Lectures on the strategy of the Russo-Japanese war

QforncU Itttueraita Slibrarg

charles william wason
collection'

CHINA AND THE CHINESE

THE GIFT OF

CHARLES WILLIAM WASON

CLASS OF 1876

1918

Cornell University Library
DS 517.B61

Lectures on the strateav of the Russo-Ja

3 1924 023 037 199

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924023037199

LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY

OF THE

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

BY

BREVET-MAJOR W. D. BIRD, d.s.o.

(Late Professor Indian Staff College)

LONDON
HUGH REES, Ltd.

119, PALL MALL, S.W.
1909

ALL BIGHTS RESERVED

CONTENTS

rAOE

I. Geographical and Political Factors ... 1
II. Events leading up to the War — Organisation of

THE Armies — Strategical Considerations . 10

III. Narrative of the Land Operations up to the

Battle op Liao-Yang 24

IV. Narrative op the Events Preceding the Battles

OP THE Sha-Ho and Mukden .... 50
V. Lessons of the "War 64

APPENDICES
Details op Organisation op Troops .... 70
Approximate Distribution and Strength of Troops at
Various Periods 73

MAPS

1. General Map op Southern Manchuria . . In pocket

2. Plan op Positions at end op April, 1904

28

3.

, 27th May ....

33

4.

, 15th June ....

37

5.

, 30th June ....

38

6.

, 31sT July ....

45

7.

, 25th August

48

8.

, END OP Battle of Llao-Yang

49

9.

, EARLY IN October

57

10.

, END OP Sha-Ho Battle

58

11.

New Year, 1905

59

12.

, 20th February .

61

LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

EVEEY campaign possesses special features distinguishing
it from others, and perhaps even rendering comparison
with them difficult. These differences are conditioned by
topography, fertility, and climate, by national characteristics,
by relative strength and efficiency, by resources, and by the
character of the rival leaders.

Some acquaintance with these factors is therefore required
before a just appreciation can be made of the significance of
the strategical operations during the recent struggle in
Manchuria.

The first item dealt with will be the geography of the
seat of the war.

The soldier regards geography from a somewhat different
standpoint to that adopted by the civilian.

To the latter the term geography means information as to
the physical features of a country, as to its resources,
climate, railways, rivers, harbours, cities, inhabitants, ex-
ports, imports, policy, etc., which will be valuable in a
commercial, political, or even social sense. But the soldier
looks on all countries as possible theatres of war, and
though he may, and does, seek for information similar to that
required by the civilian, he enquires how the various
physical, meteorological, commercial, human, and political
factors will affect the progress of a campaign carried out in
the country the geography of which he is studying.

One of the first, if not the very first consideration, when

2 LECTUKES ON THE STEATEGY OF

regarding geography from a military point of view, is
therefore the communications of a potential theatre of war.

Speaking generally, the direction taken by roads is deter-
mined by the trend of the mountain ranges, which, to a
certain extent, condition the flow of the water rained on to
their sides, the river mouths, as a rule, also affording the
best havens.

Eoads usually follow the line of the least resistance —
that is, the water channels — but lateral communications
between river valleys cross the intervening ranges of moun-
tains or hills at their lowest points.
1 Hence, to discover the general direction of roads, it is
first of all necessary to obtain a clear idea of the coast-line,
mountains, and rivers of an area.
Coast. The coast-line of Manchuria and Korea from Shan-hai-
kuan, eastwards, extends for 2300 miles, of which 1700
belong to Korea. [See Map 1.] Though in this long stretch
there are many indentations, there are but few good har-
bours, except in the south of Korea. Elsewhere tEe coast
is of a shelving character, with flat mud shore_ sloping
gradually for miles out to sea, and hardly covered with
water even at high tide.

On the shores of the Pe-chi-li gulf, the difference between
high and low tide is sometimes as much as^twenty-five feet,
but along the southern and eastern coast of Korea it does
not amount to more than eight feet, and at Port Arthur and
Dalny is ten or twelve feet. Commencing from the west,
the first port of interest is Ying-kow, on the Liao river.
Vessels drawing about seventeen feet can cross the bar at
the mouth of the Liao, and can lie in the stream, which is
five hundred yards or more wide, though the fair-way is
much less. Ying-kow possesses wharves, lighters, etc.,
capable of dealing with a fair trade, but is ice-bound during
five months in each year.

Following the coast-line of the Liao-tung peninsula, lying
between Ying-kow and the Yalu, the next important arm of
the sea is found in Fu-chou bay, where shelter may be

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 3

obtained by vessels of moderate size, but at some distance
from the shore.

A more favourable anchorage is Hu-lu-shun bay, seven-
teen miles southwards, but this place is without facilities
for landing.

To the south of Hu-lu-shun lies Society bay, with the
Port Adams inlet, the latter being eighteen miles long and
open to vessels of the average tramp steamer size. The
shore of the inlet is, however, shelving, and there are few, if
any, landing facilities.

Chin-chou bay gives little or no shelter. Louisa and
Pigeon bays afford protection to small steamers, from all
but westerly winds. Port^AjjJuir is ice-free, land-locked,
and of considerable extent, '15ut rias little deep water.
The entrance is about five hundred to six hundred yards
wide, but the fair-way available for large vessels is not much
more than one hundred yards. The deep water lies in con-
tinuation of the harbour mouth. There are docks, with
accommodation for cruisers and smaller craft, and fairly
good workshops. The harbour bottom is of stiff clay, with
rock outcrop, which makes dredging difficult. The town and
harbour were protected by a complete system of works.
Thirty miles north of Port Arthur is Ta-lien-wan bay, six
miles long and six miles wide. To the south of this bay lies
Dalny, an ice-free port, with docks, and harbour available
fOTsEips drawing thirty feet of water. Next come Yen-
ta-kou, Kow-shi, and Pe-tsi-wo, also ice-free, but giving
shelter only from ^est and south-west, and with shoal fore-
shore for several miles. Ta-ku-shan resembles Pe-tsi-wo, but
is ice-bound for several months in the year. The mouth of
the Yalu is navigable by small steam vessels, but further
south the Che-chen river affords a good anchorage, though
Chin- am-pho, twenty miles up the estuary of the Tai-tpng
river, IS ITBeibter port. The river at Chin-am-pho is a mile
wide, and is said to be deep, but the foreshore shelves for
half a mile, and the harbour is, in winter, ice-bound.

Chem-ul-po, on the Han river, is the port of Seoul. It

4 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF

is accessible to all ships throughout the year, though the
anchorage is a mile from shore. In January and February
the harbour is partially frozen, making discharge of cargo
difficult.

Fu-san, to the south of Korea, is a fair harbour protected
by an island. Gen-san, on the east of Korea, is a good
port, usually ice-free in winter, but shut off from the rest
of the country by steep mountains.

Vladivostock, in the Amur river province, possesses docks,
and a harbour with two entrances. It is fortified, but is ice-
bound for five months in each year.
Mountains. The mountains of Manchuria are, in character, a series of
wooded hills, whose lower slopes, when not covered with
plantations of scrub oak or hazel, are cultivated in rough
terraces, whilst the higher portions often consist of bare
masses of rock, affording positions accessible in only one or
two places.

The hillsides, where not cleared for cultivation, are of
soft soil, freely sprinkled and in some places almost covered
with slabs of rock, and between the stones grow a profusion
of creepers and wild flowers.

The mountain area lies east and south of a line drawn
roughly from Hsiung-yao-cheng to Fu-shun.
' The hills, which are volcanic in origiuj trend in a general
' north-easterly and south-westerly direction, and consist of a
number of ranges roughly parallel to one another. These
are separated by fairly level valleys, from one or two miles
to four hundred yards wide, each boasting a stream, which
rambles over a stony and shallow, though relatively wide
bed.

The principal range of hUls is the Feng-shui-ling^ with
their southern continuation the Shui-nie-shan. The former
rear themselves to a total of about 5000 feet above sea
level, or 2000-3000 Jeet^ above their valleys ; the latter are
not more than 2000-3000 feet above the sea.

In these hills rise the Tai-tzu-Ho^ and its tributaries, which
' "Ho" ia the Chinese word for river, and "Ling" for pass.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 5

flow westwards, the Ai Ho and its tributaries flowing south
to join the Yalu ; also the Tai-an Ho running southwards
to Ta-ku-shan, and the Fu-chou river in the Liao-tung
peninsula.

West of the mountain area lies a great plain, extending
for one hundred and fifty miles, or more, westwards to the
Mongolian liilis. This plain, consisting of rich alluvial soil
brought down by the great rivers Liao, Hun, and Tai-tzu, is
thickly peopled, and highly cultivated, though liable to be-
come swampy in wet weather.

The division between plain and mountain is, in most
localities, distinctly marked, still, in the area between Kai-
chou and Liao-Yang, at distances of about twenty or thirty
miles, long, somewhat serrated ridges run westwards on to
the level ground, but usually end rather abruptly near the
line followed by the railway.

In the district between Liao-Yang and Mukden, the
dividing line between plain and hill is still less clear, a
series of isolated hills, or groups of little hills, extending for
ten or fifteen miles west of the upland area, but as in the
more southerly district, ceasing at or near the line of
railway.

The principal rivers watering the mountain and plain are Rivers.
the Liao, the Hun and Tai-tzu. The Liao, rising in the
Mongolian hills, flows at first in a north-easterly direction
for three hundred miles. Then, bending south-east, it con-
tinues in this course, until, after passing the Manchurian
boundary, it is turned southwards by a spur of the central
Manchurian hills, and travels for three hundred miles, across
the plain to which it gives its name, into the gulf of Pe-chi-li
near Ying-kow. On its left bank the Liao, twenty or thirty
miles above Ying-kow, receives the Hun and Tai-tzu
rivers, which meet a few miles above this point. The ^
general characteristic of all these rivers is that they run
on, rather than below the plain, in broad, relatively shallow '
beds, and between banks raised by the silt they bring down.
In the rainy season they are therefore liable to overflow,

6 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

and some ten years ago, eight days' continuous rain flooded
the whole Liao plain for nearly three weeks.

Steamers drawing seventeen feet of water can, as has
been noted, navigate the Liao to Ting-kow, thirteen miles
from its mouth. Large junks can sail up the river for some
fifty miles, small junks ascend to Hsin-ming-ting.

The Hun and Tai-tzu are navigable well above Mukden
and Liao-Yang, and considerable timber trade, by means of
rafts of logs cut in the higher reaches, is done on both
rivers.

The Hun, south of Mukden, is three hundred to four
hundred yards wide, and the Liao is of similar width at
Liao-Yang. In flood both rivers apparently rise five
or six feet, and are not easy to navigate owing to the
rapidity of the current. They are covered with ice, from
November to March, sufficiently thick to support guns.

The Yalu rises about midway across the northern boun-
dary of Korea, and after flowing south-west for three
hundred miles, empties its waters into the sea. In the upper
reaches a wild region of mountain and forest is traversed,
but some sixty miles from the mouth the southern bank is
cultivated, though on the northern it is still enclosed by
rocky hills and bluffs. The river is navigable, by junks, for
about fifty miles, and small steamers can cross the bar at its
mouth. At An-tung, it is over three-quarters of a mile
wide.

The remaining mountain streams possess characteristics
similar to the Fu-chou river. This winds along in a sandy
valley, from half a mile to two or three miles wide, and
flows in a stony bed, not more than two feet below the
valley level, its depth, in spring, rarely exceeding two
feet.

In the plain some of the tributaries of the Hun and
Tai-tzu are six or eight feet below the level of the fields, but
their banks are more often grass, or willow grown, than
precipitous, and the depth of water is not, in spring, more
than one or two feet.

THE EUSS'O-JAPANESE WAE 7

The Chinese cart, drawn by three or four mules, is the Eoadsand
tr anspo rt of Manchuria, hence almost every valley boasts a ™* *'
cart track, and the passes traversable by wheel transport,
possess, if not good, at least practicable, though steep, roads.

No road in Manchuria is metalled, and the great Imperial
and Mandarin roads differ from the others, only in that they
are two or three times as wide, and, if possible, more rutty.

In many places the roads and tracks have sunk below the
level of the surrounding country. This is partly due to
wear, but mainly to the fact that the Chinese farmer is
accustomed, annually, to remove, and use as field manure, the
road surface.

So heavy do the roads become after rain, that carts habitu-
ally sink up to their axles in mud, and on these occasions
the carter often seeks firmer soil by a small detour into the
neighbouring ploughed fields. To prevent this, the farmer
digs, at right angles to and close to the edge of the road, a
series of little trenches, about eighteen inches deep and
wide, and six or eight feet long.

In Manchuria, rain usually falls in July, August, and
September, coming, as do the Monsoon rains in India, in
bursts of from three to eight days, separated by bright
intervals. During, and immediately after rain, cart traffic
practically ceases, but as the soil is friable and dries quickly,
the roads can be used again after two or three days' sun-
shine.

In October the roads freeze, and remain hard, but rough
and full of ruts, until March, when the scanty snow that
has covered them during winter, thaws by day. In April,
the thaw regularly sets in, but the relatively hot sun soon
dries the roads, and keeps them so, until the break of the
Monsoon rains.

The climate is temperate to hot in summer, but is, at
times, very cold in winter. The snowfall is light, but when,
as happens two or three times a week, a northerly wind
blows, the thermometer, by day, falls to and below zero,
whilst the nights are always bitter.

8 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

The principal, that is, the most used roads, are the Im-
perial rbad from Pekin to the Yalu, and thence to Seoul.
This road, which is some thirty to forty feet wide, runs, in
Manchuria,' from Hsin-ming-ting to Mukden, a distance of
140 miles, thence to Liao-Yang, forty miles. From this
place it plunges south-eastwards into the mountains, and
after crossing the Mo-tien-ling pass, about 3500 feet above
the sea, and the Feng-shui-ling mountains at Len-shan-kuan,
runs, by Feng-huang-cheng, to An-tung, 180 miles from
Liao-Yang. In Korea, it passes by Ping- Yang to Seoul, 140
miles from An-tung.

The coast road from the Yalu to Port Arthur, via Ta-ku-
shan, 230 miles. The road from Port Arthur to Kirin, via
Kai-chou, Hai-cheng 230 miles, and Mukden 310 miles from
Port Arthur.
Eailways. The most important railways were, an extension of the
Trans-Siberian line, known as the Chinese Eastern railway,
running from near Chita to Vladivostock, for 200 miles in
Eussian, and for 950 miles in Chinese territory.

At Sungari, not far from Harbin, and 600 miles from
the Siberian border, the Port Arthur branch leaves the
main line, reaching Dalny in 600 miles, and Port Arthur
in 615 miles. The line was single, and of five-foot gauge,
the rails being single-headed, with flat base, and weigh-
ing 62 lb. the yard; the ballast and sleepers were of but
moderate quality. The sidings and crossing places were
about ten miles apart, and the fuel burnt was wood, except
in Southern Manchuria, where coal was used. Of bridges
there were, on the main line, about a dozen over
200 yards length, of which the longest was that at
Sungari, which measured about 800 yards. On the Port
Arthur branch were thirty of about 80 yards length,
whilst those at Liao-Yang and Mukden were more than
600 yards long, and that at Kai-chou was of some 300
. yards span. Apparently the maximum carrying capacity
k developed was about twelve pairs of trains per day.

The Imperial Chinese railway from Pekin to Ying-kow,

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 9

with a branch to Hsin-ming-ting, might possibly have been
used by the Japanese to move troops against the Eussian
right. This was a single line, of British standard gauge.

There were telegraph lines along the railways, and cables! Telegraphs
connected Fu-san with Japan, and Port Arthur with Chifu. joables.

The Liao valley is a great grain-producing area, beans and Eesources.
mi llet being princip ally raised . The millet, which grows to
a height of ten feet, provides the Chiaaman with most of the
necessaries of life. The grain is used as food for man and
beast, and for distillation of spirits, whilst the stalks are
chopped up as fodder, or are employed to thatch houses,
fence gardens, or even as firewood. Few domestic animals
are bred, except pigs, but Mongolia produces "quantities of
sheep, cattle, and small horses, which are readily obtained
from Hsin-ming-ting.

The hilly country produces timber, and coarse silk from
silk worms, which feed on the underwood.

Coal of fair quality exists near many of the big towns,
the principal centres being Fu-shun, Yen-tai, Pen-si-hu.

The Chinese towns are all of one pattern, square built, Towns and
and surrounded by a crenulated wall twenty to thirty feet ' *^°^'
high, and at top eight to ten feet wide. These walls are
pierced by numerous pagoda -roofed gates. Within are
unmetalled streets, of one story, tile-roofed, shanties and
shops, and in the case of the larger towns, suburbs of mud
houses have grown up outside the city walls.

In the plain, the villages consist of groups of thatched
houses, with walls of mud, or of sun-dried bricks plastered
with mud, each standing in a garden surrounded by a more
or less thick and well-built wall, or by a fence of plaited
millet stalks. In the hills, houses and walls are of roughly
shaped stones, sometimes cemented, and the roofs are of
thatch, slate, or tile.

II

Events rPHE war between Eussia and Japan is traceable, as are

tlTe wir^^ ° most modern wars, at any rate, to intense conflict of

interest between the two powers. For centuries, and at
intervals of about a hundred years, the Japanese had made
incursions into Korea and Manchuria, and had, after suc-
cesses more or less important, and occupation more or less
prolonged, been driven back to their islands by the Chinese.
Korea and Manchuria were therefore the historical lines of
Japanese expansion.

Some fifty years ago, the Eussians first appeared in the
Far East, when they wrested the Amur province and Vladi-
vostock from China. At this time Japan was governed
under a feudal system, when the land, though nomin-
ally ruled by the emperor, was really under the power
of the nobles, or Daimios, and their armed Samurai re-
tainers. But, in 1868, the nation, after a severe struggle,
overthrew the Dafmios. At about the same time the
Eussians occupied Saghalien, an event which, combined
with the seizure of the Amur province, caused Japan to
fear for her safety.

The Japanese, noting that the European strength lay in
armament and organisation, now decided to avoid the fate of
the Amur province and Saghalien, by organising the country,
Grovernment, army and navy, on European principles.
Japanese were therefore sent to Europe to assimilate
Western ideas, and European teachers were freely imported
into Japan.
1890. The combined result of this policy, and of these events,
was such an increase in the material prosperity and popula-

10

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 11

tion, that Japan_felt, about 18^90, the need foi expansion.
At the same time it was feared that Korea, Japan's his-
torical outlet on the mainland, inhabited by a physically
fine, but in spirit decadent race, and ruled under the nerve-
less suzerainty of China, might fall into the hands of
Russia. Japan therefore decided either to occupy Korea, or
to render herself paramount in the peninsula.

With this object a quarrel was picked with China in 1894, 1894.
the Chinese fleet was defeated off tfie Yalu, the passage of
the river was forced, Port Arthur and Wai-hai-wai were
taken.

China thereupon concluded a peace on April 30th, 1895, 1895.
under which Korea was declared intiependent, the Kuan-
tung peninsula, that is, the area between Chin-chou and
Port Arthur, was leased to Japan, and a large indemnity
promised.

