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Cornell University Library 
DS 461.9.S5S242 1920 

Shivaij and his times / 

3 1924 024 056 750 

Cornell University 

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M^ " ■^ 






Indian Educational Service (Bihar), 

Revised and enlarged. 

39 Paternoster Row, London 



History of Aurangzib, based on original sources. 
Vol. 1. Reign of Shah Jahan. 

II. War of Succession. 
,, III. Northern India, 1658-1681. 
„ IV. Southern India, 1645-1689. 

Shivaji and His Times, an original life based on an 
exhaustive study of Persian, Marathi and Hindi 
sources, and English Dutch and Portuguese 
Records. 2nd edition, revised and enlarged. 

Studies in Mughal India, 22 historical essays. 

Economics of British India, 

4th edition, brought up to 1917. 

Anecdotes of Aurangzib, 

(Persian text of Ahk.iim-i-Aldmgiri with English 
trans., notes, and a life of Aurangzib.) 

Mughal Administration, 

a study of its machinery, official duties, policy, 
procedure, achievements and failure. 

Chaitanya's Life and Teachings, 

translated from the saint's 16th century Bengali 


First Edition, ( April, 1919.) 

A new and critical study of Shivaji's life and 
"character has long been due, as the last scholarly 
>vork on the subject was composed, by Captain 
James Grant Duff, a century ago, and a vast mass 
of original material unknown to him has become 
accessible to the student since then. To put the 
case briefly, the present work differs from his 
•eminently readable and still valuable History of the 
Mahrattas, (3 Vols., 1826), in the rigid preference of 
contemporary records to later compilations, and the 
exhaustive and minute use of the available sources, 
both printed and MS. — in Persian, English, Marathi 
and Hindi, as well as the Dutch Records in the India 
Office, London. 

The present work marks an advance on Graint 
Duff's History in three points in particuleir : 

First, among Persian materials his only autho- 
rities were Khafi Khan, who wrote 108 years after 
the birth of Shivaji and is admittedly unreliable 
where he does not borrow faithfully from earlier 
writers, and Bhimsen, an incorrect and brief transla- 
tion of whose Journal (by Jonathan Scott, 1794) 
alone was then available. I have, on the other hand, 
jelied on the absolutely contemporary official histories 

6 SHiVAji. [preface. 

of Shah Jahan and Aurangzib, Muhammad and 
Ali Adil Shah, many historical letters in Persian, 
the entire letter-books of Jai Singh and Aurangzib, 
daily bulletins of Aurangzib's Court, and the full 
text of Bhimsen as well as another contemporary 
Hindu historian in Persian, viz., Ishwardas Nagar, 
— all of which were unknown to Grant Duff. 

Secondly, he relied too much on the uncritical 
and often deliberately false Chiinis Bakhar, written 
183 years after Shivaji's birth, while I have preferred 
the work of Shivaji's courtier, Sabhasad, and also 
incorporated whatever is valuable and above 
suspicion in the mass of Marathi materials published 
by a band of devoted Indian workers at Puna and 
Satatra during the last 40 years. Grant Duff, more- 
over, worked on single manuscripts of the Marathi 
chronicles ; but we live in a happier age when these 
sources have been carefully edited with variations 
of reading and notes. 

Thirdly, the English and Dutch Factory Records 
have been more minutely searched by me and every 
useful information has been extracted from them. 

Two minor improvements which, I hope, will 
be appreciated by the reader, are the exact positions 
of all the places mentioned, traced with the help of 
the extremely accurate Government Survey maps, 
and the chronology, which is the most detailed 
possible in the existing state of our knowledge and 
corrects Grant Duff's numerous inaccuracies in this 


From the purely literary point of view, the book 
would have gained much by being made shorter. But 
so many false legends about Shivaji are current in our 
country and the Shivaji myth is developing so fast 
(attended at times with the fabrication of documents), 
that 1 have considered it necessary in the interests of 
historical truth to give every fact, however small, 
about him that has been ascertained on unimpeach- 
able evidence and to discuss the probabilities of the 

The Marathas were only one among the many 
threads in the tangled web of Deccan history in the 
Seventeenth century. Therefore, to understand the 
true causes and full consequences of Shivaji's own 
acts and policy, it is necessary to have a detailed 
knowledge of the internal affairs of the Mughal 
empire, Bijapur and Golkonda also. TTie present 
work is more than a mere biography of Shiva ; it 
frequently deals with the contemporary history of 
these three Muslim States, though an exhaustive 
treatment of the subject belongs to my History of 

Aurangzib, Vol. IV 

Second Edition, ( June, 1920.) 

In the second edition, occasion has been taken 
to enlarge the book and subject it to a minute 
revision and correction, — the most noticeable 
example of the last-mentioned being the position of 
Ponda in Oi. X. Among the more important 
additions are a critical examination of the evidence 
for the Javli and Afzal Khan affairs, a full discussion 

8 sHivAji. [preface. 

of the real nature of the Meirathi sources and a com- 
parative estimate of the evidential value of the 
English, Persian and Meirathi records, an account of 
the very first battle between the English and the 
Marathas (here published for the first time), Shivaji's 
letter of protest ageiinst the jaziya, and a long note 
on his personal appearance and extant portraits. 1 
have also inserted at the proper places notes on the 
extent of his dominion in 1648, 1655, 1660, and 
1674-5, which together with their extent at his death 
(previously given) will enable the reader to remember 
the broad outlines of his territorial expansion and 
thus take a bird's-eye view of the growth of his 
power in successive ages. His most authentic 
portrait has, also, been reproduced in this edition. 

Jadunath Sarkar. 


Preface ... ... ... v 

Chapter I. The Land and the People I— 18 

Population speaking Marathi, I — ^boundaries of 
Maharashtra, 2— rainfall and crops, 3 — ^isolated 
valleys of the western belt, 5 — ^hill-forts, 6 — all 
people work hard, 7 — character : lack of elegance 
and taste, 9 — ^pride, courage and hardiness, 9 — social 
'equality, 10 — ^religious reformers, II — literature and 
language. 12 — ^minstrels, 14 — Marathas a nation, 15 — 
defects of character, 17. 

Chapter II. Boyhood and Youth ... 19—54 

Birth of Shiva ji, 19 — neglected by father, 21 — 
lonely boyhood, 21 — miserable condition of Puna, 
23 — Dadaji Kond-dev's improvements, 24 — love of 
justice, 25 — Shivaji's education, 25 — the Mavals 
described, 27 — subdued by Dadaji, 28 — Shivaji's 
Hindu spirit, 29 — love of independence, 30 — decline 
of Bijapur, 32 — Shiva captures Toma, 32 — ^seizes 
Puna district, 33 — gains forts, 34 — ^invades N. 
Xonkan, 35 — Shahji imprisoned, 37 — Shiva appeals 
to Murad, 40— Shahji released, why? 41 — Baji 
Shyamraje's expedition, 42 — Mores of Javli, 43 — 
Mores murdered, 45 — criticism of Shiva's conduct, 
46 — gains from the conquest of Javli, 47 — early 
officers, 48— extent of territory, 49 — Appendix I. 
Murder of the Mores, evidence discussed, 50. 

Chapter III. First Wars with Mughals 

and Bijapur ... ... 55—81 

Shiva's early negotiations with Aurangzib, 55 — 
Taids Junnar and Ahmadnagar, 56 — Mughal defensive 
measures, 57 — Nasiri Khan defeats Shiva, 58 — 


Aurangzib guards frontier, 59 — Shiva makes peace, 
6I^Aurangzib's distrust of him, 62 — Bijapur Govern- 
ment sends Afzal Khan against Shiva, 63— his 
sacrileges, 65 — Afzal's doings at Wai, 66 — Shiva's 
perplexity, 67 — envoy from Afzal, 68 — ^Afzal reaches 
place of meeting, 71 — the afifray, 72 — Afzal's army 
attacked, 74 — local legends about Afzal, 76 — the 
"Afzal Khan ballad," 77— Maratha view of the 
affair, 78 — Appendix II. Affair of Afzal Khan, 
evidence discussed, 79. 

Chapter IV. Strenuous Warfare ... 82—110 

Shaista Khan viceroy of Deccan, 82 — Siddi 
Jauhar besieges Shiva in Panhala, 83 — Shiva's 
escape, gallantry of Baji Prabhu, 84 — Shaista Khan's 
march on Puna, 85 — siege of Chakan, 87 — ^Firangji 
Narsala, 89— Mughals in N. Konkan, 91— Netaji's 
disastrous retreat, 91 — night-attack on Shaista Khan, 
93 — Surat described, 98 — panic and neglect of 
defence, 99 — heroic action of English factors, 101 — 
Shivaji's first sack of Surat, 103 — attempt on his life, 
106 — Jaswant's siege of Kondana, 109 — Shiva's 
movements in 1664, 109. 

Chapter V. Shivaji and Jai Singh ... Ill — 151 

Jai Singh sent to Deccan, 111 — his character, 
112— -his plan of war, 115 — unites all the enemies of 
Shiva, 115 — theatre of war described, 118 — Mughal 
outposts, 120 — march on Purandar, 121 — Purandar 
hill described, 124 — Mughal siege-positions, 125 — 
Vajragarh stormed, 126 — Daud Khan's faithless 
conduct, 127 — Shiva's villages ravaged, 128 — 
Marathas make diversions, 130 — outer towers of 
Purandar stormed, 132 — Murar Baji's death, 135 — 
Shiva opens negotiations, 136 — visits Jai Singh, 137 
— treaty of Purandar ■ its terms, 139 — Shiva visits 
Dilir, 141 — forts delivered, "142 — Jai Singh invades 
Bijapur, 145 — Shiva captures forts for Mughals, 145., 


and fights Bijapuri army, 146 — retreat from Bijapur, 
147 — Shiva sent against Paoihala, why? 148 — fails to 
storm it, 150 — Netaji deserts to Bijapur, 150. 

Chapter VI. Visit to Aurangzib ... 152—179 

Shiva's reluctance to go to Aurangzib's Court, 
152 — ^hopes held out to him, 153 — ^his arrangements 
for home defence during his absence, 155 — asserts 
his dignity at Aurangabad, 156 — ^his audience with 
Aurangzib, 157 — is placed under guard, 161 — appeals 
to prime-minister, 162 — Aurangzib's changes of 
policy to Shiva, 163 — Jai Singh's advice, 163 — Shiva 
escapes from Agra by stratagem, 166 — ^hue and cry, 
168— Shiva at Mathura, 169 — adventures during 
flight, 171 — returns home, 173 — Shambhuji's return, 
1 74 — Jai Singh's anxieties during Shiva's flight, 1 75 — 
renewed Maratha hostilities, 176 — Jai Singh's plot to 
catch Shivaji, 1 78. 

Chapter VII. 1667— 1670 ... 180—212 

Death of Jai Singh, 180 — disunion in Mughal 
viceroy's camp, 181 — Shiva makes peace with 
Emperor again, 183 — Shambhu sent to Aurangabad, 
185 — causes of Shiva's rupture with Mughals, 186 — 
captures Kpndana, named Singh-garh, 188 — sieges of 
Mahuli, 189 — Daud Khan's vigorous campaign, 190 
— Dilir disobeys Prince Muazzam, 192 — investigation 
by Iftikhar Khan, 193 — Dilir pursued by Muazzam, 
195 — second loot of Surat, 198 — refugees at Swally, 
201 — frequent panic and ruin of commerce at Surat, 
203 — Shivaji gains battle of Vani, 205 — sack of 
Karinja, 208 — Shiva captures Salhir, 21 1 — Chhatra Sal 
Bundela visits Shiva, 211. 

Chapter VIII. Struggle with the 

Mughals, 1670— 1674 ... 213—237 

Large armies sent against Shiva, 213 — Daud 
Khan's campaign in the Chandor range, 214 — 


Mahabat invades Maharashtra, massacre of Puna, 
216^— defeat of Ikhlas Khan near Salhir, 217 — 
Mughals expelled from Puna, 217 — Marathas con- 
quer Jawhar and Ramnagar, 218 — chauth demanded 
from Surat, 219 — Koli Rajahs, 221 — Mughal officers 
desert to Shiva, 222 — raid into Berar, 223 — successful 
pursuit by Mughals, 223 — Pedgaon, Mughal base, 
225 — Shiva fails at Shivner, 226 — gains Satara and 
Panhala, 227 — raids Bijapuri Kanara, 228 — ^battle of 
Umrani, 230 — defeat and death of Pratap Rao, 231 
— Hambir Rao's raids, 232 — Bahlol's victory, 234 — 
Dilir defeated by Shiva, 234— Mughal power 
weakened, 235 — extent of Shiva's territory, 236. 

Chapter IX. Coronation of Shivaji ... 238—259 

Why Shiva wanted to be crowned, 238 — Gaga 
Bhatta declares him a Kshatriya, 241 — preparations 
for coronation, 241 — religious ceremonies, 242 — 
Shiva performs penance and is "made a Kshatriya," 
but is denied Vedic mantras, 244 — lavish gifts, 245 — 
bath on coronation day, 247 — coronation hall 
described, 247 — enthronement, 249 — Oxinden pre- 
sented, 250 — street procession at Raigarh, 250 — cost 
of coronation, 252 — loot of Mughal camp, 253 — raid 
into Baglana and Khandesh, 254 — into Kolhapur, 
255 — Bahadur Khan deceived by pretended negotia- 
tions, 255 — Maratha activities, 257 — Shiva's illness, 
258 — Mughals invade Bijapur, 259. 

Chapter X. South Konkan ©" Kanara 260—292 

Kanara uplands and coast, 260 — trade and ports, 
261 — Rustam-i-Zaman's concert with Shiva, 262 — 
English collision with Shiva at Rajapur, 264 — Ejiglish 
brokers and Mr. Gyffard imprisoned by Marathas, 
264 — released, 265 — Englishmen fight against Shiva 
at Panhala, 266 — Rajapur factors seized, 266 — Adil 
Shah invades Bednur, 268 — Shiva in S. Konkan 
coast, 269 — disorders in the coast, 270 — Shiva's 


doings in Kanara, 272— loot of Barcelore and black- 
mailing of Karwar, 274 — Bijapuris recover and lose 
S. Konkan, 277 — ^siege of Ponda raised, 280— plot to 
capture Goa by stratagem, detected, 281 — rebellion 
of Rustam-i-Zaman, 282— sack of Hubli, 283— Bahlol 
expels Maratbas from Karwar district, 284 — Shiva's 
grand raid into Kanara fails, 285 — Mian Sahib's 
rebellion in Bijapuri Kanara, 286 — Shiva captures 
Ponda, 288 — and other forts, 290 — Maratha failure in 
Sunda and success in Bednur, 291. 

Chapter XI. Naval Enterprises ...293-321 

The Siddis of Janjira, 293 — Shiva's early conflicts 
with Siddis, 295 — Shiva captures Danda, 296 — 
Vyankoji Datto viceroy, 297 — Shiva's navy described,. 
298 — his sailors, 299 — ^his mercantile marine, 299 — 
doings of Maratha fleet, 300 — revolution at Janjira : 
Siddis enter Mughal service, 302 — Portug^iese defeat 
Maratha fleet, 304 — Siddis recover Danda, 305 — 
Shiva's efforts fail, 307 — naval war 1672-75, 308 — 
battle of Satavli, 310 — grand assault on Janjira by 
Marathas, 311— naval war 1676-80, 312— Marathas 
fortify Khanderi, 315 — naval battles with the English, 
316 — Ejiglish make peace, 319 — Siddis fortify Underi 
and bombard Khanderi, 320. 

Chapter XII. Invasion of the Karnatak 322—352 

Shiva's need of money, 322 — Karnatak : its 
wealth, 323 — ^Vyankoji and his minister quarrel, 325 
— Bijapur in disorder, 327 — Shiva secures Mughal 
neutrality, 328 — and alliance with Golkonda, 329 — 
strict discipline in Shiva's army, 330 — ^his grand entry 
into Haidarabad, 331 — audience 'with Qutb Shah, 
334 — treaty \yith Golkonda, 335 — feasts and reviews, 
336 — ^pilgrimage to Shri Shaila, 338 — religious frenzy, 
339 — marches by Madras city, 339 — Jinji fort 
captured, 340 — siege of Tiruvadi, 341 — siege of 
Vellore, 342 — defeat of Sher Khan, 342 — ^presents 

14 SHIVAJl. 

from Madras factors, 340 and 343 — blackmail from 
Nayak of Madura, 344— Shiva invites Vyankoji to 
interview, 344 — ^flight of Vyankoji, 345— Shiva at 
Vriddhachalam, 347— asks for siege-engineers from 
Madras, 347 — enters Mysore plateau, 348 — ^Vellore 
capitulates, 349 — value of Shiva's conquests in 
Karnatak, 349 — Vyankoji attacks Shiva's agent 
Shantaji, 350 — peace, Madras plains restored to 
Vyankoji, 352. 

Chapter XIII. His Last Years ...353—383 

Route of return from Karnatak, 353 — fight with 
Savitri Bai, 354 — attempt to gain Bijapur fort by 
bribery, 355 — Shambhuji attacks Goa territory, 356 — 
Peshwa plunders Trimbak-Nasik, 357 — the Mianas of 
Kopal district, 357 — annexations beyond Tunga- 
bhadra, 358 — second failure at Shivner, 359 — disorder 
in Bijapur and weakness of Masaud, 361 — Shambhuji 
deserts to Dilir, 362 — Maratha stratagem to seize 
Bijapur fort, detected, 363 — Mughals and Bijapuris 
against Shiva, 364 — Dilir captures Bhupalgarh, 364 — 
Marathas fight Ikhlas Khan, 365 — and capture a 
Mughal convoy at Karkamb, 366 — Shivaji's letter to 
Aurangzib against the jaziya, 366 — Dilir invades 
Bijapur, 371 — Shiva arrives near Bijapur to help, 
372 — Dilir ravages environs of Bijapur, 373 — sacks 
Athni, 374 — Shambhuji returns to father, 375 — 
Shivaji defeated by Dilir, 376 — fortifies Panhala as a 
refuge, 376 — raids Khandesh, 377 — sack of Jalna, 377 
— curse of saint, 378 — Shiva defeated by Ranmast 
Khan, 378 — escapes with heavy loss, 379 — anxiety 
about succession, 380 — ^lectures to Shambhu, 380 — 
intrigues among Shiva's wives, 382 — death of Shivaji, 
382 — was he poisoned? 383. 

Chapter XIV. Shivaji and the English 

merchants of the West Coast ... 384 — 404 

Rajapur factors kept in prison, 384 — ^their 


wrangle with Surat Council, 386 — English think of 
naval reprisal, 386 — prisoners released, 387 — English 
negotiate for compensation for Rajapur factory, 389 
— the secret aims of the two parties, 389 — delicate 
position of the English, 391 — Ram Shenvi's report, 
391 — Maratha envoy at Bombay, 392 — mission of 
Lt. Ustick, 393— embassy of Niccolls, 395— Shiva's 
letter to Bombay, 396 — ^his evasiveness, 397 — embassy 
of Oxinden, 398 — its result, 399 — Rajapur factors 
interview Shiva, 400 — Austen's embassy, 401 — 
indemnity in kind, 403 — Rajapur indemnity how far 
paid, 404. 

Chapter XV. Government, Institutions, 

and policy ... ...405—426 

Extent of his kingdom, 405 — three provinces, 
405 — belt of territory subject to chaath, 407 — nature 
of chauth, 407 — his annual revenue, 408— hoarded 
treasure, 408 — strength of his army, 409 — elephants 
and artillery, 410 — early administrative officers, 410 
— ashta-pradhans : their powers, 4il — their titles and 
duties, 412 — Kayastha clerks, 413 — Army: organisa- 
tion of forts, 414 — cavalry, 415 — ^infantry, 416 — 
salaries of officers, 416 — how his army subsisted, 417 
— Revenue system, 418 — no farming of revenue, no 
military fiefs, 419 — district administration, 420 — 
religious policy, 421 — Ramdas, 421 — ^practical effect 
of Shivaji's regulations, 423 — spirit of brigandage, 
423 — Aurangzib's despair of subduing Shivaji, 424 — 
anecdotes, 424 — Shiva's personal appearance, 425 — 
his portraits, 426. 

Chapter XVI. Shivaji's achievement, 

character and place in History ... 427-449 

Shivaji's foreign policy like that of Muslim kings, 
427 — malk.-giri, 428 — causes of his failure to build an 
enduring State, 429 — revival of Hindu orthodoxy, 
•429 — caste quarrels and divisions, 430 — no elevation 


of people, 432 — evils of autocracy, 433 — neglect of 
the economic factor, 433 — necessity of raids and 
their ruinous effect, 434 — excess of trickery and 
intrigue, 435 — failure against Wellesley, 436 — 
character of Shivaji, 436— his political ideal, 438 — 
natural insecurity of kingdom, 439 — readiness for 
war a condition of his existence, 439 — his relations 
with Bijapur, 440 — his true greatness, 440 — the last 
constructive genius among Hindus, 441 — his influence 
on the Hindu spirit, 443. 

Appendix III. Character of Marathi records about 
Shivaji, 445. 

Bibliography ... ... ... 449-459 

Abbreviations ... ... 459 


The Land and the People. 

§1. Extent, rainfall, soil and crops. 

To-day nearly eleven millions of men, forming 
about half the entire population of the Bombay 
Presidency (minus its unnatural adjunct, Sindh), speak 
Marathi, and another nine millions living in the 
Central Provinces, the Nizam's Dominions, and other 
parts, claim the same language as their mother- 
tongue.* TTiis language has been steadily gaining 
ground since the days of the Peshwas, and its peace- 
ful annexation of the children of ruder and less 
literary tongues has gone on unabated even during 
the British period. 

But the Maratha country is not co-extensive vrith 
the land where the Marathi speech prevails to-day. 

* The Census of 1911 showed a total of 1 9- 8 millions as 
speaking Marathi (against 18-23 millions in 1901.) Of this 
total 10-74 millions live in Bombay and its States, 4-8 millions 
in the C. P., and 3-5 millions in the Haidarabad State. 
Maiathi is spoken by above 86 p. c. of the population of the 
fConkan division, 85 p.c. of the Deccan division, and nearly 
54 p. K.. of Bombay city. In the C. P 31 p. c. smd in the 
Haidarabad State 26 p. c. of the population speak it. 


Four centuries ago the name Maha-rashtra was con- 
fined to the western edge of the Deccan plateau, 
i.e., to a tract bounded on the north by the Tapti, 
on the south by the upper courses of the Krishna 
(probably the Warna), and on the east by the Sina.* 
The cradle-land of Maharashtra was, therefore, 
formed by the Nasik, Puna and Satara districts, parts 
of Ahmadnagar and Sholapur, and probably the 
western corner of Aurangabad, — a rough total of 
28,000 square miles. The Maratha race w^as also 
settled in Konkan or the narrow land between the 
Western Ghats and the Indian Ocean. Here the 
districts of Thana, Kolaba and Ratnagiri and the 
State of Savant-vadi, — ^with a total area of over 
10,000 square miles, — are now predominantly 
Marathi-speaking ; but in the i6th century a consi- 
derable portion of the population, probably one-half, 
belonged to other races and spoke other tongues. 
Four centuries ago the population of Maharashtra 
was very thin and forests covered much of the land. 
The western edge of the Deccan plateau is subject 
tc a low and uncertain rainfall, cultivation is poor 

* " The word Dekkan expresses the country watered by 
the upper Godavari and that lying between that river and the 
Krishna. The name Maharashtra also seems at one time to 
have been restricted to this tract. For that country is, in the 
Puranas and other works, distinguished on the one hand from 
Northern Konkan and from the regions on either side of the 
Narmada and the Tapti, as well as from Vidarbha" or Berar. 
{Bom. Gaz. i. pt. ii. p. 134, 587; xxiv. 81.) 


and precarious, and it is only along the narrow 
margins of the few rivers that the peasant is assured 
of a good return for his labour. From nearly the 
whole of the Western Deccan the heavy clouds of 
the S. W. monsoon are either shut out by the Ghat 
range, or, if they surmount this barrier, they sail 
away to the east leaving the land unwatered and 
untilled, so that "the Deccan, generally speaking, 
yields to much labour a bare measure of 
subsistence."* {Moral and Mat. Prog. 1911-12, 
p. 10.) 

* The rain is precipitated on the coast-line [i.e., Konkan] 
at an average of 100 to 120 inches [in the year.] Once the 
crest [of the Western Ghats] is passed, the precipitation 
decreases very rapidly, until a belt is reached only 35 miles 
from the hills vyhere the rainfall is very precarious and 
averages only about 17 inches. Further east again, the S. W. 
monsoon is nearly spent, but the influence of the N. E. 
monsoon begins to be felt and the rainfall improves... South of 
Khandesh, we get the Deccan proper divided into three tracts 
[running parallel to the Ghats and called] the Dang or Maval 
to the west, the Transition in the centre, and the Desh, or 
black-soil plain to the east. The soil, however, is not fertile, 
and there are ranges of bare rocky hills running east and west, 
spurs* so to speak of the Ghats, which neither store water for 
cultivation nor attract the rainfall... The Karnatak [i.e., the 
Dharwar, Belgaum, and Bijapur districts] has a more certain 
and more copious rainfall and more fertile soil." (Census o/ 
India, IQll, vii. pt. I, pp. 4-6.) The western hilly belt is called 
Dang in the north (i.e., Baglana), Maval in the centre (i.e.. 
the Nasik, Puna and Satara districts), and Mallad in the south 
(i.e., Karnatak.) The Konkan, on the other hand, is an area 


In such a soil rice cultivation is impossible, and 
wheat and barley grow in very small quantities. TTie 
staple crop of most of this region is the hardy millet, 
— jaioari, bajra and ragi or maize. But even these 
cannot always be depended upon. One year the rain 
would fail, the sprouting plants would be scorched 
by the sun or the young heads of grain would shrink 
and wither before they can grow to fulness and 
ripen, and there would be famine throughout the 
length and breadth of the land. The soil, covered 
with bare rock at places and with only a thin layer 
of mould at others, would be baked to a brown dust, 
not a green blade would be seen anywhere, and in 
addition to the human victims the cattle would perish 
by tens of thousand. 

§2. Isolation of the People. 

The broken rocky nature of the country and 
its abundance of forests, while it kept the population 
down, also made travelling difficult and unprofitable. 
TTiere were no rich courts, populous cities or thriving 
marts to attract merchants. Nor were there regular 
occasions for the march of large bodies of soldiers, 
as from one province of a compact and mighty 
empire to another. The country was cut up by 

of certain and heavy rainfall, with rice for the predominant 
crop, "and along the sea-coast, wherever there is any soil. ..a 
fringe of palms, mango-groves and plaintain orchards add to 
the beauty of the landscape and the wealth of the inhabitants. 
Thana and Kanara are forest-dad districts." (Ibid.) 


Nature into small compartments in which the natives 
lived isolated self-contained lives, the world 
forgetting and by the world forgot. 

This was true in a special degree of the belt 
lying immediately east of the Ghats. The empires 
of the central and more level portion of the table- 
land, both in Hindu times and Muslim, had sent 
forth their conquering hosts westwards, but the 
flood of invasion had been broken at the foot of the 
hills or their numerous spurs, or, where a thin 
stream of it had poured through the passes, it had 
retired after a short and unprofitable stay. In their 
rugged and inhospitable nooks the natives had 
found safety and peace, while the richer plains had 
been the scenes of revolution and rapine. 

This natural isolation of the western belt was 
no doubt occasionally broken by the pilgrim, the 
trader, and the soldier of fortune. Across this rugged 
tract lay all the routes from the ocean-ports of our 
western coast to the rich capitals and marts of 
Central Deccan. Through it alone could the stream 
of recruits from Persia, Arabia, Turkey, Abyssinia 
and even Central Asia reach the welcoming Muslim 
Courts of Kulbarga, Bidar, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and 
Golkonda. Through Maharashtra alone could the 
cloth, metal- ware and spices of the upper Godavari 
and Krishna valleys reach their ports of embarkation 
for Europe. 

TTien, again, the sterile soil discouraged its sons 
from the thankless task of tilling it. Strong muscles 

6 SHIVAJl. [CH. I, 

and stout hearts found greater rewards and a higher 
position by serving in the armies of the mighty 
monarchies of the central plateau. An able partisan 
leader was sure of high pay, noble rank, and it 
might be the proud position of a king-maker, at 
any of these Courts, which were constantly at war 
with their neighbours, and prepared to bid high for 
the lances of useful condottieri from the Desh tract. 

But such occasional visitors only brought a 
breath of the outer world to the sequestered vales 
of Maharashtra ; they did not disturb the noiseless 
tenor of the life of the natives, for the natives them- 
selves had hardly occasion to move. Even w^hen 
they went abroad as soldiers, they usually settled 
there in the fiefs given to them and rarely returned 
to their barren ancestral homes. 

TTie Maratha people's inborn love of indepen- 
dence and isolation was greatly helped by Nature, 
which provided them with many ready-made and 
easily defensible forts close at hand, where they 
could quickly flee for refuge and whence they could 
offer a tenacious resistance. Unlike the Gangetic 
plain, this country could not be conquered and 
annexed by one cavalry dash or even one year's 
campaigning. Here the natives had the chance of 
making a long struggle against superior numbers 
and, it may be, of recovering their own when the 
invader was worn out. "The whole of the Ghats 
and neighbouring mountains often terminate towards 
the top in a wall of smooth rock, the highest points 


of which, as well as detached portions on insulated 
hills, form natural fortresses, where the only labour 
required is to get access to the level space, which 
generally lies on the summit. Various princes at 
different times have cut flights of steps or winding 
roads up the rocks, fortified the entrance with a 
succession of gateways, and erected towers to com- 
mand the approaches ; and thus studded the whole 
of the region about the Ghats and their branches 
with forts." "In many of them there are springs 
of the finest water, and in all a supply can be 
secured, in tanks or reservoirs, during the periodical 
rains from May to October." The soft trap dis- 
solving has exposed the hard basalt in steep scarped 
precipices and smooth tops, which forrn natural 

§3. Poverty, simplicity and equality of society. 

In such a country no man can afford to lead 
a sheltered life. There was no parasite class in 
ancient Maharashtra. Even the village headmen, 
who neither sowed nor spun, had to work as 
collectors of revenue, local judges and parochial 
policemen, to earn the fee on which they lived. 
There was hardly a rich man, except the trader 
who was also the only banker of this primitive 
society. Even the landlords were rich rather in 
grain-heaps and armed retainers than in gold and 

* Elphinstone's History, 6th ed. 615. Duff. i. 7. Bom. 
Gaz., xviii. pt. 1, pp. 9-10 ; xix. 16. 

8 SHIVAJl. [CH. I. 

silver. Some temples, especially at the chief centres 
of pilgrimage, had accumulations of wealth, but 
their income was precarious, entirely dependent on 
voluntary gift, and incomparably smaller than the 
riches of the grand Madras temples. 

In a society so circumstanced, every man, and 
often every w^oman, has to work and work \vith the 
hand. Elegance and refinement cannot grow here. 
If culture can be rightly defined as the employment 
of the intellect in pleasure, then there is no room 
for culture among men who have to sacrifice pleasure 
to the bare necessaries of life. Where Nature 
enforces a Spartan simplicity, there can be no 
luxury, no learned leisure (except among the priests), 
no aesthetic development, no polished manners even. 

The Marathas, when they rose to political 
power, did not impress the subject population 
favourably. To the over-polished decadents of the 
Mughal capitals, the warriors from the South 
appeared as a race of upstarts, insolent in prosperity, 
and lacking in grace, refinement and even good 
manners. They had no taste for the fine arts, no 
elegance of address, no aptitude for the amenities 
of social life. Even their horsemanship was awkv/ard 
and graceless, though eminently practical. The 
period of Maratha ascendency has not left India 
richer by a single grand building, or beautiful picture, 
or finely written manuscript. Even the palaces of 
the Peshwas are low, mean-looking, flimsy structures, 
with small rooms and narrow staircases — relieved 


from Utter insignificance only by their richly carved 
wooden facade. 

§4. Maratha character. 

But such a country and climate have their 
compensating advantages, too. They develop self- 
reliance, courage, perseverance, a stern simplicity, 
a rough straightforwardness, a sense of social 
equality and consequently pride in the dignity of 
man as man. As early as the 7th century of the 
Christian era, a learned Chinese traveller thus noted 
the character of the Maratha people living in the 
more prosperous Central Deccan : "The inhabitants 
are proud-spirited and warlike, grateful for favours 
and revengeful for wrongs, self-sacrificing towards 
suppliants in distress and sanguinary to death with 
any who treated them insultingly." (Watters's Yuan 
Chwang, ii. 239.) "If they are going to seek 
revenge, they first give their enemy warning." 
(Beal, ii. 256.) 

This racial character was somewhat modified in 
the course of the next ten centuries. The disappear- 
ance of the protective influence of the large Hindu 
monarchies of the province, the growing rigour of 
the Muslim occupation of the country, and the 
ravages of constant warfare between rival States, 
forced the remnant of the Maratha population to be 
more cunning and less chivalrous. Shivaji did not 
"first give warning" to Afzal or Shaista Khan.* 

* In 1880 an English observer wrote of the Maratha 

10 SHIVAJI. [CH. I. 

But the basis of their character remained the 
same, — activity, courage, self-reliance, self-respect 
and love of equality. With the loss of their own 
cities and capitals on the Godavari and the Krishna 
in the I4tli century, they were pressed back to the 
sterile western edge of the plateau and became 
poorer and more isolated. In the lonely struggle 
with Nature and beasts, they developed greater 
cunning, without losing their valour and hardiness. 
Indeed, in their combination of courage, cleverness 
and power of endurance, — in their ability to plan and 
execute surprises and night-attacks, in the skill of 
their soldiers to extricate themselves from a tight 
corner or vary their tactics according to the changing 
phases of a battle, without waiting for guidance 
from a superior, — the Marathas resemble the 
Afghans most among all Asiatic races. 

Social distinctions were fewer and much less 
sharp among the 16th century Marathas than among 
richer and more civilised communities. The rich 
inan was not immeasurably above the poor in such 
a simple society ; and even the poorest man had 
his value as a fighter or indispensable labourer ; at 
least, he preserved his self-respect, because where 
few had anything to spare, none was tempted to 

peasantry (of the Kunbi caste), "They are hard-working, 
temperate, hospitable, fond of their children and kind to 
strangers. At the same time they are cruel in revenge, and 
seldom scruple to cheat either Government or their creditors." 
(Bom. Gaz. xviii. pt. 1, 288.) 


lead the pampered life of the professional beggars 
and hangers-on of Agra or Delhi. Poverty and im- 
memorial custom alike preserved the womankind of 
Maharashtra (except among those castes that aspired 
to be Kshatriyas) from seclusion in the harem, and 
thus the effective strength of society was doubled, 
while life gained in health and sweetness. 

§5. Religious teachers. 

The same sense of equality was fostered by 
religion. The Brahmans, no doubt, tried to maintain 
their monopoly of the sacred lore and their aloofness 
from other castes as a sort of spiritual aristocracy. 
But strong religious movements arose and swept 
through the length and breadth of the land, teaching 
the sanctity of conduct rather than mere birth, the 
superiority of a living personal faith to mere ritual, 
and the oneness of all true believers before God. 
These popular movements were hostile to the 
haughty claims of the Brahman hierarchy, and their 
chief centre was Pandharpur, one of the most famous 
seats of pilgrimage in the land. 

" Like the Protestant Reformation in Europe in 
the 16th century, there was a religious, social, and 
literary revival and Reformation in India, but notably 
in the Deccan in the !5th and 16th centuries. This 
religious revival was not Brahmanical in its ortho- 
doxy ; it was heterodox in its spirit of protest against 
forms emd ceremonies and class distinctions based 
on birth, and ethical in its preference of a pure heart. 

12 SHIVAJl. [CH. I. 

and of the law of love, to all other acquired merits 
and good works. This religious revival was the 
work also of the people, of the masses, and not of 
the classes. At its head were saints and prophets, 
poets and philosophers, who sparng chiefly from the 
lower orders of society, — tailors, carpenters, potters, 
gardeners, shop-keepers, barbers, and even mahars 
(scavengers) — more often than Brahmans. Tne 
names of Tukaram [born about 1568], of Ramdas 
[b. 1608] , of Vaman Pandit [b. 1636] , and of Eknath 
[b. 1528] still retain their ascendency over the minds 
of the people of Maharashtra." (Ranade, 10 ; also 
Bom. Gaz. xx. 473 ; Sardesai, i. 38-78.) 

The fairs held at the chief places of pilgrimage 
on particular holy days tended to foster a sense of 
Hindu unity, like the national games of ancient 
Greece, though to a lesser extent, because caste has 
always remained with us a disintegrating force. 
These shrines became distributing centres of cult 
and culture, and broke down tribal or parochial 
narrowness, though imperceptibly. 

§6. Literature and Language. 

Literature afforded another bond of union in 
Maharashtra. Its themes were taken from the 
ancient scriptures and epics which are the heritage 
of all the Hindus. TTie devotional songs and moral 
maxims of popular teachers like Tukaram and 
Ramdas, Vaman Pandit and Moro Pant, made their 
way to every home where Marathi letters could be 


read. "In every town and village in the Deccan 
and Konkan, -especially during the rains, the pious 
Maratha will be found enjojnng with his family and 
friends the recitation of the Pothi of Shridhar 
[b. 1679], and enjoying it indeed. Except an 
occasional gentle laugh, or a sigh, or a tear, not a 
sound disturbs the raipt silence of the audience, 
unless when one of those passages of supreme 
pathos is reached, which affects the whole of the 
listeners simultaneously with an outburst of emotion 
which drowns the voice of the reader." (Acworth's 
Ballads, xxvii.) 

The simplicity and uniformity of early Maratha 
society are also reflected in the language. Their 
poetry consisted of short jingles and apopthegms or 
monotonous metrical couplets like the epics, — with 
no lyric outburst, no long-flowing sonorous verses, 
no delicate play on the w^hole gamut of sounds. Like 
the other daughters of Sanskrit, the Marathi verna- 
cular had no literary prose till well into the 18th 
century. TTie prose that was created by the official 
class in their letters and chronicles, was a barbarous 
jargon composed nearly three-fourths of Persian 
words and grotesque literal translations of Persian 
idioms. The highly Sanskritised, elegant and varied 
prose that is no\jr used, is a creation of the British 
period. (Rajwade, viii. Intro, fully discusses the 
Persian element.) 

" On the whole it may be said that the written 
[Marathi] poetry, consisting as it does in such very 

'4 SHIVAJI. [CH. I. 

large measure of moral disquisitions and reflections, 
and the praises of this deity or that, is little known 
to the ryots and the Mavalis of Maharashtra, and 
that it would not command their attention or 
admiration if it were known... In Maharashtra, where 
the immense majority of the peasantry can neither 
read nor write, it is a mere truism to say that the 
literature of their country is absolutely unknown to 
them.* It is not to be supposed, however, that they 
are without a poetry of their own. With the 
Marathas, the feelings of the commons have taken 
shape in the ballads, which are the genuine embodi- 
ment of national enthusiasm... Over the plains of the 
Deccan, and the deep valleys and bold ridges of the 
Sahyadris, from village to village, the humble 
Gondhali (minstrel) still travels, and still to rapt and 
excited audiences sings of the great days when the 
armed fathers of the men around him gave laws at 
the spear's point to all the princes of India, or 
retreated wounded and dismayed before the sword 
of the sea-dwelling stranger." (Acw^orth and 
Shaligram, Powadas, i and ii.) But this national 
ballad literature was the creation of the age of 
Shivaji and his successors. 

Not only was their literature poor, but their 
popular spoken tongue was a rough practical speech, 

* But the entire meiss of legends and traditions of the 
race was the common property of all classes of people 
throughout the land and gave them cultural homogeneity. 


incapable of expressing the ceremonious courtesy, 
indirectness, and delicate shades of meaning of the 
highly developed Urdu language. The democratic 
temper of the Maratha people is shown by their 
having no respectful mode of address like the ap 
("your honour") of Northern India ; all ranks are 
theed and ihoued. 

Thus, a remarkable community of language, 
creed, and life v/as attained in Maharashtra in the 
17th century, even before political unity was con- 
ferred by Shivaji. What little was wanting to the 
solidarity of the people was supplied by his creation 
of a national State, the long struggle with the 
invader from Delhi under his sons, and the imperial 
expansion of the race under the Peshwas. Thus, in 
the end a tribe, — or rather a collection of tribes emd 
castes, — ^was fused into a nation* and by the end of 
the 18th century a Maratha people in the political 
and cultural senses of the term had been formed, 
though caste distinctions still remained. TTius history 
has moulded society. 

§7. Maratha soldiers and peasants of to-day. 

The backbone of Shivaji's army was composed 
of the peasantry, who belonged to two low castes, 
named Maratha and Kunhi. The Maratha caste, — a 

* " The Maratheis are a nation, and from the Brahman 
to the ryot they glory in the fact." (Acworth and ShaU- 
gram's Powadas, iii.) 

16 SHIVAJl. [CH. I. 

name which should not be applied to all Marathi- 
speaking people in general, — numbered five millions 
and the Kunbis (of the Bombay Presidency alone), 
two and a half millions, in 1911, and they bear the 
following character in our times : 

"As a class, Marathas (i.e., the caste so called) 
are simple, frank, independent and liberal, courteous, 
and, when kindly treated, trusting. They are a 
manly and intelligent race, proud of their former 
greatness, fond of show, and careful to hide poverty 
...Stronger, more active, and better made than the 
Kunbis, many of the Marathas, even among the 
poorer classes, have an air of refinement. (TTiey 
take animal food, including fowls, and drink toddy 
and other liquors, like the Kunbis.) No caste 
supplies the Bombay army with so many recruits as 
the Ratnagiri Marathas. Others go into the police 
or find employment as messengers. Like the Kunbis, 
orderly, well-behaved, and good-tempered, the 
Marathas surpass them in courage and generosity. 
Very frugal, unassuming, respectable and 
temperate,... they are a very religious class." 

"The Deccan Kunbis are [now] all cultivators, 
steady and hard-working... A very quiet, easy- 
tempered and orderly class, singularly free from 
crime, they have much respect for the gods. In the 
Deccan they are strong, hardy, enduring and 
muscular, [but in Konkan, smaller, darker and more 
slightly made.] The Kunbi women, like their 
husbands, are strong and hardy, but the veiled 


Maratha women are generally weak... Widows are 
generally allowed to marry." (Bomb. Gaz., xxiv. 70; 
X. 123, 121 ; xviii. pt. i, 285. 307.) 

§8. Defects of the Marattia character. 

We shall now turn to the other traits of the 
Maratha character. When a Government lives on 
plunder as a regular source of supply, its officers 
naturally see no immorality in takiilg bribes for 
themselves. The ethics of the servant easily slide 
off into the ethics of the master. These Indian 
Spartans with their simplicity, hardiness and sense 
of equality, were no more proof against corruption 
than the Spartans of ancient Greece. Contemporary 
travellers have noticed how greedy of bribes the 
Brahman officers of the Maratha State were, even 
under the great Shivaji. 

TTie chief defect of the Marathas, which has 
disastrously reacted on their political history, is their 
lack of business capacity. This race has produced 
no great banker, trader, captain of industry, or even 
commissariat organiser or contractor. Hence, on 
the economic side, in the broadest sense of the term, 
the Maratha administration was very weak. TTie 
Peshwas, in spite of the dazzling brilliancy of their 
political success, were bankrupts from the days of 
the great Baji Rao I. onwards. Even Shivaji had 
repeated money difficulties during his short reign, — 
though in his case it was due not so much to real 


18 SHIVAJI. [CH. I. 

insolvency, as to his aversion to touch his hoarded 
treasure for the annual expenses of his army. 

But the Marathas have a historic advantage of 
unique importance in the India of to-day. Their 
near ancestors had faced death in a hundred battle- 
fields, had led armies and debated in the chamber 
of diplomacy, had managed the finances of kingdoms 
and grappled with the problems of empire ; they 
had helped to make Indian history in the immediate 
and not yet forgotten past. The memory of these 
things is a priceless asset to their race. In the 
combination of intellectual keenness, patient industry, 
simplicity of life, devotion to the nobler ideals of 
man, in the courage necessary for translating thought 
into deed, in the spirit of sacrifice, grit of character, 
and a diffused sense of democratic equality, the 
vast middle class of modern Maharashtra have no 
superior and hardly any equal among the other races 
of India. Would that they also possessed the 
organising skill, the power of co-operation, the tact 
in the management of instruments and colleagues, 
the foresight, and the saving common sense of the 
Anglo-Saxon race ! 

Boyhood and Youth. 1627-1656. 

§1. Shioaji's birth and infancy. 

Shahji Bhonsla, a captain of mercenaries, 
belonged to a Maratha family that had migrated from 
Daulatabad and entered the service of the Nizam- 
Shahi Sultans of Ahmadnagar. Some of his kinsmen 
had joined the Mughals with their retainers and risen 
to high rank early in Shah Jahan's reign. Shivaji, 
the second son of ShaJiji, was born in the hill-fort 
of Shivner, which towers over the city of Junnar, 
in the extreme north of the Puna district. His mother 
Jija Bai (a daughter of the aristocratic Lukhji Jadav 
of Sindkhed) had prayed to the local goddess, 
Shiva-Bed, for the good of her expected child, and 
named him after that deity. 

Of the exact date of his birth and the incidents 
of his boyhood, there is no contemporary record. 
Even Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad, writing in 1694, is 
silent on these points. The earliest mention of them 
is found in works composed 150 years after his birth, 
when the Shivaji myth had been fully developed 
among the Marathas and baseless legends and deli- 
berate fabrications had entirely overspread the few 
historic truths about him that were still preserved in 


unwritten memory. They place bis birth on 6tb 
April, 1627 or near about that date.* 

The stories told in the later Marathi bakhars 
about the history of his parents during the year pre- 
ceding his birth and the events of his own life up to 
the age of tw^enty, are in many points contrary to 
authentic history, and in others improbable, or, at all 
events, unsupported by any evidence. 

We know from the contemporary Persian 
histories that Shahji led a roving life, subject to 
frequent change of place and enemy attacks, during 
much of the period 1630 to 1636. Under these 
circumstances he would naturally have left his wife 
and infant son for safety in a stronghold like Shivner. 
But, in reality, he seems to have deserted both. A 
later traditional work asserts that at this time his 
eldest son Shambhuji was killed at Kanakgiri and 
he conceived a deep-rooted aversion to Lukhji Jadav 
and his family, and after saying that his surviving 
offspring from Jadav's daughter would come to no 
good, he deserted Jija Bai and Shivaji. (T. S. 9a.) 
This reasoning is unconvincing and falsified by dates. 
It is, however, beyond dispute that Jija Bai now lost 

* T. S. 6a ; Dig. 53 ; Chit. 22. The Zedhe Chronology 
(in Chaturtha Sam. Britta, 175) is clearly wrong about the year 
of his birth. The traditions about Shivaji's ancestors : Chit. 
14-18, Dig. 31-43, r. S. la-4b, Sabh. 5 (meagre.) Khafi Khan 
gives some legends about the origin and meaning of Bhonsla 
{'i. 111-113.) 1 have narrated the correct history of Shahji's 
life up to 1636 in Modern Review, Sept. 1917. 


her hust>and's love, probably with the loss of her 
youth, and Shahji abandoned her and her new-born 
son and took a younger and more beautiful wife, 
Tuka Bai Mohite, on whom and whose son Vyankoji 
he lavished all his affection and wealth. (Chit. 22 ; 
Dig. 53 and 64 ; T. S. 9a ; Shed. 15.) 

It is expressly stated in the contemporary 
Padishahnamah (I. B. 150) that in March 1636 
Shahji's family was living at Shivner. This shows 
that Shiva did not reside at Puna till after 1636. This 
view is supported by the Tarikh-i-Shivaji (8a), which 
states that after entering Bijapur service (October 
1636) and securing from that Government a grant 
of the whole country from Chakan to Indapur and 
Shirwal, as his jagir, Shahji appointed Dadaji 
Kond-dev as administrator of the tract and told him, 
"My wife Jija Bai is living in the fort of Shivner and 
has brought forth a son named Shivaji. Bring her 
and her son and keep them in your charge [at Puna] 
and supply them with money for their necessary 
expenses." Shivaji was, therefore, practically a 
stranger to his father for several years after his birth. 

Her husband's neglect drove the mind. of.. Jij* 
Bai inwards and deepened her natural religious 
spirit, which she imparted to her son. Shiva grew up 
in solitude, a mateless child, without brother sister 
or father. The isolation of their life drew mother 
and son very close together and intensified his love 
for her till it became almost an adoration for a deity. 
From a very early age, he was naturally thrown on 


his own resources, and learnt to carry out his own 
ideas unaided, and to take the initiative without any 
sense of subordination or responsibility to some higher 
authority, in the condition of the homes of their 
boyhood, their early life and training, and the 
development of their character, — even as in the steps 
by which they mounted to thrones, — the forsaken son 
of Shahji Bhonsla was the exact parallel of the 
forsaken son of Hassan Sur. Shivaji and Sher Shah 
were not only alike in character and genius, but also 
grew up amidst like circumstances. 

§2. Condition o/ the Puna jagir, 1637. 
When, at the end of October 1636, Shahji made 
peace with the Mughals, he had to cede to them 
Shivner, Trimbak and four other forts. He retained 
m Balaghat or the tableland only his ancestral jagir 
of Puna and Supa, formerly held under Nizam Shah 
and henceforth under Adil Shah. The estate included 
the Puna district from Chakan to Indapur, Supa, 
Shirwal, Wai (? Walti) and Jadgir, (T. S. 8a), or a 
tract bounded on the west by the Ghats, on the north 
by the Ghod river, on the east by the Bhima and on 
the south by the Nira river. Shahji, when retiring to 
Bijapur in 1636, placed this jagir in charge of a 
Brahman named Dadaji Kond-dev, who had gained 
administrative skill and experience as the land- 
steward (k^lkarni) of Malthan.* Jija Bai and Shiva 

* Chit. 19 and Dig. 47 call him kulkaini of Malthan in 
Patas subdivision. But T. S. 8a says that he was formerly 


were now removed from Shivner to Puna and Dadaji 
was appointed their guardian. 

The Puna district that Dadaji took over was in 
a sadly ruined condition. Six years of warfare had 
desolated the land, and the work of the invading 
soldiery had been completed after their departure by 
robber chiefs who tried to profit by the anarchy. 
Indeed, the province had so recently passed from the 
Nizam-Shahi ownership to that of Bijapur that the 
authority of the new Government had not yet been 
established there. It was only the rule of a strong 
jagirdar that could have given peace and prosperity 
to the district ; but during 1630-1636 Shahji had been 
forced to lead a life of constant movement, danger 
and warfare. The Puna and Thana districts at the 
extreme north-western corner of the kingdom of 
Bijapur, therefore, formed a No man's Land, with 
none to administer and defend them. 

In 1630 Shahji had plundered and seized the 
Nizam-Shahi country round Puna. Soon afterwards 
a Bijapuri army had looted and burnt Puna, Indapur 
and other villages of Shahji and "totally desolated 
them." (B. S. 227.) Next he had recovered posses- 
sion of them by force. Then had followed the 
famine of 1631-1632, the most terrible in the sad 

kulkaini of Hingani Burdi and Dhuligaon. There is a Hingana 
Buzurg, 3 m. =. w. of Puna. {Ind. Atlas, 39 S. W.) A critic 
suggests the emendation Hingani Beradi and Devalgaon, which 
1 accept. 


history of the Deccan (Pad. I. A. 362.) The Junnar 
or North Puna tract was the scene of frequent Mughal 
invasions in l634-'36. During Khan-i-Zaman's 
campaign against Shahji (July — October 1636), he 
penetrated to Puna, but there was probably nothing 
left for him to plunder or burn there. During the 
dissolution of the Ahmadnagar sultanate, a revenue 
farmer (deshpande) named Moro Tandev, "a proud 
rebel, well acquainted with the country round the 
Bhima, had raised a tumult and seized the neighbour- 
hood of Puna. These disorders had devastated the 
whole kingdom from Ahmadnagar to the boundary 
of WaiandShirwal." (T. S. 8a.) 

The desolation caused by man preying on his 
species favoured the growth of wild beasts. The 
Puna district, especially the Sahyadri hill-side forming 
its western border, was now infested by large numbers 
of wolves, which thinned the population and hindered 
cultivation. Dadaji Kond-dev offered rewards to the 
hillmen for killing the wolves and thus cleared the 
whole tract of these pests in a short time. He 
conciliated the hillmen and tempted them to settle 
in the valleys and extend cultivation by offering very 
liberal terms. Leases were granted to the effect that 
the new tenants should pay a rent of only Re. I in 
the first year, Rs. 3 in the second, Rs. 6 in the third, 
Rs. 9 in the fourth, Rs. 10 in the fifth, Rs. 20 in the 
sixth and the same rate as the older tenants from the 
7th year onwards. Thus the whole country was 
brought under tillage." (T. S. 9a; Dig. 113; 


Chit. 26.) When Dadaji took charge of the Puna 
jagir, its paper revenue was only 40,000 hurt (or 
Rs. 1,60,000, according to the current rate of 
exchange.) (Sabh. 102.) But only a fraction of this 
amount was actually collected. 

For the defence of the district he organised a 
body of local soldiers (barqandazes) and set up out- 
posts at suitable places. (Chit. 26.) The memory 
of his able and beneficent administration was long 
preserved, and a later chronicle tells us, "He did 
such strict justice that the very name of robbers and 
usurpers disappeared from the district." (T. S. 9a.) 
An anecdote illustrates his punctilious sense of 
justice: "He planted a garden of fruit trees named 
after Shahji and gave strict orders that if any one 
plucked even a leaf from the trees, he would be 
punished. One day Dadaji with his own hand pluck- 
ed a mango from a tree. For this offence he was 
about to cut off the hand when the other people 
prevented him. To show his respect for the rules, 
however, he wore an iron chain round his neck" 
(T. S. 9b), — or "kept the offending arm confined in 
a long glove!" (Chit. 29.) 

