Skip to main content

Full text of "Lectures on the strategy of the Russo-Japanese war"

See other formats

QforncU Itttueraita Slibrarg 

charles william wason 




CLASS OF 1876 


Cornell University Library 
DS 517.B61 

Lectures on the strateav of the Russo-Ja 

3 1924 023 037 199 

The original of this book is in 
the Cornell University Library. 

There are no known copyright restrictions in 
the United States on the use of the text. 







(Late Professor Indian Staff College) 


119, PALL MALL, S.W. 




I. Geographical and Political Factors ... 1 
II. Events leading up to the War — Organisation of 

THE Armies — Strategical Considerations . 10 

III. Narrative of the Land Operations up to the 

Battle op Liao-Yang 24 

IV. Narrative op the Events Preceding the Battles 

OP THE Sha-Ho and Mukden .... 50 
V. Lessons of the "War 64 

Details op Organisation op Troops .... 70 
Approximate Distribution and Strength of Troops at 
Various Periods 73 


1. General Map op Southern Manchuria . . In pocket 

2. Plan op Positions at end op April, 1904 



, 27th May .... 



, 15th June .... 



, 30th June .... 



, 31sT July .... 



, 25th August 



, END OP Battle of Llao-Yang 



, EARLY IN October 



, END OP Sha-Ho Battle 



New Year, 1905 



, 20th February . 



EVEEY campaign possesses special features distinguishing 
it from others, and perhaps even rendering comparison 
with them difficult. These differences are conditioned by 
topography, fertility, and climate, by national characteristics, 
by relative strength and efficiency, by resources, and by the 
character of the rival leaders. 

Some acquaintance with these factors is therefore required 
before a just appreciation can be made of the significance of 
the strategical operations during the recent struggle in 

The first item dealt with will be the geography of the 
seat of the war. 

The soldier regards geography from a somewhat different 
standpoint to that adopted by the civilian. 

To the latter the term geography means information as to 
the physical features of a country, as to its resources, 
climate, railways, rivers, harbours, cities, inhabitants, ex- 
ports, imports, policy, etc., which will be valuable in a 
commercial, political, or even social sense. But the soldier 
looks on all countries as possible theatres of war, and 
though he may, and does, seek for information similar to that 
required by the civilian, he enquires how the various 
physical, meteorological, commercial, human, and political 
factors will affect the progress of a campaign carried out in 
the country the geography of which he is studying. 

One of the first, if not the very first consideration, when 


regarding geography from a military point of view, is 
therefore the communications of a potential theatre of war. 

Speaking generally, the direction taken by roads is deter- 
mined by the trend of the mountain ranges, which, to a 
certain extent, condition the flow of the water rained on to 
their sides, the river mouths, as a rule, also affording the 
best havens. 

Eoads usually follow the line of the least resistance — 
that is, the water channels — but lateral communications 
between river valleys cross the intervening ranges of moun- 
tains or hills at their lowest points. 
1 Hence, to discover the general direction of roads, it is 
first of all necessary to obtain a clear idea of the coast-line, 
mountains, and rivers of an area. 
Coast. The coast-line of Manchuria and Korea from Shan-hai- 
kuan, eastwards, extends for 2300 miles, of which 1700 
belong to Korea. [See Map 1.] Though in this long stretch 
there are many indentations, there are but few good har- 
bours, except in the south of Korea. Elsewhere tEe coast 
is of a shelving character, with flat mud shore_ sloping 
gradually for miles out to sea, and hardly covered with 
water even at high tide. 

On the shores of the Pe-chi-li gulf, the difference between 
high and low tide is sometimes as much as^twenty-five feet, 
but along the southern and eastern coast of Korea it does 
not amount to more than eight feet, and at Port Arthur and 
Dalny is ten or twelve feet. Commencing from the west, 
the first port of interest is Ying-kow, on the Liao river. 
Vessels drawing about seventeen feet can cross the bar at 
the mouth of the Liao, and can lie in the stream, which is 
five hundred yards or more wide, though the fair-way is 
much less. Ying-kow possesses wharves, lighters, etc., 
capable of dealing with a fair trade, but is ice-bound during 
five months in each year. 

Following the coast-line of the Liao-tung peninsula, lying 
between Ying-kow and the Yalu, the next important arm of 
the sea is found in Fu-chou bay, where shelter may be 


obtained by vessels of moderate size, but at some distance 
from the shore. 

A more favourable anchorage is Hu-lu-shun bay, seven- 
teen miles southwards, but this place is without facilities 
for landing. 

To the south of Hu-lu-shun lies Society bay, with the 
Port Adams inlet, the latter being eighteen miles long and 
open to vessels of the average tramp steamer size. The 
shore of the inlet is, however, shelving, and there are few, if 
any, landing facilities. 

Chin-chou bay gives little or no shelter. Louisa and 
Pigeon bays afford protection to small steamers, from all 
but westerly winds. Port^AjjJuir is ice-free, land-locked, 
and of considerable extent, '15ut rias little deep water. 
The entrance is about five hundred to six hundred yards 
wide, but the fair-way available for large vessels is not much 
more than one hundred yards. The deep water lies in con- 
tinuation of the harbour mouth. There are docks, with 
accommodation for cruisers and smaller craft, and fairly 
good workshops. The harbour bottom is of stiff clay, with 
rock outcrop, which makes dredging difficult. The town and 
harbour were protected by a complete system of works. 
Thirty miles north of Port Arthur is Ta-lien-wan bay, six 
miles long and six miles wide. To the south of this bay lies 
Dalny, an ice-free port, with docks, and harbour available 
fOTsEips drawing thirty feet of water. Next come Yen- 
ta-kou, Kow-shi, and Pe-tsi-wo, also ice-free, but giving 
shelter only from ^est and south-west, and with shoal fore- 
shore for several miles. Ta-ku-shan resembles Pe-tsi-wo, but 
is ice-bound for several months in the year. The mouth of 
the Yalu is navigable by small steam vessels, but further 
south the Che-chen river affords a good anchorage, though 
Chin- am-pho, twenty miles up the estuary of the Tai-tpng 
river, IS ITBeibter port. The river at Chin-am-pho is a mile 
wide, and is said to be deep, but the foreshore shelves for 
half a mile, and the harbour is, in winter, ice-bound. 

Chem-ul-po, on the Han river, is the port of Seoul. It 


is accessible to all ships throughout the year, though the 
anchorage is a mile from shore. In January and February 
the harbour is partially frozen, making discharge of cargo 

Fu-san, to the south of Korea, is a fair harbour protected 
by an island. Gen-san, on the east of Korea, is a good 
port, usually ice-free in winter, but shut off from the rest 
of the country by steep mountains. 

Vladivostock, in the Amur river province, possesses docks, 
and a harbour with two entrances. It is fortified, but is ice- 
bound for five months in each year. 
Mountains. The mountains of Manchuria are, in character, a series of 
wooded hills, whose lower slopes, when not covered with 
plantations of scrub oak or hazel, are cultivated in rough 
terraces, whilst the higher portions often consist of bare 
masses of rock, affording positions accessible in only one or 
two places. 

The hillsides, where not cleared for cultivation, are of 
soft soil, freely sprinkled and in some places almost covered 
with slabs of rock, and between the stones grow a profusion 
of creepers and wild flowers. 

The mountain area lies east and south of a line drawn 
roughly from Hsiung-yao-cheng to Fu-shun. 
' The hills, which are volcanic in origiuj trend in a general 
' north-easterly and south-westerly direction, and consist of a 
number of ranges roughly parallel to one another. These 
are separated by fairly level valleys, from one or two miles 
to four hundred yards wide, each boasting a stream, which 
rambles over a stony and shallow, though relatively wide 

The principal range of hUls is the Feng-shui-ling^ with 
their southern continuation the Shui-nie-shan. The former 
rear themselves to a total of about 5000 feet above sea 
level, or 2000-3000 Jeet^ above their valleys ; the latter are 
not more than 2000-3000 feet above the sea. 

In these hills rise the Tai-tzu-Ho^ and its tributaries, which 
' "Ho" ia the Chinese word for river, and "Ling" for pass. 


flow westwards, the Ai Ho and its tributaries flowing south 
to join the Yalu ; also the Tai-an Ho running southwards 
to Ta-ku-shan, and the Fu-chou river in the Liao-tung 

West of the mountain area lies a great plain, extending 
for one hundred and fifty miles, or more, westwards to the 
Mongolian liilis. This plain, consisting of rich alluvial soil 
brought down by the great rivers Liao, Hun, and Tai-tzu, is 
thickly peopled, and highly cultivated, though liable to be- 
come swampy in wet weather. 

The division between plain and mountain is, in most 
localities, distinctly marked, still, in the area between Kai- 
chou and Liao-Yang, at distances of about twenty or thirty 
miles, long, somewhat serrated ridges run westwards on to 
the level ground, but usually end rather abruptly near the 
line followed by the railway. 

In the district between Liao-Yang and Mukden, the 
dividing line between plain and hill is still less clear, a 
series of isolated hills, or groups of little hills, extending for 
ten or fifteen miles west of the upland area, but as in the 
more southerly district, ceasing at or near the line of 

The principal rivers watering the mountain and plain are Rivers. 
the Liao, the Hun and Tai-tzu. The Liao, rising in the 
Mongolian hills, flows at first in a north-easterly direction 
for three hundred miles. Then, bending south-east, it con- 
tinues in this course, until, after passing the Manchurian 
boundary, it is turned southwards by a spur of the central 
Manchurian hills, and travels for three hundred miles, across 
the plain to which it gives its name, into the gulf of Pe-chi-li 
near Ying-kow. On its left bank the Liao, twenty or thirty 
miles above Ying-kow, receives the Hun and Tai-tzu 
rivers, which meet a few miles above this point. The ^ 
general characteristic of all these rivers is that they run 
on, rather than below the plain, in broad, relatively shallow ' 
beds, and between banks raised by the silt they bring down. 
In the rainy season they are therefore liable to overflow, 


and some ten years ago, eight days' continuous rain flooded 
the whole Liao plain for nearly three weeks. 

Steamers drawing seventeen feet of water can, as has 
been noted, navigate the Liao to Ting-kow, thirteen miles 
from its mouth. Large junks can sail up the river for some 
fifty miles, small junks ascend to Hsin-ming-ting. 

The Hun and Tai-tzu are navigable well above Mukden 
and Liao-Yang, and considerable timber trade, by means of 
rafts of logs cut in the higher reaches, is done on both 

The Hun, south of Mukden, is three hundred to four 
hundred yards wide, and the Liao is of similar width at 
Liao-Yang. In flood both rivers apparently rise five 
or six feet, and are not easy to navigate owing to the 
rapidity of the current. They are covered with ice, from 
November to March, sufficiently thick to support guns. 

The Yalu rises about midway across the northern boun- 
dary of Korea, and after flowing south-west for three 
hundred miles, empties its waters into the sea. In the upper 
reaches a wild region of mountain and forest is traversed, 
but some sixty miles from the mouth the southern bank is 
cultivated, though on the northern it is still enclosed by 
rocky hills and bluffs. The river is navigable, by junks, for 
about fifty miles, and small steamers can cross the bar at its 
mouth. At An-tung, it is over three-quarters of a mile 

The remaining mountain streams possess characteristics 
similar to the Fu-chou river. This winds along in a sandy 
valley, from half a mile to two or three miles wide, and 
flows in a stony bed, not more than two feet below the 
valley level, its depth, in spring, rarely exceeding two 

In the plain some of the tributaries of the Hun and 
Tai-tzu are six or eight feet below the level of the fields, but 
their banks are more often grass, or willow grown, than 
precipitous, and the depth of water is not, in spring, more 
than one or two feet. 


The Chinese cart, drawn by three or four mules, is the Eoadsand 
tr anspo rt of Manchuria, hence almost every valley boasts a ™* *' 
cart track, and the passes traversable by wheel transport, 
possess, if not good, at least practicable, though steep, roads. 

No road in Manchuria is metalled, and the great Imperial 
and Mandarin roads differ from the others, only in that they 
are two or three times as wide, and, if possible, more rutty. 

In many places the roads and tracks have sunk below the 
level of the surrounding country. This is partly due to 
wear, but mainly to the fact that the Chinese farmer is 
accustomed, annually, to remove, and use as field manure, the 
road surface. 

So heavy do the roads become after rain, that carts habitu- 
ally sink up to their axles in mud, and on these occasions 
the carter often seeks firmer soil by a small detour into the 
neighbouring ploughed fields. To prevent this, the farmer 
digs, at right angles to and close to the edge of the road, a 
series of little trenches, about eighteen inches deep and 
wide, and six or eight feet long. 

In Manchuria, rain usually falls in July, August, and 
September, coming, as do the Monsoon rains in India, in 
bursts of from three to eight days, separated by bright 
intervals. During, and immediately after rain, cart traffic 
practically ceases, but as the soil is friable and dries quickly, 
the roads can be used again after two or three days' sun- 

In October the roads freeze, and remain hard, but rough 
and full of ruts, until March, when the scanty snow that 
has covered them during winter, thaws by day. In April, 
the thaw regularly sets in, but the relatively hot sun soon 
dries the roads, and keeps them so, until the break of the 
Monsoon rains. 

The climate is temperate to hot in summer, but is, at 
times, very cold in winter. The snowfall is light, but when, 
as happens two or three times a week, a northerly wind 
blows, the thermometer, by day, falls to and below zero, 
whilst the nights are always bitter. 


The principal, that is, the most used roads, are the Im- 
perial rbad from Pekin to the Yalu, and thence to Seoul. 
This road, which is some thirty to forty feet wide, runs, in 
Manchuria,' from Hsin-ming-ting to Mukden, a distance of 
140 miles, thence to Liao-Yang, forty miles. From this 
place it plunges south-eastwards into the mountains, and 
after crossing the Mo-tien-ling pass, about 3500 feet above 
the sea, and the Feng-shui-ling mountains at Len-shan-kuan, 
runs, by Feng-huang-cheng, to An-tung, 180 miles from 
Liao-Yang. In Korea, it passes by Ping- Yang to Seoul, 140 
miles from An-tung. 

The coast road from the Yalu to Port Arthur, via Ta-ku- 
shan, 230 miles. The road from Port Arthur to Kirin, via 
Kai-chou, Hai-cheng 230 miles, and Mukden 310 miles from 
Port Arthur. 
Eailways. The most important railways were, an extension of the 
Trans-Siberian line, known as the Chinese Eastern railway, 
running from near Chita to Vladivostock, for 200 miles in 
Eussian, and for 950 miles in Chinese territory. 

At Sungari, not far from Harbin, and 600 miles from 
the Siberian border, the Port Arthur branch leaves the 
main line, reaching Dalny in 600 miles, and Port Arthur 
in 615 miles. The line was single, and of five-foot gauge, 
the rails being single-headed, with flat base, and weigh- 
ing 62 lb. the yard; the ballast and sleepers were of but 
moderate quality. The sidings and crossing places were 
about ten miles apart, and the fuel burnt was wood, except 
in Southern Manchuria, where coal was used. Of bridges 
there were, on the main line, about a dozen over 
200 yards length, of which the longest was that at 
Sungari, which measured about 800 yards. On the Port 
Arthur branch were thirty of about 80 yards length, 
whilst those at Liao-Yang and Mukden were more than 
600 yards long, and that at Kai-chou was of some 300 
. yards span. Apparently the maximum carrying capacity 
k developed was about twelve pairs of trains per day. 

The Imperial Chinese railway from Pekin to Ying-kow, 


with a branch to Hsin-ming-ting, might possibly have been 
used by the Japanese to move troops against the Eussian 
right. This was a single line, of British standard gauge. 

There were telegraph lines along the railways, and cables! Telegraphs 
connected Fu-san with Japan, and Port Arthur with Chifu. joables. 

The Liao valley is a great grain-producing area, beans and Eesources. 
mi llet being princip ally raised . The millet, which grows to 
a height of ten feet, provides the Chiaaman with most of the 
necessaries of life. The grain is used as food for man and 
beast, and for distillation of spirits, whilst the stalks are 
chopped up as fodder, or are employed to thatch houses, 
fence gardens, or even as firewood. Few domestic animals 
are bred, except pigs, but Mongolia produces "quantities of 
sheep, cattle, and small horses, which are readily obtained 
from Hsin-ming-ting. 

The hilly country produces timber, and coarse silk from 
silk worms, which feed on the underwood. 

Coal of fair quality exists near many of the big towns, 
the principal centres being Fu-shun, Yen-tai, Pen-si-hu. 

The Chinese towns are all of one pattern, square built, Towns and 
and surrounded by a crenulated wall twenty to thirty feet ' *^°^' 
high, and at top eight to ten feet wide. These walls are 
pierced by numerous pagoda -roofed gates. Within are 
unmetalled streets, of one story, tile-roofed, shanties and 
shops, and in the case of the larger towns, suburbs of mud 
houses have grown up outside the city walls. 

In the plain, the villages consist of groups of thatched 
houses, with walls of mud, or of sun-dried bricks plastered 
with mud, each standing in a garden surrounded by a more 
or less thick and well-built wall, or by a fence of plaited 
millet stalks. In the hills, houses and walls are of roughly 
shaped stones, sometimes cemented, and the roofs are of 
thatch, slate, or tile. 


Events rPHE war between Eussia and Japan is traceable, as are 

tlTe wir^^ ° most modern wars, at any rate, to intense conflict of 

interest between the two powers. For centuries, and at 
intervals of about a hundred years, the Japanese had made 
incursions into Korea and Manchuria, and had, after suc- 
cesses more or less important, and occupation more or less 
prolonged, been driven back to their islands by the Chinese. 
Korea and Manchuria were therefore the historical lines of 
Japanese expansion. 

Some fifty years ago, the Eussians first appeared in the 
Far East, when they wrested the Amur province and Vladi- 
vostock from China. At this time Japan was governed 
under a feudal system, when the land, though nomin- 
ally ruled by the emperor, was really under the power 
of the nobles, or Daimios, and their armed Samurai re- 
tainers. But, in 1868, the nation, after a severe struggle, 
overthrew the Dafmios. At about the same time the 
Eussians occupied Saghalien, an event which, combined 
with the seizure of the Amur province, caused Japan to 
fear for her safety. 

The Japanese, noting that the European strength lay in 
armament and organisation, now decided to avoid the fate of 
the Amur province and Saghalien, by organising the country, 
Grovernment, army and navy, on European principles. 
Japanese were therefore sent to Europe to assimilate 
Western ideas, and European teachers were freely imported 
into Japan. 
1890. The combined result of this policy, and of these events, 
was such an increase in the material prosperity and popula- 



tion, that Japan_felt, about 18^90, the need foi expansion. 
At the same time it was feared that Korea, Japan's his- 
torical outlet on the mainland, inhabited by a physically 
fine, but in spirit decadent race, and ruled under the nerve- 
less suzerainty of China, might fall into the hands of 
Russia. Japan therefore decided either to occupy Korea, or 
to render herself paramount in the peninsula. 