Eussia, Germany, and Austria, now brought diplomatic
pr^ufeT to beaj^on"^Japaif,'causing' her, much to the disgust
of the nation, to relinquish her conquests. About 1891,
Eussia had begun the construction of the Trans-Siberian
railway, with the object of at once linking up her East
Asian possessions more closely with her European territory,
and, if circumstances were favourable, of wresting a further
piece of country from China's feeble grasp. By 1895 the
railway had nearly reached Lake Baikal.

The Eussian press, and Foreign Office, at that time
fostered in the national mind, the idea that Eussia must
possess an ice-free port on the open sea, and this conception
seems to have beeiT used "By a group of leading men in
Eussia to induce the Government to take up the project of
obtaining such a harbour in Southern Manchuria. J^an,
meanwhile, seeing in Eussia's various manoeuvres, a direct
threat to Japanese independence, began, in 1895, deliber-
ately to prepare herself, both morally, physically, and
politically, for a life and death struggle with her powerful
competitor. She therefore set about"e3ucatmg the nation" \
to the idea of war with Eussia, and at the same time further

12 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF

improved her armed forces, and looked round for allies.

1896. In 1896, Russia made another move in the game, when she
obtained permission, from China, to run the Chinese Eastern
railway direct from Chita to Vladivostock, instead of along
the left bank of the Amur. In 1898, she went further,
leasing Port Arthur from China, together with the southern
portion of the Liao-tung peninsula. At the same time she
began to construct, from near Harbin, a branch railway
which, by 1900, had reached Port Arthur, though the line
was but roughly laid, and was unballasted.

1900. In 1900, the late Dowager Empress of China, much
impressed by the South African disasters of England, the
power at that time most feared in Pekin, determined to
try and rid China of foreigners, and with this object
fomented the so-called Boxer rising.

Russia at once seized the opportunity to occupy Man-
churia to protect her railway, but later, in response to
diplomatic representations, promised the powers to evacuate
the Mukden province in October 1902, Kirin in the spriag
of 1903, and Tsi-tsi-har, north-west of Kirin, in the autumn
of the same year.

Whilst these events were taking place, and the Japanese
were organising their forces, the statesmen of Japan had, in

1902. 1902, concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with
Great Britain, under which it was agreed that if either
nation were attacked by two powers, the other should come
to the aid of her ally.

Japan also entered into friendly relations with the United
States, thus practically securing herself against the inter-
vention of other nations in the forthcoming struggle with
Russia.

In October 1902, Russia evacuated part of south-west
Manchuria, but failed to carry out her promise in respect to
the remainder of the province.

1903. At the beginning of 1903, general Kuropatkin, the
Russian War Minister, made a tour of inspection in the Far
East, and as a result, a viceroyalty was created, which would

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 13

bring the various provinces, commands, and garrisons, under
the central authority of admifal Alexiev, who was nomin-
ated viceroy.

Japan, angry at Eussia's breach of faith regarding the
evacuation of Manchuria, and alarmed by the creation of
a viceroyalty, which, it was feared, was but the prelude to
an'mcfeasetn Eussian activity in the Far East ; began, in
July 1903, to negotiate for the redemption of the pledge to
quit Manchuria. These negotiations ended in war, in
February 1904.

Though Japan was not, perhaps, quite ready for war in
1903, her preparations^ere so far advanced as to render
possible the inception of the campaign, whenever diplomacy
decided that the favourable moment had arrived. Eussia,
on the other hand, was by no means so well prepared.
The Trans-Siberian, and Chinese Eastern railways, except
the section round Lake Baikal, had indeed been roughly
completed, the fortifications of Port Arthur had been
strengthened, and the port of Dalny created.

But the railways were not yet capable of heavy traffic, and
the forces in the Far East were numerically weak. The
bulk of the latter had not even been organised into corps,
there was but little cavalry or technical troops, guns were
not plentiful, nor for the most part of the newest models,
and lastly, the troops were scattered throughout the terri-
tory in small garrisons.

Whether, from a military point of view, Japan should '
have declared war earlier, before, for instance, the railway
to Port Arthur was completed, is for consideration.

If the moment was unpropitious in 1900, she might, in
1902, after the conclusion of the alliance with England, have
argued that Eussia's preparations were likely to be propor-
tionally less complete than her own, and pressure could have
been put on Eussia, in October 1902, to carry out the
promised evacuation of Mukden.

Possibly, however, the political atmosphere was less
favourable in 1902 than was the case a year later.

14 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF

Again, it would seem that Japan would have been better
advised to have declared war after the Manchurian and
Korean ports were ice-free, than at the time she selected.
True, such policy would have added to the Port Arthur
squadron four large cruisers from Vladivostock ; but Russia
would not have been allowed two months in which to collect
troops before the first blow was struck on land, and Japan
might, in these circumstances, have overrun Southern Man-
churia, and captured Port Arthur, before Russian regiments
had begun to arrive in any numbers.

It was, however, probably Russia's threat to increase her
Par Eastern squadron, which caused Japan to precipitate
matters, and make war in winter.

Possessed of almost boundless resources in men, and with
a navy twice as large as that of Japan, it would, at first
sight, appear that Russia must have inevitably crushed her
opponent.

But complete accord between policy, and organisation for
war, is as necessary to success as are great resources, other-
wise defeat may be experienced before the resources can be
developed, and Russia was unprepared for the conflict even
in 1903-4.

Encouraged by the success of a policy of bluff against
other nations, Russia had apparently come to regard such
procedure as infallible, but its inherent weakness became
soon apparent when attempted against a rival ready to
fight for her rights.

Russia was, in a military sense, weak in the Par East.
Her navy was, on paper, equal to that of the Japanese, but
paper equality is not sufficient to command success in war,
and the ships which might have turned the balance were
many months' sail distant in Europe, whence it was, perhaps,
impolitic to move them.

Similarly, the Russian land forces in Manchuria were
separated from the main army by a gap of some six thou-
sand miles, bridged only by a single line of railway, ill laid,
and, moreover, incomplete in the stretch round Lake Baikal.

THE EUSSO-JAPAJ;rESE WAE 15

In 1904, Eussia possessed, according to the British official 'jOrganisation.
account of the war, in round numbers^ a total of some
4,500,000 trained soldiers, of whom 3,500,000 belonged to i
the active army and reserve, 345,000 were Cossacks, and i
685,000 National Guard.

The period of military service was from the 21st-43rd
year, of which eighteen years were spent in the active army
and reserve, and the remainder in the National Guard.

The colour service was for four or five years, and three
years were passed in the reserve, during which period two
trainings of six months were carried out.

The Cossacks, Finns, and the Christians of the Caucasus,
served under special regulations, whilst Mahomedans were
pbliged to pay a sum of money in lieu of military service,
but might volunteer to serve if they so desired.

The field troops comprised the units of the active army
brought up to war strength by reserves, and certain so-
caUed reserve units, the cadres of which were maintained in
peace, and filled up with reservists on mobilisation.

In war time, depot units were also formed, of reservists
and soldiers not fit or not required on mobilisation.

For garrison duty there were special fortress and local
troops.

The National Guard was primarily designated for home
defence, but was liable to furnish drafts for the field troops.

At the commencement of the war, there were, in Europe
and the Caucasus, twenty-five active army and reserve
corps, in Eussian Turkestan two corps, in Eastern Siberia
two corps, and in the remainder of the empire a number of
unallotted units.

(For composition of the army corps, see Appendix I.)

The Eussian army was not really well trained and fit to
take the field. Even officers who had passed the staff
college rarely studied their profession after the completion
of their course, and the regimental officers were ignorant of
the theory of war.

The practical training also left much to be desired. The

16 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF

men were little practised in shooting, but were taught to
rely on mass attacks, and the bayonet, to gain victory. Out-
post and reconnaissance duties were neglected, and indi-
vidual initiative discouraged.

All ranks were, moreover, steeped in the plausible fallacy
of the advantages inherent in the occupation of defensive
positions, and attached undue importance to the value of
ground, and to a defensive attitude ; yet, in actual practice,
folds and features of ground were rarely utilised to the best
advantage.

Generals immersed themselves in details, and interfered
unduly in the instruction of troops and companies, to the
detriment of the training, and to the limitation of their
own power to handle large forces, grasp important situations,
or deal with great issues. But serious as were the above
faults, they might have been partially overcome during the
campaign, had all ranks been inspired with the sentiment of
patriotism and unselfish devotion to duty.

This was far from being the case. Even the officers
openly, expressed their indifference to the war, and the rank
and" file, though they fought well, and endured hardship with
praiseworthy patience, went to the front unwillingly.

Very different was the attitude of the Japanese army.

Here every man was convinced that his utmost efforts
were demanded to save the country from destruction, and
the wonderful constancy of the Japanese soldiers was a
more important factor in the national success, than was even
the bold generalship of the liigher leaders.

In Japan, every male between the ages of seventeen and
forty was, in 1904, liable to serve in either army or navy,
but military service did not, as a rule, according to the
British official account, begin until the twentieth year.

The army was organised as follows (see also Ap-
pendix II) : —

Active army, service three years — 180,000 men.

On working furlough for four years and four months —
200,000 men.

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAK 17

Eeserve army (or Kobi), in which men served for five
years, witE an organisation separate from that of the active
army— 200,000.

Conscript reserve, of men who had escaped service with
the colours ; obligation for seven years and four months, or
for one year and four months — 300,000.

National reserve, of all men who had passed the classes
mentioned above, and were less than forty years old —
400,000, of whom about half had received training.

Of Japan's naval resources it is sufficient to note that her
merchant navy had a tonnage of 650,000 and possessed be-
tween 200 and 300 steamers.

The Japanese army was trained in the German fashion,
and though to several armies in Europe, Japanese officers
were, and still are attached for instruction, it was to the
German army that the majority were sent. The German
model was therefore generally copied in both strategy and j
tactics, though it is perhaps doubtful whether the Japanese
peace training was as thorough as is sometimes claimed.

The Japanese adopted the enveloping form of offensive ■
war, but attacked, with vigour, at all points. |

Their infantry, at the beginning of the campaign, ad- '
vanced to the attack in relatively dense lines of skirmishers,
whose movements were covered by both rifle and artillery i
fire. The infantry pressed on, in the usual manner, as close
as possible to the enemy's line, and then delivered a series
of assaults, prepared by rapid but somewhat wild rifle fire,
and covered by storms of shrapnel, delivered from rather
long range.

It does not seem that the subordinate generals and regi-
mental leaders directed their men with any particular
intelligence, or that the latter fought much with their
heads. The commanders were, as a rule, rather prodigal of
their meii's lives, and the soldiers, responding gallantly to
their officers' orders, often, by their doggedness, repaired
mistakes of tactics and leadership.

The cavalry was not well organised. Eegiments were, for

18 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF

the most part, with divisions, instead of being brigaded, and
their employment was on a par with their organisation.

Striking a balance between the forces actually or poten-
tially available on both sides, and having due regard to
their military value, it may be concluded that the Japanese
possessed over the Eussians certain advantages of patriotism
and training.
Command Though Eussia had sufficient naval and military re-
sources to ehsiire the defeat of her rival, the distribution of
her fleet and army, necessitated by her European responsi-
bilities, and the absence of well-developed land communica-
tions between her European territories and the theatre of
war, rendered it improbable that she would be able to
transport to, and maintain in the Far East, an army large
enough to overcome the Japanese, unless command of the
sea could be obtained; for to have duplicated the railway
would have been the work of years. Besides, Japan, even if
overwhelmed on land, could, so long as she retained com-
mand of the sea, have securely retired to some Torres
Vedras, and there awaited a favourable opportunity to again
take the offensive. And even if Eussia succeeded in driv-
ing the Japanese from the mainland, her conquest would
have been of little value until she obtained the power to
utilise the ports won in land battles.

Command of the sea, then, was vital to Eussia.

Japan is an island empire, and though fairly self-con-
tained, was, in some degree, dependent on retention of the
command of the sea, the loss^of which would, at any rate,
have put an end to her dreams of expansion. Moreover,
loss of command of the sea would have exposed her to the
danger of invasion.

Without naval supremacy, Japan's armies could not have
reached the continent of Asia, and once there, even supposing
they drove the Eussians to Lake Baikal, before attaining
naval superiority, their eventual ruin would have been all
the greater, if the link binding the land forces with their
island home was severed; for no large army could have been

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 19

maintained in Manchurja with command of the sea irre-
vocably lost.

Apparently, then, naval supremacy, that is, the destruction
of ^EeTEostile fleet, was, for both sides, the decisive factor,
and each should have strained every nerve to attain this end,
relegating other necessary operations to strictly subordinate
positions.

Had Eussia been able to concentrate her whole fleet in
Far Eastern waters, Japan's position would have been well-
nigh hopeless, but Eussia had, as has been stated, been
obliged to divide her navy iuto two portions, and at the
decisive point possessed no numerical superiority over her
opponent.

Hence Japan might hope to apply the principle of ■
interior lines, to defeat the Eussians in detail, to ruin the
Eastern detachment before it could be joined by its Wes-
tern consorts.

If the Eussian Eastern detachment chose to meet the
Japanese fleet in fair fight, so much the better for Japan.
But if the Eussians should elect to await, in their harbours,
the arrival of their European navy, then it would be Japan's
duty to capture those harbours, either sinking the ships at
their berths, or obliging them to bolt out and give battle.

Of the two military harbours, in the Far East, held by
Eussia, Port Arthur and Vladivostock, the former was most
valuable, being ice-free throughout the year. But whatever
the relative merits of the two places, Port Arthur was of ! ;
greatest importance to the Japanese, being the base of the '•
larger portion of the Eussian fleet (four large cruisers i :
only were in VladivostocTE) and after the naval surprise of , '
February 8th its asylum.

It would seem, then, that Japan's primary objective being Japanese
the Eussian fleet based on Port Arthiif, plans should have ° ^^"^ ^^^'
been made to secure the early capture of the fortress, since
it was possible that the squadron would not quit the shelter
of the harbour.

But it was important to occupy Korea, whence the siege of

20 LECTURES ON THE STEATEGY OF

Port Arthur could, in some degree, be covered, for no Eus-
sian force moving into the Liao-tung peninsula could afford
to neglect a Japanese army placed on or near the Yalu. The
possession of Korea would also be a strong diplomatic card,
and until Dalny was taken, no satisfactory harbours for
landing troops, existed, except in Korea.

If beaten in Manchuria, or at Port Arthur, Japan, with
command of the sea, could perhaps maintain herself suffi-
ciently long in the mountains of Korea to render Eussia
weary of the struggle.

Even without command of the sea, if the naval actions
were indecisive, Japan, by using the islands in the Tsushima
strait, might maintain a force in Korea, and might even,
though this would be unlikely, prosecute the siege of Port
Arthur from this base.

It is therefore^thought, that, as was done, Korea should,
in the first instance, have been occupied by the Japanese.

The capture of a fortress can be attained either by main
force, or by starvation, the method employed being contin-
gent on the necessity for the early reduction of the place.

No fortress can survive, for long, the defeat of the field
forces of the nation, hence, if the field armies are destroyed,
the capitulation of the national fortresses is only a matter
of time.

Thus there were open to Japan two methods for the re-
duction of the Far Eastern naval bases of the Eussian fleet.
They could either be besieged, assaulted, and so captured,
every effort being directed to the achievement of this result,
and only sufficient troops diverted against the Eussian
armies, to prevent their interfering with the besiegers; or one"
or both fortresses could be blockaded, whilst every man not
required for this purpose marched against the Eussian army.

Of these alternatives it is believed that the former
would have been the correct course, more especially in view
of the possibility of the despatch of Eussian naval reinforce-
ments from Europe.

But whichever policy Japan elected to pursue, her utmost

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 21

e ndeavours should h av e beendiD eatfid to the achievement of
the main purpose, whether it was the early destruction of the
Eussian ISavai bases, or the rapid ruin of the Eussian field
armies, before either armies, or fleet, could be reinforced from
Europe.

There should have been no halting between two opinions,
such policy tends to failure, and at the decisive point it is
impossible to be too strong.

Japan, however, chose to pursue a double objective, under-
taking both the siege of Port Arthur, and the destruction
of the Eussian armies. Possibly she undervalued the re-
sisting power of Port Arthur, and the carrying capacity of
the Trans-Siberian railway, hoping to achieve the early
capture of the fortress, and then victory over such forces as
Eussia might have deployed. Or, perhaps, her army was, in
the circumstances, deemed sufficiently strong to attain both
objects. Or, again, the Japanese may have thought that, in
spite of the necessity for taking Port Arthur, the Eussian
army must be attacked and beaten, before it became for-
midable in organisation and numbers.

Whatever motives may have . prompted her military
policy, Japan, in the event, possessed decisive preponderance
of force neithe r in front of "Jort Arthur, nor in the field.

But for the determination of her infantry, and the resolu-
tion of her higher"commanders, this fact might well have
led to disaster. Neither at Liao-Yang, nor at the Sha-Ho,
did the Japanese possess sufficient force to gain decisive
victories, and the cause ol..,itiajr^ weakness was the large
number of troops that had been absorbed in the siege of
Port A.rthur.

The resistance offered by this fortress made Liao-Yang
an indecisive battle, and gave Eussia time in which to
collect so many troops, that, even after the fall of the
place, the Japanese failed to gain, at Mukden, a decisive
victory.

On the other hand it is believed that had two or three
extra divisions been detailed to besiege Port Arthur, this

22 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

' place would have fallen by assault, after a few weeks' siege ;
and long before the Eussians could have made really serious
efforts for its relief, or could have assembled a sufficiently
large army in Manchuria, to give them the advantage in the
subsequent campaign.
Japanese plan. The plan actually adopted by Japan was an enveloping
advance of three armies, from widely different directions

i — the Yalu, Ta-ku-shan, and Dalny — on Liao-Yang, whilst a

' fourth army besieged Port Arthur.

Converging operations, though they menace the enemy's
communications, involve risk of defeat in detail. They
were, however, doubtless forced on Japan, by the political
necessity for initial occupation of Korea, and the immobility
of the Eussians was probably known, and counted on. More-
over, in so mountainous a country as Southern Manchuria,
some dispersion of force would have been necessary for pur-
poses of supplj, unless Japan made adequate arrangements
for rapidly utilising the Port Arthur railway as it fell into
her hands. But then her advance would have been frontal.
Having adopted a plan of convergent operations from
separate bases, Japan's object should have been to exercise
such simultaneous and vigorous pressure, from all directions,
as to prevent concentration of hostile force against any one
of her separated armies. At the same time these should have
made every effort to attain, as soon as possible, tactical con-
tact with one another, by rapid, but well-regulated advance
on a common objective.

Russian Eussia's objects were naturally, to a great extent, the con-
objects. ^gj,gg Qf ^.jjQgg Qf jjjg Japanese.

Japan wished for rapid and early success, Eussia desired
time to collect her scattered forces.

Such development of resources might be accomplished if
Eussia's Far Eastern fortresses correctly carried out, with the
assistance of her Siberian field troops, their delaying
functions.

