law Reports (i. e., Reports at Common Law), 1838 — 1850.
13 vols.
I. R. C. L Irish Reports, Common Law, 1867—1877.
I. R. Eq Irish Reports, Equity, 1867—1877.
J. J. Marsh J. J. Marshall's Rep., Kentucky, 1829—1832. 7 vok. (D.)
Jebb, C. C Jebb's Crown Cases Reserved, Ireland. 1 vol.
Jebb & B Jebb and Bourke's Rep., Queen's Bench, Ireland. 1 vol.
Jebb & Sy Jebb and Symes' Rep., Queen's Bench, Ireland. 2 vols.
Johns Johnson's Reports, New York, 1806—1823. 20 vols. (A.)
Johns. Ch. R Johnson's Chan. Rep., New York, 1814—1823. 7 vols. (A.)
Jones Jones' Exchequer Reports, Ireland. 2 vols.
Jones & Lat Jones and Latouche's Rep., ^Dhaneery, Ireland. 3 vols.
Joy on Conf Joy on Confession in Criminal Cases, Dublin, 1842.
Kent, Com Kent's Commentaries, Boston, 1840.
Kirby Kirby's Reports, Connecticut, 1785 — 1788. 1 vol. (D.)
L. R. (Ir.) Law Reports for Ireland, 1878—1894. 33 vols. (vol. 33 current
to end of 1894) . Formerly cited by Author as ' ' Ir. Law R."
LL., U. S Laws of the United States.
Lans (N. Y.) .... Lansing, Reports of Decisions in the Supreme Court of the
State of New York. New York and Albany, 1869—1873. ,
7 vols.
Law Reo. 1st Ser. 1 -^^^ -Recorder, 1st and 2nd Series. Irish. 10 vols.
or 2nd Ser )
Leigh, R Leigh's Reports, Virginia, 1829—1839. 9 vols. (B.)
Lloyd & Gr Lloyd and Goold's Ir. Chan. Rep., temp. Sugden, Ch. 1 vol.
Long. & T Longfield and Townsend's Rep. Exchequer, Ireland. 1 vol.
Louis Reports of Louisiana, 1830 — 1840. 16 vols. (B.)
jIoC MoCord's Rep., South Carolina, 1820 — 1828. 4 vols. (B.C.)
McC Ch. R McCord's Chancery Reports, South Carolina, 1825 — 1827.
2 vols. (B.C.)
McDouall, Inst. . . MoDouaU's (Ld. Bankton) Institutes of Law of Scotland.
McNally, Ev McNally on Evidence, Ireland.
A. K. Marsh A. K. Marshall's Rep., Kentucky, 1817 — 1821. 3 vols. (D.)
J J. Marsh J. J. Marshall's Rep., Kentucky, 1829— 1832. 7 vols. (D.)
xyiU ABBREVIATIONS, ETC.
ABBEEVIATIOHS. NAME OF 'WOEK, ETC.
Mart Martin'8 Reports, Louisiana, 1809—1823. 12 vols. (B.)
Mart., N. S Martin's Reports, New Series, Louisiana, 1823— 1830. 8 vols.
(B.)
Mart., N. Car. R.. Martin's North Carolina Reports, 1778—1797. 1 vol. (D.)
Mart. & Y Martin and Yerger's Rep., Tennessee, 182-5—1828. 1 vol. (D.)
Mason Mason's Reports, United- States, Ist Circuit Court, 1816 —
1830. 5 vols. (A.) Judge Story's Decisions.
Mass Reports of Massachusetts, 1804 — 1822. (A.)
Meto Metoalf's Reports, Massachusetts, 1840— 1846. (A.)
Milw. Eo. Ir. R. . . Mil ward's Eooles. Irish Rep., temp. Dr. Eadohfle.
Mo Missouri, 1821— 1881. 74 vols.
MoU MoUoy's Reports, Chancery, Ireland. 3 vols.
Monroe Monroe's Reports, Kentucky, 1824 — 1828. 7 vols. (D.)
Morison Morison's Scotch Reports.
Munf Munford's Reports, Virginia, 1810—1820. 6 vols. (C.)
Murph Muxphey's Reports, North Carolina, 1804—1819. (0.)
N. York Civ. Code The Code of Civil Procedure of New York, 1850.
N. York Cr. Code The Code of Criminal Procedure of New York, 1850.
New Hamp Reports of New Hampshire, 1816 — 1843. (B.)
Nott & M'C Nott and M'Cord's Rep., S. Carolina, 1817—1820. 2 vols. (B.)
Ohio R Hammond's Ohio Reports, Ohio, 1821—1839. 9 vols. (D.)
Pa. St Pennsylvania State Reports, New York and Albany, 1845 —
1895. 165 vols. (Series still current.)
Paige Paige's Chan. Rep., New York, 1828—1844. 10 vols. (B.)
Paine Paine's Rep., United States, 2nd Circuit Court, 1810 — 1826.
1 vol. (B.)
Paine & D. Pr. . . Paine and Duer's Practice of the Courts of the United States,
New York, 1830.
Peck Peck's Reports, Tennessee, 1822—1824. 1 vol. (D.)
Penning Pennington's Rep., New Jersey, 1806 — 1813. 2 vols. (0.)
Pennsylv Reports of Pennsylvania, 1829 — 1832. 3 vols. (B.)
Pet Peters' Rep., Supreme Courts of United States, 1827 — 1843.
(A.)
Pet. 0. 0. R Peters' Circuit Courts Reports, United States, 3rd Circuit Court
1803—1818. 1vol. (B.)
Pick Pickering's Rep., Massachusetts, 1823 — 1840. 24 vols. (A.)
Porter Porter's Reports, Alabama, 1834— 1839. 9 vols. (D.)
Poth. Obi Pothier on Obligations, by Evans, Philadelphia ed., 1826.
R The Reports.
R. R Revised Reports.
Rand Randolph's Reports, Virgima, 1821 — 1828. 6 vols. (B.)
Rawle Eawle's Reports, Pennsylvania, 1828 — 1835. 6 vols. (A.)
Rev. St Revised Statutes of diflferent States in America.
Ridg. L. & S Ridgway, Lapp and Sohoales' Rep., King's Bench, Irel. 1 vol.
Ridg. P. C Ridgway's Parliamentary Cases, Irish Parliament.
Riley Riley's Law Cases, South Carolina, 1836—1837. 1 vol. (B.)
Soh. & Lef Sohoales and Lefroy's Reports, Chancery, Ireland. 2 vols.
&R Sergeant and Rawle's Rep., Pennsylv., 1818 — 29. 17 vols. (A.)
ABBEEVIATIONS, ETC. XIX
ASBEBVIATIONS. NAME OP 'WOKK, ETO.
Shepl Shepley'B Eeports, Maine, 1836—1841. 6 vols. (0.)
South Southard's Reports, New Jersey, 1816—1820. 2 vols. (0.)
Stair Inst Stair's Institutes of the Law of Scotland.
Story, E Story's Eeports, United States, 1st Circuit, 1839—1845. 3
vols. (A.) Judge Story's Decisions.
Siimn Sumner's Eeports, 1st Circuit Court of United States. Judge
Story's Decisions. 1830—1839. 3 vols. (A.)
Swift, Dig Swift's American Digest.
Swift, Et Swift's American Law of Evidence. Hartford.
Tait, Ev Tait on Evidence. Edinburgh, 1834.
U. S United States.
Verm Vermont's Eeports, Vermont, 1826—1837. 9 vols. (B.)
Virg. Cas Virginia Cases, Virginia, 1789— 1826. 2 vols. (D.)
Wall WaUis's Irish Chancery Eeports, 1766-1791, 1 vol.; or in
references to American Eeports, either Wallace's United
States Supreme Court Eeports, Washington, 1863 — 1874.
23 vols. ; or else Wallace's Circuit Court Eeports, Phila-
delphia, 1801. 1 vol.
Wall, Jr Philadelphia. 1842—1862. 3 vols.
Wash Washington's Eeports, Virginia, 1790—1796. 2 vols. (C.)
Wash. C. C. E. . . Washington's Circuit Court Eeports, United States, 3rd Circuit
Court, 1803—1827. 4 vols. (B.)
Watts Watts' Eeports, Pennsylvania, 1832—1840. 10 vols. (A.)
Watts &S Watts and Sergeant's Eep.,Pennsylv., 1841—1842. 3 vols. (A.)
Wend. WendaU's Eeports, New York, 1828—1841. (A.)
Whart Wharton's Eeports, Pennsylvania, 1835 — 1840. 6 vols. (A.)
Wheat Wheaton's Eep. , Superior Ct. of Un. States, 1816—1827. (A.)
Wheel. C. C Wheeler's Criminal Cases, New Tork. 3 vols. (D.)
Woodb. & M Woodbury and Minot's Eeports, United States, 1st Circuit,
1845—1847. 2 vols. (A.)
Wright, E Wright's Eeports, Ohio, 1831—1834. 1 vol. (D.)
Teates Teates' Eeports, Pennsylvania, 1791 — 1808. 4 vols. (B.)
Yerg. Terger's Eeports, Tennessee, 1832—1837. 10 vols. (D.)
( ^^i )
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAGB
Aaeonj). Aaron (1849), 3De&. &Sm. 475; 14 Jur. 125 701
Abbey v. Lill (1829), 2 M. & P. 534 ; 5 Bing. 299 932
Abbeyleix Gardens v. Sutolifee (1890), 26 L. E. Ir. 332 508
Abbot V. Hermou (1830), 7 Greenl. 118 524
Abbot V. Plumbe (1779), 1 Doug. 216 1208
Abbot V. Wolsey (1895), 14 R. (July) 211 ; (1895), 2 Q. B. 97 ; 72 L. T. 581 ;
43 W. B. 513 Add. [689, 690]
Abbott V. Abbott andGodoy (1860), 29 L.J. P. & M. 57 ; 4 S. & T. 254. . 1048,
1054
Abbott ji. Bates (1876), 45 L. J. C. P. 117; 33L. T. 491; 24 "W. R. 101. .748, 765
Abbott V. Hendricks (1840), 1 M. & Or. 791 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 183 ; 1 Drink.
31; 4 Jur. 1113 758
Abbott V. Massie (1796). 3 Ves. 148 ; 3 R. R. 79 795
Abbott V. Middleton (1858), 7 H. L. Cas. 68 ; 28 L. J. Oh. 110 ; 33 L. T.
66 ; 21 Beav. 143 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 717 741
Abbotun v. Dansford (1699), 2 Bott, 80 465
AbeelK. RadoliflE (1816), 13 Johns. 297 673
Abel V. Potts (1800), 3 Esp. 242 ; 6 R. R. 826 1048
Abignye v. Clifton (1612), Hob. 213 901
Abley v. Dale (1850), 10 C. B. 62 ; 1 L. M. & P. 626 ; 20 L. J. 0. P. 33 ;
14 Jur. 1069 1148
Aboulofe V. Oppenheimer (1882), 52 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 10 Q. B. D. 295 ; 47
L. T. 326 ; 31 "W. R. 57 1142
Abrath v. North Bast. Ry. Co. (1886), 11 App. Cas. 247 ; 55 L. J. Q. B.
457 ; 55 L. T. 63 ; 15 Cox, C. C. 364 30, 31, 110, 643
Abrey v. Crux (1869), L. R. 5 C. P. 37 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 9 ; 21 L. T. 327 . . 757
Acoero v. Petroni (1815), 1 Stark. 100 922
Accidental and Mar. Ins. Co., Re (1867), 37 L. J. Ch. 56 ; L. R. 5 Eq. 22;
17 L. T. 308 845
Aoebal v. Levy (1834), 10 Bing. 384 ; 4 M. & So. 217 689, 691
Aokary, Re, Ex parte Bolland (1876), 45 L. J. Bank. 133 ; 3 Ch. D. 125 ;
34 L. T. 666 ; 24 W. R. 932 851
Ackland v. Pearce (1811), 2 Camp. 601 317
Ackworth, Ex parte (1843), 3 Q. B. 397 ; 1 Dowl. & L. 718 ; 1 New Sess.
Caa.64; 13 L. J. M. 0. 38 ; 18 Jur. 291 1139
A'Courtv. Cross (1825), 3 Bing. 329; 11 Moore, C. P. 198 ;. 712
Acraman v. Hemiman (1851), 16 Q. B. 998 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 356 ; 15 Jur. 1008 735
Acraman v. Morrioe (1849), 8 C. B. 449 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 57 ; 14 Jur. 69 . . 690
Adam «. Kerr (1798), 1 Bos. & P. 360 1213, 1216
Adams v. AngeU (1876), 5 Ch. D. 634 ; 36 L. T. 334 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 352 . . 153
Adams v. Baloh (1827), 5 Greenl. 188 1(198
Adams «>. Barnes (1821), 17 Mass. 365 1114
Adams ». Barry (1843), 2 T. & C. (Ch.) 167 601
Adams v. Dansey (1830), 6 Bing. 506 ; 4 M. & P. 245 678
Adams v. Frye (1841), 3 Mete. 103 1201
Adams v. Gibney (1830), 6 Bing. 656 ; 4 M. & P. 491 773
Adams «!. Jones (1862), 21 L. J. Ch. 352 797
Adams v. Lloyd (1858), 3 H. & N. 351 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 499; 4 Jur, N. S. 590 964
Adams v. Sanders (1829), M. & M. 373 ; 4 C. & P. 25 552
Adams v. Wordley (1836), 1 M. & W. 374 ; 2 Gale, 29 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 158 ;
IT. &G. 620 , 743, 757
Adamson, Re (1875), L. R. 3 P. & D. 253 146
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
XXU TABLE OP CASES CITED.
PAGE
Adamthwaite v. Synge (1816), 1 Stark. 183 1018
Addington v. Clode (1774-5), 2 Wm. Bl. 1030 &9*
Addingtoni). Magau(1851), IOC. B. 576; 20L. J. C. P. 82 192
Adelaide, The (1799), 2 Robertson, 611 1095
Admiral Austen, Re (1852), 2 C. Rob. 112, n. .'. 192
Admiral Boxer, The (1857), Swab. 193 178
Aflalo V. Fourdrinier (1829), M. & M. 334, n 314
Agnew V. Jobson (1878), 47 L. J. M. C. 67 ; 13 Cox, C. C. 625 226
AgraBk. i>. Barry (1874), L. R. 7 H.L. 155; Ir. E. 8Eq. 325 737
Agricultural Cattle Ins. Co. v. Fitzgerald (1861), 14 Q. B. 432 ; 20 L. J.
Q. B. 244 ; 15 Jur. 489 294, 1197
Aheam v. Bellman (1879), L. R. 4 Ex. D. 201 ; 40 L. T. 771 ; 27 W. R.
928 ;..... 523
Ahearne v. M'Gmre (1840), 2 Ir. Eq. R. 437 867
Ainsworth, Re (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 151 .■ 699
Airth Peer. (1839), Pari. Min. 105 423
Aitken, Ex parte (1820), 4 B. & Aid. 49 594
Alban v. Pritohett (1796), 6 T. R. 680 604
Albert v. The Grosvenor Invest. Co. (1867), L. R. 3 Q. B. 123 ; 37 L. J.
Q. B. 24 ; 8 B. & S. 664 751
Alehin «. Hopkins (1834), 1 Bing. N. C. 99 ; 4 M. & So. 615 •. . . 682
Alcoek V. Cook (1829), 1 Ph. Evid. 251, n. 1 404, 1040
Alcook V. The Roy. Exch. Ins. Co. (1849), 13 Q. B. 292 ; 18 L. J. Q. B.
121 ; 13 Jur. 445 924, 926, 949
Alcook V. Whatmore (1840), 8 Dowl. 615 15
Alcorn V. Larkin (1842), Arm. M. & 0. 367 1023
Alder v. SavUl (1814), 5 Taun. 454 ; 15 R. R. 551 1160
Alderson v. Clay (1816), 1 Stark. R. 405 169, 288, 526
Alderson v. Langdale (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 660 1194
Alderson v. Maddison (1877), 8 App. Cas. 467 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 737 ; 49 L.
T. 303 ; 31 "W. R. 820 ; 47 J. P. 821 539, 688
Aldous V. ComweU (1868), L. R.. 3 Q. B. 573 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 201 ; 9 B.
& S. 607 1195, 1201
Aldridge v. Gt. "W. Ey. Co. (1864), 15 C. B. N. S. 582 ; 33 L. J. C. P.
161 , 729
Aldridge v. Haines (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 395 1099
Aldridge v. Johnson (1857), 7 E. & B. 885 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 296 ; 3 Jur.
N. S. 913 690
Alexander «. Burchfield (1842), 7 M. & Gr. 1066 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 555 ;
Car. & M. 75 ; 11 L. J. C. P. 253 32, 33
Alexander v. Calder (1885), 54 L. J. Ch. 487 ; 28 Ch. D. 457 ; 33 W. R. 579 912
Alexander v. Crosbie (1835), Lloyd & G. (temp. Sugden) 145 749
Alexander v. Dixon (1823), 1 Bing. 366 ; 8 Moore, 387 816
Alexander v. Strong (1842), 9 M. & W. 733 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 316 ; 2 Dowl.
P. C. 256 307
Alexander v. Vanderzee (1872), L. E. 7 C. P. 530 ; 20 W. E. 871 42
Alexandria, Mechanics' Bk. of, v. Bk. of Columbia (1820), 6 Wheat. 336 . . 388
Alfonso V. U. S. (1843), 2 Story R. 421 278
Alford V. Clay (1876), Ir. E. 9 Eq. 215 462
AUvon V. Pumival (1834), 1 C. M. & E. 277, 296 ; 3 L. J. Ex. 241 ; 4
Tyr. 751 278, 306, 309, 1024
Allan's Patent, Re (1867), L. E. 1 P. C. 507 ; 36 L. J. P. C. 76 129
Allen, Ee (1839), 2 Curt. 331 694
Aliens;. Benuet (1810), 3 Taun. 169; 12 R. R. 633 672, 675
Allen V. Cameron (1833), 3 Tyr. 907 ; 1 C. & M. 832 223
Allen V. Deustone (1839), 8 C. & P. 760 388
Allen p. Duncan (1831), 11 Pick. 309 376
Aliens). Dundas (1789), 3 T. R. 126; 1 E. E. 666 1045,1103,1133,1161
Allen V. D. of Hamilton (1867), L. E. 2 C. P. 630 ; 15 W. R. 866 829
Aliens;. Maddock (1858), 11 Moo. P. C. C. 427 701, 785
Allen V. M'Keen (1833), 1 Sumn. 314 623
Allen V. Pink (1838), 4 M. & W. 140 ; 6 Dowl. 668 ; 1 H. & H. 207 ; 7 L.
J. Ex. 206 745
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXUl
PAGE
Allen V. Sayward (1828), 5 Greenl. 227 90
Allen V. Yoxall (1844), 1 C. & Kir. 315 819
Alliance Bank of Simla v. Carey (1870), 5 C. P. D. 249 ; 49 L. J. C. P.
781 ; 29 W. R. 306 76
Alluutt, Re (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 86 701
AUport'D. Meek (1830), 4 0. & P. 267 1224
Almosnino, Re (I860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 46 ; 39 L. T. 19 ; 8 W. R. 29 ; 6
Jur. N. S. 302 701, 786
Alner v. George (1808), 1 Camp. 392 552, 744
Alston, In the Goods of (1892), P. 142 ; 61 L. J. P. 92 ; 66 L. T. 591 174
Alvord 11. Baker (1832), 9 Wend. 323 154
Amalia, The (1864), Brown & L. Adm. 311 185
Ambrose Rookwood's Case (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 139 236
American Fur Co. v. V. S. (1829), 2 Peters, 358 382
Aniey v. Long (1808), 9 East, 473 ; 6 Esp. 116 ; 1 Camp. 14 ; 9 R. R. 589 814
Amherst, Ld. v. Ld. Somers (1788), 2 T. R. 372 ; 1 R. R. 497 1101
Amiss, Be (1849), 2 Roberts. 116 700
Amos V. Hughes (1835), 1 M. & Rob. 464 258, 259
Amos V. Smith (1867, should be 1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 423 ; 1 H. & C. 238. . 715
Anchor Milling Co. v. Walsh (1891), 32 Am. St. R. 600 Add. [460]
Anderson v. Anderson (1872), 41 L. J. Oh. 247 ; L. R. 13 Eq. 381 ; 26
L. T. 12 ; 20 W- R. 313 701
Anderson v. Gill (1858), 3 Maoq. 180 ; 1 Paterson, 738 170, 262
Anderson v. Gorrie, 14 R. (Feb.) 283 ; 71 L. T. 382 1099
Anderson v. Hamilton (1816), 8 Price, 244; 4 Moore, C. P. 593, n. ; 2
Pro. & B. 156, u 618
Anderson v. Hayman (1789), 1 H. Bl. 120 ; 2 R. R. 734 678
Anderson v. Long (1823), 10 Serg. & R. 55 252
Anderson v. Pitcher (1800), 2 Bos. & P. 164 ; 3 Esp. 134 ; 1 Stark. 262 ;
6 R. R. 665 783
Anderson v. Sanderson (1817), 2 Stark. R. 204 ; Holt, 591 ; 17 R. R. 681 . 603
Anderson v. Soot (1806), 1 Camp. 235, n 690
Anderson v. Thornton (1853), 8 Ex. 425 201, 542
Anderson v. Wef-ton (1840), 6 Bing. N. 0. 296 146, 451
Anderson v. Whalley (1852), 3 C. & K. 64 925
Anderston v. Magawley (1726), 2 Bro. P. 0. 588 , 1040
Andrew v. Motley (1862), 12 C. B. N. S. 526 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 128. .278, 431, 1215
Andrews f. Andrews (1884-5), 15 L. R. Ir. 199, 211 , 793, 797
Andrews v. Andrews (see Ke D'Angibau).
Andrews v. Askey (1837), 8 0. & P. 7 253, 254, 257, 951, 954
Andrews v. Elliot (1866), 5 E. & B. 502 ; 6 E. & B. 338 ; 25 L. J. Q. B.
336 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 663 ; 543
Andrews v. Hailes (1853), 2 E. & B. 349 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 409 ; 17 Jur. 761 116
Andrews v. Martin (1862),' 12 C. B. N. S. 371 ; 6 L. T. 433 869, 871
Andrews v. Palmer (1812), 1 Ves. & B. 22 329
Andrews v. Solomon (1816), 1 Peters C. 0. Rep. 356 598
Andrews v. Turner (1842), 3 Q. B. 177 708, 709
Andrews v. Vanduzer (1814), 11 Johns. 38 266
AngeU 1). Duke (1876), L. R. 10 Q. B. 174 ; 44 L. J. Q. B. 78 ; 32 L. T.
25 ; 23 W. R. 307 683, 754
Angell 1). Worsley (1849), 2 Ex. 196, n 146
Anglesey (M. of) v. Ld. Hatherton (1842), 10 M. & W. 218 ; 12 L. J. Ex.
67 231, 232, 402, 403
Ai.glo-French Co-operative Soc, Re (1880), 14 Ch. D. 633 ; 49 L. J. Ch.
388 ; 28 W. R. 680 36
Angus V. Dalton (1881), 3 Q. B. D. 85 ; 6 App. Oas. 740 ; 50 L. J. Q. B.
689 ; 44 L. T. 844; SOW. R. 196 115
Angus V. Smith (1829), M. & M. 473 964
Ann, The (1860), Lush. Adm. R. 55 185
Annapolis, The (I860), Lush. Adm. R. 295 ; 30 L. J. Adm. 201 ; 4 L. T.
417 178, 976, 977
Annesley v. Ld. Anglesea (1743), 17 How. St. Tr. 1430 . .65, 81, 108, 368, 592,
606, 610, 892, 976, 977
Vol. I. ends with page 636.
XXiy TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PA8B
Annett v. Osborne (1840), 2 Jebb & Sy. 376 31
Anon, (undated), cited 3 Esp. 115 545
Auon. undated), E.y. & M. 143 1227
Anon, (undated), 1 Ph. Ev. 406 569
Anon, (undated), cited 2 Ph. Ev. 523 976
Anon, (undated), cited 6 East, 195 ; 8 E. E. 455 464
Anon. (1623), 2 EoUe R. 255 114
Anon. (1670), 11 Mod. 79 9
Anon. (1693), Skin. 404 592, 696
Anon. (1698), 1 Ld. Eaym. 731 108
Anon. (1748), 3 Atk. 644 612
Anon. (1763J, 1 Lew. 101 923
Anon. (1764), cited 5 B. & Aid. 939, 940, n 629
Anon. (1799), 12 Mod. 345 9
Anon. (1807, Burr's Trial), Evid. for Deft., 2 616
Anon. (1808), cited 2 Ph. Ev. 29 1117
Anon (1810), cited 2 Camp. 390 n 1161
Anon. (1811), 8 Mass. 370 604
Anon. (1827), 1 Moo. C. C. 101 924
Anon. (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 382 1100
Anon. (1832), 1 Dowl. 157 870, 872
Anon. (1833), 1 Lew. C. 0. 128, 133, 134 824, 825
Anon. (1833), 1 HiU, S. 0. 251 972, 973
Anon. (1841), li. C. E. 165, 167, n. (a) 238
Anon. (1841), 3 Ir. L. R. 301 871
Anon. (1841), Ir. 0. E. 374 165
Anon. (1846), cited BuU. N. P. 236 b 1228
Auon. (1878), cited Campbell v. Twemlow, 1 Price, 88 890
Anon. V. Anon. (1856), 22 Beav. 481 ; 23 Beav. 273 621
An8teei;.Nehnes(1853),lH.&N.225; 26L.J.Ex.5; 27L.T.190; 4W.E.612 787
Anstey v. Dowsing (1745-6), 2 Str. 1253 ; Bull. N. P. 264 279
Antram v. Chace (1812), 15 East, 209 ; 1 Rose, 344 1038
Apoth. Co. V. Bentley (1824), Ry. & M. 159 ; 1 C. & P. 538 267
Appleton V. Ld. Braybrook (1817), 6 M. & S. 34 ; 2 Stark. R. 6 ; 18 R. R. 294 52
Appotens v. Dunswell (1699), 2 Bott, 80 465
Aranguerin v. Scholfield (1856), 1 H. & N. 494 ; 28 L. T. 0. S. 105 308
Arbon v. Eussell (1862), 1 N. E. 31 ; 9 Jur. N". S. 753 ; 11 W. R. 26 ; 7
L. T. 718 133
Arohangelo v. Thomson (1811), 2 Camp. 620 ; 12 E. R. 758 154
Archer, Re (1871), L. E. 2P. &D. 252; 40 L.J. P. & M. 80; 19 W. E. 785 699
Archer v. Baynes (1850), 5 Ex. 626 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 64 670, 672
Archer v. Leonard (1863), 15 Ir. Ch. E. 267 » 710, 711
Ardeu t!. Sullivan (1850), 14 Q. B. 832 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 268 ; 14 Jur. 712. . 654
Arding v. Flower (1800), 8 T. R. 536 ; 3 Esp. 117 866, 869
ArgoU, Ly. v. Cheney (1624), Palmer, 402 ,. , 1200
Arklow, The {see Emery v. Cichero).
Arlett V. Ellis (or ShefEord) (1827), 7 B. & C. 346 ; 9 D. & E. 897 ; 9 B. &
C. 671 115
Armistead v. Wilde (1851), 17 Q. B. 261 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 624 ; 15 Jur.
1010 162
Armory ». Delamirie (1721), 1 Str. 505 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 385 108, 117, 361
Armstrong, Re, Ex parte Lindsay, (1892) 1 Q. B. 327 ; 65 L. T. 464 ; 40
W. R. 159 ; 17 Cox, C. C. 349 ; 8 M. B. R. 271 36
Armstrong v. Hewett (1817), 4 Price, 216 ; 18 R. R. 707 430, 1050
Armstrongs. Norton (1839), 2 Ir. L. E. 96 1113
Armstrong v. Stockham (1835), 24 L. J. Ch. 176 ; 3 Eq. Rep. 130 1030
Arnit's Trusts, Re (1868), Ir. Rep. 5 Eq. 352 100
Arnold V. Bp. of Bath &W. (1829), 5 Bing. 316 ; 2 M. & P. 550 . 1050
Arnold v. Blaker (1871), 40 L. J. Q. B. 185 ; L. E. 6 Q. B. 433 ; 19 W. E
1090 124
Amoldi). Harael(1854),9Ex. 404; 2C. L. E. 499; 23L. J.Ex. 137..40 226 227
Arnold v. Holbrook (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 96 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 80 ; 28 L T
23; 21 W. E. 330 124
The refer encea are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXV
PAQB
Arnold v. May. of Poole (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 860 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 97 ; 7 Jur.
653 ; 5 Soott, N. R. 741 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 574 639, 640, 644, 645
Arnott». Hayes (1887), 36 Ch. D. 731; 66 L. J. Cli. 844 ; 57 L. T. 299 ; 36
W. R. 246 1062
Arnott ». Redfem (1826), 3 Bing. 353; 2 0. & P. 88 ; 11 Moore, 0. P.
209 1163, 1164
Amsby v. Woodward (1827), 6 B. & C. 519 : 9 Dowl. & R. 636 622
Aronegary v. Lambonade (1881), 50 L. J. P. C. 28 ; 6 App. Gas. 364 ; 44
L. T. 895 149
Arundell v. Ld. Falmoutli (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 440 ; 15 R. R. 306 404
Arundell v. Wiite (1811), 14 East, 218 1033
Ash, Re (1866), Deane's Ece. R. 181 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 526 701
Ashby V. Bates (1846), 16 M. & W. 589 ; 4 Dowl. & L. 33 259
Ashby V. James (1843), 11 M. & W. 542 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 296 716
Ashoroft V. Morrin (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 450 ; 6 Jur. 783 671, 675
Asher v. Wtitelock (1865), 35 L. J. Q. B. 17 ; L. R. 1 Q. B. 1 ; 13 L. T.
264; 11 Jnr. N. 8. 925 118
Ashforth v. Redford (1873), L. R. 9 C. P. 20 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 57 42
Ashburst ». Mill (1848), 7 Hare, 602 ; 12 Jur. 693, 1035 749
Asblin V. Lee (1876), 44 L. J. Ch. 376 ; 32 L. T. 348 ; 23 W. R. 458 ... . 721
Ashling V. Boon, (1891), 1 Ch. 568 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 306 ; 64 L. T. 193 ; 39
W. R. 298 281
Ashmore, Re (1843), 3 Curt. 758 696
Ashmore v. Hardy (1836), 7 C. & P. 501 517
Ashpitel V. Bryan (1864), 32 L. J. Q. B. 91 ; 33 L. J. Q. B. 328 ; 3 B. &
S. 474; 5 B. &S. 723; 3 P. & F. 183; 11 L. T. 221; 12 W. R 1082.. 548
Ashpitel «;. Seroombe (1850), 5 Ex. 147 ; 6 Rail. C. 224; 19 L.J. Ex. 82. .44, 526
Ashrufood Dowlah Ahmed v. Hyder Hossein Khan (1885), 11 Moore, Ind.
App. C. 94 101
Ashton, In goods of, (1892) P. 83 ; 61 L. J. P. 85 ; 67 L. T. 325 739, 740
Ashton V. Ld. Langdale (1851), 4 De Gex & Sm. 402, n 684
Ashton's case (1845), 7 Q. B. 169 811
Ashwell V. Lomi (1850), L. R. 2 P. & D. 477 136
Ashworth v. Munn (1878), 15 Ch. D. 363 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 747 ; 50 L. J. Ch.
107 ; 43 L. T. 553 ; 28 W. R. 965 683
Ashworth v. Outram (1877), 5 Ch. D. 923 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 687 ; 25 W. R.
896 ; 37 L. T. 86 ; 36 L. T. 400 663
Asliu V. Parkin (1768), 2 Burr. 665 1113
Aspden v. Seddon (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 369 ; L. R. 10 Ch. App. 394 ; 31
L. T. 626 ; 32L. T. 415; 20 W. R. 680 ; 114
Astbury t.. Belbin (1850), 3 K. & C. 20 871
Aste V. Stumore (1884), 53 L. J. Q. B. 82 ; 13 Q. B. D. 326 ; 49 L. T. 742 ;
32 W. R. 219 ; 5 Asp. M. C. 175 769
Aston, Ex parte (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 631 ; 4 De Gex & J. 220 ; 27 Beav.
474 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 779 965
Astor V. Union Ins. Co. (1827), 7 Cowen, 202 763
Atalanta, The (1808), 6 Co. Rob. Adm. 440, 464 102
Atchinsou v. Baker (1797), Peake, Add. Cas. 103 163
Atnhley v. Sprigg (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 346 ; 10 L. T. 16 ; 12 W. R 364 ;
10 Jur. N. S. 144 101, 422, 621
Athenry Peer. (1836). Pari. Min. 45 425
Atherfold v. Beard (1788), 2 T. R. 610 ; 1 R. R. 656 996
Atherley v. Harvey (1877), 46 L. J. Q. B. 518 ; 2 Q. B. D. 524 ; 36 L. T.
551; 25W. R. 727.... 961,1182
Athlone Peer. (1841), 8 CI. & Pin. 262 1048
Atkins 11. Curwood (1837), 7 C. & P. 767 166
Atkins V. Hatton (1794), 2 Anst. 386 ; 3 Gwill. 1406 ; 4 "Wood's Decrees,
410 ; 2 Eag. & Y. 403 ; 3 R. R. 589 430, 1050
Atkins V. Meredith (1836), 4 Dowl. P. C. 658 314
Atkins V. Palmer (1821), 4 B. & Ad. 377 347, 348
Atkins ». Tredgold (1823), 2 B. & C. 23 ; 3 D. & R. 200 492, 493
Atkins V. Ld. Willoughby de Broke (1794), 4 Wood's Decrees, 424 ; 2 Anst.
397 ; 3 R. R. 691 ^30
fol. J. ends with page 033.
XXVI TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAGB
Atkinson v. Littlewood (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 595 ; 31 L. T. 225 806
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hutli (1880), lb Ch. D. 474; 44 L. T. 67; 29
W. R. 387 179
Atter«>. Atkinson (1869), -L.R. 1 P. & D. 665; 20 L. T. 404 141
Att.-Gen. v. Ashe (1859), 10 Ir. Ch. R. 309 320
Att.-Gen. v. Bond (1839), 9 C. & P. 1S9 956
Att.-Gen. v. Boston (1847), 1 De G. & Sm. 519 791
Att.-Gen. V. Bowman (1791), 2 B. & P. 532, n. (a) 252
Att.-Gen. I). Bradlaugh (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 667; 54 L. J. Q. B. 205 ; 52
L. T. 589 ; 33 W. R. 673 ; 49 J. P. 500 899, 901, 903
Att.-Gen. V. Brazenose Coll. (1834), 2 CI. & Fin. 295 ; 8 Bligh, N. S. 377 ;
1 L. J. Ch. 66 791
Att.-Gen. v. Briant (1846), 15 M. & W. 169 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 265 613, 614
Att.-Gen. V. May. of Bristol (1820). 2 Jao. & W. 294 790
Att.-Gen. v. Bulpit (1821), 9 Price, 4 918
Att.-Gen. v. Bunoe fl868), L. R. 6 Eq. 663 ; 37 L. J. Ch. 697 ; 18 L. T. 742 77
Att.-Gen. 4'. Calvert (1857), 23 Beav. 248; 26L. J.Ch. 682; 3 Jur. N. S. 500 138
Att.-Gen. t'. Cast Plate Glass Co. (1792), 1 Anstr. 39 ; 3 Rev. R. 543 ... . 765
Att.-Gen. V. Chambers (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 662; 4 De G. M. & G. 206 ;
2 Eq. Rep. 1195 ; 2 W. R. 636 112
Att.-Gen. V. Clapham (1854), 4 De G. M. & G. 691 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 177 ;
1 Jur. N. S. 505 791
Att.-Gen. v. Clero (1844), 12 M. & W. 640 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 82 201
Att.-Gen. v. Dakin (1869), 36 L. J. Ex. 167 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 150 ; 39 L. J.
Ex. 113 ; L. R. 4 E. & I. App. 338 4
Att.-Gen. v. Davison (1825), M'Clel. & Y. 160 325
Att.-Gen. v. Donaldson (1842), 10 M. & W. 117; 11 L. J. Ex. 338 4
Att.-Gen. V. Drummond (1842, should be 1849), 2 H. of L. Cas. 862 . .784, 791
Att.-Gen. iJ. Drummond (1842), 1 Dr. & "War. 3.^3 786
Att.-Gen. V. Emerson (1882), 52 L. J. Q. B. 67; 10 Q. B. D. 191; 48
L. T. 18; 31 W. R. 191 1183
Att.-Gen. v. Ewelme Hospital (1853), 17 Beav. 366 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 846 . . 123
Att.-Gen. v. Fadden (1815), 1 Price, 403 837
Att.-Gen. v. GaskUl (1882), 20 Ch. D. 519 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 870; 46 L. T.
180 ; 30 "W. R. 558 660
Att.-Gen. V. Grote (1827), 2 Russ. & My. 699 785
Att.-Gen. V. H^wkes (1830), 1 Tyr. 3 ; 1 Cr. & J. 121 216
Att.-Gen. v. Hitchcock (1847), 1 Ex. 93 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 259 ; 11 Jur. 478.. 949,
950, 952, 953
Att.-Gen. v. Kohler (1861), 9 H. of L. Cas. 660 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 467 416
Att.-Gen. ■:,. Lambe (1838), 3 Y. & C. (Ex.) 162 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 323 ; 2 Jur.
698 1183
Att.-Gen. v. Le Merchant (1772), 2 T. R. 201, n , , 310
Att.-Gen. v. Corp. of London (1850), 2 Hall & T. 1 : 2 Mac. & G. 247 ; 19
L. J. Ch. 314; 14 Jur. 205 1183
Att.-Gen. v. Metrop. Dist. Ry. Co. (1883), L. R. 5 Ex. D. 218 ; 42 L. T.
342 ; 28 W. R. 376 911
Att.-Gen. v. Murdoch (1852). 1 De G. M. & G. 86 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 694 .... 791
Att.-Gen. ■^. Naylor (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 151 ; 1 H. & M. 809 538
Att.-Gen. V. North Metropolitan Tram. Co. (1895), 72 L. T. 340 ..Add. [1182]
Att.-Gen. ■„. Parker (1747), 3 Atk. 577 791
Att.-Gen. v. Pamther (1792), 3 Brown, C. C. 443 170
Att -Gen. ■</. Earl of Powis (1863), Kay, 186 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 218 784
Att.-Gen. v. RadloflE (1854), 10 Ex. 84; 23 L. J. Ex. 240; 10 Jur. 555;
2C. L. R. 1116 252, 884, 970
Att.-Gen. v. Ray (1843), 2 Hare, 618 353
Att.-Gen. v. Riddle (1832), 2 C. & J. 493 : 2 Tyr. 523 107
Att.-Gen. V. St. Cross. Hosp. (1853), 17 Beav. 435 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 793 .... 791
Att.-Gen. ■„. Sidney Sussex Coll. (1869). 38 L. J. Ch. 657 790
Att.-Gen. t. Sitwell (1835), 1 Y. & C. Ex. 559 ; 5 L. J. Ex. Eq. 86 750
Att.-Gen. V. Skinners' Co. (1837;, Cooper C. P. 1 870, 871
Att -Gen. v. Stephens (1855), 6 De G. M. & G. 141 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 888 ;
2 Jur. N. S. 51 99, 442,443, 537
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OP CASES CITED. xxvii
PAGE
Att.-Gren. v. Sullivan (1842), 1 Arm. M. & 0. 294 919
Att -Gen. v. Theakstone (1820), 8 Price, 89 18, 1093
Att.-Gen. v. Thompson (1849), 8 Hare, 106 1183
Att.-Gen. v. Tomline (1877), 5 Ch. D. 750 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 654; 36 L. T.
684 ; 25 W. R. 802 ; 15 Ch. D. 150 ; 43 L. T. 486 116
Att.-Gen. w.Whitwood Local Bd. (1870), 40 L. J. Ch. 592; 19W.R. 1107.. 1189
Att.-Gen. f . Wilson (1839), 9 Sim. 526 ; 8 L. J. Ch. 1 19 813
Att.-Gen. of Prince of Wales v. Grossman (1866), 4 H. & C. 568 ; L. K.
1 Ex. 381 ; 35 L. J. Ex. 215 ; 14 L. T. 856 ; 14 W. R. 996 ; 12 Jur.
N. S 712 : : 275
Attree v. Hawe (1878), 9 Ch. D. 337 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 863 ; 26 W. R. 871 ;
38 L. T. 733 684
Attridge, Re (1848), 6 Notes of Cases (Eoo. & Mar.), 597 698
Attwood V. Small (1838), 6 CI. & Fin. 234 486
Attwood V. Taylor (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 289 ; 1 Scott, N. R. 611 10:^5
Attwood V. Welton (1828), 7 Conn. 66 950
Aubert v. Walsh (1812), 4 Taun. 293 '. 154
Auckland, The Earl of (1861), 30 L. J. P. M. & A. 121 ; Lush. Adm. 164 ;
{nom. Malcomson v. Baldock) 15 Moo. P. C. C. 304 ; 5 L. T. 558 ; 10
W. R. 124 178
Auckland, Maid of, Re (1848), 6 Notes of Cases (Eoc. & M.) 240 1122
Audley, Ld., case of (1631), 3 How. St. Tr. 402 893
Augusta, Bk. of v. Earle (1839), 13 Pet. 690 16
Augustien v. Challis (1847), 1 Ex. 280 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 73 285, 288
Austee (should be Anstee) v. Nelms (1853), 1 H. & N. 225 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 5 ;
27 L. T. 190 ; 4 W. R. 612 787
Austen, Admiral, Re (1852), 3 Roberts. 611 702
Austin, Ex parte (1876), 4 Ch. D. 13 ; 46 L. J. Bkv. 1 ; 35 L. T. 529 ; 25
W. R. 51 849
Austin V. Bunyard (1865), 4 P. & F. 253 ; 6 B. & S. 687; 34 L. J. Q. B.
217 546
Austin V. Chambers (1837-8), 6 CI. & Fin. 1 486
Austin V. Evans (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 430 814
Austin V. Guard, of Bethnal Green (1874) L. R. 9 C. P. 91 ; 43 L. J. C. P.
100 ; 29 L. T. 807 ; 22 W. R. 406 642
Austin V. Mead (1880), 15 Ch. D. 651 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 30 ; 43 L. T. 117 ; 28
W. R. 891 638
Austini). Ol8en(1868), 37L. J.M. C. 34; L. R. 3 Q. B. 208 ; 9B. &S. 461 ;
16 W. R. 426 77
Austin V. Rumsey (1849), 2 C. & Kir. 736 329, 1216
Australasia, Bk. of, v. BreUlat (1847), 6 Moore, P. C. R. 152 ; 12 Jur.
189 160
Australasia, Bk. of, v. Harding (1850), 19 L. J. C. P. 345 ; 9 0. B. 661 . . 1155
Australasia, Bk. of, v. Nias (1851), 16 Q. B. 717 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 284 1154
Australian Roy. Mail St. Nav. Co. v. Marzetti (1855), 11 Ex. 228 ; 24 L. J.
Ex. 273 642, 645
Aveliue «). Whisson (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 801 ,; 12 L. J. C. P. 158 654
Avery v. Pixley (1808), 4 Mass. 462 706
Aveson v. Ld. Kinnaird (1805), 6 East, 188; 2 Smith, 286; 8 E. R. 455. .374,
464, 591
Awdley v. Awdley (1690), 2 Vem. 194 482
Aykroyd, Re (1847), 1 Ex. 479 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 157 ; 5 Dowl. & L. 701. . . . 112S
Aylesford, Ld., ». Morris (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. App. 490 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 646 ;
28 L. T. 541 ; 21 W. R. 424 137
Aylesford Peer. (1885), 11 App. Cas. 1 416, 621
Ayliffe v. Tracy (1722), 2 P. Wms. 65 680
Aynsley ». Glover (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 523 ; L. R. 10 Ch. App. 283 ; 32
L. T. 345 ; 23 W. R. 457 76
Ayrey v. Davenport (1807), 2 Bos. & P. N. R. 474 1031
Ayrey ». Hill (1824), 2 Add. 209 170
Ayrton v. Abbott (1849), 14 Q. B. 1 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 314 ; 14 Jur. 314 . . 1099,
1136
Ayton V. Bolt (1827), 4 Bing. 106 712
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
XXVIU TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PA8B
B., falsely called B. v. B. (1875), Ir. R. 9 Eq. 551 167
Babb V. Cleineon (1825), 12 Serg. & R. 328 514
Babbage v. Babbage (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 222 881
Babington v. Mahony (1837), 6 Law Rec. 2nd Ser. 232, n 870
Backhouse, In re (1841), 3 Ir. L. R. 301 871
Backhouse v. Alcook (1885), 28 Ch. D. 669 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 842 ; 52 L. T.
342 ; 33 W. R. 407 913
Backhouse v. Bonomi (1861), 28 L. J. Q. B. 378 ; 1 E. B. & E. 622, 654 ;
6 Jur. N. S. 1345 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 1182 ; 32 L. T. 156 ; 9 H. of L. 0. 503 ;
34 L. J. Q. B. 181 ; 9 W. R. 769 114
Backhouse v. Jones (1839), 6 Bing. N. C. 65 ; 8 Scott, 148 230, 369
Bacon v. Bacon (1876), 34 L. T. 349 602
Baoon v. Chesney (1816), 1 Stark. N. P. Rep.' 192 508, 552
Baddeley v. Mortlook (1816), Holt, N. P. Rep. 151 ; 17 R. R. 626 256
Bagot V. Bagot (1878), 1 L. E. Ir. 308 240, 349
Bapot V. Easton (1877), 47 L. J. Ch. 225 ; 7 Ch. D. 1 ; 37 L. T. 369 ; 26
W. R. 66 187
Bagot, Ld., ». Williams (1824), 3 B. & C. 235; 5 D. & Ry. 87 1123,1124
Bagueley v. Hawley (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 625 ; 36 L. J. C. P. 328 ; 17
L. T. 116 775
Bahia, The (1865), L. R. 1 Adm. & Eco. 15; 11 Jur. N. S. 1008; 14
W. R. 411 818
Bahia & Erancisco Ry. Co., Re v. Tritten (1868), 37 L. J. Q. B. 176; L. R.
3 Q. B. 584 ; 9 B. & S. 844 ; 18 L. T. 467 ; 16 W. R. 802 541
Baildon v. Walton (1847), 1 Ex. 617 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 357 480, 717
Bailey, Ex parte, and Ex parte ColHer (1854), 23 L. J. M. C. 161 ; 3 E. &
B. 607 132, 1136
B.ailey, Ex parte, In re Barrell (1852), 22 L. J. Bank. 45 ; 1 W. R. 343. . 83
Bailey, Re (1S38), 1 Curteis, 914 700
Bailey v. Appleyard (1838), 8 A. & E. 161 ; 3 N. & P. 257 ; 1 W. W. & H.
208 ; 2 Jur. 872 207
Bailey v. BeUamy (1841), 9 Dowl. 507 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 41 733
Bailey w. Bidwell (1844), 13 M. & W. 73 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 264 262, 1210
BaOey v. Bodenham (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 288 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 252 ; 10
Jur. N. S. 821 ; 10 L. T. 422 ; 12 W. R. 865 32
Bailey v. Edwards (1865), 34 L. J. Q. B. 41 ; 4 B. & S. 761 ; 11 Jur.
N. S. 134 758
Bailey «. Harris (1849), 12 Q. B. 905; 18 L. J. Q. B. 115 1104
Bailey v. Hyde (1820), 3 Conn. 463 255
Bailey f. Macaulay (1849), 13 Q. B. 815; 19 L. J. Q. B. 73; 14 Jur. 80 541,
617
Bailey v. Sweeting (1861), 30 L. J. C. P. 160 ; 9 C. B. N. S. 843 ; 9 W. R.
273 673
BailUe v. Jackson (1853), 3 De G. M. & G. 38 ; 10 Hare (Appendix) xlvi ;
22 L. J. Ch. 753 ; 1 W. R. 196 ; 19 Jur. 170 13
Baillie v. Kell (1868), 4 Bing. N. C. 638 ; 6 Scott, 379 ; 1 Arn. 246 223
Bailliet). Ld. Inchlquin (1796), 1 Esp. 435 712
Baillie's case (1778), 21 How. St. Tr. 358 603, 612
Bain v. Case (1 829), 3 C. & P. 496 ; M. & M. 262 1048
Bain ;>. Fothergill.(1874), L. R. 6 Ex. 59 ; L. R. 7 H. L. 158 ; 40 L. J.
Ex. 34 ; 43 L. J. Ex. 243 ; 23 L. T. 670 ; 31 L. T. 387 ; 19 W. R. 134. . 773
Bain v. Mason (1824), 1 C. & P. 202, 203, n 1172, 1173
Bain j). Whitehaven andEumess Junc.Rail. Co. (1850), 3 H. L. Cas.l9. .51,1176,
1231
Bainbridge v. Wade (1850), 16 Q. B. 89 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 7 ; 15 Jur. 572. . 786
Bainbrigge ». Baddeley (1847), 2 Phillips, 705 . . .' 1117
Bainbrigge v. Browne (1881), L. R. 18 Ch. D. 188 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 622 ; 44
L. T. 706 ; 29 W. R. 782 136
Baines v. Swainson (1863), 4 B. & S. 270 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 8 L. T. 536 ;
11 W. R. 945 116
Bairdi!. Cochran (1818), 4 Serg. &R. 397 969
Baker, Re, ColUns v. Rhodes (1882), 20 Ch. D. 230 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 316 ; 45
L. T. 658 ; 30 W. R. 858 76
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xxix
Baker v. Baker (1863), 32 L. J. Pr. & Mat. 145 ; 3 Swab. & Trist. 213 : 11
W. R. 602 947 949
Baker v. Bradley (1856), 25 L. J. Ch. 7 : 4 De a. M. & d. 597 '. ' 136
Baker J). Cave (1857), 1 H. & N. 674 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 190 1076
Baker v. Dening (1838), 8 A. & E. 94 ; 3 N. & P. 228 700
Baker v. Dewey (1823), 1 B. & C. 704 ; 3 Dowl. & R. 99 ' 92
Baker v. Keen (1819), 2 Starkie, N. P. 501 168
Baker «>. Lend, and S. W. Ry. Co. (1867), 37 L. J. Q. B. "ss ;' l! R.'s
Q. B. 91; 8B. &S. 645; 16L. T. 126 1186
Baker v. Monk (1864), 33 Beav. 419 ; 4 De G. J. & S. 388 ; 10 jur. isf S.
624, 691 ; 10 L. T. N. S. 86, 630 ; 12 W. R. 521, 779 136
Baker v. Ray (1826), 2 Rusb. 73 108
Baker v. Sampson (1863), 14 C. B. N. S. 383 166
Bakewell' 8 Patent, Re (1862), 15 Moo. P. C. 385 129
Baloettif. Serani (1792), Peake, N. P. 142 231
Baldeyj). Parker (1823), 2 B. & C. 37 ; 3 Dowl. & R. 220 '.'.".". .689, 690
Baldney v. Ritchie (1824), 1 Starkie, N. P. 338 311
BalkisCo. Re (1888), 58 L. T. 300; 36 "W. R. 392 ... 134
Ball, Re (1890), 25 Ir. L. R. 556 79O
BaUard v. Way (1836), 1 M. & "W. 529 : 2 Gale, 61 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 207 . . ' 1092
BaUs and Met. Bd. Works, Re (1866), 7 B. & S. 177 ; L. R. 1 Q. B. 337 ;
35 L. J. Q. B. 101 ; 13 L. T. 702 ; 14 W. R. 370 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 183 . . 728
Balme ». Button (undated), 2.Lew. C. C. 152 (cited) ; 3 Moo. & So. 1 926
Ealtazzi v. Ryder (1808), 12 Moo. P. C. C. 168 ; 31 L. T. 0. S. 373 .... 102
Bamfield v. Maesey (1808), 1 Camp. 460 256
Bamfield ». Tapper (1851), 7 Ex. 27 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 6 .'.'.".'."."" 716
Bamford, Ex parte (1809), 15 Ves. 449 379
Banbury Peer. (1809), Le Marohant's Gardner's Peerage; Selwyn'a Nisi
Prius, 748—750 101, 416, 422, 423, 424
Banbury's Trusts, Re (1876), I. R. 10 Eq. 408 144
Bancroft ». Bancroft and Runmey (I860), 34 L. J. Pr. & Mat. 14 • 13
W. R. 506 1110
Bandy v. Cartwright (1819), 8 Ex. 913 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 285 773, 774
Bank Prosecutions (1819), R. & R. 378 278
Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839), 13 Pet. 519, 589 16, 181
Bank of Columbia v. Patterson (1813), 7 Cranch, 299 640
Bank of Monroe v. Field (1842), 2 Hill R. 445 ,'..'. 388
Bankof New South Wales v. Owstou (1879), L. R. 4 App. Cas. 270 ; 14
Cox C. C. 267 ; 48 L. J. Pr. C. 25 ; 40 L. T. 500 643
Banks ». Crossland (1874), 44 L. J. M. C. 8 ; L. R. 10 Q. B. 97 ; 32 L. T
226 ; 23 W. R. 414 681
Banly, R* (1849), 1 Roberts. 710 698
Bannatyne v. Bannatyne (1852), 2 Roberta. 476 ; 16 Jur. 864 1102
Banner v. Jackson (1847), 1 De G. & Sra. 472 609
Bar V. Gratz (1819), 4 Wheat. 213 429, 433
Barbat v. Allen (1852), 7 Ex. 609 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 166 879, 887, 891, 910
Barber, Re (1866), 36 L. J. P. D. & Mat. 19 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 267 ; 15
L. T. 192 ; 15 W. R. 231 307
Barber u. Holmes (1800), 3 Esp. 190 1049, 1172, 1173
Barber v. Houston (1885), 18 L. R. Ir. 475 71
Barber v. Lamb (1860), 29 L. J. C. P. 234 ; 8 C. B. N. S. 95 ; 8 W. R.
461 ; 6. Jur. N. S. 981 II53
Barber v. Wood (1877), 4 Ch. D. 886 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 728 ; 36 L. T. N. S.
373 801
Barber v. Wood (1838), 2 M. & Rob. 172 814, 815, 816
Barclay v. Bailey (1810), 2 Camp. 527 ; 11 R. R. 787 33
Barclay v. Maskelyne (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 115 ; 1 Johns. 124 ; 4 Jur.
N. S. 1293 704
Barclay D. Parrott (1856), 1 C. B. N. S. 49 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 77 ; 3Jur.N.S.
672 726
Bardeu v. Keverberg (1837), 2 M. & W. 61 ; 2 Gale, 201 231
Bargaddie Coal Co. v. Wark (1859), 3 Macq. H. of L. Cas. (Sc.) 468 ; 1
Paterson, 814 592, 751
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
XXX TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOH
Barings. Clagett (1802), 3 B. & P. 215; 6E.R. 759 1146,1149
Baring v. Clark (1837), 12 Pick. 220 388
Barker v. Buttress (1845), 7 Beav. 134 ; 13 L. J. Ch. 684 8 Jur. 89 74
Barker v. Davis (1864), 34 L. J. M. 0. 140 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 651 638
Barker v. Dixie (1736), Cases temp. Hardw. 264 891
Barker v. Ray (1826), 2 Russ. 76 435
Barker v. Richardson (1827), 1 T. & J. 362 487
Barker v. Stead (1847), 3 C. B. 946 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 160 1219
Barker's Estate, Re (1878), 10 Ch. D. 162 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 171 ; 27 W. R.
393 534
Barkworth v. Young (1857), 26 L. J. Ch. 153 ; 4 Drew. 1 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 34 680
Barnard, Re (1862), 31 L. J. Pr. & Mat. 89 ; 2 Swab. & Trist. 489 1031
Barned's Banking Co., Re (Peel's Case) (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 757 ; L. R.
2 Ch. 674 ; 15 W. R. 1100 ; 16 L. T. N. S. 780 1076
Barnes, Ex parte (1842), 2 Dowl. N. S. 20 ; 7 Jur. 217 994
Barnes v. Kettle (1766), 2 WUs. 314 932
Barnes v. Lucas (1825), Ry. & M. 264 1213
Barnes 1;. Mawson (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 81 397, 403
Barnes v. Pendrey (1839), 7 Dowl. 747 733
Barnes v. Toye (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 410 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 567 ; 61 L. T. 292 ;
33 W. R. 15; 48 J. P. 664 48
Barnes v. Trompowsky (1797), 7 T. R. 266 1213
Barnes v. Vincent (1846), 5 Moo. P. C. C. 201 1045, 1132
Bamett v. Brandao (1843), 6 M. & Gr. 630 5
Bamett v. Cox (1847), 9 Q. B. 617 ; 4 New Sess. Cas. 487 ; 16 L. J. M. C.
27 ; 11 Jur. 118 228
Bamett v. Glossop (1835), 1 Bing. N. C. 636 ; 3 Dowl. 625 220
Barnett v. Lucas (1872), I. R. 6 C. L. 247 1120
Bamett «. TugweU (1862), 31 Beav. 232 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 629 ; 8 Jur. N. S.
787 ; 10 W. R. 679 ; 7 L. T. N. S. 121 174
Barnstable f. Lathey (1789), 3 T. R. 303 995
Barnstaple Second Annuity Society (1884), 50 L. T. 424 748
Barough v. White (1825), 4 B. & C. 328 487, 512
Birr V. Gratz (1819), 4 Wheat. 213 429, 433, 1098
Barraolough v. Greenhough (1867), 36 L. J. Q. B. 26, 251 ; 7 B. & S. 170 ;
8 B. & S. 623 ; L. R. 2 Q. B. 1 1163
Barraclough v. Johnson (1838), 8 A. & E. 99 ; 3 N. & P. 233 ; 1 W. W. &
H. 162 ; 2 Jur. 839 402
Barrell, Re {see Bailey, Ex parte).
Barren 1). TrusseU (1811), 4 Taunt. 121 653
Barrett v. Buxton (1826), 2 Aik. (Vermont) 167 747
Barrett v. Hyndman (1840), 3 Ir. L. R. 109 676
Barrett v. Long (1866), 8 Ir. L. R. 331 ; 3 H. L. Cas. 395 46, 243
Barrett v. Rolfe (1845), 14 M. & W. 348 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 308 666
Barrett v. WUsou (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 586 ; 3 Dowl. P. C. 220 ; 5 Tyr.
218 1160
Barron v. Daniel (1838), Crawf. & Dix. Abrid. C. 283 1015
Barronet's Case (1853), 1 El. & Bl. 1 ; Dears. (Pearce's Report) 51 ; 22 L.
J. M. C. 25 ; 17 Jur. 184 79
Barrow v. Dyster (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 635 ; 51 L. T. 573 ; 33 W. R. 199. . 769
Barrow v. Humphreys (1820), 3 B. & A. 598 831, 832
Barrs v. Pewkes (1866), 34 L. J. Ch. 622 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 669 ; 13 W. R.
987 ; 12 L. T. N. S. 727 808
Barrs». Jackson (1845), 1 Phillips, 682; 14L.J.Ch.433; 9Jur. 609. .1106, 1106, 1132
Barry v. Bebbington (1792), 4 T. R. 514 ; 2 R. R. 450 279, 437
Barry v. ButUn (1838), 1 'Curt. 638 ; 2 Moo. P. C. R. 482 142
Barrymore, Ld., v. Taylor (1796), 1 Esp. 326 484
Barstow's case (1831), 1 Lewin C. C. 110 662
Barthelemy v. The People, &c. (1842), 2 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 248 378
Bartholomew v. Stephens (1839), 8 C. & P. 728 308, 309, 319
Bartlett v. Delprat (1808), 4 Mass. 702 371, 614
Bartlett v. Downes (1826), 3 B. & C. 616 ; 5 Dowl. & R. 526 ; 1 C. & P.
622 126
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OP CASES CITED. XXXI
PAOK
Bartlettu. Gfflard (1826), 3 Eusa. 156; 6 L. J. Oh. 19 483, 806
Bartlett v. Pentland (1830), 10 B. & 0. 760 158
Bartlett v. Pickeregill (1769-60), 4 East, 677, n. ; 1 Cox, 6; 1 E. R. 1 . . 667
Bartlett v. Smith. (1843), 11 M. & W. 486 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 287 ; 7 Jur. 448. .25, 26
Bartlett v. WeUB (1861), 31 L. J. Q. B. 57 ; 1 B. & S. 836 ; 6 L. T. 607 ;
10 W. R. 229 541
Barton v. Bank of New South Wales (1890), 15 App. Cas. 379 85, 748
Bartons. Dawes (1850), 10 C. B. 261; 19 L. J. C. P. 302 758, 804
Barton (should be Barlow) v. Dupuy (1823), 1 Mart. N. S. 442 1034
Barton (should be Barstow) v. Palmes (1704), Preo. in Ch. 233 327
Barton v. Robins (1769), 3 Phillim. 445, n. (*.) 140
BarweU?;. Adkins(1840), IM. &Gr. 807; 2Soott, N. R. 11 243
Barwick v. EngUsh Joint Stock Bank (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 259 ; 36 L. J.
Ex. 147 ; 16 L. T. 461 ; 15 W. R. 877 586
Baseley v. Forder {see Bazeley v. Eorder) .
Bass V. CUve (1815), 4 M. & Sol. 13 ; 4 Camp. 78 547
Bastard v. Smith (1839), 10 A. & E. 213 ; 2 P. & D. 453 476, 966, 1014
Bastard v. Trutoh (1835), 3 A. & E. 451 ; 6 N. & M. 109 ; 4 Dowl. 6 ; 1 H.
& W. 321 130
Easten v. Carew (1825), 3 B. & C. 652 ; 6 D. & R. 558 1098, 1100
Bastin v. Oarew (1824), Ry. & M. 127 917
Batohelor v. Honeywood (1799), 2 Esp. 714 1222
Bate V. HiU (1823), 1 0. & P. 100 257
TSatev. Kinsey (1835), 1 0. M. & R. 41 ; 4 Tyi-. 662 109, 319, 603
Bateman*. Bailey (1794), 5 T. R. 512 377, 380, 381, 514
Bateman v. PhilUps (1812), 15 East, 272 ; 4 Taun. 157 670, 759
Bateman v. Binder (1842), 3 Q. B. 574 ; 2 G. & D. 790 ; 11 L. J. Q. B.
281 714
Bateman !). Ld. Roden (1844), 1 Jones & Lat. 366 739
Bates V. Barber (1849), 4 Gush. (Mass.), 107 974
Bates w. Don Pablo Sora (1856), 10 Moo. P. 0. R. 467 178
Bates «). Townley (1848), 2 Ex. 166; 19 L. J. Ex. 399 517, 1161
Bateson v. Hartsink (1801), 4 Esp. 43 598
Bath, Ld. v. Bathersea (1696), 6 Mod. 10 480
Bathurst v. Eriington (1877), L. R. 2 App. Cas. 698 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 748 ;
37 L. T. 338 ; 25 W. R. 908 741
Batley «. Kynook (1875), L.R. 20 Eq. 632; 44 L. J. Ch. 665 ; 33L. T. 45.. ,818
Batten, Re (1849), 7 Notes of Cases (Ecel. & M.) 288 698
Batthews v. Galindo (1828), 4 Bing. 613 ; 1 M. & P. 665 ; 3 C. & P.
238 639, 890
Batthyany v. Bouoh (1881), 50 L. J. Q. B. 421 ; 44 L. T. 177 ; 29 W. R.
665 651
Batturs v. Sellers (1820), 5 Har. & J. 117 528
Baugh V. Cradocke (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 182 602
Baumann v. James (1868), L. R. 3 Ch. 608 ; 18 L. T. 424 ; 16 W. R. 877. 672
Baxendalev. Bennett (1878), 3 Q B. D. 626 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 624 ; 26 W.
R. 899 547
Baxendale v. De Valmer (1887), 67 E. T. 556 697
Baxter v. Brown (1846), 7 M. & Gr. 215 ; 8 Scott, N. R. 1019 . . . .666, 683, 684
Baxter v. Nurse (1844), 6 M. & Gr. 935 ; 7 Scott, N. R. 801 ; 1 C. & K.
10 ; 13 L. J. 0. P. 82 ; 8 Jur. 273 153
Bayard v. Malcolm (1806), 1 Johns. 467 743
Bayley». Ashton (1840), 12 A. &E. 493; 4 P. &D. 204 717
Bayley v. Bradley (1848), 5 Com. B. 396 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 206 93, 98
Bayleyj). Buokland (1847), 1 Ex. 1 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 204 1111
Bayley v. M. of Conyngham (1863), 16 Ir. C. L. Rep. 406 654
Bayley v. Overseers of Nantwich (1846), 2 C. B. 118 ; 1 Lutw. Reg. C.
363 156
Bayley v. Wilkins (1849), 7 C. B. 886 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 273 ; 13 Jur. 883 . . 168
Bayley J>. Wylie (1807), 6 Esp. 86 1037, 1040
BayUflfe v. Butterworth (1847), 1 Ex. 429 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 18 ; 11 Jur. 1019 ;
5 Railw. Cas. 283 167, 168
Baylis v. Lawrence (1840), 11 A. & E. 926 ; 3 P. & D. 526 ; 4 Jur. 652 . . 46, 46, 82
V»l. L ends with page 636.
XXXll TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAQB
Baynton's case (1702), U How. St. Tr. 630 369
Bazeley v. Forder (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 562 ; 9 B. & S. 602 ; 37 L. J. Q.
B. 240; 18L. T. 756 166, 168
Beadle, Re (1849), 1 Roberts. 749 ; 7 Notes of Cases (Eool. & M.) 43 .... 698
Beadon v. King (1849), 17 Sim. 34 601
Beal «. S. Dev. Ry. Co. (1864), 5 H. & N. 875 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 441 723
Beale v. Sanders (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 850 ; 5 Scott, 58 654
Beall r. Beck (1794), 3 Hard. & MoHen. 242 508
Bealy d. Greenslade (1831), 2 C. & J. 61 716
Beamish v. Beamish (1876), I. R. 10 Bq. 413 1071
Beamou v. EUioe (1831), 4 C. & P. 585 918
Bean v. Quimby (1829), 5 New Hamps. 91 600
Beardman v. Wilson (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 57 ; sub nom. Beardmore v.
Wilson, 38 L. J. C. P. 91 ; 19 L. T. 282 ; 17 W. R. 54 656
Beardslee v. Richardson (1833), 11 Wend. 25 378
Beasley v. Magrath (1804), 2 Sqh. & Lef . 34 496
Beasney's Trusts, Re (1869), 38 L. J. Ch. 159 ; L. R. 7 Eq. 498 173
Beatson v. Skene (1860), 29 L. J. Ex. 430 ; 5 H. & N. 838 618, 619
Beattie ». Ld. Ebmy (1872) L. R. 7 Ch. App. 777, 800—803 ; 41 L. J. Ch.
804 780, 781
Beauohamp v. Cash (1822), Dowl. & Ry. N. P. 3 1223
Beauohamp j;. Parry (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 89 811, 512
Beaufort, D. of v. Ashburnham (1863), 32 L. J. C. P. 97 ; 13 C. B. N. S.
.598 818
Beaufort, D. of v. Crawshay (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 699 ; 35 L. J. C. P.
342 ; 1 H. & R. 638 25, 349
Beaufort, I), of v. Neald (1844), 12 CI. & Fin. 249 638
Beaufort, D. of v. Smith (1849^ 4 Ex. 450 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 97 .... 124, 396, 397,
403, 404, 1040, 1092
Beaufort, D. of v. May. of Swansea (1849), 3 Ex. 413 124, 791, 792
Beaumont v. Brengerl (1847), 6 C. B. 301 690
Beaumont v. Fell (1723), 2 P. Wms. 141 795
Beaumont v. Field (1818), 2 Chitty R. 275 789
Beaumont v. Mountain (1834), 10 Bing. 404 1006
Beaumont v. Perkins (1809), 1 PhiUim. 78 1223
Beaurain v. Sir W. Scott (not dated). Lord Eldon's Life by Twiss, Vol. II.
pp. 233—235 616
Beavan v. M'Donnell (1854), 23 L. J. Ex. 326 ; 10 Ex.' 184 243
Beck and Jackson, Re (1857), 1 C. B. N. S. 695 1039
Beckett v. Howe (1869), 39 L. J. P. & M. 1 ; L. R. 2 P. & D. 1 697
Beckett v. Corp. of Leeds. (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. App. 421 ; 26 L. T. 375 ;
20 W. R. 464 112
Beckford v. Beckford (1774), Lofit, 490 666
Beckham v. Drake (1847-9), 2 H. L. C. 579 664
Beckham v. Osborne (1843), 6 M. & Gr. 771 486
Beckton v. Barton (1859), 27 Beav. 99 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 673 806
Beckwithj!. Benner (1834),6 C. &P. 681 610
Beckwith v. Sydebotham (1807), 1 Camp. 117 ; 10 R. R. 652 934, 935
Beoquetj;. MacCarthy (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 961 1146, 1147, 1154
Bedford, E. of v. Exeter, Bp. of (1616-17), Hob. 137 1115
Bedford, D. of v. Lopes (1838), cited Doe v. Pulman, 3 Q. B. 623 301, 433
Bedfordshire case (1785), 2 Luders, 411 497
Beech v. Jones (1848), 6 C. B. 696 924, 927
Beeoheri.-. Major (1866), 2 Dr. & Sm. 431 667
Eeechiug v. Gower (1816), Holt, N. P. Rep. 314 ; 17 R. R. 644 909
'Beema.nv. Duck (1843), 11 M. & W. 261 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 198 547, 548
Beer v. Walker (1877), 46 L. J. C. P. 677 ; 25 W. R. 880 776
Beer v. Ward (1821), cited 2 Ph. Ev. 268 1227
Bees V. Williams (1836), 2 C. M. & R. 581 ; 1 T. & G. 23 660
Beeston v. Collyer (1827), 4 Bing. 313 ; 12 Moore, 552 ; 2 C. & P. 607 153
Belbin v. Skeats (1857), 27 L. J. P. & M. 66 ; 1 Sw. & Tr. 148 278, 1216
Belcher v. M'Intosh (1839), 8 C. & P. 721 .258, 269
T/ie references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED XXXIU
PAOE
Beldon v. Campbell (1861), 6 Ex. 886 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 324 179
Belfast Dock Act, Ee (1866-7), Ir. Rep. 1 Eq. 128, 142 234
Belfort, The (1884), 9 P. D. 215 ; 53 L. J. P. 88 ; 61 L. T. 271 ; 33 W. R.
171 ; 5 Asp. M. 0. 291 282
Bell V. Ansley (1812), 16 East, 143 ; 14 B,. R. 322 496
Bell V. Bruen (1843), 17 Peters, 161 765
Bell V. Chaytor (1843), 1 C. & Kir. 162 1211
Bell V. FothergiU (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 148 ; 23 L. T. 323 ; 18 W. R.
1040 143
Bell V. Erankis (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 446 ; 11 L. J. 0. P. 300 ; 5 Scott, N. R.
460 620, 621
BeU V. Howard (1741), 9 Mod. 305 762
Bell V. Kennedy (1868), L. E. 1 H. L. (So. & D.) 307 179
Bell V. Love (1884), 10 Q. B. D. 547 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 290 ; 48 L. T. 592 ;
47 J. P. 468 115
Bell V. Morrison (1828), 1 Peters, 371 386
Bell V. Parke (1860), 11 Ir. C. L. Rep. 413 266, 256
Bell V. Simpson (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 363 ; 2 H. & N. 410 83
Bell V. Stewart (1842), Arm. M. & 0. 401 977
Bell V. Warden (1740), Willes, 202 , 39
BeU V. "Wilson (1866), 2 Dr. & Sm. 395 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 337 50
Bell's case (1800), cited in Joy on Conf. 71 ; and in 1 McNally, Ev. 43 . . 566
Bellamy v. Debenham (1891), 48 Ch. D. 481 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 166; 64 L. T.
478 ; 39 "W. R. 257 672
Bellamy v. Jones (1802), 8 Ves. 31 ; 6 R. R. 205 342
Bellerophon, H.M.S. (1874), 44 L. J. Adm. 5 ; 31 L. T. 766 ; 23 W. R.
248 618
Bellinger v. The People (1832), 8 "Wend. 696 962
BeUinger's case (1832), 8 "Wend. 896, 599 674
Belt V. Lawes (1883), " Times," 1883 932
Bempdfe v. Johnstone (1796), 3 Ves. 198 179
Bend v. Greorgia Ins. Co. (1842), Sup. Ct. N. T., 1842, cited in Gr. Ev.
s. 292 766
Benesh v. Booth (1864), 18 C. B. N. S. Ill ; 34 L. J. C. P. 99 ; 11 L. T.
479 ; 13 W. R. 271 726
Bengal, The (1869), Svrab. Adm. 468 1120
.Benham's Trusts, Re (1868), 37 L. J. Ch. 265 ; 16 W. E. 180 ; reversing
36 L. J. Ch. 602 ; L. R. 4 Eq. 416 173
Benham v. Newell (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 424 ; S. C, sub nom. Palmer v.
NewaU, 20 Beav. 32 807
Benmore, The (1873), L. R. 4 Adm. & Ecc. 132 ; 43 L. J. Adm. 8 260
Bennet v. Bennet (1879), 10 Ch. D. 474 ; 40 L. T. 378 ; 27 "W. R. 673. . . . 666
Bennet v. Hartford (1650), Sty. 333 899
Bennet v. "Watson (1814), 3 M. & Sel. 1 ; 16 R. R. 373 811
Bennett v. Blain (1863), 15 C. B. N. S. 518 ; 1 H. & P. 35 ; 33 L. J. C. P.
63; 10 Jur. N. S. 130; 9 L. T. 506; 12 "W. R. 176 684
Bennett ». Brumfitt (1867), L. R. 3 C. P. 28 ; 37 L. J. C. P. 36 ; 17 L. T.
213 ; 16 "W. R. 131 ; 1 H. & P. 407 700
Bennett v. Gamgee (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 33, 204 ; 35 L. T. 764 ; 36 L. T.
48 ; 26 "W. R. 81, 293 92
Bennett & Glave, Re (1877), 46 L. J. Bank. 81 ; L. R. 6 Ch. D. 145 ; 25
"W. R. 604 847
Bennett v. Griffiths (1861), 30 L. J. Q. B. 98 ; 3 L. T. 735 ; 9 "W. R. 332 ;
7 Jur. N. S. 284 364
Bennett v. Houldsworth (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 646; L. E. 6 Ch. D. 671 ;
36 L. T. 648 806
Bennett v. Hyde (1825), 6 Conn. 24 266
Bennett v. Marshall (1866), 2 K. & J. 740 793
Bennett v. Sharpe (1892), cited Greenleaf on Evid., 16th ed. 369 698
Bennett v. The State of Tennessee (1826), Mart. & Y. 133 18
Bennion v. Davison (1838), 3 M. & "W. 179 ; 1 H. & H. 46 ; 7 L. J. Ex.
116 533
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
XXXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAOE
Benson v. Benson (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 172; 40 L. J. P. & D. 1 ; 23
L. T. 709 ; 19 W. R. 190 705
Benson v. Chapman (1848), 2 H. L. Cas. 696, 722 ; 8 C. B. 950 ; 13 Jur.
969 207
Benson ». Marshal (undated), cited Shaw v. Broom, 4 Dowl. & Ry. 731 . . 511
Benson v. OHve (1781, should be 1732), 2 Str. 919 171, 328
Benson v. Post (1748), 1 Wils. 240 996
Bentall v. Burn (1824), 5 D. & R. 284 ; 3 B. & C. 423 ; R. & M. 107 691
Bentall v. Sidney (1839), 10 A. & E. 164 1014
Bentham v. Wilson {see Re Parker).
Beutley v. Cooke (1784), 3 Dour. 424 892
Benlley, Dr., case of (1735-6), Fortesc. 202; 1 Str. 557: Andr. 176; 2Ld.
Raym. 1334 1148
Bentley v. Maokay (1862), 31 Beav. 165 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 697 539, 749
Benton v. Sutton (1797), 1 Bos. & P. 24 37
Benyon v. CressweU (1848), 12 Q. B. 899 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 1 : 12 Jur. 1036 652
Beuyou V. Nettlefold (1850), 3 Mao. & G. 94 ; 20 L. J. Ch. 186 91
Berdan v. Greenwood (1878), 20 Ch. D. 767, n. ; 46 L. T. 524, u 536
Bere v. Ward (1821), 2 Ph. Et. 246 87
Bergheim v. Gt. East. Ry. Co. (1878), 3 C. P. D. 221 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 318 ;
38 L. T. 160 ; 26 W. R. 301 161
Berkeley, Peerage (1811), 4 Camp. 415; 14 R. R. 782, vi. ..367, 393, 408, 416,
418, 419, 422, 435, 976
Berkeley, Peerage (1858-61), 8 H. L. 0. 21 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 21 ; 4 L. T. 686. .309,
411, 412, 423
Berkeley v. Hardy (1826), 5 B. & C. 355 ; 8 D. & R. 102 645
B-rmon «. Woodhridge (1781), 2 Doug. 788 479, 480
Bernard! v. Motteux (1781), 2 Doug. 575 1149
Bemasoom v. Atkinson (1853), 10 Hare, 345 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 184 ; 1 W. R.
152; 17 Jur. 128 798, 799
Bemasconi v. Farehrother (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 372 498
Berne, City of v. Bk. of England (1804), 9 Ves. 347 ; 7 R. R. 218 3
Bemett v. Taylor (1804), 9 Ves. 381 1213
Bemey «. Bp. of Norwich (1866), 36 L. J Ecc. 10 632, 884
Bemey v. Read (1845), 7 Q. B. 79 : 14 L. J. Q. B. 247 1038
Berrey v. Lindley (1841), 3 M. & G. 512 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 61 ; 5 Jur. 1061 ;
11 L. J. C. P. 27 654, 655
Berridge v. Ward (1861), 30 L. J. C. P. 218 ; 10 C. B. N. S. 400; 7 Jur.
N. S. 876 ; 2 F. & F. 208 112
Berry, Ex parte (1872, should be 1812), 19 Ves. 218 824
Berry v. Alderman (1853), 14 C. B. 95 ; 2 C. L. R. 691 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 34 262
Berry v. Banner (1792), Peake, 157 ; 3 R. R. 674 397, 1109
Berry v. Pratt (1823), 1 B. & C. 276 ; 2 Dowl. & R. 424 818
Berryman v. Wise (1792), 4 T. R. 366 ; 2 R. R. 413 148, 150, 519
Berthon v. Loughman (1817), 2 Stark. 258 934
Bertie v. Beaumont (1816), 2 Price, 308 87, 431
Berwick v. HorsfaU (1858), 27 L. J. C. P. 193 ; 4 C. B. N. S. 450 ; 4 Jur.
N. S. 615 44, 45
Berwick-upon-Tweed, May. & Corp. of v. Murray (1850), 19 L. J. Ch.
281, 286 945
Berwick, May. of, v. Oswald (1853), 1 E. & B. 295 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 129 ;
17 Jur. 1148 750
Berwick's case (1746), Fost. C. L. 10 ; 18 How. St. Tr. 370 558
Besant v. Cross (1851), 10 C. B. 895 ; 2 L. M. & P. 351 ; 20 L. J. C. P.
173; 15 Jur. 828 766
Besley, Ex parte (1850), 2 Mac. & G. 176 ; 2 H. & Tw. 376 ; 19 L. J. Ch.
382 ; 14 Jur. 704 541
Bessela v. Stem (1877), 2 C. P. D. 265 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 467 ; 37 L. T. 88 ;
25 W. R. 561 631, 881
Bessey v. Windham (1844), 6 Q. B. 172 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 7 ; 8 Jur. 824. .481, 1133
Betham v. Benson (1818), Gow, R. 45 388
I%e references are to pages, not to paragrapht.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXXV
PAaB
Bethell «i. Blencowe (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 119 ; 3 Scott, N. E. 568 ; 10 L. J.
C.P. 243 288, 291
Betteley v. MuLeod (1837), 3 Bing.' N. C. 405 ; 6 L. J. C. P. Ill ; 4 Sc.
121 ; 6 Dowl. 481 819
Betteley v. Eeid (1843), 4 Q. B. 511 ; 3 a. & D. 561 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 172 ;
7 Jnr. 507 545
Betts V. Bagley (1832), 12 Pick. 572, 682 1098
Beits V. De Vitre (1868), L. E. 3 Ch. 429 ; 37 L. J. Oh. 325 ; 18 L. T. 165 ;
16 W. E. 529 107
Betts V. Menzies (1859), 1 E. & E. 990, 1020 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 361 ; 5 Jur.
N. S. 1164 ; 10 H. L. Gas. 117 ; 31 L. J. Q. B. 233 ; 7 L. T. 110 ; 11
W. E. 1 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 29 43, 599
Betty V. NaU (1856), 6 Ir. 0. L. E. 17 417
Bevan v. Bevan (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 45 1138
Bevan v. Gething (1842), 3 Q. B. 740 ; 3 G. & D. 59 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 37 ;
6 Jur. 971 717
Bevan v. Hill (1810), 2 Camp. 381 ; 11 E. E. 741 307
Bevan v. MoMahon (1859), 2 S. & T. 65 ; 28 L. J. P. & M. 40 977
Bevan v. Waters (1828), M. & M. 236 ; 3 C. & P. 520 609
Bevan v. Williams (1776-1776), 3 T. E. 636, n. (a) 160, 518
Beveridge v. Minter (1824), 1 C. & P. 364 591
Beverley v. Beverley (1690), 2 Vera. 131 171
Beverley, May. of v. Craven (1838), 2 M. & Eob. 140 1040
Beverley v. Lincoln Gas Light and Coke Co. (1837), 2 N. & P. 283 ; 6 A.
& B. 829 640, 641, 644
Beverley's case (1603-4), 4 Co. Eep. 123, 124 609
Bewley v. Atkinson (1880), 13 Ch. D. 283 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 6 ; 41 L. T. 603;
28 W. E. 638 76, 437
Bewley v. Power (1833), Hayes & J. 368 711, 713
Beynou v. Cook (1875), L. E. 10 Ch. 389 ; 23 W. E. 531 ; 32 L. T. 353. . 137, 138
Beynon ». Garrat (1824), 1 0. & P. 154 649
Bheart). Harradine (1852), 7 Ex. 269 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 127 1160
Bibb V. Thomas (1776-7), 2 W. Bl. 1043 705, 706
Biccard v. Shepherd (1861), 14 Moore, P. C. C. 471 ; 5 L. T. N. S. 604 ;
10 W. E. 136 770, 771
Biekett v. Morris (1866), L. E. 1 H. L. 47 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 803 ; 14 L. T.
835 111 523
Bidder v. Bridges (1884)', '37 'Ch.' I).' 406;' 57 L. J. Ch. s'o'o';' '68 l'.'t! '6'6'6 . . '342,
343, 349, 430, 914, 1168
Biddle v. Bond (1865), 6 B. & S. 225 ; 34 L. J. Q. B. 137 ; 12 L. T. 178 ;
13 W. E. 661 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 425 545
Biel, De v. Thomson (1844), 3 Beav. 476, 476 680
Biffin V. Bignell (1862), 7 H. & N. 877 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 189 ; 8 Jur. N. S.
647 ; 6 L. T. 248 ; 10 W. E. 322 167
Bigg V. Strong (1857), 3 Sm. & G. 592 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 108, 983 ; 6 W. E.
173, 636 523
Bigg V. Whisking (1863), 14 C. B. 196 689
Bigge V. Parkinson (1862), 7 H. & N. 955 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 301 ; 8 Jur. N. S.
1014 ; 7 L. T. 92 ; 10 W. E. 349 776, 777
Biggs V. Lawrence (1789), 3 T. E. 454 ; 1 E. E. 740 747
Bignell v. Clarke (1860), 6 H. & N. 485 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 257 ; 2 L. T. 189. . 201
Bigsby ». Dickinson (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 280 ; 4 Ch. D. 24 ; 35 L. T. 679;
25 W. E. 89 1233, 1234
Bilbie v. Lmnley (1802), 2 East, 469, 472 : 6 E. E. 479 79
Bm*. Bament (1841), 9 M. & W. 36; 10 L. J. Ex. 302 674, 690
BUlage V. Southee (1852), 9 Hare, 534 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 472 137
Billing V. Welch (1871), Ir. E. 6 C. L. 88 86
Billingshurst ». Vickers (1810), 1 Phillim. 191 140
BiUs V. Smith (1863), 6 B. & S. 214 ; G4 L. J. Q. B. 68 ; 12 L. T. 22 ; 13
W E. 407 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 164 83
Bingham v. Stanley (1841), 2 Q. B. 117 ; 1 G. & D. 237 ; 6 Jur. 389 ; 9 C.
& P 374 262, 633
Vol. I. ends with page 636.
XXXVl TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOB
Biroh, Re (1853), 17 Beav. 358 129
Birch 0. Birch (1848), 6 Notes of Gas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 142
Birch V. Depeyster (1816), 1 Stark. 210 ; 4 Camp. 385 783
Birch ». Edwards (1847), 5 C. B. 45; 2 Lutw. (Eeg. Cas.) 37; 17 L.J. C.P.
32 ; 12 Jur. 18 728
Biroh V. Ld. Liverpool (1829), 9 B. & C. 392, 395 ; 4 M. & R. 380 681
Biroh V. Eidgway (1858), 1 F; & F. 270 1224
Birch V. SomerviUe (1852), 2 Ir. C. L. R. 243 900, 906, 910
Bird ». Adeock (1878), 47 L. J. M. C. 123 ; 26 "W. R. 634 132
Bird*. Boulter (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 443 730
Birdj». Gammon (1837), 5Soott,213; 3 Bing. N. C. 883 ; 3 Hodgea, 224. .677, 711
Bird V. Higginson (1834), 2 A. & E. 696 ; 4 N. & M. 505 ; 1 H. &W. 61 . . 272,
637, 638
Bird V. RandaU (1762), 3 Barr. 1345 ; 1 "W. Bl. 373, 387 1115
Birkenhead, Lane. & Cheshire June. Rail. Co. v. Brownrigg (1849), 6 Railw.
Cas. 47 ; 4 Ex. 426 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 27 ; 13 Jur. 943 1176
Birkenhead, Lane. & Cheshire June. Rail. Co. v. Piloher (1860), 6 Ex. 121 ;
6 Eailw. Cas. 564 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 207 ; 14 Jur. 297 100
Birkmyr v. Darnell (1704), Salk. 27 ; 1 Smith L. C. 359, 362 676
Bilks V. Birks (1865), 34 L. J. P. & M. 90 ; 4 S. & T. 23 ; 13 L. T. 193 ;
13 W. R. 638 704
Birmg., May of, e. Allen (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 673 ; 6 Ch. D. 284 ; 37 L. T.
207 ; 25 W. R. 810 114
Birmg., Brist. & Thames June. Ry. Co. v. White (1841), 1 Q. B. 282 ; 4 P.
& D. 649 ; 2 Railw. Cas. 863 ; 5 Jur. 800 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 121 995, 998
BirreU v. Dryer (1884), 9 App. Cas. 345 ; 51 L. T. 130 ; 6 Asp. M. 0. 267 17
Birt, Re (1871), L. R. 2 P. & D. 214 ; 40 L. J. P. & M. 26 ; 24 L. T. 142 ;
19 W. R. 511 699
Birt «>. Barlow (1779), 1 Doug. 171, 174 150, 295, 373, 1172
Birt V. RothweU (1697), 1 Ld. Raym. 210, 343 18
Bishop V. Chambre (1827), 3 C. & P. 55 ; M. & M. 116 1193
Bishop V. Helps (1845), 2 C. B. 45 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 43 ; 1 Lutw. (Reg. Cas.)
363 156
Bishop V. Howard (1823), 2 B. & C. 100 ; 3 Dowl. & R. 293 152
Bishop V. Countess of Jersey (1854), 2 Drew. 143 ; 2 Eq. R. 545 ; 23 L. J.
Ch. 483 ; 18 Jur. 766 161
Bittleaton v. Cooper (1845), 14 M. & W. 399 474
Bittlestone v. Cooke (1866), 6 E. & B. 296 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 2 Jur.
N. S. 758 82
Black V. Lord Braybrook (1816), 2 Stark. 7 ; 6 M. & Sel. 39 ' 62
Black V. Holmes (1822), 1 Fox & Sm. 28 618
Black V. Jobling (1869), L. R. 1 P. & D. 685 ; 38 L. J. P. & M. 74; 21
L. T. 298 ; 17 W. R. 1108 143
Blackburn v. Hargreave (1828), 2 Lew. C. C. 259 815
Blackburn v. Mackey (1823), 1 C. & P. 1 168
Blackburn Guard, v. Brooks (1877), 25 W. R. 57 912
Blackett v. Lowes (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 494 ; 15 R. R. 324 398
Blackett v. Roy. Ex. Ass. Co. (1832), 2 C. & J. 244 ; 2 Tyr. 266 765, 766
Blackball v. Gibson (1878), 2 Ir. L. R. 49 94
Blackham's case (1708), 1 Salk. 290, 291 1132
Blaokie v. Ridding (1848), 6 C. B. 196 307
Blacquiere v. Hawkins (1780), 1 Doug. 380 7
Blagrave v. Blagrave (1847), 1 De G. & Sm. 262 ; 16 L. J. Ch. 346 ; 11
Jur. 744 327
Blague V. Gold (1635), Cro. Car. 447 802
Blair, Re (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Eoc. & M.) 528 701
Blair v. Ormond (1851), 17 Q. B. 423 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 444 715
Blake v. Albion Life Ass. Co. (1878), 45 L. J. C. P. 663 ; 36 L. T. 269 ;
24 W. R. 677 243
Blake v. Blake (1882), 51 L. J. P. D. & A. 36 ; 7 P. Div. 102 ; 46 L. T.
641 ; 30 W. R. 505 695, 697
Blake v. Concannon (1870), 4 Ir. R. C. L. 323 100
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OP CASES CITED. XXXVll
PAGE
Blake v. Jennings (1861), 12 Ir. C. L. R. 458 1165
Blake v. Johnson (1819), Milw. 164 170
Blake v. KnigM (1843), 3 Curt. 563 696, 697
Blake v. Pilford (1832), 1 M. & Eob. 198 618, 620
Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Can. Co. (1835\ 2 C. M. & R. 133; 1 Gale,
78; 5Tyr. 603 '. 1102, 1109, 1116, 1116
Bland V. Bland (1866), 36 L. J. P. & M. 104 ; L. E. 1 P. & D. 237 ; 16
W. E. 9 1110
Bland v. Swaflord (1791), Peake, 60 831
Biandy v. Be Burgh (1848), 6 C. B. 623 ; 6 D. & L. 412 ; 5 EaUw. Cas.
361 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 2 ; 12 Jur. 1005 169
Blankley v. Winstanley (1789), 3 T. E. 279 ; 1 E. E. 704 791
Blayney's Trusts, Ee (1875), Ir. E. 9 Eq. 413 798
Bleakley v. Smith (1840), 11 Sim. 160 670, 674
Blenkarn v. Longstafie (1885), 84 L. J. Ch. 516 ; 62 L. T. 681 915
Bleukinsop v. Blenkinsop (1848), 17 L. J. Ch. 343 ; 2 PhOl. 607 603
Blewett V. Tregonning (1835), 6 N. & M. 308 ; 3 A. & E. 664 ; 1 H. & W.
432 976
Blemtt, Inre(1880), 49L. J.P. D. & A. 31; 6P. D. 116; 42L. T. 329;
28 W. R. 620 700
Blewitt V. Roberts (1841), Cr. & Ph. 274 ; 10 L. J. Ch. 342 ; 5 Jur. 979. . 144
Blewitt V. Tritton, (1892) 2 Q. B. 327 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 773 ; 67 L. T. 72 ;
41 "W. E. 36 282
Bligh V. Brent (1836-7), 2 T. &.C. Ex. 968 ; 6 L. J. Ex. Eq. 68 683
Bhgh V. Brewer (1834), 3 D. P. C. 266 ; 1 C. M. & E. 651 ; 5 Tyr. 222 . . 732
Bligh V. "WeUesley (1826), 2 C. & P. 400 305
Blight V. Fisher (1809), 1 Pet. C. C. R. 41 873
Blomington v. Legg (1894), 42 Am. St. R. 216 Add. [220]
Bloomer v. Spittle (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 427 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 369 ; 26 L. T.
272 ; 20 W. R. 436 749
Bloomfield v. Wharton (1867), Ir. E. 8 C. L. 68 Ill
Blossom V. Cannon (1817), 14 Mass. 177 122
Blount V. Burrow (1792), 5 Brown, C. C. 75 480, 482
Blount V. Harris (1879), 47 L. J. Q. B. 696 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 159 ; 39 L. T.
466 ; 27 "W. R. 202 736
Blount V. Kimpton, (1892) 31 Am. St. R. 564 692
Blower's Trusts (1871), L. R. 11 Eq. 97 ; 6 Ch. 351 ; 23 L. T. 548 ; 25
L. T. 181 ; 19 W. R. 121, 666 740
Blower V. G. W. Ry. Co. (1872), 41 L. J. C. P. 268 ; L. R. 7 C. P. 656 ;
27 L. T. 883 ; 20 W. R. 776 771
Blower v. HoUis (1833), 3 Tyr. 366 ; 1 C. & J. 393 1035, 1036
Bloxam v. Elsee" (1825). 1 C. & P. 658 ; Ry. & M. 187 291
Bloxam ». Favre (1884), 8 P. D. 101 ; 62 L. J. P. 42 ; 31 "W. R. 610 ; 47
J. P, 377 703
Bluok V. Gompertz (1852), 7 Ex. 67 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 25 1195
Bluck V. Rackman ( 1846), 5 Moo. P. C. R. 308 16, 267
BlundeU v. CatteraU (1821), 5 B. & A. 293, 298 112
Blundell v. Gladstone (1841), 11 Sim. 486; 1 PhiUips, 279, 283, 289; 12
li. J. Ch. 225 739, 784
Blunt V. Lack (1867), 26 L. J. Ch. 148 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 195 7
Blyth V. Archhold (1835), Pears. Chit. PI. 330, n. (4) 147
Blyth V. Dennett (1853), 13 C. B. 178 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 79 523
Boardman v. Jackson (1813), 2 Ball & B. 382 627
Boardman v. Reed and Ford's Lessees (1832), 6 Pet. 328, 345 801
Boast V. Firth (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 1 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 19 L. T. N. S.
264 ; 17 W. R. 29 780
Boddington v. Schlencker (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 572 ; 1 N. & M. 541 ; 2 L.
J. K. B. 138 32
Boddy ». Boddy (I860), 30 L. J. P. & M. 23 243
Boddy V. Wall (1877), 7 Ch. Div. 164 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 112 ; 26 W. E. 348. . 187
Bodger v. Arch (1864), 10 Ex. 333 ; 2 C. L. E. 1491 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 19. .714, 716
Bodmin United Mines Co., Re (1866), 23 Beav. 370 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 670 ;
3 Jur. N. S. 360 7
Vol. I. ends with pa^e 635.
XXXVIU TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAGB
Body, Re (1864), 34 L. J. P. & M. 55 ; 4 S. & T. 9 307
Boehtlinck v. Schneider (1799), 3 Esp. 58 ; 3 East, 381 ; 7 E,. E.. 490 936
Bogert V. Cauman (1807-51), Anthon JR. 70 743
Bohuu V. Delessert (1813), 2 Coop. 21 129, 424
Boileaut). Rutlin (1848), 2 Ex. 678 500, 531, fS2, 1158
Bolckow V. Seymour (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 107 44
Bold V. Hutchinson (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 285 ; 20 BeaT. 250 ; 1 Jur. N. S.
365 ; 3 Eq. Eep. 743 639, 679, 749
Bold V. Eayner (1836), 1 M. & W. 343 ; 2 Gale, 44 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 172 . .299, 763
Bolding V. Lane (1863), 1 De G. J. & S. 122 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 219 ; 11 W. R.
386 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 506 720
Boldron v. "Widdows (1824), 1 C. & P. 65 219, 230
Bolingbroke, Ld. v. Local Board of Swindon (1874), 43 L. J. C. P. 287 ;
L. R. 9 C. P. 575 ; 30 L. T. 723 587
Bolingbroke, Ld. v. Townsend (1873), L. B. 8 C. P. 645 ; 42 L. J. 0. P.
255 ; 29 L. T. 430 191
BoUand, Ex parte. Re Aokary (1876), 45 L. J. Bank. 133 ; 3 Ch. D. 125 ;
34 L. T. 666 ; 24 W. R 932 851
BoUand, Ex parte, Re Holden (1874), L. R. 19 Eq. 131 ; 44 L. J. Bk. 9 ;
31L. T. 445; 24 W. R. 24 849
Bolton V. Bolton (1876), 2 Ch. D. 217 ; 34 L. T. 123 ; 24 W. R. 426 1036
Bolton v. Bp. of Carlisle (1793), 2 H. Bl. 263 659, 1198
Bolton V. Gladstone (1804), 5 East, 155 ; 1 Smith, 372 ; 2 Taun. 85 ; 7 R.
R. 674 1149
Bolton V. Corp. of Liverpool (1833), 1 Myl. & K. 94 ; Cooper, 19 ; 1 L. J.
Ch. 166 593, 601, 606, 1183
Bolton V. Corp. of Liverpool (1831), 1 Myl. & K. 88 ; 3 Sira. 467 995
Bolton V. Lambert (1889), 41 Ch. D. 295 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 425 ; 60 L. T. 687 ;
37 W. R. 434 672
Bolton V. London School Board (1878), 7 Ch. D. 766 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 461 ;
38 L. T. 277 ; 26 "W. R. 549 123
Bolton «;. O'Brien (1885), 16 L. R. Ir. 97 46, 243
Bolton 1). Sherman (1837), 2 M. & W. 403 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 147 607
Bolton, Ld. V. Tomlin (1836), 1 N. & P. 247 ; 5 A. & E. 856 ; 1 C. & J. 391 926
Bond V. Douglas (1836), 7 C. & P. 626 245
Bond ». Evans (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 249; 57 L. J. M. C. 105; 59 L. T.
411; 36 W. R. 767; 52 J. P. 612 107
Bond V. Rosling (1861), 1 B. & S. 371 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 227 ; 4 L. T. 442 ;
9W. R. 746 649
BoneUi, Re (1875), L. R. 1 P. Div. 69 ; 45 L. J. P. D. & A. 42 ; 34 L. T.
32 ; 24 "W. R. 255 , 938
Bonfield D. Smith (1844). 2 M. & Rob. 519 270, 929
Bonner, Re, Tucker «. Good (1881), 19 Ch. D. 201 ; 51 L. J. Ch 83 ■ 45
L. T. 470 ; 30 "W. R. 58 145
Bonnewell v. Jenkins (1878), 8 Ch. D. 70 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 758 ; 38 L. T 81 '
26 W. R. 294 673
Bonzi v. Stewart (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 295 ; 5 Scott, N. R. 1 ' " ' 534
Booker v. Allen (1831), 2 Russ. & M. 270 ; 9 L. J. Ch. 130 .'.!!."!!! 807
Boorman v. Johnston (1834), 12 Wend. 573 741
Boom's Case (1819), cited Greenleaf on Evid. 290 .".'."."." 656
Boosey D. Davidson (1849), 13 Q. B. 2.i7 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. niVisJur.Ms' 299
Booth v. Briscoe (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 496 ; 25 "W. R. 838 187
Booth V. Clive (1851), 10 C. B. 827 ; 2 L. M. & P. 283 ; 20 L. j.' c" 'p.
151 ; 15 Jur. 563 227
Booth V. Kennard (1858), 2 H. & N. 84 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 305 ." ' ." 43
Boothj).MillDs(1846),4DowI.&L.52; 15M.&W. 669; 15 L.J. Ex 354" 271 272
Booth©. Turle (1873), L. R. 16 Eq. 182; 21 "W. R. 721 " '665
Bootle V. Blundell (1815), 19 Vea. 494 ; 13 R. R. 254 .',,'. 1215
Borthwlok Pier. (1812), Pari. Min 62 !!!!!!!!!! 423
Bosanquet, Re (1852), 2 Roberts. 577 !.!!!!!!!! 696
Boeanquet v. Anderson (1806), 6 Esp. 44 g^y
Bosville V. Attornev-General (1887), 12 P. D. 177 ; 66 L. J. P. 97 • '57 "i,"
T. 88 ; 36 "W. R." 79 '. .' 101
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXXIX
FAOB
BoBweU V. Smith (1833), 6 C. & P. 60 154
Bosworth V. 'Crotohett (1824), 1 Ph. Ev. 300 447, 451
Botham v. Swingler (1794), 1 Esp. 164 ; 1 Pea. 285 910
Bothe's case (16U2), Moo. (F.) 666 985
Bothnia, The (1860), Lush. 52 ; 29 L. J. P. M. & A. 65 ; 36 L. T. 0. S.
160 176
Botting V. Martin (1808), 1 Camp. 317 656
Bottomley v. Forhes (1838), 6 Scott, 816 ; 6 Bing. N. C. 121 ; 1 Arn. 481 ;
2 Jur. 1016 782
Boucher v. Lawson (undated), Caa. temp. Hard. 9 1 150
Boucher v. Murray (1844), 6 Q. B. 362 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 278 192
Bouchier v. Taylor (1776), 4 Bro. P. C. 708 1103, 1105
BouiUon V. Lupton (1863), 15 C. B. N. S. 113 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 37 ; 10 Jur.
N. S. 422 : 8 L. T. N. S. 575 ; 11 "W. K. 966 770
Boulter v. Peplow (1850), 9 C. B. 493 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 191 ; 14 Jur. 248..291, 292,
296
Boulton's case (1835), Milw. 36 502
Bourd V. Lawrence, (1892) 1 Q. B. 226 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 21 ; 65 L. T. 844;
40 W. E. 1; 56 J. P. 118 779
Bourdin v. Green-wood (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 281 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 73 ; 25 L. T.
782 ; 20 W. E. 166 713
Bourke v. Davis (1890), 44 Ch. D. 110 ; 62 L. T. 34 ; 38 W. R. 167 915
Bourno !>. Coulter (1884), 53 L. J. Ch. 699 ; 50 L. T. 321 186
Bourne v. Fosbrooke (1865), 18 C. B. N. S. 515 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 164 .... 639
Bourne v. GatlifEe (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 643, 689, 690 ; 3 Scott, N. K. 1 . .43, 7«2
Bouts v. Tuokerman (1811), 7 Johns. 538 870
Bousfield V. Mould (1847), 1 De G. & Sm. 347 ; 11 Jur. 902 910
Bovill «. Pimm (1866), 11 Ex. 718 ; 26 L. T. 0. S. 312 43
Bowden v. Henderson (1854), 2 Sm. & G. 360 172
Bowden v. Home (1831), 7 Bing. 716 1124
Bowen v. Owen (1847), 11 Q. B. 130 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 5 ; 11 Jur. 972 ... . 48
Bowerbank v. Monteiro (1813), 4 Taun. 844 ; 14 E. R. 679 755
Bowers v. Bowers (1850), 1 Abb. (N. Y.) App. Deo. 214 766
Bowers t>. Nizon (1847), 2 C. & Kir. 372 189, 192
Bowes V. Foster (1858), 2 H. & N. 779 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 262 91, 481, 552
Bowes V. Pontifex (1863), 3 F. & F. 739 692
Bowes v. Shand (1877), 2 App. Cas. 455 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 561 ; 36 L. T. 857;
25 W. E. 730 . . : 42
Bowey V. BeU (1878), 4 Q. B. D. 95 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 161 ; 39 L. T. 607 ;
27 "W. E. 247 41
Bowker v. Burdekiu (1843), 11 M. & W. 128 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 329 1204
Bowlby V. Bell (1846), 3 C. B. 284 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 18 685
Bowles V. Jackson (1854), 1 Notes of Cas. (Eco. & M.) 294 702
Bowles ». Johnson (1748), 1 W. Bl. 36 815, 819
Bowles V. Langworthy (1793), 5 T. E. 366 ; 1 Doug. 216, n. (/) 1208
Bowman, Ee (1834), 5 B. & Ad. 1113 988
Bowman ». Bowman (1843), 2 M. & Eob. 501 921, 1209, 1215
Bowman v. Hodgson (1867), L. E. 1 P. 362; 36 L. J. P. 124; 16 L. T. 392 278
Bowman v. Horsey (1837), 2 M. & Eob. 85 764
Bowman «.-. Manzelman (1809), 2 Camp. 315; 11 E. R. 716 319
Bowman v. Nichol (1794), 5 T. E. 537 ; 1 Esp. 81 1194
Bowman v. Norton (1S31), 5 C. & P. 177 599, 603
Bowman v. Eostron (1835), 2 A. & E. 295 ; 4 N. & M. 452 89, 552
Bowman v. Taylor (1835), 4 N. & M. 264 ; 2 A. & E. 278, 279 88, 93
Bowring v. Shepherd (1870), L. E. 6 Q. B. 309 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 129 ; 24
L. T. 721 ; 19 "W. E. 852 158
Bowsher v. CaUey (1808), 1 Camp. 391, u. ; 10 E. E. 711, n 385
Boyoe v. Douglas (1807), 1 Camp. 60 1115
Boyce v. Green (1826), Batty, 608 671, 684
Boyd V. Bolton (1844), 8 Ir. Eq. E. 113 523, 527, 528
Boyd V. M'Lean (1815), 1 Johns. Ch. (Am.) 582 667
Boyd V. Petrie (1868), 19 W. E. 221 1189
Boyd V. The State (undated), 2 Humph. 37 671
Vol. I. ends with page 63d.
xl TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOE
Boydell v. Drummond (1809), 11 East, 142 ; 10 E. E. 450 673, 681
Boydell's case (1830), Maoq. H. of L. Practice, 651 502
Boyes v. Bedale (1863), 1 H. & M. 798 ; 10 L. T. 131 ; 12 W. E. 232 ; 33
L. J. Ch. 233 145
Boyle V. MulhoUand (1860), 10 Ir. C. L. E. 150 803
Boyle ». Wiseman (1855), 11 Ex. 360; 24 L. J. Ex. 284 26, 309, 964
Boynton v. Kellogg (1807), 3 Mass. 189 255, 973
Boys V. Williams (1831), 2 Euss. & My. 689 78-0
Boyse v. Colclougla (1854), 1 K. & J. 124 ; 2 W. E. 354 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 7. . 1 145
Bracegirdle v. Heald (1818), 1 B. & Aid. 722 681
Braoegirdle v. Hinks (1854), 9 Ex. 361 ; 2 C. L. E. 991 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 128;
18 Jut. 70 222
Bradford v. Eomuey (1862), 30 Beav. 431, 438 : 31 L. J. Ch. 497 749
Bradford ». Young (1884), 29 Ch. D. 617 ; 53 L. T. 407 ; 33 W. E. 860 ;
54 L. J. Ch. 96 1105
Bradlaugh v. Grossett (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 271 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 209 ; 53
L. T. 620 ; 32 W. E. 552 4
Bradlaugh v. E. (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 607 ; 38 L. T. 118 : 26 W. E. 410 . . 85
Bradley v. Arthur (1825), 6 Dowl. & E. 413 ; 4 B. & C. 292 932
Bradley v. Beckett (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 994 89
Bradley v. Bradley (1834), 2 Fairf. 367 1117
Bradley ». Holds-worth (1838), IH.&H. 156; 3M.&W.422; 7L.J.Ex 153.. 683
Bradley v. James (1853), 13 C. B. 822 ; 22 L. J. 0. P. 193 442, 448
Bradley v. Pilots of Newcastle (1853), 2 E. & B. 427 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 35. . 792
Bradshaw v. Bennett (1831), 5 C. & P. 48 ; 1 M. & Eob. 143 1211
Bradshaw v. Murphy (1836), 7 C. & P. 612 969, 997
Bradstreet v. Nept. Ins. Co. (1838), 3 Sumn. 600 1142, 1147, 1150
Brady v. Cubitt (1778), 1 Doug. 31, 39 667
Brady v. Curran (1868), 2 Ir. E. C. L. 314 ; 16 W. E. 514 508
Brady v. Oastler (1864), 3 H. & C. 112 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 300 ; 11 Jur. N. S.
22 ; 11 L. T. N. S. 681 745
Brady v. Tod (1861), 30 L. J. C. P. 224 ; 9 C. B. N. S. 592 ; 4 L. T. 212 ;
9 W. E. 483 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 827 388
Brain v. Preece (1843), 11 M. & W. 773 455
Braithwaite v. Gardiner (1845), 8 Q. B 473 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 187 ; 10 Jur. 591 646
Brake, Ee (1881), 60 L. J. P. D. & A. 43; 6 P. Div. 217 ; 45 L. T. 191 ;
• 29 W. E. 744 798
Bramble, Ex parte. In re Toleman, &c. (1880), 13 Ch. D. 885 ; 42 L. T.
413 ; 28 W. E. 676 321
Bramwell v. Lucas (1824), 4 Dowl. & E. 367 ; 2 B. & C. 746 608
Brandao v. Bamett (1846), 6 M. & Gr. 630 5
Brandford v. Freeman (1850), 2 Ex. 734 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 36 272
Branford v. Branford (1879), 4 P. D. 72 ; 48 L. J. Mat. 40 ; 40 L. T. 659 ;
27 W. E. 691 604
Branton v. Griffits (1877), 2 C. P. D. 212 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 408 ; 36 L. T. 4;
29 W. E. 313 736
Branwell v. Penneck (1827), 7 B. & C 536 1136
Brashier ». Jackson (1840), 6 M. & W. 549; 8 D. P. C. 784; 9 L. J.
Ex. 313 192, 193, 194
Brassington v. Brassington (1823), 1 S. & St. 455 321
Bray v. Hadwen (1816), 5 M. & Sel. 68 32
Braye Peer. (1836-39), 6 CI. & Fin. 757 •. 403
Brazier v. Jones (1828), 8 B. & C. 124 ' . 1038
Breadalbane Case (1866), L. E. 1 H. L. (So.) 182 106, 149
Breadalbane, M. of, p. M. of Chandos (1837), 2 My. & Cr. 732 ; 4 CI & F
43 ; 7 L. J. Ch. 28 1124
Breadalbane Peer. (1872), L. E. 2 H. L. (So.) 269 181
Breckon v. Smith (1834), 1 A. & E. 488 " " " 517
Breech Loadg. Arm. Co., Ee (1867), L. E. 4 Eq. 453 ; 15 W. E. 1007 '. ! 845
Breeze v. Hawker (1844), 14 Sim. 350 , . , _ IO54
Brembridge v. Osborne (1816), 1 Stark. E. 374 ; 18 E. E. 784 ] 154
Bremer v. Freeman (1857), 1 Deane, Ecc. E. 192 936 937
Brenan's case (1847), 10 Q. B 498 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 289 ; 11 Jur. 776 7, 83
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xli
PAGE
Brenohley e. Still (1850), 2 Roberts. 162 697
Breunan ». Dillane (1843), Ir. Oir. C. 853 1035
Brennan v. Howard (1856), 1 H. & N. 138 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 289 ; 2 Jur.
N. S. 546 192, 194
Brennan (should be Breenan) v. Moran (1867), 6 Ir. Ch. R. 126 805
Brest t). Lever (1841), 7 M. &W. 693; 9 D. P. C. 246 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 337.. 118
Breton's Estate, In re (1881), 17 Ch. D. 416 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 369 ; 44 L. T.
337 ; 29 W. R. 777 639
Breton v. Cope (1791), Peake, 31 154, 1054, 1092, 1173, 1208
Brett V. Beales (1829), 10 B. & C. 508 ; M. & M. 416 397, 403, 433, 1006
Brettel v. "Williams (1849), 4 Ex. 623 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 123 161
Bretton v. Prettiman (1666), T. Ray. 153 498
Brew «. Haren (1877), 11 Ir. R. C. L. 29 1116, 1161
Brewer v. Knapp (18-^3), 1 Pick. 337 154
Brewer v. Pahner (1800), 3 Esp. 213 285
Brewing Co. v. Beaner (1893*), 40 Am. St. R. 686 Add. [220]
Brewis, Re (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 124 ; 3 S. & T. 473 701
Brewster, Re (1860), 3 8. & T. 473 ; 33 L. J. P. 124 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 593. . 706
Brewster v. Sewell (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 296 277, 302, 303, 306, 323
Brioe v. Bannister (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 569 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 722 ; 38 L. T.
739 ; 26 W. R. 670 513, 651
Briokell v. Hulse (1837), 7 A. & E. 456 ; 2 N. & P. 426 600
Bridge v. Eggleston (1817), 14 Mass. 245 514
Bridge v. Gray (1833), 14 Pick. 65 1123
Bridge ». Sumner (1823), 1 Pick. 371 1139
Bridges v. N. Lond. Ry. (1874), L. R. 7 H. L. 213 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 161 ;
30 L. T. 844 ; 23 W. R. 62 38
Bridges V. Potts (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 314 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 338 ; 10 Jur.
N. S. 1049 ; 11 L. T. 373 35
Bridget Feltham, Re (1866), 1 K. & J. 528 798
Bridgewater, Ld., case of (undated), cited Skin. 16 1179
Bridgman v Jennings (1699), 1 Ld. Raym. 734 ; B. N. P. 283a 610
Bridgwater Trust v. Bootle-oum-Linacre (1866), L. R. 2 Q. B. 4 ; 36 L. J.
Q. B. 41; 7B. &S. 348 HI, 112
Bridson v. Smith (1876), 24 W. R. 392 534
Brian v. Swainson (1877), 1 L. R. Ir. 136 673
Briggs, Ex parte (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 272 ; 1 E. & E. 881 993
Briggs V. Aynsworth (1838), 2 M. & Rob. 168 274
Briggs V. Briggs (1880), 6 P. D. 163 ; 49 L. J. P. 38 ; 28 W. R. 702 .... 1143
Briggs V. Wilson (1853), 5 De G. M & G. 12 ; 17 Beav. 330 448, 461, 712
Brigham v. Rogers (1822), 17 Mass. 571 767
Bright V. Hutton (1851-2), 2 H. L. Cas. 341 ; 16 Jur. 696 540, 641
Bright V. Legerton (1860-1), 30 L. J. Ch. 338 ; 2 De G. & J. 421 ; 8 W. R.
678 455
Brighti!."Walker(1834), IC. M. &R. 222; 3L. J. Ex. 250; 4 Tyr. 502. .119, 128
Brigstocke v. Smith (1833), 1 C. M. & R. 483 ; 3 Tyr. 446 ; 2 L. J. Ex. 187 . . 710,
712
Brine v. Bazalgette (1849), 3 Ex. 692 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 348 252, 253
Bringloe «. Goodson (1839), 8 Soott, 71 ; 5 Bing. N. C. 738 ; 1 Am. 322. . 1208,
1213
Brinsmead v. Harrison (1871), L. R. 7 C. P. 547 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 190 ; 27
L. T. 99 ; 20 W. R. 784 1114
Brisco V. Lomax (1838). 3 N. & P. 308 ; 8 A. & B. 198 ; 2 Jur. 682 . .233, 396,
398, 404, 405, 1109
Briscoe V. Stephens (1824), 9 Moore (C. P.) 413 ; 2 Bing. 213 1133
Bristol Aerated Bread Co. «. Maggs (1890), 44 Ch. D. 616 ; 59 L. J. Ch.
472; 62L. T. 416; 38 W. R. 393 672
Bristol, City of, v. Wait (1834), 3 N. & M. 359 ; 1 A. & E. 264 303
Bristol, May. of, ». Cox (1884), 26 Ch. D. 678; 53 L. J. Ch. 1144; 50
L. T. 719; 33 W. R. 255 1182, 1183
Bristow V. Brown (1862), 13 Ir. C. L. R. 201 773
Bristow». Cormican (1878), 3 App. Cas. 641, 667 Ill, 301, 432
Bristow V. Miller (1848), 11 Ir. L. R. 461 387, 716
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
xlii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Bristow v. Sequeville (1850), 5 Ex. 275 ; 3 0. & K. 64 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 289 ;
14 Jnr. 674 61, 938
Bristow v. Wright (1 781), 2 Doug. 666 ; 1 T. R. 235, n 187
Britain v. Bossiter (1879), 11 Q. B. D. 123 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 362 ; 40 L. T.
240 ; 27 W. R. 482 681
Briti.ih Empire Asa. Co. v. Browne (1852), 12 C. B. 723 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 49;
16 Jut. 1157 676
British Farmers' Pure Line. Cake Co., Re (1878), 7 Ch. D. 533 ; 47 L. J.
Ch. 415 ; 38 L. T. 45 : 26 W. R. 334 1076
British Linen Co. v. Drummond (1835), 10 B. & C. 903 52
British Prov. Life and Fire Ass. Co., Re {see Grady's Case).
Brittain v. Kinnaird (1849), 4 Moore, C. P. 50 ; 1 B & B. 432 ; Grow, 164 . . 1098,
1099, 1108, 1136
Britten, Ex parte (1840), 3 Deac. & Chit. 35 '. 865
Brittlebank v. Smith (1884), 50 L. T. 491 1031
Broad v. Ham (1839), 5 Bing. N. C. 722 ; 8 Scott, 40 ; 8 L. J. C. P. 357 . . 30
Broad v. Pitt (1828), 3 C. & P. 518 693, 591, 696
Brooas v. Lloyd (1867) 23 Beav. 129 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 768 ; 4 W. R. 540 ; 2
Jur. N. S. 556 819, 832
Brook V. Kent (1807), 1 Camp. 366, n. ; 10 R. R. 706, n 498
Brockbank v. Anderson (1844), 7 M. & a. 295 ; 13 L. J. C. P. 102 910
Brodie v. Brodie (1861), 2 S. & T. 259 ; 30 L. J. Mat. 185 ; 4 L. T. 307 ;
9 W. R. 815 377
Brodie v. Howard (1856), 17 C. B. 109 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 67 ; 1 Jur. N. S.
1209 179, 492
Brogan's case (undated), 2 Russ. Cr. & M. 874 (4th ed.) 685
Bromage v. Prosser (1825), 4 B. & C. 247 ; 6 D. & R. 296 ; 1 C. & P.
476 110
Bromley v. Smith (1859), 26 Beay. 644, 665 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 18 ; 6 Jur.
N. S. 833 137
Bromley v. Wallace (1803), 4 Esp. 237 264
Bromwich's ease (1666), 1 Lev. 180 340
Brook and Delcomyn, Re (1864), 16 C. B. N.S. 403; 33 L.J. C. P. 246 .. 1147
Brook V. Hook (1871), L. R. 6 Ex. 89 ; 40 L. J. Ex. 50 ; 24 L. T. 34 ; 19
W. R. 508 44
Brook V. Jenney (1841), 2 Q. B. 273 ; 1 G. & D. 567 ; 11 L. J. M. C. 10 . . 132
Brooke, Re, {see Brooke v. Kent).
Brooke v. Brooke (1881), 17 Ch. D. 833 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 528 ; 44 L. T. 512 ;
30 W. R. 45 13
Brooke v. Hayraes (1868), L. R. 6 Eq. 25 - 93
Brooke v. Kent (1840), 3 Moo. P. C.-C. 334 ; 2 Curt. 343 708
Brooker v. Scott (1843), 11 M. & W. 67 49
Brooks V. Mitchell (1841), 9 M. & W. 16 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 51 612
Broom v. Batchelor (1856), 1 H. & N. 256 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 299 787
Broome v. Wootton (1606), Telv. 67 ; Cro. Jac. 73 ; Moo. (F.) 762 1115
Broomfield v. Smith (1836), 2 Gale, 114 ; 1 M. & W. 642 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 156 . . 222
Brough V. Parkings (1703), 2 Ld. Raym. 994 16
Brounker, Ld. ». Atkyns (1682), Skin. 14 1179
Brown, Ex parte (1854), 19 Beav. 97 526
Brown, Re (1849), 1 Rob. 710 698
Brown, Be (1858), 27 L. J. P. & M. 20 ; 1 Sw. & Tr. 32 ; 30 L. T. 353 ;
2 Jur. N. S. 244 143, 366, 706, 708
Brown, Be (1889), 61 L. T. 463 793
Brown and Croyd. Can. Co., Re (1839), 9 A. & E. 526 1160
Brown ti.Ackroyd (1856), 5 E. &B. 819; 25L. J. Q. B. 193 ; 2 Jur. N.S.
283 166
Brown v. Armstrong (1873), 7 Ir. C. L. R. 130 296
Brown (should be Broom) v. Batchelor (1856), 1 H. &N. 266; 25 L.J. Ex.
299 787
Brown v. Brown (1836), 1 Keen, 275 114
Brown v. Brown (1868), 27 L. J. Q. B. 173 ; 8 E. & B. 876 ; 4 Jur. N. S.
163 ; 1 S. & T. 32 ; 27 L. J. P. 20 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 244 143, 356, 705, 709
Brown V. Brown (1869), 38 L. J. P. & M. 78 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 720 360
X'he references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xHii
FAOB
Brown v. Brown and Paget (1874), 33 L. J. P. 198 ; 43 L. J. Mat. 33 ;
30 L. T. N. S. 767 ; 22 "W. R. 759 881
Brown v. Byrne (1854), 3 El. & B. 703 ; 2 C. L. R. 1599 ; 23 L. J. Q. B.
313 ; 18 Jut. 700 768
Brown v. Dawson (1705), Preo. in Oh. 240 806
Brown v. Eastern Counties Ey. Co. (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 391 ; 58 L. J.
Q. B. 212 231, Add. [220]
Brown v. Edgington (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 279 ; 2 Soott, N. R. 496 ; 1 Drink.
106 ; 10 L. J. C. P. 66 777
Brown v. Foster (1857), 1 H. & N. 736 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 249 ; 3 Jur. N. S.
245 605, 609, 611
Brown v. Getotell (1814), 11 Mass. 11 871
Brown v. Goodwin (1841), Ir. Cir. Rep. 61 257
Brown v. Kempton (1850), 19 L. J. C. P. 169 82
Brown v. Langley (1842), 6 Soott, N. R. 249 ; 4 M. & Gr. 466 ; 12 L. J.
C. P. 62 755
Brown v. Leeson (1792), 2 H. Bl. 43 ; 3 R. R. 341 621
Brown v. M'Dermott (1840), 2 Ir. Eq. R. 438 869
Brown v. Payson (18;«), 6 New Hamp. 443 609, 611
Browin). Pearson (1882), 21 Ch. D. 716; 46 L. T. 411 ; 30 W. R. 436 . . . 5i4
Brown v. Perkins (1843), 2 Hare, 540 ; 11 L. J. Ch. 307 605
Brown v. Philpot (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 285 261
Brown v. Pinkham (1836), 18 Pick. 172 1196
Brown v. Robins (1859), 4 H. & N. 186 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 250 114
Brown v. Symons (1860), 29 L. J. C. P. 251 ; 8 C. B. N. S. 208 ; 6 Jur.
N. S. 1079 ; 8 W. R. 460 152
Brown v. Thornton (1837), 1 N. & P. 339 ; 6 A. & E. 185 ; 6 L. J. K. B. 82 62
Brown V. Wood (1820), 17 Mass. 68 122
Brown v. Woodman (1834), 6 C. & P. 206 300, 356
Brown ?;. Wren, 16 R. (Feb.) 281 ; (1895) 1 Q. B. 390; 43 W. R. 351. .^(^i. [169]
Brown's case (1673), 1 Vent. 243 ; 1 Russ. C. &M. 709; 2 Russ. C. &M.984 893
Browne D. Gumming (1829), 10 B. &C. 70; 5 M. &R. lis 986
Browne v. Gisbome (1843), 2 Dowl. K. S. 963 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 297 ;
7 Jur. 328 836
Browne v. Murray (1825), Ry. & M. 254 272
BrowneUt). Bonney (1841), 4P. & D. 523; 1 Q. B. 39 ; 5 Jur. 6 521
Browning v. Biidd (1848), 6 Moo. P. C. C. 430 140
Browning v. Paris (1839), 5 M. & W. 117 ; 7 Dowl. 398 ; 2 H. & H. 66 ;
8 L. J. Ex. 222 714
Browning v. Sabiu (1877), 6 Ch. D. 511 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 728 ; 25 W. R. 602 834
Brownsword v. Edwards (1751), 2 Ves. sen. 245 960, 961, 1116, 1132
Bruce v. Bruce (1790), 2 Bos. & P. 230, n 179
Bruce v. Nioolopulo (1855), 11 Ex. 129 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 321 129, 309
Bruce v. Wait (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 39 ; 1 Scott, N. R. 81 ; 9L. J. C. P. 237 7
Bruin v. Knott (1842), 12 Sim. 452-456 ; 6 Jur. 885 7
Brune v. Thompson (1842), 2 Q. B. 789 : 2 G. & D. 110 ; Car. & M. 34 ;
11 L. J. Q. B. 131 17, 443, 792
Brunner, In re (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 572 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 606 ; 57 L. T.
418 ; 35 W. R. 719 ; 4 Morr. B. R. 255 340
Brunsden v. Humphrey (1884), 11 Q. B. D. 712 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 766 .... 1120
Brunswick, D. of, «. Harmer (1850), 3 C. & K. 10 929
BrunswickGasCo.s. United Gas Co. (1893), 35 Am. St. R. 385 Add.\).69)^
Brutt V. Pioard (1824), R. & M. 37 1196
Bryan v. Child (1860), 6 Ex. 368 ; 1 L. M. & P. 429 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 264 ;
14 Jur. 510 735
Bryan v. WagstafE (1825), 8 Dowl. & R. 208 ; 5 B. & C. 314 ; R. & M. 329 ;
2 C. & P. 126 315
Bryan v. AVhite (1850), 2 Roberts. 315 700
Bryan v. Winwood (1808), 1 Tauu. 208 ; 9 R. R. 751 116, 233
Bryan Reynolds, Re (1873), 42 L. J. P. & M. 20 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 35 ;
28 L. T. 144 ; 21 W. R. 512 709
Bryant v. Foot (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 497 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 217 ; 9 B. & S.
444 ; 18 L. T. 687 ; 16 W. R. 808 16, 123
Vol. I. ends with, page 635,
xliv TABLE OP CASES CITED.
Bryant v. Herbert (1877), 3 C. P. D. 189, 389 ; 47 L. J. 0. P. 670 ; 39
ii. T. 17 ; 26 W. B. 898 40
Bryant ». Lefever (1879), 4 C. P. D. 172; 48 L. J. C. P. 380 ; 40 L. T.
679 ; 27 W. R. 592 76, 125
Bryoe, Re (1839), 2 Curt. 325 700
Brydges v. Branfill (1841), 12 Sim. 334 ; 11 L. J. Ch. 12 348
Brydges v. Walford (1817). 6 M. & Sel. 42 ; 1 Stark. 389 ; 18 R. R. 787, n. 549
Bucoleuoh, D. of, «. Met. Bd. of Works (lh72), L. R. 6 H. L. 418 ; 41
L. J. Ex. 137 ; 27 L. T. 1 612
Buchanan v. Ruoker (1808), 1 Camp. 63 ; 9 East, 192 ; 9 R. R. 531 . .1147, 1154
Buoher v. Jarratt (1802), 3 Bos. & P. 143 289, 290, 318
Buck V. Robson (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 686 ; 39 L. T. 325 ; 26 W. R. 804 ; 48
L. J. Q. B. 250 651
Buckell V. Blenkhom (1846), 5 Hare, 131 693
Backet v. Church (1840), 9 C. & P. 209 44, 710
Buckhouse v. Crossby (1737), 2 Eq. Cas. Ab. 32, pi. 44 752
Buckingham, D. of, ». Com. of Inl. Rev. (1851), 2 L. M. & P. 311 ; 6 Ex.
464 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 269 277
Buckland v. Johnson (1854), 15 C. B. 145 ; 2 C. L. R. 784 ; 23 L. J. C. P.
204; 18 Jur. 775 191,1115, 1118, 1120
Buckle V. Knoop (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 333 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 49, 223 ; 16 L. T.
571; 15W. K. 999 157, 781
Buckler v. Millerd (1689), 2 Ventr. 107 746
Buckley v. Beardslee (1819), 2 South. 670 669
Buckley v. Cooke (1864), 1 K. & J. 29 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 24 ; 3 Eq. Rep. 138 ;
3 W. R. 33 940
Buckley v. Littlebury (1711), 3 Bro. P. C. 43 805
Buckley v. V. S. (1846), 4 How. Sup. Ct. Rep. 258 1050
Buckmaster v. Meiklejohn (1861), 8 Ex. 634 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 242 631
Buckmaster v. Russell (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 745 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 155 712
Bnckmasters v. Cox (1839), 2 Ir. L. R. 101 870
Buokminster v. Perry (1808), 4 Mass. 693 ■. 931
Buckton «. Higgs (1879), 4 Ex. D. 174 ; 40 L. T. 755 ; 27 "W. R. 803 ... . 636
BuU V. Loveland (1830), 10 Pick. 9, 14 698, 969
Bulls. O'Sumvan (1871), L.R.6Q.B. 209; 40 L.J. Q.B. 141; 24L. T.130 546
Bull V. Parker (1843), 2 Dowl. N. S. 345 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 93 ; 7 Jur. 282. . 48
Bullen V. Michel (1816), 4 Dowl. 297; 2 Price, 399; 16 R. R. 77.. 430, 431,
441
Bulley V. Bulley (1876), L. R. 9 Ch. 739 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 79 ; 30 L. T. 848 ;
22 "W". R. 779 93
BuUockt). 'Corrie'(or'Corry) (1878),'3 'q.'b. d'. '366 ;' 47 L. J. Q. B."352";
38 L. T. 102 ; 26 "W. R. 330 599, 602
Buhner v. Norris (1860), K. & G. 321 ; 9 C. B. N. S. 19 ; 30 L. J. C. P.
25 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 342 ; 3 L. T. 470 ; 9 W. R. 122 683
Bunbury v. Bunbury (1833), 2 BeaT. 173 ; 8 L. J. Ch. 297 ; 3 Jur. 644 . . 699
Bunbury ». Matthews (1844), 1 C. & K. 382 147
Bunn V. Bunn (1864), 4 De G. J. & S. 316 ; 10 L. T. 211 ; 3 N. R. 679 ;
12 W. R. 561 965
Bunn V. Markham (1841), 2 Marsh. 532 ; 7 Taunt. 224 ; Holt, 352 ; 17 R.
R. 497 638
Bunsby v. Bailly {see Bumaby v. Baillie).
Bunting's case (1686), 4 Co. Rep. 29 1103
Burchard v. Macfarlane, (1891) 1 Q. B. 408 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 687 ; 66 L. T.
282 ; 39 W. R. 694 856, 857
BurcheU v. Clark (1876), 2 C. P. D. 88 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 116 ; 36 L. T. 690 ;
26 W. R. 334 300
Burchaeld v. Moore (1854), 3 E. & B. 683 ; 2 C. L. R. 1308 ; 22 L. J. Q. B.
261 ; 18 Jur. 727 1194
Burder ». O'Neill (1863), 9 Jur. N. S. 1109 ; 9 L. T. 232 632, 884
Burdick v. Hunt (1873), 43 Ind. 38 616
Burgess v. Burgess (1817), 2 Hagg. Con. 227 503
Burgess V. Clements (1815), 4 M. & S. 306 ; Holt, 211, n. ; 1 Stark. 251, n. ;
16 R. R. 473 162
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xlv
PAOE
Burgees v. Lane (1824), 3 Greenl. 165 494
Burgess v. Langley (184a), 5 M. & G. 722 ; 1 D. & L. 21 ; 6 Scott, N.'r.
518 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 257 . 617
Burgess v. Wiokham (1864), 3 B. & 8. 669 ; 33 L. j. Q. B.'i?" .......... 770
Burghart «.. Angerstein (1834), 6 C. & P. 690 506, 1170
Burghart v. Hall (1839), 4 M. & W. 727 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 235 48
Burgoyne r. Showier (1844), 1 Roberts. 5 697
Burke v. Moore (1875), 9 Ir. E. Eq. 609 697
Burleigh v. Stibbs (1793), 5 T. R. 465 300
Burling v. Paterson, 1792 (should be 1840), 9 C. & P. 570 ']."'!! ! 134
Burlinson v. Hall (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 347 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 222 ; 60 L. T.
723; 32 "W. R. 492 ; 48 J. P. 216 .. 651
Burls «). Burls (1868), L. R. 1 P. & D. 472 ; 36L. J.P. &M. lis-'feLT.
677; 15 W. R. 1090 ; 307
Burmah Trading Corp. Lim. v. Mirza Mahomed Ally, &o.'(1878)' L R.
5 Ind. App. 130 ...... 686
Burmester v. Norris (1851), 6 Ex. 796 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 43 ! ! ! ! 160
Bum V. Boulton (1846), 2 C. B. 476 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 97 714 717
Burnaby v. Baillie (1889), 42 Ch. D. 282 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 842 : 61 L. T. 634 ; '
38W. R. 125 309,621,1054
Bumby v. Rollitt (1847), 16 M. &W. 644; 17 L. J. Ex. 190; 11 Jur. 827.. 776
Bumham v. Bennett (1847), 1 De G. & Sm. 513 ; 2 Colly. 260 134
Burnham v. Webster (1846), 1 Woodb. & M. 176 1145, 1148, 1150, 1155
Bumside v. Dayrell (1849), 3 Ex. 224 ; 6 RaUw. Cas. 67 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 46.. 541
Burr's case (18o7), Evidence for Defendant, p. 2 616 619
BuiT». Harper (1816), Holt, 420; 17 R. R. 656 .'..". !!l220 'l221
Burrell v. Nicholson 1832), 1 Myl. & K. 680 906
BurreU v. Nicholson (1833), 1 M. & Rob. 306 ; 6 C. & P. 202 272, 996, 1183
Burrough v. Martin (1809), 2 Camp. 112 ; 11 R. R. 679 923 925
Burrows ». Baker (1869), I. R. 3 Eq. 596 711
Bursill V. Tanner (1885), 16 Q. B. D. 1 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 53 ; 63 L.' T.'445 ;
34 W. R. 35 321, 592 698, 609, 610
Burstall v. Beyfus (1884), 26 Ch. D. 35 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 566 ; 50 L. T. 542 •
32W. R. 418 Sgg
Burt, Ex parte (1842), 2 Mont. D. & De G. 666 869 870
Burt V. Burt (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 133 ; 2 S. & T. 88 ; 2 L. T. 439 ■ '
8W. R. 552 149
Burt V. Palmer (1803), 5 Eap. 145 ; 10 R. R. 707, n '.!!.'."'.!!!.' 498
Burt V. "Walker (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 697 328, 329, 1214, 1216
Burtenshaw v. Gilbert (17 74), 1 Cowp. 62 708
Burton and Saddlers' Co., Re (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 62 ; 10 W. R.'s?'." ' 994
Burton ». Ld. Damley (1869). L. R. 8 Eq. 576, n 510
Burtons. Griffiths (1843), 11 M. & W. 817 38
Burton v. Issitt (1821), 5 B. & Aid. 267 ...'. 386
Burton v. Newbery (1875), 1 Ch. D. 234; 45 L. J. Ch. 202; 34 L.'t.'i5"-
24W.R.388 ' 701
Burton D. Payne (1827), 2 C. & P. 620 !.'."'.'..'.'.'! 311
Burton v. Plummer (1834), 4 N. & M. 315 ; 2 A. & E. 341 .'. .'.V.'9'24 'o'ce 927
Burton v. Reevell (1847), 16 M. & W. 307 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 86 ; 11 Jur. 71 . ' 648
Bury V. Blogg (1848), 12 Q. B. 877, 882 ; 18 L. J. Q- B. 85 • 15, 192
Bury V. Oppenheim (1859), 26 Beav. 694 136
Bush ff. Pox (1856), 6 H. L. Cas. 707 ; 2.t L. J. Ex. 261 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1029 43
Bush V. Green (1837), 1 Scott, 289 ; 4 Bing. N. C. 41 ; 3 Hodges, 265 ;
1 Jur. 844 ; 7 L. J. C. P. 38 227
Bush V. Martin (1863), 2 H. & C. 311 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 17 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 347-
9 L. T. N. S. 610 ; 12 W. R. 204 713
Bushel V. Wheeler (1844), 15 Q. B. 543, n. ; 8 Jur. 532 689 692
Bushell's case (1670), 6 How. St. Tr. 999, 1008, 1013, 1014 25
Bussard v. Levering (1821), 6 Wheat. 102 155
Bussey v. Bamett (1842), 9 M. & W. 312 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 646 ; 11 L. J. Ex
211 222
Bustros V. White (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 423 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 642 ; 34 L T
865; 24W. R. 721 4,598, 1182, 1187
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
Xlvi TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAQB
Batcher v. Jarratt (1802), 3 Bos. & P. 146 289, 290, 318
Butcher v. Nash (1889), 61 L. T. 72 671
Butcher v. Steuart (1843), 11 M. & W. 857 ; 1 D. & L. 608 ; 12 L. J. Ex.
391 ; 7 Jur. 774 677
Butcher's case (1601), Cro. EKz. 821 1019
Butchers' Co. v. Joues (1794), 1 Eap. 160 910
Bute V. James (1886), 33 Ch. D. 157 ; 65 L. J. Ch. 668 ; 66 L. T. 133 ; 34
W. B. 754 363
Butler V. Allnutt (181 6), 1 Stark. 222 167
Butler V. Carver (1818), 2 Stark. 433 910
Butler V. Ford (1833), 1 C. & M. 662 ; 3 Tyr. 677; 2 L. J. Ex. 286 ; M. C.
109 148
Butler V. Gale (1866), 27 Vem. 739 741
Butler V. Moore (1802), MacNally, 263 696
Butler V. Mountgarret (1859), 7 H. L. Cas. 646, 647 146, 164, 409, 417, 423
Butler i;. Wright (1829), 2 Wend. 369 454
Buttemere v. Hayes (1839), 5 M. & W. 456 ; 7 Dowl. 489 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 44 . . 682
Butterworth, Re {see Ex parte EusseU).
Butts V. Swart-wood (1823), 2 Cowen, 431 903
Buxton V. Cornish (1844), 1 Dowl. & L. 585 ; 12 M. & W. 426 ; 13 L. J.
Ex. 91 286
Buxton V. North East. Ey. Co. (1869), L. R. 3 Q. B. 549 ; 37 L. J. Q. B.
258 ; 18 L. T. 795 ; 16 W. R. 1124 ; 9 B. & S. 824 772
Buxton V. Rust (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 279 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 173 ; 27 L. T. 210 ;
20 W. R. 1014 673
Byamv. Booth (1814), 2 Price, 234, n , 1040
Byne, Ex parte (1813), 1 V. & B. 320 866
Byrd, Re (1842), 3 Curt. 117 697
Byrd V. Nunn (1877), 5 Ch. D. 781 ; 7 Ch. D. 284 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 1 ; 37
L. T. 585 ; 26 W. R. 101 224
Byrne v. Boadle (1863), 2 H. & C. 722 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 13 163
Byrne v. Frere (1828), 2 Moll. 167 327
Byrne v. Harvey (1838), 2 M. & Roh. 89 314
Byrom v. Thompson (1839), 3 P. & D. 71 ; 11 A. & E. 31 ; 3 Jur. 1121. .1193, 1196
Bywater v. Richardson (1834), 3 N. & M. 748 ; 1 A. & B. 608 769
Caballeeo v. Slater (1854), 14 C. B. 300 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 67 669
Caddick v. Skidmore (1858), 3 Jur. N. S. 1185 673 682
Cadge, Re (1868), 37 L. J. P. & M. 16 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 543 ; 17 L. T.
484 ; 16 W. R. 406 142
Cadogan, Re, Cadogan «. Palagi (1883), 25 Ch. D. 154; 53 L.J. Ch. 207;
49 L. T. 666 ; 32 W. R. 57 146
Oahn Re (1877), 3 Redf. (N. T.) 81 76fi
Caldbeck v. Boon (1872), 7 Ir. R. C. L. 32 611
Calder v. Dobell (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 486 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 224 ; 25 L. T
129 ; 19 W. R. 409, 978 758
Calder ». Halket (1839), 3 Moo. P. C. C. 28 1099
Caldwell v. Hunter (1848), 10 Q. B. 85, 86 " 19
Caldwell v. Parker (1869), Ir. R. 3 Eq. 619 ] 1194
Caledonian Ey. Co. f. Sprot (1856), 2 Macq. 449; 1 Paterson, 663 114
Call V. Dunning (1803), 4 East, 63 ; 5 Esp. 16 1208
Callaghan v. Pepper (1840), 2 Ir. Eq. R. 399 645
Callan, Re (1874), Ir. R. 9 Eq. 484 307
Callans v. Sherry (1832), Alo. & Nap. 126 870
Galley v. Richards (1864), 19 Beav. 401 600 602 607
Callow V. Howie (1847), 1 De G. & Sm. 631 ; 17 L. J. Ch. 71 ; 11 Jur. 984. . ' 495
Cahnady v. Rowe (1848), 6 C. B. 861, 878, 879 112 124
Calvert ». Bovill (1798), 7 T. R. 523; 4 R. R. 617 1147 1149
Calvert v. Flower (1836), 7 C. & P. 386 966, 1191
Calvert v. Scinde Ry. Co. (1866), 18 C. B. N. S. 306 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 245 ;
13 W. R. 430 819
The refereneet are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xlvii
PAGE
Calye'B case (1583), 8 Eep. 32a ; 1 Smith, L. C. 132 162
Calypso, The (1856), Swabey, 28 1122
Cambrian Mining Co., Ee (1881), 20 Ch. D. 376 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 221 ; 30
W. E. 283 846
Cameron's Coalbrook Ey. Co., Ee (1858), 25 Beav. 1 320, 321
Cameron v. Lightfoot (1777), 2 W. Bl. 1190 551, 872, 873
Camfield v. Bird (1852), 3 C. & K. 56 244
Cammell i/. Sewell (1860), 3 H. & N. 646 ; 5 H. & N. 728 ; 29 L. J. Ex.
350 1101, 1103, 1149
Camoys, Lord v. Blundell (1848), 1 H. L. Cas. 786 794, 797, 798
Camoys Peerage (183^), 6 C. & F. 789 424, 425, 426
Campbell, Ex parts, Cathoart, In re (1870), L. E. 5 Ch. 703 ; 18 W. E.
1056 592, 610
Campbells. Att.-Cen. (1867), L. E. 2 Ch. 671 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 600; 15 W.
E. 916 858
Campbell v. Campbell (1866), 36 L. J. Ch. 241 ; L. E. 1 Eq. 383 ; 13 L. T.
667; UW. E. 327; 12Jur. 118 806
Campbell v. Christie (1817), 2 Stark. 64 1193
Campbell®. DaJhousie, Earl of (1869), L. E. 1 H. L. Sc. 462 ; 22 L. T. 879 352
Campbell v. Hodgson (1819), Grow, 74 757
Campbell v. MoConaghey (1870), L. E. 6 Eq. 20 144
Campbell v. Riokards (1833), 6 B. & Ad. 840 ; 2 N. & M. 542 933, 934
CampbeU «>. Twemlo-w (1814), 1 Price, 88 890
Campbell v. Webster (1845), 2 C. B. 258 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 4 ; 9 Jur. 992 . . 521
Campion's case (1578), cited 7 Howell, St. Tr. 1205 (E. v. Cellier) 573
Canada's Appeal (1880), 47 Conn. 450 696
Canada, West of, OU Co., Ee (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 683 ; 6 Ch. Div. 109 ;
25 W. E. 787 345, 917
Canal Bk. v. Bk. of Albany (1841), 1 Hill, N. Y. E. 287 641
Cann». CUpperton (1839), 10 A. & E. 582 ; 2 P. & D. 560 226
Cannam v. Farmer (1849), 2 C. & K. 746 ; 3 Ex. 698 271
Cannan v. Hartley (1850), 9 C. B. 634 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 323 ; 14 Jur. 577. . 660
Canning's, Eliz., case (1754), 19 How. St. Tr. 632 877
Cannons. People (1893), 36 Am. St. E. 295 Add. [635]
Cape Copper Co. v. Comptoir d'Esoompte (1890), 38 W. E. 763 343
Capital Fire Ins. Assoc, Ee (1883), 24 Ch. U. 408 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 71 ; 32
W. E. 260 321
Capron v. Capron (1874), L. E. 17 Eq. 288 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 677 ; 22 W. E.
347; 29 L. T. 826 139
CardweU ». Martin (1808), 9 East, 190 ; 1 Camp. 79, 180 1 194, 1203
Carew v. White (1842), 5 Beav. 172 1184
Carey v. Adkins (1814), 4 Camp. 92 503
Carey v. Pitt (1797), Pea. Add. Cas. 130 1221, 1222
Cargill V. Bower (1878), 10 Ch. D. 602 ; 47 L. J. Oh. 649 ; 38 L. T. 779 ;
26 W. E. 716 192
Cariss v. Tattersall (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 890 ; 3 Scott, N. E. 257 1193
Carlisle, Mayor of v. Blamire (1807), 8 East, 487 ; 9 E. E. 491 300, 552
Carlisle v. Eady (1824), 1 C. & P. 234 910
CarUsle v. Whaley (1867), L. E. 2 H. L. 391 ; 16 W. E. 229 738
Carlos V. Brook (1804), 10 Ves 49 974
Carmalt v. Post (1837), 8 Watts, 411 930
Carmarthen, Mayor of v. Lewis (1834), 6 C. & P. 608 190, 643
Carnarvon, Lord v. ViUebois (1844), 13 M. & W. 313 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 233. . 397,
405, 406
Came v. NiohoU (1835), 1 Bing. N. C. 430 ; 1 Scott, 466 443, 444
Carne ». Steer (1860), 5 H. & N. 628 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 281 626
Carpenter v. Buller (1841), 8 M. & W. 212 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 393 89, 93, 94
Carpenter v. Provid. Wash. Ins. Co. (1846), 4 How. Sup. Ct. E. 222 .... 750
Carpenter v. WaU (1840), 3 P. & D. 457 ; 11 A. & E. 803 254, 969, 973
Carpenters' Co. v. Hayward (1780), 1 Dougl. 374 2
Carpmael ii.Powis (1846-6), 1 Ph. 687; 16 L. J. Ch. 275 592, 593, 699
Cairv. Bnrdiss(1835), 1 C. M. &E. 782; 6Tyr.309; 4 L. J. Ex. 60.. 1211, 1212
Yol. I. ends with page 635,
xlviii TABLE OP CASES CITED.
PAGB
Carr v. Griffith {see Ee Griffith).
Carr v. Jackson (1852), 21 L. J. Ex. 137 ; 7 Ex. 382 759
Carr v. Lond. & N. W. Ry. Co. (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 307 ; 44 L. J. C. P.
109; 31L. T. 785; 23 W. R. 747 648
Carr v. Mead (1858), 12 Gray, 166 616
Carr v. Montefiore (1864), 6 B. & S. 408 ; 33 L. J. Q. B. 256 741
Carr v. Mostyn (1860), 5 Ex. 69 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 249 397, 510, 1169
Carrier Dove, The (1863), B. & L. 113 ; 2 Moore, P. C. C. (N. S.) 261 ... . 178
Oarrigy v. Brook (1871), 6 Ir. R. 0. L. 501 730
Carrington v. Comock (1829), 2 Sim. 567 327
Carrington v. Jonea (1824), 2 Sim. & St. 136, 140 447
Carrington v. Roots (1837), 2 M. & W. 248 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 95 687
Carroll v. Co-weU (1838), 1 Jehh & Sy. 43 670
Carroll v. The State (1893), 40 Am. St. R. 786 Add. [968]
Carruthera v. Graham (1841), 9 Dowl. 947 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 364 328, 349
Carskadden v. Poorman (1840), 10 Watts, 82 422
Carstaira v. Stewart (1734), Morison's Presumptiona, XVI 170
Carter v. Boehm (1766), 1 W. Bl. 593 ; 3 Burr. 1905 931, 933, 934
Carter v. Carter (1858), 27 L. J. Ch. 74, 84, 85 ; 3 K. & J. 618 ; 4 Jur.
• N. S. 63 94
Carter f. Leeds Daily Newa (1876), W. N. 1876, at p. 11 963
Carter v. Ld. Coleraine (1740), cited 2 BaU & B. 384 ; Barnard. Ch. R. 126.. 482
Carter v. Downiah (1658), Garth. 83 5
Carter v. James (1844), 13 M. & W. 137 ; 2 Dowl. &L. 236 ; 13 L. J. Ex.
373; 8 Jur. 912 532, 534, 1132
Carter v. Jones (1833), 1 M. & Rob. 281 271
Carter v. Muroot (1768), 4 Burr. 2163 Ill
Carter v. Pryke (1791), Peake, 95 230
Carter v. Tousaaint (1822), 1 Dowl. & R. 515 ; 6 B. & A. 855 689, 690
Carter v. White (1882), 20 Ch. D. 226 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 465 ; 46 L. T. 236 ;
30 W. R. 466 1205
Carter and Croat's oaae (1585), Godb. 33 1161
Cartwright v. Cartwright (1878), 26 W. R. 684 938
Cartwright v. Green (1803), 2 Leach, C. C. 952 ; 8 Ves. 405 ; 7 R. R. 99. .<592, 960
Carver, Re (1842), 3 Curt. 29 698
Carver J). Jacfoon (1830), 4 Pet. 83 88, 509
Cary v. Gerrish (1801), 4 Esp. 9 154
Case V. Reeve (1817), 14 Johns. 81 1112
Casement v. Fulton (1845), 5 Moore, P. C. C. 140 ; 3 Moore, Im.App. 395 . . 693, 694
Caahill v. Wright (1866), 6 E. & B 891 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1072 162
Casmore, Re (1869), L. R. 1 P. 653 ; 38 L. J. P. 64 ; 20 L. T. N. S. 497 ;
17 W. R. 627 699
Cassidy v. Firman (1867), Ir. R. 1 C. L. 8 712
Caaaidy v. Steuart (1841), 2 Scott, N. R. 432 ; 2 M. & Gr. 437 ; 9 Dowl.
P. C. 366; 6 Jur. 25 4
Casson v. Churohley (1884), 53 L. J. Q. B. 335 ; 50 L. T. 568 731
Casson v. O'Brien (1842), Arm. M. & O. 263 977
Caatt). Poyaer(1856), 2Sm. &G. 369; 3Jur.N.S. 38; 26L. J. Ch. 93, 353 831
Caatle v. Downton (1879), 5 C. P. D. 56 ; 49 L. J. C. P. 6 ; 41 L. T. 528 ;
28 W. R. 257 736
Caatle v. Fox (1871), L. R. 11 Eq. 542 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 302 ; 24 L. T. 536 ;
19 W. R. 840 784, 786
Caatle ». Sworder (1861), 6 H. & N. 828 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 310 ; 8 Jur. N. S.
233 ; 4 L. T. 865 ; 9 W. E. 697 690
Caatlebar Guard. *. Ld. Luoau (1849), 13 Ir. L. R. 44 1173
Castleden v. Castleden (1861), 9 H. L. C. 186 ; 4 Macq. 159 ; 31 L. J. Mat.
103 ; 5 L. T. 164 129
Castrique v. Imrie (1860), 8 C. B. N. S. 405 ; SOL. J. Q. B. 163 ; 30 L. J.
C. P. 177; 4L. T. 143; 9 W. R. 455 1103
Castrique v. Imrie (1869), 39 L. J. C. P. 350 ; L. E. 4 H. of L. 414 ; 23
L. T. 48; 19 W. E. 1 1103, 1147
Gates V. Hardacre (1811), 3 Taun. 424 ; 12 E. E. 678 962
Cates:). Winter (1789), 3 T. R. 306 310, 312
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED, xlix
PAdB
Catherina Maria, The (1866), L. R. I Adm. 63 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 380 1049
Catherwood v. Caslon (1844), 13 M. & W. 261, 265 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 433 ;
8 Jur. 1076 149
Catling V. Skoulding (1795), 6 T. R. 189 716
Catling V. King (1877), 6 Ch. D. 660 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 384 ; 36 L. T. 526 ; 25
W. R. 550 671
Caton V. Caton (1849), 7 Notes of Cas. (Eoc. & Mar.) 28 185, 503
Catoni!. Caton (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. U7; 36 L. J. Ch. 886 ; 16 W. R. 1..674,
679, 680
Caton V. Hamilton (1889), 53 J. P. 504 1168
Caton V. Lenox (1827), 5 Rand. 31, 36 354
Catt V. Howard (1820), 3 Stark. 3 483, 494, 926
Cattell». Ireson (1858), E. B. & E. 91 ; 27 L. J. M. C. 167 ; 1 Jnr. N. S.
560 884
Catton V. Simpson (1855), 8 A. & E. 136 ; 3 N. & P. 248 1194
Cattrall, Re (1863), 3 S. & T. 419 ; 33 L. J. P. 106 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 136 . . 141
Caunoe v. Spanton (1844), 7 M. & Ur. 903 152
Cavau V. Stewart (1 816), 1 Stark. 525 1147
Cave V. Hastings (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 125 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 576 ; 45 L. T.
348 ; 46 J. P. 56 672, 673
Cave V. Mackenzie (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 564 ; 37 L. T. 218 729
Cave V. Mills (1862), 7 H. & N. 913 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 265 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 363 ;
6 L. T. 650 642
Cave V. Mountain (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 260 ; 1 Scott, N. R. 132 ; 9 L. J.
M. C. 90 36, 1100
Oawley v. Furnell (1852), 12 C. B. 291 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 197 ; 16 Jur. 908. . 712
Cawthome v. Cordrey (1863), 13 C. B. N. S. 406 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 152 ... . 681
Cazenove v. Vaughan (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 4 ; 14 R. R. 377 325
Central News Co. v. East. News Tel. Co. (1884), 53 L. J. Q. B. 236 ; 60
L. T. 235; 32W. R. 493 346,855
Chabbook's case (1804), 1 Mass. 144 562
Chad V. Tilsed (1821), 2 B. & B. 403 ; 5 Moore (C. P.), 185 791
Chadwick v. Chadwiok (1863), L. R. 8 Ch. 926 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 805 ; 29 L. T.
284 961, 970
Chadwick v. City of Dub. St. Pack. Co. (1856), 6 El. & Bl. 771 ; 3 Jur.
N. S. 207 6
Chadwick v. Turner (1866), 34 Beav. 634 ; 34 L. J. Ch. 366 ; 35 L. J. Ch.
349; 11 Jur. N. S. 333 738
Chalmers v. Shaokell (1834), 6 C. & P. 475 105
Chamberlain ». King {or King v. Chamberlain) (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 474 ;
40 L. J. C. P. 273 ; 24 L. T. N. S. 736 ; 19 W. R. 931 226
Chamberlain v. Stoneham (1889), 61 L. T. 560 ; 38 W. R. 107 817
Chambers v. Bemasconi (1831), 1 C. M. & R. 347 ; 4 Tyr. 531 ; 3 L. J.
Ex. 373 444, 4.58
Chambers v. Kelly (1873), 7 Ir. C. L. R. 231 784
Chambers V. Mason (1858), 5 C. B. N. S. 59 ; 28 L. J. C. P. 10; 4 Jur. N.
S. 1037 607
Chambers v. "Wood (1848), 2 Notes of Cases (Eoc. & Mar.), 485 140
Chamley*. Lord Dunsany (1807), 2 Sch. & Lef . 718 1123
Chamney, Re (1849), 7 Notes of Cases (Ecc. & Mar.), 70 699
Champian v. Atkinson (1672), 3 Keb. 90 232
Champion v. Plummer (1805), 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 262 ; 5 Esp. 240 ; 8 Rev.
R. 795 671
Champion v. Terry (1822), 3 B. & B. 295 ; 7 Moore, C. P. 130 307
Champneys v. Peck (1816), 1 Stark. 404 157, 464
Chandler v. Grieves (1812), 2 H. Bl. 606, n. ; 6 T. R. 325, n. ; 3 R. R. 625. . 4, 21
Chandler v. Home (1842), 2 M. & Rob. 423 918
Chandler v. Howell (1877), 4 Ch. D. 651 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 25 ; 35 L. T. 692 ;
25 W. R. 55 684
Chandos, Marquis of, v. Corns, of Inl. Rev. (1851), 6 Ex. 464 ; 20 L. J.
Ex. 269 ; 2 L. M. & P. 311 277
Chandos Peerage (1791), Pari. Min. 27 423, 424, 425, 426, 427
Chant V. Brown (1851-2), 9 Hare, 790 692, 699, 603
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
1 TABLE OF CASES CITED.
TAOB
Chanter e. HopMns (1838), 4 M. & "W. 399 ; 1 H. & H. 377 ; 3 Jur. 58 . . 777
Chapel V. Hioks (1833), 2 0. & M. 214 ; 4 Tyr. 43 ; 3 L. J. Ex. 38 223
ChapHn v. Levy (1854), 2 C. L. R. 566 ; 9 Ex. 531 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 117. .318, 476
Chaplin v. Rogers (1800), 1 East, 192 ; 6 R. R. 249 691
'Chapman, Re, Ex parte Johnson (1884), 26 Ch. D. 338 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 763 ;
60 L. T. 214 ; 32 W. R. 693 129
Chapman ». Beard (1797), 2 Anst. 942; 4 R. R. 875 521
Chapman ». Callis (1861), 9 0. B. N. S. 769 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 241 ; 3 L. T.
890; 9W. R. 375; 7 Jur. N. S. 995 661
Chapman v. Chapman (1817), 2 Conn. 347 41^
Chapman v. Coffin (1860), 14 Gray, 464 954
Chapman v. Cowlan (1810), 13 East, 10 ; 12 R. R. 294 395
Chapman v. Dayis (1841), 1 Dowl. N. S. 239 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 319 ; 3 M. &
Gr. 609 817, 832
Chapman^. Emden(1841), 9 0. &P. 717 272
Chapman v. Keane (1835), 3 A. & E. 193 : 4 N. & M. 607 32
Chapman v. Monm. Ry. & Can. Co. (1857), 2 H. & N. 267 ; 27 L. J.
Ex. 97 1102
Chapman v. Rawson (1845), 8 Q. B. 673 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 225 271
Chapman v. Searle (1825), 3 Pick. 38, 44 544
Chapman v. Speller (1850), 14 Q. B. 621 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 239 ; 14 Jur. 652. 775
Chapman v. Walton (1833), 10 Bing. 57 ; 3 M. & Scott, 389 934
Chappell V. Purday (1845), 14 M. & W. 303 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 258 1036
Chappie V. Cooper (1844), 13 M. & W. 252 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 286 49
Charkieh, The(1878), 42L. J.Adm. 17; L. R. 4 A. & E. 69; 28L.T. 513.. 21
Charlotta, The (1814), 1 Dods. Adm. 392 79
Charlter v. Barret (1790), Peake, 32 244
Charlton v. Coomhes (1868), 32 L. J. Oh. 284 ; 4 Giff. 372; 8 L. T. 81 ;
11 W. R. 604 ; 1 New R. 547 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 634 592, 603, 605
Charlton «. Hindmarsh (1861), 1 S. & T. 519 ; 8 W. R. 269 ; 8 H. L. Cas.
160 695, 700
Charlton v. "Watton (1834), 6 0. & P. 385 '. 245
Ohamley v. Grundy (1854), 14 0. B. 608 ; 2 0. L. R. 822 ; 23 L. J. 0. P.
121 ; 18 Jur. 653 307
Charnook v. Dewings (1853), 3 0. & K. 378 918
Charter*. Charter (1874), L. R. 2 P. 315; 4lL. J. P. 10; 20 W. R. 212. .792, 798
Chart. Mer. Bank of India i>. Dickon (1871), L. R, 3 P. 0. 574 38
Chase v. Lincoln (1807), 3 Mass. 237 931
Ohasemore v. Richards (1859), 7 H. L. Cas. 349 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 81 ; 5 Jur.
N. S. 873 ; 7 W. R. 685 125
Chasemore v. Turner (1876), L. R. 10 Q. B. 500 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 66 ; 33
L. T. 323 ; 24 "W. R. 70 711
Chatelaine. Pontigny (1859), 1 S. & T. 411 1132
Chater v. Beckett (1797), 7 T. R. 201 ; 4 R. R. 418 678
Ohatfield v. Fryer (1815), 1 Price, 263 401
Chatland v. Thornley (1810), 12 East, 544 19
Chaurand ». Angerstein (1791), Pea. 43 764
Cheese v. Lovejoy, Re Harris (1877), L. R. 2 P. D. 161 ; 25 W. R. 453 . . 705,
706, 1231
Cheesebrough, Re (1871), L. R. 12 Eq. 358 ; 40 L. J. Bauk. 79 ; 26 L. T,
76 ; 19 W. R. 973 82
Cheesmau i). Exall (1861), 6 Ex. 341 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 209 646
Cheltenham and Gt. West Union Ry. Co. v. Daniel (1841), 2 Q. B. 281,
292 ; 2 Railw. Cas. 728 641
Chemical Electric Light, &o. Co. v. Howard (1890), 160 Mass. 496 741
Cheney v. Oourtois (1863), 13 C. B. N. S. 634; 32 L. J. 0. P. 116; 9 Jur.
N. S. 1057; 7 L. T. 680 129, 916
Chennell, In re, Jones r. Chennell (1877), 8 Ch. D. 492 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 80 ;
38 L. T. 494 ; 26 W. R. 596 1233
Cherry v. Colonial Bk. of Australasia (1869), 38 L. J. P. .0. 49 ; 21 L. T.
356; 17 W. R. 1031 781
Cherry «. Heming (1849), 4 Ex. 19; 19 L. J. Ex. 63 136, 654, 667, 680
Cheslyn v. Dalby (1846), 4 T. & C. Ex. R. 238 713
The references art to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OP CASES CITED. H
PAQE
Cheater v. 'Wortley (1856), 18 0. B. 239 960
Chesterton v. Parlar (1838), 7 A. & E. 713 ; 3 N. & P. 15 ; 1 W. W. & H.
19 ; 2 Jut. 394 132
Chetwynd v. Lindon (1752), 2 Ves. sen. 450 960
Chichester v. M. of Donegal (1870), 39 L. J. Ch. 694 ; 5 L. R. Ch. 497 ; 22
L. T. 458 ; 18 W. R. 531 321, 597
Chichester, Ld. Jn., v. Coventry (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 673 ; L. R. 2 H. L.
71 ; 16 W. R. 849 806
Chifferiel v. Watson (1889), 68 L. J". Ch. 137 ; 68 L. T. 877 ; 36 W. R. 806. 912
Child V. Grace (1825), 2 C. & P. 193 527, 528
Childerston v. Barrett (1809), 1 1 East, 439 866
China St. Ship Co. v. Com. Ass. Co. (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 142 ; 51 L. J. Q. B.
132; 45L. T. 641; 30 W. R. 224 1180
Chinnock v. Ly. Ely (1866), 2 H. & M. 220 ; 4 De G. J. & S. 638 ; 34 L. J.
Ch. 399 673
Chipp V. Harris (1839), 5 M. & W. 430 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 64 734
Chipperfield «). Carter (1896), 72 L. T. 487 Add. [673]
Chirac v. Reinioker (1826), 11 "Wheat. 280, 295 610
Chieman v. Count (1841), 2 M. & G. 317 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 569 ; 10 L. J. C. P.
124 525
Chitty V. Dendy (1835), 3 A. & E. 324 ; 4 N. & M. 842 ; 1 H. & W. 169 . . 20
Chodwiok v. Palmer (1851), unreported 694
Cholmondeley, Ld. v. Ld. Clinton (1815), 19 Ves. 268; 2 Ves. & B. 113;
G. Coop. 80 ; 13 R. R. 183 ; 14 R. R. 219 603
Chri8tian,Re(1849),2Rob.Eco.Rep.llO; 7Notesof Cas. (Eco. & Mar.) 265 700
Christian v. Coombe (1796), 2 Eap. 489 552
Christie v. Richardson (1842), 10 M. & W. 688 ; 2 D. N. S. 503 ; 12 L. J.
Ex. 86 ; 6 Jur. 1069 1073
Christie v. Vuwin (1840), 3 P. &D. 204; 11 A. &E. 373 ; 4 Jur. 363. . 131, 132, 1137
Christmas v. Whinyates (1863), 32 L. J. P. & M. 73 ; 3 S. & T. 81 ; 9 Jur.
N. S. 283 ; 8 L. T. 801 ; 11 "W. R. 371 142
Chubb V. Solomons (1852), 3 C. & K. 75 617
Church i>. Imp. Gas Light and Coke Co. (1838), 6 A. & E. 846 ; 3 N. & P.
35; 1 W. W. &H. 137 639, 640, 641,' 642, 644
Churchward v. Palmer (1856), 10 Moo. P. C. C. 472 6
Churton v. Erewen (1866), 2 Dr. & Sm. 390 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 660 ; 12 L. T.
105 ; 13 W. R. 490 599
Churton v. Frewen (1877, should be 1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 660 ; 15 W. R. 569;
16 L. T. 171 818
Chute?;. Busteed (1862-3), 15 Ir. Law R. N. S. 115 654
Ciocoif. Ciocci (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 60 1119
City of Berne «. Bk. of England (1804), 9 Ves. 347 ; 7 R. R. 218 3
City of Bristol v. Wait (1834), 6 C. & P. 691 303
City of Cambridge, Re, Wood v. Smith (1874), 43 L. J. Adm. 11 ; 5 L. R.
P. C. 461 ; 30 L. T. 439 ; 22 W. R. 678 .' 178
City of London v. Clerke (1690), Carth. 181 397
City of London v. Perkins (1734), 3 Bro. P. C. 602 327
City of London Gas Light and Coke Co. v. NichoUs (1823), 2 C. & P. 365.. 641
atyof ]U:eooa(1880), 5P.D.28; 49 L.J. P. 17; 41L. T.444; 28W. R. 260 1103
Clagetti). Phillips (1842), 2 T. & C. Ch. 82 601
Clan Gordon, The (1882), 7 P. Div. 190 ; 4 Asp. M. C. 613 ; 46 L. T. 490;
30 W. R. 691 178
aanmorris, Ld. v. Mullen (1837), C. & D. Abr. Cas. 8 1214
Clapham v. Cologan (1813), 3 Camp. 382 1195
Clapham v. Langton (1865), 34 L. J. Q. B. 46 ; 5 B. & S. 729 ; 10 L. T.
875; 12 W. R. 1011 770
Clarapede v. Commercial Union Assoc, (1893) 32 W. R. 262 188
Clarges v. Sherwin (1698-9), 12 Mod. 343 1097
Claridge v. Hoare (1807), 14 Ves. 69 961
Claridge v. Mackenzie (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 143 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 726 98, 99
Claridge v. South Staffordshire Ry. Co., (1892) 1 Q. B. 422 ; 61 L. J. Q. B.
603 ; 66 L. T. 666 ; 66 J. P. 408 117
Vol. !■ tnds with page 635.
lii TABLE OP CASES CITED.
FAOB
Clark's Ex. v. Van Keimsdyk (1815), 9 Cranch, 153 495, 627
Clark, Ke (1842), 2Q. B. 630; 2G. &D. 780; 11 L. J. Q. B. 75 132
Clark V. Adie (1877), 2 App. Gas. 423 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 598 ; 37 L. T. 1 ; 26
W. R. 45 644
Clark V. Alexander (1844), 8 Scott, N. R. 161 ; 13 L. J. C. P. 133 ; 8 Jur.
496 169, 387, 716
Clark V. Big-elow (1839), 4 Shepl. 246 930
Clark V. Clark a830), 1 M. & Rob. 3 593
Clark V. Gifford (1833), 10 Wend. 310 748
Clark V. Hooper (1834), 10 Bing. 481 ; 3 L. J. C. P. 159 ; 4 M. & So.
353 713
Clark V. Hougham (1823), 2 B. & C. 149 ; 3 Dowl. & R. 322 219
Clark V. Leach (1863), 32 L. J. Ch. 290 ; 1 De G. J. & S. 409 ; 9 Jur. N. S.
610 ; 32 Beav. 14 169
Clark V. Molynenx (1876), 14 Cox, C. C. 10 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230 ; 3 Q. B.
D. 237 ; 37 L. T. 694 ; 26 "W. R. 104 Ill
Clark V. Mullick (1340), 3 Moo. P. C. C. 279 51, 52
Clark V. Vorce (1836), 15 Wend. 193 927
Clark V. Waite (1815), 12 Mass. 439 514
Clark V. Wilmot (1841), 1 T. & C. C. C. 53 437
Clark f. Wray (1886), 31 Ch. D. 68; 55 L. J. Ch. 119; 63L.T.485; 34
W. R. 69 192
Clarki). Wright (18C0), 11 Ir. C. L.R. 402 48
Clark V. York (1882), 47 L. T. 381 ; 31 W. R. 62 192
Clarke, Ex parte (1832), 2 Dea. & C. 99 8B6, 869, 870
Clarke, Re (1842), 2 Q.B. 630 ; llL. J. Q. B. 75; 2 G. &D. 780. .132, 1100,1136
Clarke, Re (1839), 2 Curt. 329 701
Clarke, Re (1858), 1 S. & T. 22 ; 27 L. J. P. & M. 18 700
Clarke v. Bradlaugh (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 63 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 46 L. T.
49 ; 30 W. R. 53 ; 46 J. P. 278, affg. 7 Q. B. D. 151 84
Clarke v. Callow (1876), 46 L. J. Q. B. 53 224
Clarke V. Clarke (1806), 6 Esp. 61 542
Clarke ». Clarke (1868) I. R. 2 C. L. 396 700
Clarke v. Clarke (1879), 3 L. R. &. 306 700
Clarke v. Courtney (1831), 5 Pet. 319, 344 429
Clarke v. Cuckfield Union (1851-2), 1 Bail Ct. C. 81 (Lowndes, M. & P.) ;
21 L. J. Q. B. 349 ; 16 Jur. 686 641, 644
Clarke v. Dickson (1868), 6 C. B. N. S. 453 ; 28 L. J. C. P. 225 ; 6 Jur.
N. S. 1027 '. 746
Clarke v. Fuller (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 24 ; 12 W. R. 671 673
Clarke «. Hall (1888), 24 L. R. Ir. 316 93
Clarke v. Roche (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 372 ; 25 W. R. 309 281
Clarke v. Roystone (1846), 13 M. & W. 752 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 143 781
Clarke v. Satfery (1824), Ry. & M. 126 921
Clarke v. Scripps (1852), 2 Roberts. 568 706
Clarkson v. Clarkson (1862), 2 S. & T. 497 ; 31 L. J. P. 143 ; 6 L. T. 606 ;
10 W. R. 781 703
Clarkson v. Woodhouae (1782), 6 T. E. 412, n. ; 3 Doug. 189 301, 433
Clary v. Clary (1841), 2 Iredell, 78 931
Clay's case (1784), 2 East, P. C. 680 148
Clay V. Crowe (1853), 8 Ex. 295 ; 9 Ex. 604 308
Clay ». Stephenson (1837), 3 A. & E. 807 ; 6 N. & M. 318 347
Clay j;. Thackrah (1839), 9 C. & P. 53 ; 2 M. & Rob. 244 475
Clay V. Yates (1856), 25 L. J. Ex. 237 ; 1 H. & N. 73 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 908.. 688
Claytons. Blakey (1798), 8 T. R. 3 ; 4 Rev. R. 575 6.54
Clayton v. Gregson (1836), 6 A. & E. 302 ; 6 N. & M. 694 763
Clayton v. Ld. Nugent (1844), 13 M. & W. 205 744, 784, 795, 796
Cieare v. Oleare (1869), L. R. 1 P. & D. 655 ; 38 L. J. P. & M. 31 ;
20 L. T. 497 ; 17 W. R. 687 140
Cleave v. Jones (1862), 7 Ex. 421 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 105 26, 27, 600, 717
Cleggv. Levy (1812), 3 Camp. 166 936
Clemenshaw ». Corp. of Dublin (1876), 10 Ir. R. C. L. 1 645
The references are topazes, not to paragraphi.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. liii
Clement's case (1868), 37 L. J. Oh. 296 ; L. R. 13 Eq. 179 ; 18 L. T. 59C. . 845
Clement, Ex parte (1822), 11 Price, 68 920
Clementi v. Golding (1809), 2 Camp. 25 ; 11 Bast, 244 16, 20
Clendon v. Dinneford (1831), 5 0. & P. 18 ; 3 Stark. Ev. 1160 13, 152
Clergy Society, Re (1856), 2 E. & J. 615 760
Clerk V. Molineux (1664), T. Ray. 100 ; 1 Lev. 159 ; 1 Sid. 268 ;' 1 Keb.' 845 871
Cleve V. Powel (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 228 602 1119
Cleveland, Duch. Dow. of, v. Meyrick (1868), 37 L. J. Ch. 125 ; 17 L. T.'
238 KQ
Clifford o. Burton (1823), 1 Bing. 199r8'Moore',C.' P.'ie".'.' .'.'.'.*.".'.'.' .'.390, 504
Clifford V. Hunter (1827), 3 C. & P. 16 ; M. & M. 103 48, 942
Clifford V. Parker (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 909 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 233 ; 10 L. J.
^9-^;^^'^ 1192, 1193
Clifford V. Turrell (1841), 1 Y. & C. C. C. 138; 9 Jur. 633; 14 L. J. Ch.
390
748
Clifton V. U. S. (1846), 4 How. S. Ct. R. 242 109, 277, 520
Clinau V. Cooke (1802), 1 Soh. & Lef. 41 ; 9 R. R. 3 679, 688, 760
CUne's case (1870), L. R. 18 Eq. 213 ; 22 W. R, 512 ; 30 L. T. 249 139
Clive V. Carew (1859), IJ. & H. 199, 207 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 685 ; 5 Jur. N. S.487. . 495
Clogstown V. Walcot (1847), 5 Notes of Cases (Ecc. & Mar.), 523 143
Cloncurry, Ld., case of (18 1 1), Maoq. H. of L. Practice, 606 602
Close, Ex parte (Ex parte. Kirk, Re Bennett) (1877), 46 L. J. Bk. 1 ; 36
L. T. 429; 26W.R. 604; 6Ch, D. 145......... 847
Closmadeuc v. Carrel (1856), 18 C. B. 36 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 216 ; 2 Jur. N. S.
474 J33
Clothiers. Chapman (1806), 14 East,' 331;' iVR.'R.'sis.'.' .'.".','.'.".".'.".*.'.".".' 398
Clowes V. Higginson (1813), 1 Ves. & B. 375 ; 12 R. R. 284 750
Clowes4;.Hmiard(1876),4Ch. D. 413; 46L. J.Ch. 271; 25 W. R. 224. .187, 192
Clunnes v. Pezzey (1807), 1 Camp. 8 108
Clyde Nav. Co. v. Barclay (1876), 1 App. Cas. 790 ; 36 L. T. 379 ........ 178
Coal Consuming Gas Co., Re, Ex parte Gover (1876), 45 L. J. Ch. 95 ;
1 Ch. D. 182 ; 33 L. T. 619 ; 24 W. R. 125 1233
Coates V. Bainbridge (1828), 5 Bing. 58 ; 2 M. & P. 142 388
Coates V. Birch (1841), 2 Q. B. 262 ; 1 G. & D. 647 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 540 ";
6 Jur. 540 g()9
Coats V. Chaplin (1842), 3 Q. B. 486 ; 11 L. J.'q.'b'. '315 ;' 2 G.'&'i)'.'652';
6 Jur. 1123 670, 692
Cobbett, Ex parte (1858), 4 Jur. N. S. 145 837, 869 870
Cobbett V. Grey (1819), 4 Ex. 729 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 137 ; 1 L. M. & P. S83. . 479
Cobbett ». Hudson (1862), 22 L. J. Q. B. 11 ; 1 E. & B. 11; 17 Jur.
^^88 909 918
Cobbett V. Kilminster (I860), 4 E. & P. 490 1224 1225
Cobbold V. Oaston (1824), 1 Bing. 399 ; 1 C. & P. 51 ;' 's 'Moore '('c'.'p.) 456 688
Cobden v. Kendrick (1791), 4 T. R. 431 ; 2 R. R. 424 607 610
Cochran v. Retberg (1800), 3 Esp. 121 763
Cochrane v. Moore (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 57 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. '377 ; 63 L "t
153 ; 38 W. R. 588 ; 64 J. P. 804 639
Cockv. Gent (1843), 12 M. & W. 234; 13 L. J. Ex. 24 ; 1 D. '& 'l.
413 227 228
Cockayne, Re (185(i), Deane, Ecc. R. 177 !!!.'!."!" 705' 708
Cooking V. Ward (1»45), 1 C. B. 858 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 245 682
Cookrill «. Sparkes (1862), 32 L. J. Ex. 118 ; 1 H. & C. 699 ; 9 Jur. N. S.
307 ; 7 L. T. 752 490
Cocks V. Nash (1833), 6 0. & P. 164 597
Cooks V. Purday (1846), 2 C. & K. 269 .'!..!!!!.'.'!! 936
Coe V. Clay (1829), 5 Bing. 440 ; 3 M. & P. 57 773
Coggs V. Bernard (1704), 2 Ld. Raym. 918 ; 1 Smith, L. 0. 201 161, 162
Cohen v. Davidson (1877), 46 L. J. Q. B. 305 ; 2 Q. B. D. 455; 36 L. T
244; 26W. R. 369 771
Cohen v. Hinkley (1809), 2 Camp. 61 ; 1 Tauu. 249 ; 11 R. R. 660 176
Cohen v. Templar (1817), 2 Stark. 260 598
Cohn V. Davidson {see Cohen v. Davidson) .
Coit V. Tracy (1830), 8 Conn. 268 386
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
liv TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOB
Colbern's case (1823), 1 Wheel. C. C. 479 891
Colbourn v. Dawson (1851), 10 C. B. 765 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 154 ; 16 Jur.
680 786
Colclough V. Smyth (1860), 15 Ir. Ch. R. 347 ; 10 L. T. 918 798
Cole V. Hadley (1840), 11 A. & B. 807 ; 4 Jur. 483 ; 3 P. & D. 458 500
Cole V. Hawkins (1738), Andr. 275 ; 2 Str. 1094 873
Cole V. Manning (1877), 46 L. J. M. C. 175 ; 2 Q. B. D. 611 ; 35 L. T.
941 631
Cole?;. Sherard(1855), 11 Ex. 482 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 59 9
Coleman's case (1 748) , cited in Joy on Confession 655
Coleman v. Gibson (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 168 692
Coleman v. Southwiok (1812), 9 Johns. 45 372
Coles f. Bk. of England (1839), 10 A. & E. 437 : 2 P. & D. 521 542
Coles V. Bristowe (1868), L. R. 4 Ch. App. 3 ; 38 L. J. Ch. 81 ; 19 L. T.
403 ; 17 W. R. 106 158
Coles V. Coles and Brown (1866), 35 L. J. P. & M. 40 ; L. R. 1 P. & D.
70 989
CoUard v. Sampson (1853), 16 Beav. 543 ; 4 De G. M. & G. 224 ; 17 Jur.
641 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 729 ; 1 Eq. Kep. 262 693
CoUedge v. Horn (1825), 3 Bing 119 ; 10 Moore (J B.) 431 507, 711
CoUen V. Wright (1857), 26 L. J. Q. B. 147 ; 7 E. & B. 301 ; 27 L. J. Q.
B. 216; 8E. &B. 647; 3 Jur. N. S. 363 780
CoUetti;. CoUett (1838), 1 Curt. 687 931, 934
Collett V. Hubbard (1846), 2 Coop. 94, 99 544
CuUett f. Ld. Keith (1803), 4 Esp. 212 517, 1144
CoUette V. Goode (1877), 7 Ch. D. 842; 47 L. J. Ch. 370 ; 38 L. T. 504 . . 224
Collier, Ex parte {see Ex parte Bailey).
Colliers. Nokes (1849), 2 C. & Kir. 1012 16, 960
CoUier». Simpson (1831), 5 C. & P. 74 936, 936
CoUingi;. Treweek (1827), 6 B. & C. 398 300, 316, 317
Collins ». Barrow (1831), 1 M. & Rob. 112 774
Collins V. Bayntun (1841), 1 Q. B. 117 ; 4 P. &D. 644 ; 5 Jur. 630 1211
Collins V. Bishop (1879), 48 L. J. Ch. 31 149, 373
ColUnsf. Blantem (1767), 2 Wils. 341 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 310 91, 746, 747
CoUins». Carnegie (1834), 1 A. & E. 695, 703; 3 N. & M. 703 161, .'iig
Collins V. Gashon (1860), 2 F. & P. 47 1 192
CoUins J). Godefroy (1831), 1 B. & Ad. g.iO ; 1 D. P. C. 326 819,820
Collins V. Jackson (1862), 31 Beav. 645 160
Collins V. Martin (1797), 1 B. & P. 651 : 2 Esp. 250 ; 4 R. R. 752 133
Collins J>. Maule (1838), 8 C. & P. 502 297, 10.54
Collins «». Prosser (1823), 1 B. & C. 682; 3 D. & R. 112 1194
Colhns V. Rhodes {see Re Baker).
Collins V. Welch (1879), 5 C. P. D. 27 ; 49 L. J. C. P. 260 ; 41 L. T. 786 ;
28 W. R. 208 41, 42
Collinson v. Margesson (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 305 712
Collis V. Emett (1790), 1 H. Bl. 313 1205
Collis V. Stack (1867), 1 H. & N. 605 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 138 711
CoUyer v. WiUock (1827), 12 Moore (C. P.), 657 ; 4 Bing. 313 716
Colman v. Anderson (1813), 10 Mass. 105 122
Colt V. Nettervill (1725), 2 P. Wms. 308 685
Coltmant). Gregory (1871), 4 0 L. J. Ch. 352; 19 W. R. 671 800
Coltmant'. Marsh (1811), 3 Taun. 380 712
Colvin V. Proo. Gen. (1827), 1 Hagg. Ecc. R. 92 174
Com. '6-. Boynton (1874), 116 Mass. 343 636
Com. V. Bullard (1812), 9 Mass. 270 74fi
Com. V. Carey (1823), 2 Pick. 47 1221, 1228
Com. V. Dana (1841), 2 Mete. 329, 337 600
Com. V. Downing (1855), 4 Gray. 29 636
Com. V. Drake (1818), 16 Mass. 161 567, 696
Com. V. Eberle (1817), 3 Serg. & R. 9 382
Com. V. Feely (1789-1826), 2 Virg. Cas. 1 873
Com. V. Green (1822), 17 Mass. 538 910
Com. «. Griffin (1872), 110 Mass. 181 590
TAe references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE or CASES CITED. 1y
PAOB
Com. V. Hill (1817), 14 Mass. 207 897
Com. V. Knapp (1830), 9 Pick. 507 654, 568, 585, 632
Com. V. Kneeland (1838), 20 Pick. 229 16
Com. V. Lynes (1886), 142 Mass. 577 898
Com. V. NorcrOHS (1813), 9 Mass. 492 295
Com. V. Pollard (1847), 12 Meto. 225 630
Com. V. Richards (1836), 18 Pick. 434 354
Com. V. Sapp (1890), 29 Amer. St. B. 405 590, 691
Com. V. Shepherd (1814), 6 Binn. 283 621
Com. V. Smith (1812), 9 Mass. 107 615
Com. V. Tilden (undated), cited 2 Stark. Ev. 232, n. 1 615
Com. V. VasB (1831), 3 Leigh, R. 786 469
Com. V. Woelper (1817), 3 Serg. & R. 29 1175
Com. V. Wood (1858), 11 Gray, 85 635
Comhei!. Corp. of London (1842), 2 Y. & C. C. 0. 631 601, 1183
Combe v. Pitt (1764), 3 Burr. 1586 ; 1 Wm. Bl. 624 550
Comm. of Leith Har. & D. v. luspeo. of Poor (1866), L. R. 1 H. L. (So.) 17 1139
Comm. V. White (1888), 147 Mass. 76 617
Commercial Bk. of Seotl. v. Rhind (1860), 3 Macq. 643 ; 1 Paterson, 903 . . 632
Commings v. Heard (1869), 10 B. & S. 606 ; L. R. 4 Q. B. 669 ; 39 L. J.
Q. B. 9 ; 20 L. T. 976 ; 18 W. R. 16 1160
Commins v. Scott (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 11 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 563 ; 32 L. T.
420 ; 23 W. R. 498 671
Comptonj). ChandleS8(1801), 4 Esp. 19 1081, 1165
Concha v. Concha (1886), 11 App. Cas. 541 ; 56 L. J. Ch. 257 ; 56 L. T.
522 ; 35 W. R. 477 912
Concha v. Murrietta (1889), 40 Ch. D. 543 ; 60 L. T. 798 937
Concordia, The (1866), L. E. 1 Adm. 93 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 771 ; 14 L. T. 896. . 6
Conflans Quarry Co. v. Parker (1867), L. R. 3 C. P. 1 ; 37 L. J. C. P. 61 ;
17 L. T. 283 ; 16 W. R. 127 308
Conlou V. Moore (1876), 9 L R. C. L. 190 1114
Connelly v. Connelly (1850), 2 Roberts. 202 1144, 1145
Connor, In the goods of, (1892) 29 L. R. Ir. 261 172, Add. [181]
Connor v. (1842), Ir. Cir. R. 610 832
Connor v. Cronin (1868), 17 Ir. L. R. 480 133
Connybeare v. Farries (1869), L. E. 5 Eq. 16 ; 39 L. J. Ex. 26 ; 21 L. T.
49y _ Qig
Conradi ■!).' Conradi!(18'68)! L.' R.' IP. '&i>.'bU '; ' 18 L. t] 659 ;' I'e W. R.
1023 353, 1103
Conron v. Conron (1858), 7 H. L. C. 168 144
Conaerv. of Riv. Thames ». Hall (1868), 37 L. J. C. P. 163 ; L. R. 3 C. P.
415 ; 18 L. T. 361 ; 16 W. R. 971 ". 178
Constable v. Constable (1879), 11 Ch. D. 681 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 621 ; 40 L. T.
616 140
Contract Corp., Re (1871), 40 L. J. Ch. 351 ; L. R. 6 Ch. App. 146 846
Conway v. Beazley (1831), 3 Hagg. Ecc. R. 639 1144
Cooeh «. Goodman (1842), 2 Q. B. 580 ; 2 G. & D. 169 ; 6 Jur. 779 . . . .653, 654
Coode V. Coode (1838), 1 Curt. 755 1048
Cook, Re (1845), 7 Q. B. 653 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 188 ; 9 Jur. 869 837
Cook V. Heam (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 20 319
Cook v. Lambert (1863), 32 L. J. P. & M. 93 ; 3 S. & T. 46 ; 9 L. T. 211 ;
11 W. R. 401 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 258 699
Cook «!. Leonard (1827), 6 B. & C 361 ; 9 Dowl. & R. 339 226
Cook D. Nethercote (1835), 6 C. & P. 743 918
Cook V. North Metropolitan Tramways Co. (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 683 ; 56
L. J. Q. B. 309 ; 56 L. T. 448 ; 67 L. T. 746 ; 36 W. R. 677 ; 51 J. P.
630 779
Cook V. Steams (1814), 11 Mass. 633 683
Cookv. The State (1893), 40 Am. St. R. 756 Add. [568]
Cpok«). Tomlinson (1876), 24 W. R. 851 912
Cooke B.Banks (1826), 2 C. & P. 478 401, 1174
Cooke V. Butler (1872), 2 Hop. & Colt. 22 ; 21 W. R. 73 ; 27 L. T. 548 ; 42
L. J. C. P. 23 ; L. R. 9 C. P. 256 1173
Vol. I. ends with page 633.
Ivi TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOH
Cooke i). Green (1823), 11 Price, 736 112
Cooket). Laniotte(1851), 15Beav. 234; 21 L. J. Ch. 371 136
Cooke V. Lloyd (1803), Peake, Evid. Appendix xxviii *1*
Cooke V. Loxley (1792), 5 T. R. 4 ; 2 R. K. 521 96
Cooke V. Maxwell (1817), 2 Stark. N. P. 183 ; 19 R. R. 700 618, 620, 1031
Cooke «>. Shollfl793), 6 T. R. 255 1103, 1141
Cooke V. Tanswell (1818), 2 Moore (C. P.), 513 ; 8 Taun. 131 1210
Cooke V. Wilby (1884), 25 Ch. D. 769 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 592 ; 50 L. T. 152 ;
32W. R. 379 13, 1030
Cooke v. WUdes (1855), 5 E. & B. 328 ; 3 C. L. R. 1090 ; 24 L. J. Q. B.
367 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 610 47, 111
Cookes V. Cookes (1863), 3 N. R. 97 ; U W. R. 871 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 843 ... . 462
Cookea v. Maseall (1694), 2 Vem. 200 639
Coolei). Braham (1848), 3 Ex. 185 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 105 498, 509, 512
Coombs, Re (1866), 36 L. J. P. & M. 25 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 302 698
Coombs V. Bristol and Exeter Ry. Co. (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 401 ; 3 H. &
N. 510 692
Coombs V. Coether (1829), M. & M. 398 1050
Coombs V. Wilks, (1891) 3 Ch. 77 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 42 ; 65 L. T. 66 ; 40 "W.
R. 77 671
Coope V. Cresswell (1866), L. R. 2 Ch. 112 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 1)4 ; 15 L. T.
42 ; 15 W. R. 242 449
Cooper, In re. Cooper v. Vesey (1882), 20 Ch. D. 611, 6^9 ; 51 L. J. Ch.
862 ; 47 L. T. 89 ; 30 W. R. 648 135
Cooper V. Blandy (1839), 1 Bing. N. C. 45 99
Cooper V. Bockett (1863, should be 1844), 4 Moo. P. C. C. 419 ; 4 Notes
of Cases (Eoc. & Mar.), 685 ; 10 Jur. 931 142, 697, 707
Cooper «). Gibbons (1813), 3 Camp. 363 ,.. 109
Cooper «. Grant (1852), 12 C. B. 154; 21 L. J. C. P. 197 732
Cooper D. Harding (1845), 7 Q. B. 928 ; 9 Jur. 777 848
Cooper D.Lloyd (1859), 6 C. B. N. S. 619 622
Cooper V. Macdonald (1867), 36 L. J. Eq. 304 1036
Coiper V. Macdonald (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 633, 638 ; L. R. 16 Eq. 258 ; 28
L. T. 693 806
Cooper V. Marsden (1793), 1 Esp. 1 467
Cooper V. Metrop. Board of Works (1883), 25 Ch. D. 472 ; 50 L. T. 602 . . 597
Cooper V. Meyer (1830), 10 B. & C. 468 547, 648
Cooper V. Robinson (1842), 10 M. & W. 694 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 48 756
Cooper V. Shepherd (1846), 3 C. P. 272 ; 4 D. & L. 218 ; 15 L. J. C. P.
237 ; 10 Jur. 758 1115
Cooper V. Slade (1858), 6 E. & B. 447 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 324 ; 2 Jur. N. S.
1016 104, 106, 586
Cooper i>. Smith (1812), 15 East, 103 ; 13 R. R. 397 672
Cooper «;. Taylor (1844), 6 M. & Gr. 989 ; 7 Scott, M. R. 950; 13 L. J.
C. P. 92 ; 8 Jur. 450 532
Cooper V. "Wands. Board of "Works (1863), 32 L. J. C. P. 185 ; 14 C. B.
N. S. 180; 9 Jur. N. S. 1166; 11 "W. R. 646 1148
Cooper V. "Woolfitt (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 310 ; 2 H. & N. 122 ; 3 Jur. N. S.
870 146
Coorg, Rajah of «). East India Co. (1856), 25 L. J. Ch. 345 618
Cootei). Boyd (1789), 2 Bro. C. C. 521 807, 808
Coote V. Leighworth (1596), Moore (F.), 457 543
Cope, Re (1850), 2 Roberts. 335 701
Copes;. Cope (1833), 5 0. & P. 604; 1 M. & Rob. 269, 27 ..101,621,622,1170
Cope V. Mooney (1862), 14 Ir. C. L. R. 256 ; 10 L. T. 854 1163
Cope V. Rowlands (1836), 2 M. & "W. 160 ; 2 Gale, 231 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 63. . 150
Cope V. Thames Haven Dock Co. (1848), 2 C. & Kir. 757 929, 960
Cope V. Thames Haven Dock & Rail. Co. (1849), 3 Ex. 841 ; 6 Railw. Cas.
83 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 345 642
Copeland v. "Watts (1815), 1 Stark. 95 598
Copiu V. Adamson (1875), L. R. 9 Ex. 345 ; 43 L. J. Ex. 161 ; 31 L. T.
242; 22'W. R. 658 1147
Copland v. Toulrain (1840), 7 CI. & Ein. 350 486
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ivii
Copley 41. Burton (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 489; 39 L. J. M. 0. 141; 22
L. T. 888 263
Copp V. Upham (1825), 3 New Hamp. 159 969
Copper Miners' Co. v. Pox (1851), 16 Q. B. 229 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 174 ; 15
Jur. 703 531, 642
Corbett v. Corbett (1813), 1 Ves. & B. 335 329
Corbishley's Trusts, Re (1880), 14 Ch. Div. 846 ; 49 L. J. Oh. 266 ; 28
W. R. 536 172
Corder, Re (1848), 6 Notes of Oas. (Eoo. & Mar.), 656 698
Cordery v. Colville (or Colvin) (1863), 14 C. B. N. S. 374 ; 32 L. J. C. P.
210; 9 Jut. N. S. 1200; 8 L. T. 245 521
Cordwent v. Hunt (1818), 8 Taun. 696 750
Cork, Bp. of, V. Porter (1877), Ir. U C, L. 94 961
Cork and Bandon Ry. Co. v. Cazenove (1847), 10 Q. B. 935 ; 11 Jur. 802.. 100
Cork and Bandon %. Co. v. Goode (1853), 13 C. B. 826; 22 L. J. C. P.
198 ; 17 Jur. 555 76
Cornelius Regan, Re ( 1838), 1 Curt. 908 696
Cornell V. Baker (1885), 29 Ch. D. 711 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 844; 52 L. T. 421.. 913
Cornell v. Green (1823), 10 Serg. & R. 14, 16 354
Cornfoot v. Fowke (1840), 6 M. & W. 377 ; 4 Jur. 919 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 297. . 200
Cornforth v. Smithard (1859), 5 H. & N. 13 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 228 ; 8 W. R. 8 711
Cornish v. Abingtou (1859), 4 H. & N. 549 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 262 638
Cornish v. Clark (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 184 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 14 ; 26 L. T. 494 ;
20 "W. E. 897 135
Cornish v. Hockin (1853), 1 E. & B. 602 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 142 ; 17 Jur.
1049 186
Cornwall v. Richardson (1825), By. & M. 305 219, 252, 255, 256
Corsen v. Dubois ( 1816), Holt, N. P. R. 239 698
Cort V. Ambergate, &o. By. Co. (1851), 17 Q. B. 127 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 460 ;
15 Jur. 877 751
Cortis V. Kent Waterworks Co. (1827), 7 B. & C. 314 151
Cory V. Bretton (1830), 4 C. & P. 462 514
Cory V. Davis (1863), 14 C. B. N. S. 370 282
Cosmopolitan, Re (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.), Supp. xxviii. .... 177
Cosnahan v. Grioe (1862), 15 Moo. P. C. C. 215 638
Cossens, Ex parte, WarraU, Re (1820), Buck, 531, 545 970
Cossens v. Cossens (1737), Willes, 25 92
Cossey v. Lend. & Bright. Ry. Co. (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 146 ; 39 L. J. C. P.
174 ; 22 L. T. 19 ; 18 W. R. 493 599, 1186
Costa Rica, Rep. of </. Erlanger (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 281; L. R. 19
Eq. 33 321
Coster V. Hetherington (1859), 8 Cox, C. C. 175 ; 1 E. & E. 802 ; 28 L. J.
M. 0. 193 1073
Cotohing V. Basset (1862), 32 L. J. Ch. 286 ; 32 Beav. 101 ; 9 Jul-. N. S.
590 ; 11 W. B. 197 523
Cotes «). Davis (1808), 1 Camp. 485 604
Cotesworth v. Spokes (1861), 30 L. J. C. P. 220 ; 10 C. B. N. S. 103 ; 7 Jur.
N. S. 803 522
Cottam V. Partridge (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 271 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 819 ; 11 L. J.
C. P. 161 713
Cotterill v. Hobby (1826), 4 B. & C. 465 ; 6 D. & R. 661 286
Cottington, Ex parte (1678), 2 Swans. 326 1150
Cottle, Ex parte (1850), 2 Mac. & G. 186 ; 2 H. & T. 382 ; 19 L. J. Ch.
368 640
Cotton, Re (1848), 6 Notes of Caa. (Ecc. & Mar.) 307 698
CottreU f . Hughes (1855), 15 C. B. 532 ; 3 C. L. R. 496 ; 24 L. J. C. P.
107 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 448 126, 127
(Jottrill V. Myrick (1835), 3 Fairf. 222 932
Conch V. Meeker (1817), 2 Conn. 302 755
Couling V. Coxe (1848), 6 C B. 703 ; 6 Dowl. & L. 399 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 100 ;
13 Jur. 101 835
Cnunhavp. Re (1873), L. R. 8Q. B.410; 42 L. J. Q. B.217 ; 38L.T. 761;
ZlW. R. 883 1028
Vol. I. ends with page 635,
Iviii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOH
Courteem;. Touse (1807), 1 Camp. 43 ; 10 R. R. 627 92i
Cousins u. Paddon (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 547; 5 L. J. Ex. 49; 6 Tyr.
536 222
Coutts V. Acworth (1869), 38 L. J. Ch. 694 ; L. R. 8 Eq. 558 ; 21 L. T.
224 ; 17 W. R. 1121 136
Couturier v. Hastie (1852), 8 Ex. 40 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 97 677
Coventry v. Great Eastern Ry. Co. (1883), 11 Q,. B. D. 776 ; 52 L. J. Q. B.
694 ; 49 L. T. 641 548
Cowan V. Abrahams (1793), 1 Esp. 50 289, 318
Cowan V. Braidwood (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 882 ; 2 Soott, N. R. 138 ; 9 D.
P. C. 27 ] 142, 1143, 1146, 1147, 1164
Cowburn, Re {see Ex parte Eirth).
Cowell». Chambers (1856), 21 Beav. 619 1092
Cowie V. HalsaU (1821), 4 B. & Ad. 197 ; 3 Stark. N. P. 36 119^
Cowie V. Remfry (1846), 5 Moo. P. C. C. 232 ; 3 Moo. Ind. App. 448 ; 10
Jur. 789 298
Cowley V. Knapp (1886), 42 N. J. L. 297 693
Cowling D. Ely (1818), 2 Stark. R. 366 ; 20 R. R. 694 488
Co-wper V. Lord Cowper (1734), 2 P. Wms. 720, 748, 749, 760, 751, 752 . . 108
Cox's Trusts, Re (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 735 ; 9 Ch. D. 169 ; 27 W. R. 63 . . 139
Cox V. Allingham (1822), Jae. 614 1046
Cox V. Camion (1838), 4 Bing. N. C. 453 ; 6 Dowl. 625 732
Cox V. Hill, (1892) 36 Sol. J. 446 193
Cox «. Knight (1856), 18 C.B.N. S. 645; 25 L.J. C. P. 314 •.... 99
Cox V. Middleton (1856), 2 Drew. 209 ; 2 Eq. Rep. 631 ; 23 L. J.
Ch. 618 673
Cox V. Midi. Ry. Co. (1849), 3 Ex. 268 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 65 ; 14 Jur. 65 ; 5
Railw. Cas. 583 641
Coxf. Newman (1813), 2 Ves. & B. 168 1037
Cox 4). Reid (1849), 13 Q. B. 568 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 216 ; 13 Jur. 663 ....39,227
Cox V. Walter (should be Walker) (undated), cited 9 C. & P. 339 269
Cox V. Willoughby (1880), 13 Ch. D. 863 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 237 ; 42 L. T. 125 ;
28 W. R. 603 169
Coxhead v. MuUis (1878), 3 C. P. D. 439; 47 L. J. C. P. 761 ; 39 L. T.
349 ; 27 W. R. 136 718
Coxhead®. Richards (1846), 2 0. B. 684; 15 L. J. C. P. 278; 10 Jur. 984.. 39,
47, 111
Coyle ». Great North of Ireland By. Co. (1887), 20 L. R. Ir. 409 163
Craig V. Fenn (1841), C. & Marsh. 43 259
Crane v. London Dock Co. (1864), 33 L. J. Q. B. 224 ; 6 B. & S. 313 ; 10
L.T.372: 12W.R.745; 10 Jur. N. S. 984 7
Crane v. Marshall (1839), 4 Shepl. 27 443
Crane -tf. Powell (1868), 38 L. J. C. P. 43 ; L. R. 4 C. P. 123 ; 20 L. T.
703 ; 17 W. R. 161 672
Craven, Ex parte (1870), 39 L. J. Bank. 33 ; L. R. 10 Eq. 648 ; 23 L. T.
663 ; 18 W. R. 1022 : afld. sub nom. Craven, Ex parte, Tempest, In re,
L. R. 6Ch. 70; 40L. J. Bank. 22; 23L. T. 650; 19 W. R. 137 .... 82
Craven v. Halliley (1838), cited Thomas v. Connell, 4 M. & W. 270 379
Crawoour v. Salter (1881), 18 Ch. D. 30 ; 46 L. T. 62 6, 611
Crawford v. Crawford (1867), Ir. R. 2 Eq. 166 710, 711
Crawford and Lindsay Peer. (1848), 2 H. L. C. 634, 550 ; 2 Macq. 479 . . 134,
423, 1018, 1227
Crawford v. Spencer (1851), 62 Mass. 418 767
Cray v. Halls (1825), cited Smith v. Blandy, Ry. & M. 269 479
Creagh v. Blood (1845), 3 J. & La T. 133, 161 660
Crease v. Barrett (1835), 1 C. M. & R. 919 ; 6 Tyr. 468 ; 4 L. J. Ex, 297. . 393,
396, 396, 397, 401, 404, 413, 436. 444, 446, 610
Credland v. Potter (1874), 10 L. R, Ch. 8 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 169 ; 31 L. T,
622 ; 23 W. R. 36 738
Creen v. Wright (1877), 2 0. P. D. 364 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 427 ; 36 L. T. 355 ;
26 W. R. 602 42
Creevy »>. Carr (1836), 7 C. & P. 64 245, 942
Crepps V. Durden (1776-7), 2 Cowp, 140 ; 1 Sm. L, C. 692 lue
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixix
FAas
Crerer v. Sodo (1827), M. & M. 85 ; 3 0. & P. 10 274
CresBwell i;. Jackson (1860), 2 F. & F. 24 1224
Crew 41. Saunders (1734-6), 2 Str. 1005 993, 996, 997
Crippsj). Da-pis (1843), 12 M. & W, 159; 13 L. J. Ex. 217 713,714
Cripps V. HartnoU (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 381 ; 10 Jur. N. 8. 300 ; 8 L. T.
765 ; 11 W. R. 953 678
Cripps V. HiUs (1844), 6 Q. B. 606 ; 1 Dav. & M. 544 ; 8 Jur. 466 ; 13
L. J. Q. B. 130 49
Cripps V. Wells (1843), C. & Mar. 489 '. 271
Crlsdee n. Bolton (1827), 3 C. & P. 240 44
Crisp V. Anderson (1815), 1 Stark. R. 35 ; 18 R. R. 744 109, 133
Crispin ». Doglioni (1862), 32 L. J. P. & M. 109 ; 3 S. & T. 44 ; 8 D. T.
91 ; 11 W. R. 500 309,-414
Croft V. Croft (1863), 4 S. & T. 10 ; 34 L. J. P. & M. 44 ; 11 Jur. N. S.
183; IIL. T. 781; 13 W. R. 526 967
Croft V. Graham (1863), 2 De G. J. & Sm. 155 ; 9 L. T. 589 137
Croft V. Lumley (1857-8), 5 E. & B. 648 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 223 ; 27 L. J. Q. B.
321; 6H. L. Cas. 672; 4 Jur. N. S. 903 522
Croft 41. Rickmansworth Highway Board (1888), 57'L. J. Ch. 689 121
Crofton4). Poole (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 568 519
Crofts V. Marshall (1836), 7 G. & P. 597 765
Crokerv. M. of Hertford (1844), 4 Moo. P. 0. C. 339 702, 708
Cromaok v. Heathoote (1820), 4 Moore (0. P.) 357 ; 2 B. & B. 4 591, 592
Crompton v. Butler (1790), 1 Hagg. Cons. 460 632
Cronk v. Frith (1839), 9 C. & P. 197 ; 2 M. & Rob. 262 1209
Crook V. Dowling (1782), 3 Doug. 77 1013, 1014
Crook V. HiU (1876), 3 Ch. D. 773 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 119 ; 24 W. R. 786 145
Crook V. Seaford' (Corpn. of) (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 661; 25 L. T. 1 ; 19
W. R. 938 645
Crookenden v. Fuller (1859), 29 L. J. P. & M. 1 ; 1 S. & T. 441 ; 5 Jur.
N. S. 1222 ; 1 L. T. 70 179, 180
Crookewit v. Fletcher (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 153 ; 1 H. & N. 893 1198
Cropper v. Smith (1884), 26 Oh. D. 710 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 891 ; 51 L. T. 733 ;
33 "W. R. 60 187
Croshie v. Thompson (1847), 11 Ir. Eq. R. 404 487
Crosby v. Hetheringtoiv (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 933 ; 5 Scott, N. R. 637 ; 12
X. J. 0. P. 261 6, 7
Crosby v. Percy (1808), 1 Taun. 364 372, 1214
Crosby v. Wadeworth (1806), 6 East, 602 ; 2 Smith, 659 ; 8 R. R. 566 687
Cross V. Kaye (1796), 6 T. R. 663 618
Crosse v. Bedingfield (1821), 12 Sim. 35 488
Crossley, Ex parte. Re Taylor (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 409 ; 41 L. J. Bank.
35 848
Crossley v. Dixon (1863), 32 L. J. Ch. 617 ; 10 H. L. Cas. 293 ; 9 Jur.
N. S. 607; 8L. T. 260; 11 W. R. 716 644
Crossley v. Elworthy (1871), L. R. 12 Eq. 168 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 480 ; 24 L. T.
607 ; 19 W. R. 842 135
Crossley v. Lightowler (1867), L. R. 3 Eq. 279 ; 2 Ch. App. 478 ; 36 L. J.
Ch. 5S4 ; 16 W. R. 801 Ill
Crossley v. Maycock (1874), L. E. 18 Eq. 180; 43 L. J. Ch. 379; 22
W. R. 387 -673
Crotty V. Hodges (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 661 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 221 1194
Crouch V. Cred. Fon. of England (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 374 ; 42 L. J.
Q. B. 183; 29L. T. 259; 21 W. R. 946 660
Crouch V. Hooper (1852), 16 Beav. 182 421
Croudson v. Leonard (1808), 4 Cranch, 434 1150
Croughton v. Blake (1843), 12 M. & W. 206 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 78 ; 8 Jur. '
275 1060, 1109, 1169
Crowder v. Hopkins (1843), 10 Paige, 190 433, 614
Crowe 4). Clay (1854), 9 Ex. 604 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 150 ; 18 Jar. 654 307
Crowley 4-. Page (1837), 7 0. & P. 789 9.i4
Crowley 4;. Vitty (1852), 7 Ex. 319 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 135 657
Crowninshield's case (1830), 10 Pick. 497 382
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
IX TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PA8H
Crowninsliield v. Crowninshield (1854), 2 Gray, 524 170, 262
Crowther v. Appleby (1873), L. R. 9 C. P. 23 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 7 ; 29 L. T.
580 ; 22 W. R. 265 814
Crowther v. Solomons (1848), 6 C. B. 758 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 92 13i
Croxton V. May (1876), 9 Ch. D. 388 ; 39 L. T. 461 ; 27 W. R. 327 101
Cruise v. Clancy (1844), 6 Ir. Eq. R. 552 305, 1223
Cubitt V. Porter (lh28), 8 B. & G. 267 ; 2 M. & R. 267 113
Cuff V. Penn (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 21 ; 14 R. R. 384 752
Cumberland v. Copeland (1861), 1 H. & C. 194 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 353 ; 9 Jur.
N. S. 253 ; 7 L. T. 334 730
Cuming t: French (1809), 2 Camp. 106, n 615
Cummin JJ. Smith (1816), 2 Serg- & R. 440 620
Cumming ». Roebuck (1816), Holt, N. P. R. 172 297
Cundell V. Pratt (1827), M. & M. 108 967, 968
CunUfiet). Sefton (1802), 2 East, 183 328, 1214, 1216
Cunningham, Re (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 71 ; 4 S. & T. 194 704
Cunningham v. Cunningham (1814), 2 Uow, 483 149
Curlewis v. Corfield (1841), 1 a. & D. 489 ; 1 Q. B. 814 ; 6 Jur. 259 . .520, 521
Curling V. Perring (1835), 2 Myl. & K. 380 ; 4 L. J. Ch. 80 601
Curren v. Crawford (1818), 4 Serg. & R. 3, 5 458
Currie v. Anderson (1859), 2 E. & E. 592 ; 29 L. J. Q. B. 87 ; 6 Jur. N. S.
442; 8 W. R. 274 689, 692
Currie v. Child and Brown (1812), 3 Camp. 283 1207, 1213
Curry v. Walter (1796), 1 Esp. 456; 5 R. R. 743; 1 Bos. & P. 525;
4R. R. 717 612
Curtin V. Evans (1872), Ir. R. 9 Eq. 653 806
Curtis 1). Hunt (1824), 1 C. & P. 180 553
Curtis V. Mackenzie (1877), W. N. No. 45 of 1877, Ch. D. 213 806
Curtis V. March (1858), 3 H. & JST. 866 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 36 ; 4 Jur. N. S.
1112 16
Curtis V. M'Sweeney (1841), Ir. Cir. R. 343 1211
Curtis V. Pugh (1847), 10 Q. B. Ill ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 199 690
Curtis V. Rickards (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 47 ; 1 Scott, N. R. 155 ; 4 Jur.
508 118
Curzon v. Lomax (1803), 6 East, 60 397, 403
Cusack V. Farrell (1887), 18 L. R. Ir. 494 ; 20 L. R. Ir. 56 152
Cusack V. Robinson (1861), 1 B. & S. 299 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 261 ; 7 Jur.
N.'S. 542; 4L. T. 506; 9W. R. 735 689, 690
Cutbush V. Gilbert (1818), 4 Serg. & R. 665 279
Cuthbert o. Cumming (1855), 11 Ex. 406 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 310 ; 1 Jur. N. S.
686 768
Cutler V. NewHu (1819), Mann. Dig. N. P. 137 508
Cutler V. Pope (1836), 1 Shepl. 337 686
Cutto V. Gilbert (1854), 9 Moo. P. C. C. 143 143, 705
Cutts V. Pickering (1672), 1 Ventr. 197 606
Cutts V. U. S. (1812), 1 Gall. 69 1199
Cutts V. Ward (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 367 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 161 ; 8 B. & S.
277; 18L. T. 614; 16 W. R. 445 723
D. falsely called F. v. F. (1864), 34 L. J. P. & M. 66 167
Dabbs V. Humphries (1834), 10 Bing. 44 6 ; 4 M. & Sc. 285 711
Da Costa v. Edmunds (1815), 4 Camp. 143 ; 2 Chitty, 227 ; 16 R. R. 763.. 765
Da Costa v. Jones (177H), 2 Cowp. 729 620
Da Costa v. Pym (1797), Peake, Add. Cas. 144 1221
Da Costa J). Villa Real (1734), 2 Str. 961 U03, 1107
Dagleish v. Dodd (1832), 6 C. & P. 238 484
Dailies v. Hartley (1848), 3 Ex. 200 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 81 929
Daines ». Heath (1847), 3 C. B. 938 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 117 ; 11 Jur. 185.. .. 1206
Daintry v. Brooklehurst (1848), 3 Ex. 207 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 67 117
Daioz, The (1878), 47 L. J. Adm. 1 ; 37 L. T. 137 178
Dalby v. Hirst (1819), 1 B. & B. 224 ; 3 Moore (0. P.), 536 782
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs .
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixi
PAOB
Dale's case (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 474; 50 L. J. Q. B. 234; 43 L. T. 786 ;
45 J. P. 284 •. 846
Dale V. HamUton (1846), 5 Hare, 369 ; 2 Phillips, 266 ; 16 L. J. Ch. 126,
397 ; 11 Jur. 163, 574 688
Dalev. Humfrey (1858), 26 L. J. Q. B. 137; 7 E. & B. 266; 27 L. J.
Q. B. 390 ; B. B. & E. 1004 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 191 769
Dalgleish v. Hodgson (1831), 7 Bing. 495 ; 5 M. & P. 407 1149
DaUson v. Stark (1803), 4 Esp. 163 2S9
Dallow, Ee (1866), 35 L. J. P. & M. 81 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 189 701
Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (1811), 2 Hagg. Cons. 64 7, 936
Dalrymple v. HaU (1881), 16 Ch. D. 715 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 302 ; 29 W. B. 421 146
Dalston v. Coatsworth (1721), 1 P. "Wms. 731 ; 3 Brown, P. C. 550 108
DaltoD V. Angus (1881), 6 App. Caa. 1740 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 689 ; 44 L. T.
844 ; 30 W. R. 191 ; 46 J. P. 132 115
Daly's Settlements, Re (1858), 25 Beav. 456 ; 27 L. J. Ch. 751 ; 31 L. T.
278; 6 W. B. 533; 4 Jur. N. S. 525 1144
Dalyv. Att.-Gen. (1870), I. B. 8 Eq. 595 139
Daly V. Wilson (1842), Milw. 658 435, 446
DalzeU v. Mair (1808), 1 Camp. 532 542
Damerell v. Protheroe (1847), 10 Q. B. 20 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 170 ; 11 Jur.
331 397, 404
Dan V. Brown (1825), 4 Cowen, 483, 492 493, 705
Dance v. Bobson (1829), M. & M. 295 20, 1045
Dancer v. Crabb (1873), 42 L. J. P. & M. 53 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 98 ; 28
L. T. 914 703
Dandridge v. Corden (1827), 3 C. & P. U 960
Dane v. Kirkwall (1838), 8 C. & P. 683 1102
Danford v. MoAnulty (1883), 8 App. Cas. 456 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 652 ; 49
Ij. T. 207 ; 31 W. B. 817 221
D'Angibau, In re, Andrews ». Andrews (1880), 15 Ch. D. 228 ; 49 L. J.
Ch. 756; 43L. T. 135; 28 W. R. 930 100
Daniel v. Bond (1861), 9 C. B. N. S. 716 ; 3 L. T. 700 ; 9 "W. R. 313 . . . . 1186
Daniel v. Luker (1571), 3 Dyer, 305a, pi. 58 1151
Daniel v. North (1809), 11 East, 375 446
Daniel v. Pitt (1808), Peake, Add. Cas. 238 ; 6 Esp. 74 ; 1 Camp. 366, n. ;
10 R. R. 706, n 498
Daniel v. Thompson (1812), 15 East, 78 837
Daniel w. Wilkin (1852), 7 Ex. 429; 21 L. J. Ex. 236 396, 404
Daniellf.Daniell(1840),4DeG. J.&Sm. 337; 18 L. J. Ch. 157; 13 Jur. 164 803
Daniels t). Conrad (1833), 4 Leigh R. 401, 40;j 954
Daniels v. Harris (1874), 44 L. J. C. P. 1 ; L. R. 10 C. P. 1 ; 31 L. T. 408 ;
23 W. R. 86 770
Daniels v. Potter (1830), M. & M. 601 385, 386, 493 .
Dansey v. Richardson (1854), 3 E. & B. 144 ; 2 C. L. R. 1442 ; 23 L. J.
Q. B. 217 ; 18 Jur. 721 162
Darby v. Ouseley (1856), 1 H. & N. 1 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 227 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 497.. 46,
243, 291, 483, 931
Daroys, Re (1860), 11 Ir. C. L. R. 298 621
Darley v. Martin (1853), 13 Q. B. 684 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 249 ; 17 Jur. 1125.. 740
Darlington, &c. Bank. Co., Ex parte (1864),4D. J.&S. 681; 34L.J.Bk.lO 160
Darrell v. Evans (1862), 30 L. J. Ex. 254 ; 6 H. & N. 660 ; 1 H. & C. 174;
31 L. J. Ex. 337 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 104 ; 7 L. T. 97 ; 10 W. R. 665 730
Dartmouth, Ly., v. Roberts (1812), 16 East, 334 510, 1013
Darrill v. Roper (1855), 3 Drew. 294 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 779 •. 50
Dashwood v. Jermyn (1879), 12 Ch. D. 776 ; 27 W. R. 868 680
Davenport v. The Queen (1877), 3 App. Cas. 116 ; 47 L. J. P. 0. 8 ; 37
L. .T. 727 522
Davey v. Shannon (1879), 4 Ex. D. 81 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 459 ; 40 L. T. 628 ;
27 W. R. 599 682
David V. Preece (1843), 5 Q. B. 440 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 88 192
Davidson i>. Cooper (1843), 11 M. & W. 784 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 467 ; 13 M. &
W. 343; 13L. J. Ex. 276 134,1193,1194,1196,1198,1200,1201,1202
Davidson v. Kimpton (1881), 18 Ch. D. 213 ; 45 L. T, 132 ; 29 W. E. 912.. 101
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
Ixii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAQB
Davidson r. Smyth (1887), 20 L. K. Ir. 326 110
Davidson v. Wood (see Wood's Estate).
Davie (should be Davey) v. London & S. W. Ey. Co. (1883), 12 Q. B. D.
70 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 58 ; 49 L. T. 739 ; 48 J. P. 279 163
Davies, Ex parte, Ee Sadler (1881), 19 Ch. D. 86 ; 46 L. T. 632 ; 30
W. E. 237 645
Davies, Re (1849), 2 Eoberts. 377 696
Daviess. Brown (1^24), 9 Moore (C. P.), 778 998
Davies v. Campbell (1841), 1 IredeU, 482 443
Davies 9. Davies (1840), 9 C. & P. 252 956, 957, 1013
Davies v. Davies (1863), 2 New E. 384 ; 4 GifE. 417 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1002 ;
11 W. E. 1040 ; 9 L. T. 161 136
Davies v. Dodd (1817), Wils. Ex. 110 308
Davies v. Edwards (1861), 7 Ex. 22 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 4 ; 15 Jur. 1014 71o
Davies v. Fitton (1842), 2 Dr. & War. 232 749, 7o0
Davies v. Humphreys (1840), 6 M. & W. 153, 166 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 263 .... 440
Davies v. Lovnides (1843), 7 Scott, N. E. 214 ; 6 M. & Gr. 527 ; 12 L. J.
0. P. 606 146, 408, 409, 414, 416, 424, 426
Davies v. D. of Marlborough (1818), 2 Swans. 108 137
Davies v. MarshaU (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 697 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 61 ; 7 Jur.
N. S. 1247 ; 4 L. T. 581 ; 9 W. E. 866 523
Davies v. Morgan (1831), 1 C. & J. 587 ; 1 Tyr. 467 396, 410, 416, 442
Davies v. Nicholas (1836), 7 C. & P. 339 152
Davies v. Otty (1866), 36 Beav. 208 ; 34 L. J. Ch. 252 ; 13 W. E. 484 ;
12 L. T. 789 ; 5 N. E. 391 971
Davies ». Pierce (1787), 2 T. E. 63 ; 1 E. E. 419 444, 446, 610
Davies v. Eidge (1802), 3 Esp. 101 ; 6 E. E. 817 493
Davies v. Stainbank (1865), 6 De G. M. & G. 679 758
Davies v. Waters (1842), 9 M. & W. 608 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 651 ; 11 L. J. Ex.
214 697, 607
Davies v. White (1884), 53 L. J. Q. B. 275 ; 60 L. T. 327 ; 32 W. E. 520.. 1062
Davis's Trusts, Ee (1869), L. E. 8 Eq. 98; 21 L. T. 137 9
Davis V. Black (1841), 1 Q. B. 911, 912 ; 1 G. & D. 432 ; 6 Jur. 65 ; 10
L. J. Q. B. 338 85
Davis ». Capper (1829), 4 C.& P. 134a, 138; lOB. &C. 33 ; 5 M. & Ey. 53. .36, 37
Davis V. Curling (1845), 8 Q. B. 287 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 56 ; 10 Jur. 69 227
Davis V. Dale (1830), M. & M. 614 ; 4 C. & P. 335 942
Davis V. Davis (1880), 13 Ch. Div. 861 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 241 ; 41 L. T. 790 ;
28 W. E. 346 508
Davis V. Dodd (1812), 4 Taun. 602 307
Davis V. Hedges (1871), L. E. 6 Q. B. 687 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 276 ; 25 L. T.
155 ; 20 W. E. 60 1122
Davis ». Jones (1856), 17C. B. 625; 25 L. J. C. P. 91 746
Davis ». Lloyd (1844), 1 C. & K. 276 436, 456, 1048
Davis ». Lovell (1839), 7 DoTvl. 178 ; 4M. &W. 679; 8L. J. Ex. 152. .816, 835
Davis ». Lowndes (1836), 6 Scott, 738 ; 1 Arn. 379 ; 7 Dowl. P. C. 101 ; 2
Jur. 945 1098, 1227
Davis V. Mason (1826), 4 Pick. 166 931
Davis V. Eainsford (1821), 17 Mass. 210 802
Davis V. Eeid (1832), 5 Sim. 443 965
Davis V. Sorace [or Scrase) (1869), 4 L. E. C. P. 172 ; 38 L. J. M. C. 79 ;
19 L. T. 789 ; 17 W. E. 411 263
Davis V. Spurling (1829), 1 Euss. & M. 68 482
Davis V. Trehame (1881), 50 L. J. Ch. 665 ; 6 App. Cas. 460 ; 29 W. E. 869. 1 14
Davis «>. Trevanion (1846), 2 D. & L. 743 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 138; 9 Jur. 492. . 734
Davis V. Vass (1812), 15 East, 97 1039
Davis V. Waddington (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 44 : 8 Scott, N. E. 807 ; 1 Lutw.
Eeg. Cas. 169 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 45 ; 8 Jul-. 1142 791
Davis V. Williams (1811), 13 East, 232 ; 1 Smith, 6 1045, 1046, 1054
Davis V. Wood (1816), 1 Wheat. 6 368
Davisont!. Gent(1856),26L. J. Ex. 122; IH. &N. 744; 3 Jur. N. S. 342.660, 661
Davison v. Stanley (1768), 4 Burr. 2213 668
Davhn v. Hill (1834), 2 Fairf. 434 766
The referenoea are to pages, not to paragrapKt.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixiii
Davy V. Garrett (1877), 7 Ch. D. 473 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 218 ; 38 L. T. 77 ; 26
"W. B. 225 187
Dawes®. Peek (1799), 8 T. R. 330; 3 Esp. 12 ; 4 E."b. 675" .'!!!.'.'!!!.".' .' 691
Dawkinss. Antrobus (1879), 17 Ch. D. 615: 44 L. T. 557; 29 W.Il. 611. . 1147
Dawkins v. Paulet (1869), L. E. 5 Q. B. 94 ; 9 B. & S. 768 ; 39 L. J. Q. B.
53 ; 21 L. T. 684 ; 18 W. R. 336 46
Dawkins v. Eokeby, Ld. (1873), L. K. 8 Q. B. 255 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 63 ; 28
L. T. 134 ; 21 W. R. 544 618, 619, 865
Daws V. Shed (1818), 15 Mass. 6 508
Dawson v. Chamney (1843), 5 Q. B, 164 ; D. & M. 348 ; 13 L. J. Q. B.
33 ; 7 Jut. 1037 162
DawBon v. Dawson (1867), L. R. 4 Eq. 504 .'.'.'.' 806
Dawson v. Gregory (1846), 7 Q. B. 756 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 286 ; 9 Jur. 688. . 1033
Dawson v. Jay (1854), 2 Sm. & G. 199 ; 22 L. T. 345 ; 23 L. T. 36 ;
2W. R. 311 ; 1150
Dawson v. Maodonald (1836), 2 M. & "W. 26 ; 2 Gale, 215 ; 6 L. J. Ex.
10 225
Dawson v. Remnant (1806), 6 Esp. 24 . , 552
Day V. Bather (1863), 2 H. & C. 14 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 171 : 9 Jur. n! S.'iio";
8L. T. 205; 11 W. R. 575.... 162
Dayti. King (1836), 5 A. & E. 359; 6 N. & M. 845; 2 H. & W. 178, .132, 1137
Days. Spread (1842), Jebb & B. 163 1103 1141
Day ». Trig (1715), 1 P. "Wms. 286 801
Day ». Wimams (1832), 2 C. & J. 461 ; 1 L. J. Er. 168 125
Deacle v. Hancock (1824), McCleland, 85 ; 13 Price, 226 401, 410
Deacon's case (1746), 18 How. St. Tr. 365 236
Deady v, Harrison (1815), 1 Stark. 60 514
Dean«. Green (1882), 8 P. D. 79 ; 46 J. P. 742 .'.'.. 846
Deane B. Packwood (1846), 4 D. & L. 395, n. (*) 9U9
Dear v. Knight (1869), 1 F. jfe P. 433 ......'. 938
Debenham v. Mellon (1880), 6 App. Cas. 24 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 155 ; 43 L. T.
673 ; 29 W. R. 141 ; 45 J. P. 252 166
De Biel v. Thomson (1844), 3 Beav. 475 .' 680
De Bode, Baron, Case of (1845), 8 Q. B. 245 444, 936
De Caen, General, The (1855), Swa. 9 '. . . '173
Decamp v. Archibald (1893), 40 Am. St. R. 622 .'!!'..'.' 246
De Cosse Brissao v. Rathbone (1863), 6 H. & N". 301 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 238 . . 1154
Deeble v. Lineham (1860), 12 Ir. C. L. R. 1 125
Defreeze v. Trumper (1806), 1 Johns. 274 ','/.', 775
Defries». Davis (1835), 7 0. & P. 112 245
De Gaminde v. Pigou (1812), 4 Taunt. 246 !."'.!.'!.'."!! 642
De Grave v. May. of Monmouth (1830), 4 C. & P. Ill 640 644
Delamere, Ld. v. The Queen (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. 419; 36 L. j. Q B '
313 : 17 L. T. 1 gS
Delamotte v. Lane (1840), 9 C. & P. 261 231
Delaney v. Fox (1857), 2 C. B. K. S. 768 ; 26 L. J. C. F. Hs ".'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.' 97
Delame v. Church (1833), 2 L. J. Ch. 113 \ 123
De la Rue v. Dickenson (1857), 7 E. & B. 738 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 841 47
De la SauBsaye, Re (1873), L. R. 3 P. & D. 42 ; 42 L. J. P. & M. 47 '• 28
L. T. 368 ; 21 W. R. 549 705
Delegalw. Highley (1837), 8 C. & P. 444; 5 Scott, 154; 3 Bing. N.'c'.
950 ; 3 Hodges, 158 244
Delesline ». Greenland (1795), 1 Bay, 458 '.'.'.'.'. 499
Delhasse, Ex parte. Re Megevand (1867), 7 Ch. D. 611 ; 47 L. J. Bk'.'es'
38 L. T. 106 ; 26 W. R. 338 159
De L'Isle, Peer. (1826), House of Lords Minutes of Evidence, 12 ...'.'!.' i * 1167
Delmege v. MulUns (1876), 9 Ir. R. C. L 209 98
DelognyB. Eentoul (1812), 2 Mart. 175 '*"' 616
De Medina v. Norman (1842), 9 M. & "W. 827 ; 2 D. N. S. 239 ; 11 l' J
Ex. 320 774
De Medina v. Owen (1850), 3 C. & K. 77 '.'.'.'.'. 484
De Mora v. Concha (1885), 29 Ch. D. 281 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 632 ; 52 l' "t
282; 33W. R. 846 .' mg
Vol. I. enda with page 635.
Ixiv TABLE OF CASES CfTED.
FAQB
Bempsey v. Lawson (1877), L. R. 2 P. D. 98 ; 46 L. J. P. 23 ; 36 L. T.
516 ; 25 W. R. 629 704
Dent-. Clark (182H), 5 Halst. 217 1102
Deu V. Fulford (1761), 2 Burr. 1179 1015
Llenoli V. Bench (1878), 46 L. J. P. D. & A. 13 ; 2 P. Dir. 60 ; 25 W. R.
414 142, 747
Bendy v. NioboU (185S), 4 C. B. N. S. 376 ; 27 L. J. C. P. 220 622
Bendy f. Simpson (1856), 18 C. B. 831; 2 Jur. N. S. 642 233
BeniBon v. Biteher (18o7), Beane & Swabey, Eco. R. 334 77
Benn v. Spray (1786) 1 T. R. 466 395
Benn». White (1797), 7 T. R. 112 504
Benn». ■Wilford(1826), 1 C. &P. 284; Ry. &M. 88 787
Bennett v. Crocker (1832), 8 Greenl. 239 288
Bent V. Bennett (1858), 4 Myl. & Cr. 269 136
Be Pontes v. Kendall (1862), 31 L. J. Ch. 185 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 323 ; 10 W. R.
69 ; 6 L. T. 516 ; 30 Beav. 572 702
Be Praslin, Buc, case of. Law Review, Art. 7 (No. xiii.) 574
Berhy, Ld., case of (1592), Littleton, R. 370 170
Berinzy «. Turner (1851), llr. Ch. R. 341 698
Berisley ». Custance (1790), 4 T. R. 75 663
Be Roo V. Foster (1862), 12 C. B. N. S. 272 641
Be Roos Peer. (1804-5), 2 Cooper, 542 422, 423, 424, 427, 1166
Be Rosaz Francois, In re Goods of (1877), 46 L. J. P. & M. 6 ; 2 P. B.
56 ; 36 L. T. 263 ; 25 W. R. 362 795
Be Rutzen, Baron, v. Farr (1835), 4 A. & E. 63 ; 5 N. & M. 617 ; 1 H. &
W. 735 442
Desborough v. Rawlins (1838), 3 Myl. & Cr. 515 ; 7 L. J. Ch. 171 ; 2 Jur.
125 593, 606, 608
Besbrow v. Wetherley (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 438 ; 6 C. & P. 768 1194
Bespaui). Swindler (18-25), 3 Mai-t. N. S. 705 20
Bessau v. Lewin (1887), 52 L. T. 609 912
Be Thoren v. Att.-G-eu. (1876), 1 App. Ca^. 686 149
BevalaProT. Gold Min. Co., Re (1883), 22 Ch. Biv. 593; 52 L. J. Ch.
434 ; 48 L. T. 259 ; 31 W. R. 425 388
Be Vaux V. Steinkeller (1839), 6 Bing. N. C. 84 ; 8 Scott, 202 ; 8 B. P. C. '
33 ; 3 Jur. 1053 719
Be Visme, In re (1864), 2 Be G. J. & S. 17 ; 33 L. J. Ch. 332 666
BcTon Peer. (1832). Report by Nicolas, App. 44, 46 423
Bevon Witches (1682), 8 How. St. Tr. 1017, 1037 657
Devonshire, Buke of, v. Neill (1877), 2 Ir. L. R. 132, 146; 8 App. Cas.
147 42, 296, 396,403, 405, 407, 411, 425, 791, 1007
Devoy v. Bevoy (1858), 2 Sm. & G. 403: 3 Jur. N. S. 79 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 290 666
Bewdney v. Palmer (1839), 4 M. & W. 664 ; 7 Bowl. 177 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 148 . . 909
Be Whelpdale v. Milburn (1818), 5 Price, 486 510, 561
Bews V. Ryley (1851), 2 L. M. & P. 644 ; U C. B. 434 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 264 ;
15 Jur. 1169 1023
Dexter v. Hayes (see Hayes v. Bexter).
Deybel's case (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 243 17
Diana, The (18p3), 6 C. Rob. (Adm.) 60 179
Diane, The (1840), 1 W. Rob. 131 ; 4 Moo. P. C. 11 178
Dicas V. Lawson (1835), 1 C. M. & R. 934 ; 3 Bowl. 427 ; 5 Tyr. 235 ; 4
L. J. Ex. 80 832
Bickenson v. Biokenson. (1814), 2 Phillim. Ecc. R. 173 693
Bickenson v. Teasdale (1862), 1 De G. J. & S. 52 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 37 ; 9 Jur.
N. S. 237 ; 7 L. T. 655 449
Diokins, Re (1842), 3 Curt. 60 701
Dickinson v. Coward (1818), 1 B. & Aid. 677 518, 519
Dickinson v. Fletcher (1874), 43 L. J. M. C. 25 ; L. R. 9 C. P. 1 ; 29 L. T.
540 107
Dickinson ». Hatfield (1831), 5 C. & P. 46; 1 M. & Rob. 141 713
Bickinaon v. Shee (1801), 4 Esp. 67 945
Bickinaon v. Stidolph (1861), 11 C. B. N. S. 341, 357 143, 701 705
Bickinaon v. Swatman (1861), 4 S. & T. 206 ; 30 L. J. P. & M. 84 703
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixv
JJiofanaon v. Valpy (1829), 10 B. & C. 128 ; 5 M. & R. 126 160, 540
Dicks V. Brooks (1880), 15 Ch. D. 22 ; 49 L. J. Oh. 812 : 43 L. T. 71 ; 29
^W.R.87 : :... 1234
Dickson ». Evans (1794), 6 T. E. 80; 3 R. R. 119 266
Dickson v. E. of Wilton (1859), 1 F. & P. 425 619
Digby V. Atkinson (1815), 4 Gamp. 275 ; 16 R. R. 792 169
Dis'gle V. Higgs (1877), 2 Ex. D. 422 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 721 : 37 L. T. 27 :
25 W. R. 777 620
Diggle V. Loud, and Blaokwall Ry. Co. (1850), 5 Ex. 442 ; 19 L. J. Ex.
308 ; 14 Jur. 937 642, 645
Dilkes, Re (1874), L. R. 3 P. & D. 166 ; 43 L. J. P. & M. 38 : 30 L. T.
305 ; 22 W. R. 456 699
Dill V. People (1894), 41 Am. St. R. 264 '.'.'.'.'.Add'. [893]
Dilley v. Matthews (1863), 2 New R. 80 ; 11 W. R. 614 ; 8 L. T. 762 797
Dimsdale v. Dimsdale (1856), 25 L. J. Ch. 806 ; 3 Drew. 656 136
Dinmore, Re (1863), 2 Roberts. 641 696
Dinnt). Blake (1875), 44 L.J. C. P. 276; L. R. IOC. P. 388 ; 32L.T.489.. 1160
Dinomoyi Debi v. Roy Luchmissut Singh (1879), L. R. 7 lud. App. 8 . . . . 490
Di Sora, Duch., v. PhUHpps (1864), 2 New R. 553 ; 10 H. L. Cas. 624 ; 33
L. J. Ch. 129 937
D'Israeli v. Jowett (1795), 1 Esp. 427 .'.*." 1049, 1172
Ditcham v. Worral (1880), 5 C. P. D. 410 ; 49 L. J. C. P. 688 ; 43 L. T.
286 ; 29 W. R. 59 ; 44 J. P. 799 718
Ditohbum v. Goldsmith (1815), 4 Camp. 152 '..'.'.'. 620
Ditcher v. Denison (1857), 11 Moore, P. C. C. 324 77
Ditcher v. Eenriok (1824), 1 C. & P. 161 3'21, 698
DivoU V. Leadbetter (1826), 4 Pick. 220 520 889
Dix V. Otis (1827), 5 Pick. 38 '757
Dix V. Reed (1823), 1 S. & S. 239 I44
Dixon I'. Birch (1872), L. R. 8 Ex. 135 ; 42 L. J. Ex. 135 ;' 28 L.T.360 :
21 W. R. 443 ' 162
Dixon V. Cock (undated), Ridg. L. & S. 79 .'."..*!!!!.".'!!'.!.'! 1 1 03
Dixon V. Hamoud (ISloV 2 B. & Aid. 310 '5'4'4, 545
Dixon V. Lee (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 645 ; 5 Tyr. 180 ; 3 Dowl. P. C. 259. . ' 831
Dixon V. Mucklestone (1872), L. R. 8 Ch. 155 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 210 ; 27 L T
804; 21-W.R.178 539
Dixon V. Sinclear (1832), 4 Verm. 354 II39
Dixon V. Vale (1821), 1 C. & P. 278 '. 970
Dixon V. White (1883), 8 App. Cas. 833 .................'. 114
Dobell V. Hutchinson (1835), 3 A. & E. 371 ; 1 H. & W. 394 ; 5 N.' & M.
251 671, 672
Dobell V. Stephens (1825), 3 B. & C. 623 ; 5 D. & R. 490 747
Dobree v. Eastwood (1827), 3 C. & P. 250 "32 48 155
Dobson t>. Bell (1676), 2 Lev. 176 ," ' ' 19
Dobson*. Collis (1856), 1 H. &N. 81 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 267 '. .' 681
Dodd V. Acklom (1843), 6 M. & Gr. 672 ; 7 Scott, N. R. 415 ; 7 Jur.'ioi?';
13L.J C.P. 11 660,662
Dodd V. Norns (1814), 3 Camp. 620 ; 14 R. R. 832 253, 256, 9.)1, 967
Doddington's case (1594), 2 Co. Rep. 33 92
Dodds V. Freke (Tuke) (1884), 26 Ch. D. 617 ; 53 L.' J. Ch! '598;" Vo'l.'t.
320 ; 32 W. R. 424 473
Dodge !). Meech (1828), 1 Hagg. Ecc. 620 ...'..'..'.'.'....'.'.'.'..'...'..." 140
Dodsley v. Varley (1840), 12 A. & E. 632 ; 4 P. & D. 448 ; 5 Jur.'sie.'!!". 690
Dodson V. Mackey (1834), 8 A. & E. 225 n. ; 4 N. & M. 327 711
Doe 41. Allen (1799), 8 T. R. 147, 497 747
Doe i>. Allen (1810), 3 Taun. 78 ; 12 R. R. 597 '. . 622, 623 524
Doe V. Allen (1840), 12 A. & E. 461 ; 4 P. & D. 220 793 794
Doe V. Andrews (1778), 2 Cowp. 846 ; cited 1 Myl. & K. 108 . . . .610,611' 816
Doe V. Andrews (1850), 16 Q. B. 766 •. 171 1049
Doe«). Arkwright (1833), 5 C. & P. 575 .377 446 1173
Doe f. Ashley (1847), 10 Q. B. 663 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 356 803,' 1050
Doe V. Askew (1809), 10 East, 620 ; 10 R. R. 366 1050
Vol. 1. ends with page 635.
Ixvi TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOB
Doet'. Austin (1832), 9 Bing. 41 ; 2 Moo. & So. 107 443, 510
Doe (;. Barnard (1849), 13 Q. B. 945 118
Does. Barnes (1834), 1 M. & Bob. 386 1049, 1054, 1170
Doe V. Barnes (1846), 8 Q. B. 1037 148, 269
Doe V. Barton (1827), 2 M. & Bob. 28 412
Doe V. Barton (1840), 11 A. & E. 311 ; 3 P. & D. 194 ; 4 Jiir. 432 . .96, 98, 99
Doe V. Batten (1775), 1 Cowp. 243 ; 9 East, 314, n. ; 9 E.. R. 570. n. . .39, 522
Doe V. Baytup (1835), 2 N. & M. 837 ; 3 A. & E. 188 ; 1 H & W. 270 . . 97
Doe V. Beckett (1843), 4 Q. B. 601 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 236 721
Doe V. Bell (1793), 6 T. K. 471 ; 2 R. R. 642 654
Doe V. Benjamin (1839), 9 A. & E. 644 1231
Doe V. Benson (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 688 766
Doe i: Beviss (1849), 18 L. J. C. P. 128 ; 7 C. B. 456 441, 457, 791, 1231
Doe V. Beynon (1840), 12 A. & E. 431 ; 4 P. & D. 193 87, 788
Doe V. Biggs (1809), 1 Taun. 367 ; 2 Taun. 107 ; U E. R. 533 624
Doe V. Bingham (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 672 1202
Doe V. Birch (1836), 1 M. & W. 402 ; 1 T. & Gr. 769 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 185 . . 622
Doe V. Birchmore (1839), 1 P. & D. 448 ; 9 A. & E. 662 97
Doe V. Bird (1835), 7 C. & P. 6 605
Doe V. Bold (1847), 11 Q. B. 127 ; 12 Jur. 360 643
Doe V. Bower (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 469 803, 804
Doeff. Bo-wer (1851), 16 Q. B. 806 273
Doe V. Brawn (1821), 5 B. & A. 243 148
Doe j;. Bray (1828), M. & M. 166; 3 M. & R. 428 ; 8B. &C. 813 ....270, 1049
Doe V. Brayne (1848), 5 C. B. 655 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 127 269, 272
Doe V. Bridges (1831), 1 B. & Ad. 847 658
Doe V. Brown (1837), 7 A. & E. 447 99
Doe». Burdett (1836), 4 A. & E. 19; 6 N. & M. 259 86, 134
Doe V. Burt (1787), 1 T. E. 701 ; 1 R. R. 367 786, 787
Doe V. Burton (1840), 9 C. & P. 254 438
Doe«). Calvert (1810), 2 Camp. 388; 11 R. R. 745 622, 624, 1161
Doe J). Caperton (1839), 9C. &P. 116 19, 1213
Doe V. Carpenter (1850), 16 Q. B. 181 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 70 800
Doe V. Cartwright (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 326 288
Doe V. Cartwright (1824), R. & M. 62 ; 1 C. & P. 218 1050, 1173
Doev. Catomore (1851), 16 Q. B. 746; 20 L. J. Q. B. 728 142, 1192
Doev. ChaUis (1851), 17 Q. B. 166 1113
Doe V. Chambers (1836), 4 A. & E. 410 ; 6 N. & M. 639 1214
Deed. Child*. Roe (1852), 1 E. & B. 279; 22 L. J. Q. B. 102; 17 Jur. 136 607
Doe V. M. of Cleveland (1829), 9 B. & C. 864 119, 1211
Doe*. Clifford (1847), 2 0. & Kir. 448 ..'. 296, 320, 321
Doe V. Coekell (1834), 6 0. & P. 527 1191
Doe V. Colcombe (1841), C. & Marsh. 155 441
Doef. Cole (1834), 6 C. & P. 360 ; 308, 610
Doe V. Cooke (1829), 6 Bing. 180 126
Doe V. Cooke (1831), 7 Bing. 346 ; 6 M. & P. 181 118
Doe V. Corbett (1813), 3 Camp. 368 269
Doe ». Coulthred (1837), 7 A. & E. 235 116, 444
Doe V. Courtenay (1848), 11 Q,. B. 702 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 161 658
Does. Cox (1790), 6 C. & P. 743, n 918
Doe V. Crago (1848), 6 0. B. 90 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 263 162
Doe V. Cranstoun (1840), 7 M. & W. 1 801
Doe V. Date (1842), 3 Q. B. 609 322, 600, 969, 970, 979, 987
Doe V. Davies (1795), 1 Esp. 461 ; 5 R. R. 745 116
Doe V. Davies (1837), 2 M. & W. 503 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 176 119
Doe V. Davies (1847), 10 Q. B. 314 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 218 ..26, 27, 171, 409, 414,
697, 1227
Doe V. Deakin (1828), 3 C. & P. 402 ; 8 B. & C. 22 170, 172
V>oev. Derby, E. of (1834), 1 A. & E. 790 326, 327, 1112, 1114
Doe d. Devine v. Wilson (1855), 10 Moore, P. C. R. 527 123, 1224
Doe V. Dumford (1813), 2 M. & Sel. 62 1207
Doef. Dyeball (1829), 3C. &P. 610; M. & M. 346 118
Doe«. Edmonds (1840), 6 M. & W. 302 44, 721
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OP CASES CITED. Ixvii
FAQH
Doe». Edwards (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 321 192
Doe V. Edwards (1839), 1 P. & D. 408 ; 9 A. & E. 554 8,9
Does. Ld. Egremont (1841), 2 11. & Rob. 386 969, 970
Does. Errington (1834), 1 A. &E. 760; 3N. &M. 646; 1 M. &Rob. 344 n. 194
Doe V. Errlngton (1840), 6 Bing. N. C. 79 ; 8 Seott, 210 ; 3 Jur. 1126. .95, 1109
Doe V. Evans (1827), 3 0. &. P. 219 329
Doe V. Evans (1832), 1 C. & M. 42 ; 3 Tyr, 56 701
Doe V. Eyre (1851), 17 Q. B. 366 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 431 ; 15 Jur. 1031 75
Doe V. Fleming (1827), 4 Bing. 266 149, 373
Doe V. Ford (1835), 3 A. & E. 649 ; 4 L. J. (N. S.) K. B. 268 : 5 N. & M.
209 90, 91, 747
Doe B. Forster (1811), 13 East, 405 ; 12 R. R. 383 524
Does. Porwood (1842), 3 Q. B. 627 ; 11 L. J. Q. B. 321 658
Doe V. Foster (1834), 1 A. & E. 791, n. (S) 326
Doef. Fowler (1850), 19 L.J. Q. B. 15; 14 Q. B. 700 430
Doe V. Francis (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 57 99
Doe V. Frankis (1840), 11 A. & E. 795 ; 3 P. & D. 565 526, 529
Doe V. Galloway (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 43 ; 2 N. & M. 240 800, 801
Doe V. Gardiner (1852), 12 C. B. 319 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 222 119
Doe V. Gatacre (1838), 8 C. & P. 578 1047
Doe V. Gladwin (1845), 6 Q. B. 953 ; 14 L. J. Q,. B. 189 522, 544, 750
Doe V. Glenn (1834), 1 A. & E. 49 ; 3 N. & M. 837 92
Doe V. Gore (1837), 2 M. & W. 321 1039
Doe ». Gosley (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 243 ; 9 C. & P. 46 274
Doe V. Green (1820), Gow, R. 227 446
Doe ». Grey (1816), 1 Stark. 284 319
Boev. Griffin (1812), 16 East, 293; 13 R. R. 474 171, 416
Doe V. Groves (1847), 10 Q. B. 486 ; 11 Jur. 558 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 297 542
Doe«. Gunning (1837), 3N. &P. 260; 7A. &E. 240; W. W. & D. 460.. 1046
Doe V. Gwillim (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 129 788
Doe*. Hall (1812), 16 East, 208 1169
Does. Hanipson(1847), 4C. B. 267; 17 L. J. C. P. 226 112
Doe V. Hardy (1836), 1 M. & Rob. 625 747
Doe V. Hares (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 440 ; 1 N. & M. 237 91
Doe V. Harris (1833), 5 C. & P, 592 592
Doe V. Harris (1837), 6 A. & E. 215 ; 1 N. & P. 405 653
Doev. Harris (1838), 8 A. & B. 12 706
Doei). Harvey (1825), Ry. & M. 297 415
Doe V. Harvey (1832), 8 Bing. 239 ; 1 Moo. & So. 374 286, 288
Doe ». Hawkins (1841), 2 Q. B. 212; 1G.&D.551; 6Jur.216; 10 L. J.
Q. B. 285 387, 442
Doe d. Hearle v. Hicks (1831-2), 9 Dowl. & R. 15 704
Doe V. Hemming (1826), 9 Dowl. & R. 16 ; 1211
Doe V. M. of Hertford (1850), 19 L. J. Q. B. 526 603, 606
Doe V. Hicks (undated), cited Doe v. Walker, 4 Er-p. 50 ; Bull. N. P. 286
(nom. Goodright v. Hinks) 252, 253
Does). Hilder (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 790, 793 5, 126
Doe V. Hirst (1821), 3 Stark. 60 1198
Doe V. Hiscocks (1839), 5 M. & W. 369 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 27 744, 784, 793, 794,
796, 797, 798, 7S9, 802, 804, 805
Doe V. Hodgson (1840), 12 A. & E. 135 ; 2 M. & Rob. 283 ; 4 P. & D. 142 ;
4 Jur. 1202 1192
Doe V. Holtom (1832), 4 A. & E. 76 760
Doe V. Home (1843), 3 Q. B. 757, 766, 767 ; 3 G. & D. 239 ; 12 L. J.
Q. B. 721 ; 7 Jur. 38 91
Doe V. Howell (1840), 12 A. & E. 696 734
Doe V. Howells (1832), 2 B. & Ad. 747 91
Doe ». Hubbard (1850), 16 Q. B. 227 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 61 789, 794, 800
Doe V. Huddart (1836), 2 0. M. & R. 316 ; 5 Tyr. 846 ; 1 Gale, 260 ;
4 Dowl. 437 89, 1113
Doe V. Huthwaite (1820), 2 M. & Rob. 48 798
Doe V. James (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 47 321, 322, 591
Doe V. Jauncey (1837), 8 C. & P. 101 599
Vol, J. ends with page 635.
Ixviii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAGB
Doe!). Ld. Jersey (1825), 1 B. & Aid. 550 786
Boev. Jesson (1805), 6 East, 85 172
Doe V. Johnson (1819), Gov, N. P. 173 117
Doe V. Johnson (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 1047 ; 8 Scott, N. R. 761 ; 14 L. J.
0. P. 17 259
Doe 1). Johnston (1825), McCl. & T. 141 662
Doev. Jones (1808), 1 Camp. 367 444, 445, 510
Doe V. Jones (1842), 9 M. & W. 372 ; 1 Dowl. N. 8. 352 664
Doe ». Jones (1846), 15 K. & W. 580 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 58 116
Doe V. Jones (1849), 13 Q. B. 774 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 260 127
Doet!. Jones (1850), 5 Ex. 498 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 405 622
Doe V. Keeling (1848), 11 Q. B. 889 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 199 ; 12 Jur. 433 . . 26,
305, 432
Doe ». Kemp (1831), 7 Bing. 336 26, 112,233, 234
Doe V. Kemp (1835), 2 Bing. N. 0. 102 ; 2 Soott, 9 112
Doe«!. Kilner(1826), 2 C. & P. 289 297, 1054
Doe«;. Kingston (1841), 1 Dowl. N. S. 203 734
Doef. Knight (1826), 8 D. & R. 348 ; 5 B. & C. 471 1204
Doef. Lakin (1836), 7 0. & P. 481 1168
Doe 1). Laming (1814), 4 Camp. 76 ; 15 E. R 728 162
Doe V. Langdon (1848), 12 Q. B. 711 ; 18 L. J Q. B. 17 ; 13 Jur. 96. .98, 127,
321, 322, 598
Doe V. Langfield (1847), 16 M. & W. 497 294, 443, 444, 454
Doe V. Lea (1809), 11 East, 312 766
Doe V. Leach (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 230 ; 10 L. J. C. P. 289 192
Doe V. Lewis (1836), 7 C. & P. 574 134
Doe V. Lewis (1843), 1 0. & K. 122 269
Doe V. Litherland (1836), 6 N. & M. 313 ; 4 A. & E. 784 611
Doe V. Lloyd (1806), Pea. Bv. App. 41 126
Doe V. Lloyd (1839), 6 Bing. N. C. 741 ; 8 Soott, 93 ; 3 Jur. 751 89, 1214
Doe V. Lloyd (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 685 ; 1 Scott, N. S. 605 ; 10 L. J. C. P.
128 21, 1081, 1083
Doe V. Look (1835), 4 N. & M. 807 ; 2 A. & E. 705 638
Doe V. Long (1841), 9 C. & P. 777 193
Doe V. Lyne (1822), cited 2 Ph. Ev. 258, n. 1 1227
Doe «. Manifold (1814), 1 M. & Sel. 294 141
Doe V. Martin (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 212 312
Doe«>. Martin (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 771, 785; 1 N. & M. 512 784, 786, 788
Doe V. Mason (1793), 1 Esp. 63 9
DoetJ. Massey (1851), 17 Q. B. 373; 20 L. J. Q. B. 434 ; 15 Jur. 1031. .76, 116
Doe 4!. Mee (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 617 1169
Doe». Mew (1837), 7 A. & E. 240 1046
Doe«. Michael (1851), 17 Q. B. 276 171, 443
Doe V. Millett (1848), 11 Q. B. 1036 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 202 125, 434
Doe V. Mills (1835), 2 A. & K. 17 ; 1 M. & Rob. 385 97, 99
Doe V. Milward (1838), 3 M. & W. 328 ; 1 H. & H. 79 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 67. . 660
Doe V. Mobbs (1841), Car. & M. 1 442
Doe V. Moflfatt (1860), 15 Q. B. 267 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 438; 14 Jur. 936. .648, 655
Doe V. Morgan (1832), 1 C. & M. 236 793
Doe V. Morris (1835), 3 A. & E. 46 ; 4 N. & M. 698 319
Doe V. Morris (1810), 12 East, 237 ; 2 Taun. 62 287
Doe V. Mostyn (1862), 12 C. B. 268 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 178 1039
Doe V. Movdsdale (1847), 16 M. & W. 689 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 169 127
Doeji. MulUner (1796), 1 Esp. 460; 5 R. R. 746 116
Doe V. Murless (1817), 6 M. & Sel. 110 1166, 1166
Doe V. Murrell (1837), 8 C. & P. 134 116
Doe V. Keeds (1836), 2 M. & W. 129 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 59 793
Doe ». Nepeau (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 86 173, 174
Doe V. Olley (1840), 12 A. & E. 481 ; 4 P. & D. 275 ; 4 Jur. 1084 1169
Doei). Owen (1837), 8 0. & P. 110 320
Doe V. Palmer (1851), 16 Q. B. 747 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 367 ; 16 Jur. 836. .142, 747
Doe*. Passingham (1826), 2 C. & P. 444 433
Doe t>. Paul (1829), 3 0. & P. 613 1216
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixix
PAGE
Doe V. Pearce (1839), 2 M. & Eob. 240 431
Doe V. Pearsey (1827), 7 B. & C. 304 ; 9 D. & E. 908 112
Doe V. Peek (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 428 622
Doe V. Pegge (1787), 1 T. R. 760 96
Doe V. Pembroke (1809), 11 East, 504 ; 11 E. E. 260 424
Doe». Penfold (1838), 8 C. & P. 537 116, 1208
Doe V. Perkes (1820), 3 B. & A. 489 706
Doe V. Perkins (1790), 3 T. E. 749 923, 924
Doe ». Perratt (1843), 6 M. & Gr. 343 741
Doe v. Pettett (1R21), 5 B. & A. 223 443, 444, 510
Doe «. Phillips (1845), 8 Q. B. 158 ; 16 L. J. Q B. 269 429
Doe V. Plowman (1819), 2 B. & Ad. 577 5
Doe V. Poole (1848), 11 Q. B. 713 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 143 ; 12 Jur. 450 658
Doe j;. Powell (1834), 1 A. & E. 531 ; 3 N. & M. 616 98
Doet). Powell (1836), 7 C. & P. 617 329, 1216
Doe V. PoweU (1852), 3 0. & K. 323 326
Doe V. Price (1847), 16 M. & W. 603 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 159 ; 11 Jur. 131 127
Doe V. Pulman (1842), 3 Q. B. 622 ; 6 Jur. 1122 ; 11 L. J. Q. B. 319. . 301, 433
Doe V. Pye (1795), 1 Esp. 366 623
Doe». EandaU (1828), 2 M. & P. 20 415, 416
Doe *. Eees (1834), b C. & P. 610 116
Doe V. Eees (1838), 4 Bing. N. C. 384 ; 6 Scntt, 161 ; 1 Am. 159 622
Doe».Eliode8(1843), IIM. &W. 600; 12L. J. Ex. 382; 1 Dowl. &L. 293.. 35
Doe V. Eiohards (1846), 2 0. & Kir. 216 606
Doe V. Eiokarby (1803), 6 Esp. 4 444
Doe ®. Eidgway (1820), 4 B. & Aid. 63 438, 464, 466
Doe ». Eies (1832), 8 Bin?. 178 ; 1 Moo. & So. 259 318
Doe i;. Eoberts (1819), 3 B. & Aid. 367 90, 367, 1133
Doe V. Eoberts (1844), 13 M. & "W. 520, 633 1040, 1054
Doe V. Eoberts (1847), 16 M. & W. 778 390, 488
Doe V. Eobson (1812), 15 East, 32 ; 13 E. E. 361 439
Doe V. Eoe (1826), 5 Dowl. 420 644
Doe V. EoUings (1847), 4 C. B. 188 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 268 605
Doe V. Eoss (1840), 7 M. & W. 102 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 201 . .300, 320, 321, 356, 357
Doei). Eosser (1802), 3 East, 15 1160
Doe V. Eouse (1848), 5 C. B. 422 : 17 L. J. C. P. 108 797
Doe V. Eowe (1825), 2 C. & P. 246 ; E. & M. 343 644
Boev. Eowlands (1840), 9 C..& P. 734 248, 259, 273
Doe v. Samples (1838), 8 A. & E. 151 ; 1 W. "W. & H. 228 ; 2 Jur. 841 ;
3 N. & P. 254 87, 429, 431
Doe ». Scudamore (1705), 2 Ld. Eaym. 1025 6
Doei;. Seaton (1834), 2 A. & E. 178 1050
Doe V. Seaton (1835), 2 C. M. & E. 732 ; 1 Tyr. & Gr. 19 ; 1 Gale, 303 . . 89,
96, 98, 510, 602, 1113, 1173
Doe V. Sisson (1810). 12 East, 62 231, 396
Doe V. Skinner (1848), 3 Ex. 84 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 107 403, 455, 457
Doe V. Sleeman (1846), 9 Q. B. 298 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 338 ; 10 Jur. 668 397
Doe V. Smaridge (1845), 7 Q. B. 957 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 327 ; 9 Jur. 781 ... . 152
Doe V. Smart (1835), 1 M. & Eob. 47^ 268
Doe V. Smith (1838), 8 A. & E. 256 ; 3 N. & P. 335 ; 2 M. & Eob. 7 ;
IW. W. &H. 429; 2 Jur. 854 474, 475
Doe V. Smith (1817), 2 Stark. 199; 19 E. E. 702 1166
Doe d. Smith v. Jersey (1819), 1 B. & B. 97, 160 ; 2 B. & P. 692 39
Doe V. Lady Smythe (1815), 4 M. & Sel. 348 ; 16 E. E. 486 97
Doe V. Suowdon (1769), 2 W. Bl. 1224 36
Doe V. Somerton (1845), 7 Q. B. 58 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 210 ; 9 Jur. 775 .... 317
Doe V. Spence (1805), 6 East, 123 ; 2 Smith, 255 ; 8 E. E. 422 35
Doei). Spitty (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 182 315, 319
Doe V. Staoey (1833), 6 0. & P. 139 442
Doe V. Stanion (1835), 1 M. & "W. 695; 5 L. J. Ex. 253; 1 E. & G. 1066 . . 668, 659, 773
Doe V. Staple (1788), 2 T. E. 6«4 ; 1 E. E. 596 127
Does. Steel (1811), 3 Camp. 115; 13 E. E. 768 661
Doe V. Stephenson (1801), 3 Esp. 284 ; 4 Esp. 50 976
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
IxX TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAQH
Doe »). StillweU (1838), 8 A. & E. 645 ; 3 N. & P. 701 ; 1 W. W. & H.
532 ' 2 Jur 591 146
Doe «!.' Stone (1846)', "s C.' B.' ivB -IS l! J.'c. P." 234 ".".'.'!!!!!!!!!.'!."!!! 552
Doe V. Stratton (1828), 4 Bing. 446 ; 1 M. & P. 183 : 3 (J. & P. 164 655
Doe V. Suokermore (1836), 5 A. & E. 703; 2 N. & P. 16; W. W. & D. 405.. 1220,
1221, 1222, 1223, 1226, 1228
Doe V. Sutton (1841), 9 C. & P. 706 644
Doe V. Sybom-n (1796), 7 T. E. 2 ; 2 Esp. 499 ; 4 R. R. 363 . . 126, 126, 552, 1158
Doe V. Taniere (1848), 12 Q. B. 998 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 49 ; 13 Jur. 119 . . 152, 645
Doe V. Tarrer (1824), Ry. & M. 141 410, 1227
Doe d. Tatham v. Wright (1837), 2 Russ. & Mvl. 1 ; 1 A. & E. 3 ; 3 N. & M.
260; 7A. &E. 313; 6N. &M. 132; 4 Bing. N. 0. 489 : 6L. J- Q. B. 124. .369,
370, 371, 410
Hoev. Taylor (1849), 1 Allen, 144 (N. Bruns.) 766
Doe ». Thomas (1811), 14 East, 323 ; 2 Smith, L. C. 432 398
Doe V. Thomas (1829), 9 B. & 0. 299 128, 698, 659
Doe V. Thomson (1841), 9 Dowl. 948 816
Doe V. Thynne (1808), 10 East, 206 ; 10 R. R. 280 443
Doe ». Tidbury (1854), 14 C. B. 304 ; 2 C. L. R. 347 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 57 ;
18 Jur. 468 116
Doe d. Tindal v. Roe (18:i6), 5 Dowl. 420 476
Doe V. Tucker (1830), M. & M. 536 269
Doe V. Turford (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 890, 895 157, 435, 437, 454, 457, 459
Doe !;. Tyler (1830), 6 Bing. .561 ; 4 M. & P. 377 1113
Doev. Vowles (1833), 1 M. & Rob. 261 438
Doe V. Wainwright (1836), 5 A. & E. 620 1211
Doe V. Wainwright (1838), 8 A. & E. 700 444, 497
Doe V. Walker (1801), 4 Esp. 50 ; Bull. N. P. 296 252, 253
Doe V. Ward (1852), 18 Q. B. 197 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 145 ; 16 Jur. 709 . . . . 704
Doe V. Watkins (1806), 7 East, 551 ; 3 Smith, 617 ; 8 R. R. 670 35
Doe V. Watkins (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 421 ; 4 Scott, 165 602
Doe V. Watson (1817), 2 Stark. 230 98
Doet). Webber (1834), 3 N. & M. 686; 1 A. & E. 733 513, 514, 1114
Doe f. Webster (1840), 12 A. & E. 442; 4 P. &D. 270 759
Doe B. WeUa (1839), 10 A. & E. 435, 437 656
Doe V. Wellsman (1848), 2 Ex. 368 ; 6 D. & L. 179 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 277 1113
Doe V. Whitefoot (1838), 8 0. & P. 270 306
Doe V. Whitehead (1838), 8 A. & E. 571 ; 1 W. W. & H. 521 ; 2 Jur. 493. .260,
267, 306
Doe V. Whitroe (1822), D. & R. N. P. C. 1 98
Doe V. Wiggins (1843), 4 Q. B. 367, 375 ; 3 G. & D. 504 ; 7 Jur. 629 96
Doe V. Wilford (1824), 1 C. & P. 284 ; R. & M. 88 787
Does. WilUams (1836), 7 0. & P. 332 115, 116
Doe V. WOson (1809). 11 East, 56 39
Doe V. Wittcomb (1851), 4 H. L. Gas. 425 ; 6 Ex. 601 302, 403, 457, 460
Doe V. WoUey (1829), 8 B. & C. 22 ; 2 M. & R. 195 ; 3 C. & P. 402 86, 170
Does'. WombweU (1811), 2 Camp. 559 524
Doe V. Wood (about 1828), 5 Bing. 439 977
Doe V. Wood (1845), 14 M. & W. 682 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 41 ; 9 Jur. 1060 .... 660
Doe V. Woodbridge (1829), M. & R. 302 ; 9 B & C. 376 522
Doe V. Wright (1839), 10 A. & E. 763 . 2 P. & D. 672 89 1140
Doef. Young (1845), 8 Q. B. 63; 15 L. J. Q. B. 9; 9 Jur. 941 ... ' 148
Doglioni v. Crispin (1866), 35 L. J. P. & M. 129 ; L. R. 1 H. L. 301 : 15
L. T. 44 1106, 1145
Doherty v. Dyer (1890), 25 L. R. Ir. 297 142
Doker t'. Hasier (1824), Ry. & M. 198 "" 591
Dolby D. lies (1840), 11 A. & E. 335 ; 4 Jur. 432 ' "9799
Dolderv. Bk. of England (1806), 10 Ves. 286, 352 " ' 3
Dolder v. Ld. Huntingfield (1806), 11 Ves. 292 ; 8 R. R. 1.59 18
Dolling i-. Evans (1867), 36L. J. Ch. 474 |" 673
Dolphin V. Aylward (1864), 15 Ir. Ch. R. 583 UlV 1123
Dolphin V. Robins (1859), 7 H. L. Cas. 390 ; 3 Maoq. 563 ; 29 L. J P 11 •'
6 Jur. N. S. 1271 ; 7 W. R. 674 180, 1144
The references are to pages, not to paragraph*.
TABLE or CASES CITED. Ixxi
PAOE
Don P. Lippmann (1837), 5 a. & Fin. 1, 13—17 52, 1142, 1146, 1155
Donatrh v. Bergiu (1842), Arm. M. & 0. 367 1023
Donald v. duckling (1866), 3S L. J. Q. B. 2S2 ; 7 B. & S. 783 ; L. R.
1 Q. B. 185 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 795 ; 14 L. T. 772 ; 15 W. K. 13 781
Donaldson v. Thompson (1808), 1 Camp. 429 ; 10 R. R. 717 1143, 1149
Dou'-aster, May. of, v. Day (1810), 3 Taun. 262 ; 12 R. R. 650 324, 353
Donegal] v. Templemore (1858), 9 Ir. C. L. R. 374 234, 791
Donellan v. Donellan (1795), 2 Hagg. Eoo. 144 631
Donellani!. Read (1832), 3 B. &Ad. 905 659, 680
Donelson v. Taylor (1829), 8 Pick. 390 909
Don Francisco, The(1862), 1 Lush. 468 ; 31 L. J. Adm. 205 ; 6 L. T. 133 . . 1 182, 1189
Donnlson v. Elslev (1824), 3 Eagle & Y. 1.S96, n 398
Dooley v. Mahon"(1877), Ir. R. 11 Eq. 299 798
Doorman v. Jenkins (1834), 2 A. & E. 256, 260 ; 4 N. & M. 170 38, 39
Doran's case (1838), 2 Moo. C. C. 37 907
Dore Gallery, In re, (18901, 62 L. T. 758 ; 38 W. R. 491 913
Dorin v. Dorin (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 668 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 652 145, 793
Dorr V. Munsell (1816), 13 Johns. 431 746
Dorrett v. Meux (1854), 23 L. J. 0. P, 221 ; ] 5 0. B. 142 1046, 1064
Dorsey v. Dorsey (1838), 7 Watts, 360 1144
Dost Aly Khan, In goods of (1880), 6 P. D. 6 ; 49 L. J. P. 78 ; 29 W. R. 80 937
Douce, Re (1862), 2 S & T. 693; 31 L. J. P. 172; 8 Jur. N. S. 723; 6
L. T. 789 700
Doucet V. Geoghegan (1878), 9 Ch. D. 441 ; 26 W. R. 825 378
Douglas, Re (1842), 3 Q. B. 837 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 49 ; 3 G. & D. 509 ; 7
Jur. 39 868, 870
Douglas V. Corhett (1856), 6 E. & B. 514 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1247 30
Douglas V. Douglas (1871), L. R. 12 Eq. 617 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 74 ; 26 L. T.
530 ; 20 W. R. 55 180
Douglas V. Ewing (1857), 6 Ir. C. L. R. 395 39
Douglasf . Fellows (1853), 1 Kay, 114; 2 W. R. 654 ; 23 L.J. Ch. 167 . . 792,798,799
Douglas V. Forrest (1828), 4 Bing. 686 ; 1 M. & P. 663 1146
Douglas J). Holme (1840), 12 A. &E. 641 ; 4 P. &D. 685 117
Douglas V. Saunderson (1791), 2 Dall. 116 422
Douglas ». Tousey (1829), 2 Wend. 362 255, 974
Dover V. ChUd (1876), 1 Ex. Div. 172 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 462 ; 34 L. T. 737 ;
24 W. R. 637 1159
Dover v. Maestaer (1804), 5 Esp. 96 ; 4 Bast, 435 ; 1 Smith, 123 273
Dowdell V. Australian Royal Mail Co. (1854), 3 E. & B. 902 ; 2 C. L. R.
1656; 23 L. J. Q. B. 369; 18 Jur. 579 819
Dowden v. Fowle (1814), 4 Camp. 38 496
Dowling V. Dowling (1860), 10 Ir. C. L. R. 244 229
Dowling ». Finigan (1824), 1 C. & P. 687 273
Down 1). Ellis (1865), 36 Beav. 578 631
Downest). Garbutt(1843),2Dowl.N.S. 945; 14 L. J. Q. B. 216; 9 Jur. 690 734
Downes v. Richardson (1822), 5 B. & A. 675 ; 1 D. & R. 332 1203
Downing v. Butcher (1841), 2 M. & Rob. 374 262
Downing v. Capel (1867), 36 L. J. M. 0. 97 ; L. R. 2 C. P. 461 ; 16 L. T.
323 ; 16 W. R. 746 226, 499
Downs*. Cooper (1841), 2 a. B. 266; 1G.&D.573; IIL.J.Q.B. 2; 6 Jur. 622 98
Dowton«!. Cross (1794), 1 Esp. IfiS 498
Doyly's case (1830), Maoq. Prao. H. L. 654 502
Drabble v. Donner (1824), Ry. & M. 47 ; 1 C. & P. 188 315
Drake*. Drake (I860), 8 H.L.Cas. 172; 29 L J.Ch.850; 3L.T. 193. .797, 798,799
Orako v. Marryat (1823), 1 B. & C. 473 ; 2 D. & R. 696 1178
Drake*. Sykes (1797), 7 T. R. 113 496
Dranquet *. Prudhomme (1831), 3 Louis. 83, 86 258
Drant *. Brown (1825), 5 D. & R. 682 ; 3 B. & C. 665 288
Drayton *. Dale (1823), 3 D. & E,. 534 ; 2 B. & C. 293 117, 646
Dresser v. Stansfield (1845), 14 M. & W. 828 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 274 1039
Drew V. Nunn (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 661 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 591 ; 40 L. T. 671 ;
27 W. R. 810 167
Drew V. Prior (1843), 5 M. & Gr. 264 1222
Vol, I. ends with page 635.
Ixxii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAQB
Drinkwater v. Porter (1835), 7 C. & P. 181 397, 399, 402
Droitwioh rase (1835), Knapp & 0. 64 497
Drown v. Smith (1825), 3 New Hamp. 299 644
Draitt's case (1872), L. B. 11 Eq. 6 845
Drummond, Re (1880, should be 1860), 2 S. & T. 8 ; 8 W. E. 476 701
Drummond v. Att.-Gen. (1849), 1 Dr. & War. 353 763, 784, 791
Drummond v. Parish (1843), 3 Curt. 522, 542 702
Drury's case (see Malone v. O'Connor), Drury (temp. Napier), 644 79
Druryj;. Macnamara(1855),5E. &B.612; 25L.J.Q.B.5; lJur.N.S.1163 773
Dryden v. Allix (1863). 1 Moo. P. C. N. S. 528 6
Duane, Re (1862), 31 L. J. P. & M. 173 ; 2 S. & T. 590 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 752 ;
6 L. T. 788 140
Du Barre v. Livette (1791), Pea. R. 77 ; 3 B. R. 655 595, 59S
Dublin, Abp. of v. Lord Trimleston (1849). 12 Ir. Eq. R. 251 . .1133, 1167, 1168
DubHn, Corp. of v. Judge (1847), 11 Ir. L. R. 8 729
Dublin, "W. & W. Ry Co. v. Slattery (1878), 3 App. Gas. 1155; 39 L. T.
365; 27 "W. R. 191 ; 10 Ir. C. L. Rep. 256 28
Du Bost r. Beresford (1810), 2 Camp. 512 : 11 R. R. 782 371, 374
Duckett V. Cover (1877), 6 Ch. D. 82 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 407 ; 25 W. R. 6-54 . . 187
Duiikett V. Williams (1851), 1 C. & J. 610 ; 1 Dowl. 291 347
Dudgeon v. Pembroke (1877), li. R. 2 Apn. Gas. 284 ; 1 Q. B. D. 96 ; 46
L. J. Q. B. 409 ; 36 L. T. 382 ; 25 W. B. 499 771
Dudley »•. Sumner (1809), 5 Mass. 444 372
Dudley v. Vose (1873) 114 Mass. 34 763
Dufaur v. Croft (1840), 3 Moo. P. C. R. 147 140
Dufferin's, Ld., case (18.S7), 4 CI. & Fin. 568 1093
Duffeiiu Peer. (1848). 2 H. of L. Gas. 47 1048
Dufan V. Smith (1792), Pea. R. 108 606
Duffr, Re (1871), 5 Ir. B. Equity, 506 142, 747
Dugdale V. Bobertson (1857), 3 K. & J. 695 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 687 114
Duggins, Be (1870), 39 L. J. P. 24 ; 22 L. T. 182 701
Duke «. Ashby (1862), 7 H. & N. 600 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 168; 8 Jur. N. S.
236 ; 10 W. B. 273 97
Dukes V. Gostling (1835), 1 Bing. N. C. 588 ; 1 Scott, 570 ; 1 Hodges, 120;
4 L. J. C. P. 211 202
Dumfries, Earl of. The (1885), 10 P. D. 31 ; 54 L. J. P. 7 ; 61 L. T. 906 ;
33 W. B. 568 ; 6 Asp. M. C. 342 388
Dumper v. Dumper (1862), 3 G-ifE. 583 666
Dunboyne, Ld. v. Brander (1854), 18 Beav. 313 144
Duncan v. Beard (1820), 2 Nott & M'C. 400 429
Duncan v. Brady (1860), 12 Ir. C. L. B. 171 1086
Duncan v. Hill (1871), 40 L. J. Ex. 137 ; L. B. 6 Ex. 255 ; 25 L. T. 59 ;
19 W. R. 894 158
Duncan v. Hodges (1827), 4 McC. 239 1206
Duncan v. Louch (1845), 6 Q. B. 904 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 185 ; 9 Jur. 346 207
Duncan v. Lowndes (1813), 3 Camp. 478 ; 14 R. B. 815 161
Duncan v. Scott (1807), 1 Camp. 100 1013, 1044
Duncan v. Tiudal (1853), 13 C. B. 257 ; 22 L J. C. P. 137 ; 17 Jur 347. . 651
Duncombe v Daniell (1837), 1 W. W. & H. 101 ; 2 Jur. 32 ; 8 C. & P. 222 507
Duncuft V. Albrecht (1841), 12 Sim. 189 685
Dundas's case (1814), Macq. H. L. Prac. 610 502
Dundasf. Dutens (1790), IVes. jun. 199; 2 Cox, 240; IR. B. 112 679
Dunford v. Trattles (1844), 2 M. & W. 529 ; 1 D. & L. 55i ; 13 L. J. Ex
124 ; 8 Jur. 180 533
Dunlop V. Higgins (1848), 1 H. of L. C. 381 ; 12 Jur. 295 155
Dunn ». Devon, &o. Newspaper Co., (1894) 10 R. 167; (1896) 1 Q B
211, n. ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 342; 70 L. T. 593 636
Dunns;. Murray (1829), 4 M. &B. 571 ; 9 B. & C. 780 "" 1124
Dunn V. Slee (1816), 1 Moore, C. P. ; Holt, N. P. 401 : 17 B. R. 651 508
Dunuj). Snowden (1863), 32L. J. Ch. 104; 2Dr. &Sm. 201; 7 L. T 658-
U W. B 160 173
Dimne v. EngUsh (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 624; 31 L.T. 75 324, 971
Dunne v. Ferguson (1832), Hayes, 343 686 686
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixxiii
„ PAQB
DuimingD. Boterts (1862), 36 Barb. (N. T.) 463 e74
Dimraven, Ld. v. Llewellyn (1860), 15 Q. B. 7i)l ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 3S8. .394, 396,
397, 398, 402
Dunsford*. Curlewis (1859), 1 P. & F. 702 26
Danston v. Paterson (1857), 2 C. B. N. S. 495 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 267 643
Dnpays». Shepherd (16'18), 12 Mod. 216 4
Dupuy V. Traraan (1843), 2 T. & C. 341 .....' 927
Durance, Ee (1872), L. R. 2 P. & D. 406; 41 L. J. P. & M. 60: 26 L. T.
983 ; 20 "W. R. 769 703
Durham, Lady, Re (1842), 3 Curt. 67 '..'..'. 701
Durham, Bp. of, v. Beaumont (1808), 1 Camp. 207 464, 976, 977
Durham andSunderl. Ry. Co. v. Walker (1842), 2 G. & D. 326; 2 Q. B. 940 638
Darling v. Loveland (1839), 2 Curt. 226, 227 140
Durrantn.Priend(18o7), 6 DeGr. &Sm. 343; 21 L. J. Ch. 353; 16Jur.769 174
I Durrell v. Bederley (1816), Holt, 283 ; 17 R. R. 639 934
Dun-ell (should be Darrell) v. Evana (1861), 1 H. & C. 174 ; 31 L. J. Ex
337; 9 Jur. N. S. 104; 7 L. T. 97; 10 W. R. 665 297, 674
Dutton, Re (1862), 32 L. J. P. & M. 137 ; 3 S. & T. 66 143
Duttons. Solomonson (1803), 3 Bos. & P. 582; 7 R. R. 883 691
Dutton V. 'Woodman (1832), 9 Cush. 255 494, 5 >6
Dwyer 1). Collins (1852), 7 Ex. 639; 21 L. J. Ex. 225 ; 16 Jur. 569. .318, 319, 609
Dwyer v. Rich (1871), 6 I. R. C. L. 144 Ill
Dyoe Sombre*. Troup (1856), Deane, Eoo.R. 38; 26L.T.(O.S.)288. . 169, 170, 262
Dye V. Dye (1884), 47 J. P. 520 666
Dyer, Re (1828), 1 Hagg. Eoo. R. 219 693
Dyeri;. Best (i866), L. R. 1 Ex. 152; 25 L. J. Ex. 105; 4 H. & C. 189.. 76
DTert».Dyer(1788),lWhite&T.L.C.236; "Watk.Copyh. 214-228 (3rd ed.)..665,666
Dyer». Green (1847), 10 L. J. Ex. 239 ; 1 Ex. 71 1206
Dyer «-.Munday (1895), 14 R (May) 266; (1895) 1 Q. B. 742; 64L. J.Q.B.
448; 72L.T. 448; 43 W. R. 440 Ada.ho7S']
Dyke v. Aldridge (1798), cited 7 T. R. 665 ; 11 East, 5s4 496
Dykev. Williams (1861J, 2 S. & T. 491 ; 31 L. J. P. & M. 157 414, 416
Dymooh v. Watkins (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 451 ; 31 W. R. 331 ; 48 L. T. 393 944
Dyne!). Nutley (1853), 14 G. B. 122 801
DyaartPeer. (1881), 6 App. Gas. 489 149 367
Dyson v. Wood (1824), 3 B. & C. 449 1033
Eabon ». JefEoock (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 379 ; 42 L. J. Ex. 36 ; 28 L. T. 273 ;
20 W. R. 1033 114
Eads V. Williams (1854), 24 L. J. Ch. 531 ; 4 De G. M. & G. 674 1039
Eagletons. Gutteridge (1843), 11 M. & W. 469; 12 L. J. Ex. 359; 2
Dowl. N. S. 1053 227, 1196, 1205
Eagleton v. King^iton (1803), 8 Ves. 438 1220, 1223
Earner v. Merle (1802-9), cited 2 Camp. 263 255
Earl's Trust, Re (1858), 4 K. & J. 300 9, 1030
Earl of Auckland, The (1861), 30 L. J. P M. & A. 121 ; Lush. Adm. 164;
15 Moo. P. C. C. 304 ; 5 L. T. 558 ; 10 W. R. 124 178
Earl of Dumfries, The (1883), 10 P. D. 31 ; 54 L. J. P. 7 ; 61 L. T. 906 ;
33 W. R. 568 ; 5 Asp. M. C. 342 388
Earl V. Lewis (1801), 4 Esp. 1 432, 1168
Earle v. Picken (1833), 5 C. & P. 542 291, 292, 655
Earp V. Henderson (1876), 3 Ch. D. 254 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 738 ; 34 L. T. 844.. 221
Earp V. Lloyd (1857), 3 Kay & J. 549 1 183
East V. Chapman (1827), 2 C. & P. 570 ; M & M. 46 245, 970
East Lond. Waterw. Co. v. Bailey (1827), 4Bing. 283 ; 12 Moo. (C. P.) 532 642
East. Cos. Ry. Co. .-. Broom (1851), 6 Ex. 614 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 196; 6 Railw.
Cas. 678 643
East.UnionRy.Co.v.East.Co8.Ry.Co.(1853),2E.&B.540; 22L.J.Q.B.371 1160
East. Union Ry. Co. v. Symonds (1850), 6 Ex. 237 ; 6 RaUw. Cas. 578. .454, 458
Eaatland v. BurcheU (1870), 3 Q. B. D. 432 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 500 ; 38 L. T.
568; 27W.R.290 167
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
Ixxiv TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PASS
Eastman v. Tuttle (1823), 1 Cowen, 248 644
Eastmui'e v. Laws (1839), 6 Bing. N. C. 444 ; 7 Scott, 461 ; 7 Dowl. 431 ;
2 Am. 54; 3 Jur. 460 1121
Easton V. Carter (1860), 5 Ex. 8 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 173 1133
Eastwood V. Eenyon (1840), 9 L. J. Q. B. 409 ; 4 Jur. 1081 ; 3 P. & D. 276 ;
11 A. & E. 438 679
Eastwood V. Saville (1842), 11 L. J. Ex. 383 ; 9 M. & W. 615 717
Eaton V. Basker (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 201 ; 7 Q. B. D. 529 ; 60 L. J. Q. B.
444 ; 44 L. T. 703 ; 29 W. E. 697 ; 45 J. P. 616 650
Eccles V. Harrison (1848), 6 Notes of Gas. (Eco. & Mar.) 204 488
Ecules. CommisB. v. Merral (1869), L. E. 4 Ex. 162; 38 L. J. Ex. 93 ; 17
W. R. 676 97, 152, 644
Eccles. Commiss. v. Eowe (1880), 6 App. Gas. 736; 4tf L. J. Q. B. 771 ;
43 L. T. 353 ; 29 W. B. 169 ; 46 J. P. 36 74
Ecclestont). Speke (1689), Garth. 79 ; 3 Mod. 258; Comb. 156 488,496
Eokersley v. Piatt (1866), L. R 1 P. & D. 281 ; 36 L J. P. 7 ; 14 L. T.
800 ; 15 L. T. 327 ; 16 W. R. 232 143, 703
Eckstein v. Reynolds (1837), 7 A. & E. 80 ; 2 N. & P. 256 48
Edans;. Dudfield (1841), 1 Q. B. 302, 307; 4 P. & D. 656 ; 6 Jur. 317.. 48, 691,
717
Eddowes v. Argentine Land Go. (1890), 59 L. J. Gh. 392 ; 62 L. T. 514 ;
38 W. R. 629 915
Eden v. Blake (1845), 13 M. & W. 614 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 194 ; 9 Jur. 213 746
Edge«). Hillary (1852), 3 G. & K. 43 271
Edge V. SaUsbury (1749), Amb. 70 789
Edge V. Strafford (1831), 1 Tyr. 293 ; 1 C. & J. 391 682
Edgewortb v. Johnston (1877), I. R. 11 Eq. 326 806
Edie V. East India Go. (1761), 2 Buir. 122B ; 1 W. Bl. 295 5
Edie V. Kingsford (1864), 14 C. B. 759 ; 2 C. L. R. 832 ; 23 L. J. C. P.
123 286
Edme, Ex parte (1822), 9 Serg. & R. 147 869
Edmonds*. Ghallis (1849), 7 G.B. 413; 6 Dowl.&L. 681; 18L.J.G.P 164.. 1191
Edmonds v. Foster (1876), 45 L. J. C. P. 41 ; 33 L. T. 690 ; 24 W. R.
368 109, 520
Edmonds f. Goater (1852), 15 Beav. 415; 21 L. J. Ch. 290 711
Edmonds v. Harris (1834), 2 A. & E. 414 ; 4 N. & M. 182 222
Edmonds v. Walter (1820), 3 Stark. 8 922
Edmondeon v. Stevenson (1765), Bull. N. P. 8 110
Edmunds v. Downes (1834), 2 C. & M. 459; 4 Tyr. 173 ; 3 L.J. Ex. 98 .. 673,712, 713
Edmunds «>. Low (1857), 3 K. & J. 318; 26 L. J. Ch. 432 806
Edmunds v. Newman (1823), R. & M. 5 506
Edwards, Re (1848), 6 Notes of Gas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 306 701
Edwards v. Bates (1844), 7 M. & G. 600 754
Edwards v. Buchanan (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 788 1019, 1174
Edwards v. Crock (1801), 4 Esp. 39 376
Edwards v. Edwards (1836), 2 T. & C. Ex. 123 667
Edwards v. Etherington (1825), Ry. & M. 268 774
Edwards v. Hall (1865), 6 De G. M. & G. 74 ; 25 L. J. Gh. 82 683
Edwards v. Havell (1853), 14 C. B. 107 ; 2 C. L. R. 1343 ; 23 L. J. C. P.
7; 17 Jur. 1103 179
Edwards v. Hodges (1855), 16 C. B. 477 ; 3 C. L. R. 472 ; 24 L. J. M. C.
81 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 91 191
Edwards v. Janes (1855), 1 Kay & J. 534 717
Edwards v. Jevons (1849), 8 G. B. 430 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 50 786
Edwards v. Jones (1837). 7 C. & P. 633 268
Edwards v. Matthews (1847), 16 L. J. Ex. 291 ; 4 D. & L. 721 ; 11 Jur.
398 272
Edward's'^.' Midl.Ry.'Co! "(1880)," 9'q.'b'. d! '287 ;' "s'o L.' J! 'q! B." 281';' 43
L. T. 694 ; 29 W. R. 609 ; 45 J. P. 374 643
Edwards v. R. (1854), 9 Ex. 628 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 166 84
Egan D. Cowan (1858), 30 L. T. 223 1224
Egan V. Larkin (1842), 1 Arm. M. & 0. 403 26, 330, 1214
Egerton v. Mathews (1805), 2 Smith, 389 ; 6 East, 307 ; 8 R. R. 489 . .668, 675
T/ie references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. IxXV
PAGE
Egg V. Bamett (1800), 3 Esp. 196 154
Egremont Burial Board v. Egremont Iron Ore Co. (1880), 14 Ch. D. 168 ;
49 L. J. Ch. 623 ; 42 L T. 179 ; 28 W. R. 594 321
Ehrenspergen v. Anderson (1842), 3 Ex. 148 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 132 315
Eicholz V. Bannister (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 708 ; 34 L. J. 0. P. 105 ; 11
Jur. N. S. 15; 12L. T. 76; 13 W. E.. 96 775
Eioke V. Nokes (1829). M. & M. 303 , 609, 713
Elden v. Keddell (1807), 9 R. R. 404 ; 8 East, 187 1046
Elder «. Carter (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 194; 55 L. J. Q. B. 281; 62 L. T.
516 ; 38 W. R. 612 ; 64 J. P. 692 343
Eldridge d. Knott (1774). 1 Cowp. 214 119, 123, 125
Elect. Teleg. Co., Re, Ex parte Buna (1857), 24 Beav. 137 ; 26 L. J. Ch.
614 844
Eley V. PositiTo Govt. &c. Co. (1875), 45 L. J. Ex. 58 ; 1 Ex. D. 20 ; 33
L. T. 143 ; 24 "W. R. 252 648, 681
Elford V. Teed (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 28 33
EUas V. Griffith (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 806 ; 8 Ch. D. 521 ; 38 L. T. 871 ; 26
"W. R. 869 971
Eliot V. Allen (1845), 1 C. B. 18 ; 14 L. J. C, P. 136 227
Elkin V. Janson (1846), 13 M. & W. 665 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 201 ; 9 Jur. 353. . .261,
262, 266, 267
Elkington v. Holland (1845), 9 M. & W. 659 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 613 733
EUenborough's, Ld., case (1830), Maoq. H. L. Praut. 655 502
EUershaw*. Rohinson (1816-28), Stark. Ev. 641, 642 255
EUioe, Re (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 27 ; 12 W. R 353 143
EUioe V. Roupell (1863), 2 New R. 3 ; 11 W. R. 579 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 563 ; 9
Jur. N. S. 533 353
Elliott V. Dean (1884), C. & E. 283 673
Elliott V. Elliott (1841), 9 M. & W. 27 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 3 47
Elliott V. Kemp (1840), 7 M. & W. 306 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 321 116, 117
EUiott V. North East. Ry. Co. (1863), 32 L. J. Ch. 402; 10 H. L. C. 333 ;
8L. T. 337 114
Elliott ». South Devon Ry. Co. (1848), 2 Ex. 725 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 262 ... , 50, 763
EUiott V. Thomas (1838), 3 M. & W. 170 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 129 689
ElUott ». Totnes Union (1893), 67 J. P. 151 ; 9 T. L. R. 35 373
Ellis ». Cowne (1849), 2C. &K. 719 460
Ellis V. DesUva (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 521; 60 L. J. Q. B. 328; 44 L. T. 209;
29 W. R. 493 ; 42
Ellis V. EUis (1814), 11 Mass. 92 295
Ellis ». Houstoun (1878), 10 Ch. D. 236; 27 W. R. 501 145, 766
Ellis V. Saltan (1808), 4 0. & P. 327, a. {a] 612
Ellis V. Thompson (1838), 3 M. & W. 466 ; 1 H. & H. 131 164
Elhs V. Watson (1818), 2 Stark. R. 463 ; 20 R. R. 726 495, 551
EUison V. Ellison (1802), 6 Ves. 666 ; 6 R. R. 19 ; 1 "White & T. L. C. 291. 665
Elimaker v. Buckley (1827), 16 Serg. & R. 77 945
Elmore v. Kingsoote (1826), 8 Dovel. & R. 343 ; 5 B. & C. 583 671
Elmore v. Stone (1809), 1 Taun. 458 ; 10 R. R. 578 690
Elsamj). Faucett (1797), 2 Esp. 563.... 253, 254
Elston V. Wood (1833), 2 My. & K. 678 496
Elton?;. Larkins (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 196; 5 C. & P. 385 505, 954
Elwes v. Elwes (1861), 2 GifP. 545 749
Elwood V. Bullock (1844), 6 Q. B. 384 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 330 1091
Elworthy «. Sandford (1864), 34 L. J. Ex. 42 : 3 H. & C. 330 305
Emanuel v. Eobarts (1868), 6 B. & S. 687 ; 34 L. J. Q. B. 217 546
Embleton v. Brown (1860), 3 E. & E. 234 ; 30 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 6 Jur. N. S.
1298 112
Emerson v. Blonden (1794), 1 Esp. 142 : 5 R. R. 725 503
Emery v. Barnett (1858), 27 L. J. C. P. 216 ; 4 C. B. N. S. 423 ; 4 Jur.
N. S. 634 98
Emery v. Chicbero (The Arklow) (1883), 63 L. J. P. C. 9; 9 App. Cas. 136 ;
50 L. T. 306; 5 Asp. 219 177
Emery v. Grocock (1821), 6 Madd. 54 126
Emery v. Twombly (1840), 5 Shepl. 66 1213
Vol, I. ends with page 635.
Ixxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOB
Emraersonv. Heelis (1809), 2 Taun. 38; 11 R. E. 520 686, 730
Eramerton v. Matthews (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 139 ; 7 H. & N. 686 ; 8 Jur.
N. S. Bl ; 5 L. T. 681 ; 10 W. E. 346 776
Emmet v. DewWrst (1852), 21 L. J. Ch. 497 ; 3 Mac. & a. 587 ; 15 Jur.
1115 ....:. 762
Emmott V. Marohant, HMlkett, Claimt. (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 555 ; 38 L. T.
608 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 436 ; 26 "W. E. 632 1088
Emsley, Mary, Re (1862), 2 S. & T. 491 414, 416
Engell V. Fitch (1869), 10 B. & S. 738 ; 17 W. E. 894 ; L. R. 4 Q. B. 659 ;
37 L. J. Q. B. 145 773
England v. Downs (1840), 2 Beav. 523 ; 6 Beav. 269 785
England v. Slade (1792), 4 T. R. 682 ; 2 E. E. 498 126
English Jt. Stock Bk., Ee (1866), L. E. 3 Eq. 203 845
English V. Tottie (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 141; 46 L. J. Q. B. 138; a3 L. T.
724; 2lW. E. 393 1187
EngUshman, The (1877), 3 P. D. 18 ; 47 L. J. Adm. 9 ; 37 L. T. 412. . . . 177
Ennia's case (1835), Knapp & 0. 435 497
Enohin v. Wylie (1862), 10 H. of L. Cas. 1 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 402 ; 6 L. T. N. S.
603 ; 10 W. E. 467 1161
Enos V. Tuttle (1820), 3 Conn. 250 380
Ensign t). Webster (1799), 1 Johns. 145 552
Enticknap v. Eice (1865), 4 S. & T. 136 ; 13 L. T. 211 ; 34 L. J. P. 110.. 978
Entwistle v. Davis (1867), L. E. 4 Eq. 272 ; 36 L. J. Oh. 826 684
Entwistle v. Dent (1846), 11 Q. B. 1002 1037
Enyon, Ee (1873), 42 L. J. P. & M. 62; L. E. 3 P. & D. 92 ; 21 W. E.
856 695
Eriskine v. Murray (1728), 2 Ld. Raym. 1542 5
Ernest v. NiohoUs (1857), 6 H. of L. Cas. 401 642
Erskine v. Adeane (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 395 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 919 774
Erwin V. Saunders (1823), 1 Cowen, 249 757
Eschemann, In re, (1893) 9 Times L. E. 426 179
Escott V. Mastin (1842), 4 Moo. P. C. 130 1019
Espey v. Lake (1852), 10 Hare, 260 ; 16 Jur. 1107 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 336 137
Essex, Countess of, case (1613), 2 How. St. Tr. 802 359
Essex Witches (1645), 4 How. St. Tr. 817 557
Easton, Ld., v. Ld. Hy. Seymour (1802), cited 2 Curt. 339 702
Evans v. Angell (1858), 26 Beav. 202 804
Evans ». Beattie (1803), 5 Esp. 26 608
Evans v. DaUow (1862), 31 L. J. P. 128 706, 707
Erans V. Davies (1836), 2 H. & W. 15 ; 3 N. & P. 404 ; 4 A. & E. 840 . . 717
Evans v. Evans and Eobinson (1858), 27 L. J. P. 57 1119
Evans v. Eryer (1839), 10 A. & E. 615 ; 2 P. & D. 501 187, 190
Evans v. Getting (1834), 6 C. & P. 586 1179
Evans v. Hoare, (1892) 1 Q. B. 593 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 470 ; 66 L. T. 345 ;
40 W. E. 442 ; 56 J. P. 664 674
Evans V. Morgan (1832), 2 C. & J. 453 295, 373
Evans 1). Niohol (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 614; 4 Scott, N. E. 43 ; 5 Jur.
1110 646
Evans «!. Phillips (1763), 2 Selw. N. P. 1072 987
Evans J). PowiB(1847), 1 Ex. 601; 11 Jur. 1043 192
Evans V. Eees (1839), 2 P. & D. 627 ; 10 A. & E. 161 ..396, 404, 405, 406, 432,
811, 1109, 1161, 1207
Evans f. Roberts (1826), 8 D. &E. 611 ; 6 B. & C. 832 685, 686
Evans i>. Eoe (1872), L. E. 7 C. P. 138 ; 26 L. T. 70 753
Evans «>. Simon (1853), 9 Ex. 282; 2 C. L. E. 416; 23 L. J. Ex. 16 711
Evans v. Sweet (1824), Ey. & M. 83 ; 1 C. & P. 277 311, 312
Evans t). Taylor (1838), 7 A. & E. 617; 3 N. & P. 174 395, 404, 1038, 1040
Evans V. Watson (1846), 3 C. B. 327 ; 4 D. & L. 193 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 256 ;
10 Jur. 818 396, 818
Evans V. Williamson (1881), 60 L. J. Ch. 197; 17 Ch. D. 696; 43 L. T.
719 ; 29 W. E. 230 146
Evelyn v. Haynes (1782), cited Outram v. Morewood, 3 East, 365 ; 7 E. E,.
473 1 120
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixxvii
PAGE
Everard v. Poppleton (1843), 6 Q. B. 181 ; Dav. & M. 322 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 1 ;
7 Jut. 991 733, 734
Everett v. Everett (1877), 7 Ch. D. 428 ; 47 L. J. Oh. 367 ; 30 L T. 913 ;
25 W. R. 765 808
Everett v. Lowdham (1831), 5 C. & P. 91 918
Everett v. Robertson (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 23; 1 E. & E. 16 ; 4 Jur.
N. S. 1083 710
Everett v. Touells (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 349 1 139
Everingham v. Roundell (1838), 2 M. & Rob. 138 ; 2 Lewin, C. C. 157. .357, 358
Ewart «i. Jones (1845), 14 M. & W. 774 ; 2 Dowl. & L. 252 872
Ewart V. Williams (1855), 3 Drew. 21 ; 7 De G. M. & G. 68 462
Ewer V. Ambrose (1825), 4 B. & C. 24 ; 6 Dowl. & R. 127 956, 1013
Ewing V. Osbaldiston (1834), 6 Sim. 608 970
Exall V. Partridge (undated), cited 1 Starkle, 284 319
Exeter, May. of, v. Warren (1844), 5 Q. B. 801 ; D. & M. 524 ; 8 Jar.
441 123, 440, 442, 443
Eynon, Inre (1873), 42L.J. P. &M:.52; L. R. 3P & D. 92; 21 W. R. 866. 695
Eyre, Re (1895), 72 L. T. 588 ; 43 W. R. 638 Add. [679]
Eyre t). Smith (1877), 2 C. P. D. 435 ; 37 L. T. 417 ; 25 W. R. 871 1132
F., falsely called D., v. D. (1865), 4 S. & T. 86 ; 34 L. J. P. & M. 66 ; 11
Jur. N. S. 307 ; 12 L. T. 84 ; 13 W. R. 546 167
Fabrigas v. Mostyn (1776), 20 How. St. Tr. 122 ; 2 W. Bl. 929 500
Faoey v. Hurdom (1824), 3 B. & 0. 213 37
Fairlie v. Christie (1817), 7 Taun. 416 ; Holt, 331 ; 1 Moore, C. P. 114 . . 1193
Fairlle v. Denton (1828), 3 C. &. P. 103 525
Fairlie v. Hastings (1804), 10 Ves. 123 388, 389
Fairman v. Oakford (1860), 5 H. & N. 635 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 459 153
Fairtitle». Gilbert (1787), 2 T. R. 169 ; 1 R. R. 455 91
Faith V. M'Intyre a835), 7 C. & P. 44 271, 274
Falconer v. Hanson (1808), 1 Camp. 171 ; 10 R. R. 663 328, 485
Fallon V. Robins (1865), 16 Ir. Ch. R. 422 749
Falmouth, B. of, v. Moss (1822), 11 Price, 455 695
Fahnouth, E- of, ». Roberts (1842), 9 M. & W. 469; 11 L. J. Ex. 180 ;
1 Dowl. N. S. 633 328, 1192, 1197, 1214, 1216
Falmouth, E. of, ». Thomas (1832), 1 C. & M. 89 ; 2 L. J. Ex. 57 ; 3 Tyr. 26 687
Fanny CarviU, The {see The Magnet).
Fanshawe v. Lond. and Prov. Dairy Co. {see Timson v. Wilson).
Farina ». Home (1846), 16M. & W. 119; 16 L. J. Ex. 73 691
Farquhar v. Southey (1826), 1 M. & M. 14 1196, 1 201
Farquharson v. Seton (1828), 5 Russ. 45 1123
Farquharson Tweedale, In re (1875), 44 L. J. P. & M. 35 ; L. R. 3 P. & D.
204 ; 31 L. T. 799 142, 702
Farrah v. Keat (1838), 6 Dowl. 470 833
Farrar v. Beswiok (1836), 1 M. & Rob. 627 160
Farrar v. Hutchinson (1839), 9 A. & E. 641 ; 1 P. & D. 437 ; 2 W. VV. &
H. 106 487, 552. 744
Farrar v. Staokpole (1829), 6 Greenl. 154 786
Farrer v. St. Catherine's CoUege (1873), L. R. 16 Eq. 21 ; 42 L. J. Ch.
809 ; 28 L. T. 800 ; 21 W. R. 643 797, 799
Farringdou v. Clerk (1782), 3 Doug. 124 ; 2 Chitty, 429 545
Farrington v. Donohoe (1866), Ir. R. 1 C. L. 675 ; 14 W. R. 922 682
Farrow v. Mayes (1862), 18 Q. B. 516 ; 17 Jur. 132 736
Farrow V. Wilson (1869), 38 L. J. C. P. S26 ; L. R. 4 C. P. 744 ; 18
W.R. 43 780
Farwell v. Hilliard (1825), 3 New Hamp. R. 318 1116
Faaset v. Brown (1861), Peake, R. 23 134
Fanlder v. Silk (1811), 3 Camp. 126 ; 13 R. R. 771 1102
Faulds V. Jackson (1845), 6 Notes of Cas. (Eco. & Mar.), Supp. i 694, 696
Faulkner v. Brine (185S), 1 F. & P. 254 939
Faussett v. Faussett (1849), 7 Notes of Cas. (Eoc. & Mar.), 93 389, 503
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
Ixxviii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOB
raviell V. East. Count. Ey. Co. (1848), 2 Ex. 344 ; 6 Dowl. & L. 54 ; 17
L. J. Ex. 223, 297 543
Pawoettj;. Cash (1834), 5 B. & Ad. 904; 3 N. & M. 177 36, 153
Fawoett V. Jones (1810), 3 Phillim. 476 140
Pawcus, In the goods of (1884), 9 P. D. 241 ; 54 L. J. P. 47 ; 33 W. R. 323 ;
48 J. P. 743 1031
Faircus e. Sarefield (1856), 25 L. J. Q. B. 249 ; 6 E. & B. 192 ; 2 Jul.
N. S. 665 771
Pawkea «>. Lamb (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 98 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 385 756,782
Fazakerley v. Wiltshire (1720), '1 Str. 1720 17
Fearn v. Lewis (1830), 6 Bing. 349 ; 1 M. & P 1 712
Fearnside v. Flint (1882), 22 Ch. D. 579 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 479 ; 48 L. T. 154 ;
31 W. R. 318 721
Feaubert v. Turst (1702), Pree. Ch. 207 938
Fellowes v. Clay (1842), 4 Q. B. 313 ; 3 G. & D. 407 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 202. . To
Fellowes v. AViiUamaon (1829), M. & M. 306 378
Feltham's Trusts, Re (1855), 1 K. & J. 528 798
Fennv. Griffith (1830), 6 Bing. 633; 4 M. & P. 299 285
FenneU v. Tait (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 584 ; 5 Tyr. 218 837
Fanner «. Lond. & S. E. Ry. Co. (1872), 41 L. J. Q. B. 313 ; L. R. 7
Q. B. 767 ; 26 L. T. 971 ; 20 W. R. 830 1186
Fenton v. Emblers (1762), 3 Burr. 1278 ; 1 W. Bl. 363 682
Fenwiok, Re (1867), L. R. 1 P. & D. 319 ; 36 L. J. P. 54 ; 16 L. T. 124 .. 704
Fenwick v. BeU (1844), 1 C. & K. 312 934, 936
Fenwiok v. Laycook (1841), 2 Q. B. 108 ; 1 G. & D. 532 ; 6 Jur. 341 ; 11
L. J. Q. B. 146 550
Fenwiok v. Reed (1816), 1 Meriv. 114 .-. 600
Fenwiok v. Thornton (1827), M. & M. 51 495
Ferguson j>. Mahon (1839),11 A.&E.179; 3P.&r).143..8, 1142, 1147, 1148, 1154
Fernandey v. Glynn (1807), 1 Camp. 426 1200
Fernandez, Ex parte (1861), 10 C.B.N. S. 3; SOL. J. C. P. 321 920,962,
964
Femley ». "Worthington (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 491 ; 1 Scott, N. R. 432 ;
4 Jur. 918 304, 1101
Ferrand v. Milligan (1845), 7 Q. B. 730 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 103 ; 10 J-ur. 6 . . 1231
Ferrer v. Oven (1827), 7 B. & C. 427 ; 1 M. & R. 222 1038
Ferrers v. Arden (1599), 6 Co. Rep. 7 ; Cro. Eliz. 668 1110
Ferrers, Ld., v. Shirley (1730), Fitz-G. 195 ; Bull. N". P. 236 1221
Ferris t>. Goodbum( 1858), 27 L.J. Ch. 574: 6 W. R. 485 753,807
Fesenmayer v. Adcock (1847), 16 M. & W. 449 117
Feversham, Ld., v. Emerson (1866), 11 Ex. 385 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 264 ; 26 L.
T. (0. S.) 28 ; 3 C. L. R. 1379 89
Few V. Guppy (1830), 10 Beav. 281, n. (i) ; 13 Beav. 467 597
Ffinch V. Combe, (1894) 6 R. 546; (1894) P. 191; 63 L. J. P. 113; 70
L. T. 160; 42 W. R. 377 142,708
Fiddey, Re, Jones v. Frost (1872), L. R. 7 Ch. 773 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 47 ; 27
L. T. 465 ; 20 W. R. 1025 93
Field V. Flemming (1836), 7 0. & P. 619; 6 Dowl. 460 ; 1 M. & H. 21 ;
1 Jur. 24 474
Field V. Gt. North. Ry. Co. (1878), 3 Ex. D. 261 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 662 ; 39
L. T. 80; 26W. R. 817 42
Field V. Hemming [see Field v. Flemming).
Field V. Holland (1810), 6 Cranoh, 8, 24 495
Fields. Lelean (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 170; 6 H. & N. 627; 7 Jur. N. S.
918 ; 4 L T. 121 ; 9 W. R. 387 766, 769
Fields. Woods (1837), 7 A. &E. 114; 2 N. & P. 117 225, 646
Figgo. Wedderbume (1842), 6 Jur. 218 419
Filipowski v. Merryweather (1860), 2 F. & P. 285 162
Filmerf. Gott (1774), 4 Brown, P. C. 230 746, 748
Financial Ins. Co., Re (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 687 846
Finch V. Finch (1752), 2 Ves. sen. 493 960
Finch V. Finch (1867), 36 L. J. P. & M. 78 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 371 ; 16 L. T.
268 ; 16 W. R. 797 143, 307
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OP CASES CITED. Ixxix
FAoa
Finoh V. Finch (1882), 23 Ch. D. 267 ; 48 L. T. 129 ; 31 W. E. 526 631
Finlay v. Bristol & Ex. Ey. Co. (1852), 7 Ex. 409 ; 7 Eallw. Gas. 449 ; 21
L. J. Ex. 117 6»3
Finlay «>. Einlay (1862), 31 L. J. P. & M. 149 62
Finn's case (1827), 5 Eand. 701 328
Finnerty v. Tipper (1809), 2 Camp. 72 245, 246
Finney v. Finney (1868), L. E. 1 P. & D. 483 ; 37 L. J. P. & M. 43 ; 18
L. T. 489 1106
Finney v. Grioe (1878), 10 Ch. D. 13 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 247 ; 27 W. E. 147 . . 146
Firkin v. Edwards (1840), 9 C. & P. 478 314
Firth, Ex parte, Ee Cowburn (188j), 19 Oh. D. 419 ; 61 L. J. Oh. 473 ; 45
L. T. 120 ; 30 W. E. 529 , 136
Firth, In re, Ex parte Sohofield (1877), 12 Ch. D. 337; 48 L. J. Bank.
122 ; 40 L. T. 823 ; 27 W. E. 925 966
Fischer v. Popham (1875), L. E. 3 P. & D. 246 ; 44 L. J. P. 47 ; 33 L. T.
231 ; 23 W. E. 683 697
Fischers. Szataray (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 239; E. B. & E. 321 ; 4 Jur.
N. S. 632 347
Fish, Ee, Ingham v. Eayner, (1894) 7 E. 434 ; (189i) 2 Ch. 83 ; 63 L. J.
Ch. 437 ; 70 L. T. 826 ; 24 W. E. 520 793
Fisher v. Clement (1830), 10 B. & C. 475 82
Fishery. Dudding (1841), 9 Dowl. 872; SM. &Gr. 238; 3 Soott, N. E.516.. 1031
Fisher ». Heming (1809), cited 1 Ph. Evid. 170 600
Fisher v. Joyce (1839), cited 9 C. & P. 338 259
Fisher v. Keane (1880), 11 Oh. D. 353 ; 49 L. J. Oh. 11 ; 41 L. T. 335 .. 1147
Fisher v. latohingmau (1742), Willes, 367 1031
Fisher ». Lane (1771), 2 "W. Bl. 834; 3 Wils. 297 1033, 1034
Fisher v. Magnay (1843), 5 M. & Gr. 787 ; 1 D. & L. 40 ; 6 Soott, N. E.
588 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 276 543
Fisher v. Ogle (1808), 1 Camp. 419 1149
Fisher v. Owen (1878), 8 Oh. D. 645 ; 47 L. J. Oh. 681 ; 38 L. T. 677 ; 26
W. E. 681 961, 964
Fisher v. Eonalds (1852), 12 0. B. 762 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 62 ; 17 Jur. 393 ;
20 L. T. O. S. 100 ; 1 W. E. 54 964,970
Fisher v. Samuda (1808), 1 Camp. 193 357
Fisher v. Thames June. Ey. Co. (1837), 5 Dowl. 773 227, 367
Fishmongers' Co. v. Dimsdale (1852), 6 C. B. 898 ; 12 0. B. 557 ; 22 L. J.
C. P. 44 ; 16 Jur. 799 1213
Fishmongers' Co. v. Eohertson (1845), 5 M. & Gr. 194 ; 12 L. J. 0. P.
185; 6 Scott, N. E. 56 97, 531, 552
Fishmongers' Co. v. Eohertson (1845), 1 0. B. 67 1213
Fitch V. Jones (1855), 5 E. & B. 238 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 293 ; 1 Jur. N. S.
854 261, 262
Fitch V. SmaUhrook (1661), T. Baym. 32 1031
Pitz V. Eabbits (1837), 2 M. & Eob. 60 306
Fitzgerald «. Dressier (1859), 29 L. J. 0. P. 113; 7 C. B. N. S. 374; 6
Jur. N. S. 598 676
Fitzgerald v. Elsee (1811), 2 Camp. 635 1209
Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (1849), 8 Com. B. 492 1069
Fitzgeraldw.Fitzgerald(1863), 3S.,&T. 397; 33L. J.P.&M. 39; 11W.E.85 325
Fitzgerald v. O'Flaherty (1827), 2 Moll. 394, n 487
Fitz-James v. Moya (1663), 1 Sid. 133 ; Andr. 321 899
Fitzmaurice, Ee (1864), 15 Ir. Eq. E. 445 720
Fitzmauiioe v. Bayley (1857), 8 E. & B. 664 ; 9 H. L. Cas. 78 673, 729
Fitzpatriok v. Dunphy (1851), 1 Ir. C. L. E. 366 117
Fitzroy, Sir C.,Ee (1858), 1 S. & T. 133 702
Fitzwalter Peer. (1842), Pari. Min. 34, 91 425, 426, 1226, 1227, 1228
Fladoyen, The (1799), 8 T. E. 270, n 1143
Flagg V. Mann (1837), 2 Sumn. 487 '. . . . 909
Flannery's case (1832), 1 Lew. CO. 133 824
Flannery v. "Waterford & 0. Ey. Co. (1877), I. E. 11 0. L. 30 163
Fleet V. Murton (1871), 41 L. J. Q. B. 49 ; L. E. 7 Q. B. 126 ; 26 L. T. 181 ;
20 W. E. 97 232, 764, 769
Vol. I. ends with page 636.
IXXX TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAOE
Fleet V. Perrins (1868), 37 L. J. Q. B. 233 ; L. E. 3 Q. B. 636 ; 9 B. & S.
675; 191.. T. 147 1036, 1037
Fleming v. Fleming (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 419 ; 1 H. & C. 242 793
Fleming v. Newton (1848), 1 H. of L. Gas. 363 1005
Fletcher v. Braddyll (1821), 3 Stark. R. 64 164, 932
Fletcher ». Calthrop (1845), 6 Q. B. 880, 891 ; I New Sess. Cas. 629 ; 14
L. J. Q. B. 49 ; 9 Jut. 205 131
Fletcher v. Froggatt (1827), 2 C. & P. 569 479
Fletcher v. aillespie (1826), 3 Bing. 636 ; 11 Moore, C. P 547 764
Fletcher v. Gt. West. Ry. Co. (1869), 4 H. & N. 242 ; 29 L, J. Ex. 263 ;
6 Jur. N. S. 961 ; 8 W. R. 601 114
Fletcher v. L. & N. W. R. Co. (1892), 1 Q. B. 122 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 324 ;
65 L. T. 605 ; 40 W. R. 182 1138
Flinn V. Calow (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 689 768
Flitters v. Allfrey (1874), 44 L. J. C. P. 73 ; L. R. 10 C. P. 29 ; 31 L. T.
881 1117, 1119
Flood V. Russell, (1892) 29 L. R. Ir. 91 436
Fioijv. Denny (1852), 7 Ex. 581 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 223 639
Flower v. Herbert (1851), 2 Ves. sen. 326 542
Floyd V. Barker (1607), 12 Co. Rep. 25 1099
Flureau v. Thomhill (1775-6), 2 W. Bl. 1078 773
Fogarty v. Smith (1836), 4 Dowl. 558, n 16
Foggassa's case (1349), T. B. 24 Edw. 3, 23, cited in Olive v. Guin, 2 Sid. 146 8
Foley V. Tabor (1861), 2 F. & F. 663 270
Folkes V. Chadd (1782), 3 Doug. 157 240, 930, 932
FoUett V. Jefferyes (1850), 1 Sim. N. S. 17; 20 L. J. Ch. 65; 16 Jur. 118. .692,606
Fonsiok v. Agar (1807), 6 Esp. 92 328
Foot V. Clarke (1826), 1 Russ. 604 423
Foot V. Stanton (1856), Deane, Eco. R. 19 697
Foot V. Tracy (1806), 1 Johns. 46 265
Foote V. Hayne (1824), 1 C. & P. 545 ; Ry. & M. 165 699
Foquet v. Moor (1852), 7 Ex. 870 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 35 657
Forbes' case (1872), 41 L. J. Ch. 467 ; 20 W. R. 586 ; 26 L. T. 680 845
Forbest).Forbes(1854),Kay,364; 2Eq. R. 178; 23L. J.Ch.724; 18Jur.642. 179
Ford V. Agar (1863), 2 H. & C. 279 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 138 ; 7 L. T. 795 ; 11
W. R. 429 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 416 75
Ford V. Batley (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 225 ; 17 Beav. 303 800
Ford V. Cotesworth (1870), 9 B. & S. 659 ; 10 B. & S. 991 ; L. R. 5 Q. B.
544; 39L. J. Q. B. 188; 23L. T. 165; 18^. R. 1169 154
Ford V. Elliott (1849), 4 Ex. 78 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 447 382
Ford V. Ford (1848), 6 Hare, 490 741
Ford V. Tennant (1863), 32 L.' J. Ch. 465 ; 32 Beav. 162 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 292 ;
7L. T. 732; 11 W. R. 324 608
Ford V. Yates (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 549 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 645 757
Fordham v. "Wallis (1852-3), 10 Hare, 217 ; 17 Jur. 228 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 648 493
Forman v. Free Fishers of Whitstable (1869), L. R. 4 H. L. 266 ; 21 L. T. 804 123
Forman». Wright (1851), 11 C. B. 481 ; 20 L.J. C. P. 145; 15 Jur. 706.. 201
Forrest v. Forrest (1865), 34 L. J. Ch. 428 666
Forshaw v. Chabert (1821), 3 B. & B. 158 ; 6 Moore (C. P.), 369 1193
Forshaw v. Lewis (1855), 10 Ex. 716 ; 1 Jar. N. S. 263 1184
Forster v. Clements (1809), 2 Camp. 17 ; 11 R. R. 650 647
Forster v. Farquhar, (1893) 1 Q. B. 564 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 296 ; 68 L. T.
308 ; 41 W. R. 425 42
Forster v. Forster (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 113 1216
Forster v. Hale (1798), 3 Ves. 696 ; 6 Ves. 308 ; 4 R. R. 128 665
Forster v. Maokreth (1867), 22 L. J. Ch. 926 160
Forster v. Rowland (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 396 ; 7 H. & N. 103 676
Forsyth v. Bristowe (1853), 8 Ex. 716 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 265 ; 17 Jur. 675 . . 722
Forsythe v. Norcross (1836), 6 Watts, 432 458
Forth!). Stanton (1668), 1 Wms. Saunders, 211a, 21 le 676
Foster v. AUanson (1788), 2 T. R. 479 764
Foster v. Bank of England (1846), 8 Q. B. 689 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 212 ; 10
Jur. 372 . , 997
TAe references are to pages, not to paragraph).
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixxxi
FAQB
Foster v. Blakelook (1826), 5 B. & C. 328 ; 8 D. & R. 48 653
Foster v. Charles (1830), 6 Bing. 396 ; 7 Bing. 105 ; 4 M. & P. 61, 741 . . 82
Foster v. Compton (1818), 2 Stark. 364 1032
Foster v. Hall (1831), 12 Pick. 89 599, 600
Foster v. Jolly (1836), 1 C. M. & R. 707 ; 5 Tyr. 239 ; 4 L. J. Ex. 66. .748, 757
Foster v. Mentor Life Ass. Co. (1854), 3 E. & B. 48 ; 2 C. L. B. 1404 ; 23
L. J. Q. B. 145 ; 18 Jur. 828 44, 538, 648, 769
Foster ». M'Mahon (1847), 11 Ir. Eq. R. 287 437, 613
Foster v. Pointer (1840), 9 C. & P. 718 189, 315, 319
Foster v. Shaw (1821), 7 Serg. & R. 163 353, 364, 1097
Foster v. Steele (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 892 ; 6 Soott, 26 ; 3 Hodges, 231 . . 176
Foulkes V. SeUway (1800), 3 Esp. 236 255, 373
Fountain v. Boodle (1842), 3 Q. B. 6 : 2 a. & D. 455 Ill, 263
Fountain v. Young (1807), 6 Esp. 113 600
Fowell V. Forrest (l669-70), 2 Wms. Saund. 47 ff, 47 gg 760
Fowkes V. Pascoe (1876), 44 L. J. Ch. 367 ; L. R. 10 Ch. 343 ; 32 L. T.
545 ; 23 W. R.-638 667, 806
Fowler v. Coster (1828), M. & M. 241 ; 3 C. & P. 463 270
Fowler v. Fowler (1735), 3 P. Wms. 353 806
Fowler ». Fowler (1859), 4 De G. & .J. 2.'i0 749
Fowler v. Fowler (1881), 60 L. J. Ch. 686 ; 44 L. T. 799 ; 29 W. R. 800. . , 321
Fowler t>. Savage (1819), 3 Conn. 90 1098
Fowlis V. Davidson (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Eco. & Mar.) 473 263
Fox V. Clifton (1830), 6 Bing. 792 386, 540
Fox V. Fox (1863), 15 Ir. Eq. N. S. 89 666
Fox V. Jones (1828), 7 B. & C. 732 ; 1 M. & R. 570 998
Foxt). Waters (1840), 12 A. & E. 43 291, 492
Fox's case (1863), 3 De G. J. & S. 46-') 1176
Foxoroft V. Nevens (1826), 4 Greenl. 72 508
France v. Lucy (1825), Ry. & M. 341 313
Franohot v. Leach (1826), 5 Cowen, 508 746
Francis v. Cockrell (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 184 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 113 ; L. R.
6 Q. B. 501 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 291 ; 10 B. & S. 950 772
Francis v. Dichfield (1742), 2 Ccop. 531 760, 805
Francis v. Hawkesley (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 370 ; 1 E. & E. 1052 ; 6 Jur.
N. S. 1391 710
Francisco v. Gilmore (1797). 1 Bos. & P. 177 341
Franoklin's case (1731), 17 How. St. Tr. 626 25
Frank v. Frank (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 315 1102
Franklin u. Baker (1893, should be " 1891 "), 29 Am. St. Rep. 547; 48
Ohio, 296 1192
Frankum v. Ld. Falmouth (1835), 6 C. & P. 529 ; 2 A. & E. 462 192
Eraser, Re (1869), 39 L. J. P. & M. 20 ; L. R. 2 P. & D. 40 703
Eraser t>. Burrows (1877), 46 L. J. Ex 501 ; 2 Q. B. D. 624 1186
Fraser v. Hill (1863), 1 Macq. 398 ; 1 Paterson, 232 30
Praser v. Pendlebury (1862), 31 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 10 W. R. 104 94
Fray v. Blackburn (1863), 3 B. & S. 576 1099
Frayes v. Worms (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 149 1152
Frederick v. Att.-Gen. (1874), 44 L. J. P. & M. 11 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 270 ;
32 L T 39 409
Free ti.Hawkirls (i8i7)VHolt,' N.' P.' R.",5,5o'.'.' .'.'.'.'.'.".'.'.'.'.'.".'.'.'.".'.'.'.'.' .548, 757
Free Fishers of "WhitBtable v. Foreman (1869), L. R. 2 C. P. 688 ; 37 L. J.
C. P. 305 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 345 ; L. K. 4 H. 266 ; 21 L. T. 804 123
Free Fishers of Whitstable v. Gann (1863), 11 C. B. N. S. 387 ; 13 C. B.
N. S. 869 123
Freeman v. Arkell (182i), 2 B. & C. 494 ; 3 D. & R. 669; 1 C. & P. 135,
326 303, 616
Freeman v. Baker (1833), 6 0. & P. 482 ; 5 B. & Ad. 797 ; 2 N. & M. 446 1047
Freeman v. Cooke (1848), 2 Ex. 662 ; 6 Dowl. & L. 189 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 114. .89,
90, 538, 543, 560
Freeman v. Cox (1878), 8 Ch. D. 148 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 560 ; 26 W. R. 689 . . 524
Freeman ». Freeman (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 838 ; 5 De G. M. & G. 704 ;
Kay, 479 704
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
Ixxxii TABLE OF CASES CITED,
PAOE
Freeman ». aainsford (1865), 34 L. J. C. P. 95 ; 18 C. B. N. S. 185 ; 1
H. &P. 255; 11 Jur. N. S. 116; 11 L. T. 675; 13 "W. R. 343 684
Freeman v. Phillipps (1816), 4 M. & Sel. 486 ; 16 R. E. 524. .395, 404, 410, 411
Freeman v. Pope (1870), L. R. 9 Eq. 206 ; L. R. 5 Ch. 538 ; 39 L. J. Oh.
148, 689; 21 L. T. 816; 18 W. R. 906 135
Freeman t;. Read (1863), 32 L. J. M. 0. 226; 4B. &S. 174; 10 Jur. N. S.
149; 8L. T. 458; 11 W. R. 802 S95, 396, 1040
Freeman ». Steggal (1849), 14 Q. B. 202; 19L.J. Q. B. 18; 13 Jur. Iu30.. 474,
1192, 1212
Freeman v. Tatham (1846), 5 Hare, 329 ; 15 L. J. Ch. 323 ; 10 Jur. 685. . 482
Freeman v. Walker (1829), 6 Greenl. 68 651
Freemoult v. Dedire (1718), 1 P. Wms. 431 936
Freestone v. Butnher (1840), 9 C. & P. 647 166
French v. French (1 755), 1 Dick. 268 1104
Freston, Inre (1883),52L. J. Q.B. 545; llQ. B.D. 545; 31W. R. 804.. 868
Fricker's case, Re Bank of Hindustan (1871), Ij. R. 13 Eq. 178 ; 41 L. J.
Ch. 278 , 846
Friendv.Lond. Chat. &D.Ry. (1877), L.R.2Ex. 437; 46L.J.Ex. 696. .697,1186
Frinsep (should be Prinsep) and E. Indiai Co. v. Dyce Somhre (1832 should
be 1856), 10 Moo. P. C. C. 285 140
Frith, Re (1858), 27 L. J. P. & M. 6 ; 1 S. & T. 8 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 288 .... 700
Frith V. Barker (1807), 2 Johns. 335, 765
Frost V. HoUoway (1818), cited 1 Stark. Evid. 212 ; 2 Ph. Evid. 500 .... 967
Frost V. OUver (1853), 2 E. & B. 301 ; 1 C. L. R. 1003 ; 22 L. J. Q. B.
353 ; 18 Jur. 166 17S
Froude v. Hobbs (1859), 1 Fost. & Fin. 612 26
Fry V. Chapman (1836), 5 Dowl. P. C. 265 287
Fry 1!. Hin (1817), 7 Taun. 397 ; 18 R. R. 512 37
Fry V. Wood (1731), 1 Atk. 445 328, 329
Fryer v. Wiaeman (1876), 45 L. J. Ch. 199 ; 24 W. R. 206 ; 33 L. T. 779. . 910
Puentes v. Montis (1868), L. R. i C. P. 93 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 95 ; 19 L. T.
364 ; 17 W. R. 208 116
Fuller V. Crittenden (1832), 9 Conn. 401 552, 744
Fuller V. Fenwick (1846), 3 C. B. 705 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 79 ; 10 Jur. 1057 . . 1160
Fuller V. Fotoh (1695), Carth. 346 1050, 1064, 1059, 1103
Fuller V. Hampton (1824), 5 Conn. 416 515
Fuller V. Pattrick (1849), 18 L. J. Q. B. 236 1211
FuUer v. Prentice (1788), 1 H. Bl. 49 ; 2 R. R. 715 819
Fuller V. Redman (1859), 26 Beav. 614 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 324; 5 Jur. N. S.
1045 713
Fulmerston v. Steward (1554), Plowden, 107a 658
Fulton V. Andrew (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 461 ; 44 L. J. P. & M. 23 ; 32
L. T. 209; 23 W. R. 566 140
Fulwood's, Lady, case (1637), Cro. Car. 483 ; 1 Chit. Cr. L. 404 986
Purley v. Wood (1794), 1 Bsp. 198 766
Furlong v. Howard (1804), 2 Soh. & Lef. 116 321
Furly V. Newnham (1780), 2 Doug. 419 837
Furneanx v. Hutchius (1778), 2 Cowp. 807 231
Fumell V. Staokpoole (1829), Millward, 485 9, 1024
Furness)). Meek (1857), 27 L. J. Ex. 34 44, 47, 1204
Fursdou V. Clogg (1842), 10 M. & W. 672 437
Futcher v. Patcher (1881), 50 L. J. Ch. 735; 45 L. T. 306; 29 W. R.
884 224
Fyler v. Givens (1835), Riley, L. Cas. 56 669
Fysons). Chambers (1842), 9M. & W. 460; 11 L. J. Ex. 190 117
Fyson v. Kemp (1833), 6 C. & P. 71 1018
Gaeat v. Lloyd (1825), 3 B. & C. 793 158
Gabbett v. Clancy (1844-5), 8 Ir. L. R. 299 1040
Gadd V. Houghton (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 71 ; 1 Ex. D. 357 758
Gainsford v. Grammar (1809), 2 Camp. 9 ; 11 R. R. 648 506, 607
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixxxiii
PAGE
G-albratth v. Neville (1776-6), 1 Doug. 6, n 1154, 1155
Gale «. Lindo (1887, should be 1687), 1 Vera. 475 639
Gale)). "Wmiamson (1841), 8M. & W. 408; 10 L. J. Ex. 446 748,764
Galsworthy ». Norman (1861), 21 L. J. Q. B. 70 1185
Gananoque, The (1862), Lush. 448 168
Ganer v. Lanesborough (1790), 1 Peake, 18 ; 3 R. R. 647 938
Gann i>. Free Fishers of Whitstable (1862), 20 C. B. N. S. 1 ; 36 L. J. C.
P. 29 ; 12 L. T. 150 ; 13 W. R. 589 ; 11 H. L. Cas. 192 123
Gann v. Gregory (1853), 22 L. J. Ch. 1059 ; 3 D. M. & G. 777 ; 18 Jur.
1063 ; 2 Eq. B. 484 ; 2 "W. E,. 484 142
Gann v. Johnson (1863), 11 C. B. N. S. 387 ; 13 C. B. N. S. 859 123
Garbutt v. Simpson (1863), 32 L. J. M. C. 186 ; 2 New R. 276 ; 8 L. T.
423 ; 11 "W. R. 751 951
Garcias v. Ricardo (1844), 14 Sim. 265 ; 12 CI. & Fin. 368 1142
Garden v. Cresswell (1837), 2 M. & W. 319 ; 6 Dowl. 461 ; M. & H. 44. .816, 832
Gardener v. Ennor (1866), 35 Beav. 549 136
Gardner, Ee (1858), 27 L. J. P. & M. 56 ; 1 S. & T. 109 356
Gardner Peer. (1727), Le Marchant's Rep. 389, 432 ; Selw. N. P. 672— 674. . 101
Gardner v. Croasdale (1760), 2 Burr. 904 207
Gardner v. Grout (1857), 2 C. B. N. S. 340 690
Gardner v. McMahon (1842), 3 Q. B. 561 ; 2 G. & D. 593 ; 6 Jur. 712 ;
11 L. J. Q. B. 297 710, 711
Gardner J!. Moult (1839), 10 A. &E. 464; 2 P. & D. 403 600
. Gardner v. Walsh (1865), 5 E. & B. 83 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 285 ; 1 Jur. N. S.