With this object a quarrel was picked with China in 1894, 1894. 
the Chinese fleet was defeated off tfie Yalu, the passage of 
the river was forced, Port Arthur and Wai-hai-wai were 

China thereupon concluded a peace on April 30th, 1895, 1895. 
under which Korea was declared intiependent, the Kuan- 
tung peninsula, that is, the area between Chin-chou and 
Port Arthur, was leased to Japan, and a large indemnity 

Eussia, Germany, and Austria, now brought diplomatic 
pr^ufeT to beaj^on"^Japaif,'causing' her, much to the disgust 
of the nation, to relinquish her conquests. About 1891, 
Eussia had begun the construction of the Trans-Siberian 
railway, with the object of at once linking up her East 
Asian possessions more closely with her European territory, 
and, if circumstances were favourable, of wresting a further 
piece of country from China's feeble grasp. By 1895 the 
railway had nearly reached Lake Baikal. 

The Eussian press, and Foreign Office, at that time 
fostered in the national mind, the idea that Eussia must 
possess an ice-free port on the open sea, and this conception 
seems to have beeiT used "By a group of leading men in 
Eussia to induce the Government to take up the project of 
obtaining such a harbour in Southern Manchuria. J^an, 
meanwhile, seeing in Eussia's various manoeuvres, a direct 
threat to Japanese independence, began, in 1895, deliber- 
ately to prepare herself, both morally, physically, and 
politically, for a life and death struggle with her powerful 
competitor. She therefore set about"e3ucatmg the nation" \ 
to the idea of war with Eussia, and at the same time further 


improved her armed forces, and looked round for allies. 

1896. In 1896, Russia made another move in the game, when she 
obtained permission, from China, to run the Chinese Eastern 
railway direct from Chita to Vladivostock, instead of along 
the left bank of the Amur. In 1898, she went further, 
leasing Port Arthur from China, together with the southern 
portion of the Liao-tung peninsula. At the same time she 
began to construct, from near Harbin, a branch railway 
which, by 1900, had reached Port Arthur, though the line 
was but roughly laid, and was unballasted. 

1900. In 1900, the late Dowager Empress of China, much 
impressed by the South African disasters of England, the 
power at that time most feared in Pekin, determined to 
try and rid China of foreigners, and with this object 
fomented the so-called Boxer rising. 

Russia at once seized the opportunity to occupy Man- 
churia to protect her railway, but later, in response to 
diplomatic representations, promised the powers to evacuate 
the Mukden province in October 1902, Kirin in the spriag 
of 1903, and Tsi-tsi-har, north-west of Kirin, in the autumn 
of the same year. 

Whilst these events were taking place, and the Japanese 
were organising their forces, the statesmen of Japan had, in 

1902. 1902, concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with 
Great Britain, under which it was agreed that if either 
nation were attacked by two powers, the other should come 
to the aid of her ally. 

Japan also entered into friendly relations with the United 
States, thus practically securing herself against the inter- 
vention of other nations in the forthcoming struggle with 

In October 1902, Russia evacuated part of south-west 
Manchuria, but failed to carry out her promise in respect to 
the remainder of the province. 

1903. At the beginning of 1903, general Kuropatkin, the 
Russian War Minister, made a tour of inspection in the Far 
East, and as a result, a viceroyalty was created, which would 


bring the various provinces, commands, and garrisons, under 
the central authority of admifal Alexiev, who was nomin- 
ated viceroy. 

Japan, angry at Eussia's breach of faith regarding the 
evacuation of Manchuria, and alarmed by the creation of 
a viceroyalty, which, it was feared, was but the prelude to 
an'mcfeasetn Eussian activity in the Far East ; began, in 
July 1903, to negotiate for the redemption of the pledge to 
quit Manchuria. These negotiations ended in war, in 
February 1904. 

Though Japan was not, perhaps, quite ready for war in 
1903, her preparations^ere so far advanced as to render 
possible the inception of the campaign, whenever diplomacy 
decided that the favourable moment had arrived. Eussia, 
on the other hand, was by no means so well prepared. 
The Trans-Siberian, and Chinese Eastern railways, except 
the section round Lake Baikal, had indeed been roughly 
completed, the fortifications of Port Arthur had been 
strengthened, and the port of Dalny created. 

But the railways were not yet capable of heavy traffic, and 
the forces in the Far East were numerically weak. The 
bulk of the latter had not even been organised into corps, 
there was but little cavalry or technical troops, guns were 
not plentiful, nor for the most part of the newest models, 
and lastly, the troops were scattered throughout the terri- 
tory in small garrisons. 

Whether, from a military point of view, Japan should ' 
have declared war earlier, before, for instance, the railway 
to Port Arthur was completed, is for consideration. 

If the moment was unpropitious in 1900, she might, in 
1902, after the conclusion of the alliance with England, have 
argued that Eussia's preparations were likely to be propor- 
tionally less complete than her own, and pressure could have 
been put on Eussia, in October 1902, to carry out the 
promised evacuation of Mukden. 

Possibly, however, the political atmosphere was less 
favourable in 1902 than was the case a year later. 


Again, it would seem that Japan would have been better 
advised to have declared war after the Manchurian and 
Korean ports were ice-free, than at the time she selected. 
True, such policy would have added to the Port Arthur 
squadron four large cruisers from Vladivostock ; but Russia 
would not have been allowed two months in which to collect 
troops before the first blow was struck on land, and Japan 
might, in these circumstances, have overrun Southern Man- 
churia, and captured Port Arthur, before Russian regiments 
had begun to arrive in any numbers. 

It was, however, probably Russia's threat to increase her 
Par Eastern squadron, which caused Japan to precipitate 
matters, and make war in winter. 

Possessed of almost boundless resources in men, and with 
a navy twice as large as that of Japan, it would, at first 
sight, appear that Russia must have inevitably crushed her 

But complete accord between policy, and organisation for 
war, is as necessary to success as are great resources, other- 
wise defeat may be experienced before the resources can be 
developed, and Russia was unprepared for the conflict even 
in 1903-4. 

Encouraged by the success of a policy of bluff against 
other nations, Russia had apparently come to regard such 
procedure as infallible, but its inherent weakness became 
soon apparent when attempted against a rival ready to 
fight for her rights. 

Russia was, in a military sense, weak in the Par East. 
Her navy was, on paper, equal to that of the Japanese, but 
paper equality is not sufficient to command success in war, 
and the ships which might have turned the balance were 
many months' sail distant in Europe, whence it was, perhaps, 
impolitic to move them. 

Similarly, the Russian land forces in Manchuria were 
separated from the main army by a gap of some six thou- 
sand miles, bridged only by a single line of railway, ill laid, 
and, moreover, incomplete in the stretch round Lake Baikal. 


In 1904, Eussia possessed, according to the British official 'jOrganisation. 
account of the war, in round numbers^ a total of some 
4,500,000 trained soldiers, of whom 3,500,000 belonged to i 
the active army and reserve, 345,000 were Cossacks, and i 
685,000 National Guard. 

The period of military service was from the 21st-43rd 
year, of which eighteen years were spent in the active army 
and reserve, and the remainder in the National Guard. 

The colour service was for four or five years, and three 
years were passed in the reserve, during which period two 
trainings of six months were carried out. 

The Cossacks, Finns, and the Christians of the Caucasus, 
served under special regulations, whilst Mahomedans were 
pbliged to pay a sum of money in lieu of military service, 
but might volunteer to serve if they so desired. 

The field troops comprised the units of the active army 
brought up to war strength by reserves, and certain so- 
caUed reserve units, the cadres of which were maintained in 
peace, and filled up with reservists on mobilisation. 

In war time, depot units were also formed, of reservists 
and soldiers not fit or not required on mobilisation. 

For garrison duty there were special fortress and local 

The National Guard was primarily designated for home 
defence, but was liable to furnish drafts for the field troops. 

At the commencement of the war, there were, in Europe 
and the Caucasus, twenty-five active army and reserve 
corps, in Eussian Turkestan two corps, in Eastern Siberia 
two corps, and in the remainder of the empire a number of 
unallotted units. 

(For composition of the army corps, see Appendix I.) 

The Eussian army was not really well trained and fit to 
take the field. Even officers who had passed the staff 
college rarely studied their profession after the completion 
of their course, and the regimental officers were ignorant of 
the theory of war. 

The practical training also left much to be desired. The 


men were little practised in shooting, but were taught to 
rely on mass attacks, and the bayonet, to gain victory. Out- 
post and reconnaissance duties were neglected, and indi- 
vidual initiative discouraged. 

All ranks were, moreover, steeped in the plausible fallacy 
of the advantages inherent in the occupation of defensive 
positions, and attached undue importance to the value of 
ground, and to a defensive attitude ; yet, in actual practice, 
folds and features of ground were rarely utilised to the best 

Generals immersed themselves in details, and interfered 
unduly in the instruction of troops and companies, to the 
detriment of the training, and to the limitation of their 
own power to handle large forces, grasp important situations, 
or deal with great issues. But serious as were the above 
faults, they might have been partially overcome during the 
campaign, had all ranks been inspired with the sentiment of 
patriotism and unselfish devotion to duty. 

This was far from being the case. Even the officers 
openly, expressed their indifference to the war, and the rank 
and" file, though they fought well, and endured hardship with 
praiseworthy patience, went to the front unwillingly. 

Very different was the attitude of the Japanese army. 

Here every man was convinced that his utmost efforts 
were demanded to save the country from destruction, and 
the wonderful constancy of the Japanese soldiers was a 
more important factor in the national success, than was even 
the bold generalship of the liigher leaders. 

In Japan, every male between the ages of seventeen and 
forty was, in 1904, liable to serve in either army or navy, 
but military service did not, as a rule, according to the 
British official account, begin until the twentieth year. 

The army was organised as follows (see also Ap- 
pendix II) : — 

Active army, service three years — 180,000 men. 

On working furlough for four years and four months — 
200,000 men. 


Eeserve army (or Kobi), in which men served for five 
years, witE an organisation separate from that of the active 
army— 200,000. 

Conscript reserve, of men who had escaped service with 
the colours ; obligation for seven years and four months, or 
for one year and four months — 300,000. 

National reserve, of all men who had passed the classes 
mentioned above, and were less than forty years old — 
400,000, of whom about half had received training. 

Of Japan's naval resources it is sufficient to note that her 
merchant navy had a tonnage of 650,000 and possessed be- 
tween 200 and 300 steamers. 

The Japanese army was trained in the German fashion, 
and though to several armies in Europe, Japanese officers 
were, and still are attached for instruction, it was to the 
German army that the majority were sent. The German 
model was therefore generally copied in both strategy and j 
tactics, though it is perhaps doubtful whether the Japanese 
peace training was as thorough as is sometimes claimed. 

The Japanese adopted the enveloping form of offensive ■ 
war, but attacked, with vigour, at all points. | 

Their infantry, at the beginning of the campaign, ad- ' 
vanced to the attack in relatively dense lines of skirmishers, 
whose movements were covered by both rifle and artillery i 
fire. The infantry pressed on, in the usual manner, as close 
as possible to the enemy's line, and then delivered a series 
of assaults, prepared by rapid but somewhat wild rifle fire, 
and covered by storms of shrapnel, delivered from rather 
long range. 

It does not seem that the subordinate generals and regi- 
mental leaders directed their men with any particular 
intelligence, or that the latter fought much with their 
heads. The commanders were, as a rule, rather prodigal of 
their meii's lives, and the soldiers, responding gallantly to 
their officers' orders, often, by their doggedness, repaired 
mistakes of tactics and leadership. 

The cavalry was not well organised. Eegiments were, for 


the most part, with divisions, instead of being brigaded, and 
their employment was on a par with their organisation. 

Striking a balance between the forces actually or poten- 
tially available on both sides, and having due regard to 
their military value, it may be concluded that the Japanese 
possessed over the Eussians certain advantages of patriotism 
and training. 
Command Though Eussia had sufficient naval and military re- 
sources to ehsiire the defeat of her rival, the distribution of 
her fleet and army, necessitated by her European responsi- 
bilities, and the absence of well-developed land communica- 
tions between her European territories and the theatre of 
war, rendered it improbable that she would be able to 
transport to, and maintain in the Far East, an army large 
enough to overcome the Japanese, unless command of the 
sea could be obtained; for to have duplicated the railway 
would have been the work of years. Besides, Japan, even if 
overwhelmed on land, could, so long as she retained com- 
mand of the sea, have securely retired to some Torres 
Vedras, and there awaited a favourable opportunity to again 
take the offensive. And even if Eussia succeeded in driv- 
ing the Japanese from the mainland, her conquest would 
have been of little value until she obtained the power to 
utilise the ports won in land battles. 

Command of the sea, then, was vital to Eussia. 

Japan is an island empire, and though fairly self-con- 
tained, was, in some degree, dependent on retention of the 
command of the sea, the loss^of which would, at any rate, 
have put an end to her dreams of expansion. Moreover, 
loss of command of the sea would have exposed her to the 
danger of invasion. 

Without naval supremacy, Japan's armies could not have 
reached the continent of Asia, and once there, even supposing 
they drove the Eussians to Lake Baikal, before attaining 
naval superiority, their eventual ruin would have been all 
the greater, if the link binding the land forces with their 
island home was severed; for no large army could have been 


maintained in Manchurja with command of the sea irre- 
vocably lost. 

Apparently, then, naval supremacy, that is, the destruction 
of ^EeTEostile fleet, was, for both sides, the decisive factor, 
and each should have strained every nerve to attain this end, 
relegating other necessary operations to strictly subordinate 

Had Eussia been able to concentrate her whole fleet in 
Far Eastern waters, Japan's position would have been well- 
nigh hopeless, but Eussia had, as has been stated, been 
obliged to divide her navy iuto two portions, and at the 
decisive point possessed no numerical superiority over her 

Hence Japan might hope to apply the principle of ■ 
interior lines, to defeat the Eussians in detail, to ruin the 
Eastern detachment before it could be joined by its Wes- 
tern consorts. 

If the Eussian Eastern detachment chose to meet the 
Japanese fleet in fair fight, so much the better for Japan. 
But if the Eussians should elect to await, in their harbours, 
the arrival of their European navy, then it would be Japan's 
duty to capture those harbours, either sinking the ships at 
their berths, or obliging them to bolt out and give battle. 

Of the two military harbours, in the Far East, held by 
Eussia, Port Arthur and Vladivostock, the former was most 
valuable, being ice-free throughout the year. But whatever 
the relative merits of the two places, Port Arthur was of ! ; 
greatest importance to the Japanese, being the base of the '• 
larger portion of the Eussian fleet (four large cruisers i : 
only were in VladivostocTE) and after the naval surprise of , ' 
February 8th its asylum. 

It would seem, then, that Japan's primary objective being Japanese 
the Eussian fleet based on Port Arthiif, plans should have ° ^^"^ ^^^' 
been made to secure the early capture of the fortress, since 
it was possible that the squadron would not quit the shelter 
of the harbour. 

But it was important to occupy Korea, whence the siege of 


Port Arthur could, in some degree, be covered, for no Eus- 
sian force moving into the Liao-tung peninsula could afford 
to neglect a Japanese army placed on or near the Yalu. The 
possession of Korea would also be a strong diplomatic card, 
and until Dalny was taken, no satisfactory harbours for 
landing troops, existed, except in Korea. 

If beaten in Manchuria, or at Port Arthur, Japan, with 
command of the sea, could perhaps maintain herself suffi- 
ciently long in the mountains of Korea to render Eussia 
weary of the struggle. 

Even without command of the sea, if the naval actions 
were indecisive, Japan, by using the islands in the Tsushima 
strait, might maintain a force in Korea, and might even, 
though this would be unlikely, prosecute the siege of Port 
Arthur from this base. 

It is therefore^thought, that, as was done, Korea should, 
in the first instance, have been occupied by the Japanese. 

The capture of a fortress can be attained either by main 
force, or by starvation, the method employed being contin- 
gent on the necessity for the early reduction of the place. 

No fortress can survive, for long, the defeat of the field 
forces of the nation, hence, if the field armies are destroyed, 
the capitulation of the national fortresses is only a matter 
of time. 

Thus there were open to Japan two methods for the re- 
duction of the Far Eastern naval bases of the Eussian fleet. 
They could either be besieged, assaulted, and so captured, 
every effort being directed to the achievement of this result, 
and only sufficient troops diverted against the Eussian 
armies, to prevent their interfering with the besiegers; or one" 
or both fortresses could be blockaded, whilst every man not 
required for this purpose marched against the Eussian army. 

Of these alternatives it is believed that the former 
would have been the correct course, more especially in view 
of the possibility of the despatch of Eussian naval reinforce- 
ments from Europe. 

But whichever policy Japan elected to pursue, her utmost 


e ndeavours should h av e beendiD eatfid to the achievement of 
the main purpose, whether it was the early destruction of the 
Eussian ISavai bases, or the rapid ruin of the Eussian field 
armies, before either armies, or fleet, could be reinforced from 

There should have been no halting between two opinions, 
such policy tends to failure, and at the decisive point it is 
impossible to be too strong. 

Japan, however, chose to pursue a double objective, under- 
taking both the siege of Port Arthur, and the destruction 
of the Eussian armies. Possibly she undervalued the re- 
sisting power of Port Arthur, and the carrying capacity of 
the Trans-Siberian railway, hoping to achieve the early 
capture of the fortress, and then victory over such forces as 
Eussia might have deployed. Or, perhaps, her army was, in 
the circumstances, deemed sufficiently strong to attain both 
objects. Or, again, the Japanese may have thought that, in 
spite of the necessity for taking Port Arthur, the Eussian 
army must be attacked and beaten, before it became for- 
midable in organisation and numbers. 

Whatever motives may have . prompted her military 
policy, Japan, in the event, possessed decisive preponderance 
of force neithe r in front of "Jort Arthur, nor in the field. 

But for the determination of her infantry, and the resolu- 
tion of her higher"commanders, this fact might well have 
led to disaster. Neither at Liao-Yang, nor at the Sha-Ho, 
did the Japanese possess sufficient force to gain decisive 
victories, and the cause ol..,itiajr^ weakness was the large 
number of troops that had been absorbed in the siege of 
Port A.rthur. 

The resistance offered by this fortress made Liao-Yang 
an indecisive battle, and gave Eussia time in which to 
collect so many troops, that, even after the fall of the 
place, the Japanese failed to gain, at Mukden, a decisive 

On the other hand it is believed that had two or three 
extra divisions been detailed to besiege Port Arthur, this 


' place would have fallen by assault, after a few weeks' siege ; 
and long before the Eussians could have made really serious 
efforts for its relief, or could have assembled a sufficiently 
large army in Manchuria, to give them the advantage in the 
subsequent campaign. 
Japanese plan. The plan actually adopted by Japan was an enveloping 
advance of three armies, from widely different directions 

i — the Yalu, Ta-ku-shan, and Dalny — on Liao-Yang, whilst a 

' fourth army besieged Port Arthur. 