Whilst fortifying and provisioning. Port Arthur, and
Vladivostock, for lengthy sieges, Eussia should, therefore,

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 23

have prepared to manoeuvre with the troops not required to '
garrison these places, so as to draw on themselves, and away
from the fortresses, the Japanese armies. At the same time,
pending the collection of an army adequate to undertake
the offensive, the Japanese, as opportunity offered, might
have been harassed and exhausted by minor engagements,
and attacked in detail, if chances, as actually happened,
occurred.

Whether the Eussian Eastern squadron should have fought
a decisive action with the Japanese, or awaited the arrival
of the reinforcements, is a difficult question to answer.

The solution of the problem depended on the probable
date when naval reinforcements from Europe might be ex-
pected. If likely to be long delayed, the natural inclination
would be to risk all in a decisive naval action.

Such resolution might have been taken, having regard to
the fact that long waiting in port might be harmful to the
machinery of the vessels, and deleterious to the efficiency
of the crews, and might even, as was the case, result in the
destruction of the fleet from land.

As to the Eussian plan it is not easy to speak, for, Russian plan.
in effect, the operations, up to the battle of Liao-Yang,
were a series of half-measures.

This tencTs'to confirm the report that the Eussian councils
were divided, one party advocating that tihe defence of
Port XrthuFshould be intrusted solely to the garrison ; the
other that every effort should be made for its assistance.

in

Japanese
calculations.

February
1904.

WHEN initiating, in the autumn of 1903, the diplomatic
pressure which finally resulted in war, Japan, prac-
tically secure, through the JBriti8h_aUiance, from the in-
terference of third parties, seems to have calculated that
her navy was capable of beating^ in detailj the divided
portions of the Eussian fleet, aiM that her army could cqp-^
successfully, with any force that Eussia could maintain in
the Far East. " ' ,~^^^~-^

The confidence of the Japanese in their navy was fully
justified. But the unwise dispositions of the Japanese armies,
the resistance offered by Port Artl^ur, the slowness of the
Japanese military deployment, the quantities of supplies
obtained by Eussia from Manchuria and Mongolia, and the
imexpectedly efficient working of the. Trans-Siberian rail-
way, enabling Eussia to place in the fiehi a larger force than
Japan had contemplated, upset the Japanese calculations.
Japan was therefore obliged, not only to augment her active
army, but to so modify her recruiting laws as to enable larger
masses of men to be placed in ffie field.

Trusting, however, in her power to beat Eussia, Japan con-
tinued to press for Eussia's evacuation of Manchuria, until,
on February 6th, 1904, negotiations were broken off, and
diplomatic relations with Eussia severed. (See Appendix III.)

On the same day the Japanese navy sailed to attack the
Eussian squadron at Port Arthur, a few ships being detached
to destroy a couple of small Eussian cruisers lying at Chem-
ul-po, and to convoy a force of 2500 men, destined to occupy
Seoul, the capital of Korea.

At 3 a.m. on 9th, the Japanese troops landed in face

24

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAK 25

of the Eussian cruisers, and railed at once to Seoul. The
next day the Eussian ships were sunk when issuing from
the harbour.

Meanwhile, admiral Togo had surprised the Eussian
squadron lying outside Port Arthur, and had torpedoed
three of the largest ships.

Whilst these events were taking place, mobilisation orders
had been issued in Japan, at 2 p.m., on February 6th, to
the Guard, 2nd and 12th divisions, and to the fortresses of
Tsushima and Hakodadi.

The Japanese had originally intended to secure possession
of Southern Korea, at"any rate, by landing the 12th division
at Fu-san and moving it, by march route, eighteen stages to
Seoul; and had already made arrangements for supply along
the road.

After the fi rst naval success it was, however, determined
to use Chem-ul-p6~as the"porFoI disembarkation.

In February the mouth of the Yalu, Ta-ku-"shan, and
Ying-kow are all ice-bound, and do not become clear of ice
until the middle of Maircff, so that the Japanese could not,
at that time, have taken advantage of their temporary
command of the sea by landing troops at those places.

Thegain, by adoption of such a course, would have been
shortened lines of communication had command of the sea
been maintained; but tEeTorce at Ying-kow, at any rate,
would have been somewhat exposed, owing tolts proximity \
to Liao-Yang, where the Eussians were assembling, and
transports sailing to Ying-kow must have passed relatively ^.r^
close to Port Arthur.

On February 14th, the 12th division railed to Nagasaki,
where it embarked in six groups of transports, of which the
first sailed at noon, on 15th. By 21st, t he whole division
had landed at Chem-ul-po, and a defachment had occupied
Ping- Yang. ""■" ''''"

Simultaneously two regiments of the 4th division were March,
despatched to Chem-ul-po, and garrisons placed in Fu-san,
Ma-sam-po, and Gen-san. Mobilisation had, meanwhile.

26 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

proceeded in Japan, and by March 4th, the Guard and 2nd
divisions had concentrated at Hiroshima, ready to embark
under the command of general Kuroki.

Chin-am-ph^ the port of Ping- Yang, was reported clear
of ice on Mar ch 10t h, and as the 12th division had now
assembled in sufficient force at the latter place, to secure the
landing, it was decided to disembark, here, the Guard and 2nd
divisions.

By 29th the troops were all on shore, and the 12th
division well to the north of Ping- Yang.

Information now reached general Kuroki, that, with the
exception of 1500 to 2000 Eussian. cavalry, no hostile troops
were south of the Yalu.

The Japanese, therefore, pushed forward parties towards
the river Yalu, to at once bridge the rivers Che-chen and
Tai-ing, to form supply depots, and to reconnoitre roads.

The result of this reconnaissance was that all roads
were found to be bad, and the coast road alone was
reported fit for the movement of a large force. The "whole
country was, moreover, stated to be destitute of supplies.

In these circumstances, it is for "consideration, whether
Kuroki would not hav e been better advised to have marched
6nIy~tEel2th division towards the Talu, seiiding the Guard
and 2nd divisions northwards, by ship, at any rate to
Bo-to and Ei-ka-ho, thus following the precedent of the
Vimeiro campaign.
'■ This course would have been less fatiguing, and not more
risky, than marching by detachments along one bad road,
^ '. and would have saved valuable time.

' Probably, however, shipping was not available for the
purpose.
April. On April 1st, sufficient supplies having been collected at
An-ju, Kuroki pushed on a force londer general Asada, who,
by 7th, had reached Ei-ka-ho, where a supply depot was
formed.

On the latter date the main body of the Japanese marched
northwards, throwing out towards Yong-pyong a weak flank

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 27

guard, which was to halt there until the main body had
passed An-ju, and Jhen march to Chang-Syong.

The advanced guard reached Wi-iTTon'April 8th , and on
21st, the army was concentrated near that place, whilst the
i^lSk detachment stood at Chan g-Syong . Lines of supply
had also been established to Ei-ka-ho, Bo-to, and Qui-em-pho.

During these operations, the 1st and 3rd di vision s had,
on April 1st, conc entrated at . Hir oshima, whilst the 4th
division had mobilised and was standing at Osaka, and an
ar tillery brigade , of 108 guns, was also ready to take the
field. In April, these divisions had been quietly embarked
in a fleet of about a hundred transports, which sailed to
Chin-am-pho, as they were ready, unescorted, though pro-
tected by the operations of the Japanese fleet against Port
Arthur.

By May 1st, the three divisions had concentrated at May.
Chin-am-pifib 'under general __Oku, ready either to assist I
Kufoki in forcing the passage of the Yalu, by landing
between that river and Ta-ku-shan, or, if not required by '
the Ist army, to invade the Liao-Tung peninsula.

As it is hardly conceivable that the Japanese can have
been ignorant of the weakness of the Eussian Yalu detach-
ment (see Appendix IV), it seems to have been excess of
caution that held Oku's detachment in hand so long, for the
greateT delay in attacK^Port Arthur, the more formidable
woulHnje'itsTorEiEcatiqSr'

Meanwhile, war had been formally declared on February
10th, and, on the same date, the Czar had issued a ukase,
ordering the mobilisation of the troops in the Siberian
military district, and in the districts of Perm, Viatka, and
Kazan.

Between February 9th and 12th, most of the powers,
including China, published declarations of neutrality.

Japan and Korea entered into an a^eement on February
23f3, under "wBTcBrtrapan, in exchange for "the right to
use certain places in Korea for military purposes, guaranteed
the integrity of the country.

28 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF

On February 29th, general Kuropatkin was appointed
commander-in-chief in Manchuria, and general Linevitch in
the Ussuri district, but both were under the orders of
admiral Alexiev, the viceroy.

Admiral Makarov was given command of the Eussian Far
Eastern squadron on February 16th, and on the same day
the viceroy transferred his headquarters from Port Arthur
to Mukden. '"" "' ' """*'"

Meanwhile, the Japanese had made several abortive at-
tempts to enclose the Eussian fleet, which had taken rwuge
in Port Arthur, within the confines of the harbour, by sink-^
ing vessels across the mouth.

By April i2th, the Eussian fleet had been so far repaired
as to be able to leave Port Arthur, but on this day, the
battleship Petr o^mlov jk, with Makarov on board, was sunk
by a floating mine, and another battleship was injured by
the same means.

By the end of April, the opposing forces had reached
roughly the strength, and had attained the distribution given
in Appendix IV, the bulk of the Eussian field troops being,
apparently, in the neighbourhood of Liao-Yang and Ying-
kow, and on the Yalu. [See also Map 2.]

Probably the acquisition, by the Japanese, of command of
the sea, disinclined the Eussians to risk more troops in the
Liao-tung peninsula than were required for the defence of
Port Arthur.

At any rate no, arrangement seems to have been made
to hold points where the disembarkation of Japanese
troops was possible; or to place a mobile force in some
central position such as Pu-la/n-tien, whence troops could
march, with relative rapidity, to oppose a landing at Port
Adams, or Pe-tsi-wo. The coast-line was watched by cavalry,
but this was the only measure taken.

But this same factor of sea-power induced considerable
dispersion of force, for, in addition to the garrison of Vladi-
vostock, there were strong detachments on the Yalu, and at
Ying-kow, the former separated by 180 miles of rough

APPROKIMATE POSITIONS AND STRENGTH, AT END OF APRIL, 1904. 2

Scale of Miles

P . 20 *p 60 , 80 too

Russians O
Japanese cb

"Fibres represent
TVumbert irv
thousands.

/Port A-rlhxtr

Hfi/IcdenA

fJLiao yanff

Ta.-7ru-shano_9^

ArLtujig^,

@^

vwrftfi.

APPROKlMJiTE POSITTOIsrS J^n STRENGTH, 27 MAY, 1904. 3

Scale of Miles.

O go ^ 60 So 100

Russians vJ
Japanese r'~l

Figures Tepr-eserCt
maribera ZTi
thodLsands. „

Q

Ut'Erfi

(i3)<

yPoT-i Arlh-vcr

Mulcdenl"

Liao Yo-nq

®

^

f-lt.i^'-

Ta-lat-shan

GlI

'o<il

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 29

country from Liao-Yang, the latter, even, some 70 miles
from that place, though connected with it by a railway.

In theory the polij^of^etachingstroi^ such as

those at tlie Yaluand at Ying-kow, to delay the advance
of an enemy and to gain time for the assembly of an army
is attractive. Irr^pfacHce^such detachments more often
Tirasrnbt'becom'B' seriously _ compromised in performing
their difficult task, and even if they escape disaster, their
continuous and necessary retirement is apt to react unfavour-
ably on the morale of the men.

Perhaps, then, the Eussians should , have, w atched the
Yalu, Ying-kow, and, in addition, Ta-ku-shan, and the
Pe-tsi-wo neighbourhood, with weaker but more mobile
forces. These would have been u nirer^ncr temptat ion to
give battle, and, whilst being well placed to obtain in-
formation, would have delayed, or at least imposed caution
on the Japanese, who might, at first, have overestimated
the Eussian strength. The main army could have been
retained in central positions, such as Hai-cheng and ^ai-
cKou, every effort being made to render it ready to strike.

As has been remarked, it is probable that the dispositions
actually made by the Eussians were a compromise between
fEe policies of two contending factions. The Eussian general
staff is said to have computed, that whereas the Japanese, j
except in winter, could disembark in Manchuria a consider-
able force within six weeks of the first order to mobilise, '■
Eussia could not assemble, even in Northern Manchuria, i
an army of six corps and six cavalry divisions, in less than j
six months.

A strong party of Eussian strategists, headed by the late
general Dragomirov, therefore advocated the abandonment
of Port ArtiiurfiS3*the withdrawal of the^Eusskn troops to
Harbin, or even further north, untiTsufficient numbers had
been'coUected to ensure victory, and the Japanese had been
weakeneH by the long northward march, with its line of com-
munication, and inevitable detachments. Another faction,
however, desired the maintenance of communication with

30 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF

Port Arthur atall costs, and considered that retirement
would be impolitic.

On May 1st, general Kuroki defeated the detachment of
general ^lOTlitch on the Yalu, and on the same date, prob-
ably to cover the sailing of general Oku's transports, the
Japanese again attempted to block up the mouth of the
harbour of Port Arthur.

Before the battle of the Yalu, Kuroki had been informed
that he must be prepared to wait on that river for one month,
as it was not expected that Port Arthur would be blockaded
on the land side before June. This accomplished^a converging
movement on Liao-Yang, and the Eussian field armies, would
be undertaken, by the army of general Oku moving up the
Liao-tung peninsula, by a force advancing from Ta-ku-shan,
and by general Kuroki's army marching from the Yalu.

During this interval, general Kuroki was, apparently, to
collect transport, to perfect supply arrangements for his
advance through the hilly country on Liao-Yang, and, whilst,
by his presence on the Yalu, acting as a deterrent to Eussian
enterprises against Port Arthur, to avoid compromising
himself with large hostile forces.

Oku's ships were weather-bound for some days, at Chin-
am-pho, after the victory at the Yalu, but on May 4th,
guarded by gun and torpedo boats, and preceded by a naval
landing party, the first group, of twenty vessels, containing
the 3rd division, was able to sail.

The selected landing place, Kow-shi bay, was a few miles
south of Pe-tsi-wo, where the Japanese force which captured
Port Arthur had disembarked in 1894, and was believed to
offer greater facilities than the latter. Kow-shi was, how-
ever, by no means an ideal port. It possessed a shallow
muddj foreshore of considerable extent, and was expraeof to
easterly winds, tTiough somewliat' sheltered by the Elliott
islands. But it was sufficiently far from Port Arthur (fifty
to sixty miles) to render serious interruption of the landing
operations, by troops from that place, improbable ; and trans-
ports coming from Japan need not pass close to the Eussian

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 31

warships, as would have been the case had a landing been
effected on the west coast of the Liao-tung peninsula.

On May 5th, the ships sighted Kow-shi, where a few
Cossacks were observed, but the weather was too rough to
render landing practicable, so the Japanese seem to have
sailed to the Elliott islands. Here a shallow haven had
been selected as night anchorage for the vessels, and pro-
tected, by a boom, against a Eussian torpedo-boat attack.

It was hoped that even if the enemy's torpedo boats
damaged the transports, the passengers could easily be saved
in the shallow water, whilst the cargoes would, without much
difficulty, be salvaged.

On 6th the disembarkation commenced, the naval covering
party Deing first put ashore,' then a "battalion, then more
infantry, and some cavalry. Pe-tsi-wo was now occupied, the
few Eussians in the place retiring northwards; a detachment,
too, was despatched to Pu-lan-tien to cut the railway, but
did little beyond skirmist with the small Eussian garrison.

By May 16th, general Oku, though the field hospitals and
supply and ammunition columns had not landed, was able
to march the 3rd division towards Chin-chou, whilst the 1st
and part of the 4th division had taken up a position at
Pu-lan-tien, and along the Ta-sha river, facing northwards.

Between May 15th and 23rd, the 5th division and the
1st cavalry brigade arrived from Japan, and the trains
oTthe ist, 3rd, and 4th divisions were landed, together with
half of an artillery brigade.

General Oku issued orders, on 21st, for the 1st, 3rd, and
4th divisions to advance to Chin-chou, where tfie Eussians
were known to be holding a strongly fortified position,
whilst the 5th division, with detachments of the 3rd and
4th divisions, and the 1st cavalry brigade, held the line
Pu-lan-tien and the Ta-sha river. '—^ -
" On 26th Chin-chou was captured, and on the same day
14,000 Eussians were driven from Nan-shan.

The 11th division disembarked at Yeid-ta-kou on May
24th, aSJon 27th reached Chin-chou.

32 LECTUEES ON THE STKATEGY OF

The 1st and 11th divisions were now, with some Kobi
brigades, constituted into a 3rd army, under general Nogi,
and such troops as had landed, marched on Port Arthur,
occupying, by 31st, Dalny, Ta-lien-wan, and Nan-ke-ling.

The 3rd, Ith, and_5th division^, with the 1st cavalry
brigade, and the 1st artUlery brigade, were, at the sameTime,
grouped into the 2n31irmy under general Oku.

The 3rd and 4th divisions and the artillery brigade
were now moved to Pu-lan-tien, to support the 5th division,
and the cavalry. These had, for several days, been skirmish-
ing with a Eussian force of 1600 sabres and six guns, pushed
southwards under general Samsonov, and thought, by the
Japanese, to be probably the advanced guard of a larger
force.

On May 19th, the 10th division, forming the nucleus
of the 4th Japanese army, had begun to disembark at
Ta-ku-shan, under general Kawamura.

Kurokij too, finding supply difficult at An-tung, and
perhaps also to help Kawamura, had, on May 19th, advanced
the main body' of the 1st army to Feng-huang-cheng,
detaching the 12th division to Ai-yang-pien-meng. "

After the battle of "tbe Talu, the Eussians, owing to the
movement of a Japanese detachment towards Sai-ma-chi,
became seriously alarmed for Mukden. Troops under
Eennenkamf, amounting to a Cossack brigade, 2000 in-
fantry, and two horse batteries, were therefore pushed to
Sai-ma-chi, and two or three battalions began to fortify the
passes near Len-shan-kuan to support ZasuUtch, who had
retired to that place. At the same time another Cossack
brigade, under Mischenko, was sent to watch the coast-line
near Ta-ku-shan.

Madridov, also, who was still on the upper Yalu, made,
on May 10th, a raid into Korea, against the Japanese
line of communicatfons, attacking An-ju, but was easily
beaten joff by its garrison of less than a hundred men.

During the remainder of May, nothing occurred except
a few Eussian reconnaissances from Sai-ma-chL

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 33

The augmentation of the Eussian army, had, meanwhile,
been proceeding, and towards the end of May the forces had
reached a respectable total. (See Appendix V, and Map 3.)

In these circumstances, the Eussians, who had suffered I
two serious reverses, should have decided definitely whether '
their policy was to be one of offensive, or of retrograde until
a large army had been assembled.

AlexieVj_the viceroy, being in favour of vigorous action,
thought that something ought to be done to chect the
Japanese, known to be widely separated, and not credited
with large numbers. He therefore, on May 19th, directed
Kuropatkin to assume the offensive, giving him the alter-
native of either attacking Kiiroki, or, whilst holding Kuroki,
of marching against Oku.