§3. Shivaji's education. 

On the subject of Shivaji's education, Sabhasad 
is silent. The Tarikh-i-Shivaji tells us that "Dadaji 
trained Shivaji and appointed an excellent teacher 
for him. In a short time Shiva became skilled in 


fighting, riding* and other accomplishments." (9a.) 
The weight of evidence is in favour of the view that 
Shivaji was unlettered, like three other heroes of 
mediaeval India, — Akbar, Haidar Ali, and Ranjit 
Singh. The many Europeans who visited him never 
saw him write anything ; when they presented any 
petition to him the Rajah always passed it on to his 
ministers to be read to him. No piece of writing in 
his own hand is known to exist. f 

But though he may not have pored over books, 
he certainly mastered the contents of the two great 
Hindu epics by listening to recitations and story- 
tellings. The noble examples of doing and suffering, 
of action and sacrifice, of military skill and statecraft, 
which the stories of Rama and the Pandavas afford, 
the political lessons and moral maxims with which 
these epics are filled, deeply impressed his young 
mind. He loved to distraction religious readings and 
songs (k,irtan) and sought the society of Hindu and 
Muslim saints wherever he went. The want of book- 

* No mention is made of book-learning. Chitnis, 28, 
vaguely says that Shivaji at the age of ten became very learned 
(hahat vidvan.) Dig. 85 gives a long list of every known art 
and science as mastered by him in boyhood ! 

t At the conclusion of a letter to Reimdas there are a few 
words which have been taken by the editor of Ramdasi 
Patravyavahar (Mr. Dev) as Shivaji's writing. But this letter 
has not yet been critically examined by any expert or 
independent historian. These very recent "discoveries" in 
Maharashtra require corroboration before they can be accepted. 


§4. The Mavals occupied. 
learning, therefore, did not leave his mind a dull and 
sterile soil, nor impair his efficiency as a man of action 
in a world that was mediaeval. 

The western belt of the Puna district, running along 
the Western Ghats for a length of 90 miles and a 
breadth of 12 to 24 miles, is known as Maval or the 
Sunset Land. "It is extremely rugged, a series of table- 
lands cut on every side by deep winding valleys 

From the valleys, hills of various heights and forms' 
rise, terrace above terrace, with steep sides often 

strewn with black basalt boulders Where the trees 

have been spared, they clothe the hill^sides with a 
dense growth mixed with almost impassable brush- 
wood. Here and there are patches of ancient ever- 
green forests The people in the northern valleys 

are Kolis and in the southern valleys Marathas. 
They have a strong strain of hill-blood and are dark, 
wiry and sallow... The climate is dry and invigorating, 
the air is lighter, and the heat less oppressive than in 
most parts of Western or Southern India." (Bom. 
Gaz. xviii. pt. I. pp. 2, 13, 15.) 

In popular speech, the valleys into which this 
western belt is divided are collectively known as the 
twelve Mavals, though their names end with the 
words ner and ^/lore as well as maval, and their 
number exceeds twelve. A Marathi ballad speaks 
of 12 Mavals under Junnar and twelve others under 

28 SHIVAJl. [CH. II. 

Dadaji established complete mastery over the 
Mavals. The local chiefs (deshpandes) were mostly 
won over. Those who defied his authority were 
defeated* and crushed. Thus peace and prosperity 
were established in that region and it became a source 
of wealth and strength to the owner of Puna, instead 
of being an unprofitable and even dangerous 
possession. (Sabh. 7 ; Chit. 26.) From this region 
Shivaji drew his best soldiers, his earliest comrades, 
and his most devoted followers. Yesaji Kank and 
Baji Pasalkar were Mavle chieftains of his own age ; 
they gathered round him very early and were enrolled 
as his first captains. So, also, was Tanaji Malusare, 
a young deshmukh of Konkan. (Chit. 32.) 

§5. Shivaji' s choice of a career. 

In their company young Shivaji wandered over 
the hills and forests of the Sahyadri range, and along 
the mazes of the river valleys, thus hardening himself 
to a life of privation and strenuous exertion, as well 

* Raj. XV. 316 and 393 records the story of one of his 
reverses : "Dadaji Kond-dev came to Shivapur. Among the 
12 Mavals, Krishnaji Nayak Bandal, the deshmukh of Hirdas 
Maval, had seized another man's lands and refused to give 
them up. Dadaji marched against him, but wras defeated emd 
forced to retreat to Shivapur. He then sent Kanhoji Nayak 
Zedhe to persuade Krishnaji and other Maval deshmukhs to 
come for an interview." Chitnis, 33, says that Bandeil refused 
to come and wait on Shivaji, who marched against him, 
captured and put him to death. This is incorrect, as the 
subjugation of the Mavals was completed by Dadaji. 


as getting a first-hand knowledge of the country and 
its people. During his residence at Puna his plastic 
mind was profoundly influenced by the readings from 
the Hindu epics cind sacreJ books given by his 
guardian and other Brahmans, and still more by the 
teaching of his mother. The deeply religious, almost 
ascetic, life that Jija Bai led amidst neglect and 
solitude imparted by its example, even more than by 
her precepts, a stoical earnestness mingled with 
religious fervour to the character of Shiva. He began 
to love independence and loathe a life of servile 
luxury in the pay of some Muslim king. It is, how- 
ever, extremely doubtful if at this time he conceived 
any general design of freeing his brother Hindus from 
the insults and outrages to which they were often 
subjected by the dominant Muslim population.* An 
independent sovereignty for himself he certainly 
coveted ; but he never posed as the liberator of the 
Hindus in general, at all events not till long after- 
wards. (Chit. 29; Dig. 100-103, 112.) 

The inconstancy, intrigue and bloodshed which 
stained the Court of Bijapur in those days foreboded 
for it a downfall like that of Ahmadnagar. Mughal 
service was a no better alternative to Shivaji. The 
imperialists had killed Kheloji Bhonsla, his grand- 

* Baaatin-i-Salatin, 332 and 334, frankly describes in detail 
how the Hindus were depressed as a deliberate policy of the 
State of Bijapur in the palmy days of Muhammad Adil Shah. 

30 SHIVAJl. [CH. II. 

uncle, and their superior resources and organisation 
made it unlikely for the Hindus of the Deccan to 
enjoy greater toleration or power under them than 
under the weaker and smaller sultanates close 
by. Moreover, to the Deccanis, both Hindu and 
Muhammadan, Delhi was a far-off city, with an alien 
speech and an alien ruling race, who would pitilessly 
discard their southern instruments after service had 
been taken from them. A career of independence 
was no doubt risky to Shivaji, but it had undreamt of 
advantages to compensate for the risks, if only he 
could succeed. 

On the question of his future career he came into 
conflict with his guardian. Dadaji Kond-dev w^as, 
no doubt, an able and honest land-steward, a man of 
methodical habits, leading a sober blameless and 
humdrum life, but quite incapable of lofty ideals, 
daring ambition or far-off vision. Shivaji's love of 
adventure and independence appeared to his guardian 
as the sign of an untutored and wayward spirit, which 
would ruin his life's chances. He argued long with 
Shivaji, advised him to follow the footsteps of his 
ancestors and rise to wealth and position as an 
obedient vassal and captain of mercenaries under 
Adil Shah. The young lad's association with the hill 
brigands and his projects about robbery and surprise 
of forts filled Dadaji with apprehensions about his 
future. He complained to Shahji, but without 
succeeding in effecting a reform. Worn out by anxiety 


and age, Dadaji Kond-dev died, early in 1647,* and 
Shiva ji became his own master at the age of twenty. 

§6. Shioaji's early conquest of forts, 1646-1647. 

The death of Dadaji Kond-dev found Shiva ready 
for his task. He had already been trained in martial 
exercises and civil administration ; he had fami- 
liarised himself with the troops of his father's western 
jagir and the people he would have to govern. 
Initiative and power of command had been freely 
developed in him without check or interference from 
his guardian. Administrative orders had for some 
time before this been issued in his name, as his 
father's representative, while Dadaji Kond-dev had 
stood by watching his pupil. Shivaji had also taken 
part, with his mother or his tutor, in some judicial ' 
investigations and public decisions of legal disputes 

The band of officers already gathered round him 
were men of tried ability and devotion to him. 
Shyamraj Nilkanth Ranjhekar (the correct form of the 
name is Rozekar, according to some modern Maratha 
scholars) was the Chancellor (peshwa) ; Balkrishna 
Dikshit was Accountant-General {majmaadar) ; 

* Letters and Sanads, 111, gives 1 647 as the year of 
Dadaji's death. A mahzar issued by him on 31 May 1646 is 
extant (Raj. iv. 80; cf. xvi. 36.) T. S. lOb says that in utter 
disgust at Shivaji's waywardness, Dadaji took poison, when 
Shiva was 17 years old. Dig. 119 asserts that he died in 1640 
(wrong.) Dig. 113-117. Chit. 29-31. 

t I have missed the reference, and cannot make the above 
statement with confidence. (Try Raj., xv-xviii.) 


Sonaji Pant was secretary (dabir) and Raghu- 
nath Ballal Korde was paymaster (sabnis.) These 
four officers had been sent by Shahji about 1639. To 
them Shivaji now added Tukoji Chor Maratha as 
commander-in-chief (sar-i-naubat) and Narayan Pant 
as divisional paymaster. (Sabh. 7 and 8 ; Chit. 21 ; 
T. S. lOb.) 

The year 1646 marks a crisis in the history of 
Bijapur. The king fell seriously ill, and for some time 
his life was despaired of. Though he lingered on for 
ten years more, these years were by popular belief 
held to be a portion of the life of the saint Shah 
Hashim Uluvi, given away by that holy man to the 
king. (B. S. 312.) During this time no serious business 
was attended to by Muhammad Adil Shah. The 
expansion of territory in the Kamatak went on under 
some of the nobles, but at the capital the king 
w^as inert, and the administration fell into the hands 
of the queen Bari Sahiba. The official history of 
Bijapur is significantly silent about Muhammad Adil 
Shah's doings from 1646 to his death in 1656. 

This was Shivaji 's opportunity. Even before the 
death of Dadaji, he had begun his annexations. In 
1646 he had sent his captains Baji Pasalkar, Yesaji 
Kank and Tanaji Malusare with a force of Mavle 
infantrymen and occupied Torna fort by tricking its 
Bijapuri commandant. Here he seized Government 
treasure amounting to 2 lakhs of hurt. The captured 
fort was newly named Prachandgarh, a name which 
it soon lost. Five miles east of it, on the crest of the 


same spur of hills, he built a new fort named Rajgarh, 
with three walled redoubts (machi) on the successive 
terraces of the hill-side. (Chit. 30; Dig. 117; 
7. S. 12b.)* 

These acts of aggression were reported to Bijapur. 
But Shivaji secured friends at Court by bribing the 
ministers, and they sided with him against the local 
jagirdars whom he had dispossessed. (K. K. ii. 1 14.) 
Shahji also is said to have turned away the king's 
wrath by similar assertions of Shivaji's loyal 
intentions and the negligent administration of the 
former owner of Torna. At the same time he sent 
a secret letter of reprimand to his son and warned 
Dadaji to keep better control over him. (Chit. 31.) 

Shivaji's first act after the death of Dadaji was 
to bring all parts of Shahji's western jagir under his 
own control, so as to form one compact State ruled 
by one authority. Shambhuji Mohite, the brother of 
Shahji's second wife, had been left by that chief as 
his agent in the Supa subdivision. On the death of 
Dadaji, he refused to obey his young nephew and 
wanted to take his orders direct from Shahji. But 
Shivaji imprisoned him during a holiday visit, attached 
all his property, and, on his persisting in his refusal 

* Sabhasad is silent about the capture of Torna. A. N. 
576, and following it K. K. (ii. 115), say that Chandan was the 
first fort taken by him. The date of the capture of Torna has 
been conjecturally put as 1646. Shiva loots Bijapuri treasure 
on the way, Chit. 31 ; Dig. 140. 


34 sHivAji. [cH. n. 

to serve him, sent him back to Shahji with his personal 
effects. Thus Supa was annexed. (Sabh. 8, Chit. 
32, Dig. 119, T. S. 12a & b.) 

The fort of Chakan, guarding the road to Puna 
in the north, had been entrusted by his father to 
Firangji Narsala. This officer offered obedience to 
Shivaji and was confirmed in his post. (Chit. 32 ; 
T. S. 12f> ; Dig 120.) The petty officers of the thanahs 
of Baramati and Indapur on the eastern margin of 
the jagir, peacefully submitted to Shiva's authority. 
The fort of Kondana, 1 1 miles south-west of Puna, 
was next secured by bribing its Adil-Shahi governor. 
(Sabh. 9.) 

The strong fortress of Purandar, 18 miles s. s. e. 
of Puna, was held for Bijapur by an old Brahman 
named Nilo Nilkanth Nayak, whose family had been 
in hereditary charge of it and its adjacent lands ever 
since the days of the Ahmadnagar dynasty. Nilo was 
a stern grasping man who denied his younger 
brothers, Pilaji and Shankaraji, any share of his power 
or emolument. They resented this exclusion from 
their birth-right and appealed to Shivaji to arbitrate 
between them. He was admitted into the fort at the 
Feast of Lamps (November) as a guest. On the third 
day of his stay, the two younger brothers surprised 
and fettered Nilo and brought him before Shiva, who 
imprisoned all the three and took possession of the 
fort for himself! The Nayak's retainers, "all faith- 
less and disorderly men," were expelled and a Mavie 
garrison was placed there by Shivaji. According to 


the Chitnis Bakhar and Shivadigvijay , he gave the 
two younger brothers estates elsewhere as compensa- 
tion. (Sabh. 9 ; Chit. 40 ; Dig. 121-122 ; T. S. 11b- 

Supa, Baramati and Indapur, in the south-eastern 
corner of the Puna district, had belonged to him 
from before. And now the occupation of Purandar, 
Rajgarh, Kondana and Torna secured his territory 
by a strong chetin of hill-forts on the south. Another 
fort in the same direction was Rohira, gained some 
time afterwards. North-west of Puna he acquired 
the forts of Tikona, Lohgarh, and Rajmachi, — the laist 
being on the Sahyadri crest, 6 miles north of the 
Bhor pass and overlooking the Konkan plain on the 
west. (Chit. 33-36 ; Dig. 148, a mere list.) 

§7. Shioaji enters North Konkfin. 

Next Shivaji crossed the Western Ghats and 
ventured into Konkan. The northern part of this 
coast-strip formed the Kalian (modem, Thana) district 
and was then held by an Arab foreigner named 
Mulla Ahmad of the Nawaiyat clan, one of the lead- 
ing nobles of Bijapur. The protracted illness of 
Muhammad Adil Shah had detained this governor at 
Bijapur for a long time, and during his absence the 
defence of his jagir had grown slack and inefl&cient. 
(A. N. 576 ; K. K. ii. 114.) A considerable amount 
of disaffection and disorder seems to have prevailed 
among the petty chieftains of the district, which was 

36 SHIVAJI. [CH. 11. 

a recent acquisition from the Nizam-Shahi State and 
where the authority of the new Government sat loose. 
A body of Maratha horsemen under Abaji Sondev 
raided the rich towns of KaHan* and Bhiundy, which 
were then without walls, and thence they carried off 
much wealth and costly merchandise. The fort of 
Mahuli, which had once belonged to Shahji, was next 
seized. The city of KaHan, with some other parts 
of the Thana district, thus passed into Shiva's posses- 
sion, and he got a firm footing in Northern Konkan, 
which he rapidly improved in the course of the year. 
His progress southwards into the Kolaba district 
seems to have been assisted by the petty local chiefs 
who were eager to throw off Muslim yoke and wrote 
inviting him to come. (Chit. 34, 35 and 41 ; Dig. 1 75 ; 
T. S. 13a.) Surgarh (8 miles east), Birwadi (5 miles 
west), Tala (10 miles south), Ghosalgarh (5 m. s. w.), 
Bhurap or Sudhagarh, 15 miles east of Roha town, 
Kangori 12 miles east of Mahad, and above all the 
impregnable fortress of Rairi (Raigarh) which was to 
be his future capital, all passed into his hands, and 
thus the Abyssinians of Janjira lost the eastern half 
of the Kolaba district to him. At Birwadi and 
Lingana (5 miles east of Raigarh) he built strong forts. 

* Shivaji's chivalry to a captive Muhammadan girl, Chit. 
34 and 41 ; T. S. 14a ; Dig. 189 (different story.) Chitnis calls 
the governor of Kalian, MuUa Hayat. Tavernier (ii. 205) tells 
us that Shiva discovered buried treasure at Kalian; Chit (31) 
says at Torna, T. S. (14b) at Pradhangarh (evidently a mistake 
for Prachandgeirh or Torna.) 


But he does not seem to have occupied Mahad 
or the country south of that town at this time. Abaji 
Sondev was created viceroy of the province thus w^on 
in North Konkan, which included the eastern parts 
of the Thana and Kolaba districts. The Maratha 
forces here met with a great repulse at the hands of 
the Siddis (about 1648), and Shivaji marked his dis- 
pleasure with his defeated general Shyamraj, Nilkanth 
Ranjhekar by removing him from the Peshwaship 
(Chit. 34) and conferring that post on Moro Trimbak 
Pingle, while a large army under Raghunath Ballal 
Korde was sent against the Siddis to retrieve the 
prestige of his arms. The history of Maratha activity 
in this region will be described in Chapter XI. 

§8. Adil Shah imprisons Shahji, 1648. 
Shivaji's annexations had reached this point by 
the middle of 1648, when his career of conquest was 
suddenly checked by alarming news from the 
Karnatak. On 6th August his father was arrested 
and all his property and contingent attached by the 
Bijapuri commander-in-chief, Mustafa Khan, then 
investing Jinji in the South Arcot district. Later 
historians have misunderstood the cause of this act. 
The contemporary Persian historian of Bijapur asserts 
that Shahji was imprisoned for displaying a spirit of 
insubordination to the commander-in-chief. The 
earliest Marathi bakhar, that of Sabhasad, is entirely 
silent about the affair. But Chitnis writing 160 years 
after the event, ascribes it to the Bijapuri king's anger 

38 SHIVAJI. [CH. 11. 

at Shivaji's usurpations and Shahji's supposed con- 
nivance at them. 

Zahur, son of Zahuri, in his Mtihammad-namah 
(pp. 371-372), written by order of Muhammad Adil 
Shah, gives the following earliest and most correct 
account of the incident : — "When the siege of Jinji 
was protracted and fighting continued long, the cun- 
ning Shahji sent an agent to Nawab Mustafa Khan 
begging leave to go to his own country and give 
repose to his troops. The Nawab replied that to 
retire then would be equivalent to disturbing [the 
work of the siege.] Then Shahji sent to say that 
grain was very dear in the camp, that the soldiers 
could not bear the privation and labour any longer, 
and that he would retire to his own country without 
waiting for permission [from the commander-in- 
chief.] The Nawab, being convinced that Shahji 
meant mischief and would show fight, had him 
arrested with such extreme cleverness and good 
arrangement that no part of his property was plun- 
dered, but the whole was confiscated to Govern- 

A later but very reliable Persian history of Bija- 
pur, viz., Basatin-i-Salatin (309-311), supplies some 
additional information: — "Shahji, withdrawing his 
head from obedience to the Nawab Mustafa Khan, 
began to oppose him, till at last the Nawab decided 
to arrest him. One day he made Baji Rao Ghorpade 
and Jaswant Rao Asad-Khani get their forces ready 
and sent them very early in the morning to Shahji's 


camp. Shahji, having passed the preceding night in 
mirth and revehy, was still sleeping in bed. As soon 
as the two Raos arrived and he learnt of their pur- 
pose, he in utter bewilderment took horse and 
galloped away from his house alone. Baji Ghorpade 
gave chase, caught him, and brought him before the 
Nawab, who threw him into confinement. His 
contingent of 3,000 cavalry was dispersed, and his 
camp was thoroughly looted... Adil Shah on hearing 

of it sent from his Court Afzal Khan to bring 

Shahji away and an eunuch to attach his property, 
...Nov. 1648." Shahji was brought in chains to 
Bijapur, and according to a late and very doubtful 
Maratha tradition the door of his cell was slowly 
walled up, in order to induce him to compel his son 
to give up his lawless career and come to Bijapur. 
(Chit. 37-38 ; Dig. 143-146.) 

Shivaji was in a terrible dilemma : he could not 
submit to Bijapur and thereby sacrifice all his gains 
.and hopes of future greatness ; nor, on the other 
hand, could he leave his father in danger of torture 
and starvation. By diplomacy alone could he rescue 
his father, and diplomacy pointed to only one path 
as open to a man in his position. The Mughal 
Emperor was the hereditary enemy of Adil Shah, 
and every rebel against Bijapur was sure to gain the 
Emperor's patronage if he could hold forth the chance 
of strengthening the imperial cause in the Deccan by 
the adhesion of his followers. The Mughal Emperor 
alone was strong enough to intimidate Adil Shah. 


Shivaji first wrote to Prince Murad Bakhsh,* 
the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan, entreating him 
to secure the Emperor's pardon for Shahji's past con- 
duct and protection for him and his sons in future, 
and offering to come and join the Mughal service on 
receiving a written assurance of safety (qaul.) To 
this Murad replied on i4th March 1649, telling him 
to send first a trusty agent to report his demands. 
This was evidently done, and Murad after reporting 
the case to the Emperor and learning his wishes, 
wrote to Shiva on 14th August asking him to come 
to Court with his father and kinsmen, that he might 
be created a 5-hazari, while Shahji would get back 
the rank he had once held in the Mughal peerage. 
Still later, on 31st October, Murad wrote directly to 
Shahji to inform him that Shivaji's appeal for his 
release had been received, and that as the Prince 
was soon going back to the imperial Court, he would 
there report the prayers of Shahji to the Emperor 
and take his orders. He asked the Maratha chief to 
send his agent to Court to receive the Emperor's 
jarman and assurance of safety, and on his own 
behalf presented him with a robe of honour. In this 

* Shivaji neither wrote nor sent any envoy to the 
Emperor at Delhi. All his negotiations about his father were 
conducted with Murad, as the four original Persian letters of 
Murad in Parasnis's possession show. Rajwade, viii. 2-3. 
wrongly represents these letters as coming from Sheth Jahan. 
The Emperor never interfered for the release of Shahji. 


letter Shambhuji and other sons of Shahji are spoken 
of as sharing his captivity. 

Shivaji then sent Raghunath Pant [Korde?] as 
his envoy to the Prince to ask for the deshmukhi of 
the Junnar and Ahmadnagar parganahs. Murad, on 
30th November, 1649, promised to try to secure these 
rights for him on reaching the Emperor's presence. 
Whether Shah Jahan really consented to put pressure 
on Adil Shah to release Shahji is very doubtful. No 
historian mentions it. Indeed, active Mughal inter- 
vention on behalf of Shahji seems to me very improb- 
able. For one thing, Shah Jahan always treated 
Muhammad Adil Shah with marked courtesy and 
kindness, while Shahji was bitterly hated at the 
Mughal Court for the trouble he had given them in 
1633-1636. Then, again, the Mughal Emperor had 
definitely promised in his treaties with Bijapur not 
to take into his service or extend his protection to 
any officer of Adil Shah. I, therefore, hold that 
Malhar Ram Rao, the hereditary secretary (chitnis) 
and record-keeper of Shivaji's descendants, is right 
when he ascribes the release of Shahji to the friendly 
mediation of Sharza Khan and the bail of Randaula 
Khan, two leading nobles of Bijapur, and says not 
a word about any Mughal exertion for his liberation. 
{Chit. 39 ; Dig. 147.) 

Shahji was probably kept in prison till the capture 
of Jinji (17th Dec. 1649) made the Adil.Shahi position 
in the Kamatak absolutely secure, so that in the 
event of his return there he could no longer work 

42 sHiVAji. [cH. n. 

any mischief. On his release he seems to have livetl 
for some time in the Tungabhadra region subduing 
the rebellious chieftains of his jagir in Northern 
Mysore. Here his eldest son Shambhuji fell in an 
attack on Kanakgiri, but he himself eifterwards 
carried the fort by assault. (Chit. 23 ; Dig. 61-62 ; 
T. S. 8b.) 

While Shahji was in prison, or after his release, 
an attempt was made by the Bijapuri Court to cap- 
ture Shiva. For this purpose a Maratha named Baji 
Shyamraje was sent into Konkan with 10,000 men. 
By way of Wai and Javli, in the northern side of the 
Satara district, he reached the town of Mahad, 
hoping to surprise Shivaji there. But Shiva was just 
then at Chaul, looting the port and setting up his 
own administration there, and so he returned to 
Rajgarh without being caught. A detachment from 
his army fell on Baji Shyamraje and sent him quickly 
back with heavy loss by the same way that he had 

As the release of Shahji had been conditional, 
Shiva kept quiet during the years 1649 to 1655. He 
seems to have contented himself with consolidating 

* Chitnis, 36. But Shed. Bakhar, 19, says that Randaula 
Khan of Rahamatpur and Baji Ghorpade of Datvad came 
against Shiva with 8,000 men and halted at Wai, where they 
were defeated and put to flight by a concerted attack by 
Shivaji and Netaji from two sides with 10,000 men. But this 
source of information is usually unreliable. Parasnis's 
%1ahahaleshwar, 19 (legendary.) 


his conquests and organising their administration, 
instead of giving the Bijapur Government new pro- 
vocation by fresh annexations. 

§9. Conquest of Jaoli, 1655. 

At the extreme north-western comer of the 
Satara district lies the village of Javli, which was 
then the centre of a fair^^ large principality includ- 
ing nearly the whole of that district. The 
subdivision of Javli is "throughout hilly and thickly 
wooded with evergreen trees... The narrow rugged 
and steep crest of the Sahyadris, rising 4,000 feet or 
more above sea-level, forms its western wall ; and 
in the valleys the tree growth is luxuriant, forming 
high forests." {Bom. Gaz. xix, 3.) Within a length 
of 60 miles as many as 8 passes cross the range, 
two of them being fit for carts and now transporting 
a large traffic from the Deccan plateau to Mahad in 
Kolaba and Chiplun in Ratnagiri. There are, 
besides, countless gorges and foot-tracks leading 
from Javli to Konkan. 

A Maratha family named More had received a 
grant of the State of Javli from the first Sultan of 
Bijapur early in the 16th century, and made the 
claim good by their sword. For eight generations 
they conquered the petty chieftains around and 
amassed a vast treasure by plunder. They kept 
12,000 infantry, mostly sturdy hillmen of the same 
class as the Mavles, and succeeded in getting 
possession of the entire district of Satara and parts 

44 SHIVA JI. [CH. 11. 

of Konkan. The head of the family bore the 
hereditary title of Chandra Rao, conferred by a 
Bijapur king in recognition of the founder's personal 
strength and courage. The younger sons enjoyed 
appanages in the neighbouring villages. Eighth in 
descent from the founder was Krishnaji Baji, who 
succeeded to the lordship of Javli about 1652.* 

The State of Javli, by its situation, barred the 
path of Shivaji's ambition in the south and south- 
west. As he frankly said to Raghunath Ballal Korde, 
"Unless Chandra Rao is killed, the kingdom cannot 
be secured. None but you can do this deed. I send 
you to him as envoy." The Brahman entered into 
the conspiracy, and went to Javli, attended by an 
escort of 125 picked men, on a pretended proposal 
of marriage between Shiva and Chandra Rao s 
daughter. (Sabh. 10, Chit. 41, Dig. 128, Shed. 

On the first day the envoy made a show of 
opening marriage negotiations. Finding out that 
Chandra Rao was fond of drink and usually lived in 
a careless unguarded manner, Raghunath w^rote to 
his master to come to the neighbourhood in force 
and be in readiness to take advantage of the murder 
immediately after it was committed. The second 
interview with Chandra Rao w^as held in a private 
chamber. Raghunath talked for some time on the 
endless details of a Hindu marriage treaty, and then 

* Parasnis Itih. Sangr. Sfuta lekh, i. 26. 


drew his dagger all of a sudden and stabbed 
Chandra Rao to death and wounded his brother 
Surya Rao, who was despatched by a Maratha 
soldier. The assassins promptly rushed out of the 
gate, cut their way through the alarmed and confused 
guards, beat back the small and hurriedly organised 
band of pursuers and gained a chosen place of hid- 
ing in the forest. 

Shivaji had kept himself ready to follow up 
his agent's crime ; according to later accounts he 
had arrived at Mahabaleshwar with an army on the 
plea of a pilgrimage. Immediately on hearing of the 
murder of the Mores, he arrived and assaulted Javli. 
The leaderless garrison defended themselves for six 
hours and were then overcome. Chandra Rao's two 
sons and entire family were made prisoners. But his 
kinsman and manager, Hanumant Rao More, rallied 
the partisans of the house and held a neighbouring 
village in force, menacing Shivaji's new conquest. 
Shiva found that "unless he murdered Hanumant, 
the thorn would not be removed from Javli." 
(Sabh. IQ.) So, he sent a Maratha officer of his 
household neimed Shambhuji Kavji with a pretended 
message to Hanumant Rao, who was then stabbed 
to death at a private interview, (about Oct. 1655.) 
The whole kingdom of Javli now passed into 
Shivaji's possession and he was free to invade South 
Konkan with ease or extend his dominion southwards 
into the Kolhapur district. 

46 SHIVAJI. [CH. u. 

The acquisition of Javli was the result of 
deliberate murder and organised treachery on the part 
of Shivaji. His power was then in its infancy, and 
he could not afford to be scrupulous in the choice 
of the means of strengthening himself. In exactly 
similar circumstances, Sher Shah, his historic parallel, 
used similar treachery in gaining forts in South Bihar 
as the first step to a throne. 

The only redeeming feature of this dark episode 
in his life is that the crime was not aggravated by 
hypocrisy. All his old Hindu biographers are agreed 
that it was an act of pre-meditated murder for 
personal gain and not a pardonable homicide done 
in self-defence or during the confusion of an un- 
expected brawl. Even Shivaji never pretended that 
the murder of the three Mores was prompted by a 
desire to found a "Hindu swaraj," or to remove from 
his path a treacherous enemy beyond the chance of 

TTiis last touch of infamy it has been left to the 
present generation to add. Some Maratha writers 
have recently "discovered" what they vaguely call 
"an old chronicle," — written nobody knows when or 
by whom, based nobody knows on what authorities, 
and transmitted nobody knows how, — ^which asserts 
that Chandra Rao had tried to seize Shiva by 
treachery and hand him over to the vengeance of 
Bijapur, and that he had at first been pardoned by 
the latter and had then ungratefully conspired with 


Baji Ghorpade to imprison Shivaji.* Unfortunately 
for the credibility of such convenient "discoveries," 
none of the genuine old historians of Shiva could 
anticipate that this line of defence would be adopted 
by the twentieth century admirers of the national 
hero ; they have called the murder a murder. 

The two sons of the murdered Chandra Rao 
were taken to Puna and there put to death. f But 
some of the Mores remained at large and sought to 
be avenged on Shivaji, though in vain. In 1665, 
when Jai Singh opened a campaign against that 
Maratha chief, he invited these Mores to join him and 
carry on their blood-feud with the Bhonslas with 
greater hope of success. 

The annexation of Javli not only opened to 
Shivaji a door for the conquest of the south and 
the west, but brought a very important accession to 
his strength, in the form of many thousands of Mavie 
infantrymen from among the subjects and former 
retainers of Chandra Rao. In short, his recruiting 
ground for these excellent fighters along the Sahyadri 
range, was now doubled. The Mores had accumu- 
lated a vast treasure in eight generations of 
undisturbed and expanding rule, and the whole of 
it fell into Shivaji's hands. 

Two miles west of Javli he built a new fort 

* Patcisnls liih. Sangrah, Sfuta lekh, i. 26-29 and ii. II. 
Mahabaleshwar (Eng.), 17-21. 

t T. S. 14a; Dig. 132; Chit. 42. Sabh. silent. 

48 SHIVA Jl. [CH. II. 

named Pratapgarh, and here he set up an image of 
his patron goddess Bhavani, as the more ancient 
Bhavani of Tuljapur was beyond his reach. On her 
he lavished his wealth in costly ornaments and trapp- 
ings and to this shrine he made repeated pilgrimages. 
(Sabh. 26 : Chit. 42 ; Itih. Sang. Sfuta lekh, ii. 11 ; 
Dig. 132.) 

West of Javli, in the Konkan plain, near the 
centre of the Ratnagiri district, lay the principal- 
ity of Shringarpur,* owned by a chieftain named 
Surve, but virtually ruled by his minister, a Shirke. 
As Shiva entered the country, the chief fled away 
and the minister surrendered it and was taken into 
Shivaji's pay. (Sabh. II.) Other petty chiefs of the 
neighbourhood were reduced to submission and their 
lands annexed. Thus, the eastern half of Ratna- 
giri became Shiva's, while Rajapur and the ports 
continued under Bijapur till 1660, and in some cases 
even later. 

The greatly expanded Maratha kingdom was 
now organised on a stronger and more elaborate 
plan : Mbro Trimbak Pin^e was appointed as 
Chancellor {Peshwa) vice the incompetent Shyamraj 

* A letter written by the English prisoners at Songarh in 
June 1661 says, "Shivaji hath lately enlarged his country by 
overcoming the two Rajahs of Dulvice (? Dalve) and the Rajah 
of Singapur {sic), by which means he commands all the coeist 
from Danda Rajpuri castle to Kharepatan." (Orme MSS. Vol. 
155, pp. 1-21.) "Singapur, 7 gav to the northward of Rajapur." 
(F. R. Surat, 104.) 

1656] shiva's territory & officers. 49 

Nilkanth Ranjhekar, Nilo Sondev Accountant- 
General (majmtmdaT) vice Balkiishna Pant, and 
Netaji Palkar as Master of the Horse (aar-i-naubat.} 
Two new posts, those of Surnis (Superintendent of 
Correspondence) and Waqnis (News-writer) were 
created and given to Abaji Sondev and Gangaji 
Mangaji respectively.* The cavalry now mustered 
10,000, out of whom 7,000 were mounted on Govern- 
ment horses and the rest on their own ; the Mavle 
infantry numbered 10,000 and their commander was 
Yesaji Kank. (Sabh. 1 1 .) The forts, new and old, 
held by Shivaji at this time were forty. (A. N. 576.) 
In June 1657 the newly-founded kingdom was blessed 
with the birth of an heir to the throne, the ill-fated 

We may conveniently pause here and take note 
of the exact size of the infant Maratha kingdom. 
At the cautious outset of his independent career 
(1647-48), Shivaji's territory consisted of his father's 
jagirs and his own early annexations from Bijapur. 
These together covered the southern half of the Puna 
district, and their northern boundeuy was the old 
Mughal frontier, — a line running diagonally from the 
north-western to near the south-eastern corner of that 
district and avoiding the Mughal forts Junnar, Visa- 
pur, and Parnir ; i.e., for some distance the Ghod river 

* The reading of the Mahad MS. of Sabh. (1 1 n) has been, 
accepted here. Chit. 34 (Anlnaji Datto Jind not Abaji Sondev 
as Surnis) ; Shed. 20. Dig. 186-188 gives a long Hst in which 
official ai>pointnients of different periods seem to be mixed up. 

50 SHIVAJI. [Ch. 11. 

divided the two dominions in the north ; Junnar and 
Chamargunda belonged to the Mughals and Chakan 
to Shivaji. His southern boundary was marked by 
the outposts of Indapur, Baramati, and Supa and the 
forts of Purandar, Rajgarh, Kondana, and Torna. In 
Konkan or the country west of the Ghats, he had 
gained Kalian, Mahuli, and some other places in the 
south-eastern corner of the Thana district and the 
eastern half of the Kolaba district down to but not 
including the town of Mahad. 

The above was his position in 1648. But in 
1655 the conquest of Javli extended his dominions 
in the uplands or Desh to the southern limit of the 
Satara district, and in Konkan from Mahad to near 
Rajapur, i.e., over the south-eastern Kolaba and 
nearly the whole of eastern Ratnagiri districts. Thus 
he now became master of the whole of Konkan 
except the ports and adjacent lands on the west coast 
(which belonged to Bijapur, the Siddis, and the 
Portuguese) and the extreme north of the Thana and 
the extreme south of the Ratnagiri districts. 

The Murder of the Mores. 

TTie earliest Maratha historian of Shivaji, viz., 
Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad (1694), writes that Shivaji 
sent Raghunath Ballal as envoy to Chandra Rao, 


frankly telling him, "Unless Chandra Rao is killed, 
the kingdom cannot be secured. None but you can 
do this deed," (p. 10), and that Raghunath committed 
the murder on getting a suitable opportunity. This 
book was written by a courtier of Shivaji, by order of 
Shivaji's favourite son. He had the best means of 
knowing the truth and no motive for suppressing it. 
It is inconceivable that such a writer invented a false 
charge of murder against Shivaji, unless the latter 
had been notoriously guilty of the crime. A century 
later, Malhar Ram Rao, the hereditary secretary of 
Shivaji's descendants and keeper of their family re- 
cords, also tells the same story, (p. 41.) What motive 
could he have had for calumniating the great founder 
of his master's family as a murderer? The Marathi 
life of Shivaji preserved in Raigarh castle when it 
was in Maratha possession, and composed much 
earlier than Chitnis's history, tells us, "Raghunath 
treacherously assassinated Hanumant Rao. Shivaji 
was pleased with Raghunath's conduct," (p.! i .) But 
as the origineJ of this work has been lost, 1 attach no 
importance to it. 

Against the unanimous testimony of such known 
and authentic witnesses, Rao Bahadur Parasnis puts 
the evidence of the so-called Mahabaleshwar Bakhar, 
which exists in a single anonymous undated MS., — 
discovered some 20 years ago among the papers of 
the modern Rajahs of Satara, while of Sabhasad 
and Chitnis's bakhars many MSS. have been found 
and in different parts of the country. The unique 

52 SHivAji. [Ch. IL 

MS. of the Mahabaleshwar Bakhar has not been 
shown to the public even in Maharashtra, nor ex- 
amined by experts with a view to judging its date and 
authenticity. A critic, evidently in the confidence of 
the Rao Bahadur, now writes that the MS. contains a 
statement that it was written by order of Rajah 
Shahu. We do not know the authority for this entry, 
nor whether the colophon was contemporaneous with 
the body of the MS. or is a modem addition. 

Now, Shahu overcame his domestic rivals, curbed 
his Muslim enemies and became firmly seated on his 
throne after 1725, and he could have had time to 
think of rectifying his grandfather's reputation only 
towards the peaceful close of his reign (which ended 
in 1 749.) This bakhar, if written by Shahu's order 
at all, was written about 1740 or even later, — i.e., 
more than 80 years after the murder of the Mores. 
What were its nameless author's means of knowing 
the truth better than Shivaji's own courtier? Could any 
written record about the Javli affair, contemporaneous 
with the event, have survived till 1740 and then dis- 
appeared, while the bakhar alleged to have been 
composed in that year and at the same place has 
survived ? The Mahabaleshwar Bakhar, therefore, 
even if written in Shahu's time, had no other basis 
than unreliable oral tradition or deliberate invention. 
To accept such a work against Sabhasad and Chitnis 
is to defy the most elementary laws of historic 

And even then, the Mahabaleshwar Bakhar 


never really contradicts Sabhasad ; it does not ceite- 
gorically deny that Shiva's envoy murdered Chandra 
Rao or that Shiva had authorised the deed. It merely 
accuses Chandra Rao of implacable hostility to 
Shivaji, but tells us nothing of what actually happen- 
ed at the fatal interview. And yet on its slender — or 
rather non-existent basis, Mr. Kinceud's brilliant 
imagination builds up the following scene which he 
presses upon the public ignorant of Marathi as the 
true and attested story of the Javli affair : 

"From the recently discovered Mahabaleswar 
account, it is clear that Shivaji repeatedly strove to 
win More to his side, that More as often tried 
treacherously to take Shivaji prisoner, and that he 
eventually fell in a quarrel between him and Ragho 
Ballal Atre, while the latter was delivering him an 
xiltimatum. Shivaji was thus clearly innocent of 
More's death." 

"What happened [at the interview with More] 
is obscure. It is probable that Shivaji's envoy charged 
Balaji [i.e., Chandra Rao More] with double dealing 
and that the latter complained of Shivaji's invasion 
[i.e., occupation of Mahabaleshwar in force.] High 
"words were exchanged, swords were drawn and 
Ragho Ballal Atre and Sambhaji Kavji killed More 
and his brother. . .Shivaji had not authorised his 
■envoy's acts." (Kincaid and Parasnis, History of the 
Maratha People, i. 272, 150-151.) 

I trust that the astonishing method of appraising 
evidence and drawing legitimate inferences exhibited 

54 SHIVAJl. [Ch. II. 

by the learned ex-Judge of Satara in the above 
passage, will not be taken by scholars abroad as 
typical of the way in which the amateur Judges of 
the Indian Civil Service deal criminal justice in India. 

The historian who cares for his reputation has,, 
unfortunately, to place truth above popularity. 


First Wars with Mughals and 
BijAPUR, 1656-1659. 

§1. Relations ivith the Mughals up to 1657. 

For many years after his first assertion of in- 
dependence, Shivaji carefully maintained peace with 
the Mughals. For one thing, his power was not yet 
secure, and it would have been the height of folly to 
provoke both Bijapur and Delhi at the same time. 
Secondly, from 1653 onwards Mughal Deccan 
was governed by Prince Aurangzib with singular 
efficiency and vigour, and his neighbours rightly 
dreaded giving him any offence. When Aurangzib 
was involved in war with Golkonda (January-March 
1656), Shivaji was too busy organising his conquests 
in Javli and the northern Ratnagiri district to raid 
Mughal territory during that Prince's absence from 
his charge. 

On the death of Muhammad Adil Shah (4 Nov. 
1656), Aurangzib began active preparations for the 
invasion of Bijapur, and tried to seduce as many 
Adil-Shahi nobles and vassals as he could. Shivaji 
then wrote a letter to Multafat Khan, the Mughal 
governor of Ahmadnagar, offering to join the im- 
perialists if his desires were granted. To this a 
conciliatory reply was given, in accordance with 

56 SHiVAji. [Ch. III. 

Aurangzib's policy of "keeping the path of corres- 
pondence with him open." An envoy from Shiva 
approached Aurangzib directly at Aurangabad and 
reported his demands. The Prince replied in 
"reassuring and friendly terms, so as to make him 
more devoted to the imperial cause than before." 
{Adah. I44fc, I45f).) TTiis correspondence seems to 
have passed in December 1656 or the next month, 
though the letter to Multafat Khan may have been 
written as early as the preceding August. 

§2. Shioaji's first raid into Mughal Deccan. 

Shivaji had evidently demanded that the Mughal 
Government should take him under its protection and 
legalise his usurpations of Bijapur territory. The 
vague promises of favour and protection made by 
the Prince could not satisfy him. Even a less astute 
man than he must have known that such promises 
would amount to nothing in practice when the need 
of the imperialists would be over. So, when the 
■war broke out, Bijapur made a higher bid and 
induced Shivaji to make a diversion by raiding the 
south-western corner of Mughal Deccan, while 
Aurangzib's forces were concentrated at the siege of 
Bidar, beyond his south-eastern frontier. Two 
Maratha leaders, Minaji Bhonsla at the head of 3,000 
borse, and Kashi, crossed the Bhima and plundered 
the Mughal villages in the Chamargunda and Raisin 
subdivisions respectively, late in March 1657. They 
carried devastation and alarm to the very gates of 


Ahmadnagar, the most notable city in Mughal 
Deccan. (Kambu, 3b ; Adah. 148a.) 

While Minaji was raiding the Ahmadnagar dis- 
trict in the east, Shivaji was busy looting the Junnar 
subdivision in the north. One night he silently 
scaled the walls of Junnar city with rope-ladders and 
after slaughtering the guards, carried off 300,000 hurt 
in cash, 200 horses, and much costly clothing and 
jewellery. (Sabh. 8 ; Adab. !53fc'.) TTie success of 
the Maratha raiders was due to the negligence of the 
local Mughal officers (as the Delhi historian Kambu 
asserts) and probably also to their military weakness. 
Aurangzib, on hearing of these disturbances, 
censured the thanahdars and poured reinforcements 
into the Ahmadnagar district. 

§3. Aurangzib' s defensive measures. 

Nasiri Khan, Iraj Khan and some other officers 
at the head of 3,000 cavalry were ordered there. 
Rao Kam, who was coming from Aurangabad to 
Bidar, was diverted from the way. to the same place. 
Shaista Khan was ordered to detach 1 ,000 men from 
his contingent there. But Nasiri Khan's movements 
were provokingly slow. On 30th April he entered 
the parganah of Bir and four days later marched 
towards Ashti.* Thus, there was a great delay in 

* Bir (or Bid) is 68 m. e. and Ashti is 35 m. s. e. of 
Ahmadnagar. Chamargunda (or Shrigunda) is 33 m. s. of 
Ahmadnagar. (Ind. At. 39 N. E.) Raisin is 20 m. s. e. of 

58 SHIVAJI. [Ch. Ill, 

his going to Ahmadnagar and Junnar, expelling the 
enemy, and ravaging Shivaji's territory, as ordered 
by Aurangzib. (Kambu, 3b ; Adab. 147a, 153a, 

Meantime, Multafat Khan had issued from the 
fort of Ahmadnagar and relieved the beleaguered 
outpost at Chamarg^nda by defeating Minaji, (28th 
April.) But the Marathas continued to rove about 
the parganah for some time longer. However, the 
retainers of Multafat and Mirza Khan followed up 
their victory and at last cleared the Chamargunda 
subdivision. {Adab. llOfc, 153b, 154a.) 

Shivaji had stayed in the Junnar subdivision for 
some time, robbing the villages, as the Mughal rein- 
forcements were late in arriving there and he found 
the field clear. But, at the approach of Rao Kam 
and Shaista Khan, he fled from the neighbourhood 
of Junnar city and wandered over the district for 
some time, as he could not be caught and crushed. 
{Adab. ilOfc, 111b, il2a.) But when the pressure 
became great, he slipped away to the Ahmadnagar 
district and began to plunder it. By this time (end 
of May), however, Nasiri Khan had reached the 
scene. By a forced march he surprised Shiva's army 
and nearly encircled it. Many of the Marathas were 
slain, many wounded, and the rest put to flight. 
But there was no pursuit, as the Mughal horses were 
too tired. (Kambu, 4fc ; Adab. 154a, 156a.) 

Aurangzib's letters to Nasiri Khan and other 
officers breathed fury and revenge ; they must beat 


the raiders back from the imperial dominions and 
make reprisals by entering Shiva's land from all 
sides, "wasting the villages, slaying the people with- 
out pity, and plundering them to the extreme" ; 
Shivaji's possessions, Puna and Chakan, must be 
utterly ruined, and not the least remissness shown 
in slaying and enslaving the people ; the village 
headmen and peasants of the imperial territory who 
had secretly abetted the enemy, must be slain with- 
out pity. {Adah. 147a and b, 148a.) 

Aurangzib's new dispositions for guarding his 
south-western frontier showed excellent combination 
and judgment. Kar Talab Khan was posted near 
Junnar, Abdul Munim at Garh Namuna, and Nasiri 
Khan and Rao Kam at Panda "opposite Parenda 
fort," to guard the Chamargunda, Kara and Ashti 
parganahs.* {Adah. 148fe.) These officers stood 
facing the frontier and barring every path of the 
enemy's advance, so that the imperial ryots behind 
them might enjoy safety. The officers w^ere further 
bidden to make a dash forward across the frontier, 
whenever they got an opportunity; ravage as much 
of the enemy's territory in front of them as they 

* Panda (in Pers. text, Pandeh) is 16 m. n. w. of Parenda 
and 3 m. s. of Karmala. Kara is 9 m. n. w. of Ashti. I have 
followed Aurangzib's letters (in Adah) above ; but Kambu 
omits Garh Namuna and says that Abdul Munim was posted 
at Chamargunda. I have failed to trace Garh Namtina, unless 
it was a name given to the old and ruined outpost at Pedgaon, 
8 m. 3. of Chamargunda. 

60 SHIVAJI. [Ch. III. 

could, and then quickly return to the defence of their 
respective posts. {A dab. I47i>.) 

A Maratha attempt to loot the city of Ahmad- 
nagar was defeated ; Multafat Khan, the qiladar of 
the fort, took effective steps to defend the city at 
its foot, and removed the property of the inhabitants 
for greater safety within the fort. (Adah. I48b.) 

After Nasiri Khan's victory over Shiva in the 
Ahmadnagar district, he was ordered by Aurangzib 
to "pursue the Marathas and extirpate them," (end 
of May.) But this could not be done. The rains 
now set in with the full violence of the monsoons, 
and the campaign had to be closed. Shiva retreated 
to his own country and the Mughal officers fell back 
on their appointed stations, watching the frontier. 
"There was peace in the whole district." {Adah. 
156a, 1 49a.) 

June, July and August 1657 passed in enforced 
idleness for the imperial troops. In September the 
situation was complicated by the illness of Shah 
Jahan and the preparations for a War of Succession 
among his sons. Bijapur made peace with the 
Mughals. But throughout the month of September 
Aurangzib continued to urge his officers not to relax 
their vigilance, but hold the S. W. frontier in force, 
lest Shiva should renew his raids. About the middle 
of October he wrote to the governor of Ahmadnagar 
to take care of the city and keep his troops in 
readiness, lest when Nasiri Khan went back, Shiva 

1657] aurangzib's letter to shiva. 61 

finding the field clear should begin to plunder again 
(Adah. 14%. 1576.) 

§4. Shioaji makes peace with the Mughals. 

When in September his liege-lord, the king of 
Bijapur, made peace, Shivaji found it useless and 
even ruinous to himself to continue the war with 
the Mughal empire single-handed. He must try to 
save his patrimony. So, he wrote to Nasiri Khan 
offering submission, and the Khan replied in a con- 
ciliatory tone. Then Shiva, as requested, sent a 
trusty agent (probably Raghunath Ballal Korde) to 
the Khan to state his demands. These were reported 
to Aurangzib {Adab. 156fc, 1 57a} ; but no definite 
agreement followed. Shivaji now sent Raghunath 
Peint to Aurangzib directly. The Prince was just 
starting on his march to Northern India (25 Jan., 
1658) and wrote to Shiva in reply, "Though your 
offences do not deserve pardon, I forgive you as you 
have repented. You propose that if you are granted 
all the villages belonging to your home [i.e., Shahji's 
old jagir] together with the forts and territory of 
Konkan, after the imperialists have seized the old 
Nizam-Shahi territory now in the hands of Adil 
Shah, — ^you will send Sona Pandit as your envoy to 
my Court and a contingent of 500 horse under one 
of your officers to serve me, and you will protect 
the imperial frontiers. You are called upon to send 
Sonaji, and your prayers will be granted." (Parasnis 
MS., Letter 5.) 

62 SHivAji. [Ch. III. 

But while Aurangzib received Shiva's submission 
with outward pleeisure, his mind was not really com- 
posed about him. He omitted no precaution to 
maintain peace in that quarter by force, for he felt 
convinced that the young Maratha chief was a raider 
■whose daring was only equalled by his cunning, and 
an ambitious adventurer who would place self- 
interest above fidelity to his plighted word or 
gratitude for favours received. He wrote to Mir 
Jumla (December, 1657), "At Nasiri Khan's departure 
that district has been left vaccant. Attend to it, as 
the son o/ a dog is waiting for his opportunity." 
(Adab. 92a.) Adil Shah was thus urged by the 
Prince : "Protect this country. Expel Shiva who 
has sneaked into the possession of some forts of the 
land. If you wish to entertain his services, give 
him jagirs in the Karnateik, far from the imperial 
dominions, so that he may not disturb them." 
(Adab. 163a.) 

Aurangzib, therefore, left the Deccan without 
granting peace and pardon to Shivaji. The Mughals 
also repaired and garrisoned the old and ruined fort 
of Pedgaon, as a convenient outpost for operations 
against Puna. (Adab. I57fc.) But Shiva was freed 
from all fear of the Mughals by the War of Succes- 
sion which kept Aurangzib busy for the next two 
years, 1658 and 1659. 

§5. Bijapur plans to subdue Shivaji. 
After the Mughal invasion of 1657 had rolled 


back and Aurangzib had marched away to Northern 
India, the Bijapur Government gained respite and a 
sudden accession of vigour. True, the old prime- 
minister, Khan Muhammad, was murdered on a false 
suspicion of collusion with Auremgzib during the late 
war ; but his successor, Khawas Khan, was an able 
administrator. The Queen Mother, Bari Sahiba, 
who virtually ruled the State till her fatal journey to 
Mecca (1660), was a womsin of masterful spirit and 
experienced in the conduct of business. Freed for 
the time being from the constant menace of the 
Mughals on the frontier, the Bijapur Government 
now began tO' call its refractory vassals to account. 
Shahji was asked to punish his rebel son, but he 
frankly repudiated Shiva as his son and left the 
Government free to punish him without any consi- 
deration for his father's feelings. Measures had, 
therefore, to be taken for crushing Shivaji by force. 
<Sabh. 12.) 

This was, how^ever, no easy task. Shiva's 
military strength was not despicable ; and the 
Bijapuri nobles shrank from the idea of a campaign 
among the hills and jungles of the Western Ghats. 
TTie command of the expedition against him went 
abegging at the Bijapur Court, till Afzal Khan 
accepted it. (Sabh. 13 ; Chit. 54 ; Powadas, 6-7 ; 
.Shed. 24.) 