Converging operations, though they menace the enemy's 
communications, involve risk of defeat in detail. They 
were, however, doubtless forced on Japan, by the political 
necessity for initial occupation of Korea, and the immobility 
of the Eussians was probably known, and counted on. More- 
over, in so mountainous a country as Southern Manchuria, 
some dispersion of force would have been necessary for pur- 
poses of supplj, unless Japan made adequate arrangements 
for rapidly utilising the Port Arthur railway as it fell into 
her hands. But then her advance would have been frontal. 
Having adopted a plan of convergent operations from 
separate bases, Japan's object should have been to exercise 
such simultaneous and vigorous pressure, from all directions, 
as to prevent concentration of hostile force against any one 
of her separated armies. At the same time these should have 
made every effort to attain, as soon as possible, tactical con- 
tact with one another, by rapid, but well-regulated advance 
on a common objective. 

Russian Eussia's objects were naturally, to a great extent, the con- 
objects. ^gj,gg Qf ^.jjQgg Qf jjjg Japanese. 

Japan wished for rapid and early success, Eussia desired 
time to collect her scattered forces. 

Such development of resources might be accomplished if 
Eussia's Far Eastern fortresses correctly carried out, with the 
assistance of her Siberian field troops, their delaying 

Whilst fortifying and provisioning. Port Arthur, and 
Vladivostock, for lengthy sieges, Eussia should, therefore, 


have prepared to manoeuvre with the troops not required to ' 
garrison these places, so as to draw on themselves, and away 
from the fortresses, the Japanese armies. At the same time, 
pending the collection of an army adequate to undertake 
the offensive, the Japanese, as opportunity offered, might 
have been harassed and exhausted by minor engagements, 
and attacked in detail, if chances, as actually happened, 

Whether the Eussian Eastern squadron should have fought 
a decisive action with the Japanese, or awaited the arrival 
of the reinforcements, is a difficult question to answer. 

The solution of the problem depended on the probable 
date when naval reinforcements from Europe might be ex- 
pected. If likely to be long delayed, the natural inclination 
would be to risk all in a decisive naval action. 

Such resolution might have been taken, having regard to 
the fact that long waiting in port might be harmful to the 
machinery of the vessels, and deleterious to the efficiency 
of the crews, and might even, as was the case, result in the 
destruction of the fleet from land. 

As to the Eussian plan it is not easy to speak, for, Russian plan. 
in effect, the operations, up to the battle of Liao-Yang, 
were a series of half-measures. 

This tencTs'to confirm the report that the Eussian councils 
were divided, one party advocating that tihe defence of 
Port XrthuFshould be intrusted solely to the garrison ; the 
other that every effort should be made for its assistance. 




WHEN initiating, in the autumn of 1903, the diplomatic 
pressure which finally resulted in war, Japan, prac- 
tically secure, through the JBriti8h_aUiance, from the in- 
terference of third parties, seems to have calculated that 
her navy was capable of beating^ in detailj the divided 
portions of the Eussian fleet, aiM that her army could cqp-^ 
successfully, with any force that Eussia could maintain in 
the Far East. " ' ,~^^^~-^ 

The confidence of the Japanese in their navy was fully 
justified. But the unwise dispositions of the Japanese armies, 
the resistance offered by Port Artl^ur, the slowness of the 
Japanese military deployment, the quantities of supplies 
obtained by Eussia from Manchuria and Mongolia, and the 
imexpectedly efficient working of the. Trans-Siberian rail- 
way, enabling Eussia to place in the fiehi a larger force than 
Japan had contemplated, upset the Japanese calculations. 
Japan was therefore obliged, not only to augment her active 
army, but to so modify her recruiting laws as to enable larger 
masses of men to be placed in ffie field. 

Trusting, however, in her power to beat Eussia, Japan con- 
tinued to press for Eussia's evacuation of Manchuria, until, 
on February 6th, 1904, negotiations were broken off, and 
diplomatic relations with Eussia severed. (See Appendix III.) 

On the same day the Japanese navy sailed to attack the 
Eussian squadron at Port Arthur, a few ships being detached 
to destroy a couple of small Eussian cruisers lying at Chem- 
ul-po, and to convoy a force of 2500 men, destined to occupy 
Seoul, the capital of Korea. 

At 3 a.m. on 9th, the Japanese troops landed in face 



of the Eussian cruisers, and railed at once to Seoul. The 
next day the Eussian ships were sunk when issuing from 
the harbour. 

Meanwhile, admiral Togo had surprised the Eussian 
squadron lying outside Port Arthur, and had torpedoed 
three of the largest ships. 

Whilst these events were taking place, mobilisation orders 
had been issued in Japan, at 2 p.m., on February 6th, to 
the Guard, 2nd and 12th divisions, and to the fortresses of 
Tsushima and Hakodadi. 

The Japanese had originally intended to secure possession 
of Southern Korea, at"any rate, by landing the 12th division 
at Fu-san and moving it, by march route, eighteen stages to 
Seoul; and had already made arrangements for supply along 
the road. 

After the fi rst naval success it was, however, determined 
to use Chem-ul-p6~as the"porFoI disembarkation. 

In February the mouth of the Yalu, Ta-ku-"shan, and 
Ying-kow are all ice-bound, and do not become clear of ice 
until the middle of Maircff, so that the Japanese could not, 
at that time, have taken advantage of their temporary 
command of the sea by landing troops at those places. 

Thegain, by adoption of such a course, would have been 
shortened lines of communication had command of the sea 
been maintained; but tEeTorce at Ying-kow, at any rate, 
would have been somewhat exposed, owing tolts proximity \ 
to Liao-Yang, where the Eussians were assembling, and 
transports sailing to Ying-kow must have passed relatively ^.r^ 
close to Port Arthur. 

On February 14th, the 12th division railed to Nagasaki, 
where it embarked in six groups of transports, of which the 
first sailed at noon, on 15th. By 21st, t he whole division 
had landed at Chem-ul-po, and a defachment had occupied 
Ping- Yang. ""■" ''''" 

Simultaneously two regiments of the 4th division were March, 
despatched to Chem-ul-po, and garrisons placed in Fu-san, 
Ma-sam-po, and Gen-san. Mobilisation had, meanwhile. 


proceeded in Japan, and by March 4th, the Guard and 2nd 
divisions had concentrated at Hiroshima, ready to embark 
under the command of general Kuroki. 

Chin-am-ph^ the port of Ping- Yang, was reported clear 
of ice on Mar ch 10t h, and as the 12th division had now 
assembled in sufficient force at the latter place, to secure the 
landing, it was decided to disembark, here, the Guard and 2nd 

By 29th the troops were all on shore, and the 12th 
division well to the north of Ping- Yang. 

Information now reached general Kuroki, that, with the 
exception of 1500 to 2000 Eussian. cavalry, no hostile troops 
were south of the Yalu. 

The Japanese, therefore, pushed forward parties towards 
the river Yalu, to at once bridge the rivers Che-chen and 
Tai-ing, to form supply depots, and to reconnoitre roads. 

The result of this reconnaissance was that all roads 
were found to be bad, and the coast road alone was 
reported fit for the movement of a large force. The "whole 
country was, moreover, stated to be destitute of supplies. 

In these circumstances, it is for "consideration, whether 
Kuroki would not hav e been better advised to have marched 
6nIy~tEel2th division towards the Talu, seiiding the Guard 
and 2nd divisions northwards, by ship, at any rate to 
Bo-to and Ei-ka-ho, thus following the precedent of the 
Vimeiro campaign. 
'■ This course would have been less fatiguing, and not more 
risky, than marching by detachments along one bad road, 
^ '. and would have saved valuable time. 

' Probably, however, shipping was not available for the 
April. On April 1st, sufficient supplies having been collected at 
An-ju, Kuroki pushed on a force londer general Asada, who, 
by 7th, had reached Ei-ka-ho, where a supply depot was 

On the latter date the main body of the Japanese marched 
northwards, throwing out towards Yong-pyong a weak flank 


guard, which was to halt there until the main body had 
passed An-ju, and Jhen march to Chang-Syong. 

The advanced guard reached Wi-iTTon'April 8th , and on 
21st, the army was concentrated near that place, whilst the 
i^lSk detachment stood at Chan g-Syong . Lines of supply 
had also been established to Ei-ka-ho, Bo-to, and Qui-em-pho. 

During these operations, the 1st and 3rd di vision s had, 
on April 1st, conc entrated at . Hir oshima, whilst the 4th 
division had mobilised and was standing at Osaka, and an 
ar tillery brigade , of 108 guns, was also ready to take the 
field. In April, these divisions had been quietly embarked 
in a fleet of about a hundred transports, which sailed to 
Chin-am-pho, as they were ready, unescorted, though pro- 
tected by the operations of the Japanese fleet against Port 

By May 1st, the three divisions had concentrated at May. 
Chin-am-pifib 'under general __Oku, ready either to assist I 
Kufoki in forcing the passage of the Yalu, by landing 
between that river and Ta-ku-shan, or, if not required by ' 
the Ist army, to invade the Liao-Tung peninsula. 

As it is hardly conceivable that the Japanese can have 
been ignorant of the weakness of the Eussian Yalu detach- 
ment (see Appendix IV), it seems to have been excess of 
caution that held Oku's detachment in hand so long, for the 
greateT delay in attacK^Port Arthur, the more formidable 

Meanwhile, war had been formally declared on February 
10th, and, on the same date, the Czar had issued a ukase, 
ordering the mobilisation of the troops in the Siberian 
military district, and in the districts of Perm, Viatka, and 

Between February 9th and 12th, most of the powers, 
including China, published declarations of neutrality. 

Japan and Korea entered into an a^eement on February 
23f3, under "wBTcBrtrapan, in exchange for "the right to 
use certain places in Korea for military purposes, guaranteed 
the integrity of the country. 


On February 29th, general Kuropatkin was appointed 
commander-in-chief in Manchuria, and general Linevitch in 
the Ussuri district, but both were under the orders of 
admiral Alexiev, the viceroy. 

Admiral Makarov was given command of the Eussian Far 
Eastern squadron on February 16th, and on the same day 
the viceroy transferred his headquarters from Port Arthur 
to Mukden. '"" "' ' """*'" 

Meanwhile, the Japanese had made several abortive at- 
tempts to enclose the Eussian fleet, which had taken rwuge 
in Port Arthur, within the confines of the harbour, by sink-^ 
ing vessels across the mouth. 

By April i2th, the Eussian fleet had been so far repaired 
as to be able to leave Port Arthur, but on this day, the 
battleship Petr o^mlov jk, with Makarov on board, was sunk 
by a floating mine, and another battleship was injured by 
the same means. 

By the end of April, the opposing forces had reached 
roughly the strength, and had attained the distribution given 
in Appendix IV, the bulk of the Eussian field troops being, 
apparently, in the neighbourhood of Liao-Yang and Ying- 
kow, and on the Yalu. [See also Map 2.] 

Probably the acquisition, by the Japanese, of command of 
the sea, disinclined the Eussians to risk more troops in the 
Liao-tung peninsula than were required for the defence of 
Port Arthur. 

At any rate no, arrangement seems to have been made 
to hold points where the disembarkation of Japanese 
troops was possible; or to place a mobile force in some 
central position such as Pu-la/n-tien, whence troops could 
march, with relative rapidity, to oppose a landing at Port 
Adams, or Pe-tsi-wo. The coast-line was watched by cavalry, 
but this was the only measure taken. 

But this same factor of sea-power induced considerable 
dispersion of force, for, in addition to the garrison of Vladi- 
vostock, there were strong detachments on the Yalu, and at 
Ying-kow, the former separated by 180 miles of rough 


Scale of Miles 

P . 20 *p 60 , 80 too 

Russians O 
Japanese cb 

"Fibres represent 
TVumbert irv 

/Port A-rlhxtr 


fJLiao yanff 






Scale of Miles. 

O go ^ 60 So 100 

Russians vJ 
Japanese r'~l 

Figures Tepr-eserCt 
maribera ZTi 
thodLsands. „ 




yPoT-i Arlh-vcr 


Liao Yo-nq 








country from Liao-Yang, the latter, even, some 70 miles 
from that place, though connected with it by a railway. 

In theory the polij^of^etachingstroi^ such as 

those at tlie Yaluand at Ying-kow, to delay the advance 
of an enemy and to gain time for the assembly of an army 
is attractive. Irr^pfacHce^such detachments more often 
Tirasrnbt'becom'B' seriously _ compromised in performing 
their difficult task, and even if they escape disaster, their 
continuous and necessary retirement is apt to react unfavour- 
ably on the morale of the men. 

Perhaps, then, the Eussians should , have, w atched the 
Yalu, Ying-kow, and, in addition, Ta-ku-shan, and the 
Pe-tsi-wo neighbourhood, with weaker but more mobile 
forces. These would have been u nirer^ncr temptat ion to 
give battle, and, whilst being well placed to obtain in- 
formation, would have delayed, or at least imposed caution 
on the Japanese, who might, at first, have overestimated 
the Eussian strength. The main army could have been 
retained in central positions, such as Hai-cheng and ^ai- 
cKou, every effort being made to render it ready to strike. 

As has been remarked, it is probable that the dispositions 
actually made by the Eussians were a compromise between 
fEe policies of two contending factions. The Eussian general 
staff is said to have computed, that whereas the Japanese, j 
except in winter, could disembark in Manchuria a consider- 
able force within six weeks of the first order to mobilise, '■ 
Eussia could not assemble, even in Northern Manchuria, i 
an army of six corps and six cavalry divisions, in less than j 
six months. 

A strong party of Eussian strategists, headed by the late 
general Dragomirov, therefore advocated the abandonment 
of Port ArtiiurfiS3*the withdrawal of the^Eusskn troops to 
Harbin, or even further north, untiTsufficient numbers had 
been'coUected to ensure victory, and the Japanese had been 
weakeneH by the long northward march, with its line of com- 
munication, and inevitable detachments. Another faction, 
however, desired the maintenance of communication with 


Port Arthur atall costs, and considered that retirement 
would be impolitic. 

On May 1st, general Kuroki defeated the detachment of 
general ^lOTlitch on the Yalu, and on the same date, prob- 
ably to cover the sailing of general Oku's transports, the 
Japanese again attempted to block up the mouth of the 
harbour of Port Arthur. 

Before the battle of the Yalu, Kuroki had been informed 
that he must be prepared to wait on that river for one month, 
as it was not expected that Port Arthur would be blockaded 
on the land side before June. This accomplished^a converging 
movement on Liao-Yang, and the Eussian field armies, would 
be undertaken, by the army of general Oku moving up the 
Liao-tung peninsula, by a force advancing from Ta-ku-shan, 
and by general Kuroki's army marching from the Yalu. 

During this interval, general Kuroki was, apparently, to 
collect transport, to perfect supply arrangements for his 
advance through the hilly country on Liao-Yang, and, whilst, 
by his presence on the Yalu, acting as a deterrent to Eussian 
enterprises against Port Arthur, to avoid compromising 
himself with large hostile forces. 

Oku's ships were weather-bound for some days, at Chin- 
am-pho, after the victory at the Yalu, but on May 4th, 
guarded by gun and torpedo boats, and preceded by a naval 
landing party, the first group, of twenty vessels, containing 
the 3rd division, was able to sail. 

The selected landing place, Kow-shi bay, was a few miles 
south of Pe-tsi-wo, where the Japanese force which captured 
Port Arthur had disembarked in 1894, and was believed to 
offer greater facilities than the latter. Kow-shi was, how- 
ever, by no means an ideal port. It possessed a shallow 
muddj foreshore of considerable extent, and was expraeof to 
easterly winds, tTiough somewliat' sheltered by the Elliott 
islands. But it was sufficiently far from Port Arthur (fifty 
to sixty miles) to render serious interruption of the landing 
operations, by troops from that place, improbable ; and trans- 
ports coming from Japan need not pass close to the Eussian 


warships, as would have been the case had a landing been 
effected on the west coast of the Liao-tung peninsula. 

On May 5th, the ships sighted Kow-shi, where a few 
Cossacks were observed, but the weather was too rough to 
render landing practicable, so the Japanese seem to have 
sailed to the Elliott islands. Here a shallow haven had 
been selected as night anchorage for the vessels, and pro- 
tected, by a boom, against a Eussian torpedo-boat attack. 

It was hoped that even if the enemy's torpedo boats 
damaged the transports, the passengers could easily be saved 
in the shallow water, whilst the cargoes would, without much 
difficulty, be salvaged. 

On 6th the disembarkation commenced, the naval covering 
party Deing first put ashore,' then a "battalion, then more 
infantry, and some cavalry. Pe-tsi-wo was now occupied, the 
few Eussians in the place retiring northwards; a detachment, 
too, was despatched to Pu-lan-tien to cut the railway, but 
did little beyond skirmist with the small Eussian garrison. 

By May 16th, general Oku, though the field hospitals and 
supply and ammunition columns had not landed, was able 
to march the 3rd division towards Chin-chou, whilst the 1st 
and part of the 4th division had taken up a position at 
Pu-lan-tien, and along the Ta-sha river, facing northwards. 

Between May 15th and 23rd, the 5th division and the 
1st cavalry brigade arrived from Japan, and the trains 
oTthe ist, 3rd, and 4th divisions were landed, together with 
half of an artillery brigade. 

General Oku issued orders, on 21st, for the 1st, 3rd, and 
4th divisions to advance to Chin-chou, where tfie Eussians 
were known to be holding a strongly fortified position, 
whilst the 5th division, with detachments of the 3rd and 
4th divisions, and the 1st cavalry brigade, held the line 
Pu-lan-tien and the Ta-sha river. '—^ - 
" On 26th Chin-chou was captured, and on the same day 
14,000 Eussians were driven from Nan-shan. 

The 11th division disembarked at Yeid-ta-kou on May 
24th, aSJon 27th reached Chin-chou. 


The 1st and 11th divisions were now, with some Kobi 
brigades, constituted into a 3rd army, under general Nogi, 
and such troops as had landed, marched on Port Arthur, 
occupying, by 31st, Dalny, Ta-lien-wan, and Nan-ke-ling. 

The 3rd, Ith, and_5th division^, with the 1st cavalry 
brigade, and the 1st artUlery brigade, were, at the sameTime, 
grouped into the 2n31irmy under general Oku. 

The 3rd and 4th divisions and the artillery brigade 
were now moved to Pu-lan-tien, to support the 5th division, 
and the cavalry. These had, for several days, been skirmish- 
ing with a Eussian force of 1600 sabres and six guns, pushed 
southwards under general Samsonov, and thought, by the 
Japanese, to be probably the advanced guard of a larger 

On May 19th, the 10th division, forming the nucleus 
of the 4th Japanese army, had begun to disembark at 
Ta-ku-shan, under general Kawamura. 

Kurokij too, finding supply difficult at An-tung, and 
perhaps also to help Kawamura, had, on May 19th, advanced 
the main body' of the 1st army to Feng-huang-cheng, 
detaching the 12th division to Ai-yang-pien-meng. " 

After the battle of "tbe Talu, the Eussians, owing to the 
movement of a Japanese detachment towards Sai-ma-chi, 
became seriously alarmed for Mukden. Troops under 
Eennenkamf, amounting to a Cossack brigade, 2000 in- 
fantry, and two horse batteries, were therefore pushed to 
Sai-ma-chi, and two or three battalions began to fortify the 
passes near Len-shan-kuan to support ZasuUtch, who had 
retired to that place. At the same time another Cossack 
brigade, under Mischenko, was sent to watch the coast-line 
near Ta-ku-shan. 