Before undertaking any considerable operation of war the '
main question to be decided is whether the results are
likely to be decisive; if not, the undertaking will rarely be
worth inception. The attempt may even be disastrous, for
if a leader plays for lower stakes when the enemy is aiming
at decision, he stands to win pence and to lose pounds.

Kuropatkin's first consideration should therefore have
been, which, if either alternative, would lead to decisive
results.

From this point of view he made a correct selection in
deciding to attack general Oku, for the defeat of general
Kuroki, though it might have delayed the Japanese opera-
ticms, would not have ruined their plan of campaign.

But, by crushing Oku, the Eussians would not only, in all |
probability, have paved the way for the destruction of the J
larger portion of the Japanese army, but would have re- i
opened the road to Port Arthur, and perhaps saved the !
Eussian flcBt.

Having determined to strike at Oku, the next point ioi
decision should have been in what force the operation was to
be undertaken.

Here again it should only have been necessary to follow
one of the great principles of war, and to strike with every

D

34 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF

available man, cutting down necessary detachments to the
lowest possible limits. But " to do is not so easy as to know
what 'twere good to do," and Kuropatkin ■vyas set no easy
task to decide how many men would be required to deal
with Kuroki and Kawamura, and how many to secure his
line of communication against Japanese forces which might
be landed at Ying-kow, or even at Shan-hai-kuan.

Lastlj, assuming that the Russian general decided to
march southwards with the bulk of his troops, he must
weigh the all-important questions of supply, time, and
space, to discover whether his plan was really capable of
execution.

It is an axiom that continuoiis.-pj^essure on the enemy is
the very soul^of_the convergent system_of strategy, which
depends greatly for its success on the exeirtion of simul-
taneous pressure, on the enemy, from the various directions
in which the army is moving.

It was to be expected, then, that the combined forward
movement of the Japanese armies would be vigorously
prosecuted, and that, if any army were attacked, the others
would at once exercise the greatest pressure on the Russians
to relieve it.

It is therefore clear, that in this, as in all operations of
war, a Russian success could hardly be obtained unless the
Japanese were kept in ignorance, up to the moment of
decisive attack on Oku, of the Russian projects.

But to adopt the defensive towards the 1st and 4th
armies, whilst an attack was made on Oku, would indicate,
to the Japanese, the Russian plan. Whilst troops were
marching against the 2nd army, Kuroki and Kawamura
must, therefore, be led to believe that they were about to
be attacked. Finally, a simultaneous offensive must be
undertaken against the three armies, though only pressed
home against Oku, and the garrison of Port Arthur must
sally against the besiegers.

Oku, too, must not be permitted to discover that the
decisive blow was about to fall on his army, lest he should

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 35

fall back on Nan-shan, whilst the others pressed forward on '
to the Eussian comiminications. j

Keller, who had superseded Zasulitch, and Eennenkamf,
haoEefween them some 18,000 sabres and bayonets, opposed
to Kuroki's 34,000; and Mischenko, but 2000 sabres against
Kawaihura's 11,000 sabres and bayonets. Itwould seem, then,
thaf " Kuropatkin should have reinforced Mischenko with one
infantry brigade, that is 6000 men, who would have required
about one week to reach Hsui-yen, whilst their movement
would have deceived the Japanese. With these numbers, and
having regard to the nature of the country in which the |
operations were to be conducted, Keller and Mischenko should '
have been able to contain the 1st and 4th armies, whilst a •
decisive blow was struck at Oku.

If a brigade were left at Ying-kow, and a force at Kai-chou,
the remaining troops, less depots, and small garrisons of, say,
half a brigade, in all, at Liao-Yang and Mukden, would have
numbered some 55,000 sabres and bayonets.

With these Kuropatkin could have" moved against Oku,
who, to oppose him, could have mustered about 35,000 fight-
ing men.

Possibly, had he displayed energy, Kuropatkin might, \
with the help of the railway, have collected this force at
Wa-fang-tien in a fortnight, that is, during the first week in
June, when Oku would probably have been in the neigh-
bourhood of Pu-lan-tien, if not farther north.

It is thought, then, that Kuropatkin, had he acted in
whole-hearted fashion, might towards the beginning of June
have taken the offensive with fair prospects of success.
But the Eussian general, who seems to have leaned rather
to the procrastinating policy of Dragomirov, was content to
adopt a half -measure — a decision in which he may have
been influenced by a demonstration made, in the neighbour-
hood of Kai-chou, early in June, Tsy the Japanese fleet.

Only on May 27th did he reply to the viceroy's suggestion, June,
and it was not until June 7th, that he addressed, to general
Stackelberg, a memorandum ordering a forward movement.

36 LECTUEES ON THE STKATEGY OF

In this Stackelberg was directed to advance southwards
with the 1st Siberian corps and other troops, so as to draw
against himself, and away from Port Arthur, as large a
Japanese force as possible. But Stackelberg was warned
that he was not to become entangled in a decisive action
against superior forces, though he was to capture N"an-shan,
and then march on Port Arthur.

On receipt of these ambiguous instructions, Stackelberg
began to advance his detachment, mainly by rail, to Teh-li-
tzu. On June 10th Kuropatkin countermanded the move-
ments of a portion of Stackelberg's troops, owing to the
operations of the 10th Japanese division, but the imits
were soon allowed to proceed again, and, eventually, some
27,000 bayonets, and 2000 to 3000 sabres, were massed at
or near Teh-li-tzu.

Samsonov had, meanwhile, retired on Teh-li-tzu when the
2nd army moved to Pu-lan-tien, but had again advanced to
Wa-fang-tien, on receiving from Stackelberg a reinforce-
ment of two battalions.

Early in June the Japanese heard, both from local spies
and from their intelligence service in Europe, that the
Kussians were about to attack Oku.

On 2nd, Kawamura was therefore ordered to hold himself
in readiness to advance towards Kai-chou and menace the
Kussian flank, whether or not his division had completed its
disembarkation.

At this time there was, as has been stated, in front of the
10th division, only Mischenko's detachment, holding the
passes south of Hsui-yen; but, to make the movement
thorougbly effective, Kuroki was ordered to send to Kawa-
mura, a force of one brigade, two squadrons, and two
batteries, under general Asada.

Asada left Feng-huang-cheng on June 6th, and, on
8th, he combined with part of the 10th division in an
attack on Hsui-yen, which easily drove off Mischenko's
force.

As the Russian operations now seemed to 'be hanging fire.

APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AND STF^

Scale of jyiibis

w^-

O o

I^orl A-rihuT-

fQ

I</zi7cde7iJ

Miao yang

dp

(S>

6?

^

APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AND STRENGTH 30^'' JUNE . 1904. 5

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 37

Japanese headquarters ordered Kawamura not to advance
beyond Hsui-yen.

He therefore halted and intrenched.

This fact, as has been stated, considerably influenced
Kuropatkin's plans, for, seeing that the Japanese had not
advanced beyond Hsui-yen, he allowed Stackelberg to con-
tinue his concentration on Teh-li-tzu.

On 12th, Oku being ready to move from Pu-lan-tien,
Kawamura was directed to proceed towards Hai-cheng as
soon as he could, leaving Asada to watch Hsi-mu-cheng.

Kuroki, too, was ordered tb advance, and so distract
Russian attention from Oku.

But supply difficulties prevented the movement of the
1st army, so that Kuroki was only able to pUsh forward
some detachments, in addition to sending Asada to the 10th
division.

Keller was, however, deceived by these movements, and
thmEmg that Kuroki meant to attack his right, began to
mass troops on this flank.

Meanwhile, Oku had commenced his march from Pu-lan-
tien, and by 13th, the 3rd and 5th divisions were, with the
artillery brigade, at Wa-fang-tien, the 4th division near
Fu-chou, and the cavalry brigade on the right flank; the
6th division, which had now landed, was following some
marches in rear.

Why Oku advanced before the arrival of the 6th division
is not quite clear. Possibly policy dictated the move, or
perhaps the Japanese were anxious as to the 1st and 4th
armies, though to risk the defeat of Oku, to help them,
imless they were believed to be in serious straits, was hardly
sound strategy ; or it may be that they wished to retain the
initiative, n^ot allowing this advantage to pass to the enemy.

On June 15th the Japanese defeated the Eussians at
Teh-U-tzu, driAring in their right, but did not follow up the
success with any vigour; in fact there was practically no
pursuit.

The only other incidents, worth mention, which took

38 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF

place at this juncture, were some readjustraents of troops on
the Eusaian side, when Eennenkamf was strengthened at
{ the expense of Keller, whilst Mischenko was reinforced.

In looking at the table showing the number of troops in
Manchuria on June 15th (Appendix VI, and Map 4), the large,
garrison of Vladiyostock is noteworthy, as demonstrating the
containing effect of sea^power.

TChe^f esence of "half this force in Manchuria might, at
this period, have turned the scale in favour of the Eussians.

After the battle of Teh-li-tzu, the 1st and 9th East
Siberian divisions, now known as the 1st Siberian corps,
retired to Kai-chou, covered by Samsojiov's cavalry, and
remained in this neighbourhood until the end of the month.

During June, Mischenko's detachment was again re-
inforced, and a general southward movement made towards
Ta-shih-chiao, where a position was fortified. (See Appendix
VII and Map 5.)

The dispositions of the Eussian troops appeared, in fact,
to indicate an offensive in force against Oku, and perhaps it
would have been well for the Eussians had they now defi-
nitely decided either to advance or to retire, instead of con-
tinuing a wasteful policy of half -measures.

Apparently Kuropatkin would have liked to have with-
drawn his southernmost forces north of Hai-cheng, for the
operations of Kuroki and Kawamura had rendered the
Eussians anxious as to the safety of the corps of Stackel-
berg and Zarubaiev. But the viceroy, Alexiev, who was con-
tinually urging Kuropatkin to adopt the offensive, on the
ground that the strength of the Japanese had been exagger-
ated, forbade such retirement, which would have been detri-
mental to Port Arthur, as showing that the Eussians had,
for the moment at any rate, abandoned all idea of its relief.

On the Japanese side, the 2nd army, probably owing to
transport and supply difficulties, hardly made any advance
northwards, and on June 30th, was only thirteen miles north
of Teh-li-tzu.

The 10th division, which in accordance with the orders of

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 39

marshal Oyama, the Japanese commander-in-chief, had
moved slowly on Hai-cheng, was, soon after the victory of
Teh-li-tzu, ordered to halt and await the advance of the
2nd army.

On receipt of these instructions, Kawamura determined to
attack, about June 26th, the Chi-pan-ling and Ta-ling
passes, by which date he calculated that Oku should have
reached Kai-ping.

On 24th, just as all arrangements were completed, Kawa-
mura, in common with the other generals, was notified that
as the Eussian fleet could still leave Port Arthur, and render \
sea transport of supplies precarious, the combined advance
on Liao-Yang must be delayed until after the rainy season,
that is, until Setitembjer, At the same time news came from
Oku, that, owiiig to transport difficulties, the 2nd army could
not, for the moment, advance.

Thus the Japanese, already beginning to feel the drag on
their operations, of the fortress of Port Arthur, which was
sheltering the enemy's fleet, proposed to abandon the
initiative, a step likely to bring ^fio'us consequences in
view of the dispersion of their forces,

Kawamura, nevertheless, decided that it would be wise to
secure his position, by clearing the passes, and, by 27th, had {
taken both Chi-pan-Hng and Ta-ling, driving off Misehenko's ,
detachment.

Meanwhile, Keller had, as a result of Teh-li-tzu, been
ordered to send one brigade to An-shan-tien, and to make,
with the remainder of his force, a demonstration towards
Peng-huang-cheng ; an operation which, if it had any effect, i
would be more likely to increase than to relieve pressure on
Stackelberg.

Keller, therefore, mustered eight battalions, and advancing
in two columns, reached a point ten miles from Peng-huang-
cheng, unopposed. He then retired, and on arriving at Len-
shan-quan, on June 18 th, received orders to remain on the
defensive.

N"o sooner had Keller withdrawn, than Eennenkamf

40 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF

attacked the 12th division at Ai-yang-pien-meng, but soon
drew off.

The two Eussian generals seem to have acted indepen-
dently, thereby reducing the chances of success.

On June 24th, the 1st army commander also moved
forward to occupy the passes over the main Feng-shui-ling
range, for by doing so, though drawing nearer to the enemy's
masses, he would limit the Eussian power of manoeuvre.
The army marched north-westwards ia three columns,
owing to the mountainous nature of the district, the
Guards on Erh-chia-pu-tsz, the 2nd division on Len-shan-
kuan, and 12th division by Sai-ma-chi. Before this advance
Keller and Eennenkamf feU back, so that, by 27th, the Guard
and 2nd divisions were holding the Mo-tien-ling and neigh-
bouring passes, and the 12th division a pass twelve miles
west of Sai-ma-chi — sometimes called North Feng-shui-ling.
Eain now fell heavily, quite disorganising the communica-
tions of the 1st army.

It has been suggested that, under the original Japanese
plan of campaign, the 1st army was intended to move
on Hai-cheng, and not towards Liao-Yang, and that the
primary object of the Japanese leaders was to concentrate
their own forces rather than to envelop the Eussians. The
direction actually taken by Kuroki's army is ascribed to the
influence of topography, and to the fact that the only
practicable roads from the Yalu to the Liao converged on
Liao-Yang.

In 1894, the army which crossed the Yalu did march on
Hai-cheng. It appears, then, that if the Japanese had
desired Kuroki's army to move on Hai-cheng, sufficient
roads would have been available for the purpose. It is
probable, therefore, that the Japanese deliberately moved the
1st army by the more northerly routes, with the object
of at once preventing Eussian operations towards Port
Arthur by the menace thus offered to the Eussian line
of commimication, and of keeping the 1st army in a position
from which it could envelop the Eussian left in any locality

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 41

south of Mukden. No doubt it was calculated that the
Eussians could not quickly overwhelm Kuroki in the hilly
country lying south-east of Liao-Yang, and that the attrac- 1
tion of Port Arthur, and the presence of the other two
armies, would tend to lessen the probability of such a
counter-stroke. Possibly the Japanese hoped, after the
rapid capture of Port Arthur, to apply to the Eussians
the enveloping tactics actually attempted at Mukden, with
the 3rd army as left wing, and Kuroki's army in a more
favourable position than was their right on that occasion.

Whilst these events had been taking place inland, the
Bussian fleet had, on June 23rd, put to sea, but was driven
back intoTKe harbour by the Japanese. On June 26th the
3rd army captured a ridge known as Ken-san, about ten
miles from Port Arthur, subsequently repulsing several
attempts to retake the position.

At about this time the 3rd army was reinforced by the
9th division and 4th Kobi brigade. (For positions of troops
see Appendix VII, and Map 5.)

During the early part of July, the Eussians showed a July,
good deal of activjtj^in the eastern theatre of war, a couple
of battalions attacking Mo-tien-ling, whilst Eennenkamf
continually, but without success, harassed Kuroki's line
of communication, with the object of trying to find out his
dispositions. The operations were all apparently under-
taken to obtain information, for, owing to Kuroki's inert-
ness after his _ advance, whilst the other armies were
relatively active, and to the westward movement of Asada,
the Eussians thought that Kuroki's army was stealing a
march on them. Kuroki, in fact, was at one time reported
to be marching towards Ta-k^-shan and Port Arthur, or, as
another rumour had it, to be concentrating on his right,
preparatory to crossing the Tai-tzu river, and advancing on
Mukden — a movement of which the Eussians were a good
deal afraid.

Not satisfied with the result of the earlier operations,
and since the cavalry was not able to pierce the Japanese

42 LECTURES ON THE STEATEGY OF

outpost Knes, Keller, on July 17tli, attacked the Japanese
positions at an'di near Mo-tien-ling, with one brigade of the
rtrEircorps7and twelve battalions of the 3rd and 6th East
Siberian divisions. With these troops he succeeded, though
at somewhat heavy cost of life, in discovering that the
Japanese 1st army had not materially altered its dispositions.
Kuropatkin thereupon determined, on the arrival, in Southern
Manchuria, of the 1st and 17th European cor£s, expected
about the middle of Augusl,'"to attack and drive back
Kuroki, whose position was thought to be menacing to
Liao-Yang; though it does not appear that the Eussians
had valid grounds for assuming that the Japanese would
remain quiet for so long a period.

Kuroki now d.elivered a eountej-attack, when, on July
19th, the i2th division drove a Eussian force, of some 7000
men, with twenty-four guns, from Chao-tao, whence they
not only prevented direct communication between the 2nd
and 12th divisions, but could have attacked, in flank, the
Mo-tien-ling position.

From Chao-tao a road led to Mukden, via Pen-si-hu, so
that the Japanese exploit again made Kuropatkin doubt
whether the 1st army was not contemplating a movement
against his communications.

The Eussian commander-in-chief, who, on the news of
Teh-li-tzu, had at once hurried southwards, now hastened to
An-ping, directing portions of the 10th corps, newly arrived
from Eussia, to march to Yu-shu-lin-tzu, and drive the
Japanese back towards Sai-ma-ehi.

At this period, the Japanese armies in Manchuria were
still without a commander-in-chief in the theatre of war,
marshal Oyama not having yet arrived from Japan. Such
procedure, closely copying the action of Moltke in 1866, is
open to criticism, for the rival armies were now in such
close contact that decisive events, which could not well be
controlled from Tokyo, might take place at any moment.
Oya ma should, therefore, more especially since the activity
of the Eussians had no doubt shown the danger of post-

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 43

poning the advance until September, and as the Eussian
fleet was no longer formidable, have ere now placed himself
where he could closely supervise the operations of his
forces.

But Kuropatkin's action was much more reprehensible, for j
his continued movements" musThave dislocated the arrange-l
ments of his staff, and his presence, in localities where
detachments of his army had suffered reverses, was likely
not to improve, but to prejudice his grasp of the general
situation, by leading him to attach undue importance tc
local incidents.

Ku ropatkin's j flttiasys are said to have been prompted by
the fact that he mistrusted the capacity of his subordinate
generals. But such meddlesomeness would tend to aggravate
rather than to mend matters, and all the Eussian leader's
energies were requiref^for tEe organisation, and even train-ij
ing of his army. . Many regiments possessed newly raised/
battalions; the East Siberian brigades had recently beei^:
expanded into divisions, and were full of drafts of men who |
had never seen a magazine rifle ; and the transporFtrain was
not e^JeTen'Er Uofebve^'tlie Eussian armies were parcelled ;
into a series of independent detachments, without cohesioq,,
or knowledge of one anothe/s movemeiTts. Not even thai
force opposing Kuroki was under one commander.

It is a matter of experience that no one leader can
efficiently control more than five or six units. It would
seem, then, that Kuropatkin should have done as he after-
wards did, divided his troops into two or three armies, each
under a responsible commander. Probably, however, the I
men were lacking.

No sooner had Kuropatkin reached An-ping, than news
came of the advance of Oku's army, on July 23rd, doubtless
ujader taken to jceli^ve pressure on Kuroki. This general's
isolated position was, most likely, causing' anxiety to the
Japanese, who had probably heard of the movement of
troops eastwards from Liao-Yang.