§6. Afzal Khan's expedition against Shiva. 
Abdullah Bhatari, surnamed Afzal Khan, was a 

64 SHiVAji. [Ch. III. 

noble of the first rank, who had risen to power and 
honour under the late Sultan of Bijapur. As a 
general he was of the highest standing in the king- 
dom, being the peer of Bahlol Khan and Randaula 
Khan, and had fought with conspicuous bravery and 
skill in the recent war with the Mughals. But the 
resources of Bijapur had been crippled by that war 
and the disorder and impoverishment natural in a 
regency under a veiled w^oman. Only 10,000 cavalry* 
could be spared to accompany Afzal, while popular 
report had raised the strength of Shiva's Mavle in- 
fantry to 60,000 as the result of his conquest of Javli, 
and he had also enlisted a regiment of valuable 
Pathan mercenaries from the disbanded soldiery of 
Bijapur. (Chit. 33 ; T. S. !5fc.) Afzal Khan, there- 
fore, did not prefer an open contest of force ■with 
Shiva. Indeed, he was instructed by the Dowager 
Queen to effect the capture or murder of Shiva by 
"pretending friendship" with him and offering to 
secure his pardon from Adil Shah.f 

* This is the strength of Afzal's army as given by con- 
temporaries, viz., Tarikh-i-AU 11. 76 and the English letter 
quoted in the next note. The Maratha accounts, all very 
much later, put it at 12,000 cavalry besides infantry. (Powadas, 
7, Sabh. 13); 30,000 "including 3,000 Mavles familiar with 
the locality." (Chit. 54.) In A. N. 577, du hazar is evidently 
a misprint for dah hazar. The letter in Shed. 25 is a 

t "Against Shivaji the Queen this year sent Abdullah 
Khan with an army of 10,000 horse and foot, and because 
she knew with that strength he was not able to resist Shivaji, 


The Bijapuri general had accepted the command 
in a spirit of bravado, and even boasted in open 
Court that he would bring Shiva back a captive with- 
out having once to dismount from his own horse. 
But his mind must have been oppressed by the 
heaviness of his task. He planned to effect his 
purpose by a combination of "f rightfulness" and 
diplomacy. From Bijapur the expedition marched 
due north to Tuljapur, one of the holiest shrines in 
Maharashtra and the seat of Bhavani, the guardian 
goddess of the house of Bhonsla. AfzsJ's strategy 
was either to make a sweep round Shiva's line of 
southern fortresses and penetrate to Puna through 
the exposed eastern flank of the Maratha kingdom, 
or to provoke Shiva, by a gross outrage on his faith, 
into coming out of his fastnesses and meeting the 
Bijapuri army in the open. At Tuljapur he ordered 
the stone image of Bhavani to be broken and 
pounded into dust in a hand-mill. (Sabh. 13 ; Chit. 
54 ; Dig. 157.) 

Then the news reeiched him that Shiva had left 
Rajgarh and betaken himself to Pratapgarh in the 
south-west. Afzal now gave up the objective of 
Puna (Chit. 54, Dig. 158), and turned due west 

she counselled him to pretend friendship with his enemy, 
which he did. And the other [, Shivaji], whether through 
intelligence or suspicion it is not known, dissembled his love 
toward him &c." (Factors at Rajapur to Council at Sural, 
10 Oct., 1659. F. R. Rajapur.) 


towards Pratapgarh. On the way he committed fresh 
sacrileges on the gods and outrages on the Brahmans 
at Manikeshwar, Pandharpur and Mahadev 
{Powadas, 8-9), and in a fortnight reached Wai, 20 
miles north of Sateira. This last town lay within his 
fief, and here he halted for some days devising 
means for luring Shiva out of the hills by diplomacy 
or capturing him by rneans of local chieftains. (Dig. 
158 ; Chit. 54.) He wrote to Vithoji Haibat Rao, 
the deshmukh of Gunjan-maval, to join with his men 
near Javli and eissist the Bijapuri army as directed. 
Khandoji Khopde, the rival of Kanhoji Zedhe for 
the deshmukhi of Rohidkhore, waited on Afzal at 
Wai and gave a written undertaiking to eirrest and 
hand over Shiva on condition of being granted the 
deshmukhi. (Raj. xvii. 31, xv. 393 and 317 ; Dig. 
165 ; T. S. 16a.) 

While these plots were being hatched at Wai, 
Afzal sent his land-steward Krishnaji Bhaskar to 
Shivaji with a very alluring message, saying, "Your 
father has long been a great friend of mine, and you 
are, therefore, no stranger to me. Qjme and see 
me, and I shall use my influence to make Adil Shah 
confirm your possession of Konkan and the forts you 
now hold. I shall secure for you further distinctions 
and military equipment from our Government. If 
you wish to attend the Court, you will be welcomed. 
Or, if you want to be excused personal attendance 
there, you will be exempted." (Sabh. 13-14.) 


§7. Shioaji's danger and perplexity. 

Meantime, the news of Afzal's coming had 
caused great terror and perplexity among Shiva's 
followers. Hitherto they had surprised obscure forts, 
looted isolated convoys, or fought skirmishes with 
the small irreguleir forces of private jagirdars. Here 
■was their first encounter with the regular forces of 
Bijapur, led by a famous general, and numbering 
10,000 with artillery, transport, and all the other 
material of the best-equipped armies of that age. 
Moreover, Afzal's march from Bijapur to Wai had 
been an unbroken success ; the Marathas had not 
ventured to oppose him in the open, and he had 
freely looted and laid waste the territory of Shiva 
that he had crossed. (Tarikh-i-Ali II. 76-77.) Tales 
of his irresistible strength and ruthlessness had 
reached the Maratha camp. Shivaji's officers 
naturally shrank from the idea of resistance. At the 
first council of war which he held, they urged him 
to make peace, as the enemy was strong emd 
hostilities would only cause a great loss of life to 
their side. (Sabh. 14 ; Chit. 55.) 

This w^as the most critical moment in the career 
of Shivaji. If he capitulated to Afzal Khan, all his 
hopes of independence and future greatness would 
be gone for ever, and he w^ould have to end his days 
as a tame vassal of Bijapur, even if he escaped Lis 
sovereign's vengeance for his late rebellion. Yet, 
the open defiance of Bijapur authority now would 
for ever close the door to reconciliation with that 

68 SHivAji. [cH. m. 

State, and lie must be prepared ever afterwards to 
defend his life and independence against the power 
of that kingdom and of the Mughals and other 
enemies, without a single friend or protector to turn 
to in the wide world. His ministers and generals 
advocated the more ignoble policy. Shiva himself 
was in a terrible dilemma. For a night he ponderecT' 
on his life's choice and then chose the manlier part. 
A legend, as old as his contemporaries, tells us that 
the care-worn chieftain's sleep was broken by ai vision 
of the goddess Bhavani who urged him to confront 
Afzal boldly apd promised him victory and her full 
protection. (Sabh. 14.) 

His mind was made up. Next morning the 
council met again. Moved by Shiva's manly words, 
appeal to their sense of honour, and report of the 
goddess's blessings, they resolved on war. He now 
made his dispositions for the contest with the utmost 
forethought and skill. He took counsel of his 
mother, who blessed him and foretold his success, 
and then he left minute instructions for carrying on 
the government in the event of his being killed. 
The armies under Moro Trimbak Pingle and Netaji 
Palkar were summoned from Konkan and the Ghats 
respectively, and ordered to take post within easy 
reach of Pratapgarh. (Sabh. 15 ; Chit. 55, 57-59.) 

§8. Plots and counter-plots. 

Then came Afzal "s envoy, Krishnaji Bhaskar, 
with the invitation to a parley. Shiva treated him 

1659] afzal's plan detected. 69 

with respect, and at night met him in secrecy and 
solemnly appealed to him as a Hindu and a priest to 
tell him of the Khan's real intentions. Krishnaji 
yielded so far as to hint that the Khan seemed to 
harbour some plan of mischief. Shivaji then sent the 
envoy back with Gopinath Pant, his own agent, 
agreeing to Afzal's proposal of an interview, pro- 
vided that the Khan gave him a solemn assurance 
of safety. Gopinath 's real mission w^as to find out 
the strer^th of Afzal's army and other useful in- 
formation about it and learn for himself what the 
Khan's real aim was. Through Gopinath Shiva 
vowed that no harm would be done to Afzal during 
the interview, and Afzal, on his part, gave similar 
assurances of his honesty of purpose. But 
Gopinath learnt by a liberal use of bribes that 
AfzsJ's officers were convinced that "he had so 
arranged matters that Shiva would be arrested at 
the interview, as he was too cunning to be caught 
by open fight." (Sabh. 18.) On his return, 
Gopinath told it all to Shiva and urged him to 
anticipate the treacherous attack on himself by 
murdering Afzal at a lonely meeting and then sur- 
prising his army. (Sabh. 16-18 ; Chit. 55-58 ; Dig. 

Shiva, taking the hint from Gopinath, feigned 
terror and refused to visit Wai, unless the Khan met 
his nearer home and personally promised him safety 
and future protection. Afzal agreed to make this 
concession. By Shiva's orders a path -was cut 

70 SHIVAJI. [CH. 111. 

through the dense forest all the ■way from Wai to 
Pratapgarh and food and drink were kept ready for 
the Bijapur army at various points of it. By way 
of the Radtondi pass (below 'Bombay Point' of the 
Mahabaleshwar plateau), Afzal Khan marched to 
Par, a village lying one mile below Pratapgarh on 
the south, and his men encamped there in scattered 
groups, deep down in the valley near every pool of 
water at the source of the Koyna. 

Gopinath was sent up the hill to report the 
Khan's arrival. The meeting was arranged to take 
place next day. The place chosen for the interview 
was the crest of an eminence, below the fort of 
Pratapgarh, and overlooking the valley of the Koyna. 
On both sides of the forest-path leading up the 
hill-side to the pavilion picked soldiers were posted 
in ambush at intervals by Shivaji. Here he erected 
tents and set up a richly decorated canopy with 
gorgeous carpets and cushions worthy of a royal 

Then he prepared himself for the meeting. 
Under his tunic he wore a coat of chain armour 
and below his turban he placed a steel cap for the 
protection of the skull. What offensive arms he 
had, nobody could see ; but concealed in his left 
hand was a set of steel claws (baghnal^h) fastened 
to the fingers by a pair of rings, and up his right 
sleeve lay hidden a thin sharp dagger called the 
scorpion (bichwa.) His companions were only two, 
but both men of extraordinary courage and 


agility, — Jiv Mahala, an expert swordsman, and 
Shambhuji Kavji, the murderer of Hemumant Rao 
More. Each of them carried two swords and a 

As the party was about to descend from the 
fort a saintly female figure appeared in their midst. 
It was Jija Bai. Shiva bowed to his mother. She 
blessed him saying, ' 'Victory be yours ! ' ' and 
solemnly charged his companions to keep him seife ; 
they vowed obedience. TTien they walked down to 
the foot of the fort and waited. 

§9. Interview between Shiva and Afzal. 

Meanwhile Afzal Khan had started from his 
camp at Par, with a strong escort of more than a 
thousand musketeers. Gopinath objected to it, 
saying that such a display of force would scare 
away Shiva from the interview, and that the Khan 
should, therefore, take with himself only two body- 
guards exactly as Shiva had done. So, he left his 
troops some distance behind and made his way up 
the hill-path in a palki accompanied by tw^o soldiers 
and a famous sw^ordsman named Sas^yid Banda, as 
well as the two Brahman envoys, Gopinath and 
Krishnaji. Arrived in the tent, Afzal Khan angrily 
remarked on its princely furniture and decorations 
as far above the proper style of a jagirdar's son. 
But Gopinath soothed him by saying that all these 
rich things would soon go to the Bijapur palace as 
the first fruits of Shiva's submission. 

72 SHIVAJI. [CH. Ill 

Messengers were sent to hurry up Shiva, who 
was waiting below the fort. He advanced slowly, 
then halted on seeing Sas^yid Banda, and sent to 
demand that the man should be removed from the 
tent. This was done, and at last Shivaji entered the 
pavilion. On each side four men were present, — the 
principal, two armed retainers and an envoy. But 
Shiva was seemingly unarmed,* like a rebel who 
had come to surrender, while the Khan had his 
sword at his side. 

The attendants stood below. Shiva mounted 
the raised platform and bov^fed to Afzal. The Khan 
rose from his seat, advanced a few steps, and opened 
his arms to receive Shiva in his embrace. The short 
slim Maratha only came up to the shoulders of his 
opponent. Suddenly Afzal tightened his clasp, and 
held Shiva's neck in his left arm with an iron grip, 
while with his right hand he drew his long straight- 
bladed dagger and struck at the side of Shiva. The 
hidden armour rendered the blow harmless. Shiva 
groaned in agony as he felt himself being strangled. 
But in a moment he recovered from the surprise, 
passed his left arm round the Khan's waist and tore 
his bowels open with a blow of the steel claws. 
Then with the right hand he drove the bichwa into 

* Khafi Khan, ii. 117, states that both Afzal and Shivaji 
came to the interview unarmed. But ko'nar wa kflrda, 'writh 
no sword girt on the waist,' was the customary attitude of the 
defeated party, so often described in Persian histories. 


Afzal's side. Th« wounded man relaxed his hold, 
and Shivaji wrested himself free, jumped down from 
the platform, and ran towards his own men outside. 

The Khan cried out, "Treachery ! Murder ! Help ! 
Help!" The attendants ran up from both sides. 
Sayyid Bainda faced Shiva with his long straight 
s\vord and cut his turban in twain, making a deep 
dint in the steel cap beneath. Shiva quickly took 
a rapier from Jiv Mahala and began to parry. But 
Jiv Mahala came round with his other sword, hacked 
off the right arm of the Sayyid, and then killed 

Meanwhile the bearers had placed the wounded 
Khan in his pal^i, and started for his camp. But 
Shambhuji Kavji slashed at their legs, made them 
drop the psalki, and then cut off Afzal's head, which 
he carried in triumph to Shiva.* 

§10. Afzal's army routed and plundered. 

Freed from danger, Shivaji and his two comrades 
then made their way to the summit of Pratapgarh, 
and fired a cannon. This was the signal for w^hich 
his troofjs were waiting in their ambush in the 
valleys below. At once the armies of Moro Trimbak 
and Netaji Palkar and the thousands of Mavles 

* The head was buried beneath a tower (called Abdullah 
barj) in an outwork on the south-eaistern side of the lower fort. 
A short distance from it is the temple of Bhavani built by 
Shivaji. {Bom. Gaz. xix, 546-547.) For illustrations, see 
Parasnis's Mahabaleshwar, 143 and 144. 


rushed on the Bijapuri camp from four sides. Afzal's 
officers and soldiers alike were panic-stricken at the 
news of their chief's death and this unexpected 
attack, in that unknown region, where every bush 
seemed to be alive with enemies. But the way of 
escape was closed and they had perforce to fight. 
For three hours many of the entrapped soldiers made 
a desperate defence, evidently in isolated groups, 
without any common plan or superior guidance. TTie 
Marathas fought on their own ground, in the full 
flush of their initial triumph, confident of succour 
close behind, and led by eminent chiefs. The 
carnage in the Bijapuri army was terrible. "All who 
begged quarters holding grass between their teeth 
were spared, the rest were put to the sword." 
(3000 men were killed, according to the report that 
reached the English factory at Rajapur a few days 
later.) The Mavle infantry hacked at the fleeing 
elephants, "severing the tedls, breaking the tusks, or 
chopping off the legs." Even camels were cut down 
as they crossed the path of the assailants. 

The booty taken was immense : all the artillery, 
waggons, ammunition, treasure, tents and equipage, 
transport-cattle and baggage of an entire army, fell 
into the victors' hands. Among them were 65 
elephants, 4,000 horses, 1 ,200 camels, 2,000 bundles 
of clothing, and 10 lakhs of Rupees in cash and 

The prisoners included one sardar of high rank, 
two sons of Afzal, and two Maratha chiefs namely 


Lambaji Bhonsla and Jhujhar Rao Ghatge. All the 
captured women and children, Brahmans and camp- 
followers were immediately released. One section of 
the beaten army, consisting of Afzal Khan's wives 
and eldest son, Fazl Khan, escaped round the source 
of the Koyna, under the guidance of Khandoji 
Khopde and his 300 Mavle friendlies.* 

A grand review was held by Shivaji below 
Pratapgarh. The captured enemy, both officers and 
men, were set free and sent back to their homes with 
money, food and other gifts. The Maratha soldiers 
who had fought so gallantly were rewarded ; if the 
fallen warriors had grown-up sons, they were enlisted 
in their fathers' places ; if otherwise, their widows 
were given pensions amounting to half their pay. The 
wounded received rewards ranging from 25 to 200 
hurt according to the severity of their hurt. The 
officers were presented with elephants, horses, robes, 
jewellery and grants of land. (Sabh. 25.) 

* Meeting with Afzal Khan : Sabh. 19-21 ; Chit. 60-62; Dig. 
165-169; T. 5. 16a— 17b; A. N. 577; Dilkasha, 19; K. K. ii. 
116-118; Rajapur Factory Records; Fryer, ii. 61; Powadas, 
12-18; Shed. 29-30. Plunder of his army: Sabh. 23-24; Chit. 
62; Dig. 170; T. S. 17b; Powadas, 19-20; Shed. 31-32. Escape 
of Fazl Khan: Sabh. 24; Chit. 62; Dig. 170-171. Tarikh-i-Ali 
Adil Shah II., 76-81, contains a maximum of mere words and 
rhetorical flourishes but few facts. B. S. 352 is even more 
meagre in details, but concise. Chit. 62 says that Khandoji 
Khopde was beheaded by Shivaji; Dig. 171. 

76 SHIVAJI. [CH. 111. 

§11. Legends about Ajzal Khan. 
The tragic fate of Afzal Khan has most pro- 
foundly stirred the popular imagination in his own 
country and in that of his enemy. At his village of 
Afzalpura, close to Bijapur city, the gloomy legend 
sprang up that before starting on this fatal expedition, 
he had a premonition of his coming end, and killed 
and buried all his 63 wives, lest they should share 
another's bed after his death. The peasants still 
point to the height from which these hapless victims 
of man's jealousy were hurled into a deep pool of 
water, the channel through which their drowned 
bodies were dragged out with hooks, the place where 
they were shrouded, and the 63 tombs, of the same 
shape, size and age, standing close together in regular 
rows on the same platform, where they were laid in 
rest. Utter desolation has settled on the spot. Where 
his mansion once stood with its teeming population, 
the traveller now beholds a lonely wilderness of tall 
grass, brambles and broken buildings, the fittest 
emblem of his ruined greatness. The only form of 
life visible is the solitary bird, startled by the un- 
wonted presence of a human visitor.* Other traditions 
tell us that ill-omens dogged his steps from the very 
outset of his campaign against Shivaji. {Shed. 24 ; 
Powadas, 7, II.) 

* This was the appearance of Afzalpura when I visited it 
in Oct., 1916. 


§ 12. Ballad of A fzal Khan. 
Among the Marathas the destruction of Afzal 
Khan caused the wildest exultation ; it marked the 
dawn of their national independence. The defeat of 
Bijapur w^as complete : the chief had fallen, his army 
had ceased to exist, and the victory, both in respect 
of carnage and of booty, was the most complete 
possible. The incident caught hold of the public 
imagination of Maharashtra as the most glorious event 
in the history of the race. Soon a ballad was com- 
posed by the wandering bards {gondhalis) which ex- 
panded the contest into a Homeric duel with all its 
details and supernatural adjuncts. Every class of 
Marathas, from the officers of SharAbhuji's Court to 
the soldiers in their camps and the peasants in their 
hamlets, welcomed the minstrel and crowded together 
to listen to this story of the first triumph of their 
national hero, set forth with graphic details which 
made the whole scene live before their eyes. The 
short ringing lines of the ballad (powada) almost 
reproduce the tramp of the soldiery, the journeys of 
the rival chiefs, their meeting, the exchange of 
taunts, the death-grapple, and the triumph of the 
Maratha army. As the bard's narrative passes 
rapidly from stage to stage of the whole contest, the 
audience follow him with breathless attention ; their 
blood courses in unison with the verses, and they are 
wound up to a high pitch of excitement as the spirit 
of the actual march or fight catches them. 

To the Marathas the fight with Afzal has always 


appeared as at once a war of national liberation and 
a crusade against the desecrator of temples. To them 
Afzal Khan typifies the bold bad man, who combines 
treachery with f rightfulness, and defies God and man 
alike. Their historians from the earliest times have 
seen no element of murder in the incident, but always 
described it as a glorious example of the sagacity, 
Courage and agility with which their national hero 
averted a treacherous plot against his own life, made 
the treachery recoil on the plotter's head, and 
avenged the outraged shrines of their gods. Shivaji's 
laureate, Bhushan, calls the slaughter of Afzal a 
righteous deed of retribution like the slaughter of the 
licentious ruffian Kichak by Bhim in single combat. 
A very late legend regards it as a blood-feud waged 
by Shiva for the treacherous slaughter of his elder 
brother Shambhuji by the qiladar of Kanakgiri at the 
instigation of Afzal Khan. (Dig. 61-62 ; Chit. 23 ; 
Powadas, 15.)* 

Flushed with their victory over Afzal Khan 
(September, 1659) and the destruction of his army, 
the Marathas poured into South Konkan and the 
Kolhapur district, capturing the fort of Panhala, 
defeating another Bijapuri army, and making exten- 
sive conquests (Oct., 1659 — Feb., 1660), which will 

* Is the remark "As he slew Shambhuji," Eiscribed to 
Shivaji in Sabh. 14, an interpolation? That history is otherwise 

absolutely silent about Shivaji's elder brother and totally 

ignores him. 


be described in Chapter X. But in the April following, 
Shivaji was recalled by a dangerous attack on his 
own dominions by a combination of enemies. 

Affair of Afzal Khan. 

Was the slaying of Afzal Khan a treacherous 
murder or an act of self-defence on the part of 
Shivaji? No careful student of the sources can deny 
that Afzal Khan intended to arrest or kill Shivaji by 
treachery at the interview. The absolutely contem- 
porary and impartial English factory record (Rajapur 
letter, 10 Oct. 1659) tells us that Afzal Khan was 
instructed by his Government to secure Shivaji by 
"pretending friendship with him" as he could not 
be resisted by armed strength, and that the latter, 
learning of the design, made the intended treachery 
recoil on the Khan's head. This exactly supports 
the Marathi chronicles on the point that Shivaji's 
spies learnt from Afzal's officers of the Khan's plan 
to arrest him by treachery at the pretended interview, 
and that Afzal's envoy Krishna ji Bhaskar was also 
induced to divulge this secret of his master. 

Who struck the first blow at the interview? The 
old Maratha chroniclers (as distinct from the English- 
educated 20th century apologists of the national hero) 

80 SHIVAJI. [CH. 111. 

all assert that it was Afzal. These genuine old 
historians never shrink from charging Shivaji with 
murder or treachery whenever they know him to be 
really guilty. They wrote long before Grant Duff's 
book had roused public indignation against Shivaji's 
alleged murder of an invited guest. It is, therefore, 
impossible to contend that the story of Afzal having 
struck the first blow was an invention of the modern 
Marathas after English education had wakened their 
conscience to the enormity of pre-meditated political 
rr)urders. Sabhasad (1694) and Chitnis (1810) at least 
cannot be suspected of any design to whitewash 
their hero's character by falsifying history. In saying 
that Afzal struck the first blow, they truly record a 
genuine old tradition and not a modem nationalist 

The point is further supported by Shivaji's letter 
to Ramdas in which he says that he gained strength 
by uttering the name of his guru while he was feeling 
himself being strangled in Afzal's grip. A disem- 
bowelled man cannot give his adversary a deadly 
hug, and therefore Afzal was unwounded when he 
seized Shivaji in his clasp. But I am not at present 
sure about the genuineness of this letter. 

Shivaji's elaborate protection of his person 
before going to the interview and his placing an 
ambush round Afzal's forces cannot be taken as 
proofs of a treacherous intention. Secret assassination 
is the favourite weapon of decadent monarchies, and 
many such murders had taken place in the sultanates 


of the Deccan before this time, as I showed in detail 
in the Modern Review, (vol. I. 1907.) Shivaji was 
fully convinced — and with good reason, as we know, 
— that Afzal meant treachery. He would have been 
wanting in common prudence if he had not taken 
these precautions to save himself. 

A friend (Prof. A. Rahman) has asked me, "If 
Afzal meant treachery why did he not keep his troops 
in readiness for delivering an assault or at least for 
defending themselves?" My answer is that Afzal 
believed that the death of Shivaji would lead to the 
immediate collapse of his upstart power and' no 
attack on his leaderless troops would be necessary. 
He was, moreover, ignorant of the position and 
strength of the enemy's forces and did not know that 
two large Maratha armies had arrived by rapid 
marches in his neighbourhood. 

The weight of recorded evidence as well as the 
probabilities of the case supports he view that Afzal 
Khan struck the first blow and that Shivaji only 
committed what Burke calls, a 'preventive murder' 

Strenuous Warfare, 1660-1664. 

§ 1 . Shaista Khan sent against Shivaji. 

Among the administrative changes made by 
Aurangzib at his second coronation (July, 1659) was 
the posting of Shaista Khan to the viceroyalty of the 
Deccan, in the place of Prince Muazzam. This able 
and spirited general had already governed Malwa and 
the Deccan and had taken a distinguished part in 
Aurangzib's recent invasion of Golkonda. Chief 
among the tasks entrusted to him was the suppression 
of Shivaji. And in discharging this duty he was for- 
tunate enough to secure the hearty co-operation of 
Bijapur, which forced the Maratha chief to divide 
his army into two and therefore to be defeated in 
both the theatres of war. 

After Shivaji had followed up his victory over 
Afzal Khan's leaderless army by defeating the com- 
bined forces of Rustam-i-Zaman and Fazl Khan, and 
taking Panhala in the Kolhapur district and many 
places in Ratnagiri, AH Adil Shah II. felt it necessary 
to march in person against the audacious rebel. But 
just at this time Siddi Jauhar, an Abyssinian slave 
who had usurped the fief of Kamul and defied the 
royal authority, wrote to Bijapur offering to make his 
submission if his position were recognised. The 


Sultan agreed, gave Jauhar the title of Salabat Khan, 
and sent him with an army to put down Shiva. The 
campaign was opened about May 1660, the month in 
which Shivaji also lost the Puna district in the north 
to the Mughals. Jauhar easily sweprt away the 
Maratha resistance in the open, and drove Shivaji 
into Panhala, which he -closely invested. 

§2. Shivaji besieged in Panhala fort. 

The siege d);agged on for nearly four months ; 
all the paths of ingress and egress were closed to 
the garrison. Shivaji found himself in a fatal trap. 
So, he v^rrote a secret letter to ^aijihjajr,, deceitfully 
begging his protection and p^erii)g to make an 
alliance with him. In order to q^ptiate for the terms 
he asked for a passport. Jawliar, "who was both fool 
and traitor," swallowed the bait ; .he assured Shivaji 
of his protection, gave him a jsaf^e conduct, and 
flattered hi;!nself that with Shiya for an ally he would 
be able to create a kingdom of his own in independ- 
ence of Adil Sh^h. Next day Shivaji with only two 
or three fpllowers visited Javhew at midnight, and was 
received in darb&r. After oaths of co-operation had 
been taken on both sides, Shivaji returned qj,iiickly 
to the fort, and the pretended siege was continued. 

When the news of Jauhar's treacherous coquet- 
ting with Shiva reached the ears of Ali Adil Shah, 
that king burst into anger and left his capital (5th 
August) "to punish both the rebels." An envoy was 


sent to bring Jauhar back to the right path, but the 

mission was a failure. When, however, Ali reached 

Miraj and his Vanguard advanced beyond it still 

nearer to Panhala, Shivaji slipped out of the fort one 

night with his family and 5 to 6 thousand soldiers, 

and Panhala returned to Adil Shah's possession with. 

out a blow (about 25th August, 1660.) As the Bijapur 

Court-poet sang in exultation, ' 'Ali took Panhala from 

Salabat in a twinkle." (Tarikh-i-Ali, 82-93 ; B. S. 

353-357 ; F. R. Rajapur, Kolhapur to Sural, dated 

5 June. 1660. Chit. 64 ; Dig. 175-176 ; T. S. I8b-19a.) 

Shiva's escape from the fort was soon detected, 

and a strong Bijapuri force under Jauhar's son Siddi 

Aziz and Afzal Khan's son Fazl Khan set out in 

pursuit of him. On reaching a narrow ravine 

(probably near Malkapur), Shiva left 5 thousand 

men there under Baji Pradhu (the deshpande 

of Hardis Maval) with orders to hold the mouth 

of the pass at all costs till the main body of 

the fugitives had reached Vishalgarh. The Bijapuris 

delivered three bloody assaults on the heroic 

rear-guard, all of which were beaten off. But 

when at last the gun-fire from Vishalgarh gave 

the anxiously expected signal that Shivaji had 

reached safety within its walls, the gallant Baji Prabhu 

was lying mortally wounded with 700 of his followers. 

The faithful servant had done his appointed duty. 

The Bijapuris declined to besiege Vishalgarh, and 

retired to their own territory, after recovering Pavan- 

garh and some other forts in addition to Panhala. 


Shiva retained in that quarter only the forts of Ran- 
^ana and Vishalgarh.* 

In the same month, almost in the same week, 
in which Shivaji lost Panhala in the extreme south 
of his dominions, his arms met with another disaster 
in the extreme north. On 15th August, his fort of 
Chakan, 1 8 miles north of Puna, was captured by the 
Mughals. To explain how it happened, we shall have 
-to trace the course of the war in that quarter from 
its commencement. 

§3. Shaista Khan occupies Puna. 

Early in 1 660, Shaista Khan opened the campaign 
against Shivaji fyom the north, after arranging for an 
attack upon the Maratha dominions by the Bijapuris 
from the south at the same time. Leaving Ahmad- 
Tiagar with a vast army on 25th February, the Khan 
marched southwards along the eastern side of the 
Puna district, methodically capturing and garrisoning 
all the strongholds that guarded the approaches to 
Puna on the east and south. 

The Marathas at first retreated before him with- 
out risking a battle. By way of Sonwadi (close to 
the Dhond railway station) and Supa (16 miles s. w. 

*Chil. 64-65; Dig. 182-185; T. S. 19a & b; the name of 
Siddi Aziz is given by Duff (i. 181) only, while T, 5. reads 
Siddi Halal. The Persian works are absolutely silent about 
^his retreat. Vishalgarh is 27 miles from Panhetla via 
Malkapur. {Ind. At. 40 S. W.) 

86 SHIVAJl. [CH. IV. 

of Dhond), he reached Baramati (18 miles s. e. of 
Supa) on 5th April. At the last two places were 
mud-forts which the enemy had evacuated. He next 
worked his way westwards up the valley of the Nira 
river, by way of Hoi, reaching Shirwal, 26 miles 
south of Puna, on 18th April. Like a wise general, 
Shaista Khan left detachments at all these outposts, 
to guard his line of conrmunication and hold the forts. 
A flying column sent from Shirwal sacked the villages 
round Rajgarh (22 miles due west.) 

From Shirwal the Mughal army moved along the 
Nira river 16 miles northwards to Shivapur (near 
Khed), and thence due eastwards through Garara, 
arriving at Saswad (13 miles east of Shivapur and 
16 miles south-east of Puna) on 1st May. 

Up to this point the Mughal advance had been 
unopposed, the Marathas only hovering at a distance 
to cut off supplies and skirmishing with the foraging 
parties. They made their first stand near the pass 
leading from Shivapur to Garara. On 30th April a 
body of 3,000 Maratha cavalry threatened the Mughal 
r6aT-guard under Rao Bhao Singh, but were attacked 
and routed after a long fight. 

From SasVvad a small Mughal detachment raided 
the villages at the foot of Purandar fort. They were 
attacked by 3,000 of the enemy, but held their ground 
by fighting desperately at close quarters, though they 
lost 50 in killed and wounded. Reinforcements 
arrived, routed the enemy, and pursued them to the 
pass which was commanded by the guns of Purandar. 

1660] SHAISTA khan's SUCCESS. 87 

The Mughals, flushed with victory, cleared the pass 
at a gallop, in the teeth oi a hot fire from the fort- 
walls, and dispersed the enemy assembled beyond it. 
The victors returned to their camp at Saswad in the 
evening. Thence, after a four days' halt at Rajwah, 
they entered Puna on 9th May. 

Meantime, a force 3,000 strong, detached by 
Shaista Khan under Ismail, had occupied North 
Konkan, and that district was now placed under a 
Mughal faujdar (Salabat Khan Deccani) with a contin- 
gent of Maratha friendlies, among whom Babaji 
Bhonsla and Raghuji are mentioned in the official 
history of Aurangzib (A. N. 584), while the Chitnis 
Bakfiar (p. 97) speaks of Shambhuji Kavji and Babaji 
Ram Honap, deshpande of Puna, as having joined 
the Mughals. (A. N. 578-588, our only authority.) 

§4. Shaista Khan captures Chakan. 

Shaista Khan had decided to pass the rainy 
season with his army at Puna, then a small hamlet. 
But before his arrival there, the enemy had totally 
destroyed the grain afid fodder in the country round 
Puna and Chakan and removed all traces of habita- 
tion. And now the many rivers between Puna and 
the Mughal frontier being in flood, no provision 
reached his camp, and his army had to undergo great 
hardship from scarcity. He, therefore, decided to 
remove his camp from Pufta to Chakah, 18 miles 
northwards, as being nearer to Ahmadnagar and the 


Mughal dominion, whence supplies could more easily 
reach him. (A. N. 584-'5.) 

Chakan is a place of great strategic importance. 
On the east it is separated from the imperial terri- 
tory by the shallow upper courses of the Bhima and 
Ghod rivers only, with no difficult mountain pass to 
cross. Its possession would have greatly shortened 
Shaista Khan's line of communication with his base 
of supplies at Ahmadnagar and also secured his camp 
against any attack from the north. Moreover, Chakan 
is only 31 miles due east of the Bhorghat pass and 
commands the shortest route leading from Ahmad- 
nagar to Konkan. 

Leaving Puna on 1 9th June, the Khan arrived 
in the vicinity of Ch'hkan on the 21st, reconnoitred 
the fort and distributed the lines of investment among 
his officers. The fort of Chakan is a square enclosure 
with bastioned fronts and towers at the four corners. 
The walls are high, with a ditch 30 ft. deep and 15 ft. 
wide all around. The only entrance is in the eastern 
face, and passes through five or six gateways. 
Beyond the walls there is an outwork of mud with 
a ditch, the remnant of a very old fortification. (Bom. 
Gaz. xviii. pt. iii., p. 121 ; Ind. Antiq. ii. 43, iv. 352.) 

Shaista Khan, after throwing up defensive earth- 
works round the positions taken up by the four divi- 
sions of his army, began to run trenches towards 
the fort- walls, construct raised platforms at suitable 
points, and mount on them large pieces of artillery 
brought from the Mughal forts in the Deccan. 


Though the heavy showers of the rainy season ham- 
pered his work and the defenders kept up a galling 
fire, he pressed the siege vigorously. After 54 days 
of hard labour a mine was carried from his own 
position in the north to under the tower at the north- 
eastern corner, and it was exploded at 3 P.M. on 
14th August, 1660. The work and its defenders were 
blown away ; the Mughals rushed to the assault, but 
found to their surprise that behind the breach the 
enemy had thrown up a high embankment of earth 
which they held in force and from the shelter of 
which they assailed the Mughals with rockets, musket- 
shots, bombs and stones. The storming party was 
checked with heavy loss, but clung to the blood- 
stained ground for the night. 

Next morning (15th August) they resumed the 
attack, scaled the wall, and captured the main fort, 
putting many of the garrison to the sword and driving 
the rest into the citadel. In a short time even the 
last-named work capitulated. But the imperialists 
had to purchase their victory at a heavy price, losing 
268 killed and 600 wounded. (A. N. 585-588 ; Chit. 
97 ; Dig. 216.) 

Firangji Narsala, an old officer of the days of 
Shahji, had been left by Shiva in charge of Chakan, 
with orders to hold out as long as he could, but to 
■surrender when driven to extremities, because it was 
impossible for Shiva, then battling with the Bijapuris 
near Panhala, to divert any force for the relief of 
Chakan, 140 miles away in the north. For nearly 


two months Firangji had defended his post with tire- 
less energy, "incessantly showering shots, bullets and 
rockets at the besiegers." He had disputed every 
inch of the ground on the two days of assault. And 
now, hopeless of his master's aid (Dig. 217), he capi- 
tulated with honour. Shaista Khan greatly admired 
the gallant qiladar and pressed him to enter the 
imperial service on high pay. But Firangji refused 
to prove false to his salt, and was allowed to go 
back to Shivaji with his army.* 

§5. Desultory fighting, 1661-63. 

The capture of Chakan was followed by the 
return of Shaista Khan to Puna, where he took up 
his residence, while his detachments continued to 
improve the Mughal hold on N. Konkan. TTiis long 
period of inactivity on the part of the Mughal viceroy's 
main army has been very plausibly ascribed by Grant 
Duff (i. 194) to reluctance on the part of Shaista 
Khan to face again the heavy loss inevitable in the 
siege of Maratha hill-forts. 

The next time that we hear of the Mughals is 

* According lo Ditkaaha, 37. Shivaji had not more than 
3,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry, when besieged in Panhala. 
Chifnh Bak,har, 97, says that Firangji on returning to Shivaji 
was at once sent to Bhupalgarh as qiladar. But Digvijay, 
217, says that, on being dismissed by Shiva for capitulating to 
a Muslim, Firangji in disgust joined Shaista Khan, who made 
him a 5-sadi and ihanahdar of Malkargaon (parganah Chakan), 
but Shivaji brought him back by force through Netaji Palkar. 


in the earKer part of 1661, when they took posses- 
sion of Kalian Bhiundy. Shivaji was reported to be 
making preparations for recovering these posts during 
the following rainy season. But either the attempt 
was not made or it failed, for these two places con- 
tinued in the hands of the Mughals till February 1670, 
whera the Marath-ara- once more got possession of them. 
(Dil. 37-'3&; Orme MSS. vol. 155, pp. 1-21.) 

For more than two years after these successes 
the Mughals kept their grip on the northern portion 
of Shivaji 's dominions. Of these minor operations 
we have no exact information either from Persian or 
from Marathi sources. In March 1663, the Mughals 
gave a long and vigorous chase to Netaji, the Master 
of the HorSe iii Shiva's army. 

He had' led his cavalry in a raid into the imperial 
territory, but a Mughal force of 7,000 horse pursued 
him so closely that "he was fain to travel 45 or 50 
miles a day and yet [had] much ado to escape with 
a small [part of the] booty he had got. They left 
not the pursuit till they came within five leagues of 
Bija'pui'." But RuStam-i-Zaman met the Mughals and 
induced them to give up the pursuit, "by telling them 
that the country was dangerous for any strange army 
to march ifi a-nd also pfomising to go himself and 
follow him, by which deceit Netaji got away, though 
not without loss of 300 horse and himself wounded." 
(F. R. Surat, voL f03, Gyffard to Surat, 30 March, 
and 8 April 1663.) 

But within a mofttlt dt me^tktg with this reverse to 


his arms, Shivaji dealt a masterly blow at the 
Mughals, — a blow whose cleverness of design, neat- 
ness of execution and completeness of success created 
in the Mughal Court and camp as much terror of 
his prowess and belief in his possession of magical 
powers, as his coup against Afzal Khan had done 
among the Bijapuris. He surprised and wounded 
the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan in the heart of 
his camp, in his very bed-chamber, within the inner 
ring of his bodyguards and female slaves.* 

§6. Shivaji's night-attack, on Shaista Khan. 

Shaista Khan had, as we have seen, seized Puna 
in May 1660 and retired there after the fall of Chakan 
in August next. He took up his residence in what 
was then the best house of the future Maratha capital, 
the unpretentious home of Shivaji's childhood. His 
harem was with him, and around his mansion lay 
the quarters of his guards and attendants, the band- 
room and offices. Further off, across the road leading 
southwards to Singh-garh lay the camp of his lieute- 
nant, Maharajah Jaswant Singh and his contingent 
of 10,000 men. 

* Night-attack on Shaista Khan : the earliest records are 
Gyffard to Sural 12 April, 24 May, 1663 (F. R. Sural, vol. 103) 
containing Shivaji's own version; Bernier, 187; A. N. 819 (only 
one sentence!); Storia, ii. 104-106; Sabh. 35-37; Dil 44-46. 
Khafi Khan (ii. 172-'5) reports the narration of his father, a 
servant of Shaista Khan, and has been followed by Grant Duff, 
but Khafi Khan wrote after 1730. Chit. 98-100; Dig. 220-224; 
T. S. 19b-20a. Zedhe Chron. for date. 


The enterprise required no less agility and 
cunning than bravery and dash. Shivaji picked out 
a thousand of his bravest and most expert soldiers 
and took them with him, while two supporting divi- 
sions of one thousand each (including cavalry and 
Mavles) under Netaji Palkar and Moro Pant the 
Peshwa, were directed to take post on the two flanks 
of the vast Mughal encampment, at a mile's distance 
from its outer side. Babaji Bapuji and Chimnaji 
Bapuji, of Khed, accompanied Shiva as his body- 
guards and right-hand men in this enterprise. 

The Maratha force, lightly equipped, set out 
from Singh-garh, covered the intervening eleven miles 
rapidly in the course of the day, and arrived at Puna 
after nightfall. With 400 picked men Shivaji entered 
the limits of the camp, replying to the challenge of 
the Mughal guards that they were Deccani soldiers 
of the imperial army going to take up their appointed 
posts. After resting for a few hours in some obscure 
corner of the camp, the party arrived near the 
Khan's quarters at midnight. Shiva knew the 
ins and outs of the city and every nook and corner 
of the house where he had passed his boyhood and 

It was Ramzan, the month of fasting for 
Muslims. The servants of the Nawab's household 
had mostly fallen asleep after their day's abstinence 
followed by the heavy meal at night. Some cooks 
who had risen from bed to make a fire and prepare 
the meal which is taken a little before dawn in the 


month of Ramzan, were despatched by the Marathas 
without the least noise being made. TTie wall divid- 
ing this outer kitchen from the body-servants' room 
within the harem once had a small door in it, but 
the opening had been closed with brick and mud 
to complete the seclusion of the harem. The 
Marathas began to take out the bricks and make an 
opening there. The noise of their pick-axes and the 
groans of the dying awoke some of the servants, who 
reported the suspicious noise to the Khan, but that 
general only rebuked them for disturbing his sleep 
for a trifle. 

Soon the breach in the wall was large enough 
for a man to creep through. Shivaji, with his trusty 
lieutenant Chimnaji Bapuji, was the first to enter the 
harem, and was followed by 200 of his men. The 
place was a maze of canvas, screen-wall after 
screen-wall and enclosure within enclosure. Hacking 
a way through them with his sword, Shivaji reached 
the very bed-room of the Khan. TTie frightened 
women roused the Nawab, but before he could use 
his weapons Shivaji was upon him and severed his 
thumb with one stroke of his sword. It was evidently 
at this time that the lamps in the room w^ere put 
out by some wise woman. In the darkness two of 
the Marathas tumbled into a cistern of water ; and 
the confusion that followed was used by Shaista 
Khan's slave-girls to carry him away to a place of 
safety. The Marathas continued their work of 
slaughter in the darkness for some time, killing and 


wounding eight of the Khan's women, probably 
without knowing their sex. 

Meantime the other half of Shivaji's force, the 
200 men, evidently under Babaji Bapuji, who had 
been left outside the harem, had rushed the main 
guard, slasdng the sleepers and the awake and crying 
in derision, "Is it thus that you keep watch?" TTiey 
next entered the band-room and ordered the bands- 
men, as if from the Khan, to play. The loud noise 
of the kettle-drums drowned all voices, and the yells 
of the enemy swelled the confusion. The tumult in 
the harem, too, now became so great that the 
Mughal troops became aware that their general was 
being attacked. Shouting "The enemy have come," 
they began to take up their arms. 

Abul Fath, a son of Shaista Khan, had been 
the first to hasten to his father's rescue without 
waiting for others ; but the brave youth was slain 
after he had struck dow^n two or three Marathas. 
Another Mughal captain who lodged just behind the 
harem enclosure, finding its gate closed from within 
by the wily Marathas, let himself down inside by 
means of a rope-ladder ; but he was at once 
attacked and killed. 

Shivaji, finding his enemiies fully awakened and 
arming, delayed no longer, but promptly left the 
harem, called his men together, and withdrew from 
the camp by the direct route, while the Mughals, 
not knowing where their enemies were, fruitlessly 
searched all their camp. 

96 SHIVAJl. [CH. IV. 

This night-attack was a complete success. The 
retreat from the camp was unmolested and no pur- 
suit was made. During the surprise the Marathas 
lost only six men killed and forty wounded, while 
they slew a son and a captain of Shaista Khan's, 
40 of his attendants and six of his wives and slave- 
girls, besides wounding two other sons, eight other 
women and Shaista Khan himself. (Gyffard to 

The daring and cunning of the Maratha hero 
■were rewarded by an immense increase of his 
prestige. He was taken to be an incarnation of 
Satan ; no place was believed to be proof against 
his entrance and no feat impossible for him. The 
whole country talked with astonishment and terror 
of the almost superhuman deed done by him ; and 
there was bitter humiliation and sorrow in the 
Emperor's Court and family circle at this disaster to 
his maternal uncle and the "premier peer" {amir-ul- 
umara) of his empire. 

This attack took place on 5th April, 1663. The 
morning following it, all the imperial officers came to 
Shaista Khan to condole with him in his loss. Among 
them w^as Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who had not 
raised a finger to defend his chief or to oppose the 
retreat of his assailant, though he had 10,000 horse 
under him and lay encamped across the road taken 
by Shivaji. Shaista Khan, with the polished sneer 
of a high-bred Mughal courtier, turned to Jaswant 
and merely remarked, "When the enemy fell upon 


me, I imagined that you had already died fighting 
against them!" Indeed, the public, both in the 
Mughal camp and throughout the Deccan, ascribed 
Shivaji's exploit to the conniveince of Jaswant. 
Shivaji, however, asserted that this astonishing feat 
was performed by him under the inspiration of his 
God and not of any human counsellor. Immediately 
after his return from it, he wrote to Raoji Rao, his 
agent at Rajapur, boasting how he had been the 
chief actor in this business and had himself wounded 
Shaista Khan. 

TTie Mughal viceroy, covered with shame and 
grief, retired to Aurangabad for greater safety. The 
Emperor heard of the disaster early in May, when on 
the way to Kashmir, and ascribed it to the viceroy's 
negligence and incapacity. As a mark of his dis- 
pleasure, he transferred Shaista Khjin to the govern- 
ment of Bengal, (I Dec. 1663) which was then 
regarded as a penal province, or in Aurangzib's own 
words, "a hell well stocked with bread," without 
permitting him even to visit the Emperor on his way 
to his new charge. The Khan left the Deccan about 
the middle of January 1664, on being relieved by 
Prince Muazzam. 

§7. Surat described. 

While this change of governors was going on 
at Aurangabad, Shivaji performed a feat of even 
greater audacity than he had ever displayed before. 
From 6th to 10th January he looted the city of Surat, 



the richest port of the west coast and "the gateway 
to the holy places of Arabia" for Indian Muslims, 
who here embarked for the pilgriniage to Mecca. 

The fort of Surat stood on the south bank of 
the Tapti, 12 miles from the sea. It was impregnable 
to a body of light raiders like Shiva's troopers. 
But the city close to the fort offered a rich and 
defenceless prize. It had, at that time, no wall to 
protect it. Its wealth was boundless. TTie imperial 
customs alone yielded a revenue of 12 lakhs of 
Rupees a year (in 1666, ace. to Thevenot, v. 81.) 

The city of Surat covered nearly four square 
miles, including gardens and open spaces, and had 
a population of 200,000 souls. The streets were 
narrow and crooked ; the houses of the rich were 
near the river-side and substantially built ; but the 
town was mainly composed of poor men's huts 
built of wooden posts and bamboo walls and with 
floors plastered with mud. "In the greater part of 
the town scarcely two or three brick-houses w^ere to 
be seen in a street, and in some parts... not one for 
many streets together. The whole town was un- 
fortified either by art or nature and its situation was 
upon a large plain of many miles' extent. They had 
only made against the chief avenues of the town 
some weak and ill-built gates [more for show than 
for defence.] In some parts there was a dry ditch 
easily passable by a footmem, with no wall on the 
inner side. The rest was left so open that scarcely 
any sign of a ditch was perceivable." {Bom. Gaz., 


ii. 301, 90-91 ; Letter from the English chaplain 
Elscaliot to Sir T. Browne, in Ind. Antiq. viii. 256.) 
ELarly in the morning of Tuesday, 5th January, 
1664, Surat was suddenly alarmed by the news that 
Shivaji had arrived with an army at Gandavi, 28 
miles southwards, and wais advancing to plunder the 
town.* At once the people were seized with a 
panic, and began to flee away with their wives and 
children, mostly across the river, to save their lives. 
Rich men found shelter in the fort by bribing its 
commandant. Later in the day a courier brought the 
intelligence that Shivaji had come still nearer, and 
at night it was leeirnt that he had halted only five 
miles from Surat. Inayet Khan, the governor of the 
town — who was quite distinct from the commandant 
of the fort, — ^had sent out an agent to treat with 
Shiva for terms of ransom. But when he heard that 
the Maratha chief had detained the messenger and 
was approaching with all speed, he himself fled to 
the fort, leaving the town at the enemy's mercy. He 
used to draw from the Treasury the pay of 500 

* First sack of Surat : The most minute details and graphic 
accounts are found in the factory records : Log of the Loyal 
Merchant (Orme MSS. vol. 263. pp. 23-24); F. R. Surat 2 
(Surait Consult. 6 Jan., 1664), vol. 86 (Surat to Persia; Surat to 
Co. 18 and 28 Jan. and 4 April); Dutch Records, vol. 27, 
Nos. 711 and 719. Letter of Escaliot very valuable. Bernier, 
188-190; Storia, ii. 29, 112, 120, 132, iv. 428. Sabh. 63 and 
Chit. 72 describe only the 2nd sack. B.S. 371 ; Ishwardas 52a. 
(A.N., K.K., and Tavernier silent.) 

100 SHIVAJI. [CH. IV. 

soldiers, but had so long appropriated the money 
without maintaining a proper force. His cowardice 
also prevented him from organising a defence or even 
from dying at his post. 

The townspeople were sheep worthy of such 
a shepherd. A population composed mostly of 
money-loving traders, poor artisans, punctilious fire- 
worshippers and tender-souled Jains, cannot readily 
take to war even in self-defence. TTie richest 
merchants, though owning millions of Rupees, had 
not the sense to hire guards for the protection of their 
■wealth, though they might have done so at only a 
twentieth part of what they -were soon to lose through 

§ 8. Heroic defence of the English at Surat. 

The shame of this cowardice in high and low^ 
alike was deepened by the contrast ciflforded by the 
manly spirit of a handful of foreigners. The English 
and Dutch merchants resolved to defend their own 
factories at all costs, though these were open houses, 
not built to stand an attack. They might have sought 
safety by escaping to their ships at Swally on the 
coast, 10 miles west of Surat ; but "it was thought 
more like Ejiglishmen to make ourselves ready to 
defend our lives and goods to the uttermost than by 
a flight to leave money, goods, house to merciless 

Sir George Oxenden, the English President, and 


hi^ Council stood at their posts in Surat, and im- 
provised a defence of the factory. They procured 
two small brass guns from a merchant in the town 
and four others from their own vessels. With the 
armed sailors promptly sent up from the English 
ships at Swally, they mustered in the factory 150 
Englishmen and 60 peons, a total of 210 defenders. 
Four of the guns were mounted on the roof to scour 
two broad streets and command the large and lofty 
house of Haji Said Beg, adjacent to theirs. Two other 
guns were posted behind the front gate, in which 
port-holes were cut for firing into the passage leading 
to the factory. What provisions, water and powder 
could be got were hurriedly laid in. "Some were set 
to melt lead and make bullets, others with chisels to 
cut lead into slugs ; no hand idle but all employed 
to strengthen every place. Captains were appointed 
and every man quartered and order taken for reliev- 
ing one another upon necessity. To secure the 
approaches to the factory, the English went outside 
and took possession of a temple just under their 
house, and cleared it of its refugees, and aJso shut 
up a mosque on another side, whose windows looked 
into the outer courtyard of the factory. President 
Oxenden at the head of his 200 soldiers "drawn out 
in rank and file, with drum and trumpet," publicly 
marched through the town in the morning of the 6th, 
"declaring that he intended to withstand Shivaji with 
this handful of men." 

The Dutch, too, defended their house, though 

102 SHIVAJl. [CH. IV. 

its distance of a mile from the English factory made 
mutual aid between the two nations impossible. The 
example of the Europeans also heartened a body of 
Turkish and Armenian merchants to defend their 
property in their serai, close to the English factory. 

§ 9. First loot oj Surat, 1664. 

Shivaji had been heard of at Bassein, four miles 
east of Bombay, only nine days before. But he had 
made a forced march to Surat with 4,000 men 
mounted on choice horses with such speed and 
secrecy that he was at Surat a day after his approach 
had been detected. His route lay by the forts of 
Nar-durg (probably Naldurg, s. w. of Nana Ghat), 
Mahuli, and Kohaj and then across the zamindaris 
of Jawhar, Ramnagar and Lakdar( ?), north of the 
Thana district. Two Rajahs had joined him on the 
way with their contingents in the hope of sharing 
the plunder, and his army now mustered 10,000. 

At 1 1 o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, 
6th January, 1664, Shivaji arrived at Surat and 
pitched his tent in a garden a quarter of a mile outside 
the Burhanpur or eastern gate. The night before 
he had sent two messengers ^vith a letter requiring 
the governor and the three most eminent merchants 
and richest men in the city, viz., Haji Said Beg, 
Baharji Borah, and Haji Qasim, to come to him in 
person immediately and make terms, otherwise he 
threatened the whole town with fire and sword. No 
answer had been given to the demand, and the 


Maratha horsemen, immediately after their arrival on 

the 6th, entered the defenceless and almost deserted 

city, and after sacking the houses began to set fire 

to them. A body of Shivaji's musketeers was set "to 

play upon the castle, -with no expectation to take it, 

but to keep in and frighten the governor and the rest 

that had got in, as also [to prevent] the soldiers of 

the castle from sallying out upon them whilst the 

others plundered and fired [the houses.] " The 

garrison kept up a constant fire, but the fort- guns 

inflicted more damage on the town than on the 

assailants. Throughout Wednesday, Thursday, 

Friday and Saturday, this work of devastation was 

continued, every day new fires being raised, so that 

thousands of houses were consumed to ashes and 

two-thirds of the town destroyed. As the English 

chaplain wrote, "Thursday and Friday nights were 

the most terrible nights for fire. The fire turned the 

night into day, as before the smoke in the day-time 

had turned day into night, rising so thick that it 

darkened the sun like a great cloud." 