Madridov, also, who was still on the upper Yalu, made, 
on May 10th, a raid into Korea, against the Japanese 
line of communicatfons, attacking An-ju, but was easily 
beaten joff by its garrison of less than a hundred men. 

During the remainder of May, nothing occurred except 
a few Eussian reconnaissances from Sai-ma-chL 


The augmentation of the Eussian army, had, meanwhile, 
been proceeding, and towards the end of May the forces had 
reached a respectable total. (See Appendix V, and Map 3.) 

In these circumstances, the Eussians, who had suffered I 
two serious reverses, should have decided definitely whether ' 
their policy was to be one of offensive, or of retrograde until 
a large army had been assembled. 

AlexieVj_the viceroy, being in favour of vigorous action, 
thought that something ought to be done to chect the 
Japanese, known to be widely separated, and not credited 
with large numbers. He therefore, on May 19th, directed 
Kuropatkin to assume the offensive, giving him the alter- 
native of either attacking Kiiroki, or, whilst holding Kuroki, 
of marching against Oku. 

Before undertaking any considerable operation of war the ' 
main question to be decided is whether the results are 
likely to be decisive; if not, the undertaking will rarely be 
worth inception. The attempt may even be disastrous, for 
if a leader plays for lower stakes when the enemy is aiming 
at decision, he stands to win pence and to lose pounds. 

Kuropatkin's first consideration should therefore have 
been, which, if either alternative, would lead to decisive 

From this point of view he made a correct selection in 
deciding to attack general Oku, for the defeat of general 
Kuroki, though it might have delayed the Japanese opera- 
ticms, would not have ruined their plan of campaign. 

But, by crushing Oku, the Eussians would not only, in all | 
probability, have paved the way for the destruction of the J 
larger portion of the Japanese army, but would have re- i 
opened the road to Port Arthur, and perhaps saved the ! 
Eussian flcBt. 

Having determined to strike at Oku, the next point ioi 
decision should have been in what force the operation was to 
be undertaken. 

Here again it should only have been necessary to follow 
one of the great principles of war, and to strike with every 



available man, cutting down necessary detachments to the 
lowest possible limits. But " to do is not so easy as to know 
what 'twere good to do," and Kuropatkin ■vyas set no easy 
task to decide how many men would be required to deal 
with Kuroki and Kawamura, and how many to secure his 
line of communication against Japanese forces which might 
be landed at Ying-kow, or even at Shan-hai-kuan. 

Lastlj, assuming that the Russian general decided to 
march southwards with the bulk of his troops, he must 
weigh the all-important questions of supply, time, and 
space, to discover whether his plan was really capable of 

It is an axiom that continuoiis.-pj^essure on the enemy is 
the very soul^of_the convergent system_of strategy, which 
depends greatly for its success on the exeirtion of simul- 
taneous pressure, on the enemy, from the various directions 
in which the army is moving. 

It was to be expected, then, that the combined forward 
movement of the Japanese armies would be vigorously 
prosecuted, and that, if any army were attacked, the others 
would at once exercise the greatest pressure on the Russians 
to relieve it. 

It is therefore clear, that in this, as in all operations of 
war, a Russian success could hardly be obtained unless the 
Japanese were kept in ignorance, up to the moment of 
decisive attack on Oku, of the Russian projects. 

But to adopt the defensive towards the 1st and 4th 
armies, whilst an attack was made on Oku, would indicate, 
to the Japanese, the Russian plan. Whilst troops were 
marching against the 2nd army, Kuroki and Kawamura 
must, therefore, be led to believe that they were about to 
be attacked. Finally, a simultaneous offensive must be 
undertaken against the three armies, though only pressed 
home against Oku, and the garrison of Port Arthur must 
sally against the besiegers. 

Oku, too, must not be permitted to discover that the 
decisive blow was about to fall on his army, lest he should 


fall back on Nan-shan, whilst the others pressed forward on ' 
to the Eussian comiminications. j 

Keller, who had superseded Zasulitch, and Eennenkamf, 
haoEefween them some 18,000 sabres and bayonets, opposed 
to Kuroki's 34,000; and Mischenko, but 2000 sabres against 
Kawaihura's 11,000 sabres and bayonets. Itwould seem, then, 
thaf " Kuropatkin should have reinforced Mischenko with one 
infantry brigade, that is 6000 men, who would have required 
about one week to reach Hsui-yen, whilst their movement 
would have deceived the Japanese. With these numbers, and 
having regard to the nature of the country in which the | 
operations were to be conducted, Keller and Mischenko should ' 
have been able to contain the 1st and 4th armies, whilst a • 
decisive blow was struck at Oku. 

If a brigade were left at Ying-kow, and a force at Kai-chou, 
the remaining troops, less depots, and small garrisons of, say, 
half a brigade, in all, at Liao-Yang and Mukden, would have 
numbered some 55,000 sabres and bayonets. 

With these Kuropatkin could have" moved against Oku, 
who, to oppose him, could have mustered about 35,000 fight- 
ing men. 

Possibly, had he displayed energy, Kuropatkin might, \ 
with the help of the railway, have collected this force at 
Wa-fang-tien in a fortnight, that is, during the first week in 
June, when Oku would probably have been in the neigh- 
bourhood of Pu-lan-tien, if not farther north. 

It is thought, then, that Kuropatkin, had he acted in 
whole-hearted fashion, might towards the beginning of June 
have taken the offensive with fair prospects of success. 
But the Eussian general, who seems to have leaned rather 
to the procrastinating policy of Dragomirov, was content to 
adopt a half -measure — a decision in which he may have 
been influenced by a demonstration made, in the neighbour- 
hood of Kai-chou, early in June, Tsy the Japanese fleet. 

Only on May 27th did he reply to the viceroy's suggestion, June, 
and it was not until June 7th, that he addressed, to general 
Stackelberg, a memorandum ordering a forward movement. 


In this Stackelberg was directed to advance southwards 
with the 1st Siberian corps and other troops, so as to draw 
against himself, and away from Port Arthur, as large a 
Japanese force as possible. But Stackelberg was warned 
that he was not to become entangled in a decisive action 
against superior forces, though he was to capture N"an-shan, 
and then march on Port Arthur. 

On receipt of these ambiguous instructions, Stackelberg 
began to advance his detachment, mainly by rail, to Teh-li- 
tzu. On June 10th Kuropatkin countermanded the move- 
ments of a portion of Stackelberg's troops, owing to the 
operations of the 10th Japanese division, but the imits 
were soon allowed to proceed again, and, eventually, some 
27,000 bayonets, and 2000 to 3000 sabres, were massed at 
or near Teh-li-tzu. 

Samsonov had, meanwhile, retired on Teh-li-tzu when the 
2nd army moved to Pu-lan-tien, but had again advanced to 
Wa-fang-tien, on receiving from Stackelberg a reinforce- 
ment of two battalions. 

Early in June the Japanese heard, both from local spies 
and from their intelligence service in Europe, that the 
Kussians were about to attack Oku. 

On 2nd, Kawamura was therefore ordered to hold himself 
in readiness to advance towards Kai-chou and menace the 
Kussian flank, whether or not his division had completed its 

At this time there was, as has been stated, in front of the 
10th division, only Mischenko's detachment, holding the 
passes south of Hsui-yen; but, to make the movement 
thorougbly effective, Kuroki was ordered to send to Kawa- 
mura, a force of one brigade, two squadrons, and two 
batteries, under general Asada. 

Asada left Feng-huang-cheng on June 6th, and, on 
8th, he combined with part of the 10th division in an 
attack on Hsui-yen, which easily drove off Mischenko's 

As the Russian operations now seemed to 'be hanging fire. 


Scale of jyiibis 


O o 

I^orl A-rihuT- 



Miao yang 







Japanese headquarters ordered Kawamura not to advance 
beyond Hsui-yen. 

He therefore halted and intrenched. 

This fact, as has been stated, considerably influenced 
Kuropatkin's plans, for, seeing that the Japanese had not 
advanced beyond Hsui-yen, he allowed Stackelberg to con- 
tinue his concentration on Teh-li-tzu. 

On 12th, Oku being ready to move from Pu-lan-tien, 
Kawamura was directed to proceed towards Hai-cheng as 
soon as he could, leaving Asada to watch Hsi-mu-cheng. 

Kuroki, too, was ordered tb advance, and so distract 
Russian attention from Oku. 

But supply difficulties prevented the movement of the 
1st army, so that Kuroki was only able to pUsh forward 
some detachments, in addition to sending Asada to the 10th 

Keller was, however, deceived by these movements, and 
thmEmg that Kuroki meant to attack his right, began to 
mass troops on this flank. 

Meanwhile, Oku had commenced his march from Pu-lan- 
tien, and by 13th, the 3rd and 5th divisions were, with the 
artillery brigade, at Wa-fang-tien, the 4th division near 
Fu-chou, and the cavalry brigade on the right flank; the 
6th division, which had now landed, was following some 
marches in rear. 

Why Oku advanced before the arrival of the 6th division 
is not quite clear. Possibly policy dictated the move, or 
perhaps the Japanese were anxious as to the 1st and 4th 
armies, though to risk the defeat of Oku, to help them, 
imless they were believed to be in serious straits, was hardly 
sound strategy ; or it may be that they wished to retain the 
initiative, n^ot allowing this advantage to pass to the enemy. 

On June 15th the Japanese defeated the Eussians at 
Teh-U-tzu, driAring in their right, but did not follow up the 
success with any vigour; in fact there was practically no 

The only other incidents, worth mention, which took 


place at this juncture, were some readjustraents of troops on 
the Eusaian side, when Eennenkamf was strengthened at 
{ the expense of Keller, whilst Mischenko was reinforced. 

In looking at the table showing the number of troops in 
Manchuria on June 15th (Appendix VI, and Map 4), the large, 
garrison of Vladiyostock is noteworthy, as demonstrating the 
containing effect of sea^power. 

TChe^f esence of "half this force in Manchuria might, at 
this period, have turned the scale in favour of the Eussians. 

After the battle of Teh-li-tzu, the 1st and 9th East 
Siberian divisions, now known as the 1st Siberian corps, 
retired to Kai-chou, covered by Samsojiov's cavalry, and 
remained in this neighbourhood until the end of the month. 

During June, Mischenko's detachment was again re- 
inforced, and a general southward movement made towards 
Ta-shih-chiao, where a position was fortified. (See Appendix 
VII and Map 5.) 

The dispositions of the Eussian troops appeared, in fact, 
to indicate an offensive in force against Oku, and perhaps it 
would have been well for the Eussians had they now defi- 
nitely decided either to advance or to retire, instead of con- 
tinuing a wasteful policy of half -measures. 

Apparently Kuropatkin would have liked to have with- 
drawn his southernmost forces north of Hai-cheng, for the 
operations of Kuroki and Kawamura had rendered the 
Eussians anxious as to the safety of the corps of Stackel- 
berg and Zarubaiev. But the viceroy, Alexiev, who was con- 
tinually urging Kuropatkin to adopt the offensive, on the 
ground that the strength of the Japanese had been exagger- 
ated, forbade such retirement, which would have been detri- 
mental to Port Arthur, as showing that the Eussians had, 
for the moment at any rate, abandoned all idea of its relief. 

On the Japanese side, the 2nd army, probably owing to 
transport and supply difficulties, hardly made any advance 
northwards, and on June 30th, was only thirteen miles north 
of Teh-li-tzu. 

The 10th division, which in accordance with the orders of 


marshal Oyama, the Japanese commander-in-chief, had 
moved slowly on Hai-cheng, was, soon after the victory of 
Teh-li-tzu, ordered to halt and await the advance of the 
2nd army. 

On receipt of these instructions, Kawamura determined to 
attack, about June 26th, the Chi-pan-ling and Ta-ling 
passes, by which date he calculated that Oku should have 
reached Kai-ping. 

On 24th, just as all arrangements were completed, Kawa- 
mura, in common with the other generals, was notified that 
as the Eussian fleet could still leave Port Arthur, and render \ 
sea transport of supplies precarious, the combined advance 
on Liao-Yang must be delayed until after the rainy season, 
that is, until Setitembjer, At the same time news came from 
Oku, that, owiiig to transport difficulties, the 2nd army could 
not, for the moment, advance. 

Thus the Japanese, already beginning to feel the drag on 
their operations, of the fortress of Port Arthur, which was 
sheltering the enemy's fleet, proposed to abandon the 
initiative, a step likely to bring ^fio'us consequences in 
view of the dispersion of their forces, 

Kawamura, nevertheless, decided that it would be wise to 
secure his position, by clearing the passes, and, by 27th, had { 
taken both Chi-pan-Hng and Ta-ling, driving off Misehenko's , 

Meanwhile, Keller had, as a result of Teh-li-tzu, been 
ordered to send one brigade to An-shan-tien, and to make, 
with the remainder of his force, a demonstration towards 
Peng-huang-cheng ; an operation which, if it had any effect, i 
would be more likely to increase than to relieve pressure on 

Keller, therefore, mustered eight battalions, and advancing 
in two columns, reached a point ten miles from Peng-huang- 
cheng, unopposed. He then retired, and on arriving at Len- 
shan-quan, on June 18 th, received orders to remain on the 

N"o sooner had Keller withdrawn, than Eennenkamf 


attacked the 12th division at Ai-yang-pien-meng, but soon 
drew off. 

The two Eussian generals seem to have acted indepen- 
dently, thereby reducing the chances of success. 

On June 24th, the 1st army commander also moved 
forward to occupy the passes over the main Feng-shui-ling 
range, for by doing so, though drawing nearer to the enemy's 
masses, he would limit the Eussian power of manoeuvre. 
The army marched north-westwards ia three columns, 
owing to the mountainous nature of the district, the 
Guards on Erh-chia-pu-tsz, the 2nd division on Len-shan- 
kuan, and 12th division by Sai-ma-chi. Before this advance 
Keller and Eennenkamf feU back, so that, by 27th, the Guard 
and 2nd divisions were holding the Mo-tien-ling and neigh- 
bouring passes, and the 12th division a pass twelve miles 
west of Sai-ma-chi — sometimes called North Feng-shui-ling. 
Eain now fell heavily, quite disorganising the communica- 
tions of the 1st army. 

It has been suggested that, under the original Japanese 
plan of campaign, the 1st army was intended to move 
on Hai-cheng, and not towards Liao-Yang, and that the 
primary object of the Japanese leaders was to concentrate 
their own forces rather than to envelop the Eussians. The 
direction actually taken by Kuroki's army is ascribed to the 
influence of topography, and to the fact that the only 
practicable roads from the Yalu to the Liao converged on 

In 1894, the army which crossed the Yalu did march on 
Hai-cheng. It appears, then, that if the Japanese had 
desired Kuroki's army to move on Hai-cheng, sufficient 
roads would have been available for the purpose. It is 
probable, therefore, that the Japanese deliberately moved the 
1st army by the more northerly routes, with the object 
of at once preventing Eussian operations towards Port 
Arthur by the menace thus offered to the Eussian line 
of commimication, and of keeping the 1st army in a position 
from which it could envelop the Eussian left in any locality 


south of Mukden. No doubt it was calculated that the 
Eussians could not quickly overwhelm Kuroki in the hilly 
country lying south-east of Liao-Yang, and that the attrac- 1 
tion of Port Arthur, and the presence of the other two 
armies, would tend to lessen the probability of such a 
counter-stroke. Possibly the Japanese hoped, after the 
rapid capture of Port Arthur, to apply to the Eussians 
the enveloping tactics actually attempted at Mukden, with 
the 3rd army as left wing, and Kuroki's army in a more 
favourable position than was their right on that occasion. 

Whilst these events had been taking place inland, the 
Bussian fleet had, on June 23rd, put to sea, but was driven 
back intoTKe harbour by the Japanese. On June 26th the 
3rd army captured a ridge known as Ken-san, about ten 
miles from Port Arthur, subsequently repulsing several 
attempts to retake the position. 

At about this time the 3rd army was reinforced by the 
9th division and 4th Kobi brigade. (For positions of troops 
see Appendix VII, and Map 5.) 

During the early part of July, the Eussians showed a July, 
good deal of activjtj^in the eastern theatre of war, a couple 
of battalions attacking Mo-tien-ling, whilst Eennenkamf 
continually, but without success, harassed Kuroki's line 
of communication, with the object of trying to find out his 
dispositions. The operations were all apparently under- 
taken to obtain information, for, owing to Kuroki's inert- 
ness after his _ advance, whilst the other armies were 
relatively active, and to the westward movement of Asada, 
the Eussians thought that Kuroki's army was stealing a 
march on them. Kuroki, in fact, was at one time reported 
to be marching towards Ta-k^-shan and Port Arthur, or, as 
another rumour had it, to be concentrating on his right, 
preparatory to crossing the Tai-tzu river, and advancing on 
Mukden — a movement of which the Eussians were a good 
deal afraid. 

Not satisfied with the result of the earlier operations, 
and since the cavalry was not able to pierce the Japanese 


outpost Knes, Keller, on July 17tli, attacked the Japanese 
positions at an'di near Mo-tien-ling, with one brigade of the 
rtrEircorps7and twelve battalions of the 3rd and 6th East 
Siberian divisions. With these troops he succeeded, though 
at somewhat heavy cost of life, in discovering that the 
Japanese 1st army had not materially altered its dispositions. 
Kuropatkin thereupon determined, on the arrival, in Southern 
Manchuria, of the 1st and 17th European cor£s, expected 
about the middle of Augusl,'"to attack and drive back 
Kuroki, whose position was thought to be menacing to 
Liao-Yang; though it does not appear that the Eussians 
had valid grounds for assuming that the Japanese would 
remain quiet for so long a period. 

Kuroki now d.elivered a eountej-attack, when, on July 
19th, the i2th division drove a Eussian force, of some 7000 
men, with twenty-four guns, from Chao-tao, whence they 
not only prevented direct communication between the 2nd 
and 12th divisions, but could have attacked, in flank, the 
Mo-tien-ling position. 

From Chao-tao a road led to Mukden, via Pen-si-hu, so 
that the Japanese exploit again made Kuropatkin doubt 
whether the 1st army was not contemplating a movement 
against his communications. 

The Eussian commander-in-chief, who, on the news of 
Teh-li-tzu, had at once hurried southwards, now hastened to 
An-ping, directing portions of the 10th corps, newly arrived 
from Eussia, to march to Yu-shu-lin-tzu, and drive the 
Japanese back towards Sai-ma-ehi. 