Kuropatkin at once posted southwards, only to arrive

44 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF

after the action of Ta-shih-chiao, when Oku drove back the
1st and 4th Siberian corps, both under general Zarubaiev, of
the 4th corps, which was most severely engaged.

The position of Ta-shih-chiao, on one of the spurs flung
westwards into the Liao plain from the Eeng-shui-ling
group of mountains, had been fortified, so it is curious that
the Russians, having accepted battle, offered so moderate a
resistance, for they fought merely a rear-guard action.
Apparently Kuropatkin, in view of Kuroki's position at
Mo-tien-ling and Chao-tao, did not desire to involve his
southern detachment too deeply, but at the same time did
not wish to give up Ying-kow without a struggle. Zaru-
baiev had therefore been ordered not to commit himself,
and as a result, the Japanese gained the prestige of a victory,
and the Russians sacrificed lives to no purpose.

On 25th and 26th, the 2nd army halted at Ta-shih-chiao,
occupying Ying-kow on the latter date.

On 28th, communication was oj)ened between the 2nd .
and 4th armies, and the 5th division was detached to re-
inforce general Nodzu^s command. This army had, after the
capture of Chi-pan-ling and Ta-Ung, skirmished, in the area
south of Hsi-mu-cheng, with Mischenko's detachment.

Towards the end of July marshal Oyama assumed direct
command of the Japanese armies. Coupling this fact with
the advance of Oku's force to Ta-shih-chiao, it may there-
fore be assumed that the Japanese policy of delay until
September, had now been definitely abandoned. 7

After Ta-chih-chiao the Russians fell back to Hai-cheng^
and as a result of this contraction of frontage, were now in
a more favourable position than at any previous period of
the campaign. They were occupying, with 140,000 sabres
and bayonets, a semicircle of about sixty miles raffius, where-
as the Japanese, with not more thaS 1T)6,000, were spread
over quite eighty-five miles ; moreover, owing to the draw-
ing of 1;Ee"4th army towards the 2nd, probably with the
object of placing as strong a force as possible near the Port
Arthur road, a gap of quite thirty miles of mountainous

APPROKIMATE POSITIONS AND STREmiTIf ON 31 f^ JULIT, 190^.

Scale of Mflas

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THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 45

country existed between the right of the 4th and the left of
the 1st army. (See Appendix VIII, and Map 6.)

Kuropatkin could now, without much countermarching,
have attacked the 2nd and 4th armies, who combined
mustered about 61,000 sabres and bayonets and 300 guns,
with 75,000 bayonets, 8500 sabres, and 350 guns, whilst
he attacked and contained, with some 40,000 bayonets, j
3500 sabres, and 172 guns, Kuroki's army of 37,000 rifles
and sabres and 152 guns.

Or, conversely, he could have moved against Kuroki with
about 55,000 bayonets, 5000 sabres, and 200 guns, whilst i
holding the 2nd and 4th armies with 60,000 bayonets, 7000
sabres, and 282 guns.

Kuropatkin's reserve was, however, so meagre, that in
neither case was it probable that the numerical preponder-
ance he could bring to bear would be decisive, whilst which-
ever fraction of the Japanese was attacked, must be met
more or less directly in front, unless, indeed, the troops at
Liao-Yang could tufnrKTuroki's right by Pen-si-hu.

As already remarked, before taking the offensive, Kuro-
patkin should have considered where success was most
likely to produce decisive results.

Kuroki's army certainly most nearly menaced the Eus-
sian line of communication, and for this reason its defeat
would have been advantageous to the Eussians. But Kuro-
patkin's forces were so disposed that he could not easily
envelop Kuroki's left, separate this army completely from
the 4th army, and drive the former towards Feng-huang-
cheng; moreover, success against Kuroki's left would not
necessarily involve the retirement of Oku and Nodzu;

StiU less would the victory be decisive, if Kuropatkin,
moving his Liao-Yang troops to Pen-si-hu, rolled up the 12th
division; for though, perhaps, this division could be more
easily defeated than any other portion of the Japanese
forces, a success against the Japanese right would tend only
to bring the armies into one straight line, not to cause their
ruin.

46 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

Similarly, the defeat of the 4th army, though it would
doubtless iaeonvenience the Japanese, and would probably
cause Kuroki to fall back, would not oblige them to raise
the siege of Port Arthur ; and since Nodzu lay in a hilly
country, rapid success, so necessary to prevent envelopment
by the Japanese wings, would not be easy.

J)ku, on the other hand, directly covered the most im-
portant of the Japanese lines of supply, to Ying-kow and
Dalny, and also the siege of Port Arthur. If he could be
driven back and routed, the Japanese armies would be in a
sorry plight.

Hence, it seems that the Eussian stroke should have been
delivered against Oku's army, which, by using the railway,
could also be most quickly attacked. Besides, the ground
where the battle would take place was more favourable to
the Eussian organisation and armament than the mountains,
and the physical difficulties of the hills would help to delay
Kuroki and Nodzu, when they attempted to exert pressure
to assist Oku.

However, Kuropatkin seems to have intended nothing more
than a direct attack on the 12th division, with the fractions
of the 10th corps already designated for the purpose.

But before even this operation could take place, marshal
Oyama, hearing from Kuroki that the Eussians appeared to
be massing against the right of the 1st army, wisely decided
to anticipate the enemy's offensive, and to spoil their plan
by a forward moveinent by the whole 1st army, on July 30th
and 31st. This operation was to be comtmed, apparently,
with a simultaneous advance by the other two armies, and
with active raids against the Eussian line of communication,
by the Chinese Hun-huse brigands.

On 31st, the 1st army was successful in defeating Keller's
detachment, and portions of the 10th corps, and drove them
back to the ridges enclosing, on the east, the valley of the
i'Tan river.

On news of this reverse, Kuropatkin, fearing for Liao-Yang
and his Une of communication, directed those troops which

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 47

had been in the neighbourhood of Hai-oheng to fall back to
a strong and carefully intrenched position along the ridge of
hills near An-shan-tien. This retrograde movement was also
due to the lacli that U^u had succeeded in interposing, after
but slight resistance, some troops between the 2nd and 4th
Siberian corps; whilst the 4th army had, on July 31st, taken
Hsi- mu-chen g^dri ving back Mischen ko. The 4th army thus
closed to within five miles jof the 2ncrarmy.

The Japanese occupied Hai-cheng" on ^August 3rd, and the August,
result of the operations undertaken towards the end of July,
was therefore to reduce tlie combined frontage to about sixty
or seventy miles. BiiF^uroki's army was not more than
twenty-five or thirty miles from Liap-Yang, whilst the 2nd
and 4th were still quite forty-five miles from that city. At
the same time the country to be traversed by Kuroki was the
more difficult, so that in_pointof_time, the three armies were
perhaps ec[ually_distant from the town._

Kuroki's advanced position had, however, practically com-
mitted the Japanese to a converging attack on Liao-Yang,
for his army, which should have formed the mobile wing of
the Japanese forces, could now only manoeuvre with
difficulty and risk. Had Oyama's hand not been forced by
the threat against the 12th division, and had the 1st army
force been held back on the line Chao-tao to Geb-ato, for
instance, and the 2nd and 4th armies pushed on to An-
shan-tien, the Eussians would have been in a more difficult
position, whilst the Japanese would have run no greater
risk. The 2nd and 4th armies could then have attacked
the enemy's front, and the 1st been used to envelop his left
flank, wherever the battle for Liao-Yang was fought.

Heavy rain fell at the beginning of August, which, com-
bined with the fact that the Japanese were also probably
waiting for the result of the first and abortive assault^
on Port Arthur, delivered between August 20th and 24th,
put an end to active operations, on a large scale, for nearly
a month.

During this interval, the Eussians were still lying south

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 49

and no idea of offensive seems to have been entertained by
the Eussian general. The initiative was therefore left to
th e Japan ese, and fearful lest, on the news of the failure of
the assault on Port Arthur, the Eussians should seize this
advantage, they recommenced their converging advance on
Liao-Yang.

As before, the 1st army was first committed to action,
with the object, it is said, of causing the Eussians to
evacuate the An-shaB-tien position.

The Japanese, as a result, lost all power jol manoeuvre,
except with such troops as could, at considerable risk, "Be
withdrawn from the battle frontage. But, it would, ap-
parently, have been to the Japanese advantage had the
Eussians stood at An-shan-tien, for their envelopment by
Kuroki could then have been undertaken without the
necessity of placing his army astride the Tai-tzu riyer.

Kuropatkinj plan appears to have been to hold the posi-
tions at An-shan-tien, and east of An-ping, sufficiently long to
oblige the enemy to show his hand and force. Having accom-
plished this, the army was to retire on the intrenchments
that had been made round Liao-Yang, then, pivoting on this
bridge-head, it was to manoeuvre on both banks of the Tai-
tzu ; and if the enemy divided his force and placed it astride
the river, it was to faU, in superior numbers, on one or other
fraction.

Except that the troops holding the advanced positions
were liable to defeat in detail, and if not beaten, must, at
any rate, have been subjected to the demoralising influence
of another retirement, the plan, though cautious, was reason-
able. But in the event Kuropatkin failed 'to~carry out his
conception, and was defeated. (See Map 8.)

IV

September. fTHHE strategical operations, proper, of the Eusso-Japanese
JL war, may be said to have ended with the commence-
ment of the battle of Liao-Yang, but the subsequent
operations were on so extended a scale, that it is proposed
to deal, in outline, with events leading up to the battle of
Mukden.

After their defeat at Liao-Yang, the Eussians retired
northwards with stolid deliberation, unpursued by the
Japanese, the main body reaching the neighbourhood of
Mukden on September 6th.

Kuropatkin's first impulse seems to have been to evacuate
Mukden, and retreat to Tieh-ling, a town about forty miles
north of the Manchu capital, where an offshoot from the
Manchurian mountains is again projected into the Liao
plain, offering a position suitable for defensive tactics.

But circumstances soon caused the Eussian commander
to change his mind. In the first place the Japanese pursuit
ceased. Then political pressure appears to have been
brought to bear on him from Eussia, through the viceroy
Alexiev, to discontinue the retirement. Then, again, the
Eussians were much dependent for meat supply on Hsin-
ming-ting, and were naturally unwilling to abandon to the
enemy, Mukden, a town lying in a rich grain-growing
district, and of considerable political importance.

It was therefore decided to halt at Mukden, and the army
was quartered in this neighbourhood, as follows : —

Of the cavalry, G-rekov's Orenburg Cossack division kept
touch with the Japanese along the Sha and Shi-li rivers ;
Mischenko, with the Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade, stood

5°

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 51

eastwards, as far as the Fu-shun to Pen-si-hu road ; and the
cavalry division, under Samsonov, watched the country east
of Fu-shun. Besides these, there were the customary de-
tachments wide to both flanks.

The 10th and 17th corps remained, with the 2nd and 4th
Siberian corps, south of the Hun river, and were employed
in constructing bridge-heads to the railway and Imperial
road bridges, in the shape of a semicircle of forts, round
a radius from Hun-ho-pu to Yan-su-chian-tzu.

The 1st Siberian corps proceeded to Fu-ling, six miles
east of Mukden, the 3rd to Fu-shun, twenty miles further
east. The two then began to intrench the line of the Hun
from Mukden to Fu-shun, constructing works on both banks
of the river. The 5th Siberian corps was placed between
Mukden and Hsin-ming-ting ; and the 1st corps, now arriving
from Europe, had its headquarters at Pu-ho, fifteen miles
north of Mukden. The 5th East Siberian corps, which had
been broken into detachments during the battle of Liao-
Yang, seems still to have been disseminated. But, later,
apparently, portions of this and of the 5 th Siberian corps
were amalgamated, and known as the 5th corps.

Soon after Liao-Yang, the Czar, believing that the defeat
of the Russians had perhaps, in part, been due to the fact
that Kuropatkin's army was too large for one man to
manage, decided to form two armies in Manchuria, under
admiral Alexiev as commander-in-chief, one to be com-
manded by Kuropatkin, the other by general Grippenberg,
at that time commanding the Vilna army corps.

This appointment, perhaps, turned Kuropatkin's thoughts
to projects for retrieving his reputation.

The fact that the numbers and strength of the Russian
army had been much increased also made an offensive
appear to be promising ; for there had arrived from Europe,
the 1st corps, drafts to replace casualties, Q.F. guns in sub-
stitution for those of older pattern, up to that time in use
by the Siberian corps, and the 6th Siberian corps was on its
way to the seat of war.

52 LECTUKES ON THE STRATEGY OF

Before attempting to attack the Japanese, Kuropatkin,
taught hy his experience at Liao-Yang, proceeded to delegate
his authority, and to decentralise command, by organising
his forces into three groups or armies. Of these, the Eastern
detachment, lying east of Mukden, was composed of the 1st,
2nd, and 3rd Siberian corps, with the Siberian Cossack
division, under general Stackelberg. The western detach-
ment of the 10th, 17th corps, and portions of the 5th
European and 5th Siberian corps, now known as the 5th
corps, with the Orenburg Cossack division, was under general
Bilderling. A central force consisting of the 1st corps, the
4th Siberian corps, and the 6th Siberian corps, when it came
up, with Mischenko's Trans-Baikal Cossack division, was
under the commander-in-chief. In addition, the usual-
strong mixed forces watched both flanks.

Attention was also given to mapping, or to revising maps
of the area round Mukden, but apparently little was really
done, for Stackelberg's detachment is said to have possessed
but few maps at the time of the Sha-Ho battle.

Whilst the Russians were thus engaged, the Japanese,
exhausted by their efforts at Liao-Yang, had halted, the
1st army on the line Hei-yin-tai to Lo-ta-tai, the 2nd and
4th armies south of the Tai-tzu, and west and east of Liao-
Yang.

About September 14th, marshal Oyama seems to have
decided to undertake further offensive operations in a
month's time, by which date, no doubt, drafts to make good
the losses of Liao-Yang would have arrived, as well as the
8th division.

Accordingly, instructions were issued to this effect, each
army was allotted a district in which to advance, and the
troops were warned, that, in future, frontal attacks, when
unaccompanied by enveloping movements, were to be avoided
as far as possible. This last provision exactly coincided
with tactical instructions promu^ated by the Russians
about the same time.

To the 1st army was assigned the Ta-lien-kou to Pu-tsao-

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 53

yai road, and the district eastwards as far as Pen-si-hu. The
4th army was to use the roads on either side of the railway,
and the 2nd army the roads westward as far as the right
bank of the Hun. The reserve, of Kobi brigades, was to march
west of the railway, and behind the right of the 2nd army.

It was not until September 10th that the bridges over
the Tai-tzu, at Liao-Yang, were repaired, and the 2nd army
began to cross the river and to intrench itself on the line
Shan-tai-tzu to Ta-pa-tai-tzu.

The 4th army, which commenced, about the same time, to
move to the north of Tai-tzu, took up the line Nan-tai to
La-ni-pu.

The 1st army lay mainly between La-ni-pu and the Yen-
. tai coal mines, but Umezawa's detachment was about fifteen
miles to the east, at Ping-tai-tzu ; apparently partly for the
purpose of reconnoitring the district allotted to the 1st
army, partly because Ping-tai-tzu is an important valley
centre, whence roads lead to Pen-si-hu, and thence to Chao-
tao and the Yalu.

As has been stated, both commanders were contemplating
offensive operations, and for this purpose each wanted in-
formation of the enemy's dispositions.

Though the masses of Eussian cavalry made it difficult for
^the Japanese patrols to penetrate the enemy's outpost line,
the Japanese service of spies seems to have afforded them
fairly accurate information of the Eussian dispositions ; and,
after all, cavalry, more often than not, can only confirm, or
show to be false, news obtained from other sources. At any
rate, Oyama knew that the whole Eussian front and flanks
were covered by cavalry; that the 5th Siberian corps was
reported west of Mukden, the 10th and 17th corps round,
or close to the city, the 1st and 2nd Siberian corps east of
Mukden ; but the 3rd Siberian corps was not located. He
was also aware that works were being constructed north of
the Sha-Ho, and east of Mukden, and that reinforcements, in
the shape of the 1st European and 6th Siberian corps, were
coming up.

54 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

It has been said " that rivers and mountains, like other
complications in the art of war, afford additional oppor-
tunities to skill and talent, and additional embarrassments
to incapacity " ; and, indeed, the presence, in the theatre of
operations, of the great Hun river, and of the mountains
north of Pen-si-hu, fully exemplify the truth of this remark.

The Hun river certainly complicated the problem pre-
sented to Oyama, for he could not, without placing his army
astride so serious an obstacle, carry out a converging move-
ment against the Eussians, nor could he, without consider-
able risk, attempt to turn, after the manner of Lee, or
envelop their right flank. On the other hand, the Hun
would protect the Japanese left, and render, difficult, attack
by the Eussians from this direction.

Perhaps the Japanese commander-in-chief might have
tried to surprise the enemy by crossing the whole, or at any
rate the greater, part of his army, over the Hun and Tai-tzu,
near Hsiao-pei-ho. Then marching between the Hun and
Liao rivers, he could have attacked the Eussian right, thus
turning the Hun and the fortifications south and east of
Mukden and, at the same time, using the Hun as a line of
supply.

Such plan would have demanded the temporary uncover-
ing of the main line of supply from Ying-kow and Dalny.
But a fortified Liao-Yang should have sufficiently protected
the line of communication, until Japanese pressure on the
Eussian communications had obliged the latter to abandon
any enterprises that might have been undertaken south of
Mukden. Moreover, if advancing southwards in force, the
Eussians would probably have sent a detachment west of the
Hun, and would have, therefore, placed themselves astride
the river.

If unable to adopt so bold a course, Oyama, relying on
the Hun to protect his left, could repeat the tactics of Liao-
Yang, by advancing directly on Mukden with the 2nd army,
and moving the 1st and 4th armies, in echelon behind the
2nd, through the hills, towards Fu-shun. Here they could

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 55

probably, with ease, force the passage of the Hun, but
supply in the hill area might be difficult.

Or he could imitate Lee's action in 1862, and detach
Kuroki to move round the Eussian left whilst the rest
attacked, or remained fronting, the Eussians.

In any case, either the passage across the Hun, or the
march through the hiUs, would be a slow proceeding, which
would increase the risk that the enemy might probe the
plan, and counter-attack before its development.

Or, again, he could adopt a less ambitious, though probably
not less risky plan, and act as he apparently intended,
making a direct advance on Mukden and Pu-shun, and
trusting to Kuroki to overlap and envelop the enemy's left.

At any rate the situation of the two armies, now front-
ing each other, and astride their lines of communication,
rendered necessary either a bold turning movement^ or an
equally dangerous, though to outward appearance less risky
frontal advance against the Eussian works; and the last
course would be the least likely to lead to decisive results.

The alternatives presented to the Eussian commander-in-
chief much resembled those placed before Oyama.

About the middle of September, the information available
to Kuropatkin inclined him to believe that two Japanese
divisions were between Nan-tai and Shan-tai-tzu, that four
divisions were immediately north of Liao-Yang, two divi-
sions near the Ten-tai coal mines, and two divisions be-
tween Ping-tai-tzu and Pen-si-hu. He knew, moreover,
that Liao-Yang was fortified, for he had made the works,
and he believed that all the Japanese troops were in-
trenched.