Near the Dutch factory stood the grand mansion 
of Baharji Borah, then "reputed the richest merchant 
in the world," his property having been estimated at 
80 lakhs of Rupees. The Marathas plundered it at 
leisure day and night till Friday evening, when 
having ransacked it and dug up its floor, they set fire 
to it. From this house they took away 28 seers of 
large pearls, with many other jewels, rubies, emeralds 
and "an incredible amount of money." 

104 SHIVAJI. [CH. IV. 

Close to the English factory were the lofty- 
residence and extensive warehouses of another very 
rich merchant, Haji Said Beg, who, too, had fled 
away to the fort, leaving his property without a 
defender. All the afternoon and night of Wednesday 
and till past the noon of Thursday, the Marathas 
continued to break open his doors and chests and 
carry off as much money as they could. Entering 
one of his warehouses they smashed some casks of 
quicksilver and spilt a great quantity of it on the 
floor. But in the afternoon of Thursday the brigands 
left it in a hurry, on being scared by a sortie which 
the English had made into the street to drive away 
a party of 25 Maratha horsemen who seemed intent 
on setting fire to another house in dangerous proximity 
to the English factory. In this encounter one Maratha 
trooper was wounded with a bullet, and two 
Englishmen with arrow and sword, but slightly. 

The English merchants next day put a guard of 
their own in the house of Said Beg and thus he 
suffered no further loss. Shivaji was angry with the 
English at being balked of his prey, and in the after- 
noon of Friday he sent them a message calling upon 
them to pay him three lakhs of Rupees or else let 
his men freely loot the Haji's house, and threatening 
that in case they refused to do either he would come 
in person, kill every soul in the English factory, and 
raze their house to the ground. President Oxenden 
took time to consider the proposal till next morning 
(Saturday), when he rejected both the demands of 


Shivaji and boldly defied the Maratha chief to come 
and do his worst, saying, "We are ready for you 
and resolved not to go away. But come when you 
please ; and [as] you have, as you say, resolved to 
come, I ask you to come one prahar sooner than you 
intend." To this challenge Shivaji gave no reply. 
He was surfeited with booty and was too wise to 
run a needless risk by facing artillery concealed 
behind defences and served by resolute and dis- 
ciplined men, for the sake of a few lakjis more. 

§ 10. How money was extorted. 

The plunder of Surat yielded him above a kxor 
of Rupees, the city "not having been so rich [as 
then] in many years before." The looting was 
unresisted, and extended over fully four days and 
nights, and he "scorned to carry away anything but 
gold, silver, pearls, diamonds and such precious 
ware." (Log of the Loyal Merchant.) 

On reaching Surat, " Shivaji had publicly declared 
that he had not come to do any personal hurt to the 
English or other merchants, but only to revenge 
himself on Aurangzib for having invaded his country 
and killed some of his relations. But money was 
really his sole aim.* He had to make the most of 

* An old merchant who had brought 40 ox-loads of cloth 
from near Agra but sold none, tried to propitiate Shivaji by 
offering it to him. But on his answering that he had no ready 
money, his right hand was cut off by Shivaji's order, he was 
driven away, and his cloth burnt by the Marathas. (Letter 

106 SHIVAJI. [CH. IV. 

his four days' free run at Surat and shrank from no 
cruelty to extort money as quickly as possible. As 
the English chaplain wrote, "His desire of money 
is so great that he spares no barbarous cruelty to 
extort confessions from his prisoners, whips them 
most cruelly, threatens death and often executes it if 
they do not produce so much as he thinks they may 
or desires they should ; — at least cuts off one hand, 
sometimes both." 

§ II. Attempt to murder Shivaji. 
The cowardly governor Inayet Khan, who had 
run into the fort in Tuesday night, formed an in- 
famous plot from his safe refuge. On Thursday he 
sent a young follower of his to Shivaji with 
pretended terms of peace. These were so manifestly 
unreasonable that Shiva scornfully asked the envoy, 
"Your master is now cooped up in his chamber like 
a woman. Does he think of me too as a v^^oman 
that he expects me to accept such terms as these?" 
The young man immediately replied, "We are not 
women ; I have something more to say to you ;" and 
whipping out a concealed dagger he ran full at 
Shivaji 's breast. A Maratha bodyguard that stood 
before the Rajah with a drawn sword, struck off the 
assassin's hand with one blow. But so great was 
the force of the desperado's rush that he did not 

of Escaliot.) Bernier, 190, for the narrow escape of a Jewish 
ruby-merchant from the death threatened by Shivaji to extort 
his wealth. 


stop but drove the bloody stump of his arm on Shiva's 
person and the two rolled on the ground together. 
The blood being seen on Shiva's dress, his followers 
imagined that he had been murdered, and the cry 
ran through the camp to kill the prisoners. But the 
same guardsman clove the assassin's skull ; Shiva 
rose up from the ground and forbade any massacre. 
Then he ordered the prisoners to be brought before 
him and cut off the heads of four and the hands of 
24 others from among them at his caprice, but 
spared the rest.* 

At ten o'clock in the morning of Sunday the 10th, 
Shivaji suddenly departed from Surat with his army, 
on hearing that a Mughal force was coming to the 
relief of the town. That night he encamped twelve 
miles off and then t-etreated by rapid marches to 

For some days afterwards the fear of his return 
prevented the townspeople from coming back to 

* Mr. Anthony Smith, a servant of the English E. I. 
Company, Was seized on landing at the Dutch jetty and kept 
a prisoner in the Maratha camp for three days. Along with 
other prisoners, his right hand was ordered to be cut off, at 
which he cried out to Shivaji in Hindusthani to cut off his 
head instead. But on his hat bsing taken off, he was recognised 
as an Englishman and spaifed. On Friday afternoon he was 
sent to the English factory With a message from ShiVa, but 
President Oxenden detained him there. The Log of the Loyal 
Merchant says that he was ransomed for Rs. 550; (also the 
Eng. President's letter.) 

108 SHIVAJI. [CH. IV. 

their desolated homes. But the imperial army reached 
Sural on the 1 7th and then the cowardly governor 
ventured to return from the fort. The people hooted 
at him and flung dirt on him, for which his son in 
anger shot a poor innocent Hindu trader dead. Sir 
George Oxenden, the English President, won the 
people's praise and admiration for having made a 
gallant stand and saved not only the Company's 
property, but also the quarter of the town situated 
round the English factory.* 

The Emperor showed his sympathy with the 
afflicted citizens by excusing the custom duties for 
one year in the case of all the merchants of Surat, 
and he rewarded the valour of the English and the 
Dutch traders by granting them a reduction of one 
per cent, from the normal import duties on their 
merchandise in future. 

* As he wrote to the Company, 28th January, 1664, (F.R. 
Surat 86) : "The townspeople cry out in thouseincis for a 
reward from the King to the English that had by their courage 
preserved them. We were with the noblemen of the army 
that came to our relief, from whom we received great thanks 
for the good service we did the King and the country, where- 
upon your President, having a pistol in his hand, laid it before 
the chief, saying.. .he now laid down his arms, leaving the 
future care eind protection of the city to them ; which was 
exceedingly well taken, [the general] telling the President 
[that] he accepted it, and he must give him a vest, a horse 
and girt a sword about him. But your President told him they 
were things becoming a soldier, but we were merchants and 
expected favour from the King in our trade." 


§ 12. Shivaji's doings in 1664. 
The year 1664 that lay between the departure 
of Shaista Khan and the arrival of Jai Singh, was not 
marked by any Mughal success. The new viceroy. 
Prince Muazzam, lived at Aurangabad, CEiring only 
for pleasure and hunting. His favourite general, 
Maharajah Jaswant Singh, was posted at Puna. From 
this place he marched out and besieged Kondana. 
The Rajputs are proverbially inefficient in sieges, and 
Jaswant, after wasting some months before the fort, 
delivered a rash and fruitless assault, in which he 
lost many hundreds of his soldiers, chiefly owing to 
a gunpowder explosion. Then he quarrelled with 
his brother-in-law Bhao Singh Hada, evidently on the 
question of responsibility for the failure, and the two 
officers with their armies retired to Aurangabad (in 
June) to pass the rainy season. The campaign ended 
with absolutely no gain. (Dil.47 ; A. N. 867 ; Z. C, 
siege from Dec. 1663 to June, '64.) 

The field being clear, Shivaji ranged at liberty 
in spite of the height of the rainy season, and 
plundered Ahmadnagar. (Karwar to Surat, 8th 
August, 1664. F. R. Surat, vol. 104.) 

On 26th June the English factors write, "Shivaji 
is so famously infamous for his notorious thefts that 
Report hath made him an airy body, and added 
wings, or else it were impossible he could be at so 
many places as he is said to be at, all at one time... 
They ascribe to him to perform more than a 
Herculean labour that he is become the talk of all 

' '0 SHIVAJI. [CH. IV. 

conditions of people... That he will lay siege to Goa 
we do hardly believe, in regard it is none of his 
business to lay siege to any place that is fortified 
against him, for it will not turn hini to account. He 
is, and ever was, for a running banquet, and to 
plunder and bum those towns that have neither 
defence nor guard." (Surat to Karwar. F.R. 
Surat 86.) 

And, again, on 26th November, "Deccan [i.e., 
Bijapur] and all the South coast [i.e., Kaneira] are 
all embroiled in civil wars,... and Shivaji reigns 
victoriously and uncontrolled, that he is a terror to 
all the kings and princes round about, daily increasing 
in strength... He is very nimble and active, imposing 
strange labour upon himself that he may endure 
hardship, and also exercises his chiefest men that he 
flies to and fro with incredible dexterity." (Surat to 
Co., F.R. Surat 86.) At the end of the monsoons, 
i.e., in October, he burst into Kanara. (See Ch. X.) 

Shivaji and Jai Singh, 1665. 

§ 1 . Jai Singh sent against Shivaji. 

The failure of Shaista Khan and the setck of 
Surat caused bitter mortification to Aurangzib and 
his Court, and he decided to send his ablest Hindu 
and Muhammadan generals to the Deccan. Among 
the promotions and transfers on his birthday, 30th 
September, 1 664, the Emperor appointed Mirza Rajah 
Jai Singh to put down Shivaji. Under him were 
deputed Dilir Khan, Daud Khan Qureshi, Rajah Rai 
Singh Sisodia, Ihtisham Khan Shaikhzada, Qubad 
Khan, Rajah Sujan Singh Bundela, Kirat Singh (a 
son of Jai Singh), MuUa Yahia Nawaiyat (a Bijapuri 
noble who had come over to the Mughals), and many 
other officers, with 14,000 troopers. (A. N. 868 ; 
Storia, ii. 120.) 

After making the necessary preparations, and 
collecting his subordinates, Jai Singh left Upper India 
and crossed the Narmada at Handia on 9th January, 
1665. He pusKed rapidly on, never wasting a day 
by halting, except when strong necessity compelled 
him. On 10th February he arrived at Aurangabad, 
where Prince Muazzam was holding Court as viceroy 
of the Deccan. In three days Jai Singh finished the 

1 12 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. 

work of waiting on the Prince, receiving and return- 
ing the visits of the local officers and nobles, and 
settling some points connected with the expedition. 
Then, leaving Aurangabad on 13th February, he 
arrived at Puna on 3rd March and took over charge 
from Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who immediately 
afterwards (7th) started for Delhi, as commanded by 
the Emperor. (H. A. Paris MS. 110b, 1 12a, IMb, 

§2. Character of }ai Singh. 

Jai Singh's career had been one of undimmed 
brilliancy from the day when he, an orphan of twelve, 
received his first appointment in the Mughal army 
(1617.) Since then he had fought under the imperial 
banner in every part of the empire, — from Balkh in 
Central Asia to Bijapur in the Deccan, from Qanda- 
har in the west to Mungir in the east. Hardly a year 
had passed during the long reign of Shah Jahan when 
this Rajput chieftain had not seen active service 
somewhere and received some promotion for con- 
spicuous merit. His marked ability had found 
recognition in his being given the command of the 
Van or one of the wings in the Mughal armies led 
by princes of the blood in campEiigns beyond India. 
Latterly he had commanded in chief. In diplomacy 
he had attained to a success surpassing even his 
victories in the field. Wherever there was a difficult 
or delicate work to be done, the Emperor had only 
to turn to Jai Singh. A man of infinite tact and 


patience, an adept' in the ceremonious courtesy of 
the Muslims, a master of Turki and Persian, besides 
Urdu and the Rajput dialect, he was an ideal leader 
of the composite army of Afghans and Turks, Rajputs 
and Hindusthanis, that followed the crescent banner 
of the sovereign of Delhi. 

Age and experience had cooled the impetuous 
ardour of his youth, — he had once led a forlorn 
hope, at the storming of Mau, — and he now employed 
stratagem in preference to force, and bribe in pre- 
ference to war. His foresight and political cunning, 
his smoothness of tongue and cool calculating policy, 
were in striking contrast with the impulsive generosity, 
reckless daring, blunt straightforwardness, and im- 
politic chivalry which we are apt to associate with 
the Rajput character. 

And now this veteran of a hundred fights donned 
his armour at the age of sixty to crush a petty chief- 
tain, who in less than ten years had grown great 
enough to baffle all the resources of Bijapur and to 
challenge the prestige of the empire of Delhi. 

§3. Jai Singh's anxieties and far-sighted 

It was, however, with no light heart that Jai 
Singh* set himself to the task of subduing Shivaji, 

* My account of this war is beisecl upon Jai Singh's 
copious letters (Ho/l Anjuman, Benares and Paris MSS., with 
a few extra letters in Faiyyaz-td-qawanin), Aurangzib's letters 
(given in Paris MS. Sappl. 476, with two stray letters in a 


114 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. 

against whom Bijapuris and rival Maratha chiefs, 
Shaista Khan and Jaswant Singh, had toiled in vain. 
The Deccan had been the grave of many a reputation, 
and he had the failures of his predecessors before 
him. Shiva had already established a name for 
stratagem, and his Mavles had measured swords with 
the best regular troops on more than equal terms. 
Then, again, there was the likelihood that the arrival 
of a large Mughal force in the Deccan would alarm 
Bijapur and Golkonda and throw them into the arms 
of Shiva to make a common cause against the invader 
from the north. Jai Singh, therefore, could not give 
undivided attention to the Marathas : he had to keep 
an eye on Bijapur too. The problem before him was 
no easy one. As he wrote to the Emperor, "Not for 
a moment, in day or night, do I seek rest or ease 
from being busy about the task on which I have been 
sent." We see from his letters how he employed 
every possible device for dealing with an enemy, how 
wide-awake and full of many-sided activity he was, 
how he looked far ahead, and how he handled his 

miscellaneous Delhi MS.) and certain other letters given in 
Khatat-i-Shivaji (R.A.S. MS.) Some of these have been 
translated by me in the Modem Review. A.N. 887-907, though 
contemporary and authentic, heis no independent value after 
the use of the above materials. Storia, ii. 120-125, 132-137, 
gives Manucci's personal experience of the war. Bernier, 190 
(meagre.) The Marathi chronicles, Sabh. 38-46, Chit. 101-107, 
and Dig. 236-241, contain later and partly legendary accounts, 
but are our only authority for the doings of the Marathas. 


force so as to cause distraction to the enemy or deal 
a concentrated blow at a vital point. 

In view of his two enemies, ]ei Singh very wisely 
decided to take up a position between both, i.e., in 
ihe eastern part of Shiva's dominion, whence he could 
also easily threaten Bijapur, instead of pushing the 
war into the Western Ghats or the Konkan plain 
further west. So convinced was he of the wisdom 
of this plan that when Aurangzib urged him to make 
a descent into Konkan, he strongly objected and 
succeeded in carrying his point. He knew that if he 
could strike fatally at the heart of the Maratha king- 
dom, the distant limbs would drop down of 

§4. Coalition of all the enemies of Shivaji. 

Secondly, he played skilfully upon the hopes and 
fears of the Sultan of Bijapur, holding forth the 
chance of reduction of tribute and removal of the 
Emperor's displeasure, if Adil Shsih Elided the 
Mughals and thus clearly proved his want of connec- 
tion with Shivaji. Thirdly, he arranged to combine 
against Shivaji all his enemies and distract his atten- 
tion by attacks from all possible quarters. As early 
as January he had sent two Europeans named Francis 
Mile and Dick (or Diego) Mile,* to the western coast 
with letters to the chiefs of the European settlements, 

* Probably Mello, 'a family living in the Mughal country,' 
according to Manucci (ii. 144.) 

116 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. 

inviting them, to help the imperialists by obstructing 
Shiva, who had collected a fleet of his own. In May 
he wrote to the Emperor, "Now that Shiva is quite 
negligent and free from anxiety about the west coast, 
if our ships from Gujrat make a sudden descent on 
his maritime possessions much booty can be gained." 
He also wrote to the Siddis of Janjira inviting their 
co-operation. (H. A. Paris 114a ; Ben. 78a.) 

In January he had sent his Brahman emissaries 
to various Deccani chieftains, to stir them up against 
Shiva. The zamindars of Karnatak were asked to 
help the Mughals by threatening Bijapur from the 
south ; and agents from two such chiefs, namely 
Shivappa Nayak and the zamindar of Basavapattan, 
reached Jai Singh's camp wdth offers of service in 
April (Paris MS. 132a.)* Towards the end of Janu- 
ary an envoy from the Rajah of Jawhar had met 
Jai Singh at Burhanpur with a proposal to join the 
Mughal side ; he had been conciliated, promised a 
mansab, and asked to send his son or brother with 
a contingent of troops . Every one who bore a grudge 
to Shivaji or envied the sudden rise of the Bhonslas, 
had been approached by the Mughal general's spies. 
Beiji Chandra Rao and (his brother?) Ambaji Govind 
Rao More, — the family from which Shivaji had 
wrested Javli, — in response to Jai Singh's invitation, 
sent to him a Brahman named Mudha, asking for a 

* The words Shivappa and Biisavapattan are doubtful, as^ 
the Persian MS. is incorrect. 


safe conduct and money help, (middle of February.) 
These were given, and they reached his camp, along 
with Mankoji Dhangar, and were enlisted in the 
Mughal army (4th week of March) (Paris MS. 113a, 
123a.) Similarly, Afzal Khan's son, Fazl Khan, 
solicited from Jai Singh a command and an oppor- 
tunity of avenging his slaughtered father on Shivaji. 
(120fc.) The adhesion of the petty Rajahs of the Koli 
country north of Kalian was secured through Niccolao 
Manucci, then chief of Jai Singh's European artillery. 
{Storia, ii. 132-133.) 

Money and promises of high rank in the 
Mughal service were lavishly employed on Shiveg'i's 
olEcers to corrupt their loyally (Ben. MS. 54b.), and 
with some success, as in February Atmaji and Kahar 
Koli and two other brothers of the former, who 
commanded 3,000 cavalry and were posted by 
Shiva at the foot of Purandar in charge of artillery, 
sent their agent to Jai Sihgh agreeing toi desert to 
him. (Paris MS. 1 1 3a & b.) Rama and Hanumant, 
two captains descended from an ancient line of 
jagirdars of the Supa subdivision, were called away 
from the service of the Rajah of Chanda and employ- 
ed under Jai Singh on account of their familiarity 
with the seat of war and local influence. (122a.) 

Above all, Jai Singh concentrated all authority 
in his own hands, as an indispensable condition of 
success in war. The Emperor had at first given him 
the command of the field-operations only, while all 
administrative work, like the promotion, punishment 

118 SHIVAJI. [CH. V, 

and transfer of officers, the payment of the troops, 
and the regulation of jagirs, was left in the hands 
of the viceroy at Aurangabad. Jai Singh rightly 
insisted that in war there should be only one head, 
and that the 'man on the spot' should be given full 
authority, or else the work would suffer. The 
Emperor yielded to the Etrgument and Jai Singh 
gained absolute civil and military authority alike. 
The commandants of the Mughal forts at Ahmad- 
nagar and Parenda were also placed under his 

In Western Maharashtra with its heavy rainfall, 
campaigning is impossible during the monsoons. It 
was already 3rd March when Jai Singh reached 
Puna, and if he was to effect anything it must be 
done in the next three months. From his despatches 
we leam how he utilised every day, how he struck 
swiftly and hard, and how he followed up every 
success to the utmost. The mariner does not scan 
the sky for the storm-cloud with more anxiety than 
did this general for the herald of the monsoons 
which must interrupt his w^ork in the middle and 
drive him into the forced inactivity of cantonments. 

§5. The theatre of War described. 

The Western Ghats form a long towering wall 
running north to south along the western side of the 
Deccan. They have thrown off a number of short 
spurs eastwards, every two of which enclose a 
valley, the bed of some stream rolling east to join 


its sisters and form the mighty rivers of the south, 
the Godavari and the Krishna. Towards the east 
the spurs end, the valleys widen out and merge in 
the Tfast plains of the kingdom of Bijapur. This 
land, almost locked among the hills, is the cradle 
of the Maratha kingdom. Open, and therefore 
vulnerable, on the east, it is almost impenetrable 
from the west on account of hills and jungles. And 
it is in the west that the historic forts of Shivaji are 
situated, almost every peak being crowned with the 
Maratha eagle's eyrie. 

Going southwards from Junnar (which is 55 
miles west of Ahmadnagar) and crossing the old 
Mughal frontier, we have first the valley of the 
Indrayani, overlooked by the hill-forts of Lohgarh 
and Tikona in the west and Chakan in the centre. 
Next comes the valley of the Bhima, in which 
Puna stands. Further south, across a long range, 
lies the valley of the slender brook Karha, •with the 
cities of Saswad and Supa in the plain and the forts 
of Singhi-garh on the western hills and Purandar on 
its southern rocky barrier. Beyond these hills lies 
the valley of the Nira, with the town of Shirwal on 
its bank and the forts of Rajgarh and Toma in the 
west and Rohira in the south-west. 

Puna is almost the same distance (about 26 
miles) from Lohgarh in the north-west and Singh- 
garh in the south. Saswad was admirably situated 
for attacking Purandar (6 miles south of it), Singh- 
garh and Rajgarh (18 and 24 miles in the west), and 

120 SHIVAJl. [CH. V. 

Puna (18 miles north-west of it), — while the widen- 
ing plain east of it enabled cavalry to make an easy 
and rapid dash into Bijapur territory, or bar the 
path of reinforcements coming from that side. Even 
now five main roads meet at Saswad. 

§6. Mughals set up outposts. 

Jai Singh, therefore, with a true general's eye 
for the ground, made Saswad his base. Puna was 
strongly garrisoned. An outpost was established 
opposite Lohgarh to' observe and blockade it and 
guard the road leading north to the Mughal frontier 
near Junnar. A flying column was organised to 
ravage the Maratha villages embosomed among the 
hills to the west and south-west of Saswad. On his 
eastern side he was quite secure from attack, from 
the nature of the ground, the position of Sasw^ad 
close to the boundary line between Shiva's dominion 
and Bijapur, and the existence of a Mughal advanced 
post at Supa. 

After arriving at Puna (3rd March), Jai Singh 
spent some days in settling the country and 
establishing outposts, which he regarded as the 
"first of the pillars supporting the work of this ex- 
pedition." Qutbuddin Khan was sent with 7,000 
cavalry with orders to guard the country from Junnar 
in the north to the foot of the hills (painghat) of 
Konkan opposite Lohgarh, to set up one permanent 
outpost facing Lohgarh (to be garrisoned by 3,000 


men), another facing fort Nar-durg*{which is also 
known as Dablhar) with a strong force, and other 
outposts to bar the paths usually followed by the 
enemy, and to be constantly touring through his 
jurisdiction and inspecting his outposts. Ihtishaim 
Khan with 4,000 cavalry was left to guard Puna 
and its surrounding district. Between Puna and 
Lohgarh, a distance of some 28 miles, is a difficult 
pass, where a guard of 2,000 cavalry was jxjsted. 
Saj'yid Abdul Aziz was appointed with 3,000 horse 
to hold the thanah of Shirwal and prevent aid from 
reaching Purandar from the south. With him ^vent 
Baji Chandra Rao, Ambaji Govind Rao (zamindars 
of Javli), and Mankoji Dhangar. who had joined the 

There was already another thanah at Supa, in 
charge of Sayyid Munawwar Khan of Barha, and 
some other Muslim and Hindu officers. 

§7. Jai Singh opens the campaign. 

Deciding, for the reasons given above, to take 
up his position at Sasvsrad and besiege Purandar, Jai 
Singh marched out of Puna on 14th March. 

But he had immediately afterwards to make a 
long halt in its environs, as news came tO' him that 
Qutbuddin had gone to Junnar to escort treasure and 

* In the Persiein MS. the word may sJso be read as 
Tardurg or Taldttrg. Not found in the map. I doubtfully 
suggest Talegaon Dahhada, at the eastern end of the ridge 
on which Lohgarh and Vi^pur sttutd. 

122 SHIVAJl. [CH. V. 

Shiva had come to Lohgarh to make a dash into the 
imperial territory as soon as Jai Singh's back would 
be turned on Puna. Jai Singh quickly recalled 
Qutbuddin to his post opposite Lohgarh to watch 
Shiva's movements and resumed his march on the 
23rd. Loni,* some 12 miles east of Puna, was next 
reached ; here a block-house or enclosure for shelter- 
ing the troops was built in 3 days, and a thanah 
established under Rama and Hanumant, with 300 
cavalry and 300 foot musketeers, to guard the line 
of communication with Puna and the two roads 
which led to the imperial territory. 

Arriving on 29th March at a place one day's 
march short of Saswad, he sent on Dilir Khan with 
the Vanguard and the artillery to cross the pass 
lying in the way, advance four miles up the hill, 
and then halt. 

Next day the Rajah crossed the hill and pushed 
on to Dilir Khan's camp, leaving Daud Khan below 
the pass to see to the safe transit of the army up 
to noon. The rear-guard w^ere to bring up the 

On this very morning (30th March) Dilir Khan 
went with the Van to select a proper place for 
encampment. In this reconnaissance he approached 

* The Persian MS. reads "Tabi (or Tnpi) 5 kos iioia 
Puna towards Saswad, on the hill of the fort of Purandar." 
This would give some village near the Bapdeo Ghat, but there 
is none of the name in the map. I read Loni, which is about 
12 miles east of Puna, but in a plain. 


fort Purandar. A large body of Maratha musketeers, 
who occupied an enclosure in the waist of the hill 
— called vadi in the local language, — now came 
down and attacked the imperialists, who, however, 
routed them and captured the vadi. The houses there 
were burnt and the Mughal Van very boldly im- 
proved their victory by at once pushing on as near 
Purandar as they could and entrenching just beyond 
the fire of the fort-guns. 

Jai Singh on hearing of it, at once sent up 3,000 
of the troops of his command under Rai Singh, 
Kirat Singh, Qubad Khan, Mitrasen, Indraman 
Bundela and other officers at a gallop. He also 
despatched an urgent order to Daud Khan to come 
to him, take charge of the camp, and enable the 
Rajah to go to supervise the siege. But Daud Khan, 
on hearing the news, had hastened to join Dilir 
Khan, without coming to Jai Singh. 

The day was far spent ; there was no high officer 
left to guard the camp, and so Jai Singh had to 
stay there perforce. He had already sent forward 
a party of pioneers and water-carriers, shot, powder, 
gun munitions, and entrenching tools for the use of 
Dilir Khan. 

Next morning (3 1st March), Jai Singh carefully 
escorted the baggage to a permanent camp serving 
as a base, between Saswad and Purandar, only 4 
miles from die latter. TTien he reconnoitred the 
fort from the position of Daud Khan and Kirat 
Singh. It was not a single fort, but a fortified mass. 

124 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. 

of hills ; hence to surround and closely blockade it 
was impossible. 

§8. Purandar described. 

Six miles south of Saswad rises the stupendous 
mountain mass of Purandeir, the highest point of 
which towers 4,564 feet above sea-level and more 
than 2,500 feet above the plain at its foot. It is 
really a double fort, with an independent and very 
strong sister enclosure, named Vajrageirh, on a 
ridge running out east of it. Purandar consists of 
an upper fort or citadel with precipitous sides all 
around and a lower fort or machi, 300 feet or more 
below it. The latter is a ledge running round the 
waist of the hill with many a winding, the entire 
circuit being four miles. On the north side the 
ledge widens out into a broad terrace, containing 
the barracks and offices of the earrison. This terrace 
is bounded on the east by the high spur named 
Bhairav Khind, which starts from the base of the 
steep overhanging north-eastern tower (called 
Khand-kala or the Sky-scraper)* of the upper fort, 
and runs for about a mile eastw^ards in a narrow 
ridge, ending in a small tableland (3,618 feet above 
sea-level), crowned with the fort of Rudramala, (now- 
called Vajragarh.) 

This Vajragarh commands the machi or lower 
fort of Purandar on its northern and most important 

* Molesworth, 2nd ed. 192, explains Khadkal as 'a rocky 


face, as the garrison has tx> live here. It was by 
seizing Vajragarh diat Jai Singh in 1665 and the 
English in 1817 made Purandar untenable for the 
Marathas. Jai Singh, like a true general, decided 
to attack Vajragarh first. {Bom. Gaz. xvii. pt. iii, 
PD. 428-435.) 

§9. Mughals open the siege. 

Dilir Khan with his nephews and Afghan 
troops, Hari Bhan and Udai Bhan Gaur, entrenched 
between Purandar and Rudramal. In front of him 
were the chief of the artillery, Turktaz Khan, and 
the party sent by Jai Singh. Kirat Singh with the 
3,000 troopers of the Rajah and a few other 
mansabdars made a stockade opposite the north 
gate of Purandar. On the right were the trenches 
of Rajah Narsingh Gaur, Kam Rathor, Jagat Singh 
of Narwar, and Sayyid Maqbul Alam. Behind 
Purandar and facing its postern gate (khi^k') was the 
position of Daud Khan, Rajah Rai Singh, Md. Salih 
Tarkhan, Ram Singh [Hada ?] , Sher Singh Rathor, 
Raj Singh Gaur and others. To the right of this 
position were posted Rasul Beg Rozbhani and his 
Rozbhani followers. Opposite Rudramal, Chatur- 
bhuj Chauhan with a party of Dilir Khan's followers 
entrenched, and behind these Mitrasen, Indraman 
Bundela and some other officers. 

Jai Singh removed his quarters from the camp 
to the foot of the hill to be nearer the besieged 
fort, while the soldiers pitched their tents along the 

126 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. 

hill-side. He visited the trenches every day, 
encouraged his men, and supervised the progress 
of the siege. At first all his efforts v^'ere directed to 
dragging guns to the top of the steep and difficult 
hill. It took three days to raise a gun, named 
Abdullah Khan, and mount it opposite Rudramal. 
In 3J4 days more a second gun, named Path Lashkar, 
was taken there. A third, named Haheli, was pain- 
fully approaching the summit. The incessant 
bombardment of the Mughals demolished the bases 
of the tower in front, and pioneers were sent to its 
foot to dig a hole underneath. 

§ 10. Capture of Vajragarh. 

At midday, 1 3th April, Dilir Khan's division 
stormed the tower and drove the enemy into an 
enclosure behind it, leaving on the field seven slain 
and four wounded. Jai Singh reinforced Dilir Khan 
with a party of his own Rajputs. Next day, the 
victorious Mughals pushed on to the inner enclosure 
and tried to capture it by escalade. The garrison, 
oppressed by their fire, capitulated in the evening 
(14th April), left the fort, and were disarmed. But 
Jai Singh very wisely allowed them to return home 
in order to tempt the garrison of Purandar, by this 
example of leniency, to surrender instead of fighting 
to the last. The heroic leaders of the defence were 
chivalrously given robes of honour by Dilir Khan 
and Jai Singh alike. The imperialists lost 80 killed 


and 109 wounded, as the price of this success. 
(Paris MS. 126fc.) 

§11. Flying columns raoage Shioaji's oillages. 

The possession of Vajragarh was the stepping- 
.stone to the capture of Purandar, or in Jai Singh's 
own language, "the key that would unlock 
Purandar." Dilir Khan now turned to the latter 
fort, while Jai Singh organised raids into the Maratha 
country, in order, as he wrote to the Emperor, to 
convince Shiva and the Sultan of Bijapur that the 
Mughal army ■was large enough to be able to spare 
troops from the siege, and also to prevent jmy con- 
centration of forces round Shivaji by creating 
constant terror and disturbance in various parts of 
Hs kingdom. (Paris MS. 133a.) 

There was also a secret reason for thus sending 
away certain generals from the siege-camp. He had 
some disloyal officers under him, whose presence 
w^as worse than useless. Daud Khan Qureshi weis 
posted to watch the postern gate (^/iirjji) , of the fort ; 
but after a few^ days it became known that a peurty 
of Marathas had entered the fort by that gate, 
without being opposed by him. Dilir Khan severely 
rebuked Daud Khan for his failure, and a bitter 
quarrel broke out between the two. Jed Singh then 
transferred Daud Khan to his own division £md 
posted Purdil Khan and Subh-Kam Bundela opposite 
the postern. But matters did not improve : "Subh- 
Karn did not at all give his heart to the work, but 

128 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. 

preferred above everything else to favour Shiva!" 
Daud Khan, too, was a source of mischief in his 
ne-w station. He constantly declared that the capture 
of Purandar was beyond the range of possibility, 
and that the siege was a waste of men and money. 
His intention in talking in this way was, as Jai 
Singh detected, to discourage the commander-in- 
chief from heartily supporting the siege-operations, 
so that Dilir Khan would be left to bear the burden 
of the fight unaided and would have to retire with 
failure and disgrace. Jai Singh removed the 
mischief-maker from the camp by creating an 
independent flying column and sending him at its 
head, to make raids daily, or on alternate days, on 
different places in the district. (Ben. MS. I91t>, 
Faiyyaz. 592.) 

On 25th AprU, the flying column six thousand 
strong under Daud Khan, accompanied by Rajah Rai 
Singh, Sharza Khan (a Bijapuri general), Amar Singh 
Chandawat, Achal Singh Kachhwa (the principal 
officer of Jai Singh's household troops), and 400 of 
Jai Singh's own troopers, marched out with orders 
to enter the region of Rajgarh, Singh-garh and Rohira 
from two sides and "not to leave any vestige of 
cultivation or habitation, but make an utter desola- 
tion." (Paris MS. 133b.) At the same time 
Qutbuddin Khan and Ludi Khan were ordered to 
harry the district from the north and thus distract 
and wear out Shivaji. 

Daud Khan's party arrived near fort Rohira on 


the 27th and burnt and totally ruined about 50 
villages. A body of Mughal skirmishers entered 
four populous villages hidden among the hills, which 
had never before been visited by an enemy ; the 
invaders soon received reinforcements, overcame the 
opposition, occupied the villages, razed them to the 
ground, and brought away many of the peasants 
and their cattle and other property as spoils of war. 
After a day's halt here, the Mvighals marched 
towards Rajgarh on the 30th, burning the villages 
on the way. Without stopping to besiege the fort 
(for which they were not prepared), they sacked the 
villages around it, — the garrison watching the work 
of ruin from the shelter of the fort-guns, without 
venturing to make a sally. 

The ground in the neighbourhood was hilly and 
uneven. So, the column retreated four miles to a 
level place, near the pass of Gunjankhora, where 
they encamped for the night, and next day (1st May), 
reached Shivapur. TTience Daud Khan marched 
towards Sin^-garh and harried its environs, return- 
ing to Puna on 3rd May, by order of Jai Singh. 

Meantime Qutbuddin Khan, in the midst of his 
raids into the passes of Pur-khora and Tasi-khora, 
near fort Kumari, was urgently recalled to Puna, 
where he joined Daud Khan. TTie cause of this 
new order was that Jai Singh had learnt that Shivaji 
had mustered a large force near Lohgarh, which 
required to be immediately broken up. 

The two Mughal columns were, therefore, 


130 SHIVAJl. [CH. V. 

diverted to that side (the north-west.) Leaving Puna 
they halted at Chinchwad (10 or 12 miles north) on 
the 4th and reached Lohgarh on the 5th. When the 
Mughal skirmishers arrived near the fort, 500 
Maratha horse and 1,000 infantry salHed forth and 
attacked them. But the imperialists held their 
ground, were soon reinforced, and routed the enemy 
with heavy loss after a severe fight. Then they 
burnt the houses on the skirt of the hill, taking many 
prisoners and cattle. The villages enclosed by the 
four forts, — Lohgarh, Visapur, Tikona, and Tangai, 
— ^were devastated, and much of Balaghat (high- 
lands) and Painghat (lowlands) harried. Thereafter 
they returned, Qutbuddin Khan and his party taking 
up an outpost near Puna, and Daud Khan and his 
comrades rejoining the main army on 19th May, 
after a fortnight's absence. 

§12. Maratha efforts to raise the siege. 
Meantime the Maratha captains had not been 
idle, but tried hard to harass the Mughals and raise 
the seige. Early in AprO, Netaji Palkar, Shiva's 
kinsman and cavalry leader, made a dash on 
Parenda, but a Mughal detachment from Supa 
hastened in pursuit, and the Maratha host melted 
away at the news and offered no fight. Late in May, 
Qutbuddin Khan had to advance up to fort Urouda,* 

* The Alamgir-namah gives Ur-drug. I suggest Urouda, 
I ) miles west of Puna. It may also have been Udai-durg. 


to break up a gathering of the enemy of which he 
had got news. The villages on the way were 
plundered, and the enemy dispersed wherever they 
assembled round any of their forts. The hill of 
Lohgarh was scaled, and a body of Marathas on the 
top slain or routed, Daud Khan returning with 300 
captives and nearly 3,000 cattle. Then, again, a 
body of 300 Maratha cavalry, who were sheltering at 
Narkot, were dislodged by a detachment sent by 
Qubad Khan, the new thanahdar of Puna (w'ce 
Ihtisham Khan deceased), the victors returning with 
the captured peasants and catde. 

But the MEirathas did not invariably fail. As 
Jai Singh admits, "sometimes we have failed to 
prevent the enemy from accomplishing their hostile 
designs." (136t>.) Khafi Khan is more explicit : 
"The surprises of the enemy, their gallant successes, 
attacks on dark nights, blocking of roads and diiHcillt 
passes, and burning of jungles, made it very hard 
for the imperialists to move about. The Mughals 
lost many men Eind beasts." (ii. 180.) 

After the capture of Vajragarh in the middle of 
April, Dilir Khan advanced along the connecting 
ridge and laid siege to the machi or lower fort of 
Purandar. His trenches approached the tower of 
Khand-kala at the north-eastern angle of the fort. 
At first, the garrison made sorties to drive back the 
besiegers. One night they attacked Kirat Singh, 
who was quite prepared and repulsed them with 
slaughter. Another attack was made in a dark 

132 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. 

nigkt on the trenches of Rasul Beg Rozbhani : he 
was caught napping, the guns in his trenches were 
spiked, and 15 of his soldiers wounded. But rein- 
forcements, attracted by the din of battle, poured 
in from the neighbouring trenches, and the enemy 
were repulsed with loss. Next day there was a 
sharp skirmish over the removal of the corpses, in 
which the Mughals lost 8 men. 

But Dilir Khan sat down before Purandar like 
grim Death, his men "doing in a day what could 
not be achieved elsewhere in a month." 

§ 13. Outworlzs of Purandar stormed. 
When, in the course of May, the Mughal 
trenches reached the foot of the two White Towers, 
which had been dismantled by bombardment, the 
garrison began to throw down lighted naphtha oil, 
leather bags full of gunpowder, bombs and heavy 
stones which effectually stopped the further advance 
of the Mughals. Jai Singh ordered a high wooden 
platform of logs and planks to be made, on -which 
guns were to be mounted and parties of gunners 
and musketeers placed, to command the enemy's 
position. His first two attempts were frustrated : on 
the first occasion the upright posts had been just set 
up, on the second the cross-pieces had been joined, 
when the enemy burnt them down. On 30th May, 
however, the parts of the third tower were joined 
together in the rear and sent to the appointed place 
in front of the White Tower, in charge of Rup Singh 


Rathor and Giridhar Purohit, with orders to set up 
a defensive wall in front first of all, and then plant 
the two rows of posts. Next some Rajput marksmen 
were to climb to the top and keep the enemy down 
with their bows and matchlocks while the tower was 
being completed. TTiis was done two hours before 

Then the general's hemds were forced by the 
impetuosity of his men. Before artillery was mounted 
on the wooden tower and the enemy opposite 
crushed, with only two hours of daylight remaining, 
some Rohila soldiers, without informing Dilir Khan, 
tried to storm the White Tower. The enemy 
crowded the wall in large numbers and checked 
them. But reinforcements rapidly currived : the men 
of the trenches on both hands scaled the wall with 
ladders, and ran towards the enemy. Jai Singh's 
officer Bhupat Singh Puar, a commander of 500, was 
slain on the right side of the smaller White Tower, 
with several other Rajputs. On the left side Bal- 
krishna Sakhawat and some Afghans of Dilir Khan 
carried on the fight. Just then the line of supports, 
under Achal Singh and Kirat Singh, arrived on the 
scene of battle from their shelter behind the wooden 
structure. After an obstinate struggle at close 
quarters, the Marathas lost heavily, retreated to 
behind the Black Tower (formerly known as Shah 
Burj or Royal Tower), and began to gall the Mughals 
by discharging bombs., kettles full of gunpowder. 

134 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. 

rockets, stones, etc. Finding further advance im- 
possible, Jai Singh was contented with the capture 
of the three bastions made that day and ordered his 
men to dig trenches exactly where they had reached 
and to hold the White Tower, without attempting to 
push on to the Black Tower. 

In the course of the next two days the wooden 
structure was completed and two small pieces of 
cannon were mounted on it. The enemy, unable 
to reply to this fire from a superior height, evacuated 
the Black Tower and another bastion near it and 
took refuge in a stockade adjoining the wall of the 
tower. But they could not show their heads. The 
stockade was untenable, and they retired to the 
trenches behind it. (Ben. MS. 1876— 189a.) Thus 
five towers and one stockade of the lower fort fell 
into the hands of the Mughals. 

Purandeir now seemed doomed. And, as if to 
complete its destruction, the Ejnperor had at Jai 
Singh's request despatched a train of very heavy 
artillery which were now on the way to the fort. 
The garrison had originally numbered only 2,000* 
against at least ten times ,that number of Mughals, 
and they had suffered heavy casualties during two 
months of incessant fighting. Early in the siege they 
had lost their gallant commandant Murar Baji 

* Sabhasad, 42 — 43, gives this number, which is evidently 
an underestimate. Alamgir-namah, 903, says that the fort had 
4,000 combatants left in it at capitulation. 


§14. Death of Marar Baji Prabhu. 

Taking seven hundred select men with himself 
Murar Baji made a sortie on Dilir Khan, who was 
trying to climb the hill with 5,000 Afghans and some 
more troops of other races. The Marathas dashed 
forward, mingled with the enemy on all sides, and 
there was severe fighting at close quarters. Murar 
Baji with his Mavles slew^ 500 Pathans besides many 
Bahlia infantrymen, and at the head of sixty 
desperate followers cut his way to Dilir 's camp. 

His comrades were slain by the overwhelming 
body of the Mughals, but Murar Baji rushed straight 
on towards Dilir. The Khan, in admiration of his 
matchless courage, called UDon him to yield and 
promised him his life and a high post under him. 
Murar indignantly refused, and was going to strike 
at Dilir when the latter shot him down with an 
arrow. Three hundred Mavles fell with him, and 
the rest retreated to the fort. But the garrison, with 
a courage worthy of the mother of Brasidas the 
Spartan, continued the struggle, undismayed by their 
leader's fall and saying, "What though one man 
Murar Baji is dead? We are as brave as he, and 
we shall fight with the same courage!" (Sabh. 
43-44 ; T. S.) 

§ 15. Shivaji negotiates for submission. 

But at last the steady pressure of Jai Singh bore 
fruit. Purandar was closely invested, the garrison 

136 SHIVAJl. [CH. V. 

had been wofully thinned by two months of fighting, 
and now the capture of five bastioins of the lower 
fort made the stronghold untenable. Its fall was 
only a question of time. Shiva found it futile to 
prolong the resistance. The families of the Maratha 
officers were sheltered in Purandar, and its capture 
would meein their captivity and dishonour. He had 
also failed to prevent the Mughal flying columns 
from ravaging his country. Failure and ruin stared 
him in the face wherever he looked. 

With his usual foresight, he had for some time 
past been sending envoys to Jai Singh to beg for 
terms, but the astute Rajput did not take him 
seriously.* TTien, as the Mughal success became 
more and more evident, Shiva began to rise in his 
offer of tribute and forts as the price of peace ; but 
his terms were not proportionate to the military 
advantage gained by Jai Singh, and were therefore 
uniformly rejected. 

* "After the arrival of the imperial army near Pabal, 
Shiva's agents began to visit me, and by the time of my 
arrival at Puna they had brought two letters from him. But 

1 gave no answer and sent them back in dis^pointment 

Then he sent a long Hindi letter with a trusted servant named 
Karmaji, who repeatedly entreated me to read the contents 
only once. In it Shiva offered to be loyal and to help us in 
a war with Bijapur as more likely to succeed than a war 
in his hilly and intricate country — In reply I asked him. 
enter the Emperor's service if he desired his life and safety. " 
(Ben. MS. 54a.) 


The Mughal victory of 2nd June, and the im- 
pending fall of the lower fort decided Shivaji. He 
resolved to interview Jai Singh and offer fresh ierms 
for peace with the imperialists, and if these were 
rejected he would make an alliance with Adil Shah 
by restoring Konkan and continue the war with the 
Mughals with renewed vigour. He had about 20th 
May sent his Chief Justice Raghunath Ballal (Pandit 
Rao) on a secret mission to leam Jai Singh's terms, 
which were that Shiva must come in person and 
make an unconditional surrender, after which 
impericJ mercy would be shown to him.* 

Shivaji next demanded and secured from Jai 
Singh an assurance, confirmed with solemn oaths, 
that he would be allowed to visit Jai Singh and 
return home in safety, whether his terms were 
accepted or not. This visit was to be made in strict 
secrecy, as "the Emperor had forbidden Jai Singh 
to hold any negotiations whatever with Shiva." 

§ 16. Shivaji interviews Jai Singh. 
Raghunath Ballal returned to his master on 9th 
June. On the 10th he sent word that Shivaji would 
come next day. On the llth, at 9 o'clock in the 
morning, while Jai Singh was holding Court in his 
tent at the foot of Purandar, Raghunath came in and 
reported that Shivaji had arrived at hand in a palki 

* Shiva's next move was to send the Pandit Rao back with 
an offer to send his son to make the submission. Jai Singh 
declined. (Ben. MS. 55a.) 

138 SHIVAJI. [CH. V, 

accompanied by six Brahmans only. Jai Singh 
immediately sent his secretary Udairaj and Ugrasen 
Kachhwa to meet him on the way and tell him that 
if he agreed to surrender all his forts he might come, 
otherwise he should turn back from the place. Shiva 
agreed to the terms in general and proceeded forward 
with the two officers. At the door of the tent he 
was welcomed by Jai Singh's Paymaster and ushered 
in. The Rajah advanced a few steps, embraced 
Shiva, and seated him by his side, w^hile armed 
Rajputs stood around to guard against any treacher- 
ous movement on the part of the slayer of Afzal 
Khan ! 

Jai Singh had got up a little scene to conquer 
any lingering reluctance that Shiva might still have 
had. In anticipation of the Maratha chief's arrival 
he had sent word to Dilir Khan and Kirat Singh, 
whose trenches were the most advanced, to be 
ready to deliver an assault on Purandar. After Shiva 
had entered, Jai Singh gave the signal, the Mughals 
attacked and captured the remaining part of the 
Khand-kala defences. TTbie garrison made a sortie to 
check them, but were driven back with the loss of 
SO killed and many wounded. The fighting could be 
distinctly seen from the interior of the Rajah's tent. 
Shiva then offered to surrender the fort in order to 
prevent the useless slaughter of his men. Jai Singh, 
therefore, sent his Mir Tuzuk, Ghazi Beg, to Dilir 
Khan and Kirat Singh with an order to stop the fight 
and allow the garrison to depart unmolested. An 


officer of Shiva was sent with Ghazi Beg to order the 
garrison to capitulate. They begged respite for the 

night. (A. N. 903.) 

§ 17. Terms of the Treaty of Parandar 1665. 

Shiva had travelled without any baggage or 
retinue, and therefore Jai Singh lodged him in his 
office-tent as his guest. Up to midnight the two 
sides higgled for the terms of a permanent peace. 
But Jai Singh knew the strength of his position. As 
he wrote in his despatches to the Emperor, "I 
declined to abate a single fort. Gradually, after 
much discussion, we came to this agreement : — (a) 
Tliat 23 of his forts, the lands of which yielded 4 
laJ^hs of hun as annual revenue, should be annexed 
to the empire ; and (b) that 12 of his forts, including 
Rajgarh, with an annual revenue of 1 lakh of hun, 
should be left to Shiva, on condition of service and 
loyalty to the imperial throne." 

Shivaji, however, begged to be excused from 
attending the Emperor's Court like other nobles and 
Rajahs, and proposed to send his son, as his repre- 
sentative, with a contingent of 5,000 horse, (to be 
paid by means of a jagir), for regular attendance and 
service under the Emperor or the Mughal governor 
of the Deccan. This ■was exactly the favour shown 
to the Maharana of Udaipur. As he pleaded with 
Jeii Singh, "By reason of my late unwise and disloyal 
acts, I have not the face to wait on the Ejnperor. I 
shall depute my son to be His Majesty's servant and 

140 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. 

slave, and he will be created a Commander of Five 

Thousand with a suitable jagir As for me 

sinner, exempt me from holding any mansab or 
serving in the Mughal army. But whenever in your 
wars in the Deccan, I am given any military duty, I 
shall promptly perform it." 

In addition to the above terms, Shivaji made 
another and a conditional engagement with the 
Mughals : "If lands yielding 4 lakhs of hun a year 
in the lowlands of Konkan and 5 lakhs of hun a year 
in the uplands (Balaghat Bijapuri), are granted to me 
by the Emperor and I am assured by an imperial 
jarman that the possession of these lands will be 
confirmed in me after the expected Mughal con- 
quest of Bijapur, then I agree to pay to the 
Emperor 40 lakhs of hun in 13 yearly instalments." 
He was expected to wrest these lands from the 
Bijapuri officers by means of his own troops. (H. A. 
Ben. MS. 66b— 67a.) 

Here we detect the shrewdness of Jai Singh's 
policy in throwing a bone of perpetual contention 
between Shivaji and the Sultan of Bijapur. As he 
wrote to the Emperor, "This policy will result in 
a threefold gain : first, we get 40 lakj\s of hun or 
2 k^ores of Rupees ; secondly, Shivaji will be alienated 
from Bijapur ; thirdly, the imperial army will be 
relieved from the arduous task of campaigning in 
these two broken and jungly regions, as Shiva will 
himself undertake the task of expelling the Bijapuri 
garrisons from them." In return for it, Shiva also 


agreed to assist the Mughals in the invasion of Bijapur 
with 2,000 cavalry of his son Shambhuji's mansab 
and 7,000 expert infantry under his own command. 
(Ben. MS. 70a & b.) 

§ 1 8. Shivaji receives Mughal faoours. 

Dilir Khan was greatly offended at this pacific 
end of the siege, which robbed him of the chance 
of military glory, and at Shiva's not having made 
him the intermediary of the Emperor's pardon. So 
he refused to move from his trenches or consent to an 
armistice. The politic Jai Singh now turned to soothe 
him. On the 12th, as the public did not yet know 
of Shiva's arrival, he was mounted on an elephant 
and sent with Rajah Rai Singh to wait on Dilir Khan, 
who, mollified by this attention, presented him with 
two horses, a sword, a jewelled dagger, and two 
pieces of precious cloth. Then Dilir Khan conducted 
Shiva back to Jai Singh, took his hand, and entrusted 
him to the' Rajah. The Rajah now presented Shiva 
v^^ith a robe of honour, a horse, an elephant, and an 
ornament for the turban (jigha.) Shiva, who had 
come unarmed, with cunning policy girt on the sword 
for a short time and then put it off sasdng, "1 shall 
serve the Emperor as one of his devoted but unarmed 

That day (12th June) according to the agreement, 
7,000 men and women, (of whom 4,000 were com- 
batants), left Purandar, and the Mughals entered into 
possession of it ; all the stores, weapons, artillery. 

142 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. 

and other property found within were attached by 
the Government. Mughal officers were sent with 
Shivaji's men to take charge of five other forts to be 
surrendered by the Marathas. 

Some time before this, w^hile Shiva had been 
sending Brahman envoys to Jai Singh, the latter -with 
his usual foresight had written to the Emperor beg- 
ging him to send to him a gracious imperial farman 
(letter) addressed to Shiva. This was to be delivered 
to Shiva in the event of his making submission. 
By a happy coincidence the farman and an ordinary 
robe of honour sent by the Emperor arrived on the 
day following Shiva's surrender. By the Rajah's 
advice he followed the Court etiquette, advanced six 
miles on foot to welcome the farman on the way, 
and put on the robe of honour. (A. N. 904 ; but 
I doubt its accuracy here, as Jai Singh is silent about 
this episode.) 

On the 14th Shiva was presented by Jai Singh 
with an elephant and two horses, and sent away to 
Rajgarh with Kirat Singh, after paying a ceremonious 
visit to Daud Khan. As he begged hard for the full 
suit of ^/leZai (robe of honour) worn by Jai Singh, 
the latter presented it to him. 