At this period, the Japanese armies in Manchuria were 
still without a commander-in-chief in the theatre of war, 
marshal Oyama not having yet arrived from Japan. Such 
procedure, closely copying the action of Moltke in 1866, is 
open to criticism, for the rival armies were now in such 
close contact that decisive events, which could not well be 
controlled from Tokyo, might take place at any moment. 
Oya ma should, therefore, more especially since the activity 
of the Eussians had no doubt shown the danger of post- 


poning the advance until September, and as the Eussian 
fleet was no longer formidable, have ere now placed himself 
where he could closely supervise the operations of his 

But Kuropatkin's action was much more reprehensible, for j 
his continued movements" musThave dislocated the arrange-l 
ments of his staff, and his presence, in localities where 
detachments of his army had suffered reverses, was likely 
not to improve, but to prejudice his grasp of the general 
situation, by leading him to attach undue importance tc 
local incidents. 

Ku ropatkin's j flttiasys are said to have been prompted by 
the fact that he mistrusted the capacity of his subordinate 
generals. But such meddlesomeness would tend to aggravate 
rather than to mend matters, and all the Eussian leader's 
energies were requiref^for tEe organisation, and even train-ij 
ing of his army. . Many regiments possessed newly raised/ 
battalions; the East Siberian brigades had recently beei^: 
expanded into divisions, and were full of drafts of men who | 
had never seen a magazine rifle ; and the transporFtrain was 
not e^JeTen'Er Uofebve^'tlie Eussian armies were parcelled ; 
into a series of independent detachments, without cohesioq,, 
or knowledge of one anothe/s movemeiTts. Not even thai 
force opposing Kuroki was under one commander. 

It is a matter of experience that no one leader can 
efficiently control more than five or six units. It would 
seem, then, that Kuropatkin should have done as he after- 
wards did, divided his troops into two or three armies, each 
under a responsible commander. Probably, however, the I 
men were lacking. 

No sooner had Kuropatkin reached An-ping, than news 
came of the advance of Oku's army, on July 23rd, doubtless 
ujader taken to jceli^ve pressure on Kuroki. This general's 
isolated position was, most likely, causing' anxiety to the 
Japanese, who had probably heard of the movement of 
troops eastwards from Liao-Yang. 

Kuropatkin at once posted southwards, only to arrive 


after the action of Ta-shih-chiao, when Oku drove back the 
1st and 4th Siberian corps, both under general Zarubaiev, of 
the 4th corps, which was most severely engaged. 

The position of Ta-shih-chiao, on one of the spurs flung 
westwards into the Liao plain from the Eeng-shui-ling 
group of mountains, had been fortified, so it is curious that 
the Russians, having accepted battle, offered so moderate a 
resistance, for they fought merely a rear-guard action. 
Apparently Kuropatkin, in view of Kuroki's position at 
Mo-tien-ling and Chao-tao, did not desire to involve his 
southern detachment too deeply, but at the same time did 
not wish to give up Ying-kow without a struggle. Zaru- 
baiev had therefore been ordered not to commit himself, 
and as a result, the Japanese gained the prestige of a victory, 
and the Russians sacrificed lives to no purpose. 

On 25th and 26th, the 2nd army halted at Ta-shih-chiao, 
occupying Ying-kow on the latter date. 

On 28th, communication was oj)ened between the 2nd . 
and 4th armies, and the 5th division was detached to re- 
inforce general Nodzu^s command. This army had, after the 
capture of Chi-pan-ling and Ta-Ung, skirmished, in the area 
south of Hsi-mu-cheng, with Mischenko's detachment. 

Towards the end of July marshal Oyama assumed direct 
command of the Japanese armies. Coupling this fact with 
the advance of Oku's force to Ta-shih-chiao, it may there- 
fore be assumed that the Japanese policy of delay until 
September, had now been definitely abandoned. 7 

After Ta-chih-chiao the Russians fell back to Hai-cheng^ 
and as a result of this contraction of frontage, were now in 
a more favourable position than at any previous period of 
the campaign. They were occupying, with 140,000 sabres 
and bayonets, a semicircle of about sixty miles raffius, where- 
as the Japanese, with not more thaS 1T)6,000, were spread 
over quite eighty-five miles ; moreover, owing to the draw- 
ing of 1;Ee"4th army towards the 2nd, probably with the 
object of placing as strong a force as possible near the Port 
Arthur road, a gap of quite thirty miles of mountainous 


Scale of Mflas 

ZQ 'to 60 So 



RzLSsians O 
tlapanese L_J 

Fitjtcres represent 
rucmierj in T^iLsands 




' RTI 


country existed between the right of the 4th and the left of 
the 1st army. (See Appendix VIII, and Map 6.) 

Kuropatkin could now, without much countermarching, 
have attacked the 2nd and 4th armies, who combined 
mustered about 61,000 sabres and bayonets and 300 guns, 
with 75,000 bayonets, 8500 sabres, and 350 guns, whilst 
he attacked and contained, with some 40,000 bayonets, j 
3500 sabres, and 172 guns, Kuroki's army of 37,000 rifles 
and sabres and 152 guns. 

Or, conversely, he could have moved against Kuroki with 
about 55,000 bayonets, 5000 sabres, and 200 guns, whilst i 
holding the 2nd and 4th armies with 60,000 bayonets, 7000 
sabres, and 282 guns. 

Kuropatkin's reserve was, however, so meagre, that in 
neither case was it probable that the numerical preponder- 
ance he could bring to bear would be decisive, whilst which- 
ever fraction of the Japanese was attacked, must be met 
more or less directly in front, unless, indeed, the troops at 
Liao-Yang could tufnrKTuroki's right by Pen-si-hu. 

As already remarked, before taking the offensive, Kuro- 
patkin should have considered where success was most 
likely to produce decisive results. 

Kuroki's army certainly most nearly menaced the Eus- 
sian line of communication, and for this reason its defeat 
would have been advantageous to the Eussians. But Kuro- 
patkin's forces were so disposed that he could not easily 
envelop Kuroki's left, separate this army completely from 
the 4th army, and drive the former towards Feng-huang- 
cheng; moreover, success against Kuroki's left would not 
necessarily involve the retirement of Oku and Nodzu; 

StiU less would the victory be decisive, if Kuropatkin, 
moving his Liao-Yang troops to Pen-si-hu, rolled up the 12th 
division; for though, perhaps, this division could be more 
easily defeated than any other portion of the Japanese 
forces, a success against the Japanese right would tend only 
to bring the armies into one straight line, not to cause their 


Similarly, the defeat of the 4th army, though it would 
doubtless iaeonvenience the Japanese, and would probably 
cause Kuroki to fall back, would not oblige them to raise 
the siege of Port Arthur ; and since Nodzu lay in a hilly 
country, rapid success, so necessary to prevent envelopment 
by the Japanese wings, would not be easy. 

J)ku, on the other hand, directly covered the most im- 
portant of the Japanese lines of supply, to Ying-kow and 
Dalny, and also the siege of Port Arthur. If he could be 
driven back and routed, the Japanese armies would be in a 
sorry plight. 

Hence, it seems that the Eussian stroke should have been 
delivered against Oku's army, which, by using the railway, 
could also be most quickly attacked. Besides, the ground 
where the battle would take place was more favourable to 
the Eussian organisation and armament than the mountains, 
and the physical difficulties of the hills would help to delay 
Kuroki and Nodzu, when they attempted to exert pressure 
to assist Oku. 

However, Kuropatkin seems to have intended nothing more 
than a direct attack on the 12th division, with the fractions 
of the 10th corps already designated for the purpose. 

But before even this operation could take place, marshal 
Oyama, hearing from Kuroki that the Eussians appeared to 
be massing against the right of the 1st army, wisely decided 
to anticipate the enemy's offensive, and to spoil their plan 
by a forward moveinent by the whole 1st army, on July 30th 
and 31st. This operation was to be comtmed, apparently, 
with a simultaneous advance by the other two armies, and 
with active raids against the Eussian line of communication, 
by the Chinese Hun-huse brigands. 

On 31st, the 1st army was successful in defeating Keller's 
detachment, and portions of the 10th corps, and drove them 
back to the ridges enclosing, on the east, the valley of the 
i'Tan river. 

On news of this reverse, Kuropatkin, fearing for Liao-Yang 
and his Une of communication, directed those troops which 


had been in the neighbourhood of Hai-oheng to fall back to 
a strong and carefully intrenched position along the ridge of 
hills near An-shan-tien. This retrograde movement was also 
due to the lacli that U^u had succeeded in interposing, after 
but slight resistance, some troops between the 2nd and 4th 
Siberian corps; whilst the 4th army had, on July 31st, taken 
Hsi- mu-chen g^dri ving back Mischen ko. The 4th army thus 
closed to within five miles jof the 2ncrarmy. 

The Japanese occupied Hai-cheng" on ^August 3rd, and the August, 
result of the operations undertaken towards the end of July, 
was therefore to reduce tlie combined frontage to about sixty 
or seventy miles. BiiF^uroki's army was not more than 
twenty-five or thirty miles from Liap-Yang, whilst the 2nd 
and 4th were still quite forty-five miles from that city. At 
the same time the country to be traversed by Kuroki was the 
more difficult, so that in_pointof_time, the three armies were 
perhaps ec[ually_distant from the town._ 

Kuroki's advanced position had, however, practically com- 
mitted the Japanese to a converging attack on Liao-Yang, 
for his army, which should have formed the mobile wing of 
the Japanese forces, could now only manoeuvre with 
difficulty and risk. Had Oyama's hand not been forced by 
the threat against the 12th division, and had the 1st army 
force been held back on the line Chao-tao to Geb-ato, for 
instance, and the 2nd and 4th armies pushed on to An- 
shan-tien, the Eussians would have been in a more difficult 
position, whilst the Japanese would have run no greater 
risk. The 2nd and 4th armies could then have attacked 
the enemy's front, and the 1st been used to envelop his left 
flank, wherever the battle for Liao-Yang was fought. 

Heavy rain fell at the beginning of August, which, com- 
bined with the fact that the Japanese were also probably 
waiting for the result of the first and abortive assault^ 
on Port Arthur, delivered between August 20th and 24th, 
put an end to active operations, on a large scale, for nearly 
a month. 

During this interval, the Eussians were still lying south 


and no idea of offensive seems to have been entertained by 
the Eussian general. The initiative was therefore left to 
th e Japan ese, and fearful lest, on the news of the failure of 
the assault on Port Arthur, the Eussians should seize this 
advantage, they recommenced their converging advance on 

As before, the 1st army was first committed to action, 
with the object, it is said, of causing the Eussians to 
evacuate the An-shaB-tien position. 

The Japanese, as a result, lost all power jol manoeuvre, 
except with such troops as could, at considerable risk, "Be 
withdrawn from the battle frontage. But, it would, ap- 
parently, have been to the Japanese advantage had the 
Eussians stood at An-shan-tien, for their envelopment by 
Kuroki could then have been undertaken without the 
necessity of placing his army astride the Tai-tzu riyer. 

Kuropatkinj plan appears to have been to hold the posi- 
tions at An-shan-tien, and east of An-ping, sufficiently long to 
oblige the enemy to show his hand and force. Having accom- 
plished this, the army was to retire on the intrenchments 
that had been made round Liao-Yang, then, pivoting on this 
bridge-head, it was to manoeuvre on both banks of the Tai- 
tzu ; and if the enemy divided his force and placed it astride 
the river, it was to faU, in superior numbers, on one or other 

Except that the troops holding the advanced positions 
were liable to defeat in detail, and if not beaten, must, at 
any rate, have been subjected to the demoralising influence 
of another retirement, the plan, though cautious, was reason- 
able. But in the event Kuropatkin failed 'to~carry out his 
conception, and was defeated. (See Map 8.) 


September. fTHHE strategical operations, proper, of the Eusso-Japanese 
JL war, may be said to have ended with the commence- 
ment of the battle of Liao-Yang, but the subsequent 
operations were on so extended a scale, that it is proposed 
to deal, in outline, with events leading up to the battle of 

After their defeat at Liao-Yang, the Eussians retired 
northwards with stolid deliberation, unpursued by the 
Japanese, the main body reaching the neighbourhood of 
Mukden on September 6th. 

Kuropatkin's first impulse seems to have been to evacuate 
Mukden, and retreat to Tieh-ling, a town about forty miles 
north of the Manchu capital, where an offshoot from the 
Manchurian mountains is again projected into the Liao 
plain, offering a position suitable for defensive tactics. 

But circumstances soon caused the Eussian commander 
to change his mind. In the first place the Japanese pursuit 
ceased. Then political pressure appears to have been 
brought to bear on him from Eussia, through the viceroy 
Alexiev, to discontinue the retirement. Then, again, the 
Eussians were much dependent for meat supply on Hsin- 
ming-ting, and were naturally unwilling to abandon to the 
enemy, Mukden, a town lying in a rich grain-growing 
district, and of considerable political importance. 

It was therefore decided to halt at Mukden, and the army 
was quartered in this neighbourhood, as follows : — 

Of the cavalry, G-rekov's Orenburg Cossack division kept 
touch with the Japanese along the Sha and Shi-li rivers ; 
Mischenko, with the Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade, stood 



eastwards, as far as the Fu-shun to Pen-si-hu road ; and the 
cavalry division, under Samsonov, watched the country east 
of Fu-shun. Besides these, there were the customary de- 
tachments wide to both flanks. 

The 10th and 17th corps remained, with the 2nd and 4th 
Siberian corps, south of the Hun river, and were employed 
in constructing bridge-heads to the railway and Imperial 
road bridges, in the shape of a semicircle of forts, round 
a radius from Hun-ho-pu to Yan-su-chian-tzu. 

The 1st Siberian corps proceeded to Fu-ling, six miles 
east of Mukden, the 3rd to Fu-shun, twenty miles further 
east. The two then began to intrench the line of the Hun 
from Mukden to Fu-shun, constructing works on both banks 
of the river. The 5th Siberian corps was placed between 
Mukden and Hsin-ming-ting ; and the 1st corps, now arriving 
from Europe, had its headquarters at Pu-ho, fifteen miles 
north of Mukden. The 5th East Siberian corps, which had 
been broken into detachments during the battle of Liao- 
Yang, seems still to have been disseminated. But, later, 
apparently, portions of this and of the 5 th Siberian corps 
were amalgamated, and known as the 5th corps. 

Soon after Liao-Yang, the Czar, believing that the defeat 
of the Russians had perhaps, in part, been due to the fact 
that Kuropatkin's army was too large for one man to 
manage, decided to form two armies in Manchuria, under 
admiral Alexiev as commander-in-chief, one to be com- 
manded by Kuropatkin, the other by general Grippenberg, 
at that time commanding the Vilna army corps. 

This appointment, perhaps, turned Kuropatkin's thoughts 
to projects for retrieving his reputation. 

The fact that the numbers and strength of the Russian 
army had been much increased also made an offensive 
appear to be promising ; for there had arrived from Europe, 
the 1st corps, drafts to replace casualties, Q.F. guns in sub- 
stitution for those of older pattern, up to that time in use 
by the Siberian corps, and the 6th Siberian corps was on its 
way to the seat of war. 


Before attempting to attack the Japanese, Kuropatkin, 
taught hy his experience at Liao-Yang, proceeded to delegate 
his authority, and to decentralise command, by organising 
his forces into three groups or armies. Of these, the Eastern 
detachment, lying east of Mukden, was composed of the 1st, 
2nd, and 3rd Siberian corps, with the Siberian Cossack 
division, under general Stackelberg. The western detach- 
ment of the 10th, 17th corps, and portions of the 5th 
European and 5th Siberian corps, now known as the 5th 
corps, with the Orenburg Cossack division, was under general 
Bilderling. A central force consisting of the 1st corps, the 
4th Siberian corps, and the 6th Siberian corps, when it came 
up, with Mischenko's Trans-Baikal Cossack division, was 
under the commander-in-chief. In addition, the usual- 
strong mixed forces watched both flanks. 

Attention was also given to mapping, or to revising maps 
of the area round Mukden, but apparently little was really 
done, for Stackelberg's detachment is said to have possessed 
but few maps at the time of the Sha-Ho battle. 

Whilst the Russians were thus engaged, the Japanese, 
exhausted by their efforts at Liao-Yang, had halted, the 
1st army on the line Hei-yin-tai to Lo-ta-tai, the 2nd and 
4th armies south of the Tai-tzu, and west and east of Liao- 

About September 14th, marshal Oyama seems to have 
decided to undertake further offensive operations in a 
month's time, by which date, no doubt, drafts to make good 
the losses of Liao-Yang would have arrived, as well as the 
8th division. 

Accordingly, instructions were issued to this effect, each 
army was allotted a district in which to advance, and the 
troops were warned, that, in future, frontal attacks, when 
unaccompanied by enveloping movements, were to be avoided 
as far as possible. This last provision exactly coincided 
with tactical instructions promu^ated by the Russians 
about the same time. 

To the 1st army was assigned the Ta-lien-kou to Pu-tsao- 


yai road, and the district eastwards as far as Pen-si-hu. The 
4th army was to use the roads on either side of the railway, 
and the 2nd army the roads westward as far as the right 
bank of the Hun. The reserve, of Kobi brigades, was to march 
west of the railway, and behind the right of the 2nd army. 

It was not until September 10th that the bridges over 
the Tai-tzu, at Liao-Yang, were repaired, and the 2nd army 
began to cross the river and to intrench itself on the line 
Shan-tai-tzu to Ta-pa-tai-tzu. 

The 4th army, which commenced, about the same time, to 
move to the north of Tai-tzu, took up the line Nan-tai to 

The 1st army lay mainly between La-ni-pu and the Yen- 
. tai coal mines, but Umezawa's detachment was about fifteen 
miles to the east, at Ping-tai-tzu ; apparently partly for the 
purpose of reconnoitring the district allotted to the 1st 
army, partly because Ping-tai-tzu is an important valley 
centre, whence roads lead to Pen-si-hu, and thence to Chao- 
tao and the Yalu. 

As has been stated, both commanders were contemplating 
offensive operations, and for this purpose each wanted in- 
formation of the enemy's dispositions. 

Though the masses of Eussian cavalry made it difficult for 
^the Japanese patrols to penetrate the enemy's outpost line, 
the Japanese service of spies seems to have afforded them 
fairly accurate information of the Eussian dispositions ; and, 
after all, cavalry, more often than not, can only confirm, or 
show to be false, news obtained from other sources. At any 
rate, Oyama knew that the whole Eussian front and flanks 
were covered by cavalry; that the 5th Siberian corps was 
reported west of Mukden, the 10th and 17th corps round, 
or close to the city, the 1st and 2nd Siberian corps east of 
Mukden ; but the 3rd Siberian corps was not located. He 
was also aware that works were being constructed north of 
the Sha-Ho, and east of Mukden, and that reinforcements, in 
the shape of the 1st European and 6th Siberian corps, were 
coming up. 


It has been said " that rivers and mountains, like other 
complications in the art of war, afford additional oppor- 
tunities to skill and talent, and additional embarrassments 
to incapacity " ; and, indeed, the presence, in the theatre of 
operations, of the great Hun river, and of the mountains 
north of Pen-si-hu, fully exemplify the truth of this remark. 