There were several courses open to the Eussian leader.
He could utilise the Hun as a line from which to manoeuvre,
constructing bridges, and building bridge-heads at, say,
Chan-tan, at Hun-ho-pu south of Mukden, and at Fu-shun,
and keeping his army, with the exception of his cavalry,
north of the river. But this plan would be unenterprising,
and therefore a confession of weakness and inferiority.

56 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

Or he could, whilst fortifying Hun-ho-pu to secure his com-
munications, and covering his front with cavalry, who would
be especially active in the hill area, march the bulk of his
army down the right bank of the Hun, and cross the river
south of Chan-tan and Hei-kou-tai. This plan would in-
volve the passage of the Hun, a broad river, in somewhat
close proximity to the Japanese left, but the blow would
fall near the Japanese main line of communication.

Or, again, the Eussian general could move his army south-
wards, astride the Hun, attacking the Japanese in front
with one portion, and when their attention was fully en-
gaged, throwing the remainder across the river on to their
left flank. In this case there would be risk of defeat
in detail, for the enemy might envelop the troops east of the
Hun Ho, or might even make a counter-attack towards
Fu-shun. But if they advanced on Fu-shun, their move-
ments in the hills, especially if opposed, would be slow, and
their blow would not so nearly menace the Eussian line, as
would his own operations the Japanese communications.

Or, the Eussians, advancing from Mukden and Fu-shun,
might try to envelop the Japanese right at Pen-si-hu, whilst
closely engaging their front. In order that the enveloping
movement might come as a surprise to the enemy, it should
take place after his front had been attacked. Objections to
this project would be that the Eussian armament was not
well suited to hill warfare, for they had only three or four
mountain batteries; that supply would be difficult; that
movements in mountainous country are always slow, but
are particularly so when opposed ; that the Japanese main
line of communication was many miles distant, and that
therefore to sever it would be difficult ; also that there would
be risk of defeat in detail, for the enemy, whilst holding the
Eussian left in the hills, might attack their centre, and
envelop their right.

Again, the Eussians might advance in three converging
masses with the object of enveloping the enemy, though,
having regard to the fighting power of the Japanese, they

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 57

had hardly sufiBcient numerical preponderance to justify
hopes that envelopment would be successful. Or, they
might move in double echelon from their centre, holding
back both wings, so as to meet and counter the enveloping
tactics practised by the Japanese. Such procedure would
lead to a desperate frontal battle, without prospect of de-
cisive victory.

The plan actually adopted by Kuropatkin was an attack
on the Japanese right, for which the detachment of Staokel-
berg was designated, the purpose of the movement being to
draw the Japanese reserves in an easterly direction. This
accomplished, the Eussian right and centre, which would
have been withheld from close action, could, it was hoped,
attack with success.

To this plan it may be objected that the main operation,
though to be directed against the troops covering the
principal Japanese line of supply, was to be a mere frontal
attack, and therefore more likely to be costly than decisive.
Moreover, the Japanese might consider that an advance
against the Eussian left, would afford more effective relief
to their own right, than the direct despatch of reinforce-
ments to this flank.

(For positions of troops, see Appendix X, and Map 9.)

In criticising the Eussian dispositions it may be remarked
that it might have been more advantageous had Kuropatkin,
instead of putting his reserve behind his centre, in position
to directly reinforce either wing, added, from the beginning,
one corps to his left wing, and placed two corps along the
Sha-Ho to the east, and three corps to the west of the
railway. The three groups could then have come into
action, successively, from left to right, whilst the corps west
of the railway could have outflanked the enemy's left. At
the same time, such of his 17,000 cavalry as were not
required for local protection, might, since the Japanese
cavalry was not numerically formidable, have been formed
into two masses of, say, 7000 and 10,000, the larger to operate
against the Japanese right, the smaller against their left wing.

58 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

The flank detachments should also, if not quite abolished,
have been very much reduced in strength, so as to enable
effort to be concentrated at the decisive point.

The arrangement of the Japanese army may be criticised
in the sense that it was perhaps better posted for a defensive
battle covering Liao-Yang, than for the offensive movement
which Oyama is said to have contemplated, for long marches
to either flank would have to be made before the troops
could be in position to initiate an enveloping movement,

Oyama seems to have received early intimation of the
enemy's projects. On September 28th, the actual date
on which Kuropatkin issued his general plan of action, [with
only a reservation that the time for its inception was to be
notified later,] the Japanese commander-in-chief informed
his army leaders that the Eussians might, at any moment,
move in force against Ping-tai-tzu, and that arrangements
must, therefore, be made against this contingency.
October. Again, on October 2nd, a Eussian army order was pub-
lished, and copied in the Press, announcing that the time
had come for the Eussian army to take the offensive, and
drive the enemy southwards.

This may have been regarded by the Japanese as a blind,
for in spite of this warning, they were in some degree sur-
prised by the enemy's offensive.

But, as happened throughout the war, the Eussian opera-
tions were so slow and hesitating, that the Japanese, by a
vigorous offensive, were able to deprive the enemy of his
initial advantage.

After severe fighting, the armies halted, exhausted and
facing one another, on the banks of the Sha river, where
they settled down, in close contact, to await— the Eussians
the arrival of reinforcements, before again ilnder taking the
offensive, the Japanese the release of their 3rd army by the
capture of Port Arthur. (See Map 10.)

The viceroy Alexiev was recalled soon after the Sha-Ho
battle, leaving Kuropatkin free to direct operations, and to
continue the work of organising the army.

s

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THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 59

For some months the Eussians devoted themselves to November
reorganisation, and to the absorption of reinforcements. *"•*>
Both sides also busily intrenched, and whilst bickering was
frequent, it rarely assumed serious proportions, notwithstand-
ing that the armies, in places, were not fifty yards apart.

The first event, worthy of note, to happen in the winter January,
was the fall of Port Arthur on January 1st, 1905. (For ^^o^-
positions of the armies, see Appendix XI, and Map 11.)

This occurrence made it certain that the Japanese would
soon receive an accession of three or four divisions. The
Eussians having now completed the organisation of their
army, and being in sufficient numbers to warrant hope of a
successful attack on the enemy, Kuropatkin seems, therefore,
to have thought the moment propitious for an offensive, more
especially because the political situation in Eussia was such
as to render the government anxious for a victory.

Two great obstacles stood in the way of active measures —
the shortness of the days, and the coldness of the time of
year.

In spite of the rigorous climate, Kuropatkin decided to
attack the Japanese, hoping, perhaps, that the Eussians,
inured to cold, would support the inevitable hardships
better than the enemy.

Before taking the offensive, the Eussian leader, either
with the object of discovering if any troops from Port
Arthur had reached the armies, or to alarm the enemy as to
his communications, sent round the Japanese left, a force of
about fifty squadrons, with half a dozen batteries, and a few
infantry, all under Mischenko.

The raid ended on January 11th, and was so far suc-
cessful, that the Eussians learnt that no troops of the 3rd
army had reached Liao-Yang.

Kuropatkin now resolved to roll up the Japanese left,
but proposed to use for this purpose, only about 30,000 men,
drawn from the 8th and 10th corps, the Eifle corps, and
the 1st and 6th Siberian corps.

There seems no doubt that, having regard to the frontage

60 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

occupied by the two armies, the numerical superiority of
the Eussians, some 100,000 men, and the strength of the
Eussian front line, behind which manoeuvre should not have
been difficult, Kuropatkin possessed the power to deal a
serious blow on either flank. This the Japanese would find
difficult to parry, unless troops were withdrawn from the
first line, in which case there would be risk of the front
being broken.

The left flank of the Japanese was most inviting; here
the country was not so difficult as were the eastward hills,
the distance to be traversed by the Eussians would be less
than would be required to turn the enemy's right, and the
Japanese left was nearer their main line of communication.
If, then, the left were broken, the enemy's line of supply
would be in serious danger, and, in addition, it was believed
that the Japanese did not anticipate an attack on this
flank.

On the other hand, the Japanese reserves were thought
to be standing near Yentai station, and therefore well
placed to reinforce the left.

Forewarned is forearmed, and a primary condition of
success in war, is, therefore, that the enemy shall be misled,
and that the blow, when delivered, shall come as a sur-
prise.

The Eussians, however, neglected this rule, for, from
January 13th onwards, the Eussian right began to show
unusual activity, a balloon usually raised at Sha-ho-pu,
moving westwards, whilst on 17th and 18th, cavalry occu-
pied Ssu-fang-tai, west of Chan-tan.

It may of course be said that these manoeuvres might
have been a ruse to draw the enemy's attention westwards ;
and this fact constitutes one of the great disadvantages of
the defensive, in that the defender can rarely be certain
whether the enemy's movements are a stratagem, or the
prelude to an attack.

But the Japanese possessed other information of the
Eussian intentions, for, on the night of January 24th, six

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 61

EuBsian soldiers, who surrendered to the Japanese in differ-
ent portions of the frontage held by the armies — and such
desertions were unfortunately frequent, especially amongst
the Jews in the Czar's service — all reported that an attack
would be made, on 26th, agaiast the Japanese left.

In spite of this, the Japanese were somewhat taken
aback, when, on 26th, the Eussians attacked, in force, the
village of Hei-kou-tai. They were, however, driven back
after three days' hard fighting.

As at the Sha-Ho, the Eussians lost their initial advantage
through the undue deliberation of their movements, and no
serious operations took place against the Japanese front, to
prevent reinforcement of the threatened point.

The Japanese contented themselves with beating off the
attack, probably, because they were unwilling to become in-
volved in a decisive battle, before the arrival of the 3rd
army.

In the interval between the battle of Hei-kou-tai and that February,
of Mukden, no stirring events occurred ; but, as a result of
this action, both sides increased their fortified frontage, the
Japanese continuing to hold Hei-kou-tai, and the neighbour-
ing villages, in force, whilst the Eussians threw up in-
trenchments west of Chan-tan.

In other respects the Eussians do not seem to have
altered their dispositions, but the arrival of the 3rd army,
and the completion of Kawamura's 5th army, caused some
changes to be made in the arrangement of the Japanese
troops. (See Appendix XII, and Map 12.)

The annual thaw, which usually begins early in March,
and would render the rivers unfordable, and the roads and
fields heavy, was now imminent. It was therefore to be pre-
sumed, that, in spite of the cold, one or both commanders
would assume the offensive in the interval, more especially
since the Japanese, now that the 3rd army had arrived,
could not, for some time at any rate, expect further rein-
forcement.

Towards the middle of February, the Eussians did decide

62 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

again to attack the Japanese, and even before this date the
latter had worked out a plan of attack.

The experience of the Sha-Ho battle had taught the Eus-
sians the local resisting power inherent in mountain positions,
and whilst railways had been run to various portions of the
Eussian frontage, thus facilitating supply, none had been
laid far into the mountains south of Fu-shun. The feeding
of a large force in this locality would therefore have de-
manded quantities of transport, which could probably only
be procured with difficulty. Moreover, to have turned the
Japanese right, would have required a long detour, for
Kawamura's army was some distance east of Pen-si-hu ; and
success, if attained, would probably have been local rather
than decisive, for the enemy's line of communication lay
many miles from the 5th army. Attack on the right was
also apparently expected by the enemy, for, according to
Kuropatkin's information, the bulk of the 3rd army had been
sent to Kawamura. Then, again, the armament of the
Eussian army, possessing as it did but few mountain guns,
was not well suited to hill warfare ; and lastly, if he moved
a number of troops eastwards, Kuropatkin would, in some
degree, uncover his own communications, and render himself
liable to counter-attack west of Mukden.

On the other hand, the position of the Eussian reserves,
the alignment of the auxiliary railways, the armament of
the Eussians, their preponderance in cavalry, and the level
nature of the country, would facilitate operations against
the Japanese left. By adopting this plan, Kuropatkin
would be retaining the bulk of his army near Mukden, and
his line of communication, and it might reasonably be
hoped that Kawamura's advance would be sufficiently long
retarded, to enable decisive success to be gained against
the Japanese left; though here would be met the enemy's
reserves.

Kuropatkin, therefore, decided to attack the Japanese left,
but without attempting envelopment, the intention being,
apparently, to crush the enemy by weight of numbers, about

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 63

three corps being used for the offensive, whilst the remainder
kept their positions.

This plan may be characterised as a half-measure, and it
would have been wiser to have withdrawn certainly one,
probably better still two corps, from the strongly fortified
frontage, and to have placed a mass of four or five corps
west of the Hun, covered by 10,000 or 15,000 cavalry. The
enemy's right and front might then have been attacked, and
when these had been closely engaged, the stroke might have
been launched against their left.

The Japanese, however, had already adopted a formation
calculated to at once meet envelopment by the enemy, or
shouM he remain on the defensive, to facilitate the enclos-
ing of his forces; the 3rd army being placed behind the
left, the 5th behind the right flank. They had moreover
decided to assume the offensive, on February 20th, their
plan, apparently, stopping short at nothing less than the
envelopment of the Eussians, the 5th army operating
against the enemy's left, the 3rd army against his right.

In order, however, to deceive the enemy as to their
intentions, and to induce him to send his reserves eastwards,
thus facilitating the deployment of the 3rd army, Kawamura
was to move first.

This stratagem succeeded, and to it the Japanese were
a good deal beholden for their victory.

That the Japanese plan was rather beyond the capacity
of their forces, is shown by the event.

In these circumstances, it would probably have been better
to have reduced Kawamura's strength, and added these
troops, as well as the general reserve, which was retained
behind the centre far into the battle, to the 3rd army.

This army would then have comprised about five divisions,
and its operations would probably have been decisive.

By withdrawing cavalry from the divisions of the 2nd and
4th armies, where it had not much scope, a larger mass
might also have been placed on the left, with advantage
to the Japanese operations.

V

THE strategical lessons of the Eusso-Japanese war are
those which throughout history have clamoured for
recognition, but have never, apparently, been thoroughly
appreciated.

Often governments have courted disaster by living in the
present, by disregarding future possibilities, and by pur-
suing, regardless of consequences, policies likely to end in
disaster.

So Eussia, hypnotised by the vastness of her empire, and
encour^Mby the exaggerated fear of her actions displayed
by certain European ministries, embarked thoughtlessly on
an ni-considered policy of expansion. This brought her
face to face with an apparently we^ak, buLdetermined_foe,
whose ve^y existence was threatened by Eussian preten-
sions.

Eussia's policy, in this particular, outst ripped her stratfigx,
that is, her forces were not in position to liHpose her wishes,
should they lead to conflict with Japan.

As a result, the great northern power paid the usual
penalty for unpreparedness, bad organisation, and unsou nd
distribution of force. She lost the initiative, was obliged to
conform to the operations of^ the enemy, and to push into
the front line, as they arrived in the theatre of war, a
heterogeneous collection of units, who were without cohesion.

As always happens in such circumstances, councils were
divided, plajis hastily arranged, and as hastily abandoned,
generals Tiad_ no confidence in one another, nor in their
men, and the troops, sharing this feeling, mistrusted their
leaders.

64

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 65

Even when projects promised success, they were marred
by faulty execution.

Fighting as they were in the midst of a semi-hostile
population, and dep endent t o a great extent onjheir single
line of_railway to Europe, the Eussians were also, from the
first, forced to make l arge detachments to guard their com-
munications, as to the security of which they were naturally
sensitive.

Eussia was therefore obliged J:q_accgptdef eat from a
weaker nation, who, through careful preparation, and sound
OTganisation, which go far to ensure succesrin war; and
with the help of judicious alliances, was able to beat a more
powerful rival.

Neither wealth, resources, .numbers^of •f>&pulatiQn, nor
PY§a arme d force , are therefore decisive factors in war.
More important than these are foresight, preparation, and
organisation.

Eussia's pol icy of expansion was not_ national ; it was
rather the policy of a few ambitious men. The support
of the natioja,^ an. important. Atem_in_w^ was therefore
lacking, and the soldiers went to the front unwillingly, or
even under compulsion.

Consequently, though the Eussians fought well, they
fou ght wi thout enthusiasm, and their generals could not
rely on this factor. But the Japanese people entered heart
and soul into the ^ntest, inspiring their soldiers to noble
deeds.

The difficulty of remedying errors in initial deployment
is clearly shown by the course of the campaignT^ The Eus-
sians never overcame the original drawback of their local
weaknessj the Japanese laboured, throughout^ under TEe
disadvantage inherent in the false strategy of pursuing a
double objective, unless possessed of great preponderance
of force.

The Japanese plan was faulty, in that effort was not con-
centrated against the decisive point, whilst the projects were
somewhat beyond the capacity of the national resources.

66 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

Not only was the power of resistance of the Eussian
troops quartered in Manchuria esteemed too lightly, but
the transporting capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway was
also undervalued.

Nor was war declared at the most favourable moment,
from a military and meteorological point of view. "

Want of foresight, too, was displayed in not sufficiently
discou nting the influence jof the climatic and topographical
conditions in HancEuna, which undoubtedly delayed the
Japanese operations, to the advantage of the Eussians.

Still, vigorous execution^ enabled the nation to achieve a
considerable success; the movements of the armies were
successfully co-ordinated in such a manner as to afford one
another support; and the menace of the 1st army to the
Eussian line of communication produced the expected
effect.

The whole course of the operations, in fact, again proves
that it is not so much ability to plan, as resolution to carry
through^ that is required to make successful war ; though,
naturally, a good plan, well executed, is the ideal to be
attained.

Comjnand of _the sea also proved a valuable asset to
Japan, in forcing~Eussia to strongly guard the fortress of
Vladivostock, and in causing her generals to be diffident of
risking troops in the Liao-tung peninsula.

The value and importance of the initiative is another
lesson of the war.

He who is obHgedJ;o|£no]^hejenmj^lead£eases to be
a free agent, a fact which adversely affects his judgment,
rendering him weak and vacillating.

The initiative does not belong in perpetuity to the
assailant, to him who first attacks, for the defender, by an
early counter-stroke, may reverse the positions.

Circumstances will not always permit a belligerent to
attack first, but it is to be remembered that the longer the
initiative is left to the opponent, the greater become his
chances of success.

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 67

"^^^ strong and weak points of e nveloping st rategy stand
out clearly. There is no magic, calculated to ensure success,
in enveloping strategy, that is, in converging movements on
several lines of operation. Far from it, this form of war is
the most risky, and the general who adopts exterior lines,
deliberately, or of necessity, separates his forces, affording
the opponent the desired opportunity of beating them in
detail.

But converging .movements favour e nvelop ment, and en-
velopment, if successful, is decisive, a fact which tempts
commanders to run the risks its inception entails.

War would be fairly easy were the game played, even
blindfold, on a chessboa rd: with no factors of weather, or
topography, to disturb calculations; with men of wood, not
delicate human beings, with which to make moves ; and with
full knowledge of the enemy's dispositions.

It is the presence of these disturbingelements that makes
war so difficult an art; Iot even in countries with settled
cUmates, the influence of weather on the health of the men,
or on the mobility of the army, may, at any moment, pre-
judice the best-laid plans.