828 1194
Gardom, Ex parte (1808), 15 Vea. 286 161
Garey v. Nicholson (1840), 24 Wend. 350 222, 479
Garey v. Pyke (1839), 10 A. & E. 612 ; 2 P. & D. 427 222
Garland, Ke, Garland v. Beverley (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 711 ; 9 Ch. D. 213 ;
38 L. T. 9U ; 26 W. R. 718 798
Garland v. Cope (1848), 11 Ir. L. R. 514 444
Garland v. Jaoomb (1873), L. R. 8 Ex. 216; 28 L. T. 877 ; 21 W. R. 868 547
Garland v. Sooones (1 798), 2 Esp. 648 1032
Garloch v. Geortner (1831), 7 Wend. 198 154
Gamer v. Gamer (1860), 29 Beav. 116 ; 7 L. T. 182 798
Garnet v. Ball (1822), 3 Stark. R. 160 499
Gamett, Inre, Gandy !). Maoaulay (1885), 31 Ch. D. 1 631
Gamett «;. Ferrand (1827), 6 B. & C. 611 ; 8 D. & R. 657 1099
Gamett v. Woodcock (1817), 6 M. & S. 44 ; 1 Stark. R. 475 33
Gamier, Re (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 532 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 419 ; 20 W. R. 288 . . 1150
Garnons v. Barnard (179:5), 1 Anstr. 298 ; ? Eagle & Y. 380 401
Garrard v. Lewis (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 30 ; 47 L. T. 408 1205
Garrard v. Tuck (1849), 8 C. B. 231 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 338 ; 13 Jur. 871 127
Garrells v. Alexander (1801), 4 Esp. 37 1220, 1223
Garrett v. Handley (1825), 4 B. & C. 664 ; 7 D. & R. 144 ; 1 C. & P. 483. 759
Garth v. Howard (1832), 8 Bing. 461 ; 5 C. & P. 346 ; 1 Moo. & Sc. 628. .388,
390
Gartside v. Outram (1866), 26 L. J. Ch. 115 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 39 592
Gartside v. Silkstone, &c. Co. (1882), 21 Ch. D. 762 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 828 ; 47
L. T. 76 ; 31 W. R. 36 133
Garvin v. Carroll (1847), 10 Ir. L. R. 330 957, 1013
Gas Light and Coke Co. v. Turner (1839-40), 5 Bing. N. C. 666 ; 6 Bing.
N. C. 324 ; 7 Scott, 779 ; 8 Scott, 609 91
GaskiU v. Skeeue (1867), 19 L. J. Q. B. 275 ; 14 Q. B. 664 ; 14 Jur. 597 .. 525
Gass V. Stinson (1837), 2 Sumn. 610 972
Gathercole v. Miall (1846), 16 M. & W. 319 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 179 ; 10 Jur.
337 303
Gatty V. Fry (1877), L. R. 2 Ex. Div. 265 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 605 ; 36 L. T.
182 ; 25 W. R. 305 646
Gaunt V. Johnson (1848), 6 Beav. 551 819
Gaunt!). Wainman (1836), 3 Bing. N. C. 69 ; 3 Scott, 413; 2 Hodges,
186 95, 1109
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
Ixxxiy TABLE OP CASES CITED.
Gausden, Re (1862), 2 S. & T. 362 ; 31 L. J. P. 63 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 180 ; 5
L. T. 767......: 699
Gay ». Hill (1849), 18 L. J. Q. B. 12 ; 5 Dowl. & L. 422 734
Gaze !>. Gaze (1843), 3 Curt. 451 696
Geach v. IngaU (1845), 14 M. & W. 95 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 37 ; 9 Jur. 691 . .258, 259,
Geary v. Hopkins (1702), 2 Ld. Eaym. 851 997
Geaves «. Price (1868), 32 L. J. P. & M. 113 : 3 S. & T. 71 704
Gee«;. Ward (1857), 7 E. & B. 509; 3 Jur. N. S. 692 404, 411
Geill V. Jeremy (1827), M. & M. 61 32
Geils V. Geils (1852), 1 Macq. 36, 255 ; 1 Paterson, 1 1144
General De Caen, The (1855), Swa. 9 178
Gen Steam Nav. Co. v. Brit, and Col. St. Nav. Co. (1869), L. E. 3 Ex. 330 ;
L R. 4 Ex. 238 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 194 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 97 ; 20 L. T. 581 ; 17
W. R. 741 178
Gen. Steam NaT. Co. ■„. Guillou (1843), 11 M. & W. 877 ; 13 L. J. Ex.
168 1143, 1146, 1152
Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Hedley (1869), L. R. 3 P. C. 44 ; 39 L. J. Adm.
20 ; 21 L. T. 686 ; 18 W. R. 264 ; 6 Moore, P. C. C. N. S. 263 6
Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Loud, and Ed. Ship. Co. (1877), 2 Ex. D. 467 ; 47
L. J. Ex. 77 ; 36 L. T. 743 ; 25 W. R. 694 41
Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Mann (1855), 14 C. B. 127 ; 22 L. T. (O. S.) 223 ;
2W. R. 154 6
Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Morrison (1856), 13 C. B. 581 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 179. . 6
Genese, In re, Ex parte Gilbert (1885). 3 Morrell, B. E. 223 964, 966
Gening V. The State (1822), 1 MoC. 573 267
George's Estate, Re, King ». George (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 670 ; 36 L. T.
759 ; 25 W. E. 638 808
George v. Pritohard (1826), Ry. & M. 417 773
George v. Surrey (1830), 1 M. & M. 516 1220
George v. Thompson (1836), 4 Dowl. 656 , 314
Geralopulo v. Wieler (1851), 10 C. B. 712 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 105 ; 15 Jur.
N. S. 316 290, 299
Gerish v. Chartier (1845), 1 C. B 13 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 84 ; 9 Jur. 69 242
German Mining Co., Re (1853), 22 L. J. Ch. 926 ; 4 De G. M. & G. 19 . . 160
Germania, The (1868), 37 L. J. Adm. 69 ; 19 L. T. 20 ; 21 L. T. 44 .... 364
Gervia v. Grand West. Canal Co. (1816), 5 M. & Sel. 76 1165
Gery v. Redman (1875), L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 161 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 267 ; 24
W. R. 270 112, 444
Geyer v. Aquilar (1798), 7 T. R. 696 ; 4 R. R. 543 1103
Geyer v. Irwiu (1790), 4 Dall. 107 871
Gibblehouae v. Strong (1832), 3 Rawle, 437 443, 511
Gibbons. Budd (186.3), 32 L. J. Ex. 182; 2 H. & C. 92 ; 9 Jur. N. S.
625 ; 8 L. T. 321 520
Gibbons. Featherstonhaugh (1816), 1 Stark. R. 225 154
Gibbon V. Young (1818), 2 Moore (C. P.), 224 763
Gibbon's case (1734), 17 How. St. Tr. 810 1175
Gibbons v. Powell (1840), 9 C. & P. 634 314
Gibbons v. Wilcox (1817), 2 Stark. E. 43 494
Gibbs V. Cruikshank (1873), L. E. 8 C. P. 451 ; 42 L. J. C. P. 273 ; 28
L. T. 735 ; 21 W. E. 734 1118
Gibbs V. Fremont (1853), 9 Ex. 26 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 302 ; 17 Jur. 820 48
Gibbs V. Guild (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 59 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 313 ; 46 L. T. 248 ;
30 W. E. 591 71
Gibbs V. Phillipson (1829), 1 Euss. & My. 19 867
Gibbs V. Pike (1842), 9 M. & W. 351, 360, 361 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 409 ; 12
L. J. Ex. 257; C Jur. 465 85, 111, 1231
Gibbs V. Ealph (1845), 14 M. & W. 804 ; 1ft L. J. Ex. 7 1139
Gibson v. Doeg (otherwise Doey) (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 37 ; 2 H & N. 615. . 128
Gibson v. East India Co. (1839), 6 Bing. N. C. 269 ; 1 Am. 493 ; 7 Scott,
74 ; 3 Jur. 56 . . . .' 640, 642, 644
Gibson «. Holland (186.5), 35 L. J. C. P. 5 ; 1 H. & R. 1 ; L. R. 1 C. P.
1; 11 Jur. N. S. 1022; 13 L. T. 293; 14 W. R. 86 672, 673
T/ie references are to pages, not to paragraph!.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixxxv
PAQB
Gibson v. Hunter (1794), 2 H. Bl. 288 ; 6 Bro. P. 0. 235, 255 242
Gibson v. M'Oarty (1736), Cas. temp. Hardwicke, 311 1 116
Gibson v. Small (1853), 4 H. L. Cas. 396; 1 C. L. E. 363; 17 Jur.
1131 770, 771
Gilbert v. Endean (1878), 9 Ch. D. 259 ; 39 L. T. 404 ; 27 W. B. 252. . . . 914
Gilbert v. Smitb (18>6), 2 Ch. D. 686 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 514 ; 35 L. T. 43 ; 24
W. E.. 668 634
Gilbert v. Sykes (1812), 16 East, 154 ; 14 R. R. 327 682
Gilchrist v. Bale (1839), 8 Watts, 355 374, 375
Oildea v. Brien (1821), 10 Ir. C. L. E. 230 865
Giles V. Dyson (1815), 1 Stark. E. 32 ; 18 E. E. 743 553
Giles V. Siuey (1864), 3 New R. 78 ; 11 L. T. 310 ; 13 "W. R. 92 1032
Giles V. Wa'rren (1872), L. E. 2 P. & D. 401 ; 41 L. J. P. 69 ; 26 L. T.
780; 20 W. R. 827 703, 705
Gillanders v. Ld. Rossmore (1835), Joues, 504 683
GiUard ». Bates (1840), 6 M. & W. 547 ; 8 Dowl. 774 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 171 . . 611
Gillespie v. Camming (1841), Long. & T. 181 1031
Gillespie «. Moon (1817), 2 Johns. Ch. (Am.), 585 749
Gillespie v. Russel (1859), 3 Maoq. 757 ; 1 Paterson, 877 1139
Gillett V. Abbott (1862), 3 N. & P. 24 ; 7 A. & E. 783 ; 2 Jur. 300 ; 1 W.
W. & H. 89 95
Gillett V. Gane (1870), L. E. 10 Eq. 29 ; 39 L. J. Ch 818 ; 18 W. E. 423 ;
22 L. T. 58 798
Gilliat V. GiUiat (1860), 28 Beav. 481 804
Gillies V. Smither (1819), 2 Stark. E. 528 1208
GiUis V. GilHs (1874), I. E. 8 Eq. 597 179
GiUman®. Connor (1840), 2 Jebb&Sy. 210 36
Gilpin V. Fowler (1854), 9 Ex. 616 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 152 ; 18 Jur. 292 Ill
Giraud v. Eiohmond (1846), 2 C. B. 835 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 180 681, 753
Gisborne v. Hart (1839), 5 M. & W. 50 ; 7 Dowl. 402 ; 3 Jur. 536; 8
L. J. Ex. 197 1038
Givens v. Bradley (1813), 3 Bibb, 192 252
Gladwell v. Turner (1869), 39 L. J. Ex. 31 ; 5 L. E. Ex. 59 ; 21 L. T.
674 ; 18 W. R. 317 32
Glannibanta, The (1876), 1 P. Div. 283 ; 34 L. T. 934 ; 24 W. R. 1033 . . 1234
Glass V. Beach (1833), 5 Verm. 172 324
Glave D. "Wentworth (1844), 6 Q. B. 173, n 481
Gleadow v. Atkin (1833), 1 C. & M. 424 ; 3 Tyr. 289 ; 2 L. J. Ex. 163 . . 435,
445, 461, 462
Glencairn Peer. (1796). 1 Macq. 444 180
Glengall, E. of, v. Barnard (1836), 1 Keen, 769 ; 6 L. J. Ch. 26 806
Glenister v. Harding, In re Turner (1885), 29 Ch. D. 985 ; 54 L. J. Ch.
1089 ; 63 L. T. 528 420, 1170
Glenorchy v. Bosville (1733), Cas. temp. Talbot, 3 ; 1 White & T. L. C. 1 665
Glerawley's, Ld., case (1821), Macq. Prao. H. L. 629 503
Glossop t). Heston and Isleworth Local Board (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 536 ; 26
W. R. 433 911
Glossop V. Jacob (1815), 1 Stark. N. P. R. 69 ; 4 Camp. 227 16
Glossop V. Pole (1814), 3 M. & Sel. 176 1102
Glover (■. Hall (1848), 2 Phillips, 484 1183
Glubb V. Edwards (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 300 1213
Glyn V. Caulfield (1851), 3 Mac. & G. 463 ; 15 Jur. 807 599
Glyn V. Houston (1836), 1 Keen, 329 ; 6 L. J. Ch. 129 997
Glynn v. Bk. of England (1750), 2 Ves. sen. 38 435, 448
Goate V. Goate (1856), 1 H. & N. 29 710
Goblet V. Beechey (1829), 3 Sim. 24 ; Wigr. WIUh, 187 762, 786, 786
Godard v. Gray (1870), 40 L. J. Q. B. 62 ; L. R. 6 Q. B. 139 ; 24 L. T.
89 ; 19-W. R. 348 1147
Goddard's case (1584), 4 Co. Eep. 44 95
Goddard v. Parr (1865), 24 L. J. Ch. 783 948, 949
Godefroy v. Dalton (1830), 6 Bing. 460 39
Godefroy v. Jay (1827), 3 C. ^ P. 192 1031
Godfrey v. Macaulay (1795), Pea. R. 155, n. ; 3 E. R. 672, n 1096
Vol- I. ends with page 635.
Ixxxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAOE
Godfrey v. Tumbull (1795). 1 Esp. 371 1095
Godson V. Smith (1818), 2 Moore, 0. P. 157 ; 19 R. R. 533 1115
Godta V. Rose (1855), 17 C. B. 229 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 61 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 1173. 769
Godwin v. CuUey (1859), 4 H. & N. 373 7U, 713
Godwin V. Francis (1870), 39 L. J. 0. P. 121 ; L. R. 6 C. P. 121 ; 22 L. T.
338 .' 674,773
Goff V. Gt. North. Ry. Co. (1869), 30 L. J. Q. B. 148 ; 3 E & E. 672 ; 7
Jur. N. S. 286 ; 3 L. T. 850 643
GofE V. Mills (1844), 2 Dowl. & L. 23 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 227 ; 8 Jur. 758 ... 831,
832, 833
GofBn V. DoneUy (1881), 6 Q. B D. 307 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 303 ; 44 L. T.
141 ; 29 "W. R. 440 ; 45 J. P. 439 865, 869
Gold Co., Re, The (1879), 12 Oh. D. 77; 48 L. J. Ch. 650; 40 L. T. 865;
27 W. R. 757 845
Gold V. Canham (1678-9), cited in note to Kennedy v. Cassillis, 2 Swans.
325 1154
Golden v. Gillam (1882), 61 L. J. Ch. 154 ; 46 L. T. 222 ; 20 Ch. D. 389 ;
51 L. J. Ch. 503 135
Goldicutt V. Townsend (1860), 28 Beav. 445 679
Goldie V. Shuttleworth (1807), 1 Camp. 70 475
Golding v. Wharton Salt Works (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 374 ; 34 L. T. 474 ; 24
W. R. 423 193
Goldshede v. Swan (1847), 1 Ex. 154 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 284 786
Goldstein v. Fosa (1827), 6 B. & C. 154 ; 1 M. & P. 402 ; 2 T. & J. 146 ;
9 D. & R. 197 ; 4 Bing. 489 ; 2 C. & P. 252 46
Goldthorpe v. Hardman (1845), 13 M. & W. 377 ; 2 Dowl. & L. 442 ; 14
L. J. Ex. 61 85
Gommsj. Parratt (1857), 26 L. J. C. P. 279; 3 C. B. N. S. 47; 3 Jur.
N. S. 1150 1183
Gompertz v. Bartlett (1853), 2 E. & B. 849 ; 2 C. L. R. 395 ; 23 L. J. Q. B.
65; 18 Jur. 266 222, 776
Goodall D. Little (1851), 20 L. J. Ch. 132 ; 1 Sim. N. S. 155 599, 601, 606
Goodef. Job (1858), 28 L. J. Q. B. 1: 1 E. & E. 6 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 145.. 721, 966
Goodered ». Armour (1842), 3 Q. B. 956; 3 G. & D. 206 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 56 318
Goodier». Lake (1737), 1 Atk. 446 306
Goodins;. Smith (1831), MUw. 243 1103
Goodinge v. Goodinge (1749), 1 Ves. sen. 231 789
Goodman's Trusts (1880), 14 Ch. D. 619 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 805 ; 43 L. T. 14 ;
28 W. R. 902 145
Goodman v. Chase (1818), 1 B. & Aid. 297 ; 19 R. R. 322 677
Goodman v. Goodman (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 745 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 902 .... 149, 373
Goodman v. Griffiths (1857), 1 H & N. 574 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 415 671, 672
Goodman v. Harrey (1864), 3 New R. 512 1185
Goodman i> Saltash, Mayor of (1882), 7 Q. B. D. 106 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 508;
46 L. T. 120 ; 29 W. R. 639 ; 45 J. P. 844 123
Goodrich!). Stevens (1871), 5 Lans. (N. T.) 230 763
Goodright v. Cordwent (1795), 6 T. R. 219 ; 3 R. R. 161 622
Goodright v. Davids (1778), 2 Cowp. 803 622
Goodright v. Harwood (1774-5), 2 W. Bl. 937 ; 3 Wils. 497 704
Goodright ii. Hicks (1801), Buller N. P. 296 ; (nom. Doe v. Walker, 4 Esp.
N. P. 60) 252
Goodright v. Hodges (1773), Watkins on Copyholds, 227 ; 2 East, 634, n.. 667
Goodright v. Moss (1777), 2 Cowp. 891 408, 413, 414, 418, 424, 621
Goodright J). Saul (1791), 4 T. R. 3.56 ; 2 R. R. 409 422
Goodright v. Straphan (1774), 1 Cowp. 201, 204 ; Shep. Touch. 53 1206
Goodtitlev. Baldwin (1809), 11 East, 488; 11 E. R. 249; Preface, v, li., 123,
269
Goodtitle v. Braham (1792), 4 T. R. 498 631, 1228
Goodtitle v. Dew (1802), Pea. Add. Caa. 204 397
Goodtitle v. Jones (1796), 7 T. R. 47 127
Goodtitle v. Milburu (1837), 2 M. & W. 853 ; M. & H. 207 ; 6 L. J. Ex.
209 146
Goodtitle v. Southern (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 299 801
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED, Ixxxvii
FAQB
Goodwin v. Uubbard (1818), 15 Mass. 218, n 667
Goodwin v. Lordon (1835), 1 A. & E. 378 ; 2 Dowl. P. C. 504 ; 3 N. & M.
879 870
Goodwin v. Eobarts (1876), 1 App. Cas. 476 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 748 ; 35 L. T.
179 ; 24 W. R. 987 6, 643
Goodwin v. West (1637), Cro. Car. 522 819, 820
Goodwyn v. Cheveley (1859), 4 H. & N. 631 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 298 ; 33 L. T.
284; 7 W. R. 631; 1 F. & F. 313 37
Goold n. "White (1854), Kay, 683 ; 2 Eq. R. 1100 180
Goom V. Aflalo (1826), 6 B. & C. 117 ; 9 D. & R. 148 297
Gordon's case (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 582 836
Gordon's, Lord George, trial (178 1 ), 21 How. St. Tr. 542 377
Gordon v. Gordon (1871), L. R. 5 H. L. 254 741
Gordon v. Lord Reay (1832), 5 Sim. 274 701
Gordon v. Seoretan (1807), 8 East, 548 1211
Gore, Be (1843), 3 Curt. 758 698
Gore V. Bethel (1858), 12 Moore, P. C. C. 180 177
Gore V. Bowser (1851), 5 De G. & Sm. 30 ; S. C, sub nom. Gore v. Harris,
21 L. J. Ch. 10 ; 15 Jur. 1168 608
Gore V. Gahagan (1819), Milw. 220 140
Gore V. Harris {see Gore v. Bowser) .
Gore V. Hawsey (1862), 3 F. & F. 609 626
Gore V. Wright (1838), 8 A. & E. 118 ; 3 N. & P. 343 661
Gorharo v. Canton (1828), 5 Greenl. 266 377
Gorrissen v. Perrin (1857), 27 L. J. C. P. 29 ; 2 C. B. N. S. 681 ; 3 Jur.
K. S. 867 763
Gorton v. Dyson (1819), 1 B. & B. 219 ; 3 Moore (C. P.), 558 1046
Gosbellj). Archer (1835 ,2 A. & E. 500 729
Gosford, Ld., i). Robb (1845), 8 Ir. L. R. 217 292, 646
Goslin V. Corry (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 342 ; 8 Soott, N. R. 21 1231
Gosling V. Birnie (1831), 7 Bing. 346 ; 5 M. & P. 160 545
Gobs v. Ld. Nugent (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 64; 2 N; & M. 28; Wigr. Wills, 6;
2 Ph. Ev. 339 743, 751, 752, 763
Goss V. Quinton (1842), 3 M. & Gr. 825 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 471 ; 12 L. J.
C. P. 173 481
Goss V. Watlington (1821), 3 B. & B. 132 ; 6 Moore, C. P. 365 437, 508
Gosset K. Howard (1847), 10 Q. B. 453; 16 L. J. Q. B. 345; 11 Jur.
750 83, 132, 841
Gott V. Gandy (1863), 2 E. & B. 845 ; 2 C. L. B. 392 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 1 ;
18 Jur. 310 774
Goudy V. Buncombe (1847), 1 Ex. 430 ; 6 D. & L. 209 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 76. . 36
Gould V. Coombs (1845), 1 C. B. 543 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 175 ; 9 Jur. 494. .. . 1194
Gould V. Gould (1830), 6 Wend. 263 160
Gould V. Lakes (1880), 49 L J. P. & M. 59 ; L. R. 6 P. Div. 1 790
Gould V. Shirley (1829), 2 Moo. & P. 581 712
Gould (should be Goold) v. White (1864), Kay, 683 ; 2 Eq. Rep. 1100. . , . 180
Gouldie V. Gunston (1816), 4 Camp. 381 542
Gouldsworth v. Knights (1843), 11 M. & W. 337 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 283 98
Gouthwaite, Ex parte (see Be North of England Joint Stock Co.).
Cover, Ex parte (1876), 45 L. J. Ch. 95 ; 1 Ch. D. 182 ; 33 L. T. 619 ; 24
W.R.125 1233
Governor v. Bell (1819), 3 Murph. 331 1178
Governor v. Jeffreys (1820), 1 Hawks. 207 1178
Gowan v. Foster (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 507 717
Grady's case. Re British Provident Life Ass. Socy. (1863), 32 L. J. Ch.
326; 1 DeG. J. &S. 488 134
Graham, Be (1863), 32 L. J. P. & M. 113 ; 3 S. & T. 69 704
Graham v. Birkenhead By. Co. (1850), 2 Mac. & G. 146 ; 12 Beav. 460 ;
2H. &T. 450 538
Graham v. Cox (1848), 2 C. & K. 702 164
Graham ». Dyster (1816), 2 Stark. R. 23 956, 1191
Graham v. Glover (1855), 25 L. J. Q. B. 10 ; 6 E. & B. 591 ; 2 Jur. N. S.
160 838
Vol. I. ends with page 635,
Ixxxviii TABLE OP CASES CITED.
PAOB
Graham v. Hope (1795), Pea. R. 154 ; 3 R. R. 671 1095
Graham v. Oldis (1858), 1 F. & P. 262 312
Graham v. Whichelo (1832), 1 C. & M. 188; 3 Tyr. 201 ; 2 L. J. Ex.
70 660
Grahame ». Grahame (1887), 19 L. R. Ir. 249 739, 784
Grand June. Can. Co. v. Dimes (1850), 12 Beav. 63 ; 2 H. & T. 92 ; 2 Mao.
& G. 285 ; 19 L. J. Ch. 345 1147
Grant v. Bagge (1802), 3 East, 128 ; 6 R. R. 56 i 18
Grant «. Pletoher (1826), 5 B. & C. 436 ; 8 D. & R. 59 297
Grants). Gould (1792), 2 H. Bl. 100; 3 R R. 342 1103
Grant v. Grant (1839), 2 Curt. 16 603
Grant v. Grant (1865), 34 Beav. 623 ; 34 L. J. Ch. 641 ; 12 L. T. 721 ; 13
W. R. 1057 631
Grant v. Grant (1869), L. R. 2 P. & D. 8 ; 39 L. J. P. & M. 17 ; 21 L. T.
597 ; 18 W. R. 230 739, 740
Grant v. Grant (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 727 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 272 ; 22 L. T.
821 ; 18 W. R. 951 784
Grant v. Jackson (1793), Pea R. 204 493, 494, 617, 551
Grant v. M'Laohlin (1809), 4 Johns. 34 1160
Grant v. Maddox (1846), 15 M. & W. 737 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 227 763
Grant v. Moser (1843), 5 M. & Gr. 129 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 46 ; 2 Dowl. N. S.
923 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 146 ; 7 Jar. 8.54 17
Grant v. Thompson (1822), 4 Conn. 203 931
Gravenor v. Woodhouse (1824), 1 Bing. 38 ; 7 Moore, 289 99
Graves v. Key (1832), 2 B. & Ad. 313 552
Graves i). Legg (1857), 11 Ex. 642; 2 H. & N 210 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 316 ; 3
Jur. N. S. 619 157
Graves i). M'Carthy (1838), Crawf. & D. Abr. C. 127 868, 869
Graves v. Weld (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 105 ; 2 N. & M. 725 686, 687
Gray «). Bartholomew, (1894) 14 R. (Feb.) 264; (1896) 1 Q. B. 209 ; 71
L. T. 867 ; 43 "W. R. 177 . 64 L. J. Q. B. 125 636
Gray i>. Boswell (1862), 13 Ir. Ch. R. 77 749
Gray f. Cookson (1812), 16 East, 13 1100
Gray v. Dinnen (1840), 2 Jebb & Sy. 265 39
Gray v. Gardner (1807), 3 Mass. 399 122
Gray*. Haig (1855), 20 Beav. 219 108
Gray v. Harper (1841), 1 Story, R. 574 783
Gray v. Palmers (1794), 1 Esp. 135 494
Gray v. Pearson (1851), 6 H. L. Cas. 106 741
Gray v. Pentland (1815), 2 Serg. & R. 23 619
Gray v. Smith (1890), 43 Ch. D. 208 ; 59 L. J. Ch. 145 ; 02 L. T. 335 ; 38
W. R. 310 .672, 682
Gray v. Warner (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 556 ; L. R. 16 Eq. 677 ; 28 L. T. 835 ;
21 W. R. 808 136
Gray v. Young (1823), 4 M'C. 31 374
Grayson v. Atkinson (1752), 2 Ves. sen. 459 ; Dick. 158 700, 1215
Great Eastern, The (1868), L. R. 2 Adm. 88 ; 17 L. T. 667 179
Great North. Ry. Co. v. Sheppard (1852), 8 Ex. 30 ; 7 Railw. Caa. 310 ; 21
L. J. Ex. 286 162
Great West. Ry. Co. v. Bennett (1867), 36 L. J. Q. B. 133 ; L. R. 2 H. L.
27 ; 16 L. T. 186 ; 15 W. R. 647 H4
Great West. Ry. Co. ». WilUs (1865), 34 L. J. C. P. 196 ; 18 C. B. N. S.
748 388
Greaves v. Ashlin (1813), 3 Camp. 426 ; 14 R. R. 771 767
Greaves v. Fleming (1879), 48 L. J. Q. B. 335 ; 4 Q. B. D. 226 ; 27 W. R.
458 536
Greaves v. Greenwood (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 252 ; 2 Ex. D. 289 ; 36 L. T.
1 ; 25 W. R. 639 171
Greaves v. Hunter (1826), 2 C. & P. 477 1222
Greaves v. Legg (185i), 11 Ex. 642 ; 2 H. & N. 210 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 316- 3
Jur. N S. 619 167
Greaves v. Tofield (1880), 14 Ch. D. 663 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 118 ; 43 L. T. 100 :
28 W. R. 840 737
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixxxix
PAOE
Greely V. Smith (1846), 1 "Woodb. & M. 181 1109, 1138
Greeni;. Brown (1744), 2 Str. 1199 175
Green v. CresBwell (1839), 10 A. & E. 453 ; 2 P. & D. 430 .- 678
Green v. Gatewick (1673), Bull. N. P. '243 330
Green v. Green (1873), 43 L. J. P. & M. 6 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 121 1119
Green v. Howard (1779), 1 Bro. 0. C. 31 789
Green v. Humphreys (1884), 53 L. J. Ch. 625 ; 26 Ch. D. 474 ; 51 L. T.
42 711
Green v. Jackson (1865), Pea. R. 236 160
Green v. ICopke (1856), 18 C. B. 549 ; 25 L. J C. P. 297 161
Green v. London Gen. Omn. Co. (1859), 29 L. J. C. P. 13 ; 7 C. B. N. S.
290 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 228 ; 2 L. T. 95 : 8 W. R. 88 643
Greene. Ld.Penzince (1881), 6 App. Cas. 657; 51 L. J. Q. B. 25; 45
L. T. 353 ; 30 "W. R. 218 ; 46 J. P. 115 846
Green v. New River Co. (1792), 4 T. R. 590 1096
Green v. Tribe (1878), 9 Ch. D. 231 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 783 ; 38 L. T. 914 ; 27
W. R. 39 701
Green «. "Waller (1703), 2 Ld. Raym. 893 8
Green v. Weaver, (1827), 1 Sim. 404 541
Greenaway, Ex parte (1802), 6 Ves. 812 • 308
Greenish v. White (1861), 31 L. J. C. P. 93 ; 11 C. B. N. S. 209 ; 8 Jur.
N. S. 563 549
Greenla-w v. King (1838), 3 Beav. 49 601
Greenough v. Eooles (1859), 5 C. B. N. S. 786 ; 28 L. J. C. P. 160 ; 6 Jur.
N. S. 766 938
Greenough ». Gaskell(1833), 1 My. & K. 100; Cooper (temp. Brougham),
96 591. 593, 594, 606, 008, 610
Greenough v. M'Clelland (1861), 30 L. J. Q. B. 16 ; 2 E. & E. 424 ; 2
L. T. 671; 8 W. R. 612; 6 Jur. N. S, 772 758
Greenshield v. Pritohard (1841), 8 M. & W. 148 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 295 872
Greenshields v. Crawford (1842), 1 Dowl. N. S. 439 ; 9 M. & W. 314 ; 6
Jur. 303 1216, 1219
Greenwich Bd. of Works v. Maudslav (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 397 ; 39 L. J.
Q. B. 205 ; 23 L. T. 121 ; 18 W. R. 948 124
Gregg's case (1708), 14 How. St. Tr. 1375 558
Gregg «i. Wells (18.39), 10 A. & E. 98 ; 2 P. & D. 296 637, 542
Gregory's Settlm., Re (1865), 34 Beav. 600 ; 13 W. R. 828 798
Gregory ». Doidge (1827), 3 Bing. 474 ; U Moore (C. P.), 394 99
Gregory v. Howard (1800), 3 E.sp. 113 616
Gregory v. Marychuroh (1850), 12 Beav. 398 ; 19 L. J. Ch. 289 ; 13 Jur.
1019 920
Gregory v. Parker (1808), 1 Camp. 394 ; 10 R. R. 712 504
Gregory v. Queen's Proctor (1846), 4 Notes of Cases (Eoc. & Mar.), 620 . . 141
Gregory v. Tavemor (1833), 6 C. & P. 281 927, 928
Gregory «). Thomas (1811), 2 Bibb, 286 252
Gregory v. West Mid. Ry. Co. (1864), 33 L. J. Ex. 155 ; 2 H. & C. 944 ;
10 Jur. N. S. 243 ; 12 W. R. 528 722.
Gregaon v. Ruck (1843), 4 Q. B. 737 298
GrelHer v. Neale (1790), 1 Peake, 198 ; 3 R. R. 669 134
Gremaire v. he Clerk Bois Valon (1809), 2 Camp. 144 150
Grenfell v. Girdlestone (1837). 2 T. & C. Ex. 676 713
Gresham Hotel Co. v. Manning (1867), Ir. R. 1 C. L. 125 369
Gresley v. Mousley (1861), 3 De G. F. & J. 433 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 537 92
Gresley v. Mousley (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 620 ; 1 GiflE. 450 ; 4 De G. & J.
78 136
Greves, Re (1859), 28 L. J. P. & M. 28 ; 1 S. & T. 250 ; 7 W. R. 86 .... 701
Greville ». Chapman (1844), 5 ft. B. 731 ; D. & M. 553 934
Grevilleo. Stulz(1847), 11 ft. B. 1004; 17 L. J. ft. B. 14; 12 Jur. 49.. 347, 1037
Greyille v. Tylee (1851). 7 Moo. P. C. C. 320 140, 142, 707
Grew V. Hill (1849), 3 Ex. 801 ; 6 Dowl. & L. 664 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 317 533
Grey (should be Gray) B. Young (1823), 4 M'C. 31 374
Grioe v. Richardson (1877), 47 L. J. P. C. 48 ; 3 App. Cas. 319 ; 37 L. T.
677 ; 26 W. R. 358 689
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
XC TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAGI!
Griffin v. Brown (1824), 2 Pick. 304 lUw7
Griffith, In re, Carr v. Griffith (1879), 12 Ch. D. 655 ; 4 1 L. T. 640 139
Griffith V. Davies (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 602 602, 607
Griffith V. Kicketts (1849), 7 Hare, 303 ; 19 L. J. Ch. 399 ; 14 Jur'. 326. .321, 942
Griffiths, Ex parte (1822), o B. & Aid. 730 837
Griffiths V. Griffiths (1871), L. E. 2 P. & D. 300 ; 41 L. J. P. 14 ; 25 L. T.
574 ; 20 W. R. 192 700
Griffiths v. Jenkins (1864), 3 New R.- 489 683
Griffiths V. Lond. & St. Kath. Docks Co. (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 259 ; 53 L. J.
Q. B. 504 ; 51 L. T. 533 ; 33 W. E. 35 ; 49 J. P. 100 778
Griffiths V. Rigby (1856), 1 H. & N. 237 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 284 43
Griffiths V. WilHams (1787), 1 T. R. 710 506
Griffits V. Ivory (1840), 11 A. & E. 322 ; 3 P. & D. 179 1226
Griffits V. Payne (1839), 11 A. & E. 131 ; 3 P. & D. 1079 231
Grigg's case (1672), T. Eaym. 1 ; 1 Hale, 693 ; 3 Russ. C. & M. 315,
621 888, 889, 893
Grill V. Gen. Iron Screw CoUier Co. (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 600 ; 35 L. J.
C. P. 321 ; 1 H. & R. 654 ; 14 L. T. 711 ; 14 "W. R. 893 ; 12 Jur. N. S.
727 347
Grimani v. Draper (1848), 6 Notes of Cases (Eco. & M.) 421, 441 170, 263
Grimman v. Legge (1828), 8 B. & C. 324 ; 2 M. & R. 438 660
Grimwood v. Bartels (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 788 ; 28 W. R. 143 1150
Grimwood v. Cozens (I860), 2 S. & T. 364 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 497 143
Grimwood v. Moss (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 360 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 239 ; 27 L. T.
268 ; 20 "W. R. 972 622
GrindeU v. Godmond (1836), 5 A. & E. 756 ; 1 N. & P. 168 ; 2 U. & W.
339 166
Grinnell v. Wells (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 1033 ; 8 Scott, N. B. 741 ; 2 Dowl. &
L. 610 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 19 ; 8 Jur. 1101 253
Gripper v. Bristow (1840), 6 M. & W. 807 ; 8 Dowl. 797 ; 9 L. J. Ex.
324 733
Grissell v. Bristowe (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 36 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 10 ; 19 L. T.
N. S. 390 ; 17 W. R. 123 168
Groenvelt v. Burrell (1696-7), 1 Ld. Raym. 253 ; Garth. 421 987
Grose v. West (1816), 7 Taun. 39 ; 17 R. R. 437 112
Grosvenorji. Sherratt (1860), 28Beav. 659 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1228 137
Grounsell v. Lamb (1836), 1 M. & W. 352 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 154 222
Grove V. Ware (1817), 2 Stark. R. 174 317
Groves v. Groves (1829), 3 T. & J. 170 666
Guardhouse v. Blackburn (1866), L. R. 1 P. & D. 109 ; 35 L. J. P. & M.
116; 12 Jur. N. S. 278 ; 14 L. T. 69 ; 14 W. R. 463 140,141
Gudgen </. Basset (1856), 26 L. J. Q. B. 36 ; 6 E. & B. 986 ; 3 Jur. N. S.
212 746, 1204
Guest f . Elwes (1836), 5 A. & E. 126 194
Guest V. Warren (1854), 23 L. J. Ex. 121 ; 9 Ex. 379 ; 2 C. L. R. 979 ; 18
Jur. 133 1120
Guidon V. Robson (1809), 2 Camp. 302 ; 11 R. R. 713 640
Guier V. O'Daniel (1806), 1 Binn. 349, n 179
Guild's case (1828), 6 Halst. 168 560, 663, 664, 666, 671
GuU«. Lindsay (1849), 4 Ex. 45; 18 L. J. Ex. 355 192, 677
Gully V. Bp. of Exeter (1828), 4 Bing. 298 ; 12 Moore, C. P. 491 302, 614
Gumm V. Tyrie (1864), 33 L. J. Q. B. 108 ; 4 B. & S. 680 741
Gun«). McCarthy (1884), 13 L. R. Ir. 304 746, 750
Gunn V. Roberts (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 331 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 233 ; 30 L. T.
424 ; 22 W. R. 652 178
Gurford v. Bayley (1842), 3 M. & Gr. 781 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 398 ; 1 Dowl.
N. S. 619; 11 L. J. C. P. 105 190, 192
Gurney v. Langlands (1822), 5 B. & A. 330 1228
Gurr V. Button (1816), Holt, N. P. R. 327 373
Gutsole V. Mathers (1836), 1 M. & W. 502 ; 2 Gale, 64 ; 6 Dowl. P. C. 69 ;
1 T. & G. 694 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 274 220
Guy V. Sharpe (1833), 1 Myl. & K. 602 784
Guy V. West (1808), 2 Sel. N. P. 1244 113
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. XCl
PAGE
Guy Mannerinpr, The (1882), 7 P. D. 132 ; 51 L. J. Adm. 57 ; 46 L, T.
906 ; 30 W. E. 835 ; 4 Asp. M. C. 553 178
GwiUim v. GwilUm (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 31 ; 3 S. & T. 200 698
Gwynne v. Davy (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 857 751
Gyles t). HiU(1809), 1 Camp. 471, n 1018
H., falsely called C. v. C. (1862), 31 L. J. P. & M. 103 128
Habergham v. Vinoent (1793), 2 Ves. 204 ; 5 T. R. 92 701
Haokwood v. Lyall (1855), 17 0. B. 124 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 44, n. ; 2 Jur.
N. S. 44, n 179
Haddriok v. Heslop (1848), 12 Q. B. 274—277 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 313 ; 12 Jur.
600 : afe. sub nom. Heslop v. Chapman, 2 C. L. R. 139 ; 23 L. J. Q. B.
49 ; 18 Jur. 348 30
Hadley v. Carter (1835), 8 New Hamp. 40 375
Hadley v. Green (1832), 2 Tyr. 390 ; 1 L. J. Ex. 137 ; 2 C. & J. 374 1123
Hagedom v. Reid (1813), 3 Camp. 305 ; 1 M. & Sel. 567 454
Haggitt V. Ineff (1854), 24 L. J. Ch. 120 ; 5 De G. M. & G. 910 ; 1 Jur.
N. S. 49 ; 3 W. R. 141 ; 3 Eq. 144 1030
Baig r. Newton (1817), 1 Mill, R. 423 927
Haigh V. Belcher (1830), 7 C. & P. 389 946
Haigh V. Kaye (1872), 41 L. J. Ch. 667 ; L. R. 7 Ch. 469 ; 26 L. T. 675 ;
20 W. R. 697 688
Haigh V. North Bierley Union (1858), E. B. & E. 873 ; 28 L. J. Q B. 62 . . 641
Haigh V. West, (1893) 2 Q. B. 19 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 532 ; 68 L. T. 531 ; 69
L. T. 166 ; 57 J. P. 368, 630 125
Hailea v. Marks (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 389 ; 7 H. & N. 56 ; 7 Jur. N. S.
851 30, 189
Haine v. Davey (1836), 4 A. & E. 892 ; 6 N. & M. 356 ; 2 H. & W. 30 . . 227
Haines v. East India Co. (1856), 6 Moore, Ind. App. 467 543
Haines v. Guthrie (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 818 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 621 ; 51 L. T.
645 ; 33 W. R. 99 ; 48 J. P. 756 419, 645
Haines v. Roberts (1857), 26 L. J. Q. B. 353 ; 7 El. & Bl. 625 ; 27 L. J. Ex.
49; 3Jur. N. S 886 114
Haire v. Wilson (1320), 9 B. & C. 643 ; 4 M. & Ry. 605 82
Haldane v. Eukford (1869), L. R. 8 Eq. 631 378
Hale V. Russ (1821), 1 Greenl. 335 1196
Halkett v. Emmott (1878), 47 L. J. Q. B. 436 ; 3 Q. B. D. 566 ; 38 L. T.
508 ; 26 W. R. 632 1088
Hall's Estate, Re (1852), 22 L. J. Ch. 177 ; 2 De G. M. & G. 748 ; 9 Hare,
App. xvi 10.54
HaU, Ex parte, Re Whitting (1878), 10 Ch. D. 615 ; 48 L. J. Bank. 79 ; 40
L. T. 179; 27W. R. 385 651,682
Hall, Re (1871), L.E. 2 P. &D. 256; 40 L.J. P. &M. 37 671
Hall D. Bainbridge (1848), 12 Q B. 699 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 317 134
Hall V. Ball (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 242 ; 10 L. J. C. P. 285 300, 306, 356
HaU V. Betty (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 410; 5 S.jott, N. R. 608; 11 L. J. C. P. 256. 773
HaU V. Brand (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 39 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 19; 49 L. T. 492;
32 W. R. 133 829, 830
HaU f. Burgess (1826), 5 B. &C. 332; 8 D. &R. 67 660
HaU V. Butler (1839), 10 A. & E. 206 ; 2 P. & D. 374 99
HaU V. Byron (1876), 4 Ch. D. 667, 680 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 297 ; 36 L. T. 367 ;
25 W. R. 317 lis
HaU V. Cazenove (1804), 4 East, 477 ; 1 Smith, 272 ; 7 R. R. 61 1 756
HaU V. City of Loudon Brewery Co. (1862), 31 L. J. Q B. 267 ; 2 B. & S.
737 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 18 773
HaU V. Conder (1857), 2 C. B. N. S. 40 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 251 776, 777, 778
HaU 1). Eve (1876), 4 Ch. D. 341 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 146 ; 35 L. T. 926 ; 25
W. R. 177 221, 224
HaU V. Eeatherstone (1858), 3 H. & N. 284 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 308 262
HaU V. Eisher (1844), 1 CoU. 47 ; 8 Jur. 119 804
HaU V. HaU (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 444 ; L. R. 8 Ch. 430 ; 28 L. T. 283 ; 21
W. R. 373 139
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
XCll TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOE
HaUi). HiU(1757), 2 Str. 1094 604
Hall v. HiU (1841), 1 Dr. & War. U6 805, 806, 807, 808
Hall V. Janson (1855), 4 E. & B. 500 ; 3 C. L. E. 737 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 97 ;
1 Jur. N. S. 571 766
Hall ». Levy (1875), 44 L. J. C. P. 89 ; L. R. 10 C. P. 154 ; 31 L. T. 727 ;
23 W. E."393 1120
Hall V. Lund (1863), 32 L. J. Ex. 113 ; 1 H. & C. 676 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 205 ;
11 W. R. 271 116
Hall V. Maule (1838), 7 A. & E. 721 ; 3 N. & P. 459 ; 1 "W. W. & H. 399 ;
2 Jur. 887 132
Hall v. Mayor of Swansea (1844), 5 Q. B. 526 ; 1 D. & M. 475 ; 13 L. J.
Q. B. 107 ■•• 643
Hall J!. Odber(1809), 11 East, 118; 10 R. R. 443 1152, 1155
HaU ». "Warren (1804), 9 Ves. 605 : 7 R. R. 306 170
Hallaok v. V. of Cambridge (1841), 1 Q. B. 693 ; 1 a. & D. 100 ; 9 D. P.
C. 583 ; 6 Jur. 10 132
Hallen ■„. Runder (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 266 ; 3 Tyr. 959 ; 3 L. J. Ex.
260 683
Haller i>. Worman (1860), 2 F. & F. 165 607
Hallet V. Hears (1810), 13 East, 15 ; 12 R. R. 296 820
HaUett V. Cousens (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 238 922
Halley, The (1868), L. R. 2 Ad. & Eco. 3 ; 37 L. J. Adm. 1 ; L. R. 2 P. C.
193 ; 37 L. J. Adm. 33 ; 18 L. T. 879 ; 16 W. R. 998 178
HalUday v. Holgate (1861), L. R. 3 Ex. 299 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 174 781
Halliday v. Martinett (1822), 20 Johns. (Am.) 168 454
Halllfax V. Lyle (1849), 3 Ex. 446 ; 6 Dowl. & L. 424 90, 547
Hallmark's case (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 868 ; 9 Ch. D. 329 ; 38 L. T. 660 ; 26
W. R. 824 626
Haly V. La;ne (1741), 2 Atk. 182 546
Hamber v. Roberts (1849), 7 C. B. 861 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 250 1219
Hambrook v. Smith (1852), 17 Sim. 209 961
Hamelin v. Bruck (1847), 9 Q. B. 306 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 343 ; 10 Jur. 1094. . 1196
Hamerton v. Hamerton (1828), 2 Hagg. Eoc. R. 8 503
Hamerton v. Stead (1824), 5 Dowl. & R. 206 ; 2 B. & C. 478 .... 667, 658, 660
HamQton v. Chaine (1881), 50 L. J. Q. B. 456 ; 7 Q. B. D. 1, 319 ; 29
W. R. 676 ; 44 L. T. 764 136
Hamilton f. Nott (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 512; L. R. 16 Eq. 112 599
Hamilton v. Terry (1852), 11 C. B. 954 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 132 712
Hamlyn v. Betteley (1880), 5 C. P. D. 327; 49 L. J. C. P. 466 ; 42 L. T.
373 ; 28 W. R. 956 ; 44 J. P. 411 136
Hammersley v. de Biel, Baron (1845), 12 CI. & Fin. 45 639, 674, 679, 680
Hammiok v. Bronson (1812), 5 Day, 290, 293 373
Hammond's case (1822), 2 Greenl. 33 1223,1228
Hammond, Re (1863), 3 S. & T. 90 ; 32 L. J. P. 201 ; 8 L. T. 616 ; 9 Jur.
N. S. 581 ; 11 W. R. 639 699
Hammond v. Bradstreet (1854), 23 L. J. Ex. 332 ; 10 Ex. 390 403
Hammond v. Rogers (1860), 7 Moo. P. C. C. 160 178
Hammond v. Smith (1864), 33 Beav. 452 712
Hammond v. Stewart (1734-6), 1 Str. 510 • 815
Hampden v. Wallis (1884), 27 Ch. D. 251 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 1175 ; 61 L. T.
357 ; 32 "W. R. 977 624
Hampden v. Walsh (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 189 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 238 ; 33 L. T.
852; 24 W. R. b07 : 620
Hampshire v. Peiroe (1750), 2 Ves. sen. 216 797
Hampton V. Spencer (1693), 2 Vem. 288 482
Hanbury v. EUa (1834), 1 A. & E. 61 ; 3 N. & M. 438 190
Hancock v. Somes (1859), 8 Cox, C. C. 172 ; 1 E. & E. 795 ; 28 L. J. M.
C. 198; 6 Jur. N. S. 985 1073
Hancock «. Welsh (1816), 1 Stark. 347 1113, 1119
Hand V. Hall (1877), 2 Ex. D. 356 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 603 649
Handley d. Jones (1836), cited Morgan v. Boys, 7 A. & E. 337 371
Handley v. Ward (1818), cited 1 Stark. Ev. 188, n. («) 921, 944
anmer v. Chance (1865), 4 De G. J. & S 626, 631 ; 34 L. J. Ch. 413. .119, 722
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. XCIU
PAOB
Hannai Tlie (1866), 36 L. J. Adm. 1 ; L. K. 1 A. & E. 283 ; 15 L. T. 334 ;
15 W. R. 263 178
Hannaford v. Hunn (1825), 2 C. & P. 155 1101, 1103
Hannaford v. Whiteway (1856). 1 C. B. N. S. 63; 26 L. J. C. P. 75 ; 3
Jur. N. S. 53 156
Hannay v. Stewart (1837), 6 Watts, 487 388
Hansard v. Robinson (1827), 7 B. & C. 90 ; 9 D. & R. 860 ; R. & M. 404, n. 307
Hansom v, Armitage (1822), 5 B. & A. 659 ; 1 D. & R. 128 685
Hanson's case (1821), Paley on Conv. 282, 283 ; 4 B. & Aid. 521 267
Hanson v. Parker (1749), 1 Wils. 257 496
Hanson v. Shaokelton (1835), 4 Dowl. 48 ; 1 H. & W. 342 16
Hanson v. Stetson (1827), 5 Pick. 506 756
Harden v. Gordon (1823), 2 Mason, 541,561 652
Harding v. Greening (1G17), 8 Taun. 42 107
Harding v. Jones (1835), Tyr. & Gr. 135 615
Harding v. King (1834), 6 0. & P. 427 1073
Harding v. Williams (1880), 14 Ch. D. 197 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 661 ; 42 L. T.
507 ; 28 W. E. 615 1062
Hardman v. Willoock (1832), 9 Bing. 382, n 545
Hardwioke, The (1883), 9 P. D. 32 ; 53 L. J. P. D. & A. 23 473, 533
Hardwick v. Hardwick (1873), L. R. 16 Eq. 168 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 636 ; 21 W.
E. 719 801
Hardy's case (1794), 24 How. St. Tr. 451—453 ; 613
Hardy, Re (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 142 142, 747
Hardy v. Alexander (1837), 2 Stark. Ev. 641, 642, n. (e) 255
Hare v. Henty (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 65 ; 30 L. J. 0. P. 302 ; 7 Jur. W. S.
523 ; 4 L. t. 363 ; 9 W. R. 738 32
Hare )'. Hyde (1851), 16 Q. B. 394 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 185 ; 15 Jur. 315 .... 870
Hargest v. Pothergill (1832), 5 C. & P. 303 314
Hargrave v. Hargrave (1848), 9 Beav. 552 ; 19 L. J. Ch. 261 ; 14 Jur. 212 . . 101, 422
Hargrave «. Hargrave (1850), 12 Beav. 408 390, 505
Hargreave v. Everard (1856), 6 Ir. Ch. R. 278 137
Hargreave v. Spink, (1892) 1 Q. B. 26 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 318 ; 65 L. T. 650 ;
40 W. E. 254 7
Hargreaves v. Parsons (1844), 13 M. & W. 561 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 250 679
Harland v. Morley {see Morley v. Morley).
Harlook v. Ashberry (1882), 19 Ch. D. 539 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 394; 46 L. T.
356 ; 30 W. R. 327 75
Harman v. Anderson (1809), 2 Camp. 243 ; 1 1 R. E. 706 545
Harman v. Gurner (1866), 35 Beav. 748 792
Harman v. Reeve (1856), 25 L. J. C. P. 257 ; 18 C. B. 587 688
Harmart!. Davis (1817), 7 Taun. 577; 1 Moore, C. P. 300 518, 642
Harmert). Bean (1853), 3 C. & K. 307 294
Harmerw. Bell (1851), 7 Moo. P. C. C. 267 1103, 1120
Harmer v. Cornelius (1858), 28 L. J. C. P. 88 ; 5 C. B. N. S. 246 ; 4 Jur.
N. S. 1110 780
Harmony, The (1800), 2 C. Eob. Adm. 322 179
Harnett," In re, Leaby v. O'Grady (1886), 17 L. E. Ir. 543 631
Harnett v. Vise (I88u), 6 Ex. D. 307 ; 43 L. T. 645 ; 29 W. E. 7 41
Harnor v. Groves (1866), 15 C. B. 667 ; 3 C. L. E. 406 757
Harper, Ee (1849), 7 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 44 709
Harratt v. Wise (1830), 9 B. & C. 712 ; 4 M. & E. 521 39, 1095
Harrington v. Fry (1824), Ey. & M. 90 ; 9 Moore, 344 ; 1 C. & P. 289 ; 2
Bing. 179 1218, 1221
Harris, Re (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 79 ; 1 S. & T. 536 708
Harris, Ee (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 181 ; 3 S. & T. 485 706, 707
Harris, Ee, Cheese v. Lovejoy (1877), 46 L. J. P. JD. & A 66 ; L. E. 2 P.
Div. 251 ; 37 L. T. 294 ; 25 W. R. 853 706
Harris v. Berrall (1858), 1 S. & T. 153 705
Harris v. Costar (1826), 1 C. & P. 637 162
Harris v. Gamble (1878), 7 Ch. D. 877 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 344 ; 38 L. T. 253. . 221
Harris V. Goodwyn (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 408 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 459 ; 9 Dowl.
409 85, 750
Vol. I. ends with page 636.
XCIV TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAQB
Harris*). Harris (1829), 2 Hagg. Eoc. R. 409 558
Harris v. Hill (1822), 2 Stark. 140 ; D. & R. N. P. K. 17 321
Han-is V. Mantle (1789), 3 T. R. S07 220
Harris v. O'Loghlen (1871), 5 Ir. R. Eq. 514, 520 17
Harris v. Pepperell (18fi7), L. R. 5 Eq. 1 ; 16 W. R. 68; 17 L. J. Ch. 191 749
Harris v. Petheriok (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 611 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 521 ; 41 L. T.
146 42
Harris v. Eiokett (1859), 4 H. & N. 6 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 47 529
Harris v. Ryding (1839), 5 M. & W. 60 114
Harris v. Saunders (1825), 4 B. & C. 411 ; 6 D. & R. 471 1142, 1153
Harris v. Tenpanv (1883), 1 0. & E. 65 1196, 1206
Harris v. Thomps'on (1863), 13 C. B. 333 Ill
Harris f. Tippett (1811), 2 Camp. 638; 11 R. R. 767 947, 950, 967
Harris v. Wilson (1831), 7 Wend. 57 494
Harrison, Ex parte (1852), 16 Jur. 726 ; 19 L. T. 114 1160
Harrison 0. Barton (1861), 30 L. J. Ch. 216 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 19 ; 9 W. R.
177 1 39, 787
Harrison v. Blades (1813), 3 Camp. 458 329, 1209
Harrison v. Corp. of Southampton (1853), 22 L. J. Ch. 722 ; 4 De G. M.
&C. 137 149, 295, 1103, 1132
Harrison v. Creswick (1853), 13 C. B. 399, 416 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 113 ; 16
Jur. 315 85
Harrison v. Elvin (1842), 3 Q. B. 117 ; 6 Jur. 849 ; 2 G-. & D. 769 ; 11
L. J. Q. B. 197 700
Harrison v. Fane (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 550 48, 49
Harrison v. Gordon (1838), 2 Lew. C. C. 166 951
Harrison v. Heathom (1843), 6 M. & Gr. 81 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 735 ; 12 L. J.
C. P. 203 540
Harrisons. Hyde (1859), 4 H. &N. 806; 22 L. J. Ex. 119 801
Harrison 4). Jackson (1877), 7 Ch. D. 339 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 142 753
Harrison v. Luke (1845), 14 M. & W. 139 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 248 222
Harrison v. Rowan (1820), 3 Wash. 580 945
Harrison v. Rowley (1798), 4 Ves. 212 ; 4 R. R. 199 144
Harrison v. Southcote (1751), 1 Atk. 5?8 962
Harrison v. Taylor (1860), 29 L. J. Ex. 3 ; 4 H. & N. 815 ; 5 Jur. N. S.
1219 47
Harrison v. Turner (1847), 10 Q. B. 482 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 295 ; 11 Jur. 817 480
Harrison «;. Vallance (1822), 1 Bing. 45; 7 Moore, C. P. 304 496, 511
Harrison v. Williams (1824), 3 B. & C. 162 995
Harrison v. Wright (1845), 13 M. & W. 820 ; 2 D. & L. 695 ; 14 L. J.
Ex. 196 537, 544
Harrod v. Barred (1854), 1 K. & J. 4 ; 18 Jur. 853 149, 897
Harry v. Broad (1704), 2 Salk. 626 16
Hart V. Alexander (1837), 7 0. & P. 749 ; 2 M. & W. 484 ; M. & H. 63 . .1095,
1096
Hart V. Bush (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 271 ; E. B. & E. 494 692
Hart V. Deamer (1831), 6 Wend. 497 1102
Hart*. Frontino, &o.. Gold Min. Co. (1870), L. R. 5 Ex. Ill ; 31 L. J.
Ex. 93 ; 22 L. T. 30 541
Hart V. Hart (1842), 1 Hare, 1 ; 5 Jur. 1007 ; 1 1 L. J. Ch. 9 133, 302, 305
Hart V. Horn (1809), 2 Camp. 92 496
Hart u. Nash (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 337 ; 1 Gale, 171 ; 6 Tyr. 955 715
Hart f. Newman (1811), 3 Camp. 13 620
Harts. Prendergast (1845), 14 M. & W. 741 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 223 . .710, 711, 712
Hart V. Sattley (1814), 3 Camp. 528 691
Hart u. Tulk (1862), 22 L. J. Ch. 649 ; 2 De G. M. & G. 300 802
Hart V. WilUams (1829), 2 Wend. 513 ; . 454
Hart V. Windsor (1843), 12 M. & W. 68 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 129 ; 8 Jur. 160 . . 774
Harter v. Harter (1872), 42 L. J. P. & M. 1 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 11 ; 27
L. T. 858 ; 21 W. R. 341 141
Hartford v. Palmer (1819), 18 Johns. (Am.) 143 896
Hartford v. Power (1869), I. R. 3 Eq. 602 631
Hartley v. Cook (1832), 5 C. & P. 441 U74
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. XCV
PAQB
Hartley v. Hindmarsli (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 353 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 255 ; 14
W. R. 862 1132
Hartleys;. Wharton (1840), 11 A. &E. 934; 3P. &D. 529; 4 Jur. 676. .673, 713
Hartley?). 'Wilkinson (1815), 4 Camp. 127; 4 M. fcS. 25 755
Harton, The (1884), 9 P. D. 44 ; 53 L. J. P. D. & A. 25 ; 50 L. T. 370 ;
32 W. R. 697 ; 5 Asp. M. C. 213 177
Hartopp V. Hartopp (1855), 21 Beav. 259 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 794 ; 25 L. J. Ch.
471 136
Hartshome v. "Watson (1839), 5 Bing. N. C. 477 ; 7 Soott, 494 ; 2 Am. 70 909
Harty«>. Davis (1850), 13 Ir. L. R. 23. 720
Harvey's nase (1800), 2 East, P. C. 658 585
Harvey v. Clayton (1675), 2 Swans. 221, n. ; 19 R. R. 66 592
Harvey v. Copeland, (1892) 30 L. R. Ir. 412 35
Harvey i/. Croydon Union, &c. (1884), Court of Appeal, "Times," 14
Feb., overruling 53 L. J. Ch. 335 507
Harvey v. Divers (1855), 16 C. B, 497 819
Harvey v. Famie (1880), 5 P. Div. 153 ; 49 L. J. P. D. & A. 33 1143
Harvey «;. Farnie (1882), 8 App. Cas. 43 1144
Harvey v. Grabham (1836), 5 A. & E 61 ; 6 N. & M. 164 753
Harvey v. Harvey (1884), 26 Ch. D. 644 ; 51 L. T. 508 ; 33 W. R. 76. . . . 868
Harvey v. MitcheU (1841), 2 M. & Rnb. 366 26, 273, 310
Harvey v. Morgan (1816), 2 Stark. 17 313
Harvey v. Mun. Perm. Invest. Build. Soc. (1884), 26 Ch. D. 273 ; 52 L. J.
Ch. 349 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 1126 ; 61 L. T. 408 ; 32 W. R. 657 663
Harvey t). Towers (1851), 6 Ex. R. 666 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 318 ; 15 Jur. 544 . . 262
Harwoodt'. Goodright (1774), 1 Cowp. 91, 92; Lofft, 569; 3 Wils. 497;
2 "W. Bl. 937 29
Harwood v. Keys (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 204 496, 514
Harwood v. Sims (1810), Wightw. 112 401, 410
Haseldine v. Grove (1842), 3 G. & D. 210 ; 3 Q. B. 997 ; 12 L. J. M. C.
10 ; 7 Jur. 36 39
Hasleham t>. Young (1844), 5 Q. B. 833 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 205; 1 D. & M. 700 161
Haslock V. Fergusson (1837), 7 A. & E. 86 ; 2 N. & P. 269 ; 1 Jur. 689 . . 719
Hasluck V. Pedley (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 143 ; L. R. 19 Eq. 271 ; 23 W. R. 165 139
Hassard v. Smith (1872), I. R. 6 Eq. 429 170, 263, 1102
Hastie v. Hastle (1876), 1 Ch. D. 562 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 288 1234
HastiloTV V. Stobie (1866), 35 L. J. P. & M. 18 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 64 ; 14
W. R. 211 ; 13 L. T. 473 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 1039 140
Hastings Peer. (1840), Pari. M. 200 423, 425, 426
Haswell, The (1864), Brown. & Lush. 247 185
Hatch «>. Dennis (1833), 1 Fairf. 244 511
Hatch V. Hatch (1812), 9 Mass. 311 1201
Hatch «;. Searles (1854),2 Sm. &G. 147; 23 L. J. Ch. 467 ; 24L. J.Ch. 22. . 1205
Hathaway v. Barrow (1807), 1 Camp. 161 1102, 1109, 1116
Hathaway v. Haskell (1829), 9 Pick. 42 493
Hathomi). King (1811), 8 Mass. 371 • 931
Hatton V. Royle (1868), 27 L. J. Ex. 486 ; 3 H. & N. 600 161
Havelock v. Rookwood (1799), 8 T. R. 268 1143
Hawarden v. Dunlop (1861), 2 S. & T. 340; 31 L. J. P. 17 ; 5 L. T.
765 1045
Hawea v. Armstrong (1835), 1 Bing. N. C. 765 669
Hawes !'. Draeger (1883), 23 Ch. D. 173 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 449; 48 L. T. 518;
31 W. R. 576 101
Hawes v. Forster (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 368 297, 298
Hawes v. Watson (1824), 2 B. & C. 540 ; 4 D. & R. 22 645
Hawk V. Freund (1858), 1 F. & F. 294 474
Hawkes v. Baker (1829), 6 Greenl. 72 906
Hawkes v. Salter (1830), 4 Bing. 716 ; 1 M. & P. 750 32
Hawkesley v. Bradshaw (1880), 49 L. J. Q. B. 333 ; 5 Q. B. D. 302 ; 42
L. T. 285 ; 28 W. R. 557 535, 536
Hawkesworth v. Showier (1843), 12 M. & W. 49 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 86 889
Hawkins ». Gathercole (1860-1), 1 Sim. N. S. 150; 20 L. J. Ch. 303 , 601
Hawkins v. Howard (1824), Ry. & M. 64 ; 1 C. & P. 222 598
Vol. I. ends with page 636.
XCVl TABLE OK CASES CITED.
PAGB
Hawkins v. Luaoombe (1818), 2 Swans. 392 496
Hawkins »'. Warre (1826), 3 B. & 0. 697 286, 288
Hawks r. Kennebec (1811), 7 Mass. 461 20
Hawksford«,'.GieFard(1886),12App.Ca3.122; 56L. J.P.C. 10; 66L.T.32.. 1154
Hayden v. Madison (1830), 7 Greenl 78 524
Haydon v. WiUiams (1830), 7 Bing. 166 ; 4 M. & P. 811 710, 712
Hayes, Re (1839), 3 Curt. 338 702
Hayes 4). Dexter (1861), 11 Ir. 0. L. R. 106 ; 13 Ir. C. L. R. 22 148
Hayea v. Seaver (1831), 7 Greenl. 237 508
Haylock v. Sparke (1853), 22 L. J. M. C. 67 ; 1 E. & B. 471 481
Hayne v. Maltby (1789), 3 T. R. 438 91, 92
Havnes v. Birks (1804), 3 Bos. & P. 599 32
Haynes v. Haynes (1866), 35 L. J. Ch. 303 ; 14 L. T. 47 ; 14 W. R. 361.. 101
Haynes». Hayton (1837). 6 L. E. K. B. (0. S.) 231 481
Hayues v. Hill (1849), 7 Notes of Cas. 256 701
Hayaeldent). StafB(ls36), 5A. &E. 153; 6N. &M.659; 2H.&'W. 204...222, 223
Hayslepj!. Gymer (1834), 1 A. &E. 165; 3N. &M. 479 628
Hayter v. Tucker (1857), 4 K. & J. 243 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 257 684
Hayton v. Irwin (1879), 5 C. P. D. 130 ; 41 L. T. 666 ; 28 W. R. 665 . . 766
Hayward v. Hayward (1854), Kay, Appendix xxxi 844
Hayward v. Stephens (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 135 ; 15 L. T. 173 1030
Ha.zeldine v. Grore (1844), 3 Q. B. 997 ; 3 G. & D. 210 31, 227
Head v. Baldry (1838), 8 A. & E. 605 132
Headlam v. Hedley (1810), Plolt, N. P. R. 463 112
Heald v. Kenworthy (1855), 10 Ex. 743 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 76 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 70 161
Healey v. Thatcher (1838), 8 C. & P. 388 514
Healy v. Healy (1875), I. R. 9 Eq. 418 798
Healy v. Thome (1870), 4 I. R. C. L. 495 124
Heane v. Rogers (18^9), 9 B. & C. 577 529, 542
Heap V. Mairia (1876), 2 Q. B. D. 630 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 761 187, 220
Heard v. Pilley (1869), L. R. 4 Ch. 548 ; 38 L. J. Ch. 718 ; 21 L. T. N. S.
68; 17 W. R. 750 729
Heam, Re (1849), 2 Roberts. 112 ; 7 Notes of Cas. (Eoc. & Mar.) 266 698
Hearne v. Stowell (1840), -12 A. & E. 719 ; 4 P. & D. 696 ; 6 Jur. 458 46
Heath's case (1744), 18 How. St. Tr. 68 . .' 367
Heath v: Brewer (1864), 15 C. B. N. S. 803 ; 9 L. T. 653 226
Heath v. Crealock (1873), L. R. 15 Eq. 257 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 455 ; 28 L. T.
101 ; 21 W. R. 380 610
Heathcote's Divorce (1851), 1 Macq. 277 15, 1172
Heathcote, In goods of (1881), 6 P. Div. 30 ; 50 L. J. Prob. 42 ; 44 L. T.
280 ; 29 W. R. 356 ; 45 J. P. 361 701
Heawood v. Bone (1884), 13 Q. B. Div. 279 ; 51 L. T. 125 ; 32 W. R. 752 ;
48 J. P. 710 723
Hebblethwaite v. Hebblethwaite (1869), 39 L. J. P. & M. 15 ; L. E. 2 P.
& D. 29 881
Hedges v. Tagg (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 283 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 169; 20 W. R. 976 253
Hedley ». Baiubridge (1842), 3 Q. B. 316 ; U L. J. Q. B. 293 ; 2G. &D. 483 160
Heenan v. Clements (1850), 1 Ir. C. L. R. 44 512
HefBeld v. Meadows (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 596 ; 20 L. T. 746 786
Heiron's case, Re Metropolitan Bank (1880), 15 Ch. D. 139 ; 49 L. J. Ch.
651 ; 43 L. T. 299 845
Helby v. Mathewa, (1894) 2 Q. B. 262; 63 L. J. Q. B. 577; 70 L. T. 837;
42 W. R. 514 ; 68 J. P. 785. H. L. : 11 R. (Aug.) 1 ; 64 L. J. Q. B.
465 ; 43 W. R. 561 Add. [116]
Hellinga, Re (1849), 1 Roberta. 753 698
Helps 1). Clayton (1864), 17 0. B. N. S. 553 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 11 L. T.
476 ; 13 W. R. 161 49
Helshamj). Blackwood (1851), 11 C. B. Ill; 20 L. J. C. P. 187 1116
Helyear v. Hawke (1803). 5 Eap. 72 ! 388
Hemming v. Blanton (1873), 42 L. J. C. P. 158 : 21 "W. R. 636 75
Hemming v. Maddiok (1872), 41 L. J. Ch. 522 ; L. R. 7 Ch. 395 ; 26 L. T.
566 ; 20 W. R. 433 954
Hemming v. Pariy (1834), 6 C. & P. 580 190
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. XCVU
PAGE
Hemmings ». Gasson (1858), E. B. & E. 346 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 252 ; 4 Jur.
N. S. 834 244
Hemrainffs !>. Williamson (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 459; 52 L. J. Q. B. 273;
48 L. T. 392 ; 31 W. R. 336 1177
Hemphill v. M'Kenna (1845), 8 Ir. L. E. 43 1 109
Hempston v. Humphreys (1867), Ir. E. 1 C. L. 271 832
Henderson v. Australian Koyal Mail Steam Navig. Co. (1855), 5 E. & B.
409; 24 L. J. Q. B. 322; 1 Jur. N. S. 830 642, 645
Henderson v. Barnewell (1827), 1 T. & J. 387 297
Henderson v. Broomhead (1859), 4 H. & N. 669 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 360 ; 5 Jur.
N. S. 1173"; 33L. T. 0. S. 302 865
Henderson v. Henderson (1843), 3 Hare, 115 1123, 1153, 1154
Henderson v. Henderson (1848), 6 Q. B. 288 1142, 1147
Henderson v. Squire (1869), L. B. 4 Q. B. 170 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 73 ; 10 B.
& S. 183 ; 19 L. T. 601 ; 17 W. R. 519 774
Henderson v. Williams, (1895) 1 Q. B. 521 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 308 ; 72 L. T.
98 ; 43 W. R. 274 Add. [545]
Henfree v. Bromley (1808), 6 East, 309 ; 2 Smith, 400 ; 8 B. R. 491 1200
Henfrsy v. Henfrey (1842), 4 Moo. P. 0. C. 29 ; 2 Curt. 468 704
Henkin v. Gerss (1810), 2 Camp. 408 ; 12 East, 247 ; 11 R. R. 754 621
Henley v. Soper (1828), 8 B. & C. 16 ; 2 M. & R. 153 1153
Henman v. Dickinson (1828), 5 Bin?. 183 ; 2 M. & P. 982 892, 1192
Henman ». Lester (1862), 31 L. J. C. P. 370 ; 12 C. B. N. S. 781 ; 9 Jur.
N. S. 601 292, 968
Hennessy V.Wright (1888), 36W.R.879; o7L.J.Q.B. 594; 59 L. T. 795.. 613, 618
Henry v. Goldney (1846), 15 M. & W. 494 ; 4 Dowl. & L. 6 ; 15 L. J. Ex.
298 ; 10 Jur. 439 1115
Henry v. Lee (1814), 2 Chit. R. 124 926
Henry v. Leigh (1813), 3 Camp. 499 310, 1047
Henry v. Risk (1788), 1 Dall. 265 765
Henry v. Marq. of Westmeath (1843), Ir. Cir. R 809 285
Henry Coxon, The (1878), 47 L. J. Adm. 83 ; 3 P. Div. 156 ; 38 L. T. 819 . . 455,
458, 1175
Hensha-wt). Pleasance (1777), 2 W. Bl. 1174 • 1103
Kenwood v. OUver (1841), 1 Q. B. 409 ; 1 G. & D. 25 48
Hepworth v. Hepworth (1870), L. R. 11 Eq. 10 ; 40 L. J. Ch. Ill ; 23 L.
T. 388 ; 19 W. R. 46 666
Herbert v. Ashhumer (1750), 1 Wils. 297 992
Herbert v. Herbert (1855), Deane, Ecc. R. 10 702
Herbert v. Rae (1862), 13 Ir. Eq. R. 25 133
Herbert i>. Sayer (1844), 5 Q. B. 965 ; 2 Dowl. & L. 49 ; 13 L. J. Q. B.
209 ; 8 Jur. 812 664
Herbert v. Tuckal (1663), T. Raym. 84 417, 422
Hereford, Bishop of, v. T n (1853), 2 Robei-ts. Eno. R. 695 ; 4 Moore,
P. C. N. S. 385 77
Hermann f . Seneschal (1862), 32 L. J. C. P. 43 ; 13 C. B. N. S. 392 •
6 L. T. 646 ; 11 W. R. 184 226, 227
Hermes v. Chicago Bay Co. (1891), 27 Am. St. R. 69 377
Herries Peerage (1858), 3 Macq. 585 ; 2 L. R. H. L. (So.) 258 180
Herring v. Boston Iron Co. (1854), 1 Gray (Mass.), 134 783
Herring v. Clobery (1842), 1 Phill. 91 591, 593, 600
Hervey v. Hervey (1773), 2 W. Bl. 877 373, 426
Heseltine v. Siggers (1848), 1 Ex. 856 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 166 685
Heslop V. Chapman (see Haddriok v. Heslop).
Heston v. St. Bride (1853), 22 L. J. M. C. 65 ; 1 E. & B. 683 1141
Hetherington v. Hetherington (1887), 12 P-. D. 112; 56 L. J. P. 78;
67 L. T. 633 ; 36 W. R. 12 ; 51 J. P. 119 102
Hetherington v. Kemp (1815), 4 Camp. 193 ; 16 R. R. 773 168
Hetherington v. Longrigg (1879), 48 L. J. Ch. 171 ; 10 Ch. D. 162 ;
27 W. R. 393 534
Heugh V. Garrett (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 305 ; 32 L. T. 45 1183
Hewitt V. Piggott (1831), 5 0. c& P. 75 485, 626
Hewlett V. Cook (1831), 7 Wend. 371 429, 433
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
XCVXH TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAGB
HevUns v. Shippam (1826), 5 B. & C. 229 ; 7 Dowl. & R. 783 637
He-vrson v. Brown (1760), 2 Burr. 1034 1014
Hext V. GiU (1872), L. R. 7 Ch. 699 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 761 ; 27 L. T. 291 ;
20 W. R. 957 114
Hey V. Moorhouse (1839), 6 Bing. N. 0. 52 ; 8 Soott, 156 288
Heyea v. Hindle (1863), in Q. B. M. T. 1863, MS 616
Heyman v. Plewker (1863), 13 C. B. N. S. 519 ; 32 L. J. 0. P. 132 ; 9 Jur.
N. S. 895 116
Heyman v. Neale (1809), 2 Camp. 337 297
Heymann v. R. (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 102 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 383 ; 28 L. T.
162; 21 "W. R. 357 84
Heysham v. Forster (1829), 6 M. & R. 277 1039
Heywood v. Pickering (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 428 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 145 33
Heyworth v. Knight (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 298 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 866 298
Hibberd v. Knight (1848), 2 Ex. 11 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 119 ; 12 Jur. 162 . .321, 598
Hibbert«.Barton(1842), lOM. &W. 683; 2Dowl. N.S.434; 12L.J.Ex.70 733
Hibblewhite v. M'Morine (1840), 6 M. &W. 214 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 217 . . 683, 684,
1202, 1204, 1205
Hibbs V. Ross (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 534 ; 35 L. J. Q. B. 193 ; 12 Jur.
N. S. 812 ; 15 L. T. 67 ; 14 W. R. 914 178, 1175
Hickey, In re (1875), Ir. R. 10 Eq. 117 155
Hickey v. Burt (1816), 7 Taun. 48 ; 17 R. R. 440 487
HLckey v. Campion (1872), Ir. R. 6 C. L. 557 631, 881
Hickey v. Hayter (1795), 1 Esp. 313 ; 6 T. R. 384 ; 3 R. R. 213 553
Hickman ». Haynes (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 598; 44 L. J. C. P. 358; 32
L. T. 873 ; 23 W. R. 872 752
Hickman v. Maohin (1859), 4 H. & N. 716 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 310; 5 Jur.
N. S. 576 98
Hickman v. Upsall (1877), 4 Ch. D. 144 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 245 ; 35 L. T. 919 ;
26 W. R. 175 172
Hicks, Re (1869), 38 L. J. P. & M. 65 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 683 ; 21 L. T.
300 702
Hicks 1!. Duke of Beaufort (1838), 4 Bing. N. C. 229; 5 Soott, 698;
1 Arn. 56 ; 2 Jur. 255- 521
Hicks V. Faulkner (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 167 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 268 ; 30 "W. R.
545 ; afad. 46 L. T. 127 ; 46 J. P. 420 29
Hicks V. Sallitt (1864), 23 L. J. Ch. 571 ; 3 De G. M. & G. 782 74], 789
Hickton ». Antrobus (1846), 2 C. B. 82 ; 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 363 1.56
Hide, Re (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. 28 ; 41 L. J. Bank. 6 662
Hidet). Thornboroiigh (1840), 2 C. &Kir. 250 114
Higgins' Trusts, Re (1861), 2 GifE. 562 ; 30 L. J. Ch. 405 532
Higgins V. Hopkins (1848), 3 Ex. 163; 6 Railw. Cas. 75 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 113 541
Higgins ». Scott (1832), 2 B. & Ad. 413 79
Higgins «!. Senior (1841), 8 M. & W. 844; 11 L. J. Ex. 199 758, 759
Higginson v. Clowes (1808). 15 Vea. 616 ; 10 R. R. 112 750
Higginson v. Simpson (1877), 46 L. J. C. P. 192 ; 2 C. P. D. 76 ; 36
L. T. 17 ; 25 W. R. 303 620
Higgs V. Dixon (1817), 2 Stark. 180 12u7
Hisgs V. Maynard (1866), 1 H. & R. 681 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 705 ; 14 L. T.
332 ; 14 W. R. 610 163
Higham v. Ridgway (1808), 10 East, 109 ; 2 Smith, L. C. 270 ; 10 R. R.
235 ; Preface, v 434, 435, 437, 438, 439, 441
Highfield v. Peake (1827), M. & M. 109 956, 1013, 1036
Highland Turnp. Co. v. McKean (1813), 10 Johns. 154 1175
Hiliard «. Phaley (1723), 8 Mod. 180 ""'" 49.5
Hill, Re (1849), 1 Roberts. 276 698 702
Hill V. Campbell (1872), 44 L. J. C. P. 97 ; L. R. 10 C. P. 222 ; 32 L T '
59 ; 23 W. R. 336 1182
Hill V. Coombe (1818), cited 1 Stark. Ev. 188, n. (n) 921 944
Hill V. Crook (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 702 ; L. R. 6 H. L. 266 ; 22 W. r' 137 ■ '
24 L. T. 488 739
HilL V. Dolt (1867), 7 De G. M. & G. 397 '.'.'.'.'." 812
Hill V. Hart- Davis (1884), 26 Ch. D. 470 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 1012 ; 51 L T 279 914
Hill V. Hennigan (1877), I. R. 11 C. L. 622 130
The referenms are to pages, not to parai/raphx.
TABLE OF OASES CITED. XCIX
PAGE
Hill V. Manchester "Waterw. Co. (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 552, 553 ; 2 N. & M.
573 91, 92, 93
Hill V. Packard (1830), 6 "Wend. 387 1018
Hilli). Philp (1852), 7 Ex. 232; 21 L.J. Ex. 82; 16 Jur. 90 1187
Hill i: Ratley (1862), 31 L. J. Ch. 380 ; 2 J. & H. 63t 144
Hill V. Salt (1834), 2 0. & M. 420 ; 4 Tyr. 271 ; 3 L. J Ex. 84 193
Hill V. Thompson (1817), 3 Mer. 630 ; 2 Moore, 424 ; 8 Taun-. 375 ; Holt,
636 43
Hillary v. Waller (1805), 12 Ves. 239, 252 126
Hills V. Evans (1862), 31 L. J. Ch. 461, 462 ; 4 De G. P. & J. 288 ; 6 L. T.
90 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 526 43
Hills ff. Laming (1854), 9 Ex. 256 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 60 93
Hills V. London Gas Co. (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 60 ; (1860), 5 H. & N. 312 ;
29 L. J. Ex. 409 43
Hillyard v. Grantham (1750), cited 2 Ves. sen. 246 1116
Hilton V. Fairolough (1811), 2 Camp. 633 : 12 R. R. 766 321
Hilton V. Giraud (1847), 1 De G. & Bm. 187 ; 16 L. J. Ch. 285 ; 11 Jur. 838 693
Hindekoper v. Cotton (1834), 3 Watts, 56 616
Hindley v. Haslam (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 481 ; 27 W. R. 61 1119
Hindmarsh, Re (1860), 1 Drew. & Sm. 129 713
Hindmarsh v. Charlton (1861), 8 H. L. Cas. 160 695, 700
Hindos. China and Japan, Bk. of, v. Smith (1867), 36 L. J. C. P. 241 1198
Hindson v. Kersey (1765), 4 Bum, Eco. L. 118 1215
Hindustan, Bk. of, Re, Pricker's case (1871), L. R. 13 Eq. 178 ; 41 L. J.
Ch. 278 845
Hinton V. Heather (1846), 14 M. & W. 134 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 39 30
Hlpgrave v. Case (1886), 28 Ch. D. 356 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 399 ; 52 L. T. 242 192
Hirsohfield v. Smith (1841), 1 H. & R. 284, 288 ; L. R. 1 C. P. 340 ; 35
L. J. C. P. 177; 12 Jur. N. S. 523 31
Hirst V. Hannah (1861), 17 Q. B. 383 732
Hitch V. WeUs (1846), 10 Beav. 84 697
Hitchin v. Campbell (1771-2), 2 W. Bl. 827 ; 3 Wils. 304 .... 1118, 1120, 1122,
1139
Hitchin v. Groom (1848), 2 M. & W. 816 801
Hitohings v. Thompson (1850), 5 Ex. 60 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 146 99
Hitchins v. Eardley (1871), L. R. 2 P. & D. 248 ; 40 L. J. P. & M. 70. .26, 414
Hitohins e. Hitchins (1866), L. R. 1 P. &D. 153 ; 35 L. J. P. & M. 62 347
Hoad V. Grace (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 98 ; 7 H. & N. 494 786
Hoare v. Coi'yton (1812), 4 Taun. 660 147, 498
Hoare v. Graham (1811), 3 Camp. 57 ; 13 R. R. 752 756
Hoare v. Johnstone (1838), 2 Keen, 553 ; 7 L. J. Ch. 207 495
Hobhs». Henmng(1864), 17 0. B. N". S. 791; 34L. J. C. P. 117 1149
Hobbs V. Knight (1838), 1 Curt. 768 706, 707, 708
Hobhouse v. Hamilton (1803), 1 Sch. & Lef. 207 ; 2 Sch. & Lef. 28 1069
Hobsons. Parker (1753-4), Barnes, 237 ; cited in 3 T. R. 142 ; 1 R. R. 673 . . 994
Hobson V. Thellusson (1867), 36 L. J. Q. B. 302 ; L. R. 2 Q. B. 642 639
Hoby V. Roebuck (1816), 7 Taun. 167 682
Hockin ». Cooke (1791), 4 T. R. 314 16, 766
Hodenpyl v. Vingerhoed (1818), Chitty on Bills, 627, n. (?) 386
Hodgeus V. Graham (1831), Ale. & Nap. 49 712
Hodges V. Anoram (18661, 11 Ex. 214 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 257 944
Hodges V. Bennett (I860), 6 H. & N. 625 ; 29 L. J. M. C. 224 630
Hodges V. Cobb (1867), 36 L. J. Q. B. 266 ; L. R. 2 Q. B. 662 ; 8 B. & S.
683 ; 16 L. T. 792 ; 15 W. R. 1038 347
Hodges V. Holder (1813), 3 Camp. 366 270
Hodgkinson v. Fletcher (1781), 3 Doug. 31 118
Hodgkinson v. Kelly (1868), 37 L. J. Ch. 837 ; L. R. 6 Eq. 496 ; 16 W. R.
1078 168
Hodgson's ease (1830), 1 Lew. C. C. 102—104 246
Hodgson, In re, Beckett v. Ramsdale (1886), 31 Ch. D. 177 ; 65 L. J. Ch.
241; 64L. T. 222; 34 W. R. 127 631
Hodgson V. Clarke (1860), 1 De G. F. & J. 394 ; 1 Giff. 139 ; 5 Jur. N. S.
1024 798
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
C TABLE OF CASES CITED.
TACB
Hodgson V. Davies (1810), 2 Camp. 532 ; 11 R. K. 789 707
Hodgson ». De Beauoliesne (1858), 12 Moo. P. C. C. 285, 317 179, 378
Hodgson V. Hutchenson (1712), 5 Vin. Abr. 622 539, 680
Hodgson V. Johnson (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 88 ; E. B. & E. 685 ; 6 Jur.
N. S. 290 682
Hodgson V. Le Bret (1808), 1 Camp. 223 690
Hodgson D. Merest (1821), 9 Price, 563 496
Hodgson V. Scarlett (1813), 1 B. & Aid. 232, 245, 246 Ill
Hodnett v. Eorman (1815), 1 Stark. 90 1213
Plodson V. Mid. Gt. W. Ry. Co. (1877), I. R. 11 C. L. 109 1232
Hoe V. Nathrop {or Nelthorpe) (1697), 3 Salk. 154 ; 1 Ld. Ray. 154 . .1046, 1052
Hoffman v. Smith (1803), 1 Caines, 157 595
Hogarth V. Latham (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 643 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 339 ; 39 L. T.
75 ; 26 W. R. 388 \ 1205
.Hogg V. Garrett (1849), 12 Ir. Eq. R. 559 389
Hogg V. Skeen (1866), 34 L. J. C. P. 153 ; 18 0. B. N. S. 426 ; 11 Jur.
N. S. 244 ; 12 L. T. 709 ; 13 W. R. 383 262
Hoghton V. Hoghton (1872), 15 Beav. 278 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 482; 17 Jur. 99. .137,
506, 514
Holbard v. Stephens (1841), 5 Jur. 71 286
Holbeckj;.Holbeck(1849), 7Noteaof Cas. 294 (Eoc. &Mar.); 2Roberts. 126 698
Holbrook v. Tirrell (1829), 9 Pick. 109 659
Holoombe v. Hewson (1810), 2 Camp. 291 ; 11 R. R. 746 230
Holcroft's case (1577-8), 4 Co. Rep. 46 b 1129
Holcroft V. Barber (1813), 1 C. & K. 4 153
Holoroft, LadY, v. Smith (1702), 2 Freem. 259 1214
Holden, Re, Ex parte BoUand (1874), L. R. 19 Eq. 131 : 43 L. J. Bk. 9 ;
31 L. T. 445 ; 23 W. R. 24 849
Holden V. Ballantyne (1860), 29 L. J. Q. B. 148 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 451 194
Holden v. Holden (Hill v. Dolt) (1857), 7 De G. M. & G. 397 812
Holden v. King (1876), 46 L. J. Ex. 75 ; 35 L. T. 497 ; 25 W. R. 62 . . . . 1073
Holder r. Coates (1827), M. & M. 112 114
Holder v. Snulby (1860), 29 L. J. C. P. 246 ; 8 C. B. N. S. 254 ; 6 Jur.
N. S. 1031 ; 8 W. R. 438 162
Holdfast V. Dowsing (1746), 2 Str. 1254 ; Ball. N". P. 264 1215
Holding V. Elliott (1850), 39 L. J. Ex. 1.34 ; 5 H. & N. 117 520, 758
Holding V. Pigott (1831), 7 Bing. 465 ; 5 M. & P. 427 781
Holdsworth v. Davenport (1876), 46 L. J. Ch. 20 ; 3 Ch. D. 185 ; 35 L. T.
319 ; 25 W. R. 20 * 684
Holford V. BaQey (1850), 13 Q. B. 427 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 109 ; 13 Jur. 278.. Ill
Holgate, Re (1859), 1 S. & T. 261 ; 29 L. J. P. 161; 5 Jur. N. S. 251 ; 17
W. R. 19 697
Holgate V. Slight (1851), 2 L. M. & P. 662 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 74 732
Holiday v. Pitt (1814), 2 Str. 986 ; Gilb. R. 308 867
HoU t: Griffin (1833), 10 Bing. 246 ; 3 M. & Sc. 732 545
Holland ». Reeves (1835), 7 C. & P. 705 485, 929
Hollidav v. Atkinson (1826), 5 B. & C. 501 ; 8 D. & R. 163 133
Hollingham v. Head (1858), 27 L. J. 0. P. 241 ; 4 C. B. N. S. 388 ; 4 Jur.
N. S. 379 230, 241
HoUins V. Verney (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 304 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 430 ; 51 L. T.
753 ; 33 W. R. 5 ; 48 J. P. 580 76
Hollis V. Goldfinch (1823), 2 D. & R. 316 ; 1 B. & C. 205 236
HoUoway v. Rakes (1772), cited Davies r. Pierce, 2 T. R. 55; 1 R. R. 419 445
Holman v. Burrow (1702), 2 Ld. Raym. 795 16, 18
Holman v. Pullin (1884), C. & E. 254 780
Holme p. Brunskill (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 495 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 610 ; 38 L. T.
838 523
H.lmes V. Baddeley (1844), 1 Phill. 476 : 14 L. J. Ch. 113 ; 9 Jur. 289 . . 601
Holmes V. Bellingham (1859), 7 0. B. N. S. 329 ; 29 L. J. M. C. 132 ; 6
Jur. N. S. 531 112
Holmes V. Clifton (1839), 10 A. & E. 673 549
Holmes V. Hoskins (1854), 9 Ex. 753 689. 690
Holmes «;. MackreU (1858), 3 0. B. N. S. 789; 30 L. T. (0. S.) 243.... 674, 713
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CI
PAQB
Holmes V. MUward (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 622 ; 38 L. T. 381 ; 26 W. E. fi08.. 133
Holmes v. MitoheU (1869), 48 L. J. 0. P. 301 ; 7 0. B. N. S. 361 ; 6 Jur.
N. S. 73 670, 676
Holmes v. Staines (1860), 3 C. & Kir. 19 821
Holt V. CoUyer (1881), 16 Ch. D. 718 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 311 ; 44 L. T. 214 ;
29 W. E. 602 741
Holt V. Jesse (1876), 3 Ch. D. 177 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 264 ; 24 W. K. 879 .... 608
Holt V. Miers (1839), 9 C. & P. 195 314, 1032
Holt V. Pie (1888), 120 Pa. St. 439 741
Holt V. Squire (1825), Ry. & M. 282 , 505
Homan v. Thompson (1834), 6 C. & P. 717 271
Home V. Bentinck (1820), 2 B. & B. 162 614, 618
Homer v. Homer (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 635 ; 8 Ch. D. 758 ; 39 L. T. 3, 27 803
Homer v. Wallis (1814), 11 Mass. 309 •. 1223
Homersham v. Wolverhampton Waterworks Co. (1851), 0 Ex. 137 ; 6
Railw. C. 790 642, 645
Honiball v. Bloomer (1854), 10 Ex. 538 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 11 ; 1 Jur. N. S.
188 1068
Hood V. Ld. Barrington (1868), L. R. 6 Eq. 218 671, 1045
Hood V. Lady Beauohamp (1836), Hubb. Ev. of Suco. 468 420, 423
Hood V. Reeve (1828), 3 C. & P. 632 498
Hooper v. Gumm (1862), 2 J. & H. 602 ; 10 W. R. 644 : 6 L. T. 891 .... 699
Hooper v. Stephens (1835), 4 A. & E. 71 ; 7 C. & P. 260 715
Hopcraft v. Keys (1833), 9 Bin^. 613 ; 2 M. & Scott, 760 98
Hope V. Beadon (1851), 2 L. M. & P. 593 ; 17 Q. B. 509 ; 21 L. J. Q. B.
25 ; 16 Jur. 80 315
Hope V. Hope, (1893) W. N. 1893, at p. 20 463, 465
Hope V. Liddell (1865), 24 L. J. Ch. 694 ; 7 De G. M. & G. 338 321
Hopewell v. De Pinna (1809), 2 Camp. 113 172
Hopkins V. Crowe (1836). 4 A. & E. 774 ; 2 H. & W. 21 227
Hopkins v. Grazebrook (1826), 6 B. & C. 31 ; 9 Dowl. & R. 22 773
Hopkins v. Logan (1839), 5 M. & W. 248 ; 7 Dowl. 360 ; 8 L. J. Ex.
■218 387, 716
Hopkins v. Ware (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 268 : 38 L. J. Ex. 147 ; 20 L. T. 147 32
Hopper V. Warburton (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 104 ; 7 L. T. 722 ; 11 W. R.
384 191, 196
Hopwood V. Hopwood (1860), 26 L. J. Ch. 292 ; 22 Beav. 4^8 ; 29 L. J. Ch.
747 ; 7 H. L. Cas. 728 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 897 806
Hordem v. Commercial Union (1887), 56 L. J. P. C. 78 ; 66 L. T 240. .. . 48
Horn V. Thornborough (1849), 3 Ex. 846 ; 6 Dowl. & L. 651 ; 18 L. J. Ex.
349 , 39, 227
. Home V. Mackenzie (1839), 6 01. & Fin. 628 924
Home V. Smith (1815), 6 Taun. 9 ; 1 Marsh. 410 ; 3 East, 16, n. {a) ; 16
R. R. 558 819, 832
Home V. Swinford (1822), 1 D. & R. Mag. Cas. 361 868
Horner «). Horner (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 617; 47 L. J. Ch. 635; 8Ch.D. 758.. 803
Hornsby ii. Robson (should be Bolton) (1856), 1 C. B. N. S. 63 ; 26 L. J.
C. P. 56 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 674 156
Horrocks v. Metrop. Ry. Co. (1863), 4 B. & S. 315 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 367 ; 10
Jur. N. S. 204 ; 8 L. T. 663 ; 11 W. R. 910 1102
Horsefall v. Hodges (1824). 2 Coop. 115 673
Horsey v. Graham (1869), L. R. 6 C. P. 9 ; 39 L. J. 0. P. 58 ; 21 L. T.
639 ; 18 W. R. 141 682
Horsfall v. Hey (1848), 2 Ex. 778 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 266 688
Horsford, Re (1874), 44 L. J. P. & M. 9 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 211 ; 31 L. T.
553 ; 23 W. R. 211 707
Horton v. M'Murtry (1860), 29 L. J. Ex. 265 ; 6 H. & N. 667 ; 8 W. R. 285 202
Horton v. Westminster Improvement Comrs. (1862), 7 Ex. 780 ; 21 L. J.
Ex. 297 ' 91, 93
Horwood, In re (1886), 66 L. T. 373 914
Horwood V. Griffith (1864), 23 L. J. Ch. 466 ; 4 De G. M & G. 700 . . 785, 789
Hospital for Incurables, In re (1884), 13 L. R. Ir. 361 1012
Hotson ff. Browne (1860), 30 L. J. C. P. 106 ; 9 0. B. N. S. 442 747
Vol. I. ends with page 636.
Cll TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FA OB
Hough V. Manzanos (1879), 48 L. J. Ex. 398 ; 4 Ex. D. 104 768
Houghton, Ex parte (1810), 17 Ves. 251 ; 11 B. B. 73 666
Houg-htoiiB. Kcenig(1856), 18C. B. 235; 25 L. J. C. P. 218 300
Houlden v. Smith (1850), 14 Q. B. 841 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 170 ; 14 Jur. 598. . 1099
Houlditch V. M. of Donegal (1834), 8 BUgh, N. B. 337 ; 2 01. & Fin.
476 1142, 1146, 1147, 1153, 1156
HouHston V. Smyth (1825), 2 0. & P. 24 ; 3 Bing. 127 ; 10 Moore, 0. P. 482 147,
375 1032
Household Fire, &o. Ins. Co. v. Grant (1879), 48 L. J. Ex. 677 ; 4 Ex. D.'
216; 41L. T. 298; 27 W. B. 858 165
Houseman v. Eoberts (1832), 6 0. & P. 394 312
Houston V. Sligo, Marquis of (1885), 29 Oh. D. 448 ; 52 L. T. 96 1110, 1117
How V. Hall (1811), 14 East. 274 ; 12 B. B. 515 289, 318, 319
Howard 1'. Beal (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 1 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 384 ; 60 L. T. 637 ;
37 W. E. 555 1062
Howard v. Oanfield (1836), 6 Dowl. 417 927
Howard v. Duoane (1823), 1 Turn. & E. 86 ; 1 L. J. Ch. 0. S. 85 8
Howard v. Hudson (1853), 2 B. & B. 1 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 341 ; 17 Jut. 856. . 538,
648
Howard v. Maitland (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 695 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 42 773
Howard v. MiteheU (1817), 14 Mass 241 89
Howard v. Newton (1843), 2 M. & Bob. 509 237
Howard v. Peete (1817), 2 Ohitly, B. 315 201
Howard v. Sheward (1866), 36 L. J. C. P. 42 ; L. B. 2 0. P. 148 ; 15 L. T.
183; 15 W. E. 45 230, 388
Howard v. Smith (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 254 ; 3 Scott, N. E. 574 291
Howard v. WUliams (1842), 9 M. & W. 725 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 877 ; 6 Jur. 585 314
Howard v. "Wright (1823), 2 Coop. 114 750
Howoutt V. Bonser (1849), 3 Ex. 491 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 262 721, 722
Howe V. Hall (1870), I. B. 4 Eq. 242 688
Howe V. Palmer (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 321 689
Howe V. Scarrott (1859), 4 H. & N. 723 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 325 98
Howe V. Walker (1855), 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 318 757
Howell, Be (1848), 6 Notes of Oas. (Eco. & Mar.) 20, 406 698
Howell V. Look (1809), 2 Camp. 14 909
Howes ®. Barber (1852), 18 Q. B. 588 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 264 ; 16 Jur. 614 . '. 819
Howlett V. Tarte (1861), 10 0. B. N. S. 813 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 146 ; 19 W. E.
868 1120
Hoyle, Be, Hoyle v. Hoyle, (1892) 41 W. E. 81 : reversing 67 L. T. 254. . 673
Hoyle V. Lord Comwallis (1720), 1 Str. 387 16
Hubbard ». Alexander (1876), 3 Ch. D. 738 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 740 ; 35 L. T. 62 ;
24 "W. E. 1058 805
Hubbard v. Johnstone (1810), 3 Tann. 209 29
Hubbard v. Lees (1866), 35 L. J. Ex. 169 ; L. B. 1 Ex. 255 ; 4 H. & 0.
418 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 435 ; 13 L. T. 367 ; 14 W. B. 694 423, 693
Hubbart v. PhiUips (1846), 13 M. & W. 703 ; 2 Dowl. & L. 707 ; 14 L. J.
Ex. 103 1112
Huber v. Steiner (1835), 2 Soott, 304 ; 2 Bing. N. 0. 202 ; 2 Dowl. P. C.
781 ; 1 Hodges, 206 62
Hubert v. Moreau (1826), 2 C. & P. 528 ; 12 Moore (0. P.), 216 675
Hubert v. Treheme (1842), 3 M. & Gr. 743 ; 4 Scott, N. E. 486 ; Car. &
M. 351 ; 11 L. J. 0. P. 78 674
Hubert's Case (1666), 6 How. St. Tr. 807 ; Wills, Ch-. Ev. 70 557
Huckman v. Fimie (1838), 3 M. & W. 605 ; 1 H. & H. 149 ; 2 Jur. 444 ;
7 L. J. Ex. 163 272
Huckvale, Be (1867), 36 L. J. P. & M. 84 ; L. E. 1 P. & D. 375; 16 L. T.
434 ; 16 W. B. 64 698
Hudson V. Guestier (1848), 4 Oranch, 293 1150
Hudson V. Parker (1844), 1 Boberts. 24 695, 696, 697
Hudson V. Bevett (1829), 6 Bing. 368 ; 2 M. & P. 663 1204
Hudson V. Tahor (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 290 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 463 ; 36 L. T.
492 ; 26 W. B. 740 397
Hudson j>. Tooth (1877), 2 P. D. 125 ; 35 L. T. 820 846
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CUl
PAOG
Huetp. LeMeaurier (1786), 1 Cox, Ch. 275 1048
HufEell V. ArmitBtoad (1835), 7 C. & P. 66 35
Huggins V. Ward (1873), 8 Q. B. D. 621 ; 29 L. T. 33 ; 21 "W. E. 914.. 266, 1008
Hughes' case (1802), 2 East, P. 0. 1002 278
Hughes' Patent, Re (1879), 48 L. J. P. 0. 20 ; 4 App. Cas. 174 ; 27 W. E.
493 129
Hughes V. Biddulph (1827), 4 Buss. 190 601
Hughes V. Blake (1818), 1 Mason, 515 U40
Hughes V. Buokland (1846), 16 M. & W. 346 ; 3 Dowl. & L. 702 ; 16 h. J.
Ex. 233; 10 Jur. 884 31, 39, 227
Hughes V. Budd (1840), 8 Dowl. 315 ; 4 Jur. 150 312, 314
Hughes V. Metrop. Ry. Co. (1877), 46 L. J. C. P. 578 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 583 ;
2 App. Cas. 439 ; 36 L. T. 932 ; 25 W. E. 680 544
Hughes V. Morris (1852), 21 L. J. Ch. 761 ; 2 De G. M. & G. 349 ; 16 Jur.
603 661
Hughes V. Paramore (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 681 ; 7 De G. M. & G. 229 ; 1
Jur. N. S. 1101 710, 715
Hughes V. Rogers (1841), 8 M. & W. 125 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 238 1226
Hughes V. Vargas (1893), 9 R. 661 ; 9 T. L. E. 92 618, 619
Huguenin v. Baaeley (1807), 14 Ves. 273 ; 9 R. R. 148, 276 ; Preface vi. . 136
Hulbert v. Hulbert (1891), 26 Amer. St. E. 482 592
Hull V. Blake (1816), 13 Mass. 163 1139
Hull, Mayor of, w. Homer (1779), 1 Cowp. 102 122, 123
Humble v. Hunt (1817), Holt, N. P. E. 601 1050
Humble v. Hunter (1848), 12 Q. B. 310 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 350 ; 12 Jur.
121 759
Humble v. MitcheU (1839), 11 A. & E. 205 ; 2 Railw. Cas. 70 6«3, 684
Hume V. Burton (1785), 1 Eidg. P. C. (Ir.) 204 1102
Hume V. Scott (1821), 3 A. K. Marsh. 261 973
Humphrey v. St. Leger (1841), Ir. Cir. E. 714 314
Humphreys v. Budd (1841), 9 Dowl. 1000 ; 6 Jur. 630 17
Humphreys v. Green (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 148 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 140 ; 48
L. T. 60 ; 47 J. P. 244 688
Humphreys v. Jones (1846), 14 M. & W. 1 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 254 712
Humphries v. Brogden (1848), 12 Q. B. 739, 746 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 10 ; 16
Jur. 124 114, 115
Hungate v. Gascoyne (1846), 2 PhOl. 26 ; 2 Coop. 414 422, 423, 424
Hungerford v. Beecher (1866), 6 Ir. Ch. Rep. 417 93
Hunt V. Adams (1809), 5 Mass. 360 668, 744, 757, 768
Hunt«. Adams (1811), 7 Mass. 518 768, 1196
Hunt V. Anderson (1868), L. R. 1 P. & D. 476 ; 37 L. J. P. & M. 27 . . . . 1189
Hunt V. Goodlake (1873), 43 L. J. C. P. 64 ; 29 L. T. 472 46
Hunt V. Hecht (1853), 8 Ex. 814 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 293 692
Hunt V. Hewitt (1852), 7 Ex. 243 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 210 ; 16 Jur. 603 . .1184, 1185
Hunt V. Hort (1791), 3 Bro. C. C. 311 760
Hunt V. Hunt (1866), L. R. 1 P. & D. 209 ; 35 L. J. P. & M. 135 699
Hunt i>. Livermore (1827), 5 Pick. 395 756
Hunt V. Massey (1834), 2 B. & Ad. 502 ; 3 N. & M. 109 146
Hunt V. Peake (1860), Johns. 706 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 786 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 107 . . 115
Hunt V. Rousmanier (1823), 8 Wheat. 211 748
Hunt (should be Hart) v. Tulk (1862), 2 De G. M. & G. 300 ; 22 L. J. Ch.
649 802
Hunt 4). Wimbledon Local Board (1878), 3 C. P. D. 208 ; 47 L. J. C. P.
640 650
Hunt V. Wise (1869), 1 F. & F. 445 476
Hunter, The (1815), 1 Dods. Adm. 480, 486, 487 102, 108
Hunter v. Atkins (1832), 3 Myl. & K. 113 137
Hunter v. Caldwell (1847), 10 Q. B. 69 ; 12 Jur. 285 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 274. . 39
Hunter v. Emmanuel (1854), 16 C. B. 290 ; 24 L. J. C. P. 16 190
Hunter v. Leathley (1830), 10 B. & C. 858 321
Hunter v. Neck (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 181 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 448 ; 10 L. J.
C. P. 297 19
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CIV TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAOa
Hunter v. Parker (1840), 7 M. & W. 343 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 281 . . . .643, 646, 651,
652, 730
Hunter v. Stewart (1861), 31 L. J. Ch. 346 ; 4 De a. P. & J. 168. . . .1117, 1123
Hunter v. Walters (1870), L. E. 11 Eq. 292 ; 24 L. T. 276 542
Huntingdon Peerage (1818), Report by Bell, 357 ; Att.-Gen.'s Report,
357 423, 426
Huntingford v. Massey (1869), 1 F. & E. 690 243
Huntley v. Donovan (1850), 15 Q. B. 96 1047
Huntley Peerage (1818), Pari. Min. 15 423
Hurd V. Moring (1824), 1 C. & P. 372 609
Hurpurshad v. Sheo-Dyal (1870), L. R. 3 Ind. App. 259, 286 899
Hurst's case (1804), 4 ball. 387 866
Hurst «i. Beach (1821), 5 Madd. 351 805, 808
Hussey v. Crickett (1811), 3 Camp. 168 621
Hussey «>. Home-Payne (1878), 4 App. Cas. 311 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 846; 47
L. J. Ch. 751 ; 8 Ch. D. 670 672
Hutoheon v. Mannington (1802), 6 Ves. 823 9
Hutohins V. Denziloe (1792), 1 Hagg. Cons. R. 181 632
Hutchinat). Soott(1837),2M.&W.816; M.&H. 194; 6L.J.Ex. 186. .801, 1197,
1199
Hutchinson v. Bernard (1836), 2 M. & Roh. 1 355
Hutchinson v. Glover (1875), 45 L. J. Q. B. 120 ; 1 Q. B. D. 138 ; 33
L. T. 605 ; 24 "W. R. 185 1187
Hutchinson v. Tatham (1873), 42 L. J. 0. P. 260 ; L. R. 8 C. P. 482 . .764, 769
Hutchison v. Bowker (1839), 5 M. & W. 635 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 24 43
Huthwaite v. Phaire (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 159 ; 1 Soott, N. R. 43 ; 8 Dowl.
541 1133
Hutt, Ex parte (1839), 7 Dowl. 690; 3 Jur. 1105 994, 998
Hutt V. Morrell (1849), 3 Ex. 241 532
Huttou, Be (1837), 1 Curt. 595 173
Hutton V. Bright (1851-7), 3 H. L. Cas. 341 ; 16 Jur. 696 540, 641
Huttou V. Rossiter (1854-6), 7 De G. M. & G. 9; 24L. J. Ch. 106 539, 553
Hutton V. ITpflll (1850), 2 H. L. Cas. 674 ; 14 Jur. 843 540
Hutton V. "Ward (I860), 15 Q. B. 26 : 19 L. J. Q. B. 293 ; 14 Jur. 372 318
Hutton V. Warren (1836), 1 M. & W. 466 ; 2 Gale, 71 ; 1 T. & G. 646 ;
5 L. J. Ex. 234 169, 768, 770, 781, 783
Hux, Re (1877), 46 L. J. P. D. & A. 39 ; 35 L. T. 909 ; 25 W. R. 273 . . 1214
Huxley v. East London Ry. Co. (1889), 14 App. Cas. 26 ; 58 L. J. Q. B.
305 ; 60 L. T. 642 ; 37 W. R. 626 41
Hyckraan v. Shotbolt (1567), 3 Dyer, 279 b 543
Hyde v. Hyde (1889), 69 L. T. 623 914
Hyde v. Palmer (1862), 3 B. & S. 667 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 126 ; 11 W. R.
433 380
Hydev. Watts (1843), 12 51. &W. 254; IDowl. &L. 479; 13 L.J. Ex.41 522
Hyman v. Nye (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 685 ; 44 L. T. 919 ; 46 J. P. 554 772
Hynde's case (1592-3), 4 Rep. 71 b : cited in Doe ». Wright, 10 A. & E.
775 1140
Ibbott v. Bell (1866), 34 Beav. 396 708
Illingworth v. Leigh (1800), 4 GwiUim, 1615 ; 3 Eag. & T. 1385 511
Ilott*. Genge (1846), 3 Curt. 174 696, 697
Imperial Bank v. Lend. & St. Catherine Dock Co. (1876), 46 L.J. Ch. 337;
5 Ch. D. 195; 36L. T. 233 6, 769
Imperial Gas Co. v. Clarke (1830), 7 Bing. 95 ; 4 M. & P. 727 995
Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone, (1892) 1 Q. B. 599 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 449 ;
66 L T. 556 ; 56 J. P. 436 242
Imrie v. Castrique (1860), 8 C. B. N. S. 405 1103
Inca, The (1858), 12 Moore, P. C. C. 189 ; Swab. 370 177
Incledon v. Berry (1806), 1 Camp. 203, n. («) 1096
Indian Zoedone Co., Re (1884), 53 L. J. Ch. 468 ; 26 Ch. D. 70 1022
InajaUs v. Bills (1816), 9 Mete. 1 772
Ingilby v. Shafto (1863), 32 L. J. Ch. 807 ; 33 Beav. 31 USS
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CV
PAGE
Inglesant v. Inglesant (1874), L. K. 3 P. & D. 172 ; 43 L. J. P. & M. 43. . 69t5
IngUs V. Buttery (1878), 3 App. Cas. 552 743
Inglis V. Great North. Ey. Go. (1852), 1 Maoq. 112; 1 Paterson, 78.. 294; 1176, 1177
Inglia V. Inglis and Allen (1867), 16 L. T. 775 ; 15 W. R. 1093 621
IngUsj!. Spenoe (1834), 1 0. M. &R. 436; 4L.J.Ex.ll; 3 Tyr. 8. . ..518, 619
Ingraliam v. Bookius (1823), 9 Serg. & R. 285 458
Ingram v. Lea (1810), 2 Camp. 621 289
Ingram v. "Wyatt (1828), 1 Hagg. Eoo. 384 140
Inman v. Foster (1832), 8 Wend. 602 255
Inman v. Stamp (1815), 1 Stark. 12 ; 18 R. E. 740 . . . .' 682
Innell v. Newman (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 419 ." 487
Innia v. Campbell (1829), 1 Rawle, 373 172
Interleaf Publishing Co. v. Phillips (1885), C. & B. 315 281
International Ey. Co. v. Anderson (1891), 27 Amer. St. E. 907 377
lona. The (1867), L. E. 1 P. C. 426 ; 4 Moo. P. C. 0. N. S. b36 ; 16 L. T.
158 178
Ipswich case (1835), Knapp & Ombler, 387 497
Ipswich Dock Commiss. v. St. Peter, Ipswich (1867), 7 B. & S. 310 112
Ireland*. PoweU (1802), cited Pea. Ev. 16 396, 400
Irish Society v. Bp. of Derry (1846), 12 CI. & Pin. 665 1102, 1230
Irons V. Smallpiece (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 551 639
Irving V. Greenwood (1824), 1 0. & P. 350 255
Irving V. Veitoh (1837), 3 M. & W. 90 ; Mur. & H. 313 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 25 . . 717
Irwin V. Callwell (I860), 12 Ir. C. L. R. 144 1163
Isaacs. Farrer (1836). IM.&W. 70; 4Dowl.765; 5L. J.Ex.94; 1T.&G.281 220
Isaac V. Gompertz (1837), cited Hubback on Ev. of Suoo. 650 418
Isaacs V. Hardy (1884), C. & E. 287 ' Add. [688]
Isabella, The (1799), 2 C. Eob. Adm. 241 757
Isquierdo v. Forbes (1750-61), cited 1 Doug. 6 1165
Israel v. Argent (1834), Pears. Chit. PI. 330, n. (i) 147
Israel ». Clark (103, should be 1803), 4 Esp. 259 650
Issard v. Lambert, In re Davies (1890), 44 Ch. D. 263 ; 59 L. J. Ch. 516 ;
62 L. T. 716 ; 38 W. R. 534 913
Ivat V. Finch (1808), 1 Taun. 141 ; 9 R. E. 716 612
Ivey V. Young (1836), 1 M. & Rob. 545 192
Ivy, Lady, and Neal's case (1684), cited Skin. 623; 1 Salk. 281 ; 12 Mod. 86 1179
Jack v. Kiernan (1840), 2 Jebb & Sy. 231 1016, 1017, 1044
Jackson, Re, Ex parte Bk. of Manchester (1871), 40 L. J. Bk. 57 ; L. R.
12Eq. 354; 19 W. R. 872; 24L. T. 961 685
Jackson, Re, In re "Walker (1886), 63 L. T. 660 ; 34 W. R. 95 621
Jackson v. Adams (1835), 2 Scott, 599 ; 2 Bing. N. C. 402 ; 1 Hodges, 339 244
Jackson v. Allaway (1844), 6 M. & Gr. 942 ; 7 Scott, N. R. 875 ; 13 L. J.
C. P. 84 ; 8 Jur. 63 201
Jackson v. Allen (1822), 3 Stark. R-. 74 1191
Jackson v. Bailey (1806), 2 Johns. 17 364
Jackson V. Bard (1809), 4 Johns. 230 443, 610
Jackson v. Blanshan (1808), 3 Johns. 292 86, 433
Jackson v. Browner (1820), 18 Johns. 37 413
Jackson v. Bumham (1852), 8 Ex. 173 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 13 664
Jackson v. Christman (1830), 4 Wend. 277 927
Jackson v. Cooley (1811), 8 Johns. 128 422
Jackson v. French (1829), 3 Wend. 337 698, 599
Jackson v. Frier (1819), 16 Johns. 196 306
Jackson v. Gridley (1820), 18 Johns. 98 898
Jackson v. Hesketh (1819), 2 Stark. R. 618 270
Jackson v. Hill (1839), 10 A. & E. 477 ; 2 P. & D. 466 ; 3 Jur. 976 649
Jackson v. Irvin (1809), 2 Camp. 60 ; 11 R, E. 658 169
Jackson v. Jackson (1825), 5 Cowen, 173 909
Jackson v. Jackson (1842), Ir. Cir. R. 469 1162
Jackson -o. KniflEen (1806), 2 Johns. 31 466, 470
Jack-son v. Lamb (1827), 7 Cowen, 431 433
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CVl TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOB
Jackson v. Ijowe (1822), 1 Bing. 9 ; 7 Moore, 219 672
Jackson v. Luquere (1825), 5 Cowen, 221 , 433
Jackson v. M'Call (1813), 10 Johns. 377 124, 433
Jackson v. Malin (1818), 15 Johns. 297 1199
Jackson v. Marsh (1826), 6 Cowen, 281 802
Jackson v. Matsdorf (1814), 11 Johns. 97 90
Jackson v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1877), 3 App. Gas. 193 ; 47 L. J. C. P.
303 ; 37 L. T. 679 ; 26 W. R. 175 23, 28, 38
Jackson v. Miller (1827), 6 Cowen, 751 11/8
Jackson ». Oglander (1865), 2 H. &M. 465; 13L. T. 16; 13W. R. 936.. 672
Jackson v. Pesked (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 237 ; 14 R. R. 417 85
Jackson v. Seagar (1«44), 2 Dowl. & L. 13 815, 832
Jackson v. Thomaeon (1862), 31 li. J. Q. B. 11 ; 1 B. & S. 745 ; 8 Jur.
N. S. 134 ; 6 L. T. 104 ; 10 W. R. 42 939
Jackson v. Waldron (1834), 12 Wend. 178-197 1219
Jackson v. 'Williamson (1788), 2 T. R. 281 816
Jaofoon V. "Winchester (1800), 4 Ball. 206 .' 327
Jackson v. Wood (1829), 3 Wend. 27 1098
Jackson v. WooUey (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 181 ; 8 E. & B. 778 ; 4 Jur.
N. S. 656 490
Jackson v. Wright (1817), 11 Johns. 193 90
Jacob V. Hungate (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 445 261, 816, 832
Jacob «>. Lee (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 33 313
Jacob V. Lindsay (1801), 1 East, 460 293, 485, 926
Jacobs, Re (1836), 1 Har. & W. 123 833
Jacobs V. Hart (1817), 6 M. & Sel. 142 ; 2 Stark. R. 45 1195, 1196
Jacobs V. Humphrey (1834), 2 C. & M. 413 ; 4 Tyr. 272; 3 L. J. Ex. 82. . 496
Jacobs V. Jacobs (1834), 3 Dowl. 677 870
Jacobs V. Layborn (1843), 11 M. & W. 685 ; 1 Dowl. & L. 352 ; 12 L. J. Ex.
427 ; 7 Jur. 562 909, 910
Jacobs V. Seward (1872), L. R. 6 H. L. 464 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 221 ; 27 L. T.
185 192
Jacobs V. Tarleton (1848), 11 Q. B. 421 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 194 ; 12 Jur. 517 272
Jacomb v. Turner, (1892) 1 Q. B. 47 1040
Jaggers v. Binnings (1815), 1 Stark. R. 64 ; 19 R. R. 746 492
Jakeman v. Cook (1879), 48 L. J. Ex. 165 ; 4 Ex. D. 26 ; 27 W. R. 171. . 1157
James v. Biou (1826), 2 Sim. & St. 606 520, 621
James v. Cohen (1844), 3 Curt. 782 709
James v. Hatfield (1734), 1 Str. 648 488
James v. Salter (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 544 74
James v. Smith (1890), 63 L. T. 524 665
James v. Williams (1834), 5 B. & Ad. 1109 ; 3 N. & M. 196 ; 2 Dowl. 481 669
Jameson v. Drinkald (1826), 12 Moore (C. P. ), 148 935
Jameson v. Leitch (1842), Milw. 688 1031, 1116
Jameson v. Stein (1855), 21 Beav. 6 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 41 679
Jameson v. Swintou (1810), 2 Taun. 224 ; 2 Camp. 373 33
Janaway, Re (1875), 44 L. J. P. & M. 6 ; 31 L. T. 800 ; 23 W. R. 385 . . 697
J' Anson V. Stuart (1796), 1 T. R. 754 ; 1 R. R. 392 249
Jardine i). Sheridan (1846), 2 C. & K. 24 606, 514
' Jarmain v. Hooper (1843), 6 M. & Gr. 827 ; 1 Dowl. & L. 769 ; 13 L. J.
C. P. 63 ; 8 Jur. 127 168
Jarrett v. Leonard (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 265 498
Jayne i>. Price (1814), 5 Taun. 326 ; 1 Marsh. 68 ; 15 R. R. 618 116
Jeakes v. White (1861), 6 Ex. 873 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 265 682
Jeans v. Cooke (1857), 24 Beav. 613 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 57 ; 27 L. J. Ch. 202. . 666
Jeans v. Wheedon (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 486 294, 366
Jeffoott «>. North Brit. Oil Co. (1873), I. R. 8 C. L. 17 671
Jefeerson Ins. Co. v. Cotheal (1831), 7 Wend. 72 934
Jeffery v. Walton (1816), 1 Stark. R. 267 745
Jefferys v. Boosey (1884), 4 H. L. Cas. 815 ; 3 0. L. R. 625 ; 24 L. J. Ex.
81 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 615 731
Jeffries v. Great Western Ry. Co. (1856), 5 El. & Bl. 802 ; 25 L. J. Q. B.
107 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 230 117
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CVH
PAQE
JefPries v. Wmiams (1850), S Ex. 792 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 14 114, 115
Jenkins v. Betham (1854), 15 C. B. 188 ; 3 C. L. R. 373 ; 24 L. J. 0. P.
94 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 237 780
Jenkins v. Blizard (1816), 1 Stark. R. 419 ; 19 R. R. 792 1096
Jenkins v. Bushby (1866), 35 L. J. Ch. 400, 820 ; L. R. 2 Eq. 547 ; 14 W. R.
631 ; 34 L. T. 431 692, 699, 1183
Jenkins v. Bushby, (1891) 1 Ch. 484 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 254 ; 64 L. T. 213 ; 39
W. R. 321 23
Jenkins f. Davies (1876), 1 Ch. D. 696 ; 24 W. R. 690 534
Jenkins v. Gaisford (1883), 37 L. J. P. & M. 122 ; 3 S. & T. 93 700
Jenkins v. Harvey (1835), 1 C. M. & E. 877 ; 2 C. M. & R. 393 ; 1 Gale,
23 ; 6 Tyr. 326 792
Jenkins v. Heycock (1853), 8 Moo. P. C. 0. 351 ; 1 C. L. R. 406 ; 5 Moo.
Ind. App. 361 771
Jenkins v. Morris (1847), 16 M. & W. 877, 880 160
Jenkins v. Phillips (1841), 9 C. & P. 766 ; 5 Jur. 252 189, 194
Jenkins v. Reynolds (1821), 3 B. & B. 21 ; 6 Moore (C. P.), 86 668
Jenner v. Ffinoh (1879), 49 L. J. P. & M. 25 ; 5 P. DIt. 106 ; 42 L. T. 327 ;
28W. R. 620 704
Jenner v. JolifEe (1810), 6 Johns. 9 293
Jenner v. Morris (1861), 30 L. J. Ch. 361 ; 2 De G. F. & J. 45 ; 7 Jur. N. S.-
376 ; 3 L. T. 871 ; 9 W. R. 391 167
Jennings, Re (1851), 1 Ir. Ch. E. 236 1177
Jennings v. Johnson (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 425 724
Jennings v. Whittaker (1826), 4 T. B. Monroe, 50 529
Jessel V. Bath (1867), 36 L. J. Ex. 149 ; L. E. 2 Ex. 267 ; 15 W. R. 1041 . .85,
741
Jesus Coll. V. Gibhs (1834), 1 T. & 0. Ex. 156 ; 4 L. J. Ex. Eq. 42 320
Jetley v. HiU (1884), C. & E. 239 166
Jewell V. Christie (1867), 36 L. J. C. P. 168 ; L. R. 2 C. P. 296 ; 15 L. T.
680 85
Jewell V. Jewell (1843), 1 Howard, Sup. Ct. R. 231 413
Jewett V. Torry (18 14), 11 Mass. 219 544
Jewis V. Lawrence (1869), L. R. 8 Eq. 345 144
Jewisou V. Dyson (1842), 9 M. & W. 540 ; 2 M. & R. 377 ; 11 L. J. Ex.
401 232
Jewitt, Re (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 730 ; 33 Beav. 559 869
Jewitt V. Eokhardt (1878), 8 Ch. D. 404 ; 26 W. R. 415 651
Jewshury v. Newhold (1867), 26 L. J. Ex. 247 166
Jeyes v. Booth (1797), 1 Bos. & P. 97 ; 4 E. R. 771 732
Jinks «). Edwards (1866), 11 Ex. 776 773
Joel V. Dicker (1847), 6 Dowl. & L. 1 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 359 732, 733
John and Mary, The (1859), Swab. Adm. E. 471 1120
John V. Bacon (1870), L. E. 5 C. P. 437 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 355 772
Johnson, Ex parte, Re Chapman (1884), 26 Ch. D. 338 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 763 ;
32 W. R. 693 915
Johnson v. Appleby (1874), 43 L. J. C. P. 146 ; L. R. 9 C. P. 158 743
Johnson v. Baker (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 440 1203
Johnson v. Ball (1851), 5 De G. & Sm. 85 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 210 701
Johnson v. Barnes (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 527 ; 42 L. J. C. P. 259 ; 29 L. T.
66 122
Johnson v. Blane (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Eoc. & Mar.) 457, 461 170
Johnson i). Caulkins (1799), 1 Johns. 116 255
Johnson v. Credit Lyonnais Co. (1877), 3 C. P. D. 32 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 241 ;
37 L. T. 657 ; 26 W. E. 195 116
Johnson v. Daveme (1821), 19 Johns. 134 609, 1221
Johnson v. Dodgson (1837), 2 M. & "W. 659 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 185 674
Johnson t). Duke of Marlborough (1818), 2 Stark. R. 378 1193
Johnson v. Durant (1831), 4 C. & P. 327 ; 2 B. & Ad. 925 612, 1160
Johnson v. Hooker (1789), 1 Dall. 406 1178
Johnson v. Holdsworth (1835), 4 Dowl. 63 487
Johnson v. Johnson (1832), 2 L. J. Ex. 73 ; 1 C. & M. 140 ; 3 Tyr.
73 696
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CVm TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAQB
Johnson v. Kershaw (1847), 1 De G. & Sm. 260 ; 11 Jur. 553, 795 323
Johnson v. Lawson (1824), 2 Bing. 86 ; 9 Moore, 183 413, 415
Johnson v. Lindsay (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 608 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 581 ; 38
W. E. 119 492
Johnson v. Lyford (1868), 37 L. J. P. & M. 65 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 646. .143, 356,
747
Johnson v. Manning (1860), 12 Ir. C. L. R. 148 167
Johnson v. Mason (1794), 1 Esp. 89 1208
Johnson v. Raylton (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 438 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 753 777
Johnsgn v. Reid (1840), 6 M. & W. 124 ; 9 L. J. M. 0. 25 132
Johnson f. St. Peter, Hereford (1846), 4 A. & E. 525 ; 4 N. & M. 186 ;
1 H. & W. 720 169
Johnson v. Stear (1863), 15 C. B. N. S. 330 781
Johnson v. Ward (1806), 6 Esp. 47 500, 1050
Johnson v. Warwick (1856), 25 L. J. C. P. 102 ; 17 C. B. 516 92
Johnston v. Clinton (1841), Arm. M. & 0. 123 977
Johnston v. Mappin, (1891) 60 L. J. Ch. 241 ; 64 L. T. 48 679
Johnston v. Summer (1858), 3 H. & N. 261 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 341 ; 4 Jur.
N. S. 462 166, 167
Johnston v. Ushorne (1840), 11 A. & E. 549 ; 3 P. & D. 236 764, 783
Johnstone v. Hudlestone (1826), 4 B. & C. 932 ; 7 D. & R. 411 16, 660
Johnstone «. Sutton (1786), 1 T. R. 546; 1 R. R. 257, 269 110
Joint V. Mortyn (1823), 2 Fox & Sm. 4 669
JoUey u. Taylor (1807), 1 Camp. 143 289, 318
Jolly V. Rees (1864), 33 L. J. C. P. 177 ; 15 C. B. N. S. 628 166
Jolly V. Young (1800), 1 Esp. 186 763
Joly «;. Swift (1847), 11 Ir. Eq. E. 410 1110, 1138
Jones, In re (1855), Deaue, Eeo. R. 3 696
Jones, In re (1864), 46- L. J. P. D. & A. 80 699
Jones, Re, Ex parte Jones (1881), 18 Ch. D. 109 ; 29 W. R. 747 ; 50 L. J.
Ch. 673 100
Jones and Beaver's case (1665), Kelynge, 52 1126
Jones V. Boland (1840), 2 Jebb & Sy. 289 47
Jones V. Boyce (1816), 1 Stark. 493 163
Jones «. Brewer (1811), 4 Taun. 47 329, 1209
Jones V. Carringtou (1824), 1 C. & P. 329 511
Jones V. Cowley (1825), 4 B. & C. 445 185
Jones V. Curling (1884), 13 Q. B. ». 262 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 373 ; 50 L. T.
349 ; 32 W. R. 651 41
Jones V. Cwmorlhen Slate Co. (1879), 5 Ex. Div. 93 ; 49 L. J. Ex. 110 ;
41 L. T. 575 ; 28 W. R. 237 ; 44 J. P. 168 50
Jones V. Edwards (1823), M'Cl. & Y. 139 313
Jones V. Elint (1839), 10 A. & E. 758 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 252 ; 2 P. & D.
594 685, 686
Jones !>. Fort (1828), M. & M. 196 ' 26
Jones V. Foxall (1852), 15 Beav. 388 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 725 514
Jones V. Frost, In re Fiddey (187*), L. R. 7 Ch. App. 773 ; 42 L. J. Ch.
47; 27 L. T. 465; 20 W. R. 1025 93
Jones V. Gale's Exors. (1817), 4 Mart. 635 14
Jones V. Galway Town Commissioners (1847), Ir. L. E. 435 134
Jones V. Gooday (1842), 9 M. & W. 743 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 914 226, 227
Jones V. Goodrich (1844), 5 Moo. P. C. 0. 16 610 1045
Jones V. Harris (1871), 41 L. J. Q. B. 6 ; L. E. 7 Q. B. 197 736
Jones V. Hoey (1880), 128 Mass. 585 782
Jones f. Howell (1835), 4 Dowl. 176 286
Jones V. Hutchinson (1851), 10 C. B. 516 ; 20 L. J. C.P. 114 193
Jones V. Jones (1786), 1 Cox, Ch. 184 3^9
Jones V. Jones (1841), 9 M. & W. 76 ; 11 L J. Ex. 265 " 1216
Jones V. Just (1868), 37 L. J. Q. B. 89; L. E. 3 Q. B. 197 ; 9 B. & S 141 777
Jones V. Littledale (1837), 6 A. & E. 486 ; 1 N. & P. 977 768
Jones 0. Milla (1861?), 10 C. B. N. S. 788 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 66 : 8 Jur N S
387 36
Jones V. Morrell ^844), 1 C. & K. 266 628
TAe references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OP CARES CITED. CIX
PAQB
Jones V. Newman (1750-1), 1 "W. Bl. 60 793
Jones J). Ogle (1&73), 41 L. J. Ch. 633; 42 L. J. Ch, 334; L. R. 14 Eq.
419 ; L. R. 8 Oh. 192 ; 20 W. R. 794 : 21 W. R. 239 ; 27 L. T. 367 ;
28L. T. 245 139
Jones 4). Pepperoorne (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 158 ; Johns. 430 ; 5 Jur. N. S.
140 5
Jones V. Perry (1796), 2 Esp. 482 373
Jones V. Pugh (1842), 1 Phill. 91 593
Jones V. Randall (1774), 1 Cowp. 17 ; Lofft, 383, 428 1032, 1036, 1093
Jones V. Ryder (1838), 4 M. & W. 32 ; 1 H. & H. 256 387, 716
Jones «). Stevens (1822), 11 Price, 235 252, 255
Jones V. Stroud.(1825), 2 0. & P. 196 ■ 923, 924
Jones V. Tarleton (1842), 9 M. & W. 676 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 625 ; 6 Jur.
348 309
Jones ». Turberville (1792), 2 Ves. jun. 11 495
Jones V. Tumour (1830), 4 0. & P. 204 647
Jones V. Turpin (1871), 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 181 616
Jones V. Victoria Graving Dock Co. (1877), 46 L. J. Q. B. 219 ; 2 Q. B.
D. 314 ; 36 L. T. 144 ; 26 W. R. 348 672, -674
Jones V. Waller (1753), 3 GwilUm, 847 171, 431
Jones «). -Walters (1835),. 4 L. J. Ex. 109; 1 C. M. & R. 713; 5 Tyr.
361 1203, 1204
JonesD. White (1717), 1 Str. 68 ; Bull. N. P. 233 1102, 1116
Jones i-.WiUiams (1837), 2 M. & W. 327 233
Jouiaux, Madame, case of, " Times," 8 Jan., 4 Feb. 1895 673
Jopp V. Wood (1865), 4 De O. J. & S. 616 ; 34 L. J. Ch. 211 ; 11 Jur.
N. S. 212 ; 12 L. T. 41 ; 13 W. R. 481 179
Jordaine v. Lashbrooke (1798), 7 T. R. 601 877
Jordan v. Lewis (1739), 14 East, 305, n. ; 12 R. R. 520, n 600, 987
Jorden v. Money (1854), 6 H. L. Gas. 185 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 865 539, 627
Jory V. Orchard (1779), 2 Bos. & P. 39 ; 5 R. R. 537 317
Josling V. Kingsford (1863), 32 L. J. 0. P. 94 ; 13 C. B. N. S. 447 ; 11
W. R. 377 776
Joumu V. Bourdieu (1787), Park on Insurance, 245 763
Judd «>. Green (1876), 46 L. J. Oh. 108 ; 33L. T. 597 i37
Judge V. Berkeley (1826), cited 7 0. & P. 371, n. (a) 246
Jugsomohun Ghose v. Manickchund (1859), 7 Moo. Ind. App. Cas. 263 . . 782
Justice «). Elstob (1858), 1 P. & F. 256 290, 312, 1055
Justice V. Gosling (1852), 12 C. B. 39 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 94 ; 16 Jur. 429 . . 1116
Justice V. Mersey Steel Co. (1875), 24 W. R. 199 1234
Kadish v. Garden City, &o., (1894) 42 Am. St. R. 256 Add. [644]
Kahl V. Jansen (1812), i Taun. 565 388, 486
Kain v. Old (1824), 2 B. & 0. 634 747
Kaines v. Knightly (1682), Skin. 54 756
Karla, The (1864), B. & Lush. Adm. 367 ; 13 W. R. 295 818
Kavanagh v. Cuthbert (1874-5), I. R. 9 0. L. 136 779
Kay V. Brookman (1828), 3 0. & P. 556 328, 1216
Kay V. Crook (1857), 3 Sm. & G. 407 679
Kay V. Duohesse de Pienne (1811), 3 Camp. 123 373
Keable v. Payne (1838), 8 A. & E. 660; 7 L. J. Q. B. 218 ; 3 N. &P. 531. .1102,
1116
Kealy v. Tenant (1861), 13 Ir. L. R. 394 690
Keane v. Smallbone (1855), 17 0. B. 179 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 72 1195
Kearney v. Great Southern and Western Ry. Co. (1886), 18 L. R. Ir. 303. . 163
Kearney v. King (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 301 16, 18
Kearney v. Lond. and Brigh. Ry. Co. (1871), L. R. 5 Q. B. 411 ; 39 L. J.
Q. B. 200 ; 22 L. T. 886 ; 18 W. R 1000 ; L. R. 6 Q. B. 769 ; 40 L. J.
Q. B. 285 ; 24 L. T. 913 ; 20 W. R. 24 163
Keating v. Boultou (1887), 22 L. R. Ir. 143 624
Keeeh v. Sandford (1776), 1 White & T., L. C. 53 ; Select Cas. in Chan. 61 665
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
ex TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOE
Keeling*). Ball (1796), Peake, Add. Cas. 88 1214
Keen ». Batshore (1794), 1 Esp. 194 1161
Keen v. Keen (1873), 42 L. J. P. & M. 61 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 105 143
Keenf. Priest (1858), 1 F. & F. 314 526
Keene v. Biscoe (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 644 ; 8 Ch. D. 201 ; 38 L. T. 286 ;
26 "W. E,. 552 522
Kehoe, Re (1884), 13 L. E. Ir. 13 701
Keigwin v. Keigwin (1843), 3 Curt. 607 696
Keenan v. Boylan (1803), 1 Soh. & Lef. 232 1014
Keisfielbrack v. Livingstone (1819), 4 Johns. (Am.) 114 750
Keith V. Burrows (1876), 1 0. P. D. 722 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 876 651
Kell V. Charmer (1856), 23 Beav. 195 761, 786, 796
Kell V. Nainby (1829), 10 B. & 0. 20 540
KeUer, In goods of (1891), 61 L. J. P. 39 ; 65 L. T. 763 702
Keller v. Blood (1861), 13 Ir. C. L. R. 19 2ii2
Kellington, Vicar of, v. Trin. Coll. (1747), 1 Wils. 170 lOJO
Kelly V. Bamewall (1834), Cooke & Ale. 94 870
Kelly f. Jackson (1849), 13 Ir. Eq. R. 129 592, 605
Kelly V. Keatinge (1871), I. R. 5 Eq. 174 697
Kelly V. Lawrence (1864), 33 L. J. Ex. 197 ; 3 H. & C. 1 ; 10 Jur. N. S.
637 ; 12 W. R. 413 543
Kellyj). Mid. G. W. Ry. Co. (1872), I. R. 7C. L. 8 643
Kelly V. Powlet (1763), Amb. 605 ; Dick. 559 789
Kelly V. Small (1799), 2 Esp. 716 504
Kelly J). Smith (1841), Arm. M. &0. 130 977
Kelly *. Webster (1852), 12 C. B. 283 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 163 ; 16 Jur. 838 . . 682
Kelsall V. Marshall (1856), 10 C. B. N. S. 266 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 19 ; 2 Jur.
N. S. 1142 341, 1165
Kelsev v. Bush (1842), 2 HiU, S. Car. R. 440 479
Kelson V. Kelson (1853), 10 Hare, 385 ; 17 Jur. 129 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 745 . . 748
Kemble v. Farren (1829), 3 C. & P. 623 488
Kemp V. Derrett (1814), 3 Camp. 510 ; 14 R. R. 820 35
Kemp 1). King (1842), 2 M. & Rob. 437 321
Kempland v. Macauley (1791), Peake, R. 66 ; 4 T. R. 436 514
Kempson v. Boyle (1865), 34 L. J. Ex. 191 ; 3 H. & C. 763 ; 11 Jur. N. S.
832 299
Kempstou i>. Butler (1861), 12 Ir. C. L. R. 516 115
Kempton ». Cross (1735), Cas. temp. Hardw. 108 8, 1045, 1046
Kendall v. Hamilton (1879), 4 App. Cas. 504 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 705 ; 41 L. T.
418; 28"W. R. 97 1115
Kendall v. Lond. & S. W. Ry. Co. (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 373 ; 41 L. J. Ex.
184 ; 26 L. T. 735 ; 20 W. R. 886 771
Kenn'scase (1607), 7 Co. Rep. 42 1103
Kennas. Nugent (1873), I. R. 7 C. L. 464 1119
Kennedy v. Earl of Essex, (1891) 28 L. R. Ir. 586 544
Kennedy v. Hilliard (1859), 10 Ir. L. R. N. S. 195 865
Kennerly v. Nash (1816), 1 Stark. R. 452 1203
Kennett ». Milbank (1831), 8 Bing. 38 ; 1 Moo. & So. 102 713
Kensington, Ld., v. Bouverie (1869), 7 H. L. C. 557 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 105 ;
29 L. J. Cb. 537 138
Kensington v. Inglis (1807), 8 East, 273 ; 9 R. R. 438 303, 927
Kent ». Courage & Co., (1891) 55 J. P. 264 ; 7 T. L. R. 50 643
Kent V. Jackson (1851), 14 Bear. 384 ; 2 De G. M. & G. 49 ; 21 L. J. Ch.
438 538
Kent V. Riley (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 190 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 569 ; 27 L. T. 263 ;
20 "W. R. 852 135
Kenworthy v. Schofield (1824), 2 B. & C. 947 ; 4 Dowl. & R. 556 668, 730
Keogh 1>. Keogh (1874), I. R. 8 Eq. 179, 449 SOI
Keogh V. Leonard (1877), I. R. 11 Eq. 366 912
Kepp V. Wiggett (1851), 10 C. B. 63; 20 L. J. C. P. 49: 14 Jur. 1137 ..88, 94
Keriu V. Davoren (1861), 12 Ir. Ch. B. 352 455
Kemot V. Pittis (1853), 2 E. & B. 425 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 33 ; 17 Jur. 932 . . 887
Kerr v. Shedden (1831), 4 C. & P. 531, n. (a) 1048
The references are to pages, not to paragrajihs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXI
PAGE
Kershaw ». Cox (1800), 3 Esp. 246 1196
Kershaw v. Kershaw (1875), 119 Mass. 140 74'4
Kershaw 0. Ogden (1865), 34 L. J. Ex. 1-59; 3 H. & C. 717; 11 Jur.
N. S. 642 ; 12 L. T. 573 ; 13 W. E. 765 689, 690
Kestrel, The (1881), 6 P. D. 182; 4 Asp. M. G. 433; 45 L. T. Ill ; 30
W. E. 182 935
Kettlewell v. Barstow (1872), 41 L. J. Oh. 718 ; L. E. 7 Oh. 686 ; 27 L. T.
258 ; 20 W. E. 917 1184
Kevans). Crawford (1876), 45 L. J. Oh. 668 1031
Kevilj;. Lynch (1873), L E. 8 Eq. 244 693
Key V. Ootesworth (1852), 7 Ex. 595 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 4 , 42
Key V. Shaw (1832), 8 Bing. 320 ; 1 Moo. & So. 462 372, 524
Keynes (should be Ryves) v. D. of Wellington (1846), 9 Beav. 579 ; 15
L. J. Oh. 461 1045
Keyse v. Powell (1853), 2 E. & B. 132 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 305 ; 17 Jur. 1062. . 118
Kibble, Ex parte, Re Onslow (1875), L. R. 10 Ch. 373 ; 44 L. J. Bank.
63 ; 32 L. T. 138 ; 23 W. R. 433 718
Kidderminster, Mayor of, v. Hardwioke (1873), 43 L. J. Ex. 9 ; L. E. 9
Ex. 13 ; 29 L. T. 612 ; 22 "W. R. 160 631
KidgiU i>. Moor (1860), 9 C. B. 364 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 177 : 14 Jur. 790 ; 1
L. M. & P. 131 85
Kidner v. Keith (1863), 15 0. B. N. S. 35 1204
Kidney v. Cookbum (1831), 2 Russ. & Myl. 168 417, 423
Kidstou V. Emp. Mar. Ins. Co. (1866), 35 L. J. C. P. 250 ; L. R. 1 C. P.
535 ; 1 H. & E. 433 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 665 ; 15 L. T. 12 ; 15 W. R. 63 . . 764
Kierau v. Sandars (1837), 6 A. & E. 515 ; 1 N. & P. 626 643
Kilbee v. Sneyd () 828), 2 Moll. 193 627
Kilgour V. Alexander (1860), 14 Moo. P. 0. C. 173 ; 4 L. T. 487 185
Kilgour V. Finlyson (1789), 1 H. Bl. 156 386
Killby V. Eochussen (1866), 18 C. B. N. S. 357 521
Kilhek, Ee (1866), 3 S. & T. 578 ; 34 L. J. P. 2 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1083 .... 695
Kilpint). Ratley, (1802) 1 Q. B. 682; 66 L. T. 797 ; 40 W. R. 479; 66
J. P. 565 639
Kilvert's Trusts, Re (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. 170 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 351 ; L. R. 12
Eq. 183; 26 L. T. 221; 20 W. R. 225 798
Kimball v. Morrell (1826), 4 Greenl. 368 306
Kimmel v. Kimmel (1817), 3 Serg. & E. 336 972, 973
Kimpton, Ee (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 153 ; 3 S. & T. 427 699
Kimpton v. Loud. & N. West. Ey. Co. (1854), 9 Ex. 766 ; 2 C. L. E. 1026 ;
23 L. J. Ex. 232 868, 870
Klndersley v. Chase (undated), 2 Park, Ins. 743 1149
Kine v. Balfe (1813), 2 Ball & B. 347 679
Kine v. Beaumont (1822), 3 B. & B. 291 ; 7 Moore, C. P. 112 316, 317
Kine v. Evershed (1847), 10 Q. B. 143 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 271 ; 11 Jur. 673. . 226
King's Coll. Hospital v. Wheildon (1864), 18 Beav. 30 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 5 i7. . 784
King's County (should be Knox County) v. Neath National Bank (should
be Ninth National Bank) (1893), 147 XT. S. 91 133
King, Ex parte (1802), 7 Ves. 312 869
King, In re, Unity Joint Stock, &c. Assn., Ex parte (1858), 3 De G-. & J.
63 ; 27 L. J. Bank. 33 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 1257 641
King V. Anderson (1874), 8 I. R. Eq. 147 136, 137
King V. Bellord (1863), 1 H. & M. 343 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 646 ; 8 L. T. 633 ; 11
W. R. 900 ; 2 N. R. 442 100
King V. Chamberlain (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 474 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 273 226
King V. Clerk (1695), 1 Salk. 349 7
King*'. Cole (1848), 2 Ex. 632 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 283 291
King V. Eoxwell (1876), 3 Ch. D. 518 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 693 ; 24 W. E. 629 . . 179
King V. Francis (1800), 3 Esp. 116 256
King V. George, George's Estate, Re (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 670 ; 36 L. T.
759 ; 5 Ch. D. 627 ; 25 W. R. 638 808
King V. Hawkesworth (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 371 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 484 ; 41 L. T.
411 ; 27 W. R. 660 41
King V. Hoare (1844), 13 M. & W. 494 ; 2 Dowl. & L. 382 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 29 1115
Vol. I. ends with page 636,
CXH TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOH
King V. King (1850), 2 Roberts. 153 961, 962
King V. Norman (1847), i C. B. 884 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 23 ; 11 Jur. 824. .533, 1097
King V. Paddock (1820), 18 Johns. 141 172
King ». Walker (1863), 2 H. & C. 384 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 167 207
King V. "Waring (1803), 6 Esp. 14 263
King V. Zimmerman (1871), 40 L. J. C. P. 278 ; L. E. 6 C. P. 466 ; 24
L. T. 623; 19 W. E. 1009 308
King of Two Sicilies v. "WiUoox (1851), 1 Sim. N. S. 301 966, 970
Kingsmill v. Millard (1855), 11 Ex. 313 ; 3 C. L. R. 1022 116
Kingston's (Duchess of) Case (1776), 20 How. St. Tr. 540 ; 2 Sm. L. C.
642 594, 924, 925, 1107, 1110, 1111
Kingston v. Gale (1676), Rep. temp. Mnoh, 259 60H
Kingston v. Knibbs (1809), 1 Camp. 508, n. ; 10 E. E. 742, n 765
Kingston v. Lesley (1824), 10 Serg. & R. 383 1048
Kinnersley ». Orpe (1779), 1 Doug. 58 1081, 1183, 1112, 1154
Kinsman v. Eouse (1881), 17 Ch. D. 104 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 486 ; 44 L. T. 597 ;
29 W. E. 627 75
Kintrea v. Perston (1856), 1 H. & N. 357 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 287 773
Kip V. Brigham (1810), 6 Johns. 158 ; 7 Johns. 168 1097
Kippen V. Darley (1858), 3 Macq. 203 ; 1 Paterson, 762 805
Kirby v. Hickson (1850), 1 L. M. & P. 364 17
Kirby v. Simpson (1854), 23 L. J. M. C. 165 ; 10 Ex. 358 ; 2 C. L. R.
1286 ; 18 Jur. 983 40, 226, 228
Kirohner «. Venus (1859), 12 Moore, P. 0. C. 361 ; 7 W. E. 455 ; 6 Jur.
N. S. 732 158
Kirk, Ex parte, Bennett and Glave, Re (1877), 5 Ch. D. 800 ; 46L. J. Bank.
101 ; 36 L. T. 431 ; 25 W. R. 598 803
Kirki). Eddowes (1844), 3 Hare, 517; 13 L. J. Ch. 402; 8 Jur. 1024. .753, 806,
807, 808
Kirkham v. Marter (1819), 2 B. & A. 613 ; 1 Chitty, R. 382 677, 678
KirHand v. Nisbet (1859), 3 Macq. 766 ; 1 Paterson, 876 43
Kirkman v. Oxley (1811-16), cited 2 Stark. Ev. 306, n. {k) 255
Kirkpatrick v. Gowan (1875), Ir. R. 9 C. L. 521 776
Kirkstall Brewery Co. v. Furness Ry. Co. (1874), L. E. 9 Q. B. 468 ; 43 L. J.
Q. B. 142 ; 30 L. T. 783 ; 22 W. E. 876 388
Kirkwood's case (1830), 1 Lew. C. C. 102 246
Kirwan's Trusts, Ee (1883), 25 Ch. D. 373 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 952 ; 49 L. T.
292 ; 32 W. R. 581 702, 7C3
Kirwan v. Cookbum (1805), 5 Esp. 233 ; 8 R. R. 849 1093
Kirwan v. Gorman (1846), 9 Ir. Eq. R. 154 92
Kite and Lane's case (1822), 1 B. & C. 101 1137
Klingeman, Goods of, Ee (1862), 3 S. & T. 18 ; SQ L. J. P. M. & A. 16 . , 1178
Knapp V. Maltby (1835), 13 Wend. 587 1196
Knapp's case (1830), 10 Pick. 489 562, 564
Knatohbull v. Fowle (1876), 1 Ch. D. 604 ; -24 W. E. 629 911
Knight V. Barber (1846), 16 M. & W. 66 ; 2 C. & K. 333 ; 16 L. J. Ex.
18 ; 10 Jur. 929 684, 685
Knight V. Campbell (1848), (Guildford Summer Assizes MS.) 349
Knight V. Clements (1838), 8 A. & E. 215 ; 3 N. & P. 375 1193
Knight V. Cox (1856), 18 C. B. 645 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 314 99
Knight V. Crookford (1794), 1 Esp. 190 ; 5 E. E. 729 674
Knight, Ee, Knight v. Gardner (1883), 26 Ch. D. 297 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 183 ;
49 L. T. 545 ; 32 W. E. 469 913
Knight V. Hasty (1843), 12 L. J. Q. B. 293 734
Knight V. Knight (1861), 30 L. J. Ch. 644 ; 2 Giff. 616 789
Knight J). Martin (iSW), Gow, 26 310, 1212
Knightj). M. of Waterford(1836), 2 Y. & C. Ex. 38 601
Knight V. M. of Waterford (1840), 4 Y. & C. 294 ; 10 L. J. Ex. Eq. 57 ;
5 Jur. 818 ; 11 CI. & F. 653 440, 441
Knights v. WijBfen (1870), L. E. 5 Q. B. 660 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 51 ; 23 L. T.
610 ; 19 W. E. 244 645
Knill V. Hooper (1857), 2 H. & N. 277 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 377 770
Knill V. WiUiams (1809), 10 East, 431 ; 10 R. E. 349 1194
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXIU
PAGE
Kuobell V. Fuller (1797), Pea. Add. Cas. 139 : 4 R. R. 896 265
Knowles, In re (1880), 49 L. J. Ch. 625 ; 43 L. T. 132 ; 28 W. E. 975. ... 146
Enowlman v. Bluett (1873), 43 L. J. Ex. 29 ; L. R. 9 Ex. 1 ; 29 L. T.
462 ; 22 W. R. 77 191, 680, 682
Knox V. Bushell (1837, should be 1857), 3 0. B. N. S. 334 167
Knox V. Ld. Mayo (1858), 7 Ir. Ch. R. 563 1168
Knox V. Waldoborough (1827), 5 Greenl. 185 1139
Knox County v. Ninth National Bank (1892), 147 tJ. S. 91 133
Koebel v. Saunders (1864), 33 L. J. C. P. 310 ; 17 C. B. N. S. 71 ; 10 Jur.
N. S. 920 ; 12 W. R. 1106 771
Kopitofi V. Wilson (1876), 45 L. J. Q. B. 436 ; L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 377 ; 34
L. T. 677; 24 W. R. 706 771
Koster v. Innes (1825), Ey. & M. 333 175
Koster v. Reed (1826), 6 B. & C. 19 ; 9 Dowl. & R. 2 175
Kraft V. Wickey (1832), 4 Gill. & J. 332 1160
Krishna Behari Roy v. Brojeswani Chowdranee (1875), L. R. 2 Indian
App. 283 1118
Kronheim v. Johnson (1877), 7 Ch. D. 60 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 132 ; 37 L. T.
751 ; 26 W. R. 142 665
Kufh V. Weston (1799), 3 Esp. 54 155
Kurtz V. Spence (1888), 57 L. J. Ch. 238 : 58 L. T. 438 606
Kyle V. Jeffreys (1839), 3 Macq. 317 ; 1 Paterson, 850 730
Kynaston v. Maokinder (1870), 47 L. J. Q. B. 76 ; 37 L. T. 390 41
LAOKiNOTOif V. Atherton (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 360 ; 8 Scott, N. R. 38 ; 8 Jur.
406 ; 13 L. J. C. P. 140 649
Laclough V. Towle (1800), 3 Esp. 114 646
Lacon V. Higgins (1822), 3 Stark. 178 ; Dowl. & R. N. P. C. 38 937
Lafone v. Falkland Islands Co. (1867), 27 L. J. Ch. 25 ; 4 K. & J. 34 ; 6
W. R. 4 599
Laing V. Barclay (1821), 3 Stark. 42; 2 Dowl. & R. 530; IB. & C.
398 698, 969
Laing ii. Kaine (1800), 2 Bos. & P. 86 1212
Lainson v. Tremere (1834), 1 A. & E. 792 ; 3 N. & M. 603 88, 93
Laird v. Briggs (1881), 19 Ch. D. 22 ; 45 L. T. 238 192
Lake v. Duke of Argyll (1844), 6 Q. B. 477 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 73 641
Lake v. Bfllers (1698), 1 Ld. Raym. 733 481
Lake v. King (1667), 1 Wma. Saunders, 131a ; 2 Keble, 361, 462, 496, 659,
801, 832 ;. 1 Lev. 240 ; 1 Sid. 414 4
Lakeman v. Mountstephen (1874), 39 L. J. Q. B. 275 ; L. R. 5 Q. B. 613 ;
41 L. J. Q. B. 67 ; L. R. 7 Q. B. 196 ; L. R. 7 H. L. 17 ; 22 W. R.
617 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 188 ; 30 L. T. 437 677
Laker v. Hordem (1876), 1 Ch. D. 644 ; 24 W. R. 643 ; 45 L. J. Ch.
316 ; 34 L. T. 88 145
Lalorw. Lalor (1879), 4 L. R. Ir. 678 613
Lamb V. Orton (1860), 29 L. J. Ch. 286 ; 6 Jur. 61 ; 1 L. T. 290 172
Lamb v. Munster (1882), 52 L. J. Q. B. 46 ; 10 Q. B. T>. 110 ; 47 L. T.
442; 31 W. R. 117 961, 964
Lambe's case (1791), 2 Lea. 554 ; 1 McNally, Ev. 42 668
Lambert's Estate, In re (1886), 13 L. R. Ir. 234 424, 542, 739
Lambert, Re (1866), 35 L. J. P. & M. 64 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 138 ; 14 L. T.
227 ; 14 W. R. 617 1031
Lambert v. Norris (1837), 2 M. & W. 335 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 109 659
Lamoudv. Dayall (1847), 9 Q. B. 1030 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 136 ; 11 Jur. 266. 222
Lamont v. Crook (1840), 6 M. & W. 625 ; 8 Dowl. 737 ; 4 Jur. 489 831, 834
Lampltigh v. Lamplugh (1709), 1 P. Wms. 112 666
Lampon v. Corke (1834, should be 1822), 5 B. & Aid. 606 ; 1 Dowl. &
R. 211 93, 652
Lamprell ». Billericay Union (1849), 3 Ex. 283 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 282. .639, 642, 645
Lananze v. Palmer (1827), M. & M. 31 31«
Lancaster Canal Co.'s case (1832), Mon. & B. 94 ; 1 Deao. & Ch. 411 ; 1
Mont. 116 .' 683
Vol. I, ends with page 635.
CXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAQB
Landers and Bagley's Contract, (1892) 3 Ch. 41 ; 61 L. J. Oh. 707 ; 67
L. T. 521 670
Lane's oaae (1587), 2 Co. Rep. 17 b 8, 19, 20
Lane's oase (1863), 1 De G. J. & S. 504 ; 33 L. J. Ch. 84 ; 10 Jur. N. S.
25 134
Lane, In re (1880), 14 Ch. D. 856 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 768 ; 43 L. T. 87 ; 28
W. B. 764 146
Lane v. Burghart (1841), 1 Q,. B. 933 ; 1 G. & D. 312 ; 6 Jur. 155 677, 678
Lanet'. Gray (1873), L. R. 16 Eq. 552 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 187 1182
Lane ;;. Harrison (1820), 6 Munf. 573 1139
Lane v. Ironmonger (1844), 13 M. & "W. 368 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 35 166
Lane v. Nixon (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 412 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 243 ; 12 Jur.
N. S. 392 ; 14 W. R. 641 771
Lanfranohi v. Mackenzie (1857), 36 L. J. Ch. 518 ; L. R 4 Eq. 421 ; 15
W. R. 614 ; 16 L. T. 114 76
Lang V. Gale (1813), 1 M. & S. Ill 740
Lang V. Smith (1838, should be 1831), 7 Bing. 284 ; 5 M. & P. 78 42
Langdale v. Trimmer (1812), 15 East, 291 32
Langdale v. Whitfield (1858), 3 K. & J. 426, 432 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 706 ; 27
L. J. Ch. 795 ; 6 "W. R. 862 146
Langdon v. Hulls (1804), 4 Q. B. D. 337 ; 48 L. J. M. C. 113 ; 40 L. T.
880 ; 27 W. R. 657 317
Langford ». Selmes (1867), 3 K. & J. 220 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 859 98
Langford v. Woods (1844), 8 Scott, N. R. 369 ; 7 M. & Gr. 625 227
Langhorn ». AUnutt (1812), 4 Taun. 511 ; 13 R. R. 663 388
Langley v. E. of Oxford (1836), 1 M. & W. 508 ; 2 Gale, 63 ; 1 T. & G.
808 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 166 605
Langmead v. Maple (1865), 18 C. B. N. S. 255 ; 12 L. T. 143 ; 13 W. R.
469: 11 Jur. N. S. 177 1117, 1138
Langridge v. Campbell (1877), 2 Ex. D. 281 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 277 ; 36 L. T.
64 ; 25 W. R. 351 536
Langston v. Cotton (1795), Peake, Add. Cas. 21 837
Langton v. Carleton (1873), L. R. 9 Ex. 57 ; 43 L. J. Ex. 54 ; 29 L. T.
660 1.52
Langton v. Higgins (1859), 4 H. & N. 402 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 252 690
Lanyon v. Martin (1884), 13 L. R. Ir. 297 688
La Plata (1855), 1 Swab. Adm. R. 298 6
Lapsley v. Grierson (1848), 1 H. L. Cas. 498 106, 149
Lascelles v. Ld. Onslow (1877), 2 Q B. D. 433, 450 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 343 ;
36 L. T. 459 ; 25 W. R. 496 115
Lassence v. Tiemey (1849), 1 Mao. & G. 351 ; 2 H & T. 115 ; 14 Jur. 182 679
Lasseux v. Tyroounel (1846), 10 Beav. 28 1151
Latch V. Wedlake (1840), 3 P. & D. 499 ; 11 A. & E. 959 386
Latkow V. Earner (1795), 2 H. Bl. 437 1102
La Touche v. Hutton (1875), 9 Ir. R. Eq. 166 445
Latter v. Goolden, (1894) 10 Nov. (not reported) 618, 619, 620
Lauderdale, Peerage (1885), 10 App. Cas. 692 1177
Laver v. Fielder (1862), 11 W. R. 245 ; 7 L. T. 602 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 190 . . 539
Laverry v. Pursell (1888), 39 Ch. D. 508 ; 57 L. J. Ch. 570 ; 58 L. T. 846;
37 W. R. 163 687
Lavie v. PhilHps (1765), 3 Burr. 1776 ; 1 W. Bl. 750 7
Lavies, In re. Ex parte Stephens (1877), 7 Ch. D. 127 ; 47 L. J. Bk. 22 ;
37 L. T. 613 ; 26 W. R. 136 662
Law V. Wilkin (1837), 6 A. & E. 718 : 1 N. & P. 697 ; W. ^V. & D. 235.. 168
La-wdon v. La-wdon (1885), 5 Ir. R. 27 922
Lawes, In re (1882), 20 Ch. D. 81 ; 46 L. T. 480 ; 30 W. R. 33 805
Lawes v. Reed (1836), 2 Lewin, 0. C. 152 926
Lawler v. Linden (1876), Ir. R. 10 C. L. 188 36
Lawless v. Queale (1845), 8 Ir. L. R. 382 292
Lawley's, Lady, case (undated) Bull. N. P. 287 893
Lawrence v. Baker (1830), 5 Wend. 306 946
Lawrence v. Campbell (1869), 4 Drew. 485 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 780 ; 7 W. R.
336 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1071 699
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXT
PAGE
I/a-wrence v. Clark (1845), 3 Bowl. & L. 87 ; 14 M. & W. 250 ; 15 L. J.
Ex. 40 314, 318
Lawrence v. Hitch (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 521 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 209 ; 9 B. &
S. 467 ; 18 L. T. 483 ; 16 W. R. 813 123
Lawrence v. Houghton (1809), 5 Johns. 129 906
Lawrence v. Lawrence (1884), 26 Ch. D. 796 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 982 ; 50 L. T.
715 ; 32 W. R. 791 140
Lawrence v. Maule (1859), 4 Drew. 472 ; 7 "W. R. 314 325
Lawrence :;. "Walmeley (1862), 31 L. J. C. P. 143 ; 12 0. B. N. S. 799 ;
5L. T. 798; 10 W. R. 344 758
Lawrenson v. Butlec (1802), 1 Soh. & Lef. 13 675
Laws V. Rand (1857), 27 L. J. C. P. 76 ; 3 0. B. N. S. 442 ; 4 Jur. N. S.
74 32
Lawson v. Carr (1856), 10 Moo. P. C. C. 162 6
Lawson v. Stoddart (1853), 3 New R. 241 ; 9 L. T. 569 ; 12 W. R. 286 ;
10 Jur. N. S. 33 844
Laybonnie v. Crisp (1838), 4 M. & W. 320 ; 8 C. & P. 397 ; 1 H. & H.
326 397, 40.5, 406, 1035, 1036
Layer's case (1722), 16 How. St. Tr. 93 236, 318, 625
Layland v. Stewart (1876), 46 L. J. Ch. 103 ; 4 Ch. D. 419 ; 25 "W. R.
225 651
Laythoarp v. Bryant (1836), 3 Scott, 238 ; 2 Bing. N. C. 735 ; 2 Hodges,
25 ....:..... 670, 675
Lazonhy v. Rawson (1854), 4 De G. M. & G. 556; 24 L. J. Ch. 482; 1 Jur.
N. S. 289 553
Lea V. "Wheatley (1678), cited in 20 How. St. Tr. 574 603
Leach, In goods of (1890), 63 L. T. 191 705
Leach, Re (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & M.) 92 697
Leach ti. Buchanan (1803), 4 Esp. 228 546
Leach v. Simpson (1839), ft M. & W. 309 ; 9 Dowl. P. C. 13 ; 3 Jur. 654.. 283
Leader, Lessee of v. Duggan (1841), Ir. Cir. R. 124 , , 314
Leader v. Barry (1795), 1 Esp. 353 373, 1048
Leaf *. Butt (1842), C.> & Marsh. 451 314
Leake v. M. of Westmeath (1841), 2 M. & Rob. 391 1035
Leame v. Bray (1814), 3 East, 593 ; 5 Esp. 18 ; 7 R. R. Preface vii 6
Learmouth, Ex parte (1821), 6 Madd. 113 353
Learoyd, Ex parte. Re Foulds (1878), 10 Ch. D. 3; 48 L. J. Bank. 17;
27 W. R. 277 ; 39 L. T. 525 1157
Leary v. Lloyd (1860), 3 E. & E. 178 ; 29 L. J. M. C. 194 ; 6 Jur. N. S.
1246 1175
Leather Cloth Co.«. Hieronimus (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 140; 44 L. J.
Q. B. 54; 32 L. T. 307; 23 W. R. 593 673, 752
Le Caux v. Eden (1781), 2 Doug. 594 1103
Lechmerej). Fletcher (1833), 1 C. & M. 623; 3 Tyr. 450 711, 713, 1115
Ledbetter v. Salt (1828), 4 Bing. 623 ; 1 M. & P. 597 518
Ledgard «). Thompson (1843), 11 M. & W. 40 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 766; 12
L. J. Ex. 229; 7 Jur. 2i 9 734
Lee Peerage (should be Leigh), (undated), Min. Ev. 155, Pt. 2 1179
Lee «. Angas (1866), 35 L. J. Ch. 373 ; 14 L. T. 324 ; 14 W. R. 667 813
Lee*. Birrell (1813), 3 Camp. 337 ; 1 M. & Sel. 482 595, 617
Lee V. Dick (1836), 10 Pet. 482 755
Lee V. Everest (1857), 2 H. & N. 285 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 334 820
Lee V. Gansel (1774), 1 Cowp. 1 ; LofEt, 374 1031
Lee V. Gaskell (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 700 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 540 ; 34 L. T. 759 ;
24 W. R. 824 683
Lee V. Griffin (1861), 1 B. & 8. 272 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 252 ; 7 Jur. N. S.
1302 ; 4 L. T. 54B ; 9 W. R. 702 688
Lee V. Huson (1791), Peake, 166 244
Lee V. Johnstone (1869), L. R. 1 H. L. (So.) 426 129
Lee i>. Lane. & Torks. Rail. Co. (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 527 ; 25 L. T. 77 ;
19 W. R. 729 552, 744
Lee V. Meecock (1805), 6 Esp. 177 1031
Lee V. Merest (1870), 39 L. J. Ecc. 63 ; 22 L. T. 420 ; . . . 322
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CXVl TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PACT
Lee V. Pain (1814), 4 Hare, 201 ; 14 L. J. Ch. 346 ; 9 Jur. 127 ..740, 795, 803;
808
Lee V. Smith (1854), L. R. 9 Ex. 662 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 198 664
Lee V. Wilmot (1866), L. R. 1 Ex. 364; 35 L. J. Ex. 175 ; 14 L. T. 627 ;
14 W. K. 993; 4H. & C. 469; 12 Jur. N. S. 762 711
Leech v. Bates (1849), 1 Roberts. 714 697
Leeds, Duke of, v. Lord Amherst (1846), 2 Ph. 117 ; 10 Jur. 956 74
Leeds ». Cook (1803), 4 Esp. 256 ; 6 R. R. 855 103, 255, 318
Leeds v. Lancashire (1809), 2 Camp. 205 ; 755
Leeds and County Bank v. Walker (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 84 ; 52 L. J. Q. B.
590 ; 47 J. P. 502 1195
Leeds and Thirsk Ry. Co. v. Feamley (1849), 5 Railw. Cas. 644 ; 4 Ex.
26 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 330 ; 7 Dowl. & L. 68 100
Lees V. Marton (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 210 381
Lees V. Whitoomb (182H), 5 Bing. 34 ; 2 M. & P. 86 ; 3 C. & P. 289 .... 669
Leesou v. Holt (1816), 1 Stark. 186 ; 18 R. R. 758 1096
Leete v. Hart (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 322 ; 37 L. J. C. P. 157 ; 18 L. T.
292 ; 16 W. R. 676 227
Leferre v. Lloyd (1814), 5 Taun. 749 ;. 1 Marsh. 318 ; 16 R. R. 644 758
Lefroy v. Walsh (1851), 1 Ir. C. L. R. 31 1 128
Legeyt v. O'Brien (1834), Milw. 334 170
Leggatt V. ToUervey (1811). 14 East, 301 ; 12 R. R. 618. . . .600, 979, 987, 109S
Legge V. Edmonds h856), 25 L. J. Ch. 125 ; 4 W. R. 71 . . . . 101, 495, 621, 622
Leggott V. Great North. Ry. Co. (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 699 ; 45 L. J. Q. B.
657 ; 35 L. T. 334 ; 24 W. R. 784 92
Legh V. He-witt (1803), 4 East, 164 ; 7 R. R. 645 782
Legh v.. Legh (1820), 1 Boa. & P. 447 487
Leicester, Earl of, v. Walter (1809). 2 Camp. 251 ; 3 Camp. 241, n 255
Leidemann v. Schultz (1853), 14 C. B. 38 ; 2 C. L. R. 87 ; 23 L. J. Ch.
17 ; 18 Jur. 42 763
Leifohild's case (1865), L. R 1 Eq. 231 ; 13 L. T. 267 ; 14 W. R. 22 ;
11 Jut. 941 748
Leigh's Kitate, In re, Rowcliffe v. Leigh (1877), 6 Ch. DIt. 256 ; 37 L. T.
557 ; 26 "W. R. 783 1189
Leigh Peerage (1828-9), Pari. Min. 307 ; Pari. Min. (Pt. 2), 145.. 416, 422, 42S,
116-7
Leigh V. Baker (1867), 2 C. B. N. S. 367 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 220 ; 3 Jur.
N. S. 668 186
Leigh V. Jack (1879), 49 L. J. Ex. 220; 6 Ex. D. 264 ; 42 L. T. 463 ;
28 W. R. 452 ; 44 J. P. 488 112
Leigh V. Lloyd (1865), 35 Beav. 465 ; 34 L. J. Ch. 646 ; 2 De G. J. & S.
330 1208
Leighton v. Leighton (1720), 1 Str. 308 ; Hubb. Ev. of Suco. 590 1040
Leighton v. Leighton (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 594 ; L. R. 18 Eq. 458 ; 22
W. R. 727 806
Leland v. Murphy (1866), 16 Ir. Ch. R. 600 710
Lemage v. Goodban (1865), 35 L. J. P. & M. 28 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 67. .704, 711
Lemaitre ». Davis (1881), 19 Ch. D. 281 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 173 ; 46 L. T. 407 ;
30 W. R. 360; 46 J. P. 324 114
Le Marohant's Gardner's Peerage case (Banbury Peerage, 1727), Selw.
N. P. 672 -674 101
Le Marohant ». Le Marohant and RadolifE (1876), 46 L. J. P. D. & A. 43 ;
34 L. T. 367 ; 24 W. R. 374 602
Lemayne v. Stanley (1681), 3 Lev. 1 674
Lemere v. Elliott (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 360 ; 6 H. & N. 656 ; 7 Jur. N. S.
1206 ; 4 L. T. 304 117
Lemon d. Dean (1810), 2 Camp. 636, n 1209
Lempriere v. Lauge (1879), 12 Ch. D. 675; 41 L. T. 378; 27 W. R.
879 100
Lench v. Lench (1805), 10 Vea. 511 564, 556, 667
Le NeuvOle v. Nourse (1813), 3 Camp. 361 776
Leonard v. Simpson (1835), 2 Bing. N. C. 176 ; 2 Soott, 335 ; 1 Hodges, 261 532
Leonard v. Taylor (1874), I. R. 8 0. L. 300 774
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXVll
PAOH
Lepiot ». Browne (1703), 1 Salk. 7 ICS
Lepping v. Kedgewin (1675), 1 Mod. 207 H39
Leroux v. Brown (1852), 12 C. B. 801 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 16 Jur. 1021. .52, 681
Leslie v. Be la Torre (1795), cited 12 East, 583 ; 11 R. B,. 578 756
Leslie v. Leslie (1872), I. E. 6 Eq. 332 704
Lessee of Leader v. Duggan (1841), Ir. Cir. R. 124 314
Les.see of Phayre v. Pahy (1832), Hay. & Jon. 128 47
Le Strange v. Eowe (1865), 4 F. & E. 1048 124
Le Sueur v. Le Sueur (1876), 1 P. D. 139 ; 45 L. J. P. D. & A. 73 ; 34
L. T. 511 ; 24 W. R. 616 1144
Lethulier's case (1692), 2 Salk. 443 764
Le Trinidad v. Browne (1887), 36 W. R. 138; reported on another point,
37 Ch. Div. 1 ; 57 L. J. Ch. 87 912
Lett V. Randall (1860), 2 Sm. & Gifi. 83 ; 2 De G. E. & J. 388 ; 6 Jur.
N. 8. 1359; 9 W. R. 130; 3 L. T. 455 ; 30 L. J. Cli. 110 144
Lever v. Goodwin (1887), 36 Oh. D. 1 ; 57 L. T. 583 ; 36 W. R. 177 .... 939
Levey and Rohson, Re, Ex parte Topping (1865), 34 L. J. Bank. 44 ; 12
L. T. 787 ; 13 W. R. 1025 716
Levin!). Levin (1889), 60 L. T. 317 ; 37 W. R. 396 914
Levinsoni). Syer (1852), 21 L. J. Q. B. 16; 2L. M. & P. 557 ; 15 Jur. 10.. 11733
Levitt V. Levitt (1865), 2 H. & M. 626 1030
Levy V. Hale (1849), 29 L. J. 0. P. 127 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 702 ; 1 L. T. 132 ;
8 W. R. 126 549
Levy V. MerriU (1826), 4 Greenl. 180 669
Levy V. Pope (1829), M. & M. 410 609
Lewes' Trusts, Re (1871), L. R. 11 Eq. 236; L. R. 6 Ch. App. 356 ; 40
L. J. Ch. 602 ; 24 L. T. 533; 19 W. R. 195, 617 172
Lewis, Re, Ex parte Munro (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 724 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 816 ;
36 L. T. 857 ; 24 W. R. 1017 724
Lewis, Re (««« Lewis v. Lewis).
Lewis, falsely called H., v. Hayward (1865), 35 L. J. P. & M. 105 167
Lewis V. Brass (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 667 ; 37 L. T. 738 ; 26 W. E. 162 .... 673
Lewis ». Evans (1874), 44 L. J. C. P. 41 ; L. R. 10 C. P. 297 ; 31 L. T.
487 ; 23 "W. R. 244 ; 2 Hopw. & C. 279 156
Lewis V. Gt. West. Ry. Co. (1860), 6 H. & N. 867 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 426 .... 723
Lewis V. Gt. "West. Ry. Co. (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 195 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 131 ;
37 L. T. 774 ; 26 W. R. 255 723
Lewis «. Hartley (1835), 7 0. & P. 406 1192
Lewis V. James (1886), 64 L. T. 260 912
Lewis V. Ld. Kensington (1846), 2 0. B. 463 ; 3 Dowl. & L. 637 ; 15 L. J.
0 P. 100 734
Lewis V. Lewis (1862), 2 S. & T. 153 ; 4 L. T. 583 ; 31 L. J. P. 153 ; 7
Jur. N. S. 688 700
Lewis f . Marshall (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 743 ; 8 Scott, N. E. 729 ; 13 L. J.
C. P. 193 ; 8 Jur. 848 26, 763, 782
Lewis ». Parker (1836), 4 A. & E. 838 261
Lewis V. Payn (1827), 8 Cowen, 71 1198, 1199
Lewis V. Pennington (1860), 29 L. J. Ch. 670 ; 8 W. R. 466 ; 6 Jur. N. S.
478 605
Lewis V. Roberts (1861), 11 0. B. N. S. 23 ; K. & O. 402 ; 31 L. J. C. P.
61 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 485 ; 5 L. T. 351 ; 10 W. R. 80 726
Lewis «). Sapio (1827), 1 M. & M. 616 1220
Lewis V. Simpson (1848), 2 Ex. 196, u 146
Lexington v. Clark (1690), 2 Vent. 223 678
Ley*. BaUard (1790), 3 Esp. 173, n 1209
Ley V. Barlow (1848), 1 Ex. 801 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 1 ; 5 Dowl. & L. 375 ; 17
L. J. Ex. 105 321
Leyfiold's, Dr., case (1610), 10 Co. Rep. 88 11S<8
Leyland v. Stewart (1876), 46 L. J. Oh. 103 ; 4 Ch. D. 419 ; 25 W. R. 225 661
Lidster v. Borrow (1839), 9 A. & E. 664 227
Liebman v. Pooley (1816), 1 Stark. R. 167 ; 18 R. R. 756 278, a58
Lightfoot V. Bickley (1830), 2 Rawle, 431 1151
Lightfoot 41. Cameron (1776), 2 W. BI. 1113 668
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CXVUl TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAGE
TAffhttier v. Wike (1818), 4 Serg. & E. 203 324
Like V. Howe (1806), 6 Esp. 20 542
Lilley v. Elwin (1843, should be 1848), 11 Q. B. 742 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 132 ;
12 Jur 623 36, 153
Lilly & Co. V. Smales, (1892) 1 Q. B. 456 ; 40 W. R. 544 764
Lilly white v. Devereux (1846), 16 M. & W. 291 48, 691
Limehouse Board of Works, Ex parte Vallanoe (1883), 24 Ch. D. 177 ; 52
L. J. Ch. 791 ; 48 L. T. 941 ; 32 W. R. 287 1151
Limerick v. Limerick (1863), 32 L. J. P. & M. 22 ; 4 S. & T. 262 ; 11 W. R.
503 130, 294
Lincoln's case, Earl of (1626), 1 Bl. Com. 402 ; 3 Bao. Abr. 202 900
Lincoln f. "Wright (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 70-5 : 4 De G. & J. 16 688,, 920
Liadenau v. Desborough (1828), 8 B. & C. 586 934
Lindenberger v. Beal (1821), 6 Wheat. 104 155
Lindgren v. Lindgren (1846), 9 Beav. 358 ; 15 L. J. Ch. 428 ; 10 Jur. 674 802
Lindley v. Girdler (1843), 1 Dowl. & L. 699 ; 13 L. J. Q. B -iS ; 8 Jur. 61 734
Lindlev v. Lacey (1864), 17 C. B N. S. 578 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 7 ; 10 Jur.
N. S". 1103; 11 L. T. 273 ; 13 W. R. 80 745, 746
Lindo V. Rodney (1782), 2 Doug. 614 1103
Lindon v. Sharp (1843), 6 M. & Gr. 898 ; 7 Soott, N. R. 730 ; 13 L. J.
C. P. 67 136
Lindsay v. Wicklow, Earl of (1873), Ir. R. 7 Eq. 192 93
Linnell and Walker v. Gunn (1867), L. R. 1 Adm. & Eoo. 363 ; 36 L. J.
Eoo. 23 1133
Linsellf. Bonsor (1835). 2 Bing. N C. 241 ; 2 Soott, 399; 1 Hodges, 305.. 44, 712
Lion, The, Owners v. York Town Owners (1869), 38 L. J. Adm. 51 ; L. R.
2 P. C. 525 ; 21 L. T. 41 ; 17 W. R. 993 ; 6 Moo. P. C. 0. N. S. 163 . . 178
Lipsoombe v. Holmes (1810), 2 Camp. 441 520
Lisbon Steam Tramways Co., Re (1876), 2 Ch. D. 575 ; 34 L. T. 209 ; 25
W. R. 516 845
Lisburne, Lord v. Davies (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 259 ; 35 L. J. C.P. 193 ; 12
Jur. N. S. 340 ; 13 L. T. 795 : 14 W. R. 333 ; 1 H. & R. 172 116
Lishman v. Christie (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 333 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 538 ; 57 L. T.
562 ; 35 W. R. 744 ; 6 Asp. M. C. 186 766
L'Isle Peer. (1825). Pari. Min. 116 423
List's case (1814), 2 Ves. & B. 374 869
Lister f. Leather (1868), 27 L. J. Q. B. 295; 8 E. & B. 1004; 4 Jur.
N. S. 947 47
Lister «. Perrymau (1870), L. R. 4 H. L. 621 ; 39 L. J. Ex. 177 ; 23 L. T.
N. S. 269 : 19 W. R. 9 29
Lister v. Priestly (1810), Wightw. 67, 405 518
Li.ster v. Smith (1863), 33 L. J. P. & M. 29 ; 3 S. & T. 282 746
Litchfield v. Ready (1850), 5 Ex. 939 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 51 98, 1113
Little 1). Larrabee (1822), 2 Greenl. 37, 41, n 616
Little V. Libby (1823), 2 Greenl. 242 443
Little V. Wingfield (1859), 11 Ir. C. L. R. 63 123, 124, 125
Littlechild v. Banks (1845), 7 Q. B. 739 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 356 ; 9 Jur. 1096 222
Littler «!. Holland (1790), 3 T. R 590 751, 752
Litton V. Murphy (1878), 1 L. R. Ir. 301 353
Liver Alkali Co. v. Johnson (1874), L. R. 9 Ex. 338; 43 L. J. Ex. 216 ; 31
L. T. 95 771
Livermore v. Herschell (1826), 3 Pick. 33 1U8
Liverpool Adelphi Loan Assoc, v. Fairhurst (1854), 9 Ex. 423 ; 2 C. L. R.
512; 23 L. J. Ex. 163; 18 Jur. 191 541
Liverpool Borough Bank v. Eccles (1859), 4 H. & N. 139 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 122 675
Liverpool Borousfh Bank v. Turner (I860), 1 J. & H. 169 ; 2 De G. F. &
J. 502 ; 30 L. J. Ch. 379 651
Llanover v. Homfray (1880), 19 Ch. D. 224 ; 30 W. R. 557 326
Llewellyn v. Jersey, Earl of (1843), 11 M. & W 189 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 243. .672, 758
LleweUyn v. Winckworth (1845), 13 M. & W. 598 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 329 241
Lloyd V. Fleming (1872), W. N. 1872, at p. 6 652
Lloyd V. Gregory (1638), Cro. Car. 501 65S
Lloyd ». Harvey (1832), 2 Russ. & My. 310 807
The references are to pages, not to paragraplis.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXIX
FAOH
Lloyd V. Maund (1788), 2 T. R. 760 44
Lloydj;. Moetyn (1842), lOM. &W. 481; 2Dowl. N. S. 476; 12L.J.Ex.l 600
Llojd V. Passingham (1809), 16 Ves. 64 970
Lloyd V. Roberts (1858), 12 Moo. P. C. C. 158 697
Lloyd «>. Sandiland (1818), Gow, R. 13, 16 154
Lloyd V. SpiUet (1740), 2 Atk. 150 666
Lloyd V. Waterford & Lim. Ry. Co. (1862), 15 Ir. C. L. R. 37 723
Lloyd V. WUlan (1794), 1 Esp. 178 499
Lobb V. Stanley (1844), 5 Q. B. 574 : 13 L. J. Q. B. 117 673, 674, 713
Lock V. Furze (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 441 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 141 ; H. & R. 379 ;
14 W. R. 403 773
Lock V. Norborne (1687), 3 Mod. 141 1113
Locke «>. James (1843), 11 M. &W. 901; 13 L. J. Ex. 186 708
Lockett V. Gary (1864), 3 New R. 405 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 144 321, 1184
Lockett V. Nioklin (1848), 2 Ex. 93 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 403 744, 757
Lookwood V. Smith (1812), 5 Day, 309 493
Lodge V. Phipher (1824), 11 Serg. & R. vn 1228
Lodge V. Priohard (1863), 3 De G. M. & G. 906 ; 1 8m. & G. App. viii. .462, 527
LofPus V. Maw (1862), 3 Gife. 592 : 32 L. J. Oh. 49 539
Login V. Prin. of Coorg (1862), 30 Beav. 632 8
Londesborough's, Lord, case (1853), 4 De G. M. & G. 41 1 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 736 529
Londesborough, Lord v. Foster (1863), 3 B. & S. 805 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 225 ;
9 Jur. N. S. 1173 ; 8 L. T. 240 ; 11 W. R. 593 529
London v. Lynn (1789), 1 H. Bl. 214, n. (s) 1175
Lond. & Birm. Ry. Go's case (1838), 3 M. & W. 422 ; 1 H. & H. l-i6 683
Lond. & Brigh. Ry. Co. v. Fairolough (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 705 ; 2 Railw.
Cas. 544 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 68 ; 10 L. J. C. P. 133 1192, 1204
Loud. Chart. Bk. of Australia v. White (1878), L. R. 4 App. Cas. 413 ; 48
L. J. P. C. 75 5
Lond., City of v. Gierke (1690), Garth. 181 397
Lond., City of v. Perkins (1734), 3 Bro. P. C. 602 327
Lond., City of. Gas Light and Coke Company v. Nichols (1826), 2 C. & P.
365 641
Lond. Comm. of Sewers «. Gellatly (1876), 45 L. J. Ch. 788; 3 Ch. D.
610; 24 W. R. 346, 1059 1113
Lond. Comm. of Sewers v. Glasse (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 345 1183
Lond. (shouW be Dublin), Corp. of v. Judpe (1847), 11 Ir. L. R. 8 729
Lond. Dock Co. o. Sinnott (1857), 8 E. & B. 347 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 129 ; 4
Jur. N. S. 70 642
Lond. Gas L. Co. v. Chelsea Ves. (1859), 28 L. J. C. P. 275 ; 6 C. B. N. S.
411 1185
Lond. Gas Meter Co., Re, The (1872), 41 L. J. Ch. 145 ; 20 W. R. 394 . . 845
Lond., Mayor of v. Loner (1807), 1 Camp. 22 ; 10 R. R. 618 791
Lond. School Board v. Harvey (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 451; 48 L. J. M. C.
130 ; 27 W. R. 786 1033, 1072
Loud. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Durham (1856). 18 C. B. 826 ; 4 "W. R. 653 . . 723
Lond. & N. W. Ry. Co. ». M'Michael (1850), 5 Ex. 855 ; 14 Jur. 987 100,
1176
Lond. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. West (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 553; 36 L.J. C. P.
245 97, 98
Lond. & S. West. Bk. v. Wentworth (1880), 6 Ex. D. 96 ; 49 L. J. Ex.
657 ; 42 L. T. 188 ; 28 W. R. 516 547, 1205
Lonergan v. Roy. Ex. Ass. (1831), 7 Bing. 725, 729 ; 1 Dowl P. C. 233 ;
6 M. & P. 805 818
Long's case (1797), 1 Hayw. 624 (455) 560
Long v. Barrett (1846), 7 Ir. L. R. 439 ; 8 Ir. L. R. 331 ; 3 H. L. Cas.
396 46, 242
Long V. Champion (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 284 485
Long V. Donegan (1880), I. R. 7 Eq. 494 1234
Long V. Hitchcock (1840), 9 C. & P. 619 954
Long V. Keightley (1877), 11 Ir. R. C. L. 221 253
Long V. Lamkin (1852), 9 Gush. 361, 365 974
Vol. I. ends with page 633.
CXX TABLE OF CASES CITED,
Long V. Malar (1878), 4 C. P. D. 450 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 596 ; 41 L. T. 306 ;
27 W. B,. 720 672
Longchamp v. Pish (1807), 2 Bos. & P. N. R. 415 ; 9 R. B,. 670 140
Longenecker v. Hyde (181:)), 6 Binn. 1 508
Longfellow v. Williams (1804), Peake, Add. C. 225 673
Longworth v. Yelverton (1867), L. R. 1 H. L. (So.) 218 ; 4 Maoq. 746 ;
10 Jut. N S. 1209 ; 11 L T. 118 ; 13 W. R. 235 876
Loomis V. Green (1831), 7 Greenl. 386 1118
Loomis V. Jackson (1822), 19 Johns. 449 802
Loomis and Jackson v. Loomis (1854), 3 Deane, Verm. R. 198 386
Lopez V. Andrew (1826), 3 M. & R. 329 a 112, 123
Lord V. Colvm (1854), 2 Drew. 205 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 469 ; 5 De G. M. & G.
27 927
Lord V. Colvin (1855), 3 Drew. 222 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 517 ; 4 W. R 455 . .943, 946
Lord V. Colvin (1857), 4 Drew. 366 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 361 377
Lord V. Colvin (1859-1860), 28 L. J. Ch. 361; 1 Drew. & Sm. 24 ; 29 L. J.
Ch. 297 ; 8 W. R. 254 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 189 8, 179, 180, 377
Lord V. Commiss. for City of Sydney (1859). 12 Moo. P. C. R. 473 HI
Lord V. Lord (1856), 5 E. & B. 404 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 34 1039
Loring V. Steineman (1840) , 1 Meto. 204 172
Lothian v. Henderson a8U3), 3 Bos. & P. 499, 517 ; 7 R. R. 829 1149
LoTat's, Ld., case (1746), 18 How. St. Tr. 596 909, 910
Lovat Peerage (1826-57), Pari. Min. 89 416, 419, 424, 425
Lovat Peerage case (1885), 10 App. Cas. 763 421
Love, In re. Green «;. Tribe (1878), 9 Ch. D. 231 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 7h3 701
Lovell V. Wallis (1884), 53 L. J. Ch. 495 ; 49 L. T. 593 911
Loveridge v. Botham (1797), 1 Bos. & P. 49 652
Lovesy v. Smith (1880), 15 Ch. D. 655 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 809 ; 43 L. T. 240 ;
28 "W. R. 979 749
Low's ease, (1827), 4 Greenl. 439 615, 616
Lowe V. Carpenter (1851), 6 Ex. 825 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 374 ; 15 Jur. 883 . .76, 119
Lowe V. Govett (1832), 3 B & Ad. 862 ; 1 L. J. K. B. 224 112
Lowe V. London & N. W. Ry. Co. (1852), 7 Railw. Cas. 624 ; 18 Q. B.
632 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 361 ; 17 Jur. 375 643
Lowe V. Peers (1768), 4 Burr. 2225 85
Lowick's case (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 267 236
Lowrey v. Barker (1880), 5 Ex. D. 170 ; 49 L. J. Ex. 433 ; 42 L. T. 215 ;
28 W. R. 55^ 662
Loyd V. Ereshfield (1826), 2 C. & P. 325 595, 927
Lubbock V. Tribe (1838), 3 M. & W. 607 ; 1 H. & H. 160 ; 7 L. J. Ex.
158 307
Lucas V. Beale (1851), 10 C. B. 739 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 134'. 194
Lucas V. Bristow (18o8), 27 L. J. Q. B. 364 ; E. B. & E. 907 ; 5 Jur. N.
S. 68 763, 768
Lucas V. Cooke (1880), 13 Ch. D. 872 ; 42 L. T. 180 ; 28 W. R. 439 .... 1002
Lucas V. De la Cour (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 249 ; 14 R. R. 426 488
Lucas V. Groning (1816), 7 Taun. 164 763
Lucasi-. Tarleton (18.i8), 27 L. J. Ex. 246; 3 H. & N. 116 191
Lucas V. Williams, (1892) 2 Q. B. 113 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 695 ; 66 L. T.
706 310
Lucey v. Murphy (1873), 7 Ir. R. C. L. 494 733
Lucker, Ex parte {see Re Wood).
Luckie v. Bushby (1853), 13 C. B. 864 ; 1 C. L. R. 685 ; 22 L. J. C. P.
220 . 562
Lucy !).'Mouflet'('l86b), 5H. &N. 229 ; 29 L. j. Ex. lib .............. 626
Luders v. Anstey (1799), 4 Ves. 501 ; 5 Ves. 217 ; 4 R. R. 276 539
Ludford V. Gretton (1576), Plow. 490 84
Ludlow, May. of, v. Charlton (1840), 9 C. & P. 242 639, 640, 645, 1044
Luff V. Lord (1864), 34 Bear. 220 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1248 ; U L. T. 656 136
Luke, Re (1865), 34 L. J. P. & M. 105 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 397 701
Lumley v. Gye (1854), 3 E. & B. 114 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 112 347
Lund V. Tyngsboro (1851), 9 Cush. 37, 43 377, 379
Lundy V. Reilly (1858), 30 L. T. 223 768
The references are to pages, not to paragrofplxs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXl
PAdB
Lunnis v. Bow (1839), 10 A. & E. 606 ; 8 L. J. Q. B. 264 ; 2 P. & D.
638 910
Luntly V. (1833), 1 C. & M. 679 867
Luscombe v. Steer (1867), 37 L. J. Ch. 119 ; 17 L. T. 370 1184
Lush V. Druse (1830), 4 Wend. 313 802
Lush V. Russell (1860), 1 L. M. & P. 369 ; 6 Ex. 203 ; 7 Dowl. & L. 228 ;
19 L. J. Ex. 214 ; 14 Jur. 435 202
Luehington v. Onslow (1848), 6 Notes of Cases (Eco. & Mar.) 183, 188 . . 142
Lutsoher, In re. Ex parte WaddeU (1877), 6 Ch. D. 328 ; 26 W. R. 9 ; 36
L. T. 345 848
liUtterell v. Revnell (1677), 1 Mod. 284 329, 976
Lyde v. Barnard (1836), 1 M. & W. 101 ; Tyr. & Gr. 260 ; 5 L. J. Ex.
117 718, 729
LyeU V. Kennedy (1884), 27 Oh. D. 1 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 937 ; 50 L. T. 730. . 352,
424, 601, 1170
Lyell V. Kennedy (1889), 27 Ch. D. 1 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 937 ; 60 L. T. 730. . 424,
1049
Lygon V. Strutt (1795), 2 Anst. 601 ; 3 R. R. 631 430
Lyle V. EUwood (1872), L. B. 15 Eq. 67 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 80 ; 27 L. T. 671 ;
21 W. R. 69 1030
Lyle V. EUwood (1874), 44 L. J. Ch. 164 ; L. R. 19 Eq. 98 ; 23 W. R.
1 67 149, 373
Lyle V. Richards (1866), 35 L. J. Q. B. 214 ; L. R. 1 H. L. 222 ; 12 Jur.
N. S. 947 ; 16 L. T. 1 42, 44
Lyman ». Lyman (1814), 11 Mass. 317 544
Lyn V. Miller (1855), 24 Pa. St 392 767
Lynch «;. Clerke (1696), 3 Salk. 154 480, 1052
Lynch o. Lynch (1843), 6 Ir. L. R. 142 657, 658, 660, 661
Lynde v. Judd (1807), 3 Day, 499 1018
Lyne, Ex parte (1822), 3 Stark. R. N. P. 182 868
Lynn, Mayor of, r. Denton (1787), 1 T. R. 689 ; 1 R. R. 359 995
Lynn v. Robertson (1823), 2 Coop. 217 ; 1 L. J. Ch. 88 330
Lyon's Trusts, In re (1879), 48 L. J. Ch. 246 798
Lyon V. Home (1868), 37 L. J. Ch. 674 ; L. R. 6 Eq. 655 ; 37 L. J. Ch.
674 ; 18 L T. 451 ; 16 W. R. 824 136
Lyon V. Lyman (1831), 9 Conn. 65 1223, 1 228
Lyon e. Mells (1802), 5 East, 428 ; 1 Smith, 478 ; 7 R. R 726 771
Lyon V. Reed (1844), 13 M. & W. 303 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 377 ; 8 Jur. 762 . . 637, 656,
657, 661, 662
Lyons v. De Pass (1840), 11 A. & E. 326 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 51 ; 3 P. &
D. 177 7
Lyons ». Mulderry (1832), Hayes, R. 530 92
M., falsely called H. v. H. (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 159 ; 3 S. & T. 517,
592 167
Maher ii'. Maher (1867),' 36'l. J.' Ex.' 7o';' 'l.' R.' 2'Ex'. I'-is .' .' .' .' .' .' ." .' .' ." .' .' .' ." 715
Maberley ». Sheppard (1833), 10 Bing. 101 ; 3 M. & Scott, 436 ; 2 L. J.
C. P. 181 689, 690
Maby V. Shepherd (1623), Cro. Jao. 640 543
Macallum v. Turton (1828), 2 T. & J. 183 961, 962
Macartney v. Graham (i828), 2 Sim. 285 308
Maobeath v. Haldimand (1786), 1 T. R. 172 ; 1 R. R. 177 44
Macbride ». Maobride (1802). 4 Esp. 242 947, 967, 968
M'Ardle v. Irish Iodine Co. (1864), 15 Ir. 0. L. R. 146 645
M'Cabe, Re (1873), 42 L. J. P. & M. 79 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 94 707, 703
M'Calmont v. Rankin (1852)^ 2 De G. M. & G. 403 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 564. . . . 651
M'Canoee'. Lond. feN.W. Ry. Co. (1864), 34L. J.Ex. 39; 3H.& 0.343 542
Maoaulay v. Robertson (1886), 18 L. R. Ir. 483 524
Macoann v. Macoanu (1862), 3 S. & T. 142 ; 32 L. J. P. & M. 29 601
MCannon ». Sinclair (1859), 2 E. & E. 53 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 247 ; 6 Jur.
N. S. 1302 Ill
M'Carthy v. De Caix (1834), 2 Russ. & My. 614 ; 3 Hagg. Eco. 642, n. . . 1144
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CXXll TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOK
M'Carthy ». O'Brien (1839), 2 Ir. L. 11.67 713
M'Clory v. Wright (1860), 10 Ir. C. L. R. 514 634
McCoUin 1). Gilpin (1881), 6 Q. B. Div. 516 ; 44 L. T. 914 ; 29 W. K. 408 784
M'Combie v. Auton (1843), 6 M. & Gr. 27 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 923 325
MacCormaok r. MaeCormack (1876), 1. R. 11 Eq. 130 ; 1 L. R. Ir. 119.. 749, 750
M'Cormiok v. Garnett (1864), 23 L. J. Ch. 717 ; 5 De G. M. & G. 278 . . 50
McCorquodale v. Bell (1876), 45 L. J. 0. P. 329 ; 1 0. P. D. 471 . . . .597, 1186
M'Cullooli V. Dawes (1826), 9 Dowl. & R. 40 492
M'Donaldw. Longbottom (1860), 1 E. & E. 977; 28 L. J. Q. B. 293; 29
L. J. Q. B. 256 784
M'Donald f. Rainor (1811), 8 Johns. 442 1139
McDonaU v. Alcorn, (1894) 1 I. R. 274, 278 Add. [1103]
M'Donnell v. Conry (1843), Ir. 0. Rep, 807 603
MacdonneU v. Evans (1852), 11 C. B. 930 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 141 ; 16 Jur. 103 955,
956, 968
M'Donnell v. Murray (1859), 9 Ir. C. L. R. 495 308
M'Donnell :>. Pope (1852). 9 Hare, 705; 16 Jur. 771 660
Macdougal v. Young (1826), Ry. & M. 392 ; 1 Vent. 257 357
McDougall V. Field (1872), I. R. 6 C. L. 185 757
M'Dowall V. Lyster (1836), 2 M. & W. 52 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 11 225
Mace V. Cadell (1774), 1 Cowp. 233 539
M'Elveney v. CouneUan (1864), 17 Ir. C. L. R. 55 618
M'Bwan v. Campbell (1857), 2 Maoq. 499 ; 1 Paterson, 676 540
M'Ewan ». Smith (1849), 2 H. L. Cas. 309 ; 13 Jur. 265 691
M'Fadden v. Murdock (1867), I. R. 1 C. L. 211 '240, 933
Macfarlan v. Rolt (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 580 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 649 ; 27 L. T.
305 ; 20 "W. R. 9*5 602
Macfarlane, Re (1884), 13 L. R. Ir. 264 704
Macferson v. Thoytes (1790), Peake, 20 647
M'Gahey v. Alston (1836), 2 M. & "W. 206 ; 2 Gale, 238 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 29.. 148,
302, 304, 508
M'Gonnell v. Murphy (1869), I. R. 3 Eq. 460 638, 639
M'Gregor v. Bainbrigge (1848), 7 Hare, 164 n. (ri) 160
Macgregor v. Keily (1849), 3 Ex. 794 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 391 ; 2 D. & L. 635 . . 158
MGregor v. Topham (1850), 3 H. L. Caa. 155 ; 3 Hare, 488 1215
M'Gregor Laird, The (1867), 36 L. J. Adm. 10; L. R. 1 A. & E. 307 ; 15
W. R. 262 1189
M'Guire's case (1801), 2 East, P. C. 1002 278
Machell v. Ellis (1845), 1 C. & K. 682 507
Maohin v. Grindon (1756), 2 Lee, 335 ; 2 Add. 91 1223
Machu V. Lond. & S. W. Ry. Co. (1848), 2 Ex. 415 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 271 ... . 549
Macintosh v. Haydon (1826), Ry. & M. 362 1194
Mclntyre v. Mancius (1819), 16 Johns. 592 961
Mclver v. Walker (1815), 9 Cranoh, 178 802
Mackay v. Com. Bank of New Brunswick (1874), 43 L. J. P. C. 31 ; L. R.
5 P. C. 394 686
M'Kay V. Rutherford (1848), 6 Moo. P. 0. C. 413 680
McKeohnie v. Vaughan (1873), L. R. 15 Eq. 289 803
McKee v. Farnam (1841), 2 Crawf. & D. C. C. 209 1035
M'Kee v. Nelson (1825), 4 Cowen, 365 930
McKenire v. Fraser (1803), 9 Ves. 5 433
MeKenna v. Eager (1875), 9 I. R. C. L. 79 128, 1046
McKenzie v. British Linen Co. (1881), 6 App. Cas. 82 538
Mackenzie v. Dunlop (1856), 3 Macq. 26 763
Mackenzie v. Pooley (1856), 11 Ex. 638 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 124 179
Mackenzie v. Teo (1841), 2 Curt. 866 60S
M'Key, Re (1876), I. R. 11 Eq. 220 699
Mackintosh v. Marshall (1843), 11 M. & W. 126 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 337 47, 157
Maokley v. Chillingworth (1877), 46 L. J. C. P. 484 ; 2 C. P. D. 273 .... 818
M'Kone, Re (1841), Ir. Cir. R. 65 866, 869
Maclae v. Sutherland (1854), 3 E. & B. 1 ; 2 C. L. R. 1320 ; 23 L. J. Q. B.
229 ; 18 Jur. 942 160, 161
McLaren v. Home, or Home (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 477 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 658. . 818
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXIU
PAGE
Maclean v. Dunn (1828), 4 Bing. 722 ; 1 M. & P. 761 7^9
M'Lean v. Hertzog (1820), 6 Serg. & R. 154 289
M'Lellan j>. Richardson (1836), 1 Shepl. 82 615, 616
Macleod v. WaMey (1828), 3 0. & P. 311 243
McMahon v. Burohell (1846), 2 Ph. 1 27 ; 1 Coop. 475 487
M'Mahon v. ElUa (1859), 10 Ir. L. R. N. S. 120 962
M'Mahon v. EUis (1863), 10 Ir. C. L. R. 499, 509 148
M-Mahon ». Lennard (1858), 6 H. L. C. 970 148
M'Mahon v. M'Elrojr (1869), I R. 5 Eq. 1 172
MMahon v. Rawlings (1848), 16 Sim. 429 1151
M'Manus v. Lanoas. & Torks. Ry. Co. (1859), 2 H. & N. 693 ; 4 H. & N.
327 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 353 ; 33 L. T. 0. S. 259 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 651 723, 771
M'Master and Boyle's case (1843), Ir. Cir. R. 768 ; 314
M'Murdo, Re (1867), 37 L. J. P. & M. 14 ; L. R. IP. &D. 540; 17 L. T.
393 ; 16 W. E. 283 702
M'Naghten's case (1843), 10 CI. & F. 200 ; 1 0. & K. 135 ; 8 Scott, N. R.
595 934, 935
M'Naughten's trial. Legal Obs., May 27, 1843 164
M'Neil V. Perohard (1795), 1 Esp. 264 1018
M'Neil V. PhiUp (1821), 1 McC. (South Car.), 392 544
MoPherson v. Watt (1877), 3 App. Gas. 254 136
Maorory v. Scott (1850), 5 Ex. 907 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 90 C72, 677
M'Vicar, Re (1869), L. R. 1 P. 671 ; 38 L. J. P. 84 ; 20 L. T. 1013 ;
7 W. R. 832 703
M'WiUiams v. Nisby (1816), 2 Serg. & R. 515 90
Maddiaon v. Alderson (1883), 8 App. Cas. 473 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 737 ; 49
L. T. 303 ; 31 W. R. 820 ; 47 J. P. 821 539, 6S8
Maddison v. Nuttall (1829), 6 Bing. 226 ; 3 M. & P. 544 510
Maddock, Re (1874), L. R. 3 P. 169 ; 43 L. J. P. 169 ; 30 L. T. 696 ;
22 W. R. 741 700
Maddox v. Fisher (1 S51), 14 Moo. P. C. C. 103 6
Maden v. Catanach (1862), 7 H. & N. 360 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 118 ; 6 L. T. 288;
10 W. R. 112; 7 Jur. N. S. 1107 902, 904
Magdalen College v. Att.-Gen. (1857), 26 L. J. Ch. 620 ; 6 H. L. Cas. 189 ;
3 Jur. N. S. e75 74, 125
Magdalen Hospital, Governors of, v. Kjiott (1877), 47 L. J. Ch. 726;
8 Ch. D. 709 ; 38 L. T. 624 ; 26 W. R. 616 301
Magee v. Atkinson (1837), 2 M. & W. 440 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 115 758
Magee v. Mark (1860), 11 Ir. 0. L. R. 449 1IJ5, 634
Magennis v. MacCuUough (undated), Gilh. (Eq. R ) 236 659
Maghee v. CNeU (1841), 7 M. & "W. 531 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 326 717
Magnays;. Burt (1843), Dav. &M. 652; 5 Q. B. 381 ; 7 Jur. 1116 866,872,
873
Magnay v. Fisher (1843), 5 M. & Gr. 778 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 588 543
Magnay ». Knight (1840), 2 Scott, N. R. 64 ; 1 M. & Gr. 944 ; 1 Drink.
13 ; 4 Jur. 1088 287
Magnet, The (The Fanny Carvill) (1875), 44 L. J. Adm. 34 ; 32 L. T.
646 ; 24 W. R. 62 ; 6 Asp M. C. 569 177
Magoun v. N. Engl. Ins. Co. (1840), 1 Story, R. 157 1142, 1148
Magrath v. Browne (1841), Arm. M. & 0. 133 954
Magrath v. Hardy (1838), 4 Bing. N. C. 782 ; 6 Scott, 627 ; 6 Dowl. P. C.
749 ; 1 Am. 362 ; 2 Jur. 594 89, 1101
Mahalen v. DubHu Distilleiy Co. (1877), 11 Ir. R. C. L. 83 672
Mahalm v. McOuUagh, (1891) 27 L. R. Ir. 431 631
Maharajah Pertab Narain Singh v. Maharanee Subhao Kootr (1877), L. R.
4 Ind. App. 228 703
Mahon'a Trust, Re (1852), 9 Hare, 459 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 75 1026
Mahon v. Mahon (1840), 2 Ir. Eq. R. 440 867
Mahoney v. Keknle (1854), 14 C. B. 390 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 54 ; 18 Jur.
313 161
Mahony*. "Widows' Life Ass. Fund (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 252; 40 L. J.
C. P. 203 ; 24 L. T. 548 ; 19 W. R. 722 1186
Mahood v. Mahood (1874), I. R. 8 Eq. 359 307
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CXXiy TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOB
Maid of Auckland, The (1848), 6 Notes of Gas. (Eoc. & Mar.), 2*40 1122
Maingay v. Gahan (1793), Eidg. L. & S. 1, 79 ; 1 Kldg. P. C. 43, 44, n. . 1103
Mair's Estate, Ee (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 882 ; 28 L. T. 760 ; 21 W. R. 749. . 1208
Major V. WilUams (1843). 3 Curt. 432 709
Malcolm v. Ray (1819), 3 Moore, C. P. 222 831
Malcolm v. Scott (1843, should be 1850), 5 Ex. 601 487
Malcolmson v. Morton (1847), 11 Ir. L. R. 230 766
Maloomson v. Baldock {tee Auckland, Earl of} .
Maloomson v. Clayton (186U), 13 Moo. P. C. C. 198 185
Maloomson v. O'Dea (1862), 10 H. of L. Cas. 593, 614, 616 ; 9 L T. 93 ;
12W. E. 178; y Jur. IS.S. 1135 87, 111, 124, 432
Maiden ii. Great North. Ry. Co. (1874), L. R. 9 Ex. 300 1186
Male V. Roberts (1800), 3 Ksp. 163 ; 6 R. E. 823 7
•MallaUeu v. Hodgson (1852), 16 Q. B. 689 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 339 ; 15 Jur.
817 91
MaUan v. May (1844), 13 M. & W. 517 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 48 741
Mallan v. Eadcliff (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 588 ; 11 L. T. 381 ; 13 W. E.
139 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1132 777
M>illett V. Bateman (1865), L. E. 1 C. P. 163; 35 L. J. C. P. 40 ; 13 L. T.
410 ; 14 W. R. 225 ; 1 H. & E. 109 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 122 ; 16 C. B. N. S.
630 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 243 676
MalKsou, Re (1832), 1 Lew. C. C. 132 824
Malone v. O'Connor (1859), Drury, temp. Napier, 644 79
Malone v. Spillessy (1847), Ir. Cir. E. 504 946
Maloney v. Bartley (1812), 3 Camp. 210 960, 961
Malpas V. Clements (1850), 19 L. J. Q. B. 436 146
Malpas V. London & South West. Ey. Co. (1866), L. E. 1 C. P. 336 ;
35 L. J. C. P. 166 ; 13 L. T. 710 ; 14 W. E. 391 ; 1 H. & R. 227 ; 12
Jur. N. S. 271 745
Maltby J). Christie (1795), 1 Esp. 340 618
Malton 0. Nesbit (1824), 1 C. & P. 70 935
Man V. Eicketts (1845), 2 Coop. (C. P.) 21 ; 14 L. J. Ch. 255 16, 129
Manby v. Curtis (1815), 1 Price, 225 171, 430, 443
Manby v. Scott (1660), 2 Smith's L. C. 466 ; 1 Lev. 4 166, 167
Manchester, Bank of, Ex parte, Ee Jackson (1871), 40 L. J. Bank. 57 :
L. E. 12 Eq. 354 685
Manchester Bonded "Warehouse Co. v. Carr (1880), 5 C. P. D 507 ; 49
L. J. C. P. 809 ; 43 L. T. 476 ; 29 W. E. 354 ; 45 J. P. 7 774
Manchester, May. of, ». Williams, (18911 1 Q. B. 94 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 23 ;
63 L. T. 805 ; 39 W. E. 302 ; 54 J. P. 712 643
Mandeville v. Welch (1820), 1 Wheat. 233 488
Mangles v. Dixon (1849), 1 Mac. & G. 446 ; 1 H. & T. 550 ; 19 L. J. Ch.
240 538
Manley v. Boycot (1853), 2 E. & B. 46 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 265 ; 17 Jur. 1118. 758
Manley v. Shaw (1840), Car. & M. 361 899
Mann, Ee (1859), 28 L. J. P. & M. 19 69J
Mann v. Lang (1835), 3 A. & E. 702 ; 5 N. & M. 202 ; 1 H. & W. 441 . . 553
Mann v. Nunn (1874), 43 L. J. C. P. 241 ; 30 L. T. 526 683, 754
Mann ». Owen (1829), 9 B. & C. 595 ; 4 M. & R. 449 1133
Manners v. Postan (1803), 4 Esp. 239 ; 3 Bos. & P. 343 1209
Manning v. Cox (1823), 7 Moore, C. P. 617 487
Manning v. East. Cos. Ey. Co. (1843), 12 M. & W. 237 ; 3 Eailw. Cas.
637 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 265 1033, 1039
Mansel v. Clanricarde (1885), 54 L. J. Ch. 982 ; 53 L. T. 496 913
ManseU v. Clements (1874). L. E. 9 C. P. 139 9:i0
Manser v. Back (1848), 6 Hare, 443 750
Manser v. Dix (185.5), 1 K. & J. 451 ; 24 L. J. Ch 497 602
Marathon, The (1879), 4S L. J. Adm. 17 ; 40 L. T. 163 178
Marbury v. Madison (1803), 1 Cranoh, 144 61 8
Marchmont Peer. (1840), Pari. Min. 346, 353 423, 1179
Mare v. Charles (1856), 5 E. & B. 978 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 119 ; 2 Jur. N. S.
234 787
Margareson v. Saxton (1835), 1 T. & C. Ex. 629 487
The references are to pages, not to paiagraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXV
PAGE
Maria das Dorias, or Dores, The (1863), 32 L. J. P. & M 163 ; Erown &
L. 27; 7L. T. 838; 11 W. R. 500 1172
Marianslsi v. Cairns (1851-2), 1 Macq. 212 ; 1 Paterson, 416 480
Marine Investmeut Co. v. Haviside (1872), L. R. 5 H. L. 624; 42 L. J.
Ch. 173 133
Markham -;. Gonaston (1688), Cro. Eliz. 626 1200, 1205
Markham v. Standford ^1863), 14 C. B. N. S. 380 ; 8 L. T. 277 649
Mark8«).Beyfus(1890), 25Q.B. D. 494; 59 L.J. Q.B.479; 38W.R.705.. 613
Marks v. Lahee (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 419 ; 4 Scott, 137 435, 440
Marmyon Peer. (1818), Pari. Min. Ill 423
Marriage v. Lawrence (1819), 3 B. & Aid. 412 10.50, 1175
Marriot ». Marriot (1725-6), 1 Str. 671 1105, 1133
Marsden v. Goode (1845), 2 C. & Kir. 133 48
Marsdon v. Lauo. & York. Ry. Co. (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 641 ; 50 L. J. Q. B.
318; 44 L. T. 239; 29 W. R. 580 41
Marsden v. Overbury (1856), 18 C. B. 34 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 200 838
Marsh V. Collnett (1798), 2 Esp. 666 ; 5 R. R. 763 86, 1053, 1054, 1173
Marsh v. Keith (1860), 30 L. J. Ch. 127 ; 1 Dr. & Sm. 342 605
Marsh V. Loader (1863), 14 C. B. N. S. 535 ; 2 New R. 280 ; 11 W. R. 784. 99
Marsh v. Marsh (1858, should be 1860), 1 S. & T. 528 ; 30 L. J. P. & M.
77 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 380 141, 709
Marshal v. Crutwell (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 328 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 504 667
Marshall v. Berridge (1882), 51 L. J. Ch. 329 ; 19 Ch. D. 223 ; 45 L. T.
599 ; 30 W. R. 94 670
MarshaU v. Cliff (1815), 4 Camp. 133 606
Marshall v. Gougler (1823), 10 Serg. & R. 164 1199
Marshall v. Green (1875), 1 C. P. D. 35 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 153. .685, 686, 687, 690
MarshaU v. Lamb (1843), 5 Q. B. 113 ; D. & M. 315 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 75 ;
7 Jur. 850 147, 148
MarshaU v. Lynn (1840), 0 M. & W. 116 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 126 762
MarshaU v. Smith (1866), 34 L. J. Ch. 189 ; 11 L. T. 443 ; 13 W. R. 198 ;
10 Jur. N. S. 1174 74
MarshaU v. Taylor, (1895) 1 Ch. 641 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 416 Add. [113]
MarshaU v. The UUeswater St. Na. Co. (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 139 ; 3 B.
& S. 732 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 988 ; 8 L. T. 416 ; 11 W. R. 489 Ill
MarshaU v. The York, Newcastle, & Berwick Ry. Co. (1851), 11 C. B. 398 832
Marston v. Dean (1836), 7 C. & P. 13 2S7
Marston v. Downes (1834), 1 A. & E. 31 ; 4 N. & M. 861 ; 6 C. & P. 381 . . 320,
321, 597, 969
Martin's case (1830), 1 Lew. C. C. 104 246
Martin, Re (1883), 13 L. R. Ir. 312 321
Martin v. Andrews (1856), 26 L. J. Q. B. 39 ; 7 B. & B. 1 ; 2 Jur. N. S.
1121 820
Martin v. Gale (1867), 4 Ch. D. 428 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 84 ; 36 L. T. 357 ; 25
"W. R. 406 100
Martin v. Geoghegan (1850), 13 Ir. L. R. 403 710
Martin v. Kennedy (1800), 2 Bos. & P. 71 1122
Martin v. Nioolls (1830), 3 Sim. 458 1154
Martin v. Podger (1770), 5 Burr. 2631 481
Martin v. Smith (1874), 43 L. J. Ex. 42 ; L. R. 9 Ex. 50 650, 654
Martin ». Thornton (1796), 4 Esp. 181 612
Martindale v. Booth (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 498 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 16 136
Martindale v.- Falkner (1846), 2 C. B. 719, 720; 15 L. J. C. P. 91 ; 3 Dowl.
& L. P. C. 600 79
Marfcyn v. Williams (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 117 ; 1 H. & N. 817 192
Marvin v. Wallace (1856), 25 L. J. Q. B. 369 ; 6 E. & B. 726 690
Mary, The (1878), 48 L. J. P. D. & A. 66 ; 5 P. D. 14 ; 41 L. T. 361 ;
28W. R. 95 178
Mary, The, or Alexandra (1868), 38 L. J. Adm. 29 ; L. R. 2 Adm. & Eoo.
319 ; 18 L. T. 891 964, 1189
Mary, The (1815), 9 Cranch, 126 1150
Marzetti v. Smith (1883), 49 L. T. 680 ; 6 Asp. M. C. 166 ; 1 C. & E. 6 . . 769
Mash V. Densham (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 442 190
Vol. I. end) with page 63fi.
CXXVl TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAas
Mason and Barry v. Comptoir d'Esoompte (1890), 38 W. R. 685 343
Maaon v. Bradley (1843), 11 M. & W. 6i)0 ; 1 Dowl. & L. 380 ; 12 L. J. Ex.
426 ; 7 Jur. 496 1194
Mason v. Farnell (1844), 12 M. & W. 674 ; 1 Dowl. &L. 676 ; 13 L. J. Ex.
142 47
Mason 1). Kiddle (1839), 6 M. & W. 513 ; 8 Dowl. 207 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 37 . . 732
Mason ». Mason (1816), 1 Meriv. 308 174
Mason v. Skurray a78u), Park, Ins. 245 763
Mason v. "Wood (1875), 45 L. J. 0. P. 76 ; 1 C. P. D. 63 ; 33 L. T. 671 ;
24 "W. R. 46 1088
Masper and Wife v. Brown (1875), 45 L. J. C. P. 203 ; 1 C. P. D. 97 ; 34
L. T. 254 ; 24 W. R. 369 1130
Massey v. Allen (1879), 13 Ch. D. 658 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 76 ; 41 L. T. 788 ;
28 W. R. 212 435, 456, 846
Massey v. Johnson (1847), 1 Ex. 255 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 182 682
Master v. Miller (1791), 4 T. R. 330 ; 5 T. R. 367 ; 2 H. Bl. 140 ; 1 Anstr.
225; 2R. R. 399 1193, 1194, 1200, 1201
Master Pilots & Seamen of Newcastle v. Bradley (1851), 2 B. & B. 428, n. ;
23 1. J. Q. B. 35 791
Masters v. Barrets (1849), 2 C. & K. 715 262
Masters v. Masters (1718), 1 P. Wms. 425 762
Misters v. PoUie (1620), 2 Rolle R. 141 114
Mather v. Lord Maidstone (1866), 26 L. J. C. P. 58 ; 1 C. B. N. S. 273 ;
3 Jnr. N. S. 112 262
Mather v. Trinity Chnrch (1877), 3 Serg. & R. 509 123
Mathews v. Mathews (1867), L. R. 4 Eq. 278 ; 1 5 W. R. 761 804
Mathews». Ovey (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 403; 53 L.J. Q. B.439; 50L.T.776.. 1232
Mathias, Re (1863), 32 L. J. P. & M. 115 ; 3 S. & T. 100 701
Matson v. Booth (1816), 6 M. & Sel. 223 1203
Matson v. Wharam (1787), 2 T. R. 80 ; 1 R. R. 429 678
Matthew!). Osborne (1865), I3C.B. 919; 22 L. J. 0. P. 241; 17 Jur. 696. .89, 1113
Matthews ». Matthews (1755), 2 Ves. sen. 636 806
Matthews v. Port (1687), Comb. 63 1167
Matthews v. Whittle (1880), 13 Ch. D. 811 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 359 ; 43 L. T.
114 ; 28 W. R. 822 636
Matthey v. Wiseman (1865), 18 C. B, N. S. 657 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 216 ; 11
Jur. N. S. 603 ; 12 L. T. 846 ; 13 W. R. 914 1116
Matts V. Hawkins (1813), 5 Taun. 20 ; 14 R. R. 695 113
Maubourquet v. Wyse (1867), I. R. 1 C. L. 471 1146, 1148
Maude v. Baildon Local Board (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 394 ; 48 L. T. 874 ; 47
J. P. 644 48
Maugham v. Hubbard (1828), 8 B. & C. 14 ; 2 M. & R. 6 926, 927
Maund V. Monmouth Can. Co. (184 2), C. & Marsh. 606 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 113 ;
4 M. & G. 452 ; 5 Scott, N. R. 457 ; 3 Railw. Cas. V,9 ; 6 Jur. 932 227
MaunseU v. Ainsworth (1840), 8 Dowl. 869 ; 1 H. & W. 5 815
Maunsell v. Hedger (1851), 2 Ir. C. L. R. 88 712
MaunseU w. White (1864), 4 H. L. Cas. 1039 639, 679
Mavor v. Payne (1825), 3 Bing. 285 ; 11 Moore, C. P. 2 682
Mawby v. Barber (1826), 2 St. Ev. 641, 642 255
Mawson v. Hartsink (1802), 4 Esp. 103 ; 6 R. R. 841 972, 974
Maxwells. PameU fl866-7), L R. 1 C. L. 234 780
May, Re (1868), 37 L. J. P. & M. 68 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 575 709
May V. Brown (1824), 3 B. & C. 113 ; 4 D. & R. 670 245, 246
May V. Footner (1855), 5 E. & B. 506 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 32 ; 1 Jur. N. S.
1019 188
May V. Gwynne (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 301 996
May V. Selby (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 142; 4 Scott, N. R. 727; 1 D. N. S. 702;
6 Jur. 52; 11 L. J. 0. P. 223 818
May V. Taylor (1843), 6 M. & Gr. 266 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 974 ; 12 L. J. C. P.
314 ; 7 Jur. 615 496, 497
Mayfield v. Robinson (1845), 7 Q. B. 486 ; 9 Jur. 826 637
Mayfield i;. Wadsley (1824), 3 B. & C. 366 ; 6 D. & R. 224 687
Mayhew v. Nelson (1833), 6 C. & P. 68 378
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXVll
PAGE
Mayor p. Jolmson (1813), 3 Camp. 324 3u7
Mead v. Daubigny (1792), Pea. 125 244
Meade v. Smith (1844), 16 Conn. 346 617
Meagoe v. Simmons (1827), 3 C. & P. 75 925
MearsD. Ld. Stourton (1711), IP. Wma. 146 900
Meath, Bp. of v. Ld. Belfield (1748), 7 WiU. 215 ; 2 Salk. 512 398
Meath, Bp. of v. M. of Winchester (1836), 3 Bing. N. 0. 198 ; 3 So.
561 26, 87, 429, 431, 510, 602
Mechanics' Bk. of Alexandria ». Bk. of Columbia (1820), 5 Wheat. 336 . . 388
Meohelen v. Wallace (1837), 7 A. & E. 49 ; 6 L. J. K. B. 217 ; 2 N. & P.
•224 678, 682
Meoredy v. Taylor (1873), I. R. 7 0. L. 256 166
Meddowcroft v. Huguenin (1844), 4 Moo. P. C. C. 386 1132
Medlycott v. Assheton (1824), 2 Add. 229 143
Mee V. Reid (1791), Pea. B. 23 ; 3 R. R. 648 905
Meekins v. Smith (1791), 1 H. Bl. 637 ' 865, 866
Megevand, Re, Ex parte Delhasse (1867), 37 L. T. 440 ; 26 W. R. 20 ; 7
Ch. D. 611 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 65 ; 38 L. T. 106 ; 26 W. R. 338 159
Megson v. Hindle (1880), 15 Ch. D. 198 ; 43 L. T. 551 ; 28 W. R. 866 . . 145
Melon V. Andrews (1829), M. & M. 3:j6 523, 528, 687
Melhnish v. Collier (1850), 15 Q. B. 878 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 493 ; 14 Jur. 621 . . 242, 939
MeUish v. Rawdon (1832), 9 Bing. 416 ; 2 M. & Scott, 570 38
Mellor V. Sidebottom (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 398 ; 5 Ch. D. 342 ; 37 L. T. 7 ;
25 W. R. 410 534
Mellow V. May (1601), Moo. (F.) 636 657
Melville's, Ld., case (1806), 29 How. St. Tr. 707 8, 14, 108, 472, 587, 969
Melvin v. Whiting (1828), 7 Pick. 79 327
Mercant. Credit Associat., Re, Clement's case (1868), 37 L. J. Ch. 295 ; 13
L. R. Eq. 179, n. 1 845
Mercer v. Cheese (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 8U4 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 664 ; 2 Dowl. N.
S. 619 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 56 168
Mercer v. Sparks (1586), Owen, 51 ; Noy, 35 110
Mercer v. Whall (1845), 5 Q. B. 462 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 267 ; 9 Jur. 676. .270, 273
Mercer v. Wise (1800), 3 Esp. 219 542
Mercer -i). Woodgate (1870), 10 B. & S. 833 ; 39 L. J. M. C. 21 ; L. R. 5
Q. B. 26 ; 21 L. T. 458 ; 18 W. R. 116 124
Merchant Prince, The, (1892) P. 9, 179 ; 67 L. T. 261 260
Merchants' Co., Re (1867), L. R. 4 Eq. 453 845
Meredith v. Eootner (1843), 11 M. & W. 202 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 183 503, 505
Meredith ». Meigh (1853), 2 E. & B. 364 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 401 692
Merle v. More (1826), Ry. & M. 390 603
Merrick v. Wakley (1838), 8 A. & E. 170 ; 3 N. & P. 284 ; 1 W. W. & H.
268; 2 Jar. 838 1048
Merrill v. Morton (1881), 60 L. J. Ch. 249 ; 17 Ch. D. 382 ; 43 L. T. 750 ;
29 W. R. 394 741
Merritt, Re (1868), 1 S. & T. 112 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 1192 705
Merry e. Nickalls (1876), L. R. 7 Ch. 733 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 767 ; 26 L. T.
496 ; 20 W. R. 531 168
Messia v. Ld. Massareene (1791), 4 T. R. 493 1165
Messina v. Petrooooohino (1872), L. R. 4 P. C. 144 ; 8 Moo. P. C. C. N. S.
375 1147
Meteor, The (1875), L R. 9 Eq. 567 178
Metropol. Ry. Co. i>. Defries (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 189, 387 ; 36 L. T. 150,
494 ; 25 W. R. 271, 841 535
Metropol. Ry. Co. ». Jackson (1877), 3 App. Cas. 193 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 303 ;
37 L. T. 679 ; 26 W. R. 175 23, 28, 38
Mettersf. Brown (1862), 32 L. J. Ex. 138; 1 H. & C. 686 92, 116, 495
Mews V. Carr (1856), 1 H. & N. 484 ; 26 L J. Ex. 29 730
Mexican & S. American Co., Re, Ex parte Aston (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 634 ;
4 De G. & J. 220 ; 27 Beav. 474 964
Meyer v. Dresser (1864), 16 0. B. N. S. 646 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 289 ; 10 L. T.
612 ; 12 W. R. 983 85
Meyer v. Montriou (1846), 9 Beav. 521 496
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CXXVlll TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOB
Meyer v. Ealli (1876), 1 C. P. D. 358 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 741 ; 24 W. E. 963. . 1147
Meyer v. Sefton (1817), 2 Stark. R. 274 ; 19 R. E. 720 323
Meyerhofe v. Froehlioh (1878), 3 C. P. D. 333 ; 4 0. P. D. 63 ; 48 L. J. 0.
P. 43 : 39 L. T. 620 ; 27 W. E. 258 712
Meynell's case (1834), 2 Lew. C. C. 122 666
Meyrick v. James (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 579 ; 324, 920
Mpyrick v. Woods (1842), 0. & Marsh. 452 314
Michael v. Seockwith (1587), Cro. Eliz. 120 1200
Michael v. Tredwin (1856), 17 C. B. 551 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 83 771
Michell V. Rabhetts (1810), cited 3 Taun. 91 430
Michell V. "WilHams (1843), 11 M. & W. 205 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 193 30, 31
Middleditoh v. Ellis (1848), 2 Ex. 623 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 365 764
Middlehiirst v. Johnson (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 14 140
Middlesex Sheriffs, case of (18)0), 11 A. & E. 273 4
Middleton's case (1603), 5 Go. Eep. 21 92
Middletou, Re (1865), 34 L. J. P. & M. 16 ; 3 S. & T. 583 ; 10 Jur. N. 8.
1109 708
Middleton v. Earned (1849), 4 Ex. 241 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 433 106, 977
Middleton v. Croft (1736), Str. 1056 79
Middleton v. Mass (1819), 2 Nott. &• M;C. 65 429
Middleton v. Melton (1829), 10 B. & C 322 ; 5 M. & R. 264. .279, 437,441, 608
Middleton v. Pollock, Ex parte WetheraU (1876), 4 Ch. D. 49 : 46 L. J. Ch.
39 ; 35 L. T. 608 ; 26 W. R. 94 539
Midland Ry. Co. v. Hunchwood Brick and Tile Co. (1882), 20 Ch. D. 552 ;
51 L. J. Ch. 778 ; 46 L. T. 301 ; 30 W. E. 640 60
Midland Ey. Co. v. "Withington Local Board (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 788; 52
L. J. Q. B. 689 ; 49 L. T. 489 ; 47 J. P. 789 226
Mighell V. Sultan of Johore, (1893) 9 R. 447 ; (1894) 1 Q. B. 149 ; 63 L. J.
Q. B. 593 ; 70 L. T. 64 ; 58 J. P. 244 14
Migottif. Cclville (1879), 4 C. P. D. 233; 48 L. J. C. P. 695; 40 L. T.
747 ; 27 W. E. 744 ; 14 Cox, C. C. 305 16
Milan, The (1861), Lush. 388 ; 31 L. J. Adm. 106 ; 6 L. T. 590 1122
Mildrone's case (1786), 1 Lea. C. C. 412 905
Miles V. Bough (1842), 3 Q. B. 845; 3 Eailw. Cas. 668; 3 G. .& D. 119 ;
12 L. J. Q B. 74 294, 1177
Miles V. Dawson (1796), 1 Esp, 405 ; 2 Peake, 54 969
Miles V. M'Cullough (ISnS), 1 Binn. 77 873
MUes V. O'Hara (1811), 4 Biun. 108 353, 354
Millar v. Heinrick (1815), 4 Camp. 115 ,.. . . 936
Millard v. Bailey (1866), L. R. 1 Eq. 378 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 312 ; 13 L. T. 751 ;
14 W. R. 386 789
Miller's case (1772-3), 3 "Wilson, 427 ; 2 W. Bl. 886 930
Miller's case (1817), Macq. Prao. H. L. 620 503
MiUer v. Cook (1870), L. E. 10 Eq. 641 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 11 ; 18 W. E. I(i61;
22L. J. Ch. 740 137
Millers. Covert (1828), 1 Wend. 487 1U4
Miller v. Huddlestone (1851), 3 Mac. & G. 513, 523, 524 ; 21 L. J. Ch 1 ;
15 Jur. 1043 144
Miller V. Irvine (1834), 1 Dev. & B. 103 669
Miller v. James (1872), L. E. 3 P. & D. 4 ; 42 L. J. P. & M. 21 ; 27 L. T.
862 ; 21 W. E. 272 1151
Miller v. Lawton (186+), 2 New E. 430 ; 15 C. B N. S. 834 388
Miller v. Salomons (1852), 7 Ex. 534 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 161 905
MiUer v. Stevens (1868), 100 Mass. 518 763
Miller v. Tetherington (1861), 6 H. & N. 278 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 217 ; 7 H. &
N. 954; 3L. T. 893; 9 W. E. 437 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 214 ; 31 L. J. Ex.
363 ; 10 W. E. 356 764, 766
Miller v. Travers (1832), 8 Bing. 250 744, 760, 761, 801, 802
Miller D. Wheatley (1890), 28 L. R. Ir. 144 305, 431, 460, 1210
Milligan, Re (184m), 2 Roberts. 108 702
Millington v. Loring (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 190 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 214 ; 43 L. T.
657 ; 29 W. E. 207 ; 45 J. P. 268 220
Millman v. Tucker (1803), Pea. Add. Cas. 222 967, 970
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXIX
PAQE
Millner's Estate, Re (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 245 ; 42 L. J. Oh. 44 ; 26 L. T.
825 ; 20 "W . R. 823 101
Mills V. Barber (1836), 1 M. & W. 427 ; 5 Dowl. P. 0. 77 ; 2 Gale, 6 . .258, 261
Mills V. Dennis (1818), 3 Johns. 367 496
Mills V. Eowkes (1839), 6 Bing. N. C. 455 ; 7 Soott, 444 ; 8 L. J. C. P.
276 715, 716
Mills V. Mayor of Colchester (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 476 ; 36 L. J. C. P. 216;
16 L. T. 626 ; 15 W. R. 955 123, 124, 1092
Mills ». Mills (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 183 ; 2 S. & T. 310 ; 4 L. T. 479. . 348
Mills V. Milward (1890), 15 P. D. 20 ; 69 L. J. P. 23 ; 61 L. T. 651 703
Mills V. Oddy (1834), 6 C. & P. 728 271, 320, 599
MUls V. Scott (1873), 42 L. J. Q. B. 234 ; D. R. 8 Q. B. 496 ; 29 h. T. 96 ;
21 "W. R. 915 191, 195
Milne V. Leisler (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 257 ; 7 H. & N. 786 ; 5 L. T. 802 ; 10
W. R. 250 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 121 378
Milroy v. Lord (1862), 4 De G. F. & J. 264 ; 31 L. J. Oh. 798 639
Milsoni-. Day (1829), 3 M. & P. 333 817
Milward v. Eorbes (1803), 4 Esp. 171 517
Milward v. Hibbert (1842), 3 Q. B. 135 ; U L. J. Q. B. 137 ; 2 G. & D. 142 765
Milward v. Temple (1808), 1 Camp. 375
Mima Queen v. Hepburn (1813), 7 Cranch, 290 368, 506
Minet ». Morgan (1873), L. R. 8 Oh. App. 361 ; 42 L. J. Oh. 627 ; 28 L. T.
N. S. 573; 21 W. R. 467 321, 601, 602
Minna, The (1868), L. R. 2 A. & E. 97 178
Minor v. TUlotson (1833), 7 Pet. 100 277
Minshall v. Lloyd (1837), 2 M. & W. 450 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 115 304
Mints V. Bethill (1601), Oro. EUz. 749 323
Minty, Re (1850), 7 Notes of Oases (Eoo. & Mar.) 374 698
Mires v. Solebay (1678), 2 Mod. 244, 245 29
Mitchell V. OrassweUer (1853), 13 C. B. 237 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 100 ; 17 Jur.
716 193
MitcheU v. Darley Main OoU. Co. (1886), 11 App. Oas. 127 ; 65 L. J. Q. B.
629 ; 54 L. T. 882 ; 51 J. P. 148 114
Mitchell V. Homfray (1881), 50 L. J. Q. B. 460 ; 8 Q. B. D. 687 ; 45 L. T.
694 ; 29 W. R. 668 136
Mitchell V. Jenkins (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 594—596 ; 2 N. & M. 301 30, 39, 110
Mitchell V. Lapage (1816), Holt, N. P. R. 253 ; 17 R. P.. C33 299
MitcheU V. Thomas (1847), 6 Moo. P. 0. 0. 137 140, 141
Mitcheaon v. Oliver (1865), 5 E. & B. 419 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 39 ; 1 Jur.
N. S. 900 17d
Mobile, The (1866), Swa. Adm. 69, 127 178
Mody V. Gregson (1868), 38 L. J. Ex. 12 ; Jj. R. 4 Ex. 49 ; 19 L. T. 458 ;
17 W. R. 176 776
Moffatt V. Bateman (1869), L. R. 3 P. C. 116 ; 22 L. T. 140 ; 6 Moore,
P. 0. 0. N. S. 369 163
Mohesh Lai v. Mohunt Bawan Das (1883), L. R. 10 Ind. App. 62, 70, 71.. 153
Moises V. Thornton (1799), 8 T. R. 307 ; 3 Esp. 4 1214
MoUett V. Brayne (1809), 2 Oamp. 103 ; 11 R. R. 676 656, 660
Mollett V. Wackerbath (1847), 5 C. B. 181 ; 17 L. J. 0. P. 47 ; 11 Jur.
1066 1193, 1195
MoUwo, March & Co. v. Ct. of "Wards (1872), L. R. 4 P. 0. 419, 435 159
Molton V. Camroux (1849), 2 Ex. 487 ; 4 Ex. 17 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 366 ; 18
L. J. Ex. 68 ; 12 Jur. 800 542
Molton V. Harris (1797), 2 Esp. 549 296
Monaghau v. Cox (1892), 31 Am. St. R. 556 372
Mouoriefi v. Reade (1848), 2 C. & K. 705 192
Mondel v. Steele (1841), 8 M. & "W. 300 ; 9 Dowl. 812 ; 6 Jur. 611 ; 10
L. J. Ex. 314 1122
Money v. Jorden (1852), 16 Beav. 372 ; 20 L. J. Ch. 174 539
Monktonii. Att.-Gen. (1831), 2 Russ. & My. 161.. 408, 409, 410, 413, 416, 416,
418, 421, 423, 424
Monroe, Bank of, ». Field (1842), 2 HiU, R. 445 388
Monroe v. Twistleton (1802), Pea. Add. Oas. 221 591
Vol. I. ends with page 636.
CXXX TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAOB
Montacute v. Maxwell (1720), 1 P. Wms. 619 679, 680
Montague v. Harrison (1857), 3 C. B. N. S. 292 ; 27 L. J. C. P. 24 ; i
Jur. N. S. 29 869
Montag-ue, Ld., o. Dudman (1751), 2 Ves. sen. 397 997
Montague v. Montague (1852), 15 Beav. 565 805
Montague v. Perkins (1853), 22 L. J. C. P. 187 ; 17 Jur. 677 38, 1205
Montefior* v. Guedalla (1860), 29 L. J. Oh. 65 ; 1 De Gr. F. & J. 93 .... 806
Montefiori v. Monteaori (1762), 1 "W. Bl. 363 539
Montgomery v. Middletou (1862), 13 Ir. 0. L. R. 173 43
Montreal, Bank of, v. Munster Bank (1876), I. E- 11 0. L. 47 44
Montrose, Peer. (1853), 1 Macq. 401 180, 792
Moodie d. Bannister (1859), 4 Drew. 432 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 881 ; 5 Jur. N. S.
402 722
Moody V. Kowell (1835), 17 Pick. 490 922, 945, 1220, 1223, 1228
Moody V. Surridge (1798), Park, Ins. 245 763
Moons V. De Bernales (1856), 1 Russ. 301 1104
Moor ». (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 284 255
Moore v. Booth (1797), 3 Ves. 350 ' 869
Moore v. Campbell (1854), 10 Ex. 323 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 310 298, 752
Moore v. Culverhouse (1860), 27 Beav. 639 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 419 ; 6 Jur.
N. S. 1 15 738
Moore v. Garwood (1849), 4 Ex. 681 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 15 44
Moore v. King (1842), 3 Curt. 243 694
Moore V. Met. Ey. Co. (1872), L. R. 8 Q. B. 36 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 23 ; 27
L. T. 579 ; 21 W. E. 145 686, 643
Moore v. Moore (1755), 2 Ves. sen. 596, 603 180
Moore v. Moore (1871), 6 Ir. R. Bq. 166 142
Moore «. Moore (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 617; L. R. 18 Eq. 474; 30L.T.762;
22 W. E. 729 638
Moore v. Mourgue (1776), 2 Cowp. 479 39
Moore D. Oastler (1836), St. Ev. 641, 642 255
Moore V. Peaohey, (1891) 2 Q. B. 707 ; 39 W. E. 592 1181
Moore v. Smith (1826), 14 Serg. & E. 393 527
Moore V. Terrell (1833). 4 B. & Ad. 870 ; 1 N. & M. 559 6S1
Moores;. Whitehouse (1864), 3t L. J. P. &M. 31; 3S. &T. 567; 11 L T.
458 307
Moorhouse v. Newton (1849), 3 De G. & Sm. 307 480
More (should be Moor) v. Salter (1615), 3 Buls. 79 1198
Moreau and Carleton's Trial (1820), 200 900
Morewood v. "Wilkes (1833), 6 C. & P. 144 135
Morewood v. Wood (1792), 14 East, 327, n. ; 12 R. R. 537. .393, 399, 401, 1226,
1227
Morgan v. Boys (1836), cited 7 A. & E. 337 371
Morgan v. Brydges (1818), 2 Stark. R. 314 945
Morgan v. Chetwynd (1865), 4 F. & F. 451 166
Morgan v. Couohman (1853), 14 C. B. 100 ; 2 C. L. E. 63 ; 23 L. J.
C. P. 36 629
Morgan i). Davies (1878), 3 C. P. D. 260 ; 39 L. T. 60 ; 26 "W. R. 816 . . 35
Morgan v. Griffith (1871), L. E. 6 Ex. 70 ; 40 L. J. Ex. 46 ; 23 L. T. 783 ;
19 W. E. 957 745
Morgan v. Hatohell (1856), 24 L. J. Ch. 135 ; 19 Beav. 96 ; 1 Jur. N. S.
125 731
Morgan v. Hedger (1870), L. E. 5 C. P. 485 ; 40 L. J. M. C. 13 263
Morgan v. Lond. Gen. Omnibus Co. (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 203; 53 L. J.
Q. B. 352 ; 50 L. T. 687 ; 32 W. R. 416 779
Mors-an v. Morgan (1832), 9 Bing. 359 ; 2 L. J. C. P. 27 ; 2 Moo. & So.
490 372, 1218
Morgan v. Nicholl (1866), 36 L. J. C. P. 86 ; L. R. 2 C. P. 117 ; 15 L. T.
184; 15 W. E. 110; 12 Jur. ISr. S. 963 327
Morgan .;. Pike (1864), 14 C. B. 473 ; 2 C. L. E. 696 ; 23 L. J. 0. P. 64. . 67fl
Morgan v. Eavey (1861), 6 H. & N. 265 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 131 ; 3 L. T. 784 ;
9W.R.376; 2P.&F.283 162
I%e re/srirwei are to pages, not to paragraplt*.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXXl
PAQE
TSInrgan v. Rowlands (1872), 41 L. J. Q. B. 187 ; L. E. 7 Q. B. 493 ; 26
L. T. 855; 20 "W. R. 726 715, 1125
Morgan v. Sim (1858), 11 Moo. P. C. 0. 307 6
Morgan v. Sykes (1842), cited Coats v. Chaplin, 3 Q. B. 486 670
Morgan v. Thome (1841), 7 M. & W. 408 ; 9 D. P. C. 228 ; 5 Jur. 294 ;
10 L. J. Ex. 125 488, 1111
Morgan o. Whitmore (1852), 6 Ex. 716 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 289 146
Morgan's case (1764), 1 Lea. C. C. 54 904
Morgans v. Bridges (1818), 1 B. & Aid. 650 543
Moriarty v. Grey (1860), 12 Ir. C. L. R. 129 302
Moriarty v. Lond. Chat. & D. Ry. Co. (1870), 39 L. J. Q. B. 109 ; L. R.
5 Q. B. 314 : 22 L. T. 163 ; 18 W. R. 625 520
Morley v. Attenborough (1849), 3 Ex. 500 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 148 ; 13 Jur. 282 775
Morley v. Morley (1855), 5 De G. M. & G. 610 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 1097 ; 25
L. J. Ch. 1 1 38, 720
Morley's, Ld., case (1666), Kel. (J.) 55 ; 6 How. St. Tr. 771 . . . .328, 330, 340
Mornington v. Mornington (1861), 2 J. & H. 697 592
Morrell v. Dickey (1814), 1 Johns. (Ch. Am.) 153 1150
Morrell v. Eisher (1849), 4 Ex. 604 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 273 803, 804
Morrell v. Frith (1838), 3 M. & W. 402 ; 8 C. & P. 246 ; 1 H. & H. 100 ;
2 Jur. 619; 7 L. J. Ex. 172 44, 710, 712
Morrell v. Martin (1841), 3 M. & 6r. 593 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 300 1101
MorreU v. Morrell (1882), 7 P. Div. 68 ; 51 L. J. P. & M. 49 ; 46 L. T.
485 ; 30 "W. R. 491 ; 46 J. P. 328 141
Morris V. Bethell (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 7C5 ; L. R. 5 C. P. 47 ; 38 L. J.
C. P. 379 ; 17 "W. R. 736 241
Morris V. Burdett (1808), 1 Camp. 218 ; 10 R. R. 667 524
Morris V. Davies (1866, should be 1827), 3 C. & P. 215, 427 ; 5 CI. & Fin.
163 ; 1 M. & R. 271, n 101, 422
Morris v. Glynn (1859), 27 Beav. 218 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 1047 684
Morris V. Hammer (1833), 7 Pet. 554 1179
Morris v. Hauser (1841), 2 M. & Rob. 392 ; Car. & M. 29 313
Morris v. Miller (1767), 4 Burr. 2057 ; 1 W. Bl. 632 149, 295, 549
Morrison v. Arnold (1817), 19 Ves. 670 353
Morrison v. Gen. St. Navig. Co. (1852), 8 Ex. 733 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 233 ... . 6
Morrison v. KeUy (1762), 1 W. Bl. 385 987
Morrison v. I^ennard (1827), 3 C. & P. 127 897
Morrison v. Martin (1846), 5 Hare, 507 803
Morrisons. Univ. Marine Ins. Co. (1872), 42 L. J. Ex. 17, 115 ; L. R.
8 Ex. 40, 197 ; 27 L. T. 791 ; 21 W. R. 196 156
Morritt V. Douglass (1872), 42 L. J. P. & M. 10 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 1 ; 27
L. T. 591 ; 21 W. R. 162 694
Morrogh v. Power (1842), 5 Ir. L. R. 494 713
Morse V. Royal (1806), 12 Ves. 362 ; 8 R. R. 338 493, 494
Mortimer v. M'CaUan (1840), 6 M. & W. 68 ; 4 Jux. 172 ...308, 309, 388, 1049,
1052, 1054, 1059
Mortimer ». Mortimer (1820), 2 Hagg. Cons. 316 603, 558
Mortimer ». Shortall (1842), 2 Dm. & War. 371 749
Mortimore v. Wright (1840), 6 M. & W. 482 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 158 168
Morton v. Chandler (1831), 8 Greenl. 9 746
Morton v. Copeland(1865), 16 Com. 517; 24 L. J. C. P. 517; 1 Jur. N. S.
Q'jQ ^ ^ ^ 267 729
Morton' V.Tibbett ('mo')', 15 Q. B. 434; "I'g L. J. Q.' B. 382 ; 14 Jur. '
669 689, 682
Morton v. Woods (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 658 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 242 ; L. R.
4 Q. B. 293 ; 38 L. J. ft. B. 81 ; 17 W. R. 411 ; 9 B. & S. 659 97
Moseley v. Davies (1822), 11 Price, 162 398, 401, 410
Moseley v. Hanford (1830), 10 B. & C. 729 ; 5 M. & R. 607 757
Moaeley v. M'MuUen (1856), 6 Ir. C. L. R. 69 222
Moss V. Ang.-Egyp. Nav. Go. (1865), L. R. 1 Ch. 108; 36 L. J. Ch. 179 ;
14W. R. 150 1117
Moss V. Russell (1884), 1 Times L. R. 13 162
Mossomi". Ivy (1684), 10 How. St. Tr. 562 362, 1179
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CXXXU TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAoa
Moasopi). Eadon (1810), 16 Ves. 430 308
Mostyn v. Fabrigas (1774), 1 Cowp. 174 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 628 7, 51, 52, 938
Mostyn v. Mostyn (1854), 3 De a. M. & U-. 140 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 925 ; 5 H. L.
Cas. 155 795
Mostynt). West Mostyn Ooal & Iron Co. (1876), 34 L. T. 531 602
Motteram v. East. Cos. Ry. Co. (1859), 29 L. J. M. C. 57 ; 7 0. B. N. S.
58 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 759 1054, 1089
Mouflet 4). Cole (1872), L. B,. 7 Ex. 70 ; L. R. 8 Ex. 32 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 28 ;
42 L. J. Ex. 8 ; 27 L. T. 678 ; 21 W. R. 175 16
Mould V. Williams (1844), 5 Q. B. 473 ; B. & M. 631 1099, 1100, 1101
Moule V. Brown (1838), 4 Bing. N. C. 266 ; 5 Scott, 694 ; 1 Am. 79 ; 2 Jur.
277 32
Mouusey v. Bumham (1841), 1 Hare, 15 1208
Mounson v. Bourn (1648), Cro. Car. 526 19
Mount V. Boa-ert (1816), Anthon, 190 ' 515
Mount V. Larkins (1831), 8 Bing. 108 ; 1 M. & Scott, 165 38, 818
Mountague v. Harrison (1857), 27 L. J. G. P. 24 ; 3 C. B N. S. 292 ;
4 Jur. N. S. 29 869
Mountford v. Harper (1847), 16 M. & W. 825 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 182 154
Mountnoyi). Oollier(1853),22L.J. Q.B. 124; 4E. &B. 630; 17 Jur. 503.. 98,
444, 445
Mountatephen v. Brooke (1819), 1 CWtty, R. 390 487, 713
Mountstephen v. Lakeman (1874), 39 L. J. Q. B. 275 ; L. R. 5 Q. B. 613 ;
41 L. J. Q. B. 67 ; L. R. 7 Q. B. 196 ; L. R. 7 H. L. 17 ; 43 L. J. Q. B.
188 ; 30 L. T. 437 ; 22 W. R. 617 678
Moylan v. Nolan (1864), 17 Ir. C. L. R. 427 166
Moyle«). Jenkins (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 116 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 112; 46 L. T.
472 ; 30 W. R. 324 156
Muilman v. D'Equino (1795), 2 H. Bl. 564 37
MulhoUand v. KiUen (1874), I. R. 9 Eq. 471 1109
MuUaly V. Walsh (1872), I. R. 6 C. L. 314 171
Mullen, Re (1871), I. R. 5 Eq. 309 695, 696
MuUett V. Hunt (1833), Car. & M. 752 831, 835
Mulliner v. Florence 11878), 3 Q. B. D. 484 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 700 ; 38 L. T.
167 ; 26 W R. 385 5, 781
Mullins V. Collins (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 292 ; 43 L. J. M. C. 67 ; 29 L. T.
838 ; 22 W. R. 297 107
Mumford v. Gething (1859), 29 L. J. C. P. 105 ; 7 C. B. N. S. 305 784
Munoey v. Dennis (1856), 1 H. & N. 216 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 66 781
Munday D. Asprey (1880), 13 Ch. D. 855; 49 L. J. Ch. 216; 28W. R. 347.. 673
Munu V. Baker(1817), 2 Stark. R. 255 ; Holt, N P. 646, n. ; 19 R. R. 715. . 1096
Muun ». Godbold (1825), 3 Bing. 292 ; 11 Moore, C. P. 49 300
Munro, Ex parte (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 724 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 816 ; 35 L. T.
857 ; 24 W. R. 1017 724
Munro V. De Cheinant (1815), 4 Camp. 215 539
Munro «!. Munro (1840), 7 CI. & Fin. 842 179
Munro V. Vandam (1794), cited 1 Park, Ins. 469 176
Munroe v. Pilkington (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 81 ; 2 B. & S. 11 ; 6 L. T.
N". S. 21 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 557 1140, 1154
Munster v. Lamb (1883), U Q. B. D. 688 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 726 ; 49 L. T.
252 ; 32 W. R. 248 ; 47 J. P. 805 869
MurcMe v. Black (1865), 34 L. J. C. P. 337 ; 19 C. B. N. S. 190 ; 11 Jur.
N.S.608; 12L.T.735; 13 W. R. 89'i 114,115
Murgatroyd v. Murgatroyd (1828), cited 2 St. Ev. 307, n. (o) 257
Miirfeta z. Wolfhageu (1849), 2 0. & K. 744 1219
Miirly V. M'Dermott (1838), 8 A. & E. 138 ; 3 N. & P. 256 ; 1 W. "W.
* H. 226 113
Murphy <'. Boese (1875), 44 L. J. Ex. 40; L. R. 10 Ex. 126 ; 32 L. T. 122;
23 W. R. 474 668
Murphy v. Meredith (184'2), 5 Ir. L. R. 120 7U
Murphy «). Nolan (1873), I. R. 7 Eq. 49-( 818
Murphy ti. SuUivan (1866), 11 Ir. Jur. N. S. Ill 682
Murray, In the goods of (1837), 1 Curt. 596 174
The references a/re to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXXIH
PAOB
Murray v. Coster (1825), i Cowen, 635 615
Murray v. Sherifis of Dublin (1841), Arm. M. & O. 130 977
Murray v. Oregory (1850), 6 Ex. 468 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 355 ; 14 Jur. 553 293
Murray ». Mace (1874), Ir. 8 C. L. 396 774
Murray v. Mackenzie (1876), L. E. 10 C. P. 626 ; 44 L. J. C. P. 313 ;
32 L. T. 777 ; 23 "W. E. 595 736
Murray v. Milner (1879), 48 L. J. Ch. 776 ; 12 Ch. D. 849 ; 41 L. T. 213;
27 W. E. 881 415
MuiTay V. Parker (1854), 19 Beav. 306 749
Murray v. E. of Stair (1823), 2 B. & C. 82 ; 3 Dowl. & E. 278 746, 1203
Musgrave v. Emerson (1847), 10 Q. B. 326 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 174 440
Mussumat Cheetha v. Baboo Miheen Lall (1867), 11 Moore, Indian App. C.
369, 380 169
Mutual Life, &o. ». Hillman, (1892), 146 U. S. 285 377, 794
Mutual Loan Fund Ass. v. Sudlow (1858), 28 L. J. C. P. 108 ; 5 C. B. N. S.
449 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 338 758
Myers i). Defries (1879), 4 Ex. D. 176 ; 40 L. T. 795 ; 27 W. E. 791 ; 48
L. J. Ex. 446 41, 42
Myers v. Perigal (1851-2), 2 De G. M. & G. 699 ; 11 C. B. 90 ; 21 L. J.
C. P. 217 ; 16 Jur. 1118 684
Myers v. Sari (1860), 30 L. J. Q. B. 9 ; 3 E. & E. 306 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 97. .764, 766
Myers v. Willis (1855), 17 C. B. 77 ; 18 C. B. 886 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 39, 256 ;
2 Jur. N. S. 41 179, 1176
Myles V. Burton (1884), 14 L. E. Ir. 258 539
Myriek v. Dame (1862), 9 Gush. 248 758
Mysore, &c., Co., Ee (1889), 42 Ch. D. 535 ; 68 L. J. Ch. 731 ; 61 L. T.
463 ; 37 W. E. 794 ; 1 Meg. 347 346
Nabin v. Bassett (1883), 26 Ch. D. 21 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 253 ; 49 L. T. 454 ;
32 W. E. 70 349
Nagle V. Shea (1875), I. E. 9 C. L. 389 293, 1213
Naish V. Brown (1846), 2 C. & K. 219 274
Napper v. Sanders (1628), Hutton, 119 170
Nash V. Armstrong (1861), 30 L. J. C. P. 286 ; 10 C. B. N. S. 269 ; 9
W. E. 782 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 1060 751
Nash V. Gilkeson (1819), 5 Serg. & E. 352 262
Nash V. Hodgson (1856), 26 L. J. Ch. 186 ; 6 De G. M. & G. 474 ; 1 Jur.
N. S. 946 714, 716
Nash V. Turner (1795), 1 Esp. 217 1213
Natchbolt V. Porter (1689), 2 Vem. 112 659
Nate's {or Nute's) case (1800) 6 Peters, Abridg. 82 ; 3 Euss. C. & M. 458
(6th ed.) 562
Naylor v. Semmes (1829), 4 Gill. & J. 273 969
Nealv. Jay (1684), cited 12 Mod. 86; 1 Salk. 281 1179
■ Neal v. Wilding (1740), 2 Str. 1161 423
Neale v. Fry (1684), cited 1 Salk. 281 ; 12 Mod. 86 1179
Neale v. Parkin (1795), 1 Esp. 229 523
Nedby v. Nedby (1852), 21 L. J. Ch. 446 ; 5 De G. & Sm. 377 137
Needham v. Bremner (1866), L. E. 1 C. P. 583 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 313 ; 1
H. & E. 731 1103
Needham v. Fraser (1845), 1 C. B. 816 ; 3 D. & L. 190 ; 14 L. J. C. P.
256 ; 9 Jur. 734 835
Needham*. Smith (1704), 2 Vem. 463 ^..909, 910
Neeley v. Lock (1838), 8 C. & P. 632 105
Neil V. Neil (1829, 1839), 1 Leigh, E. 6, 10, 21 142
Neile v. Jakle (1849), 2 C. & K. 709 528
Neill 1/. D. of Devonshire (1876-82), 2 L. E. Ir. 154 ; 8 App. Cas. 147. .42, 296,
396, 403, 406, 406
NeUson V. Harford (1841), 8 M. & W. 806, 818, 819 ; Webs. Pat. Eep. 295,
328 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 20 43
Nelson v. Walters (1890), 63 L. T. 328 631
Nelson, Ee (1872), I. E. 6 Eq. 669 708
Fol. I. ends with page 635.
CXXXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOB
Nelsoii,La.».La.Briaport(1844,Bliouldbel846),8Beav.547; 10 Jur. 1043. .51,936
Nelson 1). Coucli (1863), 15 C. B. N. S. 99 ; 8 L. T. 577 ; 11 W. R. 964 ;
10 Jur. N. S. 366 1120
Nelson v. Stooker (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 760 ; 4 De O. & J. 758 541
Nelson v. WWttall (1817), 1 B. & Aid. 19 1216
Nepean v. Doe d. Knight (1847), 2 M. & W. 894 ; 2 Sm. L. C. 610, 629, 729. 173
Neptunus, The (1799), 2 C. Eob. 110 1095
Nesham «. Selby (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 191 ; L. R. 7 Ch. 406 ; 41 L. J. Ch.
551 ; 26 L. T. 145, 568 673
Netherlands Steam Boat Co. v. Styles (1854), 9 Moo. P. C. C. 286 178
Netherwood v. Wilkinson (1855), 17 C. B. 226 832
Neve V. PenneU (1863), 2 New R. 508 ; 11 "W. R. 986 738
Nevil V. Johnson (1703), 2 Vera. 447 327
Nevill V. SnelHng (1880), 49 L. J. Ch. 777 ; 15 Ch. D. 679 ; 43 L. T. 244 ;
29 W^ R 375 138
Neville v. Fine Art's Co". ,' (1895) 2'q.'b.'i56 ';'72 l' T. 725'.'.'.'.'.'.liii.'i47, 643]
Neville v. Wilkinson (1782), 1 Bro. C. C. 643 539
Nevin V. Drysdale (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 662 ; 15 W. R. 980 753, 806
NewaU v. Elliott (1863), 1 H. & C. 797 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 120 ; 7 L. T. 758 ;
11 W. R. 438 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 359 1160
Newberry v. Benson (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 1003 462
Newbould v. Coltman (1851), 6 Ex. 189 ; 20 L. J. M. C. 149 1101
Newbould v. Smith (1889), 14 App. Cas. 423 ; 55 L. J. Ch. 788 ; 55 L. T.
194 ; 34 W. R. 690 447, 462
Newburgh v. Newburgh (1712), 3 Bro. P. C. 653 1038
Newby v. Reed (1763), cited 1 Park, Ins. 148 175
Newby v. Sharpe (1877), 8 Ch. D. 39 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 617 ; 38 L. T. 583 ;
26 W. R. 685 192
Newcastle, D. of, v. Broxtowe (1832), 4 B. & Ad. 273 394
Newcastle, D. of, v. Clark (1818), 8 Tauu. 627, 628 ; 2 Moore (C. P.) 666 ;
20 R. R. 583 113
Newcastle, D. of, v. Kinderley (1803), 8 Ves. 363, 375 ; 7 R. R. 71 108
Newcastle, Master Pilots and Seamen of, v. Bradley (1851), 2 E. & B.
428, n. ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 35 '. 791
NeweU v. Radford (1867), 37 L. J. C. P. 1 ; L. R. 3 C. P. 52 ; 17 L. T.
1 18 ; 16 W. R. 97 671
Newell «;. SimpMn (1830), 6 Bing. 565 ; 4 M. & P. 395 996
New England Bank v. Lewis (1829), 8 Pick. 113 1139
Newenham v. xSmith (1859), 10 Ir. C. L. R. 245 788
Newhall v. Holt (1840), 6 M. & W. 662 ; 4 Jur. 610 291
Newham v. Raithby (1811), 1 Phillim. 315 1047
Newington v. Levy (1870), 40 L. J. C. P. 29 ; £. R. 6 C. P. 180 ; 23 L.
T. 595 ; 19 W. R. 473 1119
Newman v. Jenkins (1830), 10 Pick. 615 172
Newman v. Piercy (1876), 4 Ch. D. 41 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 36 ; 35 L. T. 461 ;
25 W. R. 317 803
Newman v. Stretch (1829), M. & M. 338 379
New Romney, Mayor, &c., v. New Romney Commissioners of Sewers, (1892)
1 Q. B. 840 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 558 ; 56 J. P. 756 404
Newry and Ennisk. Ry. Co. n. Combe (1849), 6 Railw. Cas. 633 ; 3 Ex.
565 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 325 100
Newsamji. Carr (1817), 2 Stark. R. 69; 19 R. R. 675 252, 255
Newsome v. Coles (1811), 2 Camp. 617 ; 12 R. R. 756 1095
Newton v. Askew (1848), 6 Hare, 319 869
Newton v. Belcher (1848), 1 Q. B. 921 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 38 ; 18 L. J. Q. B.
53 ; 13 Jur. 253 530
Newton v. Beresford (1831), Younge, Ex. R. 376 601
Newton v. Blunt (1846), 3 C. B. 675 ; 4 D. & L. 674 ; 5 Railw. Cas. 29 ;
16 L. J. C. P. 121 1115
Newton V. Chaplin (1850), 10 C. B. 366 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 374 ; 14 Jur. 1121. 320
Newton V. Clarke (18:i9), 2 Curt. 320 695
Newton v. Constable (1841), 2 Q. B. 162 ; 1 G. & D. 408 ; 9 D. P. C. 933 ;
6 Jur. 317 869, 870, 871
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXXV
FAOE
Newton V. ElKs (1855), 5 E. & B. 115 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 337 ; 1 Jur. N. S.
850 227
Newton V. Harland (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 956 ; 1 Soott, N. R. 502; 9 Dowl.
16 ; 1 W. P. C. 53 ; 4 Jur. 992 819
Newton ». Liddiard (1848), 12 Q. B. 927; 6 Railw. Cas. 42; 18 L. J.
Q. B. 53 530
Newton v. Ricketts (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Eoo. & M.) 35 942
Newton v. Ricketts (1861), 8 H. L. C. 260 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 2J7 134
New Windsor case (1835), Knapp & O. 173 497
Nias V. North. & East. Ry. Co. (1838), 3 My. & Cr. 365 ; 7 L. J. Ch. 142 ;
2 K. 76 601, 995
Niohol V. Godts (1854), 10 Ex. 191 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 314 776
Nicholas and Freeman v. Binns (1858), 1 S. & T. 243 ; 27 L. J. P. & M. 6 170
NichoUe v. Plume (1824), 1 C. & P. 272 691
Nicholls v. Dowding (1815), 1 Stark. R. 81 ; 18 R. R. 746 . .386, 488, 494, 921
Nicholls V. Downes (1830), 1 M. & Rob. 13 520
NiohoUa v. Goldsmith (1831), 7 "Wend. 160 454
Nicholls V. Osbom (1727), 2 P. Wma. 419 789
Nicholls V. Parker (1811), 14 East, 331, n. ; 12 R. R. 542 396, 410
Nicholls V. Walker (1634), Cro. Car. 394 1101
Nichols, In re (1872), 41 L. J. P. & M. 88 ; L. R. 2 P. & M. 461 ; 27 L.
T. 323 ; 21 W. R. 161 173
Nichols V. Johnson (1834), 10 Conn. 192 1199
Nichols V. Webb (1823), 8 Wheat. 326 454
Nicholson, Ex parte. Re Willson (1880), 14 Ch. D. 243 ; 49 L. J. Bk. 68 ;
43 L. T. 266 ; 28 W. R. 936 849
Nicholson v. Bower (1858), 1 E. & E. 172 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 97 ; 5 Jur. N.
S. 246 689, 692
Nicholson v. Bradfield Union (1866), 35 L. J. Q. B. 176 ; L. R. 1 Q. B.
620 ; 7 B. & S. 744 641
Nicholson v. Mulligan (1868), I. R. 3 Eq. 308 806
Nicholson «. BeviU (1836), 4 A. & E. 675 ; 6 N. & M. 192 1194
Nicholson i: Smith (1822), 3 Stark. R. 129 515
NickaUs v. Merry (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 530 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 575 ; 32 L. T.
623 ; 23 W. R. 663 158
Nickells v. Atherstone (1847), 10 Q. B. 944 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 371 ; 11 Jur.
778 660, 661
Nickolson v. Knowles (1820), 5 Madd. 47 545
NieoU V. Greaves (1864), 33 L. J. C. P. 259 ; 17 C. B. N. S. 27 ; 10 L. T.
531 ; 12 W. R. 961 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 919 36
Nifa, The, (1892) 1 R. 640; (1892) P. 411; 62 L. J. P. 12; 69 L. T. 56. .740, 766
Nightiugal v. Devisme (1770), 5 Burr. 2594 1036
Niles V. Brackett (1819), 16 Mass. 378 910
Noble's Trusts, Ee (1871), I. R. 5 Eq. 140 , 798
Noble V. Chapman (1854), 14 C. B. 400 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 66 ; 18 Jur. 44 . . 190
Noble V. Durell (1789), 3 T. R. 271 765
Noble V. Kennoway (1780), 2 Doug. 613 157, 232, 765, 782
Noble V. Ward (1867), 35 L. J. Ex. 81 ; L. R. 1 Ex. 117 ; 4 H. & C. 149 ;
36 L. J. Ex. 91 ; L. R. 2 Ex. 135 752
Noble V. WUlock and Phelps (1871), 40 L. J. P. & M. 60 ; L. R. 2 P. &
D. 276 ; 25 L. T. 65 ; 19 W. R. 1115 1132
Nodiu V. Murray (1812), 3 Camp. 228 : 13 R. R. 796 296
Noding »>. Alleston (1892), cited Greenleaf on Ev. 15th edit. 369 698
Noel V. WeUs (1669), 1 Lev. 235 1103, 1105
Nolan V. Copeman (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 84 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 44 ; 27 h. T.
789 ; 21 W. R. 263 818
Nolan V. Gumley (1863), 14 Ir. C. L. R. 301 732, 734
Norden v. Williamson (1808), 1 Taun. 377 891
Nordonj;.Defrie8(1882),8Q.B.D.508; 61 L. J. Q. B. 415; 30W.R.612.. 1186
Norman v. Cole (1800), 3 Esp. 253 747
Norman v. Morrell (1799), 4 Ves. 769 ; 4 R. R. 347 762
Norman v. PhiUips (1846), 14 M. & W. 283 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 306 ; 9 Jur. 832. . 689, 692
Norreys v. Franks (1874), I. R. 9 Eq. 18 801
Vol. I. ends with page 63S.
CXXXn TABLE OF CASES CITED.
*A8B
Norris v. Beach (1807), 2 Johns. 294 866
Norris v. Cooke (1857), 30 L. T. (Ir.) 224 667
Norris V. Cottle (1850), 2 H. L. Cas. 647 ; 14 Jur. 703 540
Norris V. Miles (1808), 1 Camp. 389 ; 10 R. R. 710 385, 496
North of Eng. Joint Stock Bk. Co., Re, Ex parte Gouthwaite (1861), 20
L. J. Ch. 182, 192, 193 ; 3 Mac. & G. 187 74
North of Eng. Joint-Stock Bk. Co., Re, Ex parte StrafEon's Exors. (1863),
22 L. J. Oh. 194 ; 1 De G. M. & G. 576 ; 4 De G. & Sm. 256 541
North German Lloyd St. Ship. Co. v. Elder (The Sohwable) (1861), 1 Lush.
239 ; 14 Moo. P. C. 0. 241 ; 4 L. T. 160 178
North- West. Ry. Co. v. McMichael (1850), 5 Ex. 855 ; 14 Jur. 987 ; 20L. J.
Ex. 6 100
Northam v. Latouche (1829), 4 C. & P. 140 1019
Northeote v. Doughty (1879), 4 C. P. D. 385 ; 24 Sol. J. 776 718
Northumberland, D. of, v. Todd (1878), 7 Ch. D. 777 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 343 ;
38 L. T. 746 ; 28 W. R. 350 914
Norton V. Bazett (1856), Deane, Eoc. R. 259 696
Norton V. Pettibone (1829), 7 Conn. 319 510
Norwich & Lowestoft Nav. Co. v. Theobald (1828), M. & M. 163 1096
Norwich, Bishop of, v. Pearsc (1868), 37 L. J. Ecc. 90 ; L. R. 2 A. &E. 281 . .884, 885
Notor V. Brooks (1861), 7 H. & N. 499 778
Nottidge V. Prince (1858), 2 Giflf. 246 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 857 136
Nottingham, Guard, of, v. TomMnson (1879), 4 C. P. D. 343 ; 48 L. J.
M. C. 171 ; 28 "W. R. 151 621
NoveUi V. Rossi (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 767 ; 9 L. J. K. B. O. S. 307. . . .1147, 1200
Nowlan V. Ablett (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 54 ; 1 Gale, 72 ; 5 Tyr. 709 ; 4
L. J. Ex. 155 36
Nowlan v. Gibson (1847), 12 Ir. L. R. 5, 8—12 89, 1110, 1113, 1140
Nugent V. Smith (1876), 1 0. P. D. 423 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 697 ; 34 L. T. 827 ;
25 W. R. 117 771
Nunn's WUl, Re (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 255 ; L. R. 19 Eq. 331 798
Nunn 1). Fabian (1866), 35 L. J. Ch. 140 ; L. R. 1 Oh. 36 631, 688
Nye i>. Maodonald (1870), 39 L. J. P. C. 34 ; L. R. 3 P. C. 331 ; 23 L. T.
220 : 18 W. R. 1075 9
OAKippLE V. Copous (1791), 4 T. R. 361 624
Oakeley v. Ooddeen (1861), 2 F. & F. 651 271
Oitkes V. Hill (1833), 14 Pick. 442 1178
Cakes v. Turquand (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. 325 ; 36 L. J. Oh. 919 1076
Oakley v. Monck (1865), L. R. 1 Ex. 159 ; 35 L. J. Ex. 87 ; 14 L. T. 20 ;
14 W. R. 406 ; 4 H. & C. 251 169
Oastler v. Henderson (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 575 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 607 ; 37 L. T. 22 660
Obicini v. Bligh (1832), 8 Biag. 335 ; 1 Moo. & S. 477 1147
O'Brien v. Lewis (1863), 32 L. J. Ch. 569 ; 4 GiEB. 221 ; 8 L. T. 380 ;
11 W. R. 716; 9 Jur. N. S. 620 136
O'Brien v. R. (1849), 2 H. L. Cas. 465 895
O'Brien v. Sheil (1873), I. R. 7 Eq. 255 666
Ocean, The (1804), 6 0. Rob. Adm. 90 179
Ochsenbein v. Papelier (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. 695 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 861 ; 28 L. T.
4-59 ; 21 W. R. 616 1132, 1142
O'Oonnell's case (1843-4), Arm. & T. 275 383
O'Connell v. Butler (1819), Milw. (Ir. Ecc.) 102 140
O'ConueU v. The Queen (1844), 11 01. & Fin. 373 435
O'Connor v. Majoribanks (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 435 ; 11 L J. C. P. 267. .690, 591
O'Connor v. Spaight (1804), 1 Sch. & Lef. 306 682
Odell, Re (1849), 7 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 267 435, 698
O'Donnelli). O'Donell (1882), 13 L. R. Ir. 226 765
O'DonneU v. O'DouneU (1878), 1 L. R. Ir. 284 16
O'Flanaganji. Geoghegan (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 636 830
Ogden V. Hesketh (1849), 2 C. & K. 772 481
Ogilvie «>. Ourrie (1868), 27 L. J. Oh. 541 ; 16 W. R. 769 ; 18 L. T. 693 . . 129
Ogilvie V. Foljambe (1817), 3 Mer. 53 ; 17 R. R. 13 674
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXXVU
PAGE
Ogle V. Cook (1748), 1 Ves. sen. 177 1215
Ogle V. Noroliffe (1708), 2 Ld. Eaym. 869 19
Ogle V. Ld. Vane (1868), L. E. 2 Q. B. 275 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 175 ; 7 B. & S.
855 752
O'Grady v. Corr (1876), I. R. 10 Eq. Ill 462
Ohlsen v. Terrero (1874), 44 L. J. Oh. 155 ; L. E. 10 Ch. 127 ; 31 L. T.
811 ; 23 W. E. 195 922
O'Kane v. O'Kane (1892), 30 L. E. Ir. 489 Add. [125]
Okeden v. CUMen (1826), 2 Euss. 309 786
Olding, Ee (1841), 2 Curt. 865 697
O'Leary «. Douglass (1878), 1 Ir. L. E. 46 704
Olive V. Ouin (1668), 2 Sid. 146 8, 283
Oliver o. Bartlett (1819), 1 B. & B. 269 373
Oliver V. Hunting (1890), 44 Ch. D. 206 ; 59 L. J. Ch. 265 ; 62 L. T. 108 ;
38 W. E. 618 672
Oliver ^."Woodrofee (1889), 4 M.&W. 650; 7Do-wl.l66; 1 H.&H. 474. .732, 733
OUivant v. Bayley (1843), 5 Q. B. 288 ; D. & M. 373 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 34 ;
7 Jur. 1130 777
Olver V. Johns (1870), 39 L. J. P. & M. 7 697
O'Meagher v. O'Meagher (1883), 11 L. E. Ir. 117 697
Oinichund v. Barker (1744-5), Willes, 550 901, 903, 905, 1178
Ommaney v. Stilwell (1856), 23 Beav. 328 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1058 173
O'Neill V. Allen (1869), 9 Ir. L. E. N. S. 132, 141 123
O'NeiU V. Bell (1866), I. E. 2 C. L. 68 768
O'Neill V. Eead (1845), 7 Ir. L. E. 434 487
Onions v. Tyrer (1716), 1 P. Wms. 43 708
Onslow, Ee, Ex parte Kihble (1875), L. E. 10 Ch. 373 ; 44 L. J. Bk. 63 ;
32 L. T. 138 ; 23 W. E. 433 718
Oppenheim v. White Lion Hotel Co. (1871), 6 L. E. C. P. 515 ; 40 L. J.
C. P. 231 : 25 L. T. 93 162
Ord, In re (1878), 9 Ch. D. 667 808
O'Eeilly, Ee (1874), 43 L. J. P. & M. 5 ; 29 L. T. 546 ; 22 W. E. 224 . . 793
Ormerod v. Chadwick (1847), 16 M. & W. 367 ; 16 L. J. M. C. 143 131
Ormrod v. Huth (1845), 14 M. & W. 664 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 366 775
O'Rorke v. Bolinghroke (1877), 2 App. Gas. 814 ; 26 "W. E. 239 138
O'Eourke v. Perceval (1811), 2 Ball & B. 58 ; 12 E. E. 68 676
Orr V. Dickenson (1858), Johns. 1 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 616 : 5 Jur. N. S. 672 . . 652
Orr V. Morice (1821), 3 B. & B. 139 ; 6 Moore, C. P. 347 1211
Orrell CoUiery Co., Ee (1879), 12 Ch. D. 681 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 665 1138
Orrell v. Coppock (1857), 26 L. J. Ch. 269 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1244 676
Orrett v. Corser (1856), 21 Beav. 52 436
Osbom V. Lond. Dock Co. (1855), 10 Ex. 698 ; 3 C. L. E. 313 ; 24 L. J.
Ex. 140 ; IJur. N. S. 93 964
Osbom V. Thompson (1839), 2 M. & Eob. 256 ; 9 C. & P. 337 258, 259, 274
Osgathorpe ». Diseworth (1745-6), 2 Str. 1256 ; Burr. 261 1139
Osgood V. Manhattan Co. (1824), 3 Cowen, 612 493
O'SuUivan v. Burke (1875), I. E. 9 C. L. 106 444
Oswald, In re (1874), 43 L. J. P. & M. 24 ; L. E. 3 P. & D. 162 141
Oswell V. Shepherd (see Re Smith).
Ottaway v. Hamilton (1878), 47 L. J. C. P. 725 ; 3 C. P. D. 393 ; 38 L. T.
925 ; 26 W. E. 783 166
Otter, The (1874), L. E. 4 Adm. 203 ; 30 L. T. 43 ; 22 W. E. 557 260
Ougier v. Jennings (1800), 1 Camp. 505, 506, n. ; 10 E. R. 739, n 766
Outh-waite v. Luntley (1816), 4 Camp. 179 ; 16 R. E. 771 1194, 1203
Outram v. Morewood (1803), 3 Easft, 346 ; 5 T. R. 121 ; 7 R. R. 473 88, 89,
446, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1120
Overend, Gumey & Co. v. Oriental Finance Corp. (1874), L. E. 7 H. L.
348 ; 31 L. T. 322 ; 21 W. E. 504 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 502 758
Owen V. Flack (1826), 2 Sim. & St. 606 520
Owen V. Warburton (1805), 1 Bos. & P. N. E. 326 ; 8 E. E. 817 616
Owen V. "Wynn (1878), 9 Ch. D. 29 ; 38 L. T. 623 ; 26 W. E. 644 994,1183
Owings w. Wyant (1796), 1 Har. & M'H. 393 295
Oxford Circuit ease (Spring, 1833), 5 C. & P. 542, n 183
Vol. I. ends with page 636.
CXXXVlll TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOB
Oxford, ■Worcester, and Wolverhampton Ey. Co. v. Soudamore (1857), 1
H. &N. 666 474
Paoet v. liond. Tramways Co. (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 440. n., 698 1186
Pacific St. Nav. Co. v. Lewis (1847), 16 M. & W. 792 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 212 ;
4 Dowl. & L. 6S1 187, 190
Packard v. Richardson (1821), 17 Maes. 122 669
Paddock v. Forrester (1842), 2 Scott, N. K. 734 ; 3 M. & Gr. 903 506, 5U
Paddon v. Winch (1870), 39 L. J. Ch. 627 ; L. E. 9 Eq. 666 ; 22 L. T. 403 608
Padgett V. Lawrence (1843), 10 Paige, 180 514
Page t>. Carew (1831), 1 C. & J. 514 817
Page V. Faucet (1591), Cro. Eliz. 227 16, 20
Page V. Homana (1837), 2 Shepl. 478 1221
Pam V. Beeston (1830), 1 M. & Eob. 20 9.'i4
Paine & Layton, Ex parte, (1869), 4 Ch. App. 215 ; 38 L. J. Ch. 305. .321, 845
Paine v. HaU (1812), 18 Ves. 475 140
Paine v. M'Intier (1804), 1 Mass. 69 ; 10 Mass. 461 759
Paine ». Strand Union (1846), 8 Q. B. 326 ; 15 L. J. M. C. 89 ; 10 Jur. 308 . . 639, 6t2
Painter ». Ahel (1862), 3 F. & F. 518 529
Palermo, The (1883), 9 P. D. 6 ; 53 L. J. P. D. & A. 6 1186
Palethorp v. Furnish (1783), 2 Esp. 511, n 604
Pallikelagatha Marcar «. Sigg (1880), L. E,. 7 lud. App. 83, 100 740
Palmer v. Maclear (1858), 1 S. & T. 149 929
Palmerj!.NewhaU(1855),30Beav.32; 8DeG.M.&G.74; 24L. J.Ch.424..806,807
Palmer v. Pahner (1885), 18 L. E. Ir. Ig2 4, 419, 420
Panton v. Holland (1819), 17 Johns. 92 201
Panton v. Williams (1841), 2 Q. B. 192 ; 1 G. & D. 504 ; 10 L. J. Ex. Ch. 545 . . 25, 30
Papendiok v. Bridgwater (1855), 5 E. & B. 166; 24 L. J. Q. B. 289 ; 1 Jur.
N. S. 657 444, 446, 511
Pardington v. South Wales Ey. Co. (1856), 1 H. & N. 392 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 105 723
Pardee v. O'Connor (1848), 12 Ir. L. E. 63 521
Pardee ». Price (1844), 13 M. & W. 267; 14 L. J. Ex. 212 302
Parfitt V. Lawless (1872), 41 L. J. P. & M. 68 ; L. E. 2 P. & D. 462 ; 27
L. T. 215 ; 21 W. R. 200 136
Pargeter v. Harris (1845), 7 Q B. 708 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 113 ; 10 Jur. 260.. 93
Parker, In re, Bentham v. Wilson (1881), 15 Ch. D. 528 ; 17 Ch. D. 262;
50 L. J. Ch. 639 ; 44 L. T. 885 ; 29 W. E. 855 146
Parker v. Carter (1818), 4 Munf . 273 698
Parker v. Gordon (1808), 7 East, 385 ; 3 Smith, 358 ; 6 Esp. 41 ; 8 E. E. 646 33
Parker v. Hoskins (1810), 2 Taun. 223 328, 1214
Parker v. Ibbetson (1858), 4 C. B. N. S. 348 ; 27 L. J. C. P. 236 ; 4 Jur.
N. S. 636 153, 768
Parker v. M'Kenna (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 802 ; 30 L. T. 807 324
Parker v. M'WiUiam (1830), 6 Bing. 683 ; 4 M. & P. 480 918
Parker v. Morrell (1848), 2 PhiU. 453 496
Parker v. Palmer (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 387 37
Parker v. Potts (1816), 3 Dow, 23 ; 15 E. E. 1 176
Parker v. Staniland (1809), 11 East, 362 ; 10 E. E. .')21 686
Parker v. Taswell (1858), 2 De G. & J. 559 ; 27 L. J. Ch. 812 649
Parker v. WaUis (1855), 5 E. & B. 21 689
Parker i;. Wells (1881),18 Ch. D. 477; 46 L. T. 517 ; 30 W. E. 392 1189
Parker v. Tates (1827), 12 Moore, C. P. 620 603
Parkhurst v. Lowten (1816), 1 Mer. 401 ; 2 Swanst. 194 ; 15 R. E. 140 . . 960,
961, 962, 965, 967, 968, 969
Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt (1814), 1 Johns. 280 673
Parkin v. Moon (1836), 7 C. & P. 409 921, 944
Parkins v. Hawkshaw (1817), 2 Stark. E. 239 ; 19 E. E. 711 506, 599
Parkinson v. Lee (1802), 2 East, 314 ; 6 E. E. 429 776
Parkinson v. Townsend (1875), 44 L. J. P. & M. 32 ; 33 L. T. 232 ; 23 W.
R. 656 1132
Parmenter v. Webber (1818), 8 Taun. 593 656
Parmiter v. Coupland (1840), 6 M. & W. 107, 108 ; 4 Jur. 701 45, 46
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXXIX
PAGE
Parmiter v. Parmiter (1860), IJ. & H. 135 ; 3 De G. F. & J. 461 ; 30 L. J.
Ch. 508 ; 3 L. T. 799 712
Parnell v. Wood, (1892) P. 137 ; 66 L. T. 670 ; 40 W. E. 664 1062
Parr, He (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 70 708
Parr (or Bosworth) v. Cotohett (1824), 1 Ph. Ev. 333 ; 3 St. Ev. 824 .... 451
Parrott v. "Watts (1877), 47 L. J. C. P. 79 ; 37 L. T. 755 377
Parry v. Fairhurst (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 196 187, 190, 194
Parry ». May (1833), 1 M. & Rob. 279 ; 5 Tyr. 685 311
Parry v. Nicholson (1845), 13 M. & W. 779 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 119 ; 2 Dowl.
& L. 640 1192
Parsona v. Brown (1852), 3 0. & K. 295 284
Parsons v. Hancock (1829), M. & M. 330 553
Parsons v. Hayward (1862), 31 L. J. Ch. 666 ; 4 De G. F. & J. 474; 8 Jur.
N. S. 924 169
Parsons v. Loyd (1772), 3 Wils. 341 83
Parsons v. Purcell (1849), 12 Ir. L. R. 90 292
Parsons v. Sexton (1847), 4 C. B. 908 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 181 777
Parteriche v. Powlet (1742), 2 Atk. 383 743
Parton v. Cole (1842), 6 Jur. 370 286, 287
Parton «. Crofts (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 11 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 189 ; 10 L. T.
34 ; 12 "W. R. 553 297
Partridge v. Coates (1824), Ry. & M. 156 ; 1 C. & P. 534 311
Partridge v. Soott (1838), 3 M. & W. 220 ; 1 H. & H. 31 114, 115
Partridge v. Usbome (1828), 6 Russ. 195 1123
Paske V. Ollat (1815), 2 Phillim. 324 140
Pasley v. Freeman (1789), 3 T. R. 51 ; 2 Sm. L. C. 74 ; 1 E. R. 634 . . . . 718
Pater v. Baker (1847), 3 C. B. 831 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 124 ; U Jui-. 370 .... 189
Patersouj>.Gandasequi(1812), 15East, 62; 2 Sm. L. C. 378 ; 13R.R.368.. 768
Paterson v. Hardacre (1811), 4 Taun. 114 262
Paton V. Sheppard (1839), 10 Sim. 186 146
Patrick v. Shedden (1853), 2 E. & B. 14 1153
Patriokson v. Patriclrson (1865), 35 L. J. P. & M. 48 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 86;
12 Jur. N. S. 30 ; 13 L. T. 567 ; 14 W. R. 212 150
Patten v. Poulton (1858), 1 S. & T. 55 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 341 ; 27 L. J. P. 41 . . 143
Patterson v. Becher (1821), 6 Moore, C. P. 319 521
Patterson v. Black (1780), cited 2 Park, Ins. 919, 920 173
Pattinson v. Luckley (1876), L. R. 10 Ex. 330 ; 44 L. J. Ex. 180 ; 33 L. T.
360 ; 24 W. R. 224 1197
Pattonj;. Ash (1821), 7 Serg. &E. 116, 125 154
Pattonv. Goldsborough (1822), 9 Serg. & E. 47 514
Paul (;. Cleaver (1810), 2 Taun. 360; 11 E. E. 608 732
Paul V. Meek (1828), 2 T. & J. 116 300
Paul V. Eoy (1862), 21 L. J. Ch. 361 ; 15 Beav. 433 1153
Pauling V. London & North Western Ey. Co. (1853), 8 Ex. 867 ; 23 L. J.
Ex. 105 ; 7 EaUw. Cas. 816 641, 644, 647
Paull V. Simpson (1846), 9 Q. B. 365 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 382 663
Pawseyj!. Armstrong (1881), 18Ch.D. 698; 60L. J. Ch. 683; SOW. E. 469. 159
Paxton 1). Douglas (1809), 16 Ves. 242 970
Paxton V. Douglas (1812), 19 Ves. 225 ; 12 E. R. 175 961, 962
Paxton V. Popham (1814), 9 East, 419 91, 746
Payne v. Barker (1659), Bridg. 18, 23, 26 6, 83
Payne v. Ibbotson (1859), 27 L. J. Ex. 341 926, 927
Payne v. Eogers (1785), 1 Doug. 407 487
Payne v. Wilson (1895), 16 E. (April) 276 ; (1895) 1 Q. B. 653 ; 64 L. J.
Q. B. 328; 72L. T. 110; 43 W. R. 250 Add. [116]
Peaceable v. Watson (1811), 4 Taun. 16 ; 13 R. E. 662 444, 445
Peacham's case (1616), 2 How. St. Tr. 870 673
Peacock's Estate, Ee (1872), L. E. 14 Eq. 236 806
Peacock v. BeU (1667), 1 Wms. Saunders, 75 20, 83
Peacock v. Harper (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 238 ; 7 Ch. D. 648 ; 38 L. T. 143 ;
26 W. E. 109 274
Peacock v. Harris (1808), 10 East, 104 ; 10 R. R. 231 519
Peacock v. Harris (1836), 6 A. & E. 449 519
Vol. J. ends with page 636.
Cxl TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOH
Peacock v. Monk (1748), 1 Ves. sen. 128 748
Peacock v. Peacock (1809), 16 Ves. 49, 56 ; 10 E. R. 138 160
Peacock v. Peacock (1859), 1 Sw. & Tr. 183 ; 27 L. J. Mat. 71 48
Pearce v. Hooper (1810), 3 Taun. 60 1211
Pearce v. Morrioe (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 396 ; 4 L. J. K. B. 21 ; 4N. & M. 48 300
Pearce v. Ornsby (1835), 1 M. & Bob. 455 244
Peardon?). Underbill (1850), 16Q. B. 120; 20 L. J. Q. B. 133; 15Jur.465.. 234
Pearn, Re (1876), 45 L. J. P. D. & A. 31 ; 1 P. D. 70 ; 33 L. T. 705 ;
24 W. B. 143 698
Pears v. Laing (1871), 40 L. J. Ch. 225 ; L. B. 12 Eq. 41 ; 24 L. T. 19 ;
19 W. B. 653 449, 720
Pearae v. Coaker (1869), L. B. 4 Ex. 92 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 82 ; 20 L. T. 82 . . 1119
Pearse v. Grrore (1747), 3 Atk. 523 537
Pearse*. Pearse(1846), lDeG.&Sm.26; 16L. J. Cb. 153. .592, 593, 594, 601, 602
Pearson i>. Att.-Gen. (see Be Perton).
Pearson v. Pleteber (1803), 6 Esp. 90 598
Pearson v. Isles (178 1), 2 Doug-. 556 834
Pearson v. Le Maitre (1843), 6 Scott, N. B. 607 ; 5 M. & Gr. 700 ; 12 L. J.
Q. B. 253 ; 7 Jut. 748 243, 244, 245
Pearson v. Pearson (1872), 40 L. J. P. & M. 53 ; L. B. 2 P. & D. 451 ; 24
L. T. 917; 19W. B. 1014 698
Pearson v. Pearson (1884), 27 Cb. D. 149 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 37 ; 32 "W. B. 1006 754
Pearson i>. Scott (1878), 47 L. J. Cb. 705 ; 9 Cb. D. 198 ; 38 L. T. 747 ;
26 W. B. 796 157
Pearson v. Sbaw (1844), 7 Ir. L. B. 1 16
Pearson «>. Spencer (1863), 3 B. & S. 761 ; 8 L. T. 166 ; IIW. R. 471 115
Pearsons, Be (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 177 697
Peases-. Wells (1840), 8 Dowl. 626 732
Peck, Re (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 95 ; 2 S. & T. 506 173
Peck V. Peck (1870), 21 L. T. 670 ; 18 W. B. 295 929, 960
Peokbam v. Potter (1824), 1 C. & P. 232 5U
Pedler v. Paige (1833), 1 M. & Bob. 268 1209
Pedley v. Dodds (1866), L. B. 2 Eq. 819 ; 14 L. T. 823 ; 14 W. B. 884 . . 803
Pedley v. Wellesley (1829), 3 C. & P. 568 891
Peek V. North Stafford By. Co. (1849, should be 1860), 29 L. J. Q. B. 97 •
35 L. T. O. S. 407 ; 8 W. B. 364 675
Peek V. North Stafford By. Co. (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 469 ; E. B. & E. 958.. 755
Peeks). North Stafford By. Co. (1863), lOH.L. Cas. 473 ; 32L. J. Q. B. 241 723
Peel's case (see Be Barned's Banking Co.).
Peel, Re (1870), L. B. 2 P. & D. 46 ; 39 L. J. P. & M. 36 ; 22 L. T. 417. . 789
Peerless, The (see Prowse v. European, &c. Shipping Co.).
Peiroe v. Corf (1874), L. B. 9 Q. B. 210 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 62 ; 29 L. T. 919 •
22W. B. 299 673, 730
Peisob 11. Dixon (1815), 1 Mason, 11 763
Pejepscot Prop's ». Ransom (1817), 14 Mass. 146 " 122
Pelham v. Pickersgill (1787), 1 T. B. 660 ; 1 B. B. 348 '..'..'. 124
Pell V. Daubeny (1850), 3 Ex. 965 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 44 " " 820
Pelletreau v. Jackson (1833), 11 Wend. 117 .".'.".'!!! 88
Pembroke, Lady, Be (1856), Deane, Ecc. B. 182 ; 20 Jur. 626 ....!!"" 701
Pender v. Eobes (1838), 1 Dev. & B. 250 \\\\ 757
Pendleton v. Booth (1859), 1 Giff. 45 ; 29 L. J. Cb. 265 ; 5 Jur. n' S 840 497
Pendrell v. Pendrell (1731), 2 Str. 924 417
Penfold V. Abbott (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 67 ; 7 L. T. 384 ; 11 W. i?.."i69 "•
9Jur. N. S. 617 773
Penn v. Bibby (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 455 ; L. B. 2 Cb. 127 ; 15 L." T "399 "•
16 W. E. 208 1232
Penn«. Jack (1866), L. B. 2 Eq. 314; 14 W. B. 760; 14 L.'T.'igs! ! .'! ." 272
Pennefather v. Pennefather (1872), Ir. 6 Eq. 171 172
Pennell v. Meyer (1838), 2 M. & Bob. 98 ; 8 C. & P. 470 481
Pennimani). Hill (1875), 24 W. R. 245 917
Penny I). Watts (1848-60), 2 DeG. & Sm. 501 97I
Penrioe i>. Williams (1883), 23 Ch. D. 353 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 693 ; Vs l' T
868 ; 31 W. R. 496 ' . . ' ijgg
Xhe references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Cxli
PAGH
Penruddook v. Hammond (1847), 11 Beav. 59 601
Pentreguinea Coal Co., He (1862), 4 De G. E. & J. 541 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 741 ;
7 L. T. 84 ; 10 W. R. ti56 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 706 681
People, The, ». Holbrook (1816), 13 Johns. 90 289
People, The, v. Mather (1830), 4 "Wend. 229, 252—254 . .962, 964, 965, 968, 972
People, The, v. Matteson (1827), 2 Cowen, 433, 573, n 903
People, The, ex. rel. Ordronaux v. Chegaray (1836), 18 "Wend. 642 893
People V. Bill (1813), 10 Johns. 95 883
People V. Cannon (1893), 36 Am. St. R. 689 Add. [70]
People V. Carlton (1894), 40 Am. St. E. 346 Add. [68]
People V. Whipple (1827), 9 Cowen, 707 632
Perohard v. Tindall (1795), 1 Esp. 394 509
Peroival v. Oaney (1851), 4 De G. & Sm. 623 480
Pereival v. Nanson (1851), 7 Ex. 3 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 1 435, 440, 458
Perfect v. Lane (1861), 3 De G. P. & J. 369 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 489 ; 6L. T. 8 ;
10 W. R. 197; 30 Beav. 187; 8 Jur. N. S. 547 137
Perigal V. Nicholson (1810), "Wightw. 63 447
Perkins v. Bradley (1842), 1 Hare, 219 ; 6 Jur. 254 135
Perkins v. Vaughan (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 988 ; 5 Scott, N. R. 881 ; 12 L. J.
C. P. 38; 6 Jur. 1114 243, 144
Perring v. Hone (1826), 4 Bing. 28 ; 12 Moore, C. P. 13c ; 2 C. & P. 401 . . 1194
Perry f. Davis (1858), 3 C. B. N. S. 769 524
Perry v. Fisher (1846), Spring Assize, Surrey, 1816 194
Perry f. Fitzhowe (1846), 8 Q.B. 757,778: 15 L. J. Q.B.239; lfljur.799.. 638
Perry v. Gibson (1834), 1 A. & E. 48 ; 3 N. & M. 462 942
Perry ». Meadowcroft (1846), 10 Beav. 122 1103, 1104, 1132
Perry v. Phosphor Bronze Co. (1894), 71 L. T. 864 1062
Perry «. Smith (1842), 9 M. &W. 682; 11 L. J. Ex. 269 602,603
Perry D. Watts (1842), 3 M & Gr. 775 ; 11 L. J. C. P. 97 192
Persse v. Persse (1856), 5 H. L. Cas. 671 867
Perth Peerage (1846-8), 2 H. L. Cas. 265 403, 425, 1048
Perton, Re, Pearson v. Att.-Gen. (1885), 53 L. T. 707 413, 415, 421, 435
Peruvian Ry. Co. v. Thames and Mersey Marine Ins. Co. (1867), L. R.
2 Ch. 617 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 864 ; 15 W. R. 1002 648
Petch V. Lyon (1846), 9 Q. B. 147 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 393 506
Petchell, Re (1874), 43 L. J. P. & M. 22 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 153 ; 30 L. T.
74 ; 22 W. R. 353 704
Peter v. Comptou (1693), Skin. 353 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 359 682
Peters v. Brown (1801), 4 Esp. 46 713
Peters v. Fleming (1840), 6 M. & W. 42 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 81 48, 49
Petersfield case (1833), Cock. & Arm. 34 ; Perry & K. 49 497
Petherhridge v. Ash (1846), 4 C. B. 74 ; 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 507 ; 10 Jur. 950 726
Petherick v. Turner (1802), cited 1 Taun. 105 ; 9 R. R. 712 386, 495
Peto V. Hague (1804), 5 Esp. 134 ; 1 Smith, 417 388
Petrie v. Nuttall (1855), 11 Ex. 569 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 200 95, 405, 1116
Petty V. Anderson (1825), 3 Bing. 170 504
Petty V. Styward (1632), 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 290 ; 1 Ch. Rep. 57 139
Peyton v. M'Dermott (1837), 1 Dr. & Wal. 198 297
Phayre, Lessee of, v. Fahy (1832), Hayes & Jon. 128 47
Phelan ». Slattery (1887), 19 L. R. Ir. 177 793
Phelps V. Foot (1815), 1 Conn. 387 372
Phelps V. Prew (1854), 3 E. & B. 430 ; 2 C. L. R. 1422 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 140 ;
18 Jur. 249 321
Phene's Trusts (1869), L. R. 5 Ch. App. 139 ; 39 L. J. Ch. 316 ; 22 L. T.
Ill; 18 W. R. 303 172
Phen6 v. Popplewell (1862), 31 L. J. C. P. 235 ; 12 C. B. N. S. 334 ;
6 L. T. 247 ; 10 W. R. 523 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 1104 660
Phenix v. Ingraham (1809), 5 Johns. 412 514
Philadelphia and Trenton Ry. Co. v. Stimpsoa (1840), 14 Pet. 448 945
Philimore v. Barry (1808), 1 Camp. 513 ; 10 R. R. 742 672
Philips V. Hunter (1795), 2 H. Bl. 402 ; 4 T. R. 182 ; 2 R. R. 353 . . 1152, 1155
Philips ». Philips (1878), 48 L. J. Q. B. 135 ; 4 Q. B. D. 127 ; 39 L. T.
656 ; 27 W. R. 436 187, 220
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
Cxlii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAOS
Philipson v. Cliaae (1809), 2 Camp. Ill 316
Philipson v. Earl of Egremont (1844); 6 Q. B. 605 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 25;
8 Jut. 1164 1132
Phillips V. Barker (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 44 ; 1 Sm. & G. 583 788
Phillips V. Berriok (1819), 16 Johns. 136 1123
Phillips V. Bistolli (1824), 2 B. & C. 514 ; 3 Dowl. & R. 822 689
Phillips V. Briard (1856), 25 L. J. Ex. 233 ; 1 H. & N. 21 766
PhOlips V. Bury (1788), 2 T. K. 346 1103
Phillips V. Clagett (1843), 11 M. & "W. 84 ; 2 Dowl. 1004 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 275 492
Phillips V. Cole (1839), 10 A. & E. 106 ; 2 P. & D. 289 ; 4 Jur. 83. .435, 444, 512
PhUUps V. Earner (1796), 1 Esp. 357 942
Phillips V. Evans (1843), 12 M. &"W. 309 ; 1 D. & L. 463 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 80.. 1160
Phillips V. Gibhs (1846), 4 Dowl. & L. 275 ; 16 M. & W. 208 ; 16 L. J.
Ex. 48 733
Phillips V. Hall (1832), 8 Wend. 610 544
Phillips V. HalUdav, (1891) A. C. 361 ; 64 L. T. 745 ; 55 J. P. 741 121
Phfllips V. Henson(1877), 3 C. P. D. 26 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 273 ; 37 L.T. 432;
26 W. R. 214 •. 723
Phillips V. Im Thum (1866), 18 C. B. N. S. 400, 694 ; 35 L. J. 0. P. 220 ;
L. E. 1 C. P. 463 ; 1 H. & R. 499 548
Phillips V. Irving (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 326 ; 8 Soott, N. R. 3 ; 13 L. J.
0. P. 145 38
Phillips V. Kingfield (1841), 1 Applet. 375 972
Phillips V. MuUings (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. 244 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 211 ; 20 W. R.
29 137, 139
PhiUips V. Phillips (1864), 34 Beav. 19 806
Phillips «;. Pound (1852), 7 Ex. 881 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 277 ; 16 Jur. 645 865
Phillips V. Ward (1863), 16 C. B. N. S. 717 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 7 ; 9 L. T 345;
12 W. R. 106 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1182 1115
Phillips V. Winbum (1830), 4 C. & P. 273 679
Phillipson v. Hayter (1870), 40 L. J. C. P. 14 ; L. R. 6 C. P. 38 ; 23 L. T.
556 ; 19 W. R. 130 166
Phillpotts V. PhUlpotts (1861), 10 C. B. 86 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 11 90
Phipps ». Hale (1874), L. R. 3 P. & D. 166 700
Phipps V. Parker (1808) 1 Camp. 412 1209
Piokard». Sears (1837), 6 A. & E. 174 637, 542
Pickering v. Appleby (1720-1), Com. R. 354 685
Pickering v. Dowson (1813), 4 Taun. 779 767
Pickering v. Noyes (1823), 1 B. & 0. 263 ; 2 D. &R. 386 321, 969
Pickett V. Packham (1869), L. R. 4 Ch. App. 190 169
Pickford v. Gutch (1787), 8 T. R. 305, n. (o) 161
Pickup V. Thames Ins. Co. (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 604 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 749 ;
39 L. T. 341 ; 26 W. R. 689 176
Pieton's case (1806), 30 How. St. Tr. 493 1093, 1179
Piercy's case (1682), T. Jones, R. 164 1179
Piers V. Piers (1849), 2 H. L. C. 331 ; 13 Jur. 669 149
Pierson v. Hutchinson (1809), 2 Camp. 211 ; 6 Esp. 126 307
Pigg«>. Clarke (1876), 46 L. J. Ch. 849 ; 3 Ch. D. 672 ; 24 W. R. 1014 .. 146
Piggott V. Green (1833), 6 Sim. 72 144
Pigot's case (1614), 11 Co. Rep. 27 1193, 1200, 1201
Pigot V. Cubley (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 701 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 134 ; 9 L. T.
804 ; 12 W. R. 467 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 318 781
Pigott V. HoUoway (1808), 1 Binn. 436 927
Pike's case (1829), 3 C. & P. 698 898
Pike V. Ongley (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 708 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 373 ; 35 W. R.
634 769
PHgrim, Ee (1835), 3 A. & E. 485 ; 4 Dowl. 89 ; 4 L. J. M. C. 120. . . .838, 842
Pilgrim v. Southampton & Dorchester Ry. Co. (1835), 18 L. J. C. P. 330 ;
8 C. B. 25 476
PilHngton v. RUey (1849), 6 Dowl. & L. 628 ; 3 Ex. 739 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 323 2?3
Pillar V. Llynvi Coal Co. (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 752 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 294 ;
20L.T.923; 17 W. R. 1123 723
Pilsworth V. Mosse (1862), 14 Ir. Ch. R. 163 704
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. cxliii
FAQB
Pim «». Cuirell (184(>5, 6 M. & "W. 234 393, 397, 404, 405, 406, liu9
Pinches v. Harvey. (1841), 1 Q. B. 869 ; 1 G-. & D. 236; 10 L. J. Q. B. 316.. 734
Pinney v. Jones (1894), 42 Am. St. E,. 209 Add. [376]
Pinney v. Pinney (1828), 8 B. & C. 335 1046
Pipe*. Pulcher (1858), 28L. J. Q. B. 12; 1 E. &E. m 403
Piper V. Chappell (1845), 14 M. & W. 649 ; 9 Jur. 601 7
Pitcher v. King' (1845), 2 Dowl. & L. 755 815, 816
Pitman v. Maddox (1698), 2 Salk. 690 ; 2 Ld. Raym. 732 454
Pitman v. Woodbury (1848), 3 Ex. 4 675
Pitt V. Ohappelow (1841), 8 M. & W. 616 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 487 546
Pitt V. Coomes (1834), 6 B. & Ad. 1078 ; 3 N. & M. 212 867
Pitt V. Shew (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 206 37
Pitton V. "Walter (1718), 1 Str. 162 1031, 1034, 1167
Pitts 1). Beciett (1845), 13 M. & W. 746 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 358 297
Pizarro, The (1817), 2 Wheat. 227, 241, 242, u. (c) 102, 108
Plaoker v. Gonsalus (1815), 1 Serg. & B. 526 514
Planche (Packer) v. Braham (1837), 8 C. & P. 68 ; 6 Scott, 242 ; 4 Bing.
N. C. 17 ; 3 Hodges, 288 ; 1 Jur. 823 ' 50
Plant V. M'Ewen (1823), 4 Conn. 544 : 495
Plant V. Taylor (1863), 7 H. & N. 211 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 289 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 140 127
416, 418
Piatt V. Att.-Gen. of N. S. Wales (1878), 3 App. Cas. 336 ; 47 L. J. P. C.
26; 38L. T. 74; 26 W. E,. 516 179
Plaxton v. Dare (1829), 10 B. & C. 17 ; 5 M. & E,. 1 305, 396, 403
Playne v. Scriven (1849), 7 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 122 ; 1 Roberts. 772 694
Plenty v. West (1845), 1 Roberts. 264 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 185 704
Plevins v. Downing (1876), 1 C. P. D. 220 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 695 ; 35 L. T. 263 762
PUmmer v. SeUs (1834), 3 N. & M. 422 604
Plowes V. Bossey (1862), 2 Dr. & Sm. 145 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 681 ; 10 W. R.
332 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 362 101, 621
Plumerti. Brisoo (1847), 11 Q. B. 46 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 158; 12 Jur. 351. .148, 1213
Plummer v. Woodbume (1825), 4 B. & C. 625 ; 7 Dowl. & R. 25 1142, 1 152
Plunkett's Estate, Re (1861), 11 Ir. Ch. R. 361 798
Plunkett 1). Cobbett (1804), 6 Eap. 136 243, 617
Pooock V. Billing (1824), 2 Bing. 269 513
Pooook V. Pickering (1852), 18 Q. B. 789 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 365 733
Podmore v. Whatton (1864), 3 S. & T. 449 ; 33 L. J. P. 143 ; 10 L. T.
754 ; 13 W. R. 106 143, 307
Pogson V. Thomas (1840), 6 Bing. N. C. 337 803
Polden V. Bastard (1865), 4 B. & S. 258 ; 8 L. T. 535 ; 11 W. R. 778 ; 7
B. & S. 130 ; 13 L. T. 441 115
Pole V. Leask (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 155 538
Pole V. Rogers (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 287 259
Polini V. Gray (1881), 12 Ch. D. 411 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 41 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 86 ;
5 App. Cas. 623; 43 L. T. 209; 29 W. E. 217 ; 44 L. J. 812 458, 1092
Pollack V. Pollack (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 183 ; 2 S. & T. 310 ; 4 L. T.
N. S. 479 348
Pollard 41. BeU(1800), 8 T. E. 434; 6 E. R. 404 1147, 1149
Pollard V. Scott (1790), Pea. R. 19 404, 1168
Pollock V. PoUook (1874), L. E. 18 Eq. 329 ; 22 W. R. 724 ; 30 L. T. 779 ;
44 L. J. Ch. 168 139
Pollock V. Stables (1848), 12 Q. B. 765 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 352 ; 17 L. J. Q. B.
352 : 12 Jur. 1043 157, 158
Pollock V. Stacy (1847), 9 Q. B. 1033 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 133 ; 11 Jur. 267 . . 656
Pollok V. M'Alpin (1851), 7 Moo. P. C. 0. 427 178
Pomeroy v. Baddeley (1826), Ry. & M. 430 918
Ponsford v. Swaine (1861), IJ. & H. 433 ; 4 L. T. 15 612
Pontefraot, Ex parte (1843), 3 Q. B. 391 ; 7 Jur. 1086 1139
Pontifex v. Bignold (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 63 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 390 ; 9 Dowl.
P. C. 860 ; 10 L. J. C. P. 269 82
Pool V. Bridges (1826), 4 Pick. 379 376
Poole V. Dioaa (1835), 1 Bing. N. C. 653 ; 2 L. J. C. P. 47 ; 1 Sc. 600. .453, 454,
467, 458, 459, 460
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
Cxliv TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAQE
Poole V. Gould (1856), 25 L. J. Ex. 250 ; 1 H. & N. 99 873
Poole V. Griffith (1865), 15 Ir. C. L. R. 239 1168
Poole V. Hobbs (1839), 8 Dowl. 113 733
Poole V. Huskinson (1843), 11 M. & W. 827 124
Poole V. Palmer (1842), Car. & M. 69 474
Poole V. Richardson (1807), 3 Mass. 330 931
Poole V. Warren (1838), 8 A. & E. 588 ; 3 N. & P. 693 : 1210
Pooley V. Driver (1876), 5 Ch. D. 458 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 466 ; 36 L. T. 79 ; 25
W. R. 162 169
Pooley V. Goodwin (1835), 4 A. & E. 94 ; 6 N. & M. 466 133
Pooley V. Harradine (1857), 7 E. & B. 431 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 156 ; 5 "W. R.
405 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 488 758
Pope 81. Andrews (1840), 9 C. & P. 564 606
Pope V. Askew (1840), 1 Iredell, 16 1221
Pople, Re, Ex parte Baker (1889), 40 Ch. D. 589 ; 58 L. J. Cb. 372 ; 60
L. T. 668; 37W.R. 554 172
Porter's Trusts, Re (1856), 25 L. J. Cb. 688 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 349 1054
Porter, Re, Pearson v. Att.-Gen. (1885), 53 L. T. 707 421
Porter v. Cooper (1834), 6 C. & P. 364 1031
Porter v. Weston (1839), 5 Bing. N. C. 715 ; 8 Soott, 25 ; 3 Jur. 507 110
Portland, D. of, v. Hill (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 765 ; 36 L. J. Cb. 439 ; 12 Jur.
N. S. 286 ; 16 W. R. 38 402
Portmore, Ld. v. Taylor (1831), 4 Sim. 182 ; 9 L. J. Ch. 203 137
Postletbwaite v. Freeland (1880), 5 App. Cas. 599 ; 49 L. J. Ex. 630 ; 42
L. T. 846 ; 28 W. R. 833 163
Postletbwaite ». Riokman (1889), 60 L. T. 514 ; 37 W. R. 200 ; 63 J. P. 357. 121
Potez V. Glossop (1848), 2 Ex. 191 146, 450
Potbonier v. Dawson (1816), Holt, N. P. R. 383 ; 17 R. R. 647 781
Pott ». Eyton (1846), 3 C. B. 32 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 257 159
Pott V. Todhunter (1845), 2 Coll. 76 748
Potter V. Baker (1850), 13 Beav. 273 ; 21 L. Cb. 11 ; 15 Beav. 489 144
Potter V. Deboos (1815), 1 Stark. R. 82 153
Potter V. Duffleld (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 4 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 472 ; 22 W. R. 585. 671
Potter V. Nicholson (1841), 8 M. & W. 294 ; 9 Dowl. 808 ; 10 L. J. Ex.
Oil 733
Potter J.'ilantin' (1870)', L. R.' 5 C.p! Sl's';' "I's W. R. "868 '...'.'.'.'.'..'...'.'. 818
Potter V. Webb (1829), 6 Greenl. 44 252
Potts V. Duramt (1795), 3 Anstr. 789, 795 ; 2 Eag. & T. 432 ; 3 GwiU. 1450 ;
4 R. R. 864 430
Potts V. Nixon (1870), 5 Ir. R. C. L. 45 89, 92
Potts V. Smith (1869), 38 L. J. Ch. 68 ; L. R. 6 Eq. 311 ; 18 L. T. 629 ;
16 W. R. 891 76
Potts V. Surr (1865), 34 Beav. 543 ; 13 W. R. 909 136
Poulsum V. Thirst (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 449 ; 36 L. J. C. P. 225 ; 16 L. T.
324 ; 15 W. R. 766 227
Poxdtney v. Holmes (1733-4), 1 Str. 405 666
Poulton V. Lond. & S. West. Ry. Co. (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 634 ; 36 L. J.
Q. B. 294; 8 B. & S. 616 643
Pound V. Wilson (1865), 4 F. & P. 301 938
Pounsett ». Fuller (1856), 17 0. B. 660 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 145 773
Pountney v. Clayton (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 820 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 666 ; 49 L. T.
283 ; 31 W. R. 664 ; 47 J. P. 788 114
Powell, Re (1864), 34 L. J. P. & M. 107 ; 4 S. & T. 34 699
Powell V. Bradbury (1849), 7 C. B. 201 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 116 ; 13 Jur. 349. 202
Powell !). Dillon (1814), 2 BaU & B. 420 671
PowelU. Divett (1812), 16 East, 29 ; 13 R. R. 358 1193, 1195
Powell V. Edmunds (1810), 12 East, 6 ; 13 R. R. 785 757
Powell V. Ford (1817), 2 Stark. R. 164 1220
Powell ». Hellioar (1858), 26 Beav. 261 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 266 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 232. 638
Powell V. Hodgetts (1826), 2 C. & P. 432 385
Powell V. Jessop (1856), 18 C. B. 336 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 199 683
PowelU. Layton(1806), 2Bn8. &P. 371; 9R. R. 660 1097
PoweU 1). Miibum (1772), 3 WUs. 365, 366 103
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Cxlv
PAOB
Powell V. Powell (1866), 35 L. J. P. & M. 100 ; L. E. 1 P. & D. 209 ; 14
L. T. 800 703
Powell V. Smith (1872), 41 L. J. Ch. 734 ; L. R. 14 Eq. 85 ; 20 W. K. 602. 79
Power V. Keeyes (1864), 10 H. of L. Cas. 645 86
Power V. "Webber (1876), I. R. 10 Eq. 188 830
Powers V. Balhurst (1880), 49 L. J. Ch. 294 ; 42 L. T. 123 ; 28 W. R. 390. 124
Powis Barony (1731), cited Cruise, Dign. o. 6, s. 60 1040
Powist). Smith (1822), 5 B. & A. 850 ; ID. &R. 490 39
Powys V. Mansfield (1836-7). 3 My. & Or. 359 ; 7 L. J. Ch. 9 666
Prance ». Sympson (1854), Kay, 678 710, 711
Praslin, Duo de, case of, 7 Law Rev. Art. vii 574
Pratt, Ex parte, Re Haymaa (1882), 21 Ch. D. 493 ; 52 L. Ch. 120 ; 47
L. T. 368 ; 31 W. R. 189 848
Pratt V. Hanbury (1849), 14 Q. B. 190 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 17; 13 Jur. 1003. . 189
Pratt ». Pratt (1882), 61 L. J. Ch. 838 ; 47 L. T. 249 ; 30 W. R. 837 . . 321, 1182,
1184
Presoott V. BufPery (1845), 1 0. B. 41 1174
President, The (1804), 5 0. Rob. Adm. 277 179
Preston v. Carr (1826), 1 Y. & J. 175 601
Preston v. Meroeau (1775), 2 W. Bl. 1249 743, 757
Preston v. Peeke (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 424 ; E. B. & E. 336 ; 4 Jur. N. S.
613 84, 1123
Preatwiok v. Poley (1865), 34 L. J. C. P. 189 ; 18 C. B. N. S. 806 ; 12 L. T.
390; 13 W. R. 763; llJur. N. S. 583 608
Price, Re (1804), 4 East, 587 ; 1 Smith, 284 ; 7 R. R. 637 838, 842
Prices. Carter (1846), 7 Q. B. 838 732, 734
Price ». Dewhurst (1838), 8 Sim. 302 1142, 1147, 1161
Price ». Dyer (1810), 17 Ves. 356 ; 11 R. R. 102 732
Price V. Harwood (1811), 3 Camp. 108 643
Price t). Hewett (1852), 8 Ex. 146; 17 Jur. 4 541
Price V. Hollis (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 105 499
Prices. Ley (1863), 4 GifB. 235; 32 L. J. Ch. 530 748
Price V. Littlewood (1812), 3 Camp. 288 1174
Price V. Manning (1889), 42 Ch. D. 372 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 649 ; 61 L. T. 537 ;
37 "W. R. 786 921, 939
Price V. Powell (1858), 3 H. & N. 341 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 409 706
Price «. Price (1852), 1 De G. M. & G. 308 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 53 137
Price V. Price (1847), 16 M. & W. 230 ; 4 Dowl. & L. 637 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 99 . . 168
Price V. Ramsay (1840), 2 Jebb & Sy. 338 525
Price V. Richardson (1845), 15 M. & W. 540 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 345 669
Price V. Torrington (1703), 1 Salk. 285 ; 2 Ld. Raym. 873 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 352.. 454,
458
Price V. Woodhouse (1849), 3 Ex. 616 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 271 407
Price V. Worwood (1859), 4 H. & N. 512 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 329 522
Price V. Wright (1779), 1 Dougl. 241* 696
Prichard v. Powell (1845), 10 Q. B. 589 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 166 396, 398, 399
Prideaux v. Bunnett (1857), 1 C. B. N. S. 613 777
Prideaux v. Criddle (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 455 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 232 ; 20 L. T.
695 ; 10 B. & S. 616 32
Priestley v. Fowler (1837), 3 M. & W. 1 ; M. & H. 305 ; 1 Jur. 987 778
Priestman ». Thomas (1884), 9 P. D. 70 ; 53 L. J. P. D. & A. 58 ; 32 W. R.
842 1118
Prince v. Blackburn (1802), 2 East, 250 1213
Prince v. Samo (1838), 7 A. & E. 630 ; 7 L. J. Q. B. 123 ; 3 N. & P. 139 . . 480,
484, 561, 970
Prince Peter Oldenburg, Re (1884), 63 L. J. P. D. & A. 46 ; 9 P. D. 234 ;
32 W. R. 724 ; 49 J. P. 104 1178
Prince of Wales Life Ass. Co. v. Harding (1868), 27 L. J. Q. B. 297 ; E. B.
& E. 183 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 851 642
Princess Charlotte, The (1863), Brown. & L. 75 1175
Princeton, The (1878), 47 L. J. Adm. 33 ; 3 P. D. 90 ; 38 L. T. 260 178
Prinsep & E. India Co. -v. Dyce Sombre (1832, should be 1856), 10 Moo.
P.O. C. 286 140, 170, 263, 1102
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
Cxlvi TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOE
Pristwioh V. Poley (1865), 34 L. J. C. P. 189 ; 18 C. B. N. S. 806 ; 12 L. T.
390 ; 13 W. R. 753 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 583 508
Pritchard v. Bagshawe (1851), 11 C. B. 469 ; 20 L. J. C. P. Iril 500
Pritchard v. Brown (1828), 4 New Hamps. 397 667
Pritchard v. Draper (1830-31), 1 Euss. & My. 191 386, 495
Pritchard v. Eoulkes (1837), ^ioop- (C. P.) 14 607
Pritchard v. Hitchcock (1843), 6 M. & Gr. 166 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 322 . . 1096, 1097
Pritchard v. Walker (1827), 3 0. & P. 212 148, 519
Pritt V. Farrolough (1812), 3 Camp. 305 ; 13 K. R. 811 157, 464
Proo.-Gen. v. Wmiams (1861), 31 L. J. P. & M. 157 ; 2 S. & T. 491 . .414, 416
Proctor V. Jones (1826), 2 C. & P. 532 690
Proctor V. Lainson (1836), 7 C. & P. 631 329, 496
Prole V. Wiggins (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 235 ; 3 Scott, 607 ; 2 Hodges, 204. .90, 91
Prosser v. Gwillim (1843), 1 C. & K. 96 612
Prosserr. Wagner (1856), 1 C. B. N. S. 289; 26L. J. C. P. 81 1103
Protector, The (1839), 1 W. Rob. Adm. 45 178
Proudfoot V. Montefiore (1867), L. E. 2 Q, B. 611 ; 8 B. & S. 610 ; 16 L. T.
585; 16 W. E. 920; 36 L. J. Q. B. 226 686, 770
Provis V. Eeed (1829), 5 Bing. 435 ; 3 M. & P. 4 977
Prowse V. The European & American Steam Shipping Co. (1860), 13 Moo.
P. C. E. 484, sub nom. The Peerless ; Lush. Adm. E. 103 ; 30 L. J.
Adm. 89 7, 178
Prudential Ass. Co. v. Edmonds (1877), 2 App. Cas. 487 172
Prudential Mutual Ass. Co. v. Curzou (1852), 8 Ex. 97 ; 22 L. J. Ex 85. . 1164
Prudhamt;. PhilUps (1737), 2 Amb. 763 ; 20 How. St. Tr. 479, 480, n. . . 1106,
1133
Prudhomme v. Fraser (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 435 192
Pruenj;. Cox(1845), 2 0. B. 1; 15 L. J. C. P. 17; 1 Barr. & Ar. 514. . .. 726
Pryor v. Pryor (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 114 700
Pryor ». Swaine (1844), 2 Dowl. & L. 37 732
Puddephatt, Ee (1870), L. E. 2 P. & D. 97 ; 39 L. J. P. & M. 84 699
Pagh & Sharman's case (1872), L. E. 13 Eq. 566 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 680 ;
26 L. T. 274 846
Pugh ». Eobinson (1786), 1 T. E. 118 19
Puiolas V. Holland (1841), Ir, Cir. E. 19 25-t
Puibrook V. Lawes (1876), 45 L. J. Q. B. 178 ; 1 Q. B. D. 284 ; 34 L. T. 96.. 688
Pullen V. Snelus (1879), 48 L. J. 0. P. 394 ; 40 L. T. 363 ; 27 W. E. 634. , 224
PuUen V. White (1828), 3 C. & P. 434 273
Pulley V. Hilton (1823), 12 Price, 625 1050
Pulsford ». Richards (1853), 17 Beav. 87 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 659 539
Purcell V. Macnamara (1808), 1 Camp. 200 ; 9 East, 157, 361 ; 9 R. R. 578.. 1013,
1096
Purdon v. Ld. Longford (1877), 11 Ir. E. C. L. 267 48
Purdonv. Purdon(1842), lOM. & W. 562 ; 12L. J. Ex. 3 716
Putnam v. Lewis (1811), 8 Johns. 389 652
Pye V. Butterfield (1865), 34 L. J. Q. B. 17 ; 5 B. & S. 829 960
Pyerj). Carter (1866), 1 H. &N. 916; 26 L. J. Ex. 258 115
Pyke V. Crouch (1696), 1 Ld. Eaym. 730 324, 328, 1113
Pym V. CampbeU (1856), 26 L. J. Q. B. 277 ; 6 E. & B. 370 ; 27 L. T. 122 ;
4 W.E. 628; 20 Jut. 641 746
Pym V. Lockyer (1840), 6 My. & Cr. 29 ; 10 L. J. Ch. 153 806
Pyne, Re (1843), 1 Dowl. & L. 703 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 37 816
QUAETEBMAN ». Cox (1837), 8 C. & P. 97 910
Quartz Hill Co., Ee, Ex parte Young (1882), 21 Ch. D. 642 ; 61 L. J. Ch.
940 ; 31 W. E. 173 912, 942
Quebec Marine Ins. Co. v. Commer. Bk. of Canada (1870), L.E. 3 P.O. 234 ;
39 L. J. P. 0. 53 770
Queen, The (1869), L. E. 2 Adm. 354 ; 38 L. J. Adm. 39 ; 4 Moo. P. C. 0.
N. S. 336 177
Queen, The, v. Flavell (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 364 ; 62 L. T. 133 ; 33 W. E.
343 ; 49 J. P. 406 695
The refcrenais are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OP CASES CITED. cxlvii
PAGE
Queen's, The, case (1820), 2 B. & B. 287 . . . .280, 281, 484, 561, 587, 901, 904,
906, 950, 954, 955, 959, 974, 975, 977
Queen's Proctor v. Ery (1879), 4 P. D. 230 ; 48 L. J. P. D. & A. 68.. 1050, 1054
QuenneU v. Turner (1851), 13 Beav. 240 ; 20 L. J. Oh. 237 802, 804
Quick V. Quick (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 146 ; 2 S. & T. 442 ; 12 W. E.
119; 10 Jur. N. S. 682 143
Qmck V. Staines (1798), 1 Bos. & P. 203 ; 4 E. E,. 801 , 650
Quilter V. Joras (1853, should be 1863), 14 C. B. N. S. 747 ; II "W. E. 888 ;
3 F.& F. 644 309
Quincey v. Sharpe (1876), 1 Ex. D. 72 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 347 ; 34 L. T. 495 ;
24W. E. 373 711
Quinn v. Butler (1868), L. E. 6 Eq. 225 708
E.'b Trusts, Ee (1870), 39 L. J. Ch. 192 621
E. V. (1826), 2 0. & P. 459 120
E. ff. (1834), 6 C. & P. 408 216
E. V. (1838), 3N. &P. 627; 8 A. & E. 589 824
E. V. Abergavenny Union (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 31 ; 50 L. J. M. 0. 1 ; 43
L. T. 602 ; 29 W. E. 303 631
E. V. AbergwiUy (1807, should be 1801), 2 East, 63 368, 420, 465
E. v. Abingdon (1794), Pea. E. 236 274
E. «. Ackroyd (1824), 1 Lew. 0. 0. 49 671
E. !>. Adams (1828), 3 0. & P. 600 120
E. V. Adderbury East (1843), 5 Q. B. 187, 189, n. (a) ; 13 L. J. M. 0. 9 ;
D. & M. 324 ; 7 Jur. 1035 494
E.». Addis (1834), 6 0. & P. 388 634
E. ,;. Adey (1831), 1 M. & Rob. 94 969
E. i>. Aickles (1784), 1 Lea. 294, 297, n., 300, n. (a) ; 2 East, P. 0. 968 .. 289,
318, 1050, 1172
E. V. AUen (1826), 1 Den. C. C. 364 ; T. & M. 56 ; 2 C. & K. 869 ; 3 Cox,
C. 0. 270 ; 18 L. J. M. 0. 72 ; 13 Jur. 108 100, 263, 278
E. V. Allen (1872), L. E. 1 C. 0. 367 ; 41 L. J. M. 0. 97 ;■ 12 Cox, C. C.
193 149
E. V. AUgood (i7P8J,"7 t! E." 'uG- V E.' eV 574 ." .' ". '. '. '. .... '. '..".'!!'.".'.!!!! .' 994
E. V. Allison (1806), E. & E. 109 130, 295
E. V. All Saints (1828), 7 B. & 0. 789 416
E. V. All Saints, Southampton (1828), 7 B. & 0. 790 132, 1137
E. V. All Saints, Worcester (1817), 6 M. & Sel. 194 891, 892, 960
E. ». Almon (1770), 6 Burr. 2686 107
E. V. Ambergate, &o. Ey. Co. (1852), 17 Q. B. 957 ; 16 Jur. 777 998
E. V. Ambnry (1852), 6 Cox, 0. 0. 79 826
E. ». Anderson (1680), 7 How. St. Tr. 874 899
E. V. Anderson (1868), 11 Cox, C. C. 134 1029
E. V. Andrews (1837), 2 M. & Eob. 37 209
E. V. Antrobus (1835), 2 A. & E. 793 ; 1 H. & W. 96 ; '6 0. & P. 784 ;
4 N. & M. 565 397
E. V. Appleby (1821), 3 Stark. E. 33 628, 587
E. V. Archer (1826), 1 Moo. 0. C. 143 165
E. 1). Armitage (1872), L. E. 7 Q. B. 773; 42L. J. M. 0. 16 630
E. v. Arnold (1838), 8 C. & P. 622 570, 576
E. V. Arundel (1721), Hob. 109 108
E. V. Ashburton (1846), 8 Q. B. 876 ] 33
E. V. Ashtou (1837), 2 Lew. 0. C. 147 470
E. V. Aspinall (1827), cited 3 St. Evid. 952 257
E. V. Aspinall (1876), 46 L. J. M. 0. 146 ; 2 Q. B. D. 48 ; 36 L. T. 297 ;
26 W. E. 283 84
E. V. Aston (1838), 2 Euss. 0. & M. 732 246
R. V. Atkins (1679), 7 How. St. Tr. 728 518
E. V. Atwood (1789), 1 Lea. 0. 0. 464 633
E. V. Austin (1856), Dears. C. C. 612 ; 7 Cox, 0. 0. 55 ; 25 L. J. M. 0.
48 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 95 328
n.v. Avery (1838), 8 0. & P. 696 592, 602, 604
E. V. Azire (1737-8), 1 Str. 633 893
Vol. I. end6 with page 635.