The Hun river certainly complicated the problem pre- 
sented to Oyama, for he could not, without placing his army 
astride so serious an obstacle, carry out a converging move- 
ment against the Eussians, nor could he, without consider- 
able risk, attempt to turn, after the manner of Lee, or 
envelop their right flank. On the other hand, the Hun 
would protect the Japanese left, and render, difficult, attack 
by the Eussians from this direction. 

Perhaps the Japanese commander-in-chief might have 
tried to surprise the enemy by crossing the whole, or at any 
rate the greater, part of his army, over the Hun and Tai-tzu, 
near Hsiao-pei-ho. Then marching between the Hun and 
Liao rivers, he could have attacked the Eussian right, thus 
turning the Hun and the fortifications south and east of 
Mukden and, at the same time, using the Hun as a line of 

Such plan would have demanded the temporary uncover- 
ing of the main line of supply from Ying-kow and Dalny. 
But a fortified Liao-Yang should have sufficiently protected 
the line of communication, until Japanese pressure on the 
Eussian communications had obliged the latter to abandon 
any enterprises that might have been undertaken south of 
Mukden. Moreover, if advancing southwards in force, the 
Eussians would probably have sent a detachment west of the 
Hun, and would have, therefore, placed themselves astride 
the river. 

If unable to adopt so bold a course, Oyama, relying on 
the Hun to protect his left, could repeat the tactics of Liao- 
Yang, by advancing directly on Mukden with the 2nd army, 
and moving the 1st and 4th armies, in echelon behind the 
2nd, through the hills, towards Fu-shun. Here they could 


probably, with ease, force the passage of the Hun, but 
supply in the hill area might be difficult. 

Or he could imitate Lee's action in 1862, and detach 
Kuroki to move round the Eussian left whilst the rest 
attacked, or remained fronting, the Eussians. 

In any case, either the passage across the Hun, or the 
march through the hiUs, would be a slow proceeding, which 
would increase the risk that the enemy might probe the 
plan, and counter-attack before its development. 

Or, again, he could adopt a less ambitious, though probably 
not less risky plan, and act as he apparently intended, 
making a direct advance on Mukden and Pu-shun, and 
trusting to Kuroki to overlap and envelop the enemy's left. 

At any rate the situation of the two armies, now front- 
ing each other, and astride their lines of communication, 
rendered necessary either a bold turning movement^ or an 
equally dangerous, though to outward appearance less risky 
frontal advance against the Eussian works; and the last 
course would be the least likely to lead to decisive results. 

The alternatives presented to the Eussian commander-in- 
chief much resembled those placed before Oyama. 

About the middle of September, the information available 
to Kuropatkin inclined him to believe that two Japanese 
divisions were between Nan-tai and Shan-tai-tzu, that four 
divisions were immediately north of Liao-Yang, two divi- 
sions near the Ten-tai coal mines, and two divisions be- 
tween Ping-tai-tzu and Pen-si-hu. He knew, moreover, 
that Liao-Yang was fortified, for he had made the works, 
and he believed that all the Japanese troops were in- 

There were several courses open to the Eussian leader. 
He could utilise the Hun as a line from which to manoeuvre, 
constructing bridges, and building bridge-heads at, say, 
Chan-tan, at Hun-ho-pu south of Mukden, and at Fu-shun, 
and keeping his army, with the exception of his cavalry, 
north of the river. But this plan would be unenterprising, 
and therefore a confession of weakness and inferiority. 


Or he could, whilst fortifying Hun-ho-pu to secure his com- 
munications, and covering his front with cavalry, who would 
be especially active in the hill area, march the bulk of his 
army down the right bank of the Hun, and cross the river 
south of Chan-tan and Hei-kou-tai. This plan would in- 
volve the passage of the Hun, a broad river, in somewhat 
close proximity to the Japanese left, but the blow would 
fall near the Japanese main line of communication. 

Or, again, the Eussian general could move his army south- 
wards, astride the Hun, attacking the Japanese in front 
with one portion, and when their attention was fully en- 
gaged, throwing the remainder across the river on to their 
left flank. In this case there would be risk of defeat 
in detail, for the enemy might envelop the troops east of the 
Hun Ho, or might even make a counter-attack towards 
Fu-shun. But if they advanced on Fu-shun, their move- 
ments in the hills, especially if opposed, would be slow, and 
their blow would not so nearly menace the Eussian line, as 
would his own operations the Japanese communications. 

Or, the Eussians, advancing from Mukden and Fu-shun, 
might try to envelop the Japanese right at Pen-si-hu, whilst 
closely engaging their front. In order that the enveloping 
movement might come as a surprise to the enemy, it should 
take place after his front had been attacked. Objections to 
this project would be that the Eussian armament was not 
well suited to hill warfare, for they had only three or four 
mountain batteries; that supply would be difficult; that 
movements in mountainous country are always slow, but 
are particularly so when opposed ; that the Japanese main 
line of communication was many miles distant, and that 
therefore to sever it would be difficult ; also that there would 
be risk of defeat in detail, for the enemy, whilst holding the 
Eussian left in the hills, might attack their centre, and 
envelop their right. 

Again, the Eussians might advance in three converging 
masses with the object of enveloping the enemy, though, 
having regard to the fighting power of the Japanese, they 


had hardly sufiBcient numerical preponderance to justify 
hopes that envelopment would be successful. Or, they 
might move in double echelon from their centre, holding 
back both wings, so as to meet and counter the enveloping 
tactics practised by the Japanese. Such procedure would 
lead to a desperate frontal battle, without prospect of de- 
cisive victory. 

The plan actually adopted by Kuropatkin was an attack 
on the Japanese right, for which the detachment of Staokel- 
berg was designated, the purpose of the movement being to 
draw the Japanese reserves in an easterly direction. This 
accomplished, the Eussian right and centre, which would 
have been withheld from close action, could, it was hoped, 
attack with success. 

To this plan it may be objected that the main operation, 
though to be directed against the troops covering the 
principal Japanese line of supply, was to be a mere frontal 
attack, and therefore more likely to be costly than decisive. 
Moreover, the Japanese might consider that an advance 
against the Eussian left, would afford more effective relief 
to their own right, than the direct despatch of reinforce- 
ments to this flank. 

(For positions of troops, see Appendix X, and Map 9.) 

In criticising the Eussian dispositions it may be remarked 
that it might have been more advantageous had Kuropatkin, 
instead of putting his reserve behind his centre, in position 
to directly reinforce either wing, added, from the beginning, 
one corps to his left wing, and placed two corps along the 
Sha-Ho to the east, and three corps to the west of the 
railway. The three groups could then have come into 
action, successively, from left to right, whilst the corps west 
of the railway could have outflanked the enemy's left. At 
the same time, such of his 17,000 cavalry as were not 
required for local protection, might, since the Japanese 
cavalry was not numerically formidable, have been formed 
into two masses of, say, 7000 and 10,000, the larger to operate 
against the Japanese right, the smaller against their left wing. 


The flank detachments should also, if not quite abolished, 
have been very much reduced in strength, so as to enable 
effort to be concentrated at the decisive point. 

The arrangement of the Japanese army may be criticised 
in the sense that it was perhaps better posted for a defensive 
battle covering Liao-Yang, than for the offensive movement 
which Oyama is said to have contemplated, for long marches 
to either flank would have to be made before the troops 
could be in position to initiate an enveloping movement, 

Oyama seems to have received early intimation of the 
enemy's projects. On September 28th, the actual date 
on which Kuropatkin issued his general plan of action, [with 
only a reservation that the time for its inception was to be 
notified later,] the Japanese commander-in-chief informed 
his army leaders that the Eussians might, at any moment, 
move in force against Ping-tai-tzu, and that arrangements 
must, therefore, be made against this contingency. 
October. Again, on October 2nd, a Eussian army order was pub- 
lished, and copied in the Press, announcing that the time 
had come for the Eussian army to take the offensive, and 
drive the enemy southwards. 

This may have been regarded by the Japanese as a blind, 
for in spite of this warning, they were in some degree sur- 
prised by the enemy's offensive. 

But, as happened throughout the war, the Eussian opera- 
tions were so slow and hesitating, that the Japanese, by a 
vigorous offensive, were able to deprive the enemy of his 
initial advantage. 

After severe fighting, the armies halted, exhausted and 
facing one another, on the banks of the Sha river, where 
they settled down, in close contact, to await— the Eussians 
the arrival of reinforcements, before again ilnder taking the 
offensive, the Japanese the release of their 3rd army by the 
capture of Port Arthur. (See Map 10.) 

The viceroy Alexiev was recalled soon after the Sha-Ho 
battle, leaving Kuropatkin free to direct operations, and to 
continue the work of organising the army. 







S s- 






For some months the Eussians devoted themselves to November 
reorganisation, and to the absorption of reinforcements. *"•*> 
Both sides also busily intrenched, and whilst bickering was 
frequent, it rarely assumed serious proportions, notwithstand- 
ing that the armies, in places, were not fifty yards apart. 

The first event, worthy of note, to happen in the winter January, 
was the fall of Port Arthur on January 1st, 1905. (For ^^o^- 
positions of the armies, see Appendix XI, and Map 11.) 

This occurrence made it certain that the Japanese would 
soon receive an accession of three or four divisions. The 
Eussians having now completed the organisation of their 
army, and being in sufficient numbers to warrant hope of a 
successful attack on the enemy, Kuropatkin seems, therefore, 
to have thought the moment propitious for an offensive, more 
especially because the political situation in Eussia was such 
as to render the government anxious for a victory. 

Two great obstacles stood in the way of active measures — 
the shortness of the days, and the coldness of the time of 

In spite of the rigorous climate, Kuropatkin decided to 
attack the Japanese, hoping, perhaps, that the Eussians, 
inured to cold, would support the inevitable hardships 
better than the enemy. 

Before taking the offensive, the Eussian leader, either 
with the object of discovering if any troops from Port 
Arthur had reached the armies, or to alarm the enemy as to 
his communications, sent round the Japanese left, a force of 
about fifty squadrons, with half a dozen batteries, and a few 
infantry, all under Mischenko. 

The raid ended on January 11th, and was so far suc- 
cessful, that the Eussians learnt that no troops of the 3rd 
army had reached Liao-Yang. 

Kuropatkin now resolved to roll up the Japanese left, 
but proposed to use for this purpose, only about 30,000 men, 
drawn from the 8th and 10th corps, the Eifle corps, and 
the 1st and 6th Siberian corps. 

There seems no doubt that, having regard to the frontage 


occupied by the two armies, the numerical superiority of 
the Eussians, some 100,000 men, and the strength of the 
Eussian front line, behind which manoeuvre should not have 
been difficult, Kuropatkin possessed the power to deal a 
serious blow on either flank. This the Japanese would find 
difficult to parry, unless troops were withdrawn from the 
first line, in which case there would be risk of the front 
being broken. 

The left flank of the Japanese was most inviting; here 
the country was not so difficult as were the eastward hills, 
the distance to be traversed by the Eussians would be less 
than would be required to turn the enemy's right, and the 
Japanese left was nearer their main line of communication. 
If, then, the left were broken, the enemy's line of supply 
would be in serious danger, and, in addition, it was believed 
that the Japanese did not anticipate an attack on this 

On the other hand, the Japanese reserves were thought 
to be standing near Yentai station, and therefore well 
placed to reinforce the left. 

Forewarned is forearmed, and a primary condition of 
success in war, is, therefore, that the enemy shall be misled, 
and that the blow, when delivered, shall come as a sur- 

The Eussians, however, neglected this rule, for, from 
January 13th onwards, the Eussian right began to show 
unusual activity, a balloon usually raised at Sha-ho-pu, 
moving westwards, whilst on 17th and 18th, cavalry occu- 
pied Ssu-fang-tai, west of Chan-tan. 

It may of course be said that these manoeuvres might 
have been a ruse to draw the enemy's attention westwards ; 
and this fact constitutes one of the great disadvantages of 
the defensive, in that the defender can rarely be certain 
whether the enemy's movements are a stratagem, or the 
prelude to an attack. 

But the Japanese possessed other information of the 
Eussian intentions, for, on the night of January 24th, six 


EuBsian soldiers, who surrendered to the Japanese in differ- 
ent portions of the frontage held by the armies — and such 
desertions were unfortunately frequent, especially amongst 
the Jews in the Czar's service — all reported that an attack 
would be made, on 26th, agaiast the Japanese left. 

In spite of this, the Japanese were somewhat taken 
aback, when, on 26th, the Eussians attacked, in force, the 
village of Hei-kou-tai. They were, however, driven back 
after three days' hard fighting. 

As at the Sha-Ho, the Eussians lost their initial advantage 
through the undue deliberation of their movements, and no 
serious operations took place against the Japanese front, to 
prevent reinforcement of the threatened point. 

The Japanese contented themselves with beating off the 
attack, probably, because they were unwilling to become in- 
volved in a decisive battle, before the arrival of the 3rd 

In the interval between the battle of Hei-kou-tai and that February, 
of Mukden, no stirring events occurred ; but, as a result of 
this action, both sides increased their fortified frontage, the 
Japanese continuing to hold Hei-kou-tai, and the neighbour- 
ing villages, in force, whilst the Eussians threw up in- 
trenchments west of Chan-tan. 

In other respects the Eussians do not seem to have 
altered their dispositions, but the arrival of the 3rd army, 
and the completion of Kawamura's 5th army, caused some 
changes to be made in the arrangement of the Japanese 
troops. (See Appendix XII, and Map 12.) 

The annual thaw, which usually begins early in March, 
and would render the rivers unfordable, and the roads and 
fields heavy, was now imminent. It was therefore to be pre- 
sumed, that, in spite of the cold, one or both commanders 
would assume the offensive in the interval, more especially 
since the Japanese, now that the 3rd army had arrived, 
could not, for some time at any rate, expect further rein- 

Towards the middle of February, the Eussians did decide 


again to attack the Japanese, and even before this date the 
latter had worked out a plan of attack. 

The experience of the Sha-Ho battle had taught the Eus- 
sians the local resisting power inherent in mountain positions, 
and whilst railways had been run to various portions of the 
Eussian frontage, thus facilitating supply, none had been 
laid far into the mountains south of Fu-shun. The feeding 
of a large force in this locality would therefore have de- 
manded quantities of transport, which could probably only 
be procured with difficulty. Moreover, to have turned the 
Japanese right, would have required a long detour, for 
Kawamura's army was some distance east of Pen-si-hu ; and 
success, if attained, would probably have been local rather 
than decisive, for the enemy's line of communication lay 
many miles from the 5th army. Attack on the right was 
also apparently expected by the enemy, for, according to 
Kuropatkin's information, the bulk of the 3rd army had been 
sent to Kawamura. Then, again, the armament of the 
Eussian army, possessing as it did but few mountain guns, 
was not well suited to hill warfare ; and lastly, if he moved 
a number of troops eastwards, Kuropatkin would, in some 
degree, uncover his own communications, and render himself 
liable to counter-attack west of Mukden. 

On the other hand, the position of the Eussian reserves, 
the alignment of the auxiliary railways, the armament of 
the Eussians, their preponderance in cavalry, and the level 
nature of the country, would facilitate operations against 
the Japanese left. By adopting this plan, Kuropatkin 
would be retaining the bulk of his army near Mukden, and 
his line of communication, and it might reasonably be 
hoped that Kawamura's advance would be sufficiently long 
retarded, to enable decisive success to be gained against 
the Japanese left; though here would be met the enemy's 

Kuropatkin, therefore, decided to attack the Japanese left, 
but without attempting envelopment, the intention being, 
apparently, to crush the enemy by weight of numbers, about 


three corps being used for the offensive, whilst the remainder 
kept their positions. 

This plan may be characterised as a half-measure, and it 
would have been wiser to have withdrawn certainly one, 
probably better still two corps, from the strongly fortified 
frontage, and to have placed a mass of four or five corps 
west of the Hun, covered by 10,000 or 15,000 cavalry. The 
enemy's right and front might then have been attacked, and 
when these had been closely engaged, the stroke might have 
been launched against their left. 

The Japanese, however, had already adopted a formation 
calculated to at once meet envelopment by the enemy, or 
shouM he remain on the defensive, to facilitate the enclos- 
ing of his forces; the 3rd army being placed behind the 
left, the 5th behind the right flank. They had moreover 
decided to assume the offensive, on February 20th, their 
plan, apparently, stopping short at nothing less than the 
envelopment of the Eussians, the 5th army operating 
against the enemy's left, the 3rd army against his right. 

In order, however, to deceive the enemy as to their 
intentions, and to induce him to send his reserves eastwards, 
thus facilitating the deployment of the 3rd army, Kawamura 
was to move first. 

This stratagem succeeded, and to it the Japanese were 
a good deal beholden for their victory. 

That the Japanese plan was rather beyond the capacity 
of their forces, is shown by the event. 

In these circumstances, it would probably have been better 
to have reduced Kawamura's strength, and added these 
troops, as well as the general reserve, which was retained 
behind the centre far into the battle, to the 3rd army. 

This army would then have comprised about five divisions, 
and its operations would probably have been decisive. 

By withdrawing cavalry from the divisions of the 2nd and 
4th armies, where it had not much scope, a larger mass 
might also have been placed on the left, with advantage 
to the Japanese operations. 


THE strategical lessons of the Eusso-Japanese war are 
those which throughout history have clamoured for 
recognition, but have never, apparently, been thoroughly 

Often governments have courted disaster by living in the 
present, by disregarding future possibilities, and by pur- 
suing, regardless of consequences, policies likely to end in 

So Eussia, hypnotised by the vastness of her empire, and 
encour^Mby the exaggerated fear of her actions displayed 
by certain European ministries, embarked thoughtlessly on 
an ni-considered policy of expansion. This brought her 
face to face with an apparently we^ak, buLdetermined_foe, 
whose ve^y existence was threatened by Eussian preten- 

Eussia's policy, in this particular, outst ripped her stratfigx, 
that is, her forces were not in position to liHpose her wishes, 
should they lead to conflict with Japan. 

As a result, the great northern power paid the usual 
penalty for unpreparedness, bad organisation, and unsou nd 
distribution of force. She lost the initiative, was obliged to 
conform to the operations of^ the enemy, and to push into 
the front line, as they arrived in the theatre of war, a 
heterogeneous collection of units, who were without cohesion. 

As always happens in such circumstances, councils were 
divided, plajis hastily arranged, and as hastily abandoned, 
generals Tiad_ no confidence in one another, nor in their 
men, and the troops, sharing this feeling, mistrusted their 



Even when projects promised success, they were marred 
by faulty execution. 

Fighting as they were in the midst of a semi-hostile 
population, and dep endent t o a great extent onjheir single 
line of_railway to Europe, the Eussians were also, from the 
first, forced to make l arge detachments to guard their com- 
munications, as to the security of which they were naturally 

Eussia was therefore obliged J:q_accgptdef eat from a 
weaker nation, who, through careful preparation, and sound 
OTganisation, which go far to ensure succesrin war; and 
with the help of judicious alliances, was able to beat a more 
powerful rival. 