But a more variable factor, even than weather, is human
nature, and if a wide margin must be left to allow for the
'effect of climate, a wider is required to discount human
eccent ricities.

If ignorance of the enemj's jgosition and movements be
added to the plot, it is clear that no plan of operations,
npt ela stic, ha s great chance of success.

Kuro patkin's wavering attitude may have, and probably
did, influence, that of his subordinate generals, but it cannot
be said that they executed his plans with the spirit he had
the right to expect. Yet generous_eo;;Ogeration^is one of the
foundations of success in war.

It'is notj at present, easy to say how much or how little
either commander was influenced by political pressure, and
to what extent the course to be pursued, was dictated from
localities far from the seat of war.

68 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF

The general policy to be followed in war rests with the
National Government^ but interference in the details of the
conduct of a campaign cannot but lead to disaster, as his-
tory has shown time and again.

Training for war is an important part of peace prepara-
tion, but is, owing to the innate conservatism of human
nature, perhaps the most difficult portion of 'what maybe
called peace strategy.

Men's minds habitually seek refuge in rules, vainly hoping
thereby to solve life's difficulties and dilemmas. As a
result, though formalism spells ruin in war, the Russians
certainly, the Japanese in some"degree, were found behind
modern rec[uirements in their training, and both paid for
their fault by useless sacrifice of life. The difficulty of
keeping training up to date lies mainly in the fact that it is
not possible, in peace, to pronounce definitely on the in-
fluence that will be exercised by improvements in armament.
Moreover, officers and men dislike the trouble of changing
methods in which they have been trained, and which may,
in the past, have stood the test of war.

A lesson of this_war is thafif a sound plan vigorously
execuEeT is the foundation, good information is the keystone
of military success. An efficient service of intelligence
cannot be improvised, it must be carried on by men whose
minds have been trained in these matters. Of this the
Japanese were aware, and though, in some respects, their
topographical information was faulty, their intelligence
service in Europe, combined with a local system of spies,
who were assisted by the friendly Chinese population, usually
afforded early and accurate news of the enemy's dispositions
and intentions.

The Russian intelligence department is said to have been
ill organised ; and it is even stated that few, if any, officers
at Russian headquarters were able to read the Japanese
writing, and that documents which fell into their hands
could not therefore be deciphered.

In contrast, too, to the silence of the Japanese press, the

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 69

Eussian newspapers published details of the mobilisation of
troops, and the despatch of reinforcements, which laid bare
to the enemy the strength of the opposing army.

Lastly, the great d ifficulty of war is demonstrated by the
failure of the Eussian leader in this campaign.

Kuropatkin was n o fool as judged by or dinary standards.
To those who knew him he appeared a clever, cultured
man, well read in military literature. He was reckoned
resolute, he possessed much of that war experience which
is rated so high, and had distinguished himself on service.

He seemed, therefore, to possess the qualifications required
in a general. Yet he failed. The weight of responsibility
was too great for him, and, in reality, he lacked the character
to carry through his plans, and to d ominate the will of his
opponent.

Character may be an inborn quality, like strength of arm,
or swiftness of foot, but character can be formed and
developed, and " to teac h taste is inevitably jo^formjcharac-
ter." But if there has been acquired the ambition to
labour to perfect knowledge and judgment ; the will to over-
come difficulties not to be beaten by them ; the sentiment
that "nothing has been done whilst anything remains un-
done, and that to fail is better than not to attempt"; a great
step will have been made towards the formation of a
character fit to take command, should fortune so shape the
career.

APPENDIX I

EUSSIAN OEGANISATION

A Normal Army Corps consisted of —

Two infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and corps
engineers.
An Infantry Division included —

Two brigades, each of two, four-battalion regiments; one
artillery brigade of six or eight batteries, each of eight
guns; and an engineer company. 1 :J '''<'••■'■'•-

"^ A cavalry division comprised two brigades, each of two, six-
squadron regiments, with two horse batteries. Total: 3000-3500
sabres or lances, and 12 guns.

Total strength of an army corps : about 28,000 rifles, 3500
sabres, 124 guns. '

Of the corps that took part in the war, the following, which
belonged to the active European army, were approximately of the
above strength: 1st, 4th, 10th, 16th, 17th.

The 5th and 6th Siberian Corps were composed of European
reserve units, and numbered 28,000 rifles and 96 guns.

The 4th Siberian Corps was made up of Siberian reserve units,
and possessed 28,000 rifles and 64 guns.

The 2nd Siberian Corps included East Siberian troops, and
reserve units, and possessed 27,000 rifles and 80 guns.

The 1st and 3rd Siberian Corps were formed in Eastern Siberia
before the war, and numbered 22,000 rifles and 80 guns.
\\ None of the Siberian corps had special corps cavalry, but
It Cossack divisions, and smaller units, were attached to them as
> > required.

Armambnt. — That of the artillery was of a heterogeneous nature.
About one-third of the field batteries possessed a modem 3 in. Q.F.
gun, with shield; firing a practically smokeless powder, and throwing
a shrapnel up to 6000 yards with time fuse, and 7000 yards with
percussion fuse. The remainder of the field guns were principally

70

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE "WAE 71

muzzle-loading weapons, of 3-42 calibre. Tljere were a ;few_
mountain guns, and a proportion* of Keavy artillery and howitzers.

The cavah^r carried sword, a rifle similar to that of the infantry,
sometimes a bayonet, and the front rank had, also, usually a lance.
Of rifle ammunition, 45 rounds were on the man, and 24 rounds
in the regimental transport.

The infantry weapon was a '3 charger-loading rifle, each charger
holding five cartridges. The rifle was sighted to 2100 yards, and
weighed nine pounds. Each man carried 120 rounds in his
pouches, bandolier, and kit bag.

Equipmbnt and Eations. — Each infantry man had usually, on
his person, biscuit and salt for t wo and a half days ; and eighty men
per company were equipped with spades!~ llie total weight
carried by the infantry soldier, including clothing, was sixty
pounds. '

DT reserve rations, there were, in Vladivostock and district, at
the begiiohiiig 6i Ihe war, three months' supplies; in the Port
Arthur command, twelve months' food ; and eight months' in the
Siberian military district.

Enginkers. — Pontoon units had from 300-400 yards of bridg-
ing material, and many engineer companies possessed a light field
park.

The European companies had forty miles of cable and wire, and
there were four East Siberian telegraph companies, each with six-
teen miles of wire. There were also, in the army, three telegraph
companies with Marconi wireless equipment, for maintenance of
communication between the Commander-ia-Chief and army com-
manders.

Machine Guns. — Several divisions had eight-gun machine-gun
companies.

Mounted Soouts. — Most divisions possessed companies of
mounted scouts.

72 LECTUKES ON THE STEATEGY OF

APPENDIX II

JAPANESE OEGANISATION

The army was organised on a territorial system. There were
thirteen districts, each furnishing one division, and one Kobi
brigade.

Four new divisions, and Kobi brigades, were raised in 190jL_

A division included two brigades, each of two, three-battaUon
regiments ; one cavalry regiment ; six, six-gun batteries ; and three
companies of engineers.

Total: 11,400 rifles, 430 sabres, 36 guns, 830 engineers.

The 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th divisions had mountain
guns only; the 7th division had half field and half mountain guns;
the remainder possessed field guns.

A Kobi brigade consisted of two, two-battalion regiments, and
numbered 3500 rifles.

A mixed Kobi brigade was composed of one infantry brigade of
two, threfrK,ttalion regiments ; three batteries ; and one company of
engineers. Total: 5000 rifles, ? sabres, 18 guns, 280 engineers.

An artillery brigade^ consisted of three regiments, each of six,
six-guiTlBattMwir ' \ C"''^'' '^'^'^^"^

A cavalry brigade comprised two regiments, of four squadrons
each.

Armament. — The field and mountain guns were of the same
calibre — 2 '95 inches. Both fired a practically smokeless powder,
and the field gun ranged to about 5000 yards. After the Sha-Ho
battle, the field gims were provided with shields.

There were batteries of 4'72 howitzers, and heavy guns of
various kinds.

The artillery carried both shrapnel, and high explosive shell.

The cavalry were armed with a sword, and with a carbine
sighted to 1500 yards.

The infantry possessed a rifle of -256 calibre, sighted to 2280
yards, weighing about eight and a half pounds, and loaded by
means of a charger carrying five cartridges.

Of ammunition, 150 rounds were supposed to be on the man,
and 60 rounds on the ammunition mules.

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 73

Eations, etc. — Each man had, on his person, two days' rations ;
and two-thirds of the men carried an intrenching tool strapped to
the knapsack.

Enqinbbks. — The bridging sections possessed 153 yards of
bridge, and a telegraph section had 36 miles of air line and
cable.

Machine Guns. — In 1904-5 each division was given fourteen
Hotchkiss guns. These were organised into two six-gun batteries,
and one two-gun section.

APPENDIX III

TABLES SHOWING THE APPEOXIMATE
DISPOSITIONS AND NUMBERS OF THE AEMIES

COMBATANT TROOPS, LESS ARTILLERYMEN

Japanese

BEGINNIKG OF FEBRUARY, 1904.
1st division, 1st Kobi brigade
Guard, Guard Kobi brigade .
2nd division, '2nd Kobi brigade
3rd division, 3rd Kobi brigade
4th division, 4th Kobi brigade
5th division, 5th Kobi brigade
6th division, 6th Kobi brigade
7th division, 7th Kobi brigade
8th division, 8th Kobi brigade
9th division, 9th Kobi brigade
10th division, 10th Kobi brigade
11th division, 11th Kobi brigade
12th division, 12th Kobi brigade
Depot troops in addition.
Grand total: 245,000 rifles, 10,500 sabres,
engineers.

Tokyo.
Tokyo.
Sendai.
Nagoya.
Osaka.
TJjina.
Kumatoto.
Hokkaido.
Hirosaki.
Kanazawa.
, Hijemi.
Marugame.
Kokura.

828 guns, 14,000

74 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF

Russians
Vladivostock (Ussuri) district
BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY, 1904.
1st, 2nd, 6tli, 8th East Siberian rifle brigades.
2nd brigade of the 31st division.
2nd brigade of the 35th division.
Two regiments of cavalry.
One engineer battalion.
Fourteen batteries.
Fortress troops.
Railway troops.

Field troops
Fortress troops .
Railway troo^DS .

Total .... 40,500 1,500 112

Kuan-tung peninsula, and Southern Manchuria

3rd, 4th, and 7th East Siberian rifle brigades.
Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade.
One engineer battalion.
Five batteries.
Fortress troops.

Rifles.

Sabres.

Guns.

33,500

1,500

112

3,500

—

—

3,500

—

—

Rifles.

Sabres.

Guns.

Field troops

21,000

1,400

40

Fortress troops .

2,500

—

—

Total .

23,500

1,400

40

On the '

railway •

south of Harbin

5th East Siberian rifle

brigade,

One cavalry brigade.

Two batteries.

Railway troops.

Rifles.

Sabres.

Guns.

Field troops

. 5,500

1,300

12

Railway troops

. 7,500

—

—

Total

. 13,000

1,300

12

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 75

Russians {continued)
Grand total. Rifles. Sabres. Field Guns.

Field troops . . . 60,000 4,200 164

Fortress troops
Railway troops
Frontier guards

Total .

6,000 — —

11,000 — —

13,500 8,000 48

90.500 12,200 212

APPENDIX IV

Japanese

South of Wi-ju, and Ghang-syong
END OF APRIL.
1st army, general Baron Kuroki.
Guard division.
2nd division.
12tli division.

Rifles. Sabres.
Total . . 33,500 1,000

Guns.
126

Engineers.
800

Chm-am-pho

Under general Oku, in transports.
1st division.

3rd division.

4tli division.

Half an artillery brigade.

Rifles. Sabres.
Total . . 33,500 1,000

Guns.
162

Engineers.
800

Grand total . 67,000 2,000

288

1,600

Russians

Towards Shan-hai-huan

END OF APRIL.

Rifles. Sabres.

General Kossagovski. 1,400 250

76 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

Russians (continued)

Neighbourhood of Ldao-Yang
5th East Siberian, rifle division.
1st Siberian infantry division.
One brigade 10th corps.
One brigade 17th corps.
Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade.
Twelve squadrons Cossacks.
Six companies engineers.

Rifles. Sabres.

Guns.

Total .... 27,500 4,300

140

Near Ying-how

1st and 9th East Siberian rifle divisions.

Six squadrons dragoons.

One battalion engineers.

Teh-li-tzu, and Pu-lan-tien

One brigade, five squadrons, and one horse battery.

Rifles. Sabres.

Guns.

Total .... 20,000 700

64

Near An-tung, and Ta-ku-shan

Lieutenant-general Zasulitch.

3rd and 6th East Siberian divisions.

Mischenko's Cossacks.

Rifles. Sabres.

Guna.

Total .... 18,000 2,900

72

East of Kuan-tien-hsien
Colonel Madridov.
Two squadrons and two companies of mounted scouts.

Port Arthur, and neighbourhood

4th East Siberian rifle division.

7th East Siberian rifle division.

Two companies engineers.

Three battalions fortress troops.

One squadron.

Rifles. Sabres. Field guns.

Total .... 25,500 120 64

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 77

Russians {continued)

Vladivostoek and district
2nd East Siberian rifle division.
8th East Siberian riile division.
Ussuri cavalry brigade.
Fortress troops.

Rifles.
Total . . . 21,500

Sabres,

1,000

Field guns.
56

Rifles.
Field troops . . . 67,000
In fortresses . . . 47,000
Railway and frontier troops 24,500

Sabres.

8,300
1,120
8,000

Field Guns.

276

120

48

Grand total . . 138,500

17,420

444

APPENDIX V

Japanese

Feng-huang-cheng, and Ai-yang-pien-meng
27th may.
1st army, general Baron Kuioki.
Guard division.
2nd division.

12 th. division.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.

Total . . 30,000 1,000 128 2,000

Nanshan, Pu-lan-tien, Torsha river,

and Yen-ta-kou.

2nd army, general Baron Oku.

1st division.

3rd division.

4th division.

5th division.

11th division.

1st cavalry brigade.

An artillery brigade (less one regiment).

Rifles. Sabres.

Guns. Engineers

Total . . 55,000 3,200

234 4,000

78 LECTUEES

ON THE STRATEGY OF

Japanese (continued)

Ta-hiL-shan

Nucleus of the ith army.

10th division.

Rifles. Sabres.

Guns. Engineers.

Total .

11,000 400

36 300

Grand total .

96,000 4,600

398 6,300

Russians

Towards Shan-hai-kuan

27th may.

General Kossogovski.

Rifles.

Sabres.

1,400

250

Liao-Tang and neighbourhood
5th East Siberian rifle division.
2nd brigade 31st division, 10th corps.
2nd brigade 35th division, 17th corps.
Portions of 2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions.
Various Cossack and artillery units.

Total

Rifles.
37,000

4,000

Guns.
118

South of Wa-fang-tien.
Major-general Samsonov.

Sabres.
2,600

Guns.
6

Ying-kow, Kai-chou, Hai-cheng, and neighbourhood
Lieutenant-general Stackelberg.
1st East Siberian rifle division.
9th East Siberian rifle division.
Part of 2nd Siberian reserve division.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total . . . 27,500 200 80

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE

79

EussiANS (continued)

North of Feng-huang-cheng

Lieutenant-general Count Keller.

Srd East Siberian rifle division.

6th East Siberian rifle division.

Part of 2nd Siberian reserve division.

One Cossack regiment and horse battery.

Eifles.

Sabres.

Guns.

14,000

600

54

Sairma-ehi.

Major-general Eennenkamf.

Eifles.

Sabres.

Guna.

2,100

2,100

14

East of Sai-ma-cM

Colonel Madridov.

Eifles and Sabres.

700

Hsui-yen

Major-general Mischenko.

Sabres.

Guns.

2,000

6

Port Arthur, and Nan-shan

Lieutenant-general Stoessel.

Eifles.

Sabres.

Field Guns.

25,500

120

64

VladivostocJc

Lieutenant-general Linevitch.

Eifles.

Sabres.

Field Guns.

22,000

3,600

64

Eifles.

Sabres.

Field Guns.

Field troops . . . 82,500

11,950

278

In fortresses . . . 47,500

3,720

128

Eailway and frontier

guards . . . 34,300

8,000

48

Grand total . . 164,300

23,670

454

80 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

APPENDIX VI

Japanese

Advancing from Feng-huang-cheng, and Ai-yang-pien-meng

15th JUNE.
1st army, general Baron Kuroki.
Guard division (less Asada brigade).
2nd division.

12tli division.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.

Total . . 25,000 1,000 128 2,500

North of Torku-shan, and at Hsui-yen
4th army, general Kawamura.
lOth division.
Asada brigade of Guards.

Eiflea. Sabres.

Guns.

Engineers.

Total . . 16,500 400

36

800

Teh-li-tzu

2nd army, general Baron Oku.

3rd division.

4tli division.

5tli division.

1st cavalry brigade.

Artillery brigade.

6th division (coming up).

Rifles. Sabrea.

Guns.

Engineers.

Total . . 45,000 2,800

252

3,000

Advancing on Port Arthur
3rd army, general Baron Nogi.
1st division.
1 1th division.

Rifles. Sabres. Guna. Engineers.

Total . . 23,000 430 72 1,600

Grand total . 109,500 4,6.i0 488 7,900

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

81

RtrsaiANs

Liao-Yang, and Mukden
15th JUNE

Portions of 1st brigade, 31st diYision, and of Isfc Siberian

division.

Cossack and artUlery units.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total .... 12,500 1,500 46

Torshih-cMao, Hai-cheng, and Ying-kow

Bulk of 4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve

divisions).
2nd brigade 31st division.

Biflea. Sabres. Guns.

Total .... 21,000 2,200 54

Towards Shan-Jiai-kuan
General Kossogovski.

Total

Rifles.
1,500

Sabrea. Guns.
250 8

Feng-shui-ling range

Lieutenant-general Count Keller.

3rd East Siberian rifle division.

Part of 6th East Siberian rifle division.

One Cossack regiment, and one horse battery.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total .... 12,600 600 54

Sai-ma-chi
Major-general Eennenkamf.

Total .

Rifles.
3,500

Sabres. Guns.
2,200 16

Hdng-ehing-ting
Lieutenant-colonel Madridov.

Total .

Rifles.
700

Sabres. Guns.
1,000 4

82 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

EussiANS (continued)

Ghi-pan-Ung, Ta-Ung

Major-general Mischenko.

Part of the 4th Siberian corps.

Cossacks, and horse guns.

Rifles.

Sabres.

Guns.

Total .... 10,500

2,000

38

Teh-U-tzu
Lieutenant-general Stackejberg.
1st East Siberian rifle division.
9th East Siberian rifle division.
2nd brigade 35th division.
Cossack units.

Rifles.

Sabres.

Guns.

Total .

. 27,000

2,500

94

Port Arthur

Lieutenant-general Stoessel.

Rifles.

Sabres.

Field Guns.

Total .

. 25,500

120

64

Vladivostock

Lieutenant-general Linevitch.

Rifles.