Cxlviii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAGK
E. •«. Babb{1790), 3 T. R. 581 991, 997
R. V. Bagshaw (1797), 7 T. R. 363 1137
R. u. Baines (1706), 2 Ld. Raym. 1199, 1265 131
R. V. Baker (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 53 465
R. V. Baker (1895), 15 R. (May), 380 ; (1895) 1 Q. B. 797 ; 64 L. J. M. C.
177 ; 72 L. T. 631 Add. [47, 948]
R. *. Baldry (1852), 2 Den. C. 0. 430 563, 572
R. V. Ball (1807), 1 Camp. 324 ; R. & R. 132 ; 10 R. R. 695 246
R. V. Ball (1837), 8 C. & P. 745 921
R. V. Balls (1871), 40 L. J. M. C. 148 ; L. R. 1 C. C. 328 ; 12 Cox, C. C.
96 ; 24 L. T. 760 ; 19 W. R. 876 239
R. V. Banks (1794), 1 Esp. 146 ; 5 R. R. 726 264
R. V. Bannam (1839), 1 Crawf. & D. C. C. 117 214
R. V. Barker (1829), 3 C. & P. 589 257
R. V. Barker (1858), 1 F. & E. 326 312
R. V. Barnard (1823), 1 C. & P. 88 633, 947
R. V. Barnes (1816), 1 Stark. 243 520, 1046
R. V. Barnes (1835), 7 C. & P. 166 826
B. V. Barnes (1856), L. R. 1 C. C. 45 ; 35 L. J. M. C. 204 ; 12 Jur. N. S.
549 ; 14 L. T. 601 ; 14 W. R. 805 198
R. V. Barnett (1829), 3 C. & P. 600 829
R. V. Bamsley (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 377 521
R. f. Barrett (1833), 6 C. & P. 124 148, 518
R. i>. Barrett (1852), 6 Cox, C. C. 78 826
R. V. Barrow (1866), 10 Cox, C. C. 407 275
E. V. Barry (1865), 4 F. & P. 392 238
R. V. Bartlett (1837), 7 C. & P. 832 569, 587
R. V. Barton (1854), Dears. 284 12 1
R. V. Basingstoke (1851), 14 Q. B. 611 ; 19 L. J. M. C. 28 ; 3 New Sess.
Cas. 693 ; 6 D. & L. 303 291
R. ». Bate (1871), 11 Cox, C. C. 686 572
R. V. Bateman (1866), 4 F. & F. 1068 583
R. u. Bates (1860), 2 F. & F. 317 335
R. i>. Bathwiok (1832), 2 B. & Ad. 648 87, 890, 891, 892
R. V. Bayley (1835), 7 C. & P. 264 217
R. ». Beale (1866), L. R. 1 C. C. 10 ; 35 L. J. M. C. 60 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 12 ;
13L. T. 335; 14 W. R. 57 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 157 100
R. ■„. Beaney (1820), R. & R. 416 16, 205
R. V. Beard (1837), 8 C. & P. 143, 148, 149 80,110
R. V. Beardsall (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 452 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 157 1173
R. V. Beckwith (1858\ 7 Cox. C. C. 505 275
R. V. Bedfordshire (1855), 4 B. & B. .542 393, 399
R. V. Bedingfield (1879), 14 Cox, C. C. 341 377, 467
R. V. Bedingham (1844), 1 New Sess. Cas. 144 621
R. V. Beeston (1855), 24 L. J. M. C. 5 ; Dears. C. C. 405 ; 3 C. L. R. 82 ;
18 Jur. 1058 ; 326, 327, 335, 337
R. V. Beeton (1849), 1 Den. 414 239
R. V. Beezley (1830), 4 C. & P. 220 943
R. V. Bell (1831), 5 C. & P. 162 680
R. V. Bellamy (18i4), Ry. & M. 171 1031
R. V. Benson (1810), 2 Camp. 508 129, 278, 1013
R. V. Bentley (1833), 6C. & P. 148 580
R. V. Berenger (1817), 2 Stnrk. R. 129, n 921
R. 1). Berigan (1841), Ir. Cir. R. 177 669, 1130
R. V. Bemadotti (1869), 11 Cox, C. C. 316 468
R. i>. Berriman (1833), 5 C. & P. 601 216
R. V. Berry (1859), Bell, C. C. 46 884
R. V. Berry (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 447 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 123 897
R. V. Betts (1850), 16 Q. B. 1022 ; 4 Cox, C. C. 211 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 601 . . 47
R. V. Beverley (1839), 8 Dowl. 140 994
R. «). Bigg (1717), 3P. Wms. 423 640
R. V. Bignold (1824), Dowl. & R. N. P. 59 ; 4 Dowl. & R. 70 274
R. V. Bingham (1829), 3 T. & J. 109 1013
R. V. Bingley (1833). 5 C. & P. 602 211
R. V. Birch (1842), 3 Q. B. 431 1031
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Cxlix
FAOB
R. V. Bird (1851), 2 Den. 94 ; T. & M. 437; 5 Cox, C. C. II ; 20 L. J.
M. C. 70 ; 16 Jnr. 193 206
R. V. Birdseye (1830), 4 0. & P. 386 238
R. V. Birmingliam (undated), cited in Hubb. on Ev. of Suco. 660 417
R. V. Birmingham (1861), 31 L. J. M. C. 63 ; 1 B. & S. 763 436, 444, 445
R. ». Biss (1838), 8 C. & P. 773 216
R. V. Bjornsen (1865;, 1 L. & C. 545 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 74 ; 34 L. J. M. C.
180; 12 L. T. 473; 13 "W. R. 664; 11 Jur. N. S. 589 106, 129, 1175
R. V. Blackburn (1853), 6 Cox, C. C. 339 ; 3 0. & K. 330 273, 569, 572
R. V. Blake (1832), 4 B. & Ad. 365 ; 2 N. & M. 312 870
R. V. Blake (1844), 6 Q. B. 126 ; 13 L. J. M. C. 131 ; 8 Jur. 666 382, 384
R. ./. Blakemore (1852), 2 Den. 410 ; 21 L. J. M. C. 60 ; 16 Jur. 154. .89, 1102,
1110, 1114
R. „. Bland (1832), ] Lew. C. C. 149 217
R. V. Blandy (1752), 18 How. St. Tr. 1187 65, 374, 469
R. V. Bleasdale (1848), 2 C. & K. 765 236
R. V. Bliss (1837), 7 A. & E. 655 ; 7 L. J. Q. B. 4 . . . . 396, 397, 400, 401 , 402, 446
R. x/. Bodle (1833), 6 C. & P. 186 943
R. V. Bodmin, JJ. of, (1892) 2 Q,. B. 21 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 151 ; 66 L. T.
562 ; 40 W. R. 606 ; 56 J. P. 504 998
R. ». Bolton (1841), 1 Q. B. 74; 4 P. & D. 679; 5 Jur. 1154 1100, 1136
R. ■«. Bond (1850), 4 Cox, C. C. 236 ; 19 L.J.M.C. 138; 1 Den. C.C. 617. .678,579
R. V. Bonner (1834), 6 C. & P. 386 467, 468
R. ». Borrett (1833), 6 C. & P. 124 148, 618
R. V. Boawell (1842), C. & Marsh. 584 669, 572
R. V. Boucher (1859), 1 F. & F. 486 312
R. «i. Boulter (1852), 2 Den. C. C. 396; 3 C. & K. 236; 21L. J. M. C. 67.. 627
R. V. Bowden (1869), Liverpool Assizes, Deo. MS. (Mr. 0. H. Hopwood). 668
R. V. Bowen (1841), 0. & Marsh. 149 82
R. V. Bowen (1849), 13 Q. B. 790 ; 19 L. J. M. C. 65 ; 13 Jur. 1045 ; 3
Cox, C. C. 483 84
R. «!. Bowman (1834), 6 C. & P. 342' 1133, 1140
R. ■•/. Boyes (1860), 2 F. & F. 158 970
R. ■„. Boyes (1861), 30 L. J. Q. B. 302 ; 1 B. & S. 311 633,960, 964,965,966
R. ■„. Bradlaugh (1883), 47 L. T. 477 ; 31 W. R. 229 ; 16 Cox, C. C. 217 ... . 884
R. ■„. Braintree (1869), 28 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 1 E. & E. 51 304
R. V. Braithwaite (1859), 8 Cox, C. C. 264, 444 ; 1 F. & F. 638 627
R. V. Biaithwaite (1864), 8 Cox, C. C. 254, 444 627
R. V. Bramley (1795), 6 T. R. 330 621, 890
R. V. Brandreth (1817), 32 How. St. Tr. 867 383
R. V. Brangan (1742), 1 Lea. C. C. 27 987
R. «. Brasier (1779), 1 Lea. 199 ; 1 East, P. C. 443 367, 898
R. V. Braynell (1850), 4 Cox, C. C. 404 683
R. V. Brecknock and Aberg. Can. Co. (1836), 3 A. & E. 222 998
R. ». Brennan (18j3), 3 Craw. & D. C. C. 109 318
R. V. Brettell (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 424 ; 1 L. J. M. C. 46 60
R. V. Brewer (1834), 6 C. & P. 363 601
R. V. Brewer (1863), 9 Cox, C. C. 409 968
R. V. Brice (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 606 909
R. V. Briggs (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 199 241
R. V. Brightside Bierlow (1849), 13 Q. B. 933 ; 19 L. J. M. C. 50 ; 4 New
Sesa. C. 47 ; 14 Jur. 174 234, 405
R. V. Bri8by(1849), lDen.C.C.416; 2Car. &K. 962; 18 L. J. M. C. 157.. 1160
R. V. Bristol & Exeter Ry. Co. (1843), 4 Q. B. 162; 12 L. J. Q. B. 106 998
R. V. Brittleton and Bates (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 266 ; 63 L. J. M. C. 83 ; 50
L. T. 276 ; 32 "W. R. 463 ; 48 J. P. 295 ; 15 Cox, C. C. 431 . .165, 894, 1231
R. V. Britton (1833), 1 M. & Rob. 297 683
R. V. Broadhempston (1859), 28 h. J. M. C. 18 ; 1 E. & E. 154 ; 6 Jur.
N. S. 267 131
R. V. Brogan (1834), 3 Rues. C. & M. (4th ed.) 463; Roscoe, Cr. Ev. 60 . . 577
R. V. Brommich (1679), 7 How. St. Tr. 722 518
R. V. Brooke (1819), 2 Stark. R. 472; 20 R. R. 723 942
R. V. Brookes (1847), C. & Marsh. 543 205
R. V. Brooks (1847), 2 C. & K. 402 ; 1 Den. C. C. 217 78
Vol. I. ends with page 636.
Cl TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAGE
B,. V. Brooks (1S53), Dears. C. C. 184 ; 6 Cox, C. C. 14S : 22 L. J. M. 0.
121 ; 17 Jur. 400 165
R. V. Brown (1779), 1 Cowp. 110 123
R. V. Brown (1828), M. & M. 164 16
R. V. Brown (1861), 2 F. & F. 559 247
R. V. Brown (1862), 9 Cox, C. C. 281 604
R. «. Brown (1867), 36 L. J. M. C. 59 ; L. R. 1 C. C. 70 972
■ R. V. Browne (1829), M. & M. 319 ; 3 C. & P. 572 283, 1033, 1034
R. V. BrowneU (1834), 1 A. & E. 598 ; 3 L. J. M. C. 118 833
R. V. Bryan (1834), Jebb, 0. C. 157 667
R. V. Buckingham, JJ. (1828), 8 B. & C. 375 996, 997
R. V. Buckingliamshire JJ. (1843), 3 Q. B. 809 ; 2 a. & D. 660 ; 12 L. J.
M. C. 29 1100, 1136
R. V. Buckley (1873\ 13 Cox, C. C. 293 326,436,455
R. 4). Budd (1805), 6 Esp. 230 168
R. V. Bull (1839), 9 C. & P. 22 943
R. V. Bull (1871), 12 Cox, C. C. 31 329
R. V. Bullard (1872), 12 Cox, C. C. 353 615
R. „. Bullock (1825), 1 Moody, C. 0. 324, n. (a) 205, 209
R. V. Burbage (1 763), 3 Burr. 1440 837
R. V. Burdett (1865), Dears. C. C. 431 ; 6 Cox, C. C. 458 943
R. ■<-. Burgiss (1836), 7 C. & P. 488 829
R. ^. Burke (1859), 8 Cox, C. C. 44, 47 58, 963
R. a. Burley (1818), 2 Stark. Ev. 13, n. (z) 668, 569, 632
R. ■„. Burridge (1735), 3 P. Wms. 497 17
R. 6 . Burt (1851), 5 Cox, C. C. 284 251
R. V. Burton (1853), Dears. 284 121
R. o. Bury St. Edmunds (1784), Cald. 486 465
R. „. Bush (1818), R. & R. 372 216
R. V. Butcher (1798), 1 Lea. 265, n 585
R. V. Butterwick (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 196 824
R. V. Buttery (1818), R. & R. 342 1105, 1107
R. V. Buttle (1870), 39 L. J. M. C. 115 ; 11 Cox, C. C. 666 ; L. R. 1 C. C.
248 : 22 L. T. 728 ; 18 W. R. 966 962
R. V. Buttleton (see R v. Brittleton).
R. V. Cadogan, E. of (1822), 5 B. & A. 902 ; 1 Dowl. & R. 550 998
R. V. Cain (1839), 1 Craw. & D. C. C. 37 568, 685
R. V. Callaghan (1793), McNally, Evid. 385 470
R. V. Calvert (1848), 2 Cox, C. C. 491 335
R. V. Cambridge, CJ. of (1736), 2 Ld. Raym. 1334 20
B. V. CampbeU (1843), 1 C. & K. 82 215
R. V. Canterbury, Abp. of (1848), 18 Q. B. 581 792
R. V. Canterbury, Abp. of (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 164 ; 7 W. R. 212 ; 1 E.
& E. 346 1147
R. V. CanweU (1869), 11 Cox, C. C. 263 ; L. R. 1 C. C. 194 ; 20 L. T. 402;
17 W. R. 023 206
R. V. Carew (1850), 1 L. M. & P. 626, n 727
R. i-. Carey (1845), 7 Q. B. 126 ; 14 L. J. M. C. 190 814
R. !;. Carlile (1832), 2B. & Ad. 367— 369 84
R. V. Carlile (1834), 6 C. & P. 643 274
R. V. Carnarvonshire (1841), 2 Q.B. 325; IIL. J. M. C. 3; 1 G. &D. 423. . 521
R. V. Carr (1669), 1 Sid. 418 ; Bull. N. P. 237 480
R. «<. Carrol (1869), 11 Cox, C. C. 322 336
R. v. Cart (1838), Maidstone Sum. Ass. MS 570
R, V. Carter (1845), 1 Den. C. C. 65 1019, 1174
R. V. Carter 1884), 12 Q. B. D. 522 ; 53 L. J. M. C. 96 ; 50 L. T. 432,
596 ; 32 W. R. 663 ; 48 J. P. 456 ; 15 Cox, C. C. 448 247
R. V. Carty (1797), cited Joy on Conf. 97 ; MoNally, Evid. 45 679
R. V. Casey (1837), Jebb, C. C. 203 634
R. V. Cass (1784), 1 Lea. 293, n. (a) 663, 671
n.v. Cas8idy(1868), 1 F. & F. 79 943
R. ■!>. Castle Morton (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 690 284
R. V. Castleton (1795), 6 T. R. 236 303, 306
R. V. Catesby (1824), 2 B. & C. 814 130, 131
Xhe refercnoea a/re to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. cli
PAGE
R. «. Cafor(1802), 4 Esp. 117, 145; 2 East, 361 1228
E. V. Cavendish (1873), 8 Ir. R. C. L. 178 106
K. V. CeUier (1680), 7 How. St. Tr. 1205 673
R. V. Chadderton (1801), 2 East, 29 420
R. V. Champney (1836), 2 Lewin, C. 0. 259 626, 627
R V. Champneys (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 26 1127
R. V, Chapman (1838), 8 C. & P. 559 921, 943
R. «/. Charlbury (1843), 3 Q. B. 378 ; 13 L. J. M. C. 19 ; 3 G. & 1). 177. . 1139
R. V. Chailesworth (1860), 2 F. & E. 326 962, 965
R. V. Chatham (1807), 8 East, 498 621
R. V. Chawtou (1841), 1 Q. B. 247 ; 10 L. J. M. C. 55 740
R. V. Cheadle (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 838 765
R. 4). Cherry (1871), 12 Cox, C. C. 32 683, 966
R. V. Chester (1819), 1 Chitty, R. 297 992
R. V. Chester, Bp. of (1747), IW. BJ. 26 1133
R. V. Chester, Sheriff of (1819), 1 Chitty, R. 477 998
R. V. Cheverton (1862), 2 E. & E. 833 666, 571
R. V. Chldley (1860), 8 Cox, C. C. 365 580, 583
R. V. Christian (1842), Car. & M. 388 196, 1018
R. V. Christie (1821), 3 Russ. C. & M. 355 468
R. V. Christie (1858), 1 F. & F. 75 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 506 275
R. V. Christopher (1849), 2 C. iS! K. 994 ; 1 Den. 536 ; 4 Cox, C. C. 76 283,
284, 294, 336, 356, 969
R. V. Clapham (1829), 4 C. & P. 29 1170
R. V. Clare (1803), 28 How. St. Tr. 887, 924 623
R. V. Clark (1810), R. & R. 181 211
R. V. Clark (1818), R. & R. 358 216
R. V. Clarke (1799), 8 T. R. 220 551
R. V. Clarke (1817), 2 Stark. R. 241 257,375, 976
R. V. Clarke (1859), 2 F. & F. 2 337
R. V. Cleary (1862), 2 F. & F. 850 339, 467
R. V. Clement (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 218 833
R. V. Clements (1851), 2 Den. 251 ; 6 Cox, C. C. 191 ; T. & M. 579 ;
20 L. J. M. C. 193 ; 15 Jur. 407 336
R. V Clewes (1830), 4 C. & P. 221 661, 562, 566, 570
R. V. Cliiii (1841), 11 A. & E. 624 ; 10 L. J. M. C. 151 1139
R. V. Cliviger (1788), 2 T. R. 263 891
R. V. Cluderoy (1849), 3 C. & K. 205 821, 824
R. «/. Clure (1841), Ir. Cir. R. 275 267
R. V. Coady (1882), 16 Cox, C- C. 89 46
R. ■^. Oobden (1862), 3 F. & F. 833 237
R. V. Cockbum (1857), Dears. & Bell, 203 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 265 ; 19 L. J.
M. C. 119 ; 329, 332
R. V. Cockcroft (1870), 11 Cox, C. C. 410 267, 951
R. V. Cocking (1836), 2 Lewin, C. C. 235 120
R. ■^. Cohen (1858), 8 Cox, C. C. 41 264
R. ■^. Colclough (1882), 15 Cox, C. C. 92 ; 10 L. R. Ir. 241 246
R. ■„. Cole (1810), 1 Ph. Ev. 508 235
R. -v. Coleman (1852), 6 Cox, C. C. 163 1228
R. -v. Coleorton (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 25 521
R. V. Coleme (1850), 11 Q. B. 909 ; 3 New Sess. Cas. 143 ; 17 L. J. M. C.
121 ; 12 Jur. 599 727
R. V. Coll (1889), 24 L. R. Ir. 522 283, 284, 976
R. V. CoUey (1827), M. & M. 329 '918
R. V. Collier (1831), 6 C. & P. 160 238
R. V. Cohner (1864), 9 Cox, C. C. 606 583
R. V. Com. of Sewers for T. Hamlets (1842), 3 Q. B. 670 ; 3 G. & D. 92 ;
13 L. J. Q. B. 12; 6 Jur. 1059 997
R. V. Compton (1828), 3 C. & P. 418 205, 1129
R. V. Coney (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 534 ; 15 Cox, C. C. 46 ; 51 L. J. M. C. 66 :
48 L. T. 307 ; 30 W. R. 678 ; 46 J. P. 404 633
R. V. Connell (1853), 6 Cox, C. C. 178 1126
R. V. Conning (1868), 11 Cox, C. C. 134 ! 1029
R. V. ConoUy (1829), 2 Lew , C. C. 229 165
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
clii TABLE OF CASES CITED,
PAOG
R. V. Cook (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 348 917, 967
E. V. Cooke (1824), 1 C. & P. 322 820
R. V. Cooke (1836), 7 C. & P. 559 196
R. V. Cooke (1838), 8 C. & P. 682 80, 247, 615
R. V. Cooper (1833), 5 C. & P. 635 563, 566, 667
R. V. Cooper (1852), 3 C. & K. 318 ; 16 Jur. 750 120
R. V. Coote (1873), L. R. 4 P. G. 605; 42 L. J. M. C. 45; 29 L. T. Ill;
21 W. R. 553 ; 9 Moo. P. C. C. 463 582, 683
R. V. Cope (1835), 7 C. cSi: P. 726 454, 459
R. V. Coppard (1827), M. & M. 118 1034
m.v. CoppuU (1801), 2 East, 25 290
R. V. Corden (1769), 4 Burr. 2281 131
R. V. Cornelius (1743-4), 2 Str. 1210 ; 1 Wils. 142 997
R. V. CottiLgham (1834), 2 A. & E. 250 1139
R. V. Cotton (1813), 3 Camp. 444 399, 406, 408, 1161
-R.v. Cotton (1873), 12 Cox, C. C. 400 237
R. ■(;. Court (1836), 7 C. & P. 487 565, 572
R. «.. Courtenay(1856), 7Cox, C. C. HI; 5 Ir. C. L. R. 434 47
R. ■<-. Courtney (1840), 2 Crawf. & D. C. C. 63 670
R. „. Cousens (1850), 3 Russ. C. & M. 599 820
R. V. Cox and RaUton (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 153 ; 54 L. J. M. C. 41 ; 52
L. T. 25; 33W. E. 396; 49 J. P. 374; 15 Cox, C. C. 611 ....592, 604,605
R. .,. Coyle (1855), 7 Cox, C. 0. 74 607, 527
R. ^. Cradock (1863), 3 P. & F. 837 129
R. V. Cramp (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 307 ; 49 L. J. M. C. 44 ; 42 L. T. 442 ; 28
W. R. 701 ; 44 J. P. 411 ; 14 Cox, C. 0. 390, 401 635
R. V. Crediton (1858), 27 L. J. M. C. 265 ; E. B. & E. 231 1170
R. V. Creevey (1813), 1 M. & S. 273 ; 14 R. R. 427 109
R. V. Cresswell (1876), 45 L. J. M. C. 77 ; 13 Cox, C. C. 126 ; 1 Q. B. D.
446 ; 33 L. T. 760 ; 24 W. R. 281 130
R. V. Crick (1832), 5 C. & P. 508 ." 209
R. V. Crockett (1831), 4 C. & P. 544 468
R. V. Croke (1774), 1 Cowp. 30 1137
R. V. Crondall (1847), 2 New Sess. Caa. 667; 10 Q. B. 812 521
R. V. Cross (1856), Dears, ft Bell, 68 ; 966
R. ■:,. Crossfield (1796), 26 How. St. Tr. 109 556, 559
R. V. Croucher (1862), 3 F. & F. 285 332, 336
R. ■„. Crowther (1786), 1 T. R. 125 ; 1 R. R. 162 336
R. V. Cruise (1842), Ir. Oir. R. 674 986
R. V. Cruse (1838), 8 C. & P. 545 81, 165, 166
R. V. Culkin (1832), 5 C. & P. 121 213
R. V. Culpepper (1696), Skin. 673 306
R. V. Curgeuwen (1865), 35 L. J. M. C. 58 ; L. R. 1 C. C. 1 ; 11 Jur. N. S.
984 ; 13' L. T. 383 ; 14 W. R. 55 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 152 172
R. V. Curtis (1848), 2 C. & K. 763 958
R. V. Daman (1819), 2 B. ft Aid. 378 131
R. V. Danu(18<5), 1 Moo. C. C. 424 1127
R. V. Davie (1837), 6 A. & E. 386 763
R. V. Davis (1833), 6 C. ft: P. 177 580, 682
R. ». Davis (1870), L.R.I C. C. 272; 39 L. J. M. C. 135; 11 Cox, C. C. 578 251
R. V. Dawber (1821), 3 Stark. R. 34 633
R. V. Dawson (1821). 3 Stark. 62 204
R. V. Day (1852), 6 Cox, C. C. 55 835, 336
R. V. Deacon (1746), Fost. C. L. 9 626
R. 1). Dean (1852), 6 Cox, C. 0. 23 ; 18 How. St. Tr. 366 257
R. V. Dean of St. Asaph (1783), 21 How. St. Tr. 1033 23, 45
R. ». De Berenger (1814), 3 M. & S. 67 ; 15 R. R. 415 18, 1092
R. V. DelaMotte (1781), 1 East, P. C. 124 318, 972
R. V. Denio (1827), 7 B. & C. 620 ; 1 M. & R. 294 303
R. V. Dent (1813), 1 C. & K. 97 938
R. V. Derby (1850), 1 L. M. & P. 660 727
R. V. DerbyHhire (1837), 6 A. ft: E. 885 727
R. „. Derrington (1826), 2 0. & P. 418 568
R. ^. De Salvi (1857), C. 0. 0. Sess. Pap. vol. 46, p. 884 1126
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. cliii
PAGB
R. V. Despard (1803), 28 How. St. Tr. 489 635
R. «. Devlin (1841), 2 Crawf . & D. C. 0. Ifi2 669
R. V. Dewhurst (1825), 1 Lew. C. 0. 47 580
R. V. Dillon (1877), 14 Cox, C. C. 4 283
R. ». Dilmore (1852), 6 Cox, C. C. 52 326, 337
R. V. Dingier (1 791), 2 Lea. 561 333
R. V. Din(;ley (1845), 1 C. & K. 637 566, 569, 572
R. V. Dixon (1765), 3 Burr. 687 604, 969
R. S.Dixon (1814), 3 M. & Sel. 15; 4 Camp. 12; 15 R. R. 381 80, 107
R. V. Doherty (1810), 13 East, 171 ; 12 R. R. 315 893
R. V. Doherty (1874), 13 Cox, C. C. 23 566
R. V. Doolin (1832), 1 Jebb, C. C. 123 971
R. V. Doran (1791), 1 Esp. 127 296
R. V. Dossett (1846), 2 C. & K. 306 248
R. ». Douglas (1824), 2 Dowl. N. S. 416 341
R. V. Douglas (1845), 1 C. & K. 670 348
R. t). Douglas (1846 , 13 Q. B. 42 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 417 ; UJur. 841. .341, 348,
1029
R. ». Dowlin (1792), Pea. R. 170; 3 R. R. 679 354
R. V. Dowling 1826), Ry. & M. 433 209
R. 1). Dowuer (1880), 14 Cox, C. C. 486 604
R. V. Downham (1858), 1 F. & F. 386 312
R. V. Downing (1840), Chelmsford Spring Assizes, MS 564
R. V. Downshire, Dow. March, of (1835), 4 A. & E. 232 ; 5 N. & M. 662 ;
5 M. & W. 662 209
R.v. Doyle (1840), 1 Crawf. &D. C.C. 396 569
R. «;. Drage (1875), 14 Cox, C. C. 85 247
R. «i. Drew (1837), 8 C. & P. 140 563, 572
R. V. Drummond (1784), 1 Lea. C. C. 338 464, 467
R. V. Drury (1849), 3 C. & K. 193 1140
R. V. Duffin (1818), R. & R. 365 81
R. ». Dukinfield (1848), 11 Q. B. 678; 17 L. J. M. C. 113 454
R. V. Dulwioh College (1851), 17 Q. B. 600 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 36 ; 16 Jur. 664 791
R. V. Dunboyne, Ld. (1850), 3 C. & Kir. 1 77
R. V. Dunoombe (1838), 8 C. & P. 369 929
R. V. Dungey (1864), 4 F. & F. 99 1127
R. e. Dunmurry (1841), Ir. Cir. R. 312 216
R. V. Dunn (1826), 1 Moo. C. C. 146 238, 247
R. V. Dunn (1831), 4 C. & P. .543 564
R. V. Dunne (1838), Ir. Cir. R. 407 986
R. *. Dunsford (1835), 2 A. & E. 568 ; 4 N. & M. 349 ; 1 H. & W. 93 . . 50
R. 1). Dunstan (1824), Ry. & M. 109 47
R. V. Durham (1787), 1 Lea. C. C. 478 633
R. V. Durkin (1837), 2 Lew. C. C. 163 826
R. 1). Durore (1784), 1 Lea. 351 ; 1 East, P. C. 45 202
R. V. Dwyers (1843), 1 Ruas. C. & M. 797 577
R. V. East. Count. Ry. Co. (1839), 10 A. & E. 631 998
R. V. East Fairley (1826), 6 Dowl. & R. 153 303
R. 0. East Mark Tything (1848), 11 Q. B. 887 ; 3 Cox, C. C. 60 ; 17 L. J.
Q. B. 877 ; 12 Jur. 332 124
R. V. East Winch (1840), 12 A. & B. 697 521
R. V. Eaton (1851), 2 Den. C. C. 274 ; nom. R. „. Uezzeli, 3 C. & K. 150;
T. & M. 598 209
R. v. Edgar (1831), 3 Russ. C. & M. 441 560
R. V. Edmonton (1831), 1 M. & Rob. 32 113
n.v. Edmunds (1833), 6 C. .S; P. 164 326, 329, 528
R. ». Edmundson (1859), 28 L. J. M. C. 213 ; 2 E. & E. 77 ; 8 Cox, C. C.
212 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 1351 264
R. ,-. Edwards (1791), 4 T. R. 440 947, 967
R. t,. Edwards (1837), 8 C. & P. 26 959
R. ». Edwards rf 872), 12 Cox, C. C. 230 377
R. I). Edwinstowe (1828), 8 B. & C. 671 521
R. D. Egerton (1819), R. & R. 375 ; cited in R. v. Ellis, 6 B. & C. 148 241
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
cliv TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PA<JB
E. ■!). Eldershaw (1828), 3 C. & P. 396 100
E. V. Elderton (1703), 2 Ld. Eaym. 980 4
E. V. Eldridge (1821), E. & E. 440 560
E. V. Ellel (1845), 7 Q. B. 593 ; 2 New Sess. Cas. 39 1139
E. V. Ellioombe (1833), 5 C. & P. 622 296, 314, 318
E. V. EUlott (1839), 8 0. & P. 772 216
E. V. Ellis (1802), MoNally, Ev. 55 883
E. V. ElUs (1824, should be 1826), 6 B. & C. 147 236, 241, 669
E. V. Elrington (1862), 1 B. & S. 688 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 14; 9 Cox, 0. C. 86. . 1131
E. V. Elworthy (1867), L. E. 1 C. C. 103 ; 37 L. J. M. C. 3 ; 17 L. T. 293 ;
16-W.E.207; 10 Cox, C. C. 579 318
E. V. Ely, Bp. of (1828), 8 B. & C. 112 ; 2 M. & E. 127 997
E. ». Emmons (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 279 826
E. ■!>. Enoch (1833), 5 C. & P. 639 563, 572
E. V. Entrehman (1842), C. & Marsh. 248 £05
E. V. Eriswell (1790), 3 T. E. 721 325, 329, 333, 340, 368, 398, 420
E. V. Erith (1807), 8 East, 539 ,420
E. V. Errington (1838), 2 Lew. 0. C. 142 333, 468
E. V. EsdaUe (1858), 1 E. & E. 213 1231
E. V. Esop (1836), 7 C. & P. 456 80
E. «.. Evans (1821), 3 Stark. 35 204
E. V. Evans (1839), 8 C. & P. 765 215
E. V. Evenwood Barony (1843), 3 Q. B. 370 1139
E. V. ExaU (1866), 4 E. & E. 922 120
E. «). Exeter (1869), L. E. 4 Q. B. 341 ; 38L. J.M. C. 127 ; lOB. &S.433.. 444,
445
E. „. Exeter, Treasurer of (1829), 5 M. & E. 167 ; and see 8 A. & E. 690. . 824
E. V. Eagent (1835), 7 C. & P. 238 468,469
E. «>. Eairie (1867), 8 E. & B. 486 247, 1121
E. V. Ealkner and Bond (1822), E. & E. 481 660
E. 1). Eanning (1865), 17 Ir. C. L. E. 289 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 411 ; 14 W. E.
701 149
E. V. Earler (1837), 8 C. & P. 106 633, 634
E. v. Earley (1846), 2 C. & K. 313 592, 601, 605
E. V. Earrell (1874), 43 L. J. M. C. 94; 12 Cox, C. C. 606 ; L. E. 2 C. C.
116; 29L. T. 404; 22 W. E. 678 332
E. V. Earrington (1811), E. & E. 207 80
E. V. Eeargus O'Connor (1843), 5 Q. B. 16 000
E. V. Eearshire (1779), 1 Lea. 202 283, 679
E. V. Felton (1628), 3 How. St. Tr. 371 673
E. ». Fennell (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 147 ; 50 L. J. M. C. 126 ; 44 L T. 687 ;
29 W. E. 742 ; 45 J. P. 666 ; 14 Cox, C. C. 607 671
E. V. Ferrers, E. of (1758), 1 Burr.635 893
E. V. Ferry Frystone (1801), 2 East, 64 368, 420
E. V. Finnoane (1833), 6 C. & P. 551 238
E. V. Firth (1869), 38 L. J. M. C. 54 ; 11 Cox, C. C. 234 ; L. E. 1 C. C.
172 ; 19 L. T. 746 ; 17 W. E. 327 236
E. V. Fisher (1785), cited 1 Lea. 310, 311, n 579
E. V. Fitzgerald (1741), 1 Lea. C. C. 20 1049, 1172
E. V. Fitzgerald (184 1), Ir. Cir. E. 168 469
E. V. Fitzgerald (1884), unreported 877
E. V. Fitzsimons (1869), I. E. 4 C. L. 1 289
E. V. Flaherty (1847), 2 C. & K. 782 293
E. V. Flannagan (1882), 15 Cox, C. C. 463 237, 247
E. ■</. Flatley (1842), Ir. Cir. E. 445 942
E. V. FlaveU (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 364; 62 L. T. 133 ; 33 W. E. 343 ; 49
J. P. 406 595
E. V. Fleming (1842), 1 Arm. M. & 0. 330 663, 571
E. V. Flemming (1799), 2 Lea. 864 334, 338
E. V. Fletcher (1829), 4 0. & P. 250 562
E. i". FHntshire (1846), 3 Dowl. & L. 637 758, 788
E. 11. Folkes (1832), 1 Moo. C. C. 354 238
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clv
FAOB
R. V. Fontaine Moreau (1848), 11 Q. B. 1028 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 187 ; 12 Jur.
626 1U6, 1117
E. V. Forbes (1814), Holt, N. P. R. 599, n 335
B. V. Forbes (1836), 7 C. & P. 224 247
R. V. Ford (1861), 2 Den. C. C. 245 ; 2 C. & K. 113 ; 5 Cox, 0. C. 184. .925, 958
R. V. Fordingbridge (1868). E. B. & E. 685, 678 ; 27 L. J. M. C. 290 ; 4
Jut. N. S. 951 '. ;149, 303
R. V. Forester (1866), 4 F. & F. 857 468
R. D. Forster (1865), Dears. 466 246
E. V. Forsyth (1814), R. & R. 274 15, 211
R. ■„. Foster (1827), 1 Lewin, C. C. 46 576
R. -D. Foster (1834), 6 C. & P. 325 377, 562
R. V. Fox Maule (1839), 7 Dowl. 693 832
R. V. France (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 207 336
R. ». Francis (1874), 43 L. J. M. C. 97 ; L. R. 2 C. C. 128 ; 12 Cox, C. C.
612 ; 30 L. T. 503 ; 22 W. R. 663 ' 247
R. V. Franoklin (1731), 17 How. St, Tr. 638 1093
R. V. Eraser (1797), 1 MoNaUy, Et. 56 883
R. V. Frederick (1738), 2 Str. 1095 888
R. V. Fi'eeman (1875), I. R. 9 C. L. 527 265
R. V. Freind (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 16 837, 960, 961, 907
R. V. Fretwell (1864), 1 L. & 0. 443 ; 9 Cox, C. C. 471 ; 31 L. J. M. C.
145 : 6 L. T. 333 ; 10 W. E. 545 80
R. V. Frost (1839), 9 C. & P. 131 829, 895, 896, 909
R. V. Frost (1855), Dears. C. C. 474 ; 6 Cox, C. C. 626 ; 3 C. L. E. 665 ;
24 L.J. M. C. 116; IJur. N. S. 406 198, 216
E. V. FuUarton (1853), 6 Cox, C. C. 191 198
E. V. Fuller (1816), E. & E. 0. C. 308 121
E. V. Fullford (1861), 1 L. & Cave, 403 ; 9 Cox, C. C. 463 ; 33 L. J. M. C.
122 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 522 ; 10 L. T. 346 ; 12 W. E. 716 47
E. V. Fumival (1821), R. & R. 446 206
E. r. Fursey (1833), 6 0. & P. 81 241, 308
R. V. Gadbury (1838), 8 C. & P. 676 261
R. V. Gallagher (1875), 15 Cox, C. C. 291 i 883
R. V. Gallagher (1883), 13 Cox, C. C. 61 633
R. n. Galvin (1865), 16 Ir. C. L. E. 452 335
E. V. Ganz (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 93 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 419 ; 46 L. T. 592 .... 1028
E. V. Garhett (1847), 1 Den. C. C. 236 ; 2 C. & K. 474 584, 960, 965, 970
E. V. Gardiner (1839), 8 C. & P. 737 ; 2 Moo. C. C. 95 627
E. 1/. Gardner (1810), 2 Camp. 513 ; U E. E. 784 518, 1093
E. V. Garner (1848), 1 Den. 3i9 ; 3 New Sess. Cas. 329; 2 C. & K. 920. .563, 571
E. V. Garner (1864), 3 P. & F. 681 237
E. J/. Garnt (1S67), 36 L. J. M. C. 89; L. E. 2 Q. B. 466; 8 B. &S.365.. 1160
E. V. Gay (1836), 7 C. & P. 230 470
R. i-. Gaynor (1839), 1 Crawf. & D. C. C. 142 ; Jebb, 0. C. 262 627, 629
R. ■!/. Gazard (1838), 8 C. & P. 695 612, 899
R. .,. Geach (1840), 9 C. & P. 499 80
R. V. Geering (1849), 18 L. J. M. C. 215 237, 247
R. V. Genge (1774), 1 Cowp. 16 60
R. V. Gibbons (1823), 1 C. & P. 98, n. (i) 564, 666, 594
R. 1,. Gibney (1822), Jebb, C. C. 15 567, 569, 570
R. •</. Gibson (1802), E. & E. 343 1105, 1107
E. V. Gibson (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 637; 66 L. J. M. C. 49 ; 66 L. T. 367 ;
36 W. E. 411 ; 51 J. P. 742 : 16 Cox, C. C. 181 1231
E. V. Giddins (1842), C. & Marsh. 634 238
E. V. Gilbrass (1836), 7 C. & P. 444 826
E. J). Gilham (1795), 1 Esp. 285 ; 6 T. E. 265 905
E. V. GUham (1828), 1 Moo. C. C. 186 ; Joy on Conf. 52— 66. . . . 567, 683, 594,
595, 596
E. V. GQlis (1866), 11 Cox, 0. C. 69 669, 582, 584
E. «. GUlow (1826), 1 Moody, C. C. 85 ; 1 Lewin, C. 0. 57 82
E. V. GUmore (1882), 15 Cox, C. C. 86 1126
R. V. Gilson (1807), R. & R. 138 296
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
Clvi TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAOB
R. V. Girdwood (1770), 1 Leaeh, C. C. 142 ; 2 East, P. C. 1120 46
E. V. Gisbum (1812), 15 East, 67 91"
K. V. Giason (1847), 2 0. & K. 781 1126
R. ». Glassie (1854), 7 Cox, 0. C. 1 888
R. V. Gleed (1832), 3 Russ. C. & M. 623 892
R. V. Glynne (1871), L. R. 7 Q. B. 16 ; 41 L. J. M. C. 58 ; 26 L. T. 61 ;
20 W R. 94 1160
R. V. Goddaid (1882), 16 Cox, C. C. 7 468
R. V. Goldsliede (1844), 1 C. & K. 651 683
R. V. Goldsmith (1873), 12 Cox, C. C. 479 8*
R. V. Goodere (1741), 17 How. St. Tr. 1015 917
R. V. Goodfellow (1879), 14 Cox, C. C. 326 332
R. V. Goodwin (1828), 1 Lew. C. C. 100 148
R. V. Gordon (1789), 1 Lea. 515 148
H.v. Gordon (1842), Car. & M. 410 1034
R. V. Gordon (1855), 25 L. J. M. C. 19 ; Dears. C. C. 686 302, 1193
R. V. Gordon, Ld. G. (1781), 21 How. St. Tr. 535. .377, 378, 383, 895, 960, 961
R. V. Gould (1840), 9 C. & P. 364 121, 685
R. V. Grady (1836), 7 C. & P. 660 334
R. V. Graham (1791), 2 Leach, 547 217
R. V. Gray (1835), 7 C. & P. 164 238
R. V. Gray (1841), Ir. Cir. R. 73 465, 469
R. V. Gray (1866), 4 F. & F. 1102 . . ., 247
R. V. Great Bolton (1845). 7 Q. B. 387 ; 14 L. J. M. C. 122 1139
R. V. Great Canfield (1810), 6 Esp. 136 209
R. V. Green (1832), 5 C. & P. 312 ., 570, 576
R. V. Green (1834), 6 C. & P. 665 568
R. V. Green (1852), 3 C. & K. 209 246
R. V. Greenaway (1846), 7 Q. B. 126 814, 833
R. V. Greene (1837), 6 A. & E. 548 1092
R. V. Gregory (1846), 8 Q. B. 608 ; 2 New Sess. Cas. 229 ; 15 L. J. M. C.
38 ; 10 Jur. 387 216
R. V. GrifBn (1809), R. & R. 161 685
R. V. Griffin (1853), 6 Cox, C, C. 219 567, 596
R. v. Griffin (1879), 14 Cox, C. C. 308 ; 4 L. R. Ir. 497 149
R. ». Griffiths (1832), 3 Russ. C. & M. 456, 463 571
R. V. Griffiths (1841), 9 C. & P. 746 958
R. V. Grimwood (1815), 1 Price, 369 1050
R. V. Groombridge (1836), 7 C. & P. 582 99
R. 1). Grove (1833), 7 C. & P. 635 ; 1 Moo. C. C. 447 212
R. V. Gmndon (1775), 1 Cowp. 322 1103, 1108
R. V. Guinea (1841), Ir. Cir. R. 167 927
R. '„. Gully (1773), 1 Leach, 98 14
R. V. Gumble (1872), 42 L. J. M. C. 7 ; L. R. 2 C. C. 1 ; 12 Cox, C. C.
248 ; 27 L. T. 692 ; 21 W. R. 299 198, 212
R. V. Gumey (1869), 11 Cox, C. C. 414 909
R. X.. Gutoh (1829), M. & M. 433 107, 687
R. V. Guthrie (1870), 11 Cox, C. C. 522 ; L. R. 1 C. C. 241 ; 39 L. J. M. C.
95 ; 22 L. T. 485 ; 18 W. R. 792 206
R. „. Guttridge (1840), 9 C. & P. 473 330, 376
R. „. Hagan (1837), 8 C. & P. 167 328
R. «-. Hagan (1873), 12 Cox, C. C. 357 248
R. V. Haines (1830), 2 Russ. C. & M. (4th ed.) 886 678
R. «. Hains (1696), Comb. 337 1019, 1032, 1033, 1046, 1052
R. .-. Hale (1778), 2 Cowp. 728 120
R. „. Hall (1790), 1 Lewin, C. C. 110 569, 679
R. V. Hall (1838), 8 C. & P. 358 388, 662
R. ■„. Halliday (1860), 29 L. J. M. C. 148; 8Cox,C. C. 298; Bell, C. C. 257.. 891
R. 1). Hamp (1852), 6 Cox, C. C. 167 314
R. i). Handoock (1841), Ir. Cir. R. 229 961
R. ?;. Hankins (1849), 2 C. & K. 823 314, 604
R. «. Hanson (1841), C. & Marsh. 334 ; 2 Moo. C. C. 245 80
R. V. Hapgood and Wyatt (1870), 11 Cox, C. C. 471 206
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clvii
PAGE
R. ». Harbome (1835), 2 17. & M. 341; 2 A. & E. 540; 1 H. iW. 36..106, 173
R. 1'. Harding (1842), 1 Arm. M. & O. 340 572
R. V. Hardwiok (1809), 11 East, 585 385, 386, 493, 494, 496
R. V. Hardwiok (1811), 1 C. & P. 98, n. (J) 566
R. V. Hardy (1794), 24 How. St. Tr. 704. .248, 383, 384, 385, 613, 614, 927, 944
R. V. Hare (1870), 13 Cox, C. C. 174 627
R.v. Hargrave (1831), 5 C. & P. 170 633
R. V. Harringworth (1815), 4 M. & Sel. 353 1208
R. V. Harris (1680), 7 How. St. Tr. 926 252
R. V. Harris (1832), 1 Moo. C. C. 338 284, 579
R. ./. Harris (1836), 7 C. & P. 429 246,943
R. ■,,. Harris (1850), 4 Cox, C. C. 440 336
R. ■„. Harris (1860), 8 Cox, C. C. 333 120
R. .-. Harris (1864), 4 P. & P. 342 248
R. V. Harrison (1692), 12 How. St. Tr. 851 330, 340
R. V. Han-ison (1834), 2 Lew. C. C. 118 246
R. V. Harriss (1822), 5 B. & Aid. 926 629
R. V. Harrisson (1846), 2 New Sess. Cas. 490 996
R. t<. Hartington (1855), 4 E. & B. 780 1106, 1131
R. V. Harvey (should be Harney) (1827), 2 B. & C. 257 ; 3 D. & R. 464 . . 109
R. V. Harvey (1850), 4 Cox, C. C. 441 332
R. D. Harvey (1871), L. R. 1 C. C. 284; 40 L. J. M. C. 63; 23 L. T. 856;
19 "W. R. 446 ; 11 Cox, C. C. 662 264
R. V. Harvey (1874), 44 L. J. M. C. 1 ; L. R. 10 Q. B. 46 1137
R. ». Haslingfield (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 558 ; 15 R. R. 350 1039
R. V. Hastings (1835), 7 C. & P. 152 633
R. V. Hatfield (1835), 4 A. & E. 156 112, 113
R. V. Haughton (1853), 1 E. & B. 612 ; 6 Cox, C. C. 101 ; 22 L. J. M. C.
89; 17 Jur. 465 89, 1109, 1141
R. V. Hawes (1847), 1 Den. C. C. 270 1170
R.'!;. Hawkins (1808), 10 East, 211 ; 2 Dow, 124 ; 14 R. R. 129 105
R. ■„. Haworth (1830), 4 C. & P. 254 289, 318, 319, 683
R. V. Hay (1860), 2 P. & P. 4 596
R. V. Hay, Dr., Stanwix's case (1767), 1 W. Bl. 640 175
R. V. Hayes (1838), 2 M. & Rob. 155 273
R. V. Haynes (1816), 4 M. & S. 214 208
R. V. Hayward (1833), 6 C. & P. 157 468
R. V. Hayward (1846), 2 C. & Kir. 234 ; 1 Den. C. C. 166 604
R. V. Hazell (1810), 13 East, 141 131
R. ». Hazy (1826), 2 C. & P. 458 263, 278
R. V. Heaiey (1824), 1 Moody, C. C. 1 202
R. V. Hearu (1841), C. & Marsh. 109 563, 568, 578
R. V. Heame (1830), 4 C. & P. 215 662
R. V. Heath (1744), 18 How. St. Tr. 123 899
R. 'v. Hebden (1738), Andr. 389 88, 1114
R. V. Hedges (1767), 28 How. St. Tr. 1367 924
R. V. Heesom (1878), 14 Cox, C. C. 14, 40 237, 332
R. V. HelUng (1715-16), 1 Str. 8 131, 132
R. 1-. Henderson (1841), 2 Moo. C. C. 192 1126
R. V. Hendon (undated), cited arguendo, 9 C. & P. 255 438
R. ... Henwood (1870), 11 Cox, C. C. 526 ; 22 L. T. 486 236
R. V. Herefordshire, JJ., Ex parte Humphreys (1850), 19 L. J. M. C. 189;
1 L. M. & P. 323 936
R. 1,. Herrington (1864), 3 New R. 468 1169
R. V. Herstmonceaux (1827), 7 C. & B. 555 681
R. X,. Hewett (1842), C. & Marsh. 534 563, 666, 567
R. ■^. Hewins (1841), 9 C. & P. 786 196
R. ■„. Heydon (1762), 1 W. Bl. 351 997
R. v. HiokHng (184.')), 7 Q. B. 880; 15 L. J. M. C. 23 1100, 1103, 1108
R. «. Hickman (1784), 2 East, P. C. 593 202
R. V. Hiffgins (1829), 2 C. & P. 603 561
R. ^. Highaeld (1828), cited 3 Russ. 0. & M. 479 583
R. V. Higson (1849), 2 C. & K. 769 577
Vol. I. ends with page 636.
Clviii TABLE OF CASES CTTED.
PAGE
E. V. Hill (1838), SO. & P. 276 80
E. V. Hill (1851 , 2 Den. C. C. 254 ; 20 L. J. M. 0. 222 26, 896
R. V. HiUam (1872), 12 Cox, 0. C. 174 583, 966
E. V. Hinckley (1810), 12 East, 361 130
E. V. Hinckley (1863), 32 L. J. M. C. 168 ; 3 B. & S. 885 ; 8 L. T. 270 ;
11 "W. R. 663; 9 Jur. N. S. 1054 305
E. «>. Hind (1860), 29 L. J. M. 0. 147 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 300 465
E. «. Hinley (1843), 2M. &Eob. 624 238
E. V. Hinxman (1791), cited 1 Leach, C. C. 310, 311, n , 579
E. V. Hirst (1828), 1 Lew. C. C. 46 676, 680
E. V. Hodg-e (1838), 2 Lewin, C. C. 227 68
E. V. Hodgkisa (1836), 7 C. & P. 298 250, 942
E. V. Hodgson (1812), R. & E. 211 257, 951, 967
E. V. Hodgson (1831), 1 Lewin, 236 217
E. V. Hogg (1833), 6C. &P. 176 329
E. «>. Hogg (1841), 2 M. & Eob. 380 215
E. V. Holbrook (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 60 : 4 Q. B. D. 42 ; 13 Cox, C. C. 650 ;
14 Cox, C. 0. 185; 47 L. J. Q. B. 35; 48 L. J. Q. B. 113 ; 37 L. T.
630; 39 L. T. 536; 26 W. E. 144 ; 27 W. E. 313 107, 587
E. V. Holden (1838), 8 C. & P. 609 943, 958
E. V. Holl (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 575 ; SO L. J. Q. B. 763 ; 45 L. T. 69 ; 46
J. P. 53 962
E. V. HoUingberry (1825), 4 B. & C. 329 ; 6 Dowl. & E. 345 203
E. V. HoUond (1794), 5 T. E. 607 ; 2 E. E. 678 208
E. «. Holmes (1843), 1 C. & Kir. 248 572
E. f. Holmes (1861), 2 E. &F. 788 897
E. V. Holmes and Fnrness (1871), 41 L. J. M. C. 12 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 137 ;
L. E. IC. 0. 334 257, 950, 961, 967
E. i-. Holt (1793), 6T. E. 436 16, 20, 1093
E. V. Holt (1836), 7 C. & P. 618 81
E. V. Holt (I860), 30 L. J. M. C. 11 ; Bell, C. C. 280 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 411 ;
6 Jur. N. S. 1121; 3 L. T. 310 ; 9 W. E. 74 247
E. -----
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E
E
E
E
Holy Trinity, Hull (1827), 7 B. & C. 611 ; 1 M. & E. 444 288
.(...Hood (1830), iMoo. C. C. 281 888
V. Hook (1857), Dears. & BeU, 606 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 6 629
V. Hooper (1842), cited 3 Euss. C. & M. 509 679
■„. Hopes (1835), 7 C. & P. 136 ; 1 M. & Eob. 396 678
V. Home (1777), 20 How. St. Tr. 664 274, 275, 276
V. Home Tooke (1794), 25 How. St. Tr. 120 526, 923, 1220
■,;. Hostmen of Newcastle (1744-5), 2 Str. 1223 994, 997
V. Hough (1806), E. & E. 122 '246
■„. Houlton (1823), 1 Jebb, C. C. 24 889, 892
■„. Howard (1832), 1 M. & Eob. 187 147
■■,. Howell (1845), 1 C. & K. 689 ; 1 Den. C. C. 1 468
„. Howes (1834), 6 C. &-P. 404 567
■.,. Hubbard (1881), 14 Cox, C.C. 665 468
■c. Hucks (1816), 1 Stark. N. P. E. 623 25, 51)
„. Huet (1798), 2 Lea. 821 679
■„. Hughes (1813), 2 Lew. C. C. 229 ; 1 Euss. C. & M. 147 165
E. ^. Hughes (1832), 5 C. & P. 126 213
E. ^. Hughes (1839), 1 Crawf. & D. C. 0. 13 1018
E. V. Hughes (1844), 1 C. & K. 619 616
E V. Hughes (i860), 29 L. J. M. C. 71 239
E. V. Hulcott (1796), 6T. R. 583 132, 1137
E. v. HuU (1860), 2 F. & F. 16 78
E. „. Hulme (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 377 ; 39 L. J. Q B. 149 962
R. ■„. Humphries (1829), cited 3 Euss. C. & M. 344 '. 318
R. i;. Hunt (1811), 2 Camp. 583 ; 31 How. St. Tr. 408 203
R. V. Hunt (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 666 248, 296, 383
R. V. Hunt (1826), 1 Moo. C. C. 93 80
R. V. Hunt (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 300 ; 60 L. J. M. 0. 35 1140
E. V. Hunter (1829), 3 C. & P. 591 698
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. cllX
PAOB
R. V. Huntley (1860), 29 L. J. M. C. 70 ; BeU, C. C. 238 ; 8 Cox, 0. C.
260; 1 L. T. 384; 8 "W. R. 183; 6 Jur. N. S. 80 1127
R. V. Hurley (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 473 278
R. V. Hutohins (1880), S Q. B. D. 353 ; 6 Q. B. D. 300 ; 49 L. J. M. C.
64; 42 L. T. 766; 28 W. R. 595 89, 1073, 1131,1140
R. V. Hutchinson (1822), 2 B. & C. 608, n 465
R. V. Hyde (1848), 3 Cox, C. 0. 90 335
R. V. Ingham (1864), 5 B. & S. 267; 33 L. J. Q. B. 183; 9 Cox, C. C.
508; 10 Jut. N. S. 968 ; lOL. T. 456; 12 W. R. 793 210,213
R. V. Ingram (1705), 1 Salk. 384 165
R. V. Ings (1820), 33 How. St. Tr. 757 310
R. V. Isle of Ely (1850), 15 Q. B. 827 ; 4 New Sess. Cas. 222 ; 19 L. J.
M. C. 223 ; 14 Jur. 956 17
R. V. Jackson (1842), cited 3 Russ. C. & M. 404 205
R. V. Jackson (1855), 6 Cox, C. C. 525 883
R. n. Jacobs (1784), 1 Lea. 309 283, 579
R. V. Jagger (1797), cited 3 Russ. C. & M. 625 893
R. V. James (1823), cited 1 C. & P. 86 947
R. V. Jarrald (1863), L. & C. 301 ; 9 Cox, C. C. 307 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 258 ;
9 Jur. N. S. 629 ; 8 L. T. 515 ; 11 W. R. 787 209
R. V. Jarvis (1756), 1 East, 644, n 263
R. V. Jarvis (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 40 81, 633, 635
R. V. Jarvis (1855), 25 L. J. M. C. 30 ; Dears. C. C. 552 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 532 ;
1 Jur. N. S. 1114 121
R. V. Jarvis (1867), L. R. 1 C. C. 96 572
R. V. Jeffries (1722), 1 Str. 446 20, 1006
R. V. Jelioote (1819), 2 Stark. R. 483 576
R. V. JeUyman (1838), 8 C. & P. 604 893
R. V. Jenkins (1822), R. & R. 492 563, 586
R. V. Jenkins (1869), L R. 1 C. C. 187 ; 38'L. J. M. C. 82; 11 Cox, C. C.
250 468
R. V. Jennings (1858), Dears. & B. C. C. 447 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 397 ; 4 Jur.
N. 8. 146 205, 1129
R. V. Jeyes (1835), 3 A. & E. 416 821, 822, 824
R. V. John (1790), 1 East, P. C. 357 467
R. V. Johnson (1805), 7 East, 65 ; 3 Smith, 94 ; 29 How. St. Tr. 103 ;
8 R. R. 597, and Preface viii 154, 302
R. V. Johnson (1827), 1 Moo. C. C. 173 824
R. V. Johnson (1829), 2 C. & K. 355 579
R. V. Johnson (1846), 2 C. & K. 394 335, 374
R. «. Johnson (1847), 2 C. & K. 355 336, 578
R. V. Johnston (1864), 16 Ir. C. L. R. 60 669
R. V. Johnstone (1793), 2 East, P. C. 786 202
R. V. JolifEe (1791), 4 T. R. 290 ; 2 R. R. 383 324, 353, 364
R. V. Jones (1774), 1 Lea. 174 151, 1209
R. V. Jones (1791), Pea. R. 38 354
R. V. Jones (1806), 8 East, 31, 451 ; 9 R. R. 368 342
R. ®. Jones (1809), 2 Camp. 131 ; 11 Rev. R. 680 15, 18, 67, 147, 237, 585,
633
R. V. Jones (1809), R. &R 152 663, 671
R. V. Jones (1827), 2 C. & P. 629 661
R. V. Jones (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 611 203
R. V. Jones (1834), 7 C. & P. 167 826, 829
R. I/. Jones (1840), 9 C. & P. 260 81, 822
R. 17. Jones (1846), 1 Den. C. C. 166 ; 2 C. & K. 234 604
R. V. Jones (1868), 11 Cox, C. C. 388 106
R. V. Jones (1872), 12 Cox, C. C. 241 572
R. V. Jones (1883), 52 L. J. M. C. 96 ; 15 Cox, C. C. 284 106, 172
R. V. Jones (1887), 14 Cox, C. C. 3 247
R. V. Jordan (1838), 9 C. & P. 118 99, 273, 274
R. V. Kain (1883), 15 Cox, C. C. 388 274
R. ». Kea(1809), 11 East, 132; lOR. R. 448 621
VoL I. ends with page 63,5.
Clx TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOE
E. V. Kealey (1851), 2 Den. 68 ; T. & M. 405 ; 5 Cox, C. C. 193 ; 20 L. J.
M. 0. 57 ; 15 Jur. 230 202
B. V. KeUy (1825), 1 Moo. C. C. 113 ; 1 Lew. C. C. 193 213
E. V. Kelsey (1832), 1 Dowl. 481 824
E. 1). Kenilworth (1788), 2 T. E. 599 1103
E. V. Kenilworth (1845), 2 Sess. Cas. 72 ; 7 Q. B. 652 ; 14 L. J. M. 0. 160 ;
9 Jur. 898 304
E. V. Kenny (1877), 46 L. J. M. C. 156 ; 13 Cox, C. C. 397 ; 2 Q. B. D. 307 ;
36 L. T. 36 ; 25 W. E. 679 165
E. v.JJ. of Kent (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 305; 42 L. J. M. 0. 112 726
E. V. Keme (1679^, 7 How. St. Tr. 714 518
E. V. Kerr (1837), 8 0. & P. 176 669
E. 1-. Kiddy (1824), 4 D. & E. 734 335
E. V. Killminster (1835). 7 C. & P. 228 78
E. V. Kimber (1849), 3 Cox, C. C. 223 677
E. V. King (1788), 2 T. E. 236 997, 1050, 1054
E. V. Kinglake (1870), 11 Cox, C. C. 499 969
E. V. Bjngsclere (1843), 3 Q. B. 388 : 13 L. J. M. C. 22 ; 3 G. & D. 177.. 1139
E. V. Kingston, Duch. of (1776), 20 How. St. Tr. 538, n. ; 1 Smith's L. C.
812 1103, 1104, 1116, 1131, 1132, 1133
E. V. Kingston (1830), 4 C. & P. 387 563, 664, 571
E. V. Kingston (1806), 8 East, 41 ; 9 E. E. 373 237
E. V. Kinloeh, Sir A. Gordon (1795), 26 How. St. Tr. 937 923
E. V. Kinloeh (1746), 18 How. St. Tr. 402 897
E. V. Kinsey (1836), 7 C. & P. 447 829
E.4). Kitson (1832, should bel853),22L.J.M.C. 118; Dears. C.C.187..296,314,318
E. V. Knaptoft (1824), 2 B. & C. 883 1131
E. V. Knill (1822), 5 B. & Aid. 929, 930, n 629
E. V. Kuollys (1694), 1 Ld. Eaym. 10, 15 18
E. i: Koops (1837), 6 A. & E. 198 1045
E. «-. Laindon (1799), 8 T. E. 379 755
E. V. Lallement (1853), 6 Cox, C. C. 204 198
E. v. Lambe (1784), 2 Lea. 559 579
E. V. Lambe (1791), 2 Lea. 552 676
E. 1). Lambeth (1845), 5 Q. B. 513 727
E. V. Lancashire (1843), 3 Q. B. 367 ; 12 L. J. M. C. 76 ; 2 G. & D. 714. . 1139
E. V. Landulph (1834), 1 M. & Eob. 393 Ill
E. V. Langbridge (1849), 1 Den. 448 ; 2 C. & K. 975 ; T. & M. 146 ; 3 Cox,
C. C. 465 ; 3 New Sess. Cas. 645 ; 18 L. J. M. C. 198 ; 13 Jur. 545 ... . 335
E. V. Langmead (1864), L. & C. 427 ; 9 Cox, C. C. 464 ; 10 L. T. 350 .. 120
E. V. Langton (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 296 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 136 ; 35 L. T. 527 ;
13 Cox, C. C. 349 150, 294, 925
E. V. Larkin (1854), 6 Cox, C. C. 377 ; Dears. C. C. 365 ; 2 C. L. E. 776 ;
23 L. J. M. C. 126 ; 18 Jur. 539 198
E. V. Laugher (1846), 2 C. & K. 225 663, 572
E. V. Lavey (1850), 3 C. & K. 26 47
E. 'J. Lavin (1843), Ir. Cir. E. 813 569, 918
E. V. Layer (1722), 16 How. St. Tr. 214 680, 626, 967, 971
E. V. Leatham (1861), 3 E. & E. 658 962, 969
E. V. Ledbetter (1850), 3 C. & K. 108 327
E. -!■. Lee (1766), cited 3 Euss. C. & M. 72 626
E. V. Lee (1838), 2 Lew. C. C. 15'4 950
E. V. Lee (1864), 4 F. & F. 63 326, 336, 337
E. V. Leeds (1847), 9 Q. B. 910 1140
E. V. Leicester JJ. (1825), 4B. & C. 892 992, 993
E. !<. Leisrh (1840), 10 A. & E. 398 397, 404, 406, 1109
E.t<. Leominster (1845), 6 Q. B. 640; 13 L.J. M. C. 54 728
E. v. Leonard (1848), 1 Den. 304 ; 3 Cox, C. C. 284 ; 2 C. & K. 514 .... 204
E. v. Levy (1819), 2 Stark. E. 458 210, 237, 238
E. V. Levy (1858), 8 Cox, C. C. 73 1071
E. V. Lewen(1836), 2 Lew. C. C. 161 824
E. V. Lewis (1802), 4 Esp. 226 ; 2 T. E. 617 947, 967
E. ■„. Lewis (1833), 9 C. & P. 161 81, 682, 583
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxi
PAGE
R. V.Lewis (1840), Aroh. Cr. PI. 651 246
E. V. Lewis (1857), Dears. & B. 326 821, 824
E. ■v. Lightfoot (1856), 6 E. & B. 822 ; 25 L. J. M. C. 115 884
E. ». LiUeshall (1845), 7 Q. B. 158 ; 14 L. J. M. C. 97 168
E. V. Lingate (1815), 1 Ph. Ev. 410 567
R. V. Little (1758), 1 Burr. 613 131
R. V. Liverpool, Mayor of (1768), 4 Burr. 2244 1137
R. V. Llaufaethly (1853), 2 E. & B. 940 320
E. V. Llanguunor (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 616 735
E. «!. Lloyd (1830), 4 C. & P. 233 465
R. V. Lloyd (1834), 6 C. & P. 393 668
E. V. Lookhart (1785), 1 Lea. C. 0. 386 685
E. «). LoUey (1812), E. &E. 237 ; 15 R. R. 737 1143
E. V. Lend. & North'- West. Ry. Co. (1854), 3 E. & B. 443 1102
E. V. Lond. & St. Kath. Dock Co. (1874), 44 L. J. Q. B. 4 ; 31 L. T. 588 ;
23 W. R. 136 1001
R. V. Loud. & South Coast Ry. Co. (1851), 20 L. J. M. C. 145 ; 15 Q. B.
313 520
R. •■-. Long (1833), 6 C. &P. 179 237, 569
R. V. Long Buckby (1806), 7 East, 45 ; 3 Smith, 92 ; 8 E. R. 595 . . . .131, 133
R. •./. Loom (1827), 1 Moo. C. C. 160 214
E. V. Loughrau (1839), 1 Crawf. & D. C. C. 79 873
E. V. Lowe (1883), 15 Cox, C. C. 286 ; 62 L. J. M. C. 122; 48 L. T.
768 1008
E. V. Lower Heyford (1840), cited 2 Smith L. C. 363 438
E. V. Lubbenham (1834), 6 JB. & Ad. 968 1170
E. „. Luoas (1808), 10 East, 235 ; 10 E. E. 283 993, 994
E. V. Luokhurst (1853), 1 Dears. C. C. 245 ; 23 L. J. M. C. 18. . . .563, 568, 571
E. V. Luffe (1807), 8 East, 202 ; 9 E. E. 406 ; Preface vii 15, 101, 621, 622
E. V. Lumley (1869), L. E. 1 C. C. 196 ; 38 L. J. M. C. 86 ; 11 Cox, C. C.
274 ; 20 L. T. 454 ; 17 W. E. 085 106, 170
E. V. Lunny (1854), 6 Cox, C. C. 477 375
E. V. Lyon (1824), Ey. & M. 151 209
E. V. M'Anemey (1841), Ir. Cir. E. 270 216
E. V. Macclesfield (1726), 16 How. St. Tr. 1252, 1391 900
E. V. Macclesfield (1849), 13 Q. B. 881 1140
E. V. Macclesfield, Ld. (1725), 16 How. St. Tr. 1146 960
B. V. M'Cafferty (1866-7), I. E. 1 C. L. 363 385
E. V. M'Conkey (1841), Ir. Cir. E. 77 213
E. V. M'Cue(1831), Jebb, C. C. 120 1117
E. •«,. M'Gulley (1838), 2 Moo. C. C. 34 ; 2 Lew. C. C. 272 214
E. ■:,. M'Donald (1841), Arm. M. & 0. 112 1018
E. ■„. M'Govem (1852), 5 Cox, C. C. 506 579
E. «/. Maohen (1849), 14 Q. B. 74 ; 18 L. J. M. C. 213 1140, 1169, 1160
E. V. M'Hugh (1857), 7 Cox, C. C. 483 582
E. i,. Mackay (1868), 11 Cox, C. C. 148 468
E. V. MoKenna (1842), Ir. Cir. R. 416 202, 382
E. V. Macpherson (1869), 39 L. J. P. C. 69 ; L. E. 3 P. C. 268 ; 23 L. T.
101 ; 18 W. E. 1063 203
E. V. M'Pherson (1857), 26 L. J. M. C. 134 ; Dears. & B. 197 206
E. V. Magill (1799), cited McNally, Ev. 38 669
E. V. MagQl (1842), Ir. Cir. R. 418 636
E. V. Mainwaring (1857), 26 L. J. M. C. 10 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 192 ; Dears.
&B. 132; 2 Jur. N. S. 1236 129, 295, 1053, 1056
E. V. Mainwaring (1858), E. B. & E. 474 ; 27 L. J. M. C. 278 78
E. V. Mallett (1830), cited 3 Euss. C. & M. 492 676
E. V. Mallory (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 33 ; 63 L. J. M. C. 134 ; 50 L. T. 429 ;
32 W. E. 721 ; 48 J. P. 487 ; 16 Cox, C. C. 456 498
E. 1!. Manning (1849), 2 C. & K. 887, 903 165
E. V. Mansfield (1841), 1 Q. B. 444 ; 1 G. & D. 7 ; 6 Jur. 605 .. . 101, 106, .422,
621
R. 4). Mansfield (1881), 14 Cox, 639 571
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
clxii TABLE 01? CASES CITED.
R. V. Mariquita & New Granada Mining Co. (1858), 28 L. J. Q. B. 67 ; 1
El. & El. 289 ; 5 Jur. N. 8. 725 1001
E. V. Marley (1842), cited 2 Russ. C. & M. 289 203
R. V. Marsden (1829), M. & M. 439 276
R. V. Marsh (1837), 6 A. & E. 236; 1 N. & P. 187; 2 H. & W. 366 ...615, 617
R. V. Marshall (1841), C. & Marsh. 147 329
R. V. Martin (1809), 2 Camp. 100 ; 11 R. R. 674 1050, 1174
R. V. Martin (1832), 5 C. & P. 128 213, 257
R. V. Martin (1834), 6 C. & P. 562 950
R. V. Martin (1869), L. R. 1 C. C. 214 ; 11 Cox, 0. C. 343 251
R. V. Martin (1872), L. R. 1 C. C. 378 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 204 ; 41 L. J. M. C.
113 365
R. V. Mashiter (1837), 6 A. & E. 153 ; 1 N. & P. 314 763
R. V. Mathews (1793), 5 T. R. 162 " 203
R. V. May (1880), 49 L. J. M. C. 67 ; 5 Q. B. D. 382 1160
R. V. Mayhew (1834), 6 C. & P. 315 627
R. V. Mazagora (1815), R. & R. 291 80
R. V. Mead (1758), 1 Burr. 542 893
R. V. Mead (1824), 2 B. & C. 608 ; 4 Dowl. & R. 120 465
R. V. Medley (1834), 6 C. & P. 292 107
R. V. Megson (1840), 9 C. & P. 420 375, 468
R. V. Meroeron (1818), 2 Stark. E. 366 583
R. V. Merch. Tailors' Co. (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 128 993, 994, 995
R. V. Merthyr Tidvil (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 29 285
R. V. Middlehurst (1757), 1 Burr. 400 203
R. V. Middlesex (1850), 1 L. M. & P. 621 727
R. V. Middlesex JJ., Re Bowman (1834), 5 B. & Ad. 1113 988
R. V. Midlam (1765), 3 Burr. 1720 992
R. ;;. MiUard (1813), R. & R. 245 246, 247
R. V. Miller (1772), 2 W. Bl. 797 14
R. «). MiUer (1850), 4 Cox, C. C. 166 336
K. V. Miller (1879), 14 Cox, C. C. 356 1129
R. V. Mills (1833), 6 C. & P. 146 563, 571
R. V. Milne (undated), cited 2 B. & Aid. 606, n. (a) 909
R. V. Milnes (I860), 2 F. & F. 10 1014
R. V. Milton (1843), 1 C. & K. 58 403
R. v. Minton (1785), 2 East, P. C. 1021 202, 468
R. V. Mitchell (1818), 2 Stark. Ev. 307, n. (»-) 148
R. V. Mitchell (1852), 2 Den. 468 ; 3 C. &K. 181 ; 21 L.J, M. C. 135. .206, 1129
R. V. MitcheU, (1892) 17 Cox, C. C. 503 Add. [335], 339, 465, 468, 523
R. ■„. Mockford (1868), 11 Cox, C. C. 10 ; 17 L. T. 582 ; 16 W. R. 375 . . 121
R. V. Mogg (1830), 4 C. & P. 364 248
R. ■„. Moore (1831), cited 3 Rnss. C. & M. 509 579
R. v. Moore (1852), 3 C. & K. 153; 2 Den: C. C. 522; 21 L. J. M. C. 199.. 563
R. V. Moore, (1892) 61 L. J. M. 0. 80 ; 66 L. T. 125 ; 40 "W. R. 304 ;
56 J. P. 345; 17 Cox, C. C. 458 902, 903
R. V. Mooree (1836), 7 C. & P. 270 634
R. V. Moors (1801), 6 East, 421, n 295
R. «/. Morgan (1852), 6 Cox, CO. 107 294
R. •.,. Morgan (1875), 14 Cox, C. C. 337 467
R. »- Morris (1761), 2 Burr. 1189 1013
R. ■„. Morris (1792), 4 T. R. 652 131
R. V. Morris (1840), 9 C. & P. 347 211
R. V. Morris (1867), 35 L. J. M. C. 85; L. R. 1 C. C. 93 1126, 1131
R. a. Morse (1838), 8 C. & P. 605 , 578
R. V. Mortlock (1845), 7 Q- B. 459 ; 2 New Sess. Cas. 108 ; 14 L. J. M. C.
153 ; 9 Jur. 621 317
R. V. Morton (1815), 4 M. & Sel. 48 303
K. V. Morton (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 514 563, 672
R. V. Mosey (1784), 1 Lea. 265, n 683
R. V. Mosley (182.5), 1 Moo. 0. C. 97 213,467, 468
R. </. Mothersell (1707), 1 Str. 93 1050, 1175
R. i,'. Mudie (1831), 1 M. & Rob. 128 62S
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxiii
PAQB
R. V. Munslow (1895), 15 E. (Mar.) 382 ; (1895) 1 Q. B. 758 ; 72 L. T. 301 ;
43W. E. 495 Add. [80]
E. V. Murlis (1829), M. & M. 615 942
E. V. Murphy (1753), 9 How. St. Tr. 724 974
E. v. Murphy (1837), 8 C. & P. 310 148, 383, 384, 917, 921, 1220
E. V. Murphy (1841), 1 Arm. M. & 0. 206 468, 945
E. «. Murphy (1859 , 28 L. J. C. P. 63 1127
E. 41. Murphy (1875), 13 Cox, C. C. 298 80
E. «;. Musiiot (1713), 10 Mod. 194 627
E. V. Musson (1858), 27 L. J. M. 0. 100; 8 E. & B. 900; 4 Jur. N. S.
Ill 112
E. ;;. Mytton (1860), 2 E. & E. 557 ; 29 L. J. M. 0. 109 396, 430
E. V. Napper (1824), 1 Moo. 0. C. 44 209
E. V. Neal (1836), 7 C. & P. 168 635
E. V. Nether HaUam (1854), 6 Cox, C. C. 435 1141
E. V. Netherthong (1813), 2 M. & Sal. 337 87, 432
E. V. Neville (1791), Pea. E. 91 549, 552
E. V. Neville (1852), 6 Cox, 0. C. 69 198
E. v. Newbonlt (1872), 41 L. J. M. C. 63 ; L. E. 1 C. C. 344 ; 2.3 L. T.
883 ; 20 W. E. 343 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 148 217
E. V. Newman (1822, should be 1853), 1 E. & B. 2C8 ; 3 C. & Kir. 252;
22 L. J. Q. B. 166 587
E. !). Newman (1852), 2 Den. 390; 3 C. & K. 240 623, 918, 1034
E. V. Newton (1843), 2 M. & Eob. 603 293
E. ». Newton 1844), 1 C. & K. 480 147
E. V. Newton (1859), 1 F. &E. 641 335
n.v. Nicholas (1846), 2 C. & K. 246 367, 898
E. V. NichoUs (1838), 1 F. & F. 51 247
E. V. Nicolas (1852), 6 Cox, C. C. 121 468
E. «. Nisbett (1853), 6 Cox, C. C. 320 246
E. V. Noakes (1832), 5 C. & P. 326 635
E. ». Northleach and Witney Eoads Trustees (1834), 3 A. & E. 477; 5 N. &
M. 344 999
E. ». North Petherton (1826), 5 B. & C. 508 ; 8 D. & E. 325 1170
E. V. North Eedbum (1784), Cald. 452 305
E. V. Norton (1823), E. & E. 510 216
E. V. Norwich Eoad Trustees (1836), 5 A. & E. 563 ; 1 N. & P. 32 ; 2 H.
& "W. 385 1 137
E. V. Nuneham Courtney (1801), 1 East, 373 368
E. V. Nute (1842), 3 Euss. C. & M. 458 ; 6 Peters, Abr. 82 567
E. V. O'Coigly (1798), 26 How. St. Tr. 1351 967
E. V. O'Connell (1843-4), Arm. & T. 163 290, 296, 383, 384, 613
E. V. Oddy (1851), 2 Den. 264 ; T. &. M. 593 ; 6 Cox, C. C. 210 ; 20 L. J.
M. G. 108 ; 15 Jur. 517 247
E. V. O'Donnell (1835), 7 C. & P. 138 829
E. V. O'Donnell (1857), 7 Cox, C. 0. 337 883
E. V. Oliver (1860), 1 BeU, 218 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 384 ; 30 L. J. M. C. 12 ; 6
Jur. N. S. 1214 ? 3 D. T. 311 ; 9 W. E. 60 206
E. V. Olney, (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 387 755
E. V. Omant (1854), 6 Cox, C. C. 466 . . ; 332
E. V. O'NeiU (1871), I. E. 6 C. L. 1 210
E.«. Onslow and Whalley (1873), 12 Cox, C. C. 358 873
E. V. Orchard (1838), 8 C. & P. 565 218, 943
E. V. O'EeiUy (1832), Ir. Cir. E. 718 570
E. V. Osborne (1837), 8 0. & P. 113 336
E. V. Osborne (1842), C. & Marsh. 624 375
E. V. Osman (1881), 15 Cox, C. C. 1 468
E. V. Otway (1849), llr. C. L. E. 69 268
E. (;. Oulton(1835), 5B. & Ad. 9.i8; 3N. &M. 62; 3L. J. M. C. 33 .. 168
E. V. Owen (1752), 18 How. St. Tr. 1223, 1227 45
E. V. Owen (1826), 1 Moo. C. C. 118 209
E. V. Owen (1830), 4 C. & P. 236 164
E. V. Owen (1840), 9 C. & P. 238 580, 582
Vol, I, ends with page 635,
clxiy TABLE OF CASES CITED,
PAGE
E. V. Owen (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 829 ; 36 "W. R. 575 ; 57 L. J. M. 0. 46 ;
58 L. T. 780 ; 62 J. P. 582 ; 16 Cox, C. C. 397 885
R.I'. Oxford (1819), B. & R. 382 202
R. V. Oxford (1840), 9 C. & P. 525 213
R. V. Packer (1829), cited 3 Russ. 0. & M. 505 579
R. V. Padstow (1832), 4 B. & Ad. 208 ; 1 N. & M. 9 ; 2 L. J. M. C. 15 . . 287
R. a. Page (1788), 6 Esp. 83 84, 283
R. V. Page (1798), 2 Esp. 649, n 1034
R. V. Pain (1826), 7 D. & R. 678 ; 5 B. & C. 251 131
R. V. Paine (1695), 1 Salt. 281 ; 5 Mod. 163 333
R. V. Paine (1834), 7 C. & P. 136 821
R. i>. Painter (1846), 2 C. & K. 319 335
R. V. Palmer (1851), 5 Cox, C. C. 236 958
R. t!. Pamenter (1872), 12 Cox, C. C. 177 669, Add. [590]
R. V. Parker (1783), 3 Doug. 242 976
R. V. Parker (1842), 0. & Mareh. 639 628, 630
R. V. Parker (1861), L. & Care, 42 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 465 563
R. V. Parker (1 862), York Summer Assizes, 1862 332
R. V. Parker (1864), 33 L. J. M. 0. 136 ; 1 L. & C. 459 ; 5 Cox, C. C. 475 78
R. V. Parker (1870), L. R. 1 C. C. 226 ; 11 Cox, C. C. 478 ; 39 L. J. M. C.
60 ; 21 L. T. 724 ; 18 W. R. 353 336
R. I-. Parratt (1831), 4 C. &. P. 670 563, 571
B. V. Parry (1837), 7 C. & P. 836 238, 985, 1127
R. V. Parsons (1866), 35 L. J. M. C. 167 ; L. R. 1 C. C. 24 ; 10 Cox, C. C.
243 1071
R. V. Partridge (1836), 7 C. & P. 551 120, 671
R. V. Payne (1872), 41 L. J. M. C. 65 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 118 ; L. R. 1 C. C.
349 883
R. V. Peace (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 579 217
R. V. Peacock (1870), 12 Cox, 0. C. 21 331
B. V. Pearoe (1791), Pea. 75 241
B. V. Pearce (1840), 9 C. & P. 668 893
R. V. Peat (1838), 2 Lew. C. C. 288 890
B. p. Pedley (1784), 1 Lea. C. 0. 325 930
B. V. Peel (1860), 2 P. & F. 21 468, 959
B. V Pegler (1833), 5 C. & P. 621 960
B. V. Peuge (1793), Nolan's Bep. 176 1139
B. V. Perlrin (1840), 2 Moo. C. C. 139 897
B. V. Perkins (1840), 9 C. & P. 395 ; 2 Moo. C. C. 135 408
E. V. Perranzabvdoe (1844), 3 Q. B. 400 ; 3 G-. & D. 315 ; 13 L. J. M. C.
47 788, 1139
B. V. Perry (undated), cited By. & M. 352 888
B. V. Petcherini (1856), 7 Cox, 0. C. 79 383
R. V. Petrie (1855), 24 L. J. Q. B. 167 ; 4 E. & B. 737 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 752 124
B. I.. PhiKps (1837), 8 C. & P. 736 100
R. V. Phillips (1818), R. & B. 369 202,283
B. V. Phillips (1829), cited 3 Buss. C. & M. 505 579
R. V. Phillips (1829), 1 Lew. C. C. 106 247
B. V. Phillpott (1861), 2 Den. 308 1045
B. V. Philp (1830), 1 Moo. C. 0. 263..-. 80
B. V. Pickford (1830), 4 C. & P. 227 46
B. V. Picton (1806), 30 How. St. Tr. 536—540, 864—870 51, 936, 937
R. V. Piddlehinton (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 460 306
R. V. Pike (1829), 3 0. & P. 598 467
R. V. Pikesley (1839), 9 C. & P. 124 577, 580
R. '\ Pilkington (1844), 5 Q. B. 662; 1 New Sess. Cas. 90 ; 13 L. J. M. C.
61 ; 8 Jur. 267 153
R. V. Pitcher (1817), 1 C. & P. 85 947
B. V. Pitts (1839), 8 C. &P. 771 216
B. V. Plant (1836), 7 0. & P. 575; 1 Moo. C. C. 477 1127
B. V. Plumer (1814), B. & B. 264 154
R. V. Plummer (1844), 1 C. & K. 604 ; 8 Jur. 921 334
B. V. Plymouth, &o. By. Co. (1889), 37 W. R. 334 916
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OP CASES CITED, clxv
PAGE
R. V. Pollard (1838), 8 0. & P. 553 165
E. V. Ponsonby (1844), 3 Q. B. 14 ; 1 Gale & D. 713 ; 6 Jur. 642 4
E. V. Pook(1871), 13 Cox, C. C. 172 378
E. «;. Potter (1829), 7 C. & P. 660, n 334
R. 41. Pountney (1836), 7 C. & P. 302 663, 664
R. ■</. Povey (1855), 22 L. J. M. C. 19 ; Dears. C. C. 32 ; 17 Jur. 120.. 7, 936, 937
E. -r. Powell (1854), 3 B. & B. 377 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 199 122
E. V. Po-wis, Earl (1678-85), 7 How. St. Tr. 1384, 1458, 1552 900
E. V. Pressly (1833), 3 C. & P. 183 676, 580
E. I.. Preston (1848), 12 Q. B. 816, 825, 826 131
E. V. Preston, Ld. (1791), 12 How. St. Tr. 658 ; Post. C. L. 228 900, 985
E. V. Price (1837), 8 0. & P. 19 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 405 166, 958
E. V. Pringle (1840), 2 M. & Eob. 276 16, 18
E. V. Pritohard (1867), 30 L. J. M. C. 169 ; L. & C. 34 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 461 ;
7 Jur. N, S. 657 ; 4 L. T. 340 ; 9 W. E. 971 199
E. V. Pnddifoot (1829), 1 Moo. C. C. 247 214
E. V. Purefoy (1794), Pea. Evid. 61 n. (6th ed.) 340
E. V. PumeU (1748-9), 1 W. Bl. 37 ; 1 Wils. 239 997
E. V. Pye (1790), 2 East, P. C. 785 202
E. V. Qualter (1854), 6 Cox, C. C. 357 468
E. V. Queen'sCty.JJ.,EeEeehan(1882),10L.E.Ir.294; 16Cox,C.C.149..483,884
E. V. Quigley (1842), Ir. Cir. E. 677 375
E. ». Quin (1863), 3E. &E. 818 969
E. V. Eadley (1849), 1 Den. 450 ; 3 New Sese. Cas. 651 ; T. & M. 144 ;
2 0. & K. 974 ; 3 Cox, C. C. 460 ; 18 L. J. M. C. 184 ; 13 Jur. 544 ... 202
E. ■„. Eamsay (1883), 15 Cox, C. C. 231 ; 1 C. & E. 126 ; 48 L. T. 733. .107, 687
E. V. Eamsbottom (1787), 1 Lea. 25, n 1045
E. •</. Eamsden (1827), 2 C. & P. 604 927, 960
E. ^. Eatcllflfe (1832), 1 Lewiu, C. C. 122 1102
E. V. Eatoliflee Culey (1846), 2 New Sess. Cas. 352 578
E. »-. Eawden (1828), 8 B. & C. 708 ; 3 M. & E. 426 284
E. V. Eawden (1834), 2 A. & E. 158 303
E. V. Eead (1839), 9 A. & E. 619 ; 1 P. & D. 413 630
E. V. Eeader (1830), 4 C. & P. 245 ; 1 M. C. C. 239 1140
E. V. Eeading (1679), 7 How. St. Tr. 796 965
E. D. Eeading (1734), Cases temp. Hardw. 79 621, 622
E. V. Eeading (l836), 7 C. & P. 649 678
E. *. Eeaney (1857), Dears. & Bell, 161; 26 L. J. M. C. 43 ; 7Cox, C.C. 209.. 468
E. ».. Eearden (1864), 4 E. & P. 76 236
E. «-. Eeason (1734), 1 Str. 499 ; 16 How. St. Tr. 1 469, 470, 679
E. ■</. Eeason (1872), 12 Cox, C. C. 228 672
E. .«/. Eeed(1829), M. &M. 403 283, 880
E. «. Eees (1789, should be 1834), 6 C. & P. 606 148
E. ^. Eees (1832), 6 C. & P. 302 824
E. „. Eees (1836), 7 C. & P. 569 569
E. „. Reeve (1872), L. E. 1 C. C. 362 ; 41 L. J. M. C. 92; 12 Cox, C. C.179. . 672
E. «,. Eeg. of Deeds for Middlesex (1869), 28 L. J. Q. B. 77 731
E. V. Eeid (1829), M. & M. 403 685
E. 4». Eeilly (1843), Ir. Cir. E. 795 1033
R. ■</. Eemnant (1807), 5 T. R. 169 -. 959
R. •.,. Rhodes (1742), 1 Lea. C. C. 24 1049, 1172
E. V. Richards (1828), 8 B. & C. 420 ; 824
E. V. Eiohards (1832), 1 M. & Eob. 177 567, 571 .
R. «/. Richards (1866), 4 P. & P. 860 336
R. V. Richardson (1860), 2 P. & F. 343 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 848 209
R. «/. Richardson (1863), 3 P. & P. 693 614
E. «.. Eickman (1789), 2 East, P. C. 1034 121
- E. «-. Eidley (1823), E. & E. 615 209
E. •</. Eigg (1866), 4 P. & P. 1085 340
E. V. Eiley (1851), 3 C. & K. 116 336
R. V. Riley (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 481 : 56 L. J. M. C. 52 ; 66 L. T. 371 ;
35 W. R. 382 950
E. V. Ring (1800), 8 T. R. 585 ; 5 R. R. 478 833
Vol. I. ends with page fiSfi.
Clxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAGE
E. V. Rishworth (1842), 2 Q. B. 487 ; 1 G. & D. 597 ; 11 L. J. M. C. 34 . . 414
E. -I/. Eivers (1835), 7 C. &P. 177 283, 580
E. ». Roadley (1880), 14 Cox, C. C. 463 ; 49 L. J. M. C. 88 ; 42L.T. 616.. lOO
E. V. Eoberts (1808), 1 Camp. 399 263
E. V. Eoberts (1848), 2 C. & Kir. 614 630
U.v. Eoberts (1873), 14 Cox, C. C. 101 ; 147, 1023
E. V. Eobey (1833), 6 C. & P. 662 826
E. V. Eobins (1843), 2 M. & Eob. 612 257, 951
E. V. Eobinson (1796), 2 Leach, C. C. 765, 765 46, 248
E. V. Eobinson (1817), Holt, N. P. E. 695 215
E. V. Eobinson (1828), 1 Lew. C. C. 129 826
E. V. Eobinson (1839), 1 Crawf. & D. C. C. 329 1031, 1033, 1034
E. V. Eobinson (1840), 12 A. & E. 672 ; 4 P. & D. 391 1073
E. V. Eobinson (1867), L. E. 1 0. C. 80 ; 36 L. J. M. C. 78 966
E. V. Eoche(1775), 1 Lea. 134; B. N. P. 246 1153
'R.v. Eoche (1841), C. & Mar. 341 676, 585
E. V. Eoddam (1777), 2 Cowp. 672 838
E. V. Eoden (1874), 12 Cox, C. C. 630 , 237
E. v. Eoebuek (1855), Dears. & B. 24 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 126 ; 25 L. J. M. C.
101 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 597 247
E. V. Eook (1752), 1 WUs. 340 621
E. V. Eookwood (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 211 971, 973
E. V. Eooney (1836), 7 C. & P. 517 241, 829
E. V. Eosa Eue (1876), 13 Cox, C. C. 209 566
R. V. Eosewell (1684), 10 How. St. Tr. 190 920, 960
E. V. Rosier (1821), 1 Ph. Et. 410 667
R. V. Eosser (1836), 7 C. & P. 648 899
R. V. Row (1809), E. & E. 153 666
E. V. Eowland (1826), Ry. & M. 401 883
R. V. Rowley (1825), 1 Moo. C. C. Ill 364
R. V. Rowton (1865), 34 L. J. M. C. 57 ; L. & Cave, .520 ; 10 Cox, C. C.
26 ; 11 L. T. 745 ; 13 W. R. 436 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 325 249, 251
R. .,. Eudd (1775), 1 Lea. C. U. 127 889
E. V. Eudge (1805), Pea. Add. Cas. 232 ; 4 R. R. 906 948
E. V. Eudge (1874), 13 Cox, C. C. 17 1128
E. ■«. Eussell (1827), 6 B. & C. 566 47
E. V. EusseU, Ld. J. (1839), 7 Dowl. 793 832
E. 0. Euston (1786), 1 Lea. C. C. 408 897
R. V. Ryan (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 213 81
R. 11. Ryland (1868), 11 Cox, C. C. 101 ; 18 L. T. 538; 16 W. E. 941.... 206
E. f. Ryle (1841), 9M. AW. 227; 1 D. N. S. 431; 6 Jur. 238 349
E. V. Eymer (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 136 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 108 ; 35 L. T. 774 ;
25 W. E. 415 ; 13 Cox, C. C. 378 162
E. V. Eymes (1863), 3 C. & K. 326 198
E. V. Ryton(1792), 6 T. R. 259 87, 432
R. ». Sadler (1830), 4 C. & P. 218 815
R. V. Saffron HUl (1852), 22 L. J. M. C. 22 ; 1 E. & B. 93 302, 303
R. V. St. Andrew, Pershore (1828), 8 B. & C. 679 153
E. V. St. Anne, Westminster (1847), 2 New Sess. Cas. 529 ; 9 Q. B. 884;
16L. J. M. C. 33 1138, 1140
E. V. St. Asaph, Dean of (1783), 21 How. St. Tr. 1039, 1040 23, 45
E. V. St. George (1840), 9 0. & P. 488 974
E. *. St. George, Bloomsbury (1866), 4 E. & B. 620 ; 24 L. J. M. C. 49 . . 1136
E. V. St. Giles (1863), 22 L.J. M. C. 64; 1 E. & B. 642 1214, 1219
E. V. St. GQes-in-the-Fields (1844). 6 Q. B. 872 ; D. & M. 110 ; 1 New
Sess. Cas. 137 ; 13 L. J. M. C. 89 ; 8 Jur. 467 521
E. V. St. John (1839), 9 C. & P. 40 209
E. V. St. Katherine (1831), 5 B. c& Ad. 970, n 1170
E. «-•. St. Martin's, Leicester (1834), 2 A. & E. 210 ; 4 N. & M. 202 . .289, 924,
926 927
R. V. St. Mary, Lambeth (1796), 6 T. E. 615 ; 8 E. E. 236, 240 'll06
R. 1). St. Mary, Lambeth (1846), 7 Q. B. 587 ; 2 New Sess. Cas. 36 1139
R. V. St. Marylebone (1824), 4 Dowl. & R. 476 149
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxvii
PAOH
R. V. St. Maryletone (1836), 5 A. & E. 268 993
R. V. St. Mary Magdalen (1853), 2 E. & B. 809 ; 23 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 17
Jur. 1075 131
R. V. St. Mary, Warwiok (1853), 22 L. J. M. 0. 109 ; 1 El. & Bl. 816 ; 1
C. L. R. 192 ; 17 Jur. 551 454
R. 1/. St. Maurice (1851), 16 Q. B. 908 ; 20 L. J. M. 0. 221 ; 15 Jur. 559. . 17
R. V. St. Michael's (1848), 12 Q. B. 96 ; 3 New Sess. Cas. 260 578
R. V. St. Pancras (1794), Pea. R. 220 1109, 1141
R. V. St. Paul, Covent Garden (1845), 7 Q. B. 232 134
R. V. St. "Weonard's (1834), 6 0. & P. 682 209
R. V. Salisbury (1838), 8 A. & E. 716 ; 3 N. & P. 476 ; 7 L. J. M. C. 110. . 683
R. V. Salt (1862), 3 F. & E. 834 246
R. V. Salter (1804), 6 Esp. 126 248
R. V. Sansome (1860), 1 Den. 545 677, 680
R. V. Savage (1831), 6 0. & P. 143 329
R. 0. Savage (1876), 13 Cox, C. 0. 178 293, 937
R. V. Soaife (1851), 17 Q. B. 242 ; 2 Den. 281 ; 5 Cox, C. C. 243 ; 20 L. J.
M. C. 229 ; 16 Jur. 607 328, 330, 332, 469
R. ■„. Soallan (1838), Craw. & D. Abr. Cas. 340 468, 470
R. V. Scammonden (1789), 3 T. R. 476 ; 1 R. R. 752 748, 756
R. V. Sohlesinger (1847), 10 Q. B. 670 ; 2 Cox, C. C. 200 ; 17 L. J. M. C.
29 ; 12 Jur. 283 930
R. «. Scott (1790), 3 T. R. 604 792
R. V. Scott (1856), 25 L. J. M. C. 128 ; Dears. & B. C. 0. 47 ; 2 Jur. N. S.
1096 583, 966
R. v. Scott (1877), L, R. 2 Q. B. D. 415 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 259 ; 13 Cox,
694 1041, 1042, 1097
R. V. Searle (1831), 1 M. & Rob. 75 934
R. V. Sedgeley (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 65 50
R. V. SeUers (1796), Carr. Cr. L. 233 , 469
R. V. Serjeant (1826), Ry. & M. 352 888, 889, 893
R. V. Serva (1845), 2 C. & K. 56 906
R. V. Sewell (1846), 8 Q. B. 161 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 49 ; 10 Jur. 48 1178
R. -v. Sexton (1822), cited in Joy on Conf. 17—19 568, 576
R. V. Shaftesbury (1681), 8 How. St. Tr. 817 965
R. V. Shaw (1823), R. & R. 526 1032, 1097
R. V. Shaw (1834), 6 C. & P. 372 568, 569
R. t). Shaw (1867), L. & Cave, 579; 10 Cox, C. C. 66; 34L. J.M. C. 169. . 627
R. V. Sheehan (1826), Jebb, C. C. 64 ,633, 634
R. V. Sheen (1837), 2 C. & P. 765 215
R. V. Sheering (1836), 7 C. & P. 440 821
R. V. Shellard (1840), 9 C. & P. 279 956, 958
R. «. Shelley (1789), 3 T. R. 142; IR. R. 673 993, 997
R. V. Shepherd (1836), 7 C. & P. 579 663, 672
R. V. Shepherd (1868), 37 L. J. M. C. 45; L. R. 1 C. C. 118 ; 11 Cox,
C. C. 119 ; 17 L. T. 482 ; 16 W. R. 373 211
R. V. Sheppard (1806), R. & R. 169 80
R. V. Shfrman (1736), Cases temp. Hardw. 303 883
R. V. Shipley (1784), 4 Doug. 73,177 82
R. t>. Shott (1851), 3C. &K. 206 1128
E. V. Shrimpton (1851), 2 Den. 319 ; 3 C. & Kir. 373 ; T. & M. 628 ; 21
L. J. M. C. 37 ; 5 Cox, C. 0. 387 251
R. V. Shurmer (1886), 17 Q- B. D. 323 ; 55 L. J. M. C. 153 ; 66 L. T. 126; •
34 W. R. 666 ; 50 J. P. 743 338
R. V. Sidney Westley (1868), 11 Cox, C. C. 139 1073 '
R. V. Simmonds (1823), 1 C. & P. 84 943
R. v. Simons (1834), 6 C. & P. 541 183, 556, 669
R. «/. Simpson (1738), 2 Ld. Eaym. 1379 17
R. V. Simpson (1834), 1 Moo. C. C. 410 563
R. «/. Sippet (1839), Maidstone Assizes 568
E. ■„. Sirrell (I860), cited 2 Den. 267 247
R. V. Skeen and Freeman (1859), 28 L. J. M. C. 91 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 143 ;
Bell, C. C. 97 ; 7 W. R. 256 ; 5 Jnr. N. S. 151 963
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
Clxviii TABLE OP CASES CITED.
FAQB
R. 4). Skinner (1772)^ LofEt, 56 869
E. V. Slaney (1832), 5 C. & P. 213 960
E. V. Slator (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 267 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 246 ; 30 W. R. 410 ;•
46 J. P. 694 962
R. V. Slaughter (1831), 4 C. & P. 644, n. (i) 564
R. V. Slawstone (1852), 18 Q. B. 388 ; 21 L. J, M. C. 145 ; 16 Jur. 1066.. 727
R. V. Sleeman (1853), Dears. & Bell, 249 663, 565, 567
R. V. Sleep (1861), L. & Cave, 44 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 472 ; 30 L. J. M. C. 170 ;
7 Jur. N. S. 979 ; 4 L. T. 625 ; 9 W. R. 709 264
E. V. Slogget (1856), Dears. & Bell, 666 ; 25 L. J. M. C. 93 ; 2 Jur. N. S.
1096 683
E. V. Sloman (1832), 1 Dowl. 618 832
R. V. SmaUpieoe (1821), 2 Chitty, R. 288 996
R. V. Smart (1841), Ir. Cir. Rep. 15 240
R. V. Smith (1783 , 1 Lea. 288 1116
R. V. Smith (1816), 1 Stark. R. 242 580
R. V. Smith (1817), E. & R. 339 ; 2 Stark. R. 208 ; Holt, N. P. E. 614.. 326, 339
E. V. Smith (1822), cited 1 Ph. Ev. 171 604
E. ». Smith (1826), 1 Moo. C. C. 289 888
E. V. Smith (1827), 2 C. & P. 633 246
E. V. Smith (1828), 8 B. & C. 341 1031, 1033
E. I). Smith (1833), 1 Moo. C. C. 402; 6 C. & P. 151 215
E. V. Smith (1842), Ir. C. E. 459 1-65
E. V. Smith 1845), 2 C. & K. 207 334
E. V. Smith (1849), 1 Den. 610, 512 ; 2 C. & Kir. 882, 884 46
E. v. Smith (1856), Dears. 559 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 5 80
E. V. Smith (1858), Dears. & Bell, 653 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 27 165
E. V. Smith (1866), L. & Cave, 607 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 82 ; 34 L. J. M. C.
153 469
E. V. Smithies (1832), 5 C. & P. 332 587
E. V. Somersetshire JJ. (1826), 6 B. & C. 816 1136
E. V. Sourton (1836), 6 A. & E. 180 ; 6 N. & M. 575 ; 2 H. & W. 209. . . . 621
R. V. South Holland Drainage (1844), 8 A. & E. 437 ; 1 P. & D. 79 ; 1 W.
W. & H. 647 1137
R. V. Southampton (1845), 6 Q. B. 613 727
R. V. Sow (1843), 4Q. B. 93 525, 1131
R. V. Spencer (1824), Rv. & M. 97 1013, 1014 '
R. V. Spencer (1837), 7 C. & P. 776 664
R. V. Spicer (1845), 1 C. & K. 699 ; 1 Den. C. C. 82 214
R. V. SpUsbury (1835), 7 C. & P. 187 468, 668, 679
R. V. Stafford (1680), 7 How. St. Tr. 1378 929
E. V. Staffordshire JJ. (1837), 6 A. & E. 99 981, 992, 993
E, V. Stainforth (1845), 11 Q. B. 66 ; 3 New Sess. Cas. 63 ; 17 L. J. M. C.
25 ; 12 Jur. 95 130, 131
E. V. Stamper (1841), 1 Q. B. 123 ; 10 L. J. M. C. 73 93
E V. Stanley cum Wrenthorpe (1812), 15 East, 350 621
E. ». Stanton (1861), 5 Cox, C. C. 324 1131
R. ». Staple Eitzpaine (1842), 2 Q. B. 494 290
E. V. Stapleton (1828), Jebb, C. C. 93 165
R. V. Steel (1787), 1 Lea. 462 897
E. V. Stephens (1866), L. E. 1 Q. B. 702 ; 35 L. J. Q. B. 251 ; 10 Cox,
C. C. 340 ; 7 B. & S. 710 ; 14 L. T. 593 ; 14 W. E. 859 ; 12 Jur. N. S.
951 107
R. V. Stephenson (1862), 31 L. J. M. C. 147 , L. & Cave, 166 ; 9 Cox,
C. C. 156 332, 336
R. V. Steptoe (1830), 4 C. & P. 397 561
R. V. Stevenson and Coulter (18$1), MS., 4th March, Ireland 883
R. V. Sfceventon (1843), 1 C. & K. 66 209
R. V. Stewart (1876), 13 Cox, 0. C. 296 1030
R. V. Stoke Goldinfr (1817), 1 B. & A. 173 306
R. V. Stoke-upon-Trent (1843), 5 Q. B. 308 ; D. & M. 357 ; 13 L J. Q. B.
41; 8 Jur. 34 756, 768
R. V. Stokes (1850), 4 Cox, C. C. 451 958
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxix
PAQE
R. V. Stone (1796), 6 T. R. 528 382
E. V. Stonyer (1843), 3 Russ. 0. & M. 371 237
R. V. Stourbridge (1828), 8 B. & C. 96 ; 2 M & R. 43 304
R. V. Stourton (1836), 5 A. & E. 180 415
R. V. Strahan (1855), 7 Cox, C. C. 85 963
R. V. Strand Board of Works (1864), 4 B. & S. 626 ; 33 L. J. M. 0. 33 ;
12 W. R. 826 Ill, 112
K. V. Stretch (1835), 4 Dowl. 30; 3 A. & E. 603 831, 832
R. V. Stripp (1856), 7 Cux, C. C. 97 ; Dears. C. C. 648 577, 679
R. 4). Strouer (1845), 1 C. & K. 650 943
R. V. Stroud (1842), 1 C. & K. 187 ; 2 Moo. 0. C. 270 215
R. V. Stubbs (1856), 25 L. J. M. C. 16 ; "Dears. C. C. 555 ; 1 Jmr. N. S.
1115 633, 634
R. V. Sturge (1854), 3 E. & B. 734 ; 23 L. J. M. C. 172 ; 18 Jur. 1052 . . 198
R. V. Suddis (1801), 1 East, 306 1103
R. V. Sullivan (1874), I. R. 8 C. L. 404 884
R. v. Sullivan (1887), 20 L. R. Ir. 550 551
R. v. SuUs (1800), 2 Leaoh, 861 217
R. •^. Summers (1705), 2 East, P. C. 786 202
R. ■„. Surrey (1844), 6 Q. B. 606 727
R. .,. Sutolifie (1850), 4 Cox, 0. C. 270 660
R. V. Sutton (1817), 4 M. & S. 542 3, 893, 1092
R. V. Sutton (1835 , 3 A. & E. 597, 612 ; 5 N & M. 353 ; 1 H. & W. 428 lfi4
R. ..,. Sutton (1838), 8 A. & E. 616 ; 3 N. & P. 569 897, 402
R. V. Swatkins (1831), 4 C. & P. 548 16, 563, 570
R. V. Sweeney (1841), Ir. C. Rep. 366 215
R. V. Swendsen (1702), 14 How. St. Tr. 496 : 250
R. V. Tait (1861), 2 F. & P. 653 332
R. V. Tancock (1876), 13 Cox, C. C. 217 1129
R. V. Tanner (1795), 1 Esp. 306 168
R. v. Tarrant (1833), 6 C. & P. 182 578, 580
R. V. Taverner (1809), Carr. Supp. 195 ; 4 C. & P. 413, n. (») 246
R. V. Taylor (1790), Pea. R. 11 904
R. V. Taylor (1823), 1 C. & P. 84 n 943
R. ». Taylor 1832), 6 C. & P. 301 824
R. V. Taylor 1839), 8 0. & P. 734 563, 665
R. V. Taylor (1868), L. R. 1 C. C. 194 ; 38 L. J. M. C. 106 ; 11 Cox, C. C.
261 ; 4 F. & F. 611 206
R. V. Teal (1809), 11 East, 309 ; 13 East, 4 ; 10 R. R. 616 877
R. V. Tew (1866), Dears. C. C. 429 919
R. V. Thanet, Earl of (1799), 27 How. St. Tr. 846 612, 899
R. V. Thistlewood (1820), 33 How. St Tr. 691 267, 291, 310
R. V. Thoman (1871), 12 Cox, C. C. 54 211
R. V. Thomas (1794), 2 Lea. C. C. 637 : 576
R. V. Thomas (1834), 2 Lea. 877 ; 2 East, P. C. 934 239, 564, 571
R. v. Thomas (1837), 7 0. & P. 817 334
R. V. Thomas (1870 , 11 Cox, C. C. 535 824, 1020
R. V. Thomas (1875), 13 Cox, C. C. 52 1126
R. ». Thompson (1783), 1 Lea. C. C. 291 563, 671
R. V. Thompson (1826), 1 Moo. C. C. 139 ; 1 Lew. C. C. 194 213
R. *. Thompson (1845), 6 Q. B. 721 998
R. V. Thompson 1876), 13 Cox, C. C. 181 382
R. V. Thompson, (1893 2 Q. B. 12 ; 62 L. J. M. C. 93 ; 69 L. T. 22 ; 41
W. R. 525 ; 57 J. P. 312 ; 5 R. 392 562, 663, 671, 573
E. ». Thompson and others (1872), 41 L. J. M. C. 112 ; L. R. 1. C. C. 377 ;
12 Cox, C. C. 202 888
R. V. Thompson and Simpson (1863), 3 F. & F. 824 889
R. ». Thornton (1824), 1 Moo. C. C. 27 568, 669, 671
R. ■!). Thring (1832), 5 C. & P. 507 1034
R. f. Thurseross (1834), 1 A. & E. 126 1169
R. V. Thurtell (1822), Alison, Prac. 584 ; Joy on Conf . 84 685
R. ». Tinckler(1781), 1 East, P. C. 354 467, 468
R. V. Tippet (1823), R. & E. 509 569
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
Clxx TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOE
R. V. ToaHey (1866), 10 Cox, C. C. 406 275
E. «. Tolaon (1864), 4 P. & P. 73 , 1071
E. i;. Tomlinson (1834), 6 0. & P. 370 " 213
R. V. Tooke (1794), 25 How. St. Tr. 446 1033
E. V. Toole (1857), Dears. & B. 194 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 266 ; 26 L. J. M. C. 79 ;
3 Jur. N. S. 420 216, 572
E. «). Torpey (1871), 12Cox, 0. 0. 45 165
E. V. Totness (1849), 11 Q. B. 80 ; 18 L. J. M. C. 46 132
E. V. Tower (1815), 4 11. & Sel. 162; 16 E. R. 428 993, 994
E. V. Towey (1860), 8 Cox, C. C. 328 627
E. V. Townsend (1841), C. & Marsh. 178 148
E. V. Treble (1810), 2 Taun. 329 1194
E. 0. Trehame (1831), 1 Moo. C. C. 298 210
E. V. Trenwyth (1841), Ir. C. E. 172 148
E. ». TrevelH (1882), 15 Cox, C. C. 289 274
E. V. Trowbridge (1827), 7 B. & C. 252 521
E. V. Trueman (1839), 8 C. & P. 727 238
E. V. Tubby (1833), 5 C. & P. 530 683
E. V Tuberfield (1864), 34 L. J. M. 0. 20 ; L. & C. 495 ; 10 Cox,
C.C.I ; : 250
E. V. Tuffs (1848) 1 Den. C. C. 324 604
R. i>. Turner (1664), 6 How. St. Tr. 613 249, 250, 252
E. V. Turner (1816), 5 M. & Sel. 206 266, 267
R. V. Turner (1830), 1 Lew. 0. C. 177 213
R. V. Turner (1832), 1 Moo. P. C. 347 ; 1 Lew. C. C. 119 528, 686, 1102,
1116
E. V. Turner (1848), 2 C. & K. 732 1014
E. V. Turwestou (1830, should be 1850), 16 Q. B. 109 ; 4 Cox, C. C. 349 •
20 L. J. M. C. 46 ; 15 Jur. 650 203
E. ■!). Tutohin (1704), 14 How. St. Tr. 1128 45
E. «;. Twyning (1819), 2 B. & A. 386 106
E. V. Tyler (1823), 1 C. & P. 129 566
R. V. Tylney (1849), 18 L. J. M. C. 37 ; 1 Den. C. C. 319 6"4
R. j;. Tymms (1870), 11 Cox, C. C. 645 198
E. V. Udall (1590), 1 How. St. Tr. 1289 45
R. V. TJezzell {see R. v. Eaton) .
E. ». trimer (1850), 4 Cox, C. C. 442 336
E. V. Unkles (1873), I. E. 8 C. L. 60 659
E. ». Upoh'urch (1836), 1 Moo. 0. C. 465 663 571
E. D. Upper Boddingtou (1826), 8 D. & R. 726 321, 597! 699
E. V. TJpton Gray (1830), 10 B. & C. 812 127 130
R. V. Upton-on-Sevem (1833), 6 C. & P. 133 202' 209
R. V. Van ButoheU (1825, should be 1829), 3 C. & P. 631 ..'. 467^ 468
R. V. Vandercomb (1796), 2 East, P. C. 614 ; 2 Lea. 708 . . .205, 236, 985, 1126
R. V. Vane (1662), 6 How. St. Tr. 123 ; 1 East, P. C. 125 626
E. «j. Varlo (1775), 1 Cowp. 248 ' 791
E. V. Vaughan (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 535 ' 624 626 917
E. V. Verelst (1813), 3 Camp. 432 ; 14 E. R. 775 ' 147
R. «i. Vernon (1872), 12 Cox, C. C. 153 603
E. V. Vickery (1848), 12 Q. B. 478 ; 3 New Sess. Cas. 193 ; 17 L. J.'m 'c
129 ; 12 Jur. 681 833
R. !>. Vidil (1861), 9 Cox, C. C. 4 ■.'.■.■.■.' .'332, 333
R. f. Vincent (1771-2), 1 Str. 481 HOa 1107
R. D. Vincent (1839), 9 C. & P. 91 ■"■■ '943
E. V. Vincent (1840), 9 C. & P. 276 373
E. V. Vincent (1852), 2 Den. C. C. 464 ; 6 Cox, 0. C. 537 ; 3 C & K ' 246 •
21 L. J. M. C. 109 ; 16 Jur. 457 ' 193
E. v. Virrier (1840), 12 A. & B. 324 627
E. «. Voke (1823), R. & E. 531 248
E. ». Wade (1825), 1 Moo. G. 0. 86 897 ggg
E. V. "Waiawright (1876), 13 Cox, C. 0. 171 '378
E. V. Waite, (1892) 2 Q. B. 600 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 187 ; 67 L. T 308 "■
41 W. R. 80 ' 100
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxxi
PAOH
R. V. Waltefield (1804), 5 East, 335 ; 1 Smitli, 512 6-21
R. V. "Wakefield (1827), 2 Lew. C. C. 279 890, 893
R. V. Walker (18U6), cited 6 C. & P. 162 583
R. V. "Walker (1811), 3 Camp. 264 216
R. ». "Walker (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 212 375
R. V. Walker (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 357 1100, 1131
R. V. Walker (1859), 1 F. & P. 634 332
R. V. Walkley(1833), 6 0. & P. 175 662, 664
R. V. Wall (1830), 3 Rubs. C. & M. 625, 834 329, 340
R. V. Wallace (1853), 3 Ir. 0. L. R. 38 109, 111
R. o. Wallace (1866), 17 Ir. 0. L. R. 206 15
R. «/. Walsh (1843), Ir. Cir. R. 866 566, 571
R. V. Walsh (1850), 5 Cox, 0. 0. 115 335
R. f. Walter (1836), 3 Esp. 21 ; 6 R. R. 808 ; Preface vi 678
R. V. Ward (1834), 6 C. & P. 366 1032
R. V. Ward (1836 , 4 A. & E. 384 47
R. V. Ward (1864), 10 Cox, 0. 0. 42 238
R. c. Wardle (1800), R. & R. 9 ' 202
R. V. Wardroper (1860), 1 BeU, C. 0. 249 ; 8 Cox, C. 0. 284 : 29 L. J.
M. 0. 116 165
R. V. Warickshall (1783), 1 Lea. C. 0. 263 685
R. V. Warman (1846), 1 Den. 183 ; 2 Oar. & K. 196 213
E. V. Warner (1832), cited 3 Russ. C. & M. 452, 498 668
R. V. Warringham (1851), 2 Den. C. C. 447 662, 563
R V. Warwickshire (1837), 6 A. & B. 873 ; 2 N. & P. 153 727
R. v. Washbrook (1826), 4 B. & C. 732 1133
R.». Waters (1832), 7 0. & P. 250; 1 Moo. 0. 0. 467 213,216
R. ». Waters (1848), 1 Den. 356 ; 2 0. & K. 868 ; 18 L. J. M. 0. 53 . . . .84, 215
R. V. Watkins (1831), cited 4 0. & P. 660, n. (4) 680
R. V. Watkinson (1739-40), 2 Str. 1122 610
R. V. Watson (1788), 2 T. R. 201 ; 1 R. R. 461 310
R. V. Watson (1808), 1 Camp. 215 154
R. V. Watson (1817), 2 Stark. R. 139 ; 32 How. St. Tr. 82 121, 248, 296,
382, 384, 385, 626, 613, 616, 626, 895, 896, 909, 921, 947, 948,
970, 972
R. V. Watson (1834), 6 C. & P. 653 959, 977
R. V. Watson (1851), 3 C. & Kir. Ill 680
R. V. Watts (1864), 3 New R. 177 ; 33 L. J. M. 0. 63 ; L. & Care, 339 ;
9 Cox, 0. 0. 396 ; 9 L. T. 453 ; 12 W. R. 112 335
R. v. Waverton (1851), 17 Q. B. 662 ; 2 Den. 0. C. 340 ; 21 L. J. M. 0.
7 ; 16 Jur. 6 209
R. V. Wavertree (1841), 2 M. & Rob. 253 399
R. V. Weaver (1873), 43 L. J. M. C. 13 ; L. R. 2 0. 0. 85 ; 12 Cox, 0. 0.
627 1053, 1066
R. V. Webb (1819), 3 Russ. 0. & M. 622 918
R. V. Webb (1831), 4 C. & P. 564 582, 889
R. ». Webb (1867), 11 Cox, 0. C. 133 877
R. V. Webster (1861), L. & 0. 77 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 17 199
R. V. Wedderbum (1746), Post. 0. L. 22 ; 18 How. St. Tr. 425 625
R. V. Weeks (1861), 8 Cox, 0. C. 455 ; L. & C. 18; 30 L. J. M. 0. 141 ;
7 Jur. N. S. 472 ; 4 L. T. 373 ; 9 W. R. 553 246
R. V. Welbom (1792), 1 East, P. C. 3.58 468
R. V. Welch (1846), 2 0. & K. 296 ; 1 Den. 0. C. 199 291
R. V. Welland (1822), R. & R. 494 215
R. V. Weller (1846), 2 C. & K. 223 334, 579
R. V. Wellings (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 426 ; 47 L. J. M. 0. 100 ; 38 L. T. 652 ;
26 W. R. 692 332
R. V. Wells (1829), M. & M. 326 634
R. „•. Welton (1862), 9 Cox, C. 0. 297 198, 216, 336
R. «,. Wenham (1866), 10 Cox, 0. C. 222 1079
R. V. West, Dr. (undated), cited 2 Wils. 240 ; 5 Mod. 395 996
R. V. Westbury (1844), 5 Q B. 500 ; 1 New Sess. Cas. 33 ; D. & M.
606 727
Vol, I. ends with page 63S.
clxxii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOB
E. V. Western (1868), 37 L. J. M. C. 81 ; L. E. 1 0. C. 122; 11 (3ox, C. 0.
93 ; 18 L. T. 299 ; 16 W. R. 730 198
E.. V. Westley (1859), BeU, 0. C. 193; 29L. J. M. C. 35 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 1362. . 198
E. V. Wheater (1838), 2 Moo. C. C. 45 ; 2 Lew. C. C. 157 583, 684
E. V. Wheatland (1838), 8 C. & P. 238 629
E. V. Wheeley (1838), 8 C. & P. 260 283, 580
E. i;. Wheeling (1789), 1 Lea. C. C. 311, n 560
E. V. Wheelook (1826), 6 B. & C. 511 788, 1139
E. II. Whelan (1881), 8 L. E. Ir. 314 ; 14 Cox, C. C. 595 954
E. V. Whiston (1836), 4 A. & E. 607 ; 6 N. & M. 65 131
E. «!. Whitbread (1823), 1 0. & P. 84, n 943
E. V. Whitoliarch (1827), 7 B. & 0. 673 130
E. 11. White (1786), 3 Bac. Ab. 202, n. ; 1 Lea. C. C. 430, n. (a) . . 896, 898, 901, 904
E. V. White (1823), E. & E. 508 500
E. V. White 1843), 4 Q. B. Ill, 112 91
E. 1). White (-1865), 4 F. & F. 383 104
E. V. Whitehead (1866), 35 L. J. M. C. 186 ; L. E. 1 C. 0. 33 ; 10 Cox,
C. C. 34 ; 14 L. T. 489 ; 14 W. E. 677 910
E. V. Whitehouse (undated), cited 3 Euss. C. & M. 625 893
E. V. Whitley Lower (1813), 1 M. & S. 636 '. 494, 496
E. V. Whitworth (1858), 1 F. & F. 382 468, 469
E. V. Wick St. Lawrence (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 526 . . 788, 1103, 1139, 1140, 1141
E. V. Wiokham (1835), 3 A. & B. 517 755
E. V. Wiokham (1839), 10 A. & E. 34 ; 2 P. & D. 333 204
E. V. Widdop (1872), 42 L. J. M. C. 9 ; L. E. 2 C. C. 3 ; 12 Cox, C. C.
261 ; 27 L. T. 693 ; 21 W. E. 176 583
E. V. Wideoombe in the Moor (1847), 2 New Seas. Gas. 639 ; 9 Q. B. 894 ;
16 L. J. M. C. 44 ; 11 Jur. 227 1139
E. V. Wigan (1849), 14 Q. B. 287 ; 3 New Sess. Cas. 670 ; 19 L. J. M. 0.
18 ; 13 Jur. 1052 621
E. V. Wigley (1835), 2 Lew. C. C. 258, 259, n 627
E. ». wad (1836), IMoo. C. 0.462 667,569
E. V. Wilde (1669), 1 Lev. 396 ; 1 Doug. 97, n. 41 18
E. V. Wilkes (1836), 7 0. & P. 273 633, 634
E. V. Wilkinson (1838), 8 C. & P. 662 284, 679
E. V. Willans (should be Williams) (1835), 7 0. & P. 320 898
E. J). Williams (1710), 10 Mod. 63 ; 4 Bl. Com. 29 165
E. V. Williams (1811), 2 Camp. 646 ; 11 E. E. 781 203
E. V. Williams (182.5), 1 Moody, C. C. 107 204
E. V. WiDiams (1834), 6 C. & P. 626 239
E. v. Williams (1836), 7 0. & P. 298 ." " 216
E. V. WUliams (1838), 8 C. & P. 284, 434 889, 932
E. 1-. Williams (i860), 2 Den. 61 202
E. „. WiUiams (1853), 6 Cox, C. C. 343 '.'.'.'.'. " 995
E. V. Williams 1862), 3 New E. 338, per Ir. CO.; 9 Cox, 0. C. 338. . . . 211
E. V. Williams (1865), 4 F. & F. 515 . : 336
E. V. WiUiams (1871), 11 Cox, 0. C. 684; 12 Cox, 0. C. 101 '.'.'.'."l2l','326, 337
E. •^. Williams, (1893) 1 Q. B. 320 ; 62 L. J. M. 0. 69 ; 41 W. E. 332 100
E. V. WiUis (1710), 16 How. St. Tr. 624 558 559
E. «-. Willis (1845), 1 Den. C. 0. 80 ; 1 0. & K. 722 '215
E. V. WiUshiie (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 366 ; 50 L. J. M. 0. 57 ; 14 Cox, 0. 6
641 ; 44 L. T. 222 ; 29 W. E. 473 ; 45 J. P. 375 106
E. ■!/. Wilmett (1848), 3 Cox, C. 0. 281 ] '. . . 264
E. v. Wilshaw (1841), 0. & Marsh. ] 45 329, 336, 339, 577
E. K. Wilson (1817), Holt, N. P. E. 597 669
E. V. Wilson (1861), 8 Cox, C. 0. 453 ' ' " ' 332
E. K. Wilson (1874), 12 Cox, C. C. 622 '322 836
E. D. Wilton (1858), 1 F. & F. 309 '332
E. i>. Wilts. & Berks. Can. Co. (1836), 3 A. & E. 47 992 998
E. I). Windsor (1864), 4 F. & F. 366 ' 663
E V. Wink (1834), 6 0. & P. 397 367
E. V. Winkworth (1830), 4 C. & P. 444 248 375
E. V. Winslow (1860), 8 Cox, 0. 0. 397 .' " "237', 247
T!ie references are to paries, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxxiii
PAOH
R. V. "Wifters (1811), cited E. v. Holt, 5 T. R. 446 20, 598
H.v. Witney (1836), 5 A. & E. 191 ; 6 N. & M. 562 131
R. V. Woburn (1808), 10 Bast, 395 494
R. V. Womersly (1836), 2 Lew. C. C. 162 826
R. V. Wood (1832), 1 Dowl. 509 816
E. V. Wood (1841), Jebb & B. vii. ; 7 M. & W. 573 ; 9 Dowl. 310 ; 10 L. J.
Ex. 168 342, 906
R. V. Wood (1842), Ir. Cir. R. 597 572
R. V. Wood (I860), 5 Jur. 225 2.'50
R. V. Wood (1877) 14 Cox, C. 0. 46 375
R. V. Woodohe8ter(1742-3), Burr. S. C. 191 ; 2 Str. 1172 1106
R. V. Woodcock (1787), 1 Leach, 504 25, 333, 464, 467, 468, 470
R. V. Woodfall (1770), 5 Burr. 2661 ; 20 How. St. Tr. 913,918, 920.. 25, 45, 109
R. 1-. WoodhaU (1872), 12 Cox, C. C. 240 206
R. V. Woodhead (1847), 2 C. & K. 520 942, 943
R. V. Woodley (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 390 322
R. V. Woods (1840), 1 Crawf . & D. C. C. 439 974
R. V. Woodward (1831), 1 Moody, C. C. 323 16, 209
R. V. Wooldale (1844), 6 Q. B. 549 ; 1 New Seas. Cas. 377 ; 14 L. J. M. C.
13; 9 Jur. 83 543, 784, 795
R. •:,. Woolford (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 384 1127
R. „. Worcester (1838), 5 Q. B. 608, u 727
R. V. Worcestershire JJ. (1854), 3 E. & B. 477 ; 2 C. L. R. 1333 ; 23 L. J.
M. C. 113 ; 18 Jur. 424 1137
R. „. Worfield (1794), 5 T. R. 608 153
R. .-. Worth (1843), 4 Q. B. 132 ; 12 L. J. M. C. 47 ; 3 G-. & D. 376 . .436, 437,
458
R. D. Wrangle (1835), 2 A. & E. 514 ; 4 N. & M. 375 ; 1 H. & W. 41 . . . . ■za\)
E. V. Wright (1821), E. & R. 456 931, 934, 935
R. 1). Wright (I860), 2 P. & F. 320 199
R. V. Wyoherley (1838), 8 C. & P. 262 359
R. V. Wye (1838), 7 A. & E. 770 ; 3 N. & P. 6 1106
R. 0. Wylde (1834), 6 0. & P. 380 357, 918
R V. Wylie (1804), 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 94 ; 2 Lea. C. C. 983 237, 246
R. 1). Yarwell (1829), 9 B. & C. 894 ; 4 M. & Ry. 685 521
E. V. Yates (1841), 0. & Mar. 139 624
E. V. Yeadon (1861), L. & Cave, 81 ; 9 Cox, C. C. 91 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 70 ;
7 Jur. N. S. 1128 ; 6 L. T. 329 ; 10 W. R. 64 206
R. V. Yeoveley (1838), 8 A. & E. 818 ; 1 P. & D. 60 788, 1032, 1140
R. V. Yewin (1811), 2 Camp. 639 947, 950, 951
R. V. Yore (1839), 1 Jebb & Sy. 463 893
E. ■„. York, Mayor of (1792), 6 T. E. 66 1114
E. V. Young (1850), 3 C. & E. 106 336, 578
E. V. Young (1866), 10 Cox, C. C. 371 633
Eabey v. Gilbert (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 170 ; 6 H. & N. 636 ; 3 L. T. 752 ;
9 W. E. 386 521
Rackham i: Marriott (1857), 1 H. & N. 234 ; 2 H. & N. 196 ; 26 L. J.
Ex. 315 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 495 712
Radeliffe v. Fursman (1730), 2 Bro. P. C. 614 601
Radcliffe v. Tin. Ins. Co. (1810), 7 Johns. 38 1093
Radford®. M-Intosh (1790), 3 T. R. 632 150, 519
Radford v. Wilson (1754), 3 Atk. 815 180
Rae, In Goods of (1892), 27 L. R. Ir. 116 702
Rao-gett V. Musgrave (1827), 2 C. & P. 556 ( 526
Raikes «. Todd (1838), 8 A. & E. 855 ; 1 P. & D. 138 ; 8 L. J. Q. B. 35. . 669
Rainforth, Re (1880), 49 L. J. Ch. 5 716
Rainsford v. Smith (l563). Dyer, 196a 94
Rajah, The (1872), L. E. 3 Ad. & Ecc. 639 ; 41 L. J. Adm. 97 ; 27 L. T.
102 ; 21 W. E. 14 178
Eajah of Coorg ®. E. India Co. (1856), 29 Beav. 300 ; 30 L. J. Ch. 226 . . 618
Eamadge v. Eyan (18321, 9 Bing. 333 ; 2 Moo. & Sc. 421 933
Eambertr. Cohen (1803), 4 Esp. 213; 6 E. E. 854 '. 293, 926
Rambler v. Tryson (1821), 7 Serg. & E. 90 931
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
clxxiv TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAGE
Ramchum Mulliok v. Luckmeechund Radakiasen (1854), 9 Moo. P. C. 0. 4G. .38
Ramsbotham v. Senior (1869), L. R. 8 Eq. 676 ; 17 W. R- 1057 610
Ramabottom v. Buokhurst (1814), 2 Maule & S. 567 ; 15 R. R. 362 84
Ramsbottom v. Mortley (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 445 ; 15 R. R 304 286, 289
Ramabottom v. Tunbridge (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 434 ; 15 R. R. 302 .... 286, 289
Ramaden v. Dyaon (1865), L. R. 1 H. L. 129; 12 Jur. N. S. 506 ; 14
W. R. 926 538, 542
Ramuz v. Crowe (1847), 1 Ex. 167 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 280 ; 11 Jur. 715. . . .307, 308
Rancliflfe v. Parkyns (1818), 6 Dow. 202 433
Randall v. Guruey (1819), 3 B. & Aid. 252 ; 1 Chitty, 679 868, 869, 870
Randall v. Lith^ow (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 525 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 518 ; 60 L. T.
587 ; 32 W. R. 794 1116
Randall v. Lyncli (1810), 2 Camp. 357 ; 11 R. R. 727 1212
Randall v. Morgan (1805), 12 Ves. 67 ; 8 K. R. 289 665, 680
RandaU v. Newson (1877), 46 L. J. Q. B. 259 ; 2 Q. B. D. 102 ; 36 L. T.
164 ; 25 W. R. 313 777
Randall's case (1820), 6 City Hall Reo. 141 891
Randell v. Trimen (1856), 18 C. B. 786 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 307 780
Randle v. Blackburn (1813), 5 Taun. 245 479
Randolph v. Gordon (1815), 5 Price, 312 ; 19 R. R. 633 430
Rands v. Thomas (1816), 6 M. & Sel. 244 877
Ranee Khnjooroonissa v. Mussamat Roushun Jehan (1876), L. R. 3 Ind.
App. 291, 311 149
Raugeloy v. Webster (1840), 1 1 New Hamps. 299 1148
Ranken v. M'Murphy (1889), 24 L. R. Ir. 290 542
Rankin ». Homer (1812), 16 East, 193 518
Rankin v. Tenbrook (1837), 6 "Watts, 388 443
Rann ». Hughes (between 1764—1797), 7 T. R. 350., n 653
Ransley, Ex parte (1823), 3 D. & R. 672 120
Raper v. Birkbeck (1812), 15 East, 17 ; 13 R. R, 354 l200
Raphael v. Bk. of England (1855), 17 C. B. 161 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 33 617
Rapp V. Latham (1819), 2 B. & A. 795 488
Rashdall v. Ford (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 750 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 769 ; 14 L. T. 790 ;
14 W. R. 950 780
RatoUff «). RatolifE and Anderson (1859), 1 S. & T. 467; 29 L. J. Mat.
171 1060, 1054
Ravee «). Farmer (1791), 4 T. R. 146 : 2 R. R. 347 1124
Ravenga v. Mackintosh (1824), 2 B. & C. 693 ; 1 C. & P. 204 ; 4 Dowl. &
R. 107 372
Ravenscroft v. Jones (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 482 ; 32 BeaT. 669 806
Rawley v. Rawley (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 460 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 675 ; 35 L. T.
191 ; 24 W. R. 995 718
Rawlins v. Desborough (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 328 ; 8 C. & P. 321 . .48, 259, 271
Rawlins v. Rickards (1860), 28 Beav. 370 455, 708
Rawlins v. Turner (1699), 1 Ld. Raym. 736 655
Rawlins v. West Derby (1846), 2 C. B. 72 ; 1 Lutw. 373 ; 15 L. J. 0. P. 70.. 726
Rawlinsou». Clarke (1845), 14M. &W. 187; 14 L. J. Ex. 364 750
Rawlinson v. Oriel (1688), 1 Show. 75 ; Carth. 96 1116
Raworth i). Marriott (1833), 1 My. & K. 643 140
Rawson v. Haigh (1824), 2 Bing. 104 376 377, 381
Rawson v. "Walker (1816), 1 Stark. 361 757
Rawstome v. Gandell (1846), 15 M. & "W. 304 ; 4 Railw. Cas. 295 ; 3
Cowl. &L. 682; 15 L.J. Ex. 291; 10 Jur. 294 492
Ray V. Jones (1836), 2 Gale, 220 458
Raymond, Ex parte (1874), L R. 8 Eq. 231 128
Rayner v. AUhusen (1851), 2 L. M. & P. 606 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 68 ; 15 Jur.
1060 1185
Read v. Anderson (1884), 10 Q. B. D. 100 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 214 ; 48 L. T
74 ; 31 "W. R, 453 620
Read v. Bishop of Lincoln, (1892) A. C. 644 ; 62 L. J. P. CI ; 67 L T
128 ; 56 J. P. 725 16, 1179
Read v. Coker (1863), 13 C. B. 850 ; 22 L. J. 0. P. 201 ; 17 Jur. 990 .. . 227
Read v. Dunsmore (1840), 9 C. & P. 588 ISo
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxxv
PAGE
Read 17. Gamble (1839), 10 A. & E. 597, n 289, 318
Read v. Nash (1761), 1 "Wils. 305 677
Read*. Passer (1794), 1 Esp. 214 373, 1U47
Read v. Victoria St. and PimUco Ry. Co. (1863), 1 H. & C. 826 ; 32 L. J.
Ex. 127 1102
Reade's case (1604-5), 5 Co. Rep. 33 550
Reader v. Kingham (1862), 13 C. B. N. S. 344 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 108 ; 9 Jur.
N. S. 797; 7L. T. 789; 11 W. R. 366 677, 679
Readhead v. Midi. Ry. Co. (1869), 36 L. J. Q. B. 181 ; L. R. 2 Q. B. 412 ;
8B.&S.371; 16L.T.48o; 15 W. R. 831 772
Rearden v. Minter (1843), 5 M. & Gr. 204 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 139 1211
Reay's estate (1855), 1 Jur. N. S. 222 1208
Redding v. Wilks (1845), 3 Bro. C. C. 401 679
Redford v. Birley (1822), 3 Stark. 88 373, 383
Redington v. Redington (1734), 3 Ridg. P. C. 106 666
Reeoe v. Rigby (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 202 39
Reeoe v. Trye (1846), 9 Beav. 316 601
Reed v. Deere (1827), 7 B. & C. 261 ; 2 C. & P. 624 287
Reed v. Devaynes (1791), 2 Cox, 285 ; 3 Br. C. C. 95 ; 2 R. R. 48 144
Reed v. Eenn (1866), 36 L. J. Ch. 464 721
Reed v. Jackson (1801), 1 East, 365 ; 6 R. R. 283 84, 397, 398, 405, 1109
Reed v. James (1816), 1 Stark, R. 132 942
Reedsj. King (1858), 30 L. T. 290 939
Reed 1!. Lamb (1860), 29 L. J. Ex. 462 ; 6H. &N. 75; 6 Jur. N. S. 828. .1050,
1230
Reed v. Passer (1794), Pea. R. 232 ; 3 R. R. 696 295
Reed v. Woodward (l877), 11 Phila. (Pa.) 64, 641 693
Rees, Re (1865), 34 L. J. P. & M. 56 697
Reesi). Bowen(1826),M'Cl. & T. 383 H57
Reest). Lloyd (1811), Wightw. 1811 119
Rees V. Overbaugh (1827), 6 Cowen, 746 1199
Rees V. Rees (1873), L. R. 3 P. & D. 84 : 29 L. T. 375 141
Rees V. Smith (1816), 2 Stark. R. 30 272
Rees V. Walters (1838), 3 M. & W. 527 ; 2 Jur. 378 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 138. .. . 431,
1116
Rees V. Williams (1847), 1 De G. & Sm. 314 1209
Reeside, Schooner, The (1837), 2 Sumn. 567 766, 783
Reeve's Trusts, Re (1879), 4 Ch. D. 841 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 412 144
Reeve v. Bird (1831), 1 C. M. & R. 31 : 4 Tyr. 612 ; 3 L. J. Ex. 2S2 660
Reeve ». Hodson (1863), 10 Hare, App. xix 1037, 1063
Reeve v. Whitmore (1865), 2 Dr. & Sm. 446 483
Reeve v. Wood (1868), 34 L. J. M. C. 16 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 68 ; 6 B. & S. 364 894
Reeves v. Hearne (1836), 1 M. & W. 323 ; 2 Gale, 4 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 156 . . 716
Reeves v. Lindsay (1869), I. R. 3 Eq. 609 697
Reeves v. Slater (1827), 7 B. & C. 486 ; 1 M. & R. 265 643
Reffell V. Reffell (1866), L. R. 1 P. & D. 139 ; 35 L. J. P. & M. 121 .... 766
Regicides, Trial of the (1660), Eel. J. 12 ; 5 How. St. Tr. 1181 899
Reid V. Batte (1829), M. & M. 414 281, 286, 287, 746
Reid V. Langlois (1849), 1 Mac. & G. 627 ; 19 L. J. Ch. 337 ; 2 H. & T. 69.. 599
Reid V. Margison (1808), 1 Camp. 469 1018
Reid». Teakle(]853), 13 C. B. 627; 22 L. J. C. P. 161 ; 17 Jur. 841 .... 166
Reidpath's case (1870), 40 L. J. Ch. 39 ; 11 L. R. Eq. 86 ; 23 L. T. 834 ;
19 W. R. 219 155
Reidy v. Pierce (1861), 11 Ir. C. L. R. 374 19
Reilly v. Fitzgerald (1843), 6 Ir. E. R. 335 409, 1105
Reimers v. Druoe (1867), 26 L. J. Ch. 196 ; 23 Beav. 146 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 147.. 1147
Remmett v. Lawrence (1850), 15 Q. B. 1004 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 25 ; 14 Jur.
1067 549
Rendles, Re, Rhodes v. Rhodes (see Rhodes, Re, &c.).
Reneaux ». Teakle (1853), 8 Ex. 680 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 241 ; 17 Jur. 351 .... 166
Renner v. Bank of Columbia (1824), 9 Wheat. 581 767
Rennieti. Clarke (1850,, 5Ex. 292; 19 L. J. Ex. 278 541
Rennie v. Wynn (1849), 4 Ex. 691 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 2 541
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
clxxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAGE
Kenmson v. Walker (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 143 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 43 ; 26 L. T.
167; 20 W. E. 471 187
Resp. v. Fields (1822-4), Peck, R. 140 555
Reap. V. MoCartj (1781), 2 Dall. 86 661, 574
Reuss V. Pick^Iey (1866), L. R. 1 Ex. 342 ; 35 L. J. Ex. 218 ; 4 H. & C.
588 ; 15 L. T 25 ; 14 W. R. 924 ; 12 Jiir. N. S. 628 675
Reuter v. Electric Telegr. Co. (1856), 6 E. & B. 346 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 46 ;
2 Jur. N. S. 1245 642, 645
Revell, Ex parte, Tollemache, In re (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 720, 727 ; 64 L. J.
Q. B. 89, 92 ; 51 L. T. 376, 379 ; 33 W. R. 288, 289 629
Revell V. Blake (1873), 41 L. J. C. P. 129 ; 42 L. J. C. P. 165 ; L. R.
8 C. P. 533 ; 29 L. T. 67 ; 22 W. R. 96 1167
Eevis». Smith (1856), 18 C. B. 126; 29L. J. C. P. 196; 2 Jur. N. S. 614. . 865
Rew V. Barber (1824), 3 Cowen, 272 775
Rew V. Hutchins (1861), 10 0. B. N. S. 829 230
Reynell v. Lewis (1846), 15 M. & W. 617 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 25 540, 641
Reynell v. Sprye (1846), 10 Beav. 51 ; 16 L. J. Ch. 117 602, 603, 607
Reyner V. Hall (1813), 4 Tavm. 725 ; 14 R. R. 650 552
Reyner v. Pearson (1812), 4 Taun. 662 ; 13 R. R. 723 388
Reynolds, Ex parte (1883), 52 L. J. Ch. 223 ; 21 Ch. D. 601 ; 47L. T. 495;
31 W. R. 187 849
Reynolds, Ex parte, Reynolds, Re (1882), 20 Ch.. D. 294 ; 61 L. J. Ch.
756 ; 46 L. T. 508 ; 30 W. R. 651 ; 46 J. P. 533 964
Reynolds, Re (1873), L. R. 3 P. & D. 35 ; 42 L. J. P. & M. 20 ; 28 L. T.
144 ; 21 W. R. 512 709
Reynolds v. Fenton (1846), 3 C. B. 194 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 16 ; 10 Jur. 668 . . 8,
1146, 1148
Reynolds v. Reynolds (1848), 12 Ir. Ch. R. 172, 181 117
Reynolds v. Staines (1849), 2 C. & K. 745 1219
Reynoldaon v. Perkins (1769), Amh. 663 497
Rhodes, Re, Rhodes v. Rhodes (1887), 36 Ch. D. 686 ; 56 L. J. Ch. 825 ;
57 L. T. 652 172
Rhodes v. Airdale Drain. Com. (1876), 45 L. J. C. P. 337 ; L. R. 9 C. P.
608; 31 L. T. 59 1160
Rhodes v. Rhodes (1889), 7 App. Cas. 112 ; 46 L. T. 463 ; SOW. R. 709. . 741
Ricardof. Garcias (1846), 12 CI. &Fin.368; 9 Jur. 1019. .1117, 1142, 1143,1152
Riccardj;. Inclosure Commiss. (1864), 4 E. & B. 329; 3 C. L. R. 119;
24 L. J. Q. B. 49 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 496 1183
Rice, In re (1886), 32 Ch.D. 35; 66 L. J. Ch. 799 ; 54L. T. 589 ; 34 W. R.
747 1208
Rice, Re (1870), Ir. R. 5 Eq. 176 690
Rice V. Howard (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 681 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 311 ; 34 W. R. 532. 939
Rice V. Rice (1863), 2 Drew. 73 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 289 542
Rich V. Jackson (1794), 4 Bro. C. C. 619 743, 750, 757
Richards v. Bassett (1830), 10 B. & C. 633 398, 408
Richards v. Bluck (1848), 6 Dowl. & L. 325 ; 6 C. B. 437 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 17 . 192
Richards!). Easto (1846), 15. M. & W. 244; 3 Do-wl. & L. 615 ; 16 L. J.
Ex. 163 ; 10 Jur. 695 227
Richards D. Gellatly (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 127; 26L.T.435; 20 W. R. 630.. 1186
Richards ■». Gogarty (1870), I. R. 4 C. L. 300 436
Richards i>. Hough (1882), 51 L. J. Q. B. 361 ; 30 W. R. 676 900, 906
Richards v. Johnston (1859), 4 H. & N. 660 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 322; 5 Jur.
N. S. 520 529
Richards f. Lewis (1852), 11 C. B. 1054; 20 L.J. C. P. 177; 15 Jur. 512.. 303,
305, 1204
Richards v. Lond. & S. Coast Ry. Co. (1849), 7 C. B. 839 ; 6 Eailw. Cas.
49 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 251 ; 13 Jur. 986 201
Richards v. Porter (1827), 6 B. & C. 437 672
Richards v. Richards (1731), 16 East, 294, n. (a) ; 13 R. R. 476, n 171
Richards v. Richards (1844), 2 M. & Rob. 557 246, 255
Richards D. Rose (1852), 9 Ex. 218; 2 C. L. R.311; 23L. J. Ex. 3 115
Richardson v. Anderson (1806), 1 Camp. 65, n. (a) ; 10 R. R. 628, n 1011
Richardson v. Barry (1860), 29 Beav. 22 712
The refereneoa are to pages, not to parayrapha.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxxvii
PAOB
Richardson v. Dutois (1869), L. K. 6 Q. B. 61 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 69 ; 21 L. T.
636 ; 18 W. E. 62 ; 10 B. & S. 830 167
Richardson ». aifford(1834), 1 A. &E.60; 8 Dowl. & R. 643 ; 2Sm.L.C.112. 654
Richardson v. Melliah (1824), 2 Bing. 241 1048, 1049, 1050
Richardson V. Newoomb (1838), 21 Pick. 315 1223
Richardson v. Watson (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 787 ; 1 N. & M. 567 ; 2 L. J.
K. B. 134 740, 789
Richardson «. Williamson (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 276 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 145 . 780
Richardson v. Willis (1872), 42 L. R. Ex. 15 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 298 ; 27 L. T.
828 ; L. R. 8 Ex. 69 190, 1071
Richardson v. Tounge (1871), L. R. 10 Eq. 276 ; L. R. 6 Ch. 478 ; 39 L. J.
Ch. 475 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 338 ; 25 L. T. 230 ; 19 W. R. 612 491
Riches and Marshall's Trust Deed, Re (1864), 4 De G. J. & S. 581 ; 11
L. T. 651 ; 34L. J. Bank. 10; 13 W. R. 353 160
Richey v. Garvey (1847), 10 Ir. L. R. 644 298
Richmond v. Smith (1830), 8 B. & C. 9 ; 2 M. & R. 236 162
Rickards v. Murdock (1830), 10 B. & C. 627 934
Rioketts v. Bennett (1847), 4 C. B. 686 ; 17 D. J. C. P. 17 ; 11 Jur. 1062. . 160
Rinketts v. Gurney (1819), 7 Price, 699 866, 868
Ricketts V. Turquand (1848), 1 H. L. Caa. 472 784
Riokford v. Ridge (1810), 2 Camp. 539 32
Rickman v. Carstairs (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 662 789
Rideont's Trusts, Re (1870), L. R. 10 Eq 41 ; 39 L. J. Ch. 192 621
Rider v. Wood (1855), 24 L. J. Ch 737 ; 1 K. & J. 644 6
Ridgeway v. Darwin (1802), 7 Ves. 404 ; 8 Ves. 66 ; 6 R. R. 227 482
Ridgway v. Ewbank (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 218 258, 259
Ridgway v. Wharton (1856-7), 3 De G. M. & G. 677 ; 6 H. L. Cas. 238 ;
24 L. J. Ch. 46 672, 673
Ridler, Re, Ridler ». Ridler (1882), 22 Ch. D. 74 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 343 135
Ridley f. Gyde (1832), 9 Bing. 349 ; 2 Moo. & Sc. 448 ; 2 L. J. C. P. 25. .376, 380
Ridley v. Ridley (1865), 34 L. J. Ch. 462 ; 34 Beav. 478 ; 12 L. T. 481 ;
13W. R. 763; llJur. N. S. 475 682
Rigden v. Vallier (1751), 2 Ves. sen. 252 ; 3 Atk. 731 139
Rigg V. Curgenven (1769), 2 Wils. 399 549, 550, 554
Rigge V. Burbidge (1846), 15 M. & W. 598 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 309 ; 4 Dowl. &
L. 1 532, 1122
Right, on d. of Flower, ». Darby (17S6), 1 T. R. 162 ; 1 R. R. 169 35
Right Ji. Price (1779), 1 Doug. 241 696
Riley v. Gerrish (1851), 9 Gush. 1 n4 , 753^ 1205
Riley v. Home (1828), 5 Bing. 217 ; 2 M. & P. 331 771
Ripley, Re (1858), 1 S. & T. 68 747
Ripley v. Warren (1824), 2 Pick. 592 20
Riponcase (1833), Cock. & R. 301 ; Per. & K. 211 496, 497
Ripon V. Davies (1833), 2 N. & M. 310 607
Eippon*. Priest (1863), 3 F. & F. 644 < 1163
Rishton «. Nesbitt (1844), 2 M. & Rob. 554 421
Rishton v. Nisbett (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 347 866, 869
Rishton v. Whatmore (1878), 8 Ch. D. 467 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 629 ; 26 W. R.
827 673, 730
Rising V. Dolphin (1840), 8 Dowl. 309 732
Risl V. Faux (1863), 4 B. & S. 409; 32 L. J. Q. B. 386 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 202 ;
8L. T. 737; 11 W. R. 918 263
Ritchie v. Van Gelder (1854), 9 Ex. 762 ; 18 Jur. 385 193
River Steam Co., Re (Mitchell's Claim) (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 822 ; 25 L. T.
319; 19 W. R. 1130 710
Roach V. Garran (1748), 1 Ves. sen. 159 1160
Robarts v. Tucker (1851), 16 Q. B. 560 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 270 647
Robb V. Connor (1874), Jr. 9 Eq. 373 ...,..., 818
Robb V. Starkey (1845), 2 C. & K. 143 , 310
Roberts, Ex parte (1850), 2 Mao. & G. 192 ; 2 H. & T. 391 ; 19 L. J. Oh.
368 ; 3 De G. & Sm. 205 , , . 640
Roberts, Re, Ex p. Brook (1879), 10 Ch, D. 100 ; 48 L. J. Bank. 22 ;
39 L. T. 458 ; 27 W. R. 255 662
Vol. I. ends with page 636.
clxxviii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOE
Roberts v. AUatt (1828), M. & M. 192 966, 967
Roberta v. Bethell (18o2), 12 G. B. 778 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 69 ; 16 Jur. 1087 . . 147
Roberta v. Bradshaw (1815), 1 Stark. 28 317
Roberts v. Doxon (1791), Pea. R. 83 ; 3 R. E. 660 323
Roberts ». Eddington (1801), 4 Esp. 88 , 1178
Roberts v. Fortune (1742), Harg. Law Tracts, 468, n 1103
Roberts v. Humphreys (1882), L. R. 8 Q. B. 483 ; 42 L. J. M. C. 147 ;
29 L. T. 387 ; 21 W. R. 885 266
Roberts v. Justice (1843), 1 0. & K. 93 613
Roberts v. Ogilby (1821), 9 Price, 269 645
Roberts v. Orchard (1863), 2 H. & C. 769 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 65 ; 9 L. T. 727 ;
12 W. R. 253 226
Roberts v. Phillips (1856), 4 E. & B. 450 ; 3 C. L. R. 513 ; 24 L. J. Q. B.
171; iJur. N. S. 444 700
Roberts v. Boberts (1862), 2 S. & T. 337 ; 31 L. J. P. M. & A. 46 ; 5 L. T.
689 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 220 709
Roberts v. SneU (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 577 194
Roberts v. Tucker (1849), 3 Ex. 632 681
Roberts' case (1827), 1 Dev. 269 666
Robertson v. French (1803), 4 East, 130 ; 4 Esp. 246 ; 7 R. R. 635.. 116, 740, 741
Robertson v. Jackson (1845), 2 C. B. 412 ; 16 L. J. 0. P. 28 ; 10 Jur. 98. . 763,
764, 782
Robertson v. Powell (1864), 2 H. & 0. 762 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 34; 10 Jur. N. S.
442 ; 12 "W. R. 623 704
Robertson ». Strath (1843), 6 Q. B. 942; Dav. &M. 773; 8 Jur. 404. .83, 1143,
1154
Robins V. Bridge (1837), 3 M. & W. 114 ; 6 Dowl. 140 ; M. & H. 357 . . . . 820
Robins v. Dolphin (1858), 29 L. J. P. & M. 11, 138 ; 7 H. L. Cas. 390 ;
SMacq. 563; 1 S. &T. 518; 8 W. R. 177 1144
Robinson v. Anderson (1865), 20 Beay. 98 ; 7 De a. M. & G. 239 160
Robinson i). Brown (1845), 3 C. B. 754 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 46 316, 317
Robinson n. ColKngwood (1866), 17 0. B N. S. 777 ; 34 L. J. 0. P. 18 ;
10 Jur. N. S. 1080; 11 L. T. 313; 13 W. R. 84 148
Robinson v. Curry (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 466 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 661 ; 45 L. T.
368; 30 W. R. 39; 46 J. P. 148 76
Robinson v. Davies (1879), 5 Q. B. D. 26; 49 L. J. Q. B. 218 ; 28 W. R. 255 . 347
Robinson v. Davison (1871), L. R. 6 Ex. 269 ; 40 L. J. Ex. 172 ; 24 L. T.
755 ; 19 W. R. 1036 780
Robinson v. Harman (1848), 1 Ex. 850 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 202 773
Robinson v. Hawksford (1846), 9 Q. B. 52; 15 L. J. Q. B. 377; 10 Jur. 964.. 32
Robinson v. Kitohin (1856), 21 Beav. 365 ; 8 De G. M. & G. 88 ; 25 L. J.
Ch. 441 641
Robinson v. Local Board of Barton (1882), 8 App. Cas. 798 ; 53 L. J. Ch.
226 ; 50 L. T. 57 ; 32 W. R. 249 47, 48
Robinson t-. Markis (1841), 2 M. & Rob. 375 329, 349
Robinson ji. MoUett (1876), L. R. 7 H. L. 802; 44 L. J. C.P. 362; 33L.T.
544 158
Robinson v. Nahon (1808), 1 Camp. 245 539
Robinson n. Robinson (1879), L. R. 2 P. Dir. 76 ; 46 L.J. P. 47 ; 36 L. T.
414 ; 25 W. R. 376 89
Robinson v. Robinson and Lane (1868), 1 S. & T. 362 ; 27 L. J. P. & M. 91 ;
5 Jur. N. S. 392 602, 662
Robinson v. Sootney (1816), 19 Ves. 684 482
Robinson v. Swett (1823),3 Greenl. 316 377, 1117
Robinson t;. Touray (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 217; 3Canip.l58; 13R.R.781.. 1196
Robinson v. United States (1871), 13 WaU. (80 U. S.) 363 782
Robinson v. Vaughton (1838), 8 C. & P. 262 294
Robinson v. Vernon, Ld. (1859), 7 C B. N. S. 236 ; 29 L. J. C. P. 310. .281, 746
Robinson v. Wakefield, (1892), 30 L. R. Ir. 547 644
Robinson v. Yarrow (1817), 7 Taun. 455 ; 1 Moore, 0. P. 150 ; 18 R. R.
637 647, 548
Robiason's case (1603), 5 Rep. 32 b 92
Robson V. Alexander (1828), 1 M. & P. 448 517
The references are to pages, nut to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxxiX
PAGE
Robson V. Att.-Gen. (1843), 10 01. & Pin. 500 416, 422
Eobsou V. Eaton (1785), 1 T. R. 62 1112
Robson ». Kemp (1803), 4 Esp. 234 498, 611
Robson V. N. East. Ry. Co. (1876), 46 L. J. Q. B. 50 ; 2 Q. B. D. 85;
35 L. T. 535 ; 25 "W. R. 418 ' 38
Robson V. Rolls (1833), 9 Bing. 648 ; 2 M. & Sc. 786 ; 2 L. J. C. P. 80 . . 379
Rooh V. CaUen (1847), 6 Hare, 531 ; 17 L. J. Ch. 144 ; 12 Jur. 112 808
Rochester, Dean and C. of, v. Pierce (1808), 1 Camp. 466 97, 643
Rochfort ». Sedley (1861), 12 Ir. C. L. R. App. iv 475
Roddam v. Morley (1857), 25 L. J. Ch. 329 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 438 ; 1 De G.
6 J. 1 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 449 138, 448, 497, 720
Rodenj). Lond. SmaUArmsCo. (1877),46L. J. Q. B. 213; 35 L. T. 505 ;
25 W. R. 269 784
Roden V. Ryde (1843), 4 Q. B. 626 ; 3 G. & D. 604 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 276 ;
7 Jnr. 213 1218
Rodriques v. Melhuish (1854), 10 Ex. 110 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 26 178
Rodriquezi;. Tadmire (1799), 2 Esp. 721 252
RodweU V. Osgood (1825), 3 Peck. 379 82
Rodwell V. Phillips (1842), 9 M. & W. 505 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 885 ; 11 L. J.
Ex. 217 685, 686, 687
RodweU V. Redge (1824), 1 C. & P. 220 105
Roe «. Birkenhead, Lane, & Ches. Junot. Ry. Co. (1851), 7 Ex. 36;
6 Railw. Cas. 795 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 9 643
Roev. Davis (1806), 7 East, 363 300
Roei). Day (1836), 7 C. & P. 705 484
Roe V. Eerrars (1801), 2 Bos. & P. 548 485
Roe jj. Harrison (1788), 2 T. R. 430; 1 E. R. 513 522
Roe V. Harvey (1769), 4 Burr. 2084 109
Roe». Hersey (1771), 3 WUs. 274 84
Roe V. Ireland (1809), 11 East, 280 ; 10 R. R. 604 123
Roe V. Minshal (1759), cited B. N. P. 96 522
Roe V. Nix, (1892), Times Newspaper, 2Deoember, 1892, and following days. 1102
Roe V. Parker (1792), 5 T. R. 32 402, 403
Roe V. Rawlings (1815), 7 East, 291 ; 3 Smith, 254 ; 8 R. R. 632 87, 417,
436, 437, 1227
Roej-. Reade (1799), 8 T. R. 118 127
Roe V. Wilkina (1835), 4 A. & E. 86 ; 6 N. & M. 434 1212
Roe«. York, Axchb. of (1805), 6 East, 86; 2Smith, 166; 8R. R.413..128, 668, 669
Rofeey V. Henderson (1851), 17 Q. B. 674 637
RofEey v. Smith (1834), 6 C. & P. 622 223
Rogers «. Allen (1808), 1 Camp. 309 ; 10 R. R. 689 432
Rogers v. Custance (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 181 313
Rogers v. Goodenough (1862), 2 S. & T. 342 ; 31 L. J. P. & M. 49 709
Rogers v. Hadley (1863), 32 L. J. Ex. 241 ; 2 H. & C. 227 746
Rogers v. Payne (1768), 2 Wils. 276 750
Rogers ». Pitcher (1818), 6 Taun. 202 ; 1 Marsh. 641 99
Rogers v. PoweU (1869), 38 L. J. Ch. 648 ; 18 W. R. 282 631
Rogers ». Spenoe (1846), 12 CI. & Fin. 700 664
Rogers ». Taylor (1858), 2 H. & N. 828; 27 L. J. Ex. 173 114, 115
Rogers v. Wood (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 245 395, 406
Rohan v. Hanson (1853), 11 Cush. (Mass.), 446 745
Rokeby Peerage (1830), Pari. Min. 4 424
Roles V. Davis (1859), 4 H. & N. 484 ; 1 E. & F. 563 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 287 ;
33 L. T. 166 186, 191
Rolf V. Dart (1809), 2 Taunt. 51 1018
Rolfe, Ex parte, Re Spindler (1881), 19 Ch. D. 98; 61 L. J. Ch. 88;
45 L. T. 482 ; 30 "W. R. 52 ; 46 J. P. 181 136
Rolls V. Pearce (1877), 6 Ch. D. 730 ; 36 L. T. 438 ; 25 "W. R. 899 638
RoUason v. Leon (1862), 7 H. & N. 73 : 31 L. J. Ex. 96 649
Rolt V. White (1862), 3 De G. J. & S. 360 538
Ronayne ». Sherrard (1877), 11 Ir. R. C. L. 146 682
RonkendorflE v. Taylor (1830), 4 P«t. 349, 360 1173
Rooke V. Ld. Kensington (1856), 2 Kay & J. 753 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 795 749
Vol, I, ends with page 635,
clxXX TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Rooker v. Eooker and Newton (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 42 ; 3 S. & T. 526 ;
9 Jur. N. S. 1329; 12 W. B. 807 149, ISO
Rookwood'8 case (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 139 236
Roos Barony (1804), Mln. Ev. 145, cited Hubb. Ev. of Sue. 613 101)6
Root V. King (1827), 7 Oowen, 613 255, 1093
Ropps V. Barker (1826), 4 Pick. 239 i 86
Rosoommou Peerage (1824), Pari. Min. 36 423, 425
Rose V. Blakemore (1826), Ry. & M. 383 970
Rose V. Bryant (1809), 2 Camp. 321 ; 11 R. R. 720 452
Rose ». Cunynghame (1805), 11 Ves. 550 ; 12 Ves. 29 673
Rose V. Himely (1808), 4 Cranch, 269 1142
Rose V. N. East. Ry. Co. (1876), 2 Ex. Div. 248 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 374 ;
35 L. T. 693 ; 26 "W. R. 205 38
Rose V. Savory (1835), 2 Bing. N. C. 145 ; 2 Scott, 199 ; 4.L. J. C. P. 275.. 480
Rosier, Re (1884), 26 Ch. Div. 821; 53 L. J. Ch. 722; 51 L. T. 785;
32 "W. R. 825 5
Rosa ». Bruce (1803), 1 Day, 100 289
Ross V. Buhler (1824), 2 Mart. K. S. 312 899, 900
Ross V. Clifton (1841), 11 A. & E. 631 ; 1 G. & D. 72 ; 9 Dowl. 1033 ; 10
L. J. Q. B. 233 227
Ross V. Gibbs (1869), L. R. 8 Eq. 522 ; 39 L. J. Ch. 61 599
Ross V. Gould (1828), 3 Greenl. 204 27, 1183
Ross V. Hill (1846), 2 C. B. 890 ; 3 D. & L. 788 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 182 . .161, 162
Ross V. Lapham (1817), 14 Mass. 275 25S
Rossi'. Parkyns (1875), L. R. 20Eq. 331 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 610; SOL. T. 331;
24 W. R. 6 159
Rossiter v. Miller (1878), 46 L. J. Ch. 228 ; L. R. 5 Ch. D. 648, 658 . .671, 673
Rouch V. G. W. Ry. Co. (1841), 1 Q. B. 63 379, 380, 381
RoupeU V. Haws (1863), 3 F. & F. 784 236, 609
Rousillon V. Rousillon (1880), 14 Ch. D. 351 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 339 ; 42 L. T.
679 ; 28 W. R 623 ; 44 J. P. 663 1146
Routledge v. Hislop (I860), 29 L. J. M. C. 90 ; 2 E. & E. 549 1119
Routledge v. Ramsay (1838), 8 A. & E. 222 ; 3 N. & P. 319 ; 1 W. W.
& H. 232 ; 2 Jur. 789 ; 7 L. J. Q. B. 156 44, 712
Rowan V. Jebb (1846), 10 Ir. Law R. 216 553
Rowbotham v. "Wilson (1861), 6 E. & B. 593 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 61 ; 30 L. J.
Q. B. 49 ; 8 E. & B. 123 ; 8 H. L. Cas. 348 114
Rowcliffle V. Leigh, Leigh's Estate, Re (1877), L. R. 4 Ch. D. 661 ;
46 L. J. Ch. 60 ; 2S W. R. 56 1189
Rowcroft V. Basset (1802), Pea. Add. Cas. 199, 200 454
Rowe V. Brenton (1828), 8 B. & C. 737. .118, 232, 297, 437, 438, 441, 1036, 1040
Rowe V. Carney (1885), 139 Mass. 41 616
Rowe V. Grenfel (1824), Ry. & M. 398 118
Rowe V. Osborne (1815), 1 Stark. R. 140 ; 18 R. R. 754 298
Rowe V. Parker (1792), 5 T. R. 31 232
Rowe V. Rowe (1848), 2 De G. & Sm. 297 ; 17 L. J. Ch. 357 806
Rowe «. Tipper (1853), 13 C. B. 249 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 135; 17 Jur. 440. . .. 32
Rowland v. Ashby (1826), Ry. & M. 232 679
Rowlands v. De Veoohi (1882), Cab. & E. 10 159, 454
Rowlands v. Samuel (1850), 11 Q. B. 41, n. ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 65 30
Rowley v. Home (1825), 3 Bing. 2 1096
Rowley v. Lond. & N. W. Ry. Co. (1873), 42 L. J. Ex. 163 ; L. R. 8 Ex.
221 C^'^l, 935
Rowntree v. Jacob (1809), 2 Taun. 141 92
Royal Aquarium v. Parkinson, (1892) 1 Q. B. 431 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 409;
66 L. T. 513 ; 40 W. R. 450 ; 56 J. P. 4(i4 869
Royal Bank, &c. v. Tottenham (1894). 9 R. 569 ; (1894) 2 Q. B. 715 ; 64
L. J. Q. B. 99; 61 L. T. 522 ; 43 W. R. 22 Add. [5461
RoyalEx. Ass. Co.». Moore(1863),2New.Ca.63; 8L.T.242; 11W.R.592. 758
Royle V. Harris, (189.5) P. 16S ; 64 L. J. P. 6a ; 43 W. R. 362 ; 72 L. T.
474 Add. [699]
Rudd». Wright (1832), 1 Ph. Ev. 240. . .. ,., 396, 440
Ruddock V. Marsh (1857), 1 H. & N. 601 166
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxxxi
PAOB
Rudge ». M'Oarthy (1841), 4 Ir. L. R. 161 285
Rugg V. Kingsmill (1867), L. R. 1 Adm. & Ecc. 343 ; 36 L. J. Eoo. 17 . . 130
RumbaU v. Met. Bank (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 194 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 346 ; 36
L. T. 240 ; 25 W. E. 366 6, 543
Rumsev v. Reade (1876), 1 Ch. D. 643 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 489 ; 33 L. T. 803 ;
24 W. R. 245 534
Rush V. Peacock (1838), 2 M. & Rob. 162 311, 510
Rush V. Smith (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 94 ; 2 Dowl. 687 ; 4 Tyr. 675 ; 3 L. J.
Ex. 355 942
Rushworth v. Lady Pembroke (1668), Hardr. 472 1116
Russel V. Rusael (1783), 1 Bro. 0. C. 269 ; 12 Ves. 197 682
Russell, Ex parte (1812), 1 Rose, 278 866
Rusaell, Ex parte, Re Butterworth (1882), 51 L. J. Ch. 521 ; 19 Ch. D.
588; 46 L. T. 113; 30 W. R. 584 135
RusseU V. Coffin (1829), 8 Pick. 143 927
Russell V. Dickson (1842), 2 Dr. & War. 139 740
Russell V. Dickson (1853), 4 H. L. Cas. 293 805
RusseU t). Jackson (1851), 9 Hare, 392 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 146 ; 15 Jur. 117. .592, 593, 6(14
Russell V. LangstafBe (1780), 2 Doug. 514 1206
RusseU V. Rider (1834), 6 C. & P. 416 928, 960
Russell*. St. Aubyn(1876),2Ch.D.398;46L.J. Ch. 6tl;35L. T.395 .806,1153
RusseU V. Smyth (1842), 9 M. & W. 810 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 929 ; 11 L. J. Ex.
308 1142, 1146, 1217
Rust V. Baker (1837), 8 Sim. 443 172
RuateU V. Macqmster (1809), 1 Camp. 49, n 244
Rutherford, Re (1880), 14 Ch. D. 687 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 654 ; 43 L. T. 105 ;
28 "W. R. 802 716
Rutland's, Countess of, case (1605), 6 Co. Rep. 54a 83, 743
Rutterw. Chapman (1841), 8 M. & "W. 388 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 118; 5 Jur.
610 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 178 475
Rutter V. Tregent (1879), 48 L. J. Ch. 791 ; 12 Ch. D. 768 ; 41 L. T. 16 :
27 W. R. 902 ; 221
RyaU V. Hannam (1847), 10 Beav. 536 ; 16 L. J. Ch. 491 ; 11 Jur. 761 . . 798
Ryan v. Dolan (1872), I. R. 7 Eq. 92 818
Ryan v. Nolan (1864-5), I. R. 3 C. L. 319 166
Ryan v. Ring (1890), 25 L. R. Ir. 184 1170
Ryan v. Ryan (1816), 2 PhiU. Boo, L. 332 1144
Ryan v. Ryan (1889), 25 L. R. Ir 185 455, 457
Ryan v. Sams (1848), 1 2 Q. B. 460 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 271 ; 12 Jur. 745 169
Ryberg v. Ryberg (1863), 32 L. J. P. & M. 112 ; 11 W. R. 502 939
Ryder v. Malbome (1831), cited 2 Russ. & My. 169 418
Ryder v. WombweU (1868), 38 L. J. Ex. 8 ; L. R. 4 Ex. 32 ; 19 L. T.
491; 17W. R. 167 28,48,49
Sadlbb*. Robins (1808), 1 Camp, 255 1142, 1153, 1154
Sadlier v. Biggs (1853), 4 H. L. Cas. 435 ; 10 Ir. Eq. R. 522 297, 792
Sage V. Wilcox (1826), 6 Conn. 81 669
Sainsbnry v. Matthews (1838), 4 M. & W. 347 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 1 ; 7 Dowl. 23 . . 187,
194, 686
St. Catherine's Hospital case (1672), 1 Vent. 151 1179
St. Devereux v. Much Dew Church (1761-2), 1 W. Bl. 367 295
St, George v. St. Margaret (1706), 1 Salk. 123 102
St. Losky V. Green (1860), 9 C. B. N. S. 370 ; 2 P. & F. 106 ; 30 L. J. C. P.
191 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 394 ; 3 L. T. 297 ; 9 W. R. 119 188, 194
Sainter v. Ferguson (1849), 7 C. B. 727 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 217 44
SainthiU v. Bound (1802), 4 Eep. 74 957
Sale V. Lambert (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 1 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 470 ; 22 W. R. 478. . 671
Salisbury v. MarshaU (1829), 4 C. & P. 65 774
SaUsbury, M. of v. Gt. North. Ry. Co. (1858), 5 C. B. N. S. 174 ; 28 L. J.
C. P. 40 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 70 112
Salkeld v. Johnson (1841), 1 Hare, 186 ; 11 L. J. Ch. 201 7-'>
Salkeld». Johnson (1816), 2 C. B. 749 75
SaUield v. Johnson (1846, should be 1848), 2 Ex. 256 ; 18 L. J. Ex 89 . . 75
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
Clxxxii TABLE OP CASES CITED.
FAOE
Salmkyrburg v. Pomansky (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 218 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 428 ;
32 W. R. 752 834
Salmon v. Webb (1852), 3 H. L. Cas. 510 ; 13 Q. B. 886 757
Saloucci V. Woodmass (undated), 2 Park. Ins. 727 1149
Saltev. Thomas (1802), 3 B. & P. 188 1050, 1061, 1172
Saltmarsh t>. Hardy (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 422 495
Sammons».BaiIey(1890),24Q.B.D. 727; o9L. J.Q.B.342; 38W.K.605.. 964
Sampson v. Yardley (1667), 2 Keb. 223, pi. 74, 19 Car. 2 367
Sanborn v. Neilson (1828), 4 New. Hamps. 501 515
Sanders v. Maclean (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 327 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 481 ; 49 L. T.
462 ; 31 W. R. 698 6
Sanders v. Meredith (1828), 3 M. & Ry. 116 451
Sanders v. St. Neot's Union (1846), 8 Q. B. 810 ; 15 L. J. M. C. 104 ; 10
Jur. 566 641, 644
Sanders v. Sanders (1882), 19 Ch. D. 380; 51 L. J. Ch. 279 ; 45 L. T. 637;
30 W. R. 281 721
Sanderson v. CoUman (1843), 4 M. & Gr. 209 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 638 ; 11 L. J.
C. P. 270 90, 547
Sanderson v. Graves (1876), L. R. 10 Ex. 234 ; 44 L. J. Ex. 210 ; 33 L. T.
269 ; 11 L. J. 0 P. 270 ; 33 W. R. 797 752
Sanderson v. Nestor (1826), Ry. & M. 402 1139
Sandersons. Symonds (1819), IB. & B. 430 ; 4 Moore (C. P.) 42. .1194, 1195, 1201
Sanderson v. Westley (1840), 6 M. & W. 98 ; 8 Dowl. 412 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 204 732
Sandford v. Remington (1793), 2 Ves. 189 ; 2 R. R. 195 611
Sandilands, Re (1871), L. R- 6 C. P. 411 ; 24 L. T. 273 ; 19 W. R. 641 . . 134
Sandilands v. Marsh (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 673 161, 386
Sandys V. Hodgson (183tf), 10 A. & E. 472 ; 2 P. &D. 435 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 31 . . 542, 549
Sanford v. Chase (1824), 3 Cowen, 381 869
Sanford v. Raikes (1816), 1 Mer. 6.i3 784
Sangster v. Mazarredo (1816), 1 Stark. 161 495
Saph«. Atkinson (1822), 1 Add. 215 1223
Sarell v. Wine (1803), 3 East, 409 714
Sargesout). Sealy (1742), 2 Atk. 412 1102
Sari V. BourdiUon (1856), 26 L. J. C. P. 78 ; 1 C. B. N. S. 188 ; 2 Jur.
N. S. 1208 670, 671, 672
Sastry Velaider v. Sembecutty (1881), 6 App. Cas. 364 ; 50 L. J. P. C. 28 ;
44 L. T. 896 149
Satterthwaite v. Powell (1838), 1 Curt. 705 174
Saunders, Re (1865), 35 L. J. P. & M. 26 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 16 ; 11 Jur.
N. S. 1027 ; 14 W. R. 148 702
Saunders v. Bates (1867), 1 H. & N. 402 189
Saunders d. Cramer (1842), 3 Dr. & War. 187 669
Saunders v. MiUs (1829), 3 M. & P. 620 ; 6 Biug. 213 245
Saunders v. Saunders (1848), 6 Notes of Cases, 518 143
Saunders v. Topp (1849), 4 Ex. 390 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 374 689, 690
Saunderson ». Jackson (18i)0), 2 B. & P. 238 ; 3 Esp. 180 ; 6 R. R. 680.. 674, 675
Sauudersou v. Judge (1796), 2 H. Bl. 609 ; 3 R. R. 492 165
Savage v. (1780), 1 Doug. 366, n. 4 151
Savage v. Binney (1834), 2 Dowl. 643 341
Savage*. Canning (1867), I. R. 1 C. L. 434 188
Savage v. Hutchinson (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 232 ; 2 Eq. R. 368 1030
Saveryf. King (1866), 6 H. L. C. 627, 665, 656; 2 Jur. N. S. 603; 25
L. J. Ch. 482 137
Sawyer*. Birchmore (1836), 3 My. &K 672 693, 608
Sawyer ». Eifert (1820), 2 Nott. & M'C. 511 265
Sawyer v. Maine Fire and Mar. Ins. Co. (1839), 12 Mass. 291 1147
Saye and Sele Peer. (1846), 1 H. of L. Cas. 507 101, 1093
Sayer v. Glossop (1848), 2 Ex. 409 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 300 1229
Sayer v. Kitchen (1791), 1 Esp. 200 1191
Sayer v. WagstaflE (1842), 5 Beav. 462 ; 13 L. J. Ch. 161 ; 3 Jur. 1083 . . 923
Sayers v. Walsh (1848), 12 Ir. L. R. 436 616
Sayre v. Hughes (1868), L. R. 5 Eq. 376 ; 37 L. J. Ch. 401 ; 16 W. R.
662 ; 18 L. T. 347 : 666
Sayward*. Stevens (1854), 69 Mass. (3 Gray), 97— 102 767
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxxxiii
FAOB
Scaife v. Farrant (1875), 44 L. J. Ex. 36, 235 ; L. R. 10 Ex. 358 ; 33 L. T.
278; 23 W. E. 840 772
Scales V. Key (1840), 11 A. & E. 819 ; 3 P. & D. 50.5 168
Scaramanga «. Stamp (1880), 6 C. P. D. 295 ; 49 L. J. C. P. 674 ; 42 L. T.
804 ; 28 "W. K. 691 770
Soheibel v. Eairbairn (1799), 1 Bob. & P. 388 37
Sohibsby v. Westenholz (1870), 40 L. J. Q. B. 73 ; L. R. 6 Q. B. 165 ; 24
L. T. 93 ; 19 W. R. 587 1147
Sohmeltz v. Avery (1851), 16 Q. B. 655 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 228 ; 15 Jur. 291.. 759
Schneider v. Norris (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 286 ; 15 R. R. 250 675
Schofield, Ex parte, In re Eirtb (1877), 6 Ch. D. 230 ; 46 L. J. Bank. 112 ;
37 L. T. 281; 26 W. R. 9 966
Schofield ji. Heap (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 104; 27Beav.93; 4 Jur. N. S. 1067.. 806
Schofield V. Londesborough (Lord), (1895) 14 R. (March), 233 ; (1895) 1 Q. B.
536 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 293 ; 72 L. T. 46 ; 43 "W. R. 331 Add. [1205]
Soholesf. Chadwick(1843), 2 M. & Rob. 507 446, 511
Scholea v. HUton (1842), 10 M. & W. 15 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 229 ; 11 L. J.
Ex. 332 832, 833
Scholey v. Goodman (1823), 1 Bing. 349 : 8 Moore, C. P. 350 ; 1 C. & P. 36.. 501
Scholey v. Walton (1844), 12 M. & W. 514 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 122 4S2
Schultz V. Aatley (1836), 2 Bing. N. C. 544 ; 2 Scott, 815 ; 1 Hodges, 542;
7 C. & P. 99 547, 1205
Schwalbe, The (1861), Lush. 239 ; 14 Moo. P. C. C. 241 ; 4 L. T. 160. . . . 178
Sooones v. Morrell (1839), 1 Beav. 251 , 112
Scorell V. Boxall (1827), 1 T. & J. 396 687
Scott V. Bentley (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 244 ; 1 K. & J. 281 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 394.. 1150
Scott V. BourdilUon (1806), 2 Bos. & P. N. R. 213 ; 9 R. R. 644 763
Soott V. Brown (1892), 4 R. 42 ; 2 Q. B. 724 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 738 ; 41
"W. E. 116 ; 67 L. T. 782 ; 57 J. P. 213 7
Scott t). Clare (1812), 3 Camp. 236 293
Scott «. Commonwealth (1893), 42 Am. St. R. 371 Add. [569]
Scott V. Crawford (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 1031 ; 5 Scott, N. R. 781 545
Scott V. Fenoulhett (1784), 1 Cox, Ch. R. 79 803
Scott V. Irving (1830), 1 B. & Ad 605 158
Scottv. Jones (1813), 4 Taun. 865; 14 R. E. 686 289, 318
Scott V. LifPord (1808), 9 East, 347 ; 1 Camp. 246 32
Scott V. Lond.DockCo. (186,5), 34 L.J. Ex. 220; 3 H.&C. 596; 13 L.T. 148 163
Scott V. Marshall (1832), 2 C. & J. 238 ; 2 Tyr. 257 ; 1 L. J. Ex. 97 496
Scott V. Miller (1859), 1 Johns. 328 965
Soott V. Oxford, Ld. (1808), Peake, 170, n. a ; BuU, N. P. 7 244
Scott ■„. Pilkington (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 81 ; 2 B. & S. 11 ; 6 L. T.
21 1 140, 1154
Soott v. Sampson (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 491 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 380 ; 46 L. T.
412 ; 30 W. E. 541 ; 46 J. P. 408 255
Scott 4). Scott (1859), 1 S. &T. 258 703
Scott V. Shearman (1775), 2 W. Bl. 977 1103
Scott V. Stansfield (1868), L. R. 3 Ex. 220 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 155 ; 18 L. T.
572 ; 16 W. R. 911 1099
Scott V. Waithmau (1822), 3 Stark. 168 1213
Scott V. Walker (1853), 2 E. & B. 555 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 404 ; 17 Jur. 916. . 1185
Soouler v. Plowright (1856), 10 Moo. P. C. R. 440, 444—446 140
Sorutton V. Childs (1877), 36 L. T. 212 740, 766
Sea Nymph, The (1860), Lush. Adm. R. 23 176
Seago V. Deane (1828), 4 Bing. 459 ; 1 M. & P. 227 ; 3 C. & P. 170 754
Seale-Hayne v. Jodrell, (1891) A. C. 304 ; 65 L. T. 57 740
Seaman v. Netherclift (1876), 1 C. P. D. 540 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 798 ; 34 L.
T. 878 ; 24 W. R. 884 86S
Searle v. Barrington, Ld. (1728), 2 Str. 826 ; 8 Mod. 278 ; 2 Ld. Raym.
1370; 3Bro. P. C. 593 447, 451
Searle v. Keeves (1797), 2 Esp. 598 691
Searle v. Laverick (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 122 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 43 ; 30 L. T.
89 ; 22 W. E. 367 772
Searle v. Price (1816), 2 Hagg. Cons. 189 603
Searle v. Eeynolds (1866), 7 B. & S. 704 ; 14 L. T. 618 107
Vol. I. ends with pof/e 636.
clxxxiv TABLE OF CASES CITED,
PAOE
Searlea v. Scirlett, (1892) 2 Q. B. 56 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 673 ; 66 L. T. 8'^7 ;
40 W. R. 696 ; 56 J. P. 789 1005
Seddon v. Tutop (1796), 6 T. R. 607 ; 1 Esp. 401 ; 3 R. R. 274 1123
Seed V. Higg-ins (I860), 8 H. L. Gas. 550, 561, 666 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 314 ;
6 Jur. N. S. 1264 43, 47
Selby V. Harris (1698), 1 Ld. Raym. 745 1013, 1044
Selby V. Hills (1832), 8 Bing. 166 ; 1 Dowl. 257 ; 1 M. & So. 253 ; 1 L. J.
C. P. 65 866,870
Selby f. Selby (1817), 3 Mar. 2; 17 R. R. 1 674
Selden v. Williams (1839), 9 Watts, 9 7Sr
Selfes;. Isaacson (1858), 1 P. & F. 194 917,918
Sellers v. Till (1825), 4 B. & C. 655 151
Sells V. Hoare (1822), 3 B. & B. 232 ; 7 Moure (C. P.), 36 906
Sells V. Sells (1860), 29 L. J. Ch. 600 ; 1 Dr. & Sm. 42 ; 8 W. R. 327 .... 749
Selmes v. Judge (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 724 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 287 ; 24 L. T.
905; 19 W. R. 1110 226
Selway v. Chappell (1841), 12 Sim. 113 ; 10 L. J. Ch. 323 910
Selwood V. Mildmay (1797), 3 Ves. 306 ; 4 R. R. 1 8«2
Selwyn's case (1831), 3 Hag^. Eco. 748 174
Senior v. Armytage (1816), Holt, N. P. R. 197 ; 17 R. R. 627 (US
Serle». Norton (1841), 2 M. ^ Rob. 401. 404, u. {d) 32
Seton V. Slade (1802), 7 Ves. 27n ; 6 R. R. 124 675
Sewellu. Corp (1824), 1 C. & P. 392 1178
Sewell 0. Evans (1843), 4 Q. B. 626; 12 L. J. Q. B. 276; 3 G. & D.
604 1218,1219
Seymour v. Maddox (1851), 16 Q. B. 326 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 327 778
Shaftesbury, Ld. v. Digby, Ld. (1676), 3 Keb nn 900
Shah Mukhum LaU v. Nawab Im. Dowlah (1865), 10 Moo. Ind. App. C.
362 711
Shand v. Bowes (1877), 1 Q. B. D. 470 ; 4.i L. J. Q. B. 507 ; 2 App. Cas.
455 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 661 ; 36 L. T 857 ; 25 W. R. 730 42
Shankland v. City of Washington (1831), 5 Pet. 394 758
Shannon v. Bi-adstreet (1803), 1 Soh. & Lef. 7H ; 9 R. R. 11 670
Shapcott V. ChappeU (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 68 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 77 ; 32 W. R.
183 1232
Shardlow v. Cotterill (1881), 20 Ch. D. 90 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 353 ; 45 L. T.
672; 30 W. R. 143 670, 672
Sharmau ». Brandt (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 720 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 312 ; 19 W.
R. 956 668
Sharp f . Carter (1735), 3 P. Wms. 375 961
Sharp V. Leach (1862), 31 Beav. 491 ; 10 W. R. 878 137
Sharp V. Newsholme (1839), 5 Bing. N. C. 713 ; 8 Soott, 23 ; 3 Jur. 581 ;
9 L. J. C. P. 21 1 377
Sharp V. Scoging (1817), Holt, N. P. R. 641 973
Sharpe v. Bingley (1817), 1 Mill. R. 373 927
Sharpe v. Lamb (1840), 11 A. & E. 805 ; 3 P. & D. 454 ; 4 Jur. 965 . .310, 475
Shatwell ■„. Hall (1842), 10 M. & W. 523 ; 2 Dowl N. S. 667 ; 12 L. J.
Ex. 74 227
Shaw, Ex parte (1821), Jao. 270 321
Shaw V. Att.-Gen. (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 156 ; 39 L. J. P. 81 ; 23 L. T.
322; 18 W. R. 1145 1143
Shawf. Beck (1853), 8 Ex. 392 272
Shaw j;. Bran (1816), 1 Stark. R. 319; 18 R. R. 772 135
Shaw». Broom (18241, 4 Dowl. & R. 731 511, 513
Shaw*. Gould (1868), L. R. 3 H. L. 56; 37 L.J. Ch. 433; ISL. T. 833.. 1144
Shaw V. Markham (1791), Pea. R. 166 317
Shaw «. Neville, cited Greenleaf on Ev. 15th pd 369 . . , 698
Shaw V. Picton (1825), 7 Dowl. & R. 201 ; 4 B. & C. 715 642
Shaw V. Port Philip Gold Mining Co. (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 103 ; 63 L. J.
Q. B. 369 ; 50 L. T. 685 ; 32 W. R. 771 687
Shaw«>. Shaw (1862), 31 L. J. P. & M. 96 ; 2 S. & T. 642 873
Shearman v. Pyke (1724), cited 3 Curteis, 639 -642 702
Shearn, In goods of (1880), 50 L. J. P. 16 ; 43 L. T. 736 ; 29 W. R. 446 ;
45 J. P. 308 707
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED, clxxxv
PAGB
Shedden v. Att.-Gen. and Patrick (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 217 ; 2 S. & T.
170 408, 409,412, 415, 1103, 1109
Shedden v. Patrick (1854), 1 Macq. 535 ; 1 Paterson, 332 1132, 1133
Sheehy v. The Profess. Life Assur. Co. (1853), 13 0. B. 787: 22 L. J.
C. P. 244 1148
Sheen v. Bumpstead (1863), 2 H. & C. 193 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 271 ; 8 L. T.
832 ; 11 W. R. 734 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 242 242
ShefBeld & Manch. Ey. Co. ». Woodcock (1841), 7 M. & W. 574: 2 Eailw.
C. 522 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 26 641
Sheldon v. Clark (1806), 1 Johns. 613 267
SheUy v. "Wright (1737), Willes, 9 n
Shelton V. Braithwaite (1841), 7 M. & W. 436 ; 5 Jur. 28, 32, 671
Shelton v. Springett (1851), 1 1 C. B. 452 168
Shephard v. Payne (1863), 3 N. R. 580 ; 16 C. B. N. S. 132 ; 33 L. J. G P.
158; lOL. T. 193; 12 W. E. 581 ; 10 Jur. N. 8. 640 124,791
Shepheard v. Beetham (1872), L. E. 2 P. & D. 384 ; 41 L. J. P. 44 844
Shepherd v. Chewter (1808), 1 Camp. 274 ; 10 E. E. (.81 552
Shepherd v. Currie (1816), 1 Stark. E. 454 164
Shepherd v. Hills (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 6 ; 11 Ex. 65 76
Shepherd v. Hodsman (1852), 18 Q. B. 316 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 263 ; 16 Jur. 948 649
Shepherd v. Mackoul (1813), 3 Camp. 326 ; 14 E. R, 752 166
Shepherd v. Pybus (1842), 3 M. & Gr. 880 ; 4 Scott, N. E. 434 ; 11 L. J.
C. p. 101 776, 777
Shepherd «. Sharp (1856), 25 L. J. Ex. 264 ; 1 H. & N. 115 228
Shepherd v. Shorthose (1719), 1 Str. 412 1046
bheppard v. Gosnold (1673), Vaugh. 169 792
Sheridan and Kirwan's case (1811), 31 How. St. Tr. 673 295
Sheridan v. The New Quay Co. (1858), 28 L. J. C. P. 68 ; 4 C. B. N. S.
618 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 248 546
Sherlock i;. Passman (1836), 7 C. & P. 292, 293 39, 259
Sherman v. Sherman (l787), 2 Vera. 2T6 625
Sberratt v. Montford (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 688 ; L. E. 8 Ch. 928 ; 21 W E
719 793
Sherrington's case (183«), 2 Lew. C. C. 123 566
Sherrington v. Jermyn (182M), 3 C. & P. 374 ..'. 1208
ShickemeU V. Hotham (1854), 1 Kay, 669 "" 713
Shiel V. O'Brien (1872), I. E. 7 Eq, 64 704
Shields v. Boucher (1847), 1 De G. & Sm. 61 418, 419 420 421
Shiells V. Blackburne (1789), 1 H. Bl. 158 ; 2 E. E. 750 '. . ' 39
Shiels V. Cannon (1865), 16 Ir. C. L. E. 588 777
Shilcock (should be Sherlock) v. Passman (18:16), 7 C. & P. 292, 293 . . 39 259
Shipworth v. Green (1725), 8 Mod. 311 ; 1 Str. 610 " ' '92
Shirley t). Todd (1832), 9 Greenl. 83 "" 511
Shore v. Bedford (1843), 5 M. & Gr. 27I ; 12 L. J. C. P. 138 60' 607
Shore v Wilson (1842), 9 CI. & Fin. 365, 625 741, 744, 761, 762, 763,'764,
784, 788, 789, 790
Short V. Lee (1821), 2 Jac. & W. 464 396, 434, 435, 437, 441, 442, 443 447
Short V. Stoy (1836), cited Eoscoe, N. P. Evid. 65, 86 528
Short :;. Williams (1835), 4 Dowl. 357 " 15
Shortrede ji. Cheek (1834), 1 A. &E. 57; 3N.&M. 866;' s'l.'JIk.B.' 125. .670,671
Shott V. Strealfield (1830), 1 M. & Eob. 8 372
Shower D. Pilck (1849), 4 Ex. 478 ; 19L.J.Ex.ll3 .."!.'!!!!!!!!!!!'.!! 639
Shrewsbury's (Lady) case (1612), 2 How. St. Tr. 773 '.'.'.'.'.'. 573
Shrewsbury Peer. (1867), 7 H. L. C. 1 309, 403, 414, 425, 426, 1047," 1092,
1167, 1224
Shropshire Union Ey. & Canal Co. v. E. (1876), L! E. 7 H. L. 496 • 4S
L. J. Q. B. 31; 32 L. T. 283; 23 W. E. 7"9,... 1076
Shuttleworth v. Le Fleming (1865), 19 C. B. N. S. 687 ; 34 L. J. C P 369'
11 Jur. N. S. 840 ; 14 W. E. 13 76 722
Sibbering v. Baloarras (1860), 3 De G. & Sm. 735 ; 19 L. J. Ch.'252 ;" 14 '
Jur. 753 J28
Siohel V. Lambert (1864), 15 C. B. N, S. 781 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 137;' Vo" Ju!r"
N. S. 617 ; 12 W. R. 312 129, 149
Yol. I. ends withpaae 635,
clxxxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOB
Siddons v. Lawrence (1879), 4 Ex. D. 176 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 446 ; 40 L. T.
796 ; 27 W. B. 791 .....' *1
Siddons 5). Short (1877), 2 C. P. D. 572 ; 46 L.J. C. P. 795; 37L.T. 230.. 114
Sidebottom ». Adkins (1858), 27 L. J. Ch. 152; 30 L. T. 163; 6 W. R.
97 964
Sideways v. Dyson (1817), 2 Stark. 49 956, 1191
Sidmouth v. Sidmouth (1840), 2 Beav. 447 ; 9 L. J. Ch. 282 666, 806
Sidney, Algernon, case of (1683), 9 How. St. Tr. 854 385
Sidwell V. Mason (1857), 2 H. & N. 306 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 407 ; 3 Jur. N. S.
649 711
Sievewright v. Archibald (1851), 17 Q. B. 115 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 529 ; 15
Jur. 947 297, 299
Siggers v. Evans (1855), 5 E. & B. 367 ; 3 C. L. B. 1209 ; 24 L. J. Q. B.
705 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 8.51 639
Sikes V. Wild (1861), 30 L. J. Q. B. 325 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 375 ; 1 B. & S.
587 ; 4 B. & S. 421 ; 8 L. T. 652 ; 11 W. B. 954 773
Silberman t). Clark (1884), 96 N. T. 524 763
Silkstone and Dodsworth Coal and Iron Co., Be Whitworth's case (1881),
19 Ch. D. 118; 51L. J. Ch. 71 ; 45L. T. 449; 30W. B. 33 845
Sillick V. Booth (1841), 1 T. & C. C. C. 117 ; 11 L. J. Ch. 41 173, 175
Sills ». Brown (1840), 9 C. & P. 601 340, 935
Silver v. Stein (1852), 21 L. J. Ch. 312 ; 1 Drew. 295 1151
Simmt;. Anglo- Amer. Tel. Co. (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 188; 49 L. J. Q. B.
392 ; 42 L. T. 37 ; 28 W. B. 290 ; 44 J. P. 280 541
Simmonds, Be (1842), 3 Curt. 79 694
Simmonds v. Andrews (1839), 1 Jebb & Sy. 531 7
Simmonds v. Humble (1862), 13 C. B. N. S. 258 : 9 L. T. 168 690
Simmonds v. Simmonds (1847), 6 Notes of Cas. (Eoc. & Mar.) 324 631
Simmons v. London Joint Stock Bank, (1891) 1 Ch. 270 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 313 ;
62 L. T. 427 ; 63 L. T. 789 ; 39 W. B 449 ; (ia92) A. C. 201 ; 61 L. J.
Ch. 723 ; 66 L. T. 625 ; 41 "W. B. 108 ; 56 J. P. 644 390
Simmons v. Mitchell (1881), 6 App. Cas. 156 ; 50 L. J. P. C. 11 ; 43 L.T.
710 ; 29 "W. E. 401 ; 45 J. P. 237 929
Simmons*. Budall (1850), 1 Sim. N.S. 115, 136,137; 15 Jur. N. S. 162.. 142, 1192
Simmons v. Simmons (1847), 1 Boberts. 566 502
Simma v. Henderson (1848), 11 Q. B. 1015 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 209 348, 1037
Simons v. Great West. By. Co. (1857), 18 C. B. N. S. 805 ; 2 C. B. N. S.
620 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 25 722
Simons v. Patohett (1857), 26 L. J. Q. B. 195 ; 7 E. & B. 568 ; 3 Jur.
N. S. 742 780
Simpson*. Dendy (1860), 8 C. B. N. S. 433; 6 Jur. N. S. 11H7 112
Simpson v. Dismore (1841), 9 M. & W. 47 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 357 ; 5 Jur.
1012 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 137 1217
Simpson v. Elamank (1867), L. B. 1 P. C. 463 ; 36 L. J. Ecc. 28 77
Simpson v. Fogo (1860), 1 J. & H. 18 ; 1 H. & M. 195 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 403 ;
32 L. J. Ch. 249; 11 W. B. 418; 8 L. T. 61 1103, 1146, 1147
Simpson v. Grayson (1892), 26 Amer. St. B. 52 254
Simpson *. Lond. Gen. Omnibus Co. (1873), 42 L. J. C. P. 112 ; L. B. 8
C. P. 390 ; 38 L. T. 560 ; 21 W. B. 595 771
Simpson v. Margitson (1847), 11 Q. B. 23 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 81 ; 12 Jur.
155 16, 741, 763, 784
Simpson v. Pickering (1834), 1 C. M. & B. 529 ; 5 Tyr. 143 ; 4 L. J. Ex. 20. 1112
Simpson v. Eobinson (1848), 12 Q. B. 511 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 73 ; 13 Jur.
187 245, 623, 527
Simpson v. Smith (1822), 2 Ph. Ev. 397 942
Sims!!. Marryat (1851), 17 Q. B. 281; 20 L. J. Q. B. 454 4, 775
Sims V. Thomas (1841), 3 Ir. L. R. 417 1147, 1154
Sinclair v. Baggaley (1838), 4 M. & W. 312 ; 1 H. & H. 294 ; 2 Jur. 683 ;
7 L. J. Ex. 305 146, 147
Sinclair i>. Eraser (1771), cited 20 How. St. Tr. 468 ; 1 Doug. 4, n 1154
Sinclair!). Sinclair (1798), 1 Hagg. Const. 297 1145, 1150
Sinclair ». Sinclair (1846), 13 M. & W. 640; 14 L. J. Ex.109 488, UU
' The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxxxvil
PAGB
Sinclair v. Stevenson (182i), 1 C. & P. 585 ; 2 Bing. 514 . . . .310, 311, 747, 927,
928, 960
Singleton v. Barrett (1832), 2 C. & J. 368 ; 2 Tyr. 409 ; 1 L. J. Ex. 134 293
Singleton v. St. Louis, &o. (1877), 66 Mo. 63 763
Singleton ». Tombneon (1878), 3 App. Cas. 404 ; 38 L. T. 653 ; 26 W. B.
722 701
Sinquaei, The (1880), 5 P. D. 241 ; 50 L. J. P. D. & A. 5 ; 43 L. T. 768 . . 178
Siordet v. Kuozinski (1855), 17 C. B. 251 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 2 282
Sisaons v. Dixon (1826), 5 B. & C. 758 ; 8 D. & R. 526 105
Skaife v. Jackson (1«21), 3 B. & C. 421 ; 5 Dowl. & R. 290 487, 552, 744
Skeet V. Lindsay (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 249 ; 2 Ex. D. 314 ; 36 L. T. 98 ;
25 W. E. 322 711
Skelton v. Cole (1857), 4 De G. & J. 587 671, 672
Skelton v. Hawling (1749), 1 Wils. 268 532
Skilbeck*. Garbett (1845), 7 Q. B. 846; 14L. J. Q. B. 3:j8; 9 Jur. 939. . 155, 158
Skinner v. Great North. Ry. Co. (1874), 43 L. J. Ex. 150 ; L. R. 9 Ex.
298 ; 32 Ij, T. 223 ; 23 W. R. 7 1186
Skinner «. Lond. & Bright. Ry. Co. (1850), 5 Ex. 787 ; 15 Jur. 299 163
SHpworth V. Green (1725), 8 kod. 311 ; 1 Str. 610 92
Skrine v. Gordon (1875), Ir. R. 9 C. L. 479 49
Skusej;. Davis (1839), 10 A. &E. 635; 2P. &D. 550; 7 Dowl. 774 ; 8 L. J.
M. C. 75 1073
Skyring v. Greenwood (1825), 4 B. & C. 281 ; 6 Dowl. & R. 401 ; 1 C. &
P. 517 542
Slack V. Buohannan (1790), Pea. R. 5 516
Slack V. Busteed (18.i6), 6 Ir. Ch. R. 1 694
Slade V. Tucker (1880), 14 Ch. D. 824 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 644 ; 43 L. T. 49 ;
28 W. R. 807 595
Slane Peerage (1855), Pari. Min. Pt. 2, p. 49 ; 5 CI. & Fin. 41 422
Slaney v. Wade (1836). 1 My. & C. 338 ; 7 Sim. 595 . . . .409, 416, 423, 424, 425
Slater v. Hodgson (1846), 9 Q. B. 727 : 2 New Seas. Cas. 488 430
Slater v. Lawsou (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 396 493
Slator V. Nolan (1876), I. E. 11 Eq. 367 137
Slatterie ». Pooley (1840), 6 M. & W. 664 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 8 ; 1 H. & W.
16; 4 Jur. 1038 29], 292, 486
Slaymaker v. Gundacker's Ex. (1823), 10 Serg. & R. 75 493
Slaymaker v. Wilson (1829), 1 Penrose & Watts, 216 1220
Sleght V. Rhinelacder (1806), 1 Johns. 192 765
Slingabyi;. Grainger (1859), 7 H. L. Caa. 283; 28 L. J. Ch. 616 741, 801
Sly V. Sly (1877), L. R. 2 P. D. 91 ; 46 L. J. P. D. & A. 63 444, 445
SmaU V. Nairne (1849), 13 Q. B. 840 355
Smallcombe v. Bruges (1824), M'Cl. 45 ; 13 Price, 136 498
Smart v. Harding (1855), 15 C. B. 652 ; 24 L. J. C. P. 76 ; 1 Jur. N. S.
311 682
Smart V. Hyde (1841), 8 M. & W. 723 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 60 ; 10 L. J. Ex.
479 769
Smart v. Morton (1855), 5 E. & B. 30 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 260 ; 1 Jur. N. S.
825 114
Smart v. Rayner (1834), 6 C. & P. 721 271
Smart v. West Ham Union (1855), 10 Ex. 867 ; 3 C. L. R. 696 ; 24 L. J.
Ex. 201 641
Smartle ». Williams (1695), 3 Lev. 387 ; 1 Salk. 280 1214
Smee v. Bryer (1848), 6 Moo. P. C. C. 604 ; 6 Notes of Cas. (Eoo. & Mar.)
406 698
Smee v. Smee (1879), 6 P. Div. 84 ; 49 L. J. P. 8 ; 28 W. R. 703 ; 44 J.
P. 220 262, 263
Smith's Estate, Re, Bridson v. Smith (1876), 24 W. R. 392 534
Smith, Re, OsweU v. Shepherd, (1892) 67 L. T. 64 134
Smith and Goddard v. Ridgway (1866), 2 H. & C. 37 ; 4 H. & C. 577 ; 35
L. J. Ex. 198 ; L. R. 1 Ex. 331 803
Smith, Knight & Co., Re (1869), L. R. 4 Ch. 421 ; 38 L. J. Ch. 710 845
Smith, Marv, case of (1616), 2 How. St. Tr. 1049 657
Smith V. Adkins (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 402 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 628 693
Vol. I, ends with page 635.
clxxxyiii table op cases cited.
PAOB
Smith V. Andrews, (1891) 2 Ch. 678 ; 65 L. T. 175 76, 1173
Smith V. Battams (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 232 92
Smiths). Battens (1834), 1 M. & Rob, 341 146, 461
Smith V. Beadnell (1807), 1 Camp. 30 617
Smith V. Dk. of Beaufort (1842), 1 Hare, 520; 13 L. J. Ch. 33; 1 Phill. 209.. 1183
Smith V. Biggs (1832), 5 Sim. 391 ; 2 L. J. Ch. 161 482
Smith V. Bird (1839), 3 Dowl. 641 476
Smith V. Blakey (1867), 8 B. & 8. 164 ; L. K. 2 Q. B. 326 ; 36 L. J. Q. B.
156 ; 15 W. R. 492 : 436, 437, 455
Smith V. Blaudy (1829), Ry. & M. 259 4 79
Smith V. Brain (1851), 16 Q. B. 244 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 201 ; 15 Jur. 287 262
Smith V. Braudram (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 250 ; 2 Soott, N. R. 539 ; 9 Dowl.
441 ; 5 Jur. 173 194
Smith«).Brownlow,Ld.(1869),L.R.9Eq. 241; 21L.T.739 ; 18 W. R. 271 396
Smith V. BuUer (1875), L. R. 19 Eq. 473 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 69 ; 31 L. T. 873 ;
23 W. R. 332 818
Smith V. Bumham (1838), 3 Sumn. 438 556
Smithu. Cannan (1854), 2E. & B. 35; 22 L. J. Q. B. 291 ; 17 Jur. 911.. 82
Smith V. Cartwright (1851), 6 Ex. 927 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 401 148
Smith V. Chester (1787), 1 T. R. 654 ; 1 E. R. 345 547, 548
Smith V. Conder (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 878 ; 9 Ch. D. 1 70 , 27 W. R. 149 . . 785
Smith <). Cramer (1836), 1 Bing. N. C, 686; 1 Scott, 541; 1 Hodges, 124.. 377, 381
Smith V. Crooker (1809), 5 Mass. 538 1196
Smith V. Daniell (1876), 44 L. J. Ch. 189 ; L. R. 18 Eq. 649 ; 30 L. T. 752.. 699
Smith V. Daviea (1836), 7 C. & P. 307 259
Smith V. Be Wmitz (1825), Ry. & M. 212 612
Smith V. Doe d. Jersey (1819), 2 B. & P. 592 ; 1 B. & B. 97, 160 39
Smith V. Dunham (1829), 8 Pick. 246 1201
Smith V. East India Co. (1841), 1 PhiU. 50 618
Smith V. Evans (1851), 1 Wils. 313 700
Smith p. Fell (1841), 2 Curt. 667 600
Smith V. Flanders (1880), 129 Mass. 322 741
Smith V. Forty (1829), 4 C. & P. 126 716
Smith V. Harris (1846), 1 Roberts. 262 700
Smith «. Hayes (1867), I. R. 1 C. L. 333 523
Smith V. Henderson (1842), 9 M. & "W. 798 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 316 ; 2 Dowl.
N. S. 245 1217, 1218
Smith V. Howden (1863), 2 New R. 30 ; 14 C. B. N. S. 398 113
Smith V. Hudson (1865), 34 L. J. Q. B. 145 ; 6 B. & S. 431 ; 12 L. T. 377;
13 W. R. 683 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 622 692
Smith V. Hughes (1871), L. R, 6 Q. B. 597 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 221 ; 26 L. T.
329 ; 19 W. R. 1069 776
Smith V. Huson (1811), 1 PhilUmore, 294 373
Smith V. James (1861), 11 C. B. N. S. 62 ; 5 L. T. 525 ; 10 W. R. 131 . . 726
Smith V. Jeffries (1821), 9 Price, 267 267
Smith «). Jeffryes (1846), 15 M. & W. 561 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 325 783
Smith V. Johnson (1812), 16 East, 213 ; 13 R. R. 449 1124
Smith V. Keal (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 340 ; 47 L. T. 142 ; 31 W. R. 76 390
Smith V. Keating (1849), 6 C. B. 136 86
Smith V. King, (1892) 2 Q, B. 543 ; 67 L. T. 420 ; 40 W. R. 542 ; 66
J. P. 776 718
Smith V. Knowelden (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 561 ; 9 Dowl. 402 ; 10 L. J. C. P.
126 187, 188
Smith V. Lane (1824), 12 Serg, & R. 84 927
Smithu. Lister (1895), 15 R. (Mar.), 416; 64 L.J. Q. B. 154; 72L.T. 20 .. 1061
Smith?!. Lloyd (1854), 9 Ex. 662, 574; 2 C. L. R. 1008; 23 L. J. Ex.
194 118
Smith V. LoTell (1850), 10 C. B. 6; 1 L. M. & P. 794 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 57 ;
15 Jur. 250 202
Smith V. Lyon (1813), 3 Camp. 465 ; 14 R. E. 810 496
Smith V. Maplebaok (1786), 1 T. R. 441 ; 1 R. R. 247 • 666
Smith V. Marrable (1842), C. & Marsh. 479 ; 11 M. & W. 6 ; 12 L. J. Ex.
223 273, 77S
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxxXlX
PiOE
Smith V. Marsack (1818), 6 0. B. 486 ; 6 Dowl. & L. 363 ; 18 L. J. C. P.
65 ; 12 Jur. 1050 547
Smith V. Martin (1841), C. & Marsh. 68 ; 9 M. & W. 304 ; 1 Dowl. N. S.
418 261
Smith V. Matthews (1861), 30 L. J. Ch. 445 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 378 ; 4 L. T. 266;
9 W. R. 644 665
Smith V. Morgan (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 257 496, 923, 925
Smith ». Mullett (1809) 2 Camp. 208 ; 11 R. R. 694 31
Smith V. Neale (1857), 2 0. B. N. S. 67 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 143 ; 3 Jur. N. S.
516 675, 680, 778
Smith V. NicoUs (1839), 6 Bing. N. 0. 222; 7 Scott, 147; 7 Dowl. 282;
1 Am. 474 1142, 1152, 1165
Smith V. Poole (1841), 12 Sim. 17 ; 10 L. J. Ch. 192 713
Smith V. Royston (1841), 8 M. & "W. 386 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 124 ; 10 L. J. Ex.
437 1121
Smithy. Rnmmens (1807), 1 Camp. 9 1102, 1109, 1116
Smith V. Sainsbury (1832), 5 C. & P. 196 1222
Smith V. Soudder (1824), 11 Serg. & R. 325 504
Smith V. Shaw (1829), 10 B. & C. 277 ; 5 M. & R. 226 227
Smith V. Simmes (1795), 1 Esp. 330 614
Smith V. Sleap (1843), 1 C. & K. 48 310
Smith V. Smith (1733-4), 2 Str. 955 638
Smith V. Smith (Huson) (1 81 1), 1 Phillimore, 294 373
Smith V. Smith (1836), 3 Bing. N. C. 29 ; 7 C. & P. 401 610
Smith ». Smith (1866), 36 L. J. P. & M. 65 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 143 ; 14 L. T.
147 ; 14 W. R. 648 695, 697
Smith V. Smith (1876), I. R. 10 Eq. 273 304, 419
Smith V. Surman (1829), 9 B. & C. 561 ; 4 M. & R. 45.5 . . 686, 687, 689, 690, 691
Smith V. Surridge (1801), 4 Esp. 26 ; 6 R. R. 837 1143
Smith «. Taylor (1805), 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 196 151, 519
Smith V. Tebbitt (1867), L. R. 1 P. & D. 398, 434; 36 L. J. P. 97 ; 16 L.T.
841; 16W. E. 18 170, 416, 423
Smith V. Thackeray (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 564 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 276 ; 12 Jur.
N. S. 64-') ; 14 L. T. 761 ; 14 "W. R. 832 114
Smith V. Thomas (1836), 2 Bing. N. C. 380 ; 1 Hodges, 366 , 4 Dowl. P. C.
333 207
Smith »." Thompson '(isio),' Sc! B.'ii' ;" ISL. J.' C.'p. Hi '. '. .'. '.'. '.'.'.'.'.'. '. '. 44
Smith D. Thorne(1862),21 L. J. Q. B. 199; 18 Q. B. 134; 16 Jur. 332. .710, 712
Smith V. Tombs (1839), 3 Jur. 72 682
Smith V. Truaoott (1843), 1 Dowl. & L. 630; 6 M. & Gr. 267; 12 L. J.
C. P. 336 832
Smith V. Voss (1867), 2 H. & N. 97 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 233 6
Smith V. Webster (1876), 45 L. J. Ch. 528 ; 3 Ch. D. 49 ; 35 L. T. 44 ; 24
"W. R. 894 667
Smith 11. Whittingham (1833), 6 C. & P. 78 436, 508
Smith V. WiUdns (1833), 6 C. & P. 180 231
Smith V. "Wilson (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 729 764, 765
Smith V. Winter (1882), 12 C. B. 487 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 168 ; 16 Jur. 908 . . 222
Smith V. Young (1808), 1 Camp. 439 293
Smithson's, Sir Hugh, oise (undated), cited Bull. N. P. 2^8 10 8
Smyth V. Anderson (1849), 7 C. B. 21 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 109 ; 13 Jur. 211. .222,
460
Smyth V. Wilson (1841), 2 Jebb & Sy. 660 89, 92
Smythe v. Banks (1797), 4 Dall. 329 866
Snelgrove v. Martin (1822), 2 M'C. 241 511
Snell V. Finch (1863), 32 L. J. C. P. 117 ; 13 C. B. N. S. 661 ; 9 Jur. N. S.
333 ; 7 L. T. 747 162
Snelling v. Huntingfield (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 20 ; 4 Tyr. 606 : 4 L. J.
Ex. 232 68 1
Snowball ». Goodricke (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 641 496
Snowdon v. Smith (1811), cited 1 M. & Sel. 286 255
Soar V. Foster (1758, should be 1858), 4 K. & J. 152 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 406 . , 066
Society, &o. *. Wheeler (1814), 1 New Hamp. 310 122
Vol- 1, ends with page 63d.
CXC TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOB
Solicitor, In re, A (1880), 14 Ct. D. 162 834
Solicitor to the Treasury v. White (1886), 55 L. J. P. 79 1282
Solly V. Hinde (1834), 2 C. & M. 516 ; 4 Tyr. 305 748
Solomon, Re, Ex parte Dressier (1878), 9 Ch. D. 252; 48 L. J. Bank. 20;
39 L. T. 377 662
Solomon V. Vintners' Co. (1859), 4 H. & N. 685 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 370 ; 6 Jur.
N. S. 1177 115
Solomons v. CampbeU (1822), cited 1 St. Ev. 177 924
Solway, The (1885), 10 P. D. 137 ; 64 L. J. P. 83 ; 53 L. T. 680 ; 34 W. E,.
232 ; 6 Asp. M. C. 482 388
Somerset, D. of, v. Fogwell (1826), 6 B. & C. 876 ; 1 D. & R. 747 Ill
Somerset, D. of, t>. France (1727), 1 Str. 662 232
Somersets. Hart (1884), 12 Q.B.D. 360; 63 L. J. M. C. 77; 48 J. P. 327. . 107
Somervme v. Hawkins (1-861), 10 C. B. 583 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 131 ; 15 Jur.
460 46, 111
Somerville v. Somerville (1801), 5 Ves. 750 ; 5 R. R. 155 179
Somes V. Skinner (1826), 3 Pick. 52 90
Soper V. Dibble (1696), 1 Ld. Raym. 175 6
Sopwith 1). Sopwith (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 131 ; 2 S. & T. 160 ; 7 Jur.
N. S. 554 ; 4 L. T. 256 1110
Sbtheran v. Dening (1881), 20 Ch. D. 99 706
Sotiliohos V. Kemp (1848), 3 Ex. 105 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 36 766
Souch*. Strawbridge (1846),2C.B. 814; 15 L. J. C. P. 170; lOJur.367.. 681,
682
Soule's case (1828), 5 Greenl. 407 893
Souter V. Drake (1834), 2 B. & Ad. 992 ; 3 N. &.M. 40 773
South-Eastem Ry. Co. v. "Warton (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 615 ; 6 H. & N. 520 94
South of Ireland ColHery Co. v. Waddle (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 618 ; 38
L. J. C. P. 338 640, 641
Southall V. Rigg (1851), 11 C. B. 481 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 145 ; 16 Jur. 706 . . 201
Southampton case (1833), Cock. cSc R. 113 ; Per. & K. 225 '. 496
Southampton Dock Co. v. Richards (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 448 ; 1 Scott, N. R.
219 1177
Southampton, Mayor of, v. Graves (1800), 8 T. R. 590 ; 6 R. R. 480 993
Southard v. Wrexford (1826), 6 Cowen, 254 962
Southee*. Denny (1847), 1 Ex. 196; 17 L. J. Ex. 15i 189
Southey v. Nash (1837), 7 C. & P. 632 917
Southwark Bridge Co. v. Sills (1826), 2 C. & P. 371 643
Southwark Water Co. v. Quick (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 315 ; 47 L. J. Q. B.
288; 26 W. R. 341 595, 1186
Southwell D. Bowditch (1876), 1 C. P. D. 100, 374 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 630 ;
34 L. T. 133 ; 35 L. T. 196 ; 24 W. R. 275, 838 769
Southwick V. Southwick (1870), 2 Sweeney, 234 689
Soward V. Leggatt (1836), 7 C. & P. 616 258, 269
Sowerby v. Butcher (1834), 2 C. & M. 371 ; 4 Tyr. 320 768
Spaddacini v. Keary (1889), 21 L. R. Jr. 553 914
Spadwell V. (1730), cited Berkeley Peerage, 4 Camp. 410 419
Spaight V. Tedcastle (1881), 6 App. Cas. 217 ; 44 L. T. 589 ; 29 W. R.
761 ; 4 Asp. M. C. 406 178
Spaight V. Twiss (1868), 13 Ir. C. L. R. 416 1168
Spargo V. Brown (1829), 9 B. & C. 935 435, 487
Sparrow v. Farrant (1819), 2 St. Bv. 517, n 1227
Sparrowv. Hill (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 362; 8Q. B. D.'479; 60 L. J. Q. B.
675; 44L. T. 917; 29 W. R. 705 42
Spartali v. Beneoke (1850), 10 C. B. 212 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 293 766, 769
Spears v. Hartly (1837), 3 Esp. 81 ; 6 R. R. 814 79
Spence v. Dodsworth (1891), 60 L. J. Ch. 768 ; (1891) 1 Ch. 657 ; 64 L. T.
282 ; 39 W. R. 362 9U
Spence D. Healey (1863), 8 Ex. 668; 22 L. J. Ex. 249 750
Spence v. Stewart (1802), 3 East, 89 ; 6 R. R. 549 869
Spenceley, In the goods of , (1892) P. 256 ; 61 L. J. P. 133 1104
Spenoeley v. De Willott (1806), 7 East, 108 ; 3 Smith, 289 947
Spenceley v. Schulenburgh (1806), 7 East, 367 607, 608
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE or CASES CITED. CXCl
PAQB
Spencer ». Barough (1842), 911. &'W.426; 6 Jur. 154; 11 L.J. Ex. 378..475,476
Spencer v. Billing (1812), 3 Camp. 310 323
Spencer v. Newton (1837), 6 A. & E. 623 ; 1 N. & P. 818 ; 1 Jur. 52 . .867, 868
Silencer v. Thompson (1856), 6 Ir. C. L. R. 537, 565 158, 243, 1 111
Spencer v. Williams (1871), L. R. 2 P. & D. 230 ; 40 L. J. P. & M. 45 ;
24L. T. 513; 19 W. K. 703 1106
Sperling, Re (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 25 ; 9 L. T. N. S. 348 ; 12 "W. R.
354 ; 3 S. & T. 272 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1205 700
Spice V. Bacon (1877), 2 Ex. D. 463 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 713 ; 36 L. T. 896 ; 25
W. R. 840 : 162
Spicer v. Burgess (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 129 ; 4 Tyr. 598 1203
Spioer v. Cooper (1841), 1 Q. B. 424 ; 1 a. & D. 52 ; 5 Jur. 1036 763
Spickernell v. Hotham (1854), 1 Kay, 669 671
Spieres v. Parker (1 786), 1 T. R. 141 ; 1 R. R. 165 85
Spiers i). "Willison (1808), 4 Crancli, 398 288
Spill V. Manle (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 232 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 138 ; 20 L. T. 675 ;
17 W. R. 805 Ill
Spindler, Re, see Bx parte Rolfe.
Spittle V. "Walton (1851), L. R. 11 Eq. 420 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 368 ; 24 L. T.
18 ; 19 W. R. 405 896
SpoUan ». Magan (1851), 1 Ir. C. L. R. 700 710,713
Spong V. Wright (1842), 9 M. & W. 629 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 144 712, 713
Spooner v. Juddow (1848-50), 6 Moo. P. C. R. 257 19, 225, 227
Spooner v. Payne (1847), 4 C. B. 328 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 225 328, 1214, 1216
Spragge's case (undated), cited 14 East, 276 318
Spratt V. Harris (1833), 4 Hagg. Eco. 405 1151
Sprigge V. Sprigge (1868), 38 L. J. P. & M. 4 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 608 ; 19
L. T. 462 ; 17 W. R. 8 143
Spring, The (1866), L. R. 1 Adm. 99 ; 14 W. R. 975 6
Spring V. Eve (1677\ 2 Mod. 240 20
Spring V. Lovett (1831), 11 Pick. 417 757
Spurr V. Trimble (1818), 1 A. K. Marsh. 271 172
Squire v. Campbell (1836), 2 Cooper, 114 750
Srimut Rajah v. Katama Natohiar (1866), 11 Moo. lud. App. 50 1123
Staoe V. Griffith (1869), 6 Moo. P. C. N. S. 18 ; L. R. 2 P. C. 420 ; 20 L. T.
197 47, 618, 619
Stackpole v. Arnold (1814), 11 Mass. 27 552, 744, 758
Stackpole ». Howell (1807), 13 Ves. 417 ; 9 R. R. 200 144
Staokpoole v. The Queen (1875), I. R. 9 Eq. 619 398
Stafford's, Ld., case (1680), 7 How. St. Tr. 1459-. 624, 973, 974
Stafford Peer. (1825), Pari. Min. 4 413, 416, 423
Stafford ». Clark (1824), 2 Bing. 382 ; 9 Moore, C. P. 724 ; 1 C. & P. 24,
403 1124
Stafford, Mayor of, v. Till (1829), 4 Bing. 75 ; 12 Moore, 260 97, 643
Staines v. Stewart (1862), 31 L. J. P. & M. 10 ; 2 S. & T. 320 ; 8 Jur. N. S.
440 705, 747, 950
Stainton v. Chadwiok (1851), 3 M. & G. 575 ; 13 Beav. 320 ; 15 Jur. 1539. . 1183
Stainton and Wife v. Jones (1779), 1 Doug. 380, n. 96 7
Stalworth v. Inns (1844), 13 M. & W. 466 ; 2 Dowl. & L. 428 ; 14 L. J.
Ex. 81 ; 9 Jur. 285 1039
Stamford Bank ». Smith, (1892) 1 Q. B. 765 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 405 ; 66 L. T.
306; 40 W. R. 355; 56 J. P. 229 713
Stamford, Ld. v. Dunbar (1846), 13 M. & W. 822, 827 119
Stammers ». Dixon (1806), 7 East, 200 ; 3 Smith, 261 ; 8 R. R. 612 791
StancUff V. Hardwicke (1836), 2 C. M. & R. 1, 12 ; 3 Dowl. P. C. 762 ; 6
Tyr. 551 ; 1 Gale, 127 152
Standage v. Creighton (1832), 6 C. & P. 406 606
Standard v. Baker (1785-6), cited Tidd's Prao. 858 836
Standen v. Chrismas (1847), 10 Q. B. 135 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 265 ; 11 Jur. 694 1169
Standen v. Standen (1791), Pea. R. 45 ; 4 T. R. 469, n. ; 6 T. R. 331, n. .436, 621
Standish v. Ross (1849), 3 Ex. 527 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 186 549
Standley, Re (1849), 1 Roberts. 755 ; 7 Notes of Cas. (Eco. & Mar.) 69 . . 698
Stanger v. Searle (1793), 1 Esp. 16 1221
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CXCll TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAGE
Stanhope «>. Nott (undated), 2 Swans. 221, n 609
Stanley v. Dowdeswell (1874), L. R. 10 C. P. 102 ; 23 W. R. 389 672
Stanley J). Stanley (1862), 2 J. & H. 491 ; 10 W. R. 857 Sd
Stanley v. White (1811), 14 Bast, 338 ; 12 R. B. S44 232, 234, 523
StansBeld v. Hobsou (1852), 16 Beav. 236 ; 3 De G. M. & G. 620 ; 22 L. J.
Ch. 457 ; 20 L. T. 301 ; 1 "W. R. 216 720
Stantone. Collier (1854), 3E. &B.274; 23L. J.Q.B. 116; 18 Jnr.N.S. 650.. 664
Stanton i>. Peroival (1854), o H. L. Cas. 257 ; 24 L. J. Oh. 369 492
Stanton v. Styles (1850), 1 L. M. & P. 575 ; 5 Ex. 678 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 336. . 1121
Stanwix's, Gen., case (see R. v. Hay, Dr.).
Stapleton v. Crofts (1852), 18 Q. B. 367 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 246 . . . .879, 887, 892
Stapleton v. Haymen (1865), 33 L. J. Ex. 170 ; 2 H. & C. 918 ; 12 W. R.
317; 10 Jur. iST. S. 417 651
Stapylton v. Clough (1853), 2 E. & B. 933 ; 2 C. L. R. 266 ; 23 L. J. Q. B.
5 ; 18 Jur. 60 437, 454, 460
Startup V. Maodonald (1841), 2M:. & Gr. 395 ; 2 Soott, N. R. 485 ; (1843),
6M. & Gr. 619; 7 Scott, N. R. 269; 12 L. J. 0. P. 477 33, 34
State, The, v. Adams (1789-1806), 1 Hayw. 463 120
State, The, v. Atkinson (1894), 42 Am. St. R. 877 Aiid. [68]
State, The, v. Boswell (1829), 2 Dev. 209 972, 973
State, The, v. Buie (1876), 43 Tex. 532 627
State, The, v. Center (1862), 35 Vern. 378 690
State, The, v. Clifford (1892), 42 Am. St. R. 518 Jdd. [68, 580]
State, The, v. De "Wolf (1830), 8 Conn. 93 897
State, The, v. Freeman (1824), 5 Conn. 348 617
State, The, v. Hayward (1819), 1 Nott & M'C. 547 627
State, The, v. Held (1874), 57 Mo. 252 627
State, The, v. Johnson (1893), 40 Am. St. R. 405 Add. [468]
State, The, v. McKean (1873), 36 Iowa, 349 635
State, The, v. Molier (1826-34), 1 Dpt. 263 627
State, The, v. Rawls (1820), 2 Nott & M'C. 331 528
State, The, v. Stinson (1844), 7 Law Reporter, 383 169, 903
State, The, v. Whisenhurst (1823), 2 Hawks. 458 906
State, The, v. Wood (1873), 53 New Hamp. 484 616
Stattuck V. The State (1858), 11 Ind. 473 616
Staverton v. Ashburton (1855), 4 E. & B. 526 ; 24 L. J. M. C. 53 ; 1 Jur.
N. S. 233 1136
Stead V. Dawher (1839), 10 A. & E. 57 ; 2 P. & D. 447 752
Stead V. Heaton (1792), 4 T. R. 669 440, 441
Steadman v. Dnhamel (1845), 1 C. B. 892 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 270 546
Steamship Co. "Norden" t>.Dempsey (1876), 45 L. J. C. P. 764 ; 1 C. P. D.
654 ; 24 W. R. 984 158, 763
Stearine, &o. Co. v. Heintzmann (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 60 ; 11 L. T. 272 ;
10 Jur. N. S. 881 937
Stearn i;. Mills (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 657 ; 1 N. & M. 434 553
Stebbing v. Spicer (1849), 8 C. B. 827 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 24 168
Stedman v. Gooch (1793), 1 Esp. 6 103.t
Steel V. Prickett (1819), 2 Stark. R. 463 112, 397, 402
Steel V. State Line Steamship Co. (1877), 3 App. Caa. 72 ; 37 L. T. 333 . . 771
Steele, Re, May v. Wilson (1868), 37 L. J. P. & M. 68 ; L. R. 1 P. & D.
575 ; 19 L. T. 91 ; 17 W. R. 16 709
Steele i;. Howe (1849), 14 Q. B. 431; 19 L. J. Q. B. 89 ; 14 Jur. 147 .. . . 787
Steele v. Mart (1825), 4 B. & C. 273 756
Steele v. Stewart (1843-4), 1 Phill. 471 ; 14 L. J. Ch. 34 ; 9 Jur. 121 .... 699
Steevens's Hosp. v. Dyas (186.3), 15 Ir. Ch. B. 405, 420 142
Steiglitz V. Egginton (1815), Holt, N. P. R. 141 ; 17 R. R. 622 645
Steinkeller v. Newton (1840), 1 Soott, N. R. 148 ; 8 Dowl. 579 ; 9 C. & P.
313 325, 355, 356, 923
Stephen v. Gwenap (1831), 1 M. & Rob. 120 4'j5
Stephens v. Foster (1833), 6 C. & P. 289 928
Stephens v. Heathcote (1860), 1 Dr. & Sm. 138 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 529 496
Stephens v. Pinney (1818), 8 Taun. 327 ; 2 Moore, C. P. 349 287
Stephens (should be Stevens) v. Webb (1835), 7 C. & P. 60 274
The references are to pages, not to paragrap/is.
TABLE OP CASES CITED. CXCIU
PAGH
Steuart v. Gladstone (1878), 7 Oh. D. 394 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 154 ; 37 L. T. 575 ;
26 W. E. 277 487
Stevens v. Clark (1842), 2 M. & Eob. 435 481
Stevens v. Lloyd (1829), 1 M. & M. 292 1195
Stevens v. Midi. Ey. Co. and Lauder (1854), 23 L. J. Ex. 328 ; 10 Ex. 352 ;
2 C. L. E. 1300 ; 18 Jur. 932 643
Stevens v. Thaoker (1793), Pea. E. 187 499
Steward v. Eddowes (1874), 43 L. J. C. P. 204 ; L. E. 9 C. P. 311 ; 30
L. T. 333 ; 22 W. E. 634 668
■ Steward v. North Metropolitan Tram Co. (1886), 16 Q. B. X>. 656 ; 55 L. J.
Q. B. 157; 64L. T. 35; 34 W. E. 316; 60 J. P. 324 191, 192
Stewart, Ee (1863), 3 S. & T. 192 ; 4 S. & T. 211 ; 32 L. J. P. & M. 94 . . 701
Stewart v. Alison (1821), 6 Serg. & E. 324 1178
Stewarts. Anglo-Califor. Gold Miu. Co. (1852), 18 Q. B. 736 ; 21 L. J.
Q. B. 393 643
Stewart v. BaUris Co. (1883), 63 L. J. Ch. 760 ; 50 L. T. 479 ; 32 W. E.
676 347, 845
Stewart i>. Cauty (1841), 8 M. & W. 160 ; 2 Eailway & C. Cas. 616 ; 10
L. J. Ex. 348 37
Stewart v. Forbes (1849), 1 H. & T. 461, 472 ; 1 Mao. & G. 137 ; 19 L. J.
Ch. 133 160
Stewart v. Steele (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 669 ; 5 Soott, N. E. 517 ; U L. J.
C. P. 155 818
Stewartson v. Watts (1839), 8 Watts, 392 388
Steyner v. Droitwich (1696), Skin. 623 ; 1 Salk. 281 ; 12 Mod. 85 1179
Still V. Halford (1814), 4 Camp. 19 1039
Stimson*). Earnham (1871), 41 L. J. Q. B. 52; L. E. 7 Q. B. 175 ; 26
L. T. 747 ; 20 W. E. 183 549
Stoate V. Stoate (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 102 ; 2 S. & T. 223; 3L.T 756. . 1110
Stobart v. Dryden (1836), 1 M. & W. 615 ; 2 Gale, 146 ; 1 T. & G. 899 ; 5
L. J. Ex. 218 308, 446, 465
Stobart v. Todd (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 956 ; 2 W. E. 617 ; 2 Eq. 1144 ; 18 Jur.
618 1036
Stobell (should be Stokell) v. Niven (1889), 61 L. T. 18 671
Stock V. M'Avoy (1872), L. E. 15 Eq. 85 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 230 ; 21 W. E.
620 ; 27 L. T. 441 666
Stookbridge v. Quicke (1853), 3 C. & K. 305 1047
Stockdale v. Hansard (1839), 2 P. & D. 1 ; 9 A. & E. 1 ; 3 Jnr. 905 4
Stocken v. Collin (1841), 7 M. & W. 616 ; 9 C. & P. 653 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 227. . 31,
154
Stockfleth V. De Tastet (1814), 4 Camp. 11 ; 15 E. R. 720 516, 517
StockU V. Puushou (1880), 6 P. D. 9 ; 50 L. J. P. 14 ; 44 L. T. 280 ; 29
W. E. 2:4 ; 45 J. P. 169 701
Stockton V. iJemuth (1838), 7 Watts, 39 388
StockweU V. Eitherdon (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Eoo. & Mar.) 409 705
Stoddart v. Grant (1851-2), 1 Macq. 171 ; 1 Paterson, 122 704
Stoddart v. Manning (1828), 2 Har. & G. 147 969
Stoer, In re (1884), 9 P. D. 120 ; 51 L. T. 141 ; 32 W. E. 1006 362
Stoever v. Whitman (1814), 6 Binn. 417 765
StokehiU v. Pettingell (1852), 21 L. J. Q. B. 249, n 879
Stokes V. Bate (1826), 6 B. & C. 491 ; 3 Dowl. & E. 247 1133
Stokes V. Dawes (1826), 4 Mason, 268 423, 1102
Stokes V. Grant (1878), 4 C. P. D. 25 ; 40 L. T. 36 ; 27 W. E. 397 187
Stokes V. Heron (1845), 12 C. & E. 161 ; 9 Jui-. 563 144
Stokes V. Mason (1808), 9 East, 426 19
Stokes V. Salomons (1861), 9 Hare, 79 ; 20 L. J. Ch. 343 79
Stokes ». White (1834), 1 CM. & E. 223; 4 Tyr. 786 872
Stonard v. Dunkin (1810), 2 Camp. 344 ; 11 E. E. 724 545
Stone's case (1661), Dyer, 215, pi. 50 660
Stone, James, Ee (1868), 1 S. & T. 238 142
Stone V. Blackburn (1793), 1 Esp. 37 909
Stone V. Eorsyth (1781), 2 Doug. 707 1045
Stone V. Greening (184»), 13 Sim. 390 804
Vol. I. ends with page 636.
CXCIV TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAOE
Stone V. Metoalf (1815), 1 Stark. S3 ; 755
Stone V. Whiting (1817), 2 Stark. R. 235 ; 19 R. R. 710 660
Stones V. Byron (1846), 4 Dowl. & L. 393 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 32 ; 1 BaU Gt.
K. 248 ; 11 Jut. 44 909
Stones V. Menhem (1848), 2 Ex. 382 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 215 363
Stoomvaart v. Peninsular and Oriental Steam Nav. Co. (1880), 5 App. Cas.
876 ; 52 L. J. Adm. 1 ; 43 L. T. 610 ; 29 "W. R. 173 177
Stoop's case (1799), Addis. 381 467
Storr V. Scott (1833), 6 C. & P. 241 520
Stothert v. James (1843), 1 C. & K. 121 512
Stott V. Pairlaml) (1883), 53 L. J. Q. B. 47 ; 49 L. T. 525 767
Stoveld V. Hughes (1811), 14 East, 308 ; 12 R. R. 523 691
Stowe V. Quemer (1870), L. R. 5 Ex. 155 ; 39 L. J. Ex. 60 ; 22 L. T. 29 ;
18 W. R. 466 26
Stowell V. Robinson (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 928 ; 6 L. J. C. P. 326 ; 5 Scott,
196 752
Stracey v. Blake (1835), 7 C. & P. 404 474
Stracy v. Blake (1836), 1 M. & W. 168 ; Tyr. & G. 528 507
Straffon's Exors., Ex parte, North of England Joint Stock Bank. Co., Re
(1853), 22 L. J. Ch. 194 ; 1 De G. M. & G. 576 ; 16 Jur. 435 641
Straker ». Graham (1839), 4 M. & W. 721 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 86 ; 7 Dowl. 223 . . 617
Straker v. Reynolds (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 262; 58 L. J. Q. B. 180; 60
L. T. 107 ; 37 W. R. 379 855
Stranks v. St. John (1867), 36 L. J. C. P. 118 ; L. R. 2 C.P. 376 . . . .649, 773
Stratford v. Greene (1810), 1 Ball & B. 296 1013, 1014
Stratford and Morton Rail. Co. v. Stratton (1832), 2 B. & Ad. 618 91
Stratton v. Rastall (1788), ,2 T. R. 366 93, 552, 744
Strauss v. County Hotel Co. (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 27 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 25 ;
49 L. T. 601 ; 32 "W. R. 170 162
Strauss 1). Francis (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 379 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 133 ; 7 B. &
S. 365 508
Streathley, In the goods of, (1891) P. 172 ; 60 L. J. P. 56 ; 39 W. R.
432 700
Streeter v. Bartlett (1848), 5 C. B. 562 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 140 1044, 1210
Stringer v. Gardiner (1859), 27 Beav. 35 ; 4 De G. & J. 468 ; 28 L. J. Ch.
758 799, 800
Strode v. Russel (1708), 2 Vem. 621 789, 794
Strong V. Dickenson (1836), 1 M. & W. 490 ; 2 Gale, 83 ; 6 Dowl. 99 ; 1
T. & G. 683 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 231 866, 867
Strong V. Foster (1855), 25 L. J. C. P. 106 ; 17 C. B. 201 758
StronghiU v. Buck (1850), 14 Q. B. 787 ; 14 Jur. 741 94
Strother v. Barr (1828), 2 M. & P. 207 ; 5 Bing. 136 277, 280, 286, 288
Stroud, Re (1849), 8 C. B. 518 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 117 1160
Strutt V. Bovingdon (1803), 5 Esp. 66 ; 8 R. R. 834 324, 353, 1114
Stuart V. BaJkis Co. (1883), 53 L. J. Ch. 790 ; 60 L. T. 479 ; 32 W. R.
676 347, 846
Stuart V. LoveU (1817), 2 Stark. R. 94 ; 19 R. R. 688 219, 245
Stuoley V. Baily (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 483 ; 1 H. & C. 405 ; 10 "W. R.
720 757
Studdy V. Sanders (1823), 2 Dowl. & R. 347 561, 610
Stukeley i). Butler (1615), Hob. 171 800
Sturge V. Buchanan (1839), 2 P. & D. 573 ; 10 A. & E. 698 ; 2 M. & Rob.
90 316, 483, 485, 976
Sturgeon v. Wingfield (1846), 16 M. & "W. 224 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 212 96
Sturla V. Frecoia (1879), 12 Ch. D. 411 ; 6 App. Cas. 623 ; 50 L. J. Ch.
86 ; 43 L. T. 209 ; 29 "W. R. 217 ; 44 J. P. 812 458, 1092, 1167, 1174
Sturm V. JefEree (1847), 2 C. & K. 442 314
Sturt V. Blagg (1847), 10 Q. B. 906, 908 46
SufEell V. Bank of England (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 656 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 401 ,
47 L. T. 146; SOW. R. 932; 46 J. P. 500 1194, 1195
Suffield V. Brown (1864), 3 New R. 343, 344 ; 33 L. J. Ch. 259 ; 4 De G.
J. & S. 185 115
Suffolk Witches (1666), 6 How. St. Tr. 647 ; 667
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLB OF CASES CITED. CXCV
PAGB
Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards (1876), 45 L. J. P. D. & A. 1 ; 1 P. Div.
154 ; -34 L. T. 369 ; 24 W. R. 479 143, 307, 356, 790
Sugg V. Bray (1885), 54 L. J. Gh. 132 ; 61 L. T. 194 314
Suisse V. Lowther (1843), 2 Hare, 424; 12 L. J. Ch. 315 806, 808
Sullivan v. Galbraith (1870), 4 Ir. Eq. 582 144
Sullivan v. Sullivan (1870), Ir. R. 4 Eq. 457 789
Summers, Be (1850), 7 Notes of Gas. (Ecol. & Mar.), 562; 2 Roberts.
295 697
Summers v. Griffiths (1866), 35 ^Beav. 27 137
Summers (should be Simmons) v. London Joint Stock Bank, (1891) 1 Ch.
270 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 313 ; 62 L. T. 427 : 63 L. T. 789 ; 39 W. R. 449 ;
(1892) A. G. 201 ; 61 L. J. Gh. 723 ; 66 L. T. 626 ; 41 W. R. 108 ; 66
J. P. 644 390
Summers v. Moorhouse (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 388 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 564 ; 51
L. T. 290 ; 32 W. R. 826 ; 48 J. P. 424 756
Sunmaers i>. Moseley (1834), 2 C. & M. 477 ; 4 Tyr. 168 ; 3 L. J. Ex. 128. . 942
Summersett v. Adamson (1822), 1 Bing. 73 293
Sumner v. Williams (Dudley v. Sumner) (1809), 5 Mass. 444 372
Sunderland, Re (1866), 35 L. J. P. & M. 82 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 198 ; 14
L. T. 741 ; 14 W. R. 971 701
Sunderland's, Hodgson's, Kirkwood's, and Martin's cases (1830), 1 Lew.
C. G. 102 246
Snroome ». Pinniger (1853), 3 De G. M. & G. 571 ; 22 L J. Gh. 419 ; 17
Jur. 196 679
SurpUoe v. Famsworth (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 576 ; 8 Soott, N. R. 306 ; 13
L. J. 0. P. 215 774
Suse V. Pompe (1860), 8 0. B. N. S. 538 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 75 ; 7 Jur. N. S.
166 ; 9 W. R. 15 781
Sussex Peerage case (1844), 11 Gl. & Fin. 114—117 ; 8 Jur. 793 7, 51, 411,
422, 434, 435, 436, 437, 467, 936, 937, 938
Suter V. BurreU (1857), 2 H. & N. 867 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 193 311
Sutton V. Ainslie (1852), 1 Maoq. 299 ; 1 Paterson, 72 348
Sutton V. Buck (1810), 2 Taunt. 302 ; 11 R. R. 685 116, 117
Sutton V. Gioeri (1890), 15 App. Gas. 144 ; 62 L. T. 742 742
Sutton V. Devouport (1858), 27 L. J. C. P. 54 109, 520
Sutton V. Gregory (1797), Peake, Ad. C. 160 ; 4 R. R. 899 454
Sutton V. Johnstone (1787), 1 T. R. 493, 784 ; 1 Br. P. G. 76 ; 1 R. R. 257 . . 30
Sutton V. Sadler (1857), 26 L. J. C. P. 284 ; 3 C. B. N. S. 87 .... 169, 170, 262
Sutton V. Sutton (1882), 22 Ch. D. 611 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 338 ; 48 L. T. 98 ;
31'W. R. 372 721
Sutton V. Tatham (1839), 10 A. & B. 27 ; 2 P. & D. 308 ; 8 L. J. Q. B.
210 '. 158
Sutton V. Temple (1843), 12 M. & W. 64 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 17 774, 775, 776, 777
Swain v. Lewis (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 261 ; 5 Tyr. 998 317
Swan V. N. Brit. Austral. Co. (1863), 2 H. & C. 175 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 273 ; 2
New R. 521 ; 11 W. R. 862 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 102 641, 1205
Swan's case (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 675 ; 18 "W. R. 447 843
Swann v. PhilHps (1838), 8 A. & E. 457 ; 3 N. & P. 1017 ; 22 L. T. 854 . . 719
Swanne v. TaafEe (1845), 8 Ir. L. R. 101 ■. 817
Swansea Bk. v. Thomas (1879), 48 L. J. Ex. 344 ; 4 Ex. D. 94 ; 40 L. T.
558 ; 27 W. R. 491 139
Swansea V. Ry. Co. v. Budd (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 274 ; 35 L. J. Gh. 631 ;
14 "W. R. 663 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 661 1189
Swatmau v. Ambler (1862), 8 Ex. 72 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 81 675
Sweeney v^ Spooner (1863), 32 L. J. M. C. 82 ; 3 B. & S. 329 ; 7 L. T. 623;
IIW. R. 264; 9 Jur. N. S. 691 894
Sweeny v. Promoter Life Ass. Go. (1863), 14 Ir. G. L. R. 476 638, 639
Sweet V. Lee (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 452 673, 675, 783, 784
Sweeting v. Fowler (1815), 1 Stark. R. 106 168, 217
Sweeting v. Pearce (1861), 7 G. B. N. S. 449 ; 9 C. B. N. S. 634 ; 30 L. J.
C. P. 109 ; 6 L. T. 79 ; 9 W. R. 343 158
Sweetland v. Sweetland (1865), 4 S. & T. 6 ; 24 L. J. P. 42 ; 11 Jur. N. S.
182; UL. T. 749; 13 W. R. 604 699
Vol. I. ends with page 636.
CXCVl TABLE OF CASES CITED,
PAGE
Sweigart v. Berk (1822), 8 Serg. & R. 305 1139
Swift V. Dean (1810), 6 Johns. 523 910
Swift V. Eyres (1636), Oro. Car. 548 802
Swift V. Jewesbury (1874), 43 L. J. Q. B. .50 ; L. R. 9 Q. B. 301 ; 43 L. J.
Q. B. 56 ; 30 L. T. 31 ; 22 W. E. yi9 718
Swift V. M'Tieman (1848), 11 Ir. Eq. R. 602 487, 1050, 1054, 1168, 1173
Swift V. Pannell (1883), 24 Ch. D. 210 ; 48 L. T. 3.01 ; 31 "W. R. 543 731
Swift V. Swift (1832), 4 Hagg. (Eco.) 154 961, 962
Swift V. "Winterbotham (1873), 42 L. J. Q. B. Ill ; L. R. 8 Q. B. 244 718
Swiney *. Barry (1835), Jones, 109 1199
Swinfenj>. Ld. Chelmsford (1860), 6H. &N. 890; 29 L. J. Ex. 382; 6 Jur.
N. S. 1036; 2L. T. 406; 8 "W. R. 545 201, 508
Swinfen ». Swinfen (1857), 25 L. J. C. P. 303 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 97; 1 C. B.
N. S. 364 ; 3 Jur. N. S 85 507
Swinnerton v. Stafford, M. of (1810), 3 Taun. 91 430, 1050
Swire v. Francis (1877), 3 App. Cas. 106 ; 47 L. J. P. C. 18 ; 37 L. T. 554 586
Sybrav v. White (1836), 1 M. & "W. 435; Tyr. & Gr. 746 ; 2 Gale, 68 ; 5
L. j. Ex. 173 499
Sydenham v. Rand (1784), 3 Doug. 429 814
Syers v. Jonas (1848), 2 Ex. Ill 768
Sykes, Re (1873), 42 L. J. P. & M. 17 ; L. B. 3 P. & D. 26 ; 28 L. T. 142;
21 W. E. 416 142
Sykes v. Dixon (1839), 9 A. & E. 693 ; 1 P. & D. 463; 1 W. "W. & H. 120. 669
Sykes v. Dunbar (1800), 2 Selw. N. P. 1081 616
Sylph, The (1843-4), 2 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 86 1122
Sylvester v. Hall (1825), Ry. & M. 255, n 272
Symplons v. Blake (1835), 1 M. & Rob. 477 244
Symonda v. Gaslight and Coke Co. (1848), 11 Beav. 283 526
Symonds v. Lloyd (1859), 6 C. B. N. S. 691 764
Symons v. Eees (1876), 1 Ex. D. 416 1118
T. V. D. (falsely called D.) (1866), L. R. 1 P. & D. 127 128
Talbot, Ld. v. Cusaek (1864), 17 Ir. C. L. E. 213 924, 925
Talbot V. Hodgson (1816), 7 Taun. 251 ; 2 Marsh. 527 134
Talbot V. Hodson (1816), 7 Taun. 251 ; 2 Marsh. 527 1209
Talbot V. Lewis (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 495 ; 5 Tyr. 1 398
Talbot V. Seeman (1801), 1 Cranch. 1 1093
Talbutt V. Clark (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 312 245
Tamvaco v. Lucas (1862), 1 B. & S. 185 ; 3 B. & S. 89 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 234;
31 L. J. Q. B. 296 ; 4 L. T. 400 ; 6 L. T. 697 ; 10 "W. E. 733 ; 7 Jur.
N. S. 1100 42
Tanored v. Delagoa Bay Ey. Co. (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 239 ; 58 L. J. Q. B.
549 ; 61 L. T. 229 ; 38 W. E. 15 651
Tanham v. Nicholson (1872), L. E. 5 H. L, 561 ; I. R. 6 C. L. 188 158
Tann v. Tann (1863), 2 New R. 412 ~ 802
Tannery. Smart (1827), 6 B. & C. 609; 9 D. & R. 549 710, 712, 714
Tanner v. Taylor (1756), cited 3 T. E. 754 924
Taplin v. Atty (1825), 3 Bing. 164 ; 10 Moore (C. P.), 564 311
Taplin v. Florence (1851), 10 C. B. 744 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 137 ; 15 Jur. 402. 638
TapHng v. Jones (1865), 11 H. L. Cas. 290 ; 20 C. B. N. S. 166 ; 34 L. J.
C. P. 342 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 309 ; 12 L. T. 555 ; 13 W. E. 617 76
Tapp V. Lee (1803), 3 B. & P. 371 82
Tarleton v. Shingler (1849), 7 C. B. 812 1203
Tarletonj). Tarleton (1815), 4 M. & Sel. 20 1142, 1164, 1155
Tarlton i). Fisher (1781), 2 Doug. 671 872
Tarpley v. Blabey (1836), 2 Bing. N. C. 437 ; 2 Scott, 642 ; 7 C. & P. 395 ;
Hodges, 414 245
Tarte v. Darby (1846), 15 M. & W. 601 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 326 658
Tatham v. Drummond (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 438 ; 2 H. & M. 262 805
Tattersall v. Fearnley (1856), 17 C. B. 368 282
Tattershall v. Nat. Steamship Co. (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 297 ; 53 L. J. Q. B.
332 ; 50 L. T. 299 ; 32 W. R. 566 ; 5 Asp. M. C. 206 771
The references are to pa^es, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXCVll
PAQE
Tatton, Ex parte, Re Thorp (1881), 17 Ch. D. 512 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 792 ; 45
L. T. 89 848
Tayler v. Waters (1817), 7 Taun. 374 : 2 Marsh. 551 ; 18 R. E. 499 638
Tayleur v. Wildin (1868), L. B,. 3 Ex. 303 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 173 ; 18 L. T.
656; 16W. R. 1018 623
Tayloe ». Riggs (1828), 1 Pet. 591 277
Taylor, Ex parte (1820), IJac. & W. 483 1047
Taylor, Re (1842), 9 Paige, 611 373
Taylor, Re (1851), 2 Roberts. 711 ■ 699
Taylor, Re, Cloak d. Hammond (1887), 34 Ch. D. 265 ; 66 L. J Ch. 171 ;
66 L. T. 649 ; 36 "W. R. 186 793
Taylor, In goods of (1890), 63 L. T. 230 705
Taylor v. Barclay (1828), 2 Sim. 213 ; 7 L. J. Ch. (0. S.) 65 3, 18, 21
Taylor v. Beech (1749), 1 Ves. sen. 297 679, 680
Taylor v. Blaoklow (1836), 3 Bing. N. C. 235 ; 3 Scott, 614 ; 2 Hodges,
224 600
Taylor v. Bowers (1877), 46 L. J. Q. B. 39 ; 1 Q, B. D. 291 ; 34 L. T.
938 ; 24 W. R. 499 91
Taylor D.Briggs (1827), 2 C. & P. 625 ; M. & M. 28 763
Taylor v. Burgess (1859), 5 H. & N. 1 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 7 768
Taylor v. Carpenter (1846), 2 Woodb. & M. 5 324
Taylor v. Clemson (1844), 2 Q. B. 1031 ; 3 Railw. Cas. 65 ; 2 G. & D. 346 ;
11 CI. & Fin. 610 : 8 Jur. 833 10>8, 1137
Taylor>«). Cole (1799), 7 T. R. 3, n. ; 4 R. R. 363 424, 1158
Taylor v. Cook (1820), 8 Price, 652 1226, 1227
Taylor v. Croker (1803), 4 Esp. 187 647
Taylor v. Devey (1837), 7 A. & E. 409 ; 2 N. & P. 469 ; W. W. & D. 646 ;
1 Jur. 892 401
Taylor v. Diplook (1815), 2 Phillim. 261 , 174
Taylor v. Forster (1825), 2 C. & P. 195 506, 599
Taylor ■„. Gt. Ind. Pen. Ry. Co. (1859), 4 De G. & J. 669 ; 28 L. J. Ch.
709 1205
Taylor v. Hawkms (1851), 16 Q. B. 308 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 313; 15 Jur.
746 46,111
Taylor v. Horde (1757), 1 Burr. 107 133
Taylor v. Hughes (1844), 2 Jones & La T. 24 541
Taylor v. Humphries (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 539 ; 34 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 10
Jur. N. S. 1153 ; 11 L. T. 376 ; 13 W. R. 136 263
Taylor v. Johnston (1882), 51 L. J. Ch. 879 ; 19 Ch. D. 403 ; 46 L. T. 219 ;
30 W. R. 608 137
Taylor v. Kinlooh (1816), 1 Stark. R. 176 , 147, 498
Taylor v. Lawson (1828), 3 C. & P. 543 919
Taylor v. Linley (1860), 2 De G. E. & J. 84 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 534 ; 8 W. R.
735 683
Taylor v. Meads (1865), 34 L. J. Ch. 203 ; 4 De G. J. & S. 697 ; 13 W. R.
394 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 166 693
Taylor v. Mosely (1833), 6 C. & P. 273 1193, 1194
Taylor v. Needham (1811), 2 Taun. 278 ; 11 R. R. 572 8«, 97
Taylor v. NichoUs (1840), 6 M. c& W. 95 ; 8 Do-wl. 242 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 78. .732, 733
Taylor v. Parry (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 604 ; 1 Scott, N. R. 576 234, 803, 1092
Taylor v. Richardson (1853), 2 Drew. 16 76
Taylor v. Ross (1832), 3 Terger, 330 669
Taylor v. Smith (1892), 61 L. J. Q. B. 331 ; 67 L. T. 39 ; 40 W. R. 486. . 672
Taylor v. Stray (1867), 2 C. B. N. S. 176, 197 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 287 ; 3 Jur.
N. S. 964 168
Taylor v. Wakefield (1866), 6 E. & B. 766 690
Taylor v. Weld (1809), 6 Mass. 116 746
Taylor ». WiUans (WiUiame) (1830-31), 4 M. & P. 69 ; 2 B. & Aid. 845 . . 372,
606, 832
Taylor v. Witham (1876), 3 Ch. D. 605 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 798 438
Teal V. Auty (1820), 2 B. & B. 99 ; 4 Moore (C. P.), 542 687
Temperley v. Scott (1832), 8 Bing. 392 ; 1 M. & So. 601 818, 1036
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CXCVlll TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAQB
Tempest, Ex parte, Re Cra-ren (1870), 40 L. J. Bank. 22 ; L. R. 6 Oh. 70 ;
23 L. T. 650 ; 19 W. R. 137 82
Tempest v. Fitzgerald (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 680 689
Tempest v. Kilner (1845), 2 C. B. 300 ; 15 L. J. 0. P. 101 ; 3 Dowl. & L.
407 201, 685
Temple, Ex parte (1814), 2 Ves. & B. 395 866, 869
Temple v. PuUen (1853), 8 Ex. 389 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 151 38, 1205
Tennant, Ex parte, Re Howard (1877), 6 Ch. D. 303 ; 37 L. T. 284; 25
W. R. 854 159
Tennant v. Bell (1846), 9 Q. B. 684 ; 16 L. J. M. C. 31 ; 10 Jur. 946 . .37, 1004
Tennant v. Creston (Overton) (1846), 2 New Ssss. Gas. 425 ; 8 Q. B. 707 ;
15 L. J. M. 0. 105 ; 10 Jur. 660 1004
Tennant v. Hamilton (1839), 7 01. & Fin. 122 ; MoL. & R. 821 947
Tennent v. Neil (1870), I. R. 5 C. L. 418 128
Tennyson v. O'Brien (1855), 5 E. & B. 497 189
Terrett t). Taylor (1815). 9 Cranoli, 43 90
Terry v. Huntington (1669), Hardr. 480 1103
Terry v. Hutchinson (1868), 37 L. J. Q. B. 257 ; 9 B. & S. 487 ; L. R. 3
Q. B. 599 ; 18 L. T. 521 ; 16 "W. R. 932 253
Texira v. Evans (undated), cited 1 Anst. 228 ; 2 H. Bl. 140 ; 4 T. R. 320 ;
2 R. R. 399 1205
Thames Iron Works Co. v. The Royal Mail St. Packet Co. (1862), 13 C. B.
N. S. 3.58 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 169 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 100 750
Thanet, E. of ». Forster (1683), T. Jones, 224 1167
Tharpe v. Giehume (1825), 2 C. & P. 21 1221
Tharpe v. Stallwood (1843), 5 M. & Or. 768 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 715 ; 12 L. J.
C. P. 241 ; 1 Dowl. & L. 24 ; 7 Jur. 492 227
Thatcher v. Waller (1675), T. Jones, 53 340
Thelluson v. Cosling (1803), 4 Esp. 266 1093
Theobald v. Crichmore (1818), 1 B. & Aid. 227 227
Theodor Komer, The (1878), 3 P. Div. 162 ; 47 L. J. Adm. 85 ; 38 L. T.
818 ; 27 W. R. 307 1186
Thetford v. Tyler (1845), 8 Q. B. 95 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 33 ; 10 Jur. 68 ... . 169
Thetford'scase (1719), 12 Vin. Abr. 90, pi. 16 1050, 1176
Thin V. Richards (1892), 2 Q. B. 141 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 39 ; 66 L. T. 327 ;
56 J. P. 696 770
Thom V. Bigland (1853), 8 Ex. 726 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 243 201
Thomas, In the goods of (1871), 41 L. J. P. & M. 32 ; 26 L. T. 609 ; 20
W. R. 149 439
Thomas, Re (1859), 1 S. & T. 255 ; 28 L. J. Prob. 33 698
Thomas Blyth, The (1860), Lush. Adm. 16 177
Thomas v. Ansley (18fi6), 6 Esp. 80 84, 283
Thomas v. Brown (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 714 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 811 ; 35 L. T.
237; 24 W. E. 821 538, 671
Thomas v. Churton (1862), 2 B. & S. 475 ; 31 L. J. Q. B. 139 ; 8 Jur.
N. S. 795; 6L. T. 320 869
Thomas v. ConneU (1838), 4 M. & W. 267 ; 1 H. & H. 189 ; 7 L. J. Ex.
306 379
Thomas v. Cook (1818), 2 Stark. (N. P.) 408 ; 2 B. & A. 119 ; 20 R. R.
374 128, 660, 661
Thomas ». Cooke (1828), 8 B. & C. 728 ; 3 M. & Ry. 444 678, 679
Thomas v. David (1836), 7 C. & P. 350 918, 950
Thomas v. Evans (1802), 2 East, 488 705
Thomas v. Foyle (1803), 6 Esp. 88 116
Thomas v. Fredericks (1847), 10 Q. B. 775 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 393 ; 11 Jur.
942 638
Thomas v. Jenkins (1837), 6 A. & E. 626 ; 1 N. & P. 587 ; 1 Jur. 261. .396, 398
Thomas v. Ketteriohe (1749), 1 Ves. sen. 333 1106
Thomas v. Lewis (1878), 4 Ex. D. 18 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 7 ; 39 L. T. 669 ; 27
W. R. Ill 178
Thomas v. Morgan (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 496 ; 4 Dowl. 223 ; 1 Gale, 172 ;
5 Tyr. 1085 615
Thomas v. Newton (1826), M. & M. 48, n 969
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXCIX
FAOB
Thomas v. Packer (18S7), 1 H. & N. 669 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 207 ; 3 Jur. N. S.
143 169
Thomas v. Eawlings (1859), 27 Beav. 140 597, 698
Thomas v. SorreU (undated), Vaugh. 351 638
Thomas v. Stephenson (1853), 2 E. & B. 108 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 258 ; 17 Jur.
897 227
Thomas v. Thomas (1796), 6 T. E. 671 ; 3 R. B,. 306 794, 799
Thomas v. Thomas (1811), 2 Camp. 647 524
Thomas v. Thomas (I860), 2 Dr. & Sm. 298 173
Thomas v. Williams (1830), 10 B. & C. 664 678
Thompson, Ex parte (1845), 6 Q. B. 721 998
Thompson, Goods of. Be (1887), 12 P. D. 100; 56 L. J. P. D. & A. 40; 57
L. T. 373 ; 35 W. E,. 384 413
Thompson4).Bowyer(1863),2NewB. 504; 11W.II.975; 9 Jur.N. S. 863. . 720
Thompson v. Donaldson (1800), 3 Esp. 63 ; 6 R. K. 812 1104
Thompsons. Falk (1852), 1 Drew. 21 601
Thompson v. Gardiner (1876), 1 C. P. D. 777 297
Thompson«i.Gibson(1841),8M.&W.285; lOL. J.Ex. 241; 9Dowl.717.. 1073
Thompson v. Hopper (1856), 25 L. J. Q. B. 240 ; 6 B. & B. 172 771
Thompson v. Laoy (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 283 162
Thompson v. Lambe (1802), 7 Ves. 588 482
Thompson v. Mosely (1833), 5 C. & P. 502 231, 321
Thompson v. Nye (1850), 16 Q. B. 175 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 85 ; 15 Jur. 285. . 256
Thompson v. Boss (1858), 29 L. J. Ex. 1 ; 6 H. & N. 16 ; 5 Jur. N. S.
1133; IL. T. 43 253
Thompson v. Small (1845), 1 C. B. 328 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 157 152
Thompson v. Trail (1826), 2 C. & P. 334 ; 6 B. & C. 36 ; 9 D. & R. 31 . . 162
Thompson v. Trevanion (1694), Skin. 402 377
Thompson v. Waithman (1856), 3 Drew. 628 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 134 490
Thomson v. Austen (1823), 2 Dowl. & By. 361 479, 514
Thomson v. Davenport (1829), 9 B. & C. 78 ; 4 M. & E,. 110 620
Thomson v. Hall (1852), 2 Robertson, 426 697
Thomson v. Harding (1853), 2 E. & B. 630 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 448 510
Thomson v. Hempenstall (1849), 7 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 141 ; 1
Roberts. 783 798
Thomson v. Wilson (1818), 2 Stark. 379 666
Thoringtou v. Smith (1868), 8 Wall. (U. S.) 1 763
Thomdike v. City of Boston (1840), 1 Meto. 242 377
Thome v. Jackson (1846), 3 C. B. 661 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 87 ; 4 Dowl. & L.
478 17
Thome v. Tilbury (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 407 ; 3 H. & N. 534 545
Thomes. v. White (1835), Tyr. & Gr. 110 531
Thornhill v. ThornhiU (1820), 2 Jao. & W. 347 814
Thomton v. Charles (1836), 2 M. & W. 809 298
Thornton v. Kempster (1814), 5 Taun. 786 ; 1 Marsh. 355 ; 15 R. R. 658 . .297,
299
Thornton v. Meux (1827), M. & M. 43 297
Thornton v. Place (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 218 1122
Thornton v. Roy. Ex. Ass. Co. (1791). Pea. R. 25 935
Thorp, Re, Ex parte Tatton (1881), 17 Ch. D. 512 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 792 ; 45
L. T. 89 848
Thorp V. Holdsworth (1876), 45 L. J. Ch. 406 ; 3'Ch. D. 637 224
Thorpe v. Cooper (1828), 5 Bing. 129 ; 2 M. & P. 246 ; 2 Y. & J. 445 ... . 1123
Thorpe v. Macaulay (1820), 5 Madd. 229 961
Thresh v. Rake (1794), 1 Esp. 63 762
Thunder v. Warren (1845), 8 Ir. Law R. 181 286
Thurbaine et al. (1664), Hardr. 323 543
Thurle v. Madison (1655), Sty. 462 1214
Thurston v. Slatford (1700), 1 Salk. 284, 285 357
Thurtell's case (undated), cited 8 C. & P. 284 889
Thurtell v. Beaumont (1823), 8 Moore, C. P. 612 ; 1 Bins. 339 105
Thwaites v. Foreman (1844), 1 Coll. 409, 414 ; 10 Jur. 483 144
Thwaites v. Richardson (1790), Pea. R. 16 ; 3 R. R. 645 488
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CC TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOH
Thwaites v. WUding (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 4; 53 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 49 L. T.
396 ; 32 "W. B. 80 723
Thynne, Lady B., v. Ld. Qlengall (1847-81, 2 H. L. Oas. 131 679, 806
Tichbome case (1871-2), MS. 28th Feb. 1872 55, 608
Tickel V. Short (1750), 2 Ves. sen. 239 525
TicHe V. Brown (1836), 4 A. & E. 378 ; 6 N. & M. 230 ; 1 H. & "W. 769 . .446,
610
Tidey v. MoUett (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 298 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 235 ; 10 L. T.
380 ; 12 W. E. 802 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 800 649
Tidmarsh v. Grover (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 735 ; 14 E.. K. 563 1194
Tiemey v. Wood (1854), 19 Beav. 330 ; 23 L. J. Oh. 895 ; 2 W. R. 577 . . 665
Tighe V. Tighe (1877), I. E. 11 Eq. 203 1151
Tildesley v. Harper (1876-78), 7 Ch. D. 403 ; 10 Ch. D. 393 ; 48 L. J. Ch.
495 ; 39 L. T. 552 ; 27 W. E. 249 186, 188, 221, 224
Tiley «. Cowling (1701), 1 Ld. Raym. 744 1117
Tilghman v. Fisher (1840), 9 "Watts, 441 620
Tillotson, Ex parte (1816), 1 Stark. 470 871
Timson v. Wilson (1888), 38 Ch. D. 72 ; 69 L. T. 76 ; 36 W. E. 418 .... 22
TindaU v. Baskett (1861), 2 P. & P. 664 270
Tinley v. Porter (1837), 6 Dowl. 744 ; 2 M. & W. 822 832
Tinn v. BiUingsley (1835), 2 0. M. & R. 253 ; 3 Dowl. 810 474
Tippet's case (E. v. Tippet) (1823), E. & E. 509 660
Tippets V. Heane (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 252 ; 4 Tyr. 772 714
Tippius V. Coates (1847), 6 Hare, 16 971
Tirzah, The (1878), 48 L. J. P. D. & A. 15 ; 4 P. D. 33 177
TisdaU v. PameU (1863), 14 Ir. C. L. E. 1, 27, 28 433, 1167, 1168
Titus Gates' case (1685), 10 How. St. Tr. 1185 877
Tobacco-pipe Makers' Co. v. Loder (1851), 14 Q. B. 765 ; 20 L. J. Q. B.
414 ; 15 Jur. 1194 71
Toby V. Lovibond (1848), 5 C. B. 784 ; 5 Dowl. & L. 769 ; 17 L. J. C. P.
201; 12 Jur. 436 1160
Tod V. E. of Winohelsea (1828), 3 C. & P. 387 141, 284, S53
Todd V. Kerrich (1852), 8 Ex. 151 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 1 ; 17 Jur. 119 36, 153
Todd V. Eeid (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 210 158
Todd V. Winohelsea, Ld. (1826), 2 C. & P. 488 ; M. & M. 12 141
Toft V. Stephenson (1851), 1 De G. M. & G. 28 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 129 ; 15 Jur.
1187 720
Toker v. Toker (1863), 31 Beav. 629 ; 3 De G. & Sm. 487 ; 8 L. T. 525,
777 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 322 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 370 137
Toleman v. Portbury (1869), 39 L. J. Q. B. 136 ; L. E. 5 Q. B. 288 ; 22
L. T. 33 ; 18 W. E. 579 260, 522
Toleman, Ee, Ex parte Bramble (1880), 13 Ch. D. 885 ; 42 L. T. 413 ; 28
W. E. 676 321
ToUemaohe, Ee, Anderson, Ex parte (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 606 ; 54 L. J. Q. B.
383 ; 52 L. T. 786 1013, 1110, 1114
Tollemache, Ee, Ex parte Edwards (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 415 435, 629
ToUemache v. ToUemaohe (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 113 ; 1 S. & T. 667 . . 1144
Tolman and TJx v. Johnstone (1860), 2 F. & P. 66 949
Tomkins V. Att.-Gen. (1813), 1 Dow, 404 1050
Tomkins v. Saltmarsh (1826), 14 Serg. & E. 276 378
Tomkins v. Tomkins (1859), 1 Sw. & Tr. 168 48
Tomkinson v. Staight (1856), 25 L. J. C. P. 85 ; 17 C. B. 697 ; 2 Jur. 354. . 690
Tomlinson ». Gell (1837), 6 A. & E. 564 ; 1 N. & P. 588 ; W. W. & D. 229 678
Tompson v. Williamson (1831), 7 Bligh, 432 160
Toms V. Cuming (1865), 7 M. & Gr. 88 ; 8 Scott, N. E. 910 ; 1 Lut. Reg-
Cas. 259; 14 L. J. C. P. .58 ; 9 Jur. 91 711,726
Tomson V. Judge (1855), 3 Drew. 306 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 929 ; 2 Eq. E. 1141 137
Toogood V. Spyring (1834), 1 C. M. & E. 181, 193 ; 4 Tyr. 582 Ill
Tooker i). Smith (1857), 1 H. & N. 732 654
Topham v. M'Gregor (1844), 1 C. & K. 320 324, 925
Toppia V. Lomas (1855), 16 C. B. 145 ; 24 L. J. C. P. 144 682
Topping, Ex parte, Ee Levy and Robsou (1865), 34 L J. Bank. 44 ; 12
L. T. 787 ; 13 W. R. 1025 71,5
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CCl
PAQK
Tomano v. Young (1833), 6 C. & P. 8 169
Tottenham's Estate, Ee (1869), Ir. B. 3 Eq. 528 86
Toulmiu V. Copland (1848), 2 PhiU. 711 1117
Toulmin v. Prioe (1800), 5 Ves. 238 308
Tourret v. Cript)s (1879), 48 L. J. Ch. 567 ; 27 W. E. 708 675
Tovey, In re (1878), 1 P. Div. 150 ; 45 L. J. P. 78 ; 34 L. T. 856 ; 24
W. E 539 . . 701
Tovey v. UndBaj (isis), I'liow, Vl 7 '.'.'.'.'.".".'.'.'.' .'.'.','.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.".'.'.".1143, 1144
Towers v. Newton (184l), 1 Q. B. 319 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 106 ; 9 Dowl. 576. . 871
Town of Union v. Bermes (1882), 44 New Jersey Beports (Law), 269 508
Towne v. CampbeU-(1847), 3 C. B. 921 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 104 35
Towne v. Lewis (1849), 7 0. B. 608 152
Towne v. Smith (1845), 1 Woodb. & M. 115 1151
Townend v. Drakeford (1843), 1 0. & K. 20 297, 298, 299
Townley v. "Watson (1844), 3 Curt. 761 ; 3 Notes of Cas. (Eoo. & M.) 17. . 707
Townsend v. Ives (1748), 1 Wils. 216 1215
Townsend, M. of v. Strangroom (1801), 6 Ves. 339 ; 5 E. R. 312 749, 750
Townsend v. Weld (1811), 8 Mass. 146 759
Townshend Peer. (1843), 10 CI. & Pin. 289 422
Toymhee «». Brown (1849), 3 Ex. 117 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 99 75
Tracy Peer. (1839), Min. Ev. 18 1167
Tracy Peer. (1843), 10 CI. & Pin. 191 422, 423, 425, 931, 1226, 1228
Trafford ». Blanc {see In re Truefort).
Trailf. Baring(1864), 33L. J. Ch. 621; 4(JifE. 485 639
Trasher v. Everhart (1831), 3 Gill & John. 234, 242 51
Travers v. Blundell (1877), 6 Ch. D. 436 ; 36 L. T. 341 801
Treacy v. Corcoran (1874), I. E. 8 C. L. 40 139
Treeby, Ee (1875), L. E. 3 P. & D. 242 ; 44 L. J. P. & M. 44 706
Tregany v. Fletcher (1696), 1 Ld. Eaym. 164 19
Trelawney v. Colman (1817), 2 Stark. 193 147, 375, 376, 930
Tremain v. Barrett (1815), 6 Taim. 88 ; 1 Marsh. 463 ; 16 E. E. 584 818
Trench v. Doran (1887), 20 L. E. Ir. 338 746, 784
Trent v. Hunt (1853), 9 Ex. 14 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 318 ; 17 Jur. 899 98, 162
Tress v. Savage (1864), 23 L. J. Q. B. 339 ; 4 E. & B. 36 ; 2 C. L. E. 1316 ;
18 Jur. 680 655
Trevanion, Ee (1850), 2 Eoberts. 311 700
Trevivau v. Lawrence (1704), 1 Salk. 276 ; 2 Smith, L. C. 664 89
Trewhitt v. Lambert (1839), 10 A. & E. 470 ; 3 P. & D. 676 288
Tribe v. Tribe (1849), 7 Notes of Cas. 132 ; 1 Eoberts. 775 695
TrickettjJ. Tomlinson(1863), 13C. B. N. S. 663; 7L. T. 678 538
Trimbey v. Vignier (1834), 1 Bing. N. C. 161 ; 4 M. & Scott, 695 ; 6 C. & P. 25 62
Trimble ». HiU (1879), 6 App. Cas. 342 ; 49 L. J. P. C. 49 ; 42 L. T. 103 ;
28 W. E. 479 620
Trimlestown, Ld. v. Kemmis (1843), 9 CI. & Pin. 763 . .431, 435, 443, 446, 485,
1207
Trimmer v. Bayne (1802), 7 Ves. 518 ; 6 E. E. 173 794, 806, 806
Trist V. Johnson (1833), 1 M. & Eob. 260 314
Tronsoni-. Dent (1853), 8 Moo. P. C. C. 419 179
Trotman v. Wood (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 479 778
Trott V. Skidmore (18t)0), 2 S. & T. 12 ; 29 L. J. P. 156 ; 8 W. E. 590 ;
6 Jur. N. S. 760 698
Trotter v. Maclean (1876), 13 Ch. D. 680 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 256 ; 42 L. T. 118 ;
28 W . E. 244 158, 460
Trowbridge v. Baker (1823), 1 Gowen, 251 518
Trowel v. Castle (1661), 1 Keb, 22 1192
Trowell v. Shenton (1878), 8 Ch. D. 318 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 738 ; 38 L. T. 369 ; 26
W. E. 837 680
Trower and Lawson's case (1872), L. E. 14 Eq. 8 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 468 845
Truefort, In re, Trafford v. Blanc (1885), 34 W. E. 66 ; 53 L. T. 498 . . 188
Trueman v. Loder (1840), 11 A. & E. 600 ; 3 P. & D. 567 765, 767, 781, 783
Trulook V. Eobey (1841), 12 Sim. 402 ; 15 L. J. Ch. 343 720
Truro, Lady, Ee (1866), 35 L. J. P. & M. 89 ; L. E. 1 P. & D. 201 ; 14
L. T. N. S. 893 ; 14 W. E. 976 701
Vol. I. ends with page 636.
ecu TABLE OP CASES CITED.
FASa
Truslove v. Burton (1824), 9 Moore, C. P. 64 606
Trustee Eelief Act, Ee, Higgins' Trusts (1861), 2 Giff. 562 ; 30 L. J. Ch.
405 632
Tucker v. Barrow (1828), 7 B. & 0. 625 ; 3 C. & P. 90 ; 1 M. & R. 518 ;
M. & M. 137 .- 517
Tucker v. Burrow (1865), 34 L. J. Ch. 478 ; 2 H. & M. 515 ; 13 W. R.
771; 12 Jur. N. S. 485 666
Tucker v. Good [see Re Bonner).
Tucker v. Maxwell (1814), 11 Mass. 143 662
Tuokey v. Henderson (1863), 33 Beav. 174 806
Tuff V. Warman (1857), 2 C. B. N. S. 740 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 263 : aflfd. 6 C.
B. N. S. 573; 27 L. J. C. P. 322; 5 Jur. N. S. 222 6
Tufton ». Whitmore (1840), 12 A. & B. 370 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 405 366
Tugwell V. Hooper (1847), 10 Beav. 348 ; 16 L. J. Ch. 171 607
Tull V. Parlett (1829), M. & M. 472 748
Tullock V. Dunn (1826), Ry. & M. 416 492
TunnioliflEe v. Tedd (1848), 6 C. B. 553 ; 17 L. J. M. C. 67 1073
Tupling V. Ward (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 222 ; 6 H. & N. 749 ; 4 L. T. 20 ;
9 W. R. 482 964
Tupper V. Eoulkes (1861), 30 L. J. C. P. 214 ; 9 C. B. 797 ; 3 L. T. 741 ;
9 W. R. 349 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 709 645, 646, 1206
Tupper V. Tupper (1855), 1 K. & J. G66 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 917 708
Turley v. Thomas (1837), 8 C. & P. 104 6
TurnbuU v. Janson (1878), 3 C. P. D. 264 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 384 ; 26 W. R.
815 818
Turner's case (1664), Kel. (J.) 30 1126
Turner, Re (1872), L. R. 2 P. & D. 403 ; 27 L. T. 322 ; 21 W. R. 38 143
Turner, Re, Glenisterji. Harding (1885), 29 Ch. D. 985 ; 63 L. T. 528. .421, 1170
Turner v. Ambler (1847), 10 Q. B. 262 ; 11 L. J. Q. B. 168 ; 6 Jur. 346.. 30, 703
Turner «). Barlow (1863), 3 F. & P. 946 16
Turner v. Cameron's Coalbrook Steam Coal Co. (1850), 6 Ex. 932 ; 20 L. J.
Ex. 71 98
Turner v. Collins (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. 329 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 558 ; 25 L. T. 374 136
Turner v. Crisp (1728), 2 Str. 827 448
Turner v. Heyland (1879), 4 C. P. D. 432 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 535 ; 41 L. T.
556 41
Turner v. Mason (1845), 11 M. & W. 116 ; 2 D. & L. 898 ; 14 L. J. Ex.
311 153
Turner v. Pearte (1787), 1 T. R. 717 910
Turner v. Power (1828), 7 B. & C. 625 ; M. & M. 131 285
Turner v. Walsh (1881), 6 App. Cas. 636 ; 60 L. J. P. C. 65; 45 L. T. 60.. 124
Tumey ». Dodwell (1854), 3 E. & B. 136 ; 2 C. L. R. 666 ; 23 L. J. Q. B.
137 ; 18 Jur. 787 717
Turquand v. Pearon (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 280; 48 L. J. Q. B. 341 ; 40 L. T.
191 ; 27 W. R. 396 187, 220
Turquand i). Knight (1836), 2 M. & W. 100 ; 2 Gale, 192 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 4. 591,
692, 694, 595, 611
Turquand f. Wilson (1875), 1 Ch. D. 85 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 104 ; 24 W. R. 66.. 634
Turrill V. Crawley (1849), 13 Q. B. 197 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 166 ; 13 Jur. 878.. 162
Turton V. Barber (1874), L. R. 17 Eq. 329 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 468 ; 22 W. R.
438 602
Tussaud, Re, Tussaud v. Tussaud (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 849 ; 9 Ch. D. 363 ;
26 W. R. 874; 39 L. T. 113 805,806
Tutton V. Darke (1860), 5 H. & N. 649, 660 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 271 ; 6 Jur. N.
S. 983 ; 2 L. T. 361 15, 20
Tweedale, Re (1874), L. R. 3P. & D. 204; 44L. J. P. 36; 31 L. T. 799. .142, 702
Twemlow v. Oswin (1809), 2 Camp. 85 ; 11 R. R. 670 175
Twias V. Baldwin (1832), 9 Conn. 291 201
Twyman v. Kuowles (1863), 13 C. B. 222 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 143 ; 17 Jur. 238 277,
288
Twyne's case (1602), 3 Co. Rep. 80 ; 1 Smith, L. C. 1 135
Tyerman v. Smith (1866), 25 L. J. Q. B. 359 ; 6 E. & B. 719 ; 2 Jur. N.
S. 860 643
The referencea are to pages, not to paragraphi.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CClll
PAOB
Tyers v. Rosedale and Ferry Hill Iron Co. (1876), 42 L. J. Ex. 185 ; L. E.
8 Ex. 305 ; 29 L. T. 751 : 21 W. E. 793 752
Tyler v. Ulmer (1815), 12 Mass. 166 1096
Tyler v. Yates (1871), L. E. 11 Eq. 265 ; 19 W. R. 118 : 23 L. T. 447 ; 40
L. J. Ch. 768 ; 6 L. R. Ch. 665 ; 26 L. T. 284 ; 19 W. E. 909 137
Tyrer ». Henry (I860), 14 Moo. P. C. C. 83 ; 3 L. T. 219 185
Tyrwhitt v. Wynne (1819), 2 B. & A. 554 235
U., falsely oaUed J. ■«. J. (1867), L. E. 1 P. & D. 461 ; 16 "W. R. 518 ; 37
L. J. P. & M. 7 631
Udny V. Udny (1869). L. R. 1 H. L. (So.), 441 179
Ulverstone Union v. Park (1889), 53 J. P. 629 621
Underwood v. Lord Courtown (1804), 2 Sch. & Lef . 67 515
Underwood v. Wing (1854), 19 Beav. 459 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 159 ; 24 L. J. Ch.
293 i 174
Ungley v. Ungley (1877), 4 Ch. D. 73 ; 5 Ch. D. 887 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 189,
854 679
Union Bank of London v. Lenandon (1878), 3 C. P. D. 343 ; 27 L. J. Ex.
409 651
Unity Jt. St. Mutual Banking Assoc, Ex parte. Re King (1858), 3 De G-.
& J. 63 ; 27 L. J. Bank. 33 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 1257 641
Upton V. Hume (1893), 41 Am. St. R. 863 245
Urquhart v. Butterfield (1888), 37 Ch. D. 357 ; 67 L. J. Ch. 621 ; 57 L. T.
780 ; 36 W. R. 376 7, 473, 507
Urquhart v. Macpherson (1878) , 3 App. Cas. 831 746
U.S. V. Battiste (1835), 2 Sunm. 243 25
U.S. i>. Breed (1832), 1 Sumn. 159 764
U.S. V. Bnford (1850), 3 Pet. 12 1178
U.S. V. Cushman (1836), 2 Sumn. 426 1115
U.S. V. Gibert (1818), 2 Sumn. 19, 80, 81 279
U.S. V. Gooding (1827), 12 Wheat. 469 382
U.S. V. Hanaway (1861), 2 Wall. Jr. 139 626
U.S. V. Hayward (1815), 2 Gall. 485 267
U.S. V. Lefder (1837), 11 Pet. 86 748
U.S. V. M'Rae (1867), 37 L. J. Ch. 129 ; L. R. 3 Ch. 79 ; 16 W. R. 377 ;
17 L. T. 428 966
U.S. V. Moses (1827), 4 Wash. 726 614
U.S. V. Reybum (1832), 6 Pet. 352 277
U.S. V. Spalding (1822), 2 Mason, 478 1199
U.S. V. Wagner (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 634 ; L. R. 2 Ch. 685 ; 15 W. R.
1026 ; 16 L. T. 646 3
U.S. V. Wood (1818), 3 Wash. 440 354
U.S. V. Wood (1840), 14 Peters, 430 628
Ustioke V. Bawden (1824), 2 Add. 125 709
Utterton v. Robins (1834), 1 A. & E. 423 701
Uxbridge, Lord, v. Stavelaud (1747), 1 Ves. sen. 56 961
Vacheb v. Cooks (1829), M. & M. 353 377, 379
Vaoher i>. Cooks (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 147 1212
Tail V. Rice (1851), 1 Seld. (N. Y.), 155 782
Vaillant v. Dodemead (1792), 2 Atk. 524 595, 603, 965
Vale V. Oppert (1875), 10 Ch. App. 340 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 579 ; 33 L. T. 41 ;
23 W. R. 780 321
Valentine v. Piper (1839), 22 Pick. 90 1219
Vallanoe v. Dewar (1808), 1 Camp. 503 ; 10 R. R. 738 765, 782
Vallee ». Dnmergue (1849), 4 Ex. 290 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 398 1147
Valpy V. Gibson (1847), 4 0. B. 864 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 241 671
Vance v. Lowther (1876), 46 L. J. Ex. 200 ; 1 Ex. D. 176 ; 34 L. T. 286 ;
24 W. R. 372 1194
Vance v. Vanoe (1871), I. R. 5 C. L. 363 523
Vandenburgh v. Spooner (1866), L. E. 1 Ex. 316 ; 35 L. J. Ex. 201 ; 4
H. & C. 519 ; 14 W. R. 843 671
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CCIV TABLE OF CASES CITED.
PAOH
Vander Donokt v. TheUusson (1849), 8 C. B. 812 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 12 938
Vandevelde v. Lluellin (1661), 1 Keb. 220 872, 873
Van Diemen's Land Bank v. Victoria Bank (1871), 40 L. J. P. C. 28 ;
L. R. 3 P. C. 526 ; 19 W. R. 857 38
Vane's, Lord, ease (1743-4), 13 East, 171, n. (a) ; 1 T. R. 697 ; 12 R. R.
317 ; Preface, vi 893
Van Omeron v. Dowick (1809). 2 Camp. 44 ; 11 R. R. 656 4, 20, 167, 1093
Vanquelin v. Bouard (1863), 15 G. B. N. S. 341 ; 33 L. J. 0. P. 78 ; 9 L. T.
582; 12 W. R. 128; 10 Jur. N. S. 566 1151, 1154
Vaa Reimsdyk v. Kane (1813), 1 Oall. 630 386, 494, 495
Van Sandau v. Turner (1845), 6 Q. B. 773, 786 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 154 ; 9 Jnr.
296 20, 533
Van Straubenzee v. Monck (1863), 32 L. J. P. & M. 21 ; 3 S. & T. 6 .... 701
Van Wart v. Wolley (1823), Ry. & M. 4 506
Varioas v. French (1849), 2 0. & K. 1008 328
Vasiev. Delaval (1785), 1 T. R. 11 616, 617
Vater's Trusts, Re (1887) W. N. 1887, at p. 128 1171
Vaugban's case (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 485 ; Fost. C. L. 246 236
Vaughan v. Hancock (1846), 3 C. B. 766 ; 16 L. J. 0. P. 1 ; 10 Jar.
926 , 682
Vaughan v. Martin (1796), 1 Esp. 440 925, 926
Vaughan v. WorraU (1817), 2 Madd. 322 ; 2 Swans. 400 910
Vaughtou V. Bradsha-w (1«60), 9 C B. N. S. 103; 30 L. J. 0. P. 93; 3
L. T. 373 ; 9 W. R. 120 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 468 1073
Vaux Barony (1836), Min. Ev. 67 1040
Vaux Peerage (1824), Pari. Min. 44 423, 425
Vaux V. Shefler (1852), 8 Moo. P. C. C. 75 1122
Velasquez, The (1867), L. R. 1 P. C. 494 ; 1 Moo. P. C. C. 426 ; 36 L. J.
Adra. 19 ; 4 Moo. P. C. C. (N. S.), 426 ; 16 W. R. 89 178
Venables v. Schweitzer (1873), L. B. 16 Eq. 76 ; 42 L. J. Oh. 389 ; 28
L. T. 462 844
Venafra v. Johnson (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 316 '. 579
Vent V. Paoey (1830), 4 Russ. 193 601
Vernon, B-wens & Co., In re (1886), 32 Ch. D. 165 ; 54 L. T. 365 ; 34
W. R. 606 665
Verry v. Watkins (1836), 7 C. & P. 30S 254, 257, 951
Vice V. Lady Anson (1827), M. & M. 97 ; 7 B. & C. 409 ; 1 M. & R. 113 ;
3C. &P. 19 314
Vickers «). Hertz (1871), L. R. 2 H. L. (Sc.) 113 116
Victoria, The (1867), 1 Ir. R. Eq. 336 ; 37 L. J. Adm. 12 178
Vincent ». Bp. of Sodor & Man (1851), 4 De G. & Sm. 294 ; 20 L. J. Ch.
433 ; 15 Jur. 365 ; 5 Ex. 683 693
Vincent v. Cole (1828), M. & M. 258 ; 3 0. & P. 481 280, 286, 287
Vines v. Arnold (1849), 8 C. B. 638 1124
Viney v. Barss (1795), 1 Esp. 293 231
Vinnioombe «;. Butler (1865), 34 L. J. P. & M. 18 ; 3 S. & T. 580 ; 10 Jur.
N. S. 1109 ; 13 W. R. 392 697, 698
Violett V. Patton (1809), 5 Cranoh, 142 ; 669
Viret V. Viret (1880), 50 L. J. Ch. 69 ; 43 L. T. 493 _ 680
Vivian v. Little (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 370 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 771 ; 48 L. T.
793; 31 W. R. 891; 47 J. P. 566 1111
Volant V. Soyer (1853), 13 C. B. 231 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 83 321, 598
Von Stentz v. Comyn (1848), 12 Ir. E. R. 622, 642—645 140
Vooght V. Winch (1832), 2 B. & Aid. 662 89
Vowles V. Toung (1806), 13 Ves. 147 ; 9 R. R. 154 413, 415, 416, 424, 425
VuUiamy v. Huskisson (1838),, 3 T. & C. Ex. 82 ; 2 Jur. 6)6 418, 423
Waddel, Ex parte, In re Lutscher (1877), 6 Ch. D. 328 ; 36 L. T. 345 ; 26
W. R. 9 848
Waddington v. Bristow (1801), 2 B. & P. 452 686
Wade V. Nazer (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Eco. & Mar.) 46 705
Wade V. Simeon (1846), 2 C. B. 342 910
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CCV
PAGE
Wade V. Tatton (1856), 25 L. J. C P. 240 ; 18 0. B. 371 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 491 . . 719
Wadeer v. East India Co. (1856), 8 De Or. M. & G. 182 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 407. 618
Wadley v. BayUss (1814), 5 Taun. 752 ; 15 Rev. R. 645 791
Wadsworth v. Bentley (1854), 23 L. J. Q. B. 3 ; 1 L. & M. (BaU Court),
203 ; 17 Jur. 1077 1122
Wadsworth v. Hamshaw (1819), 2 B. & B. 6, n 693
Wadsworth v. Marshall (1832), 1 C. & M. 87 ; 3 Tyr. 228 816
WagstafE v. WUson (1832), 4 B. & Ad. 339 ; 1 N. & M. 1 606
Wain «). Bailey (1839), 10 A. & E. 616 ; 2 P. & D. 507 308
Wainman v. Kynman (1847), 1 Ex. 118 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 232 715
Waithman v. Wakefield (1807), 1 Camp. 120 ; 10 R. E. 654 166
Waithman v. Weaver (1822), D. & R. N. P. 10 ; 11 Price, 257 255
Wakefield v. D. of Buccleuch (1866), L. R. 4 Eq. 613 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 763. . 114
Wakefield v. Ross (1827), 5 Mason, 18 ; 9 Dane, Abr. 317 903
Wakeman v. West (1836), 7 C. & P. 479 1168
Wakley v. Johnson (1826), R. & M. 422 246
Waloot v. AUeyn (1819), Milw. Eoo. R. (Ir.) 69 170
Waloott J). Amerioan Life, &o. Soo. (1891), 33 Am. St. E. 923 Add. [105]
Waloott V. Hall (1810), 6 Mass. 514 255
Waldridge v. Kennison (1794), 1 Esp. 144 515
Waldrons. Coombe (1810), 3Taun. 162; 12 R. R. 629 1178
Waldron v. Jacob (1871), I. R. 5 Eq. 131 673
Waldron v. Tuttle (1828), 4 New Hamp. 371 413
Waldron v. Ward (1654), Sty. 449 603
Waldy V. Gray (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 238 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 394 ; 32 L. T. 531 ;
23 W. R. 676 357
Walford v. Fleetwood (1845), 14 M. & W. 449 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 271 19
Walker's case (1586), 3 Co. Rep. 23 509
Walker's case (1788), 1 Lea. 498 905
Walker, In re. In re Jackson (1885), 53 L. T. 660 ; 3i W. R. 95 621
Walker v. Bartlett (1856), 18 0. B. 845 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 643 ; 25 L. J. C. P.
263 684
Walker v. Beauchamp, Lady (1834), 6 C. & P. 552 . . .' 303, 409
Walker v. Bradford Old Bk. (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 511 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 280 ;
32 W. R. 645 ' 651
Walker v. Broadstock (1795), 1 Esp. 458 444
Walker i). Butler (1856), 25 L. J. Q. B. 377 ; 6 E. & B. 506 ; 2 Jur. N. S.
687 714
Walker v. Gardner (1832), 4 B. & Ad. 371 733
Walker v. Gode (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 172 ; 6 H. & N. 594 524
Walker v. G. W. Ry. Co. (1867), 36 L. J. Ex. 123 ; L. R. 2 Ex. 228 ; 15
W. R. 769 641
Walker v. Milue (1849), 11 Bear. 607 ; 18 L. J. Ch. 288 684
Walker v. Moore (1829), 10 B. & C. 416 773
Walker v. Poole (1882), 21 Ch. D. 835 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 840 914
Walker v. Richardson (1837), 2 M. & W. 882 ; M. & H. 251 ; 6 L. J. Ex.
229 128, 659, 660, 662
Walker v. Webb (1797), 3 Anst. 941 870
Walker v. Wildman (1821), 6 Madd. 47 599, 601
Walker v. Wilsher (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 335 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 501 ; 37 W. R.
723 42, 506, 514
Walker v. Wingfield (1812), 18 Ves. 443 ; 11 R. R. 232 1049
Walker v. Witter (1778), 1 Doug. 1 1155
Wall's case (1872), L. R. 16 Eq. 18 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 372 155
Wallace v. Brockley (1837), 5 Dowl. 695 732
Wallace v. Cook (1804), 6 Esp. 117 1049, 1172
Wallace ». Fielden (1851), 7 Moo. P. C. C. 398 179
Wallace v. Kelsall (1840), 7 M. & W. 264 ; 8 Dowl. 841 ; 4 Jur. 1064 ; 10
L. J. Ex. 12 487, 552, 744
Wallace v. Pomfret (1805), 11 Ves. 547 ; 8 R. R. 241 806, S07
Wallace v. Seymour (1871), Ir. R. 6 C. L. 196, 219, 343 704
WaUace v. SmaU (1830), M. & M. 446 515, 711
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CCVl TABLE OF CASES CITED.
FAai
WaUer v. Lacy (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 54, 71 ; 8 Do-wl. 563 ; 8 Scott, N. E.
186; 4 Jur. 435; 9 L. J. 0. P. 217 71:!, 715
■Wallisj!. Littell (1861), 31 L. J. C. P. 100; 11 0. B. N. S. 369; 8 Jur.
N. S. 745 ; 10 W. R. 192 746
WalUs V. Smitli (1882), 21 Oh. D. 243 ; 47 L. T. 389 ; 52 L. J. Gh. 145 ;
31 W. R. 214 44
Walpole V. Alexander (1782), 3 Doug. 45 865, 866, 867
Walroad v. Ha-wldna (1875), 44 L. J. C. P. 116 ; L. R. 10 C. P. 342 .... 522
Walsh V. Nally (1877), I. R. 11 C. L. 337 732
Walsh ». Trevanion (1850), 15 Q. B. 733 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 458 740
Walsh V. Wilson (1851), 1 Ir. Eq. R. 610 867
Walsham «. Stainton (1863), 2 H. & M. 1 599
Walsingham, Ld. v. Goodrioke (1843), 3 Hare, 124 593, 601. 602
Walter v. BoUman (1839), 8 Watts, 544 458
Walter v. Cubley (1833), 2 0. & M. 151 1195
Walter v. Haynes (1824), Ry. & M. 149 155
Walters v. Morgan (1792), 2 Cox, Ch. 369 682
Walters v. Rees (1819), 4 Moore, C. P. 34 869, 871
Walton, Ex parte. Re Levy (1881), 17 Ch. D. 766 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 662; 45
L. T. 1 ; 30 W. R. 395 662, 741
Walton V. Chandler (1845), 1 C. B. 307 ; 2 Dowl. & L. 802 ; 14 L. J. C. P.
149 ; 9 Jur. 257 732
Walton V. Green (1825), 1 C. & P. 621 500, 601
Walton V. Hastings (1816), 4 Camp. 223 ; 1 Stark. 215 1194, 1203
Walton V. SheUey (1786), 1 T. R. 296 877
Walton V. Waterhouse (1672), 3 Wms. Saunders, 417a 96
Wambough v. Sohank (1807), 1 Penningt. 229 172
Wankford v. Fotherley (1694), 2 Vern. 322 539
Ward V. Day (1864), 7 Notes of Cas. (Eco. & Mar.) 96, 101 522
Ward V. Dey (1849), 33 L. J. Q. B. 3, 254 ; 4 B. & S. 337 ; 5 B. & S. 359 ;
10 L. T. 578 ; 12 W. R. 829 937
Ward V. Gamgee (1891), 66 L. T. 610 ; 40 W. R. .'^O 915
Ward V. Hobbs (1878), 4 App. Cas. 13 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 2S1 ; 40 L. T. 73 ;
27 W. R. 114 777
Ward V. Johnson (1807), 13 Mass. 148 1115
Ward V. Londesborough, Ld. (1862), 12 C. B. 252 168
Ward, Ld. v. Lumley (1860), 29 L. J. Ex. 322 ; 6 H. & N. 87 669, 1197
Ward V. Pearson (1839), 6 M. & W. 18 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 163 ; 7 Dowl. 382 . . 187
Ward V. Pomfret (1832), 6 Sim. 475 ; 2 L. J. Ch. 22 447
Ward V. Ryan (1876), 10 Ir. R. C. L. 17 97
Ward V. Sinfield (1880), 49 L. J. C. P. 696 ; 43 L. T. 252 948
Ward V. Ward (1848), 11 Beav. 377 1045, 1132
Ward V. Wells (1809), 1 Taun. 461 ; 10 R. R. 581 328, 1213
Warde v. Warde (1851), 3 Mac. & G. 365 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 90 602
WardeU v. Fermor (1809), 2 Camp. 282 1216
Warden v. Jones (1857), 2 De G. & J. 76 ; 27 L. J. Ch. 190 ; 4 Jar. N. S.
269 ; 23 Beav. 487 679, 680
Ware ». Cumberlege (1855), 20 Beav. 503 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 630 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 745 683
Warickshall's case (1783), 1 Lea. 263 ; 2 East, P. C. 658 557, 558, 562
Waring v. Waring (1848), 6 Moo. P. C. C. 341 ; 6 Notes of Cas. (Eoo. &
Mar.) 394 263
Warmsley v. Child (1749), 1 Ves. sen. 141 , 308
Warner v. Mosses (1881), 50 L. J. Ch. 28 ; 43 L. T. 401 ; 29 W. R. 201 . . 349
Warner v. WiEington (1856), 3 Drew. 523 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 662 ; 2 Jur. N. S.
433 671, 672, 675
WarraU, Re, Ex parte Cossens (1820), Buck. 531 970
Warren v. Anderson (1839), 8 Soott, 384 1218. 1220
Warren v. Stagg (1787), cited 3 T. R. 591 752
Warren «. Warren (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 250 ; 4 Tyr. 850 155
Warren Hastings' case (1788), cited 30 How. St. tr 492 ; 2 Ph. Ev. 451. . 1179
Warrender v. Warrender (1834), 9 Bli. N. S. 89 ; 2 CI. & Fin. 488 1144
Warrick v. Queen's Coll., Ox. (Betts v. Thompson) (1867), 40 L. J. Ch.
785 ; L. R. 6 Ch. 732 ; 26 L. T. 264 ; 19 W. R. 1098 994
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CCVll
PAGE
■Warriner v. Giles (1734), 2 Str. 954, 1223, n. 1 1050
■Warrington v. Early (1853), 2 E. & B. 763 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 47 ; 18 Jur. 42. 1194
"Warwick v. Bruce (1813), 2 M. & Sel. 205 ; 6 Taun. 118 ; 14 R. R. 634 . . 686
Warwick v. Foulkes (1844), 12 M. & W. 507 ; 1 Dowl. & L. 638 ; 13 L. J.
Ex. 109 ; 8 Jur. 85 244
"Warwick v. Hooper (1850), 2 Mac. & G. 60 622
Warwick v. Queen's Coll. (1871), L. R. 3 Eq. 683 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 505 ; 18
W. R. 19 ; 23 L. T. 63 394, 398
Warwick v. Rogers (1843), 5 M. & Gr. 340 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 1 ; 12 L. J.
C. P. 113 1200
Wason V. Walter (1869), 8 B. & S. 671 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 34 ; L. R. 4 Q. B.
73 ; 19 L. T. 409 ; 17 W. R. 169 4
Waterford, Estate of M. of. Re (1871), Ir. R. 5 Bq. 434 768
Waterford, Corp. of D. Price (1846), 9 Ir. L. R. 310 1175
Waterford Ry. Co. v. Wolsely (1851), 1 Ir. 0. L. R. 444 1176
Waterford, Wexford, Wicklow and Dublin Ry. Co. v. Pidoock (1853), 8
Ex. 279 ; 7 Railw. Cas. 439 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 146 ; 17 Jur. 26 1176
Waterloo Bridge Co. •.,. Cull (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 75 ; 1 E. & E. 213 ; 5
Jur. N. S. 464 112
Waterman v. Soper (1697), 1 Ld. Ray. 737 114
Waterpark v. Fennell (1859), 7 H. L. Cas. 650 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 1135 ; 7 W.
R. 634 791, 792
Waters «. Earl of Thanet (1842), 2 Q. B. 757 ; 2 G. & D. 166; 6 Jur.
708 712
Waters v. Hewlett (1831), cited 1 A. & E. 8 371
Waters v. Thorn (1856), 22 Beav. 547, 556, 557 68
Waters v. Tomkins (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 723 ; 1 Tyr. & Gr. 137 714, 717
WatMns, Ex parte (1752), 2 Ves. sen. 470a 1150
Watkins, Re (1865), 35 L. J. P. & M. 14 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 19 701
Watkins v. Morgan (1834), 6 C. & P. 661 191
Watkins v. Nash (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 262 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 605 1204
Watkins v. RymiU (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 178 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 121 ; 48 L. T.
426 ; 31 W. R. 337 86
Watson V. Clark (1813), 1 Dow, 336 ; 14 R. R. 73 176
Watson V. Gray (1880), 14 Ch. D. 192 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 243 ; 42 L. T. 294 ;
28 W. R. 438 ; 44 J. P. 537 113
Watson V. King (1815), 1 Stark. R. 121 ; 4 Camp. 272 173, 1049, 1172
Watson V. King (1846), 3 C. B. 608 506
Watson V. Lane (1866), 11 Ex. 769 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 101 97, 98
Watson V. Little (I860), 29 L. J. Ex. 267 ; 5 H. & N. 472 1097
Watson V. Spratley (1854), 10 Ex. 237 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 53 683, 684, 685
Watson t>. Threlkeld (1798), 2 Esp. 637 ; 5 R. R. 760 539
Watson V. Waoe (1826), 5 B. & C. 153 542
Watson V. Watson (1864), 33 Beav. 574 806
Watson V. Woodman (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 721 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 67 ; 24 W.
R. 47 387
Watters v. Smith (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 892 1115
Watts V. Ainsworth (1862), 3 F. & F. 12 ; 1 H. & C. 83 ; 31 L. J. Ex.
448 ; 6 L. T. 252 675
Watts V. Fraser (1837), 7 A. & E. 323 ; 1 M. & Rob. 449 ; 7 C. & P. 369. .246,
246
Watts v. Kelson (1870), L. R. 6 Ch. 166 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 126 ; 24 L. T. 209;
19 W. R. 338 115
Watts V. Lawson (1830), M. & M. 447, n 515
Watts v. Thorpe (1808), 1 Camp. 376 498
Waugh V. Bussell (1814), 5 Taim. 707 ; 1 Marsh. 214, 311 ; 16 R. R. 624. 1196
Waugh V. Carver (1793), 2 H. Bl. 235 ; 14 R. R. 845 159
Waugh V. Cope (1840), 6 M. & W. 824 714
Wayman v. Hilliard (1830), 7 Bing. 101 ; 4 M. & P. 729 615
Waymell v. Reed (1794), 6 T. R. 600 ; 2 R. R. 675 747
Weale v. Lower (1672), Pollexfen, 67 170
WeaR V. Rice (1831), 2 Russ. & My. 251 ; 9 L. J. Ch. 116 806, 807
Weaver v. Price (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 409 1101
Vol. I. ends with page 636.
CCVIU TABLE OP CASES CITED.
FASE
"Webb's Estate, Ee (1870), Ir. R. 5 Eq. 235 171
Webb, Re (1855), 1 Deane, Eoo. R. 1 694
Webb V. Austiu (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 701 ; 8 Scott, N. R. 419 ; 13 L. J. C.
P. 203 96
Webb V. Bird (1863), 13 0. B. N. S. 841 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 335 ; 8 Jur. N.
S. 621 125
Webb V. Byng (1855), 1 K. & J. 680 786
Webb V. East (1880), 5 Ex. D. 23 964, 1182
Webb 4). Fox (1797), 7 Tr. 391 ; 4 R. R. 472 116, 117
Webb V. Hayoook (1854), 19 Beav. 342 421
Webb V. Heme Bay Improvement Com. (1870), 39 L. J. Q. B. 221 ; L. R.
5 Q. B. 642 ; 22 L. T. 745 641
Webb V. Manoh. and Leeds Ry. Co. (1839), 4 My. & Cr. 120 ; 1 Railw.
Cas. 676 932
Webb V. Paternoster (1620), Palm. 71 ; RoQe, R. 143 ; Noy, 98 ; Poph.
151 ; Godb. 282 638
Webb V. Petts (undated), Noy, 44 398
Webb V. Plnmmer (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 746 781
Webb V. Smith (1824), 1 C. & P. 337 488, 695
Webb V. Taylor (1843), 1 Dowl. & L. 684 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 24 ; 8 Jur. 39 . .869,
871
Webber v. Corbett (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 164 ; 16 L. R. Eq. 515 ; 29 L. T.
366 793
Webber v. East. Ry. Co. (1840), 2 Meto. 147 932
Webber «. Lee (1882), 61 L. J. Q. B. 174, 485 ; 9 Q. B. D. 315 682
Webber v. Stanley (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 698 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 217 803
Webster v. Bray (1848), 7 Hare, 159 160
Webster v. CeoQ (1861), 30 Beav. 62 750
Webster v. Cook (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. 542 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 763 ; 13 W. R 1001 137
Webstfer v. Lee (1809), 6 Maes. 334 1123
Wedderbume's case (1746), 18 How. St. Tr. 425 ; Post. C. L. 246 236
Wedge V. Berkeley (1837), 6 A. & E. 663 ; 1 N. & P. 665 ; W. W. & D.
271 31, 39
Wedgwood's case (1831), 8 Greenl. 76 1173
Weeks v. Argent (1847), 16 M. & W. 817 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 209 ; 11 Jur. 526. .602,
607
Weeks v. Maillardet (1811), 14 East, 568 1205, 1206
Weeks v. Propert (1873), 42 L. J. O. P. 129 ; L. R. 8 C. P. 427 ; 21 W. R.
676 780
Weeks V. Sparke (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 686 ; 14 R. R. 546 .... 393, 396, 398, 401
Weidmans. Kohr (1818), 4 Serg. & R. 174 413, 510
Weidner v. Sohweigart (1823), 9 Serg. & R. 3S5 154
Welch V. Barrett (1819), 16 Mass. 380 464
Welch V. Mandeville (1816), 1 Wheat. 233 488
Welch V. Nash (1807), 8 East, 394 ; 9 R. R. 478 1136
Welch V. Phillips (1856), 1 Moo. P. C. R. 299, 302 143
Welch V. Seaborn (1816), 1 Stark. R. 474 154
Weld V. Hornby (1806), 7 East, 199 ; 3 Smith, 244 ; 8 R. R. 608 79D, 792
Welfare v. Lond. & Brigh. Ry. Co. (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. G93 ; 38 L. J.
Q. B. 241; 20L. T. 743; 17 W. R. 1066 163
WeHord v. Beezely (1747), 1 Ves. sen. 6 ; 1 Wils. 118 674
WeUand Can. Co. v. Hathaway (1832), 8 Wend. 480 293, 629
Welland v Ld. Middleton (1844), 11 Ir. Eq. R. 603 1050, 1054, 1173
WeUs V. Pisher (1831), 6 C. & P. 12 ; 1 M. & Rob. 99, and n 890
Wells V. Pletcher (1831), 6 C. & P. 12 ; 1 M. & Rob. 99, and n 890
Wells V. Horton (1826), i Bing. 40 ; 12 Moore, C. P. 176 682
WeUs V. Jesus CoUege (1836), 7 C. & P. 284 398, 401
Wells V. Kingston-upon-Hull (1875), L. R. 10 0. P. 402 ; 44 L. J. C. P.
257 ; 32 L. T. 615 ; 23 W. R. 562 641, 683
Wells V. Wells (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 681 ; L. R. 18 Eq. 504 ; 31 L. T. 16 ;
22 W. R. 893 741, 793
Welman v. Wehnan (1880), 16 Oh. D. 570 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 736 ; 43 L. T.
145 139, 749
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CCIX
PAGB
"Welsteade. Levy (1831), 1 M. & Eob. 139 27, 496, 511, 514
Wemyss «. Hopkins (1876), 44 L. J. M. 0. 101 ; L. R. 10 Q. B. 378 ; 32
L. T. 9 ; 23 W. R. 691 1131
Wernnan v. Mackenzie (1855), 5 E. & B. 447 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 44 ; 1 Jur.
N. S. 1016, 1049, n 406, 1116, 1161
"Wentworth v. Lloyd (1864), 33 L. J. Cli. 688 ; 10 H. L. Cas. 589 ; 10 L. T.
767 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 961 109
Wequelin v. Wequelin (1839), 2 Curt. 263 353
West, Re (1862), 32 L. J. P. & M. 182 ; 12 "W. R. 89 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1158 699
West V. Baxendale (1850), 9 C. B. 141 ; 19 L. J, C. P. 149 30, 189
"West V. Blakeway (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 729; 9 Dowl. 846 ; 3 Soott, N. R.
199; 15 Jur. 461; 10 L. J. C. P. 173 544, 750, 751
West V. Lawday (1865), 2 Ir. E. Eq. 517 801
West V. Moore (1807), 8 East, 343 ; 9 R. R. 460 145
West V. Ray (1854), 1 Kay, 385 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 447 ; 2 Eq. R. 431 ; 2 W.
R. 319 693
West «. Steward (1845), 14 M. & W. 47 1202, 1204, 1205, 1206
West Cambridge v. Lexington (1824), 2 Pick. 536 443
West of Canada Oil, &c. Co., Re (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 683 ; 6 Ch. D. 109 ;
25 W. R. 787 345, 917
West ComwaU Ry. Co. v. Mowatt (1850), 15 Q. B. 521 ; 19 L. J. Q. B.
478 ; 16 Jur. 101 ; 1 Drew. 247 1176
West Jewell Tin Mining Co., In re (1879), 10 Ch. D. 579 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 426 ;
40 L. T. 43; 27 W. R. 310 1233
West of Eng. Bk. v. Canton Ins. Co. (1877), 2 Ex. D. 472 1180
WestLondon Com. Bk. v. Kitson (1884), 63 L. J. Q. B. 2i8, 345 ; 13 Q. B. D.
360; 50L. T. 656; 32 W. R. 757 780
Westoby v. Day (1853), 2 E. & B. 605 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 418 ; 18 Jur. 10. .7, 1116
Weston, Re (1869), L. R. 1 P. & D. 633 ; 38 L. J. P. & M. 53 703
Weston's case. In re (1879), 10 Ch. D. 579 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 425 ; 40 L. T.
43 ; 27 W. R. 310 1233
Weston V. Ernes (1808), 1 Taun. 115 766
Wetherall, Ex parte, Middleton v. PoUock (1876), 4 Ch. D. 49 ; 46 L. J.
Ch. 39; 35L. T. 608; 25 W. R. 94 539
Wetherell v. Langston (1847), 1 Ex. 634 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 338 675
Wey V. Tally (1704), 6 Mod. 194 8
Whaleyw. CarUsle (1866), 17 Ir. C. L. R. 792 18,441
Whalley r. Pepper (1836), 7 C. & P. 506 872
Wharam v. Routledge (1805), 5 Esp. 235 ; 8 R. R. 851 1191
Wharram v Wharcam (1863), 33 L. J. P. & M. 76 ; 3 S. & T. 301 ; 10 Jur.
N. S. 499 ; 10 L. T. 163 ; 12 W. R. 889 307
Wharton Peer. (1846), 12 CI. & Fin. 301 ..1035, 1092
Wharton v. Mackenzie (1844), 6 Q. B. 606 ; 1 Dav. & M. 644 ; 8 Jur. 466;
13 L.J. Q. B. 130 49
Whateley v. Spooner (1857), 3 K. & J. 542 786, 796
Whatman, Re (1805), 34 L. J. P. & M. 17 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1242 801
Wheatcroft's case (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 853 ; 29 L. T. 324 526
Wheatley I). WilUams (1836), 1 M. & W. 533 ; 2 Gale, 140; 1 T. & G.
1043 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 237 609, 611
Wheaton v. Maple (1893), 3 Ch. 48 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 963 ; 68 L. T. 641 ; 69
L. T. 208 ; 41 W. R. 677 119
Wheeldou v. Burrows (1878), 12 Ch. D. 31 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 853 ; 41 L. T.
327 ; 28 W. R. 196 115
Wheeler, In re (1880), 49 L. J. P. D. & A. 29 ; 42 L. T. 60 ; 28 W. R. 476;
44 J. P. 285 706
Wheeler v. Alderson (1831), 3 Hagg. Eoo. 587 140, 371, 930
Wheeler v. Atkins (1805), 5 Esp. 246 355
Wheeler v. Collier (1827), M. & M. 125 671
Wheeler v. Fox (1841), 3 Ir. L. R. 302, n 869
Wheeler v. Le Marcbant (1881), 17 Ch. D. 681 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 795 ; 44 L. T.
632; 45 J. P. 728 694, 1183
Wheeler v. Lowth (1710), Comyn's Dig. tit. " Evid.," c. 1 1035
Wheeling's case (1789), 1 Lea. 311, n 560
Vol, I. ends with page 635.
CCX TABLE OF CASES CTTED.
PAOB
Whioher, Re, Stevens, Ex parte (1888), 5 M. B. R. 173 849
Wiicker v. Hume (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 396 ; 7 H. L. Cas. 124 ; 4 Jur. N. S.
933 179, 180, 1103
WhlfFen v. Hardwright (1848), 11 Beav. Ill 514
Wtippy V. Hillary (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 399 ; 5 C. & P. 209 712
"Whistler v. Eorster (1833), 32 L. J. C. P. 161 ; 14 C. B. N. S. 248 ; 8 L. T.
317 ; 11 "W. R. 648 546
Whitaker v. Izod (1809), 2 Tami. 115 ; 321, 969
Whitaker v. Tatham (1831), 7 Bing. 628 ; 6 M. & P. 628 794
WhitakerB.Wisbey (1852), 12 0. B. 56,69; 21L. J. C.P. 116; 16 Jur. 411.. 19,
84, 135, 283
Whitcomb v. Whiting (1781), 2 Doug. 652 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 555 488
White, Re (1850), 2 Roberts. 194 698
White, Re (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 55 142
White V. Birch (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 174 ; 16 W. R. 305 ; 16 L. T. 605 . . 801
White V. Cuyler (1795),, 6 T. R. 176 ; 1 Esp. 200 ; 3 R. R. 147 645
White V. Bowling (1846), 8 Ir. L. R. 128 500
White V. Greenish (1861), 11 C. B. N. S. 209 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 563 548
White V. Hawn (1810), 5 Johns. 351 906
White V. Lisle (1819), 4 Madd. 214 396, 398
White «!. M'Dermott (1872), L R. 7 C. L. 1 144
White t>. Morris (1852), 11 C. B. 1015; 21 L. J. C. P. 185; 16 Jur. 500 .. 481
White V. Parkin (1810), 12 East, 578 ; 11 R. R. 488 754
White V. Proctor (1811), 4 Taun. 209 ; 13 R. R. 580 730
White V. Repton (1844), 3 Curt. 818 702
White ». Sayer (1622), Palm. 211 768
White D. Sharp (1844), 12 M. &W.- 712; 13 L. J. Ex. 215 ; iDowl. &L.
10r,9 ; 1 C. & K. 348 ; 8 Jur. 344 1039
White V. Smith (1841), Arm. M. & 0. 171 977
White, Ex parte. White v. Tommey (1853), 4 H. L. Cas. 313 1133
White 1). Trustees of the British Museum (1829), 6 Bing. 310 696
White V. Wilson (1800), 2 Bos. & P. 116 757
White V. Wilson (1806), 13 Ves. 87 ; 14 Ves. 151 170
White's case, R. v. White (1823), R. & R. 508 660
Whiteacre v. Symonds (1808), 10 East, 13 ; 10 R. R. 224 47
Whitehead v. Clifford (1814), 5 Taun. 518 660
Whitehead v. Scott (1830), 1 M. & Rob. 2 289, 318, 372
Whitehead v. Tattersall (1834), 1 A. & E. 491 499
Whitehouse v. Hemmant (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 295 1231, 1232
Whiteley v. King (1854), 17 C. B. N. S. 756 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1079 ; 11 L. T.
342 ; 13 W. R. 83 143
Whitelooke J). Baker (1807), 13 Ves. 514; 9 R. R. 216 408, 413
Whitelook v. MusgroTe (1833), 1 C. & M. 511 ; 3 Tyr. 541 1216, 1219
Whitefleld v. Brand (1847), 16 M. & W. 282 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 103 288 '
Whitfieldj).SouthEast.Ry.Co.(1858),27L. J. Q.B.229; lE.B.&E. 115..111,643
Whitford v. Tutin (1834), 10 Bing. 395 ; 4 M. & So. 166 ; 4 L. J. K. B. 63 286
Whitley v. Gough (1556-7), Dyer, 140 658
Whitmore v. Humphries (1871), L. R. 7 C. P. 1 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 43 ; 25
L. T. 496 ; 20 W. R. 79 116
Whitnash v. George (1828), 8 B. & C. 556 437, 508
Whitney v. Boordman (1875), 118 Mass. 242 763
Whittaker v. Edmunds (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 366 ; 1 A. & E. 638 261
Whittaker v. Jackson (1864), 33 L. J. Ex. 181 ; 2 H. & C. 926 ; 11 L. T.
155 1113, 1119, 1120
Whitting, Re, Ex parte Hall (1878), 10 Ch. D. 816; 48 L. J. Bank. 79;
40L. T. 179; 27 W. R. 385 651, 652
Whittuok V. Waters (1830), 4 C. & P. 376 419, 424, 1047
Whitwell V. Perrin (1858), 4 C. B. N. S. 412 179
Whitwell V. Wyer (1814), 11 Mass. 6 479
Whitwill V. Soheer (1838), 8 A. & E. 301 ; 3 N. & P. 391 ; 7 L. J. Q. B.
244 189, 192, 194
Whitworth's case (1881), 19 Oh. D. 118 ; 51 L. J. Oh. 71 ; 45 L. T. 449 ;
30 W. R. 33 845
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CCXl
PAGE
Whyman v. Garth (1853), 8 Ex. 803 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 316 1208
Whyte «. Ahrena (1884), 26 Oh. D. 717 ; SOL. T. 344; 32 W. R. 649. . .. 1188
Whyte V. Rose (1842), 4 P. & D. 199 ; 3 Q,. B. 495 ; 2 G. & D. 312 . . . .17, 19,
1133, 1101
Wifikens v. Goatley (1851), 11 C. B. 666 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 50 ; 2 L. M. & P.
572 18
Wickham v. M. of Bath (1865), 35 L. J. Ch. 5 ; L. R. 1 Eq. 17 ; 36 Beav.
69 ; 13 L. T. 313 ; 14 W. R. 21 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 988 731
Wickham v. Hawker (1840), 7 M. & W. 63 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 153 638
Wickham v. Lee (1848), 12 Q. B. 626 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 21 ; 12 Jur. 628 . . 1125
Wickham v. Wickham (1856), 2 K. & J. 478 677
Widdows' Trusts, Re (1871), L. R. 11 Eq. 408 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 380 ; 24 L.
T. 87 ; 19 W. R. 468 101
Wiedeman v. Walpole, (1891) 2 Q. B. 634 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 762 ; 40 W. R.
114 625, 881
Wieler v. Sohillizzi (1866), 17 C. B. 619 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 89 776
Wigglesworth v. DalUson (1778), 1 Doug. 201 ; 1 Bligh, 287 ; 1 Smith. L. C. . 768
Wight's Mortgage Trusts, Re (1873), 43 L. J.-Ch. 66; L. R. 16 Eq. 41 ;
28 L. T. 491 738
Wihen v. Law (1821), 3 Stark. 63 1170
Wike «). Lightner (1824), 11 Serg. & R. 198; Swift, Ev. 143 972, 973
Wilbur V. Selden (1826), 6 Cowen, 162 328, 354
Wilby V. Elgee (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 497 ; 44 L. J. C. P. 264 ; 32 L. T.
310 711, 722
Wilby V. Elston (1849), 7 Bowl. & L. 143; 8 C. B. 142; 18 L. J. 0. P.
320 ; 13 Jur. 706 223
Wildes V. Dudlow (1876), 44 L. J. Ch. 341 ; L. R. 19 Eq. 198 ; 23 W. R.
435 679
Wiles V. Woodward (1851), 5 Ex. 557 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 261 94
Wilkes V. Hopkins (1845), 1 C. B. 737 ; 3 Dowl. & L. 184 ; 14 L. J. C. P.
225 476
Wilkin V. Reed (iVsV)^ iV C. B. 192, i98,'265 • "-22 L.' J. C.'P. 193;' 'l8 Jur'.
1081 40, 191, 193
Wilkins v. Jadis (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 188 ; 1 M. & Rob. 41 33, 621
Wilkius V. Stephens (1842), 1 Y. & C. (Ch.) 431 666
Wilkinson, In re (1881), 6 P. Div. 100 ; 29 W. R. 896 ; 45 J. P. 716 707
Wilkinson v. Evans (1866), 35 L. J. C. P. 224 ; L. R. 1 C. P. 407 ; H. & R.
622 ; 14 W. R. 963 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 600 673
Wilkinson v. Gordon (1824), 2 Add. (Ecc.) 162 1116
Wilkinson v. Johnston (1824), 3 B. & C. 428 ; 5 D. & R. 403 1200
Wilkinson v. Kirby (1854), 23 L. J. C. P. 224 ; 15 C. B. 430 ; 2 C. L. R.
1387; 1 Jur. N. S. 164 1119
Wilkinson v. Storey (1839), 1 Jebb & Sy. 509 44
Wilkinson v. Verity (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 206 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 141 ; 24
L. T. 32 ; 19 W. R. 604 71
Wmesford, Re (1842), 3 Curt. 77 701
Williams, Ex parte (1824), 13 Price, 673 ; M'Clel. 493 811
Williams, Rq (1865), 35 L. J. P. & M. 2 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 4 698
Williams v. Armroyd (1813), 7 Craneh, 423 1150
WiUiams v. Ashton (1860), 1 J. & H. 115 142
Williams v. Bryant (1839). 5 M. & W. 447 ; 7 Dowl. P. C. 502 ; 9 L. J.
Ex.47 216, 543
WilHams v. Byrnes (1863), 2 New R. 47 ; 1 Moo. P. C. C. 154 ; 8 L. T.
69 ; 11 W. R. 487 671
WiUiams v. Callender (1810), Holt, N. P. 307 255
WiUiams v. Comm. (1879), 91 Pa. St. 493 627
Williams ». Davies (1833), 11 Q. B. D. 74 ; 52 L. J. M. C. 87 ; 47 J. P.
ggj 272 273
Wimanis'«i'/E.'lnd.'c'o'.'('l'8'o'2),''3'E'ast,'i92,''2'o'l";''6'R.'R'.'6'8'9';''B^ '
298 105, 260
WUliamsc. Evans (1863), 2 H. &N. 771; 27L. J.Ex. 176; 1 E.&B.727.. 704
WilUams v. Evans (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 319 ; L. R. 19 Eq. 547 ; 32 L. T.
359 ; 23 W. R. 466 688
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CCXU TABLE OF CASES CITED,
vAon
Wmiams v. Eyton (1859), 4 H. & N. 357 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 176 122, 1039
WUliams v. Fairington (1789), 2 Cox (Ch.) 202 965
"WUliams v. Geaves (1838), 8 C. & P. 692 437, 438
"Williams «i. ariffith (1849), 3 Ex. 335; 18L. J. Ex.210 711
WDUams v. Griffiths (1839), 2 0. M. & E. 46 ; 1 Gale, 65 ; 5 Tyr. 748. .. . 715
"Williams «. Gutoh (1857), 14 Moo. P. C. C. 202 6
■Williams v. Hulie (1663), 1 Sid. 131 ; Swift, Evid. 512 919
"Williams v. Innes (1808), 1 Camp. 364 ; 10 R. K. 702 498
"Williams !;. Jones (1841), 11 A. & E. 643 227
Williams v. Jones (1849), 7 Notes of Cases, 106 143
"Williams v. Jones (1887), 36 "W. R. 573 764
"WilHams v. Jordan (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 681 ; 6 Ch. D. 517 ; 26 "W. R. 230. 671
"WiUiams v. Lake (1859), 29 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 2 E. & E. 349 ; 1 L. T. 56 ; 6
Jut. N. S. 45 671
"Williams v. Lucas, (1892) 2 Q. B. 113 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 695 ; 66 L. T. 706. 310
"Williams v. Morgan (1850), 15 Q. B. 782 277, 398
Williams v. Morris (1841), 8 M. & W. 488 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 126 638
Williams v. Mudie (1824), 1 C. & P. 168 : Ry. & M. 34 593
Williams v. Pigott (1848), 2 Ex. 201 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 196 : 5 Railw. Cas. 544 ;
12 Jur. 313 541
WUliams v. Scottish Widows' Fund (1888), 62 J. P. 471 ; 4 Times L. R.
489 172
WilUams v. Smith (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 496 32
Williams v. Steele (1835), 4 Law Rec. (lat Series) 169 870
WiUiams v. Stern (1879), 5 Q. B. D. 409 ; 49 L. J. Q. B. 663 ; 42 L. T.
719 ; 28 W. R. 901 751
Williams v. Swansea Canal Navig. Co. (1868), L. R. 3 Ex. 158 1068
WiUiams v. Thomas (1862), 2 Dr. & Sm. 29 ; 31 L J. Ch. 674 ; 7 L. T. 184;
8 Jur. N. S. 250 606
WiUiams v. Tyley (1858), Johns. 530 706
Williams «). Walsby (1803), 4 Esp. 220 645
WiUiams f. Wheeler (I860), 8 C. B. N. S. 316 681
Williams v. Wilcox (1838), 8 A. & E. 314 ; 3 N. & P. 606 ; 1 W. W. &H.
477 1231
WilUams v. Williams (1693), Carth. 269 5
WiUiams v. WiUiams (1798), 1 Hagg. Cons. 304 183, 502, 556
WiUiams v. Williams (1863), 32 Bear. 370 666, 806
WiUiams v. WiUiams (1868), 37 L. J. Ch. 854 679
Williams v. WiUiams (1877), 8 Ch. D. 789, 793 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 857 ; 27
W. R. 100 : 39 L. T. 180 146, 704
WUliams v. Williams (1866), L. R. 2 Ch. 15 268
WiUiams ». WUliams and Padfield (1866), 35 L. J. P. & M. 8 ; L. R. 1 P.
& D. 29 ; 13 L. T. 610 501
WiUiams v. Wilson (1853), 9 Ex. 90 ; 1 C. L. R. 921 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 17 . . 1160
WiUiams v. Tounghusband (1815), 1 Stark. R. 139 303
WUliamson v. Allison (1802), 2 East, 446 200, 201
WiUiamson v. Barton (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 170 ; 7 H. & N. 899 ; 8 Jur.
N. S. 341 ; 5 L. T. 800 758
WiUiamson (Wilkinson) v. Scott (1821), 17 Mass. 249 652
WilUngham v. Matthews (1815), 6 Taun. 358 ; 2 Marsh. 57 866, 869
Willins V. Smith (1854), 4 E. & B. 180 ; 3 C. L. R. 16 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 62 ;
1 Jur. N. S. 163 713
WUUsf. Bernard (1832), 8 Bing. 376; lMo.&Sc.584; 1 L. J. C.P. 118.. 375
Willis V. Jemegan (1741), 2 Atk. 252 625
WUUs V. Newham (1830), Y. & J. 518 717
WUlis V. Peckham (1820), 1 B. & B. 515 ; 4 Moore (C. P.) 300 820
Willman v. WorraU (1838), 8 C. & P. 380 1216, 1220
WiUmett v. Harmer (1839), 8 C. & P. 695 105
Willock V. Noble (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 580 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 345 ; 32 L. T.
419 ; 23 W. R. 809 709
Willoughby v. Willoughby (1787), 1 T. R. 772 ; 1 R. R. 397 5, 21
WUlson, Re, Nicholson, Ex parte (1880), 14 Ch. D. 243 ; 49 L. J. Bank.
68 849
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CCXlll
PAOE
WUson V. Allen (1820), 1 Jao. & W. 611, 620 126
Wilson ». Beddard (1846), 12 Sim. 28 700
"Wilson V. Boerem (1818), 15 Johns. 286 466
Wilson V. Bowie (1823), 1 C. & P. 10 289, 1191
Wilson V. Butler (1838), 4 Bing. N. 0. 748 ; 6 Scott, 540 ; 8 L. J. 0. P. 143 . . 89
WUson V. Oollum (1881), 9 L. R. Ir. 150 1213
WHsou V. De Coulon (1883), 22 Oh. D. 841 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 248 ; 48 L. T.
614 ; 31 W. E. 839 347
Wilson V. Lady Duusauy (1854), 18 Beav. 293 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 492 ; 18 Jur.
762 1152
WUson V. Finch-Hatton (1877), 2 Ex. D. 336 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 489 ; 36 L. T.
473 ; 26 W. B. 537 775
Wilson V. Ford (1868), L. R. 3 Ex. 63 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 60 ; 17 L. T. 605 ;
16 W. R. 482 166
Wilson V. Hoare (183H), 10 A. & E. 236 39
Wilson V. MitoheU (1813), 3 Camp. 393 600
Wilson V. N. & Banb. Ry. (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 477 ; 20 W. R. 938 ; 27
L. T. 507 602
Wilson V. O'Leary (1872), L. R. 12 Eq. 625 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 709 805
Wilson V. Rastall (1792), 4 T. R. 460 ; 2 R. R. -"iie 594, 695, 598, 603, 607
Wilson ». Robinson (1846), 7 Q. B. 68 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 196 ; 9 Jur. 726 . . 246
Wilson V. Rogers (1745-6), 2 Str. 1242 992
Wilson V. Sewell (1766), 4 Burr. 1980 658
WUson ». Sheriffs of London (1620), Brownl. 16 871
WUson V. Turner (1808), 1 Taun. 398 ; 9 R. R. 797 606
WUson V. Wallaui (1880), 6 Ex. D. 155 ; 49 L. J. Ex. 437 ; 42 L. T. 376 ;
28 W. R. 697 ; 44 J. P. 475 662
WUson V. WUson (1883), 5 P. Div. 8 : 49 L. T. 430 : 32 W. R. 282 341, 348
Wilson's Trusts (1865), L. R. 1 Eq. 247 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 243 1143
Wilton V. Dunn (1851), 17 Q. B. 294 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 60 ; 15 Jur. 1104 . . 98
WUton V. Webster (1839), 7 C. & P. 198 376
Wiltshire «. Sidford (1827), 1 M. & R. 404 ; 8 B. & C. 259, n 113
WUtzie V. Adamson (1789), 1 Ph. Ev. 357 526
Windle v. Andrews (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 696 ; 2 Stark. 425 731
Wing V. Angrave (1860), 8 H. L. Cas. 183 30 L. J. Ch. 65 174, 741
Winn V. Bull (1877), 47 L. J. Ch. 139 ; 7 Ch. D. 29 ; 26 W. B. 230 673
Winn V. Patterson (1835), 9 Pet. 663 429
Winsor v. Dumford (1848), 12 Q. B. 603 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 14 ; 12 Jur. 629 1014
Winsor v. R. (1866), 35 L. J. M. C. 161 ; 7 B. & S. 490 ; L. R. 1 Q. B.