Reaching Kondana at noon of the 14th, Shivaji 
delivered the fort to Kirat Singh and left for Rajgarh, 
where he arrived on the 15th. On the 1 7th he sent 
away Shambhuji from Rajgarh, in charge of Ugrasen 
Kachhwa and they arrived in Jai Singh's camp on the 


The Maratha forts surrendered to the Emperor 
by the treaty of Purandar (A. N. 905) were : — in the 
Deccan : (1) Rudramala or Vajragarh, (2) Purandar, 
(3) Kondana, (4) Rohira, (5) Lohgarh, (6) Isagarh, 
(7) Tanki, (8) Tikona; in Konhan: (9) Mahuli, 
(10) Muranjan, (11) Khirdurg, (12) Bhandardurg, 
(13) Tulsi-khul, (14) Nar-durg, (15) Khaigarh or 
Ankola. (16) Marg-garh or Atra, (17) Kohaj, 
(18) Basant, (19) Nang, (20) Karnala, (21) Songarh, 
(22) Mangarh, (23) Khand-kala near Kondana. 

These terms were reported to the Emperor for 
ratification, together with a letter of submission and 
prayer for pardon from Shiva (but really drafted by 
Jai Singh's secretary Udairaj) and a despatch from Jai 
Singh recommending the acceptance of the terms 
and the granting of a robe of honour to Shiva. They 
reached Aurangzib at Delhi on 23rd June and he was 
pleased to accede to them all. (Parasnis MS. No. 8.) 

Thus, in less than three months from the date 
when he opened the campaign, Jai Singh had 
succeeded in bringing Shiva down on his knees ; he 
had made this haughty chief cede a large part of his 
dominions and consent to serve as a dependent 
vassal of the Emperor. It was a splendid victory. 
Shiva loyally carried out his promises : in the war 
with Bijapur he with his contingent rendered distin- 
guished service under the Mughal banner and was 
mentioned in the despatches. 

144 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. 

§19. Shivaji assists the Mughals in the 
inoasion of Bijapur. 

The war with Shiva having been thus happily 
ended and the terms of the Treaty of Purandar 
having been faithfully carried out, Jai Singh now 
began to make preparations for the invasion of 
Bijapur, in order to prevent his large army from 
eating its bread in idleness after its recent victorious 
campaign against Shivaji. In September he received 
the Emperor's despatch accepting all his recommend- 
ations about Shiva together with a gracious jarman 
(stamped with the impression of his palm) and a robe 
of honour for the latter. Jai Singh invited Shiva to 
come and receive these marks of imperial favour 
with befitting solemnity. "Shivaji, then in Adil- 
Shahi Konkan, immediately on hearing of it, travelled 
quickly and reached my camp on 27th September, 
1665. On the 30th, I sent him, with my son Kirat 
Singh and my Paymaster Jani Khan, to advance and 
welcome the imperial letter on the way." 

A little mummery was acted on this occasion, 
to satisfy the etiquette of the Mughal Court : ' 'As 
Shiva had worn no weapon on his person from the 
day when he had come like a penitent offender to 
wait on the Rajah up to this date, Jai Singh now gave 
him a jewelled sword and dagger and pressed him 
to put them on." {A.N. 907.) The ceremony com- 
pleted his restoration to the good grace of the 


Jai Singh then dismissed Shivaji to enable him 
to gather his contingent of 9,000 men and make the 
necessary preparations for the coming campaign, 
offering him two lakhs of Rupees from the imperial 
treasury for the purpose. Shiva promised to join Jai 
Singh the day before he started. 

At last, on 20th November, 1665, Jai Singh set 
out on the invasion of Bijapur,* from the fort of 
Purandar. The Maratha contingent, 9,000 strong, 
under Shiva and his kinsman (^^ures/i) Netaji Palkeir, 
— "whom the Deccanis regard as a second Shivaji," 
— formed the Left Centre of the Mughal army. 

During the first month of the campaign, Jai 
Singh's march was an uninterrupted triumph. From 
Purandar to Mangalbirah (Mangalvedhe), a fort 52 
miles north of Bijapur, the invaders advanced without 
meeting with any opp>osition ; the Bijapuri forts on 
the way were either evacuated in terror or surren- 
dered at call to Shiva's troops, who had been sent 
ahead by Jai Singh to capture them. Phaltan, about 
forty miles south-east of Purandar, was entered on 
7th December ; Thathora, 14 miles south-west of 

* The invasion of Bijapur by Jai Singh and Shivaji : 
Haft Anjuman. (Ben. MS.) 78a— 94«, 138b. 172b— I73fr. 1906, 
192a— I93b, 20Ib— 202fl, 214a— 215a, 231a— 233b; Storia, ii. 
141—142; A. N. 988—1021; B. S. 378—392; the narrative in 
Tarikh'i-AU II. is useless, the sense being completely buried 
under the flowers of rhetoric. The Maratha writers are totally 
silent. For details about the war, see my Hiitory oj Aumngzib, 
vol. iv. ch. zli. 


146 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. 

Phaltan, on the 8th ; Khawan about a week later ; 
and Mangalbiicih itself on the 1 8th. For these services 
Shivaji received a letter of praise, a robe of honour, 
and a jewelled dagger from the Emperor. (Parasnis 
MS. No. 9.) 

The invaders marched on, and then, on 24th 
December, they came into touch with the enemy for 
the first time. Next day, a Mughal detachment under 
Dilir Khan and Shivaji marched 10 miles from their 
camp and fought a Bijapuri army of 12,000 under 
the famous generals Sharza Khan and Khawas 
Khan and their Maratha auxiliaries under Jadu 
Rao [Ghorpare ?] of Kalian and Vyankoji, the 
half-brother of Shivaji. The Deccanis evaded the 
charge of the cavaliers of Delhi, but harassed 
them by their "cossack tactics," dividing them- 
selves into four bodies and fighting loosely with 
the Mughal divisions opposite. After a long contest, 
Dilir Khan's tireless energy and courage broke 
the enemy force by repeated charges, and they 
retired in the afternoon, leaving one general (Yaqut 
the Abyssinian) and 15 captains dead on the field and 
many flags, horses and weapons in the Mughal hands. 
But as soon as the victors begem their return march 
to camp, the elusive enemy reappeared and galled 
them severely with rockets from the tw^o wings and 
rear. The Maratha reeir-guard under Netaji bore the 
brunt of the attack, but stood its ground well. When 
the Deccanis hemmed Neta round and pressed him 
hard, he called for reinforcements from Kirat Singh 


and Fath Jang Khan, and with their aid repulsed the 
enemy. Jadav Rao of Kalian received a musket 
shot, of which he died in five or six days. Shivaji 
and his brother Vyankoji fought on opposite sides ! 

After a two days' halt, Jai Singh resumed his 
march on the 27th. The next day, after reaching the 
-camping-ground in the evening, he detached a force 
to attack and expel the Bijapuri army from the neigh- 
bourhood. The fight soon became general, and Jai 
Singh himself had to chairge the enemy's largest 
division. Shivaji and Kumar Kirat Singh, seated on 
the same elephant, led his Van and dashed into the 
Deccani ranks. After a hard fight, the enemy were 
put to flight leaving more than a hundred dead and 
many more wounded. 

On 29th December, 1665, Jed Singh arrived at 
Makhnapur,* ten miles north of Bijapur fort. Here 
his advance was stopped, and after waiting for a 
week, he was forced to begin his retreat on 5th 
January, 1666, as he found his fondly hoped-for 
chance of taking Bijapur by a coup de main gone. 
He was not prepared for a regular siege, because, in 
his eagerness "to grasp the golden opportunity" of 
attacking Bijapur while undefended and torn by- 
domestic factions, he had not brought any big 
artillery and siege.materials with himself. On the 

* In the Persian MS. the name may be read either as 
Makhanah or as Nagthana. The latter is a village 8 miles 
n. 11. c. of Bijapur. 

148 SHIVAJI. [CH. V, 

other hand, Adil Shah had put the fort of Bijapur 
in a strong posture of defence ; its walls had been 
repaired, large quantities of provisions and material 
laid in, its regular garrison augmented by 30,000 
Kamatak infantry, and the country round for a radius 
of seven miles laid waste, drained of its w^ater-supply, 
and denuded of its trees. At the same time he had 
sent a picked force under Sharza Khein and Siddi 
Masaud to invade the Mughal dominions and make 
a diversion in Jai Singh's rear. 

On 27th January, the retreating Mughal army 
reached a place 16 miles from Parenda, and there 
halted for 24 days. Here we shall leave it, as the 
historian of Shivaji is not concerned with its opera- 
tions any further. 

§ 20. Shii>aji fails at Panhala, 1666. 

On receiving the unexpected check before 
Bijapur, Jai Singh looked round, to create a diversion. 
As he writes in a despatch to the Ojurt, "At my 
request the Emperor had [on 25th Dec] sent a robe 
of honour and a jewelled dagger for Shiva, ■who was 

ready to co-operate at the siege of Bijapur, but I 

did not deem it expedient. Shiva said to me, — 'If 
you detach me, I can go' and capture for the Emperor 
Panhala, of which I know all the exits and entrances, 
while the garrison are off their gU£U-d. I shall raise 
so much disturbance in that district that the enemy 
will be compelled to divert a large force from their 
army to oppose me.' As his words bore promise of 


action, I sent him away on his promised errand." 
<H. A., Ben. MS. 84b.) 

But there was a deeper reason for this step, as 
we learn from Jai Singh's secret correspondence. 
The unexpected failure before the fort of Bijapur 
gave rise to dissensions in the Mughal camp. The 
party hostile to Jai Singh, which was led by Dilir 
Khan,* ascribed his ill^success to the lukewarmness 
or treachery of Shivaji, and demanded that he should 
be imprisoned as a punishment. Jai Singh saw the 
danger in which Shiva stood among the defeated and 
sullen Mughal soldiery. To seifeguard the liberty of 
the Maratha chief, and send him out of the reach 
of his enemies, he gladly accepted the proposal that 
the Maratha contingent should make a diversion in 
the western provinces of Bijapur. (H. A., 1 95a, 846, 
192a ; hints only.) 

Shiva left Jai Singh about llth January, 1666. 
Five days later he reached the environs of Panhala, 

* Manucci attests that Dilir Khan several times urged Jeu 
Singh "to take Shivaji's life, or at least to give him (Dilir Khan) 
leave to do so. He would eissume all responsibility, and see 
that the Rajah was held bleimeless." (Storia, ii. 137.) The 
English factory records state, "In a battle between the Mughals 
and this country people, Shivaji ran away, being afraid that 
Dilir Khan would put him to death, he having told the said 
wazir [Dilir] that he would take Bijapur in 10 days' time, 
upon which persuasion he set forwards widi 20,000 horse, 
but to his cost he found the contrary, being forced quickly to 
letire." (Deccan News in F. R. Surat, vol. 104.) 

150 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. 

and delivered an assault on it three hours before 
sunrise. But the garrison were on the alert and 
offered a stubborn defence. A thousand of Shiva's 
followers fell down, killed and ■wounded. When the 
rising sun lit up the scene, Shiva at last recognised 
that it was madness to continue the struggle, and 
drew back sullenly to his own fort of Khelna 
[Visheilgarh] , about 25 miles westwards. But his 
troops continued to ravage that quarter and succeeded 
in drawing and detaining there a force of 6,00(J 
Bijapuris under Siddi Masaud and Randaula Khan. 
(H. A. 84b— 85a.) 

Tbe news of Shivaji's failure at Panhala reached 
Jai Singh on 20th January. The evil w^as aggravated 
by the desertion of Netaji. Taking offence with 
Shiva for some reason or other, — probably because 
he deemed his valuable services and gallant feats of 
arms inadequately rewarded, — Neta accepted the 
Bijapuri bait of 4 lal^hs of hun and, deserting to Adil 
Shah, raided the Mughal territory with great vigour 
and effect. Jai Singh could not afford to lose such 
a man ; and so he lured Netaji back (20th March) 
with many persuasive letters and the granting of all 
his high demands, viz., the mansab of a Gjmmander 
of Five Thousand in the Mughal peerage, a jagir in 
the settled and lucrative old territory of the empire 
(as distinct from the ill-conquered, unsettled, ever- 
ravaged recent annexations in the Deccan), and 
Rs. 38,000 in cash. (H. A. 193.) 

Netaji 's defection at the end of January, 1666^ 


coming so soon after the recent reverses, greatly 
alarmed Jai Singh. If Shiva were to do the same, 
the entire Meiratha army would swell the enemy's 
ranks and the MugheJ invaders would be crushed 
between the two. As he wrote to the Emperor, 
"Now that Adil Shah and Qutb Shah have united 
in mischief, it is necessary to win Shiva's heart by 
all means and to* send him to Northern India to have 
audience of Your Majesty." (94a.) TTie Emperor 
having consented to this proposal, Jai Singh set him- 
self to induce Shiva to visit the imperial Court. 


Visit to Aurangzib, 1666. 

§ 1 . Shivaji's fears and hopes from a journey 
to the Mughal Court. 

Jai Singh had undertaken to send Shivaji to the 
imperial Court. But it was no easy task. In the 
Treaty of Purandar, Shivaji had expressly stipulated 
that he was not to be called upon to enter the 
Mughal military service (mansab), nor to attend 
the imperial Court. There were strong reasons 
for it. For one thing, he and his countrymen had 
no faith in Aurangzib's word and believed the 
Emperor to be capable of any act of treachery and 
cruelty. Then, again, the Maratha chief had an in- 
born repugnance to bending his head before a 
Muslim ; he had been brought up in the freedom and 
solitude of hill and woodlamd, away from cities and 
Courts ; he had imbibed the orthodox Hindu spirit 
from his mother and his tutor, from the comrades of 
his boyhood and the saints whom he adored ; and 
he had risen to independent sovereignty without ever 
filling any subordinate post as the servant of a higher 
authority. He was therefore at first averse to visit 
the imperial Court. 

But Jai Singh plied him with hopes of high 
reward and "used a thousemd devices" (as he 
repeatedly wrote in his letters), to induce him to go 


to Agra. The Maratha chronicles assert that Jai 
Singh gave Shiva hopes that after his visit to the 
Emperor he was likely to be sent back as Viceroy 
of Mughal Deccan, with sufficient men and money 
for the conquest of Bijapur and Golkonda. The 
Emperor never committed himself to any such 
promise, and the Persian histories and Jai Singh's 
correspondence are silent about it. But it is very 
probable that among the vague hopes which the wily 
Rajput general held out to Shiva, was that of being 
appointed Viceroy of the Deccan, where all the 
preceding imperial representatives, including Jai 
Singh himself, had failed, and only a bom general 
and renowned conqueror like Shiva could be expected 
to succeed. The Deccan charge was so heavy and 
mere generals had so often wasted imperial resources 
there, that in 1656 and 1666 the Emperor had talked 
of going there in person and conducting the war 
against the local Sultans. Shiva's past achievements 
promised success in such an enterprise, if the vast 
resources of Delhi were placed under a tried military 
genius like him. What could be more reasonable 
(Jai Singh may have argued) than that the Emperor, 
after seeing Shiva and personally learning of his 
merits, would appoint him Viceroy of the Deccan* 
to achieve its conquest and save himself the trouble? 

* Sabhasad, 46 and 50, says that Shiva himself made the 
offer of conquering Bijapur and Golkonda for the Emperor, 
if he were appointed Mughal commander-in-chief in the 
Deccan, and Jai Singh merely agreed to the proposal. Chit. 113. 

154 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. 

Besides the problematical viceroyalty of the 
Deccan, Shiva had some humbler but more necessary 
objects which could be gained only by a personal 
interview with the Emperor. He had requested that 
the Emperor should order the Siddi, now an imperial 
servant, to cede Janjira island to him. According to 
a modem and unreliable chronicle, (Chit. 107), he 
had also hopes of gaining the imperial sanction to 
his plan of exacting chauth from Bijapur territory. 
On these points the replies from Delhi had been 
evasive ; but much better result could be expected ■ 
from an interview and personal representation. 

In spite of these temptations, Shiva hesitated 
long. Both he and his friends were as much alarmed 
at the idea of his going to the Mughal Court as at 
the prospect of his interview with Afzal Khan. TTiey 
feared that a visit to Aurangzib would be only rush- 
ing into the jaws of an ogre (Ravan.) But the sooth- 
sayers whom he consulted assured him of a safe re- 
turn home. (Sabh. 47; Chit. 109; Dig. 242; T. S. 22b.) 

Jai Singh took the most solemn oaths possible 
for a Hindu that Shiva would not be harmed during 
his visit, while the Rajput Rajah's son and agent at 
Court, Kumar Ram Singh, similarly pledged his word 
for the safety of Shiva during his stay at the capital. 
In the Maratha council of ministers the majority 
favoured the journey. 

§ 2. His arrangements for his absence. 
Shivaji's arrangements for the administration of 


his kingdom during his expected absence in Northern 
India, were a masterpiece of forethought and 
organisation. His plan was to make, his local 
representatives absolutely independent of any need 
for his orders or guidance during his absence. The 
administration of his territories and forts would go on 
as efficiently as before, even if he were imprisoned 
or killed at Agra. His mother Jija Bai was left as 
Regent, with direct control over the Desh country, 
while Moro Pant the Peshwa, Niloji Sondev the 
Majmttadar, and Annaji Datto the Keeper of the 
Seal, were placed in independent cheirge of the 
Konkan province. (Sabh. 47, Chit. 1 10.) The com- 
mandants of his forts were strictly ordered to be 
watchful day and night and to follow his rules 
implicitly, so as to guard against surprise or fraud. 
The civil officers w^ere to follow his former regulations 
and practice in all matters. 

After making a tour of inspection throughout his 
small kingdom, and even paying surprise visits to 
some of his forts, and repeating, as his final 
instructions to his officers, "Act as I had previously 
laid down," Shivaji took leave of his family at 
Rajgarh, and began his journey to Northern India, 
about the third week of March, 1666, vrith his eldest 
son Shambhuji, seven trusty chief officers, and 4,000 
troops.* A lakh of Rupees from the Deccan treasury 

*Sabh. 47; Chit. 108. Oil. 57 says 1,000 soldiers, which 
I consider as more probable. 

156 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. 

was advanced to him by order of the Emperor for 
his expenses, and Ghazi Beg, an officer of Jai Singh's 
army, was deputed to act as his guide. 

§ 3. Shivaji journeys to Agra. 

On the way, he received an imperial letter, dated 
Agra 5th April, saying, "Received your letter stating 
that you have started for my Court. Come quickly 
with composure of mind, and after receiving my 
favours you will be permitted to return home. I 
send you a robe of honour [with this.]" (Parasnis 
MS., Letter No. 10.) 

When he reached Aurangabad, his fame and 
splendidly dressed escort drew all the people out of 
the city to gaze on him. But Saf Shikan Khan, the 
governor of the place, despising Shiva as a mere 
zamindar and a Maratha, remained with his officers 
in the audience-hall, and merely sent his nephew to 
receive Shiva on the way and ask him to come and 
see him there. Shivaji was highly offended at this 
intended slight of the governor and asserted his 
dignity by riding straight to his appointed quarters 
in the city, entirely ignoring the governor's exist- 
ence. Saf Shikan Khan then climbed down and 
visited Shiva at his residence with all the Mughal 
officers ! Next day, Shiva returned the visit, showing 
great politeness and cordiality to all. After a halt 
of some days, he resumed his march, receiving 
rations and presents from the local officers along his 
route, as ordered by the Emperor. (Dil. 57-58.) On 


9th May he arrived in the outskirts of Agra, where 
the Emperor was then holding Court. 

§ 4. Shioaji's interview with Aurangzib. 

The 12th of the month was appointed as the day 
of his audience.* It was the 50th lunar birthday of 
the Emperor. The Hall of Public Audience in Agra 
Fort was splendidly decorated for the occasion. 
TTie courtiers appeared in their most gorgeous robes. 
All things were ready for weighing the Emperor 
against gold and silver, which would then be given 
away in charity. TTie nobles of the empire and their 
retainers in thousands stood in marshalled ranks 
filling that vast hall of pillars and the ground beyond 
on three sides of it, which was covered with costly 

Into this Diwan-i-am, Kumar Ram Singh ushered 
Shivaji with his son Shambhuji and ten of his officers. 
On behalf of the Maratha chief, 1500 gold pieces 
were laid before the Elmperor as present (nazar) and 
Rs. 6,000 as offeriiig (nisar.) Aurangzib graciously 
cried out, "Come up, Shivaji Rajah!" Shivaji was 
led to the foot of the throne and made three salams. 

*Shivaii*s audience with Aurangzib: A.N. 963, 968-970; 
H. A. 236a; Surat to Karwar, 8 June, 1666, in F. R. Surat, 
vol. 86; {all contemporary.) Sabh. 49; Storia, ii. 138; K. K. 
ii. 189-190; Dil. 58-59; (all reliable.) Chit. 111-112; Dig. 
245-7; T. S. 22b-23a (later and legendary.) Bernier, 190, 

158 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. 

Then, at a signal from the Emperor, he was con- 
ducted back to the place reserved for him among 
the third-grade nobles, the work of the darbar 
proceeded, and Shivaji seemed to have been 

This was not the kind of reception he had so 
long been picturing to himself and expecting* as 
almost a certainty from his many conversations with 
Jai Singh. Ever since coming to Agra his mind had 
been ill at ease. First, he had been welcomed on 
behalf of the Emperor in the environs of the city by 
Ram Singh and Mukhlis Khan, two petty officers 
holding the nominal ranks of 2,500 and 1,500 
respectively. No costly present, no high tide, no 
kind word even, had followed his bow to the throne. 
He found himself standing behind several rows of 
nobles who almost shut him from the Emperor's 
view. He learnt from Ram Singh that he was among 
the commanders of 5,000. "What!" he exclaimed, 
"my little son of seven years was created a 5-hazari 
without having had to come to the Emperor's pre. 
sence. My servant Netaji is a 5-hazari. And am I, 

* This view is supported by the Persian and English 
accounts. "Shiva cherished some absurd fancies and hopes. 
So, ...after standing for a while, he created a scene, retired to 
a corner and told Kumar Ram Singh that he was disappointed, 
making unreasonable and foolish complaints." (A. N. 969.) 
"His spirit could not bear such humiliation as the other 
Umrahs to wait at a distance with their hands before them, 
like mutes." (Surat to Karwar.) Also K. K. 


aitei rendering all these services and coming all the 
way to the Court, to get the same low rank?" Then 
he asked, who the noble standing in front of him 
was. Ram Singh replied that it was Rajah Rai 
Singh* Sisodia. At this Shivaji cried out, "Rai 
Singh ! a mere subordinate of Rajah Jai Singh ! Have 
I been considered only equal to him?" 

Stung to fury by what he c'onsidered a public 
humiliation, Shivaji expostulated with Ram Singh in 
a high tone, and even wanted to commit suicidef 

* Here I follow Dilkflsha, 58. The Maratha writers 
(Sabhasad 49 and Chitnis 111) say that it was Jaswant Singh, 
on hearing whose name Shiva exclaimed, "Jaswant, whose 
back my soldiers have seen 1 He to stand before me !" But 
Jaswant was a 7-hazari, and as such he would have stood two 
rows in front of Shiva. Rai Singh Sisodia (the son of Maha- 
rana Bhim Singh) was created a 5-hazari for his services at 
Purandar (M. U. ii. 300; A. N. 868, 989.) By a mistake he is 
called Rathor in A. N. 891 and once in H. A. Paris MS. 125a. 
tHere I follow K. K. ii. 190 and Storia, ii. 138. But 
Sabhasad, 49, says that he begged for Ram Singh's dagger in 
order to kill Jaswant ! The prolific imagination of the Hindi 
poet Bhushan has distorted the incident into the following 
shape: "On the day of the Court festivity [birthday], 
Aurangzib sat on the throne like Indra, with his subjects 
around him. But the sight of all this splendour could not 
make Shiva tremble. He made no salam, he despised the 

pomp and force of the Padishah They made him stand in 

the ranks of the 5-hazari mansabdars, as if he were not distinct 
from them. Bhushan says that Aurangzib's ministers had no 
sense of propriety. He (Shivaji) could not get the sword from 
the belt [of Ram Singh] and the Muslim (Aurangzib) ^aved 

160 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. 

rather than outlive such a shame. Ram Singh, 
alarmed at this unexpected development and the 
breach of Court etiquette caused by Shiva's loud voice 
and violent gestures, tried his best to pacify him, but 
in vain. Sv/elling with suppressed anger and fretting 
within himself in bitterness of mortification, Shivaji 
fell down in a swoon. (Dil 59 ; K. K. ii. 190 ; Surat 
to Karwar.) There was a stir among the courtiers. 
The Emperor asked what the matter was. Ram Singh 
diplomatically replied, "The tiger is a wild beast of 
the forest. He feels oppressed by heat in a place 
like this and has been taken ill." He also apologised 
for the Rajah's rude conduct by saying that he was 
a Deccani unfamiliar with Courts and polished 
manners. Aurangzib graciously ordered the sick 
Rajah to be removed to an ante-room and sprinkled 
with rose-water, and, on his restoration to his senses, 
gave him leave to go to his quarters without waiting 
for the close of the darbar. 

§5. Shivaji placed under guard by order of 

On returning from the Court, Shivaji openly taxed 
the Emperor with breach of faith towards him, and 
asked to be put to death as a lesser evil. There 
were men about him who reported his angry words 
and complaints here and in the darbar hall to 

himself [by running] into the ghusalkhana." (Bhushan, 
Cranthaoali, pp. 66, 70, also 66.) 


AuBaaagzib, amd it only increased the EmpeBor s dis' 
like and. distrust of due Maratha chief. Ram Singh 
was ordered to^ Ibdge hiiaai in the Jaipur House outside 
the city-walla,, and be neaponsible fou his custody- 
Shiva w£k8 forbidden: the- Ccwust, thought Shambhuji was 
asked to come noMV and then. Thus, Shivaji's high; 
hopesi wer® finaUijr dashed to pieces and he found 
hiiaaself a prisoner instead. (Dil. 59 ; A. N. 969'.) 

He took counsel with his) devoted foUoweus and 
with Raghunedih Paaat Koitdle, his agent at the imperial 
Court, as. to how- he could effect his release. They 
advised, him: to plagr on the Emperor's greed of terri- 
tojiy and: to promise the conquest of Bijapur and 
Colkonda"^ as the pmce of his restoration to liberty. 
A petition to this' effect was presented by the hand 
of Raghunath Korde, but the Ejnperor onl|y answered,, 
"Wait a litde and- I shall do what you ask for."^ 
Shiva knew tfce ans^wer was evasive. Hte then- begged 
fior a psrwadre intervaie'W' with the Emperor in which 
he pEonaiaed) to. make a secret communication very 
much to> the benefit at the latter. The Maratha 
chronicles- say that the prime-minister Jafar- Khan, 
wainedi by a lletten f rom< Shaista Khan, dissuaded the 
Enapeiaoir fromi risking his person in a private inter- 
view^ with a magiciam like Shiva. But Aurangzib 
hardly needed other people's advice in such a matter. 
He was too wise* to meet in a small room with a 
few guards the man who had slain Afzal Khan almost 
withinr sight o£ hia^ l:<iHOOO* soldiers, and wounded 

*Or Qandahar, according to Dfl. 69. 


162 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. 

Shaista Khan in the very bosom of his harem amidst 
a ring of 20,000 Mughal troops, and escaped un- 
scathed. Popular report credited Shiva with being 
a wizard with "an airy body," able to jump across 
40 or 50 yards of space upon the person of his victim. 
The private audience was refused. 

Shivaji next tried to win over the prime-minister, 
and paid him a visit, begging him to use his influence 
over the Emperor to send him back to the Deccan 
with adequate resources for extending the Mughal 
empire there. Jafar Khan, warned by his wife (a 
sister of Shaista Khaij) not to trust himself too long 
in the company of Shiva, hurriedly ended the inter- 
view, saying "All right ; I shall do so." Shiva knew 
that he meant to do nothing. (Sabh. 50-51 ; A. N. 
970; Chit. 113.) 

He was now thrown entirely upon his own 
resources. At the same time his position became 
worse than before. Fulad Khan, the police chief 
of Agra, by imperial order placed a large guard with 
artillery round Shiva's mansion, and he now became 
a prisoner in appearance as well as reality. "This 
made the Rajah lose heart ; he felt sad and 
lamented long, clasping Shambhuji to his breast." 
In this state he passed three months. 

§6. Mughal policy during Shivaji's confinement 
at Agra. 

We now turn to the policy of the imperial 
Government and the action of Jai Singh during this 


interval. Aurangzib had intended to present Shiva 

with an elephant, a robe of honour, and some jewels 

at the end of his first audience. But Shiva's violation 

>of Court etiquette made him change his mind, and 

as a mark of displeasure he withheld these gifts, 

at least for the time. (H. A. 238a.) The Maratha 

chief, on his part, complained that the promises 

made to him on behalf of the Mughal Government 

had not been kept. Aurangzib, therefore, wrote to 

Jai Singh asking him to report fully and exactly what 

promises he had made. The Rajah replied by 

repeating and explaining the clauses of the Treaty 

of Purandar, and solemnly asserting that nothing 

beyond them had been promised. (A. N. 970. H. A. 

does not contain Jai Singh's reply.) 

Jai Singh was placed in a dilemma by this un- 
expected result of Shiva's visit to the Court. True, 
he had sfent Shiva away to Northern India "by a 
thousand devices" in order to get him out of the 
Deccan when the military situation there turned 
against the Mughals ; but he had also pledged his 
honour for the safe return of his ally. He, therefore, 
tried to persuade the Emperor that he would gain 
nothing by imprisoning or killing Shiva, as the 
Maratha chief's wise arrangements had made his 
Government independent of his personality ; on the 
contrary the imperial interests in that quarter would 
be best promoted by turning Shiva into a friend, at 
the same time that such a course would convince 
the public of the sacredness of the imperial officers* 

164, SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. 

Wiord^. All, the whills Jai Singh continued to write 
toi his Court agent, R^m Singh, to gee to it fchftt 
Shiva' S- life was safo and, the soleinxii assurances of, 
Jpi. Singh and. his spn remained, inviqlate. (H. A\. 

This, however^ was no easy matter. It was im^ 
possible foi; Jai Singh^ to cjhpnge Aurangzib's crooked 
policy, or, at times, even to divine it. Xhe Einperor 
seerrjed, at first to, have plguyed a waiting game — Uy 
keep Shiya under surveillance in order to prevent his. 
escape, and to decide aftej; the conclusion of the^ 
Deccan campaign if and when he would be released. 
At first. Rani, Singh was ordered tp stand bail and 
security fpr- the good conduct Eind presence of Shiya 
at Agra. Jai Singji protested, against this responsibi- 
lity being thrown on his son, and urged, the latter 
to try his best to be relieved of it. After a shprt 
time, Aurangzib changed his, mind, evidently because 
he distrusted a. Hindu prince as the keeper, of anpth^ 
Hindu prince, and for, a few days talked; of taking 
Shiya out of his bail ^nd sending to him to Afghanis- 
tan, where he would be beyond the possibility of 
escape, as was actually done in the case of Netaji 
Palkar afterv^ards. Bnt the idea, was soon dropped. 
(H. A. I96f).; Dil 69 ; Surat to Karwar.) Then the 
Emperor proposed to get out for the Deccan. to conr 
duct the war in person, while Shiva would be left a 
State-prisoner at Agra in. charge of Ram Singh, who 
would be appointed qflcfdar for the purpose. Jai Singh 
vehernently urged his son to avoid this dissigpreeabl^ 


nessessity, fewt iadvised the tmperrW to leaive 
Skiva aft Agra. "Wben 1 prayed that Shiva might 
be ipeTmitted to fetiJm hotnre, affairs [fti the Deccan] 
-Werie in a different cbnditioiii. NoW that they haVe 
changed altogether [against us,] it is iiot at 'eiW politic 
to send him to this side. Please detain him in such 
a Mray thait his officers may not despeiir [about his 
T-etutn] , go over to Adil Shah a:nd raise disturbances 

[against us.] It WouM bfe expefdient '-tb leaVe "ShiVa 

at Agra. He ouglit to be conciK'ated and assured 
that he would be summoftfed to the Court after it 
•had arrived in the iDeccEfft. His son shoteld, afe a 
matter of policy, be kept with the Ewiperor, in ordter 
•th'St his followers may not bfe thrown into despair, 
•but may loyally serve us." {fi. A. \94a, \97a.] But 
the war in the Deccan feteadily went against the 
■M-ughals, attd Sihiva's ihope of an early release grew 
<Jimmer •a'nd dimmer. 

§7. Shivaji's escape from Agra. 
He, therefore, ttitrned to hits own inner resources 
to effect his liberaititofi.* After a few days of cap- 
ti-vity, he made a lo'ud profession of submission and 
fear and untreated courtrer after courtier to intercede 
vHth the Rtnlperat for his pardon, but •with no success. 

♦Shivaji's escape from Agra: A. N. 971 (orie senfende 
only !) ; Bernier, 190. (same) ; Storia. ii. 139-140 ; Sabh. 52-55 
and K. K. ii. 198-201, 217-220, (most detailed); Dil. '59-61 ; 
cm. 115-118 ; DiS. 2^^-254 ; f. 5. 23<i-25d ; fryer, ii. 65 ; 


166 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI.- 

{Akhbarat, 9-32.) He, however, succeeded in getting 
permission for his Maratha escort to return to the 
Deccan. The Emperor felt that he would then have 
fewer enemies 'to watch and Shiva would be utterly- 
friendless at Agra. 

The Maratha civil officers, too, at a hint from 
their chief, returned home in small parties. Being 
thus freed from anxiety about his followers, Shiva ji 
set about devising plans for his own escape. He 
feigned illness and began to send out of his house 
every evening sweetmeats for Brahmans, religious 
mendicants and courtiers. These were carried in 
huge baskets slung from a pole which was borne by 
two men on their shoulders. The guards searched 
the baskets for some days and then allow^ed them to 
pass out unchallenged. This was the opportunity for 
which Shivaji had been waiting. In the afternoon 
of 19th August, he sent word to his guards that he 
was very ill and had taken to his bed and that they 
should not disturb him. His half-brother Hiraji Far. 
Zand, who looked somewhat like him, lay down on 
his cot, with a quilt covering all his body except the 
outstretched right arm adorned ■with. Shiva's gold' 
wristlet, — while Shiva and his son crouched down in 
two baskets, which were safely sent out through the 
line of unsuspecting guards, being preceded and 
followed by baskets of real sweets, shortly after 

The baskets were deposited at a lonely spot 
outside the city ; the porters were dismissed ; and 


then Shiva and his son issued forth and made their 
way to a village six miles from Agra, where the 
trusty Niraji Ravji (his Chief Justice) was waiting for 
them with horses. After a hurried consultation in 
a jungle the party divided ; Shiva with his son and 
three officers, Niraji Ravji, Datta Trimbak and Raghu- 
mitra a low-caste Maratha, smeared themselves with 
ashes like Hindu ascetics, and hastened towards 
Mathura, while the others took their own way home- 

§8. His escape discovered by the police. 

Meanwhile, at Agra, Hiraji lay in bed all that 
night and well into the afternoon of the next day. 
The guards who peeped in in the morning were 
satisfied when they saw Shiva's gold bracelet on the 
sleeper's wrist, and a servant sitting on the floor 
massaging the patient's feet. About 3 P.M. Hiraji 
quietly walked out of the house with the servant, 
warning the sentries at the gate, "Make less noise ; 
Shivaji is ill and under treatment." Gradually the 
guards' suspicion was aroused ; the house seemed 
strangely deserted ; no crowd of visitors came to see 
Shiva as usual ; and there was no sound, no stir in 
the house. They entered his room and found that 
the bird had flown ! They at once ran with the 
astounding news to their chief Fulad Khan, who 
reported it to the Emperor, ascribing Shiva's flght to 
witchcraft and saving himself from all blame. "The 
Rajah," so he said, "w^as in his own room. We 

166 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. 

visited it regmlarly. But he vanished all of a -sudden 
from onr si^t. Whether he flew into the sky or 
disappcEired into the earth, is not known, nor what 
magical trick he has played," 

Aurangzib was not the man to be taken in by 
such a tale. A hue and cry was immediately raised, 
and fsist couriers and sergeants-at-arms were sent off 
to watch the road to the Deccein through Berar and 
Khandesh, and to -warn the JoceJ officers to look out 
for the fugitives. The Maratha Breihmans and other 
followers of Shivaji were arrested wherever found, 
at Agra or near it. But by this time Shiva had had 
twenty-four hours' clear start over his pursuers. 

The vigorous inquiry made at the capital 
gradually brought to light the details of the romantic 
story of the flight. Suspicion naturally fell on Ram 
Singh, as he had so often tried to avoid the responsi- 
bility for Shiva's presence at Agra, and it was his 
interest to effect the Maratha chief's safe return home, 
for which he and his father had pledged their honour. 
Some of the Maratha Brahmans ■who were caught 
admitted, probably unddr torture, that their master 
had fled with the connivance of Ram Singh. (H. A. 
201a.) The Rajput prince was punished, first by 
being forbidiien the Court and then being deprived 
of his rank and pay.* 

* Three leading Brahmans of Shiva's service were arrested 
and probably tortured by Fulad Khan. They alleged that the 
flight of Shivaji vifas due to the advice of Ram Singh and 
resulted from the latter's neglect to watch him well. Jai Singh 


§9. Route of SktVafi's flight. 

With consummate cunning Sliiva "fcew his pur- 
suers off the scent, by following a Toule exactly 
opposite to that which 'leads to Maharashtra. Instead 
of moving due south-west froHi Agra, through Malwa 
and Khandesh or Gujrat, he travelled eastwards to 
Mathura, Allahabad, Benares, Gaya, awd Puri, and 
then soulii-westwards througfh Gondwana and Gol- 
konda, describing a vast loop round India bfefore 
returning to Rajgafh. 

Arrived at Mathura, he found the boy Shambhu 
worn out by fatigue and unable to proceed further. 
Three Deccani Brahmans,- — Krishnaji, Kashi, and 
Visaji, brothers-in-law of Moro Trimbak (the Peshwa), 
were living at this holy city. Niraji knew them and 
Goridided to tfiem the story of Shiva's escape and his 
present plight. They nobly responded to the appeal 
in the name of their country and faith, and braving 
ail risks of imperial vengeance in the event of detec- 
tion, they agreed to keep Shambhuji* till Shiva should 

on hearing of diis charge exclaims, "May God give death to 
(he man who cherishes the very thought of such an act of 
faithlessness in his heart!" (H. A. 200a, 201a.) Eleven months 
later, on the deafli of his father. Ram Singh was taken back 
into favour and created a 4-hazari, but was soon afterwards 
sent to join the army fighting in Assam, to die of pestilence 
there. (A. N. 1051.) Z. C, arrest of Brahmans. 

* According to the Maratha chroniclers, (Sabh. 55, Chit. 
117, Dig. 252, T. S. 25a) also Dil. 61, Shambhuji was left at 
Mathura in charge of Kashi Pant and his brothers. iBut 

170 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. 

reach home and write for him. One of the brothers, 
Krishnaji, even undertook to guide the fugitives as 
far as Benares. 

Shivaji had crammed the hollow core of a 
sannyasi's staff with gems and gold coins. Some more 
money was concealed in his shoes, and a diamond 
of great value and several rubies coated with wax 
were sewn in the dresses of his servants or Ccimed 
in their mouths. (K. K. ii. 200 and 217.) 

At Mathura, which was reached within six hours 
of leaving Agra, he shaved off his beard and mous- 
taches, smeared himself with ashes, and put on the 
disguise of sannyasis. "Travelling in the darkness of 
the night with swift Deccani couriers, who were prac- 
tised in the art of moving in various disguises and 
assumed characters, he rapidly left the capital behind 
him. Forty or fifty of his servants accompanied him 
divided into three parties and dressed as monks of 
the three Hindu orders, Bairagis, Gosains, and Udasis. 

§10. Adventures of Shivaji during his flight. 

The fugitives pursued their way, constantly 
changing their disguise, sometimes passing for reli- 
gious mendicants, sometimes as petty traders, and 
escaped detection because no one dreamt of their 
going to the eastern provinces of India while their 
destination was the west. They, however, had some 
hairbreadth escapes. 

K. K. {ii. 201 & 218) incorrectly says that he was entrusted to 
Kavi Kulesh at Allahabad. 


In one towji they were arrested on suspicion by 
the jaujdar Ali Quli, who had learnt of Shivaji's 
flight from a letter of his Court agent before he 
received the official intimation of it. A close 
examination of the prisoners was begun. But at mid- 
night Shivaji met the faujdar in private, boldly dis- 
closed his identity and offered him a diamond and 
a ruby w^orth a lakh of Rupees as the price of his 
liberation. The faujdar preferred the bribe to his 
duty. (K. K. ii. 218.) 

After performing his bath at the junction of the 
Ganges and Jamuna at Allahabad, Shivaji proceeded 
to Benares. Here he hurriedly went through all the 
rites of a pilgrim in the dim morning twilight and 
slipped out of the town just as a courier arrived from 
Agra with the proclamation for his arrest and a hue 
and cry was started.* 

* In this connection Khafi Khan (ii. 219-220) writes : — 
"When I was at the port of Surat, a Brahman physician 
named Nabha [or Babha] used to tell the following tale : "I 
had been serving one of the Benares Brahmans as his pupil, 
but he stinted me in food. At last, one morning when it was 
still dark, I went to the river-side as usual ; a man seized my 
hand, thrust into it a quantity of Jewels, ashrafis and huns, 
and said, 'Don't open your fist, but quickly finish the bathing 
rites for me.' I immediately hastened to shave and bathe 
him, but had not done ministering to him, when a hue and 
cry was raised and the news spread that sergeants at the mace 
had arrived [from the Court] in search of Shiva. When I' 
became attentive I found that the man to whom I had been 
ministering had slipped away. I [then] knew that It was. 

172 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. 

Still moving "eastwards, he visited the famous 
's'brine of (Hiirdu) Gaya and was joined by two of 
his men whswn he had sent there beforehand. Then 
thty started for the temple of Jagannath at Puri on 
the seashrore of Orissa. "Through travelling long 
distances on foot every day, he felt a desire for 
riding. At the time of buying a pony he had not a 
stiflflcient number of Rupees with him. So, opening 
his purse of gold coins, he gave a few^ of them to 
the horse-dealer. The flight of Shivaji had already 
been noised abroad, and the man cried out, 'You 
must be Shiva, as you are paying so much "for a 
little pony ! ' At this Shivaji gave him the whole purse 
[as hush money] and fled from the place." (Dil. 61 .) 

After -worshipping Jagannath at Puri, he turned 
westwards and returned home by way of Gondwana, 
Haidarabad and Bijapur territories. 

We have a characteristic anecdote about an 
incident during this journey. The story runs (Chit. 
118; variant in Dfg. 254), that the pretended sannyasis 
one evening took refuge in the house of a peasant 
in a village on the Godavari.* The old mother of 
the host apologised to the holy men for the poor 

Shivaji. He had given me 9 gems, 9 askrtxfis and 9 hans. 
Then without going to my preceptor I returned to hiy couWWy 
and reached Surat. The grand 'hcmse that I have here was 
bought -with that money." 

* Probably near Indur, a town 10 m. e. of Dharur and 
10 m. n. of the Manjira, an affluent of the Godavari. 
Di^. 253 names Indur. 


fare.- placed! before them, saying that the troopers of 
th^' brigand Shiveji had recently robbed the \fillaees- 
She cursed, them and their, mastei: to her heart's con- 
tent, Shivaji noted the names of the peasant and 
the village carefully, and on his return home, sumr 
moned" the family of his host and gave them more 
than what they had lost. 

A late, tradition gives a charming picture of the 
scene of Shivaji's home-coming. "He went to the 
gate of Reiigarh, wliere hiS' mother resided, 2tnd 
requested admittance tpi the presence of Jj,ja Bai. 
The guards informed her- that some strange Bair,agiiS> 
or religious, wiedicants were at the gfite of the fort 
and requested to, see her-. She desired that they- 
should be adjnitted. When they came into her pre- 
sence, Niraji, Pant blessed her after the manner of 
the Bairagis, ; but Shiva advanced towards her and-: 
threw himself at, her feet. She did not recognise him 

and was surprised. that a Beiiragi, should pleuie his 

head on, her feet Shivaji then placed his headi in 

Jija, Bcii's; lap: and tQok off his cap. She immediately 
perceived, by a-, mark on hi^i headj that he was her 
son and embreiced him." (Raigarh Life in Forrest, 
i. 17.) 

His return to Rajgarfe (towards; the end of' Decem- 
ber 1666); was, followed by widespread rejoicings 
among hist family, officers and subjects. It was a 
national deliverance, as providential as it was 

He, spread* a- false report thatt Shambhuji had 

1 74 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. 

died, and even went into mourning for him. Then, 
when the suspicion of the Mughal officers on the way 
had been thus lulled asleep, and some months had 
elapsed, he wrote to Mathura for him, and the three 
brothers with their whole family migrated to Maha- 
rashtra, carrying Shambhuji, disguised as a Brahman 
kinsman, with them. 

At a certain outpost on the road, the Mughal 
officer suspected that Shambhuji was not of their 
family or caste ; but his Brahman protectors dined 
with him to prove their kinship, and the danger was 
passed. (Chit. 120 ; Dig. 255-256 ; T. S. 25a ; Dil. 
61 gives a vatriant.) Shiva royally rewarded the faith- 
ful three — Krishnaji, Kashi Rao and Visaji, — gave 
them the title of Vishwas Rao (Lords Fidelity) and 
a laJ^h of gold pieces, and settled on them an annual 
revenue of 10,000 hurt. The devoted companions of 
his own escape were similarly rewarded. (Sabh. 57.) 

Shivaji's escape from captivity caused lifelong 
regret to Aurangzib. As the Emperor wrote in his 
last will and testament: "The greatest pillar of a 
Government is the keeping of information about 
everything that happens in the kingdom, — while even 
a minute's negligence results in shame for long years. 
See, the flight of the wretch Shiva was due to careless- 
ness, but it has involved me in all these distracting 
campaigns to the end of my days." (Anec. §10.) 

§11. Jai Singh's anxieties and plans about Shivaji. 
We now turn to Jai Singh's anxieties, plans, and 


measures dtiring Shivaji's absence from the Deccan. 
-His correspondence with the Emperor and with 
Kumar Ram Singh during the three months of Shiva's 
captivity has been given before. 

His position was rendered infinitely worse by 
Shiva's escape from Agra (19th August.) He had 
been disgraced in the eyes of the Emperor by the 
failure of his invasion of Bijapur. And now his son 
Ram Singh was openly suspected of having connived 
at Shiva's flight. As he writes in bitterness, "All the 
plans and devices that 1 had employed in sending 
Shiva to Court have been spoiled, and measureless 
distraction has fallen to my lot. But there is no 
remedy against Fate and what is written on a man's 
forehead. I learn from the letters of soine Court 
agents that there is a proposal to dismiss Ram Singh 
from his rank {mansab) and jagir, because Shiva's 
Brahman followers, at the instigation of selfish men 
{my enemies at Court], have alleged that the flight 
of Shiva was due to the advice of Ram Singh, and 
resulted from the latter's omission to watch him well. 
May God give death to the man who cherishes the 
very thought of such an act of faithlessness in his 
heart ! Why should Shiva's men's words be believed 
ageiinst mine, when I had reduced him to such an 
extremity [in war] ?" [H. A. 201a.] 

The anticipated return of Shivaji to the Deccan 
greatly added to Jai Singh's fears. As he wrote on 
5th November, 1666 : — "The times are bad for me. 
My anxieties are ceaseless. The lying Bijapuris are 

176 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. 

wastJBig time [by delusive negotiations.]! Ttere is 
no trace or news of the fugitive Shiva. My days are 
pjissing in distraction and anxiety. I have sent trusty 
spies, in various disguises, to get news of Shiva. 
[H. A. 200b..] 

About tihis time the officers left by Shiva in the 
D.eccan when staiting for Agra began to display 
ominous activity. Sayyid Masaud, the Mughal 
qiladar of Raiganh, wrote to Jai Singh's Paymaster 
complaining of the lack of provisions, etc. in the 
fort, and the collection of lead, gunpowder, rockets 
and infantry in the neighbourhood of Raigarh by 
some men who gave themselves out to be Shiva's 
followers andi pretended that they intended to invade 
Bijapuri territory. At this alarming news J&i Singh 
sent orders to provision the fort as a precaution and 
to hold ib strongly, pending the arrival of Udai-bhan 
[the permanent qiladar ?] A reinforcement of 500 
infantry, under Sukh-man Chauhan was also ordered 
to be thrown into the fort if necessary. [H. A. 234a 
and b.] 

At last, in December, 1666, definite news was 
received of Shiva's arrival at Rajgarh. As Jai Singh's 
secretary wrote, "Trusty spies have now brought the 
news that Shiva himself has arrived but is very anxious 
about his son who has not returned with him. He 
professes a determination [to submit] to the imperial 
Government. But who knows what is in his heart? 
For some time past> Mahadji Nimbalkar, the son of 
Baj'aji* the zamindar of Phaltan and son-in-law of 


the infernal Shiva, has been causing disturbances in 
the region of Puna and other places. My master 
[i.e., Jai Singh] has appointed the jagirdars of that 
tract, such as, Tanaji [or Babaji ?] Bhonsla and 
others to Supa, Halal Khan to Indapur, Ghalib Khan 
to Chamargunda, Hassan Khan, Abdur Rasul and 
other Deccanis also to that side, and Trimbakji 
Bhonsla and others to Raisin. Before the others 
could arrive at their posts, Tanaji Bhonsla went to 
his jagir and getting an opportunity attacked Mahadji, 
sent many of his followers to hell, captured his flag, 
torah, 150 horses, arrows, etc., and returning lived 
in peace of mind. As the Deccanis have some 
[unknown] need for the flag and torah, MeJiadji trod 
the path of submission and humility ; but Tanaji 
declined [to restore them.] At last, four days after- 
wards, that wretch got help from the Bijapuris and 
attacked Tanaji by surprise. That loyal and martial 
officer fought valiantly on foot, till he fell in the 
Emperor's service. And Anaji (or Dataji) Deshmukh 
went to hell in the neighbourhood of Pandharpur. 

It is reported that Mahadji also was wounded 

Jcii Singh at first wanted to march there in person 
[and retrieve the disaster] , but was persuaded to 
give up the idea, lest the Bijapuris should take 
advantage of his absence. So, he has decided to 
send Abdul Hamid with 5,000 men to that quarter." 
[H. A. 2]\b.] 

Then, in a letter to the prime-minister Jafar Khan 
we have this astounding proposal from Jai Singh to 


178 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. 

entrap Shiva by the false proposal of a msirriage 
between his daughter and Jai Singh's son, and get 
him murdered during his journey to the Rajput 
general's camp : — 

"I have not failed, nor will 1 do so in future, 
to exert myself against Bijapur, Golkonda and Shiva 

in every possible way I am trying to arrange 

matters in such a way that the wicked wretch Shiva 
will come to see me once, and that in the course of 
his journey or return [our] clever men may get a 
favourable opportunity [of disposing of] that luck- 
less fellow in his unguarded moment at that place. 
This slave of the Court, for furthering the Emperor's 
affairs, is prepared to go so faur, — ^regardless of praise 
or blame by other people, — that if the Emperor sanc- 
tions it, I shall set on foot a proposal for a match 
with his family and settle the marriage of my son 
with his daughter, — though the pedigree and caste 
of Shiva are notoriously low and men like me do not 
eat food touched by his hand (not to speak of entering 
into a matrimonial connection with him), and in case 
this wretch's daughter is captured I shcJl not con- 
descend to keep her in my harem. As he is of low 
birth, he will very likely swallow this beat and be 
hooked. But great care should be taken to keep this 
plan secret. Send me quickly a reply to enable me 
to act accordingly." [H. A. 139a.] 

This letter throws a lurid light on the political 
morals of the 1 7th century. When people argue that 
Afzal Khan could not have possibly intended to stab 

.1667] jAi Singh's cunning plot. 179 

Shivaji dtiring an interview, they should remember 
that the sanctimonious Jai Singh was prepared to 
prove his loyalty by lowering his {amily honour and 
Jaying a fatal snare for Shivaji, a brother Hindu. 



§ 1 . State of Mughal Deccan, 1667. 

On returning home from Agra in December 1 666, 
Shivaji found the political situation in the Deccan. 
entirely changed. The Mughal viceroy, Jai Singh, 
was no longer in a position to repeat his former suc- 
cess over the Marathas. Worn out by age, toil, dis- 
appointment and domestic anxieties, discredited in 
his master's eyes by the failure of his invasion of 
Bijapur, and expecting every day to be removed from 
his post, Mirza Rajah was visibly hastening to his 
grave. In May 1667 Prince Muazzam, the newly 
appointed governor, reached Aurangabad and reliev- 
ed Jai Singh of his charge. The Rajput veteran set 
out on his homeward journey in extreme misery of 
mind and sense of public humiliation, and died on 
the way at Burhanpur on 2nd July. 