Neither wealth, resources, .numbers^of •f>&pulatiQn, nor 
PY§a arme d force , are therefore decisive factors in war. 
More important than these are foresight, preparation, and 

Eussia's pol icy of expansion was not_ national ; it was 
rather the policy of a few ambitious men. The support 
of the natioja,^ an. important. Atem_in_w^ was therefore 
lacking, and the soldiers went to the front unwillingly, or 
even under compulsion. 

Consequently, though the Eussians fought well, they 
fou ght wi thout enthusiasm, and their generals could not 
rely on this factor. But the Japanese people entered heart 
and soul into the ^ntest, inspiring their soldiers to noble 

The difficulty of remedying errors in initial deployment 
is clearly shown by the course of the campaignT^ The Eus- 
sians never overcame the original drawback of their local 
weaknessj the Japanese laboured, throughout^ under TEe 
disadvantage inherent in the false strategy of pursuing a 
double objective, unless possessed of great preponderance 
of force. 

The Japanese plan was faulty, in that effort was not con- 
centrated against the decisive point, whilst the projects were 
somewhat beyond the capacity of the national resources. 


Not only was the power of resistance of the Eussian 
troops quartered in Manchuria esteemed too lightly, but 
the transporting capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway was 
also undervalued. 

Nor was war declared at the most favourable moment, 
from a military and meteorological point of view. " 

Want of foresight, too, was displayed in not sufficiently 
discou nting the influence jof the climatic and topographical 
conditions in HancEuna, which undoubtedly delayed the 
Japanese operations, to the advantage of the Eussians. 

Still, vigorous execution^ enabled the nation to achieve a 
considerable success; the movements of the armies were 
successfully co-ordinated in such a manner as to afford one 
another support; and the menace of the 1st army to the 
Eussian line of communication produced the expected 

The whole course of the operations, in fact, again proves 
that it is not so much ability to plan, as resolution to carry 
through^ that is required to make successful war ; though, 
naturally, a good plan, well executed, is the ideal to be 

Comjnand of _the sea also proved a valuable asset to 
Japan, in forcing~Eussia to strongly guard the fortress of 
Vladivostock, and in causing her generals to be diffident of 
risking troops in the Liao-tung peninsula. 

The value and importance of the initiative is another 
lesson of the war. 

He who is obHgedJ;o|£no]^hejenmj^lead£eases to be 
a free agent, a fact which adversely affects his judgment, 
rendering him weak and vacillating. 

The initiative does not belong in perpetuity to the 
assailant, to him who first attacks, for the defender, by an 
early counter-stroke, may reverse the positions. 

Circumstances will not always permit a belligerent to 
attack first, but it is to be remembered that the longer the 
initiative is left to the opponent, the greater become his 
chances of success. 


"^^^ strong and weak points of e nveloping st rategy stand 
out clearly. There is no magic, calculated to ensure success, 
in enveloping strategy, that is, in converging movements on 
several lines of operation. Far from it, this form of war is 
the most risky, and the general who adopts exterior lines, 
deliberately, or of necessity, separates his forces, affording 
the opponent the desired opportunity of beating them in 

But converging .movements favour e nvelop ment, and en- 
velopment, if successful, is decisive, a fact which tempts 
commanders to run the risks its inception entails. 

War would be fairly easy were the game played, even 
blindfold, on a chessboa rd: with no factors of weather, or 
topography, to disturb calculations; with men of wood, not 
delicate human beings, with which to make moves ; and with 
full knowledge of the enemy's dispositions. 

It is the presence of these disturbingelements that makes 
war so difficult an art; Iot even in countries with settled 
cUmates, the influence of weather on the health of the men, 
or on the mobility of the army, may, at any moment, pre- 
judice the best-laid plans. 

But a more variable factor, even than weather, is human 
nature, and if a wide margin must be left to allow for the 
'effect of climate, a wider is required to discount human 
eccent ricities. 

If ignorance of the enemj's jgosition and movements be 
added to the plot, it is clear that no plan of operations, 
npt ela stic, ha s great chance of success. 

Kuro patkin's wavering attitude may have, and probably 
did, influence, that of his subordinate generals, but it cannot 
be said that they executed his plans with the spirit he had 
the right to expect. Yet generous_eo;;Ogeration^is one of the 
foundations of success in war. 

It'is notj at present, easy to say how much or how little 
either commander was influenced by political pressure, and 
to what extent the course to be pursued, was dictated from 
localities far from the seat of war. 


The general policy to be followed in war rests with the 
National Government^ but interference in the details of the 
conduct of a campaign cannot but lead to disaster, as his- 
tory has shown time and again. 

Training for war is an important part of peace prepara- 
tion, but is, owing to the innate conservatism of human 
nature, perhaps the most difficult portion of 'what maybe 
called peace strategy. 

Men's minds habitually seek refuge in rules, vainly hoping 
thereby to solve life's difficulties and dilemmas. As a 
result, though formalism spells ruin in war, the Russians 
certainly, the Japanese in some"degree, were found behind 
modern rec[uirements in their training, and both paid for 
their fault by useless sacrifice of life. The difficulty of 
keeping training up to date lies mainly in the fact that it is 
not possible, in peace, to pronounce definitely on the in- 
fluence that will be exercised by improvements in armament. 
Moreover, officers and men dislike the trouble of changing 
methods in which they have been trained, and which may, 
in the past, have stood the test of war. 

A lesson of this_war is thafif a sound plan vigorously 
execuEeT is the foundation, good information is the keystone 
of military success. An efficient service of intelligence 
cannot be improvised, it must be carried on by men whose 
minds have been trained in these matters. Of this the 
Japanese were aware, and though, in some respects, their 
topographical information was faulty, their intelligence 
service in Europe, combined with a local system of spies, 
who were assisted by the friendly Chinese population, usually 
afforded early and accurate news of the enemy's dispositions 
and intentions. 

The Russian intelligence department is said to have been 
ill organised ; and it is even stated that few, if any, officers 
at Russian headquarters were able to read the Japanese 
writing, and that documents which fell into their hands 
could not therefore be deciphered. 

In contrast, too, to the silence of the Japanese press, the 


Eussian newspapers published details of the mobilisation of 
troops, and the despatch of reinforcements, which laid bare 
to the enemy the strength of the opposing army. 

Lastly, the great d ifficulty of war is demonstrated by the 
failure of the Eussian leader in this campaign. 

Kuropatkin was n o fool as judged by or dinary standards. 
To those who knew him he appeared a clever, cultured 
man, well read in military literature. He was reckoned 
resolute, he possessed much of that war experience which 
is rated so high, and had distinguished himself on service. 

He seemed, therefore, to possess the qualifications required 
in a general. Yet he failed. The weight of responsibility 
was too great for him, and, in reality, he lacked the character 
to carry through his plans, and to d ominate the will of his 

Character may be an inborn quality, like strength of arm, 
or swiftness of foot, but character can be formed and 
developed, and " to teac h taste is inevitably jo^formjcharac- 
ter." But if there has been acquired the ambition to 
labour to perfect knowledge and judgment ; the will to over- 
come difficulties not to be beaten by them ; the sentiment 
that "nothing has been done whilst anything remains un- 
done, and that to fail is better than not to attempt"; a great 
step will have been made towards the formation of a 
character fit to take command, should fortune so shape the 



A Normal Army Corps consisted of — 

Two infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and corps 
An Infantry Division included — 

Two brigades, each of two, four-battalion regiments; one 
artillery brigade of six or eight batteries, each of eight 
guns; and an engineer company. 1 :J '''<'••■'■'•- 

"^ A cavalry division comprised two brigades, each of two, six- 
squadron regiments, with two horse batteries. Total: 3000-3500 
sabres or lances, and 12 guns. 

Total strength of an army corps : about 28,000 rifles, 3500 
sabres, 124 guns. ' 

Of the corps that took part in the war, the following, which 
belonged to the active European army, were approximately of the 
above strength: 1st, 4th, 10th, 16th, 17th. 

The 5th and 6th Siberian Corps were composed of European 
reserve units, and numbered 28,000 rifles and 96 guns. 

The 4th Siberian Corps was made up of Siberian reserve units, 
and possessed 28,000 rifles and 64 guns. 

The 2nd Siberian Corps included East Siberian troops, and 
reserve units, and possessed 27,000 rifles and 80 guns. 

The 1st and 3rd Siberian Corps were formed in Eastern Siberia 
before the war, and numbered 22,000 rifles and 80 guns. 
\\ None of the Siberian corps had special corps cavalry, but 
It Cossack divisions, and smaller units, were attached to them as 
> > required. 

Armambnt. — That of the artillery was of a heterogeneous nature. 
About one-third of the field batteries possessed a modem 3 in. Q.F. 
gun, with shield; firing a practically smokeless powder, and throwing 
a shrapnel up to 6000 yards with time fuse, and 7000 yards with 
percussion fuse. The remainder of the field guns were principally 



muzzle-loading weapons, of 3-42 calibre. Tljere were a ;few_ 
mountain guns, and a proportion* of Keavy artillery and howitzers. 

The cavah^r carried sword, a rifle similar to that of the infantry, 
sometimes a bayonet, and the front rank had, also, usually a lance. 
Of rifle ammunition, 45 rounds were on the man, and 24 rounds 
in the regimental transport. 

The infantry weapon was a '3 charger-loading rifle, each charger 
holding five cartridges. The rifle was sighted to 2100 yards, and 
weighed nine pounds. Each man carried 120 rounds in his 
pouches, bandolier, and kit bag. 

Equipmbnt and Eations. — Each infantry man had usually, on 
his person, biscuit and salt for t wo and a half days ; and eighty men 
per company were equipped with spades!~ llie total weight 
carried by the infantry soldier, including clothing, was sixty 
pounds. ' 

DT reserve rations, there were, in Vladivostock and district, at 
the begiiohiiig 6i Ihe war, three months' supplies; in the Port 
Arthur command, twelve months' food ; and eight months' in the 
Siberian military district. 

Enginkers. — Pontoon units had from 300-400 yards of bridg- 
ing material, and many engineer companies possessed a light field 

The European companies had forty miles of cable and wire, and 
there were four East Siberian telegraph companies, each with six- 
teen miles of wire. There were also, in the army, three telegraph 
companies with Marconi wireless equipment, for maintenance of 
communication between the Commander-ia-Chief and army com- 

Machine Guns. — Several divisions had eight-gun machine-gun 

Mounted Soouts. — Most divisions possessed companies of 
mounted scouts. 




The army was organised on a territorial system. There were 
thirteen districts, each furnishing one division, and one Kobi 

Four new divisions, and Kobi brigades, were raised in 190jL_ 

A division included two brigades, each of two, three-battaUon 
regiments ; one cavalry regiment ; six, six-gun batteries ; and three 
companies of engineers. 

Total: 11,400 rifles, 430 sabres, 36 guns, 830 engineers. 

The 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th divisions had mountain 
guns only; the 7th division had half field and half mountain guns; 
the remainder possessed field guns. 

A Kobi brigade consisted of two, two-battalion regiments, and 
numbered 3500 rifles. 

A mixed Kobi brigade was composed of one infantry brigade of 
two, threfrK,ttalion regiments ; three batteries ; and one company of 
engineers. Total: 5000 rifles, ? sabres, 18 guns, 280 engineers. 

An artillery brigade^ consisted of three regiments, each of six, 
six-guiTlBattMwir ' \ C"''^'' '^'^'^^"^ 

A cavalry brigade comprised two regiments, of four squadrons 

Armament. — The field and mountain guns were of the same 
calibre — 2 '95 inches. Both fired a practically smokeless powder, 
and the field gun ranged to about 5000 yards. After the Sha-Ho 
battle, the field gims were provided with shields. 

There were batteries of 4'72 howitzers, and heavy guns of 
various kinds. 

The artillery carried both shrapnel, and high explosive shell. 

The cavalry were armed with a sword, and with a carbine 
sighted to 1500 yards. 

The infantry possessed a rifle of -256 calibre, sighted to 2280 
yards, weighing about eight and a half pounds, and loaded by 
means of a charger carrying five cartridges. 

Of ammunition, 150 rounds were supposed to be on the man, 
and 60 rounds on the ammunition mules. 


Eations, etc. — Each man had, on his person, two days' rations ; 
and two-thirds of the men carried an intrenching tool strapped to 
the knapsack. 

Enqinbbks. — The bridging sections possessed 153 yards of 
bridge, and a telegraph section had 36 miles of air line and 

Machine Guns. — In 1904-5 each division was given fourteen 
Hotchkiss guns. These were organised into two six-gun batteries, 
and one two-gun section. 





1st division, 1st Kobi brigade 
Guard, Guard Kobi brigade . 
2nd division, '2nd Kobi brigade 
3rd division, 3rd Kobi brigade 
4th division, 4th Kobi brigade 
5th division, 5th Kobi brigade 
6th division, 6th Kobi brigade 
7th division, 7th Kobi brigade 
8th division, 8th Kobi brigade 
9th division, 9th Kobi brigade 
10th division, 10th Kobi brigade 
11th division, 11th Kobi brigade 
12th division, 12th Kobi brigade 
Depot troops in addition. 
Grand total: 245,000 rifles, 10,500 sabres, 

, Hijemi. 

828 guns, 14,000 


Vladivostock (Ussuri) district 
1st, 2nd, 6tli, 8th East Siberian rifle brigades. 
2nd brigade of the 31st division. 
2nd brigade of the 35th division. 
Two regiments of cavalry. 
One engineer battalion. 
Fourteen batteries. 
Fortress troops. 
Railway troops. 

Field troops 
Fortress troops . 
Railway troo^DS . 

Total .... 40,500 1,500 112 

Kuan-tung peninsula, and Southern Manchuria 

3rd, 4th, and 7th East Siberian rifle brigades. 
Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade. 
One engineer battalion. 
Five batteries. 
Fortress troops. 
















Field troops 




Fortress troops . 




Total . 




On the ' 

railway • 

south of Harbin 

5th East Siberian rifle 


One cavalry brigade. 

Two batteries. 

Railway troops. 




Field troops 

. 5,500 



Railway troops 

. 7,500 




. 13,000 




Russians {continued) 
Grand total. Rifles. Sabres. Field Guns. 

Field troops . . . 60,000 4,200 164 

Fortress troops 
Railway troops 
Frontier guards 

Total . 

6,000 — — 

11,000 — — 

13,500 8,000 48 

90.500 12,200 212 



South of Wi-ju, and Ghang-syong 
1st army, general Baron Kuroki. 
Guard division. 
2nd division. 
12tli division. 

Rifles. Sabres. 
Total . . 33,500 1,000 




Under general Oku, in transports. 
1st division. 

3rd division. 

4tli division. 

Half an artillery brigade. 

Rifles. Sabres. 
Total . . 33,500 1,000 



Grand total . 67,000 2,000 




Towards Shan-hai-huan 


Rifles. Sabres. 

General Kossagovski. 1,400 250 


Russians (continued) 

Neighbourhood of Ldao-Yang 
5th East Siberian, rifle division. 
1st Siberian infantry division. 
One brigade 10th corps. 
One brigade 17th corps. 
Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade. 
Twelve squadrons Cossacks. 
Six companies engineers. 

Rifles. Sabres. 


Total .... 27,500 4,300 


Near Ying-how 

1st and 9th East Siberian rifle divisions. 

Six squadrons dragoons. 

One battalion engineers. 

Teh-li-tzu, and Pu-lan-tien 

One brigade, five squadrons, and one horse battery. 

Rifles. Sabres. 


Total .... 20,000 700 


Near An-tung, and Ta-ku-shan 

Lieutenant-general Zasulitch. 

3rd and 6th East Siberian divisions. 

Mischenko's Cossacks. 

Rifles. Sabres. 


Total .... 18,000 2,900 


East of Kuan-tien-hsien 
Colonel Madridov. 
Two squadrons and two companies of mounted scouts. 

Port Arthur, and neighbourhood 

4th East Siberian rifle division. 

7th East Siberian rifle division. 

Two companies engineers. 

Three battalions fortress troops. 

One squadron. 

Rifles. Sabres. Field guns. 

Total .... 25,500 120 64 


Russians {continued) 

Vladivostoek and district 
2nd East Siberian rifle division. 
8th East Siberian riile division. 
Ussuri cavalry brigade. 
Fortress troops. 

Total . . . 21,500 



Field guns. 

Field troops . . . 67,000 
In fortresses . . . 47,000 
Railway and frontier troops 24,500 



Field Guns. 




Grand total . . 138,500 





Feng-huang-cheng, and Ai-yang-pien-meng 
27th may. 
1st army, general Baron Kuioki. 
Guard division. 
2nd division. 

12 th. division. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. 

Total . . 30,000 1,000 128 2,000 

Nanshan, Pu-lan-tien, Torsha river, 

and Yen-ta-kou. 

2nd army, general Baron Oku. 

1st division. 

3rd division. 

4th division. 

5th division. 

11th division. 

1st cavalry brigade. 

An artillery brigade (less one regiment). 

Rifles. Sabres. 

Guns. Engineers 

Total . . 55,000 3,200 

234 4,000 



Japanese (continued) 


Nucleus of the ith army. 

10th division. 

Rifles. Sabres. 

Guns. Engineers. 

Total . 

11,000 400 

36 300 

Grand total . 

96,000 4,600 

398 6,300 


Towards Shan-hai-kuan 

27th may. 

General Kossogovski. 





Liao-Tang and neighbourhood 
5th East Siberian rifle division. 
2nd brigade 31st division, 10th corps. 
2nd brigade 35th division, 17th corps. 
Portions of 2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions. 
Various Cossack and artillery units. 





South of Wa-fang-tien. 
Major-general Samsonov. 



Ying-kow, Kai-chou, Hai-cheng, and neighbourhood 
Lieutenant-general Stackelberg. 
1st East Siberian rifle division. 
9th East Siberian rifle division. 
Part of 2nd Siberian reserve division. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total . . . 27,500 200 80 



EussiANS (continued) 

North of Feng-huang-cheng 

Lieutenant-general Count Keller. 

Srd East Siberian rifle division. 

6th East Siberian rifle division. 

Part of 2nd Siberian reserve division. 

One Cossack regiment and horse battery. 








Major-general Eennenkamf. 







East of Sai-ma-cM 

Colonel Madridov. 

Eifles and Sabres. 



Major-general Mischenko. 





Port Arthur, and Nan-shan 

Lieutenant-general Stoessel. 



Field Guns. 





Lieutenant-general Linevitch. 



Field Guns. 






Field Guns. 

Field troops . . . 82,500 



In fortresses . . . 47,500 



Eailway and frontier 

guards . . . 34,300 



Grand total . . 164,300 






Advancing from Feng-huang-cheng, and Ai-yang-pien-meng 

15th JUNE. 
1st army, general Baron Kuroki. 
Guard division (less Asada brigade). 
2nd division. 

12tli division. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. 

Total . . 25,000 1,000 128 2,500 

North of Torku-shan, and at Hsui-yen 
4th army, general Kawamura. 
lOth division. 
Asada brigade of Guards. 

Eiflea. Sabres. 



Total . . 16,500 400 




2nd army, general Baron Oku. 

3rd division. 

4tli division. 