390 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 276 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 561 ; 14 L. T. 567 ; 14 W. R.
696 883
Winter v. MUes (1808), 10 East, 578 ; 1 Camp. 475, n. ; 10 R. R. 391 4
Winter v. Wroot (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 404 376
Winterbottom v. Ld. Derby (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 316 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 194 ; 16
L. T. 771 ; 16 W. R. 15 125
Wintle, Re (1870), L. R. 9 Eq. 373 ; 21 L. T. 781 ; 18 W. R. 394 1171
Wisden v. Wisden (1849), 6 Beav. 549 815
Wise V. Great West. Ry. Co. (1856), 26 L. J. Ex. 258 ; 1 H. & N. 63 722
Wiseman's case (1824), Macq. H. L. Prac. 631 502
Wishart v. Wyllie (1883), 1 Maoq. 389 HI
Witham v. Taylor (1876), 3 Ch. D. 605 : 45 L. J. Ch. 798 ; 24 W. R. 877. . 438
WithneU v. Garthain (1796), 6 T. R. 388 ; 1 Esp. 324 ; 3 R. R. 218 397, 792
Witmer v. Schlatter (1830), 2 Rawle, 359 1098
Witt V. Witt and Klindworth (1862), 3 S. & T. 143 ; 32 L. J. Mat. 179 ;
8 L. T. 175 ; 11 W. R. 154 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 207 374
Wogan V. SmaU (1824), 11 Serg. & R. 141 931
Wolf V. Wyeth (1824), 11 Serg. & R. 149 354
Wolfe V. Washburn (1826), 6 Cowen, 261 1178
WolEE V. Koppel (1843), 5 HUl, N. T. R. 458 677
Wolff V. Oxholm (1817), 6 M. & Sel. 92 1146
WoUaston v. HakewiU (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 297 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 593 ; 10
L. J. C. P. 303 296, 909
Woltoni). Gavin (1850), 16 Q. B. 48; 20 L. J. Q. B. 73; 15 Jur. 329.... 148
Vol. I. ends with page 635,
CCXIV TABLE OP CASES CITED.
PAGE
"Wolverton Mortgaged Estates, Re (1877), 7 Oh. D. 197; 47 L. J. Ch. 127;
37 L. T. 573 ; 26 W. R. 138 798
"Womersley v. DaUy (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 219 230
Wood, Re, Ex parte Luokes (1872), L. R. 7 Ch. 302 ; 41 L. J. Bank. 21 ;
26 L. T. 113 82
"Wood V. Anglo-ItaHan Bk. (1876), 34 L. T. 255 1189
Wood V. Duke of Argyll (1848), 6 M. & Gr. 932 ; 7 Soott, N. R. 885 ; 13
L. J. C. P. 96 540
Wood V. Beard (1876), 2 Ex. D. 30 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 100 ; 35 L. T. 866 649
Wood V. Braddiok (1808), 1 Taun. 105 ; 9 E. R. 711 386, 488
Wood V. Cooper (1845), 1 C. & K. 646 923, 925
Wood V. Drury (1699), 1 Ld. Raym. 734 ; Holt, 734 1209
Wood f. Eitz (1820), 10 Mart. 196 14
Wood V. Jackson (1831), 8 Wend. 9 1140
Wood V. Lake (1751), Sayer, 3 638
Wood t). Leadbitter (1845), 13 M. & W. 843 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 161 637, 638
Wood i>. Mackinaon (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 273 942
Wood V. Manley (1839), 11 A. & E. 34 ; 3 P. & D. 5 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 27 . . 638
Wood V. Midgley (1854), 5 De a. M. & G. 41 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 553 ; 2 Eq.
Rep. 729; 2Sm. &G. 121 670, 730
Wood V. Peel (18441, Ex. Midd. Sitt. T. T. 1844 361
Wood V. Priestner (1866), 4 H. & C. 681 ; L. R. 1 Ex. Ch. 66; 36 L. J.
Ex.42 786
Wood V. Rowcliffe (1851), 6 Ex. 407 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 285 804
Wood V. Scarth (1855), 2 Kay & J. 33 749
Wood V. Smith, Re City of Cambridge (1874), 43 L. J. Adm. 11 ; L. R. 5
P. C. 451 ; 30 L. T. 439 ; 22 W. R. 578 178
Wood V. Underbill (1847), 5 How. S. Ct. R. 1, 4 43
Wood V. Wood (1867), L. R. 1 P. & D. 309 ; 36 L. J. P. 34 ; 15 L. T.
693 143, 307, 709
Woods V. Woods (1844), 4 Hare, 83 ; 14 L. J. Ch. 9 601
Wood's Estate, Re (18^3), 2 New R. 15 ; 1 De G. J. & S. 465 ; 32 L. J.
Ch. 400 167
Woodbeck v. Keller (1826), 6 Cowen, 120 623, 627
Woodbridge v. Spooner (1819), 3 B. & A. 233 : 1 Chit. R. 661 757
Woodcock V. Houldsworth (1846), 16 M. & W. 124 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 49 . .165, 932
Woodcraft ». Kinaston (1742), 2 Atk. 317 1019
Woodfine, Re (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 832 ; 38 L. T. 753 ; 26 W. R. 678 ... . 945
Woodford v. Whiteley (1830), M. & M. 517 307
Woodgate v. Potts (1847), 2 C. & K. 467 270
Woodham v. Edwards (1836), 5 A. & E. 771 ; 1 N. & P. 207 ; 2 H. & W.
443 ; 6 L. J. K. B. 38 7,8
Woodley, Re (1864), 3 8. & T. 429 ; 33 L. J. P. 154 699
Woodley v. Coventry (18631, 32 L. J. Ex. 185 ; 2 H. & C. 164 ; 8 L. T.
249 ; 11 W. R. 599 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 548 545
Woods V. Dean (1862), 32 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 3 B. & S. 101 ; 7 L. T. 561 ; 11
W. R. 22 521
Woods V. Lamb (1866), 35 L. J. Ch. 309 169
Woods V. Woods (1802), 2 Bay. 476 172
Woodward, Re (1871), L. R. 2 P. & D. 206 ; 40 L. J. P. & M. 17 ; 24
L. T. 40 ; 19 W. R. 448 706
Woodward «;. Buchanan (1870), 39 L. J. Q. B. 71 ; L. R. 5 Q. B. 285;
22 L. T. 123 229
Woodward v. Catton (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 44 ; 6 C. & P. 489 ; 4 Tyr. 689 1006
Woodward a. Larking (1801), 3 Esp. 286 , 552
Woodward v. Leayitt (1871), 107 Mass. 453 616
Woolam V. Heam (1802), 7 Ves 218 ; 6 R. R. 113 744, 750
WooUey V. N. Lond. Ry. Co. (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 602 ; 38 L. J. C. P.
•317; 20 L. T. 813; 17 W. R. 660, 797 1186
Woolway V. Rowe (1834), 1 A. & E. 114 ; 3 N. & M. 849 ; 3 L. J. K. B.
121 510, 512, 513
Wootley V. Gregory (1828), 2 T. & J. 536 659
Worcester's, L'Evesque de, case (1594), Moore, F. 360 ; Poph. 84 6
The references are to pages, iiot to paragraphs.
TABLE OP CASES CITED. CCXY
PAGE
■Worlioli V. MaBsey (1605), Cro. Jao. 67 19
Worsley v. PiUsker (1620), 2 RoU. Rep. 119 21
Worthinston v. Grimsditoh (1845), 7 Q. B. 479 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 52 ; 10
Jur. 26 : 714
Worthington v. Hylyer (1808), 4 Mass. 196 802
Worthington v. Moore (1891), 64 L. T. 338 1211
Worthington v. Sudlow (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 131 ; 2 B. & S. 508 ; 6 L. T.
283 ; 10 W. E. 621 ; 8 Jut. N. S. 668 780
Worthington v. Warrington (1848). 8 0. B. 134 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 350 .... 773
Wotton, Ee (1874), 43 L. J. P. & M. 14 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 159 699
Wray v. Steele (1814), 2 Ves. & B. 388 ; 13 E. R. 124 666
Wray, In re (1769, should be 1876), Ir. R. 10 Eq. 266 140
Wright, Re (1865), 34 L. J. P. & M. 104 ; 4 S. & T. 35 699
Wrights. CoUa (1849), 8 0. B. 150; 19 L. J. C. P. 60 1165
Wrights. Court (1825), 2 C. & P. 232 385
Wright V. Crookea (1840), 1 Scott, N. R. 685 747, 757
Wright V. Doe d. Tatham (1834), 1 A. & E. 22 . . . .278, 279, 324, 326, 369-371,
379 380 392 1113 1216
Wright V. GoS (1856), 22 Beav. 207 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 803 ; 4 W.'r. 622 ; 2
Jur. N. S. 481 749
Wright V. Graham (1848), 3 Ex. 131 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 29 1039
Wright V. Holdgate (1850), 3 C. & K. 158 101, 621
Wright V. Lainson (1837), 2 M. & W. 739, 743 ; M. & H. 202 ; 6 Dowl.
146 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 197 147
Wright V. Littler (1761), 3 Burr. 1255 ; 1 W. Bl. 349 464
Wright V. Lond. Gen. Omnibus Co. (1877), 46 L. J. Q. B. 429 ; 2 Q. B. D.
271; 36L. T. 690; 26 W. E. 647 1130
Wright ». Ld. Maidstone (1855), 1 K. & J. 701 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 623 ; 1 Jur.
N. S. 1013 308
Wright D. Mills (1859), 4 H. & N. 488 : 28 L. J. Ex. 223 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 771 84
Wright «!. Netherwood (1793), 2 Salk. 593, n. (a); 2PhiUim. 266-277, n. (e) . . 174
Wright ». Pearson (1869), L. E. 4 Q. B. 682; 38 L. J. Q. B. 312; 10
B. & S. 723 ; 20 L. T. 849 ; 17 W. R. 1099 516
Wright f. Pulham (1816), 2 Chitty, E. 121 1095
Wright V. Rogers (1869), 38 L. J. P. & M. 67 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 678 ; 21
L. T. 166 ; 17 W. R. 833 697
Wright V. Eudd (1832), cited 1 Ph. Ev. 172 398
Wright p. Sanderson, " Times, " 28 Feb. 1884 (C. A.) 697
Wright V. Sarmuda {see Wright u. Netherwood).
Wright V. Shaworosa (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 501, n 32
Wright 1). Snowe (1848), 2 De G. & Sm. 321 639
Wright V. Stavert (1850), 29 L. J. Q. B. 161 ; 2 E. & E. 721 ; 8 W. R.
413 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 867 682
Wright V. Vanderplank (1856), 2 K. & J. 1 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 753 ; 8 De G.
M. & G. 133 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 699 136
Wright V. Wilcox (1860), 19 L. J. C. P. 333 ; 9 C. B. 660 ; 14 Jur.
740 ^ 272 274
Wright !;."Woodgate'(i83.5)V2 C.M. &R.'673 '; Y ly'r'. & Gr."l2;' 1 Salej '329. . ' 111
Wright V. Wright (1831), 7 Bing. 457 696
Wrightson v. Calvert (1860), 1 J. & H. 260 803
Wyatt, Re (1862), 2 S. & T. 494 ; 31 L. J. P. & M. 197 ■. . 701
Wyatt V. Bateman (1836), 7 C. & P. 586 329, 1216
Wyatt V. Gore (1816), Holt, N. P. R. 299 618
Wyatt V. Harrison (1832), '3 B. & Ad. 871 ; 1 L. J. K. B. 237 114
Wyoh V. Meal (1734), 3 P. Wms. 311 495
Wyld V. Hopkins (1846), 15 M. & W. 617 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 25 540, 541
Wyllie V. Mott (1827), 1 Hagg. (Eco.) 34 846
Wyndham's Divorce bill (1855), 3 Maoq. 54 376
Wynne v. Tyrwhitt (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 376 87, 442
Xenos v. Wiokham (1866), L. E. 2 H. L. 296 ; 36 L. J. C. P. 313 ; 16
L. T. 880 1204
Vol. I. ends with page 635.
CCXVl TABLE OF CASES CITED,
FAQS
Tabslet V. Noble (1697), 1 Ld. Eavm. 190 496
Tarborongh „. Bk. of England (1812), 16 East, 6 ; 14 Eev. R. 272 ; do.
Preface v 643
Tardley v. Arnold (1842), 10 M. & W. 145 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 311 ; Car. &M.
434 ; 6 Jur. 718 909
Yates, Ex parte, Ee Smith (1858), 27 L. J. Bank. 9 ; 2 De G. & J. 191 . . 1194
Yates ». Camsew (1828), 3 C. & P. 99 485
Yates V. Maddan (1851), 3 Mao. & a. 532 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 24 ; 16 Jirr. 45. . 144
Yates V. Pym (1816), 6 Taun. 446 ; 2 Marsh. 141 ; Holt, N. P. 95 .... 766, 781
Yates V. Thomson (1835), 3 CI. & Fin. 577, 580 52
Yea 41. Fouraker (1760-1), 2 Burr. 1099 714
Yearsley v. Heane (1845), 14 M. & W. 322 : 3 Dowl. & L. 265 872
Yearwood's Trusts, Ee (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 488 ; 6 Ch. D. 545 ; 25 W. R. 461 621
Yeatman, Ex parte (1835), 4 Dowl. 309 594
Yeatman v. Dempsey (1861), 7 C. B. N. S. 628 ; 9 C. B. N. S. 881 ; 9 W. E.
743 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 1245 ; 29 L. J. C. P. 177 835
Yeats V. Yeats (1852), 16 Beav. 170 803
Yelverton ». Yelverton (1867), L. R. 1 H. L. (So.) 218 ; 4 Macq 746 ; 10
Jur. N. S. 1209 ; 11 L. T. 118 ; 13 W. R. 233 876
Yeomans v. "Williams (1865), L. R. 1 Eq. 184 ; 35 !■. J. Ch. 283 639
Yorke v. Brown (1842), 10 M. & W. 78 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 283 ; 11 L. J. Ex.
410 1165
Yoter V. Sauno (1837), 6 "Watts, 166 619
Young, Ex parte, Re Kitohin (1881), 17 Ch. D. 668 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 824 ; 45
L. T. 90 508
Young V. Black (1813), 7 Cranch, 566 1118
Young V. Cawdrey (1819), 8 Taun. 734 663
Young «!. Clare HaU (1851), 17 Q. B. 529 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 12; 16 Jur. 81.. 446
Young V. Cole (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 724 ; 4 Scott, 489 ; 6 L. J. C. P. 201.. 776
Young V. Honner (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 537 ; 1 C. & K. 51 1226
Young V. Corp. of Leamington (1883), 8 Q. B. D. 597 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 292 ;
8 App. Cas. 517 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 713 ; 49 L. T. 1 ; 31 W. R. 925 ; 47
J. P. 660 650
Young V. HoUoway (1895), 11 E. (April) 59 ; (1895) P. 87 ; 64 L. J. P. D.
& A. 55; 72 L. T. 118; 43 W. R. 429 Add. [230]
Young V. Lynch (1747), 1 "W. Bl. 27 997
Young V. Murphy (1836), 3 Bing. N. C. 54 ; 3 Seott, 379 ; 2 Hodges, 144;
6 L. J. C. P. 180 255
Young V. R. (1789), 3 T. E. 98 ; 1 E. E. 660 237, 238
Young V. Raincook (1847), 7 C. B. 310 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 193 ; 13 Jur. 639. . 89,
93, 94
Young ». Sohuler (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 671 ; 49 L. T. 546 730, 758
Young V. Smith (1808), 6 Esp. 121 496
Young V. Turing (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 603 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 752 157
Young V. "Wright (1807), 1 Camp. 141 605, 606
Youuge «!. Honner (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 537 ; 1 C. & K. 51 1226
Yrisari v. Clement (1826), 3 Bing. 432 ; 11 Moore (C. P.) 308 ; 2 C. &P. 223 3
Ystalyfera Iron Co. v. Neath atjd Brecon Ey. Co. (1873), 43 L. J. Ch. 476 •
L. R. 17 Eq. 142 ; 29 L. T. 662 ; 22 "W. R. 149 1073
Zaohabiab «. CoUis (1820), 3 PhiUim. 202 140
Zichy Ferraris, Countess de v. M. of Hertford (1843), 3 Curt. 479 697 701 708
Zouch Peer. (1807), Pari. Min. 207 409 423
Zouch ». Clay (1671), 1 Ventr. 185 ; 2 Keb. 872 ; 2 Lev. 35 1203 1205
Zouch V. "WilUngale (1790), 1 H. Bl. 312 ; 2 R. E. 770 39 622
Zugaati V. Lamer (1858), 12 Moo. P. C. C. 331 6
Zulueta V. "Vinent (1851-2), 1 De G. M. & G. 315 ' ' " ' 644
The references are to pages, not to paragraphs.
AMEEICAN TABLE OF CASES.
[refekences ake to pages.]
Abbot v. Plumbe
122912,
12291s
Abbott V. Coleman
1229^5,
122962
Abington v. North Bridgewater
4121
Acklen v. Hiukman
978-^
, 97810
Adam i'. Kerr
122919
Adams v. Clark
18331
V. Davis
808"
V. Field 1229", 1229i5_
1229*8
V. Greenwich Ins. Co.
257«
V. Harrison
6224
V. Jones
183M
25718
(/■. Lawson
25734
V. Lesher
117936
V. State
3915",
117939
u. Swansea
4274
«. Watkins
80823
V. Way
218,
117913
V. Wheeler
97826, 97827
Addams v. Seitzinger
4525
Adkins v. Galbraith
35811
Adler v. State
2125
Aherti v. Goodspeed
3912
Aiken v. Kennison
2578
Alabama, &c. Ins. Co. v.
Cobb
2121
Alabama, &c. R. R. v. Hill 365i
, 36518
Alabama State Ld. Co. u
Kyle
18381
Albrittin v. Huntsville
2111
Alderman v. People
6221'
Alderman and Council v.
Fin ley
2112
Alexander v. Burnham
2118
V. Foreman
11794*
V. Kaiser
978«
V. Milwaukee
2112
V. Smoot
463
S 46321
V. U. S.
35821
Alexander's Succession
I8.32*
Allegliany v. Nelson
21 SI
Allen V. Frost
521, 522
V. Tliaxter
117928
V. Watson
6212,
117912
V. Yeater
80825
AUesbrook v. Roach
122965
Allison V. Barrow
6228
Alston V. State
5882
Amer. &c. Ass'n v. Dahl
80822
American Fire Ins. Co. u
. Hazen
25728
Amer, &c. Ins. Co. v. Eosenagle 521",
4272, 11798, II7918
Amer, Nat. Bk. v. Bushey 216
Ames V. McCamber 52i8, 52i5
u. Snider 2768
Araey v. Long 1229*
Amidon v. Hosley 257°^
Anderson v. Ames 4638
V. Fetzer 39129, 39180
V. Long 25728
V. Parker 427*
V. State 4706, 470", 5882, 58310^ 58812
Andrews v. Beck 1832*
V. Hoxie 2126
V. Solomon 6229
Aneals v. People 978^2
Angus V. Smith 978*9
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass.
Hutmacher
35816
Annapolis, &c. R. R. u. Gantt
2572*
Anon.
257'6
Apollon, The
2134
Appeal of Hartranft
62219
Application of Jacobs
2187
Arayo «. Currel
219
Arbuckle v. Terapleton
18328, 6226
Archer v. Helm
391", 39127
Archibald v. State
4704
Armil v. Chicago
39126
Armor v. State
25781
Armstrong v. U. S.
21'
Arnold v. Arnold
91011, 91013
V. .Tones
808"
Arthur v. James
5547, 55412
Asli V. Marlow
525
Ashley v. Root
5216
Ashley's Adm'x v. Martin
2131
Ashlock V. Linder
5548
Atchison, &c. R. R. u. Blacksliire 2I12
V. Cupello
11791s
V. Lawler
9781, 978'
t'. Parker
39129
V. Stanford
2572*
V. Thul
36511, 36514
Atkeson v. Lay
2140
Atkinson v. Blair
808*
Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Manning
122984
CCXVIU J
yMEKICAiT TAI
JLE OF CASES.
Beferences are to pages.
Atlas Bank v. Doyle
27612
Bank of Augusta u. Earle
2183
Att.-Gen. v. Dublin
2125, 622
Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Ex-
V. HalUday
1832'
press Co.
215
27
Bank of Newberry
21W
Atwater v. Schenck
21-22
Bank of No. Amer. v. McEIroy 91017.
Atwood V. Barney
46316, 46322
91018
V. Scott
1831
Bank of Nortliern Liberties !>.
Davis 97831
Augusta V. Windsor
46326
Bank of U. S. v. Dandridge
35821
Aulls V. Young
2768
117919
Aultman v. Clifford
80816
Bank of Upper Canada v. Boulton 8082
7>. Daggs
6228
V. Smith
525
Austin V. Austin
183«
-Bank of Utioa v. Hillard
12293
— — V. Heiser
622*
Banks v. Burnliam
2123
r. Holland
183s»
Bannon v. Aultman
80828
V. State
97834
Barber v. Merriam
39136
Austine v. People
68818, 58820
Barbour v. Watts
117920
Averill v. Sawyer
8088, 80823
Barcello v. Hapgood
117982
Avery v. Avery
46327
Barclay v. Waring
91018
V. Miller
80826
Barker v. Bradley
80826
Ayer v. Bell Mfg. Co.
80816
V. Bushnell
5547
Ayres v. Bane
5542
v. Com.
39160
V. Cliisum
35821
V. Haskell 463"
, 46316, 46318
V. Duprey
97846
V. Kuhn
62216
V. Hewett
12299
Barmby v. Plummer
35813
V. Watson
97861
Barnard v. Roane Iron Co.
80821
Barnes v. Harris
6229
Bacon v. Frisbee
62217
V. State
58816
V. Inhabitants of Charlton 39137
V. Tronipowsky
I22918
V. Towne
2578*, 391«
Barnhart v. Fulkerth
21
Badart v. Foulon
522
Barnum v. Barnum 427^, 4273, 4276,
Badger v. Story
3586, 39146^ 39146
4278, 4279
Baeder v. Jennings
4281
Barr v. Barr
80826
Bagley v. McMickle
18326, 35820
Barron v. Mason
526, 25734
Bagley, &c. Co. v. Saranac, &o. Co. 808^
Barrow v. State
39134
Bailey v. Bailey
978«
Barrows v. Downs
5216
V. Kalamazoo Pub
Co. 2183
Barry v. Ryan
122913
Bain i: Walsh
358"
Bartholomew v. Farwell
46319
Baird v. Baird •
8082*
Bartlett v. Emerson
4126
Baker v. Gausin
3918
V. Patton
4523
V. Goldsmith
39129
Bartley v. People
58826
V. Hall
8086
Barton v. Dundas
46329
V. Hess
5542
Bascom v. Smith
523
V. Knott
2122
V. Toner
358'
V. Mich., &c. R. E.
80811
Bass V. Chicago, &c. R. R.
39117
V. Mygatt
2128
Bassett v. Shares
5548
V. Thompson
91018
V. Spofford
4634
Balbo V. People
58816
Basye v. State
4709, 5881
Balch V. Smith
18331
Battaglia v. Thomas
35818, 978*5
Baldridge v. Penland
4635, 46311, 46318
Battle V. Baird
117946
Baldwin v. Burt
85811
Battles V. Laudenslager
25(26
V. Short
25717
Battre v. State
521
V. Threlkeld
3582»
Baugh V. White
8086
V. Whitcomb
3588
Baxter v. Abbott
97863
Ball V. Gates
4633
V. Ellis
18328
Ballew V. U. S.
11798
V. State
4708, 47013
Baltimore, &c. R. R. v.
Glenn 52i»
Bay V. Cook
4638, 46318
V. Ramho
978S9, 978«»
Bayly's Adm. v. Chubb
218, 5210
V. Thompson
97826
Bayse v. State
622"
V. Woodruff
25726
Beach v. State
6351
Baltimore Steamboat Co. v. Brown 8081^
Beale v. Com.
]83«
Bank v. Bank
978W
Beall V. Poole
80826
V. Dandridge
183«, 3582
Beals V. See
80821
V. Mudgett
I22918
Beamer v. Darling
62210
■ V. Rutland
391«
Beard v. Boylan
80827
V. Zorn
9781, 9785, 97849
Beardsley v. Wildman
97844, 97862
AMEKICAN TABLE OF CASES.
CCXIX
References axe to pages.
Beardstown v. Virginia
Beasley v. People
Beattie v. Hilliard
Beatty v. Clement
V. Lessee of Knowler
Beck V. Beck
Becker v. Holm
Beckham v. State
Beckman v. Beckman
Bedford v. Flowers
Bedingfield's Case
Beeokman v. Montgomery
Beemer v. Kerr
Beery v. U. S.
Beets V. State
Befay v. Wheeler
Bell V. Brewster
V. Chambers
D. Kendrick
276*
257"
35819
4525
2113, 21W
522
89121
5542
9785'
588", 58818, 58818, 58823
4705
18352, 39129
1229*5
97834
526, 35813, 48323
V. State 2139, 47010, 588I, 5885, 978IV
V. Woodman 8083
Bornman 8082"
212, 2118
58821, 58824
4703
97813, 97818
122945
2572
62210
80821
Belleville Sav. Bk. v,
Belmont v. Morrill
Belote V. State
Ben V. State
Benaway v. Conyne
Benedict v. Flanigan
V. Rose
V. State
Benicia, &c. Works v. Estes
Benjamin v. BUinger's Adm.
V. Shea ' 2763
Bennett v. State 2li9, 2573', 62223
Benns v. State 470*
Benoist v. Darby 3915"
Bentley v. Ward 46313, 46321
Benton v. Martin 80825
Berg 0. Peterson 12292', 122938
Bergen v. People 5889
Bergman v. Shoudy 978i, 9788
Berliner v. Waterloo 211°
Bernard v. Walker 80819
Bernheim v. Dibrell 25713
Berscli v. State 257"
Besson v. Southard 525
Bethea v. Byrd 4124, 4i2»
Beyerstedt v. Winona Mill Co. 808", 8O8I'
Bickel V. Fasig 9IO21
Biddis V. James 117912
Bierhaus v. W. U. Tel. Co. 52i2
Bigelow V. Chatterton 21'
V. Wilson 8088
Bigler v. Reyher 62215, 62218
Bignall, &c. Co. 0. Pierce, &c. Co
Billingslea v. Smith
Billingsley v. Hiles
Binford v. Young
Bingham v. Bernard
Binns V. State
IJirch V. Hale
Bird's Case
Birmingham v. McPoland
Bishop V. Jones
V. Nesbiit
Bissell B. Briggs
9781
117928
55413
25733, 25739, 8089
470"
97846
218
9784
2130
4272
117919
Bissell V. Edwards 11792", 117921, II7922
Bituminous, &c. Co. v. Fulton 2112
Bixler's Adm. v. Parker 21i3
80828
1834, 1835
5881, 5888, 97827
4271, 427', 4278, 4632'
470'
9104, 9108, 9107, 91022
18325
8082, 8083, 80818, 808i3
Black V. Sharkey
V. Ward
Blackburn v. Com.
V, Crawfords
i\ State
Blackwell v. State
Blade v. Noland
Bladen v. Wells
Blair v. Madison Co.
V. Seaver
Blake v. Damon
V. Fash
V. Hall
Blanchard ;;. Child
V. Young
Bland v. Warren
Blatz V. Uohrbach
Bless V. Jenkins
Blewitt V. Boorum
Bliss V. Brainard
c. Johnson
Blizzard v. Hayes
Blocker v. Burness
Bloom V. Cox, &c. Mfg. Co.
Bloomington v. Shrock
Blossom V. Griffia
Blotcky V. Caplan
Blount V. Kimpton
Board of Trustees c. Misenheimer 122958
Boardman u. Lessees of Reed 4124
V. Westchester, &c. Ins. Co. 365"
0. Woodman 2572'
Bod well V. Swan 25733
Body V. Jewson 18331
Boehringer v. Richards Medicine Co. 39132
Bolm Mfg. Co. u. Harrison 808^'
91011, 91012, 91013
3913
3582U
8081
39133
2761, 2768
4638
2138
18361
8082'
2766
39149
25734
910W
522
39132
97846
62215
Bolds V. Woods
Bolles V. Sachs
Boiling V. Fannin
Bonahan v. State
Bondy v. Valois
Bonelli v. Bowen
Bonnell v. Mawha
Bonner v. Phillips
Bonnet xt. Glattfeldt
3912
46329
58812
6224
9784'
46312, 5543
2132
9781, 9782, 9784
Bonsack Machine Co. v. Woodrum
8086
Booby V. State 62224
Bookman v. N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co. 2135
Boon V. State Ins. Co. 18351
V. Wethered's Adm. 25739, 25752
Born V. Rosenow 97826
V. Weathered's Adm. 25746
Bornheimer v. Baldwin 39129
Borum v. Fouts 6224
Bostick V. Rutherford 25734, 25735
Boston I'. Richardson 428i
V. State 2120, 2121
Bottomley v. U. S. 257"
Boulden v. State 35812, 4705, 47013
Bowden v. Spellman 9785
Bowdle V. By. Co. 91025
ccxx
AMEEICAN TABLE OP CASES.
References are to pages.
Bowen v. Chase
V. Humphreys
V. Jones
;;. Mo. Pac. E. K.
Bowers v. State
Bowersock v. Adams
Bowman v. Hekla Fire Ins. Co.
V. Sanborn
Boyce v. Cheshire R. R.
Boyd V. Ladson
V. State
V. V. S.
Boyle V. State
Brabston v. State
Brackett v. People
Bradberry v. State
Bradford v. Barclay
V. Floyd
V. State
Bradlej' v. Goodyear
V. Kent
V. M'Intosh
Bradshaw v. Combs
Brady v. Cassidy
V. Page
V. State
V. V. S.
V. Wilson
Bragg V. Colwell
Brakefield v. State
Bramlette v. State
Brancli v. Howard
V. Texas Lumber Mfg. Co.
V. Wilson
Brand v. Brand 62213
Brandon Mfg. Co. v. Morse 808»
Brazier's Case 910^
Brennan v. Vogt 2P^
Brent v. State 183S 1835
Breton v. H. B. Claflin Co. 910«
Bretz V. Mayor, &c. of New York 21"
Brewer v. Housatonic E. E. Co. 2761*
V. Porch 9782'
Brice v. Miller 3582, 808^3
Briceland v. Com. 276'
Brick V. Brick 8082"
Bridger v. Ashville, &c. R. E. Co. 52',
5214, 5216
39132
2138
978", 97813
4635
18349
122988
2112
122914
8082"
25724
6225
4522
8081"
1229"
2110
62213
117943
1179W
122928
25726
463S
91021
2574
4708, 47017
4704
21«
39125
9784'
2137
58825
4638
91018
6222"
808', 80823
80828
2135
62210
58825
427"
12294'
470"
6221
80824
4278
Bridges !>. Hyatt
Briffltt V. State
Briggs V. Rafferty
V. Georgia
V. Herrey
V. U. S.
V. Whipple
Brigham v. Palmer
Bright V. Knight
Brighthope R. E. v. Rogers
Britton v. Lorenz
Broad Street Hotel Co. v. Weaver's
Adm. 21"
Brobston v. Cahill 1229=2, 122986
Brock V. Com. 470', 47015
V. Milligan 910", 91012
BroUey v. Lapham 978="
Bromage v. Rice
122968
Bronner v. Loomis
12296'
Brooke v. Jordan
358'", 358"
Brooks V. Acton
39130
V. Clay
4274
Broschart v. Tuttle
5549, 554"
Broughton v. Null
80818
Brown v. Burrus
97858
ji. Com.
4707, 470"
V. Deacon
80828
V. Edson
117931
V. Foster
36515
V. Griffith
117948
V. Lazarus
4278
V. Luehrs
25745
V. Mitchell
117910
V. Mooers
2573', 97854
V. Morgan
80824
V. Payson
6225
V. People
391*7
V. Piper 2136, 2139_ 21*0, 39138
V. Prude
39129
V. Sheppard
39132
V. State 4701", 588i, 588*, 588«,
91021, 97818
97834, 97835
V. Williams
46318
V. Wood 35819, 6221,
97828, 978-'^
12292*
V. Wright
52", 5213
Browne v. Phila. Bank
215
Browning v. Gosnell
37846, 122947
Broyles v. State
5545
Brubaker v. Taylor 978^1
97848, 97861
Bruce y. Priest
25727
Brundred v. Del. Hoyo
11794
Bruson v. Clark
2121, 2134
Bryan v. Beckley
2137
V. Forsyth
11794
V. Wear
117938
Bryce Lorillard v. Ins. Co.
80824
Bubster v. State
58818
Buchanan v. Moore
4124
Buckingham v. Roar
6222, 91019
Buckley v. Buckley
9783*
Buckmaster v. Kelley ,
622"
Buddee v. Spangler
5542
Buell V. State
2123
V. Warner
2114
Buford V. Bostick
11795
V. Tucker
2130
Bulger V. Eoss
35822, 39139
Bull V. Com.
47014
V. Loveland
1229*
BuUard v. Lambert
978*6
V. Pearsall 9782'
97828, 97831
BuUinger v. People
978", 978i»
Bulman v. Andrews
62214
Bunnell v. Butler
2576*
Burbank v. Dennis
9782
Burch V. Harrell
35822
Burdick v. Hunt
62228
Burgess u. Burgess
122929
Burgin v. Chenault 18318, 122921. 12292*
Burk V. Andis
97818
Burke v. Delaney
80827
AMEEICAI>r TABLE OP CASES.
References are to pages.
CCXXl
Burke v. Miller
V. Miltenberger 2130
V. Ray 8081°, gosu
Burleson v. Collins 1179*8
V. Goodman 46321, 46322^ 4632*, 5543
Burlev v. German-Am. Bank 4632'
Burlington, &c. Ey. Co. v. Dey 21'6
Burnett v. Henderson 2120
V. Simpkins
■ ». State
V. Thompson
Burnham v. Aver
I'. Webster
Burns v. Fay
V. Kerr
Burr V. Harper
V, Kase
V. Sim
Burrell v. State
Burt V. State
Burtners v. Keran
Burton v. Blin
V. Driggs
V. Morrow
Bush V. Com.
V. Robinson
Bustin V. Rogers
Buswell Trimmer Co. u. Case
Butler V. Collins
V. Com.
V. Smith
V. Watkins
Butrick v. Tilton
Buttriok V. Allen
Butts V. Smartwood
Buzard v. McAnulty
Byass v. Sullivan
Byers v. McMillan
257'
12291*, 122919
12299, 12292', 122928
21"
463*
554»
122929
3582*
1833*, 18336
25737, 978M
391*', 391*8
80821
27612
358", 1179**
808'
9101*
- 808*
4635
257*5
257"
58821
8082'
2671'
42711
11791*
91013
5541*
12295
80816
■ V. Wallace
Byrd «. Campbell
4272, 4278, 4279, 11795,
11795
80825
Cabiness v. Holland 554'
Cabot V. Given 358"
Cadden v. Am. Steel Barge Co. 391*3
Cady V. State 58821
V. Walker 6225
Caha V. U. S. 213
Cain V. State 212i, 588', 5881'', 5832*, 58827
Caldwell v. Davis
V. Melvedt
V. Richmond R. R,
Calhoun v. Richardson
n. Ross
Calkins i\ State
Call V. Dunning
Cameron v. Blackraan
V. Peck
Camp V. Simmons
V. State
Campbell v. Bannister
V. Dearborn
V. State
6228
6221"
2112
8081", 80821
117915
3653
122912
215
36815
8085
25739, 257*'
26738, 25738
80819
365", 4702, 470', 470"
47013, 5888, 91022, 91026
Campbell v. Woodstock Iron Co.
Canfield v. Thompson
Cantey v. Piatt
Cantitfe v. Septor
Card V. State
Carder v. Primm
Cargill V. Atwood
Carman v. Dunham
Carmon v. State
Carnes v. Piatt
Carpenter v. Dame
V. Dexter
V. Wall
V. Willey
Carr v. GriflSn
V. Miner
V. Moore
V. State
Carrico v. W. Va. &e. R. R.
Carrington v. Holabird
Carroll v. Norwood
V. State
Carskadden v. Poorman
Carson v. Smith
Carter v. Seals
V. Com.
V. Doe
B. Jackson
122935
1179*3
122959
122919
25716
97823, 978*8
463*
4635
2138
62211
35816
218, 2116
978*9
18328, 9783*
5542
3589
97853
3913
3656
910"
12292*
978*2
4271*
211
3916, 391*5
25732
122921, 122923, 12292*
1229**
V. State 9106 9106, giot, 9IO22, 9102*,
97853
V. Tinicum Fishing Co. 183*8, 4278
Cartier v. Troy Lumber Co. 1832'
Carville v. Westford 978*8
Gary v. State 21"
Casat V. State 391*i
Case V. Case 183*", 8O821
V. Mayor of Mobile 21i6
V. McGee 117920, 11792'
V. Perew 2128, 2129
V. Phoenix Bridge Co. 808", 8O8I'
Cassidy v. McFarland 21*"
Castello V. Castello 622i
Castle V. Belard 257", 257"
Castner v. Sliker 3913
Gates V. Kellogg 554"
Catlett V. Pacific Ins. Co. 1179'
Caujolle V. Ferrie 18382, 4272, 42712
Caulfleld v. Hermann 808"
Cavender v. Guild 52"
Cawthorn v. Haynes 391*"
Cayuga, The 8O811
Central, &c. Co. v. Gamble 2121
Central Land Co. &c. o. Calhoun 2123
Central R. R. v. AUmon 978*6
Chadron v. Glover 365ii
Chaffe V. Mackenzie 554'
Chaffee v. Taylor 122935
Chaffee & Co. o. U. S. 46328, 46330, 46331,
46332, 4683*
Chahoon v. Com, 622'
Chamberlain v. Bradley 1179*', 1179*8
V. Cliamberlain 4271, 427', 427", 42712
V. Enfield 257*2
V. Sands 9782'
V. Smith 808'
ccxxu
AMERICAN TABLE OP CASES.
References are to pages.
25736, 2673'
8084, 117936
1179«
Chamberlain v. Torrence
Chamberlin v. Ball
Chambers v. Jones
Chambless v. State
Champion v. Munday
Chandler v. Le Barron 1229« 122966
V. Von Roeder 52', 628
Chanoine v. Fowler 21''
Chapin v. Dobson 808', 808is, 80816, 80822,
9786
S91S7
1229*, 1229'
80813
5212
4276, 42712, 42713
2673', 978M
8081"
V. Xapham
0. Marlborough
Chaplain v. Briscoe
Chaplin v. Baker
Chapman v. Brewer
V. Chapman
V. Cooley
V. Sutton
Charlotte v. Chouteau 529, 5210, 521*, 52i6
Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Gisborn 8085
Chase v. Lowell 3916
Chattanooga R, R. Co. 0. Clowdis 391*3
Cheatham v. State 635*, 6358
V. Young 11791*
Cheeny v. Arnold 97826
Cheever v. Brown 46322
V. Congdon 39130
V. Wilson 21"
Cheney v. Cheney 5546
Cherokee Packet Co. v. Hilson 9786*
Cherry v. Baker 2122
Chesapeake Bank v. Swain 212'
Chesapeake Ohio Canal Co. v. B. & 0.
Ry. Co. 213, 2110, 2120
Chester v. Wilhelm 97829
Chew V. Farmers' Bank , 622*, 622"
Chicago Lumbering Co. v. Hewitt 463i'
Chicago, &c. R. E. v. Artery 978*', 978**
V. Becker 3912*
V. Champion 2128, 2136
V. Coal & Iron Co. 9783*
V. Ellis
V. GrilEth
Chick V. Sisson
Child V. Kingsbury
Childs V. Merrill
Chirac v. Reinicker
Chisholm v. Sheldon
Choisser v. People
Christian v. Columbus, &c. R. R.
Christmas v. Russell
Chumasero v. Gilbert
6221
97868
3912
4128, 4129
18823, 6228, 6221'
622*, 62210, 62216
122920
18331
978*'
117919
529
Church V. Hubbart 216, 11792^ 11799^ 117915
Church in Brattle Square v. BuUard 183*8
Churchill v. FuUiam 5546
Churchman «. Smith 46323
Cicero v. State 588*
Cincinnati, &c. R. R. v. Clifford 21i*
V. Grames 212*
City Bank of Macon r. Kent 8O811
City Council of Montgomery W.Mont-
gomery, &c. Plankroad 213*
City of Alleghany v. Nelson 21'*
City of McPherson v. Nichols 21"
City of St. Louis v. Roche 21i6
21", 2116
5216
8081
2766
5547
97829
6366
97832
365*
62221
122933
6548
80820
80815
2762, 2768, 27610, 412"
1831', 12292*
1179*6
City of Winona v. Burke
Clanton v. Barnes
Clapp V. Banking Co.
V. Ellington
V. Foster
V. Peck
V. State
Clark V. Bond
V. Bradstreet
V. Field
y. Freeman
V. Grand Trunk
V. Haney
V. Hayward
V. Hills
V. Owens
V. Perdue
„. Sanderson 122920
V. State 470*
Clarke v. Bank 117913
V. Canfield 18336
V. Courtney 4282
V. Kelsey 8088
V. Magruder 46331
Clator V. Otto 8082
Clegg K.-Levy 1179'«
Cleland v. Applegate 46322
Clem V. State 1836
Clemens v. Conrad 97889, 97340
Clement v. Cureton 2i
z.. Packer 4122,412*
Clements v. Hunt 427*
V. Kyles 4125, 4126, 41210
V. McGinn 9108
V. Moore 2762, 276"
Clemons v. State 58821
Cleveland v. Burnham 80826
Cleveland, &c. R. R. v. Brown 39180
V. Mara 39126
!'. Perkins
V. Wynant
Cliquot's Champagne
Coale V. Hannibal, &c. R. R.
Coan V. Flagg
Coapstick v. Bosworth
Coates V. Sulau
Cobb V. Boston
Cobleigh v. McBride
V. Young
Coder v. Stotts
Codman v. Caldwell
Cody V. Conly
Coffin V. Bucknam
V. Grand Rapids, &c,
r. Vincent
Coffman v. Niagara, &o. Ins. Co. 36818
Cogswell V. Dolliver 463', 46322
2]S6
39161
25725
11793
257*6, 267*8
9781, 9782, 9781°
39129
18881, 18346
4636
122982, 122936
4625
Co. 27612
9788
Cohen v. Cohen
Coit V. Millikin
Coker v. Hayes
V. Scheiffer
Colburn !'. Groton
Cole V. Cole
V. Com.
V. Dial
257*
212, 11792
62228, 97865
9785*
5548, 55410, 5881, 68810
66410, 6228
257*
4632, 4636
AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES.
Beferences are to pages.
cexxiii
Cole V. Fall Brook Coal Co. 365', 3659
Com. V. Dowing
117937
V. Hadley
80824
V. Eastman
1229**, 1229*7, 1229*9
808'
V. Eddy
2766, 27613
u. Lake Shore, &o. R. R. 18327, 978«
V. Emery
35812
V. State
4701°
V. Fenno
218*
Colegrove v. N. Y.
'&c. E. R. 528
V. Ferrlgan
25711, 25712
Coleman v. Com.
52', 91021, 91025
2183
V. Frazier
452', 4529, 45210
V. Flood
588W
257"
V. FoUansbee
97813
V. Soutliwick
89129
V. Ford
9786, 9788, 978W
V. State
978«, 122912, 1229"
V. Funai
5545
Coleman's Case
9103, 910*
V. Galligan
97839
CoUagan v. Burns
3918, 3918
V. Gay
5541
CoUette V. Weed
80815
V. Goodnow
97853
Collier v. Coggins
554'
V. Gray
526
V. Simpson
I229M
v. Griffin
6223
V. State
4705
V. Hackett
3911", 39119, 391*2
Collins V. Corson
80820
V. Hall
25711
V. N. Y. Central, &c. R. R. 2572"
V. Haney
4705, 4709
V. Robinson
622'
V. Hanlon
58812
V. Stanfield
80828
V. Hardy
25729
V. Waters
.39186
V. Hawkins
978*8
Collins Bros. Drug Co. v. Graddy 46318
V. Hay den
1179**, U79*9
Colquitt V. State
3918
V. Heath
27614
Colton, &c. Co. V. Swartz SOS^
V. Hill
2183
Columbia Planing Mill Co. v. Ins. Co. 554'
V. Holmes
2578, 6355
Columbia, &c. R. R
. V. Hawthorne 528
V. Hourigan
978*5
Columbus Omnibus Co. v. Semmes 218*
V. Howe
58812
Combs V. Com.
35812
);. Hudson
9782'
978«, 97852, 97853
V. Hutchinson
910*, 9106
Comer v. State
910'
V. Jackson
25716
Commercial Bank
V. Dunham 12292
V. James
58823, 97825
Commissioners v. Leggett 3913*, 39138
V. Jeffries
18353
V. Verbarg
554'
V. Jefes
97819
Com. V. Abbott
257^
V. Johnson
257*, 58825
V. Anthes
521, 523
V. Keith
91021
V. Bean
978*5
25735
V. Billings
97882
5885
V. Blood
183**, 85822
V. King
2134
97889
V. Kipling
635*
58828
V. Knapp
58811, 58821
V. Bosworth
635*, 6355, 635'
V. Kneeland
2125
V. Bradford
5883
V. Lawler
25753, 2575*
V. Brown
588*, 5885, 978", 97822
V. Lynes 526, 527, 9106_ 9107, 9108,
V. Burke
91012
91022
V. Campbell
257*, 5882
V. Marzynski
2125, 2137
V. Carey
47018, 9106, 9107, 9108
V. Matthews
4709, 47017, 47041
4705
V. McGorty
18329
452'
■ V. McGrath
18339
97831
V. McKie
2766
>j. Chase
6855, 117949, 117950
521
V. Choate
2182, 25720, 276'
V. Merriam
2576'
V. Churchill
257*'
V. Minor
2761*
V. Clark
5883, 1229*8
V. Morgan
97837
V. Cleary
622*
V. Morrell
97833
V. Coe 525, 2579, 1229", 1229*5, |
V. M'Pike
39119, 39119, 391*2
1229*8
V. MuUins
527
V. Cooper
47012, 47013
V. Murphy
257*7, 91020
V. Corkin
2578, 25729
V. Myers
5881*. 58815, 58817
V. Coy
58815
V. Nagle
25732
V. Cuffee
5885, 58815, 58819
V. Nefus
122928, 122929, 12294*
V. Culver
526, 58826, 58827, 588-28
V. Nott
5881*
V. Curtis
978*0
V. O'Brien
25729
r. Dam
2183
V. Peckham
2138
V. Desmond
2120
V. Phillips
117935
CCXXIV
Com. V. Pollard
V. Pope
V. Porter
V. Reynolds
V. Roberts
V. Robinson
V. Russell
V. Ryan
V. Samuel
V. Sanborn
V. Seott
V. Sego
i: Shepherd
V. Silcox
V. Smith
AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES.
References are to pages.
6351
368*
621
5883
391", 47010, 47012, 47015,
47018
527, 2571", 25716, 25720
25742
2763
688S
25720, 36616
5881^ 5882'
62226
4709
58815, 58817, 58826, 91012,
978«
391S2
97830, 97840
18337, 470^, 47010, 9781s
2766
588«, 5885
■' V. Sturtivant
V. Sullivan
V. Thompson
V. Towle
V. Trefethen
V. Vose
c. Webster 2573", 36513, 30520, 122935
i: Welch 358*
V. Welsh 9782'
V. Wentz 62226
II. Wheeler 2121
V. White 25710
V. Whittaker 18323
V. Williams 526
Commissioners v. May 21-'2
Comparet v. Jernegan 117912
Comstock V. Hadlyme Ecclesiastical
Society 276', 276", 391*o
V. Smith 218*, 978"
V. State 39130
Condit V. Blackwell 529
Confederation Life Ass'n of Canada
V. O'Donnell 4525
Congar ;;. Chicago, &c. R R. 97833, 97334
Congdon v. Howe Scale Co.
Conkey v. People
Connell v. Vanderwerken
Conner v. State
Conn. V. Mead
V. Penn.
Conn. &c. Ins. Co. v. Schwenk
358*
25736, 257*2
808"
2122
62223
4126
46328
V. Smith
Conrad v. Griffey
Consaul v. Sheldon
Consequa v. Willings
Conway v. State
18327
978*9
35823, 97852, 97865
117910
5545, 97831
Conwell V. Springfield, &c. R. R. 8O822
Conyers v. State 2763
Cook V. Ashmead 40315
V. Brown 978*8
V. First Nat. Bank 12295*
V. Grange 6222
V. State 58812, 07816, 97816, 978I8,
97824
V. Union R. R. Co. 523
V. Wood 1179'*
Cooke V. Wondrow 122910, 122918
Coon V. People
Coon V. Swan
Coonrod v. Madden
Cooper V. Dedrick
V. Morrell
V. State
Copes V. Pearce
Cornelius v. Com.
Cornett v. Williams
Cornwall v. State
Corse V. Peck
Corsen v. Dubois
Corser v. Paul
Cortland Mfg. Co. v.
Costelo V. Crowell
6225
46312
9781, 97810
4271
97852
35813, 11794a
58812
8082, 8083
1229*
554*, 5545, 554', 5541*
Piatt 97810
2573, 4632', 1229**,
1229*9
808"
Couch V, Woodruff
Coulter V. Am. &c. Ex. Co. 9782', 97830
Count Joannes v. Bennett 35820
Countryman v. Bunker 46315, 45321
County of Johnson v. Wood 808'
Coveney v. Tannahill 6228
Covert V. Hertzog 427io
Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shep-
herd
Cowan V, Abbott
V. Sapp
Cowden v. Reynolds
Cowley V. People
Cox V. Eayres
V. Jones
V. Morrow
V. People
7). Peterson
V. Rust
V. State
Cozzens v. Higgins
Crafts V. Com.
Craig V. Brown
V. Proctor
V. State
Cramer v. Burlington
21", 18319
80811
80810
9782'
2185
97826, 97826, 9782'
117922
218, 219, 529, 5210, 6212
58816
80811
1179*8
3911, 3912, 3918^ 39144,
41210
2135
6356, 8351, 97850
117912, 117923
2766
257*6, 25752, 39115
62226
8082
18321
4271, 42710
1179*3
18336
122966
46338
6226, 62211, 12295
6222
Crane v. Elizabeth Library Ass'n
V. Lessee of Morris
Craufurd v. Blackburn
Crawford v. Branch Bank
V. Elliott
Cresswell «. Jackson
Creswell v. Slack
Crosby v. Berger
Crose V. Rutlsdge
Crosman v. Euller
Cross V. Bell
V. Cross
V. Riggins
Crouch V. Eveletli
Crouse i'. Holman
Crow V. Watkins
Crowe V. Colbeth
Crowninshield v. Crowninshield
Crozer v. New Chester Water Co.
Crump V. Com.
Crusen i-. State
18326
6222S
6225, 62212
39181
183S2
5541
2768,
2761*
3586,
8586
4701
6362
AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES.
Keferences are to pages.
Crutcher v. Muir 808ii*
Crystal Ice Mfg. Co. v. San Antonio
Ass'n 978»
Cuddy V. Brown 4271, 4272, 427'
Cudney v. Cudney 391*''
Cullmans v. Lindsay 80822
Culver V. Marks 463^ 4633*
V. Scott, &o. Lumber Co. 978^
Cumberland, &c. Ins. Co. v. Giltinan 358",
368'^2
Cumberland, &c. R. R. Co. v. Mau-
gans 52*
Cummings v. Nichols 46313
V. Stone 213*
Cunliffe v. Sefton 122912, 122919
Cunningliam y. State 257«, 257«
Curren v. Crawford 4631, 4632'
Currie v. Stairs 427^
Currier v. Gale ISS^i, 452^, 4529
Curry v. Raymond 1179''3
Curtis V. Aaronson 4122, ^i2S
V. State 257'
«. Strong 91011,91012
Curtiss V. State 910*
Cushing V. Nantasket Beach R. R. 1179'
V. Rice 80821
Custeau v. St. Louis, &c. Co. 808^
Cutter V. Carutliers 2122
V. State 1838
Cuvillier v. Browne 554i*
Cuyler v. Ferrill 213°
Dabnet v. Mitchell
91016
Dade v. jEtna Ins. Co.
35818
Daggett V. Shaw
4123, 4127
V. Willey
41211
Daily V. N. Y. &c. R. R.
4703
V. State
2127
Dakota v. O'Hare 122931, 1229=2, 122953
Danforth v. Tenn., &c. B. R. 358^
Daniels v, Woonsocket
Danville, &c. Plank-Road
State
Darby v. Roberts
Darling v. Hitchcock
Darrovv v. Pierce
Davenport v. Cummings
V. McKee
554', 5549
Co. V.
21"
18327, 654'
219
8589
21
9781, 9782, 9781"
V. Ogg 9781', 97818, 97822, 97821
Davidson v. Arsineau 97831
V. Nicholson 276ii
V. Peticolas 2122
V. State 9105, 910T 91022
V. Young 80829
Davie v. Briggs ISS*!
Davis V. Alston 1229', 122913
V. Bank of Fulton 21i8
V. Best 2119
V. Byrd 97813
V. Canada Farmers' Mut. Ins.
Co. 910", 91018
i;. Cook 97823
V. Crookston, &c. Co. 8O828
V. Dunham 12292
Davis V, Franke
V. Fredericks
V. Hopkins
V. McEnaney
V. McSherry
V. Pearson
V. Rhodes
V. Roby
V. Sanford
V. Sigourney
. State
CCXXV
25739, 257*3
122952
80819
2123
Dawson v. Dawson
V. Mayall
Day V. Cooley
V. De Cousse
V. Moore
V. Stickney
Deacon v. Sclireve
Dean v. Stone
De Arman v. State
De Baker v. So. Cal
Dreary v. Poirier
De Celis v. U. S.
De Haven v. De Haven
122922, 122924
117932, 1179*3
97852
46.3*. 4635, 463', 46318
35823
35822, 39132, 97829, 97345
2122
4271
97831
2140
117933, 117940
97852
62224
117928
257*0
R. R. 2134
978*3
2131
4271, 4273, 42711,
42712, 97823, 97836
De' Jarnette v. McDaniel 18350
Delafield v. Hand 215, 117916
Delano v. Jopling 21'
De la Rosa v. State 21i8
De Lavalette v. Wendt 80826
Delaware, &e. R. R. v. Converse 523
Demerritt v. Randall 3652, 3653
Demoney v. Walker 39129
Dempsey v. Kipp 8O8I
Den V. M'AUister 35818
Denmark, Griswold v. Pitcairn 212
Dennett v. Dow 9782', 97332
Denning v. Roome 11791*
Dennis v. Weekes 391*o
Dennison v. Miner 5541*
Denton v. Peters 80826
V. State 39135
Denver, &c. R. R. v. Wilson 5542, 97810
Denver Tramway Co. v. Owens 62215
Derk v. Northern Central B. R. 97838
Deshon v. Merchants' Ins. Co. 97825
Des Moines Savings Bank u. Col-
fax Hotel Co.
Despau v. Swindler
Detroit, &c. R. B.
burg
Deuser v. Hamilton
Devine v. Burleson
Devlin v. Crocker
Devoto V. Com.
Dewees v. Colorado Co.
DeWolf V. Strader
5544
2124
V. Van Stein-
52*, 97833
62211
2122
97854
25710
2118
6226
Diamond v. Northern, &c. R. B. 25724
Dicken v. Winters 46313, 49324
Dickerson v. State 6882, 58815
Dickinson v. Glenney 80825
Dickson ;•. Waldron 9102*
Diehl V. Bodgers 910=1
Dietrich v. Mitchell 6223
Diggins' Estate, In re 122923
CCXXVl
AMERICAN TABLE OE CASES.
References are to pages.
Dillard v. Scruggs 3916
Dillingham v. Snow 4121"
Dillon V. Howe 35812
V. Mattox 1179"
Dimick v. Downs 257"
Dinckler v. Baer 808='
Disraukes v. State 391'
Ditch V. Vollhardt 808M
Division of Howard Co. 21^
Dixon V. NiecoUs 2129
y. State 4709, 47012
Dixon-Woods Co. v. Phillips Glass
Co. 8082
Dobbins v. Blanchard 808*
■ Dobson V. Cothran 97846
Doctor Leyfield's Case 358'
Dodge V. Kiene
V. State
Doe V. Benyon
V, Blackman
V. Eslava
V. Eord
V. Newton
808"
6352
122922
2120
219
39180
122958, 12298", 122961,
122963, 122966
V. Reagan 978*9
V. Suckermore 122961
!i. Wilson 122967
Doe d. Arnold v. Auldjo 4276, 427"
Doe d. Dunlap v. Servos 427*
Doe d. Hagerman v. Strong 18386
Doe d. Maclem v. TurnbuU 122922
Doe d. Perry v. Newton 1229*8
Doherty v. Hill 8086
Dole V. Wilson . 218
Doles V. State 39123
Dolph V. Barney 21*
Donahoo v. Scott 978«
Donkle u. Kohn 9101*
Donnelly v. State 391«, 470" 47016, 9788*,
97836
Doolin V. Com.
Doon V. Donaher
V. Ravey
Dorr V. Tremont Bank
Dorsey v. Clapp
Doty V. Smith
Doud w. Reid
Dougherty v. McManus
Douglas V. Leighton
Douglass V. Hart
V. Mitchell
Douthitt V. Stinson
Dow V. Tuttle
Dowd V. Watson
Dowlen V. State
Downer v. Rowell
Dowtain v. Connellee
Doyle V. Village of Bradford
470"
12291
55412
2761*
25738
46312
122968
391*
9786
46319
18321
2132
808*
1833*
39188
97811, 97812
39129
211*, 2120
Drake v. Glover 52i6
V. State 36520, 39ii3_ 4706
Draper v. Draper 9106, 9106, 910'
V. Inhabitants of Hatfield 554',
554"i, 55411
Drew V. Sutton 39136
Driscoll V. People 391'
Drohn v. Brewer
Drunimond v. Hopper
Drumright v. State
Dubois V. Baker
V. Fanteaux
Ducker v. Whitson
Duck wall V. Weaver
Ducoign V. Shreppel
Dudley v. Grayson
V. McCluer
V. Sumner
Duffy !i. People
Duke of Cumberland v. Graves
97885
1832*
588*
3658, 122986
2111
97826
122915
4635
1179*1
25728
122919
521, 58821, 58828
97830,
Dumas v. State
Dunbar v. Marden
V. U. S.
Duncan v. Beard
V. Freeman
Dunham v. Riley
Dunlap V. Dauglierty
V. Waldo
Dunn V. Altman
18388,
183'*
47010, 47015
I22916, 122918
35818
18318, 122920, 122921,
122922, 12292*
II798S
12298
117932
117928
978*3
V. State 365^ 391*', 391*8, 4709, 5889
Dunnell v. Sowden 1229"'2
Du Pont V. Davis 427*
Dupoyster v. Gagani 4276, 42713
Duree v. Brown
2122
Duren v.. Houston, &c.
R. Co
219
Durfee v, Abbott
46328
Durgin n. Danville
18328
Durkee v. Leland
12296
V. Vt. Central R.
R.
35816
Durkheimer v. Heilne
r
46311
Durkin «. Cobleigh
80815, 80824
Durr V. Chase
8085
Dutillet V. Blanchard
1179*
Dutton V. Woodman
9785*
Dwelling, &c. Ins. Co
f. Shaner 8082
Dwelly V. Dwelly
910", 91019
Dyer v. Fredericks
3582*
V. Last
21-28
V. Morris
97820
Eagan v. State
2188
Eagle V. Emmet
18335, 18386
Eames v. Eames
18382
Earl V. Tupper
.39186
Earle v. Earle
3918*
V. Rice
8082'
Early v. Com.
58816, 58818
Eason v. Chapman
257*^ 25760
East Brandywine, &c. R. R. v.
Ranck 5542
Easterday v. Kilhorn
91012, 9101'
East Line, &c. R. R. u.
Scott
25786, 257*8
Eastman v. Martin
4278, 4279
t'. Moulton
4638
V. Railway Co".
5541*
V. Roland
80828
V. Shaw
80826
East Tennessee, &c. R
R. V.
Maloy 4708
V. Stewart
2762
Eastwood V. People
36518
Eaton V. Hall
1179**
AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES.
Befereuces are to pagee.
CCXXVU
Eaton V. Jervis
V. Talmadge
Ebersole v. Kankin
Eboru r. Zimpelman
Eby V. Winters
Eckel V. Eukel
1229^5
4271, 427", 42712
622fi
3582^, 1229", 1229°5
1179«
I8.327
Ecker v. First Nat. Bank of Windsor 2129
Eckerly v. Alcorn 18350
Eckford 0. Berry SOS^
Ector V. Welsli 5543
Eddy V. Gray 3655
Edelen v. Gough 1229", 1229-^8
Edes V. Board man
623
Edwards v. Common Council
365S
1'. Jones
1179^3
V. Ottawa K. Nav. Co.
25728
V. San Jose, &c. Co.
2133
V. Warner
25718
Eel River Draining Ass'n v
Topp
21"
Eiile, Estate of
2762
Ehrisman v. Scott
978
, 97812
Eiland v. State
5888
Bilert v. Green Bay, &o. R.
R.
627
Eisenlord v. Cluni
427
, 42711
Eldridge v. Knott
183«
V. State
2677
Elkins V. McKean
3919
Ellicott V. Pearl
4123, 978-27
Elliott V. Dycke
43629
V. Peirsol
4271
, 42713
V. Van Buren 3583, 3538, 39135
Ellis V. Huff
117944
V. Park
2126
2119
V. Smith
122913
V. State
526
Ellis's Estate, In re
117920
EUmaker v. Buckley
97851
, 97835
8083
EUmore v. Mills
117911
Ellswortii V. Potter
978"
Elmer v. Fessenden
341*2
Elmondorffu. Carmichael
122925
Elofrson v. Lindsay
80825
Elsenrath v. Kallraeyer
122961
Elwell V. Mersick
358"
V. Walker
35824
Elwood V. Flannigan
2115, 2117
Emery v. Berry
117912
V. Twombly
I22916,
I22918
Emmett v. Penoyer
808', 8087
Emmons v. Hayward
27614
Empire Mfg. Co. v. Stuart
122935
Empire State Phospiiate Co. v. Heller 8083
Endaily- v. State 25715
.Enders v. McDonald 2139
Enfield v. Ellington 11796, 1179*2
English V. Sprague ' 117938
Ennis v. Smith 529, 5214^ 35812, 11798,
11791"
Enslow V. Mitchell 122926
Enterprise Soap Works v. Sayers 522
Ephland v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. 978*2
Equitable, &c. Ass'n v. McCluskey 39122,
39128
Erickson v. Brookings Co.
V. R. R. Co.
Erie R. R. 0. Heath
Erissman v. Erissman
Eskridge 0. Cinciunat:
V, State
Estell V. State
Estrella, Tlie
Ethier v. Homier
Etna V. Brewer
Ettinger v. Com.
Eureka Springs R'y v. Timmons
Evans v. Browne
V. Evans
V. Hettich
V. Koons
V. Montgomery
V. State
Evansich v. R. R.
Evanston v. Gunn
Evarts v. Middlebury
Ewing V. Bailey
V. Sandoval, &c. Co.
V. Smith
808"
622*
12293
97813, 97823
&c. R. R. 2572
58812
39125
1179"
62219, 622"
391*
5545
52"
218
91019
91026
2572
554*
47019, 6355, 6356
25736, 97837
11791
3663
91012, 91013, 91014
80825
80821
Fabtan v. Russell
Faires v. Cockrill
Fairly v. Fairly
Falke v. Fassett
Fancher v. De Montegre
Farmers' Bank v. Whitehill
Farrar v. Bates
Farrow v. Nashville, &c. R. R.
Farwell v. Tyler
Fash V. Blake
Faucet v. Nichols
Faulkner v. Rondoni
Fauntleroy v. Hannibal
Faxon v. HoUis
Fay V. Gray
V. Harlan
V. Miville
Featherman v. Miller
Fee V. Taylor
Feemster v. Ringo
Fell V. Young
Felsenthal v. State
Felt V. Amidon
Feltz V. Walker
Fenno v. Weston
Fenton v. Miller
i: State
Ferdinand v. State
Ferguson v. Harwood
2122
80822
183", 97829, 97829,
122921, 122922, 12292*
2118
46325
2128
1179*8
218*
122933
2577
978**
2112
46312, 463", 46316
8082
39136
212*
3585
122953
2127
183", 122923
25729
3919
80821
554*
1179*7
2136
2130
117923, 117926,
117933
6227
V. McBean
V. Rafferty
Feron v. Donelly 11791
Field V. Boynton 4521
Fields V. State 2121
Fife V. Com. 2766, 2767, 588", 5882°, 58826
Fifield V. Richardson 3912
File V. Springel 35821
Finch V. Alston 1832*
CCXXVUl
AMEEICAN TABLE OP CASES.
References are to pages.
Finch V. Barclay
978
,978*
Fowler v. Simpson
4271
Finnegan v. ])ugan
3654
80811
Fire Asso'n v. Wicltliam
808"
Fowles V. Allen
5547, 65413
Fire Ins. Co. v. Wickhani
8086
8082a
Fox V. Com.
2119
First Kat. Bank v. Aslimead
80819
V. Peninsular, &c. Works 39182
V. Dunn
8081
V. Eeil 12296. 12297. 122912
V. First Nat. B'k of Williams-
Fralick v. Presley
87837
port
0781, 9782
Framiiigham Mfg. Co. v
. Barnard 4528
V. Huber
4639
Franklin v. Franklin
2572. 97845
V. Kingsley
2129
Franklin Bank v. Steam Nav. Co. ' 9784»
V. Post
80828
Fraser v. Fraser
9787, 978»
Fischer Leaf Co. «. Whipple
3916
V. State
5882
Fisher u. Conway
25752
6228
V. Mayor
46326
Frazier v. Pennsylvania
R. R. 25736, 25741
' V. UUman
11796
V. State
97862
Fitch V. Chapman
4525
Frear v. Drinker
910"
Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, &c.
Con-
Freeh v. Phil. &c. R. K.
276"
struction Co.
5212
Fredrick v. State
58824
Fitzgibbon v. Brown
25734
Free v. Buckingham
97842
Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick
97811)
, 97811
Freeman v. Bass
8088
Flagg V. Mason
4127, 4129
V. Brewster
6226
Flanagin v. State
910*
, 91022
18345
Flanders v. Merritt
18331
Freeny v. Freeny
9105
Flanigin v. Washington Ins. Co.
2]8
Fremont Butter, &c. Co
. V. Peters 9784*
Flattery v. Flattery
6354
Fremoult v. Dedin
11799
Fleming v. Springfield
39137
French v. Ryan
25719
. V. Yost
46311
!.-. Sale
25739, 25748
Fletcher v. Boston & Maine R. E.
978*6
V. White
25717
V. Fitchburg R. R.
524
V. Wilkinson
3657
V. Fuller
18844
Frcse v. State
2138
V. Perry
1229'
Frick V. Barbour
18327
V. State
5881
Friend v. Hamill
25712
Flower v. Balto. &c. R. R.
365"
V. Miller
117919, 117922
Flowers v. Fletcher
122932
18328
Floyd y. Tewksbury
4282
Friendly v. Lee
9789
Floyd's Heirs v. Johnson
2129
Frink & Co. v. Coe
8919, 39184
Flynn v. Coffee
18337
Fritz V. Burriss
0781
Folks V. Burnett
391«
, 39143
Frome.t). Dennis
3916
Follain v. Lefevre
2124
Frost !>. McCarger
25737, 97864
Follansbee v. Walker
62225
, 91017
Frye v. Barker
4631
Folsom V. Cook
18349
Fudge r. Payne
80826
V. Manchester
62228
Fulfcerson v. Murdock
18329
Fonda v. Burton
8081
Fuller V. Fox
1229*4
Foot V. Bentley
3583
f. Hampton
55410, 55412
Foote V. Cobb
122916
V. Linzee
18342
Porbush V. Goodwin
8081
Fulton V. Central Bank of Pittsburg 97838,
Force v, Martin
97831
97835
Ford ji. Cunningham
35813
Fulton Bank v. Stafford
97887
V. Ford
257«
25761'
Funderburg v. State
2576
v. State
97839
Funk V. Babbitt
97826
Fordyce v. McCants
39124
V. Ely
46324
Forgey v. First Nat'l Bank
122948
Furbush v. Goodwin
80810
Forrester v. State
39129
Furguson v, Wright
18331
Forsyth v. Charlebois
6224
Furhman v. Mayor, &c.
of Huntsville 21"
Foscue V. Lyon
2130
Foster, In re
97831
G., C, & S. F. R't Co.
V. Jones 8086
V. Cleveland, &c. R. R.
35821
Gady u. State
2127
V. Collner
122968
Gaffney v. People
97848
V. Hall
6226, 6229
Gage V. Campbell
35819
V. Neilson
214
I'. Lewis
80821
V. Newbrough
8081°
Gaines u. Green Pond
Iron Mining
Fongue v. Burgess
39129
Co.
427"
Fournel v. Duvert
122948
V. New Orleans
4273
Fonts V. State
58814
V. Relf
39141
Fowler v. Mtna. Fire Ins. Co.
25727
V. Scott
122912
AMERICAN TABLE OP CASES.
CCXXIX
References are to pages.
Gallagher v. Market St. K. R.
V. State
Galle V. Tode
Galveston, &c. R. R. v. Arispe
^ — V. Johnson
Galvin v. Palmer
Gammage v. Moore
Ganahl v. Shore
Gandolfo v. State
Gannon t'. People
Ganton v. Size
Garden City Sand Co. v. Miller
Gardere v. Columbian Ins. Co,
2112
62218
39183
2134
1179'
808«
4638
257'9, 257", 25748
6223
452*
1179^1
117916
Gardiner v. People
Gardner v. Collector
V. Connelly
V. Crenshaw
V, Eberhart
'- V. Erieze
V. Kellogg
■ V. Lewis
Garneau v. Port Blakely Mill Co
Garner v. Myriek
Garrard i'. State
Garrella v. Alexander
Garrett v. State
Garrigues v. Harris
Garrison u. Goodale
Garvin v. State
V. Wells
Garwood v. Hastings
Gates V. Johnson Co.
Gaul V. Fleming
Gaunt V. Harlcness
• V. State
SeS-i", 36521
2110
9782", 978-w
2572
2122, 358a3
39133
391*7, 9105
5212
117912
55413
5882», 58822, 58826
122933
25714, 5545
117934
3916
36519, 36520
2114
18334, 18.337
2132
27614
I229S8. 122945, 122947
3654, 365S
Gavit V. SnowliiU 117927
Gay V. Rogers 117935, n794», 117941
Gaynor v. Old Colony B. R. Co. 52'
Gebb V. Howell 80825
Gebhart w. Shindle 910"
Gehr v. Fisher 4277
Geist V. Detroit City Ry. 2133
Gelott V. Goodspeed 1229^
George v. Joy 978i, 978*, 978^, 978^
Georgia, &c. Co. v. Reid 808"
Georgia, &c. R. R. «. Gaines 2140
German Nat. Bank v. Burns 1835°
V. Leonard 4639, 5542
Gerrish v. Sweeter 554^, 554"
Gibbons v. Ellis 80828
V. Wisconsin, &c. R. R. 25725
Gibbs V. Gilead, &c. Society 522
Gibney v. Marchay 5545
Gibson v. Manuf rs' Ins. Co. 52i5
0. Robinson 117929
V. Stevens 215
^ — V. Trowbridge Furniture Co. 122942,
122958
Giddlngs v. Day 183*^
Gilbert v. Campbell 62216
V. Flint, &c. R. R. 2138
— — V. Gooderham 978*5
V. Moline Plow Co. 3588
V. Moline Water Power & Mfg.
Co. 2120
Gilbert v. Porter
46321
Gilchrist v. Beswick
80819
V. Brooklyn GroCers'
Manuf.
Assoc.
46318
V. Martin
4529
Gilchrist & King v. Martin & West 4527
Giles V. Morrow
18334
6545
Gill V. State
9102», 91024
Gilliam v. State
25746
Gilliland v. Sellers
2122, 2128
Gilman v. Riopelle
11795
Gilmanton v. Ham
3654
Gilmore v. Baker Co.
117936
Gilpin V. Greene
8083
Giipins V. Consequa
8088
Ginnath v. Blankenship
522
Girdlestone v. O'Reilly
218
Gizler v. Witzel
2761
Gladdish v. Godoliaux
80825
Glass V. Bennett
3916
Glasscock v. Hughes
18317, 122924
Gleason v. Kinney
46318
Gleeson v. Wallace
122927, 122942
Glen Brick Co. v. Shackell
35822
Glenn v. Roosevelt 122942, 122955
Glenn's Adm'r v. Express Co. 117928
Giidden v. Dunlap 2*
Globe Works v. Wright 52^
Goddard v. Gardner
Goins V. Moberly
Golden v. Knowles
Goldsmith v. Picard
V. Sawyer
Goldstone v. Davidson
Goltra V. Sanasaok
Gonzales a. Ross
Gooch V. Connor
Goodall V. State
Goode s". Riley
Gooding v. Morgan
Goodman v. James
Goodnow V. Parsons
Goodrich v. Weston
Goodrich's Case
Goodrum v. State
Goodwin v. Appleton
V. Garr
u. Jack
V. State
Goodwin, &c. Co.'s Appeal
Goodwyn v. Goodwyn
Goodyear v. Vosbnrgh
Goodyear Rubber Co. »
Gordon v. Montgomery
V. Parke & Co.
V. Price
V. Searing
V. Tvi^eedy
Gordon's Case
Gorgas v. Hertz
Gorham v. Auerswald
V. Canton
V. Gorham
Gormley «. Day
62214, 62215, 62217
97840
528
25729, 8085
216
117936
80826
2124, 2131
8088
470H 97844
80826
218, 2120^ 2121, 2122
11792s
5541, 55412
35816
117922
6221
2120
18324
4282
6225
117920
122950, 122966
Scott Co. 97856
2118
80814
122937
35819
2136
122952
358"
5547
39142, 39148
22
2112
ccxxx
AMEEICAN TABLE OF CASES.
References are to pages.
Gormley v. Utlie
11795
Goss f. JFromati
622-^5
Gould V. Crawford
gio'", 910^4
II. Ins. Co.
5548
V. MuCarty
1229=i
V. Smith
39131
Gove V. Downer
2129
Governor v. Roberts
358S
Goza V, Browning
12299, 1229*2, i229»o
Grace v. McArtliur
2577
Gragg V. Learned
1179"
Graham v. Anderson
2119, 2124
V. Campbell
36812
V. Chrystal
257*''
V. Nesmith
122945
V. People
6221
V. State
25732
V. Williams
219
Grand Tower, &o. E.
K. V. Walton 8082,
80821
Grand Trunk Ry. Co
V. Richardson 2182
Grangers' Ins. Co. v.
Brown 3913'
Grant v. Coal Co.
6210, 117911, 117933
V. Frost
80812
V. Hill
117946
V. Hughes
808"
V. State
2114, 2121, 97819
Grauley v. Jermyn
35812
Graves v. Battle Creek 365', 365ii
V. Keaton
219
V. People
39122, 4709
Gray v. Davis
117934
V. McLaughlin
39134
V. Pentland
6221', 62219, 12295
Greany v. Long Island R. R. 276'
Great West. Ey. Co. u. Bacon 276^
Green v. Bedell 39146
i;. Benton 11792"
V. Caulk 9784, 9786, 9737, 9738, 9781",
978"
v. Cawthorn
V. Randall
V. State
, Terwilliger
Van Buskirk
■ V.
■ V.
39145
80828
5881", 58819
122942, i229'6
2118
Greenleaf v. Dubuque, &c. R. R. 4279,
42713, 42714
Greenwood v. Fontaine 1179*2, n7943
Greer v. Richardson Drug Co. 35819
Gregg V. Forsyth 1179*
V. Jamison 978**
V. Mallett 18.'.24, 183*6, 183*7
V. State 58818, 68821, 978", 978"
Gregory v. Baugh 2132
!■• Chambers 25723, 25734
V. Thomas 25734
Orellier v. Neale 1229''
Grennan v. McGregor 2125
Gress Lumber Co. v. Goody 8085
Grider v. Clopton 80821
Grierson v. Mason 80826
GriflBn v. Smith 6222
V. State 3914', 39148^ i229«, 1229*8,
122950
Griffith V. Williams 122965, 122966
Griffits V. Ivery
122961,
122966
Grimes v. Eddy
2188
V. Martin
,
978"
V. State
9108
Griswold v. Gallup
218
Grob V. Cusliman
211'
Groome v. Odgen City
8083
Groover v. Coffee
122910
Gross V. Drager
80821
Grover v. Grover
117928
Grumley v. Webb
808"
Gugy V. Maguire
62220
Guidery v. Green
80822, 8082<
,80828
Guilbeau v. Mavs
11796
Gulf, &c. R. R. Co. V. Ellis
1832'
V. Johnson
978*0
w. Jones
8086
V. Nelson
365"
V. Rowland
2573
Gulick !;. Gulick
6225
Gulliver v. Fowler
8088, 80823
Gulzoni V. Tyler
1229*8
Gunning Co. v. Cusack
91010
Gurley v. Park
6220
Guyette v. Bolton
808"
Habertt v. State
5884
Hacker v. Young
1179*1
Hackett v. People
470*
Hadfleld v. Jameson
213
Hadjo V. Gooden
25731, 25753, 9785*
Hadley v. Carter
391*2
Haerle v. Kreihn
91018
Hagenlocher v. Coney Island, &c.
E. R. 39134
Haggin v. Haggin 52'2
Haines v. Hanrahan 5215, 5216
V. Territory 97816, 9782*
Halhert v. Skyles 21"
Hale V. Ard 4636
V. Ross 117912
Hall V. Amer. Masonic, &c. Ass'n 39135
V. Brown 2112, 5549
V. Costello 5215
V. Glidden 4631*, 46315
V. Houghton 97829, 97830
V. Manchester 1179**
!). Phelps 1229'
V. Rixey 6226
V. Vanderpool 1832', 18328
Hall's Deposition 1833'
Haller v. Clark 910*8
Halsell V. Musgrave 80821
Halsey v. Sinsebaugh 9781", 978"
Ham V. Ham 2121
Hamburg v. Wood & Co. 2i
Hamel v. Amyot 257'
Hamil v. England 622'
Hamilton v. Clark 8O8I6
V. Holder 978*5
V. Liverpool, &c. Ins. Co. 52i
V. People
213', 257*8,257*0,
622"
Hammettw. Little Rock, &C.E.R. Co. 21"
Hammil v. State 4700
AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES.
References are to pages.
CCXXXl
Hammond u. Varian 1229^^ 122936
Hammond's Case 1229411
Hammond's Lessee v. Inloes 2iu
Hanawalt v. State 3B55
Hancock v. American, &c. Ins. Co. 183^5
V. Cook 4526
V. Hintiager 463", 463a
Handy v. State 391^1
Hanks v. Rhoads 97833, 97834
Hanley v. Donoghue 219, 2116, 21"
Hanlon v. Dolierty 6225, 6228
Uanna v. Hanna 3911*
Hanney v. Com. 25731
Hannum v. Belchertown 622^*
Hanover R. R. v. Coyle 391"
Hanriok 0. Andrews 117912
Hanriot v. Sherwood 12293^, 1229**, 1229»7
Hanselman v. Dovel giO'^o
Hansen v. Miller 9783*
Hanson i'. Bean 622^
V. Cliiatovioh 18331
V. So. Scituate 21i8
Happel V. Brethauer 11791*
Hard v. Brown 391*9
V. City of Decorah 21i2
Harding v. State 588"
Hardy v. State 52i
Hargrove v. Adeock 12291^
Harkness v. Sears 8O8I1
Harlan, &c. v. Howard, &c. 428i, 428^ 4283
Harland v. Eastman 427i, 427", 427"
D. Dail 391*
1;. Rowe 117933
Harriraan v. Brown 412^
Harrington v. Inhabitants of Lincoln 554',
5549, 55411), 5.5411
,'. State 183^3, 2o'73»
Harris v. Harris 2761°
u. Holmes 218^
V. Hoskins 1229^3
w. Howard 257*
V. Johnston 8081^
!>. State 2573', 97854
Harrison v. Rowan 978^3
Hart V. Bait. & 0. R. R. 2113, 21)2
y. Bodley 2131
«. Kendall 452*
i>. Livingston 463-"
V. State" 2127
-;. Yunt 358', 3589, 358"
Hartford i: Palmer 9101", 91023
Hartford Bridge Co. «. Granger 554W
t Hartford Fire Ins. Co. u. Reynolds 622W,
62215, 622", 91024
Hartlgan v. International Society 358i
Hartranft's Appeal 6221'
Hartsfield u. State 9782"'
Harvey v. Pennypacker 8082'
V. Smith 24
I!. SuUens 8082D
V. Thorp 35814
Harwood v. Mulrv 4632, 4631'
Haseltine v. Concord R. R. 25V^
Haskill V. Com. 276'
Hassard v. Municipality No. 2 21i4
Hastings v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. 18332,
183M, 183°i
Hatch V. Dunn
2182
Hatfield v. St. Paul, &c. R. 3656
36512,
36515
Hatt V. Nay
257*1
Haughey v. Strickler
2184
Hawes v. State 18323, 257"
, 257*»
Hawkins v. Grimes
122953
V. James
2182
V. Sumter
12294
V. Thomas
2123
Haworth v. Norris
8088
Haycock v. Greuf 122946,
122958
Haj'es V. Adams
122957
Haynes v. MoRae
18326
I). Trenton
3657
Hays V. Northwestern Bank of Va. 21i3
Hazleton v. Union Bank of Colum-
bus 12295', 122959, 122963
Hazzard v. Vickery 122943
Headman v. Rose 21'
Healy v. Moule 1229-^
Hearst v. Pujol 80825
Heaston v. Cincinnati, &c. R. R. 21i2
Heavenridge v. Mondy 8082»
Hebbard v. Haughian 6225, 6228
Hedden v. Roberts 18352
Heddles v. Chicago, &c. R. R. 97846
Hedge v. Clapp 97848
Hedricks v. Morning Star 808"
HefEron v. Gallupe 62224
Heidenheimer v. Johnson 452i, 4526
Heinemann v. Heard 2762, 276i'
Heister v. Davis
622i'>
Helm V. State
452'
Helton V. Alabama, &c
R. R. 39134
Hemenway v. Smith
622", 62216
Hemingway v. Garth
9782', 97828
V. State
I8.322
Hemmens v. Bentley
97854
Hempstead v. Reed
1179"
Henderson v. Cargill
4273,4276,427",
42712
V. Hackney
122962, 122966
B. State
18328, 97846, 97851
V. Terry
6227
Hendricks v. State
6351
Henry v. Bishop
1229'
Henshaw v. Davis
4635, 46;-5'
Hensley v. Tarpey
21'
Henthorn v. Doe 219,
2131, 11793), 122921
Herbst v. Lowe
8082
Hermann v. State
36519
Hernandez v. State
18330
Herrick v. Swoniley
1229=8
Herring ?■. Rogers
12292', 122921
V. Skaegs
97826
Herster ?•. Herster
,391 w
Hester r. State
978 '7
Hewitt V. Clark
97826
V. Pigott
12298
Hewlett V. Cock
4282, 4283
Hickey v. Hinsdale
5542
Hickman v. Hickman
80823
ccxxxu
AMEEICAN TABLE OP CASES.
References are to pages.
Hickman v. Green
622'
Hickok V. Shelburne
1179<9
Hickory v. U. S.
1229*8, 122y''3
Hicks V. Leaton
80811
V. State
2573
Higbee v. Dresser
6226
Higginbotham v. Campbell
621
Higgins V. Carlton
97851
Higgs V. Sliehee
46.323
Higliam v. Ridgway
sgi-is
Higley v. Gilmer
2571"
Hildeburn v. Curran
97858
Hildreth v. Aldrich
9782'
Hill V. Bacon
212»
V. Com.
4708
V. Elridge
39130
V. Gust
978«
V. North
391M
V. Postley
910'-'2
1'. Proctor
4125
V. State 4701, 47013, 978^, 978^, 9784»,
978^8
V. Wliidden 808^3
Hill, F. I-I. Co. V. Sommer 46315
Hillary v. Waller 183'3
Hilts w. Colvin 358i, 1179«
Hilyard v. Township of Harrison 1229*
Hiramelmann v. Hoadley 211^
122962
Himrod v. Bolton
V. Oilman
Hinchman v. Keener
Hinckley !'. Beckwith
Hinde v. Valtier
Hines v. Com.
V. Driver
Hinkle v. State
Hinnemann v. Rosenback
Hipes V. Cochran
Hissricjic v. McPherson
Hizer V. State
122958, 122962
122938
2134
2116
4705
80821
97816
8085
2]36
46310
2118
Hobbs V. Mempliis, &c. R. Co. 21"
Hodges V. Coleman 39150
Hoefling v. Hambleton 3581'
Hoffman v. Bloomsburg, &c. R. R. Sed"
Hogan V. State 257«
Hoit V. Moulton 122928
Holbrook v. Gay 46320
Holcomb V. Holcomb 910i, 91021, 91022,
91023, 91026
Holder v. V. S. 97813, 978i'
Hollenbach v. Fleming 1229', 122912
2123
622'
25733, 2578*, 25788
91019, 91020
522
5215, 5216
3585
12298*, 1229*2, 1229*5
18334
V. State 257", 257*', 58815, 1179'
V. Turner's Falls Co. 4126
Holsey v. State 25729, 257«, 257*3
Holaton, &c. Co. v. Campbell 8086
Holt V. Holt 8082*
V. Schnabel
Hollenback v. Todd
Holly V. Burgess
— ^- V. State
Holm V. Colman
Holman v. King
Holmes v. Coryell
V. Goldsmith
V. Johnson
Holt V. Jarvis 39151
V. Moore 8081"
Homans v. Corning 2i
Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore Ware-
house Co. 554'
Homer v. Cilley 122923, 12292*
V. Wallis 1229', 1229", 122913, 122916
I22918, 122919
Hood V. Bloch 36521
V. Tyner 55410
Hooper v. Taylor 46313
Hoover v. Cary 3912S
V. Gehr 46311, 463M 46315, 46319,
46322
Hope V. Balen
808'
Hopkins v. Megquire
12292', 122938
Hopkinson v. Leeds
97833
Hopt V. Utali
39131, 588"
Hermann v. Wirtel
5541
Horn V. Hansen
80828
Horsford v. Eowe
4523, 452", 452'
Horton v. Reed
529, 5213
Hougli V. Henk
463*
V. People's Fire Ins
. Co. 808*
Houghtaling v. Kilderho
use 25728
Hougliton V. Jones
97833, 9783*
1.-. Paine
46313
Houlton V. Chic, &c.
E.
R. 2121
V. Manteuffel
4273
Houston, &c. R. E. v
Burke 9781, 978*,
9785
Houx V. Blum
622', 6228
Houze V. Houze
1179", 117920, 11798*
Hovey v. Sebring
1832*
Howard v. Coon
117921
622*
V. Gemming
1179*8, 1179*'
V. Moot
2132
V. Russell
4276
V. State
18386, 18840, 91020
Howe V. Fleming
35810, 35811
Howell V. Ashmore
12291
y. Huyck
35818
Howley v. Wliipple
35816
Howser v.. Com.
358*, 97832, 97841)
Hoxsie V. Empire Lumber Co. 39152,
122967
Hoy V. Morris 62215
Hoyt !'. Am. Exchange Bank 12292
V. McNeil 521"
V. Russell 2P, 2120, 2124
Hubbard v. And., &c. E. R. 25726
V. Greeley 8083
V. Hubbard 9781', 97822
V. Russell 3582*
Hubby V. State 9783
Huckestein v. Kelly 8O822
Huckins v. Ins. Co. 97826
Hudson I'. State 2182, 470i, 470', 6222*
Huetteman v. Viesselmann 554'
Huffman v. Cartwright 5542
V. Click 39132
Hughes V. Rogers 122961
V. Sandal 8O8I
V. Southern Warehouse Co. 35823
AMERICAN TABLE OE CASES.
References are to pages.
ccxxxm
Hull V. Lyon
62215, 62217
Irish f. Horn
46311
Humble v. Sclioemaker
978-'
Iron Mfg. Co. v. Gaskell
2130
Hume«. Scott
257«
Isaacson v. N. Y. Cen. R.
2187
Humes v. O'Bryan 452s, 452', 554*
Israel v. Brooks
2578*
Humphrey v. Burnside
2131
Ivy V. Yancy
183*6
Hunnicutt v. Peyton
4128, 41210
V. State
4705, 47010
Jack v. Martin
2130
Hunscom v. Hunscom
91012, 91014
Jackling v. Edward
12292
Hunt V. Luquere
122922
Jacks V. Stimpson
525
V. Order of Chosen Friends 1179"
Jackson v. Blanshan 1831', 18318,
122921.
Hunter v. Gihbs
97851
122923,
122924
V. N. Y. &c. R. K.
215, 2129
V. Boneham
39180
— - V. State
391*2
V. Brooks
122959
Huntley v. Whittier
18350
V. Burtis
12295
Hurd V. People
470*
V. Burton
122914,
122919
Hurlburt v. Hall
978»*
V. Chicago, &c. R. R.
80828
Hurley v. O'Sullivan
276"
4276, 427*
, 62218
Hussman v. Wilke
8081
97855
Husson V. Fox
12292
V. Gridley
91012
Huster v. Davis
622*
V. Jackson
520, 4278
Huston's Estate
468"
D. King
1179*1
Hutcliins V. Hebbard
80828
V. Kingsley
122920
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson
808*
V. Laraway
122922
V. Wheeler
97852
V. Lewis
257*'
Hutchison v. Patrick
117923
V. Phillips
122958
Hutto V. State
18322
V. State
5888, 97819, 9782*
Hyde v. Shank
35828
V. Swope
978*'
V. Woolfolk
1229«5
V. Waltermire
1832*
Hyde Park i'. Canton 183'3,
1833', ]83i«.
Jacksonville, &c. R. R. v.
Peninsular
9102*
Land, &c. Co.
25725
Hynes v. McDermott
1229«
Jacobs V. Duke
25726
6228
391*1
Lvsisi V. Brown
12298
James v. Wharton
4638C
, 46338
Iliinger v. State
36521, 36522
Jameson v. Conway
5542
Illinois, &c. Co. ti. Bonner
3581*
Jaques v. Horton
3581*
V. Langdon
39129
Jaquith v. Scott
41210
522
Jarvis v. Robinson
213
39186
V. Vanderford
1229*2,
122961
Imlay v. Rogers
62221
Jaspers v. Lano
9785*
Independence v. Pompton
427*
Jefferds v. People
58812
Indiana Car Co. v. Parker
3656, 36520
Jeffries v. Harris
2572'
Indianapolis, &c. R. Co. v. Caldwell 2ll5
Jemison a. Planters &
Merchants
V. Horst
2768, 2769
Bank
•
2118
V. Stepliens
2135
Jenkins v. Eldridge
978*9
Ingalls V. State
18380
V. Kinsley
11798«
Inglis V. Hughes
2119
V. Lykes
525
Ingraham w. Hart
5210, 5214
V. Pepoon
117919
Ingrain v. State
2118
V. State
635*, 9781
, 978"
Inliabitants of Springfield a
Wor-
Jenkinson v. State
622*, 62216
cester
218
Jenne v. Marble
6221
Inman v. Foster
2578*
Jennings v. Sturdevant
622'
Ins. Co. of No. Araer. u. Forcheimer
Jensen v. McCorkell
18352
2118, 529, 5213
Jester v. Steiner
1229*'
Ins. Co. V. Baker
117981
Jewell V. Center
21*
t>. Mosley 391», 3918,
39110, 39i2i_
V. Jewell
4275
39126
, 3918*, 39142
Joannes ». Bennett
18.326
r. Weide
46321
Joaquin v. Budd
2124
International, &c. R. R. v. Anderson
Jockumsen v. Suffolk Sa
V. Bk.
18338
39116
Joe V. State
58821
V. Dawson
80822
Johnson v. Blanshaw
122922
V. Pasture Co.
39151
V. Day
5.54*
V. Ragsdale
554', 55410
V. Drew
11793
Ireland v. Cincinnati, &c. R.
R. 25725
V. East Carolina, &c
. R. R.
80823
Irish V. Dean
8081*
V. Holliday
5545
CCXXXIV
AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES.
Beferences are to pages.
Johnson v. Hudson R. R. R. Co. 2129, 2139
v. Mason 122932
V. Merithew . 18334, iggss
V. State 2574', 3915, 5889, 58810,
58818, 68825, 62223, 9106, 910^2, 91025
97815, 978*5, 97863
V. Trinity Church So. 5-545
V. Watson 910"
V. Wiley 978", 978*5
Johnston v. ITariners Ins. Co. 9785, 978'
V. Heddeu 2126
Jones V. Blount 12292°
V. Brewer 122912
V. Com. 39116
V. Cordele Guano Co. 1179"
V. Duchow 257«
V. East Tenn. R. R. Co. 62*
V. Gale's Curatrix 21i5
V. Hays 2115
V. Henshall 4639, 46311
V. Howard 452i, 4525
V. Jones 35822, 3658, 3655^ 4271
V. Lake View 211^
V. Malvern Lumber Co. 978**
V. Mellndy 117933
V. M'Neil 978*5
V. Phelps 122925
V. Portland 89135
V. 11. R. 91019
V. Randall 1833, 1834
V. Roberts 1229*9
V. Simpson 276io
V. State 2183, 25733, 257*', 39128,
4706, 47013, 47015, 47017, 622", 978*5,
97851, 1229*3
V. Swearingen
522, 8086
V. Townsend
391*5
V. Tucker
526
Jordan v. Faircloth
12299
V. Osgood
25718
Joseph V. National Bank
1229*5
V. Ostell
808'
V. State
6358
Joslin V. he Baron
523
Juilliard v. Chaffee
808
, 80826
Jumpertz v. People
122957,
122962
Justice V. State
47011
Kaeltn !i. Cora.
5545
Kahn v. Traders' Ins. Co.
55412
Kansas, &o. R. R. Co. v. Foster
523
V. Miller
183*2
V. Phillips
2129
i: Richardson
52*
Karr v, .Jackson
117920
V. State
122921,
122928
V. Stivers
4635, 46318
Kaut V. Kessler
622'
Keagle v. Pessell
35828
Kean v. Rice
11791°,
117911
Kearney v. Farrell
39185
0. Mayor, &c. of N. Y.
358", 3582°
V. State
2578»
Keator v. Dimmick
6222
Keefer v. Zimmerman
122915
Keerans v. Brown
978**, 978*6
Keith V. Hayden
2126
V. Lothrop
122928, 122936
V. Stiles
117921
V. Wilson
97817, 97820, 9782*
Keller v. Stuck
18336
Kelley v. Owens
276*
V. People
588*, 6885
V. Saltmarsh
8082
2130
Kellogg V. Tonipson
8081
Kelly V. Carter
80822
V. Dunlap
122919
V. Leachman
8085
V. McGuire
427*, 4278, 42711
8082'
V. People
97818, 97816
V. State
255**
V. Stone
9783*
Kelsea v. Fletcher
9782, 978i»
Kelsey v. Hanmer 1179*2,
122920, 122928
Kelton V. Hill
463*
Kendall v. Collier
12292', 122935
V. Field
46313
V. May
9103, 91021, 91022
Keniston v. Rowe
3655
Kennard v. Kennard
529, 5218^ 5216
Kennebrew v. Southern
&c
Co. 5212
Kennedy v. Com.
2128
V. Doyle 46326,
4632', 46328, 11791
V. Luliold
412*, 4125
V. R. C. & B. R. Cc
.
39136
V. Reynolds
1179**
122961
Kenney v. Van Home
117910
Kennon v. Gilmer
257*2
Kenosha Store Co. u. Shedd
2123
Kent V. Mason
39129
V. State
97862
V. White
2762
Kentucky, &c. Bridge C
n. V
Hall 8085
Kentucky Cen. R. R. v.
Barrow 2572*
Keppel V. R. R.
2127
Kermott v. Ayer-
212'
Kern v. Bridwell
3658
Kernin v. Hill
122958
Kerr v. Freeman
2763
Kessel v. Albetis
218
Ketchum v. Am. &c. Ex
.Co
27610
V. Brooks
36816
Keyser v. Coe
2132
Kibby v. Harsh
80819
Kidd V. Ward
18329
Kidder v. Blaisdell
2121, 2122
Kierstead v. Brown
554'. 52418
Kilburn v. Bennett
3913*. 39142, 39143
Kile V. Yellowhead
2126
Kilgore v. Stoner
117936
Killebrew v. Murphy
2132
Kilpatrick v. Com.
212*, 4709
Kimball v. Davis
978*9
V. Morrell
12292^
King V. Colvin
2763
V. Donahoe
122967
V. Donaliue
1229*8
AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES.
Beferences are to pages.
CCXXXV
King V. Doolittle
V. Duke
u. Eriswell
I). Gallun
V. Harringworth
V. Holt
1836
11798'
4123
213S
122913
11793, 1179*
122922
2121
18318
V. Inhabitants of Bathwick
V. Kent's Heirs
V. Little
y. N. Y. Central, &c. E. E
u. Euckman 257^1
V. Sears 122921
V. State 39123, 4796, 588^ 97819
V. Worthington 3588, 9102"
Klnghorne i). Montreal Teleg. Co. 358i^
Kingman v. Cowles 11792", II7921
Kinnard Co. v. Cutter Co. 80816
Kinney v. Farnsworth 412ii, 554"
V. Flynn 1229', 12293, 122912, 1229"
V. U. S. 4632<"
Kirby v. Com. 39113
Kirchgraber v. Lloyd 257^
Kirkland v. Smith 117924
Kirkpatrick v. Clark 8O821
Kiser v. CarroUton Dry Goods Co. 808^
Kissam v. Forrest
978"
Kitner v. Whitlock
27613
Klare v. State
2138
Klein v. Lawdman
18332, 18339
V. Eussell
35823
Kleinmann v. Gieselmann 358ii
Kline v. Baker 52^, 521'', 5215, 5216
Knight V. House 257*9, 2575"
Knode v. Williamson 257*'
Knowles v. Crampton 36521, 36522
Knox V. Silloway 1179*', 1179*8
Koehler v. Buhl 978*'
Koehring u. Muemminghoff 808'
Koenig 0. Bauer 978S»
Koons V. State 1229'^
Kornegay v. Kornegay 1229^1
Kostenbader v. Peters SOS'^i
Kotwitz V. Wright 463ii
Kracke v. Homeyer 8082'
Krager v. Pierce 9783*
Kramer v. Goodlander 412'
Kranich v. Sherwood 8082*
Krebs v. State 470'
Kreuzberger v. Wingfield 808^
Kreuziger v. Chicago, &c. R. E. 39132,
39133
Kuglar V. Garner 3915»
Kunder v. Smith 978i, 9783
Kusch V. Kusch 91013
Kutcher v. Love 55412, 55413
Lact v. State 391*'
La Fayette Bank v. Stone 1179", 1179311
Laing v. Raine 122912
Lake Merced Water Co. v. Cowles 2133
Lake Shore, &c. R. R. </. Bangs 523
V. Rosenzweig 39136
V. Squire 80822
Lamagdelaine v. Tremblay 2572'
Lamar u. Micou 21i6
r. Pearre 39130,4522,11793'
Lamb v. State 635*
V. Ward 9783*
Lambright v. State 588^
Lamoreaux v. Atty.-Gen. 427^
Lampton v. Haggard 212'
Land 0. Pattesou 21ii*
Lander v. People 391'
V. Seaver 25726
Landis v. Turner 463', 463"
Lane v. Bryant 391'26
V. Cole 1229*
Lanergan v. People 5546
Langley v. Wadsworth 978**
Lannark v, Dougherty 365'
Lanning v. Chicago, &c. E. E. 2572S
Lansing v. Eussell 11792"
Lapowski v. Taylor 122916
La Roche 0. O'Hagau 8082, 8O8I6
Laros v. Com. 588'2*
La Salle Co. v. Milligan 2U*
Lasher v. State 2132
Lassing v. James 808^
Lassone v. Railroad 46336
Lathrop v. Stuart 219, igS**
Laughlin u. Fidelity Ins. Co. 808i»
V. State 978", 97818
Laughran v. Kelly 635'
Laurent v. Vaughn 391^1
Lavalle v. People 21i3
Laverenz v. Chicago, &c. R. R. 52*
Lawder v. Henderson 9783*, 97835
Lawrence v. Dole 80828
y. Du Bois 80819
V. Kimball 4528
V. Tennant 4121, 4129
Lawson v. Glass 978*, 978', 978"
V. State 257*s
Lazard v. Merchants', &c. Co. 808"
Lazare v. Jacques 8O821
Lazier v. Westcott 21i3
Lea V. Kilburn 391*9
League v. Thorp 1179*6
Learned v. Corley 1833*
V. Tillotson 554*
V. Tritch 80821)
Leathe v. BuUard 80828
Leather Co. v. Hardware, &c. Co. 52"
Leavitt v. Cutler 2123
Lee V. Fowler 8082
I'. Tinges 97826
Lefevre v. Lefevre 80828
V. State 58826, 58327
Lefferts v. Brampton 12292
Legg's Case ' 18.38
Lehman Bros. v. McQueen 2762, 276"
Leiber v. Com. 470*, 470'
Leland v. Wilkinson 21"
Leonard v. Allen 25733, 25735, 25739, 257*1
V. Kingsley 978*'
Leport V. Todd 18331
Lesher y. Levan 1229'
Leslie v. Hanson 46.3"
Lessee of Allen v. Lyons 2129
CCXXXVl
AMEEICAN TABLE OP CASES.
References are to pages.
Lessee of Scott v Eatliffe
39180
Lord ». Am. &o. Ins. Co.
80819
Lester v. State
68812, 68813
Loree v. Abner
2116
Levers v. Van Buskirk
622W
Lorenzana v. Camarillo
6542
Levy V. State 219, 2in 36520, 891"
Lottawanna, The
216
Lewis, In re
97840
Louden v. Blythe
3918
Lewis V. Barker
978"
Louisville, &c. R. R. u. Buck
39118
V. Bayliss
80819
V. Hall
3916''
V. Harris
217, 2181
V. Hurt
97812
0. Kramer
4638J, 978'
18319
V. McClure
218
V. Orr
35812
V. Meginniss
46323
V. Richardson
257"
25783
r. State 212i,470s.470i«|
V. Terrell
97834
V. Supervisors
2120
8658
2122
V. Wright
654'
65411
L'Herbettei). Pittsfield Nat.
Bank 2578
Lovell V. Payne
2766
Libby v. Brown
4525
Loveridge v. Hill
6228
Liddle v. Old Lowell Bank
978", 978«
Low V. Mitchell
25728
Liddon v. Hodnett
11795
Lowe V. Lowe
97826
Liggett V. Glenn
62215
V. State
68821
58822
Lightfoot V. People
2578
Lowell V. Todd
1832'
Lilly V. Waggoner
18382
Lowry v. Cady
3581
Linch V. Lineli
39139,391"
V. Moss
452
,4526
Lincoln v. Battelle 21^, II792, il79W
Loyd V. Hannibal, &c. R. R.
3659
36512
Lind V. Lind
18331
Lucas V. Flinn
97846
Lindauer v. Meyberg
358"
Luce V. Coyne
122942
Lindley v. Dakin
2*
V. Foster
80823
Lindsay v. Hamburg, &c. Ins
Co. 522
Lucker v. Com.
2114
V. Williams
2122
Luke V. Calhoun Co.
2136
Lindsey v. Atty.-Gen.
2118
Lull !>. Cass
80821
Lingo V. State
6222
Lumpkin v. Murrell
2180
Linnell v. Sutherland
4638
Lund V. Tynsboro
3918
39128
Linsley v. Lovely
80812, 97838
Lunn V. Scarborough
122921
Litchfield v. Merritt
6222
Lunsford v. Dietrich
2579
Little V. Cook
89129
Lurton v. Gilliam
11798
V. Downing
18318, 46326
Lush V. McDaniel
39134
39186
V. Rogers
1229«
Lycoming, &c. Ins. Co. v. Wright
5216
1'. State
3918
Lyman v. Philadelphia
257«
, 25769
V. Thompson
2768
Lynch v. Cronan
4636
Little's Case
39113
V. Moore
25742
Littlefield «. Rice
46318
Lynde v. Judd
12298
Little Rock Granite Co. v. Dallas Co. 463"
Lyon V. Lyon
5889
IJttle Rock Ry. Co. v. Leverett 391"
V. Manhattan R. R.
3659
Liverpool Steam Co. u. Phenix Ins. Co.
«. Marine
2186
21"
V. Prouty
6223
Livingston v. Arnoux
4521
Lyons v. Gregory
117944
u. Kiersted
9101, 91021
V. Roberts
97846
Mablbt v. Kittleberger
39124
V. Wood
80819
Macdonald v. Dana
80819
Livingstone v. Gartshore
622"
Macev v. Titcombe
21"
Lockhart v. White
18338, 18339
Mack u. State
3912S
,39126
Lockwood V. Crawford
52"
MacKinzie v. Stretch
664"
, 55413
Loeb 7'. Richardson
2129
Maclean v. Scripps
36828
Lofton V. Sterrett
8082"
Macomber v. Scott
122946
Loggins V. State
Loliman v. State
6548
Madden v. State
183'
2128
Magee ». Allison
808
, 80826
Londonderry v. Andover
4278, 4274
V. Bnrch
3582
Long V. Coltoii
V. Patton
412'
11. Scott
11798'
117982
Magie v. Herman
368i«
V. State
25781
Magill V. Stoddard
80828
Longabaugh v. "Virginia City, &c.
Maguire v. Middlesex Ry.
2571
R. R.
2572'
Maier v. State
2188
Loomis V. Bedel
1179« 11794'
Mailler v. Ex. Propeller Co.
2672
V. Stuart
46819
Major V. State
2118
358", ■6542
Malcomson v. O'Dea
4281
Lopez V. State
9101
Mallory v. Ohio Farmers Ins
.Co.
122961
AMEBICAN TABLE OP CASES.
References are to pages.
Mallory u. State 212'
Mandel v. Swan Land Co. 358i-
Mange v. Holmes 391*^
Manistee Bank v. Seymour 276^-
Mann Boudoir Car Co. v. Dupre 8O812
Manning v. Maroney 3581^
V. Pippen 80823
Manufacturers, &o. Bank v. Baack 183i>*
Manufacturing Co. v. Bennett II7922
Marbury v. Madison 622", 62218
Marcly v. Sliults 978', 978^, 978"
Marcy v. Stone 452^
Mardes v. Meyers 1229^5
Mark u. Hastings 3586, 358!)
0. Merz 25731, 257*
Marks v. Sullivan 62229
Marsh v. Case 4638
V. Davis 80820
V. Hand 3588
. V. Whitmore 183^
Marshall V. Baker 80828
V. Brown ■ 39132
V. Chicago, &c. R. K. 470^
V. G. E. B. K. Co. 4702
V. State 257"
Marshall Livery Co. v. McKelry 276ii
Martin v. Anderson 11798'
V. Bowie 35811
1;. Brown 808°
V. Elliot -36512
V. Hardesty 25784
Martin
V. Nichols
V. Payne
Martindale v. Falkner
Marvin v. Richmond
■^- — V. State
Marx V, People
Mask V. State
Mason v. Fuller
Massey v. Bank
^ — V. State
Mathes v. Robinson
Mathews v. Yerex
Matlock V. Glover
Matter of Hall's Deposition
Matter of Page
Matter of Ridgway
2120, 2121
46318
5216, 117911, 117913
183», 183*, 1835
55411
6358
978«
97832, 97888
427*
1229"
58821
46318
91020
122964
18388
39181
183«
CCXXXVll
97888, 978*1
Matter of Will of Snelling 978^2
Matteson v. Noyes 3581"
V. N. Y. Cen. R. R. 39186
Matthews v. Hoagland 622'*, 6227
«. Holmes ' 80819
V. Huntley 25728
V. Park 2126, 528
V. Sheehan 808"
Mattliewson v. Burr 25787
Matthis V. State 978«
Mattice v. Allen 97888
Mattison v. Chicago, &c, R. R. 808''
Mattox V. U. S. 470*
Mauerman w. Siemerts 528
May V. State 588l^ 58826, 978"
Mayer v. Dean 8O821
Mayes v. State 39118
Mayliew v. Thayer
Mayo IK Dwight
— - V. Foley 62216
Mayor, &c. of Baltimore v. State 2126
Mayor, &c. of N. Y. v. Second Ave.
R. R. Co. 463", 46382
Maysville, &e. R. R. v. Pellam 80828
Maxham v. Place 622*
Maxwell u.Hill 391**
V. Wilkinson 978', 9788
McAllister v. McAllister 122968
McAmore v. Wiley 9105, 9106, 910?, 9IO8,
91026
McAndrews v. Santee
McBride v. People
MoCall V. U. S.
McCamant v. Roberts
McCartee v. Camel
McCarthy v. Burtis
McCarty v. CoflBn
MoCathern v. Bell
McCausland v. Fleming
McColloch V. Gore
McClaugherty v. Cooper
McClerkin y. State
McCloskey v. Davis
McClure v. Pursell
McCombs V. Foster
McCormick v. Cheevers
V. Herndon
M'Cormick v. Sisson
McCrady 1;. Jones
McCraw v. Gentry
MeCreary v. Turk
M'Creary v. Grundy
McCulIock V. Dobson
M'Cutcheon v. M'Cutcheon
McDaniel v. State
McDonald v. Carnes
V. Com.
V. DeCairl
V. McDonald
V. Savoy
V. Unaka Timber Co.
V. Western R. R.
McDonough v. O'Neil
McDowell V. Preston
McElmurray v. Turner
McElwee Mfg. Co. v. Trowbridge
McEwen v. Portland
V. Shannon
MoFarland v. Fricks
V. Shaw
McGhee, &c. Co. v. Hudson
McGibbon v. Burpee
McGinness v. Kennedy
McGinnis v. Allison
McGrath v. Seagrave
McGregor v. Hudson
V. MoArthur
V. Montgomery
V. Wait
McGuire v. People
. V. Say ward
McHargue v. Com.
5542
4701S
4121
117931
18385
117987
25788, 25787
808"
412"
978*6
1179i0
1179"
2769
2761
12296*
80816
80819
525
35812
12297
3586
25783
978*6
257*9
25780, 257*3
46319
25786
2120
1229**, 1229*56
25735
39162
2138
18327
18327
5546
554"
1832*
91019
117919, 117923
4703
2136, 2762
358"
80816
12292a
117986
39160
25783
3582)
122920
9106, 91022, 910-23
1179*6
4709
CCXXXVlll AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES.
Referencee are to pages.
21
8085
2578*
2129
8911S
5885
MoHugh V. Dowd
V. Gallagher
Mclntire v. Levering
Mcintosh V. Lee
Mclnturf v. State
McKee v. People
MoKeigue v. Janesville 39133, 39184^ 39135
MeKenzie v. Stretch 276-
McKeone v. Barnes 1229*5
McKiel V. Real Estate Bank 21i3
McKinley v. Irvine ' 122015
McKinney v. Neil 978*6, 97360
McKinnon v. Bliss 213^, 3582
V. Norcross 391^^
McKivett V. Cone 9781, 9781''
McLane v. Johnson 8081"
McLaughlin v. McDevitt 808^2
McLean v. Clark 808^1
V. McDonell 1179*2
V. State 4705, 470", 91019
McLellan v. Richardson 32221
McLeod V. Ginther's Adm. 3911^ 391*1
McMaster v. Scriven 62215
McMath V. State 391*', 391*^
McMillan v. Baxley 35821
McMurray v. St. Louis Oil Co. 80825
McMurrin v. Kigby 391*7, 391*9
McNeely v. Duff 9781
McNeil V. O'Connor 4272
McNeill V. Donohue 858'
McNerney v. Beading 978^1
McNichol V. Pacific Ex. Co. 2126
McNutt V. McDonald 5642
M'Nutt V. Young 257^3
McPhail V. Johnson 978*3
McPherson v. State 470i*
McQueen v. People's Bank 2762
V. State 47011
McQuigan v. Delaware, &c. R. R. 3653
McReynolds v. Longenberger 35812,
122921, 122923
McShane, Henry, Co. v. Padian 8085
MeTaggart v. Thompson 391*"
McVicker v. Conkle 1229", 1229"
Meade v. Smith 62223
Mealer v. State 910"
Mears v. Cornwall 5541
Mechelke v. Bramer 622i
Medary v. Gathers 122912
Medley v. People 391*
Medway v. U. S. 122993, 122966
Meeth v. Rankin Brick Co. 463", 46315
Meguire v. Corwine 554*
Meixsell v. Freezor 97831
Melby v. Osborne & Co. 122957
Melcher v. Flanders 1229"
Mellish V. Robertson 808=5
Melton II. State 6355, 635»
Melvin v. Lyons 117919, 117920
Merchants' Bank v. Hall 215
V. McAnulty 80827
V. McGraw 2116
V. Morrison 80825
Mercier v. Harnan 3581'
Merkle v. Bennington 39125
Merrifield v. Robbins
Merrill v. Dawson
V. Ithaca, &c. R. R.
Merritt v. Straw
Mershon v. State
Merwin v. Arbuckle
V. Ward
Mewster v. Spalding
Meyer v. School District
Miami Turnpike Co. v. Baily
5216, 117913
2116
978*, 978"
1229*7
257*6
391*5
18327
117939
117927
365*, 36512,
3651*
Wil-
80816
■ 122926
21
2131, 521D, 52"
Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co.
Hams
Middleton v. Mass.
Miles V. Edelen
V. Loomis 1229*3, 122956, 122968, 122956
Miller v. Brown 2573*
V. Davis 80825
V. Fletcher 8083
V. Goodrich, &c. Co. 8087
V. Hale 11793*, 117939, 117948
V. Jones 18327, 122968, 122962
V. MacVeagh
V. Miller
V. Palmer
V. Proctor
V. Reinhart
ti. Shay
V. State 25712, 4709_ 47918^ 5546'^ 53828
V. Texas, &c. Ry. 213*
Millington v. Millington 122966
Million V. Com. 4701"
Mills V. Duryee 117919
Millsaps V. Merchant's, &c. Bank 8086
Milmine v. Bnrnham 8082*
Mima Queen v. Hepburn 39131
Minis V. Sturdevant 978"
V. Swartz 217, 218
Minchin v. Minchin 8082»
Mink V. State 62226
Minneapolis, &c. R. R. i'. Home Ins.
Co. 8081, 80811
Minneapolis Times Co. v. Nimocks 35816
1836
117937
4631*, 46316
2138
3587
S9133
39161
35819
365", 391**
1179*6
Minnesota v. Barber
Minor v. Tillotson
Mississippi, &c. R. R. v. Arispe
Missouri, &c. R. R. v. Cocrehara
V. Gernan
V. Johnson
Mitchell V. Bridgers
V. Kingman
V. Sawyer 97829
Mitehum v. State 3918, 3919
Mobile, &o. Ins. Co. v. McMillan 8087
Mobile, &c. R. R. v. Ashcraft 25715
Mobile & Birmingham R. R. v.
Ladd 2129, 21*6
Mobley v. Hamit 257*9
Mockabee v. Com. 4701°
Modawell v. Holmes 2127
Moffet V. Moffet 2762
Moffin V. Mtna. Axle, &c. Co. 218»
Moffit V. Maness 8088
V. Witherspoon 427*
Moline-Milburn Co. v. Franklin 25713
AMERICAN TABLE OP CASES.
BeferenceB are to pages.
CCXXXIX
Moline Plow Co. v. Braden 2182
Molyneaux v. Collier 554', 654'
Monahan v. Worcester 257^^ 391*^
Money v. Turnipseed 21^2
Montee v. Com. 52^
Montforton v. Bondit 808"
Montgomery v. Allen 554'
V. Bevans ISS^s
V. Deeley 21'
V. Pickering 622^^
V. Schockey 80825
i;. State 4709, 470"
Montgomery's Case 470^2
Montjoy v. State 2123
Moody V. Rowell 97826, 9785', gysss^ 1229*»
Mooers v. Bunker ' 427^^
Moog V. Randolph 211"
Mooney v. Kenuett 211^
V. Olsen 391", 391"
Moore v. Cliicago R. R. Co. 978-32
Gaus
V. Gwynn
V. Palmer
■ V. Rush
V. Smead
V. State
!,■. U. S.
V. Wingate
Moorman v. Collier
Mora V. People
Mordecai v. Beal
Morehead v. State
Moreland v. Lawrence
Morelock v. State
Morey v, Hoyt
Morgan v. Burrow
V. People
V. Purnell
V. Roberts
5549
52", 5216
1229*8
80825
8089
470*, 47010, 470"
122952, 122960
6221
80825
470*, 5881
3588, 358", 35819
25735
47013
358"
2129
358i«
4273, 4276, 42712
910"
2573', 25739, 257*', 257^3_
4702, 4703, 4709
5542
4272
39130
. 427*
1835
46.3", 46316, 46318
&c. Dock Co. 9781
218
21*0
V. State
Morrell v. Cawley
V. Foster
V. Morgan
Morrill v. Foster
V. Graham
Morris !'. Briggs
V. Columbian
V. Davidson
V. Edwards
V. Leesee of Harmer 2132
V. Pateliin 117926
V. Wadsworth 1179*9
Morrison v. Delorimier 9783*
V. Jackson 3588, 358", 35822
V. Sturges 1229^
Morrissey v. Ingham 2183, 39136
Morrow v, Parkman 9101'
Morse v. Congdon 4638
V. Rice 808"
V. Weymouth 522
V. Woodworth 358i>
Morss V. Morss 91015
Morton V. State 391*5
Moseley's Adm'r v. Mastin 2125
Mosley v. Ins. Co. 213'
V. Vermont, &e. Ins. Co. 2572*
Moss V. Green 808'
Mossman v. Forrest 2122
Mowell V. Van Buren 6225, 622"
Mudsill Mining Co. u. Watrous 25719
Muldoon V. Deline 8086
Mulhado v. Brooklyn City R. R. 3656
MuUanphy Sav. Bank v. Schott 3589, 358i»
Mullen V. Morris 117912, 1179"
MuUer v. Dows 18319
V. St. Louis Hospital Ass'n 97889
Mullery v. Hamilton 4272
Munn V. Burch 21*
Munns v. Dupont 1229'
Munroe v. Douglass 521''
Munshower v. State 2128, 21^9
9782*
6221
2122
5881, 58816
588*, 5885, 588", 978"
18325
117936
18339, 183*6
11795
Murphey v. State
Murphy v. Com.
V. Hendricks
V. People
V. State
Murray v. Lepper
V. Marsh
V. Murray
' V. Polglase
Muse V. Richards 2122
Musick V. Barney 117916
Mutual Life, &c. v. Blodgett 427*
V. Hillman 391*2
V. Robinson 213*
V. Tillman 39128
Myer v. Grafflin 46321
Myers v. Carrie 25738
V. Knabe 39129
Mynatt v. Hudson 257**
Myron v. Union R. R. 808^3
Naanes v. State 1179*8
Nason v. Jordan 35815
National Bank, &c. v. Gray 122921
V. McManigle 18350
National Car, &c. Builder w. Cyclone,
&c. Co. 8081
National Cash Reg. v. Pfister 8089, 808^1
National Ulster Co. Bank v. Madden 978'
Naumberg v. Young 808*, 808", 808"
Neaderliouser v. State 213*
Neal V. Neal 978"
V. Patten 6226
Neeb v. McMillan 978*6
Neese v. Farmers Ins. Co. 216
Nelms V. State
Nelson v. Becker
V. Davis
V. Ladd
V. State
V. Weeks
Nesbit V. State
Nesbitt V. Cavender
Neville v. Northcutt
Nevin v. Ladue
Newcomb v. Griswold
V Wallace
Newell V. Newton
1229", 1229*8
6226
b0826
2124
521, 97814, 978-4
808"
470"
80819
46.38
2188
978*0
8082*
21"
ccxl
AMEKICAN TABLE OF CASES.
References are to pages.
Newell 7). Nichols
183<"
Ohleyer v. Bernheim
80824
Newhall v. Appleton
2578
Olive w. State
25729
V. Jenkins
588"
Oliver v. Pate
62226
New Haven Co. v. Goodwin
4632", 463M
Olmstead v. Hill
24
New Haven County Bank v. Mitchell 183«
V. Winsted Bank
97829
New Jersey, &c. Co. v. Suydara 1179«
Olson V. Peterson
5547
Newman v. Dodson
39135
Omnium Securities Co.
V. Richard-
V. Jenkins
18335
son
5549
New Milford v. Slierman
391«
Oppenheim v. Wolf
2136
New Portland u. Kingfield
978«
Ordway v. Conroe
117921, 117983
News Pub. Co. v. Butler
978"
V. Haynes
97859
New York Dry Dock v. Hicks
117931
Oregon Steamship Co. v. Otis 18353, 35316
N. Y. Mutual,' &c. Ins. Co. <;.
Arm-
Orman v. State
622'
strong
25719
Orr V. Lacy
215
Nichols V. Haynes
46.38
Orton V. McCord
6225, 6228
V. Vinson
46314
Osborne v. Allen
18334
!.'. Webb
46325
V. Forsliee
97826
Nickerson v. Gould
2182, 2183
11. Stringham
8081°, 80828
V. Spindell
3581'
Ostrander v. Snyder
80810
Niles V. Sprague
117931
Otey V. Hoyt
122944
Nixon V. McKinney 257^8^
257«, 257"
Ott V. Soulard
219
V. Palmer
18331
Over V. SchifHing
21
Noble V. Douglass
1179*2
Owen V. Boyle
529, 52M 5214
Norfolk, &c. R. K. o. Groseclose 3912*
Owens ;;. Hull
2115, 2116
Norman v. Waite
80826
V. Kansas City, &c
. R. R. 36512,
Norris v. Cargill
978'«
36518
V. Harris
52", 5212
V. State
97818
V. Ins. Co.
276"
Owers V. Olathe Co.
35820
North Bank v. Abbot
4363'
Owings V. Speed
117941
North Brookfield v. Warren
4275, 4278_
4279
Pabst Bkewing Co. v.
Smith 1179"
Northern Pac. E. K. v. Urlin
97826, 97834
Pacific Iron Works v. Newhall 808'
Northwestern Fuel Co. „. Bruns. 808",
Packard v. Dunsmore
122916
808"
V. Hill
117912, 117916
Northwestern M'f g Co. v. Chambers 218"
Paddock v. Salisbury
25738
Northrop, The
2180
Page V. Osgood
27614
Northrop v. Hale 427i, 427^
, 4275, 4276,
V. Parker 39129,
39180, 39131 97826
4278,
42712, 42713
Pagett V. Curtis
2128
Norton v. Ladd
910", 91012
Paige V. Carter
9781, 9785, 978'
V. Perkins
97840
Paine c. Schenectady
21"
Norvell v. Mc Henry
2128
Palmer v. Aldridge
2115
Norwood V. Kenfield
97829, 9783D
V. Atchison, &c. E.
R. 6212
Noyes v. Ward
412M
97849
Nunes v. Perry
1229*9
V. State
58826
Nunne v. Mayes
4275
Pancake v. Cauffman
80819
Nute V. Nute
978«
Pape V. Wright
25746
Nye V. McDonald
216
Papin V. Ryan
218
Parent v. Walmsley's Adm. 213
Parish u. Perham
8088
Oak Leather Co. o. Union Bank 521^
Parke v. Mears
12297
Oakes v. Harrison
2762, 27610
Parker v. Carter
6224, 62210, 62212,
Oaks V. Weller
188"
62214, 62215
Ober V. Blalock
1179T
!!. Cleveland
117946
O'Blenis v. State
26736
V. Davis
SOS'^i
O'Brien v. Com.
25713
!.'. Enslow
3659
V. Frasier
25784
V. Hardy
24
V. Krockinski
2122
V. Logan
80820
Ocean Ins. Co. v. Fields
219
V. State 9105,
910', 91024, 97828
O'Connor v. Chicago, &c. R. R. SQl" |
Parkhurst v. McGraw
18323, 622'
Odiorne v. Bacon
117938
V. Van Courtlandt
8083
Ohio V. Hinchman
21"
Parkinson v. Nashua
2578
Ohio Life Ins. Co. i/. Debolt
2181 2183
Parliman ik Young
3585
Ohio & Miss. R. R. v. Wheeler 18319 |
Parsons v. State
6364
Ohio R. Co. V. Ridge
2112
Partin v. State
9105
Ohlert V, Alderson
8082
Patohen v. Park
97836
AMEEICAN TABLE OF CASES.
Bef erences are to pages.
ccxli
Patrick v. Gibbs
117920
People V. Denby
978*2
V. Hallett
528
V. Devines
978*5, 978*6
V. Jack
4638
II. Dillwood
97885, 978*8
Patten v. Glover
6225
V. Dimock
2578
V. Moor
622W
• V. Dohring
91015, 91016
Patterson v. Com.
6356
V. Elyea
97812
V. M'Causland
2129
V. Estrado
688*
Pattison v. Norris
55418
V. Etting
2112
Pavey v. Pavey
1229"
V. Evans
25732, 6358, 635*
Pawashiok, The
5211, 1179W
V. Everhardt
257"
Payne v. Treadwell
2121 2181, 18346
V. Fair
25729, 25789
V. Troy & Boston R. R. 62*
V. Plynn
68815
Peace v. Jenkins
4523
V. Fulton Fire Ins
Co. 4272
Peagler v. Stables
80819
V. Garbutt
2766, 27018
Peak V. State
470"
V. Glenn
4702, 4705, 47017
Pearl v. Allen
1229^ 122912
V. Gondalez
3588, 36521), 36522
Pearson v. Darrington
3918", 39181
97826
Peck V. Beckwith
80824
V. Green
97813
V. Clark
4128
V. Grunzig
470", 47018
80821
V. Hanifaa
97858
463i»
V. Hawes
4701
V. Ritchey
978*4, 978*6
V. Hayes
622*
V. Ryan
5546
V. Hite
97889
V. Valentine 46321
, 9781, 9787, 97811
V. Hodgdon
391*8, 47012
Peek V. Boone
62211
V. Hoy Yen
58823
Pell V. Ball
183*8
V. Hughes
62223
Peltier's Case
211
V. Hulbut
62221
Pelton V. Schmidt
6547
V. Jacobs
97821
Pelzer M't'g Co. v. Sun Eire Office 358^
V. Johr
2119
Pence v. Makepeace
5548
V. Jones
2576
62216
V. Keeley
97812
Penitentiary Co. v. Gordon 2761"
V. Keith
9785*
Penn. Co. v. Conlan
52*
9781
V. Dolan
80822
V. Knapp
25788
V. Horton
2121
V. Knickerbocker
47019
V. Newmeyer
3658, 3659, 97836
V. Lambert
529
Penn. R. R. v. Lyons
3911'
V. Langtree
91020
Penn. R. R. Co. v. Right
er 523
V. Linzey
9106, 9108, 91023
Pensecola R. R. v. SchafEer 3581^
V. Lock Wing
257*3
People V. Alden
11793*
V. Machim
97818
V. Anderson
97885
V. Mackinder
58828
V. Atkinson
62215, 622"
V. Mather
97825, 97826
V. Austin
97852
V. Matteson
91018
V. Barrie
6881*
V. McConnel
2124
V. Barringer
8081
V. McCrea
391*6
V. Biddleman
122988
V. McGloin
58816
V. Blakeley
6227
V. M'Garren
910", 91012, 910"
V. Boscovitch
978", 97822, 9782*
V. McNair
91023
V. Brooks
2183, 97852
V. McQuaid
529, 5213. 5216
V. Buchanan
62213, 97853
V. Meservey
39184
V. Buddensieck
3658, 365i7_ 36518
V. Methvin
257*8
V. Bush
25781
V. Mills
25785, 267*", 9785*
V. Carney
365*, 3655
V. Minck
1179*9
V. Cassidy
58826
V. Moett
25739
V. Chapleau
58815
V. Murphy
978*5
V. Chase
47011
V. O'Brien
6358
V. Chee Kee
2128, 2129
V. O'Neil
6355
V. Clarke
5881°
V. O'SuUivan
2576, 39148
!). Cole
97881
V. Palmer
97812
V. Copsey
91012, 978*8
V. Park
91021
V. Corey
122981, 122955
V. Parker
122954
V. Costello
635*, 6355
V. Parton
5882
V. Court
97835
V. Perry
470"
w. Daniels
5882
V. Pinckney
122957
V. Dayis
257*9 25755, 4708
V. Potter
2112
ccxlii
AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES.
Befereuces are to pages.
People V. Quanstrom
91019
V. Ramirez
68812, 58816
1'. Rector, &c. of Trinity Church 1229=
V. Robinson
68818
V. Boderigas
183^2
V. Safford
978"
V. Sanchez
4709
V. Schryver
2761
i.'. Severance
12295S
V. Shea
391«
V. Simonsen
6889
V. Simpson
4706
V. Skeehan
978^6
V. Smith
9106
V. Soto
58810, 58826
V. Stokes
1837
V. Strybe
6355
V. Superior Court of N
. Y. 2*
V. Sutherland
978*2
V. Thrall
6889
V. Tyler
25761
V. Vernon
39113, 4706
V. Wells
6351
V. Wentz
688S 588"
V. Westbrook
91020
V. White
25729, 25738
V. Williams
2131, 97840
v. Wolcott
58819, 588M
391"
V. Young
62222
Peoria, &c. R. R. v. Rice
36.59
Pepper v. Barnett
12292T, 122928,
12293°, 122932
Perdicaris v. Trenton City Bridge
Co.
21"
Perfelling v. State
8914'
Perkins v. Concord R. E.
39186, 5547_
5549, 56411
V. West
80819
Perrin v. State
3589
Perry v. Dubuque S. W. E.
Co. 23
V. Hill
808'
■ V. Moore 978*6
V. New Orleans, &c. R. Co. 2112
■ V. Newton 1229'''6
V. Randall 6221, 6222
V. Simpson Waterproof Mgf.
Co. 554"
V. State 62210, 622"
Peter v. Thickstun 39162
Peterhoff, The 21', 2180
Peterson, Ex parte 2124
Peterson v. Morgan 25738, 25788
V. State 527
l>,'trie V. Columbia, &c. E. R. 39128
IVuffli V. Davis 80819
I'l'vroux V. Howard 213*
riielan v. Gardner 8O821
Plienix, &c. Ins. Co. v. Merchants,
&c. Ass'n 3583
!'. Shoemaker
Philadelphia i;. Rule
6221
3658
Phillips V. Kelly S918*
V. People 25716, 26720
V. State 6356
D. Trowbridge Furniture Co. 3589,
35818
Phoinix Ins. Co. v. Moog 18326, 18328
Phoenix Pub. Co. Riverside v. Cloth-
Philadelphia, &c. R. R. V. Lehman 2129
V. Stimpson 391*3, 97388^ 97334
iug Co.
808"
Pickard v. Bailey
621S, 1179"
Pierce v. De Long
122968
V. Hoffman
257"
V. Indseth
212, 216^ 529
V. Kimball
2110
V. Newton
267"
V. Northey
1229*8, 1229"
V. Pierce
5546
V. State
521
Pierson v. Baird
2110
Pike V. Crehore
117927
Pillard v. Dunn
122929
Pillow V. Thomas
6222
Pillsbury v. Locke
463", 46318
Pinkham v. Benton
9788
V. Cockell
122936, 122967
Pinney v. Jones
3918
Pinney's Will
39140
Pirie v. Wyld
5548, 5549
Pitt V. Emmons
35818
Pitts V. Allen
80824
0. State
5882, 5886
Pittsford V. Chittenden
62229
Pizarro, The
18326
Plank Road Co. v. Bruce 183**
Piatt V. Haner
1179M
Plummer v. Currier
5541, 66412
V. Eastern E. E.
52*
V. Ossipee
257*1, 3918*
Polk V. Butterfield
529
Pollock V. Pollock
97826
V. Willcox
35820
Pool I'. Chase
80810
Porath V. State
635*, 6358
Porter v. Hale
35820
V. Judson
216, 46326
V. State
97818, 978", 97819
V. Waltz
3912
V. Waring
2115
V. Wilson
122926
Portugal, Church v. Hubbart 212
Post V. Supervisors
117913
Potter V. Inhabitants of Ware 91 0",
91018
1). Mellin
5641
Pougade v. Ryan
216
Powell V. Blackett
12297
V. Governor
39162
V. Tarry
5541
V. Wallace
3588
Power V. Bowdle
2126
Powers V. McKenzie
1229«
V. Presgroves
25783, 25738, 257*6,
25768
V. Russell
27610
Prairie School Township v. Haselen
80810, 808"
AMERICAN TABLE OP CASES.
References are to pages.
ccxliii
Prather v. Palmer
18331
Ray V. Blackwell
8086
358"
V. Castle
46329, 46332
Pratt V. Andrews
257^
Raynham v. Canton
117912
V. Langdon
8082"
Raynor v. Lyons
80819
V. White
46313, 46323
Head V. Com.
62228
Preeper v. Eeg.
526
Real V. People
978*", 978«
Prell V. McDonald
2111
Re Assignment of Eea
35812
Prescott V. Ward
978"
Redfield v. Gleason
8087, 80815
Price V. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 21^9
Redlich u. Baurlee
4631*
V. Garland
4638, 46319
Reed v. Wilson
21', 2129
V. Richmond, &c. E. R
35812
Reese i;. Reese
122931
V. State
68812
V. Strickland
80823
w. Torrington
4639
Reeve v. Dennett
2183
Priest V. Glenn
117928
V. Liverpool, &c. Ins.
Co. 2762
Primm v. Stewart
1833*, 39151
Reeves v. State
3582
Prince v. Blackburn
122919
R. V. Andrews
635*
V. Smith
463', 46322
V. Beckwith
635*, 6358
Pringle v. Pringle
91019
V. BcSrub^
9102i
Printup V. Patton
6542
V. Chasson
25712, 2572)
Prior V. State
2575
V. Doyle
58821
Proctor V. Houghtaling
25738
V. Mailloux
183*, 97851
V. Old Colony R. R.
554*, 5545
V. Pah-Mah-Gay
9101*
Pruitt V. Cox
25737
V. Peltier
47012
Puckett V. State
2113, 25737
V. Perry
6355
PuUen V. Hutchinson
12295
V. Reaney
47012
Pullman Palace Car v. Harkins 97853
588"
Purdy V. Purdy
91019
V. Smith
4706, 4709
Pusey V. Wright
2762
V. Sparham 4706, 4701", 47011
Putnam v. Goodall
3589
V. The Minnie
219
Reid V. McWhinnie
2127, 2138
QniMBT V. Buzzell 1229^,
1229", 122915
V. Reid
V. Warner 122927
25752
, 122935, 1229*2
Reinhart v. Miller
122915
Radcuffb v. Ins. Co.
11792, 1179*
808*
RadclyfEe v. Barton
5542
Reis V. Hellman
5542
Rader v. McElvane
80819
Reitz V. State
3655
Radford v. State
4705
Renaud v. Abbott
21"
Radley ti. Seider
97812
Renier v. Dwelling-house
80828
Railing v. Com.
4703
Renner v. Bank of Columbia 35813
Railroad v. Crider
276"
Rex V. Clewes
257'2
Railway Co. v. Beeler
808»
V. Inhabitants of Harringworth 122912
V. Cronin
35818
V. Morgan
122966
V. Henderson 4632=, 46328, 46333
V. Oneby
1838
V. Herrick
391*2 39146
V. Plummer
1837
0. McKenna
522
Reyburn v. Belotti
122937, 122938
V. Murphy
46311, 46318
Reynolds v. Longenberger
18317
V. S trout
52*
V. Manning
5547, 5548
V. Whitton
18319
r. Robinson
80826
Rains v. State
58826
V. Schaffer
91029
Rainwater ;;. Elmore
57815
Rhoades v. Selin
1179*9, 122929
Ralph V. Brown
35819
Ricard v. Williams
183*8
Ralston v. Miller
41219
Rice V. Rice
6226
Rand V. Dodge
4522
V. Shook
2139
Randal v. Yates
6228
Rice's Succession
5210
Randall v. Connecticut River R. R. 52*
Rich V. Eldredge
463'
'.-. Turner
8087
Richards v. Day
80826
Randolph v. Loughlin
122955, 122961
V. Elwell
18315
V. Woodstock
978*7
V. Noyes
5547, 5.'i4i9
Rapley v. Klugh
80819
Richardson v. Beebe
80819, 80811
Ratliff V. Vandikes
91019
V. Boston
4283
Raw V. People
2139
V. Emery
463*. 46313
Rawley v. Brown
1832*
V. Kelley
97R«
Raw Manf'g Co. v. Townsend S5812 i
V. Milburn
218*, 358*
Rawson v. Haigh
39138
V. Newcomb
1229*9
Ray V. Bell
978**
V. Robbins
3582*
ccxliv
AJVIEKICAN TABLE OP CASES.
BefereuceB are^to pages.
Richmond v. Patterson
117929
Rogers v. State
2122, 91016
Kichmond, &c. li. li
V.
Childress 36611,
V. Straub
8082, 8085
3tj
&12, 3651S, 86516
V. Tyley
122952
Eiddle v. Hudgiiis
808i»
Roll V. St. Louis Smelting
Co. 5211
Kidgeley v. Johnson
122922, 122924
Rollins V. Henry
1179'fi
Kiemer v. Rice
808*
Ronan v. Dugan
2130
Riggs V. Powell
122921
, 122935, 122953
Roop V. Clark
117921,117927
Riley v. Johnston
622"
Roosa V. Boston Loan Co.
39136
V. Mayor
80811
Root V. King
117913
V. Pierce
41211
Rose V. Eirst Nat. Bank
1229", 122958,
V. Treanor
8081*
122961
liindge V. Breok
4635
V. Otis
97846, 978"
V. Walker
46326
122945
liililey V. Seligman
. 80820
Roseboom v. Billington
4525
v. Warren
212B
Rosenbaum v. State
3913
Risk c. State
3655
Rosenkrans v. Barker
25734
Ritchie v. Catlin
2186
Rosenthal v. Walker
18350
y. Holbrooke
62224
Ross V. Austin
2122, 2181
Rixford V. Miller
18331
V. Boswell
2129
Robb V. Hewitt
55418
91016
Robbins v. Robbins
6354
V. State
2576, 3912
V. Springfield
978=6
V. White
39128
V. State
521, 47018
Roten V. State
47014
Robert's Appeal
5542
Rothrock v. Perkinson
117912
Roberts v. Com.
97815, 97839
Roupell V. Haws
122966
V. Dixon
2572, 3589, 35818
Rousey v. Wood
2112, 117936
V. Miller
97838
Rout V. Riley
122959
V. MuUenix
80827
Eowell V. Fuller
122944, 122948
V. Ogdensburg,
&c
.E
E. 3658
V. Newton
8083
Robertson v. Lynch
35815
Rowt V. Kile
122954
V. Miller
1229«
Royal V. Chandler
4128
Robinson v. Adams
39139
Royal Ins. Co. v. Schwing
2762, 27614
V. Blakely
42713
Ruan V. Perry
25728
V. Chadwick
6222
Rudd V. Erank
6225
V. Cutter
35818
Rudolph V. Lane
35820
«. Dana
91022
Rufer V. State
S8826
V. Dibble
4633, 46319
Rullman v. Barr
3589
V. Gallier
183''2
Huloff V. People
3652"
V. Oilman
212, ]n92_ 117911
Euniph V. State
122927
V. Hyers
8086
Rusch V. Rock Island
9781
u. Hutchinson
978"
Rusher v. State
68828
V. New Brunsw
ickE.
R. 25724
Russell V. Buckley
18349, 18350
V. Peru, &c. R.
R.
97853
V. Church
80810
I'. Reynolds
97829
V. Martin
2126
V. Robinson
2765
V. Sargent
2124
i: State
257*5, 257*9
Ryan v. O'Conner
80820
■ V. Stuart
5541, 5543
V. People
97847
Rocco V. State
62223
V. State
588'
Roche !'. Praser
2762
Ryerson v. Abington
97848
Rockey's Estate
122959
Rockwell V. Taylor
39126
Rockwood V. Poundstone
97829, 97830
Sahlinger v. People
18329
Roden v. Brown
35812
St. Louis, &c. R. R. V. Dearborn 80828
Roderigas v. East
River
Savings
V. Dobbins
36512
Instn.
■ 18338
«. Rexroad
91019
Rodgers v. Crook
35820
V. Sweet
97847
Kodrian v. N. Y. &c.
R
R.
524
V. Thomas
5544
Rodriguez v. Espinosa
391«
V. Weaver
629, 5218
Roe V. Hoe
12295'
St. Paul, &c. Ins. Co. 0. Gotthelf 97825
Rogers v. Crain
39130
St. Vrain Stone Co. v. Denver, &c.
V. De Bardeleben. &c. Co. 39180, 42710,
R. R.
8082
42713
Salazar v. Taylor
122927, 122982
V. Lyon
6228
Salem Gravel Road Co. v.
Penning-
V. Mexia
11790
ton
89129, 39181
V. Ritter ]22928,122932,1229«,1229«2
Salomon v. State
2137
AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES.
References are to pages.
ccxlv
Saltsman v. N. Y. &c. R. R.
80812
Sample v. Frost
6229
Sampson v. Noble
n79'0
V. Overton
1179**
Sara Sloan, The
18325
Sanborn v. Murphy
808**
Sanchez v. People
978-27
Sanders v. Keister
3918*
V. State
978*"
V. Stokes
218*
V. Wakefield
9781, 9789
Sands v. State
68824
Sankey v. Cook 1229*2, 1229*5, 1229"
Santa Ann «. Harlin
978*3
Santissima Trinidad
213
Sarahass v. Armstrong
2131
Sarbach v. Jones
9102, 91011
Sargent v. Hampden 622*,
622", 62215
Sartorius v. State
97820
Sasscer v. Farmers' Bank
21', 9788
Sauls V. State
5885
Saussy v. R. R.
2573'
Savannah, &c. R. R. v. Gray
18326
V. Holland
3912*
Saveland v. Green
35816, 5543
Sawyer v. Eifert
25733
V. Erbert
25739
Sayres v. Allen
9783S
Scales V. Desha
89129
Schaller v. State
25730
Schaser v. State
257*
Scheffler v. Minneapolis, &c. R. R. 2129,
2189
Schell V. Plumb 978*5, 9785s
Schlaff V. Louisville, &c. R. R. Co. 391^"
Schlater v. Winpenny 978**
Schlenoker v. State 9785*
Schlicht V. State 21S8
Schloss V. His Creditors 2*
Schmidt v. N. Y. &c. Ins. Co. 2572"
V. State 2765
Schnertzell v. Young 1179**
Schoen v. Sunderland 80816
School Dist. V. Ins. Co. 21", 2125, 2139
V. Tuttle 117918
School Furniture Co. v. Warsaw
School Dist. 52'
Schriedley v. State 2571"
Schroeder v. Chicago, &o. R. R. 365i°
365", 3651*
Sehubkagel v. Dierstein 6229
Sehuchardt v. Aliens 218*
Schultz V. Chicago, &c. R. R. 808"
Schuylkill Co. v. Copley
91021
Scofield V. Parlin, &c. Co.
183«, 55412,
55413
Scoggin V. Dalrymple
412*
Scotia, The
21*, 2131
Scotland, The
215
Scott V. Fletcher
25728
!i. Hillensburg
62225
V. Jackson
2118
V. Waithman
122921
V. Wood
276"
Scoville V. Baldwin
18326
Scroggin *. McClelland
5212
V. Wood
80821
Searcy v. State
588i», 58816
Seargeaut v. Seward
91018
Searls v. Kiiapp
2122
Sears v. Hayt
391*
Seavy v. Dearborn
2761, 276", 978*5
Sebree v. Dorr
358SI, 358"
Secor V. Pestana
6541, 5544
Secrist v. Green
11793-!
V. Petty
2123,211'
Seef V. State
68821
Seeley v. Engell
52'
Seguin v. Rochon
978*9
Seiber v. Price
8082'
Seip's Estate. Probst's
Appeal 6225
Selden v. Myers
8082
V. State
6222
Selsers Estate
8081
Semple v. Hagar
218
Sentell >/. State
97839
Serviss v. Stockstill
8082
Settle V. Alison
117920, 117922
Seventh Day, &c. Ass'n
V. Fisher 46322
Seward v. Garlin
Seymour v. Cowing
Shafer v. Lacock
V. State
Shaffer v. McCrackin
Sliaffner v. Cora.
Shafter v. Evans
Shailer v. Bumstead
Shaller v. Brand
Shanfelter v. Baltimore
Shank v. Coulthard
Shaw V. Bryant
V. Emery
V. State
3586
80826
391"
2766
46310
25713
526
39139, 39140^ 39141
122921, 1229-4
2115
80823
1229=6
25736
2113
V. Susquehanna Boom Co. 39129
Sharp V. Johnson 18B38 ,183*6
Shearer v. State 276'
Shearman v. Akins 4522
Shelburne Falls Nat. Bk. v. Townsley 18351
Shelton v. Hampton 97826, 97829
V. State 62220
Shepard «. Giddings 35819
V. Mo. &c. R. R. 36512, 3651', 36515
Shepardson v. Perkins 2761*
Shephard v. State 58825
Shepherd v. Busch 8O810
Sherff V. Jacobi 8O821
Sherman v. Crosby 4522
Sherrell v. Murray 2115
Sherwood v. Houston 39129, 117921
Shields v. Cunningham 978*=, 978*6
Shifflet V. Com. 58818
Shirwin v. People 25736
Shoemaker v. kellog 46313
0. Stiles 80810
Shoenberger v. Hackman 35820, 35322
Shorb V. Kinzie 1229*3
Shorey r. Hussey 9782'
Shove V. Wiley 46326, 46331, 9734, 9737
Shown r. Barr 117923
y. McMackin. 18333
ccxlvi
Shrowders v. Harper
Sliroyer v. Miller
Shubrick v. State
Sluirtleff V. Parker
Shutte V. Thompson
Sibley v. Smith
V. Waffle
AMEEICAN TABLE OP CASES.
Befereuces are to pages.
122925
2573*
212s
978*5
41210
355^', 36513
62213
Sidekum v. Wabash, &c. R. R. 36512, 36513
Sill 1:. Keese 1229«
Silliman v. Thornton 521^
Simmons v. Trumbo 2130
Simms v. Quebec, &c. R. R. 21"
V. So. Express Co. 52i2
Simon v. State 622^6
Simons v. Norton 1179**
V. I'eople 47011
V. State 52^
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Clay 1229« 122953
-, — V. Leeds 463"
V. McFarland 1229*2
Sitler V. Gehr 40327
Skelton v. Light & Power Co. 978«
Skinner v. Skinner 91018
Skipworth v. Deyell 463ii, 46.315, 46316
Slattery v. People 5545, 5835
Slaughter ;;. Bernards 117932
Sleeper v. Van Middlesworth 257**
Sloan V. N. York Central 978**, 978*6,
V. Thompson 1229W, 12291'
Slocovich V. Oriental Mut. Ins. Co. 2139
Slossen v. R. R,
Sluby V. Champlin
Small V. Clewley
Smith V. Allen
V. Asbell
V. Blagge
V. Brown
V. Butler
V. CoflSn
V. Com.
V. Groom
V. Cushman
V. Ehanert
V. Elder
V. Fenner
V. Fitzgerald
V. Forrest
V. Fowler
V. Geer
V. Gillnm
V. Kander
I'. Knowlton
V. Lane
V. Lang
V. Metropolitan R. R.
!'. Moore
V. Mussetter
V. N. B. Society 267", 39128
V. Nowells 41211
V. Old Colony, &o. R. R. 267i», 267^5
V. Palmer 5542
V. Patterson 427'
>!. Potter 117912
V. Powers 11795
25725
I229W
276W, 27612
3589
I2291'', 122915
117y22, 117926
35812, 35815
80825
91012, 91013
39161, 5889
183*3
1179*3
978'"
II791"
122929
8081
4129
5541*
42718
27611
117919
18336
46389, 46381, 97811
80819
978*8
276*
Smith V. Putnam
V. Redden
V. Rentz
V. Royalton
V. Sanford
V, Satterlee
V. Savings Bank
«. Shell
V. Smith
V. Speed
391*, 463-20
117919
46320
978*5
463", 46315
5547
62215
554', 55419
18385, 18337, 1179**
2131, 2183
V. State 257*5,3582,3586,47010,58827,
97815, 978**
V. Stevens 2132
V. Swan 122921
V. West 1179**
V. Whittier 39181, 39143, 5547
V. Zent 276'
Smitha v. Flournoy's Adm. 2120, 2121
Smoot V. Russell 52i2
Sneider v. Patterson 8085
Snodgrass v. Com. 97855
Snow V. Alley 80815
V. Grace 257**, 257*9
Snyder v. Snyder
97825
V. State
5883
Soaps V. Eichburg
5542
Societa Italiana ;;. Sulzer
80817
Solary v. Webster
8085
Solita V. Jarrow
122965
Solomon v. Dreschler
2766
V. Hughes
2115
Solomon, &c. R. R. v. Jones
978-', 9787,
9788
Solver V. Romanet
2121
Somers v. State
2110
V. Wright
46321
Somerville v. Wimhish
2118
Somerville, &c. R. R. i;. Doughty 97858
Sophia. The 808"
Soule V. Bruce 25726
South Kans. R. R. Co. v. Robbins 25735
South & N. Ala. R. R. Co. v. Wood 2137
Southern Bell Tele. Co. v. Lynch 36512
Southern Express Co. v. Thornton 122935
Southern, &c. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson 427'
S. W. School District of Bolton v.
Williams
Southwick V. Southwick
Southworth v. Hoag
Spaids V. Barrett
Spalding v. Lowe
Sparf V. U. S.
Sparhawk v. Sparhawk
Sparks v. Com.
V. Sparks
Spaulding v. Hood
V. Vincent
Spaunhorst v. Link
Spearman v. State
Spears v. Burton
V. Forrest
V. International Ins. Co.
V. Lawrence
Speer v. Coate
Spencer v. Curtis
4122
6222
2761
80820
91017
588*, 58815
91021
391**
2126, 2762, 6225, 6228
276"
62", 117910, 117914
978*6, 978*9
5882*
267*7
25727
35819
4126, 4129
2122
AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES-
Kefeiences are to pages.
ccxlvii
Spencer v. Fortescue
39129
State V. Brown 588'
, 58828, 8088, 8089
V. Langdon
117920,
117921
V. Bruce
5548, 5882
V. New York, &c. E. E.
391*
V. Buffington
6228
183*1
18336
V. Burton
5545
Spengler v. Williams
2139
V. Cadwell
622'
Spohn V. Missouri, &c. E. E.
978*5, 978«
V. Cain
3583, 39130
Spradling v. Conway
6222
V. Cake
1179**, 1179*5
Spragins v. White
522
V. Caldwell
470"
Sprague v. Sprague
122937
V. Calhoun
622*
Springfield, &e. R. E. v
Allen
80810
V. Callahan
6356
Squire v. State
18333
V. Cameron
47015
Stackus V. N. Y. R. R.
523
V. Carr
58816, 122928
Stager v. Pass. Ry. Co.
52*
V. Carrick
5881, 58820, 58821
Stallings v. Gottschalk
463"
80813
V. Cass
80821
V. Hullum
6223
V. Center 470io, 47012, 47018, 470",
V. State
39150
6228
Stamper v. Griffin
25787, 978"
V. Central, &c. E. R
35812
Stanglein v. State
II7916,
1179"
V. Chamberlain
18828
Staples V. Edwards, &c
Co.
808'
, 8081*
V. Chambers
£881, 91020
183*0
V. Church
2139
V. Wellington
80821
V. City of Dubuque
2115
Stapleton v. King
80810
V. Clark
391*', 117913
Starkey v. People
47010
V. Clifford
58815
Starr v. Com.
47012
V. Clinton
122958, 1229«i
Starratt v. Mullen
2762
V. Clothier
1179*2
State V. Abbott
2] 25
V. Cole
526
V. Ah Chuey
36520
V. Colwell
978"
0. Aldrich
4701*
V. Cook
910"
V. Allen
6355
V. Cooper
21"
V. Alston
257*
V. Coupenhaver
62223
V. Anderson
588M
, 58813
, 58826
V. Crab
635'; 9102*"
u. Angelo
978*6
V. Crawford
2766, 27618
V. Archer
2573'
, 9785*
5545
V. Arnold
365W
, 470"
V. Cronln
4703
y. Ayer
6222*
0. Croteau
521
V. Bailey
2110
2765
V. Baker
62221
V. Crowson
58810, 58825
V. Baldwin
978*'
V. Daley
25731
V. Banister
470*
V. Danforth
865*
V. Banks
39122
V. Daniel
47012
V. Barber
635*
V. Darnell
58812
V. Bartlett 11793*, 11793',
117938,
V. David
122961
1179*0
V. Dawson
635*
V. Beal
257*6
V. De Graff
58815, 122961
V. Beebe
62220
62221
V. Delesdenier
21"
V. Behrman
5883
V. Denny
2110
V. Belcher 3912, 39i9_ 39i36_ 4702
V. District Board
2138
V. Belknap
588*
V. Donelon
978*5
V. Belton
91018
910"
V. Dooley
58828
V. Benner 62222
97826
97839
978*5
V. Dooris
117913
V. Berlin
36518
V. Douglass
25781, 9105, 9106
V. Blackburn
47010
470"
V. Drake
588", 588", 58821
V. Blake
391*6
V. Duncan
58826
t,'. Blize
6352
;;. Dunwell
2120
V. Bloom
25739, 25750
V. Eddon
470*
V. Boswell
257*6
V. Edwards 5886,
9101, 9109, 91022,
V. Bowe
5888
9102*
V. Bowen
2123
V. Elliotte
47010, 47018, 47015
V. Bowman
588*
V. EUwood
978*3
0. Boyd
2132
27618
V. Branham
5888, 588*
58815
I'. Fassett
62220, 62221
V. Brascamp
2181
V. Felts
58812, 58818
V. Britt
3655
V. Fitzhugh
470', 47010
V. Brookshire
978"
97828
V. Fitzsimmous
97813, 97819
V. Broughton
5882
V. Folwell
25715
ccxlviii
AMERICAN" TABLE OP CASES.
Beferences are to pages.
3 V. Foot You
4706, 470", 47016
State V. Kidd
6227
V. Ford
2578»
V. Kimball
18380
V. Fox
391M
V. Kindle
4705, 47017
V. Freeman
391«, 978«
V. King
2578'
, 25748, 3918
V. Fritz
122958
V. Kingsbury
97846
V. Garrett
36520, 58821
V. Kinley
■ 97846
V. Garvey
5888, 58822, 58826
V. Kinney
39147
V. Gay
122982, 1229«
V. Knapp 25714, 25789,
25740, 36517,
V. Gedicke
39186
36518, 39147
V. George
5881, 58816, 9788
V. Knowles
5889
V. German
5882, 5889
V. Koontz
122961
V. Gesell
97820
V. Langford
910'
V. Gile
47010
V. Lanier
25746
V. Oilman
5888
V. Lapage
25714
V. Glyndeu
5881
V. Lee Doon
97817, 97822
V. Glynn
97861
t'. Lewis
18344, 97846
V. Godwin
62228
V. Litchfield
6355
V. Goodwin
978"
V. Lowhorne
58817
V. Gorham
58816, 58825
V. Lull
9780
V. Gossett
58819
V. Madison
5881, 58827
V. Goyette
2139
V. Marion County Ct.
2120
V. Gray
6228
V. Martin
97840
V. Gregory
3912
V. Mayes
97855
V. Gurnee
35818, 35824
V. McAllister
25782
V. Habib
58818
V. McBryde
527
V. Hagan
97818,
978" 97819, 97823
V. McClain
39180
V. Halstead
3588
V. McDonnell
5882, 5886
V. Hannibal,
&c. E
R. 18324
V. McGahey
97845, 97853
V. Hansen
58810
V. MoGill
35821
V. Hargrave
391"
V. Medlicott
4708, 47012
V. Harper
4708
V. Mellican
62223
V. Harrison
58820
V. Merrill
25729
V. Harvey
122927, 122988
V. Mewherter
62211
V. Hastings
122950
V. Michael 9104, 9195
, 9108, 91022,
V. Hawn
97846
910'4
V. Hayes
2187, 6351
V. Miller
6354. 6856, 6358
V. Hayward
ess*
V. Minnick
2119
V. Hazleton
6226
V. Mitchell
58812
V. Hedgepath
622', 91018
V. Molier
6351
y. Heed
.6352
V. Montgomery
97836
V. Henke
18334, 183«
i: Morris
2128, 2129
V. Hirsch
2763
V. Morrison
2765
V. Hodge
521, 18330
u. Moy Looke
5210
V. Hollenscheit
588'
V. Munson
5889
V. Hopkins
358"
46316, 46330, 97865
V. Murfreesboro
2112
V. Horton
3654, 3913
V. Murray
25786, 5886
V. Howard
3916, 5546, 58826,
V. Nash
47018
9102, 91021
V. NeiU
91020
V. Hoyt
6228
V. Nettlebush
4706
V. Hutchinson
117942
V. Niles
3914', 39148
V, Intox. Liq
uors
2126
V. Nixon
97847
V. Jackson
5216
V. Nocton
4709, 47014
V. James
622"
V. Norris
97881
w. Jarrett
218, 2111
V. Northrup
25731
V. Jefferson
25786
V. Pearce
9102'
V. Joest
4279
V. Pennington
2121, 91019
V. Johnson
2121,
25782, 47010, 47014,
V. Perkins
2574', 25758, 5546
470"
58816, 58828, 97844
V. Pettaway
62226
V. Jolly
91020
V. Phair
46325, 46327
V. Jones
27613,
89144, 39146, 39147
91020
4704, 58812, 58824
V. Phillips
5881
V. Jordan
978"
V. Pike
526
V. Juneau
9106
V. Plym
18388,
18334, 18340
V. Jurche
521
V. Pool
4701
V. Kelly
18380
V. Powers
2120, 2121
AMEEICAN TABLE OF CASES.
ccxlix
References are to pages.
State V. Pratt
V. Ragsdale
V. Eawls
V. Ray
V. Raymond
;;. Red
V. Reed
V. Rights
V. Rodrigues
V. Rogers
V. Rood
V. Rugan
V. Russell
V. Salge
V. Saunders
V. Sayers
V. Schilling
V. Scott
V. Severson
V. Seymour
V. Shaffer
V. Shaw
V. Shelton
V. Shuford
V. Sibley
V. Simon
V. Smith
V. Snow
V. Soper
V. Sparrow 9'
V. Spence
V. Stade
V. Staley
V. Stallings
V. Stanley
V. Staton
V. Stebbins
V. Stephen
«. Sterrett
V. Stokeley
V. Streeter
V. Sullivan
V. Swayze
— ^— V. Swift
v. Tabor
V. Talbert
V. Tally
V. Tatro
V. Taylor
!i. Terrell
V. Thomas
!'. Thompson
!'. Tilghman
V. Tompkins
V. Trivas
V. Turner
V. Tweedy
V. Twitty
V. Ulrich
V. Umble
V. Underwood
!;. Vaigneur
V. Vann
978«
978"
978«
183M 18335, 358', 635"
5881
25786, 4701", 5545, 5884
1833)
58816
529
257*6
4709, 6351
9781'', 97820
470*, 47016, 470"
122961
52"
3586
47016
2766
470*
2574
5884
4788, 47012, 47014
8654
■ 521
62226
781', 97814, 97815, 9781',
978"
1229^7
117913
97844
25746
97862
9787
635S 6356
528
6224, 62215, 62214
62224
6356, 6357
4706
183'
470W
25720
4706
62212
588"
97837, 97840
4706
2578, 97818
2138, 1229*9, 122954
526
122960, 122963, 122961,
122968
47014
6221
4706
117911, 117912
2123
4701
9109, 91010
58821, 58825
58826
State V. Vaughan
V, VoUander
V. Wagner
V. Walsh
1'. Walters
V. Walton
V. Ward
V. Warner
V. Warren
V. Watson
V. Watt
V. Walters
V. Way
V. Weiners
V. Weldon
V. Wells
V. Wentworth
V. Westfall
V. White
V. Whitson
V. Whittier
V. Whitworth
V. Williams
V. Wilner
V. Wilson
0. Wingo
V. Winningham
V. Winston
^ V. Wood
V. Woodruff
V. Woodside
V. Wright
V. Zellars
State Bank v. Curran
Steamboat Co. t. Brockett
Stearns v. Doe
V. Hall
V. Merchants' Bank
47010
91020
214, 2120, 2188, 2140,
4709
97826
2576, 257", 97844
4705
257', 97816, 1229", 1229*8
3914'
97889
6354, 6358, 97840
58812
4272
2576
36519
9102
18328, 6354
25716, 588"
470', 91011
62211
4705
910*, 9106, 91022, 91023
97816
2118, 470"
18332
1834', 4707, 4709, 47013
276'
58814
58822
3586, 46328, 62222, 6351
"654
910", 91018
18348
97816
2119
3912'
35828
97826, 97827,
Stoddard v. Burton
Stokes V. Dawes
V. Macken
V. People
V. State
Stone V. Hunt
V. Ins. Co.
V. State
Stow V. Converse
Stowe V. Bishop
Stebbins v. Duncan
Steed V. Knowles
Steele v. Lord
V. Wood
Steeples v. Newton
Stein V. Bowman
Steiner v. Jester
V. Snow
V. Stranum
Steinhoff v. M'Rae
Steinmetz i^. Versailles
Co.
Stephen v. State
Stephens v. Bernays
Stephenson v. Bannister
18324
4278
219
42716, 978», 97845
18380, 257*6, 257*9
2769
97812
39161, 58812
2578*
5541*
35818
35818, 35823
3582'
5541
2-574'
622'^
12294'
1179*1
12299
80810
Turnpike
2121
2126
117920, 117925
117925
ccl
Stertz V. Stewart
Stettaner v. White
Stevens v. Bomar
u. McNamara
V. Miles
V. R. R.
w. State
V. Stevens
V. Taft
Stevenson v. Hoy
V. State
Stewart v. Everts
V. Scott
V, Sonneborn
V. Swanzy
AMERICAN TABLE OE CASES.
References are to pages.
25726
46332
117932
18333, 18336
35811
39160
Stier V. Oskaloosa
Stiles V. Eastman
V. Estabrook
Stinchfield v. Emerson
Stinde v. Goodrich
• V. Ridgway
21
183«
35816
3588, 36522
39135
35813
526
117910, II7916, 117920,
117921, 117928
2111
635*
97834
18337
183«2
188*2, 183*3
Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge
Stokes V. U. S.
Story V. Kimball
V. Lovett
Stratton v. Hawks
Strauss v. Bodeker
V. Gross
Street v. State
Strickler v. Burkholder
Stringfellow v. State
Strode v. Churchill
Strong V. Bradley
V. Brewer
Strother v. Christy
V. Lucas
Stroud V. Tilton
Stuart V. Havens
Stubbs V. State
Studley v. Hall
Studstill V. State
1179"
122953
117938
122912
358"
80828
257', 25720
2763
11792', 117928
117938
122929
117944
122952, 122959
4639, 463", 46319, 46322
36510, 36511, 36513
211S
6222*
2125
StuU V. Thompson
Stumm V. Hummel 3653
Sturla V. Freccia _ 11798
Succession of Delachaise v. Magin-
nis
276*
Succession of Justus
117913
Succession of Morvant
12292',
122935
Sullivan v. Collins
8085
V, Cora.
4709
V. Hense
216
V. Kuykendall
18351
V. Lear
8082*
V. State
470*
V. Sullivan
91021
Sumner v. Blair
9783*
97885
Sun Accident Ass. v. King
91018
Susquehanna, &c. Ins. Co.
V. Mar-
dorf
3589
35810
Sutton V. Johnstone
526
Swain v. Cheney
46312
463=1
V. Cnmstock
2112
Swan V. Humphreys
622W
• V. Morgan
4528
Swann v. Housman 9101'
Sweet V. Sherman 2573', 97354
Sweigart v. Ricliards 122969
Swift V. Mass. &c. Co. 391"
Swift Electric Light Co. <;. Grant 97852
Swink V. French 427io
Swinnerton u. Columbia Ins. Co. 213o, 2189
Syme v. Stewart 529, 5212
Tait v. Hall
Talbot V. Seaman
Talbott V. Hedge
Tarns V. Bullitt
Tarbox v. State
Tate V. Penne
V. Tate
Taulman v. State
Taylor, Re,
Taylor v. Bank
V. Crockett
V. Evans
V. Godfrey
V. Gould
V. Horsey
V, Peck
V. R. R.
V, State
3916
521*, 11793
12293*, 122936
218*
25710
62226
4526, 62215, 62216, 635*
91018
3911
117912
80820, 80821
622'
526
452*
39165
5542
3913', 55413
5881, 58816, 58821,
978", 97818
62215
Tays V. Carr
Teachout v. People
Teall V. Van Wyck 122916
Tedens ?;. Schumers 2573'
Teese v. Huntingdon 257*6, 25753
Teipel v. Hilsendegen 52*
Temple v. State 470*
Temple St. Cable R. R. v. Hell-
man 27613
Templeton v. Morgan 21"
Tennant v. Dudley 5548, 5549
Tenney v. Tuttle 2572'
Tennis v. Rapid Transit Ry. Co. 39128
Tensley v. Penniman 35812
Terra Haute R. R. r. Stockwell 35816
V. Voelker 52*
Terrill v. Beecher 4632, 4635
Territory v. Ely 12299
Terry v. Birmingham Nat. Bk. 46330
Tessmant). Supreme Commandery 11792'
Tessmann v. United Friends 117918
Tewksbury v. Schulenberg 213*
Texas, &c. Coal Co. v. Lawson 46311, 97889
Texas, &c. R. R. v. Barron 3913*
V. Black
2185
V. Chapman
52*
V. Robertson
S9116
Thayer v. Boyle
25728, 257*'
Theilmann v. Burg
2118
Tliird Nat. Bank v. Owen
978'
Thom V. Hess
55412, 55418
Thomas v. Cora.
2113, 2188
V. Dunn
1229*
V. Hammond
808'
V. Herrall
39136
V. Gage
554*
AMEKICAN TABLE 0:F CASES.
cell
Beferences are to pages.
Thomas v. Griffin
II. Kennedy
V. People
V. State
V. Thomas
Thompson v. Bell
!). Boston
I'. Erie Railway Co.
6228
80821
183', 25735, 257"
1229^7
1838'
80821
2573
12292
V. German Valley B. Co,
V. Haskell
V. Ish
V. Maxwell
V. Musser
V. State
V. Stewart
('. Wertz
Thomson v. Porter
Thomson-Houston
Palmer
62218
2118
.39139
80810
117912, 117913
97812, 97843
216, 11792^ 117915
978«
463', 4638, 46313
Electric Co. e;.
35820
5542
1179«
80825
122921, 122924
91011, 91012
358"
391*2
Thornton v. Thornton 97827, 978^5
Thorp V. Goewey 622"
Thraslier v. Everhart 52", 5215
V. Ingram 117919, 117920, 11792',
117926, 11792'
Threadgill v. White
Thurman v. Cameron
Thurmond v. Clark
Thurston 0. Masterson
V. Whitney
Tibbals v. Iffland
Tilk V. Parsons
Tillie, The
Tillotson V. Warner 117935, 117986
V. Webber 1179^
Tingley v. Fairharen Land Co. 391™
Tinker v. State 21S9
Tisdale v. Conn. &o. Ins. Co. 18335
Titus V. Ash 257« 25763, 978«
Tobacco Co. v. McElwee 5546
Tobias v. Treist 978*2
Tobin V. Shaw 18326, 391«
Todd V. Rowley 257«
Toledo, &c. R. R. v. Bailey 978*2
Tolman v. Emerson 183", 18318, 122922
V. Ward 8082*
Tolson V. Inland, &c. Coasting Co. 276io
Tome V. Parkersburg Brancli R. R.
122963, 122966
Tomlinson v. Greenfield 2129
Toms V. Beebe 6228
Tooker v. Gormer 5542
Toole V. Nichol 9783*
Toomer v. Gadsden 46313
Toplitz V. Hedden 978**
Torbert v. Wilson 1179«
Totten V. XJ. S. 622^0
Towle V. Blake 39136
Town of So. Ottawa v. Perkins 21io
Townsend v. State 521
Traction Co. v. Board of Works 11791,
117936, 1179", 1179*2, 1179*6
Trammell v. Hndmon 4526
V. McDade 97826
V. Pilgrim 8082
Travellers Ins. Co.u. Sheppard 391", 39116
Travis v. Brown 122959
Trenier v. Stewart 213*
Trimble v. Edwards 213i, 358"
Trout V. Virginia R. B. 628
TrujiUo V. Terr. 97820, 978^2
Tucker v. Constable 39161
V. Donald 39182
V. Finch 6226
V. Hyatt 122962
V. Peaslee 218*, 3913
V. Smith 4125, 4129
V. State 2124
V. Welsh 978*9
Tudor Iron Works v. Weber 3656
Tufts V. Charlestown 5546
Tuley V. Barton 8O8IO, 808", 8O8I'
TuUy V. Fitchburg R. R. 36518, 36522
Tunstall v. Cobb 1229**, 122961
Turnbull v. Payson 218, 117919, 117937
V. Richardson
Turner v. Dewan
V. Fish
V. Luning
V. State
V. Turner
V. Waddington
V. Warren
Turner's Estate
Turney v. State
Turnipseed v. Hawkins
Turnpike Co. v. Hearn
Tuttle V. Fitchburg R. R.
V. Gridley
V. Kainey
Tutton V. Darke
Tylden v. BuUen
Tyler v. Flanders
V. Old Colony R. B.
V. Todd
Tyson v. Booth
117939
2182
4523
216
257"
36519, 4706
80821
1179"
6226
6226
97826
1229*0
257*1
2572
910", 91012
122938
2128
I22918
427*
39126
1229*'
25716
Udderzook v. Com. 2135, 35520
Udy V. Stewart 52', 3656
Ufford V. Spaulding 5215
Uhlman v. Arnholdt, &c. Brewing Co. 18361
UUman v. Babcock
12296'
Union v. Plainfield
4273, 427*
Union Bank v. Knapp 46319, 46320
Union Pac. R. R. v.
Botsford 365', 3659,
36510, 365"
V. Reese
978*5
Union Stove Wks. v
. Arnoux 8082
Unis V. Charlton
97747
U. S. u. Amedy
213, 117930
V. 4000 American Gold Coin 2130
V. Anthony
183*
V. Babcock
183*9, 18353
V. Battiste
521
V. Beebe
21', 2120, 11796
V. Bredemeyer
26786, 257*'
V. Eritton
85818
V, Burns
2127
V. Charles
62221
V. Collins
3655
cclii
U.S.
AMEKICAN TABLE OF CASES.
Eeferences are to pages.
V. Ducourneau
2188
V. Fuller
218, 2121
II. Gooding
18322
V. Gunnell
25781)
V. Hanway
6351
V. Harries
635'
V. Hay ward
276*
V. Heath
4704
V. Jackalow
2134
V. Jackson
2122
V. Johns 212 117911, nygso
V. Jourdine 391^1
V. Kirkwood 6881
V. La Vengeance 21^4
V. Mayfield 6889
V. Moses 62225
V. Nardello 39143
V. Nott 58816, 58821
V. Palmer 2]4
V. Eeyburn 3582
II. Keynes 21'
V. Richard 58823
V. Ritchie 219
«. Ross 18321, 1834'
V. Schneider 470"
V. Teschmaker 2139
V. Turner 21i6
V. Union Pac. R. R. 2131
V. Van Leuven 6358
V. Vansickle 25746, 2574', 25749
. II. Wiggins 18321, 11792
• I). Williams 5881"
V. Wood 6351, 6352
U. S. Bank v. Burson 46313
U. S. Sugar Refinery v. E. P. AUis
Co. 3583
U. S. Vinegar Co. v. Foehrenbach 117912
Vahle v. Braekenseik 21i9, 2124
Valentine v. Piper 18348, 122910
Van Alstyne v. Smith 6228, 8O821
Van Bokkelen v. Taylor 808', 8082'
Van Buskirk v. Mulock 1179", 117912
Vance v. Vance 2573'
Vanderlin v Hovis 808^
Vandervoort v. Columbian Ins. Co. 117918
Vanderwerker 11. People 2120
Van Deusen v. Turner 412'
Van Gunden v. Va. Coal & Iron Co. 358"
Van Kirk v. Scott 808'
Van Riper v. Morton 11791
Van Sickle v. Gibson 4278
V. People 122968
Van Storch v. Griffin 25738
Van Svckel v. Dalrymple 8O8I8
Van Wyck v. Mcintosh 122943, 12296',
122988, 122963
Vass's Case 4706, 47016
Vastine v. Wilding 18324
Vaughan v. Com. 47012, 588"
V. State 6356
Velten v. Carmack 80823
Viall V. Smith 4278, 427ii
Vickers v. Battershall
Vicknair v. Trosclair 8O820, 91020
Vicksburg R. R. </. O'Brien 39118, ggjig^
39124, 9782
V. Putnam 39133
Vignie v. Brady 80826
Vigus V. O'Bannon 2764
Village of Ponca !,-. Crawford 39129
Village of Winooski v. Gokey 2I12
Vinal V. Oilman 43680
Vincent v. State 9108, giQe^ 91022
Vining v. Baker 18324
Vinton V. Peck 3653, 122952, 122954, 122901
Violet V. Rose 12293'
Volkenand v. Drum
Voorhies v. Hennessy
Vosburgh v. Thayer 4636, 4638
Vose V. Manly 117934
Vriets v. Hagge 27619
Waddelb v. N. Y. &e. R. R. S9123
Waddingham v. Hulett 25744, 25745
Waddington v. Cousins 122968
Waddle v. Owen 8084
Wade V. State 9105, giQo
Wakefield v. Ross 910", 91012
Walbridge v. Jones 427'
Waldele v. N. Y. Cen. &c. E. 4703
Walden v. Canfield 213i
V. Finch 97862
Walker v. Allen 2135
D. Curtis 528
;;. Detroit, &c. R. R. 276", 97882
V. Greenlee
3581
V. Marseilles
4526
V. Murray
4271
V. Sanborn
6222
V. State 4702, 588i, 9104, giQW,
91023
V. Steele
122943
V. Stetson
525
V. Wheatly
80828
Wall V. Dovey
463", 46321
Wallace v. Fletcher
1834', 18348
V. Harris
18326
V. Howard
4278
V. Kennelly
2184
V. State
47016
V. Townsend
3588
V. White
25763
Waller v. Eleventh School District 3581"
V. Graves
25
Walston V. Com.
470", 47018
Walter v. Hoeffner
97888
Walton V. Coulson 183",
122910, 122919,
122921, 122923
Ward, Estate of
463-!8
Ward V. Henry
2119
V. Mcintosh
183-24
V. Saunders
117989, 117940
V. State
58814
V. Young
9782'
Ware v. Ware
2768, 27614
Warener v. Kingsmill
1179", 117949
Waring v. U. S. Telg. Co.
5544
Warlick v. White
3658, 36521
Warner v. Com.
117930
V. State
9105
Warren v. Chapman
97829
V. Gabriel
97825, 97829
Washabaugh v. Entriken
117920
Washington v. State
97815, 978«
Waterman v. Whitney
391W, 391"
Watkins v. Holman
1179*
V. Paine
3588
Watrous v. McGrew
117931
Watson V. Brewster
3918»,
4278, 122933
V. Com.
6354, 635'
V. Miller
SOSi", 978^ 978"
V. Tindal
18333
AMEEICAN TABLE OP CASES.
References are to pages.
Whitaker v. Salisbury
ccliii
V. Walker 212, 11792^ 11798^ 117911
Watts V. Kilburn 12298, 122910
V. Owens 427^
Wau-kon-chaw-neek-kaw v. XJ. S. 978*^
Way V. Butterworth 622^3
1.-. Cross 463"
Weathersly v. Weathersly 808"
Weaver v. Gainsville 8O8I0
V. McElhenor 21^5
V. Whildeu 1229=0
Webb V. State 978", 978^
Webber v. Dunn 554^
Weber v. Cable Ey. Co. 523
. lUing
Webster v. Calden
V. Woodford
Wedgwood's Case
Weeks v. Medler
Weitman v. Thiot
Welch V. Abbot
Welder v. MoComb
Welland Canal Co. v.
8085
1179«
Wells V. Hatch
V. Jackson Iron Mfg. Co.
Wells, &c. Ex. V. Fuller
Welsh V. Barrett
V. State
Wendell v. Abbott
Wendt V. St. Paul
Wentworth v. Wentworth
Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co. 391*, 391=
West V. Fleck 808"
V. State 18322, 18339, 4527^ 4795^ 122927,
122959
117949
80816
122921
978«, 978*0
117921
Hathaway 358",
654M
46312
2118, 2133
898"
46332
2763
4125, 117946
97836, 97830
18338
Western XJ. Tel. Co. 0. Cline
V. Collins
V. Henderson
- — V. Shotter
V. Stevenson
Wetherbee v. Dunn
V. Norrls
Wetzler v. Kelly
Wharton v. Douglass
Wheat V. State
Wheeldon v. Wilson
Wheeler v. Webster
Wheelock v. Boston & Albany E. Co. 523
Whelan v. Lynch 39152
Whitaker v. Parker 1229*o
3581', 85821
35810
39134
35810
358*
2119
257S1
2129
80821
2765
21
21*0
97821, 122913,
1229" 122915
46327
391*9
520
9105, 9106
1179*9
18353
V. White
Whitcher v. Shattuck
White V. Ballou
V. Com.
V. Dwinel
V. Fleming
V. Milwaukee City B. E. 865", 365ia
V. Phoenix Ins. Co. 2137
V. Solomon 12295
V. State 58813, 97327^ 97329
V. Strother 42712
V. Whitney 468*, 46313, 46321
V. Wood 12291*
White Sewing Machine Co. v. Gor-
don 1229*3
Whitehead v. Jessup 8083
V. Park 8080
Whitehouse v. Bickford 117933, 117912
Whiting V. NichoU 1833*, 13336^ 13336
Whitley v. Eq. Life, &e. Co. 18830
V. State 47017
Whitman v. Morey 97827
V. Shaw 122924
V. State 2113, 2180
Whitmore v. Dwelling House Ins.
Co. 183*9
Whitney v. Bacon 4127
V. Bayley 3580
V. Clark 8O8IO
V. Gauche 213*
V. Thacher
V. Wall
Whiton V. Albany, &c. Ins. Co. 2132, 2139
1179', 11797
Whittier v. Franklin 257*2
Whitton V. State 183*
Wickencamp v. Wickencamp 978=4
Wickersham v. Johnston 52i2, II791*,
117929, 117982
Wiggin V. Plumer 122928
Wiggins Ferry Co. v. C. & A. E. Co. 215
Wiggles worth v. Steers
Wike I'. Lightner
Wilber v. Eicholtz
Wilbur V. Flood
Wilburn ;;, State
Wilcox V. Henderson
V. Cate .
Wilder v. Cowles
Wildrick v. Swain
Wiley V. Athol
V. Ewalt
Wilhelmi v. Leonard
Wilkerson v. State
Will of Ehle
Willett V. Eich
Williams v. Brickell
V. Cora.
V. Conger
V. Deen
V. Finlay
V. Fisher
V. Grealy
25750
122902
97839, 97841
358"
27612
80810
2768
80810
8915
80820, 80821
9783*
470*, 6224
183*3
2763
35810, 35817
3911
122963
122927
529, 5216
8081
62*
ccliv
AMEEICAN TABLE OF CASES.
Beferences are to pages.
Williams v. Grey 358i», 358ii
V. Gunter 4638
V. Jenkins 8082»
V. Mitchell 18316, 1834s
V. MovTer 554i
V. People 2765
V. State 2180, 2IS1, 25736, 588^ 58812,
58816, 58827, 58823^ 91020, 97825, 12294b,
122981
V. Wager 978i
V. Walker 978«
V. Waters 358i*, 808^
V. Wilkes 11792", 117939
V. Williams 117926
Williamson v. Brandenberg 21 29
V. Cambridge R. K. 39126
Willink V. Miles 1179«
Willis V. State 58826, 58828
Willoughby v. Carleton 122912
V. Dewey 218*
Wills V. State 4709, 978*8
Wilmer v. Israel 4636
Wilmington v. Burlington 427''
Wilson V. Beauchamp 365'
V. Boerera 470^
V. Carpenter's Adm'r 2571^
V. Deen 8O8I8
V. Derr 808i», 8O8I1
D. Goodin 46312
V. Granby 89136
V. Higbee 8O821
V. McClenny 80828
V. Melvin 2766
V. Minneapolis, &o. R. R. 35816, 358"
V. Phoenix, &c. Co. 117922
V. Powers 80826
1;. State 257*8, 257*9, 978", 97815,
9782*
2128, 2129^ 526, 122927
97836
463*, 4635, 463', 4638
35819
55413
5216
122950, 122950, 122951
18328, 3586
I22916
4272
8589, 35810
V. Van Leer
V. Wager
V. Wilson
V. Wright
Wilt V. Bird
V. Cutler
Wimbish v. State
Wimer v. Smith
Winch V. Norman
Winder v. Little
Wing V. Abbott
Winnipiseogee Lake Co. 0. Young 21 1^,
2120, 2138
Winship v. Connor
Winslow V. Covert
V. Driskell
Winston v. Browing
Winters v. Earl
Wisdom V. Reeves
Wise V. Wynn
Wiseman v. N. Pao. R. R.
Witclier v. McLaughlin
Witliee V. Rowe
Woburn v. Henshaw
Wolf V. Lachman
V. Perryman
Wolfe V. Dyer
1838*
978*8
808-'5
8082
80819
554*, 122928
4272, 4278, 427'
35810, 35820
4278, 46326
3652, 36-58
62216
358"
25786
8086
Wolfe V. McMillan
Wollf u. Van Housen
Womack v. Dearman
V. Wamble
Wonderly v. Holmes Lumber Co
Wood V. Chetwood
V. Cullen
V. McGuire's Children
V. Moriarty
V. V. S
97889
218, 117937, 117989
6222
30829
97854
80828
25719
Woodbeck v. Keller 635i, 6358
Woodbridge, &c. Co. v. Ritter 117927
Woodbury v. District of Columbia 97888,
9788*
V. Woodbury 4638
Woodbury Granite Co. v. Milliken 522
Woodford v. McClenahan 122927, 122928
Woodman v. Segar 1229^0, 122919
Woodrick v. Woodrick 978**
Woods V. Banks 117982
V. People 25786
V. Wilder 2180
Woodward v. Chicago, &c. R. R. 2120
V. Hancock 52'
V. Leavitt 6222*
Woodworth v. Mills 257'*
Woolfork V. State 257", 58812
Woolsy V. Trustees 97856, 1179*9
Woolverton v. Sumner 91018
Wooster v. State 39151
Wooten V. Wilkins 4708
Worcester Nat. Bank v. Cheney 2120
V. Northborough 11791
Workingmen's Bank v. Converse 21"
Worley, Adm. v. Hineman 183**
Wormsdorf v. Detroit, &c. Ry. 257*2
Worthington v. Scribner
Wray v. Wray
Wrege v. Westcott
Wright V. Gay
V. Hawkins
V. Hersey
V. 111. &c. Tel. Co.
V. McKee
62219, 62225
18381
5547, 55411
80819
218, 2112
122958
62225
257-^8
V. Phillips 2122
V. Skinner 183=8
V. State 588*
V. Wright 218*, 2768
Wroe V. State 25782, 47013^ 47015, 97839,
978*1
Wynn v. City, &c. R. R. 35823
Wynne v. State 86519
Yates v. State 58821, 5882*
V. Yates 1229**
Yearsley's Appeal 4631^
Yeaton v. Fry 215, 216
Yell V. Lane 21=3
Yerkes v. National Bank 21^
York V. Pease 97856
York, &c. R. Co. u. Winans 21'
Youn V. Lamont 2762
Young V. Bank of Alexandria 117912
V. Bradv 978*5
V. Chandler 1179='
AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES.
Keferences are to pages.
cclv
YouDg V. Clapp
183«
Youngs V. HefEner
1838*, 183"
68818
Yount !;. Howell
212, 216
25733, 2673^
V. Makepeace
3655
Zelch v. Hirt
8082S
97826
Zellerbach v. AUenberg
35819
Younge v. Guilbeau
X179«
Zoldowski V. State
97813
A
PRACTICAL TREATISE
ON THE
LAW OF EYIDENCE.
PART I.
NATUEE AND PEINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE.
CHAPTER I.
PEEHMINAKY OBSERVATIONS.
§ 1.^ Evidence, in Law, includes all the legal means, exclusive
of mere argument, which tend to prove or disprove any fact the
truth of which is submitted to judicial investigation. It and the
word proof are often used as synonyms. Accurate logicians,
however, apply the latter term rather to the effect of evidence, than
to evidence itself.^ That high degree of evidence which is called
demonstration excludes all possibility of error, and mathematical
truth alone is susceptible of it. Such evidence cannot be obtained
in the investigation of matters of fact, of which the most that can
ever be said is, that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them.'
In trials of fact, therefore, the true question is not, whether it is
possible that the testimony may be false, but whether there is
sufficient probability of its truth ; that is, whether the facts are
proved by competent and satisfactory evidence.
§ 2.* By competent (or admissible) evidence is meant that which
the law requires, as the fit and appropriate proof in the particular
case — such, for instance, as the production of a writing, where its
contents are the subject of inquiry. By satisfactory evidence,
sometimes called sufficient evidence, is intended that amount of
proof which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind beyond
1 Gr. Ev. § 1, in great part. remarks, that, thougli capable of de-
* See Wills, Cir. Ev. 2 ; Whately's monstration, they are admitted by
Log. B. ii. o. iii. § 1 ; N. York Civ. most men solely on the moral evidence
Code, § 1660. of general notoriety. Id. 196. See
3 See Gamb. Guide, 121. Even of N. York Civ. Code, § 1662.
mathematical truths this writer justly * Gr. Ev. § 2, almost verbatim.
T. VOL. I. 1 B
PRELIMINARY OBSEEVATIONS. [PAET I.
reasonable doubt. The circumstances wMch will amount to this
degree of proof can never be previously defined ; the only legal
test of which they are susceptible is their sufficiency to satisfy the
mind and conscience of an ordinary man ; and so to convince him
that he would venture to act upon that conviction in matters of
important personal interest.^ Questions respecting the competency
or admissibility of evidence are entirely distinct from those which
respect its sufficiency or .effect. The former are exclusively within
the province of the court ; the latter belong exclusively to the jury.^
§ 3.' The law of Evidence may be considered under three
general heads, namely, First, The Nature and Principles of
Evidence ; — Secondly, The Object of Evidence, and the Rules
which govern its production ; — And, Thirdly, The Means of Proof,
or the Instruments by which facts are established. We will also,
in connection with the first head, consider what matters the courts
will notice without proof ; and in connection with the second and
third heads, offer a few observations respecting the functions of
the judge, as distinguished from those of the jury.
§ 3a. The present is a convenient place to mention that, by the
Short Titles Act, 1892 (iS Yict. o. 10), short titles are given by
statute to various Acts of Parliament (no less than 810), and that
in the following pages this short title is stated between inverted
commas ; while the technical reference to the Act is also added, one
or the other of these references being placed in brackets. Moreover,
where a statement in the text is founded on a decision of the House
of Lords, it is marked " H. L.," while if founded on one of the
Courts of Appeal or Privy Council, it is marked " C. A." or " P. C,"
American cases being distinguished by the mark " (Am.)," Irisb
cases by " (Ir.)," and Scotch authorities as " (So.)." On the other
hand, if it is founded on a dictum of a particular judge, his name
is generally given in brackets after that of the case in which it was
uttered (whether at Nisi Prius or in the course of a judgment
given in banc). The date of every case w^hich is important in
estimating its value is given, and every known reference to it will
be found in the Table of Cases.
> 1 St. Ev. 578. Hayward, 1780 (BuUer, J.).
' 1 Ph. Ev. *3 ; Carpenters' Co. v. » Gr. Ev. § 3, in great part
* N.B. — This and similar references throughout the work are to "Phillipps
and Arnould on Evidence." o
USAP. I.] AMERICAN NOTES. -^
AMERICAN NOTES.
§ 1. Evidence Defined. — Evidence is that which shows. Legally,
it is any fact which, either directly or mediately, tends to show to
the mind the truth of a fact or proposition submitted to legal inves-
tigation. Miles V. Edden, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 270 (1864) ; Schloss v. His
Creditors, 31 Cal. 201 (1866).
This definition includes both direct and circumstantial evidence,
though as was said in an Iowa case (Davenport v. Cummings, 15 la.
219, (1863), "direct and positive evidence cannot with a critical
regard to accuracy be spoken of as tending to prove an issue." If
believed, it proves it.
"Fact." — The definition of "evidence" is obviously incomplete
until the term "fact" used in defining it is itself defined. But
"fact" is a term exceedingly difficult of definition. So difficult,
that Sir James Eitz-James Stephen frankly abandoned it. In the
first edition of the "Digest of the Law of Evidence" "fact" is
defined as, " (1) Everything capable of being perceived by the
senses ; (2) Every mental condition of which any person is con-
scious ; (3) Every part of a fact is itself a fact." As pointed out by
a careful critic in the " Solicitors' Journal " (20 Sol. Journal, 869,
(1876), this definition on application breaks down, — e. g. when
attempted to be incorporated into the rule that evidence can only be
given of facts in issue or facts relevant thereto. The "fact in
issue " may be, for example, the existence of negligence, something
clearly not " capable of being perceived by the senses," nor yet a
" mental state of which a person is conscious." The force of this
criticism was promptly recognised by Mr. Stephen, who contijnts
himself in later editions with the statement that " fact includes the
fact that any mental state of which any person is conscious exists."
This is apparently correct. What A.'s motive was in taking a
mortgage or other transfer is a question of fact for the jury.
Wheelden v. Wilson, 44 Me. 1 (1857) ; Hamburg v. Wood & Co.,
66 Tex. 168 (1886). For the same reason, "where the intent
with which an act was done becomes material, it is proper to ask
what it was." Over v. SchifiSing, 102 Ind. 191 (1885) ; Barnhart v.
Fulkerth, 93 Cal. 497 (1892) ; Stevens v. Stevens, 150 Mass. 557
(3889). So purpose is a question of fact. Homans v. Corning,
60 N. H. 418 (1880). The same cases hold that the person whose
mental state is in question may properly testify as to it. But what
a witness supposed A. thought as a motive for what A. did, is not a
competent inquiry. McHugh v. Dowd, 88 Mich. 412 (1891) ; Clement
V. Cureton, 36 Ala. 120 (1860). For a similar reason, a witness
cannot be asked what A. " understood " by a designated parcel of
real estate. "It must be difficult, to a degree bordering on the
22 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
impossible, for one person to testify, of his own knowledge, what
the understanding of another was, to any given question. Such
testimony is not to a fact; it must be merely an opinion, a con-
jecture as to a fact. Clearly this is as far as possible from legal
testimony." Gorham v. Gorham, 41 Conn. 242 (1874).
Without attempting to define " fact " it may be suggested that
tiie fundamental idea of "fact" is that which exists. As a thing
cannot both be and at the same time not be, that which exists
is the truth or fact of the matter. About this central thought of
real or true existence, seem to cluster various uses, all associating
with the word " fact " the ideas of truth, verity, accomplishment,
actually happening, &c. Thus the Latin factum implies some-
thing done, an act or deed, something accomplished or done. The
same word, factum, represents the instrument of conveyance which
actually accomplished the transfer of land, — a " deed " as now
called. Probably the phrase " free act a.nd deed," like many
other similar formulaB, is tautological, the words having nearly the
same meaning. So an oflS.cer de facto is one in actual existence
and discharging certain functions, whatever the rights of the de jure
claimant may be. The colloquial use of the word " fact " will be
most often found to embody the same conception of actual, real
existence.
This conception of fact is by no means limited to tangible objects
or those perceived by the senses. The phrase goes further, for the
purpose of including mental processes. A thought, intention, emo-
tion ; any mental state or feeling ; the truth of propositions phrased
by the intellect, are matters of " fact." Whatever has existence is
a fact. A question of fact is an inquiry into the truth or existence
of something. It is of course only such as are in issue that are the
subject of evidence.
It may be objected that under this definition the existence of a
rule of law is a question of fact. Strictly speaking, such is the
case. Where no special cotisiderations are involved, — for example,
in regard to the law of foreign countries or, in most instances, the
law of other States of the Union, — this is recognised to be true.
The existence of a rule of law of a foreign state or country is purely
a question of fact, and appropriate evidence is introduced to prove
it as a fact.
For especial reasons, the existence of the rules of law or standards
of conduct which any domestic tribunal is established to enforce in
its own jurisdiction, are not legally treated as other matters of fact,
to be established by evidence, but are within the duty, knowledge,
and perception of the judge, without need of the intervention of evi-
dence. These matters of fact are separated from others and called
matters of law, judicially noticed by the Court. See post p. 21^
Not only are such rules of law as are judicially noticed by the
CHAP. I.j AMERICAN NOTES.
23
Court excluded from the definition of fact, but also that part of the
method of procedure which consists of, reasoning from the facts
established by evidence to the ultimate facts in issue. This is the
faculty of judgment, the formation of an opinion. It is the same
faculty as is exercised by the expert witness, and is, under these
circumstances, called "Matter of opinion." Excluding from the
entire list of facts as above illustrated those which are " Matter of
law " and " Matter of opinion," we have a residuum which for want
of a better name, or more precise definition, we call "Matter of
fact."
A Double Meaning. — The phrase "evidence," even as used
by the Courts, frequently presents a double meaning and more
or less consequent confusion. The phrase is used to designate
(1) The effect of relevant facts upon the facts in issue, — e. g., the
fact that A. has always paid for food ordered in his name by B. is
said to be " evidence " of B.'s agency, if such agency be a fact in
issue ; (2) The statements of witnesses (or other means) by which
these relevant facts are, in the first place, themselves sought to be
established, — e. g., in the above instance, statements of witnesses
that they have been paid by A. under the circumstances mentioned,
are also said to be " evidence " of such payment. Strictly speaking,
the correct use of the phrase is the second. The probative effect
of relevant facts is a matter of logical reasoning.
"Evidence" and "Pboof." — "Evidence" and "proof" are so
frequently confused as to emphasise the necessity of avoiding collo-
quial equivalents for technical words. The confusion is so common
that a request for a ruling that a confessedly competent fact tending
to show negligence in an action where negligence is in issue, " is
not in itself ^TOrt/ of negligence " was held properly refused (Perry
V. Dubuque S. W. R. Co. 36 Ta. 102 (1872), as a ruling calculated
to mislead the jury. The Court say the instruction requested laid
down " a correct legal principle. . . . In a legal sense _p)'oo/ signifies
the effect of evidence as contradistinguished from evidence which
implies the medium or means of proof. But in ordinary language
the terms are used interchangeably."
So where a statute required " proof " of the publication of a
notice and the Court allowed such publication to be proved by
affidavit, the ruling was sustained on the ground that there is " an
obvious difference between the words evidence and proof. The
former, in legal acceptation, includes the means by which any
alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investiga-
tion, is established or disproved. The latter is the effect or result
of evidence. These words are often used indiiferently as expres-
sive of the same thing."
" Testimony." — A similar confusion follows the frequent use of
the word "testimony" as synonymous with "evidence." They
2* AMEEICAil NOTES. [PAKT I.
are not synonymous. The distinction between them is well stated
in Lindley v. Dakin, 13 Ind. 388 (1859). In the upper court the
record recited that it embodied "all the testimony taken in the
Court below." Held : that this could not be so construed as to
amount to a statement of setting out the evidence. "Testimony is
not synonymous with evidence. It is but a species or class or
kind of evidence. Testimony is' the evidence given by witnesses.
Evidence is wliatever may be given to the jury as tending to prove
a case. It includes the testimony of witnesses, documents, admis-
sions of parties, &c." This is cited with approval in Harvey v.
Smith, 17 Ind. 272 (1861).
"Cumulative Evidence." — Some difference of opinion exists
as to what evidence is to be considered cumulative. It is not
disputed that cumulative evidence is correctly defined in Parker v.
Hardy, 24 Pick. 246 (1837) as " additional evidence of the same
kind to the same point." But the cases, while agreeing as to the
rule, differ as to its proper application. Certain authorities hold
that where a fact is in issue, any evidence tending to prove that
fact is cumulative to any previous evidence tending to prove the
same fact, even though the later evidence differs somewhat in its
character from that which has preceded it. For example, the
turning-point of the case being whether a certain bill of exchange
had been left at a bank for collection before noon of a certain day,
and evidence of time of the leaving being gone into by various
witnesses, newly discovered evidence that a clerk, whose duty it
was to register the receipt if received before noon, did not register
the receipt until the following day, because not received until after
noon, was held cumulative. People v. Superior Court of the City of
New York, 10 Wend. 285 (1833). The Court intimate that evidence
that the plaintiff had been in such other places at the time in ques-
tion as to render the deposit impossible as and when he claimed it,
would not be cumulative. So where the fact in issue is the
existence of a partnership between the plaintiff and defendant,
newly discovered evidence that certain foods were ordered sent in
a way tending to show a partnership is said to be cumulative,
because it " tends to support the fact or issue which was before
attempted to be proved upon the trial." Olmstead v. Hill, 2 Ark.
346 (1840). So evidence tending to discredit a witness by showing
contradictory statements is cumulative to other evidence tending to
discredit the same witness in another way. Glidden v. Duulap, 28
Me. 379, 383 (1848).
On the other hand, other American courts incline to the view that
evidence tending to establish a fact in issue in a particular way is
not cumulative to evidence tending to establish the same fact in a
different way.
For example, the question being whether A. had authorised B.
CHAP. I.] AMEEICAN NOTES.
25
to sell a certain horse, and much evidence other than admissions
of the plaintiff having been received, a new trial was granted for
newly discovered evidence that the plaintiff had admitted the author-
ity in dispute. The Court, by Morton, J., say, " This, therefore, is
a new kind of evidence, and although it is additional to other evi-
dence tending to prove the same position, yet it is not cumulative
because it is of a different character tending to establish the same
general result by proof of a new and distinct fact." Parker v.
Hardy, 24 Pick. 246 (1837). The same result is reached in Waller
V. Graves, 20 Conn. 305, 310 (1850), where, in an action of libel,
and in support of the defence that the libellous language was
inserted without the defendant's consent and without his knowl-
edge, newly discovered evidence of an independent witness that he
himself inserted the libellous matter, was held not cumulative to
the defendant's denial that he used the libellous epithets in the
article as written by him. Church, C. J., speaking for the Court,
says : — " There are often various distinct and independent facts
going to establish the same ground on the same issue. Evidence is
cumulative which merely multiplies witnesses to any one or more
of the facts before investigated, or only adds other circumstances
of the same general character. But that evidence which brings to
light some new and independent truth of a different character,
although it tend to prove the same proposition or ground of claim
before insisted on, is not cumulative within the true meaning of
the rule on this subject." As an instance of their meaning, the
Court take the case of an executor resisting a claim based on an
alleged note of the deceased, and after an adverse verdict discover-
ing a receipt in full, or learning of the plaintiff's deliberate admis-
sion of payment. " There could be no question," they say, " in
such a case, but a new trial should be granted, although the new
facts go to prove the former ground of defence."
It would seem that the weight of reasoning was in favour of the
position taken by the Massachusetts and Connecticut cases.
The extent to which cumulative evidence is admissible is discre-
tionary with the Court. A party will not be permitted unduly to
waste time by multiplying witnesses to the same fact.
§ 2. Competent Evidence. — Competent Evidence is that which
is admissible, as tending to prove the existence or non-existence of
facts in issue. The definition points to a central fact in the law
of evidence, viz.; — that it is based upon logic. In fact, the modern
trial is an appeal to the test of reasoning, as the result of a long
historical development from other tests of truth, more mechanical,
sacramental and formal, used by ancestors more or less remote. The
rules of correct reasoning are at every turn regarded as essential to
the due administration of judicial functions. The Court is charged
with the duty of enforcing this rule of correct logical reasoning.
25
AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
If its coadjutor in trials of fact, the jury, sees fit to depart froni
such a line of reasoning, whether under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or other improper motive, it is the dutj' of the Court to
correct the fault, even to the extent of nullifying a verdict which
appears to have been reached under such influence. The duty is
not, it will be observed, to enforce the particular reasoning which
commends itself to the Court. It is sufficient that a line of correct
reasoning has been adopted by the jury, even if the Court itself
would have adopted a different one. If the verdict is justified on
logical principles, it usually will stand. If the verdict is not so
justified, it is the duty of the Court, in discharge of its responsi-
bility to enforce the use of correct reasoning (even, as has been
said, if not the Court's view of the particular line of correct reason-
ing it would adopt for itself), to set the verdict aside.
It naturally follows that a Court charged with the responsibility
of insisting on the observance of the rules of logical reasoning will
permit the jury, which it holds within these rules, to consider only
such facts as meet the same requirement, i. e., which have a logical
tendency to establish the existence or non-existence of the fact or
facts whose existence is in issue or in dispute. This rule is not
only a restriction upon the admissibilitj'^ of facts in evidence, but it
also states the test which makes them admissible. As has been
said, it is the fundamental rule of evidence that all facts which
logically prove or disprove the existence of facts in issue, are
admissible.
Consideration of the law of evidence so largely consists in exam-
ining the established exclusions of properly logical evidence, and the
instances in which these exclusions themselves do not apply, that
this first and principal rule of the law of evidence — that evidence
logically tending to establish the issue is admissible — is frequently
lost sight of. Unless a special reason be shown for excluding facts
with a logically probative tendency, such facts are admissible.
Eelevancy. — This logical relation of one fact to another, is
termed "relevancy." Of this the law furnishes no test. The test
is furnished by the ordinary principles of logic or a conscious per-
ception of the relation. A legal definition of relevancy was indeed
courageously attempted by Sir James Fitz-James Stephen in the
first edition of the " Digest of the Law of Evidence," based largely
on the relation of causation. This definition was abandoned. The
amended definition seems free from objection. Two facts are rele-
vant to each other when so related " that, according to the common
course of events, one, either taken by itself or in connection with
other facts, proves or renders probable the past, present, or future
existence or non-existence of the other." (Dig. Law of Evid. Art. 1.)
The Kule Further Examined. — Such being the fundamental
rule of evidence, that all evidence logically probative is admissible,
CHAP. I.J AMERICAN NOTES.
27
the further law of evidence consists of excluding certain facts of
the evidence otherwise admissible under this fundamental general
rule. The law of evidence becomes, therefore, so to speak, a series
of exclusions. These owe their existence principally to two lines
of considerations, — • (1) The necessity for trying cases within
reasonable limits of time ; (2) The presence of the jury. These two
considerations may be examined briefly.
(1) Legal Relevancy. — The search for abstract truth, scien-
tific or otherwise, is not usually limited in time. No fact relevant
at all is too remotely relevant to deserve consideration. No press-
ing necessity usually exists that the precise fact should be ascer-
tained this year or next year, or, indeed, within the next century.
Under such conditions, logic is given its unimpeded course. All
facts logically relevant demand and receive consideration.
But the course of trials in Courts of law by no means admits of
such extended search into the rainutise of proof. The tribunal sits
for a limited time, and frequently is called on to dispose of many
contested matters within that period. The proceedings are expen-
sive, both to parties litigant, to those awaiting their turn (often
with witnesses held from gainful occupations by a compulsory pro-
cess), and to the government through the pay of jurors, Court officers,
&c. There is a recognised necessity that matters should be as
speedily disposed of as the interests of justice will admit.
This consideration was neatly put by Rolfe, B., in Atty.-Gen. v.
Hitchcock (1 Exch. 91, (1847). "The laws of evidence on this
subject, as to what ought and what ought not to be received, must
be considered as founded on a sort of comparative consideration of
the time to be occupied in examinations of this nature, and the time
which it is practicable to bestow upon them. If we lived for a
thousand years, instead of about sixty or seventy, and every case
were of sufiicient importance, it might be possible, and perhaps
proper, to throw a light on matters in which every possible question
might be suggested, for the purpose of seeing by such means
whether the whole was unfounded, or what portion of it was not,
and to raise every possible inquiry as to the truth of the statements
made. But I do not see how that could be ; in fact, mankind find it
to be impossible. Therefore some line must be drawn."
(2) Feae of the Jury. — A very distinctive feature of the English
law of procedure, of which the law of evidence is part, lies in the
fact that a jury frequently takes a share in the trial of causes. It
involves no disparagement to the benefits, real or assumed, of the
jury's presence to say that obvious dangers to the administration
of justice have always been recognised as arising from it. The
average jury is composed of men selected by chance from the
general community, brought together for a short time and for a
limited object, with minds usually entirely untrained in the dif-
2^ AMEKICAN NOTES. [PAUT I.
ficult art of justly balancing the weight of conflicting statements.
Jurymen, almost of necessity, are seldom given to reasoning with
logical exactness, and are therefore apt to jump across logical
chasms or breaks in a chain of proof ; especially at times when
sympathy or prejudice is aroused, or the fascinating process of
adjusting or, as it were, dovetailing together separate pieces of
evidence is nearly completed, and only fails for lack of a little
imagination. Above all, the jury at all times has been, as is
natural with so casual a tribunal, but little impressed with any
feeling of responsibility for maintaining the integrity of legal
rules or the influence of precedent in the administration of justice.
It has accordingly usually manifested a strong tendency to over-
look the more important remote consequences of maintaining a
general rule for the purpose of relieving the hardship of individual
cases.
Exclusions. — For these and similar reasons, the law of evidence
excludes much evidence logically relevant, either (1) By applying a
higher standard of relevancy than mere logic by requiring a certain
high grade of probative effect, which may be called legal relevancy ;
and (2) By absolutely excluding certain facts both logically and
legally relevant. What facts are so highly probative as to comply
with the standard of legal relevancy cannot be reduced to a definite
rule. The innumerable rulings on the subject will be found to
depend rather upon the personal views and mental processes of
particular judges than upon any more definite rule. The positive
exclusions, on the other hand, generally admit of definite state-
ment.
CHAP. II.] MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICED.
CHAPTEE ir.
MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICE n, WITHOUT PROOF.*
§ 4.^ All civilised nations, as members of tlie great famUy of
sovereignties, give political acknowledgment of each other's
existence, and general public and external relations. After such
acknowledgment by their own country, the existence and titles of
a state are recognised by the public tribunals and functionaries of
every nation in the civilised world.^ If, upon a civil war, one
part of a nation separate from the other, and establish an inde-
pendent government, the newly-formed nation cannot be recognised
as such by the judicial tribunals of other nations, until it has been
acknowledged by the sovereign power under which those tribunals
are constituted.* The judges of each nation are bound, ex officio,
to know whether or not their government has recognised a nation
as an independent state.*
§ 5. In like manner the judges must recognise, without proof,
the common^ and statute law,' and all legal claims, demands,
estates, titles, rights, duties, obligations, and liabilities existing by
1 See N. York Civ. Code, §§ 1705, _ » Taylor v. Barclay, 1828. There
1706. it was falsely alleged in the bill, with
* Gr. Ev. § 4, in great part. the view of preventing a demurrer,
■' United States of America v. that Guatemala, a revolted colony of
Wagner, 1867 (Ld. Chelmsford, Ch.). Spain, had been recognized by Great
But the existence of States unac- Britain as an independent state ; but
knowledged by the government must the V.-O. took judicial notice that
be proved by evidence, showing that the allegation was false. See, how-
they are associations formed for ever, contra. Bolder v. Bk. of Eng.,
mutual defence, supporting their 1805, as to which qy.
own independence, making laws, and ' Hein. ad Band., L. xxii. t. iii.
having courts of justice. Yrisari v. § 119.
Clement, 1826. ' E. v. Sutton, 1817 ; " The Inter-
* City of Berne v. Bk. of Eng., pretationAot,1889"(52 &53 V.c.63),
1804. § 9. As to private Acts of Pari., see
8 & 9 V. c. 113, § 3, cited post, § 7.
3 b2
LAWS JUDICIALLY NOTICED.
[part I.
the common law, or hj any custom, or created by any statute ; '
the rules of equity, and all equitable estates, titles, rights, duties,
and liabilities^ (while whenever the rules of equity and of the
common law differ, those of equity must prevail') ; the law of
nations, the law and custom of parliament, and the privileges and
course of proceedings of each branch of the legislature ; * the pre-
rogatives of the Crown,' and the privileges of the royal palaces ; °
the maritime law ; ' the ecclesiastical law ; ^ the articles of war,
whether in the naval,^ the marine, or the land service,'*' including
those made for the government of the forces in India,'' as well as
the auxiliary forces, — that is, the militia, the yeomanry, and the
volunteers,'^ — and also the reserve forces ; " the rules of procedure
made in pursuance of § 70 of the Army Act, 1881, " whether
signified under the hand of a secretary of state " in relation to
the army,'* or promulgated by the admiralty with respect to the
marines ; '^ royal proclamations, such being acts of State ; '® the
1 36 & 37 V. 0. 66, § 24, sub-sect. 6 ;
40 & 41 V. c. 57, § 27, sub-sect. 6, Ir.
2 See 36 & 37 V. c. 66, § 24, sub-
Beot. 4. See, also, as to Ireland, 40
& 41 V. c. 57, § 27, sub-sect. 4, Ir.
s See 36 & 37 V. c. 66, § 25,
Bub-sect. 11. See, also, Bustros v.
White, 1876, 0. A. ; and Palmer v.
Palmer, 1885. See, also, as to Ireland,
40 & 41 V. c. 57, § 28, sub-sects. 11,
29.
* Lake v. King, 1667 ; Stockdale
V. Hansard, 1830; Wason v. Walter,
1869 ; Oassidy V. Steuart, 1841 ; Case
of the Shefi. of Middlx. 1840 ; Sims
V. Marryat, 1866; Bradlaugh. v. Gos-
eet, 1884.
^ E. V. Elderton, 1703.
» Id.; Winter u. Miles, 1808; Att.-
Gen. V. Donaldson, 1842. Hampton
Court bas ceased to bave privileges
as a royal palace, Att.-Gen. v. Dakin,
1869 ; E. V. Ponsonby, 1844.
' Chandler v. Grieves, 1812.
8 1 EoU. Abr. 526 ; 6 Vin. Abr.
496; Sims v. Marryat, 1866 (Ld.
Campbell).
s 29 & 30 V. 0. 109 ("The Naval
Discipline Act, 1866," amended by
"The Naval Discipline Act, 1884,"
47 & 48 V. c. 39).
i» See § 69 of "The Army Act,
1881" (44 & 45 V. 0. 58). As to
printing of, and amendments to the
above, see 48 V. o. 8, § 8. See,
also, as to the Articles of War, § 179,
sub-sects. 1, 20, of the same Act as
to the Eoyal Marines. The latter
articles, it is presumed — though the
Act is silejit on the subject — must
be judicially noticed.
" Id., § 180.
« Id., §§ 175—178.
'3 Id., § 190, sub-sect. 9.
" Id., § 70, sub-sects. 1, 3, amended
by 49 V. c. 8, § 5.
^^ Id., § 179, sub-sect. 6.
i« Dupays v. Shepherd, 1698 (Ld.
Holt). In Van Omeron v. Dowick,
1809, Ld. Ellenborough refused to
take notice of a proclamation, on the
ground that the Gazette containing
it was not produced. The latter case
does not go the length of the mar-
ginal note, but simply decides that,
■when a judge's memory is at fault,
some document must be at hand to
establish the fact he is called upon
to notice. Copies of royal proclama-
tions, if purporting to be printed by
the Queen's printer, are admissible
by 8 & 9 V. c. 113, § 3; see post,
§ 7. They may be proved, also, in a
variety of other ways. See 31 & 31!
V. 0. 37, § 2, cited post, § 1527.
CHAP.
II.]
CUSTOMS JUDICIALLY NOTICED.
general practice of conveyancers ; ' the custom of merchants,'' — at
least where such custom has been settled by judicial determina-
tions,'— such, for example, as the lien which a vendor has on
goods remaining in his possession for unpaid purchase-money ; * or
the general lien of an innkeper on all the property belonging to
his guest for the entire amount of his bill ; ^ or the general lien of
bankers and factors on the securities of their customers in their
custody ; ^ or the practice of drawing bills of lading in sets, and of
dealing with one of a set as representing the cargo independently
1 Willougliby V. "Willougliby, 1Y87
(Ld. Hardwicke) ; Doe v. Hilder,
1819; Doe i;. Plowman, 1819; Eowei).
Grenfel, 1824 (Ld. Tenterden). Ld.
St. Leonards, in 3 V. & P., 10th edit.
(1839), at p. 28, observed (tbe passage
does not appear in recent editions, in
consequence of the chapter on the
subject of Attendant Terms, having
become of little practical importance),
"It matters very little what is the
opinion of any individual convey-
ancer; but the opinion of the con-
veyancers, as a class, is of the deepest
importance to every individual of
property in the state. Their settled
rule of practice has, accordingly, in
several instances been adopted as
the law of the land, not out of respect
for them, but out of tenderness to
the numerous purchasers who have
bought estates under their advice."
See, also, Howard v. Ducane, 1823
(Ld. Eldon) ; He Eosher, 1884 (Pear-
son, J.).
^ Erskine v. Murray, 1728 ; Soper
V. Dibble, 1696 ; Carter v. Downish,
1687 ; Williams v. "Williams, 1693.
' Barnett v. Brandao, 1843, where
judicial notice was taken of the
general lien of bankers on the secu-
rities of their customers in their
custody, and Ld. Denman (pronounc-
ing the judgment of the court) said,
' ' The law merchant forms a branch
of the law of England; and those
customs, which have been universally
and notoriously pi'evalent amongst
merchants, and have been found lay
experience to be of pubUo use, have
been adopted as a part of it, upon a
principle of convenience, and for the
benefit of trade and commerce : and
when so adopted, it is unnecessary
to plead and prove them. They are
binding on all without proof. Ac-
cordingly we find that usages affect-
ing bills of exchange and bills of
lading, are taken notice of judi-
cially " ; and then gives as in-
stances the judicial recognition of
the general lien of factors and
bankers. This judgment was after-
wards reversed by the House of
Lords (see Brandao v. Barnett, 1846),
but that portion of it which relates
to judicial notice of the general lien
of bankers was affirmed. In Edie v.
E. India Co., 1761, Mr. Just. Wilmot
observed, ' ' The custom of merchants
is part of the law of England, and
courts of law must take notice of it
as such. There may, indeed, be some
questions depending upon customs
amongst merchants, where, if there
be a doubt about the custom, it may
be fit and proper to take the opinion
of merchants thereupon ; yet that is
only where the law remains doubt-
ful, and even then the custom must
be proved by facts, not by opinion
only; and it must also be subject to
the control of law." In support of
the proposition that evidence can only
be taken as to mercantile custom
where the law is doubtful, the learned
judge says, that Ld. Mansfield,
with Denison and Foster, JJ.'s, re-
jected the testimony of witnesses to
prove the usage, solely on the ground
that the question had already been
solemnly settled by two adjudications
in the courts of law. See also Jones
V. Peppercorn, 1859.
* Imperial Bk. v. Lend, and St.
Katherine's Dock Co., 1875 (Jessel,
M.S.).
' Mulliner v. Florence, 1878, C. A.
' See cases cited ante, n. ^, supra,
p. 5 ; also Lend. Chart. Bk. of Aus-
tralia V. White, 1878.
5
CUSTOMS JUDICIALLY NOTICED.
[part I.
of the rest ; ^ or the usage among money dealers of treating scrip
certificates payable to bearer, whether of a foreign Grovernment or
of a company, as negotiable instruments transferable on delivery ; ^
or the custom of hotel-keepers holding their furniture on hire ; '
the customs which regulate the special descent of gavelkind and
borough English lands,* and it seems any other custom incident to
such tenures ; ' the custom or law of the road, viz., that horses
and carriages should respectively keep on the near or left side ;* and
the following rules with respect to navigation,— first, that ships
and steamboats, on meeting " end on, or nearly end on, in such a
manner as to involve risk of collision," should port their helms, so
as to pass on the port, or left, side of each other ; next, that steam-
boats should keep out of the way of sailing ships ; and next, that
every vessel overtaking another should keep out of its way.' Every
court will moreover take judicial notice of matters appearing in its
own proceedings. Therefore, if in the course of a case it appear
that an indictable conspiracy has been committed, it will take
• Sanders v. Maclean, 1883.
' Goodwin v. Eobarts, 1876, H. L. ;
Eumball v. Metrop. Bk., 1877.
3 Crawcour v. Salter, 1881, 0. A.
* 1 Bl. Com. 76; Doe v. Souda-
more, 1705 ; Crosby v. Hetberington,
1842 (Tindal, C.J.).
5 Eider v. Wood, 1855 ("Wood,
V.-C), following Payne v. Barker,
1659. See also 36 & 37 V. c. 66,
§ 24, sub-sect. 6.
^ See Leame v. Bray, 1814, as to
carriages, and Turley v. Tbomas,
1837 (Coleridge, J.), as to saddle
horses. See also 14 & 15 V. o. 92,
§ 13, Ir. Tbe rule bas been em-
bodied by Professor Selwyn, in what
an Etonian would call ' ' Longs and
Shorts:" — "Sed preoor hoc posthac
reminisoere, carpe sinistram : Dex-
tram occurrenti linquere norma
jubet." In Prance the law of the
road is different, and horses and
carriages pass on the off side.
'' The Eegulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, containing the rules
concerning lights, fog signals, steer-
ing and sailing, were embodied in a
table issued originally under § 25 of
25 & 26 V. c. 63, since repealed by
" The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894"
(57 & 58 V. c. 60), which substitutes
for it Id., § 418 (1), and of two Orders
in Council, dated respectively 11th
August, 1884 (printed 9 P. D". 247),
as to British ships and boats, and
14th August, 1879 (printed 4 P. D.
241), as to foreign ships. As to how
these regulations are to be published
and proved, see § 26 of the original
Act, and for this § 419 (5) of "The
Merchant Shipping Act, 1894," is
substituted ; and by § 28 of the original
Act (§ 419 (3) of "The Merchant
Shipping Act, 1894"), any damage
arising from the non-observance of
these Eegulations shall be prima facie
presumed to have been caused by
the wilful default of the person in
charge of the deck of such ship. See
post, § 206 ; Gen. St. Navig. Co. v.
Hedley, 1869; Dryden v. AUix, 1863;
The Concordia, 1866; The Spring,
1866. As to the prior law, see Chad-
wick V. City of DubUn St. Packet
Co., 1856; Smith v. Voss, 1857;
Zugasti V. Lamer, 1858 ; Maddox v.
Pisher, 1851; Williams v. Gutch,
1857; Tuff V. Warman, 1857. See
Morrison v. Gen. St. Navig. Co.,
1852; Gen. St. Navig. Co. v. Mor-
rison, 1856 ; Gen. St. Navig. Co.
V. Mann, 1855 ; Lawson v. Oarr,
1856; Churchward v. Palmer, 1856;
La Plata, 1855; Morgan v. Simj
1858.
CHAP. II.] LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF FOREIGN STATES.
judicial notice of tlie fact though it be not pleaded.^ It will also
judicially notice the particular customs which have been tried,
determined, and recorded in such court.^ The customs of London,
which have been certified by the recorder,' such, for example, as
the custom of foreign attachment * — the custom that every shop is
a market overt for the sale of goods of the same kind as usually
sold there ^ — the custom that married women may be sole traders^
— and the custom which defines the nature of a liveryman's office,' —
will be judicially noticed by the courts in which the certificates
are recorded.^ No one court can, however, take notice of a custom
merely because it has been certified to another.® Neither can
judicial notice be taken of the usages prevalent among mining
partnerships conducted on the cost-book principle, for the judges
cannot determine without evidence the meaning of the term
" cost-book principle." ^^ Nor, again, will the courts take cognisance
of the laws, usages, or customs of a foreign state ; and even the
laws of the colonies," or Jersey,'^ Guernsey, or Scotland, must be
proved as facts,'' unless steps have been taken, either under the
1 Soott V. Brown, 1892.
' See Crawcour v. Salter, 1881,
0. A.
^ Crosby v. Hetlieringtoii, 1842 ;
Bruin v. Knott, 1842 ; Blacquiere v.
Hawkins, 1780 (Ld. Mansfield). See
Blunt V. Lack, 1857. Uncertified
customs of London must be proved
in tbe High. Court, though, they will
be judicially noticed in the City
Courts : Stainton and wife u. Jones,
1779 (Ld. Mansfield). So, also, the
Q. B. Div. in Ireland will not judi-
cially notice a custom of the Lord
Mayor and Sheriff's Court in Dublin,
unless certified by the recorder :
Simmonds v. Andrews, 1839 (Ir.).
1 Certified by Starkey in 22 Ed. 4.
See 1 Eoll. Abr. 554 K 5 ; Bruce v.
Wait, 1840 ; Crosby v. Hetherington,
1842 ; Westoby v. Day, 1853.
6 Certified by Sir E. Coke, 5 Eep.
83 b (rather fuller, as L'Evesque de
Worcester's case, 1594). See Lyons
V. De Pass, 1840. See, also. Crane
V. London Dock Co., 1864 ; Har-
greave v. Spink, 1892.
* Lavie v. Philb'pa, 1765. Local
customs, as that of carting whores
in London, and foreign attachment
in Bristol, Exeter, Liverpool, and
Chester, need not be set out on the
record of a court of the city, as they
are judicially noticed in the courts
and of the respective cities (1 Dougl.
380, n. 96), as they also will be lu a
court of error. See Bruce v. Wait,
1840.
' King V. Clerk, 1695 ; cited
(Parke, B.) in Piper v. ChappeU,
1845.
* The customs as to distribution of
the personal estate of intestate free-
men in London, York, and other
places, are abrogated by 19 & 20 V.
c. 94.
' Piper V. ChappeU, 1845 (Parke,
B.).
•" In re Bodmm United Mines Co.,
1856.
'' Prowse V. The European & Amer.
St. Shipping Co., 1860.
^^ Brenan's case, 1847 (Patteson,
J.).
" Urquhart v. Butterfield, 1888,
C. A. ; Dakymple v. Dalrymple,
1811 ; Mostyn v. Eabrigas, 1774 (Ld.
Mansfield) ; Sussex Peer, case, 1844 ;
Maleu. Eoberts, 1800 (Ld. Eldon);
K. r. Povey, 1865 ; Woodham v. Ed-
SEALS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. [PAET I.
British Law Ascertaininent Act, 18o9,i or under the Foreign
Law Ascertainment Act, 1861,2 ^^ obtain a legal opinion on the
subject from a superior court of the country whose laws are under
dispute.' The laws of Ireland being substantially the same as
those of England, except where varied by statute, a very able
judge has suggested that the English courts would probably
judicially recognise them.*
§ 6. The courts will also judicially notice the following seals : —
the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, and the Great Seals of
England, Ireland, and Scotland respectively ; ' the Queen's Privy
Seal and Privy Signet, whether in England, Ireland, or Scotland ; '
the Wafer Great Seal, and the Wafer Privy Seal, framed under the
Crown OfBce Act, 1877 ; ' the seal, and the privy seal, of the duchy
of Lancaster ; the seal, and the privy seal, of the duchy of Corn-
wall ; ' the seals of the old superior courts of justice ; and of the
Supreme Court, and its several Divisions ; the seals of the old
High Court of Admiralty, whether for England or Ireland ; * of
the Prerogative Court of Canterbury ; '" and of the Court of the
Yice- Warden of the Stannaries ; *' the seals of all courts con-
stituted by Act of Parliament, if seals are given to them by the
Act; '2 amongst which are the seals of the Court for Divorce and
Matrimonial causes in England ; ^' of the Court for Matrimonial
causes and matters in Ireland ; ^* of the Central OfBce of the
Poyal Courts of Justice, and of its several Departments ; ^' of the
Principal Registry, and of the several district Registries of the
Supreme Court of Judicature ; '' of the Principal Registry, and
of the several district Registries of the old Court of Probate in
wards, 1836; Wey v. TaUy, 1704; ' 40 & 41 V. c. 41, § 4.
Story, Confl. § 637, and cases cited « 26 & 27 V. c. 49, § 2.
in n. See also post, §§ 48, 1423— » Green v. Waller, 1703 ; 24 & 25
1425. V. c. 10, § 14, now repealed by 44 &45
1 22 & 23 V. c. 63. V. c. 59 ; 30 & 31 V. c. 114, § 21, Ir.
i* 24 & 25 V. 0. 11. i» Kempton v. Cross, 1735.
3 See Lord v. Colvin, 1860; Login " 6 & 7 W. 4, o. 106 ("The Stan-
V. Princess of Coorg, 1862. naries Act, 1836 "), § 19.
* Reynolds n.Fenton, 1846 (Maule, '^ Doe v. Edwards, 1839.
J., explaining Ferguson v. Mahon, '' 20 & 21 V. c. 85 ("The Matri-
1839). monial Causes Act, 1857 "), § 13.
» Lord Melville's case, 1806. " 33 & 34 V. o. 110, § 11, Ir.
« Poggassa's case, 1349, cited in " E. S. 0. 1883, Ord. LXI. rr. 1,
Olive V. Guin, 1658 ; Lane's case, 6, 7.
1687. »• 36 & 37 V. c. 66, § 61.
CHAP.
11.]
SEALS JUDICIALLY NOTICED.
England ^ and of the present Court of Probate in Ireland ; " of
the old ' and new Courts of Bankruptcy ; * of the Insolvent
Debtors' Court/ now abolished ; of the Court of Bankruptcy and
Insolvency in Ireland^ (which, since the 6th of August, 1872, has
been called " The Court of Bankruptcy in Ireland) ; " ' of the
Landed Estates Court, Ireland ; * of the Becord of Title OfSoe of
that Court ; ^ and of the County Courts.'" Courts of law also judi-
cially notice the seal of the corporation of London." The seal of a
foreign or colonial notary-public will not generally be judicially
noticed, although such a person is an officer recognised by the
whole commercial world. '^ Yarious statutes render different other
seals admissible in evidence without proof of their genuineness.'^
1 20 & 21 V. c. 77 (" The Court of
Probate Act, 1857"), §22.
i* 20 & 21 V. c. 79, § 27, Ir.
3 See 24 & 25 V. c. 134, § 204, and
32 & 33 V. c. 71, § 109.
* See 46 & 47 V. c. 52, § 137 ;
and tlie Baukruptoy Rules of 1883,
r. 12. See, also, r. 14, as to seals on
" office copies."
^ Doe V. Edwards, 1839.
8 20 & 21 V. o. 60, § 362, Ir.
' 35 & 36 V. c. 68, § 6, Ir.
8 21 & 22 V. c. 72 (" Tlie Landed
Estates Court (Ireland) Act, 1858 "),
§ 8, Ir.
3 28 & 29 V. c. 88, § 66, Ir.
i» 51 & 52 V. c. 43, § 180.
" Doe V. Mason, 1793 (Ld. Ken-
yon).
12 Ee Earl's Trusts, 1858 ; EeDavis's
Trusts, 1869 (as to seal of a foreign
notary public); Nye v. Macdonald,
1870 (as to seal of colonial notary
public); see, however, contra. Anon.,
1799; Hutoheon v. Mannington,
1802; Cole v. Sherard, 1855; and
Furnell v. Stackpoole, 1829 (Ir.).
'' Such as the seals of the Local
Government Board for England (34
& 35 V. 0. 70, § 5) ; or Ireland (35 &
36 V. c. 69, § 4, Ir.) ; of the late Poor
Law Board, 10 & 11 V. c. 109 (" The
Poor Law Board Act, 1847 "), § 5 ; 1
& 2 V. c. 56 (" The Poor Eehef (Ire-
land) Act, 1838"), §121, Ir.; 10 &
11 V. 0. 90 (" The Poor Belief (Ire-
land) Act, 1847 "), § 3, Ir. ; of the late
Local Boards of Health (11 & 12 V.
c. 63, § 35 ; 21 & 22 V. o. 98, s. 4) ;
and of Urban Sanitary Authorities
(38 & 39 V. c. 55, § 7) and Joint Sani-
tary Boards (38 & 39 V. c. 55, § 280 ;
41 & 42 V. c. 52, § 13, Ir.); of the
now abolished Commissioners for the
Sale of Encumbered Estates in Ire-
laiid (12 & 13 V. c. 77, § 2, Ir. ; see 21
& 22 V. c. 72, § 23, Ir.) ; of the Land
Eegistry Office in England (see 25 &
26 V. c. 63, § 123 ; see also 38 & 39
V. c. 87, § 107), whether established
under the Act of 1862 or under that
of 1875; of the District Eegistry
Offices created under the Act last re-
ferred to (38 & 39 V. c. 87, § 120) ;
of the Office for the Eegistration of
Assurances of Lands in Ireland (13
& 14 V. c. 72. § 45, Ir.) ; of the Irish
Land Commi ■sion (44 & 45 V. c. 49,
§42, Ir.); of the General Eegister Office
in England (6 & 7 W. 4, c. 86, § 38 ;
see 3 & 4 V. c. 92, § 9), or Ireland
(26 & 27 V. 0. U, § 5, Ir.); of the
Charity Commissioners for England
and Wales (16 & 17 V. c. 137, §6;
and see 18 & 19 V. c. 124, § 4,
amended by 60 & 61 V. o. 49, and
§ 5 thereof as to copies and certified
extracts, and the presumption that
sealed copies are originals) ; of the
EaiLway Commissioners (51 & 52 V.
c. 25, § 2) ; of the Commissioners of
Her Majesty's Works and Public
Buildings (16 & 16 V. c. 28 ("The
Commissioners of Works Act, 1852 "),
§ 1 ; 37 & 38 V. c. 84, § 2) ; of the
Board of Agricultiore, which, speak-
ing generally, now discharges the
duties of the old Inclosure Commis-
9
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ACT, 1845. [PART I.
§§ 7—8. The Documentary Evidence Act, 1845 ^ extended the
principle of admitting in evidence official documents without
formal proof, to a numerous class of cases. That statute enacts,
that " whenever hy any Act now in force or hereafter to he in force,
any certificate, official or public document, or document or pro-
ceeding of any corporation or joint-stock or other company, or
any certified copy of any document, by-law, entry in any register
or other book, or of any other proceeding, shall he receivable in
evidence of any particular in any court of justice, or before any
legal tribunal, or either House of Parliament, or any committee
of either House, or in any judicial proceeding, the same shall
respectively be admitted in evidence, provided they respectively
purport to be sealed or impressed with a stamp, or sealed and
signed, or signed alone, as required, or impressed with a stamp
and signed, as directed by the respective Acts made or to be
hereafter made, without any proof of the seal or stamp, where a
seal or stamp is necessary, or of the signature, or of the official
character of the person appearing to have signed the same, and
without any further proof thereof, in every case in which the
original record could have been received in evidence." By sect. 2,
sioners, Copyhold Commissioners, established under " The Patents,
and Tithe Commissioners (45 & 46 Designs, and Trade Marks Act,
V. c. 38; (see 52 & 53 V. c. 30 1883" (46 & 47 V. c. 67, § 84);
("The Board of Agriculture Act, and of the Record Office, whether
1889"), especially § 6, and see also in England (1 & 2 V. c. 94 ("The
"The Settled Land Act, 1882" (45 Public Record Office Act, 1838"),
& 46 V. c. 38), amended by "The § 11) or in Ireland (30 & 31 V.
Settled Land Act, 1884 " (47 & 48 V. c. 70, § 18, Ir.). In aU proceedings,
u. 18)) ; of the respective Commis- too, under the -winding-up clauses of
sioners for the Universities of Oxford the Companies Act, 1862, the seal of
and Cambridge (40 & 41 V. c. 48, any office of the Court of Chancery,
§§ 4, 9) ; of the Prison Commissioners or Bankruptcy, in England or in
for England, and of the General Ireland, of the Court of Session in
Prisons Board for Ireland (40 & 41 Scotland, or of the Court of the Vice-
V. c. 21, § 6, and c. 49, § 4, Ir.); of Warden of the Stannaries, when ap-
the special Commissioners for Irish pended to any document made, issued.
Fisheries (26 & 27 V. c. 114, § 33, or signed under those clauses, or any
Ir. ; continued by 31 & 32 V. c. Ill ; official copy thereof, must be judi-
and amended by 32 & 33 V. c. 92, Ir.); cially noticed (25 & 26 V. c. 89, § 126).
of the Commissioners of Public ' 8 & 9 V. c. 113. The author
Works in Ireland, at least- for the naturally felt satisfaction in refer-
purposes of the Drainage Acts (26 & ring to this statute, as he originally
27 V. 0. 88, §§ 3, 6, Ir. ; 29 & 30 V. suggested to the Law Amend. Soc.
c. 49, § 21, Ir.), and of " The Settled the alterations embodied therein, and
Land Act, 1882 " (45 & 46 V. c. 38, prepared the biU founded on them,
§§ 48, 65, sub-sect. 9); of the office which was carried by Ld. Brougham.
10
CHAP. II.] PROOF OF COLONIAL LAWS.
" all courts, judges, justices, masters in chancery, masters of courts,
commissioners judicially acting, and other judicial officers, shall
henceforth take judicial notice of the signature of any " judge of
the Supreme Court of Judicature,^ "provided such signature be
attached or appended to any decree, order, certificate, or other
judicial or official document." By sect. 3, " all copies of private
and local and personal Acts of Parliament not public Acts, if
purporting to be printed by the Queen's printers, and all copies of
the journals of either house of Parliament, and of royal procla-
mations, purporting to be printed by the printers to the Crown, or
by the printers to either House of Parliament, or by any or either
of them, shall be admitted as evidence thereof by all courts,
judges, justices, and others, without any proof being given that
such copies were so printed." **
§ 9. As to colonial Imvs, an Act of 1865' provides that "the
certificate of the clerk or other proper officer of a legislative body
in any colony, to the effect that the document to which it is
attached is a true copy of any colonial law assented to by the
Governor of such colony, or of any bill reserved for the signification
of Her Majesty's pleasure by the said Governor, shall be prima
facie evidence that the document so certified is a true copy of such
law or bill, and, as the case may be, that such law has been duly
and properly passed and assented to, or that such bill has been
duly and properly passed and presented to the Governor ; and any
proclamation purporting to be published by authority of the
' " The Judicature Act, 1873 " or at Ms own discretion, to direct
(36 & 37 V. c. 66). tliat the same shall be impounded,
* By § 4, forgery or false printing and be kept in the custody of some
any of the documents referred to officer of the court or other proper
above (or, by 31 & 32 Vict. o. 37, person, until further order touching
§4, cited post, § 1527 in note, any the same shall be given, either by
proclamation) is made a felony, such court, or the court to which
punishable by penal servitude, or such master or other officer belonged,
imprisonment for not less than a or by the persons or person who con-
year ; and it also is provided that, stituted such court, or by some one
"whenever any such document as of the equity or common law judges
before mentioned shall have been of the superior courts at Westminster,
received in evidence by virtue of on application being made for that
this Act, the court, judge, commis- purpose." § 5 enacts, that the Act
sioner, or other person officiating shall not extend to Scotland. Sea
judiciaUy who shaU have admitted 24 & 25 V. c. 98 ("The Forgery Act,
the same, shall, on the request ©f 1861 "), §§ 27—29.
any party against whom the same ^ 28 & 29_V. c. 63 ("The Colonial
is so received, be authorised, at its Laws Validity Act, 1865 "), § 6.
11
FOEEIGN AND COLONIAL DOCUMENTS. [PAET I.
Governor in any newspaper in the colony to whicli suoh law or
bill shall relate, and signifying Her Majesty's disallowance of any
such colonial law, or Her Majesty's assent to any such reserved
bill as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of such disallowance
or assent."
§ 10. As to foreign and colonial documents, Lord Brougham's
Evidence Act of 1851 ^ enacts, that " all proclamations, treaties, and
other acts of state of any foreign state, or of any British colony,
and all judgments, decrees, orders, and other judicial proceedings
of any court of justice, in any foreign state or in any British
colony, and all affidavits, pleadings, and. other legal documents
filed or deposited in any such court, may be proved in any court
of justice, or before any person having by law or by consent of
parties authority to hear, receive, and examine evidence, either by
examined copies, or by copies authenticated as hereinafter men-
tioned : that is to say, if the document sought to be proved be a
proclamation,^ treaty, or other act of state, the authenticated copy,
to be admissible in evidence, must purport to be sealed with the
seal of the foreign state or British colony to which the original
document belongs ; and if the document sought to be proved be a
judgment, decree, order, or other judicial proceeding of any
foreign or colonial court, or any affidavit, pleading, or other legal
document filed or deposited in any such court, the authenticated
copy, to be admissible in evidence, must purport either to be
sealed with the seal of the foreign and colonial court to which the
original document belongs, or in the event of such court having no
seal, to be signed by the judge, or if there be more than one judge,
by any one of the judges of the said court ; and such judge shall
attach to his signature a statement in writing on the said copy
that the court whereof he is a judge has no seal ; but if any of the
aforesaid authenticated copies shall purport to be sealed or signed
as hereinbefore respectively directed, the same shall respectively be
admitted in evidence in every case in which the original document
could have been received in evidence, without any proof of the
1 14 & 15 V. c. 99 (" The Evidence c. 60), and 14 & 15 V. c. 99 (" Thg
Act, 1851 "), § 1. Evidence Act, 1851 "), as to proof
* See § 365 of "The Merchant of proclamations by governors of
Shipping Act, 1894 " (57 & 68 V. colonies under the first-named Act,
12
CHAP. II.] FOREIGN AND COLONIAL DOCUMENTS.
seal wliere a seal is necessary, or of the signature, or of the truth
of the statement attached thereto, where such signature and state-
ment are necessary, or of the judicial character of the person
appearing to have made such signature and statement."
§ 11. The Commissioners for Oaths Act, 1889,^ enables affi-
davits, &c., to be sworn abroad before consuls, &c.
§ 12. Order XXXVIII. of the E. S. C, 1883, provides, in
Eule 6, that " all examinations, affidavits, declarations, affirma-
tions, and attestations of honour in causes or matters depending in
the High Court, and also acknowledgments required for the pur-
pose of enrolling any deed in the Central Office, may be sworn and
taken in Scotland, or Ireland, or the Channel Islands, or in any
colony, island, plantation, or place under the dominion of Ser
Majesty in foreign parts, before any judge, court, notary public, or
person lawfully authorised to administer oaths^ in such country,
colony, island, plantation, or place respectively, or before any of
Her Majesty's consuls or vice-consuls* in any foreign parts out of
Her Majesty's dominions, and the judges and other officers of the
High Court shall take judicial notice of the seal or signature, as the
case may be, of any such court, judge, notary public,^ person,
consul, or vice-consul, attached, appended, or subscribed to any
such examinations, affidavits, affirmations, attestations of honour,
declarations, acknowledgments, or to any other deed or document."^
§ 13. Again, the Bankruptcy Act for Scotland^ (passed in 1856)
facilitates the proof of certain Scottish judicial documents by enact-
ing, in § 174, that "all deliverances," — which term includes all
orders, warrants, judgments, decisions, interlocutors, or decrees
under that Act,' — " purporting to be signed by the Lord Ordiaary,
or by any of the judges of the Court of Session, or by the sheriff
> 52 V. c. 10, post, Vol. n. < See ante, p. 9, n. i^.
* In Baillie v. Jackson, 1853, the " See "The Commissioners for Oaths
Lords Justices refused to take judi- Act, 1889" (52 V. c. 10). And see,
cial notice of the signature of the also, Brooke i;. Brooke, 1881 (Pry, J.).
Eegistrar of Deeds iu St. Vincent to Similar clauses to the rule above are
a certificate, he admittedly having also contained in ' ' The Court of Ad-
no authority to administer an oath. miralty (Ireland) Act, 1867" (30 & 31
' If there be no consul or vice- V. c. 114, § 57, Ir.), and " The Matri-
consul accessible, an aflBdavit made monial Causes (Ireland) Act, 1871 "
in foreign parts may be sworn before (34 & 35 V. c. 49, § 17, Ir.).
a notary public. 'Oooke v, Wilby, « i9 & 20 V. c. 79.
1884 (Chitty, J.). ' § 4.
13
WHAT SIGNATURES ARE JUDICIALLY NOTICED. [PAET I.
[or sheriff substitute],' as well as all extracts or copies thereof, or
from the books of the Court of Session, or the Sheriff Court, pur-
porting to be signed or certified by any clerk of court, or extracts
from or copies of registers purporting to be made by the keeper
thereof, or extractor, shall be judicially noticed by all courts and
judges in England, Ireland, and Her Majesty's other dominions,
and shall be received as prima facie evidence, without the neces-
sity of proving their authenticity or correctness, or the signatures
appended, or the official cheiracter of the person signing, and shall
be sufficient warranty for all diligence and execution by law com-
petent."
§ 14.^ In America, the signature of the Chief of the Executive
of the State is recognised without proof.^ In Louisiana, also,
the signatures of executive and judicial officers to all official acts
are similarly treated.* The English doctrine on this subject is
difficult of definition. On the one hand, judicial notice will be
taken of the royal sign manual,*^ and of matters stated under it ;
of matters stated in the certificate of a principal Secretary of
State,*^ and of the signatures of the judges of the Supreme
Court of Judicature, and of the old superior equity and common
law judges, if appended to any judicial or official document.'
The legislature has moreover provided that judicial notice shall
be taken of the signatures of the judges, commissioners and
registrars of the old courts," and of the judges and registrars
of the Courts ' of Bankruptcy in England, and of the judges,
registrars, and chief clerks of the Court of Bankruptcy and
Insolvency, now called the Court of Bankruptcy,* in Ireland;'
and has also directed that in all proceedings under the winding-
up clauses of the Companies Act, 1862, judicial notice shall
be taken of the signatures of the officers of the old Courts of
> 19 & 20 V. 0. 79, § 4. any question raised as to tlie neoes-
^ Gr. Ev. § 6, in part, as to fii'st sity of pi'oving the signature to be
four lines. genuine.
3 Jonesv.Gale'sExors.,1817(Ain.). « 8 & 9 V. c. 113, § 2, ante, § 7.
* Id.; Wood'v. Ktz, 1820 (Am.). « 24 & 25 V. o. 134, § 204; 32 &
^« Mighell V. Sultan of Johore 33 V. o. 71, § 109.
(1893), see also post, § 1381 ; Lord ' 46 & 47 V. c. 52, § 137, cited ante,
Melville's Case (1806) ; E. v. Miller p. 9, n. '.
(1772), and E. v. Gully (1773). In » 35 & 36 V. t. 58, § 6, Jr.
neither of the cases last-named was • 20 & 21 V. c. 60, § 362, Ir.
14
CHAP. II.] GAZETTES WHEN JUDICIALLY NOTICED.
Chancery in England or Ireland, or of the Couxts of Bankruptcy
in England or Ireland, or of the Court of Session in Scotland, or
of the registrar of the court of the Yice- Warden of the Stannaries,
whenever such signatures are subscribed to any document made,
issued, or signed under such clauses, or any official copy thereof,^
and that the signatures attached to certain other documents ren-
dered admissible by statute, need not be proved.''^ On the other
hand, it has been said that the Courts would probably not recognise
the signatures of the Lords of the Treasury to their official
letters.^ Many bodies are, too, by particular statutes, created
corporations and given a seal, for instance. County Councils ; ' yet
in each such case the seal must, in the absence of statutory provi-
sion that judicial notice shall be taken of it, be formally proved.^
§ 15. The judges will take notice of the London, DMin, or
Edinburgh Gazette on its mere production, and it is unnecessary to
prove that it was bought at the office of the Queen's printer, or to
offer any evidence as to whence it came.'
§ 16.* It is unnecessary to prove facts which may certainly be
known from the invariable course of nature ; such as that a man
is not the father of a child, where non-access is already proved until
within six months of the woman's delivery.^ Nor is it necessary to
prove the course of time,^" or of the heavenly bodies.^' Public
divisions of time, too, need not be proved, such as the ordinary public
' 25 & 26 V. c. 89, § 125. seal is given to parish, councils,
'» 8 & 9 V. 0. 113, § 1, ante, § 1. though they are incorporated. See
A partial list of the more important 56 & 57 V. o. 73 ("The Local Govern-
of these documents will be given in ment Act, 1894"), § 3, sub-sect. 9.
Part iii. Ch. iv., on Public Docu- ' See, further, post, § 87.
ments. In practice, no proof is re- ' E. v. Forsyth, 1814; 31 & 32 V.
quired of the handwriting of the o. 37, §§ 2, 5, cited post, § 1527. See
govei-nor of HoUoway prison (25 & E. v. Holt, 1793. The case E. v.
26 V. c. 104, § 12), which for all Wallace, 1865 (Ir.), can no longer be
purposes of law is now regarded as relied upon. See post, § 1527.
the Queen's Prison. See Alcock v. ^ Gr. Ev. § 5, in part.
Whatmore, 1840 ; Short v. Williams, » Heathcote's Divorce, 1851, H. L. ;
1835 ; Pogarty v. Smith, If 33. E. v. Luffe, 1807.
2 E. V. Jones, 1809 (Ld. Ellen- " See Bury v. Blogg, 1848.
borough). See 12 & 13 V. b.- 89 " However, in GoUier v. Notes,
(" The Treasury Instruments (Kgna- 1849, Wilde, C. J., is reported to have
ture) Act, 1849"), cited post, 5 1106; held that he could not judicially
and 31 & 32 V. c. 37, cited post, notice at what hour the sun set in the
§ 1527. month of November. See, also, Tut-
» 51 & 52 V. c. 41 ("The Local ton v. Darke, 1860 (PoUock, 0. B.).
Government Act, 1888"), § 79. No Sed qu. P
IP
MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICED.
[PAET I.
fasts and festiTals ; ^ the commeneement or ending of the legal
sittings;^ the coincidence of the years of the reign of any sovereign
of this country with the years of our Lord ; ^ the coincidence of
days of the week with days of the month ; * the order of the
months ;' the meaning of the word " month." ^ The meaning of
words in the vernacular language' need not be proved; the
word " time," for instance, unless specifically stated, indicating
in Great Britain " Greenwich mean time," and in Ireland " Dublin
mean time " ; ^ and the word " distance " being, except under
special circumstances, taken to mean distance measured as the crow
flies.^ Nor, again, need formal proof be given as to the legal
weights and measures ; ^'' nor the positive value of the coin of the
realm ; ^' nor its relative value at different periods of time ; ^^ nor
matters of history affecting the whole public.^^
§ 17.^* Courts also recognice the principal geographical divisions.
1 6 Vin. Abr. 492, pi. 8—44.
' 6 Yin. Abr. 490, pi. 32.
^ Holman v. Buiro-w, 1702 ; E. v.
Pringle, 1840.
* 6 Vin. Abr. 492, pi. 6, 7, 8; Hoyle
V. Ld. Cornwallis, 1720 ; Page v.
Paucet, 1591 ; Harry v. Broad, 1704;
BrougK V. Parkins, 1703 (Ld. Holt).
Thus the court is bound judicially to
notice what days of the month fall
on Sundays: Hanson v. Shackelton,
1835 ; Pearson v. Shaw, 1844.
* E. V. Brown, 1828.
^ This formerly, at common law
and in equity (see Cons. Ord. Oh.
1860, Ord. XXXVII. i. 10, now an-
nulled), used to mean four weeks,
but meant a calendar month when
used in the ecclesiastical courts
(Bluck V. Eackman, 1846 (Knight-
Bruce, V.-O.); Man v. Eioketts,
1845 (Lord Lyndhurst) ; Simpson
V. Margitson, 1847 ; 'Johnstone v.
Hudleston, 1825 (Bayley, J.) ) ; in
mercantile transactions in the city
of London (Turner v. Barlow, 1863
(Erie, O.J.)); or in bills of ex-
change or promissory notes (45 &
46 V. c. 61, § 14, sub-sect. 4, and
§ 89) ; or in any statute passed after
the year 1850 (The Interpretation
Act, 1889, of 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, § 9).
And month, when used in the Eules
of the Supreme Court (Ord. LXIV.
r. 1), or in any judgment or order of
that court (Id.), unless words be
added showing lunar month to be
intended. As to the meaning of ' ' ca-
lendar month" as applied to imprison-
ment, see Migotti v. Colville, 1879.
' dementi v. Golding, 1809, as to
the meaning of the word "book";
Com. V. Kneeland, 1838 (Am.) ; E. v.
Woodward, 1831. In the last case
the judges unanimously held that
they were bound to notice that heans
were a species of pulse. So in E. v.
Swatkins, 1831, Patteson, J., after
conferring with Bosanquet, J., judi-
cially noticed that barley was corn, in
an indictment for arson under the
Act just mentioned. In E. v. Beaney,
1820, however, the judges refused to
notice that a colt was an animal of
the horse species.
8 43 & 44 V. c. 9, § 1 ; foi-merly
local time prevailed, see Curtis v.
March, 1858.
' Mouflet V. Cole, 1872.
1" Hockin v. Cooke, 1791 ; O'Don-
nell V. O'DonneU, 1878 (Ir.) ; 41 & 42
V. c. 49.
" Glossop V. Jacob, 1815; Eeaxney
V. King, 1819.
" Bryant v. Poot, 1848.
" See Eead v. Bishop ol Lincoln,
1892, post, §1785; Bk. of Augusta
V. Earle, 1839 (Am.).
" Grr. Ev. § 6, as to first seven lines,
in great part.
16
CHAP. II.3 MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICED.
Thus they judicially notice the territorial extent of the jurisdiction
and sovereignty exercised de facto by their own government ; ' and
the local divisions of their country, such as states,^ provinces,'
counties,* counties of cities, cities,^ towns, parishes, and the like, so
far as political government is concerned or affected ; and when
dealing with questions of navigation, the geographical positions
and the names of places as shown on the Admiralty chart.® But
courts are not obliged to judicially notice mere local divisions, nor
their precise limits (further than they may be described in public
statutes '). Accordingly they have refused to notice judicially that
" a part of the coast called Suffolk " was not in Kent ; or that
" Orfordness, in the county of Suffolk," was not situated between
the North Foreland and Beachy Head ; ' that a particular place is
within a certain city ; ^ or that a particular town is within a
certain diocese ; ^^ or that a street mentioned in the pleadings is
a pubKc thoroughfare, though the word " street," via strata,
would rather imply that it was ; " or that a particular street is
not in a certain county, though it be notorious that a street
bearing the same name is in another county ; '^ or that a city
' See " Tlie Foreign Jurisdiction and, as sucli, prima facie liable to
Act, 1890 " (53 & 54 V. c. 37), legal- repair bridges within it. In Harris
izing acts done in dominions acquired v. O'Logblen, 1871 (Ir.), tbe M. E.
by 6 & 7 V. 0. 94, treaty, capitula- took judicial notice of tbe baronies
tion, grant, usage, sufferance, or in an Irish, county, such baronies
other lawful means. One of Her having been enumerated in 13 & 14
Majesty's principal secretaries of V. c. 68, Sch. A. (repealed by 54 &
state, in answer to question put by 55 V. c. 67).
any court in the Queen's dominions, ' E. v. St. Maurice, 1851.
is required, within a reasonable time ° Birrell v. Dryer, 1884.
in that behalf, to cause proper and ' Deybel's case, 1821 ; Fazakerley
sufficient answers to be returned to v. Wiltshire, 1720 ; E. v. Burridge,
all such questions, which answers 1735 ; Thorne v. Jackson, 1846.
^^, upon 'produciion thereof , he final * Deybel's case, 1821. In Eirby
and conclusive evidence, in the suit or v. Hickson, 1850, the court refused
other proceedings, of the several to take judicial notice that Park
matters therein contained. Street, Grosvenor Square, in Middle-
' Whyte V. Eose, 1842. There the sex, was within twenty miles of
court noticed, that by ' ' the kingdom Eussell Square, in the same county,
of Ireland " was meant that part of ' In Brune v. Thompson, 1842,
the United Kingdom called Ireland. where the plaintiff was nonsuited
^ Id. for not proving that the Tower of
* Deybel's case, 1821. In 2 Inst. London was within the City of
557, it is said "the King's courts" London,
"take notice of all the counties of " E. v. Simpson, 1738.
England." In E. v. Isle of Ely, " Grant v. Moser, 1843 (Tindal,
1850, the court judicially noticed C.J.).
that the Isle of Ely was a division " Humphreys v. Budd, 1841. See
of a county in theijature of a riding, Thorne v. Jackson, 1846.
T. — VOL. I. 17 0
MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. [PAET I.
mentioned in a document is in a particular country, even though
it apf.ear that one with a similar name is the capital of such
country.^ They have, however, noticed that the Queen's Prison is
situated in England.^
§ 18.' The courts will, too, judicially recognise the political
constitution or frame of their own government; its essential
political agents or public officers sharing in its regular adminis-
tration ; and its essential and regular political operations and
actions. Accordingly, all tribunals notice the accession and
demise of the sovereign of their country ; * the heads of depart-
ments, and the principal officers of state, whether past or present ; '
the marshals and sheriffs, but not the deputies of these func-
tionaries ; ^ the existence of a war in which their country is
engaged, at least when such war is recognised in public proclama-
tions or Acts of Parliament ; ' the days of special public fasts and
thanksgivings, when recognised in like manner ; the stated days of
general political elections ; the date and place of the sittings of the
legislature ; ^ and, in short, " all public matters which affect
the government of the country."^ And though they were not
formerly so,^" the journals of either House of Parliament are now
evidence, if they purport to be printed by the official printers.^'
But the coiirts will not recognise private orders made at the
council-table ; ^^ nor, it seems, any orders of Council, even though
they regard the Crown and the government.^'
1 Kearney v. King, 1819. There « See Grant v. Bagge, 1802.
it was teld tliat a declaration on a ' Dolderu. Ld. Huntingfield, 1805;
bill drawn and accepted at Dublin, E. v. De Berenger, 1814. When war
to wit, at Westminster, for 5i2l., is neither publicly proclaimed, nor
must be taken to be on a bill drawn noticed in any statute, its existence
in England for English money, and is solely a question for the jury : 1
that therefore proof of a bill drawn Hale, 164; Eost. 0. L. d. 1, o. 2, § 12.
at Dublin in Ireland for Irish money. The existence of war between foreign
which is of less value, was a fatal countries will not be judicially no-
varianoe. ticed : Dolder v. Ld. Huntingfield,
2 Wickens v. Goatly, 1851. 1805 (Ld. Eldon).
3 Or. Ev. § 6, in part. s g. „_ WUde, 1669 ; Birt v. Eoth-
* Holman v. Bui-row, 1702 ; E. v. well, 1697.
Pringle, 1840. » Taylor v. Barclay, 1828.
5 E. V. Jones, 1809; Bennett v. >« E. v. Knollys, 1694.
The State of Tennessee, 1826 (Am.) ; " 8 & 9 V. c. 113, § 3, cited ante,
Whaley v. OarHsle, 1866 (Ir.) (where § 7.
the court judicially noticed that '^ 6 Vin. Abr. 490.
Lord Hawkesbury had been foreign " Att.-Gen. v. Theakstone, 1820.
minister in 1803). See post, §§ 1527, 1664.
18
CHAP. II.] MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICED.
§ 19. Lastly, each Division of the Supreme Court is hound to
judicially notice its own rules and course of proceeding ; ^ the rules
and practice of the other Divisions ; ^ and also the limits of
their respective jurisdictions,' — as, for instance, that the Probate,
Divorce, and Admiralty Division has so far jurisdiction over the
personal estate of an intestate British subject, whether situated in
Ireland, the colonies, or any foreign country, that it may grant
letters to administer such property, and must do so before the
administrator can sue in any English Court in respect thereof.*
All courts will further notice the privileges of their officers^ and
solicitors,^ a term which now includes both " attorneys" and
" proctors" ; ' and also the fact that the assizes, though constituting
for some purposes one legal day, may be continued from day to
day with or without adjournment, and often occupy several natural
days ; ^ the existence of courts of general jurisdiction ; ^ the powers
of the Ecclesiastical Courts ; and the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy
Courts,^" together with all general rules under that Act, whether
made by the Lord Chancellor, with the concurrence of the President
of the Board of Trade, for carrying into effect its objects,^^ or made
by the Board of Trade, for regulating matters of an administrative
character under it, if printed by the Queen's printers, purporting
to be issued under the authority of the Board.^^ Judicial notice
must also be taken of the rules made under the Bankruptcy
(Ireland) Amendment Act, 1872. '^ Certain other rules made
under statutory authority are likewise judicially noticed.^*
' Dotson V. BeU, 1676 ; Pugh v. " Id. § 127.
Robinson, 1786. " Bankruptcy Eules, 1883, r. 237.
2 Lane's case, 1587 ; Worlicli v. " 35 & 36 V. o. 58, § 124, Ir.
Massey, 1605 ; Moimson v. Bourn, '* The principal of these are rules
1648 ; Eeidy v. Pierce, 1861 (Jr.) made by the Board of Trade under
(Pigot, O.B.) ; CaldweU v: Hunter, "The Gas and Water "Works Pacili-
1848. ties Act, 1873" (36 & 37 V. c. 89),
' Doe V. Caperton, 1829. See § 14 ; those made either by Order
Spooner v. Juddow, 1848. in Council, or by the Committee of
* See Whyte y. Rose, 1842. Council, under "The Crown Office
« Ogle V. NoroUfEe, 1708. Act, 1877" (40 & 41 V. c. 41), §§ 3,
* Stokes V. Mason, 1808; Chatland 5; those made by the Lord Chan-
V. Thornley, 1810; Hunter •;;. Neck, cellor, under " The Summary Juris-
1841 ; WaUord v. Fleetwood, 1845. diction Act, 1879" (42 & 43 V. c. 49),
' Jud. Act, 1873 (36 & 37 V. c. 66), § 29 ; those made by the Lord
§ 87. Chancellor with the assistance of the
" Whitaker v. Wisbey, 1852. Registrar, under "The Land Trans-
» Tregany v. Fletcher, 1696. fer Act, 1875 " (38 & 39 V. o. 87),
» 46 & 47 V. c. 52, §§ 92 et seq. § 111; those made under "The
19 c2
REFRESHING MEMORY OF JUDGE. [PART I.
§ 20. It is not clear whether or not the judges of the Supreme
Court of Judicature are bound to notice who are the judges in
inferior courts of record. The weight of American authorities is
in favour of recognising them;^ but the Court of Queen's Bench
once refused to notice who was judge of the then Court of Review.^
The Supreme Court will not, unless when called upon to review
their judgments,^ take cognizance of the customs and proceedings
in inferior courts of limited jurisdiction,* except so far as they are,
regulated by statute.^
§ 21.^ Where matters ought to be judicially noticed, but the
memory of the judge is at fault, he resorts to such means of refer-
ence as may be at hand, and he may deem worthy of confidence.'
Thus, if the point be a date, he may refer to an almanac ; * if it be
the meaning of a word, to a dictionary;^ if it be the construction
of a statute, to the printed copy ; or, in case that appears to be in-
correct, to the parliament roll.^" In some instances, the judge has
refused to take cognizance of a fact, unless the party calling upon
him to do so could produce at the trial some document by which
his memory might be refreshed. Thus Lord Ellenborough^' once
declined to take judicial notice of the King's proclamation, the
counsel not being prepared with a copy of the Gazette in which it
was published ; and iu a case in which it became material to con-
sider how far the prisoner owed obedience to his sergeant, and this
depended on the articles of war, the judges thought that these
ought to have been produced. ^^ In other cases, the courts have
themselves made the necessary inquiries, and that, too, without
Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) Act, Lane's case, 1587 ; Peacock v. BeU,
1870," either by tie Court for Land 1667 ; and Dance v. Eobson, 182v).
Cases Reserved, or by the Privy * As, e.g., the Court of the V.-Cli.
Council in Ireland (33 & 34 V. c. 46, of Oxforii, now regulated by 17 & 18
§§31, 41, Ir.); and those made by V. o. 81 ("The Oxford University
the Irish Land Commission (see 44 & Act, 1854 ), § 45.
45 V. 0. 49, § 60, subs. 2, Ir.). « Gr. Bv. § 6, as to first three lines.
1 Hawks V. Kennebec, 1811 (Am.); ' Gresl. Ev. 295.
Eipleyi).Warren,1824(Am.);I)espau * Page v. Faucet, 1591. See
V. Swindler, 1825 (Am.). Tutton v. Darke, 1860.
2 Van Sandau v. Turner, 1845. * Clementi v. Grolding, 1809.
3 Chittyi;. Dendy, 1835. i» E. ■;;. Jeffries, 1722; Spring v.
" E. V. U. of Cambridge, 1736, Eve, 1677.
where the court refused to notice " InVan Omeroni;. Dowick, 1809.
that the University Court in Cam- ^' E. v. Withers, undated (Buller,
bridge proceeded according to the J.), cited in E. ii. Holt, 1793 (Buller,
rules of the civil law. See, also, J.).
20
CHAP. II.] EEFEESHING MEMORY OF JUDGE.
strictly confining their researches to the time of the trial. Thus,
where ^ the question was, whether the Federal Eepublic of Central
America had been recognised by the British Government as an
independent state, a Vice- Chancellor sought for information from
the Foreign Office ; in another case, the Court of Common Pleas
directed inquiry to be made in the Court of Admiralty as to the
maritime law ; ^ and the same Court also once made inquiry as to
the practice of the Inrolment Office in the Court of Chancery;'
while Lord Hardwicke * asked an eminent conveyancer respecting
the existence of a general rule of practice in the latter's profession.
1 Taylor v. Barclay, 1828. See, 1620.
also. The Oharkieli, 1878. * Willougliby v. WiUoughby, 1'787.
' Chandler v. Grieves, 1792. See, also, Er. S. 0. 1883. Old. LI.
3 Doe V. Lloyd, 1840, acting on rr. 7, 8.
the authority of "Worsley v. Filisker,
21
21^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PART I.
AMERICAN NOTES.
§ 4. Judicial Notice. — Certain facts a judge or jury will adopt
as the basis of action without requiring the party to whose case
they are essential to prove them by evidence. These facts, while
having the common feature that a judge will not require them
to be proved because he knows them already, are of two classes.
Some facts the judge is bound to take notice of or, in other words,
know, at his peril. If he does not treat them as proved, in any
case in which they are relevant, such conduct is error in law. The
party aggrieved by a failure to recognise and adopt matters which
the judge is bound judicially to know, may have the error cor-
rected, upon proper proceedings, in a superior court, for all judges
in the jurisdiction are equally bound to know them. Strictly
speaking, it is not the duty of counsel to suggest them. It is the
duty of the court to know them.
Another class of facts the judge is not, as before, bound to know,
but as judges (and other men) usually know them he may fairly be
assumed to know them. If a particular judge is not actually aware
of any particular one of these facts, he may or he may not, as he sees
fit, inform himself from any source, including the parties to the
action. If he does not choose to inform himself, it is the duty of
counsel to supply him with the needed information. If the court
still declines to know such fact, it must be proved in the ordinary
way or the party will lose the benefit of it, without redress in a
superior court. Such facts are usually those of common knowledge.
The judge in any particular trial has a dual capacity. He is, in
the first place, a part of the administration of government, estab-
lished for the purpose of enforcing certain standards of conduct,
reasoning and liability, rules of law or practice, which have been
established by the sovereign power of the jurisdiction in which the
court is sitting. In the second place, he is an intelligent member
of the community in which he resides. As such, he knows what is
generally known to others in the community. These facts, usually
not disputed and capable of easy verification if disputed, may, as a
rule, be safely assumed to be true unless and until disputed or dis-
proved. In other words, there is in many cases no need for proving
to a person of average intelligence what every one assumes to be
true, unless the fact is disputed. As Lord Ellenborough said in
Peltier's Case (28 State Trials, 616) (1803), speaking of an admission
that Napoleon Buonaparte was Chief Consul and France and England
at peace on a certain date, " They were capable of easy proof if they
had not been admitted. Their notoriety seems to render the actual
proof very unnecessary."
The division into two classes of the facts which, as is said, need
CHAP, n.] AMBEICAN NOTES. 21^
not be proved, because judges already know them, follow with
general correctness this division between the official and personal
capacity of judges. In other words, matters of law or established
by law are matters of required cognisance ; matters of fact are the
subject of optional cognisance. When it is said a judge takes
judicial notice of the statute law of his state a somewhat different
thing is meant than when it is said that he knows, without proof,
the date of the battle of Lexington. The judge may really be
equally ignorant on both these points. The statute in question
may but just have been enacted and the actual knowledge of it
confined to a few officials at the seat of legislation. The judge may
never have read or heard the date of the battle. But the fact of
the statute he must know at the peril of committing error. The
other fact he may be assumed to know ; but if he does not, he com-
mits no error in law in refusing to assume its truth as part of a
decision. The one refusal may be rectified in an appellate or
superior court. The other will not.
Eor example, in a case where both the court and parties assumed
the existence of a law which had been repealed, relief by a new
trial was granted although the point was not taken at the trial.
Belmont v. Morrill, 69 Me. 314 (1879).
International Relations. — Among the facts established by law
of which courts, as part of the administration of government, are
bound to take judicial notice are the existence of other nations, their
sovereignty and forms of government, and the seals and other usual
emblems or indicia of such sovereignty or government. Courts take
cognisance of the great seal of any nation recognised by the govern-
ment under which the Court is acting, e. g. Portugal, Church v.
Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 186 (1804) ; Denmark, Griswold v. Pitcairn, 2
Conn. 86 (1816) ; Lincoln v. Battelle, 6 Wend. 475 (1831).
Such a seal is said to " prove itself," Watson v. Walker, 23 JST. H.
471, 496 (1851), speaking of the great seal of England.
The same rule applies in the courts of one state of the Union to
the great seal of a sister state, e. g. of a copy of a Maryland statute
authenticated by the great seal of Maryland when offered in a court
in Pennsylvania, U. S. v. Johns, 4 Dall. 412 (1806) ; so in New York
of a Michigan record, Coit v. Millikin, 1 Denio, 376 (1846), and in
Maine of a Massachusetts record, Eobinson v. Gilman, 20 Me. 299
(1841). It was held in Coit v. Millikin that the seal required must
be one good at common law, " an impression upon wax, wafer, or
some other tenacious substance," and that, in the absence of an
enabling statute, " an impression upon paper alone (as in that case)
is not a seal."
But see Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546 (1882) contra.
The seal of the United States government will be recognised in a
state court. Yount v. Howell, 14 Cal. 465 (1869) ; and the seal of
21^ AMEBICAN NOTES. [PABT I.
a state in the courts of the United States, U. S. v. Amedy, 11 Wheat.
392 (1826).
The seal of a district court of the United States proves itself
either in a state or federal court, and the records of such court need
not be proved in- any other way than under the seal of the court as
affixed by the clerk. The rule is thus clearly and succinctly stated :
— " Circuit and district courts of the United States certainly cannot
be considered foreign in any sense of the term, either in respect to
the state courts in which they sit, or as respects the circuit or dis-
trict court of another circuit or district. On the contrary, they are
domestic tribunals, whose proceedings all other courts of the country
are bound to respect, when authenticated by the certificate of the
clerk under the seal of the court, the rule being that the circuit
court of one circuit or the district court of one district is presumed
to know the seal of the circuit or district court of another circuit
or district, in the same manner as each court within a state is pre-
sumed to know and recognise the seal of any other court within the
same state." Turnbull v. Payson, 95 U. S. 418 (1877) ; Womacki;.
Dearman, 7 Porter, 513 (1838). " It will not be denied that the con-
stitution of the United States and the laws of congress passed in
pursuance thereof, will be judicially recognised by the courts of this
state. The several courts of the United States are called into exist-
ence by act of congress under the constitution, and their powers and
duties specifically defined by statute ; such courts, therefore, together
with their seals, will also be judicially recognised." Adams v. Way,
33 Conn. 419 (1866).
The great seal of the Province of Upper Canada of itself imports
verity. Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N. Y. 146 (1862).
So the courts of a nation will so far take cognisance of the sove-
reignty of insurgents recognised as belligerents by the executive or
legislative branches of the government as to decline to inquire into
the title or commission of their public vessels. Santissima Trinidad,
7 Wheat. 283, 335 (1822).
In a case where the condemnation of a vessel for a fraud on the
revenue laws of St. Domingo during the French occupancy of the
island was a fact in issue, the attestation of the proper British author-
ities who had subsequently conquered and then held the island, was
deemed sufiELcient, though " certified only under the governor's seal
at arms, instead of a colonial or public seal." Hadfield v. Jameson,
2 Munf. (Va.), 53, 70 (1809).
Probably this knowledge on the part of judges of the international
relations of the government under which they act is, historically, a
survival of the ideas of the time when judges sat as the direct rep-
resentatives of the king ; and might therefore be required to know
what the king himself knew in other branches of his sovereignty,
e. g. his relation to other nations.
CHAP. n.J AMEEICAN NOTES. 21*
So the limits of the nation is rather a political than a legal ques-
tion, the action of the executive controlling that of the courts, who
will support the action of the co-ordinate branch of the government.
Foster v. Neilson, 1 Peters, 263 (1829).
It is, therefore, for the executive or legislative branch of govern-
ment to take the initiative in these international matters. Conrts
will decline knowledge of the existence of sovereignties not yet rec-
ognised by the executive and legislature. The rule is that " where
the political authorities of the State have actually claimed and exer-
cised jurisdiction over particular localities . . the courts are thereby
concluded, and have only to declare the fact and govern themselves
accordingly, without undertaking to pass on the validity of such
claim." State v. Wagner, 61 Me. 178 (1873). « The seal of such
unacknowledged government cannot be permitted to prove itself ;
but it may be proved by such testimony as the nature of the case
admits." U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 634 (1818).
Public Laws. — It being their first and distinctive duty, as part
of the government, to enforce certain established rules of law and
general standards of conduct, courts are required to know, with-
out proof, the laws and standards they are constituted to enforce.
Speaking generally, and disregarding private statutes and acts of
local application, courts take judicial cognizance of the existence
and scope of all legal rules to which they are commissioned by the
sovereign of their country to compel obedience.
Law of Nations. — The law of nations being part of the public
law of each jurisdiction receives judicial notice.
So of the rules of navigation adopted by commercial nations.
The Scotia, 14 Wall. 171 (1871). As the court in that case say:
" Foreign municipal laws must indeed be proved as facts, but it is
not so with the law of nations." For the same reason, what is
part of the general law merchant " is matter of law for the court,"
— i. e. will be judicially noticed. Jewell v. Center, 25 Ala. 498, 605
(1864). For " the principles of the law merchant . . . have become
a part of the common law." Munn v. Burch, 25 III. '35, 38 (1860).
Or, as the court in a New Jersey case (Reed v. Wilson, 41 N. J.
Law, 29 (1879) say, in taking judicial notice that a note payable
on a certain day was properly protested on the day previous :
"The court must take judicial notice not only of the law merchant,
which is a part of the common law, but also of the almanac, from
which it appears that the 15th day of December, 1872, fell on
Sunday." To same effect, Sasscer v. Farmers' Bank, 4 Md. 409
(1853) holds that Sundays and great festivals such as Christmas are
dies non juridici in commercial usage.
It has, however, been held that while the general maritime law is
the basis of the law of the United States, it is, having no inherent
force of its own, only so far operative in any country as it has been
21^r AJVIEEICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
adopted by the laws and usages of the country. The Lottawanna,
21 Wall. 658, 573 (1874); The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24 (1881).
As courts of admiralty are tribunals recognised by the law of
nations, their seals need not be proved. Thompson v. Stewart, 3
Conn. 171, 181 (1819) ; Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch, 335 (1809) . So
of the general customs of trade. "We cannot close our eyes,"
say the supreme court of the United States, "to the well known
course of business in the country." Bank of Kentucky v. Adams
Express Co. 93 U. S. 185 (1876) ; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. C. & A.
E. Co., 5 Mo. App. 347, 376 (1878). But the custom, to be noticed
without proof, must be one of the commercial world. A com-
mercial custom adopted by local authority, e. g. a broker's board,
must be proved. " The court will not take judicial cognisance of
those rules, unless they are rules or usages of trade and commerce,
which would be recognised without their adoption by any particular
board or association." G-oldsmith v. Sawyer, 46 Cal. 209 (1873).
The New York courts place " the general course of business in a
community, including the universal practice of banks " in the second
class ; i. e. among matters of optional cognisance •' of which courts
may take judicial notice." Merchants Bank v. Hall, 83 IST. Y. 338
(1881) ; Yerkes v. National Bank, 69 N. Y. 382 (1877) ; Hunter v.
N. Y. &c. R. R., 116 N. Y. 615 (1889).
Where the indicia of title to certain goods to be forwarded were
assigned to a merchant to secure his advances, the court say that it
is " the usual course of the great inland commerce " for agricultural
produce between the Mississippi Valley and markets. "It has
existed long enough to assume a regular form of dealing and it
embraces such a wide extent of territory and is of such general
importance, that its ordinary course and usages are now publicly
recognised and understood ; and it is the duty of the court to
recognise them, as it judicially recognises the general and estab-
lished usages of trade on the ocean." Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How.
384, 399 (1850).
Of a custom for merchants to exchange mutual credits, the
supreme court of Michigan say : ■ — " We must take judicial notice
of a custom which is familiar everywhere." Cameron v. Blackman,
39 Mich. 108 (1878).
The powers of a notary public, being an officer recognised by the
law merchant in the protest of foreign bills of exchange, will be
noticed by the court and his "seal proves itself in all countries
where the law merchant prevails, and it is only necessary that it
should conform to the law of the place where the notary acts."
Orr V. Lacey, 4 McLean, 243 (1847). "The court will take judicial
notice of the seals of notaries public, for they are officers recognised
by the commercial law of the world." Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U. S.
646 (1882) ; Delafield v. Hand, 3 Johns. 310, 314 (1808).
CHAP, n.] AMERICAN NOTES. 21^
See also Brown v. Phila. Bank, 6 S. & R. 484 (1821).
The recognition does not extend to the power to attest deeds.
Nye V. McDonald, 2 Low. Can. Jurist, 109 (1857). Neese v. Farm-
ers Ins. Co., 55 la. 604 (1881).
But the courts will not recognise without proof the right of
other officers empowered by local laws 'to protest negotiable instru-
ments, e. g. a huissier in France. Chanoine v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 177,
178 (1829). So of the certificate of a consul. Church v. Hubbart,
2 Granch, 186 (1804).
In certain cases a notarial seal has been considered a sufficient
certification of the proceedings of a foreign court. Yeaton v. Fry,
5 Cranch, 336 (1809); Fellows v. Menasha, 11 Wise. 658 (1860).
While a notarial protest of a promissory note is not, strictly
speaking, an oflScial act, such protest duly authenticated by his
signature and seal is competent secondary evidence, after his de-
cease, of the facts stated in the protest, " because it is in the usual
course of their duty and business to keep such memoranda." Porter
V. Judson, 1 Gray, 175 (1854).
The seal may be made directly on the paper without wax or other
adhesive substance. Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546 (1882).
This judicial knowledge of the law merchant cannot be so far
extended as to embrace local customs. The local customs of miners
as to location of claims must be proved by competent evidence.
Sullivan v. Hense, 2 Col. 424 (1874) ; Pougade v. Ryan, 21 Nev.
449 (1893). The usages and customs of Indian tribes "must be
regarded as facts, and must be averred and proved like any other
material facts." Turner v. Fish, 28 Miss. 306 (1864). Courts will
require proof of local rights in water for irrigation purposes
even when such rights have been recognised by statute. Lewis v.
McClure, 8 Oreg. 273 (1880). But see Amer. Nat. Bk. v. Bushey, 45
Mich. 135, 140 (1881) that the customers of a bank will be assumed
to know the " ordinary rules and necessities of business."
Federal Laws. — The constitution of the United States being
the supreme law of the land, all courts, state and national, take
notice without proof of certain public acts done in the exercise of
the powers conferred by that instrument.
Constitution of the Federal Government. — Courts are
required to take notice of the office of president of the United
States, its incumbent and his signature.
So in speaking of a United States patent to lands, the supreme
court of California say: "The patent proves itself and requires
no authentication other than the signature of the president and the
seal of the government. The court takes judicial notice of both
signature and seal." Yount v. Howell, 14 Cal. 465 (1859).
Where a patent was signed by an acting commissioner of patents,
it was held unnecessary to aver or prove that he was legally entitled
21^ AMEEICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
to act in that capacity. "The court will take notice judicially of
the persons who from time to time preside over the patent office,
whether permanently or transiently, and the production of their
commission is not necessary to support their official acts." York
&c. R. Co. V. Winans, 17 How. 30 (1854).
"State courts are bound to take judicial notice of the existence
of the federal courts." Mims v. Swartz, 37 Tex. 13 (1872);
Headman v. Rose, 63 Ga. 468 (1879). "We all know that the
circuit courts of the several states are courts of general jurisdic-
tion, as well as we know that courts of justice of the peace are not;
and why should judges assume a degree of ignorance on the bench
which would be unpardonable in them when off of it ? " Jarvis v.
Eobinson, 21 Wise. 523 (1867).
So of the existence and powers of the president of the United
States. The proclamation of the president of the United States is
" a public act of which all courts of the United States are bound
to take notice and to which all courts are bound to give effect."
Armstrong v. U. S., 13 Wall. 154 (1871). So of the departments of
state, and public acts in pursuance of their legal powers, e. g. the
instructions of the navy department to the naval commanders
of the United States. The Peterhoff, Blatch. Pr. Cases, 463, 506
(1863).
But courts " are not bound to take official notice of the rules
adopted for the regulation of the different departments of the
federal government or those established by the board of land
commissioners or surveyor general of the United States for Cali-
fornia." Heusley v. Tarpey, 7 Cal. 288 (1857). Otherwise of the
action of the federal land office when regulated by statute. Bige-
low V. Chatterton, 51 Fed. Rep. 614 (1892).
As treaties properly executed under constitutional prerogative
are part of the law of each jurisdiction in the United States, all
courts take judicial notice of them. Thus, in an action of slander
charging a murder in Ireland judicial notice will be taken that
under the " Ashburton treaty " between Great Britain and the
United States, murder is an extraditable offence in this country.
Montgomery v. Deeley, 3 Wise. 709 (1854). The effect of the treaty
of Paris, ceding Louisiana to the United States, is judicially noticed
in relation to the land titles of that state. U. S. v. Eeyner, 9 How.
127 (1850). The rule includes treaties between the United States
and Indian nations. Carson v. Smith, 5 Minn. 78 (1860) ; U. S. v.
Beebe, 2 Dak. 292 (1880) ; Lewis v. Harris, 31 Ala. 689 (1858).
But where a treaty confers authority upon certain persons to do
certain acts, courts, while recognising the existence of the authority
without proof, will require proof of the manner in which the author-
ity was, in point of fact, exercised. Thus, where a right to select
a certain amount of land was conferred by a treaty with the Chip-
CHAP, n.] AMERICAN NOTES. 21^
pewa Indians, proof was required of the manner in which the right
was exercised, when that fact was material. Dole v. Wilson, 16
Minn. 625 (1871). The public acts of congress, for similar reasons,
are within the judicial knowledge of all courts, state and national.
Cox V. Morrow, 14 Ark. 603 (1854).
Eor example, judicial notice is taken of the national bankruptcy
law. Morris v. Davidson, 49 Ga. 361 (1873) ; Mims v. Swartz, 37
Tex. 13 (1872). Even if such public act of congress relates to the
District of Columbia, Bayly's Adm. v. Chubb, 16 Gratt. 284 (1862) ;
or concerns exclusively the municipal affairs of the District of
Columbia. Chesapeake Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Rail-
road Company, 4 Gill & J. 1, 63 (1832). Therefore where the laws
of Maryland were by act of congress continued in the District of
Columbia, the courts of Virginia take judicial notice of these laws.
Bird's Case, 21 Gratt. 800 (1871). So of the acts of congress relat-
ing to the " disposition of the public lands, and the kind of evidence
furnished to a purchaser and the system of surveys adopted for those
lands by congress." Gooding -u. Morgan, 70 111. 275 (1873) ; Scrapie
V. Hagar, 27 Cal. 163 (1865) ; Papin v. Ryan, 32 Mo. 21 (1862);
Wright V. Hawkins, 28 Tex. 452 (1866). So it is the duty of the
state courts to take cognisance of the United States internal rev-
enue laws and dismiss an action invalidated by such laws, though
the point is not relied on by the parties but is taken by the court
sua sponte. Kessel v. Albetis, 56 Barb. 362 (1870). Where con-
gress has conferred upon a department the power to prescribe rules
and regulations, courts will take judicial cognisance of the latter.
Caha V. U. S., 1.52 U. S. 211 (1893).
Following analogous decisions, it is held that where the substance
of the statutes of another state are incorporated in a public act of
congress, state courts will take judicial notice of such statutes.
Flanegin v. Washington Ins. Co., 7 Pa. St. 306 (1847).
Domestic Public Laws. — Courts not only recognise, without
proof, the existence of treaties and congressional laws which they
are required to enforce ; they also recognise all public laws passed
by the appropriate branch of any state government under which
the court is organised. State v. Jarrett, 17 Md. 309 (1861) ; Gird-
lestone v. O'Reilly, 21 Q. B. U. C. 409 (1862) ; Inhabitants of Spring-
field V. Worcester, 2 Cush. 52 (1848) ; U. S. v. Fuller, 4 N. M. 368
(1889) ; Division of Howard Co., 15 Kans. 194 (1875) ; Griswold v.
Gallup, 22 Copn. 208 (1852) ; Parent v. Walmsly's Adm., 20 Ind.
82 (1863) ; Evans, Auditor, v. Brown, 30 Ind. 614 (1869) ; Dolph v.
Barney, 5 Oreg. 191 (1874); "and where one state recognises acts
done in pursuance of the laws of another state, its courts will take
judicial cognisance of those laws, so far as may be necessary to
determine the validity of the acts alleged to be done in conformity
with them." Carpenter v. Dexter, 8 Wall. 613, 531 (1869).
21^ AMEEICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
When the courts of one state have taken judicial cognisance of
the laws of another they will " until it is proved that the law has
been changed . . . presume it still exists." Graham v. Williams.
21 La. Ann. 594 (1869).
The courts of Canada take judicial cognisance of the acts of the
Provincial legislature even though locally limited. Darling v.
Hitchcock, 25 Q. B. U. C. 463 (1866); and Canadian Admiralty
Courts are "bound to take judicial notice of an order in council from
which the court derives its jurisdiction." Eeg. v. The Minnie, 4
Can. Exch. 151 (1894).
The rule requires jiidicial knowledge of such public laws of any
state or country of which the jurisdiction formed part as were in
use while the union continued. Cox v. Morrow, 14 Ark. 603 (1854) ;
Arayo v. Currell, 1 La. Eep. 528, 541 (1830) ; Stokes v. Macken, 62
Barb. 145 (1861) ; Henthorne v. Doe, 1 Blackf. 157 (1821) ; Delano v.
Jopling, 1 Litt. 417 (1822) ; U. S. v. Eitcliie, 17 How. 525 (1854) ;
Otto V. Soulard, 9 Mo. 573 (1845) ; Doe v. Eslava, 11 Ala. 1028
(1847).
It is on the same principle that American courts take cognisance
of the common and statutory laws of England in force at the time
of the B,evolution, — so far as suitable to the new conditions. Ocean
Ins. Co. V. Fields, 2 Story, 59, 75 (1841).
So the courts of a territory are required to know the public laws of
the territory, and if the going into effect of such a law is dependent
on lapse of time or other condition, must notice the condition and its
being complied with at any particular time. Hoyt v. Russell, 117
U. S. 401 (1885). The federal courts, for the same reasons, take
judicial cognisance of the public acts of congress.
U. g. The National Bankruptcy Act. Lathrop v. Stuart, 5
McLean, 167 (1850).
So courts will notice repealing laws equally with other laws.
State V. O'Connor, 13 La. Ann. 486 (1858).
So of the amendments to the constitution. Graves ■;;. Keaton, 3
Cold. (Tenn.) 8 (1866).
In general, tlie laws of a sister state must be proved as facts ; see
post p. 521°. Hanley v. Donaghue, 116 U. S. 1 (1885).
It is usually not difficult to recognise a public act. As a rule it
applies to all parts of a state.
But this is not essential. " It is a public act if it extends to all
persons within the territorial limits described in the statute."
Levy V. State, 6 Ind. 281 (1855). An act for the survey of a tract
of land is special. Allegheny v. Wilson, 25 Pa. St., 332 (1865).
But see Duren v. Houston &c. E. Co., 86 Tex. 287 (1893). The
court will not take judicial notice of the stages of the passage of a
public act, as set out in the legislative journals. The journals must
be offered. But, like other public documents, " they prove their own
CHAP. II.] AJ!i£EKICAISr NOTES. 21^"
authenticity." Grob v. Cushman, 45 111. 419 (1867) ; Stall v. Druny,
118 Ind. 449 (1888) ; Chesapeake «&c. Canal Co. v. Baltimore &e.
R. E. Co., 4 Gill & J. 1, 63 (1832).
But whether a statute "be a law or not a law, is a judicial ques-
tion, to be settled and determined by the courts and judges. . . .
When once it became the settled construction of the Constitution
of Illinois that no act can be deemed a valid law, unless, by the
journals of the legislature, it appears to have been regularly passed
by both houses, it became the duty of the courts to take judicial
notice of the journal entries in that regard." Town of South
Ottawa V. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260 (1876). Courts may examine the
original roll in Secretary's office and any other sources of infor-
mation. Bowen v. Mo. Pac. E. E., 118 Mo. 541 (1893) ; Moog v.
Randolph, 77 Ala. 597 (1884).
To determine the existence of a statute or when it went into
effect judges "have a right to resort to any source of information
which in its nature is capable of conveying to the judicial mind a
clear and satisfactory answer to such question, always seeking
first for that which in its nature is most appropriate, unless the
positive law has enacted a different rule." Gardner v. Collector, 6
Wall. 499 (1867) ; Somers v. State (So. Dak.), 58 N. W. 804 (1894) ;
State V. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46 (1861) ; Pierson v. Baird, 2 Greene (la.),
235 (1849) ; Berliner v. Waterloo, 14 Wise. 378 (1861).
Certain laws applying only to a limited portion of the state are
considered public because they apply to all citizens of the state.
For example, in a Massachusetts case, Parsons, C. J., speaking of
an act for the preservation of bass in a certain river in the present
state of Maine, says, " We are of opinion that the statute referred
to is a public statute. It is obligatory on all the citizens, and they
must notice it at their peril. We must, therefore, ex officio, take
notice of it. Indeed, all the laws regulating the taking of fish are
made for the public benefit, to preserve the fish, and are public
statutes." Burnham v. Webster, 5 Mass. 266 (1809) ; so where an
act forbidding any but specified persons from surveying or marking
lumber in a certain county in Maine, and all persons from buying
or selling lumber not so marked, was attacked as unconstitutional,
the court say : "It is true that public acts are usually general in
their character and operation, and equally applicable to all parts
of the state. There are other acts which are considered as public
acts, of which all persons are bound to take notice upon their peril,
and yet they are local, because the violation of them is and must
be local. . . . Nothing appears which indicates that the law was
not intended as a public benefit, of which all the citizens of the
state, as well as others, might equally participate." Pierce v.
Kimball, 9 Greenl. 54 (1832). So an act authorising riparian
proprietors of a section of Maryland to extend their ownership by
21" AMERICAN NOTES. [PAKT I.
improvements into public waters " operating as a grant of the
public domain, and affecting the rights of navigation and fishery,
by allowing improvements to be made out into navigable water,"
was said to be entitled to be "judicially noticed by the court as a
public law.'' Hammond's Lessees v. Inloes, 4 Maryland, 138, 172,
(1853). On a criminal charge of selling "one pint of whiskey for
6 cents, not for mechanical or medicinal purposes," in violation of a
statute applying to three towns in a certain county, forbidding
sales of so small a quantity, except for these purposes, the defend-
ant objected that the statute was not set out in the complaint. In
overruling the objection, the court say, " Although local, it is not a
private statute. To constitute a statute a public act, it is not
necessary that it should extend to all parts of the state. It is a
public act if it extend equally to all persons within the territorial
limits described in the statute. The court was bound to notice that
statute without pleading." Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281 (1855). The
same rule is applied where a general " Local option" law is passed,
and the operation of the statute is dependent on an election. State v.
Cooper, 101 N. C. 684 (1888).
"There are statutes that are local in one sense which are never-
theless public statutes ; for it is not necessary to constitute a statute
a public act that it should be equally applicable to all parts of the
state. It is sufficient if it extend to all persons doing or omitting
to do an act within the territorial limits described in the statute."
Bretz V. Mayor &c. of New York, 6 Robertson, 325 (1868), a case hold-
ing that a statute conferring on the supreme court jurisdiction of
actions against the corporation of New York city, was a public
statute. So a statute creating a public office is a public statute.
State V. Jarrett, 17 Md. 309 (1861). So a joint resolution imposing
a duty on a public officer is a public statute and will be judicially
recognised. State v. Delesdenier, 7 Tex. 76 (1851). The courts of
Lower Canada take notice of acts published in the official gazette.
Dubois V. Fanteaux, 7 Kev. Leg. 430 (1875).
A statute changing the name of a township "is a public local
one, of which the court takes notice." State v. Cooper, 101 N. C.
684 (1888).
Municipal Coepoeations. — The case last cited is an illustration
of the general rule that, as municipal corporations are not so much
local legal entities with certain powers as they are instrumentalities
for carrying on the functions of government, legislative acts creat-
ing, enlarging, or otherwise modifying such local municipalities and
defining their powers, though necessarily of limited territorial
application, are public acts of which the courts take judicial notice.
Albrittin v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. 480 (1877) ; Macey v. Titcombe, 19
Ind. 135 (1862) ; Stier v. Oskaloosa, 41 la. 353 (1875) ; Prell v.
McDonald, 7 Kans. 426, 445 (1871); State v. Murfreesboro, 11
CHAP, n.] AMERICAN NOTES. 21^2
Humph. (Tenn.) 217 (1850) ; Gallagher v. State, 10 Tex. App. 469
(1881) ; Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wise. 247 (1862) ; Tauntleroy
V. Hannibal, 1 Dill. (U. S.) 118 (1871) ; Peoples. Potter, 35 Gal. 110
(1868) ; Jones v. Lake View, 161 111. 663 (1894) ; Briggs v. Whipple,
7 Vt. 15, 19 (1835) ; Bituminous &c. Co. v. Fulton, 33 Pac. Eep.
(Cal.) 1117 (1893). For this reason the charter of a village cor-
poration is a public law. Village of Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt. 282
(1877).
As in analogous cases, a special statute of village incorporation
which is declared in the act itself to be a public statute will be
noticed without proof. Gormley v. Day, 114 111. 186 (1885).
The rule applies to prior acts of incorporation since superseded.
Swain v. Comstock, 18 Wise. 463 (1864) ; by the same or a former
government. Payne v. .Treadwell, 16 Gal. 220, 231 (1860).
As the court say in Prell v. McDonald, (7 Kans. 426 (1871) : " In
chartering such corporations the state in one sense charters a portion
of itself. Such corporations are simply instruments in the hands
of the state, made use of for the better protection of rights, the
administration of justice, and the enforcement of the laws."
This judicial knowledge extends to similar acts of a former govern-
ment of the state. " San Francisco having been constituted, by a
public political act of the former government, a pueblo, we must take
judicial notice of its existence, powers, and rights." Payne v. Tread-
well, 16 Gal. 220, 231 (1860). The case is different only by being
stronger where municipalities, e. g., towns, are created under a
general law, " conferring uniform and general powers on each."
Aldermen and Gouncil v. Finley, 10 Ark. 423 (1860) ; Briggs v.
Whipple, 7 Vt. 16 (1835). Gourts take judicial notice of such incor-
porating statutes as being public statutes. "But the fact that a
particular village or town has availed itself of the provisions of
these statutes, and became incorporated as they authorise, is private
in its character, and we know of no principle of law which would
require or auth.orise the courts to take judicial notice of it." Hard v.
City of Decorah, 43 la. 313 (1876) ; Eousey v. Wood, 47 Mo. App.
465 (1891).
Eaileoads. — The existence of a general railroad law stands on
the same footing as any other public law and is noticed as such.
Heaston v. Cincinnati, &c. R. E., 16 Ind. 276 (1861).
But statutes incorporating particular railroads have been held to
be private. They are said (Ohio E. Co. v. Eidge, 6 Black. 78 (1839)
to " operate upon particular persons and private concerns." Atchi-
son, &c. E. E. V. Blackshire, 10 Kans. 477, 487 (1872) ; Perry v.
New Orleans, &c. Eailroad Co., 55 Ala. 413, 426 (1876). But see
Hall V. Brown, 58 N. H. 93 (1877) ; Caldwell v. Eichmond E. E., 89
Ga. 550 (1892), contra.
In Wright v. Hawkins, 28 Tex. 452 (1866), it was held that a
21^3 AMEEICAN NOTES. [PABT I.
land grant or reserve to aid the constructioii of a railroad is a public
act, though, printed among the private laws.
" lu the case of public corporations created by public laws, the
court is officially to take notice of the corporate character."
Winuipiseogee Lake Co. v. Young, 40 N. H. 420 (I860).
So of other public corporations. liJ. g., the existence of the state
bank of Arkansas need not be proved in the courts of that state.
McKiel V. Real Estate Bank, 4 Ark. 592 (1841). So of the Bank of
Tennessee. Shaw v. State, 3 Sneed (Tenn.), 86 (1855).
The courts will recognise bank charters as public acts of which
they are obliged to take judicial notice. Davis v. Bank of Fulton,
31 Ga. 69 (1860) ; Bank of Newberry, 9 Rich. (S. C.) 495 (1855) ;
Hays V. Northwestern Bank of Virginia, 9 Gratt. 127 (1852).
And acts in amendment thereof. Jemison v. Planters and Mer-
chants Bank, 17 Ala. 754 (1850).
The rule extends to a case where an insurance company was by
statute made a bank of discount and deposit. Gordon v. Mont-
gomery, 19 Ind. 110 (1862).
Statutory Modifications. — Courts may be required by statute
to take judicial cognisance of private laws. Bixler's Adm. v.
Parker, 3 Bush, 166 (1867).
Speaking of such a private law, the Virginia court of appeals
say : " The judicial notice we are to take of it, is the same with
that which we give to laws of a general and public nature."
Somerville v. Wimbish, 7 Gratt. 205 (1850).
Where a public statute requires cognisance of particular facts,
e.g. the result of local option (liquor) elections, such cognisance
will be taken, " and since no sources of information are pointed out,
it is incumbent on this as well as all other courts to inform itself
by recourse to any and all sources of information." Puckett v.
State, 71 Miss. 192 (1893) ; Thomas v. Com., 90 Va. 92 (1893). But
see also Whitman v. State, 80 Md. 410 (1894).
So if a statute incorporating a private corporation declares itself
to be a public statute, the courts will take judicial cognisance of it.
Beaty v. Lessee of Knowles, 4 Peters, 152 (1830).
So where the statute does not require that private acts should
be specially pleaded. Halbert v. Skyles, 1 A. K. Marsh, (Ky.) 368
(1818) ; Hart v. Bait. & O. R. R., 6 W. Va. 336 (1873).
Where a private statute is recognised and amended by an act
declared to be public, courts will take judicial notice of the original
statute. Lavalle v. People, 6 111. Ap. 157 (1880) . So an addition
to a public act is itself public. Belmont v. Morrill, 69 Me. 314 (1879).
The repeal of a public law is itself public. State v. O'Conner, 13
La. Ann. 487 (1858).
Where particular facts are established by public statutes, the
court of course take notice of such facts ; e. g., the character of
CHAP. n.J AMEBIC AN NOTES. 21^^
certain buildings as public houses under the gaming laws. Grant
V. State, 27 S. W. 127 (Tex. 1894).
So of the establishment of a probate court in a certain county.
La Salle Co. v. Milligan, 143 111. 321 (1892).
The courts of Canada take cognisance of facts published in the
official gazette. Simms v. Quebec, &c. E. E., 22 Low. Can. Jur. 20
(1877).
It follows from what has been said that, except in these instances
of legal requirement, courts do not take judicial notice of private
statutes. Leland v. Wilkinson, 6 Peters, 317 (1832). So of the
incorporation of private corporations. Workingmen's Bank v. Cou-
yerse, 33 La. Ann. 963 (1881) ; Broad Street Hotel Co. v. Weaver's
Adm. 57 Ala. 26 (1876) ; Danville &c. Plank-Eoad Co. v. State, 16
Ind. 456 (1861); Ferdicaris v. Trenton City Bridge Co., 29 N. J.
Law, 367 (1862).
In cases where the statute incorporating a bank or other institu-
tion declares itself to be a public act, that fact alone is sufficient to
require the courts of the same jurisdiction to take judicial notice
of it. Buell V. Warner, 33 Vt. 570 (1861).
So of a railroad. Cincinnati, &c. E. E. v. Clifford, 113 Ind. 460,
467 (1887) ; Hammett v. Little Eock, &c. E. E. Co., 20 Ark. 204
(1859) ; Western &c. E. E. v. Eoberson, 61 Fed. Eep. 692 (1894).
Or a statute may require courts to take judicial notice of village
organisations as public acts. Doyle v. Village of Bradford, 90 111.
416 (1878). Or of the incorporation of proprietors of lands. Beaty
V. Lessee of Kuowler, 4 Pet. 152 (1830).
In other cases where a statute requires courts to take judicial
notice of an otherwise private statute it will be the court's duty to
take such notice. Eel Eiver Draining Association v. Topp, 16 Ind.
242 (1861).
So courts take judicial notice of all statutes except those which
declare themselves to be private if such is the requirement of the
state constitution. Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 20
How. 227 (1857).
Courts do not take cognisance of other private statutes. City of
Allegheny v. Nelson, 25 Pa. St. 332 (1855). Por example, the in-
corporation of a turnpike by a special act. Aliter of a corporation
under a general law. Danville, &c. Plank Ed. v. State, 16 Ind. 456
(1861).
So the superior judiciary of a state will not take cognisance of
city, town, or county ordinances, or by-laws. Furman v. Mayor, &c.
of Huntsville, 54 Ala. 263 (1875) ; Hassard v. Municipality No. 2, 7
La. Ann. 495 (1852) ; State v. Oddle, 42 Mo. 210 (1868) ; City of
McPherson v. Nichols, 48 Kans. 430 (1892). Garvin v. Wells, 8 la.
286 (1859) ; Lucker v. Com., 4 Bush (Ky.) 440 (1868) ; City of
Winona v. Burke, 23 Minn. 254 (1876) ; Mooney v. Kennett, 19 Mo.
2V^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAKT I.
651 (1854) ; Shanfelter v. Baltimore, 80 Md. 483 (1894) ; City of
St. Louis V. Roche (Mo.), 31 S. W. 915 (1895) ; Porter v. Waring,
69 N. Y. 250 (1877). So of the regulations of a canal board.
Palmer v. Aldridge, 16 Barb. 130 (1852).
But it is within the reasoning by which courts take judicial
cognisance of laws which they are constituted to enforce that the
same municipal ordinances which must be proved before a superior
court of judicature are recognised without proof by the courts of
the body which passed the ordinance. State v. City of Dubuque,
11 la. 407 (1860).
So though the court will take judicial cognisance of the charter
of a municipality and of its power to make by-laws, the existence
of any particular by-laws so made must be alleged and proved.
Case V. Mayor of Mobile, 30 Ala. 538 (1867) ; Sherrel v. Murray, 49
Mo. App. 233 (1892). So where, by statute, a county board was au-
thorised to prescribe by order entered on its records such animals
as could legally run at large, if such orders exist that fact must be
alleged and proved. In the absence of such allegation and proof,
cases will be determined by the general rules of law, unaffected by
the statute. Indianapolis &c. E. Co. v. Caldwell, 9 Ind. 397 (1857).
The reason of the ru.le is partly given in Porter v. Waring, 69 N. Y.
260 (1877), where the court say that a contrarj' rule "would open
the door in many cases to mere conjecture, and involve an inquiry
as to local enactments ; the time when they took effect ; the priority
of the same, and their application to the case in litigation ; which
it would be difficult to dispose of without proof and which are not
properly included within the ordinary scope of judicial knowledge
in the determination and trial of cases."
Of course, the court, ex gratia, may look up the ordinance for
itself, as was done in Hassard v. Municipality No. 2, 7 La. Ann.
495 (1852) ; and it has been held that where an inferior court is re-
quired to take cognisance of local statutes, the appellate court should
do the same, on hearing of the appeal. Solomon v. Hughes, 24
Kans. 211 (1880).
The statutory permission to prove a by-law, ordinance, &c., by a
printed copy properly authenticated does not affect the rule. City
of Winona v. Burke, 23 Minn. 254 (1876).
Judicial Cognisance of State Law by Federal Courts. —
Not only do state courts take notice of the laws of the United
States but the federal courts take cognisance of state laws. Thus,
the circuit courts of the United States take judicial cognisance
of the public laws of any state of the Union, when relevant to the
issue, though such state is not within its immediate jurisdiction.
The reason is stated by Story, J., in Owings v. Hull (9 Peters, 607,
624 (1836)) where it was held that the circuit court of the United
States for Maryland was bound to take judicial cognisance of the
CHAP, n.] AitEEICAN NOTES. 21^6
laws of Louisiana as to the possession of a notarial instrument
executed in New Orleans. "The circuit courts of the United
States are created by congress, not for the purpose of adminis-
tering the local law of a single state alone, but to administer the
laws of all the states in the Union, in cases in which they re-
spectively apply. The judicial power conferred on the general
government by the constitution extends to many cases arising
under the laws of the different states. . . . That jurisprudence
is then, iu no just sense, a foreign jurisprudence, to be proved in
the courts of the United States, by the ordinary modes of proof
by which the laws of a foreign country are to be established, but it is
to be judicially taken notice of in the same manner as the laws of
the United States are taken notice of by these courts." See also
Elwood V. Mannigan, 104 U. S. 562 (1881); Merrill v. Dawson, Hemp-
stead (C. Ct. of Ark.), 563 (1848); Hinde v. Vattier, 5 Pet. 398
(1831) ; Jones v. Hays, 4 McLean, 521 (1849) ; Hanley v. Donaghue,
116 U. S. 1 (1885).
The rule extends to state statutes. Merchants ISTat. Bk. v.
McGraw, 59 Fed. Eep. 972 (1894), So, following the analogy of
the state courts, the federal courts will judicially recognise the
law of any foreign country, establishing land titles in any state once
part of that country. U. S. v. Turner, 11 How. 663 (1850) ; Loree
V. Abner, 57 Fed. Eep. 159 (1893).
In like manner, the supreme court of the United States exer-
cising an appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts of the
United States takes the same judicial cognisance as to state laws
that the circuit courts themselves do. It is accustomed "con-
stantly to take notice of and administer the jurisprudence of all the
states." Owiugs v. Hull, 9 Peters, 607, 624 (1835), per Story, J.
"Needing no averment or proof." Hanley v. Donaghue, 116 U. S.
1, 7 (1885) ; Carpenter v. Dexter, 8 Wall. 513 (1869). As is said in
Hanley v. Donaghue {itbi supra), " whatever was matter of law in
the court appealed from is matter of law here, and whatever was
matter of fact in the court appealed from is matter of fact here."
"The law of any state of the Union, whether depending upon
statutes, or upon judicial opinions, is a matter of which the courts
of the United States are bound to take judicial notice, without plea
or proof." Lamar v. Micou, 114 U. S. 218 (1885).
Where the supreme court of the United States entertains a writ
of error to a state court of last resort it takes the same judicial
cognisance of the public laws of the state of the court said to be in
error that the state court itself would take, " needing no averment
or proof." Hanley v. Donaghue, 116 U. S. 1, 7 (1885).
Under these circumstances of a writ of error to a state court, the
supreme court of the United States has, it will be noted, a nar-
rower range of judicial cognisance than when sitting on appeal
21" AJVIEEICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
from a circuit court of the United States and "does not take
judicial notice of the laws of another state, not proved in that
court and made part of the record sent up, unless by the local law
that court takes judicial notice of it." Liverpool Steam Co. v.
Phenix Insurance Co., 129 U. S. 397, 445 (1888) ; Hanley v.
Donaghue, 116 U. S. 1 (1885) ; Eenaud v. Abbott, 116 U. S. 277,
285 (1886).
"The courts of the United States take judicial notice of the
laws and judicial decisions of the several states." Cheever v.
Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (1869) ; Elwood v. Flannigan, 104 U. S. 562
(1881); Liverpool Steam Co. u. Phenix Ins. Co. 129 U. S. 397,
(1888).
But while it is the duty of these courts to take such cognisance,
they may by rule or otherwise compel litigants to assist them in so
doing, e. jr. by setting out in their briefs all statutes relied upon.
School List. V. Ins. Co., 101 U. S. 472 (1879).
"Pedeeal Question." — Where in a state court the provision
of the federal constitution requiring "full faith and credit" to be
given to the "public acts, records, and judicial proceedings" of
another state is involved (Const. U. S. Art. IV. sec. 1, Stats. 1790,
11), the state court will take the same judicial cognisance of the
laws of the state the validity of whose acts is in question that it
takes of its own laws. The reason on which this rule is based is
succinctly stated by the supreme court of Pennsylvania in Ohio v.
Hinchman, 27 Pa. St. 479 (1856). "A judgment of this court,
adverse to the right arising out of the federal constitution and
legislation, would be reviewable in the Supreme Court of the
United States, and there the states of the confederacy are not
regarded as foreign states, whose laws and usages must be proved,
but as domestic institutions whose laws are to be noticed without
pleading or proof. It would be a very imperfect and discordant
administration for the court of original jurisdiction to adopt one
rule of decision, while the court of final resort was governed by
another; and hence it follows, that in questions of this sort, we
shall take notice of the local laws of a sister state in the same
manner the supreme court of the United States would do on a writ
of error to our judgment."
To same effect is Paine v. Schenectady Ins. Co., 11 E. I. 411
(1876).
Foreign Laws. — Judicial notice cannot be taken of foreign
laws. Asa general rule they must be alleged and proved like other
facts. See 2}ost p. 52".
The highest court of a state may be required, by statute, to take
"judicial notice of the laws and the statutes of our sister states,"
Hobbs V. Memphis & Charlestown E. Co., 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 873
(1872),
CHAP, n.] AMERICAN NOTES. 21^8
Notice is not taken even when tlie foreign law, e. g. established
rate of interest in other states, is printed as part of the general
statutes of a particular state. Insurance Co. of North America v.
Forcheimer, 86 Ala. 541 (1888).
If the foreign law is made part of the record in error before the
supreme court of the United States it will be considered. Green
V. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139 (1868).
Coordinate Beanches op Government. — For reasons ana-
logous to those requiring state courts to recognise the existence
and composition of the national government and its international
relations, all courts recognise the existence and composition of the
government by which they are constituted, in its executive, legis-
lative, and judicial branches. " It is certainly true that the courts
will judicially recognise the public officers of the state, under whose
laws and organisation they act as the chief executive, the heads of
departments ; judges of courts of general jurisdiction ; attorneys
for the state, sheriffs, and we see no reason why clerks of the
courts should not also be included." Major v. State, 2 Sneed
(Tenn.), 11 (1854), — a case deciding that where the clerk of the
circuit court in one county transmits papers to the circuit court
of another county, on a charge of venue, the seal of the court is
not essential to the authentication of the trans iuittii)g clerk,
whose signature will be judicially noticed. Courts will not require
proof of the signature of the governor of their state or the date
of his election and inauguration. Wells v. Jackson Iron Mfg.
Co., 47 N. H. 235 (1866) ; Dewees v. Colorado Co., 32 Tex. 570
(1870); Hizer u. State, 12 Ind. 330 (1859). "The court must take
judicial notice of the changes made in the executive department."
Lindsey v. Atty.-Gen., 33 Miss. 508, 628 (1857). And courts will
notice the accession of the de facto governor. State v. Williams,
5 Wise. 308 (1856) ; and his appointment of A. as a district judge.
De la Eosa v. State, Tex. Crim. App. (1893), 21 S. W. Eep. 192 ; and
of the public proclamations of the governor, e. g., in calling for
troops. Hanson v. South Scituate, 115 Mass. 336 (1874). So it has
been held by the supreme cotu-t of Louisiana that the signatures of
former Spanish governors of their state need not be proved. Jones
V. Gale's Curatrix, 4 Martin, 635 (1817).
Courts "are bound judicially to know who are the sheriffs of the
several counties." Ingram v. State, 27 Ala. 17 (1855) ; Alexander v.
Burnham, 18 Wise. 199 (1864) ; Thompson v. Haskell, 21 111. 215
(1859) ; and their signatures. Wood v. Fitz, 10 Martin, 196 (1821).
A court will take judicial notice of the civil officers of the county
in which it holds its sittings. Thielmann v. Burg, 73 111. 293 (1874) ;
and so of the signature of the recorder. Scott v. Jackson, 12 La.
Ann. 640 (1857). So of the registers of the several counties of the
state. Fancher v. De Montegre, 1 Head, 40 (1858) ; and the levee tax-
2V^ AMEBICAN NOTES. [PAKT I.
collector. Templeton v. Morgan, 16 La. Ann. 438 (1862) ; Wethen-
bee V. Dunn, 32 Cal. 106 (1867). "Courts are authorised and
required," say the supreme court of Alabama, " to take judicial
notice of the various commissioned ofiBlcers of the state, and to
know the extent of their authority, their official signatures, and
their respective terms of office, — when such terms commence, and
when they expire. The dates of these commissions are matters of
public record in the executive department of the state government,
being accessible to inquiry by all who may be concerned, and the
law fixes the duration of each official term." Gary v. State, 76 Ala.
78 (1884); Bennett v. State, 1 Mart. & Yerg. 133 (1827). The
supreme court of California holds that " the courts will take
judicial notice of the officers of a county and the genuineness of
their signatures ; and when the law provides for the appointment of
a deputy by one of these officers, courts will also judicially recog-
nise such deputy and the genuineness of his signature." Himmel-
mann v. Hoadley, 44 Cal. 213, 226 (1872). So the Pennsylvania
courts take judicial notice of aldermen as public officers. Fox
V. Com., 81* Pa. St. 511 (1875). Illinois courts take cognisance
who are justices of the peace ; Graham v. Anderson, 42 111. 514
(1867) ; and other civil officers, Brackett v. People, 115 111. 29
(1886), including "justices of the various courts of record of the
State, and of their terms of office." Vahle v. Brackenseik, 145 111.
231 (1893). Probably Courts will not take cognisance of the
official character of a deputy marshal. Ward v. Henry, 19 Wise.
76 (1866). They will not recognise the official character of a
deputy sheriff. State Bank v. Curran, 10 Ark. 142 (1849) ; Land
V. Patteson, Minor (Ala.) 14 (1820), he not being "commissioned
in the name of the state or required by statute to take any oath
of office." But where a statute authorised a superintendent of
streets to appoint deputies, the courts of California " judicially
recognise such deputy and the genuineness of his signature." Him-
melmann v. Hoadley, 44 Cal. 213 (1872). A deputy auditor general,
" being a state officer known to the law," will be judically recog-
nised. People V. Johr, 22 Mich. 461 (1871).
Where the terms of all justices of the peace by law expire on a
certain day the court will take notice of that fact. Stubbs v. State,
53 Miss. 437 (1876).
So the courts of Indiana " take notice, as matter of law, that the
trustee of a civil township is also trustee of the school township.
Inglis V. Hughes, 61 Ind. 212 (1878).
Such cognisance includes knowledge of the general elections at
which such officers are voted for. State v. Minnick, 15 la. 123
(1863) ; Ellis v. Eeddin, 12 Kans. 306 (1873). The reason is prob-
ably that given in Davis v. Best, 2 la. 96 (1853). " The August
election is established by law, and the time it is held should be
CHAP. n.J AMERICAN NOTES. 21^0
judicially taten notice of." See also Burnett v. Henderson, 21
Tex. 688 (1858) ; Lewis v. Supervisors, 70 111. 65 (1873).
Of these requirements of judicial knowledge, the supreme court
of Alabama say (Gordon v. Tweedy, 74 Ala. 237 (1883) : " This cognis-
ance may often extend far beyond the actual knowledge, or even the
memory of judges, who may therefore resort to such documents of
reference, or other authoritative sources of information as may be at
hand, and may be deemed worthy of confidence." The court will
not take cognisance of who are town constables. The fact is not " of
publick notoriety." Doe v. Blackman, 1 D. Chipman (Vt.) 109 (1797).
Statutokt Gbogkaphy. — Courts are required to take judicial
notice of geographical or administrative subdivisions of the
sovereignty by which they are constituted. Vanderwerker v. People,
6 Wend. 630 (1830); McDonald v. DeCairl, 1 Chan. Cham. 34
(1859) ; State v. Powers, 25 Conn. 48 (1866) ; State v. Wagner,
61 Me. 178 (1873); Com. v. Desmond, 103 Mass. 445 (1869);
Winnipiseogee Lake Co. v. Young, 40 K H. 420 (1860) ; U. S.
V. Beebe, 2 Dak. 292 (1880) ; Smitha v. Flournoy's Adm., 47 Ala.
345 (1872) ; Martin v. Martin, 61 Me. 366 (1863) ; Chesapeake fee-
Canal Co. V. Baltimore &c. E. R. Co., 4 Gill & J. 1, 63 (1832) 5
Boston V. State, 5 Tex. App. 383 ; Woodward v. Chicago &c. E. E.,
21 Wise. 309 (1867).
"Courts take notice of the local divisions of the state, as into
counties, cities, towns, &c., and of the relative position thereof, but
not 'of the precise boundaries and distances. And they are not
bound to take judicial notice of the local situation and distances of
the different places in counties from each other." Goodwin v.
Appleton, 22 Me. 463 (1843) ; Doyle v. Village of Bradford, 90 111.
416 (1878) ; Boston v. State, 6 Tex. App. 383 (1879) ; Gooding v.
Morgan, 70 111. 275 (1873) ; Martin v. Martin, 51 Me. 366 (1863).
But the supreme court of Ehode Island, without citation of authori-
ties, hold that "the courts are bound to take cognisance of the
boundaries in fact claimed by the state." State v. Dunwell, 5 R. I.
127 (1856) ; and that of Iowa judicially knows that Race Island
is in the jurisdiction of the adjoining state of Illinois. Gilbert v.
Moline Water Power & M'f'g Co., 19 la. 319 (1865). So of the popu-
lation of a county according to the United States census, if the
legislature has classified counties on this basis. Worcester JSTat.
Bank v. Cheney, 94 111. 430 (1880) ; State v. Marion Co. Ct. (Mo.),
31 S. W. 23 (1896). Judicial notice is taken of population as fixed
by the census. Hawkins v. Thomas, 3 Ind. App. 399 (1891). So a
territorial court is required to take cognisance of the limits and
relative distances of the territory. Hoyt v. Russell, 107 U. S. 401
(1886). So far as the limits of county jurisdiction depend upon
the construction of records, "it is purely a question of law for the
court." State v. Wagner, 61 Me. 178 (1873).
2121 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAKT I.
Where a statute declared certain houses to be public, the court
will "recognise such houses to be public places." Graham v.
Williams, 27 S. W. Rep. 127 (1894), (Grim. Ct. Appeals of Tex.).
" Judicial knowledge of the location of towns is limited to such
places as are recognised by general statutes." Field v. State (Tex.),
24 S. W. Eep. 407 (1893) ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Horton, 132 Ind.
189 (1892). The public political act may be one by a former govern-
ment, establishing the municipality. Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal.
220 (1860).
Courts are not required to know that a place is within a particular
county. Boston v. State, 5 Tex. App. 383 (1879) ; Cain v. State,
(Tex.) 25 S. W. Rep. 1119 (1894). But see Gooding v. Morgan,
70 111. 276 (1873) ; Kidder v. Blaisdell, 45 Me. 461 (1858) ; Com.
V. Wheeler, 162 Mass. 429 (1894).
But they may do so if they see fit. " The court can take judicial
notice of the lines of counties and the towns embraced in them."
Steinmetz v. Versailles Turnpike Co., 57 Ind. 457 (1877) ; Ham v.
Ham, 39 Me. 263 (1855) ; State v. Powers, 25 Conn. 48 (1856) ;
Smitha v. Flournoy's Adm., 47 Ala. 345 (1872); Lewis v. State,
24 S. W. (Tex.) 903 (1894) ; and also that it is a railroad termi-
nus and has a post office. Central &c. Co. v. Gamble, 77 Ga. 584
(1886).
Where the location of a place is referred to in public statutes the
location must be recognised without proof. Solyer v. Romanet,
52 Tex. 662 (1880) ; Martin v. Martin, 51 Me. 366 (1863) ; People
V. Etting, 99 Cal. 577 (1893) ; People v. Curley, 99 Mich. 238 (1894).
So of the distance of a town from the county seat. Bruson v. Clark,
151 111. 495 (1894). See also State v. Pennington, 124 Mo. 388
(1894). Courts of California will take cognisance that there is only
one city of 100,000 population in the state. In re Constitutionality
of Senate Bill 293, 39 Pac. Rep. 522 (1895). In an Alabama case,
King V. Kent's Heirs, 29 Ala. 542 (1857), the court state that as a
certain town is mentioned in the state constitution as the capitol
and in other public acts, they are " bound " to know that it is in
Alabama, and also that as an act of congress establishes a land
office there and it "has long been notoriously known and recog-
nised " as a land office, they "are authorised" to take notice of the
same fact.
In a later Alabama case, the court take the same view. " The
public acts apprise us that Mobile is a municipal corporation of
Alabama and where it is situated." Alabama &c. Ins. Co. v. Cobb,
57 Ala. 547 (1877). See also to same effect, Houlton v. Chic. &c.
R. R., 86 Wise. 59 (1893). So a court will take notice of Indian
reservations within their jurisdiction, and of the laws and procla-
mations establishing or regulating them. U. S. v. Beebe, 2 Dak.
292 (1880).
CHAP, n.] AMEEICAI^ KOTES. 2122
And that the Indian Territory is beyond the jurisdiction of
Texas. Conner v. State, 23 Tex. App. 378 (1887).
For the same reasons, in many of the western states of the
Union where political subdivisions, as well as the foundation of land
titles, rest on government patents based on official surveys, the
existence and location of the lines of such survey are among the
facts of which courts are required to take cognisance. Mossman
V. Forrest, 27 Ind. 233 (1866) ; Desire v. Burleson, 35 Neb. 238
(1892) ; Atwater v. Schenck, 9 Wise. 160 (1859) ; Quinn v. Cham-
pagne, 38 Minn. 322 (1888) ; Wright v. Phillips, 2 Greene (la.) 191
(1849); Gooding v. Morgan, 70 111. 275 (1873); Gardner v. Eber-
hart, 82 111. 316 (1876) ; Murphy v. Hendricks, 57 Ind. 693 (1877) ;
Money v. Turnipseed, 50 Ala. 499 (1874) ; Muse v. Eichards,
70 Miss. 581 (1893). So of the relation of a certain town to a prin-
cipal meridian will be noticed. O'Brien v. Krockinski, 50 111. App.
456 (1893). The United States supreme court say : " It is a
matter of which this court will take judicial notice, that, by law,
the country is divided into collective districts for internal revenue
purposes, and in some states there are several of these districts
with defined geographical boundaries." U. S. v. Jackson, 104 U. S.
41 (1881).
As to proof of these lines, as matters of public and general
interest, as an exception to the rule against hearsay, see post, p. 412\
EuLES OF Pkacticb. — Courts take cognisance of the rules of
practice established in their own courts.
" And of the times when and the places where its sessions ap-
pointed by law are to be held." Kidder v. Blaisdell, 45 Me. 461 (1858) ;
Lindsay v. Williams, 17 Ala. 229 (1860) ; Eoss v. Austill, 2 Cal. 183
(1852). " Judicial notice is taken of the number of days the court is
in session at each term." Fabyan v. Eussell, 38 N. H. 84 (1859) ;
Durre v. Brown, 7 Ind. App. 127 (1893).
But see Gilliland v. Sellers, 2 Oh. St. 223 (1853), contra.
"This court judicially knows that the fall term of the circuit
court of Lowndes County begins on the fourth Monday in October
in each year, and may continue three weeks ; and that November 6th,
1873, was a day of the second week of said term." Eodgers v. State,
50 Ala. 102 (1874). To same effect, Spencer v. Curtis, 67 Ind. 221
(1877) ; Davidson v. Peticolas, 34 Tex. 27 (1870) ; Lewis v. Wintrode,
76 Ind. 13 (1881).
Courts will not take notice of the rules established by inferior
tribunals. Cutter v. Caruthers, 48 Cal. 178 (1874) ; Cherry v. Baker,
17 Md. 75 (1860). Or of their adjournments. Baker v. Knott,
Supreme Court of Idaho, 35 Pac. Eep. 172 (1893).
Courts are required to take judicial cognisance of their own records
in a prior stage of the same case. Dawson v. Dawson, 29 Mo. App.
521(1888); Searlesv. Knapp, (So.Dak.) 68N". W. 807 (1894) ; State
21^^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
V. Ulrich, 110 Mo. 350 (1892) ; State v. Bowen, 16 Kans. 475 (1876);
Pagett V. Curtis, 15 La. Ann. 451 (1860) ; Hollenbacli v. Schnabel,
101 Cal. 312 (1894) ; Yell v. Lane, 41 Ark. 63 (1883) ; Secrist v.
Petty, 109 111. 188 (1883) ; State v. Schilling, 14 la. 455 (1862) ;
Leavitt v. Cutler, 37 Wise. 46 (1875). Even in a case where the
proceedings against the garnishee and the principal defendant were
" virtually a portion of the same record." Farrar v. Bates, 55 Tex.
193 (1881) ; Kenosha Stove Co. v. Shedd, 82 la. 640 (1891).
But courts are not required to take judicial cognisance of their
own records in other cases. National Bank of Monticello v. Bryant,
13 Bush (Ky.), 419 (1877) ; Grace v. Ballou, 4 So. Dak. 333 (1893) ;
McCormick v. Herndon, 67 Wise. 648 (1887). See also, In re Man-
derson, 51 Fed. Eep. 50 (1892).
Indeed a California case, speaking of another pending petition
against the defendant in the case at bar, go so far as to say : " We
apprehend that the court could not under any circumstances take
judicial notice of the fact, except it were for mere calendar purposes."
Lake Merced Water Co. v. Cowles, 31 Cal. 215 (1866).
So an affidavit in another case cannot be judicially noticed by the
judge, though admissible in evidence if offered and the judge, in
point of fact, personally remembers the affidavit. Baker v. Mygalt,
14 la. 131 (1862).
In the same way, a court cannot take judicial notice of the con-
nection existing between two cases on its docket. Banks v. Burnam,
61 Mo. 76 (1875).
" But the courts of one state cannot judicially take notice of the
laws and practice of another." Newell v. Newton, 10 Pick. 470 (1830).
Courts will take judicial notice who were its members at a par-
ticular time and "the term fixed by law for the commencement of
its sessions." Gilliland v. Sellers, 2 Oh. St. 223 (1853).
And courts will take notice who are their officers. Central
Land Co. &c. v. Calhoun, 16 W. Va. 361 (1880) ; Montjoy v. State,
78 Ind. 172 (1881) ; Norvell v. McHenry, 1 Mich. 227 (1849) ; Dyer
V. Last, 51 111. 179 (1869). And of their signatures. Buell v. State,
72 111. 523 (1880).
Whether courts are required to take official notice of the personnel
of inferior courts is in dispute. « The court are bound to take notice
of all public acts and laws, without doubt ; but whether they must
know who are the justices or the chief justices of inferior tribunals
certainly admits of question." Kipley v. Warren, 2 Pick. 692 (1824).
In Davis v. McEnany, 150 Mass. 451 (1890) the supreme judicial
court of Massachusetts declined to take judicial cognisance of the
clerk of a police court, deciding that the record itself should show
his official character.
On the contrary, the Kentucky court of appeals recognises who
are judges of the circuit courts of that state. Kennedy v. Com., 78
CHAP, n.] AMERICAN NOTES. 212*
Ky. 447 (1880). So the Illinois court of appeals. Eussell v. Sargent,
7 111. App. 98 (1880). The supreme court of Pennsylvania, after
some review of the authorities, are "disposed to take judicial
notice " of the constitution of an inferior court. They treat the
question as one of optional cognisance. "The rule," they say, "is
that courts will take notice of what ought to be generally known
within the limits of their jurisdiction. There seems to us to be as
much reason for our having knowledge of who are in fact the judges
of our constitutional courts, as for our having judicial knowledge of
the heads of departments, sheriffs, etc., knowledge of whom is always
presumed." Kilpatrick v. Com., 31 Pa. St. 198 (1858) ; Cincinnati,
&c. K. E. V. Grames, 8 Ind. App. 112 (1893). But see County of San
Joaquin v. Budd, 96 Cal. 47 (1892).
Courts when required to take cognisance of facts which they do
not actually know are constrained to, resort to any appropriate
source of information. " Information to guide their judgment may
be obtained by resort to original documents in the public archives
or to books of history or science or to any other proper source."
Hoyt V. Russell, 117 U. S. 401 (1885) ; Gonzales v. Boss, 120 U. S.
605 (1886).
The Maryland courts " take judicial notice of the tribunals created
by the constitution." Tucker v. State, 11 Md. 322 (1857).
In Louisiana, courts recognise the signature of all justices legally
appointed by the governor. Despau v. Swindler, 3 Martin, n. s.
705 (1825). '
This is in accordance with the general rule prevailing in that state :
" We have more than once held that we would not require evidence
of the of&cial capacity of functionaries commissioned in this state,
and would take notice of the oflSces held by them." Follain v.
Lefevre, 3 Robinson, 13 (1842). So, in that state, when court offi-
cers take a bond in pursuance of law and file the same in court, no
proof is needed of the officer's signature. Wood v. Fitz, 10 Martin,
196 (1821).
And so the supreme court of Alabama takes judicial notice of the
resignation of a circuit judge, though without assigning any reason
for their decision. Ux parte Peterson, 33 Ala. 74 (1858).
The Illinois courts take judicial notice who are the justices of
the peace in their respective counties. Graham v. Anderson, 42 111.
514 (1867). Also who are the judges of inferior courts. Vahle v.
Brackenseik, 145 111. 231 (1893) ; also the date of their ceasing to
hold the office. People v. McConnell, 155 111. 192 (1895).
The Kings Bench of Lower Canada holds that courts will notice
the appointment of one of their officers to be judge of another court.
Fay V. Miville, 2 Rev. de Legis. 333 (1816). Notice will be taken
of the jurisdiction of an inferior court as regulated by statute.
Nelson v. Ladd, 4 So. Dak. 1 (1893).
2125 AMERICAN NOTES. [PART I.
Language. — Courts take judicial cognisance of the ordinary-
meaning of words in the vernacular. Probably they are required so
to do. Com. V. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 206, 241 (1838) (" blasphemy ") ;
Hill V. Bacon, 43 111. 477 (1867) ; Adler v. State, 55 Ala. 16 (1876)
("malt liquor"); Shubrick u State, 2 S. C. 21 (1870) ("sow");
State V. Abbott, 20 Vt. 537 (1848) (" steer ").
" We take judicial notice of the true significance of all English
words and phrases, and may resort for aid to any appropriate books
of reference." Grennan v. McGregor, 78 Cal. 258 (1889).
The court may decline to hear evidence concerning the signifi-
cance of words, the meaning of which it judicially knows ; e. g. in
a Massachusetts case, on trial of a complaint for violation of the
Sunday law by keeping open a tobacconist's store, the defendant
claimed that he was lawfully selling " drugs and medicines," and
offered evidence of experts to show that tobacco and cigars had
" a medicinal effect on the human system." The presiding justice
excluded the evidence, and an exception to this ruling was over-
ruled. "The court has judicial knowledge of the meaning of com-
mon words, and may well rule that guns and pistols are not drugs
or medicines, and may exclude the opinions of witnesses who offer
to testify that they are." Com. «. Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68 (1889).
See also Matthews v. Park, 159 Pa. St. 579 (1894).
The court may not only refresh its memory by reference to dic-
tionaries, etc., but may permit standard authorities, e. g., Webster's
Unabridged Dictionary, to be read to the jury for its definition of a
disputed word. Adler v. State, 55 Ala. 16 (1876).
The court must study out the meaning of terms ; e. g. " Congre-
gational." Atty.-Gen. v. Dublin, 38 N. H. 459 (1859). But may re-
quire aid from the parties. School Dist. v. Ins. Co., 101 U. S. 472
(1879). And use the testimony of experts. Atty.-Gen. v. Dublin,
ubi supra.
In a New York case, the court without proof rendered judgment
for the dollar value of a number of English " pounds." Johnston v.
Hedden, 2 Johns. Cases, 274 (1801).