The return of the weak and indolent Mueizzam 
and the friendly Jaswant to power in the Deccan 
(May 1667) relieved Shivaji of all fear from the 
Mughal side. It is true that soon afterwards an able 
and active general, bearing implacable hatred to the 
Marathas, joined the Mughal camp. Dilir Khan re- 
turned from the Gond country to the side of Prince 
Muazzam in October 1667, but the coming of this 


famous warrior brought no accession of strength to 
the imperialists. The Prince was jealous of Dilir's 
influence and prestige at his father's Court, resented 
his insubordinate spirit, and regarded him as a spy 
on behalf of the Emperor. The proud Rohila 
general, on his part, publicly slighted Maharajah 
Jaswant Singh, the right-hand man and trusted confi- 
dant of the Prince. Nor was this the only source of 
discord in the Mughal army in the Deccan. Rao 
Karn Rathor, the chief of Bikanir, was an officer in 
Dilir's contingent. His worthless son Anup Singh, 
when acdng as his father's agent at the imperial 
Court, influenced the Emperor to transfer the princi- 
peJity of Bikanir to himself. "At the news of this 
event, the Rao became even more negligent of his 

duties and reckless than before, disobeying the 

wishes of the Khan. His Rajputs practised gang- 
robbery in the camp at night, because, his lands 
having been given to his son, he ceased to get the 
necessary money for his expenses from his home. 
It was proved that his soldiers had looted some 
villages also. Dilir Khan, to save his credit with the 
Emperor, reported the matter to Court, and the 
Emperor [in reply] ordered him to arrest the Rao 
if he [still] acted in that manner. The Court agent 
of Rao Bhao Singh Hada, learning of the contents 
of the imperial letter, wrote to his master about it. 
When Dilir Khan, on the pretext of hunting, ap- 
proached the camp of Rao Karn and invited him to 
join in the chase, the Rao came to him with a 

182 SHIVAJI. [CH. VII.- 

few Rajputs. Bhao Singh, on getting news of Dilir 
Khan having ridden out towaurds the camp of Rao 
Karn that morning, arrived there quickly with his own 
troops and carried off Rao Karn to safety from the 
midst of Dilir's guards. The two Raos marched 
together to Aurangabad, 24 miles behind Dilir's army. 
Dilir Khan did not pull well with Muazzam and 
Jaswant. He was sent towards Bidar to punish the 
enemy, but the two Raos remained behind at 
Aurangabad by order [of the Prince.] " (Dil. 66-68.) 
The Prince used to help Rao Kam with money in 
his distress and enforced idleness at Aurangabad. 

Thus, Dilir's enemies found a ready shelter with 
Muazzam. After sending Dilir Khan away to Bidar, 
the Prince freely indulged his natural love of hunting 
and witnessing animal combats, and no attempt was 
made to crush Shivaji. 

But even if the viceroy of the Deccan had been 
a man of greater spirit and enterprise, it would have 
been intjiossible for him for some years from this 
time to get adequate men and money for an attempt 
to crush Shivaji. The resources of the empire had 
to be concentrated elsewhere, to meet more pressing 
dangers. Within a fortnight of Shivaji 's escape from 
Agra, a large army had to be sent to the Panjab to 
meet the threat of a Persian invasion, and the anxiety 
on this point was not removed till December. But 
immediately afterwards, in March 1667, the Yusufzai 
rising in Peshawar took place, which teixed the 
imperial strength for more than a year. 


it was, therefore, the Emperor's interest not to 
molest Shivaji at such a time. 

§2. Shivaji's peace with the Maghals, 1668. 
The Maratha chief, on his part, was not eager 
for a war with the imperialists. For some years after 
his return home from Agra, he lived very quietly, 
and avoided giving any fresh provocation to the 
Mughals. He wanted peace* for a time to organise 
his Government, repair and provision his forts, and 
consolidate and extend his power on the western coast 
at the expense of Bijapur and the Siddis of Janjira. 
As early as April 1667 he had sent a letter to the 
Emperor professing terror of the imperial army which 
was reported to have been despatched against him, 
and offering to make his submission again and send 
a contingent of 400 men under his son to fight under 
the Mughal banners. (Akhbarat, 10-9.) 

Aurangzib had taken no notice of this letter. 
Some months later Shivaji made another attempt. He 
entreated Jaswant Singh to be his intermedizuy in 
making peace with the enipire. He wrote to the 

* Shivaji's two years' peace with the Mughals 1668-1669 
and the causes of rupture: Sabh. 59-62; Chit. 121-124; 
Dil. 69-71. The terms of this treaty are nowhere given in 
detail. F. R. Sural, 105. Zedhe Chron., p. 188, tells us that 
the peace was made and Shambhuji was sent to Muazzam in 
Oct. 1667, and the Maratha contingent under Pratap Rao went 
to Aurangabad in August 1668 zmd fled from it in December 

184 SHIVAJI. [CH. VH. 

Maharajah, "The Emperor has cast me o£F. Other- 
wise I intended to have begged the task of recovering 
Qandahar w^ith my unaided resources. I fled (from 
Agra) in fear of my life. Mirza Rajah, my patron, 
is dead. If through your intercession I am pau-doned, 
I shall send Shambhu to wait on the Prince and serve 
as a mansabdar at the head of my followers wherever 
ordered." (Dil. 69-70.) 

Jaswant Singh and Prince Muazzam jumped at 
the offer and recommended Shiva to the Emperor 
(9th March 1668), who accepted the proposal, and thus 
a peace was made which lasted nearly two years. 
The Emperor recognised Shivaji's title of Rajah, but 
so far as we can judge did not restore to him any 
of his forts, except Chakan. For instance, Kalian- 
Bhiundy continued in the hands of the Mughals. For 
the next two years Shivaji lived at peace with the 
Mughal Government. The English factory letters at 
the close of 1668 and in 1669 describe him as "very 
quiet" and as "Aurangzib's vassal, (bound) to do 
whatsoever is commanded by the Prince." His rela- 
tions with Bijapur also were pacific. "The country 
all about [Karwar] at present is in great tranquillity. 
Shivaji keeps still at Rajgarh, and though as yet there 
is no peace made between this king [Adil Shah] 
and him, yet both refrain from committing any acts 
of hostility against one another." [F. R. Surat 
Vol. 105, Karwar to Surat,' 16 Sep., 1668.] Still later, 
on 17th July, 1669, the English traders at Hubli speak 


of "Shivaji being very quiet, not offering to molest 
the king's country." (Ibid.) 

In fact, during these three years (1667-69), he was 
busy framing a set of very wise regulations, which 
laid the foundations of his Government broad and 
deep, and have remained an object of admiration to 
after ages. (Sabh. 27-33, 58 ; Chit. 78-88.) 

In terms of the agreement with the Mughals, 
Shambhuji was sent to the viceroy's Court at 
Aurangabad with a Maratha contingent of 1 ,000 horse, 
under Pratap Rao Gujar. He was created a 
Commander of Five Thousand again and presented 
with an elephant and a jewelled sword. Jagirs were 
assigned to him in Berar. Half his contingent 
attended him at Aurangabad, while the other half 
was sent to the new jagir to help in collecting the 
revenue. After some months Shambhu was per- 
mitted to go back to his father on account of his 
tender age. For two years the Maratha contingent 
lived in the jagir, "feeding themselves at the expense 
of the Mughal dominion," as Sabhasad frankly puts 
it. {Dil. 70.) 

But the peace was essentially a hollow truce on 
both sides. Shivaji 's sole aim in making it was to 
save himself from the possibility of a combined attack 
by three great Pow^ers and to recover his strength 
during this respite from war. Aurangzib, ever suspi- 
cious of his sons, looked upon Muazzam's friendship 
■with Shiva as a possible menace to his throne, and he 
secretly planned to entrap Shivaji a second time, or 

186 SHIVAJI. [CH. VU. 

at least to seize his son and general as hostages. 
(Sabh. 62.) 

The rupture, inevitable in any case, was pre- 
cipitated by financial causes. Retrenchment of 
expenditure had now become a pressing necessity to 
Aurangzib, and he ordered the Mughal army in the 
Deccan to be greatly reduced. The disbanded 
soldiery took service with Shiva, who had to find 
employment for them. Another ill-judged measure 
of imperial parsimony was to attach a peut of Shiva's 
new jagir in Berar in order to recover the lakh of 
Rupees advanced to him in 1666 for his journey to 
the Court. The news of it reached Shivaji when he 
had completed his military preparations. He sent 
a secret message to Pratap Rao to sHp away from 
Aurangabad with his men. The other half of the 
contingent fled from Bereir at the same time, plunder- 
ing the villages on the way 1 (Dil. 71.) The Zedhe 
Chronology and Chhatraprakflsh, p. 68, indirectly 
suggest that Shivaji renewed the war as a protest 
against the temple destruction on which Aurangzib 
launched in 1669. 

Sabhasad, however, tells us that Aurangzib wrote 
to his son to arrest Pratap Rao and Niraji Pant, the 
Maratha agents at Aurangabad, and attach the horses 
of their troops, and that the Prince, who had learnt 
of the order beforehand from his Court agent, 
revealed it to Niraji and instigated the Marathas to 
escape, while the imperial order arrived a week. 


afterwards, when it was too late to carry it out. 
(Sabh. 61-62.) 

§3. War renewed, 1670. 

This rupture with the Mughals occurred in 
January 1670, or a month earlier. On 1 1th Dec. 1669, 
the Emperor received a despatch from the Deccan 
reporting the desertion of four Maratha captains of 
Shiva's clan (biradari) from the imperial service. 
Aurangzib soon set to strengthening his forces in 
the Deccan. On 26th January 1670 an order was 
sent to Dilir to leave Deogarh in the Gond country 
and hasten to Aurangabad. Daud Khan was ordered 
to arrange for the defence of his province of Khandesh 
and then go to Prince Muazzam's assistance. Many 
other officers were transferred from North India to 
the Deccan. {Akhbarat, year 12.) 

Shivaji opened his ofFensive with great vigour 
and immediate success.* His roving bands looted 
Mughal territory, and he attacked several of the forts 

* Sabhasad, 59, says, "In four months he recovered the 
27 forts he had ceded to the Mughals." But it is an exaggera- 
tion. There is a most spirited but legendary beJlad on the 
capture of Singh-garh (Powadaa.) The Akhbarai and Dilkflsha 
have been of invaluably help in the history of the campaigns 
of 1671 as reconstructed here. Marathi bakhars are silent. 
Z. C. gives dates in the Hindu lunar year, and says that 
during 1670 the Marathas gained Kondana, Purandar, Trimbak, 
Rohira, Mahuli, Lohgarh, Ahivant, Ravla-Javla and Markanda- 
garh, but that Mahabat Kh. recovered the last three forts 
in 1671. 


which he had ceded to Aurangzib by the Treaty of 
Purandar. "The imperial ofl&cers in command of 
most of these forts fell after fighting heroically. Every 
day the Emperor got news of such losses. .But some 
of these places defied capture by reason of the 
strength of their fortifications and abundant supply 
of war material." (Dil. 64.) 

His most conspicuous success was the capture 
of Kondana from Udai-bhan, its Rajput qiladar, (late 
in January.) Assisted by some Koli guides who 
knew the place well, one dark night Tanaji Malusare, 
with his 300 picked Mavle infantry scaled the less 
abrupt hill-side near the Kalian gate by means of 
rope-ladders and advanced into the fort, slaying the 
sentinels. The alarm was given ; the Rajputs, 
stupefied with opium, took some time to arm and 
come out ; but in the meantime the Marathas had 
made their footing secure. The garrison fought des- 
perately, but the Mavles with their w^eir cry of Hara I 
Hara I Mahadev I carried havoc into their ranks. 
The two chiefs challenged each other and both fell 
down dead, after a single combat. The Marathas, 
disheartened by the fall of their leader, were rcJlied 
by his brother Suryaji Malusare, opened the Kalian 
gate to their supporting columns, and took complete 
possession of the fort. The rest was butchery. 
Twelve hundred Rajputs were slain, and many more 
perished in trying to escape down the hill-side. The 
victors set fire to the thatched huts of the cavalry lines 
and the signal blaze informed Shivaji at Rajgarh, nine 


miles southwards, that the fort had been taken. He 
mourned the death of Tanaji as too high a price for 
the fort, and named it Singh-garh after the lion-heart 
that had won it. 

Early in March, he recovered Puremdar, capturing 
its qiladar Razi-ud-din Khan. (M. A. 99.) A few 
days later he looted the village of Chandor, seizing 
an elephant, 12 horses and Rs. 40,000 belonging to 
the imperial treasury, then entered the town and 
plundered it, while the imperial qiladar was shut up 
in the fort. At one place, however, he met with 
repulse. The fort of Mahuli (in North Konkan, 
50 miles n. e. of Bombay) was held for the Emperor 
by a gallant and able Rajput named Manohar Das 
Gaur, the nephew of Rajah Bithal Das of Shah 
Jahan's time. Shiva invested it in February 1670 and 
attempted a surprise at night. He sent up 500 of his 
men to the ramparts by means of rope-ladders. But 
Manohar Das, who "used to be on the alert day and 
night," fell on the party, slew most of the men and 
hurled the rest down the precipice. Shivaji then 
raised the siege, turned to Kalian-Bhiundy and 
recovered it after slaying its thanahdar Uzbak Khan 
and driving out the MugheJ outpost there. {Dil. 65 ; 
O. C. 3415, Surat to Co., 30 March 1670.) Ludi 
Khan, the faujdar of Konkan, was wounded in a 
battle with the Maratha forces, defeated in a second 
encounter, and expelled from his district. The 
Mughal faujdar of Nander (?) fled away, deserting 
his post. 

190 SHIVAJI. [CH. VU. 

About the end of this year (1670) Mahuli too 
was lost to the Emperor. Manohar Das, conscious 
of the inadequacy of the garrison and provisions of 
the fort to repel another attack of the superior 
Maratha forces, resigned his post in despair of getting 
reinforcements. Shivaji seized the opportunity, and 
about December captured Mahuli, slaying its new 
commandant Alawardi Khan and his garrison of 200 
men. (Dil. 65.) By the end of April 1670* he had 
looted 51 villages near Ahmadnagar, Junnar and 

The only officer who made an attempt to uphold 
the imperial prestige in the Deccan was Daud Khan 
Qureshi, who had been second only to Dilir Khan 
during Jai Singh's Maratha campaign of 1665. 
Leaving the province of Khandesh in cheurge of his 
son, Daud Khan arrived at Ahmadnagar on 28th 
March 1670. Six days afterwards he set out with 7,000 
cavalry to expel Shiva's men who were roving near 
Pamir, Junnar, and Mahuli. They evacuated Pamir 
and Junnar and retired before him, while he 
occupied these two posts. Meantime, Shivaji had 
invested three Mughal forts in that region, and Daud 
Khan left Junnar to relieve them. But at the approach 
of his Van (under his gallant son Hamid and Ludi 
Khan) the Marathas raised the siege and fled away, 

* The text of Alihharai here is doubtful. The year may 
be 1671. Z. C. asserts that Shiva recovered Mahuli about the 
middle of Aug. 1670. 


and the Mughal advanced division fell back on their 
main body. 

Soon eifterwards, these two officers went with 
a detachment and destroyed an old fort which the 
Mareithas were repairing on the frontier, 20 miles 
from Mahuli. Towards the end of April, Daud 
Khan himself marched to Mahuli. The Emperor in 
open Court highly praised Daud Khan for his spirit 
in invading the enemy's country, regardless of the 
smallness of his own force, and thereby creating a 
useful diversion of Shivaji's attention. The hot 
weather evidently put an end to the campaign soon 
afterwards. (Al^hbarat, year 13.) 

§4. Quarrel between Muazzam and Dilir. 

But the Mughal administration of the Oeccan was 
in no condition to make a stand against Shivaji. 
For half of the year 1670 it was passing through a civil 
war of its own. In obedience to the Emperor's 
anxious and repeated orders, Dilir Khan* had left 
the Gond country, where he had been profitably 
employed in squeezing the local chief tedns, and set 
off fox the Deccan. Starting from Nagpur on 19th 
March 1670, he expected to reach Aurangabad and to 

* Quarrel between Muazzazn and Dilir Khan in 1670 : 
Dil. 73-75, 80-82 (main source); Ishwardas (important) 
59a— 60a; Storia, ii. 161-165; while M. A. 101, Akhharat, year 
13, and English records give dates and a few details. O. C. 
3415, F. R. Surat Vol. 3, Vol. 105 (Bombay to Surat, 5 Sep.) 
■ &c. Mirai-i-Ahmadi, 290, merely copies Ishwardas. 


wait on the Prince on 12th April. But at his near 
approach the old quarrel between the viceroy and 
his general broke out afresh. We have seen how 
they had disagreed in 1667. So, now too, when 
Dilir, after pursuing some enemy raiders, reached 
Pathri, 26 miles w. of Aurangabad (about 8th April) 
and received an order from the Prince to wait on him, 
he feared to go to the interview lest he should be 
treacherously imprisoned or killed by the Prince. 
"Twice or thrice he took horse for the purpose of 
visiting the Prince, but returned from the way, and 
spent some days on the plea of illness." 

At this act of insubordination, Muazzam and 
Jaswant wrote to the Emperor accusing Dilir Khan 
of rebellion. The Khan had already denounced the 
Prince to the Emperor, saying that he was in collusion 
with Shivaji and had done nothing to defend the 
imperial dominions, and offering to crush the Maratha 
chief if the command of the army in the Deccan 
were left in his (Dilir's) hands for two years with an 
adequate supply of artillery and siege-material. 

Aurangzib was at this time filled with serious 
anxiety at Muazzam's wilful conduct, neglect of the 
imperial business, and failure to carry out orders. 
Popular voice in the Deccan could account for the 
open audacity and easy success of Shivaji's raids 
and the Prince's inactivity, only by ascribing to 
Muazzam a treasonable design to attempt his father's 
throne in alliance v^rith the Marathas. 

So, at the end of March 1670 the Emperor had 


sent his Chamberlain {Khan-i-saman), Iftikhar Khan, 
to Aurangabad to investigate how matters really 
stood, — whether Muazzam was really bent on treason 
and what his relations with Shiva ji were. This officer 
was now instructed to inquire into the Prince's 
charges against Dilir Khan, and, if the Pathan general 
was found to be really guilty, to bring him by any 
means to the Prince's presence and there "do to 
him what the exigencies of the State required." 
(Dil. 74.) Iftikhar's brother, a high officer of the 
imperial Court, learning of this order, wrote secretly 
to Dilir to be vigilant when visiting the Prince. This 
message only deepened the alarm and suspicion of 
DiKr Khan. 

Iftikhar, after his arrival at Aurangabad, went 
out to visit Dilir, and listen to his explaiiations of his 
conduct. When he tried to dispel the alarm of the 
general and swore that no disgrace would be done 
to him in the Prince's presence, Dilir put him to 
shame and silence by showing him the letter of his 
brother at Court, reporting the Emperor's instructions. 
Iftikhar, therefore, could only advise Dilir to keep 
away from the Prince longer by .pretending illness 
and then march away without seeking an interview 
or permission from the viceroy. 

Iftikhar, no doubt moved by kindly intentions, 
thus became guilty of double-dealing. As an English 
gunner in Muazzam's service wrote, "He played the 
Jack on both sides, and told the Prince that Dilir 
Khan was his enemy, and went to Dilir Khan and told 


him that the Prince would seize on him if he came 
to Aurangabad." (John Trotter to President of 
Surat, 20 Dec. 1670, in F. R. Surat, Vol. 105.) His 
unfortunate advice to Dilir only prolonged the tension. 

Iftikhar then returned to the Prince's Court and 
falsely testified to Dilir's illness, adding many 
imaginary details to it. Dilir marched southwards to 
attack a Maratha force (under Pratap Rao) that was 
raiding Mungi-Pattan (in May.) 

Muazzam complained to the Emperor that Dilir 
Khan had openly defied his authority and that the 
Khan's Afghan troops used to rob the people and 
sack the villages along their line of march ; and the 
latter charge was borne out by the reports of the 
news-writers. Then Dilir, finding his position in the 
Deccan intolerable, wanted to go back to the imperial 
Court without waiting for permission ; but the Prince 
ascribed this course to a wicked desire of creating 
disorder in Northern India. Imperial orders reached 
him to force Dilir Khan back to the path of obedience. 
The Prince set himself to raise an army for a war 
with Dilir and called in the Mughal detachments 
from the outlying posts to his banners. 

Dilir Khan was pursuing a Maratha band across 
the Godavari river, when he heard of the arrival of 
a jarmart from the imperial Court, and divined its 
purport. His former suspicion and anxiety now^ 
deepened into alarm and perplexity. Though it was 
the height of the rainy season (August), the rivers 
swollen and the roads miry, he burnt his tents and 


stores and fled northwards with his army on horse- 
back. Marching "in great fear of life, without 
distinguishing between night and day," he reached 
the ferry of Akbarpur on the Narmada and swam his 
horses across the raging stream, losing many men by 
drowning. Thence he proceeded to Ujjain, the 
capital of Malwa, to rest for a few days from the 
fatigues of this march. 

As soon as he started from the south. Prince 
Muazzam and Jaswant gave him chase with all the 
available Mughal troops, calling upon Shivaji to come 
to their aid ! The Deccan was filled with wild 
rumours of a civil war among the imperialists, which 
were "so confused that we cannot write them for 
credible." (O. C. 3470, Bombay to Surat, 1 Sep. 

In the pursuit of Dilir Khan, Prince Muazzam 
reached the pass of Changdev, six miles from the 
Tapti, intending to cross the river and enter 
Burhanpur, the capital of Khandesh, of which Daud 
Khan was subahdar. This governor refused to let 
him cross his frontier and prepared for armed 
resistance. The Prince distributed a month's pay to 
his soldiers to hearten them for the coming struggle. 
But this unexpected opposition brought him to a halt 
for some time, during which a letter came from the 
Emperor ordering Muazzam back to Aurangabad 
(September.) The Prince's evil genius, Jaswant 
Singh, was separated from him and posted at 
Burhanpur until further orders. 

196 SHIVAJI. [CH. VH. 

For, in the meantime, Bahadur Khan, the 
governor of Gujrat, had taken Dilir Khan under his 
protection and written to the Emperor praising Dilir's 
loyalty and past services, explaining how the un- 
reasonable antipathy of Jaswant and the misrepre- 
sentations of backbiters had turned the Prince's mind 
against the Khan, and recommending that Dilir 
might be permitted to serve under him as jaujdar of 
Kathiawad. The Emperor's suspicion and alarm had 
also been excited by Muazzam's approach to 
Hindusthan ; it looked so very like his own move in 
1657 ! Indeed, his own position now was weaker than 
Shah Jahan's in that year, for, the war with Shivaji 
had drawn the greater part of the Mughal forces 
into the Deccan and Aurangzib had no army in 
Northern India large enough to confront his son's. 
It was the talk of the Prince's camp that "if he had 
marched forward, he would before this have been 
king of Hindusthan." (Trotter to Surat.) Muazzam 
promptly obeyed his father's order and returned to 
Aurangabad at the end of September, 1670.* 

* We may here conclude this episode in the life of 
Muazzam. In April his mother, Nawab Bai, ^vas sent from 
Delhi to visit him and bring him back to the right path by 
her influence. She returned from her mission in September. 
Iftikhar Khan, the imperieJ Chamberlain, had harshly re- 
primanded the Prince. But when the Emperor learnt that 
Muazzam's heart was loyal and that his motives had been 
misrepresented to him by his enemies, the imperial wrath fell 
upon Iftikhar Khan for having exceeded his instructions and 
been guilty of double-dealing at Aurangabad. His brother. 


These internal troubles paralysed the Mughal 
arms, and Shivaji made the most of this golden 
opportunity. We have seen how he had recovered 
several of his forts early in the year. His cavalry 
bands roamed over the country, plundering far and 
wide. In March the English factors at Surat wrote, 
"Shivaji marches now not [as] before as a thief, but 
in gross with an army o£ 30,000 men, conquering as 
he goes, and is not disturbed though the Prince lies 
near him." (O. C. 3415.) 

§5. Second Loot of Surat. 

In April Bahadur Khan visited Surat with 5,000 
horse, to guard the town against an apprehended 
attack by Shiva. In August there were false rumours 
that Muazzam, then supposed to be in rebellion 
against his father, was coming to Surat, "to take 
possession of this town and castle." The Mughals 
demanded from the Court of Bijapur a contingent of 
12,000 horse for service against Shivaji, and some 
ammunition from the English at Bombay for the fort 
of Koridru ( ?) People were expectant as to what the 
imperialists would do when the rains would cease 
and campaigning again become possible. (F. R. 
Surat, Vol. 3. Consult. 16 and 18 Aug. 1670. O. C. 
3457.) But Shivaji, as usual, struck the first blow. 

Muftakhar Khan, too, was punished for communicating official 
secrets to Dilir Khan. Both brothers remained deprived of 
office for some months. (M. A. 101; Akhbarat, 13-3.) 


On 3rd October he plundered Sural for the second 

Throughout September he had been assembling 
a large body of cavalry at Kalian, evidently to invade 
Gujrat. (F. R. Surat, Vol. 3. Consult. 12 Sep. 1670.) 
The matter was so notorious that on 12th September 
the English factors at Surat* had rightly concluded 
that "that tow^n vi^ould be the first place he would 
take," and "foreseeing the ensuing danger, [we] 
had taken a convenient time to empty all our ware- 
houses at Surat of what goods were ready baled and 
sent them down to Swally ;" even their entire Council 
with the President (Gerald Aungier) were at Swally 
at the beginning of October. And yet the Mughal 
governor was so criminally negligent as to keep only 
300 men for the defence of the city. On 2nd October 
came successive reports of Shiva's arrival with 
15,000 horse and foot within 20 miles of Surat. All 
the Indian merchants of the city and even the officers 
of Government fled in the course of that day and 
night. On the 3rd, Shivaji attacked the city which had 
recently been walled round by order of Aurangzib. 
After a slight resistance the defenders Red to the fort, 
and the Marathas possessed themselves of the whole 
town except only the Elnglish, Dutch and French 

* The second loot of Surat : Surat Council to Co., 20 Nov. 
1670. (Hedge's Diary, ii. pp. ccxxvi — ix.) F R. Surat Vol. 3, 
(Consult, at Swally Marine, October); Dutch Records, Trans. 
Vol. 29, No. 763^ M. A. 106 (bare mention.) Sabh. 63-64. 
Chit. 72, confused and unreliable. ' 


factories, the large New Serai of the Persian and 
Turkish merchants, and the Tartar Serai midway 
between the English and French houses, which was 
occupied by Abdullah Khan, ex-king of Kashgarh, 
just returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca. The 
French bought off the raiders by means of "valuable 
presents." The English factory, though it was an 
open house, was defended by Streynsham Master 
with 50 sailors, and the Marathas were received with 
such a hot fire from it that they lost several men, 
and, leaving the English alone, assaulted the 
Kashghar king's serai from the advantageous position 
of some avenues next to the French factory, which 
they were suffered by the French to occupy: The 
Tartars made a stout resistance all the day, but finding 
the post untenable they fled with their king to the 
fort at night, giving up to plunder their house with 
its valuable property, including a gold palki and other 
costly presents from Aurangzib. 

From the safe shelter of the Tartar Serai the 
Marathas prepared to open fire on the English factory 
the next day, but the resolute attitude of the handful 
of Englishmen cowed them, and after an angry parley 
they came to an understanding and agreed not to 
molest the English. The Dutch warehouse was un- 
touched. "A messenger came from the invader to 
assure us that no harm would befall us if we remained 

quiet and gave him our assurances that we would 

Tiot interfere for or against him." {Dutch Records, 
Translations, Vol. 29, Surat to Directors, 14 Nov. 


1670.) The Turks in the New Serai successfully 
defended themselves, inflicting some loss on the 

The Marathas plundered the larger houses of the 
city at leisure, taking immense quantities of treasure, 
cloth, and other valuable goods, and setting fire to 
several places, so that "nearly half the town" was 
burnt to the ground. They then approached the 
fortress of Surat, threatening to storm it ; but it was 
a mere demonstration, as they were not prepared to 
conduct a siege, and did not venture close to the 
walls. The third day (5th Oct.) they again appeared 
before the English factory, threatening to bum it 
down. Shivaji and his soldiers were greatly enraged 
at the loss of their men in the first assault on this 
house, and they clamoured for vengeance. But the 
wiser among his captains knew that a second attack 
would result in further loss of life, and at their 
request two English agents waited on Shivaji in his 
tent outside the town, with some presents of scarlet 
cloth, sword blades and knives. The Maratha king 
"received them in a very kind manner, telling them 
that the English and he were good friends, and putting 
his hand into their hands he told them that he w^ould 
do the English no wrong." (Surat to Co., 20 Nov. 
1670, in Hedge's Diary.) 

On 5th October, about noon Shivaji suddenly 
retreated from the town, though no Mughal army 
was near or even reported to be coming. "But he 
had got plunder enough and thought it prudent to 


secure himself. When he marched away he sent a 
letter to the officers and chief merchants, saying that 
if they did not pay him twelve lakhs of Rupees as 
yearly tribute, he would return the next year and 
burn down the remedning part of the town. No sooner 
Shivaji was gone than the poor people of Surat fell 
to plundering what ■was left, in so much that there 
was not a house, great or small, excepting those 
which stood on their gueird, which were not 
ransacked." Even the English sailors under S. Master 
took to plundering. 

During the three days that Surat was undergoing 
this fate, the sea-port of Swally marine, ten miles west 
of it across the Tapti, was not free from alarm. 
There the English, Dutch and French had built their 
warehouses and landing-places for ocean-going 
vessels. Here lay during those days all the members 
of the English factory, their treasure, and most of the 
goods bought for Europe. Here the shah~i-bandar 
(harbour and custom-master), the qazi, and the most 
eminent merchants (Hindu, Muslim and Armenian) 
of Surat had taken refuge with the English. Many 
rich people of the to^vn, too, had fled to the villages 
north of Surat, across the river and close to Swally. 
On the 3rd it was reported that Shivaji wanted to 
send 500 horsemen north of the river to plunder the 
villages and seize these rich men ; and it was feared 
that he might even come to Swally to demand the 
surrender of the Surat refugees and blackmail from 
the European merchants. But the coming of the 


spring-tide made it impossible for the Maratheis to 
cross the river, and Swally remained safe. So great 
was the alarm there, however, that on the 3rd the 
English factors removed their treasure from the shore 
to one of their ships, and next day loaded all their 
broadcloth, quicksilver, currall (coral?) &c., on board 
ship, "to secure them against any attempts of Shivaji." 
Two other English ships, which were due to sail, 
were detained at Swally till 10th October, by which 
time the Marathas were expected to withdraw from 
the district. The English factors with the help of the 
ships' carpenters even ran up a wooden platform at 
one end of the marine yard and mounted eight guns 
on it, "to defend the Company's estate the best we 

The manly attitude of the English and their 
success in scaring away the Maratha myriads, greatly 
impressed the people of the country. These traders 
had, as a reward of their brave defence of their 
factory during the loot of 1664, received commercial 
privileges from the Emperor. And now the son of 
Haji Said Beg, the richest merchant of Surat, who 
had found shelter at Swally, publicly swore that he 
would migrate with his family to Bombay. 

The fact that all the three European factories at 
Surat were untouched while evey other shop and 
house was ransacked by the raiders, naturally excited 
suspicion. Both at Surat and the imperial Court 
people "talked of the three Christian nations having 
made a league with Shivaji when he was here." The 


foreign merchants therefore received no reward from 
the ruler of the land this time. (Master to Swally 
Marine, 3 Jan. 1671, in F. R. Surat, 105.) 

An official inquiry ascertained that Shivaji had 
carried off 66 lakhs of Rupees' worth of booty from 
Surat, — viz., cash, pearls, and other articles worth 
53 lalihs from the city itself and 13 lakhs worth from 
Nawal Sahu and Hari Sahu and a village near Surat, 
{Akhbarat, 13-10.) 

But the real loss of Surat was not to be estimated 
by the booty which the Marathas carried off. The 
trade of this, the richest port of India, was practically 
destroyed. For several years after Shivaji's with- 
drawal from it, the town used to throb with panic 
every now and then, whenever any Maratha force 
came within a few^ days' march of it, or even at false 
alarms of their coming. On every such occasion the 
merchants would quickly remove their goods to ships, 
the citizens would flee to the villages, and the 
Europeans would hasten to Swally. Business Was 
effectually scared away from Surat, and inland pro- 
ducers hesitated to send their goods to this the greatest 
emporium of Western India. 

For one month after the second sack, "the town 
was in so great a confusion that there was neither 
governor nor Government," and almost every day 
was troubled by rumours of Shiva's coming there 
again. "On the 1 2th (i. e., only a week after his 
departure) it was again rumoured that he was return- 
ing with 6,000 horse and 10,000 foot, and that he had 


already reached Pent, a place about 25 miles distant. 
At once there was a general exodus and the town was 
changed from a busy port into the death-like quiet 
of a desert. The Turkish, English and French 
merchants abandoned their factories." But the Dutch, 
52 men in all, with Hags flying and drums beating 
proceeded from their ship to their factory. This was 
their belated imitation of the English demonstration 
of January 1664, when " the English president, at the 
head of some 200 men, had maurched through the 
town, declaring that he meant to withstand Shivaji 
with this handful of men !" (Dutch Records, Trans., 
Vol. 29, letter No. 763 and Vol. 27, No. 719.) 

At the end of November, and again about 1 0th 
December, 1670, the alarm was revived ; and the 
European merchants met together to concert means 
of guarding their respective interests. The laindwstfd 
defences of Swally were strengthened by adding a 
breastwork on the north side of the choultry, and the 
entrance to the harbour or "hole" was gueirded by 
stationing a ship there. The English used to remove 
their money and goods from Surat to this place at 
every such alarm. 

In June 1672 the success of the Maratha forces 
under Moro Pant in the Koli State of Ramnageir, on 
the way to Surat, kept the city in constant terror for 
a long time. The Maratha general openly demanded 
chauth from Surat, threatening a visitation if the 
governor refused payment. There was the same 
panic again in February and October 1 672, September 

1670] shtva's return intercepted. 205 

1673. October 1674, and December 1679. In short, 
the destruction of the trade and financial prosperity 
of Surat was complete. (F. R.) 

§6. Battle of Vani, Oct. 1670. 

Having concluded the story of the Maratha 
dealings with Surat, we turn to Shivaji's activities in 
other quarters. 

Prince Muazzam had just returned to Aureinga- 
bad after chasing Dilir Khan to the bank of the 
Tapti, when he heard of the plunder of Surat. He 
immediately summoned Daud Khan from Burhanpur 
and sent him off to attack the Maratha raiders. 
Meantime, Shivaji had left Surat, entered Baglana, 
and plundered the villages nestling at the foot of the 
fort of Mulhir. Daud Khan, after sending his 
baggage back to Aurangabad, marched westwards 
w^ith light kit to Chandor, a town at which the road 
from Nasik to Baglana crosses the hill range. Spies 
brought him new^s that Shivaji had started from 
Mulhir, and intended to cross the Chandor range 
by the pass of Kanchana-Manchana, ten miles west 
of Chandor. Arriving at the hamlet of Chandor 
(below the fort) at about 9 P.M., Daud Khan waited 
to verify the news of the enemy's movements. At 
midnight his spies reported that Shiva had already 
issued from the pass and was rapidly following the 
road to Nasik with half his forces, while the other 
half of his army was holding the pass to pick up 
-streigglers. Daud Khan at once resumed his march. 


But the moon set about three o'clock in the morning, 
and in the deirkness the Mughal soldiers were some- 
what scattered. 

Ikhlas Khan Miana (son of Abdul Qadir Bahlol 
Khan, a former Pathan leader of Bijapur), com- 
manded the Mughal Vangueird. Ascending a hillock 
in the early morning, he beheld the enemy standing 
ready for battle in the plain below^. While his men 
were putting on their armour, which was conveyed 
on camels, he himself with a handful of followers 
recklessly charged the enemy. The Maratha rear- 
guard, which had faced about, was 10,000 strong 
and commanded by distinguished generals like 
Pratap Rao Gujar, the Master of the Horse, Vyankoji 
Datto' and Makaji Anand Rao (a natural son of 
Shahji Bhonsla.) Ikhlas Khan w^as very soon 
wounded and unhorsed. After a time Daud arrived 
on the scene and sent up Rai Makarand and some 
other officers to reinforce the Van, while he left his 
elephants, flags and drums at a ruined village on a 
height, surrounded by nalas, with orders to make 
his camp and rear-guard halt there when they would 
come up. 

For hours together an obstinate and bloody 
battle raged. Sangram Khan Ghori and his kinsmen 
were wounded, and many were slain on the Mughal 
side. The Marathas, "like the Bargis of the Deccan, 
fought hovering round the imperialists." But the 
Bundela infantry of the Mughal army with their 
abundant firearms kept the enemy back. Daud 


Khan himself entered the fight, repulsed the enemy 
with his artillery, and rescued the wounded Ikhlas 

Meantime, in another part of the field, Mir 
Abdul Mabud, the darogha of the divisional artillery, 
who had been separated from the main army by a 
fold in the ground, was attacked. He was wounded 
with one of his sons and some followers, while 
another son and many soldiers were sleun ; and his 
flags and horses were carried off by the enemy. 
There was a lull in the fight at noon. 

At that time Daud Khan had less than 2,000 
men with him, while the Marathas outnumbered him 
fivefold. In the evening they charged him again, 
but were driven back, evidently by the Eirtillery. At 
night the Mughals bivouacked under the autumn sky, 
their camp was entrenched, and they engaged in 
burying the dead and tending the wounded. The 
Marathas retreated to Konkan without further 
opposition. This battle w^as fought in the Vani- 
Dindori subdivision late in the month of October, 

This battle neutralised the Mughal power for 
more than a month. The day after the fight, Daud 
Khan marched with the broken remnant of his army 
to Nasik, and halted there for one month, evidently 

* Battle of Vani-Dindori ; entirely based upon Dilkflsha, 
84-88, (Bhimsen was an eye-witness); with a few points from 
Sabh. 64-65. 


to recoup his strength and also to watch the route 
from Konkan (by the Tal pass ?) The wounded were 
sent to Aurangabad. Late in November, he re- 
moved to Ahmadnagar, but at the end of December 
he \/as recalled to the scene of his last battle hy 
the revival of Maratha activity in the Chandor range. 
{Dil. 87, 89, 92.) 

§7. Raid into Berar and Baglana. 

We shall, for the present, pass over Shivaji's 
activity at sea and in the western coast-strip during 
the whole of November and part of December 1670 
after his return from Surat. Elarly in December a 
Maratha force under Pratap Rao made a raid into 
Khandesh. Advancing by rapid marches, he 
plundered Bahadurpura, a village two miles from 
Burhanpur (the capital of Khandesh), but did not 
come closer to that city, because of the w^aming of 
Jaswant Singh, who had been posted there since 
September last. Passing into Berar, he fell, when 
least expected, upon the rich and flourishing city of 
Karinja, and looted it completely. Four thousand 
oxen and donkeys were loaded with the booty — 
consisting of fine cloth, silver and gold, to the value 
of a lyrore of Rupees, captured here. All the rich 
men of the place were carried off for ransom. Only 
the most eminent one among them escaped in the 
disguise of a woman. The other towns also yielded 
vast sums of money. That rich province, with its 
accumulated wealth of more than half a century of 

1670] SACK OF KARINJA. 209 

peace and prosperity, afforded a virgin soil to the 
plunderers in this their first raid. A force, reported 
to be 20,000 strong, looted the neighbourhood of 
Ausa and collected chauth, but they rode away 
without attacking the fort. In the neighbourhood of 
Karinja and Nandurbar the Marathas took from the 
affrighted people written promises to pay them one- 
fourth of the revenue (chauth) in future.* 

No resistance was made by the Mughals. 
Khan-i-Zaman, the governor of Berar, moved too 
slowly to intercept the raiders, and he stopped on 
reaching Deogarh. Daud Khan, the governor of 
Khandesh, was absent campaigning near Ahmad- 
nagar, while his son Ahmad Khan, who officiated 
as his deputy at Burhanpur, was at open war with 
Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who was trsang to raise 
money for the Prince's expenses and had demanded 
five lakhs from the treasury of Khandesh. Daud 
Khan's son replied that if the Meiharajah could 
procure Aurangzib's order, he would pay him even 
20 lakhs, or else not a pice, at which message 
Jaswant threatened to sack the town. (F. R. Surat, 
105, Bombay to Surat, 5 February, 1671.) 

Daud Khan from his camp near Ankai Tankai 
hastened towards Burhanpur. Arriving near the pass 

*Dil. 91. Akhbarai. year 13—5, 10, 11. F. R. Surat, 
105, Letter of J. Trotter, 20 Dec. 1670; S. Master to President. 
19 Dec. Dil. 64 (bare mention of ICarinja.) Sabh. 71'. 
Karinja is 77. 30 E. 20.32 N. 



of Fardapur he heard that the Marathas returning 
from Berar had turned aside from Burhanpur and 
taken the road to Baglana. TTie situation at the 
capital of Khandesh was also saved by the arrival 
there on Ist January 1671- of a new supreme 
commander, Mahabat Khan, who took JasWant 
away with himself w^hen leaving the town. 

From Fardapur, Daud Khan sw^erved to the West 
and entered Baglana on the heels of the Marathas. 
While Pratap Rao had been sacking Karinja in 
Berar, another Maratha band under Moro Trimbak 
Pingle had been looting West Khandesh and 
Baglana, and now these two divisions had united in 
the neighbourhood of Salhir. TTiey had plundered 
the village under the hill-fort of Mulhir and laid 
siege to Salhir. Daud Khan arrived near Mulhir at 
about 8 P.M., but could advance no further as most 
of his camp and army were lagging behind. 

The Khan urged his troops to start next morning 
in order to raise the siege of Salhir. He himself 
set out before sunrise. But most of his men had 
not yet arrived, and the few^ that had come with 
him were scattered. They busied themselves in 
cooking food or taking rest in the camp, instead of 
resuming the march with their chief. Daud Khan 
heard on the way that Salhir had already been 
captured by the Marathas, and so he returned in 
disappointment to Mulhir, and after a short halt 
there fell back on his new base near Kanchana- 
Manchana in the Chandor range. 


Shivaji had invested Salhir with a force of 
20,000 horse and foot, and one day finding the 
garrison off their guard he had scaled the wall by 
meEins of rope-ladders. The qiladar Fathullah Khan 
fell fighting, and his wife's brother then gave up 
the fort to the enemy. This happened about 5th 
January 1671. The success of the Marathas 
continued. They threatened other forts in the 
province, such as Mulhir, Cheiuragarh and TeJulgarh. 
Their roving bands cut off the grain supply of 
Neknam Khan, the faujdar of Baglana (whose head- 
quarters were at Mulhir.) They also laid siege to 
Dhodap, the loftiest hill-fort in the Chandor range.* 

In the winter of 1670-71, Shivaji received a visit 
from Chhatra Seil, the son of Champat Rai Bundela, 
the late chieftain of Mahoba. TTiis young man had 
entered the imperial army at Jai Singh's recom- 
mendation, but he was discontented with what he 
considered the inadequate reward of his services in 
the Mughal invasion of the Gond country. So, he 
left the Mughal camp on the plea of hunting and 
made an adventurous journey with his wife to 
Maharashtra by obscure and roundabout paths. He 
offered to serve under Shiva against the Emperor. 
Shivaji received him with honour, praised his manly 
spirit, but sent him back with the advice to rise 

*Dil. 98-100. Akhbarat, year 13—12, 15. T. S. 33a. 
K. K. ii. 247-249 (gives another story of the surrender of 

212 SHIVAJl. [CH. VIK 

against Aurangzib in Bundelkhand, saying, "Illus- 
trious chief 1 conquer and subdue your foes. Recover 
and rule your native land.... It is expedient to com- 
mence hostilities in your own dominions, where your 
reputation will gain many adherents.... Whenever 
the Mughals evince an intention of attacking you, I 
will distract their attention and subvert their plans, 
by active co-operation." The contemporary 
historian, Bhimsen, however, tells us that Chhatra 
SeJ returned from Raigarh in disappointment as he 
found the provincial spirit of the Deccani Court un- 
congenial to him and Shivaji never gave his trust 
or any high office to men from Northern India. 
(Chhatraprakash, canto 1 1 ; Pogson's Boondelas^ 
pp. 52-53 ; Dil. 132.) 

Struggle with the Mughals, 1671-74. 

§1. Campaigns of Mahabat and Daud Khan, 1671. 

The second sack of Surat 2md the Maratha 
ravages in Baglana revised Aureingzib to a sense of 
the gravity of the situation in the Deccan. As early 
as 28th November, 1670, he had appointed Meihabat 
Khan to the supreme command in the Deccan. The 
events of December only deepened the Emperor's 
anxiety. On 9th Janueuy 1671, he sent orders to 
Bahadur Khan to leave his province of Gujrat and 
take the command of one of the imperial army corps 
in the Deccan, Dilir Khan being directed to accom- 
psmy him. The ELmperor also repeatedly talked of 
going to the Deccan and conducting the war against 
Shivaji in person, but the idea was ultimately 
dropped. Daud Khan was instructed to attack Shiva 
-wherever he was reported. Amar Singh Chandawat 
and many other Rajput officers with their clansmen 
were posted to the Deccan. Reinforcements, money 
and provisions were poured into Baglana in January, 
1671. (Akhbarat, 13-1, 2, 8, 14, 16; M.A., 107.) 

Mahabat Khan left Burhanpur on 3rd January 
1671 with Jaswant Singh, reached Aurangabad on 
the 10th, paid his respects to the viceroy, Prince 
Muazzam, and set out to join the army near Chandor. 

214 SHIVAJl. [CH. VUK 

Daud Khan had been appointed his chief lieutenant 
and the commander of his Vanguard ; tut he des- 
pised this office as below his rank, and begged the 
Emperor to recall him. (Akh. 13-12 ; Dil. 102.) 

We shall now trace the history of the war in 
the Chandor range. Late in December 1670 
Shivaji's men had laid siege to Dhodap, and Daud 
Khan had started on the 28th of that month to re- 
lieve the fort. But the qiladar, Muhammad Zaman, 
successfully repelled the attack unaided. Daud 
Khaui had next advanced to the relief of Salhir, but 
had been too late to save it, as vfe have already 
seen. In January 1671, he held a fortified base near 
the Kanchana pass from which he sallied forth in 
every direction in which the Marathas were heard 
of as roving. From the Emperor's letters it appears 
that Daud Khan wras under a general order to right 
everything that might go wrong in Baglana '. Once 
after a night-march he fell on a body of the enemy 
near Hatgarh and slew 700 of them. (Dil. 101 ; 
Akhbarat, 13-15.) 

Late in January 1671, Mahabat Khan joined 
Daud Khan near Chandor and the two leiid siege to 
Ahivant, which Shiva had recently taken. After a 
month had been wasted in a fruitless exchange of 
fire, the fort was entered from the trenches of Daud 
Khan and the garrison capitulated to him. Mahabat 
Khan became furiously angry at losing the credit of 
this success. He had been previously treating Daud 
Khan, a 5-hazari, with discourtesy, and now the 


relations between them became strained to the 
utmost. Leaving a garrison to hold Ahivant, 
Mahabat spent three months at Nasik and then went 
to Pamir (20 miles west of Ahmadnagar) to pass the 
rainy season (June to September) there, while Daud 
Khan was recalled to Court (about June.)* 

There was excessive rainfall that year and many 
men and cattle perished of pestilence in the camp 
at Parnir. But while his troops were dying. Mahabat 
Khan attended daily entertainments in the houses 
of the nobles by turns. There were 400 dancing- 
girls of Afghanistan and the Panjab in his camp, 
and they were patronised by the officers. {DiL 

§2. Campaign of Bahadur and Dilir, 1671-72. 
Battle of Salhir. 

The Emperor was dissatisfied with Mahabat 
Khan for the poor result of his campaign in the 
first quarter of 1671 and his long spell of inactivity 
afterwards, and suspected him of having formed a 
secret understanding with Shivaji. So, he sent 
Bahadur Khan and Dilir Khan to the Deccan next 
winter. They marched from Gujrat into Baglana, 

* Dil 102-104, 106; Sabh. 73. "Mahabat Khan is come 
as far as Njisik Trimbeik and hath taken 4 castles ; Huturnt 
(=Ahivant) and Salhir are the names of two of them." 
(F. R. Sural, 105, Bomb, to Sural, 8 April 1671.) But the 
Mughals did not recover Salhir, though Sabh. 73 says so. 
They only captured Ravla-Javla and Markandagarh. 

216 SHIVAJI. [CH. Vlll. 

laid siege to Salhir (now in Maratha hands), and 
leaving Ikhlas Khan Miana, Rao Amar Singh 
Chandawat and some other officers to continue the 
siege, proceeded towards Ahmadnagar. {Dil. 107 ; 
O. C. 3567.) 

From the environs of Ahmadnagar, Bahadur 
Khan advanced to Supa (in the Puna district), while 
Dilir Khan with a flying column recovered Puna, 
massacring all the inhabitants above the age of 9 
years, (end of December 1671.) Elarly in January 
1672, Shivaji was at Mahad, draining his forts of 
men to raise a vast army for expelling the invaders 
from the home of his childhood.* But the pressure 
on Puna was immediately afterwards removed and 
Bcihadur Khan was recalled from this region by a 
severe disaster to the Mughal arms in Baglana. 

*F. R. Sural 106, Bombay to Surat, 13 Jan. and 20 
Jan. 1672. The town taken by Dilir Khan is spelt in the 
English Factory Records as Puna Chackne and Puna Caukna, 
and described as *'a place of great concern in a very large 
plain in the heart of all Shivaji's upper country." This 
description suggests Puna and not Chakan ; but we have , no 
■direct evidence that Shivaji got back Puna and Chakan from 
the Mughals by the treaty of 1665 or that of 1668. The 
English record a rumour, which we know Wcis baseless, that 
at the capture of this place Dilir Khan killed Kartoji Gujar. 
the Maratha Lieutenant-General, (i.e., Pratap Rao.) Supa, a 
few lines above, may easily be a copyist's error for Puna in 
the Persian MS. of Dilkasha, 107, which, however, is silent 
about this Mughal victory. Chitnis, 1 19, says that the Marathas 
recovered Chakan by force in 1667 or later. 


There, the division left to besiege Salhir was attacked 
by Shiva himself with a large force. After an 
obstinate battle, Ikhlas Khan and Muhakam Singh 
(the son of Rao Amar Singh Chandawat) were 
wounded and captured, with 30 of their principal 
officers,* while Rao Amar Singh and many other 
commanders as well as several thousand common 
soldiers were slain, and the entire siege-camp was 
taken by the enemy. Shortly afterwards Shivaji 
captured Mulhir, and then putting fresh men, 
munitions and provisions in the two forts, he hurried 
back to Konkan unmolested. This took place in the 
second half of January 1672. Shivaji's prestige and 
confidence in his own power were immensely in- 
creased by these successes. Surat was now in 
constant terror of him, as he entirely dominated 
Baglana. (Dil. 107 ; Ishwardas, 60b ; F. R. Surat 
87, M. Gray to Bombay, 15 Feb. Vol. 106, Bombay 
to Surat, 16 Feb., 1672 ; Sabh. 74 ; K. K. ii. 249.) 

From the English records we learn that Shiva 
now "forced the two generals {oiz., Bahadur and 
Dilir), who with their armies had entered into his 
country, to retreat with shame and loss."t But the 

* They were released after a time and returned to 
Ahmadnagar (Dil. 113.) On the Maratha side also many 
soldiers were slain and only one chief of note, Surya Rao 
Kakre, a comrade of Shivaji's youth. 

t O. C. 3633, Surat to Co.. 6 April, 1672. Ramaii 
Pangre's heroic battle with Dilir near fort Kanera (Sabh. 73) 
must be placed here. 

218 SHIVAJl. [CH. VIII. 

Persian accounts are silent about it. We can, 
however, be sure that the Satnami rising in March 
and the rebellion of the Khaibar Afghans in April 
next, made it impossible for the Emperor to attempt 
the recovery of his prestige in the Deccan, and 
Shiva was therefore left the master of the situation 
throughout the year 1672. (M.A. 115-116.) 

Bahadur Khan returned from Baglana with 
failure, encamped for some time on the bank of the 
Bhima, and then went back to Ahmadnagcir to ceinton 
for the rains. About May 1672 Mahabat left the 
Deccan for Hindusthan, and a month later 
Muazzam did the same. Bahadur Khan was 
appointed commander-in-chief and acting viceroy of 
the Deccan, in the place of these two, becoming sub- 
stantive subahdar in January 1673 and holding that 
office till August 1677. (Dil 108-109 ; M.A. 121.) 
§3. Maratha occupation of the Kali country, 1672. 

So greatly was the spirit of the Marathas roused 
by their victory over Ikhlas Khan, capture of Mulhir, 
and expulsion of Bahadur and Dilir from Puna, that 
their activity continued unabated even during the 
hot weather and the reiiny season of this year. About 
5th June, a large Maratha army under Moro Trimbak 
Pingle captured Jawhar from its Koli Rajah, Vikram 
Shah, and seized there treasure amounting to 17 
lakhs of Rupees. TTie place is only 100 miles from 
Surat, and adjoins the Nasik district, from which it 
is separated by the Western Ghats. Advancing 
further north, he threatened the other Koli State of 


Ramneigar* which is only sixty miles south of Surat. 
The Rajah fled with his family (about 19th June 
1672) to Chikli, six miles s. e. of Gandavi and 33 
m. s. of Surat. Even Gandavi was deserted by the 
people in fear of the coming of the Marathas. But 
the invaders speedily retreated from Ranmagar on 
hearing that Dilir Khan was assembling his forces 
for a campaign. Heavy rain stopped the activity of 
the Marathas for a few days. But soon afterwards 
Moro Pant, with his array raised to 15,000 men, 
returned to the attack, and took Ramnagar in the 
first week of July. 

The anfiexation of Jawhar and Ramnagar gave 
the MEU'athas a short, safe and easy route from 
Kalian up Northern Korikan to Surat, and laid that 
port helplessly open to invasion from the south. The 
city became subject to chronic alarm, whenever any 
Marathas were heard of even 60 miles off, at 

§4. Surat threatened for chauth. 

From the neighbourhood of Ramnagar, Moro 
Trimbak Pingle sent three successive letters to the 
governor and leading traders of Surat demanding 
four lakhs of Rupees as blackmail, and threatening 
a visit to the city in the case of their refusal. The 

* Now called Dharampur. The old capital Ramnagar, 
how known as Nagar stands 24 m. ». w. of Dharampur, the 
new capital. 


third of these epistles was very peremptory in tone ; 
Shivaji wrote, "I demand for the third time, which 
I declare shall be the last, the chauth or quarter 
part of the king's revenue under your Government. 
As your Emperor has forced me to keep an army 
for the defence of my people and country, that army 
must be paid by his subjects. If you do not send me 
the money speedily, then make ready a large house 
for me, for I shall go and sit down there and receive 
the revenue and custom duties, as there is none nov/ 
to stop my passage." 