5tli division. 

1st cavalry brigade. 

Artillery brigade. 

6th division (coming up). 

Rifles. Sabrea. 



Total . . 45,000 2,800 



Advancing on Port Arthur 
3rd army, general Baron Nogi. 
1st division. 
1 1th division. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guna. Engineers. 

Total . . 23,000 430 72 1,600 

Grand total . 109,500 4,6.i0 488 7,900 




Liao-Yang, and Mukden 
15th JUNE 

Portions of 1st brigade, 31st diYision, and of Isfc Siberian 


Cossack and artUlery units. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total .... 12,500 1,500 46 

Torshih-cMao, Hai-cheng, and Ying-kow 

Bulk of 4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve 

2nd brigade 31st division. 

Biflea. Sabres. Guns. 

Total .... 21,000 2,200 54 

Towards Shan-Jiai-kuan 
General Kossogovski. 



Sabrea. Guns. 
250 8 

Feng-shui-ling range 

Lieutenant-general Count Keller. 

3rd East Siberian rifle division. 

Part of 6th East Siberian rifle division. 

One Cossack regiment, and one horse battery. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total .... 12,600 600 54 

Major-general Eennenkamf. 

Total . 


Sabres. Guns. 
2,200 16 

Lieutenant-colonel Madridov. 

Total . 


Sabres. Guns. 
1,000 4 


EussiANS (continued) 

Ghi-pan-Ung, Ta-Ung 

Major-general Mischenko. 

Part of the 4th Siberian corps. 

Cossacks, and horse guns. 




Total .... 10,500 



Lieutenant-general Stackejberg. 
1st East Siberian rifle division. 
9th East Siberian rifle division. 
2nd brigade 35th division. 
Cossack units. 




Total . 

. 27,000 



Port Arthur 

Lieutenant-general Stoessel. 



Field Guns. 

Total . 

. 25,500 




Lieutenant-general Linevitch. 




Total . 

. 22,000 





Field Guns. 

Field troops 

. 89,300 



In fortresses, etc. . 

. 47,500 



Railway, etc., guards . 

. 34,300 



Grapd total . 

. 171,100 






Motien-ling, and North Feng-shui-ling 
30th JUNE. 
1st army, geneial Baron Kuroki. 
Guard division (less Asada brigade). 
2nd division. 
12th division. 
Umezawa's mixed Kobi brigade. 

Rifles. Sabres. Gud3. Engineers. 

Total . . 30,000 1,000 152 2,600 

Chi-pan-ling, and Ta-ling 

4tli army, general Count Nodzu. 

10th division. 

Asada brigade of Guards. 

10th Kobi brigade. 





Total . . 21,000 




Near Kai-chou 

2nd army, general Baron Oku. 

3rd division. 

4th division. 

5th division. 

6th division. 

1st cavalry brigade. 

An artillery brigade. 





Total . . 45,000 





3rd army, general Baron Nogi. 

1st division. 

11th division. 

One or two Kobi brigades. 





Total . . 26,000 




Grand total 122,000 4,680 530 8,400 



Ldao-Tang, and Mukden 
30th JUNE. 

Various detachments. 

Rifles. Sabres. 


8,000 1,500 


Harbin, and Kirin 

Rifles. Sabres. 


3,000 400 


Towards Shan-Jmi-huan 
General Kossogovski. 

Rifles. Sabres. Gnns. 

1,500 250 8 

Chao-tao, and North Feng-ehui-lmg 

Major-general Eennenkamf. 

Rifles. Sabres. Gnns. 

3,500 2,200 26 

West of Mo-tien-ling 
Lieutenant-general Count Keller. 

Portions of the Srd and 6th East Siberian rifle divisions. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total . . 6,500 600 24 

On route to 





Lieutenant-colonel Madridov. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

700 1,000 4 


EussiANS (continued) 

Tang-chi, GM-pan-Ung, and Ta-ling 
Major-general Mischenko. 
Part of 4tli Siberian corps. 
2nd brigade 35th division. 
Cossacks and horse guns. 

Bayonets. Sabres. 


Total . . 16,000 1,800 


South of Kai-ehou 

Major-general Samsonov. 

Sabres. Guns. 

3,000 12 

Kai-chou, and Ying-kow 

Lieutenant-general Stackelberg. 

1st East Siberian rifle division. 

9th East Siberian rifle division. 

Cossacks and horse guns. 

Rifles. Sabres. 


Total . . 29,000 750 


Lieutenant-general Zasulitch. 

Portions of 5th and 6th East Siberian rifle divisions. 
Cossacks and horse guns. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total . . 10,500 1,500 46 

Hai-cheng, and Ta-sMh-ehiao 
Lieutenant-general Zarubaiev. 
Portions of 4th Siberian corps and of 31st division. 


Rifles. Sabres. Guns, 

Total . . 24,000 800 160 



Field Guns. 

Field troops . 109,200 



In Fortresses, etc. 47,500 



Eail way and frontier 

guards . . 34,300 



191,000 28,920 624 




Attacking the Russian positions at Tu-shu-lin-tzu, Pen-ling, and 

31sT JULY. 
1st army, general Baron Kuroki. 
Guard division. 
2nd division. 
12th division. 

TJmezawa brigade. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. 

Total . . 36,000 1,000 152 2,000 

South of Hsi-mu-cTieng 

4tli army, general Count Nodzu. 

5th division. 

10th division. 

10th Kobi brigade. 

Eifles. Sabres. 



Total . . 25,000 850 



Ta-shih-chiao, and south of Hai-cheng 
2nd army, general Baron Oku. 
3rd division. 
4th division. 
5th division. 
1st cavalry brigade. 
Artillery brigade. 

Eifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. 

Total . . 33,000 2,400 216 2,400 

Besieging Port Arthur 
3rd army, general Baron Nogi. 
1st division. 
9th division. 
11th division. 

Two or three Kobi brigades. 
Naval brigade. 
Siege train. 

Eifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. 

Total . . 45,000 450 378 1,600 

Grand total . 139,000 4,700 836 7,000 



Near Kovrpang-tzu 
31sT JULY. 

General Kossogovski. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

1,500 250 8 

Liao-Yang, MuMen, Kirin, Harbin 
Garrison and drafts. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 
15,600 2,10 64 

An-ping, Yu-shu-lin-tzu, and Pen-ling 
Lieutenant-general Sluchevski. 
10th corps (9th and part of 31st divisions). 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total . . 22,500 750 88 

To-wan, in Lan valley 
Lieutenant-general Count Keller. 
3rd East Siberian rifle division. 
6th East Siberian rifle division. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total . . 17,000 1,750 72 

Major-general Lubavin. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

2,000 1,000 12 

East of Pen-Bi-hu 
Lieutenant-colonel Madridov. 

Rifles. Sabrea. Guns. 

1,500 1,000 8 

Marching eastwards from Liao-Yang 

Part of 17th corps. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

11,500 750 72 





Russians (continued) 


of Hai-cheng 

Major-general Mischenko. 

Cossack brigades. 







Hai-cheng and neighbourhood 
Lieutenant-general Stackelberg. 

1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian divisions.) 
Lieutenant-general Zasulitch. 
2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division). 
Lieutenant-general Zarubaiev. 

4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions). 
Part of 31st division. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total . . 60,000 1,700 234 



Field Guns. 

Field troops 




In fortresses, etc. 




On railways, etc. 




213,300 29,300 782 



East of the ridge dividing the lower portions of the Lan and 

Tan rivers 
25th august. 

1st army, general Baron Kuroki. 
Guard division. 

2nd division. 

12th division. 

Umezawa brigade. 
A Kobi brigade. 

Total . 






Japanese {contirvued) 
Shan-in-tzai, and towards Hai-eheng 

4th army, general Count Nodzu. 
5th. division. 
10th division. 
10th Kohi brigade. 
20th Kobi brigade. 

Total . 







Between Hai-cheng and An-shan-tien 

2nd army, general Baron Oku. 

3rd division. 

dth division. 

6th division. 

2nd Kobi brigade. 

Artillery brigade. 

1st cavalry brigade. 

Total . 





Besieging Port Arthur 

3rd army, general Baron Nogi 


Grand total 




147,000 4,900 900 9,100 


Tai-t»u R., Kung-shan-ling, An-ping, etc. 
25th august. 
General Bilderling. 

10th European corps (general Sluchevski). 
I7th European corps. 
3rd Siberian corps (general Ivanov). 
2nd cavalry brigade (general Lubavin). 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total. . 53,000 4,200 330 


Russians (continued) 
Mukden, Kirin, Harbin 
Garrisons and drafts. 

Eifles. Sabres. 
20,000 350 



Towards Ta-wan, on Liao B. 

General Kossogovski. 

Eifles. Sabres. 
1,500 250 


Hast of Pen-si-hu 

Lieutenant-colonel Madridov. 

Eifles. Sabres. 
3,000 650 


An-shan-tien, Sha-Ho village 

Lieutenant-general Stackelberg. 

1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian divisions). 

Lieutenant-general Zasulitch. 

2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division and part of 71st 

Lieutenant-general Zarubaiev. 

4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions). 
Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade. 
Ural Cossack brigade. 
Siberian Cossack division. 

Eifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total. . 50,000 7,000 200 

Liao- Yang and neighbourhood 
Lieutenant-general Dembovski. 
5th Siberian corps (5th and part of 71st divisions). 
35th division. 
General Samsonov's cavalry 

Eifles. Sabres. Gnns. 

Total. . 30,000 4,000 80 


Russians (continued) 

Kifles. Sabres. Field Guns. 

Field troops . . 157,500 16,450 666 

Fortresses, etc. . 47,500 4,000 128 

Railway, etc. . 34,300 11,000 48 

239,300 31,450 842 



South of Yemtai coal mines, Ping-tai-tzu, etc. 
1st army, general Baron Kuroki. 
Guards division. 

2nd division. 

12th division. 

Umezawa's brigade. 

2nd cavalry brigade. 





Total . 





Lor^i-pu to Nan-tai, but bulk still south of the Tai-tzu 
4th army, general Count Nodzu. 
5th division. 

10th division. 

10th Kobi brigade. 

20th Kobi brigade. 


Total . . 25,000 

Sabres. Guns. 
300 170 


Nan-tai to Shan-tai-tzu, but some 

troops still south 

of the Tai-tzu 

2nd army, general Baron Oku. 

3rd division. 

4th division. 

6 th division. 

1st cavalry brigade. 

Artillery brigade. 


Total . . 35,000 

Sabres. Guns. 
2,600 138 



Japanese (continued) 
Besieging Port Arthur 
3rd army, general Baron Nogi. 





Total . 


Tang ' 



General reserve. 

2nd KoM brigade. 

3rd Kobi brigade. 

nth Kobi brigade. 

Two artillery brigades. 









Grand total 






Advancing on and between the Fu-shun to Wei-ning-ying, and 
the Fu-ling to Ping-tai-tzu roads 
Eastern force. 

Lieutenant-general Stackelberg. 

1st Siberian corps (1st and 9tb East Siberian rifle divisions). 
2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian rifle division, and part 

of 54th division). 
3rd Siberian corps (3rd and 6th East Siberian rifle divisions). 

Moving on Hsiao-chia-ho-tzu 
General Eennenkamf 's detachment. 

Eifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total . . 60,000 7,000 194 

Guarding left flank as far as Sai-ma-chi and 
Hsing-ching-ting road 
Colonel Madridov, and others. 

Eifles. Sabres. Guns. 

3,500 1,800 32 


RtrssiANS (continued) 
Guarding right flank as far as Liao river 
Detachments of generals Dembowski and Kossogovski. 
Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

11,000 3,000 48 

Advancing southwards astride the railway 
Western force. 
General Bilderling. 

10th army corps (9th and 31st divisions). 
17th army corps (3rd and 35th divisions). 
Part of Orenburg Cossack division. 

West of the Hun Ho 
5th army corps (portions of 71st and 54th divisions). 
Eifles. Sabres. Guns, 

Total . . 50,000 4,500 222 

South of Mukden 
General reserve. 

4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions). 
1st corps (22nd and 27th divisions). 
6th Siberian corps (55th and 72nd divisions). 

In touch with enemy 

Mischenko's cavalry. 




Total . 






Field Guns. 

Field troops 




Fortresses, etc. . 




Railways, etc. 




258.500 34,500 998 



(See Map 11) 


From south of Hua-ling to Tung-kow 
1st JANUARY, 1905. 
1st army, general Baron Kuroki. 
Guard division. 
2nd division. 
12th division. 
Umezawa brigade. 
Two Kobi brigades. 

Rifles. Sabres. Gune. Engineers. 

Total . . 44,000 1,200 180 3,000 

Pvrtsao-yai to Putilov hill 

ith. army, general Count Nodzu. 

lOth division. 

Two or three Kobi brigades. 


Rifles. Sabres. 



Total . . 20,000 600 



Kvrchia-tzu, to Ta-tai 

Cavalry to Hei-koiirtai 

2nd army, general Baron Oku. 

3rd division. 

4th division. 

6th division. 

1st cavaby brigade. 


Rifles. Sabres. 



Total . . 33,000 2,400 




Japanese (ecmiinued) 

East of Pen-si-hu 
Snd cavalry brigade. 

Sabres. Guns. 
1,500 6 

Near Ten-tai station, and at Lang-tung-kou 
General reserve. 
5tli division. 
8th division. 
Four or five Kobi brigades. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. 

Total . . 40,000 800 108 850 

Besieging Port Arthur 

3rd army, general Baron Nogi. 

1st division. 

7tli division. 

9tli division. 

11th division. 

Two or three Kobi brigades. 

Naval brigade. 

Siege train. 





Total . . 53,000 




Grand total. 190,000 





South-east of Mukden 
1st JANUARY, 1905. 
1st army, general Linevitch. 
1st corps (22nd and 37th divisions). 
2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division, and 1st Siberian 

3rd Siberian corps (3rd East Siberian division, and part of 78th 

4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions). 


EusaiANS (continued) 
Thirty miles east of Pen-si-hu 
General Alexiev's detachment. 
Portions of 6tli East Siberian, and of 71st divisions. 
Part of Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade. 

Eifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total . . 90,000 6,500 320 


Colonel Madridov's force. 

Bifles. Sabres. Guns. 

1,200 750 4 

Connecting Aleociev, and Madridov 

General Maslov's Siberian reserve brigade. 

Bifles. Sabres. Guns. 

4,000 200 8 

West of Putilov hill, to Ghi-tai-tzu 
3rd army, general Bilderling. 

6th Siberian corps (55th division and Orenburg Cossacks). 
I7th corps (3rd and 35th divisions). 
5th corps (54th and 61st divisions). 

Bifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total . . 60,000 4,000 240 

San-chia-tzu, to Ghanrtan 
2nd army, general Kaulbaurs. 

1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian divisions). 
8th corps (14th and 75th divisions). 
10th Corps (9th and 31st divisions). 
Eifle corps (three rifle brigades). 
Mischenko's Cossacks. 

Eifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total . . 90,000 3,000 320 

Hun-ho-pu, and Tao-shan-tun 
General reserve. 

Portions of 16th corps, and of 6th Siberian corps. 
Heavy and other artUlery. 

Bifles. Sabres, Guns. 

Total . , 20,000 200 206 

BussiANS {continited) 

Between Hun, and Liao rivers 
Bennenkamf's detachment. 





Field troops 
Fortresses, etc. 
Railways, etc. 

Rifles. Sabres. Field Guns. 

268,200 19,650 1,146 
43,000 4,000 128 

25,000 11,000 48 

336,200 34,650 1,322 



Between Wei-tzu^yu, and Pao-tzu^en. 
20th FEBRUARY, 1905. 
5th army, geiiera;l Kawamitra. 
11th division. 
Three or four Kobi brigades. 

Total . 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 
. 25,000 600 72 


From HuOrUng, to south of Feng-ehiorpu 

1st army, general ! 
Guard division. 

Raron Kuroki. 

2nd division. 

12th division. 

Umezawa brigade. 
5th Kobi brigade. 
Artillery, etc. 

Total . 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 
. 39,000 1,200 180 



Japanese (continued) 

South of Feng-ehia-pu, to Ling-shen-pu 
4th army, general Count Nodzu. 
6th division. 
10th division. 

Tvro or three Kobi brigades. 


Sabres. Guns. 


Total . . 35,000 

850 142 



to Hei-kou-tai 

2nd army, general Baron Oku. 

4th division. 

5th division. 

8th division. 

Two Kobi brigades. 



Sabres. Guns. 


Total . . 42,000 

1,000 204 


Yang-chiorwan, Huang-ni-wa, and Hsiao-pbi-ho 
3rd army, general Baron Nogi. 
1st division. 

7th division. 

9 th division. 


Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 


Total . . 30,000 1,200 270 


San-chia-pao, to Shan-ko^u-shu 

1st cavalry brigade. 

2nd cavalry brigade. 

Sabres. Guns. 

Total . . 3,000 12 

Shi-li-ho, and Yen-tai station 
General reserve. 
3rd division. 
Three or four Kobi brigades. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers. 

Total . . 25,000 350 42 400 

Grand total . 196,000 8,200 922 11,500 


South-east of Mukden 
20th FEBRUARY, 1905. 
1st army, general Linevitch. 
1st army corps (22iid and 37th divisions). 
2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division and 1st Siberian 

3rd Siberian corps (3rd East Siberian division and part of 71st 

4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian divisions). 
Siberian Cossack division. 

Thirty miles east of Pen-si-hu 

General Alexiev's detachment of part of 6th East Siberian and 
of 71st division, with a portion of Trans-Baikal Cossack 

Rifles, Sabres, Guns. 

Total . . 90,000 6,500 356 

Msing-ehing-ting neighbourhood 

Colonel Madridov's force. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

1,200 750 4 

Connecting Alexiev, and Madridov 

General Maslov's Siberian reserve brigade. 

Rifles, Sabres. Guns. 

4,000 200 8 

South of Mukden 

3rd army, general Bilderling. 

6th corps (54th and 61st divisions). 

6th Siberian corps (55th division and Orenburg Cossacks). 

17th corps (3rd and 35th divisions). 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total . . 60,000 4,000 240 


Russians {continvsd) 

South-west of Mukden 

2nd army, general Kaulbaurs. 

1st Siberian corps (1st, 9th, and part of 6th East Siberian 

8th corps (14th and 75th divisions). 
10th corps (9th and 31st divisions). 
Rifle corps (three rifle brigades). 

Between the Hun and Liao rivers 

Rennenkamf s detachment. 

Mischenko's Cossacks. 

Caucasus cavalry brigade. 

Part of 5th Siberian corps. 




Total . . 90,000 



South of Mukden 
General reserve. 

16th corps (25th and part of 41st divisions). 
72nd division of 6th Siberian corps. 

Rifles. Sabres. Guns. 

Total . . 35,000 300 240 

Field troops 
Fortresses, etc. 
Railways, etc. 

Rifles. Sabres. Field Gang, 

280,200 19,750 1,204 
15,000 3,000 80 

25,000 11,000 48 

320,200 33,750 1,332