Whether courts will notice customary abbreviations is more in
dispute. Apparently, this species of knowledge is more nearly
■analogous to those where cognisance is optional with the court, ■/. e.,
dependent upon the knowledge or feeling of the particular judge.
In an Alabama case the court say it " must judicially take notice of
such abbreviations as ' Adm'r.' or acknowledge itself incompetent to
understand the commonest writings." Moseley's Adm'r v. Mastin,
37 Ala. 216 (1861). So the usual abbreviations of proper names
will be noticed. Stephen v. State, 11 Ga. 225, 240 (1852) (" Jas.") ;
Weaver v. McElhenor, 13 Mo. 89 (1850) ("Christy"); Sparks ■»;.
Sparks, 51 Kans. 195 (1893) ("Dan"); Studsill «. State, 7 Ga. 2,
(1849) (" Thos.").
CHAP, n.] AMBEICAISr NOTES. 212S
On the other hand, the supreme court of Texas was unable judi-
cially to know that " St. Louis, Mo. " meant St. Louis in the state
of Missouri. Ellis v. Park, 8 Tex. 205 (1852) ; or that "New Or-
leans, La." meant New Orleans in the state of Louisiana. Eussell
V. Martin, 15 Tex. 238 (1855). Apparently these two cases rest on
an erroneous application of a prior case in the same court, Andrews
V. Hoxie, 5 Tex. 171 (1849), where the court decide that they cannot
judicially know that "The city of New Orleans," without more,
means the city of that name in Louisiana. This apparently is cor-
rect. Most people in the United States know that there is a city
of New Orleans in Louisiana. Whether there are other cities of
the same name elsewhere is not, perhaps, so generally known as to
dispense with proof.
Slang and phrases of peculiar or local usage must be proved. In
the case of Mayor &c. of Baltimore v. State, 56 Md. 376, 468 (1859),
where the legislature of Maryland had assumed control of the police
force of Baltimore by the appointment of commissioners under a
statute, providing "that no Black Eepublican or endorser or ap-
prover of. the Helper Book" should be appointed to any oiBce
under the board, the court say : " We cannot understand, officially,
who are meant to be affected by the proviso, and, therefore, cannot
express a judicial opinion on the question."
But the court will take judicial notice of the phrase " gift enter-
prise" as used in a criminal statute. Lohman v. State, 81 Ind.
15 (1881).
And officially notice the meaning of the initials C. 0. D. State v.
Intox. Liquors, 73 Me. 278 (1882). But, on the contrary, the Mis-
souri court of appeals " do not know that the meaning of the abbre-
viation ' C. 0. D.' as used by expressmen, is sufficiently a matter
of common knowledge that the circuit court could take judicial
notice of it," and hold that its meaning is a question for the jury.
McNichol V. Pacific Express Co., 12 Mo. App. 401 (1882). Courts
will notice surveyor's initials, not pretending " to be more ignorant
than the rest of mankind." Kile v. Yellowhead, 80 111. 208 (1875).
But the courts of Minnesota refuse to take cognisance of the mean-
ing of " S^ N. E.* and N. W.* S. E.^ " Keith v. Hayden, 26 Minn.
212 (1879). To the same effect. Power v. Bowdle, 3 No. Dak. 107
(1893).
So a foreign language must be proved ; e. g., in a case where
defendant was convicted of rape upon a woman named " Kurkwiski,"
and there was evidence that her name was written Kurkowiski,
the court refused a motion in arrest of judgment, which was
approved on report to the upper court. " There is no evidence
tending to show that, though pronounced Kurkowiski, it was not
properly spelled Kurkwiski. The courts of this state cannot take
judicial cognisance of the proper orthography or pronunciation of
2V AMERICAN NOTES. [PART I.
names in the Polish language." State v. Johnson, 26 Minn. 316
(1879).
CiECULATiNG Medium, etc. — The court and jury will take
notice, without proof, of the legal coins made at the mint of the
United States, pursuant to law and of foreign coins made current
by law. U. S. v. Burns, 5 McLean, 23 (1849) ; also of what is legal
tender. Chesapeake Bank v. Swain, 29 Md. 483, 502 (1868) ; Daily
V. State, 10 Ind. 536 (1858). Also that United States notes "are
prima facie of a commercial value equal to that imputed by their
face." Gady v. State, 83 Ala. 51 (1887).
So courts take notice of the nature and denominations of the
circulating medium. Lampton v. Haggard, 3 Monr. (Ky.) 149
(1826) ; and that there are " classes of notes and bills in circulation
as money " other than bankbills. Hart v. State, 55 Ind. 599 (1877).
That " nickels " are of value need not be proved. Mallory v. State,
62 Ga. 164 (1878). But in a case requiring damages to be assessed
according to the value of the bank notes of the Bank of the Com-
monwealth, the court say : " We are not at liberty to take judicial
notice of the value of the paper of the bank at any particular time."
Feanster v. Eingo, 5 Monr. (Ky.) 336 (1827). To same effect, as to
depreciation of Confederate money, see Modawell v. Holmes, 40
Ala. 391 (1867). That there was depreciation will be noticed.
Keppelv. R. E., Chase's Dec. 167 (1868). But the American courts
will not take notice of the value of Canadian currency. Kermott
V. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181 (1863).
Courts recognise also, without proof, the legal standards of weights
and measures prevailing in their particular jurisdictions. Courts
recognise the capacity of a " pint." Eeid v. McWhinnie, 27 Q. B.
U. C. 289 (1868).
Matters of Optional Cognisance. — The rule which allows a
court, in its discretion, to know, without proof, certain facts rele-
vant to the issue, because undisputed and generally known, per-
forms much the same office in the trial of causes, as do the rules of
pleading. It relieves the administration of justice from the con-
sideration of matters on which the parties are agreed or which they
do not care to contest, and enables the tribunal to devote its entire
attention to the real points in dispute.
In every trial of an issue of fact one or more propositions are in
dispute between the parties. Involved or connected with the proof
or disproof of these are often found relevant facts which are not
disputed. They are usually facts of notoriety, frequently capable of
being settled, one way or the other, with slight exertion. To expe-
dite business, as well as to avoid the anomaly of solemnly proving
what is not really disputed, (and generally every one knows to be as
stated), the court will usually dispense with the necessity of prov-
CHAP. II.] AMERICAN NOTES. 21^8
ing such fact and assume it to be as claimed until proof is de-
manded. The court will instruct the jury on this basis.
Apparently a party has the right to dispute such a fact, even at
the risk of a new trial if the jury be persuaded contrary to the
court's knowledge.
Such judicial cognisance is not usually taken in respect to matters
in issue. "A matter which could legitimately be the subject of
inquiry in a court could not well be said to be so well established
and to have acquired such notoriety as to come within the judicial
knowledge of the court." Chicago &c. E. R. v. Champion, 32 N. E.
(Ind.) 874 (1892).
As facts of judicial cognisance are usually those of notoriety,
equally open to all,, the jury may be assumed to know them equally
with the court, even without the aid of an instruction from the
bench.
Facts of the Almanac. — Whether the facts stated in the
almanac are of optional or required cognisance is not entirely clear
upon the American authorities. The permissive form of expres-
sion is usually employed, and that fact has controlled the classifica-
tion. There is much, however, in the dictum of Pollock, C. B.
(Tutton V. Darke, 5 H. & N. 649 (1860). "The almanack is part of
the law of England." A reputable almanac may be introduced in
evidence to show the time of the rising of the moon on a certain day.
Case V. Perew, 46 Hun, N. Y. Supreme Court, 67 (1887) ; Mun-
shower v. State, 66 Md. 11 (1880) ; the hour of sunset on a certain
day. State v. Morris, 47 Conn. 179 (1879) ; or the hour of sunrise,
People V. Chee Kee, 61 Cal. 404 (1882).
The almanac is not used as evidence of the fact stated. It
merely reminds the tribunal of a fact which it already is supposed
to know. " The almanac in such cases is used, like the statute, not
strictly as evidence, but for the purpose of refreshing the memory
of the court and jury." State v. Morris, 47 Conn. 174 (1879).
Indeed, the almanac need not be introduced in evidence at all to
be available to the party who relies on a fact stated in it. Counsel
are entitled to refer to such fact in argument and to cite the almanac
in support of it. "However often departed from as a matter of
convenience, the rule is that matters of which judicial notice is
taken, including the dates in the almanac, do not require to be put
in evidence at all." Wilson v. Van Leer, 127 Pa. St. 371 (1889).
"The fact [time of sunrise] for the proof of which the almanac
was offered, was one of those facts of which a court may take
judicial notice ; formal proof of it was therefore unnecessary. It
would have been sufficient to have called it to the knowledge of the
judge at the trial ; and if his memory was at fault or his information
not sufficiently full and precise to induce him to act upon it, he had
the right to resort to an almanac, or any other book of reference,
212S AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
for the purpose of satisfying himself about it ; and such knowledge
would have been evidence." People v. Chee Kee, 61 Cal. 404
(1882).
In like manner, the coincidence of the days of the week with
those of the month will be noticed. "It is the duty of the court to
notice the days of the week on which particular days of the month
fall." Philadelphia &c. R. E. v. Lehman, 66 Md. 209, 226 (1881) ;
Wilson V. Van Leer, 127 Pa. St. 371 (1889) ; Mcintosh v. Lee, 67
la. 366 (1881) ; Brennan v. Vogt, 97 Ala. 647 (1892) ; Ecker v.
First Nat. Bk. of Windsor, 64 Md. 292 (1886) ; Reed v. Wilson, 41
N. J. Law, 29 (1879) ; First Nat. Bank &c. v. Kingsley, 84 Me. Ill
(1891) ; Williams v. Brandenberg, 6 Ind. App. 97 (1892).. Morgan
V. Burrow (Miss.), 16 So. 432 (1894).
For the same reason the regular procession of the seasons need
not be proved but will be judicially recognised. Ross v. Boswell,
60 Ind. 235 (1877) ; Tomlinson v. Greenfield, 31 Ark. 657 (1876) ;
Patterson v. McCausland, 3 Bland (Md.) Chan. 69 (1830); Loeb v.
Richardson, 74 Ala. 311 (1883). For example, that cotton is not
planted in January. Wetzler v. Kelly, 83 Ala. 440 (1887).
But a court cannot be required to take cognisance of a fluctuating
event, e. g. the particular time of ripening of any particular crop
at a particular place under the vicissitudes of any particular season.
Dixon V. Niccolls, 39 111. 372 (1866). Or that each concentric layer
of a tree denotes a year's growth. Patterson v. McCausland, 3 Bland
(Md). Chan. 69 (1830). Or that the " pasture season " ends at " any
particular day or time." Gove v. Downer, 59 Vt. 139 (1886).
So the courts will take judicial notice of the facts set forth in the
almanac as to the rising of the moon. Case v. Perew, 46 Hun, 57
(1887) ; Munshower v. State, 55 Md. 11 (1880) ; Mobile & Birming-
ham R. R. V. Ladd, 92 Ala. 287 (1890). The hour of sunset. State
V. Morris, 47 Conn. 179 (1879).
So courts may take cognisance of other usual manifestations of
natural laws, e. g., the normal limits in height of a human being.
"We know that the average height of man is less than six feet.
That the average length of the body from the lower end of the
spine to the top of the head is less than thirty-six inches. That the
measurement varies but little in adults, and that the chief difference
in the height of men is in the length of their lower limbs." Hunter
V. N. Y. &c. R. R., 116 N. Y. 615, 622 (1889).
Or of the ordinary length of human life. Scheffler v. Minne-
apolis &c. R. R., 32 Minn. 518 (1884) ; Johnson v. Hudson R. R. R.
Co., 6 Dner, 633, 648 (1857) ; Lessee of Allen v. Lyons, 2 Wash. 475
(1811) ; Floyd's Heirs v. Johnson, 2 Littell, 109 (1822). The court
may use the "Mortality tables." Kansas City &c. R. R. Co. v.
Phillips, 98 Ala. 159 (1892). But see Price v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 48 Mo. App. 281 (1892), contra where the court decline to take
CHAP, n.] AMERICAN NOTES. Sl^"
cognisance of the value of an insurance policy, established in this
way, " depending partly on extraneous facts aud partly on the ac-
curacy of an intricate computation."
The court will judicially notice the usual limits of the period of
gestation. Whitman v. State, 34 111. 360 (1870) ; Eonan v. Dugan,
126 Mass. 176 (1879).
HiSTOKicAL Facts. — An instance of facts of optional cognisance
is found in matters of public history. Such as the existence of
the late civil war (between the United and Confederate States of
America). Woods v. Wilder, 43 N. Y. 164 (1870) ; Iron Mfg. Co. v.
Gaskell, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 742 (1879) ; Bishop v. Jones, 28 Tex. 294
(1866).
And of the particular acts which led to it. Swinnerton v. Columbia
Ins. Co., 37 N. Y. 174 (1867). Or happened during its continuance,
Cuyler v. Ferrill, 1 Abb. (U. S. Circ. Ct.) 169, 178 (1867) ; Buford v.
Tucker, 44 Ala. 89 (1870). So the courts will notice the issuance
and general value and progressive depreciation of the Confederate
paper currency. Lumpkin v. Murrell, 46 Tex. 51 (1876). But it is
error to take judicial cognisance that in a particular county it was
hazardous to person or property to hold certain political views.
" This fact ought to have been proved, and not been thus assumed
by the court as a historical fact, of which the court could take
judicial notice." Simmons v. Trumbo, 9 W. Va. 358 (1876). Of
the course of trade to which the war gave rise. The Northrop,
Blatch. Pr. Cases, 235 (1862) ; The Peterhoff, Blatch. Prize Cases,
463, 509 (1863). The sending of gold to a premium. U. S. v. 4000
American Gold Coin, 1 Woolw. 217 (1868). And of the financial and
social condition in which it left the Confederate States. "The
general and common condition of the country and its people is a
part of its history. This is presumed to be known to courts and to
every one." Ashley's Adm'x v. Martin, 50 Ala. 637 (1873) ; Foscue
V. Lyon, 65 Ala. 440 (1876). So slavery was recognised as existing
in certain states as part of the history of the country. Jack v.
Martin, 12 Wend. 311, 328 (1834).
So the abolition of slavery will be judicially noticed. Ferdinand
V. State, 39 Ala. 706 (1866). And the interdicting of commercial
intercourse^ during the pendency of hostilities. Rice v. Shook, 27
Ark. 137 (1871). But notice will not be judicially taken of the
relative positions of the opposing armies at any particular period of
the war. Kelley v. Storey, 6 Heisk. 202 (1871). Or of the military
orders issued by a particular commander. Burke v. Miltenberger,
19 Wall. 519 (1873).
The courts of Georgia take judicial notice of " Sherman's march
to the sea," and its date. Williams v. State, 67 Ga. 260 (1881). So
the adoption of the British order in council (regulating lights on
vessels and the rules of navigation) by other commercial nations
21^1 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
will be noticed as a historical fact. The Scotia, 14 Wall. 171
(1871).
So judicial notice will be taken in Illinois of historical facts
attending the settlement of Dakota. Miller v. MacVeagh, 40 111.
App. 532 (1891).
In taking notice of Col. J. C. Fremont's career in California in
1846 and 1847 the United States Court of Claims say: "The
court will take judicial notice of the leading and controlling events
in the history of the country and of the ofl&cial relations of the
principal actors therein to the government; and, in elucidation
thereof, also of less important transactions of general and public
interest immediately connected therewith, when they have passed
into commonly received authentic history." De Cells v. U. S., 13
Ct. of Claims, 117 (1877).
The court can take notice of the results of the census "and
resort for information to appropriate documents of reference.''
People V. Williams, 64 Cal. 87 (1883) ; State v. Braskamp, 87 la.
588 (1893).
So the court will take notice that in 1844 the Methodist Episco-
cal church of the United States was divided. Humphrey v. Burn-
side, 4 Bush (Ky.), 216 (1868).
To the contrary effect is Sarahass v. Armstrong, 16 Kans. 192
(1876).
Cognisance will be taken of county history relating to the choice
of a county seat. Eoss v. Anstill, 2 Cal. 183 (1852).
But see, to the effect that notice will not be taken of the date
of the organisation of a county, Trimble v. Edwards, 84 Tex. 497
(1892).
"Courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to
the history of the times when it was passed." U. S. v. Union
Pacific E. E., 91 U. S. 79 (1875), where the construction of
statutes relating to the Union Pacific Eailroad was aided by con-
sideration of the circumstances under which the road was projected.
"The history of a country, its topography and condition, enter into
the construction of the laws which are made to govern it, and we
must notice these facts judicially." Williams v. State. 64 Ind.
553 (1878) ; Smith v. Speed, 50 Ala. 276 (1873) ; Ohio Life Ins. Co.
V. Debolt, 16 How. 416 (1853).
So the early history of the settlement of the country may be
noticed in deciding questions of jurisdiction as based on occupancy
and acts of ownership. Keyser v. Coe, 37 Conn. 597 (1871).
Naturally, courts are especially apt to take judicial notice of the
history of their own state. Henthorne v. Doe, 1 Blackf. 157 (1822) ;
Hart V. Bodley, Hardin (Ky.) 98 (1807) ; Walden v. Canfield, 2 Eob.
(La.) 466 (1842) ; Paine v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220 (1860) ; Lewis v.
Harris, 31 Ala. 689 (1858) ; Gonzales v. Eoss, 120 U. S. 605 (1887).
CHAP, n.] AMEEICAN NOTES. 21^2
So of the building of the first great state railroad. Hart v. Bait. &
0. R. E., 6 W. Va. 358 (1873).
And so also of the historical source of land titles in their particu-
lar jurisdiction. Smith v. Stevens, 82 111. 554 (1876) ; Bonner v.
Phillips, 77 Ala. 427 (1884) ; Keyser v. Coe, 35 Conn. 697 (1871).
A treaty of cession of territory from one state to another, and the
extinguishment of the Indian title in the same, may be judicially
noticed. Howard v. Moat, 64 N. Y. 262 (1876).
So "the history of the Six Nations of Indians is a part of the
history of the state, of which the courts will take notice." Ibid.
Notice has been taken of the existence and conditions of land-
grant contracts. Hatch v. Dunn, 11 Tex. 708 (1854).
And the cession of territory by a state to the United States will
be judicially recognised, probably, also, on other grounds. Lasher
V. State, 30 Tex. App. 387 (1891). So the surrender of the office of
governor will be recognised. State v. Boyd, 34 Neb. 435 (1892).
But the historical fact should not be such as " concerns individuals
or mere local communities." McKinnon v. Bliss, 21 N. Y. 206
(1860).
So the action of one of the public officers in making military
records of the muster rolls of the state's volunteer regiments will
be noticed. " It is part of the history of the state of which we
must take notice." Commissioners v. May, 67 Ind. 562 (1879).
And that the state remained loyal during the American war of the
Rebellion. Douthitt v. Stinson, 63 Mo. 268 (1876). Or was under
military rule. Gates v. Johnson Co., 36 Tex. 144 (1871) ; Killebrew
V. Murphy, 3 Heisk. 546 (1871). Though these are matters of
judicial cognisance where the court, if in doubt, may resort to
any desirable method of refreshing his knowledge, such historical
facts have been occasionally treated as to be established by evidence,
and a distinction has been taken ; — to the effect that historical
facts " of general and public notoriety " may be established by
" reputation " or proved by " historical works of known character
and accuracy," while the work of a living author in reach of com-
pulsory process can be proved by summoning the author himself.
Morris v. Lessee of Harmer, 7 Pet. 554 (1833). See also Whiton v.
Albany &c. Ins. Co., 109 Mass. 24 (1871).
If these historical facts are disputed and made part of the issue
between the parties, "some evidence of them must be adduced."
McKinnon v. Bliss, 21 N. Y. 206 (1860) ; Gregory v. Baugh, 4 Rand.
(Va.) 611 (1827).
Courts are justified in judicially knowing the current history of
the times, — for example, the court will understand that to say of a
clergyman " that Iowa Beecher business of his lost him a situation,"
is an imputation of adultery, "inasmuch as courts have no right
to be ignorant of the meaning of current phrases which everybody
21^ AMEBICAN NOTES. [PABT I.,
else understands." Bailey v. Kalamazoo Pub. Co., 40 Mich. 251
(1879). So that "sack" means a fund used for political corruption.
Edwards v. San Jose &c. Co., 99 Cal. 431 (1893). Courts will take
cognisance that private and town boundaries have "almost, if not
quite uniformly, been run out according to the magnetic meridian."
Wells V. Jackson Iron Mfg. Co, 47 N. H. 235 (1866). In the same
way courts may take cognisance of the state of local feeling due to
recent events. Geist v. Detroit City E'way, 91 Mich. 446 (1892).
That companies of a certain class are incorporated in a certain way
is said to be " a matter of public history " which the court " cannot
refuse to notice." Ohio &c. Co v. Debolt, 16 How. 435. So " that
there was a great complaint of tax collectors . . . speculating in
warrants." Smith v. Speed, 50 Ala. 276 (1873). Of the differences
of christian sects, and between the King James and Douay versions
of the Bible. State v. District Board, 76 Wise. 177 (1890).
In Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters, 519 (1839), at page 690,
the action of certain corporations is spoken of as " a matter of
history which this court are bound to notice " as if the judicial
cognisance were not optional. Probably this is an inadvertence,
unless, as sometimes used, the constraint spoken of is a moral
rather than a legal one.
Geogkaphical Facts. — "We recollect of no decision that the
courts are ex officio to notice the great lakes, rivers, and mountains
of the state as parts of it, and lying within its limits, but it can
hardly be doubted that the courts would notice, of course, the
great geographical features of the state." Winnipiseogee Lake
Co. V. Young, 40 N. H. 420 (1860) ; State v. Thompson, 86 Me. 189
(1892).
The question as to whether a place has been recognised by the
legislature as within a certain county, presents nothing for a jury to
try. It is for the court alone. State v. Wagner, 61 Me. 78 (1873).
Even in the absence of express legislative recognition the question
is one for the court. " A criminal might as well call for the opinion
of the jury upon the regularity of the judge's commission or the
validity of the election of the governor by whom he was appointed.
The administration of justice becomes possible only by assuming
that certain things have been regularly and definitely settled, and
are so to remain." State v. Wagner, 61 Me. 178 (1873). The
Michigan Supreme Court say of the contention that it should not
judicially notice "Lake St. Clair" in that state that it "is not
worthy serious consideration." People v. Brooks, 101 Mich. 98
(1894).
So the supreme court of Wisconsin "take notice of the fact that
the capacity of many small navigable streams in this state to float
logs and lumber into the larger streams below and to market has
been greatly increased by the erection of dams across them."
CHAP. II.J AMERICAN NOTES. Sl^*
Tewksbury v. Schulenberg, 41 Wise. 684 (1877). But where there
are no jurisdictional facts, e. g., a crime in a vessel at sea, the
question whether the spot of the occurrence is within the bounda-
ries of the state is one for the jury. U. S. v, Jackalow, 1 Black
(U. S.) 484 (1861).
So of the boundaries of a city,, and the course, &c., of a river fre-
quently mentioned in the statutes of the state. DeBaker v. So.
Cal. E. E. (Cal.) 39 Pac. 610 (1895).
The position of a long established railroad is a geographical fact
of which judicial cognisance is taken. Miller v. Texas &c. Ey., 83
Tex. 618 (1892). And of their termini. Galveston, &c. E.. E. v.
Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. 428 (1895).
So a court will take notice that a dei:)onent resided more than
thirty miles from the place of trial. Hinckley v. Beckwith, 23
Wise. 328 (1868). Or more than one hundred. Mut. &e. Life Ins.
Co. V. Eobison, 58 Fed. Eep. 723 (1893). In a late Illinois case it
is said that "the court will take judicial notice of the geography of
the country, and that Batavia was only some two miles distant from
the court-house at Geneva, where the court was held." Bruson v.
Clark, 150 111. 495 (1894).
In Indiana, speaking of the Mississippi and its navigable tribu-
taries, the court say: "The courts take judicial notice of such
streams, as they form part of the geography of the country and
their navigability is known as forming a part of the common public
history." Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 267 (1867).
In the case of Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet. 324, 341 (1833), the
court say : " We think we are authorised judicially to notice the
situation of New Orleans, for the purpose of determining whether
the tide ebbs and flows as high up the river as that place," citing
The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, 374 (1824); U. S. v. La Vengeance,
3 Dall. 297 (1796) ; Trenier v. Stewart, 55 Ala. 458 (1876). So, that
the Mersey is a tidal river. Whitney v. Gauche, 11 La. Ann. 432
(1856).
In a Massachusetts case, the court say: "We think that the
superior court might take judicial notice that the Connecticut
Eiver, above the dam at Holyoke, does not, either by itself or by
uniting with. other waters, constitute a public highway over which
commerce may be carried on with other states or with foreign
countries, although, if the court had entertained any doubt on
the subject, it might have required evidence to be produced."
Cora. V. King, 160 Mass. 221 (1889).
So the courts of Michigan know judicially that all of the St.
Clair Eiver is not in Michigan. Cummings v. Stone, 13 Mich. 70
(1864) . And those of Alabama that no part of the Tallapoosa Eiver
is in the city of Montgomery. City Council of Montgomery v. Mont-
gomery &c. Plankroad, 31 Ala. 76 (1867).
2135 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
It has been happily said (1 Whart. Evid. § 339) that in this
connection the minuteness of the knowledge expected " is in inverse
proportion to the distance."
The courts of Alabama take notice that in a certain county all
the rivers are of fresh water. Walker v. Allen, 72 Ala. 456 (1882).
By statute the courts of California are required to take cogni-
sance of the streets of San Francisco. Brady v. Page, 59 Cal. 52
(1881).
The courts of Indiana decline to take judicial cognisance that
a railroad did not extend into a particular county, there being no
law on the' subject. But such notice is taken of the geographical
position of a certain station. Indianapolis &c. E. E. v. Stephens,
28 Ind. 429 (1867).
But whether a particular section of a state is "arid" within
the meaning of an irrigation statute is a question of fact. McGhee
&c. Co. V. Hudson, 85 Tex. 587 (1893).
Courts will take notice that the territory of a town has been
incorporated into a city, but not that the plotting of lots is the
same. Eitchie v. Catlin, 86 Wise. 109 (1893).
So of the number of railroads centering in a particular town.
Texas &c. Ed. v. Black, 87 Tex. 160 (1894).
Common Properties oe Matter. — Among the facts which
courts will, in their discretion, consider established without the
introduction of evidence are many of the ordinary mechanical,
chemical, or industrial processes, as commonly known and carried
on in the community. Por example, "A court cannot refuse to
take judicial cognisance that photography is the art producing
facsimiles, or representations of objects by the action of light on
a prepared surface. As such it has been so long recognised, the
mechanical and chemical process employed and the scientific prin-
ciples on which it is based are so generally known, that it would
be vain for a court to decline cognisance of it." Luke v. Calhoun
Co., 52 Ala. 115 (1875). "The process [photography] has become
one in general use, so common that we cannot refuse to take
judicial cognisance of it as a proper means of producing correct,,
likenesses." Udderzook v. Com., 76 Pa. St. 340 (1874). "We do
not fail to notice, and we may notice judicially, that all civilised
communities rely upon photographic pictures for taking and pre-
senting resemblances of persons and animals, of scenery and all
natural objects, of buildings and other artificial objects." Cowley
V. People, 83 K Y. 464 (1881) ; see also Cozzens v. Higgins, 1 Abb.
Ct. of App. Dec. 461 (1866). So the nature and operation of
elevated railroads may be judicially noticed. Bookman v. N. Y,
Elevated E. E. Co., 137 N. Y. 302 (1893).
Among matters of common knowledge in the natural world of
which courts require no proof is the freezing of substances in a
CHAP. II.] AMEEICAN NOTES. 21'^8
chamber, the atmosphere of which is not in contact with the freez-
ing force, and a patent for a device embodying that principle is void,
though the defence is not relied on in the pleadings. Brown v. Piper,
9i U. S. 37 (1876).
So of the common habit of compressing, for "the convenience of
trade," several packages of various commodities, wool, feathers, plug
tobacco, etc., into a single parcel. Kiiig v. Gallun, 109 U. S. 99 (1883).
But the supreme court of Indiana refuse to take notice of the
'action of a freight car under certain conditions. " The natural laws
of which courts take judicial notice are such as are of uniform
occurrence and invariable in their action." Chicago, &c. E,. E. v.
Champion, 32 N. E. Eep. 874 (1892).
So the fact that the value of unimproved fleeces is depreciated by
the undue quantity of hair on the belly, flanks, etc. of the animals,
" is commoD knowledge, taught by all text-books on sheep, and
within the judicial cognisance of the courts." Lyon v. Marine,
66 Fed. Eep. 964 (1893).
Miscellaneous Matters. — It is natural that many facts of
which courts are at times and in their discretion content to take judi-
cial cognisance do not admit of precise classification. Indeed, many
of them depend rather upon the personal views of the individual
judge than upon any more definite rule.
Facts which are so generally known that every well-informed
person knows them or ought to know them, need not be proved, and
will be judicially recognised without proof. In a case where the
supreme court of Alabama take notice of the " American Table of
Mortality " as a basis for the calculation of annuities dependent on
the probability of human life, it is said : " This cognisance may extend
far beyond the actual knowledge or even the memory of judges, who
may therefore resort to such documents of reference or other authori-
tative sources of information as may be at hand and may be deemed
worthy of confidence. The rule has been held in many instances to
embrace information derived informally by inquiry from experts."
Gordon v. Tweedy, 74 Ala. 232 (1883). The fact that the great
inland transportation of the country is largely done by connecting
lines, each forwarding goods for a continuous carriage, may be judi-
cially noted. McDonald v. Western E. E., 34 N. Y. 497 (1866) ;
Burlington, &c. E'way Co. v. Dey, 82 la. 312 (1891). So the ten-
dency of objects to frighten horses " is part of the common knowledge
possessed by all intelligent persons of mature years." Cleveland, &c.
E. E. V. Wynant, 114 Ind. 626 (1887).
The usual duration of a voyage across the Atlantic is " part of the
experience and common knowledge of the day and as such are legiti-
mate grounds for the judgment of the court." Oppenheim v. Wolf,
3 Sandf. (N. Y.) Chan. 571 (1846). So of the rapidity of travel made
possible by modern inventions. Hipes v. Cochran, 13 Ind. 175
21^^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
(1859). And the custom of through checking passengers' baggage.
Isaacson v. N. Y. Gen. E., 94 K Y. 278 (1884).
So the court will take notice that cigars are not "drugs and
medicines." " Ordinarily whether a substance or article comes
within a given description is a question of fact, but some facts are
so obvious and familiar that the law takes notice of them and receives
them into its own domain. . . . Cigars are manufactured articles
familiar to everybody." Com. v. Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68 (1889).
So the court "must take judicial notice of the nature and quali-
ties pf tobacco." Application of Jacobs, 98 K Y. 98, 113 (1885).
The peculiar nature of lotteries and the method in which they are
carried on will be judicially noticed. Salomon v. State, 28 Ala. 83
(1856).
Courts will notice the variations of the magnetic meridian. Bryan
V. Beckley, 6 Litt. (Ky.) 91, 95 (1809).
No proof is needed that an assault with a loaded pistol and a hoe
is an assault with a deadly weapon. "A hoe, both in popular and
legal signification, is per se a deadly weapon, — fully as much so as
a loaded pistol or an axe." Hamilton v. People, 113 111. 34 (1886).
In White v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 83 Me. 279 (1891) the court in taking
cognisance that vacating the premises increased the risk, declared
that expert evidence to prove it " was incompetent and unnecessary."
Evidence is not needed that coal oil is inflammable. " Courts do
not require proof that fire will burn, or powder explode, or gas illu-
minate, or that many other processes in nature and art produce
certain known effects." State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307 (1883).
But the supreme court of Vermont, in construing an insurance
policy, has refused to take judicial notice that "gin" and "turpen-
tine " are " inflammable liquids." Mosley v. Ins. Co., 55 Vt. 142
(1882).
In the same way, speaking of a statute forbidding the manufac-
ture of oleomargarine and butterine, the supreme court of Michigan
say : " We are not called upon or qualified by any knowledge which
we possess to determine the merits or defects of the well-known
substances which this statute was intended to suppress," North-
western Mfg. Co. V. Chambers, 58 Mich. 381 (1885).
The supreme court of Alabama, after laying down the rule as to
what matters are of what is " sometimes called judicial knowledge,
frequently, common knowledge," as that "all men know them and
therefore they need not be proved," go on to say that the rule for
measuring corn in the shock does not fall within the definition.
South & N. Ala. E. E. Co. v. Wood, 74 Ala. 449 (1883). The su-
preme court of Missouri has refused to take notice of the danger" of
contagion from Texas cattle. Bradford v. Floyd, 80 Mo. 207 (1883).
The same court later reversed this decision and cite with approval
the language of Judge Harlan, in delivering the opinion of the
CHAP. II.] AMEEICAB- NOTES. 21^8
supreme court of the United States in Minnesota v. Barber, 136
U. S. 313 (1890), on a similar question: — "If a fact, alleged to
exist, and upon which the rights of parties depend, is within common
experience and knowledge, it is one of which the courts will take
judicial notice." Grimes v. Eddy, (Mo.), 28 S. W. 756 (1894).
It has been held in Michigan that the fact that an empty box car
in the limits of the highway will not frighten ordinary horses is
among the " things which do not require to be pleaded or to be made
the subject of specific proof," and that it is error to leave the ques-
tion to the jury. Gilbert v. Flint, &c. E. R., 51 Mich. 488 (1883).
So "the court, from its general knowledge, can judicially say
that whiskey is an intoxicating liquor ; and the jury might so find
upon their general knowledge." Schlicht v. State, 56 Ind. 173
(1877), quoting with approval the language of Carmon v. State, 18
Ind. 450 (1862) followed in Egan v. State, 53 Ala. 162 (1876). In
Erese v. State, 23 Ela. 267 (1887), to the same effect, the question
is treated as a matter regarding the meaning of words, and the
dictionary is relied on. Where the liquor has been classified in a
statute as " spirituous," it will be so recognised. Eeid v. McWhin-
nie, 27 Q. B. U. C. 289 (1868). So of other distilled liquors.
" Jurors are not to be presumed ignorant of what everybody else
knows Now every one who knows what gin is, knows not
only that it is a liquor, but also that it is intoxicating. And it
might as well have been objected that the jury could not find that
gin was a liquor, without evidence that it was not a solid substance,
as that they could not find that it was intoxicating without testi-
mony to show it to be so." Com. v. Peckham, 2 Gray, 514 (1854).
The courts of Indiana take cognisance that brandy is intoxica-
ting and that "the addition to the term 'brandy ' of the word 'black-
berry ' does no more than designate it as a particular kind of
brandy." Fenton v. State, 100 Ind. 598 (1884). So that " apple
brandy" is intoxicating "is a matter of common knowledge of
which the court will take judicial notice." Thomas v. Com., 90 Va.
92 (1893).
On the other hand, " beer," being a generic term covering a wide
range of liquids of different alcoholic composition, is not judicially
known to be intoxicating. It is necessary to prove in any individual
case that the beer was intoxicating or that it was of a kind judi-
cially known to be intoxicating. Blotz v. Eohrbach, 116 N. Y.
450(1889); Klare v. State, 43 Ind. 483 (1873). But see Nevin
V. Ladue, 3 Denio, 437 (1846) ; Briffitt v. State, 58 Wise. 39 (1883),
contra. " It seems to be well settled that the word ' beer ' in its
ordinary sense denotes a beverage which is intoxicating." Maier
V. State, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 296 (1893) ; U. S. v. Ducourneau, 54 Fed.
Eep. 138 (1891). And the court will take cognisance that lager
beer is a malt liquor. " The government might almost as well be
2139 ASfEEICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
required to prove tliat gin or whiskey or brandy is a strong liquor
as to prove that lager beer is a malt liquor." State v. G-oyette, 11
E. I. 592 (1877). And intoxicating. State v. Church (So. Dak.),
60 N. W. 143 (1894). But see Rau v. People, 63 JST. Y. 277 (1875) ;
Tinker v. State, 90 Ala. 647 (1890). Of "rice beer" the Georgia
supreme court say : " Some beverages, such as whiskey, brandy,
&c., are in such common and notorious use as intoxicants that no
proof is requisite to stamp them with this character. But rice
beer is comparatively a rare liquor. Whether it will produce intox-
ication or not ought to be proved." Bell v. State, 91 Ga. 227 (1892).
Courts in Indiana refuse to take notice that a fence sufiB.cient to
restrain sheep will restrain hogs. Enders v. McDonald, 5 Ind. App.
297 (1892).
That business men refer to "American Lloyds," "The Green
Book," and the " Eecord Book," for the standing of ships will be
judicially recognised. Slacovich v. Oriental Mut. Ins. Co., 108
N. Y. 56 (1888). "All persons are supposed to know the curiosity
of children and their disposition to play around and about objects
of unusual appearance." Spengler v. Williams, 67 Miss. 1 (1889).
General Considerations. — Such action on the part of the
court in dispensing with proof is optional. Proof may be required
by the judge even if the fact is not disputed by a party litigant ;
and he may decline to know the fact until it is proved, to his satis-
faction or that of the jury.
On the other hand, if he prefers, the judge may satisfy himself
of the truth of a fact by resorting to any source of information he
may choose ; e. g. by resorting to public documents not introduced in
evidence. U. S. v. Teschmaker, 22 How. 392, 405 (1859) ; Brown
V. Piper, 91 U. S. 37 (1875) ; Whiton v. Albany &c. Ins. Co., 109
Mass. 24 (1871).
In so doing, he is satisfying his own mind or conscience. He is
not limited to evidence which would be competent, if objected to,
before a jury. A newspaper may be as useful as an exemplification
under the great seal of state; e. g., in Schefiler y. Minneapolis &c.
E. E., 32 Minn. 618 (1884), mortality tables of recognised stand-
ing were received as bearing on the " expectation of life " of a
person killed by a locomotive. To the same effect, Johnson v.
Hudson E. E. E. Co., 6 Duer, 633, 648 (1857).
So a history of the Southern Confederacy, "The Lost Cause,"
may be resorted to for dates and events. Swinnerton v. Columbian
Ins. Co., 37 N. Y. 174 (1867).
The court may require the aid of the parties. School Dist. v.
Ins. Co., 101 U. S. 472 (1879).
" Nor does the fact that the information thus sought by the judge
has been laid before him in the presence of the jury without any
distinct ruling that it was designed for the court alone, give a party
CHAP, n.] AMERICAN NOTES. 21*"
the right to insist that the jury shall pass upon it." State v.
Wagner, 61 Me. 178 (1873) ; Mobile &c. E. E. v. Ladd, 92 Ala.
287 (1890).
But a court is not at liberty, any more than a jury is, to supply
evidence of facts in issue from its personal knowledge where such
facts are not part of the common stock of information of the com-
munity, — as that plaintiff's lawyer had ceased to practise. Day v.
De Course, 12 Low. Can. Jur. 265 (1868).
Thus where the fact is relevant, that A. is a resident of another
state must be proved, though it is a fact known to individual
members of the court. Wheeler v. Webster, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.)
1 (1850) ; Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37 (1876). So it is error for a
court to refer a case on inspection because under the pleadings it
apparently involved a number of items. This is matter for evidence.
Cassidy v. McFarland, 139 N. Y. 201 (1893).
But see Secrist v. Petty, 109 111. 188 (1883), where there are
apparently dicta to the effect that a judge may supply facts not
generally known, from his own knowledge.
So courts will not take notice of the newspapers published in any
particular county. Atkeson v. Lay, 116 Mo. 538 (1893) .
Speaking of the general tendency to extend the range of optional
judicial cognisance to meet the growth of art, science, and general
knowledge, the Alabama supreme court say : " There is a prudent
limitation to be put upon this principle so as to confine it to matters
of a general and public nature or such as do not concern individuals
or local communities. The facts must be of such age or duration as
to have become established as part of the common knowledge of
well-informed persons, at least." Georgia &c. E. E. v. Gaines, 88
Ala. 377 (1889); Morris v. Edwards, 1 Ohio, 189 (1823).
TRIAL BY JUEYj LESS TEUSTED NOW THAN FOEMEELY. [p.I.
CHAPTEE III.
HOW QUESTIONS OF FACT TRIED FUNCTIONS OF JUDGE IN JURY
TRIALS.
§ 21a. Trial hj jury may, at least in a rudimentary form, be
traced back to tbe times of our Saxon ancestors. In 1846 the
creation of modern County Courts ailorded suitors an opportunity
of in future determining for themselves whether their disputes
should be settled by a single judge, or by the unanimous verdict of
five jurors. They by an overwhelming majority pronounced in
favour of the judge. ^ In the High Court also the tendency of
litigants now is to dispense with the services of a jury. The
respective merits and demerits of Trial by Jury will be found
impartially discussed in the Second Eeport of the Common Law
Commissioners in 1853.^
§ 21b. The provisions now in force in the High Court (Order
XXXVI. rr. 2 — 7a) are too long to set out at length here. They
are discussed in detail in most of the Books on Practice.' Their
general effect* is that in actions of slander, libel, false imprison-
ment, malicious prosecution, seduction, or breach of promise of
marriage, a trial with a jury may be had by a party,' if, when he is
a plaintiff, in his notice of trial, or if, when he is a defendant, he,
by notice given by him, within four days from the time of the
service of notice of trial, or within such extended time as the court
or a judge may allow, signify his desire to have the issues of fact
tried by a judge with a jury, upon which the same shall be so
tried ; but that in all other cases trial without a jury is the normal
mode of trial, and a jury can only be had by special order obtained
1 In the County Court Eetum ^ See, e.g., the Annual Practice
for the year 1893, published Nov., for 1894, pp. 683 et seq. A list of
1894, the following figures appear: — causes and matters assigned exclu-
" Actions determined with a jury, sively to the Chancery Division is
1,430 ; without a jury, 677,171." contained in 36 & 37 V. c. 66, § 34.
The additional cost of a jury is, in ^ Timson v. Wilson, 1888 (Lind-
the County Courts, only os, ley, L. J.).
« Pp. 3—6.
22
CH. III.] TEIAL BY JURY IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES.
under 0. XXXVI. rr. 3,i 6,^ or Ta.^ The effect of this Order has
been that the number of causes tried in the High Court of Justice
■without a jury are closely approaching the number of those which
are tried with a jury.*
§ 21c. In divorce causes, by a rule made in July, 1880,'
though the rules first cited are inapplicable,^ the action is heard,
if damages be not claimed, before the court without a jury, but if
damages are claimed, a common jury is as of course summoned.
In either case any party may apply by summons for a direction
that the cause be tried in a different manner, or by a special jury.'
Trials in the Admiralty Division of the High Court are almost
invariably without a jury. There is, however, power (0. XXXYI.
r. 44) to summon a jury, though it is said never to have been
exercised since the Judicature Acts.^
§ 21d. In criminal cases an accused, either by indictment or
information, has still the right to be tried " per legale judicium
parium suorum." In civil causes, however, the case is widely
different.
§ 22. Lord Hardwicke has observed that it is of the greatest
importance to the law of England, and to the subject, that the
powers of the judge and jury be kept distinct.^ But important as
this undoubtedly is, it is, even at the present day, not very
perfectly effected. The general principle, that the judge must
determine the law, and the jury the fact, is not, and cannot be
disputed ; '" but in the application of this principle, embarrassing
' Giving power to order a trial by ° Ord. LXVIII. r. 1.
jvjcj in Chancery actions. ' See Oakley's Divorce Practice,
* Which preserves the right to p. 61.
have, on application within ten days " See Williams and Bruce, Admi-
after notice of trial, an order for a ralty Practice, 449.
trial by jury in all purely common ' See remarks to the above effect
law actions. Jenkins?;. Bushey, 1891 per Ld. Cairns, in Metropolitan Ey.
(lindley, L.J.). ■;;. Jackson, 1877, cited post, note to
^ Giving general power to a judge § 37a.
to order trial by jury at any time. '" In E. v. The Dean of St. Asaph,
* The judicial statistics for 1892 1783, Ld. Mansfield declared, " that
(published November, 1893) show the fundamental definition of trial
(p. 9) that there were tried in that by jury depended upon the universal
j'ear, in the Common Law and Chan- maxim, ad qusestionem juris non re-
cery Divisions together, 808 actions ppondent juratores; ad qusestionem
with juries, and 763 without juries. ia ti non respondent judices"; and
* Eules in Div. and Mat. Causes, added — "Where a question can be
r. 205. proved by the form of pleading, the
23
EESPECTIVE DUTIES OF JUDGE AND JUET. [PAET I.
questions not unfrequently arise, from the experienced difEculty of
defining with clearness the ohscure and shifting houndaries of law
and fact.
distinction is preserved ■upon tie face
of the record, and tie jury cannot
encroach upon the jurisdiction of the
court ; when, by the form of plead-
ing, the two questions are blended
together, and cannot be separated
upon the face of the record, the dis-
tinction is preserved by the honesty
of the jury. The constitution trusts
that, under the direction of a judge,
they will not usurp a jurisdiction
which is not in their province. They
do not know, and are not presumed
to know, the law : they are not sworn
to decide the law ; they are not re-
quired to decide the law. ... It is
ths duty of the judge, in all cases of
general justice, to tell the jury how
to do right, though they have it in
their power to do wrong, which is a
matter entirely between God and
their own consciences." 21 How. St.
Tr. 1039, 1040. Mr. Hargrave, in a
note to 1 Co. Litt. 155 b, which is
an elaborate essay on this subject,
states that ' ' the immediate and direct
right of deciding upon questions of
law is intrusted to the judges ; that
in a jury it is onlj incidental ; that
in the exercise of this incidental right,
the latter are not only placed under
the superintendence of the former,
but are in some degree controllable
by them ; and, therefore, that in all
points of law arising on a trial, juries
ought to show the most respectful
deference to the advice and recom-
mendation of judges." In America,
Mr. Justice Story has said : " The
learned counsel for the prisoner con-
tends that in criminal cases, and
especially in capital cases, the jury-
are the judges of the law, as well as
of the fact. My opinion is, that the
jury are no more judges of the law
in a capital or other criminal case,
upon the plea of not guilty, than
they are in every civil case, tried
upon the general issue. In each of
these cases, their verdict, when gene-
ral, is necessarily compounded of law
and of fact, and includes both. In
each, they must necessarily determine
the law, as well as the fact. In each,
24
they have the physical power to dis-
regard the law, as laid down to them
by the court. But I deny that, in
any case, civil or criminal, they have
the moral right to decide the law
according to their own notions or
pleasure. On the contrary, I hold it
the most sacred constitutional right
of every party accused of a crime,
that the jury should respond as to
the facts, and the court as to the law.
It is the duty of the court to instruct
the jury as to the law ; and it is the
duty of the jury to follow the law, as
it is laid down by the court. This is
the right of every citizen, and it is
his only protection. If the jury were
at liberty to settle the law for them-
selves, the effect would be, not only
that the law itself would be most
uncertain, from the difierent views
which difierent juries might take
of it, but in case of error, there
would be no remedy or redress by
the injured party ; for the court
would not have any right to review
the law, as it had been settled by the
jury. Indeed, it would be almost
impracticable to ascertain what the
law, as settled by the jury, actually
was. On the contrary, if the court
should err in laying down the law to
the jury, there is an adequate remedy
for the injured party by a motion for
a new trial, or a writ of error, as the
nature of the jurisdiction of the par-
ticular court may require. Every
person accused as a criminal has a
right to be tried according to the
law of the land, the fixed law of the
land ; and not by the law as a jury
may understand it, or choose, from
wantonness, or ignorance, or acci-
dental mistake, to interpret it. If I
thought that a jury were the proper
judges of the law in criminal cases,
I should hold it my duty to abstain
from the responsibility of stating the
law to them upon any such trial.
But believing, as I do, that every
citizen has a right to be ^ried by the
law, and according to the law, — that
it is his privilege and truest shield
against oppression and wrong,— I
CHAP. III.]] DUTIES OF JUDGE.
§ 23. The duty of a judge presiding at a trial by jury is four-
fold : — First, he must decide all questions respecting the admissi-
bility of evidence ; secondly, he must instruct the jury in the rules
of law, by which the evidence, when admitted, is to be weighed ;
thirdly, he must determine, as a legal question, whether there be
any evidence fit to be submitted to the jury for their consideration ;
and lastly, he must explain and enforce those general principles of
law that are applicable to the point at issue. ^
§ 23a. First, then, speaking generally, all questions as to the
admisdUUty of evidence are for the judge. It frequently happens
that this depends on a disputed fact, in which case all the evidence
adduced both to prove and disprove that fact must be received by
the judge, and — however complicated the facts or conflicting the
evidence^ — must be adjudicated on by him alone.^ For example,
the judge alone must decide a question of whether a confession
should be excluded on account of some previous threat or promise,
and to do this has to determine, first, whether the threat or promise
was really made ; and, secondly, whether, if made, it was sufficient
in law to warrant the exclusion of the evidence f if a dying decla-
ration be tendered, the judge alone decides whether it has been
satisfactorily proved that the deceased believed, when he made
it, that he was on the point of death ; ^ where the receipt in
evidence of a deposition depends on the inability of the deponent
to attend the trial, whether the sickness of the witness, or other
special cause disabling him from attendance, has been satisfactorily
proved;* whether the declarant in a question of pedigree has been
feel it my duty to state my views mattersof law arising out oi the S2im.e,
fully and openly on the present occa- wherein the jury ought to be guided
sion." U. S. V. Battiste, 1835 (Am.), by them." 2 Nalson's Coll. of State
See further, on this interesting sub- Pap. 575, 582, Lond. 1683.
ject, 2 Wynne's Eunomus ; Bushell's ■* As to this see Panton v. WiUiams,
case, 1670; Francklin's case, 1731; 1841, cited infra, n. * to § 28.
and E. v. Woodfall, 1770. s Bartlett v. Smith, 1843.
' Among the questions propounded * See 1 Stark, r. 523, n. b., 1816.
by the Irish Parliament to the judges ^ So resolved by all the judges, in
of that country in 1641, was one, two cases cited by Parke, B., in
"whether the judge or jurors ought Bartlett v. Smith, 1843; and in one
to be judge of the matters of fact," case cited by Ld. EUenborough, in
to which the judges replied, that, E. v. Hucks, 1816. These cases
" although the jurors be the sole virtually overrule E. v. Woodcock,
judges of matter of fact, yet the 1787, where Eyre, C.B., left the
judges of the court are judges of the question to the jury.
validity of the evidence, and of the ' D. of Beaufort ii. Crawshay, 1866.
25
DUTIES OF JUDGE. [PAET I.
proved to be a deceased member of tbe family — and this even
though the relationship of the declarant happens to be the very
question at issue in the cause ;^ and whether or not an attesting
witness, of whose signature proof is offered, has absented himself
from the trial by collusion with the opposite party.^ In like
manner the judge alone decides upon the admissibility of the
evidence vhere the question is whether a document has been duly
executed or stamped f or whether it comes from the right custody;*
or whether suiEcient search has been made for it to admit secondary
evidence of its contents f or whether notice to produce it has been
duly served f or whether, in the event of its being produced under
notice, it be the original paper required;' or whether it is pro-
tected as being a confidential communication ;* or whether a
witness objected to on the ground of unripeness or imbecility of
mind is competent to give evidence.
§ 24. Again, where evidence is offered of acts done in places
other than the place in dispute, it is for the judge to decide, in the
first instance, whether there is such a unity of character in these
different localities as to render evidence affecting the one admis-
sible with reference to the other. He also has to pronounce whether
acts relied on as such amount to evidence of ownership,^ or whether
witnesses have proved a general usage in trade^" or a custom (as the
case may be). The general rule is, that where evidence is by law
admissible for the determination of the point raised, the judge is
bound to lay it before the jury; but that the question whether
the evidence is admissible or not, is for the judge alone.
§ 24a. Whenever the rule just indicated applies, however, the
credibility and weight of tbe evidence after it has been admitted
are entirely for the jury, who may consider all the circumstances of
the case, including those already proved before the judge, and give
' Doe V. Davies, 1847. See Hit- son, B.).
ctiiiB V. Eardley, 1871. * Harvey v. Mitchell, 1841 (Parke,
2 Egan V. Larkin, 1842 (Brady, B.).
C.B.) (Ir.). ' Proude v. Hobbs, 1859 (Byles,
' Bartlett ■!/. Smith, 1843; Duns- J.); Boyle v. Wiseman, 1855; over-
ford V. Ourlewis, ,1859 (Hill, J.). ruling Jones v. Fort, 1828.
See Stowe v. Querner, 1870. * Cleave v. Jones, 1852. See, also,
* Bp. of Meath ?;. M. of Winobester, E. v. HiU, 1851.
1836 ; Doe u. Keeling, 1848 (Ld. » Doe v. Kemp, 1831 (Bosanquet,
Denman). J.).
' Bartlett v. Smith, 1843 (Alder- i" Lewis v. Marshall, 1844.
26
CHAP, in,] DUTIES OF JUDGE.
such evidence only the credit which, upon the whole, they think it
deserves.^ The judge merely decides whether there is, prima facie,
any reason for presenting it at all to the jury ; and his decision on
this point, if erroneous, may be reviewed hy the court above.^
§ 25. Secondly,' it is the duty of the judge to point out to the
jury any rule of law, which either renders evidence on any par-
ticular point unnecessary, or which gives any particular species of
evidence peculiar weight, or which defines how a certain fact must
be proved. Thus, he should distinctly explain the nature of any
presumptions, which may apply to the point at issue, distinguishing
such as are conclusive from those which are liable to be rebutted
by counter evidence; and again, dividing this latter class into
those presumptions upon which the jury are bound to act, in the
absence of conflicting testimony, and those upon which it is merely
espedient, or allowable, to rely. Again, if by common or statute
law any document, when proved, becomes conclusive evidence of the
facts it states, the judge must point out to the jury that the
existence of such facts cannot be disputed or denied, and that the
only question for their deliberation is, whether or not the document
be duly proved. If, too, the uncorroborated testimony of a single
witness be insufficient by law to establish guilt (as, for instance, in
charges of treason or perjury), the judge must acquaint the jury
with the nature and extent of this rule. Even where a conviction
founded upon such testimony as the jury have before them would
be strictly legal (as in the case of an accomplice becoming witness
for the Crown), the judge would not properly discharge his duty
unless he warned the jury against placing implicit reliance upon
statements coming from such a suspicious quarter. Great caution
and tact are, however, necessary on the part of the judge if he
thinks it right (as he may do) to teU the jury his opinion respecting
matters of fact, since this may arouse the jealous feeKngs of a
jury, and excite them, in their anxiety to prove their indepen-
dence, to pronounce an unjust verdict.*
^ WeUstead v. Levy, 1831 (Parke, * "Few thinga incite me more to
J.); Doe v. Davies, 1847 (Ld. Uen- repel a dootrme than intolerant
man) ; Eoss v. Gould, 1828. attempts to force it on my under-
' Cleave v. Jones, 1852 (Martin, standing." See Dr. Ohanning's
B.). Works, Vol. III. p. 319. Ld.
» See supra, § 23. Bacon, in his advice to Hutton, J.,
27
DUTIES OF JUDGE. [pART I.
§ 25a. Thirdly;' the judge must, at the close of each case, deter-
mine whether any evidence has been given on which the jury can
properly find the question for the party on whom the onus of proof
lies; and if no such evidence exists, he ought to withdraw the
question from the consideration of the jury, and direct, either
a non-suit to be entered if the onus be on the plaintifE, or a verdict
to be found if the onus be on the defendant.^ It is not always
easy to act upon this somewhat vague rule which (hardly less
vaguely) is sometimes said to be that a judge should withdraw the
case from the jury, unless, there be reasonable evidence on which
reasonable men could reasonably or fairly find a verdict.' But a
judge will not often go astray if in every doubtful case he takes
the opinion of the jury, and leaves the question, as to how far he
was justified in thus acting, to be decided thereafter by the court.
And, whenever there is conflicting evidence on a question of fact,
he must leave the consideration of it for the decision of the jury,
whatever his own opinion may be respecting its weight.*
§ 26. Lastly;* the judge must explain to the jury what principles
of law are applicable to the point in issue. To do this correctly,
he must distinguish questions of law from questions of fact, which
is, in ordinary cases, no very difficult task. Tor instance, on a
charge of larceny, he lays down, as a general proposition of law,
that all persons who take and remove the personal chattels of
another without such other's consent, and with a felonious intent,
are guilty of the crime charged ; and then, according to the cir-
cumstances of the case, he explains, with more or less particularity,
what constitutes a taking, removing, &c. These, obviously, are
questions of law, and together form the major premiss of the
syllogism. The jury decide whether it is proved that the goods
says, "You siould be a light to ' See Dublin, W. & W. Ey. Co. v.
jurors to open their eyes, but not a Slattery, 1878 (Ld. Coleridge). On
guide to lead them by their noses." the kindred question as to setting
Sac. Works, Vol. VII. p. 271, ed. aside verdicts which there was no
Montagu. sufficient evidence to support, see
1 See supra, § 23. Webster v. Friedeburg, 1886; Solo-
'^ Eyder v. Wombwell, 1868; ap- mon ij. Bitton, 1881.
proved of and adopted in Metrop. * Dublin, W. & W. Ey. Co. v.
Ey. Co. V. Jackson, 1877; and in Slattery, 1878, H. L. See, also,
Dubl. W. & W. Ey. Co. v. Slattery, Metrop. Ey. Co. v. Jackson, 1877;
1878 (Ld. Hatherley and Ld. Black- post, § 37, n. *.
burn). ° See supra, § 23.
28
CHAP, III.3 DUTIES OF JUDGE.
have been taken and removed in such a manner, and witli sucli an
intent, as the judge has previously instructed them will amount to
larceny. These are questions of fact, and together form the minor
premiss. Lastly comes the conclusion of guilt or innocence, which
may either be drawn by the jury applying to the facts which they
find the rules of law as interpreted by the judge; or by their
finding the facts specially (but not the mere evidence on which the
facts are founded^), and leaving the court to apply the law to such
facts, and pronounce the final decision. Simple, however, as this
process appears to be, the line between law and fact has, in a
certain class of cases, been very indistinctly drawn, and in these,
therefore, the respective duties of the judge and jury are not
clearly defined. For instance, if the question be whether a certain
party had probable cause for doing an act, or whether he has done
an act within a reasonable time, or with due diligence, it may be
difficult to say whether the definition of what constitutes probable
cause, reasonable time, or due diligence, be for the judge or the jury,
and specious arguments are not wanting in favour of the claims
of either party. In truth, the expressions just mentioned consti-
tute neither matters of fact, nor matters of law, exclusively, but
are rather matters of quality or opinion, which are generally termed
"mixed cases." They form, in logical phrase, the middle term,
and are alike common to both the premisses, which are respectively
intrusted to the judge and jury, and upon which the ultimate
decision must proceed.^
§ 27. It is, however, necessary to see how far this subject is
governed by actual decisions which have taken place on it, and as
to whether the questions arising in particular cases are to be re-
garded as matters of law or of fact.
§ 28. First : A question of probable cause must, it is now clearly
established, — albeit the wisdom of the rule has been stoutly dis-
puted,^— be decided exclusively by the judge, and the jury can
only be permitted to find whether the facts alleged in support of
the presence or absence of probability, and the inferences to be
> Hubbard v. Jobnstoiie, 1810 ^ See, on tMs difficult subject, 12
(Wood, B.); Harwood v. Goodrigbt, Law Mag. o5—1i:\ 1 St. Ev. 512—
1774 (Ld. Mansfield) ; Mires v. Sole- 626.
bay, 1678, ' Lister v. Ferryman, 1870, H. L. ;
Hicks V. Faulkner, 1881.
29
PEOBABLE CAUSE, [PAET I.
drawn therefrom, really exist.^ Thus, in an action for a malicious
prosecution, the jury, if the evidence on the subject be conflicting,
may be asked whether or not the defendant, at the time when he
prosecuted, knew of the existence of those circumstances which tend
to show probable cause, or believed that they amounted to the
offence which he charged; and if they negative either of these
facts, the judge will decide as a point of law that the defendant
had no probable cause for instituting the prosecution.^ The rule
of law as to the respective functions of a judge and of a jury in
such cases is based on the assumption that judges are more com-
petent than juries to determine the question how far it may have
been proper for a person to have instituted a prosecution.' It is
equally binding, however numerous and complicated the facts and
inferences may be.* Indeed, it would be impracticable to lay
down any hard-and-fast rule as to what cases are " complicated."
Besides, it would be inconsistent to hold that a rule, applicable to
a simple case, should not equally apply where the facts were com-
plicated.^ Any difficulty in the application of the rule is, more-
over, more apparent than real, for it rarely happens but that some
leading facts exist in each case, which present a broad distinction
to the view, without having recourse to the less important circum-
stances.^ The judge has a right to act upon all the uncontradicted
1 Micliell V. "Williams, 1843 ; Pan- in whioli tlie question of reasonable
ton V. Williams, 1841 ; HaUes v. or probable cause depends, not upon
Marks, 1861 ; Sutton -u. Jobnstone, a few simple facts, but upon facts
1787; Mitcbell v. Jenkins, 1833; which are numerous and complicated,
Hinton v. Heather, 1845 (Alderson, and upon inferences to be drawn
B.) ; "West v. Baxendale, 1850. On therefrom, it is the duty of the judge
this subject see, generally, Abrath v. to inform the jury, that if they find
North Eastern E. C. (1886). the facts proved, and the inferences
2 Turner v. Ambler, 1847. The to be warranted by such facts, the
absence, however, of belief must be same do or do not amount to reason-
proved by the plaintiil, and cannot able or probable cause, so as thereby
be inferred from the mere fact that to leave the question of fact to the
the defendant had niade use of the jury, and the abstract question of
charge for an unfair purpose : id. law to the judge. And we are aU of
See, also, Broad i;. Ham, 1839; Had- opinion that it is the duty of the
drick V. Heslop, 1848; Heslop v. judge so to do." See Rowlands v.
Chapman, 1853. Samuel, 1850 ; Douglas v. Corbett,
3 Eraser v. Hill, 1853 (Ld. Oran- 1856.
worth). « Panton v. Williams, 1841 (Tindal,
* In Panton v. Williams, 1841, C.J.), pronouncing judgment of the
Tindal, O.J., observes, " We take Ex. Oh.
the broad question between the ' Id.
parties to be this : whether, in a case
30
CHAP. III.] REASONABLE BELIEF.
facts, and it is -only where some doubt is thrown upon the credi-
bility of the witnesses, or where some contradiction occurs, or some
inference is attempted to be drawn from some former fact not dis-
tinctly sworn to, that he is called upon to submit any question to
the jury.i
§ 29. Although, as to "prohdble cause," the question is for the
judge, yet, on the other hand, as to the reasonableness of the belief
or suspicion, upon which a party acts in causing an arrest or in
detaining goods, is a question for the jury to decide.^ Thus, if a
magistrate, sued for false imprisonment, rely, under not guilty by
statute, upon want of notice of action or the like, the question
whether he believed, with some colour of reason, and bona fide, that
he was acting in pursuance of his lawful authority, so as to entitle
him to the protection of the statute, is, in strictness, one for the
jury to determine, if the plaintiff desire their opinion to be taken
on the evidence.' But if, as commonly happens, these questions be
first submitted to the judge on an application for a nonsuit, and
the plaintiff does not then desire them to be left to the jury, the
plaintiff will be bound by the decision of the judge, if the court
think it warranted by the evidence.*
§ 30. The question of reasonable time is a more difficult one.
Upon some subjects, indeed, of frequent recurrence, the courts, for
the sake of commercial convenience, have laid down precise niles
as to what constitutes this. In these cases the duty of the jury is
clearly confined to the simple task of ascertaining whether the
facts proved fall within the rules or not.
§ 30a. For example, reasonable time for notice of dishonour of
a bill of exchange means,' — according as the parties live in the
same or in different places, — either that the letter containing
notice should be so posted that in the due course of delivery it
would arrive on the day following that on which the writer has
received intelligence of dishonour ; ^ or that su ;h letter should be
1 Michell V. Williams, 1843 (Alder- See post, § 38.
son, B.). 5 See, now, 45 & 46 V. c. 61 ("The
^ "Wedge V. Berkeley, 1838; Annett Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 "), § 49,
V. Osborne, 1840 (Ir.); Hazeldine v. sub-s. 12, which codifies the law as
Grove, 1844 ; Hughes v. Buokland, stated in the text. See as to pre-
1846. vious law, 1866, Hirschfield «. Smith,
3 Hazeldine v. Grove, 1844, supra. 1841 (Erie, C.J.).
* Hazeldine u. Grove, 1844; Abrath * Stooken v. OoUin, 1841; Smith
r. North Eastern Ey. Co., 1886, supra. v. Mullett, 1809 (Ld. Ellenborough);
31
EEASONABLE TIME, [PART I,
posted before the departure of the mail on the day following the
receipt of intelligence ; ' or if there be either no post on that day,^
or only one starting at an unreasonable hour in the morning,^ then
on the next day (thus giving the writer an additional day). If a
bill be presented through a banker, one day more is allowed for
giving notice of dishonour than if it were presented by the party
himself.* The holder of a bill has in general but one day to give
notice to all the parties against whom he intends to enforce his
remedy, though each of the indorsers in turn has Ms day,^ and the
holder may avail himself of a notice duly given by any other
party to the bill.^ And the holder of a cheque, or of a bill or note
payable on demand, must, in general, present the instrument for
payment on or before the day following that on which it was
received ; ' though in these cases the term " reasonable time "
may sometimes receive a different construction, regard being had
to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade, and the
particular facts.*
§ 31. Generally, the rule as to the time thus allowed apphes
not only as between the parties to a cheque," but as between
banker and customer with regard to its presentation, unless, in-
deed, circumstances exist from which a contract or duty on the
part of the banker to present earlier, or later, can be inferred.'"
It, however, does not apply to claims by the holder of a cheque
against the drawer, unless during the delay the fund has been
lost, as, e.g., by the banker's failure." When, however, the
rule is applicable, it matters not, so far as the liability of the
Hilton V. Fairclougli, 1811 (Law- well i;. Turner. 1869.
renoe, JJ ; Eowe v. Tipper, 1853 " Chapman v. Keane, 1835 ; Eowe
(Maule, jr.). V. Tipper, 1853 (Jervis, O.J.).
1 Williams v. Smith, 1819. See ' Eickford v. Eidge, 1810; Bod-
Shel ton V. Braithwaite, 1841. dington t;. Schlencker, 1833; Moule
2 Geill V. Jeremy, 1827 (Lord Ten- v. Brown, 1838. See Bailey v. Boden-
terden). ham, 1864.
8 Hawkes v. Salter, 1830 ; Bray v. ^ 4:0 & 46 V. o. 61, §§ 45, subs. 2 ;
Hadwen, 1816; Wright i;. Shawcross, 74, subs. 2; and 86, subs. 2.
1819. » See Hopkins v. Ware, 1869.
^ Alexander v. Burohfield, 1845 •" Hare v. Henty, 1861. See Pri-
(Tiudal, C.J.) ; Haynes v. Birks, deaux v. Griddle, 1869.
1804; Scott V. Lift'ord, 1808; Lang- " Eobinson v. Hawksford, 1846;
dale V. Trimmer, 1812. See 45 & 46 Serle v. Norton, 1841 (Ld. Abinger) ;
V. 0. 61, § 49, subs. 13. Laws v. Eand, 1857. In these cases
' Eowe V. Tipper, 1853 ; Dobree v. no time less than six years is deemed
Eastwood, 1827. See, however, Glad- unreasonable.
32
CHAP. III.] REASONABLE HOURS.
drawer is concerned, whether the presentation for payment be
made by the party himself or by his banker. Thus, when an
uncrossed cheque, given on the 10th of March, was paid into
payee's bankers' on the 11th, and presented by them on the l<^th,
but the bankers on whom it was drawn had stopped payment
early that morning, the payee failed to recover the amount of the
cheque from the drawer, because the presentment for payment had
not been made within a reasonable time, and the bankers at the
time of their failure had sufficient funds of the drawer's to pay
the cheque.^ Had the payee in this case stipulated that his
bankers' names should be crossed upon the cheque, or had the
drawer discounted his cheque in the country, the result would
have been otherwise, for the drawer then would have been taken
as agreeing that presentment should be made through a banker,
and the steps actually taken were in conformity with this course.^
§ 32. With regard to the time for the presentation of instru-
ments for payment, it has been held that, as a general rule, an
instrument payable at a banker's must be presented within
banking hours ; ^ and one payable elsewhere, at any time when the
drawer may be expected to be found at his place of residence or
business, though it be as late as eight or nine o'clock in the
evening.* If, however, a banker appoint a person to attend at
the office after banking hours for the purpose of returning an
answer to a presentment, and such person does return an answer
before midnight, no objection can be taken to the unreasonableness
of the hour when the presentment was made ; ^ and the same rule
would seem to prevail if a bill be personally presented to the
acceptor before twelve o'clock at night on the day that it falls due.^
§ 32a. With regard to a reasonable hour for a demand or tender
of rent on the land, the common law is that it must, in order to
create or avoid a forfeiture, be made before sunset, this being a rule
of convenience adopted to prevent the necessity of one party
waiting for the other till midnight. But if the tenant actually
' Alexander ?;. Burchfield, 1842. * Wilkins v. Jadis, 1831; Jame-
■' Id. (Tindal, C.J.). See 45 & 46 V. son v. Swinton, 1810, Barclay v.
c. 61, §§ 76—82; and Heywood v. Bailey, 1810 (Ld. Ellenborough).
Pickering, 1874. " Gamett v. Woodcock, 1817.
3 Parker v. Gordon, 1808 ; Elford » See Startup v. Macdonald (1841)
V. Teed, 1813. (Parke, B.}.
T. VOL. I. 33 "
REASONABLE HOURS. [PAET I.
meet the lessor, either on or off the land, at any time of the last
day of payment, and tender the reat, it will he sufficient, provided
thsre was time before midnight to receive and count the money
tendered.'
§ 33. The law as to what is a reasonable hour for the delivery of
goods has been much discussed.^ Where a jury found by special
verdict that certain oil, which the defendant had agreed to purchase of
the plaintiffs, was tendered to the defendant (who must consequently,
it is clear, have been then at his place of business) at half-past
eight in the evening of the last day allowed for delivery; that there
was full time for the plaintiffs to have delivered, and for the de-
fendant to have examined, weighed, and received the whole before
the next (a Sunday) morning ; but that the time of tendering was
unreasonably late, the Exchequer Chamber held (reversing the
Common Pleas, and Lord Denman dmentiente), that the plaintiff
was entitled to recover. Alderson, B.,' thus laid down the general
rule : — " Wherever, in cases not governed by peculiar customs of
trade, the parties oblige themselves to the pBrformance of duties
within a certain number of days, they have until the last minute
of the last day to perform their obligation. The only qualiScation
that I am aware of to this rule is, that in acts requiring time in
order that they may be completely performed, the party must, at all
events, tender to do the act at such period before the end of the
last day, as, if the tender be accepted, will leave him sufficient time
to complete his performance before the end of that day. In the
case of a mercantile contract, however, the opposite party is not
bound to wait for such tender of performance beyond the usual
hours of mercantile business, or at any other than the usual place
at which the contract ought to be performed. The party, there-
fore, who does not make his tender at that usual place, or during
those usual hours, runs a great risk of not being able to make it at
all. In this case the plaintiffs have had the good fortuue to meet
with the defendant, and to make a tender to him. in sufficient time.
And I think, under these circumstances, that the defendant was
' Startup V. Maodonald, 1841 (Pat- ' Especially ia Startup v. Mac-
teson, J. ; Alderson, B. ; Parke, B.), donald, supra,
reversed by Ex. Ch. in 1843. * In Startup v. Macdonald, 1841.
34
CHAP. 111.] REASONABLE NOTICE TO QUIT.
bound to accept the goods, and is liable in damages for not accept-
ing them."'
§ 34. The law is, again, well settled as to what is a reasonable
time to allow in giving a notice to quit. A reasonable notice to quit
a yearly tenancy has for centuries, in legal construction, meant a
six calendar months' notice,*^ terminating at the expiration of the
current year :' referring, when the tenant holds different portions
of the premises from different days, to the day of entry on the
substantial subject of the holding.* The Agricultural Hpldings
(England) Act, 1883, provides that if a holding be either agricul-
tural or pastoral, or both, or be wholly or in part cultivated as a
market garden,* a year's notice, "expiring with a year of tenancy,"
shall be necessary on every tenancy whether created before or after
the commencement of that Act, unless the landlord and tenant
shall have agreed in iiriting that this enactment shall not apply, in
which case a six months' notice shall continue to be sufficient.^ A
mortgagor occupying by arrangement with mortgagee, is entitled
not only to compensation, but to. six months' notice.'
§ 34a. So, again, a reasonable notice to terminate service is, by
1 See to same effect judgment of apparently be necessary. Towne v.
Patteson, J., id. ; and also the lumi- Campbell, 1847 (Ooltman, J.). See
nous judgment of Parke, B., id. also Kemp v. Derrett, 1814 (Ld.
* That is, from one quarter day to EUenboroiigh) ; Eight d. Flower v.
the next but one following. The Darby, 1786 (Ld. Mansfield); Bridges
exact number of months or days does v. Potts, 1864.
not signify. Notice on 26th March * Doe v. Snowdon, 1769; Doe v.
to quit on 29th September, insuffl- Spence, 1805; Doe ?;. Watkins, 1806;
cient. Notice on 28th September to Doe v. Rhodes, 1843. In this last
quit on 2oth March, sufficient. Mor- case the question raised, but not de-
gan V. Davies, 1878. oided, was whether, where a tenant
' Doe V. Spence, 1 805 (Ld. Ellen- held a farm from year to year, — the
borough). It has for the last thirty land from 2 Feb., the house from
years been held in the County Courts 1 May, — a notice to quit the whole,
that a week's notice to qait is neces- given half a year before 2 Feb., was
sary, but sufficient, to terminate a sufficient to entitle the landlord
weekly tenancy. Such also is the to recover the whole in ejectment,
Irish law. See Harvey v. Cope- on a demise dated 3 Feb. The in-
land, 1892. There appears to be clination of Ld. Abinger's opinion
no express decisions on the point, appears to have been towards the
however, in the English Superior affirmative.
Courts, See, and compare, Jones v. ^ 46 & 47 V. c. 61, § 54. See also
Mills, 1861 ; HufleU v. Armitstead, 39 & 40 V. o. 63, Ir., as to the corre-
1835 (Parke, B.) ; and Towne v. spouding law of Ireland.
CampbeU, 1847. If the hiring be « 46 & 47 V. o. 61, § 33. See also
monthly, a month's notice, and if it § 41.
be quarteily, a quarter's notice, will ' 53 & 54 V. c. d7, § 2.
35 ' 1)2
REASONABLE TIME. [_PAET I.
law, in tlie case of domestic servants, — which term has been held
to include huntsmen,^ and head gardeners,^ — a calendar month's
warning.' This rule is inapplicable to farm servants,* clerks,
travellers, governesses,^ housekeepers in large hotels,* and the like.
§ 34:B. So, the reasonable period during which a member of Par-
liament is entitled to freedom from arrest on civil process has, for
at least two hundred years, been fixed by law at forty days before
and after each session, the rule being the same in the ease of a dis-
solution as in that of a prorogation.'
§ 35. Again, the reasonable time for which a party charged with
an indictable offence may, in England or Ireland, be remanded ia
limited by statute to eight clear days, where the accused is re-
manded by warrant, or, in England, to three clear days, where he
is remanded by verbal order.* This rule does not apply where
justices have power to deal summarily with a case which is also
indictable. In such a case the remand may, by express enact-
ment,' be to " the next practicable sitting " of the Petty Sessions
Court, though this may be more than eight days off. If, in any
case not expressly provided for, the question arise whether a party
has been remanded for a reasonable time, the statutory rule
would doubtless be considei d by the court as furnishing some
guide. But, meanwhile, the jury would, no doubt, be called upon
(as in the ca^e of probable cause) to ascertain the existence
of the facts, and to leave the court to determine, upon those
facts, whether the time was reasonable or not.'" On three occa-
sions, indeed — two in England,'' and the other in Ireland '^ — ^the
entire question appears to have been submitted to the jury. But
the latter'^ of the two English cases rested upon the authority of
1 Nicoll V. Greaves, 1864. able Offences Act, 1848"), § 21. See,
* Nowlan v. Ablett, 1835. as to the Irish law, 14 & 16 V. o. 93,
' Nowlan v. Ablett, 1835 ; Fa-wcett § 14, Ir.
V. Cash, 1834. » 42 & 43 V. c. 49, § 24, subs. 2.
* Lilley v. Elwin, 1848. "> Davis v. Capper, 1829.
^ Todd V. Kerrick, 1852. See post, " Davis v. Capper, 1829 (Gaselee,
§ 177. J.) ; Cave v. Mountain, 1840 (Ld.
' Lawler v. Linden, 1876 (Ir.). Abinger).
' Goudy V. Dunoombe, 184^ ; In ^^ GiUman v. Connor, 1840 (Ir.).
re Anglo-French Co-operative Soc, ^ Cave i;. Mountain, 1840(TindaI,
1880; Ee Armstrong, Exp. Lindsay, O.J.). Moreover, Ld. Abinger, who
1892. tried the cause, was, "under all the
» H & 12 V. o. 42 ("The Indict- circumstances, satisfied with the ver-
36
CHAP. III.] REASONABLE TIME.
the former, and in the former no objection was taken at Nisi
Prius to the summing-up of the judge, though its correctness was
questioned on a subsequent motion in Banc, and at the second trial
the course suggested above was distinctly adopted.^
§ 35a. Finally, the questions whether an arrest has been counter-
manded within a reasonable time,^ or whether an executor has had
reasonable time to remove the goods from the testator's mansion,^
are in each case for the judge.*
§ 36. While there are fixed rules of law as to what is a reasonable
time for certain matters, the question appears to be, with respect to
some others, governed by no precise rules, and to be purely a matter
for a jury to determine. Thus it is for a jury to say whether a crop
has been left on the ground for a reasonable time, so as to enable
the tithe-owner to compare the tithe set out with the remainder of
the produce ; ' whether a copy of a rate has been delivered by an
overseer to an inhabitant within such reasonable time as to satisfy
the Act,^ which requires it to be given " forthwith " upon demand
and tender of payment ; '' whether the vendor of railway shares
has offered to transfer them within a reasonable time ; ^ whether
the owner of cattle, which have strayed on land through defect of
the proprietor's fences, has removed them within a reasonable
time ; ^ whether goods purchased by sample have been rejected,^"
or goods taken by distress have been sold,^' within a reasonable
time ; whether a foreign or inland bill of exchange payable at or
after sight has been presented ;'^ whether a blank stamped accept-
diot," so that tlie propriety of his of unreasonable dela-r in taking the
leaving the question to the jury party arrested to pi o i was likewise
could not practically he questioned one for the judge : Loi^ton v. Sutton,
in the court above. 1797 (Heath, J.).
1 Davis u. Capper, 1829. ^ Paoey w. Hurdom, 1824.
"^ Scheibeli'.Fairbairn, 1799, where « 17 G. 2, c. 3 ("The Poor Eate
Heath, J., held that a counter- Act, 1743 "), § 2.
mand ought to be made in the course ' Tennant v. Bell, 1846.
of the day on which the debt was * Stewart v. Canty, 1841.
received. ' Goodwyn v. Cheveley, 1859.
3 Co. Lit. § 69, and p. 56 6. •» Parker v. Palmer, 1821.
* In an action against a sheriff for '• Pitt v. Shew, 1821.
escape under the old law, which is ^ Muilman v. D'Eguino, 1795 ;
now no longer maintainable (50 & Fry v. Hill, 1817. See, ante, § 30,
61 V. 0. 55 (" The Sheriffs Act, ad fin. In determining this ques-
1887 "), § 16 ; and 40 & 41 V. tion, the jury should be directed to
c. 49, § 43, Ir.) the question whether take into consideration the interests
his officer had or had not been guilty not only of the drawer, but of the
37
REASONABLE SKILL — DUE DILIGENCE, ETC. [paET I.
ance has been filled up by the holder ;^ whether a voyage insured
has been commenced or prosecuted,^ or whether costs have been
taxed, within such time.' The last-named questions, indeed, turn
upon the ordinary course of business or trade, and are, consequently,
matters with which the jury are peculiarly acquainted.
§ 37. Having now considered how questions of "reasonable
time " are to be dealt with, when they are solely for the decision
of the judge, and when they must be left to the jury, we next
must consider how questions of reasonable skill or care, due dili-
gence, and gross negligence are to be dealt with.
§ 37a. Now questions of the description just mentioned must,
in the great majority of instances, be solely determined by the
jury.* The judges can rarely have materials which will enable
them to decide such questions by rules of law. Thus, in actions
against a surgeon for negligence in the treatment of patients,'
against gratuitous bailees for gross carelessness in losing property
intrusted to them,^ and in like cases, even when the jury have
found a verdict in opposition to the opinion of the presiding judge,
holder also. Eamclnarn MuUiok v.
Luckmeech^md Eadakissen, 1854 :
Mellish?;. Eawdon, 1832. See Chart.
Merc. Bk. of India, &o. v. Dickson,
1871 ; and Van Dieman's Land Bk.
V. Victoria Bk., 1871.
' Temple v. PuUen, 1853. The
question of reasonable time does not
arise when the bill is in the hands
of a hand fide indorsee for value
without notice. Montague v. Per-
kins, 1853.
2 Mount V. Larkins, 1831 ; Phil-
lips 0. Irving, 18'14, where it was
said that " no certain or fixed time
could be said to be a reasonable or
uni'easonable time for seeking a
cargo in a foreig-n port; but that
the time allowed must vary with the
varying circumstances, which may
render it more or less difficult to ob-
tain such cargo." Id. (Tindal, C.J.).
3 Burton v. Griffiths, 1843.
* In the Metropol. Ey. Co. v. Jack-
son, 1877, Ld. Cairns, 0., in H. L.,
thus explained these principles :—
" The judge has to say whether any
facts have been established by evi-
dence from which negligence may be
reasonably inferred; the jurors have
to say whether, from those facts,
when submitted to them, negligence
ought to he inferred. It is, in my
opinion, of the greatest importance
in the administration of justice that
the separate functions should be
maintained, and should be main-
tained distinct. It would be a serious
inroad on the province of the jury
if, in a case where there are facts
from which negligence may reason-
ably be inferred, the judge were to
withdraw the case from the juiy
upon the ground that, in his opinion,
negligence ought not to be inferred ;
and it would, on the other hand,
place in the hands of the jurors a
power which might be exercised in
the most arbitrary manner, if they
were at liberty to hold that negU-
gence might be inferred from any
state of facts whatever." See, also,
ante, § 22 ; Bridges v. N. Lond. Ey.
Co., 1874; Eobson v. N. East. Ey.
Co., 1876, C. A. ; Eose v. N. East.
Ey. Co., 1876, C. A.
^ Doorman v. Jenkins, 1834 (Taun-
ton, J.).
" Doorman v. Jenkins, 1834.
38
CHAP. III.] REASONABLE SKILL — GEOSS NEGLIGENCE, ETC.
th(3 court must generally refuse to grant a new trial. ^ In some
eases, indeed, where the question relates to matters of legal practice,
as, for instance, if a sheriff be charged with neglect of duty in not
executing a writ, or if a solicitor be sued for negligence in con-
ducting an action,^ the judges would appear to be more competent
than a jury to decide whether the facts proved amount to a want of
reasonable care ; but it seems that, even in such cases, the province
of the judge is merely to inform the jury for what species or
degree of negligence the defendant is answerable,^ and what duty
in the particular case devolved upon him, by law, or practice ; and,
having done this, to leave the jury to decide, first, whether the
defendant has performed his duty, and next, whether, in case of
non-perfoimance, the neglect was of that sort or degree which was
venial or culpable in the sense of not sustaining or sustaining an
action.' The judges are, however, the proper parties to decide
whether fines, customs, or services are reasonable,* or whether
deeds contain reasonable covenants or powers.''
§ 38. Questions of bona fides,^ actual knowledge,'' express malice,^
real intention,^ or reasonable cause, next require consideration.
Generally speaking, all questions of this description belong abso-
lutely to the jury. To this rule there are, however, some few
exceptions. Thus, the law will sometimes presume the existence
• Doorman, v. Jenkins, 1834, per ^ Hunter v. Caldwell, 1847 (Ld.
Cur., commenting on and explain- Denman); Eeece v. B.igby, 1821
ing Shiells v. Blackbume, 1789; (Abbott, C.J.) ; Sherlock i;. Pas.sman,
Moore v. Mourgue, 1776. 1836 (Alderson, B.).
» In Godefroy v. Dalton, 1830, * Co. Lit. 56 b, 59 b; Wilson v.
tlie judges laid down, tbat in an Hoare, 1839; Bell i;. Wardell, 1740.
action for negligence against him, ^ Smitb v. Doe d. Jeisey, 1819
a solicitor is, generally speaking, (Abbott, C.J.).
" liable for the consequences of igno- * See ante, § 29; and see also
ranoe or non-observanoe of the rules Wedge v. Berkeley, 1837 ; Moore v.
of practice of this court ; for the Mourgue, 1776 ; Gray v. Dinnen,
want of care in the preparation of 1840 (Ir.); Coxheadt;: Eiohards, 1846
the cause for trial; or of attendance (Cresswell, J.); Haseldine v. Grove,
thereon with his witnesses; and for 1842; Hughes v. Buckland, 1846,
the mismanagement of so much of HorntJ.Thornborough, 1849; Douglas
the conduct of a cause, as is usually v. Ewing, 1857 (Ir.).
and ordinarily allotted to his depart- ' Harratt v. Wise, 1830.
ment of the profession. Whilst, on * As in actions for malicious pro-
the other hand, he is not answerable secution or arrest. Mitchell u. Jen-
for error in judgment upon points of kins, 1833.
new occurrence, or of nice or doubt- ^ Doe v. Wilson, 1809 ; Powis v.
ful construction, or of such as are Smith, 1822 ; Doe v. Batten, 1775 ;
usuaLl/ intrusted to men in a higher Zouch u.Willingalo, 1790 (Gould and
branch of the profession of the law." Wilson, JJ.) ; Cox v. Eeid, 1849.
39
BONA FIDES — MALICE — INTENTION. []PART I.
of fraud, knowledge, malice, intention, or justification, from the
proof of other remote facts,^ and whenever these presumptions are
embodied in rules of law, the court will either draw the inference
■without the aid of a jury, or the jury will be bound to follow the
directions of the judge. Moreover, in some particular cases the
decision of questions of bona fides, reasonable cause, 8fc., actually
belongs to the judge. For example, in cases where by law notice
of action is still required,^ the judge has to decide whether notice
of action is necessary, and consequently the question of bona fides
must be determined by him, and not by the jury ;' and, on an
application at Nisi Prius for an amendment, it is the duty of the
judge to determine, as a matter of fact, from the pleadings and the
evidence, what is the real question in controversy between the
parties.* Again, questions of discretion, or of good came, in con-
nection with costs, are for the decision of the judge. Thus, where,
in an action in the High Court, the plaintiff in an action of
contract recovers (except by summary judgment under R. S. 0.,
Ord. XIY.) a sum not over 201., or between 201. and 50/., or in
an action of tort recovers not over 10/., or between 10/. and 201.,
he is, in each case, not entitled in the first event to any costs, or
in the other, to more than County Court costs, unless the judge
certify that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action to
the High Court, subject, indeed, to a -power in the High Court or
at Chambers to allow costs.*
§ 39. The judge's discretion must, however, be exercised subject
to a rule^ which provides that — "Subject to the provisions of the
Acts' and these Rules, the costs of and incident to all proceedings
in the Supreme Court, including the administration of estates and
trusts, shall be in the discretion of the court or judge: Provided
1 See Chap. " On Presumptive Evi- of detinue is one of tort or of con-
denoe," post. _ _ tract depends on the facts of the par-
^ In many oases it is not now re- ticularcase. Bryant «. Herhert, 1877,
quired, but defendant must instead 0. A. ; E. S. 0. 1883, Ord. LXV.
be given an opportunity of tendering r. 12; Pitt-Lewis' County Court Prac-
amends. See post, § 73, at p. 72. tice, vol. i. p. 110.
3 Kirby d. Simpson, 1854; Arnold » P. S. C. 1883, Ord. LXV. r. 1.
•J. Hamel, 1854. ' These are "The Sup. Ct. of Judic.
* Wilkin V. Peed, 1854. Acts, 1873 to 1879, and 1881," and
' See § 116 of " The County Courts "The App. Jurisd. Act, 1876." See
Act, 1888" (51 & 52 V. c. 43). Ord. LXXI. r. 1.
Whether for the purpose an action
40
CHAP. III.] COSTS IN SUPREME COURT.
that nothing herein contained shall deprive an executor, adminis-
trator, trustee, or mortgagee, who has not unreasonably instituted
or carried on or resisted any proceedings, of any right to costs out
of a particular estate or fund, to which he would he entitled accord-
ing to the rules hitherto acted upon in the Chancery Division :
Provided also that, where any action, cause, matter, or issue is tried
with a, jury, the costs shall follow the event, unless the judge by whom
such action, cause, matter, or issue is tried, or the court, shall, for
good cause, otherwise order." ^
§ 39a. Under the above Rule, when a cause is tried with a jury,
the presiding judge may "for good cause" deprive a successful
litigant of costs, either on an application being made t6 him for
that purpose, or of his own motion.^ An application to the judge
for this purpose should be made either during the trial, or within
a reasonable time after its termination ; ^ and an application to the
court must — to be successful — be made without undue delay, but
may be entertained by the court, whether a previous application
to the judge who tried the cause has or has not been made.* In
no case will either the judge or the court deprive the successful
litigant of his costs unless for good cause.' The judge, in exer-
cising his discretion, must assume the truth of the facts found by the
jury, but is not confined to the consideration of the party's conduct
in the course of the litigation, and may consider such of his pre-
vious acts as have conduced to the action.^ In an action in
which the defendant succeeds, he ought not to be deprived of costs
in the Queen's Bench Division, simply because such a result would
have followed in the old Court of Admiralty.' To ascertain
' Clusere, Does this Eule extend to course of ttat litigation, is " good
tlie Liverpool Passage Court ? See cause for depriving plaintiff of his
King D. Hawksworth., 1879; and 36 costs." Huxley i;. Bast London Ey.
& 37 V. 0. 66, § 91. Co., 1889 (Ld. Halsbury, L.C.).
2 Turner v. Heyland, 1879; Collins « Harnett v. Vise, 1880, 0. A. la.
V. Welch, 1879 ; Marsdep. v. Lane. & Jones v. Curling, 1884, C. A., it was
York. Ey. Co., 1881, C. A. held, 1st, that the facts must show
' See Kynaston v, Mackinden, that it would be more just to dis-
1870, 0. A. allow than to allow the costs, as, for
* See Myers v. Defries, and Siddons instance, that there has been oppres-
V. Lawrence, 1879, C. A. ; Bowey v. sion or misconduct on the part of
Bell, 1878; Gen. St. Nav. Co. v. the successful litigant ; 2nd, that the
Lond. & Ed. Ship. Co., 1877. question of costs is one respecting
' Everything which increases the which an appeal will lie.
litigation and the costs, and which ' Gen. St. Nav. Co. v. Lond. & Ed.
places upon the defendant a burthen Ship. Co., 1877.
which he ought not to bear in the
41
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. [PART I.
■wtetlier there is or is not " good cause " the judge may not look
at communications made "without prejudice."^
§ 39b. Attempts to determine the ''event," which, in the absence
of a special order, costs are to " follow," have given rise to much
controversy.^ In a general way it means the result of all the pro-
ceedings incidental to the litigation ; so that among the costs which
follow it will be included the costs of all stages of that litigation, —
for example, the costs of a first trial when a second has been
ordered.' "When a plaintiff has united several independent causes
of action, and has succeeded on some of the issues, and failed on
the others, the term " event " is to be read distributively, and the
plaintiff wUl have only the general costs of the cause, while the
defendant will get the costs of those issues on which he succeeds,*
although the fact of the great majority of the issues being found for
the defendant n^ay be " good cause " for depriving plaintiff of the
general costs of the cause.^
§ 40. Questions as to the construction of written documents
must next be discussed. Matters of great nicety arise in con-
nection with this subject. But the clear general rule is that the
construction of all written documents is for the court alone. The
construction of these is, as we have said, for the court alone so soon
as the true meaning of the uvrds^ in which they are couched, and
the surroixnding circumstances, if any, have been ascertained as
facts by the jury ;' and it is the duty of the jury to take the con-
struction from the court, either absolutely, if there be no words to
be construed as words of art or phrases used in commerce, and no
surrounding circumstances to be ascertained;^ or conditionally,
when those words or circumstances are necessarily referred to
them. The term " written documents " includes Acts of Parlia-
ment, judicial records, deeds, wills, negotiable instruments, agree-
> Walker v. Wiltshire, 1889, C. A. ' See Ashfortli v. Bedford, 1873 ;
* See Collins v. Welch, 1879, C. A. Alexander v. Vanderzee, 1872. But
(Bramweil, L.J.) ; and Myers v. De- see Bowes v. Shand, 1877, affirming
fries, 1879. Shand v. Bowes, 1870.
3 Meld I). Gt. North. Ey. Co., 1878; ''See Tamvaco v. Lucas, 1862;
Harris v. Petherick, 1879, 0. A.; Lyle «. Richards, 1866; D. of Devon-
Oreen v. Wright, 1877. 0. A. shire v. Neill (Ir.), 1877 (Palles,
* Myers v. Defries, 1880, C. A. ; O.B.).
Ellis 'u.Desilva, 1881, 0. A.; Sparrow « Key «. Cotesworth, 1852. See,
V. Hill, 1881. also, Lang v. Smith, 1838, as to
Porster v. Parquhar, 1893. mercantile usage.
42
CHAP. 111.'] CONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.
ments, and letters. A misoonstruotion by tlie court is the proper
subject of appeal to a court of error ; but a misconstruction by the
jury cannot in any way be effectually set right.^ The effect of
the rule consequently is to render the law certain. A marked
instance of its application occurs in the case of the construction of
the specification of a patent, for though the interpretation of such
an instrument, — relating as it does to matters of science and skill,
— would seem peculiarly adapted to the practical information of
jurors, the court must construe it^ after merely ascertaining from
the jury an explanation of technical terms.* Again, the construc-
tion of all written contracts is for the court. Where a contract for
the sale of barley was in letters, one of which offered good barley,
and the other accepted the offer, " expecting you will give us fine
barley and good weight," it was held, that the jury (though they
might be asked as to the mercantile meaning of the words " good "
and " fine "), after having found that there was a distinction
between the two terms employed, could not further decide that
the parties did not misunderstand each other, but that they were
bound to take the interpretation of the contract, as a matter of
law, from the judge.* So, too, it is for the court to decide, as
matter of law, whether the sum mentioned in an agreement as to be
^ Judgment in Neilson i;. Harford, 1860; Betts v. Menzies, 1859. See,
1841. too, Betts v. Menzies, 1862, H. L. ;
2 Neilson v. Harford, 1841 ; BoviU and Seed u. Higgins, 1860, H. L.
V. Pimm, 1856. These cases virtually But see also the observations of Ld.
overrule Hill v. Thompson, 1817, Westbury, 0., on Bush v. Pox, 1856,
where Ld. Eldon observed, that the and the law supposed to be there
intelligibility of the description of a laid down, in Hills v. Evans, 1862.
specification was a matter of fact. ^ Hills v. Evans, 1862.
In America the sufficiency of the * Hutchison ■y.Bowker, 1839, where
description in a specification is still Parke, B., observed, " It is the duty
left as a question of fact to be deter- of the court to construe all written
mined by the jury, unless the state- instruments ; if there are peculiar
ment be obviously too vague. Wood expressions used in it, which have,
V. Underbill (Am.), 1847. But in in particular places or trades, a known
England, where in a patent cause the meaning attached to them, it is for
want of novelty appears distinctly the jury to say what the meaning of
from documents, such, for instance, those expressions was, but for the court
as a prior patent and specification, to decide what the meaning of the
the judge, and not the jury, must contract was." See also Bourne v.
notice the identity of the two sup- Gatliffe, 1841 ; Griffiths v. Eigby,
posed inventions, and the consequent 1856 ; Hills v. London Gaslight Co.,
want of novelty in the second. Bush 1858; Kirkland v. Nisbet, 1859;
V. Pox, 1856 ; Booth v. Kennard, Montgomery v. Middleton, 1862.
1858; Hills i;. London Gaslight Co.,
43
CONSTEUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. [PAET I,
paid for a breach thereof^ is a penalty or liquidated damages;^
whether a letter containing no words of doubtful trade meaning,
and as to which the extrinsic facts are not in controversy, amounts
to a guarantee ;' or whether* a written acknowledgment of a debt,^
or of title,* is sufificient to take the case out of the statutes of
limitation. On this last subject it will indeed, in a doubtful case,
be prudent for the judge both to express his own opinion, and also
to take the opinion of the jury.' Moreover, whenever a document
is connected with other evidence affecting its construction, the
whole must be submitted to the jury together.^
§ 41. Letters, as mentioned in the preceding section, fall within
the general rule as to "written documents."' Their construction,
consequently, unless, indeed, extrinsic circumstances be capable of
explaining them, is for the court, no matter how ambiguous the lan-
guage in which they are couched.^" If, however, letters be written
in so dubious a manner as to bear different constructions, but can
be explained by other transactions, the jury (who are clearly the
judges of the truth or falsehood of such collateral facts which may
vary the sense of the letters themselves) must decide upon the whole
evidence." Accordingly, on a question whether the defendant had
adopted the acceptance of a bill, the construction of a letter written
by him on the subject, taken in connection with his subsequent
conduct, was held to be entirely for the jury.'^ Whenever, too,
a contract has to be made out partly by letters, and partly by
parol evidence, the jury must deal with the whole question.^^ If a
document be lost, and oral evidence be given of its contents, the
judge must construe its meaning in the same manner as if it had
been produced, but here again the jury may be asked if they
» See Wallis v. Smith, 1882. B.) ; Morrell v. Fritli, 1838 (id.).
' Sainteri;. Ferguson, 1849 (Wilde, " Eoutledge t;. Eamsay, 1838 (Ld.
O.J.). Formerly this was occasion- Denman); Morrell v. Frith 1838;
ally left to the jury. See Crisdee v. Moore v. Garwood, 1849; Ashpitelr.
Bolton, 1827 (Best, O.J. ). Sercombe, 1850; Foster i;. Mentor
' Bk. of Montreal v. Munster Bk., Life Ass. Co., 1854.
1876. ' Berwick v. Horsfall, 1858.
' See, contra, Lloyd v. Maund, '° Furness v. Meek, 1862.
1788 ; LinseU v. Bonner, 1835. " Macbeath v. Haldimand, 1786
^ Morrell v. Frith, 1838; Eout- (Buller, J.); Smith v. Thompson,
ledge V. Eamsay, 1838 (Ld. Den- 1849. See Lyle v. Eichards, 1867.
man). '^ Wilkinson v. Storey, 1839. See
8 Doe w. Edmonds, 1840 (Parke, B.). Brook v. Hook, 1871.
' Bucket V. Church, 1840 (Ifarke, >' Bolokow v. Seymour, 1864.
44
CHAP. III.] CONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS,
believe oral evidence whioli has been given as to the circumstances
of the alleged loss.^
§ 42. An exception to the general rule of law which intrusts
the judge with the construction of all written documents arises
where the writing forms the subject of an indictment or an
action, and the guilt or innocence of the defendant depends upon
the popular meaning of the language employed. Thus, the legis-
latui'e, after much discussion,^ has expressly determined' that,
on a prosecution for Uhel, the question whether the particular pub-
lication is a libel or not, shall always be entirely for the jury.
Even here the judge may, as a matter of advice to them, give his
own opinion respecting the nature of the publication, though he is
not in point of law bound to do so.* The statute here referred
to is in strictness only applicable to criminal trials, but as it is
a declaratory Act, its provisions have in practice been adopted
in civil actions for libel, and it has now for a series of years
been the course for the judge, — who still has to decide whether the
words complained of are reasonably capable of bearing the defa-
' Berwick v. Horsfall, 1858. before whom such, indiotment or in-
'^ As to this celebrated dispute, in formation shall be tried, to find the
support of the claims of the judges, defendant or defendants guilty,
see E. v. Udall, 1590 ; E. v. Wood- merely on the proof of the publica-
fall, 1770 (Ld. Mansfield) ; E. v. Dean tion by such defendant or defendants
of St. Asaph, 1783 (Ld. Mansfield); of the paper charged to be a libel,
and in support of the rights of the and of the sense ascribed to the same
jury, E. V. Tutchin, 1704 (Jjd. Holt) ; in such indiotment or information."
E. V. Owen, 1752 ; E. v. Dean of St. § 2 provides, that, " on every such
Asaph, 1783 (Willes, J., and Ld. trial, the court or judge, before whom
Ellenborough). As to the proceed- such indictment or information shall
ings in the House of Lords on the be tried, shall,* according to their
passing of " The Libel Act" (32 Gr. 3, or his discretion, give their or his
c. 60), see 22 How. St. Tr. 294, 297. opinion and directions to the jury
' 32 G. 3, c. 60 (commonly called on the matter in issue between the
" Fox's Libel Act "), declares and King and the defendant or defen-
enacts (§ 1) that, on every trial of an dants as in other criminal cases."
indictment or information for a hbel, § 3 provides that a jury may find a
" the jury sworn to try the issue may special verdict; and §4 reserves to
give a general verdict of guilty or defendants a right to move in arrest
not guilty upon the whole matter put of judgment.
in issue upon such indiotment or in- * Per Parke, B., in Parmiter v,
formation ; and shall not be required Coupland, 1840.
or directed by the court or judge,
* It has been said that the word " shall" should here be interpreted as if
the word " may" had been used. Bay lis v. Lawrence, 1840 (Littledale, J.).
45
LIBEL — THREATENING LETTERS. [PART I.
matory meaning ascribed to them by the plaintiff,^ — to first give
a legal definition of the offence, and then leave the jury to deter-
mine whether the "writing complained of falls within that definition
or not.' It is, indeed, not absolutely necessary that the judge
should explain what constitutes a libel, but he may leave the whole
question without reserve to the jury.* If, however, they find a
verdict against the defendant, either onan indictment or an action,
the court will arrest the judgment, where the writing on the face
of it is not libellous.*
§ 43. The respective duties of the judge and jury on indictments
for writing threatening letters * are not very clearly defined. In
some cases the jury have been permitted, upon examination of the
paper, to decide for themselves whether or not it contained a
menace.^ In other cases, the question appears to have been ex-
clusively determined by the court ; ' while on a few occasions the
opinion of the jury, and of the judge, have been both alternatively
taken.^ On a question as to the construction of a writing written
by defendant and alleged to be libellous, other libels by the defen-
dant are admissible ' both as to construction and to show malice.'"
§ 44. In connection with the subject of libel, it should be men-
tioned that it is a question of law for the court whether a communi-
cation be privileged or not. If, indeed, the privilege claimed be of
a. character that it is on public grounds regarded as absolute,^^ the
jury must first determine what the circumstances were under which
the communication was made, and also whether such communica-
tion was made bond fide. They ought to find bona fides unless the
evidence be sufficient to raise a probability that the communication
was colourably made.'^ After they have found the facts and deter-
1 Hunt V. Goodlake, 1873 ; Sturt 1882.
V. Blagg, 1847 (Wilde, C.J.). » Bolton v. O'Brien, 1885.
* Parmiteri;. Coupland, 1840. " Barrett v. Long, 1851, H. L.
^ Baylis v. Lawrence, 1841. Though the jury are usually oau-
* Heame u. Stowell, 1840; Gold- tioned not to give damages for them,
stein V. Foss, 18'27 ; Parmiter v. the omission of such caution is not a
Coupland, 1840 (Alderson, B.). misdirection. Darby v. Ouseley,
* As to which, see 24 & 25 V. c. 96 1856.
("The Larceny Act, 1861"), §§44, 46. " As to such absolute privilege,
* E. V. Girdwood, 1770. see Dawkins v. Paulet, 1869; and
' E. V. Smith, 1849 ; E. v. Pict- Dawkins v. Ld. Eokeby, 1873.
ford, 1830. -2 Taylori;.Hawkins,1851; Somer-
* E. V. Eobinson, 1796; E.u.Coady, villa v. Hawkins, 1851.
46
CHAP. Ilir] QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR JURY.
mined the questiou of bona fides, tlie judge must decide, as a
question of law, whether the occasion of the publication was such
as to rehut the inference of malice.^ If, however, any doubt exist
as to whether or not the defendant in some respects exceeded the
limits of his privilege, and made comments, which may be evidence
of actual malice, the opinion of the jury must be taken upon the
effect of such evidence.^
§ 45. On an indictment for perjury, it is still a moot point
whether the materiality of the matter in which the false swearing
is proved, is a question of fact for the jury, or a question of law for
the judge. According to the better opiuion, it ought to be regarded
in the latter light.'
§ 46a. All questions of mere fact are for the decision of a jury,
unaided by any positive legal rules — it being the duty of the judge
merely to take care that they are not misled by anything coming
out in the evidence.* Questions of this description are as to per-
missive occupation;' the assent of an executor to a bequest;^ the
unsoundness of a horse ; ' the delivery of a document as an escrow,
unless the question turn solely on the construction of writings ; ^
the infringement of a patent,^ where such infringement does not
depend merely on the construction of the specification -^^ the novelty
of a design, within the meaning of the Acts relating to copyright
of design for articles of manufacture ; '^ the existence of a nuisance,
as caused by erecting a bridge or weir in a navigable stream ;^^ the
definition of the word " street," ^^ except in certain cases where the
term has been employed in an Act of Parliament ; '* the seaworthi-
1 Coxhead I). Eichards, 1846 (Cress- facts of the case." Per Alderson, B.,
well, J. ; Ooltman, J.) ; Stace- v. pronouncing the judgment of the
Griffith, 1869. court. See, also, EUiott v. EUiott,
^ Cooke V. Wildes, 1855. 1841 (Ld. Abinger.).
^ See and compare B. v. Courtney, ' See per Patteson, J., in Baylis v.
1836 (Ir.) ; E. ■;;. Lavey, 1850; E. v. Lawrence, 1840.
Dunstan, 1824. ^ » Purness v. Meek, 1858, H. L.
* Per Ld. Abinger, in Mackintosh See ante, § 41, post, § 1834.
V. Marshall, 1843. ^ De la Eue v. Dickenson, 1857 ;
^ Lessee of Phayre v. Fahy, 1832 Lister v. Leather, 1858.
(Ir.); Jones w.Boland, 1840 (Ir.); but '"Seed v. Higgins, 1860, H. L.
see Whiteacre v. Symonds, 1808. See post, § 43.
* Mason v. Farnell, 1844, even " Harrison v. Taylor, 1860.
though " the question depends upon " E. v. Betts, 1850 ; E. v. Eussell,
the careful and somewhat critical 1827 ; E. v. Ward, 1836.
comparison of the terms of a deed '^ E. v. FulLford, 1861.
with the other circumstances and " Eobinson v. Local Board of Bar-
47
QUESTIONS FOE JDEY — NECESSAEIES. '['PAET I.
ness of a ship ; ^ the construction of a policy of insurance, shown
by eyidence to contain a latent ambiguity;^ the materiality of
facts not communicated in effecting an insurance;' the competency
of a testator in a will cause, and his freedom from undue influence;*
the cruelty of a husband as a ground for judicial separation ;' the
condonation of a conjugal offence;® whether there has been an
acceptance of goods sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds;'
whether a tender be absolute or conditional.^ The court, however,
in the last-named case, should be mindful to point out that a tender
is not invalid in law as being conditional, if it merely implies that
the debtor admits no more to be due, but that to make it bad it
must go further, and imply that the creditor, if he takes the sum
offered, will admit that his entire claim is satisfied.' The jury
have also, in any question relating to the amount of interest payable
on a foreign bill of exchange, to determine as facts, first, what rate
of interest is usually paid at the respective places where the bill was
drawn or indorsed or accepted, and next, whether the plaintiff has
sustained any damage requiring the payment of interest at all ; but
the jud|^e wiU decide as a pure question of law, whether the case is
to be governed lege loci contractus, or lege loci solutionis ^^
% 46. Among other matters of fact it is for a jury to decide
whether articles supplied to an infant be necessaries : but, as to this,
their decision is subject to the control of the judges," who have laid
down general rules of law, as follow : first, the question whether
articles are necessaries or not does not, in any degree, depend upon
what allowance the infant may have received from his father, and
may have misapplied ; '^ secondly, the articles must be really useful,
ton, ] 882 ; Maude u. Baildon Local ^ Eckstein v. Eeynolds, 1837 ;
Board, 1883. , Marsden v. Goode, 1845.
1 Oliflord V. Hunter, 1827 (Ld. ^ Bowen v. Owen, 1847 ; Bull v.
Tenterden). _ Parker, 1843; Henwood v. Oliver,
^ Hordern v. Commercial Union, 1841.
&c., 1887. "> Gibbs v. Fremont, 1853. See
' Eawlings v. Desborougb, 1840 further on this subject, post, § 47.
(Ld. Denman). " Harrison v. Fane, 1840 (Tindal,
* Purdon v. Ld. Longford, 1877 C.J.) ; fiyder v. Wombwell, 1868.
(Ir.). ■ 1'' Burghart w. Hall, 1839 ; Peters
" Tomkins v. Tomkins, 1859. v. Fleming, 1840. But see Barnes v.
^ Peacock v. Peacock, 1859. Toye, 1884, where it was held that,
, ' Lillywhite v. Devereux, 1846 ; on a question of necessaries, an in-
Alderson, B., recognising Edan v. fant might prove that at the date of
Dudfleld, 1841; Clark v. Wright, the sale he was sufficiently supplied
1860 (Ir.). with other similar goods.
48
CHAP. III.] INFANT — NECESSAEIES.
and therefore merely ornamental jewellery,^ or luxurious confec-
tionery,^ cannot be necessaries; and, thirdly, articles, even if
useful, must be such as would be necessary and suitable to the
degree and station in life of the infant.' The judge determines
whether the articles are capable of being necessaries, regard being
had to the position of the defendant ; and if he decide this in the
affirmative, the jury say whether, under the circumstances, they
actually were necessaries or not.* Funeral expenses incurred on
her husband's death by an infant widow;* legal expenses incurred
by an infant bride on marriage,^ and a gold watch and chain for
an undergraduate,' are all capable of being " necessaries." But a
pair of jewelled solitaires and a silver-gilt goblet cannot be " neces-
saries."' And in a case where the jury, in opposition to the
opinion of the judge, found that the hiring of horses and gigs were
" necessaries " for an Oxford undergraduate, who was the younger
son of a man of fortune, but kept a horse of his own, the court
set aside the verdict as perverse, and granted a new trial ; * the
same course was pursued, where an Irish jury had found that a
hunter was " necessary " for a mere boy.°
§ 47. Questions as to the meaning of particular expressions have
already been seen to be in all criminal cases — and this even when
they are in writing — entirely for the jury.'" Speaking generally,
it may be said that the meaning of expressions is in most cases
to be determined by a jury. The power of a jury to interpret
expressions is not confined merely to such as are employed in con-
tracts, or have a peculiar commercial meaning. It extends to all
phrases, capable of being used in a technical sense, which do not
require any knowledge of the law to explain them. Accordingly,
the courts have more than once refused to entertain the question,
whether an excavation is or is not a mine," and as such not rate-
' Eyder w. Wombwell, 1868, supra. ' Skriae v. Gordon, 1875 (Ir.); so
* Brooker v. Scott, 1843 ; Wharton in Wharton v. Mackenzie, 1844, and
V. Mackenzie, 1844, and Oripps v. Cripps v. Hills, 1844, where juries
Hills, 1844. decided that wine parties and suppers
' Peters v. Fleming, 1840. were necessaries for undergraduates.
♦ See Skrine v. Gordon (Ir.) i? jra, '" Ante, j 42.
and Cripps v. Hills, 1844, supra. " Any question as to whether a
' Chappie V. Cooper, 1844. mine is a mine within the meaning
' Helps V. Clayton, 1864. of the Mining Acts "shall be referred
' Peters v. ELming, 1840. to a Secretary of State, whose deoi-
8 Harrison v. Fane, 1840. sion thereon shall be final." 50 & 51
T. VOL. I. 49 T
MEANING OF TECHNICAL PHRASES. [PAET I.
able to the relief of the poor, and have left the Sessions to apply
to the question, as one of fact, the information they possess, and
their knowledge of the English language,' declining to lay down
any legal principle, except that the method of working is to be con-
sidered, and not the chemical or geological character of the produce.^
It also is exclusively for a jury to say whether what is proved to
have taken place is or is not " a representation " of a dramatic work,
so as to subject the person representing it to penalties under the
Act of 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 15 (" The Dramatic Copyright Act, 1833 ").3
If, however, a word of doubtful import be used in an Act of Par-
liament, its general meaning ought to be explained to the jury by
the judge ; and accordingly where, on the trial of an issue whether
a railway was passing through " a town," within the meaning of
the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, the judge merely told the
jury that the word " town " was to be understood in its ordinary
and popular sense, the omission to give them any further instruc-
tion was held to constitute a misdirection, and a new trial was
granted.* But the inspection of a record is a matter within
the peculiar province of the court ; and a jury will not be allowed
to examine a record, for the purpose of giving their opinion as to
what word has been written above an erasure.'
§ 48. Questions as to whether a, foreign law, &c. exists or not are,
as we have already seen," entirely matters to be found as facts by a
jury. Foreign' laws, usages and customs cannot be judicially
noticed, but must be proved as facts in each particular case,* and
found by the jury. In such oases, the abstract meaning as well as
the existence of the law must, in general, be determined by the jury
V. c. 58, § 71 ; and 35 & 36 V. c. 77, Co. v. Hauncliwood Briot and Tile
§ 39. Co., 1882.
1 R. V. Sedgeley, 1831 ; E. v. Bret- ' Planclie v. Braham, 1837.
tell, 1832 ; E. v. Dunsford, 1835. < ElKott v. South Devon Ey. Co.,
"The Court of Quarter Sessions are 1848.
judges of law and fact. The appeal ' E. v. Hucks, 1816 (Ld. EUen-
to the Queen's Bench is confined to borough),
questions of law. The distinction, * Ante, § 5.
therefore, between the respective pro- ' As to colonial laws, see ante, § 9.
vinces of the two courts is so far « Although a point of foreign law
analogous to the distinction under may have been proved and acted
discussion as to justify the drawing upon in one court, another court will
of illustrations from cases of appeal." not rely upon the report of such a
^ See Darvill v. Eoper, 1855 ; BeU case, but will require fresh proof of
V. Wilson, 1866 ; Dow. Duoh. of the law, as a matter of fact, on each
Cleveland v. Meyriok, 1868 (Malins, particular occasion : M'Cormick v.
V.-C). But see Jones -y. Cwmorthen Garnett, 1854 (Knight-Bruce, L.J.).
Slate Co., 1879. See, also, Midi. Ey.
50
CHAP. III.] FOREIGN LAWS.
on tHe testimony of the skilled witnesses.^ It is, however, the duty
of the court to decide, first, as to the competent knowledge of the
witnesses called ; ^ next, as to the admissihility of the documents
hy which they seek to refresh their memory ; and lastly.,' as to the
special applicability of the law, when proved, to the particular
matter in controversy.* Even where the admissibility or inadmissi-
bility of certain evidence depends on its existence or interpretatiork,
proof of a foreign law should exclusively be addressed to the court,
just as in other cases where a question respecting the admissibility
of evidence rests upon disputed facts.^ Perhaps, indeed, as the
object of the proof of foreign law is to enable the court to instruct
the jury respecting its bearing on the case in hand, it will always
be advisable for the judge to assist the jury in ascertaining what
the law really is.®
§ 49. Before leaving the subject of foreign law, it must be pointed
out that the rules of evidence adopted in one country, — whether
established by the practice of its courts, or enacted by its legisla-
ture,— will not regulate the proceedings of courts in another
country, when transactions in the first-named country become the
subject of investigation in the latter.' The lex fori governs every
court upon all questions of evidence. Such questions as whether
a witness is competent or not ; whether a certain matter requires
to be proved by writing or not ; whether certain evidence proves a
certain fact or not, must be determined, not lege loci contractus, but
by the law of the country where the question arises, where the
remedy is sought to be enforced, and where the court sits to enforce
it.^ Thus, where (before the Evidence Amendment Act of 1861 ')
the assignees of an English bankrupt sued in Calcutta, the bank-
ruptcy and the assignment could not be proved in the Calcutta
court by producing copies ■ of the proceedings in the Bankruptcy
Court, purporting to bear the seal of that court, and to be signed
» E. V. Pioton, 1806. « See Story, Oonfl. (Am.), § 638 ;
' Bristow V. Sequeville, 1850. The Mostynf. Pabrigas, 1774 (Ld. Mans-
whole of thia subject will be dis- field); Disora w. Phillips, 1863.
cussed, post, §§ 1423—1425. ' Clark v. MuUick, 1840 (Ld.
^ See Sussex Peer, case, 1844; Brougham), infra.
Ld. Nelson v. Ld. Bridport, 1844. * Bain v. Whitehaven, &c. Juno.
* Story, Confl. (Am.), § 638. Ey. Co., 1850 (Ld. Brougham)
» Trasher v. Everhart, 1831 (Am.) ; (H. L.).
Story, Confl. (Am.), § 638, n. 3, ante, » 14 & 15 V. c. 99, §§ 11 and 19.
§23.
51 e2
FOREIGN RULES OP EVIDENCE. [PAKT 1
by the Clerk of Enrolments, for sucli evidence, although sufficient in
English courts of justice, was not then admissible in India.' Again,
although by Scotch law, all instruments prepared and witnessed
according io the provisions of the Scotch Act of 1681 are probative
writs, and may be given in evidence in a Scotch court without
any proof, in an English court, the mere production of such a
Scotch instrument would not suffice, but it would be necessary to
caE one or other of the attesting witnesses. '^ A copy of a charter-
party which has been verified in accordance with the law of the
place where it was entered into, cannot on that account be received
in an English court, but is inadmissible there.^ Several other oases
might be cited to the same effect;* and in all, the distinction is
recognised between the cause of action, which must be judged of
according to the law of the country where it originated, and the
mode of proceeding, including of course the rules of evidence, which
must be adopted as it happens to exist ia the country where the
action is brought.^
§ 49a. English courts-martial held abroad are expressly excepted
from the general rule that the lex fori governs the laws of evidence.
For the Army Act, 1881,^ enacts, first, that "a court-martial
under this Act shall not, as respects the conduct of its proceedings,
or the reception or rejection of evidence, or as respects any other
matter or thing whatsoever, be subject to the provisions of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, or to any Act, law, or ordinance of any
legislature whatsoever, other than the Parliament of the United
Kingdom ;" and next, that " the rules of evidence to be adopted in
proceedings before courts-martial shall be the same as those which
are followed in civil courts in England ; and no person shall be
required to answer any question or to produce any documents,
which he could not be required to answer or produce in similar
proceedings before a civil court."
' Clark 1). Miillick, 1840. brook, 1816; Don u. Lippmann, 1837;
2 Yates v. Thomson, 1835 (Ld. Leroux v. IBrown, 1852; Pinlay v.
Brougham). Pinlay, 1802.
^ Brown v. Thornton, 1837. '' Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1774. See
*■ Trimbey w. Vignier, 1834 ; Huber also Story, Confl. (Am.), §§ 556 et seq.
V. Steiner, 1835 ; British Linen Co. and 629—636.
V. Drummond, 1830 ; Appleton v. ^ 44 & 46 V. c. 58, §§ 127 and 128.
Ld. Braybrook, 1816; Black v. Bray-
52
CHAP. in.J AMERICAN NOTES. 52^
AMEEICAN NOTES.
Law and Pact. — The line of distinction between matter of law
and matter of fact by no means follows the same lines as the divi-
sion of judicial functions between the court and the jury. The
action of the jury is confined to deciding such facts as are involved
in the issue raised by the pleadings in the case, or by the nature of
the particular investigation. These are what may be called the
ultimate facts. It is to such facts alone that the evidence sub-
mitted to the jury is limited. State v. Hodge, 50 jST. H. 610, 522
(1869). Various dicta, indeed, speak of a wider power on the part
of the jury. Thus Judge Story, in denying the right of the jury to
judge of the law in criminal causes, says : " I hold it the most
sacred constitutional right of every party accused of a crime, that
the jury should respond as to the facts, and the court as to the
law." U. S. V. Battiste, 2 Sumn. 240 (1835) ; Townsend v. State,
2 Blackf. 151 (1828). That it is the duty of the jury, even in
criminal cases, to take the law from the court, see Bobbins v. State,
8 Oh. St. 131 (1857) ; Duffy v. People, 26 N. Y. 588 (1863) ; Com.
V. Anthes, 5 Gray, 185 (1855) ; Battre v. State, 18 Ala. 119 (1850);
Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 536 (1843) ; Hardy v. State, 7 Mo. 607
(1842) ; Townsend v. State, 2 Blackf. 151 (1828) ; State v. Hodge,
50 E". H. 521 (1869). « The jury are not judges of the law in any
case, civil or criminal. Neither at common law, nor under the con-
stitution of Pennsylvania, is the determination of the law any part
of their duty or their right." Com. v. McManus, 143 Pa. St. 64, 86
(1891); Higginbothara v. Campbell, 85 Ga. 638 (1890). Counsel
can address the jury on all questions of law within the issue. Com.
■ V. Porter, 10 Mete. 263 (1845). Under these decisions all questions
of domestic law are for the court ; some questions of fact are for
the jury.
To the contrary, see State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14 (1849) ; State v.
Jurche, 17 La. Ann. 71 (1866) ; Nelson v. State, 2 Swan (Tenn.),
482 (1852) ; State v. Snow, 18 Me. 346 (1841) ; Montee v. Com., 3
J. J. Marsh. 132, 151 (1830).
CoNSTEucTiON OF WRITINGS. — Though construction of writ-
ten documents is in most cases merely attempting to ascertain a
fact, viz., the intention set forth in it, the duty of construction is a
function of the court. In Hamilton v. Liverpool, &c. Ins. Co., 136
U. S. 242 (1889), it is said that " the construction of the correspon-
dence in writing between the parties," presents " a pure question
of law." The same phrase is employed in Allen v. Frost, 62 Ga. 659
(1879). Probably the rule had its inception in the fact that in
early days juries could not read. It owes its continuance to reasons
52^ AMEEICAiT NOTES. [PAET I.
of policy and convenience. Morse v. Weymoutli, 28 Vt. 824 (1856) ;
Allen V. Frost, 62 Ga. 659 (1879) j K. E. Co. v. McKenna, 13 Lea,
280 (1884) ; Jones v. Swearingen, 42 S. C. 58, 67 (1894) ; Lindsay
V. Hamburg, &c. Ins. Co., 115 IST. C. 212 (1894).
" Where a contract is oral, the question what the contract is
must, if controverted, be tried by the jury as a question of fact ;
but where the terms of a contract are undisputed, its construction
and effect, where the contract is oral as well as where it is written,
are to be determined by the court." Globe Works v. Wright, 106
Mass. 207 (1870). This duty of construction may, at times, princi-
pally involve a question of the meaning of words, of which the
court takes judicial cognisance ; e. g., whether the term " Congrega-
tional persuasion" means theological doctrine, or merely church
government, so as to embrace a " Unitarian clergyman." Atty.-
Gen. V. Dublin, 38 N. H. 459 (1859). The court may be aided by
experts in reading a document, e. g., railroad orders. R. E.. v.
McKenna, 13 Lea, 280 (1884). It is error to submit the question of
the construction of a deed to the jury " without limitation or
restriction, and without specific instruction," but if the jury take
the correct view, a new trial will not be granted. Morse v. Wey-
mouth, 28 Vt. 824 (1866).
While " the construction of a written document, where the mean-
ing is to be collected from the document itself, is matter of pure
law and for the court," its meaning, if to be determined by refer-
ence to extrinsic facts or usages, must be submitted to the jury as a
question of fact under appropriate instructions. Gibbs v. Gilead,
&c. Society, 38 Conn. 153 (1871). Whether the printed regulations
of a railroad applied to a particular train is a question of construc-
tion for the court, and it is error to submit it to the jury. Illinois
Central R. E. Co. v. Murphy, 52 111. App. 65 (1893).
" The interpretation of writings is always for the court except in
two cases : First, where the writing is ambiguous and the ambiguity
must be solved by extrinsic, unconceded facts ; and next, where the
writing is merely adduced as containing evidence of certain facts,
from which different inferences may be drawn, and where it is for
the jury, and not the court, to draw the inferences." Enterprise
Soap Works v. Sayers, 55 Mo. App. 15 (1893).
Whether the written contract was made as the final agreement
of the parties, is a question for the jury. Holm v. Coleman, 89
Wise. 233 (1895) ; Bloom v. Cox, &c. Mfg. Co., 83 Hun. 611 (1894).
And the meaning of a contract in a foreign language as inter-
preted by those familiar with it. Badart v. Foulon (Mich.), 61
N. W. 536 (1894). So where there is ambiguity in the contract.
Ginnath v. Blankenship, 28 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.), 828 (1894);
Becker v. Holm, 89 Wise. 86 (1894). See to same effect, Wood-
bury Granite Co. v. Milliken, 66 Vt. 465 (1894),
CHAP, in.] AMERICAN NOTES; 52^
Where the facts attending the making of an alleged contract are
in dispute, it is not error, as referring the construction of a written
instrument to the jury, for the, court to construe the contract upon
the assumption that certain facts exist, and then leaving it to the
jury to determine whether these facts do exist. Bascom v. Smith,
164 Mass. 61 (1895).
So the interpretation of statutes " in order to ascertain the true
intent and meaning of the legislature," i. e., a plain matter of fact,
is a question for the court. Com. v. Anthes, 5 Gray, 185, 190
(1856) ; Edes v. Boardman, 68 N. H. 680, 592 (1879).
The reason on which this rule apparently at present rests is in
part the necessity of a uniform administration of justice. "It is
of the highest importance, not only that there should be a true and
correct interpretation of the statute, . . . but also that such opera-
tion shall be equal and uniform over all those who are subject to the
same government." Com. v. Anthes, 6 Gray, 186, 191 (1866).
The meaning of unambiguous oral language is a question for the
court. Matthews v. Park, 159 Pa. St. 579 (1894); Spragins v.
White, 108 N. C. 449 (1891).
Negligence. — It is said that when the facts are undisputed, neg-
ligence is a matter of law for the court. This is an imperfect
. statement. It is, as has been said, part of the duty of the court to
enforce the rules of correct reasoning. It is but natural, therefore,
that courts should find themselves forced to attempt establishing a
standard of what is reasonable conduct under certain circumstances,
where the question is not as to the existence of facts, but as to the
inferences to be deduced from them. Joslin v. Le Baron, 44 Mich.
160 (1880) ; Woodward v. Hancock, 7 Jones (Law), 384 (1860) ;
Mauerman v. Siemerts, 71 Mo. 101 (1879) ; Lake Shore, &c. R. E.
V. Bangs, 47 Mich. 470 (1882) ; Pennsylvania R. E. Co. v. Eighter,
42 N. J. Law, 180 (1880) ; Stackus v. N. Y. E. E., 79 I^. Y. 464
(1880); Delaware, &c., E. E. v. Converse, 139 U. S. 469 (1891).
It is also clearly of advantage oni recognised grounds of public
policy that certain standards of conduct should be uniformly and
definitely settled, to afford serviceable guides for the future.
This can, of course, best be done by removing cases which are
clearly settled either on reason or by previous action of the jury as
being or not being instances of negligence, from the further con-
sideration of the jury and deducing from them a rule of law. This
is legal growth.
Beginning with clear cases on either side of the line, courts are
enabled, by this process of ruling as matter of law, gradually to
restrict the range of doubtful cases, with the result of more defi-
nitely establishing legal standards of conduct. Wheeloek v. Boston
& Albany E. Co., 105 Mass. 203 (1870).
For instance, it has " become a postulate that due care requires a
SS** AMEEICAN NOTES. [PABT I.
pedestrian, before crossing a railroad track, to look in either direc-
tion to ascertain whether a train is approaching." Eodrian v. N. Y,,
&c. R. K., 126 N. Y. 526 (1891) ; Fletcher v. Fitchbnrg E. E., 149~
Mass. 127 (1889) ; Lavarenz v. Chicago, &c. E. E., 56 la. 669 (1881).
But to the contrary, i. e., that the failure to look is a fact to be
left with other facts to the jury, see Texas, &c. E. E. v. Chapman,
57 Tex. 76 (1832) ; Plummer v. Eastern E. E., 73 Me. 591 (1882) ;
Terre Haute E. E. v. Voelker, 129 111. 540 (1889).
Doubtful cases of negligence, which have not been covered by
rules of law, where "it is a matter of judgment and discretion, of
sound inference, what is the deduction to be drawn from the undis-
puted facts," are pure questions of fact for the jury. "It is
assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life
than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions
from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge." Eail-
road Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657 (1873) ; Williams v. Grealy, 112 Mass.
79 (1873); Eandall v. Connecticut Eiver E. E., 132 Mass. 269
(1882) ; Teipel v. Hilsendegen, 44 Mich. 461 (1880) ; Stager v. Pass.
Ey. Co., 119 Pa. St. 70 (1888); Kansas Pacific E. E. v. Eichardson,
26 Kans. 391 (1881).
" It is a matter of right in the plaintiff to have the issue of neg-
ligence submitted to the jury when it depends upon conflicting
evidence, or on inferences to be drawn from circumstances in regard
to which there is room for a difference of opinion among intelligent
men." Payne v. Troy & Boston E. E., 83 N. Y. 572 (1881) ; Jones
V. East Tenn. E. E. Co., 128 U. S. 443 (1888).
" Whether there was negligence or want of ordinary care in the
conduct and acts of the plaintiff under all the circumstances of this
case, is a question in regard to which reasonable men may honestly
hold different views. This being so, it follows that we must sustain
the refusal of the court below to withdraw the case from the con-
sideration of the jury." Cumberland, &c. E. E. Co. v. Mangans, 51
Md. 53 (1883) ; Detroit, &c. E. E. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99
(1868).
It is in this sense that it is frequently said that negligence is a
question of fact. Not "that the definition of negligence is one
of fact, and that the jury shall be left to their own fancies to
determine what, in each case, shall be the measure to which the
proof shall be applied in determining whether there is negligence,
but, simply, the general rule being declared as matter of law, the
jury must determine whether such facts have been proved as bring
the case within that general rule." Pennsylvania Co. v. Conlan,
101 111. 93 (1881).
The question of negligence, in other words, may be, and often is,
a complex one involving two main questions : (1) Did the defendant
do or omit to do certain things ? (2) Do these acts or omissions
CHAP, ni.] AMEEICA3Sr NOTES. 62^
constitute negligence ? The court may leave both these questions to
the jury; or it may leave the first to the jury and rule, in a clear
case, itself upon the second. In a doubtful case the court, not feel-
ing confident of whether the reason of mankind unhesitatingly
stamps the conduct as negligence, " aids its conscience by taking
the opinion of the jury." Holmes, Common Law, p. 123.
Dub Diligence. — What is reasonable diligence in giving no-
tice of dishonor to the drawer or indorser of commercial paper
is, when the facts are proved or admitted, a question in many cases
for the court. Walker v. Stetson, 14 Oh. St. 89 (1862) ; Bank of
Upper Canada v. Smith, 4 Q. B. U. C. 483 (1847).
But what is a " reasonable time " in which to cut and carry away
cedar under a contract has been held to be " a question for the jury
to determine upon evidence given on that subject." Jenkins v.
Lykes, 19 Fla. 148 (1882).
The same considerations call for this rule as affect the action of
the courts in matters of negligence. The result has been reached in
the same way ; i. e., by establishing rulings upon clear cases, and
gradually limiting the doubtful cases in which lies the province of
the jury.
Probable Cause. — So where the facts are proved or conceded,
the existence of reasonable and probable cause in an action for
malicious prosecution is "a question of law to be determined
by the court." Taylor v. Godfrey, 36 Me. 528 (1853) ; Jacks v.
Stimpson, 13 111. 701 (1852) ; Barron v. Mason, 31 Vt. 189 (1858).
So in an action for malicious prosecution, the supreme court of
the United States say : " It is true that what amounts to probable
cause is a question of law in a very important sense. In the cele-
brated ease of Sutton v. Johnstone, 1 T. E. 493 (1786), the rule is
thus laid down : ' The question of probable cause is a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact. Whether the circumstances alleged to show
it probable are true and existed, is a question of fact ; but whether,
supposing them to be true, they amount to a probable cause, is a
question of law.' This is the doctrine generally adopted. M'Cor-
mick V. Sisson, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 715 (1827) ; Besson v. Southard, 10
N. Y. 236 (1851) ; " Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187, 194 (1878).
In all these cases where, if the facts were admitted or otherwise
settled, the determination of due care, reasonable and probable
cause, due diligence, &c., would be matter of law for the court, the
facts themselves are in dispute, it is the duty of the court to submit
the question of fact to the jury with alternate rulings of law appro-
priate to the jury's action in determining the issue of fact. Ash v.
Mario w, 20 Ohio, 119 (1851); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187
(1878).
Peeliminaet Facts. — In discharging his duty of presiding and
enforcing the rules relating to the admissibility of evidence, either
52® AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
sua sponte or when called upon to act, many occasions arise where
such admissibility depends on the determination by the judge of
some preliminary fact.
Such decision is final, and not reviewable on exceptions. Walker
V. Curtis, 116 Mass. 98 (1874). Such finding " is a finality as much
as the verdict of a jury upon a question of fact." State v. Pike, 49
N. H. 399 (1876). " But his ruling as matter of law that such fact
renders the evidence competent or incompetent is the subject of re-
vision." Com. V. Gray, 129 Mass. 474 (1880).
Whether a dying declaration was made under a sense of impending
dissolution is a question for the court, its weight being a matter for
the jury. State v. Tilghman, 11 Ired. Law, 513 (1850).
The competency of a witness to a codicil to a will is " in the first
instance clearly a matter for the court." Wilson v. Van Leer, 127
Fa. St. 371 (1889).
So whether, in case of a dispiited handwriting, a certain writing
is so far proved to be genuine as to serve as a safe standard for
comparison, is a preliminary fact to be settled by the court. Com.
V. Coe, 116 Mass. 481, 603 (1874).
So whether an expert is sufficiently qualified to testify is a ques-
tion of fact for the court. Jones v. Tucker, 41 N. H..646 (1860) ;
State V. Cole, 94 K C. 958 (1886) ; Preeper v. Eeg., 15 Sup. Ct. of
Can. 401 (1888) ; Com. v. Williams, 105 Mass. 62 (1870). ;
Whether the subject on which the evidence of the expert is offered
is such that the jury might reasonably be expected to derive benefit
from eitpert opinion, is a matter of law. Shafter v. Evans, 53 Cal.
32 (1878) ; White v. Ballon, 8 All. 408 (1864) ; Jones v. Tucker, 41
N. H. 646 (1860).
So the question whether a confession offered in evidence is " vol-
untary," presents a fact for the decision of the judge. Ellis v.
State, 65 Miss. 44 (1887); State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399, 407 (1870).
This question cannot be submitted in toto to the jury except by
consent. "The prisoner has always the right to require of the
judge a decision of the competency of the evidence, and even after
the judge has decided the evidence to be competent, the prisoner
has the right to ask of the jury to disregard it, and to give no
weight to it, because of the circumstances under which the con-
fessions were obtained." Com. v. Calder, 126 Mass. 464 (1879).
Where secondary evidence is offered of the contents of a written
document, the question whether a sufficient foundation has been
laid for its admission by accounting for failure to produce the
original, is a preliminary question of fact for the court. Bell v.
Kendrick, 25 Ela. 778 (1889).
Whether a witness is qualified to testify, as being of sufficient
mental capacity to understand the nature and solemnity of an oath,
is question of fact for the court. Com. v. Lynes, 142 Mass. 677
CHAP, rn.] AMEBIC AJff NOTES. 52^
(1886) ; Peterson v. State, 47 Ga. 624 (1873) ; State v. Severson, 78
la. 663 (1889) ; Coleman v. Com., 25 Gratt. 866 (1874) ; Udy v.
Stewart, 10 Ont. Eep. 691 (1886).
The court may suspend his examination as to competency to allow
the witness to be instructed as to the nature and meaning of the
oath, e. g., by a christian minister. Com. v. Lynes, 142 Mass. 677
(1886).
The finding of the court may be reviewed by an upper court upon
evidence duly reported. Udy v. Stewart, 10 Ont. Rep. 591 (1886).
But the court will be very loath to disturb the finding of the lower
court. "He has the child before him. We can only judge of its
capacity from written evidence." Peterson v. State, 47 Ga. 524
(1873).
The court's inquiry in case of youth may extend to the mental
capacity of a witness. Simpson v. State, 31 Ind. 90 (1869) ; Com.
V. Mullins, 2 All. 296 (1861).
This inquiry must be conducted by the judge himself in open
court and in presence of the parties. He cannot properly delegate
the duty to some one else out of court, and decide according to
the report. Simpson v. State, 31 Ind. 90 (1869).
No case has been found that " the right to the preliminary exam-
ination, when insisted on, could be denied." Seeley v. Engell, 13
N. Y. 642 (1856).
" The decision upon this particular question of the admissibility
of the evidence is ordinarily conclusive, unless the judge sees fit to
reserve or report the question. . . . There is no rule of law that, in
order to render the testimony admissible, such prior fact must be
established by a weight of evidence which will amount to a demon-
stration, and shut out all doiibt on the question of its existence. It
is only necessary that there should be so much evidence as to make
it proper to submit the whole evidence to the jury." Com. v. Rob-
inson, 146 Mass. 571 (1888).
In pursuance of its duty to enforce the exercise of correct reason-
ing and decide what is reasonable in connection with legal liability,
it is for the court to determine, as matter of law, whether there is
any evidence on which the jury can, by logical rules, reasonably
find in favour of a contested proposition of fact. School Furniture
Co. V. Warsaw School Dist., 122 Pa. St. 494 (1888) ; State v. Mc-
Bryde, 79 N. C. 393 (1887) ; Chandler v. Von Roeder, 24 How. 224
(1860) ; Bridger v. Ashville, &c. R. R. Co., 26 S. C. 24 (1886).
" If there is, that is sufScient to send the case to the jury, no
matter how strong may be the proofs to the contrary." School
Furniture Co. ■». Warsaw School Dist., 122 Pa. St. 794 (1888) ; and
it is the duty of the judge to send it there, "although in his opinion
its preponderance should be against the plaintiff." Gaynor v. Old
Colony R. R., 100 Mass. 208 (1868) ; Eilert v. Green Bay, &c. R. R.,
48 Wise. 606 (1879).
52* AMEEICAN NOTES. [PABT I.
" The court will not decide the question upon the preponderance
of the evidence." Cook v. Union Eailway Co., 125 Mass. 57 (1878).
"Whether there is any evidence is a question for the judge;
whether there is sufficient evidence is for the jury." Chandler v.
Von Boeder, 24 How. 224 (1860). See, also, State v. Stephen, 45 La.
Ann. Pt. 1, 702 (1893).
Dbmuekbe to Evidence. — A method of getting a ruling as
matter of law from the court as to the sufficiency of certain facts
to support a verdict, is by demurring to the evidence. It is the
right of either party to ask the court to rule that upon the facts
submitted by the opposite party, the latter has not sustained his
contention. Trout v. Virginia E. E., 23 Gratt. 619 (1873) ; Kansas,
&c., E. E. Co. V. Foster, 39 Kans. 329 (1888).
For example, in an action for negligence, " a demurrer to the
evidence must be sustained where an unavoidable inference of con-
tributory negligence arises out of the plaintiff's own evidence, or
out of other evidence which stands undisputed in the case." Weber
V. Cable Ey. Co., 100 Mo. 194 (1889).
This right is not waived by putting in contradictory evidence.
" The defendant, by putting in its evidence, took the chance of aiding
the plaintiff's case ; but it was not thereby deprived of the right to
ask the court to direct a verdict on all the evidence." Weber v.
Cable Ey. Co., 100 Mo. 194 (1889).
Indeed, it is held that the party demurring must rest his case on
demurring, and that overruling a demurrer where the party demur-
ring does not rest, cannot be assigned for error. Columbia, &c.
Eailway v. Hawthorne, 144 U. S. 202 (1892).
"The demurrer to evidence has long since gone out of use in
this state, and ought not any longer to be regarded as a right upon
which an exception can be predicated." Colegrove v. N. Y., &c.
E. E., 20 N. Y. 492 (1859).
So the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts say : " A demur-
rer to evidence is rarely resorted to in our practice, as the statutes
furnish more simple and convenient ways of raising any questions
of law." Golden v. Knowles, 120 Mass. 336 (1876).
" Unless all inferences are admitted which a jury might have
drawn, judges, instead of confining themselves within their province
of deciding on questions of law, will also become triers of every
matter of fact." Patrick v. Hallett, 1 Johns. 241 (1806).
Foreign Laws. — As has been stated, the existence of a rule of
law is in reality a fact. Such facts are segregated from others
largely because rules of domestic law are not the subjects of evi-
dence, but are in a special sense within the cognisance of the court
as representing that branch of government whose duty it is to en-
force the rights they prescribe and the standards of conduct they
CHAP, ni.] AMERICAN NOTES. 52^
establish. Where the existence of a rule of law other than those
which the court is charged with the administrative duty of enforc-
ing, e. g. , a foreign law, is a fact in issue or relevant to the issue,
the reason for distinguishing rules of law from other facts at once
ceases. "The existence or non-existence of a foreign law is a ques-
tion of fact." Kennard v. Kennard, 63 N. H. 303 (1885); Horton
V. Eeed, 13 B. I. 366 (1881) ; Williams v. Einlay, 40 Oh. St. 341^
(1883) ; Chumasero v. Gilbert, 24 111. 293 (1860) ; People v. Mc-
Quaid, 85 Mich. 123 (1891) ; Ins. Co. of K America v. Forcheimer,
86 Ala. 641 (1888) ; Condit v. Blackwell, 19 N. J. Eq. 193 (1868) ;
St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Weaver, 35 Kans. 412, 425 (1886) ; Syme v.
Stewart, 17 La. Ann. 78 (1865) ; Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253 (1868) ;
Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400, 427 (1862) ; Charlotte v. Chouteau, 25
Mo. 465 (1857) ; Cox v. Morrow, 14 Ark. 603 (1854) ; Polk v. Butter-
field, 9 Col. 325 (1886) ; Jackson v. Jackson, 80 Md. 176 (1894).
But on an indictment for adultery in Vermont, the marriage of the
female defendant having been in ISTew York and no proof being
offered at the trial court as to the laws of New York, the supreme
court say, speaking of the New York law, " It was not necessary
to prove the law if it was known to the court at the trial, or if it is
now known to be as decided on the trial." State v. Eood, 12 Vt.
396 (1840).
To contrary effect and with better reasoning, see People v. Lam-
bert, 6 Mich. 349 (1868).
Peooi- of Fokeigh Law. — In the absence of statutory provis-
ions, the accepted rule is that proof of the foreign law is a matter
for expert testimony by those familiar with it. Kennard v. Ken-
nard, 63 N. H. 303 (1885); Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400, 427
(1852) ; Owen v. Boyle, 15 Me. 147 (1838) ; Pierce v. Indseth, 106
U. S. 546 (1882); People v. Lambert, 6 Mich. 349 (1858). "The
laws of Wisconsin are not, in fact or by theory of law, known to
the courts of this state and must be proved, either by experts, coun-
sel learned in the law of that state, or copies of its statute, with the
decisions of its courts thereon." Condit v. Blackwell, 19 IST. J. Eq.
193 (18G3). Speaking of some of the Wisconsin decisions on cer-
tain of their statutes, the learned Chancellor (Zabriskie) says: "I
concur in (and would be bound by, if I did not) the conclusion at
which the courts, with hesitation, but with sound reasoning, ar-
rived." Ibid. To the same effect, the supreme court of Kansas,
speaking of a cause of action which arose in Arkansas, say that "If
it had been proved in the case what view the supreme court of
Arkansas has taken with respect to the common law in cases of this
kind, we would follow its view ; and this we would do even if its
views should differ from ours. If within its views the plaintiff has
no cause of action, we would also hold that he has no cause of
action." St. Louis, &c. Ey. v. Weaver, 35 Kans. 412, 426 (1886).
5210 AMEEICAN KOTES. [PAET I.
Speaking of the law of Virginia, the court of appeals of Mary-
land say, " That law is a fact to be proved in our courts, as other
facts : if unwritten, by the testimony of experts ; if statutory, by
the law itself or exempliiied copy." Baltimore &c. E. E. v. Glenn,
28 Md. 287 (1867) ;' Charlotte v. Chouteau, 25 Mo. 465 (1857) ; State
V. Moy Looke, 7 Oreg. 54 (1879). So a Spanish lawyer who has
practised in Cuba, can testify from the Commercial Code as to the
law of partnerships in Cuba. Barrows v. Downs, 9 E. I. 446
(1890).
" The law of a foreign country on a given subject may be proved
by any person, who, though not a lawyer, or not having filled any
public office, is or has been in a position to render it probable that
he would make himself acquainted with it." American &c. Ins. Co.
V. Eosenagle, 77 Pa. St. 607 (1875).
Law of othee States. — "The existence of a law of another
state is a question of fact." Ingraham v. Hart, 5 Ohio, 255 (1842);
Miller v. MacVeagh, 40 111. App. 532 (1891) ; Hoyt v. McNeil, 13
Minn. 390 (1868).
A declaration which states the alleged effect of a statute of an-
other state instead of setting it out is demurrable. Hoyt v. McNeil,
13 Minn. 390 (1868).
" The relation of the United States to each other in regard to all
matters not surrendered to the general government by the Constitu-
tion, are those of foreign states in close friendship, each being
sovereign and independent ; and the courts have generally held that
therefore the laws of one state were to be proved in the courts of
another only as other foreign laws." Bay ley's Adm. v. Chubb, 16
Gratt. 284 (1862).
But, as the Arkansas supreme court say : " Where two countries
have the same origin, or were at one time associated, the courts of
each are bound to take judicial notice of what the law was when it
was common to both," giving as an example the states of Missouri
and Arkansas. Cox v. Morrow, 14 Ark. 603 (1854).
Where a statute of a sister state certified according to act of
Congress embraces several subjects, it need not contain all its sec-
tions but only such as are relevant to the case in which it is offered.
Where in the certified statute another act is referred to, the statute
itself is admissible without including the statute referred to. Grant
V. Coal Co., 80 Pa. St. 208 (1876).
As to what is a sufficient compliance with the formalities of au-
thentication required by the act of congress, see Eice's Succession,
24 La. Ann. 614 (1869). See also Grant v. Coal Co., 80 Pa. St.
208 (1876).
Where the law of a sister state is an essential fact and no evi-
dence is adduced as to what it is, the court of the forum is obliged to
assume as to the law of the sister state either, (1) That the common
CHAP, m.] AMERICAN NOTES. 52^
law prevails in the state iu question on that point. (2) That the
foreign law is the same as that of the forum.
Which of these assumptions is indulged in, frequently depends
on whether the sister state was originally settled by those using the
common law of England.
(1) It is assumed that the common law prevails in "those states
which were originally colonies of England or carved out of such
colonies." Norris v. Harris, 15 Gal. 226 (1860) ; Miller v. MacVeagh,
40 111. App. 532 (1891) ; Eureka Springs Ey. v. Timmons, 51 Ark.
459 (1888).
" In the absence of any proof as to the statute law of Michigan,
we must assume the existence there of the common law." Leather
Co. V. Hardware &c. Co., 57 Mo. App. 297 (1894).
In the case of Miller v. MacVeagh, ubi supra, the court were asked
to rule that while the common law would be presumed to exist in all
states of the American Union which were colonies of Great Britain,
judicial cognisance should be taken of the fact that Dakota (the
state whose law was involved) was formed out of the "Louisiana
Purchase " from France, and therefore the civil law should be pre-
sumed to exist in that state. The court in declining so to rule say :
" Laws are for people and not for mere territory, as such. In the
portion of the Louisiana purchase from which Dakota was formed
there existed no civilised community governed by any law at the
time of the cession. When Dakota was peopled and an organised
community created in her territory it was by emigrants from states
where the common law was in force, and by citizens who looked to
that common law as their natural right and as forming the source
and basis of their jurisprudence."
The same ruling is made in the courts of California. Norris v.
Harris, 15 Cal. 226 (1860) ; and in those of Arkansas concerning
the State of Missouri. Eureka Springs Ey. v. Timmons, 51 Ark.
459 (1888) ; and in those of Missouri. EoU v. St. Louis Smelting
Co., 52 Mo. App. 60 (1892).
"But no such presumption can apply to states in which a govern-
ment already existed at the time of their accession to the country,
as Florida, Louisiana, and Texas. They had already laws of their
own, which remained in force until by the proper authority they
were abrogated and new laws were promulgated. With them there
is no more presumption of the existence of the common law than of
any other law." ITorris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 226, 253 (1860), per
Field, C. J. So held of Texas in Brown v. Wright, 58 Ark. 20
(1893).
(2) When the sister state was not settled by men living under the
common law, and had at the time of the cession to the United States
an organised jurisprudence, the assumption of the prevalence of
the common law can no longer be indulged, and recourse must be
52 '2 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I
had to another assumption, viz., — that the law of the state in ques-
tion is the same as that of the forum.
"The law of the sister state of Illinois, both statutory and
common, in the absence of any showing to the contrary is presumed
to be the same as that of our own state." Bierhaus v. W. U. Tel.
Co., 8 Ind. App. 246, 263 (1893) ; Oak Leather Co. ■;;. Union Bank,
9 Utah, 87 (1893) ; Haggin v. Haggin, 35 Neb. 375 (1892) ; Palmer
V. Atchison &e. K. E,., 101 Col. 187 (1894) ; Scroggin v. McClelland,
37 Neb. 644 (1893) ; Chapman v. Brewer, 43 Neb. 890 (1895) ; Silli-
man v. Thornton (Tex.), 30 S. W. 700 (1896).
This rule applies also to England. Wickershan v. Johnston, 104
Cal. 407 (1894). So the rate of interest in a sister state will be
presumed to be the same fixed by the statutes of Nebraska. Fitz-
gerald V. Fitzgerald &c. Construction Company, 41 Neb. 374 (1894).
Of the two assumptions, the second seems the one sustained by
the weight of authority. "It is almost universally held that where
there is no proof of the law of another state, nor judicial knowledge
of the origin of such state which would raise a presumption that the
common law prevails there, it will be presumed that the law of the
forum in which the issue is being tried is the law of that state on
the question under consideration." Kennebrew v. Southern &c. Co.
(Ala.), 17 So. Kep. 545 (1896).
The feeling on the part of the court which leads to this
course is well stated in an early California case. " The question
then recurs as to what is to be presumed as to the law of Texas, in
the absence of any proof on the subject. We can perceive only one
way in which the question can be answered, and that is to presume
the law of that state to be in accordance with our own. We are
called upon to determine the matter in controversy, and are not at
liberty to follow our own arbitrary notions of justice. We cannot
take judicial notice of the laws of Texas, and we must therefore, as
a matter of necessity, look to our own laws as furnishing the only
rule of decision on which we can act ; and to meet the requirement
that the case is to be disposed of according to the laws of Texas, the
presumption is indulged that the laws of the two states are in ac-
cordance with each other." Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 226, 253
(1860), citing Smoot v. Russell, 1 Martin, N. S. 523 (1823) ; Allen
V. Watson, 2 Hill (S. C), 319 (1834) ; Syme v. Stewart, 17 La. Ann.
78 (1865) ; Gardner v. Lewis, 7 Gill. 377 (1848).
If the laws are in fact different, the party desiring the benefit
of the difference "-can only obtain the benefit of the foreign law by
making it a part of the case in evidence." Cox v. Morrow, 14 Ark.
603 (1864). See also Simms v. So. Express Co., 35 Kans. 129
(1868).
The same result is reached on other grounds by the New York
court of appeals relating to the law of Scotland. It is held that
CHAP, ni.] AMERICAN NOTES. 6213
prima facie the lex fori governs, and whoever desires the benefit of
the law of any other jurisdiction must prove what that law is.
Monroe v. Douglass, 1 Seld. 447, 462 (1851).
" With no proof before him as to the laws of Texas, the Chan-
cellor could not determine the right to the Tyler hotel otherwise
than according to our own laws." Brown v. Wright, 58 Ark. 20
(1893).
The supreme court of Alabama in a case where no evidence
was offered of the New York rate of interest on an insurance pol-
icy decline to make either assumption and treat the evidence as
failing as to an essential fact. Ins. Co. of N. America v. Porcheimer,
86 Ala. 541 (1888). So also in California, Cavender v. Guild, 4 Cal.
250 (1854). It is not perceived why such a course is not, in point
of principle, correct.
Proof, how made. — If the law in question is said to be estab-
lished by the decisions of the courts of the sister state, the courts
of the former will examine the officially printed reports of their
decisions. The Supreme Court of Ehode Island, in an equity case,
say : " The question of what is the law of Massachusetts is a ques-
tion of fact, to be determined on evidence, and on such a question
we can have no better evidence than the decisions of the highest
judicial court of the state." Horton v. Eeed, 13 R. I. 366 (1881) ;
Kennard v. Kennard, 63 N. H. 303 (1885) ; Ames v. McCamber, 124
Mass. 85 (1878).
But there seems force in the decision of the supreme court of
Kansas. " If it be claimed that we should take judicial notice of the
common law of Arkansas, we would answer that we cannot do so.
The courts of this state may take judicial notice of the common law
of Kansas, and what it would be except for our own statutes or our
own written law; and for this purpose our courts may take judicial
notice of all the judicial decisions of this country, and of all other
countries which have adopted the common law of England. But for
the purpose that the courts of this state shall know as a fact in a
particular case what the common law of some other state is, such
law must be proved like any other fact." St. Louis, &c. Ey. v.
Weaver, 35 Kans. 412 (1886). See, to same effect, Owen ■;;. Boyle, 15
Me. 147 (1838).
UnoflB.eial publications, e. g., Brightley's Pennsylvania Digest, if
properly authenticated as reliable, will be admitted for the same
purpose. People v. McQuaid, 85 Mich. 123 (1891), where the Digest
was admitted on the statement of a Pennsylvailia minister that he
had consulted it and seen it used in court, and that it had continued
publication for twenty years. The court add : " It was within the
knowledge of the trial court that Brightley's Digest is not a fugitive
publication."
The use of official reports of decisions is frequently provided for
52" AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
by statute. Bridger v. Asheville, &c. E. E., 25 S. C. 24 (1885). The
volume must be produced and offered in evidence ; it is not suf-
ficient merely to refer to it. Ibid. Lockwood v, Crawford, 18
Conn. 361 (1847) is to the same effect.
" The written foreign law may be proved by a copy of the law
properly authenticated. . , . They may he verified by an oath or
by an exemplification of a copy, under the great seal of a state, or
by a copy proved to be a true copy by a witness who has examined
and compared it with the original, or by a certificate of an officer,
properly authorised by law to give the copy ; which certificate must
be duly proved. But such modes of proof as have been mentioned
are not to be considered exclusive of others, especially of codes of
laws and accepted histories of the law of a country." Ennis v.
Smith, 14 How. 400, 427 (1852) ; Charlotte v. Chouteau, 25 Mo. 465
(1857). The validity of a discharge in bankruptcy under the law of
Canada can only be proved by a witness who produces a copy of the
law authorising it. " Some copy of the law which the witness
could swear was recognised in the Province as authoritative should
have been produced." Spaulding v. Vincent, 24 Vt. 601 (1852).
See also Pub. Sts. of Mass., Chap. 169, § 73. So a printed volume
of the laws of New Brunswick, purporting and proved to be official,
has been admitted as evidence of these statutes. Owen v. Boyle,
15 Me. 147 (1838).
"In the admiralty, as in other courts, foreign law must be pleaded
and proved as a fact. ... I believe it to be the true doctrine that
the unwritten law of England may be proved in this court, not by
experts only, but also by text-writers of authority and by the
printed reports of adjudged cases; and that the unwritten law may
be proved by the printed copies, and be construed with the aid
of text-books as well as of experts." The Pawashick, 2 Lowell,
142 (1872).
If the government of the court of the forum has itself promul-
gated a foreign law or ordinance as authentic, that promulgation is
sufficient proof of such law. Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1, 38
(1801).
To VTHOM Pkoof is TO BE MADE. — " The rule of the common law
undoubtedly is, that the laws of other states and nations are to be
proved here by documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses ;
in which case the jury are the judges of the proofs, as in other
questions of fact." Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 361 (1847) ;
Thrasher v. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234 (1831) ; Kline v. Baker, 99
Mass. 253 (1868) ; Moore v. Gwyun, 5 Ired. 187 (1844) ; Ingraham
V. Hart, 11 Ohio, 255 (1842) ; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400, 427
(1862).
The qualification of these experts is a preliminary question of fact
for the court. Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253 (1868) ; Hall v. Costello,
CHAP, in.] AMERICAN NOTES. 52^^
48 N. H. 176 (1868). And -where the question to which the existence
of the foreign law is relevant is one for the decision of the court,
e. g., the admission of evidence, "the evidence to enable the decision
to be made must of course be addressed to the court." Pickard v.
Bailey, 26 N. H. 152 (1862) ; Thrasher v. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234
(1831).
But even this question the court can leave, if in doubt, to the jury,
with alternative instructions. Thrasher v. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234
(1831). Holman v. King, 7 Mete. 384, 388 (1844), aj^plies this rule
even to the construction of foreign statutes. Like any other finding
of fact, a finding of the existence of a foreign law is usually final.
Kennard v. Kennard, 63 jST. H. 303 (1885) ; Williams v. Finlay, 40
Ohio St. 342 (1883). " When the law of another state is in dispute,
it is to be determined as a question of fact by the court or jury trying
the case. If the evidence was conflicting, as the plaintiff contends,
we have no authority to revise the finding, although the judge has
reported the evidence." Ames v. McCamber, 124 Mass. 85 (1887).
A question much debated in Charlotte v. Chouteau, 25 Mo. 465
(1857), was this : Whether proof of the existence of a foreign law
should first be made to the court or jury. The court conclude:
" The decided weight of the American authorities goes to the length
of establishing the doctrine not only that it is the province and duty
of the court to instruct the jury as to the meaning and effect of a
foreign law, when proved, whether the law is written or unwritten,
but that the proof must be made to the court."
"It is well settled that foreign laws, like foreign judgments, are
to be proved as facts, and the better opinion is that the evidence
should be addressed to the court and not to the jury." Pickard v.
Bailey, 26 N. H. 152, 169 (1852).
On the contrary, except in cases of " a statute or judicial opinion
or document," in Massachusetts, "it is a general rule, that laws of
other states must be proved as facts ; • and ordinarily, in a trial by
jury, the question must be left to the jury to decide as a fact what
the law of another state is, if it becomes material to be determined.
This may in some cases prove inconvenient in practice, especially in
view of the provision of our statute that the court shall not charge
juries with respect to matters of fact ; but such is the established
rule in this commonwealth." Afford v. Spaulding, 156 Mass. 65
(1892).
" When the evidence admitted consists entirely of a written docu-
ment, statute, or judicial opinion, the question of its construction
and effect is for the court alone." Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253
(1868) ; Haines v. Hanrahan, 105 Mass. 480 (1870) ; Gibson v.
Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 144 Mass. 81 (1887) ; Lycoming, etc., In-
surance Co. V. Wright, 60 Vt. 515 (1888) ; Charlotte v. Chouteau, 33
Mo. 194 (1862) ; Afford v. Spaulding, 166 Mass. 65 (1892).
52^8 AMEEICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
See also, to the effect that the court can, if so disposed, leave the
question of construction of a statute to the jury, Holman v. King,
7 Mete. 384, 388 (1844).
But the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts will not, on
exceptions, consider any statute of another state which is not made
part ot the bill of exceptions. Haines v. Hanrahan, 105 Mass. 480
(1870). To same effect, Drake v. Glover, 30 Ala. 382 (1857).
" The statute being authenticated in the manner pointed out by
the constitution of the United States and the act of Congress, both
the fact of its existence and its proper construction is matter for the
court." Moore «. Gwynn, 5 Ired. 187 (1844); State v. Jackson,
2 Dev. 668 (1830).
"And if the evidence is uncontroverted and will not support the
action, it is the duty of the court so to instruct the jury." Kline v.
Baker, 99 Mass. 253 (1868).
In the North Carolina case, which actually was an instance of a
written statute, the court lay down a broader rule than seems sus-
tained by the current of authority. " The existence of a foreign
law is a fact. The court cannot judicially know it, and therefore it
must be proved ; and the proof, like all other, necessarily goes to
the jury. But when established, the meaning of the law, its con-
struction and effect, is the province of the court. It is a matter of
professional science." State v. Jackson (ubi supra).
Statutory Pkovisions. — It has been usually provided that
printed copies of the statutory laws of any state of the American
Union, apparently published by official authority, will be received in
the courts of the forum as prima facie evidence of the existence
of such statutes.
People V. McQuaid, 85 Mich. 123 (1891) ; Bridges v. AshevilleE. E.
Co., 25 S. C. 24 (1885); Martin v. Payne, 11 Tex. 292 (1854) ; Clan-
ton V. Barnes, 50 Ala. 260 (1874).
So if a pamphlet copy of laws of a single session purporting to be
published by authority. Ashley v. Koot, 4 All. 504 (1862).
It is sufficient that the title-page of the volume in question bears
the words "By authority." Merrifield v. Eobbins, 8 Gray, 160
(1857). So " Printed by order of the Governor " is sufficient. Wilt
V. Cutler, 38 Mich. 189 (1878).
Under such circumstances parol evidence or an unofficial copy of
a statute cannot be received. Martin v. Payne, 11 Tex. 292 (1854).
CHAP. IV.] DISPOSITION TO BELIEF INSTINCTIVE.
CHAPTER IV.
THE GROUNDS OF BELIEF.
§ 50.^ We proceed now to a brief consideration of the General
Nature and Principles of Evidence. No inquiry is here proposed
into the origin of human knowledge ; it being assumed, on the
authority of approved writers, that all which men know is referable,
in a philosophical view, to perception and reflection. But, in fact,
the knowledge acquired by an individual through his own percep-
tion and reflection is but a small part of what he possesses ; much
of what we are content to regard and act upon as knowledge,
having been acquired through the perception of others.^ It is not
easy to conceive that the Supreme Being, whose wisdom is so con-
spicuous in all His works, constituted man to believe only upon
his own personal experience ; since, in that case, the world could
neither be governed nor improved ; and society must remain in the
state in which it was left by the first generation of men. On the
contrary, during the period of childhood we believe implicitly
almost all that is told us ; and we thus are furnished with informa-
tion which we could not obtain for ourselves, but which is necessary
at the time for our present protection, or as the means of future
improvement. This disposition to confide in the veracity of others,
and to believe what they say, may be termed instinciive. At an
early period, however, we begin to find that of the things told to
us some are not true ; and thus our implicit reliance on the testi-
mony of others is weakened ; first, in regard to particular things,
in which we have been deceived ; then, in regard to persons, whose
falsehoods we have detected ; and, as these instances multiply upon
us, we gradually become more and more distrustful of statements
made to us, and learn by experience the necessity of testing them
by certain rules.' " Confidence," exclaimed Lord Chatham, on a
' Gr. Ev. § V, nearlv verbatim. p. 42.
» Abercr. on Intell" Pow., Part 2, ' Id. Part 2, § 3, p. 73.
53
INSTINCTIVE TENDENCY TO BELIEF.
[part I,
memorable occasion, " is a plant of slow growth in an aged
bosom ; " and indeed, it may be generally observed, that, as our
ability to obtain knowledge by other means increases, our instinc-
tive and indiscriminate reliance on testimony diminishes, by
yielding to a more rational belief.^ Still, in every period of life,
' Gr. Ev. § 7, 11. verbatim. See also
Gamb. Guide, 87 ; M'Kinnon, Phil,
of Ev. 40. Dr. Eeid, in his Inquiry
into the Human Mind, c. 6, § 24,
pp. 196, 197 of his collected Works,
observes : — " The wise and beneficent
Author of Nature, who intended that
we should be social creatures, and that
we should receive the greatest and
most important part of our knowledge
by the information of others, hath,
for these purposes^ implanted in our
nature two principles, that tally with
each other. The first of these prin-
ciples is a propensity to speak truth,
and to use the signs of language, so
as to convey our real sentiments.
This principle has a powerful opera-
tion, even in the greatest liars ; for
where they lie once they speak truth
a hundred times. Truth is always
uppermost, and is the natural issue
of the mind. It requires no art or
training, no inducement or tempta-
tion, but only that we yield to a
natural impulse. Lying, on the
contrary, is doing violence to our
nature ; and is never practised, even
by the worst men, without some
temptation. Speaking truth is like
using our natural food, which we
would do from appetite, although it
answered no end ; but lying is like
taking physic, which is nauseous to
the taste, and which no man takes but
for some end, which he cannot other-
wise attain. * * * * Another original
principle, implanted in us by the
Supreme Being, is a disposition to
confide in the veracity of others, and
to believe what they tell us. This is
the counterpart to the former: and
as that may be called the principle
of veracity, we shall, for want of a
proper name, call this the principle
of credulity. It is unlimited in chil-
dren until they meet with instances
of deceit and falsehood ; ai»d it con-
tains a very considerable degree of
strength through Ufe. If nature had
left the mind of the speaker in equi-
librio, without any inclination to the
side of truth more than to that of
falsehood, children would lie as often
as they speak truth, until reason was
so far ripened, as to suggest the im-
prudence of lying, or conscience, as
to suggest its immorality. And if
nature had left the mind of the
hearer in equilibrio, without any
inclination to the side of belief more
than to that of disbelief, we should
take no man's word, until we had
positive evidence that he spoke truth.
His testimony would, in this case,
have no more authority than his
dreams, which may be true or false :
but no man is disposed to believe
them, on this account, that they were
dreamed. It is evident, that, in the
matter of testimony, the balance of
human judgment is by nature in-
clined to the side of belief ; and turns
to that side of itself, when there is
nothing put into the opposite scale.
If it was not so, no proposition, that
is uttered in discourse would be be-
lieved, until it was examined and
tried by reason : and most men would
be unable to find reasons for believing
the thousandth part of what is told
them. Such distrust and incredulity
would deprive us of the greatest
benefits of society, and place us in
a worse condition than that of sav-
ages. Children, on this supposition,
would be absolutely incredulous, and
therefore absolutely incapable of in-
struction ; those who had little know-
ledge of human life, and of the man-
ners and characters of men, would be
in the next degree incredulous ; and
the most credulous men would be
those of greatest experience, and of
the deepest penetration ; because,
in many cases, they would be able
to find good reasons for believing
testimony, which the weak and the
ignorant could not discover. In a
■word, if oreduUty were the effect of
5i
CHAP. IV.] INSTINCTIVE TENDENCY TO BELIEF.
and in every state of intellectual culture, man is instinctively more
prone to believe than to. disbelieve the testimony of others, and this
disposition towards credulity may be regarded as a fundamental
principle of our moral nature, implanted in us by the Almighty for
the wisest and most beneficent purposes. As such it constitutes the
general basis upon which all evidence may be said to rest.
§ 51.' Subordinate to this paramount and original principle,
evidence rests upon our faith in human testimony, as sanctioned by
experience; that is, upon the generally experienced truth of the
statements on oath of men of integrity, having capacity and oppor-
tunity for observation, and without apparent influence from passion
or interest to pervert the truth. This belief is strengthened by our
knowledge of the narrator's reputation for veracity and intelligence,
by the absence of conflicting testimony, and by the presence of
that which is corroborating and cumulative.*
§ 52. In the hasty progress of a trial at Nisi Prius, it is difiicult,
and sometimes impossible, to ascertain, with anything like cer-
tainty, what characters the witnesses respectively deserve for
honesty and intelligence, and how far they are actuated by inte-
rested, malignant, or other improper motives. A rigid cross-
examination, skilfully applied,' will, however, often throw much
light upon these subjects; while a careful attention to the demea-
nour of the witness is always a good guide. While simplicity,
minuteness, and ease are the natural accompaniments of truth, the
language of witnesses coming to impose upon the jury is usually
laboured, cautious, and indistinct.* We have, too, more or less
reasoning and experience, it must portant points to be ascertained, in
grow up and gather strength, in the deciding on the credibility of wit-
same proportion as reason and ex- nesses : first, whether they have the
perienoe do. But if it is the gift of means of gaining correct informa-
uature, it will be strongest in child- tion ; secondly, whether they have
hood, and limited and restrained by any interest in concealing truth, or
experience ; and the most superficial propagating falsehood ; and, thirdly,
viewof human life shows, that the last whether they agree in their testi-
is really the case, and not the first." mony." — P. 14, 6th ed.
> Gr. Ev. § 10, nearly verbatim. ' In the Tichborne trial of 1871,
' Archbishop Whately, in his jeu Mr. Hawkins' cross-examination of
d'esprit, "Historic Doubts relative Mr. Baigent should be carefully
to Napoleon Buonaparte," clep'-ly studied, as being the best modern
states the main tests of human example of forensic ability in that
veracity. He says: "I suppose it direction.
•will not be denied that the three * Channing, Ev. of Christ. 3rd voL
following are among the most im- of Works, 356.
55
DEMEANOUR OF WITNESSES — TESTS OF TRUTH. [PART I.
conclusive indications of insincerity or falsehood when we find a
witness over- zealous on behalf of his party ; exaggerating circum-
Btances ; assuming an air of bluster and defiance ; ' answering
without waiting to hear the question ; forgetting facts where he
would be open to contradiction ; minutely remembering others,
which he knows cannot be disputed ; ^ reluctant in giving adverse
testimony ; replying evasively or flippantly ; ' pretending not to
hear the question, for the purpose of gaining time to consider the
effect of his answer; afi'eoting indifference; or often vowing to
Grod* and protesting his honesty.* In the testimony of witnesses
of truth there is, on the other hand, a calmness and simplicity ; a
naturalness of manner ; an unaffected readiness and copiousness of
detail, as well in one part of the narrative as another ; and an
evident disregard of either the facility or difficulty of vindication
or detection.^
§ 53. Besides these tests of truth, which are obviously of value
in fixing what amount of credit is due to each individual witness,
certain general rules must be borne in mind, as bearing upon the
relative merits of particular classes of witnesses. It has been said
that " a propensity to lying has been always, more or less, a pecu-
liar feature in the character of an enslaved people, — accustomed to
oppression of every kiad, and to be called upon to render strict
account of every trifle done, not according to the rules of justice,
but as the caprice of their masters may suggest ; — it is little to be
wondered at if a lie is often resorted to as a supposed refuge from
punishment, and that thus an habitual disregard is engendered."'
This passage accounts in some measure for the lamentable neglect
of truth evinced by most Oriental nations, by Russians, and by
some of the Irish peasantry.
■ "Asseveration blustering in your are stating falsehoods are extremely
face apt to give flippant and impertinent
Makes contradiction such a answers." Per Mr. Brougham on
hopeless case." the Queen's trial, 1820.
CowPER, Gonversation. ' "And even when sober truth
' "Por, when we risk no contra- prevails throughout,
diction, They swear it, till affirmance
It prompts the tongue to deal' breeds a doubt."
in fiction." Oowter, Convermtion.
Gay's Fables, Part I., Fable x. » 1 St. Ev. 547.
'"All persons who have been ' Greenl. on Test, of Evang. § 40.
accustomed to see witnesses in a ' Bp. of Tasmania's Lect. on Christ,
court of justice know, that those ■who Catechism, 519.
56
CHAP. IV.]
TESTIMONY OF WOMEK.
§ 54. Again, as exaggeration chiefly springs from an innate
vain love of the marvellous,^ and is most remarkable in the softer
sex,^ a prudent man will, in general, do well to weigh with some
caution the testimony of female witnesses. This is the more neces-
sary, in consequence of the extensive and dangerous field of false-
hood opened up by mere exaggeration ; for, as truth is made the
groundwork of the picture, and fiction lends but light and shade,
to detect the lurking falsehood often requires much patience and
acuteness.' In short, the intermixture of truth disarms the
suspicion of the candid, and sanctions the ready belief of the
malevolent.* If due allowance be made for this feminine weak-
ness of a proneness to exaggerate, the testimony of women is at
least deserving of equal credit to that of men. Indeed, in some
respects they are superior witnesses ; for first, they are, in general,
closer observers than men ; next, their memories, being less loaded
with matters of business, are usually more tenacious ; and lastly,
they often possess unrivalled powers of simple and unaffected
narration.*
' Bp. of Tasmania's Lecture on
Ghrist. Cateoliism, 522.
' The woman of Samaria, for in-
stance, wlien told by our Saviour that
she had had five husbands, went into
the city, saying, " Come, see a man,
which told me all things that ever 1
did." 4th ch. of St. John, v. 29. _
^ Bp. of Tasmania's Leot. on Christ.
Catechism, 522. The difficulty of
detecting falsehood ' engrafted on
truth has been noticed by Tennyson,
in the " Grandmother": —
" and the parson . . . said like-
wise,
That a lie which is half a, truth is
ever the blackest of lies,
That a lie which is all a lie may be
met and fought with outright.
But a lie which is part a truth is a
harder matter to fight."
Mr. Brougham, in the Queen's trial,
1820, said : " If an individual were
to invent a story entirely, — if he were
to form it completely of falsehoods,
the result would be his inevitable de-
tection ; but if he build a structure of
falsehood on the foundation of a little
truth, he may raise a tale which, with
a good deal of drilling, may put an
honest man's hfe, or an illustrious
Princess' reputation, in jeopardy."
1 Ld. Br. Sp. 147. And, again:
" The most effectual way, because
the safest, of laying a plot, is not to
swear too hard, is not to swear too
much, or to come too directly to the
point ; but to lay the foundation in
existing facts and real circumstances,
— to knit the false with the true, —
to interlace reality with fiction, — to
build the fanciful fabric upon that
which exists in nature, — and to escape
detection by taking most especial
care, as they have done here, never
to have two witnesses to the same
facts, and also to make the facts as
moderate, and as little offensive, as
possible." 1 Ld. Br. Sp. 215.
* Bp. of Tasmania's Leot. on Christ.
Catechism, 522.
° Take, for instance, the Letters of
Madame de Sevigne, or Lady Mary
Wortley Montagu. The only letters
written by men which at all equal
them are those of the effeminate Ld.
Orford.
67
TESTIMONY OF CHILDREN. [PART I.
§ 55. Sir William Blackstone apparently thought,^ that less
credit was due to the testimony of a child than to that of an adult ;
but reason and experience scarcely warrant this opinion. In
childhood, ohservation and memory are usually more artive than
in after life, while the motives for falsehood are less numerous and,
powerful. The inexperience and artlessness accompanying tender
years usually render a child incapable of sustaining consistent
perjury, while they operate powerfully in preventing his true
testimony from being shaken. A child comprehending the drift
of the questions put in cross-examination has no course but to
answer them according to the fact. Thus, if he speak falsely, he
is almost inevitably detected ; but if he be the witness of truth, he
avoids even that suspicion of dishonesty, which sometimes attaches
to older witnesses, who, though substantially telling the truth,
throw discredit on their testimony, by a too anxious desire to
reconcile every apparent inconsistency.
§ 56. The testimony of foreigners and of others, who are brought
from a distance to the place of trial, requires to be scrutinised with
more than common caution. Such persons speak before a tribunal,
which ordinarily knows no more of them than they care for it,
whose threat they have no reason to fear, and whose gwod opinion
they utterly disregard. Consequently they are obviously far less
likely to be influenced by the dread of having their falsehoods
exposed than witnesses living on the spot.^ Such witnesses, even
if detected of perjury, have little to fear from loss of character,
and are in no real danger of punishment. A dishonest foreigner,
who has attained a tolerable knowledge of our language, may, too,
conceal it, and by seeking the assistance of an interpreter, obtain
an opportunity of preparing with caution his answer to any incon-
venient question during the time that the interpreter is furnish-
ing him with a needless translation.^
§ 57. The testimony against a prisoner of policemen, constables,
and others employed in the suppression and detection of crime,
should usually be watched with care; not because they inten-
tionally pervert the truth, but because their professional zeal and
1 4 Bl. Com. 216. id. p. 241.
^ Per Mr. Brougham on the Queen's ^ Id. 168. See E. v. Burke, 1853
trial, 1820. 1 Ld. Br. Sp. 126. See (Ir.), cited post, § 1444.
68
CHAP. IV.] TESTIMONY OP SKILLED "WITNESSES,
Labitual contact with bad men and women almost necessarily leads
them to ascribe all actions to the worst motives, and to give a
coloTiring of guilt to facts and conversations, which, in themselves,
are consistent with perfect rectitude. ' The creed of the police is
naturally apt to be that " all men are guilty, till they are proved
to be innocent."
§ 58. The testimony of skilled witnesses Is perhaps that which
deserves least credit with a jury. These usually speak to opinions
and not to facts ; and it is often really surprising to see the facility
and extent to which views can be made to coincide with wishes or
interests. Skilled witnesses do not, indeed, wilfully misrepresent
what they think: but their judgments have often become so
warped by regarding the subject from only one point of view, that
they are, in truth, not capable of forming an independent opinion
even when they would conscientiously desire to do so. Being
zealous partisans, their belief becomes synonymous with the
Apostle's^ definition of Faith, "the substance of things hoped
for, the evidence of things not seen." Lord Campbell once
said, " Skilled witnesses come with such a bias on their minds to
support the cause in which they are embarked, that hardly any
weight should be given to their evidence." '
§ 59. Coincidences in the testimony of independent witnesses
afford a third ground for the credibility of evidence. Such
coincidences, when numerous, and presenting themselves as un-
designed, or incidental, necessarily produce a prodigious effect
in enforcing belief ; because, if the witnesses had concerted a
plot, the coincidences would almost inevitably have been eon-
verted by cross-examination into contradictions ; * while, if the
supposition of collusion, or that some deception has been practised
on the witnesses, be excluded, then coincidences and harmony in
' See post, § 68. and another to a confirmation ; have
* Ep. to the Hebrews, c. xi., v. 1. some things true, which unimpeach-
' Tracy Peer., 1843. See post, able evidence can prove; other things
§ 68. fabricated, -without which the true
* Mr. Brougham said on the would be of no avail, — but avoid
Queen's trial: — "Why were there calling two witnesses to the same
never two witnesses to the same fact ? thing at the same time, because the
Because it is dangerous ; because, cross-examination is extremely likely
when you are making a plot, you to make them contradict each other."
should have one witness to a fact, 1 Ld. Br. Sp. 215, 1820.
59
COINCIDENCES IN TESTIMONY. [PAET I.
the evidence of several persons can be explained upon no otlier
hypothesis than that their individual statements are true. Each
witness taken singly may be notorious for lying ; but the
chances against their ail agreeing by accident in the same lie
may be so great as to render the agreement morally impossible.^
It has been remarked, that "in 9, number of concurrent testi-
monies, where there has been no previous concert, there is a
probability distinct from that which may be termed the sum
of the probabilities resulting from the testimonies of the wit-
nesses; a probability which would remain, even though the
witnesses were of such a character as to merit no faith at all.
This probability arises purely from the concurrence itself. That
such a concurrence should spring from chance, is as one to
infinite ; that is, in other words, morally impossible. If, there-
fore, concert be excluded, there remains no cause but the reality
of the fact." 2
§ 60. Lord Mansfield gave expression to the truth of this prin-
ciple when he once observed, "It is objected that the books
[Keble's and Freeman's Reports] are of no authority ; but if both
the reporters were the worst that ever reported, if substantially they
report a case in the same way, it is demonstration of the truth of
what they report, or they could not agree." ' Dr. Paley, in his
Evidences of Christianity, says that " the usual character of human
testimony is substantial truth, under circumstantial variety. This is
what the daily experience of courts of justice teaches. When
accounts of a transaction come from the mouths of different wit-
nesses, it is seldom that it is not possible to pick out apparent or
real inconsistencies between them. These inconsistencies are
studiously displayed by an adverse pleader, but oftentimes with
little impression upon the minds of the judges. On the contrary,
a close and minute agreement induces the suspicion of confederacy
and fraud."* These last observations apply with almost over-
' Aber. on Intell. Pow., Part 2, "substantially" bere used is bigbly
§ 3, p. 91. _ important, witb a view to tbe ques-
^ Oampbell's Pbilos. of Bbetorio, tion of collusion, since it is scarcely
cb. v., b. 1, par. 3, p. 125; Wlntely's possible tbat several independent
Ebetorio, iPart 1, cb. 2, § 4, pp. 58, witnesses sbould tell precisely tbe
69. same tale, -without any variation.
a E. V. Genge, 1774. Tbe word * Part 3, cb. 1, p. l'o8.
60
CHAP. IV.] PROBABILITY OF EVIDENCE.
whelming force when the facts deposed to consist of conversations,
or of a series of trifling and unimportant events, and the testimony
is given after the lapse of a considerahle interval of time.^
§ 61.* Fourthly, in receiving the knowledge of facts from the
testimony of others, men axe much influenced hy their accordance
■with facts premomly known or believed ; and this constitutes what
is termed theii probabiliti/. Statements, thus probable, are received
upon evidence much less cogent than is required for the belief of
those which do not accord with previous knowledge ; but while
such statements are more readily received, and justly relied upon,
care shoidd be taken lest all others be unduly distrusted. While
unbounded credulity is the attribute of weak minds, — which quo
magis nesciunt, eo magis admirantur, — indiscriminate scepticism
belongs only to those who, affecting to make their own knowledge
and observation the exclusive standard of probabiKty, forget that
they are liable to be misled even by their own senses.' Such
persons, therefore, if they intend to sustain a truly consistent
character, should act like Moliere's Docteur, in "Le Mariage
Forc^," who, in answer to Sganarelle's statement that he had come
to see him, replied, " Seigneur Sganarelle, changez, s'iL vous plait,
cette facon de parler. Notre philosophie ordonne de ne point
^noncer de proposition decisive, de parler de tout avec incertitude,
de suspendre toujours son jugement ; et par cette raison vous ne
pouvez pas dire, je suis venu, mais, il me semble que je suis venu."*
Even sceptical philosophers, true to the nature of man, but incon-
sistently with their avowed principles, receive a large portion of
their knowledge upon testimony which has been derived, not from
their own experience, but from that of other men ; and they will
even do this about matters which are at variance with their own
personal observation.. Thus they receive with confidence the testi-
mony of the historian in regard to the occurrences of ancient
times ; that of the naturalist and the traveller, in regard to the
natural history and civil condition of other countries ; and that of
the astronomer, respecting the heavenly bodies ; facts which, upon
' See fuTther on this interesting § 3, p. 74. Channing, on Ev. of
subject, Greenl. on Test, of Evang. Eevealed fielig., 3rd vol. of Works,
^1 34 — 36. p. 116, observes — "All my senses
' Gr. Ev. § 8, in great part. have sometimes given false reports."
» Abercr. on InteU. Pow., Part 2, * Scene 8.
61
ACCOKDANCE WITH PKEVIOUS KNOWLEDGE. [PAKT I.
the narrow basis of their own " firm and unalterable experience,"
which is so much relied upon by Hume, they ought to reject, aa
wholly unworthy of belief.'
§ 62. The sceptical philosopher is not the only person, however,
who is reluctant to lend faith to a narrative of facts, which do
not strictly accord with preconceived opinions that are mistaken
for knowledge. Persons of a similar stamp of mind to his
are abundant in all ranks and conditions. Thus, the king of
Siam rejected the testimony of the Dutch ambassador, that, in
his country, water was sometimes congealed into a solid mass ; for
it was utterly repugnant to his own experience ; ^ the stories of the
Abyssinian traveller Bruce were long considered mere fictions;
and in 1825, the evidence of George Stephenson, before a parlia-
mentary committee, was much impaired by his venturing an
opinion, that steam-carriages might possibly travel on railroads
twelve miles an hour.' With his finite knowledge, man should, in
truth, on the one hand, be slow to reject a narrative as incredible,
merely because it is beyond, or even contrary to, his own very
limited experience. On the other hand, scientific knowledge is not
confined within the narrow limits of ascertained facts, but enlarges
the understanding so as to prepare it for the further reception of
truth, and sets it free from many of the prejudices which influence
men, whose minds are limited by merely the narrow field of actual
experience. For example, Archimedes, deeply imbued as he was
with science, might well have believed an account of the invention
and wonderful powers of the steam-engine, which unscientific
Englishmen of the last century would have rejected as incredible
and absurd.*
§ 63.* A. fifth basis of evidence is the known and experienced
connexion subsisting between collateral facts or circumstances satis-
factorily proved, and facts and circumstances such as those which
are in controversy. This is merely the legal application of a process
^ Aberor. on Intell. Pow., Part 2, observes : — " La oil le vuljraire rit,
§ 3, pp. 79, 80. le philosopbe admire ; et il rit oii
* Id. p. 75. le vulgaire ouvre de grands yeux
' Life of George Stephenson, by stupides d'etonnement." Yol. 42,
Samuel Smiles, 1857, cb. 19. p. 142.
* Aberor. on Intell. Pow., Part 2, ^ Gr. Ev. § 11, verbatim, except
§ 3, pp. 75, 76, So Voltaire shrewdly the notes,
62
CHAP. IV.] CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
familiar in natural philosophy, namely, that of proving the truth of
an hypothesis by showing its coincidence with existing phenomena.
Such connections and coincidences may be either physical or moral ;
and the knowledge of them is derived from the known laws of
matter and motion, from animal instincts, and from the physical,
intellectual, and moral constitution and habits of man.'^ Their
degree of force depends on their suiBciency to exclude every other
hypothesis but the one under consideration, and will be considered
hereafter.'' Meanwhile a good illustration of the legal application
of the principle is afforded by the doctrine of law by which the
possession of goods recently stolen, accompanied with personal
proximity in point of time and place to them by the party charged,
accompanied by inability on his part to show how he came by
them, naturally, though not necessarily,' excludes every hypo-
thesis but that of his guilt, although the possession of the same
goods at another time and place would warrant no such conclusion,
since it leaves room for the hypothesis of the goods having been
lawfully purchased in the course of trade. Another illustration of
the same principle is afforded by the legal rule of construction
" noscitur a sociis" which implies that the meaning of words in
a written instrument is ascertained by the context.
§ 64.* In considering this subject, it must always be borne in
mind, that in the actual occiu-rences of human life nothing is incon-
sistent. Every event, which actually transpires, has its appropriate
relation and place in the vast complication of circumstances of
which the affairs of men consist ; it owes its origin to those which
have preceded it ; it is intimately connected with many others which
occur at the same time and place, and often with those of remote
regions ; and, in its turn, it gives birth to a thousand others which
succeed.' In all this system of inter-dependence perfect harmony
prevails ; so that a man can hardly invent a story, which, if closely
' For an amusing example of a Baked Head, in Mr. Morier's Hajji
fact proved by a long chain of cir- Baba, botb turn on an erroneous
cumstantial evidence, see Voltaire's presumption of guilt arising from
Zadig, cb. 3. recent possession. See, too, SmoUett's
2 Post, §§ 64—69. Eoderick Eandom, ob. xxi.
' For Joseph's cup was found in * Gr. Ev. § 12, in great part.
Benjamin's sack. Gen. 0.44, v.l — 17. *1 St. Ev. 560; 3 Cbanning's
The story of the Hunchback, in the Works, 133, 340.
Arabian Nights, and that of the
63
DIEECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. [PAET I.
compared with all the actual contemporaneous and successive
occurrences, may not be shown to be false. From these causes,
minds enlarged by long and matured experience, and close obser-
vation of the conduct and affairs of men, may, with a rapidity and
certainty approaching to intuition, perceive the elements of truth
or falsehood in the face itself of the narrator, without any regard
to the narrative. Thus, an experienced judge may instantly dis-
cover the falsehood of a witness, whose story an inexperienced jury
might be inclined to believe. But though the mind, in these cases,
seems to have acquired a new power, it is properly to be referred
only to experience and observation.
§ 65.' In trials of fact, it will generally be found that Va.e factum
prohandum is either directly attested by those who speak from their
own actual and personal knowledge of its existence, or is to be
inferred from other facts, satisfactorily proved. In the former case,
the proof rests upon the second, third, and fourth grounds of belief
before mentioned ; that is, it depends, partly, upon faith in human
testimony, as sanctioned by experience ; — which faith will be iu-
oreased or diminished in proportion to the apparent honesty and
intelligence of the witnesses, and their opportunities for observa-
tion;— partly, upon the exercise of reason on the consistency of
the narratives given by different witnesses ; — and here the value of
the testimony will vary, according to the number of the deponents,
and the apparent absence or presence of collusion ; — and partly
upon the conformity of the testimony with experience. In the
latter case, however, namely, when the fact in dispute is to be
inferred from other facts satisfactorily established, the proof rests
upon the grounds before mentioned, with the addition of the con-
nexion shown by knowledge and experience to usually exist
between collateral facts such as those which have been proved, and
facts such as those which are in controversy ; which connexion has
already been pointed out to constitute the fifth basis of evidence
before stated. In both the two cases which have been above sup-
posed, the facts proved are directly attested. In the former one,
the proof applies immediately to the factum prohandum, without
any intervening process, and is therefore called direct or positive
' Gr. Ev. § 13, in great part,
64
CHAP. IV,J DIRECT AND CIECUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
testimony. In the latter case, the proof applies immediately to
collateral facts, supposed to have a connexion, near or remote, with
the fact in controversy, and is termed circumstantial ; and some-
times (although not with entire accuracy) presumptive. For example,
if a witness testifies that he saw A. inflict a mortal wound on B., of
which B. instantly died, this is a case of direct evidence. If, how-
ever, a witness only testifies that a deceased person was shot with a
pistol, and it is proved from other sources that the wadding was
found to be part of a letter addressed to the prisoner, the residue of
which was discovered in his pocket, the facts themselves are directly
attested ; but the evidence which they afford is termed circumstan-
tial. From such facts, if uniBxplained by the prisoner, the jury
may, or may not, deduce, or infer, or presume his guilt, according as
they are satisfied, or not, of the natural connexion between similar
facts and the guilt of the person thus connected with them. In
both cases the veracity of the witness is presumed, in the absence
of proof to the contrary ; but in the latter case there is an addi-
tional presumption or inference, founded on the known usual con-
nexion between the facts proved, and the guilt of the party impli-
cated. This operation of the mind, which is more complex and
difficult in the latter case, has caused the evidence afforded by
circumstances to be sometimes termed presumptive evidence ;
though, in truth, the mental operation is similar in. both cases.
§ 66. Much has been said and written respecting the compara-
tive value of direct and circumstantial evidence ; but one argument
urged in favour of circumstantial evidence is palpably erroneoua.
" Witnesses may lie, but circumstances cannot," ' has been more
than once repeated from the bench, and is now almost received as
a judicial axiom. Yet no proposition can be more false or dangerous.
If "circumstances " mean — and they can have no other meaning —
those facts which lead to the inference of the fact in issue, they not
only can, but constantly do lie — in the sense that the conclusion
deduced from them is false. For example, when the viper fastened
on St. Paul's hand at Melita, the barbarians said " No doubt this
man is a murderer ;" but when they saw that no harm came to
* Annesley v. Ld. Anglesea, (Ir.) 1743 ^Mountenoy, B.); E. v. Blandy,
1752 (Legge, B.).
T.— VOL. I. 65 F
DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. [PAET I.
compared with all the actual contemporaneous and successive
occurrences, may not be shown to be false. From these causes,
minds enlarged by long and matured experience, and close obser-
vation of the conduct and affairs of men, may, with a rapidity and
certainty approaching to intuition, perceive the elements of truth
or falsehood in the face itself of the narrator, without any regard
to the narrative. Thus, an experienced judge may instantly dis-
cover the falsehood of a witness, whose story an inexperienced jury
might be inclined to believe. But though the mind, in these cases,
seems to have acquired a new power, it is properly to be referred
only to experience and observation.
§ 65.^ In trials of fact, it will generally be found that Vob factum
prohandum is either directly attested by those who speak from their
own actual and personal knowledge of its existence, or is to be
inferred from other facts, satisfactorily proved. In the former case,
the proof rests upon the second, third, and fourth grounds of belief
before mentioned ; that is, it depends, partly, upon faith in human
testimony, as sanctioned by experience ; — which faith will be in-
creased or diminished in proportion to the apparent honesty and
intelligence of the witnesses, and their opportunities for observa-
tion;— partly, upon the exercise of reason on the consistency of
the narratives given by different witnesses ; — and here the value of
the testimony will vary, according to the number of the deponents,
and the apparent absence or presence of collusion ; — and partly
upon the conformity of the testimony with experience. In the
latter case, however, namely, when the fact in dispute is to be
inferred from other facts satisfactorily established, the proof rests
upon the grounds before nientioned, with the addition of the con-
nexion shown by knowledge and experience to usually exist
between collateral facts such as those which have been proved, and
facts such as those which are in controversy ; which connexion has
already been pointed out to constitute the fifth basis of evidence
before stated. In both the two cases which have been above sup-
posed, the facts proved are directly attested. In the former one,
the proof applies immediately to the factum probandum, without
any intervening process, and is therefore called direct or positive
' Gr. Ev. § 13, in great part.
64
CHAP. IV.J DIEECT AND CIECUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
testimony. In the latter case, the proof applies immediately to
collateral facts, supposed to have a connexion, near or remote, with
the fact in controversy, and is termed circumstantial ; and some-
times (although not with entire accuracy) presumptive. For example,
if a witness testifies that he saw A. inflict a mortal wound on B., of
which B. instantly died, this is a case of direct evidence. If, how-
ever, a witness only testifies that a deceased person was shot with a
pistol, and it is proved from other sources that the wadding was
found to be part of a letter addressed to the prisoner, the residue of
which was discovered in his pocket, the facts themselves are directly
attested ; hut the evidence which they afEord is termed circumstan-
tial. From such facts, if unisxplained by the prisoner, the jury
may, or may not, deduce, or infer, or presume his guilt, according as
they are satisfied, or not, of the natural connexion between similar
facts and the guilt of the person thus connected with them. In
both cases the veracity of the witness is presumed, in the absence
of proof to the contrary ; but in the latter case there is an addi-
tional presumption or inference, founded on the known usual con-
nexion between the facts proved, and the guilt of the party impli-
cated. This operation of the mind, which is more complex and
difficult in the latter case, has caused the evidence afforded by
circumstances to be sometimes termed presumptive evidence ;
though, in truth, the mental operation is similar in both cases.
§ 66. Much has been said and written respecting the compara-
tive value of direct and circumstantial evidence ; but one argument
urged in favour of circumstantial evidence is palpably erroneous,
"Witnesses may lie, but circumstances cannot,"' has been more
than once repeated from the bench, and is now almost received as
a judicial axiom. Yet no proposition can be more false or dangerous.
If " circtunstances " mean — and they can have no other meaning —
those facts which lead to the inference of the fact in issue, they not
only can, but constantly do lie — in the sense that the conclusion
deduced from them is false. For example, when the viper fastened
on St. Paul's hand at Melita, the barbarians said " No doubt this
man is a murderer ;" but when they saw that no harm came to
1 Annesley v. lid. Anglesea, (Ir.) 1743 fMountenoy, B.); E. v. Blandy,
1752 (Legge, B.).
T. — VOL. I. 55 r
DIRECT AND CIECUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. [pART I.
him, "they changed their minds, and said that he was a god,"'
and hoth conclusions were alike false. Again, in Macbeth, Lenox,
Macduff, and the other chieftains are described as erroneously
assuming, first, that the grooms had murdered the King, because
" their hands and faces were all badged with blood, so were their
daggers, which un wiped we found upon their pillows :"^ and next,
that " they were suborned " by the King's two sons, who had
"stolen away and fled."' In truth, the only "circumstances
which cannot lie " are those which necessarily/ lead to a certain
conclusion. Who is to decide on this necessity ? Clearly those
who have also to decide on the fact in issue. Throw a case of
circumstantial evidence into the form of a syllogism, and it will be
found that the major premiss rests solely on the erring experience
of the tribunal to whom it is presented. Besides, these very circum-
stances must be proved, Kke direct facts, by witnesses, who are
equally capable with others of deceiving * or of being deceived. In
no sense therefore is it possible to say, that a conclusion drawn from
circumstantial evidence can amount to absolute certainty, or, in
other words, that circumstances cannot lie.
§ 67. It may not be without some advantage to keep in mind
the dangers against which juries should especially guard, in
deciding cases supported by each species of testimony. In a case
sought to be established by direct evidence the witnesses are
usually few, and there consequently is the more reason to
apprehend conspiracy and fraud ; since it is far more easy to find
' The Acts, xxviii. 3 — 5. So, ■when hha>,; Joseph is without doubt rent in
Jacob saw Joseph's coat of many pieces.' " Gen. xxvii. 33.
coloiors stained with kid's blood, "he * Act ii., so. 3.
knew it, and said, ' It is my son's ' Act ii., sc. 4.
coat ; an evil beast hath devoured
* lago's story of the handkerchief, which goaded Othello to madness, will
occur to everyone : — ■
"Iago. Have you not sometimes seen a handkerchief,
Spotted with strawberries, in your wife's hand?
Othello. I gave her such a one ; 'twas my first gift.
Iago. I knew not that; but such a handkerchief ,
(I am sure it was your wife's,) did I to-day
See Cassio wipe his beard with.
Othello. If it be that, —
Iago. If it be that, or any that was hers,
It speaks against her, with the other proofs.
Othello. Oh ! that the slave had forty thousand lives^
One is too poor, too weak for my revenge !
Now do I see 'tis true."
„,. Othello, Act iii., Sc. iii.
bo
CHAP. IV.] CIECUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
two or three persons who, from motives of interest or malignity,
will combine to aggrandise themselves, or to ruin an opponent,
than to get together a larger number. The story, too, being for
the most part simple, is readily concocted and remembered, while
its very simplicity renders it extremely difficult, on cross-examina-
tion, to detect the imposture. The imcorroborated statements of
single witnesses, especially when they testify to atrocious crimes,
such as rape, &c.,^ or are known, like accomplices,^ to be persons of
bad character, and to have an interest in the result, are in conse-
quence regarded with distrust, and, in practice, generally deemed
insufficient to warrant a conviction.
§ 68. In cases supported by circumstantial evidence, juries
should remember, that, although the number of facts drawn from
apparently independent sources renders concerted perjury both
highly improbable in itself, and easy of detection if attempted ; '
yet, the witnesses in such eases are more likely to make uninten-
tional misstatements, than those who give direct testimony. The
truth of the facts they attest depends frequently on miuute and
careful observation, and experience teaches the danger of relying
implicitly on the evidence of even the most conscientious witnesses,
respecting dates, time, distances, footprints, handwriting, admis-
sions, loose conversations, and questions of identity. Yet these in
general are the links in the chain of circumstances, by which guilt
is sought to be established. The number too of the witnesses, who
must all speak the truth, or some link will be wanting, renders
additional caution the more necessary. Besides, it must be
remembered, that, in a case of circumstantial evidence, the facts
are collected by degrees. Something occurs to raise a suspicion
against a particular party. Constables and police officers are
immediately on the alert, and, with professional zeal, ransack
every place and paper, and examine into every circumstance which
can tend to establish, not his innocence, but his guilt. Presuming
him guilty from the first, they are apt to consider his acquittal as a
tacit reflection on their discrimination or skill, and, with something
like the feeling of a keen sportsman, they determine, if possible, to
» 1 Hale, 635. » Greenl. on Test, of Evang. § iO.
» E. V. Jones, 1809.
67 f2
CIECUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. [PAJRT I.
bag their game. Though both sportsmen and policemen alike
would be horrified at anything unfair or " unsportsmanlike," yet,
as both start with this object in view, it is easy to unintentionally
misinterpret innocent actions, to misunderstand innocent words, for
men readily believe what they anxiously desire,^ and to be ever
ready to construe the most harmless facts as confirmations of
preconceived opinions.^ These feelings are common alike to the
police, to counsel, engineers, surveyors,^ medical men, antiquarians,
and philosophers; indeed, to all persons who first assume that a
fact or system is true, and then seek for arguments to support and
prove its truth.
§ 69. But, even where the facts sworn to are satisfactorily
proved, the task of the jury in cases turning on circumstantial
evidence is highly difficult. For they must decide, not whether
these facts are consistent with the prisoner's guilt, but whether
they are inconsistent with any other rational conclusion ; since it
is only on this last hypothesis that they can safely convict the
accused.*
1 A striMug illustration of this ^ Ante, § 57.
•was the credit that was given by the ^ Waters v. Thorn, 1856 (EomiUy,
whole oiviUsed world to the lying M.E.).
telegram which, in October, 1854, * E. v, Hodge, 1838.
announced the fall of SebastopoL
68
CIIAP. v.] PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE.
CHAPTER V.
PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE.
§ 70.^ Presumptive evidence is usually divided into two
branches, namely, presumptions of law, and presumptions of fact.
Presumptions of law consist of those rules, which, in certain
cases, either forbid or dispense with any ulterior inquiry. Pre-
sumptions of law are sub-divided into two classes, namely,
conclusive and disputable. For the general doctrines in accordance
with which presumptions are made are not peculiar to inunicipal
law, but are common to all departments of science. For instance,
the presumption of a malicious intent to kill from the deliberate
use of a deadly weapon, and the presumption of aquatic habits in
an animal found with webbed feet, belong to the same philosophy,
differing only in the instance, and not in the principle of its
application. The one fact being proved or ascertained, the other,
its uniform concomitant, is universally and safely presumed. The
presumption, however, has more or less force, in proportion to the
universality of the experience ; and this furnishes the reason for
the distribution of presumptions of law into the two classes which
we have mentioned, namely, conclusive and disputable.
§ 71.^ Conclusive, or, as they. are sometimes termed, imperative,
or absolute presumptions of law, are rules determining the quantity
of evidence requisite for the support of any particular averment,
and forbidding such averment to be overcome by any evidence that
the fact is otherwise after the degree of proof which they demand
has been furnished. Conclusive presumptions exist chiefly in
those cases in which the long-experienced connexion, just alluded
to, has been found so general and uniform, as to render it expedient
for the common good, that such connexion should be taken to be
> Gr. Ev. § 14, largely. • Gr. Ev. § 15, largely.
69
CONCLUSIVE STATUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS. [PAET I.
inseparable and universal. They have been adopted by common
consent, from motives of common policy, for the sake of greater
certainty, and the promotion of peace and quiet in the community.
Where they arise all corroborating evidence is dispensed with, and
all opposing evidence is forbidden. '
§ f2. Sometimes this common consent is expressly declared
through the medium of the legislature in statutes. Thus, under
the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, in the absence of fraud, the approval
of the Court, testified by a certificate of the official receiver, is
conclusive as to the validity of any composition, or general scheme
of arrangement, accepted in pursuance of the Act ; ^ all the requisi-
tions of the Public Schools Act, 1868, in respect to any statutes
made by the governing body of a school, " shall be deemed to have
been duly complied with," so soon as the statutes themselves have
been approved by Her Majesty in Council ; ' under the Endowed
Schools Act, 1869, an Order in Council approving a scheme is
conclusive evidence of its validity;* under the Yaluation Metro-
polis Act, 1869, "the valuation list for the time being in force
shall be deemed to have been duly made ;" * under the Act for the
protection of bankers, it is enacted that " any draft or order drawn
upon a banker payable to order on demand, which shall, when
presented for payment, purport to be indorsed by the person to
whom the same shall he drawn payable"^ shall be a sufiicient
' The presumption in Eoman law 48. An exception to tte oonclusive-
is defined to be, "conjectura, duota ness of this class of presumptions is
ab eo, quod ut plurimum fit. Ea con- allowed by the civil law, when the
jectura vel a lege, inducitur, vel a presumption is met by an admission
judice. Quse ab ipsa lege inducitur, injudicio.
vol ita comparata, ut probationem " 46 & 47 V. c. 52, § 18, subs. 9 ;
contrarii hand admittat; vel uteadem 53 & 54 V. c. 71, § 3, subs. 13. As
possit elidi. Priorem doctores prte- to presumptions which, in the absence
sumptionem jUEis ET DB jtjee, pos- of fraud arose under the Bankruptcy
terinrem prcesumptionem JURIS, ad- Act of 1869, see 32 & 33 V. c. 71,
pellant. Quse a Judice inducitur § 127.
conjectura, prcesumptio hominis vo- ^ 31 & 32 V. o. 118, § 8, subs. 4,
cari solet ; et semper admittit proba- * 32 & 33 V. c. 56, § 47.
tionem contrarii, quamvis, si alioujus ^ 32 & 33 V. c. 67, § 45. See also
momenti sit, probandi onere relevet." " The Local Government Act, 1888"
Hein. ad Pand., Pars iv. § 124. Of (51 & 52 V. c. 41).
the former, answering to our con- " These words include the payee's
elusive presumption, Mascardus ob- agent, though not really authorized
serves, — " Super hac prsesumptione to endorse, see Charles v. Blackwell,
lex fuTnum saneit jus, et eam pro 1877, 0. A.
veritate habet." I de Prob., Qusest. x.
70
CHAP, v.] STATUTES OP LIMITATION.
authority to such banker to pay the amount of such draft or order
to the bearer thereof; and it shall not be incumbent on such
banker ' to prove that such indorsement, or any subsequent indorse-
ment, was made by, or under the direction of, the person to whom
the said draft or order was or is made payable either by the
drawer or any indorser thereof;^ and, under the Stamp Act,
1891, "a bill of exchange or promissory note purporting to be
drawn or made out of the United Kingdom, is, for the purpose of
this Act, to be deemed to have been so drawn or made, although
it may in fact have been drawn or made within the United
Kingdom."'
§ 73. Again : by the Statutes of Limitations,* where a simple
contract debt has not been distinctly recognised within six years as a
subsisting obligation, either in some writing signed by the party
chargeable, or his agent, or by part payment of principal, or by
payment of interest,* such debt^ is, at the end of the six years, con-
clusively presumed to have been paid ; and a presumption of satis-
faction arises with respect to all injuries, the remedy for which is an
action on the case, other than slander, trespass to goods or land, or for
detinue' or replevin, unless they have been sued for within six years
after the cause of action shall have accrued ; ^ while actions for an
assault or false imprisonment must be brought within four years ; *
for slander, within two years ;* for compensation to the families of
persons killed by accident, within twelve calendar months from the
death of the deceased.' Actions under the Employers' Liability
Act must be commenced within six months from the date of the
' This enactment does not protect applies to an action of debt for a
any other person than a banker -who penalty under a by-la-w. Tobacco-
takes a cheque on the faith of a pipe Makers' Co. v. Loder, 1851.
forged indorsement. Ogden v. Benas, ^ 9 Gr. 4, c. 14, § 1 ; 19 & 20 V.
1874. c. 97, § 13.
2 This Act is extended to drafts by ' See Wilkinson v. Verity, 1871,
the Paymaster-General by 35 & 36 as to when the cause of action will
V. c. 44, § 11. See, also, 45 & 46 V. accrue in detinue,
c. 61, § 60. And see Hare v. Cop- » 21 J. 1, c. 16, § 3. As to when
land, 1862 (Jr.). concealed fraud and non-discovery
5 54 & 55 V. c. 39, § 36. can be pleaded in reply to a defence
* 21 J. 1, c. 16 ("The Limitation under the Stat., see Gibbs v. Guild,
Act, 1623"); 16 & 17 V. c. 113, § 20 1882, 0. A. See, also, Barber v.
(Ir.). The first-namedAct is amended Houston, 1885 (Ir).
by 19 & 20 V. c. 97, § 9. » 9 & 10 V. c. 93, § 3, as amended
» The St. of Limitat. 21 J. 1, c. 16, 'by 27 & 28 V. c. 95.
71
STATUTES OF LIMITATION. [PAET I.
accident, or, in case of death, "within twelve months from the
time of death." ^
§ 73a. The Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893,^ enacts'
that where, after 1st January, 1894, " any action, prosecution, or
other proceeding is commenced in the United Kingdom against
any person for any act done in pursuance, or execution, or in-
tended execution of any Act of Parliament, or of any public duty
or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the
execution of any such act, duty or authority, the following pro-
visions shall have effect : —
{a) The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or he
instituted unless it is commenced within six months next
after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case
of a continuance of injury or damage, within six months
next after the ceasing thereof :
{b) Wherever in any such action a judgment is obtained by the
defendant it shall carry costs to be taxed as between
solicitor and client :
(c) Where the proceeding is an action for damages, tender of
amends before the action was commenced may, in lieu of
or in addition to any other plea, be pleaded. If the action
was commenced after the tender, or is proceeded with
after payment into court of any money in satisfaction of
the plaintiff's claim, and the plaintiff does not recover
more than the sum tendered or paid, he shall not recover
any costs incurred after the tender or payment, and the
defendant shall be entitled to costs, to be taxed as
between solicitor and client, as from the time of the
tender or payment; but this provision shall not affect
costs on any injunction in the action :
{d) If in the opinion of the court the plaintiff has not given the
defendant a sufficient opportunity of tendering amends
before the commencement of the proceeding, the court
' 43 & 44 V. 0. 42, § 4. A notice has power to relax the stringency of
that injury has been sustained must this last rule,
also be given "within six weeks," ' 66 & 67 V. o. 61.
though in cases of death, the judge ' § 1,
72
CHAP, v.] STATUTES OF LIMITATION.
may award to the defendant costs to be taxed as between
solicitor and client.
" This section shall not affect any proceedings by any department
of the Government against any local authority or officer of a local
authority."
By § 2 of the Act last cited so much of any public general Act
is repealed as enacts, with reference to any proceeding, that —
" (a) The proceeding is to be commenced in any particular
place; or
(5) The proceeding is to be commenced within any particular
time; or
(c) Notice of action is to be given ; or
(d) The defendant is to be entitled to any particular kind or
amount of costs, or the plaintiff is to be deprived of costs
in any specified event ; or
(e) The defendant may plead the general issue."
The section then repeals various older enactments.
A provision contained in an earlier Act, which was passed in
1842,^ provides that actions for anything done in pursuance of any
public local and personal Act, or any local and personal Act, shall
be brought within two years after the cause of action shall have
accrued, or in the case of continuing damage, within one year
after the damage shall have ceased.^ Any action, prosecution, or
proceeding against any person for any act done in pursuance or
intended execution of the Army Act, 1881, or of the Militia Act,
1882, must be commenced within six months next after the
act, neglect, or default complained of, or, in case of a continuance
of damage within six months next after the ceasing thereof.'
Actions and proceedings against persons acting under the Seamen's
Clothing Act, 1869,* or the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882,^ must
be commenced within six months after the act complained of shall
have been committed." Justices of the peace in England faU
within the protection of the Public Authorities Protection Act,
and in Ireland every action against a justice of the peace foi
> 5 & 6 V. c. 97. V. c. 49, § 46.
2 § 5. * 32 & 33 V. 0. 57, § 6.
= 44 & 45 V. c. 58, § 170, subs. 1, » 45 & 46 V. o. 50, § 226.
amended by "The Army (Annual) • See note ', pos^, p. 74.
Act, 1894 " (57 V. c. 8), § 7 ; 45 & 46
73
STATUTES OF LIMITATION.
[part I.
anything done by Mm in the execution of his office must be
brought within six months.' On similar principles, when a
judgment has been obtained against a banking copartnership, no
execution can issue thereon against any former member of such
copartnership, after the expiration of three years next after the
person sought to be charged shall have ceased to be a member.^
§ 74. Presumptions that their rights have been satisfied or in
some other way extinguished are, in like manner, sometimes raised
by statute against the Crown or the Duchy of Cornwall. Thus,
the right of the Sovereign,' or of the Duke of Cornwall,* to insti-
tute legal proceedings for the recovery of lands, rents, or minerals,
is barred, under several special statutes, by uninterrupted possession
for a period of sixty, or in certain cases, of one hundred years.
§ 74a. Length of enjoyment, too, as between subjects of the
Crown raises a conclusive presumption of right. Thus, the pos-
session of land, or of rent, for the length of time mentioned in the
general statutes of limitation, luider a claim of absolute title and
ownership, constitutes a conclusive presumption of a valid grant;'
1 12 & 13 V. c. 16 ("The Justices
Protection (Ireland) Act, 1840"), § 8.
In Scotland, under "The Summary
Proc. Act, 1864," the period is fixed
at two months, 27 & 28 V. c. 53, § 35.
2 7 G. 4, c. 46, § 13 ("The Country
Bankers Act, 1826"). See In re
North of Engl. Joint Stock Bank
Co., Ex parte Q-outhwaite, 1851 ;
Barker v. Buttress, 1845.
» 9 G. 3, 0. 16, amended hy " The
Stat. LawEev. Act, 188S " (51 V. c.3) ;
24 & 25 V. 0. 62 ; 39 & 40 V. o. 37 (Ir. ).
* 7 & 8 Y. 0. 105, §§ 73 et seq. ;
23 & 24 V. 0. 53 ; 24 & 25 V. o. 62
(" The Crown Suits Act, 1861 ").
^ This period has for many years
past been shortened, at successive
revisions of the law, both in England
and the United States. In 1833 the
Act of 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27 (" The Eeal
Property Limitation Act, 1833"), § 2,
passed, and barred all actions to re-
cover land or rent, after twenty years
from the time when the right of
action accrued ; unless, at such time,
the plaintiff or the party through
whom he claims shall have been
■under some disability, specified in the
Act, in which case he is allowed ten
years from the ceasing of the dis-
ability ; provided that in no case
shall an action be brought after forty
years from the time when the right
first accrued, although the period of
ten years shall not have expired :
§§ 16 and 17. This statutory rule is
extended by §§ 24 and 25 to all claims
in equity for the recovery of land :
Magdalen College i;. Att.-Gen., 1857,
H. L. ; it also applies to a claim for
dower : Marshall v. Smith, 1865
(St\iart,V.-C.); to a claim for compen-
sation for equitable waste : D. of Leeds
V. Ld. Amherst, 1846 ; and to the claim,
of an annuity charged upon land by
will, the twenty years in this last
case being calculated fi-om the death
of the testator : James v. Salter, 1837.
The sections just referred to do not,
however, apply to spiritual or elee-
mosynary corporations sole, who are
empowered by § 29 to bring actions
or suits to recover land or rent within
two successive incumbencies and six
years, or, in case these periods do not
amount to sixty years, then within
sixty years next after the right of
action shall first have accrued. See
Ecclesias. Oommis. v. Howe, 1880,
H. L. §§ 30—33 Hmit the time
within which advowsons can be
74
CHAP, v.]
TITLE TO LAND.
the payment of a modus, or the adverse, and as of right enjoyment
of land tithe-fi.ee, for the periods specified in the Act of 2 & 3
W. 4, 0. 100,' conclusively hars the right of all parties, even the
Queen, to recover tithes, unless such payment has been made, or
enjoyment had, under an express written consent or agreement.^
§ 75. The principle that, by statute, rights are after a certain
time to be presumed to be extinguished is further exemplified by
the rule that on the completion of any contract of sale of land, the
period of the commencement of title which a purchaser may
require (or, in the language of conveyancers, the root of title) is
now fixed by statute at forty years, unless there be some stipula-
tion to the contrary in the contract, or some very special circum-
stances in the case,'
§ 75a. Again, by the Prescription Act, 1832,* the length of time
recovered, wtile § 40 enacts, that
all moneys ciarged upon land and
legacies shall be deemed satisfied
at the end of twenty years, unless
some interest shall have been paid,
or some ■written acknowledgment
shall have been given in the mean-
while. Under § 28 no mortgagor
shall bring a suit to redeem a
mortgage but ■within twenty years
from the time -when the mortgagee
took possession (see Kinsman v.
House, 1881), or from the last ■written
acknowledgment of the mortgagor's
title. Mortgagees also may bring
actions to recover land at any time
■within twenty years next after the
last payment of any part of the
principal or interest secured by the
mortgage : 7 W. 4 & 1 V. c. 28 ; Doe
V. Eyre, 1851 ; Doe ?;. Massey, 1851 ;
Ford V. Ager, 1863 ; provided that
such last payment be itself ■vrithin
twenty years from the date of the
mortgage : Hemming v, Blanton,
1873; and pro-vided that the pay-
ment be made by the mortgagor, or
by some person bound to make it on
his behalf : Harlock v. Ashberry,
1882. On 1st January, 1879, the
" Eeal Property Limitation Act,
1874 " (37 & 38 V. c. 57), came into
operation, and by it these periods
of limitation were reduced by
six, twelve, and thirty years being
substituted for the ten, 'twenty, and
forty years mentioned in the Acts of
75
1833 and 1837. 6 & 7 V. c. 54, and
7 & 8 V. c. 27, extend to Ireland
such of the pro^visions of 3 & 4 W. 4,
0. 27, as were not already in force
there, and explain and amend that
Act. Tl>3 period of twenty years
has been adopted in most of the
United States. See 4 Kent, Com.
188, n. a. The same period in regard
to the title to real property, or, as
some construe it, only to the profits
of the land, is adopted in the Hindoo
law : 1 Macnagh. Elem. of Hindoo
L. 201. See, as to the Scotch law,
37 & 38 V. 0. 94, §§ 13, 34.
^ See Salkeld v. Johnson, 1848.
See, also, Fellowes v. Clay, 1842,
and Salkeld v. Johnson, 1846.
" See Tovmbee v. Brown, 1849.
3 37 & 38 V. c. 78 (" The Vendor
and Purchaser Act, 1874 "), § 1.
* 2 & 3 W. 4, c. 71,— extended to
Ireland by 21 & 22 V. c. 42,— limits
the period of legal memory as follows :
— In cases of rights of common or
other profits or benefits arising out
of lands, except tithes, rent, and
services, prima facie to thirty years,
and conclusively to sixty years,
unless it shall appear that such
rights were enjoyed by some consent
or agreement expressly given or
made by deed or writing : § 1 ; in
cases of ■ways or other easements,
watercourses, or the use of water,
prima fade to twenty years, and
conclusively to forty years, unless it
SPECIALITIES — ACTIONS FOR PENALTIES. [PAfiT I.
■whicli constitutes the period of legal memory, or, in other words,
which affords a legal title in respect of incorporeal rights,^ has
heen definitely fixed.
§ 75b. Further, hy the Eeal Property Limitation Act, 1833,2
the time within which actions for rent due under a lease, actions
of covenant,' or debt on specialties,* and debt or scire facias on a
recognizance,^ may be brought, is expressly limited. So, likewise,
by the same enactment, is the time for actions for debt or on an
award, where the submission is not by specialty ; for copyhold-
fines, escapes, money levied on a scire facias, or for penalties.*
§ 75c. Again, as regards religious trusts. "Where any real or
personal estate, subject to a trust for a Roman Catholic charity,
has been applied upon some trusts connected with that religion for
twenty years, but the original trusts cannot be ascertained by any
document, a consistent usage of twenty years is, by statute, rendered
conclusive evidence of the trusts on which the property has been
settled.* Under Lord Lyndhurst's Act for regulating suits relating
shall be proved, in like manner, by
written evidence, that the same were
enjoyed by consent of the owner:
§ 2 ; and in cases of lights, conclu-
sively to twenty years, unless it shall
be proved, in like manner, that the
same were enjoyed by consent : § 3.
See Bewley v. Atkinson, 1880; Tap-
ling V. Jones, 1865 ; Lanfranchi v.
Mackenzie, 1857 ; Aynsley v. Glover,
1875. § 4 directs, that the before-
mentionfed periods shaU. be deemed
those next before some suit or action
respecting the claims, and further
defines what shall amount to an
interruption. § 6 enacts, that no pre-
sumption shall be made in support of
any claim, upon proof of the enjoy-
ment of the right for any less period
than the period mentioned in the Act
as applicable to the nature of the
claim. § 7 provides for parties who
are under legal disabilities. As to
what evidence of user is necessary
under this Act, see Lowe v. Car-
penter, 1851 ; Hollins u. Verney,
1884, 0. A.
' A right to the passage of air and
light to a garden : Potts v. Smith,
1869 (Malins, V.-O.) ; or of air to a
windmill or house, is not within the
meaning of this Act: Webb v. Bird,
I860 ; Bryant v. Lefever, 1879, 0. A.;
nor is a claim of " a free fishery " in
the waters of another proprietor :
Shuttleworth v. Le Fleming, 1865 ;
Smith V. Andrews, 1891. For "pre-
scription pre-supposes a grant," see
Smith V. Andrews, supra, and no
grant of the right claimed can here
be imagined.
=i 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27. As to spe-
cialties, see § 3 of this Act. § 4, as
amended by 19 & 20 V. c. 97, § 10,
provides for parties under legal dis-
abilities, and § 5 states the effect
of an acknowledgment in writing
or part payment. See the Irish Act
of 16 & 17 V. 0. 113, §§ 20—24 ; also
Alliance Bk. of Simla i;. Carey, 1870.
' See In re Baker, Collins v. Ehodes,
1882.
* The term "specialty" includes
all actions on statutes, as, for in-
stance, an action against a share-
holder of a company for calls : Cork
& Bandon Bail. Co. v. Goode, 1853 ;
Shepherd v. Hills, 1857.
' See, also, as to actions for penal-
ties, 31 El. c. 5, § 5, as limited by 11
& 12 V. 0. 43 ("The Summary Juris-
diction Act, 1848 "), § 36, and amended
by " The Stat. Law B,ev. Act, 1888 "
(61 V. o. 3), and Eobinson v. Curry,
1881 ; overruling Dyer v. Best, 1866.
» 23 & 24 V. o. 134, § 5.
76
CHAP, v.] SPECIALITIES — ACTIONS FOR PENALTIES.
to meetiag-liouses and other property held for religious purposes
by dissenters, the usage for twenty-jive years immediately preceding
any such suit, shall he taken as conclusive evidence that the reli-
gious doctrines, opinions, or mode of worship, which for that period
have been taught or observed in these houses, may properly be
taught or observed, provided the contrary is not declared by the
instrument declaring the trusts of such houses, either in express
terms or by reference to some other document.^
§§ 76-8. The principle that after the lapse of a certain period it
must be presumed that the offender is innocent, or, at all events,
must not be called upon to defend himself, is also one which finds
a place in Criminal Jurisprudence. Many statutes accordingly
limit the period within which particular offenders may be prose-
cuted. Some of the principal of these are mentioned in the foot-
note.^ Clauses of this nature will be found in a vast variety of
1 7 & 8 V. o. 45 ("The Noncon-
formist Chapels Act, 1844"), § 2.
See Att.-Gen. v. Bunco, 1868 (Malins,
V.-C).
" The imder-mentioned statutes
(arranged in alphabetical order)
prescribe periods of limitation which
are respectively as follows, viz. : — ■
" The Army Act, 1881 " (44 &_45 V.
0. 58, § 161), creates a limitation of
three years for offences other than
mutiny, desertion, or fraudulent en-
listment, and by it absolute im-
munity is conferred (except for the
offence of desertion on active ser-
vice) by three years' exemplary ser-
vice ; "The Births and Deaths
Registration Act, 1874 " (as to
England, 37 & 38 V. o. 88, § 46,
and as to Ireland, 43 & 44 V. c. 13,
§ 36), creates a limitation of three
years; " The Clergy Discipline Act,
1892 " (55 & 56 V. o. 32, § 5, with
which coBipare former Acts on this
subject, as construed in Denison v.
Ditcher, 1857 ; Ditcher v. Denison,
1857 ; Bishop of Hereford v. T ^n,
1853 ; and Simpson v. Flamank,
1867), creates (by § 5) a limitation of
five years, or of two years after con-
viction by a temporal court; "The
Coal Mines Eegulation Act, 1887 "
(50 & 51 V. c. 58, § 62), one of three
months; "The Corrupt Practices
Act, 1883" (46 & 47 V. c. 51, § 51,
and Part 12 of " The Municipal Cor-
porations Act, 1882," viz., 45 & 46
V. c. 50, § 78), unless against a party
who has absconded, creates a limita-
tion of one year from date of of-
fence, or within three months after
report of commissioners ; offences
against "The Customs Act, 1876"
(39 & 40 V. c. 36, § 257), must be
prosecuted within three years from
commission of the offence ; offences
against " The Diseases of Animals
Act, 1894" (57 & 58 V. c. 57), must
be prosecuted within the time limited
by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts
(which see); offences against "The
Factory and Workshops Act, 1878 "
(41 V. 0. 16, § 91), within two
to three months (varying with the
offence) from commission of act ;
a false declaration, in order to
procure a marriage to take place out
of its proper district (3 & 4 V. c. 72,
§ 4), within eighteen months from
the marriage ; high treason, or mis-
prision of treason (7 W. 3, c. 3, §§ 5, 6,
extended to Scotland 7 Anne, c. 11),
within three years after offence;
summary proceedings under "The
Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 " (57 &
58 V. 0. 60, § 683), on the construction
of which see Austin o. Olsen, 1868,
must be usually taken six months, but
in some cases within twomonthsof the
date of the alleged offence; offences
against the Marriage Acts (the Eng-
lish " Marriage Act, 1836," being
6 & 7 W. 4, c. 85, on the construc-
tion of which see E. ■;;. Ld. Dun-
77
STATUTES OF LIMITATION.
[part I.
statutes, to which it is considered unnecessary to make particular
reference.^
§ 79. The principle upon which these statutes rest would
appear to he simply the broad one of general expedience and
justice, rather than upon that of any presumption, for " Interest
reipubhcse ut sit finis Htium." When a party has been in
undisputed possession of property for a considerable length of
time, it is harsh to deprive him of that which, however obtained,
has now acquired the character of a vested interest. No presump-
tion of a former grant is, however, necessary to give validity to his
title, but it rests on the fact of long uninterrupted enjoyment.
When a person has foregone a claim for many years, there is,
indeed, no need for presuming that he has, in reality, been satis-
boyne, 1850, and tlie Irish Act being
7 & 8 V. 0. 27, § 13), witbin three
years, or in tbe case of offences
under tbe Irish Act, punishable on
summary conviction (7 & 8 V. o. 81,
§§48, 78 ; also 26 & 27 V. _o. 27, § 16),
within three months, or in the case
of false declarations to procure a
marriage out of its proper district,
within the time stated above, under
bead "False Declaration"; "Tbe
Mines Eegulation Act, 1872" (35 &
36 V. c. 76, § 63, r. 1 ; and c. 77,
§ 34, r. 1, extended to Isle of Man by
54 & 65 V. c. 47), requires offences
against it to be prosecuted within
three months ; ' ' The Municipal
Corporations Act, 1882" (45 & 46
V. c. 60, § 219, subs. 1), requires
proceedings for offences and fines
under it to be taken within
six months from act ; proceedings
imder the Public Health Acts (of
1875, for England, being 38 & 39
V. c. 65, § 252, and of 1878, being
41 & 42 V. c. 52, § 250, for Ireland),
must be taken within six months
from when matter arose ; proceed-
ings under "The Naval Discipline
Act, ls66 " (29 & 30 V. c. 109, § 54),
within three years from offence, or if
offender has been abroad, one year
from his return; proceedings under
"The Night Poaching Act, 1844"
(being 7 & 8 V. c. 29), are, as to
indictable offences (by 9 G. 4, o. 59,
§ 4, and 7 & 8 V. o. 29, as to the con-
struction of which see E. v. Casbolt,
1869), to be within twelve calendar
months ; and as to offences punish-
78
able on summary conviction, to be
within six calendar months, the
commencement of the prosecution
being the laying of an information,
or the obtaining of a warrant : see
E. V. Parker, 1864; E. v. Hull,
1860 ; E. V. Brooks, 1847 ; E. v.
KOliainster, 1835; and E. v. Main-
w-aring, 1858; under "The Pre-
vention of Cruelty to Children Act,
1894 " (57 & 58 V. c. 41), by § 18 (3),
a summary conviction must be within
six months of the offence. The
Summary Jurisdiction Acts, in all
cases where no time is specially
limited, require that complaint shall
be made, and information laid, within
six calendar months. See " The
Summarv Jurisdiction Act, 1848 "
(11 & 12"V. c. 43), § 11.
1 Various periods of limitation are
also imposed by 11 & 12 V. c. 118,
§ 3; 1 G. 1, st. 2, c. 5, § 8; 33
G. 3, c. 67, § 8; 4 G. 4, o. 76,
§ 21 ("The Marriage Act, 1823");
60 G. 3 & 1 G. 4, c. 1 (partially
repealed by "The Stat. Law Eev.
Act, 1893," 56 & 67 V. c. 61), §7;
6 A. c. 7, § 3 ; 23 & 24 V. c. 107, § 32
(Ir. ) ( " The Eef reshment Houses (Ire-
land) Act, I860"); 14 & 15 V. c. 93,
§ 10, r. 4 (Ir.); " The Merchandise
Marks Act, 1887 " (50 & 51 V. o. 28),
§ 15. In Scotland summary com-
plaints must, in general, be insti-
tuted ' ' within six months from the
time when the matter of such com-
plaint arose." 27 & 28 V. c. 53, § 24.
See as to the Police Courts in Edin-
bui-gh, 30 & 31 V. c. 58, sch. § 172.
CHA.P. v.] STATUTES OP LIMITATION.
fied ; it is sufficient to say that his right to recover is lost hj his
own negligence. The statute of James, which has been held not
to discharge the debt, but merely to bar the remedy, is strongly
confirmatory of these views.^ Lord Plunket once eloquently said,
" If Time destroys the evidence of title, the laws have wisely
and humanely made length of possession a substitute for that
which has been destroyed. He comes with his scythe in one
hand to mow down the muniments of our rights ; but in his other
hand the law- giver has placed an hour-glass, by which he metes
out incessantly those portions of duration, which render needless
the evidence that he has swept away." *
§ 80.^ The doctrines of irrebuttable presumptions are sometimes
(as in most of the instances just cited) embodied in statutes. In
other instances they are declared by judicial tribunals as being the
common law of the land. The decisions of the courts on such
matters are respected, equally with the enactments of the legisla-
ture, as authoritative declarations of imperative rules of law,
against the operation of which no averment or evidence is received.
In short, in determining the legal rights and liabilities of parties,
the courts conclusively presume that which in a vast number of
cases must of course be contrary to the fact.* Tor instance, it is
conclusively presumed that every sane person, above the age of
fourteen, is acquainted with the criminal as well as the civil,* the
common ^ as well as the statute,' law of the land ; and the doctrine
" ignorantia juris, quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem excusat," is
as uniformly recognised in this country, as it formerly was in
ancient Eome ; * and, indeed, has been carried so far as to include
the case of a foreigner, who was here charged with a crime, which
' Spears v. Hartly, 1857 ; Higgins impedit, on the trial of whioli Ld.
V. Scott, 1832. Plunket made use of the imagery in
* See " Statesmen of the Time of his address to the jury.
George III.," by Ld. Brougham, ' Gr. Ev. § 17, as to first six Unes.
3rd Ser. p. 227, n. In Malono * See Martindale v. Ealkner, 1846
V. O'Connor, 1859 (Ir.), Napier, 0., (Maule, J.)
the above passage is cited as fol- * Bilbie v. Lumley, 1802 (Lord
lows: — "Time, with the one hand EUenborough).
mows down the muniments of our * A mistake of the legal effect of a
titles; with the other, he metes out documentoannotbesetupasadefence'
the portions of duration which render PoweU v. Smith, 1872 (Ld. Eomilly).
these muniments no longer neces- ' See Stokes v. Salomons, 1851
sary." Drury's Gas. in Oh. temp. (Turner, V.-C); The Charlotta, 1814
Napier, 644. This version is pro- (Sir W. Scott) ; Middleton v. Croft,
bably more accurate than any other, 1736 (Ld. Hardwicke).
as it was furnished to the Chancellor ^ See 1 Euss. C. & M. 154 ; 1 Hale,
ly one of the counsel in the quare 42 : Ff. 22, 6, 9.
CONCLUSIVE PEESUMPTIONS AT COMMON LAW. [PART I.
wau no offence in his own country.' It is again conclusively
presumed that every '* sane man of the age of discretion contem-
plates the natural and probable consequences of his own acts. Thus
an intent to kill is conclusively inferred from the deliberate violent
use of a deadly weapon ; ^ on an indictment for cutting with intent
to do the prosecutor some grievous bodily harm,' the prisoner is
rightly convicted, though it appeared that his real intent was to
wound another person ; * an intent to defraud a particular party
will be conclusively presumed on an indictment for forgery, pro-
vided the defrauding of such party would be the natural result of
the prisoner's act, if successful,^ and this even though it be proved
that the prisoner did not entertain the intention charged ; ® and on
a charge of arson for setting fire to a mill, an intent to injure or
defraud the mill-owners will be conclusively inferred from the
wilful act of firing.' The same doctrine would, apparently, on
principle, apply to all other crimes.^
§ 81. There are, indeed, several decisions which tend to show
that where the character of statutory offences varies according to
the intent with which they are perpetrated, the real intention of
the prisoner must be left to the jury. For instance, on an indict-
1 E. V. Esop, 1836 (Bosanquet and w. 21, 22, 23. This very reasonable
Vauglian, JJ.); Barronet's case, 1853. distinction seems to have been un-
'» Gt. Ev. § 18, as to four following known to the Gentoo Code, which
lines. demands life for life, in all oases,
" See 1 Pvuss. 0. & M. 940, 941 ; except where the culprit is a Brah-
E. f. Dixon, 1814. But if death does min. " If a man deprives another of
not ensue till a year and a day, that life, the magistrate shall deprive that
is, a full year, after the stroke, it is person of life." Halhed's G-entoo
conclusively presumed that the stroke Laws, b. xvi. § 1, p. 233.
was not the sole cause of the death, ^ Under the repealed Act of 43
and it is not murder. 4 Bl. Com. G. 3, c. 68.
197 ; Glassf. Ev. 592. The doctrine * E. ■;;. Hunt, 1825 ; E. v. PretweU,
of presumptive evidence was familiar 1864. See, also, E. ■!/. Smith, 1855,
to the Mosaic Code ; even to the which was an indictment under the
letter of the principle stated in the repealed Act, 7 W. 4 & 1 V. c. 85,
text. See Numb. xxxv. 16, 17, 18, § 0; and E. v. Ward, under 14 & 15
where every instrument of iron is V. c. 19, § 6 (fifteen judges),
conclusively taken to be a deadly " E. «. Beard, 1837 (Coleridge, J.);
weapon; and the use of any such E. v. Hdl, 1838 (Alderson, B.); E.
weapon raises a conclusive presump- v. Cooke, 1838 (Patteson, J.),
tive of malice. The same presump- * E. v. Sheppard, 1806; E. v, Maza-
tion axose irom lying in ambush, and gora, 1815 (all the judges); E. v.
thence destroying another. Id. v. 20. Geach, 1840. The prisoner may also
But, in other oases, the existence of be convicted on a count charging the
maUce was to be proved, as one of real intent. E. v. Hanson, 1841 (by
the facts in the case ; and in the ab- all the judges),
senoe of express malice, the offence ' E. v. Earrington, 1811; E. v,
was reduced to the degree of man- Philp, 1830.
slaughter, as at the common law. Id. * See E. v. Murphy, 1875.
80
CHAP, v.] CASES WHERE REAL INTENT MUST BE PROVED.
ment for cutting,^ where the intent laid in the several counts was
to murder, to disable, and to do grievous bodily harm, but the
intent found by the jury was to prevent being apprehended, it was
held that a conviction could not be sustained, though the prisoner
had inflicted a serious wound ; ^ where a party was charged with
inflicting an injury dangerous to life with intent to murder, it was
held ^ that the jury must be satisfied that the prisoner, at the time
he committed the assault, had formed a deliberate intention of
murdering his victim ; on an. indictment * charging the prisoner
with shooting at the prosecutor with intent to murder him, the
jury were allowed to pronounce a verdict in accordance with the
actual intent, which was to kill another person, and the prisoner
was consequently acquitted ; ' on the same principle, where the
prisoner was charged^ with causing poison to be taken by the
prosecutor with intent to murder him, and it appeared that the
prisoner's real intention was to poison another party, he was
acquitted.'
§ 82. Nevertheless it is submitted that the distinction which
these decisions seek to establish is founded on no sound principle,
and goes far towards frittering away one of the most valuable pre-
sumptions known to the criminal law. Moreover, one judge of
great experience in the administration of criminal justice refused
to recognise the distinction.*
§ 82a. It is immaterial whether the intent charged be the prin-
cipal or subordinate motive which instigated the commission of the
■ Under tlie repealed Act of 43 The learned judge observed, in sum-
Q-. 3, c. 58. ming up : "If this had been a oas9
" E. V. Duffln, 1818. This case is of murder, and the prisoner intend-
badly reported, and perhaps the deoi- ing to murder one person, had, by
sion turned upon the ground that mistake, murdered another, he would
the attempted apprehension was not be equally liable to be found guilty,
lawful. The question, however, may be dif-
' E. V. Cruse, 1838 (Patteson, J.). ferent on the construction of this
But the jury may infer such intent Act of Parliament."
from the circumstance that if death * Under 7 W. 4 & 1 V. c. 85, § 2 ;
bad been caused it would, under the repealed by 24 & 25 V. c. 95, and
circumstances, have been murder : E. otber provisions enacted ia 24 & 25
V. Jones, 1840 (Patteson, J.). V. c. 100 (" The Oflences against the
* Under 9 G. 4, o. 31 ; repealed Person Act, 1861 "), amended by 48
by 24 & 25 V. c. 95, and other pro- & 49 V. c. 69.
visions enacted ia 24 & 25 V. c. 100 ' E. v. Eyan, 1839 (Parke and
("The Oifences against the Person . Alderson, BB.).
Act, 1861"). 8 E. y_ Lewis, 1833 (Gurney, B.);
^ E. V. Holt, 1836 (Littledale, J.). E. v. Jarvis, 1837 (id.).
T. — VOL. I. 81 a
PEESUMPTION OF INTENT AND MALICE. [PAET I.
crime. Therefore where the jury found that a prisoner had
wounded the prosecutor with the view of preventing his lawful
apprehension, and that, in order to effect that purpose, he intended
to do him some grievous bodily harm, the conviction on a count
charging the latter offence was held right.^ And the same rule has
been applied where the immediate object of the criminal was to
rob the party he wounded, and the wound was inflicted as the
means of effecting the robbery.^
§ 83. The presumption that a party intends the natural conse-
quences of his acts, also extends to civil responsibilities. Thus, in
an action for libel,^ the deliberate publication of calumny, which
the publisher knows to be false, or has no reason to believe to be
true, is by statute taken to raise a conclusive presumption of
malice;* if a party make a representation, which he knows to be
false, and injury ensues to another, it will be inferred by law that
he was actuated by a fraudulent or malicious intent ; ^ the wilful
neglect of a defendant to plead within the time appointed by law,
is taken conclusively against him, as a confession of the plaintiff's
right of action ; ^ if a person who is, in the language of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, " unable to pay his debts as they become due from his
own money," spontaneously make a transfer or payment in favour
of any creditor, which necessarily has the effect of defeating or
delaying his other creditors, it will be conclusively presumed to
have been made with that intent, and the transfer or payment
will be set aside as fraudulent, though all fraud in fact may
be distinctly negatived if the payer or transferor is adjudged bank-
rupt on a petition presented within three months from the date of
the transaction.'
' E. V. Gillow, 1825. belongs to general jurisprudenoe.
' E. V. Bowen, 1841 (Coleridge, J.). So in the Eoman law : " Contumacia
^ See 6 & 7 V. 0. 96 (" The Libel eorum, qui jus dioenti non obtem-
Act, 1843 "), § 6. perant, litis damno coercetur." Dig.
" Haire v. Wilson, 1829; E. v. lib. 42, t, 1, 1. 53. " Si citatus aliquis
Shipley, 1784 (Ashhurst, J.); Fisher non compareat, habetur pro consen-
V. Clement, 1830 (Ld. Tenterden) ; tione." 3 Maso. de Prob. p. 253, con-
Baylis v. Lawrence, 1840 (Patteson, el. 1159, n. 26.
J.); EodweU v. Osgood, 1825 (Am.). ' 46 & 47 V. o. 52, § 48, and 35 &
' Tapp V. Lee, 1803 ; Foster v. 36 V. o. 58, § 53, L?. See Ex parte
Charles, 1830 ; Pontifex v. Bignold, Craven, 1870 ; In re Craven, Ex parte
1841. Tempest, 1871 ; Brown v. Kempton,
« E. S. C. 1883, Ord. XXVII. r. 2 1850 ; In re Cheesebrough, 1871 ;
et seq. The principle of this Order Smith v. Cannan, 1854; In re Wood,
82
CHAP, v.] JUDICIAL PEOCEEDINGS.
§ 84. Conclusive presumptions are, again, made in favour of all
judicial proceedings. Thus, as an undoubted rule of pleading,
nothing will he intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a superior
court but that which is so expressly alleged, so that the records of
superior courts, among which are the courts of the Counties
Palatine, need not state the cause of action to have arisen within
the jurisdiction;^ whenever the contrary does not plainly and
expressly appear, the respective Houses of Parliament will be con-
clusively presumed to have acted within their jurisdiction, and
agreeably to the usages of Parliament, and the rules of law and
justice. So that a warrant issued by the Speaker of the House of
Commons at the instance of the House for the arrest of a witness
need not contain any recital of the grounds on which it was
founded ; ^ all writs issued by any Division of the High Court of
Justice are presumed to be issued duly in a case in which the court
has jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears on the face of them,
so that such writs of themselves, and without any further allega-
tion, protect all officers and others in their aid acting under them,
and this even though they appear on the face of them to be
irregular, or even void in form.' The respect due to the High
Court, and the credit given to it, that it will not abuse its powers,
furnish alike the reason and the justification for this somewhat
arbitrary presumption.*
§ 85.' The irrebuttable presumption that all judicial proceedings
have been regularly conducted, has, among others, the following
consequences. It is assumed, at least prima facie, that the un-
reversed sentence of a foreign or colonial court of competent
jurisdiction is correct, since otherwise our courts woxild be, in
effect, constituting themselves courts of appeal, without power to
reverse the judgment.^ Judicial acts are, as a general rule, con
1872; Ex parte Bailey, In re Barrell, ' Gosset v. Howard, 1847, citing
1852; Bittlestonef. Cooke, 1856; Bell Countess of Eutlaucl's case, 1605, and
V. Simpson, 1857 ; Bills v. Smith, Parsons v. Loyd, 1772.
1863. See, also, as to the aYoidance * Id. See tho elaborate judgment
of voluntary settlements, 46 & 47 V. of Ex. Ch. in Gosset v. Howard, 1847.
0. 52, § 47 ; and 35 & 36 V. c. 58, = Gr. Ev. § 12, as to one or two
§ 52, Ir. lines.
' Peacock v. Bell, 1667, recognised ' Brenan's case, 1847 (Ld. Den-
in Gosset V. Howard, 1847. man) ; Robertson v. Strutb, 1843
« Gosset V. Howard, 1847. (Patteson, J.).
83 g2
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. [PAET I.
clusively presumed to have taken place at the earliest period of the
day on which they were done, so that a judgment is regular though
signed several hours after the defendant had died,' — provided
only this doctrine does not work injustice in any particular
case ;^ and with the further hmitation that it does not apply
to the issuing of a writ of summons, since, if it did, a plaintiff
could not commence legal proceedings till the day after the cause
of action had accrued, and the defendant in the meanwhile might
escape out of the jurisdiction.^ The records of a court of justice,
and indeed all records, must again always he presumed to have
been correctly made ; ' so that no evidence will be admissible to
show that a charter granted by the Crown was made or delivered
at another time than when it bears date;* while the day specified
in a record of conviction will be conclusive proof of the commission
day of the assizes at which the trial took place,^ — though (as in the
case just mentioned), the court will, where it is necessary to do so,
in order to prevent justice being defeated,^ allow the party against
whom the record is produced to show by parol evidence the actual
day of trial, and will judicially notice that though by fiction of
law the whole time of the assizes is only one legal day, yet that
this legal day may consist of many natural days, and thus prevent
justice from being defeated by a mere arbitrary rule f and will on
production of a Nisi Prius record containing two counts, on distinct
causes of action, admit parol evidence to show that on a verdict
entered as awarding damages to the plaintiff generally, that the
substantial damages were recovered on one count only.' In these
two last-named cases proof of the real facts would not contradict the
record, but nlerely eorplain it. On the principle, too, that every
presumption necessary to sustain a record will be made, it will after
verdict, whether in a civil or a criminal case,* be presumed that those
> Wright V. Mills, 1859 ; Edwards ° See Thomas v. Ansley, 1806 ; E.
V. E., 1854. V. Page, 1788.
2 Clarke ». Bradlaugh, 1881. « Whitaker v. Wisbey, 1852; Eoe
' Eeed v. Jackson, 1801 ; Earns- v. Hersey, 1771.
l)ottonn;.Buckhurst,1814(Ld.EUen- ' Preston v. Peeke, 1858.
borough) ; E. ■;;. Carlile, 1832 (Ld. s j^, ,,, -Waters, 1848 ; E. v. Bowen,
Tenterden). "Ees judicata pro Teri- 1849; Heymann v. E., 1873; E. «,
tate accipitnr." Dig. lib. 50, t. 17, Goldsmith, 1873; E. v. Aspinall,
1. 207. 1876.
* Ludford v. Gretton, 1576.
84
CHAP, v.] LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.
facts, without proof of whioh the verdict could not have been
found, were proved, though they are not distinctly alleged in the
record ; provided such record contains terms suflBciently general to
comprehend them in reasonable intendment.^ In other words, the
verdict will cure any defective statement, though it will not cure
the omission of any material averment.* It is, again, always a
presumption of law that the notes taken by the judge at Nisi
Prius are correct, and no party is allowed to raise any question
respecting the rejection of evidence at the trial, unless it appears
from these notes that the evidence was formally tendered.*
§ 86. A conclusive presumption in favour of an act is sometimes
raised by the solemnity with which it was done, though it was not
done in court. Thus, where an award professes to be made de
prsemissis, the presumption is that the arbitrator intended to dis-
pose finally of all matters in difference, and if by any intendment
it can be made so, his award will be held final ; * a bond, or other
specialty, is, so long as it remains unimpeached,^ presumed to have
been made upon good consideration, and for the consideration
stated on it.^ And, by an Act of the present reign,' " every bill of
lading in the hands of a consignee or indorsee for valuable con-
sideration, representing goods to have been shipped on board a
vessel, shall be conclusive evidence of such shipment as against the
master or other person signing the same,^ notwithstanding that such
goods or some part thereof may not have been so shipped, unless
such holder of the bill of lading shall have had actual notice at the
time of receiving the same, that the goods had not been in fact
taken on board ; provided that the master or other person so sign-
ing may exonerate himself in respect of such misrepresentation, by
showing that it was caused without any default on his part, and
wholly by the fraud of the shipper, or of the holder, or of some
' Jackson v. Pesked, 1813 (Lord and Alderson, B.).
EUenborough) ; Spieres v. Parker, * Harrison v. Creswick, 1853 ;
1786; Davis «. Black, 1841 (Ld. Den- Jewell v. Christie, 1867.
man, O.J., and Patteson, J.) ; Harris * Lowe ■;;. Peers, 1768; Story,
V. Goodwyn, 1841 ; Goldtkorpe v. BUls, § 16. See post, § 148.
Hardman, 1845. See, also. Smith v. ^ Barton v. Bank of New South
Keating, 1849; Kidgillt). Moor, 1850; Wales, 1890 (P. C).
and Ld. Delamere v. The Queen, ' 18 & 19 V. c. Ill (" The Bills of
1867. Lading Act, 1855 "), § 3.
2 Bradlaughv. E., 1878, 0. A. » ggg Meyer v. Dresser, 1864:
» Gibbs t;. Pike, 1842 (Ld. Abinger, Jessel v. Bath, 1867.
85
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS. [PAET I.
person under whom the holder claims." Again, it is by statute
enacted that every conveyance made under the Act for facilitating
the sale and transfer of land in Ireland shall be " for all purposes
conclusive evidence " that all previous proceedings leading to such
conveyance have been regularly taken ; ^ and that every declaration
of title by the Landed Estates Court shall be as conclusive upon
the rights of all parties as any such deed of conveyance.^
§ 86a. Again, when (as is now often the case) the contract is
made by one party delivering to the other a document, in a common
form containing the proposed terms, if the form is accepted without
objection, the acceptor is presumed to have agreed to its terms,
and is bound by the contents, whether he has or not in fact read
the document.' Exceptions to this rule exist, however — 1st, where
from the nature of the transaction the person accepting the docu-
ment may reasonably suppose that it contains no special terms ;
2nd, where the terms are printed in a mode calculated to mislead ;
and 3rd, where the terms or conditions are in themselves unreason-
able or irrelevant.'
§ 87.* Another conclusive presumption made by the law, is that
in favour of the due execution of ancient deeds and wilh. When
these instruments are thirty years old, and are unblemished by
any alterations, they (as it is said) prove themselves ; their bare
production is suflBcient, and the subscribing witnesses are conclu-
sively taken to be dead. This presumption, — so far as the present
rule of evidence is concerned, — is not affected by proof that the
witnesses are living,^ and, it seems, even actually in court ;^ nor, in
the case of wills, by showing that the testator died within the
thirty years.' But it must appear that the instrument comes from
custody, which (even though it is not in point of law strictly
proper), affords a reasonable presumption in favour of its genuine-
1 21 & 22 V. c. 72 (" The Landed * Gr. Ev. § 21, in great part.
Estates Court (Ireland) Act, 1858"), » Doe v. Burdett, 1836.
§ 85, Ir. See Power v. Reeves, 1864 * PerTates, J., as cited (Ld. Een-
(H. L.) ; In re Tottenham's Estate, yon) in Marsh v. Collnett, 1798.
1867. ' Doe w.Wolley, 1828. In Jackson
2 21 & 22 V. 0. 72, § 61, Jr. ; Billing v. Blanshan, 1808 (Am.), the Sup. Ct.
u. Welch, 1871 (Ir.). _ of New York held that the thirty years
^ Watkins v. EymiU, 1883, and must be computed from the testator's
cases there cited. death,
86
CHAP, v.] ANCIENT INSTEUMENTS — ESTOPPELS.
ness ; ^ and that it is otherwise free from just ground of suspicion.^
It is not altogether clear whether, if the deed be a conveyance of
real estate, the party is bound first to show some acts of possession
under it ; but the weight of opinion seems to be in the negative,
as will hereafter be more fully explained.' It also is questionable
whether the rule applies to an instrument bearing the seal of a
court or a corporation; "because, although the witnesses to a
private deed, or persons acquainted with a private seal, may be
supposed to be dead, or not capable of being accounted for after
such a lapse of time, yet the seals of courts and corporations, being
of a permanent character, may be proved by persons at any dis-
tance of time from the date of the instrument to which they are
affixed."*.
§ 88. The presumption in their favour, if they come from the
proper custody, and purport to be thirty years old, is not confined
to deeds and wills, but extends equally to letters^ entries^ receipts^
settlement certifioates,^ and indeed to all other written documents ; and
in such cases the signatures and handwriting need not be proved.
The rule is founded " on the great difficulty, nay, impossibility, of
proviag the handwriting of the party after such a lapse of
time." 9
§ 89.1" Estoppels may be ranked among the class of irrebuttable
presumptions. 1"^ A man is estopped, when he has done or permitted
some act, which the law will not allow him to gaiasay. " The law
of estoppel is not so unjust or absurd, as it has been too much the
custom to represent." ^^ Its foundation rests partly on the obli-
gation to speak and act in accordance with truth, by which every
honest man is bound, and partly on the policy of the law, which
thus seeks to prevent the mischiefs that would inevitably result
' Doe V. Samples, 1838 ; Bishop of 1833.
Meath v. M. of Winoliester, 1836 ' Bertie v. Beaumont, 1816.
(Tindal, O.J., representing all the * E. -v. Eyton, 1792; E. i;. Nether-
judges in Dom. Proc). thong, 1813. In these cases no proof
^ Eoe V. Eawlings, 1815. of the ciistody was given in evidence,
' See Malcolmson v. O'Dea, 1862 but the court held this to be imma-
(H. L.), cited post, §§ 665, 666. terial.
* E. V. Bathwick, 1832 (Ld. Ten- « Wynne v. Tyrwhitt, 1821.
torden, O.J.). i" Gr. Ev. § 22, in part.
» Doe V. Beynon, 1840; Bere v. " Bythe N. TorkOiv. Code, § 1792,
Ward, 1821 (Dallas, C.J.); and 1823 estoppels are abohshed.
(Ld. Tenterden, C.J.). '* Per Taunton, J., in Bowman v.
' Per cur. in Wynne v. Tyrwhitt, Taylor, 1834.
87
ESTOPPELS BIND PARTIES AND PRIVIES. [PAET I.
from uncertainty, confusion, and want of confidence, were men
permitted to deny what they had deliberately asserted. The doc-
trine of estoppel is, however, guarded with great strictness, or, as
it is said, "estoppels are odious." The reason for this is not
because the party enforcing the estoppel is presumed to be desirous
of excluding the truth ; indeed, the more reasonable supposition is
that that which the opposite party has already solemnly admitted
to be so really is the truth ; but because the estoppel mat/ exclude
the truth. It consequently is required that all estoppels must be
certain to every intent ; for no one shall be prevented from setting
up the truth, unless it be in plain contradiction to allegations and
acts previously made in his interest.'
§ 90. From these last words it will be gathered that a man is
estopped not only by his own allegations and acts, but also by
those of all persons through whom he claims.^ In technical language,
estoppels are usually binding upon both parties and privies} Lord
Coke divides privies into three classes ; first, privies in blood, as
heirs ; secondly, privies by estate, as feoffees, lessees, assignees, &c. ;
and thirdly, privies in law, " as the lord by escheat, the tenant by
the courtesy, the tenant in dower, the incumbent of a benefice," *
husbands suing or defending in right of their wives,' executors
and administrators.^ Upon the principle qui sentit commodum,
sentire debet et onus, the privy stands in no better position than
the party through whom he derives his title ; and if the latter is
not at liberty to contradict what he has formerly said or done, the
former is subject to a like disability.' An exception to this rule is
admitted in favour of those privies, who would themselves be
aggrieved or defrauded by the conduct of the party through whom
they claim. For instance, where a man executes a deed with the
fraudulent intent of defeating the statutes of mortmain, his heir-
at-law is not estopped from questioning the validity of the inden-
1 Bowman v. Taylor, 1835 (Lord = See post, §§ 787—793, as to ad-
Denman and Taunton, J.); Lain- missions by privies,
son V. Tremere, 1834 ; Kepp v. Wig- *■ Co. Litt. 352 a.
gett, 1851 (Williams, J.); Pelletreau ' Outram v. Morewood, 1814.
V. Jackson, 1833 (Am.) ; Carver v, ' E. v. Hebden, ] 738.
Jackson, 1830 (Am.). ' Taylor v. Needham, 1811.
» B. N. P. 233.
88
CHAP, v.] ESTOPPELS NOT BINDING UNLESS PLEADED.
ture, since his claim to the lands is founded, not on the deed, hut
on his title hy descent.'
§ 91. There are three classes of estoppels ; namely, estoppels hy
matter of record, estoppels by deed, and estoppels in pais} Judg-
ments ' are the most extensive species of records, and consequently
estoppels by record will be most conveniently discussed in treating
of judgments. Neither an estoppel by record nor one by deed will
operate as a conclusive estoppel, unless the matter of estoppel appears
on the record,* nor unless it has been expressly pleaded by way of
estoppel where an opportunity of so pleading it has been afforded.*
If a party, having an opportunity of pleading an estoppel, does
not avail himself of it, the court will conclusively presume that he
has intended to waive all benefit derivable from it, and allow the
jury to form their own conclusions from the facts presented to them
in evidence.^ If, indeed, no opportunity for pleading the matter
of estoppel in bar has arisen, an estoppel by record or by deed
ought, on principle, to be binding when offered in evidence ; and
this has been held to be the law in some of the United States,'
though the point has not yet been expressly decided in this
country.^ In pleading, an estoppel can only be met by the plead-
ing which is now equivalent to the old demurrer.'
§ 92. As a general rule, however, estoppels in pais need not be
pleaded in order to make them obligatory. For instance, if a man
represent another as his agent, in order to procure a person to con-
tract with him as such, and this person so contract, the contract
' Doe V. Lloyd, 1839. See Smyth 1838, as to estoppels by matter of
D. "Wilson, 1841 (Ir.). ■ record; Wilson v. Butler, 1838;
* Co. Litt. 352 a ; 2 Smith., L. 0. Bowman v. Eostron, 1835 ; foung v.
Qol. Eainoock, 1847 ; Carpenter v. Buller,
3 See post, §§ 1667 et seq. 1841 ; Potts v. Nixon, 1870 (Ir.), as
♦ See Robinson v. Eobinson, 1879. to estoppels by deed ; and Freeman v.
0 2 Smith, L. 0. 670, 674, and 683. Cooke, 1848 (Parke, B.), as to both
The whole note, from pp. 656 to 726, kinds of estoppel,
should be perused. It contains an ' See Howard v. Mitchell, 1817
elaborate exposition of avery difficult (Am.) ; Adams v. Barnes, 1821 (Am..),
branch of the law. See also Tre- ^ E. v. Blakemore, 1852. See E.
vivan v. Lawrence, 1704; Magrath ii. Haughton, 1853; Ld. JFeversham
V. Hardy, 1838. v. Emerson, 1856 ; and E. v. Hutching,
• Outram v. Morewood, 1814; 1880, reversed (on another point) ia
Vooght V. Winch, 1832; Doe v. 0. A., 1881.
Huddart, 1835 ; Doe v. Seaton, 1835 » E. S. 0. 1883, Ord. XXV. rr. 1-
(Parke, B.); Nowlani;. Gibson, 1847 2; see, also, BraiUey v. Beckett,
(Ir.); Matthew i). Osborne, 1855; Doe 1844.
V. Wright, 1839 ; Magrath v. Hardy,
89
NO ESTOPPEL FEOM SETTING UP ILLEGALITY. [PART I.
binds the principal equally with one made by himself, and no form
of pleading can leave such a matter at large, or enable the jury to
treat it as no contract;^ and in an action by indorsee against
acceptor on a bill payable to drawer's order, to a plea that the
drawer had no authority to indorse, plaintiff, though he might
reply the estoppel,^ would not be forced to do so, but he might by
his pleading raise the point of law, that the defence disclosed no
legal answer to the action.*
§ 93. A party is not, however, estopped by his own deed where
he can make it void by proving that it was executed for a fraudu-
lent, illegal, or immoral purpose. In one case,* indeed, where a
man, in order to give his brother a colourable qualification to kill
game, had conveyed some lands to him, it was held that the
grantor's widow could not avoid this conveyance in an action of
ejectment against her by the brother. But although Sir Nicholas
Tindal attempted to support this decision as resting on the fact,
that " the defence set up was inconsistent with the deed," * it can,
even on this ground, scarcely be supported. Modem decisions
have established that in an action of ejectment by the grantee of
an annuity, to recover premises on which it was secured, the grantor
may show that the premises were of less value than the annuity,
and that the deed, consequently, required enrolment, notwithstand-
ing that he had expressly covenanted in the deed that the premises
were of greater value ; ^ and that where a bond has been given, or a
covenant made, for an illegal consideration, the obligor or cove-
nantor may avoid the instrument by pleading and proving the
' Freemaii ». Cooke, 1848 (Parke, up an after- acquired title against
B.). the grantee, for it is a perpetually
* Sanderson i;. Collman, 1843. operating covenant : Terrett v. Taylor,
3 HaUifax ?). Lyle, 1849. 1815 (Am.); Jackson v. Matsdorf,
* Doe V. Roberts, 1832. See also 1814 (Am.); Jackson v. Wright,
Phillpotts «;. Phillpotts, 1851. 1817 (Am.); M'WilUams v. Nisby,
5 Prole V. Wiggins, 1837. 1816 (Am.) ; Somes v. Skinner, 1825
* Doe V. Ford, 1835, where a ques- (Am.). But a grantor is not estopped
tion was raised -whether a covenant, by a covenant, that he is seised in
under any circumstances, is such a fee and has good right to convey ;
declaration as to estop a party from Allen v. Sayward, 1828 (Am.); for
afterwards disputing the fact cove- any seisin in fact, though by wrong,
nanted for, but the point was left is sufficient to satisfy this covenant,
madecided. In America a party may, its import being merely this, that he
in some oases, be estopped by a has the seisin in fact, at the time of
covenant. Thus a covenant of war- conveyance, and thereby is qualified
ranty estops the grantor from setting to transfer the estate to the grantee.
90
CHAP, v.] ESTOPPEL BY DEED — ILLEGAL COVENANTS.
illegality ;' and this too, though a legal, but untrue, consideration
is stated on the face of the deed.^ Indeed, where both parties to
an indenture either know, or have the means of knowing, that it is
executed for an unmoral purpose, or in contravention of a statute,
or of public policy, in general neither will be estopped from
proving facts which render the instrument void ab initio.' For
although a party will thus, in certain cases, be enabled to take
advantage of his own wrong,* yet this evil is trifling in comparison
with the flagrant evasion of the law, that would result from an
opposite rule.* Neither will a party be estopped by his deed, if he
executed it while, from duress, infancy, or other cause, he was
incapable of making a valid contract, or if he was deceived by the
fraudulent misrepresentations or acts of other parties.^
§ 94. The doctrine at one time prevailed' that trustees acting
for the benefit of the public could never be estopped from disputing
the validity of their deeds, because, if they were, the innocent
parties, on whose behalf they were acting, might be seriously
injured.' The doctrine now, however, only holds good in cases in
which the trustees have, in their dealings with another party,
violated a public statute, the contents of which are presumed to
be known to such party. Therefore, where a bridge Act authorised
commissioners to mortgage the tolls, and enacted that the mort-
gagees should have no preference by reason of priority, it was held
in an action of ejectment brought by a mortgagee of the tolls
against the commissioners, that the defendants were estopped from
setting up the fact of an earlier mortgage to defeat the legal estate
of the lessor of the plaintiffs.*
§ 95. Though an estoppel may bind a person acting in one capa-
city, it does not necessarily follow that it will have a similar effect
' Prole V. Wiggins, 1837; CoUins Doe v. Howells, 1832.
V. Blantern, 1767 ; Gas Light and ^ Benyon v. Nettlefold, 1850. See
Coke Go. V. Turner, 1839; aild. in Mallalieu v. Hodgson, 1852; Bowea
Ex. Oh.., 1840; Stratford and Moreton v. Foster, 1858; Taylor v. Bowers,
Ey. Co. V. Stratton, 1832; HiU v. 1877.
Manoh. Waterw. Co., 1831; Benyon « Hayne v. Maltby, 1789.
V. Nettlefold, 1850; Hortoa v.Westm. ' Fairtitle v. Gilbert, 1787 ; Doe v.
Improve. Comrs., 1852. Hares, 1833 (Littledale, J.).
2 Paxton V. Popham, 1814. ^ d^q v. Horn*, 1843; E. v. White,
' Id. 1843 ; Horton v. Westm. ImproTe.
* Do© V. Ford, 1835 (Ld. Denman); Comrs., 1852.
91
ESTOPPEL BY DEED — MERE DESCRIPTION. [PAET I.
when he is sustaining a totally different character.* For instance, an
executor de son tort, who has verbally agreed with the landlord to
deliver up demised premises, but has afterwards taken out letters of
administration, is not concluded from bringing an action of eject-
ment against the landlord, who has actually obtained possession
under the agreement.^ Where, however, "an heir apparent,
having only the hope of succession, conveys, during the life of his
ancestor, an estate, which afterwards descends upon him, although
nothing passes at that time, yet, when the inheritance descends
upon him, he is estopped to say that he had no interest at the time
of the grant."' The distinction between these two cases is, that
in the former, the party not estopped was acting for the benefit of
others ; in the latter, the party estopped was sui juris, and acting
on his own behalf.
§ 96. A deed does not estop a party from disputing the correct-
ness of that which is not an essential averment thereon, but is
mere description — such, for instance, as the date of the deed ; the
quantity of land ; its nature, whether arable or meadow ; and the
like — for these statements are but incidental and collateral, and
may be supposed not to have received the deliberate attention of
the parties.* In this country, however, if a deed of conveyance
distinctly states in the operative part that the consideration money
has been received, and the estoppel is properly pleaded,^ the fact of
payment, and the amount paid, are conclusively presumed.^ The
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881,' has expressly
enacted that this (which appears to have been so long before the Act)
shall be so in favour of a subsequent innocent purchaser. Under
' 2 Smith, L. C. 667 ; Robinson's case, 1594; Shipwortli v. Green, 1725
case, 1603 ; Smyth v. Wilson. 1841 ^ p^tts v. Nixon, 1870 (Ir.).
(Ir.) ; Leggott v. Gt. N. Ey. Co., 1876. « Shelly v. Wright, 1737 ; Cossens
See Bennett v. Gamgee, 1877, 0. A. v. Oossens, 1737 ; Eowntree v. Jacob,
''■ Doe V. Glenn, 1834. See also 1809, in which last case there were
Middleton's case, 1603; Metters v. highly suspicious circumstances tend-
Brown, 1862; Lyons v. Mulderry, ing to show that the consideration
1832 (Ir.); Eirwan ?). Gorman, 1846 money had not in fact been paid;
(Ir.); Johnson V. Warwick, 1856. Baker v. Dewey, 1823; Lampon v.
3 Hayne v. Maltby, 1789 (Ld. Corke, 1834 ; HiU i;. Manch. Waterw.
Kenyon). Co., 1832. See Smith v. Battams,
* Com. Di. Estoppel, A. 2 ; Telv. 1857 ; also Gresley v. Mousley, 1861.
227, by Metcalfe, n. 1 ; Doddington's ' 44 & 45 V. o. 41, § 55.
92
CHAP, v.] ESTOPPELS — RECITALS IN DEEDS.
the same Act,^ the production by a solicitor of a deed with a receipt
in the body thereof or indorsed upon it for the consideration is
sufficient authority for the payment of the consideration to him,
although a receipt indorsed upon the deed will not in itself amount
to an estoppel.^ In America/ though the party is estopped from
denying the conveyance, and that it was for a valuable considera-
tion, the statement in the deed is apparently only prima facie
evidence of the amount paid.*
§ 97. Lord Coke's doctrine that " a recital doth not conclude,
because it is no direct affirmation,"^ has been expressly overruled.
The law now is^ thus: "If a distinct statement of a particular
fact is made in the recital of a bond, or other instrument under
seal, and a contract is made with reference to that recital, it is
unquestionably true, that, as between the parties to that instru-
ment, and in an action upon it, it is not competent for the party
bound ' to deny the recital, notwithstanding what Lord Coke says
on the matter of recital in Coke Littleton, 352 b ; and a recital in
instruments not under seal may be such as to be conclusive to
the same extent. A strong instance as to a recital in a deed,
is found in a case* where, in a bond to secure the payment of
rent under a lease stated, it was recited that the lease was at
a rent of 170/., and the defendant was estopped from pleading
that it was 140/. only, and that such amount had been paid.
So, where other particular facts are mentioned in a condition
to a bond, as that the obligor and his wife should appear, the
obligor cannot plead that he appeared himself, and deny that he
is married, in an action on the bond.^ All the instances given
1 44 & 45 V. c. 41, § 56. 1834 ; E. v. Stamper, 1841 ; Hill v.
^ Lampon'i). Oorke, 1834 (Holroyd, Manoh.. Waterw. Co., 1831 ; Pargeter
J., Best, J.); Stratoni;. Eastall, 1788. v. Harris, 1845 ; Clarke v. Hall, 1889
3 Gr. Bv. § 26, n., almost verlsatim. (Ir.). SeealsoBayleyy. Bradley, 1848;
' The principal cases will be found Young v. Eaincock, 1847 ; Horton v.
referred to in tlie early editions of Westm. Improve. Comrs., 1852; and
tHs Work. Hungerford v. Beecher, 1855 (Ir.).
^ Co. Lit. 352 6. As to the effect But see Lindsay v. E. of Wicklow,
of recitals in a deed -wHcli has been 1873 (Ir.).
tendered for execution but not exe- ' Even though she be a married
cuted, see BuUey v. BuUey, 1875. woman, sembleTLd. J. James), Jones
* Per Parke, B., in Carpenter v. v. Erost, In re Eiddey, 1872.
Buller, 1841. As to other cases where ^ Lainson v. Tremere, 1834. See
a recital has been held conclusive, see Brooke v. Haymes, 1868.
Bowman v. Taylor, 1835 ; Hills v. ' 1 EoU. Abr. 873, c. 25.
Laming, 1854; Lainson v. Tremere,
93
WHEN RECITALS OPERATE AS ESTOPPELS. [^PAET I.
in Com. Dig., Estoppel, A. 2, under the head of ' Estoppel by
Matter of Writing ' (except one which relates to a release), are
cases of estoppel in actions on the instrument in which the
admissions are contained. By his contract in the instrument
itself a party is assuredly bound, and must fulfil it. But there is
no authority to show that a party to the instrument would be
estopped, in an action by the other party, not founded on the deed,
and wholly collateral to it,' to dispute the facts so admitted, though
the recitals would certainly be evidence ; for instance, in another
suit, though between the same parties, where a question should
arise whether the plaintifE held at a rent of 170^. in the one case, or
was married in the other case, it could not be held that the recitals
in the bond were conclusive evidence of these facts. Still less could
it be so held, if the matter alleged in the instrument were wholly
immaterial to the contract therein contained ; as, for instance,
suppose an indenture or bond to contain an unnecessary description
of one of the parties as assignee of a bankrupt, overseer of the poor,
or as filling any other character, it could not be contended that such
statement would be conclusive on the other party, in any other pro-
ceeding between them."
§ 98. To make a recital operate as an estoppel, there must then
be, first, a distinct statement ^ of some material ' particular * fact ;
secondly, a contract made with reference to such statement ; * and,
thirdly, either an action directly founded on the instrument con-
taining the recital, or one which is brought to enforce the rights
arising out of such instrument.^ If these requisites are satisfied,
' See S.-East. Ey. Co. v. Warton, Eainsford v. Smyth, 1561.
1862. _ * In Stronghill v. Buck, 1850, the
^ See Kepp v. Wiggett, 1851. court thus stated the law : — "Where
' In Carpenter v. Buller, 1841, the a recital is intended to be a state-
court were strongly inclined to think ment, -which all the parties to the
that, in a deed relating to an adit, a deed have mutually agreed to admit
leoital that certain neighbouring as true, it is an estoppel upon all.
lands, through which the adit did not But where it is intended to be the
pass, belonged to A. B., was an im- statement of one party only, the
material matter, which a party to_ the estoppel is confined to that party,
deed was not estopped from denying. and the intention is to be gathered
The point, however, was not directly from construing the instrument."
decided, as the admission was held See, also, Young v. Eaincock, 1847 ;
inconclusive on other grounds. Blackball v. Gibson, 1878 (Ir.).
* As to the distinction between ' Wiles v. Woodward, 1851; Carter
generality and particularity, see Com. v. Carter, 1858 (Wood, V.-C.) ; Fraaer
Dig,, Estoppel, A. 2, and notes to v, Pendlebury, 1862.
94
CHAP, v.] ESTOPPELS MTTST BE RECIPEOCAL.
the doctrine may, in some cases, he extended to instruments not
under seal. In aH cases of estoppel by recital, the matter recited
requires no proof ; since the recital is not offered as secondary, but
as primary evidence, which cannot be controverted, and which
forms a muniment of title. This rule, however, only applies to so
much of a deed as is actually recited; and therefore if it becomes
necessary to rely on a part of the recited deed which is not itself
recited, such recited deed must be produced and proved in the
regular way.^
§ 99. It is a rule in the general doctrine of estoppels, that every
estoppel must be reciprocal; that is, it must bind both parties, since
a stranger can neither take advantage of an estoppel, nor be bound
by it.^ For example, where a party, holding chambers in Lincoln's
Inn as tenant-at-will under the benchers, in a deed, by which he
conveyed his interest to A., recited that he was seised of them for
life, and subsequently surrendered them to the benchers, who
admitted B. as tenant, it was held that B. was, as against A.,
not estopped from denying that the surrenderor was seised for
life ; * again, where a man took lands from the assignees of a
bankrupt, by a deed describing such lands as freehold, he was held
not estopped, as against the bankrupt's wife (on a claim by her of
dower), from proving that the lands were in fact leasehold ; * in an
action against an individual for using a way,^ plaintiff's conviction
on a previous indictment, in respect of the same way, for obstructing
a public highway, though doubtless strong evidence, cannot be used
as an estoppel ; while the grantee or lessee under a deed poll if he
claim title under it (although not, in general, estopped from
gainsaying anything mentioned in the deed which is the deed of
the grantor or lessor only) is thereby estopped from denying title
of the grantor.® Indeed, as against the grantor imder such a deed
poll an exception to the general rule requiring reciprocity in
estoppels might perhaps be recognised, because in these instruments
only one party is ever intended to be bound, and as he has executed
a deed with the same solemnities as an indenture, there is no
1 Abtott V. OiUett, 1838. « Petrie v. Nuttall, 1855.
2 Co. Lit. 352 a. « Co. Lit. 363 b ; Goddard's case,
' Doe V. Errington, 1840. 1584.
* Gaunt V. Wainmaii, 1836.
95
ESTOPPELS BY DEED — ESTOPPELS IN PAIS. [PART I.
valid reason why the doctrine of estoppel should not apply to
him.i
§ 100. Another rule with respect to estoppels by deed is that a.
deed which can take effect by interest shall not be construed to take
effect by estoppel.^ Therefore if a lessor has any interest in the
demised premises, even though it be one less than he professes to
grant, the lease shall not work by estoppel, but shall enure to the
extent of the lessor's interest, and no further.' If, however, a
person, having no title whatever, makes a lease by indenture, this
will estop the parties to the deed from alleging the lessor's want of
title during the continuance of the lease ; and if the lessor subse-
quently purchases the land, or otherwise obtains an interest in it,
the lease, which was originally a lease by edoppel, will be converted
into a lease in interest, and the heir or assignee of the lessor will be
bound thereby, as well as the lessee and his assignees.*
§ 101. The third kind of estoppels are estoppels by matter in
pais} The most ordinary instance of these is the well-established
rule, that a tenant, during his possession of premises, shall not
deny that a landlord, under whom he entered, or from whom he
has taken a renewal of his holding,' or to whom he has paid rent,
had title at such time.' Neither in an ejectment by the landlord,
nor in an action by him for rent or for use and occupation, can the
tenant set up the superior title of a third person,^ or that the land-
lord has no title. For instance, if the plaintiff be an incumbent,
the tenant cannot give evidence that his presentation was simo-
niaoal ; ^ if he be a devisee he will not be allowed to prove that the
devisor was incapable of making a will *" (unless, indeed, the party
claiming as devisee was guilty of fraud in making the will, and in
falsely representing it to him as a valid one)." The only course
■ 2 Smitli, L. 0. 660 ; Bac. Abr. tit. pels in pais, see post, §§ 772, 783, 820
Jjeases, U. et seq., 839 et seq.
* Doe V. Barton, 1840 (Patteson, * Doe v. Wiggins, 1843.
J.). ' Doe V. Pegge, 1787 (Ld. Mans-
^ Id. in argument; Co. Lit. 45a, field); Doe v. Barton, 1840. See
47 6; Doe v. Seaton, 1835 (Parke, Att.-G-en. i>. Stephens, 1855.
I!.) ; Walton v. Waterhouse, 1672. « Doe v. Pegge, 1787 (Ld. Mans-
* Webb V. Austin, 1844 ; Sturgeon field).
V. Wingfield, 1846. ' Cooke v. Loxley, 1792.
"* As to "judicial admissions," and '" Doe v. Wiggins, 1843.
"admissions acted upon," which " Ld. Denman, in Id,
Bometimes are classed among estop-
96
CHAP v.] ESTOPPEL IN PAIS — LANDLORD AND TENANT,
which a tenant who wishes to dispute the title of the landlord
under whom he entered can pursue (save indeed in the one case of
his being able to show that his admission of being tenant was
obtained by a clear fraud) is to yield up the premises, and then
bring an action to recover them.^ So strict is this rule, that, even
if a landlord, in proving his own case, disclose the fact that he has
only an equitable or a joint estate in the premises, the tenant
cannot avail himself of that circumstance as a defence.^ Further
examples of the rule are, that a lessee, who has once accepted a
lease and paid rent under it, cannot dispute the lessor's title,
though the deed itself admits upon its face some infirmity in that
title,' and that a tenant who has held premises under a corporation
aggregate, and paid rent, cannot object to such corporation suing
him for use and occupation, on the ground that a corporation
cannot demise except by deed, and that he has occupied without
deed.* The rule that a tenant cannot deny his landlord's title is
applicable in an action of trespass, as well as in one to recover
land ; * and is binding, not only on the tenant himself, but on all
who claim in any way through him,^ as, for instance, a party to
whom a lessee has given up possession.' Its principle, moreover,
extends to the case of a person coming in by permission as a mere
lodger, a servant, or other licensee.'
§ 102. But though a tenant cannot deny that the person, by
whom he was let into possession, had title at the time when he so
let him in, he may show that such person had no title at some
previous time. For instance, where the defendant claimed under a
conveyance from a certain company, dated in 1824, he was allowed
' Per Coleridge, J., in Id. 377; Doe Watson v. Lane, 1856. See also
V. Lady Smythe, 1815. See E. S. 0. Ward v. Eyan, 1875.
1883, Ord. XVIII. r. 2 ; App. 0. ^ Lond. & N. West. Ey. Co. v.
§ 7. West, 1867.
2 Dolby V. Ilea, 1840. ' Doe v. Mills, 1833 ; Doe v. Lady
3 Duke V. Ashby, 1862; Morton i;. Smythe, 1817; Taylor u. NeedLam,
Woods, 1868. 1809.
* May. of Stafford v. Till, 1829; ^ Doe v.' Baytup, 1835, where a
Dean and Ch. of Eoohester v. Pierce, woman who had asked leave to get
1808; recognised in Fishmongers' vegetables in the garden, and ob-
Co.' V. Eobertson, 1843. See Bcoles. tained the kej's for this purpo.se,
Commis. v. Merral, 1869 ; also post, fraudulently took possession of the
§ 984. house and tried (unsuccessfully, of
° Delaney v. Fox, 1857 ; qualify- course) to set up a title. See also
ing a dictum of Pollock, C.B., in Doe v. Birchmore, 1839,
T. vol.. I, Q7 U
ESTOPPEL IN PAIS — LANDLORD AND TENANT. [PAET I.
to dispute the title of the company to convey the same premises to
the plaintiff in 1818 ; ^ a lessee let into possession in 1826 under a
demise from a tenant for life, was allowed, in an action brought
by the reversioner (though he would not have been permitted to
show after the death of the tenant for life adverse title in another
at the date of the lease), to prove that, before 1826, the legal estate
was outstanding in a third party, and that, consequently, the
reversioner, who claimed in common with the tenant for life under
a settlement of a much earlier date, had no legal title. ^ A tenaut
is also allowed to prove that, since the commencement of the
tenancy, the title of his lessor has expired or been defeated.' For
example, he may prove that his landlord was a tenant pour autre
vie, and that the cestui que vie is dead ; or that he was a tenant
from year to year or at will, and that the superior landlord had
given him a notice to quit or determined the will ; * or that the
person who let him in was a mortgagor in possession, who, not
having up to the date of demise been treated as a trespasser, had
then title to confer the legal possession, but has subsequently been
treated as a trespasser.' In short, the tenant may rely on any
fact which either amounts to an eviction by title paramount,* or
shows that the title of his landlord has expired.^
§ 103. It is not always clear what constitutes a " letting into
possession." Where a party was in possession of premises without
leave obtained from any one, and a person came to him and said,
" You have no right to the premises," upon which he acquiesced,
and took a lease from this person, the relation of landlord and
tenant was held to be sufficiently created to debar the one from
' Doe V. Powell, 1834. notice, to have such an efiect, must
* Doe V. Langdon, 1848; Doe v. either be coupled with an attorn-
Whitroe, 1822. ment, or he followed by actual pay-
^ Doo V. Barton, 1840 (Ld. Den- ment of rent, to the mortgagee. See
man) ; Hopcraft v. Keys, 1833. See id. ; also Wilton v. Dunn, 1851 ;
Bayley v. Bradley, 1847 ; Watson o. Turner v. Cameron's Coalbrook St.
Lane, 1856; Laiigford v. Selmes, Coal Co., 1850; Litchfield i). Eeady,
1857; Howe D. Scarrott, 1859; Lond. 1850; Trent v. Hunt, 1853.
& N. West. Ey. Co. v. West, 1867. = Gouldsworth v. Knights, 1843.
^ Doe V. Barton, 1840. ' Downs v. Cooper, 1841. See Doe
' Doe V. Barton, supra. A mort- i>. Watson, 1817; Doei;. Seaton, 1836;
gagee, by simply giving notice to the Claridge v. Mackenzie, 1842; Mount-
tenant to pay rent to him, does not noy v. Collier, 1853 ; Emery v. Bar-
treat the mortgagor as a trespasser : nett, 1858 ; Delcue^e v, Mulb'ns
Hickman v, Machin, 1859 , but a 1875, Ex. Ch.
98
c. y.]
WHAT CONSTITUTES A LETTING INTO POSSESSION.
disputing the title of the other.^ But where a tenant, already in
possession of premises under a demise from a termor, at the expi-
ration of the termor's right entered into a parol agreement with
another party to hold under him, in ignorance of the real facts,
and under the supposition that this party was entitled to the pre-
mises, this agreement was held not to be equivalent to the first
letting into possession.^ Neitlier a parol agreement by a tenant to
hold of a party, by whom he was not let into possession,^ nor an
attornment,* nor an actual payment of rent to such party, even
under a distress,' will in themselves operate as estoppels ; but the
tenant may still show that he has acted in ignorance, or under a
misapprehension of the real circumstances,^ or, in the case of pay-
ment of rent, that some other party was entitled to receive it.'
§ 104.^ There are also certain conclusive presumptions of law
with respect to infants.^ Thus, an infant under seven is conclu-
sively presumed incapable of committing any felony, or, indeed,
any indictable offence,'" for want of discretion ; ^^ a male infant
under fourteen is presumed incapable, on the ground of impotency,
of committing a rape as a principal in the first degree,'^ or of being
^ Doe V. Mills, 1835 (Patteson, J.). of tenancy, Patteson, J. allowed the
See also Dolby v. lies, 1840. defendant to show, that the lessor of
^ Cltadge V. Mackenzie, 1842. the plaintiff had acted as the agent
"There was no new possession given of third parties. See Hitchings v.
by the defendant; she was in no Thompson, 1850, explained by Ld.
way prejudiced ; she could not have Cranworth, C, in Att. -Gen. v.
turned the plaintiff out of posses- Stephens, 1855.
sion ; and before their agreement, if * Grr. Ev. § 28, in part,
she had brought her ejectment, the ' In all civil questions where the
plaintiijf might have shown that she rights of parents depend on the birth
had no title, and that the title was in of a living child, the Scotch law cou-
some one else. It is not like the clusively presumes that the child
case of a person letting another into was not born alive, if it was not
possession of vacant premises; it is heard to cry. 1 Dickson, Ev. 180.
in fact a remaining in possession of ^^ 42 &43V. c. 49 ("The Summary
premises, which had been formerly JurisdiotionAct, 1879"),§10,sub-s. 5.
occupied by the tenant." PerTindal, " 4 Bl. Com. 23 ; 1 Hale, 27. If
C.J. an infant under seven is given into
^ Id. custody on a charge of felony, an
' Doe V. Brown, 1837. action for false imprisonment wiU
^ Knight V. Cox, 1856. lie ; Marsh v. Loader, 1863.
« Gregory v. Doidge, 1827; Gra- '^ i Hale, 630; 1 Euss. C. & M. 676.
venor v. Woodhouse, 1824 ; Eogers This presumption is not affected by
I). Pitcher, 1818; Doe U.Barton, 1840; 24 & 25 V. c. 100 ("The Offences
Hall V. Butler, 1839 (Patteson, J.). against the Person Act, 1861 "), § 48 ;
' Cooper V. Blandy, 1839; Doe w. E. v. Groombridge, 1836 (Gaselee, J.,
Francis, 1837 ; in which case pay- and Ld. Abinger) ; and it applies to
ment of rent being the only evidence the offence of carnally abusing a
99 h;^
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS — INFANTS. [PAET I.
guilty, under sect. 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885,*
of the offence of carnal knowledge of a girl under thirteen,^ though
he may be convicted of a criminal assault upon her,^ or of com-
mitting an assault with intent to perpetrate that crime ; * a
female under thirteen is presumed incapable of consenting to
sexual intercourse, and to have carnal knowledge of her is a
felony; while an attempt to have such knowledge is a misde-
meanour,^ and to have, or attempt to have, carnal knowledge of a
girl over thirteen and under sixteen is a misdemeanour,^ and the
consent of a girl under thirteen to an act of indecency cannot be
set up as a defence to a charge of assault.' An unmarried girl
under eighteen cannot consent to be abducted in order that a man
may have carnal knowledge of her, and to abduct such a girl for
such a purpose is a misdemeanour.* An infant of either sex under
twenty-one is presumed to be so far incapable of managing his
own affairs as not to be able, in general,^ to alien land, execute a
deed,'" state an account, to make any binding contract," unless for
necessaries.'^ He is also incapable of being subjected to a receiving
order made under the Bankruptcy laws ; '' and since the first of
girl under the statutory age ; E. v.
Jordan, 1838 (Williams, J.). But if
the boy have a mischievous discre-
tion, he may he a principal in the
second degree ; 1 Hale, 630. The
patient may be convicted of an un-
natural crime, though the agent be
under fourteen; E. v. Allen, 1826.
1 48 & 49 V. c. 69.
2 E. V. Waite, 1892.
" E. V. Williams, 1893.
* B. V. Eldershaw. 1828 (Vaughan,
B.); E. V. Philips, 1837 (Patteson, J.).
* See " The Criminal Law Amend-
ment Act, 1885" (48 & 49 V. c. 69),
§ 4 ; and see, also, E. v. Beale, 1806.
" See Id. § 5.
' 43 & 44 V. c. 45 ("The Criminal
LawAmendmentAot,1880"), §2; E.
V. Eoadley, 1880. The last-named case
is overruled by the above enactment.
8 48 & 49 V. c. 69, § 7.
s See 18 & 19 V. c. 43 ("The In-
fants' Settlements Act, 1855"), and
23 & 24 V. 0. 83 (Ir.), enabling male
infants of twenty, and female infants
of seventeen, to make, with the ap-
probation of the Chancery Division,
binding settlements on marriage.
" See Martin v. Gale, 1867, hold-
ing a deed by an infant charging
his reversionary interest to secure
money advanced for necessaries void-
able and not enforceable.
" 37 & 38 V. c. 62 ("The Infants'
Eelief Act, 1874"). As to how far
an infant can act as a trustee, or
exercise a power, see King v.Bellord,
1863; also. In re Arnit's Trusts, 1868,
(Ir.); In re D'Angibau, 1880, C. A.
^ '2 1 Bl. Com. 465, 466; Co. Lit.
78 b. As to what are necessaries,
see ante, § 42. As to how far infant
shareholders are liable to actions for
calls, see Newry c& Ennisk. Ey. Co.
V. Combe, 1849 ; Leeds & Thirsk Ey.
Co. V. Pearnley, 1849 ; Cork & Ban-
don Ey. Co. V. Cazenove, 1847 ; N.
West. Ey. Co. v. McMichael, 1850 ;
Birkenhead, Lane. & Chesh. Juno.
Ey. Co. V. Pilcher, 1850. An infant
lessee, though not liable on the con-
tract of tenancy, is answerable for
the rent during his occupation of the
premises. Blake v. Conoannon, l.s'O
(Ir.). But see Lempriere v. Lango,
1879 (Jessel, M.E.).
" Ee Jones, Ex p. Jones, 1881,
C. A.
100
CHAP, v.] CHILD-BEAKING AGE — LEGITIMACY.
January, 1838, such a person cannot make a will, whether it pur-
ports to dispose of real or of personal estate.^
§ 105. No rigid presumption is fixed by law as to the exact
period of life at which the possibility of having issue, without
miraculous agency,* becomes in women extinct; but in directing
the distribution of trust funds, the courts have been in the habit of
assuming that, in general, females, after arriving at the age of
fifty-three, are past child-bearing.'
§ 106. A conclusive presumption in favour of legitimacy exists in
certain cases.* Thus, where husband and wife have cohabited
together, and no impotency is proved, the issue is conclusively
presumed to be legitimate, though the wife is shown to have been,
at the same time, guilty of infidelity.' Even where the parents
are living separate, a strong presumption of legitimacy still arises,
which can only be rebutted, either by proving a divorce a mensa
et thoro, or, since the 11th of January, 1858, a judicial separation,
or by cogent and almost irresistible proof of non-access in a sexual
sense ; ^ and, indeed, the fact that a married woman is living in
notorious adultery, though amounting to very strong evidence, is
not, in itself, sufiicient to repel the presumption of the legitimacy
of her offspring.' But where alleged parents have been divorced
1 7 W. 4 & 1 V. 0. 26 (" The Wills never having tad a child, past child-
Act, 1837"), §§7, 34. Before that bearing. Sed qu., and see Davidson
date, boys of fourteen years, and u. Kimpton, 1881.
girls of twelve, might have disposed * See ante, § 16.
of personalty by will, if proved to ' Cope v. Cope, 1833; Morris v.
have been of sufficient discretion. 1 Davies, 1866 ; Wright v. Holdgate,
Will, on Ex. 14—16. 1850; Legge?;. Edmonds, 1856; Ban-
2 See Gen., ch. xvii., w. 15 — 19; bury Peer., 1727, H. L., in Appen-
ch. xviii., w. 9 — 15, and oh. xxi., dix, n. e. to Le Marohant's Gardner's
vv. 1— 7. Peer. ; E. ■;;. Luffe, 1807. As to the
^ Haynes v. Haynes, 1866 (Kin- Mahomedan Law on this subject, see
dersley, V.-C), and cases cited in the Ashrufood Dowlah Ahmed v. Hyder
note. See also Ee Widdow's Trusts, Hosseiu Khan, 1885.
1871 (Malius, V.-C), andEeMillner's * Id. ; Bosvile v. Attorney-Gen.,
Estate, 1872, in which last case a 1887; SayeandSelePeer., 1846, H.L.;
woman married for twenty- six years, Hargrave v. Hargrave, 1848; Plowes
and having never had a child, was v. Bossey, 1862; Atchley v. Sprigg,
presumed to be barren at the age of 1864.
forty-nine years and nine months. '' E. v. Mansfield, 1841. In this
But in Oroxton v. May, 1876, the case Ld. Denman questions the au-
Court of Appeal refused to regard a thority of Cope v. Cope, 1833. See
woman whose age was fifty-four and Hawea v, Draeger, 1883 (Kay, J.).
a half years, married three years, and
101
SPOLIATION OF PAPERS — EUNNING BLOCKADE. [PAET I.
or judicially separated, children born during the separation are
prima facie illegitimate.'
§ 107.^ Conclusive presumptions are also known to the law of
nations. For instance, despatches of the enemy which a neutral
vessel is found carrying between different parts of the enemy's
dominions, are presumed to be hostile,' at least, if they have been
fraudulently concealed ; the spoliation of papers by a captured party
is regarded, in all the States of Continental Europe, as giving rise
to a conclusive presumption of guilt. But, in general, in England
and America, the presumption of guilt is only prima facie, and is
open to explanation. English and American law are more lenient,
and do not found on the mere spoliation of papers an absolute pre-
sumption of guilt. But they only stop short of that result ; for a
case that escapes with such a brand upon it is saved, as it were,
from the fire ; * and where the case labours under other circumstances
of suspicion, or the surrounding circumstances establish bad faith
or gross prevarication, the presumption is, even in English and
American law, conclusive.' Again, a presumption all but conclu-
sive is raised against any vessel which has been captured while
entering a blockaded port; and the owner can protect the ship
from being condemned as lawful prize only by establishing a
justification on the ground of imperative necessity.^ It is, more-
over, also prima facie presumed that the owners of a cargo found
on board a ship, which is condemned for blockade-running, were
privy to the intention of violating a blockade, and their only escape
from this presumption is their being able to prove that, at the time
when the shipment was made, they could not have known that the
blockade had been imposed.'
§ 108.* In all cases of conclusive presumption, the rule of law
merely attaches itself to the circumstances when proved ; it is not
deduced from them. It is not a rule of inference from testimony,
but a rule of protection, which is held to be expedient for the
1 St. George v. St. Margaret, 1706; « The Hunter, 1815 (Sir W. Scott).
Hetherington ». Hetherington, 1887. 'The Pizarro, 1817 (Am.); The
In .such cases, non-access is pre- Hunter, 1815. See post, § 116.
sumed. ' Baltazzi v. Eyder, 1858.
2 Gr. Ev. § 31, in part. ' Id.
3 The Atalanta, 1808. ^ Qr. Ev. § 32, almost verbatim.
102
CHAP, v.] DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS.
general good. It is not, for example, assumed that all landlords
have good titles; but it is held that it will he a public incon-
venience to suffer tenants to dispute them. Neither is it assumed
that all averments and recitals in deeds and records are true ; but
it is held that it will be mischievous if parties are permitted to deny
them. It is not assumed that all simple contract debts, of six
years' standing, are paid, nor that every man quietly occupying
land twenty years as his own has a valid title by grant ; but it is
deemed expedient that claims opposed by such evidence as the
lapse of those periods affords, should not be countenanced, and that
society is more benefited by a refusal to entertain such claims than
by suffering them to be made good by proof. In fine, the law does
not assume the impossibility of things which are possible ; but the
presumption of law is founded, not only on the possibility of their
existence, but on their occasional occurrence ; and it is against the
mischiefs of their occurrence that it interposes its protecting prohi-
bition.^
§ 109 — 110.^ We now come to the second class, into which are
divided presumptions of law.' These are what are termed disput-
able presumptions, and answer to the prcesuinptiones juris of the
Roman law. Presumptions of this class may always be overcome
by opposing proof.* These disputable presumptions of law are,
like conclusive presumptions, the result of the general experience of
a connection between certain facts or things, the one being usually
found to be the companion, or the effect, of the other. Where
disputable presumptions arise, however, the connexion is not so
intimate, or so uniform, that it can be conclusively presumed to
exist in every case ; yet it is so general, that the law itself, with-
out the aid of a jury, in the absence of all opposing evidence, infers
the one fact from the proved existence of the other. In this mode
the law — even in the absence of any corresponding allegation in the
pleading ' — defines the nature and amount of the evidence which is
sufi&cient to establish a prima facie case, and to throw the burthen
of proof on the other party ; and says that in such cases, if no
opposing evidence is offered, the jury are bound to find in favour
1 See fi Law Mag. 348, 355, 356. * Hein. ad Pand. P. iv. § 124.
2 Gr. Ev. § 33, ia great part. » E. S. 0. 1883, Ord. XIX. r. 25,
3 See supra, § 70. cited post, § 368, n.
103
PRESUMPTIONS OF LAW AND OF FACT. [PAET I.
of the presumption, and that a contrary verdict may be set aside as
being against evidence.
§ 111. Disputable presumptions of law differ from mere pre-
sumptions of fact in three important particulars. In the first
place, the judge is bound to explain to the jury whatever legal
presumptions arise from the facts proved ; ' next, the jury are
bound to give full weight to the presumptions so explained ; and
lastly, the court alone, without the intervention of the jury, may
draw the proper legal inferences, whenever the requisite facts are
developed in the pleadings.^ In practice, however, the distinction
between presumptions of law and presumptions of fact is by no
means well defined, and the line of demarcation, even when visible
at all, is often overlooked.^ A presumption which is regarded by
some judges as one of law, is treated by others as one of fact ;
nay, the same judges place the same presumption at different
times in different classes. The following remarks principally
apply to disputable presumptions of law, but they will be occa-
sionally found to extend to cogent presumptions of fact.
§ 112. One of the most important of disputable legal presump-
tions is that of innocence. This, in legal phraseology, " gives the
benefit of a doubt to the accused," and is so cogent, that it cannot
be repelled by any evidence short of what is sufficient to establish
the fact of criminality with moral certainty.* In civil disputes,
when no violation of the law is in question, and no legal pre-
sumption operates in favour of either party, the preponderance of
probability, due regard being had to the burthen of proof, may
constitute sufficient ground for a verdict,* To affix on any person
the stigma of crime requires, however, a higher degree of assurance ;
and juries will not be justified in taking such a step, except on
evidence which excludes from their minds all reasonable doubt.^
It has sometimes been said, that the presumption in question is
confined to the criminal courts, and is adopted there specially in
favour of life and liberty, and as a safeguard against error in
I Ante, § 25. ' St. Ev. 818, 4th ed. ; 1 Gr. Ev.
^ Best, Ev. 404, 405. § 13a; Best, Ev. 120; Cooper v. Slade,
3 Best, Ev. 424. 1858, H. L. (Willes, J.).
* St. Ev. 817, 8G5, 4tli ed. ; 1 Gr. ^ St. Ev. 817, 865, 4th ed. ; Best,
Ev. § 13 a ; E. ■!;. White, 1865 (Martin, Ev. 12U.
B.).
104
CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTION OP INNOCENCE.
convictions which are not open to revision.^ But it rests on a
broader basis. The right which every man has to his character,
the value of that character to himself and his family, and the evil
consequences that would result to society if charges of guilt were
lightly entertained, or readily established in courts of justice : —
these are the real considerations which have led to the adoption of
the rule that all imputations of crime must be strictly proved.
The rule, accordingly, is recognised alike by all tribunals, whether
civil or criminal, and in all proceedings, whether the question of
guilt be directly or incidentally raised.^ For example, in an
action against an insurance company to recover a loss by fire, and
where the defence is that the plaintiff wilfully burnt down the
premises, the jury, before finding a verdict against the plaintiff,
must be satisfied that the act imputed to him has been proved by
clear evidence, so clear as to justify a conviction for arson ;^ and,
in general, whether the question arises in a prosecution for it, or
in a civil court, forgery or bigamy must similarly be established
by the same strict evidence.*
§ 113.* So strong is the presumption of innocence, that even
where guilt can be established only by proving a negative, that
negative must, in most cases (unless indeed a special statute be
applicable^), be proved, though as a general rule the burthen of
proof lies on the party alleging the affirmative. For instance, a
plaintiff who complained that the charterer of a ship had put on
board an article highly inflammable and dangerous, without giving
notice of its nature to the master in charge, was held bound to
prove this negative averment.'
§ 114.^ Questions of nicety arise where the presumption of
1 Mageei;. Mark, 1860 (Ir.) (Pigot, ^ See post, § 372.
O.B.); Best, Ev. 120; 1 Gr. Ev. ' Williams v. B. Ind. Co., 1802.
§ 13 a. So of allegations tliat a party had not
2 Best, Ev. 447. taken the Sacrament : 'R.v. Hawkins,
^ Thurtell v. Beaumont, 1823. 1808 ; or had not complied with the
* Chalmers v. Shackell, 1834 (Tin- Act of Uniformity, &c. : Powell v.
dal, C.J.); Willmett v. Harmer, Milburn, 1772; or that goods were
1839 (Ld. Denman). See, also, not legally imported: Sissons v.
Neeley «;. Lock, 1838 (Tindal, C.J.); Dixon, 1826; or that a theatre was
Magee V. Mark, 1860 (Ir.) (Fitz- not duly licensed : Eodwellu. Eedge,
gerald, E.). 1824. See post, § 371.
» Gr. Ev. § 3ii, in part. ' Gr. Ev. § 35, m part.
105
PEESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. [PAKT I.
innocence is met by some counter presumption.^ For example,
where a woman, twelye months after her husband (a soldier on
foreign service) was last heard of, married a second husband, on a
question as to the settlement pi the children by the second
husband, it was held that it might be presumed that the first
husband was dead at the time of the second marriage, though the
presumption of the continuance of life would have prevailed had it
not been displaced by the stronger legal presumption of innocence ; ^
and on a trial for bigamy of a woman who had married again only
four years after separating from her first husband, it was held that
the law could not presume the continuance of the first husband's
life, but that it was a question of fact for the jury whether he was
alive or dead at the date of the second marriage ; ' but where a
letter was proved to have been written by a wife from Yan
Dieman's Land, dated only twenty-five days prior to second
marriage, it was held that it might be presumed that the husband
had been guilty of bigamy ;* and on an indictment for manslaughter
by driving a cab over a woman, the fact that the woman had been
killed was in itself regarded as sufficient prima facie evidence of
negligence to rebut the presumption of innocence, and to place upon
the driver the burthen of proving that he had exercised due care.^
§ 115. An exception to the rule that innocence is to be presumed
on principles of public policy exists in some cases of agency, both
in criminal and civil cases." Thus, a contract baker may be
convicted of selling unwholesome bread, if it appear that he has
allowed his foreman to use alum, though not in such quantities
as to render the bread unwholesome, but that the servant has
introduced alum to a deleterious extent;' by the Pawnbrokers
Act, 1872, " anything done or omitted by the servant, apprentice,
1 See Middleton v. Earned, 1849 ; v. Grierson, 1848, H. L. ; and the
E. V. Bjornsen, 1865. Breadalbane case, 1866, H. L., cited
2 E. V. Twyning, 1819. See E. ■;;. post, § 172.
Jones, 1883. ^ E. v. Cavendish, 1873 (Ir.).
3 E. V. Lumley, 1869; E. v. Will- « See post, §§ 905, 906. See, also,
shire, 1881. See further, E. f. Jones, Cooper v. Slade, 1857, H. L. (Ld.
1868 ; and see, as to the presumption Wensleydale).
of life, §§ 198—203, post. ' E. v. Dixon, 1814. See Att.-
* E. V. Harborne, 1835; E. v. Gen. u. Eiddle, 1832; and Searle v.
Mansfield, 1841. See, also, Lapsley Eeynolds, 1866.
106
CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTION OF GUILT.
or agent of a pawnbroker, in the course of or in relation to the
business," shall be deemed to be done or omitted by the pawn-
broker ;^ the directors of a gas company are criminally answerable
for an act done by their superintendent and engineer, under
a general authority to manage the works, though personally
ignorant of the particular plan adopted, and though such plan was
a departure from the original and understood method, which the
directors had no reason to suppose was discontinued f and the sale
of a libeP in a bookseller's shop by his servant in the ordinary
course of his employment, is evidence of a guilty publication by
the master. But this presumption is never conclusive against the
master. Indeed, on indictments for libel, it is especially provided
that the master, under "not guilty," may prove that the publica-
tion was in fact made " without his authority, consent, or know-
ledge," and that there was " no want of care or caution on his
part."* Similar principles apply not only to publishers of news-
papers,^ but to owners of alkali works.®
§ 115a. In spite of the usual presumption of innocence, it must,
too, be presumed on a prosecution under the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children Act, 1894, that the child, who is the subject
of the charge, is of the age which it is charged as being and
apparently is.'
§ 116.* Moreover, the presumption of innocence may be over-
thrown, and a presumption of guilt be raised, by the misconduct of
the party in suppressing or destroying evidence, which he ought to
produce, or to which the other party is entitled.' For example,
' 35 & 36 V. c. 93, § 8. E. v. Holbrook, 1878 ; on second
» E. V. Medley, 1834 (Ld. Den- trial, 1878 ; E. v. Eamsey, 1884.
man). See, also, E. v. Stephens, M4 & 45 V. c. 37 ("The Alkali, &c.
1866 ; Mullins v. Collins, 1874 ; and Works Eegulation Act, 1881 "), § 25,
Betts V. De Vitre, 1868 (Ld. Chelms- amended by 55 & 56 V. c. 30.
ford, 0.) ; and Dickinson v. Fletcher, ' 57 & 58 V. o. 41, § 17.
1874; Somerset v. Hart, 1884; dis- « Qr. Ev. § 37, in great part,
tinguished Bond v. Evans, 1888. » For instance, formerly, by 21
3 Gr. Ev. § 36, in part. J- 1, c. 27 (probably copied from a
* 6 & 7 V. c. 96 (" The Libel Act, similar edict of Hen. II. of France,
1843"), § 7. As to the law before cited by Domat), the mother of an
the stat., see 1 Euss. 0. & M. 251 ; E. illegitimate child who endeavoured
V. Gutch, 1829 ; Harding v. Green- privately, either by drowning, or
ing, 1817 ; E. v. Almon, 1770. secret burying, or by any other way,
« 1 Euss. 0. & M. 251 ; 6 & 7 V. to conceal its death, was presumed
0. 96 (" The Libel Act, 1843 "), § 7 ; to have murdered it, unless she could
107
SUPPEESSING OE DESTEOYING EVIDENCE. [PAET I.
the spoliation of papers, material to show the neutral character of
a vessel, furnishes, as before pointed out'), a strong presumption,
in odium spoliatoris, against the ship's neutrality ;^ if any person on
board a vessel, which is being chased by an officer of the preven-
tive service, throw overboard, stave, or destroy any part of the
lading, the vessel is forfeited, because such conduct raises an almost
irresistible presumption that the freight so made away with was
legally liable to seizure f the concealment on board a vessel of any
goods liable to duty, justifies the inference that the owner intended
to defraud the customs, and such goods will accordingly be for-
feited;* a presumption that they are adverse to him is raised
against a party, who, having obtained possession of papers from
a witness, after the service of a subpoena duces tecum upon the
latter, withholds them at the trial.^ Indeed, the general rule is
" omnia j)rcesumuntur contra spoliatorem,"^ whose conduct is attri-
buted to a supposed consciousness that the truth would operate
against him. Thus, to take a familiar example, where the finder
of a jewel would not produce it, the jury, under the judge's direc-
tion, presumed against him that it was of the highest value of its
kind.' But in an action for goods sold against a defendant who
has been guilty of no fraud or improper conduct, in the absence of
evidence of the quality of the .goods which were delivered, the pre-
sumption is that such goods were goods of the cheapest description.^
§ 117.^ But the mere fabrication of evidence does not of itself
furnish any presumption of law against the innocence of the party,
but is a matter to be dealt with by the jury. Innocent persons,
under the influence of terror, have sometimes been led to the simula-
tion of exculpatory facts, of which there are several instances in the
prove by one witness at the least that * 2 Poth. Obi. 292 ; Dalston ;■.
the child was bom dead. This bar- Coatsworth, 1721 ; Cowper v. Ld.
barous rule is now rescinded both ia Cowper, 1734 ; E. v. Arundel, 1721 ;
England and America. See, as to D. of Newcastle i". Kinderley, 1803;
present English law, 24 & 25 V. c. 100 Gray v. Haig, 1855 ; Annesley v. E.
("The Offences against the Person of Anglesea, 1743 (Ir.). See, also.
Act, 1861 "), § 60. Sir S. Eomilly's argument in Ld!
1 Supra, § 107. Melville's case, 1806; Anon., 1698.
^ The Hunter, 1815 ; The Pizarro, In Baker v. Eay, 1826, the L. C.
1827 (Am.). thought that this rule had in some
3 See 39 & 40 V. c. 36 (" The Cus- cases been pressed a little too far,
toms Consolidation Act, 1876"), § 180. ' Armory v. Delamirie, 1721.
* See 39 & 40 V. c. 36, § 177. » Clunnes v. Pezzey, 1807.
* Leeds v. Cook, 1803. - ' Gr. Ev. § 37, as to first six lines,
108
C. v.] FABRICATION AND NON-PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE.
books. ^ Moreover, the exercise by a client of Ms undoubted
right to prevent his solicitor from disclosing confidential com-
munications, forms no just ground for adverse presumption against
him.^ The non-production of deeds or papers, after notice, has,
in general, only the effect of admitting the other party to prove
their contents by parol,' and, as against the party refusing to
produce them, to raise a prima facie presumption that they have
been properly stamped.* Nevertheless, such conduct is, in the
absence of excuse, calculated to produce a very prejudicial effect in
the minds of the jury against the person having recourse to it ;^
and if the production of his papers would establish the guilt or
innocence of a person charged with fraud or misconduct, the jury
will be amply justified in presuming him guilty from the unex-
plained fact of their non-production.^ Indeed, jurors will always
do well to regard with suspicion the conduct of a party, who,
having it in his power to produce cogent evidence in support of his
case-, offers testimony of a weaker and less satisfactory character.'
§ 118.^ Though the general presumption of law is in favour of
innocence, yet, as men seldom do unlawful acts with innocent
intentions, the law presumes that every act, which in itself is
unlawful, has been wrongfully intended, till the contrary appears.'
Thus, on a charge of murder, malice is presumed from the fact of
killing, unaccompanied by circumstances of extenuation ; and the
burthen of disproving the malice is thrown upon the accused ; i" and
if an unauthorised party, to raise money, puts the name of another
person to a bill, a felonious intent will be presumed, unless the
accused show reasonable grounds for believing that he was autho-
1 See 3 Inst. 232 ; Wile. Circ. Ev. » (j.,., Ev. § 34, as to first seven
154. lines.
2 Wentworth V. Lloyd, 1864, H. L. " "Where an act, in itself in-
(Ld. Chelmsford). different, if done with a particular
3 Cooper V. Gibbons, 1813. intent becomes criminal, there the
* Crisp V. Anderson, 1815. See intent must be proved_ and found ;
§ 148, post. but -where the act is in itself unlaw-
^ See Eoe v. Harvey, 1769 (Ld. fal, the proof of justification or ex-
Mansfield) ; Bate v. Kinsey, 1835 cuse lies on the defendant ; and in
(Ld. Lyndhurst); Sutton i;. Devon- failure thereof, the law implies a
poit, 1858 ; Edmonds v. Poster, criminal intent." E. v. Woodfall,
1876. 1770 (Ld. Mansfield). See also E. t;.
« Clifton V. U. S., 1816 (Am.). Harvey, 1827 ; E. v. Wallace, 1853
' See N. Y. Civ. Code, § 1852, (&.); and E. v. Creevoy, 1S13.
arts. 6 ajid 7. " I'ost. C. L. 255.
109
UNLAWFUL INTENT WHEN NOT PRESUMED. [PAET I.
rised to act as he did, and acted on that belief.^ A similar pre-
sumption arises in civil actions, where the act complained of is
unlawful. Thus, on the one hand, where the act was prima facie
unlawful, malice in law is presumed. For instance, in actions of
slander, though it appear that the defendant was not actuated by
ill-will against the plaintiff, malice in law will usually be inferred
from the fact of intentional publication.^ And in other actions for
damages founded on wrongs, as for a malicious arrest, a malicious
prosecution, and the like, the fact that the defendant has had
recourse to legal proceedings raises a primS, facie inference in his
favour, which the plaintiff is bound to rebut by proving the absence
of all reasonable and probable cause,' and the presence of an actual
malicious intent.^ On the other hand, where the act was prima
facie lai.rful, and an action cannot be maintained in respect of
it except on proof of " malice," malice in law will not be implied,
but it is necessary that actual malice be proved. If, therefore,
1 E. V. Beard, 1837 (Coleridge, J.).
^ Bromage v. Prosser, 1825, where
Bayley, J., as to implied (or legal)
malice (as distinguished from malice
in fact), says : " Malice, in the
common acceptation, means ill-will
against a person ; hut in its legal
sense it means a wrongful act, done
intentionally, without just cause or
excuse. If I give a perfect stranger
a blow likely to produce death, I do
it of malice, because I do it inten-
tionally, and without just cause or
excuse. If I maim cattle, without
knowing v/hose they are ; if I poison
a fishery, without knowing the
owner, I do it of malice, because it
is a wrongful act, and done inten-
tionally. * * * If I traduce a man,
whether I know him or not, and
whether I intend to do him an injury
or not, I apprehend the law considers
it as done of malice, because it is
wrongful and intentional. It equally
works an injury, whether I mean to
produce an injury or not, and if I
had no legal excuse for the slander,
why is he not to have a remedy
again nt me for the injury it pro-
duces ? And I apprehend the law
recognises the distinction between
these two descriptions of malice,
malice in fact, and malice in law, in
actions of slander. In an ordinary
action for words, it is sufficient to
charge that the defendant spoke them
falsely ; it is not necessary to state
that they were spoken maliciously.
This is so laid down in Sty. 392, and
was adjudged upon error in Mercer
V. Sparkes, 15S6. The objection there
was, that the words were not charged
to have been spoken maliciously, but
the court answered, that the words
were themselves malicious and slan-
derous, and, therefore, the judgment
was affirmed. But in actions for
such slander as is prima facie ex-
cusable on account of the cause of
speaking or writing it, as in the case
of servants' characters, confidential
advice, or communications to persons
who ask it, or have a right to expect
it, malice in fact must be proved by
the plaintiff, and in Edmonson v.
Stevenson, 1765, Ld. Mansfield takes
the distinction between these and
ordinary actions of slander."
3 Abrath o. North East Ry. Co.,
1886, H. L. See, also, Davidson v.
Smyth, 1887 (Ir.).
* Mitchell V. Jenkins, 1833 ; Portor
i;. Weston, 1839; Johnstone v. Sutton,
1786. The jury may, but are not
hound, to infer malice in fact from
the want of probable cause. Id,
110
CHAP, v.] EOUNDARIES — RIPARIAN OWNERSHIP,
defamatory language was used upon a privileged occasion, the
plaintiff must establish .actual malice,^ and in order to do this,
must, either by extrinsic or by intrinsic evidence,^ prove facts which
are inconsistent with bona fides.' The occasion being lawful, the
prima facie legal presumption, which exists tiU it is displaced by
actual evidence, is that the speaker was actuated by proper
motives.*
§ 119. Some presumptions also exist with respect to the owner-
ship of property. Thus, with regard to boundaries of property,"^
where two counties or parishes are separated by a non-tidaP river,
the mid-stream is the presumptive boundary between them ;' the
owner of a several fishery is, when the terms of the grant are un-
known, presumed to be the owner of the soil ;' the soil of unnavig-
able rivers, usque ad medium filum aquse, together with the right
of fishing, — but not the right of abridging the width, or interfer-
ing with the course, of the stream,' — is presumed to belong to the
owner of the adjacent land ; '" and, in navigable rivers and arms of
the sea, the soil is primS, facie vested in the Crown, and the fishery
is prima facie public.'^ These presumptions as to riparian owner-
ship in streams, do not, however, apply to great non-tidal inland
lakes, whether navigable or not.'^ But somewhat similar presump-
tions are recognised in respect of the sea- shore. Land there which
' Clark V. Molyneux, 1877, 0. A. 1872"), §§ 2, 3, 4, cited post, § 1771.
' Cooke V. Wildes, 1856. ' Bridgwater Trust v. Bootle-cum-
' Toogood V. Spyring, 1834; Whit- Linacre, 1866.
field V. South East Ey. Co., 1858; ' E. v. Landulph, 1834 (Patteson,
Ooxhead v. Eichards, 1846; Spill i). J.); M'Oannon v. Sinclair, 1859;
Maule, 1869 ; Wright v. Woodgate, E. v. Strand Board of Works, 1864.
1835; Taylor v. Hawkins, 1851 ; Gil- » D. of Somerset v. Fogwell, 1826;
pin V. Fowler, 1854 ; Somerville v. Holford v. Bailey, 1850 (in error) ;
Hawkins, 1851 ; Harris v. Thompson, Marshall v. The UUeswater St.
1853; E. v. Wallace, 1853 (Ir.). In an Navig. Co., 1863. But see observa-
action for alleged libel contained in tions, contra, by Cockburn, O.J., in
an answer to inquiries respecting a S. C, at pp. 747 — 749 ; also, Bloom-
servant's character, the jury may find field w. Wharton, 1867 (Ir.).
express malice from the simple fact • Biokett v. Morris, 1866, H. L.
that the answer complained of was "" Carter^). Murcot, 1768; Wishart
untrue to defendant's knowledge. v. WylUe, 1853 ; Lord v. Commiss.
Fountain i;. Boodle, 1842. for City of Sydney, 1859; Crossley
* Note h to Hodgson v. Scarlett, v. Lightowler, 1867 ; Dwyer v. Eich,
1818 ; approved of by Alderson, B., 1871 (Ir.).
in Gibbs I). Pike, 1842. " Carter v. Murcot, 1768; Mal-
° As to boundaries of counties, &o., oomson v. O'Dea, 1862, H. L.
in Ireland, see 35 & 36 V.c. 48 ("The i^ Bloomfield v. Wharton, 1867
County Boundaries (Ireland) Act, (Tr.); Bristowv.Cormican.lSTS, H.L.
111
PEESUMPTIOXS RESPECTING BOUNDAEIES. [PART I.
is covered by the ordinary high water, — or, to speak more accurately,
hy the medium high tide between the spring and the neap,- — is
presumed prima facie to be the property of the Crown, though by
grant or prescription it may belong to the lord of the manor, or to
any other subject j^ while that which is overflowed only at spring
tide, is presumed to be vested in the proprietor of the adjoining
lands ;^ land between high and low water mark, though forroing
part of the body of the adjoining county, '' is prima facie presumed
to be extra-parochial.^ Similarly, waste land on the sides, and the
soil to the middle, of a highway, are, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, presumed to belong to the owner of the adjoining
inclosed land, whether he be a freeholder, leaseholder, or copy-
holder.^ This latter presumption is founded on a supposition that
the proprietor of the adjoining land, at some former period, gave
up to the public for passage all the land between his inclosure and
the middle of the road,' and is, consequently, liable to be rebutted
by showing that the road has n«ver in fact been dedicated to the
public at all,^ or that it was originally dedicated by some other
party," or that the lord of the manor, or even that a stranger, has
exercised acts of ownership, either over the spot in dispute, or over
other waste land in immediate connection with it.'" The presump-
tion just mentioned as usually prevailing in the case of a public
highway, also obtains in the case of a private occupation road
running between two properties. In the absence of all evidence
of acts of ownership, in such a case each owner will be presumed
to be the proprietor of the soil usque ad medium filum viae.^^ And
1 Att.-Gen. V. Chambers, 1854. Packett, 1819 (Abbott, C.J.) ; Cooke
2 Blmidell v. Catterall, 1821 (Hoi- ■;;. Green, 1823 ; Sooones v. Morrell,
royd, J. , Bayley,J. ); Lopezi;. Andrew, 18139; M. of Salisbury f. Gt. N. Ey.
182G; Oalmady v. Eowe, 1848. See Co., 1858; Simpson v. Dendy, 1860;
post, §§ 130, 131. Berridge v. Ward, 1861 ; E. v. Strand
" Lowe V. Govett, 1832. Board of Works, 1864. See Gery v.
* Embleton v. Brown, 1860. Eedman, 1875.
^ E. V. Musson, 1858; Waterloo ' Doe t). Pearsey, 1827 (Bayley, J.).
Bridge Co. v. Cull, 1859 (Ld. Camp- « Leigh v. Jack, 1879, C. A.
bell). This presumption applies not ' Headlam v. Headley, 1810 (Bay-
only to the main seashore, but also ley, J.).
to an estuary or arm of the sea : '" Doe v. Kemp, 1835 ; Grose v.
Ipswich Dock Commrs. v. St. Peter, West, 1816 ; Anon., 1773 ; Doe v.
Ipswich, 1867 ; and to the shore of a Kemp, 1631 ; Doe v. Hampson, 1847;
tidal river: Bridgwater Trust v. Beckett i', Corporation of Leeds, 1871
Bootle-cum-Linacre, 1867. (L.JJ.).
" Doe V. Pearsey, 1827; Steel v. " Holmes w. BeUingham, 1859.
112
CHAP, v.] EIGHT OF OWNERS OP ADJOINING LANDS.
the mere fact that the owner of a field has a private right of way
over a lane leading only to that field, affords no presumption that
the soil of the lane is vested in him.^ Indeed, as to roads set out
under the first general Inclosure Act, the presumption that " the
herbage and grass arising therefrom" belongs to the proprietors of
the adjoining lands is conclusive.^ As to roads made under the
later Act of William the Fourth, the commissioners are directed to
award "the grass and herbage growing and renewing upon " them
to such persons as in their judgment are best entitled to the same.'
But as both Acts are silent respecting the ownership of the soil, it
seems that no legal presumption as to that can, under either Act,
arise in favour of the proprietors of the neighbouring allotments.*
§ 120. Further presumptions of law with regard to boundaries
are as follows. Where fields belonging to different owners are
separated by a hedge and ditch, the hedge primH facie belongs to
the owner of the field in which the ditch is not.' The common
user of a wall separating lands or houses which belong to different
proprietors, is prima facie evidence that the wall, and the land on
which it stands, belong to them in equal moieties as tenants in
common.^ But this presumption may be rebutted by showing
that the wall in fact stands on land, parts of which were separately
contributed by each proprietor.' There is* a distinction between
a bank and a wall ; the former, being made of earth taken from
the adjacent soil, is presumed to belong to the party whose land
adjoins thereto ; the latter, being built of materials brought from a
distance, is prim^ facie the property of the person who is bound to
repair it. Where a tree grows on the boundary of two fields,
so that the roots extend into the soil of each, the property in the
' Smith V. Howden, 1863. and the trees in them are declared to
2 41 Or. 3, 0. 109, § 11 ("The In- be common property, "mitoyens,"
closure (Consolidation) Act, 1801 "). except in certain cases; Code Civ.,
3 6 & 7 W. 4, c. 115, § 29. Arts. 670, 673.
* E. V. Hatfield, 1835 (Ld. Den- « Cubitt v. Porter, 1828; Wiltshire
man); E. v. Edmonton, 1831 (Ld. v. Sidford, 1827; Watson v. Gray,
Tenterden). 1880 (Fry, J.).
* Guy V. West, 1808 (Bayley, J.). ' Matts v. Hawkins, 1813; Murly
Where there are two ditches, one on v. M'Dermott, 1838.
each side of the hedge, no presump- ^ D. of Newcastle v. Clark, 1818
tion arises, and the ownership of the (Park, J.) ; Callis on Sewers, p. 74,
hedge depends upon evidence : see 4th ed.
id. In Prance, boundary hedges
T. VOL. 1. 113 I
ADJOINING OWNERS — SURFACE OWNERS. [PART I.
tree is presumed to belong to the owner of that land in which it
was first sown or planted.'
§ 121. The following disputable presumptions arise when the
surface and the property lying beneath it are vested in diilerent
owners. In the case of land, if the surface and the subjacent
minerals are vested in different owners without any deeds ^ regu-
lating their respective rights, the law presumes that the owner of
the surface has a right to the support of the minerals.' Similarly,
when a building is divided into different flats, the proprietor of
every upper story has a presumptive legal right, without any
express grant, or enjoyment for any given time, to the support of
each lower story, and the owner of each lower story is entitled to
the protection afforded by the upper rooms as a roof or covering
for his dwelling.* "When two adjoining closes, or two ancient
buildings,' respectively belong to different persons, the owner of
the one is presumed to have a limited right ® to the lateral support
of the other.' This presumption of a right to support does not
extend to a case where, by the erection of modern buildings, an
additional weight has been put upon the land.^ Tet even here, if
the house has been built for more than twenty years, the law will
presume the grant of an easement entitling the grantor to have his
house supported by the soO. of his neighbour's property' if the
' Holder v. Coates, 1827 (Little- perty incidental to all land, and not
dale, J.); Masters v. Pollie, 1620; a right founded on any presumption
contra, Waterman v. Soper, 1697 — of a grant or an easement : Baok-
1698; Anon., 1623. house i). Bonomi, 1861 (H. L.). Also,
"Where such deeds exist, see Wakefield t;. D. of Buooleuch, 1866;
Aspden v. Seddon, 1875 ; Davis v. also, May. of Birmingham v. Allen,
Treharne, 1881, 'per Dom. Proc. 1877 (0. A.); Dixon v. White, 1883
3 Humphries v. Brogden, 1848; (H. L.). And every fresh suhsidence
Smart v. Morton, 1835; Harris v. of a worked-out mine gives a mw
Eyding, 1 839 ; Hainos v. Eoherts, cause of action : Mitchell v. Darley
1857 ; Eowbotham v. Wilson, 1861 Main Coal Co., 1886 (H. L.).
(H. L.); Caledonian Ey. Co. v. ^ Humphries v. Brogden, 1848;
Sprot, 1856 (H. L.). See Elliot Caledonian Ey. Co. v. Sprot, 1856
V. The N. East. Ey. Co., 1863 (H. L.;
(H. L.); Brown v. Eobins, 1859
Fletcher v. Gt. W. Ey. Co., 1859
Gt. W. By. Co. V. Bennett, 1867
Pountney v. Clayton, 1883 (C. A."
» Lemaitre v. Davis, 1881 (Hall,
V.-C).
« See Smith v. Thackeray, 1866;
and Siddons v. Short, 1877.
Jeffries v. Williams, 1850; Eogers ' 2 EoU. Abr. 564, Trespass I.,
V. Taylor, 1858 ; Eadon v. Jeflcook, pi. 1, cited in 12 Q. B. 743.
1872 ; Hext v. Gill, 1872 ; Dugdale « MurcMe v. Black, 1865.
V. Eobertson, 1857. The right of « Wyatt v. Harrison, 1832; Hide
support is an ordinary right of pro- v. Thomborough, 1846 ; Partridge v,
114
CHAP, v.] LATERAL SUPPORT — WASTE LANDS.
easement has been enjoyed peaceably, openly, and without any
attempt at deception or concealment.' Where, too, a landowner,
having built two or more adjoining houses in such a way as to
require mutual support, or mutual drainage, afterwards parts
with them to different persons, either a grant or reservation will,
in general,^ be presumed, entitling each owner to have his house
supported by,' or drained through,* the adjoining buildings. A
presumption, however, of a legal right for bowsprits to project
will not be made where a dock and a wharf belonging to the same
owner, a separate sale is made of the wharf after the bowsprits
of vessels in the dock had for some years usually projected over
a part of the wharf.*
§ 122. With regard to manors, the following disputable pre-
sumptions exist. The lord of the manor is prima facie entitled to
all waste lands within the manor ; and it is not essentially necessary
that he should show acts of ownership upon them.^ The lord, in
exercising his right as owner of the soil to take gravel, marl, loam,
or subsoil, so long as he can do it without injury to the commoners,
will be presumed not to have exceeded his limited powers, and if
they complain the tenants must adduce some evidence that he has
done so.' In the case of an " approvement " by him, however, the
presumption is against the lord, apparently on the ground that, as
he has made a grant over the whole waste, his right to inclose any
portion of it must be conditional on his establishing that sufficient
waste is left for the tenants to enjoy their rights of common.*
§ 122a. When a tenant encroaches upon and incloses the waste
contiguous to his farm, he is presumed, in the absence of facts
proving a contrary intention, to have done it for the benefit of his
Scott, 1838, all of -wHoli cases are v. Carter tas been denied by Ld.
commented on in Humphries v, Westbury, 0., in SufBeld v. Brown,
Brogden, 1848. See Hunt v. Peake, 1864. See Pearson?;. Spencer, 1863;
1860 (Am.); Jeffries v. Williams, Wheeldon v. Burrows, 1878, 0. A. ;
1830; Rogers i;. Taylor, 1858. Polden v. Bastard, 1865; Watts v.
1 Dalton V. Angus, 1881 (H. L.). Kelson, 1870.
See, also, Bell v. Love, 1884 (H. L.). « Suffield v. Brown, 1864.
'^ See Muichiei;. Black, 1865. « Doe v. Williams, 1836 (Cole-
" Eichards v. Eose, 1852. See ridge, J.).
Solomon V. Vintners' Co., 1859, and ' Hall v. Byron, 1876.
Kempston v. Butler, 1861 (L-.). ^ Id.; Arletti;. ElUs, 1827 (Bayley,
* Pyer v. Carter, 1856 ; Hall v. J.) ; Lascelles v. Ld. Onslow, 1877
Lund, 1863. The authority of Pyer (Lush, J.).
115 1 2
PEESUMPTION ARISING FEOM POSSESSION. [PART I.
landlord.^ This presumption will be recognised even thougt tlie
lands inclosed be the property of a stranger ; ^ and will be much
strengthened, if the landlord of the farm be also the lord of the
waste.^
§ 123. A presumption of ownership in many cases arises from
possession, as men generally own the property they possess.* This
presumption arises under the Factors Act f under the Irish, Scotch,
and English Acts relating to injuries done by dogs to sheep f under
the Pawnbrokers Act, 1872, so far as relates to the holders of
pawn-tickets ;' and also under most of the statutes authorising the
compulsory sale of lands for particular purposes ; as, for instance,
in the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act.^ It may also be illus-
trated by a great variety of cases at common law. Thus in an
action on a policy of insurance on ship and cargo, plaintiff may
rely on the mere fact of possession,' or of having purchased the
ship's stores,^" without the aid of any documentary proof or title
deeds, unless such further proof be rendered necessary by some
contrary evidence. In matters relating either to real or personal
property, possession again gives rise to the same presumption of
ownership, which in the case of real property is presumed to be
ownership in fee." Indeed, in actions for trespass to real property,
the presumption arising from the possession, as against a mere
wrongdoer, amounts to conclusive evidence.^^ Therefore, in an
action for an injury done to the reversion of real estate, proof of
1 Doe?). Jones, 1846; Andrewes u. « 25 & 26 V. o. 59("TheDogs(I^e-
Hailes, 1853; Kingsmill ■y. Millard, land) Act, 1862"), § 2. See, also, 28 &
1855 ; Ld. Lisburne v. Davies, 1866 ; 29 V. c. 50, § 7, Ir. ; 26 & 27 V. c. 100
Doe V. Massev, 1851; Doe v. Wil- ("The Dogs (Scotland) Act, 1863",),
liams, 1836 ; Doe v. Murrell, 1837 § 2, So. ; and 28 & 29 V. c. 60 (" The
(Ld. Abinger); Doe v. Eees, 1834 Dogs Act, 1865"), § 2.