At the first news of the arrival of the Maratha 
army in Ramnagar, the governor of Surat summoned 
all the leading Hindu and Muhammadan merchants 
and proposed that they should subscribe Rs. 45,000 
for engaging 500 horse and 3,000 foot to guard the 
town for two months. Officers w^ere immediately 
sent to make a list of all the Hindu houses in the 
town for assessing this contribution. But no soldiers 
were enlisted, and the governor pocketed whatever 
money was actually raised for the defence. 

On the receipt of the third letter from Shiva, 
the helpless citizens were seized with a panic. 
The rich went to the governor that very night and 
wanted permission to remove their families to 
Broach and other towns for safety. He kept them 
waiting till after midnight, gave them the permission, 
but retracted it next morning, when he held a second 
conference vnth the townsmen, asking them to raise 
the blackmail demanded, — the merchants paying one 


lakh and the desais raising two lakhs from the 
cultivators of the villages around. After a discus- 
sion lasting a day and a night, in which he reduced 
his demand to Rs. 60,000, the people finally refused 
to pay anything, as they knew too well that he 
would appropriate the money instead of buying the 
enemy off with it. Thereafter, every time that there 
was an alarm of the approach of Shivaji's troops, 
the citizens of Surat hastened to flee from the town, 
but the governor shut the gates to keep them in I* 

We may conclude the history of the Koli 
Rajahs here. Vikram Shah, the ex-chief of Jawhar, 
on losing his kingdom in June 1672, fled to the 
adjoining Mughal district of Nasik. From this place 
he used to sally forth with roving bands of his own, 
plunder the peasantry, and cut off communications 
in the north Thana district, now in Maratha hands. 
In January 1678 when Moro Trimbak invaded Nasik, 
Vikram Shah joined the Mughal faajdar and offered 
a vigorous resistemce, but was defeated and put to 
death. His son escaped, and joining Dhara Rai 
Koli (another dispossessed chief) took to brigandage, 
causing considerable loss to Maratha territory and 
military routes. Finally both were captured and 
executed. (Z. C ; T. S. 40a ; Dig. 400.) 

* Conquest of Koli country : F. R. Surat, Vol. 3, Consult. 
Surat 21 June, 1672; Vol. 87, Surat to Bombay, 21 and 25 
June; Vol. 106, Bombay to Surat, 8 July; O. C. 3649; F. R. 
Surat, Vol. 87, Surat to Persia, I November 1673; Sabh. 72. 


The Rajah of Ramnagar fled to Devnes on 
losing his kingdom (June 1672.) T. S. (40d) is 
wrong in sa3ang that he was captured by Moro 

§5. Further Maratha successes in 1672, but raid 
into Khandesh and Berar, Dec. 1672, defeated. 

From their base in the Koli country of Jawhar 
and Ramnagar, a Maratha force under Moro Trimbak 
easily crossed the Ghats into the Nasik district, in 
the middle of July 1672, plundered and occupied it. 
Jadun Rao Deccani, a great-grandson of Lukhji 
Jadav (the maternal grandfather of Shivaji) with 4,000 
men, was the Mughal thanahdar of Nasik-Trimbak. 
He was defeated and captured after losing many of 
his troops in battle. Siddi Halal, the thanahdar of 
Vani-Dindori (or North Nasik), w^as also defeated 
and his charge looted by the Marathas. For this 
failure, both the officers were sharply reprimanded 
by Bahadur Khan, and in anger they deserted to 
the Maratheis, with two other officers and all the 
men of their "four great regiments of horse" 
(October.) Other desertions were apprehended, and 
Dilir Khan was left in great danger with a weakened 
army to defend the province of Gujrat against the 
exultant enemy. {Dil. 116 ; F. R. Surat 87, Surat to 
Bombay, 20 July, 1672, Vol. 3, Surat, 26 October ; 
Bombay to Surat, 18 October, in F. R. Surat 106. 
T. S. 33b for the two deserters.) 

On 25th October, a large Maratha army 


appeared at Ramnagar again, and Surat trembled in 
alarm, especially as a party of Shivaji's horse ad- 
vanced to Chikli. But that city weis not Shivaji's 
objective now. He made a lightning raid into a 
different corner of the Mughal Empire. 

He sent his light cavalry to plunder Berar amd 
Telingana.* The viceroy Bahadur Khan, on hearing 
of it, set out from Ahmadnagar due eastwards, left 
his heavy baggage at Bir (70 miles to the east) and 
Qandahar, and arrived as fast as he could near the 
fort of Ramgir (18-35 N. 7935 E.) in pursuit of the 
raiders. But they had been two days beforehand 
with him, looted the village at the foot of the fort, 
and carried off the families of most of the inhabitants 
for ransom. So the baffled Mug^al general returned 
by way of Indur (modern Nizamabad), 95 miles due 
west. Entering the Qutb-Shahi territory, he ravaged 
the land at the instigation of Dilir Khan. TTie 
Marathas in their retreat divided into two bodies ; 
one escaping south into the Golkonda State and the 
other turning northwards to Chanda, and thence 
westw^ards into Berar proper. Dilir Khan was sent 
off to pursue the first division, while Bahadur Khan 
tried to cut off the retreat of the second. 

Sending his heavy baggage back to Aurangabad 
from the neighbourhood of the village of Khair (?), 
the viceroy hastened by way of Partur, Shellode and 
Peedola, and arrived near the pass of Anlur (38 
miles north of Aurangabad.) Here the Marathas 
♦Di7. 116, 120-122 (full.) 


turned at bay, and attacked the Mughal Van under 
Sujan Singh Bundela. But they were repulsed and 
pursued till evening, many of the horses of traders 
and other kinds of booty were recovered from the 
enemy and restored to their owners. Next day the 
Mughals crossed the pass and encamped at Durga- 
pur, four miles from the fort of Antur. 

TTie following day, when they were marching 
to Aurangabad in rather straggling groups, before 
the time fixed for the starting of the general, one 
division of 10,000 imperialists weis charged by 750 
picked Maratha cavalry on the left of the pass of 
Bakapur, six miles (from Durgapiu- ?) After an 
obstinate battle, in which the Mughals were rein- 
forced by their general, the Marathas retreated, 
leaving 400 of their number dead in the field. The 
credit of this victory belongs to the Bundelas under 
Subh-Kam, whose gallant son Dalpat Rao was 
wounded in the fight. 

The division under Dilir Khan headed the other 
Maratha band off into Bijapur territory, capturing 
much booty and rejoining Bahadur Khan. That 
general cantoned his troops at Pathri, 76 miles s. e. 
of Aurangabad. This Maratha raid into Khandesh 
and Berar, unlike their first incursion in December 
1670, was completely foiled, and the Mughal troops 
showed commendable mobility and enterprise. 
(Nov.-Dec. 1672.)* 

* It is probably this campaign that is referred to in 
M. A. 128, eonong the Court news of 1673, in the following 


To guard against a repetition of these twa 
Maratlia penetrations into Khandesh from Balaghat, 
Bahadur Khan set up gates across the tops of the 
chief passes* and posted troops with artillery at each 
of them. Bajaji Nayaik Nimbalkar, " a great 
Deccani zamindar" and father of Shiva's son-in-law 
Mahadji, with his family, was now won over by the 
Mughals. (Dil. 122- '5.) 

§6. Desultory fighting in Desh, 1673. 

Maratha activity, thus shut out of Khandesh 
and Berar, burst forth in another quarter (Jan. 1673.) 
They next redded the Puna district. Bahadur Khan 
left his baggage at Chamargunda, hastened to meet 
the invaders, and defeated them after a severe battle. 
TTien he encamped at Pedgaon, on the north bank, 
of the Bhima, eight miles due south of Chamargunda. 
This place became the residence of his army for 
many years afterwards, and here a fort and town 
grew up from their cantonment, which the Emperor 
permitted him to name Bahadur-garh. (Dil. 126.) 

Pedgaon occupies a position of great strategic 
importance. It stands on the plain just clear of the 

terms : "Bahadur Khan had defeated Shiva after a forced 
march of 120 miles, made large captures of spoils and sent 
them with Dalpat to the Emperor, who viewed them on 
22 Oct." 

* They are named in Dilkasha as Fardapur, Tundapur, 
Malkapur, Bararpuri, Ra;dhir, Lakanwarah, Deogaon, Rajwara, 
Dilirpur, &c. 


226 SHIVAJl. [CH. VIII. 

long mountain spur running eastwards from Puna. 
From this place the Mughal general could at will 
move westwards along the north of the ramge to 
protect the valleys of the Mula cind the Bhima (the 
North Puna district), or along the south of it to g^ard 
the valleys of the Nira and the Baramati (the southern 
portion of the district.) Northwards he could com- 
municate with his great depot of arms and provisions 
at Ahmadnagar, without having to cross any river 
(except at the foot of that fort) ; and southwards he 
could easily invade Bijapur through the Sholapur 
district. In short, the cantonment at Pedgaon served 
cis the Mughal advanced base for some yeeirs after 
this time, exactly as Aurangzib's camp at Brahma- 
puri, 90 miles s. e. e. of it, did twenty-two years 
later, when the Mughal empire had extended further 

It was most probably in this year (1673)* that 
Shivaji met with a sore disappointment. The fort 
of Shivner, a mile west of Junnar, was no doubt of 
strategic importance, as it guarded the Mughal 
frontier in the north of the Puna district and blocked 
the shortest route by which he could sally out of 
North Konkan to overrun Mughal Deccan. But 
what gave it the greatest value in Shivaji 's eyes weis 
that it w^as his birth-place. The Mughal governor 
of Shivner was Abdul Aziz Khan, a Breihman convert 

* But Z. C. Eisserts that he besieged Junnar (i.e., Shivner) 
in Sept. 1670. 


to Islam and one of the most faithful and valued 
servants of Aurangzib. Sluvaji promised him 
"mountains of gold" for surrendering the fort into 
Maratha hands ; and he, pretending consent, received 
the money, appointed a day for the delivery, and 
asked Shivaji to send 7,000 cavalry to take the fort 
over. But Abdul Aziz at the same time secretly 
informed Bahadur Khan of the plot ; the Maratha 
army fell into an ambuscade planned by the 
Mughals, and retired in disappointment with heavy 
loss. (Fryer, i. 339-340.) 

§7. Raids into Kanara and S. Maharashtra, 1673. 
In another direction, however, a wide door of 
conquest was now opened to the Marathas. Ali 
Adil Shah 11. died on 24th Nov., 1672, and in a few 
months the Government of Bijapur fell into disorder 
and weakness. This was Shivaji 's opportunity. On 
5th March 1673, he got possession of Panhala a 
second time, by bribery, and early in September he 
secured the hill-fort of Satara by the same means. 
In May his men under Pratap Rao Gujar burst into 
the inland parts of Bijapuri Kanara, looting Hubli 
and many other rich cities. But they received a 
great check from the Bijapuri general Bahlol Khan, 
who repeatedly defeated the Maratha rovers and 
expelled them from Kanara, and then (in June 1673) 
took post at Kolhapur, to watch the road and pre- 
vent their return. Soon afterwards the rains put an 
end to military operations, and Maratha activity in 
this region was checked, but for a time only. (6. S. 


■397-399 ; O. C. 3779 ; F. R. Surat 106, Bombay to 
Surat 16 Sep., 1673; Dutch Records, Vol. 31, 
No. 805 ; O. C. 3800.) 

As Mr. Gerald Aungier, the English President 
of Bombay, wrote on 16th Sep. 1673, "Shivaji bears 

himself up manfully against all his enemies and 

though it is probable that the Mughal's army may 
fall into his country this year Eind Bahlol Khan on 
the other side, yet neither of them can stay long for 
want of provisions, and his flying army wll constantly 
keep them in alarm, nor is it either their design to 
destroy Shivaji totally, for the Umarahs maintain a 
politic war to their own profit at the king's charge, 
and never intend to prosecute it violently so as to 
end it." (F.R. Surat, 106.) 

Shivaji took fiill advantage of his enemies' moral 
and political weakness.* Early in October 1673, he 
was reported to have made 20,000 sacks "ready to 
convey what plunder he cein get, having also a con- 
siderable flying army ready for that action." Soon 
afterwards, this army, 25,000 strong, led by Shiva 
in person, burst into west Bijapur territory, plunder- 
ins: many rich towns, and then passed into Kaneira 
for more plunder. This work occupied him till the 
end of December. In the first week of that month 
he was at Kadra with 6,000 men, and stayed there 
only four days. But his detachments were twice 

*F. R. Surat 106, Bomb, to Surat, 10 Oct.. 1673; 
O. C. 3910; F. R. Surat 88. Karwar to Surat, 17 Dec. 


defeated at this time, by Bahlol Khan at Bankapur 
and by Sharza Khan at Chandgarh (midway between 
the towns of Belgaum and Savant-vadi) and forced 
to quit Kanara. 

§8. Battles with Bahlol Khan : Umrani and 

It was probably in November or December 
of this year, while Shivaji was campedgning in 
Kanara, that Bahlol Khan* marched from Bijapur with 
a Icirge army (12,000 men according to the Maratha 
chronicle) to protect the Miraj-Kolhapur district, and 
cut Shivaji 's northern line of communication with his 

* Battles of Umrani and Nesari : Sabh. 78-79 (reads Jesari 
for Nesari); B. S. 399-400 (full about Umrani, but silent about 
Nesari); Chit. 126 (has Babse Navari for Nesari.) Dig. 271 
(meagre.) Z. C. names the place Nivti. Narayan Shenvi 
writes from Raigarh, 4th April, 1674, "Pratap Rai fell in the en- 
counter of Shivaji's army with Bahlol Khan in a narrow 
passage between two hills, who with six horsemen more were 
slain, being not succoured by the rest of the army, so that 
Bahlol Khan remained victorious." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 88.) 
Umrani is 36 m. w. of Bijapur (Ind. At., 40 S. E.) According 
to Duff's authorities, Pratap Rao's appearance near Bijapur 
induced the Regent to recall Bahlol from Kolhapur and the 
latter general was intercepted by the Marathas at Umrani on 
the way to Bijapur. There is no Jesari in the maps. A critic 
suggests Nesari, 18 m. n. w. of Belgaum city (Sh. 41 N. W.) 
It is no doubt situated in "a narrow passage between two 
hills," but there are several objections to this identification. 
Nesari stands 83 miles s. w. of Panhala in a straight line, 
across rugged hills, so that the distance by the actual route 

230 sHivAji. [cH. vni. 

dominions by the Satara-Panhala route. If this 
strategic move had succeeded, the road for Shiva's 
return from Kanara through the Southern Desh 
country would have been closed, while the Portuguese 
State of Goa would have barred the land-route west 
of the Ghats, and he would have been compelled to 
make the journey in ships or make a wide detour 
eastwards and try to force his way between Miraj 
and Bijapur and run the risk of an attack on both 
flanks by the large Adil-Shahi forces at these two 

Pratap Rao Gujar, the Maratha commander-in- 
chief, was detached with a slightly larger force and 
artillery, to meet the danger. He tried to envelop 
Bahlol's army near Umrani, between Miraj and 
Bijapur, cutting him off from his water supply. The 
battle raged all day with intense ferocity. Many 
were slain on both sides, the Marathas suffering less 
than the Bijapuris. After sunset, Bahlol induced 
Pratap to grant a truce, while he promised not to 

is at least 200 miles. It is very far away from Bijapur, off 
the usual track of campaigns, and occupying an out-of-the-way 
hilly nook. 1 cannot imagine any motive that could have 
brought Bahlol to this place ; there was no rich city in this 
region for him to plunder, no Maratha outpost to break up. 
If the battle-field was correctly named Nesari, it must have 
been some other Nesciri, nearer to Panhala and connected with 
it by a frequented road. Is Nesari a. copyist's error for Nigvat 
There are two places of the latter name near Kolhapur 
(Sh. 40 S. W.) 


commit any further hostility against Shivaji. So, 
the Maratha army withdrew, instead of following up 
their success and capturing the whole of the stricken 
enemy force. 

The Bijapuris with their numerous wounded, fell 
back on Tikota (13 m. west of Bijapur) ; but being 
reinforced appeared in the Panhala district again a 
few months later (Feb. 1674.) Shivaji sharply censured 
Pratap Rao for having let Bahlol Khan escape, when 
he could have easily crushed him and ended for ever 
his frequent menace to the Maratha possessions in 
the Southern Desh tract and the roads leading across 
the Ghats to South Konkan. Pratap Rao, immediately 
after the battle of Umrani, had dashed off to plunder 
parts of Golkonda, Telingana and Berar. On 
returning from this raid, which was utterly useless 
from the military point of view, he found Bahlol 
back near Panhala and received an angry message 
from his master saying, "Bahlol has come agadn. Go 
with your army, destroy him and win a complete 
victory. Otherwise, never show your face to me 
again ! ' ' 

Stung to the quick by this letter, Pratap Rao 
sought Bahlol out at Nesari, "in a narrow passage 
between two hills." Smarting under his master's 
censure, he threw generalship to the winds, and 
rushed upon Bahlol followed by only six horsemen, 
the rest of his army hanging back from the mad 
charge. The gallant seven were cut down by the 
swarm of foes, and much havoc was done among 


the Marathas who were disheartened by the fall of 
their leader ; "a river of blood flowed." Shivaji 
greatly mourned the death of Pratap Rao and re- 
pented of his angry letter. The dead general's 
relatives and dependents were well provided for, and 
his daughter was married to Raja Ram, the favourite 
son of the king. 

Anand Rao, a lieutenant of Pratap Rao, rallied 
the disheartened army of his chief. Shiva appointed 
Hansaji Mohite* commander-in-chief in succession to 
Pratap Rao, gave him the title of Hambir Rao, and 
ordered him not to return alive without defeating 
the enemy. At this Hambir Rao went off with the 
whole body of his cavalry far into Bijapur territory 
in search of Bahlol. Dilir Khan v^dth the Mughal 
army advanced promptly to the succour of his 
brother Afghan, Bahlol Khan. But Hambir Rao, not 
daring to fight two such large forces, retreated to- 
wards Kanara, making forced marches of 45 miles a 
day. The two Khans, unable to overtake the mobile 
Marathas, gave up the pursuit and turned, — Bahlol 
to Kolhapur and Dilir to Panhala, whence, after a 

* The new coinmancIer-in-chief*s name is given as Hasaji 
(Hansaji) Mohite by both Sabhasad and Chitnis. The latter 
adds (p. 126) that Hasaji attacked Bahlol's arnny when dispersed 
in pursuit, converted the defeat into a victory, and chased 
Bahlol back to Bijapur. But Narayan Shenvi, writing from 
Raigarh, only a month later, on information supplied by 
Shiva's ministers, states that Anand Rao rallied the leaderless 
army after the fall of Pratap Rao. 


5 days' halt with the intention of besieging it, he fell 
back on his base (Parnir?) 

Hambir Rao, penetrating further into Kanara, 
robbed the city of Pench,* 24 miles from Bankapur, 
in Bahlol's jagir, looting at least 150,000 hun worth 
of booty. Thence he returned with 3,000 ox-loads 
of plunder. Bahlol and Khizr Khan, with 2,000 
cavalry and niany foot-soldiers, tried to intercept him 
near Bankapur, but were defeated after a desperate 
battle and put to flight with the loss of a brother of 
Khizr Khan. Hambir Rao robbed the entire Bijapuri 
army, captured 500 horses, 2 elephants, and much 
other prize. (March, 1674.) t 

* The whole of this paragraph and the next is based upon 
Narayan Shenvi's letter of 4th April 1674 (F. R. Surat, Vol. 88) 
and the Dutchman Vain Reade's letter of 15th Dec. 1674, 
(Dutch Records, Vol. 32, No. 824), which latter calls the 
pillaged bazar "Honspent, situated on the borders of Bijapur 
near Bankapur." (Hospet near the ruins of Vijaynagar cannot 
be the place meant.) 

t Sabhasad refers to this catnpeiign on p. 80, but gives 
other names to the place of battle and the Bijapuri genereJ : 
"Hambir Rao went with his army to Sampgaon [19 m. «. <=. 
of Belgaum.] Husain Khan Miana, a great Bijapuri general, 
with 5,000 Pathans inarched against Hambir Rao. A severe 
battle took place between them, from noon till next morning. 
Many men horses and elephants -were slain in Husain's army. 
He was captured with 4,000 horses, 12 elephants, many camels, 
and property beyond calculation. His whole army was des- 
troyed." See also Chitnis, 146; Dig. 339. Z. C. says that 
towards the end of March 1674, the Meirathas looted Sampgaon 
and that Anand Rao fought Khizr Kb. capturing two elephants. 

234 SHIVAJl. [CH. VIII. 

But the Bijapuris had their revenge immediately 
afterwards. Bahlol Khan, "regarding the loss [of 
the elephants] as a great disgrace to him, became 
desperate, attacked the robbers again, and being 
reinforced secured such a victory that the robbers 
had to abandon 1 ,000 horses and were pursued for 
a long distance." It was not the Maratha policy 
during a raid to light pitched battles. So, Hambir 
Rao rapidly retreated vfith his booty to Shiva's 
dominions, left it there in safety, and then (in April) 
burst into Balaghat. * 

§9. Defeat of Dilir Khan, Jan. 1674. 

Late in January 1674, a Mughal army tried to 
descend into Konkan and cause a diversion in that 
quarter simultaneously with the Bijapuri invasion of 
the Panhala region. But Shiva stopped the paths by 
breaking the roads and mountain passes and keeping 
a constant guard at various points where the route 
was most difficult ; and the Mughals had to return 
baffled. It was probably this expedition to which 
the English merchants refer in a letter written at the 
end of January 1674, in the following words, "Dilir 
Khan hath lately received a rout by Shivaji and lost 

* Sabhasad, 81, says that Hambir Rao's raid extended over 
Khandesh, Baglana, Gujrat, Ahmadabad, Burhanpur, Berar, 
and Mahur, to the bank of the Narmada, and that the tired 
Mughal pursuers always lagged 30 or 40 miles behind, so that 
the Marathas returned home unmolested and with all their 


1 ,000 of his Pathans, and Shivaji about five or six 
hundred men." If so, Dilir Khan had either made a 
rash frontal attack on one of the entrenched passes 
or fallen into an ambuscade of the Marathas. 
Throughout these four months, December 1673 to 
March 1674, Shivaji's wars with Adil Shah and the 
Siddis were carried on languidly with only occasional 
outbreaks of vigour. The soldiers on both sides 
were weary of fighting and their commanders not in 
earnest to end this paying business. The winter 
rains of this yeeir were very heavy and bred pestilence. 
Shiva in December and January was compelled to 
distribute his horses throughout his dominions in 
order to stable them in comfort.* 

Soon afterwards, the Mughal power in the 
Deccan was crippled. The rising of the Khaibar 
Afghans became so serious that Aurangzib had to 
leave Delhi (7th April) for I-Iassan Abdal, in order 
to direct the war from the rear, and next month Dilir 
Khan was called to the North-western frontier. 
Bahadur Khan was left alone in the Deccan with a 
greatly weakened force. This lull in the war was 
utilised by Shivaji to crown himself with the greatest 
pomp and ceremony. (M. A. \32 ; F. R. Surat 88, 
Oxinden's Letter, 21 May, 1674.) 

The eve of Shivaji's coronation a£Fords a 
suitable time for making a survey of his territorial 

* Narayan Shenvi's letter from Raigarh in F. R. Surat, 
Vol. 88; O. C. 3906 and 3939; Dutch Records, Vol. 34„ 
No. 840. 


position. We have seen at the end of Chapter II. 
what his kingdom was in 1648 and in 1655. His 
gains between October 1659 and February 1660 were 
short-lived except in S. Konkan. Here he completed 
the conquest of the Ratnagiri district by taking 
possession of its western part (including all the ports 
except Rajapur and Vingurla) as well as its southern 
extremity. From this time his power began to im- 
pinge on that of the Savants of Vadi (or the 
desais of Kudal, as they w^ere then called), and after 
a long and confused struggle much of the latter's 
territory as well as the ports of Rajapur and Vingurla 
passed into Shivaji's hands, (by the middle of 1663), 
and all South Konkan owned him as its sole master. 
He had already wrested the western coast of the 
Kolaba district from the Siddis. 

What he ceded to the Mughals by the Treaty 
of Purandar (1665) touched only his territories in the 
Puna and Thana districts, while his acquisitions in 
middle and South Konkan remained intact. Most 
of these; cessions even were recovered in 1 67 1 . 

From 1664 the Marathas began to raid Kanara, — 
both the Karwar coast and the uplands of Hubli and 
Bednur ^ but their actual conquest of the coast was 
achieved as late as 1675. 

Maratha activities in 1671 and 1672 resulted in 
the annexation of Baglana (north of the Nasik 
district) and the Koli country (Jawhar and Ramnagar) 
in Konkan, between Surat and the Thana district. 
The hill-forts in the Chandor range seem to have 


repeatedly changed hands between the Mughals and 
the Marathas. But their importance in Shivaji's eyes 
was only strategical, as they secured his northward 
route to Baglana and Khandesh. 

Southwards, Shivaji's power was firmly planted 
by his annexation of Panhala in 1673 and Kolhapur 
and Ponda in 1675. Thus his boundary in 1675 ex- 
tended beyond the Kolhapur district well into western 
Kamatak or Kanara uplands. 

The full extent of his kingdom at his death (1680) 
will be described at the beginning of Ch. XV. 


The Coronation of Shivaji and after. 

§ 1 . Why Shivaji wanted to be crowned. 

Shivaji and his ministers had long felt the 
practical disadvantages of his not being a crowned 
king.* True, he had conquered many lands and 
gathered much wealth : he had a strong army and 
navy and exercised powers of life and death over 
men, like an independent sovereign. But theoreti- 
cally his position was that of a subject ; to the Mughal 
Emperor he was a mere zamindar ; to Adil Shah he 

* This chapter is mainly based upon the detailed reports 
of the English ambassador Henry Oxinden, the English inter- 
preter Narayan Shenvi, and the Dutch merchant Abraham Le 
Feber (of Vingurla), preserved in Factory Records, Surat, 
Vols. 88 and 3, and Dutch Records, Vol. xxxiv. No. 841, of 
the India Office, London. These have been supplemented by 
Sabhasad (81-84), Chitnis (157-170) and Shivadigvijay (406-440), 
— the last being extremely unreliable and imaginciry. The 
Persian MS. Tarilih-i-Shivaji, 39a, confirms the contemporary 
European records in some particulars in a surprising manner. 
I find that the Bomhay Gazetteer asserts, what I suspected 
when first reading Chitais, that this hal^ar imputes to Shivaji's 
coronation in 1674 the ceremonies which marked the Puna 
coronation of a century later ! Family history of Gaga Bhatta 
in Sardesai, i. 355. 


was the rebel son of a vassal jagirdar. He could not 
claim equality of political status with any king. 

Then, again, so long as he was a mere private 
subject, he could not, with all his real power, claim 
the loyalty and devotion of the people over whom 
he ruled. His promises could not have the sanctity 
and continuity of the public engagements of the head 
of a State. He could sign no treaty, grant no land 
with legal validity and an assurance of permanence. 
The territories conquered by his sword could not 
become his lawful property, however undisturbed 
his possession over them might be in practice. The 
people living under his sway or serving under his 
banners, could not renounce their allegiance to the 
former sovereign of the land, nor be sure that they 
were exempt from the charge of treason for their 
obedience to him. The permanence of his political 
creation required that it should be validated as the 
act of a sovereign. 

It is also clear that the rise of the Bhonslas 
created much jealousy among the other Maratha 
families which had once been their equals in social 
status. These men consoled themselves by refusing to 
adhere to Shivaji as his servants, bragged of their 
being loyal subjects of Aurangzib or of Adil Shah, 
and sneered at Shivaji as an upstart rebel and usurper. 
It was necessary to rectify his position in their eyes. 
A formal coronation alone could show them that he 
' was a king and therefore their superior, and enable 

240 SHIVAJI. [CH. IX. 

him to treat on equal terms with the rulers of Bijapur 
and Golkonda. (Dig. 406-409.) 

The higher minds of Maharashtra, too, had 
begun to look up to Shivaji as the champion of 
Hinduism, and wished to see the Hindu race elevated 
to the full stature of political growth by the formal 
assertion of his position as an independent king. 
They longed for the Hindu swaraj, and that implied 
a Hindu chhatrapati. (Sabh. 82 ; Chit. 158, inference ; 
Dig. 412.) 

§2. Shivaji recognised by Gaga Bhatta as 
a Kshatriya. 

But there was one curious hindrance to the 
realisation of this ideal. According to the ancient 
Hindu scriptures, only a member of the Kshatriya 
caste can be legally crowned as king and claim the 
homage of Hindu subjects. The Bhonslas were 
popularly known to be neither Kshatriyas nor of any 
other twice-born caste, but mere tillers of the soil, 
as Shivaji's great grandfather was still remembered 
to have been. How could an upstart sprung from 
such a Shudra (plebeian) stock aspire to the rights 
and honours due to a Kshatriya? The Brahmans of 
all parts of India would attend and bless the corona- 
tion of Shivaji, only if he could be authoritatively 
declared a Kshatriya. 

It was, therefore, necessary first to secure the 
support of a pandit, whose reputation for scholarship 
would silence all opposition to the views he might 


propound. Such a man was found in Bishweshwar, 
nicknamed Gaga Bhatta, of Benares, the greatest 
Sanskrit theologian and controversialist then alive, a 
master of the four Vedas, the six philosophies, and 
all the scriptures of the Hindus, and popularly- 
known as the Brahma-deva and Vyas of the age. 
After holding out for some time, he became com- 
pliant, accepted the Bhonsla pedigree as fabricated 
by the clever secretary Betlaji Avji and other agents 
of Shiva, and declared that that Rajah was a 
Kshatriya of the purest breed, descended in unbroken 
line from the Maharanas of Udaipur, the sole repre- 
sentatives of the solair line of the mythical hero 
Ramchandra. (Dig. 410-12.) His audacious but 
courtierly ethnological theory was rewsirded with a 
huge fee, and he was entreated to visit Maharashtra 
and officiate as high priest at the coronation of 
Shiva. He agreed, and on his arrival was welcomed 
like a crowned head, Shiva and eill his officers 
advancing many miles from Satara to receive him on 
the way. 

§3. Preparations for coronation. 

The preparations took many months. There 
•was no unbroken tradition about the exact ceremonies 
and paraphernaJia required at the coronation of an 
independent Hindu sovereign. The Sanskrit epics 
and political treatises were ransacked by a syndicate 
of pandits to find out the orthodox ancient precedents 


242 SHIVAJl. [CH. IX. 

on these points, and agents were sent to learn the 
modem practice of the Rajahs of Udaipur and Jaipur. 

Invitations had been sent to learned Brahmans 
of every part of India ; the report of the coming 
ceremony had attracted others. Eleven thousand 
Brahmans, making 50,000 souls with their wives and 
children, were assembled at Raigarh and fed with 
sweets for four months at the Rajah's expense. 
Chitnis asserts, and we can readily believe it, that the 
greatest forethought and organising power were 
shown by Shiva in providing for the comfort of the 
numerous guests — Brahmans, nobles, local magnates 
of the realm, agents of other States, foreign merchants 
and visitors, and poor cousins, who had flocked to 
the ceremony. Nothing went amiss ; there was no 
disorder, no deficiency, no shouting or bustle in 
catering to this lakh of men women and children. 

The daily religious ceremonies and consultations 
with the Brahmans left Shiva no time to attend to 
other business, as the English envoy, Henry Oxinden, 
found to his chagrin. Shiva began by bowng to his 
guru Ramdas Swami and his mother Jija Bai and 
receiving their blessings. The unhappy discarded 
first wife of Shahji, now verging on eighty, had 
forgotten her husband's neglect in the love and devo- 
tion of her son, and rejoiced to see, before she closed 
her eyes, that he had reached the summit of human 
greatness as the crowned king of the land of his 
birth, an irresistible conqueror, and a strong defender 
of the religion which was the solace of her life. Like 


a queen-mother of the same country bom 15 centuries 
earlier, Gautami, the mother of the Andhra king 
Shri Satakami, she gloried in the glory of her 
victorious and orthodox son. A kind Providence 
seemed to have prolonged her life only to enable 
her to witness the scene of his coronation, for she 
died twelve days after it. 

§4. Puja and purification by Shioa. 

Then he set out on a round of worship at the 
most famous shrines of the land. Chiplun was 
visited early in May, 1674, and after adoring 
Parashuram in the great temple there, he returned to 
Raigarh on the 12th. Four days afterwards he again 
issued forth to worship the Bhavani goddess he had 
installed at Pratapgarh, as the ancient Bhavani of 
Tuljapur was beyond his reach. To this image he 
presented an umbrella of pure gold, weighing one 
eind a quarter maunds, (worth about Rs. 56,000) eoid 
many other costly gifts. 

Returning to Raigarh in the afternoon of. the 21st, 
he plunged into devotion there. Under the guidance 
of his family priest, Balam Bhatta, (the son of 
Prabhakar Bhatta Upadhyay), he adored Mahadev, 
Bhavani and other local deities for many days in 

But one great defect had to be removed before 
his coronation could take place. He had to be 
publicly purified and "made a Kshatriya." On 28th 
May he performed penance for his ancestors' and 

244 SHIVAJI. [CH. IX. 

his own sin of omission in not having observed the 
Kshatriya rites so long, and was invested by Gaga 
Bhatta with the sacred thread, the distinctive badge 
of the twice-born castes like the "pure" Kshatriyas 
of Northern India. The next step was to teach him 
the mantra (sacred verses) and initiate him into the 
rules of the Kshatriya caste. Shivaji very logically 
demanded that all the Vedic verses appropriate to 
the initiation and coronation of a true Hindu king 
should be chanted in his hearing, because the 
Kshatriyas being one of the holy "twice-born" castes, 
he as an admitted Kshatriya was entitled to use the 
Vedic mantras equally with the Brahmans. At this 
there was a mutiny among the assembled Brahmans, 
w^ho asserted that there was no true Kshatriya in the 
modern age* and that the Brahmans were the only 
twice-born caste now surviving ! Even Gaga Bhatta 
was cowed by the general opposition and evidently 

* Exactly the same kind of trouble has been given by 
the Brahmans of the present generation to Shivaji's descendant, 
the Metharajah of Kolhapur. M.M. Haraprasad Shastri suggests 
that the greedy Brahmans probably saved their conscience by 
reciting some of the Vedic hymns at Shivaji's coronation, but. 
mumbling them in such a way that not a syllable reached the 
ears of Shivaji ! The following significant passage in T. S. 
{39a) suggests that Shivaji at one time thought of punishing 
the ultra-orthodox Brahmans by removing them from lucrative 
secular duties like the command of armies and viceroyalties of 
provinces and confining them to their scriptural functions of 
fasting £uid praying. "The Meiharajah learning [of the refusal 
of the Brahmans to teach him the Vedic mantras], said, 'The 


<lropped the Vedic chant and initiated the Rajah only 
in a modified form of the life of the twice-born, 
instead of putting him on a par with the Brahmans 
in this respect. (T. S. 39a ; Dutch Records.) This 
purification and its sequel, the investiture with the 
sacred thread, were performed with "great 
ceremony ;" a vast amount of money was distributed 
among the Brahmans, Gaga Bhatta alone getting 
7,000 hun and the crowd 17,000. 

Next day, Shiva made atonement for the sins, 
deliberate or accidental, committed in his own life- 
time. He was separately weighed against each of 
the seven metals, — gold, silver, copper, zinc, tin, lead 
and iron, — as well as very fine linen, camphor, salt, 
nails (sic), nutmegs, and other spices, butter, sugar 
fruits and all sorts of eatables (betel-leaves Eind 
•country wine being among them.) All these metals 
and other articles to the weight of his body, together 
'with a lakh of hun more, were distributed after the 
coronation to the assembled Brahmans. 

But even this failed to satisfy their greed. Two 
of the learned Brahmans pointed out that Shiva, in the 
course of his raids, had burnt cities "involving the 
death of Brahmans, cows, women and children." 
He could be cleansed of this sin, — for a price. It 

Brahmans are reverend men. It is not proper to appoint them 
royal servants. They ought not to discharge any work except 
worshipping God.' So he removed all the Brahmans from 
their posts and appointed Prabhu Kayasthas in their places. 
Moro Pant interceded for the Brahmans." 

246 SHIVAJI. [CH. IX. 

was not necessary for him to pay compensation to the 
surviving relatives of the men and women who had 
perished in his sack of Surat or Karinja. It would be 
enough if he put money into the pockets of the Brah- 
mans of Konkan and Desh. The price demanded 
for this 'pardon' was only Rs. 8,000, and Shiva could 
not have refused to pay this trifle. {Dutch Records, 
Vol. 34, No. 841.) 

§5. Scene of Shivaji's Coronation. 

All his disqualifications having been thus re- 
moved with gold, the actual coronation was now 
begun. The 5th of June was the eve of the grand 
ceremony. It had to be spent in self-restraint and 
mortification of the flesh, like the night of vigil 
preceding knighthood in the age of chivalry. Shivaji 
bathed in water brought from the holy Ganges, and 
gave Gaga Bhatta 5,000 hun and the other great 
Brahmans a hundred gold-pieces each. The day 
was probably spent in fasting. 

Next day (6th June, 1674) came the coronation 
itself. Rising very early in the morning, Shivaji pre- 
pared himself by bathing amidst ceremonies intended 
to avert evil, worshipped his household gods, and 
adored the feet of his family priest. Gaga Bhatta, 
and other eminent Brahmans, who all received gifts 
of ornaments and cloth. 

The essential parts of a Hindu king's coronation 
are washing him (abhishel^ and holding the royal 
umbrella over his head {chhatra-dharan.) Clad in a 


pure white robe, wearing garlands of flowers, scented 
essence, and gold ornaments, Shiva walked to the 
place appointed for the bath. Here he sat down 
on a gold-plated stool, two feet square and two feet 
high. The queen-consort, Soyra Bai, occupied a seat 
on his left with her robe knotted up with his, in sign 
of her being his equal partner in this world and the 
next (saha-dharmini), as the Hindu sacred law lays 
down. The heir-apparent Shambhuji sat down close 
behind. Then the eight ministers of his cabinet 
{ashta-pradhan), who stood ready at the eight points 
of the horizon with gold jugs full of the water of the 
Ganges and other holy rivers, emptied them over 
the heads of the king queen and crown-prince, 
amidst the chanting of hymns and the joyous music 
of the band. Sixteen pure-robed Brahman wives each 
with five lamps laid on a gold tray, waved the lights 
round his head to scare away evil influences. 

Then Shivaji changed his dress for a robe of 
royal scarlet, richly embroidered with gold, put on 
sparkling gems and gold ornaments, a necklace, a 
garland of flowers, and a turban adorned with strings 
and tassels of pearls, worshipped his sword shield 
bow and arrows, and again bowed to his elders and 
Brahmans. Then, at the auspicious moment selected 
by the astrologers, he entered the throne-room. 

The hall of coronation was decorated with the 
32 emblematic figures prescribed by Hindu usage 
and various auspicious plants. Overhead an awning 
of cloth of gold was spread, with strings of pearls 

248 SHIVAJI. [CH. IX. 

hanging down in festoons. The floor was covered 
with velvet. In the centre was placed a "magnificent 
throne," constructed after months of continuous 
labour in a manner v/orthy of a king. Even if we 
reject Sabhasad's statement that it contained 32 
maunds of gold (worth 14 lakhs of Rupees), we 
must accept the English observer's report that it 
was ''rich and stately." The base v^as evidently 
coated with gold plate, and so also were the eight 
pillars standing at the eight angles, which were 
further richly embellished with gems and diamonds. 
They supported a canopy of the richest gold 
embroidery from which strings of pearls were sus- 
pended in tassels and festoons, interspersed with 
dazzling gems. The coverings of the royal seat were 
a grotesque combination of ancient Hindu asceticism 
and modern Mughal luxury : tiger skin below and 
velvet on the top ! 

On the two sides of the throne, various emblems 
of royalty and government were hung from gilded 
lance-heads. On the right hand stood two large 
fish-heads of gold with very big teeth, and on the 
left several horses' tails (the insignia of royalty 
among the Turks) and a pair of gold scales, evenly 
balanced (the emblem of justice) on a very costly 
lance-head. All these were copied from the Mughal 
Court. At the palace gate were placed on either 
hand pitchers full of water covered with bunches of 
leaves, and also two young elephants and two 
beautiful horses, with gold bridles and rich trappings. 


These latter were auspicious tokens according to 
Hindu ideas. 

As Shivaji mounted the throne, small lotuses of 
gold set with jewels, and various other flowers made 
of gold and silver were showered among the 
assembled throng. Sixteen Brahman married women 
again performed the auspicious waving of lamps 
round the newly enthroned monarch. The Brahmans 
lifted up their voices in chanting holy verses and 
blessing the king, who bowed to them in return. 
The crowd set up deafening shouts of "Victory, 
victory unto Shiva-raj ! ' ' All the instruments began 
to play and the musicians to sing at once. By pre- 
vious arrangement the artillery of every fort in the 
kingdom fired salvoes of all their guns exactly at this 
time. The arch-pontiff Gaga Bhatta advanced, held 
the royal sun-shade of cloth of gold fringed with 
pearls over his head, and hailed him as Shiva 
Chhatrapati, or Shiva the paramount sovereign ! 

The Brahmans stepped forward and poured 
their blessings on his head. The Rajah gave away 
vast sums of money and gifts of every kind to them 
and to the assembled beggars and general public. 
"He performed the sixteen varieties of great alms- 
giving {maha-dari) prescribed in the sacred books of 
the Hindus. Then the ministers advanced to the 
throne and made their obeisance, and received from 
his hands robes of honour, letters of appointment, 
and large gifts of money, horses, elephants, jewels, 
>cloth, and eirms. Sanskrit titles were ordered to be 

250 SHIVA JI. [CH. IX. 

used in future to designate their offices, and the 
Persian titles hitherto current were abolished." 

The crown-prince Shambhuji, the high-priest 
Gaga Bhatta, and the prime-minister Moro Trimbak 
Pingle, were seated on an eminence a little lower 
than the throne. The other ministers stood in two 
rows on the right and left of the throne. All other 
courtiers and visitors stood according to their ranks 
at proper places in a respectful attitude. 

By this time it was eight o'clock in the morning. 
The English ambassador, Henry Oxinden, was now 
presented by Naroji Pant. He bowed from a distance, 
and his interpreter Narayan Shenvi held up a 
diamond ring as an offering from the English to the 
Rajah. Shivaji took notice of the strangers and 
ordered them to come to the foot of the throne, 
invested them with robes of honour, and then sent 
them back. 

§6. Street procession at Raigarh. 

When the presentations were over, the Rajah 
descended from his throne, mounted his best horse, 
decked with gorgeous trappings, and rode to the 
palace-yard. There he mounted the finest elephant 
in his stable, dressed out most splendidly for the 
occasion, and then rode through the streets of the 
capital in full military procession, girt round by his 
ministers and generals, with the two royal banners, 
}ari-pataka and Bhagwe-jhanda, borne aloft on two 


elephants walking in the Van, while the generals and 
regiments of troops followed with their respective 
flags, artillery and band. The citizens had decorated 
their houses and roads in a manner worthy of the 
occasion. The housewives waved lighted lamps 
round him and showered fried rice, flowers, holy 
grass, &c., on his head. After visiting the various 
temples on Raigarh hill and offering adoration with 
presents at each, he returned to the palace. 

On the 7th began a general distribution of gifts 
to all the assembled envoys and Brahmans and of 
alms to the beggars, which lasted twelve days, during 
which the people were also fed at the king's expense. 
The more distinguished pandits and sannyasis were 
not included in this alms-giving, as the men got only 
3 to 5 Rupees and the women and children a Rupee 
ot two each. 

Probably the day after the coronation the 
monsoon burst, the rains set in with violence, and 
the weather continued wet for some time, to the 
intense discomfort of the assembled crowd. On the 
8th, Shivaji took a fourth wife without any state or 
ceremony. Shortly before he had married* a third. 
(Letter of Oxinden, 27 May ; Oxinden's Memorial 
under date 8 June.) 

* He took this third wife two days after his investiture 
with the sacred thread. Z. C. says that the marriage was 
celebrated with [Vedic] mantras, and we shall not be wrong 
in supposing that Shivaji made these late marriages in order 
to assert publicly his right as a 'twice-bom' to hear Vedic 
mantras I 

252 SHIVAJI. [CH. IX. 

After the coronation was safely over, Jija Bai 
died on 18th June, in the fulness of years and 
happiness, leaving to her son her personal property 
worth 25 lakhs of hun, "some say more." When 
the period of mourning for her was over, Shivaji sat 
on the throne a second time, to celebrate his 
purification after her funeral. (Dutch Records.) 

§7. Cost of the Coronation. 

The total cost of the coronation, including the 
sums distributed in gifts and alms, is put down by 
Sabhasad at the incredible figure of one krore and 
42 lakhs of hun. The Dutch merchant Abraham Le 
Feber, writing from Vingurla only four months after 
the event, quotes the popular report that "this 
ceremony and distribution of largess cost 150,000 
pagodas." He evidently means the money spent in 
the 12 days' general alms-giving from the 7th to the 
18th, and not the special gifts to the ministers and 
other officers, Brahmans and priests. But even when 
all these are taken into account, together with the 
price of the throne and ornaments made for the 
occasion and the cost of feeding the assemblage, the 
total expenditure cannot be put higher than 10 lakhs 
of hun or fifty lakhs of Rupees. 

§8. Loot of Bahadur Khan's camp and extensive 
contest with the Mughals. 

The coronation exhausted Shivaji's treasury and 
he was in need of money to pay his troops. It was. 

1674] Bahadur's camp looted. 253 

therefore, necessary for him to be out on raid 
immediately afterwards. (F. R. Surat, 88, NiccoUs 
to Surat, 14 Oct., 1674.) 

His first movement was against Bahadur Khan. 
As early as May 1674 it was the talk of the Maratha 
Court that Dilir Khan, whom they feared most, having 
been recalled by the Emperor, the Mughal forces in 
the Deccan were commanded by Bahadur Khan 
alone, whom they despised and whose "quarters 
they intended to beat up after the rains." The blow 
was struck much sooner, in the very height of the 
monsoons. Towards the middle of July, a body of 
2,000 Maratha light cavalry, made a false demonstra- 
tion and lured Bahadur Khan some 50 miles away 
from his cantonments at Pedgaon, when Shivaji 
himself with another division, 7000 strong, swooped 
down by another route on his defenceless camp, 
carried away a krore of Rupees in booty and 200 
fine horses collected for presentation to the Emperor, 
and burnt all his tents. (F. R. Surat 88, Oxinden to 
Surat, 21 May ; Vol. 87, Surat to Bombay, 1 Aug., 

The state of war with Bijapur continued, though 
languidly. A general of that State, probably 
Rustam-i-Zaman II., lay with his army on the Ghats 
near Kolhapur (July), ready to descend into Konkan 
and wrest Rajapur from the Marathas. In August, 
September and October Maratha bands spread north- 
wards into the Koli country, giving repeated eianas 
to the port of Surat. But a body of three to four 

254 SHIVAJl. [CH. IX. 

thousand Bhils of Ramnagar held the jungles and 
passes through that State and opposed the Marathas, 
who vainly offered them a bribe of one lakh of 
Rupees for a safe passage (middle of October 1674.)* 

By the end of the month, the baffled Maratha 
army, after provisioning their forts in that region, 
inarched away to join Shiva near Aurangabad, and 
Surat breathed freely again. They had found an 
easier prey in another quarter. Late in October, a 
large army commanded by Shivaji in person crossed 
the Ghats into the Deccan plateau, skirted Bahadur 
Khan's camp, which was "hotly alarmed," looted 
several towns near Aurangabad, and then burst into 
Baglana and Khandesh, where they continued for 
more than a month (Nov. to middle of Dec.) Among 
other places they pillaged and burnt "Dungom" 
(Dharamgaon, 10 m. north of Erandol) and its 
English factory. Qutbuddin Khan Kheshgi bravely 
opposed the raiders, but his small force was routed 
with the loss of 3 to 4 hundred men, and he fled to 
Aurangabad for refuge. (F. R. Surat 87, Surat to 
Bomb. 28 Oct., 1664 ; Vol. 107, Bomb, to Surat 2 
Nov., 1674 ; Dungom to Surat, 10 Dec. ; O. C. 

It was probably on his return from this raid 
that Shiva encamped near Junnar, but a shot from a 
22 feet narrow-bore gun on the walls of Shivner 

* F. R. Surat, 3, Consult. 6 Aug. ; Vol. 87, Surat to Bomb. 
b Aug. and 22 Oct., 1674; O. C. 4062. 


killed a Rajah of his army* "at a distance of four 
miles" and caused the prompt retreat of the Marathas. 
(Fryer, i. 332.) 

At the end of January 1675, a band of 3,000 
Maratha cavalry under Dattaji roved in the Kolhapur 
district. The town of Kolhapur saved itself by pay- 
ing 1 ,500 hun, and Shongaon (near Gargoti, about 
30 miles south of Kolhapur) 500 hun. In the middle 
of February, a Mughal force crossed the Ghats, fell 
on the town of Kalian, burnt the houses (including 
those of many Khojas) and then quickly retired, when 
the Marathas re-occupied the place. (F. R. Surat 88, 
Rajapur to Surat, 6 Feb. ; Vol. 107, Bomb, to Surat, 
27 Feb., 1675.) 

§9. Shivaji's false negotiations with 
Bahadur Khan, 1675. 

Shivaji next opened delusive peace negotiations 
with Bahadur Khan, who eagerly swallowed the bait, 
as he was weary of the war and at his wit's end 
how to guard all parts of his viceroyeilty against such 
a mobile and elusive enemy. For nccurly three 
months (March — May) Shiva kept the Mughals in 
play, by feeding false hopes of a peace. f His real 

* Fryer says that it happened "some four months before" 
22 May, 1675. 

t False overtures of peace with the Mughals in 1675 : 
F. R. Surat 107, Bomb, to Surat, 27 Feb. 1675; O. C. 4077; 
Vol. 88, Surat to Bomb. 15 June and 17 July_ also Letter from 

256 SHIVAJl. [CH. IX. 

motives were to gain respite from Mughal attacks in 
order to provision his forts, to get money out of Adil 
Shah by the threat of an alliance with the Mughals 
for the invasion of Bijapur, and to secure his northern 
frontier during the siege of Ponda. 

It was proposed that Shivaji should cede 17 of 
his forts to Aurangzib and send his son Shambhuji 
vnth a contingent to serve under the Mughal 
subahdar, while the Emperor would create Shambhu 
a commander of 6 thousand horse, and grant Shiva 
all the country on the right bank of the Bhima. The 
negotiations were deliberately spun out. Shiva 
"demurred to sending his son to the Mughal general 
until he had better security for his safety." Bahadur 
Khan reported the terms to the Emperor, who sent 
in reply a farman accepting them and pardoning 
Shiva's past misdeeds. Then the viceroy sent 
messengers to Shivaji to receive the farman and 
deliver the forts. But, by this time (July 1675), Ponda 
had been captured. Shivaji now threw off the mask 
and dismissed the Mughal envoys with taunts, sasang, 
"What pressure have you succeeded in putting on me 
that I should seek peace with you? Go hence 
quickly, or you will be disgraced." 

Bahadur Khan, ashamed at being thus outwitted 
and anxious to cover his foolish credulity and diplo- 
matic defeat by some striking success, hurriedly 

J. Child, 7 August; Dil. 134—135; B. S. 401—2; M. A. 142 
(7 July, 1675.) 


made an agreement with the Bijapuri wazir Khawas 
Khan (October) for a joint war on Shiva. (B. S. 402.) 
Aurangzib approved of the idea, and is said to have 
offered to give up one year's tribute from Bijapur if 
that State heartily co-operated vnth his viceroy in a 
concerted attack on Shiva from two sides. But the 
overthrow of Khawas Khan and the usurpation of 
the regency by Bahlol Khan (1 Ith Nov.) spoiled this 
plan, and soon afterwards the Mughals were drawn 
into the whirlpool of faction-fights at the Adil-Shahi 

Meantime, while the Mughal viceroy was being 
lulled into inactivity by these peace overtures, and 
Shiva was hastening to the siege of Ponda, he 
captured Kolhapur (March) but failed at Raibagh. 
A little later another division of his army ranged far 
eastwards, plundering Bijapur and Golkonda terri- 
tories, especially Yadagiri and two towns near 
Haidarabad, "bringing away a great deal of riches 
besides many rich persons" held to ransom. At the 
same time his men robbed Cucullee and Veruda* 
in the Portuguese territory (middle of April.) The 
other Maratha activities in the latter half of this year 

* F. R. Surat 88, Rajapur to Surat 1 April, Kuwai to 
Surat 22 April, 1675. There is a Khokele, 7 m. e. of Maneri 
in Savant-vadi, but just wutside the present Portuguese 
boundary. Verada may be either Girode or Inridi, 4 or 5 miles 
from Khokele. All these places are overlooked by Suda fort. 
(Ind. At, 41 S. W.) 

258 SHIVAJI. [CH. IX. 

will be described in the chapter on South Konkan 
and Kanara. 

§10. War with the Mughals renewed. 
Union with Bijapur. 

In November, Bahadur Khan, on being sharply 
censured by Aurangzib, marched to Kalian, and 
pressed Shiva hard in North Konkan. In January 
next ( 1 676), a Maratha band spread near Aurangabad, 
but Bahadur with light equipment and no tent, made 
a rapid march from Pedgaon, defeated the rovers 
near Lasur, 28 miles from the capital, and drove them 
back towards Junnar. (O. C. 4139 ; Dil. 140.) 

At this time Shiva was taken severely ill, and 
passed the next three months on the sick-bed at 
Satara. His perfect recovery was announced at the 
end of March. The Marathas looted Athni, 43 m. 
west of Bijapur, in April. The civil war that had 
broken out between the Deccani and Afghan parties 
at Bijapur, was Shivaji's opportunity. Early in May 
we hear of his having sent out "4,000 horse that 
ranges up and down, plunders and robs without any 
hindrance or danger." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 89, Rajapur 
to Surat, 1 1 Jan. and 9 May 1676 ; O. C. 4202.) 