Sabres.

Guns.

Total .

. 22,000

3,600

64

Rifles.

Sabres.

Field Guns.

Field troops

. 89,300

12,250

314

In fortresses, etc. .

. 47,500

3,720

128

Railway, etc., guards .

. 34,300

8,000

48

Grapd total .

. 171,100

23,970

490

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 83

APPENDIX VII

Japanese

Motien-ling, and North Feng-shui-ling
30th JUNE.
1st army, geneial Baron Kuroki.
Guard division (less Asada brigade).
2nd division.
12th division.
Umezawa's mixed Kobi brigade.

Rifles. Sabres. Gud3. Engineers.

Total . . 30,000 1,000 152 2,600

Chi-pan-ling, and Ta-ling

4tli army, general Count Nodzu.

10th division.

Asada brigade of Guards.

10th Kobi brigade.

Rifles.

Sabres.

Gnus.

Engineers.

Total . . 21,000

430

54

1,000

Near Kai-chou

2nd army, general Baron Oku.

3rd division.

4th division.

5th division.

6th division.

1st cavalry brigade.

An artillery brigade.

Rifles.

Sabres,

Guns.

Engineers.

Total . . 45,000

2,800

252

3,200

Kensan

3rd army, general Baron Nogi.

1st division.

11th division.

One or two Kobi brigades.

Rifles.

Sabres.

Guns.

Engineers.

Total . . 26,000

450

72

1,600

Grand total 122,000 4,680 530 8,400

84 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

EUSSIANS

Ldao-Tang, and Mukden
30th JUNE.

Various detachments.

Rifles. Sabres.

Guns.

8,000 1,500

14

Harbin, and Kirin
Garrisons.

Rifles. Sabres.

Gnns.

3,000 400

8

Towards Shan-Jmi-huan
General Kossogovski.

Rifles. Sabres. Gnns.

1,500 250 8

Chao-tao, and North Feng-ehui-lmg

Major-general Eennenkamf.

Rifles. Sabres. Gnns.

3,500 2,200 26

West of Mo-tien-ling
Lieutenant-general Count Keller.

Portions of the Srd and 6th East Siberian rifle divisions.
Cossacks.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total . . 6,500 600 24

On route to

join

Keller

Rifles.
6,500

Guns.
24

Hsing-ching-ting
Lieutenant-colonel Madridov.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

700 1,000 4

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 85

EussiANS (continued)

Tang-chi, GM-pan-Ung, and Ta-ling
Major-general Mischenko.
Part of 4tli Siberian corps.
2nd brigade 35th division.
Cossacks and horse guns.

Bayonets. Sabres.

Guns.

Total . . 16,000 1,800

72

South of Kai-ehou

Major-general Samsonov.

Sabres. Guns.

3,000 12

Kai-chou, and Ying-kow

Lieutenant-general Stackelberg.

1st East Siberian rifle division.

9th East Siberian rifle division.

Cossacks and horse guns.

Rifles. Sabres.

Guns.

Total . . 29,000 750

50

Hsi-mvrchmg
Lieutenant-general Zasulitch.

Portions of 5th and 6th East Siberian rifle divisions.
Cossacks and horse guns.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total . . 10,500 1,500 46

Hai-cheng, and Ta-sMh-ehiao
Lieutenant-general Zarubaiev.
Portions of 4th Siberian corps and of 31st division.

Cossacks.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns,

Total . . 24,000 800 160

Rifles.

Sabres.

Field Guns.

Field troops . 109,200

13,800

448

In Fortresses, etc. 47,500

4,120

128

Eail way and frontier

guards . . 34,300

11,000

48

191,000 28,920 624

86 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

APPENDIX VIII

Japanese

Attacking the Russian positions at Tu-shu-lin-tzu, Pen-ling, and

To-wan
31sT JULY.
1st army, general Baron Kuroki.
Guard division.
2nd division.
12th division.

TJmezawa brigade.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.

Total . . 36,000 1,000 152 2,000

South of Hsi-mu-cTieng

4tli army, general Count Nodzu.

5th division.

10th division.

10th Kobi brigade.

Eifles. Sabres.

Guns.

Engineers.

Total . . 25,000 850

90

1,000

Ta-shih-chiao, and south of Hai-cheng
2nd army, general Baron Oku.
3rd division.
4th division.
5th division.
1st cavalry brigade.
Artillery brigade.

Eifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.

Total . . 33,000 2,400 216 2,400

Besieging Port Arthur
3rd army, general Baron Nogi.
1st division.
9th division.
11th division.

Two or three Kobi brigades.
Naval brigade.
Siege train.

Eifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.

Total . . 45,000 450 378 1,600

Grand total . 139,000 4,700 836 7,000

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 87

ElTSSIANS

Near Kovrpang-tzu
31sT JULY.

General Kossogovski.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

1,500 250 8

Liao-Yang, MuMen, Kirin, Harbin
Garrison and drafts.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
15,600 2,10 64

An-ping, Yu-shu-lin-tzu, and Pen-ling
Lieutenant-general Sluchevski.
10th corps (9th and part of 31st divisions).

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total . . 22,500 750 88

To-wan, in Lan valley
Lieutenant-general Count Keller.
3rd East Siberian rifle division.
6th East Siberian rifle division.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total . . 17,000 1,750 72

Pen-si-hu
Major-general Lubavin.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

2,000 1,000 12

East of Pen-Bi-hu
Lieutenant-colonel Madridov.

Rifles. Sabrea. Guns.

1,500 1,000 8

Marching eastwards from Liao-Yang

Part of 17th corps.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

11,500 750 72

88

LECTUEES ON

THE STEATEGY

OF

Russians (continued)

South

of Hai-cheng

Major-general Mischenko.

Cossack brigades.

Sabres.

Guns.

Total

•

5,000

48

Hai-cheng and neighbourhood
Lieutenant-general Stackelberg.

1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian divisions.)
Lieutenant-general Zasulitch.
2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division).
Lieutenant-general Zarubaiev.

4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions).
Part of 31st division.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total . . 60,000 1,700 234

Rifles.

Sabres.

Field Guns.

Field troops

131,500

14,300

606

In fortresses, etc.

47,500

4,000

128

On railways, etc.

34,300

11,000

48

213,300 29,300 782

APPENDIX IX

Japanese

East of the ridge dividing the lower portions of the Lan and

Tan rivers
25th august.

1st army, general Baron Kuroki.
Guard division.

2nd division.

12th division.

Umezawa brigade.
A Kobi brigade.

Total .

Rifles.
45,000

Sabres.
1,200

Guns.
170

Engineers.
3,000

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Japanese {contirvued)
Shan-in-tzai, and towards Hai-eheng

4th army, general Count Nodzu.
5th. division.
10th division.
10th Kohi brigade.
20th Kobi brigade.

Total .

Rifles.
27,000

Sabres.
850

GUUB.

112

89

Engineers.
1,700

Between Hai-cheng and An-shan-tien

2nd army, general Baron Oku.

3rd division.

dth division.

6th division.

2nd Kobi brigade.

Artillery brigade.

1st cavalry brigade.

Total .

Rifles.
35,000

Sabres.
2,400

Guns.
240

Engineers.
2,800

Besieging Port Arthur

3rd army, general Baron Nogi

Rifles.
40,000

Grand total

Sabres,
450

Guns.
378

Engineers.
1,600

147,000 4,900 900 9,100

Russians

Tai-t»u R., Kung-shan-ling, An-ping, etc.
25th august.
General Bilderling.

10th European corps (general Sluchevski).
I7th European corps.
3rd Siberian corps (general Ivanov).
2nd cavalry brigade (general Lubavin).

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total. . 53,000 4,200 330

90 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

Russians (continued)
Mukden, Kirin, Harbin
Garrisons and drafts.

Eifles. Sabres.
20,000 350

GllTlfl.

24

Towards Ta-wan, on Liao B.

General Kossogovski.

Eifles. Sabres.
1,500 250

Guns.
8

Hast of Pen-si-hu

Lieutenant-colonel Madridov.

Eifles. Sabres.
3,000 650

Guns.
24

An-shan-tien, Sha-Ho village

Lieutenant-general Stackelberg.

1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian divisions).

Lieutenant-general Zasulitch.

2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division and part of 71st

division).
Lieutenant-general Zarubaiev.

4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions).
Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade.
Ural Cossack brigade.
Siberian Cossack division.

Eifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total. . 50,000 7,000 200

Liao- Yang and neighbourhood
Lieutenant-general Dembovski.
5th Siberian corps (5th and part of 71st divisions).
35th division.
General Samsonov's cavalry

Eifles. Sabres. Gnns.

Total. . 30,000 4,000 80

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 91

Russians (continued)

Kifles. Sabres. Field Guns.

Field troops . . 157,500 16,450 666

Fortresses, etc. . 47,500 4,000 128

Railway, etc. . 34,300 11,000 48

239,300 31,450 842

APPENDIX X

Japanese

South of Yemtai coal mines, Ping-tai-tzu, etc.
BEGINNING OF OCTOBER.
1st army, general Baron Kuroki.
Guards division.

2nd division.

12th division.

Umezawa's brigade.

2nd cavalry brigade.

Rifles.

Sabres.

Guns.

Engineers.

Total .

42,000

2,100

120

3,000

Lor^i-pu to Nan-tai, but bulk still south of the Tai-tzu
4th army, general Count Nodzu.
5th division.

10th division.

10th Kobi brigade.

20th Kobi brigade.

Artillery.

Rifles.
Total . . 25,000

Sabres. Guns.
300 170

Engineers.
1,700

Nan-tai to Shan-tai-tzu, but some

troops still south

of the Tai-tzu

2nd army, general Baron Oku.

3rd division.

4th division.

6 th division.

1st cavalry brigade.

Artillery brigade.

Rifles.

Total . . 35,000

Sabres. Guns.
2,600 138

Engineers.
2,400

92 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF

Japanese (continued)
Besieging Port Arthur
3rd army, general Baron Nogi.

Eifles.

Sabrea.

Guns.

Engineers.

Total .

45,000
Liao-

450
Tang '

396

1,600

General reserve.

2nd KoM brigade.

3rd Kobi brigade.

nth Kobi brigade.

Two artillery brigades.

Eifles.

Sabres.

Guns.

Engineers.

Total

26,000

430

144

Grand total

173,000

5,880

968

8,700

Russians

Advancing on and between the Fu-shun to Wei-ning-ying, and
the Fu-ling to Ping-tai-tzu roads
BEGINNING OF OGTOBEE.
Eastern force.

Lieutenant-general Stackelberg.

1st Siberian corps (1st and 9tb East Siberian rifle divisions).
2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian rifle division, and part

of 54th division).
3rd Siberian corps (3rd and 6th East Siberian rifle divisions).

Moving on Hsiao-chia-ho-tzu
General Eennenkamf 's detachment.

Eifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total . . 60,000 7,000 194

Guarding left flank as far as Sai-ma-chi and
Hsing-ching-ting road
Colonel Madridov, and others.

Eifles. Sabres. Guns.

3,500 1,800 32

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 93

RtrssiANS (continued)
Guarding right flank as far as Liao river
Detachments of generals Dembowski and Kossogovski.
Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

11,000 3,000 48

Advancing southwards astride the railway
Western force.
General Bilderling.

10th army corps (9th and 31st divisions).
17th army corps (3rd and 35th divisions).
Part of Orenburg Cossack division.

West of the Hun Ho
5th army corps (portions of 71st and 54th divisions).
Eifles. Sabres. Guns,

Total . . 50,000 4,500 222

South of Mukden
General reserve.

4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions).
1st corps (22nd and 27th divisions).
6th Siberian corps (55th and 72nd divisions).

In touch with enemy

Mischenko's cavalry.

Eifles.

Sabres.

Guns.

Total .

55,000

3,200

326

Rifles.

Sabres.

Field Guns.

Field troops

179,500

19,500

822

Fortresses, etc. .

45,000

4,000

128

Railways, etc.

34,000

11,000

48

258.500 34,500 998

94 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF

APPENDIX XI

(See Map 11)

Japanese

From south of Hua-ling to Tung-kow
1st JANUARY, 1905.
1st army, general Baron Kuroki.
Guard division.
2nd division.
12th division.
Umezawa brigade.
Two Kobi brigades.
ArtUlery.

Rifles. Sabres. Gune. Engineers.

Total . . 44,000 1,200 180 3,000

Pvrtsao-yai to Putilov hill

ith. army, general Count Nodzu.

lOth division.

Two or three Kobi brigades.

Artillery.

Rifles. Sabres.

Guns.

Engineers.

Total . . 20,000 600

96

450

Kvrchia-tzu, to Ta-tai

Cavalry to Hei-koiirtai

2nd army, general Baron Oku.

3rd division.

4th division.

6th division.

1st cavaby brigade.

Artillery.

Rifles. Sabres.

Guns.

Engineers.

Total . . 33,000 2,400

204

2,400

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAK 95

Japanese (ecmiinued)

East of Pen-si-hu
Snd cavalry brigade.

Sabres. Guns.
1,500 6

Near Ten-tai station, and at Lang-tung-kou
General reserve.
5tli division.
8th division.
Four or five Kobi brigades.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.

Total . . 40,000 800 108 850

Besieging Port Arthur

3rd army, general Baron Nogi.

1st division.

7tli division.

9tli division.

11th division.

Two or three Kobi brigades.

Naval brigade.

Siege train.

Rifles.

Sabres,

Guns.

Engineers.

Total . . 53,000

450

396

2,000

Grand total. 190,000

6,950

990

8,700

KUSSIANS

South-east of Mukden
1st JANUARY, 1905.
1st army, general Linevitch.
1st corps (22nd and 37th divisions).
2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division, and 1st Siberian

division).
3rd Siberian corps (3rd East Siberian division, and part of 78th

division).
4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions).

96 LECTUKES ON THE STRATEGY OF

EusaiANS (continued)
Thirty miles east of Pen-si-hu
General Alexiev's detachment.
Portions of 6tli East Siberian, and of 71st divisions.
Part of Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade.

Eifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total . . 90,000 6,500 320

Hsing-ching-ting

Colonel Madridov's force.

Bifles. Sabres. Guns.

1,200 750 4

Connecting Aleociev, and Madridov

General Maslov's Siberian reserve brigade.

Bifles. Sabres. Guns.

4,000 200 8

West of Putilov hill, to Ghi-tai-tzu
3rd army, general Bilderling.

6th Siberian corps (55th division and Orenburg Cossacks).
I7th corps (3rd and 35th divisions).
5th corps (54th and 61st divisions).

Bifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total . . 60,000 4,000 240

San-chia-tzu, to Ghanrtan
2nd army, general Kaulbaurs.

1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian divisions).
8th corps (14th and 75th divisions).
10th Corps (9th and 31st divisions).
Eifle corps (three rifle brigades).
Mischenko's Cossacks.

Eifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total . . 90,000 3,000 320

Hun-ho-pu, and Tao-shan-tun
General reserve.

Portions of 16th corps, and of 6th Siberian corps.
Heavy and other artUlery.

Bifles. Sabres, Guns.

Total . , 20,000 200 206

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
BussiANS {continited)

Between Hun, and Liao rivers
Bennenkamf's detachment.

Rifles.
3,000

5,000

Guns.
48

97

Field troops
Fortresses, etc.
Railways, etc.

Rifles. Sabres. Field Guns.

268,200 19,650 1,146
43,000 4,000 128

25,000 11,000 48

336,200 34,650 1,322

APPENDIX XII

Japanese

Between Wei-tzu^yu, and Pao-tzu^en.
20th FEBRUARY, 1905.
5th army, geiiera;l Kawamitra.
11th division.
Three or four Kobi brigades.

Total .

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
. 25,000 600 72

Engineers.
2,000

From HuOrUng, to south of Feng-ehiorpu

1st army, general !
Guard division.

Raron Kuroki.

2nd division.

12th division.

Umezawa brigade.
5th Kobi brigade.
Artillery, etc.

Total .

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
. 39,000 1,200 180

Engineers.
3,000

98 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF

Japanese (continued)

South of Feng-ehia-pu, to Ling-shen-pu
4th army, general Count Nodzu.
6th division.
10th division.

Tvro or three Kobi brigades.
Artillery.

Rifles.

Sabres. Guns.

Engineers

Total . . 35,000

850 142

1,700

Ling-shen-pu,

to Hei-kou-tai

2nd army, general Baron Oku.

4th division.

5th division.

8th division.

Two Kobi brigades.

Artillery.

Rifles.

Sabres. Guns.

Engineers.

Total . . 42,000

1,000 204

3,000

Yang-chiorwan, Huang-ni-wa, and Hsiao-pbi-ho
3rd army, general Baron Nogi.
1st division.

7th division.

9 th division.

Artillery.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

Engineers.

Total . . 30,000 1,200 270

1,400

San-chia-pao, to Shan-ko^u-shu

1st cavalry brigade.

2nd cavalry brigade.

Sabres. Guns.

Total . . 3,000 12

Shi-li-ho, and Yen-tai station
General reserve.
3rd division.
Three or four Kobi brigades.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.

Total . . 25,000 350 42 400

Grand total . 196,000 8,200 922 11,500

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 99

Russians
South-east of Mukden
20th FEBRUARY, 1905.
1st army, general Linevitch.
1st army corps (22iid and 37th divisions).
2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division and 1st Siberian

division).
3rd Siberian corps (3rd East Siberian division and part of 71st

division).
4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian divisions).
Siberian Cossack division.

Thirty miles east of Pen-si-hu

General Alexiev's detachment of part of 6th East Siberian and
of 71st division, with a portion of Trans-Baikal Cossack
brigade.

Rifles, Sabres, Guns.

Total . . 90,000 6,500 356

Msing-ehing-ting neighbourhood

Colonel Madridov's force.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

1,200 750 4

Connecting Alexiev, and Madridov

General Maslov's Siberian reserve brigade.

Rifles, Sabres. Guns.

4,000 200 8

South of Mukden

3rd army, general Bilderling.

6th corps (54th and 61st divisions).

6th Siberian corps (55th division and Orenburg Cossacks).

17th corps (3rd and 35th divisions).

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total . . 60,000 4,000 240

100 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Russians {continvsd)

South-west of Mukden

2nd army, general Kaulbaurs.

1st Siberian corps (1st, 9th, and part of 6th East Siberian

divisions).
8th corps (14th and 75th divisions).
10th corps (9th and 31st divisions).
Rifle corps (three rifle brigades).

Between the Hun and Liao rivers

Rennenkamf s detachment.

Mischenko's Cossacks.

Caucasus cavalry brigade.

Part of 5th Siberian corps.

Rifles.

Sabrea.

Guns.

Total . . 90,000

8,000

356

South of Mukden
General reserve.

16th corps (25th and part of 41st divisions).
72nd division of 6th Siberian corps.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total . . 35,000 300 240

Field troops
Fortresses, etc.
Railways, etc.

Rifles. Sabres. Field Gang,

280,200 19,750 1,204
15,000 3,000 80

25,000 11,000 48

320,200 33,750 1,332

WILLIAM BRENDON AND SON, LTD.
PRINTERS, PLYMOUTH