(Parke, B.); Doe v. Tidbury, 1854; ' 35 & 36 V. c. 93, s. 25.
Whitmore v. Humphries, 1871; Att.- ^ y & 9 y, p_ ^g, § 79.
Gen. V. Tomline, 1877. Formerly ' Robertson i'. French, 1803 ; Sut-
this point was otherwise : see Doe v. ton v. Buck, 1810.
Mulliner, 1 795 (Ld. Kenyon) ; Doe 1° Thomas v. Foyle, 1803 (Ld. El-
V. Davies, 1795. lenborough).
* Cases cited in last note. " Doe v. Conlthred, 1837 (Ld.
3 Bryan 11. Winwood, 1808. Denman) ; Jayne v. Price, 1814;
* Webb V. Fox, 1797 (Ld. Kenyon). Doe v. Penfold, 1838 (Patteson, J.).
' 52 & 53 V. c. 45. See Heyinan v. See Metters v. Brown, 1863, as to
Flewker, 1863; Baines v. Swainson, how this presumption can be re-
1863; Fuentes V. Montis, 1868 (Ex. butted.
Ch.);Vickersi;. Hertz, 1871; Johnson "Elliott v. Kemp, 1840 (Parke
V. Credit Lyonnais Co., 1877, C. A. B.).
116
CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTION ARISING FROM POSSESSION.
the receipt of rent^ by the plaintifi will, -unless the sum annually
received be so small as to raise a presumption that it is a mere quit
rent/ be sufficient evidence of title to the reversion as against all
the world, except the real owner and persons claiming under him.'
In actions against wrong-doers for injuries io personal chattels, proof
of possession, when coupled with evidence that the plaintiff has
some special property in such chattels, has, too, long been held to
constitute a complete title.* Therefore, an undischarged bankrupt
may' sue in trover a vrrong-doer who has taken goods out of his
custody ; certainly possession of a ship under a transfer from the
rightful owner, void under the register Acts for non-compliance
therewith, constitutes a sufficient title to support an action of
trover against a stranger for converting a part of the ship which
was wrecked ; ® even a general bailment will suffice, without being
made for any special purpose, but only for the benefit of the
rightful owner ; ' and a mere naked possession will (when no more
is proved) entitle a party to maintain trover as against a wrong-
doer,* though it wiU not entitle a mere bailee, who is proved to be
under no liability to his bailor, to maintain an action for negligence
against a third party.'
§ 124. Many authorities also show that the fact of his producing
a document makes it ample primS, facie evidence for a jury in
support of a plaintiff's claim.'" Thus the production of an I 0 TJ
signed by the defendant, though not addressed to anyone by
name, is, in general, '^ abundant evidence, not indeed of money lent
(of which it furnishes no proof whatever),'^ but of an account stated
* See, also, 23 & 24 V. o. 154, 1856, wMcli resolves a doubt raised
§ 24, Ir., which makes the receipt of by Parke, B., in Fyson v. Chambers,
rent, under certain circumstances, for 1842 ; Fitzpatriok v. Diinphy, 1851
a certain period, prima facie evidence (Ir.). See also Armory v. Delamirie,
of a landlord's derivative title. 1721, 1722; Sutton v. Buck, 1810
^ Doe V. Johnson, 1819 (Holroyd, (Lawrence, J.).
J., recognised in Eeynolds v. Eey- ' Clarridge v. South Staffordshire
nolds, 1848) (Jr.). EaU. Co., 1892.
^ Daintry v. Brocklehurst, 1848. '" Fesenmayer v. Adcock, 1847
* ElHott'w. Kemp, 1840 (Parke, B.). (Pollock, C. B.).
* Webb V. Fox, 1797 ; Drayton v. " But it will not furnish evidence
Dale, 1823 ; Fyson v. Chambers, of an account stated, if the defendant
1842; these were decisions under the can show that, in fact, it was not
old law. given in acknowledgment of a debt
« Sutton V. Buck, 1810. due : Lemere v. Elliott, 1861.
' Per Chambre, J., id. 309. "Fesenmayer v. Adcock, 1847,
' Jeffries v. Gt. West. Eail. Co., questioning Douglas v. Holme, 1840.
117
PRESUMPTION ARISING FROM POSSESSION. [PART I.
between the parties,^ and if a letter be given in evidence with tbe
direction torn ofP, the jury will do well to presume, prima facie,
that it was addressed to the party who produces it.*
§ 125. As possession is prima facie proof of ownership in actions
for the recovery of land, it is on the one hand an iaflexible rule
that the plaintiff must solely rely on the strength of his own legal
title, and on the other hand clear that proof of a prior possession
by the plaintiff, however short, will be prima facie evidence of
title as against a wrong-doer.^ Thus, where the plaintiff had given
possession of a room to a third party, he was held entitled to
recover against the defendant who had, about a year afterwards,
broken into the room at night and taken the key ; * and again,
where on the plaintiff's part, possession for twenty- three years, and
making increases of rent during that period, were proved, it was
held that defendant could not rebut the presumption of a seisin in
fee arising from these unequivocal acts of ownership by merely
showing a subsequent possession (for less than twenty years ') by
himself. The presumption of ownership which arises from posses-
sion will in general extend not only to the surface of the land
which has been the subject of possession, but to all minerals which
are under it.^ Still, this presumption is not universal, since in
mining districts the right to the minerals and the fee-simple of the
soil are frequentlyl n different persons. Even where it arises it
may be rebutted by showing either an absence of enjoyment of
the minerals by the owner of the soil, or an actual user of the
minerals by a stranger.' A very similar primS, facie presumption
is that the tenant of the surface is tenant of the subjacent strata.
But this presumption also is liable to be defeated by proof that the
surface and the subsoil have become separate tenements.*
' See last note; Curtis v. Eiokards, "The Land Transfer Act, 1875" (38
1840; Croker v. Walsh, 1862 (Ir.). & 39 V. c. 87), § 18, both of which
See Wilson v. Wilson, 1854. ^ statutes, for purposes of registration
^ Curtis V. Eickards, 1840 (Tindal, of title, recognise an opposite pre-
C.J.). _ sumption, unless, in the description
3 Asher v. Whitelook, 1865. of the land, mines or minerals bo
* Doe V. Dj'eball, 1829. See Doe expressly mentioned.
V. Barnard, 1849. ' Eowe v. Grenfel, 1824 (Ld. Ten-
'^ Doe i;. Cooke, 1831 (Ld. Tenter- terden) ; Eowe v. Brenton, 1828-
den). See, also, Brest v. Lever, 1841. Hodgkinson v. Fletcher, 1781. '
« But see "The Transfer of Land « geyse v. Powell, 1853; Smith v
Act, 1862 " (25 & 26 V. c. 53), § 9, and Lloyd, 1854 (Parke, B.),
118
CHAP, v.] LONG UNINTEEEUPTED POSSESSION.
§ 126. The presumption of title arising from possession will
always be much strengthened by proof of uninterrupted enjoyment
for a considerable time. In many cases, indeed, the legislature has,
as before observed,^ fixed what periods of undisturbed possession
will suffice to confer an absolute title. In such cases, when the
party by his pleading shows that he relies upon the statutory limi-
tation, no lapse of time but that of the full period fixed by Act of
Parliament will justify a presumption in support of the claim.^ If,
however, a party, instead of depending upon the statute-law, relies
(as he may do) upon common-law presumption, or a lost grant,
enjoyment for a less period than the statutory number of years,
when coupled with other circumstances, will warrant a jury in
finding a verdict in his favour.'
§ 127. The principles of legal presumption which we have just
been discussing apply, indeed, to all cases to which the statutes of
limitation do not extend, though in many of them they are of
necessity only capable of a vague interpretation. For instance,
though (as we have just incidentally seen*) a plaintiff seeking to
recover land is bound to establish his own title, he will not be
required to prove strictly every successive link in it, provided that
the property has been .long in his possession. Therefore, when a
person claiming under a feoffment proved that he had had un-
interrupted enjoyment of the premises for twenty years, the court
and jury presumed, in his favour, that the necessary formalities of
the old livery of seisin had been complied with.^ Presumptions of
this latter nature will not, however, now be raised, where the land
has been held for a less period than twelve years,* nor will they,
where the acts of the parties, or the other facts in the case, lead to
a different inference.'
§ 127a. Another disputable presumption of law is that arising
from the possession of stolen property recently after the commission
of a theft. Such possession raises a prima facie presumption that
1 Ante, § 74. bury).
* See 2 & 3 W. 4, c. 71, § 6 (" The ^ Ante, § 125.
Prescription Act, 1832"); 2 & 3 W. " jjges v. Lloyd, 1811; Doe v.
4, c. 100, § 8 ; Eldridge v. Knott, Cleveland, 1829 ; Doe v. Davies,
1774 ; Lowe v. Carpenter, 1851. 1837 ; Doe v. Gardiner, 1852.
3 See Wheaton v. Maple & Co., « 37 & 38 V. o. 57 ("The Eeal Pro-
1893; Bright i;. Walker, 1834 (Parke, perty Limitation Act, 1874"); and
B.) ; Ld. Stamford v. Dunbar, 1845 ; see cases in last note.
Lowe V. Carpenter, 1851 (Parke, B.); ' Doe v. Gardiner, 1852.
Haumer v. Chance, 1865 (Ld. West-
119
RECENT POSSESSION OF STOLEN PEOPERTY. [PART I.
the possessor was either the thief, or the receiver, accordiDg to the
other circumstances of the case.^ This presumption, though rebut-
tahle, is, when unexplained,^ either by direct evidence, or by the
character and habits of the possessor, or otherwise, usually regarded
by the jury as conclusive.^ The question as to what amounts to
recent possession, varies according as the stolen article is or is not
calculated to pass readily from hand to hand. Thus, where two
ends of woollen cloth in an unfinished state, consisting of. about
twenty yards each, were found in the possession of a prisoner two
months after they had been stolen, it was held that the prisoner
should explain how he came by the property.* But, on the other
hand, where the only evidence against a prisoner was, that certain
tools had been traced to his possession three months after their
loss, an acquittal was directed ; ^ and a similar course was pursued
on an indictment for horse-stealing, where the horse was not dis-
covered in the custody of the accused until after six months from
the date of the robbery ; ^ and where goods, lost sixteen months
before, were found in the prisoner's house, but no other evidence
was adduced against him, he was not called upon for his defence.'
The finding of stolen property in the house of the accused, provided
there were other inmates capable of committing the larceny, wiU,
moreover, be of itself insufficient to prove his possession, however
recently the theft may have been effected ; * though, if coupled
^ E. V. Langmead, 1864. presumption, id.
» E. V. ExaU, 1866 (Pollock, O.B.). « E. ■;;. Cooper, 1852 (Maule, J.);
3 2 East, P. 0. 656; E. v. , E. v. Harris, 1860 (Channell, B.).
1826; The State V.Adams, 1789— 1806 ' E. v. , 1826 (Bayley, J.).
(Am.). " Furtum prsesumitur com- * 2 St. Ev. 614, n. (g). See Ex
luissum ah illo, penes quern res parte Eansley, 1823, -wrnere the bare
furata inventa fuerit, adeo ut si non finding of smuggled spirits in de-
doouerit a quo rem habuerit, just^, fendant's house, during his absence
ex ilia iuventione, poterit subjici from home, was held insufficient to
tormentis." 2 Masc. de Prob. concl. support a conviction under 11 G. 1,
834; Menoch. de Prses. lib. 5, prses. c. 30, § 16 (now repealed by 30 & 31
31. See ante, § 63. V. c. 59), for knowingly harbouring
* E. V. Partridge, 1836 (Patteson, and concealing. Abbott, C.J., ob-
J.). served, " The mere naked fact of the
^ E. V. Adams, 182S (Parke, J.). spirits being found in the defendant's
See E. V. Cocking, 1836, where two house during his absence cannot be
sacks were found in the prisoner's considered as conclusive evidence of
possession twenty days after they had knowledge to support a conviction
been missed; and Coleridge, J., left on this statute. There is abundant
the question to the jury, observing, ground for suspicion, but we cannot
that " stolen property usually passes say that it is a clear and satisfactory
through many hands." See the ob- ground to convict." See, also E. v,
seivations of the reporter on this Hale, 1778.
120
CHAP, v.] RECENT POSSESSION OF STOLEN PEOPEETT.
with proof of other suspicious circumstances, it may fully warrant
the conviction of the accused. '^
§ 127b. This presumption is in all cases one of fact rather than
of law. It is occasionally so strong as to render unnecessary any
direct proof of what is called the corpus delicti. Thus, to borrow
an apt illustration from Maule, J., if a man were to go into the
London Docks quite sober, and shortly afterwards were found very
drunk, staggering out of one of the cellars, in which above a
million of gallons of wine are stowed, " this would be reasonable
evidence that the man had stolen some of the wine in the cellar,
though no proof were given that any particular vat had been
broached, and that any wine had actually been missed." ^
§ 127c.^ The presumption under discussion is not confined to
charges of theft, but extends to all charges, however penal. Thus,
on an indictment for arson, proof that property, which was in an
house at the time it was burnt, was soon afterwards found in the
possession of the prisoner, raises a probable presumption that he
was present and concerned in burning the house ; * and under
similar circumstances a like inference arises in the cases of murder
accompanied by robbery,' of burglary,^ and of the possession of
a quantity of counterfeit money.'
§ 128. The maxim, " ex diuturnitate temporis omnia prsesumun-
tur rit^ et solemniter esse acta," is also of great importance. It is
a presumption of law that where there has been long continued
possession in assertion of a right, the right must be presumed to
have had a legal origin if such a legal origin was possible, and
that all those acts were done and the circumstances existed which
were necessary to the creation of a valid legal title.* It is also a
presumption of law that all transactions were originally legal and
honest, while the older they are the stronger will be the presumption.'
Such presumption indeed is sometimes, and under certain circum-
stances, conclusive. An instance of this has already been furnished'"
1 E. V. Watson, 1817 (Ld. Ellen- Bxall, 1866.
borougli and Abbott, J.). ' E. v. FuUer, 1816; E. v. Jarvis,
^ E. V. Barton, 1854. See, also, E. 1855.
K. Mockford, 1868. See, however, E. « pijUlips v. Halliday, 1891 (Ld.
V. Williams, 1871 ; sed qy. this case. Herschell).
' Gr. Ev. § 34. 8 Croft v. Eiokmansworth High-
* E. V. Eiokman, 1789. -way Board, 1888 ; Postlethwaite v.
« Wills, Cr. Ev. 61. Eickman, 1889 (C.A.) (Bowen, L.J.).
• See E. V. Gould, 1840 ; E. v. '» Ante, ^ 87.
121
REGULARITY PRESUMED FROM LAPSE OF TIME. [PART I.
in the case of ancient documents, the due execution of which will be
presumed on their mere production. And the American courts recog-
nise other applications of the rule. Thus, after ^ the lapse of twenty
years, they conclusively presume, in favour of every judicial tribunal
which has acted within its jurisdiction, that all persons interested in
its proceedings have had due notice.^ They have also held, that
where an authority is given by law to executors, guardians, and
other officers, to make sales of lands upon being duly licensed by
the courts, but they are required to advertise the sales in a par-
ticidar manner, and to observe other formalities, the lapse of
sufficient time (which in most cases is fixed at thirty years) raises
a conclusive presumption that aU the legal formalities were ob-
served ; ^ the licence to sell, and the official character of the vendor,
being provable by record or judicial registration, must in general
be so proved; and the deed must also be proved in the usual
manner ; but the intermediate proceedings are presumed. Prohatis
extremis prcesumuntur media. And in England the valid existence
of a bye-law will be inferred without any direct proof of its having
been passed, or of the loss of it, but the court will infer its existence
from a usage of long standing.*
§ 129. The maxim, " ex diuturnitate temporis omnia prsesu-
muntur rite esse acta " has, indeed, since the passing of the Vendor
and Purchaser Act, 1874,* become one of the leading rules, which
are henceforth to regulate the practice of conveyancers and the rights
of vendors and purchasers. And by the Conveyancing and Law of
Property Act, 1881,^ it is enacted that the purchaser of any property
" shall assume, imless the contrary appears, that the recitals contained
in the abstracted instruments of any deed, will, or other document
forming part of the title [prior to the time prescribed by law
> Largely, Gr. Ev. §§ 19 and 20. Johnson v. Barnes, 1873 (Ex. Cli.).
" Brown ■«. Wood, 1820 (Am.). ^ 37 & 38 V. c. 78. Provisions
^ See Pejepscot Prop's v. Eansom, almost identical with those in the
1817 (Am.); Blossom V. Cannon, 1817 text contained in the Act of 1881
(Am.); Colman v. Anderson, 1813 are contained in § 2, subs. 2, of the
(Am.); Williams v. Eyton, 1859; Act of 1874, and are said, in the
Gray v. Gardiner, 1807 (Am.), tabular index to statutes for that
holding an interval of twenty-two year (which is of no authority how-
years sufficient. See cases collected, ever), to be repealed by the Act of
Broom's Legal Maxims (6th edit. p. 1881, but they are not mentioned in
890),tit."OmiiiaPr8e8umuiitur,&c."; the repealing portions (viz., § 7, and
Society, &o. v. Wheeler, 1814 (Am.). Sched. n. Part III.) of the Act of
* E. V. PoweU, 1854 ; May. of Hull 1881.
V. Homer. 1779 (Ld. Mansfield). See « 44 & 45 V. c. 41, § 3, subs. 3.
122
CHAP, v.] REGULARITY PRESUMED FROM LAPSE OP TIME.
for its commencement] are correct, and give all the material
contents of the deed, will, or other dociunent so recited, and that
every document so recited was duly executed by all necessary
parties, and perfected, if and as required, by fine, recovery,
acknowledgment, inrolment, or otherwise." The time prescribed
by law for the commencement of the title may be fixed by express
stipulations, and it is always desirable to so fix it, at the same time
stating the nature of the instrument with which the title com-
mences.^ In the absence of stipulation,^ abstracts of title in
general ^ commence, as to freeholds, with a document at least forty
years old ; ' as to leaseholds for years, with the lease or under-
lease;* as to the freehold interest in enfranchised copyholds or
customary freeholds, with the deed of enfranchisement.*
§ 130. The presumption afforded by the maxim, " ex diuturni-
tate temporis omnia prsesumuntur rit^ esse acta," has again an
important application where the rights of the Crown are con-
cerned. Here," — though lapse of time does not of itself furnish a
conclusive legal bar to the title of the Sovereign, — yet, if the
adverse claim could have had a legal commencement, juries are
instructed or advised to presume such commencement, after many
years of uninterrupted possession. Accordingly, royal grants,
charters, and even Acts of Parliament, have not infrequently been
thus found by the jury, after long-continued peaceable enjoyment,
accompanied by the usual acts of ownership ; ' the long enjoyment
of port duties, toUs, customary dues, fees, or the like, will, if the
nature of the case adroits it,' be held to warrant the presumption
of any fact necessary to make them legal;" while i£ distinct
' Wolstenholme & Brinton's Con- Allen, 1859 (Pigot, C.B.) (Ir.) ; Doe
veyancing Act, 6th. edit., p. 2. d. Devine v. "Wilson, 1855 (P. 0.);
* See Bolton v. London Sctool Little v. Wingfield, 1859 (Ir.); Roe
Board, 1878. v. Ireland, 1809 ; Goodtitle v. Bald-
3 Vendor and Purciaser Act (37 & win, 1809 ; Att.-Gen. v. Ewelme
38 V. c. 78), § 1. Hospital, 1853; Matter v. Trinity
* Id. § 2, r. 1 ; and " The Convey- Churcli, 1877 (Am.).
ancing and Law of Property Act, ^ See Gann v. Free Fishers of Whit-
1881" (44 & 45 V. c. 41), § 3, subs. 1. stable, 1864 (H. L.); Free Fishers
' Id. subs. 2. of Whitstable v. Gann, and Gann v.
* Gr. Ev. § 45, in part, as to nine Johnson, 1863 (Ex. Ch.) ; Bryant
lines. V. Foot, 1868 ; Lawrence v. Hitch,
' Goodman v. Mayor of Saltash, 1868. See, also, MLLLs v. May. of
1882(0. A.); E.V.Brown, 1779; May. Colchester, 1867; Forman v. Free
of Hull V. Horner, 1779 ; Eldridge v. Fishers of Whitstable, 1869 (H. L.).
Knott, 1774; Lopez i). Andrew, 1826; ' May. of Exeter v. Warren, 1844
Delarue v. Church. 1833 ; O'NeUl v. (Ld. Denman^.
123
TITLE PRESUMED FROM LONG ENJOYMENT. [PAET I.
evidence of any such payments be given as far back as living
memory goes, the jury, unless evidence to the contrary be shown,
will not only be quite justified in presuming, but will be directed
to presume, that such payments were immemorial, or at least were
referable to a legal origin ; ^ and a series of acts of ownership exer-
cised on the seashore by an adjoining proprietor, or the production
by him of a royal grant conveying the right of wreck,^ affords
abundant evidence for a jury to presume that the Crown formerly
granted the soil to one of his ancestors.' On the same principle,
after evidence of possession for nearly forty years of a tract of land,
of a prior order in council for a survey and of an actual survey, a
jury has, in America,* been instructed to presume that a patent
was duly issued. A longer period is, however, usually required for
this presumption to arise with regard to Crown or public grants
than is needed in the case of a grant by a private individual.*
§ 1-31. Again, on the same principle, the uninterrupted user of
a road by the public for forty or fifty years justifies a presumption
in favour of the original animus dedicandi, although there was
ground for supposing that the soil of the highway was vested in
the Crown,® and this although it is a rule that, to constitute a valid
dedication to the public of a highway, the owner of the soil must
intend to dedicate.'' Even a qualified or partial dedication of a
way may be presumed from continuous use. Accordingly,' where,
as far back as living memory goes, the public have enjoyed a right
of way across an arable field, and the owner has ploughed up the
whole field, including the path, it is presumed that the original
dedication of the way was subject to the right of ploughing it up
in due course of farming,^ and therefore the public had no right of
deviating from it, although the path may have become temporarily
impassable in consequence of being so ploughed." Where, too, the
1 Malcomsoa v. O'Dea, 1862 (H. * Jackson v. McCall, 1813 (Am.).
L.); Mills V. May. of OolcheBter, » See Mascard de Prob., p. 239;
1867; D. of Beaufort i;. Smith, 1849 concl. 199, n. 11, 12.
(Parke, B.); Pelliam v. Piokersgill, « E. v. East Mark, 1848; E. v,
1787 (Ashurst, J.); Shephard v. Petrie, 1855 ; Turner i). Walsh, 1881
Payne, 1863 (Ex. Ch.). (P. C). See Greenwich Board of
^ Hale de Jure Mar. 25, recognised Works v. Maudslay, 1870 ; Powers v.
in Calmady v. Eowe, 1848. Bathurst, 1880 (Pry, J.).
^ Oalmady v. Eowe, 1848; D. of ' Poole «;. Huskinson, 1843.
Beaufort v. May. of Swansea, 1849; ^ Mercer v. Woodgate, 1870; Ax-
Le Strange v. Eowe, 1865 (Erie, C. J.); nold v. Blaker, 1871.
Healy v. Thorne, 1870 (Ir.). See ' Arnold v. Holbrook, 1873.
nate, ^ 119.
124
CHAP, v.] TITLE PRESUMED FROM LONG ENJOYMENT.
facts proved leave room for such a presumption, property which a
parish has enjoyed for a long period may be presumed to be vested
in trustees for such parish.^
§ 132. In cases of incorporeal hereditaments, where it is desirable
to raise a presumption of lost grant, juries should not be required
to find as a fact that a deed of grant has been actually executed,
but without believing any grant to have been made, they may
often, under the instruction of the court, presume its existence for
the simple purpose of quieting possession} Such a presumption may
be sometimes raised even against a reversioner, provided it can be
either directly proved, or reasonably inferred, that he has had full
knowledge of his opponent's actual enjoyment of the right in
question, and has tacitly assented thereto.^ But the presumption
of a grant can only arise when the person against whom the right
is claimed might have interrupted or prevented the user relied on.*
Therefore, the grant of a right to the uninterrupted passage of air
to a windmill from over the soil of a neighbour, cannot be pre-
sumed from an uninterrupted use of the mill for forty years.^
§ 133.^ Juries are also sometimes advised to presume convey-
ances of corporeal hereditaments between private individuals, in
favour of the party who has proved a right to the beneficial owner-
ship, and whose undisturbed possession, being consistent with the
existence of the conveyance required to be presumed, affords reason-
able ground for belief that the legal title has in fact been con-
veyed.^ This presumption is made in order to prevent an apparently
just title from being defeated by mere formal matter.' It ought
only to be drawn where a party has shown a right good in sub-
stance, but in some way technically deficient in form.
' Haigh V. West, 1893 (0. A.). ^ Webb v. Bird, 1863 (Ex. Cb.);
2 Deeble v. Lineban, 1860 (Ir. Ex. Bryant v. Lefever, 1879 (0. A.).
Cb.'), following tbe dicta of Ld. Mans- ^ Gr. Ev. § 46, in part,
field in Eldridge v. Knott, 1774 ; and ' Doe v. Cooke, 1829 (Tindal, 0. J.),
of Ld. Wensleydale in Brigbt v. See Doe v. Millett, 1848, and cases
Walker, 1833 ; and in Magdalen Ooll. tbere cited.
V. Att.-Gen., 18o7 ; and overruling * Doe v. Cooke, 1829 (Tindal, O.J.) ;
a dictum of Bayley, B., in Day v. Doe v. Sy bourn, 1796 (Ld. Kenyon).
Williams, 1832 ; Little v. Wingfield, In Little v. Wingfield, 1859 (Ir.), a
1859 (It.). passage in Doe v. Cooke (supra), in
' Deeble v. Lineban, 1860 (L:. Ex. wbicb Tindal, C.J., states in wbat
Cb.); Winterbottom v.lA. Derby, cases tbis presumption may be made,
1867. is called in question, as laying down
* Chasemore v. Eichards, 1859 tbe law too narrowly.
(H. L.).
125
PRESUMPTION OP CONVEYANCE OF LEGAL TITLE. [PT. I.
§ 134. A presumption in favour of sucli a conveyance having
been made will, in general, prevail whenever it was the duty of
trustees to convey to the beneficial owner at a specified time, as
upon his attainment of the age of majority, or on the death of a
cestui que vie, or after the payment of debts, legacies, portions, or
the like, for in such cases it is reasonable to presume that the
trustees have performed their duty, and have done what a court of
equity would compel them to do.' A like presumption probably
arises where the duty to convey, though not express, may construc-
tively be gathered from the object of the trust, as, for instance,
where an estate is vested in trustees for a temporary purpose,
which has been attained, and no further intention is declared, or
can reasonably be inferred, requiring the legal estate to remain
outstanding.^
§ 135. It is said (probably rightly) that this presumption will
never be made against the owner of the inheritance, save in cases
where he has attempted to defeat the solemn acts of himself, or of
those through whom he claims. If, however, a mortgagor attempt
to set up an outstanding fee as against a mortgagee for years, or
the appointee of a devisee in fee to dispute the right of a former
devisor to grant a lease of the premises in question, on the ground
that the legal estate was, at the time of the grant, outstanding in a
trustee, the jury (even if in eases the estoppel is not pleaded) may
presume a conveyance. In the first case,^ the presumption wiU be
made in favour of the honesty of the mortgagor at the time of the
mortgage, though against his interest at the time of the trial ; and
in the second,* it will prevail, in order to give effect to the grant of
the devisor, which would otherwise be void.
§ 136. Questions under this head of presumptions frequently
arose in former times, when juries used often to be called upon to
1 England v. Slade, 1792 ; Doe v. " Hillary v. Waller, 1805 (Sir W.
Syboum, 1796 ; Wilson v. Allen, Grant) ; Doe v. Lloyd, 1806 (Law-
1820 (Sir T. Plumer); Emery v. rence, J.). See Sug. V. & P. (14th
Grocock, 1821 (Sir J. Leaoh). In edit.), 399; Math., Pres. Ev. 215—
England v. Slade, a conveyance from 217.
the trustees was presumed, though ' Per Abbott,C.J.,inDoev.Hilder,
only three years had elapsed from the 1819 ; Cottrell v. Hughes, 1855.
time when they ought to have con- ^ Bartlettti.Downes, 1825 (Abbott,
veyed. O.J.).
126
CHAP, v.] OUTSTANDING TERMS ACT.
presume the surrender of outstanding satisfied terms ; ^ tut an Aet,^
passed in 1845, provides that every satisfied term of years, -which,
either by express declaration or by construction of law^ shall, upon the
31st day of Decemher, 1845, he attendant upon the inheritance or
reversion of any land, shall on that day ahsolutely cease and
determine as to the land, upon the inheritance or reversion whereof
such term shall be attendant as aforesaid, except that every such
term of years which shall be so attendant as aforesaid by express
declaration, although thereby made to cease and determine, shall
afford to every person the same protection against every incum-
brance, charge, estate, right, action, suit, claim, and demand, as it
would have afforded to him if it had continued to subsist, but had
not been assigned or dealt with, after the said 31st day of December,
1845, and shall, for the purpose of such protection, be considered in
every court of law and of equity to be a subsisting term. It also
provides * that every term of years now subsisting or hereafter to
be created, becoming satisfied after the said 31st of December,
1845, and which by express declaration or construction of law,
shall after that day become attendant upon the inheritance or
reversion of any lands, shall, immediately upon the same becoming
so attendant, absolutely cease and determine as to the land, upon
the inheritance or reversion whereof such term shall become
attendant as aforesaid.*
§ 137. Notwithstanding this Act, it is perfectly clear that no
presumption can be allowed in favour of the surrender of a term
which is still wnsatiafied^ or the continuance of which is found in
a special verdict, or admitted in a special case ; ' for, whatever
individual hardship may result, it is obviously absurd to permit
any inference to be drawn, which is directly opposed, either to the
ascertained fact, or to all reasonable belief.*
§ 138. A jury may also, under certain circumstances, presume
1 See Garrard v. Tuck, 1849 ; Doe Act, see § 3.
V. Langdon, 1848. * Doe v. Staple, 1788, where the
2 8 & 9 V. c. 112. lessor of the plaintifl was heir-at-
' See Doe v. Price, 1847 ; Doe v. law, and only claimed the premises
Moulsdale, 1847; Doe v. Jones, 1849; subject to the charge.
Cottrell V. Hughes, 1855 ; Plant v. ' Goodtitle v. Jones, 1796 ; Eoe v.
Taylor, 1863. Eeade, 1799.
1 § 2. * See per Bay ley, J. , in £. v. TJpton
» As to the construction of this Gray, 1830.
127
PRESUMPTION OF SUEEENDER OF LEASE. [PAKT I.
the surrender of a lease by operation of law. The production by
the lessor of a cancelled lease will not, indeed, warrant the pre-
sumption of such a surrender as will satisfy the Statute of Frauds.'
Yet, when the production of the cancelled lease was coupled with
proof that a new lease had been granted to another party, who,
like the former lessee, was a mere trustee for the same eestuis que
trust, and it further appeared, that when leases were renewed from
time to time, the usage was to send in the old lease to be cancelled
in the lessor's oifioe, the jury were allowed to infer that the second
lease was granted with the assent of the former tenant.^ The
unexplained payment of an abated rent for thirty years by a
tenant of premises, which were shown to have been leased to
another party for an unexpired term, has been treated in Ireland
as evidence from which a jury might presume the surrender of the
original lease, and the creation of a new tenancy from year to
year, at the abated rent, in favour of the present occupier.'
§§139 — 142. The principle "ex diuturnitate temporis omnia
prsesumuntur rit^ esse acta " has also been applied in a variety of
matters other than those mentioned above. Thus, where eject-
ment was brought to recover a messuage, demised for a long term
by a lease containing a covenant that the house should not be
used as a shop without the lessor's written consent, with a proviso
for re-entry on breach of such covenant, it was held that, on proof
of the uninterrupted user of the premises as a beershop for twenty
years, the jury ought to be directed to presume that a licence in
writing had been duly given ; * after the lapse of sixty years, the
court, in the absence of any direct evidence, has presumed that
executors, who were proved to have renounced, had also disclaimed
an estate in a chattel real, which had been bequeathed to them by
the testator ; ^ and it is a general proposition," that stale demands
ought always to be regarded in courts of justice with jealous
suspicion,' and that long acquiescence in any adverse claim of
1 Doe V. Thomas, 1829; Roe v. ♦ Gribson v. Doeg, 1858.
Abp. of York, 1805. » M'Kenna v. Eager, 1875 (Ir.).
* Thomas v. Cook, 1818. See, also, » Gr. Ev. § 47, in great part.
Walker v. Eiohardson, 1837. See ' Sibbering v. Ld. Balcarras, 1850.
post, §§ 1009, 1010. See H., falsely called C, v. C, 1862 ;
3 Lefvoy ^. Walsh, 1851 (Tr.). See, T.w.D., falsely calledD., 1866. Thus,
also, Tennent v. Neil, 1870 (Ir. Ex. too_, the non-user of a patent for a
Oh.); Ex parte Raymond, 1874 (Ir.). series of years raises a strong pre-
128
CHAP, v.] PRESTTMPTION OMNIA RITE ESSE ACTA.
riglit is good ground, on which a jury may presume that the claim
had a legal commencement;^ since it is contrary to general
experience for one man long to continue to pay money to another,
or to perform any onerous duty, or to submit to any inconvenient
claim, unless in pursuance of some contract, or other legal obli-
gation.^
§ 143-4. In the great majority of cases to which the maxim " ex
diuturnitate temporis omnia prsesumuntur rite esse acta " applies it
is only available, " donee probetur in contrarium." ' The application
of the presumption arising from it to acts of an official or judicial
character will be best illustrated by referring to one or two deci-
sions.* For instance, where successive decisions are inconsistent
with a general order of the court, a reversal of that order ought to
be presumed ; * on an indictment for perjury proof of the signa-
tures of the defendant, and of the official before whom the docu-
ment purports to have been sworn, is sufficient evidence that the
defendant was regularly sworn to the truth of its contents, though
the clerk, who proves the handwriting of the official, has no re-
collection of administering the oath, and admits that the jurat was
not written by himself ; ^ the fact that a town was in the military
occupation of an enemy, and proclamations, purporting to be signed
by the general in command, posted on its walls, is evidence whence
a jury may infer that the placards had been printed and posted by
the authority of the commander ; ' on an indictment for bigamy,
proof of the solemnization of the first marriage in a Wesleyan
chapel in the presence of the registrar, and of the entry of such
marriage in his book, raises a prima facie presumption that the
chapel was duly registered ; ' and so also proof by a witness present
at it, that a marriage was solemnized in a parish church by the
curate of the parish, renders it unnecessary to prove either the
sumption of its practical inutility : Ee ' Boliun v. Delessert, 1813 (Ld.
Allan's Patent, 1867, P.O.; EeBake- Eldon); Man v. Eicketts, 1845 (Ld.
weU's Patent, 1862, P. 0. ; Be Lyndiurst).
Hughes' Patent, 1879, P. 0. « E. v. Benson, 1810 (Ld. EUen-
1 See Ee Birch, 1853. borough). See, also, Cheney v.
'' See Castleden I). Castleden, 1861, Courtois, 1863; and Ee Chapman,
H. L. ; Ogilvie v. Currie, 1868 (Ld. Ex parte Johnson, 1884, 0. A.
Cairns, Oh.). ' Bruce v. Nicolopulo, 1855.
3 See E. V. Bjornsen, 1865. « E. i;. Mainwaring, 1857; Sichelu.
♦ See, also, Lee v. Johnstone, 1869. Lambert, 1864; E. v. Oradock, 1863
(WiUes, J., and PoUock, O.B.).
T. VOL. I. 129 K
PRESUMPTION OMNIA RITE ESSE ACTA. []PART I.
registration of the marriage, or the fact of any licence having been
granted, or of any banns having been published ; ' and the constant
performance of divine service from an early period in a chapel,
raises a prima facie presumption that it has been duly consecrated.^
§ 144a. An Irish decision carried this presumption to its extreme
limit. There a shopkeeper (prior to the passing of the "Weights
and Measures Act, 1878)' was prosecuted for using weights which
were light when compared with the county standard. Proof that
the county standard had been compared with the imperial standard
within the last five years, although such comparison was expressly
required by statute, was held unnecessary, on the ground that the
prima facie presumption was that the officials in charge of the local
standards had performed their duty.*
§ 145. Again, the court presumed the regularity of the proceed-
ings, and that the writ had in due course come to the gaoler
through the coroner, on a motion to discharge out of custody a
party detained for debt in the sheriff's gaol, made on the ground
of irregularity in the proceedings, although it did not appear that a
writ of ca. sa. at the suit of the sheriff, which was in the hands of
the governor of the gaol, had ever been in the coroner's hands,
such writ having been set out in a return which the gaoler had made
to a writ of habeas corpus previously issued, together with a certifi-
cate by the coroner, that the copy of the writ was a true one.^ The
court has also presumed that a parish certificate purporting to be
granted by A, the only churchwarden, and B, the only overseer
of the parish, sixty years previously, during which the appellant
parish had submitted to such certificate, was regular, and that, by
custom, there was only one churchwarden in the parish, and that
two overseers had been originally appointed, but that one of them
was dead, and his vacancy not filled up at the date of the certificate ; ^
in favour of the regularity of a parish indenture of apprenticeship,
signed only by one churchwarden and one overseer ; ' in favour of
' E. V. Allison, 1806. See Limerick » E. v. Catesby, 1824. See also,
V. Limerick, 1863. E. v. Whitchurcli, 1827. Prom E. v.
' Eugg V. Kingsmill, 1867 ; E. v. Upton Gray, 1830, it appears that
Cress-well, 1876. this presumption is rather one of fact
' 41&42V.C.49; amendedby52& tha,n oilaw.
53 V. c. 21. ■> E. V. Hinckley, 1810: E. v. Stain-
* Hill V. Hennigan, 1877 (&.). forth, 1845.
5 Bastard v. Trutch, 1835.
130
CHAP, v.] OFFICIAL AND JUDICIAL ACTS.
deeds of parisli apprenticeship — that where such a deed had been
allowed by justices as required by the then law, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, it must be taken that notice had been
duly given to the officers of the parish, where the apprentice was
to serve ; ' that where such a deed, certified by the allowance of
the justices, contained a recital of the order of binding, no
evidence of such order, beyond the indenture itself, is necessary,^
and that where an apprentice had served his time under a deed
executed thirty years before, and it was proved both that such
deed was lost, and that the parish in which the pauper was settled
under it had relieved him for the last twelve years, it must be
presumed that the deed was properly stamped, though the stamp
officers proved that it did not appear in their office that any
such indenture had been stamped during the last thirty-one
years.'
§ 146. On this same principle of " omnia prsesumuntur rite esse
acta," every reasonable intendment will be made in support of an
order of justices, provided it appear on the face of the order that
the justices had jurisdiction.* But this rule does not extend to
convictions, which, as combining summary power with penal con-
sequences, are watched with peculiar vigilance, and construed with
strictness at least as great as indictments.* Still, even with respect
to convictions, if the authority of the magistrate can be distinctly
collected from the facts stated on the record, the court will not be
astute in discovering irregularities in the proceedings. The safest
rule on the subject is that laid down by Lord EUenborough, that
the court " can intend nothing in favour of convictions, and mil
intend nothing against them,"^ and the conviction or order will bo
construed according to the very language employed in it.'
' E. V. WHston, 1836 ; E. v. "Wit- Preston, 1848 ; E. v. Stainforth, 1845.
ney, 1836. * E. v. Morris, 1792 ; E. v. Baines,
" E. V. Stainforth, 1845. See also 1706; Fletcher v. Calthrop, 1845; E.
E. V. St. Mary Magdalen, 1853 ; E. v. v. Little, 1758 (Ld. Mansfield) ; E. v.
Broadlienipston, 1859. Corden, 1769, wliere tlie court ob-
' E. V. Long Buckby, 1805. Both served that "a tight hand ought to
this case, and E. v. Catesby, 1824, be holden over these summary con-
cited above, partly rested on the victions :" E. v. Pain, 1826 (Abbott,
presumption of validity arising from O.J.) ; E. v. Daman, 1819.
long acquiescence. See ante, §§ 126 — * E. v. Hazell, 1810. See Paley
131, 139. on Conv. 74—77.
* E. V. Morris, 1792 (Ld. Kenyon); ' E. ■;;. Helling, 1715, 1716 (Pratt,
Ormerod v. Chadwick, 1847 ; E. v. O.J.) ; Chi-istie v. Unwin, 1840 (Cole-
131 k2
OFFICIAIi AND JUDICIAL ACTS. [PAET I.
§ 147. Neither does the rule that " omnia prsesumuntur rit^ esse
acta " apply, so as in any event to give jurisdiction to authorities
acting judicially under a special statutory power ; but in all such
cases every circumstance required by the statute to give juris-
diction niMst appear on the face of the proceedings, either by direct
averment, or by reasonable intendment.' There is no distinction,
in this respect, between convictions, commitments,^ inquisitions,
warrants to arrest, examinations, or orders;' and whether an order
under a special act be made by the Lord Chancellor or by a justice
of the peace, the facts which gave the authority must be stated.*
A presumption that an Ecclesiastical Court will exceed its juris-
diction will not be made.' On the same principle the courts
refuse to anticipate the decision of the master on a question of
costs, as they cannot presume that he will decide erroneously.^
§ 147a. The presumption under consideration is ignored in the
case of highway rates. In such cases, although its recognition
would have been productive of much public advantage, the pro-
duction of the official book, with the rate duly entered in it and
allowed, does not even furnish at least prima facie evidence of a
highway rate ; and the fact that it has been duly published must
still be proved by independent evidence.' With regard to poor-
rates, however, it has been expressly enacted, that " the production
of the book purporting to contain a poor-rate, with the allowance
of the rate by the justices, shall, if the rate is made in the form
prescribed by law, be prima facie evidence of the due making and
publication of such rate."*
§ 148. The doctrine that " omnia prsesumuntur rit^ esse acta "
ridge, J.); In re Clark, 1842 (Ld. " Day v. King, 1836 ("Williams,
Denman.). J.) ; Brook i;. Jenney, 184] (per id.);
' fi. V. All Saints, Southampton, Johnson v. Eeid, 1840 ; Gosset v,
1828 (Holroyd, JJ ; Gosset v. Howard, Howard, 1847.
1847 ; E. V. Helling, 1715, 1716 * Christie v. TJnwin, 1840 (Oole-
(Pratt, 0. J.) ; E. v. Totness, 1849 ; E. ridge, J.).
V. Hulcott, 1796, and note to § 147, ' Chesterton v. Farlar, 1838; HaU
infra. _ v. Maule, 1838; Hallack v. U. of
^ But a warrant of commitment Cambridge, 1841.
which purports to be founded on a * Head v. Baldry, 1838.
preceding conviction will be good, ' Bird v. Adoock, 1878.
though it does not state that the evi- ' " The Poor Eate Assessment and
dence was given on oath, or in the Collection Act, 1869" (32 & 33 V.
presence of the prisoner : Ex parte o. 41), § 18.
iBailey, and Ex parte Collier, 1854.
132
CHAP, v.] SOLEMN ACTS OF PRIVATE PERSONS.
is, in many instances, recognised in support of tlie solemn acts of
even private persons. For instance, if an act can only he lawful
after the performance of some prior act, due performance of that
prior act wiU he presumed.' Again, although, in the case of
contracts not under seal, a consideration must in general be averred
and proved, bills of exchange and promissory notes are prima facie
presumed to be founded on valuable consideration,^ this latter
presumption being made partly because it is important to preserve
the negotiability of such instruments intact, and partly, because
the existence of a valid consideration may reasonably be inferred
from the solemnity of the instruments themselves, and the deliberate
mode in vrhich they are executed.' The following are further
examples of presumptions : if secondary evidence be tendered to
prove the contents of an instrument either lost or detained by the
opposite party after notice to produce it, it will be presumed that
the original was duly stamped, unless some evidence to the con-
trary, as, for example, that it was unstamped when last seen,* can
be given ; ' under the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act,
1877, the execution of a lease by the lessor furnishes sufficient
presumptive evidence that the counterpart has been duly executed
by the lessee ; ^ where lands originally leasehold have been dealt
with as freehold for a long period by persons in possession, as
between parties claiming under such persons, a presumption will
be raised that the reversion has been got in ; ' in the absence of
all proof as to which of two deeds of even date was first executed,
the court will presume in favour of that order of priority which
wDl best support the clear intent of the parties;^ and where an act
has been done by a joint stock company, to the legality of which
certain formalities are requisite, and the circumstances are such
' King's County v. Neath National Anderson, 1815 ; E. v. Long Buckby.
Bank, 1893 (Am.). 1805; Olosmadeuc «. Carrel, 1856.
2 45 & 46 V. c. 61, § 30 ; Collins v. See Arbon v. Fussell, 1862 ; Connor
Martin, 1797 ; HolHday v. Atkinson, v. Cronin, 1858 (Ir.) ; Herbert v. Eae,
1826 ; Story, Bills, §§ 16, 178. See 1862 (Ir.) (Smith, M.fi.); 33 & 34 V.
ante, § 86. ' c. 46, § 58, Ir.
3 Story, Bills, §§ 16, 178. e 40 & 41 V. c. 18, § 48.
* Marine Investoent Co. v. Havi- ' Holmes v. MUward, 1878 (Fry,
Bide, 1872, H. L. J.).
» Hart V. Hart, 1842 (Wigram, e Taylor v. Horde, 1757. See E.
V.-C); Orowther t;. Solomons, 1848; v. Ashburton, 1846; Gartside v.
Pooley V. GoodwiQ, 1835 ; Crisp v, Silkstone, &c. Co., 1882.
133
EXECUTION OF DEEDS. [PAET I.
that acquiescence may be imputed to the shareholders, a com-
pliance with the necessary formalities will, as against the company,
be presumed.'
§ 149. On the same principle, where the attedation of a deed has
been in the usual form,^ and the signature of the party has been
proved, the jury will be advised to presume a due sealing and
delivery, and that, too, in cases where the attesting witness has
denied all recollection of any other form having been gone through
beyond the mere signing.' Indeed, it is not necessary, to consti-
tute a valid sealing, that an impression should be made with wax
or with a wafer, but an impression made in ink with a wooden
block will sufBce ; * and even though no impression at all appear
on the parchment or paper, still, if the instrument purport to be a
deed, is on proper stamps, and be stated in the attestation to have
been duly sealed and delivered, it will, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary (especially if it be an ancient instrument),* be pre-
sumed to have been sealed.* Evidence to the contrary will, how-
ever, be afforded where a bond, bearing no trace of any seal, and
referring to contemplated testamentary dispositiqns which are to
supersede it, is found among the papers of the obligor J And a
transfer which bears upon it a printed circle, and within such
circle the words " Place for seal," but bears no actual seal, is not
a deed merely because its attestation clause says it was " signed,
sealed, and delivered." * But a deed executed by a corporate body
need not have the corporate seal affixed to it, but the corporation
may adopt any private seal they please for the occasion, and the
jury may presume that the use of the adopted seal was a corporate
' Grady's cass, Ee The Britisli 1847. This presumption was for-
Prov. Life and Fire Ass. Soc, 1863; merly treated as one of law, but is
Lane's case, 1863 (Ld. Westbury, C). now considered one of fact, and left
^ As to presumption in favour of a to the jury,
will having a due attestation clause, * E. v. St. Paul's, Covent Garden,
see post, § 1056. 1846.
3 Passet V. Brown, 1861; Grellier ' Crawford and Lindsay Peer
V. Neale, 1790 (Ld. Kenyon); Talbot 1848, H. L.
V. Hodgson, 1816; Hall v. Bain- * In re Sandilands, 1871, cited by
bridge, 1848; Burling v. Paterson, Ld. Denman in E. v. St. Paul's,
1792 (Patteson, J.); Davidson o. Covent Garden, 1845.
Cooper, 1843 (Ld. Abinger). See, ^ Ee Smith, Oswell v. Shepherd,
also, Doe v. Lewis, 1836 ; Doe v. 1892, 0. A.
Burdett, 1843 ; Newton v. Eicketts, « Ee Balkis Co., 1888.
1861, H.L.; and Burnham v. Bennett,
134
CHAP, v.] EXECUTION OF DEEDS.
act, if tlie instrument purport to be executed by the head and the
subordinate members of the corporation " under their seal." ' The
presumption in favour of the due execution of instruments was
carried to a great length in a case''' in which an action having been
brought upon the assignment of certain letters-patent to recover
the consideration money named therein, one of the defendants
pleaded non est factum, and produced the deed, which was signed
and executed by all the parties to it except himself, but with a
seal placed for him in the usual way. And he having acted
under the assignment, and having recognised it as a valid instru-
ment, it was presumed that he had duly executed it.
§ 150. In accordance, again, with the maxim, " omnia prsesu-
muntur rite esse acta," every man is, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, presumed to know the contents of any deed which he
executes,^ and to be bound by it. It is, however, enacted by 13
Eliz. c. 6,' that all conveyances of lands or chattels, which are not
made for a valuable consideration and bona fide,* shall be void as
against any person, including the Crown,' whose claims on the
original owner of the property shall be thereby delayed or dis-
turbed.^ Whenever, therefore, any transaction is sought to be
invalidated under this Act, the purchaser must both establish the
justice of his title, and show afiSrmatively, not only that the deed
under which he claims was duly executed, but that it was made in
perfect good faith, and also for a valuable, as contradistinguished
from a mere good, consideration.' In determining the question of
bona fides, the jury will take into consideration all the circum-
stances connected with the transfer. If, therefore, the conveyance
be absolute, and passes to the vendee an immediate right of pos-
session, the fact of the vendor being allowed to continue as tho
apparent owner of the property naturally raises a very strong
' Jones i;. Gal way Town Commiss., * Shawv. Bran, 1816; Morewood
1847 (Ir.). V. Wilkes, 1833; Perkins v. Bradley,
i« Cherry i;. Heming, 1849. 1842. See Whitaker ?;. Wisbey, 1852.
* In re Cooper, 1882 (Jessel, * See Freeman v. Pope, 1870;
M.E.). Crossley «. Elworthy, 1871; Cornisli
3 Made perpetual by 26 & 27 V. v. Clark, 1872 (Ld. Eomilly) ; Kent
c. 125, and amended by Statute Law v. Eiley, 1872 (Ld. Eomilly); G-olden
Eevision Act, 1888 (51 V. c. 3). v. Gilham, 1882, C. A. ; Ex parte
* See In re Eidler, Eidler v. Eidler, Eussell, Ee Butterworth., 1882, C. A.
1882, 0. A. ' Twyne's case, 1602.
135
PRESUMPTIONS EESPECTING DEEDS OF GIFT. [PAET I.
presumption of fraud.' If, indeed, the conveyance or bill of sale
is by way of mortgage, and the mortgagee is not to take possession
till a default in payment of the mortgage money, then, as the
nature of the transaction does not call for any change of possession,
the absence of such change will not of itself furnish any evidence
of collusion.^
§ 150a. Bills of sale of personal chattels are, moreover, now ren-
dered void under the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, unless they set
forth the consideration for which they were given.^
§ 151. Notwithstanding the maxim, "omnia prsesumuntur rite
esse acta," whenever any person by donation derives a benefit
under a deed to the prejudice of another person,* — and the more
especially so, if any confidential or fiduciary relation subsists
between the parties, — the courts so far presume against the validity
of the instrument as to require some proof (varying in amount
according to circumstances) of the absence of anything approach-
ing to imposition, over-reaching, undue influence, or unconscionable
advantage.^ For example, a deed of gift, or other disposition of
property, except a will,^ made in favour of a solicitor by a
client,' of a medical attendant by a patient,^ of a parson by one of
his congregation,^ of a " spiritual medium " by one of his dupes,'"
of a trustee by a beneficiary,'' of an executor by a legatee,'^ of a
guardian by a ward, of a parent by a child, '^ of a husband by a
wife, of an agent by a principal,'* or of a shrewd man of business
by an infirm ignorant old woman,'^ will be regarded with jealous
1 Martindale v. Booth, 1832 ; Lia- H. L.
don V. Sharp, 1843 (Tindal, O.J.). » Mitchell i;. Homfray, 1881, 0. A.;
* Martindale v. Booth, 1832. Dent v. Bennett, 1858.
3 45 & 46 V. c. 43, § 8; 42 & 43 « Nottidge v. Pi-inoe, 1860; Hu-
V. 0. 50, § 8, Ir. As to what is a gnenin v. Baseley, 1807.
eufflcient compliance with this rule, '" Lyon v. Home, 1868 (Giffard,
see Ex parte Firth, Ee Cowburn, V.-C).
1882 ; Hamlyn v. Betteley, 1880 ; " Lufl v. Lord, 1864.
Hamilton v. Chaine, 1881, C. A. ; Ex '^ (jray v. Warner, 1873 (Wickens,
parte Eolfe, Re Spindler, 1881, 0. A. V.-C).
* Oookei). Lamotte, 1851 (Eomilly, '^ Wright i). Vanderplank, 1856;
MR.). See Coutts v. Acworth, 1869. Bainbrigge v. Browne, 1881 (Fry,
5 1 Story, Eq, Jur. §§ 308—323. J.); Hartopp v. Hartopp, 1855;
See Baker v. Bradley, 1856. Dimsdale v. Dimsdale, 1856; Bury u.
" Parfitt V. Lawless, 1872. See Oppenheim, 1859 ; Davies v. Davies,
Ashwell V. Lomi, 1850. 1863 (Stuart, V.-C.) ; Potts v. Surr,
' Gre8ley!;.Mousley,1859; O'Brien 1865 ; Turner v. Collins, 1871, C. A.
V. Lewis, 1863 ; Gardener v. Ennor, " King v. Anderson, 1874 (Ir.).
1866; M'Pherson v. Watt, 1877, " Baker v. Monk, 1864 (L.JJ.);
136
CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIONS IN DEALING WITH EEVEESIONS.
suspicion, and the instrument will be set aside as conclusively void,^
or the person benefited will have thrown upon him the burthen of
establishing beyond all reasonable doubt the perfect fairness and
honesty of the entire transaction.^
§ 152. A grotesque attempt was made in Ireland to extend this
doctrine to a case in which a woman had, living in adultery with a
married man, assigned some of her property to secure a debt owing
by her paramour, and had the hardihood to afterwards apply to
the Court of Chancery to set aside the assignment on the ground
of undue influence. But it was held that the doctrine in question
was only applicable when some lawful relation existed between the
parties.'
§ 153. The old Court of Chancery used to look with peculiar
favour on heirs apparent and other expectant heirs, who entered
into negotiations as to their expectancies.* Every person who dealt
with an expectant heir for his reversion had, if the transaction were
subsequently disputed, the burthen of proof upon him to establish
its entire fairness.^ At the instance of some prominent lawyers,"
an Act passed in December, 1867, enacts, that " no purchase made
bona fide, and without fraud or unfair dealing, of any reversionary
interest in real or personal estate, shall hereafter be opened or set
aside merely on the ground of under- value." ' It wiU be noted
that this enactment is carefully limited to purchases " made bona
fide and without fraud or unfair dealing," and it not only leaves
untouched the law which governs unconscionable bargains, but
allows under-value to be still regarded by the court as a material
element in cases where fraud is charged.*
Summers v. Griffitlis, 1866; Slator v. ' Hargreave v. Everard, 1856 (Ir.).
Nolan, 1876 (Ir.). * Bromley v. Smith, 1859; Ld.
1 Tomson v. Judge, 1855. This Portmore v. Taylor, 1831 ; Davies v.
was the case of a deed of gift by a D. of Marlhorough, 1818 ; Sharp v.
client to his solicitor. Leach, 1862 ; Croft v. Graham, 1863;
2 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 308—323 ; Perfect v. Lane, 1861 ; Benyon o.
Hunter v. Atkins, 1832; Nedby v. Fitch, 1866.
Nedby, 1852 ; Hoghton v. Hoghton, ' See cases cited in last note.
1872 ; Grosvenor v. Sherratt, 1860 ; • See Webster v. Cook, 1867, C. A.
Savery v. King, 1856, H. L. ; Espey (Ld. Chelmsford, C).
V. Lake, 1852; Billage v. Southee, ' 31 V. c. 4, § 1. See Miller v.
1852. See Price v. Price, 1852; Cook, 1870; Tyler v. Tales, 1871
Tokeiv. Toker, 1863; Phillips v. Mul- (Ld. Hatherley, C); Judd v. Green,
lings, 1871, C. A.; King v. Anderson, 1876.
1874 (L:.) See Taylor v. Johnston, * Ld. Aylesford v. Morris, 1873
1882. (Ld. Selborne, C.) ; Beynon v. Cook,
137
INCUMBEANCES — CHARITABLE GRANTS. [PAKT I.
§ 154. It is a presumption that a tenant for life, or other- person
having a partial interest in settled estates, who pays ofE an incum-
brance upon them, intends to keep the charge alive as against the
inheritance for his own benefit.^ This presumption, however (on
technical rather than on substantial grounds), is inapplicable to a
case where a tenant for life pays off the bond debts of the settlor.*
Neither does it extend to the ease of a charge bearing interest,
where, — the rents and profits of the estate having been insufBcient
to meet the interest, — the tenant for life has paid the balance of it
out of his own pocket, without having warned the remainderman
of his intention to charge the excess of his payments on the
inheritance.'
§ 155. Certain presumptions are also recognised as to charitable
institutions, and in interpreting charitable grants. Thus, if the
charity be founded to support a religious establishment, or to pro-
mote religious education, and the intentions of the founder he not
clearly expressed, the prima facie presumption is, first, that he
intended to support an establishment belonging to some particular
form of religion, or to promote the teaching of certain particular
doctrine ; next, that the form of religion or doctrine contemplated
was that which he himself had professed ; and lastly, if no evidence
be adduced of his entertaining particular religious views, that the
established religion of the country was the one meant to be sup-
ported. If, however, the charity were founded for purposes of
mere secular education, or if it were one of a purely eleemosynary
character, the court, in the absence of any expressed intention to
the contrary, will presume that its benefits are intended to be
shared by all persons, whatever their religious opinions.*
§ 156. It is also now presumed (contrary to what was once
considered. to be the law) that an estate for life without impeach-
ment of waste does not confer upon the tenant for life any legal
right to commit " equitable waste," unless an intention to confer
such right expressly appears in the instrument creating the estate.*
1873, 0. A. See, also, Nevill v. " Ld. Kensington v. Bouverie,
Snelling, 1880 ; O'Eorke v. Boling- 1859, H. L.
broke, 1877, H. L. See, too. Gen., * Att.-Gen. v. Calvert, 1857
ch. XXV. w. 29—34. (Eomilly, M. R.).
1 Morley v. Morley, and Harland * 36 & 37 V. c. 66 ("The Supreme
1). Morley, 1855. See post, § i7tiA. Court of Judicature Act, 1873"),
^ Id. See Eoddam v. Morley, § 25, subs. 3 ; 40 & 41 V. c. 57, § 28,
1857. subs. 3, [Ir.).
138
CHAP, v.] JOINT TENANCY — VOLUNTAEY SETTLEMENTS.
§ 157. The presumptions, or, rather, the rules of construction
recognised in equity with respect to joint tenancy are "not very
comprehensihle." ^ If two persons jointly advance money on
mortgage, a mere tenancy in common will be created, though the
property he conveyed to them as joint tenants, because the law
presumes that men will not willingly speculate with money which
they lend.^ But, on the other hand, if two persons jointly advance
money as purchasers, and the sums paid by each be equal, a joint-
tenancy will be established, because here it is supposed that men
will readily gamble as to survivorship with respect to property
which they buy.' If, however, two persons make a purchase, and
one of them advances more of the purchase-money than the other,
even though the deed does not contain the words " equally to be
divided " there will be no survivorship.'
§ 158. The existence of some mistake in it will not be presumed
from the absence from a voluntary settlement of a power of revo-
cation. The circumstance wUl, however, generally be taken into
account, as entitled to weight, in deciding on the validity of the
instrument.* Parties relying upon an irrevocable voluntary settle-
ment ought, therefore, to be prepared to prove that the settlor was
properly advised when he executed it, that he thoroughly under-
stood the effect of omitting the power, and that he intended to
omit it.'
§ 159. It is, in the absence of any express stipulation to the
contrary, since the 1st of August, 1870, presumed, that " all rents,
annuities," — which term includes salaries and pensions,^- " divi-
dends,' and other periodical payments, in the nature of income,
whether reserved or made payable under an instrument in writing
or otherwise," accrue from day to day, like interest on money lent,
and are apportionable in respect of time accordingly.* The statute
^ See Harrison v. Barton, 1861, ' See In re Griffith., Oarru. Griffith,
and the remarks there of Wood, V.-O. 1879 ( Jessel, M. E.).
2 Petty V. Styward, 1632, ^ 33 & 34 y. o. 35, §§ 2, 7. See,
3 Eigden v. VaUier, 1751. also, 4 & 5 W. 4, 0. 22 ("The Ap-
* Hall V. Hall, 1873, 0. A.; portionment Act, 1834 "). See Jones
Phillips u. MuUings, 1874, 0. A. See, «. Ogle, 1873, 0. A. See, also, Capron
also, Welman v. Welman, 1880. v. Capron, 1874 ; Ee Cline's Estate,
» Id. 1870 ; Pollock v. Pollock, 1874 ; Has-
« Treacv v. Corcoran, 1874 (Ir.) ; luck v. Pedley, 1875 ; Daly v. Att.-
33 & 34 V. c. 35 ("The Apportion- Gen., 1870 (Ir.); Ee Cox's Trusts,
meat Act, 1870"), § 5. 1878 (Hall, V.-C); Swansea Bk. v.
Thomas, 1879.
139
EXECUTION OF WILLS. [PAET I.
providing this extends to wills, which, though execated before its
passing, have come into operation since its date.'
§ 160. There exist the following presumptions with respect to
the execution, alteration, and revocation of wills : ^ — First, on
proof of the signature of the deceased, he will be presumed
to have known and approved of the contents and effect of the
instrument he has signed;^ such knowledge and approval beiug
essential to the validity of the will.* This presumption, how-
ever, is liable to be rebutted by showing any suspicious circum-
stances.* Therefore, if the testator, from want of education, or
from bodily infirmity, was unable to read,'' or if his capacity at
the time of executing the instrument is a matter of doubt ; '
or if the party who is materially benefited by the will has pre-
pared it, or conducted its execution, or has been in a position
calculated to exercise undue influence ; * or if the instrument itself
is not consonant to the testator's natural affections and moral
duties ; ' — a more rigid investigation will take place, and probate
wiU. generally not be granted, unless the court be satisfied by evi-
dence that the paper propounded really does express the true wiU
of the deceased.'" In cases of extraordinary suspicion, it will be
highly expedient to prove, either that instructions were given by
the deceased corresponding with the actual provisions of the will,
or that the instrument was, at the time of execution, read to or by
1 Constable «. Constable, ISYO (Fry, Dnane, 1862; In re Wray, 1769
J.). The Act applies where a tenant (Ir.) ; but see Longchamp v. Fish,
for Hfe dies after its passing, but the 1807.
testator, under whose will he took, ' 1 Phillim. E. 193 ; Ingram v.
died before that date; Lawrence v. Wyatt, 1«28; Dodge i;. Meech, 1828;
Lawrence, 1884 (Pearson, J.). Dufaur v. Croft, 1840, P. 0.
2 Forotherpresumptionsrespecting ' Mitchell v. Thomas, 1847, P. C. ;
wills made prior to 1st Jan., 1838, Sconler v. Plowright, 1856, P. C. ;
see the former editions of this Work, Eaworth v. Marriott, 1833 ; Greville
§§ 131—134. V. Tylee, 1851, P. 0. ; Paske v.
3 Billinghurst v. Tickers, 1810; OUat, 1815; Zacharias v. Collis,
Fawcett D. Jones, 1810; Guardhouse 1820; Wheeler v. Alderson, 1831;
V. Blackburn, 1866; Wheeler v. Billinghurst v. Viokers, 1810; Ful-
Alderson, 1831 ; Browning v. Budd, ton v. Andrews, 1875, H. L. (Ld.
1848, P. 0. Cairns, C); Burling v. Loveland,
* Hastilow V. Stobie, 1865 (Wilde, 1839 ; Chambers v. Wood, 1848 (Ld.
J. O., overruling a dictum of Cress- CottenLam); Paine v. Hall, 1812;
well, J. 0., in MiddlehuTst v. John- O'Connel v. Butler, 1819 (Ir.); Gore
son, 1861J. See Cleare v. Cleare, v. Gahagan, 1819 (Ir.).
1869. 9 See Prinsep and E. India Co. v.
^ Von Stentz v. Comyn, 1848 (Ir.) Dyoe Sombre, 1832, P. C.
(Brady, C). ■>» Browning v. Budd,- 1848, P. Q.;
' Barton v. Eobins, 1769; In re Fulton v. Andrew, 1875, H. L.
140
CHAP. V.3 EXECUTION OF WILLS.
the testator, or that he had expressed some subsequent knowledge
and approval of its dispositions ; but this precise species of evidence
is not absolutely required, and it vrill be sufficient if, by any means
of proof, a knowledge and approval of the contents of the will can
be brought home to the deceased.'
§ 161. Secondly, where proof can be furnished that, prior to the
execution of a will by a competent testator, it was either read over
to him, or otherwise brought specially to his notice, the Probate
Division will, in the absence of fraud, not only infer, primi facie,
that he approved of the contents, but will recognise a conclusive
presumption to that effect. No matter what evidence may be
forthcoming to establish a case of obvious error, or to show that
some passage has crept into the instrument by a sheer mistake of
the draughtsman, the judge will turn a deaf ear to all such testi-
mony.^ Where, however, the jury found as facts, both that a certain
word had been introduced into the will by a blunder, and that the
clauses in which it appeared had never been brought to the notice
of the testator in any way, the court directed that the obnoxious
expression should be struck out of the instrument wherever it
occurred.^
§ 162. Thirdly, in the absence of direct proof, when several
sheets of paper, constituting a connected disposal of property, are
found together, the last only being duly signed and attested as a
will, it will (even in spite of partial inconsistencies in some of the
provisions) be presumed that each of the sheets so found formed a
part of the wiU at the time of its execution.*
§ 163. Fourthly, it is, in favour of attestations to wills, presumed
that if a testator might have seen them, that he, in fact, did see, the
witnesses subscribe their names.* The fact of his having been in
the same room with them is prima facie evidence of their attesta-
1 Barry v. Butlin, 1838, P. C. ; expected. See In re Oswald, 1874.
Mitcliell V. Thomas, 1847, P. 0. ' Morrell v. Morrell, 1882.
See further on this subject, 1 Will. * Marsh v. Marsh, 1858; Gregory
on Ex. 97, 311, 312; and Atter v. v. Queen's Proctor, 1846; Eees v.
Atkinson, 1869. Eees, 1873. See, also, In re Cattrall,
2 Guardhouse v. Blackburn, 1866 1863.
(Ld. Penzance); Harter v. Barter, ** Todd v. Ld. Winchelsea, 1826
1872 (Sir J. Hannen). Sed qu., for (Abbott, J.); Doe v. Manifold, 1814.
the judicial reasoning in these oases See post, § 1054.
is not so logical as might fairly be
141
ALTERATIONS IN WILLS. [PAET I.
tion in his presence, while an attestation not made in the same
room is prima facie not made in his presence.^
§ 164. Fifthly, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
the law presumes that all alterations, interUneatiom, or erasures,
which may appear on the face of a will, were made after its execu-
tion,^ and even after the execution of any codicils thereto.^ Con-
sequently the Probate Division of the High Court will, in a case
of unexplained alteration, interlineation,* or erasure, only grant
probate of the wiU in its original form.* This presumption, how-
ever,— which is contrary to that which prevails with respect to
deeds,^ resolutions, and other official documents,' — may be rebutted
by slight affirmative evidence,' such as a statement in the attesta-
tion clause that a will had been executed " with a few alterations.'"
And it will not apply at all to the filling up of blanks. Therefore,
where a testator gave instructions that his will should be prepared
with blanks for the amount of the legacies, and after his death the
will was found regularly executed, with the amounts filled up in
his own handwriting, it was, in the absence of all evidence on the
subject, presumed that the blanks were filled up before the vdll
was signed, since otherwise the execution would have been a mere
idle ceremony.^"
§ 165. Sixthly, if a will, traced to the possession of the testator,
' Neil V. Neil, 1829, 1839 (Am.). they were also not admitted to
■■= Simmonds v. Eiidall, 1850 ; Doe probate. About twenty years after-
V. Catomore, 1851; Doe v. Palmer, wards it was found that these original
1851; In re Stone James, 1858; figures were legible, and the probate
Williams v. Ashton, 186''. was amended by inserting them ;
3 Lushington v. Onslow, 1848 (Sir Ffinoh v. Combe, 1894. See Eules
H. Fust). See, also, Christmas v. for Eeg. of Ct. of Prob. in Non-con-
Whinyates, 1863. tentious Business, Nos. 8 — 10.
* In re White, 1861. But see In « Simmonds v. Eudall, 1850 ; Doe
re Cadge, 1868. v. Catomore, 1851.
" Gann v. Gregory, 1853 (Stuart, ' Steevens's Hospital u. Dyas, 1863
V.-C); Cooper v. Bockett, 1863, (Ir.).
P. C' ; Greville v. Tylee, 1851, P. C. ; « See Dench v. Dench, 1878 ; In re
In re Hardy, 1861. A curious in- Duffy, 1871 (Ir.); and In re Sykes,
stance of this occurred lately. A 1873; Moore o. Moore, 1871 (Ir.).
wiU was found with pieces of paper The presumption, moreover, has been
stating the amounts of certain altogether set at nought in the case
legacies pasted over it. These were of a will made by an officer in actual
presumed to have been made since military service : In re Parquharson
execution, and so not admitted to v. Tweedale, 1875. Sed qu.
probate. At that time the original » Doherty v. Dwyer, 1890 (Ir.).
figures, iinderneath the pieces so '° Birch i;. Birch, 1848 (Sir H. Fust);
pasted on, could not be read, so GrevilLe v. Tylee, 1851.
142
CHAP, v.] REVOCATION OF WILLS.
and last seen in his custody, be not forthcoming on his death, a
presumption is made under ordinary circumstances, and unless
there be sufficient evidence to rebut it, that such will has been
destroyed by the testator, animo canoellandi.' But the declarations
of a testator, whether written or oral, and whether made before or
at or after ^ the execution of the instrument, in such cases furnish
cogent proof of his intentions.' Again, the finding of the will
among the testator's papers, with the signature cut out, raises a
presumption that the mutilation was effected intentionally by the
testator himself ; and the will cannot be regarded as revived, though
the signature has been again attached by gum to its original place,
and the document, when discovered, was in that condition.* In
the event, moreover, of a testator having become insane after the
will was made, the burthen of proving that it was destroyed by
him while of sound mind lies upon the party who sets up the revo-
cation.^ The revocation of a will by the testator was at one time
considered to raise a prima facie, though by no means a conclusive,
presumption that the testator intended to revoke every codicil to
it,' but this presumption no longer prevails; and now a codicil
(however dependent it may be on the will) can only be revoked in
one of the methods prescribed by the Wills Act.'
§ 166. With regard to gifts in uills, the follovnng presumptions
arise. It is, in the absence of any distinct intimation to the con-
trary, presumed that every testator considers his estate sufficient to
answer the purposes to which he has by his will devoted it. Con-
sequently, in the event of any deficiency arising in the assets, all
annuities and legacies will, prima facie, be held to abate rateably.
In all cases the onus lies upon those who claim any priority to
furnish conclusive proof from the language employed, that the
' SugdeniJ.Ld. St. Leonards, 1876, Leonards, 1876. See also Saunders
C. A.; Welch v. Phillips, 1856, P. 0. v. Saunders, 1848; Williams n. Jones,
(Parke, B.) ; Fincli i;. Finch, 1867 ; 1849; Patten v. Poulton, 1858;
Johnson v. Lyford, 1868 ; Podmore Eckersley v. Piatt, 1866.
V. Whatton, 1864 ; Dickinson u. * Bell v. FothergiU, 1870.
Stidolph, 1861 ; Brown v. Brown, " Sprigge v. Sprigge, 1868.
1858; In re Brown, 1858; Wood v. * Grimwoodu. Cozens, 1860; In re
Wood, 1867; Cutto v. Gilbert, 1854, Button, 1862; Medlyoott u. Assheton,
P. C. (Dr. Lushington). 1824 ; Clogstown v. Walcot, 1847.
^ Sugden v. Ld. St. Leonards, 1876, But see In re Ellice, 1864 ; Black v.
overruling Quick v. Quick, 1864. Jobling, 1869.
3 Whiteley v. King, 1854 ; Keen v. ' Ee Turner, 1872 (LA. Penzance).
Keen, 1873; Sugden v. Ld. St.
143
BEQUEST OF ANNUITY — LEGACY TO EXECUTORS. [PT, I.
testator intended the bequests not to stand on an equal footing.^
Again, it is prima facie presumed that property speoifloally be-
queathed or devised was intended by the testator to pass to the
legatee or devisee in its entirety ; and this presumption will not be
rebutted by a codicil, charging certain pecuniary legacies on all
the testator's estates, both real and personal.^ If, too, an annuity
be bequeathed by will for an indefinite period, the law will pre-
sume, in the first instance, that it was intended to be given for the
life of the annuitant ; but this presumption is liable to be rebutted
by proof that the testator has used words which indicate an inten-
tion that the annuity should be granted, either in perpetuity, or
for a fixed number of years.'
§ 167. It is likewise prim^ facie presumed that a legacy
bequeathed to a person, who is also named in the will as an
executor, was given to bim in that character, and consequently
if such person decline to accept the ofiice, he must relinquish the
legacy, unless he can show, from the language employed, that
the bequest was made to him independently of his character
of executor, and solely as a token of personal regard.* When,
too, under the terms of a will, the consent of executors or
trustees is rendered necessary to the validity of any act, the law
presumes, in the absence of any express direction on the subject,
that this discretionary power should be exercised by those only
who undertake the duties of the office ; * and an executor or trustee,
who, even without any formal renunciation or disclaimer, declines
to accept the office or to act in the trusts, thereby relieves the
parties interested from the responsibility of obtaining his consent.*
It also is presumed, in the absence of evidence of intention to the
contrary, when executors are appointed, and the residuary estate is
undisposed of, that the executors are trustees for the next of kin ; '
' Miller v. Huddlestone, 1851 (Ld. * Staokpole v. Howell, 1807; In re
Truro); Brown u. Brown, 1836; Reeve's Trusts, 1877 (Jessel, M. E.);
Thwaites v. Foreman, 1844; Dun- Harrison v. Rowley, 1798; Reed v.
boyne v. Brander, 1854. Devaynes, 1791 ; Dix v. Reed, 1823;
* Conron «;. Conron, 1858, H. L. ; Piggott v. Green, 1833; Jewis' v.
Campbell D. M'Oonagliey, 1870 (Ir.). Lawrence, 1869; In re Banbury's
= Yates V. Maddan, 1851; Lett i/. Trusts, 1876 (Ir.); In re Reeve's
Randall, 1860; Stokes v. Heron, Trusts, 1877 (Jessel, M. R.).
1845, H. L. ; Potter v. Baker, 1850; « White v. M'Dermott, 1872 ilrX
Blewitt V. Roberts, 1841 ; Hill v. « Id.
Eatley, 1862 (Wood, V.-C " "
livan V. Galbraitb, 187Q (Ir,
Eatley, 1862 (Wood, V.-O.) ; Sul- ' 11 G. 4 & 1 W. 4, o. 40.
114
CHAP, v.] MEANING OF TEEMS USED IN WILLS.
and that if there be no next of kin (as where the testator is illegiti-
mate), that they may retain the property for their own use instead
of its becoming forfeited to the Crown. ' The presumptions of law
with regard to emblements '' are somewhat capricious ; ^* for it is
presumed that the personal representatives of a man dying seised
in fee of land are entitled to the emblements in preference to the
heir, but where there is a devise of the land, that the testator
intended them to pass to such devisee.' This capricious presump-
tion may be rebutted by a specific bequest of the growing crops, or
" farming stock,"* to another party ; but the title of the devisee to
them will not be ousted by a mere disposition of all the testator's
personal estate.'
§ 168. There is a primS, facie presumption that the following
terms, when used in wills, bear the following meanings : — The word
" children " is limited — as it also is when employed in the Statute
of Distributions,^ — to such children as are legitimate according
to the law of England ; and this presumption will be conclusive,
unless there be something in the will itself to show clearly an
intention to provide for natural children.' In this last event, such
a child, though en ventre sa mere at the date of the will, is
included in the term.^ The word " cousins," in a will, is inter-
preted to mean "first cousins" only; — first cousins being persons
who are cousins german, that is, persons having the same
grandparents ; while " second cousins " prima facie means persons
having the same great-grandparents.^ Neither " cousins " nor
" second cousins " will, in the absence of an evident intention,'"
include the children or grandchildren of first cousins, who are
commonly called first cousins once or twice removed.' Again :
a testator who uses the word " family " will be presumed, prima
■1 In re Enowles, 1880 (Malins, by "Stat. Law Eev. Act, 1888" (51 V.
V.-C). o. 3) ; In re Goodman's Trusts, 1880.
2 The old technical term " enbla- ' Dorin v. Dorm, 1875, H. L. ;
vence de hlet," for the profits of a Ellis v. Houstoun, 1878; Boyes v.
growing crop. Bedale, 1863 ; Megson v. Hindle,
2» Westv. Moore, 1807 (Ld. Ellen- 1880, 0. A. See Laker v. Hordern,
borough). 1876.
» Cooper v.'Woolfitt, 1857. » Crook v. HiU, 1876.
* Evans v. Williamson, 1881, 0. A. ' Ee Parker, Bentham v. Wilson,
(Jessel, M. E.). 1881, 0. A.
* Cooper V. Woolfitt, 1857. ^^ Ee Bonner, 'Tucker v. Good,
* 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10, as amended 1881.
T. VOL. I. 145 L
PRESUMPTIONS RESPECTING DATE OF DOCUMENTS. [PT. I.
facie, to mean the children, if any, of the person whose family
is spoken of, and there must he a special context to give the
word a different meaning.' Further, the word " moneys " in a
testamentary instrument, will, in the absence of anything in the
instrument indicating a different intention,^ be confined to ready
money actually in hand ; ' the word " furniture " — unless under
special circumstances * — will not include tenant's fixtures ; ^ the
term " debentures " will not include "debenture stock " ; " and the
term "unmarried " will, unless otherwise explained by the context,
mean " without ever having been married." '
§ 169. Another general prima facie presumption of law is, that
all documents were mack on the day they hear date} This presump-
tion obtains, whether the document be a modern or ancient deed,'
a bill of exchange or promissory note,'" an account," or even a
letter ; '^ and whether it be written by a party to the suit or not."
The rule, however, has been only recognized with reluctance by at
least some distinguished judges,'* and it is, moreover, certainly
subject to two CTccptions}^ The first is, where, in order to prove a
petitioning creditor's debt, an instrument is put in signed by the
bankrupt, which purports to bear date before the act of bankruptcy.
The effect of a proceeding in bankruptcy being retrospective,'^ and
to invalidate all transactions which have taken place between the
act of bankruptcy and the time when the adjudication takes effect,
the court feels a reasonable jealousy of a collusion between the
petitioning creditor and the bankrupt, and, accordingly, requires
that independent proof of the existence of the instrument, previous
to the act of bankruptcy, should be given in evidence.'' The
' Pigg V. Clarke, 1876 (Jessel, "= 45 & 46 V. c. 61 (" The Bills of
M. E.). Exchange Act, 1882 "), § 13 ; Ander-
2 See Ee Cadogan, Cadogan v. son v. Weston, 1840 ; Smith, v.
Palagi, 1883. Battens, 1834.
^ Langdale v. Whitfield, 1858 " Sinclair v. Baggaley, 1838.
(Wood, V.-C); Williamsi;. Williams, '^ Potoz v. Glossop, 1848 ; Lewisv.
1877 (Baggallay, L. J.). Simpson, 1848, and Angell v. Worsley,
* Paton V. Sheppard, 1839. 1849 ; Hunt v. Massey, 1834; Good-
' Finney v. Grice, 1878 (Jessel, title v. Millburn, 1837.
M. R.). " Potez V. Glossop, 1848; Anderson
" In re Lane, 1880. v. Weston, 1840 (Bosanquet, J.).
' Dalrymple v. Hall, 1881. " Potez v. Glossop, 1848. See also
" Malpas V. Clements, 1850; Potez Butler v. Mountgarret, 1859, H. L.
V. Glossop, 1848; Morgan u. Whit- (Ld. Wensleydale).
more, 1852. '* See also Be Adamson, 1875.
' Anderson 1). Weston, 1 840 ;Davies " 46 & 47 V. c. 52 ("The Bank-
V. Lowndes, 1843; Doe v. Stillwell, ruptoy Act, 1883"), §43.
1838; Smith v. Battens, 1834. " Anderson v. Weston, 1840 (Bos-
146
CHAP, y.] DATE OF DOCUMENTS — ACTING IN OFFICES.
second exception is, where, in petitions for damages for adultery,'
letters are put in evidence to show the terms on which the husband
and wife were living before the seduction. Here again, to avoid
the obvious danger of collusion, some independent proof must be
given that the letters were written at the time they bear date.^ A
third exception to the rule in those cases perhaps now exists, where
evidence of indorsements made by a deceased obligee on a bond,
acknowledging the receipt of interest, is tendered by his assignee,
to defeat a plea of the Statute of Limitations, by the obligor.*
§ 170. In applying the presumption that a document was written
on the day on which it is dated to bills of exchange, the date of a
bill, though prima facie evidence of the day when it was drawn, is
no proof that it was accepted at the same time. The most that the
law will presume is that a bill was accepted within a reasonable
time after it was drawn, and before its maturity ; and it makes
that presumption, because in all ordinary transactions such a course
of business would be pursued.*
§ 171. It is another prima facie presumption of law that a
person has been duly appointed to it if he has in fact acted in an
official capacity. Eor it cannot be supposed that any man would
venture to intr;[ide himself into a public situation which he was not
authorised to fill. The legislature itself has expressly adopted this
presumption in the statutes relating to the excise ^ and customs.*
At common law it applies to lords of the treasury,' masters in
chancery, though exercising special powers,* deputy county court
judges,^ commissioners for taking affidavits,^" surrogates," sheriffs,*^
anquet, J.) ; Sinclair v. Baggaley, Act, 1882 "), § 13.
1838 (Ld. Abinger); Hoare v. Cory- » 53 & 54 y_ g_ 2I ("The Inland
ton, 1812; WrigM i;. Lainson, 1837. Eevenne Eegulation Act, 1890"),
These cases overrule Taylor v. Kin- § 24.
lock, 1816. « 39 & 40 V. c. 36 (" The Customs
'See 20 & 21 V. c. 85, "The Consolidation Act, 1876"), § 261.
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857," § 33. ' E. v. Jones, 1809 (Ld. Ellen-
^ Trelawney v. Coleman, 1817; borough).
(Holroyd, J.) ; Houliston v. Smyth, * Marshall v. Lamb, 1843.
1825 (Best, C.J.). , » E. f . Eoberts, 1878, by Ct. of
' See this question discussed, post, Crim. App.
§§ 690—696. i» E.w. Howard, 1832(Patteson, J.);
* Eoberts v. Bethell, 1852, ques- E. v. Newton, 1844.
tioning Israel v. Argent, 1834, and " E. v. Verelst, 1813 (Ld. EUen-
Blyth V. Archbold, 1835, cited in borough).
Pears. Chit. PI. 330, n. h. See 45 & '^ Bunbury v. Matthews, 1844
46 V. c 61 (" The Bills of Exchange (Parke, B.).
147 T. 2
PEESUMPTIONS FROM ACTING IN PUBLIC OFFICES. [PT. I.
under-sheriffs,^ justices of the peaee,^ constables,' though appointed
by commissioners under a local public Act,* trustees under a
turnpike Act,* churchwardens,® overseers,' vestry-clerks,* trustees
empowered to raise church-rates under a local Act,' weigh-masters
of market towns, i" attested soldiers engaged in the recruiting
service,'^ and, indeed, to all public officers.'^ Moreover, no distinc-
tion is recognised, though the appointment is one required to be
either in writing,!^ or under seal,^* or though an action be brought
in the name of the ofBoer,'' or though the title be directly put in
issue by the pleading,'® or though the proceedings be criminal, (as,
for instance, a trial for the murder of a constable in the execution
of his duty,) and in the highest degree penal." Nor will any
exception to the rule be allowed, even where parties are indicted
for offences committed by them in their character of public ofBcers.
For example, if a person employed by the Post-office be indicted
for stealing or embezzling a letter,'^ his formal appointment need
not be proved, but it will suffice to show that he has acted in the
capacity charged."
§ 172. On similar principles the law prima faoie presumes the
' Doe V. Brawn, 1821. SeePlumer v. Barnes, 1846, wMcliwasaiiaotionof
V. Brisoo, 1 847 ; Eobinson v. Colling- ■ ej ectment brought by parish officers :
wood, 1865. Cannell v. Curtis, 1 835, where an aver-
^ Berryman v. Wise, 1792 (BuUer, ment in a declaration that the plaititiH
J.). had been appointed and was assistant
^ Id. overseer was traversed by the plea.
* Butler V. Ford, 1833. But Tindal, O.J., intimated a strong
° Pritchard v. "Walker, 1827. opinion that it was only necessary
8 E. V. Mitchell, 1818 (Abbott, for the plaintifl to prove that he
C.J.), cited 2 St. Ev. 307, n. r. acted as assistant overseer. This
' Doe V. Barnes, 1846. ruling was cited by Parke, B., in 2
8 M'Gahey v. Alston, 1836. M. & W. 209, 1836.
« E. V. Murphy, 1837 (Coleridge, '" Hayes v. Dexter, 1861 (Ir. Ex.
J.). Ch.); M'Mahon v. Lennard, 1858,
1" M'Ma.hon v. Lennard, 1858, H. L.
H. L. ; Hayes v. Dexter, 1861 (Ir.) ; " E. v. Gordon, 1789.
M'Mnhon v. Ellis, 1863 (Ir.). le See 7 W. 4 & 1 V. c. 36 ("The
" Walton i;. Gavin, 1850. Post Office (Offences) Act, 1837").
12 M'Gahey t>. Alston, 1836 (Parke, §§25,26.
B.) ; Marshall v. Lamb, 1843 (Pat- " Clay's case, 1784 ; E. v. Eees,
teson, J.); Doe v. Young, 1845. 1834 (Parke, B.); E. v. Barrett,
'^ Seecases cited in preceding notes 1833 (Littledale and Bosanquet, JJ.,
to this section. and Bolland, B.) ; E. v. Townsend,
"Dexter v. Hayes, 1860 (Ir.) 1841 ; E. ■«. Goodwin, 1828. In an
(Fitzgerald, B., explaining Smith Irish case, some proof of acting with
V. Cartwright, 1851). the sanction of the Post-office autho-
•' M'Gahey V. Alston, 1836; M'Ma- rities was ap]iarently held necessary.
hon V. Lennard, 1858, H. L. ; Doe E. v. Trenwyth, 1841 (Ir.). Sed qu. ?
143
CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIONS AS TO MARRIAGE, ETC.
existence of certain relations in life from parties having acted
towards each other as occupying those relationships. Erom such
conduct there may be inferred the relations of landlord and tenant,
of partnership, and of master and servant,^ or of master and appren-
tice, even where no direct proof of the existence of any indenture
has heen given. ^ A cogent legal presumption is also raised in
favour of the validity of any marriage which is shown to have been
celebrated de facto,' and will not be rebutted where a minor is.
married by licence in her father's lifetime by the mere fact that
the mother's name appears in the register as the consenting party,
and no evidence is adduced as to the consent of the father ; * if
persons live together as man and wife, it will, in favour of morality
and decency, be presumed that they are legally married,^ while this
presumption has been carried in Scotland so far that even where
the connexion was shown to have commenced in adultery, a sub-
sequent valid marriage has been inferred from strong evidence of
habit and repute.® Two exceptions to this last example are, how-
ever, recognised in England. Both on an indictment for bigamy,'
and on a petition claiming damages against an alleged adulterer,*
a valid first marriage ' must be proved ; and even the proof of a
ceremony, which the parties supposed to be sufficient to constitute
the relation of husband and wife, is not enough, unless it be shown
to be legally valid.'" These two exceptions rest on the ground, that
' E. V. Fordingbridge, 1858 (Erie, v. Ounningliam, 1814; and Lapsley
J.). V. Grierson, 1848, H. L. See also
» Id. ; E. •;;. St. Marylebone, 1824. Lyle v. EUwood, 1874 ; De Thoren v.
' Piers V. Piers, 1849, H. L.; Siohel Att.-Gen., 1875, H. L. ; and Dysart
V. Lambert, 1864 ; Sastry Velaider v. Peer., 1881, H. L.
Sembecutty, 1881, P. 0. See Harrod ' 24 & 25 V. c. 100 (" Tbe Offences
V. Harrod, 1854, also ante, § 144. against the Person Act, 1861 "), § 57.
* Harrisonu. Corp. of Southampton, See E. v. Griffin, 1879.
1853. 8 20 & 21 V. c. 85 ("The Matri-
' Doe V. Fleming, 1827; Goodman monial Causes Act, 1857"), § 33.
V. Goodman, 1859 ; Collins v. Bishop, ' The second marriage need not bo
1879(Malins, V.-C); Sastry Velaider such as would be binding inlaw, if
V. Sembecutty, 1881, P. C. The same it were not bigamous; e.g., awidower
presumption is recognised by the Ma- maybe convicted of bigamy, if, having
homedan Law (Eanee Khujooroonisa a second wife living, he has gone
V. Mussamut Eoushun Jehan, 1876, through the ceremony of marriago
P. C); and by the Eoman Dutch Law with a niece of his first wife. E. v.
as prevailing in Ceylon. Aronegary Allen, 1872 ; overruling E. v. Fan-
V. Sambonade, 1881, P. C. uing, 1865.
* TheBreadalbanecase, 1867,H.L.; '" Catherwood v. Caslon, 1844
explaining, or, perhaps, as some may (Parke, B.); Burt v. Burt, 1860.
think, explaining away, Cunningham But see Eooker v. Eooker and New-
149
COEPOEATE BODIES — PEOFESSIONAL MEN. [PAET I.
such proceedings, teing of a penal nature, require the strictest
proof ; and for the exception in cases of adultery, a further reason
is, to prevent parties from setting up pretended marriages for evil
purposes.^
§ 173. It is not altogether clear, however, how far the presump-
tion, derivahle from aoting in a particular character, raises a prima
faoie presumption that those who have done so filled the character,
which they have assumed, of corporate bodies, or of persons suing or
being sued us professional men, or as filling particular situations. On
an indictment, which charged the accused with obtaining the goods
of the company by false pretences,^ parol evidence that a limited
company had acted as such was held sufficient, without strict proof
of incorporation ; but in this case no allegation of ownership was
necessary.* In an action against a clergyman for non-residence,
the plaintiff was held not to be bonnd to prove the admission,
institution, and induction of the defendant, but to have given
sufficient prima facie evidence by showing that he had received
tithes and acted as incumbent.^ Plaintiff's appointment as Farrier-
General under the Post-horse Act, was, too, presumed from defen-
dant's having accounted to him as such ; * and a solicitor, who sued
a party for slandering him in his profession, by threatening to
strike him off the rolls for misconduct, recovered damages, on proof
that he had acted as a solicitor, without showing his due admission
and enrolment.^ The same lax evidence has several times been
allowed in actions by surgeons ' and solicitors for their fees, and by
parsons for their tithes.* But all these eases, perhaps, rest not so
much upon the presumption now under discussion, as on the
ground that the opposite party had, by his admissions, either by
word or deed, rendered it unnecessary to prove the actual appoint-
ton, 1864 (Wilde, J.O.). See, also, « Berryman v. Wise, 1791.
Patrickson D. Patrickson, 1865; and ' Gremairei). Le Clerk BoisValon,
cases cited ante in two last notes 1809. See also Cope v. Eowlands,
save one to § 143-4. 1836. But 21 & 22 V. c. 90, § 32,
1 Morris v. Miller, 1767 ; Birt v. has rendered it necessary for a
Barlow, 1779 (Ld. Mansfield). medical man (and 41 & 42 V. c. 33,
^ E. V. Langton, 1877, 0. A. § 5 (amended by 49 & 50 V. c. 48,
= By 24 & 25 V. c. 96 (" Tlie Lar- § 26) for a dentist), when suing for his
Deny Act, 1861 "). charges, to prove his due registration.
* Bevan v. Williams, 1775, 1776 « Radford w.M'Intosh, 1790 ; Berry-
(Lord Mansfield). man v. Wise, 1791 (Buller, J.). See
* Eadiord v. M'Intosh, 1790. Green v. Jackson, 1865.
150
OIL v.] PRESUMPTIONS RESPECTING PROFESSIONAL MEN.
ment.i Where no such admission has been made, the safer, if not
the necessary, course will be to prove the appointment in the
ordinary manner ; and to do so seems most consistent with modern
practice and the latest decisions.
§ 174. As a rule, indeed, it is clear in an action for slander on
him in any particular character, the plaintiff must show that he
possesses that character.^ At all events, where, in an action for
defaming him as a physician by using words denying that he held
an M.D. degree, the plaintiff, not content with resting his case on
evidence of having practised, proceeded to prove that he had
received the degree of M.D. from a Scotch University (St. Andrews),
the court having held that this did not entitle him to practise in
England, he was not allowed to fall back upon proof of practice,
on the legality of which he had himself thrown doubt.
§ 175. There are, moreover, three actions, brought by persons
who alleged that they held particular offices, where the plaintiffs
were respectively nonsuited on failing to prove appointment to the
office claimed, although it does not appear that any evidence was
offered that they had ever acted in the respective capacities alleged.'
These cases, though for this reason, perhaps, not direct authorities,
tend to show what the practice has been, and so far support the
view that the rule which renders evidence of acting prima facie
proof of due appointment, is confined to cases where the parties
occupy a public situation, or, perhaps, where the question of
appointment is not directly in issue.*
§ 176. There are also various prima facie presumptions which
are founded upon the experience of human conduct in the ordinary
1 See Smith v. Taylor, 1805 (Cham- r. 13.
bre, J.) ; also judgment of Heath, J. ' Sellers v. Till, 1825; Savage v.
" Collins V. Carnegie, 1834; Pick- , 1780; Cortis v. Kent Water-
ford V. Gutcli, 1787 (Buller, J.) ; and works Co., 1827.
Smith. V. Taylor, 1805, where possibly * E. v. Jones, 1774, where, on an
the words impKed an admission of indictment against an apprentice for
the character in which the plaintiff fraudulent enlistment, it was held
sued. In actions of this kind, if the that the indenture must be proved,
statement of claim alleged that the is an authority on neither side of this
plaintiff holds a certain office, or question, for that decision rested on
belongs to a particular profession or the ground, that as the actual and
trade, no evidence is now required to legal binding was the fact which con-
support this .statement, unless it be stituted the gist of the offence, this
distinctly denied in the statement of could only be proved by the best
defence, E. S. C, 1883, Ord. xix. evidence.
151
PKESUMPTIONS FOUNDED ON BUSINESS. [PAET I.
course of business. For instance, a mere holding over after the
expiration of an old lease, even for a long period (such as ten
years), raises no presumption of a new tenancy from year to year ;'
tut the receipt of rent raises a legal presumption of a new tenancy
from year to year ; ^ though either the payer or the receiver of such
rent may repel the presumption, by proving that the payment was
made under circumstances inconsistent with it, as, for example,
under the impression that the old lease was still subsisting.'
Again, if a tenancy from year to year be created, the law presumes
that it was intended to be determinable by either party at the end
of the first, as well as of any subsequent, year, unless the parties,
when arranging the terms of the contract, have used expressions
showing that they contemplated a tenancy for two years at least.*
Further, if a lessor, having mortgaged his reversion, is permitted
by the mortgagee to continue in the receipt of the rent incident to
that reversion, he is daring such permission presumptione juris
authorised, if it should become necessary, to sue for such rent, or
to prevent or recover damages in respect of any trespass or wrong
relative to the property, in his own name only.* Whether, under
these circumstances, the mortgagor could realise the rent by
distress in his own name, is not so clear, but under the old law he
could distrain for it in the mortgagee's name, and as his bailiff.'
The same implied authority is also recognised in favour of a party,
to whom the mortgagor has assigned his equity of redemption.'
Again, in actions of trover, the jury will be advised, if not directed,
to presume a conversion from unexplained evidence of a demand
and refusal.^
§ 176a. Whether paying ofE a mortgage will keep it alive or
extinguish it, depends upon the intention of the parties ; but, in
the absence of any express evidence, equity will raise a presumption
' Cusaok V. Farrell, 1887 (Ir.). § 25, subs. 5 ; 40 & 41 V. c. 57, 8. 28,
' Bishop V. Howard, 1823 ; Doe v. subs. 5 (Ir.).
Taniere, 1848; Eccles. Commiss. v. ^ Trent v. Hunt, 1853 (Alderson,
Merral, 1869. In these last two B.).
cases the lessors were a corporation. ' SneU v. Finch, 1863.
^ Doev. Orago, 1848. ^ Caunce v, Spanton, 1844; Stan-
* Doe V. Smaridge, 1845. See cliffe v. Hardwick, 1835 ; Thompson
Brown v. Symons, 1660 ; Langton v. v. Trail. 1826 ; Thompson v. Small,
Cavleton, 1873. 1845; Davies v. Nicholas, 1836;
5 36 & 37 V. 0. 66 (" The Supreme Clendon v. Diuneford, 1831. See
Court of Judicature Act, 1873 "), Towne v. Lewis, 1849.
152
CHAP, V.J PEESUMPTIVE TEEMS OF SERVICE.
in favour of that intention, wMch, under the circumstances, would
be most advantageous to the party paying. Thus, a mortgage
paid off by a tenant for life will, as stated in another plaoe,^ be
presumed to have been intended to be retained for his own benefit
against the inheritance ; but if the owner of an estate in fee or in
tail pays off a charge, a contrary presumption will be recognised,
and the mortgage will prim^ facie be extinguished.^
§ 177. It is also prima facie presumed upon a general hiring
of a servant, without any stipulation as to time, that such
hiring was for a year, unless, indeed, there are circumstances
tending to rebut this presumption,^ as, for instance, an agreement
to pay weekly or monthly wages, with no stipulation showing an
intention that the service should continue for a longer period than
a week or a month.* This rule applies to domestic as well as to
farm servants. There is, however, this difference between the two
classes, that the service of domestic servants, unlike that of farm
servants,^ may be determined by a month's warning or on payment
of a month's wages." In the case of clerks, warehousemen,
travellers, editors, reporters, actors, ushers, governesses, and the
like, the law raises no inflexible presumption of an indefeasible
yearly hiring from the mere fact of a hiring for an indefinite
period. In all such eases, the jury must determine the question
for themselves, after weighing all the circumstances proved, and
ascertaining, if possible, what usage prevails in the particular
business or employment to which the hiring relates.'
§ 177a. There is a presumption that there was a promise that
the act should be done within a reasonable time on proof of a
promise to marry,* to discharge a cargo,' and in all cases {f.. g., a
1 Ante, § 154. lee, J.); Fawcett v. Cash, 1834.
2 Adams v. Angell, 1876; Mohesh Ante, § 34.
Lai V. Mohunt Bawan Das, 1883, P. C. ' Baxter v. Nurse, 1 844. See Hol-
' Lilley v. Elwin, 1843. croft ii. Barber, 1843; Todd f. Kerriok,
' E. u. Worfield, 1794; E. v. St. 1852; Parker v. Ibbetson, 1858;
Andrew, Pershore, 1828; E. v. Pilk- Fairman v. Oakford, 1860.
ington, 1844; Baxter i;. Nurse, 1844 * Potter t^.Deboos, 1815 (Ld.BUen-
(Ooltman, J.). borougb) ; Atohinson v. Baker, 1797
° Beestonv. OoUyer, 1827 (Gaselee, (Ld. Kenyon).
j_\ ■ 9 Postlethwaite v. Freeland, 1880,
<* Turner v. Mason, 1845 (Parke, H. L.
B.) ; Beeston v. CoUyer, 1827 (Gase-
153
PRESUMPTIONS RESPECTING PAYMENTS. [PART I.
contract to deliver goods) in which the time of completion has been
left undefined.'
§ 178.^ Moreover, as men are usually vigilant in guarding their
property, prompt in asserting their rights, and diligent in claiming
and collecting their dues, the law prima facie presumes, where a
bill of exchange or an order for the payment of money or the
delivery of goods is found in the hands of the drawee, or a
promissory note is found in the possession of the maker, that such
note has been duly paid,"* or that the goods ordered have been
delivered ; * a receipt for the last year's or quarter's rent is evidence
of all the rent previously accrued having been paid.'* Further,
the mere delivery of money, or of a bank cheque, by one person
to another, or the transfer of stock, is, if unexplained, presumptive
evidence of the payment of an antecedent debt, and not of a loan ;*
while payment of money. of another, which the drawer admittedly
had in his hands, must be presumed on its being shown that a
cheque in favour of the plaintiff, who has had it duly cashed, has
been drawn on the account of the person who held the money,
though it be not proved that the cheque was directly received by
the plaintiff from the defendant, and it be urged that it might
have passed through many other hands."
§ 179.* Several prima facie presumptions, moreover, are made
from the regular course of business in a jniblic office. Thus, post-
marks on letters, {when capable of being deciphered,) are prima
facie evidence that the letters were in the post at the time and
place therein specified;' "the official mark of any sum on any
postal packet as due to the Post-office, British, colonial, or foreign,
1 Ellis V. Thompson, 1838 (Alder- v. Cope, 1791 ; Lloyd v. Sandiland,
Bon, B.). See Ford v. Cotesworth, 1818; Gary i". Geirish, 1801 ; Aubert
1870. V. Walsh, 1812; BosweU v. Smith,
2 Gr. Ev. § 38, in part. 1833; Graham v. Cox, 1848 ; Patton
'^'^ Brembridge v. Osborne, 1816. v. Ash, 1821 (Am.).
' Gibbon V. Featherstonhaugh, ^ Mountford v. Harper, 1847 {K\-
1816; Egg i;.Bamett,lhOO; Garlook derson, B.).
V. Geortner, 1831 (Am.) ; Alvord v. « Gr. Ev. § 40, in part.
Baker, 1832 (Am.); Weidner v. ' Fletcher <>. Braddyll, 1821 ; R. v.
Soh-weigart, 1823(Am.); Shepherds. Johnson, 1805; R. v. Watson, 1808;
Currie, 1816. Archangelo v. Thompson, 1811; E.
3= iGilb.Ev. 309; Brewer ?;.Knapp, i). Plumer, 1814; Stooken «. Collin
1823 (Am.); 23 & 24 V. o. 154, § 47. 1841; Butler v. Mountgarret, 1859,
* Welch V. Seaborn, 1816 ; Breton H. L.
154
CHAP, v.] NOTICES, ETC. SERVED THROUGH THE POST.
in respect of that packet, shall in every part of Her Majesty's
dominions be received as evidence of the liability of such packet to
the sum so marked ; " ^ and if a letter properly directed ^ is proved
to have been either put into the post-ofEce, or delivered to the
postman,' it is presumed to have reached its destination at the
regular time, and to have been received by the person to whom it
was addressed.*
§ 180. This last presumption, indeed, though generally only
prima facie," is in certain cases rendered conclusive, either by
rules of court, or by Act of Parliament. Thus, Order LXVII.
r. 3 of the E. S. 0. of 1883 provides, that " notices sent from any
office of the Supreme Court may be sent by post ; and the time at
which the notice so posted would be deKvered in the ordinary
course of post shall be considered as the time of service thereof, and
the posting thereof shall be a sufficient service." Under sect. 142
of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, " all notices and other documents, for
the service of which no special mode is directed, may be sent by
prepaid post letter to the last known address of the person to be
served therewith," ^ and by the Bankruptcy Rules, as to notices of
meetings of creditors,' — " an affidavit by the trustee, official receiver,
or other officer of the court, or the solicitor in the matter, or by the
clerk of any such person, that the notice has been duly posted, shall
be sufficient evidence of such notice having been duly sent to the
person to whom the same was addressed." There are also con-
tained in such rules special provisions,* as to the service of creditors'
petitions, and the proof of such service with respect to bankruptcy
notices,^ and as to serving and proving service of petitions for
administering insolvent estates,"* while the rules further provide '-
that, " where notice of an order or other proceeding in court may
1 38 & 39 V. 0. 22, § 8. Beal, 1821 (Am.); Warren t;."Warren,
2 Where the address was "Mr. 1834; Kufhi;. Weston, 1799; Dobree
Haynes, Bristol," it was held in- v. Eastwood, 1827 ; Wall's case,
sufficient to raise this presumption: 1872 (Malins, V.-C); In re Hickey,
Walter v. Haynes, 1824 (Abbot, 1875 (ir.) ; Story, BiUs, § 300.
C.J.), ^ Eeidpath's case, 1870 (Ld. Bo-
's Skilbeokw. Garbett, 1845. milly, M.E.).
* Saunderson v. Judge, 1795
Woodcock V. Houldsworth, 1846
Dunlop V. iaiggins, 1848, H. L. _
Household Fire, &c. Ins. Co. v. ' Id. r. 123.
Grant, 1879, 0. A.; Bussard i;. Lever- i" Id. r. 201,
ing, 1821 (Am.) ; Lindenberger v. " Id. r. 82.
155
« 46 & 47 V. c. 52, § 142.
' See rr. 184 and 188.
' See Bankruptcy Eules, 144 — 8,
NOTICES, ETC. SERVED THROUGH THE POST. [PART I.
be served by post, it shall be sent by registered letter."' Again, in
Scotland, any summons or warrant of citation, whether of a party
or a witness, or warrant of service or judicial intimation, may, in
any civil action or proceeding in any court, be executed by posting
a registered letter duly addressed.^ And, under various Acts of
Parliament, the service of notices and other documents by post
(which is indeed sometimes required to be registered post) is per-
mitted. Some of the principal of these Acts are enumerated in
the foot-note, but reference must be made to the provisions of the
particular statute to see if any given notice or document has been
served in the manner required by its provisions.^
"The Explosives Act, 1875" (38 & 39
V. c. 17, § 85); "The Factories and
Workshops Act, 1878 " (41 V. c. 16,
§ 79) ; " The Friendly Societies Act,
1875 " (38 & 39 V. c. 60, § 30, subs. 11,
as amended by 42 V. c. 9); "The
Landed Property Improvement (Ire-
land) Act, 1847" (10 & 11 V. c. 32,
§60); "The Licensing Acts, 1872"
(35&36V. c. 94,§70); "The London
County Council" (see 18 & 19 V.
c. 120, § 22, and 51 & 52 V. c. 41, § 40,
subs. 8); "The Lunacy Act, 1890"
(53 V. c. 5, §327); " The Mines Regu-
lation Acts, 1872" (35 & 36 V. c. 76,
§ 71, and c. 77, § 40); " The Parlia-
mentary Voters' Registration Act,
1843" (6 & 7 V. c. 18) : " The Patents
Designs and Trade-marks Act, 1883"
(46 & 47 V. c. 57, § 97); " The Poor
Law Amendment Act, 1844 " (7 <&; 8
V. c. 101); "The Public Health Acts,
1875," for England (38 & 39 V. c. 55,
§ 267); and for Ireland (41 & 42 V.
0. 52, § 267); "The Public Works
Loans Act, 1875 " (38 & 39 V. c. 89,
§ 47) ; " The Regulation of Railways
Act, 1873" (36 & 37 V. c. 48, § 35);
"The Telegraphs Act, 1878" (41 &42
V. c. 76, § 12); "The Valuation
(Metropolis) Act, 1869 " (32 & 33 V.
c. 67, § 65); "The Parliamentary
Voters' Registration Act, 1843," for
England (6 & 7 V. c. 18, on construc-
tion of which, see Bishop v. Helps,
1845; Hiokton v. Antrobus, 1846;
Bayley v. Overseers of Nantwich,
1846; Lewis t;. Evans, 1874; Hornsby
V. Bolton, 1856 ; Hannsford i;.White-
way, 1856) ; and for Ireland, 13 & 14
V. 0. 69, §§113, 114.
' See, however, 46 & 47 V. c. 52,
§ 11, which relates to the service of
orders staying proceedings, and is
inconsistent with the above rule.
2 45 & 46 V. 0. 77, §§ 3 and 4.
^ Some of the principal of the sta-
tutes here referred to, arranged alpha-
betically (no better arrangement sug-
gesting itself), under which notices,
&c., may be served by post, are as
follow : — ' ' The Agricultural Holdings
(England) Act, 1833" (46 & 47 V. c. 61,
§ 28) ; " The Alkali, &c. Works Regu-
lation Act, 1881 " (44 & 45 V. c. 37,
amended 55 & 56 V. c. 30, § 26);
" The Army Act, 1881 " (44 & 45 V.
c. 58, § 163, subs. F.) ; The Act of
1851 as to Charitable Institutions
(14 & 15 V. c. 56, § 2); " The Com-
panies Act, 1862 " (25 & 26 V. c. 89,
§§ 62, 63) ; " The Companies Clauses
Act, 1845" (8 & 9 V. c. 16, § 136);
' ' The Conveyancing and Law of Pro-
perty Act, 1881 " (44 & 45 V. c. 41,
§ 67, subs. 4); "The Copyhold Act,
1894" (57 & 58 V. 0. 46, § 57, subs.
1 h)\ "The Corrupt and Illegal
Practices Prevention Act, 1883 "
(46 & 47 V. c. 51, § 62) ; The Act of
1844 as to County Rates(7 & 8 V. c. 33,
§ 6) ; "The Dentists Act, 1 878 " (4 1 &
42 V. c. 33, § 39) ; "The Diseases of
Animals Act, 1894 " (57 & 58 V. c. 57,
§ 48, subs. 3) ; " The Ecclesiastical
Dilapidations Act, 1871 " (34 & 35 V.
c. 43, § 69) ; " The Elementary Edu-
cation Act, 1870" (33 & 34 V. c. 75,
§ 81); "The Endowed Schools Act,
1869" (32 &33 Vict. c.56,§57); "The
Employers' Liability Act " (43 & 44 V.
c. 42, § 7), on the construction of
which see Moyle v, Jenkins, 1881 ;
156
CHAP, v.] PEESUMPTIONS FOUNDED ON BUSINESS.
§ 180a. Where by the course of business in a public department
a thing has taken place which would not have been allowed to
occur without the previous performance of certain formalities, it
will be presumed that those formalities have taken place. Thus,
on its being shown that the Custom-house would not have allowed
goods to be entered without an indorsement on the licence, under
which the vessel in which they came was sailing, of the time of her
clearance, such an indorsement will be presumed to have been
made ;' and on proof that goods, which cannot be exported without
licence, were entered at the Custom-house for exportation, a licence
to export them will be presumed.^
§ 181. A similar presumption to that just mentioned is some-
times drawn from the usual course of men's private ofSces and
business, where the primary evidence of the fact is wanting.^ For
example, underwriters upon a foreign ship or a foreign voyage are
presumed to know the usages and laws of foreign states which
affect that ship or that voyage, because such knowledge is neces-
sary for the due conduct of the business ; * an underwriter is often
presumed, as a matter of fact, though not as one of law,^ to know
the contents of Lloyd's Shipping List, to which, in the ordinary
course of business, he has access ; " a man who deals in a particular
market will be taken to act according to the custom of that
market ; a man who, if he directs another to make a contract at a
particular place, will be presumed to intend that the contract
should be made according to the usage of that place ; ' so that a
person employing a broker on the Stock Exchange impliedly
authorises him to act in accordance with the rules there established,
provided only that they be reasonable, or, in other words, legal ; *
and this whether the principal himself be or be not acquainted
' Butler V. AUnutt, 1816. This presumption is strictly con-
' Van Omeron v. Dowick, 1809. fined to cases wliere the assured lias
s Doe V. Turford, 1832 ; Cliamp- made no representation inconsistent
neys v. Peek, 1816; Pritt v. Pair- with tiie list, which is calciolated to
clough, 1812. mislead the underwriter. Id.
* Young V. Turing, 1841 (Ld. ' Baj'lifle v. Butterworth, 1847
Abinger) ; Nohle ti. Kennoway, 1780 (Alderson, B.); Pollock v. Stables,
(Ld. Mansfield). _ 1848 ; Graves v. Legg, 1857 ; Buckle
' Morrison v. The Universal Mar. v. Knoop, 1867. See post, §§ 1160
Ins. Co., 1872. et seq.
8 Mackintosh v. Marshall, 1843. ^ gge Pearson v. Scott, 1878.
157
PRESUMPTIONS FOUNDED ON BUSINESS. [_PAET I.
with the rules by which such brokers are governed.^ This latter
doctrine, however, will not be carried too far ; ^ and therefore where
goods were shipped at Liverpool, and the bill of lading was
indorsed to parties residing in New South Wales, evidence of a
local usage in Liverpool, affecting the construction of the written
contract, was held inadmissible as against the indorsees, in the
absence of proof that they were acquainted with the usage.^
Moreover, "Lloyd's" at the Eoyal Exchange is not a market
within the rule, and the usage there prevalent among insurance
brokers is not such a general usage as to bind merchants and ship-
owners unacquainted with its existence.* Indeed, it is doubtful
whether the doctrine applies in its full force to cases of maritime
insurance, and authorities^ are not wanting which "look the other
way."^
§ 182. The presumption arising from the usual course of men's
private offices and business, again, gives rise, where letters or
notices properly directed to a gentleman are left with his servant,
to a prima facie presumption that they reached his hands;' while
the fact of sending a letter to the post-office will in general be
regarded by a jury as presumptively proved, if the letter be shown
to have been handed to, or left with, the clerk, whose duty it was
in the ordinary course of business to carry it to the post, and he
declares that, although he has no recollection of the particular
letter, he invariably took to the post-office all letters that either
were delivered to him, or were deposited in a certain place for that
purpose.* But it has been held at Nisi Prius that neither proof of
1 Sutton V. Tatham, 1839 ; recog- 1821 ; Gabay v. Lloyd, 1825.
nised in Bayliffe v. Butterworth., ^ Bartlettv. Pentland, 1830; G-abay
1847 ; Pollock v. Stables, 1848 ; Bay- v. Lloyd, 1825.
ley«.Wilkins, 1849; Taylor i). Stray, « Bayliffe v. Butterworth, 1847
1857 ; Hodgkinson v. Kelly, 1868 ; (Ld. Wensleydale).
Coles 1/. Bristowe, 1868, C. A. ; ' Maogregor v. Keily, 1849. Tbis
Bowring v. Shepherd, 1870 ; Grissell presumption is sometimes conclusive,
n. Bristo-we, 1868; Duncan n. Hill, as, for instance, in the case of a notice
1871. See NiokaUs v. Merry, 1875, to quit served at the tenant's house
H. L. on one of his servants. Tanham v.
^ See Eobinson v. Mollett, 1875, Nicholson, 1872, H. L.
H. L. « Skilbeck v. Garbett, 1845 ; Heth-
= Kirchner v. Venus, 1859, P. 0. erington v. Kemp, 1815; Trotter v.
But see The Steamship Co. Norden v. Maclean, 1875 ; Ward v. Ld. Londes-
Dempsey, 1876. borough, 1852; Spencer u. Thompson,
* Sweeting v. Pearce, 1861, Ex. Oh. ; 1856 (Ir.). So, in Scotland, " where
Scott V. Irvmg, 1830 ; Todd v. Eeid, there is proof of the regular practice
158
CHAP, v.] WORKING OF SCIENTIFIC INSTEUMENTS.
the possession of a letter by a deceased person for the purpose of
posting, nor of an entry in a postage book made by him in the
ordinary course of business, is sufficient legal proof of the postage
of a letter.^
§ 183. The working accuracy of scientific instruments is also
presumed. For example, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, a jury would be advised to rely on the correctness of a
watch or clock, which had been consulted to fix the time when a
certain event happened ; a thermometer would be regarded as a
sufficiently safe indication of the heat of any liquid in which it had
been immersed ; a pedometer would afford prima facie evidence of
the distance between two places which had been traversed by the
wearer ; and similar prima facie credit would be given to aneroids,
anemometers, and other scientific instruments ; and blood stains are
every day detected by means of known chemical tests. Indeed,
in some instances this presumption has been recognised by the
legislature.^
§ 184. Yarious presumptions are again recognized in the law of
partnership. The mere fact of participation in the net profits of a
business was, prior to 1860, supposed,' by an arbitrary and absolute
presumption of law, to constitute a partnership. In that year the
House of Lords, in the well-known case of Cox v. Hickman,^
however, denied the existence of any legal presumption to this
effect. Consequently, although a right to share in the profits of
trade is a strong test of partnership, and, when standing alone, will
even justify a jury in presuming its existence, the question whether
or not several persons are partners must, nevertheless, in each case
depend on the real intention and contract of the parties.* And
of a house of business to despatch, its facie evidence of the quantity " of gas
letters in a particular manner to or water consumed. See 34 & 35 V.
the post-office, it is not necessary to c. 41, § 20 ; 38 & 39 V. c. 55, § 59 ; 41
prove that the individual letter in & 42 V. o. 52, § 69, Ir.
question -was so despatched." Dick- ' Waugh i;. Carver, 1793; Pott r.
son, Ev. § 6, and oases cited in n. e. Eyton, 1846.
1 Eowland v. De Vecchi, 1882 * 1860, H. L.
(Day, J.). " MoUwo, March & Co. v. The Ct.'
« Thus, under "The Gas Works ofWards, 1872, P.O.; Eossv.Parkyns,
Clauses Act, 1871," and tha Public 1875; Pooley v. Driver, 1876; Exp.
Health Acts of 1875 for England, Tennant, Ee Howard, 1877, C. A." ;
and 1878 for Ireland, bhe register of Ex p. Delhasse, Ee Megevand, 1867,
a gas or water meter " shall be prima C. A. ; Pawsey v. Ai'mstrong, 1881.
159
PRESUMPTIONS IN LAW OF PARTNERSHIP. [PART I.
bhe Partnership Act, 1865 ^ (coramonly called Bovill's Act), enables
loans of money and contracts for remuneration to be made and
annuities to be granted by partnerships without making the
recipient a partner. And in partnership law, it is still presumed —
in the absence of any contract between partners, or any dealing
from which a contract may be implied, — both in England ^ and in
America,' following the civil law,* that the business has been con-
ducted on terms of an equal partnership ; and, consequently, that
each partner has a right to insist on an equal participation in
profit and loss. It has even been held at Nisi Prius, that, in the
absence of all evidence on the subject, partners must be presumed
to be interested in equal proportions in the partnership stock.^
§ 185. Every member in an ordinary trading copartnership is
moreover presumed to be intrusted with a general authority to enter
into contracts on behalf of the firm for the usual purposes of the
business, and, consequently, to be empowered to borrow money,
and to contract or pay debts, on account of the partnership, and to
make, draw, indorse, and accept negotiable securities in the firm's
name.^ Similar powers, however, are not presumed to exist in the
case of mining copartnerships. Accordingly one of several co-
adventurers in a mine has no authority, as such, to negotiate any
bill on behalf of his fellows,' or to pledge the credit of the general
body for money borrowed for the purposes of the concern.' Still
less have the members of a firm, not established for trading pur-
poses (as, for example, a firm of solicitors) any implied authority
to bind each other by drawing or indorsing bills of exchange, or
making promissory notes or even post-dated cheques.' Nor in an
' 28 & 29 V. c. 86. » Farrar v. Beswiok, 1836 (Lord
' Stewart v. Forbes, 1849 (Lord Wensleydale).
Cottenliam, 0., recognising ruling of , ' Jenkins v. Morris, 1847 ; Ex p.
Lord Eldon in Peacock v. Peacock, l)arlington, &c. Bank Co., Ee Eiclies
1809) ; Webster v. Bray, 1848 ; and Marshall's Trust Deed, 1864 ;
M'Gregori).Bainbrigge, 1848; Robin- Story, Part. §§ 102, 124, 125. Bk. of
son V. Anderson, 1855 ; Collins v, Australasia v. Breillat, 1847, P. C.
Jackson, 1862; Story, Part. § 24. See Maclae v. Sutherland, 1854.
But see contra. Peacock v. Peacock, ' Dickinson v. Valpy, 1829.
1809(Ld.Ellenborougli); andTomp- ^ Eicketts i). Bennett, 1847; Bur-
son V. Williamson, 1831. mester v. Norris, 1851. See In re
2 Gould V. Gould, 1830 (Am.). German Mining Co., 1853; and post,
^ Inst. lib. 3, tit. 26, § 1 ; Dig. lib. § 1185 ad fin.
17, tit. 2, § 29. » Forster v. Mackreth, 1867 ; Hed-
ley V. Bainbridge, 1842.
160
CHAP, v.] PEESUMPTIONS RESPECTING PARTNERS.
ordinary partnership lias one member of a firm power to bind tbe
others by contracts out of the ordinary mode of the partnership
dealings, merely because they are reasonable acts towards effecting
the partnership purposes.^ Consequently, where a partner signed
a guarantee in the name of the firm for the purpose of giving effect
to a transaction within the scope of the partnership dealings, it
was, in the absence of proof of any usage, and of any recognition
by tbe other partners, held that the firm was not bound by the
guarantee.^ Had any evidence been given of the adoption of the
act by the other partners, the result would, of course, have been
different.'
§ 186. Presumptions are also made in the law of agency. Thus,
when a seller deals with an agent resident in this country, and
acting for a foreign principal, he is presumed not to contract with
the foreigner, but to simply trust the party with whom he actually
makes the bargain.* This, however, is at best * a mere presumption
of fact, liable to be rebutted by any evidence, whether extrinsic or
intrinsic, that credit was intended to be given to the foreign
principal."
§ 187. One or two presumptions also attach to particular trades,
having been originally founded on principles of public policy.'
Thus with regard to common carriers. If goods intrusted ^ to a
common carrier be lost or damaged, the law will conclusively
presume that the carrier has been guilty of negligence, unless he
can show that the loss or damage was occasioned by " the act of
God," or by the Q,ueen's enemies." Similarly the loss or damage
> See Bisliop V. Countess of Jersey, v, Kekule, 1854.
1854. ' Best, Ev. 528—530.
'^ Brettel v. "Williams, 1849 ; over- * The rule does not extend to a
ruling Ex p. Gardom, 1808. See passenger's luggage placed in tlie
also Hasleham v. Young, 1844 ; same carriage with him on a railway ;
Duncan v. Lowndes, 1813. One and if such luggage be lost or injured
partner, too, has no implied autho- the company will only be hable for
rity to bind another by submission the damage on proo/of the negligence
to arbitration. Hatto'n v. Eoyle, of their servants. Bergheim v. Gt.
1858. East. Ey. Co., 1878, 0. A.
s Sandilands v. Marsh, 1819. See » Boss v. Hill, 1846 (Tindal, C.J.) ;
Maclae v. Sutherland, 1854. Coggs v. Bernard, 1704 (Ld. Holt).
* Healdw. Konworthy, 1855 (Parke, See post, § 1172. The Scotch law on
B.), this subject is now embodied in § 17
"'It is put too strongly by Mr. of 19 & 20 V. c. 60, which enacts,
Justice Story in Story, Agen. § 290. that " all carriers for hire of goods
« Green V. Kopke, 1856; Mahoney within Scotland shall be liable to
-VOL. I. i61
M
PRESUMPTIONS RESPECTING INNKEEPERS. [PART I.
of luggage, while under the custody of a stage-ooachman, a cat-
man, or even a gratuitous hailee, raises a prima facie inference of
want of care, which, iu the absence of evidence to the contrary,
renders the baUee liable to an action.^ Again, with regard to
innkeepers. Where chattels not exceeding in value the sum of
thirty pounds,^ have been lost by a guest ^ in a public inn, — which
term seems to include an hotel, a tavern, and a coffee-house,* —
or injured there, the primcl facie presumption is that the loss or
injury was occasioned by the negligence, or, at least, through the
defect, of the innkeeper or his servants : ^ but on proof that it was
caused by the negligence of the guest, the landlord's responsibility
will cease." The salaried manager of an hotel belonging to a
company, is not regarded as an " innkeeper " within this rule,
though the hotel licence may have been granted to himself
personally.'
§ 188. A presumption of negligence sometimes may be made (if
a jury think fit) from the mere happening of an accident, if it be one
which, in the ordinary course of things, does not happen to those
who use proper care in the management of their business, and
therefore affords reasonable evidence of negligence, in the absence
make good to the owner of suoh goods Act, 1863"), interprets the word
all losses arising from aooidental fire, " inn " as meaning "any hotel, inn,
while such goods are in the custody tavern, public-house, or other place
or possession of such carriers." of refreshment, the keeper of which
^ Eoss V. Hill, 1846 ; Harris v. is now by law responsible for the
Costar, 1825 ; Coggs v. Bernard, goods and property of his guests."
1704. See G-t. North. Ey. Co. v. See Doe v. Laming, 1814 ; and E. v.
Sheppard, 1852. Eymer, 1877. A boarding-house or
' The common law liability of inn- lodging-house keeper has no duty
keepers has been restricted by 26 & imposed upon him by law to take
27 V. c. 41 ("The Innkeepers Lia- care of his lodgers' goods. Holder
bility Act, 1863"), and is now limited v. Soulby, 1860; Dansey v. Eichard-
to 301., save as to goods deposited for son, 1854.
safe custody, and as to horses and " Dawson i;. Chamney, 1843; Mor-
carriages, if the inn has a copy of gan v. Eavey, 1861 ; JElichmond v.
§ 1 of the Act exhibited in a con- Smith, 1830 ; Burgess v. Clements,
spiouous part of its hall or entrance. 1816; Armistead v. Wilde, 1851;
As to the construction of the Act, Calye's case, 1583; Day v. Bather,
there is a case of Moss v. Eussell, 1863.
1884, 0. A. See, as to this point, ^ Armistead v. Wilde, 1851 ; Oas-
Spioe y. Bacon, 1877, 0. A. hill v. Wright, 1866; Morgan v.
^ The depositor must be a guest. Eavey, 1860 ; Filipowski v. Merry-
See as to what constitutes a guest, weather, 1860 ; Oppenheim v. White
Strauss V. County Hotel Co., 1883. Lion Hotel Co., 1871; Spice «. Bacon,
* Thompson v. Lacy, 1820 ; TurriU 1877, C. A.
V. Crawley, 1849. § 4 of 26 & 27 V. ' Dixon v. Birch, 1872.
0. 41 (" The Innkeepers' Liability
162
CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIONS RESPECTING ACCIDENTS.
of any explanation by the defendant.^ For example, this has been
done where the injury complained of was caused, either by a col-
lision between two railway trains belonging to the same company,*
by a railway carriage having, during the jo\irney, unaccountably
left the rails,' or by a barrel of flour falling on a man out of a
warehouse window while he was walking in the street below.* On
the other hand, where a ladder, inside a private house, from some
unexplained cause fell against an upper window and broke it, and
the glass in falling damaged the eye of a person passing by, the
proof of these facts alone was held insufficient to fix the owner of
the house with negligence.' And the mere happening of an acci-
dent does not raise a presumption that an injury, which was caused
to a person by his acting with rashness to avoid an imaginary
danger, that he erroneously supposed had arisen owing to such
accident, is attributable to the negligence which originally occasioned
such accident.' Indeed, an accident will not be presumed to have
been attributable to it in all cases where negligence by the defen-
dant is proved. If the facts are equally consistent with its having
been caused by some voluntary act of the plaintiffs, a case should
only be left to the jury (1) where the circumstances make it a
question of fact whether such voluntary act of the plaintiff was
negligent or not ; or (2) where the circumstances are such that an
inference that the defendant could, by reasonable care, have avoided
the accident would not be unreasonable.'
§ 189. Various prima facie and disputable presumptions arise,
again, in respect of infants. Thus, infants between seven" years
and fourteen, are prima facie presumed to be unacquainted with
guilt, and therefore cannot be convicted, unless the jury shall be
satisfied from the evidence, that, when the offence was committed,
they had a guilty knowledge that they were doing wrong.* This
1 Cases cited infra, note ». ^ Higgs v. Maynard, 1866 ; Wel-
» Skinner v. Lond. & Brighton Ey. fare v. Lond. & Brigh. Ey. Co., 1869.
Co., 1850. SeeMoflatt'y. Bateman, 1869.
' 'Flannery v. Waterf . & L. Ey. ' Kearney v. Gt. Sonthern & Wes-
Co., 1877 (It.). tern Ey. Co., 1886 (Ir.). Compare
* Byrne v. Boadle, 1863 ; Scott v. Jones v. Boyoe, 1816 ; Davie v,
Lond. Dock Co., 1865 ; Kearney v. London & S. W. Ey. Co., 1883.
Lond. & Brigh. Ey. Co., 1871, Exct. ' Coyle v. Great North of Lreland
Oh. Ey. Co., 1887 (Ir.).
8 Euss. C. & M. 1—5.
163 m2
PEESUMPTIOXS RESPECTING INFANTS.
[part I.
rule, though perhaps originally adopted in favorem vitsB with
respect to capital offences only,' has for many years past been ex-
pressly held applicable to all felonies.^ There seems no reason, on
principle, why it should not also be extended to misdemeanors,
with the exception, perhaps, of those where an infant occupier of
lands, charged with the repair of a bridge or road, might be
indicted for non-repair.' The test of juvenile exemption pro-
pounded by Lord Hale, is whether the accused was capable of
discerning " between good and evil." * These words are sufficiently
indefinite, since they may apply either to legal responsibility or to
moral guilt ; ^ and many children of tender years, though perfectly
well aware that it is wrong to take what does not belong to them
(who are consequently, according to this test, fit subjects for
punishment), may yet be only partially acquainted with the sinful
nature of theft, and be wholly ignorant that it is a crime against
the law of the land."
§ 190. The law also recognises certain presumptions with respect
to married women. Thus, if a wife commit a felony,' other
1 1 Hale, c. 3.
^ E. V. Owen, 1830.
s E. V. Sutton, 1835.
* 1 Hale, 27.
^ See 30 Law Mag. 24, and article on
M'Naughten's trial in Leg. Obs. for
May 27, 1843, as to tte dangerous and
unphilosopliical nature of this test.
" The loose and unsatisfactory
manner in which this merciful pre-
sumption of infantile innocence has
• — at least in former years — been
practically rebutted, cannot be more
clearly exposed than by referring to
a statistical return of juvenile delin-
quents, published in the present
reign. By these it appears that, out
of 297 children under the age of
fifteen, committed in the metropolis
alone during a single year, 238 were
actually convicted; and of these no
fewer than 36 were sentenced to
transportation. See Porter's Statist.
Tables, Part 14, pp. 149, 151, 152,
153. In 1844, 1596 children, under
the age of fifteen, were committed
for trial in England and Wales.
Porter's Progress of Nation, p. 656.
' Some doubt exists as to the
crimes excepted from this presump-
tion. "Thus, Ld. Hale, in one
part of his Pleas of the Crown,
vol. i., pp. 45, 47, asserts that the
presumption is recognised in aU
cases excepting treason and murder ;
but in later passages (id. 434, 516)
he excludes from its operation man-
slaughter also, and cites as his autho-
rity a passage from Dalton, in which
manslaughter is not mentioned : Dalt.
c. 104, p. 267 ; new ed. c. 157, p. 503.
Mr. Ser j t. Hawkins makes the excep-
tions consist of treason, murder, and
robbery (1 Hawk. c. 1, p. 4) ; while
Mr. Justice Blaokstone, in the first
vol. of his Comm., mentions only
treason and murder (c. 15) ; and in
the 4th vol., c. 2, excepts also crimes
that are mala in se, and prohibited
by the law of nature, as murder and
the Uke. *_ * * We would gladly see
the exception extended to all capital
felonies, if not to all crimes punish-
able with transportation, and thus
abolish a rule of law, which was
originally founded on doctrines that
no longer prevail, and which every
maiTied man knows is often diametri-
cally opposed to the fact " : 30 Law
Mag. pp. 9, 11.
164
CH. v.] PRESUMPTIONS RESPECTING MARRIED WOMEN.
than treason or homicide,^ or, perhaps, highway robhery,^ in com-
pany \vith her husband, the law presumes that she acted under his
coercion, and consequently without any guilty intent, unless the
fact of non-coercion be distinctly proved. This presumption appears,
on some occasions, to have been considered conclusive, and is still
practically regarded in no very different light, especially when the
crime is of a flagrant character.' The better opinion, however, now
seems to be that, in every case, the presumption may be rebutted
by positive proof that the woman acted as a free agent.* Indeed,
in one case,^ the Irish judges apparently considered that such posi-
tive proof was not required, but that the question was always one
to be determined by the jury on the evidence submitted to them.
However, a married woman cannot, under any circumstances, be
convicted as a receiver of stolen goods, when the property has been
taken by her husband, and given to her by him." But she may
now be convicted of stealing her husband's goods.'
§ 191. It is somewhat doubtful whether this doctrine of coercion
extends to any misdemeanors. But the better opinion seems to
be, that, if the misdemeanor be of a serious nature, as, for instance,
the uttering of base coin,^ the wife will be protected in like manner
as in cases of felony. The protection does not, however, extend to
assaults and batteries,' or to the offence of keeping a brothel."
Indeed, it is probable that in all inferior misdemeanors, the pre-
sumption,— if admitted at all, — would be held liable to be defeated
1 See E. V. Manning, 1849. » jj, ^_ Stapleton, 1828 (Ir.).
" In E. V. Stapleton, 1828 (Ir.), the " E. i;. Brooks, 1853. See E. v.
majority of the judges thought that Wardroper, 1860.
this presumption does not apply to ' See " The Married "Women's Pro-
highway robbery. It certainly does perty Act, 18S2 " (45 & 46 V. o. 75),
not apply to a case of felonious §§ 12, 16, amended by " The Married
■wounding with intent to disfigure, Women's Property Act, 1884 " (47 &
or to do grievous bodily harm : '&. v. 48 V. o. 14); E. v. Brittleton, 1884
Smith, 1858. But see E. v. Torpey, (Ct. of Crim. App.). Formerly she
1871. could not .be convicted, even if she
' 1 Hale, 45; E.D.Archer, 1826. had committed adultery and fled with
See E. V. Torpey, 1871. her paramour, taking the goods with
* See 7 Eep. of Crim. Law Com., her. E. v. Kenny, 1877.
p. 21 ; 30 Law Mag., pp. 9—12 ; E. » E. v. ConoUy, 1829 (Bayley, J.) ;
V. Hughes, 1813; E. v. Pollard, 1838 E. v. Price, 1837 ; Anon., 1841 (Ir.).
(Tindal, O.J., and Vaughan, J., in ' E. v. Cruse, 1838; E. v. Ingram,
a case of arson where the husband 1705.
was bedridden). See, also, E. v. '° E. v. Williams, 1710.
Smith. 1842 (Ir.).
165
PRESUMPTIVE AGENCY OF MARRIED WOMEN. [PART I,
by fax less stringent evidence of the wife's active co-operation than
would suffice in cases of felony.^
§ 192. The following primS, facie presumptions exist with
regard to a husband's liability for debts contracted by his wife ;
where goods are supplied to family or wife, on the order of a
man's wife, who is living with him at the time, and the articles
are neither excessive in quantity, improvident in quality, noi
extravagant in price, it is, in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary, presumed that the wife was the husband's agent to order
such goods.^ But this presumption may always be rebutted by
proof that the husband, while supplying his wife with an adequate
allowance, has expressly forbidden her to pledge his credit even for
necessaries ; and that, too, though the tradesman may have had no
knowledge whatever of the husband's prohibition.^ If, indeed, the
debt has been incurred by the wife while living separate from her
husband, the doctrine of presumptive agency will depend on the
cause of separation. Should the wife have been turned out of
doors or deserted by the husband, or have left him because his
misconduct rendered it impossible for her to remain under his roof,^
she has an implied authority to pledge his credit for necessaries,'
whether supplied to herself or to her infant child,* unless by an
adequate ' allowance from her husband, or by the terms of her
settlement, or perhaps by her own exertions, she be in a position
to provide for her maintenance.^ On the other hand, a wife who
leaves her husband without his consent, and without justifiable
cause, has no authority to bind him by her contracts.' Where
' E. V. Cruse, 1838. (Pollock, B.).
* Lane v. Ironmonger, 1844; re- * Bazeley w. Forder, 1868 (Black-
cognising Freestone v. Butcher, 1840 burn, J.).
(Ld. Abinger) ; Atkins v. Curwood, ^ Wilson v. Ford, 1868. As to bow
1837; Jobnston v. Sumner, 1858; far tbis doctrine applies to cases wbere
Morgan 11. Cbetwynd, 1865 (Cook- tbe wife has retained a solicitor to act
burn, C.J.); Waitbman v. Wakefield, for ber in divorce or otber legal pro-
1807 ; Manby v. Scott, • 1660. See ceedings against ber busband, see
Eeneaux D. Teakle, 1853; Pbillipson Ottaway v. Hamilton, 1878, C. A.;
V. Hayter, 1870; Moylan v. Nolan, Mecredy v. Taylor, 1873 (Ir.); Sbep-
1864 (Ir.) ; Eeid v. Teakle, 1863; berd v. Maokoul, 1813; Brown v,
Euddook V. Marsh, 1857 ; Jewsbury Ackroyd, 1856 ; GrindeU v, God-
V. Newbold, 1857 ; and post, §§ 770, mond, 1836.
771. See also post, § 842. » Bazeley v. Forder, 1868.
^ Debenbamw.Mellon, 1880, II. L.; ' Baker d. Sampson, 1863.
Jolly V. Eees, 1864 ; Eyan v. Nolan, ^ Johnston v. Sumner, 1858.
1884-5 (Ir.); Jetley v. Hill, 1884 » Id.
166
CnAP. v.] PRESUMPTIVE AGENCY OF MARRIED WOMEN.
husband and wife liave parted by mutual consent, and the wife has
afterwards incurred a debt for articles suitable to her degree, the
creditor, to recover from the husband, must afiSrmatively show
either an express authority from him, or at least such circumstances
as will justify the jury in implying an authority; for instance,
that the wife has been left without adequate means of support, or
that an allowance promised to her by the husband has not been
paid.^ Under any circumstances, too, the authority of a wife to
pledge her husband's credit is no greater when he is a lunatic
than when he is sane.^
§ 193. Moreover, though a wife has often an implied authority
from her husband to procure goods on credit, an English court
wbuld never, under the old system, presume that she was his agent
for the purpose of borrowing money ; and this even though she
were turned out of doors without any misconduct on her part, and
without any means of livelihood, and notwithstanding she might
have expended the whole of it in procuring the actual necessaries
of life.^ But a creditor who had been non- suited at common law
in pursuance of this doctrine might succeed in equity before a vice-
chancellor.* The rules of equity will, in future, prevail on this
subject.*
§ 194. The rule of law as to proving impotence in matrimonial
suits for nullity of marriage is somewhat fantastic. Where the
marriage has not been consummated, and no visible defect is
proved to exist in either party ,° impotence is presumed after, but
aot before, the expiration of three years of ineffectual cohabita-
tion.' This rule, however, only applies where the impotence is not
otherwise proved, but is left to be presumed from continual non-
consummation ; and the court will never rely on this rule of pre-
sumption when other evidence on the subject can be obtained.^
§ 195. The presumptions with respect to parent and child are not
' Johnston v. Sumner, 1858; Biffin formerly was in equity in England.
y.Bignell, 1862; Eastland «;.BurclLell, Jolmson v. Manning, 1860 (Ir.).
1870. See Manby v. Scott, 1660. ^ See D., falsely called E. v. F.,
» Eichardson v. Dubois, 1869. See 1864 ; B., falsely called B. v. B.,
Drew V. Nunn, 1879, C. A. 1875 (Ir.).
3 Enox V. Bushell, 1857. ' M., falsely caUed H. v. H., 1864;
* Jenner v. Morris, 1861. See Ee Lewis, falsely called Hay ward v.
Wood's Estate, 1863. Hayward, 1865, H. L.
' The old law in Ireland was as it » E., falsely called D. v. D., 1865.
167
PKESUMPTI0N8 AS TO SENIOKITY. [PAET 1
very important. If a parent and a child both hear the same
Christian and surname, and this name occur in an instrument
without any addition of " senior " or " junior," it will be presumed,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the parent was
intended.' For example, if a legacy be left, or a note be made
payable, to John Holland, and there be two of that name, father
and son, the law, prima facie, presumes that the father is the
legatee or payee. This presumption may, however, readily be
rebutted, as for instance, in the case of the will, by proving that
the testator did not know the father,^ or in the case of the note, by
showing that the son had had it in his possession, or had indorsed
it, or had given instructions to bring an action upon it.^ No pre-
sumption of a promise to pay a debt contracted by the child for
necessaries is made from the mere moral obligation of a parent to
maintain his child.*
§ 196.' Various prima facie legal presumptions are founded on
the continuance, or immutability, for a longer or shorter period, of
human afEairs, which experience tells us usually occurs.* For
instance, when the existence of a person, or pei-sonal relation, or a
state of things, is once proved, the law presumes that the person,
relation, or state of things continues to exist till the contrary is
shown, or till a different presumption is raised, from the nature of
the subject.' Por example, where a jury found that a certain
custom existed up to 1689, it was held, that, in the absence of all
evidence of its abolition, this was in legal effect a verdict finding
that the custom still subsisted in 1840 ; * in settlement cases, unless
there be some evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that a
son, though long since arrived at manhood, has continued uneman-
cipated,* and that the settlement of a pauper,^'' or the appointment
' StebLing i;. Spicer, 1849; Lepiot _ ^ Gr. Ev. § 41, as to first seven
V. Browne, 1703 ; Sweeting n. Fowler, lines.
1815 ; Jarmaiu v. Hooper, 1843. * See argument in Blandy u De
2 Lepiot V. Browne, 1703. Burgh, 1848.
' Stebbing v. Spicer, 1849 ; Sweet- ' See Price v. Price, 1847, over-
ing V. Fowler, 1815. ruling Mercer v. Cheese, 1842. See,
* Shelton v. Springett, 1851 ; re- also. The Gananogue, 1862.
cognising Mortimore v. Wright, 1840, ^ Scales v. Keys, 1840.
and overruling Baker t;. Keene, 1819; " E. v. Lilleshall, 1845, explaining
Blackburn v. Mackey, 1823; Law v. E. v. Oulton, 1835.
Wilkin, 1837. See Bazeley v. Forder, "> E. v. Tanner, 1795 (Ashhurst J 1
1868. ' ^
168
CHAP, v.] PEESUMPTIONS IN FAVOUR OF IMMUTABILITY.
of a partj to an official situation, continues in force for, at least,
a reasonable time ; '^ a partnership, agency, tenancy,^ or other
similar relation, once shown to exist, is presumed to continue, till
it is proved to have been dissolved.^ From the presumption of a
continuance of a state of things once shown to exist, it foUows that
when a business is carried on by partners after the expiration of
the term limited by the articles, it is prima facie presumed, that
such of the provisions of the articles as are not inconsistent
with a partnership at will, continue to apply : * if a tenant hold
over after the expiration of the term, he impliedly holds subject to
all the covenants in the lease which are applicable to his new situa-
tion ' — and this, though the rent has been advanced,'^ or though
the original lessor has assigned his interest to a third party, or,
being a clergyman, has resigned his living, and a fresh incumbent
has succeeded him ; ' and that if a man on several occasions
authorise his mistress to order goods from a tradesman on his
credit, he is liable for articles supplied after the termination of the
connexion, unless the tradesman knew of such termination.^
§ 197. The continuance of a debt once shown to have existed, is
presumed, in the absence of proof of payment, or some other
discharge.' It is also presumed, till the contrary appears, that
opinions,'" which individuals once entertained and expressed, and
that a state of mind on their part once proved to exist, remain
unchanged." Every man who has once been sane is presumed to
be stni of sound mind till the contrary is shown. '^
IE. V. Budd, 1805 (Ld. Ellen- « Torriano v. Young, 1833; Thomas
borougli). V. Packer, 1857; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 154,
2SeePiokettt;.Paokliam,18G9,0.A. § 5, Ir. But see Oakley v. Monck,
» Clark V. Alexander, 1844, where 1865 (Ex. Ch.).
a partnership admitted to exist in ^ Digby v. Atkinson, 1815 (Ld.
1816 was presumed to continue in Ellenborough), explained in Johnson
1838. See, also, Alderson v. Clay, v. St. Peter, Hereford, 1836.
1816; Blandy v. De Burgh, 1848; ' Hutton v. Warren, 1836. See
and Parsons v. Hayward, 1862. So, Thetford v. Tyler, 1845.
by Hindoo law, a family once joint ' Eyan v. Sams, 1848.
is presumed to retain that status, ' Jackson v. Irvin, 1809 (Ld.
unless evidence can be given to show EUenborough).
that it has become diTidod : Mussu- i" Or. Ev. § 42.
mat Cheetha v. Baboo Miheen Lall, " For instance, all members of a
1867. Christian community are presumed
* And this, however diificult it to believe the common faith till their
may be to say what provisions faU acts or declarations evidence the
within this description : Cox v. Wil- contrary. See The State v. Stinson,
loughby, 1880 (Fry, J.); Clark t. 1844 (Am.).
Leach, 1863. See Woods v. Iamb, " Dyce Sombre v. Troup, 1856
1866 (Woods. V.-C). (Sir J. Dobson). Li Sutton v. Sad-
169
PRESUMPTIONS AS TO CONTINUANCE OF LIFE. [PAET I.
§ 198. It is on the above principles also a presumption of law that a
person shown to have once been living is, by English law, in the ab-
sence of proof that he has not been heard of within the last seven years,
presumed to be still alive:' until a time considerably exceeding the
ordinary duration of human life has elapsed. In the civil law the
presumption of life ceases at the expiration of one hundred years
from the date of the birth,^ and the same rule appears to have been
adopted in Scotland.' In England, however, no definite period
has been fixed, at the end of which the presumption of a continu-
ance of life ceases. In several old cases, however, the possibility of
persons having survived the expiration of terms, periods varying
from eighty to ninety-nine years, was neglected in determining the
nature of remainders.* In an action of ejectment, where the plain-
tiff, to prove his title, put in a settlement 130 years old, by which
it appeared that the party through whom he claimed had four elder
brothers, the jury were allowed to presume, not only that these
persons were dead, but, in the absence of all evidence to the con-
trary, that they had died unmarried and without issue.^ And
ler, 1857, tMs presumption was held
to be one oifad, wMch ought not to
influence the jury in a case of con-
flicting evidence. See, also, Ander-
son V. GiU, 1858, H. L. (Ld. Wens-
leydale) ; Crowninshield v. Crownin-
shield, 1854 (Am.). And, on the other
hand, where any derangement or
imhecility is proved or admitted to
have existed at any particular period,
it is presumed to continue tiU dis-
proved. See Att.-Gen. v. Parnther,
1792; Grimani v. Draper, 1848 (Sir
H. Fust) ; Johnson v. Blane, 1848
[Sir H. Fust) ; Dyce Sombre v. Troup,
1856 (Sir J. Dodson); Frinsep and
B. I. Co. V. Dyce Sombre, 1856, P. C. ;
Xicholas and Freeman v. Binns, 1858
(Sir 0. Cresswell) ; Hassardt;. Smith,
1872 (Iv.); Blake v. Johnson, 1819
(Ir.); Smith w. Tebbitt, 1867— unless,
indeed, it be obviously of a partial or
temporary character. See Walcot v.
AUeyn, 1819 (Ir.); Legeyt v. Obrien,
1834 (Ir.); Aii-ejv. Hill, 1824; White
V. Wilson, 1806; Hall v. Warren,
1804.
1 See, however, E. v. Lumley,
1869, cited ante, § 114.
a ' ' Yivere etiam usque ad centum
170
annos quilibet prsesumitur, nisi pro-
mortuus." Corpus Juris Glossatum,
tom. 2, p. 718, n. j; 1 Maso. de Prob.
concl. 103, n. 5; Oampegius Tract,
de Test. reg. 350.
' Morison, Presump. xvi., Car-
stairs V. Stewart, 1734; Ilubb., Ev.
of Sue. 168. Mr. Dickson in his Law
of Evid. in Scotland, states, however,
that ' ' a precise limit to this pre-
sumption has not been fixed." 1 vol.
p. 183. For other foreign laws on
the same subject, see Hubb., Ev. of
Sue. 758, 759.
* Weale </. Lower, 1672 (Lord
Hale) ; Napper v. Sanders, 1628 ; Ld.
Derby's case, 1592.
= Doe V. Deakin, 1828; Doe v.
Wolley, 1828. There Bayley, J., in
stating that the jury had properly
made this presumption, relied on the
general rule, that things must be
presumed to remain in the same state
in which they were proved to have
once been, unless there is some evi-
dence of a subsequent alteration. 3
C. & P. 403. It is, however, sub-
mitted that the rule was in this case
strained somewhat beyond its legiti-
mate extent. If presumptions are
CHAP, v.] PKESUMPTIONS AS TO CONTINUANCE OF LIFE.
whenever it becomes necessary to prove tb.e exhaustion of remote
branches of a family, the jury may safely be advised to act on, very
slight evidence, such, for example, as unanswered advertisements
or ineffectual inquiries.^ And in two other cases a book kept by a
person has been admitted in evidence, without proof that any
inquiries had been made for the writer, or as to his death, in the
one case after the lapse of seventy-four years,^ and in the other of
fifty-four years only.*
§ 199. On the other hand, where a term was for sixty years, the
court refused to presume the death of the termor at the expiration
of that period, and recognized the possibility of his liviag after its
expiration : * and where a person's deposition had been taken siKty
years previously it was held that there was no presumption of his
death, and it was refused to admit such deposition in evidence in the
absence of any proof of search having been made for the deponent,
or any account of him.^
§ 200. The presumption of life will, however, certainly on the
one hand continue for a period exceeding half a century, unless
proof be given either that the party has not been heard of by those
persons who would naturally have heard of him had he been alive,
or, at least, that search has been ineffectually made to find him."
On the other hand, if evidence be furnished of a person's con-
tinuous unexplained absence from home, and of the non-receipt of
intelligence concerning him, after the lapse of seven years'' the
presumption of life ceases, and the burthen of proof is devolved on
founded, as ttey shoiild be, on the presumption could be admitted against
experienced course of events, it was the person in possession. See In re
surely more probable that one out of Webb's Estate, 1870 (Ir.); Mullaly v.
four brothers should marry and have Walsh, 1872 (Ir.).
children, than that they should all ^ Greaves v. Greenwood, 1877,
die unmarried. In Doe v. GrifiBn, 0, A.
1812, where a similar question arose, ^ Jones v. Waller, 1753. See also
evidence negativing the marriage of Doe i;. Davies, 1847.
the party, who was there presumed ' Doe v. Michael, 1851.
to have died without issue, was given; * Beverley v. Beverley, 1690; Doe
and in Eiohards v. Bichards, 1731, v. Andrews, 1850.
where the plaintifE claimed as heir « Benson i/. Ohve, 1781; Manbyv.
by descent, and proved the death of Curtis, 1815.
his elder brothers, the court held that * Doe v. Andrews, 1850.
he must further show that they died ' Gr. Ev. § 41, in part.
without issue, since in ejectment no
171
PRESUMPTIONS AS TO CONTINUANCE OF LIFE. [PAET I.
the party denying the death.' Thus, where a person whose life is
insured has not heen heard of for seven years, those who have
effected the insurance are, at the end of that period, entitled to
have it paid.^ The fixing of this arbitrary period of seven years is
explained by its having been inserted in the old statutes concerning
leases for lives,' and since, by analogy, been adopted in other cases.^
A period of seven years is also recognized in the various Acts
relating to bigamy.* Under the last-named statutes on an indict-
ment, if it appear that the prisoner and his first wife lived apart for
seven years before the second marriage, mere proof that the first
wife was alive at the latter time will not warrant a conviction, but
afiirmative evidence that the accused was aware of this fact must be
given." Although, however, a person who has not been heard of
for seven years, is presumed to he dead, the law raises no presump-
tion as to the time of his death; and if any one who seeks to
establish the precise period during those seven years, at which such
person died, must do so by actual evidence.'
' Hopewell v. De Pinna, 1809 ;
Bust w. Baker, 1837; Loringw.Steine-
man, 184(j (Am.). In Bowden i;. Hen-
derson, 1854, the presumption of death,
after seven yeais' absence was held
not to arise, if the probability of the
exile sending intelhgenoe home be
rebutted by circumstances. See also
M'Mahon v. M'Elroy, 1869 (Ir.);
Prudential Ass. Co. v. Edmonds,
1877, H. L.
^ WiUyams v. Scottish Widows'
Pund, 1888.
3 19 Car. 2, c. 6, § 2. See also 6 A.
c. 18, entitled " An Act for the more
effectual discovery of the death of
persons pretended to be alive, to the
prejudice of those who claim estates
after their death." Por the construc-
tion and practice under which, see In
re Pople, Ex parte Baker, 1889.
* Doe V. Jessou, 1805 ; Doe v.
Deakia, 1821 ; King v. Paddock, 1820
(Am.). In Scotland the law on this
subject is embodied in "The Pre-
sumption of Life Limitation (Scot-
land) Act, 1881" (44 & 45 V_. c. 47).
See especially § 8. In America it is
not necessary that the party be proved
to be absent from the United States ;
it is sufficient if it appears that he has
been absent for seven years from the
particular State of his residence,
without having been heard of. New-
man V. Jenkins, 1830 (Am.); Innis v.
Campbell, 1829 (Am.); Spurr v.
Trimble, 1818 (Am.); Wambough u.
Shenk, 1807 (Am.); Woods t;. Woods,
1802 (Am.). In the New York
Civ. Code, the presumption is thus
briefly expressed: — "That a person
not heard from in seven years is
dead." § 1780, art. 26. As to cases
where the presumption of life con-
flicts with that of innocence, see
§ 114, ante. Willyams v. Scottish
Widows' Fund, 1888.
MJ. l,c.ll,§2; 9G.4,c.31,§22;
24 & 25 V. 0. 100 (" The Offences
against the Person Act, 1861 "j, §57.
^ E. V. Curwengen, 1865. See E.
V. Jones, 1883.
' Connor, In the goods of, 1892
(Ir.) ; Ee Ehodes, Ehodes v. Ehodes,
1887; Ee Phene's Trusts, 1869,
C. A.; Ee Lewes's Trusts, 1871,
C. A. ; Re Corbishley's Trusts, 1880 ;
Hickman v. Upsall, 1877, 0. A.;
Lambe v. Orton, 1860 ; Pennefather
V. Pennefather, 1872 (Ir.); Thomas
172
CHAP, v.] PEESUMPTIONS AS TO SUEVIVOESHIP.
§ 201. Where, moreover, the facts reasonably raise sncli an
inference, a person's death may be presumed to have taken place
befare a certain date,' and death may be presumed after the lapse of
a shorter period than seven years — as for instance, if the party,
when last heard of, was aged, or infirm, or ill,^ or had since been
exposed to extraordinary peril, such as a storm and probable ship-
wreck.^ Although the presumption of the common law, indepen-
dent of the finding of a jury, does not attach to the mere lapse of
time short of seven years.*
§ 202.' Closely connected with the subject of the legal presump-
tion as to the continuance of life is that of presumption as to
survivorship, which may become important with regard to the devo-
lution of property. Common instances, affording occasions for
questions of survivorship arising, occur when two persons (especially
when two relatives), perish in the same calamity, such as a wreck, a
battle, or a conflagration. Direct proof can seldom be procured in
these cases. In the Eoman law, and in several other codes, recourse
is had to artificial presumptions, whenever the particular circum-
stances connected with the deaths are wholly unknown, such pre-
sumptions being based on the probabilities of survivorship resulting
V. Thomas, 1860; In re Benliam's veniences may no doubt arise, but
Trusts, 1868 (Eolt, L.J.) ; In re Peck, they do not warrant us m laying
1860 ; In re Nichols, 1872 ; Dunn v. down a rule, that the party shall be
Snowdon, 1863 ; Doe v. Nepean, presumed to have died on the last
1833. In Nepeau v. Doe d. Knight, day of the seven years, which would
1847 (Ex. Oh.), Ld. Denman, in the manifestly be contrary to the fact in
court's judgment, observes: — "It is almost all instances." 2 M. & W.
true the doctrinewill often practically 913, 914.
limit the time for bringing the action ' See, for example, Sillicki). Booth,
of ejectment ia such cases [viz., 1841 ; Ommaney v. Stillwell, 1856.
where the plaintiff claims as grantee '' R. v. Harboi-ne, 1835 (Ld. Den-
in reversion of an estate] ; and cir- man) ; Ee Beasney's Trust, 1869.
cumstances may be supposed, as of a ^ Watson v. King, 1815 ; Patter-
lease for seven years, commencing son v. Black, 1780. In the case of a
on the death of A., or of a promissory missing ship, bound from Manilla to
note payable two months after A.'s London, on which the underwriters
death, and many other cases which had voluntarily paid the amount
might be put, in which it would be insured, the death of those on board
difficult to carry into effect certain was presumed by the Prerogative
contracts, or to have remedies for the Court, after the absence of only two
breach of them, if the parties inte- years, and administration was granted
rested, instead of making inquiries accordingly: In re Hutton, 1837.
respecting the person on whose life * See further on this sub ject,Hubb.
so much depended, chose to wait for Ev. of Sue. 167 et seq., 758, 759.
the legal presumption. Such incon- " Gr. Ev. s. 29, in part.
173
PRESUMPTIONS AS TO SURVIVORSHIP. [PART I.
from strength, age, and sex. Thus, if a father and son perish
together in the same shipwreck or battle, Eoman law presumed
that the son died first, if he was under the age of puherty ; but if
he was above that age, that he was the survivor ; the principle
being, that in the former case, the elder is generally the more
robust, and in the latter, the younger.^ The French code has
regard to the ages, and presumes that of those under fifteen the
eldest survived ; and that of those above sixty, the youngest sur-
vived ; that if one of the parties were under the age of fifteen, and
the other above the age of sixty, the former survived, and that if
both parties were between those ages, but of different sexes, the
male survived, unless he were more than a year younger than the
female : but that if they were of the same sex, the survivorship of
the younger must be presumed, as opening the succession in the
order of nature.^ The same rules were in force in the territory of
Orleans, at the time of its cession to the United States, and have
since been incorporated into the Code of Louisiana.' They have
also, with some modifications, been adopted into the State of New
York.*
§ 203. The law of England, however, in such cases recognizes'
' Dig. lib. 34, tit. 5; De rebus Works, 38; Doe v. Nepean, 1833
bubiis, lib. 9, § 1, 3 ; Id. i. 16, 22, Underwood v. Wing, 1854 (Komilly,
23; Menoob. de Frees, lib. 1, Qusest. M.E.) ; afp. on appeal (Ld. Cran-
X. n. 8, 9. This rule, however, was worth, C, assisted by Wightman, J.,
subject to some exceptions for the and Martin, B.), 1856 ; Mason v.
benefit of mothers, patrons, and Mason, 1816. See Durrant t;. Friend,
beneficiaries. 1857 ; Barnett v. Tugwell, 1862.
2 Code Civil, §§ 720, 721, 722; For the cases decided in the old
Duranton, Cours de Droit Fran9ais, Eccles. Courts, see Wright v. Nether-
tom. 6, pp. 32, 42, 43, 48, 67, 69 ; wood, 1793 ; more fuUy reported
Eogron, Code Civil, Expli. 411, 412; under the name of Wright v. Sar-
Touiller, Droit Civil Franjais, torn. 4, muda, 1793; Taylor i). Diplock, 1815;
pp. 70, 72, 73. Selwyn's case, 1831 ; In the Goods
3 Civ. Code of Louis, art. 930— of Murray, 1837. In the brief note
933; Dig. of Civ. L. of Orleans, of Colvin ij. Proc. Gen., 1827, where
art. 60 — 63. the husband, wife, and iiifant (if any)
* N. T. Civ. Code, § 1780, tit. 3. perished together, the Court seems to
' Alston, In the Goods of, 1892 ; have held that the prima facie pre-
E. V. Dr. Hay, 1767. The latter sumptionof law was that the husband
case (known as General Stanwix's survived ; but the question was not
case) was compromised upon the re- much discussed; and in Satterthwaite
commendation of Ld. Mansfield, who v. Powell, 1838, where a husband
said he knew of no legal principle on and wife perished in the same wreck,
which he could decide it. See, 1767, the court would not presume that he
2Phillim. E.268, n.; Fearne's Posth. survived, and consequently refused
174
CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIONS AS TO SURVIVORSHIP.
no presumption, either of survivorship, or of contemporaneous
death ;^ and in the total absence of all evidence respecting the
particular circumstances of the calamity, treats the matter as one
incapable of being determined.'^ If indeed, any circumstances
connected with the death of either party be proved, the ques-
tion of survivorship may be dealt with as one of fact, and the
comparative strength, or skill, or energy, of the two sufferers taken
into account.*
§ 204. A prima facie presumption in insurance law is that, if a
vessel has sailed, and no tidings of her have been received within a
reasonable time, she is presumed to have foundered at sea.* By
"tidings" are meant, not mere rumours, but some actual intelli-
gence received from persons capable of giving an authentic account.^
In an action on a policy from an Eaglish to a foreign port, the
presumption of loss will arise, from proof that the ship was not
heard of in this country after she sailed, without calling witnesses
from the port of destination to show that she never arrived there.^
to grant to Ms representative tlie
administration of property vested in
the wife, tlie subject of presumed
survivorship is fully treated in 4
Burge, Com. on Ool. & For. L., 11 —
29 ; and in Hubb. Ev. of Sue. 186,
et seq., and 759 — 764. See, also,
2 Kent, Com. 435, 436, 4tli ed., n. 6.
1 By the Mahometan law of India,
when relatives thus perish together,
"it is to be presumed that they all
died at the same moment ; and the
property of each shall pass to his
living heirs, without any portion of
it vesting in his companions in mis-
fortune." See Baillie's Moohum-
mudan Law of Inherit. 172.
2 Wing V. Angrave, 1860, H. L.
» In SilUok ^. Booth (1841),
Knight-Bruce, V.-C, held that a
presumption of priority of death
might be raised from the compara-
tive age, strength, and skill of the
parties ; and accordingly, where two
brothers perished by shipwreck, under
the circumstances wholly unknown,
the one twenty-eight years of age,
and the master of the ship, while the
other was under age, and acted as
second mate, presumed that the elder,
as the stronger and more experienced
sailor, survived the younger. This
case must, however, be taken not
as laying down any rule of law, but
as merely a finding of fad, under
the particular circumstances.
* Grreen v. Brown, 1744 ; Newby v.
Eeed, 1763 ; Koster v. Eeed, 1826.
But in order to recover on a policy,
there must be some evidence that
when the ship left the port of outfit
she was bound upon the voyage in-
sured. Cohen v. Hinkley, 1809 (Ld.
EUenborough) ; Koster v. Innes,
1825 (Abbott. C.J.).
5 Kostert^.Eeed, 1826(Bayley, J.),
where the statement of a witness that
a few days after the vessel sailed he
heard that she had foundered, but
that the crew were saved, was held
not sufficient to rebut the presump-
tion of loss which arose from the ship
never having arrived at her port of
destination, and not to oblige the
plaintiff either to call any of the
crew, nor to show that he was unable
to do so.
« Twemlow v. Oswin, 1809 (Sir J.
Mansfield, C.J.).
175
PRESUMPTIONS ADOPTED IN INSURANCE LAW. [|PART I.
Neither English law nor any general custom has fixed any definite
period after which the assured may demand payment for his loss,
in case no intelligence is received respecting the vessel insured ; but
among insurers a vessel is in practice treated as lost if she be not
heard of within six months after departure for any port in Europe,
or within twelve months for a greater distance.'
§ 205. Another presumption in insurance law is that if a ship,
shortly after sailing, without visible or adequate cause, becomes
leaky, or otherwise incapable of performing the voyage insured, she
is deemed to have been unseaworthy at the commencemeiit of the
risk.^ This, however, is not really a proposition of law, but simply
an inference of fact which may be drawn by the intelligence of the
jury,^ and it is not so binding that the court will grant a third
trial, after the verdict the other way by two special juries.*
§ 206. Certain presumptions are again, in maritime cases, made
by the Admiralty Division of the High Court, which technically
shift the burthen of proof. Thus, if two vessels come into collision,
of which one was at anchor,^ or " in stays " " at the time, the fact so
far raises a presumption in her favour that she is so far presumed to
be without blame ; and the burthen of proof rests on the opposite
side to establish, either that the other vessel was to blame or had
been improperly put " in stays," or that the damage was occasioned
by stress of weather, or by other unavoidable accident. Again, in
the case of a collision between two ships, if the master of either
ship fail to render assistance to the other, and to stay by her for
that purpose, the collision shall, in the absence of proof to the con-
1 1 Park, Ins. 149. By the ordi- obliged to produce any certificate of
nances of Spain, if a ship insured on the loss. Ordonnanoe de la Marine,
going to, or coming from, the Indies, liv. 3, t. 6, des Assur. Art. 58.
is not heard of within a year and a half 'Watson v. Clark, 1813; Munro
after her departure from the port of v. Vandam, 1794 (Ld. Kenyon) ;
outfit, she is deemed lost, 2 Magens, Parker v. Potts, 1815, H. L.
33 ; by those of France, if the assured ^ Pickup v. Thames Ins. Co., 1878
receives no news of his ship, he may, 0. A.
at the expiration of a year for common ■* Poster v. Steele, 1837 (Tindal,
voyages, reckoning from the day of C.J. and Park, J. ; Vaughan and
the departure, and after two years Coltman, JJ., diss.).
for those of a greater distance, make ' The Bothnia, 1860.
his session to the underwriters, and ' The Sea Nymph, 1860.
demand payment, without being
176
CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIONS ADOITED IN MARITIME LAW,
trary, be deemed to have been caused by the wrongful act of
the defaulter.' Moreover, the infringement of any regulation for
preventing collisions at sea,^ made under the Merchant Shipping
Act,' 1894, raises a presumption of blame as against the infringer,
unless he can show either that circumstances " made a departure
from the regulation necessary," * or that the infringement charged
could not by possibility have contributed to the collision.^ Again,
if a salvor's vessel be injured or lost while engaged in a salvage
service, the Admiralty Division presumes, prima facie, that such
injury or loss was caused by the necessities of the service, and not
by the salvor's default.'
§ 2(l7. Another presumption of maritime law, moreover, is in
favour of the rights of property in the owners, whenever any ques-
tion of derelict is mooted between them and the salvors. There-
fore, where salvors make a claim, as in a case of dereliction, it will
not sufBce for them to merely prove that they found the vessel at
sea apparently abandoned, but they must go further and prove that
the master and crew, when they left the vessel, did so without any
hope, expectation, or intention of being able to return, or, in the
technical language of the law, sine spe recuperandi.'
§ 208. Another presumption of Maritime Law is that a ship-
owner,— except so far as his liability is limited by the Merchant
1 The Queen, 1869 ; 57 & 58 V. or other vessel have been cast over-
c. 60 ("The Merchant Shipping Act, boai-d several goods or merchandises
1894"), §422. which are in chests well looked and
* Made under Order in Council, made fast ; or books so well secured
gazetted 19th August, 1 884. and so well conditioned that they may
^ 57 & 58 V. c. 60, § 503 (1, fi). not be damnified by salt water ; in
* 57 & 58 V. c. 60, § 419 (3, 4). such oases it is to be presumed that
These words mean "absolutely neoes- they who did cast such goods over-
saiy," leaving no margin for dis- board do still retain an intention,
cretion: Stoomvaart, &o. v. Pen. & hope, and desire of recovering the
Orien. St. Nav. Co., 1880, H. L. same; for which reason, such as
But § 17 does not apply to an in- shall happen to find such things, are
fringement of the Thames Eules : obliged to make restitution thereof to
The Harton, 1884. him who shall make a due inquiry
' The Magnet, 1875 ; The English- after them," which has been the law
man, 1877 ; The Tirzah, 1878 ; Emery for 750 years and is still in full force
V. Cichero, Ee The Arklow, 1883. and deserves attentive perusal. In-
° The Thomas Blyth, 1860. dependently of dereliction, the Ad-
' In re Cosmopolitan, 1848 (Dr. miralty Division will never decree
Stock), and cases there cited. The more than a moiety of the value of
judgment of the court in this case is the article saved for mere salvage :
in accordance with the 33rd article of Gore v. Bethel, 1858, P. 0.; The
the laws of Oleron, "if from any ship Inoa, 1858.
T. VOL. I. 177 N
PRESUMPTIONS ADOPTED IN MARITIME LAW. [PART I.
Shipping Act, 1894,' — is primS. facie responsible for any damage
occasioned by negligence in the navigation of his vessel. To
bring himself within the exemption from liability conferred upon
him by the Act where pilotage is compulsory,^ a ship-owner must
show not merely that he had a pilot on board at the time of the
accident, and that the presence of such pilot was compulsory,' but
also that the damage was occasioned exclusively by the pilot's
fault.* It will, however, suffice for him in the first instance if he
show that the pilot's fault occasioned the damage, leaving his
opponent to establish, if he can, a case of contributory negligence
against the ship-owner.'
§ 208a. It is a further presumption of Maritime Law that the
legal owner of a ship is prima facie liable to pay for all such
repairs and stores ordered by the master," as are necessary for the
equipment and navigation of the ship in the voyage or trade in
which she is employed, and that in the absence of all evidence to
the contrary,' the master is the agent of the owner to give all
1 57 & 58 V. 0. 60, % 502, 503, and
§ 633, infra ; as to' the construction
of which, see The Eajah, 1872.
2 § 633 of 57 & 68 V. c. 60 (" The
Merchant Shipping Act, 1894,")
enacts, that " An o'wner or master
of a ship shall not he answerable
to any person whatever for any
loss or damage occasioned by the
fault or incapacity of any qualified
pilot acting in charge of such ship,
within any district where the em-
ployment of such pilot is compulsory
by law." See Conserv. of Eiv. Thames
V. Hall, 1868 ; Prowse v. The Euro-
pean & Amer. St. Shipping Co,, 18fi0;
The Clan Gordon, 1882. This statut-
able law is applicable to a case where
the collision has occurred within the
limits of a foreign port : The Halley,
1868, C. A. As to the meaning of the
word "compulsory," see Gren. St.Nav.
Co. V. Brit. & Col. St. Nav. Co., 1869.
As to the meaning of the term ' ' acting
in charge," see The Princeton, 1878 ;
The Guy Mannering, 1882, C. A. A
pilot being on board a towed vessel
will not exempt the tug from lia-
bility: The Mary, 1878; The Sin-
quasi, 1880. See, also, Spaight v.
Tedcastle, 1881, H. L.
5 The Earl of Auckland, 1861 , P. C. ;
S. C. nom. Malcomson v. Baldock,
1861 ; The Hanna, 1866; The Anna-
polis, 1861 ; The Lion, Owners u.
The York Town, Owners, 1869.
* Hammond v. Rogers, 1850, P. C;
Pollock V. M'Alpin, 1851, P. C;
Bates V. Don Pablo Sora, 1856, P. C. ;
The Carrier Dove, 1863 ; The lona,
1867, P. 0. ; The Minna, 1868; The
Valesquez, 1867, P. C. ; The Victoria,
1867 (Ir.); The General De Caen,
1855; The Mobile, 1856; The Admiral
Boxer, 1857; The Schwalbe, 1861,
P. C. ; The Netherlands St. Boat Co.
V. Styles, 1854, P. 0. ; The Protector,
1839 ; The Diana, 1840, P. C. ;
Eodriques v. Melhuish, 1854 ; Wood
V. Smith, Ee The City of Cambridge,
1874 ; Clyde Navig. Co. v. Barclay,
1876, H. L. ; The Meteor, 1875 (Ir.).
" Clyde Navig. Co. v. Barclay,
1876, H. L. ; The Daioz, 1878; The
Marathon, 1879.
* As to the authority of a ship's
husband to bind the owners, see
Thomas v. Lewis, 1878.
' Mitcheson v. Oliver, 1855 ; Hibbs
V. Eoss, 1866: Gunn v, Eoberts,
1874.
17S
CHAP, v.] PEESUMPTIONS EESPECTING DOMICIL.
needful orders, and lias authority to pledge the owner's credit for
goods supplied or work done in pursuance of his orders.^
§ 209. In private International Law, legal presumptions are
sometimes made with regard to domicil. Where, for instance, a
man either has no fixeji place of residence, or has two homes, the
scale between which is almost evenly balanced, the presumption is
prima facie in favour of what is called the forum originis, or domicil
of origin ; by which is meant, not the place where he may chance
to have been born, but the home of his parents.'^ Intention to adopt
a place as his domicil may be presumed from a person's merely
residing or merely marrying in a country — and k fortiori from
both ' in cases where the domicil of origin is not known ; * though
any presumption which would otherwise arise from the circum-
stances last mentioned may be rebutted by showing that the person
whose domicil is in question merely came to live in the country
for a limited period, or for a special purpose, or that he had no
animus manendi, or settled intention of making that country his
place of permanent abode.' It wiU also be presumed, where a
married man has two houses situate in different countries, in eacli
of which he is in the habit of residing, that his home or domicil
is in that house in which his lawful wife and his establishment of
servants usually remain Vyhen he is at the other." In consequence
of the legal presumption in favour of the domicil of origin,' slighter
evidence is required to warrant the conclusion that a man has
intended to abandon an acquired domicil, and to resume his domicil
' Frost I). Oliver, 1853; Beldon v. ^ In re Esohmann, infra.
Campbell, 1851 ; The Great Eastern, * In re Esohmann, 1893 ; Bempde
1868 ; Edwards v. Havell, 1853. See v. Johnstone, 1796 fLd. Thurlow) ;
Wallace v. Eielden, 1851, P. 0. ; Bi'uce v. Bruce, 1790; The Diana,
Tronsonu. Dent, 1853, P. C; Myers 1803; The Ocean, 1804; The Presi-
V. Willis, 1855 ; Brodie v. Howard, dent, 1804 ; Guier v. O'Daniel, 1806
1856; Hackwood v. Lyall, 1855; (Am.).
Mackenzie iJ. Pooley, 1856; Whitwell ^ Bruce v. Bruce, 1790; Bell v.
V. Perrin, 1858. See Atlantic Mut. Kennedv, 1868 ; Lord v. Oolvin,
Ins. Co. V. Huth, 1880. ' 1869 ; Jopp v. Wood, 1865 ; King v.
* Munro w.Munro, 1840, H.L.; Bell Foxwell, 1876; Gillis i;. Gillis, 1874
V. Kennedy, 1868, H. L. ; Somerville (Ir.) ; The Harmony, 1800 ; Guier v.
V. Somerville, 1801; Forbes v. Forbes, O'Daniel, 1806 (Am.).
1854; Ordokenden v. Fuller, 1859; * Forbes v. Forbes, 1854 (Wood,
Whicker v. Hume, 1859, H. L. ; V.C); Piatt i^. Att.-Gen. of New S.
Lord V. Colvin, 1859 (Kindersley, Wales, 1878, P. C.
V.-O.) ; Hodgson v. De Beauobesne, ' See Udny v. Udny, 1869, H. L. ;
1858, P. 0. King V, Foxwell, 1876.
179 N 2
DOMICIL — COPYHOLDS — PEERAGES. [PAET T.
of origin, than is necessary to justify the conclusion that he has
determined to abandon this last, and to acquire a new domicil.^
§ 210. There will, however, be a stronger presumption against
the acquisition of a new domieil in the case of a person who is
alleged to have gained one in a foreign land, than against the acqui-
sition of one at a place where the party would not be a foreigner."
For instance, a Scotchman would be more readily decided to have
acquired an English, or Anglo-Indian, domioil than a French
one. This is because a man's acquisition of a foreign domioil is a
most serious matter, since it not only renders the validity of his
testamentary acts, and the disposition of his personal property,
liable to be governed by foreign laws, but is calculated to involve
him in a conflict of national duties, and to subject him to the
embarrassments of a divided allegiance.' Further presumptions
with regard to domieil are that it is by law presumed that the
domieil of a wife is the domieil of her husband. Although, how-
ever, this presumption is, as a general rule, conclusive,* an excep-
tion might possibly be recognized in the case of a judicial separa-
tion pronounced by competent authority,^ or where the husband
had abjured the realm, deserted his wife, and established hirriself
permanently in a foreign country, or had committed felony, and
been transported."
§ 211. It is a presumption of law with regard to copyhold pro-
perty which is made in the absence of proof of any specific custom
in the manor, first, that estates tail cannot be created, and next,
that if they can, they are liable to be barred either by a common
surrender, or by a surrender to the use of a will.'
§ 212. It is a prima facie presumption of law with regard to
peerages that where the limitation of a peerage cannot be dis-
covered, it descends, not to tha heirs general, but to the heirs male
of the body of the original grantee.'
' Lord V. Colvin, 1859 (Kindersley, * Dolpliin v. Robins, 1859, H. L.
V.-O.); Douglas v. Douglas, 1871 » Id. (Ld. Gran worth, Ld. Eings-
(Wickens, V.-C). down).
' Id. ; Whicker v. Hume, 1838, « Id. (Ld. Cranworth).
H. L. (Ld. Cranworth); Hodgson ' Gould v. White, 1854; Eadford
V. Do Beauchesne, 1858, P. 0, ; v. Wilson, 1754 ; Moore v. Moore,
Orookenden v. Fuller, 1859. 1755.
' Id. 8 GlenoairnPeer., 1796, H. L. ; re-
180
CHAP, v.] NATIONAL COMITY — PRESUMPTIONS OF FACT.
§ 213.' It is a presumption arising from the spirit of comity
which is presumed to exist among nations, and a maxim of inter-
national law, that when the solution of any legal question depends
upon the laws of a foreign state, — as, for example, when a contract
made in one country is sought to be enforced in another, — courts
of justice must, in the absence of any positive rule affirming or
denying or restraining the operation of such foreign laws, presume
that such foreign laws have been adopted by their own government,
unless, indeed, they are repugnant to its policy, or prejudicial to
its interest.^
§ 21-5 A. The above appear to be some of the examples of pre-
sumptions of law which are most frequently met with.
§ 214.' Pkesumptions of fact, it was pointed out, at the
commencement of this chapter,* are the second of the two
branches into which all presumptive evidence may be divided.
Such presumptions are, in truth, mere arguments, of which the
major premiss is not a rule of law ; they belong equally to any
and every subject-matter ; and are to be judged by the common
and received tests of the truth of propositions, and the validity of
arguments. They depend upon their own natural efficacy in gene-
rating belief, as derived from those connexions, which are shown by
experience, irrespective of any legal relations. They differ from
presumptions of law in this essential respect, that while presump-
tions of law are reduced to fi.xed rules, and constitute a branch of
the system of jurisprudence, presumptions of fact are derived
wholly and directly from the circumstances of the particular case,
by means of the common experience of mankind, without the aid
or control of any rules of law. Such, for example, is the inference
of guilt, drawn from the discovery of a broken knife in the pocket
of the prisoner, the other part of the blade being found sticking in
the window of a house, which, by means of such an instrument,
had been burglariously entered.'
cognized and confirmed in Montrose Huber, de Confl. Leg., lib. 1, tit. 2,
Peer., 1853, H. L. ; Herries' Peer., § 2, p. 538.
1858, H. L. ; Breadalbane Peer., ' Gr. Ev. § 44, almost verbatim,
1858, H. L. except the note.
1 Gr. Ev. § 43, in part. * Supra, § 70.
" Bk. of Augusta v. Earle. 1839 « In Henry VI., Pt. ii., Act iii.,
(Am.) ; Story, Confl. §§ 36 — 38 ; So. 2, Warwick, after contemplating
181
PEESUMPTIONS OF FACT. [PAET. 1.
§ 215. These presumptions of fact remain the same under what-
ever law the legal effect of the facts, when found, is to be decided.^
They embrace all the relations between the fact requiring proof
and the fact or facts actuaUj proved, whether such relations be
direct or indirect, and whether they be physical or moral. A
single circumstance may raise the inference, as well as a long chain
of circumstances. For instance, the decision of King Solomon as
to which of the two harlots was the mother of the living child,
rested on the general presumption ^ in favour of maternal affection,'
while the famous judgment of Sancho Panza acquitting the herds-
man charged with rape,* was founded on the ascertained fact that
the prosecutrix successfully resisted the attempt to take her purse,
which the accused made by order of the court.
§ 216.* Although it is the exclusive province of the jury to fix
the due weight which ought to be given to presumptions of fact,
juries are usually aided in their labours by the advice and instmc-
tion of the judge, more or less strongly urged, at his discretion.
Indeed, some few general propositions in regard to matters of fact,
and the weight of testimony, are now universally taken for granted
in the administration of justice, and are sanctioned by the usage
of the bench.* Such, for instance, is the caution usually given to
juries, to regard with distrust the testimony of an accomplice,
" duke Humphrey's timeless deatli," wliom she refused to acknowledge,
comments thus : — • by commanding her to marry him ;
' ' Who finds the heifer dead, and for rather than commit incest she
bleeding fresh, confessed the truth. Diodorus Sicu-
And sees fast by a butcher with lus also speaks of a King of Thrace,
an axe, who discovered which of three claim-
But will suspect 'twas he that ants was the son of a deceased king
made the slaughter ? " of the Cimmerians, by ordering each
See, also, Smollett's "Adventures of of them to shoot an arrow into the
Eoderick Random," Ch. xx. dead body. Two obeyed without
' See 3 St. Ev. 932 ; 6 Law Mag. hesitation, but the other refused.
370. This subject has been success- See Bagster's Comprehensive Bible,
fully illustrated in Wills, Cir. Ev. note B. to v. 25 of ch. 3 of 1 Kings,
passim. * "Sister of mine," said honest
^ Apart from this presumption, the Sancho, to the damsel, "had you
sacred narrative contains not one shown the same, or but half as much
word to show that, after all, the courage and resolution in defending
judgment was really in accordance your chastity, as you have shown in
with the fact. defending your money, the strength
' 1 Kings, ch. 3, vv. 16 — 28. Sue- of Hercules could not have violated
tonius, in his life of the Emperor you." Don Quixote, part 2, book 3,
Claudian, ch. 15, states that that oh. 13.
monarch discovered a woman to be ' Gr. Ev. § 45, in part,
the real mother of a young man, • See New York Civ. Code, § 1852.
182
CHAP, v.] TESTIMONY OF ACCOMPLICES.
unless it be materially confirmed by other evidence, for though
there is no rigid presumption of the common law against such
testimony, experience has shown that it is little worthy of credit :
and on this experience the usage is founded.* Other cases in which,
though there is no actual rule of law on the subject, similar cautions
should be given, are with regard to the verbal admissions of a
party, (this kind of evidence being subject to much imperfection
and mistake^), or to the effect that little reliance can be placed on
the remainder of the evidence of a witness who has been detected
in telling a falsehood in one pstrt of his testimony.
' See fuTtter as to the corrohora- 0. & P. 542, n. (Parke, J.) ; E. v.
tion of accomplices, post, §§ 967 — Simons, 1834 (Alderson, B.); Wil-
971. Uams v. Williams, 1798. See post,
2 Oxford Spring Circuit, 1833, 5 §§ 861, 862.
183
183^ AMEEICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
AMERICAN NOTES.
Conclusive presumptions. — The phrase " conclusive presump-
tion" is a contradiction in terms. There is and, indeed, in the
nature of things, can be, no such thing. The expression, while
possibly sufficient or at least innocuous for the purposes of particular
cases in which it has been used, has brought into the law of pre-
sumptions an almost impenetrable mass of ambiguity. A presump-
tion is an inference of the existence of one thing from proof of
another. It is a creature of logic; — a syllogism where the major
premise is the known connection which human experience establishes
between the fact proved and the fact to be proved. A dry remark
of Chief Justice Chapman (Atwood v. Scott, 99 Mass. 177 (1868)
illustrates this. " Experience is not sufficiently uniform to raise a
presumption that one who has the means of paying a debt, will
actually pay it. Accordingly, it is held that the fact that a debtor
has had such means is not evidence tending to show that the debt
has been paid."
In all cases where evidence is not direct, it produces convic-
tion in the mind of the tribunal in this way. Where evidence is not
directed immediately to the fact in issue but to facts which tend to
render probable (or improbable) the existence of the fact in issue,
i. e.) when facts relevant to the issue are the subject of evidence, the
probative force of those mediate facts consists entirely in this ; — that
they " raise a presumption " of the existence of the fact in issue.
Strictly speaking, therefore, all presumptions are of fact. Juris-
prudence may intervene, for various reasons, and with various effects,
to assuTne that certain of the stronger presumptions of fact are
sufficient to establish a prima facie case, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary. It is convenient to call these latter, "presumptions
of law." But such a course is confusing if it leads to any obscuring
of the fact that a " presumption" is, as has been stated, merely the
logical inference of the existence of the unknown from proof of the
known.
The confusion so created is increased if not only the " assump-
tions" of jurisprudence but the rules of positive, even, at times, of
statutory, law are classed among presumptions — " conclusive pre-
sumptions," as the phrase is. When it is said that we " presume " a
certain fact exists because we know that another fact, with which it
usually co-exists, is in existence, it is of the very essence of the ex-
pression that it is permissible to show that the inference is erron-
eous ; — either (1) Because the major premise of common experience,
to which reference is impliedly made, is fallacious, or (2) Because
the minor premise, that the case in hand comes within the rule, is
itself untrue. If, for example, it be claimed that, as a matter of
CHAP, v.] AMEBIC AN NOTES. 183^
experience, men not heard from for seven years by those who would
be most apt to hear from them are dead, and that since A. has not
been heard from by such persons within that period he is presum-
ably dead ; — we have a ease of presumptive reasoning. Without tak-
ing into consideration any weight which judges have seen fit to give,
as a rule of law, to the probative force of this presumption, we have,
in any case where the death of A. is in issue, or relevant to the issue,
established an inference or presumption of his death. But it must
necessarily be open to the opposite interest to contend and ofEer evi-
dence to show either (1) That men not so heard from are not usually
dead ; (2) that A. has been heard from ; — in other words that one or
the other premise of the syllogism is false. If the instance is a fair
one, it follows that all presumptions are rebuttable ; — from the
meaning of words.
What, then, are conclusive presumptions of law ? They will, it is
thought, be found to have no direct relation whatever to the
law of evidence. They are almost uniformly rules of substantive
law expressed as a rule of evidence. Like other rules of positive law,
they determine what facts may be proved in any particular issue,
and as evidence is only directed to the existence of facts in issue,
the rules of substantive law which masquerade as so-called
" conclusive presumptions," affect the law of evidence merely by
determining what issues can be raised. But to extend the law of
evidence so as to embrace decisions as to what issues may be raised
would obviously be to transfer a large part of the entire corpus juris
into this branch of the law. What facts may be placed in issue in
a given matter is a question to be settled by substantive law.
Which of these facts are placed in issue in a given case is a
question of pleading. What may be shown, assuming a fact to
have been placed in issue, in order to prove (or disprove) its exist-
ence, is a question of evidence.
Yet judges only too frequently rule that " evidence is not admis-
sible to prove " a certain fact when what they really mean, or should
mean, is that the fact itself is not admissible, because, as a matter
of positive law, or under the pleadings, the fact itself is not in
issue or relevant to any fact that is in issue. In any case where
the fact itself is admissible, very frequently the evidence offered
and properly rejected would be entirely competent.
In much the same way, judges have said that a fact is " conclu-
sively presumed," to exist when, in truth, the rules of positive law
forbid its existence being placed in issue and have therefore made it
impossible to introduce any evidence on the subject. This has
usually been done for two main reasons : (1) I"rom the confusion of
expression above referred to ; (2) From a desire to conceal the fact
of judicial legislation.
(1) False presumptions. Statute of Limitations. — It is said,
183^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
for example, that unless a cause of action accrued within a certain
time prior to bringing proceedings to enforce it, it will be "con-
clusively presumed," that the cause of action has been paid or othei--
wise settled. This is spoken of as part of the law of evidence. But
where the statute of limitations is relied on to defeat a cause of
action it is perfectly clear that the issue is not one of payment; —
where the defendant supports a plea of payment by setting up a
conclusive presumption of payment under the statute. The statute
itself must be pleaded and relied on, and the only issue is whether
the facts necessary to this statutory bar really exist. Did the cause
of action accrue within the statutory period ? If it did not, has the
statutory bar been waived or defeated ? These are the only points
on which evidence is admissible, because they alone can be in issue.
The fact of payment of the cause of action is not in issue. It is of
no consequence. The phrase that it is "conclusively presumed" to
exist is merely a misleading way of saying so. With the intention
of the legislature, or the grounds of public expediency on which the
legislature proceeded, the law of evidence is not concerned, except
in the matter of construction.
Ignoeance of Law. — Another instance of the fact that "con-
clusive presumptions " are paraphrases of some rule of positive law
is furnished by the learned author in § 80, supra. The statement
is that " courts conclusively presume that which in a vast number
of cases must of course be contrary to the fact . . . that every sane
person, above the age of fourteen, is acquainted with the criminal
as well as the civil, the common as well as the statute, law of the
land."
It may well be doubted, we may notice, in passing, whether any
authority whatever can be cited for this proposition. The English
authorities seem to be opposed to such a rule.
"There is no presumption in this country," says Mr. Justice
Maule, "that every person knows the law; it would be contrary
to common sense and reason, if it were so." Martindale v. Falk-
ner, 2 C. B. 706, 719 (1846). So Lord Mansfield, in Jones v.
Eandall, 1 Cowper, 37 (1774), said, speaking of the contention that
all the judges knew the laws, " as to the certainty of the law
mentioned ... it would be very hard upon the profession, if the
law was so certain that everybody knew it ; the misfortune is that
it is so uncertain, that it costs much money to know what it is, even
in the last resort."
What is meant by this conclusive presumption apparently is that,
as a matter of substantive law, knowledge of the law is immaterial
on the question of its observance. It is not and cannot, with safety
to society, ever be a defence to a claim of legal liability that the
party said to be liable did not know of his liability. No issue,
therefore, can be raised on the question of such knowledge. There-
CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTES. 183*
fore no evidence can be submitted as to it. Tlie equivalent phrase,
" Ignorance of the law excuses no one," correctly states the rule as
one of positive law. Such a form of statement is not open to the
objection of attempting to incorporate into the law of evidence
something with wliich evidence has no concern ; — by saying that a
fact, the existence of which is immaterial, is " conclusively pre-
sumed " to exist. That the latter is the correct statement of the
rule is amply established by authority.
"No system of criminal jurisprudence can be sustained on any
other principle " than that " ignorance of the law excuses no one."
U. S. V. Antony, 11 Blatoh. 200 (1873); "No man can avoid a
liability, as a general thing, because he is ignorant of the law.
This is an essential rule of society." Black v. Ward, 27 Mich.
191 (1873).
" The rule is that ignorance of the law shall not excuse a man or
relieve him from the consequences of a crime, or from liability
upon a contract." Martindale v. Falkner, 2 C. B. 709, 720 (1846) ;
" As he is bound to know the law, he is held to the consequences
of a wilful violation of it, whether he knew of its existence or not.
Otherwise it would be difficult to punish any man for a violation
of law, because it might be impossible to prove that he had knowl-
edge of the law. Hence the legal presumption is that every man
knows the law and that his violations of it are wilful." Whitton v.
State, 37 Miss. 379 (1859) ; " If a man knowingly does acts which
are unlawful the presumption of law is that the mens rea exists ;
ignorance of the law will not excuse him." 11. v. Mailloux, 3 Pugs-
ley, 493, 615 (1876) ; " It is a rule of presumption, adopted from
necessity, and to avoid an evil which would otherwise constantly
perplex the courts in the administration of the criminal law ; that
is, the plea of ignorance. Hence the maxim 'that ignorance of the
law excuses no one.' The courts and the profession, however, well
know that this necessary rule of presumption, as often, and perhaps
oftener than otherwise, presumes against the truth." Brent v. State,
43 Ala. 297 (1869).
That the so-called conclusive presumption of knowledge of the
law is in truth not a presumption is demonstrated when knowledge
of the law becomes a fact in issue or relevant thereto and when there-
fore it is to be established by affirmative evidence. Under these cir-
cumstances the so-called "presumption" of knowledge is found to
have no probative force whatever. For example, where a question
arose whether a wager as to the existence of a rule of law was upon
a certain event; held, it was not. Jones v. Randall, 1 Cowper, 37
(1774). Where the question was whether a client knew enough
law to understand when and in what courts the services charged
by an attorney were rendered, the court say, "The question is,
whether this bill conveys information enough to a person as igno-
183^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
rant of the law as he may with propriety be. I think that the
client is not to be presumed to know that the business was done in
Chancery, because of the mention of warrants, interrogatories, de-
crees, and the like. . . . Afterwards there comes a charge for ' perus-
ing decrees and reports at the Eeport-ofBce ' which it is said the
client must know could only be in Chancery. I do not agree that
the client is to be presumed to know anything of the kind." Martin-
dale V. Falkner, 2 C. B. 709 (1846). Where, by statute, all votes
cast at a certain election for a candidate were, if the latter was
known to be ineligible to election, thrown away ; and an election-
was held at which votes were cast for A., who was by a plain pro-
vision of law ineligible to the office in question, it was decided that
there was no such presumption that the voters knew the law as to
prove that, as a matter of fact, they did know it and, by consequence,
that such votes would be thrown away. "It does not seem to me
consistent with either justice or common sense or common law, to
say that because these voters were aware of a certain circumstance,
they were necessarily aware of the disqualification arising from that
circumstance. ... A maxim has been cited, which, it has been
urged, imputes to every person a knowledge of the law. The
maxim is ignorantia legis neminem excusat, but there is no maxim
that says that, for all intents and purposes, a person must be taken
to know the legal consequences of his acts." Queen v. Mayor of
Tewksbury, L. K. 3 Q. B. 629 (1868).
In a ease where a promissory note payable in Canada was made
payable in " Canada currency " and this was construed to mean
payment in gold, the contention was made that as the parties
must be presumed to know that, by the law of Canada, the note
would have been payable in gold without express stipulation, some
other meaning must have been intended, the court say, " The maxim
referred to in regard to a knowledge of law is misapplied. No man
can avoid a liability, as a general thing, because he is ignorant of
the law. This is an essential rule of society. But the law is not
so senseless as to make absurd presumptions of fact." Black v.
Ward, 27 Mich. 191 (1873). Negligence is not imputable to an
attorney because he followed a widely accepted but erroneous con-
struction of the law. Mash v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 178 (1874) ;
Morrill v. Graham, 27 Tex. 646 (1864).
The real nature of this "conclusive presumption" is further
shown by the limitations which have been placed on it. '' It must
be confined to presuming that all persons know the law exists, but
not that they are presumed to know how the courts will construe it,
or whether, if it be a statute, it will, or will not, be held to be
constitutional." Brent v. State, 43 Ala. 297 (1869) ; " Where the
act done is malum in se, or where the law wliich has been infringed
is settled and plain, the maxim in its rigour will be applied ; but
CHAP, v.] AMEEICAN NOTES. 183^
where the law is not settled, or is obscure, and where the guilty
intention, being a necessary constituent of the particular offence, is
dependent on a knowledge of the law, this rule, if enforced, would
be misapplied." Cutter ads. State, 36 N. J. Law, 125 (1873). So
where trustees acted in good faith and under the advice of counsel,
but in an erroneous view of the law, the supreme court of Ohio say : —
" Would it be just under such circumstances to hold them account-
able for their ignorance of this recondite, and I miglit even say,
doubtful principle of law ? . . . A majority of the court think not."
Miller v. Proctor, 20 Oh. St. 442 (1870). " The familiar maxim
that ignorance of the law is no excuse for the breach or non-
performance of any agreement, because any one is presumed to
know the law, applies only to general public laws, which prescribe
a rnle of action to the entire community: ... It has no application
whatever to special or private laws. . . . All the authorities concur,
that ignorance of foreign law is deemed to be ignorance of fact ;
because no one is presumed to know the foreign law . . . The laws
of the other states of the Union are to be regarded as foreign
laws." King v. Doolittle, 1 Head (Tenn.), 77 (1858).
Conclusive Pkesumption of Intent. — So the learned author,
relying on 1 Greenleaf, Evid. § 18, aifirms that " a sane man of the
age of discretion is conclusively presumed to contemplate the nat-
ural and probable consequences of his own acts." If by this is
meant, as a matter of positive law, that if A. has done an illegal
act, he cannot set up in defence that he did not mean to do it, the
statement is correct. In this view, it'closelj'' resembles the so-called
"conclusive presumption that every one knows the law."
But if the statement is intended to assert a rule of evidence, it is
not only erroneous, but fairly open to the criticism which the
supreme court of Indiana (Clem v. State, 31 Ind. 480, 484 (1869),
in a well-considered opinion, make on the statement as it appears
in the learned work of Prof. Greenleaf. "It is not sustained
by the authorities which the author cites in its support. It is
entirely at variance with principles which have received the uni-
form sanction of all the courts in this country and Great Britain.
It is a great inaccuracy, and it is strange that a work which has
passed through so many editions should still contain it. A con-
clusive presumption admits of no proof to rebut it; and murder
is a felonious killing. . . . The purport of it, then, is, that if the
defendant killed the person named by the deliberate use of a
deadly weapon, no evidence to show that the act was done in his
necessary self-defence can be sufficient to rebut the presumption, or
to prove that the killing was excusable and not felonious." The
courts of Kansas refuse even to allow the presumption the prima
facie force of a presumption of law. " The presumption that the
accused intended the natural and probable consequences of his own
183' AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
acts is not one of law to be applied by tbe court, but one of fact to
be weighed by the jury." Madden v. State, 1 Kans. 340, 356 (1863).
" The intention may be inferred from the act, but this in principle
is an inference of fact to be drawn by the jury, and not an implica-
tion of law to be applied by the court." People v. Stokes, 53 N. Y.
164 (1873). In a later New York case (Thomas v. People, 67 N. Y.
218 (1876) the court of appeals sustain a ruling that the facts that
the prisoner used a deadly weapon, and aimed at and struck a vital
part, were presumptive evidence of an intent to kill. "He must
be presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his act,
just as if he had aimed at the heart of the deceased and fired a
gun. It was not charged that the evidence was conclusive, but
simply that it was presumptive, and it was left to the jury to
determine the fact upon the evidence under the charge as given."
"The intent may be inferred from the act, but this, in principle, is
an inference of fact to be drawn by the jury, and not an implication
of law to be applied by the court." State v. Swayze, 30 La. Ann.
pt. 2, 1323 (1878).
Malice. — The example given by Mr. Greenleaf of the "conclu-
sive presumption " of intent is also affirmed by the learned author ;
— "Therefore the intent to kill is conclusively inferred from the
deliberate violent use of a deadly weapon." This is the so-called
" conclusive presumption of malice." Exactly how it came about
that the most vital part of the government's case in an indictment
for murder could be established without proof has, as might be
expected, furnished somewhat of a mystery to the courts. Much
learning has been displayed in weighing the claims of the " presump-
tion of innocence" against this so-called "conclusive presumption"
of malice. In fact, neither of these so-called presumptions are
presumptions at all. The " presumption of innocence " merely
states the burden of proof in criminal cases. The " presumption
of malice " probably owes its origin to another branch of positive
law. It was at first, in all probability, merely a rule of judicial
construction. The jury in cases of murder frequently found special
verdicts : — stating the facts and reserving the questions of law
for the court to pass upon. A¥hen, on such a verdict, the mere
fact was stated of a "killing," without circumstances of justiii-
cation or excuse, the courts very naturally ruled that, as a question
of how to construe this language, they must understand killing to
be " voluntary," for the plain reason that, had circumstances of
justification or excuse existed, it was the duty of the jury to have
stated them. Their not having done so must be taken to mean
that none such existed. Thus Plummer's Case (Rex v. Plummer,
Kelyng, 109 (1701). The indictment was for murder. The jury
returned a special verdict that under certain circumstances therein
stated, one of a company of smugglers " did shoot ofE the fuzee
CHAP. V.J AMERICAN NOTES. 183*
and thereby did kill " one of the others. The court, by the
chief-justice, in construing this verdict say : " It seems to me
hard upon a Special Verdict to construe that the fuzee went off
by accident, but it must be understood to be voluntary ; though
even in an Indictment for Manslaughter, it is requisite that it
should be averred that he discharged it voluntarily ; but in a
Verdict it need not be so alleged, but the saying he did it must
be understood to be with, and not against his will ; for where
any one upon any killing of a Man is to be discharged by an
involuntary killing, it must be so found, without which it will be
understood to be voluntary; for a Man being a free Agent, if he
be found to do any Act, it must be supposed to be with his will,
unless it be specially, and particularly foxind to be against his
will. Therefore when a Man is indicted for a voluntary killing, if
he did kill the Man by misadventure, the special Circumstances of
the Case must be found that it may appear to the Court to be
by accident." In Oneby's Case (Eex v. Oneby, 2 Raym. 1486, 1494,
2 Strange, 766 (1727) the court say, " Although there are many
special verdicts in indictments for murder, there never was one,
where the jury find in express terms that the act was done with
malice, or was not done with malice prepense, or that it was done
upon a sudden quarrel and in transport of passion, or that the passion
was cooled or ' not cooled ; or that the act was deliberate or not
deliberate ; but the collection of those things from the facts found,
is left to the judgment of the court." In reply to an objection that
the homicide was on a sudden quarrel and so manslaughter, the
court say, "I must first take notice, that where a man is killed,
the law will not presume, that it was upon a sudden quarrel, unless
it is proved to be."
The general reason for the rule is stated in Lord Raymond's
report of the same case at page 1497. In commenting on Legg's
Case (Kelyn, 27) the court say : — "If A. kills B. and no sudden
quarrel appears, it is murder; for it lies on the party indicted to
prove the sudden quarrel ; and therefore the jury not having found
any such thing for the prisoner's benefit, it is to be took, there was
no such." This rule of construction is probably the origin of the
so-called " presumption of malice." To turn this rule of construc-
tion into a rule of evidence is precisely to reverse it. In construing
the special verdict malice is presumed because it must have been
proved to the jury. As a rule of evidence malice, it is said, need
not be proved at all, but is conclusively presumed on mere proof of
the killing.
The rule that malice is conclusively presumed from deliberate
killing has been either, (1) repudiated in the American courts or,
(2) so explained as to render it of but little practical effect,
(1) Among the courts which decline to recognise this " conclusive
183^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
presumption " are the following. The supreme court of Indiana
say: — " Whatever the origin of the rule may be, we are convinced
that it is entirely arbitrary, contrary to the reason and the analogies
of the law of criminal procedure, both at common law and under
our procedure and code." Clem v. State, 31 Ind. 480, 484 (1869).
In Farris v. Com. 14 Bush, 362 (1878), on an indictment for murder
the trial court ruled : — "Malice is implied by the law from any cruel
and unnecessary act done by one person to another, and from the
deliberate and unnecessary use of a deadly weapon." It will be
noted, in passing, that this ruling does not come up to the level of a
" conclusive presumption," but is stated in the language of a pre-
sumption of law. But even this modified expression of the doctrine
was held to be error. " Malice," the court hold, " is necessarily a
constituent element in the crime of murder, and must be established
by evidence to the satisfaction of the jury, as any other fact
necessary to make out the offence, and it is no more within the
province of the court to determine, than the fact of death or the
character of the weapon used to inflict it." In Tennessee (Coffee v.
State, 3 Yerger, 283 (1832), a ruling that, " if the fact of killing by
the defendant be proved, the law implied him guilty of murder
unless the proof clearly and satisfactorily showed the offence was
one of less magnitude," was held erroneous. " There is no reason
in saying that a jury must acquit upon a doubt as to the fact of
killing, and yet upon a stronger doubt as to the equally important
fact of malice, they must convict." Ibid. In People v. Stokes, 63
N. Y. 164 (1873), the court of appeals say, " Argument seems un-
necessary to demonstrate the error of this charge. It was a necessary
part of the case of the prosecution to establish that the homicide
was perpetrated with a premeditated design to effect the death of
the person killed. Yet the court, assuming to determine what the
circumstances of the killing were, solemnly instructed the jury that,
the fact of killing being conceded, the law implied malice." See
also People v. Downs, 123 K Y. 67 (1890).
(2) In other jurisdictions, the so-called " conclbsive presumption "
of malice from proof of killing is treated, not as conclusive, but as
an ordinary presumption or inference of law unless and until
evidence is introduced, by one side or the other, of justi-
fication or excuse. When such evidence is introduced, the pre-
sumption, as such, is, like any other presumption of law, as
distinguished from a presumption of iact, functus officio. There is
reason for thinking that the courts have not in all cases been care-
ful to distinguish between the burden of proof (which, in a criminal
case, never leaves the government) and the "burden of introducing
evidence," which, in case of murder, upon the establishment by the
government of a deliberate killing, without justification or excuse,
obviously rests, for any justification or excuse, upon the defence;
CHAP. V.J AMERICAN NOTES. 183^°
whether this burden of establishing evidence is, strictly speaking,
shifted by the establishment of a presumption of law from killing
itself, or not.
The supreme court of Massachusetts shows the tendency mani-
fested by the courts which do not repudiate the presumption, but
" draw its sting." In York's Case (Com. v. York, 9 Mete. 91 (1845),
the court was divided on this " presumption of malice." The
majority, in an exhaiistive opinion by Chief Justice Shaw, adopt
the view that when the fact of killing is proved, the accused must
establish any facts of justification or excuse by a preponderance of
the evidence. As they say, " It will not be sufficient to make it
doubtful or questionable. It must preponderate." From this
opinion, Mr. Justice Wilde dissented. The dissenting opinion has
been, by general professional opinion, considered to contain the better
law. In his view "The question depends entirely upon the rule of
law as to the burden of proof. If the burden of proof, throughout
the trial, was on the Commonwealth, the instructions to the jury were
clearly incorrect ; if, on the contrary, it was on the prisoner, after
the proof of the homicide as charged, he has no ground of exception.
. . . The counsel for the Commonwealth contends, that, the homi-
cide having been proved as charged, the law presumes malice, and
consequently that a jjrinia facie case for the government was fully
proved, and thereupon the burden of proof shifted, and was thrown
on the prisoner, to make it appear that the homicide was excusable,
or was committed on such provocation as would be sufficient
to reduce the crime to manslaughter. This argument cannot be
maintained, unless the law of homicide as to the burden of proof
is an exception to the well-established rule of law in all other
cases. ... In criminal cases, the burden of proof never shifts, so
long as the defendant grounds his defence on the denial of any
essential allegation in the indictment. . . . And how can the principle
vary when a prima facie case is made out partly by presumption ?
If on the whole evidence, the jury had a reasonable doubt of the
prisoner's guilt as charged, they conld not be justified in convicting
him." After examining the authorities cited by the majority, and
tracing them all back to Oneby's Case (2 Ld. Eay. 1485 (1727), — a
case of special verdict, — he reaches the conclusion that " These
principles and authorities are wholly irreconcilable with the pre-
sumption of malice on which the counsel for the Commonwealth
relies. No malice can be inferred from the mere act of killing. Such
a presumption, therefore, is arbitrary and unfounded." The results
of a full examination of the entire field are summed up by the
learned judge in three propositions ; — which have frequently been
cited with approval, as a clear and concise statement of the law.
He holds : " (1.) That when the facts and circumstances accompany-
ing a homicide are given in evidence, the question whether the
183" AMEEICAX NOTES. [PAET I.
crime is murder or manslaughter is to be decided upon the evi-
dence, and not upon any presumption from the mere act of killing.
(2) That if there be any such presumption, it is a presumption of fact,
and if the evidence leads to a reasonable doubt whether the pre-
sumption be well founded, that doubt will avail in favour of the
prisoner. (3) That the burden of proof, in every criminal case, is
on the Commonwealth to prove all the material allegations in the
indictment ; and if, on the whole evidence, the jury have a reasonable
doubt whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, they
are bouud to acquit him."
A few years later, in Com. v. Hawkins, 3 Gray, 463 (1855), Chief
Justice Shaw himself, interrupting counsel when proceeding to
argue in favour of the dissenting opinion in York's Case {uhi supra),
remarked, according to the report (page i:&o), " that the doctrine of
York's Case was that where the killing is proved to have been com-
mitted by the defendant, and nothing further is shown, the pre-
sumption of law is that it was malicious and an act of murder ;
and that this was inapplicable to the present case, where the
circumstances attending the homicide were fully shown by the
evidence," and charged that " if the jury, upon all the circum-
stances, are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, that it was done
with malice, they will return a verdict of murder ; otherwise, they
will iind the defendant guilty of manslaughter." Though there is
reason to doubt whether York's Case would still be followed even in
Massachusetts on precisely the same facts, the qualification on the
rule laid down in Com. v. Hawkins ( ubi suj^ra) effectually removes
the practical mischief of the rule, as it probably can but seldom
happen that, in any given case, the killing and no other fact will
appear in evidence.
The Vermont courts follow the rule laid down in Com. v. Hawkins
{ubi supra), in holding that the homicide is presumed to be malicious
only when nothing except the killing is shown, and follow the
learned chief justice (Shaw) by quoting his very clear and concise
ruling in that case. " The murder charged must be proved ; the
burden of proof is on the Commonwealth to prove the case ; all the
evidence on both sides which the jury find true is to be taken into
consideration and if, the homicide being conceded, no excuse or
justification is shown, it is either murder or manslaughter; and if
the jury, upon all the circumstances, are satisfied beyond a reason-
able doubt that it was done with malice, they will return a verdict
of murder ; otherwise they will find the defendant guilty of man-
slaughter." State V. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873).
In Maine in a case where the trial court ruled that " in all cases
where the unlawful killing is proved and there is nothing in the
circumstances of the case, as proved, to explain, qualify, or palliate
the act, the law presumes it to have been done maliciously; and if
CHAP, v.] AMEEICAN NOTES. ISS^^
the accused would reduce the crime below the degree of murder, the
burden is upon him to rebut the inference of malice which the law
raises from the act of killing, by evidence in defence," — the in-
struction, " not having been satisfactorily shown to be erroneous,''
was sustained. State v. Knight, 43 Me. 12, 137 (1857).
In Texas, the trial court had charged the jury that "they should
look to all the facts and circumstances attending the homicide, as
disclosed by the evidence, and if they disclosed no facts or circum-
stances which reduce the offence to negligent homicide or man-
slaughter, or which excuse or justify the fact, the law, in such
cases, implies malice and makes such killing murder." The court
on appeal say : — " We are unaWe to discover any error in this
instruction calculated to injure the rights of the defendant."
Brown v. State, 4 Tex. App. 276 (1878).
In Louisiana, the trial judge charged that " where the killing is
proved, malice is presumed by the law from the fact of killing, and
that it was incumbent on the accused to prove any matter of excuse
or extenuation." Held, error. "The circumstances which surround
the act either attest or negative a criminal intent. If none exist,
the court — as said by Mr. Greenleaf — is justified in charging that
from the act of killing, unaccompanied hy circumstances of extenu-
ation, malice is presumed (he should have said ' may he inferred ') and
that the burden of disproving it is then thrown upon the accused.
This rule is as correct as rational, and its application would prevent
an otherwise unavoidable conflict between the presumption estab-
lished by law in favour of the state and of the prisoner. The intent
may be inferred from the act ; but this, on principle, is an inference
of fact to be drawn by the jury, and not an implication of law to be
applied by the court." State v. Swayze, 30 La. Ann. pt. 2, 1323
(1878). In a later case in the same court, the trial judge had
charged that the state must prove, 1. The killing ; 2. That the
prisoner did it, and that " when this is done, the law presumed
malice." Held error. " The jury must be instructed to weigh
and consider all the circumstances arising from, or connected with,
the evidence proving the homicide, and that the presumption of the
innocence of the accused must yield to the presumption of malice or
deliberate intent, only when the evidence is unaccompanied by cir-
cumstances showing alleviation, justification, or excuse." State v.
Trivas, 31 La. Ann. 1086 (1880).
In Mississippi, the rule is laid down thus : — " We understand the
settled rule to be this : The law presumes the accused to be
innocent of the crime charged, until the contrary is made to
appear ; but when it is shown that he killed the deceased with a
deadly weapon, the general presumption of innocence yields to the
specific proof of such homicide, and the law infers that it was
malicious and therefore murder, because, as a rule, it is unlawful to
18313 AMERICAIf NOTES. [PAET I.
kill a human being, and it is murder if not something else, and as
special circumstances alone can vary the legal view of homicide
so as to relieve it from the character of murder, it is inferred or pre-
sumed to be such from the fact of killing, unexplained : but if the
attendant circumstances are shown in evidence, whether on the part
of the state or the accused, the character of the killing is to be
determined by considering them, and it is then not a matter for
presumption, which operates in the absence of explanatory evi-
dence, but for the determination from the circumstances shown in
evidence." Hawthorne v. State, 58 Miss. 778 (1881).
In North Carolina, a charge was sustained, '• that a presumption
in favour of innocence prevailed, until overcome by evidence of the
truth of the criminal charge, and this must be such as to remove all
reasonable doubt from the mind. That when such proof of the
homicide is presented, matters in excuse or mitigation must ap-
pear, or be shown, not beyond a reasonable doubt, but to the satis-
faction of the jury. The prisoner admitting the killing by means of
a shot from a pistol, that instrument, thus used, is a deadly weapon,
and the law implies malice, unless its absence is made to appear,
and this must be to the satisfaction of the jury." State v. Potts,
100 N. C. 457 (1888). See also State v. Smith, 77 N. C. 488 (1877).
In Georgia, the court approve a ruling that " When the state has
shown the defendant has done the killing, such killing would be pre-
sumed to have been done with malice, unless the defendant or the
circumstances of the case show the contrary." Marshall v. State, 74
Ga. 26 (1884).
In Alabama, the supreme court indorse a ruling that " When life
is taken by the direct use of a deadly weapon, the law presumes
that the killing was malicious and therefore murder, and casts upon
the defendants the onus or burden of rebutting it ; unless the evi-
dence establishing the killing also shows circumstances of justi-
fication, excuse, or mitigation, which overturn the presumption."
The court say : " There was no error in that portion of the charge."
Gibson v. State, 89 Ala. 121 (1889). See also Sylvester v. State, 72
Ala. 201 (1882.)
It will be observed that in no instance throughout these rulings
is the presumption of malice spoken of as conclusive.
Malice in Libel. — It is said by the learned author (§ 83),
following Mr. Greenleaf (in § 18), that the deliberate publication of
calumny, which the publisher knows to be false, or has no reason
to believe to be true, raises a conclusive presumption of malice."
Like other so-called " conclusive presumptions " this is a rule of
substantive law, having no direct relation to the law of evidence.
It amounts to saying that, under the law of libel, malice is imma-
terial. If a defamatory statement is false and made without reason-
able and probable cause, the publisher is legally (even if not
CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTES. 183^*
morally) liable. As Judge Cooley says (Cooley, Torts, 245) : " It
seems misleading, therefore, to employ the term malice, and mali-
cious, in defining these wrongs ; and, in a legal sense, as used, they
can only mean that the false and injurious publication has been
made without legal excuse." So in an action for slander, Bromage
V. Prosser, 4 B. & C. 247, 265 (1825), Bayley J., said, "Malice in
common acceptation means ill-will against a person, but in its legal
sense it means a wrongful act done intentionally, without just
cause or excuse." Certainly this is true of the law of libel, where
no question of privilege is involved. So in a Pennsylvania action
for libel, the court say, "In its common acceptation malice means
ill-will against a person ; but in its legal sense it means a wrongful
act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse, and therefore
every utterance or publication having the other qualities of slander
or libel, if it be wilful and unauthorised, is in law malicious."
Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. St. 385 (1878). See also Moore v. Stevenson,
27 Conn. 14(1858).
" The publication of what is necessarily injurious, and done
purposely and knowingly, and not for any good purpose or justifi-
able end, is legally malicious in the law of libel." McLean v.
Scripps, 52 Mich. 214 (1883).
" The court properly declined to instruct the jury . . . that if
the defendant acted bona fide in the discharge of what he believed
to be his duty, the action could not be maintained without extrin-
sic proof of express malice." Smart v. Blanchard, 42 N". H. 137
(1860). "If a publication be libellous and not privileged, the law
implies that it was malicious. This is not a mere presumption,
which may be wholly overcome by proof, but it is a legal conclusion
which cannot be rebutted." Lick v. Owen, 47 Cal. 252 (1874).
The supreme court of Wisconsin holds, except in questions of
privilege, that " In all other actions for libel and slander, malicious
intent constitutes no part of the issue, but is or may be considered
only as a circumstance in aggravation of damages." Wilson v.
Noonan, 35 Wise. 321, 349 (1874). See also Lewis v. Chapman, 16
N. Y. 372 (1857).
It is merely putting the rule in another form to say that "When
the appellant proved the publication of the article, the law implied
malice, and appellant was entitled to recover such compensatory
damages as he had sustained, regardless of the intent that actuated
the appellee in the publication of the libel." Eearick v. Wilson, 81
111. 77 (1876). "In common parlance malice means ill-will against
a person, but the law attaches a different meaning. In its legal
sense the term implies an act wrongfully and intentionally done,
without just cause or excuse, and does not necessarily imply malevo-
lence of disposition or enmity toward any particular individual."
Pennington v. Meeks, 46 Mo. 217 (1870). See also Indianapolis
18315 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
Sun. Co. V. Horrell, 53 Tnd. 527 (1876). "The falsity of the libel
is sufficient proof of malice to uphold CKemplary damages." Berg-
mann v. Jones, 94 N. Y. 51 (1883). " Where the words spoken or
■written are shown to be within a confidential or privileged com-
munication, the presumption of malice no longer exists ; but the
plaintiff in such a case must show express malice, and cannot rely
on the presumption of malice which the law attaches in all other
cases to the utterance or publication of the words spoken or written."
Dillard v. Collins, 25 Gratt. 343 (1874).
Malice in Other Connections. — In all cases where the exist-
ence of malice is a material fact, except in the anomalous case of
homicide above referred to, it must be proved like any other fact.
Tor example, on an indictment for maliciously placing obstructions
on the track of a railroad. State v. Hesseukamp, 17 la. 25 (1864);
Com. V. Bokeman, 105 Mass. 53 (1870). So of malicious mischief.
Com. V. Williams, 110 Mass. 401 (1872).
Other Conclusive Presumptions. — The other conclusive pre-
sumptions referred to by the learned author are equally rules of
substantive law. The conclusive effect of judgments, for example,
is properly referable to that subject, see post, § 1682. The law of
estoppel is a branch of substantive law, considered ante, § 89. So the
rules as to the conclusiveness of a default upon due service of process
have clearly no relation to the law of evidence. That an award
binds the parties, if within the scope of the submission ; that a
document under seal' requires no consideration; — these and many
others stand on the same footing. Most rules of substantive law
seem capable of being made an apparent part of the law of evidence,
by simply saying that " evidence is admissible to show, &c.," or
"evidence is not admissible to show," according as the rule of
positive law is in form affirmative or negative.
Ancient Documents. — The rule relating to ancient documents
differs from those above-mentioned by being legitimately part of
the law of evidence. There seems, however, but little reason for
stating the rule in the form of a conclusive presumption, or indeed
in the form of a presumption at all. A well recognised rule of evi-
dence requires that the execution of a written instrument, executed
in presence of a subscribing witness, should be proved by the sub-
scribing witness, or, in case of his death, disability, or justifiable
absence, by proof of his signature. In case there is no subscribing
witness, the signature of the party must be proved, unless admitted.
See post, § 1839.
Ancient documents, — i. e. documents at least thirty years old,
produced from the proper custody and free from circumstances
of suspicion, form a recognised exception to this rule. Their pro-
duction and inspection is sufficient evidence of execution. If
there is a subscribing witness, he need not be called. No proof is
CHAP, v.] AMEEICAN NOTES. 183^^
necessary of the signature of an unavailable subscribing witness, or
of a party. If the document is relevant, it goes in evidence on its
face. It is said that the subscribing witnesses are " conclusively
presumed to be dead." It is perhaps quite as accurate to say that
the rule applies, whether they are dead or not, or even whether they
are in court or not. There seems to be no inference, presumption,
or question of proof about the matter. It is simply a question of a
rule. The rule dispenses with living evidence if the witnesses
are alive ; of proof of signatures, if they are dead. All is, a docu-
ment thirty years old proves itself. This, of course, is by no means
the same thing as saying that it is admissible. To be admissible,
the evidence must also be relevant and not the subject of any rule
of exclusion.
For example, the Massachusetts supreme judicial court say : —
" It is an old and well-settled rule of evidence, that registered deeds
which appear to be thirty years old, and which have been followed
by possession under them, may be given in evidence, without any
proof of their execution. After such a lapse of time the witnesses
are presumed to be dead. And it is said to be a peremptory rule of
law, found to be both safe and convenient, that, after a lapse of
thirty years, a deed, unaccompanied by any circumstances of sus-
picion, may be admitted without proof of its execution." Green v.
Chelsea, 24 Pick. 71 (1836) ; Henthorne v. Doe, 1 Blackf. 157 (1822) ;
Thruston v. Masterson, 9 Dana, 228 (1839) ; Carter v. Chandron,
21 Ala. 72, 91 (1852) ; McReynolds v. Longenberger, 61 Pa. St. 13,
31 (1868) ; Duncan v. Beard, 2 Nott & McC. 400 (1820) ; Clark v.
Owens, 18 N.Y. 434 (1858); Burgin v. Chenault, 9 B. Monr. 285
(1848) ; Weitman v. Thiot, 64 Ga. 11 (1879). So in speaking of a
memorial of an ancient deed, the court of queen's bench of Upper
Canada hold, "The principle of receiving in evidence documents
more than thirty years old, without proof of their authenticity, is
not confined to the deeds themselves, but extends to any written
documents whatever, even to letters." Doe v. TurnbuU, 5 Q. B. U. C.
129 (1848).
The supreme court of Georgia, speaking of a witnessed receipt over
thirty years old, say, "It was properly admissible in evidence on
the ground that it was more than thirty years old, and therefore its
execution need not have been proven at the trial. In admitting
written documents in evidence, when more than thirty years old,
the courts do not go altogether upon the presumption that the
subscribing witnesses are proved to be dead, but they adopt that
limit of time, beyond which proof of the execution of written
instruments will not be required, although the subscribing witnesses
may be alive." Settle v. Alison, 8 Ga. 201 (1850). So of a will.
" The reason of the law, in dispensing with the attendance of
witnesses to a deed of thirty years' standing, and where possession
1831'' AMEEICAJT NOTES. [PAET I.
has been held under it, is founded upon the presumption that they
are dead, and the impossibility of proving its execution ; and
although they are, in fact, alive, it is not necessary to produce
them, for the rule is general in its operation. The reason of this
rule applies to the time of the execution of a will, and not to
the death of the testator, for the same difficulty of proof exists in
the one case as in the other." Jackson v. Blanshan, 3 Johns. 292
(1808). "The rule on this subject is, that when instruments are
more than thirty years old, and are unblemished by any alterations,
and obtained from the proper custody, they are said to prove them-
selves, and the bare production is sufficient, the subscribing witnesses
or all living witnesses of the transaction being presumed to be dead;
and this presumption, as far as this rule of evidence is concerned, is
not affected by proof that there are witnesses living. But it is
essential that it appear that the instrument or instruments come
from such custody as to afford a reasonable presumption in favour
of their genuineness and be otherwise free from just grounds of
suspicion." Eeynolds v. Longenberger, 57 Pa. St. 13, 31 (1868).
The rule is arbitrary. A document twenty-nine years old is ex-
cluded. Glasscock v. Hughes, 65 Tex. 461 (1881).
Where a deed was executed under a power, the power, if an
ancient document, proves itself equally with the deed made under
it. But if the power is on record, neither are admissible, unless
the power or a copy of it is produced. Tolman v. Emersoii, 1 Pick.
160 (1826).
The supreme court of Illinois have gone further; — holding that
ancient documents cannot be admitted in evidence when purporting
to be executed by one acting in a fiduciary character, in the absence
of proof of his authority to make the deed. Fell v. Young, 63 111.
106 (1872).
Where there are circumstances of suspicion concerning a docu-
ment over thirty years old, if the evidence explains or refutes such
circumstances, the document is entitled to the benefit of the rule.
Walton V. Coulson, 1 McLean, 120 (1831). To come under the rule,
" It is not sufficient . . . that the instrument merely bears date thirty
years before the time of its production. It is necessary to show
that it has been in existence for that period of time ; and that may
be done not only by evidence of its execution, by the maker, or of
its possession by the party claiming under it for that period, but by
circumstances creating the presumption of such existence." Fairly
V. Fairly, 38 Miss. 280 (1859). In New York existence for thirty
years is not sufficient. " If possession has accompanied the deed, for
that length of time, that is enough. If not, other circumstances
may be resorted to for the purpose of raising the necessary pre-
sumption in favour of the deed." Clark v. Owens, 18 N. Y 434
(1858).
CHAP. V.J AMERICAN NOTES. 183^8
That a predecessor in title relied on such ancient deed is sufficient
to admit it. Whether without this it would have been admissible,
quaere. Burgin v. Chenault, 9 B. Monr. 286 (1848).
In Massachusetts, " If a subscribing witness be alive, he shall be
called to prove the deed, although it be more than thirty years
old." Tolman v. Emerson, 1 Pick. 160 (1826), citing Jackson v.
Blanshan, 3 Johns. 292 (1808), which, by the way, does not support
it.
The basis of such presumption as may exist in the matter is prob-
ably found in Duncan v. Beard, 2 Nott & McC. 400 (1820) :
" After a lapse of thirty years it is difficult, and in most cases im-
possible to procure the witnesses to the deed. Those who are parties
to a deed of thirty years' standing, must be upwards of fifty years
old, and a large portion of those who are born, die before that
period."
The rule relating to proving the execution of ancient documents
must not be confused with the somewhat analogous rule that ancient
records from proper custody are admissible to show facts of ancient
title, without further attestation. For example, " Ancient books pur-
porting to be record of the Lower Housatonic Proprietary " produced
from the custody of the clerk, " were properly admitted as evidence,
without any further proof of the original and continued organisation
of the proprietary. This species of evidence is that usually intro-
duced in tracing ancient titles, and has long been sanctioned by this
court." King v. Little, 1 Gush. 436 (1848).
So the supreme court of New Hampshire hold that an " ancient
book of records, purporting to be the proprietary records of
Eumney, accompanied as it was by an admission that it came from
the custody of the town clerk of Eumney, the proper depositary, by
statute, of the public records of that character belonging to the
town, was properly admitted in evidence, without proof that it con-
tained the records of the original proprietors of the town. . . . The
jury may well presume many things, which it would be indispensable
to prove in relation to more recent documentary evidence." Little
V. Downing, 37 N. H. 355, 365 (1858).
The other conclusive presumptions mentioned by the learned
author fall into the same class. They are rules of positive law.
Thus that a child under seven cannot be guilty of felony; that a
boy under fourteen cannot be guilty of rape and certain kindred
crimes ; that a female child under a fixed age cannot legally consent
to certain sexual acts, — are among the rules of criminal law, common
or statutory. That an infant under a given age cannot dispose of
real or personal property in certain ways ; that the children of
husband and wife begotten during their cohabitation cannot be
shown to be illegitimate by the testimony of the parents, — all
present no question in the law of evidence.
18319 AMEEICAil NOTES. [PAET I.
(2) Fictions. — Courts have usually been sensitive about con-
fessing that they are making law rather than declaring it. A
common method of concealing this frequent and often valuable
process has been by interpretation. Another has been by the
creation oi fictions. Now, it is obviously essential to the value of a
legal fiction that it should not be disputed. The casual loss by the
plaintiff and the finding by the defendant, in an action of trover ;
the promise in an indebitatus assumpsit, for example, would have
been of but little use, as fictions, if they could have been traversed
and an issue raised on them. The fiction was necessarily non-
issuable and, as in other cases, where a fact is not issuable, it has
been " conclusively presumed " to exist.
A modern instance will illustrate this process of legal develop-
ment. The circuit courts of the United States have acquired juris-
diction over suits between corporations organised under the laws of
different states, or where the other party is a citizen of a different
state, by establishing the fiction that the members of any corpora-
tion before them are all citizens of the state to which such corpo-
ration owes its charter. This is done by conclusively presuming
them to be so.
" A corporation itself can be a citizen of no state in the sense in
which the word ' citizen ' is used in the Constitution of the United
States. A suit may be brought in the Federal courts by or against
a corporation, but in such a case it is regarded as a suit brought by
or against the stockholders of the corporation ; and, for the purposes
of jurisdiction, it is conclusively presumed that all the stockholders
are citizens of the state which, by its laws, created the corporation."
MuUer v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444 (1876).
" The members of the corporate body must be presumed to be
citizens of the state in which the corporation was domiciled and
that both parties were estopped from denying it." Louisville, &c.,
E. R. V. Letson, 2 How. 497 (1844), cited in Covington Drawbridge
Co. V. Shepherd, 20 How. 227, 233 (1867) ; Ohio & Mississippi E. E. v.
Wheeler, 1 Black, 286, 297 (1861); E. E. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270
(1871). The same rule applies to a corporation created under the
laws of the United States, e. g. a National Bank ; Manufacturers, &c..
Bank y. Baack, 2 Abb. Circ' Ct. 232 (1871).
Presumptions. — Presumptions, strictly so called, are divided into
two main classes, "Presumptions of Fact" and " Presumptions of
Law." The presumption of fact is, as has been said, the logical
inference of the existence of one fact from proof of another. It is
the only real presumption, as the "presumption of law" is an
assumption of jurisprudence that a given presumption of fact has a
certain probative force, to wit : that it establishes a prima facie
case, or, in other words, that a tribunal of fact would be justified in
CHAP, v.] AMEKICAJT NOTES. ISS^"
acting on it in the absence of evidence to the contrary. It is, there-
fore, a rule of law, concerning presumptions. It is a levamen pro-
hationis, rather than proof itself. It is, like an admission, or other
levamen prohationis, rather a fact to be proved by evidence, than
evidence to prove a fact. Presumptions of law are rules of law ;
and a rule has no probative force. The phrase " presumption " has
proved a very favorite one in judicial reasoning, and it apparently
embodies many different meanings. In deciding whether, in any
particular case, we are dealing with a bona fide presumption or a
counterfeit, but one infallible test presents itself, — to weigh it in
the scales of logic. If the " presumption " shows probative weight,
it is a presumption. If it does not, it is something else, — usually
a rule of positive law, or possibly one of pleading. A useful way
of verifying this result will be to see whether the so-called
" presumption " can be exactly restated as a rule of positive law or
pleading. A true presumption does not lend itself readily to this
process ; but a rule which has been paraphrased from the positive
law into the language of presumption can usually be paraphrased
back again. Good illustrations of this process may be found
in the so-called "presumption of innocence," or the "conclusive
presumption that every one knows the law."
A " presumption " (or assumption) of law, Mr. Wharton (2 Whar.
Ev. § 1237) well says, " derives its force from jurisprudence as dis-
tinguished from logic." Perhaps it would be fully as accurate to say
that its force is derived from a definite weight, which jurisprudence,
in certain cases, has seen fit to give to logic. The law of evidence
alone does not fix rules for carrying on a line of reasoning. But
courts, from early times have apparently felt under pressure of
an obligation to the general community for the promotion of cer-
tainty in the rules of law. They have constantly tried to lessen
the field of the uncertain and the debatable in connection with
rights and liabilities ; to make repeated trials of fact settle some-
thing valuable generally ; to prevent, so far as possible, the use-
less expense and annoyance of trying the same question of fact
over and over again. As in cases of negligence, reasonable care,
due diligence, &c., the effort is to " lay down a rule about it" which
will remove some element of uncertainty as to what the legal stan-
dard really is. In its dealings with the jury this feeling has appar-
ently been intensified by practical dangers which a permanent
tribunal, realising the value of precedent, and responsible for the
larger consequences of litigation, would readily perceive might
arise from the uncontrolled and unaided efforts of a casual tribunal,
little given to the solution of the problems which they were called
upon temporarily to solve, and much more apt to be moved by the
facts of a particular case than by a consideration of the remoter
social consequences of permitting themselves to follow their feel-
18321 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAKT I.
ings. Partly to guide the jury, and perhaps largely to control it;
partly to bring the experience of the past to their aid, and partly to
enforce the use of correct reasoning, or retain in the court a power
which it was undesirable the. jury should exercise, — the court
naturally and early adopted the practice of stating to the jury that
certain plain, obvious inferences or " presumptions " of fact they
might safely assume to be correct, until they were disputed by other
evidence on the same point. When conflicting evidence was gone
into, the "assumption" they had been asked to make would of
course be gone, and it became the duty of the jury to weigh all the
evidence, including the presumption of fact which they could have
assumed to be correct if it had been alone. It is obvious that this
action on the part of the court practically amounts to a ruling as to
the burden of proof in the sense of the "burden of introducing
evidence." This burden rests always on him against whom the
tribunal of fact would decide if no more evidence were introduced.
In other words, at the opening of the case, it rests, together with
the " burden of establishing," on him who has the affirmative of the
issue, but may shift during the trial whenever the party on whom
it has rested succeeds in establishing a priTna facie case in his own
favor. Proof of a presumption of fact sufliciently strong to be
assumed by the law to be correct, establishes such a prima facie
case. Heoce it is said that " a presumption of law shifts the burden
of proof ; '' which is true, if the burden of introducing evidence
is meant. When the party on whom this burden of evidence now
rests introduces evidence to show that the assumption of law is in-
correct in the particular case, the " assumption " is functus officio as
such, leaving the presumption of fact to have its probative force.
It simply has ceased to be assumed to be correct. U. S. v. Wiggins,
14 Pet. 334, 347 (1840). There is nothing in the above practice to
conflict with the rule that the probative force of a presumption is
always a question for the jury. " Whenever evidence is offered to
the jury which is in its nature prima facie proof, or presumptive
proof, its character as such ought not to be disregarded ; and no
court has a right to direct the jury to disregard it, or to view it
under a different aspect from that in which it is actually presented
to them. Whatever just influence it may derive from that charac-
ter, the jury have a right to give it." Crane v. Lessee of Morris,
6 Peters, 598, 620 (1832).
The facts on which the presumption or inference is claimed must
be themselves proved by affirmative evidence. They cannot be
themselves presumed. A presumption on a presumption is not per-
mitted. "A presumption which a jury is to make is not a circum-
stance in proof ; and it is not, therefore, a legitimate foundation for
a presumption." IT. S. v. Boss, 92 U. S. 281 (1875); Douglass v.
Mitchell, 36 Pa. St. 440 (1860).
CHAP, v.] AMEPaCAM NOTES. 183^2
Illustrations of certain of the more usual and definite presump-
tions of law have been cited by the learned author.
" Presumption of Innocexce." — This is a spurious presumption,
and merely a paraphrase of the usual statement of the rule of the
burden of proof in criminal cases; — that the burden is on the gov-
ernment to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all facts material to the
offence charged. Mr. Justice Stephen (Dig. Law of Evid. Art. 94)
frankly abandons this so-called " presumption." It rests apparently
on no probative basis of fact. Speaking of the rights of a prisoner, the
supreme court of Ohio say : " The benefit of the presumption of
innocence was fully and practically secured to him in the instruc-
tion that the state must prove the material elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt." Morehead v. State, 34 Oh. St. 212
(1877) ; Hemingway v. State, 68 Miss. 371, 408 (1890). « The first
instruction prayed puts the point, whether the burthen of proof of
the offences charged in the indictment does not rest upon the United
States. Without question it does in all cases where a party stands
charged with an offence, unless a different provision is made by
some statute; for the general rule of our jurisprudence is that the
party accused need not prove his innocence ; but it is for the gov-
ernment itself to prove his guilt before it is entitled to a verdict or
conviction." U. S. v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460, 471 (1827).
Where the charge covered the rule as to burden of proof, but did
not state the " presumption of innocence," held, no error. Hutto v.
State, 7 Tex. App. 44, 49 (1879). "A reasonable doubt must be
charged in every felony case whether' asked or not." Ibid.
The nature of this so-called presumption is seen when the attempt
is made to use it in a probative capacity. So tested, it cannot be
used as evidence of the fact of innocence. For example, on an
indictment charging the seduction of a woman " of previously chaste
character," affirmative evidence of the woman's chastity must be
furnished, the presumption of innocence furnishing no evidence of it
whatever. The court say that the presumption of innocence is
" always to be used in the administration of justice as a weapon of
defence, not of assault. They are the shield of the accused ; not
the sword of the prosecutor." West v. State, 1 Wise. 209 (1853) ;
People V. Eoderigas, 49 Cal. 9 (1874).
So on an indictment for enticing women of " chaste life and con-
versation," the judge at nisi prius ruled that it was for the govern-
ment to prove their chastity, but that " in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, it is a presumption of law that they were of chaste
life and conversation." This was held erroneous. "This instruc-
tion permitted the jury to find that the burden on the government
was satisfied by the legal presumption that the women were chaste,
although the government had introduced no affirmative evidence of
their chastity. . . . The defendant is presumed to be innocent until
18323 AMBEICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
every material allegation necessary to constitute the offence charged
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. To allow the proof of "Such an
allegation to rest merely on the legal presumption that the women
were chaste, would be to permit the presumption in favor of the
defendant's innocence of the offence charged to be overborne by
another legal presumption in favor of the innocence of other persons
not parties to this proceeding." Com. v. Whittaker, 131 Mass. 224
(1881).
To the contrary effect that in an action of seduction " the chaste
character of the prosecutrix was presumed, and the burden was on
the defendant to overcome the presumption," see State v. Wells,
48 la. 671 (1878).
On a civil action for breach of promise of marriage, the plaintiff
claimed a pretended marriage and subsequent cohabitation. The
defendant being already married ; held that evidence of recognition
of the plaintiff as his wife, &c., would not warrant a presumption of
a lawful ceremony. Wright v. Skinner, 17 C. P. U. C. 317 (1866).
Differing from other courts, the supreme court of Vermont appar-
ently regards the " presumption of innocence " as having a certain
probative force. See Childs v. Merrill, 66 Vt. 302 (1894).
" The presumption is single, and the same in all cases, and in all
must be overturned by evidence which excludes every other reason-
able hypothesis but that of guilt." Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37, 72
(1889).
Where proof of good character is said to raise a " presumption of
innocence," a true presumption of fact is referred to, but such is not
the usual meaning of the expression. Harrington v. State, 19 Oh.
St. 264 (1869).
In many civil cases, on the analogy of the " presumption of inno-
cence," is a so-called presumption against fraud, illegality, &c.,
which amounts merely, as also in many cases the so-called pre-
sumption of regularity, to a statement that the burden of evidence
is upon him who relies on proof of fraud, illegality, or irregularity.
"He who alleges fraud must prove it." Parkhurst v. McGraw,
24 Miss. 134 (1852).
So in an action on a promissory note it is for the defendant to
allege and prove illegality or fraud. Baxter v. Ellis, 67 Me. 178
(1869).
So where a corporation was prohibited from making certain con-
tracts after a given date, it was held, in an action on such a con-
tract, " the presumption being that there was no violation of law,"
it would be presumed that the contract was made while it was yet
legal to make it. Priend v. Smith Gin Co., 69 Ark. 86 (1894). So
where a constitutional provision prohibited towns from issuing
bonds in aid of a railroad, after a certain date, held, in an action
on such bonds, " Courts can presume that an act was done prior to
CHAP. V.J AlIEEICAJSr NOTES. 183^
a period after which it could not legally have been done." State
V. Hannibal &c. E. E., 113 Mo. 297 (1893).
Presumption of Ownership. — The presumption of ownership
from proof of possession is one of fact based on the general expe-
rience of mankind, stated by the learned author at § 123 supra, that
"Men generally own the property they possess." McEwen v. Port-
land, 1 Oreg. 300 (1860).
The accuracy of this presumption of fact is an assumption or pre-
sumption of law, and proof of possession is prima facie evidence of
ownership. " The first evidence of personal property is possession.
If this young man was in possession of the house ; holding himself
out to others as the owner ; and acting as the owner, the presumption
of law is that he was the owner." Drummond v. Hopper, 4 Har-
rington, 327 (1845). "Possession is prima facie evidence of title."
Vining v. Baker, 63 Me. 644 (1866) ; Andrews v. Beck, 23 Tex. 465
(1859). " Possession of personal property is prima facie evidence
of ownership." Goodwin v. Garr, 8 Cal. 615 (1867). So of a
promissory note. Its possession at the trial is prima facie evi-
dence of ownership and authority to sue. Hovey v. Sebring, 24
Mich. 232 (1872)] Vastine v. Wilding, 45 Mo. 89 (1869); Stod-
dard V. Burton, 41 la. 682 (1876). "It is a presumption of law,
that every species of property found in a person's possession at his
death belongs to his succession." Alexander's Succession, 18 La.
Ann. 337 (1866).
So in an action of trespass quare clausum, the court say, "The
presumption of the law is, that the person who has the title is the
one in possession." Pinch u. Alston, 2 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 83 (1832).
So possession of land under a general claim of title is prima
facie evidence, of a seisin in fee simple. Ward v. Mcintosh, 12 Oh.
St. 231 (1861). So Chief Justice Savage, in Jackson v. Waltermire,
6 Cowen, 301 (1826), speaking of actual possession of land, says :
"This is presumptive evidence of a seisin in fee, and sufficient until
the contrary appears."
"Possession of property alone and without explanation, is evi-
dence of ownership ; but is the lowest species of evidence. It is
merely presumptive, and liable to be overcome by any evidence
showing the character of the possession, and that it is not neces-
sarily as owner. If the custody and possession is shown to be
equally consistent with an outstanding ownership in a third person,
as with a title in the one having possession, no presumption of
ownership arises solely from such possession." Eawley v. Brown,
71 N. Y. 86 (1877).
The reasoning from experience on which the presumption is based
defines its scope. " The possession of an open account in favor of
another has never been held to be evidence of ownership in the
holder." Gregg v. Mallett, 111 N. C. 74 (1892).
18325 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
Omnia Contra Spoliatokem. — The presumption that one who
destroys or suppresses evidence does so because the evidence so
suppressed would operate against him, seems a true presumption,
i. e., one of distinct probative effect. As in the case of other
presumptions, it is capable of being rebutted. Thus, in prize pro-
ceedings, where it appeared that during the chase resulting in the
capture, a package of papers relating to the cargo was thrown over-
board by the master and super-cargo, the ship papers being retained,
the court say: — "Concealment, or even spoliation of papers, is
not of itself a sufficient ground for condemnation in a prize court.
It is undoubtedly a very awakening circumstance, calculated to
excite the vigilance and justify the suspicions of the court. But
it is a circumstance open to explanation, for it may have arisen
from accident, necessity, or superior force ; and if the party in the
first instance fairly and frankly explains it to the satisfaction of
the court, it deprives him of no right to which he is otherwise
entitled. If, on the other hand, the spoliation be unexplained, or
the explanation appear weak and futile ; if the cause labour under
heavy suspicions, or there be a vehement presumption of bad faith,
or gross prevarication, it is made the ground of a denial of further
proof, and condemnation ensues from defects in the evidence which
the party is not permitted to supply." The Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 227,
241 (1817).
So abstracting from the court files part of a vessel's original
report of a collision "throws great discredit on the claimant's side
of the case." The Sam Sloan, 65 Fed. Eep. 125 (1894). So where
a party attempts to suppress testimony by defacing a public record,
it is held that the court was " justified in construing the testimony
strongly" against him. Murray v. Lepper, 99 Mich. 135 (1894).
"The spoliation of evidence, damaging to a litigant's cause, may
constitute just as much of a fraud, as the manufacture of evidence
that is favourable to it." Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Moog, 78 Ala. 284,
307 (1884).
For similar reasons, a plaintiff who has deliberately and volun-
tarily destroyed a promissory note will not be permitted, in the
absence of suitable explanation, to give secondary evidence of its
contents. " I believe no case is to be found, where if a party has
deliberately destroyed the higher evidence, without explanation
showing affirmatively that the act was done with pure motives,
and repelling every suspicion of a fraudulent design, that he has
had the benefit of it." Blade v. Noland, 12 Wend. 173 (1834).
So it is held error to allow the plaintiff in an action for libel
to introduce secondarj' evidence of the contents of an alleged
libellous letter which he had voluntarily destroyed. "This we
think was a violation of the cardinal principle that where it ap-
pears that a party has destroyed an instrument or document, the
CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTES. 183^^
presumption arises that if it had been produced it would have been
against his interest or in some essential particular unfavorable to
his claims under it. Contra spoliatorem omnia presumuntur. . . .
He must first rebut the inference of fraud which arises from the
act of a voluntary destruction of a written paper before he can
ask to be relieved from the consequences of his act by introducing
parol evidence to prove his case." Joannes v. Bennett, 6 All. 1G9
(1862). " It is not a matter of course to allow secondary evidence
of the contents of an instrument in suit upon proof of its destruc-
tion. If the destruction was the result of accident, or was without
the agency or consent of the owner, such evidence is generally
admissible. But if the destruction was voluntarily and deliberately
made by the owner, or with his assent, as in the present case, the
admissibility of the evidence will depend upon the cause or motive
of the party in effecting or assenting to the destruction." Bagley
V. MeMickle, 9 Cal. 430, 446 (1858).
Where the destruction was done in good faith ; — for example,
under the well intentioned though injudicious advice of a sister,
the secondary evidence is receivable. Tobin v. Shaw, 45 Me. 331
(1858).
In a lesser degree, the same presumption arises where a material
witness is withheld. " Where a party has evidence in his power
and within his reach, by which he may repel a claim or charge
against him, and omits to produce it, this supplies a presumption
of fact that the charge or claim is well-founded. This presumption
attaches with more force in cases where a party, having more
certain and satisfactory evidence in his power, relies upon that
which is of a weaker or more inferior nature." Savannah, &c.,
E. R. V. Gray, 77 Ga. 440 (1886). But this rule receives a reason-
able construction. No presumption can be drawn against a railroad
if it does not produce a witness — one of its engineers — who has
gone to another state and whose residence is unknown. Ibid.
And where the witness is " subject to the call of either party,"
no inference can be drawn from a failure to produce him. Haynes
V. McEae, 101 Ala. 318 (1893) ; Scoville v. Baldwin, 27 Conn. 316
(1858).
Where the question is as to the meaning of a certain written
contract which the appellant refused to produce, the court say ; —
" Where the adverse party has it in his power to produce evidence
that would settle the question at issue, although not compelled to
produce it, every intendment and presumption is to be made
against the party who might remove all doubt on the question."
Benjamin v. Ellinger's Adm., 80 Ky. 472 (1882) ; Cross v. Bell, 34
N. H. 82 (1866) ; Wallace v. Harris, 32 Mich. 380, 394 (1875).
So the defendant's non-production of his books on notice is
"strong presumptive evidence against him." Atty-Gen. v.
18327 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
Halliday, 26 Q. B. IJ. C. 397 (1867). "If he does not exhibit it
to the court and jury for their satisfaction, they have the right to
infer that it contains evidence unfavourable to him in the matters in
dispute between him and the defendants." Lowell v. Todd, 15
C. P. U. C. 306 (1865) ; Merwin v. Ward, 15 Conn. 377 (1843).
But see Cartier v. Troy Lumber Co., 138 111. 533 (1891). So where
the defendant did not appear to testify to matters peculiarly
within his own knowledge, the court say that his course " carries
with it the usual unfavourable and damaging presumptions." Con-
necticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 117 Mo. 261 (1893).
The limits of the rule are well defined in a Michigan case.
Where a female plaintiff was absent, without excuse, a ruling
" that if she was absent when able to be present, the jury might
consider that as evidence tending to impeach the good faith of her
claim " was held correct. An instruction that there was a pre-
sumption of law that, if she had testified, her testimony would
have hurt her was held to have been properly refused. Cole v.
Lake Shore, &c. E. E., 95 Mich. 77 (1893). So where parties re-
fuse to obey the precept of a subpoena duces tecum, the court say
that "it is a circumstance that the jury could have considered as
a fact tending to show a purpose upon the part of appellees to
suppress evidence against them." Darby v. Eoberts, 3 Tex. Civ.
App. 427 (1893).
But the " mere non-production of books, upon notice, has no other
effect than to admit the other party to prove their contents by
parol. . . . Any presumption against him can only be on the ground
that he withholds evidence and omnia contra spoliatorem. But
this rule cannot operate where all that is done is not to produce
evidence which can only go in by consent of the other side."
Cartier v. Troy Lumber Co., 138 111. 533 (1891).
" Where withholding testimony raises a violent presumption
that a fact not clearly proved or disproved exists, it is not error to
allude to the fact of withholding as a circumstance strengthening
the proof." Frick v. Barbour, 64 Pa. St. 120 (1870) ; Gulf, &c.,
E. E. Co. V. Ellis, 54 Ped. Eep. 481 (1893).
" The non-production of evidence clearly within the power of a
party creates a strong presumption that, if produced, it would be
against him." Miller v. Jones, 32 Ark. 337 (1877).
"In equity, as at law, the omission of a party to testify in con-
trol or explanation of testimony given by others in his presence is
a proper subject of consideration." McDonough v. O'Niel, 113
Mass. 92 (1873) ; Eckel v. Eckel, 49 N. J. Eq. 687 (1892) ; Hall v.
Vanderpool, 156 Pa. St. 152 (1893).
"Where evidence which would properly be part of a case, is
within the control of the party whose interest it would naturally
be to produce it, and, without satisfactory explanation, he fails to
CHAP. V.J AMEKICAN NOTES. 183®
do so, the jury may draw an inference that it would be unfavourable
to him. It is an inference of fact, not a presumption of law."
Hall V. Vanderpool, (ubi supra).
It is competent for the party against whom such presumption
would lie to introduce evidence to meet its force. Thus, where it
is claimed that the plaintiff, in an action for personal injury, was
feigning weakness to escape medical examination into the extent
of her injuries, it is competent for her to show that shortly prior
she had herself freely invited such examination. Durgin v.
Danville, 47 Vt. 95, 105 (1874).
But it has been held that (however important as bearing on
evenly balanced evidence) the mere failure to question one's own
witness as to a certain fact will not relieve the other side of the
necessity of proving the fact affirmatively ; — if material to his case.
" To so hold would be substituting conjecture for proof." Arbuckle
V. Templetou, 65 Vt. 205 (1892). But where a party offers only
weak and unsatisfactory evidence, when he clearly has plenary
evidence in his control, such evidence as is offered should " be
viewed with suspicion." Wimer v. Smith, 22 Oreg. 469 (1892).
In criminal cases, the voluntary suppression of testimony is
usually cogent circumstantial evidence of guilt. For example,
that a defendant travelled under an assumed name and destroyed,
on his arrest, the notes alleged to have been forged, State v.
Chamberlain, 89 Mo. 129 (1886) ; or offered to destroy some
barrels furnishing incriminating evidence of barratry, Phoenix
Ins. Co. V. Moog, 78 Ala. 284, 307 (1884), do not differ in any
essential particulars from other facts circumstantially tending to
sustain the claim of criminality.
The same inference or presumption obtains where evidence is
fabricated in support of any contention. Indeed, courts have fre-
quently exhibited a perhaps natural resentment and impatience in
disposing of such cases and have not always, apparently, felt in-
clined or constrained calmly to balance the weight of evidence in
favor of one who has deliberately attempted to mislead them
But even as matter of logic, an inference or presumption of lack
of real merits in a claim or defence which feels forced to rely upon
manufactured testimony, presses most strongly on the judgment.
Thus, in an admiralty case of collision, where the defendants
produced a log-book found to be false, the court say, "This conclu-
sion disposes of the case ; for, in a conflict of evidence such as the
case presents, the production of a fabricated log warrants the
rejection of the testimony which it is brought to support." The
Tillie, 7 Benedict, 382 (1874).
Similarly, for a plaintiff to attempt to bribe the sherifif to select
certain jurymen "is in the nature of an admission that the cause
of the party resorting to bribery of witnesses or jurors is unjust,
18329 AMBEICAiT NOTES. [PABT I.
and that his claim is dishonest and unrighteous." Kidd v. Ward,
(Iowa) 69 N. W. 279 (1894).
So in relation to witnesses. " Evidence of the fact of an at-
tempted subornation is admissible as an admission by conduct that
the party's cause is an unrighteous one." Fulkerson v. Murdock,
53 Mo. App. 151 (1892). So a party may show, if he can, that his
opponent has attempted to prevent an adverse witness from attend-
ing the trial, and to bribe a witness to testify on his own behalf.
Carpenter v. Willey, 65 Vt. 168 (1892).
Recent Possession — The possession of stolen goods shortly after
the commission of the crime is presumptive evidence of guilt, or of
a receiving with guilty knowledge. " The rule is well established,
that the recent exclusive possession of the fruits of crime soon after
its commission is prima facie evidence of guilty possession." Hen-
derson V. State, 70 Ala. 23 (1881).
The supreme court of Illinois has sustained the following ruling :
"The jury are instructed, as a matter of law, that possession of
stolen property, immediately after the theft, is sufficient to warrant
a conviction, unless attending circumstances or other evidence so far
overcomes the presumption thus raised as to create a reasonable
doubt of prisoner's guilt." Sahlinger v. People, 102 111. 241 (1882).
It may well be doubted, hjowever, whether th& prima facie weight
of a presumption of law has usually been given this presumption.
It seems to be essentially one of fact. " The instruction, that pos-
session of stolen property immediately after the theft, if an unsatis-
factory account is given, ' affords presumptive evidence of guilt,' was
right; and the whole matter of the degree of force the presumption
ought to bear in the particidar case was submitted to the jury, as a
question of fact, in a manner which leaves no ground for exception."
Com. V. McGorty, 114 Mass. 299 (1873). " The doctrine of the cases
referred to is, that there is no presumption of law arising from the
possession of stolen goods. To that doctrine we readily yield our
assent. It is not a presumption of law for the. court, but a presump-
tion of fact for the jury." State v. Eaymond, 46 Conn. 345 (1878).
The reasons for declining to assign this presumption the probative
weight of a presumption of law are principally that the varying cir-
cumstances of particular cases, as to remoteness of time, presence
or absence of reasonable explanation, etc., give this presumption
a very varying weight.
"The first practical difficulty in the way of making it a presump-
tion of law is the impossibility of inventing a rule by which to
determine whether the possession is recent or not. ... It is use-
less to call such a presumption a presumption of law. Call it what
we may, it is a presumption of fact. ... It is a presumption estab-
lished by no legal rule, ascertained by no legal test, defined by no
legal terms, measured by no legal standard, bounded by no legal
CHAP, v.] AMEEICAJ^ NOTES. 183^
limits. It has none of the characteristics of law." State v. Hodge,
50 N. H. 510 (1869).
In Stokes v. State, 58 Miss. 677 (1881), a ruling that the present
was a presumption of law was held erroneous. " However strongly
the one fact may seem to follow from the other, they (the jury)
cannot be told they must infer it, or that the law infers it for
them."
" Ordinarily it is stronger or weaker in proportion to the period
intervening between the stealing and the finding in possession of
the accused ; and after the lapse of a considerable time before the
possession is shown in the accused, the law does not infer his guilt,
but leaves the question to the jury under the consideration of all the
circumstances." State v. Rights, 82 N. C. 675 (1880).
In Hernandez v. State, 9 Tex. App. 288 (1880), the court say that
the request for an instruction that, " The possession of property re-
cently stolen is a circumstance proper for the consideration of the
jury in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused, but does
not of itself constitute suificient evidence to sustain a verdict of
guilty," should have been granted. To same effect. State v. Kim-
ble, 34 La. Ann. 392 (1882). On the contrary, and with a confused
perception of the real relations of presumptions of fact to assump-
tions of law, the supreme court of Iowa hold that "the presumption
in question, unless overcome, will authorise conviction. It is a pre-
sumption recognised by the law, and may therefore be termed a
presumption of law. The term ' presumption of fact ' implies that
from certain facts the law will raise a presumption. Either of
these terms, ' presumption of law ' or ' presumption of fact,' may be
used to express the same thought, for they are identical in mean-
ing." State V. Kelly, 57 la. 644 (1882).
Like other presumptions of fact, proof of the recent possession of
stolen goods amounts to circumstantial evidence of a fact in issue.
" The fact of the possession of the stolen property by the accused is
evidence tending to prove his guilt, but in no sense conclusive as
to his guilt ; nor does his guilt follow as a presumption of law
unless such possession be explained by the accused." Ingalls v-
State, 48 Wise. 647 (1879). See also State v. Eaymond, 46 Conn.
345 (1878).
Pkesumption of Continuance. — The inference of the existence
of a fact at a particular time from proof of its existence at a time
previous seems to be entirely one of logic. In other words, it is a
presumption of fact. The inference naturally varies much in weight
according to the nature of the fact itself and the length of time over
which the continuance is sought to be presumed. The presumption
has probative force so far as based on experience.
The illustrations of the inference are as endless as the application
of any other line of thought.
18331 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
" If seizin is once proved, it will be presumed to continue until
tlie contrary is shown." Currier v. Gale, 9 All. 522 (1865) ; Cob-
leigh V. Young, 15 N. H. 493 (1844) ; Lind v. Lind, 63 Minn. 48
(1893) ; Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497 (1892).
Evidence being introduced of delivery of bonds to a railroad, and
there being no evidence as to what was done with them, the court
say : " The only presumption arising from these facts is that said
bonds are still in the hands of the railroad company." Choisser v.
People, 140 111. 21 (1892).
Where A. is shown to have owned certain personal property "the
law would presume, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
that it continued to be his up to the time of his death, and that it
belonged to the estate at the date of the commencement of this
action." Hanson v. Chiatovich, 13 Nev. 395 (1878); Flanders v.
Merritt, 3 Barb. 201 (1848).
But finding a piece of property at a certain place eight months
before the death of the deceased is no evidence that it was in the
same place at his death. Adams v. Clark, 8 Jones (N. C.) L. 56
(1860).
Where one enters into possession of premises as a tenant, he will
be presumed to hold under that title, and any intention to claim
under a title adverse to the landlord can only be shown by " plain
proof." Leport v. Todd, 32 N. J. Law, 124 (1866). This presumption
has been extended over a period of ten years without evidence in
the meantime. Alabama State Ld. Co. v. Kyle, 99 Ala. 474 (1892).
The fact that A. was insolvent shortly before giving a certain note
and mortgage raises " a legal presumption " that he was insolvent
at the time issue was joined in a suit on the note. Evidence that
he was solvent at the trial of the cause does not countervail the
presumption. Body v. Jewson, 33 Wise. 402 (1873).
When a person's residence is proved to be in a certain place, it
will be presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. "As A.'s
residence was admitted to be in the state in 1886, the law presumes
that his residence continued to be in this state unless such presump-
tion has been rebutted." Ferguson v. Wright, 113 I^T C. 537
(1893).
"When the residence of the defendants in New York is once
established, it is presumed to continue there till the contrary is
shown; and the burden is cast upon the defendants to show a
change of residence." Rixford v. Miller, 49 Vt. 319 (1877) ; Nixon
V. Palmer, 10 Barb. 175 (1850); Prather v. Palmer, 4 Ark. 456
(1841) ; Wray v. Wray, 33 Ala. 187 (1858).
The expression last above quoted from the court in Rixford v.
Miller is significant. The presumption of continuance, like many
others, is often made useful by the courts in determining who has
the burden of evidence as to a particular fact. In determining this.
CHAP, v.] AMEBICAJ^ NOTES. 183^
jurisprudence plays a part as well as logic, and the presumption of
tact being ruled in the language of a presumption of law as a
prima facie case is pro hao vice, given the force of a presumption
of law.
Insanitt and other Mental States. — A state of settled per-
manent insanity once shown to exist will be presumed to continue.
" The rule does not apply to cases of occasional or intermittent
insanity ; but it does to all cases of habitual or apparently confirmed
insanity, of whatever nature," State v. Wilner, 40 Wise. 304
(1876) ; Lilly v. Waggoner, 27 111. 395 (1862).
"When it appears in proof that a person was, at any given time,
of unsound mind (unless from some temporary or transient cause),
the legal presumption is, that that state of mind continues until the
contrary is made to appear by evidence." Grouse v. Holman, 19
Ind. 30 (1862).
If a certain state of relations is shown to exist between two per-
sons it will be presumed to continue. Eames v. Eames, 41 N. H.
177 (1860).
So of improper sexual relations. Caujolle v. Eerrie, 23 N. Y. 90
(1861).
Evidence that certain persons were partners two or three years
before raises a presumption that they are still partners. Cooper
V. Dedrick, 22 Barb. 616 (1856).
So if a course of dealing, e.g., taking by an insurance company of
a promissory note secured by a pledge of the policy in payment of
the premiums on a life insurance policy, is once shown to exist, it
will be presumed to continue. Hastings v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co.,
138 N. Y. 473 (1893).
But where a former marriage would render a second one bigamous,
it will not be presumed to continue on proof that it once existed.
" That a fact continuous in its nature, will be presumed to continue
after its existence is once shown, is a presumption which ought not
to be allowed to overthrow another presumption of equal if not
greater force, in favor of innocence." Klein v. Lawdman, 29 Mo.
269 (1860).
The real meaning of this apparently is that a presumption is not
proof beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal cases.
Pbesumptions as to Life. — The presumption of the continu-
ance of life may be and frequently is of but slight probative force.
Its logical effect apparently varies greatly not only with the inter-
val of time which it is sought to cover with the presumption, but
also with the probability of procuring evidence other than the pre-
sumption if the fact be as claimed. While the presumption of the
continuance of life certainly continues during the period of seven
years from the time the person was last known to be alive, the
presumption of fact may and usually does gradually grow less and
18333 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
less strong ; — until it finally remains merely a forensic presump-
tion or assumption of law ; in other words, amounts to a ruling
as to the burden of proof ; — that he who asserts the death of
a person shown to be alive before seven years of unexplained
absence has intervened must introduce evidence to show it. " The
presumption of the continuance of life is merely a presumption of
fact, which is subject to be controlled by facts and circumstances
and other legitimate evidence. ... It is a presumption by no means
of equal strength at all times and under all circumstances. If the
last known of a person was that he was a soldier, and was about
entering into a battle, and had been seen by none of his comrades
after the battle, the presumption of the continuance of life would
be very slight, and very slight evidence would be sufficient to con-
trol it." Hyde Park v. Canton, 130 Mass. 605 (1881). " The evi-
dence, therefore, that a person was living at a particular time is but
one of the facts to be considered in the determination of the ques-
tion whether he is living at any future given time." Ibid.
So if a person be once shown to be alive, he will be presumed to
continue to live, within reasonable limits, until the contrary is
shown. State v. Plym, 43 Minn. 385 (1890). " Ordinarily, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the continuance of the life of
an individual, to the common age of man, will be assumed by
presumption of law. The burden of proof lies upon the. party
alleging the death of the person." Stevens v. McNamara, 36 Me.
176 (1853).
" The rule is, that the proof of the death of a person, known to
be once living, is incumbent upon the party who asserts his death ;
for it is presumed he lives until the contrary be proved." Duke of
Cumberland v. Graves, 9 Barb. 695 (1850).
Extreme age alone is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of
the continuance of life. "The civil law will presume a person liv-
ing at a hundred years of age, and the common law does not stop
much short of this." Watson v. Tindal, 24 Ga. 494 (1858). So the
fact that a person in " bad health " twenty-two years before, would
now, if alive, be eighty years old, raises no presumption of death.
Matter of Hall's Deposition, 1 Wall. Jr. 85 (1843).
Presumption of Death. — This apparently is not the entire
truth in the matter. As the unexplained absence grows in duration,
even during the seven years, and as the inference that the person in
question is alive because he has been shown to be at a previous time,
therefore continuously grows weaker, a presumption of fact that he
is dead has been gaining probative force. As both processes are
continuous, a time comes in any case when the probative weight of
the second presumption of fact not only preponderates over that of
the first, but preponderates to such an extent as to constitute a
prima facie case in favour of death. The burden of introducing evi-
CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTES. 183^^
dence to prove the existence of life under these circumstances lies
on him who asserts it; — in other words, there is a presumption of
law that the person is dead. This period the law, somewhat arbi-
trarily but upon reasons historically satisfactory (see Stat. 1 Jac. 1,
Ch. 11, sec. 2 ; 19 Car. 2, Ch. 6), has fixed at seven years. Johnson
V. Merithew, 80 Me. Ill (1888) ; Whiting v. Nicholl, 46 IH. 230
(1867) ; Adams v. Jones, 39 Ga. 479 (1869) ; Winship v. Conner,.
42 N. H. 341 (1861) ; Primm «;. Stewart, 7 Tex. 178 (1851) ; Spen-
cer V. Koper, 13 Ired. 333 (1862) ; Youngs v. Heffner, 36 Oh. St.
232 (1880) ; Giles v. Morrow, 1 Ont. Eep. 527 (1882) ; Osborne v.
Allen, 26 N. J. L. 388 (1857) ; Burr v. Sim, 4 Whart. 150 (1838) ;
Learned v. Corley, 43 Miss. 687, 709 (1871) ; State v. Henke, 58 la.
467 (1882) ; Holmes v. Johnson, 42 Pa. St. 159 (1862) ; Garwood
V. Hastings, 38 Cal. 216 (1869).
" When a person goes abroad and has not been heard of for a long
time, the presumption of the continuance of life ceases at the expi-
ration of seven years from the period when he was last heard of.
And the same rule holds, generally, with respect to persons away
from their usual place of resort, and of whom no account can be
given." Whiting v. NichoU, 46 111. 230 (1867).
It is error to exclude evidence of persons who have heard of the
alleged deceased on the ground that it is hearsay. It rebuts the
presumption, which only arises when a person is not heard from
in seven years. Dowd v. Watson, 106 N. C. 476 (1890).
" The presumption of death, from any lapse of time which the
evidence in the case would justify, would only apply where the indi-
vidual alleged to be dead had left the place of his domicile and had
not been heard from for seven years or more." Duke of Cumber-
land V. Graves, 9 Barb. 595 (1850).
"The statutory presumption, in certain cases, of death after
seven years affords no ground for the converse proposition that, if
the person has been heard from within seven years, there is a pre-
sumption of law that he is still living. Neither is it true that there
is any presumption of law one way or the other as to the continu-
ance of life. It is a mere presumption of fact which is subject to
be controlled by facts and circumstances, and consequently by no
means of equal strength at all times, and under all circumstances ;
or, perhaps, more correctly speaking, there is no rigid presumption
one way or the other." State v. Plym, 43 Minn. 386 (1890).
If the contention that great length of absence tends rather to
show that the person in question has changed his home than that
he is dead, the court say, " We do not perceive any solid foundation
for it." Winship v. Conner, 42 N. H. 341 (1861). But the court
of Alabama very truly say that " considering the great length and
breadth of this country, and the migratory character of the people,
the presumption has less force here than in the country where the
18335 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAKT I.
law on this subject originated." Smith v. Smith, 49 Ala. 156
(1873).
Where heirs at law, while very young, moved to a western state as
a place of permanent residence, evidence that for twelve years they
had not been heard of by the testatrix at the place of their original
residence, does not raise a presumption of their death. " The
absence, without being heard from for seven years, which will war-
rant the presumption that a person is dead, means absence from
that person's place of residence — his home — with which place he
would most certainly keep up some kind of communication, or to
which he would return were he alive." Keller v. Stuck, 4 Eedf.
294 (1880).
The death of such person at any time within the seven years
is not presumed, but must be proved. Newman v. Jenkins, 10
Pick. 615 (1830) ; Whiting v. Nicholl, 46 111. 230 (1867) ; Spencer
V. Eoper, 13 Ired. 333 (1852) ; Johnson v. Merithew, 80 Me. Ill
(1888). Such " death may be proved by showing facts from which
a reasonable inference would lead to that conclusion, as by proving
that a person sailed in a particular vessel for a particular voyage,
and that neither vessel nor any person on board had been heard of
for a length of time sufficient for information to be received from
that part of the globe where the vessel might be driven or the per-
sons on board of her might be carried." Johnson v. Merithew (ubi
supra). So that "the person was dangerously ill, or in a weak state
of health, was exposed to great perils of disease or accident, or that
he embarked on board of a vessel which has not since been heard
from, though the length of the usual voyage has long since elapsed."
Eagle V. Emmet, 4 Bradf. 117 (1856) ; Smith v. Knowlton, 11 N". H.
191 (1840).
" Any facts or circumstances relating to the character, habits, con-
dition, affections, attachments, prosperity, and objects in life which
usually control the conduct of men and are the motives of their
actions, are competent evidence from which may be inferred the
death of one absent and unheard from, whatever has been the dura-
tion of such absence." Tisdale v. Connecticut, &c., Ins. Co., 26 la.
170 (1868).
" It may well be conceded that where a person is studious in his
habits, attentive to his business, has a fixed and permanent resi-
dence, and is surrounded by those influences which are calculated
to endear him to his home, sviddenly and unaccountably disappears,
a presumption may arise which would warrant a jury in finding that
he was dead." Hancock v. American, &c., Ins. Co., 62 Mo. 26
(1876).
" A jury may find the fact of death, if the circumstances of the
case concur, from the lapse of a shorter period than seven years."
Puckett V. State, 1 Sneed, 355 (1853). So in a case where deceased
CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTES. 183^
■was last seen on an overland journey to California, through a coun-
try infested with hostile Indians, and determined to fight his way
through, the court presume from the fact that neither he nor any of
the party were since seen that he died soon after he was last seen.
Davie v. Briggs, 97 U. S. 628 (1878).
Whoever claims that death occurred at any period within the
seven years has the onus of proving that fact. Doe d. Hagerman
V. Strong, 4 Q. B. U. C. 510 (1848), confirmed 8 Q. B. U. C. 291
(1851); Howard v. State, 75 Ala. 27 (1883).
No Presumption of Death within the Seven Yeaes. — The
attempt has been made to establish a presumption of law that the
person died precisely at the end of the seven years, i. e., lived through
that period. The better opinion seems to be that the time of death
within the prescribed period of seven years is a matter entirely for
evidence, and that the person to whose contention the fact of such
death is essential, must prove it. " It certainly has not been
expressly decided that the person must be taken to have lived
throughout the period ; but that conclusion inevitably follows from
the legal presumption of life, which, though prospectively rebutted
at a particular period, is sufficient to sustain the allegation of exist-
ence during the time it lasted." Burr v. Sim, 4 Whart. 150, 171
(1838). " The legal presumption . . . establishes not only the fact
of death, but also the time at which the person shall first be
accounted dead." Whiting v. Nicholl, 46 111., 230 (1867) ; Eagle
V. Emmet, 4 Bradf. 117 (1866) ; Whiteley v. Equitable Life, &c., Co.,
72 Wise. 170 (1888). "It is no answer to say that the probabilities
are that the death did not occur at the expiration of the seven
years, but at some other time within that period. The time of the
death, as well as the fact of death, are presumptions not of fact
but of law. The law regards neither as certain. It simply declares
that the party shall be presumed to be dead at the expiration of
seven years, whenever his death shall come in question." Clarke
V. Canfield, 15 K J. Eq. 119 (1862) ; Shown v. McMackin, 9 Lea,
601, 607 (1882) ; Stevens v. McNamara, 36 Me. 176 (1853) ; Craw-
ford V. Elliott, 1 Houst. 465 (1866); Montgomery v. Bevans,
1 Sawy. C. Ct. 663 (1871).
If a person was unmarried when last heard from, it will be pre-
sumed that he died without issue. Shown v. McMackin, 9 Lea,
601 (1882).
Whose Ignorance is Important. — In an Alabama case it is
very truly said that "evidence of parties having no particular
interest in the person whose life or death is in issue, not being rela-
tions, friends, or members of the family, — parties with whom the
absent person, if alive, would not be likely to have any correspond-
ence ; . . . should have but little weight." The court held a single
letter from the alleged deceased from Texas to one of her friends
18337 AMERICA2>r NOTES. [PAET I.
four years before of mucli greater weight than many affidavits from
persons who would not naturally be expected to hear from the per-
son, if alive. Smith v. Smith, 49 Ala. 156 (1873).
No presumption of death is raised by the fact that inquiries
at the post-office of the party's former residence reveal the fact
that he is not known there; — even if the person were in "bad
health" twenty-two years ago; that if now alive he would be
eighty years old, and that his name is not in the directory ; — in
the absence of evidence of inquiry being made among his friends,
the kind of ill health, and the fact of change of residence. " Show
me that (alleged deceased) was the subject of some quick consum-
ing disease, or of any speciiic malady, and you will change the case.
... It is no presumption of law that the runners of the post-office
know, so as to answer at first inquiry, the name and residence of
every person in a populous city." Hall's Deposition, 1 Wall. Jr.,
85, 104 (1843).
" There is no rule of law which confines such intelligence to any
particular class of persons. It is not a question of pedigree." Flynn
V. Coffee, 12 All. 133 (1866).
So where a wife left the place where the parties had resided as
husband and wife, her evidence that she had not heard of her hus-
band for seven years does not raise the presumption of his death.
The persons whose not hearing is significant of the death of per-
sons not heard from are " those who are nearly related to them, or
were upon terms of friendship with them, and remained at or near
the place where they last resided." Thomas v. Thomas, 16 Neb.
553 (1884) ; Com. v. Thompson, 11 All. 23 (1865). To the same
effect is Hyde Park v. Canton, 130 Mass. 505 (1881). Under simi-
lar facts, and answering the question as to whether the former,
abandoning, husband, were dead, the court say : " This is a pure
question of fact ; and, in the absence of any direct evidence, is to
be determined by the presumption which the law authorises. If a
man leaves his home and goes into parts unknown, and remains
unheard from for the space of seven years, the law authorises to
those that remain, the presumption of fact that he is dead ; but it
does not authorise him to presume therefore that any one of those
remaining in the place which he left has died." Hyde Park v.
Canton {ubi supra). To same effect, of an absence of seventeen
years under similar circumstances, see Garwood v. Hastings, 38
Cal. 216 (1889). The fact that one has been absent twenty years
from a certain place raises no presumption of death, " as there is
no evidence he ever established his residence there." Stinchfield
V. Emerson, 52 Me. 465 (1864).
It is unnecessary to say that the presumption may be rebutted.
Youngs V. Heffner, 06 Oh. St. 232 (1880). "This is merely a pre-
sumption of fact, and may be rebutted." Flynn v. Coffee, 12 All.
CHAP, v.] AMEEICAN NOTES. 183^
133 (1866). The explanations of such absence may be such as to
deprive the presumption of much of its probative force.
Where a person leaves home for some foreign place, unex-
plained absence for seven years does not raise a presumption of
death unless inquiry were " made at such place without getting
tidings of him." Wentworth v. Wentworth, 71 Me. 72 (1880) ;
McCartee v. Camel, 1 Barb. (S. Y.) Chan. 455 (1846).
It naturally follows that if the presumption of death from seven
years' absence turns out to be erroneous, that acts done on the
strength of the presumption are of no legal validity. For example,
a savings bank may be required to pay to a depositor money already
paid to his administrator, erroneously appointed on the presumption
of his death from seven years' absence. Jockumsen v. Suffolk
Savings Bk., 3 All. 87 (1861) . For a New York decision, by a divided
court, to the contrary effect, see Eoderigas v. East Eiver Savings
Instn., 63 N. Y. 460 (1875).
Presumption ov Life in Ceiminal Cases. — The presumption
of the continuance of life, being at the highest a presumption of
law, regulating the burden of proof and based upon a presumption
of fact of a varying probative force, which grows weaker in exact
proportion as it becomes necessary to rely on it, is not considered
sufficient to sustain the government's burden of proof in a crim-
inal case on a material point. In other words, it is not proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt. To adopt a common expression, " The
presumption of life yields when in conflict with the presumption of
innocence." "Though the law presumes a continuance of life, yet
where this presumption necessarily involves a presumption of crime,
and comes in conflict with the presumption of innocence, the former,
which is the weaker, yields to the latter presumption, and the party
afiirming that an individual is not dead will be bound to prove it."
Lockhart «. White, 18 Tex. 102 (1856). For these reasons, on an
indictment for bigamy, the courts have usually refused to consider
the fact that the defendant's first husband or wife was alive shortly
before the second marriage as sufficient evidence that such husband
or wife was actually alive at the time of the second marriage.
Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 467 (1874).
On an indictment for bigamy, the supreme court of Indiana de-
cline to consider the fact that the first wife was alive two years
before the second marriage suiRcient evidence that she was alive at
that time. " Inasmuch as the state was required to prove the appel-
lant's guilt beyond 'a reasonable doubt, we think the jury were not
justified in coming to the conclusion, over the presumption of his
innocence, that the first wife was living at the time of the second
marriage." Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 469 (1874). The same rule is
applied in a civil case where the continuance of life would establish
bigamy in a criminal case. Sharp v. Johnson, 22 Ark. 79 (1860) ;
18339 AMEEICAN NOTES. [PAKT I.
Klein v. Laudman, 29 Mo. 269 (1860) ; West v. State, 1 Wise. 209
(1853). " Though the law presumes a continuance of life, yet
■where this presumption necessarily involves a presumption of
crime, and comes in conflict with the presumption of innocence, the
former, which is weaker, yields to the latter presumption, and the
party affirming that an individual is not dead will be bound to prove
it." Lockhart w. White, 18 Tex. 102 (1856). « Otherwise the second
marriage would be held criminal, by reason of a presumption ; which
would be to establish a crime upon a bare presumption." Spears v.
Burton, 31 Miss. 547 (1856).
While " it may be true that innocence is to be presumed, and that
when the presumption of life is brought in conflict with the pre-
sumption of innocence, the latter should prevail," the jury are not
to presume death except at the end of seven years, but are to weigh
all the evidence in the case. Murray v. Murray, 6 Oreg. 17
(1876).
The rule, more or less definitely announced in the above cases,
that the presumption of the continuance of life cannot be used to
prove the defendant guilty of bigamy was considered in an interest-
ing Massachusetts case. Com. v. McGrath, 140 Mass. 296 (1885)._
The indictment was for polygamy. Eor the lawful marriage the
government relied on a marriage to one N. W. on January 24,
1880. The defendant set up thab previously, in 1876, he had mar-
ried one C. T. and cohabited with her until within a month of his
going through the ceremony with the said N. W. He then asked
the court to rule that " the presumption of law in the absence of
evidence to the contrary" was that C. T. was alive at the date of
the ceremony relied on by the government as the legal marriage.
This the judge, on the strength of the presumption of innocence,
declined to do. Held error. " The fact that a person is alive at a
certain time does afford some presumption that he is alive a month
later, as it does that he was alive an hour or a j'ear later. It is evi-
dence tending to prove that fact, which in ordinary cases, in the ab-
sence of other evidence, would be deemed conclusive. Its weight, of
course, would be affected by any circumstances affecting the proba-
bility of the continuance of life in particular cases, or rendering it
probable that death had occurred ; and, in this case, the fact of the
defendant's marriage is such a circumstance. But the question
whether a person is alive at a certain time, whether a day, or a
month, or a year, or any period less than seven years, after direct
evidence that he was living, is for the jury, to be determined by the
general presumption or probability of the continuance of life, modi-
fied by the circumstances of the particular case. . . . The jury were
to judge of the strength of the presumption of the innocence of the
defendant, as well as of the continuance of the life of his former
wife, in view of all the circumstances affecting them. The instruc-
CHAP. V.J AMBKICAN NOTES. 183*"
tions of the court were not merely that there was no presumption of
law, and that the fact was for the jury to find upon the evidence,
but were in effect a ruling that the presumption of innocence
destroyed the presumption of the continuance of life, so that the
fact that the first wife was alive a month before the second marriage
was not to be considered as evidence that she was living at the time
of that marriage."
In a libel for adultery on account of a second marriage, the first
being denied, it was held that the general rule that marriage could
be inferred from cohabitation did not apply, and an actual marriage
must b6 proved. " We cannot indulge this inference without pre-
suming that the defendant has been guilty of the crime of bigamy."
Case V. Case, 17 Cal. 598 (1861).
For analogous reasons, when the crime of bigamy is collaterally
involved, the continuance of life will not be presumed, e. g., in an
action of ejectment where the claim is made that certain heirs of
the patentee were illegitimate because a former wife was shown to
be living within five years of his marriage to their mother. Sharp
V. Johnson, 22 Ark. 79 (1860).
Presumption of Continuance Affirmed. — But this contention
that where, in a civil case, the presumption of the continuance of
life tends to show a subsequent marriage to be bigamous, the pre-
sumption of innocence requires that probative force should be
denied the presumption of continuance of life, has been vigor-
ously repudiated. In a case involving a pauper settlement acquired
by a second marriage and residence in the defendant town, the
defence being that of a prior marriage to a man who had abandoned
the pauper several years before and not shown to be dead, the court
say : " It is said, however, in argument, that there is a presumption
of innocence, which of itself is sufficient to overcome the presump-
tion of continuance of life ; and that therefore the fact that the
pauper married again is to be considered as some evidence that she
might lawfully do so. The presumption of innocence is not based
upon facts, but is independent of all evidence. The presumption of
continued life rests upon facts proved ; and those established facts,
while they raise the presumption of continued life, rebut the pre-
sumption of innocence." Hyde Park v. Canton, 130 Mass. 505
(1881).
Under similar circurastances, the supreme court of Oregon say :
" Ordinarily the death of a person would not be presumed until
after an absence of seven years without being heard from. But if
within the seven years, the presumption of life is to be overcome by
the presumption of innocence, then the entire case and circum-
stances under which a party claims such force for this presumption
of innocence ought to be carefully considered." Murray v. Murray,
6 Greg. 17 (1876).
183*1 AlIEEICAN NOTES. [PAitT I.
For similar reasons, the court will not allow a statute permitting
persons to marry after three years' unexplained absence by a former
husband or wife without being deemed guilty of bigamy to be used
as proof of actual death in a criminal case where such death is a
material fact. State v. Henke, 58 la. 457 (1882).
But in a Minnesota case, on an indictment where, however, there
were corroborating circumstances, the first wife being shown to be
alive within two years of the second marriage, the court sustain a
ruling that " when life is once shown, it is presumed to continue
until it is shown to have ended. That presumption may be stronger
or weaker according to the circumstances of any particular case.
It is not a conclusive presumption, but it is a presumption which
the jury is warranted in drawing, from the fact of life being shown,
that life continues until it otherwise appears." The court state
their opinion thus : " Taken as a whole, we find no error in this
statement of the law. There is some confusion, if not conflict, of
views in the decisions in cases of conflicting presumptions of the
continuance of life and of innocence as to which shall prevail. Some
hold that what is called the presumption of the continuance of life
must yield to the stronger presumption of innocence ; and therefore,
in prosecutions for bigamy, the fact that the former husband or wife
was living at some particular date before the second marriage will
not warrant a conviction ; that there must be some direct evidence
that he or she was still living at the date of the second marriage.
Reduced to its logical result, the effect of this would be that, if it
was proved by the most indisputable evidence that the former hus-
band or wife was alive and in good health a few hours before the
second marriage, the jury could not presume that death had not
intervened, without some direct evidence to the contrary. The
unreasonableness of this as a practical rule of evidence would seem
almost self-evident." State v. Plym, 43 Minn. 385 (1890) ; Howard
V. State, 75 Ala. 27 (1883).
Probably the " confusion, if not conflict," referred to in State v.
■Plym, 43 Minn. 385 (1890), in part, at least, arises from a failure
to distinguish presumptions of fact from assumptions or presump-
tions of law. In a criminal cause, the forensic rule of the " pre-
sumption of innocence " may fairly be considered to be inconsistent
with the establishment of a conflicting rule of presumption that
there is such a probative force in the presumption of fact of a
continuance of life as to satisfy the burden of establishing pre-
scribed by the " presumption of innocence." But there seems no
reason why the presumption of continuance should not be used as
an inference of fact with such weight as the jury see fit to give it.
SuEvivoKSHip. — A mass of ingenious reasoning clusters about
the question. What presumption of survivorship exists when several
persons perish in a common accident ? The rugged common-sense
CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTES. 183*^
of English, law, after some slight attempts to adopt them, discards
the intricate presumptions of the civil law, as based on age, health,
sex, &c., and adopts the rule that there is no presumption on the
subject whatever ; that he who relies on the fact of survivorship
must establish it as best he can. Newell v. Nichols, 12 Hun, 604
(1878) ; Newell v. Nichols, 76 N. Y. 78 (1878) ; Stinde v. Eidg-
way, 55 How. Prac. 301 (1878) ; Stinde v. Goodrich, 3 Eedf. 87
(1877).
So in charging a jury, in such a case, Mr. Justice Woods says :
" There are no presumptions of law in the case. If the evidence
produced by the plaintiffs establishes the fact of survivorship to the
satisfaction of your minds, your verdict should be for the plaintiff.
. . . The plaintiffs have the aifirmative of the issue, the burden of
proof is on them, and unless the testimony in the case satisfies and
convinces your minds you cannot return a verdict in their favor ;
but, if you are satisfied and convinced, you can and should." Eobin-
son V. Gallier, 2 Woods, 178 (1876).
It is merely reversing the statement, without affecting the mean-
ing, to say, as is frequently done, that the parties are presumed to
have perished at the same moment. What is meant is, that he who
desires to establish any survivorship, has the burden of proving it.
There is no probative force in the " presumption " of simultaneous
death, and if that fact were material, affirmative evidence would be
required to prove it.
"When two persons, husband and wife, are killed in the same
accident, and there is no proof on the subject, the presumption of
law is that they died co-instantaneously." Kansas Pac. E. v. Miller,
2 Col. 442 (1874).
Apparently the facts that the accident was at sea; that the hus-
band was in the prime of life and an expert swimmer, while the
wife was in feeble health, does not authorise an inference that the
husband survived. Fuller v. Linzee, 135 Mass. 468 (1883).
But, on the contrary, in weighing the effect of positive testimony,
the tribunal may properly take into consideration the physical con-
dition of the parties. For example, where a father was washed
overboard from a wrecked vessel, a son for a time remaining, evi-
dence of the health of the father may found an inference of the
point of time at which the father died. "As we understand the
doctrine of the common law, it is this, that when several individuals
perish by a common calamity, and there is no circumstance other
than that of age, sex, &c., from which it may be rationally inferred
who was the longer liver, in such case, no presumption arises upon
which a conclusion can be predicated. But that when the calamity,
though common to all, consists of a series of successive events, sep-
arated from each other in point of time and character, and each
likely to produce death upon the several victims according to the
ISS^^S AMEBIC AiT NOTES. [PAET I.
degree of exposure to it, in such a case, the difference of age, sex and
health becomes a matter of evidence and may be relied upon as such."
Smith V. Croom, 7 Ma. 81, 144 (1857). To the same effect is Pell
V. Ball, 1 Cheves (S. C.) Eq. 99, 108 (1840), where the fact that the
wife was heard for some time loudly calling for her husband in all
parts of the vessel, without reply, was held sufficient evidence to
warrant the finding of her survivorship. " Because the plaintiffs
are to prove the fact of survivorship, it does not follow that they
are to prove it to demonstration." Ibid. So where an elderly lady
was swept away by a wave, while her grandchildren were seen
standing in the place " some ten or fifteen minutes after the grand-
mother disappeared," it was held that " it may be that the evidence
is sufficient to justify the conclusion that the children survived their
grandmother as they were last seen alive." Stinde v. Ridgway,
65 How, Prac. 301 (1878). This decision, however, was reversed in
Matter of Ridgway, 4 Redf. 226 (1880), where the surrogate says,
after remarking that in such a calamity those who abandon the ves-
sel are the safer : " The facts of this case seem to me to indicate
the instant and inevitable doom of the children, with hope of res-
cue or at least some continuance of life on the part of the grand-
mother. At all events, I am of the opinion that the parties alleg-
ing survivorship have not satisfactorily proved the fact." Ibid.
Where the conditions of a common death, e. g., that caused by a
burning building, can be made the subject of evidence, all the cir-
cumstances of the case are relevant of the question of survivorship.
"The death of the several victims resulted from a succession of
causes." Will of Ehle, 73 Wise. 445 (1889).
Presumption of Regularity. — In most instances, this so-called
presumption is rather a rule of administration than one of logic.
It generally has slight probative force, and amounts in many in-
stances to a statement that whoever relies on an irregularity must
prove it. In other words, it states who has the burden of intro-
ducing evidence on that particular subject. As the effect of the
courts announcing an assumption or "presumption" of law is to
shift this burden of introducing evidence, the process of locating the
burden of introducing evidence on a particular point by ruling that
there is a presumption of law to the contrary has proved an easy
one. The practical considerations which have led courts to assume
the regularity of proceedings (especially those of long standing)
until the contrary is shown are obvious and valuable. It is fair to
say of these assumptions, as Sir William Grant, in Hillary v. Waller,
12 Vesey, Jr., 239, 252 (1806), said, in presuming a lost grant of the
estate, that these " Presumptions do not always proceed on a belief
that the thing presumed has actually taken place. Grants are fre-
quently presumed, as Lord Mansfield says (Eldridge v. Knott 1
Cowp. 214 (1774), merely for the purpose, and from a principle of
CHAP. V.J AMEKICAN NOTES. 183^*
quieting the possession. There is as much occasion for presuming
conveyances of legal estates ; as otherwise titles must forever remain
imperfect, and in many respects unavailable, when from length of
time it has become impossible to discover in whom the legal estate
(if outstanding) is actually vested." This statement is cited with
approval in Fletcher v. Fuller, 120 U. S. 534 (1886).
Judicial Proceedings. — Whoever would impeach the accuracy
of judicial proceedings must introduce evidence to that effect. The
reason is partly given by the supreme court of Pennsylvania : —
"We are not to expect too much from records of judicial pro-
ceedings. They are memorials of the judgments and decrees of the
judges, and contain a general but not a particular detail of all
that occurs before them. . . . Much must be left to intendment
and presumption, for it is often less difficult to do things correctly
than to describe them correctly." Beale v. Com., 25 Pa. St. 11
(1855); State v. Lewis, 22 N. J. L. 564 (1849); Worley Adm. v.
Hineman, 6 Ind. App. 240 (1892).
"It is a principle long since settled, that in pleading the judg-
ment or decree of a court having plenary jurisdiction of the subject,
it is not necessary to set forth the proceedings preliminary to such
judgment or decree. The presumption of law is conclusive, that
all the requisite prior proceedings were had in the case until the
contrary appears." Lathrop v. Stuart, 5 McLean, 167 (1850).
So the Maryland court of appeals, in a case involving the validity
of a license issued to a Pennsylvania corporation by the governor of
Pennsylvania under an act of the legislature of that state, hold that
they are required by comity " to presume, that the license granted
by the governor, purporting to be in pursuance of the law, was a
regular exercise of power, and further to presume from it, that the
patent had duly and regularly preceded it." Plank Road Co. v.
Bruce, 6 Md. 457 (1854).
But the proceedings must be prima facie regular.
The courts of Massachusetts, for example, will not assume, in the
absence of a recital in the record or evidence to that effect, that a
California court had jurisdiction to grant a valid divorce between
non-resident parties. "A presumption may exist in favor of the
jurisdiction of a court of record of another state, which has assumed
to exercise jurisdiction over a subject matter in controversy between
parties residing there. But there is no such presumption in favor
of the jurisdiction of such a court over parties not there residing."
Com. V. Blood, 97 Mass. 538 (1867).
Omnia eite acta. — So it will be assumed, after a suitable length
of time, that all facts existed necessary to the validity of an ancient
title. The rule proceeds partly upon the presumption of fact that
if serious flaws had in reality existed, advantage would have been
taken of them in so long an interval, and partly upon consideration
183*^ AMEKICAN NOTES. [PABT I.
of the practical advantages of quieting titles as contrasted with the
mischief and hardship of requiring the proof of trivial things in
cases where the evidence is perishable, and, after an interval of
time which would render the furnishing of absolute proof extremely-
difficult and expensive, if not indeed impossible. " There is a time
when the rules of evidence must be relaxed. We cannot summon
witnesses from the grave, rake memory from its ashes, or give fresh-
ness and vigour to the dull and torpid brain." Eichards v. Elwell,
48 Pa. St. 361 (1864).
So in a case in Maine, where the question turned on the validity
of a tax-deed over thirty years old, it is said that " after the lapse of
thirty years from a collector's sale of land for taxes, it may be pre-
sumed from facts and circumstances proved, that the tax-bills, valu-
ation, warrants, notices, &c., were regular ; that the assessors and
collector were duly chosen at legal meetings ; that the collector was
sworn ; that a valuation and copy of the assessment were returned
by the assessors to the town-clerk, and that everything which can
be thus reasonably and fairly presumed, may have the force and
effect of proof." Freeman v. Thayer, 33 Me. 76 (1851).
Where the plaintiff's title was based in part on a grant of land
by a proprietors' meeting ten years before the bringing of the action,
held: "It is but a just assumption as against them (and a fortiori
against a stranger) that a grant asserted by their records to have
been made at a legal meeting, was made by a meeting duly warned
and holden, until the contrary appears." Cobleigh v. Young, 15
N. H. 493 (1844).
But in a Massachusetts case, where five persons petitioned for a
proprietors' meeting under a statute authorising that number to
apply to a justice of the peace for the purpose, and nine years
after a writ of entry was brought on a title derived through the
proceedings of that meeting, it was held that there was no " legal
presumption " that all five were in fact proprietors, but that the
demandant must establish that fact by competent evidence. Stevens
V. Taft, 3 Gray, 487 (1855).
In a later case in Maine, the point was raised in 1862 that the bond
filed by an administrator who had made sale of certain real estate
in 1836 did not appear of record to have been approved in writing
by the judge of probate, as required by law. The court say : " When
we consider that this was a transaction which occurred more than
twenty years ago ; that the law required the bond to be approved
by the judge before it could be legally filed ; that the bond was in
fact filed ; that the record shows that all the substantial steps were
taken required by law, and, so far as the administrator was con-
cerned, with technical accuracy ; that the sale was a public one, and
that the defendant immediately entered under his deed, and has held
undisturbed possession for more than twenty years, the law would
CHAP, v.] AMEEICAJiT NOTES. 183^
fully authorize the conclusion that all was done which was required
to give the defendant a perfect title." Austin v. Austin, 50 Me. 74
(1862). In a case in Missouri, where executors had been directed
by the probate court to give a deed, and there had been undisturbed
possession for over twenty years, the court say : " It may well be
presumed that the executors . . . executed ... a deed ... in con-
formity to the order of the probate court." The court further speak
of " the liberal presumptions that we would indulge in order to pre-
vent irregularities or imperfections in such transactions from being
held fatal." Williams v. Mitchell, 112 Mo. 300 (1892). A sheriff's
deed, over thirty years old, recited a judgment. The court records
being burned, held: "The existence of the judgment and execution
recited in the sheriff's deed ought to be presumed." Giddings v.
Day, 84 Tex. 605 (1892).
In a North Carolina case the court, in deciding that a commis-
sioner appointed to take depositions offered in evidence is pre-
sumed qualified until the contrary is shown, use the following
language : —
" By the general rules of evidence, certain presumptions are con-
tinually made in favour of the regularity of proceedings and the
validity of acts. It presumes that every man in his private and
of&cial character does his duty, until the contrary is proved ; it will
presume that all things are rightly done, unless the circumstances
of the case overturn this presumption. Thus it will presume that a
man acting in a public office has been rightly appointed; that entries
made in public books are rightly made by the proper officer, and
like instances abound of these presumptions. Bank v. Dandridge,
12 Wheat. 64 ; " Gregg v. Mallett, 111 N. C. 74 (1892) .
Othbe Instances. — The same rule, for the same reasons, assumes
the propriety of oificial conduct in matters not of record or in aid of
ancient titles.
So the official acts of public officers, within the general scope of
their powers, will be presumed to be by legal authority. Payne v.
Tread well, 16 Gal. 220 (1860).
Public officers and all other people will be presumed to do their
duty, — the idea being that the onus of evidence is on the person
alleging the contrary. A county judge, for example, will be pre-
sumed to have paid over insurance-money to the county treasurer as
required by law. Staples v. Llano Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W.
569 (1894). So it will be presumed that a sheriff in giving a deed
acted within his legal powers. Ivy v. Yancey (Mo. Supreme Court),
31 S. W. 937 (1895). The courts of North Carolina say that there
is a presumption that men do their duty, private and official, until
the contrary is shown ; that all things were rightly done unless the
circumstances rebut the presumption ; that they will presume men
in public office were rightly appointed ; that entries in public books
183*5^ AMEEICAIT NOTES. [PART I.
were made by the proper officers. So it will be presumed that a
commissioner appointed by the court to take depositions is qualified
until the contrary is shown. Gregg ^v. Mallett, 111 N. C. 74
(1892).
Such a presumption, as has been said, usually amounts merely to
a statement of the burden of evidence. Its lack of probative force
is seen when it is attempted to use it probatively, i. e., to supply
proof of such alleged regularity. Such a force the courts have
declined to give it. "The presumption that public officers have
done their duty, like the presumption of innocence, is undoubtedly
a legal presumption ; but. it does not supply proof of a substantive
fact. . . . Nowhere is the presumption held to be a substitute for
proof of an independent and material fact." U. S. ■;;. Koss, 92 U. S.
281 (1875).
Lost Grant. — Analogous to the presumption of regularity in acts
of ancient possession is the rule that, in favor of the legality of a
long continued enjoyment of corporeal or incorporeal hereditaments,
a jury is authorised to infer the previous existence and subsequent
loss of such documents as would legally account for the existing
user. This " presumption " hardly pretends to be anything more
than a judicial fiction. By employing the language of the law of
evidence, the idea that judges declare law and do not create it is
made to '' moult no feather." At first the inference of a lost grant
was said by the court to be a justifiable one ; i. e., one which the
jury might draw if so disposed. Then it is stated as an inference
which the court advised. Finally, the rule was laid down broadly
that a jury should be instructed not only that they might, but also
that they were bound, to presume the existence of such a lost grant,
although neither judge nor jury nor any one else had the remotest
idea that any such instrument had, in fact, really existed.
Incorporeal Hereditaments. — In case of incorporeal heredita-
ments, the presumption of a lost grant has been stated as a positive
rule. " Adverse, exclusive, and uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty
years of an incorporeal hereditament affords a conclusive presump-
tion of a grant or a right, as the case may be, which is to be applied
as a presumptio juris et de Jure, wherever by possibility a right can
be acquired in any manner known to the law." Wallace v. Fletcher,
30 N. H. 434 (1855).
The rule has even been invoked in favor of the state's power of
taxation. Certain Indian lands in the state of New Jersey were, by
convention in 1758, exempted from taxation. In 1803, these lands
were sold to the predecessors in title of the realtors, who, upon
being taxed by the state under a statute of 1804, resisted the attempt
to collect the tax, and by a decision of the United States supreme
court (State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164 (1812) suc-
ceeded in their contention. For some unexplained reason, the pay-
CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTES. 183^8
meiit of taxes was resumed in 1814 and continued until 1877. Upon
their again insisting on an immunity from taxation, it was held by
the court in giving judgment affirming the tax, that " the presumption
will arise from the payment of the tax for so long a period, that the
claim of the citizen has been discharged and extinguished." The
fact "raises a conclusive presumption that by some convention
with the state the right to exemption was surrendered." State v.
Wright, 41 N'. J. L. 478 (1879). The language of the court as to
" conclusive presumptions " sufficiently indicates that the rule laid
down is not one based upon logic primarily, but is a rule of positive
law.
But in a well-considered case in Pennsylvania, Carter v. Tinicum
Fishing Co., 77 Pa. St. 310 (1875), user of a fishery for a long
period was held to raise merely a presumption of fact, the weight
of which should have been submitted to the jury. "Acts of owner-
ship over incorporeal hereditaments," say the court, " corresponding
to the possession of corporeal, are deemed a foundation for a
presumption."
Corporeal Hekeditambnts. — The presumption of a grant of
corporeal hereditaments has not usually been placed higher than a
presumption of law, while in case of incorporeal hereditaments it
has been laid down as a positive rule of law, under the disguise of
a presumption of law.
" In cases where the party claiming title under such presumption,
may find it necessary to rely upon the presumption of a deed, we
think that long continued user is evidence of a lost or non-existing
grant, from some person who might, at some time, have made a valid
grant to some person capable of accepting it." Wallace v. Fletcher,
30 N. H. 434, 452 (]855) ; Proprietors of the Church in Brattle
Square v. Bullard, 2 Mete. 363 (1841) ; Williams v. Mitchell, 112
Mo. 300 (1892).
The rule in Massachusetts is stated thus by Chief Justice Shaw :
" Such a question is a mixed question of fact and law, to this
extent, that the facts being found, it is for the court to advise the
jury, whether in their nature and quality they are sufficient to raise
the presumption proposed, the weight of the evidence being for the
jury." Valentine v. Piper, 22 Pick. 85, 94 (1839).
This presumption of a grant " can never fairly arise where all the
circumstances are perfectly consistent with the non-existence of a
grant ; a fortiori, they cannot arise where the claim is of such a
nature as is at variance with the supposition of a grant." Eicard v.
Williams, 7 Wheat. 59, 109 (1822).
Eegulaeity IK Business. — In cases involving the operation of
an established course of public or private business where precision
is a necessary requirement, and systematic accuracy has been demon-
strated by experience, it is evident that we have in the so-called
183*9 AMERICAN NOTES. [PABT I.
presumption of regularity something more than a statement that
the burden of introducing evidence to the contrary rests on him who
disputes it. The presumption in such cases is one of fact, the pro-
bative force of which is readily recognised, though it may greatly
vary, for obvious reasons.
Eegularity of Mails, etc. — For example, letters received in
regular course of business responsive to letters on the same subject,
with proper letter-heads, envelopes, etc., are presumably authentic,
according to their purport. Scofield v. Parlin, &c. Co., 61 Fed. Eep.
804 (1894).
The postmark of a letter containing a notice of protest of a
promissory note " is evidence that the letter was mailed and sent,
rather than that it was merely put into the post-office." New Haven
County Bank v. Mitchell, 15 Conn. 206 (1842) ; Oaks v. Weller, 16
Vt. 63 (1844) ; Russell v. Buckley, 4 E. I. 525 (1857) ; U. S. v. Bab-
cock, 3 Dill. C. Ct. 571 (1876).
The presumption has been placed as high as a presumption of
law. "The depositing in the post-oifice of a letter properly
addressed, with the postage prepaid, is prima facie evidence that
the person to whom it was addressed received it. The fact that the
defendants had no additional proof that the letters were actually
received by the plaintiff is immaterial. The evidence that letters
were so deposited was competent, and should have been submitted to
the jury to be weighed by them in connection with the other evi-
dence in the case. They alone have the right to decide whether the
inference that the letters were received, founded upon the proba-
bility that the officers of the government will do their duty, and that
letters will be duly delivered, is overcome by the other evidence."
Briggs V. Hervey, 130 Mass. 186 (1881) ; Folsom v. Cook, 115 Pa.
St. 539 (1887).
Speaking of a notice of dissolution of a partnership, the supreme
court of Illinois say : " Proof of the mailing of the circular to them
was prima facie evidence that they received it. And no rebutting
testimony was introduced to overcome the presumption thereby
created." Young v. Clapp, 147 111. 176 (1892).
" It is well settled that the fact of depositing, in the post-office, a
properly addressed, prepaid letter, raises a natural presumption,
founded in common experience, that it reached its destination by
due course of mail. In other words, it is prima facie evidence
that it was received by the person to whom it was addressed ; but
that prima facie proof may be rebutted by evidence showing that
it was not received. The question is necessarily one of fact, solely
for the determination of the jury, under all the evidence." Whitmore
V. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 148 Pa. St. 405 (1892).
"It was error to instruct the jury that the mailing of a letter
addressed to the appellants was notice to them of its contents. It
CHAP. V.J AMERICAN NOTES. ISS^O
was presumptive evidence, but nothing more." Eckerly v. Alcorn, 62
Miss. 228 (1884) ; Hastings v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 138 N. Y.
473 (1893).
So the supreme court of Pennsylvania say : " There is no pre-
sumption of law that a letter, mailed to one at the place he usually
receives his letters, was received by him. A strong probability of
its receipt may arise . . . and the fact of its deposit in the mail-
bag in connection with other circumstances may be sufficient to
warrant the court in referring the question of its receipt to the
determination of the jury." National Bank, &c. v. McManigle, 69
Pa. St. 156 (1871).
The requirement that the letter be sent to the sendee's permanent
address is a reasonable qualification of the rule. Huntley v. Whit-
tier, 105 Mass. 391 (1870).
" Such a presumption is in accordance with and is founded upon
common experience, and is therefore known to the law as a pre-
sumption from the ordinary course of business. Farther proof of
the receipt of a letter than what is derived from proof of the proper
direction and mailing of it would be wholly unnecessary, always
difficult, and often impossible." Eussell v. Buckley, 4 E. I. 525
(1857).
Other courts have considered the presumption purely one of fact.
" The presumption so arising is not a conclusive presumption of law,
but a mere inference of fact, founded on the probability that the
officers of the government will do their duty, and the usual course
of business ; and when it is opposed by evidence that the letter was
never received, must be weighed, with all the other circumstances
of the case, by the jury, in determining the question whether the
letter was actually received or not ; and the burden of proving its
receipt remains throughout upon the party who asserts it." Huntley
V. Whittier, 105 Mass. 391 (1870), quoted with approval in Rosen-
thal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 185 (1883). "The mailing of a notice
properly directed to the party to be charged raises a presumption of
notice in fact, for it is presumed that letters sent by post to a party,
at his residence, are received by him in due course. But it is a pre-
sumption of fact and not of law, and may be repelled by proof."
Austin V. Holland, 69 K. Y. 571, 576 (1877) ; De Jarnette v.
McDaniel, 93 Ala. 215 (1890) ; German Nat. Bk. v. Burns, 12
Col. 539 (1889).
" There is no presumption of law that a letter directed and mailed
to one at the place where he usually received his letters was
received by him. . . . From its postmark, the fact that a letter was
mailed may be inferred ; but by that, or other admissible evidence,
the mailing, when material, must be proved. It will not be pre-
sumed from evidence that it had been written. So as to time of
mailing. No presumption whatever arises from the date written
183^1 AMEKICAN NOTES. [PAET I.
in the letter. . . . The date of a postmark upon a letter is not evi-
dence that it was forwarded on that day. . . . A fortiori the date of a
letter is not." Uhlman v. Arnholdt, &c. Brewing Co., 63 Fed. Rep.
485 (1893).
There is no presumption of law that a letter postmarked June
12th was not deposited in the post-office until that day. " A letter
deposited on the 11th might happen not to be noticed or stamped
until the 12th. It was sufficient, on this point, to instruct the jury
that the postmark was one of the circumstances to be taken into
consideration, with others, in deciding whether the letter was actu-
ally left on the 11th, or not till the 12th." Shelburne Falls Nat.
Bank v. Townsley, 102 Mass. 177 (1869).
Kentucky court of appeals denies the presumption the weight of
a presumption of law, but considers it " proper testimony to be con-
sidered by the jury, together with the other evidence, in determin-
ing when it [the letter mailed] was received ; and they should not
have been instructed that a presumption arose from it which must
prevail, unless overthrown by other satisfactory evidence." Sulli-
van V. Kuykendall, 82 Ky. 483 (1885).
The presumption does not go so far as to establish the date of the
receipt of the letter in the absence of evidence as to the frequency
and speed of trains or the "usual course and time of mails." Boon
V. State Ins. Co., 37 Minn. 426 (1887).
The mailing must be itself proved. Where the secretary of an
insurance company testified that he wrote and signed a certain
letter, and gave it to an attendant to press-copy; that the latter
brought it back looking as if it had been press-copied ; that he
folded and enclosed it in a sealed envelope, on which was a notice
to return if not delivered ; directed it to the insured, and put it in a
basket where letters for mailing were usually placed. And the
office-porter testified that it was his business to take the letters from
the basket and mail them ; that he mailed all letters found in the
basket, but had no recollection of ever seeing or handling this par-
ticular letter, it was held, this being the only evidence on the point,
that whether the letter was mailed was a question for the jury, and
it was not so conclusive as to authorise the court to take the ease
from the jury. Hastings v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 473
(1893).
So no presumption of the receipt of a letter arises in the absence
of evidence that it was stamped. Bless v. Jenkins (Mo. Supreme
Court), 31 S. W. 938 (1895).
On the same ground of the due performance of official duty rests
the presumption that a letter was received by the sendee, if the
envelope containing it bore a request for its return to the sender if
not delivered in a certain time, and it has not been returned. " Evi-
dence that upon the envelope was printed a request for a return of
CHAP, v.] AMEEICAK NOTES. 183^2
the letter to the post-offlce address of the plaintiff, if not called for in
ten days, and that the letter was not returned to him, was rightly
admitted in connection with the evidence that the plaintiff sent the
bill enclosed in this envelope by mail to the defendant. It was
the duty of the officers of the postal service to return the letter to
the address upon the envelope (the postage being prepaid) if it was
not delivered to the person to whom it was addressed, and there
is the same inference of fact that they would do their duty in this
respect as in forwarding and delivering letters addressed to a mer-
chant at his place of business." Hedden v. Roberts, 134 Mass. 38
(1882). In a recent Pennsylvania case, the court say that the fact
of non-return of a letter bearing a request for return in case of non-
delivery so strengthens the presumption of receipt from mailing
" that it becomes well-nigh conclusive." Jensen v. McCorkell, 154
Pa. St. 323 (1893).
But this presumption of the regular performance of official duty
may have but small weight in a particular instance especially outside
of the routine work of an office, and it may therefore be only a
ruling on the burden of evidence, i. e., a pure presumption of law.
On the question whether a defendant knew he had no title to timber
he had cut, an attempt was made to show that he had been notified
by the United States government authorities that his entries had
been cancelled. Defendant absolutely denied that he ever had been
so notified. To prove notice, evidence was introduced that the
Commissioner of the Land-Office had notified the local register
that the defendant's entries were cancelled, and directed him so to
notify the defendant. The plaintiffs then relied on the presumption
that the Eegister had done as directed. The court say : " They rely
upon the familiar rule that all reasonable presumptions must be
made in favor of the regularity and validity of the action of public
officers and tribunals. This rule is well established, but it does not
appear to be applicable under the present circumstances. It is a
mere presumption of law, which operates only in case of absence of
evidence. It disappears entirely in the presence of positive, uncon-
tradicted evidence upon the subject ; and, furthermore, it seems
very doubtful whether any presumption could be indulged here that
the register gave the notice in question." Befay v. Wheeler, 84
Wise. 135 (1893).
Ebgulaeity in Telegrams. — Based on similar reasons, a pre-
sumption of fact exists that a telegram properly directed and deliv-
ered to the company for transmission is duly received by the person
to whom it is sent. But little can be added to the very cogent
reasoning adopted by the New York court of appeals on the subject.
Finch, J., in Oregon Steamship Co. v Otis, 100 N. Y. 446, 451 (1885) ;
Com. V. Jeffries, 7 All. 548 (1863) ; U. S. v. Babcock, 3 Dill. C. Ct.
571 (1876) ; White v. Plemming, 20 Nova Scotia, 335 (1888).
ALLEGATIONS AND EYIDENCE MUST COEEESPOND.
PART II.
ETJLES GOVEENING THE PEODUCTION OF TESTIMONY.
CHAPTEE I.
correspondence of evidence with allegations; substance of
issue; variance; and amendment.
§ 217.^ The production of evidence on a trial — whether civil or
criminal — is governed by four general rules. First, the evidence
must correspond with the allegations in the pleadings,^ but the
substance only of the issues raised thereby need be proved ; secmidly,
the evidence must be confined to the points in issue ; thirdly, the
burthen of proving a proposition at issue lies on the party holding
the substantial affirmative; and fourthly, the best evidence, of
which the case in its nature is susceptible, must always be
produced.
§ 218.^ The first rule is that the evidence must correspond with
the allegations in the pleadings. The pleadings, it may be explained,
are the written allegations of the parties, terminating in proposi-
tions distinctly affirmed on one side, and denied on the other,
called the issues.^ If these are propositions of fact, the first rule,
which it is important to remember, is, that the evidence must corre-
spond with the allegations, but that it is sufficient if the substance of thi
issues be proved. Pleadings being intended * to apprise the parties
of the specific questions to be tried, this object would be defeated
> Gr. Ev. § 50, slightly. » Gr. Ev. § 51, in part, as to first
' See generally as to the nature of six lines,
pleadings, and the rules by which * As to their objects, see further,
they are now governed, post, § 298 post, § 299.
et seq.
184
CHAP. I.] AMENDMENTS UNDER SUCCESSIVE STATUTES.
if either party were at literty to prove facts essentially different
from those stated on the record, as. constituting the claim or charge
on the one hand, or the defence on the other.i Every material
disagreement, between the allegation and the proof, constitutes
what is called a variance, which, in strictness, is as fatal to the party
on whom the proof lies as a total failure of evidence.
§ 219. Having regard to the recent changes in the law on this
subject, it appears to be unnecessary to give detelUed instances of
what the old law held to be a variance.^
§ 220. A partial remedy for the injustice which in old days was
done by the highly technical rules which prevailed as to " vari-
ances " was provided in 1828 ; ' larger powers of amendment were
granted in 1833 to the English judges,* and in 1840 to the Irish
judges.'
§ 221. In civil cases further powers of amendment were created
in 1852, by the Common Law Procedure Act,* and by the Equity
Procedure Act of that year ; ' the Common Law Procedure Acts of
1854 and 1860 contained clauses authorising the amendment of
" all defects and errors in any proceedings under the provisions " of
those Acts respectively, " if duly applied for ; " ^ while the Irish
Common Law Procedure Act of 1853 empowered the judges in
that country to amend " all defects and errors in any writ, pleading,
record, or other proceeding ia civil causes," ' and the law relating
• InCatoin;.Oatoii,1849,Dr.Lu8h- great disgrace to tlie English law,"
ington observed: "The maxim of the in Hemming v. Parry, 1834. See,
Eooles. Courts, and I may say of all also, Goodtitle v. Lammiman, 1809 ;
other courts, is to decide secundum Brooks v. Blanshard, 1833.
allegata et probata. There must be ^ By 9 Geo. 4, o. 15 (repealed by
both charge and evidence; the party 53 & 54 V. c. 33, " The S. L. E. Act,
cited is entitled to know the specific 1890").
charge for the purpose of defence. * * * By 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 42, §§ 23, 24
The difficulty I feel is to avoid the (repealed as to High Court by 44 &
error of adhering to this rule with 45 V. c. 59).
pedantic strictness, and, on the other ^ By 3 &4 V. c. 105 ("The Debtors
hand, not to weaken a rule which is (Ireland) Act, 1840 "), §§ 48, 49.
founded on one of the great principles ^ 15 & 16 V. c. 76, §§ 34, 35, 37,
of justice." See Malcolmson D. Clay- 222 (repealed by 46 & 47 V.c. 49).
ton, 1860, P. C. (Ld. Chelmsford); See corresponding sections in the
The Ann, 1860, P. 0. ; Tyrer v. IrishActof 16&17V.c.ll3,§§85— 91.
Henry, 1860, P. C. ; Kilgour v. ' 15 & 16 V. c. 86, §§ 49, 53.
Alexander, 1860, P. 0. ; The Has- ^ 17 & ig V. c. 125, § 96; 23 & 24
well, 1864 ; and The Amalia, 1864. V. c. 126, § 36. Eepealed by 46 & 47
' Jones V. Cowley, 1825, was de- V. o. 49.
Glared by Alderson, B., to be " a • 16 & 17 V. 0. 113, § 231, Ir.
18S
AMENDMENT UNDEE RULES OF 1883. [PAET II.
to such amendments was in civil cases further altered by the Eules
of Court originally framed under the Judicature Acts of 1873 and
1875 ; and in 1883 these last-named Eules were annulled. The
Rules, now regulating the amendment of proceedings in civil cases
in the Supreme Court, are Orders XYI., XIX., and XXVIII. of
the E. S. C, 1883.1
§ 222-5. Not one of the above named three Orders, however, has
any effect on criminal proceedings, or on proceedings for divorce or
other matrimonial causes. Orders XVI., and XIX., moreover, are
inoperative in proceedings, either on the Crown side, or on the
Eevenue side, of the Queen's Bench Division. Order XXVIII.
however, applies to all ciml proceedings on the Crown side, includ-
ing mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto, and to all pro-
ceedings on the Eevenue side, of the same Court.^ And it will be
recollected that the law as to amendment of civil proceedings in
many inferior courts, is still governed by the enactments earlier
than the Judicature Act which are referred to in § 220.
§ 226. Eeference must be made to a Book upon Practice for the
details of the contents of the Eules just mentioned, and of the
decisions upon them. Briefly, however, their effect may be sum-
marized by saying that, 1st, the court or a judge may at any stage
of the proceedings, " for the purpose of determining the real ques-
tion or issue,"' allow either party to alter or amend his indorse-
ment or pleadings ; * 2nd, all such amendments shall be made as
' Even an indorsement can be tended to have tried, and not any
amended, see Cornish, v. Hoohen, question -wMcli, during the course of
1853 ; Leigh v. Baker, 1857. As to the trial, may for the first time be
amendments of pleadings in the Con- brought into controversy by one of the
sistory Court of London, see Eeg. litigants. See Eoles v. Davis, 1859
Gen. of 1877 relating to that court, (judgment of Court of Common
Ord. III. Pleas). As to amendments of names,
* Crown Office Eules, 1883, r. 299. or substituting or adding parties, see
' As to what is "the real matter rr. 11 and 12 of Ord. XVI., under
in controversy," it has been said that which an application cannot be made
it is a matter, not of law, but of fact, ex parte : Tildesley v. Harper, 1876
what "the real question in contro- (Hall, V.-O.) ; S. 0. in 0. A., 1878.
versy between the parties " is ; next, * Where a plaintifi amends his
that this matter of fact must be de- claim so as to alter the whole cause
termined, not by thejury, butby the of action, the proper course is to
judge on a careful consideration of apply to the court to disallow the
the pleadings and the evidence ; and, amendment, or to allow it only on
lastly, that " the question in contro- terms: Bourne r. Coulter, 1884. See
versy" is, in other words, the ques- also rr. 1 and 4 of Ord. XVI., which
tion which both parties really in- respectively render amendments tm-
186
CHAP. I.]
AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS.
may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions
in controversy;^ 3rd, without leave, hut subject to the risk of
having to pay costs, the plaintiff may amend his statement of
claim, and the defendant may amend his counterclaim or set-off ;
4th, the application for leave to amend any pleading may be
made by either party to the court or a judge, or to the judge at
the trial of the action ; ^ 5th, pleadings may be amended by
striking out any scandalous or embarrassing matter ; and lastly,
any of these respective amendments may be allowed upon such
terms as to costs or otherwise as may be just.
§ 227. The powers of amendment conferred by these rules ought
to be exercised in a liberal spirit.*
necessary in oases wtere too many
plaintiffs or defendants have been
joined. See Child v. Stenning, IS'??;
Booth V. Briscoe, 1877.
1 See n. ', ante, p. 186.
' An application to amend can only
te made where there has been a bona
fide mistake: Clowes v. Hilliard, 1893
(Jessel, M.E.). But such mistake
may be one of law : Duckett v. Gover,
1877 (Jessel, M.E.). And the court
m.ust be satisfied, where a party is
proposed to be added, that he has
assented, or that his interests have
been properly protected : Turquand
V. Fearon, 1879. Where, after an
amendment, the opposite party fails
to plead again, he is taken to rely on
his original pleading : Boddy v. Wall,
1877. If a party be added (see r. 11
of Ord. XVI. as to this) he must, if
he be a plaintiff, have given a written
consent, and, if a defendant, be served
with a summons or notice. As to
when a plaintiff will or will not pre-
judice the fair trial of the action by
asking alternative relief, see Bagot
V. Easton, 1877, C. A. As to what is
embarrassing, see Heap v. Harris,
1876 ; Davy v. Garrett, 1877, C. A. ;
Stokes V. Grant, 1878; PhiHpps v.
Philipps, 1878, C. A. This last case
shows what statements must be con-
tained in an action for the recovery
of land of which the plaintiff has
never been in possession. A county
court judge can amend a misjoinder
of defendants in an action remitted
trom the High Court. See Eennison
V. Walker, 1872.
^ This was so even with regard to
the power of amendment conferred
before the Judicature Acts. See Parry
V. Fairhirrst, 1835 (Alderson, B.) ;
Sainsbury v. Matthews, 1838 (Parke,
B.); Ward v. Pearson, 1839; Evans
V. Fryer, 1839 (Williams, J.) ; Pacific
St. Navig. Co. V. Lewis, 1847 (Pol-
look, O.B.); Smith v. Knowelden,
1841. Lord Mansfield long ago said
(Bristow V. Wright, 1781) : " The
strong bias of my mind has always
leaned to prevent the manifest justice
of a cause from being defeated or
delayed by formal sUps, which arise
from the inadvertence of gentlemen
of the profession; because it is ex-
tremely hard on the party to be turned
round, and put to expense, from such
mistakes of the counsel or attorney he
employs. It is hard, also, on the pro-
fession." With reference to amend-
ments under the Judicature Act,
Bowen, L.J., said that there was no
kind of error or mistake which, if not
fraudulent or intended to overreach,
a court ought not to correct, if it can
be done without injustice to the other
party, for courts of justice do not
exist for the sake of discipline, but
for the sake of deciding matters in
controversy, and amendments for this
purpose ought not to be regarded
as matters of favour or of grace :
Cropper I). Smith, 1884, 0. A. (Bowen,
L.J.). In accordance with the spirit
of tms dictum, the Court of Appeal
has held that an amendment on such
187
AMENDMENTS ALLOWED UNDER OLD LAW. [PAET II.
§ 228-9. It would, since this is not a book of Practice, not only
be irrelevant to give details of the various decisions which have
taken place as to amendments, but it would also be of no practical
utility,- seeing that it is extremely unlikely that a case in which the
necessity for amendment arises at Nisi Prius will be identical, or
nearly so, with any case which has been previously the subject of
actual decision.
§ 230. At the same time, it may not be entirely without use to
here point out a few instances which exemplify principles, in
accordance with which an amendment has been permitted to be
made even under the old law."^
§ 231. Where the real questions in dispute were, first, whether
land in the possession of a tenant was the plaintiff's property, and,
next, whether there was a public footway across it, the plaintifl
was allowed to amend the pleadings in such a way as to really raise
these questions free from technicalities.^ Where the real question
was whether cargo had been delivered in proper time, an amend-
ment of the pleadings, by inserting averments that raised this
question in proper form, was allowed.'
§ 232. In an action for slander, where the words charged were,
" S. is to be tried at the Old Bailey, &c.," and those proved to
have been really spoken were, " I have heard that S. is to be tried,
&c.," an amendment was allowed on payment of costs,* Bosanquet,
J., observing that the introduction of the words " I have heard "
left the slander as actionable as before, although the amount of
terms as tlie circumstances may de- But now a totally different principle
mand ought always to be allowed prevails. Every amendment is to be
wliere the other party would not be made, which is necessary for deter-
seriously or irremediably damnified, mining the real question in con-
but no injury would be caused to troversy between the parties."
him which would not be sufficiently ' Those who wish to understand
compensated for by costs, see Clapa- the very old doctrine of variance, and
rede v. Comm. Union Assurance Co., to trace its oppressive operation pre-
1893, 0. A. ; Tildesley v. Harper, viously to the passing of the remedial
1878, 0. A. ; In re Trufort, Traftbrd statutes, will find the subject fuUy
V. Blanc, 1885. In St. Losky v. and ably treated in 1 St. Ev. 430 —
Green, 1860, Byles, J., observed, 494. See, also, 1 Ph. Ev. 503 et seq.
"Various statutes have, from time See, also, the cases cited supra, in n. '
to time for more than 500 years, been to § 219.
passed, from the 14 Ed. 3, c. 6, down- * May v. Footner, 1855.
wards, to facilitate amendments, but ' Tennyson v. O'Brien, 1855. See
the strict and almost perverse con- Savage v. Canning, 1867 (Ir. C. P).
struotion which the judges put upon * Smith, v. Knowelden, 1841,
them, rendered them nearly abortive.
188
CHAP. I.] AMENDMENTS ALLOWED UNDER OLD LAW.
damages might be lessened, and also that, as the damages were
given for the words as proved, and as the defendant did not apply
to amend his pleadings or to put off the trial, it did not appear how
he could have been prejudiced in his defence.^ In another action
for slander, where the words alleged to have been spoken about a
surgeon were, " There have been many inquests held upon persons
who have died, because he attended them ; " but those proved were,
" Several have died that he (plaintiff) has attended, and inquests
have been held on them," an amendment was likewise allowed.^
Where the only variance was, that the words stated in the declara-
tion were in English, while the expressions proved were Welsh, an
amendment was also allowed.'
§ 233. In another action for defamation, on objection being
taken that the plaintiff's pleadings did not (as is necessary) set out
the libel, but merely stated its substance, an amendment by setting
out a verbatim copy of the defendant's letter on the record was
allowed.* Where it was alleged that the defendant published a
libel, " contained in and being an article in a certain weekly paper,
called the '■Faul Pry,' " and proved that he had given a slip of
printed paper, containing the libellous matter, to several persons to
read ; but it was not proved that this slip had been out from any
newspaper, the record was amended by striking out the allegation
marked in italics without any terms whatever being imposed.'
Similarly, a statement by way of justification, that goods had been
stolen by " some person unknown," was allowed to be amended by
striking these three words out, and substituting the name of the
party who was proved to have taken such goods.°
§ 234. Where a special contract is stated, and the pleading then
contains an erroneous allegation in conformity with its supposed
legal effect, such allegation (even under the old law) might either
be struck out, or so altered as to express correctly the real meaning
of the contract.'
1 2 M. & Gr. 565. « Pratt v. Hanbury, 1849. See,
• Southee v. Denny, ISiV. also. West v. Baxendale, 1850 ; and
s Jenkins v. Phill'ips, 1841 (Cole- Hailes v. Marks, 1861.
ridge, J.). ' Whitwill v. Scteer, 1838. But
* Saunders v. Bates, 1857. see Bowers v. Nixon, 1847, cited
" Foster v. Pointer, 1840 (Gurney, post, § 239.
B.). See, also, Pater v. Baker, 1847.
189
AMENDMENTS ALLOWED UNDEE OLD LAW. [PAET II.
§ 235. An amendment, too, might, under the old law (and
k fortiori may now) usually be made, where the contract, or tort,
or custom declared upon, turns out to he either more or less com-
prehensive than the one proved.^ For example, the statement of a
general warranty of a horse has been amended by substituting an
allegation of a qualified warranty, where the defence did not depend
upon the qualification introduced;^ and a pleading alleging that
defendant promised to lay out certain money in the purchase of a
government annuity, and averring as a breach that he had not done
so, but had placed it in the hands of some private company, has
been amended by substituting " security " for " annuity," where
the evidence showed that the money had in fact been received for
the purpose of investing it in sode government security?
§ 236. Where a contract, a duty, an instrument, or other matter
has been misdescribed on the record, an amendment to suit the facts
proved is permissible, alike under the old law and the present Eules.^
For example, where the pleadings stated that the defendants, in
consideration of plaintiffs supplying beer to a third party, promised
to pay them the amount of the beer so supplied, and in support of
plaintiff's claim a written guarantee was put in, the " variance "
(between an original liability to pay, and the collateral liability
arising on a guarantee) was allowed to be amended by substituting
the word "guarantee" for "pay."' In former editions of this
work, numerous further cases were set out, which furnished detailed
examples of amendments having been allowed ; but, for the reasons
already given, it is thought that the insertion of any more detailed
instances would be now useless.
§ 237. Even under the old law (and k fortiori now) the court
could, upon the trial of an issue of nul tiel record, — which, be it
remembered, must be determined by the court, and not by a judge
and jury,^ — amend, by inserting in the pleadings, the true date of
tha judgment alleged to have been recovered.' A defence of " Not
' SeePacificSt.Navig. Co.'W.LewiB, * Hanbury ?;. Ella, 1834.
1847. 0 Parry v. Eairhurst, 1845.
2 He nming v. Parry, 1834 (Alder- « Ante, § 47 ; and see Eiohardson
son, B.); Mash v. Densham, 1834 i;. Willis, 1872.
(id.) ; Read v. Dunsmore, 1840. ' Noble v. Chapman, 1854. Soe,
^ Qurfoid V. Bayley, 1842. See, also. Hunter v. Emmanuel, 1854,
also, Evans v. Fryer, 1839 ; May. of where the true amount recovered
Carmarthen v. Lewis, 1834. was inserted in the declaration.
190
CHAP. I.] AMENDMENTS ALLOWED UNDER OLD LAW.
guilty by statute " has been amended by inserting in the margin
an Act which had been omitted ; ^ and a defence, not technically
proved by the evidence, was amended at Nisi Prius so as to raise
the substantial question, without the imposition of any costs.^ A
judge has been held' justified in amending a claim at the trial so
as to increase it from 600/. to 760/. ; and in an action against the
clerk of a local board of health, an amendment of the proceedings, by
substituting the board as defendants instead of the clerk, has been
allowed,* and vice versa amendment has been sanctioned, where the
board had sued in the name of their clerk in lieu of their own name.'
§ 238. The cases in which amendments were refused under the
old law furnish no safe guide in interpreting the more liberal
language of the new rules. Indeed, it is clear that very many of
such decisions are no longer law.' So far, however, as they appear
to establish principles which may be supposed to still exist, they are
to the effect stated in the following paragraphs : —
§ 239. Some of the decisions cited in the footnotes were, it will be
noticed, before the Judicature Acts and Eules, but it would appear
that the principles they establish are sound, and ought still to be
acted upon. It would thus, on principle, appear that there exist
two great limitations on the exercise of the power of amendment.
First. An amendment ought never to be made for the mere pur-
pose of conferring jurisdiction.'
Secondly. An amendment ought never to be made where it
would be impossible if this were done to replace the opposite party
in the position in which he formerly stood, and irremediable hard-
ship would consequently be inflicted upon him by permitting the
amendment.' In accordance with this principle, where more than
six months after action brought, defendants sought to amend by
the first time setting up a defence that the liability for the act
complained of rested with a third person against whom all remedy
had been lost because he was only liable if sued within six months
> Edwards v. Hodges, 1855. « See, also, Wilkin v. Eeed, 1854 ;
2 Buckland ?;. Jotmson, 1854. Lucas v. Tarleton, 1858; Roles d.
3 Knowlman v. Bluett, 1873. See Davis, 1859.
Watkins v. Morgan, 1834. '' Hopper v. Warburton, 1863.
« Ld. Bolinbroke v. Townsend, * Steward v. North Metropolitan
1873. Tram. Co., 1886, 0. A.
6 MUls V. Scott, 1873.
191
AMENDMENTS REFUSED UNDER OLD LAW. [PAET II.
of the act, leave to make the amendment was refused.^ On this
principle, although the mere impropriety or harshness of an action
ought to have no effect in influencing the decision of the judge,^
an amendment has been refused where the matter sought to be
expunged has been purposely and improperly introduced, with the
view of creating a prejudice against the other side ; as, for instance,
where a complaint contains averments and innuendoes unfairly
connecting the plaintiff with parts of an alleged libel, which, in
fact, related to other persons.* Moreover, as the rules for allowing
amendments at Nisi Prius are intended to meet variances arising
from mere slips or accidents, the judge will be very reluctant to
allow an amendment, where the party has intentionally framed his
pleading in such a manner as to give rise to the objection.* When
it turns out at the trial that the plaintiff, having misconceived his
remedy, seeks to convert the proceedings into an action of a
different character, an amendment will usually be refused — certainly
at Nisi Prius — and never granted on other than strict terms.^
§ 240. On this latter principle, the court has, to prevent in-
justice, refused to amend a variance, where it appeared likely that
such variance has prevented the defendant from pleading a good
bar to the action," or where the amendment proposed would in all
probability have caused the defendant either to raise a question of
law,' or to plead different defences from those on the pleadings,*
or would introduce an entirely new contract and new breach,' or,
perhaps even, any entirely new matter.""
' Steward v. Nortli Metropolitan B.).
Tram. Co., 1886, 0. A. ' Evans v. Po-wis, 1847 ; Bury v.
" Doe V. Edwards, 1834 (Parke, Blogg, 1848; Martyn v. Williams,
B.) ; Doe v. Leach, 1841. See Bren- 1857.
nan v. Howard, 1856. * Perry v. "Watts, 1842, explained
' Prudhomme v. Eraser, 1834 (Ld. in Gurford v. Bayley, 1842; Prankum
Denman). v. Ld. Ealmouth, 1835.
* Bowers v. Nixon, 1847 (Maule, « BrasHer ?;. Jackson, 1840; Bou-
J.); Clowes i;. Hilliard, 1876 ( Jessel, cher v. Murray, 1844; Eiohards v,
M.R.). But see WHtwill v. Soheer, Bluck, 1848 ; MonoriefE v. Eeade,
1838, cited ante, § 234. 1848.
' See Jacobs D.Seward, 1872, H.L.; '" David i). Preece, 1843. See Gull
Newby v. Sharpe, 1877, C. A. ; Clark v. Lindsay, 1849; and Addington v.
V. York. 1882; Hipgrave v. Case, Magan, 1851. For examples, see
1885, 0. A. ; Clark v. "Wray, 1885. Perry v. Watts, 1842, explained by
See, however. Laird v. Briggs, 1881, Maule, J., in Gurford v. Bayley,
C. A. ; Cargill i;. Bower, 1878. 1842; Erankum v. Ld. Ealmoutk'
" Ivey V. Young, 1836 (Alderson, 1835.
192
CHAP. I.] ADDING PLEAS AT TRIAL.
§ 241. Independently of actual decisions, there is very little doubt
that the judge may allow a paragraph raising a new defence to he
added at the trial, whenever it is necessary for the purpose of
placing on the record the real question in dispute.* It often
happens, as was once observed by Maule, J., that in consequence
either of imperfect instructions given to the pleader, or of ignorance,
or of oversight, the substantial point intended by the parties to be
tried is not raised by the pleadings ; ^ and when this occurs it would
be obviously unjust to refuse an amendment.* It was, however, said
(before the Judicature Acts) that a direction that all amendments
necessary for determining the real question in controversy " shallhQ
made," does not make it imperative on the court to allow a plea to be
substituted after issue joined, even though the application be made
prior to the trial, and though it be supported by an affidavit that
the real question in controversy between the parties can only be
raised on the record by the introduction of the proposed plea.*
§ 241a. All disputed questions of amendment depend upon the
discretion of the judge ; the Court of Appeal ^ will, therefore, always
be very unwilling to interfere with that discretion, save in a ease
where it is obvious that some serious mischief would result from
non-interference.°
§ 242. It remains to notice a few practical points respecting the
exercise of powers of amendment, which, though decided under earlier
statutes, probably would, in general, be acted upon even with regard to
the powers of amendment conferred by the Judicature Acts : First,
an amendment at Nisi Prius must be made, if at all, during the
trial and before the verdict ; ' unless, indeed, the opposite party
waives his right to enforce this amount of strictness, in which case it
would suffice if the amendment were made within the time allowed
for moving, provided it were ultimately in agreement with the judge's
note.* Secondly, the amendment must be allowed by the presiding
judge, who, it seems, may be the sheriff or his officer.' Thirdly,
1 Mitchell V. Craseweller, 1853. r. 4, cited pott, § 1883.
'^ Wilkin V. Eeed, 1854. « Golding v. Wharton Salt Works
3 See supra, note ^ to § 227, and Co., 1876, C. A.
mfra, § 253, as to the spirit in which ' Brashier v. Jackson, 1840 ; Doe
applications for amendments ought v. Long, 1841 (Coleridge, J.),
to be entertained. " Jones v. Hutchinson, 1851.
* Ritchie v. Van Gelder, 1854. » Hill v. Salt, 1834. Compare Cos
» See E. S. 0. 1883, Ord. LVIII. v. Hill, 1892.
T. VOL. I. 193 o
COSTS OF AMENDMENTS, [PART II.
•when, in consequence of an amendment being allowed in a state-
ment of claim, some alteration becomes necessary in the defence,
the court "will direct this also to be made, should the counsel for the
defendant decline to interfere or to amend the pleadings himself.^
Fourthly, a divisional court ^ will not control the discretion of the
judge either in refusing ^ or allowing* an amendment to be made,
unless upon clear proof that he was wrong, or, at least, unless it be
shown, by affidavit, that the defendant has been prejudiced by the
amendment. In all these cases, if both parties consent, a larger
power may be exercised, either by the judge at Nisi Prius, by the
person substituted in his stead, or by the court above.*
§ 243. It is difficult to lay down any distinct rule as to the terms
with regard to costs, and otherwise, upon which an amendment will
be permitted. Each case must, in a great degree, depend upon its
own particular circumstances. As a general proposition it may be
said that the court will not allow any additional expense to be
thrown upon the opposite party by reason of any amendment.'
Thus, if the defendant has put a defence on the record, the proof
of which will be rendered unnecessary by the plaintiff's amendment,
or has summoned witnesses, whom it will thereby becoine needless
to call, or has otherwise been at any bona fide expense in preparing
to disprove the original allegations, the plaintiff will only be per-
mitted to amend on payment of the costs occasioned by his error.
If the defendant, in consequence of plaintiff's amendment, will
require to alter his statement of defence, or to summon other
witnesses, the trial will at least be postponed, and the plaintiff
obliged to pay the costs of the postponement. In cases where a
variance cannot have misled the opposite party, an amendment will
be allowed without the payment of any costs.'
§ 244. Although the judge at Nisi Prius has a discretionary
' Perry v. Fisher, 1846 (Ld. Den- * Sainsbury v. Matthews, 1838 (Ld.
man). Abinger).
'' So, too, the 0. A., see supra, ' Parry v. Fairburst, 1835, noticed
§ 241a. by Patteson, J., in Guest v. Elwes,
' Doe V. Errington, 1834 ; Jenkins 1836; Eoberts v. Snell, 1840; Brasbier
V. Phillips, 1841 (Coleridge, J.); ?>. Jackson, 1840.
Whitwill V. Sobeer, 1838 (Patteson, « Smith v. Brandram, 1841 (Tindal,
J.); Holden v. Ballantyne, 1860. See C.J.).
Lucas V. Beale, 1851 ; Brennan v. ' St. Losky v. Green, 1860.
Howard, 1856.
194
CHAP. I.] APPLICATION OF RULES AS TO AMENDMENTS.
power of awarding or refusing costs in the event of an amendment,
the court will take care that no injustice Is done by his accidentally
omitting to give directions on the subject. Therefore, when an
order had been obtained by the plaintiff, enabling him to withdraw
the record and amend his pleadings, but no mention was made as
to costs, the court held that, as the variance had been corrected
for the benefit of the plaintiff, he was bound to liquidate the
defendant's costs of the day.'
§ 245. As already stated,^ the present Er. S. C, which have
been referred to as to amendments, " apply to all civil proceedings
on the Crown side of the Queen's Bench Division, including man-
damus and prohibition, and also to quo warranto, and to all pro-
ceedings on the Revenue side of the said Division." ' Such Rules
further apply to the High Court exercising jurisdiction in Bank-
ruptcy, which now forms part of the Supreme Court,* to Admiralty
actions, and to Probate actions, and to such of the County Courts
as have Bankruptcy jurisdiction.* But they do not affect the
procedure or practice, either in criminal proceedings, or in pro-
ceedings for Divorce or other Matrimonial Causes.* In the Divorce
Court the only material rule respecting the amendment of pleadings
was promulgated in 1875, and is thus expressed : — " Either of the
parties before the court desiring to alter or amend a pleading may
apply by summons to one of the registrars for an order for that
purpose." '
§ 246. Large powers of amendment are also possessed by the
County Courts, when errors have been committed with respect to
the names, descriptions, numbers, or representative characters of
the plaintiffs and defendants ; * and, in addition to these powers, it
is provided' that a County Court judge " may at all times amend
all defects and errors in any proceeding in the court, whether there
is anything in writing to amend by or not, and whether the defect
or error be that of the party applying to amend or not ; and aU
' Skinner v. Lond. & Bright. Ey. ' Bules in Div. and Mat. Causes,
Co., 1850. r. 187. See also rr. 35—37.
2 Ante, § 221. s ggg Oy. Ct. Bules, 1889, Ord.
» Ord. LXVIII. r. 2. XIV. See MiUs v. Scott, 1878, cited
* 46 & 47 V. c. 52 (" The Bank- ante, § 237.
ruptoy Act, 1883 "), § 93. » By § 87 of " The County Courts
» Ibid., § 100. Act, 1888" (51 & 52 V. c. 43).
6 Ord. LXVni. r. 1.
195 -02
AMENDMENTS IN CIVIL BILL COURTS. [PAET II.
such amendments may be made with or without costs, and upon
suoh terms as the judge may think j ast ; and all suoh amendments
as may he necessary for the purpose of determining the real ques-
tion in controversy between the parties shall be so made, if duly
applied for." Still, if the particulars of the plaintiff's claim do not
disclose a case within the jurisdiction of the County Court, the
judge has no power to amend them, so as to turn the complaint
into one over which he has cognisance.'
§ 247. The Civil Bill Courts in Ireland possess^ powers of amend-
ment ; for, by § 2 of the Act regulating their practice,^ " it shall
and may be lawful for the several assistant barristers, and judges
on appeal, and they are hereby respectively empowered, in all eases,
to amend all variances between the statement of the cause of action
in any civil bill, or other process or proceeding in their respective
civil bill courts, and the evidence in support of suoh cause of action,
and also to amend all variances, omissions, and misdescriptions in
the descriptions, additions, and residence of the parties, or any of
them, or otherwise howsoever, of or in any such process, or between
the original and any copy or copies thereof, provided such last-
mentioned variances, omissions, or misdescriptions shall not, in the
opinion of the assistant barrister, be calculated to mislead the defen-
dant or defendants therein ; and in every case of any misjoinder
of parties or causes of action, it shall and may be lawful for every
assistant barrister to strike out of the process the name or names of
any one or more plaintiffs or defendants, or any count or counts in
such process, by reason of whom or which such misjoinder shall arise,
and thereupon to proceed therein as to justice shall appertain." ^
§ 247a. We have now indicated in a general way, and so far
as they appear to be relevant to a work on Evidence, the principles
which regulate amendments in cwil cases. The subject of amend-
ments in criminal cases remains for consideration.
§§ 248 — 51. We have seen that in 1828 * some powers of amend-
ment of variances in criminal cases were given,' these powers were
' Hopper ti. Warburton, 1862 (Mel- to the "judge of assize on appeal,"
lor, J., in B. Ct.). by 27 & 28 V. e. 99, § 48, Ir.
2 By 14 & 15 V. c. 57 ("Tbe Civil * By 9 G. 4, c. 15. See ante,
Bill Courts (Ireland) Act, 1851 "), § 220.
§ 106. 5 See E. v. Cooke, 1836 ; E. v.
' Puxther powers of amendment Hewins, 1841 ; E. v. Christian, 1842.
are given to the Civil Bill Cts., and
196
CHAP. I.] LOKD Campbell's criminal act of 1851.
exceedingly limited. Accordingly, in 1848, and the following
year, the limited provisions of the Act of 1828 were greatly
extended, and made applicable to all offences whatever.' In 1851,
at the instance of Lord Campbell, an Act was passed,^ which has
placed criminal proceedings on nearly the same footing with civil
actions, in respect to the amendment of variances between the record
and the proof.*
1 By 11 & 12 V. 0. 46, § 4, as to
assize courts; and 12 & 13 V. c. 45
("The Quarter Sessions Act, 1849 "),
as to sessions, tlie provisions of wMch.
Act are extended to Irish quarter
sessions by 27 & 28 V. c. 99, § 49, Ir.
The inferior courts in Scotland have
now, under "The Summary Pro-
cedure Act, 1864 " (21 & 28 V. c. 53),
§ 5, large powers of amending com-
plaints before them with respect to
variances and other defects.
" 14 & 15 V. c. 100 (" The Criminal
Law Procedure Act, 1851 ").
^ The principal provisions of this
Act are as follows: § 1, "Whenever,
on the trial of any indictment for any
felony or misdemeanor, there shall
appear to be any variance between
the statement in such indictment and
the evidence offered in proof thereof,
m the name of any county, ridiag,
division, city, borough, town corpo-
rate, parish, township, or place men-
tioned or described in any such in-
dictment,— or in the name or descrip-
tion of any person or persons, or
body politic or corporate, therein
stated or alleged to be the owner or
owners of any property, real or
personal, which shall form the sub-
ject of anj"- offence charged therein,
— or in the name or description of
any person or persons, body politic
or corporate, therein stated or alleged
to be injured or damaged or intended
to be injured or damaged by the
commission of such offence, — or in
the Christian name or surname, or
both Christian name and surname,
or other description whatsoever, of
any person or persons whomsoever
therein named or described, — or in
the name or description of any matttr
or thing whatsoever therein named or
described, — or in the ownership of
any property named or described
therein, — it shall and may be lawful
for the court before which the trial
shall be had, if it shall consider such
variance not material to the merits of
the case, and that the defendant can-
not be prejudiced thereby in his defence
on such merits, to order such indict-
ment to be amended, according to the
proof, by some officer of the court or
other person, both in that part of the
indictment where such variance
occurs, and in every other part of
the indictment which it may become
necessary to amend, on such terms
as to postponing the trial to be had
before the same or another jury, as
such court shall think reasonable ;
and after any such amendment the
trial shall proceed, whenever the
same shall be proceeded with, in the
same manner in all respects, and
with the same consequences, both
with respect to the Hability of wit-
nesses to be indicted for perjury and
otherwise, as if no such variance had
occurred ; and in case such trial shall
be had at Nisi Prius, the order for
the amendment shall be indorsed on
the postea, and returned together
with the record, and thereupon such
papers, rolls, or other records of the
court from which such record issued,
as it may be necessary to amend,
shall be amended accordingly by the
proper officer ; and in all other cases
the order for the amendment shall
either be indorsed on the indictment,
or shall be engrossed on parchment,
and filed, together with the indict-
ment, among the records of the
coui't. Provided always that, in all
such cases where the trial shall be so
postponed as aforesaid, it shall be
lawful for such court to respite the
recognisances of the prosecutor and
witnesses, and of the defendant, and
his surety or sureties, if any, accord-
197
AMENDMENTS IN CEIMINAL PEOCEEDINGS. [^^^'^ ^^•
§ 252. Under the provisions of the Act just referred to, an
indictment charging the defendant with having obstructed a foot-
way may be amended, when one of the termini of the way has been
misdescribed, provided the variance be not calculated to prejudice
the defence ; ' — an amendment may be made when the ownership ol
stolen property,^ or the stolen property itself,^ is wrongly described ;
— the misnomer of a party injured may be rectified ; * — the misde-
scription of any persons described in the indictment may be set
right ;° — an erroneous date ascribed to the passing of a statute
may be struck out ; * — an indictment for perjury alleging that the
crime was committed on a trial for burning a barn, may (to meet
the facts) be amended by alleging its commission on a charge of
firing a stack.'' It, moreover, is not too late to apply for an amend-
ment, even though the counsel for the prisoner may have addressed
the jury.^
§ 252a. In general, however, the court will not amend an indict-
ment after plea, if, in its amended form, it would be open to a
demurrer.' Neither can an amendment be made after verdict.'"
ingly ; in wMch case tlie prosecutor
and witnesses sliall be bound to attend
to prosecute and give evidence re-
spectively, and tlie defendant shall
be bound to attend to be tried, at the
time and place to which such trial
shall be postponed, without enter-
ing into any fresh recognisances for
that purpose, in such and the same
manner as if they were originally
bound by their recognisances to
appear and prosecute or give evi-
dence at the time and place to which
such trial shall have been so post-
poned ; " and a further proviso
directs, "that, where any such trial
shall be to be had before another
jury, the Crown and the defendant
shall respectively be entitled to the
same challenges, as they were respec-
tively entitled to before the first jury
was sworn." By § 2, "Every verdict
and judgment, which shall be given
after the making of any amendment
under the provisions of this Act,
shall be of the same force and effect
in all respects, as if the indictment
had originally been in the same form
in which it was after such amend-
ment was made." By § 3, "if it
shall become necessary at any time
for any purpose whatsoever to draw
up a formal record, in any case where
any amendment shall have been made
under the provisions of this Act, such
record shall be drawn up in the form
in which the indictment was after
such amendment was made, without
taking any notice of the fact of such
amendment having been made." See
further as to amendment of formal
defects in indictment, § 25 of the Act,
post, § 280, n. 1.
' E. V. Sturge, 1854.
2 R. V. Vincent, 1852 ; E. ■;;. Ful-
laiion, 1853.
2 E. V. Gumble, 1872.
*■ E. V. Welton, 1862.
' E. V. Western, 1868.
« E. V. "Westley, 1859.
' E. V. Neville, 1852 (Williams, J.);
E. V. Tymms, 1870 (Lush, J.).
8 E.i-.FuUarton, 1853(Ir.)(Lefroy,
C.J., and Monahan, O.J.); overruling
E. V. Eymer, 1853 (Williams, J.).
' E. V. Lallement, 1853. Sed qu.
The case, as reported, is not satis-
factory.
'" E. V. Larkin, 1854 ; E. v. Frost,
1855.
198
CHAP. I.] AMENDING INDICTMENTS.
Nor will the court amend an amendment, or restore an indictment,
once amended, to its original form.' Where a prisoner was indicted
for a statutahle forgery, but the evidence only sustained a forgery
at common law, an amendment on the indictment by striking out
the word " feloniously " (thus converting a charge of felony into
one of misdemeanour), has been refused.^
§ 253. The Acts which authorise amendments in criminal pro-
ceedings are founded on the policy that substantial justice is of
more real importance than technical precision, and they accordingly
seek to render punishment more certain, by neutralising the effect
of trivial variances, which have constantly protected the wrong-
doer. So long as the least rational doubt exists respecting his
guilt, juries should weigh with jealousy the evidence against a
prisoner; and judges should see most clearly that the act, with
which he is charged, is an offence against the law. But when
courts of justice go further than this, and permit the law to be
defeated by technical errors, which cannot by possibility mislead a
defendant, and which have nothing to do with the substantial
merits of the case, they take the most effectual means of rendering
the administration of the criminal law a fitting subject for con-
tempt and ridicule. In civil causes, the Rules authorising amend-
ments receive a liberal construction.^ Why should an unduly strict
construction be applied in criminal courts? The statutes them-
selves warrant no such distinction, and to introduce into the
interpretation of them the old doctrine " striotissimi juris," is to
misunderstand and misapply the meaning of that doctrine.
§ 254. Having drawn attention to the Eules and the Acts now
authorising amendments, whether in civil or criminal proceedings,
and the leading decisions upon their construction, some three or
four general rules, which regulate the law of variance, may, with
utility, be noticed; for although a discrepancy between the allega-
tion and the proof is not (as formerly) fatal, if immaterial to the
substantial merits, yet it may still entail considerable expense and
responsibility as to costs on the party, who is driven by a " vari-
ance " to apply for an amendment. It is in view of this that the
1 E. V. Barnes, 1866 ; E. v. Prit- ^ See as to tlie spirit in wMoh they
chard, 1867 ; E. v. Webster, 1861. should be regarded, supra, § 227, and
2 E. V. Wright, 1860 (Hill, J.). note ' thereto.
199
SUEPLUSAGE NEED NOT BE PROVED. [PART II.
subject is still discussed in this work, and in applying the strict
rules which exist as to variances, the ample power of amendment
now possessed by the courts must not be forgotten. Subject to this
observation, the rules with regard to variance may be stated to
he four in number, and are as follow: — (1) Surplusage need not be
proved; (2) Cumulative allegations, or such as merely operate in
aggravation, are immaterial ; (3) Mere formal allegations need not he
proved ; (4) But allegations of matter of essential description must be
proved as laid. Having stated these four important rules, the
remainder of this chapter will be devoted to discussing them in
detail —
§ 255.1 rpj^g gj,g^ ^^^ g^g ^Q (( yariances " is, that surplusage need
not he proved, and that the proof, even if offered, should be rejected.
" Surplusage " comprehends whatever may be stricken from the
record without destroying the right of action, or the charge, on the
one hand, or the defence on the other. This, it is true, is a loose,
and therefore unsatisfactory, definition ; but it is difficult, if not
impossible, to find one more distinct and practical. Each case
must, in a great measure, depend on its own particular circum-
stances. The best general idea of what will, or will not, amount to
surplusage, is to be gained from one or two decisions on the point.
Thus, where the pleading in an action for breach of a warranty
that some claret was in a certain state alleged that it was not, and
that the defendant well knew it was not in that state, but at the trial
no evidence was given of the defendant's knowledge, after a verdict
for the plaintiff, a motion having been made for a new trial, on
the ground that the scienter, having been alleged, ought to have
been proved, the court were unanimously of opinion that the alle-
gation of the scienter was wholly imnecessary and immaterial, and
therefore required no proof .^ Said Lord EUenborough : " If the
whole averment respecting the defendant's knowledge of the unfit-
ness of the wine for exportation were struck out, the declaration
would still be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover upon the
breach of the warranty proved. For, if one man lull another into
security as to the goodness of a commodity, by giving him a wax-
• Or. Bv. § 51, in part. bv Ld. Abiager in Cornfoot v. Eowke,
2 Williamson t). Allison, 1802; cited 1840.
200
CHAP. 1.3 INSTANCES OF SURPLUSAGE.
ranty of it, it is the same thing whether or not the seller knew it
at the time to be unfit for sale ; the warranty is the thing which
deceives the buyer, who relies on it, and is thereby put off his
guard. Then, if the warranty be the material averment, it is
sufficient to prove that broken to establish the deceit." Said
Lawrence, J. : "I take the rule to be, that if the whole of an
averment may be struck out without destroying the plaintiff's right
of action, it is not necessary to prove it ; but otherwise, if the
whole cannot be struck out without getting rid of a part essential
to the cause of action ; for then, although the averment be more
particular than it need have been, the whole must be proved, or the
plaintiff cannot recover." '
§ 256 — 7.^ On the same principle, in an action for removing earth
from the defendant's land, whereby the foundation of the plain-
tiff's house was injured, the allegation of bad intent in the defen-
dant need not be proved, for the cause of action is perfect,
independent of the intention ;' in an action for impounding cattle
in an unfit pound, an averment that the pound was "at all times
unfit, as the defendant well knew," may be rejected as immaterial,
and consequently it requires no proof;* if plaintiff's pleadings dis-
close a state of facts upon which an action may be maintained,
although it may also (needlessly) allege malice or fraud, the
plaintiff is not bound to prove either, and may recover upon the
liability which the facts disclose, and this even if both fraud and
malice be actually disproved ; ^ in an action against a common carrier
for the loss of property intrusted to him, negligence, though averred,
need not be proved ; ^ in trespass, for driving against the plaintiff's
cart, an averment that he was in the cart is immaterial ;' an aver-
ment that the defendant wrongfully cut in plaintiff's close, used as
a private road, a certain large sewer, and thereby diverted the
water from a pond, was held clearly immaterial, so far as regarded
' In ■Williamson v. Allison, 1802. ' Panton v. Holland, 1819 (Am.);
See, also, Jackson v. Allaway, 1844; Twiss v. Baldwin, 1832 (Am.).
Att.-Gen. v. Olerc, 1844; Tempest v. * Bignell v. Clarke, 1860.
Eilner, 1845; Anderson v. Thorn- ° Swinfen v. Lord Chelmsford,
ton, 1853; Thorn v. Bigland, 1853; 1860.
Sonthall V. Eigg, and Forman v. * Richards v. Lond. & South Coast
Wright, 1851. Ey. Co., 1849. See ante, § 187.
^ Gr. Ev. § 64, as to first four lines. ' Howard v. Peete, 1817.
201
SURPLUSAGE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. [PAET II,
the words marked in italics, and the plaintiff entitled to recover
damages, though it appeared that the sewer was cut previously to
the construction of the road. " For," said Tindal, 0. J., " what
has it to do with the wrongful act of the defendant, or the
measure of damages which the plaintiff is entitled to claim,
whether the defendant used his close as a road, an orchard, or a
garden ? " '
§§ 258 — 262. In the former editions of this work many further
examples of averments in pleading in civil cases which were
" surplusage," and consequently " immaterial," were given, hut
having regard to the present liberal state of the law with regard
to amendments, it is not thought advisable to weary the reader
with any further examples of the application of the rule in civil
cases.'*
§ 263. The law rejecting surplusage applies equally in criminal
as in civil proceedings. The application of the rule that immaterial
averments (or " surplusage ") need not be proved in criminal
cases may, moreover, be usefully exemplified. For instance, if a
party be indicted for robbery in the dwelling-house of A. B? or for
arson in the night time^ the allegations marked in italics may be
rejected as surplusage, and, consequently, need not be proved ; *
and where one section of a statute* (now repealed) said that a
certificate given knowingly and wilfully, with intent to deceive,
should be a misdemeanour, and a separate clause made it a distinct
offence to give such a certificate without having visited the patient,^
it was held that a conviction on an indictment, blending two
distinct offences in one charge, and stating that defendant
knowingly, and with intention to deceive, signed the certificate without
having visited the patient, was, after a verdict in which the jury
1 Dukes V. Q-ostling, 1833. ^ jj_ „_ pyg^ ;^y90 ; E. v. Jolmstone,
1" Examples of tlie application of 1793 (by aU the judges); see, also, E.
tlie old law are contained in Powell v. Wardle, 1800.
V. Bradbury, 1849 (see, however, ' E. v. Miaton, 1786.
Lush 1). EusseU, 1850, where this case * For other instances, see E. v.
is denied to be law) ; Smith v. Lovell, Phillips, 1818 ; E. v. Oxford, 1819 ;
1850; Horton v. M'Murtry, 1860; E. v. Summers, 1705; E. v. Hick-
Keller V. Blood, 1861 (Ir.); E. v. man, 1784; E. ■«. Eadley, 1849; E. t;.
M'Kenna, 1842 (Ir.); E. v. Durore, Otway, 1849 (Ir.); E. v. Williams,
1784; and E. v. Upton-on-Severn, 1850; E. v. Kealey, 1851- E v
lti33, Healey, 1824.
» 9 G. 4, c. 41, §§ 9, 29, and 30.
202
CHAP. I.] CUMULATIVE ALLEGATIONS IMMATEEIAL.
negatived any intent to deceive, but found the defendant 'guilty,
held to have been rightly recorded, since, on the charge under the
latter clause of the statute (viz., that of having certifled without
visiting), the averment of intention was mere surplusage.'
§ 264. On the same principle, too, where an indictment charged
the defendants with conspiring to indict the T^TOseontoT fakelt/, with
intent to extort money, they were held to be rightly convicted,
though the jury, in finding them guilty of conspiring to indict
with the intent alleged, expressly negatived any conspiracy to
make a false charge ; for the court observed that a conspiracy to
prefer an indictment for purposes of extortion was doubtless a
misdemeanour, whether the charge were true or false.^ Again,
where a parish was indicted for non-repair of a highway, an alle-
gation that the road in question was an immemorial highway has
been rejected as surplusage ;^ on an indictment ioT jointly receiving
stolen property, persons guilty of separately receiving any part of
such property may by statute be convicted;* and on an indictment
charging a common law offence as having been committed " against
the form of the statute," the allegation in question may be rejected
as surplusage.*
§ 265. The second rule* respecting variances is, that cumulative
allegations, or such as merely operate in aggravation, are immaterial,
provided thai sufficient is proved to establish some right, offence, or
justification, included in the claim, charge, or defence specified on the
record.'^ For example, where a defendant was charged in an in-
formation with composing, printing, and publishing a libel, but no
evidence having been given to show that he was the author, his
counsel having claimed an acquittal, Lord Ellenborough* observed,
" It is enough to prove publication. If an indictment charges that
the defendant did and caused to be done'' a particular act, it is enough
to prove either. The distinction runs through the whole criminal
law ; and it is invariably enough to prove so much of the indiet-
' E. V. Jones, 1831. post, % 280, n. i.
2 E. V. Hollingberry, 1825. « Supra, § 254.
3 E. v. Turweston, 1830. ' E. v. Macpherson, 1869.
* 24 & 25 V. 0. 96 ("The Larceny « geg E. u. Hunt, 1811; S. P. in
Act, 1861 "), § 94. E. V. Williams, 1811 (Lawrence, J.).
* E. V. Mathe-ws, 1793. See, also, » S. P. (Ld. Mansfield) in R. v.
14 & 15 V. c. 100 ("The Criminal Middlehurst, 1757.
Procedure Act, 1851"), § 24, cited
203
CUMULATIVE ALLEGATIONS IMMATERIAL. [PAKT II.
ment as shows that the defendant has committed a substantive
crime therein specified."
§ 266. Accordingly at common law, on an indictment for
murder the prisoner may be convicted of manslaughter, for the
averment of malice aforethought is merely matter of aggravation;'
on an indictment for treason or conspiracy charging several overt
acts, it is suflScient to prove one ; ^ and on an indictment for
obtaining property by several false pretences, it is not necessary to
prove them all, unless they are so connected as to be incapable of
separation,' but it will sufiice to prove the one or more, by which
the property was in fact obtained.*
§ 267. Moreover, if a compound intent, or several intents, be laid
in the indictment, and if one part of the compound intent, or each
of the several intents, when coupled virith the act done, constitute
an offence, it will not be necessary to prove the whole as laid. For
example, an indictment for killing a sheep, with intent to steal the
whole carcase, will be supported by proof of an intent to steal part
of the carcase ; ' if a prisoner be charged with obtaining an order
for a certain sum from the prosecutor with intent to defraud him
of the same, he may be legally convicted, though it appears that
his real intention was to cheat the prosecutor out of a small portion
only of the proceeds of the order ; ^ under the old law a man
accused of assaulting a girl with intent to abuse her and carnally
know her, might be found guilty of an assault with intent to abuse
simply ; ' and a party indicted for publishing a libel with intent to
defame certain magistrates, and also to bring the administration of
justice into contempt, may be found guilty, if the libel was pub-
lished with either of those intents.*
§ 268. But the intent proved must either correspond with, or be
included in, the intent alleged. Thus, it will be a fatal variance if
an indictment for burglary charge an intent to steal, and it be
' Co. Lit. 282 a. part was part of the offence of in-
^ Post. 194. tending to steal the whole, and that
" B. V. Wiokham, 1839. the statute meant to make it im-
^ E. V. Hill, 1811. material whether the intent applied
' E. V. Williams, 1825. The same to the whole, or only to part."
point seems to have been ruled by ° E. v. Leonard, 1848.
Cresswell, J., in E. v. Marley, 1842. ' E.v. Dawson, 1821 (Holroyd, J.).
The principle in both cases was "that ' E. v. Evans, 1821 (Bailey, J.).
the offence of intending to steal a
204
CHAP. I.] HOW FAR INTENT MUST BE PEOVED AS LAID.
shown that the real intent was to commit rape or murder ; ' and a
prisoner charged with burglary and stealing will he acquitted, if no
property was taken, though it appear that the house was entered
with an intent to steal ; and though, had larceny actually heen
committed, he would have heen convicted without any allegation in
the indictment of a felonious intent.^
§§ 269 — 70a. The rule that matters merely of aggravation are
material, provided enough be proved to establish some substantial
right, offence or defence included in the proceeding upon the
record has been adopted by statute on several occasions. For
example, by statute, on an indictment for burglary and stealing,
if the prosecutor establish his case with the exception of proving
that the breaking was by night, the prisoner may be convicted of
housebreaking ; ^ if no breaking be proved, but the property stolen
be laid in the indictment, and be proved by the evidence, to be of
the value of five pounds, the verdict may be guUty of stealing in a
dwelling-house to that amount,* the prisoner may be found guilty
of larceny, if the evidence be not sufficient to prove the commission
of the more aggravated crime ; ' if no satisfactory evidence be
offered to show, either that the house laid in an indictment as such
was a dwelling-house, or some building communicating therewith ;
or that it was the dwelling-house of the party named in the indict-
ment ; or that it was locally situated as therein alleged ; or that
stolen property, laid as of that value, was of the value of five
pounds, provided it appear that any goods were stolen by the
prisoner, he may be convicted of simple larceny ; ^ and the same law
applies on a charge of stealing in a dwelling-house with menaces,'
or of stealing from the person, with or without violence,* or of
stealing as a servant,' while an indictment under the statute for
horse- stealing, though bad for not describing the animal by any
term used in the Act, wiU. support a conviction for larceny ; i" a
1 2 East, P. 0. 514. Brookes, 1847 (Patteson, J.); E. v.
= E. V. Purnival, 1821 ; E. v. Van- Jackson, 1842 (Oresswell, J.),
dercomb, 1796. ' See 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("Tie
3 Under 24 & 25 V. o. 96 ("The Larceny Act, 1861"), §61.
Larceny Act, 1861 "), § 56. ^ ibid., §§ 40, 43.
* Ibid., §60; see E. v. Compton, » E. v. Jennings, 1858; 24 & 25
1828 (Gaseiee, J.). V. o. 96 ("Tie Larceny Act, 1861"),
5 2 Hale, 302 ; 2 East, P. 0. 784. § 67.
6 E. V. Bullock, 1825 ; E. v. i" E. v. Beaney, 1820.
205
HOW FAR INTENT MUST BE PROVED AS LAID. [PART II.
woman charged with the murder of her infant may be convicted of
endeavouring to conceal its birth ; ^ a person indicted for felony in
administering poison so as to endanger life, or to inflict grievous
bodily harm, may be convicted of the misdemeanour of adminis-
tering poison with intent to injure, aggrieve, or annoy some one ; ^
on the trial of an indictment for simple or aggravated robbery,
the jury may convict of a simple or aggravated assault with intent
to rob, if the evidence shall prove such an offence to have been
committed ; ' upon a count for maliciously wounding, or for
maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, against the statute, a
prisoner may be convicted of a common assault, even though the
term " assault " be not found in the indictment ; * and it is pro-
vided' that, "if, on the trial of any person charged with any
felony or misdemeanour," it shall appear to the jury upon the
evidence that the defendant did not complete the offence charged,
but that he was guilty only of an attempt to commit the same,
such person shall not by reason thereof be entitled to be acquitted,
but the jury shall be at liberty to return as their verdict, that the
defendant is not guilty of the felony or misdemeanour charged, but
is guilty of an attempt to commit the same, and thereupon such
person shall be liable to be punished in the same manner as if he
had been convicted upon an indictment for attempting to commit
the particular felony or misdemeanour charged in the said indict-
ment ; and no person, so tried as herein lastly mentioned, shall be
liable to be afterwards prosecuted for an attempt to commit the
felony or misdemeanour for which he was so tried." '
1 24 & 25 V. c. 100 ("The Offences construction of wMot, see E. v. Bird,
against the Person Act, 1861"), § 60. 1851. See E. v. M'Pherson, 1857.
2 Ibid., §25. » See E. v. Eyland, 1868; E. v,
s 24 & 25 V. c. 96 (" The Larceny Hapgood and Wyatt, 1870.
Act, 1861 "), § 41 ; E. v. MitcheU, ' The Articles of War for the
1852. See E. v. Woodhall, 1872 government of the Navy establish
(Denman, J.). rules similar to those recognized by
* E, V. Taylor, 1868; E. v. Can- canon and statute law. "The Naval
well, 1869 ; E. v. OHver, 1860 ; E. v. Discipline Act, 1866 " (29 & 30 V.
Yeadon, 1861. See, also, E. v. c. 109), expressly enacts, indeed, in
Guthrie, 1870. § 48, that " where any prisoner shall
" 14 & 15 V. 0. 100 ("The Criminal be charged with murder, a court-
Procedure Act, 1851 "), § 9, replacing martial may find him guilty of man-
7 W. 4 & 1 V. 0. 85, § 11 (which was slaughter, or of a common assault;
worded differently, and is repealed where he shall be charged with
by 14&15Y. c. 100, § 10); as to the sodomy, a court-martial may find
206
CHAP. I.] CUMULATIVE ALLEGATIONS IN CIVIL MATTERS.
§ 271 — 7. The rule that mere " cumulate allegations," or " aver-
ments in aggravation," need not he proved not only prevails in
crimiaal cases, hut equally ohtaias in civil actions. For instance,
in an action for defamation, if the plaintiff allege special damage, he
need not prove it, provided the words be actionable per se ; ' in an
action on a policy of insurance, the material allegation is the loss ;
but whether total or partial, is a mere question of degree ; and if
the former be alleged, proof of the latter is sufficient.'' In all
cases, indeed, a party may in his statement of claim sue for a less
right than he is able to prove, provided that the lesser right claimed
does not differ in kind from, but is included in, the greater right
proved.^
§ 278 — 9. The third rule * with regard to variances is that mere
formal allegations need not be proved. " Formal allegations "
comprise, — among other matters, — all those averments of phce,
time, number, ralue, quality, and the like, which may be inserted
in the pleadings, without being either essentially descriptive of the
subject of the claim or charge, or otherwise rendered material by
special circumstances, and also a multitude of other idle statements,
which, in former times, English lawyers loved to introduce into
Tii'tti guilty of an indecent assault; be charged with desertion may be
■where he diall be charged with theft, found guilty of attempting to desert,
a court-martial may find >n'Tn guilty or of being abroad without leave ;
of an attempt to lideve, or of em- and if he be charged with attempt-
bezzlement, or of wrongful appro- ing to desert may be found guilty of
priation of property belonging to desertion or of illegal absence. The
another; and, generally, where any section then concludes with a general,
prisoner shall be charged with any but not very happily expressed, en-
offence under this Act, he miay, upon actment, that "a prisoner charged
failure of proof of the commission of before a court-martial with any oiher
the greater offence, be found guilty offence under this Act may, on failure
of another offence of the same class of proof of an offence being corn-
involving a less degree of punish- nutted under circumstances , inrolv-
ment, but not of any offence involv- ing a higher degree of punishment,
ing a greater degree of punishment." be found guilty of the same offence as
"The Army Act, 1881" (44 & 45 being committed imdercircimistancea
V. c. 58), in § 56 thereof, also con- involving a less degree of punish-
tains provisions to the same effect, ment."
and enacting that any prisoner ' Smith v. Thomas, 1835 (Tindal,
charged before a court-martial with C. J.).
stealing may be found guilty of em- ' Grardner v. Croasdale, 1760 ;
bezzlement, or of fraudulently mis- Benson v. Chapman, 1848, H. L. ;
applying money or property ; and if King v. Walker, 1863.
he be charged wilh embezzlement ' Duncan v. Louch, 1845 ; Bailey
may be convicted of stealing, or of v. Appleyaxd, 1838 (Coleridge, J.),
fraudulent misapplication ; and if he * Supra, § 254.
207
rOEMAL ALLEGATIONS NEED NOT BE PEOVED. [PAET II.
every legal document. Since the modern amendments in tlie law,
the rule in question has fortunately become a matter more of his-
torical curiosity than of present practical interest.
§ 280. Indeed, so far as civil actions are concerned, this rule has
passed into a dead letter ; and Lord Campbell's Act of 1851,'
renders it of little importance even in criminal cases. With regard
to averments of place, it is now sufficient in all cases, excepting
where local description is required, to state in the margin of the
indictment the county, city, or other jurisdiction, as the venue for
all the facts averred in the body of the indictment.^
1 14 & 15 V. c. 100 ("The Criminal
Procedure Act, 1851 "), § 23, enact-
ing, that "it shall not be necessary
to state any venue in the body of
any indictment, but the county, city
or other jurisdiction named in the
margin thereof shall be taken to be
the venue for all the facts stated in
the body of such indictment ; pro-
vided that in cases where local de-
scription is or hereafter shall be re-
quired, such local description shall be
given in the body of the indictment ;
and provided also, that where an in-
dictment for an offence committed in
the county of any city or town corpo-
rate shall be preferred at the assizes
of the adjoining county, such county
of the city or town shall be deemed
the venue, and may either be stated
in the margin of the indictment, with
or without the name of the county in
which the offender is to be tried, or be
stated in the body of the indictment
by way of venue." § 24 enacts, that
" no indictment for any offence shall
be held insufficient for want of the
averment of any matter unnecessary
to be proved, nor for the omission of
the words ' as appears by the record,'
or of the words ' with force and
arms,' or of the words 'against the
peace,' nor for the insertion of the
words ' against the form of the
statute,' instead of ' against the form
of the statutes,' or vice versa, nor for
that any person mentioned in the
indictment is designated by a name
of office, or other descriptive appella-
tion instead of his proper name, nor
for omitting to state the time at
208
which the oflence was committed in
any case where time is not of the
essence of the offence, nor for stating
the time imperfectly, nor for stating
the offence to have been committed
on a day subsequent to the finding of
the indictment, or on an impossible
day, or on a day that never happened,
nor for want of a proper or perfect
venue, nor for want of a proper or
formal conclusion, nor for want of or
imperfection in the addition of any
defendant, nor for want of the state-
ment of the value or price of any
matter or thing, or the amount of
damage, injury, or spoil, in any case
where the value or price, or the
amount of damage, injury, or spoil,
is not of the essence of the offence."
§ 25 enacts, that " every objection to
any indictment for any formal defect
apparent on the fai e thereof shall be
taken, by demurrer or motion to
quash such indictment, before the
jury shall be sworn, and not after-
wards ; and every court, before
which any such objection shall be
taken for the formal defect, may, if
it be thought necessary, cause the
indictment to be forthwith amended
in such particular by some officer of
the court or other person, and there-
upon the trial shall proceed as if no
such defect had appeared."
'^ As to the former law, see E. v.
HoUond, 1794; E. v. Haynes, 1815;
E. V. Feargus O'Connor, 1843; 7
G. 4, c. 64 ("The Criminal Law
Act, 1826"), § 20. Even before the
Act it was no objection in the case
of a transitory felony that there was
CHAP. I.] AVERMENTS OF PLACE — LOCAL OFFENCES.
§ 281. In indictments, however, for those offences which the law
regards as bearing a local character, the proof respecting the place
must still correspond with the allegation ; though probably in
many cases of variance on this point the courts would sanction an
amendment of the record.^ The distinction between local and tran-
sitory offences is not very clearly drawn, but among local offences
are — among others — burglary,^ but not highway robbery ;' house-
breaking; * stealing in a dwelling-house ; ' sacrilege ; * riotously de-
molishing churches, houses, machinery, &c. ; ' maliciously firing a
dwelling-house, perhaps an out-house, but not a stack ; * forcible
entry ; ° poaching ; " nuisances to highways ; " and malicious in-
juries to sea-banks, mill-danas, or other local property. In most
of these cases it is sufficient to allege and prove the parish, town-
ship, or other local district, less than a county, in which the offence
was committed;'^ but in some, a more aociirate description is
necessary.
§ 282. For example, an indictment for not repairing a highway
must specify the situation of the road within the parish, and any
substantial variance between the description and the evidence will
be material ; ^^ on an indictment for night poaching, it has been
held, by a majority of the judges, that the locus in quo must be
described either by name, ownership, occupation, or abuttals, and
that it is not sufficient to allege that the prisoner was found " in a
certain close in the parish of A ; " " but on a charge of taking or
no such, parish in the county as that "^ E. v. Great Canfield, 1810 ; E.
in which the oflenoe was stated to v. Upton-on-Severn, 1833; E. v.
haye been committed : E. v. Wood- Steventon, 1843. See E. v. March,
ward, 1831 ; E. v. Bowling, 1826. Dow. of Downshire, 1835 ; E. v.
1 14 & 15 V. 0. 100 ("The Criminal Waverton, 1851. If a carriage-way
Procedure Act, 1851 "), § 1, cited is described as a bridle-way, the
ante, § 249. variance is material: E. v. St.
2 1 Euss. 0. & M. 826; E. v. Weonard's, 1834. See, also, E. v.
St. John, 1839. Lyon, 1824.
3 E. V. Dowling, 1826. " E. v. Eidley, 1823, under the
* E. V. Bullock, 1825. repealed Act of 57 G. 3, c. 90, § 1 ;
« E. ■;;. Napper, 1824; E. v. Jarrald, E. v. Crick, 1832 (Vaughan, B.),
1863. under 9 G. 4, c. 69 ("The Night
8 Arch. Or. PI. 57, and p. 457 of Poaching Act, 1828"), § 9. In E. ■;;.
21st edit. (1893). Owen, 1826, where the close was
' E. ■;;. Eichards, 1832. described by name and occupation,
^ E. V. Woodward, 1831. but the name proved was diiierent
" 2 Leon. 186. from that alleged, the judges held
'" E. V. Eidley, 1823. that the variance was fatal. See E.
" E. V. Steventon, 1843. v. Andrews, 1837 (Gurney, B.), and
^ See E. V. Napper, 1824. E. v. Eaton, 1851.
T, VOL. I. 209 P
AVERMENTS OF PLACE. [PAET II.
destroying fisK in water adjoining a dwelling-house, if the houndary
of any parish, township, or vill, happen to be in or hy the side of
such water, it is by statute sufHoient to prove that the offence was
committed either in the parish, township, or Till, named in the
indictment, or in any such local district adjoining the water ; ' and
if the charge be that of stealing oysters, or oyster brood, the bed,
laying, or fishery may also by statute be described by name or
otherwise, without stating it to be in any particular parish, town-
ship, or vill.^ Moreover, an indictment for an affray cannot be
sustained, unless it contain an averment that the offence was com-
mitted in a public street or highway, and unless that averment be
supported by corresponding proof.'
§ 283. Why a burglar should be entitled to more accurate infor-
mation respecting the house he is charged with having entered,
than the highway robber can claim as to the spot where his offence
is stated to have been committed, it is impossible to say ; either
full information should be given in all cases or in none.
§ 284. Excepting in the very few cases where time is of the
essence of the offence, an indictment,* too, need not contaia any
allegation respecting time.^
§ 285. Allegations of number and value are, also, in general
immaterial in indictments. Thus, if a party be charged with steal-
ing five horses, he may be convicted of stealing one ; and if he be
indicted for larceny or robbery, and the property be laid as of the
value of twenty shillings, the offence will be complete, though it
1 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("Tlie Larceny what year of our Lord, '^' I would
Act, 1861 "), § 24. not give a liaUpenny to know,' said
* Id. § 26. my Uncle Toby. ' Only, an' please
' E. V. O'Neill, 1871 (Ir.). your Honour, it makes a story look the
* So as to coroner's inquisitions ; hetttr in the face.' ' Leave out the
see " The Coroners Act, 1887 " (50 & date entirely. Trim;' said my Uncle,
51 V. c. 71), § 20; and see, also, E. 'a story passes very well without these
V. Ingham, 1864. -niceties, unless one is pretty sure of
0 14 & 15 V. c. 100 ("The Criminal 'em!'" Even before the statute,
Procedure Act, 1851"), § 24, cited where a court had no jurisdiction to
ante, § 280, n. ', on p. 208. The old try a criminal, except for an oSence
rule required a day to be specified, committed after a certain day, no
but did not require that day to be objection could be taken to the in-
proved. But the legislature has dictment in arrest of judgment, for
now adopted my Uncle Toby's reply alleging that the act was done before
to Corporal Trim's argument in that day, when the jury had ex-
telling his unfortunate story of the pressly found that this was not
King of Bohemia. "'There was a correct. See, also, E. v. Treharne,
certain King of Bohemia, but in 1831 ; and E. v. Levy, 1819.
210
CUAP. I.] ALLEGATIONS OF NUMBER AND VALUE-
appear that the article stolen was of less value than any coin of the
realm, provided that it was of some value to the owner.'
§ 286. In certain cases, however, value is essential to constitute
the offence ; as where a bankrupt is indicted for fraudulently con-
cealing or removing property to the value of ten pounds,^ or for
absconding with property to the amount of twenty pounds,' or a
person is indicted for maliciously injuring property to an amount
exceeding five pounds,* or a tenant is indicted for stealing a chattel
or fixture let to him with his house or lodging, and exceeding the
value of five pounds,' or a party is charged with stealing in a
dwelling-house chattels, &c., to that amount,' or with stealing, or
with destroying or damaging, either maliciously or with intent to
steal, any trees in a park, pleasure-ground, garden, or orchard,
above the value of one pound, or any trees elsewhere above the
value of five pounds.' In such cases as these, the evidence must so
far correspond with the allegation as to show that the statutable
offence has been committed : that is, the property fraudulently or
maliciously dealt with, stolen, or destroyed, must be proved, as well
as alleged, to" be of the requisite value ; though if this be done, the
exact amount specified in the indictment need not be proved.
Where ' a bankrupt was charged with concealing his property, and
the indictment, — after specifying many articles without stating the
separate value of each, — added these words, " and also one hundred
' E. V. Morris, 1840 (Parke, B.) ; stated, but it will be sufficient to
E. V. Bingley, 1833 (Gurney, B.) ; allege that tbe amount of the aggre-
E. V. Olark, 1810. The fact of the gate damage exceeded ol. : E. v.
article being in the possession of the Thoman, 1871.
prosecutor is, in general, evidence * 24 & 25 V. c. 96 (*' The Larceny
that it was of value to him. Id. Act, 1861 "), § 74. If the value of
" 32 & 33 V. o. 62 (" The Debtors the property stolen do not exceed 51.,
Act, 1869"), § 11, subs. 4, 5; as the prisoner is not Kable to penal
amended by 46 & 47 V. c. 52 ("The servitude. Id.
Bankruptcy Act, 1883"), § 163, and « 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("The Larceny
53 & 54 V. 0. 71 ("The Bankruptcy Act, 1861 "), § 60.
Act, 1890"), § 26; 35 & 36 V. c. 57, ' 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("The Larceny
§ 11, subs. 4, 5, Ir. Act, 1861"), § 32; 24 & 25 V.
' 32 & 33 V. 0. 62, § 12; as c. 97 ("The Malicious Damage Act,
amended by 46 & 47 V. 0. 52, § 163; 1861 '0, §§ 20, 21. Where several
35 & 36 V. c. 57, § 12, Ir. trees have been stolen or damaged
* 24 & 25 V. c. 97 ("The Malicious at the same time, their collective
Damage Act, 1861^'), § 51. The value wiU satisfy the Act: E. v,
damage must be. done at one time: Shepherd, 1868.
E. V. Williams, 1862 (Ir.). The value » E. v. Eorsyth, 1814 (aU the
of each article injured need not be Judges).
211 ^2
ALLEGATIONS OF NUMBER AND VALUE. [PART II.
other articles of furniture and a certain debt due from J. T. to tlie
prisoner, to the value of twenty pounds and upwards ;" ' the indict-
ment was held bad, as all the property concealed was not specified,
and no distinct value was put upon the articles enumerated. It,
therefore, would seem that where value, being material, is ascribed
to several articles collectively, the offence must be made out as to
each of those articles.
§ 287. Descriptions of the subject-matter of the offence are also,
in many cases, unnecessary. Thus in an indictment for embezzle-
ment against a clerk or servant, or against a person employed either
in her Majesty's public service, or in the police, if the offence
relate to any money or valuable security, it is sufficient to allege
that money was embezzled, without specifying any particular coin
or valuable security ; and such allegation may be supported by
equally loose evidence ; ^ and it seems, even by proof of a general
deficiency of money that ought to be forthcoming, without showing
from what persons the money was received, or of what coins it con-
sisted, or that any particular sum was received, and not accounted
for by the prisoner.' So, also, " in any indictment in "which it shall
be necessary to make any averment as to any money,* or any note
of the Bank of England, or any other bank, it shall be sufficient to
describe such money or bank-note simply as money, without speci-
fying any particular coin or bank-note ; and such allegation, so far
as regards the description of the property, shall be sustained by
proof of any amount of coin or of any bank-note, although the
particular species of coin of which such amount was composed, or the
particular nature of the bank-note, shall not be proved ; and in
cases of embezzlement and obtaining money or bank-notes by false
pretences, by proof that the offender embezzled or obtained any
piece of coin or any bank-note, or any portion of the value thereof,
although such piece of coin or bank-note may have been delivered
to him in order that some part of the value thereof should be
returned to the party delivering the same, or to any other person,
and such part shall have been returned accordingly." ^
' This case was decided under the including the three chiefs against
repealed Act of 5 G. 2, c. 30, § 1. seven).
^ 24 & 25 V. 0. 96 ("The Larceny * See E. v. Gumhle, 1872.
Act, 1861 "), § 71. ^ 14 & 15.V. c. 100 ("The Criminal
' E. V. Grove, 1833 (eight judges Procedure Act, 1851 "), § 18.
212
CHAP. I.] ALLEGATIONS OF QUALITY.
§ 288. Allegations of quality (or, in other words, those allegations
which describe the mode in which certain acts have been done) may
often be omitted from an indictment, and it is seldom necessary to
prove them with precision. For example, in an indictment^ for
murder or manslaughter, it is unnecessary to set forth the manner
in which, or the means by which, the death of the deceased was
caused ; but it is sufficient to charge that the defendant did felo-
niously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought kill and murder
the deceased, or, in an indictment for manslaughter, that he did
feloniously kill and slay him.^ Moreover, should an indictment
for homicide unnecessarily allege the means of death, it would be
quite sufficient for the proof to agree with the allegation in its
general character, without precise conformity in every particular.
Similarly, on a charge of felonious assault, if it be alleged that it
was committed with a staff, and the proof be that it was done with
a stone ; or if a wound, alleged to have been given with a sword,
be proved to have been inflicted by an axe ; or if a pistol be
stated to have been loaded with a btdlet, and it turns out to have
been loaded with some other destructive material,^ the charge is
substantially proved, and no variance occurs.*
§ 289. The fourth general and remaining rule ' as to variances is
that allegations of matter of essential description must be proved as
laid. The only practical mode of understanding this rule is to
examine some of the leading decisions on the subject, and then to
apply the reasoning or ruling contained therein to other analogous
cases, always bearing in mind that the judges now have large
powers of granting amendments both in civil and in criminal pro-
ceedings." And first, with respect to the criminal law, it is now
clearly established, that the name or nature of the property stolen or
damaged is matter of essential description. For example, the variance
is fatal if, on a charge of firing a stack of hay, it turns out to
* THs term includes inquisitions Ld. Campbell's Act in 1851, E. v.
taken before coroners; E. v. Ingham, M'Oonkey, 1841(Ir.)(Torrens, J.); E.
1864. V. Waters, 1832 ; E. ■;;. Oulkin, 1832 ;
2 24 & 25 V. 0. 100 (" The Offences E. v. Thompson, 1826 ; E. v. KeUy,
against the Person Act, 1861 "),§ 6. 1825; E. v. Mosley, 1825; E. v.
» E. V. Oxford, 1840. See E. v. Tomlinson, 1834 (Patteson, J.); E.
Hughes, 1832, the marginal note of v. Turner, 1830 (Parke, B.); E. v.
which is misleading. Warman, 1846.
* 1 East, P. 0. 341 ; E. v. Martin, ^ Supra, § 254.
1832 (Parke, B.). See, further, as » See ante, §§ 220—225, 249.
to the law prior to the passing of
213
MATTER OF ESSENTIAL DESCEIPTION. [PAET II.
have been a stack of wheat ; or if a man be accused of stealing a
drake, and it is proved to have been a goose, or even a duck,
unless, indeed, an amendment be permitted.^ An instance of the
application of this rule, before amendments were as liberally-
allowed as now, occurred some years ago at assizes. A man,
charged with stealing " a slop," the theft of which was clearly
proved, when called upon for his defence, exclaimed, " Why, my
lord, it ain't no slop." " You hear what he says," observed the
judge to the jury. " Is it a slop, gentlemen ? " " No, my lord,
it's a smock," said they. " Then you must acquit the prisoner."
He was acquitted ; but the grand jury not being discharged, a
second indictment was preferred and found, charging him with
stealing " a smock." Nothing daunted, the prisoner now pleaded
autrefois acquit, and called several witnesses to prove that the
article he had stolen was in fact a slop, and this question was sub-
mitted to a second jury with much gravity by the learned judge.^
§ 290. Where the stealing of specified animals is made a sta-
tutable offence, it seems sufficient to use the generic term which
includes the whole species, even though the language of the Act
should be more specific. Thus, on an indictment for sheep stealing,
framed under an Act ^ making it penal to steal any '" ram, ewe,
sheep, or lamb," charging a man with killing a sheep, with intent
to steal the carcase, it having been proved that a sheep was killed,
but the sex could not be discovered, a great majority of the judges
held that " sheep " was a generic term, which included equally
rams, ewes, and wethers, and confirmed the conviction ; * an in-
dictment for stealing a sheep will now be supported by evidence of
killing a lamb ; ^ but whether a charge of stealing a horse would
» Under § 1 of 14 & 15 V. o. 100 of 7 & 8 G. 4, o. 29, § 25, specified
("The Oriminal Procedure Act, lambs as well as sheep. In an old
1851 "), cited ante, § 249. Act of 25 H. 8, o. 13, §§ 2, 13, which
* 29 Law Mag. 12, 13. is now repealed by 19 & 20 V. o. 64,
' 7 & 8 G. 4, 0. 29, § 25 (now and which prohibited persons from
repealed). The same words are now having above 2,000 sheep, it was
contained in 24 & 25 V. c. 96 (" The expressly enacted, that "lambs under
Larceny Act, 1861 "), § 10. the age of one whole year shall not
* E. V. M'OuUey, 1838; E. v. be adjudged for sheep prohibited by
Bannam, 1839 (Ir.j. These cases the statute." The special insertion
overrule E. v. Puddifoot, 1829. of such a clause leads rather to an
' E. V. Spicer, 1845, overruling R. inference, that, without it, the men-
V. Loom, 1827. The decision in E. tion of the grown animal would have
V. Loom was under the repealed Act included the young. See next note,
of 15 Q. 2, 0. 34, which, like the Act
214
CHAP. I.] SUBSTANCE OF OFFENCE.
he sustained by proof of stealing a gelding, a mare, a colt, or a
filly,' is by no means clear.
§ 291. Wben forgery was a capital offence, on prosecutions for
that offence great nicety was required in describiag the instrument
forged. The law, however, is now happily amended, and the
punishment for forgery has become less severe but more certain.
For the Act of 1861, now governing the law on this subject,^ by
§ 42, enacts that, " in any indictment for forging, altering, offering,
uttering, disposing of, or putting off, any instrument, it shall be
sufficient to describe such instrument by any name or designation
by which the same may be usually known, or by the purport
thereof, without settiag out any copy or fac-simile thereof, or
otherwise describing the same or the value thereof." A similar
laxity of description is permitted, whenever any person is indicted
for engraving or making " any instrument, matter, or thing," or
for using or unlawfully possessing any plate, material, or paper on
which any instrument, matter, or thing shall have been engraved,
made, or printed.'
§ 292. Moreover in indictments, too, for offences raider the
Debtors Act, 1869,* or the Bankruptcy Act, 1883,^ it is sufficient
to " set forth the substance of the offence charged, in the words of
the Act specifying the offence, or as near thereto as circumstances
admit, without alleging or setting forth any debt, act of bank-
ruptcy, trading, adjudication, or any proceeding in, or order,
warrant or document of, any court acting under the Bankruptcy
Act, 1883." 5
§ 293. Grenerally speaking, the name of the person injured,^ and,
indeed, the name of every person necessarily mentioned in the
1 Probably it would be good ; * 32 & 33 V. c. 62, § 19 ; amended
" horse, mare, gelding, colt or filly " by 46 & 47 V. c. 52, § 149, subs. 2.
are tbe words used in 24 & 25 V. ^ 46 & 47 V. c. 52, §§ 31, 163—167.
c, 96 ("The Larceny Act, 1861"), "The Irish Debtors Act, 1872,"
§ 10. Under an old Act, which only contains a similar provision. 35 &
mentioned "horses, geldings, and 36 V. c. 57, § 19, Ir.
mares," proof of stealing a filly was ° See, as to the old law on this
held to support an indictment for subject, E. v. Biss, 1838; E. v.
stealing a mare : E. v. WeUand, Eobinson, 1817 ; E. v. Campbell,
1822. 1843; E. v. Waters, 1848; E. v.
M4 & 25 v. c. 98 ("The Forgery Willis, 1845; E. v. Stroud, 1842; E.
Act, 1861"), § 42. V. Sweeny, 1841 (Ir.); E. v. Smith,
' IbiJ. § 43. 1833 ; E. v. Evans, 1839 ; E. v.
Sheen, 1837; E. v. Hogg, 1841.
215
NAMES AND DESCRIPTIONS IN INDICTMENTS. [PAET II.
indictment,' is matter of essential description, and formerly it must
have been proved with precision. There is, however, little room
for doubt that the court would now, in every case of mere
misiiomer,^ direct an amendment to he made almost as a matter of
course.* Still a question may eccasionally arise as to what the
nature of the amendment ought to be, and as to this, the following
rules, therefore, may furnish some guide : — Ist. If the name of the
injured party cannot be proved, it will suffice to describe him as a
person " whose name is to the jurors unknown." * 2nd. It is not
necessary to describe a party by what is, in strictness, his right
name ; but it will be sufficient to state any name he has assumed,'
or by which he is generally known, and the omission of a second
christian name has been frequently held to be immaterial.' 3rd.
An illegitimate child is not entitled to the surname either of the
mother or of the putative father, but can only acquire a surname
by reputation.' 4th. The proper mode of describing a peer is by
his christian name and rank in the peerage ; but the christian
name may be omitted ; * and it seems that under the degree of a
duke, a nobleman may be designated by the simple title of " lord."°
6th. Foreigners of rank may be described by their christian names
and foreign titles, provided they be generally known by those
appellations ; '" or it will suffice, as it seems, to describe them by
' See, as to tlie old law on this Williams v. Bryant, 1839. But see
subject, E. V. Dunmurry, 1841 (Ir.); E. v. M'Anerney, 1841 (Ir.) (Oramp-
E. V. Walker, 1811 ; E. v. Bust, ton, J.).
1818. ' E. V. Waters, 1835; E. v. Clark,
2 See E. V. Walton, 1862. 1818.
•- Under § 1 of 14 & 15 V. c. 100 " E. v. Frost, 1855.
(" The Criminal Procedure Act, " E. v. Pitts, 1839, where the pro-
1851 "), cited ante, § 249. ' secutor was described as "George
* See E. V. Welton, 1862. Talbot Eice, Lord Dynevor," instead
' E. V. Norton, 1823. See E. v. of "George Talbot, Baron Dynevor;"
WiUiams, 1836. In E. v. Toole, 1857, E. v. Elliott, 1839, where the words
where the only proof of the prose- were, " The Eight Honourable Wil-
cutor's christian name was the state- liam Fitzhaidinge, Lord Segrave,"
meut of a witness, who said that he he being an earl. It seems that
had seen the prosecutor sign the " Edward, Bishop of Hereford," is
charge against the prisoner, and the not a right description : E. v. Pitts,
deposition before the magistrates, supra.
and that the signatures of those "• E. v, Gregory, 1846, where the
documents, which the witness iden- prosecutor was held sufficiently de-
tified, corresponded with the name scribed as "Charles Frederick Au-
laid in the indictment, the court held gustus William, Duke of Brunswick
that the evidence was sufficient. and Luneberg," his name being Oh.
« Att.-Gen. v. Hawkes, 1830 ; E. v. Fr. Aug. Wm. D'Este, and he having
Berriman, 1833; E. v. , 1834; ceased to be the reigning Duke ; E. w.
216
CH. I.] NAME OF INJURED PAETY NEED NOT BE PROVED.
their christian and surnames, with the addition of the word esquire,
that heing the title which English courtesy confers on foreign
noblemen.' 6th. If a parent and child bear the same name, it wiU
suffice in an indictment to describe the latter by that name without
the addition of " junior." ^ And lastly, where joint-stock com-
panies, trustees, or other joint owners have been injured, several
Acts of Parliament have been passed, which render it sufficient in
such cases to describe in the indictment one person only by name,
and to state that the offence has been committed against that
person, and another or others, as the case may be.' The same de-
scription ^ is allowed, under certain circumstances, in informations
or complaints before justices of the peace.
§ 294. In some few instances it has been expressly provided by
statute that, to justify a conviction, the name of the injured party
need neither be alleged nor proved. For instance, on an indict-
ment against a person for any offence against the Act of 1861
relating to malicious injuries to property, it will suffice to allege
and prove that the prisoner did the act charged with intent to
injure or defraud, and no allegation or proof is necessary that the
prisoner intended to injure or defraud any particular person ; *
the law is the same in prosecutions " for forging, altering,
uttering, offering, disposing of, or putting off, any instrument," *
or for obtaining, or attempting to obtain, any chattel, money, or
valuable security by false pretences ; ' — and, in this last case, the
indictment will be good,' " without alleging any ownership of the
chattel, money, or valuable security." Similarly, in indictments
for stealing, or fraudulently destroying, or concealing wills,' or for
stealing, or fraudulently taking, or maliciously destroying, records
Sulls, 1800, where, in an indictment ' 7 G-. 4, c. 64 ("The Criminal Law
for larceny, the goods stolen were held Act, 1826"), § 14. See, also, 7 G. 4,
to be properly laid as the property of c. 46 ("The Country Bankers Act,
Victory, Baroness Turkheim, the pro- 1826 "), § 9.
secutrixbeing an Alsatian lady, whose * 11 & 12 V. c. 43 ("The Summary
real name was Selina Victoire. In Jurisdiction Act, 1848"), §4.
both these cases the parties were well ' 24 & 25 V. c. 97 ^"The Malicious
known by the names used. Damage Act, 1861 "), § 60. See E.
' E. V. Graham, 1791. v. Newboult, 1872 (C. C. E.).
» E. V. Peace, 1820; E. v. Hodg- « 24 & 25 V. o. 98 ("The Forgery
son, 1831 (Parke, B.) ; E. v. Bland, Act, 1861 "), § 44.
1832 (Bolland, C); Sweeting v. ' 24 & 25 V. c. 96 (" The Larceny
Fowler, 1815; E. v. Bayley, 1835. Act, 1861 "), § 88.
See ante, § 195. « Id. § 29.
217
DESCRIPTIVE ALLEGATIONS IN ACTIONS. [PAET II.
or legal documents,' or for stealing fixtures attached to any square,
street, or place dedicated to public use or ornament,^ it is not neces-
sary to allege that " the article in respect of which the offence is
committed is the property of any person."
§ 295. The prisoner's name is not a matter of essential descrip-
tion, because on this subject the prosecutor may have no means of
obtaining correct information. Therefore, if it, or his addition, be
wrongly described, or the addition omitted, the court may correct
the error, and call upon the prisoner to plead to the amended
indictment.'
§ 296. The rule that proof must be given of descriptive allega-
tions, which are essential, need not be illustrated with regard to
civil actions, because that subject has already been discussed, while
examining the cases that have been decided on the Eules authorising
amendments.*
' 24 & 25 V. c. 96 (" The Larceny the murder of her husband, being
Act, 1861 "), § 30. described as " A., the wife of B. 0.,"
^ Id. § 31. the record was amended by inserting
= 7 G. 4, c. 64 ("The Criminal Law the word "widow" instead of "wife"
Act, 1826"), § 19. See E. v. Orchard, (Ld. Abinger).
1838, where a woman charged with * Ante, § 227 et seq.
218
CHAP, v.] AMEEICAN NOTES. 2181
AMEEICAISr NOTES.
Relation of Pleading to Evidence The rules of pleading exert
in certain directions a controlling influence upon the admissibility of
evidence. They determine also which party has the onus of convin-
cing the tribunal, to a predetermined extent, of the truth of facts in
issue. As the only admissible evidence is that bearing on facts in
the issue or relevant to the issue, the issue is an absolute limitation
upon the facts provable in any given case. As such, a very natural
habit may be noticed on the part of the court to rule that evidence
offered to prove facts other than those in issue or relevant thereto,
is not admissible to prove such facts ; — as if such an exclusion
were under some rule of evidence.
The truth, however, frequently is that, in such a case, the evi-
dence offered is excluded not by the rules of evidence, but by those
of pleading. Very possibly the evidence offered to prove the fact
is perfectly competent by the rules of evidence to prove it if the
fact itself were competent. It is not, and therefore evidence to
prove it is not admissible. The pleadings have not made the fact as
to which evidence is offered relevant, — a circumstance which the
rules of evidence themselves have no power to control.
Per contra, a ruling is frequently made that evidence is admissible
to prove a certain fact when no possible question has been or could
be raised that the evidence is competent to prove the fact in any
case where the fact itself would be admissible, and all that such
ruling in reality amounts to is a statement that under the pleadings
the fact itself can be proved.
The object and function of the pleadings being to bring the par-
ties to an issue of fact upon some one or more material fact or facts
afftrmed on the one side and denied on the other, it is of importance
in any given case to determine what facts are material, for it is only
on these that issue can be taken. To ascertain this, namely, what
are the material allegations of fact in any case, resort must be had
neither to the law of evidence (which decides how a fact in issue may
be proved) nor to the law of pleading (which determines what material
facts are placed in issue, and how it should properly be done) but to
the rules of the branch of the substantive law involved in the case.
In other words, what allegations are material in any given matter is
a question of positive law ; which of these material allegations is
placed in issue, is a question of pleading ; how such allegation, when
placed in issue is to be proved or disproved is a question of evidence.
There seems, as has been said, an unfortunate tendency to turn
many of the rules of positive law or pleading into rules of evidence
simply by saying that evidence is not admissible to prove a certain
fact, or that the opposite of it is " conclusively presumed " when
21 8^ AMEBIC AN NOTES. [PAET H.
■what is meant is that, as a matter of pleading, the fact is not in
issue or perhaps, as a matter of positive law, is not material. Or,
on the other hand, to rule, as if on a point in the law of evidence, that
evidence is admissible to prove a certain fact when what is meant is
that, as .matter of positive law, the fact is material and that, as a
matter of pleading, it has been placed in issue.
That the evidence offered must tend to prove some fact placed in
issue by the pleadings, is abundantly sustained by aiithority.
" It is a settled principle, that no evidence can be admissible,
which does not tend to prove or disprove the issue joined." Hudson
V. State, 3 Cold. 355 (1866). " The principle is, that all the evidence
admitted must be pertinent to the point in issue." Com. v. Choate,
105 Mass. 451 (1870).
" Evidence was introduced .... tending to show that the defend-
ant held possession of the property under some other right than
under the contract. In so holding the Court erred, for the reason
that there was no such issue." Moline Plow Co. v. Braden, 71 la.
141 (1887).
" The fact that, &c did not tend to prove or disprove the
issue joined." Hawkins v. James, 69 Miss. 274 (1891).
"The end and purpose of testimony in legal piroceedings is to
arrive at the truth of the issues between the parties." TurnbuU v.
Eichardson, 69 Mich. 400 (1888). "Collateral facts are not admis-
sible. The evidence must be relevant to the issue, that is, to the
facts put in controversy by the pleadings." Nickerson v. Gould, 82
Me. 512 (1890); Grand Trunk R. R. Co. v. Eichardson, 91 U. S.
454, 469 (1876).
Where the issue is not defined, " and where of course, at the time,
it is often impossible to anticipate what questions may arise in the
course of the trial, the rule in such cases is, that the testimony
should be received, if it is competent evidence in any view of the
case which may be thereafter taken." Harris v. Holmes, 30 pt 362
(1858) per Eedfield, C. J.
Evidence Admitted db bene. — As a party can prove but one fact
at a time ; and as a strictly logical order of proof, especially when
offered by different witnesses, is not always possible, except at great
practical inconvenience, courts frequently receive evidence condi-
tionally upon its being connected later ; i, e. made relevant and
otherwise admissible. " We agree," say the supreme court of Con-
necticut, " with the defendants' counsel that, as a general rule, no
evidence should be admitted till the court can see that it is admis-
sible. Where however the admissibility of evidence depends upon
several facts, to some extent independent of each other, and where
each fact must be proved to complete the chain of evidence, the exer-
cise of a sound judicial discretion does not require the court, uni-
formly, to interfere in the order of the testimony. A beginning
CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTES. 218^
must be made somewhere ; and when, as in the present case, the court
is satisfied that the party is acting in good faith, and intends fairly
to supply each particular link till the chain of testimony is perfect,
the evidence, as offered, may come in, subject to objection, to be
stricken out and go for nothing if the necessary connecting portion
be not supplied." Moppin v. ^tna Axle, &c. Co., 41 Conn. 27
(1874).
Such a ruling, being as to the order in which the evidence may be
introduced, is matter of judicial discretion, and therefore not a mat-
ter to which an exception may be taken. Com. v. Dam, 107 Mass.
210 (1871).
Tf the condition is not complied with, and the other side does not
ask to have it stricken out or disregarded, there is no error on the
part of the court in not itself taking action in regard to the matter.
Reeve v. Dennett, 145 Mass. 23 (1887).
Eelbvancy. — Whether a fact tends to establish the existence or
non-existence of a fact in issue is a question of logic. As the views
of particular judges naturally differ as to the logical effect of facts,
it is not surprising to have the supreme court of Maine say, that
" the relevancy of evidence of other facts, as bearing upon the proba^
bility or non-probability of the main fact in issue, has been one of
the most troublesome questions for the courts to decide." Nickerson
V.Gould, 82 Me. 612 (1890).
The recognition of a logically probative effect on the issue being a
fact preliminary to the receipt of evidence, it is one to be decided by
the court. In exercising this discretion, it has been held that where
the fact offered in evidence seems to the court to be of but slight pro-
bative force, either because too remote in point of time or for other
reasons, it is permissible within reasonable limits, for the court to
reject it. Jones v. State, 26 Miss. 247 (1853) ; Morrissey v. Ingham,
111 Mass. 63 (1872).
This discretion may be reviewed on exceptions and reversed where
it appears to have been unreasonably exercised. Thus where a
defendant, endeavoring to show that he did not consent to his wife's
using her own house, in which he also resided, for au illegal
purpose, was confined to his acts during the time covered by the
indictment, an exception to this ruling was sustained. "When
the question is of, the state of mind of a person at or during a partic-
ular time, which can only be shown by acts or speech, evidence of
what he said or did for a reasonable time before, if it tends to show
a permanent or settled state of mind on the subject, has always been
admitted." Com. v. Hill, 145 Mass. 305 (1887).
Evidence that during ten days immediately prior to the date
alleged certain premises were used for the illegal purpose charged
in the indictment is competent. Com. v. Perry, 146 Mass. 203
(1888). The issue being whether a party was insane at a certain
218* AJNIEEICAN NOTES. [PABT II.
time, the court refused to admit evidence of such party's mental state
eight months after. " We cannot say that the judge who tried the
cause exercised the discretion confided to liini erroneously." Wright
V. Wright, 139 Mass. 177 (1885).
It is not necessary that evidence offered should be sufficient to
prove any fact in issue. "If such were its tendency — if it were 'a
link ill the chain of proof,' it was within the sphere of competency,
Avhile its effect was for the consideration of the jury." Schuchardt
r. Aliens, 1 Wall. 359 (1863). "Distinct matters, forming separate
links in a connected chain of title, often cannot conveniently be
given in evidence together. It is no answer to evidence, that it
does not prove the plaintiff's whole case ; if it is a link in the chain
of the evidence afterwards to be given, it is admissible." Haughey
V. Striclder, 2 W. & S. 411 (1841) ; Tarns v. Bullitt, 35 Pa. St. 308
(1860); Tucker v. Peaslee, 36 N. H. 167 (1858) ; Com. v. Fenno,
134 ^lass. 217 (1883) ; Sanders v. Stokes, 30 Ala. 432 (1857) ; Co-
lumbus Omnibus Co. v. Semmes, 27 Ga. 283 (1859) ; Willoughby r.
Dewey, 54 111. 266 (1870); Farwell v. Tyler, 5 la. 535 (1857);
Comstock V. Smith, 20 Mich. 338 (1870).
" Although, of itself, it may have been weak and inconclusive, yet
being derived from a legal source, and pertinent to the issue, the
jury was the proper tribunal to pass upon it." Richardson v. Mil-
burn, 17 Md. 67 (1860).
Auxiliary Facts. — ^ If a fact be admissible, all preliminary and
introductory facts necessary to explain it are equally admissible.
As Mr. Justice Stephen (Dig. Law. Evid. pt. 1, chap. 2, Art. 8) says,-
" Facts necessary to be known to explain or introduce a fact in issue
or a relevant fact, or which support or rebut an inference suggested
by the fact in issue or relevant fact, are relevant in so far as they
are necessary for these purposes respectively." Thus the question
being whether a lease was verbally surrendered, evidence is compe-
tent as to certain dealings between the landlord and tenant as to the
quality of certain ale, complaint as to which was the cause and occa-
sion of the alleged surrender. Wallace v. Kennelly, 47 N. J. L.
242 (1885).
In contests not held under the rules of the common law, and
where, therefore, there are, strictly speaking, no pleadings, the facts
in issue are determined by the nature of the investigation, and the
burden of producing conviction in the tribunal lies on him who asks
the intervention of the court in his favor.
Questions involving the power of the court in the allowance of
amendments and relating to the sufficiency of allegations, etc., are,
it would seem, too oloselj^ related to the statutory procedure of the
several states to admit of profitable discussion.
CHAP. II.] EVIDENCE CONFINED TO POINTS IN ISSUE.
CHAPTER IL
CONFINING EVIDENCE TO POINTS IN ISSUE.
§ 298. We may now pass to the consideration of the second of
the four general rules which have been pointed out ' as governing
the production of evidence. This second general rule is, that the
evidence must he confined to the points in issue. These points having
been selected by the parties in their pleadings, as those on which
they are respectively willing to rest the fate of the cause,'^ any
evidence, in support of other facts, would be obviously improper.
Accordingly, in an action of defamation, where the issues raised by
the pleas of justification were whether the plaintiff's scholars were
"ill-fed, badly lodged, and covered with vermin," defendant's
counsel was not permitted to put any questions to show that the
boys were also hadly educated.^ In another action of the same kind,
where the defendant had only pleaded the general issue, Lord
EUenborough would not allow the plaintiff to prove that the asser-
tions contained in the libel were false, observing : " There is no
plea of justification on the record, and, therefore, I can no more
hear a falsification on the one side than a justification on the
other." * Where to an action in contract {not founded, be it
observed, on any allegation of fraud) the defendant pleaded the
Statute of Limitations, to which there was a replication that he did
promise within six years, and the plaintiff did not reply fraud to
this plea, but simply denied the fact by taking issue on the plea,
the plaintiff was not allowed to prove that the action was grounded
on a fraudulent receipt of money by the defendant, and that the fraud
was first discovered uithin six years from the commencement of the
suit ; ' where the breach of covenant for which the action was
' See supra, § 217. * Stuart v. Lovell, 1817 ; Cornwall
* Steph. PI. 115. V. Eichardson, 1825.
' Boldron v. Widdows, 1824. ' Clark v. Hougham, 1823.
219
NEW EULES OF PLEADING — THEIE OBJECTS. [PAET II.
brought was that defendant had not used the plaintiff's farm in a
hushandhke manner, but had committed waste, evidence of bad
husbandry not amounting to tmste was rejected.'
§ 299. The cases just cited were decisions under the old rules of
pleading. The new rules (Order XIX. of E. S. C, 1883), are
intended to effect three material objects: first, to make each party
acquainted with the intended case of his opponent, and thus to
prevent either side from being taken by surprise at the trial;
secondly, to save the expense of collecting unnecessary evidence ;
and thirdly, to bring legal defences more prominently forward on
the face of the record.^
§ 300. Accordingly, it is provided, in general terms, that all
pleadings shall henceforth consist, first, of a statement of claim,
and of the relief or remedy sought ; ' next, of a defence, set-off, or
counter-claim ; * thirdly, of a reply,^ if any ; and lastly, of a joinder
of issue on the one side or the other.* It is further provided that
" such statements shall be as brief as the nature of the case wiU
admit," ' and that " every pleading shall contain, and contain only,
a statement in a summary form of the material facts on which the
party pleading relies, but not the evidence by which they are to be
proved." * For example, if an agreement be alleged in any plead-
ing, it is not sufficient to aver generally its existence, and to state
its effect, but the party relying on it should state whether it be in
writing, or by parol, or the result of a series of documents.*
The phrase "material facts" will include any facts which the
party pleading is entitled to prove at the trial.'" Thus, in an action
for breach of promise of marriage, the plaintiff may allege in her
statement of claim her consequent seduction or infection, these
matters being important by way of aggravation."
§ 301. Twelve other pleading rules have a material bearing on
the Law of Evidence. Eule 13 of Order XIX. provides that
1 Harris v. Mantle, 1789. ' Ord. XIX. r. 18. See post, § 304,
»_ See Isaac v. Farrer, 1836 (Ld. also § 829, and Ord. XXVII. r. 13,
Abinger) ; Barnett v. Glo'ssop, 1835 there cited.
(Park and Bosanquet, JJ.); Gutsole ' E. 2.
i;. Mathers, 1836 (Ld. Abinger). ^ jj, 4_ ggg ^eap v. Marris, 1816 ;
3 Ord. XIX. r. 2. Philipps v. Philipps, 1878, 0. A.
* Id. » Turquand v. Fearon, 1879, 0. A.
' Id. '" Millington v. Loring, 1880, C. A.
"Id.
220
CHAP. II.] FACTS NOT DENIED IN PLEADING — ADMITTED.
" every allegation of fact in any pleading, not being a petition or
summons, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or
stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the opposite party,
shall be taken to he admitted,^ except as against an infant, lunatic,
or person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition." By
Eule 14, " any condition precedent, the performance or occurrence
of which is intended to be contested, shall be distinctly specified in
his pleading by the plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be ;
and, subject thereto, an averment of the performance or occurrence
of all conditions precedent necessary for the case of the plaintiff or
defendant shall be implied in his pleading." Eule 15 provides,
that " the defendant or plaintiff, as the case may be, must raise by
his pleading all matters which show the action or counter-claim
not to be maintainable, or that the transaction is either void or
voidable in point of law,^ and all such grounds of defence or reply,
as the case may be, as if not raised would be likely to take the
opposite party by surprise, or would raise issues of fact not arising
out of the preceding pleadings, as, for instance, fraud,' the Statute
of Limitations, release, payment, performance, facts showing ille-
gality either by statute or common law, or Statute of Frauds."
By Eule 16, "No pleading, not being a petition or summons,
shall, — except by way of amendment,'^ — raise any new ground of
claim, or contain any allegation of fact inconsistent with the
previous pleadings of the party pleading the same."
§ 302. By Eule 17, " it shall not be sufficient for a defendant
in his statement of defence to deny generally the grounds alleged
by the statement of claim,^ or for a plaintiff in his reply to deny
generally the grounds alleged in a defence by way of counter-claim,
• See Tildesley v. Harper, 1878, ford v. M'Anulty, 1883, H. L.
0. A. ; Harris v. Gamble, 1878 (Fry, » See post, § 306.
J.) ; Eutter v. Tregent, 1879. * See, also, Ord. XXIII. r. 6, which
" An exception to this proposition provides, that "no neiv assignment
is contained in Ord. XXI. r. 21, shall be necessary or used." But
■which proTides, that " no defendant everything which was formerly al-
in an action for the recovery of land, leged by way of new assignment may
who is in possession by himself or his hereafter be introduced by amend-
tenant, need plead his title, unless ment of the statement of claim, or by
his defence depends on an equitable way of reply. See Earp v. Hender-
estate or right, or he claims relief son, 1876, as explained by Hall v.
upon any equitable ground against Eve, 1876.
any right or title asserted by the « See Harris v. Gamble, 1878 (Fry,
plaintiff," As to this role, see Dan- J.) ; Eutter v. Tregent, 1879.
221
GENERAL ISSUE PRACTICALLY ABOLISHED. [PART 11.
but each party must deal specifically with each allegation of fact
of which he does not admit the truth, except damages." Eule 18
provided that, " subject to the last preceding rule, the plaintiff by
his reply may join issue upon the defence, and each party in his
pleading, if any, subsequent to reply, may join issue upon the
previous pleading.' Such joinder of issue shall operate as a denial
of every material allegation of facts in the pleading upon which
issue is joined, but it may except any facts which the party may
be willing to admit, and shall then operate as a denial of the facts
not so admitted."
§ 303. The general efPeet of these rules — especially of the two
which are last cited — is to do away in the statement of defence with
what used to be termed by Special Pleaders " the Greneral Issue."
Under the old forms of pleading, on an action, which was in form
one " ex contractu " (or founded on contract), being brought, when-
ever the defendant could show that no debt in fact existed before
action brought, he was allowed to do it under the plea of " never
indebted." For example, in an ordinary action for goods sold and
delivered, the defendant might, under the useful plea of "never
indebted," show either that they were paid for by ready money ;^
that they were sold on credit, which was unexpired when the
action was commenced ;' that they were bought through an agent,
to whom, before the expiration of the credit, the defendant had
remitted the price;* that they were sold under a condition, that if
they did not answer their purpose nothing should be paid for them,
and that in fact they did not answer their purpose;* that they
were sold under any special agreement, which had not been per-
formed;" that they were delivered under a contract of barter;'
that the goods delivered did not answer the description of the
articles which the vendor professed to sell;^ or that they turned
out to be utterly useless.'
' As to the effect of not delivering lamond v. Davall, 1847.
a reply, or any subsequent pleading « Broomfield v. Smitli, 1836 (Ld.
within the proper period, see Ord. Abinger) ; Garey v. Pyke, 1839;
XXVII. r. 13, cited post, § 829. Hayselden v. Staff, 1836 ; Mosely v.
2 Bussey v. Barnett, 1842. But M'Mullen, 1856 (Ir.).
see Littleohild v. Banks, 1845. ' Harrison v. Luke, 1?4.5 ; Smith
^ Broomfield v. Smith, 1836, over- •». Winter, 1852; Bracegirdle v.Hinks,
ruling Edmonds v. Harris, 1834. 1854.
* Smyth ii. Anderson, 1849. ^ Gompertz v. Bartlett, 1853.
° Grounsell v. Lamb, 1836. See ' Cousins v. Paddon, 1835, reco"-
222
CHAP, n.] REPLIES — EVASIVE PLEADINGS.
§ 303a. a similar multiplicity of defences was open under the
plea of " never indebted " in an action for use and occupation. No
useful purpose is to be served by mentioning them in detail.
§ 303 b. Now, however, the grounds of defence are in all cases
(in the two above specified, as well as in others), required to be
specifically set out in the statement of defence.
§ 303c. While in an action founded on contract a great variety
of defences was thus permitted to be raised (without any previous
notice to the plaintiff as to which of such possible defences the
defendant intended to set up), under the " general issue " (or plea
of "never indebted"), in an action founded upon tort a similar
variety and choice of defences was allowed under a " plea of the
general issue," taking the form of " not guilty." The effect of
such a plea is learnedly discussed in BuUen on Pleading.^ By the
Pleading Rules of 1853 the operation of such a plea was considerably
restricted. But even after the passing of these rules the plea of " not
guilty " had stiU, in some cases, a wide operation ; for instance, in
actions for fraud, its operation was to deny that the defendant made
the representation charged, that it was false, that he made it either
knowing it to be false, or even vnthout a belief in its truth, that
he made it with the intent to induce the plaintiff to act upon it,
that the plaintiff did act upon it, and also that the plaintiff sustained
damage in consequence of so doing.^ Again, in respect of slander
for words not actionable in themselves, but which are so only by
reason of special damage caused by them, a plea of " not guilty "
denied the speaking of the words, the speaking of them maliciously,
their use in the defamatory sense imputed, and the alleged special
§ 304. The general issue is, by the rules at present in force under
the Judicature Act, forbidden to be raised by a statement of defence.
But it will be observed that, by Eule 18 of Order XIX., it is still
allowed to be contained in the plaintiff's reply, the rule saying that
the plaintiff " by his reply may join issue upon the defence."* The
nised by Ld. Denman in Hayselden ' 3rd edit. pp. 697 et seq.
V. Staff, 1836; Baillie v. Kell, 1858; ^ Biillen on Pleading, ubi supra,
Obapel w.. Hioka, 1833; Allen o. p. 701.
Cameron, 1833. These cases over- ' Wilby v. Elston, 1849.
rule Eoffey v. Smitb, 1834. * See ante, § 302.
223
ISSUES TO BE DEFINITE AND DISTINCT. [PAET II.
rule in question does not mean tbat the plaintiff must take tbat
course. He may — except in a case where, under the old system of
common law pleading, a new assignment would have been neces-
sary,'— either amend his claim under Order XXVIII., or traverse
the allegations in the defence generally or specially, or confess and
avoid them, or unite in one reply those several answers.^
§ 305. Thus the whole object of the present system of pleading
is to narrow the parties to definite and distinct issues, and thereby
to diminish expense and delay, especially as regards the amount of
oral testimony required on either side at the trial.*
§ 306. This object is further sought to be attained by the help
of various rules besides those which have already been cited. Thus
Order XIX., r. 20, provides, that " when a contract, promise, or
agreement is alleged in any pleading, a bare denial of -the same by
the opposite party shall be construed only as a denial in fact of the
express contract, promise, or agreement alleged, or of the matters
of fact from which the same may be implied by law, and not as a
denial of the legality or sufficiency in law, of such contract, promise,
or agreement, whether with reference to the Statute of Frauds or
otherwise." The effect of this rule is, that, whenever a party in-
tends to rely on the illegality or insufficiency in law of any con-
tract, whether with reference to the Statute of Frauds, or other-
wise, he must specially plead such illegality or insufliciency, and it
will not be sufficient to traverse allegations made by bis opponent
in anticipation of objections to the contract upon such grounds.*
Neither can a defendant avail himself of the Statute of Frauds by
simply raising in general terms by his pleading a point of law' (the
substitute for the old general demurrers*), nor will it suffice for him
to state generally that he relies on a statute, but the facts which
make the statute applicable must distinctly appear on the plead-
ings.'
§ 307. Again, Eule 5 of Order XXI., provides, that " if either
party wishes to deny the right of any other party to claim as
1 See ante, p. 221, n. *. * Clarke v. Callow, 1876, C. A.
2 Hall V. Eve, 1876, C. A. « Futcher u. Putcher, 1881 (Ery,
8 Thorp w. Holdaworth, 1876 (Jessel,
M.E.); Byrd v. Nunn, 1877, C. A,
Tildesley v. Harper, 1878, C. A
Collette V. Goode,'l877 (Fry, J.).
J.
'" Ord. XXV. rr. 1, 2.
' PuUen V. Snelus, 1879.
224
CHAP. II.] WANT OF STAMP — OF JURISDICTION.
executor, or as trustee, whether in bankruptcy or otherwise, or in
any representative or other alleged jj^pacity, or the alleged consti-
tution of any partnership firm, he shall deny the same speci-
fically."
§ 308„ Sometimes it will be difficult to reconcile this last rule,
and also Eule 13 of Order XIX.,' with certain express enactments.
For example, if in. an action on a doctor's bill the statement of
claim allege that plaintiff is a " legally qualified medical prac-
titioner," ^ an omission to specifically deny this statement amounts
to an admission of the fact. But the Medical Act of 1858*
expressly enacts that " no person shall be entitled to recover any
charge in any court of law for any medical or surgical advice,
attendance, or for the performance of any operation, or for any
medicine which he shall have both prescribed and supplied, unless
he shall prove upon the trial that he is registered under the Act."
Yet it cannot be that a quack doctor, who must inevitably be
nonsuited in any county court, would have a fair chance of
recovering his charges, if he sues in the High Court.
§ 309. Again, it would appear to follow that the objection that
an instrument is not stamped, or is insufficiently stamped, cannot be
taken at the trial by a party who has not relied on that point in
his pleading.* But when the document is offered in evidence,
these pleading rules do not affect the steps which must be taken
either by the presiding judge, or by the ministerial officer of the
court, to protect the interests of the Revenue.
§ 310. Moreover, the question how far a defendant can avail
himself of want of jurisdiction in the court without raising that
defence by means of a special plea, does not seem to have been set
at rest by the rules of pleading under the Judicature Act, and is
m an unsatisfactory state.*
' Cited ante, § 301. diction are brouglit by th.e plaintiff
2 See 21 & 22 V. 0. 90, § 34. himself to tlie notice of the court, the
" Id. § 32. mere omission of the defendant to
* See, as to the old law. Field v. plead specially will not give the
Woods, 18a7 ; Dawson v. Macdonald, court jurisdiction over the suit, but
1836; M'Dowall v. Lyster, 183(5. it will be bound, whatever be the
See, also, post, § 397. nature of the issues raised, either to
^ See Spooner v. juddow, 1848-50, nonsuit the plaintiff, or to direct a
P.O., where the Privy Council decided, verdict for the defendant, but de-
thatwhen the facts ousting the juris- clined to state what would be the
T. vol. I. 225 ci
PLEA OF NOT GUILTY BY STATUTE. [PART II.
§ 311. The numerous oases in which a defendant is expressly
empowered to plead "Not Gu^y bij statute," and to give special
matter in evidence under such plea, are not affected by the present
pleading rules further than this, that the party who intends so to
plead cannot " plead any other defence to the same cause ai action
without the leave of the court or a judge ;"^ and must "insert in
the margin of his pleading the words ' By Statute,' together with
the year of the reign in which the Act of Parliament on which he
relies was passed, and also the chapter and section of such Act, and
specify whether such Act is public or otherwise ; otherwise such
defence shall be taken not to have been pleaded by yirtue of any
Act of Parliament." ^
§ 312. Under this form of general issue a defendant may some-
times give special matter in evidence so as to be entitled to lely
upon the want of notice of action, or a tender of amends, or on
some other special protection given by a particular Act of Parlia-
ment. But when such a privilege as this is claimed by virtue of
having acted in an office, or under a statute, it is extremely difficult
to lay down, as an abstract proposition of law, what amounts
to such an acting in pursuance of the statute, or in the execution of the
office, as to entitle the defendant to the protection of the statute.'
This much, however, may safely be stated, that if a party believes,
bona fide, in the existence of a state of facts,* which, if they had
existed, would have afforded a defence to the action,^ he is, —with-
out reference to the reasonableness of such belief," — entitled to pro-
law, if tie plaintiff were to close Ms * If there are no facts on which
case -without betraying the want of a bona fide belief can reasonably be
jurisdiction, and the defendant were founded, the protection will nut
then, without any special plea raising apply : Agnew v. Jobson, 1878.
the point, to offer evidence of facts ^ Hermann v. Seneschal, 1862 ;
with a view of showing that the Heath u. Brewer, 1864; Mid. Ey.
cause of action was ultra vires. Co. v. Withington Local Board,
1 Ord. XIX. 1. 12. 1883, 0. A. ; Roberts v. Orchard,
2 Ord. XXI. r. 19. 1863. See Downing v. Oapel, 1867 ;
' See Arnold v. Hamel, 1854; Selmes w. Judge, 1871.
and Kirby v. Simpson, 1854, where « Chamherlainw. King, 1871. Prior
a magistrate, acting in execution of to this decision, it was thought by
his office maliciously and without many that the belief, to be available,
reasonable and probable cause, was must have rested ' ' on some colour of
held entitled by 11 & 12 V. c. 44 reason." See Oann v. Clipperton,
("The Justices' Protection Act, 1839; Cook v. Leonard, 1827, as
1848 "), § 9 (now repealed by 57 & 58 qualified in Jones v. Gooday, 1842.
V. c. 56), to notice of action. See, also, Kine v, Evershed, 1847 ;
226
CHAP. II.] PLEA OF NOT GUILTY BY STATUTE.
tection, although he may have proceeded illegally or exceeded
his jurisdiction.! Statutes of this kind are intended for the pro-
tection of honest persons, who bon^ fide mean to discharge their
duty ; ^ and the court will, consequently, so interpret their provi-
sions, as to save harmless all persons who aot illegally under the
reasonable belief that they are authorised in what they do by Act
of Parliament ; and this, too, whether the error complained of has
been committed ia respect of time, place, or circumstance.^
§ 313. Under a plea of " Not Guilty ly statute^' a defendant
may, too, clearly set up any defence that could be specially pleaded,
whether it be founded wholly or partly on the statute, or be merely
sustainable at common law.* For example, in an action for an
excessive distress, such a plea puts in issue not only the matter of
justification, but the tenancy and the ownership of the goods.^ This
being the case, the courts will not, in general, allow a defendant to
plead " not guilty by statute," together with any other defence ;
but if a reasonable doubt exists as to whether the defendant, in
regard to the particular act complained of, is entitled to such
a plea, the rule will, in favour of substantial justice, be some-
times relaxed.'
§ 314. It may be added in connection with this subject that' so
much of any clause or provision in any Aot commonly called
Public local and personal, or Local and personal, or in any Act of
a local and personal nature,^ whereby any party was entitled,
Leete v. Hart, 1868 ; Spooner v. ^ Hughes v. Buokland, 1846 (Pol-
Juddow, 1848-50, P. 0. (Ld. Camp- lock, O.B.); Horn v'. Thornborougli,
bell) ; Booth v. Olive, 1851 ; Bead v. 1849.
Coker, 1853; Arnold i). Hamel, 1854 ; * Boss v. Clifton, 1841 ; Maund v.
Hermann v. Seneschal, 1863. Monmouth Can. Co., 1842 (Cress-
' Hazeldinei/.Q-rove, 1842; Spooner -well, J., stating the general opinion
«. Juddow, 1848-50, P. 0.; Jones v. of the judges); Fisher v. Thames
Gooday, 1842 (Parke and Alderson, June. By. Co., 1837; Haine «. Davev,
BB.) ; Theobald v. Criohmore, 1818 1836 ; Eagleton v. Gutteridge, 1843
(Ld. EUenborough, and Bayley, J.). (Parke, B.).
See, further, EHot v. Allen, 1845; * Williams w. Jones, 1841. Formerly
Shatwell V. Hall, 1842 ; Hopkins v. it also enabled a defendant to dispute
Crowe, 1836; Lidsteri). Borrow, 1839; the character in which plaintiif sued:
Bush «;. Green, 1837; Smith i;. Shaw, Tharpe v. StaUwood, 1843 (Oress-
1829; Davis v. Curling, 1845; Cox v. well, J.). But see, now, Ord. XXL
Eeid, 1849; Thomas v. Stephenson, r. 5, set out at § 307.
1853; Newtonv. Ellis, 1855; Poulsum " Langford v. Woods, 1844.
V. Thirst, 1867. ' By 5 & 6 V. c. 97, § 3.
^ Per Parke, B., in Jones v. Gooday, * As to the meaning of this phrase,
1842. see Richards v. Easto, 1846 ; Cock v,
2-27 Q 2
PLEA OF NOT GUILTY BY STATUTE. [PAET II.
before the 10th of August, 1842, to give special matter in evidence
under the general issue, is repealed. The Irish Common Law
Procedure Act of 1853,^ also repeals, by § 69, " so much of any
Act of Parliament as entitles or permits any person to plead the
general issue only, and to give special matter in evidence without
pleading the same." Unfortunately a similar clause is not to be
found in either of the English Common Law Procedure Acts ; and
the pleader is consequently still left to discover, as best he may, in
what cases the defendant may or may not avail himself of this
indefinite and comprehensive form of pleading.
§ 315. It will be recollected that a general protection to public
authorities is, in lieu of the plea of " Not Guilty," now afforded by
the provisions of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893,^ within
which is included every justice of the peace, sued for anything
done by him in the execution of his office.^ There are, however,
still in existence various statutes empowering defendants to plead
the general issue, and to tender or pay into court amends for the
injury complained of. In many of these (but not in all of them *)
it is expressly enacted that tender of amends or payment into
court shall be specially pleaded.^
§ 315a. The general rule of law, as stated above," which limits
proof to the matters put in issue by the pleadings, has been supple-
mented by express enactment, as regards actions for infriugement
of patents, by the Patents, Designs, and Trade-marks Act,
1883.'
Gent, 1843 ; Earnett v. Cox, 184Y ; § 226, subs. 2.
Pilkington v. Eiley, 1849 ; Shepherd « In §§ 298 et seq.
V. Shai-p, 1856. ' 46 & 47 V. c. 67. § 29 of this Act
^ 16 & 17 V. c. 113, Ir. provides as follows :^
« 56 & 57 V. c. 61, ante, § 73. "(1.) In an action for infringe-
' See 66 & 57 V. c. 61 ("The ment of a patent the plaintiff must
Public Authorities Protection Act, deliver -with his statement of claim,
1893 "'), ante, § 73a ; and on the con- or by order of the court or the judge,
struotionof a repealed Act (11 & 12 at any subsequent time, particulars
V. c. 44, s. 9), see Kirby v. Simpson, of the breaches complaiaed of.
1854, cited ante, notes to § 312. "(2.) The defendant must deliver
'^ See, e.g., " The Seaman's Clothing with his statement of defence, or, by
Act, 1869" (32 & 33 V. c. 57), § 6 ; order of the court or a judge, at any
and, also, 11 G. 2, o. 19 ("The Dis- subsequent time, particulars of any
tress for Rent Act, 1737 "), §§ 20, 21 ; objections on which he relies in
amended by "The S. L. Eev. Act, support thereof.
1888 " (51 V. 0. 3). "(3.) If the defendant disputes
= See 45 & 46 V. c. 50 ("The the validity of the patent, the par-
Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 "),
228
CHAP. II.] EVIDENCE OF COLLATERAL FACTS EXCLUDED.
§ 316. The rule confining evidence to the points in issue not
only precludes the litigant parties from proving any facts not dis-
tinctly controverted by the pleadings, but it limits the mode of
proving even the issues themselves. Thus,' it excludes all evidence
of collateral facts, which are incapable of affording any reasonable
presumption as to the principal matters in dispute. The reason
is, that such evidence tends needlessly to cousume the public
time, to draw away the minds of the jurors from the points in
issue, and to excite prejudice and mislead ; while the adverse party,
having had no notice of such evidence, is not prepared to rebut it.
The due application of this rule will occasionally tax to the utmost
the firmness and discrimination of the judge ; so that while he
shall reject, as too remote, overy fact which merely furnishes a
fanciful analogy or conjectural inference, he may admit as rele-
vant the evidence of all those matters which shed a real, though
perhaps an indirect and feeble, light on the question in issue. The
circumstances of the parties to the suit, and the position in which
they stood^ when the matter in controversy occurred, are generally
proper subjects of evidence ; and, indeed, the change in the law
enabling parties to give testimony for themselves, has rendered
this proof of " surrounding circumstances " still more important
than it was in former times.' Accordingly, in an action for money
lent, the poverty of the alleged lender is a very relevant fact,
evidence of which is admissible for the purpose of disproving the
loan.*
§ 317. The most important facts which are excluded on the
ground of irrelevance/, are the acts and declarations, either of
tioulars delivered by Hm must state livered Ly the plaintiff and by tte
on -what grounds he disputes it, and, defendants ; and they respectively
if one of those grounds is want of shall not be allowed any costs in
novelty, must state the time and place respect of any particular delivered
of the previous publication or user by them, unless the same is certified
alleged by him. by the court or a judge to have been
"(4.) At the hearing no evidence proven, or to have been reasonable
shall, except by leave of the court or and proper, without regard to the
a judge, be admitted in proof of any general costs of the case."
alleged infringement or objection, of ' Gr. Ev. § 52, in part for six lines,
which particulars are not so delivered. * See Woodward v. Buchanan,
" (5.) Particulars delivered may be 1870.
from time to time amended, by leave ^ Dowling v. Dowling, 1860 (Ir.)
of the court or a judge. (Pigot, C.B.).
" (6.) On taxation of costs, regard * Dowling v. Dowling, 1860 (Ir.).
shall be had to the particulars de-
229
EES INTEE ALIOS ACT^ EXCLUDED. [PAET II.
gtrangers, or of one of the parties to the action in his dealings
with strangers. These, in technical language, are denominated
" res inter alios actce."
§ 318. A good example of matters being excluded for irre-
levancy, and as " res inter alios actce," is that in an action to recover
goods by his assignees against a bankrupt's creditor, proof of the
commission of acts of bankruptcy, by showing that other goods
which, about the same time, had been delivered to other creditors
before the goods in dispute came into defendant's hands, had been
got back from them, was rejected. It was suggested that the con-
duct of such other creditors bore upon the case which was being
tried, as it showed the conviction of the other creditors that they
had received the goods under circumstances which did not entitle ,
them to keep possession. But as their opinions, expressed after
the fiat, could not have been received as evidence, so also evidence
of tlieir acts, adduced for the purpose of raising an inference
respecting the previous intentions, either of themselves or of the
bankrupt, was inadmissible.^ To return, proof of the usage of a
particular estate, however extensive it may be, is inadmissible for the
purpose of importing into the lease of a farm on that estate some
special stipulations relative to the mode of cultivation ; ^ on a ques-
tion between landlord and tenant, whether rent be payable quar-
terly or half-yearly, evidence of the mode in which other tenants
of the same landlord pay their reut is rejected ;' and where it was
necessary for a brewer to prove that he had supplied a publican
with good beer, other publicans were not allowed to show that,
during the same period as the dealing in question, he had furnished
them with beer of an excellent quality, for a man may deal well
with some of his customers, though not with others.*
§ 319. Again, where the issue is whether the plaintiff's scholars
have been ill-fed, although evidence is admissible to show the
general treatment of boys at schools, a witness may not be asked
as to the comparative quality of the provisions supplied by the
plaintiff with those consumed in a particular school ; ^ in an action
' Backhouse v. Jones, 1839. EUenborougli). See, also, HolHng-
■" Womersley v. Dally, 1837. liam v. Head, 1856; Raw v. Hutohins,
5 Carter v. Pryke, 1791 (Ld. Ken- 1861 ; Howard v. Sheward, 1866.
yon)- " Boldron v. Widdows, 1824 (Ab-
* Holcombe v. Hewson, 1810 (M. bott, C.J.).
230
CHAP. II.] CUSTOMS OF MANOES WHEN ADMISSIBLE.
against a married woman, where there is an issue whether she had
represented herself to the plaintiff as a feme sole, and he had dealt
with her as such, evidence of the defendant's dealings with other
tradesmen is only admissible, if at all, on the ground that she had
held herself out to others as a single woman in such a manner as to
reach plaintiff's ears ; ' in an action by the indorsee against the
acceptor of a hill, where the defence is that the acceptance is a
forgery, evidence that a collection of bills, on which the defendant's
acceptance was forged, had been in plaintiff's possession, and that
some of them had been circulated by him, was rejected, as no dis-
tinct proof was given that the bill in question had ever formed part of
that collection.^ But in an action for a nuisance to a highway by
placing a heap near it, evidence that ot/ier horses (as well as
plaintiff's) had shied at it goes to prove that that particular heap
is a nuisance, and such evidence is accordingly admissible.^
§ 320. The two cases last cited point us to an reception to the rule
under discussion, which is, that evidence of facts which, though col-
lateral, are proved to be connected by some general hnk with the
matter in issue, is admissible. There are numerous other instances
of the recognition of this exception. Thus, although the customs
of one manor usually cannot be given in evidence to prove the
customs of another,* yet such customs become evidence the moment
that a foundation has been laid for their admission, by clear proof
of a sufficient connection between the two manors. The mere fact
that two manors lie within the same parish and leet, nor even that
the one was a subinfeudation of the other, will not be sufficient ;
at least, unless it be clearly shown that they were separated after
the time of legal memory, since otherwise they may have had dif-
ferent immemorial customs.* If, however, it can be satisfactorily
' Barden v. Eeverberg, 1837. See Such evidence would be clearly iaad-
Smith n. Wilkins, 1833, where, the mi ssible in an indictment for forgery-
question being whether credit was (Ld. Denman).
given to defendant's wife or to her ' Brown et ux i;. Eastern Counties
father, evidence that other tradesmen Ey., 1889, 0. A.
had given credit to the father was * M. of Anglesey v. Ld. Hather-
rejected by Tindal, O.J. Also Dela- ton, 1842 (Ld. Abinger) ; Furneaux
motte V. Lane, 1840. v. Hutohins, 1778 ; Doe u. Sisson,
2 Grifflts V. Payne, 1839; Thomp- 1810.
son V. Mosely, 1833 (Ld. Lyndhurst); ^ M. of Anglesey v. Ld. Hatherton,
Viney v. Barss, 1795 (Ld. Kenyon) ; 1842.
Balcetti v. Serani, 1792 (Buller, J.).
231
COLLATERAL FACTS [PAET II.
proved that the customs in the two manors are identical, or that the
one was derived from the other after the time of Eichard the First,
then the customs of each will respectively become evidence.^ More-
over, whenever the custom in question is as to a particular incident
of a general tenure proved to be common to the two manors,
evidence may be given of what the custom of the one is as to that
tenure for the purpose of showing what is the custom of the other
as to the same.^ For instance, prove in a particular manor that
borough English or gavelkind prevails, and then you may see from
other manors what are the peculiarities of these tenures.'
§ 321. Similarly, in the manors on the border between Scotland
and England,* a particular species of tenure, called tenant-right,
and in the manors in the mining districts of Derbyshire and
Cornwall, particular customs, as to the rights of the miners and the
rights to the minerals, prevail. If in one of these no example can
be adduced of what is the custom in any particular case, in order to
explain the nature of the tenure or right in question, evidence is
admissible to show what is the general usage with respect to that
tenure or right.^
§ 322. Accordingly, too, upon a question whether the Crown, in
right of the Duchy of Lancaster, had the exclusive privilege, under
an original charter, of appointing a coroner within the honour of
Pontefract, evidence of appointments of coroners, and of their act-
ing, in other parts of the fame duchy, was admitted.' On the same
principle, the mode of conducting a particular branch of trade in one
place may be proved by showing the manner in which the same
trade is carried on in another place.' And, where there is a dispute
as to the exact line of boundary between manors, evidence that the
alleged boundary is a natural one, and bounds one of the manors
from certain other manors (not the subjects of controversy) is
admissible, because the boundary being a natural one, equally
> M. of Anglesey v. Ld. Hatherton, 1842 (Eolfe, B.).
1842 (Alderson, B.). * Eowe v. Parker, 1792 (Ld. Kon-
2 Id. ; Stanley ■!;. White, 1811 (Ld. yon).
EUenborouglij ; E. v. Ellis, 1813 ' M. of Anglesey «. Ld. Hatherton,
(id.); D. of Somerset v. France, 1842 (Ld. Abinger) ; Eowe v. Bren-
1727; Champian v. Atkinson, 1672; ton, 1828.
explained(Bolfe,B.)inM. of Anglesey ' Jewison v. Dyson, 1842. See
V. Ld. Hatherton, 1842. Fleet v. Murton, 1871.
* M. of Anglesey v. Ld. Hatherton, ' Noble v. Kennoway, 1780,
232
CHAP. 11.] CONNECTED WITH FACT IN ISSUE.
suitable in both eases, it is highly unlikely to haye been
varied.'
§ 323. Where, too, the question is whether a slip of waste land,
lying between the highway and the enclosed lands of the plaintifE,
belongs to him, or to the lord of the manor, — the lord may give
evidence of acts of ownership on other parts of the waste land
between the same road and the enclosures of other persons, although
at the distance of two miles from the spot in dispute, and although
the continuity of the waste be interrupted.^ Again, where, in
trespass, the plaintiff's object is to prove himself owner of the
entire bed of a river flowing between his land and that of the
defendant, and thus rebut the presumption that each party is
entitled ad medium filum aquae,' he may give evidence of acts of
ownership exercised by himself upon the bed and banks of the river
lower down the stream on the defendant's side, where the same
river flows between the plaintiff's land and the farm of a third
party, or of repairs done, beyond the limits of the defendant's land,
to a fence dividing defendant's and other land from the river,
which runs for a considerable distance along the side of the stream,
till at last it comes actually opposite to the extremity of the plain-
tiff's property on the other side.*
' Brisco V. Lomax, 1838. dence may he given of acts done on other
* Doe V. Kemp, 1831, recognized parts, provided there is such a common
(Parke, B.) in Jones v. "Williams, character of locality hetween those parts
1837; Bryan v. Winwood, 1808; and the spot in question, as would
Dendy v. Simpson, 1856. raise a reasonable inference in the
' Ante, § 119. minds of the jury, that the place in
* In Jones W.Williams, 183.7, Parke, dispute lelonged to the plaintiff if the
B., observes: — " I ttink the evidence other parts did. In ordinary cases, to
offered of acts in another part of one prove his title to a close, the claimant
continuous hedge, and in the whole may give in evidence acts of owner-
bed of the river, adjoining the plain- ship in any part of the same en-
tifi's land, was admissible in evi- closure ; for the ownership of one
dence, on the ground that they are part causes a' reasonable inference
such acts as might reasonably lead that the other belongs to the same
to the inference that the entire hedge person ; though it by no means fol-
and bed of the river, and, conse- lows as a necessary consequence, for
quently, the part in dispute, belonged diiferent persons may have balks of
to the plaintiff. Ownership may be land in the same enclosure ; but this
proved by proof of possession, and is a fact to be submitted to the jury,
that can be shown by acts of enjoy- So, I apprehend, the same rule is
ment of the land itself ; but it is im- applicable to a wood which is not
possible, in the nature of things, to enclosed by any fence : if you prove
confine the evidence to the very pre- the cutting of timber in one part, I
cise spot on which the alleged tres- take that to be evidence to go to a
pass may have been committed ; eui- jury to prove a right in the whole
233
COLLATERAL FACTS
[part II.
§ 324. The same principle applies to the case of mines. There-
fore, on a claim founded upon a demise of all mines and minerals
under a large contiguous area, evidence of working under one part
of the surface is evidence of possession of the entire subject of
demise.'
§ 325. In cases, as those above referred to, it is for the judge to
decide,^ vrhether such an unity of character exists, between the spot
in dispute and the parcel of land over which acts of ownership
have been exercised, as to lead to the fair inference that both are
subject to the same rights, and constitute in fact but parts of an
entire property. If no such inference can be raised, evidence of
acts done beyond the limits of the locus in quo will be inadmissible.
Tor example, where it was attempted to connect parcels of waste
land with each other, by merely showing that they all lay within
the same manor, and between enclosures and public roads, evidence
of acts of ownership over some of these lands was held inadmissible
to prove title to the others.^
■wood, altiougli tliere be no fence, or
distinct boundary surrounding the
whole ; and the case of Stanley v.
White, 1811, I conceive, is to be
explained on this principle : there
was a continuous belt of trees, and
acts of ownership on one part were
held to be admissible to prove that
the plaintiff was the owner of another
part, on which the trespass was com-
mitted. So I should apply the same
reasoning to a continuous hedge ;
though no doubt the defendant
might rebut the inference that the
whole belonged to the same person,
by showing acts of ownership pn his
part along the same fence. It has
been said in the course of the argu-
ment, that the defendant had no in-
terest to dispute the acts of ownership
not opposite his own land ; hut the
ground on which such acts are ad-
missible is not the acquiescence of any
party : they are admissible of them-
selves propria vigore, for they tend to
prove that he who does them is the
owner of the soil ; though if they are
done in the absence of all persons in-
terested to dispute them, they are of less
weight." See, also, E. v. Brightside,
Bierlow, 184:9 ; Peardon v. Underbill,
234
1850 ; Donegall v. Templemore, 1858
(Ir.) (Christian, J.); and In re Belfast
Dock Act, 1866-7 (Ir.).
' Taylor v. Parry, 1840 (Tindal,
C.J.).
* Doe V. Kemp, 1831 (Bosanqiiet,
J.); ante, § 24.
^ Doe v. Kemp, 1835. Ld. Den-
man, in giving judgment, observes,
' ' If the lord has a right to one piece
of waste land, it affords no infer-
ence, even the most remote, that he
has a right to another, in the same
manor, although both may be simi-
larly situated with respect to the
highway ; assuming that all were
originally the property of the same
person, as the lord of the manor,
which is all that the fact of their
being in the same manor proves, no
presumption arises from his retain-
ing one part in his hands that he
retained another ; nor, if in one part
of the manor the lord has dedicated
a portion of the waste to the use of
the public, and granted out the ad-
joining land to private individuals,
does it by any means follow, nor
does it raise any probability, that in
another part he may not have granted
the whole out to private individuals,
CHAP. ir.J WHEN EXCLUDED IN CRIMINAL CASES.
§ 326. The rule that evidence must he strictly confined to the
points in issue (as limited in the manner above stated), applies
■with even greater force to criminal than to civil proceedings.
An indictment should afford distinct information to the prisoner
of the specific charge about to be brought against him. There-
fore, the admission of any evidence of facts unconnected with
that charge, and, relating to acts alleged to have been done at
a different time or place, would be clearly open to the serious
objection of taking the prisoner by surprise. No man should be
bound, at the peril of life or liberty, fortune or reputation, to
answer at once and unprepared for every action of his life. Few
even of the best of men would choose to submit to such an ordeal.'
Consequently, if on an indictment for burglariously entering a
house on a certain day and stealing goods therein, the prosecutor
fail in proving that any larceny was committed on that occasion,
he cannot abandon the charge of burglary, and then proceed to
show that the prisoner stole some of the articles mentioned in the
indictment on a previous occasion ; because, though time is not
usually a material allegation, yet the prisoner, having been led to
suppose that he was to meet a charge of burglary, cannot be
expected to come prepared to prove his innocence with respect to a
distinct offence, said to have been committed at a totally different
time.^ Accordingly, too, an admission by a prisoner that he has,
at another time, committed an offence similar to that with which he
is charged, and has a tendency to perpetrate such crimes, cannot
be received.' Thus, on a charge of treason, no overt act amounting
to a distinct independent charge, though falling under the same
head of treason, can be given in evidence, unless it be either itseli
expressly alleged in the'indictment, or be direct proof of some oi
one of the overt acts which are there laid.*
and they afterwards have dedicated (Bayley, J.).
part as a public road. But the case ' Fost., 0. L. 246. Note the dis-
is very difierent with respect to those tinction between such cases and
parcels, which from their local situa- those where a charge necessarily
tion may be deemed parts of one involves some other distinct offence
waste or conmion ; acts of ownership to have been committed at the same
in one part of the same field, axe time and place, as to which, see ante,
evidence of title to the whole ; and §§ 265 et seq.
the Kke may be said of similar acts * K. v. Vandercomb, 1796.
on part of one large waste or com- ' E. v. Cole, 1810 (by all the
mon." See, also, Tyrwhitt V.Wynne, judges).'
1819 ; Hollis v. Goldfinch, 1823 « 7 W. 3, c. 3 ("The Treason Act,
235
WHAT COLLATERAL FACTS ADMISSIBLE. [PAET 11.
§ 327. When, however, several /e/o««es are so connected together
as to form part of one entire transaction, an exception to the
general rale that collateral facts must he excluded arises, similar
to that which prevails in civil cases,' and evidence of one felony
may be given to show the character of the other.'' Thus, on
an indictment for stealing 6.s. from a till, evidence was received
that on one occasion, when the till contained marked silver and
other money, amounting in all to 12.s. 6d., the prisoner went to it,
and it was afterwards found to contain lis. 6d. only, and that on
subsequent examinations of the till the money was perceived to
have gradually diminished, and that, on the prisoner being searched,
8s. of the marked money was found on his person ; for though
each taking was a separate felony, they were all so connected
together as mutually to illustrate and prove each other.* So where
the lessee of a coal-mine had run levels from his own shaft into his
neighbours' mines, and had, during a period of four years, been
constantly extracting coal belonging to thirty different proprietors,
an indictment charging him in one and the same count with
stealing the coal of each of these proprietors was held valid ; and
the judge refused to make the prosecutor elect on which case he
would rely, but allowed him to give evidence in support of all the
charges, as at least furnishing proof of a felonious intent.*
§ 328. Again, where four indictments against a woman respectively
charged her with poisoning her husband and two of her sons, and
with attempting to poison a third son, on the trial of the first indict-
ment evidence was admitted that arsenic raust have been taken by
the three sons a few months after their father's death ; that all the
four parties, when taken ill, exhibited the same symptoms ; and
1695"), § 8, as explained in Post., 0. away the custom-liouse barge, and
L. 245 ; citing Ambrose Eookwood's gone a cruising in her, was rejected :
case, 1696; Lowick's case, 1696; Vaugban's case, 1696.
Layer's case, 1722 ; Deacon's case, ' As to wbicb, see supra, §§ 320—
1746 ; and Wedderburne's case, 1746. 325.
Accordingly, on an indictment for ^ E. v. FUis, 1824 (Bayley, J.);
adhering to the King's enemies on Eoupell v. Haws, 1863 ; E. v. Eear-
the high sea, where the overt act laid den, 1 864 (Willes, J.).
was the prisoner's cruising on the ' E. v. Ellis, 1826.
King's subjects in a vessel called the * E. v. Bleasdale, 1848 (Erie, J.).
Loyal Clencarty, evidence, without See E. v. Eirth, 1869, -where' the
anything to connect it with the overt prisoner was indicted for stealing
acts for which he was being tried, gas : E. v. Henwood, 1870.
that he had some time before cut
336
CHAP. II. j DOCTRINE OF ELECTION.
that the womaii, who had lived in the same house with her husband
and children, had heen in the habit of preparing their meals, such
evidence going to prove, first, that the husband (the subject of the
indictment that was then being tried) died of arsenic, and next,
that his death had not been accidental. ^ Where, too, a man
eommitted three burglaries in one night, and left at one of the
houses property taken from another, the three felonies were con-
sidered so connected that the court eoiild hear the history of all;^
and similar evidence was received where a prisoner was charged
on three indictments with firing three stacks belonging to separate
parties, within sight of each other, v/hieh had all been set on fire
at about the same time.'
§ 329. In connection with the principle that criminal cases are
governed by the general rule that evidence of collateral facts
cannot be given eiixept where it is shown to be immediately con-
nected in some way with the transaction which is the immediate
subject of the inquiry, we may usefully, with this first exception
to such general rule,* consider the special rules of law, called the
doctrine of election, by which the application of this exception is
limited.
§ 329a. Now, in point of law, no objection can be raised, either
on demuri^r or in arrest of judgment, though the defendant or
defendants be charged in different counts of an indictment with
different offences of the same kind.* Indeed, on the face of the
record, every count purports to be for a separate offence," and
in misdemeanors it is the daily practice to receive evidence of
several libels, several assaults, several acts of fraud, and the like,
upon the same indictment.' In cases of felony, however, this rule
' E. V. Greering, 1849 (Pollock, 58 — 60, for remarkable cases of a
C.B., after consulting Alderson,' B., similar nature whicli occurred in
and TaKourd, J.) ; K. v. Flanagan, Scotland.
1882 (Brett, J.); E. v. Garner, 1864 ^ jj. v. Long, 1833 (Gumey, B.);
(Willes, J., and Pollock, G.B.); E. v. E. ■;;. Cobden, 1862 (Bramwell, B.).
Cotton, 1873 (Archibald, J., and * As to other exceptions, see infra.
Pollock, B.) ; E. v. Eoden, 1874 §§ 335 et seq.
(Lush, J.); E. ■y. Heesom, 1878(id.). * E. v. Kingston, 1806; E. v.
See post, § 340. But see E. v. Wins- Jones, 1809 (Ld. Ellenborough). As
low, 1860 (Martin and Wilde, BB.). to election in civil cases, see Howard
^ Cited by Ld. Ellenborough in R. v. Newton, 1843.
V. Wylie, 1804; E. v. Stonyer, 1843 « Young i;. E., 1789 (Buller, J.).
(Wightman, J.). See, also, Alison, ' E. v. Jones, 1809 (Ld. EUen-
Cr. L. 313, 314, and WUls, Oir. Ev. borough); E. v. Levy, 1819. See,
237
DOCTRINE OF ELECTION. [PAET II.
has, from motives of humanity, teen considerahly modified. As
an indictment containing several distinct charges is calculated to
embarrass a prisoner in his defence, the judges are accustomed to
quash indictments so framed, when it appears, before the prisoner
has pleaded and the jury are charged, that the inquiry is to include
separate crimes. When, however, this circumstance is discovered
during a trial, the prosecutor is usually called upon to elect one
felony, and to confine himself to that,' unless the offences, though
in law distinct, seem to constitute in fact but parts of one con-
tinuous transaction, in which latter event an " election " will not
be enforced.^
§ 330. For instance, in general if a prisoner be charged with
knowingly receiving several stolen articles, and it be proved that
they were received at separate times, the prosecutor may be put
to his election. But if it be possible that all the goods may
have been received at one time, he cannot be compelled to
abandon any part of the accusation.' The court, too, refused to
put the prosecutor to an election, but heard the whole story, in a
case where several prisoners were charged in different counts of
the same indictment with successive rapes upon the prosecutrix,
and with aiding each other in turn.* A similar course has been
followed where an indictment contained five counts for setting fire
to five houses belonging to different owners, and it appears that
the houses were in a row, and that one fire burnt them all ; * so,
also, it was where an indictment, in the same count, charged four
prisoners with assaulting and robbing two persons, who were
walking together at the time when they were attacked ;° and also
in a case where the defendant was charged in a single count with
uttering several forged receipts (even as many as twenty-two)
purporting to be signed by different persons, with intent to defraud,
also, E. V. Finacane, 1833; E. v. « Young u. E., 1789 (BuUer, J.) ;
Collier, 1831. But see E. v. Barry, E. v. Levy, 1819 ; E. v. Birdseye,
1866 (Martin, B.). 1830. See, also. Anon., 1841 (Ir.).
1 E. V. Ward, 1864 (Byles, J.). ' E. v. Dunn, 1826; E. v. Hinley,
That was an indictment witli three 1843 (Maule, J.),
counts for sending three threatening * E. v. Folkes, 1832 ; E. v. Gray,
letters. Held, that prosecutor must 1835 ; E. v. Parry, 1837.
elect to proceed on one count. ' E. v. Trueman, 1839.
« B,.v. Giddins, 1842 (Tindal, C.J.)-
238
CHAP. II.] LIMITATION OF DOCTRINE OF ELECTION.
it being alleged that all were uttered at one and the same time,
and the proof corresponding with this allegation.'
§ 331. It is expressly provided by statute that in the case of
embezzlement by clerks, servants, and persons employed in the
public service, or in the police, distinct acts, not exceeding three,
may be charged in one indictment, if committed against the same
master, and within six calendar months from the first to the last of
such acts.^ Still, if a prosecutor (not taking advantage of the
statute) indict his servant for a single act of embezzlement, ho
must confine his evidence to that alone, and, if it appear that the
prisoner received different sums on different days, and made a
false account respecting each sum separately, he must elect one
sum and one day on which to proceed.'
§ 332. In the case of larceny, again, it is by statute provided
that several counts may be inserted in the same indictment for
distinct acts of stealing, not exceeding three, which may have
been committed by the prisoner against the same person within
the space of six calendar months.* If, moreover, upon the trial
of any indictment for larceny, the property alleged to have been
stolen at one time shall turn out to have been taken at different
times, the prosecutor shall not be put to his election, unless it
shall appear that there were more than three takings, or that more
than the space of six calendar months elapsed between the first
and the last of such takings.^ In either of these last events the
prosecutor shall be required to elect to proceed for such number of
takings, not exceeding three, as have occurred within six months
of each other.*
§ 333. In the case, too, of receivers of stolen goods, it is also
by statute provided " that if the inquiry relate to a single criminal
act, one or more counts for feloniously stealing property may be
joined in the same indictment with one or more counts charging
the felonious receipt of the same property by the prisoner, he well
knowing it to have been stolen.'
» E. V. Thomas, 1800. * 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("The Laicenv
2 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("The Larceny Act, 1861 "), § 5.
Act, 1861"), § 71- See E. v. Balls, » Id. § 6.
1871. » Id. § 92.
» E. V. Williams, 1834. ' E. v. Beeton, 1849. See E. v.
Hughes, 1860.
239
COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PAET II,
§ 334. The time for putting the prosecutor to his eleotion is,
when it shall appear by the evidence that the two or more supposed
occurrences took place at different periods. It is not sufScient for
this purpose that the counsel for the Crown, in his opening address,
states that the fact is so, because the witnesses, on being examined,
may put the matter in a different light.'
§ 335. It is now time to return to the consideration of the excep-
tions to the general rule that evidence of collateral facts is not
usually receivable. The first exception to this general rule, which
we were considering when we entered upon a digression as to the
law of election is, it will be remembered, the exception embodied in
the rule that evidence of collateral facts is received when such facts
are connected with the transaction which is the subject of inquiry.
A second exception to the general rule, which lays down that evidence
of collateral facts canuot be received, arises where the question is a
matter of science, and where the facts proved, though not directly in
issue, tend to illustrate the opinions of scientific witnesses. For
example, where the point in dispute was, whether a sea-wall had
caused the choking up of a harbour, and engineers were called to
give their opinions as to the effect of the wall, proof that other
harbours on the same coast, where there were no embankments, had
begun to be choked about the same time as the harbour in question,
was admitted, as such evidence served to elucidate the reasoning of
the skilled witnesses.^ If the point in dispute be whether a defen-
dant was or was not in his right mind on a certain occasion, it is
clear that, after proof by a medical man, or (in a civil case) an
admission by counsel, that madness is often of an hereditary
character, evidence tending to show that none of the defendant's
ancestors or near relations had been insane, would be admissible in
support of the negative proposition ; and on a question of disputed
paternity, once prove as a matter of science that children are apt to
inherit the features or general appearance of their parents, and then,
as a matter of course, evidence will be received of personal resem-
blance between the party in question and his alleged father.'
§ 336. Tet a third exception to the general rule which, in
• E. V. Smart, 1841 (Ir.) (Bushe, » Folkesv. Cliadd,1782; M'Fadden
O.J.). V. Murdock, 1867 (Ir.).
3 Bagot.u. Bagot, 1878 (Ir.).
240
CHAP. II.] COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE.
criminal cases, excludes evidence of collateral facts, is that in such
cases evidence of such collateral facts is not excluded, when it can
raise a fair inference respecting the matter in issue by either tending
to show a prisoner's identity or to corroborate the testimony of a
witness in some material particular. For example, on an informa-
tion for a libel, where the printer swore that he had received the
manuscript from the defendant, and had returned it to him, and
notice to produce it had been given to the defendant, other libels
written by him concerning the same subject were received to corro-
borate the statement of the printer ; ' where a prisoner was charged
with robbing the prosecutor of a coat by threatening to accuse him
of an unnatural crime, evidence of a similar, but ineffectual,
attempt on the following evening, when the prisoner brought
a duplicat^e pawn-ticket for the coat, which was found on him
at the time of his apprehension, was held admissible, as con-
firmatory of the truth of the prosecutor's evidence respecting
what occurred on the former day ; ^ on a charge of highway
robbery, the prosecutor was allowed to rebut an alibi, by proving
that, shortly before the attack upon him, and near the same spot,
the prisoner had robbed another person ; ^ aad even had no such
defence been set up, similar evidence would, it seems, have been
admissible, as showing at least that the prisoner was in the neigh-
bourhood at the time when the crime was committed.*
§ 337. The exception just stated also prevails in civil causes.
For instance, where a party was sued on a bill of exchange, accepted
in his name by another person, and evidence had been given that
this person had a general authority from the defendant to accept
bills in his name, an admission by the defendant of his liability on
another bill so accepted was held receivable in evidence to confirm
the witness who had spoken to the general authority.*
§ 338. It may, in connexion with the rule that evidence of col-
lateral facts is usually inadmissible, be noted that, where the
knowledge, intent, or good faith, of a party is material, evidence
may be admitted to prove facts which happened before or after
1 E. V. Pearce, 1791 (Ld. Kenyon). J.). See, also, E. v. Fursey, 1833
* E. V. Egerton, 1819, cited by (Parke and Gaselee, JJ.).
Holroyd, J., in E. v. Ellis, 1826. ^ Llewellyn v. Winckworth, 1845.
3 E. v.Briggs, 1839(Alderson,B.). See HolKngliam v. Head, 1858;
* E. V. Eooney, 1836 (Littledale, Morris v. Bethell, 1869.
X. VOL. I, 241 B
COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PART II.
the principal transaction, even when they have no direct or
apparent connexion with such transaction. At first sight the
admission of such evidence may appear to constitute another
exception to the general rule. But the knowledge or gbod faith, or
intent of the party being a material fact, the evidence, though
apparently collateral, and foreign to the main subject, really has
a direct bearing on an issue in the case. Therefore, the admission
of such evidence, instead of being an exception to the rule, falls
strictly within it. An example of this principle is that where the
question is, whether the acceptor of a bill of exchange either
knew that the name of the payee was fictitious, or at any rate
had given the drawer a general authority to draw bills on him
payable to fictitious persons, evidence may be admitted to show
that he had accepted other bills, drawn in like manner, before it
was possible to have transmitted them from the place at which they
bore date.' Again, in an action for an assault and consequent
injury, evidence that she had ascribed her injury to a previous
accident having been given for the defence, the plaintiff was
allowed to show that in fact no such accident had ever occurred.^
So, too, in any trial, evidence will be admissible to prove or dis-
prove any attempt at subornation of witnesses.^
§ 339. Further, in an action for fraudulently representing that
a trader was trustworthy, whereby the plaintiff was induced to
trust him, the defendant was permitted to call fellow- townsmen of
the trader to state that, at the time when the representation was
made, the man was, according to their belief, in good credit ; ' in an
action for the price of fixing railings to certain houses belonging to
defendant, the defence to which was that plaiatiff had given credit
to a builder by whom the houses were buUt under a contract, such
builder was, to show the bona fides of the defence, allowed to state
that the order was given by him on his own account, and not as
agent for the defendant, and that the defendant had actually paid
him for the building of the houses, including the charge for the
railings ; ^ and where a person seeks to set aside a contract on the
ground of his having been insane when it was made, it must be
shown that the defendant was at the time aware of the insanity,^
1 Gibson V. Hunter, 1794. • Gerisli v. Chartier, 1845.
2 Melliuisli V. Collier, 1830. " Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone, 1892
» Sheen v. Bumstead, 1863. (C. A.).
242
CHAP. II.] COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE.
and, upon this question, evidence of the plaintiff's conduct, at
different times, both before and after the date of the contract, is
admissible to show that the madness was of such a character as
must have been apparent to anyone who had had opportunities
of observation like those afforded to the defendant.^
§ 340. On the same principle, in an action against a company to
recover money paid to them in consequence of a fraud alleged to
have been committed by their agent, with their knowledge and
for their benefit, evidence of similar frauds perpetrated on other
persons by the same agent, with the knowledge and for the benefit .
of the defendants, is admissible in proof of fraudulent complicity
in the case before the court ; ^ in actions for false representation,
where the questions turn on fraudulent intent, other mis-statements
besides those laid in the statement of claim will be admissible in
evidence, for the purpose of showing that the defendant was
actuated by dishonest motives ; ^ in the Divorce Division, in a suit
for dissolution of marriage, evidence of acts of adultery, subsequent
to the date of the latest act charged in the petition, will be
admissible for the purpose of showing the character of previous
• acts of improper familiarity ; * in actions for malicious arrest, the
jury are always at liberty to draw an inference of malice ex
antecedentibus et consequentibus ; ^ and in actions for defamation,
other words written or spoken by the defendant, either before,' or
after, those declared upon, or even after issue joined,' are admis-
sible as evidence of actual malice or of deliberate publication ; '
' Beavan v. M'Donnell, 1854. the alleged Ubel : Bolton v. O'Brien,
2 Blake v. Albion Life Ass. Co., 1885 (Jr.).
1878. See ante, § 328. ' Pearson v. Le Maitre, 1843. A
^ Huntingford v. Massey, 1859 letter written subsequently to tlie
(Crompton, J.). commencement of the action, and
* Boddy V. Boddy, 1860. fourteen months after the libel com-
^ Spencer v. Thompson, 1855 (Ir.). plained of, is admissible: Ibid. See,
* Long V. Barrett (Ir.), 1845 ; also, Macleod v. Wakley, 1828, where
Barrett v. Long, 1856 H. L. Libels a paragraph published only two days
written as much as six years before before the trial was admitted by Ld.
that sued upon are admissible. The Tenterden ; and Plunkett v. Oobbett,
jury should, however, be cautioned 1804, where proof that a copy of the
not to give damages respecting them: paper containing the libel was sold
Ibid. But the omission to give such after action brought was admitted by
caution will not amount to misdireo- Ld. EUenborough as evidence of de-
tion : Darby v. Ouseley, 1856. Such liberate publication.
other libels are also admissible upon ^ Pearson v. Le Maitre, 1843; Bar-
a question as to the construciion of well u. Adkins, 1840; Perkins v.
243 uz
COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PAET 11.
and this whether the language on which the action is founded be
equivocal or clear,' — whether the collateral words tendered in
evidence be addressed to the same party, to whom the slander is
alleged in the statement of claim to have been spoken, or to a
stranger,^— or whether those words be themselves actionable or not.'
§ 341. Again, in an action for false imprisonment, in which the
defendant pleaded, first, not guilty, and secondly, a plea (which
was abandoned and apologised for at the trial) setting up a justifi-
cation, and alleging that plaintiff had committed a felony, it was
held that, in estimating the damages under the first issue, the jury
might take into account the fact of a justification having been
pleaded, because the placing such a plea on the record was a
persisting in the charge, which, under the circumstances, was
strong evidence of malice.* And if, on the trial of an action for
slander, to which the general issue and a justification are pleaded,
the plaintifE express his willingness to accept an apology and
nominal damages on the plea of justification being withdrawn,
but the defendant refuses to abandon such plea, though he offers
no evidence in support of its truth, the jury may consider the
defendaafs conduct, not only with reference to the question of.
damages, but as furnishing evidence of express malice, and thus
Vaughan, 1842; Hemmings v. Gas- against giving any damages in respect
son, 1858 ; Eustell v. Macquister, of it ; and if such evidence is ofiered
1809 (Ld. EUenborougli) ; Char Iter merely for the purpose of obtaining
V. Barret, 1790 (Ld. Kenyon) ; Lee v. damages for such subsequent injury,
Huson, 1791 (id.); Scott v. Ld. Ox- it will be properly rejected. And
ford, 1808 (Lawrence, J.); Delegal perhaps the cases of Pearce ?;. Omsby
V. Highley, 1837 (Tindal, C.J.); and Syinmous v. Blake went no
Jackson v. Adams, 1835. . farther than this. * * Upon principle,
' See n. ', below. we think that the spirit and intentiom,
^ Pearson v. Lemaitre, 1843; Mead of the party publishing a libel are fit
V. Daubigny, 1792 (Ld. Kenyon). to be considered by a jury, in esti-
^ Pearson v. Lemaitre, 1843, ques- mating the injury done to the plain-
tioning Pearce v. Ornsby, 1835, and tiff, and that evidence tending to
Symmons v. Blak.j, 1835. Tindal, prove them cannot be excluded,
C.J., in pronouncing the judgment simply because it may disclose
of the court, states the correct rule another and. different cause of ac-
to be, "that either party may with tion." See, also, Eustell v. Macquister,
a view to damages, give evidence to 1809, where Ld. EUenborough re-
prove or disprove the existence of a marked, that the distinction between
malicious motive in the mind of the words actionable and not actionable
publisher of defamatory matter ; but was not founded on any principle ;
that, if the evidence given for that and Camfield v. Bird, 1852 (Jeryis,
purpose establishes another cause of C.J.).
action, the jury shall be cautioned • Warwick v. Poulkes, 1844.
244
CHAP. II.] COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE.
rendering the words proved actionable, though they were prim^ facie
privileged communications.^
§ 342. If, however, in an action for a libel, the defendant set up the
defences of a privileged communication and justification, which are
openly abandoned at the trial, the jury ought not to take into considera-
tion the circumstance that the justification was once pleaded.^ And
where it clearly appears that other libels are offered in evidence, merely
with the view of unfairly recovering damages for the injury sustained
by their publication, they will properly be rejected;' — indeed, no libels
subsequent to that which is the subject of the action ought to be
admitted, unless they directly refer to the defamatory language set out
in the statement of claim, or at least relate to the same subject-matter.*
§ 343. Not only is other defamatory matter sometimes admissible for
the purpose of showing the animus of the defendant, but the mode in
which such matter was published may also be highly material ; as, for
instance, if printed placards were sent to the plaintiff's house, or paraded
before his door.*
§ 344. On the other hand, on the principle that evidence of collateral
facts is admissible to show intent, malice, or good or had faith, a defendant
has been allowed, in mitigation of damages, to give evidence palliating,
though not justifying, his act of publishing a libel. For instance, he
may show that he copied it from another newspaper,^ or that he had
been provoked to act as he had done by the conduct of the plaintiff, who
had previously published libels of him respecting the same subject-matter,
which had only recently come to the knowledge of the defendant ; ' for
* Simpson v. Eobinson, 1848. A jury in Pearson v. Le Maitre, 1843. In Tal-
ehould, however, always consider quo butt y. Clark, 1840, Ld. Denman would
animo a justification whicli fails was not permit the editor of a newspaper to
pleaded, and whether it was put forward show, in mitigation of damages, that the
ioma/de as a defence, or only to embrace libel was published on the communica-
the opportunity of reiterating the charge. tion of a correspondent; and referring
The mere failure to prove a justification to a case, which was probably Saunders
is not alone and in itself evidence of v. Mills, his Lordship observed, that
mahce: Upton t". Hume (Am.), 1893. "that decision had been very much
' WUson V. Eobinson, 1845. questioned." However, by the recogui-
' See cases cited, ante, in notes ", ', tion of Saunders v. Mills in Pearson v.
and^ to § 340; Stuart v. LoveU, 1817; Le Maitre, Talbut v. Clark would seem
Defries v. Davis, 1835. to be indirectly overruled. See, also,
* Pinnerty v. Tipper, 1809 (Sir J. East v. Chapman, 1827 ; Charlton v.
Mansfield). Watson, 1834 (Patteson, J.) ; Creevy v,
^ Bond V. Douglas, 1836 (Ld. Abinger). Carr, 1835.
* Upton V. Hume (Am.), 1893; Saun- ' Watts v. Fraser, 1837; Tarpley v.
dersv. Mills, 1829, cited by Tindal.C. J., Blabey, 1836; May v. Brown, 1824;
245
COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PAET IL
evidence of provocation by libels on the defendant is admissible, not on
the ground of any right to set off one libel against another,* but from an
indulgent consideration of the weakness, which sometimes leads an angry
man to say " that he should be sorry for." But it is now directed that
in actions for libel or slander, in which the defendant does not by his
defence assert the truth of the statement complained of, the defendant
shall not be entitled on the trial to give evidence in chief, with a view to
mitigation of damages, as to the circumstances under which the libel or
slander was published, or as to the character of the plaintiff, without the
leave of the judge, unless seven days at least before the trial he furnishes
particulars to the plaintiff of the matters as to which he intends to give
evidence. '^
§ 345. Evidence as to animus or intent is, moreover, frequently admis-
sible in criminal proceedings. For instance, on an indictment for know-
ingly uttering a forged document, or a counterfeit bank note, or counter-
feit coin, proof of the possession, or (by statute) of the prior or subsequent'
utterance, either to the prosecutor himself or to other persons, of other
false documents or notes, or bad money, though the latter be of a dif-
ferent description,* or themselves the subjects of separate indictments,* is
admissible as material to the question of guilt)/ knowledge or intent.^ In
these cases, however, it is essential to prove distinctly that the instru-
Wakley v. Jolinson, 1826 ; Finnerty v. would be admissible, if the notes or coin
Tipper, 1809. See Richards v. Richards, were of a different description.
1844. In America the defendant is * R. w. Harris, 1836(by all the judges);
allowed to give evidence, not only in R. v. Forster, 1855. Doubts had been
mitig;ation of damages in a civil suit, but entertained on this subject by some of
of punishment in criminal proceedings, the judges in R. v. Millard, 1813, but
that the plaintifl has libelled him pre- the evidence was admitted in Sunder-
viously to the publication by the defeu- land's, Hodgson's, Kirkwood's, and
dant of the libel complained of. See Martin's cases (1830). The same evi-
Decamp v. Archibald (Am.), 1893. dence is admissible in Scotland: Ahson,
1 Watts V. Fraser, 1835 (Ld. Denman). Or. L. 420.
In Judgeti.Berkeley,1825,Burrough, J., ° R. v. Hough, 1806; R. v. Weeks,
allowed the defendant, in an action of 1861; Kirkwood's case, 1830 (Littledale,
assault, to prove, in mitigation of dama- J.) ; Martin's case, 1814 (id.) ; R.f . Aston,
§es, a series of libellous articles pub- 1838 (Alderson, B.); R. v. Lewis, 1840
ushed respecting him by the plaintiff, (Ld. Denman). Oontri, E. v. Smith,
one of which appeared on the day of the 1827 (Vaughan, B.).
assault. « R. v. WyUe, 1804; R. v. Ball, 1807;
2 R. S. 0. 1883, Ord. XXXYI. r. 37. E. v. Harrison, 1834 (Taunton, J., and
" R. V. Forster, 1855. This case dis- Alderson, B.); R. ■«. Green, 1852 (Oress-
poses of a doubt raised in R. v. Tavemer, well, J.) ; R. v. Nisbett, 1853 (Williams,
1809, and in R. v. Smith, 1831, as to J.); R. v. Salt, 1862 (Williams, J.); E.
whether evidence of subsequent utterings v, Colclough, 1882 (Ir,).
246
CHAP. II.] COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE.
ments offered in eyidence of guilty knowledge were themselves
forged.i Moreover, though the prosecutor may prove the uttering
of other forged notes by the prisoner, and his conduct at the time
of uttering them, it seems that he cannot show what the prisoner
said or did at another time, with respect to such uttering ; for these
collateral facts are too remote for any reasonable presumption of
guilt to be founded upon them, and such as the prisoner cannot by
any possibility be prepared to contradict.^
§ 346. Evidence of this description has long been admissible on
charges of uttering, and of one or two oilences of a cognate character.*
It has now been expressly rendered by the Legislature also admis-
sible against receivers of stolen goods; the Prevention of Crimes
Act, 1871, enacting* that, "where proceedings are taken against any
person for having received goods knowing them to be stolen, or for
having in his possession stolen property, evidence may be given at
any stage of the proceedings that there was found ^ in the possession
of such person other property stolen within the preceding period of
twelve months,^ and such evidence may be taken into consideration
for the purpose of proving that such person knew the property to
be stolen which forms the subject of the proceedings taken against
him."
§ 347. Nevertheless, in ordinary criminal trials, judges may, if
they so please, still decline to recognise the doctrine under discus-
sion.' Yet not only has such doctrine been acted upon in the cases
previously mentioned, but on a charge of sending a threatening
' E. V. Millard, 1813. * It is not sufficient under these
■' E. V. PMllips, 1829 (Bayley, J.); words to prove tliat tlie prisoner liad
E. V. Cooke, 1838 (Patteson, J.). very recently dealt with other stolen
Contra, E. v. Forbes, 1835 (Cole- property : E. v. Drage, 1875 (Bram-
ridge, J.). See E. u. Brown, 1861. well, L. J.) ; E. ■;;. Carter, 1884
^ E.g., tte obtaining money by (C. 0. E.).
falsely pretending to a pawnbroker * Tbis evidence will be admissible,
tbat a spurious chain was silver : E. though the property so found may
V. Eoebuck, 1855 ; E. v. Francis, be the subject of another indictment
1874. The doctrine, however, does against the prisoner at the same
not extend to ordinary indictments assizes : E. v. Jones, 1877.
for false pretences : E. v. Holt, 1860. ' See and compare E. ■;;. Fairie,
Still, it has been applied to cases of 1857 ; E. v. Winslow, 1860 ; E. v.
arson with intent to defraud insur- Oeering, 1849, cited ante, § 328,
ance companies : E. v. Gray, 1866 followed E. ■;;. Flannagan, 1882 ; E.
(Willes, J., and Martin, B.), sed qu. v. Oddy, 1851 ; E. v. SirreU, 1850 ;
* 34 & 35 Y. c. 112, § 19. E. v. Dunn, 1826; E. v. Nicholls,
1838.
247
COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PART II.
letter, other letters written by the prisoner, both before and after
the one in question, hare been admitted to explain its meaning ; ' on
an indictment for malicious shooting, if it be doubtful whether the
shot was fired by accident or design, proof may be given that the
prisoner at another time intentionally shot at the same person ; '
and on indictments for murder, evidence of former menaces oi
quarrels will have an important tendency towards supporting the
legal inference of malice,^ while proof of expressions of kindness or
of friendly acts towards the deceased wiR be entitled to equal
weight as raising a counter presumption.*
§ 348. On an indictment for a robbery, where the prisoners
formed part of a mob who went into the prosecutor's house, one of
which mob had civilly advised prosecutor to give it something to pre-
vent mischief, evidence that the same mob, in the presence of some
of the prisoners, had demanded money at other houses on the saqie
day, was admitted, as tending to prove that the advice was not
given bona fide, but was in reality a polite mode of committing a
robbery.^ On this last case the acts given in evidence were not
committed by the prisoners themselves, but only by some of the
mob with whom they were connected. But the principle is the
same, the law being, that where several evil-doers conspire together
to effect some unlawful purpose, acts done by any one of the party
in furtherance of the common design shall be considered as done
by all.»
§ 349. On this rule, that collateral facts are admissible to show
animus or intent, rests the admissibility of evidence as to the general
character of individuals. Such evidence is tendered for the purpose
of either raising a presumption of innocence or guilt, or of affecting
the amount of damages, or of impeaching or supporting the veracitt/
of a witness ; ' the first object being chiefly confined to criminal
' E. V. Eobinson, 1Y96. with, the concurrence of Ld. Ten-
' E. V. Yoke, 1823. For other terden, Alderson, J., and Vaughan.
examples, see E. v. Mogg, 1830 ; E. B.). This doctrine forms an incideit
V. Dossett, 1846 (Maule, J.); B,. y. in Mr. Baring Gould's Novel " Cheap
Eiohardson, 1860 ; E. v. Harris, Jack Zita."
1864. See, also, ante, §§ 327, 328. « E. v. Watson, 1817 ; E. v. Hardy,
' See E. V. Hagan, 1873. 1794 ; E. v. Salter, 1804 ; E; v. Hunt,
♦ 1 Ph. Ev. 470, 476. 1820.
' E. V. Winkworth, 1830 (Parke, J., '2 St. Bv. 303.
248
CHAP. II.] EVIDENCE OF GENERAL CHARACTER.
prosecutions, and tlie second to civil causes, while the third is
equally applicable to both forms of procedure.
§ 350. The term " character," as here used, is not — as some able
judges have considered it to be ' — synonymous with " disposition,"
but it simply means " reputation," or the general credit which a
man has obtained in public opinion.^ The position of a witness
who is called to speak to character is exactly the opposite of that
of a master who is asked for the character of his servant. The
master must give his servant the character which his own personal
experience has told him that the servant deserves. But a witness
to character cannot give the result of his own personal experience
and observation, or express his own opinion, but must, in strict law,
confine himself to evidence of mere general repute.' This rule
rests rather on authority than on reason, and would probably have
been long ago discarded , but for two causes. First, the rule, in
practice, is seldom strictly enforced ; and next, as " the best
character is generally that which is the least talked about," ^ the
judges have modified it, to a certain extent, by permitting witnesses
to give negative evidence on the subject, and state that "they
never heard anything agaimt the character of the person on whose
behalf they have been called." ^
§ 351. When the point at issue is whether the accused has
committed a particular criminal act, evidence of his general good
character is obviously entitled to little weight, unless some reason-
able doubt exists as to his guilt ; and, therefore, in this latter event
alone will the jury be advised to act upon such evidence." The
inquiry, too, must be confined, — except where the intention forms a
material ingredient in the offence,' — to the general character of
the prisoner, and must not condescend to particular faots.^ For
^ E. V. Eowton, 1865 (Erie, C.J., witnesses called in point of reputa-
and Willes, J.). tion I must leave to you. Pew men
2 Id, that come to be questioned but stall
' Id. See post, § 14Y0. bave some come and say, 'he is a
* Per Erie, 0. J., 1865. Some very honest man ; I never knew any
judges, indeed, have asserted that hurt by him ; ' but is this anything
evidence in this negative form is the against the evidence of the fact ? "
most cogent proof of a man's good ' Ante, § 345.
reputation: Id. " J' Anson v. Stuart, 1796 (BuUer,
* Per Oockburn, C.J., 1865. J.). In former times the practice
" In R. 0. Turner, 1664, Hyde, was less strict. See E. v. Turner
C.J., observed to the jury:— "The 1664.
249
EVIDENCE OF GENERAL CHARACTER. [PART II,
although the common reputation, in which a person is held in
society, may he undeserved, and the evidence in support of it must,
from its very nature, be indefinite, yet some inference, varying in
degree according to circumstances, may fairly be drawn from it ;
since it is not probable that a man, who has uniformly sustained a
character for honesty or humanity, will forfeit that character by
the commission of a dishonest or a cruel act. The mere proof of
isolated facts can, however, afford no such presumption. " None
are all evil," and the most consummate villain may be able to prove
that on some occasions he has acted with humanity, fairness, or
honour. In all cases, too, when evidence is admitted touching the
general character of the party, it ought manifestly to bear reference
to the nature of the charge against him ; ' as, for instance, if he
be accused of theft, that he has been reputed an honest man ; — if
of treason, a man of loyalty. It should also relate to the same
period as the supposed offence ; for, as Lord Holt once remarked,
" A man is not born a knave ; there must be time to make him so ;
nor is he presently discovered after he becomes one." ^ Subject
to these observations, evidence of the defendant's general good
character is admissible in all prosecutions whether for felony or
misdemeanor.'
§ 352. Although a defendant is, from motives of humanity,
allowed this reasonable indulgence, the prosecutor cannot, in the
first instance, have recourse to similar loose testimony for the pur-
pose of establishing the guilt of the accused.* If, however, with
the view of raising a presumption of innocence, witnesses to cha-
racter are called for the defence, counsel for the Crown may then
not only cross-examine such witnesses to rebut this presumption,
either as to particular facts,^ or, if it be deemed essential, as to the
grounds of their belief," but evidence of general bad character will also
> Douglass V. Tousey, 1829 (Am.). » R. v. Hodgkiss, 1836. In E. v.
' E. «. Swendsen, 1702. Wood, 1860, Parke, B., allowed a
I 2 Euss. 0. & M. 784. witness to character to be asked, in
E. V. Tuberfield, 1864. In that cross-examination, whether he had
case the question was put, not to not heard that the prisoner was
prove the guilt of the prisoner, but suspected of having committed a
to show that the witness, a police- robbery some years before. See also
man, had had probable cause for E. ■;;. Turner, 1664. ' '
arresting him. Held, nevertheless, « 2 St. Ev.' 304. "
that the answer was not evidence.
250
CHAP. II.] EVIDENCE OF PRl^VIOUS CONVICTION.
be admissiWe,' — thougli the right of counsel for the Crown in this
respect is in practice seldom resorted to.^ Moreover, in most trials
for felony, and in some for misdemeanor, if defendant endeavour
to establish a good character, either by calling witnesses himself,
or by cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution,' the pro-
secution have a right — which is usually exercised — to, in answer,
prove the specific fact that the prisoner has actually been convicted
previously. The statutes authorizing this, however, do not extend
to any capital felonies, and apply only partially to misdemeanors.*
§ 353. Moreover, the Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871,' in addi-
tion to the provisions which have been already' set out, provides'
that " where proceedings are taken against any person for having
received goods knowing them to be stolen, or for having in his
possession stolen property, and evidence has been given that the
stolen property has been found in his possession, then if such person
has within five years immediately preceding been convicted of any
offence involving fraud or dishonesty, evidence of such previous
conviction may be given at any stage of the proceedings, and may
be taken into consideration for the purpose of proving that the
person accused knew the property which was proved to be in his
possession to have been stolen ; provided that not less than seven
days' notice in writing shall have been given to the person accused
that proof is intended to be given of such previous conviction ;
and it shall not be necessary for the purposes of this section to
charge in the indictment the previous conviction of the person so
accused." '
§ 354. The admission of evidence of general character is only
' E. V. Eowton, 1865, by all tlie of uttering false or counterfeit coin,
judges, overruling E. v. Burt, 1851. or of possessing counterfeit gold or
' 2 St. Ev. 304. silver coin, or the offence of obtain-
' E. V. Sbrimpton, 1851 ; E. v. ing goods or money by false pre-
Gadbury, 1838 (Parke, B.). tences, or tbe oiienoe of conspiracy
* See, as allowing this, 6 & 7 W. 4, to defraud, or any misdemeanor
c. Ill, as to any felony not punishable under 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("The Larceny
wJArfeai/i after conviction for felony; Act, 1861"), § 58. See, also, "The
as to offences punishable under that Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871 " (34
Act, 24 & 25 V. 0. 96 ("The Larceny & 35 V. c. 112), §§ 9, 20.
Act, 1861"), § 116; see also, as to " 34 & 35 V. c. 112.
offences against the coin, 24 & 25 V. * Ante, § 345.
c. 99 (" The Coinage Offences Act, ' In § 19.
1861 "), § 37 ; E. v. Martin, 1869 ; « E. «. Davis, 1870.
and as to any felony, or the offence
251
evidence: of character when admissible, [part II.
allowed in criminal proceedings, where it was originally received,
some two centuries ago,' in favorem vitse. So strict is this rule,
that even upon an information for penalties filed in the Revenue
side of the Queen's Bench Division by the Attorney- General, such
evidence will be rejected, because proceedings of this kind, though
brought in the name of the Sovereign, are considered as civil suits.''
Evidence of general good character or competency is not admissible
either in an action of ejectment by an heir-at-law against a devisee,
where defendant was charged with having imposed a fictitious will on
the testator in extremis ; ' in an action for slander — even where, by
pleading the truth of word^ charging the plaintiff with stealing
money, the latter had put the character of the former directly in
jeopardy ; * in an action for malicious prosecution,' in support of
probable cause ; in an action of trespass for false imprisonment on
a criminal charge, in which the defendant must not even cross-
examine, either as to the plaintiff's bad character, or as to previous
charges made against him ; " nor in an action for a libel charging
a professional mau with want of skill in some particular work —
and this even though the evidence be offered with a view of
showing that the defendant, in making the charge, was actuated
by malice.'
§ 355. A distinction, however, exists between cases where par-
ticular acts of misconduct are imputed to a party, and those where
his general conduct is put in issue. For general evidence of cha-
^ So early as 1664, the practice of 1801.
calling " witnesses in point of repu- * Corn-wall v. Eichardson, 1825
tation" was well established. See (Abbott, C.J. ).
Hj'de, C.J., in E. v. Turner, 1664. ^ Newsam v. Carr. 1S17 (Wood,
Accordingly, in 1680, such evidence B.) ; Gregory v. Thomas, 1811 ;
was received even by Scroggs, C.J., contra, Eodriquez v. Tadmire, 1799
with Jefferies as prosecuting counsel : (Lord Kenyon). In America, this
E. V. Harris, 1680. kind of evidence has been also re-
" Att.-G-en.'y.Bowman,1791(Eyre, jeoted in actions of assault and bat-
C.B.). His lordship observed, that tery: Givensu. Bradley, 1813 (Am.);
"the true line of distinction is this; and in assumpsit, Nash v. Gilkeson,
in a direct prosecution for a crime, 1819; and is inadmissible whenever
such evidence is admissible ; but the general character is involved by
where the prosecution is not directly the plea only, and not by the nature
for the crime but for the penalty, as of the action : Anderspn v. Long,
in this information, it is not." See 1823 (Am.); Potter v. Webb, 1829
Att.-Gen. v. Eadloff, 1854 (Martin, (Am.). See Gr. Ev. § 55.
B-)- " Downing V. Butcher, 1841; Jones
^ Doe 0. Hicks (Buller, J.), cited v. Stevens, 1822.
byGibbs, arguendo, in Doe d. Walker, ' Brine v. Bazalgette, 1849.
252
CH. II.] EVIDEKCE OF CHARACTER TO AFFECT DAMAGES.
racter, though rejected in the former, is admitted in the latter class
of eases.' Thus, in an action for a libel, where the language com-
plained of stated that the defendant parted with the plaintiff " on
account of her incompetency, and her not being ladylike or good
tempered," general evidence of her competency, good temper, and
manners was given by her personal friends ; ^ and where, in a
similar action, the words charged the plaintiff generally with
dishonesty and misconduct while in service, a witness, with whom
she had formerly lived, was allowed to testify to her antecedent
general good conduct.' These eases are, however, in truth no
exception to the rule of exclusion.*
§ 356. General evidence of character is (subject to compliance
with the rule as to previous notice in actions for libel or slander,
which has been set out while considering the subject of evidence of
libellous attacks upon a defendant being received in mitigation of
damages') admissible, not only upon questions of malice, intent, and
so on, but also for the purpose of increasing or diminishing damages.
For example, evidence impeaching the previous general character
as to chastity of the seduced wife or daughter is admissible on a
petition claiming damages on the ground of adultery,* or in an
action for seduction.' For in these proceedings the plaintiff in
reality (though in actions for seduction it is not the ostensible ground
of claim') seeks compensation for the pain caused him, by the dis-
grace of his family, and the ruin of his domestic happiness ; and
the damages should be commensurate with the pain, and vary
according as the character of the seduced wife or daughter was
' Doe V. Hicks, undated (BuUer, general evidence ttat such, charge
J.), as cited by Oibbs, arguendo, in can be rebutted.
Doev. Walker, 1801. 'See Ord. XXYI. r. 37, ante,
. » Fountain v. Boodle, 1842. See § 344 ; see, also, § 349.
Brines. Bazalgette, 1849. « 20 & 21 V. c. 85 (" Tbe Matri-
3 King V. Waring, 1803 (Ld. Al- monial Causes Act, 1857"), §'33.
vanley). ' B. N. P. • 27, 296 ; Elsam v.
* For just as in cumulative of- Faucett, 1797 (Ld. Eenyon).
fences, such, as treason, or a con- ' See Dodd v. Norris, 1814 (Ld.
spiracy to carry on the business of Ellenborough) ; Andrews v. Askey,
common cheats, many acts are given 1837, (Tiudal, 0. J.). See, also, cases
in evidence, because such crimes can cited in n. a, to S. 0. ; Grrinnell «.
be proved in no other way : R. v. Wells, 1 844 ; Thompson v. itoss,
Roberts, 1808 (Ld. Ellenborough), 1858 ; Long v. Keightley, 1877 (Ir.) ;
so where the general behaviour of a Eist v. Faux, 1863 ; Terry v. Hutch-
party is impeached, it is only by inson, 1808 ; Hedges v. Tagg, 1872.
253
EVIDENCE OF CHAEACTEE TO AFFECT DAMAGES. [PT. 11.
previously unblemished or profligate. Therefore, in such cases,
not only is evidence of general had character admissible in mitiga-
tion of damages, but even particular acts of immorality or indecorum
may be proved.'
§ 357. Both evidence of acts of this description, as well as proof
of general bad character, must, however, he confined to occurrences
previously to the defendant's misconduct, because this very miscon-
duct may, by weakening the principles of the woman, have been
the indirect cause of subsequent immorality, and may have itself
occasioned a general want of reputation.^ In an action of seduction,
where plaintiff's daughter is called as a witness, the defendant can
probably in strict law (but if such a course were adopted in practice
it would be made matter of strong observation) prove specific acts
of immorality, without first cross-examining the woman ; since, on
principle, such evidence may be tendered, not so much to impeach
the veracity of the party seduced, but to show that, as her previous
conduct had been disgraceful, the father's feelings could not have been
wounded by the misconduct of the defendant.' However, where the
daughter, in her examination in chief, states that the defendant
seduced her, and that she has borne a child in consequence, and the
defence is that she has declared another person to be the father, it is
clear that ■ndtnesses cannot be called to prove her declarations, unless
she be first cross- examined as to the fact of her having made them ;
because, though language of this kind, if lightly uttered, would tend
to degrade her character, yet, if used in earnest, it would directly
contradict the testimony she had given, and would be evidence not
in mitigation of damages, but in bar of the action."
§ 358. On a claim of damages from an alleged adulterer,'
the co-respondent may. prove, in mitigation of damages, that the
petitioner has been guilty of notorious infidelity; has turned
his wife out of doors ; has refused to maintain her ; or has other-
wise been guilty of dissolute conduct ; ° for, in such cases, a man
can scarcely complain of the loss of that society upon which he has
1 Verry v. Watkins, 1836 (Alder- (Tindal, C.J.).
son, B.). See, also, Simpson v. Gray- * See 20 & 21 V. c. 85 (" The
son, 1892 (Am.). Matrimonial Causes Act, 1837 "),
' Elsam V. Faucett, 1797. § 33.
8 Carpenter v. Wall, 1840. « B. N. P. 27 ; Bromley v. Wallace,
* Id. ; Andrews v. Askey, 1837 1803.
254
CH. II.] EVIDENCE OF CHARACTEE TO AFFECT DAMAGES.
himself placed so little value. In an action for seduction, it would
on principle appear that evidence in mitigation of damages may be
given (since plaintiff conduced to the result by allowing his daughter
to consort with such a person) to show that the defendant is notori-
ously a man of profligate habits. In actions for breach of promise,
the defendant is entitled to prove, in mitigation of damages, that
the plaintiil is a person, either of bad character,' or of coarse and
brutal manners,^ though acts of misconduct committed after the
promise, or even before that event without the knowledge of the
defendant,^ can, where sufficiently glaring to constitute a bar to
the action,* only be proved under a special defence.*
§ 359. It has been much discussed, and is not now clear,
whether, in an action for defamation, evidence impeaching the
plaintiff's previous general character, and showing that, at the
time of the publication, he laboured under a general suspicion of
having been guilty of the charge imputed to him by the defendant,
is admissible as afiPecting the question of damages.*
§ 360. Assuming, however, such evidence to be admissible, a
defendant in libel or slander, who has not pleaded truth as a justi-
fication, is now precluded, by a Eule of Court already set out,
from attempting to mitigate damages by giving evidence reflecting
on the plaintiff's character, unless he has complied with such Eule.'
1 Toulkes V. Sellway, 1800 (Ld. B.); Mawby v. Barber, 1826 (Ld.
Kenyon). See, also, Jolmson v. Tenterden) ; Hardy v. Alexander,
Oauikins, 1799 (Am.) ; Boynton u. 1837 (Coltman, J.). These last four
Kellogg, 1807 (Am.). cases are cited in 2 St. Ev. 641, 642,
» Leeds v. Cook, 1803 (Ld. Ellen- n.e. ; A(x.. Kirkman v. Oxley, 1811-16
borough). (Heath, J.). See contra, Soott v.
^ Irving V. Ghreenwood, 1824 (Ab- Sampson, 1882 (Mathew and Cave,
bott, C.J.). JJ-) ; Jones v. Stevens, 1822 ;
* Leeds v. Cook, 1803 ; Baddeley Waithman v. "Weaver, 1822 (Abbott,
D. Mortlock, 1816. C.J.); Cornwall u. Eichardson, 1825
* Ante, § 301. See Young v. (Abbott, C.J.); Snowdon v. Smith,
Murphy, 1836 ; and Pujolas «). Hoi- 1811 (Chambre, J.). In Scotland
land, 1841 (Ir.). the evidence is admissible: Dickson,
* See, in support of the admissi- Ev. (Se.)§ 24, and cases there cited in
bility of the evidence, Richards v. n. id). For the American autho-
Eichards, 1844 ; v. Moor, 1813 ; rities, see Eoot v. King, 1827 (Am.) ;
Ld. Leicester «. Walter, 1809; Bell Bailey v. Hyde, 1820 (Am.); Ben-
i;.Parke, (Ir.)1860(Pigot,C.B.); Wil- nett v. Hyde, 1825 (Am.) ; Douglast
hams V. Callender, 1810; Earner v. v. Tousey, 1829 (Am.); Inman v.
Merle, 1802-9 (Ld. EUenborough); Foster, 1832 (Am.) ; Walcott i;. Hall,
KnobeU u. PuUer, 1797 (Eyre, C.J.) ; 1810 (Am.); Boss v. Lapham, 1817
Newsam v. Carr, 1817 (Wood, B.); (Am); Foot v. Tracy, 1806 (Am.).
EUershaw v. Eobinson, 1816-28 ' E.S.C. 1883, Ord. XXXVLr.37,
(Holroyd, J.) ; Moore v. Oastler, 1836 cited ante, § 344, ad fin.
(Ld. Deiunan, after consulting Parke,
255
EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER TO AFFECT DAMAGES. [PT. 11.
§ 361. In the above cases, as well as in other actions for lihel,
and other actions where witnesses to character are admitted, the
evidence impeaching the plaintiff's previous general character
must (if admissible) be confined to the particular trait in it
which is attacked in the alleged libel. Such evidence must,
moreover, be confined to the general reputation as to plaintiff's
character on this point, and it must not relate to particular acts
of bad conduct} Evidence of any rumours calculated to com-
promise the plaintiff's character must, too, be strictly confined
to rumours which were prevalent before the publication of the
slander of the defendant ; otherwise a man might slander another,
and then call neighbours to say that they had heard of the impu-
tations which he had himself originated.^
§ 362. A plaintiff cannot give evidence of general good character
in aggravation of damages, unless counter-proof has been first offered
by the defendant ; for, until the contrary appear, the presumption
of law is already in his favour. Therefore, in an action of slander
for imputing theft, plaintiff will not be allowed to prove his cha-
racter for honesty, even though the defendant has placed on the
record pleas of justification.' Indeed, in an action for seduction,
where evidence was produced for the defence, to prove that the girl
had previously had a child by another man, she was not allowed to
be asked respecting her general good character for chastity, but
plaintiff was restricted to proof that the specific charge made by
the defendant was false ; * on another occasion similar evidence
was rejected where the daughter had been cross-examined, with a
view of showing that she had been guilty of gross levity and
indelicacy ; * and in a case for criminal conversation, in which the
defendant had endeavoured, by cross-examining the plaintiff's wit-
nesses, to impeach plaintiff's character, but had failed, plaintiff was
not permitted to call witnesses to his general good conduct.^ It is
true that in these cases the characters attacked remained, in strict-
ness, unimpeached, because the facts insinuated had, or might have,
' See cases cited in last note but (Abbott, C.J.).
one, and further, Andrews v. Van- * Bamfield v. Massey, 1808 (Ld.
duzer, 1814 (Am.); Sawyer v. Eifert, Ellenborough).
1820 (Am.). 5 Dodd v. Norris, 1814 (Ld. EUea-
^ Thompson v. Nye, 1850 ; Bell v. borough).
Parke, 1860 (Ir.). « King v. Eranois, 1800 (Ld. Ken-
' Cornwall v, Eichardson, 1825 yon).
256
CHAP. II.] EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER OF PROSECUTRIX.
been denied. But, the very circumstance of the questions being
asked was calculated to excite a, suspicion in the minds of the jury,
which, it may be said, the plaintiil. should be given an oppor-
tunity of removing.^ A contrary rule has prevailed in a later
English case,^ subsequently followed in Ireland.'
§ 363. The law as to the admission of general evidence of cha-
racter to impeach the veracity of a witness will be discussed hereafter.^
Such evidence is, however, sometimes receivable, not so much to
shake the credit of the witness, as to show directly that the act in
question has not heen committed. Thus, on indictments for rape,
or attempts to commit that crime, not only is evidence of general
bad character admissible to show that the prosecutrix ought not to
be believed upon her oath, but so also is proof that she is a reputed
prostitute, for it goes far towards raising an inference that she yielded
willingly. In such cases general evidence of this kind will on this
ground be received, though the woman be not called as a witness,
and though, if called, she be not asked, on cross-examination, any
questions tending to impeach her character for chastity.* Counsel
for the defence cannot, however, prove specific immoral acts with
the prisoner, unless he has first given the prosecutrix an opportunity
of denying or explaining them.^ Moreover, the prosecutrix, if
cross-examined as to particular acts of immorality with other men,
may decline to answer tuoh questions, while, if she answers them
in. the negative, witnesses cannot be called to contradict her.'
» 1 C. & P. 100, n. a; 2 St. Ev. E. v. Aspinall, 1827 (HuUook, B.).
306, 307. On one occasion the prisoner's counsel
'^ Bate V. HiU, 1823 (Park, J.) ; was allowed to ask tlie prosecutrix,
Murgatroyd vi Murgatroyd, 1828 with the view of contradicting Tier,
(Bayley, J.). See, also, E. v. Clarke, whether she had not, on a day since
1817. the alleged rape, been walking in a
^ In Brown v. Goodwin (Ir.), 1841 certain street with a common prosti-
(Torrens, J.), an action for seduction, tute, looking out for men : E. v.
in which plaintiff's daughter having Barker, 1829 (Park, J., after consult-
been asked questions to impeach her ing Parke, J.) ; see, also, Verry v.
reputation, plaintiff was allowed to Watkins, 1856; Andrews v. Askey,
call witnesses to her general good 1837; and E. ii. Dean, 1852.
character. ' E. v. Oockcroft, 1870 (WUles, J.,
* Post, §§ 1470—1473. and Martin, B.); E. v. Holmes and
« E. V. Clarke, 1817 (Holroyd, J.) ; Furness, 1871 (0. 0. E.) ; overruling
E. w. 01ure(Ir.), 1841 (Orampton, J.).. E. v. Eobins, 1843; E. v. Hodgson,
* E. V. Cockcroft, 1870. See E. v. 1H12 ; secus, as to acts with prisoner
Martin, 1834 ; E. v. Eobins, 1843 ; himself, post, § 1441.
T. VOL. I. 257
257^ AMERICAN NOTES. PAET n.
AMEEICAN NOTES.
Res inter alios aotse It may be doubted whether many of the
facts excluded under the rule hinted at in the phrase res inter alios
aetce are excluded because they are irrelevant. It is one of the few
errors in Mr. Justice Stephen's admirable Digest of Evidence that
all questions of admissibility are decided by him on the single test
of relevancy. Such does not seem to be the case. Relevancy indeed
is essential to admissibility. But it is not suificient, in all in-
stances, to secure it. It might almost be said to be the essential
characteristic of the English common law of evidence that much
evidence, perfectly relevant, is not received ; — because practical
dangers and difficulties in receiving it are thought or have been
thought to outweigh the advantages which could be derived from its
use. Probably the historical reason of much of this is to be found in
a persistent influence of the feeling that a jury was liable to be con-
fused, or misled by the consideration of certain matters that would
not affect better disciplined minds to the same extent. That it was
better, on the whole, to lose the benefit of the evidence, rather than
run the risk. The fact that many kinds of evidence are admitted,
either directly or as exceptions to the rules of exclusion, which
seem quite as dangerous as those which are ruled out, counts for
but little. The law of evidence is neither the growth of one mind or
of several minds at one time. It was not even the work of a single
age. Its symmetry therefore lays little claim to admiration. And
all that can be said is that certain great rules for excluding other-
wise competent evidence became established. That they are prin-
cipally four ; — Res inter alios actoe, matters of hearsay, character,
and opinion. That certain exceptions in the operation of each of
these general rules have also become established. It is perhaps not
a scientific statement. But it is apparently correct as a general
statement, and gives the present condition of a branch of law
which, considering the conditions of its growth, is greatly to the
credit of those men who have helped to mould it; — in that it has
served its purpose, on the whole, fairly well.
The rule of res inter alios excludes evidence otherwise relevant.
There is little need of a special rule excluding irrelevant evidence.
It excludes itself, furnishing slight apparent necessity for classify-
ing the reasons why it is irrelevant. As a rule of exclusion, the
rule forbids the attempt to prove that A. did or omitted to do a
certain act by means of evidence that he did or omitted to do the
same or a substantially similar act at another time.
On the question whether the driver of a horse-car stopped his car
with undue suddenness, it is erroneous to admit evidence of his sud-
den stopping on previous occasions. Maguire v. Middlesex Eail-
CHAP. VI.J AMERICAN NOTES. 2572
way, 115 Mass. 239 (1874). In a case involving responsibility for a
maritime collision, it is error to permit the captain of one of the
vessels to be asked as to " accidents which had happened while he
was pilot or captain of the propeller." Mailler v. Express Propeller
Co., 61 N. Y. 312 (1874). The question whether a railroad company
gave danger signals at a certain crossing " is a question of fact that
cannot be affected one way or another by showing the conduct of
subordinate ofiScers or servants in charge of some other train or
trains " in giving the signals at this crossing. Eskridge v. Cincin-
nati, &c. E. R., 89 Ky. 367 (1889). So in a case in Massachusetts,
the issue being whether the bell was rung and the whistle sounded
at a certain crossing, the court say, " It was not competent for the
defendant to prove that its servants usually rang the bell at this
crossing, and to ask the jury to infer therefrom that it was rung at
the time of the accident; neither was it competent for the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant's servants often or usually omitted to
ring the bell at this crossing, and to ask the jury to infer therefrom
that the bell was not rung at the time of the accident." Tuttle v.
Fitchburg R. E. 152 Mass. 42 (1890).
On an issue as to the terms of a contract for the service of a
stallion, evidence is incompetent as to contracts with others for the
same service. Evans v. Koons, 10 Ind. App. 603 (1894). Of course
the rule does not apply where the second contract refers to the first.
Gardner v. Crenshaw, 122 Mo. 79 (1894). See also Roberts v.
Dixon, 50 Kans. 436 (1893).
On an issue of devisavit vel non the claim was made by the
remonstrants that the will was forged by the propounder. Held :
the propounder could not be asked whether he had not been guilty
of other forgeries. " The fact of forgery of a particular paper can-
not be shown by proof of other crimes of the same kind." Frank-
lin V. Franklin, 90 Tenn. 44 (1890). Similarly, it has been held
that where the payee is claimed to have forged one of the endorse-
ments on the note, evidence of his previous conviction of forgery is
immaterial. Benedict v. Eose, 24 S. C. 297 (1886). Or that the
party had the " capacity, skill, and appliances which would enable
him to forge the note in suit." The court say : — "In cases where
a person is accused of a crime, it is not competent to show, as evi-
dence of the coiyus delicti, that he has committed similar oifences,
or that he is of bad character, or that he has the capacity and the
means of committing the crime. The argument in favor of admit-
ting such evidence is plausible. It might aid the jury if they could
know the character of the defendant, — whether he is a man morally
and physically able and likely to commit the offence ; but the law
excludes such evidence upon grounds of public policy, to prevent
the multiplication of issues in a case, and to protect a party from
the injustice of being called upon, without notice, to explain the
257^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET 11.
acts of his life not shown to be connected with the offence with
which he is charged." Costelo v. Crowell, 139 Mass. 588 (1885).
Where the question was whether the plaintiff made a certaia con-
tract with the defendant, it is not competent for him to show that
he made similar contracts with other people. " The maxim that a
transaction between two persons ought not to operate to the disad-
vantage of a third, though somewhat obscure in its application,
because it does not show how unconnected transactions should be
supposed to be relevant to each other, and though failing in its
literal sense, because it is not true that a man cannot be affected by
a transaction to which he is not a party, is nevertheless one of the
most important and practically useful maxims of the law of evi-
dence. It means . . . that you are not to draw inferences from one
transaction to another that is not specifically connected with it
merely because the two resemble each other ; that they must be
linked together by the chain of cause and effect in some assignable
way before you can draw your inference," Aiken v. Kennison, 68
Vt. 665 (1886). On the question what arrangements a firm of book
publishers made with one of their canvassers, evidence is incompe-
tent, of their contracts with other canvassers, in the absence of evi-
dence that the particular canvasser knew of such other contracts or
of some usage in the business. ISTewhall v. Appleton, 102 1^. Y. 133
(1886).
" It would seem also that custom or the habitual conduct of the
defendant is not admissible to show the existence or absence of
negligence in a given case." Gulf, &c. Ey. Co. v. Eowland, 82 Tex.
166 (1891).
In ISTew Hampshire, however, "a different rule prevails, and has
become established in cases where the evidence is conflicting ; and
it is here held to be competent to show that the party charged with
negligence had performed or omitted the same act iu the same way
before, as tending to show that he did or omitted the act at the time
in question, on the ground that a person is more likely to do a thing
in a particular way, as he is in the habit of doing or not doing it."
Parkinson v. Nashua, &c. E. E., 61 N. H. 416 (1881).
In Massachusetts, the rule prevails that on an issue of the value
of land evidence is admissible of the price at which other lots, simi-
larly situated, sold about the same time. Eoberts v. Boston, 149
Mass. 346 (1889). The preliminary question as to whether the lots
are so far similar and the time sufficiently near to render evidence
of sales competent is for the court. "It is not competent to put in
the opinion or judgment of witnesses as to the value of other land
in the vicinity." Thompson v. Boston, 148 Mass. 387 (1889).
On a question whether a certain brick-kiln was a nuisance to the
plaintiff, evidence is inadmissible that a certain other brick-kiln
was not a nuisance to the witness. Kirchgraber v. Lloyd, 59 Mo.
App. 69 (1894).
CHAP. VI. J AMERICAN NOTES. 267*
Of course the doing of acts at another time may be inadmissible
on the ground of irrelevancy. For example, on an indictment for
arson, it is fatal error to allow evidence that the defendant had
stolen a buggy previously. Schaser v. State, 36 Wise. 429 (1874),
So on an issue of the value of a sou's services in his father's store,
evidence of what the father paid another son is immaterial. Cohen
V. Cohen, 2 Mackey, 227 (1883). So in an action to recover against
an estate for horse hire, evidence that the plaintiff did not charge
certain other persons for the use of the same horse is immaterial.
Harris v. Howard, 56 Vt. 695 (1884).
In Cbiminal Cases. — The rule excluding proof of similar acts at
another time as evidence on the question of the doing of a particular
act, has naturally been enforced with especial strictness in criminal
cases. The increased probative force of proof of a prior illegal
act and the seriousness in consequences to the prisoner have per-
mitted but comparatively little relaxation in criminal as compared
with civil cases. To permit this evidence, would substantially
amount to proof of character by evidence of particular acts of mis-
conduct. This cannot be done directly, and this rule forbids its
being done indirectly. " The rule is a familiar one in criminal pro-
cedure, that a party cahnot be proved guilty of one offence by evi-
dence that at a different time and place he was guilty of committing
a similar crime." Com. v. Campbell, 7 All. 541 (1863).
Thus on an indictment for advising 'a slave to escape, it is error
to allow the government to show that the defendant previously
advised another slave to escape. Cole v. Com., 5 Gratt. 696 (1848).
On an indictment for infanticide, an admission, by silence, that the
prisc5ner "had a child this way before, and put it away," is inadmis-
sible. ' State V. Shuford, 69 N. C. 486 (1873).
So on an indictment for murder it was held to be error to permit
the government to connect the prisoner with other offences. "The
only effect of testimony of this character .vras to distract the atten-
tion of the jury from the real issues in the case and to fill their
minds with prejudice against the accused. All independent mat-
ters and all independent crimes which are disconnected from the
crime then under investigation, which shed no light upon the alleged
criminal transaction, are to be rigorously excluded for the reasons
already given." State v. Parker, 96 Mo. 382 (1888).
" As a general rule, it is not admissible to adduce evidence that
a defendant committed an offence, in order to prove that he com-
mitted another." State v. Alston, 94 N. C. 930 (1886).
On an indictment for murder, preceded by an attempt at robbery,
it is error to permit evidence of prior robberies by the defendants.
"Proof of them only tended to prejudice the defendants with the
jurors, to draw their minds away from the real issue, and to produce
the impression that they were wretches whose lives were of no
value to the community." Boyd v. U. S. 142 U. S. 450 (1892).
257^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET II.
On an issue of burglary evidence is incompetent of a prior bur-
glary of the house of the prosecutor and the prisoner's connection
with it. Lightfoot v. People, 16 Mich. 507 (1868).
The government in a criminal case, however, is not prevented from
proving the offence charged because such proof incidentally shows
that the defendant has been guilty of another crime. Com. v. John-
son, 150 Mass. 54 (1889).
The rule has no application where the prior act was the cause of
the act in question. Under these circumstances " the two embrace
but one continuing transaction, and, occurring at the same time and
place, together constitute but the res gestae of a single principal
fact." Prior v. State, 77 Ala. 56 (1884).
Relaxation op the Eule. — In two important particulars the bene-
fits to be derived from the use of this species of evidence have been
considered to more than compensate for the danger of admitting it.
The controlling consideration apparentlj' has been that two impor-
tant sets of facts can frequently be proved in no other way. These
are, (1), mental states, and, (2), in seeking a responsible cause among
several possible causes.
(1) Mental States. — To prove purpose, intent, motive, knowl-
edge, or other mental state is a task of difilcu'lty. To the mediaeval
mind, indeed, the task was insuperable. To ascertain the secret
thoughts of the human heart seemed to our ancestors a task beyond
mere mortal power. A direct appeal to the judgment of Heaven,
by ordeal, wager of battle, &c., was needed to aid consciously feeble
resources for the discovery of truth, when locked up in a human
breast. But this is a mystery which modern jurisprudence by the
use of reason undertakes to unravel. It demands, however, from
the nature of the problem, a certain relaxation of the usual rules of
evidence. Unless the person whose mental state is involved ad-
mits its existence, the fact of such mental state can be established
only by proof of its natural manifestations, either in language or
conduct. It follows therefore that in cases where a mental state is
a fact in issue or relevant to the issue, the usual expressions of such
state are competent. The exclamation of pain, hatred, or malice ;
the threat of revenge; the timid expression of fear by a mind unduly
influenced to do what its sense of justice repudiates ; — these, and
many others are admissible in any case where such a mental state is
in issue or relevant, not as hearsay evidence of the facts stated, but
as original circumstantial evidence of the existence of the state of
mind of which they are the usual expression.
In like manner, the existence of such a mental state may be
proved by evidence of conduct which is the usual expression of such
state. It naturally follows that such proof will frequently be found
in the doing of an act at another time similar to the one as to which
the issue is raised in the case on trial. That such proof would
CHAP. VI.] AMERICAK NOTES. 257®
come within the scope of the rule against admitting res inter alios
actce, does not affect the validity of the reasoning under which it is
received.
Intent. — Perhaps the most frequent mental state to be affirma-
tively shown, especially in criminal cases, is the existence of a
specific intent.
In an indictment for assault with intent to commit murder,
" previous attacks . . . during the same evening, which showed a
continuous and persevering determination, by repeated assaults,
accompanied by threats to kill (the prosecutor) or otherwise injure
him " were admitted. Eoss v. State, 62 Ala. 224 (1878).
So on an indictment for murder previous threats or attempts to
kill are competent. " This evidence did not of itself establish the
fact that the defendant intended to kill his wife at the time he fired
the fatal shot ; but it was to be weighed by the jury in connection
with all the facts surrounding the homicide for the purpose of deter-
mining the motive and intent of the defendant at the time." People
V. Jones, 99 N. Y. 667 (1885).
So in an indictment for rape a prior unsuccessful attempt to com-
mit the same crime upon the prosecutrix is competent. People v.
O'Sullivan, 104 N. Y. 481 (1887); States. Walters, 45 la. 389
(1877).
So in a libel for divorce on the ground of adultery prior acts of
adultery are admissible " for the purpose of proving an adulterous
disposition in the persons implicated, which itself tends to prove
the particular act charged, as a continuation of tlie same immoral
proclivity." Hicks v. State, 86 Ala. 30 (1888). So on an indict-
ment for adultery, subsequent acts of adultery are competent, but
the effect of the evidence must be properly limited, and it is error
not to do so. Eunderburg v. State, 23 Tex. App. 392 (1887) ; State
V. Way, 5 Neb. 283 (1877).
In an indictment for adultery, one of the government witnesses
testified to seeing the alleged guilty parties undress for the pur-
pose of occupying the same bed for the night and go to bed together.
The defence introduced evidence of the witness's character for truth.
It was held that prior acts of undue familiarity were admissible.
" The circumstances thus proved were such as naturally excite in
the mind a belief that a woman who would so conduct herself, would
be more likely to commit the fact alleged against her, than if her
deportment had been modest and discreet." Com. v. Merriam, 14
Pick. 518 (1833).
In an action for malicious and wilful mischief the court permit
evidence of other similar offences against the prosecutor by the
defendant. " Inasmuch as the case was one where the motive or
intent with which the act was committed was the gist of the offence,
it was permissible to go into and show other criminal transactions
257" AMEEICAN NOTES. [PAET H.
of a similar character, as evidence of the intent or motive." Street
V. State, 7 Tex. App. 5 (1879).
So in a case of larceny, ■' as a general, rule, evidence that the
defendant has committed offences other than those charged in the
indictment, though of a similar nature, is prima facie inadmissible.
The general rule has its limitations and exceptions. When it is
material to show the intent with which the act charged was com-
mitted, to illustrate its criminality, or to identify the accused as the
person who committed the act laid in the indictment, such evidence
is admissible." Curtis v. State, 78 Ala. 12 (1884).
In an action of libel the publication of which is claimed to be
malicious, subsequent publications by the defendant are admissible
" for the purpose of showing the personal malice and ill-will of the
defendant towards the plaintiff." Grace v. McArthur, 76 Wise.
641 (1890). In an indictment for manslaughter, evidence of cruel
and abusive treatment of the deceased is admissible on the question
of malice. Burnett v. State, 14 Lea, 4.39 (1884) ; Eldridge v. State,
27 Fla. 162 (1891).
So where the replication of express malice was made to a defence
of privileged communication in an action of slander, the plaintiff is
entitled to give evidence of a previous statement to a similar effect,
under circumstances not privileged. Hamel v. Amyot, 14 Quebec,
56 (1887).
Where an innkeeper, in an action by a guest to recover for loss of
property by fire, relied on a statutory exemption that the fire was
incendiary, evidence was offered that on the same evening an attempt
was made to fire a neighbouring building by similar means. The evi-
dence was rejected, and such rejection was ruled to be error. The
court,^e7' Andrews, J.,while conceding that the evidence offered would
be incompetent against the prisoner on an indictment for arson, con-
tinue : — "But in investigating in a civil suit a question depending
solely upon circumstantial evidence, it would, I think, be holding
too strict a rule to refuse evidence such as was offered in this case,
which is connected with the principal fact by circumstances which
naturally tend to establish it. There is no fixed and definite rule,
by which it can be determined whether a collateral fact is so remote
as to be inadmissible to support the principal fact sought to be
established. The question must, to a considerable extent, be de-
cided in each case, on its own circumstances." Faucett v. Nichols,
64 N. Y. 377 (1876). On an indictment for arson, a prior attempt
four weeks before by the defendant to fire the same buildings, is
competent. " Evidence of previous unsuccessful attempts to com-
mit the same crime for which a respondent is on trial, is admis-
sible." State V. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 181 (1888).
Where the issue was whether the plaintiff was dealing with the
cashier of the defendant bank as an individual or as an ofQcer of the
CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 257^
defendant bank, evidence is competent of former transactions of
a similar nature between tlie parties. L'Herbette v. Pittsfield
JSTational Bank, 162 Mass. 137 (1894).
Acts admitted for the purpose of showing intent may really
amount to what would popularly be termed circumstantial evidence
of guilt, though in truth all evidence of the existence of one thing
by proof of the existence of another is, in a sense, circumstantial.
Thus on an indictment for stealing a hog, evidence is admissible
that the defendant after the taking altered the brand on the hog,
though this would be a distinct offence, " to show the intent with
which the act charged was done . . . inasmuch as the altering of
the previous mark of an animal tends to show the intent of convert-
ing it to one's own use." State v. Thomas, 30 La. Ann. Pt. 1, 600
(1878).
On an indictment for using instruments on a certain woman to
procure a miscarriage, evidence of treatment by electricity of the
same woman on the same occasion and of similar acts on other occa-
sions, is competent. " Whether it was of acts which formed part of
the principal transaction, or of acts of the defendant at other times,
it tended to prove attempts of the defendant to procure the identi-
cal result the intent to procure which constituted the gist of the
offence charged, — that is, to prove the intent which was charged in
the indictment." Com. v. Corkin, 136 Mass. 429 (1884).
Where the defendant, an insurance agent, was indicted for
fraudulently transferring to a certain insurance company from
another company, for the purpose of shielding the latter, after he
knew that the vessel called the " Wade " and her cargo insured
had been lost, a certain share of the risk, evidence is admissible
that he did the same thing as to other risks about the same time.
" It was necessary for the People to show the evil motive and
fraudulent intent of the defendant in changing the insurance upon
the cargo of the Wade, after knowledge of the loss, from the Conti-
nental to the Thames and Mersey ; and for the purpose of showing
the motive and intent, it was competent for the People to show that
the defendant had done similar acts, although it might thus be
shown that he was guilty of other crimes." People v. Dimick, 107
N. Y. 13, 32 (1887).
Malice. — Acts of the person whose malice at a particular time
is important, whether made before or after the time in question,
may be shown if such acts tend to establish the existence of malice
at the time alleged. •
On an indictment of a husband for the murder of his wife evidence
of threats and acts of violence for a period of eight years prior to
the death is competent. "It tended to show a settled ill-will and
malice on the part of the defendant towards his wife, and therefore
bore directly on the question whether there was any motive for him
to commit the crime." Com. y. Holmes, 167 Mass. 233 (1892).
257^ AMEEICAN NOTES. [PAET II.
So in an action for malicious prosecution, the court say : " Malice
may also be inferred, of course, from the circumstances surrounding
and attending upon the prosecution, the conduct and declarations of
the prosecutor, his activity in and about the case, his efforts therein
to secure some personal end. Indeed, the existence of malice being
a fact which, in the nature of things, is incapable of positive, direct
proof, it must of necessity be rested on inferences and deductions
from facts which can be laid before the jury ; and hence it is that a
wide range is permitted in adducing attendant circumstances which
tend to throw any light on the subject." Lunsford v. Dietrich, 93
Ala. 566 (1890).
Knowledge. — That a particular fact was known to a person is
diflBcult of proof in the absence of an admission or other affirmative
proof. When, as frequently happens in criminal cases, it becomes
necessary to establish such a mental state, the usual, and apparently
the necessary, method of doing so is by proving facts which tend to
render such knowledge probable. Usually a single fact of this nature
so easily admits of explanation in the way of accident or mistake as
to furnish but a slight degree of probative force. But it will be seen
that the number of such as facts is multiplied, hypotheses which
satisfactorily explain them all grow rapidly fewer and more diflB-
cult of belief. The necessity of the case and the valuable results to
be obtained from the process have warranted a frequent use of
facts which would otherwise be objectionable as res inter alios
actcB.
The question being whether A. fraudulently induced B. to loan
him money on the security of false certificates of stock, evidence of
the possession and use by A. of other altered and false certificates
about the same time, whether before or afterwards, is " competent,
to show that his possession of those, for the use of which he was
indicted, was not casual and accidental. . . . They were admitted
and allowed to be used only to show guilty knowledge." Com. v.
Coe, 115 Mass. 481 (1874).
On indictments for receiving stolen goods knowing them to have
been stolen, evidence of stealing from the same persons of similar
goods and their purchase by the accused, is competent. " The rule
is recognized as well established, that in cases like the present,
where guilty knowledge is an ingredient of the oifence charged, the
same may be proved as other facts are proved, by circumstantial
evidence, and tliat other acts of a like character, although involving
substantive crimes, may be given in evidence to prove the scienter.
The principal limitation of the rule is, that the criminal act which
is sought to be given in evidence, must be necessarily connected with
that which is the subject of the prosecution, either from some con-
nection of time and place, or as furnishing a clue to the motive on
the part of the accused." Coleman v. People, 58 jST. Y. 555 (1874).
CHAP. VI.j AMERICAJSr NOTES. 257^"
It is not essential to this rule that the goods should have been
stolen, in the second instances, from the same party. " Upon the
trial on an indictment for receiving certain stolen goods, knowing
them to have been stolen, evidence that other goods, known to have
been stolen, were previously received by the defendant from the
same thief, is admissible for the purpose of showing guilty knowl-
edge on the part of the accused that the goods, for receiving which
he is charged, were stolen." Schriedley v. State, 23 Ohio St., 130
(1872) ; Devoto v. Com., 3 Mete. (Ky.) 417 (1861).
On an indictment for forging and uttering certain receipted bills
for hides, " on the question of the defendant's knowledge that the
bills in issue were not genuine, his possession and use of other sim-
ilar false bills, about the same time, whether before or afterwards,
in a continuous series of transactions with the same persons under
the same contract, was competent to show that his use of the former
was not innocent." Com. v. White, 146 Mass. 392 (1888). It is
immaterial that the transactions extend some months later than the
latest forgery mentioned in the indictment. Ibid.
To prove defendant's knowledge of the falsity of the false pre-
tence used in obtaining a certain amount of money by means of a
cheque, evidence of prior frauds on other parties, shortly before, is
admissible. Tarbox v. State, 38 Oh. St. 581 (1883). In an action
against a stage line for damages sustained by the overturning of a
stage-coach, as bearing on the bad nature of the roads and the
defendant's knowledge of the necessity of providing a careful driver
in consequence, the frequent occurrence of other similar accidents
may be shown. But such evidence is not admissible " for the pur-
pose of showing negligence on the part of the driver at the time."
Higley v. Gilmer, 3 Mont. 90 (1878).
So in an action of negligently setting fires by sparks escaping
from a locomotive engine, prior instances of similar fires are admis-
sible as bearing on " whether, in view of their previous occurrence,
the company was, at the time of the fire in question, in the exer-
cise of reasonable care." Smith v. Old Colony, &c. R. E., 10 E. I. 22
(1871). But no evidence of past fires is admissible for that purpose.
Ibid. So on an issue of negligencQ, it is competent to show other
occurrences showing knowledge of defects on the part of the defend-
ant. Thus, in an action for personal injuries caused by the cars of
a freight train running off the track, evidence is competent that
freight trains under the same conductor had run off the track seven
or eight times within the preceding month. Mobile, &c. E. E. v.
Ashcraft, 48 Ala. 16 (1872).
So on an indictment for passing counterfeit money a witness tes-
tified " that the defendant's wife sold to him a twenty dollar coun-
terfeit bill belonging to the defendant, in his absence; but that the
defendant subsequently was advised of the transaction and sane-
257^1 AMEEIGAN NOTES. PART H.
tioned it." This was not the bill for the passing of which the
defendant was indicted. Held, " the evidence was admissible as
tending to show knowledge on the part of the defendant that the
bill passed by himself was counterfeit, as the transactions were
about the same time." Bersch v. State, 13 Ind. 434 (1859).
On an indictment for uttering and passing counterfeit money,
evidence that the prisoner " had ,been employed in the business of
printing parts of genuine bank bills was pertinent for the purpose
of showing his knowledge in respect to bills. It tended to show
guilty knowledge that the bills he passed were counterfeit." Com.
V. Hall, 4 All. 305 (1862).
So on an indictment for uttering a forged cheque, it is competent
to show the uttering of other forged cheques upon other occasions.
" Such proof is not received for the purpose of showing other crimes
than that charged in the indictment, but for the purpose of show-
ing the guilty knowledge and intent which are elements of the
crime charged." People v. Everhardt, 104 N. Y. 591 (1887).
Motive. — It is obvious that where the doing of an act, especially
one of serious consequence, is to be established by circumstantial
evidence, one of the most essential objects of judicial inquiry is as
to the existence of motive. Crimes of magnitude and other acts
of grave import are not usually done without a motive, of some
kind, which, for the time at least, probably appeared adequate.
To establish such a motive, resort frequently must be had, as in
proving other mental feelings, to proof of acts which are its usual
expression or otherwise point to it. " Indeed, it would be difficult to
detect criminals and bring them to punishment, by any other means
than by following the thread of impelling motives." Com. v. Ferri-
gan, 44 Pa. St. 386 (1863). Instances of the use of this kind of
evidence are extremely frequent.
Por example, in, a case where a father was indicted for murder of a
daughter, May, it was the theory of the government that the defend-
ant desired to be rid of a wife and two children, Irene and May, in
order to marry another woman. "There was evidence tending
strongly to support this theory, and to show that the death of each
one of the victims was but a part of a system in which the lives of
all were involved, and in the working out of which to the accom-
plishment of defendant's ulterior purpose, the life of each was, in
substantially the same manner, ruthlessly sacrificed. Under these
circumstances, all evidence going in any way to connect the defend-
ant with the murder of his wife, or of his daughter Irene, was rele-
vant to the issues involved on his trial for the murder of May, and
was properly admitted." Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37, 67 (1889).
Similarly, where the object of the government was to show that the
murder was committed to enable the prisoner to marry the wife of
the victim, evidence of adulterous intercourse between these parties
CHAP. VI.] AJEEEICAjq^ NOTES. 257^^
■was admitted. " He is a poor judge of human motives and impulses,
who cannot see in such a relation as proposed to be proved here,
between the deceased's wife and the prisoner, that it might lead to
the perpetration of the crime charged, or who would deny that it
would probably shed light on the motive for the act. History is
full of such examples." Com. v. Perrigan, 44 Pa. St. 386 (1863).
So evidence is competent, in a similar case, "that during four of
the eleven nights intervening between the killing and the finding
of the body of the deceased, the accused and Polly, the wife of the
deceased, slept in the same bed, and together, at witness's house.
Clearly this was a pregnant circumstance, taken with the other
proofs tending to show a motive for the crime on the part of the
accused." Miller v. State, 68 Miss. 221 (1890).
" Evidence of one crime may be given to shew a motive for com-
mitting another, as in the case of Rex v. Clewes (4 C. & P. 221),
and where several felonies are all parts of the same transaction,
evidence of all is admissible upon the trial of an indictment for any
of them." E. v. Chasson, 16 New Bruns. 546, 582 (1876). So
where the motive claimed for a murder was revenge for procuring
prisoner's dismissal from employment, evidence is admissible that
the prisoner had stated that he so believed and had threatened to
" fix " deceased for it. " Upon an indictment for murder, evidence
of former grudges and antecedent threats is received, because it
tends to show malice in the defendant against the deceased. Such
evidence is admissible because it supplies a motive for the act."
State V. Palmer, 66 N. H. 218 (1889).
On an action against certain judges of election for refusing to
allow the plaintiff to vote, it was the plaintiff's contention that the
motive of the defendants, who were all members of one political
party, was the partisan one of preventing members of the opposite
political party (of which the plaintiff was a member) from voting.
Held : that evidence was competent that the defendants on the same
day had rejected others of their political opponents for the same
trivial reasons. " Where the inquiry turns upon intention and motive,
and in cases where fraud, corruption and the like constitute the gist
of the action, acts and declarations of a similar character, at or
about the same time, to or towards third parties, are admissible to
show the quo animo of the particular transaction." Priend v.
Hamill, 34 Md. 298, 306 (1870).
In an indictment for the murder of one Prince Arthur Freeman
by poison, the motive of the defendant, as claimed by the govern-
ment, was as follows. That Preeman, a married man with a wife
and two children, had insured his life for $2000 in favor of his wife,
Annie Freeman. That the defendant, a sister of his wife, was bur-
dened with and pressed for the payment of debts which she had no
means of paying. That thereupon, the defendant formed the plan
257^3 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET II.
and intention of procuring to herself this insurance money, for the
payment of these pressing debts, by iirst killing her sister ; then
inducing Freeman to make his life insurance payable to herself and,
finally, killing him. The wife died February 26th, 1885 ; on May
13th, 1885, the defendant was appointed by Freeman beneficiary
under his insurance certificate ; on June 27th, 1885, Freeman died ;
the defendant's bills were paid from the insurance money which
was duly received on September 23rd, 1885. The court ruled that
upon a trial of a defendant for the commission of a crime, evidence
that at another time he committed a similar crime could not be
received or considered as tending to show that he committed the
crime for which he was on trial ; that therefore evidence tending to
show that the defendant killed her sister Annie Freeman was not
to be considered as indicating that she would be likely to kill Prince
Arthur Freeman, and that all the evidence in relation to the death
of Annie Freeman was only to be considered so far as it bore upon
the question whether the defendant, at the time of the alleged mur-
der of Prince Arthur Freeman, was actuated by the motive which
was imputed to her by the Commonwealth, to obtain for her own
use the life insurance money payable on his death. Held: "the
ruling at the trial was correct." Com. v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 671
(1888).
In a Pennsylvania case involving a series of murders by poison,
where the apparent motive in each case was different, the court
insist that the existence of a common motive is an absolute essen-
tial to admitting evidence of other crimes. In other words, the
crimes must be means to a common end foreseen from the begin,
ning, as in the Robinson case, to admit the evidence of other crimes.
" To make one criminal act evidence of another, a connection
between them must have existed in the mind of the actor, linking
them together for some purpose he intended to accomplish ; or it
must be necessary to identify the person of the actor, by a connec- ■
tion which shows that he who committed the one must have done
the other." Shaffner v. Com. 72 Pa. St. 60 (1872).
Where the supposed motive for the murder of a wife to whom the
prisoner had been secretly married was the fact that the announce-
ment of such marriage, which could be delayed but a short time
longer, would interrupt his relations with a prostitute and prevent
marriage with another woman living in Indiana, to whom he was
then under engagement of marriage, letters of the prisoner to the
deceased and such other women were held competent. "All of
them . . . showed the existence of a relation between the accused
and these two women which might be broken off or interfered with
by his marriage to the deceased becoming public. They exhibited a
motive why he should desire to rid himself of his wife and theii
unborn offspring." O'Brien v. Com., 89 Ky. 354 (1889).
CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 257^*
Where the claim was that the insured had swindled an insurance
company by insuring his life for large amounts in favour of his cred-
itors and other friends, then killing himself, a witness was allowed
to testify that a few months before the process of insurance began
he went at request of insured to raise money for him from his
(insured's) friends ; that he failed to accomplish the purpose and so
informed the insured. " It indicated an existing motive for the
fraud in the want of money and the failure to obtain it." Smith v.
K B. Society, 123 N. Y. 85 (1890). So where a prisoner had mur-
dered his father and step-mother, the government was permitted on
an indictment for the murder of the father to show ill-will on the
part of the prisoner against the step-mother. " The motive which
induced the defendant to kill any one of the family might very well
be held to have induced him to kill the others." Woolfolk v.
State, 85 G-a. 69, 105 (1890). So in a murder case, the court rule
that, "It is permissible to prove previous altercations or combats
between the accused and the deceased as tending to show malice,
ill-will, or a motive for the killing. The object of such evidence is
the fact of the previous difficulty, and collateral inquiries into the
particulars, details of merits, are not allowable." Garrett v. State,
76 Ala. 18 (1884).
On an indictment for murder in an attempt to rape, evidence of
the defendant's conduct about the time of the homicide toward vari-
ous women in the neighbourhood showing an apparent desire to
commit the crime of rape is admissible. But the government can-
not show that the defendant committed a rape several years before
on a woman other than the deceased. " The law in regard to proof
of intent, is, I apprehend, in no particular different from the law in
regard to the proof of other facts, unless it may be in the general
principle that a person is ordinarily presumed to intend the natural
consequences of his actions. But always the evidence will be sub-
ject to the condition that it legally and logically tends to prove the
facts in issue, whether it be the intent or any other fact." State v.
Lapage, 67 N. H. 245, 290 (1876) ; State v. Walters, 45 la. 389
(1877).
In an indictment for rape, evidence of solicitations six months
previous is competent. " The evidence was admissible as tending
to show the existence of a motive or passion that would render the
commission of the act charged more probable." State v. Knapp,
45 K. H. 148 (1863).
To show that a defendant had negotiated the note in suit at a
large discount because of his impecunious condition, evidence is
admissible that he negotiated other notes at large discounts at about
the same time. Turner v. Luning, 105 Cal. 124 (1894).
Where the doing of a prior act possesses a probative force apart
from its resemblance to the act in question, such fact is, in general,
257^^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET II.
admissible, in the absence of special danger to be apprehended from
its use.
Purpose. — So where criminal acts form part of a common pur-
pose or organised plan of operations. " There is a distinct and
significant probative effect, resulting from the continuance of the
same plan or scheme, and from the doing of other acts in pursuance
thereof. It is somewhat of the nature of threats or declarations
of intention, but more especially of preparations for the commission
of the crime which is the subject of the indictment." Com. v.
Eobinson, 146 Mass. 571 (1888).
On an indictment for stealing a horse it may be shown that the
defendant on the same night stole a wagon from another person.
"The taking a wagon to use with the stolen horse, if they were used
together, was evidence of a corroborating circumstance to the main
charge, and could be used as evidence for that purpose, notwith-
standing it was proof of another felony also, not charged in the
indictment." Phillips v. People, 57 Barb. 353 (1869). On an issue
of larceny of a horse evidence of the larceny of a saddle and blanket
at the same time was competent. State v. Folwell, 14 Kans. 105
(1874). So a larceny of a whiffletree about the same time, useful
in enabling the prisoner to escape. Ibid.
On the contrary, the supreme court of Arkansas granted a new
trial in a case where, on an indictment for larceny of two horses,
evidence was admitted that the defendants had shortly afterwards
stolen bridles and saddles with which to equip the horses for the
journey. "It was not competent for the State to prove these sepa-
rate and distinct offences, by the admissions of appellant, or other-
wise, on his trial upon the charge of stealing the horse and mare."
Endaily v. State, 39 Ark. 278 (1882) , In this latter case, however,
the evidence of stealing the horse was plenary the defendants hav-
ing confessed. The evidence of the further larcenies seems to have
served no useful purpose.
It is necessary to establish a connecting link between the trans-
action sought to be shown and the transaction in question ; — as that
they are part of a single plan or scheme. In a well-considered
Massachusetts case, of alleged false pretences in the sale of a horse,
similar false pretences in sales to other persons shortly before were
held inadmissible. " It is not in general competent to show a dis.
tinct crime committed by the defendant for the purpose of proving
that he is guilty of the crime charged. . . . But as in all crimes,
except a few statutory offences, a criminal intent is necessary to be
proved, evidence which legitimately bears upon this may be put in,
even if it be derived from circumstances which also show the com-
mission of another offence. . . . The evidence here admitted as to
the three other distinct fraudulent sales does not appear to come
within any of the exceptions to the general rule that limits the trial
CHAP. VI.] AMBEICAN NOTES. 2571"
to the immediate act for which the defendant is indicted. . . . The
transactions formed no part of a single scheme or plan, any more
than the various robberies of a thief." Per Devens, J., in Com. v.
Jackson, 132 Mass. 16 (1882).
Where, on the trial of one charged with the forgery of a promis-
sory note, it appears that the crime in question is one of a system
of like crimes committed by the defendant in pursuance of a con-
spiracy, other notes forged by him during the pendency of the
conspiracy and purporting to be executed by different persons, are
admissible in evidence against him. " The reason for the rule in
this and similar cases is that when once system is proved, each par-
ticular part of the system may be explained by the other parts
which go to make up the whole." Card v. State, 109 Ind. 415, 420
(1886).
In a case in ISTew Hampshire which the court evidently feel is a
close one, the evidence having been admitted on the wrong ground
at the trial, the court " after some hesitancy " decide that on an
indictment for placing obstructions on a railroad track, evidence
was admissible that shortly before and shortly after the obstruc-
tions in question were struck the defendants placed other obstruc-
tions on the track, in the immediate vicinity. "These acts would
show that the defendants were near the place where the offence was
committed, about the time it was committed, and that they were
consequently in a situation to place the obstructions on the track,
and had the strength and ability to put them there." State v.
Went worth, 37 IST. H. 196 (1858). A similar reasoning is adopted
in a Massachusetts case. " Where unlawful acts of the same
general character are continuous in their nature, and appear to
be parts of a general scheme or plan, participation in them at an
earlier stage is the usual evidence that one who was afterward
present was a participator then." Tyson v. Booth, 100 Mass. 258
(1868).
'Fraud. — Nowhere is a wider latitude given into the range ot
res inter alios acta} than in cases of fraud.
To show fraudulent intent, evidence is admitted of other frauds
of a similar nature, especially where such evidence tends to estab-
lish the existence of an organized scheme, of which separate frauds
constitute part.
For example, where it was claimed that the plaintiff was patentee
of an invention for baling cotton, and that the defendants, an
English company, making a similar device, fraudulently pretended
to be about to purchase this invention, not actually intending to do
so, but with the real object of keeping the market for their own
process during the pendency of protracted negotiations, evidence
that the defendants, during the same period, entered into negotia-
tions with other American inventors, patentees of competing inven-
257" AMEKICAJSr NOTES. [PART U.
tions, in the same way and with the same object, is competent. " It
was an important inquiry in the case, what was the purpose or
animus of the defendants in their negotiations with the plaintiff?
... If a motive exist prompting to a particular line of conduct,
and it be shown that in pursuing that line a defendant has deceived
and defrauded one person, it may justly be inferred that similar
conduct towards another, at about the same time, and in relation to
a like subject, was actuated by the same spirit." Butler v. Wat-
kins, 13 Wall. 456, 464 (1871). On an issue whether the defend-
ants fraudulently sold the plaintiff's goods to a person of no financial
standing, it may be shown that they sold the goods of others to such
persons with similar false representations. " Actions of this de-
scription, . . . where fraud is of the essence of the charge, neces-
sarily give rise to a wide range of investigation, for the reason that
the intent of the defendant is, more or less, involved in the issue.
Experience shows that positive proof of fraudulent acts is not gen-
erally to be expected, and for that reason, ^mong others, the law
allows a resort to circumstances, as the means of ascertaining the
truth." Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172, 187 (1869). So on an
issue of a fraudulent entry of goods at the custom-house, evidence of
similar previous fraudulent entries has been received. " Wherever
the intent or guilty knowledge of a party is a material ingredient in
the issue of a case, these collateral facts, tending to establish such
intent or knowledge, are proper evidence." Bottomley v. U. S.
1 Story, 135, 144 (1840). Where it was claimed that the defendant
procured an extension of time upon a certain indebtedness by fraud-
ulent representations as to his ability to pay, evidence is admissible
that at the same time the defendant was making like false repre-
sentations to others. " The plaintiff relied upon showing, that the
defendant had been engaged in a scheme, to defraud those upon
whose credulity he could impose ; and the entire history of the
defendant's dealings with him, in regard to this money loaned,
would tend, in some degree, though perhaps remotely, to show that
it was with a continued intent to defraud, that he made the rep-
resentations " in question. French v. White, 5 Duer, 264 (1856).
On the issue whether a certain conveyance to the plaintiff was in
fraud of A.'s creditors, evidence is admissible of other conveyances
from A. to the plaintiff and collusive suits between A. and the
plaintiff about the same time which were also in fraud of A.'s cred-
itors. " It is usually the only mode of proving such matters.
Purpose and intention, especially when there is an obvious motive
for disguise, is only to be reached by inference, and safe inference'
can almost never be made from a single transaction, especially when
the form of the act is in itself indifferent and of hourly occurrence."
Pierce v. Hoffman, 24 Vt. 526 (1862) ; Baldwin v. Short, 125 N. Y.
553 (1891). " It is not essential to the competency of such evidence
CHAP. VI.] AMEEICAN NOTES. 257^8
that it should relate to transactions contemporaneous with the one
investigated. If they are so closely related in time that the intent
that governed in the one may fairly and reasonably be inferred to
be the intent that controlled the other, then the one sheds light
upon the other and is therefore a relevant subject of investigation."
Bernheim v. Dibrell, 66 Miss. 199 (1888). So evidence that the
alleged fraudulent grantee assisted the grantors in devising means
to prevent their creditors from availing themselves of their legal
remedies, e. g., by leaving the State and remaining away until after
a certain session of the trial court, is competent. Adams v. Kenney,
59 N. H. 133 (1879).
It is not, ;peT contra, sufficient to show that two frauds are contem-
poraneous to succeed in establishing a probative relation between
them. This would only tend to show that the defendant was likely
to do the act complained of because he had done it before, — which
is precisely what the rule of the res inter alios seeks to prevent.
Such a line of proof substantially amounts to proof of character by
specific acts of conduct. Evidence of prior frauds is admitted only
when done with a persistent motive, or as part of a systematic plan.
In a case where the plaintiffs, who were wholesale merchants,
claimed that the defendant had procured a sale to himself of certain
goods by fraud and with intent not to pay for the same, it was held
error to admit evidence of similar fraudulent representations to
other merchants about the same time, unless the transactions should
be connected in some particular manner. " The admission of such
evidence would introduce a multiplicity of collateral issues, calculated
to withdraw the attention of the jury from the real issue in the case ;
and it would operate unjustly to the defendant, a.s it requires him
to explain his transactions with others, without any notice or oppor-
tunity for preparation." Jordan v. Osgood, 109 Mass. 457 (1872).
After reviewing the authorities, the court in that case (Jordan v.
Osgood) say : " We think the true rule to be deduced from them is,
that another act of fraud is admissible to prove the fraud charged
only where there is evidence that the two are parts of one scheme
or plan of fraud, committed in pursuance of a common purpose."
Ibid. Edwards v. Warner, 35 Conn. 517 (1869) ; Moline-Milburn
Co. V. Eranklin, 37 Minn. 137 (1887).
Where, in an action on a life insurance policy, the defence was
that the policy was procured by one Hunter on the life of Arm-
strong for the fraudulent purpose of feloniously killing Armstrong
and securing the money from the policy, the benefit of which had
previously been assigned to him, it was held that " evidence that he
effected insurances upon the life of Armstrong in other companies
at or about the same time, for a like fraudulent purpose, was admis-
sible. A repetition of acts of the same character naturally indicates
the same purpose in all of them ; and if when considered together
257^3 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET U.
they cannot be reasonably explained "witlioiit ascribing a particular
motive to the perpetrator, such motive will be considered as
prompting each act." New York Mutual, &c., Ins. Co. v. Arm-
strong, 117 U. S. 691 (1885). In a Virginia case, on an action to
cancel a contract for the sale of land alleged to have been procured
by the fraudulent misrepresentation of an agent, evidence that the
agent made similar representations to others is admissible, not as
showing what took place on the particular occasion, but as being
" very persuasive of the bent " of the agent's mind. Wilson v-
Carpenter's Adm'r, 21 S. E. 243 (1895).
So in an action in Michigan, where the issue was whether the sale
of a certificate of stock was induced by certain fraudulent represen-
tations of a promoter, similar representations to others by the same
promoter may be shown. French v. Ryan, 62 N. W. 1016 (1895).
On a bill in equity to rescind the purchase of a silver mine on the
ground of fraud perpetrated by "salting" the specimens of ore
taken by the complainant for assay, evidence is competent that the
defendant also " salted " samples used in prior negotiations with
other persons for the sale of the sam'e mine. Mudsill Mining Co.
V. Watrous, 61 Fed. Eep. 163 (1894). To prove that the "salting"
was not accidental, evidence is competent that no native silver was
found in the samples assayed, but that each one of thirty samples
contained powdered silver. Ibid. To establish fraud in the impor-
tation of certain merchandise, evidence of twenty-nine other invoices
imported by the claimant into the same port is admissible " for the
purpose of showing the fraudulent intention of the claimant in these
importations as well as the present." The supreme court of the
United States, speaking by Story, J., say : "Indeed, in no other
way would it be practicable, in many cases, to establish such intent
or motive, for the single act taken by itself may not be decisive
either way ; but when taken in connection with others of the like
character and nature, the intent and motive may be demonstrated
almost with a conclusive certainty." Wood v. U. S. 16 Peters, 342,
360 (1842). "Experience shows that positive proof of fraudulent
acts is not generally to be expected, and for that reason, among
others, the law allows a resort to circumstances, as the means of
ascertaining the truth." Castle v. BuUard, 23 How. 172 (1859).
In cases of fraud, subsequent acts may be shown to establish
a prior fraudulent intent. " The subsequent acts are illustrative
of the intent and character of the first." Butler v. Collins, 12 Cal.
457 (1859).
Skill. — So in the proof of any other mental state, e. g., the
skill needed to do the act alleged to have been done, evidence of
acts done at another time may be received.
On an indictment for arson, the government, after showing that
the fire was set by the use of a peculiarly constructed box, well
CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 2572"
adapted to that purpose and to bo other, was permitted to show
that a box found a month before, under circumstances showing its
use for incendiary purposes, was made at the defendant's shop " to
show that he possessed the requisite skill, materials, tools, and
opportunity to have made " the box used in the fire in question, and
that this was the sole legitimate purpose of the evidence, " unless
the jury should find, in the one, such marks as show that one hand
must have made both." Com. v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451 (1870).
It is immaterial that the proof of a mental state in this way inci-
dentally results in showing the commission of other crimes. Street
V. State, 7 Tex. App. 5 (1879) ; Com. v. Eobinson, 146 Mass. 571
(1888) ; State v. Palmer, 65 N. H. 216 (1889) ; E. v. Chasson, 16
New. Bruns. 546 (1876) ; Phillips v. People, 57 Barb. 353 (1869).
If evidence "tends to prove the crime alleged, it is not to be re-
jected, though it also tends to prove the commission of other crimes,
or to establish collateral facts." Com. ■;;. Choate, 105 Mass. 461
(1870); Com. v. Scott, 123 Mass. 222 (1877) ; Com. v. Corkin, 136
Mass. 429 (1884). The rule is well stated by the supreme court of
Missouri in State v. Tabor, 95 Mo. 585 (1888). "Evidence of
another crime is never admissible unless so connected with the one
then being investigated as to show that the commission of the for-
mer had something to do with the perpetration of the latter. Un-
less the apparently collateral crime be brought into a common
system, a system of mutually dependent crimes, or unless it be so
linked to the crime under trial as to show that the former, though
apparently an extraneous offence, is not so in reality, such evidence
is not admissible."
(2) Teacing a Constant Cause. — A frequent and indeed the
usual ground on which facts objectionable as res inter alios actoB are
admitted to prove intent, knowledge, motive or other mental state
is that a constant effect under various circumstances in which one
cause alone (the mental state sought to be proved) remains constant
strongly tends to show that the mental state is the impelling cause
in the case under consideration. This naturally results from the fact
that other hypotheses, perhaps at first equally tenable, are being con-
stantly eliminated from the problem. If the case under considera-
tion were alone submitted to examination, it would be difficult (if not
impossible) to establish to the required extent the proposition that
one among the several possible causes disclosed by the evidence, was
the one actually operative. Various other hypotheses would, in all
probability, seem equally tenable upon the facts in evidence. But
as these facts are varied in other instances and as these instances
are multiplied, if the same effect follows it will naturally he found
that as instance after instance is added to the scope of the inquiry,
one permissible hypothesis after another is being excluded; — until
only the mental state alleged remains as a constant cause. This
257^^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET II.
line of reasoning is in frequent use in other fields of inquiry, and it
is doubtful whether the search for truth on many issues involving
the existence of a mental state can be profitably prosecuted in any
other way.
The same statement will be found to apply to many cases other
than those involving the existence of a mental state. Where the
effort is made to fix liability for a certain result upon one among
several possible causes the same thing is true. Upon the evidence
in the case itself, the effort must fail, where other exculpating theo-
ries are deducible from the facts. Among them the cause to which
liability is assigned may not stand out with sufficient prominence to
sustain the onus of establishing the case. Ex, necessitate rei, the
pleader must proceed to show that in other instances, where different
facts existed, the same result followed the presence of the cause for
which liability is claimed. Any exculpatory hypothesis must now
apply to all the cases, and these will be found to be few and faint ; —
if, indeed, they exist at all. The process, sufficiently continued,
leads to mental certainty.
Tor example, it is claimed that the plaintiff's horse, when opposite
a pile of lumber, which the defendant town permitted to remain
near the highway, shied violently, by which damage occurred. The
plaintiff's claim is that the pile of lumber frightened the horse, and
that permitting such a pile to remain was a defect in the highway.
It may be claimed, in defence, that other causes than those inherent
in the appearance of the pile of lumber, are responsible for the acci-
dent. The time of day, the condition of the weather, the care and
skill of the driver, the unsafe character of the horse ; — these or
other more or less possible causes of the accident may be so left
upon the evidence of the particular occurrence as to render it doubt-
ful to which of such causes the injury is fairly to be attributed.
If, however, the plaintiff can go forward and show that at all times
of the day, in many various conditions of the weather, with many
drivers of varying degrees of skill and care, other horses, old and
young, kind and vicious, were affected in a substantially similar
manner when brought in contact with the same pile of lumber, it is
evident that new facts are being shown ; — of probative force great
in proportion as they exclude the operation of causes other than the
nature of the pile of lumber itself.
It may fairly be alleged against this method of proof that it tends
to a multiplicity of issues. But this objection is purely a matter for
the court, on a fair consideration of what may reasonably be expected
to be gained by pursuing such inquiries. As the supreme judicial
court of Massachusetts say : " So far. as, the introduction of collateral
issues goes, that objection is a purely practical one, a concession to
the shortness of life. When the fact sought to be proved is very
unlikely to have any other explanation than the fact in issue, and
CHAP. VI.] AMEKICAN NOTES. 257^
may be proved oi disproved without unreasonably protracting the
trial, there is no objection to going into it." Eeeve v. Dennett, 145
Mass. 23 (1887).
Reeve v. Dennett {ubi supra) is an instance of the application
of this rule. The issue was fraud in the sale of shares in a com-
pany intended to encourage the use in dentistry of a compound dis-
covered by the defendants called " Naboli." The plaintiff's claim
was that this compound was worthless. In reply to this evidence,
" the defendant put on a number of his patients, who testified that
the defendant's operatiojis upon their teeth, using his invention,
were practically painless, whereas similar operations before had been
very painful." Held that this was competent : " If a dozen patients
should testify that, when the defendant used his naboli, he filled
their teeth without hurting them, and that he hurt them a good deal
when he did not use it ... it wovild go far towards proving that
naboli had some tendency to deaden pain. Indeed, the same thing
is true in a less degree, if the painful operations were by another
hand. Filling teeth, however skilfully done, is generally unpleas-
ant. If it is found to be wholly painless when a certain compound
is used, as the witnesses testified, probably the compound is at least
in part the cause." Ibid.
Where a horse was alleged to have been frightened by steam
escaping from the defendant's mill, situated on the margin of the
public highway, " witnesses for the plaintiff were permitted to tes-
tify that, when travelling by the mill with horses well broken and
ordinarily safe, their horses were frightened by the escaping steam.
This evidence was limited to a short time before and after the
plaintiff's injury, when the mill was in the same condition as
when she was injured ; and was admitted for the sole purpose of
showing the capacity of the escaping steam to frighten ordinary
horses." Held, no error. " We think the competency of the evi-
dence rests upon the same principle as evidence, in actions against
railroad corporations for damage by fire, alleged to have been set by
coals or sparks from a passing locomotive, that the same locomo-
tive, or others similarly constructed and used, have emitted sparks
and coals, and set fire at other places and on other occasions. It
tends to show the capacity of the inanimate thing to do the mischief
complained of." Crocker v. McGregor, 76 Me. 282 (1884). So
in an action to recover for injuries caused by a defect in a high-
way where the defence is that the plaintiff was driving at a very
high rate of speed, the capacity of the horse for going at that
rate of speed may be shown by evidence of recent trials of his
speed on a race-track. Whitney v. Leominster, 136 Mass. 25 (1883).
So in an action against a town for an injury caused by an alleged
defect in the highway consisting of a pile of lumber by the side of
the road likely to frighten horses, where the defence was that the
257^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAKT II.
plaintiff's horse was vicious and unsafe, evidence is admissible that
another horse on driving past this pile of lumber was also fright-
ened by it. Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N". H. 401 (1872). "In
this case two primary questions arose, whether the lumber was
likely to frighten horses, and whether it did frighten the plaintiff's
horse. Was it of such a character, quality and condition, that it
could, and probably or manifestly would, be an object of terror to
horses in general, or horses of ordinary gentleness or of average
skittishness ? That was one question. Was the plaintiff's horse
frightened by it ? That was another and very different question. . . .
No one doubts that the fright of the plaintiff's horse was compe-
tent evidence on that question (whether the lumber was likely to
frighten horses) ; and, ordinarily, where evidence of one experiment
is admissible to show the character of inanimate matter, evidence of
two experiments of the same kind is not inadmissible. . . . What
rule of law considers the fright of Mr. Darling's horse as impor-
tant, and disregards the fright of Mr. Fletcher's horse as of no
consequence at all ? " Ibid.
Railroad Oases. — The nature of the questions raised by certain
injuries caused by the operation of railroads makes a resort to the
evidence of other occasions necessary, while the general regularity
of operation and similarity of construction in machinery, &c., which
may be presumed to exist under a common and highly systematized
management make a resort to such evidence frequently productive
of a highly probative effect.
Thus with regard to fires alleged to be communicated by sparks
from locomotive engines.
In an action to recover damages to the plaintiff's mill from fire
alleged to have been communicated by one of two locomotive en-
gines of the defendant company, on June 7th, 1870, " the plaintiffs
were allowed to prove . . . that at various times during the same
summer before the fire occurred, some of the defendant's locomo-
tives .scattered fire when going past the mill and bridge, without
showing that either of those which the plaintiffs claimed communi-
cated the fire was among the number, and without showing that the
locomotives were similar in their make, their state of repair or
management, to those claimed to have caused the fire complained
of." Held, no error. " The question has often been considered by
the courts in this country and in England ; and such evidence has,
we think, been generally held admissible, as tending to prove the
possibility, and a consequent probability, that some locomotive
caused the fire, and as tending to show a negligent habit of the
officers and agents of the railroad company." Grand Trunk E. E.
V. Eichardson, 91 U. S. 454 (1875) ; Koontz v. 0. E. & N. Co., 20
Oreg. 3 (1890) ; Pennsylvania R. E. v. Stranahan, 79 Pa. St. 405
(1875) ; Field v. jST. Y. Cen. E. E. 32 N. Y. 339 (1865) ; Cleaveland
V. Grand Trunk E. E. 42 Vt. 449 (1869).
CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 257^*
So a plaintiff can show that at intervals during a period of four
years prior to the setting of the fire in question, coals dropped from
the defendant's locomotives had caused fires in the same place and
that such locomotives had emitted sparks of sufficient size to set fire
to the plaintiff's property. Longabaugh v. Virginia City, &c. E. E.
9 Nev. 271 (1874).
So the fact "that fires frequently occurred along the line of rail-
way after the passing of the defendant's trains " is admissible.
Robinson v. New Brunswick R. R. 23 New Bruns. 323 (1883).
So evidence is competent, in a similar case, that trains frequently
set fire to fences and grass at other places in the vicinity of
plaintiff's premises during the same autumn. Kentucky Cen. R. R.
V. Barrow, 89 Ky. 638 (1890). So that within a week before the
fire in question the engines of the defendant, in passing, had scat-
tered large sparks which were capable of setting fires to combustible
articles along the road, and that frequent fires, occasioned by such
sparks, had been put out within that time. Annapolis, &c. R. R. v.
Gantt, 39 Md. 116 (1873).
" It is competent for the plaintiff to show the emission of sparks
or ignited matter from other engines of the defendant, passing the
spot upon other occasions, either before or after the damage
occurred for which the action is brought, without showing that they
were under the charge of the same driver, or were of the same con-
struction as the one occasioning the damage." The actual inquiries
were limited to within a month of the fire. Diamond v. Northern,
&c. E. E. 6 Mont. 580, 586 (1887) ; Brighthope E. E. v. Rogers, 76
Va. 443 (1881).
For similar reasons evidence is admissible "that engines had
prior to the fire passed over the road under like conditions of wind,
weather, &c., without causing fires " on an issue whether there was
negligence in causing the fire in question. Atchison, &c. R. E. v.
Stanford, 12 Kans. 354 (1874).
In a Ehode Island case, evidence of both antecedent and subse-
quent fires from sparks was held admissible under certain restric-
tions. " We think there are two purposes for which such testimony
may be admissible. The fact that other fires have been communi-
cated before, and especially if recently before, the occurrence of the
fire in question, is a fact which should put the company on their
guard and stimulate them to increased watchfulness, and therefore
testimony relating to such fire might properly pass to the jury, to
enable the jury to judge whether, in view of their previous occur-
rence, the company was, at the time of the fire in question, in the
exercise of reasonable care. For this purpose, however, no testi-
mony should pass to the jury relating to fires subsequent to the fire
in question, for obviously no such fire could have put the company
on their guard against the fire in question. A second purpose for
257^^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET II.
which such testimony might be admissible is this, namely : to show
the possibility of communicating fire by sparks from a locomotive,
if any question were made upon that point, and, for this purpose,
it would be immaterial whether the testimony related to fires of an
earlier or later date than the fire in question. If, however, the pos-
sibility were not questioned, and, especially, if it were admitted
that the fire so originated, testimony relating to fires of a later
date should be carefully excluded as being irrelevant, and as having
a tendency to excite prejudice against the company." Smith v. Old
Colony, &e. R. E. 10 E. I. 22 (1871).
Where " the fatal fire has been set out from a designated engine,
it is admissible to introduce evidence of other fires previously set
out by the same engine but not by any other engine of the defen-
dant company." Jacksonville, &c. R. E. v. Peninsular Land, &c.
Co., 27 Fla. 1, 104 (1891). " Former fires by the same engine arc
admissible as evidence tending to prove its defective condition or
construction, or improper management, and those put out by other
engines are excluded because they are matters collateral to the
issue and not evidence of the imperfect condition or bad manage-
ment of the particular locomotive." Ibid.; Ireland v. Cincinnati,
&c. E. E. 79 Mich. 163 (1890).
So where the evidence placed responsibility for the fires on one
of two designated engines, fires set by other engines were excluded.
" The evidence in this case was circumstantial, and it should not be
extended to circumstances which could not have any logical bearing
upon the issue. The syllogism that because other locomotives on
this road caused other fires at other times in the vicinity, therefore
these two locomotives, or one of them, which passed the place at
this time, caused this particular fire, would be no more logical than
that locomotives on some railway in another state, a thousand miles
distant, caused fires in the vicinity of the railway, on account of
insufficient manufacture or repair, or other negligence." Gibbons
V. Wisconsin, &c. E. E. 58 Wise. 335 (1883).
" The testimony tending to show that other fires were set about
the same time by the same engine was competent." Haseltine v.
Concord E. E. 64 K H. 545 (1888) ; Stertz v. Stewart, 74 Wise.
160 (1889). So of fires on the same day and trip. Lanning r.
Chicago, &c. E. R. 68 la. 502 (1886) ; Slossen v. E. E. 60 la. 21,'5
(1882).
' Where the fire was claimed to have been set by a designated
engine, evidence that about the same time other engines had set
fires along the defendant's road was excluded as collateral although
it was in evidence that all the locomotives on the road used the
same kind of spark arresters, and that the designated engine "was
a good, safe engine which was supplied with the most approved
spark arrester." Coale v. Hannibal, &c. E. R. 60 Mo. 227 (1875).
CHAl'. VI.] AMERICA:^ NOTES. 251^
The only authority cited by the court in support of this proposi-
tion is Baltimore, &c. R. E. v. Woodruff, 4 Md. 242 (1853), which
may be considered as overruled.
It has been held that where the emitting of sparks must, accord-
ing to the testimony, be due to a want of repair in the spark
arresters or similar contrivances, it is the duty of the court, before
admitting evidence of subsequent fires, to ascertain that the state
of repair of the engine is approximately the same on the two occa-
sions. Collins V. N. Y. Central, &c. R. R. 109 N. Y. 243 (1888).
So in New Hampshire, the qualification is made on the admissi-
bility of evidence of other locomotive fires or sparks that the other
engines were of the same construction, used in the same manner,
and in the same state of repair. Boyce v. Cheshire R. R. 43 N. H.
627 (1862).
Such evidence of other occasions is only admissible where it is
necessary to rely on it for the purpose of enabling the plaintiff to
prove his case. Where the issue is a simple question of fact to be
settled by direct evidence, it is not admissible. Thus on an issue
whether the defendant company had set fire to the plaintiff's wharf
and lumber-yard by sparks emitted from the smokestack of a
steamer, the screens being negligently left open, " evidence of the
screens being open and the escape of sparks therefrom on other
occasions and at other places than at the time and place in question
was inadmissible." Edwards v. Ottawa River Navigation Co., 39
Q. B. U. C. 264 (1876).
So where the facts are capable of being shown to the jury such
evidence will not be received. Thus where the question was
whether the defendant railroad had left the highway to the plain-
tiff's tavern in suitable condition evidence that "one or more per-
sons had been upset in driving over the road in question," is not
admissible. " The width of the road, the smoothness of its surface,
its elevations and depressions, the obstructions remaining thereon
and their size and position, are all susceptible of exact admeasure-
ment, and from these facts as disclosed with more or less of accuracy,
it will be for the jury to determine how far and to what extent the
condition of the road may have been the cause of injury to the party
complaining." Hubbard v. And. &c. R. R. 39 Me. 506 (1865).
Chaeactbe Evidence. — An exclusionary rule characteristic of
the English law of evidence is that which, on the question whether
a person did or did not do a certain act, withholds from the consid-
eration of the jury the fact that the person alleged to have done or
refrained from doing the act in question was of a character such as
to make it probable that he did it or refrained from doing it. Battles
V. Laudenslager, 84 Pa. St. 446 (1877) ; Lander !;. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114
(1859) ; Soule v. Bruce, 67 Me. 584 (1877) ; McCarty v. Leary, 118
Mass.. 609 (1876) ; Jacobs V. Duke, 1 E. D. Smith, 271 (1851).
257^ AMEEICAN NOTES. [PAET II.
Thus, in an action of assumpsit by a physician for services, where
the defendant offered evidence of the plaintiff's poor character as a
physician, the evidence was held to have been properly excluded.
" Character was not put in issue by the nature of this action. . . .
The plaintiff is entitled to compensation for his skill and labour
whatever they might be." Jeffries v. Harris, 3 Hawkes, 105 (1824).
In a civil action for assault and battery evidence of plaintiff's bad
character and loose morals is not competent even on the question of
damages. Bruce v. Priest, 5 All. 100 (1862).
This evidence is not, as a rule, excluded because irrelevant. On
the contrary, it is frequently probative in a high degree. Character
evidence may, on the other hand, be properly rejected because irrele-
vant. For example, where a witness had admitted on cross-examina-
tion various acts of drunkenness, evidence of a general reputation
for sobriety is irrelevant as " it would not have removed the imputa-
tion which resulted from his testimony on the stand." McCarty v.
Leary, 118 Mass. 609 (1875). So where a specific act of negligence
is proved, " the question whether it is actionable negligence is to be
decided by the character of that act or omission, and not by the chai^
acter for care and caution that the defendant may sustain," and evi-
dence of defendant's character as a careful man, is immaterial and
irrelevant. Tenney v. Tuttle, 1 All. 185 (1861).
All that is meant is that the ground for excluding evidence of
character is not, primarily, that it is irrelevant.
The reason for the rule is probably to be sought, in part, at least,
in that rigor of the early English criminal law code which naturally
led to unusual and, perhaps, undue leniency in its administration.
Civil Cases. — In a civil action the rule is well settled that
neither party is allowed to introduce evidence of good character.
Even though the facts savor of criminality, the party affected does
not have the option (as in criminal cases) to introduce evidence of
his good character. Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120 (1866) ;
" On principle, as well as authority, evidence of good reputation is
not competent to show that one is not guilty of a dishonorable or
unlawful act which is not punishable as a crime." Lamagdelaine
V. Trerablay, 162 Mass. 339 (1894).
So in an action on a policy of insurance, where the defence is
fraud, the plaintiff cannot set up evidence of good character. Eowler
V. JStna Fire Ins. Co., 6 Cowen, 673 (1827); "If such evidence is
proper, then a person may screen himself from the punishment due
to fraudulent conduct, till his character becomes bad. Such a rule
of evidence would be extremely dangerous. Every man must be
answerable for every improper act ; and the character of every trans-
action must be ascertained by its own circumstances, and not by the
character of the parties." Ibid., Schmidt v. K. Y. &c. Ins. Co., 1
Gray, 529 (1854). But see Spears v. Inte'rnational Ins. Co., 1 Baxter,
370 (1872).
CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 257^*
So in an action of debt, the plea of fraud does not put in issue the
character of the plaintiff. No evidence is admissible regarding it.
Anderson v. Long, 10 S. & R. 65 (1823) ; Dudley v. McCluer, 65 Mo.
241 (1877). Even if the facts in an action of trespass amount to an
embezzlement, evidence of good character is incompetent. Wright
V. McKee, 37 Vt. 161 (1864).
So on an action for bastardy, character evidence is inadmissible.
Low V. Mitchell, 18 Me. 372 (1841).
In a civil action for assault with a knife, the defendant offered
evidence of his good character as a peaceable and orderly person. In
affirming the rejection of the evidence the court say, after a full ex-
amination of the authorities, that these authorities " assert two
principles. (1) That in civil suits evidence of the character of the
parties, except where the character is directly in issue, is not admis-
sible. (2) That putting character in issue is a technical expression,
which does not mean simply that the character may be affected by the
result, but that it is of particular importance in the suit itself, as the
character of the plaintiff in an action of slander, or that of a woman
in an action on the case for seduction. The remark of Professor
Greenleaf, in his Treatise on Evidence, Vol. 1st, sect. 64, that ' gen-
erally in actions of tort, wherever the defendant is charged with fraud
from mere circumstances, evidence of his general good character is
admissible to repel it,' is not sustained by any authority which I can
find, save Ruan v. Perry, 3 Caines (120), and this is expressly over-
ruled in 16 Wend. (646) above referred to." Porter v. Seller, 23 Pa.
St. 424 (1854). Speaking of Euan v. Perry (uhi supra) the court of
appeals say " That case was long since overruled." Pratt v. An-
drews, 4 N. Y. 493 (1861). This view is concurred in by the court in
Gregory v. Chambers, 78 Mo. 294, 300 (1883), and Amer. Eire Ins.
Co. V. Hazen, 110 Pa. St. 530 (1885). But see Scott v. Fletcher, 1
Overton, 488 (1812), which follows Euan v. Perry. Evidence of
character is incompetent for the plaintiffs in an action on an insur-
ance policy where the defence set up is that the plaintiffs burned
their own mill. Amer. Eire Ins. Co. v. Hazen, 110 Pa. St. 530
(1886).
So an action of tort for maliciously burning the plaintiff's barn
does not put the defendant's character in issue, or enable him to in-
troduce evidence of good character. Thayer v. Boyle, 30 Me. 475
(1849).
In an action for slander not imputing a crime, a defence of truth
does not entitle the plaintiff in rebuttal to put in evidence of his
general good character. Matthews v. Huntley, 9 N. H. 146 (1838) ;
Houghtaling v. Kilderhouse, 1 IST. Y. 530 (1848).
The courts of Vermont admit such evidence in these eases of in-
direct incrimination on the ground that the incriminating evidence
impeaches the character of the plaintiff as a witness for veracity.
257^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET n.
" That testimony tending to show that he had sworn falsely upon a
material matter then in issue and on trial, would have that tendency
cannot be doubted." Mosley v. Vermont, &c. Ins. Co., 55 Vt. 142
(1882).
In Alabama, the rule is laid down that unless character is in issue
in a civil case evidence of reputation is incompetent ; but that if
evidence of bad character is introduced the party assailed may intro-
duce evidence of good character. Goldsmith v. Picard, 27 Ala. 142
(1855).
Criminal Cases. — In criminal cases, the defendant is entitled to
introduce evidence of his good character, if he desires. Unless and
until he avails himself of this option, the government can introduce
no evidence that the prisoner's character is bad. Felsenthal v. State,
30 Tex. App. 675 (1892) ; State v. Merrill, 2 Devereux, 269 (1829).
When the prisoner opens the subject, the government is not only at
liberty to meet the defendant's evidence but to prove afiirmatively
that the defendant has a bad character in relation to the trait in-
volved in the inquiry. People v. White, 14 Wend. Ill (1835);
People V. Pair, 43 Cal. 137 (1872) ; Com. v. Hardy, 2 Mass. 303
(1807).
This disproof of the defendant's evidence of good character must
follow the same limitations as the proof itself.
Even when the accused has opened the issue of character, and the
government attempts to rebut the evidence offered by the prisoner,
"ordinarily such rebutting testimony must be coniined to genei'al
reputation, and cannot be extended to particular acts." Holsey v.
State, 24 Tex. App. 35 (1887). So after accused offers evidence of
good character as a peaceable and quiet person, the government
cannot show that he has been indicted for an assault. Com. v.
O'Brien, 119 Mass. 342 (1875). Or has drawn his revolver on a cer-
tain occasion. Olive v. State, 11 Neb. 1, 27 (1881).
By reason of the fact that the legitimate probative effect of char-
acter evidence lies in throwing a suspicion upon facts tending to
show that a person of excellent moral character should have been
guilty of the offence charged, courts have been led to rule that it was
of comparatively little value in the case of serious offences. " There
are cases of circumstantial evidence, where the testimony adduced
for and against a prisoner is nearly balanced, in which a good char-
acter may be very important to a man's defence. . . . But where it
is a question of great and atrocious criminality, the commission of
the act is so unusual, so out of the ordinary course of things and.
beyond common experience ; it is so manifest that the offence, if
perpetrated, must have been influenced by motives not frequently
operating upon the human mind ; that evidence of character, and of
a man's habitual conduct under common circumstances, must be
considered far inferior to what it is in the instance of accusations
CHAP. VI.] AMEEICAJSr NOTES. 25 7^"
of a lower grade. Against facts strongly proved, good character
cannot avail. . . . But still, even with regard to the higher crimes,
testimony of good character, though of less avail, is competent
evidence to the jury, and a species of evidence which the accused
has a right to offer." Com. v. Webster, 5 Gush. 296, 324 (1860).
Following the same line of thought, it has been ruled that " evi-
dence of good character in relation to the particular crime charged,
seems to be only admissible in cases where the guilt of the party
accused is doubtful." McDaniel v. State, 8 Sm. & M. 401 (1847) ;
Bennett v. State, 8 Humph. 118 (1847) ; State v. Ford, 3 Strob. 517 n.
(1849) ; Schaller v. State, 14 Mo. 602 (1851).
Such, however, is not the prevailing rule in the United States.
The ruling in Com. v. Webster {ubi supra) has frequently been
repudiated as unsound. For example, in Harrington v. State, 19
Ohio St. 264 (1869), a charge based on Com. v. Webster was held
erroneous. The court say, "The weight that ought to be given to
proof of good character does not depend upon the grade of the crime,
but rather upon the cogency and force of the evidence tending to
prove the charge, and the motives shown to exist for the commission
of the crime by the accused. . . . The reasonable effect of proof of
good character is to raise a presumption that the accused was not
likely to have committed the crime with which he is charged. The
force of this presumption depends upon the strength of the opposing
evidence to produce conviction of the truth of the charge. If the
evidence establishing the charge is of such a nature as not, upon
principles of reason and good sense, to be overcome by the fact of
good character, the latter will, of course, be unavailing and imma-
terial. But the same will be true of any other fact or circumstance
in evidence, which, after receiving its due weight, does not alter the
conclusion to be drawn from the other evidence in the case. G-ood
character is certainly no excuse for crime ; but it is a circumstance
bearing indirectly on the question of the guilt of the accused, which
the jury are to consider in ascertaining the truth of the charge."
Ibid.
A ruling that evidence of character is admissible only in a doubt-
ful case, was held erroneous. "In the laws of all civilized countries,
under various aspects of the question, good character is recognized
as an element, a very potent element of defensive proof, going
directly to the credibility of the accusing witness, to the intrinsic
value of the inculpating testimony, to the probabilities of mistaking
memory, of mistaken identity, of innocent motives in actions appar-
ently culpable and in many instances amounting in and of itself to a
complete defence." U. S. v. Gunnell, 6 Mackey, 196 (1886). "Good
character is always to be considered. It will of itself sometimes
create a doubt where none could exist without it." People v. Moett,
23 Hun, 60 (1880). " Evidence of good character is substantive and
257^^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAKT H.
must be treated as such ; that it is not a mere makejveight to be
throwu in to determine the balance in a doubtful ease, but that it
may, of itself, by the creation of a reasonable doubt, produce an
acquittal." Hanney v. Com. 116 Pa. St. 322 (1887). "If upon the
whole of the evidence introduced, including that of the good char-
acter of the defendant, the jury entertain a reasonable doubt as to
the defendant's guilt, he should be acquitted." State v. Douglass,
44 Kans. 618 (1890).
In Vermont, a ruling that evidence of the defendant's good char-
acter was received " as a kind of makeweight in his favor, if there is
a pinch in the case," was held to erroneously impress the jury with
the idea that the evidence was of no value except where the respon-
dent was entitled to an acquittal without it. " Such evidence is not
only useful in cases of doubt, but it is equally so, for the purpose of
creating, generating doubts." State v. Daley, 63 Vt. 442, 446 (1881).
"A long and honorable life must be worth something to a man when
accused of a crime in eases other than those where the evidence, in-
dependent of his good character, is doubtful or obscure." State v.
Northrup, 48 la. 683 (1878) ; Long v. State, 11 Fla. 295 (1866). Of
course, " If the evidence in this case had been so clear, and con-
clusive as to satisfy the minds of the jury, and leave no doubt as to
the guilt of the party, then character, however excellent, could not
be considered." Ibid.
In Alabama, where evidence of good general character for twenty
years was introduced in favor of a person accused of murder, a ruling
that "proof of good character, then, is not permitted to go to the jury
for the purpose of shielding the defendants from the consequences
of their conduct, but simply as a circumstance to be considered by
the jury, along with the other evidence in the case," and that if upon
all the evidence the jury found the defendants guilty they were to
say so " as firmly against a man of good character as of bad," was
approved. Armor v. State, 63 Ala. 173 (1879). " In all criminal
prosecutions, whether of felony or misdemeanor, the accused may
prove his good character not only when a doubt exists on the other
proof, but even to generate a doubt of his guilt. ... It does not
shield from the consequences of a criminal act, proved to the satis-
faction of the jury ; though it may raise a reasonable doubt of the
act having been done with a criminal intent." Ibid.
It abundantly appears from the foregoing oases that the theory on
which evidence of good character is admitted in criminal cases on
behalf of the accused is, that it renders improbable the evidence
tending to show that a man of good character has been guilty of an
act involving moral turpitude. It necessarily follows that evidence
of the accused's good reputation is of no importance where it can
have no such effect. If the criminal act in question is the viola-
tion of a municipal ordinance, town by-law, &c., where the act has
CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 257^^^
no moral quality, the reasons for admitting character evidence cease
to apply. So in au indictment for selling liquor to a minor, evidence
of the defendant's good reputation for observing the conditions of
his license was held properly rejected. "This rule has little or no
application to penal acts which have no moral quality, but are merely
mala pro Mb ita. That one is of good reputation as an honest, peace-
able citizen has little tendency to show that he has not violated a
statute or ordinance forbidding him to catch trout out of season, or
to drive certain vehicles faster than a walk, or requiring him to keep
the sidewalks abutting on his premises free from snow and ice. The
sale of intoxicating liquor to minors is strictly forbidden by the
statute, but it does not necessarily involve any moral turpitude."
Com. V. Nagle, 167 Mass. 554 (1893).
Failure to offer evidence of character in a criminal case is a fact
which may be brought to the attention of the jury. State v. McAl-
lister, 24 Me. 139 (1844).
But this view has been strenuously opposed as destructive of the
defendant's privilege not to open the issue of character unless he
sees fit. Where the government attorney was allowed to comment
on the fact that the prisoner had offered no evidence of character,
the supreme court of Michigan held that it was " error of the gravest
character. No presumption of guilt arises from the fact that a per-
son, when on trial for a crime, fails to call witnesses in support of his
good character. This is a privilege which the accused may avail
himself of if he chooses. . . . No legal inference can arise from such
omission that he is guilty of the offence charged, or that his char-
acter is bad." People v. Evans, 72 Mich. 367, 382 (1888). The
same case holds that the error of permitting such an argument is not
cured by an instruction to disregard it ; quoting from Quinn v. Peo-
ple, 123 111. 333, the remarks of the court on the futility of a similar
attempt on the part of the trial judge, " As well might one attempt
to brush off with the hand a stain of ink from a piece of white
linen. One, in the very nature of things, is just as impossible as
the other."
The character of a defendant is to be established by reputation
before the difficulty arose. He is not to be exposed to the injustice
of having the arising of the difficulty assist in proving its truth.
Wroe V. State, 20 Oh. St. 460 (1870).
Evidence of character subsequent to the doing of the act in ques-
tion is rejected as " irrelevant and immaterial." Graham v. State,
29 Tex. App. 31 (1890) ; Carter v. Com. 2 Va. Cases, 169 (1819). A
different rule would expose the defendant to the great danger of
having his character ruined or badly damaged by the arts of a pop-
ular or artful prosecutor stimulated to activity by the hope of thus
making his prosecution successful." State v. Johnson, 1 Winsted,
(N. C.) 151 (1863).
257^ AMEEICAN NOTES. [PART 11.
Chaeactek in Issue. Civil Cases. — The rule by no means
absolutely excludes evidence of character. It excludes such evidence
merely as evidentiary that a person did a certain act because he was
of a certain character. In many cases the existence of a particular
character is part of the substance of the issue. To such cases the
rule has no application.
There are many instances of the application of this principle.
For example, in instituting an action for the breach of a promise of
marriage a female plaintiff places in issue her character for chastity.
McCarty v. Coifin, 157 Mass. 478 (1892) ; Van Storch v. Griffin, 77
Pa. St. 604 (1875). To the extent that damages are claimed for
injury to reputation, any flaw in the reputation may be shown in
mitigation of damages.
The witnesses of such a plaintiff may be asked on cross-examination
" respecting the plaintiff's general badness of character " in mitiga^
tion of damages. McGregor v. McArthur, 5 C. P. U. C. 493 (1856).
So the action for indecent assault puts in issue the plaintiff's
character for chastity. Bingham v. Bernard, 36 Minn. 114 (1886).
In like manner, an action for seduction, being based on the previous
existence of chastity in the woman, places such portion of character
in issue. People v. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267 (1879) ; M'Creary v.
Grundy, 39 Q. B. U. C. 316 (1876). For the same reason, in a civil
action for damages caused by a rape, the character for chastity of
the plaintiff is in issue, and may, be impeached by particular acts of
misconduct. Young v. Johnson, 123 N. Y. 226 (1890.) The fur-
ther ruling in this case that good reputation for chastity is part of
the plaintiff's original case, seems somewhat more doubtful, as a
matter of principle.
Evidence of plaintiff's bad character in these actions involving
offences against chastity is admissible in mitigation of damages.
M']S"utt V. Young, 8 Leigh, 542 (1837). "Among the elements of
damages is the injury to feelings and the injury to reputation. But
both these injuries would be less in the case of a woman of bad reputa-
tion than in one of good." Burnett v. Simpkins, 24 111. 264 (1860).
On the contrary, the Court of Queen's Bench of Upper Canada
have ruled that such evidence is inadmissible. Myers v. Carrie, 22
Q. B. U. C. 470 (1863).
On an action for libel or slander the character of the plaintiff is
in issue. Peterson v. Morgan, 116 Mass. 350 (1874) ; Holley v.
Burgess, 9 Ala. 728 (1846) ; Campbell v. Bannister, 79 Ky. 205 (1880);
Bodwell V. Swan, 3 Pick. 376 (1825) ; Leonard v. Allen, 11 Cush. 241
(1853) ; Sawyer v. Eifert, 2 Nott & McC. 511 (1820) ; Powers v.
Presgroves, 38 Miss. 227, 241 (1859) ; Paddock v. Salisbury, 2 Cowen,
811 (1824).
It is not necessary that the plaintiff should rest content in relying
on the presumption that his reputation was good at the time of the
CHAP. VI.] AMEEICAN NOTES. 257^*
alleged defamation. He can introduce affirmative evidence to that
effect. Adams v. Lawson, 17 Gratt. 250 (1867) ; Shroyer v. Miller,
3 W. Va. 158 (1869). So of a plaintiff in a civil action for rape as
to her character for chastity. Young v. Johnson, 123 N. Y. 226
(1890). The plaintiff in an action of slander can certainly prove
a good reputation when it is attacked. HoUey v. Burgess, 9 Ala.
728 (1846). For example, by evidence of rumors that the alleged
slanderous statements were true. Inman v. Foster, 8 Wend. 602
(1832). But see Stow v. Converse, 3 Conn. 325 (1820), contra.
In an action for malicious prosecution, evidence of the plaintiff's
general bad character as a horse racer and gambler is admissible.
" It would certainly require less stringent proof to make out probable
cause for prosecuting such a character for larceny, than one who
maintained a good character, and followed an occupation for a liveli-
hood altogether lawful." Martin v. Hardesty, 27 Ala. 458 (1855) ;
Mark V. Merz, 53 111. App. 458 (1893) ; Miller v. Brown, 3 Mo. 94
(1832) ; Barron v. Mason, 31 Vt. 189 (1858) ;. Gregory v. Thomas,
2 Bibb, 286 (1811).
The plaintiff, on the other hand, may prove his good reputation as
tending to establish his claim that there was no probable cause for
the prosecution. "To prove that the attack was originally made
without probable cause, we think he should be permitted to show his
good reputation known to the defendant when the prosecution was
commenced." Mclntire v. Levering, 148 Mass. 546 (1889) ; Bostick
V. Eutherford, 4 Hawks, 83 (1825) ; Blizzard v. Hayes, 46 Ind. 166
(1874) ; Woodworth v. Mills, 61 Wis. 44 (1884) ; Israel v. Brooks,
23 111. 575 (1860) ; Miller v. Brown, 3 Mo. 94 (1832) ; Eosenkrans v.
Barker, 116 111. 331 (1885). Evidence of plaintiff's bad reputation
is admissible in malicious prosecution in reduction of damages.
O'Brien v. Frasier, 47 JST. J. L. 349 (1885) ; Bacon v. Towne, 4 Cush.
217 (1849) ; Fitzgibbon v. Brown, 43 Me. 169 (1857) ; Gregory v.
Chambers, 78 Mo. 294 (1883), which cites with disapproval the
statement in 1 Greenleaf Evidence, § 65, to the effect that character
evidence "is not permissible *in trespass on the case for malicious
prosecution.' The single authority cited by him in support of the
text is Gregory v. Thomas, 2 Bibb, 286. With great respect I sub-
mit that the case is no support for the text. . . . The trial court
had, under the special plea, admitted evidence of other particular
charges of thefts, &c. imputed to the plaintiff. That was held to be
error. But the court expressly say : ' We think the court ought not
to have permitted the inquiry to have extended further than to the
plaintiff's general character.' It is, therefore, an express authority
for impeaching the general character." Gregory v. Chambers, 78
Mo. 294 (1883) ; Eosenkrans v. Barker, 115 111. 331 (1885).
A defendant has been permitted to show, in mitigation of damages,
that the defendant's character was bad after the prosecution. If the
257^ AMEKICAN NOTES. [PAET n.
prosecution itself caused the bad reputation, damages should be
enhanced. Bostick v. Rutherford, 4 Hawks, 83 (1825).
In an action against a master for keeping an incompetent servant,
traits of character showing incompetency are in issue. East Line, &c.
E. R. V. Scott, 68 Tex. 694 (1887) ; Frazier v. Pennsylvania E. E.,
38 Pa. St. 104 (1860).
So in an action for false imprisonment, evidence as to the plaintiff's
character has been admitted, and evidence of specific acts of mis-
conduct rejected. Wolf v. Perry man, 82 Tex. 112 (1891).
Where the issue involves the existence of due care on the part
of the plaintiff, evidence of his general character in the particular
involved is not admissible. The question is to be " decided by the
character of the act or omission, and not by the character for care
that the defendant may sustain." McDonald v. Savoy, 110 Mass.
49 (1872).
Such evidence of reputation for due care is not admissible ; — cer-
tainly where the facts have been observed by eye-witnesses. So.
Kans. E. E. Co. v. Eobbins, 43 Kans. 146 (1890).
In a civil case, what portion of a party's entire character may be
made the subject of evidence is determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the investigation. So in an action for slander in alleging
that the plaintiff set fire to a schoolhouse, the defendant in reduction
of damages was permitted to introduce evidence of the plaintiff's
bad reputation either for integrity and moral worth or in regard to
conduct similar to that charged in the slander. Leonard v. Allen,
11 Gush. 241 (1853).
Ceiminal Cases. — The rule excluding character evidence in
criminal cases until the defendant opens the issue applies only to
the character of the defendant. It may be of the substance of the
issue for the government to establish the character of some person
other than the accused ; and it may be equally open to the defendant
to disprove such a character or make its existence doubtful.
For example, on an indictment for carnal knowledge of a girl
under sixteen "theretofore chaste," the girl's character for chastity
is in issue, and evidence is competent to prove it. People v. Mills,
94 Mich. 630 (1893). So on an indictment for rape, evidence is
admissible of the character of the prosecutrix for chastity. "The
witness must be able to state what is generally said of the person
by those among whom he dwells, or with whom he is chieily con-
versant, for it is this only that constitutes general reputation or
character." Conkey v. People, 1 Abb. Ct. of App. Dec. 418 (1860) ;
O'Blenis v. State, 47 N. J. Law, 279 (1885).
So in an indictment for indecent assault, the accused may show
that the reputation of the woman for chastity is bad. Com. ■;;. Ken-
dall, 113 Mass. 210 (1873).
So on an indictment of an attempt to commit rape. Camp v. State,
CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 257^
3 Kelly, 417 (1847). On an indictment for rape the character for
chastity of the prosecuting witness is in issue. Evidence of partic-
ular acts of misconduct, sufficiently numerous to be habitual, has
been admitted. Thus in a New York case, numerous witnesses were
allowed to testify that the woman had been " in the habit of receiv-
ing men there for the purpose of promiscuous intercourse." It seems
probable that the evidence was really received as circumstantially
establishing the fact that the woman was a prostitute — " proof more
satisfactory than that of a bad general reputation for chastity.''
Woods V. People, 55 N. Y. 515 (1874).
Especially as bearing on the probability of consent, single acts
of sexual misconduct have been admitted, in indictments for rape.
In Vermont, on such an indictment, a single prior act of illicit sexual
intercourse with a person other than the prisoner was admitted, on
cross-examination of the woman. As compared with general reputa-
tion for chastity, the court say, that " The testimony here offered has
practically the same tendency, though inferior in force and conclu-
siveness." State V. Eeed, 39 Vt. 417 (1867). So that the complain-
ant had been delivered of a bastard child. State v. Murray, 63 N. C.
31 (1868); State v. Jefferson, 6 Ired. Eq. 305 (1846). In Illinois
the right to prove character by specified acts of incontinence as
distinguished from evidence of general reputation for chastity has
been denied, though such evidence was admitted for another pur-
pose. Shirwin v. People, 69 111. 56 (1873). So on an indictment for
adultery, the evidence of the complainant may be met by evidence of
prior acts of undue intimacy with other men. U. S. v. Bredemeyer,
6 Utah, 143 (1889).
So on an indictment for murder, to aid a plea of self-defence the
prisoner may prove that the general character of the deceased in the
neighborhood where he lived " was that of a turbulent, bloodthirsty,
and violent man." Williams v. State, 74 Ala. 18 (1883) ; Thomas v.
People, 67 N. Y. 218 (1876).
Witness. — The character of a witness for truth and veracity may
be said always to be in issue. It may be impeached by evidence
directed to that point. Evansich v. R. E., 61 Tex. 24 (1884).
The rule applies to the attesting witness to a will. Chamberlain v.
Torrance, 14 Grant's Chan. Rep. 181 (1868). And to the defendant
when offering himself as a witness. McDonald v. Com., 86 Ky. 10
(1887).
Such evidence is confined to character for truth and veracity.
Moreland v. Lawrence, 23 Minn. 84 (1876) ; Shaw v. Emery, 42 Me.
59 (1856).
A party cannot, in the first instance, sustain himself or other
witnesses by proving their good character for truth and veracity
until these qualities are directly impeached. A mere conflict of
evidence is not sufficient, although of such a nature as to raise a
257^'^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET II.
strong presumption that one side or the other is testifying falsely.
Morgan v. State, 88 Ala. 223 (1889). As is said in People v. Bush,
65 Cal. 129 (1884), "Where witnesses contradict each other, the
character of the one is as much impeached as that of the other."
Pruitt V. Cox, 21 Ind. 15 (1863) ; Vance v. Vance, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 581
(1859) ; Saussy v. K R., 22 Fla. 327 (1886) ; Tedens v. Schumers,
112 111. 263 (1884) ; Sweet v. Sherman, 21 Vt. 23 (1848) ; Stamper v.
Griffin, 12 Ga. 450 (1853).
A similar rule obtains where the contradiction is not between
different witnesses, but where evidence is introduced of contradic-
tory statements of the same witness. By the weight of authority, ,
it is not competent for the party offering the witness thus discredited
to sustain him by proof of his good general character. Erost v. Mc-
Cargar, 29 Barb. 617 (1859); Chapman v. Cooley, 12 Eich. (S. C.)
Law, 654 (1860) ; State v. Archer, 73 Iowa, 320 (1887) ; Brown v.
Mooers, 6 Gray, 451 (1866) ; Stamper v. Griffin, 12 Ga. 450 (1863).
Many of the earlier cases, relying largely upon 1 Greenl. Ev. § 469,
which "is not sustained by the case the author cites of Eex v.
Clarke, 2 Stark. R. 241, and is not law " [Brown v. Mooers, 6 Gray,
461 (1856)], have adopted the opposite view, i. e., that under such
circumstances, sustaining evidence of good general character is
competent. Barrell v. State, 18 Tex. 713 (1857) ; Sweet v. Sher-
man, 21 Vt. 23 (1848) ; Hadjo v. Gooden, 13 Ala. 718 (1848) ; Harris
V. State, 30 Ind. 131 (1868).
And see also Chamberlain v. Torrence, 14 Grant's Ch. Rep. 181
(1868), where it is said that as soon as any doubt is thrown on the
execution of a deed, the person offering it may give evidence of the
good character of the subscribing witness.
Pboof of Chaeactbe Genekallt. — The proof of character is
by proof of general reputation in the community where the person
resides. As the Supreme Court of Alabama say, it " is the only
mode in which character can be exhibited to us." Jones v. State, 76
Ala. 8 (1884) ; Bodwell v. Swan, 3 Pick. 376 (1825).
"It is not competent to show what two or three persons only may
think or say concerning the witness, but the inquiry must be confined
to the general estimation in which he is held by his neighbors and
acquaintances." Matthewson v. Burr, 6 Neb. 312 (1877).
"It is a general rule that particular acts are not admissible to
sustain an attack upon character." McCarthy v. Coffin, 167 Mass.
478 (1892). So in an. action for a breach of promise of marriage
" an intimacy with several different men " cannot be proved. Ibid.
In an action for slandering the plaintiff by accusing her of unchastity,
evidence is incompetent that others made similar remarks. " Neither
can the character of plaintiff for chastity be assailed by this class
of testimony. Nothing but general reputation is allowable for such
a purpose. It cannot be attacked by proof of particular acts or
CHAP. VI.J AMERICAN NOTES. 257^
particular suspicions." Proctor v. Houghtaling, 37 Mich. 41 (1877) ;
Jones V. State, 76 Ala. 8 (1884).
" Particular facts are not admissible to prove the reputation of a
party or witness to be either good or bad, for the reasons that they do
not necessarily tend to establish a general character ; that they con-
fuse the jury by raising collateral issues, and especially that a party
is presumed to be ready to defend his own general reputation or
that of his witnesses, but not to meet specific charges against either
without notice." Nixon v. McKinney, 105 jST. C. 23 (1890) ; People v.
White, 14 Wend. Ill (1835); Campbell v. Bannister, 79 Ky. 205
(1880) ; Kearney v. State, 68 Miss. 233 (1890).
Though a defendant in an action of slander may show that the
plaintiff's character was bad as to the offence charged at the time of
the alleged speaking of the words, he cannot show it by rumors
current in the community. Such evidence is objectionable as a
surprise on the plaintiff, " and besides proof of false rumors alone
must of necessity be by hearsay evidence in its most objectionable
form." Peterson v. Morgan, 116 Mass. 350 (1874) ; Holley v-
Burgess, 9 Ala. 728 (1846).
In an action for malicious prosecution, the defendant can introduce
evidence of plaintiff's bad reputation in reduction of damages, or as
affording probable cause for the prosecution, but he cannot prove
individual acts of misconduct. So particular rumors are to be
rejected. Powers v. Presgroves, 38 Miss. 227, 241 (1859). And
■what a minority of his neighbors say is not competent, though
precisely why not, if the evidence is offered in mitigation of
damages, is not apparent. Ibid. It is not permitted in such a
case to show that the plaintiff was seen on the street in bad
company, at all hours of the night, swearing louder than other boys.
"General reputation, when thus placed in issue may be supported
by the party thus attacked by calling witnesses to prove the contrary
of the statements of witnesses by which his reputation is attacked.
It would be quite difficult to see what proof could have been made
to rebut the impression created in the minds of the jury by this
testimony." Dorsey «. Clai)p, 22 Neb. 564 (1887). Evidence tend-
ing to show dishonesty has, however, been admitted, though not
apparently against objection, as bearing on the question of reason-
able cause for suing out a search warrant. In such case the party
sought to be impeached may give evidence of his general character.
Mark v. Merz, 53 111. App. 468 (1893).
The fact that no reputation exists on the particular aspect of char-
acter is competent evidence. " Such evidence is often of the
strongest description, as where a character for truth is in issue,
that among those acquainted with the party, it has never been
questioned, and so, as to character for peace and quietness, that
among those with whom the party associates, no instance has been
257^^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET II.
known or heard, of, in which he has been engaged in a quarrel."
Gandolfo v. State, 11 Oh. St. 114 (1860) ; French v. Sale, 63 Miss.
386 (1885) ; Boon v. Weathered's Adm. 23 Tex. 675 (1859) ; Bingham
V. Bernard, 36 Minn. 114 (1886) ; Davis v. Franke, 33 Gratt. 413
(1880).
The evidence as to the defendant's character in a criminal case
must be relevant to the offence with which he is charged, i.e.,
directed to the particular mental or moral attributes involved in
the accusation, otherwise the evidence is without logical force.
On an indictment for felonious assault, evidence of reputation as
a law-abiding citizen is inadmissible. "The law limits the inquiry
in such cases to his general character as to the trait in issue." State
V. King, 78 Mo. 666 (1883).
On the other hand, by a parity of reasoning, on an indictment for
assault with intent to kill, evidence of character for truth and
veracity is incompetent. Morgan v. State, 88 Ala. 223 (1889).
On an indictment for murder of a man by his mistress, no evidence
of the prisoner's bad reputation for chastity is admissible, "inas-
much as it involves a trait of character not in the slightest degree
involved in the alleged commission of the crime with which she
stood charged.' People v. Fair, 43 Cal. 137 (1872).
But it has been held that on an indictment for rape, the defendant
may offer evidence tending to show that he is of a good moral
character. State v. Knapp, 46 IST. H. 148 (1863).
On an indictment for larceny evidence of general moral character
is incompetent. " General character is shown by general reputation,
and not by the particular facts of one's life ; but the general reputa-
tion may well be confined to the particular traits of character that
are supposed to render, to some extent, the commission of the crime
charged improbable." State v. Bloom, 68 Ind. 64 (1879).
Specific Acts. — When Admissible. — Ceoss-examinatiox. —
The exceptions to the rule that character must be proved by evidence
of general reputation are neither numerous nor important. In
attempting to weaken the force of evidence of the defendant's good
character in a criminal case, the witnesses in his favor may be asked
in cross-examination as to specific instances of misconduct involving
the existence of the trait of character in question. " It has been
thought useful and favorable to the elucidation of truth in such cases
to allow on cross-examination an inquiry as to particulars in the
charges and also in reference to the persons who made them, or gave
their opinion as to the character of the individual impeached."
Leonard v. Allen, 11 Gush. 241 (1853) ; Sawyer 1>. Erbert, 2 Nott &
McC. 511 (1820) ; Holmes v. State, 88 Ala. 26 (1889).
Where on an indictment for rape witnesses for the defendant
testified to his good character for morality, as well as chastity, " on
cross-examination, the State was properly allowed to test their accu-
CHAP. TI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 257^"
racy by inquiries as to his reputation for selling liquor in violation
of the law ; for the court surely cannot say that such acts are not
immoral." State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148, 157 (1863).
So on an indictment for murder, where a government witness had
testified that the reputation of the deceased as a peaceable man was
good, the defendant is entitled to inquire, upon cross-examination,
whether he had not heard of certain enumerated acts of violence
done by the deceased. De Arman v. State, 71 Ala. 351 (1882). As
the defence was that the killing was in self-defence, the evidence
offered was probably admissible on other grounds.
A witness to good character of a deceased person may state in
cross-examination "that he did not think that he possessed that
high character the latter part of his life." ISTixon v. McKinney,
106 N. C. 23 (1890).
Evidence of hearsay of specific acts has been admitted in cross-
examination of a witness to the defendant's character. For example,
on an indictment for murder, a witness testifying to the defendant's
character may state that he " had heard for the last few years that
defendant had frequent difficulties with, and struck his wife."
Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37, 71 (1889).
Reputation is Character. — It may well be doubted whether
in selecting reputation in the community as the sole permissible
proof of character the law uses the only rational means of proof, or
even the best. The effort is to prove the existence or non-existence
of a mental attribute by circumstantial evidence. The probative
success of such an effort rests on a presumption of fact that when
a man has a trait of character his neighbors know of it, and suffi-
ciently discuss it to establish a reputation as to its existence. Experi-
ence hardly seems sufficiently uniform to lend much weight to such
a presumption. Ability to conceal real character is an essential
element in the commission of many offences, and dissimulation is
sufficiently common to make good standing in a community by no
means a reliable, much less a necessary test, of actual character and
disposition. On the other hand, suspicion, gossip, unpopularity; —
these and other misfortunes may place a really fair character at great
disadvantage when tested by its reputation. A partial explanation
of the limitation is found in the historical origin of this species of
evidence. Historically considered, it is a final remnant of compurga-
tion, a fact which naturally explains the test of reputation in the
community. Starkie, Evid. (*76) n. h.
While, under any circumstances, the existence of a certain repu-
tation or the absence of any reputation concerning a particular trait
of character is a circumstance of probative value, other (at present
prohibited) methods of proving the existence of such traits seem at
least of equal value.
Character is a mental or psychical condition. The usual proof of
257*1 AMEEICAM^ NOTES. [PABT U.
such conditions is by proof of acts or statements which are their
natural expression. That a multiplicity of issues might be thus
raised has not sufficed to offset the admitted benefit of receiving this
class of evidence in other cases requiring proof of a mental state.
I The difficulties do not seem greater in the case of evidence of
character.
I As a general rule, such evidence of specific acts is not admissible.
Thus on an action for furnishing a careless conductor, the supreme
court of Pennsylvania say : " Character for care, skill, and truth of
witnesses, parties or others, must all alike be proved by evidence of
general reputation, and not of special acts. . . . Character grows
out of special acts, but is not proved by them. Indeed, special acts
do very often indicate frailties or vices that are altogether contrary
to the character actually established. And sometinies the very frail-
ties that may be proved against a man, may have been regarded by
him in so serious a light, as to have produced great improvement of
character. Besides this, ordinary care implies occasional acts of
carelessness, for all men are fallible in this respect, and the law
demands only the ordinary." Frazier v. Pennsylvania E. E. 38 Pa.
St. 104 (1860) ; Nixon v. McKenney, 106 N. C. 33 (1890). So in an
action against an employer for furnishing an incompetent foreman,
specific acts of carelessness are incompetent. Hatt v, Nay, 144 Mass.
186 (1887).
In several eases, however, such evidence has been received, appar-
ently without objection.
On an indictment for murder a witness to the defendant's char-
acter was allowed to testify " He is the most quiet, peaceable boy
I ever saw or had. ... If I spoke roughly to him, it would bring
tears to his eyes, but no retort. ... I never knew him to give an
uncivil word to any of them." Gandolfo v. State, 11 Oh. St. 114
(1860) . " Those acquainted with the party, — with the ordinary
course and conduct of his life, would know how far and to what
extent he had exhibited or failed to exhibit the quality or trait."
Ibid.
In an action against a town for a defect in a highway the defence
was that the driver, the plaintiff's husband, was fast and careless.
Plaintiff was then allowed to testify to his careful driving on several
other occasions. " The evidence was relevant to the question of the
husband's character for driving safely or otherwise." Plummer v
Ossipee, 59 N. H. 56 (1879).
In the case of lower animals, character, when material, may be
proved by specific acts of conduct embodying the trait in question.
On an issue whether a certain horse was gentle, evidence of both
prior and subsequent conduct on the part of the animal is competent.
Turnpike Co. v. Hearn. 87 Tenn. 291 (1888), citing with approval
Todd V. Eowley, 8 All. 51 (1864), where, the character of a horse
CHAJP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 257^2
being in issue, under similar circumstances, the court say : " The
habit of an animal is in its nature a continuous fact, to be shown by-
proof of successive acts of a similar kind." To the same effect, also
in a highway accident case, see Chamberlain v. Enfield, 43 N. H. 366
(1861). So in an action against the proprietors of a stage line in
providing vicious horses, causing injury to the plaintiff. " The
vicious habits of a horse can only be proved by instances. . . . That
he had this habit might be proved by instances before and after the
accident in question." Kennon v. Gilmer, 5 Mont. 257 (1885) ;
Lynch v. Moore, 154 Mass. 335 (1891).
Traits of character even of inferior animals, e. g. a horse, may, it
has been said, also be proved by general reputation. Wormsdorf v.
Detroit &c. Railway, 75 Mich. 472 (1889).
On the contrary, the supreme court of New Hampshire, in allow-
ing the character of a horse to be shown by specific acts, state that
they are not "aware of any authority that would allow evidence
of general reputation. The case does not stand like the character
of a person for truth, for then it may well be presumed that it
cannot be bad without being known to the public, but it may be
otherwise in respect to the vicious propensities of the horse." Whit-
tier V. Franklin, 46 N. H. 23 (1865).
Where the question relates to the existence of a habit, it would
seem that, on principle, repeated acts calculated to show its exist-
ence are competent. The, range of these acts is largely discretionary
with the court. They may be " so remote in time or so insignificant
in character, as to furnish no aid in deciding the fact to be found."
Com. V. Eyan, 134 Mass. 223 (1883) ; Com. v. Abbott, 130 Mass. 472
(1881),
Again, upon principle, a further method of proving character
would be that those acquainted with the person a particular aspect
of whose character is involved, should testify what, in their opinion,
was the character of the person, based on their observation. Such
evidence is received as to the existence, on a particular occasion, of
anger, fright, insanity, and other mental states. It is difficult to
assign a satisfactory reason why, for example, a character of prone-
ness to the exhibition of these same mental qualities should not be
proved in the same or a similar way.
Such evidence of character by the opinion of the witness has
occasionally been received. On an indictment for rape a witness
was allowed to state that in his opinion the character for chastity of
the prosecuting witness was good. Conkey v. People, 1 Abb. Ct. of
App. Dec. 418 (1860).
But the rule is well established that the only proper proof of
character is by evidence of reputation.
In Mississippi, on an indictment for murder, counsel for the
prisoner were not allowed to ask for the prisoner's general char-
257*3 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET H.
acter " for peace or violence " as a preliminary for asking whether
from the witness's knowledge of that character he " regarded him
as a man of violent or peaceful character." The court thought the
second question was correct, but required the counsel to first inquire
as to the " general character of the accused." McDaniel v. State,
8 S. & M. 401 (1847).
On an indictment for murder in procuring an abortion, a physician
cannot be asked, in reference to certain testimony, " if, on that testi-
mony, you would lose faith in the character of any person whose
character had heretofore been high in your estimation." Beasley v.
People, 89 111. 671 (1878).
So, on an indictment for murder, where a witness was asked, con-
cerning the defendant, " What is his character for peace and quiet-
ness. ... By character I mean what the man is, not what people
say about him," the question- was held rightly excluded. " If the
question ' What the man is ? ' was intended to . . . require from the
witness his opinion formed from sources not common to those
acquainted with the party, and having no reference to the general
character as shown by his ordinary course and conduct, we do not
think that the rule has ever been carried so far." Gandolfo v. State,
11 Oh. St. 114 (1860). In a suit for damages caused by an incom-
petent engineer, to show incompetence, the opinion of an expert
engineer who had had no previous acquaintance with the engineer as
to whose competence he was testifying was offered. The evidence
was held properly rejected. "Incompetency cannot be thus estab-
lished." East Line i&c. E. E. v. Scott, 68 Tex. 694 (1887).
Such opinion as to the existence of traits of character cannot be
said to be excluded because such evidence would not be relevant.
The reason assigned is that the rule is otherwise. Of course, in
certain cases where the mode of use of an inanimate object is
involved, such evidence of opinion would be simply irrelevant. For
example, the character of a house in which a certain assault was
committed is not a matter for evidence of opinion. People v. Lock
Wing, 61 Cal. 380 (1882). But the character of a house as being a
"lewd house" must be proved by its reputation. Hogan v. State,
76 Ga. 82 (1885).
CoMMUNiTX Defined. — The question has naturally arisen in
cases where the person whose character is in issue has successively
resided in several communities, which community was entitled to
speak on the subject of his character. Is it the community where
he last resided, where he longest resided, or where he now resides ?
The question has received a very sensible answer. Inquiry may
be directed to reputation in any community where the party in
question has resided for a sufficient length of time to acquire a
reputation for the particular trait involved ; provided, the time is
sufficiently near to the time when the fact is important, to have an
CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 257**
appreciable probative effect. The question of remoteness is a pre-
liminary matter of fact for determination in the discretion of the
court. In the absence of surprise, the exercise of this discretion
will not be reviewed " unless the circumstances of the case show a
gross abuse of this discretion." Snow v. Grace, 29 Ark. 131, 141
(1874). In this discretion, evidence of reputation seven or eight
years prior to the trial has been received. Graham v. Chrystal, 2
Abb. Ct. of App. Dec. 263 (1865).
In Holsey v. State 24 Tex. App. 35 (1887) it was held that the
reputation of a witness can be proved either " in the community of
his residence or where he is best known." " The general reputation
of a witness among his neighbors is the only legitimate subject of
inquiry. . . . Neighbors are those who dwell near eacli other ; and
he who would testify as to the general reputation of a witness must
be able to state what is generally said of the person by those among
whom he dwells, or with whom he is chiefly conversant." Wadding-
ham V. Hulett, 92 Mo. 628 (1887).
So evidence offered of the reputation of the appellant as a witness
for truth and veracity in the county of Johnson, where he had lived
until four years before, was admitted. " The law does not presume
that a person of mature age, whose reputation has been notoriously
bad to within a period such as intervened between the time the
appellant resided in Johnson County and the time when the witness
testified, has so reformed as to have acquired a different reputa-
tion. The evidence offered may not have been entitled to so much
weight as if it had related to his reputation in the community in
which he lived at the time the testimony was given . . . and was
subject to be rebutted by evidence showing a different reputation at
the time of the trial in the community in which he resided."
Mynatt v. Hudson, && Tex. 66 (1886). The character of a witness
may be impeached by persons in whose neighborhood he had lived
until four years prior to the trial, though he had then removed to
another place fourteen miles from that neighborhood, where he had
since resided, and the witnesses did not know the character which
he bore at the latter place. " There is a strong probability that one,
whose general character was bad four years since, is still of doubtful
or disparaged fame. So much, at least, may be asserted, without
evincing the feeling of a misanthropist or any unseemly lack of
charity." Sleeper v. Van Middlesworth, 4 Denio, 431 (1847). So
it has been held that reputation in a place where a witness had lived
two years before was admissible for purposes of impeachment. Kelly
V. State, 61 Ala. 19 (1878) ; Louisville &c. R. E. v. Richardson, 66
Ind. 43 (1879). So the inmates of a prison can testify to the repu-
tation of a deceased person as quarrelsome and vindictive in the
community where they became acquainted with it, i.e., in the prison
itself. Thomas v. People, 67 N. Y. 218 (1876). So where a witness
257''^ AMEEICAN NOTES. [PAET n.
a few months prior to the trial had removed to a new place of
residence, where he had not lived long enough to acquire a
reputation, evidence of reputation at his former residence was
admitted. Pape v. Wright, 116 Ind. 502 (1888) ; Coates v. Sulau,
46 Kan. 341 (1891). So evidence of the reputation of a witness
two years prior at another place is competent. Lawson v. State, 32
Ark. 220 (1877). " General reputation at a former period and in
another neighborhood may or may not tend to prove that issue,
according to the remoteness of the time and place, and other circum-
stances. Ordinarily these will affect the weight, but not the compe-
tency of the matter." Brown v. Luehrs, 1 111. App. 74 (1877). Two
or three years are not too remote. State v. Lanier, 79 N. C. 622
(1878).
On the contrary, where a witness had resided for the last five years
in his present residence " and there was abundant evidence as to his
reputation," it was held incompetent to inquire as to his character
for truth and veracity at the place of former residence. State v.
Potts, 78 la. 666 (1889).
So the character for truth of a witness at a distant place where he
has resided but three months on a temporary visit is not competent.
"A man's character is to be judged by the general tenor and current
of his life, and not by a mere episode in it." Waddingham v. Hulett,
92 Mo. 528 (1887).
The reputation of a person among a minority of his neighbors is
not competent. Powers v. Presgroves, 38 Miss. 227, 241 (1859).
But it is not necessary that the witness should know that the repu-
tation he states is the opinion of the majority. Eobinson v. State,
16 Ma. 836 (1878).
The existence of a certain reputation may be circumstantial evi-
dence entirely apart from any effect in proving character. In such
cases the rules under consideration have, of course, no application.
Por example, on the question whether the vendor of a chattel intended
to reserve the title in himself, evidence of the poor reputation of the
vendee for financial stability is competent. Buswell Trimmer Co. v.
Case, 144 Mass. 360 (1887). So in an action against an employer for
negligence in hiring a fellow servant physically too infirm to safely
do his duty, evidence is competent that he " was generally reputed
to be infirm in the senses of sight and hearing and in physical
strength " . . . " for the purpose of proving that his infirmities in
these respects were well known in the community," and that there-
fore the employer either knew of his condition or with reasonable
diligence might have learned. Monahan v. Worcester, 150 Mass.
439 (1890).
Peoof of Chaeactee. Witness. — The law is now entirely
settled that, as to a witness, the only proper object of inquiry is
as to reputation for truth and veracity.
CHAP. VI.J AMERICAN NOTES. 257*^
Certain of the earlier cases, indeed, sought to establish the rule
that the general moral character of the witness is the preliminary
subject of inquiry.
It has accordingly been held that to impeach a witness the proper
method " is by asking, first, the question ' what is the witness's gen-
eral character ? ' If this is answered that it is bad, then it is fol-
lowed by the question, 'from his general character would you believe
him on his oath in a court of justice ? ' " Anon. 1 Hill, Law (S. C.)
251, 258 (1833) ; State v. Boswell, 2 Dev. Law (N. C), 209 (1829) ;
Stokes V. State, 18 Ga. 17, 37 (1865) ; Hume v. Scott, 3 A. K. Marsh.
260 (1821); State v. Stallings, 2 Haywood (N". C), 300 (1804); Cun-
ningham V. State, 65 Ind. 377 (1879) ; Gilliam v. State, 1 Head, 38
(1858).
In support of this form of interrogation, it has been urged, that
if the inquiry be limited to reputation for truth alone, a witness
of immorality so notorious that the mere matter of veracity has
escaped remark, would stand unimpeached.
In reply, it has been said that " a man who is notoriously im-
moral, who is believed to be dishonest, and who is addicted to mis-
representation, can never have a good character for truth." U. S.
V. Vansickle, 2 McLean, C. Ct. 219 (1840).
The position taken in U. S. v. Vansickle (iibi supra) has been gen-
erally approved. The prevailing rule, therefore, is that the deposing
witness must first be asked whether he knows the general reputation
for truth of the witness sought to be impeached instead of asking
for his " general character." " What is wanted is the common opin-
ion, that in which there is general concurrence, in other words, gen-
eral reputation or character attributed. That is presumed to be
indicative of actual character, and hence it is regarded as of impor-
tance when the credibility of a witness is in question." Knode v.
Williamson, 17 Wall. 686 (1873); Craig o. State, 5 Ohio St. 605
(1854) ; Davis v. Franke, 33 Gratt. 413, 425 (1880) ; U. S. v. Van-
sickle, 2 McLean, 219 (1840) ; Smith v. State, 58 Miss. 867 (1881) ;
Teese v. Huntingdon, 23 How. 2 (1859).
Where a witness was impeached by evidence of bad general char-
acter for honesty, the form of inquiry was held to be error. Born
V. Weathered's Adm. 23 Tex. 675 (1859) ; Craig v. State, 5 Oh. St.
605 (1854).
A party who takes the stand has the same position as any other
witness, and the inquiries are limited to character for veracity and
do not extend to general character. State v. Beal, 68 Ind. 345
(1879); Mershon v. State, 51 Ind. 14 (1875) ; State v. Eugau, 5 Mo.
App. 692 (1878).
It is equally well settled that specific instances of untruth or im-
morality are incompetent to prove the character of the witness for
truth and veracity.
257*^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET n.
The veracity of a male witness cannot be impeached by showing
that he is habitually intoxicated. Thayer v. Boyle, 30 Me. 475
(1849). Or has indulged in unlawful sexual intercourse. Cunning-
ham V. State, 65 Ind. 377 (1879).
Where evidence on behalf of the accused as to his good character
for truth and veracity was met by the government by evidence of
particular acts of immoral conduct, tending to show low and im-
moral associations, the court held that "This . . . was clearly ille-
gal evidence." As, however, the evidence as to truth and veracity
was itself improperly admitted, the court decline to reverse the judg-
ment. Morgan v. State, 88 Ala. 223 (1889). "A witness cannot be
impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts, nor is it proper
to question the witness with reference to such matters." Jones v.
Duchow, 87 Cal. 109 (1890) ; U. S. v. Vansickle, 2 McLean, C. Ct.
219 (1840).
The character for veracity of a female witness cannot be im-
peached by showing lack of chastity. People v. Mills, 94 Mich. 630
(1893); Camp v. State, 3 Kelly, 417 (1847)'; Johnson v. State, 61
Ga. 305 (1878) ; Jackson v. Lewis, 13 Johns. 604 (1816); Spears v.
Forrest, 15 Vt. 435 (1843) ; Com. v. Churchill, 11 Mete. 538 (1846) ;
overruling Com. v. Murphy, 14 Mass. 387 (1817) ; Dimick v. Downs,
82 111. 570 (1876).
But see IJ. S. v. Bredemeyer, 6 Utah, 143 (1889) where the court
apparently decided that on an indictment for adultery, the character
of the woman as a witness may be impeached by proof of improper
relations with other men. The evidence was admissible, however,
on other grounds.
The rule forbidding proof of character by particular instances of
conduct, does not interfere with the right, on cross-examination of a
sustaining witness to character, to inquire as to such particular in-
stances. Jones V. State, 76 Ala. 8 (1884) ; Holmes v. State, 88 Ala.
26 (1889) ; Leonard v. Allen, 11 Cush. 241 (1853); Steeples v. New-
ton, 7 Oreg. 110 (1879). An impeaching witness may be asked, on
cross-examination, to state the names of all persons whom he has
heard speak against the reputation of the witness impeached. Bates
V. Barber, 4 Cush. 107 (1849). As the court say in State v. Perkins,
66 ]Sr. C. 126 (1872), " It is settled that a witness who swears to the
general bad character of another witness on the other side, may,
upon cross-examination, be asked to name the individuals whom he
heard speak disparagingly of the witness, and what was said. This
is everyday practice."
Where the attempt is made, on cross-examination, to limit the
bad reputation to a particular set of facts, e. g., promises to pay
debts, the impeaching party can extend the scope of the bad repu-
tation to the extent of making it general. Pierce v. Newton, 13
Gray, 528 (1859).
CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 257^^
So the opinion of one witness as to the truthful character of an-
other is not competent.
On the matter of the veracity of a witness, an impeaching witness
cannot be asked " Prom what you know of his reputation, and what
you know of him, would you believe him under oath in a matter in
which he is interested ? " The court say " so far as it authorized
the witness under examination to base belief on his personal knowl-
edge — as distinguished from general reputation — the question was
improper." People v. Methvin, 53 Cal. 68 (1878) ; Holsey v. State,
24 Tex, App. 35 (1887) ; State v. King, 78 Mo. 555 (1883).
The preliminary question is whether or not he knows the general
reputation for truth and veracity in the neighborhood in which he
resides. If he says no, his examination should stop. If he says
yes, he should be asked whether that general reputation is good or
bad, and whether, from such general reputation, he would believe
the person under oath ; and the sources and extent of his information
may be tested on cross-examination. Prench v. Sale, 63 Miss. 386
(1885). He must answer, as a matter of conscience, if a sufficient
number of neighbors have expressed themselves. Ibid. Hamilton
V. People, 29 Mich. 173, 189 (1874) ; Wilson v. State, 3 Wise. 798
(1854). If the witnesses to character understand the phrase in a
general sense, it is not error to omit the word " general " in inquir-
ing for the reputation of the witness. Coates v. Sulau, 46 Kans.
341 (1891).
This preliminary question as to whether the second witness knows
the reputation of the first, is for the jury and not for the court.
Bates V. Barber, 4 Cush. 107 (1849).
" It is not like the case of experts, who are called to give opinions,
and whose qualifications to give such opinions must be first ex-
amined and decided upon by the court. What is the reputation of
a witness for truth and veracity, is a simple question of fact ; and
there is no more reason for the court to make a preliminary exami-
nation as to the knowledge of witnesses called to testify to this fact,
than there is for making such examination as to the knowledge of
witnesses called to testify to any other fact. All witnesses, com-
petent to testify to any fact in the case, are competent to testify to
the fact of reputation for truth ; and the inquiry as to the amount
and means of this knowledge is for the jury, in order to enable them
to satisfy themselves as to the weight and importance of the testi-
mony." Bates V. Barber, 4 Cush. 107 (1849).
" English Rule." — Assuming that the impeaching (or sustain-
ing) witness has answered that he knows the reputation for truth
and veracity of the witness sought to be impeached, and has next
been asked whether it is good or bad, the point in dispute on the
cases is whether the inquiry should stop here or whether the witness
should be further asked, " Prom what you know of this reputation,
257*^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET TX.
would you believe him under oath ? " This latter question, if asked,
is said to be according to the so-called " English rule."
It is believed that the great preponderance of authority is in favor
of this so-called " English " form of interrogation. The great in-
fluence of Professor Greenleaf is probably responsible for such con-
flict as exists. It is said in Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173 (1874),
" Until Mr. Greenleaf allowed a statement to creep into his work on
evidence to the effect that the American authorities disfavored the
English rule, it was never very seriously questioned. ... It is a
little remarkable that of the cases referred to to sustain this idea,
not one contained a decision upon the question, and only one con-
tained more than a passing dictum not in any way called for."
The reasons in favor of the form of question calling for the
opinion of the witness as to the effect on his own mind of the repu-
tation of the impeached witness, are given in this well considered
case of Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173 (1874). " Unless the im-
peaching witness is held to showing the extent to which an evil
reputation has affected a person's credit, the jury cannot accurately
tell what the witness means to express by stating that such repu-
tation is good or bad, and can have no guide in weighing his testi-
mony. ... It has also been commonly observed that impeaching
questions as to character are often misunderstood, and witnesses, in
spite of caution, base their answer on bad character generally, which
may or may not be of such a nature as to impair confidence in tes-
timony. . . . The objection alleged to such an answer by a witness
is, that it enables the witness to substitute his opinion for that of
the jury. But this is a fallacious objection. The jury, if they do
not act from personal knowledge, cannot understand the matter at
all without knowing the witness' opinion, and the ground on which
it is based." Ibid. The following authorities, among others, follow
the English rule. People v. Davis, 21 Wend. 309 (1839) ; Titus v.
Ash, 24 N. H. 319 (1851) ; Lyman v. Philadelphia, 56 Pa. St. 488
(1867) ; Knight v. House, 29 Md. 194 (1868) ; Eason v. Chapman,
21 111. 33 (1858) ; Wilson v. State, 3 Wis. 798 (1854) ; Stokes v.
State, 18 Ga. 17 (1855) ; M'Cutehen v. M'Cutchen, 9. Porter (Ala.),
650 (1839) ; United States v. Vansickle, 2 McLean, C. Ct. 219
(1840) ; Mobley v. Hamit, 1 A. K. Marsh, 591 (1819) ; Ford v.
Ford, 7 Humph. 92 (1846) ; Eobinson v. State, 16 Fla. 835 (1878) ;
Snow -y. Grace, 29 Ark. 131 (1874).
In a New York case a witness called to siistain a prior witness
whose veracity had been attacked, testified that he did not know
" from the speech of the people " what the prior witness's character
for veracity was. But that he had known him for ten years, knew
his character, and had heard it questioned. He was then asked,
" From the speech of the people as to his character, would you be-
lieve him under oath ? " Held to be a proper question. Adams v.
Greenwich Ins. Co., 70 N. Y. 166 (1877).
CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 257^"
To the same effect is the reasoning in Ford v. Ford, 7 Humphrey
(Tenn.), 92 (1846) : " We think it is proper that the witness should
testify as to his own opinion. But this opinion must be the result
of his knowledge of the general reputation of the principal witness ;
not of particular facts, nor of his estimate of the character of the
party, founded upon his knowledge of many facts. . . . Eumors may
exist, and may acquire a general circulation in a neighborhood, and
yet their origin may be so vague, or the sources from which they
spring so unworthy of credit, as that the people of the neighborhood
may entirely disregard them, and retain the utmost confidence in
the party to whom they relate. . . . The party has no such general
reputation as that which these rumors, if believed, would give.
General reputation is the estimate one's neighbors place upon his
character." Ibid. Wike v. Lightner, 11 S. & E. 198 (1824). " We
all know that there are persons so given to apocryphal statements
in their common conversation and intercourse with their friends
and neighbors, that no one places any confidence in their state-
ments, and this want of truthfulness becomes a subject of common
remark among all who know them, still, from their daily walk and
conversation in other respects, none would doubt their truthfulness
when solemnly called to testify in a court of justice." Eason v.
Chapman, 21 111. 33 (1858). The same rules apply to a party
when he takes the stand as a witness. State v. Beal, 68 Ind. 345
(1879).
Where a party is a witness the form of the question may be modi-
fied as follows. After inquiring as to the general reputation for
truth and veracity in the community where he resides, the impeach-
ing witness may be asked, " Whether, from that reputation, he, the
witness, would believe him on oath, in a matter in which he was
interested." Knight v. House, 29 Md. 194 (1868).
Should the sustaining witness, when inquired of as to the reputa-
tion for truth and veracity of the first witness, state that he has
never heard it questioned, he is entitled, if otherwise competent,
to state that he would believe him on his oath. "If such a question
was not permitted, the most respectable man in the community might
fail in being supported if his character for truth should happen to
be attacked." People v. Davis, 21 Wend. 309 (1839). But where
the second witness said, "I never heard his reputation spoken
of. I have heard people say he has lied," it was held that he did
not possess the requisite knowledge of the reputation for truth to
entitle him to state his own belief in the value of the first witness's
oath. " A witness must state his own knowledge of another's general
good reputation before he will be permitted to say he would believe
him on oath, otherwise he has no legitimate foundation for his be-
lief. In some of the states the secondary question as to belief is
not permitted at all." Lyman v. Philadelphia, 56 Pa. St. 488
(1867).
257°^ AJMEEICAN NOTES. [PABT H.
Certain American authorities, following the authority of Professor
Greenleaf, hold that the only proper inquiries are whether the wit-
ness knows the general reputation of the impeached witness for
truth and veracity, and if so, what it is. Prominent among these
states is Massachusetts.
In that state the usual question is, " What is his general reputa-
tion for truth and veracity ? " It is discretionary with the court to
direct the examining party to first inquire whether the witness
knows the reputation. "The practice upon this subject differs in
different courts. In this state, no practice is established as a rule
of law, but it is within the discretion of the presiding judge to re-
quire the preliminary question above stated to be asked of each
witness if he shall deem that the interests of justice require it.
The same principle is applicable to the examination of witnesses
upon other subjects. It often occurs, in the trial of cases, that the
judge is called upon to inquire of a witness whether he has knowl-
edge of the matter of which he is called to testify. If it appears to
be doubtful whether the witness understands and appreciates his
duty to testify only to what he knows of his own knowledge, or if,
for any reason, there is danger that he may testify to hearsay, it is
the right, and may be the duty, of the presiding judge to inquire of
him if he has knowledge of the matter as to which he is asked to
testify; and the party calling the witness would not be thereby
aggrieved, and uo exceptions would lie." Wetherbee v. Norris, 103
Mass. 565 (1870) ; Quinsigamond Bank v. Hobbs, 11 Gray, 250
(1858).
The rule is the same in New Jersey. It is not sufficient that the
impeaching witness should state that from what he knows of his
reputation he would not believe him under oath. "The only testi-
mony allowed in such case is as to the general reputation of the
witness impeached, in the neighborhood, for truth and veracity, and
that such reputation is generally bad ; saying that the witness, from
what heykuew of his reputation, would not believe him under oath,
is not sufficient." King v. Euckman, 20 N. J. Eq. 316 (1869).
And California, " The question of veracity is one of fact for the
jury, and it cannot be affirmed, as a legal proposition, that a witness
is not successfully impeached, unless the impeaching witnesses
testify that, from the general reputation of such witness, they
would not believe him or her under oath." People v. Tyler, 35 Cal.
553 (1868).
In Texas, the impeaching witness, after stating knowledge as to
the first witness's reputation for truth and veracity, "may then
properly be asked whether that general reputation is such as to en-
title the witness to credit on oath," but not whether he would be-
lieve him on oath. Marshall v. State, 5 Tex. App. 273, 294 (1878).
The reasons for excluding the final question as to the witness's
CHAP. VI.J AMEEICAN NOTES. 257^^
belief is thus stated in Boon v. Weathered, 23 Tex. 675 (1859),
cited with approval in Marshall v. State (ubi supra). "Where the
impeaching witness is asked ' whether or not he could believe the
other under oath,' he is more likely to give an answer suggested by
his personal knowledge, or prompted by his personal feelings, or his
individual opinion, than when he is asked, whether or not he is ac-
quainted with the general reputation of the impeached witness, for
truth, and whether it is good or bad."
In Ohio a somewhat similar rule is adopted. The court suggest
the following as the proper form of question : " Have you the means
of knowing the general reputation of A B, the witness, for truth?
Or, this preliminary question may be thus : Are you acquainted with
A B, and do you know what is his general reputation for truth?
So, any other form of words may be adopted, by which to ascertain
whether the witness has sufficient knowledge of the public estima-
tion for truth, in which the witness proposed to be impeached is
held." Craig v. State, 5 Ohio St. 605 (1854).
Reputation ante Litem Mot am. — The reputation as to veracity
is reputation at the time of trial. As bearing on this question,
reputation subsequent to the bringing of the suit is competent,
though if it arises out of the suit itself its force is naturally much
weakened. "A foundation for such evidence must first be laid by
showing that the witness has a reputation, that there is a common
report as to his veracity ; and to determine this, it is proper to show
its extent, how it originated, and what originated it, whether in the
transaction out of which the controversy arose, or independent of it.
If from the controversy itself, and since it commenced, its force and
weight would be materially lessened." Amidon v. Hosley, 54 Vt.
25 (1882) ; Fisher v. Conway, 21 Kans. 18 (1878)!
In iSTew Jersey the courts have gone further, and hold that the
reputation of a witness for veracity arising since the controversy, is
incompetent. "No rule is better settled, or founded on clearer
principles, than that which excludes all testimony touching reputa-
tion founded on opinions expressed post litem motam. Not only
should evidence as to the character of the witness be founded on
reputation, previously existing, but a stranger sent by a party to
the neighborhood of the witness to learn his character, will not be
permitted to testify as to the result of his inquiries." Keid v. Reid,
17 K J. Eq. 101 (1864).
Where evidence of bad reputation of a witness for veracity is re-
ceived, evidence is competent that prior to a certain event, e. g. his
failure in business, it was good. Quinsigamond Bank v. Hobbs, 11
Gray, 250 (1858). So where an impeaching witness has stated, in
reply to the usual questions, that he could not believe the first wit-
ness under oath, he may state further that, laying aside impressions
which he received at a certain trial at which the impeached witness
257^3 AMERICAN NOTES. [PART H.
testified, he would believe him under oath. Titus v. Ash, 24 N. H.
319 (1851).
Who may testify. — In Morgan v. State, 88 Ala. 223 (1889), a
party testified to his own reputation for truth and veracity. The
evidence was held incompetent, but not apparently on account of
any disability of the witness to testify.
Where the impeaching witness had had no dealings with the
principal witness for five years, it was held discretionary with the
court to refuse to admit the question. Teese v. Huiitingdou, 23
How. 2 (1859).
It is not necessary that the second witness should be a member of
the community in which the reputation exists. It is sufficient if he
knows what it is. Hadjo v. Gooden, 13 Ala. 718 (1848). If an
impeaching (or sustaining) witness knows the reputation of the
first witness where he resides he need not himself be one of his
neighbors. That is a circumstance going merely to the weight of
his evidence. Wallace t;. White, 58 Wis. 26 (1883). But "ordi-
narily, the witness ought to come himself from the neighborhood of
the person whose character is in question." Powers v. Presgroves,
38 Miss. 227, 241 (1859) ; Louisville, &c. E. E. v. Eichardson, 66
Ind. 43 (1879). It is for the jury to judge as to the qualifications
of the second witness. If he says he knows the reputation of the
first witness he can testify, even if the court thinks differently.
Bates V. Barber, 4 Cush. 107 (1849). But if the witness does not
claim knowledge, his evidence may be excluded. Com. v. Lawler,
12 All. 685 (1866) ; State v. Perkins, 66 N. C. 126 (1872).
In the case of Com. ■;;. Lawler, 12 All. 585 (1866), the government
relied on the evidence of one A. " In order to impeach him, the
defendant called a witness, and asked him, ' What is the general
reputation of Connell for truth and veracity ? ' The defendant then
asked the several questions following; but all were excluded by
the judge. ' Have you heard his character for truth and veracity
called in question ? If you have heard his character for truth and
veracity called in question, state what the common speech of people
is as to his character for truth and veracity. What is the general
reputation of Connell for truth and veracity, among those who
speak of it at all ? ' The judge ruled that the defendant might ask
the witness what was the common speech of people as to Connell's
character for truth and veracity, but that the questions in the form
put by the defendant were inadmissible." This ruling was sus-
tained on exceptions, the Supreme Judicial Court (Bigelow C. J.)
saying, — " The defendant has no valid ground of exception to the
ruling of the court. He was permitted to put to the witness the
proper inquiry as to the general reputation for truth of the person
whose character for veracity he sought to impeach. The questions
which were ruled out were calculated to elicit testimony to the
CHAP. VI.J AMEKICAN NOTES. 25,7°*
prejudice of the witness offered by the government, from a person
who had no actual knowledge of his general reputation for truth.
If answered, they might have led to the introduction of evidence of
particular instances of prevarication by the government witness, or
of doubt as to his truthfulness on some special occasion, without
touching liis general character for veracity. The rule is perfectly
well settled that the evidence must be confined to the general repu-
tation of the witness, and the court did nothing more than hold the
party to a strict observance of it, by requiring his questions to be
restricted to that form of inquiry solely." Com. v. Lawler, 12 All.
585 (1866).
The number of impeaching and sustaining witnesses to credibility
may be limited by the sound discretion of the court, to be exer-
cised according as the issue of credibility is important in the case.
" It would be absurd to hold, that, upon an enquiry of that sort, de-
pending, in a great measure, upon the opinion of witnesses, a party
has the right to examine as many as he pleases, and that the court
and jury are bound to sit and hear them, without any power to inter-
fere." -Bunnell v. Butler, 23 Conn. 65 (1854). In this case the
court limited the number to six on each side.
RULES RESPECTING THE BURTHEN OF PROOF. [PART II.
CHAPTEE in.
BURTHEN OF PROOF.
§ 364.^ The third of the rules^ governing the production of evi-
dence is, that the burthen of proof lies on the party who substantially
asserts the affirmative of tlie issue. This rule is in the Roman law
thus expressed, Ei incumhit probatio, qtii dieit, non qui negat? It
has been adopted in practice, not because it is impossible to prove
a negative, but because the negative does not admit of the direct
and simple proof of which the affirmative is capable ; * and also
since it is but reasonable and just that the suitor who relies upon
the existence of a fact should prove his own ease. In its applica-
tion, regard must be had to the substance and effect of the issue,
and not to its grammatical form ; for in many cases a party, by
making a slight alteration in his pleadings, can give the issue a
negative or affirmative form at his pleasure.^
§ 365. The best tests for ascertaining on whom the burthen of
proof lies are, to consider first which party would succeed if no
evidence were given on either side ; " and, secondly, what would be
the effect of striking out of the record the allegation to be proved.
The onus lies on whichever party would fail, if either of these
steps were pursued.' Instances in which, on these grounds, aver-
ments negative in form must be, nevertheless, proved by the party
who asserts such negative, arise in an action for non-compliance
with the covenants in a lease, where the breach assigned is that
1 Or. Ev. § 74 in part. ^ Amos v. Hughes, 1835 (Alder-
2 See ante, § 217. son, BJ ; Belcher v. M'Intosh, 1839
' Dig. Lib. 22, tit. 3, 1, 2; Masc. (id.) ; Doe v. Rowlands, 1840 (Oole-
de Prob. Conol. 70, tot. ; Conol. 1128, ridge, J.); Osbom v. Thompson,
n. 10. See Tait, Ev. 1. 1839 (Erskine, J.) ; Eidgway v. Ew-
* Dranquet v. Prudhomme, 1831 bank, 1839 (Alderson, B.) ; Geach v.
(Am.). Ingall, 1845 (id.).
= Soward v. Leggatt, 1836 (Ld. ' Mills v. Barber, 1836 (Alderson,
Abinger). B.).
258
CHAP. III.] EXAMPLES EESPECTING BURTHEN OF PROOF.
the premises were not kept in repair, for this allegation must, if
traversed, be proved by plaintiff ;i and in an action where a plaintiff,
claiming on a life policy, avers that the insurance was effected on
an assertion, made by the insurer, that the insured was not subject
to habits or to attacks of illness tending to shorten life, and was in
good health, which was true ; but the defence is that such state-
ment was false in these respects, namely, that the insured was
subject to habits and to attacks tending to shorten life, that is, to
habits of intemperance and to attacks of erysipelas, and was ill at
the time when the assertion was made, in which case the burthen
of proof here again lies upon the plaintiff — since, to entitle him to
a verdict, some evidence must be given that the life was insurable
at the time when the policy was effected.^
§ 366. Similarly, the burthen of proof lies upon the plaintiff in
an action for not executing a contract in a workmanlike manner, to
which it is pleaded that the work was properly done ;' in an action
on a warranty of a horse, where plaintiff alleges that the horse was
not sound as warranted, and the defendant denies the unsoundness;*
in an action against a solicitor for not using due diligence f against
a merchant for not loading a sufficient cargo on board a ship, pur-
suant to a charter-party ;" against an architect for not building
houses according to a specification ; ' and, indeed, in every case in
which plaintiff grounds his right of action upon a negative allega-
tion, and the establishment of this negative is consequently an
essential element in support of his claim.^ The practice in Admi-
ralty is also in accordance with these principles. In a damage suit
there, if a defendant, making no charge of negligence against
plaintiff, denies his averments, and pleads inevitable accident,
1 Soward v. Leggatt, 1836; Doe (Ld. Denman); S. P. (Tindal, 0. J.).
V. Rowlands, 1840 (Coleridge, J.) ; In Fisher v. Joyce, 1839, Oole-
Belolier v. M'Intoah., 1839 (Alder- ridge, J., allowed defendant to begin,
eon, B.). _ _ but in Doe v. Rowlands, 1840, con-
''■ Huokman u. Pimie, 1838; Ashby fessed this wrong.
V. Bates, 1846; Geaoh v. Ingall, * Sluloooki;. Passman, 1836 (Alder-
1845; Rawlins v. Desborougli, 1837 son, B.).
Ld. Denman); Craig v. Penn, 1841 » Ridgwayw.Bwbank, 1839 (Alder-
id.); Polo V. Rogers, 1840 (Tindal, son, B.).
" J.). ' Smith V. Davi.es, 1836 (Aldorson,
3 Amos v. Hughes, 1835. B.).
* Osborn v. Thompson, 1839 (Brs- » Doe v. Johnson, 1844 (Tindal,
kine, J.); Cox v. Walter, undated 0. J.).
259 s 2
EFFECT OF DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS OF LA.W. [PT. II.
plaintiff must begin at the trial.' But if, on the admitted fads, the
onus of proving that there was no negligence by him is upon the
defendant, he begins.^
§ 367. There are certain exceptions to this general rule that the
burthen of proof rests on the party whose assertion, though in form
negative, is in substance affirmative. These must now be noticed.
The first exception to such rule is that the party who asserts the
negative must begin whenever there is a disputable presumption of
law in favour of an affirmative allegation.^ The presumption, till
displaced by direct evidence, serves the party, in whose favour it
arises, as well as if he had given express proof. Thus, for instance,
where a shipper was charged in a civil action with having shipped
dangerously combustible goods without giving notice of their
nature, whereby the ship was burnt, as the omission to give notice
would have been criminal on the part of the defendant, the law
was held to presume that notice had been given, and to thus throw
upon the plaintiff the burthen of proving the negative;* in an
action by a landlord against a tenant for forfeiture by breach of a
covenant to insure, it was held that the law presumed, in favour of
the party in possession, that he had satisfied the covenant, and that
the non-insurance must therefore be proved by the plaintiff,' and
that the landlord could, to relieve himself from the burthen of
giving this negative proof, have inserted an express clause to
that effect in the lease ;*' in an action on an insuraace on a ship, if
the underwriter plead that certain material facts, kn6wn to the
assured, had been concealed from him, the burthen of proving the
non-communication of these facts will, on a reply traversing this the
whole statement of defence, be on the defendant ; for the presump-
tion of law prim^ facie is that the assured discharged his duty of
communicating all material facts to the underwriter — though the
' The Benmore, 1873; The Otter, See ante, §§ 71, 109, 214—216.
1874. * Williams v. E. India Co., 1802.
- The Merchant Prince, 1892. ' See Toleman v. Portbury, 1869
' It is only with reference to dis- (Ex. Ch.).
putable presumptions of law that this ' Doe v. Whitehead, 1838, where
rule applies, for if the presumption refusal to produce the policy or any
be conclusive, no evidence at all can receipt for premium was held not
be given to rebut it ; if it be merely sufficient proof of an omission to
one of fact, the presumption itseU insure,
does not arise till made by a jury.
260
CHAP. III.] EFFECT OF PRESUMPTIONS IN SHIFTING ONUS.
amount of evidence required to show the contrary will vary accord-
ing to circumstances. Indeed, sometimes very slender evidence will
be sufficient, so that, for instance, proof that a ship was known by
the assured to have been burnt at the time when the assurance was
effected would in itself be reasonable evidence to show that it had
not been communicated, because no underwriter, had he been aware
of such a circumstance, would have executed the policy.^
§ 368. A common example of the principle that a person who
asserts that which is contrary to a prima facie presumption of law
must prove it, is afforded by actions upon bills of exchange, for in
these the plaintiff need neither allege nor prove that the bill sued
upon was given for good consideration, as, in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, the law presumes that fact.^ But in an
action by indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, on a
defence that the bill was accepted for the accommodation of the
drawer, and was indorsed to the plaintiff without value,' and when
it was overdue,* and a reply traversing the latter of these allega-
tions, the burthen of proving that no value was given for the bill,
or that it was overdue at the time of indorsement, devolves on the
defendant, because the defence does not contain an allegation of
any fraud which would counteract the presumption arising from
the possession of such an instrument.'
§ 369. Where, however, the defendant " taints the biH" (as it is
called), that is, shows fraud or illegality in the original transaction,
— as, for instance, after stating that the bill was originally obtained
by fraud or duress, or had been given for gambling purposes," oi
had been lost or stolen, he avers that the plaintiff held it without
value, and this last fact is traversed, — the plaintiff is required
to prove that he gave value, because the presumption of illegality
arising from an admitted fraud in the inception of the bill is pre-
1 EUdn V. Janson, 1845 (Parke and ^ Lewis v. Parker, 1836 ; Jacob v.
Alderson, BB.). Hungate, 1834 (Parke, B.) ; BroTm
2 See 45 & 46 V. c. 61 ("The i;. Pidlpot, 1840 (Ld. Denman). See,
Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 "), § 30. also, Smith v. Martin, 1841 .
See, also, E. S. 0. 1883, Ord. XIX. « The fact that a note was given
r. 25. for a wager on duty subject to
' Mills V. Barber, 1836 ; Whit- fluctuation, does not render the in-
taker v. Edmunds, 1S34 (Patteson, strument illegal within this rule, for
J.) ; Fitch V. Jones, 1855. such a wager was only a promise
* See (Alderson, B.) Elkin v. Jan- which the law would not enforce :
eon, 1845. Fitch v. Jones, 1855.
261
EFFECT OF PEESUMPTIONS IN SHIFTING ONUS. [PAET II.
etimed to attach to every subsequent holder, and to render him in-
capable of recovering on such a bill in the absence of evidence
ehowing under what circumstances he became possessed of it.'
Similarly, if in such a case, whether the action be upon a bilP or
upon a note,' the plaintiff, in answer to such a defence, merely
reply a general denial,* and defendant gives evidence of the fraud,
as soon as the illegality is proved, the onus of showing that he gave
value is cast upon the plaintiff without notice of any fraud.
§ 370. On the same principle, too, that a person who asserts the
negative of a legal presumption must begin and prove his denial,
if a plaintiff avers that a certain party was, at a specified time, of
sound mind, and this averment is traversed by the defendant, the
latter is bound to prove the negative allegation of incompetency,
for the law presumes every man to be sane till the contrary is
shown.' If, however, on the trial of such an issue, the defendant
' See cases cited in last four pre-
ceding notes. Also 45 & 46 V. c. 61
(' ' The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 "),
§ 30, subs. 2 ; and Bingham v. Stan-
ley, 1841, overruling Ld. Denman's
decision at Nisi Prius as reported in
9 C. & P. 374. See, also, Elkin v.
Janson, 1845 (Alderson, B.). See
also, however. Masters v. Barrets,
1849.
^ Harvey v. Towers, 1851 ; Smith
V. Brain, 1851 ; Hogg v. Skeen,
1865 ; Berry v. Alderman, 1853 ;
Fitch V. Jones, 1855 ; Mather v. Ld.
Maidstone, 1856 ; Hall v. Feather-
stone, 1858.
^ Bailey v. Bidwell, 1853, over-
ruling Paterson v. Hardacre, I'Sll.
* Which is now the proper plead-
ing : see E. 8. C. 1883, Ord. XIX.
r. 18 ; ante, §§ 302, 304.
* See Sutton v. Sadler, 1857 ; Dyce
Sombre v. Troup, 1866. The pro-
position stated in the text, that every
man is presumed to be sane till the
contrary is proved, is doubtless true
in criminal cases. It may even be,
too, that it is also true in civil oases.
But, so far as probate issues are con-
cerned, the cases are conflicting. See
a learned note on the whole matter
in Greenleaf on Evidence, 15th edit.
(1892), p. 124. The passage in the
text has been allowed to stand, as it
appears to express the deliberately
formed opinion of the Author. As
to Probate issues, however, many
other text books state the law some-
what differently to the proposition in
the text above, and in the above cited
note to Greenleaf on Evidence (a
work upon which the present treatise
was, originally, to a large extent
founded) it is said that, on a ques-
tion of probate, the burthen of prov-
ing that the testator was of sound
mind " is, by the better cases, held
to rest upon the party propounding
the will." The present Editor, while
he does not feel justified in altering
Mr. Pitt Taylor's text, nevertheless
personally agrees in the views ex-
pressed in the above cited note to
Greenleaf, since, in his opinion, the
maxim that ' ' every man is presumed
to be sane till the contrary appears "
does not arise at all, until it has been
shown that the individual, whose act
is under investigation, was like other
men, and, possibly, applies only in
criminal cases, while the case oi
Sutton V. Sadler itself shows that a
direction to the effect suggested in
the text is a misdirection to a jury.
As to wills, a contrary rule prevails
in Massachusetts. Crowninshield v.
Crowninshield, 1834 (Am.); and see
Anderson v. Gill, 1858, H. L. (Ld.
Wensleydale) ; Smee v. Smee, 1879.
262
CH. III.] BURTHEN OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.
puts in evidence an inquisition finding the party lunatic from a
date prior to the transaction in question, this evidence, though only
primS, facie and not conclusive, shifts the burthen of proof on the
plaintiff, who asserts the party's sanity.' Thus, if it be shown that a
testator was insane, or even subject to delusions,^ at any time prior
to the date of an alleged will, or within a few years after that date,
the burthen of establishing his testamentary capacity will certainly
be shifted on to the party propounding the will.'
§ 371. On the ground that a prosecutor must prove every fact
necessary to substantiate his charge against a prisoner, or, in other
words, that the law always presumes innocence in the absence of
convincing evidence to the contrary, in criminal cases the burthen
of proof, unless shifted by legislative interference, always falls on
the prosecuting party, — and this though, in order to convict, he
must necessarily have recourse to negative evidence. Thus, if a
statute, in the direct description of an offence, and not by way of
proviso, contain negative matter, the indictment or information
must both contain an allegation negativing such matter, and the
allegation itself must also be supported by prima facie evidence.*
A better illustration of this principle cannot be given than to
point out that the old (and now repealed) statutes made it an
offence to either course deer in inclosed grounds without the con-
sent of the owner,' or to cut trees without such consent ; " and that
the law, having made the absence of consent a material element
in such offences, on indictments for them it was necessary both to
allege and to prove that the act was done without such consent.
§ 372' — 374. The Legislature has now, however, in many in-
stances got rid of the necessity for proving negative matter either
» Hassard v. Smitli, 1872. » E. v. AUen, 1826 ; 42 G. 3, c. 107,
» Smee v. Smee, 1879 (Sir J. Han- § 1, repealed by 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 27.
nen). Other provisions, omitting all men-
* Waring v. Waring, 1848 (Ld. tion of consent, are now substituted
Brougham); Fowlis v. Davidson, by 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("The Larceny
1848 (Sir H. Fust); Grimani v. Act, 1861 "), § 13.
Draker, 1848 (id.); Prinsep v. Dyce « E. v. Hazy, 1826; 6 G. 3, c. 36,
Sombre, 1856 (P. 0.); ante, § 197. repealed first by 7 & 8 G. 4, c, 27,
* E. V. Jarvis, 1756; Taylor v. and, secondly, by 30 & 31 V. o. 59.
Humphries, 1864 ; Davis v. Scrace, Other provisions, omitting all men-
1869 ; Morgan v. Hedger, 1870 ; tion of consent, are now substituted
Copley V. Burton, 1870. by 24 & 25 V. c. 97 (" The Malicious
Damage Act, 1861 "), §§ 20, 21,
26a
BURTHEN OF PEOOF SHIFTED BY STATUTE. [PAET II.
by enactments creating the offence afresh, and omitting all
mention of the negative matter,' hut more generally by ex-
pressly enacting that the burthen of proving authority, consent,
lawful excuse, and the like, shall lie on the defendant. Thus,
the accused is, by the statutes relating to the offences, bound to
protect himself by showing afErmatively the existence of some
lawful authority or excuse where he is charged with sundry statut-
able offences.*
' See, for instance, the two pre-
ceding notes.
^ Amongst such offences are : heing
found by night in possession of any
picklock key, crow, jack, bit, or
other implement of housebreaking
(24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("The Larceny Act,
1861"), § 58); or buying or selling
coin at an undervalue, or exporting or
importing, counterfeit coin (24 & 25
V. c. 99 (" The Coinage Offences Act,
1861 "), §§6, 7, 8, 14, 19); or making,
mending, or having possession of,
coining tools, or conveying such
tools, or any coin or bullion, out of
the Mint (24 & 25 V. c. 99 ("The
Coinage Offences Act, 1861"), §§ 14, 24,
25; see E. v. Harvey, 1871 (0. C. E.);
or having possession of paper, plates,
or dies used in connection with the
stamp duties (33 & 34 V. c. 98,
§§ 18, 22; 54 & 55 V. c. 38 ("The
Stamp Duties Management Act,
1891 "), § 15) ; or (being licensed to
sell stamps) having possession of any
forged stamps (see 54 & 55 V. c. 38,
§ 18), or any instruments or materials
for making either letter stamps (64 &
55 V. 0. 38, § 13, subs. 1 ); or excise paper
(2 W. 4, c. 16 ("The Excise Permit
Act, 1832 "). § 3 ; 11 & 12 V. c. 121,
§ 18), or paper used for making ex-
chequer bills (24 & 25 V. c. 5, § 18 ;
24 & 25 V. c. 98 (" The Forgery Act,
1861 "), § 9), bank notes (24 & 25 V.
c. 98 ("The Forgery Act, 1861"),
§ 14), the notes of private bankers
(Id. § 18), or foreign notes (Id. § 19) ;
or for manufacturing paper similar
to that used for stamps by or under
the Commissioners of Inland Eevenue
(54 & 55 V. c. 38, § 14 ; see, also, 24
& 25 V. 0. 6, § 18; 24 & 25 V. c. 98
(" The Forgery Act, 1861 "), % .10);
or having possession of such paper
before it has been stamped and issued
264
for use (54 & 55 V. c. 38, § 15 ; 24 &
25 V. c. 98( " The Forgery Act, 1861 "),
§ 1 1 ; 24 & 25 V. c. 5, § 19) ; or engrav-
ing bank notes or any part thereof
(24 & 25 V. c. 98 (" The Forgery Act,
1861"), §§ 16, 17), the notes of private
bankers (Id. § 18), or foreign notes
(Id. § 19) ; or having possession of
counterfeit dies for making gold
and silver wares, or instruments for
making such dies, or any wares of
gold, silver, or base metal, having
thereon forged dies (7 & 8 V. c. 22
(" The Gold and Silver Wares Act,
1844"), §§ 2, 3) ; or having possession
of hackney-coach and stage plates,
or drivers' or watermen's tickets (6 &
7 V. c. 86 ("The London Hackney
Carriages Act, 1843 "), § 20; and see
also 30 & 31 V. c. 134 (amended by
48 V. c. 18), § 17); and certain other
cognate offences (see E. v. Edmund-
son, 1859). The law is the same
when, on a party being charged with
applying any marks appropriated to
Her Majesty's stores (38 & 39 V.
0. 25 ("The Public Stores Act,
1875 "), § 4), or with converting or
having in his possession any such
stores, when the same are reasonably
suspected of being stolen or unlaw-
fully obtained (§ 7 ; see, also, §§ 8 and
9), proof is given, or an inference
raised, that he has acted (E. v. Wil -
mett,1848(Coltman,J.); R.i.. Cohen,
1858 (Watson, B., and Hill, J.); E.
V. Sleep, 1861) "knowingly; " so, the
burthen of proof also rests (E. v.
Banks, 1794 (Ld. Kenyon)) upon the
accused in a prosecution under the
direction of the Commissioners of
Customs, in respect of goods seized
for non-payment of duties, or any
other cause of forfeiture, or for re-
covering any penalty under any Act
relating to the customs; on an in-
CHAP. III. J BURTHEN OF PROOF SHIFTED BY STATUTE.
dictment for making a signal to a
smuggling vessel at sea, the defen-
dant (89 & 40 V. c. 36 ("The Customs
Consolidation Act, 1876"), § 259) must
prove that the signal was not made
for the purpose of giving illegal
notice (Id. § 191) ; and goods found
or seized under the customs laws
will be deemed to be run goods,
unless the owner can prove the con-
trary (Id. § 178). The burthen of
justifying his conduct (32 & 33 V.
c. 57, §§ 4, 5) also rests upon the de-
fendant in. proceedings under " The
Seamen's Clothing Act, 1869." So,
under "The Foreign Enlistment
Act, 1870," where the breach of
neutrality charged relates to the de-
livery of a ship to one of the States
(33 & 34 V. c. 90, § 9) at war. So,
under " The Merchant Shipping Act,
1894," it similarly rests where a
person is charged with sending, or
attempting to send, or take a ship to
sea in an unseaworthy state so as to
endanger lite (39 & 40 V. c. 80, § 4) ;
and in such cases the indictment
need neither aver that the accused
knew the ship was unseaworthy,
nor negative the use of reasonable
means to insure her going to sea
in a seaworthy state : R. v. Free-
man, 1873 (Ir.). In any prosecution
under the Act for preventing acci-
dents by threshing machines, on
proof that the machine was not duly
fenced while working, the person to
whom it belongs, or for whom it has
been used, must "satisfy the court
that he took all reasonable precau-
tions to ensure the observance of the
Act"r41&42V.o. 12 ("The Thresh-
ing Machines Act, 1878 "), § 1). So,
the burthen of proof that he acted
innocently lies upon any person
charged under "The Army Act,
1881," with illegally purchasing
from soldiers regimental necessaries,
equipment, or stores, or with illegally
being in possession of any such
articles (44 & 45 V. c. 58, § 156,
sub-ss. 1 and 2). Again, a man sum-
moned for being unlawfully in posses-
sion of venison, must satisfy the
magistrate that he came lawfully by
it (24 & 25 V. 0. 96 ("The Larceny
Act, 1861"), § 14); and one who
knowingly and unlawfully has on
his premises any tree, shrub, post,
pale, rail, or the like, must give a
satisfactory account of how he came
possessed of the article found (24 &
25 V. c. 96 ("The Larceny Act,
1861"), § 35). Persons found in
possession of, or offering for sale,
shipwrecked goods, are bound to
show that they have not transgressed
the law in taking them (Id. §§ 65, 66).
In proceedings against any person
for having or keeping an unlicensed
theatre, or for acting for hire there-
in, if it be proved that the theatre is
used for the public performance of
stage plays, the burthen of proving
that it is duly licensed or authorized
lies on the accused (6 & 7 V. c. 68
("The Theatres Act, 1843"), § 17).
In an action for a penalty under
" The Public Health Act, 1875," for
improperly acting as a member of a
local board, the burthen of proof is
in great measure shifted on to the
defendant (38 & 39 V. o. 55, Sch. 2,
rule 1, sub-rule 70). In any dispute
in the hosiery trade between the
manufacturer and the workmen re-
specting the alleged imperfect exe-
cution of any work, which has been
delivered to the manufacturer or his
agent, the work, if not produced in
order to adjudication, will be deemed
to have been properly executed (8 &
9 v. c. 77, § 3 ; 8 & 9 V. c. 128, § 3).
So, on a complaint that a person
employed in a factory or workshop
without a surgical certificate, is under
the prescribed age, if the court be of
that opinion, the employer shall be
liable to penalties, unless he can
prove that the party employed is of the
age required (41 V. c. 16 (" The Fac-
tory and Workshop Act, 1878 "), § 92).
The proof of the age of the employed
also rests upon the defendant in any
prosecution of a chimney sweeper for
illegally employing a climbing boy
(27 & 28 V. c. 37, § 10), and in any
proceeding against any person for
employing a child in a dangerous
performance (42 & 43 V. c. 34, § 4).
Similarly, the proof of the dog's age
lies on the defendant on the hearing
of an information for a penalty for
keeping a dog without a. licence,
where it is said that the animal is
a mere puppy (41 V. c. 15 (" The Cus-
toms and Inland Revenue Act, 1878"),
§ 19). A pawnbroker charged with
certain offences against "The Pawn-
brokers Act, 1872,"iB required to prove
265
FACTS PECULIAELY IN KNOWLEDGE OF PARTY. [PAET II.
§ 375. Moreover, as to all cases falling -within, the Summary
Jurisdiction Act, 1879,' it is generally provided,'' that " any excep-
tion, exemption, proviso, excuse, or qualification, whether it does
or does not accompany, in the same section, the description of
the offence in the Act, order, hye-law, regulation, or other docu-
ment creating the offence, may he proved by the defendant, but
need not be specified or negatived in the information or com-
plaint, and, if so specified or negatived, no proof in relation to
the matters so specified or negatived shall be required on the part
of the informant or complainant.'
§ 376. The first exception to the general ride that the burthen
of proof rests with the party who asserts the substantial affirmative
is, then, that it does not apply where there is a prima facie pre-
sumption of law one way or the other; and it is sufficiently esta-
blished by the examples which have been cited.
§ 376a. The second exception to the above-named general rule
is that where the subject-matter of the allegation lies peculiarly/
icithin the knowledge of one of the parties, that party must prove it,
whether it be of an affirmative or a negative character, and even
though there be a presumption of law in his favour.* For instance,
some lawful or reasonable excuse for wlien such meter is tinder the con-
Ms conduct (So & 36 V. c. 93, § 23, sumer's control, is prima facie evi-
r. 4, and § 31). In most prosecu- dence that such alteration, preven-
tions for offences against the bank- tion, abstraction, or consumption has
rupt law, the accused may be con- been fraudulently, knowingly, and
victed on the sole proof of his having wilfully caused by the consumer (34
committed the act charged, "unless & 35 V. c. 41 ("The Gasworks
the jury is satisfied that he had no Clauses Act, 1871"), §38). In charges
intent to defraud," or, "to conceal against consumers for fraudulently
thestateof his affairs," or, "to defeat abstracting it, or water supplied by
the law," as the case may be (32 & 33 meter (38 & 39 V. c. 55, § 60; 41 & 42
V. c. 62, §§ 11, 12; as amended by V. o. 52, § 70, Ir.), the burthen of
46 & 47 V. 0. 52, § 163; 53 & 54 V. proof also rests with the accused,
c. 71, § 26 ; 35 & 36 V. c. 57, §§ 11, As to cases under the Pedlara Act,
12, Ir.). The burthen of showing see infra, § 375.
"any lawful authority or excuse" • 42 & 43 V. c. 49.
for his conduct rests upon a person ' § 39, subs. 2 ; " The Pedlars Act,
charged with having committed an 1871" (34&35 V. c. 96),§20, sub-s. 3;
offence against " The Diseases of 41 & 42 V. c. 52, § 250, Ir., contains
Animals Act, 1894 " (57 & 68 V. a similar provision,
c. 67), §§ 52, 53. See Huggins v. ' See, on the construction of this,
Ward, 1882. On a charge against Eoberts v. Humphreys, 1882 (decided
a consumer of fraudulently abstract- on a very similar clause in the Licens-
ing gas, ' ' the existence of artificial ing Acts).
means" for altering the index to any * Dickson v. Evans, 1794 (Ash-
meter, or for preventing any meter hurst, J.) ; E. v. Turner, 1816 (Bay-
from duly registermg, or for ab- ley, J.). But see the observations of
stracting, consuming, or using gas Alderson, B., in Elkin v. Janson,
266
CHAP. III.] FACTS PECULIARLY IN KNOWLEDGE OF PARTY.
under the old law, in an action for penalties against a person for
practising as an apothecary without a certificate,! as the defendant
was peculiarly cognizant of the fact whether or not he had obtained
a certificate, and, if he had done so, could have no difficulty about
producing it, the law compelled him to do so (although, had it not
been for the principle in question, the plaintiff would have been
bound to prove the negative for two reasons ; first, as essential to
his case, and secondly, to rebut the presumption of innocence),
and in accordance with the principle under consideration it is
for him to do so, and not for the plaintiff to prove it non-
existent.^
§ 377. This second exception also prevails in all civil or criminal
proceedings instituted against parties for doing acts which they
are not permitted to do unless duly qualified. It holds good, and
compels the defendant to produce the necessary licence or autho-
rity (as the case may be), in proceedings for selling liquors, offences
against the game laws,' improperly exercising a trade or profession,
and the like;^ in actions for penalties against the proprietor of a
theatre, for performing dramatic pieces without the written consent
of the author ;^ in proceedings for misprision of treason — where, if
the treason be proved, and the knowledge of it be traced to the
prisoner, he is, in strictness, bound to negative the averment of
concealment by offering proof of a discovery on his part.* It also
prevails in the Ecclesiastical Cotirts, so that, in proceedings against
a clergyman for non-residence without licence or exemption, the
prosecution need neither allege nor prove that the defendant had
not a licence, or that he was not resident on another benefice ; but
if defendant have a hcence he must produce it.'
1845, suggesting that tte rule only Jeffries, 1821 ; Hanson's case, 1821 ;
refers to the weight of the evidence, Sheldon v. Clark, 1806 (Am.); U. S.
but that there should be some evi- v. Hayward, 1815 (Am.); Gening i).
dence to start the presumption and The State, 1822 (Am.). See, also,
cast the onus on the other side. Doe v. "Whitehead, 1838, cited ante,
1 Under 55 G. 3, c. 194 (" The § 367, where this rule was held ia-
Apothecaries Act, 1815"). See, now, applicable.
21 & 22 V. c. 90, § 40. = Under 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 15 (" The
* Apoth. Co. V. Bentley, 1824 Dramatic Copyright Act, 1833"),
(Abbott, 0. J.). § 2 ; Morton v. Copeland, 1855 (Am.).
' See 1 & 2 W. 4, c. 32 (" The « R. v. Thistle wood, 1820 (Abbott,
Game Act, 1831 "), § 42. C.J., in charge to grand jury).
* E. V. Turner, 1816; Smith v. ' Bluck i». Eackman, 1840 (P. C).
267
EULES RESPECTING THE EIGHT TO BEGIN. [PART II.
§ 378. The third rule governing the production of evidence,
namely, that the burthen of proof generally lies upon the party
who substantially asserts the affirmative, has now been in itself
sufficiently considered. But in connection with this rule questions
frequently arise with respect to the right to begin. Therefore, it
will be well to conclude this chapter with a discussion upon this
important subject. This is, indeed, strictly speaking, perhaps a
digression from the subject of the chapter, namely, the considera-
tion of the rule as to the Burthen of Proof. Yet it is so inti-
mately connected with the subject, so obviously must be determined
with a due regard to the principles contained in this third rule,
and so important, that its consideration will certainly not be
irrelevant. The " right to begin," — in other words, the privilege
of opening the case to the jury — is often one of considerable
advantage before any tribunal,' but in particular at Nisi Prius.
It not only enables a party to create an impression in his favour,
which it may be difficult subsequently to erase, but also secures
him the last word, in the event of witnesses being called by his
opponent. Still, cases sometimes occur where a defendant goes
to trial relying simply on the weakness of the plaintiff's case, and
where, if called upon to begin, he will instantly be defeated.^
The duty of beginning is, consequently, seldom a matter of in-
difference, but is generally regarded as an object which it is
important either to attain or to avoid, according to the circum-
stances. The principles which govern the question as to who
has the privilege or duty (as the ease may be) of the " right to
begin " are difficult of application, and are, moreover, not very
distinctly understood, and the decisions as to such right are alike
numerous and conflicting. A detailed examination of them all
would be out of place here, but a few general rules may, perhaps,
be of practical value.
§ '679. The first general rule as to the right to begin is, that
1 On tte hearing of appeals in substance) was want of considera-
equity the appellant always used to tion ; the plaintiffl having replied, as
begin : Williams v. Williams, 1866. to part of the sum claimed, that he
^ Beat "On Bight to Begin," 27,28. gave consideration, and as to the
See, e.g., Edwards v. Jones, 1837; residue, nolle prosequi, Alderson, B.,
where, in an action on a note by held that defendant must begin, and as
indorsee against maker, the plea (in he could not, plaintiiS had a verdict.
268
CHAP. III.] EULES RESPECTING THE RIGHT TO BEGIK.
the party on whom the onus probandi lies^ as developed on the record,
must begin} It sometimes is said that the right of beginning
belongs to the party on whom the affirmative of the issue lies ; but
this assertion, if literally understood, is by no means accurate, siace
(as we have seen) it does not apply either where the affirmative
allegation is supported by a legal presumption, or the truth of the
negative averment is peculiarly within the knowledge of the party
who relies on it.' And the rule as to the Right to begin is, in what-
ever form it may be stated, subject to some exceptions. Eirst, in
some cases, if at the trial the defendant will admit the whole prima
facie case of the plaintiff, he will be entitled to begin, provided he
was not bound to have made this admission by his pleading at
an earlier period. For instance, this is so in a claim by a person
as heir-at-law of the person last in possession against a devisee
under such person's will, if the defendant admits not only that
plaintiff is heir, but that the ancestor, through whom he claims,
died seised.*
§ 380. The exception will, however, be strictly confined to cases
where the defendant admits the whole title of the plaintiff. There-
fore, if defendant, in an action to recover land, admit at the trial
a will under which the plaintiff claims, and rely on a subsequent
devise or codicil, he will not be entitled to begin. For so
far from admitting the whole title of the plaintiff, he would
expressly deny a most material part of it, since by setting up a
second will or codicil, he would in effect assert that his opponent
was not devisee at the time of the testator's decease.^ Again, a
defendant whose title rests upon a conveyance from the ancestor,"
or in part under the ancestor's marriage settlement,' cannot, by
' As to tlie best tests of the onus Patteson, J.), defendant was allowed
probandi, see ante, § 365. to begin, though plaintiff, as to part
* Thus, where a husband petitions of the premises, was prepared to prove
for a restitution of conjugal rights^ a that he was assignee of an outstand-
respondent who answers by pleading ing term. See, now, E. S. 0. 1883,
cruelty is entitled to begin: Cherry Ord.XXI.r. 21, cited ante, §301, n. '.
V. Cherry, 1858. * Doe v. Brayne, 1848 ; overruling
' Best " On Right to Begin," 29. Doe v. Oorbett, 1813, and an anony-
See ante, §§ 367, 376. mous case cited by Ld. Denman in
* Goodtitle v. Braham, 1792 ; Doe Doe v. Barnes, 1834.
V. Brayne, 1848 ; Doe v. Barnes, « Doe v. Tucker, 1830 (BoUand, B).
1 834 (Ld. Denman). In Doe v. Smart, ' Doe v. Lewis, 1843 (Maule, J.).
1835 (Gurney, B., after consulting
269
PLAINTIFF SEEKING UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES. [PAET II.
simply admitting his opponent's heirship and his own possession,
deprive the former of his right to hegin, hecause such an admission
will not cover the entire title of the plaintiff. Where, too, each
party claims as heir-at-law, and the defendant is clearly the heir,
if legitimate, his admission of a conditional title in the plaintiff, if
the defendant was illegitimate, is insufficient to give him the right
to begin, because the plaintiff, in order to recover, must prove his
own title ; for although in this particular case the title may depend
on defendant's legitimacy, the legitimacy does not constitute the
direct issue.
§ 381 — 2. A second exception to the general rule that the party
on whom lies the onus proband!, as developed on the record, must
begin, is that the plaintiff begins in all actions where he seeks
substantial and unliquidated damages, though the affirmative lie upon
the defendant. This doctrine rests upon the broad principles of
public convenience and justice, and was promulgated by a majority
of the judges many years back, as applicable to actions for libel,
slander, and injuries to the person, and extended (in 1845) by a
considered judgment of the Court of Queen's Beneh.^ Its operation
was subsequently extended to actions of covenant and assumpsit,
and indeed, as it would seem, to all actions, where the plaintiff is
seeking to recover actual damages of an unascertained amount.^
§ 383. This second exception, however, does not extend to cases
where the plaintiff seeks to recover a debt, or a liquidated demand in
money ; * since in such actions, unless a specific denial of the claim
be placed on the record, the plaintiff is not required to give any
evidence as to its amount. Neither does such exception apply
where the damages sought to be recovered, though technically
unliquidated, are obviously nominal ; ' nor where they are admitted
' Doe V. Bray, 1828 (Vaughan, B.). he on whom the burtheu of proof lay
^ In Mercer v. Whall, 1845, an ao- ought to begin "). See, also. Cartel
tion by a solicitor's clerk for wrongful t>. Jones, 1833.
dismissal, which defendant justified ^ See JFoley v. Tabor, 1861.
by pleading misconduct on his part, ^ Woodgate v. Potts, 1847 (Parke,
plaintiff was held entitled to begin. B.) ; Fowler v. Coster, 1828 (Ld. Ten-
See judgment therein delivered by terden); Bonfield v. Smith, 1843-
Ld. Denman. (Parke, B., never as- E. S. 0. 1883, Ord. XXVII. r. 2. '
sented to this exception, but was " Hodges v. Holder, 1813 (Bayley,
always of opinion that " in all cases J.); Jackson v. Hesketh, 1819 (id.),
270
CHAP. III.] WHEN PLAINTIFF MUST BEGIN.
by the defendant, so far as amount is concerned ; ' nor where they
can be ascertained by mere computation, as, for instance, where the
action is brought on a bill of exchange or a promissory note ; ^ nor
where the plaintiff will not say whether or not he intends to
proceed for substantial damages.'
§ 384. A second general rule as to the right to begin is, that i/
the record contains several issues, and the burthen of proving any one
of them lies on the plaintiff, he is entitled to begin provided he will
undertake to give evidence upon it} This rule will equally prevail,
though it clearly appears, as matter of calculation, that if the
defendant should eventually succeed on a certain one of the issues,
the proof of which lies upon him, the plaintiff will recover nothing
on the issue which lies upon him.^ But the proviso at the end of
the rule constitutes a material part of it ; and, therefore, if a mere
claim in general terms for an unliquidated money demand has been
added to some special claim for liquidated damages, and the
defendant, while confessing and avoiding the special claim for the
liquidated amount, specifically denies that made in general terms
£or the unliquidated amount, such a denial will not entitle the
plaintiff to begin, unless in fact he intends to rely on the claim
which has thus been made in general terms for an unliquidated
amount, and to adduce evidence in support of it.° The effect of the
proviso is, in short, this : that it must be the object of an opening
to explain to the jury the facts which the witnesses are going to
prove.
§ 385. Sometimes the burthen of proof of some one or more issues
lies upon the plaintiff, while that of proving others lies upon the
defendant. Under such circumstances the plaintiff may (at his
own option) either go into the whole case in the first instance, or
else elect to only give evidence vnth regard to those issues which
1 Tindall v. Baskett, 1861 (Erie, ruling Homan v. Thompson, 1834;
O.J.). Faith V. M'Intyre, 1835; Oake-
i* Oannamv. Farmer, 1849; E. 8.0. ley u. Ooddeen, 1861 (Byles, J.). See
1883, Ord. XXXVI. r. 57. Edge v. Hillary, 1852, where to an
^ Chapman v. Eawson, 1845. action for goods sold, defendant
* Rawlins v. Desborough, 1840 pleaded, except as to 150Z., the
(Ld. Denman). general issue, and as to that sum a
' Cripps v. Wells, 1843 (Eolfe, B.); special plea. The plaintiff's par-
recognised in Booth v. Millns, 1846. ticulars limited his demand to 150Z.,
' Smart v. Eayner, 1834 (Parke, and it was held (Ld. Campbell) that
B.) ; Mills V. Oddy, 1834 (id.) ; over- defendant should begin.
271
EVIDENCE IN REPLY. |_PAET II.
he is himself bound to prove, reserving the right ai rebutting bis
adversary's proofs, in the event of the latter establishing a prim^
facie case in support of the issues which lie upon him.' The last-
named course is, in practice, most usually adopted ; and if it is
followed, the defendant may have a special reply on the plaintiff's
fresh evidence, while the plaintiff will be entitled to the general
reply on the whole case. If, however, the plaintiff at the outset
thinks fit to call any evidence to repel the defendant's case, he
will not be permitted to give further evidence by way of reply ;
in other words, he " cannot split his case ;" since if such a privi-
lege were allowed to a plaintiff, the defendant, in common justice,
might claim the same, and the proceedings would run the risk of
being extended to a very inconvenient length.^
§ 386. Accordingly, in an action by the indorsee of a bill against
the acceptor, where the only issue was on a defence denying the
indorsement, the plaintiff was not allowed to rest his case at first
on testimony given to identify the indorser's handwriting, and
after evidence for the defence had been given to show that plaintiff
himself was too poor to have discounted the bill, and that he had
disclaimed all knowledge of it, to call by way of reply evidence to
show that, in point of fact, plaintiff actually had discounted the
instrument.' A further illustration of the same principle wiE. be
found on a later page.*
§ 387. The question respecting the right to begin or to reply is
a matter of practice and regulation upon which the presiding judge
must exercise his discretion. Accordingly, the court will not
interfere with his decision, unless it be clearly proved, not only that
the ruling on this point was manifestly wrong, but that it has
occasioned substantial injustice.* It will not grant a new trial,
1 Formerly, when either by plead- a different course was, indeed, per-
ing or notice, the defence was known, mitted ; sed qy. if it be allowed now.
the plaintiff was bound to open his * Jacobs v. Tarleton, 1848. See,
whole case : Eees v. Smith, 1816 ; also, Wright v. Wilcox, 1850.
but this practice having been found * Infra, § 387.
inconvenient, has been abandoned : ' Brandford v. Freeman, 1850 ;
Browne v. Murray, 1825 (Abbott, Edwards v. Matthews, 1847. See,
C.J.) ; Shaw v. Beck, 1853. See also, Burrell v. Nicholson, 1833 (Ld.
Penn u. Jack, 1866. Denman); Bird v. Higginson, 1834
^ Browne v. Murray, 1825 (Ab- Huckman v. Femie, 1838; Doe v.
bott, C.J.); Sylvester v. Hall, 1825 Brayne, 1848; Booth v. Millns, 1846;
(id.). In WiUiams v. Davies, 1833, Chapman v. Emden, 1841 (Coleridge,
272
CHAP. III.] EULE RESPECTING THE EIGHT TO REPLY.
merely iDeoaiise the judge haa either admitted evideuce in reply
■which should in strictness have been produced in support of the
plaintiff's original case,' or has prevented the plaintiff from calling
witnesses in anticipation of the defendant's case, provided such
witnesses he subsequently examined in reply.^
§ 387*. The right to begin, however, usually draws after it, both
in civil and criminal proceedings, whenever the adversary adduces
evidence to the jury in support of his case, some right of reply.'
The right of reply thus conferred may be either (a) a right to make
a further speech in reply to the adversary's case, or (b) a right to
call evidence in reply to such case.
§ 387a. With these prefatory remarks, civil and criminal cases
must be separately considered.
§ 387b. In civil oases a right even to make a speech in reply is
not conferred by the mere commenting on a cash-book, which has
been used to refresh the memory of one of the adverse witnesses, or
even by a reference to parts of this book, not looked at by such
witness,^ nor by the production of a paper, which the judge has
called for in order to satisfy his conscience.' Neither will the
plaintiff be entitled to a speech in reply, because, in the course of
the trial, it has become necessary for the defendant to call witnesses
to inform the judge upon a question respecting the admissibility of
evidence.^
§ 387c. In criminal cases where several prisoners are jointly in-
dicted, and one of them calls witnesses, the counsel for the prosecutor
has a strict right to reply generally, if the charge be a joint one, and
the evidence affects the prisoners generally. If, however, the charges
be separate (as for stealing and receiving), or the defence be a
separate one (as an alibi), counsel for the prosecution has not a
general, but only a special, reply, and must in his reply confine his
remarks to the case of the party for whom witnesses have appeared.'
J.); Doe V. Eowlands, 1840 (id.); O.J.).
Mercer v. Whall, 1845 ; Geach v, " Cowling v. Finigan, 1824 (Best,
Ingall, 1845 (Pollock, O.B.). O.J.).
» Williams v. Davies, 1833 ; Doe * Harvey v. Mitchell, 1841 (Parke,
V. Bower, 1851. B.) ; Dover v. Maestaer, 1804 (Ld.
" Smith V. Marrable, 1842. Ellenborough). See ante, § 23.
" Best "On The Right to Begin," ' E. w. Hayes, 1838 (Parke, B., and
85, and cases there collected. Coltman, J.); E. v. Blackburn, 1853
^ Pullen V. White, 1828 (Best, (Talfourd and Williams, JJ.); E. v.
T. VOL. I. 273 T
PRACTICE AS TO CALLING ETIDENCE IN EEPLY. [PT. II.
Again, " if the only evidence called on the part of a prisoner is
evidence to character, although the counsel for the prosecution is
entitled to the reply, it will he a matter for his discretion whether
he will use it or not. Oases may occur in which it may be fit and
proper to do so." '
§ 387d. It has not been clearly decided whether the counsel for
the plaintiff or the prosecution will be entitled to reply, if the
defendant, without adducing evidence, opens new facts ; but the better
opinion is that no such right can be claimed, though the judge
may, in a flagrant case, permit its exercise.*
§ 388. As to the nature of the evidence which may be called in
reply, the remarks made on a previous page to the effect that the
party beginning is " not allowed to split his case," ' must in the
first place be borne in mind. Regard also must be had to the
circumstances of the individual case, and considerable latitude will
necessarily be granted to the judge in the exercise of his discretion.*
Thus, where a plaintiff in ejectment made out a prim^ facie case
as heir-at-law, which was met by a will being proved for the
defendant, he was permitted, in reply, to put in a subsequent will
whereby the estates claimed were devised to himself ; for although
this will proved him to be entitled to the premises as devisee, and
thus set up a title different from that on which he originally relied,
it operated also as a revocation of the former wiU, and thus
demolished the defendant's case.' Indeed, in one case, where the
plaintiff in an accident case originally offered evidence to show
that the defendant was at Layton at a given time, and the defen-
dant had called witnesses to show that he was then at Richmond,
the judge refused to exclude further witnesses, tendered in reply by
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was not at Eichmond, but
at Layton, at the time in question.' On the other hand, where the
Jordan, 1839 (Williams, J.); R. v. (Parke, B.); Stephens v. Webb, 1835;
Trevelli, 1882 (Hawkins, J.) ; E. v. a. v. Abingdon, 1794 (Ld. Kenvon) ;
Eain, 1883 (Stephen, J.). Naish v. Brown, 1846 (Pollock, O.B.).
' Resolution of the judges, 1837, ' Supra, § 38.
reported 7 0. & P. 676. * Wright v. Wilcox, 1850.
* Orerar v. Sodo, 1827 (Ld. Ten- » Doe v. Gosley (Ld. Denman).
terden). See, in favour of the right, Sed qu. as to the present practice.
E. V. Home, 1777; E. v. Bignold, SeeE.S.0. 1883,Ord. XXL r.21,and
1824 (Abbott, C.J.) ; E. v. Carlile, Ord. XXIII. r. 6, cited ante, § .'JOl.
1834 (Park, J.); Best "On The Right « Briggs v. Aynsworth, 1838 (Ld.
to Begin" 92—04 ; against it, Best, Denmany. This case certainly carries
id. 94 — 99 ; Faith v. M'Intyre, 1835 the privilege of adducing evidence
274
CH. III.] PRACTICE AS TO CALLING EVIDENCE IN REPLY.
issue was as to the soundness of a horse, which was exhibited to
the jury during the defendant's case, the plaintiff was not allowed
to recall his veterinary witnesses, who had possessed an opportunity
of inspecting the horse before the plaintifE's case had been closed,
but had only seen him on the view in question, to give their
opinion respecting his soundness.'
§ 389. In civil cases in which evidence is taken by aflBdavit under
E. S. C. 1883, Order XXXYIII., it is expressly provided by
E. 27, — in accordance with the practice described in the preceding
section, — that the plaintiff's affidavits in reply " shall be confined
to matters strictly in reply." ^
§ 390. With regard to the nature of the evidence which may be
called in reply in criminal cases, sufficient guide wUl for the most
part be obtained from what has already been said as to the practice
in civil cases. But in criminal cases it is further a rule that on
the trial of public prosecutions, whether for felony or misdemeanor,
directly instituted by the Crown, and conducted personally by the law
officers of the Crown, but not on prosecutions merely directed by
them,^ such law officers are in strictness entitled to reply, even if no
evidence be adduced on the part of the defendant.* As, however,
in reply to its extreme limit; for counsel for the Oro-wn, and in no
although, the plaintiH -was at liberty others." It had before this, in E.
to disprove the alibi by showing that v. Christie, 1858, been held that the
the defendant was not at Eiohmond, privilege does not extend to the Att.-
yet when the witnesses went on to Gen. of the County Palatine, and
prove that he was at Layton, they that where such prosecution was not
they not only gave evidence which conducted by a law officer in person,
ought to have been submitted to the it did not extend to a prosecution
jury in the first instance, but con- directed bythe Poor Law Board: E. v.
firmed that which was actually given Beckwith, 18o8(Byles, J.); but thatit
in chief, and which, consequently, did apply to Post-Office Prosecutions,
should have been then exhausted and thatit extended to the Sol. -Gen.,
(see note a to S. 0. pp. 169, 170.) as well as to the Att.-Gen. : E. o.
1 Osbom V. Thompson, 1839 (Er- ToaUey, 1866 (Mellor, J.); E. v.
stine, J.). Barrow, 1866. With respect to the
2 But tiiis rule appearsto have been Att.-Gen. of the Prince of Wales, see
disregarded in Peacock v. Harper, Att.-Gen. of P. of Wales y. Cross-
1878. Sed qu. man, 1866. The authorities as to
3 By a resolution of the judges the Att.-Gen.'s right of reply are
come to in 1887, and reported in collected 2 St. Tr. N. S. 1019.
0 St. Tr. N. S. p. 34, it was resolved: * Eesolution of the judges in 1837,
"That in those Crown cases in which reported 7 0. & P. 676: E. v. Home,
the Att.-Gen. and Sol.-Gen. is per- 1777 fLd. Mansfield); E. i;. Marsden,
sonaUy engaged, a reply, where no 1829 (Ld. Tenterden). The same un-
witnesses are called for the defence, just rule prevails in the Eevenue side
is to be allowed, as a right, to the of the Queen's Bench Div. in all cases
275 t2
ATTORNEY-GENERAL ENTITLED TO REPLY, [pART II.
this is a privilege, or rather a prerogative, opposed to the ordinary
practice of the courts, and is, emphatically, " more honoured in the
breach than the observance," it should be watched with jealousy.
Mr. Home, in 1777 observed, that the Attorney-Greneral would
be grievously embarrassed to produce a single argument of reason
or justice on behalf of his claim.' As the rule which precludes
the counsel for the prosecution from addressing the jury in reply,
when the defendant has called no witnesses, has been long thought
to afiford the best security against unfairness in ordinary trials, a
natural suspicion arises that a contrary rule may have been
adopted, and may still be followed, in State prosecutions, for a less
legitimate purpose. It is to be hoped that, ere long, the Legislature
will interfere, and introduce one uniform practice in the trial of
political and ordinary offenders.^
wtere the Crown is concerned : M. of formation respecting the subjects dis-
Chandosi^. Comrs. of Inl. Eev., 1851. cussed in this chapter are referred to
1 1777, 20 How. St. Tr. 663. to Mr. Best's work " On The Bight to
' Those who wish for fm-ther in- Btgin,"
276
CHAP, ni.] AJasKicAN 2sroTES. 276^
AMEEICAN NOTES.
Burden of Proof. — In the law of evidence this phrase means one
of two distinct things. " Proof " means either (1) " proving," or
(2) evidence to prove. In other words, either the result of evidence,
in producing aiRrmative belief, or the means used in producing
that result. Therefore, it means either a mental state or the means
of producing one. When incorporated into the phrase "burden of
proof," and the latter applied to the trial of causes, where an issue
has been raised as to the existence of a particular fact or facts, the
phrase necessarily means (1) The duty of creating by a certain pre-
ponderance an affirmative belief on the part of the tribunal in the
existence of the fact or facts in issue, or (2) The duty of introduc-
ing the evidence necessary to establish facts which produce or pre-
vent such affirmative belief. That these two burdens are distinct
from each other; that they may and often do rest at particular
times on different parties to the litigation, is perhaps obvious. It
is, however, rather the rule than the exception that they are suitably
distinguished in practice. It seems advisable, therefore, to consider
their respective differences.
(1) BuKDEN OF ESTABLISHING. — With the placing of this onus
the rules of evidence have nothing whatever to do. It has been
determined before the time comes for the use of evidence by the
issue as raised by the pleadings. Under the established rules of
pleading, the parties litigant have formed an issue of fact : — an
allegation of fact asserted by one party and denied by the other.
One party has, therefore, assumed, by asserting the truth of a con-
tested fact, the affirmative of the issue. By so doing, he has, as a
jnatter of subsbantive law (not under a rule of evidence), undertaken
the responsibility of resting the result of the entire case upon his
ability to produce in the minds of the tribunal, by a certain required
preponderance of evidence, an affirmative belief in the existence of
the fact or facts which he has asserted and his opponent has denied.
In other words, he must prove his ease. He has assumed the bur-
den of establishing it. There is no such burden on the other side.
If that interest can merely prevent the necessary affirmative belief
by the party having this burden of establishing, it succeeds. All
this has nothing to do with the rules of evidence. As a matter of
pleading or substantive law, whoever substantially has the affirma-
tive of the issue as determined by the pleadings, has the burden of
establishing his case.
"He who affirms must prove." Blanchard v. Young, 11 Gush.
341, 345 (1853) ; MoClure v. Pursell, 6 Ind. 330 (1855) ; Seavy v.
Dearborn, 19 N. H. 351 (1849) ; Southworth v. Hoag, 42 111. 446
(1867) ; Gizler v. Witzel, 82 111. 322 (1876) ; Oakes v. Harrison, 24
2762 ■ AJtERICAN NOTES. [PAKT U.
la. 179 (1867) ■; Eoyal Ins. Co. v. Schwing, 87 Ky. 410 (1888) ; Scott
V. Wood, 81 Cal. 398 (1889) ; Heinemann v. Heard, 62 N. Y. 448,
456 (1875) ; Clark v. Hills, 67 Tex. 141 (1886) ; East Tennessee, &c.
E. R. V. Stewart, 13 Lea, 432 (1884) ; Estate of Ehle, 73 Wis. 445,
458 (1889) ; Eoche v. Eraser, 7 Low. Can. Eep. 472 (1858) ; Lehman
V. McQueen, 65 Ala. 670 (1880) ; McQueen v. People's Bank, 111
N. C. 609 (1892) ; Kent v. White, 27 Ind. 390 (1866) ; Moffet v.
Moffet, 90 la. 442 (1894) ; McKenzie v. Stretch, 48 111. App. 410
(1892) ; Youn V. Lament, 56 Minn. 216 (1894).
So where the defence to a promissory note is payment, the burden
of establishing is on the defendant. Kendall v. Brownson, 47 N. H.
186 (1866). So where the defence is the existence of fraud known
to the plaintiff. Eeeve v. Liverpool, &c. Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 520
(1876). The same rules as to the effect of the pleadings to deter-
mine the burden of establishing obtain in equity, as at law. Pusey
V. Wright, 31 Pa. St. 387 (1858). " In both, the party maintaining
the af&rmative of the issue has it cast upon him." Ibid. " It is an
established rule of evidence in equity, that where an answer which
is put in issue, admits a fact, and insists upon a distinct fact by way
of avoidance, the fact admitted is established, but the fact insisted
upon must be proved ; otherwise the admission stands as if the fact
in avoidance had not been averred." Clements v. Moore, 6 Wall.
299, 315 (1867) ; McGhee Irrigation Ditch Co. v. Hudson, 85 Tex.
587 (1893).
In what particular instances the burden of establishing is on the
plaintiff or on the defendant is not a question in the law of evidence.
The affirmative of the issue may, as a matter of pleading, rest upon
the defendant when equally satisfactory a priori reasoning would
place it upon the defendant. As is said in Starratt v. Mullen, 148
Mass. 570 (1889) : " Undoubtedly many matters which, if true,
would show that the plaintiff never had a cause of action, or even
that he never had a valid contract, must be pleaded and proved
by the defendant ; for instance, infancy, coverture, or, probably,
illegality." See also Sparks v. Sparks, 51 Kans. 195 (1893). But
with all this the law of evidence is not directly concerned. Evi-
dence takes up the procedure of the trial where pleading leaves it.
Indeed Bentham says with great truth (Works, Vol. VI. p. 214) :
" This topic . . . onus probandi . . . seems to belong rather to Proce-
dure than to Evidence." Evidence is limited to facts from which
a judicial tribunal may infer the existence of a fact in issue. The
definition, therefore, excludes mere argument. Yet the burden of
establishing, fixed and unshifting, lies upon the party who has the
afiirmative of the issue, during the stage of argument, after the
evidence is all in, and throughout much legal reasoning, whether
relating to rules of law or issue of fact. Therefore while burden of
proof concerns the law of evidence, it concerns it merely because
evidence is part of the law of procedure.
CHAP. in.J AMEKICAN NOTES. 2768
Whete a party has assumed without objection the burden of es-
tablishing in the trial court, he will not be permitted to contend in
the upper court that he wrongfully assumed that burden. Benjamin
V. Shea, 83 la. 392 (1891).
The burden of establishing may involve proof of negative aver-
ments or facts.
" Whilst the party having the affirmative of the issue holds the
burden of proof, as a general rule it is not necessary that the issue
should always be presented in an affirmative form. If this were
requisite, a mere change in the form of the issue would change the
burden of proof, without regard to the substance and effect of the
issue." Clark v. Hills, 67 Tex. 141 (1886).
So in an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must show
that the proceedings were instituted luithout probable caixse. King
V. Colvin, 11 E. I. 582 (1877) ; Ames v. Snider, 69 111. 376 (1873);
Smith V. Zent, 59 Ind. 362 (1877).
In an action for negligence the plaintiff may be required to show
that certain warnings were not given. Greany v. Long Island E. E.,
101 N. Y. 419 (1886). On a complaint against the keeper of a
billiard table for allowing a minor to play billiards at his table
without the consent of his parent or guardian, the burden of proving
that the parent or guardian did not consent is on the State. Couyers
V. State, 50 Ga. 103 (1873). So in an action against a surety on a
note, where the surety has given notice of his intention not to con-
tinue liable, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the
money could not have been collected if suit had been brought when
notice was given. Strickler v. Burkholder, 47 Pa. St. 476 (1864).
In like manner, on a bill in equity to cancel a deed, on the ground
that it was never executed, it is incumbent on the complainant to
prove the negative allegation. Kerr v. Freeman, 33 Miss. 292
(1857).
So in an indictment for selling liquor to a slave without an order
from his owner, it is the duty of the State to prove that no order was
given. State v. Evans, 5 Jones, 250 (1858). In an indictment for
selling goods not of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the state,
the burden is on the government to prove this negative averment.
State V. Hirsch, 45 Mo. 429 (1870). So on an indictment for selling
goods not the produce or manufacture of the United States. Com.
V. Samuel, 2 Pick. 103 (1824). So where a statute gave a civil
remedy for cutting logs without the owner's consent, the plaintiff
must show affirmatively the absence of such consent. Little v.
Thompson, 2 Greenl. 228 (1823). But see to the contrary effect,
Welsh V. State, 11 Tex. 368 (1854).
But while the onus of establishing may include proof of negative
averments, it does not follow that the same cogency of proof is re-
quired as in proving positive allegations.
276* AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET n.
On a bill in equity for the cancellation of an agreement in writing
on the ground that certain representations were false and fraudulent,
and the plaintiff's burden of establishing involved proof of certain
negative averments, viz. : that one Lea had not invented a new and
improved process for making iron and steel; had wo^ taken out a
caveat on the same, and had not transferred the same to a certain
company, the court say : " The degree of proof of a negative allega-
tion is seldom measured by that required of an affirmative allegation.
In some cases a negative may be positively and conclusively proved,
. . . but in many cases this is impossible, and hence the amount of
proof required to support the negative proposition and to shift the
burden will vary according to the circumstances of the case ; and
very slight evidence will often be sufficient to shift the burden to
the party having the greatest opportunities of knowledge concerning
the fact to be inquired into." Kelley v. Owens (Cal.), 30 Pac. Eep.
696 (1892).
Where the burden of establishing involved proof of a negative alle-
gation, viz., that no alluvion existed at a certain time susceptible of
private ownership, the court hold : " Inasmuch as this involves the
proof of a negative and is an exception to the general rule that the
party holding the affirmative must prove it, demonstrative evidence
is not required, and the burden of proof may be shifted when suffi-
cient facts are established to raise a strong presumption in favor of
the negative." Succession of Delachaise v. Maginnis, 44 La. Ann.
1043 (1892). This extract, by the way, is an excellent instance of
the common confusing of the " burden of establishing " and the
"burden of evidence.'' The first reference is apparently to the bur-
den of establishing ; the second to the burden of evidence. " Full
and conclusive proof, however, where a party has the burden of
proving a negative, is not required, but even vague proof, or such as
renders the existence of the negative probable, is, in some cases,
sufficient to change the burden to the other party." Beardstown i).
Virginia, 76 111. 34 (1875) ; cited with approval in Vigus v. O'Ban-
non, 118 in. 334 (1886).
"Where the negative does not admit of direct proof, or the facts
lie more immediately within the knowledge of the defendant," the
party within whose knowledge the proof is, is required to produce evi-
dence of the affirmative. U. S. v. Hay ward, 2 Gall. 485, 498 (1816).
So in an action for a penalty in neglecting, ivithout excuse from
the judge of probate, to probate a will, it was held that the onus
was on the plaintiff to establish the negative averment of lack of
excuse. Smith v. Moore, 6 Greenl. 274 (1830).
Probably the onus of the pa.rty having the burden of establishing
is relieved of the proof of these facts because of the presumption
that suppressed evidence is unfavorable to the one who declines to
produce it ; a feeling embodied in the maxim, omnia contra spolia-
CHAP. III.J AMERICAN NOTES. 276"
torem. Lovell v. Payne, 30 La. Ann., Pt I., 511 (1878) ; Great
Western E. R. v. Bacon, 30 111. 347 (1863).
" Where it is as easy for the plaintiff to prove the negative as it is
for the defendant to disprove it, then the burthen of proof must rest
upon him, as that the place where the animal was killed was not in
a town or village, or was not more than five miles from a settlement ;
but where the means of proving the negative are not within the
power of the plaintiff, but all the proof on the subject is within the
control of the defendant, who, if the negative is not true, can disprove
it at once, there the law presumes the truth of the negative averment,
from the fact that the defendant withholds or does not produce the
proof, which is in his hands if it exists, that the negative is not true.
In other words, the burthen of proof is thrown upon the defendant
to prove the affirmative against the negative averment." Great
Western R. E. v. Bacon, 30 111. 347 (1863).
Pacts well known to other Pakty. — The rule requiring proof
of essential negative facts by him who has the burden of establishing
is especially modified where such proof includes facts difficult of
proof and peculiarly within the knowledge of the other party.
Thus where the defendant is charged with the commission of an
act without a license or other authority of law, as the fact of such
license or authority being one peculiarly within the knowledge of
the defendant, he may be called upon to prove it. State v. Morrison,
3 Dev. 299 (1831) ; Haskill v. Com. 3 B. Mon. 342 (1843) ; State v.
Crowell, 25 Me. 171 (1846) ; Shearer v. State, 7 Blackf. 99 (1844) ;
Schmidt v. State, 14 Mo. 137 (1851) ; Wheat v. State, 6 Mo. 455
(1840).
On an indictment for selling intoxicating liquor, not being an agent
appointed for the sale of the same, it is not incumbent upon the
government to prove the negative averment ; but if the necessary
facts exist, the onus is on the defendant to introduce evidence to
prove them. State v. Shaw, 35 N. H. 217 (1857). On an indict-
ment for keeping a ferry without a license, the same rule is applied.
Wheat V. State, 6 Mo. 455 (1840). So on an indictment against a
physician for practising without a license. Williams v. People, 121
111. 84 (1887).
So in an action against a railroad company, under a statute, for
killing stock, the burden of establishing is not on the plaintiff to
prove the averment that there was no contract between the company
and the owner of ' the land that the owner should fence. Great
Western E. R. v. Bacon, 30 111. 347 (1863).
" When a fact is peculiarly within the knowledge of a party, the
burden is on him to prove such fact whether the proposition be
affirmative or negative." Robinson v. Robinson, 51 111. App. 317
(1893) ; Clapp v. Ellington, 87 Hun, 542 (1895).
Where the plaintiff is the party to whose case the existence of a
276^ AMEBICAN NOTES. [PAET II.
license is essential, he must prove it. For example, in a civil action
for liquors sold. Bliss v. Brainard, 41 N. H. 256 (1860) ; Solomon
V. Dreschler, 4 Minn. 278 (1860).
To the contrary effect, see Wilson v. Melvin, 13 Gray, 73 (1859).
" There is no legal presumption that the sale is unlawful, and there
should hardly be, in favor of a defendant who has himself joined in
the contract. As against the Commonwealth, the legislature have
required that the de'fendant in a criminal prosecution shall prove
the authority under which he acts, when charged with a violation of
the statutes prohibiting the unlicensed sale of intoxicating liquors ;
but they have imposed no such obligation upon parties who seek the
enforcement of contracts." Ibid. So where the defendant sets up
the illegality of such a contract, it is for him to establish it, even if
so doing includes the proof of negative averments. Craig v. Proctor,
6 E. I. 647 (1860).
The same result is reached by statute in Massachusetts. Pub.
Stats. Ch. 214, Sect. 12. ^ Under this section it has been held, speak-
ing of the licensee, " If he be invested with that authority only in
case certain circumstances exist, it is for the party relying on the
license to prove the existence of the circumstances." Com. v. Towle,
138 Mass. 490 (1885). Therefore, in case of a sale on Sunday, it is
necessary to show that the persons sold to were guests of the
licensee's hotel, such sales only being authorized by the license.
Burden or Establishing in Cbiminal Cases. — The pleadings
in a criminal case place the burden of establishing upon the govern-
ment as to all the essential ingredients of the crime charged. State
V. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873). Shafer v. State, 7 Tex. App. 239
(1879) ; Com. v. McKie, 1 Gray, 61 (1854) : "The burden is on the
Commonwealth to prove all that is necessary to constitute the
crime of murder." Com. v. Eddy, 7 Gray, 583 (1856); People v.
Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9 (1868).
So of insanity in a criminal case. As the court say on a trial for
murder, " The prosecution takes upon itself the burden of establish-
ing not only the killing, but also the malicious intent in every case.
There is no such thing in the law as a separation of the ingredients
of the offence, so as to leave a part to be established by the prosecu-
tion, while as to the rest the defendant takes upon himself the
burden of proving a negative. The idea that the burden of proof
shifts in these cases is unphilosophical, and at war with fundamental
principles of criminal law." People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 21
(1868) ; State v. Crawford, 11 Kaus. 32 (1873); Fife v. Com., 29 Pa.
St. 429 (1857).
In a criminal case, where the defence of alibi was relied on, the
court say that if they are to construe a ruling of the trial judge,
that by evoking this defence, "the prisoner changed the burthen of
proof under his plea of not guilty, and waived his right under that
CHAP, ni.] AMERICAN NOTES. 276'
plea, to demand from the Commonwealth full proof of his guilt, we
should be bound to say that it was a cruel and monstrous misappre-
hension of the law. . . . But it is very clear that a resort to that
kind of evidence neither changes the burthen of proof on the other
questions in the cause, nor in any manner entitles the Common-
wealth to a verdict against the prisoner without proof of his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt." Kfe v. Com. 29 Pa. St. 429 (1857).
In a Massachusetts case for arson where the defence of alibi was
also relied upon, the court sustain a ruling which, indeed, is correct,
though using the phrase " burden of proof" indiscriminately as des-
ignating the burden of introducing evidence to support the claim
of alibi (which clearly rested on the defendant as soon as the gov-
ernment had made out a prima facie case), and the burden of
establishing that the defendant was guilty (which at no time left
the government). " The proposition was, in substance, that if the
defendant sought to establish the fact that he was at a particular
place at a particular time, the burden of proof was upon him. But
he (the trial judge) modified this statement in respect to its bearing
upon the burden of proof which was upon the government to
establish the alleged fact that the defendant was present at the fire.
The substance of the whole ruling was, that if the evidence of the
defendant which tended to prove an alibi was such that, taken
together with the other evidence, the jury were left in reasonable
doubt as to whether the defendant was present at the alleged fire,
they should acquit hiin. We cannot see that he has any ground to
object to this ruling, for it left the evidence which tended to prove
the alibi, even if it failed to establish it, to have its full effect in
bringing into doubt the evidence tending to prove the defendant's
presence at the fire." Com. v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451 (1870). To
the same effect see Briceland v. Com., 74 Pa. St. 463 (1873). " There
is no shifting of the burden of proof. It remains upon the State
throughout the trial. The evidence may shift from one side to the
other. The state may establish such facts as must result in a con-
viction, unless the presumption they raise be met by evidence, but
still the burden of proof is on the State to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Wingo, 6G Mo. 181
(1877).
To the contrary effect, that when the defendant in a criminal case
relies on the justification of self-defence, he must prove the same by
a fair preponderance of the evidence, see People v. Schryver, 42
N".Y. 1 (1870).
Proceedings without Pleadings. — Where the legal investiga-
tion is of such a nature that there are no pleadings, the analogy of
pleading is so far followed that the burden of establishing lies upon
him who asserts the affirmative of the issue as determined by the
nature of the investigation.
276^ AMEEICAJSr NOTES. [PART II.
As the party offering a will for probate impliedly affirms that the
will "was executed with the requisite formalities by one of full age
and sound mind, he must prove it." The onus of establishing is
therefore on him throughout. This burden is not shifted by evi-
dence of sanity by the subscribing witnesses. Crowninshield v.
Crowninshield, 2 Gray, 524. (1854) ; Comstock v. Hadlyme Ecclesi-
astical Society, 8 Conn. 254 (1830); Ware v. Ware, 8 Greenl. 42
(1831).
The Burden of Establishing does not Shift. — It is hardly
necessary to say that this burden of establishing a case does not
shift. It cannot shift, simply because the issue has been fixed once
for all by the pleadings, and the rules of pleading do not permit it
to be altered during the progress of a trial on those pleadings.
Wright V. Wright, 139 Mass. 177 (1885). " We understand the doc-
trine to be well settled in this Commonwealth, that the burden of
proof never shifts ; and we think, that in the case we are discussing,
and in the case at bar, the burden to show negligence was upon the
plaintiffs from the beginning, and remained on them throughout the
trial." Willett v. Rich, 142 Mass. 356 (1886); Aulls v. Young, 98
Mich. 231 (1893).
In this sense, it is true that " a prima facie case does not change
the burden of proof." Blanchard v. Young, 11 Gush. 341, 345 (1853).
In an action of contract on the warranty of the endorsement on a
promissory note, the defendant set up that he was acting as a broker
in the negotiation of the note, and that the plaintiff knew the fact.
The plaintiff asked for a ruling that the burden of proof was on the
defendant to satisfy the jury of these facts. Held: that such an
instruction was rightly refused. " Although it was incumbent upon
the defendant to establish the truth of any fact relied upon by him
to overcome the prima facie case which the plaintiff had made out,
yet there was no change in the burden of proof in a legal sense.
This defence was not a confession and avoidance. It was indeed an
assertion of new and distinct facts ; but it tended to establish the
negative of the very proposition upon which alone the plaintiff could
recover ; namely, that his contract was with the defendant in the
suit." Wilder v. Cowles, 100 Mass. 487 (1868).
It is thought that a certain amount of ambiguity in the use of the
phrase "burden of proof," lies in the fact that under the statute
laws of many of the states of the American Union, there are no
such things as pleadings, — in the scientific sense. The defendant is
allowed to set up some kind of a general issue and introduce, under
that traverse, a number of affirmative defences on which, in a more
scientific system of pleading, the burden would be on him. For
example, under a general issue to a declaration charging negligence,
the defendant, it has been held, is entitled to give evidence of
contributory negligence. Indianapolis &c. E. R. v. Horst, 93 U. S.
CHAP, in.j AMERICAJjf NOTES. 276'
291 (1876). Under these circumstances, the burden of proof is said
to be upon the defendant to establish the defence relied upon by a
fair preponderance of the evidence. In other words, he has the
burden of establishing that issue. As a matter of common-law
pleading, the defence of contributory negligence is set up by an
affirmative plea. Stone v. Hunt, 94 Mo. 475 (1887).
It may plausibly be said that in cases like Indianapolis &c. R. E.
V. Horst (ubi supra), the burden of establishing changes, or, as it is
said, shifts. Color is given to this suggestion by the fact that while,
on the record, the affirmative of the issue seems to be upon the
plaintiff, after the affirmative defence of contributory negligence is
set up, the burden of establishing it, by a fair preponderance of the
evidence, is upon the defendant. This seeming exception to the
rule that the burden of establishing does not change, exists in
appearance only. The fact seems to be that the parties are not
really at issue on the allegations of the record, and only become so
when the defendant states his real defence in the evidence. In
other words, the defendant is allowed to raise the issue by his evi-
dence, instead of in his pleading. The real issue in Indianapolis
&c. R. R. V. Horst was one of contributory negligence, and on this
defence the affirmative was on the defendant. Under a scientific
system of pleading, this issue would have been revealed before the
'close of the pleadings, and the burden of establishing definitely
placed upon the defendant. Under the system of pleading in use in
Indianapolis &c. R. R. v. Horst (ubi supra), the defendant was
accorded the privilege of delaying the time at which he should set
up liis real affirmative defence until the record pleadings had closed
and the trial begun. Another instance may be found in McCloskey
V. Davis, 8 Ind. App. 190 (1893), where the court say : " When a
general denial is pleaded, all defences may be proved under the
issues thus formed, except a set-off or counter claim."
(2) Burden of Evidence. — The duty of introducing evidence
to prove or prevent proof of facts in issue is not, like the burden of
establishing,, a resultant of the pleadings. Its position, as between
the parties, is determined, not by the state of the pleadings, but by
the logical state of the case. The issue being fixed, the logical
interest of one^ party is to produce an affirmative conviction on the
part of the tribunal. It is the object of the other party to prevent
it. Such a state of the evidence as would, if undisputed, produce
such affirmative conviction, constitutes a prima facie case. It merely
repeats the statement, therefore, in another form, to say that the
^ interest of one party is to establish such a prima facie case, and of
the other party to destroy it, either by establishing a prima facie case
of his own, or by reducing the probative force of the opposing case
below the required standard. Should this effort succeed, the neces-
sary consequence is that the burden or necessity rests on the first
276^" AMERICAN NOTES. [pAET II.
pleader to introduce additional evidence with a view to strengthening
his former proof into a prima facie ease, either by disproving the
facts alleged against it, or by proving additional facts. If, when
the evidence on both sides is all in, the pleader who has the aifirma-
tive of the issue remains with what the tribunal considers the
equivalent of a prima facie case, he succeeds ; otherwise, not. The
necessity for having the final tip of the scale in his favor has not
changed since the pleadings placed it on him, however many times
the probative scales may have changed in their balance. " When
upon all the facts the case is left in equipoise, the party afBrming
must fail." Oaks v. Harrison, 24 la. 179 (1868).
The Bueden of Evidence Shifts. — It follows from what has
been said that this burden of introducing evidence to prove or dis-
prove a 2}>'ima facie case may, and frequently does, change from one
side to the other.' A fair test of where it rests at any particular
stage of the case is to answer the question : Against whom would the
tribunal decide if no further evidence were introduced ? Applying
this test, it is obvious that at the opening of the case the burden of
establishing and the burden of evidence rest on the same person.
Vriets v. Hagge, 8 Pa. 163, 192 (1859). Upon the establishment by
him of a prima facie case, while the burden of establishing remains,
the burden of evidence is obviously shifted. Powers v. Eussell, 13
Pick. 69, 77 (1832) ; Tolson v. Inland, &c. Coasting Co., 6 Mackey, '
39 (1887) ; Penitentiary Co. v. Gordon, 85 Ga. 159 (1890) ; Ketchum
V. Araer. &c. Exp. Co., 52 Mo. 390 (1873). " The two burdens are
distinct things. One may shift back and forth with the ebb and
flow of the testimony. The other remains with the party upon
whom it is cast by the pleadings, — that is to say, with the party
who has the affirmative of the issue." Scott v. Wood, 81 Cal. 398
(1889.)
"During the progress of a trial it often happens that a party
gives evidence tending to establish his allegation, sufficient it may
be to establish it prima facie, and it is sometimes said that the
burden of proof is then shifted. All that is meant by this is, that
there is a necessity of evidence to answer the prima facie case, or it
will prevail, but the burden of maintaining the affirmative of the
issue involved in the action is upon the party alleging the fact
which constitutes the issue, and this burden remains throughout the
trial." Heinemann v. Heard, 62 N. Y. 448, 455 (1875). The su-
preme court of Texas, after saying that the fact that the negative
form of the issue does not determine the burden of proving, add,
" Much less does the fact that a defendant is forced to maintain the
affirmative of some fact, in disproving the plaintiff's case, shift upon
him the burden of proof." Clark v. Hills, 67 Tex. 141 (1886) ; Small
V. Clewley, 62 Me. 155 (1873) ; Jones v. Simpson, 116 U. S. 609
(1885); Harris v. Harris, 154 Pa. St. 501 (1893).
CHAP. III.] AMERICAN NOTES. 276"
Where a deed ^^rima facie correct was put in evidence by the
plaintiffs in aid of their title, the burden of introducing evidence to
show a forgery is on the defendant. " The appellees having made a
prima facie case of the genuineness of the instrument the burden
of proof was cast upon the intervener to rebut this." Smith v.
Gillum, 80 Tex. 120 (1891). In an action for negligently over-
driving a horse the court say : " A prima facie case was made by
the introduction of evidence tending to prove that the horse, at the
time of the delivery to the defendant, was apparently in good con-
dition. If the evidence had closed at this point, the plaintiff would
have been entitled to recover, provided the jurors were satisfied
from its evidence that the horse was in a healthy condition at the
time of its delivery to defendant. Therefore, at this stage of the
proceeding, the burden of evidence was cast on the defendant to show
by some substantial evidence that he exercised ordinary care in
the use of the animal. When this burden was met, then the final
question for the jury was whether the whole evidence preponderated
in favor of the plaintiff as to the constitutive facts of its cause of
action, i. e., that the defendant was negligent in the use of the horse,
and that such negligence was the proximate cause of its death. The
burden of proving these issues by a preponderance of evidence was
imposed on the plaintiff by the pleadings, and we can conceive of no
principle, recognized in our code of civil procedure, that would re-
lieve the plaintiff of this onus." Marshall Livery Co. v. McKelvy,
55 Mo. App. 240 (1893).
" In every case in which there is prima facie evidence of any
right existing in any person, the burden of proof is always on the
person or party calling such right in question." Walker v. Detroit,
&c. R. R., 47 Mich. 338, 351 (1882).
So where a plaintiff claims an easement by prescription, the
onus of proving the easement claimed is on him. When the
necessary facts are shown, the prima facie case is established. If
the defendant's position be that he was under a disability at the
time of the user claimed to be adverse, the onus of introducing evi-
dence to prove such disability is on the defendant. Davidson v.
Nicholson, 59 Ind. 411 (1877).
So far as proof of particular facts goes, it is undoubtedly true that
the party whose case requires proof of any particular fact is under
the onus of introducing evidence to prove it. Lehman Bros. v.
McQueen, 65 Ala. 570 (1880); Clements v. Moore, 6 Wall, 299, 315
(1867) ; Freeh v. Philadelphia, &c. R. R., 39 Md. 574 (1873).
If such particular fact, however, is involved in the proof of the
affirmative of the issue in the case, it is sufficient for the party
not having the burden of establishing, to create an equipoise or
reasonable doubt, according as the case may be civil or criminal.
As an instance of the ambiguity arising from the use of the term,
27612 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET H.
" burden of proof," to indicate the burden of introducing evidence
to prove particular facts, see Burton v. Blin, 23 Vt. 151 (1851), where
the learned judge (Chief Justice Eedfield) says : " As a general rule,
it is fair to say, that the burden of proof rests upon both parties, to
make out their own part of the case."
Presumptions op Law. — It is said that " presumptions of law
shift the burden of proof." This is not true of the burden of estab-
lishing. It may be quite correct as to the burden of evidence, if the
presumption in question covers a fact in evidence. As to such fact,
there is a levanien probationis in favor of the party having the onus.
A presumption of law is a fact to be proved, rather than evidence
to prove a fact.
As has been said, the burden of evidence is, at first, on the party
who has the burden of establishing, and afterwards on the party who
has to meet an amount of adverse evidence equivalent to a prima
facie case. A presumption of law as to fact covered by it estab-
lishes a prima facie case. That is its precise object and effect. It
follows that the party who is able to prove the existence of a pre-
sumption of law in his favor has, in so doing, made out a prima facie
case as to the fact covered. The burden of disproving it is cast on
the opposing interest. In other words, the burden of evidence is
shifted. When conflicting evidence on the point covered by the
presumption of law is gone into on the initiative of the opposing
interest, the presumption of law is functus officio, as such. The
presumption of fact on which it is founded loses its prima facie value
as a levamen probationis, but retains any probative force.
So in an action on a promissory note, where the defence is lack of
consideration, the court charged that the burden of proof was on the
defendant to prove such lack of consideration. . Held, that this was
erroneous. " In one sense, a burden of proof would be upon the de-
fendant a particular burden, to rebut the prima facie case made by
the production of a genuine note, but the general burden of proof
was upon the plaintiff to show a consideration for the notes, and
that burden does not shift. . . . Here the plaintiff declares, in his
writ, that the notes were given for value. If not so given, they
were not the contracts upon which the defendant could be legally
held. The plaintiff is required to prove this essential allegation.
He can rely on the presumption which arises from the note itself.
But there being other evidence on both sides, which has a bearing
upon the question of consideration, the burden remains upon the
plaintiff upon all the evidence produced, including the note itself
and the presumption that arises from it, to establish what he, in the
declaration in his writ, has necessarily alleged." Small v. Clewley,
62 Me. 155 (1873 ; Atlas Bank v. Doyle, 9 R. I. 76 (1868) ; Manistee
Bank v. Seymour, 64 Mich. 59 (1887) ; Wilcox v. Henderson, 64
Ala. 635 (1879) ; Cofan v. Grand Eapids, &c. Co. 136 N. Y. 655
CHAP. III.] AMEEICAJSr NOTES. 2761^
(1893) ; Kitner v. Whitlock, 88 111. 513 (1878) ; Temple Street
Cable E. R. v. Hellinan, 103 Cal. 634 (1894).
A fair instance of the effect of a presumption of law in shifting
the burden of evidence may be seen in the defence of insanity in
criminal causes. According to the better opinion the burden is on the
government to prove sanity — beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Jones, 60 N. H. 369, 400 (1871) ; People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9
(1868) ; State v. Crawford, 11 Kans. 32 (1873) ; Com. v. Eddy, 7
Gray, 583 (1856).
At the opening of the trial the burden of proving the defendant
guilty rests on the government. The burden of introducing evi-
dence of the facts necessary to sustain that burden of proving, in
other words the establishment of a prima facie case, is also on the
government.
But to make out such a prima facie case, so far as sanity is con-
cerned, the government is not required to produce affirmative evi-
dence as part of its original case. It is a presumption of law that
all men are sane.
If the accused rests his defence on the claim that he is insane, and
there is no other evidence in the case, the burden of evidence is on
him to introduce evidence to that effect. If he is silent, the pre-
sumption of law prevails. It thus has shifted the burden of evi-
dence from the government to the accused. But the burden of
establishing the defendant guilty has not shifted. If the accused
weakens the government's prima facie case by raising a reasona-
ble doubt as to his sanity, the burden of introducing evidence to
strengthen the government's quantum of proof to the equivalent of
a prima facie case now rests on the government, — who may intro-
duce affirmative evidence of sanity. In so doing, while the prima
facie effect of tlxe presumption of law as a levamen probationis is
gone, the government is entitled to the full probative effect of the
presumption of fact that the accused is sane, because men generally
are.
When all the evidence is in on the issue of sanity, the burden of
establishing still continuing to rest on the government, if the accused
has succeeded in preventing the government from establishing the
equivalent of a prima facie case, by raising a reasonable doubt as to
his sanity, he must be acquitted. State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369, 400
(1871) ; People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9 (1868) ; State v. Crawford,
11 Kans. 32 (1873).
Presumptions of law may be established by the legislature pre-
scribing that certain facts shall establish a prima facie case.
Like other presumptions of law, the presumptions so created do
not operate to alter the burden of establishing, but transfer to the
opposite party the onus of introducing evidence to meet the prima
facie case they establish. While the party having the burden of
276" AMERICAN NOTES. [PART II.
establishing is excused from going forward in the first instance when
there is a presumption of law in his favor, he is by no means there-
by excused from the necessity of establishing that fact if disputed.
Com. V. Heath, 11 Gray, 303 (1858).
Thus, v/hen an auditor's report is made prima facie evidence by
statute for the party in whose favor it is. " The auditor's report, it
is true, is only prima facie evidence, and does not change the burden
of proof, but the plaintiff may in the first instance rest his case upon
it, and, if it is attempted to control or impeach it by other evidence
offered by the defendants, may be permitted to put in evidence in
reply, in support of his own case." Brewer v. Housatonic E. E. Co.,
104 Mass. 593 (1870) ; Shepardson v. Perkins, 60 K H. 76 (1880) ;
Blodgett V. Cummings, 60 N. H. 115 (1880). So of the assessment of
value by appraisers appointed under a statute. Railroad v. Crider,
91 Tenn. 489 (1892).
Such prima facie effect may be given to certain evidence, by stat-
ute, not only in civil but in criminal cases.
Thus the law may provide that the act of a physician in prescrib-
ing whiskey is prima facie a violation of the "local option" law.
Com. V. Minor, 88 Ky. 422 (1889).
Right to Open and Close. — This right is rather a rule of
practice and procedure than one involved in the burden of proof.
As a rule, however, the party having the burden of establishing has
the right to open and close. Seavy v. Dearborn, 19 N. H. 351 (1849) ;
Royal Ins. Co. v. Schwing, 87 Ky. 410 (1888) ; Ware v. Ware, 8
Greenleaf, 42 (1831) ; Gaul v. Fleming, 10 Ind. 253 (1858) ; Norris
V. Ins. Co., 3 Yeates, 84 (1800). But while this is so, the right is
largely discretionary with the court, and on a probate of a vrill
where the party not under the burden of establishing was given the
open and close, the court refused a new trial. Comstock v. Hadlyme
Ecclesiastical Society, 8 Conn. 254 (1830).
In Massachusetts, on the contrary, the plaintiff opens and closes,
regardless of who has the burden of establishing a case under the
pleadings. Page v. Osgood, 2 Gray, 260 (1854) ; Hurley v. O'Sulli-
vau, 137 Mass. 86 (1884). The rule is the same in equity cases.
Dorr V. Tremont Bank, 128 Mass. 349 (1880).
In probate trials, in Massachusetts, the executor propounding the
will opens and closes without regard to the burden of proof. Dorr
V. Tremont {ubi supra) ; Crowninshield v. Crowninshield, 2 Graj-,
524 (1854). The rule is essentially one of procedure. For a short
period the right to open and close could be acquired by the defend-
ant under a rule of court. Spaulding v. Hood, 8 Cush. 602 (1851) ;
Emmons v. Hayward, 11 Cush. 48 (1853).
CHAP. IV.] BEST EVIDENCE MUST BE PRODUCED.
CHAPTEE ly.
BEST EVIDENCE.
§ 391.' The foiirth of the rules which have been laid down ^ a8
governing the production of evidence is, that the best evidence, of
which the case in its nature is susceptible, should always be presented
to the jury. This rule does not demand that the greatest amount
of evidence which can possibly be given of any fact should be
offered ; it is designed to prevent the introduction of such evidence
as, from the nature of the case, allows room for supposing' that
better evidence is in the possession of the party, and to prevent fraud.
For when better evidence than that which is offered is withheld, it
is only fair to presume, that the party has some sinister motive
for not producing it, which would be frustrated if it were offered.*
The rule is thus essential to the pure administration of justice. In
requiring the production of the best evidence applicable to each
particular fact, it is meant that no evidence shall be received which
is merely substitutionary in its nature, so long as the original
evidence is attainable.* For instance, depositions are in general
admissible only after proof that the parties who made them cannot
themselves be produced ; ' and a preliminary agreement, which has
been followed up by the execution of a deed of conveyance, cannot
be admitted as evidence to show what parcels were subsequently
conveyed." For the contents of every deed must be proved by the
production of the deed itself, if such deed be within the control of
1 ar. Ev. § 82, in part. * 1 Phil. Ev. 418 ; 1 St. Ev. 500 ;
2 Ante, § 217. Glassf. Ev. 266—278 ; Tayloe v. Eiggs,
= See Strother v. Barr, 1828 (Best, 1828 (Am.); U. S. v. Eeyburn, 1832
O.J.); Brewster v. Sewell, 1820 (Hoi- (Am.); Minor i;. TiUotson, 1833(Am.).
royd, J.) ; Twyman v. Knowles, 1853 « B. N. P. 239.
fjervis, O.J.); Clifton v. U. 8., 1846 » Williams v. Morgan, 1850,
(Am.) (Nelson, J.).
277
BEST EVIDENCE MUST BE PRODUCED. [PART II.
tlie party. For every deed is the best evidence of its own contents,
and its non-production raises a presumption that it contains some
matter of defeasance. On the same principle, if there be duplicate
originals of a deed, all must be accounted for, before secondary
evidence can be given of any one.^
§ 392. Similarly, an instrument, requiring attestation to its
validity,^ must in general be proved by calling a subscribing
"witness;^ and if there be two such witnesses, it will not be sufficient
BO long as one of them is alive, sane, free from permanent sickness,
within the jurisdiction of the court, and capable of being found by
diligent inquiry, to prove the signature of the other who is dead ;
for such evidence would merely raise a presumption that the deceased
had witnessed all which the law requires for the due execution of
the instrument ; whereas the surviving witness would have been
able to give direct proof. Such direct testimony is evidence of a
better and higher nature than mere presumption arising from the
proof of the witness's handwriting.*
§ 393. The rule under discussion only excludes evidence which
itself indicates the existence of more original sources of information.
Therefore, when there is no substitution of inferior evidence, but
only a selection of weaker, instead of stronger, proofs, or an
omission to supply all the proofs capable of being produced, the
rule is not infringed.* For instance, in proof or disproof of hand-
writing, or in proof of the contents of a letter which cannot be
produced, it is not necessary to call the supposed writer ; ^ where it
is necessary to prove negatively that an act was done without the
consent, or against the will, of another, the person whose will or
consent is denied, need not be himself called,' and where an
instrument is required to be attested by two witnesses, it is only
necessary, — excepting in the case of wills relating to real estate, —
to call one of them, though the other may be at hand.* Even the
> Alivon V. Fumival, 1834 (Parke, U. S., 1843 (Am.).
B.). ° B- ■y- Hurlejr, 1843 ; Hughes'
'^ As to proving execution of doou- case, 1802 ; M'Gruire's case, 1801 ; E.
ments not requiring attestation, see ?). Benson, 1810; Liebman i;. Pooley,
28 & 29 V. c. 18, § 7. 1816; Bank Prosecutions, 1819.
3 Bowman v. Hodgson, 1867. ' 'B,..v. Hazy, 1826 ; E. v. Alien,
* Wright V. Doe d. Tatham, 1834 1826 ; E. v. Huriey, 1843.
(Tindal, O.J.). « Andrew v. Motley, 1862 ; Belbin
» 1 Ph. Ev. 418. See Alfonso v. v. Skeats, 1857 ; Forster v. Forster,
278
CHAP. IV.] PEIMAKY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
previous deposition of a deceased subscribing witness, if admissible
on other grounds, may supersede the necessity of calling the
survivor.'
§ 394.^ The rule that in each case the best attainable evidence is
required to be given naturally suggests that all evidence is divided
into PRIMARY and secondary. Primary evidence is the best or
highest evidence, or, in other words, that kind of proof which,
in the eye of the law, affords the greatest certainty of the fact in
question. Until it is shown that the production of this evidence is
out of the party's power, no other proof of the fact is in general
admitted. AH evidence falling short of this in its degree, and
suggesting on the face of it that other . and better evidence is
attainable, is termed secondary. The question whether evidence is
primary or secondary has reference to the nature of the case in the
abstract, and not to the peculiar circumstances under which the
party, in the particular cause on trial, may be placed. It is a dis-
tinction of law, and not of fact ; referring only to the quality, and
not to the strength of the proof. Evidence, which carries on its
face no indication that better remains behind, is not secondary, but
primary.
§ 395.' But though all information must, if possible, be traced
to its fountain head, yet if there be several distinct sources of
information of the same fact, it is not in general necessary to show
that they have all been exhausted, before recourse can be had to
secondary evidence with respect to one of ' them.* For instance, if
it be requisite to prove that a collector has received certain sums of
money, primary evidence of that fact is the evidence of the col-
lector himself if he be alive, or else the evidence of the parties who
paid him, while (if the collector be dead) secondary evidence — such
as entries in his book acknowledging the receipt, or if the book
itself be in the hands of the opposite party, who, after notice,
refuses to produce it, even secondary evidence of its contents — is
also admissible.'
1863; Ansteyu. Dowsing, 1745, 1746; U. S. v. Gibert, 1834 (Am.).
Gr. Ev. 120, 122, 123. » Middleton v. Melton, 1829 (Bay-
1 bright V. Doe d. Tatham, 1834. ley and Parke, JJ.); Barry v. Beb-
* Gr. Ev. § 84, in part. bington, 1792. The distinction be-
' Gt. Ev. § 84, as to first four lines. tween tMs case and that of the two
* Cutbush V. Gilbert, 1818 (Am.) ; subscribing witnesses to an instru-
279
DOCUMENTS NOT PROVABLE BY PAROL. [pART II.
§ 396.' The cases whicli most frequently call for the application
of the rule that the best evidence of which the case is susceptible
must always be produced, are those which relate to the substitution
of oral for written evidence. The efPect of the rule on these cases is
to render it necessary that the contents of a written instrument,
which is capable of being produced, be proved by the instrument itself,
and not by parol evidence? Lord ' Tenterden said : " I have always
acted most strictly on the rule, that what is in writing shall only
be proved by the writing itself. My experience has taught me the
extreme danger of relying on the recollection of witnesses, however
honest, as to the contents of written instruments ; they may be so
easily mistaken, that I think the purposes of justice require the
strict enforcement of the rule."* Lord Wynford observed: "I
seldom pass a day in a Nisi Prius Court without wishing that there
had been some written statement evidentiary of the matters in
dispute. More actions have arisen, perhaps, from want of attention
and observation at the time of a transaction, from the imperfection
of human memory, and from witnesses being too ignorant, and too
much under the influence of prejudice, to give a true account of it,
than from any other cause. There is often a great difficulty in
getting at the truth by means of parol testimony. Our ancestors
were wise in making it a rule, that in all cases the best evidence
that could be had should be produced ; and great writers on the
law of evidence say, if the best evidence be kept back, it raises a
suspicion that, if produced, it would falsify the secondary evidence
on which the party has rested his case. The first case these writers
refer to as being governed by this rule is, that where there is
a contract in writing, no parol testimony can be received of its
contents, unless the instrument be proved to have been lost." ^ An
additional but important reason for the application of the rule
ment, where, as we have seen (ante, mony they wish to rely, and, conse-
§ 392) proof must be given that both qu&itly, so long as one of them can
the witnesses are unable to be called, be called, secondary evidence respect-
before evidence of the handwriting ing the other cannot be admitted,
of one of them can be received,— ' Gr. Ev. § 85, as to first three
seems to be, that the attesting wit- lines.
nesses are either rendered necessary ^ The Queen's case, 1820, H. L.
by statute, or at least have been ' Gr. Ev. § 88, in part,
solemnly chosen by the parties, as ' Vincent v. Cole, 1828.
the persons on whose united tosti- ^ Strother v. Barr, 1828.
280
CH. IV.] WANT OF PEOPEE STAMP, HOW CUEED AT TEIAL.
in the manner pointed out is, that the ooiirt may acquire a know-
ledge of the whole contents of the instrument, which may have a
very different effect from the statement of a part.'
§ 397. The rule requiring every written document to be proved
hy production of the document itself in civil courts ^ often indi-
rectly inflicts grave injustice^ in consequence of the stamp laws.
For, as a general rule, a document which is inadmissible for want
of a stamp' to prove the fact it prima facie shows is also inad-
missible for any purpose whatever,* even a collateral purpose — so
that, for example, an insufficiently stamped promissory note cannot
be used as evidence of the receipt of money by the maker of such
note.* An exception to this rule indeed prevails when it is only
sought to use a document to refresh the memory." And, moreover,
the judges, some years ago, promulgated a rule (which is, perhaps,
of questionable expediency), that, unless the want or insufficiency of
a stamp be pointed out dt the earliest possible period, that is, as soon
as the document is tendered in evidence, an objection on that ground
wiU not be entertained.' And a further attempt has been made to,
as the Common Law Commissioners express it,* "reconcile the claims
of justice with the interests of the revenue," by enabling all such
instruments as may be stamped after execution to be received in
evidence, though unstamped, or insufficiently stamped, if the party
who tenders them is prepared at the trial to pay to the officer of the
court the proper duty,' the penalty, and a further sum of 1/.'°
1 The Queen's case, 1820, H. L. o. 39, § 14, Eubs. 4; Clarke v. Eoche,
'^ In criminal courts a stamp ob- 1877.
jeotion does not apply at all. " The i" 54 & 55 V. o. 39 (" The Stamp
Stamp Act, 1891" (54 & 55 V. c. 39), Act, 1891"), § 14, subss. 1 and 2,
§ 14, subs. 4. enacts, that "upon the production of
^ See per Ld. Tenterden, in Eeid v. an instrument chargeable with any
Batte, 1829. The law as to stamps duty as evidence in any court of civil
is now contained for the most part in judicature in any part of the United
"The Stamp Act, 1891" (54 & 55 Kingdom, or before any arbitrator or
V. 0. 39). referee, notice shaU be taken by the
* Interleaf Publishing Co. v. Phil- ' judge, arbitrator, or referee of any
lips, 1885. omission or insufficiency of the stamp
* Ashhng V. Boon, 1891. thereon ; and if the instrument is one
° See post, § 1411. which may legally be stamped after
' Eobinsou v. Ld. Vernon, 1859. the execution thereof, it may, on
See ante, § 309. payment to the officer of the court
* 2nd Eep. p. 26. whose duty it is to read the instru-
* A document to be "duly stamped" ment, or to the arbitrator or referee,
must be stamped "in accordance with of the amount of the unpaid duty,
the law in force at the time when it and the penalty payable on stamping
was first executed." 54 & 55 V. the same as aforesaid, and of a further
281
282 ORAL TESTIMONY, WHEN WKITIN6 REQUIRED. [pART II,
rurther, it is provided that instruments executed abroad may
be stamped within thirty days of their being received in the United
Kingdom.' And this provision applies to a charterparty wholly
executed abroad? By E. S. C, 1883, Ord. XXXIX., r. 8, it is
also provided that " a new trial shall not be granted by reason of
the ruling of any judge that the stamp upon any document is
sufficient, or that the document does not require a stamp." This
provision impliedly restrains a judge at Nisi Prius from reserving
for the court any question respecting the sufficiency of a stamp on
a document admitted by him at the trial,' and makes the ruling of
the judge final where a case is tried by him without a jury.* In
the criminal courts, no objection can now be taken to the admis-
sibility of any document in evidence for want of a sufficient stamp.
§ 398. The cases under the rule requiring the contents of a
document to be proved by the document itself, if its production be
possible,^ may be arranged in three classes : the first class contain-
ing those instruments which the law requires to be in writing ;
the second, those contracts which the parties have put in writing ;
and the third, aU other writings material to the issue, the existence
or contents of which are disputed.'
§ 399.* The first class of cases in which oral evidence cannot be
substituted for the writing are those in which there exists any
instrument which the law requires to he in writing. The law having
required that the evidence of the transaction should be in wiiting,
no other proof can be substituted for that so long as the
sum of one pound, be received in ' See now 54 & 5n V. c. 39 ("The
evidence, saving all just exceptions Stamp Act; 1891 "), § 15, subs. (3).
on other grounds. The officer or ' '^ The Belfort, 1884.
arbitrator or referee receiving the ' Siordet i>. Kuczinski, 1855; Tat-
duty and penalty shall give a receipt tersall v. Fearnley, 1856 ; Cory v.
for the same, and make an entry in Davis, 1863.
a book kept for that purpose of the * Blewitt v. Tritton, 1892 (0. A.).
payment and of the amount thereof, ' 54 & 55 V. c. 39 (" The Stamp
and shall communicate to the com- Act, 1891 "), § 14, subs. (4).
missioners the name or title of the ' Gr. Ev. § 85, in part.
proceeding in which, and of the party ' The question how far witnesses
from whom, he received the said duty may be cross-examined as to written
and penalty, and the date and de- statements made by them without
scription of the instrument, and shall producing the writings, will be dis-
pay over to such person as the com- cussed hereafter. See post, §§ 1446,
missioners may appoint, the money et seq.
received by him for the said duty and " Gr. Ev. § 66, as to first six hnea.
penalty."
282
CHAP. IV.] DEAL TESTIMONY, WHEN INADMISSIBLE.
writing exists, and is in the power of the party. Accordingly,
parol evidence is inadmissible to prove records, public and judicial
documents, official informations' or examinations, deeds of con-
veyance of lands, wills, other than nuncupative, acknowledgments
under Lord Tenterden's Act, promises to pay the debt of another
person, and other writings mentioned in the Statute of Frauds ;
or to show at what sittings or assizes a trial at Nisi Prius came
on,' or even that it took place at all, the only proper evidence of
this being the record, or at least the record with a minute of the
verdict indorsed on it,' nor to prove the date of a party's appre-
hension for a particular offence, as the warrant for apprehension or
committal is superior evidence ; * as it also is to prove the testimony
of a witness when it is required by law that it should be reduced
into writing, — as, for instance, when it is taken by depositions,
either before an Examiner of the Court, or before a magistrate on
an indictable charge, — since the writing is in all subsequent pro-
ceedings, whether civil or criminal, the best evidence of what the
witness has stated ; ' and so it also is as to the statement of a
prisoner before the magistrate upon an examination reduced into
writing, and subscribed, and returned by the justice,* in conformity
with the Indictable Offences Act, 1848,' in England, or the cor-
responding Act in Ireland.
§ 400. Parol evidence of what was said by a prisoner before a
magistrate is however admissible if the written examination be
excluded for informality,* — other than for having been a confession
taken on oath, and therefore not voluntary,' — or if it be clearly
^ E. V. DiUon, 18Y7'. the same day, and tlie majority of
" Thomas v. Ansley, 1807 (Ld. the Irish Oourt of Criminal Appeal
Ellenborough) ; E. v. Page, 1807 sanctioned his action. The refine-
(Ld. Kenyon) ; as explained in Whit- ment by which it was supported was
aker v. Wisbey, 1852, cited ante, § 85. that for all that appeared the witness
' Olive V. Grwin, 1658 ; E. v. was speaking of a separate sworn in-
Browne, 1829. formation which had not been re-
* E. V. Phillips, 1818. duced into writing.
» Leach v. Simpson, 1839, post, * E. v. Fearshire, 1779 ; E. v.
§ 416. But in E. v. OoU, 1889 (Ir.), Jacobs, 1784. See post, § 893 et seq.
the judge at the trial, having rejected ' 11 & 12 V. c. 42; 14 & 15 V.
a deposition which he ought to have o. 93, Jr.
received, appears to have afterwards * E. v. Eeed, 1829 (Tindal, C.J.);
set the matter right by the reception E. v. Christopher, 1849, post, § 416.
of oral evidence from a witness of ' E. v. Wheeley, 1838 (Alderson,
what he said he had also sworn on B.) ; E. v. Eivers, 1835 (Park, J.),
283
ORAL TESTIMONY, WHEN CONTEACT IN WRITING. [PT. II.
proved ' that the statement was not reduced into writing. So it
may also, if the prisoner was examined on two occasions, or with
reference to two offences, and the examination, signed by the
magistrates, relates only to what occurred on one occasion,^ or with
respect to one offence,^ as to statements made by the prisoner in
that part of the inquiry not included in the written examination.
In like manner, if a witness, having given a written deposition
in a cause, has afterwards testified orally in court, parol evidence
may, in the event of his death, be given of his viva voce testimony,
notwithstanding the existence of the deposition ; * for, in this last
case, as two independent sources of information exist, the party
who relies on the evidence may, at his discretion, have recourse to
either. In all these cases the parol evidence is ofPered, not in
substitution for that of the ofiicial document, since no such docu-
ment exists, but as the best evidence which the circumstances
admit of.
§ 401.* The second class of cases ' falling within the rule requiring
the contents of a document to be proved by the docimient itself
if its production be possible consists of those in which the parties
have of themselves chosen to put their contract into writing. Here
also oral proof cannot be substituted for the written evidence. The
written instrument may indeed be regarded, in some measure, as
the ultimate fact to be proved, especially in the case of negotiable
securities ; and has tacitly been treated by the parties themselves
as the only repository and the appropriate evidence of their agree-
ment. The written contract is not collateral, but is of the very
essence of the transaction ; ' and consequently, in all proceedings,
' But in Parsons v. Brown, 1852, • See supra, § 398.
Jervis, O.J., held that the Court ' See R. v. Castle Morton, 1820
could not, in the absence of positive (Abbott, C. J.). Domat thus explains
evidence, let in parol evidence by the principles on which a document
presuming that examinations before is deemed part of the essence of any
justices on a charge of felony were transaction, and consequently the
not taken down in writing; but see best or primary proof of it: — "The
E. V. Coll (Ir.), cited ante, § 399, n. °. force of written proof consists in
'^ E. V. Wilkinson, 1838 (Parke, B., this : men agree to preserve by
andLittledale, J.); E.D. Christopher, writing the remembrance of past
1849. See also E. v. Coll (Ir.), supra. events, of which they wish to create
' E. V. Harris, 1832. a memorial, either with a view of
* Tod V. E. of Winchelsea, 1828 laying down a rule for their own
(Ld. Tenterden). guidance, or in order to have, in the
^ Gr. Ev. § 87, in part. instrument, a lasting proof of the
284
CHAP. IV.] ORAL TESTIMONY, WHEN LEASE EXISTS.
civil or criminal, in which the issue depends in any degree upon
the terms of a contract, the paxty whose witnesses show that it was
reduced to writing, must either produce the instrument, or give
some good reason for not doing so. Thus, for example, if in an
action to recover land against a tenant holding over, or in an
action for the use and occupation of real estate, it should appear,
either on the direct or cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses,
that a written contract of tenancy has been signed, plaintiff must
either produce it, or account for its absence ; ' and in an action by
landlord against tenant for rent and non-repair, if it should appear
that the parties had agreed by parol that the tenant should hold
the premises on the terms contained in a former lease between the
landlord and a stranger, a nonsuit would be directed, unless this
lease could be produced.^
§ 402. The same strictness prevails where the question at issue
is simply what amount of rent was reserved by the landlord,' or
who was the actual party to whom a demise had been made,* or
under whom the tenant came into possession.^ It has also several
times been held that, in an action for extra work done beyond the
contract, if it appeared that the work was commenced under an
agreement in writing, in the absence of positive proof that the
work in question was entirely separate from that included in the
agreement, and was in fact done under a distinct order, the
plaintiff is bound to produce the original document, since it may
truth, of what is written. Thus con- parties by their own testimony. The
tracts are written, in order to preserve truth of written acts is established
the memorial of what the contracting by the acts themselves, that is, by
parties have prescribed for each other the inspection of the originals " :
to do, and to make for themselves a Domat's Oiv. Law, Liv. 3, tit. 6, § 2.
fixed and immutable law, as to what ' Brewer v. Palmer, 1800 (Ld.
has been agreed on. So, testaments Eldon) ; Penn v. Griffith, 1830 ;
are written, in order to preserve the Henry i). M. of Westmeath, 1843 (Ir.)
remembrance of what the party, who (Richards, B.) ; Thunder v. "Warren,
has a right to dispose of his property, 1845 (Ir.) ; Eudge v. M'Carthy, 1841
has ordained concerning it, and (Ir-)-
thereby to lay down a rule for the ' Turner v. Power, 1828.
guidance of his heir and legatees. ^ E. v. Merthyr Tidvil, 1830 ; Au-
On the same principle are reduced gustien v. Ohallis, 1847, where Alder-
into writing all sentences, judgments, son, B., observes, "you may prove
edicts, ordinances and other matters, by parol the relation of landlord and
which either confer title, or have the tenant, but without the lease you
force of law. The writing preserves cannottellwhetheranyrentwasdue."
unchanged the matters intrusted to * E. v. Eawden, 1828.
it, and expresses the intention of the ' Doe v. Harvey, 1832.
286
OEAL TESTIMONY IN CLAIM FOR EXTRA WORK. [PT. II.
furnish evidence, not only that the items sought to be recovered
were not included therein, but also of the rate of remuneration
upon which the parties had agreed.' On like principles, where an
auctioneer delivered to a bidder, to whom lands were let by
auction, a written paper signed ly himself, containing the terms of
the lease, in an action for use and occupation, the landlord was
held bound to produce this paper duly stamped as a memorandum
of an agreement.^
§ 403. Similarly, where' the plaintiff had been employed as
secretary to the committee of a charitable society, pursuant to a
resolution entered in the book of the committee, of which, having
accepted the situation and entered upon its duties, the plaintiff
during his service had the care, and on the society being afterwards
dissolved sued some of the members of the committee of the society
for his salary, it was held that he was bound to produce the book
under which he was engaged. It is doubtful whether, in an action
for an injury done to the plaintiff's reversion, his interest as
reversioner may be proved by the parol testimony of the tenant,
when it appears that the premises are occupied under a written
agreement.*
§ 404. On principle, in cases of this kind, the fact that the
vsriting is in the possession of the adverse party does not change
its character ; it is still the primary evidence of the contract ; and
its absence must be accounted for by notice to the other party to
produce it, or in some other legal mode, before secondary evidence
of its contents can be received. But in all such cases, if the
plaintifE can establish a prima facie case, without betraying the
existence of a vwitten contract relating to the subject-matter of
the action, he will not be precluded from recovering by the defen-
dant subsequently giving evidence that the agreement was reduced
1 Vincent v. Cole, 1828 (Ld. Ten- v. Warre, 1825, where Abbott, C.J.,
terden) ; Buxton v. Cornish, 1844 ; draws the distinction between papers
Jones V. Howell, 1835; Holbard v. signed by the parties or their agents,
Stephens, 1841 (Williams, J.); Parton and those which are unsigned.
V. Cole, 1842 (Patteson, J.). See » Whitford v. Tutin, 1834.
Eeid V. Batte, 1829, cited post, § 405 ; * Cotterill v. Hobby, 1825, holding
and Edie v. Kingsford, 1854. that the agreement must be produced
^ Eamsbottom v. Mortley, 1814. (which seems correct), and in Strother
See Eamsbottom v. Tunbridge, 1814, v. Barr, 1828, where the judges were,
cited post, § 406. See, also, Hawkins equally divided,
286
CHAP. IV.] OEAL TESTIMONY, WHEN ADMISSIBLE.
into viT?iting ; but the defendant, if lie means to rely on a written
contract, must produce it as part of his evidence,' and in the event
of its turning out to be unstamped, or insufficiently stamped, he
must pay the duty and penalty^ — and this even though a notice to
produce the document has been served^ on the plaintiff.^ It has
even been held in an action of ejectment that the plaintiff cannot
be forced to produce a written agreement merely because one of
bis witnesses proved, on cross-examination, that an agreement,
which he only knew related in some way to the land in question, was
seen on that morning in the hands of the plaintiil's solicitor, and
was produced at a former trial between the same parties, since, to
exclude parol evidence of the tenancy, it should appear (which
it did not) that the agreement was between the same parties, and
was binding at the time of the second trial.*
§ 405.° Moreover, a written communication or agreement between
the parties which is collateral to the question in issue, need not
be produced. For example, plaintiff can recover without pro-
ducing the original written agreement, if during an employment
under a written bontract a verbal order is given for separate work,
if he can show distinctly that the items, for which he seeks remu-
neration, were not included therein ; as, for instance, that whilst
certain work was in progress in the inside of a house under a
written agreement, a verbal order was given to execute some
alterations or improvements on the outside.^ So, also, the fact of
the existence of a particular relationship may be shown by parol
evidence, though the terms which govern such relationship appear
to be in writing.' Thus, if the fact of the occupation of land is
alone in issue, without respect to the terms of the tenancy, this
fact may be proved by any competent parol evidence, such as pay-
ment of rent, or the testimony of a witness, who has seen the
tenant occupy, notwithstanding it appears that the occupancy was
» Magnay v. Enight, 1840 ; Ste- " Gr. Ev. § 89, in part,
phens V. Pinney, 1818; Marston v. ' Eeid v. I3atte, 1829 (Ld. Tenter-
Dean, 1835; Pry v. Chapman, 1836; den); commented on by Patteson, J.,
E. V. Padstow, 1832; Eeed v. Deere, in Parton v. Cole, 1842. See Vincent
1827. V. Cole, 1828, and cases cited ante,
8 Ante, § 397. _ § 402, n. \.
3 See cases cited in n. ', supra. ' See dictum of Alderson, B., and
* Doe V, Morris, 1810. other cases cited in next note.
287
COLLATERAL WRITINGS NEED NOT BE PEODUCED. [PT. II.
under an agreement in writing ;^ where a tenant holds lands under
written rules, hut the length of his term has heen agreed orally,
these rules need not be produced in an action of trespass where the
defendant denies the tenant's possession, hecause it is only necessary
to prove the extent of the tenant's term, which, having heen
agreed to by parol, does not depend upon the written rules ; ^ the fact
of partnership may be proved by parol evidence of the acts of the
parties, without producing the deed;' and the fact that a party
has agreed to sell goods on commission may be established by oral
testimony, though the terms respecting the payment of the com-
mission have been reduced into writing.^
§ 406. Parol evidence will be admissible when the writing only
amounted either to mere unaccepted proposals, or to minutes
capable of conveying no definite information to the court or jury,
and could not, by any sensible rule of interpretation, be construed
as memoranda, which the parties themselves intended to operate as
fit evidence of their several agreements. Thus, it has been admitted
where, at the time of letting premises to the defendant, the plaintiff
had read the terms from pencil minutes, and the defendant had
acquiesced in these terms, but had not signed the minutes ; ^ where,
upon a like occasion, a memorandum of agreement had been drawn
up by the landlord's bailifE, the terms of which were read over, and
assented to, by the tenant, who agreed to bring a surety and sign
the agreement on a future day, but omitted to do so ; ^ where, in
order to avoid mistakes, the terms upon which a house was let
were, at the time of letting, reduced to writing by the lessor's agent,
and in his absence signed by the lessee's wife, in order to bind him,
and the lessee himself afterwards entered upon and occupied the
premises but did not otherwise appear to have constituted the wife
1 E. V. Holy Trinity, HuU, 1827; * Whitfield i;. Brand, 1847.
Doe V. Harvey, 1832 ; Spiers v. WiHi- ' Trewhitt v. Lambert, 1839. See
son, 1808 (Am.); Dennett v. Crocker, Drant i;. Brown, 1825; and Bethell
1832 (Am.) See, however, the obser- v. Blencowe, 1841, where it was held
vations of Best, O.J., on E. v. Holy that written proposals, made pend-
Trinity, in Strother v. Barr, 1828; ing a negotiation for a tenancy, might
see, also, Twynam V. Knowles, 1853; be admitted without a stamp, as
Augustien v. Challis, 1847 (Alderson, proving one step in the evidence of
B.), cited ante, § 402. the contract.
" Hey V. Moorhouse, 1839. « Doe v. Oartwright, 1820. See
8 Alderson v. Clay, 1816 (Ld. Hawkins v. Waire, 1825.
Ellenborough).
288
CHAP. IV.] WHEN PAROL EVIDENCE NOT EXCLUDED.
as his agent, or to have recognized her act ; ' where lands were
let hy auction, and a written paper was delivered to the bidder by
the auctioneer, containing the terms of the letting, but was never
signed either by the auctioneer or by the parties ; ^ and where, on
the occasion of hiring a servant, the master and servant went to the
chief constable's clerk, who in their presence, and by their direction,
took down in writing the terms of the hiring, but neither party
signed the paper, nor did it appear to have been read to them.^
§ 407. Where, too, an action is not directly upon an agreement
and for non-performance of its terms, but is in tort, for the
conversion, or detention, or negligent loss of the writing containing
such agreement, plaintiff may give parol evidence, descriptive of its
identity, without giving notice to the defendant to produce the
document itself.* Moreover, even though the defendant be willing
to produce such document without notice, the plaintiff is not bound
to put it in, but may leave his adversary to do so, if he think fit, as
part of his own case.* For, as has been observed, for the purpose
of identification, no distinction can be drawn between written
instruments and other articles ; between trover for a promissory
note, and trover for a waggon and horses.'
§ 408. A similar rule prevails in criminal eases. For example, if
a person be indicted for stealing a bill or other written instrument,
its identity may be proved by parol evidence, though no notice to
produce it has been served on the prisoner or his agent.' On an
indictment for forgery, however, if the forged instrument be in the
hands of the prisoner, the prosecutor must serve him or his solicitor
with a notice to produce it, before he can offer secondary evidence
of its contents.*
' E. V. St. Martin's, Leicester, 1816 (Am.); M'Lean v. Hertzog,
1834. _ 1820 (Am.). These cases overrule
' Eamsbottom v. Ttmbridge, 1814. Oowaii v. Abrahams, 1793.
See Eamsbottom v. Mortley, 1814, " Whitehead v. Scott, 1830 (Ld.
cited ante, § 402. Tenterden).
3 E. V. Wrangle, 1835. See, for « JoUey v. Taylor, 1807 (Sir J.
other instances, Ingram v. Lea, 1810 ; Mansfield).
Dalison v. Stark, 1803 ; Wilson v. ' E. v. AicUes, 1784.
Bowie, 1823. s jj. v. Haworth, 1830 (Parke, J.);
* Scott V. Jones, 1813 ; How v. E. v. Fitzsimons, 1869 (Ir.). Several
Hall, 1811; Bucher ?;. Jarratt, 1802; grounds for this difierence between
Eead v. Gamble, 1839; Eoss?). Bruce, larceny and forgery may be suggested.
1803 (Am.) ; The People v. Holbrook, One is, that under the old law (see
VOL. I.
;a89
WHEN PAEOL EVIDENCE EXCLUDED BY WRITINGS. [P. II.
§ 409.' The third class of cases ^ falling within the rule that a
written document can only he proved by the instrument itself,
embraces every writing not falling within the two classes already
discussed, as to the existence or contents of which there is a dispute,
and which is material to the issue between the parties, and which is
not a mere memorandum of some other fact. Thus, to take some
common examples, newspapers and account-books are the best
evidence of their own contents, and therefore a witness cannot be
asked whether certain resolutions were published in the newspapers ; '
neither can he be questioned as to the contents of his account-books.*
The primary proof of the publication of an opera is the production
of the priated music, and consequently the fact of publication
cannot be proved in the first instance by a witness who has merely
seen the opera in print, or heard parts of it played in society.* The
fact of a person being rated to the relief of the poor can only be
legally proved by the rate-book itself," or at least a certified or
examined copy from it,' and it therefore cannot be shown by the
collector stating that such person's name was on the rate ; ' neither
can a plaintiff be asked on cross-examination whether his name is
written in a certain book described by the questioner, unless a
satisfactory reason be first given for the non-production of the book
now 24 & 25 V. c. 98 (" The Forgery larceny, it is highly improbable that
Act, 1861 "), § 42, cited ante, § 291), anything material mil turn either
it was always sufficient, on charges upon the contents of, or a minute
of larceny, to both in the indict- description of, the instrument itself,
ment and the proof describe a stolen whereas on a charge of forgery the
instrument in very general terms, exact opposite is the case, and an
whereas, in the case of forgery, examination of the instrument itself
the prosecutor was often required to may very probably prove of the
enter into a minute description of the highest importance.
document alleged to have been forged ' Gr. Ev. § 88, in part.
(Butcher v. Jarratt, 1802 (Cham- « gee supra, § 398.
ore, J.)). A second is, that a per- ' E. v. O'Connell, 1843-4 (Ir.).
son charged with stealing an instru- * See post, § 462.
ment must know, from the very ^ Boosey v. Davidson, 1849. But
nature of the accusation, that he will see Geralopulo v. Wieler, 1851 ( Jervis,
be called upon to produce it, while C.J.).
an indictment for forgery furnishes ^ B. v. Coppull, 1801, recognised
no such intimation; and it will be (Patteson, J.) in E. v. Staple Pitz-
presently seen, when the rules which paine (1842). See " The Poor Eate
regulate the serving of notices to Assessment and Collection Act, 1869,"
produce are discussed (post, § 452), 32 & 33 V. c. 41, § 18, cited ante,
that this is a material distinction. § 147a.
A third (and very substantial) one ' Justice v. Elstob, 1868.
is that, where the charge is one of
290
C. IV.] PAROL ADMISSIONS SUBSTITUTED FOE WRITINGS.
itself.' Having regard to these principles, it is very doubtful
whether the contents of handbills written or dictated at a meeting
of conspirators can be proved by oral testimony.^
§ 410 — 11. When it is stated that oral testimony cannot be sub-
stituted for any writing included in either of the three classes above
mentioned, a tacit exception must, perhaps, be made in favour of
the parol admissions of a party, and of his acts amounting to admis-
sions. A party's admissions, and acts amcnmting to admissions, are
primary proof against himself and those claiming under him, even
where they relate to the contents of a deed or other instrument,
which are directly in issue in the cause.^ It is said that the reason
why such statements or acts are admissible, without notice to
produce, or accounting for the absence of the written instrument,
is, that they are not open to the same objection which belongs to
parol evidence from other sources, where the written evidence
might have been produced ; for such evidence is excluded from the
presumption of its untruth, arising from the very nature of the
case, where better evidence is withheld ; whereas, what a party
himself admits to be true, may reasonably be presumed to be so.*
' DarT3y v. Ouseley, 1856. ment to whicli it refers, because tie
* E. V. Thistlewood, 1820. See simple question in such, case will be,
post, § 417. is the admission true ? and the
' Earlew.Picken, 1833 (Parte, B.); rational presumption is, that a man
Ne-whaU v. Holt, 1840 (id.) ; Slatterie will not teU a falsehood, which is
V. Pooley, 1840 ; BetheD. v. Blencowe, against his own interest. But when
1841 ; Howard v. Smith, 1841 ; E. ■;;. a witness is called to say that he has
Welch, 1846; King v. Cole, 1848; heard the opposite party make a
E. V. Basingstoke, 1851 ; Boulter v. certaiu statement with respect to the
Peplow, 1850. These cases overriile contents of a written instrument,
Lord Tenterden's decision in Bloxam the further question arises, was this
V. Elsie, 1825. See Pox v. Waters, statement really made ? and to per-
1814. mit such parol evidence to be equally
* Slatterie v. Pooley, 1840 (Parke, admissible, in proof of the contents
B.). Although the admission of a of the instrument, with the pro-
party may fairly be presumed to be duction of the instrument itself, is to
true, the parol evidence by which open a vast field for misapprehension,
that admission is proved need by no perjury, and fraud, which would be
means be so ; and, indeed, such wholly closed, if the salutary rule of
testimony is open to even greater law, requiring that what is in writ-
objection than applies to the ordinary ing should be proved by the writing
case, where secondary evidence is itself, were here, as in other cases,
produced, and the best evidence is to prevail. Lord Tenterden and Mr.
withheld. When the admission is Justice Maule have emphatically ex-
made in Court, it may very reason- pressed opinions in support of the
ably be allowed to render needless view here suggested (see Bloxam v.
the production of the written iustru- Elsie, 1825 ; Boulter v. Peplow,
291 tj2
PAROL ADMISSIONS — CONFESSIO JURIS. [PART II.
§ 412. Since some observations in the last footnote dealing witli
the ahove reasons were written, the judges in Ireland ^ have declared
their disapproval of the principles which such reasons emhody. " The
doctrine that parol admissions can prove the contents of written
documents is," said Pennefather, 0. J., " a most dangerous propo-
sition ; by it a man might be deprived of an estate of 10,000^. per
annum derived from his ancestors through regular family deeds
and conveyances, by producing a witness, or by one or two con-
spirators, who might be got to swear that they heard the defendant
say he had conveyed away his interest therein by deed, or had
mortgaged, or had otherwise encumbered it ; and thus, by the
facility so given, the widest door would be opened to fraud, and a
man might be stripped of his estate through this invitation to fraud
and dishonesty."
§ 413. In any case it is doubtful whether (even assuming it
to be established) the doctrine allowing admissions by parol to
sufficiently prove a written document extends to records, as well as
to deeds and ordinary writings, and whether it would embrace the
case of a confessio Juris, as well as that of a con/essio facti. On the
one hand, the admission of a party that he had been discharged
under the Insolvent Debtors Act, was held insufficient evidence of
a valid discharge, because the judicial document, on being pro-
duced, might be found irregular and void, and the party might be
1850); wliile Parke, B., himself has -wliilst what A. states, respecting a
declared that the parol evidence of document which he himself has seen,
admissions may, in some cases, he is not admissible, — although in the
quite unsatisfactory to a jury (Slat- latter case, the chance of error is
terie v. Pooley, 1840), and that too single, in the former, double."
great weight ought never to be ^ Lawless?'. Queale, 1845 (Ir.). The
attached to such evidence, since it case which called forth the remarks
frequently happens that the witness cited above was an action for use
not only has misunderstood what the and occupation. At the trial, one
party has said, but, by unintention- of the plaintiff's witnesses, after
ally altering a few of the expressions proving the occupation of the pre-
really used, has given to the state- mises by the defendant, acknow-
ment an effect completely at variance ledged in cross-examination the
with what was intended. See note existence of a written agreement ;
to Earle v. Picken, 1833. Moreover, and the Court held, that this agree-
as the reporter observes in the re- ment must be produced, though the
port of Boulton v. Peplow (1850), 9 defendant had admitted that he was
0. B. 501, n. c, " according to Slat- tenant at a particular rent. See,
terie v. Pooley, what A. states also, Ld. Gosford v. Eobb, 1845 ;
as 'to what B., a party, has said re- Parsons v. Purcell, 1849; and Hen-
specting the contents of a dooiunent man v. Lester, 1862 (Byles, J.),
which B. has seen, is admissible,
292
CHAP. IV.] ORAL EVIDENCE, WHEN ADMISSIBLE,
mistaken.' On the other hand, on an indictment for bigamy, the
prisoner's deliberate declaration, that he had been married in a
foreign country was held to render it unnecessary to prove that the
marriage had been celebrated according to the laws of that
country ; '^ and in an action for wages, an admission by plaintiff
that his claim had been referred to an arbitrator, who had made
an award against him, was held admissible evidence on behalf of
the defendant.'
§ 414. A material difference, at all events, exists between proving
by an admission the execution of an instrument requiring attestation,
which is produced, and proving the party's admission, that by such
and such instrument, which is not produced, a certain act was done.
It will hereafter be shown,* that when an instrument, which requires
attestation to give it validity,* is in court, and its execution is to be
proved against a hostile party, an admission on his part of due
execution, unless made with a view to the trial of that cause, is
generally* not sufficient.
§ 416.' Where a writing does not fall within either of the three
classes already described, no reason exists why it should exclude
oral evidence. For instance, if a written communication be accom-
panied by a verbal one to the same effect, the latter may be received
as independent evidence, though not to prove the contents of the
writing, nor as a substitute for it ; " the payment of money may be
proved by oral testimony, though a receipt be taken ; " a verbal
demand of goods may be shown, though a demand in vmting was
made at the same time ; "" the admission of a debt is provable by
oral testimony, though a written promise to pay was simultaneously
given ; " and the determination of an interest in land, whether free-
hold or copyhold, may be proved without producing, or accounting
for the non- production of, the title-deeds or court rolls, but merely
1 Scott V. Clare, 1812 (Ld. Ellen- « See 28 & 29 V. c. 18, § 7.
torougli). See, also, Summersett u. 'See, however, Nagle v. Shea,
Adamson, 1822 ; Jenner v. JolliHe, Wio.
1810 (Am.); Welland Canal Co. v. ' Gr. Ev. § 90, in part.
Hathaway, 1832 (Am.). « gee ante, § 400.
2 E. V. Newton, 1843 (Wightman » Eambert v. Cohen, 1803 ; Jacob
and Cresswell, JJ.). But see E. v. v. Lindsay, 1801.
Flaherty, 1847; and E. v. Savage, " Smith ?;. Young, 1808 (Ld.Ellen-
1876 (Lush, J.). borough).
' Murray v. Gregory, 1850. " Singleton v. Barrett, 1832,
* See post, §§ 1843, 1849.
293
ORAL EVIDENCE, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PAET II.
showing that a deceased occupier had, while in possession, declared
that his interest in the premises would expire at his death,' since, —
as will presently he seen,'' — all statements by a person, while in
possession of property, are, after his death, in themselves primary
evidence, if they tend to cut down his interest therein.'
§ 416. In the same way, oral evidence of what then passed will
be equally as admissible as the clerk's note, where, on a prelimi-
nary hearing of a charge, the magistrate's clerk takes down what
the witness says, but neither the witness nor the magistrate signs
the writing, and it does not constitute part of the depositions
returned : * or if, on the hearing of an information for a trespass in
pursuit of game,* the clerk takes a note of the charge ; because
this is not one of those cases where the magistrate is bound to take
down what the witnesses say ; " or if in support of an indictment
for perjury committed in a County Court, without production of
the judge's note, the perjury be proved by any witness who was
then present, if the case was one in which the law does not require
the judge to take any note.' Similarly, too, what passed at a
meeting where the proceedings of directors, commissioners, public
trustees, and the like, are voluntarily entered in books, may be
proved by parol, because the fact that such books are rendered by
statute admissible in evidence, does not exclude verbal proof of what
has taken place.* On like grounds, it is not necessary to produce
a certificate of registration in order to prove that a joint stock
company has been completely registered.'' The fact of birth,
baptism, marriage,'" death or burial, may, for the same reason, be
proved by parol testimony, for though the law requires a narrative
or memorandum of these events to be entered in registers, the
existence or contents of these registers form no part of the fact to
> Doe V. Langfield, 1847. ' E. ■;;. Morgan, 1852 (Martin, B.);
" Post, § 684 et seq. Harmer v. Bean, 1853 (Parke, B.).
' Doe V. Langfield, 1847 (Parke, « Miles v. Bougli, 1842; Inglis v.
B.). Gt. North. Ey. Co., 1852, H. L.
* Jeans v. Wheedon, 1843 (Cress- ' Agricultural Cattle Ins. Co. v.
well, J.); E. V. Christopher, 1849; Pitzgerald, 1851, decided under the
ante, § 400. repealed Act, 7 & 8 V. c. 110, « 7
5 Under 1 & 2 W. 4, c. 32 (" The 25. See, now, 25 & 26 V. c. 89, § is!
Game Act, 1831 "), § 30. See, also, E. v. Langton, 1876. '
" Eobinsou v. Vaughton, 1838 '" Lady Limerick u. Lord Limerick
(Alderson, B.}. . 1862. '
294
CHAP, IV.] ORAL EVIDENCE, WHEN ADMISSIBLE.
be proved, and the entry is no more than a collateral or suhsequent
memorial of that fact, which may be used to furnish a satisfactory
and convenient mode of proof, but cannot exclude other evidence,'
while the non-production of a minute book or register at most does
no more than ailord grounds for scrutinising such evidence with
more than usual care. The fact that a picture is an infringement
of the copyright in another picture may, too, be proved in an action
for infringement of copyright without producing the original
picture.' It is also every-day practice for the fact that writing is
very like that of a named person to be proved without producing
any of that person's writing.
§ 417.' The principle under consideration, though hitherto only
illustrated by examples drawn from civil cases, also applies in
criminal ones. Accordingly, on prosecutions for political offences,
such as treason, conspiracy, and sedition, the inscriptions on flags and
banners paraded in public, and the contents of resolutions read at a
public meeting, may be proved, as being of the nature of speeches,
by oral testimony.* Where, too, a party was indicted for ad-
ministering an unlawful oath, a witness was permitted to give
parol evidence of the words used, though he stated his belief that
the accused read the words from a paper, which he held in his
hand when he administered the oath, and no notice to produce this
paper had been served on the prisoner.*
§ 418. The rule of law that the best evidence which the nature of
each case permits must always be produced, has thus far been
discussed as to its effect in forbidding oral evidence being substi-
tuted for written evidence. But the same rule of law sometimes
excludes writings which the law considers as entitled to less weight
than those which might be forthcoming. The original of a
document must always (with a few exceptions that will be
presently mentioned^) be produced, and a mere copi/, however
1 Evans v. Morgan, 1832 ; E. «. » Lucas v. WiUiams, 1892, 0. A.
Allison, 1806 ; Harrison v. Corp. of ' Gr. Ev. § 90, in part.
Soutiampton, 1853 ; E. u. Main- * E. v. Hunt, 1820 ; Sheridan's and
waring, 1856; Eeed v. Passer, 1794; Kirwan's case, 1811; E. v. O'Connell,
St. Devereux v. Much Dew Oliiarcli, 1843-4 (Jr.). See ante, § 409, and
1761-2; Morris v. Miller, 1766-7; oases cited in notes.
Birt V. Barlow, 1779 ; Com. v. Nor- ^ E. v. Moors, 1801.
cross, 1813 (Am.); WRbv. EUis, 1814 « Post, § 428.
(Am.); Owings i). Wyant, 1795(Am.).
295
BEST DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRODTTCED, [pART 11.
accurate, will not he, in the first instance, admissible.' For
instance, on an indictment for feloniously setting fire to a house,
with intent to defraud the insurers, the policy itself, being the best
evidence of the fact of insurance, must be produced by the
prosecutor; and recourse cannot be had either to parol evidence
that the premises were insured, or to the books of the insurance
ofiice, unless notice to produce the policy itself has been duly
served upon the defendant, as this ought to be, and usually is, in
his possession.^ If, too, it be necessary to show the contents of a
manuscript which is in the possession of the opposite party, a
paper, purporting to be a printed copy, cannot be received in
evidence, without a notice to produce the manuscript.' The ques-
tion as to what is or is not an original is sometimes raised. On
this point it is settled that, on the one hand, a duplicate writing,
taken from an autograph at one impression by means of a copying
machine cannot be regarded as an original, but the autograph
itself must be produced, or its non-production be accounted for as
in ordinary cases.* On the other hand, all printed copies struck
off in one common impression, though they constitute merely
secondary evidence of the contents of the paper from which they
are taken, are primary evidence of each other's contents.*
§ 419. The memorial of a registered conveyance is primary evi-
dence " to prove the contents of a deed against the party by whom
the deed is registered, and those who claim under him, being con-
sidered in the light of an admission,' and is at the very least, as
against such persons, good secondary * evidence. As against third
persons, however, it is certainly inadmissible as primary evidence.'
' B. N. P. 293, 294. wMoli were traced to Ms possession,
2 E. •«. Doran, 1791 gjd.Kenyon); and a copy remaining -with the printer
E. V. Kitson, 1832 ; E. v. Gilson, -was allowed to be read in evidence
1807 ; E. V. EUicombe, 1833 (Little- for the prosecution, though no notice
dale, J.). had been served upon the prisoner to
3 E. V. Watson, 1817. produce the copies which had been
" Nodin V. Murray, 1812 (Ld. delivered to him.
EUenborough). In India, " an im- « Boulter v. Peplow, 1850 (Maule,
pression of a document made by a J.). See Brown v. Armstrong, 1873
copying machine shall be taken (Ir.).
without further proof to be a correct ' WoUaston v. Hakewill, 1841.
copy." Act 11 of 1855, § 35. « Doe v. Clifford, 1847 (Alderson,
* E. u. Watson, 1817, where the B.); D. of Devonshire v. Neill
question was, whether a prisoner was 1876-7 (Ir.).
acquainted with the contents of ' Molton v. Harris 1797 (Ld.
certain placards, some copies of Kenyon).
296
CHAP. IV.] MEMORIAL OP REGISTERED DEED.
On one or two occasions, indeed, such memorial, or even an
examined copy of the registry, has, under special circumstances,
been received as secondary evidence of the contents of an inden-
ture, not only as against parties to the deed, who have had no part
in registering it, tut also as against third persons.' The enrolment
of a lease granted by the Crown is primary evidence, because the
possessions of the Grown cannot be alienated but by matter of
record ; and so also are memorials of leases granted by the Duke
of Cornwall, on account of the identity of interest which subsists
between his Eoyal Highness and the Crown.''
§ 420. Occasionally it is a question of some nicety to determine
what instrument constitutes the primary evidence of a transaction.
For instance, it has been discussed what is the primary evidence of
the transaction where goods have been sold through the medium of
a broker. Some have said that the broker's look, if signed by the
broker, is the primary evidence of the transaction, and conse-
quently, in the first instance, the only admissible proof of the con-
tract.' On the other hand, it has, after much consideration, and
after consulting merchants, been held that the bought and sold notes,
provided they agree, and are signed so as to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds,* constitute the contract, and, as such, must be produced in
the first instance.^ It is at least quite clear, that if no notes have
been transmitted to the principals, recourse may be had to the
signed entry in the book kept by the broker," or, indeed, to any
other memorandum made by him as agent for both parties, which
> See Sadlier v. Biggs, 1853, H. L. ; borough) ; Grant v. Fletcher, 1826 ;
Bigga V. Sadlier, 1847 (Ir.) ; Peyton Henderson v. BarnewaU, 1827.
V. M'Dermott, 1837 (Ir.). See, also, * Durrell ?;. Evans, 1861. SeePar-
OoUinsD.Maule, 1838; Doe i;. Kilner, ton v. Crofts, 1864; and Thompson
1826. In all these cases, however, v. Gardiner, 1876. In these last two
either the parties had been acting for cases the production of the sold note
a long period in obedience to the pro- only was held sufficient to satisfy the
visions of the supposed instrument, statute.
or the deed has been recited or re- * Goom v. Aflalo, 1826 ; Thornton
ferred to in other documents admis- v. Kempster, 1814 ; Thornton v.
sible in the cause, Meux, 1827 (Abbott, O.J.); Cum-
* Eowe V. Brenton, 1828. For ming v. Eoebuck, 1816; Hawes v.
other instances, see post, §§ 1650 Forster, 1834 (Ld. Denman) ; Town-
et seq. end v. Drakeford, 1843 (id.).
2 Sievewright v. Archibald, 1851 ^ Townend v. Drakeford, 1843;
(Patteson, J., and Ld. Campbell) ; Pitts v. Beckett, 1845 (Parke, B.) ;
Heyman v. Neale, 1809 (Ld. Ellen- Thompson v. Gardiner, 1876.
297
broker's books — BOUGHT AND SOLD NOTES. IMPART II.
is sufficient to satisfy the statute.' But if even a single note, actually
signed by one party, has heen delivered to the other party, this
note has been held to itself constitute the contract, even though
it differed materially from the note which was sent to the party
signing that origiaally produced by the plaintiff.^* Where the
bought and sold notes are signed by the broker, and it is affirma-
tively shown that these substantially differ from each other, no
binding contract is usually effected, even although the purchaser,
on objection raised by the vendor to a particular word inserted in
the sold note, strikes out that word, and evidences his consent to
the erasure by affixing his initials thereto.^
§ 421. Whether the broker's book may be resorted to if there be
a material disagreement between the bought and sold notes is a
very difficult question. Two eminent judges, on three different
occasions, held that it could not.^ But a third, who was no mean
lawyer, thought that it could,* and it is submitted that his opinion
win ultimately prevail.
§ 422. In general, it will be sufficient if a party seeking to en-
force a contract made through a broker produces the note in his
possession, and shows that the broker was employed in the trans-
action by his adversary without producing the original broker's
book. His adversary, if he rely on any variance between the
bought and sold notes, must produce, as his evidence, the one that
has been handed to himself.'*
§ 423. As already indicated,^ any substantial variance between
the bought note and the sold note may prevent there ever having
been any contract at all. But the amount of variance that wUi
have this effect cannot be expressly defined. In one case, where
' Eiohey v. Garvey, 1847 (Ir.)- also, Moore v. Campbell, 1854 ; Hey-
There the memorandum liad beea worth v. Knight, 18H4 (Willes, J.),
drawn up two or three days after the ' Thornton v. Charles, 1836 (Ld.
sale ; but the Court held this fact to be Abinger) ; Townend v. Drakef ord,
immaterial, the broker's authority as 1843 (Ld. Denman) ; and Gregson v.
agent for the parties not having been Euok, 1843 (Ld. Denman).
revoked. * Lord Wensleydale in Thornton
^' Eowe V. Osborne, 1815. v. Charles, 1836.
* Oowie V. Eemfry, 1846, P. 0. " Hawes v. Forster, 1834 (Ld.
But see Eowe v. Osborne, 1815 (Ld. Denman).
Ellenborough), recognized in Cowie * Cowie v. Eemfry, 1846, P. C,
V. Eemfry, P. C, supra; and see. supra, § 420.
298
CH. IV.] VARIANCE BETWEEN BOUGHT AND SOLD NOTES. 299
the bought note spoke of a brokerage of one per cent., and a deposit
of fifteen per cent., and the sold note stated that the brokerage waa
ten shillings per cent., and omitted all mention of the deposit, it
was ruled that the discrepancy was fatal, though with respect to
the brokerage one of the jury interpreted the notes as meaning
that the broker should be paid by the buyer one per cent., and by
the seller a half per cent. ; ' and a similar conclusion was come to
in another case, where Scotch iron was named in the bought note,
and Dunlop's iron, which is Scotch iron, but not the only kind of
Scotch iron, was specified in the sold note ; ' and in yet a third, in
which the sole difference between the bought and the sold notes
was, that the one purported to deal with " Riga," and the other
with " Petersburg," hemp.' But a mere clerical error, or even a
mistake in a name, if productive of no loss, will not invalidate the
sale.*
§ 424. In applying the general rule that the original document,
and not a mere copy of it, must be produced as evidence, to notarial
instruments, it is always considered a duplicate made out at any
time from the original or protocol in the notarial book, is equiva-
lent to an original drawn up at the time of the entry in the book.''
§ 425. Primary proof of the title of a person as executor or
administrator may, as to grants since the 11th of January, 1858,^
be proved either by producing the probate or letters, or by an
exemplification thereof granted by a registrar or district registrar
of the Probate Division of the High Court.'
§ 426. The rule as to whether any or which of the copies of
deeds executed in duplicate may be regarded as an original, and as
to any or which of them are to be regarded as copies, is this : —
. When two or more parts are sealed and delivered by each party, —
1 Towaend v. Drakeford, 1843 (Ld. (" The Court of Probate Act, 1857 ")
Denman). See Kempson v. Boyle, (as now amended by "The Statute
1865, where parol evidence was ad- law Eevision Act, 1892," 55 & 56
mitted to explain away an apparent V. c. 19), came into operation. See
variance between the notes. Gazette of Friday, Dec. 4, 1857.
' Sievewright v. Archibald, 1851. ' See forms of exempKfications
^ Thornton v. Kempster, 1814. appended to the Eules, &c. of 1862,
* Mitchell V. Lapage, 1816. See lor the Eegistrars of the Court of
Bold V. Eayner, 1836. Probate in respect of non-contentious
* Geralopulo v. Wieler, 1831 business, Nos. 10 and 11; and similar
(Maule, J.). forms appended to Eules, &c. for the
0 When the Act of 20 & 21 V. o. 77 District Eegistrars, Nos. 11 and 12.
299
DUPLICATE ORIGINALS — COUNTEEPAETS. [PAET II.
a practice wliioh of late years has frequently prevailed, — they are
denominated duplicate or triplicate originals,^ and each copy is
considered primary evidence." When, however, each part is exe-
cuted by one party only (as often occurs in the case of leases), the
two instruments are called counterparts, and each is alternately the
test evidence as against the party sealing it, and those in privity
with such party,' and secondary evidence of the contents of the
other part.* Thus, if a landlord briags an action for rent, he
produces the counterpart executed by the tenant as original
evidence,* or, in the event of its loss, he may have recourse, either
to the part sealed by himself, or to any other species of secondary
proof of such counterpart : ^ if, however, the tenant is the person
aggrieved, he must rely on the part delivered by the landlord, and
that executed by himself will only be considered as secondary
evidence. Tor stamp purposes the counterpart sealed by the lessor
is usually deemed the original ; but that which is sealed by the
lessee may be described in pleading as the " indenture," though
stamped as a counterpart, provided the action be brought against
the lessee.' Where any discrepancy is found to exist between a
lease and its counterpart, the law will presume that the lease is
correct, unless it be clear that the mistake is in that instrument.*
§ 427. On one or two occasions, where it was necessary to show
that the plaintiff's ancestor had exercised acts of ownership over the
property in question, coimterparts of leases older than the period of
living memory, and found in the ancestor's muniment room, have
1 Note by reporter, 2 M. & Gr. actions, suits, and proceedings, proof
518 6, 1841. by or on behali' of any landlord of
* See Colling v. Treweek, 1827 tbe perfection of the counterpart of
(Bay ley, J.); Brown v. Woodman, any lease shall be equivalent to proof
1834 (Parke, J. ). _ of the perfection of the original lease ;
5 Eoe V. Davis, 1806 ; May. of and in case it shall appear that no
Carlisle v. Blamire, 1807; Paul ■;;. counterpart existed, or that the
Meek, 1828; Pearce v. Morrioe, 1832 ; counterpart has been lost, destroyed,
Burleigh v. Stibbs, 1793; Houghton or mislaid, proof of a copy of the
V. Koenig, 1856. original lease or counterpart, as the
* Munn V. Godbold, 1825. As case may be, shall be sufficient evi-
secondary evidence it wiU be admis- dence of the contents of the lease as
sible, though unstamped : id. See against the lessee, or any person
54 & 65 V. c. 39 ("The Stamp Act, claiming from or under him."
1891 "), § 72 ; and ante, § 148. « Doe v. Eoss, 1840; Hall v. Ball
* The law in Ireland is now regu- 1841. '
lated by § 23 of the Act 23 & 24 V. ' Pearce v. Morrice, 1832.
c. 154, which enacts, that " in aU ' Burohell v. Clark, 1876.
300
CHAP. IV.] COUNTEEPAETS OF OLD LEASES.
been admitted in evidence even against strangers, though executed
by no one but the persons named as lessees, who were not shown to
have actually held under them, and though no excuse was given
for not producing the original leases sealed by the ancestor.^ It is
difficult to reconcile these decisions with strict principle, since the
counterparts amounted, in fact, to no more than admissions by
third parties that the ancestor was seised ; but the rule was
apparently relaxed in consequence of the acknowledged difficulty
of tracing acts of ownership after the lapse of many years.
§ 428. The rule which requires the production of the best
attainable evidence has now been discussed, and an attempt
has been made to illustrate the distinction between primary and
secondary modes of proof. It remains, before concluding this
chapter, to be seen upon what occasions secondary evidence will be
received.
§ 428a. The first general rule is, that secondary evidence is
inadmissible, until it is shown that the production of primary evidence
is out of the party's power. The second is, that secondary evidence as
to previous oral testimony can only be given in a prescribed way and
subject to certain restrictions. The remaining general rule as to
secondary evidence is that thsre are no degrees of secondary evidence.
% 428 b. The first of these general rules, namely, the rule that
secondary evidence is inadmissible until it be shotvn that the production
of primary evidence is out of the party's power, and the exceptions
to it, will be most conveniently discussed with regard to, first,
documentary evidence, and, next, to oral testimony.
§ 428c. With respect to documents, proof of their contents may
be established by secondary evidence, first, when the original
•writing is destroyed or lost; secondly, when its production is
physically impossible, or at least highly inconvenient ; thirdly,
when the document is in the possession of the adverse party, who
refuses, after notice, or in some cases without notice, to produce it ;
fourthly, when it is in the hands of a third party, who is not com-
> Doe V. Pulman, 1842; D. of v. Woodhouse, 1782. In ihls last
Bedford v. Lopes, 1838, decided case tlie distinctioa bet-ween counter-
by Ld. Denman; Bristow v. Cor- parts and leases does not appear to
mioan, 1878 (Ld. Blackburn), in have been much discussed, li taken
H. L. ; Gov. of Magdalen Hospital at all.
V. Enotfc, 1877, 0. A.; Clarkson
301
WHEN INSTRUMENT IS DESTROYED OR LOST, [PART 11.
pellable by law to produce it, and Vfho, being called as a witness
with a subpoena duces tecum, relies upon his right to withhold it ;
fifthly, when the law raises a strong presumption in favour of the
existence of the document : sixthly, when the papers are voluminous,
and it is only necessary to prove their general results ; and lastly,
when the question arises upon the examination of a witness on the
voire dire.
§ 429." First, if an instrument be destroyed or lost, a party who
seeks to give secondary evidence of its contents must, to begin
with, give some evidence that the original once existed,^ and then
either prove positively, or at least presumptively (as by showing
that it has been thrown aside as useless^), that such instrument has
been destroyed, or he must show that it has been lost by proof that a
search has been unsuccessfully made for it, in the place or places
where it was most likely to be found. What degree of diligence is
necessary in a search for a lost instrument cannot easily be defined,
as each case must depend much on its own peculiar circumstances.^
The party seeking to be allowed to give secondary evidence, on the
ground that an instrument is lost, is, however, generally expected
to show that he has, in good faith, exhausted in a reasonable
degree all the sources of information and means of discovery which
the nature of the case would naturally suggest, and which were
accessible to him.' The object of the proof is merely to establish a
reasonable presumption of the loss of the instrument, and this is a
preliminary inquiry addressed to the discretion of the judge.^ The
party ofi'ering secondary evidence, therefore, need not on ordinary
occasions have made a search for the original document, as for
stolen goods, nor be in a position to negative every possibility of its
having been kept back.' If the document be important, and such
as the owner may have an interest in keeping, or if any reason
exist for suspecting that it has been fraudidently withheld, a very
» Gr. Ev. § 5o8, in part. Gordon, 1855.
> Doe V. Wittoomb, 1851 (Ld. « E. v. Saffron Hill, 1852. See
Campbell); iaH. L., 1853 (Alderson, Moriarty v. Grey, 1860 (Ir.).
B.). ' Ante, § 23.
3 B. V. Johnson, 1805. ' M'Gahey v. Alston, 1836 (Alder-
* Brewster v. Sewell, 1820 (Best, son, B.); recognized (AVigram,V.-C.)
J.); Gully V. Bp. of Exeter, 1827. in Hart i;. Hart, 1841.
See Pardee v. IPrice, 1844; E. i;.
302
CHAP. IV.] SEARCH FOE LOST INSTRUMENT.
strict examination mil he required ; but only a comparatively
slight degree of diligence will be demanded on a search for a paper
supposed to be of little or no value.'
§ 430. When a document belongs to the personal custody of a
particular individual, or is proved, or may be presumed, to be in
his possession, he must in general be served with a subpoena duces
tecum, and be sworn to account for it ; ^ since, so long as he is
capable of being called as a witness, his declarations respecting it
will in strictness be inadmissible,' and even after his death this
species of evidence, though admissible as tending to prove the
diHgenee and extent of the search, must be received with great
caution.* However, this species of evidence being only required
for the purpose of satisfying the conscience of the judge on a
preliminary inquiry, a looser rule is allowed to prevail than would
have been applicable to proof of material issues ; indeed it even has
1 Gathercole v. MiaU, 1846 (Pol-
lock, C.B., and Alderson, B.); Brew-
ster V. Sewell, 1820 ; Kensington v.
IngUs, 1S07; E. v. East Pairley,
1825 (Bayley, J.) ; Freeman v. ArkeU,
1824.
" See E. V. Saffron Hill, 1852.
3 E. V. Denio, 1827 ; E. v. Castle-
ton, 1795 ; Williams v. Yoiing-
husband, 1815; Walker v. Lady
Beaucliamp, 1834 (Alderson, B.).
* E. V. Eawden, 1834 (Ld. Den-
man). On one occasion, where an
apprentice, skortly before his death.,
had stated that his indenture had
been given up to him after the expi-
ration of the apprenticeship, and
that he had burnt it, secondary evi-
dence of its contents was received
without any search having been
made for it, as proof was given that
the deed had not been executed in
duplicate, that the master was dead,
and that his executrix had declared
that she knew nothing about the in-
strument (E. V. Morton, 1815). This
decision appears to have proceeded
on the somewhat dubious ground,
that if the statement of the appren-
tice was inadmissible, the indenture
■was not traced into his hands, and as
the term of service had expired, no
particular reason could be assigned
why it should be in his custody,
while, if the statement was receiv-
able to show a possession of the deed
by him, it further showed that search
for it was unnecessary (per Ld.
EUenborough, in 4 M. & Sel. 50,
1815; explained by Bayley, J., in
E. V. Denio, 1827. See Eichard^ v.
Lewis, 1832). The second branch of
this dilemma is unanswerable, but
the first is open to much doubt ; for
even if the fact of the deed not being
traced into the hands of the appren-
tice could preclude the necessity of
searching in that quarter (as to which
see post, § 434, n. '), it could not
discharge the parties of laches, in
having neither called the personal
representative of the master, nor even
examined his papers. Perhaps, how-
ever, the case may best be supported
on the grounds stated in the text a
few words further on. In City of
Bristol V. Wait, 1834, too, Aider-
son, B., held that, in order to
let in secondary evidence of the
appointment of one of the defen-
dants as overseer, it was sufficient
to show that one of the witnesses had
asked him for his appointment, and
that he had said he had lost it, where-
upon no search was made. See, also,
E. V. Pordingbridge, 1858.
303
SEARCH FOE LOST INSTRUMENT. [PART II.
been held' that, in order to show that search has been made for a
document, so as to let in secondary proof of its contents, hearsay
evidence of the answers given by persons who were likely to have it
in their custody ought to be received."
§ 431. If an instrument ought to have been deposited in a public
office, or other particular place, it will generally be deemed sufficient
to have searched that place, without calling the party whose duty
it was to have put it there, or any other person who may have had
access to it. For example, where a parish indenture of apprentice-
ship was proved to have been given to a person since dead to take
to the overseers, and a fruitless search had been made for it in the
parish chest, which was the proper repository for such instruments,
secondary evidence was admitted without more ; ' where it was the
duty of a paying clerk of a parish to deposit a certain cancelled
cheque in a room of the workhouse, an application to the successor
of this clerk for an inspection of the cheques in the room, and an
ineffectual examination of several bimdles, which were handed to
the party searching by the successor, was deemed a sufficient search
to let in secondary evidence, though no notice to produce had been
served on the first clerk, he being the defendant in the cause, and
though the person who succeeded him in the office was not called ; *
and on proof by the high constable, who levied under it, that he
had deposited it in his office, and had sought for it there in vain,
secondary evidence of the contents of a warrant issued by the
defendant has been received, and this though the constable added
that the town-clerk had access to the office, and it was objected
that the defendant should have been served with a notice to produce
the warrant, and the town-clerk with a subpoena duces tecum.*
' E. V. Kenilworth., 1845 (Cole- quitted the service of the solicitor a
ridge, J.). long time back), but the defendant's
2 E. V. Braintree, 1859; E. v clerk stated that he had searched
Kenilworth, 1845 ; Smith v. Smith, for the deed in his counting-house,
1876 (Ir.). where the transactions to which it
^ E. V. Stourbridge, 1828. See referred were aU carried on, and
Minshall v. Lloyd, 1837. where books containing entries re-
* M'Gahey v. Alston, 1836. lating to these transactions were
" Pernley v. Worthington, 1840. kept; the case, on this state of
Where, however, it appeared that facts, and without the expression
a solicitor, who had prepared an of any opinion as to the efieot of the
agreement between the plaintiff and absence of the soKcitor's clerk, was
defendant, had sent it after execu- referred back to a master, in order
tion to the defendant by his clerk, that a further search might be made
and this clerk was not called (having at defendant's private residence, since
304
C. IV.] SEARCH FOR LOST WRITINGS — PROPER CUSTODY.
§ 432. It is often difBouIt to ascertain what is tlie proper custody
of an instrument/ and it will then always be expedient, and some-
times necessary, to search several places. For example, where a
marriage settlement, after providing a portion for younger children,
and vesting a legal term in trustees to secure it, reserved an
ultimate remainder to the settlor's heir, a search among the papers
of the surviving younger child was held insufficient to let in
secondary evidence of its contents, as the papers of the surviving
trustees, and of the heir, should also have been examined ; ' an
expired indenture of apprenticeship remains sometimes with the
master, sometimes with the apprentice, but, since the apprentice
has the greatest interest in its preservation,' stricter inquiry should
be made of him than of the master, and in the absence of positive
proof respecting the possession, caution would suggest what strict
law might not require* — a search among the papers of both. Search
for an expired lease should be made among the papers of both lessor
and lessee,' whether a term has come to an end by efflux of time or
by forfeiture, since the lessee will have a right to keep the deed,
for a time at least, to use in an action of covenant against the
lessor, but it will frequently, after a considerable interval, be found
in the landlord's possession, as constituting one of the muniments
of his title.^
§ 433. A deed of compromise which comes from the office of the
solicitor to one of the parties to it comes from the proper custody.'
The legal custody of a document appointing an overseer is in that
it did not appear tliat his clerk, who ^ E. v. Hinckley, 1863.
had been actively concerned in the ^ Brewster v. Sewell, 1820; Hall
transactions in question, had ever v. Ball, 1841 (Erskine, J.),
seen the deed at the counting-house : * Hall v. Ball, 18il ; Plaxton v.
Hart V. Hart, 1841. And in Bligh Dare, 1829 ; Elworthy v. Sandford,
V. Wellesley, 1826, a witness stated 1864 ; E. v. North Redburn, 1784
that he had in vain searched for some (Buller, J.) ; 'Doe i;. Keeling, 1848.
papers in a box, in which he thought It has, however, never been ex-
he had put them, but that he still pressly decided that a search among
fancied they were somewhere in his the muniments of the lessor alone
possession, though he had not looked would not let in secondary evidence ;
elsewhere for them ; this was insuffi- and Bayley, J., on one occasion, seems
cient (Best, C.J.). to have thought that an examination
' As to this, see post, §§ 659 — 664. of the lessee's papers would not be
^ Cruise v. Clancy, 1844 (Ir.) absolutely necessary. See cases just
(Sugden, 0.) ; Eiohards v. Lewis, cited.
1852. ' Miller v. Wheatley, 1890.
3 See Hall v. Ball, 1841.
305
SEARCH FOE LOST WRITINGS. [pART II,
officer, lie being the person most interested in it, and requiring its
production as a sanction for those acts which he may be called upon
to do under its authority; therefore, in the absence of proof that the
other parish officers have the actual custody of such an instrument,
it will not suffice to give them notice to produce it, but before
secondary evidence can be received it will be necessary to call the
overseer himself. '
§ 434. If the party entitled to the custody of a document be
dead, inquiries should generally be made of his personal represen-
tatives, and if the document relate to real estate, of the heir-at-law
also. But these steps will not be necessary should it appear that
another party is in possession of the papers of the deceased. There-
fore, where the master of an apprentice, being possessed of the
indenture, failed, and an attorney took the custody of his papers,
a search among these papers by the attorney, after the master's
death, was held sufficient to let in secondary evidence of the deed
■of apprenticeship, though no inquiries had been made of the
master's widow.*
§ 435. The law does not, moreover, require that the search should
have been recent, or made for the purposes of the cause. Therefore,
a search made amongst the proper papers three years before the
trial, was held sufficient, though it would have been more satis-
factory had the papers been again examined.' If an instrument
were executed in duplicate, or triplicate, &c., the loss of all the
parts must be proved, in order to let in secondary evidence of the
contents ; ■* and, in every case, before such evidence vsdll be admis-
sible, the original instrument must be shown to have been duly
executed, and to have been otherwise genuine.* If the instrument
were of such a nature as to have required attestation,® the attesting
witness must, if known, be called, or in the event of his death, his
handwriting must be proved, precisely in the same manner as if the
deed itself had been produced ; though, if it cannot be discovered
who the attesting witness was, this strictness of proof wiU, from
1 E. V. Stoke Golding, 1817. Culpepper, 1696; Doe v. Wliitefoot,
" E. V. PiddleHnton, 1832. 1838; Jackson v. Frier, 1819 (Am.) ;
8 Fitz V. Eabbits, 1837. Kimball v. MoiTell, 1826 (Am.).
* T^.v, Oastleton, 1795; Alivon «. ° See, however, as to documents
Fui-nival, 1834. See ante, § 391. not requiring attestation, 28 & 29 V.
« Goodier v. Lake, 1737 ; E. v. c. 18, § 7.
306
CHAP. IV.] PEOBATE OF LOST WILL.
necessity, be waived. In the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the court will presume that a lost instrument was duly stamped.'
§ 436. In the Court of Probate where a will itself has, after the
death of the testator, been irretrievably lost or destroyed, if its
substance can be distinctly ascertained (either by the original
instructions, by a copy of the will, or even by the recollection of
witnesses who have heard it read) probate may be granted of a
copy embodying such substance.^ On one remarkable occasion the
contents, or rather a large portion of the contents, of a lost will,
were allowed to be proved by the testimony of a single interested
witness, whose veracity and competency were unimpeached ; and
probate granted to the extent of the proof.' In all cases, however,
of this nature, the jurisdiction of the court must be exercised with
the greatest possible caution; and a judge will scarcely feel justified
in acting on the evidence, unless it be of the most cogent and
irrefragable character, not only free from suspicion in its sources,
but exact and certain in its conclusions.*
§ 437. Notwithstanding the rule, which in general enables parties
to prove, by secondary evidence, the contents of documents which
have been lost or destroyed, in certain cases prior to the year 1854, no
action could be maintained either upon certain written instruments
themselves or even upon the consideration on which they were
founded, without the production of such written instruments them-
selves. Thus, no action could at law be sustained on a lost bill of
exchange, promissory note, or cheque, or on their respective con-
siderations, provided the instrument had been originally drawn
payable to order, or bearer, and provided the fact of the loss had
been specially pleaded.^ The payee of a lost rustrument of the
description indicated was, to recover payment, formerly compelled
' Ante, § 148. * Cases in last note but one.
^ Wharram v. Wiarram, 1863 ; ' Eamuz v. Growe, 1847 ; Cro-we v.
Podmore v. Wiatton, 1864; Moore Clay, 1854; Hansard v. Kobinson,
V. Whitehouse, 1864 ; In re Body, 1827 ; Pierson v. Hutchinson, 1809 ;
1864 ; In re Barter, 1866 ; Wood v. Mayor v. Jolmson, 1813 ; Davis v.
"Wood, 1866; Finch t). Finch, 1867; Dodd, 1812; Champion v. Terry,
Burls «. Burls, 1868; In re Callan, 1822; Bevan v. Hill, 1810; Wood-
1874 (Ir.); Mahood ?;. Mahood, 1874 ford v. Whiteley, 1830. See Alex-
(Ir.). See post, § 550. ander v. Strong, 1842; Lubbock v.
' Sugden v. Ld, St. Leonards, Tribe, 1838 ; Blackie v. Bidding,
1876. 1848; and Charnley v. Grundy, 1854.
307
SECONDARY EVIDENCE OF MURAL MONUMENTS. [PT. II.
to resort to a court of equity.' But the law on this subject was
altered in 1854 by the Common Law Procedure Act of that year
(which appears to be still in force) and the BiUs of Exchange Act,
1882, repeats very similar provisions."
§ 438. The second case ' in which the contents of a written
document may be proved by secondary evidence, is when its produc-
tion is either physically impossible, or highly inconvenient. Thus,*
inscriptions on walls and fixed tables, mural monuments, gravestones,
surveyors^ marks on boundary trees, notices affixed on boards to
warn trespassers, and the like, may be proved by secondary
evidence, since they cannot conveniently, if at all, be produced in
court." For instance, on one occasion a man was convicted of
' Warmsleyi^. CMld, 1749; Toul-
min V. Price, 1800 ; Ex parte Green-
■way, 1802 ; Macartney v. Graham,
1828; Davies u. Dodd, 1817; Mossop
V. Eadon, 1810.
2 § 87 of " The Common Law
Procedure Act, 1854" (17 & 18 V.
0. 125), is as follows: — "In case
of any action founded upon a bill
of exchange or other negotiable
instrument," which words will in-
clude a bank note (M'Donnell v.
Murray, 1859), or a lost half of a
bank note (see Byles on Bills, 1891
edit., p. 394)— "it shall be lawful
for the court or a judge to order that
the loss of such instrument shall not
be set up, provided an indemnity is
given, to the satisfaction of the court
or judge, or a master, against the
claims of any other person upon such
negotiable instrument " (see Aran-
guerin v. Scholfield, 1856 ; King v.
Zimmermann, 1871). If the payee
of a lost note can show that the in-
strument was never negotiable, aa
having been originally made payable
to himself alone, he cannot, as it
would seem, be called upon to give
an indemnity under this clause, but
the action will be sustainable, either
on the instrument itself, or on the
consideration; because, in such case,
the defendant cannot be rendered
Kable to pay the amount a second
time (Wain v. Bailey, 1839 ; recog-
nized in Ramuz v. Crowe, 1847 ;
Clay V. Crowe, 1853. As to what is
the effect of the bill being destroyed,
see § 322 of the 1st edit, of this work,
and Wright v. Ld. Maidstone, 1855
(Wood, V.-C). See, too, Conflana
Quarry Co. v. Parker, 1867 ; where
circular notes having been lost, the
party losing them was held not en-
titled to sue the bankers for money
had and received). §§ 69 and 70 of
"The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 "
(45 & 46 V. o. 61) are as follow :—
§ 69. " Where a bill has been lost
before it is overdue, the person who
was the holder of it may apply to the
drawer to give him another bill of
the* same tenour, giving security to
the drawer, if required, to indem-
nify him against all persons what-
ever in case the bill alleged to have
been lost shall be found again.
"If the drawer, on request as afore-
said, refuses to give such dui^licate
bill, he may be compelled to do
so."
§ 70. " In any action or proceeding
upon a bill, the court or a judge
may order that the loss of the in-
strument shall not be set up, pro-
vided an indemnity be given to the
satisfaction of the court or judge
against the claims of any other person
upon the instrument in question."
* See supra, § 428b.
* Gr. Bv. § 94, in part.
" Mortimer v. M'Oallan, 1840 (Ld.
Abinger and Alderson, h.) ; E. v.
Fursey, 1833; Doe v. Cole, 1834
(Patteson, J.) ; Bartholomew v.
308
CH. IV.] FOREIGN DOCUMENTS — RECORDS — REGISTERS.
writing a libel on the wall of the Liverpool gaol, on mere proof of
his handwriting.' In order, however, to let in this description of
secondary evidence, it must clearly appear that the document or
writing is affixed to the freehold, and cannot easily be removed ;
and therefore, where a notice was merely suspended to the wall of
an office by a nail, it was considered necessary to produce it at the
trial.' If, too, a document be deposited in a foreign country, and
the laws or established usage of that country will not permit its
removal, secondary evidence of the contents will be admitted,
because in that case, as in the case of mural inscriptions, it is not
in the power of the party to produce the original.'
§ 439.* On a similar ground, the existence and contents of any
record of a judicial court, and of entries in any other public books
or registers, may be proved by an examined copy, and in some cases
by an office copy, by a certified copy, or even by a mere certificate."
This rule extends to aU records and entries of a public nature in
books required by law to be kept ; and is adopted, — partly, because
of the serious risk of loss which the removal of such documents
would occasion, — partly, because of the inconvenience which the
public might experience from the removal, especially if the docu-
ments were wanted in two or more places about the same time, —
and partly, because of the public character of the facts recorded,
and the consequent facility of detection of any fraud or error in the
copy.«
§ 439a. For very similar reasons, too, and on grounds of con-
venience, in an action for infringement of a copyright in a picture
Stephens, 1839 (id.); Bruce v. Nico- could not have been removed with-
lopulo, 1855. out a special warrant from the Queen.
1 Mentioned by Ld. Abinger in Semble, this evidence would not have
Mortimer v. M'CaUan, 1840. been admissible had not the question
* Jones'!). Tarleton, 1842. On one at issue related to a jjecZ-i^ree : Berke-
occasion, indeed, the Committee for ley Peerage, 1858-61,11. L.; Shrews-
Privileges in the House of Lords bury Peerage case, 1857, H. L.
received in evidence, as proof in » ^ Bumabie v. Baillie, 1889; Ali-
pedigree, a copy of a plate of the von v. Furnival, 1834; Boyle v.
arms of the Knights of the Garter, Wiseman, 1855 ; QuUter v. Jorss,
which had been put up in the Chapel 1853. See 14 & 15 V. c. 99 ("The
Eoyal at Windsor in the reign of Evidence Act, 1851 "), § 7 ; and
Henry V., and which, being fastened Crispin v. Doglioni, 1862.
to the building only by screws, was * Gr. Ev. § 91, in part,
physically removable ; but this case ' This subject wiU be discussed
seems to rest, at least partly, on the post, §§ 1534 et seq.
ground that the plate in question * B. N. P. 226.
309
PAPERS IN POSSESSION OF OPPONENT. [PART II.
it is not necessary to produce the original picture, but the infringe-
ment may be proved by persons who, on looking at the infringe-
ment in court, say that it resembles it.^
§ 440. The third case in which secondary evidence of a written
document is admissible is when a document is in the possession of
the adversary, who withholds it at the trial, and a notice to produce the
original has been duly served, where such notice is requisite.^ This
rule applies equally both in civil and criminal cases. In either
mode of proceeding, in order to render the notice available, it must,
however, be first shown that the instrument is in the hands, or
under the control, of the party required to produce it.' Very slight
evidence will raise a sufficient presumption of this where the
document exclusively belongs to or in the regular course of business
ought to be in the custody of a party served. Therefore, where a
bankruptcy certificate was proved to have been obtained for a
defendant, the court presumed that it had come into his possession ; *
while, if papers were last seen in the hands of a defendant, it lies
upon him to trace them out of his possession,^ — and for this
purpose he may interpose with evidence while the plaintiff's case is
proceeding, and, such evidence being submitted to the judge alone,^
its admission does not give the plaintiff's counsel a right to reply
to the jury-' Where a party has notice to produce a particular
instrument which has been traced to his possession, he cannot, it
seems, object to parol evidence of its contents being given, on the
ground that, previously to the notice, he had ceased to have any
control over it, unless he has stated this fact to the opposite party,
and has pointed out to him the person to whom he delivered it.*
Neither can he escape the effect of the notice, by afterwards volun-
tarily parting with the instrument, which it directs him to produce. ^
' Williams v. Lucas, 1892, 0. A. ^ Harvey iJ. Mitcliell, 1841 (Parke,
» B. V. Watson, 1788 (Buller, J.); B.| ; Smith v. Sleap, 1843 (Alderson,
Att.-den. V. Le Marohant, 1772 ; B.j.
Gates V. Winter, 1789. As to the >* Sinclair v. Stevenson, 1824 (Best,
presumption respecting the stamp, C.J.). In Knight v. Martin, 1819,
see ante, § 148. where secondary evidence was held
3 Sharpe v. Lamb, 1840. inadmissible, the party, who was
♦ Henry v. Leigh, 1813 (Ld. Ellen- served with notice to produce a lease,
borough). See, also, Eobb v. Star- told his opponent that he had as-
key, 1845. signed it.
5 R. V. Thistlewood, 1820; E. v. » Per Dallas, O.J., in Knight v.
Ings, 1820. Martin, 1819.
8 Supra, §§ 23 et seq..
CH. IV.] NOTICE TO PEODUCE — POSSESSION BY AGENT.
§ 441. If an instrument he in the possession of a person in
privity with the party, suoh as his hanker,' agent, servant, deputy,
or the like, such person need not be served with a subpoena duces
tecum, or even be called as a witness, but a notice given to the
party himself will suffice.^ For example, the admission of secondary
evidence will be justified by a notice to a shipowner to produce
papers, though the captain has possession of them for his own
protection,' — or by a notice to a sheriff to produce a warrant, which
is shown to have been returned to the under-sheriff during the time
that the sheriff remained in office ; * and a document deposited in a
court of equity by a party to a suit, and scheduled in his answer,
which had been ordered to be delivered to him, was held to be
suflSciently within his control to let in secondary evidence after
notice to produce, though it appeared that, at the time of the trial',
the document was still in the hands of an officer of the court.'
But the party served with the notice to produce must have such a
right to the instrument which is the subject of it as would entitle
him not merely to inspect it, but to retain it. Therefore, where a
document is held by a stakeholder between the defendant and a
stranger to the cause,^ or where it has been delivered to a third
person, under whom the defendant has justified in an action of
trespass, and by whose directions he acted,' parol evidence of its
contents must be rejected, notwithstanding that a notice to produce
has been duly served on the defendant.
§ 441a. a proper notice to produce is, however, in all these
cases necessary before secondary evidence becomes admissible. A
few remarks as to the form and service of such a notice wiU, there-
fore, not be out of place here.
§ 442. The notice must, it seems, not only be in writing,^ but,
so far as civil proceedings are concerned, must be in a special
> Partridge v. Coates, 1824 (Abbott, ' Eusb v. Peacock, 1838 (Ld. Den-
O.J.); Bui-ton «. Payne, 1827 (Bay- man),
ley, J.). « Parry v. May, 1833 (Littledale,
* Sinclair v. Stevenson, 1824 (Best, J.).
C.J.). ' Evans v. Sweet, 1824 (Best,
3 Baldney v. EitoMe, 1824 (Ld. C.J.).
EUenborough). » See E. S. C. 1883, Ord. LXVL,
* Taplin V. Atty, 1825; Suter v. r. 1.
BurreU, 1857.
311
SERVICE OF NOTICE — CONTENTS OF NOTICE. [PAET II.
form.^ It may be directed to the party or to his solicitor, and may
be served on either.^ Indeed, it ■will be sufficient to leave the notice
with a servant of the party at his dwelling-house, or with a clerk
at the solicitor's office.' Where the solicitor has been changed, a
notice served on the first solicitor before the change will suffice ;
for otherwise the effect of the notice might be easily evaded by
changing the legal adviser on the eve of the trial.* A notice duly
served on the party will not be rendered invalid by a subsequent
bad service on the solicitor.'
§ 443. It is difficult to lay down any general rule as to what a
notice to produce ought to contain, since much must depend on the
particular circumstances of each case. No misstatement or in-
accuracy in the notice will, however, be deemed material, if not
really calculated to mislead the opponent.^ Neither is it necessary,
by condescending minutely to dates, contents, parties, &o., to
specify the precise documents intended. Indeed, to do so may be
dangerous, since if any material errors were inadvertently made,
the party sought to be affected by the notice might urge, with
possible success, that he had been misled thereby. If enough is
stated on the notice to induce the party to believe that a particular
1 Order XXXII. r. 8. The form is as follows :—
No. 14. App. B.
[^Heading as in Form 1.]
"Take notice, that you axe hereby required to produce and stow to the
court on the trial of this all books, papers, letters, copies of letters,
and other writings and documents in your custody, possession, or power,
containing any entry, memorandum, or minute relating to the matters in
question in this , and particularly
Dated the day of , 18 .
To the above-named
C (Signed)
1 , of , agent for
j , solicitor for the above-
h solicitor or agent. \ named ."
"Hughes V. Budd, 1840; R. v. = Evans v. Sweet, 1824 (Best, C.J. ).
Barker, 1858; '&. v. Boucher, 1859; * Doei). Martin, 1832 (Tindal.O. J.).
Houseman v. Roberts, 1832 ; Gates v. " Hughes v. Budd, 1840 (Patteson,
Winter, 1789. This last case was a J.).
qui tam action. See R. v. Downham, * Justice v. Elstob, 1858 ; Graham
1858. "• Oldis, 1858.
312
CHAP. IV.] CONTENTS OF NOTICE TO PRODUCE.
Instrument will be called for, this will be sufficient.^ But a notice
to produce " all letters, papers, and documents, touching or con-
cerning the bill of exchange mentioned in the declaration, and the
debt sought to be recovered," ^ has been held too vague to admit
secondary proof of a notice of dishonour sent by the plaintiff to the
defendant. And in an action ^ against four defendants, as owners
of a sloop, to recover an account for warehousing the rigging of the
vessel, in order to prove that one defendant was a joint owner, the
plaintiff called for a letter, which was stated to have been written
nine years before by this defendant to the son of another defendant,
and relied upon a " notice to produce letters and copies of letters,
and all books relating to the cause," but the court decided that the
notice was too uncertain, and no sensible man could entertain a
different opinion. It is believed that many judges still act upon
these old principles, though later decisions justify a greater laxity
of practice.*
§ 444. In an old case, a notice which misdescribed the title of
the cause was held invalid ; ' but an objection to a notice on the
ground that it was entitled (by mistake) in a wrong court, was over-
ruled, Alderson, B., saying, "One does not know where we are to
stop. Would the notice be bad if one of the names was spelt
wrong ? . . At the time of the decision in Harvey v. Morgan, the
courts were much more strict than now as to matters of this nature."'
' See Eogers v. Custance, 1839. addressed appeared on the notice.
' France v. Lucy, 1825 (Best, 0. J.). This was pointed out and relied upon
' Jones V. Edwards, 1825. by Patteson, J., in Jacob v. Lee,
* Thus, a notice to produce " all 1837. The Court of Queen's Bench,
letters written by the plaintiii to the in an action for work and labour,
defendant, relating to the matters in also decided that a notice to pro-
dispute in the action " (Jacob v. Lee, duce " all accounts relating to the
1837 (Patteson, J.); see, also, Conny- matters in question in this cause,"
bear «. Farries, 1869), or " all letters comprehended with suEBcient pre-
written to or received by the plaintiff cision a. particular account relating
between the years 1837 and 1841, to a small part of the work, though
both inclusive, by and from the defen- it appeared that many such accounts
dants, or either of them, or any per- for different parts of the work had
son in their behalf, and also aU books, been rendered by the plaintiff to the
papers, &o., relating to the subject- defendant: Eogers?;. Custance, 1837.
matter of this cause" (Morris v. * Harvey v. Morgan, 1816. The
Hauser, 1841 (Ld. Denman)), have notice in that case was entitled "A.
respectively been held sufficient to & B., assignees of C. & D., v. E.,"
let in parol evidence of a particular instead of "A. & B., assignees of C,
letter not otherwise specified. In v. E."
these cases the names of the parties * Lawrence v. Clark, 1845.
by and to whom the letters were
313
TIME AND PLACE OF SERVICE OF NOTICE. [pAET 11.
§ 445. As to the time and place of the service, no more precise
rule can be laid down, than that it must be such as to enable the
party, under the known circumstances of the case, to comply with
•the call.* If the person to be served, whether client or solicitor,
dwell in another town than that in which the trial is had, he must
generally be served before the commission day.^ Service after he
has left home to attend the court will usually be insufficient.' In
town causes, however, and in country causes, where the solicitor
lives in the assize town, a shorter notice will suffice, and if the
documents be such as may reasonably be presumed to be in the
solicitor's possession, service on him, or at his office, before six
o'clock* in the afternoon of the day preceding the trial, will
generally be sufficient ; * though, if the documents would probably
be in the client's custody, — as, for instance, if they were a trades-
man's books,^ or if they were letters or papers not obviously
connected with the cause, — such service would be too late.' And
a notice during the trial of a town cause lasting twelve days, given
on one day during the trial for the next, is not sufficient.* If a
party be served vnth notice sufficiently early to enable him to
produce the document, it makes no difference that at the time of
the service the cause is part heard.'
§ 446. If the party served with a notice to produce can prove
that his papers are in a foreign country, or at such a distance from
the place of trial as to render it impossible for him to produce them
under an ordinary notice, such a notice will be inoperative. The
1 E. V. Hankins, 1849 ; E. v. Kit- Miers, 1839; Lawrence i;. Clark, 1845.
Bon, 1853. If the trial is to take place on the Mon-
2 Trist V. Jolinson, 1833 (Park, J.^; day, a service on the Sunday, or even
E. i;. Ellioombe, 1833(Littledale, J.); on Saturday after 2 p.m. (see rule
Lessee of Leader v. Duggan, 1841 cited in last note), wHl not do ; and
(Ir.); Humphrey v. St. Leger, 1841 perhaps a service on a Sunday would
ilr.); M'MasterandBoyle'scase, 1843 in any event be bad. See Hughes i).
(Ir.). SeeHowardu. "Williams, 1842. Budd, 1840 (Patteson, J.); and 29
' George?;. Thompson, 1836; Har- Car. 2, o. 7, §6 ("TheSundayObserv-
gest V. Fothergill, 1832 (Taunton, J.). ance Act, 1677 ")•
* See post, § 1586a, citing Ord. « Atkins v. Meredith, 1836.
LXIV., r. 11, of E. S. 0. 1883. ' Bryne v. Harvey, 1838 (Ld. Den-
' Atkins v. Meredith, 1836; Leaf v. man); Vicei;. Lady Anson, 1827 (Ld.
Butt, 1842 (Alderson, B.); Meyrick Tenterden); Aflalo v. Pourdrinier,
t>. Woods, 1842 (id.); Firkin v. Ed- 1829 (Tindal, O.J.).
wards, 1840 (Williams, J.) ; Gibbons * Sugg v. Bray, 1885.
V. Powell, 1840 (Gurney, B.); E. v. » Sturm u. Jeffree, 1847 (Pollock,
Hamp, 1852 (Ld. Campbell); Holt v. O.B.).
314
CHAP. IV.3 TIME OP SERVING NOTICE TO PRODUCE.
courts, however, incline to favour the sufficiency of the notice,
whenever the circumstances will warrant it. For example, where
a party had gone abroad, leaving the cause in the hands of his
solicitor, it was presumed that he had left with him all papers
material to the cause, and, consequently, a notice served on the
solicitor the evening next but one before the trial, was held to
be sufficient ; ' a four days' notice, given to the defendant to
produce letters written by him to his partner in New South Wales,
was considered good, where long litigation on the subject of them
made it presumable that they had been remitted to this country ; ^
and even a similar notice to a foreign defendant was sufficient
where the action had commenced only seven months before the
trial, though the letters required had been addressed to him eighteen
years before at his residence abroad, Abbott, C. J., observing that
it would lead to great inconvenience and delay if trials were
allowed to be postponed upon such an objection.'
§ 447. However, a party who seeks the production of papers
must not put his adversary to needless trouble and expense. A
solicitor who, having been served in Essex with notice to produce
certain deeds, fetched them from London, and on the commission
day was served with a fresh notice to produce another deed, which
he on being served stated was also in town, but then said that it
should be forthcoming at the trial if the other side would pay the
expenses of a messenger, after this offer had been declined, was held
justified, in the absence of payment of such expenses, in not com-
plying with the notice, and it also was held that secondary evidence
was not rendered admissible by such second notice.* If a party, on
being served with a notice to produce a document, states that it is
not in existence, parol proof of its contents will be received, and
no objection can be taken to the lateness of the service.' A notice
to produce certain documents " upon the trial of the cause," applies
not merely to the trial which it immediately precedes, but to every
subsequent trial of the same cause which may take place.®
' Bryan v. WagstafE, 1825 (Abbott, the commission day, would have been
O.J.). too late, independent of the special
' Sturge V. Buchanan, 1839. circumstances.
' Drabble v. Donner, 1824. But ^ Foster v. Pointer, 1841 (Gurney ,
see Ehrenspergen v. Anderson, 1848. B.).
* Doe V. Spitty, 1832. Perhaps the ^ Hope v. Beadon, 1851.
second notice, having been served on
315
NOTICE TO PEOEUCE WHEN UNNECESSARY. [PART II.
§ 448. ByE. S. C, 1883, Order XXXII. r. 8, "An affidavit of
the solicitor, or his clerk, of the service of any notice to produce,
and of the time when it was served, with a copy of the notice to
produce, shall in all cases he sufficient evidence of the service of the
notice, and of the time when it was served."
§ 449. In seven cases notice to produce is not necessary, viz. : (1)
where a duplicate original or a counterpart is at hand ; (2) where
the document required is itself a notice ; (3) if the form of the
proceedings tells the party that he will he charged with the
possession of the instrument and called on to produce it ; (4) in
odium spoHatoris ; (6) in the case of agreements by sailors with
masters of ships ; (6) where the document required is admittedly
lost ; and (7) where it is actually in cOurt.
§ 449a. Each of these seven cases requires a few separate words
of notice.
§ 449b. The first of such seven cases is, where the instrument in
the possession of the adversary, and that tendered in evidence, are
either duplicate originals^ or are counterparts, and the part offered
in evidence has heen executed by the adversary, or by some person
through whom he claims. The instrument produced is, as before
stated, considered primary evidence, not secondary.''
§ 460. The second of the seven cases just indicated arises where
the instrument to be proved is itself a notice. This exception
appears to have been originally adopted in regard to notices to
produce, for the obvious reason, that, if a notice to produce such a
document were necessary, the series of notices would become
infinite.' The exception has subsequently been extended to other
' Colling w.Treweek, 1827(Bayley, rule are, partly, the experienced in-
J.) ; Philipson v. Chase, 1809 (Ld. convenience attendant on a strict ob-
Ellenborough). servance of the rule requiring notice
» Ante, § 426. (2 Ph. Ev. 226, n. 5) ; partly, because
2 3 St. Ev. 730 ; PhUipson v. Chase, the secondary evidence that is usually
1809. But see ante, § 448. This offered of a notice is a copy of the
has arisen, partly, perhaps, from a paper sent, which partakes in great
misapprehension of the ground on measure of the character of a dupli-
which the doctrine rests (in Philip- cate original (Kine v. Beaumont,
sou V. Chase, 1809, Ld. EUenborough 1822) ; and, chiefly, because it con-
observes: "Wilson, J., said that if stantly happens that the opposite
a duplicate of the notice to quit was party is well aware, from the nature
not of itself sufficient, no more ought of the action, that he will be charged
a duplioale of the notice to produce, with the possession of the original
and thus notices might be required in document (Colling v. Treweek, 1827
infinitum"). The foregoing reasoning (Bayley, J.); Robinson v. Brown,
is fallacious. See 3 St. Ev. 3rd edit. 1845 (Maule, J.). See post, § 452).
(1842) 730. The real reasons for the
316
CHAP. IV.] NOTICE TO PRODUCE A NOTICE UNNECESSARY.
notices, and now lets in proof by copies, if not by any species
of secondary evidence, of a notice to quit ; ' of a notice of dis-
honour,^ provided the action be brought upon the bill, but not
otherwise ; ' of all such notices of action, or written demands, as
are necessary to entitle the plaintiff to recover ; * and of bills of
costs of solicitors, and parliamentary agents, delivered pursuant to
statute.'
§ 451. An exception to the general principle, that no notice to
produce a notice is usually required, appears to exist in all eases in
which the notice required to be produced has been served on a third
person.^ Accordingly, where two parties had become sureties, by a
joint and several bond, for the payment, within one month after
notice should have been given to them, of such sum as should be
due from their principal, it has been held that the service of notice
upon one of the parties cannot be proved in an action brought
against the other, by producing the duplicate of the notice, but
that the first party should have been subpcenaed to produce the
original, or to account for its non-production.'
§ 452. The third of the seven cases in which a notice to produce
is unnecessary, is where from the nature of the action, or indictment,
or from the form of the pleadings, the defendant must know that he
will be charged with the possession of an instrument, and be called
upon to produce it.* For instance, in an action of trover for oon-
■ Doe V. Somerton, 1845; Jory ?;. Act, 1843"). In an action against a
Orchard, 1779 (Ld. Eldon) ; OolBng surety, on a bond conditioned to pay
V. Treweek, 1827 (Bayley, J.). See the plaintiff the principal within six
E. V. Mortlook, 1845. months after notice, Lord Ellen-
* Swain V. Lewis, 1835; Kine v. borough, however, held a notice to
Beaumont, 1822 ; Aetland n. Pearce, produce this notice to be necessary,
1811 (Le Blanc, J.) ; Eoberts v. Brad- on the ground that it was not a mere
shaw, 1815 ; Colling v. Treweek, notice, but in the nature of a state-
1827 (Bayley, J.). The first two of ment of account between the plain-
these cases were decided after con- tiff and the principal (Grove v. Ware,
ferring with the judges of the other 1817). Whether this casewould now
courts, and put the question beyond be considered a binding authority
dispute, overruling Langdon v. Hulls, may well be questioned, since, in
1804, and Shaw v. Markham, 1791. principle, it is difficult to distinguish
' Lanauze v. Palmer, 1827 (Abbott, it from several of the cases cited
C.J.). above, in which notice to produce
* Jory V. Orchard, 1799. has been deemed unnecessary.
' Colling V. Treweek, 1827, decided * Robinson v. Brown, 1846.
on § 23 of the repealed Act (2 G. 2, ' Id.
c. 23), but equally applicable to § 37 * OoUing i;. Treweek, 1827 (Bayley,
of 6 & 7 V. 0. 73 (" The Solicitors J.). See ante, §§ 407, 408.
317
WHEN KOTICE TO PEODUCE UNNECESSARY. [PAET 11.
verting a bond, a till of exchange, or other writing,^ or in a
prosecution for stealing any document,'^ the counsel for the plaintiff
or the Crown may at once produce secondary evidence of its
contents, even though the defendant offer to produce the document
itself.* A like rule prevails in an action on contract against a
carrier for the non-delivery of written instruments,* as also in
indictments for conducting a traitorous correspondence.' It is,
however, inapplicable on a charge of forging a deed ; ° or on an
indictment for arson, with intent to defraud an insurance office.'
Similarly, it is the necessary (though reverse) consequence of this
rule that a plaintiff may object to a defendant, who is the maker of
a note or cheque, or the acceptor of a bill, the making or acceptance
of which is not denied by the latter's pleadings, and is therefore
admitted on the record,* giving secondary evidence of its contents,
for the purpose even of identification, unless a notice to produce has
been duly served,' or unless the instrument is shown to be in court.^'
§ 453. The fourth case, in which a notice to produce is not
necessary, is where possession of the paper, the production of which
is required, has been obtained by the adverse party, fraudulently
or forcibly, as where, after action brought, he has received it from
a witness, in fraud of a subpoena duces tecum." In such cases
"in odium spoliatoris" a notice to produce is not required to be
given to him before admitting secondary evidence of the contents
of the document of which he has improperly obtained possession.
§ 454. The fifth case in which notice to produce is not needed, is,
that by statute every seaman may bring forward evidence to prove
'Scott V. Jones, 1813; How v. ' E. v. Ellicombe, 1834 (Littledale,
Hall, 1811; Buoher i). Jarratt, 1802. J.); R. •;;. Kitson, 1852. See E. v.
These oases overrule Cowan v. Abra- Humphries, 1829 ; E. v. Mortlock,
hams, 1793. 1845.
' E. V. Aickles, 1784; E. v. Bren- ^ The plaintiff, however, cannot
nan, 1843 (Ir.) (Perrin, J.). recover interest on the bill from the
^ Whitehead v. Scott, 1830 (Ld. date of its maturity without pro-
Tenterden). ducing it: Hutton v. Ward, 1850;
* JoUey V. Taylor, 1807 (Sir J. Chaplin ?;. Levy, 1854 (Parke, B.).
Mansfield, O.J. ). ' Goodered «. Armour, 1842; ex-
'^ E. V. De la Motte, 1781 ; Layer's plaining Eead i). Gamble, 1839; JLiaw-
case, 1722. renceti, Clark, 1845. See, also, Chap-
6 E. V. Haworth, 1830 (Parke, J.). lin v. Levy, 1854 (Parke, B.).
See Spragge's case (no date given ; '° Dwyer v. Collins, 1852.
decided by Buller, J.), cited by Ld. " Leeds v. Cook, 1803 (Ld. EUen-
EUenborough, 1811 ; also E. v. El- borough); Doe w. Eies, 1831.
worthy, 1867, C. C. E.
318
CHAP, IV.] WHEN NOTICE TO PRODUCE UNNECESSARY.
the contents of his agreement with the master of the ship, or
otherwise to support his case, without producing, or giving notice
to produce, the agreement itself or any copy of it.' The reason for
this indulgence is the provertial inexperience and recklessness of
seafaring men.
§ 455. The sixth instance in which notice to produce is dispensed
with is where either the adverse party or his solicitor has admitted
that a document is lost — for in such case the notice would he
nugatory,^ — or where, as it seems, the party in possession of the
writing might himself give secondary evidence of its contents
without producing it, as, for instance, if it be an inscription or
notice attached to the freehold.^ Under this exception, however, a
party cannot call witnesses to prove the destruction of a document
that has been traced into the hands of his opponent, and then show
its contents by secondary proof, unless he has first served a notice
to produce, since (notwithstanding the evidence to the contrary)
the document may still be in existence, or, at any rate, the
opponent may dispute the fact of its having been destroyed.*
§ 456. In the seventh, and last, place, notice to produce is
unnecessary if it be proved that the adverse party, or his solicitor,
has the original instrument in court. For the object of the notice
is not, — as was formerly thought,^ — to give the opposite party
an opportunity of providing the proper testimony to support or
impeach the document, but merely to enable him to produce it, if
he likes, at the trial, and thus to secure the best evidence of its
contents.' If a solicitor, on being called by his client's opponent
to state whether he has a particular document in court, asserts that
he does not know whether he has it with him or not, and that he
does not intend to ascertain that fact, unless compelled to do so by
the judge, it is undecided whether or not he will then be ordered
to search among his papers ; probably he will.
' 57 & 58 V. c. 60 (" The Merctant * Doe v. Morris, 1833.
Shipping Act, 1894^'), § 123. See " Bate v. Kinsey, 1834; Cook v.
Bowman i;. Manzelman, 1809. Heam, 1832 (Patteson, J.); Doe
" B. 1). Haworth, 1830 (Parke, J.I; v. Grey, 1816 (Ld. EUenhorough) ;
Fosters. Pointer, 1841 (Gumey, B.); Exall v. Partridge (no date given),
Howi». Hall, 1811 (Ld.Bllenborough); cited (by Scarlett, arg. Doe v. Grey)
Doe V. Spitty, 1832. as having been ruled by Ld. Kenyon.
' Bartholomew v. Stephens, 1839 ' Dwyer v. Collins, 1852.
(Patteson, J.).
319
SECONDAEY EVIDENCE WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PAET II.
§ 456a. The EE. S. C. provide that " if a notice to produce
comprises documents which are not necessary, the costs occasioned
thereby shall be borne by the party giving such notice." '
§ 457. The fourth ^ class of cases in which secondary evidence as
to documents is admissible, is when a document is in the hands of
a stranger, who is either not compellable by law to produce it, and
who justifiably re/uses to do so either when summoned as a witness
with a subpoena duces tecum,' or, when having been sworn as a
witness without a subpoena, he admits that he has the document in
court.* The mere disobedience of a person served with a subpoena
duces tecum will not render admissible secondary evidence of the
contents of the document which he is called upon to produce.' To
do this the witness must h& justified in refusing the production, for
otherwise the party will have no remedy, except as against him.^
The rule is only recognized at all for the same reason as that which
allows of parol proof, when an adversary, after notice, refuses to
produce a deed in his possession, — namely, because the party offering
secondary evidence has done all in his power to obtain the original
document.' If, therefore, a solicitor refuses to produce a deed as
claiming a Ken upon it, secondary evidence of its contents cannot be
received, where the party tendering such evidence is the person liable
to pay the solicitor's charges.^ And if a solicitor, who is not acting
under special instructions from his client, declines to produce an
instrument on the ground of privilege, it is very questionable
whether the client must not be subpoenaed, in order to ascertain
whether he relies on a right to withhold the deed ; ^ and it will at
least be prudent to do this, inasmuch as the privilege is, in strictness,
not that of the solicitor, but that of the client. If, however, the
solicitor swear that his client has instructed him not to produce the
instrument, it will not be necessary to subpoena the client ; for in
1 E. S. 0. Ord. XXXII. r. 9. » Jesus Coll. v. Gibbs, 1834.
^ See § 428, supra, as to the three " E. v. Llanfaethly, 1853.
classes which preceded and as to the ' Doe v. Eoss, 1840.
others which foUow the present class. * Att.-Gen. v. Ashe, 1859 (Ir.).
' Marston v. Downes, 18;<4 ; Doe See, however, as to a claim of lien,
V. Eoss, 1840 ; MiUs v. Oddy, 1834 infra, § 458.
(Parke, B.); Doe v. Owen (1837) can ' Doe v. Eoss, 1840; Newton v.
no longer be supported. Chaplin, 1850 ; In re Cameron's
* Doe V. Clifford, 1847 (Alderson, Coalbrook, «S;c. Bail. Co., 1858.
B.) ; Newton v. Chaplin, 1850.
320
CH. IV.] WITNESS NOT BOUND TO PRODUCE DOCUMENT.
such a case it would be assumed that the client, if called, would
continue of the same mind.'
§ 458. Judges always refuse to compel either a witness or a
party to a cause ^ to produce either his title-deeds,' or any document
the production of which may tend to criminate him,* or any docu-
ment which he holds as mortgagee ' or pledgee.^ But a witness
will not be allowed to resist a subpoena duces tecum on the ground
of any lien ' he may have on the document called for as evidence,*
unless the party requiring the production be himself the person
against whom the claim of lien is made.® If the witness be a
solicitor, though he will be permitted, he will certainly not be
forced^^ — except in some cases for the purpose of identification,'' —
to produce any instrument which he holds confidentially for his
client, and which the client has a right to keep back ; '^ but, as just
noticed, it by no means necessarily follows that, in the event of the
client himself not being summoned, secondary evidence wOl be
admissible.'^
' Phelps V. Prew, 1854.
'The rule, so far as it relates to
parties, appears to be this ; a plain-
tiff will not be compelled to produce
muniments of title wMcb he swears
do not, to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief, contain any-
thing impeaching his case, or sup-
porting or material to the case of the
defendant: Minet v. Morgan, 1873.
^ Pickering v. Noyes, 1823 ; Harris
V. HiU, 1822 (Abbott, C.J.) ; E. v.
Upper Boddington, 1826; Doe v.
Clifford, 184'7; Egremont Burial
Board V. Egremont Iron Ore Co.,
1880 (Malins, V.-C).
^ See Whitaker v. Izod, 1809.
' Doe V. Boss, 1840 ; explained by
Turner, L.J., in Hope ii. LiddeU,
1855; Chichester i;. Marq. of Done-
gall, 1870 (Giffard, L.J.) ; Costa
Eica, Eepublic of v. Erlanger, 1875.
« See Ex parte Shaw, 1821.
' In the Courts of Bankruptcy,
"no person shall, as against the
official receiver or trustee, be en-
titled to withhold possession of the
books of account belonging to the
debtor, or to set up any Hen there-
on": Bankruptcy Eules, 1883, r. 259.
8 Hunter v. Leathley, 1830, re-
cognized (Parke, B.) in Ley v. Bar-
low, 1848; Thompson v. Mosely,
1833 (Ld. Lyndhurst) ; Brassington
v. Brassington, 1823 (Leach, V.-C);
Pratt V. Pratt, 1882 (Bacon, V.-C);
Purlong v. Howard, 1804 (Ir.) (Ld.
Eedesdale); In re Cameron's Coal-
brook, &c. Eail. Co., 1858 ; Hope v.
LiddeU, 1855, overruling Griffith v.
Eicketts, 1849. See, also, Lockett v.
Caiy, 1864(Eomilly, M.E.); Exparte
Paine and Layton, 1869, 0. A. ; Ee
Toleman, Ex parte Bramble, 1880.
» Kemp V. King, 1842 (Ld. Den-
man), recognized in Hope v. Lid-
dell, 1855. See In re Capital Fire
Ins. Assoc, 1883, and cases there
cited. Also, In re Cameron's Coal-
brook, &c. Eail. Co., 1858 (Eomilly,
M.E.) ; Vale v. Oppert, 1875, C A.
But see Fowler d. Fowler, 1881 (Kay,
J.), et qu. ; Ee Martin, 1883 (Ir.).
'» Hibberd v. Knight, 1848, ex-
plaining Marston v. Downes, 1834.
" Phelps V. Prew, 1854.
'2 Harris v. Hill, 1822 ; Volant v.
Soyer, 1853; Doe v. James, 1837
(Ld. Denman); Ditcher v. Kenrick,
1824. See Doe v. Langdon, 1848.
^^ This sentence was cited and ap-
proved (Esher, M.E.), in BurseU v.
Tanner, 1885, 0. A.
321
WHEN WITNESS BOUND TO PRODUCE DOCUMENT. [PT. IT.
§ 459. The nile exempting witnesses from producing title-deeds
extends to a will, under which the witness claims as devisee,
though such will extend to personalty as well as to realty, and,
therefore, ought to have been deposited in the Ecclesiastical Court,
where the public might have had access to it.^ But the rule will
not prevail unless it appears that the title of the person possessing
the document will in some way be affected by its production.^ For
instance, in an action of ejectment, where plaintiff's title was
disputed, the solicitor of a gentleman, who had been in treaty
(which ultimately went off) for the purchase of the property, was
allowed to produce on behalf of the defendant the abstract delivered
to his client, as furnishing secondary evidence of the contents of
the deeds relating to the property, which had, after notice, not
been produced.' ,
§ 460. However, the mere circumstance that the production of
the document may render the witness liable to a civil action, does
not entitle him to withhold it as being within the protection of the
rule. For instance, in an action of ejectment, where a plaintiff
claimed under a devise in remainder, and defendant held under an.
invalid lease by a late tenant for life, a witness, who was an
executor and legatee of the late tenant for life, was compelled to
produce his testator's rent-book to enable the plaintiff to identify
the lands in question with the lands originally devised, notwith-
standing that the witness was, as executor, bound (under a covenant
contained in the lease granted by the late tenant for life) to
indemnify the defendant from all loss he might sustain from an
adverse verdict ; * and where a witness, who was steward of a
borough, and attorney for the lord, declined to produce certain old
precepts, books of presentment, and a case, relative to his office, on
which the opinion of counsel had been taken by a former steward,
saying that he held them as attorney for the lord, and that their
production would prejudice his client's interest, it was held that
as the precepts and presentments were public documents he was
bound to produce all of them, except the case and opinion.'
> Doe V. James, 1837 (Ld. Denman). * Doe v. Date, 1842.
» Lee V. Merest, 1870. « E. v. Woodley, 1834 (Ld. Den-
' Doe V. Langdon, 1848. man).
322
CH. IV.] witneSkS not bound to produce document.
§ 461.' The fifth ^ class of cases in which secondary evidence to
prove the contents of a document is admissible, in the first place
consists of those cases in which the law raises a strong presumption
of the existence of such a document. For instance, the original
written appointment to a public office need not in general be produced,
in consequence of the strong presumption of the validity thereof
which arises from its undisturbed exercise, but it will be sufficient
to show that any such officer has acted in an official capacity.^
§ 462.* The sixth ^ relaxation of the rule demanding primary
proof to be given of a document before any secondary evidence of
it is received, occurs where the evidence required is the result of
voluminous facts, or of the inspection of many books and papers, the
examination of which could not conveniently take place in court.*
For instance, if bills of exchange have been drawn between
particular parties in one invariable mode, this may be proved by
the testimony of a witness conversant with their habits of business,
who speaks generally of the fact without production of all the
bills ; ^ a witness who has inspected the accounts of the parties,
though he may not give evidence of their particular contents, will
be allowed to speak to the gtoeral balance without producing the
accounts ; ' and where the question is as to the solvency of a party
at a particular time, the general result of an examination of his
books and securities may be stated in like manner.* But the
exception under consideration will not enable a witness to state the
general contents of a number of letters received by him from one
of the parties in the cause, though such letters have since been
' Gr. Ev. § 92, in great part. and act on similar principles, if the
* See supra, § 428, as to wliat the parties to actions are numerous :
others are. Ord. XVI. r. 9.
2 See ante, § 171. See, also, Brew- ^ Spencer v. Billing, 1812 (Ld.
ster V. Sewell, 1820 (Holroyd, J.). EUenborongh). If the mode of deal-
* Gr. Ev. § 93, in great part. ing has not been uniform, the case
° 1 Ph. Ev. 433. In pleading, too, does not fall within this exception,
a general allegation is frequently but is governed by the rule requiring
allowed, "when the matters to be the production of the •writings,
pleaded tend to infiniteness and mul- ' Roberts v. Doxon, 1791 (Ld.
tiplioity, whereby the rolls shall be Kenyon). But see Johnson v. Kex-
incumbered with the length there- shaw, 1847, where this couxse was
of": Mints v. Bethil, 1601. See not allowed by Knight Bruce, V.-O.
E. S. C. 1883, Ord. XIX. r. 2 ; « Meyer v. Sefton, 1817 (Hoh-oyd,
Ord. LXV. r. 27, subs. 20. The J.),
courts admit the same exception,
323
SECONDAEY EVIDENCE OF ORAL TESTIMONY. [_PAET H.
destroyed, if the object of the examination be to elicit from the
witness not a fact but merely an opinion or impression ; for instance,
the impression which the destroyed letters produced on his mind
with reference to the degree of friendship subsisting between the
writer and a third party. ^ In the other cases mentioned the fact
in question is one which simply depends on the honesty of the
witness, whereas he might, from the perusal of the dooimients,
conscientiously draw a very different opinion or inference from that
which would be drawn by a jury.
§ 463. The seventh and last class of cases in which secondary
evidence of documents is admissible is in the examination of a
witness on the voire dire, and in preliminary inquiries of the same
nature. Owing to the modern improvements in the law as to the
competency of witnesses, this rule has become practically inoperative;
further discussion of it is therefore unnecessary.^
§ 464. "We have now fully considered the general circumstances
under which secondary evidence as to documents is admissible.'
We may therefore pass on to consider the circumstances under
which secondary evidence of oral testimony will be received. The
broad proposition as to this is, it will be recollected, that such proof
is only admissible where the production of primary evidence is out
of the party's power. Subject to this it may be stated, as a general
rule, that where a witness has given oral testimony under oath in
a judicial proceeding, in which the adverse litigant had the power
to cross-examine, the testimony so given will, if the witness himself
be incapable of being called, be admitted in any subsequent suit
between the same parties, or those claiming under them, if such
suit relate to the same subject, or substantially involve the same
material questions.*
§ 465. This rule is now recognized by all courts of justice.'
1 Toplianii;. M'Qregor, 1844(Rolfe, Pyke v. Orouoli, 1696; Wright v.
B.). See Taylor r. Carpenter, 1846 Doe (i.Tatliam, 1834; Glass u. Beach,
(Am.). 1833 (Am.); Lightaer v. Wike, 1818
' See Ist edit, of this work, § 342 ; (Am.),
and oases cited in this edit., post, " See Lawrence v. Maule, 1859
§ 1393, last note. (Kindersley, V.-C). The rule has
8 See ante, § 428. been extended to affidavits : Dunne
>■ B. N. P. 239—243 ; Mayor of v. English, 1874. See, also, Parker
Donoaster o. Day, 1810 ; Strutt v. v. M'Kenna, 1874, and Meyrick v.
Bovingdon, 1803(Ld. Bllenborough); James, 1877.
E. V. JolliSe, 1791 (Ld. Kenyon) ;
324
CHAP. IV.] SECONDAEY EVIDENCE OF ORAL TESTIMONY.
However, to render secondary evidence of the ' testimony of a
witness admissible, it must be proved that the witness was duly
sworn in some judicial proceeding, to the authority of which the
party, against whom his testimony is offered, was legally bound to
submit, and in which he might have exercised the right of cross-
examination. If this were not the rule, the preposterous consequence
would follow, that secondary evidence of testimony might be
received under circumstances that would exclude the testimony
itself. Therefore, should it appear that depositipns were taken,
either by parties not legally authorised to take them,' or without
the sanction of an oath or affirmation, or in the absence of the
party against whom they are offered,^ when, as in most criminal
investigations,' his presence was requisite, they cannot be received.*
§ 466. But although it is necessary that the party, against whom
depositions are offered in evidence, should have had an opportunity
of being present at the examination, and of cross-examining the
witness,^ yet it is by no means requisite that he should have
exercised that power. If, for example, notice has been given to
him of the time and place of an examination on commission, and
he neither intimates a wish to cross-examine, nor. applies to the
court to enlarge the time for that purpose, it will be presumed that
he has acted advisedly, and the depositions will be received.^
§ 467.' The admissibility of this secondary proof of oral testi-
mony seems to turn rather on the right to cross-examine than
upon the precise identity, either (if the opponent be substantially
the same) of the parties or of the points in issue, in the two
• 12 Vin. Ab. Ev. A. b. 31 ; B. N. Steinkeller v. Newton, 1840.
P. 241. " In Oazenove v. Vaughan, 1813,
" Tlie admissibility of depositions the examinations taken under the
taken before a coroner, in the ab- order were held to be admissible in
sence of the accused, wiU be dis- evidence, although the defendant had
cussed hereafter. See post, § 494. received no notice of the time and
' See post, § 479. place of taking them : MoCombie v.
°- In E. V, Eiiswell, 1790 (Ld. Anton, 1843, where a defendant,
Kenyon). after joining plaintiii in obtaining a
* Att.-Gen. v. Davison, 1825. If, commission to examine witnesses
therefore, a commission be executed upon interrogatories, gave notice that
without any notice, or without a, he declined to proceed with the exa-
sufBcient notice (Fitzgerald v. Fitz- mination, upon which plaintiff sent
gerald, 1863), being given to the him word that he should apply for a
opposite party, to enable him, if he commission ex parte, and had done
pleases, to put cross-interrogatories, so, and obtained one.
the depositions will be rejected : ' Gr. Ev. § 164, in part.
325
TESTIMOISTY IN FORMEK JUDICIAL PROCEEDING. [PT, II.
proceedings.! Consequently, the evidence taken on the first trial
is admissihle on a second trial if, although the two trials be not
between the same parties, the second trial is between those who
represent the former parties, and claim through them by some title
acquired subsequently to the first trial ; ^ if in a dispute respecting
lands any fact comes directly in issue, the testimony given to that
fact is admissible to prove the same point in another action between
the same parties or their privies, though the last suit relate to other
lands ; ' and, in criminal cases, a deposition taken on a charge
either of assault and robbery, or of stabbing, or of doing grievous
bodUy harm, can, after the death of the witness, be read upon a
trial for murder, where the two charges relate to the same transac-
tion ; * for, if this were not the law, the depositions of the deceased
would, in many cases of homicide, be most improperly excluded.^
Thus, where a prisoner, who had been summarily convicted of an
assault, was, in consequence of the death of the party struck,
subsequently indicted for murder, the convicting magistrate was
permitted to state what the deceased had sworn in the prisoner's
presence, the examination not having been reduced into writing ; ^
on another indictment for murder, a deposition of the deceased
taken on a prior charge of larceny against the accused was read.'
§ 468. If, however, the point in issue, though very similar, was
so far different in the two proceedings, that the witness, who was
called to prove or disprove the issue in the former, need not have
heen fullt/ cross-examined in regard to the matters in controversy
in the latter, his deposition, if tendered on the second trial, will
be excluded. On this ground a deposition taken on a charge of
> Wriglit V. Doe d. Tatham, 1834, 1852 (Wightman, J.) ; E. v. Beeston,
where tlie evidence of a witness who 1855 ; E. v. Williams, 1871. '
had testified in a suit, wherein A. and ' 2 Stark. E. 212 (1817), note by
several others were plaintiffs and B. the reporter.
defendant, was, after his death, held " E. v. Edmunds, 1833 (Tindal,
admissible in a subsequent action re- C.J.). The learned judge appears,
lating to the same matter, brought however, to have received the evi-
by B. against A. alone. _ dence, not as proving the facts stated,
* Com. Dig. Ev. A. 5, explained but as producing an answer from the
by Littledale, J., in Doe v. Derby, prisoner.
1834 ; Doe v. PoweU, 1852. ' E. o. Buckley, 1873 (Lush, J.).
^ Doe V. Poster, 1834 (Alderson, This, however, was allowed not as
B.) ; Llanover v. Homfray, 1880. any evidence of the facts deposed,
* E. V. Smith, 1817 ; E. v. Lee, but simply as afEording a motive for
1864 (Pollock, C.B.) ; E. v. Dilmore, revenge on the paxt of the prisoner.
326
CHAP. rV.] SECONDARY EVIDENCE OF ORAL TESTIMONY.
assault was afterward? rejected on an indictment for wounding ; '
again,'' in America, where the issue in one action had been upon a
common or free fishery, and that in another action was upon a
several fishery, evidence of what a witness, since deceased, had
sworn upon the former trial, has been held inadmissible.'
§ 469. In stating that this rule mainly depends on the oppor-
tunity given for cross-examination, it must however be carefully
noted that though a party may have had the right of cross-
examining a witness, he will be liable to have the statement of that
witness adduced against him in a subsequent action, only in the
event of his opponent being substantially the same in both suits* For,
unless this be the case, the adversary in the second suit has had no
power to offer evidence in his own favour.'
§ 470. In a civil case, E. S. C, 1883, Ord. XXXYII. r. 25,
provides " all evidence taken at the hearing or trial of any cause
or matter may be used in any subsequent proceedings in the same
cause or matter."
§ 471. Subject to the above rule, secondary evidence of oral
testimony cannot (as has already been stated) be received. An
attempt made some years ago in equity to engraft an exception on
this rule — and to say that whenever depositions have been taken
not strictly in the same matter, but against a party in one suit, who
is also a party to a second suit, wherein substantially the same
questions arise, such depositions are as against him admissible in
the second suit without any proof that the witnesses are dead, or for
other good reasons incapable of being examined ® — entirely failed.'
§§ 472-8. The common law (apart from the rule above cited)
' E. V. Ledbetter, 1850, com- tlie witnesses were alive) ; Byrne v.
mented upon, however, in E. v, Frere, 1828 (where the witnesses
Beeston, 1855. were clearly dead) ; and City of
* Gt. Ev. § 164. London v. Perkins, 1734 (where the
' Melvin v. Whiting, 1828 (Am.); decision of the House of Lords does
Jackson v. Winchester, 1800 (Am.). not touch this point), and which were
* Morgan v. Nicholl, 1866, relied on for that purpose, do not,
* Doe V. Derby, 1834. when carefully and critically exa-
' As to what constitutes this, see mined, afford any authority for the
next section. contrary. See, also, Carrington v.
' Blagrave v. Blagrave, 1847. The Cornock, 1829 ; see, and compare,
cases of Nevil v. Johnson, 1703 ; 3 Br. P. 0. and 24 Lords' Journ. 248
Barton v. Palmes, 1704 (in both (28th January, 1734).
which cases it is not clear that
327
WHEN WITNESS INCAPABLE OF BEING CALLED. [PT. II.
regards a witness as incapable of being called,' — 1, When ho
is dead ; ^ 2, "When he is out of the jurisdiction of the court,
or possibly, when he cannot be found after diligent inquiry ; '
* In ■wMcli case only is his evi-
dence on oath in a prior suit between
the same parties admissible : supra,
§464.
=> Pyke V. Crouch, 1696. The
court, however, — unless some ac-
count of the death of a witness
be given, or at least some evidence
be furnished showing that proper
inqiiiries have been made, and that
no tidings can be heard of him, — •
will not presume his death, so as to
admit his deposition, though taken
as much as fifty years before : Ben-
son V. Olive, 1732. See ante, § 297.
^ This is clear where it is proved
that the witness is actually residing
in some place beyond the jurisdiction
of the court : Fry v. Wood, 1731.
But questions sometimes arise re-
specting the amount and nature of
the proof required to establish this
fact. Thus, if a witness has been
examined on interrogatories by con-
sent, on account of expected absence,
it is not absolutely necessary that he
should be on his voyage when the
trial comes on. If the ship has
sailed, though it has put back, or
if the witness has gone on board,
and was ready to sail, though pre-
vented by contrary winds, that is
sufficient : Fonsick v. Agar, 1807
(Sir James Mansfield). But see
Carruthers v. Graham, 1841, cited
post, § 517. For instance, secondary
evidence was admitted where the wit-
ness had sailed for Spain, had been
driven back by stress of weather, and
six days before the trial was at Fal-
mouth, expecting to sail again imme-
diately : Ward V. Wells, 1809. See
Varicas v. French, 1849. But where
it was only sworn that the witness
was a seafaring man, and some six
months before the trial had belonged
to a ship lying in the Thames, this
evidence was rejected as too vague,
though possibly admissible, if it could
be further shown that any eflorts had
been recently made to find him :
Falconers. Hanson, 1808 (Ld. Ellen-
borough). This case suggests the pro-
priety of noticing an old decision of
the time of James the First (Grodb.
386), in which it was expressly laid
down that, if a party cannot find a
witness, then he is, as it were, dead
to him ; and his depositions in a
cause betwixt the same parties may
be read, provided the party make
oath that he endeavoured to find him,
but could neither see him nor hear
of him. In no modern case has pre-
cisely the same point been ruled; but
as it has frequently been held that
proof of inability to find an attesting
witness will let in evidence of his
handwriting (Kay 11. Brookman, 1828;
Ounliffe V. Sefton, 1802 ; Crosby v.
Percy, 1808; Ld. Falmouth v.
Roberts, 1842 ; Parker v. Hoskins,
1810 ; Burt v. Walker, 1821 ; Spooner
V. Payne, 1847), these analogous de-
cisions would seem in some degree to
support the correctness of the old
authority, at least so far as relates
to civil causes.
A similar latitude is not allow-
able in criminal proceedings, and
the deposition of a witness, whether
taken before a magistrate or a coro-
ner, will not be rendered admissible,
on mere proof that the witness him-
self cannot be found after diligent
search : Ld. Morley's case, 1666 (all
the Judges); fi. v. Scaife. 1851.
Neither will it be received, though
satisfactory proof be given that the
witness was not absent from any
intention to defeat justice, but that,
being a foreigner, he had, since the
prisoner was committed for trial,
returned to his own country, and
was at the time of the trial resident
abroad : E. v. Austen, 1856 ; E. v.
Hagau, 1837. These cases overrule
the law as laid down in B. N. P.
242. This kind of evidence has also
been rejected in America, both where
the witness could not be found within
the jurisdiction, but was reported
to have gone to an adjoining state
(Wilbur V. Selden, 1826 (Am.)), and
where he was proved to have left
the state, after being summoned to
attend at the trial : Finn's case,
1827 (Am.).
328
CH. rv.] WHEN WITNESS INCAPABLE OF BEING CALLED.
3, When he is either insane, or seriously sick ; ^ and 4, When
it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that he is
How far answers to inquiries re-
specting the witness are admissible
to prove that he cannot be found, is
not very clearly defined. That such
answers wiU be rejected as hearsay,
if tendered in proof of the fact that
the witness is abroad, is beyond all
doubt (Eobinson v. Markis, 1841 (Ld.
Abinger) ; Doe v. PoweU, 1836) ; but
where the question is simply whether
a diligent and unsuccessful search has
been made for the witness, it would
seem, both on principle and authority,
that the answers should be received
as forming a prominent part of the
very point to be ascertained : Wyatt v.
Bateman, 1836 (Coleridge, J.); Burl
V. Walker, 1821 ; Austin v. Eumsey,
1849 (Erie, J.). In order to show
that inquiries have been duly made
at the house of the witness, his decla-
rations as to where he lived cannot
be received (Doe v. Powell, 1832) ;
neither will his statement in the
deposition itself, that he is about to
go abroad, render it unnecessary to
prove that he has put his purpose in
execution : Proctor v. Lainson, 1836
(Ld. Abinger).
' If he be proved at the trial to
be insane, the witness's deposition
will be admissible (as to deposi-
tions taken by committiag justices,
see post, § 479a), in like manner
as if he were dead (E. v. Eriswell,
1790 (Ashhurst, J., and Ld. Ken-
yon)); and the same rtile is stated
to prevail, though the insanity be
only of a temporary character : E.
V. Marshall, 1841 (Ludlow, S., after
consulting Coltman, J.). This, how-
ever, appears to be carrying the
doctriae beyond its legitimate ex-
tent ; for since the casual illness of a
witness will not — as shown below —
warrant the reading of his former
testimony, at least in a civil suit,
but will only furnish good ground
for moving to postpone the trial, the
same rule should surely prevail in
the event of a witness being afflicted
with temporary madness. No sen-
sible distinction can be drawn be-
tween the two cases. Where deposi-
tions are tendered on the ground of
the witness being insane, it may
sometimes be advisable to show that
his intellect was sound at the time
of his previous examination ; and if
such examination were had but a
short time before the trial this course
may even be necessary : E. v. Wall,
1830 (Park, J.).
It is somewhat difficult to discover
from the authorities what degree of
ilhiess must be proved in order to
let in depositions: E. v. Bull, 1871.
See E. S. 0. 1883, Ord. XXXVII.
r. 18, cited post, § 506. In an old
case, where a witness on his journey
to the place of trial was taken so ill
as to be unable to proceed, his
deposition was allowed to be read
(LuttreU ■«. Eeynell, 1677); but too
much weight must not be given to
this decision, since, if the course there
adopted were ordinarily allowed, there
would be very sudden indispositions
and recoveries : Harrison v. Blades,
1813 (Ld. Ellenborough) ; Jones v.
Brewer, 1811 (Heath, J.). The rule
laid down by Lord Ellenborough, that
where a witness is taken ill, the party
requiring his testimony should move
to put off the trial, is certainly less
open to objection and abuse : Harri-
son V. Blades, 1813. In the criminal
courts this practice has long pre-
vailed, and it has there been ex-
pressly decided, that the depositions
of a woman who was so near her
confinement as to be unable to attend
a trial could not be received : E.
V. Savage, 1831 (Patteson, J.); see
post, § 481. If, however, from the
nature of the illness or other infir-
mity no reasonable hope remains
that the witness will be able to ap-
pear in court on any future occasion,
his deposition is certainly admissible
in criminal (11 & 12 V. c. 42 (" The
Indictable Offences Act, 1848"),
§ 17, cited post, § 479 ; E. •;;. Hogg,
1833 (Gurney, B.); R. v. Edmunds,
1833 (Tindal, C.J.) ; E. v. WHshaw,
1841 ; E. V. Cockburn, 1857), as it is
in civil, proceedings (Jones v. Jones,
1785 ; Andrews v. Palmer, 1812 ; Fry
V. Wood, 1731 ; Oorbett v. Corbett,
1813). The case of Doe v. Evans,
329
DEPOSITIONS TAKEN BEFORE JUSTICES. [PAET II.
kept out of the way by the contrivance of the opposite
party.'
§ 479. The Legislature has moreover also expressly provided
that, in certain cases, certain depositions should, under particular
circumstances, he received in evidence.^
§ 479a. Depositions taken in criminal cases in pursuance of
" The Indictable Offences Act, 1848," * are made secondary
evidence if the witness be (1) dead, (2) so ill as to be unable to
travel. The Act in question provides, " That in all cases, where
any person shall appear or be brought before any justice or justices
of the peace charged with any indictable oiience, whether com-
mitted in England or Wales, or upon the high sea, or on land
beyond the sea, or whether such person appear voluntarily, upon
summons, or have been apprehended, with or without warrant, or
be in custody for the same or any other offence, such justice or
justices, before he or they shall commit such accused person to
prison for trial, or .before he or they shall admit him to bail, shall,
in the presence of such accused person, who shall be at liberty to put
1827, -where Vaugliaii, J., is said to
have rejected the depositions of a wit-
ness, who was bedridden, and nearly
a century old, and quite tmahle to
attend the trial, is obviously not law.
Where, upon an issue being directed
out of the old Court of Chancery, it
appeared that a witness, who had
been examined in the cause as to the
handwriting of certain documents,
had since become Hind, the court
made an order that his depositions
should be read at the trial : Lynn v.
Bobertson, 1823.
' The proposition that, if a witness
be kept out of the way by the adver-
sary, his former statements on oath
will be admissible, rests partly on
the authority of several decisions
both in the civil and criminal courts
(Ld. Morley's case, 1666 (all the
Judges) ; E. v. Harrison, 1692 (Ld.
Holt); Green v. Gatewick, 1673;
B. V. Scaife, 1851 ; B. v. Guttridge,
1840. See, also, Egan v. Larkin,
1842 (Ir.) (Brady, O.B.)); partly on
the analogies furnished by one or
two statutes (see 00 G. 3, c. 102,
§ 5 (Ir.); 56 G. 3, c. 87, § 3 (Ir.),
noticed post, § 497); but chiefly
on the broad principle of justice,
which will not permit a party to
take advantage of his own wrong.
In a case where three prisoners were
indicted for felony, and a witness for
the prosecution was proved to be ab-
sent through the procurement of one
of them, the court held that his de-
position might be read in evidence
as against the man who had kept
out of the way, but that it could not
be received against the other two
men: B. v. Scaife, 1851.
'^ See, as to depositions in criminal
cases, supra, § 479a; as to deposi-
tions in bankruptcy cases, infra,
§ 496 ; and as to certain special cases,
infra, § 497 (as to Ireland), and § 499
(as to India and the Colonies) ; and
as to those in ordinary civil cases
taken on commission, infra, § 505 ;
and as to those filed in answer to
interrogatories, §§ 521 et seq. For
another and special instance, sea
"The Fugitive Offenders Act, ISSl"'
(44 & 45 V. c. 69), § 29, cited post,
§ 1562.
8 11 & 12 V. 0. 42, § 17.
330
CHAP. IV.] DEPOSITIONS TAKEN BEFORE JUSTICES.
questions to any witness produced against Mm, take the statement*
on oath or affirmation of those who shall know the facts and
circumstances of the case, and shall put the same into writing, and
such depositions shall be read over to and signed respectively by the
tritnesses who shall have been so examined, and shall be signed also
by the justice or justices taking the same; and the justice or
justices, before whom any such witness shall appear to be examined
as aforesaid, shall, before such witness is examined, administer to
such witness the usual oath or affirmation, which such justice or
justices shall have full power and authority to do ; and if, upon
the trial of the person so accused as first aforesaid, it shall be
proved, by the oath or affirmation of any credible witness, that
any person whose depositions shall have been taken as aforesaid, is
dead, or so ill as not to be able to travel, and if also it be proved that
such deposition was taken in the presence of the person so accused,
and that he or his counsel or attorney had a full opportunity ^ of
cross-examining the witness, then, if such deposition purport to be
signed by the justice by or before whom the same purports to have
been taken, it shall be lawful to read such deposition as evidence
in such prosecution, without further proof thereof, unless it shall
be proved that such deposition was not in fact signed by the
justice purporting to sign the same."
§ 480. Although the above enactment only renders his deposition
admissible if the witness be " dead, or so ill as not to be able to
travel," the maxim, "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," has
' The form given in Sohed. M to the Act is as follows : —
Depositions of Witnesses.
"To Wit,— The examination of 0. D., of [Farmer], and E. F.,
of [Labourer], taken on [oath] this day of , in the year of
our Lord at , in the [county] aforesaid, before the undersigned,
[one] of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the said [county], in the
presence and hearing of A. B. ; who is charged this day before [me], for that
he the said A. B. on at [&c., describing the offence as in a warrant
of commitment]. This deponent 0. D. on his [outh] saith as follows [&c.,
stating the deposition of the witness as nearly as possible in the words he uses.
When his deposition is complete, let him sign it].
And this deponent B. P. upon his oath saith as follows [&c.].
The above depositions of 0. D. and E. E. were taken and [sworn] before
me at on the day and year first above mentioned. T. S."
^ This fact may be negatived by ness from cross-examining the depo-
proof that the accused was insane nent : E. v. Peacock, 1870 (Brett and
when the deposition was taken, or MeHor, JJ.).
was otherwise incapacitated by ill-
331
DEPOSITIONS TAKEN BEFORE JUSTICES. [PAET II.
no application, and it does not abrogate the common-law rule,*
tliat if a witness be fraudulently or forcibly kept out of the way by
the prisoner himself, his deposition ought to be received.^ Whether
the courts will go one step further, and admit the deposition of a
witness, who, although not too ill to travel,' may be proved to be
permanently insane,* remains to be seen ; but such a decision seems
naturally to follow from the former ruling.
§ 481. Some judges consider (though this is not clear) that the
statute does abolish, however, the old common-law rule* that a
prosecutor ought to apply for a postponement of the trial, where a
material witness is only suffering under a temporary indisposition.
Accordingly, such judges have, under the statute, admitted the
deposition of a woman who, when the trial took place, had just
been confined.* But other judges think that a confinement (which
after all is but a natural state) is not "illness" within the meaning
of that word or the statute.''
§ 482. The statute, too, apparently authorises the reading of the
deposition on its being merely proved that the witness is dead, or
too ill to travel ; that he was examined in the presence of the
accused, who had a full opportunity of cross-examining him ; and
that the document purports to be signed, either by the committing
justice, or, at least, by the justice " by or before whom the same
purports to have taken place." * Possibly, however, it is also
1 Ante, note ' to §§ 472-8. See, too, E. v. Crouclier, 1862 ; E. v.
2 E. V. Scaife, 1851. Wilson, 1874 ; E. v. Heesom, 1878
' When a -witness is able to travel (Lush, J.); and E. v. Goodfellow,
without risk, hev old age and nervous- 1879 (Bowen, J.); E. v. WeUings,
ness and inabilit}' to stand a cross- 1878. In these last three oases the
examination will not justify the woman was daily expecting her con-
reading of her deposition : E. v. finement.
ParreU, 1874; E. v. Thompson, 1876 ' E. v. Wilton, 1858 (Willes, J.);
(Lush, J.). E. V. Walker, 1859 (id. with concur-
* Ante, note ' to §§ 472-8. In E. rence of Crowder, J.) ; E. v. Parker
V. Cookburn, 1857, the deposition of and Ashworth, York Summer Assizes,
a witness was received, on his doctor 1862 (Mellor, J., saying that the gene-
proving that, though he might have ralopinionof thebenchwaswithhim)-
been brought to the court without E. v. Omant, 1854. And at all events
danger to life, he was suffering from from E. v. Tait, 1861 (Orompton, J.),
paralysis, which disabled him alto- andothercasesin this note, it appears
gether from giving evidence. See, that the judge, notwithstanding the
also, E. V. Wilson, 1861. Act, has ,a discretionary power of
^ Ante, note ^ to §§ 472-8. postponing the trial (which some
» Thus in E. v. Stephenson, 1862, judges habitually exercise), instead
and E. v. Harvey, 1850, the court of allowing the deposition to be read,
admitted the deposition of a woman, * In E. v. Vidil, 1861, Blackburn,
who was daily expecting her confine- J. , held the deposition of a sick wit-
ment, and was " otherwise poorly." ness admissible, though it had been
332
C. IV.] DEPOSITIONS TAKEN BY JUSTICES, HOW PEOVED,
necessary for the prosecutor to further prove all or some of the
following facts, viz., that the deposition was taken before the
accused was committed or bailed ; that it was taken on oath or
affirmation ; that it was read over to the witness, and that it was
signed by him. For it may be contended that the section set out
above enumerates all these circumstances as apparently necessary
ingredients in a valid deposition ; and then, in the paragraph i-ela-
tive to the proof, speaks, first, of " the person, whose deposition
shall have been taken as aforesaid," being dead, &c., and next, of
" such 1 deposition " purporting to be signed by the justice, while
in the form of deposition provided the justice merely states that
the witness was examined on oath, and in the presence of the
accused, and such form is wholly silent as to whether or not the
examination was read over to the witness, or was signed by him.
§ 483. It is submitted that while " omnia prsesumuntur rite esse
acta," a deposition will be rendered inadmissible if the prisoner can
show affirmatively that the signature, purporting to be that of the
justice, is a forgery, or even that the deposition was not taken upon
oath, or that it was not read over to the witness, or that the signa-
ture purporting to be that of the witness was not made by him, or
that the witness had refused or omitted to sign the statement.
§ 484. A few words as to the proper course of iakmg depositions
under the Act, so as to render them admissible in evidence, wiU
probably prove useful here. To render depositions admissible, it
is apparently necessary that the accused should, when they were
taken, have been charged with some indictable offence ; that the
statement of each witness should have been made under the sanc-
tion of an oath or affirmation, administered by the magistrate
before whom the charge is preferred ; ^ that such oath or affirma-
tion should have been administered in the presence of the accused ;
that the statement should have been made entirely in his presence,'
taken before two magistrates who ' See E. v. Vidil, 1861, cited ante,
acted only on that occasion, and the § 482, n. *.
prisoner had been charged before ^ Th« same doctrine prevailed at
and committed by another magis- common law. See E. v. Errington,
trate. Sed qu. 1838 ; E. v. Woodcock, 1789 ; E. v.
^ As to the meaning of the word Dingier, 1791 ; E. v. Paine, 1695 ;
" such," see Ld. Brougham in Case- cited with approbation (Ld. Kenyon)
ment v. Fulton, 1845, P. 0. in E. v. ErisweU, 1790.
333
MODE OF TAKING DEPOSITIONS BY JUSTICES. [PAET II.
and that he should have had full opportunity for cross-examina-
tion ; that the whole of the statement elicited either by examina-
tion or by cross-examination, and not merely so much of the
evidence as the justice might consider material,^ should have been
reduced to writing in the first person, and in the very words of the
witness ; ^ that the deposition, when completed, should have been
read over to the witness, and signed by him, as a token of his
assenting to its correctness ; ' that the whole body of the deposi-
tions, if not each deposition,* should also be signed by the justice ;
and that they should have been transmitted by him, — together
"with the written information, the statement of the accused, and
the recognizance of bail, if any such documents should exist, — to
the proper officer of the court in which the trial is to be had, before
or at the opening of such court/
§ 485. The Legislature, in directing the magistrate to take down
the statements of the witnesses as nearly as possible in their ovra
words, and not merely " so much thereof as shall be material," of
course did not intend the depositions to be loaded with every idle
word let fall by the persons under examination, and with expres-
sions obviously having no reference to the charge against the
accused. But it certainly meant to fetter the discretion of the
justices, who, under the old law, were apt to reject as immaterial
much valuable information. For facts which on a preliminary
inquiry appear to be of trifling importance, turn out often to be
extremely relevant ; and where all the evidence is not given, the
court, the prosecutor, and the prisoner, are alike kept in the dark,
and much time may be wasted in endeavours to throw discredit
upon the testimony of witnesses, by showing that they have made
statements at the trial which are not to be found in the depositions
returned.^ If a person of weak inteUect, or a child, be examined
before the justice, it is also desirable that the questions and
' This was the old law. See 7 Gr. 4, * See § 487, post,
c. 64, §§ 2 and 3 (" The Criminal Law « See §§ 17 and 20 of 11 & 12 V.
Act, 1826 "). 0. 42 (" The Indictable Ofienoes Act,
2 See Sched. M. cited ante, § 479A, 1848 ").
n. 1. * E. V. Potter, 1829 ; E. v. Thomas,
5 See E. V. Plummer, 1844 ; E. v. 1837 ; E. •;;. Grady, 1836 ; E. v.
Flemming, 1799. Smith, 1845 ; E. v. WeUer, 1846.
334
CHAP. IV.] DEPOSITIONS TAKEN BEFORE JUSTICES.
answers touching his capacity to take an oath, should appear on
the face of the deposition. ^
§ 486. Whether a deposition originally written down in the
absence of the prisoner could be received in evidence under the
Act, on proof being given that it had afterwards been read over in
his presence to the witness, who had then assented on oath to its
contents, is very problematical. Although depositions, thus laxly
taken, have more than once been admitted under the old law,^ this
course of proceeding has frequently been condemned by judges as
highly unjust ; ^ and, indeed, it is obvious that it affords no fair
opportunity to the accused of cross-examining the deponent. On
one occasion, Piatt, B., rejected a deposition expi'essly upon this
ground, remarking that a prisoner could not have " a full oppor-
tunity of cross-examining the witness," within the meaning of the
statute, unless the deposition was taken down in his presence, and
in the presence of the magistrate, and unless he was warned by the
magistrate at the close of the examination that he might put any
questions he liked to the witness, with reference to the statement
which had been made.* It also is extremely doubtful whether a
deposition can be read in a case where the prisoner has abstaiaed
from asking any questions in consequence of the witness being too
ill to bear further examination.'
§ 487. As to the mode ia which depositions should be entitled,
one caption at the head of the whole body of depositions will
suffice,* if, indeed, it be necessary, in strict law,' to have a caption
at all ; * and no objection can be sustained on the ground that the
title does not state with sufficient precision the charge against the
accused.^ Although each witness must sign his own deposition, it
will be sufficient for the magistrate to attach his signature, once for
all, at the end of the whole body of depositions, provided that all
' E. V. Painter, 1846 (Wilde, C.J.). « E. v. Day, 1852. See E. v. Bates,
" E. V. Smitli, 1817; R.v. Calvert, 1860; E. v. Watts, 1864.
1848 ; E. V. Walsh, 1850. See E. v. ^ E. v. Hyde, 1848.
Christoplier, 1849. ^ E. v. Johnson, 1847 (Alderson
3 E. V. Johnson, 1846 (Piatt, B.) ; B.).
E. V. Forbes, 1814 (Chambre, J.); ' See, however, E. v. Newton,
E. V. Kiddy, 1824; E. v. Calvert, 1859; and E. v. Galvin, 1865 (Jr.),
1786 (EoKe, B.); E. u. Walsh, 1850; where the point almost equally
E. V. Beeston, 1854 (Alderson, B.). divided the Irish judges.
See, also, E. v. Crowther, 1786. * E. v. Langbridge, 1849.
» Id.
335
CAPTION OF DEPOSITIONS^SIGNATUEES. [PAET II.
of them be "written either on one sheet of paper,' or on different
sheets connected with each other.^ Still, if the depositions be
copied on separate sheets, and no proof be given of their having
been pinned, or otherwise fastened together, at or before the time
when the last was signed,* those bearing no signature will be
rejected.* The signature of the justice must seemingly appear on
the face of the deposition to be that of the magistrate " by, or
before, whom, the same purports to have been taken," and no parol
evidence can supply any omission on this head.^ Depositions,
when admissible under the Act, may be read in evidence before the
grand jury as well as at the actual trial.^
§ 488. It is no longer necessary (as formerly) to verify the
signature of the magistrate taking the deposition, but proof must
be adduced " that the deposition was taken in the presence of the
accused, and that he, or his counsel or attorney, had a full
opportunity of cross-examining the witness." Either the justice,
clerk, or at least some person who was present during the whole
inquiry,^ must be forthcoming, to show that the requirements of
the law have been duly complied with. When a deposition is
sought to be read on the ground of the sickness of the witness, it
must, of course, be further proved that he is at the actual time of
the trial too ill to travel. The judges require this fact to be
strictly established.^ Mere proof that the witness was confined to
his bed some days before will not sufSce ; ^ and, as a general rule,
it will be prudent,'" though it is not absolutely necessary," to have
the testimony of a medical man.
§ 489. As already mentioned,'^ a deposition wiH be admissible
under the Act, though taken upon a charge technically different
1 E.i;. Young, 1850; E. ■!;. Osborne, ' See E. v. Wilshaw, 1841; E. v.
1837 (Coleridge, J., and Ld. Abin- Wilson, 1874.
ger). ^ See E. v. Harris, 1850; E. v.
' E. V. Parker, 1870; overruling TJlner, 1850; E. v. EUey, 1851.
E. V. Eiobards, 1866. See, also, E. See, also, E. v. Day, 1852.
V. Carrol, 1869 (Hannen, J.). » E. t;. Eiley, 1851; E. i;. Williams,
' See B. V. Lee, 1864 (Pollock, 1865 (Pigott, B.).
C.B.). '» E. V. Eiley, 1851 ; E. ■;;. Welton,
* E. V. France, 1839 (Alderson 1862 (Byles, J.); E. v. Williams,
and Parke, BB.). 1865 (Pigott, B.).
« E. V. Miller, 1850 (Maule, J.). " E. v. Stephenson, 1862 ; E. v.
" E. V. Clements, 1851. Croucber, 1862 (Bramwell, B.).
>« Ante, § 467.
336
CH. IV.] DEPOSITIONS TAKEN ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED.
from that in respect of which the accused is afterwards indicted,
provided that on the former inquiry a full opportunity of cross-
examiiiatioa has been afforded to him. For instance, the deposition
of a deceased person, taken on a charge against the prisoner of
having stabbed him, or done him some grievous bodily harm, can
be read on a subsequent trial for his murder or manslaughter.'
§ 490. In addition to the regulations considered above,^ an Act
of 1867' contains two important enactments on this subject. The
first* provides in substance that every person, who is charged
before a justice with an indictable offence, shall be asked whether
he desires to call any witnesses ; and, if he does so, the justice in
his presence shall examine such witnesses on oath, and reduce their
statements to writing. The depositions thus taken shaU. then be
read over to the witnesses and signed by them, and shall also be
countersigned by the justice, and " transmitted in due course of
law ; " and, afterwards, upon the trial, all the laws relating to the
depositions of witnesses for the prosecution shall apply to these
depositions.
§ 491. The other enactment,' after reciting the provisions of
the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, which have been already set
out, further recites that it is permitted under certain circum-
stances to read in evidence on the trial of an accused person the
deposition, taken in accordance with the provisions of the said Act,
of a witness. " It may happen that a person dangerously ill, and
unable to travel, may be able to give material and important
information relating to an indictable offence, or to a person accused
thereof," and " it may not be practicable or permissible to take, in
accordance with the provisions of the- said Act, the examination or
deposition of the person so being ill, so as to make the same
available as evidence in the event of his or her death before the
trial of the accused person, and it is desirable in the interests of
truth and justice that means should be provided for perpetuating
such testimony, and for rendering the same available in the event
1 E. V. Beeston, 1854; E. v. Dil- c. 42 ("The Indictable Offences Act,
more, 1852(Wightman, J.); E. u.Lee, 1848 ").
1864 (Pollock, C.B.) ; E. v. Williams, ' 30 & 31 y. 0. 35.
1871. See E. v. Clarke, 1859. * § 3 of 30 & 31 V. c. 35.
» Under § 17 of 11 & 12 V. " 30 & 31 V. c. 35, § 6.
337
DEPOSITIONS TAKEN TO PEEPETUATE TESTIMONY. [PT. II.
of the death of the person giving the same : therefore, whenever it
shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of any justice of the
peace that any person dangerously ill, and in the opinion of some
registered medical practitioner not likely to recover from such
illness, is able and willing to give material information relating to
any indictable offence, or relating' to any person accused of any
such offence, and it shall not be practicable for any justice or
justices of the peace to take an examination or deposition in
accordance with the provisions of the said Act of the person so
being ill, it shall be lawful for the said justice to take in writing
the statement on oath or affirmation of such person so being ill,
and such justice shall thereupon subscribe the same, and shall add
thereto by way of caption a statement of his reason for taking the
same, and of the day and place when and where the same was
taken, and of the names of the persons (if any) present at the
taking thereof, and, if the same shall relate to any indictable
offence for which any accused person is already committed or
bailed to appear for trial, shall transmit the same with the said
addition to the proper officer of the court for trial at which such
accused person shall have been so committed or bailed ; and in all
other cases he shall transmit the same to the clerk of the peace of
the county, division, city, or borough in which he shall have taken
the same, who is hereby required to preserve the same, and file it of
record ; and if afterwards, upon the trial of any offender or offence
to which the same may relate, the person who made the same
statement shall be proved to be dead, or if it shall be proved that
there is no reasonable probability that such person will ever be
able to travel or to give evidence, it shall be lawful to read such
statement in evidence, either for or against the accused, without
further proof thereof, if the same purports to be signed by the
justice by or before whom it purports to be taken, and provided it
be proved to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable notice ^ of
the intention to take such statement has been served upon the
person (whether prosecutor or accused) against whom it is proposed
to be read in evidence, and that such person, or his counsel or
attorney, had or might have had, if he had chosen to be present,
1 This must be in writing : E. v. Shunner, 1886 (0. 0. E.).
338
CHAP. IV.] DEPOSITIONS TAKEN BEFORE CORONERS.
full opportunity of cross-examining the deceased person who made
the same."^
§ 492. The depositions of witnesses examined before the coroner
as to a murder or manslaughter are probably admissible as
secondary evidence^ if certified and subscribed by such coroner
with the recognizances, if they and also the inquisition taken before
him, are delivered to the proper officer of the court in which the
trial is to be, before or at the opening of the court.
§ 493. Assuming that the above provisions as to coroners'
depositions are still in force,' they differ materially from those
which regulate the mode of taking depositions before justices, and
of proving them when taken. In the first place, the coroner is
only required to put in writing " so much of the evidence as shall
be material;" secondly, the narrative may be drawn up in the
third person ; thirdly, the witness is not required to sign the docu-
ment, though he usually does so for the purpose of identifying
it ;* fourthly, the deposition must, it would seem, be proved, either
by calling the coroner who subscribed it, or by proving his signa-
ture thereto, and showing by his clerk, or by some person who was
present at the inquiry, that the requirements of the law were duly
complied with.*
§ 494. It was at one time said that a striking distinction existed
between depositions returned by justices and those taken by
coroners, inasmuch as while (as we have seen) depositions taken
before justices, to be admissible as secondary evidence against the
prisoner, must have been taken in his presence, depositions taken
before coroners might be received, though taken in a prisoner's
absence. This doctrine, however, has not only been questioned by
^ A cross-examination stopped in custody of the prigonei; to convey
consequence of the witness's illness him to the place mentioned in the
■will not suffice: B. v. Mitchell, 1892. said notice for the purpose of being
§ 7 enacts, that ' ' whenever a prisoner present at the taking of the state-
in actual custody shall have served, ment ; and such gaoler shall convey
or shall have received, notice of an the prisoner accordingly * * *"
intention to take such statement as '' By 7 G. 4, c. 54, § 4, extended
hereinbefore mentioned, the judge or to Ireland by 9 G. 4, c. 54, § 4.
justice of the peace by whom the ' Possibly they are repealed by
prisoner was committed, or the visit- § 34 of 11 & 12 V. c. 42, as to which,
ing justices of the prison in which however, see E. v. deary, 1862.
lie is confined, may, by an order in * See E. v. Flemming, 1799.
writing, direct the gaoler haviag the ° See E. v. Wilshaw, 1841.
339
DEPOSITIONS IN BANKRUPTCY. [PAET II.
Such modem test writers of eminence as Starkie,* Phillipps,^ and
Eussell;' but Montague Smith, J.,* has declined to act upon it,
and the doctrine will probably be discredited by all the judges
whenever it formally comes before the Court of Criminal Appeal.'
§ 495. Two other statutes make depositions taken either under
the English Bankruptcy Act, 1883,^ or the Irish Bankrupt and
Insolvent Act, 1857,^ admissible in evidence. The English Act
provides* that, "in case of the death^ of the debtor or his wife,
or of a witness whose evidence has been received by any court in
any proceeding under this Act, the deposition of the person so
deceased, purporting to be sealed with the seal of the court, or
a copy thereof purporting to be so sealed, shall be admitted as
evidence of the matters therein deposed to." The Irish Act
provides^" that, in the event of the death of any witness deposing
to the petitioning creditor's debt, trading, or act of bankruptcy,
under any bankruptcy heretofore or hereafter, or under any
petition for arrangement, his deposition, purporting to be sealed
with the seal of the Court of Bankruptcy, or a copy thereof pur-
porting to be so sealed, shall in all cases be received as evidence of
the matters therein respectively contained.
§§ 496 — 498. In Ireland,^^ if any person, after giving information
or examination upon oath against any person for any offence, shall,
before the trial, be murdered or violently put to death, or so maimed,
or forcibly carried away and secreted, as not to be able to give
evidence on the trial, his information or examination shall be
admitted in all courts of justice in Ireland as evidence on the trial ;
1 2 St. Ev. 384—386. dicta thrown out by Ld. Kenyon and
" 2 Ph. Ev. 74, 75. BuUer, J., in E. v. Eriswell, 1790; —
' 2 Euss. C. & M. 892, 893. on a note of a case said to have been
* In E. 'A Eigg, 1866. decided by Hotham, B. (R. v. Pure-
5 See E. V. Wall, 1830. The doc- foy, 1794) ;— and on a ruling by
trine that depositions taken before a Coleridge, J., Sills v. Brown, 1840.
coroner in a man's absence are evi- * 46 & 47 V. o. 52.
dance against him apparently rests ' 20 & 21 V. o. 60, Ir.
on two or three decisions temp. ' 46 & 47 V. o. 52, § 136.
Charles II. (Ld. Morley's case, 1666 ' The answers of a bankrupt are
(all the Judges in H.L.); Bromwich's not — at least, during his life — made
case, 1666 ; Thatcher v. Waller, 1675; evidence in proceedings in the bank-
E. V. Harrison, 1692), when the rules ruptcy against persons other than
of evidence were only partially under- himself: Bruuner, In re, 1887.
stood, and appear to be capable of a '" 20 & 21 V. c. 60, § 365, Ir.
far more limited interpretation ; — on " By 50 G. 3, c. 102, § 5.
340
CHAP. IV.] COMMISSION TO EXAMINE WITNESSES.
provided^ that tlie information or examination of a witness secreted
shall not he evidence, unless it shall be found on a collateral issue,
to he put to the jury trying the prisoner, that he was secreted hy
the person on trial, or hy some person acting for him, or in his
favour. By a subsequent Irish statute^ informations, or examina-
tions, under similar circumstances, are rendered, after similar proof,
receivable in evidence before the grand jury.
§ 499. The original common law rule which required that, to
constitute them evidence, the examinations of witnesses should be
taken vim voce in the presence of both a jury, and of, in a criminal
case, the accused, and in a civil case both parties, has in modern
times been much broken in upon by sundry Acts of Parliament
and rules made by statutory authority.
§ 500. Evidence may be given about matters which have taken
place in India or the English Colonies, or elsewhere, and have
become the subject of criminal or civil proceedings in England, if
such evidence be taken in accordance with certain statutory pro-
visions which are mentioned in the footnote. '
^ This is a remarkable proviso,
since it differs from the ordinary-
rule of law on the subject, which is
stated ante, § 23.
2 56 G. 3, c. 87, § 3.
' The principal of such provisions
is " The East India Company's Act,
1772" (13 G. 3, 0. 63, amended by
" The Statute Law Eevision Act,
1888," of 51 V. 0. 3, and further
amended by " The Statute Law Ee-
vision Act, 1892," of 55 & 56 V.
c. 19), made applicable (see Wilson
V. Wilson, 1883, C. A.) to the In-
dian High Courts by 24 & 25 V.
c. 104 ("The Indian High Courts
Act, 1861 "), §§ 10, 11. § 40 of the
original Act relates to criminal pro-
ceedings in the Queen's Bench for
offences committed in India, and
^ives power to the Queen's Bench to
issue warrants to the Indian Courts
in such proceedings in the Queen's
Bench ; and if under this section the
Attorney- General move for a rule to
order the Indian Courts to take evi-
dence, his statement that this is ne-
cessary will be sufficient without any
affidavit. See E. v. Douglas, 1824 ;
and also E. v. Douglas, 1846. The
provisions of this section were re-
enacted by 24 G. 3, c. 25 (" The East
India Company's Act, 1784 "), § 78,
and in 26 G. 3, c. 57 ("The East
India Company's Act, 1786 "), § 28.
§§ 42 and 45 of the same Act relate
to proceedings in Parliament touch-
ing offences committed in India, and
give the Lord Chancellor or Speaker
(as the case may be) power to issue
warrants to the Indian Courts to
take the necessary evidence. § 44
of the Act relates to actions in the
High' Court in England for causes
of action which arose in India, and
gives such High Court in England
power to issue warrants to the Indian
Courts to take the necessary evidence.
As to the construction of the Act
generally, and in particular of the
expression "cause of action," see
Erancisco v. Gilmore, 1797 ; Savage
V. Binney, 1834 ; and Kelsall v. Mar-
shall, 1856.
The Queen's Bench Division in
England is authorized to try any
person employed in the public ser-
vice abroad, who, in the exercise or
under colour of such employment,
shall have committed any offence,
341
COMMISSION TO EXAMINE WITNESSES, [PART II.
§ 500a. It will be noticed that none of the statutes above re-
ferred to require the party to prove that the witnesses whose
depositions he seeks to use are beyond the jurisdiction of the court
at the time of the trial. Perhaps, however, principle requires that
some slight evidence of this kind shall be given, and this view
derives confirmation from Ord. XXXVII. r. 18. ^
§ 501. In criminal proceedings a resort to the provisions of the
Acts mentioned in the footnote to § 500 may even now become
sometimes necessary.
§ 501a. In civil cases, however, the statutes mentioned in the
footnote have been rendered practically obsolete by the provisions
contained in E. S. C. Ord. XXXYII.'*
§ 502. The examination of witnesses taken de bene esse on com-
mission may also be contained in depositions which may be read at
the trial if such depositions were taken under an order for that
purpose, which may generally be obtained where a witness is over
seventy years of age,^ or is dangerously ill, or is about to go
abroad,' and the inability of the witness to attend the trial is
proved.*
§ 503. The High Court, moreover, has a general power ' to order
the examination of witnesses in any cause or matter to be taken.
by depositions on commission wherever it " shall appear necessary
for the purposes of justice."
by 42 G. 3, o. 85. The evidence on The High Court of Justice in Ire-
Buch trial may (by § 3 of the above land ie given powers similar to those
statute, and also by § 81 of 24 G. 3, possessed by the High Court of Jus-
c. 25) be taken upon commission, tice in England, by 3 & 4 V. o. 22
See, as to postponement of a trial ("The Debtors (Ireland) Act, 1840.")
under the enactment above men- As to the powers of the Scotch Courts,
tioned, E. v. Jones, 1806. see 29 & 30 V. o. 112.
The provisions of § 40 of " The ' See post, § 504.
East India Company's Act, 1772" >* Post, § 504.
(supra), are extended to the trials " This rule, however, does not en-
in the Queen's Bench Division of title the party to an order for the
offences against " The Slave Trade examination of a very large number
Acts " by 6 & 7 V. c. 98, § 4 (" The of witnesses: Biddert*. Bridges, 1884,
Slave Trade Act, 1843"). Their pro- C. A., which consult generally as to
visions as to taking evidence by examination of old witnesses de bene
commission are also extended to all esse.
Colonies, and to all actions (not ^ Bellamy v. Jones, 1802.
being actions at the suit of the * Post, § 504 ; Ord. XXXVII.
Crown: see E. v. Wood, 1841) in r. 18.
whatever country the cause of action " Under Ord. XXXYII. r. 5, set
may have arisen, by 1 W. 4, c. 22. out in full, post, § 604.
342
CHAP. IV.] COMMISSION TO EXAMINE WITNESSES.
§ 504. Under whichever of the powers mentioned ahove evidence
by depositions may have been taken, questions as to the admissi-
bility of such depositions may arise in connection with the law of
evidence; therefore, although it would be quite foreign to this
work to give any detailed instructions as to the practice ^ to be
followed in obtaining an order to take evidence on commission, it
may be useful to set out a large portion of E.. S. C. of 1883,
Ord. XXXVII., which practically collects in a code the powers of
the High Court upon this subject. The material parts of such
Order appear to be as follow : —
" Ord. XXXVII. Examination of witnesses.
5. The court or a judge may, in any cause or matter where
it shall appear necessary for the purposes of justice, make any
order ^ for the examination upon oath before the court or judge
or any officer of the court, or any other person and at any place, of
any witness or person,' and may empower any party to any such
cause or matter to give such deposition in evidence therein on such
terms,^ if any, as the court or a judge may direct.*
Ift ^ 'P 7P "W
6a. If in any case the court or a judge shall so order, there
shall be issued a request to examine witnesses in lieu of a commis-
sion. See E. S. 0. Ord. XXXVII. r. 6% (E. S. C, October, 1884,
r. 6). The Appendix to the Eules of 1884 contains (in forms 1
and 2) the forms of such order and request, which may be cited as
forms 37a and 37b in Appendix.
8. Any person wilfully disobeying any order requiring his
attendance for the purpose of being examined or producing any
^ This will be found in any good order the production of documents,
book on Practice, e.g., the Annual Cape Copper Co. v. Comptoir d'Es-
Practice for 1895, at pp. 727 et seq. compte, 1890, C. A. But quaere
* The forms of " Order for Exa- whether letters of request, or any
mination of Witnesses before Trial " matter within the jurisdiction may
are given in. E. S. C. 1883, App. K. not be added to the commission.
Nos. 36 and 37. An order under See Mason and Barry v. Comptoir
this rule may be made ex parte, but d'Escompte, 1890. Moreover, when
only at the peril of the applicant : no action is pending against, him,
Bidder v. Bridges, supra. and it is not necessary for the carry-
' See also r. 1 of same Order, cited ing out of an order already made,
post, § 1395. there is no jurisdiction under this
* See r. 18, post, § 504. rule to make an order against a
" An order under this rule can person not a party to any pending
only be made where it is sought to action. See Elder v. Carter, 1890,
examine witnesses. Under it the 0. A.
English Court has no jurisdiction to
343
WITNESSES EXAMINED UNDER COMMISSION. [PAET II.
" document shall be deemed guilty of contempt of court, and may
be dealt with accordingly.
9. Any person required to attend for the purpose of being
examined or of producing any document, shall be entitled to the
like conduct money and payment for expenses and loss of time as
upon attendance at a trial in court.
10. Where any witness or person is ordered to be examined
before any officer of the court, or before any person appointed for
the purpose, the person taking the examination shall be furnished
by the party on w;hose application the order was made with a copy
of the writ and pleadings, if any, or with a copy of the documents
necessary to inform the person taking the examination of the ques-
tions at issue between the parties.
11. The examination shall take place in the presence of the
parties, their counsel, solicitors, or agents,' and the witnesses shall-
be subject to cross-examination and re-examination.
12. The depositions taken before an officer of the court, or
before any other person appointed to take the examination, shall
be taken down in writing by or in the presence of the examiner,
not ordinarily by question and answer, but so as to represent as
nearly as may be the statement of the witness, and when completed
shall be read over to the Witness and signed by him in the presence
of the parties, or such of them cm may think fit to attend. If the
witness shall refuse to sign the depositions, the examiner shall sign
the same. The examiner may put down any particular question or
answer if there should appear any special reason for doing so, and
may put any question to the witness as to the meaning of any
answer, or as to any matter arising in the course of the examination.
Any questions which may be objected to shall be taken down by
the examiner in the depositions, and he shall state his opinion
thereon to the counsel, solicitors, or parties, and shall refer to such
statement in the depositions, but he shall not have power to decide
upon the materiality or relevancy of any question.
*****
16. When the examination of any witness before any examiner
shall have been concluded, the original depositions, authenticated
' How if they do not think fit to attend ? See r. 12.
344
CHAP. ly.] WITNESSES EXAMINED UNDER COMMISSION.
" by the signature of the examiner, shall be transmitted by him to
the Central Office, and there filed.
17. The person taking the examination of a witness under these
Rules may, and if need be shall, make a special report to the court
touching such examination and the conduct or absence of any
■witness or other person thereon,^ and the court or a judge may
direct such proceedings and make such order as upon the report
they or he may think just.^
18. Except where by this Order otherwise provided, or directed
by the court or a judge, no deposition shall be given in evidence
at the hearing or trial of the cause or matter without the consent of
the party against whom the same may be offered, unless the court
or judge is satisfied that the deponent is dead, or beyond the juris-
diction of the court, or unable from sickness or other infirmity to
attend the hearing or trial, in any of which cases the depositions
certified under the hand of the person taking the examination shall
be admissible in evidence, saving all just exceptions, without proof
of the signature to such certificate.
20. Any * * * * party or witness, having made an affidavit to
be used or which shall be used on any proceeding in the cause or
matter, shall be bound, on being served with such subpoena, to
attend before such officer or person for cross-examination.
21. Evidence taken subsequently to the hearing or trial of any
cause or matter shall be taken as nearly as may be in the same
manner as evidence taken at or with a view to a trial.
22. The practice with reference to the examination, cross-
examination, and re-examination of witnesses at a trial, shall extend
and be applicable to evidence taken in any cause or matter at any
stage.
23. The practice of the court with respect to evidence at a trial,
when applied to evidence to be taken before an officer of the court
or other person in any cause or matter after the hearing or trial,
' See r. 5, ante. It seems that the citor of one of the parties : In re
examiner may order any witness to West of Canada Oil Lands and Works
be examined apart from the others, Co., 1877 (Jessel, M.E.).
even though he be the agent or soU-
345
EXAMINEES OP SUPREME COURT. [PAET II.
"shall be subject to any special directions which may be given in
any case.
24. No affidavit or deposition filed or made before issue joined
in any cause or matter shall, without special leave of the court or a
judge, be received at the hearing or trial thereof, unless within one
month after issue joined, or within such longer time as may be
allowed by special leave of the court or a judge, notice in writing
shall have been given by the party intending to use the same to the
opposite party of his intention in that behalf.
25. All evidence taken at the hearing or trial of any cause or
matter may be used in any subsequent proceedings in the same
cause or matter."
§§ 505 — 6. It is incumbent on the judges to exercise extreme
caution before making any order of an unusual character under
either rule, unless such order be obviously necessary for the pur-
poses of justice.^ An arbitration under the Companies Acts is
a " cause or matter " falling within them.^
§§ 607 — 10. The " officers of the court " mentioned in Eule 5 are
barristers of at least three years' standing,' appointed by the Lord
Chancellor for five years, and removable by him.* They are called
" Examiners of the Supreme Court." All the examinations ordered
in the Chancery Division must be referred to them in rotation,
imless the court or a judge otherwise directs^ ; and they may take
the examinations in any cause or matter depending either in the
Queen's Bench or in the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Divi-
sions, if the court or a judge so directs.^ The examinations, unless
the court or a judge entrusts the inquiry to one particular ex-
aminer,' are distributed by tho principal clerk to the registrars of
the Chancery Division among the whole body, "according to
regular and just rotation, and in such manner as to keep secret
from all persons the rota or succession."* They are to give
appointments in writing, specifying the place and time, not more
' Central News Co. v. East. News * Id.
Tel. Co., 1884, C. A. " Id. r. 39.
2 In re Mysore, &c. Co., 1889. « Id.
3 E. S. 0. made 4 Peb. 1884, ' Id. r. 49.
Ord. XXXVn. r. 40. " Id. rr. 41, 42.
346
CHAP. IV.] EXAMINATIONS TAKEN UNDER COMMISSIONS.
Ihan seven days in advance, " at which, subject to any application
of the parties, the examination shall be taken ; " ' they are to re-
gard the convenience of the witnesses, and all the circumstances of
the ease ; ^ and, subject to such adjournment as they shall think
reasonable or just, they are to proceed de die in diem ;^ they may,
with like consent, examine persons not named in the order.*
§ 511. The Form^ given by the E. S. 0. 1883 for a commission
to examine witnesses contains a clause requiring the commissioners
to be sworn. Decided eases ® show that commissions may be
granted to examine witnesses resident in countries beyond the
dominion of the British Crown. A commission containing such a
clause, but appointing a single commissioner, should also authorize
him to administer the oath to himself.'
§ 512. To render the depositions taken under a commission avail-
able, the evidence must be such, in substance, as would be received
according to the English law. If at the trial it appears, either on
the face of the depositions, or by extrinsic proof, that the commis-
sioners have, after due objection taken,* admitted illegal, or rejected
legal, evidence, the judge will in his discretion suppress the deposi-
tions either wholly or in part.^ The examiner's certificate must
be taken up. If it be not, its effect may not be stated to the
court. ^^
§ 513. The commissioners must, moreover, have substantially
followed the instructions given by the instrument appointing them.
The court, however, will not look out critically for objections to
their conduct, but will rather in their favour presume that they
have discharged their duty.'^ Thus, though a commission that
after the examinations had been taken, the same should be trans-
mitted to this country, is not satisfied by sending mere copies of
them ; ^^ where commissioners were directed to reduce the examina-
' Id. r. 44, " Lumley v. Gye, 1854.
2 Id. r. 45. "> Stuart v. Balkis Co., 1883.
3 Id. " Atkins v. Palmer, 1821 (Abbott,
* Id. r. 46. O.J.); Greville «. Stulz, 1847 (Ld.
° See P. 13, par. 8, App. J. Denman) ; Hitcbins -o. Hitcbins,
^ Fiscber v. Sztaray, 1858 ; Due- 1866 ; Grrill v. Gen. Iron Screw
kett V. WiUiams, 1851. Collier Co., 1866; Hodges v. Cobb,
' Wilson V. De Ooulon, 1883. 1^67.
^ Eobiusonw. Dayiea, 1879. '^ Clayw. Stepbenson, 1837.
347
DEPOSITIOXS, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PAET 11.
tions into writing in the English language, and to swear an inter-
preter to translate the oath, interrogatories, and depositions, the
commission was held to be well executed by the return of deposi-
tions, which had originally been taken down in the foreign lan-
guage, and translated by the interpreter into English sis weeks
afterwards;' and when a commission contained a direction that
the witnesses should be examined apart from each other, the
court presumed that the commissioners had complied with this
order, although their return was silent on the subject.^ Possibly,
however, the court would not feel justified in presuming that com-
missioners had taken the oaths prescribed to them before acting.'
When documents have been produced in evidence before the com-
missioners, it will now suffice to transmit with the depositions,
either the originals or certified copies or extracts ; and attention
is drawn to this rule, because a more stringent one used to
prevail.*
§ 514. When a commission to take evidence has been directed to
a court, it is of course desirable that the court should have been
rightly named ; but a slight error in the description, provided it
be not of such a nature as to render it really doubtful what
tribunal was intended to have been addressed, will not invalidate
a commission.*
§§ 515 — 516. With regard to reading at the trial depositions
which have been taken under any of the various provisions men-
tioned above, reference must be made to the terms of Rule 18 of
Order XXXYII., which has been already set out in fuU.^ The effect
of this rule is, that depositions taken under the above rules are in
general admissible only in one or other of four events. First, if
the opposite party consents ; secondly, if the witness be proved to
be dead; thirdly, if he be shown to be beyond the jurisdiction of the
court ; ' and, lastly, if it appear that, from sickness or infirmity, —
1 Atkins V. Palmer, 1821 ; E. i». under a commission may be read
Douglas, 1846. without proving at the trial that he
'^ Simms v. Henderson, 1848. is then absent ; the onus of show-
" Brydges v. Branfill, 1841. ing that he is within the jurisdiction
♦ E. V. Douglas, 1845. rests on the objecting party: Sutton
» Wilson V. Wilson, 1883. v. Ainslie, 185ii. The same doctrine
' Supra, § 504, at p. 345. _ was adopted by Sir C. Cresswell in
' By Scotch law, the deposition of the Matrimonial Court : Pollack v.
a witness residing abroad examined PoUftck, 1861; andMillsj;. Mills 186l"
348
CHAP. IV.] DEPOSITIONS, WHEK ADMISSIBLE.
which terms do not necessarily mean an incurable malady, but will
be satisfied by any grave iUness,' — he cannot attend the trial. By
Rule 5,^ indeed, none of these conditions are absolutely binding,
for the judge has power to order depositions to be given in evi-
dence in any case. Still, that power must be guided by a judicial
discretion.' The admissibility in evidence of depositions will
still, in the absence of consent, depend (as it formerly did) upon
whether the witness at the trial * is or is not able. Indeed, in the
case of affidavits, it is expressly provided ' that " where it appears
to the court or judge that the other party bona fide desires the
production of a witness for cross-examination, and that such witness
can he produced, an order shaU. not be made authorizing the evidence
of such witness to be given by affidavit." ^
§ 517. The question remains, how the incapacity of the witness
to attend the trial is to be proved. The evidence as to such inca-
pacity being exclusively addressed to the judge, affidavits are
probably admissible upon the point as well as ordinary viva voce
testimony.' The E. S. C. 1883, make no reference to the matter,
while the only two forms which allude to it do so in language
inconsistent and obscure. The Form of Order for. a commission to
examine witnesses contains a clause that the depositions may be
given in evidence, " without any other proof of the absence from
this country of the witness or witnesses therein named, than an
affidavit of the solicitor or agent of the said as to his belief
of the ." This, so far as it goes, is clear, but it deals simply
with the case of the witness being out of the jurisdiction of the
court. The form given for an order for examining witnesses
before an examiner, contains a direction that the depositions of
' D. of Beaufort v, Crawshay, The point was again raised and left
1866. undecided in th.e case of the D. of
* Cited ante, § 504. Beaufort v. Crawshay, 1866. There,
" See Warner «. Mosses (C. A.), 1880 Willes, J., who seemed inclined to
(Jessel, M. E.) ; Bidder v. Bridges, support the ruling of the Chief
1884. Baron, referred to E. v. Eyle, 1841,
* See Bagot j;. Bagot (Ir.), 1878. but that case, on careful examina-
» By R. S. 0. Ord. XXXVII. tion, wiLL be found to throw a most
r. 1. treacherous light on the subject, as
' See Nadin v. Bassett, 1883, C. A. it relates to a mere ex parte proceed-
' On one occasion Pollock, C.B., ing. See, also, Carruthers u. Graham,
received the affidavit of a medical 1841 (Ld. Denman) ; Eobinson v.
man, as sufficient proof of the sick- Markis, 1841 (Ld. Abinger) ; and
ness of a deponent to let in his depo- ante, §§ 473, 475.
sition : Knight v. OampbeU, 1-848.
349
COMMISSIONS. [part II
any ■witness may be given in evidence on the trial of the cause,
" -without any further proof of the absence of the said witness than
the affidavit of the solicitor or agent of the as to his
belief." Here the term " absence " has a more indefinite significa-
tion than in the former form, and it is suggested that it may be
interpreted as including an absence from the court in consequence
of death or illness, as well as an absence from the coimtry.
§ 518. All the provisions of the special Acts cited in a footnote
on a previous page ' relating to the examination of witnesses under
commissions and orders have been extended to all suits and pro-
ceedings on the Revenue side of the Queen's Bench Division, and
also made applicable to the Probate and Divorce Division in
England,^ and to the corresponding courts in Ireland.^
§ 5 1 9. The Court of Bankruptcy is empowered * to " order that
any person, who in England would be liable to be brought before
it," with the view of discovering the debtor's property, " shall be
examined in Scotland or Ireland, or in any other place out of
England " ; and it is also provided* that " subject to general rules,
the court may in any matter take the whole or any part of the
evidence either vivS, voce, or by interrogatories, or upon affidavit,
or by commission abroad." By General Rule 66, the court may
empower any party to any matter, " where it shall appear
necessary for the purposes of justice," to give depositions in
evidence on such terms as the court may direct ; and by r. 60,
" an order for a commission to examine witnesses, and the writ of
commission shall follow the forms for the time being in use in the
High Court, with such variations as circumstances may require."
§ 520. The County Court rules on the subject of taking evidence
by deposition will be found in Ord. XYIII. of the Eules of 1889,
rr. 14 — 28, which are substantially identical with the provisions
of E. S. C, Ord. XXXVII. rr. 5 — 25, which have been already set
out.^ It is also provided' that " affidavits and depositions shall be
read as the evidence of the person by whom they are used."
' See footnote to § 500, supra. Eules of 1865 for the Ct. of Div. and
* See Eules in Div. and Mat. Mat. Causes, rr. 129 — 137 Form 20
Causes, rr. 132—137, 198. * By 46 & 47 V. c. 52 ("The Bank-
^ See, also, on this subject, Brown ruptcy Act, 1883"), § 27, subs. 5.
V. Brown, 1869 ; the Eules of March, ' Id. § 105, subs. 5.
1874, for the Ct. of Prob. in Eng., • Supra, § 604.
rr. 116—123, and Eorm 31 ; and the ' 0. 0. Ord. XVIII. r. 13.
350
CHAP. IV.] INTEEEOGATORIES UNDEE EULES OF 1883.
§ 521. It has teen already incidentally mentioned that evidence
other than oral (in other words secondary) is sometimes obtained
by means of interrogatories, and the depositions in answer to them.
Between the years 1854 and 1875 many rules were framed either
by the Legislature or the judges, with the view of enabling
litigants, before the actual trial took place, to scrape the con-
sciences of their opponents by means of interrogatories.^ The law
on the subject is now embodied in E. S. C, 1883, Ord. XXXI.
§ 522. Any discussion as to when interrogatories may be
administered, or as to the practice with regard to them, would
appear to be out of place here. Moreover, full information on the
subject will be found in any book upon "Practice." In this
edition of the present work ^ it will therefore not be further
discussed.
§ 523. The question whether any and what use can be made at
the trial of the answers to interrogatories which have been given
by the other side may properly be considered a branch of the Law
of Evidence. As to this, the ER. S. C, 1883, provide, by Ord.
XXXI. r. 24, as follows : — " Any party may, at the trial of an
action or cause, matter, or issue, use in evidence any one or more
of the answers, or any part of an answer, of the opposite party to
interrogatories without putting in the others, or the whole of such
answer : Provided always, that in such case the judge may look at
the whole of the answers, and if he shall be of opinion that any
others of them are so connected with those put in that the last-
mentioned answers ought not to be used without them, he may
direct them to be put in."
§§ 524 — 542. It has been remarked, " Under the new rules the
plaintiff can read one passage without referring to the whole, even
of the same paragraph, and I think no judge would allow a
defendant, where he had made an admission, to read with it a
passage which was not connected in sense or substance with that
> 17 & 18 V. c. 125, §§ 51—57 ; ralty, whether for England (see 24
38 & 39 V. c. 77, Ord. XXXI. For & 25 V. c. 10, § 17, repealed by 44
corresponding provisions relative to & 45 V. o. 59), or for Ireland : see
Ireland, see 19 & 20 V. o. 102, §§ 56— 30 & 31 Vict. o. 114, § 41, Ir.
59 and 62 ; 40 & 41 V. c. 77 (Ir.) and « The eighth edition (1885) of this
Eules. Similar powers were also work discussed the subject at great
extended to the old Court of Admi- length.
351
ACTIONS FOR PERPETUATING TESTIMONY. [PART II,
admission, even if he had put in a statement submitting that he
was entitled to do so, and claiming to do so. Of course, when an
admission is read, everything ought to be read which is fairly con-
nected with that admission, but I think it would be wrong for the
defendant, and he would not be allowed, to try to bring in matter
which was not in any way connected with the matter admitted." ^
§ 543. Before courts of law were empowered to issue commis-
sions for themselves, it was often necessary to institute proceedings
in Chancery as auxiliary to an action at law ; and in such cases,
recourse was had to what was called " an action for perpetuating
testimony."
§ 644. To extend the benefits derivable from this mode of pro-
ceeding, two Acts were passed. The first of these was passed in
1842,^ and is now. repealed. Its provisions are, however, sub-
stantially embodied in the R. S. C, 1883, Ord. XXXVII. r. 35,^
which provides, that " any person who would, under the circum-
stances alleged by him to exist, become entitled, upon the happen-
ing of any future event, to • any honour, title, dignity, or office, or
to any estate ■* or interest in any property, real or personal, the right
or claim to which cannot by him be brought to trial before the
happening of such event, may commence an action to perpetuate
any testimony which may be material for establishing such right
or claim." By the Legitimacy Declaration Act, 1858,* which
is the second of the Acts just referred to (and is still in force), the
Divorce Division of the High Court, on the petition of certain
persons specially interested, may make decrees declaratory of the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of any such petitioner, or of the validity
or rQvalidity of the marriage of his parents, or grandparents, or of
his own marriage, or of his right to be deemed a natural-born
subject.
§ 545. An action to perpetuate testimony must have " been com-
menced for the purpose," or no witness will be allowed to be
examined.® The court may, on motion in such an action, if the
' Cotton,L.J.,inLyellu. Kennedy, bell v. E. of Dalhousie, 1869, H. L.
1884 ; and see Bowen, L.J. * See Ee Stoer, 1884, C. A.
" 5 & 6 V. c. 69, repealed by 46 & ' 21 & 22 V. o. 93, §§ 1, 2 ; ex-
47 V. c. 49. tended to Ireland by 31 & 32 V.
•' Proceedings under tbis rule c. 20, Ir.
sboidd be jealously watched: Camp- ' Ord. XXXVII. r. 37.
352
CHAP. IV.] VIVA VOCE TESTIMONY, HOW PROVED.
defendant makes default in delivering a defence, make an order for
the action to proceed in due course, and that (where this is advisable)
a witness be at once examined, as if the pleadings were closed.^
The witnesses will be examined orally before one of the examiners
of the court under Ord. XXXYII. r. 5.^ The depositions will
then be taken down, signed, authenticated, and transmitted to the
Central Office, as in other cases.^ No relief being prayed, the
action must not be set down for trial.* In general, the depositions
will not be received at a subsequent trial as evidence,^ except in
support of an action, nor then, unless it be proved that the wit-
nesses are dead, or otherwise incapable of attending to be examined.^
The practice of the ecclesiastical courts was similar.'
§ 546. If a witness, besides being examined on interrogatories,
should testify at the subsequent trial of a cause, either party, on
any further trial respecting the same subject, may, if the witness
be then incapable of attending, rely, at his option, either on the
deposition, or on the previous viva voce testimony.^ What such
witness^ orally testified may be proved, either by any person, who
will swear from his own memory,^" or by notes taken at the time
by any person, who will swear to their accuracy,^^ or possibly from
the necessity of the case, by the judge's notes.'^ This last mode
of proof, however, is open to very grave, if not insuperable, objec-
tions, as such notes form no part of the record, nor is it the duty
of the judge to take them, nor have they the sanction of his oath
to their accuracy or completeness.^' How far it may be necessary
to prove the precise words spoken, does not clearly appear. It is
^ Marquess of Bute'w. James, 1886 ; Eay, 1843.
and see Ellice v. Eoupell, 1863. ' Wequelin v. Wequelin, 1839.
^ Marquess of Bute v. James, ^ Tod v. E. of Winolielsea, 1828
supra. See, also, Litton v. Murphy, (Ld. Tenterden), ante, § 400.
1878 (It.), decided on the correspond- ' Q-r. Ev. § 168, in part,
ing Irish Order, Ord. XXXVI. r. 6. " Strutt v. Bovingdon, 1803 (Ld.
3 Ord. XXXVII. rr. 12, 16. Ellenborough) ; May. of Doncaster
* Ord. XXXVII. r. 38. v. Day, 1810; E. v. Jollifie, 1791
^ "Where the Grown has an interest, (Ld. Kenyon).
if the Att.-Gen. be made defendant, " May. of Doncaster v. Day, 1810.
then no objection can be taken to " Id. (Sir J. Mansfield),
the depositions on the ground that " Conradi v. Conradi, 1868 (Wilde,
the Crown was noi a party to the J.O.); MUes v. O'Hara, 1811 (Am.);
action : Ord. XXXVII. r. 36. Fosters. Shaw, 1821 (Am.); Exparte
« 1 Smith's Oh. Pr. 769; Morrison Learmouth, 1821.
V. Arnold, 1817. See Att.-Gen. v.
353
VIVA VOCE TESTIMONY, HOW PROVED. [pART II.
said that in one case the evidence of a witness was rejected " as
he could not undertake to give the words, but merely to swear to
the effect of them."^ The same precision has, on several occa-
sions, been deemed requisite in America.'' On the other hand, it has
been forcibly urged' that to insist upon strict accuracy, in effect
excludes this sort of evidence altogether, while extreme particu-
larity and minuteness in a witness's narrative, and an undertaking
by him to repeat with exactness every word of the deceased's testi-
mony, ought to excite just doubts of the witness's honesty, and the
truth of his evidence.*
§ 547. It has been, on the one hand, decided that a dying depo-
sition is not admissible unless the very words of the deceased were
taken down, both question and answer having been taken down
where questions were put.* On the other hand, on indictments for
perjury, it is not necessary to state the entire examination, but it
will suffice to narrate, with accuracy, the whole of that portion of
the evidence which relates to the point on which the perjury is
assigned, provided the vsdtness can further swear that he heard the
whole examination, and that nothing was subsequently said to
qualify the original statement.^ Unless he can do this, his evidence
cannot be received ; ' and as the same rule ought to apply to the
proof of the testimony of a deceased witness, it would follow that the
person who heard a deceased witness give his evidence must at all
events be able to positively state what was said on the examination in
chief, and must also be able to give the substance of his answers
in cross-examination, or to positively swear that nothing escaped
the witness, which could vary or qualify the first statement.'
§ 548. When depositions are tendered in evidence as secondary
proof of oral testimony, they are, of course, open to all the objec-
tions which might have been raised had the witness himself been
personally present at the trial. Leading and other illegal questions
are therefore constantly suppressed, together with the answers to
• Mentioned by Lord Kenyon in Miles w. O'Hara, 1811 (Am.); Caton
E. u. Jolliffe, 1791. v. Lenox, 1827 (Am.); Jackson v.
» U. S. V. "Wood, 1818 (Am.); Bailey, 1806 (Am.).
Foster v. Shaw, 1821 (Am.); "Wilbur « E. v. Mitchell, 1892.
V. Selden, 1826 (Am.); Com. v. ' E. v. Eowley, 1825; E. «. Dow-
Eichards, 1836 (Am.). Un, 1792.
» Gr. Ev. § 165. ' E. v. Jones, 1791.
* See OomeU v. Green, 1823 (Am.) ; « yif^U. v. "Wyeth, 1824 (Am.).
354
CHAP. IV.3 DEPOSITIONS OPEN TO WHAT OBJECTIONS.
them ; and this, too, ■whether the testimony has been taken viv^
voce or by written interrogatories.^ But a party cannot repudiate
an answer which has been given to an illegal question put on his own
side ; ^ and in all eases where objections are taken to interrogatories
on the ground of their being couched in a leading form, the judge
is vested with a wide discretion as to how much, if any, of the
depositions returned he will in consequence strike out.^ Where a
witness, on being examined upon interrogatories in a foreign country,
stated in one of his answers the contents of a letter which was not
produced, that part of the deposition was suppressed at the trial,
though it was urged, that as the witness was beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the court, no means existed for compelling the production of.
the letter.* Said Chief Justice Tindal,* " We have no power to
compel the witness to give any evidence at all : but if he does give
an answer, that answer must be taken in relation to the rules of our
law on the subject of evidence."
§ 549. In another case, under similar circumstances, where a
witness described the contents of a letter and of the reply to it,
but produced neither, on this deposition being tendered the court
at the trial rejected the answers which stated what the letters con-
tained, but admitted so much of the deposition as stated that the
witness had written a letter to the party in question ; for had the
witness been himself present in court he might have been examined
thus far, in order to prove that the defendants through him had
used some exertion to procure the party's answer.* Again, depo-
sitions have been admitted, though the witness on his examination
had refreshed his memory with some papers, which he alleged were
partly in his handwriting and partly not, but which he refused to
allow the commissioners to see upon the ground that they were
private memoranda ; for, as it was a matter for the discretion of the
commissioners whether they would permit the witness to refer to
1 Hutchinson v. Bernard, 1836. stances, that either the letter must
s -[d^ be produced, or the whole inter-
' Small V. Nairne, 1849. rogatory abandoned. But this case
* SteinkeUer v. Newton, 1838 (Tin- is clearly not law. See per Ld.
dal, C.J.). In Wheeler v. Atkins, Denman, in Small v. Nairne, 1849.
1805, iid. Ellenborough is reported ' In SteinkeUer v. Newton, 1838.
to have held, under similar circum- ' Tufton v. Whitmore, 1840.
355
NO DEGREES IN SECONDARY EVIDENCE. [PART II.
papers during his examination, the learned judge, at the trial,
presumed that they had exercised their discretion with propriety.^
§ 549a. The rules governing the production of depositions as
evidence have now been fully discussed.
§ 550. It remains to consider a third head of the subject of
secondary evidence, viz., the general principle that the law
recognises no degrees in the various kinds of secondary evidence.^
This rule applies whether the original evidence be itself oral or
documentary. For instance, if a deed be lost, or in the hands of
the adversary, who after due notice refuses to produce it, secondary
evidence of its contents may at once be given by parol testimony,
even though the party offering such evidence may be proved to
have in his possession a counterpart, a copy, or an abstract of the
document ; ' and the former testimony of a deceased witness may
be proved by any person who heard him examined, even where a
clerk or a shorthand writer took down his evidence word for word.*
§ 551. At the same time, the rule that there are no degrees of
secondary evidence simply applies to the admissibility of secondary
evidence, and not to the degree of weight to which different sorts of
secondary evidence are entitled ; it does not mean that the mere
memory of a witness, who has read a deed, is entitled to equal
weight with an authenticated copy of the same instrument. In
many cases a jury would properly regard evidence with distrust if
it appeared that more satisfactory proof was intentionally withheld,
and under some circumstances this distrust might even amount to
absolute incredulity.
§ 552. Cases in which the law has expressly substituted some
particular species of secondary evidence, in the place of primary
proof, are, however, excluded from the operation of the rule that there
are no degrees of secondary evidence. For instance, examined
copies, and, in some cases, office or certified copies of pubUo records
1 Steinkelleri;. Newton, 1838 (Tia- and In re Gardner, 1868, in -wliich
dal, C.J.). cases oral evidence of the contents
* Doe V. Eos3, 1840 ; Hall v. Ball, of a lost will was admitted. See
1S41 ; Brown v. Woodman, 1834 Johnson v, Lyford, 1868 ; also, ante,
(Parke, B.); Jeans v. Wheedon, §436.
1843 (Oresswell, J.). * Jeans v. Wheedon, 1843 (Oress-
3 Cases in last note ; also, Sugden well, J.). See R. v. Christopher,
V. Ld. St. Leonards, 1876 ; Brown v. 1849.
Brown, 1858; In re Brown, 1858;
356
CtTAP. IV.] COPIES OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.
and documents are, on grounds of general conYenience, considered
admissible,^ and, though in strictness secondary evidence, partake
so much of the character of primary proof, that so long as it is
possible to produce them, other inferior degrees of secondary
evidence cannot be received.^ Parol testimony, in such cases,
can only be admitted on proof, first, that the public record or
document has itself been lost or destroyed (for otherwise a copy
might be obtained), and, secondly, that any copy which may
have been taken, is no longer under the control of the party
relying upon less satisfactory evidence.' In like manner, if a
witness has been examined before a magistrate or coroner under
such circumstances, that these officers respectively have, in pur-
suance of their duty, taken down his statement in writing, parol
evidence of his examination cannot be given in the event of his
death, so long as the deposition itself can be produced, since the
law, having constituted the deposition as the authentic medium of
proof, wiU not permit the admission of any inferior species of
evidence. The mere statement of a witness who was present at the
examination will be admissible if — and only if — it can be shown
that the deposition is lost or destroyed, or is in the possession of
the opposite party, who after notice refuses to produce it.*
§ 553. The principle, too, which includes every species of secon-
dary proof in one legal category, by no means, however, opens a
door to any sort of evidence, however loose, which a party chooses to
tender.' For example, the contents of a written instrument which
is lost cannot be proved by means of a copy, until it be shown that
such copy is accurate. If, as frequently happens, a party to the
suit has himself made a copy of a letter which he has sent to his
adversary, this copy, should the adversary, after notice to do so,
refuse to produce the original letter, cannot be read in evidence,
unless the party who made it can swear to its accuracy, or some
other witness can be called who has compared it with the original.*
Neither can a document, — excepting in a yerj few cases by
> Ante, § 439, and post, §§ 1534, Wylde, 1834.
1545, 1598 et seq. " Everingliam v. Eoimdell, 1838
' Doe V. Boss, 1840 (Ld. Abinger). (Alderson, B.).
3 Thurston v. Slatford, 1700 ; Mac- « Fisier v. Samuda, 1808 (Ld.
dougal V. Young, 1826. Ellenborougt). But see Waldy v.
* See 2 Euss. 0. & M. 895 ; E. v. Gray, 1870 (Bacon, V.-C).
357
4
COPIES OF COPIES INADMISSIBLE. [PAET II.
statutory authority, — ^be proved by the production of the copy
of a copy.^ Such evidence is rejected on the broad ground which
renders hearsay evidence inadmissible, for assuming the second
copy to correspond exactly with the first, the first must be produced
and proved to have been compared with the original, or otherwise
there wotdd be nothing to show that the second copy and the
original were identical. Such evidence would in fact be but the
shadow of a shade.
§ 553a. We have now discussed in full the four great rules
governing the production of testimony, which are : (i.) that the
evidence must correspond with the issue — a rule which has necessi-
tated as incidental to it the consideration of " variances" and of
"amendments;" — (ii.) that the evidence must be confined to the
point in issue ; (iii.) that the burden of proof always lies upon the
party who substantially asserts the affirmative — a rule as sub-
sidiary to which the subjects of the "Eight to Begin," and "Eight
to Eeply " have been necessarily considered — ; and (iv.) that the
best evidence must always be produced — ^the subjects of " Secon-
dary Evidence" being rendered admissible, (1) as to documents,
by means of " Notices to Produce," &c., and (2) as to oral evi-
dence by depositions, &c., having been treated of as arising out of,
and in connection with, this fourth rule.
§ 553b. The general rules governing the production of testimony
having been thus explained fully, we may now usefully pass on to
the next part of our subject, which wiU. be to consider the parti-
cular kinds of evidence.
' Liebman v. Pooley, 1816 (Ld. Ellenborough) ; Everingham v. Eoundell,
1838.
358
CHAP. IV.] AMERICAN NOTES. 358^
AMEEICAlSr NOTES.
Best Evidence. — It is extremely doubtful whether any rale so
philosophical and general exists in the English law of evidence as
that " the best evidence, of which the case in its nature is suscep-
tible, should always be presented to the jury," if by this is meant
that other evidence is excluded. That it would be well as a
rule of indulgence that evidence should be admitted in all cases if
it is the best that the nature of the actual situation permits, for
example, hearsay statements of a deceased person, is a position in
favor of which much might be urged. But neither as a rule of
requirement or of indulgence, does the rule exist that the best
evidence of which the case is capable is to be given. It is quite
possible to trace in the development of the law of evidence both
the feeling, on the part of judges, that the best evidence must
be given and that evidence should be received, if, ex necessitate rei,
it is the best that can be offered. But neither policy has become
established into a rule.
During the close of the sixteenth and for the major pari; of the
seventeenth century, a formative period in the law of evidence,
the effort was persistently made to determine all exclusions and
admissions by this standard.
The earlier American cases, as might be expected, follow these
stages of development of the "best evidence" rule in England by
insisting on the rule in its wider scope.
So held that conviction of larceny could not be shown by parol
to impeach a witness even if the court records had been destroyed
by the burning of the court house, since it was the duty of the
district attorney to send a certificate of the conviction to the Court
of Exchequer, and that certificate was "higher and better proof."
Hilts V. Colvin, 14 Johns. 182 (1817). So where an exemplified
copy of the judgment can be obtained, "neither the records them-
selves, nor minutes, should ever be received, when copies can be
obtained, unless there is some strong reason for dispensing with the
usual and appropriate evidence." Lowry v. Cady, 4 Vt. 504 (1832).
Such " strong reason " was considered to exist where the judgment
was in 1783 " In a new and frontier County Court at the close of
the revolutionary war, at a time and in a place where we may
presume the records were made and kept in a slovenly manner."
Walker v. Greenlee, 3 Hawkes, 281 (1824). The birth of de-
ceased cannot be proved by witnesses while the register of the
birth is not accounted for. Hartigan v. International, &c., Society,
8 L. Can. Jur. 203 (1863). It will be observed that many of these
cases bear on the vexata quaestio of degrees in secondary evidence.
So the corollary of the "best evidence" rule — that the best
358^ AMERICAN NOTES. tPABT JH.
evidence which it is possible to oiler will be received — has been
laid down in broad terms. Thus the court of appeals of New
York: "It is a universal rule, founded in necessity, that the best
evidence of which the nature of the case admits is always receiv-
able." McKinnon v. Bliss, 21 N. Y. 206 (1860).
It is not surprising that survivals are found, even in recent
times.
On an indictment for larceny of a hog the son of the owner was
not allowed to testify that his father had not consented to the
taking. "The best evidence of non-consent was that of the owner
himself; and before secondary evidence as to that fact was admis-
sible a reason should have been shown satisfactorily accounting
for the non-production of the best evidence." Smith v. State,
13 Tex. App. 507 (1883). But the later development of the law
has rejected the "Best Evidence" rule in its sweeping form, both
as a rule of indulgence and as one of requirement.
The strict rules of evidence are relaxed on the ground of impos-
sibility of other proof than that excluded only in specified instances.
For example, " The rule excluding hearsay evidence applies with
full force notwithstanding no better evidence is to be found, and
though it be certain, if the account is rejected, that no other can
possibly be obtained." Eeeves v. State, 7 Tex. App. 276 (3879).
Certainly there is at present no rule which requires, except in
certain specified cases, that weaker evidence cannot be received
where stronger is available. If a party, for any reason, presents
a case of inherent weakness, either on account of the nature of the
proof presented or because an unfavorable inference arises from
the apparent suppression of better evidence, probably no rule of
law is broken.
The official character of an individual may be shown by his
openly acting in that capacity as well as by production of a com-
mission or appointment. U. S. v. Eeyburn, 6 Peters, 362, 367
(1832); Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, 70 (1827).
A promissory note may be used to prove a fact, though it is con-
tradicted by a recital in a deed. Magee v. Burch, 108 Mo. 336
(1891). Any person may state what the opposite party said on a
previous occasion in court, though the evidence has been taken
down by a stenographer, and no attempt is made to account for
failure to produce his notes. Brice v. Miller, 35 S. C. 637 (1891).
The defence that certain machines sold do not comply with a
warranty may be established by the results of certain tests made
by the vendor; though the defendants have themselves made no
attempts to put the machines into actual use. " It is obvious that
the well-known rule of law to which the learned judge who tried
the case called the attention of the jury has no just application
to the case on trial. Its purpose is to require parties to deal
CHAP. IV.J AMERICAN NOTES. 358^
frankly with court and juries, to produce the best evidence in their
possession or control at the time of the trial, and if it appears dur-
ing the trial that the party has in his possession, or under his
control, evidence which is better in quality than that which is pro-
duced, it is the duty of the court to direct the jury, in effect, to dis-
regard the evidence produced, and to take into consideration the
attempted fraud." Baker, D. J., in U. S. Sugar Refinery v. E. P.
Allis Co. 66 Fed. Rep. 786 (1893). " The testimony of the chemist
who has analyzed blood, and that of the observer who has merely
recognized it, belong to the same legal grade of evidence; and
though the one may be, entitled to much greater weight than the
other with the jury, the exclusion of either would be illegal."
People V. Gonzalez, 35 N. Y. 49 (1866).
So a witness can testify even if better witnesses could have been
produced. "One who can testify under any circumstances upon
the facts on which he is examined, may do so as well where his
sxTperiors are to be found as where he knows as much as any other."
Elliott «. Van Buren, 33 Mich. 49 (1875). In the same way, on
an indictment for selling intoxicating liquor to a minor, the minor
was allowed to testify to his minority, though better evidence, in
the persons of his father and mother, was available, and an
instruction to the effect that such evidence was not "the best evi-
dence of which the case will admit " was held correctly refused.
"It is perhaps true that the evidence of the minor may not be so
satisfactory, as to the fact, as the evidence of the father or mother,
or some other person present at his birth — still, his statement on
oath as to his age, should be received and permitted to go to the
jury as evidence, to have such weight as it is entitled to have,
under the circumstances. ... It is true, it is a rule of evidence,
that, the best evidence of which the case, in its nature, is suscep-
tible, should be required. But still, when there is no substitution
of evidence, but only a selection of the weaker instead of the
stronger proofs, or an omission to supply all the proofs capable of
being produced, the rule is not infringed." State v. Cain, 9 W.
Va. 559, 669 (1876). Where a document from the comptroller's
office was produced, in the absence of the comptroller, by a witness
to whom he had left the keys of his office, it was objected that the
comptroller himself was the best evidence, and so that offered was
inadmissible. Held : — unsound. " The rule that the best evidence
in the party's power or possession shall be produced, does not apply
in this case, for that rule only applies to grades of evidence. Oral
evidence shall not be received when there is written , a copy when
the original can be had." Governor v. Roberts, 2 Hawks, 26 (1822).
The difficulties of applying the "best evidence" rule to the ex-
tent contended for are thus set out. "If the rule was, that the
most full and satisfactory evidence should be produced, it would
358* AMEEICAN NOTES. [PAET IH.
follow that where it appeared there were others present, they
should also be produced, or where a person from his situation had
a better view of the transaction; one who had a less favourable
position should not be received, or where it appears that another
could give a more detailed account of the affair, one who could
not give so full a one should be excluded, although there may be
no doubt as to his knowledge of the facts to which he deposes."
Ibid.
To prove the incarceration of a prisoner the sheriff who took him
there is a competent witness, though the warden, keeping a record
of the terms, &c., of prisoners, would be a better one. "If the
marriage or birth of the prisoners had been wanted as introductory
to evidsDce of the crime charged, it would scarcely be argued that
a witness, who was present at the birth or marriage, was incompe-
tent to prove it, because a registry existed. In questions of iden-
tity, records and registries are not the best evidence, for after the
entries in them are received it is necessary to individuate the per-
sons mentioned, and this must be done by evidence dehors the doc-
ument!" Howser v. Com. 51 Pa. St. 332 (1865). Evidence is
admissible that a tumbler contained intoxicating liquor without
producing the liquor or accounting for its absence. Com. v. Welch,
142 Mass. 473 (1886). The condition of clothes may be described
though no reason is given for not producing them. To hold other-
wise would require real evidence in all cases where it would be
possible. Com. v. Pope, 103 Mass. 440 (1869). And yet it has
been held that testimony was admissible that certain parts of a
broken machine fitted each other, though the machine was present
in court and could have been examined by the jury. Congdon v.
Howe Scale Co., 66 Vt. 255 (1894).
In proving what was done in buying and selling oil through
agents at distant points under telegraphic orders, the principal is
a competent witness, though better evidence could very probably
be given by the agents who effected the transactions.
" In requiring the production of the best evidence applicable to
each particular fact, it is meant that no evidence shall be received
which is merely substitutionary in its nature, so long as the original
evidence can be had. The rule excludes only that evidence which
itself indicates the existence of more original sources of informa-
tion; but where there is no substitution of evidence, but only a
selection of weaker instead of stronger proofs, or an omission to
supply all the proofs capable of being produced, the rule is not
impinged." Western Union Tel. Co. v. Stevenson, 128 Pa. St.
442 (1889) ; Richardson v. Milburn, 17 Md. 67 (1860). " It may
be weaker than other evidence which might be attained, tending
to prove the same fact; but the mere selection of weaker, instead
of stronger proofs, will not justify the exclusion of the weaker.
CHAP. IV.] AMERICAN NOTES. 358"
•when it is, in its nature, primary and relevant." McCreary v.
Turk, 29 Ala. 244 (1856). To prove percolation, the plaintiff is
not called upon to go to the expense of an uncertain experiment
of ditching. Crozer v. New Chester Water Co., 148 Pa. St. 130
(1892).
Where the making of certain statements is in issue as the basis
of conduct, one who heard them may testify to them, although the
party who made them might himself have been called as a witness.
Badger v. Story, 16 N. H. 168 (1844); Peatherman v. Miller, 45
Pa. St. 96 (1863). Or the statements are in writing. State v.
Seymore (la.), 63 N. W. 661 (1896). The age of a person may
be shown by witnesses, though there is a record of the birth in a
family Bible. State v. Woods, 49 Kans. 237 (1892).
To the contrary effect, i.e., that a witness with inferior know-
ledge cannot be called, while a better witness is available, see
Parliman v. Young, 2 Dak. 176 (1879).
SuBSTiTUTioNAEV EVIDENCE. — There seems no doubt, however,
that merely substitutionary evidence will be rejected, or, if received,
will be so counterbalanced by the inference of fraud caused by the
suppression of the superior evidence as to possess little, if any,
resultant of probative force. This proceeds upon the line of
thought embodied in the maxim, " Om,7iia contra spoUatorem,"
and has been considered in that connection. See ante, p. 183^^
There seems but slight practical advantage in formulating the
" best evidence " rule to cover the same ground already covered by
this presumption.
In Holmes v. Coryell, 58 Tex. 680 (1883) the court cite with
approval an extract from 1 G-reenl. Evid. 82. "This rule does not
demand the greatest amount of evidence which can possibly be
given of any fact ; but its design is to prevent the introduction of
any which, from the nature of the case, supposes that better evi-
dence is in the possession of the party. ... In requiring the best
evidence applicable to each particular fact, it is meant that no
evidence shall be received which is merely substitutionary in its
nature, so long as the original evidence can be had. The rule only
excludes that evidence which itself indicates the existence of more
original sources of information."
On the principle of omnia contra spoUatorem, the unfavorable
inference which arises from failure to produce witnesses who know
the entire facts, while putting forward those who know less, is both
logically and legally obvious. As the court say on an indictment
for keeping a gaming house, where several persons present at the
time of the raid were in attendance at the trial and not called as
witnesses, " Had there been any reply to be made to the inculpa-
tory evidence produced by the state, it was clearly in the power of
the accused to answer that evidence ; and his failure to do so,
358^ AMBEICAJSr NOTES. [PAET III.
notwithstanding his ample opportunity, could well be considered by
the jury as adding strength and force to the prima facie case made
out by the state. He introduced other witnesses who did not know
the material facts, but carefully avoided introducing those who did
know them. 'Where a party being apprised of the evidence to be
adduced against him has the means of explanation or refutation in
his power if the charge or claim against him be unfounded, and does
not explain or refute that evidence, the strongest presumption arises
that the charge is true or the claim well-founded. It would be
contrary to all experience of human nature and conduct to come to
any other conclusion.' 1 Stark Evid. 545." Stevenson v. State,
83 Ga. 575 (1889).
" The jury may draw unfavorable inferences from a party's failure
to call witnesses who have knowledge of material facts." Wimer v.
Smith, 22 Oreg. 469 (1892).
" Any failure to do this could hardly happen without some motive,
and in the absence of any other being shown, the almost irresistible
conclusion would be that he feared at least the witness would not
support his other testimony, and thus have the effect to create
more or less doubt and discredit of such party's case." Seward v.
Garlin, 33 Vt. 584 (1861) ; Whitney v. Bayley, 4 All. 173 (1862) ;
Baldwin v. Whitcomb, 71 Mo. 651 (1880).
The modern objection to substitution lies in the bad faith to the
tribunal implied in suppressing better evidence while offering an
inferior quality, presumably less injurious to him who declines to
produce the more conclusive. " For if it appear from the very
nature of the transaction, that there is better evidence of the facts
proposed to be proved, which is withheld, a presumption arises that
the party has some secret and sinister motive for not producing the
best and most satisfactory evidence, and is conscious that if the
best were to be afforded, his object would be frustrated." Hart v.
Yunt, 1 Watts, 253 (1832).
Facts showing that the evidence is not substitutionary but that
some good excuse exists for not producing the better evidence,
are admissible, with the effect of admitting the evidence otherwise
excluded. Smith v. State, 13 Tex. App. 507 (1883) ; Mark v. Hast-
ings (Ala.), 13 So. Rep. 297 (1893) ; Crozer v. New Chester Water
Co. 148 Pa. St. 130 (1892).
What evidence is substitutionary depends upon the circumstances
of each particular case. It by no means follows because more con-
clusive evidence is possible that a party is withholding and suppress-
ing it because, if produced, it would injure his case. A reasonable
construction of the situation is adopted.
" The rules of evidence are adopted for practical purposes in the
administration of justice ; and although it is laid down in the books
as a general rule, that the best evidence bhe nature of the case will
CHAP. IV.J AMERICAN NOTES. 358'^
admit of, must be given ; yet it is not understood that this rule
requires the strongest possible assurance of the matter in question."
Minor v. Tillotson, 7 Peters, 99 (1833). The existence of a judg-
ment cannot be shown by the parol statement of the creditor. It
" implies that there is better evidence of its existence than mere
testimony can be." McNeill v. Donohue, 44 111. App. 42 (1891).
Written Instruments. — The rule excluding substitutionary
evidence has its most rigid and invariable application where the
substitution attempted is that of secondary or inferior evidence of
the contents of a written instrument for the primary evidence of
the instrument itself. Probably the rule (and it was a most natural
beginning of the entire " best evidence " rule) concerned itself at
first with sealed instruments, and was connected -with the rules regu-
lating profert, which required the actual production of the very in-
strument set up in the pleadings. The reasons xequhxingprofert and
the nature of the acceptable excuses are forcibly and quaintly set
forth by Lord Coke. "And therefore it appears, that it is dangerous
to suffer any who by the law in pleading ought to shew the deed
itself to the court, upon the general issue to prove in evidence to a
jury by witnesses that there was such a deed, which they have heard
and read ; or to prove it by a copy ; for the viciousness, rasures, or
interlineations, or other imperfections in these cases, will not appear
to the court ; or peradventure the deed may be upon condition, limi-
tation, with power of revocation, and by this way truth and justice,
and the true reason of the common law would be subverted. But yet
in great and notorious extremities, as by casualty of fire, that all his
evidences were burned in his house, there if that should appear
to the Judges, they may, in favour of him who has so great a loss
by fire, suffer him upon the general issue to prove the deed in
evidence to the jury by witnesses, that afftiction be not added to
affliction ; and if the jury find it, although it be not shewed forth
in evidence, it shall be good enough." Doctor Leyfield's Case, 10
Co. Eep. 88, 92 (1610).
The transition from the production of the document as a matter
of procedure to its use as evidence and the broadening of the rule
from sealed to written instruments probably proved easy.
Still, as late as 1797 the common law rule obtained in New Jersey
that sealed instruments went with the jury to their consultation
room as of right, while other written documents went only by con-
sent or order of court. State v. Eaymond, 53 N. J. 260 (1891).
Modern " Best Evidence " Rule. — At present the rule requir-
ing the best evidence is practically limited in scope to requiring
proof of the contents of a written instrument by the primary
evidence of the instrument itself until a sufficient excuse has been
shown for allowing secondary evidence.
" The term ' best evidence ' is confined to cases where the law has
358^ AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET III.
divided testimony into primary and secondary. And there are no
degrees of evidence except where some document or other instru-
ment exists, the contents of which should be proved by an original
rather than by other testimony which is open to danger of inaccu-
racy." Elliott V. Van Buren, .33 Mich. 49 (1876).
Even a certified copy of a deed is not admissible until the party
offering shows that the original is not in his possession or control.
Phenix, &c. Ins. Co. v. Merchants, &c. Assoc, 51 111. App. 479
(1893).
When it appears that the party offering evidence of an inferior
grade is not suppressing evidence, but is offering the best he has,
such proof is received. So where the minutes of a parish meeting
were never extended on the records of the parish, the}' may be
proved by parol. Wallace v. Townsend, 109 Mass. 263 (1872).
The preliminary inquiry when secondary evidence is offered of
the contents of a written document is whether the party offering it
is suppressing the primary evidence. Has he the original document
in his possession or control, and, if not, could he by reasonable care
and diligence have procured it ?
"Before, therefore, testimony of an inferior grade is permitted to
be adduced, the court to whom the preliminary enquiry is addressed,
will require satisfactory proof, that better evidence is not voluntarily
withheld." Mordecai v. Beal, 8 Porter, 529 (1839); Morrison v.
Jackson, 36 S. C. 311 (1891).
The rule excludes even press copies. The originals must first be
accounted for. State v. Halstead, 73 la. 376 (1887); Marsh v,
Hand, 35 Md. 123 (1871).
" A letterpress copy is not an original. It in no wise differs from
any other accurate copy than in the mode in which it is made ; and
it can be used in the place of the original in no case where a proved
copy, made in another manner, would not be equally admissible."
King V. Worthington, 73 111. 161 (1874); Foot v. Bentley, 44 N. Y.
166 (1870); Watkins v. Paine, 67 Ga. 60 (1876).
The contention that such copies are always admissible is queried
in Gilbert v. Moline Plow Co., 119 U. S. 491 (1886). Press copies,
however, are admissible upon proof that the original letters were
duly sent by course of mail, and that the sendee has made diligent
and fruitless search for them. Powell v. Wallace, 44 Kans. 656
(1890).
The onus is on the party offering secondary evidence to
establish a satisfactory excuse. This he may do in one of three
ways, according as the original is (a) presumably in his own
possession, (b) presumably in that of the adverse party, (c) presum-
ably in the hands of a third party.
Diligent Seaecii. — (a) Own Possession. If the document, when
last seen, was in his own possession or control, a party offerino-
CHAP. IV.J AMERICAN- NOTES. 358^
secondary evidence of the same must show diligent search in all
places where the document might fairly be expected to be, and
that such a search, pursued for a reasonable period, has been fruit-
less. Phillips V. Trowbridge Furniture Co., 86 Ga. 699 (1890) ;
Wing V. Abbott, 28 Me. 367 (1848) ; Perrin v. State, 81 Wis. 135
(1892) ; Sebree v. Dorr, 9 Wheat. 658 (1824) ; Hart v. Yunt, 1 Watts,
253 (1832) ; Susquehanna &c-. Ins. Co. v. Mardorf, 162 Pa. St. 22
(1892) ; Eoberts v. Dixon, 60 Kans. 436 (1893) ; Putnam v. Goodall,
31 N. H. 419 (1856) ; Danforth v. Tennessee, &c. E. R. 99 Ala. 331
(1892).
Where court papers were taken from the files, and traced through
several successive attorneys for the plaintiff to one who said that he
had never seen them, held that a sufficient basis had been laid for
the introduction by the plaintiff of secondary evidence. Carr v.
Miner, 42 111. 179 (1866).
Eeasonable diligence in search is the test applied. Where an
ancient deed was sought among the other similar papers of the
owner of the land, without effect and no other place of search ap-
peared, secondary evidence was admitted. " If any suspicion hangs
over the instrument, or that it is designedly withheld ; a more rigid
inquiry should be made into the reasons for its non-production.
But when there is no such suspicion, all that ought to be required
is reasonable diligence to obtain the original." Minor v. Tillotson,
7 Peters, 99 (1833). Where the written resolution of a board of
directors was not found, on due search, in the office of the recorder
of deeds, nor in that of the receiver or of the attorney for the
assignee, who had received the assets prior to the receiver, but
neither the secretary, president, or assignee of the company were
produced or their depositions taken, held, that no sufficient foun-
dation had been laid for the admission of secondary evidence.
Mullanphy Savings Bank v. Schott, 136 111. 656 (1891).
"It must be proven — that a diligent, unsuccessful search has
been made for it in all places where it is likely to be." Bascom v.
Toner, 6 Ind. App. 229 (1892) ; Darrow v. Pierce, 91 Mich. 63 (1892) ;
Smith V. Allen, 112 N. C. 223 (1893). " We agree that the rule of
law which requires the best evidence within the power or control of
the party to be produced should not be relaxed, and that the court
should be satisfied that the better evidence has not been wilfully
destroyed nor voluntarily withheld. But the rule on the subject
does not exact that the loss or destruction of the document of evi-
dence should be proved beyond all possibility of a mistake. It only
demands that a moral certainty should exist that the court has had
every opportunity for examining and deciding the cause upon the
best evidence within the power or ability of the litigant." U. S. v.
Sutter, 21 How. 170, 176 (1858) ; Eullman v. Barr, 64 Kans. 643
(1895); Mark v. Hastings, 13 So. (Ala.) 297 (1893); Brooke v.
3581" AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET HI.
Jordan, 14 Mont. 375 (1894) . It is not sufficient that a present
court stenographer could not find the notes of a former stenographer.
Susquehanna Ins. Co. v. Mardorf, 162 Pa. St. 22 (1892).
Amount of Proof. — " The amount of evidence required to
prove the loss of a written instrument, for the purpose of admitting
secondary evidence of its contents, depends, in a great measure
upon the nature of the instrument iind the circumstances of the
case. . . . Thus, it is obvious, that the same evidence ought not to
be required, to prove the loss of a promissory note, after the debt
had been paid, and the note taken up by the maker, as would be
requisite to establish the loss of a deed, under which a party claimed
title. For, it is not usual to preserve instruments of the former
character, after the debts which they represent have been paid ;
while title deeds are generally kept with care." Wallers. Eleventh
School District, 22 Conn. 326 (1853); Wiseman v. Northern Pac.
R. R., 20 Oreg. 426 (1891).
Slight search will be sufficient for a subscription paper which had
become of no value, because the amount on which the obligation was
conditional had not been raised. " It might then be treated as mere
waste paper." Waller v. Eleventh School District, 22 Conn. 326
(1853).
Where the record of a judgment of a deceased justice of the
peace was lost, secondary evidence of its contents was not admissible
in the absence of evidence of inquiry among the family of the
deceased. Wing v. Abbott, 28 Me. 367 (1848). "To entitle a party
to give parol evidence of the contents of a paper alleged to be
lost, it is incumbent upon him to show that a diligent and careful
search was made at the proper places and by the proper persons,
and that it could not be found. It is not enough to give some evi-
dence of its loss, but he must give such evidence as will satisfy the
court that the proper foundation for the admission of secondary
evidence has been laid. Where a paper which the law requires to
be filed and kept by a public officer as part of the records or papers
of his office, is alleged to be lost, the court has a right to require,
before receiving parol evidence of its contents, that careful and dili-
gent search was made in the office, and by one so fully acquainted
with the office, records and papers as to make it probable that if
the paper was in the office he would find it." Howe v. Fleming,
123 Ind. 262 (1889).
A search at the Dead Letter Office will not be required in case of
a missing letter, in the absence of evidence that such a search would
probably be successful. Williams v. Grey, 23 C. P. U. C. 561 (1874).
There must be proof "that there has been diligent search and
inquiry made of the proper person and in the proper place for the
lost deed ; that the loss must be proved, if possible, by the person
in whose custody it was at the time of the loss, if such person be
CHAP, rv.] AMERICAN NOTES. SSS^^
living ; and if dead, application should be made to his representatives
and search made among the documents of deceased." Trimble v.
Edwards, 84 Tex. 497 (1892); Tibbals v. Iffland, 10 Wash. 451
(1896).
If such search is not made among the effects of the deceased
possessor of the document, secondary evidence is inadmissible.
Adkins v. Galbraith (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. W. 291 (1895).
If such search is made, evidence of contents of a deed is admissi-
ble, " even in the absence of certificates shovs^ing the proper execution
of the original." Van Gunden v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., 52
Fed. Rep. 838 (1892). " The courts have never attempted to define
the precise degree of diligence essential to be shown in the effort to
produce a written instrument in order to render admissible parol
evidence of its contents! But it would seem to be sufficient if the
party offering such proof has in good faith exhausted all the sources
and means of discovery which the nature of the case would suggest,
and which are accessible to him." Baldwin v. Burt, 43 Neb. 245
(1895).
Good Faith for the Court. — The degree of proof of good
faith in the search for the primary evidence is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court.
" What shall constitute this satisfactory proof, to authorize the
introduction of secondary evidence, cannot easily be reduced to any
fixed rule ; it is addressed to the discretion of the court, to be
governed by the circumstances of the case." Mordecai v. Beal, 8
Porter, 629 (1839); Morrison v. Jackson, 35 S. C. 311 (1891);
Gorgas v. Hertz, 150 Pa. St. 638 (1892) ; Bain v. Walsh, 85 Me. 108
(1892) ; Williams v. Grey, 23 C. P. U. C. 561 (1874) ; Stratton v.
Hawks, 43 Kans. 638 (1.890); Elwell v. Mersick, 60 Conn. 272
(1882) ; Kleinraann v. Gieselmann, 114 Mo. 437 (1893) ; Martin v.
Bowie, 37 S. C. 102 (1892) ; Brooke v. Jordan, 14 Mont. 375 (1894).
"The finding of the presiding judge upon preliminary questions of
fact material to the competency of evidence at the trial are not open
to revision in this court." Stevens v. Miles, 142 Mass. 671 (1886).
The discretion of the trial court is final, unless it has been abused.
Howe V. Fleming, 123 Ind. 262 (1889). "His determination of the
fact cannot be reviewed here, unless the proof of loss was so clear
and conclusive that it was error of law to find against it." Kearney
V. Mayor &c. of New York, 92 N. Y. 617 (1883).
There seems to be an abuse in exercising this discretion when
secondary evidence is admitted of an instrument alleged to be lost
where the witness, in whose custody it has been, testifies that, after
an hour's search, he is unable to find it, but thinks it must be among
his papers, and that, by further search, he might possibly find it.
Wilburn v. State, 60 Ark. 141 (1895).
" Whether there was sufficient evidence of the loss of the assign-
358^ AMEEICAN NOTES. [PAET III.
ment of -whicli secondary evidence was admitted, was a question of
fact for the presiding judge. Unless his finding was based upon an
error of law, or upon evidence which, as matter of law, was insuffi-
cient to sustain the finding, it would not here be open to revision."
Smith V. Brown, 151 Mass. 338 (1890).
But while the preliminary inquiry necessary to, the introduction
of secondary evidence is addressed to the discretion of tlie court,
yet all the evidence admitted is for the consideration of the jury.
" The admissibility of the evidence was a question for the court, but
its weight and effect, when taken in connection with other facts in
the case, was a question for the jury, and should be left to their
consideration and judgment." Graham v. Campbell, 56 Ga. 258
(1876).
What Instruments aee Included. — Where the regulations of
a railroad company are printed in a book, which is not produced or
accounted for, parol evidence is not admissible. Louisville, &e. E. E.
V. Orr, 94 Ala. 602 (1891) ; Price v. Richmond, &c. E. R. 38 S. C.
199 (1892).
The rule applies to books of original entry, orders, drafts, &c.
McCrady v. Jones, 36 S. C. 136 (1891). To books of account, Eau
Mfg. Co. V. Townsend, 50 111. App. 558 (1893). To time books,
Dillon V. Howe, 98 Mich. 168 (1893). To the books of a bank, Eoden
V. Brown (Ala.), 15 So. Eep. 598 (1894). To an ordinary message,
if contained in a written note. Combs v. Com. (Ky.), 25 So. West.
590 (1894).
The fact of a complaint to the assessors of taxes can only be
shown by their record and not by the testimony of one of their
number. State v. Central, &c. E. E. 17 Nev. 259 (1883).
Where dying declarations are reduced to writing they come under
the application of the rule. Boulden v. State, 102 Ala. 78 (1893).
The rule under consideration applies to ancient documents equally
with others. McEeynolds v. Longenberger, 67 Pa. St. 13 (1868).
So as to documents refreshing memory. Dillon v. Howe, 98 Mich.
168 (1893).
So to the heading of a hotel register. Grauley v. Jermyn, 163 Pa.
St. 501 (1894). And to proof of a foreign law. Ennis v. Smith,
14 How. 400, 426 (1852).
So of entries in corporation books and papers. Mandel v. Swan
Land Co., 154 111. 177 (1895).
If the authority to draw a bill of exchange is itself in writing, it
must be produced. Tensley v. Penniman, 83 Tex. 54 (1892).
A certified copy of a registered deed is not admissible until notice
has been given the grantee to produce the original. Com. v. Emery,
2 Gray, 80 (1854). But a plaintiff who has never had the original
deeds in her possession may introduce such a copy. Ee Assignment
of Eea, 82 la. 231 (1891).
CHAP. IV.J AMERICAN NOTES. SSS^^
Whether the original is in the possession or control of the party-
offering a copy is a question for the court. Bell v. Kendrick, 25 Fla.
778 (1889).
Degrees in Secondaet Evidence. — The rule requiring proof
of a written instrument by the production of the instrument itself,
practically the solitary survival of a once sweeping " best evidence "
rule, retains in many jurisdictions much of the old-time strictness
of the original. It is required that even when secondary evidence
is admissible an inferior degree or grade of secondary evidence shall
not be received while it is in the power of the party to present a
higher grade of this secondary proof.
Such is the requirement in the courts of the United States.
Where the original record of a judgment and a certified copy
of the same had both been destroyed by fire, a certified copy of this
first copy was held admissible. " The principle established by
this court as to secondary evidence in cases like this is, that it
must be the best the party has it in his power to produce. The
rule is to be so applied as to promote the ends of justice and guard
against fraud, surprise and imposition. . . . This court has not
yet gone the length of the English adjudications, which hold,
without qualification, that there are no degrees in secondary
evidence." Cornett v. Williams, 20 Wall. 226, 246 (1873). But in
Renner v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 581 (1824) it was held that in proving a
lost note a notarial copy was not required, — " it not being neces-
sary that a promissory note should be protested." Ibid.; Stebbins w.
Duncan, 108 U. S. 32, 43 (1882). Apparently the courts of Georgia
adopt a similar view. Where a blank form of a bill of sale of
furniture on the instalment plan was offered with evidence that the
contract between the parties was made by filling out a similar blank,
the evidence was rejected. " The proper foundation was not laid
for the introduction of this paper. One of the originals which had
been executed should have been introduced, if obtainable. If none
could be obtained from the original parties, or a certified copy of
the same from the record, in case they had been recorded, then,
perhaps, the paper presented might have been admissible." Phillips
V. Trowbridge Furniture Co., 86 Ga. 699 (1890).
So in Louisiana, where record of a copy of a marriage contract
was admitted although neither the absence of the original was
accounted for or any evidence offered that a copy of the original
could not be procured, the judgment was reversed. " The objection
embodied an elementary principle found in every work on evidence,
and so completely consecrated by established jurisprudence as to
dispense with any citation of authorities to support it." Mercier v.
Harnan, 39 La. Ann. 94 (1887).
So in Arkansas, Steward v. Scott, 57 Ark. 153 (1893) ; and Cali-
fornia, Ford V. Cunningham, 87 Cal. 209 (1890).
358^* AJsiEKicAisr NOTES. [part in.
A modified insistance on degrees in secondary proof prevails in
Alabama. " While the doctrine, that there are no degrees in second-
ary evidence has not prevailed to its fullest extent, in this State, we
are not prepared to adopt a stringent extension of the rule, which
excludes all secondary, until the absence of the primary evidence is
accounted for, to secondary evidence. Where the secondary evi-
dence offered, ex natura rei, supposes a higher degree of secondary
evidence, the best should be produced. 'But, where there is no
ground for legal presumption that better secondary evidence exists,
any proof is received, which is not inadmissible by other rules of
law, unless the objecting party can show that better evidence was
previously known to the other, and might have been produced ; thus
Subjecting him, by positive proof, to the same imputation of fraud,
which the law itself presumes when primary evidence is withheld.'
When a certified or examined copy of a paper required to be recorded,
or a letter-press copy of a writing, is shown to be in existence, it is
better evidence than the memoriter statements of a witness, and
its production should be demanded." Jaques v. Horton, 76 Ala.
238 (1884).
" We confess that the American rule appears to us more reason-
able than the English ; and we see great propriety, if there was an
examined copy of an instrument in the possession of a party, in
refusing to allow him to prove it by the uncertain memory of wit-
nesses. A copy of a letter, taken by a copying press would unques-
tionably be better evidence of the original than the recollection of
its contents by a witness ; and the same reasons which would require
the production of the original, if in the control of the party, would
operate in favor of the production of the fac-simile, or of the
examined copy. But, in all these cases, the strength of the proposi-
tion consists in the fact, that there is secondary evidence, in its
nature and character better than that which the party offers, and
that it is in his power to produce it. He certainly must be allowed
to show, that what appears to be secondary evidence of a higher
degree is not so in fact. In other words, he would be allowed to
show that the paper, which purported to be a copy, was not in fact
and in truth one." Harvey v. Thorp, 28 Ala. 250 (1856).
The courts of Georgia insist upon the existence of degrees in
secondary evidence. " There are degrees in secondary evidence, and
the best should always be produced. ... A sworn copy should
always be received in preference to verbal testimony, to prove the
contents of a written contract." Williams v. Waters, 36 Ga. 454
(1867).
The rule is the same in Illinois. It appearing probable that there
is in existence a copy of a lost will, parol evidence of contents is
not admissible until the non-production of the copy is accounted for.
Illinois, &c. Co. v. Bonner, 75 111. 315 (1874).
CHAP. IV.] AMEEICAN NOTES. 358^^
The rule is the same in Pennsylvania. Parol evidence of the
contents of a letter is not admissible while a facsimile (in a letter-
press copying book) is not produced or accounted for. Stevenson v.
Hoy, 43 Pa. St. 191 (1862).
The courts of Minnesota do not apply the rule that there are
degrees in secondary evidence to cases where " the nature of the
case does not of itself disclose the existence of such better evi-
dence." Minneapolis Times Oo. v. Nimocks, 53 Minn. 381 (1893).
On the contrary, it is held in many states that, when the sources
of original evidence are exhausted, the contents of the instrument
in question may be proved by any competent evidence.
Among these states is Massachusetts. "When the source of
original evidence is exhausted, and resort is properly had to second-
ary proof, the contents of private writings may be proved like any
other fact, by indirect evidence. The admissibility of evidence
offered for this purpose must depend upon its legitimate tendency
to prove the facts sought to be proved, and not upon the compara-
tive weight or value of one or another form of proof." Goodrich v.
Weston, 102 Mass. 362 (1869). « If there are several sources of
information of the same fact, it is not ordinarily necessary to show
that all have been exhausted before secondary evidence can be
resorted to." Smith v. Brown, 151 Mass. 338 (1890). Maine fol-
lows the same rule. Nason v. Jordan, 62 Me. 480 (1873).
The rule in Indiana is the same. " There are no degrees, as a
general rule, in secondary evidence." Carpenter v. Dame, 10 Ind.
125 (1858).
And New York. A copy of a letterpress copy is admissible after
notice to the other side, in whose possession it is, to produce the
original letter. Robertson v. Lynch, 18 Johns. 451 (1821).
In New Jersey. Ketcham v. Brooks, 27 N. J. Eq. 347 (1876).
In Connecticut. " The rule that a copy of a copy is not evidence,
properly applies to cases where the original is still in existence and
capable of being compared with it ; or where it is the copy of a
copy of a record, the record being still in existence, and being by
law as high evidence as the original. The reason of the rule is the
same in both cases, the copy offered is two removes from the original.
But it is quite a different question where the original is lost, and the
record is not deemed in law as high as the original." Cameron v.
Peck, 37 Conn. 555 (1871).
Telegkams. — Secoxdart Evidence. — The single point of
difference, so far as relates to primary and secondary proof of con-
tents, between telegrams and other written instruments, lies in the
fact that there are frequently two written instruments in each trans-
mission of intelligence ; — viz., the document delivered to the
transmitting office and that delivered to the sendee by the receiving
office. Which of these two instruments is the original document
3581" AMEKICAN NOTES. [PAKT m.
within the meaning of the rule under consideration is, under the
weight of authority, determined by the rules governing the law of
agency.
" When the. sender of a telegraphic message takes the initiative,
the message, as delivered, may, as between him and the person to
whom it is sent, be treated as the original, in the absence of evi-
dence to show mistake in the transmission of it." Nickerson v.
Spindell, 164 Mass. 25 (1895) ; Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431
(1876) ; Durkee v. Vermont Central R. R., 29 Vt. 127 (1856) ; Mor-
gan V. People, 59 111. 58 (1871) ; Anheuser-Busch Brewing Asso-
ciation V. Hutmacher, 127 111. 652 (1889) ; Western Union Telegraph
Co. V. Shotter, 71 Ga. 760 (1883) ; Wilson v. Minneapolis, &c. R. R.
31 Minn. 481 (1884) ; Morgan v. People, 59 111. 58 (1871) ; Magie v.
Herman, 50 Minn. 424 (1892).
To the contrary effect, that the original in all cases is the message
delivered at the transmitting ofB.ce, see Matteson v. Noyes, 25 111.
591 (1861) ; Williams v. Brickell, 37 Miss. 682 (1859).
It is necessary in some way to show that " the alleged sender did
actually send or authorize to be sent the dispatches in question."
Oregon Steamship Co. v. Otis, 100 K Y. 446 (1885).
This evidence may frequently be found in the telegram, signed by
the party himself or his agent, i. e., the copy delivered to the com-
pany. Ibid. Smith v. Easton, 54 Md. 138 (1880).
For the rule t'o apply at all, it is essential to show that the tele-
grams were in writing instead of being delivered orally, many
telegrams being communicated to the transmitting office in that
way. Terre Haute, &c. R. R. v. Stockwell, 118 Ind. 98 (1888). "In
proving a contract entered into in such a manner, it would, I appre-
hend, be necessary to produce the original communications with the
proper signatures of the parties, and the transmission over the wires
might then be admitted as the means of informing them of the
proposition on one side and the acceptance on the other." King-
horne v. Montreal Telegraph Co., 18 Q. B. U. C. 60, 71 (1859).
Where the person who afterwards becomes the sendee of a tele-
gram, requests an answer by telegraph, the telegraph company
becomes the agent of the sendee, and the original is the message as
delivered to the telegraph company at the transmitting oifice. " But
where the party to whom the communication is made is to take the
risk of transmission, the message delivered to the operator is the
original, and that is to be produced, or the nearest approach to it by
way of copy or otherwise." Durkee v. Vermont Central R. R. 29
Vt. 127 (1856) ; Smith v. Easton, 54 Md. 138 (1880).
The rules governing the admission of secondary evidence in the
case of telegrams are the same as obtain in connection with other
written instruments. Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431 (1876) ;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Collins, 45 Kan. 88 (1890) ;
CHAP, rv.] AMEEICAN NOTES. 358"
Prather v. Wilkens, 68 Tex. 187 (1887) ; Howley v. Whipple, 48
N. H. 487 (1869) ; State v. Hopkins, 50 Vt. 316 (1877) ; Lindauer v.
Meyberg, 27 Mo. App. 181 (1887) ; Western Union Telegraph Co.
V. Cline, 8 Ind. App. 364 (1893).
There is no question that a telephone message may be proved by
the oral evidence of the sendee. Wilson v. Minneapolis, &c. R. R.
31 Minn. 481 (1884).
When parol evidence is admissible as to the contents of a written
instrument it is naturally confined to such portions of the instru-
ment as would be relevant if the instrument itself were produced.
It is no objection to the competency of a witness that he cannot
state the immaterial portion of a letter. McGibbon v. Burpee, 25
E"ew Bruns. 81 (1885).
Admissions as Pkoof of Contents. — Whether an admission
by a party otherwise entitled to insist upon primary proof of con-
tents by production of the original, regarding the contents of a
written instrument is such a levamen prohationis as to dispense with
the proof of such contents is in dispute.
That an admission does have that effect, see Wolf v. Lachman
(Tex. Civ. App.), 20 S. West. 867 (1892) ; Loomis v. Wadhams, 8
Gray, 557 (1857) ; Hoefiing v. Hambleton, 84 Tex. 517 (1892) ;
Morey v. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 542 (1893).
So of the contents of a telegram, as admitted by the sender.
Williams v. Brickell, 37 Miss. 682 (1859).
To the contrary, see Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480
(1832). " The admissions of a party are competent evidence against
himself only in cases where parol evidence would be admissible to
establish the same facts, or in other words, where there is not, in
the judgment of the law, higher and better evidence in existence to
be produced." Ihid.
Production of written receipts is not excused by the fact that a
third party has made a memorandum of them to the accuracy of which
the party demanding primary proof has assented. Hart v. Yunt, 1
Watts, 263 (1832).
In New Jersey the rule prevails that while an ordinary admission
does not have the effect of relieving the adverse party from the
necessity of proving the contents of a written instrument, a "formal
and solemn " admission has been " ever regarded as intrinsically
possessing all the force of primary evidence." Cumberland, &c.
Ins. Co. V. Giltinan, 48 N. J. Law, 495 (1886).
The rule requiring primary evidence of contents is not dispensed
with in favor of a holder in a suit against the maker on a promissory
note by the fact that under a statute the defendant is not entitled to
dispute his signature, having filed no affidavit to that effect. Seebree
V. Dorr, 9 Wheat. 558 (1824).
(J) Papers in Adverse Possession. — If the original document
358^8 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET HI.
is ill the possession of the adverse party, his failure to prodiice it,
upon being seasonably requested so to do, will be regarded as suffi-
cient proof that the party is not suppressing evidence to let in
secondary evidence of contents. Steed v. Knowles, 97 Ala. 673
(1892); Eoberts v. Dixon, 50 Kans. 436 (1893); Coff man t;. Niagara
&c. Ins. Co., 57 Mo. Ap. 647 (1894) ; Morse v. Woodworth, 156 Mass.
233, 248 (1892). Or to his attorney. Den v. M'Allister, 7 N. J. Law,
46, 63 (1823). This is sufficient even where there was no evidence
that the original had never been in the hands of the defendant, but
was traced into the hands of his attorney through his connection
with another case. Ibid. " But such notice may be dispensed with
upon proof that such party has said that such writing has been lost
or destroyed. . . . The law nowhere requires the doing of an
obviously nugatory and unavailing act." Barmby v. Plummer, 29
Neb. 64 (1890) ; U. S. v. Britton, 2 Mason, 464 (1822).
So where from the nature of the action the defendant has notice
that the plaintiff intends to charge him with the possession of a
written instrument, e. g., a notice in writing, formal notice to pro-
duce is not required. Railway Co. v. Cronin, 38 Oh. St. 122 (1882) ;
Howell V. Huyck, 2 Abb. App. Cases, 423 (1867).
In a criminal case, where an original instrument is in the posses-
sion of the accused, apparently notice to produce is excused. The
court will not compel him to furnish evidence against himself.
State V. Gurnee, 14 Kans. Ill (1874). See also Dunbar v. U. S., 156
U. S. 185 (1894).
An admission by the defendant that he wrote a letter which he
refuses to produce on notice is sufficient to admit secondary evi-
dence of its contents. Dunbar v. U. S., 166 U. S. 185 (1894).
Where the defendant puts in part of a letter which he has
received from the plaintiff, but which the plaintiff claims is muti-
lated, the plaintiff can give parol evidence of the mutilated portion
without a notice to produce given to the defendant. Robinson v.
Cutter, 163 Mass. 377 (1895).
A seasonable notice must be given. A notice given on the same
day as the copy was received in evidence, the opposite attorneys dis-
claiming any knowledge of the original, has been held insufficient.
Pitt V. Emmons, 92 Mich. 542 (1892).
So a notice to attorneys to produce papers which are in a distant
state must be sufficiently extended to permit the originals to be
found and produced if secondary evidence is to be received. Dade
V. ^tna Ins. Co., 54 Minu. 336 (1893).
Less extended notice may be sufficient where the party in whose
possession they are, in view of their relation to the case or their
use in former hearings, has reason to expect that the originals will
be called for. Battaglia v. Thomas, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 563 (1893).
If the instrument is within the control of a party it is the same
CHAP. IV.] AMERICAN NOTES. 358^^
thing as if in his possession. " If a party has the legal right to the
possession of a document, in a . legal sense it is within his control,
though he may have left it with an agent or other person, from
whom he has a right to receive it by demanding its possession."
Wilson V. Wright, 8 Utah, 215 (1892).
Where the defendant, on being requested to produce certain
written receipts, excuses their non-production by claiming that a
third party refuses to surrender them, he cannot afterwards intro-
duce parol evidence of their contents if the judge finds that, in
point of fact, the defendant has attempted to suppress the written
receipts. "A party who has suppressed a written document, and
refused to produce it upon notice, and so compelled the adverse
party to resort to secondary evidence thereof, is not afterwards
entitled to offer proof of its contents." Gage v. Campbell, 131
Mass. 566 (1881).
Mere failure to produce a written document on notice, where a
reasonable excuse exists, will not prevent the party on whom the
demand was made from proving its contents by secondary evidence.
Spears v. Lawrence, 10 Wash. 368 (1894).
(c) Possession in a Stkanger. — I: the document itself is pre-
sumably in the possession of a third party, reasonable efforts to
procure his attendance as a witness, with the document, will be
required in order to admit secondary evidence of contents. Greer
V. Richardson Drug Co., 1 Tex. Civ. App. 634 (1892).
Where the document is in the hands of a third person outside the
reach of the process of the court, production is excused. Cabot v.
Given, 45 Me. 144 (1858): Mordecai v. Beal, 8 Porter, 529, 536
(1839); Pensecola E. E. v. Schaffer, 76 Ala. 233 (1884) ; Beattie o.
Hilliard, 65 N. H. 428 (1875); Missouri, &c. E. R. v. Gernan, 84
Tex. 141 (1892) ; Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wall. 125 (1873) ; Gordon v.
Searing, 8 Cal. 49 (1857); Zellerbach v. Allenberg, 99 Cal. 57
(1893) ; Brown v. Wood, 19 Mo. 475 (1854) ; Shepard v. Giddings,
22 Conn. 282 (1853) ; Ralph v. Brown, 3 W. & S. 395 (1842). When
the residence of the holders of an instrument is beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the court, the instrument is presumably out of the jurisdiction.
Manning v. Maroney, 87 Ala. 563 (1888).
But see Mullanphy Savings Bank v. Schott, 135 111. 655 (1891).
where, upon the original paper being traced into the probable
possession of persons outside the jurisdiction, the court suggest that
" Although all three were either non-residents or out of the state at
the time of the hearing, yet no reason is perceived why their testi-
mony could not have been taken." " It has repeatedly been held
that the person last known to have been in possession of the paper
must be examined as a witness, to prove its loss, and that even if he
is out of the State, his deposition must be procured if practicable, or
some good excuse given for not doing so." Kearney v. Mayor, &c.,
35820 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET lU.
92 K Y. 617 (1883). "The law provides an easy aud simple
method of taking the deposition of a witness residing out of the
state, and his deposition should have been taken, or some proper
effort made to obtain it. The fact that the person to whose posses-
sion the paper was traced resided out of the state, did not excuse
defendant from a diligent effort to procure it." Wiseman v. North-
ern Pacific E. R., 20 Oreg. 425 (1891) ; Wood v. Cullen, 13 Minn.
394 (1868) ; McGregor v. Montgomery, 4 Pa. St. 237 (1846) ; Porter
V. Hale, 23 Can. Sup. 265 (1894).
But if the party having the custody of the original is out of the
state, and on being asked to give a deposition refuses in the interest
of the opposite party to surrender the original, secondary evidence
is competent. Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Palmer, 52 Minn.
174 (1893).
If an original deed is in a foreign court, which declines to permit
its removal, a copy is admissible. Owers v. Olathe Co. (Colo.), 39
Pac. Eep. 980 (1895).
The suggestion that parol evidence is substitutionary and offered
in bad faith instead of written evidence, and to avoid its effect, pre-
sents itself in a most incisive form when it appears that the original
has been voluntarily and intentionally destroyed by the party offer-
ing the parol evidence. Under such circumstances the party is not
allowed to offer secondary evidence. Bagley v. McMickle, 9 Cal.
430 (1858) ; Count Joannes v. Bennett, 5 All. 169 (1862) ; Eudolph
V. Lane, 57 Ind. 115 (1877).
So where original documents are destroyed by the plaintiff after
the commencement of the suit. Baldwin v. Threlkeld, 8 Ind. App.
312 (1893).
Where the destruction is by accident or in good faith, parol
evidence of contents is competent. Pollock v. Willcox, 68 N. C. 46
(1878) ; Steele v. Lord, 70 N. Y. 280 (1877). But the party destroy,
ing must repel every inference of a fraudulent design in its destruc-
tion. Blake v. Fash. 44 111. 302 (1867).
Mere negligence is not fatal to the right to introduce secondary
evidence. Rodgers v. Crook, 97 Ala. 722 (1892).
The rule requiring the contents of a written instrument to be
proved by the production of the instrument itself, does not apply
when the only fact to be proved is that of the execution of the
instrument. " Here the suit was not on the paper : its contents had
nothing to do with the case." Shoenberger v. Hackman, 37 Pa. St.
87 (1860). " The rule that excludes secondary evidence in a con-
test with primary, does not mean that everything is secondary which
is not of the highest grade of proof, but only that which discloses
the existence of other evidence, the non-production of which may
be supposed to be on the ground that if produced would work
against the party offering it." Ibid. So wherever the effort is to
CHAP. IV.] AMERICAN NOTES. 358^^
prove the existence of a fact which may be shown by a writing,
parol evidence of the same fact is not rejected. For example, " If
a person acts notoriously as cashier of a bank, and is recognised by
the directors, or by the corporation, as an existing officer, a regular
appointment will be presumed : and his acts, as cashier, will bind the
corporation, although no written proof is or can be adduced of his
appointment." Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, 70
(1827). So where it is sought to prove, not the contents of certain
depositions, but simply the fact that they were properly taken and
used in a previous suit between the same parties touching the same
subject-matter, this may be done by parol. Ayers v. Chisum, 3 New
Mex. 52 (1884). In a case involving the foreclosure of a mortgage
by notices posted, objection was made to evidence of the posting of
these notices on the ground that they were in writing and should have
been produced. Held otherwise. " The rule requiring the produc-
tion of the writing itself as the best evidence does not extend to
mere notices or to matters collateral." McMillan v. Baxley, 112
N. C. 578 (1893). So the substantive fact that proofs of loss had
been made and delivered under an insurance policy may be proved
by parol. "The thing to be proved, therefore, was not what was
contained in the written proofs of loss but the fact that such written
proofs of loss had been furnished to the company within the pre-
scribed time." Pelzer Mfg. Co. v. Sun Tire Office, 36 S. C. 213
(1891). A witness may state that he had a mortgage, began a suit
to foreclose it, and took a deed of the same property, although the
record could also be used to prove them. File v. Springel, 132 Ind.
312 (1892). A witness may testify that he received orders from the
Post Office Department to demand certain things of a defaulter,
though these orders were in writing. " The question did not call
for the contents of the orders." Alexander v. U. S., 57 Fed. Rep.
828 (1893). So evidence is admissible that a defendant applied in
writing for a government liquor license, though the application is
not produced. State v. McGill, 65 Vt. 604 (1893). In an action
against a railroad company for failure to carry a theatrical company
to their destination on time, the plaintiff may testify that he was to
receive 75 per cent, of the box receipts, though the agreement estab-
lishing this share was in writing. Foster v. Cleveland, &c. E. E.,
56 Fed. Eep. 434 (1893).
On an action for failure to deliver a telegraph message, parol evi-
dence of the contents of the message as delivered and received is
admissible. " That a certain message was delivered for transmission
was a substantive fact necessary to be proved, and the rule is, that
when parol evidence is as near the fact testified to as the written,
then each is primary." Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Cline, 8
Ind. App. 364 (1893).
In refusing to apply the best evidence rule so as to exclude parol
358^2 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAET lH.
evidence that A was not mentioned in a certain will not directly
involved in the case itself, the Supreme Court of Alabama say:
" The question was not one directly raised by the issue in the cause,
but came up incidentally. In such case, the rule requiring the
highest and best evidence the nature of the question admits of does
not apply." Bulger v. Eoss, 98 Ala. 267 (1892).
A party may testify to the payment of money though a receipt
was taken at the same time. Davis v. State, 92 Tenn. 634 (1893).
In an action on an account for rent or use and occupation, the
plaintiff can recover on proof of an admission that the account is
correct and due notwithstanding the defendant has taken a written
lease of the premises from the plaintiff, and this lease is neither
produced nor any attempt made to account for it. Burch v. Harrell,.
93 Ga. 719 (1894).
Parol proof of the identity and character of an instrument not
produced will be admitted. The " best evidence " rule applies only
to proof of contents. Morrison v. Jackson, 35 S. C. 311 (1891).
On a complaint brought under the laws regulating the sale of intoxi-
cating liquor, evidence is competent as to what was written on
labels attached to jugs and decanters in the defendant's shop, with-
out producing them, or accounting for their not being produced.
"The labels on the jugs do not come within any class of written
instruments, the contents of which cannot be proved without pro-
ducing the original paper or document, or accounting for its loss or
unavoidable absence." Com. v. Blood, 11 Gray, 74 (1858).
Scope of Eule. — The rule requiring production of the primary
evidence of the contents of a written instrument applies only when
the instrument in question is admissible itself because relevant to
the issue. It does not extend to the use of written instruments in
incidental or collateral matters. " This rule has never been under-
stood to extend to matters aside from the issue and merely inci-
dental to the trial. Thus, the interest of a witness, and similar
concerns, could always be shown without the production of the
document by force -of which such interest had been acquired."
Cumberland, &c. Ins. Co. v. Giltinan, 48 K. J. Law, 495 (1886).
"The general rule has no application where the written instrument
is merely collateral to the issue ; as where the parol evidence relates
to matters distinct from the instrument of writing, although the
same fact could be proved or disproved by the writing." Coonrod v.
Madden, 126 Ind. 197 (1890) ; Schoenberger v. Hackman, 37 Pa St
87 (1860).
But it has been held that a witness cannot be questioned about a
copy of a statement until the non-production of the original is
accounted for. Glen Brick Co. v. Shackell, 14 Low. Can. Jur. 238
(1870). Or allowed to refresh his memory by a copy of a deed iiutil
the original has been accounted for. Jones v. Jones, 94 N. C. Ill
(1886).
CHAP. IV.] AMEEICAJSr NOTES. 358^^
Parol evidence of contents cannot be given until proof is offered
that the original, if itself produced, would be competent. The con-
tents of a letter supposed to have been written by the prosecuting
witness in a bastardy complaint cannot be proved until some evi-
dence is adduced that she wrote the letter itself. Stevens v. State,
60 Kaus. 712 (1893). A lease cannot be proved by parol until the
subscribing witness is produced. Hughes v. Southern Warehouse
Co., 94 Ala. 613 (1891).
In case of parol proof of the contents of a lost will ; " Unless
the whole can be proved, his intention will not be effectuated, and
therefore no part of the will can be established." Davis v. Sigour-
ney, 8 Mete. 487 (1844). But that a certain instrument is a copy
of a will and that the will was properly executed may be proved by
parol. Keagle v. Pessell, 91 Mich. 618 (1892).
The rule above stated does not extend so far as to forbid other
evidence of the fact which the written instrument would establish.
Consaul v. Sheldon, 35 Neb. 247 (1892). So where a certain sum
of money was paid and a receipt taken therefor, the evidence of a
witness who saw the sum of money paid is competent, even if the
same witness would not be allowed, until a suitable foundation was
laid, to state the contents of the receipt. " The difference between
the two principles consists in this : The payment of the money was
a fact testified to independent of the receipt, and was capable of
parol proof. But when the witness went further and stated that he
saw a receipt for the money signed, he undertook to give the con-
tents of the receipt, and the receipt itself was the better evidence."
Steed V. Knowles, 97 Ala. 573 (1892) ; Hyde v. Shank, 93 Mich. 535
(1892). Ownership in a vessel may be shown by acts of ownership
equally well as by the ship's register. Stearns v. Doe, 12 Gray, 482
(1859). A horse-car conductor may testify to the number of his
passengers on a particular trip though his slip is not produced.
Wynn v. City, &c. R. E. 91 Ga. 344 (1893).
But see also Coder v. Stotts, 51 Kans. 382 (1893).
The rule does not apply where a written document is used to
"test the temper and credibility of the witness." Klein ?;. Eussell,
19 Wall. 433, 439, 464 (1873).
A photographic copy will not excuse failure to produce the
original. Maclean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214 (1853).
Dup'licates. — The rule also does not apply to the case of dupli-
cate originals. In such case, each of the duplicates is admissible,
not as a copy but as an original. Gardner v. Eberhart, 82 111. 316
(1876).
There is no obligation to account for the absence of the other
duplicates or any of them. Cleveland, &c. R. E. v. Perkins, 17
Mich. 296 (1868).
Where two letters are written at the same time, one being retained
^^^2* AMEEICAN NOTES. [PAET DI.
and the other sent, the one retained is not a copy but a duplicate
original, and is admissible without notice to produce the other
original. Hubbard v. Eussell, 24 Barb. 404 (1857).
When a paper is made out in duplicate and one of the originals is
lost and the other in the hands of the person accused of a criminal
offence, a copy is admissible, as the court cannot compel the prisoner
to put in the other original against himself. State v. Gurnee, 14
Kans. Ill (1874).
So where a bill of lading was executed in duplicate, the plaintiff,
to prove the contents by secondary evidence, must satisfactorily
account for the non-production of both originals. When the plain-
tiff introduces parol proof of contents, the defendant may rebut
the proof by evidence of a similar nature. Dyer v. Fredericks, 63
Me. 173, 692 (1874).
Proof of Contents. — The parol evidence of contents must be
confined to an attempt to state the language contained in the written
instrument. Evidence is not competent of the previous conversation
of the parties in relation to what they proposed to agree in the
writing to be drawn up. Eichardson v. Bobbins, 124 Mass. 105
(1878).
The language itself is to be given and not evidence as to what
the witnesses understood were the propositions made and accepted
in the written instrument. Elwell v. Walker, 52 la. 256 (1879) ;
Burr V. Kase, 168 fa. St. 81 (1895).
A photographic reproduction of the original is admissible as
secondary evidence. It is merely a copy and whether a facsimile
or not is a question of fact for the jury. Eborn v. Zimpelman, 47
Tex. 503 (1877).
Depositions. — The law relating to depositions is so largely
statutory and so varying in the different states that it appears hardly
to admit of profitable attempts at classification.
Live Music Archive
Librivox Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland Museum of Art
Internet Arcade
Console Living Room
Books to Borrow
Open Library
TV News
Understanding 9/11