In May, his prime-minister Moro Trimbak drove 
the Rajah of Ramnagar out of his country and took 
Pindol* and Painecah within three days' march of 

* Pindval, 11 m. s. e. of Dhareonpur, in the Dharampur 
State, south of Surat. Painecah is probably either Panva, 5 m. 
w. of Pindval, or Panaj, 9 m. «. of Dharampur. (Ind. At., 
24 N. E.) 


Surat. But the monsoons being at hand, he left 4,000 
men to garrison the district and retired with the rest 
of his army to Raigarh at the end of the month. 
(F. R. 89, Surat to Bomb., 27 May and 1 June 1676.) 

On 31st May Bahadur Khan opened a vigorous 
and long campaign against Bijapur, where the Afghan 
faction had seized the Government. The Conse- 
quence was to drive the new regent Bahlol Khan into 
the arms of Shiva, and in July we have the report of 
a peace between the two having been concluded 
through the mediation of the Golkonda minister 
Madanna. The terms of this treaty were that the 
Adil-Shahi Government would pay Shiva 3 lakfis of 
Rupees down as a gift and one lakfi of hun annually 
as subsidy for protection against the Mughals, and 
confirm him in the possession of the country bounded 
on the east by the Krishna, including the Kolhapur 
district. But the union was short-lived, as no policy 
could be durable in a State ravaged by civil war and 
subject to almost daily changes of authority. Shivaji 
hardly minded the rupture of this subsidiary alliance; 
his eyes were fixed elsewhere ; and at the end of 
this year (1676), he set out on the greatest expedition 
of his life, the invasion of the Karnatak. (B. S. 
405-414 ; F. R. Surat 89, Rajapur to Surat. 
24 July 1676.) 

South Konkan and Kanaka. 

§ I . Kanara, its rulers and trade. 

In the seventeenth century, Kanara, the extensive 
country along our west coast, was held by various 
Hindu chieftains. North Kanara (now included in 
the Bombay Presidency) owned the overlordship of 
Bijapur, which ruled directly over the coast-strip 
from Karwar (south of Goa) to Mirjan (14-30 N. Lat.), 
leaving the inland districts in the hands of feudatory 
chiefs, among whom the Nayaks of Sunda were the 
most important. The portion of Kanara that lay 
south of Mirjan formed a large and independent 
principality under the Keladi dynasty, whose capital 
was then at Bednur. 

A Muslim officer with the hereditary title of 
Rustam-i-Zaman (originally Randaula Khan) was the 
viceroy of the south-western corner of the Bijapur 
kingdom. His charge extended on the west coast 
from Ratnagiri town, going southwards round the 
Portuguese territory of Goa to Karwar and Mirjan, 
while landwards it included the southern part of the 
Ratnagiri district, Kolhapur, Belgaum, a bit of 
Dharwar and the western corner of the North Kanara 
district. His seat was at Miraj. The fort of Panhala 
lay within his province, but it was governed by a 


commandant directly under the orders of the Sultan. 
The viceroy administered by means of his agents the 
flourishing ports of Rajapur in the north and Karwar 
in the south, through which the trade of the rich 
inland places flowed to Europe. In both towns the 
English had factories. 

"The best pepper in the world is of the growth 
of Sunda, known in England by [the name of] Karwar 
pepper, though five days' journey distant from 
thence." (Fryer, ii. 42.) Indeed, after the loss of 
Chaul, Karwar became the greatest port of Bijapur 
on the west coast. "The finest muslins of western 
India were exported from here. The weaving 
country was inland, to the east of the Sahyadris, at 
Hubli (in the Dharwar district), and at other centres, 
where the English East India Company had agents 
and employed as many as 50,000 weavers." (Bom. 
Gaz., XV., Pt. ii, pp. 123-125.) 

At Mirjan, a port twenty miles south-east of 
Karwar, pepper, saltpetre and betel-nut were shipped 
for Surat. Gersappa, a district annexed by Bednur, 
was so famous for its pepper that the Portuguese 
used to call its Rani "the Pepper Queen." (Ibid, 
333 and 124.) 

In 1649 the pepper and cardamom trade of 
Rajapur was the chief attraction that induced the 
English Company to open a factory there. Vingurla 
was spoken of in 1660 as a great place of call for 
ships from Batavia, Japan and Ceylon on the one side, 
and the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea on the other. 

262 SHIVAJI. [CH. X. 

All the ports of the Ratnagiri district did much trade 
also in calicoes, silks, grain and coarse lac, thoughr 
pepper was their chief export, "which coming out 
of Kanara is sent by sea to Persia, Surat and Europe^ 
This country is the storehouse for all its neighbours." 
(Bom. Gaz., X. 175.) 

§2. Shivaji's conflict with the English at RajapuT, 

After the disastrous f£iilure of Afzal Khan,. 
Rustam-i-Zaman had marched against Shivaji 
(October, 1659) with 3,000 horse, but this show of 
hostility was made simply to save his credit with his 
king. The queen-regent, Ban Sahiba, being his 
enemy, he had made a secret alliance with Shivaji 
for self -protection. This fact was well-known to the 
country around, and even the English factors had 
heard of it. But even if Rustam had been in earnest, 
he could have done little with his small army. 

Shivaji had followed up his victory over Afzal's 
army by pushing on to Panhala and capturing that 
fort. Tlien he entered the Ratnagiri district and 
began to "take possession of all the port and inland 
towns." The Bijapuri governors of these places fled 
to Rajapur, which was at first spared, "because it 
belonged to Rustam-i-Zaman, who is a friend of 
Shivaji." (Rajapur to Surat, 1 0th October 1659, F. R. 

On the fall of Dabhol, its defeated governor 
made his escape to Rajapur with three junks of 


Afzal Khan, of 450, 350 and 300 tons burden res- 
pectively. The magistrate of Rajapur, by order of 
his master Rustam-i-Zaman, received the junks and 
landed their cargoes. In the meantime Shivaji had 
encountered and routed near Panhala, the^ combined 
armies of Rustam and Fazl Khan (the son of Afzal.) 
The latter, who bore the brunt of the battle, lost many 
of his followers, while Rustam, who had made a 
mere show of fighting, retreated to Hukri with slight 
loss, (end of January 1660), and there sat still, while 
the Marathas continued to make their incursions in 
Adil-Shahi territory. (Rajapur to Bassein, 4 February 
1660, F. R. Rajapur.) 

The news of this battle greatly alarmed Rustam's 
agent at Rajapur, who tried to escape to the open 
sea in one of the junks eurived from Dabhol. From 
this incident sprang the first collision between the 
Ejiglish and the Marathas, but its real cause was not 
any hindrance offered by Shivaji to the legitimate 
trade of the East India Company or its servants. 
It was solely due to the greed and crooked deeding 
of one of the Company's officers, Mr. Henry 
Revington, the chief of the Rajapur factory. An 
Indian broker employed by him had lent some money 
to Rustam-i-Zaman and taken a bill for it, falsely in 
the Company's name as creditor. When the governor 
was trying to run away from the town, the broker 
influenced Mr. Revington to assist him in getting his 
money back. Mr. Revington sent an English ship, the 
Diamond, to stop the junk occupied by the governor 

264 SHIVAJI. [CH. X. 

and make him pay what he was pleased to represent 
as "monies due to the Company." A pzut of the 
amount was immediately paid in goods. But just 
then Shivaji's horsemen appeared on the bank to 
seize the junks of Afzal Khan and called upon the 
English to give up the one in which the governor 
was. The English declined, and the governor gladly 
seized this device for escaping capture by the 
Marathas and urged the English "to take possession 
of two of these junks and own them." Mr. 
Revington took one of the vessels over, renamed 
it the Rajapur Merchant, and placed it under an 
English captain. 

In a parley with Doroji, the Maratha general, the 
English refused to give up the goods in the junk 
unless he gave them an order on the revenue of the 
town for the money claimed by them. The largest 
junk, which had not been taken over by the English, 
weighed anchor and fell down the creek to beyond 
the range of the Maratha guns, after firing on Shiva's 
men on both banks. At this disappointment, the 
Marathas seized the English brokers, Baghji and Balji, 
at Jaitapur (at the mouth of the creek, 1 1 miles west 
of Rajapur), on the ground that "the English would 
not take the junk for them, but let her go." (Ibid ; 
also Surat Council to Company, 6 April 1660, F. R. 
Surat, Vol. 85.) 

Mr. Philip Gyffard was sent to the Maratha 
camp to demand the release of the brokers, but they 
seized him too, and carried away the three prisoners 


to Kharepatan fort that night, threatening to detain 
them unless the English capttited the junks for the 
Marathas and delivered to them the goods they had 
taken on the governor's junk (18th January 1660.) 

On 13th February, Revington wrote a letter to 
Shivaji promising him the friendly help of the 
English in an attack on Danda-Rajpuri, and soliciting 
an order for the release of the two captives as they 
had been seized only because the English "would 
not take the junks lying in Rajapur river and be 
enemies to those who are our friends." But before 
this the broker had already appealed to Shivaji and 
Rustam-i-Zaman, and orders had come from them for 
the release of the two. Balji was immediately set 
free, "but Mr. Gyffard was kept by a rogue Brahman 
in Kharepatan castle, out of lucre and expectation of 
a bribe." Mr. Revington protested against it to 
Shiva and Rustam. (Rajapur to Surat, 15 February 

Shivaji condemned the attack on his ally's town 
of Rajapur, dismissed Doroji, the general responsible 
for it, "commanded all things that his soldiers took 
from the townsmen [at Rajapur] to be restored," 
and put Rustam-i-Zaman's agents again in posses- 
sion of the town and port. (Ibid, 20 February.) 

Before any reply could come from Shivaji, Mr. 

Revington, learning that the Maratha governor of 

Kharepatan was sending Mr. Gyffard away to Satavli 

(9 miles north-west of Rajapur) or to Khelna fort, 

despatched a party of 30 soldiers, who waylaid the 

266 SHIVA JI. [CH. X. 

Maratha escort in a town 10 miles from Rajapur 
and rescued Mr. Gyffard by force. {Ibid, 23 

The Dutch report states that about this time 
Shiva with his troops arrived within four days' march 
of Vingurla, but was driven off by the desai of Kudal 
{i.e., Savant-vadi), while another Maratha army which 
had penetrated to near Bijapur was forced to with- 
draw after being defeated in a bloody battle by the 
combined Bijapur and Golkonda troops (late M£irch 
or early April 1660.) {Dutch Records, Trans., Vol. 
24, No. 664 and Vol. 23, No. 651.) 

The second Maratha attack on the English took 
place at the end of the same year, and here the 
Englishmen were clearly in the wrong, though the 
Company's official attitude was correct and neutral. 

In June 1660, while Siddi Jauhar, acting on 
behalf of the Bijapur Government, was investing 
Shivaji in Panhala fort, the former purchased from 
the English at Rajapur some grenades "which un- 
doubtedly will be the chiefest disturbers of the 
besieged." Some Englishmen of Rajapur were also 
bribed to go to the Bijapuri camp outside Panhala 
and help in the bombardment of the fort, by "tossing 
balls with a flag that was known to be the English's." 

Shivaji punished this breach of neutrality in 
December next, when he surprised Rajapur, 
plundered the English factory, and ceirried off four of 
the factors, — Henry Revington, Richard Taylor, 
Randolph Taylor, and Philip Gyffard, — as prisoners. 


first to Waisati, then to Songarh (a fort 3 miles n. w. 
of Mahad in the Kolaba district), and finally to Rai- 
garh. They were released after more than three 
years of captivity, about 5th February, 1663, (Orme 
MSS., Vol. 155, pp. 1-21.) 

In March 1663, Rustam-i-Zaman did another 
friendly turn to Shivaji. Netaji Palkar, Shiva's 
"lieutenant-general," had raided the imperial terri- 
tory, but a large Mughal division of 7,000 cavalry 
pursued him so close as to force him to march 45 or 
50 miles a day. Rustam met this Etrmy near Bijapur 
and persuaded the Mughal commander to give up the 
chase as "that country was dangerous for any strange 
army to march in, likewise promising them to go him- 
self and follow him, by which deceit Netaji got 
escaped, though not without the loss of 300 horse 
and himself wounded." ' (Gyffard to Surat, 30th 
March and 8th April 1663, F. R. Surat 103.) This 
reverse defeated Shivaji's plan of raiding North 
Kanara and penetrating to the rich port of Karwar. 
(F. R. Surat, Vol. 2, 9th October.) 

On 1st March 1663, Ali Adil Shah II., with all 
his Court, left his capital for Bankapur.* There they 

* F. R. Surat, Vol. 103, Gyffard to Surat, 20th July 1663. 
A letter from him to Suiat, 30th March, says that the Adil- 
Shahi Court went there in fear of the Mughals who had 
come within five leagues of Bijapur in pursuit of Netaji. 
But Tarikh-i-Ali II., 160-164, (also B. 5. 366) says that Ali 
went to Bankapur to direct the operations against the Rajah 
of Bednur in person. 

268 SHIVAJl. [CH. X. 

were at first denied entrance by the mother of Abdur 
Rahim Bahlol Khan, in whose fief it lay. But the 
gates were soon opened to the king. Adil Shah 
summoned Bahlol Khan, Shahji and other officers 
from the Karnatak, who came by forced marches and 
waited on the king on the bank of the Warda (an 
affluent of the Tungabhadra.) Bahlol and Shahji 
were at once arrested and placed in chains (end of 
June 1663), but Shahji was released in two days, 
though he continued to be deprived of his command 
tot some time. The Bijapuri invasion of Kanara 
had already begun. (F. R. Surat 103, Gyffardto 
Sural, 8th April and 20th July 1663.) 

§3. Maratha conquest of South Konkan, 1663. 

Shivappa Nayak*, who governed Bednur for 
forty-five years (1618-1663), first as regent and then 
as king, had extended his kingdom on all sides by 
his conquests and stretched his sway over the whole 
of South Kanara, the north-western comer of Mysore, 
and North Kanara up to the Gangavati river, includ- 
ing the fort of Mirjan. At the close of his life his 

* In the Persian histories of Bijapur he is called 
Bhadrappa, from Bhadraiya, the original nsone of the founder 
of the dynasty. He is there styled the Rajcih of Malnad, 
which is a Kanarese word meaning "hill country." {Mysore 
Gazetteer, ii. 286.) The Bombay Gazetteer xv, Part ii, p. 122, 
places his death in 1670. But the English factory records 
prove that he died at the close of 1663. (Surat, Vol. 104, 
Karwar to Surat, 18th April 1664.) 


ambition brought him into collision with Bijapur. 
He had conquered Sunda and some other forts 
belonging to vassals of Adil Shah and had thus come 
dangerously close to Bankapur, the fortress of asylum 
of the Bijapuri Sultans in the south-western comer of 
their kingdom. {Bom. Gaz., xv, Pt. ii, pp. 122-123.) 

Ali Adil Shah's campaign against the Bednur 
Rajah was short but vigorous and an unbroken 
success. Shivappa Nayak could make no stand 
against the combined resources of the entire Bijapur 
kingdom ; he lost Sunda, Bednur and many other 
forts, and was forced to make peace by restoring 
Sunda to its former chief and promising an indemnity 
of 7 lakhs of hun to Adil Shah. On 21st November 
the victorious Ali 11. returned to his capital. {B.S. 
368-370 ; F. R. Surat 103, Karwar to Surat, 28th 
January and 27th February, also Gyffard to Surat, 
20th July 1663.) 

We now turn to the activities of Shivaji in this 
region. While Ali was engaged in the struggle with 
Bednur, Shivaji had been active in South Konkan 
and in the north-western part of the Kanara district'. 
By way of Kolhapur and Kudal, he marched to 
Vingurla (May 1663) ; "all the way, as he goes along, 
he gives his qaul (assurance), promising them that 
neither he nor his soldiers shall in the least do any 
wrong to anybody that takes his qaul, which promise 
he hitherto hath kept." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 103, 
Gyffard to Surat, 24th May, !663.) 

His going down the coast caused such alarm 

270 SHIVAJl. [CH. X. 

that "all the Muhammadan governors as fsa as 
Singclay and Dutchole were fled," and in conse- 
quence the petty robbers on the route became more 
active than usual. In June Shivaji returned from 
Vingurla after leaving a garrison of 2,000 soldiers 
there. Shortly before this Shaista Khan had 
defeated a Maratha army, killing more than 200 men. 
(Ibid, Gyffard to Surat, 24th May and 22nd June 

In July the Bijapur Government ordered the 
governor of Ponda to join forces with the Savant of 
Vadi and other petty Rajahs and try to drive Shivaji's 
men out of Rajapur and Kharepatan. But nothing 
was done, as "there was juggling between them, and 
he remained possessed of all." (Ibid, 20th July 1663, 
Vol. 86, Surat to Co., 20th November 1663.) 

In punishment of Rustam-i-Zaman's secret 
friendship w^ith Shiva, the Sultan dismissed him from 
his viceroyalty and gave the province to Muhammad 
Ikhlas Khan, the eldest son of the late Khan-i-Khanan 
Ikhlas Khan and a brother of Khawas Khan, w^hile 
Dabhol and Chiplun were given to Fazl Khan. 
Shivaji got possession of Rajapur at this time and 
kept it permanently in his own hands. (Ibid.) 

Rustam's agent at Karwar fleeced the English 
factors there so severely that in July 1663 they were 
ordered by the Council at Surat to remove them- 
selves and the Company's goods quietly to Hubli. 
Adil Shah and Rustam-i.Zaman alike were sensible 
of the loss of revenue caused by such molestation of 


traders, and therefore the king sent them a farman 
promising that they would be left in peace at Karwar 
and would have to pay no other duties than they 
liad formerly done. Then the factory was re- 
established at Karwar. (F. R. Surat, Vol. 2, Gjnsult., 
14th August 1663.) 

§4. Shioaji in Kanara, 1664. 

In 1664 the war with Bednur was renewed. 
Shivappa Nayak, evidently an old man, died soon 
after his defeat by the Bijapuris in 1663. His son 
and successor, Soma Shekhar, was murdered by his 
Brahmans, and an infant grandson named Basava 
was set up on the throne under the regency of his 
mother Chennammaji and her favourite Timmaya 
-Nayak, a toddy-seller, who "by his cunning policy 
raised himself to be general and protector" of the 
realm. At this revolution Ali Adil Shah II. was so 
incensed that he sent his generals, Bahlol Khan and 
Sayyid Iliyas Sharza Khan, to invade Bednur from 
two sides (April 1664.) [F. R. Surat 104, Karwar to 
Surat, 18th April 1664. Fryer, i. 41-42.] 

By this time Rustam-i-Zaman seems to have 
returned to favour at Court. Muhammad Ikhlas 
Khan was transferred from the Government of 
Keirwar and his friends from that of Ankola, 
Shiveshwar (or Halekot), Kadra and other places 
in North Kanara and these tracts were given to three 
of Rustam's sons. In Augjust Rustam himself was 
ordered to go to that region with two other Bijapuri 

272 SHIVAJI. [CH. X. 

genercJs and try to expel Shivaji. He reached Kudal 
at the end of Augtust, but did nothing. (F. R. Surat, 
104, Karwar 23rd July and Hubli 28th August, 1664.) 
Any serious attack by Adil Shah on Shivaji was 
now rendered impossible as the Sultan's attention 
was diverted to Bednur, whither he wanted to march 
in person with 12,000 horse after the Dewali festival 
(October) and co-operate with Sharza Khan in 
crushing the Kanara Rajah. Throughout the second 
half of 1664 the coast region was in an unhappy 
condition. As the English merchants write, "Deccan 
and all the south coasts are all embroiled in civil 
wars, king against king and country against country, 
and Shivaji reigns victoriously and uncontrolled, that 
he is a terror to all the kings and princes round about, 
daily increasing in strength. He hath now fitted up 
four more vessels and sent them down to Bhatkal 
and thereabouts, whilst he intends to meet them 

overland with a flying army of horse The news 

of him at present are that he is intercepted in his 
journey down to his fleet by a party of this king's 
army and fought, where between them six thousand 
men were sleun, himself worsted* and forced to fly 

* It is evidendy this battle that is referred to in the 
Basatin-i-Salatin, 373-375 : "Aurangzib sent £in envoy to Adil 
Shah to beg his co-operation with Jai Singh in the war with 
Shiva. Before Jai Singh arrived, Adil Shah sent an army 
under Khawas Khan. Shiva hearing of it began to close the 
mountain passes (ghaU), but Khawas. by making rapid 
marches, crossed the ghat in safety and descended [into 


to a castle [not named] where this army following 
in pursuit hath very strictly girt him in that he cannot 
stir." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 86, Surat to Co., 26th 
November 1664.) And again (on 12th March 1665)^ 
"The subjects [of Adil Shah] unanimously cry out 
against him for suffering Shivaji to forage to and 
fro, burning and robbing his country without any 
opposition, wherefore it is certainly concluded by- 
all that he shares with the said rebel in all his rapines,, 
so that the whole country is in a confused condition, 
merchants flying from one place to another to pre- 
serve themselves, so that all trade is lost... The rebel 
Shivaji hath committed many notorious and great 
robberies since that of Surat, and hath possessed him- 
self of the most considerable ports belonging to> 
Deccan [i.e., Bijapur]to the number of eight or nine,, 
from whence he sets out two or three or more 

Konkan>] While the negligent Khawas Khan did not even 
know of Shiva's position, the latter with his full force surpriaed 
him and completely hemmed him round in an intricate hilly 
place, where the Bijapuri army had not space enough to move 
about or even to marshal the ranks. Khawas csilled his 
officers together and heartened them in the midst of their 
despair. The Marathas opened fire ; the Bijapuris advanced 
to close quarters and fought a severe battle, losing Siddi 
Sarwar (the Abyssinian general). Shah Hazrat, Shsiikh Miran 
and some other officers. The defeat of the Muslims seemed 
imminent, when Khawas Khan charged sword in hand; Jiis; 
troops followed him fearlessly in one body, and Shivaji was 
defeated and put to flight." 

274 SHIVAJI. [CH. X. 

trading vessels yearly from every port to Persia, 
Basra, Mocha, etc." 

Early in December 1664 Shivaji looted Hubli 
and many other rich towns of that region, holding 
several eminent merchants prisoners for ransom. He 
had sent only three hundred horsemen to Hubli, but 
these did their work so thoroughly that the town "was 
little better than spoiled." The merchants who had 
fled at the attack were too frightened to return there 
soon, even after the departure of the Marathas. The 
raiders were said to have been assisted by some of 
Rustam's soldiers ; that noble, as the English remark- 
ed, had "begun to taste the sweetness of plunder 
[so] that in a short time he would get a habit of it. 
Soon etfterwards, Shivaji plundered Vingurla, an 
important sea-port and trade centre, from which he 
carried away vast riches. "Shiva and his scouts 
range all over the country, making havoc wherever 
he comes, with fire and sword." (F. R. Surat 104, 
Karwar to Surat, 6th January 1665, Taylor to Surat, 
14th December 1664 ; Vol. 86, Surat to Karwar, 23rd 
March, Surat to Co., 2nd January 1665.) 

§5. Loot oj Basrur and blackmail 
from Karwar, 1665. 

At the beginning of February 1665 Shivaji left 
Malvan with a fleet of 85 frigates and three large 
ships, sailed past Goa to Basrur, which he plundered, 
and landed at the holy city of Gokeirna, on the coast, 
22 miles south of Karwar, to take peut in the holy 


bath festival before the great temple of Mahabalesh- 
war on Shivaratri day (5th February.) He next 
marched to Ankola (nine miles northweirds) with 
4,000 infantry, sending all his fleet back, with the 
exception of twelve frigates, which he detained for 
transporting his army over the rivers on his way back 
to North Konkan. On the 22nd he came to Karwar. 
The English factors, having got early news of his 
coming from the spies they had sent out, put all 
the Company's ready money and portable goods on 
board a small hundred-ton ship belonging to the 
Imam of Maskat, then Isdng in the river, its capt2un 
Emanuel Donnavado promising to defend it as long 
as he lived or his vessel kept floating. The factors 
■themselves took refuge in the ship. Sher Khan,* 
■a. son of the late Khan-i.Khanan Ikhlas Khan £ind 
a subordinate of Bahlol Khan, arrived in the town 
that very night, without knowing anything about 
Shivaji's approach. With the help of his escort of 
500 men he quickly fortified himself as well as he 
could to protect the goods he had brought down, 
and sent a messenger to Shiva in the night, warning 
him not to enter the town as he woiild resist him to 
the utmost. Sher Khan was famous throughout the 
country for his valour and ruling capacity, and his 
chief, Bahlol Khan, was "one of the potentest men 
in the kingdom of Bijapur." Shivaji, therefore, 

* The cause of his coming to Karwar was to charter a 
ship oi Rustam-i-Zaman's to convey Bahlol Khan's mother ta 

276 SHIVAJI. [CH. x„ 

shrank from provoking him, and after much discussion 
"condescended to go a little out of the way, and so 
came and encamped with his army at the mouth of 
the river" Kalanadi, sparing the town. 

From this place he sent an envoy to Sher Khan, 
asking him either to deliver the English merchants 
up to him or, retiring himself, permit him to revenge 
himself on them, "whom he styled his inveterate 
enemies." Sher Khem sent this news to the English 
and desired to know their final answer, which was 
that they had nothing on board except powder and 
bullets which Shivaji might come and fetch if he 
thought they would serve him instead of gold. 
"This our answer being sent to Shivaji did so ex- 
asperate him that he said he would have us before 
he departed, which the governor of the town hear- 
ing, they persuaded all the merchants to agree to 
send him [Shivaji] a present lest he should receJl 
his fleet, which lay on this side of Salsette." (F. R. 
Surat, Vol. 104, Karwar to Surat, 14th March, 1665.) 
To this blackmail the English contributed £112, so 
as not to endanger the Company's prc^erty in Kar- 
war, worth 8,000 hun. "With this Shivaji depsirted 
on 23rd February, very unwillingly, saying that Sher 
Khan had spoiled his hunting at the Holt, ■which is a 
time he generally attempts some such design." * 

* Shivaji's loot of Basrur and visit to Karwar : F. R. 
Surat, Vol. 104, Karwar to Surat, 28th January and 14th 
March 1665. Sabh. 70-71; Chit. 69-70. 


Thence the disappointed Maratha chief returned 
to Vingurla (eariy in March.) But soon afterwards 
Jai Singh's siege of Purandar and vigorous invasion 
of the neighbouring country called away Shivaji to 
the defence of his home, and Kanara enjoyed peace 
for some time. 

§6. Bijapuris recover and lose S. Konkan, 1665. 
By the treaty of Purandar (1 3th June 1665) the 
Mughals left Shivaji free to annex AdU-Shahi Konkan. 
The affairs of Bijapur also fell into confusion at this 
time. Bahlol Khan died (June or July.) He had 
come to Bijapur from the Karnatak war at the king's 
call, but died of illness only eight days after 'his 
arrival. The Sultan being jealous of his large force, 
10,000 brave Afghans, tried to sow dissension 
between his two sons and nephew. Sher Khan, a 
brave, able and upright man, kept them at peace. 
But he was soon afterwards poisoned, it was suspect- 
ed, by Adil Shah, and immediately bitter quarrels 
broke out between the two sons of Bahlol Khan, 
which the Sultan fanned and utilized to seize some 
of their jagirs. The affairs of the royal drunkard at 
Bijapur passed from bad to worse. (F. R. Ibid, 
Karwar to Surat, 29th August 1665.) 

The Bijapuri governor of Hubli fell into disfavour 

Basrur is four miles east of Coondapur in the South 
KanEira District, also known as Barcdore. "The principal 
port of the Bednore Rajsihs," S. Canara Gazetteer, ii. 242. 
The Marathi hakhars spell the name as Basnur or Hasntir. 

278 SHIVAJI. [CH. X- 

at Court and the governor of Mirjan rebelled. 
Muhammad Khan attacked that fort (August 1665.)' 
He had recovered Dabhol and many other places in 
South Konkan from the Marathas, while the latter 
were busy fighting Jai Singh. But by November next 
Shivaji, now an ally of the Mughals, had reconquered 
all that country after slaying 2,000 soldiers of 
Muhammad Ikhlas, including several men of note. 
The Khan fell back on Kudal and waited for Sharza 
Khan to reinforce him. But no such aid came, as 
Jai Singh began his invasion of Bijapur that very 
month and Ikhlas Khan had to hasten from Kudal 
to the defence of the capital. But Vingurla and 
Kudal continued in Bijapuri hands, while Shivaji held 
Rajapur and Kharepatan (or Gharapur?) The 
country about Karwar was at this time subjected to 
constant pillage by the soldiers of Shivaji *s garrison 
there, who used to leave their forts and roam about 
in a band of 200 men up ' and down the country, 
plundering the small towns. Murtaza Beg, who had 
lost his fort, also took to plunder with his retcdners. 
(Ibid, 29th August, 21st September and 29th Novem- 
ber 1665 and 1 5th January 1666.) 

§7. Shioaji and Rustam, 1666. 

In the course of Jai Singh's war with Bijapur, 
Shivaji had been detached against Panhala. His 
assault on that fort (16th January 1666) failed and 
then he went off to Khelna. From this place he sent 
2,000 men under a Muhammadan officer to besiege 


Ponda.* The garrison resisted for two months 
(February and March) killing 500 Marathas, and finally 
agreed to surrender in six hours. In the meantime, 
the Bijapuri Government had sent 5,000 horse and 
1 ,000 foot under Siddi Masaud, Abdul Aziz (the son 
of Siddi Jauhar) and Rustam-i-Zaman to the Panhala 
region. They formed a plan for surprising Shivaji, 
who lay on the top of the hill overlooking Konkan. 
When their Van, under Rustam, approached, he 
beat his drums and sounded his trumpets and thus 
gave his friend Shivaji timely warning to escape. 
But Masaud chased the Marathas with 600 chosen 
cavalry and cut off 200 of the enemy. On the way 
back he intercepted Shivaji's friendly letters to 
Rustam, which he immediately sent to Bijapur. At 
this Adil Shah wrote to Rustam that though he re- 
luctantly pardoned this act of disloyalty, he would 
dismiss him unless he raised the siege of Ponda! 
Rustam then wrote to his agent Muhammad Khan 
to save Ponda by all means. This was effected by a 
stratagem. Muhammad Khan could get together 
only a small force, with which he went and sat down 

* First siege of Ponda : F. R. Suiat 104, "Deccan News," 
following a letter from Karwar, dated 24th April 1666. Ponda, 
10 m. s. s. e. of Goa citjr, was the westernmost frontier- 
fortress of Bijapur nearest to Goa, and a menace to the latter. 
The Portuguese, after some previous failures, annexed it in 
the 18th century. It is quite different from Phonda, in the 
Ratnagiri district, 33 m. n. of Savant-vadi, — though the two 
places are spelt alike in the vernacular. 

280 SHIVAJI. [CH. X. 

in a town of his master's about three miles from 
Ponda, and sent word to the general of Shivaji that 
he had only come to look after his own country. 
The general suspected no stratagem, as his master 
and Rustam were friends. He went with his Muslim 
soldiery to a hill a mile off in order to say his prayers 
in public. Muhammad Khan seized this opportunity ; 
he surprised and routed the soldiers left in the siege- 
camp, and after a long and w^ell contested fight de- 
feated the rest of the Maratha army who had hurried 
back from the hill. Thus the siege of Ponda was 
raised after the poor men in it had been driven to 
eat leaves for the last three days. "This business, 
it is generally thought, hath quite broken the long 
continued friendship between Rustam-i.Zaman and 
Shivaji. Rustam hath taken now Ponda, Kudal, 
Banda, Suncle and Duchole, five towns of note, from 

§8. Plot to seize Goa, 1668. 
Soon afterwards, at the end of March 1666, 
Shivaji went to the Mughal Court. For the next 
four years he gave no trouble to Bijapuri Konkan or 
Kanara, his opponents during this interval being the 
Portuguese and the Siddis. The Ejiglish merchants 

* Kudal and Banda are well-known towns, 12 m. ji. w. 
and 7 m. a- of Savemt-vadi town. Suncle or Singclay is 
Sankulli, 8 m. c. of Goa, and Duchole is a mistake for 
Bicholim, 7 m. ii. c. of Goa town. The leiat two are now 
in Portuguese territory. {Ind. At., 41 N. W. and S. W.) 

1668] shiva's plot to surprise goa. 281 

of Karwar repeatedly speak of Shiva in 1668 and 
1669 as being "very quiet" and "keeping still at 
Rajgarh, ' ' and of his credit as decreasing during these 
years of inactivity, while the "country all about was 
in great tranquillity." (f. R. Sural, 105,) Late in 
October 1668 Shivaji made an unsuccessful attempt 
to conquer the territory of Goa by stratagem. He 
smuggled into the towns of this State 400 to 500 of 
his soldiers in small parties at different times and 
under various disguises, hoping that when their 
number was doubled they would suddenly rise one 
.night, seize one of the passes, and admit him before 
the Portuguese could raise a sufEciently lairge army 
for their defence. But either the plot leaked out, 
or the Portuguese Viceroy's suspicion was roused. 
He made a narrow search in all his towns, arrested 
the 400 or 500 men of Shivaji at various places, and 
evidently extorted the truth from them. Then he 
sent for Shivaji's ambassador, with his own hand 
gave him two or three cufis in the ear, and turned 
iiim and the Maratha prisoners out of his territory. 
On hearing of it Shivaji assembled an army of 10,000 
foot and 1 ,000 horse, threatening to lead them against 
Goa in person. From the north of Rajapur he 
marched to Ving^urla, inspected all his forts in that 
quarter, "changing their men and putting in (fresh) 
provisions and ammunition," and then in December 
returned to Rajgarh as he found "the Portuguese well 
prepared to give him a hot reception." (Gyffard to 

282 SHIVAJI. [CH. X. 

Surat, 12th November and 16th December, 1668. 
F. R. Surat 105.) 

At the beginning of 1670 came his rupture with 
the Mughals, which kept him busy in other quarters 
and prolonged the peace in Kanara till the close of 
1672, when, taking advantage of the death of Ali II., 
he renewed his depredations in Bijapur territory. 

Meantime, in September 1671, Rustam-i-Zaman 
had broken out in rebellion against his master. He 
had at last been deprived of his viceroyalty and 
jagir for his treacherous intimacy with Shiva, the 
crowning act of which w^as the surrender of one of 
the king's forts to the Marathas. And now he took 
up arms in the hope of intimidating the Government 
to reinstate him. With the underhand help of Shivaji, 
he occupied Bijapuri territory, yielding three lal^hs 
of hurt a year, and plundered and burnt Raibagh, 
completing the ruin of that port, previously sacked 
by the Marathas. But within a month the royal 
troops crushed the rebellion, — the forts of Mirjan 
and Ankola alone holding out for several months 
more. By the middle of 1672 Muzaffar Khan, the 
new Adil-Shahi viceroy of the Kanara coast, had 
made peace with the rebel chiefs (Nayak.Waris) of 
Shiveshwar and Kadra.* 

§9. Shivaji's failure in Bijapuri Kanara, 1673. 

The death of Ali Adil Shah II. (on 24th November 

*F. R. Sural 106, Kanvar to Surat, 20th September, 3Ist 
October 1671, 26th June 1672. 

1673] SACK OF HUBLI. 283 

1672) was followed by the rebellion of the Rajahs 
of Sunda and Bednur, who invaded the Bijapur terri- 
tory across their frontiers. An army under Muzaffar 
Khan chastised them (February, 1673) and wrested 
Sunda from its Rajah. (F. R. Surat, 106, Karwar to 
Co., 17th February 1673.) 

This rebellion had been hardly suppressed when 
the Marathas made their second incursion into the 
upland of Bijapuri Kanara, sacking many forts and 
rich cities in that region. Their general Pratap Rao 
raided Hubli,* the most important inland mart of the 
province, causing a loss of 7,894 hun to the English 
Company alone, besides the private property of the 
factors (May 1673.) The Company's house was the 
first they entered and dug up, carrying away all the 
broad-cloth in it to their general who sat in the bazar. 
Muzaffar Khan, however, promptly came to the scene 
■with 5,000 cavalry and saved the town from total 
destruction. The Marathas fled precipitately with 
what booty they had already packed up, "leaving 

* The commercieJ importance of Hubli can be Judged from 
the following remaiks of the English merchants : — Hubli, 
the mart of our Karwar factory, where we sell and buy most 
of the goods that port affords us." (F. R. Surat 87, 1st 
November 1673.) "Hubli, a great inroad [=inland] town and 
a mart of very considerable trade." (O. C. 3779.) Maratha 
invasion of Kanara in 1673 : F. R. Surat 3, Consult. 24th May, 
10th and 19th July, Vol. 87, Surat to Persia, 1st November. 
O. C. 3779 and 3800. Sabhasad, 70, has only eight lines for 
the events of 1673-75; Chit., 70 (nine lines only; vague, may- 
refer to 1673 or 1675.) 

284 SHIVAJl. [CH. X. 

several goods out in the streets which they had not 
time to carry away." When the English at Surat 
complained to Shiva about the outrage, he denied 
that it was done by his soldiers. 

At Hubli, Muzaffar missed the Maratha raiders 
by just one day. He was probably suspected of 
having entered into a secret understanding with them, 
like Rustam-i-Zaman, for immediately afterwards all 
the nobles under his command and most of his own 
soldiers, forsook him and the Bijapur Government 
removed him from his viceroyalty. This drove him 
into rebellion and he tried force to retain possession 
of his fiefs. The great fort of Belgaum remained in 
his hands and also many strong places between Goa 
and Kanara (June, 1673.) Adil Shah sent a large army 
to reduce Belgaum in case Muzaffar declined the 
compromise offered to him. 

In June Bahlol Khan with a large Bijapuri army 
held Kolhapur and defeated the Marathas in several 
encounters, forcing all their roving bands to leave the 
Karwar country. He also talked of invading South 
Konkan and recovering Rajapur and other towns next 
autumn. In August he is still spoken of as "pressing 
hard upon Shivaji, who supplicates for peace, being 
fearful of his own condition." But soon afterwards 
Bahlol Khan, his irreconcilable enemy, fell ill at Miraj 
and Shivaji's help was solicited by the Bijapur and 
Golkonda Governments to defend them from a 
threatened Mughal invasion under Beihadur Khan 
(September.) Shivaji's gains during this year included 


the strong forts of Panhala (5th Mstfch) and Satara 
(early September.)* 

At the end of September we find Shivaji at the 
head of a great army raised for "some notable attempt 
against the Mughal." He also sewed 20,000 sacks 
of cotton for conveying the plunder he expected to 
seize ! But on the dasahara day (early October), an 
auspicious time with the Hindus for setting out on 
campaigns, he sallied forth on a long expedition into 
Bijapuri territory, with 25,000 men, robbed many rich 
towns, and then penetrated into Kanara, "to get 
more plunder in those rich towns to bear the expenses 
of his army." Early in December he reached Kadra 
(20 miles north-east of Karwar) with a division of 
4,000 foot and, 2,000 horse, and stayed there for 
four days. The bulk of his forces occupied a hill 
near Hubli. But two severe defeats at the hands of 
Bahlol and Sharza Khan at Bankapur and Chandgarh 
(a fort midway between the Belgaum and Savant-vadi 
to^vns) respectively forced him to evacuate Kanara 
quickly. (F. R. Surat 106, Bombay to Surat, 29th 
September and lOth October, Vol. 88, Karwar to 
Surat, I7th December 1673. O. C. 3910 ; Fryer, ii. 
Dutch Rec, VoL 31, No. 805.) 

§10. Internal troubles in Kanara, 1674. 

Though Kanara had been freed from the 
Marathas, that province enjoyed no peace. Misin 

* O. C. 3800 and 3832; F. R. Surat 106, Bombay to Surat, 
16th and 29th September 1673; B. S. 399. 

286 SHIVAJI. [CH. X. 

Sahib, the faujdar of Karwar, (instigated, it was said, 
by Shiva), rebelled and Adil Shah had to conduct 
a long war before he could be suppressed. The two 
sides continued to have skirmishes with varying suc- 
cess. In February 1674 the royal troops captured 
Sunda, with the rebel's wife in it, but he held out 
obstinately in his other forts. By 22nd April this 
"long and tedious rebellion" was at last ended by 
the arrival of Abu Khan, Rustam-i-Zaman II., as the 
new viceroy. Mian Sahib's followers deserted him 
for lack of pay ; his forts (Kadra, Karwar, Ankola 
and Shiveshwar) all surrendered without a blow, and 
he himself made peace on condition of his wife being 
released. Shivaji was then only a day's march from 
Karwar, "going to build a castle upon a very high 
hill, from which he may very much annoy these 
parts." (F. R. Surat 88, Karwar to Surat, 14th 
February and 22nd April 1674. Orme, Frag., 35.) 

Unlike his father, the new Rustam-i-Zaman did 
not cultivate friendship with the Marathas. In August 
1674 he seized a rich merchant, subject of Shiva, 
living at Narsa ( 1 6 miles from Ponda) and the Maratha 
king prepared for retaliation. In October Rustam 
was summoned by Khawas Khan, the new wazir, to 
Bijapur ; and, as he feared that his post would be 
given to another, he extorted forced loans from all 
the rich men of Karwar and its neighbourhood that 
he could lay hands on, before he went away. {F. R. 
Surat 88, Karwar to Surat, 2nd September and 27th 
October, 1674.) In the beginning of September, "in 


Kudal about four hours [journey] from here 
[ = Vingfurla] , one of Shivaji's generals called Annaji 
came with 3,000 soldiers to surprise the fortress 
Ponda, but Mamet Khan who was there armed 
himself, so that the aforesaid pandit accomplished 
nothing." (Dutch Rec, Vol. 34, No. 841.) 

At Bijapur everything was in confusion, "the 
great Khans were at difference." The worthless 
wazir Khawas Khan was driven to hard straits by the 
Afghan faction in the State. Rustam-i-Zaman II. 
after his visit to the capital evidently lost his vice- 
royalty. This was Shivaji's opportunity and he now 
conquered Kanara for good. First, he befooled the 
Mughal viceroy Bahadur Khan by sending him a pre- 
tended offer of peace, asking for the pardon of the 
Mughal Government through the Khan's mediation 
and promising to cede the imperial forts he had 
recently conquered as well as the twenty-three forts 
of his own that he had once before yielded in Jai 
Singh's time. By these insincere negotiations Shivaji 
for the time being averted the risk of a Mughal attack 
on his territory and began his invasion of Bijapuri 
Kanara* with composure of mind. 

* Invasion of Kanara and capture of Ponda (1675), F. R. 
-Sural 88, Karwar to Sural, 14th and 22nd April, 8th and 25lh 
May; Rajapur to Sural, 1st and 20th April; 3rd, 21st and 3Ist 
May; 3rd and 14th June; B. S. 401 ; Orme Frag., 38, 40. Sabh. 
70 (scanty.) Delusive peace offer to Mughals, B. S. 401 ; 
O. C. 4077. 

288 SHIVAJI. [CH. X. 

§11. Capture of Ponda and annexation of 
Kanara coast, 1675. 

In March 1675 he got together an army of 15,000 
cavalry, 14,000 infantry and 10,000 pioneers with pick- 
axes, crow-bars and hatchets, etc. Arriving at Raja- 
pur (22nd March), he spent three days there, ordering 
forty small ships to go to Vinguria with all speed 
and there wait for fresh commands. Next he 
marched to his town of Kudal, and early in April 
laid siege to Ponda, the most important Bijapuri fort 
near Goa. While he was prosecuting the siege, 
another division of his army plundered Atgiri in Adil- 
Shahi territory and two other Wge cities near 
Haidarabad, carrying away "a great deal of riches, 
besides many rich persons held to ransom." 

He began the siege of Ponda on 9th April 1675 
with 2,000 horse and 7,000 foot, and made arrange- 
ments for sitting down before the fort even during 
the coming rainy season in order to starve the garrison 
into surrender. Muhammad Khan had only four 
months' provisions within the walls ; there was no 
hope of relief from Bijapur or even from the Portu- 
guese who now trembled for the safety of Goa and 
appeased Shivaji by promising neutrality. Rustam-i- 
Zaman had too little money or men to attempt the 
raising of the siege. But Muhammad Khan made a 
heroic defence, unaided and against overwhelming 

Shivaji ran four mines under the walls, but they 
were all countermined, with a heavy loss of men 


to him. He then threw up an earthen wall only 
12 feet from the fort and his soldiers lay sheltered 
behind it. The Portuguese, fearing that if Shiva took 
Ponda their own Goa would be as good as lost, 
secretly sent ten boat-loads of provisions and some 
men in aid of the besieged (middle of April) ; but 
they were intercepted by Shivaji, and the Viceroy 
of Goa disavowed the act. 

The siege was pressed with vigour. By the 
beginning of May Shivaji had taken possession of 
two outworks, filled the ditch, and made 500 ladders 
and 500 gold bracelets, each bracelet weighing half 
a seer, for presentation to the forlorn hope who would 
attempt the escalade. 

Bahlol Khan, who was at Miraj with 15,000 
troops, wanted to come down and relieve Ponda, but 
Shiva had bckrred the passages with trees cut down 
and lined the stockades with his men, and Bahlol, 
being certain of heavy loss and even an utter repulse 
if he tried to force them, returned to his base. His 
inactivity during the siege was imputed to bribery by 
Shiva. At length the fort fell about the 6th of May. 
All who were found in it were put to the sword, 
with the exception of Muhammad Khan, who saved 
his own life and those of four or five others by 
promising to put into Shiva's hands all the adjoining 
parts belonging to Bijapur. In fear of death the 
Khan wrote to the qiladars of these forts to yield 
them to the Maraihas. but they at first <leclined. So 
the Khan was kept in chains. Inayet Khan, the 


290 SHIVAJI. [CH. X. 

faujdar of Ankola, seized the country and forts lately 
held by Muhammad Khan and placed his own men 
in them, but he could make no stand against Shivaji 
whose forces were now set free by the fall of Ponda. 
He therefore compounded and gave up the forts for 
money. In a few days Ankola, Shiveshwar (which 
had been besieged by 3,000 Maratha horse and some 
foot-soldiers since 24th April), Karwar, and Kadra 
(which alone had made a short stand), all capitulated 
to Shivaji, and by the 25th of May the country as 
far south as the Gangavati river had passed out of 
Bijapuri possession into his hands. 

§12. Marathas in Kanara uplands. 

On 26th April, 1675, one of Shiva's generals had 
visited Karwar and "burnt the town effectually, 
leaving not a house standing," in punishment of the 
fort of Karwar still holding out. The English factory 
was not molested. This general, however, went 
back in a few days. But next month, after the fall 
of Ponda, the fort of Karwar surrendered to the 

The rainy season now put an end to the cam- 
paign. Bahlol Khan went back to Bijapur, leaving 
his army at Miraj. Shiva at first thought of canton- 
ing for the rains in a fort on the frontier of Sunda, 
but soon changed his mind and returned to Raigarh, 
passing Rajapur on 1 Ith June. 

A Maratha force was detached into the Sunda 
Rajah's country at the end of May. "They finding 


no great opposition seized upon Supa and Whurwa ( ?) 
belonging to the Rajah." But Khizr Khan Pani and 
the desais in concert attacked the Maratha g2a'risons 
there, killed 300 of the men and recovered both the 
places. A party of Marathas that was posted at 
BurbuUe [VarhuUi, 7 miles south of Ankola] to take 
custom duty on all goods passing that way, was now 
forced to withdraw (August 1675.) (F. R. Surat 88, 
Rajapur to Surat, 27th August 1675.) 

The dowager Rani of Bednur had quarrelled with 
her colleagfue Timmaya, but had been compelled to 
make peace with him (August), she being a mere 
cypher, while he held the real power of the State. 
The Rani then appealed to Shivaji for protection, 
agreed to pay him an annual tribute, and admitted 
a Maratha resident at her Court. (Ibid, and Chit. 70.) 

The dalvi, or lieutenant of the desai who had 
been the local Bijapuri governor of North Kanara, 
had aided Shivaji in the conquest of that district. 
But now (1675), disgusted with him, the dalvi was 
moving about the country with a force, saying that 
he would restore his former master. He attacked 
Shivaji's guards in Karwar town and forced them to 
retire to the castle. The people were in extreme 
misery in Shivaji's new conquests : he squeezed the 
desais, who in their turn squeezed the ryots. {Bom. 
Gaz. XV. Pt. i, 128.) But Bijapur was now in the 
grip of a civil war, the Adil-Shahi State was hasten- 
ing to a dissolution, and Shivaji's possession of South 

292 SHIVAJI. [CH. X. 

Konkan and -North Kanara remained unchallenged till 
after his death. 

But Bednur did not really become a Maratha 
protectorate. We learn from an English letter of 29th 
July, 1679, that the Rajah of Sunda and the Rani of 
Bednur had sharp wars, "but the former by the 
assistance of Jamshid Khan has had the advantage 
of compelling the Rani, on conclusion of the peace, 
to deliver up to him his castles of Sirsy and Sera, 
formerly possessed by them, as likewise the port and 
castle of Mirgy [ = Mirjan] , a little to the southward 
of Karwar." (Orme MSS. 1 16.) 


Naval Enterprises. 

§1. The Abyssinians of the West Coast. 

The expansion of Shivaji's rule across the 
Western Ghats into the coast-district of Konkan 
trought him into contact with the maritime Powers 
of our western sea-board. Chief among these were 
the Siddis or Abyssinians of Janjira, a rocky island 
45 miles south of Bombay, and guarding the mouth of 
the Rajpuri creek. Half a mile east of it, on the 
mainland stands the town of Rajpuri, and two miles 
south-east of the latter is Danda. But these two 
towns are regarded as one place and formed the 
headquarters of the land-possessions of the Siddis, 
covering much of the modern district of Kolaba. 
From this tract were drawn the revenue and provi- 
sions that nourished the Government of Janjira. 

An Abyssinian colony had settled here early in 
the 16th century. One of them secured the governor- 
ship of Danda-Rajpuri under the Sultans of Ahmad, 
nagar early in the 17th century. But the dissolution 
of that monarchy and the situation of the district on 
the extreme frontier of the State beyond the Western 
Ghats, made it easy for the Siddi to establish himself 
in practical independence of the central authority, so 
that, when the partition treaty of 1636 gave the west- 
coast to Bijapur, that Government recognised the 

294 SHIVAJI. [CH. XI. 

Siddi chief as its representative in the district, 
elevated him to the rank of a wazir, and added to his 
charge the whole sea-board from Nagothna to 
Bankot, on condition of his protecting Bijapur trade 
and Mecca pilgrims at sea. 

As the Siddis formed a small military aristocracy- 
dominating a vast alien population, their constitution 
provided for the rule of the ablest, and on the death 
of a chief not his son but the first officer of the fleet 
succeeded to the governorship. The Abyssinians 
were hardy skilful and daring mariners and the most 
efficient fighters at sea among the Muslim races, while 
their courage and energy, joined to coolness and 
power of command, made them enjoy a high estima- 
tion as soldiers and administrators. 

The Siddi chief of Janjira maintained an efficient 
fleet, and throughout the 1 7th century he was officially 
recognised as the admiral, at first of Bijapur and 
latterly of the Mughal empire. There was no native 
Power on the west coast that could make a stand 
against him at sea. (Bom. Gaz. xi. 434, 416.) 

To the owner of Konkan it -was essential that the 
Siddi should be either made an ally or rendered 
powerless for mischief. Shivaji found that unless he 
created a strong navy, his foreign trade would be lost, 
and his subjects on the sea-coast and for some distance 
inland would remain liable to constant plunder, 
enslavement, outrage, and slaughter at the v^ll of a 
band of pirates alien by race, creed and language. 
.The innumerable creeks and navigable rivers of the 

1659] shiva's early conflicts with siddis. 295 

west coast, while they naturally fostered the growth 
of rich ports and trade centres, made it imperatively 
necessary for their protection that their owner should 
rule the sea. On the other hand, the possession of 
Danda-Rajpuri and its adjacent district was necessary 
to the owner of Janjira for his very existence. The 
political separation of the two made war an economic 
necessity to him. 

§2. Maratha conquests from the Abyssinians, 
up to 1661. 

In 1648 Shivaji had captured the forts of Tala, 
Ghonsala, and Rairi (or Raigarh), situated in the 
Siddi's territory, but the latter still held Danda- 
Rajpuri and much of the neighbouring land. There 
must have been constant skirmishes between the 
tw^o Powers thus occupying the eastern and western 
portions of the Kolaba district, but no record of them 
has come down to us. The Siddi had too small an 
army to defy the regular Maratha forces on land, and 
seems to have confined himself to making secret raids 
and doing petty acts of mischief to Shivaji's villages 
in that region, as is clear from the Maratha chronicler's 
description of the Siddi as "an enemy like the mice 
in a house." (Sabh. 67.) 

Very little activity was probably shown by Yusuf 
Khan who ruled Janjira from 1642 to 1655. 

But his successor Fath Khan was a brave active 
and able leader. In 1659, w^hen Afzal Khan was 
advancing against Shivaji from the east with a 

296 SHIVAJI. [CH. XI. 

formidable Bijapuri aimy, Fath Khan seized the 
opportunity of trying to recover his own and laid siege 
to Tala. But, on hearing of the destruction of the 
Bijapur army (October), he retired in haste. Next 
year, when Ali Adil Shah II. opened a campaign 
against Shivaji, who v/as invested in Panhala fort, 
Fath Khan renewed his invasion of Konkan. The 
Kay Savant of Vadi, a loyal vassal of Bijapur, 
co-operated with the Siddi. After an obstinate battle 
both the Savant and Baji Rao Pasalkar (Shivaji's 
general) fell in a single combat, and the Marathas 
retreated to their base. (Sabh. 66 ; Chit. 65-66.)* 

To retrieve the position, Shivaji next sent a larger 
force, five to seven thousand strong, under Raghunath 
Ballal Atre, who forced his way to the sea-coast. The 
Marathas continued the campaign even during the 
rains, and after a long siege captured the fort of 
Danda-Rajpuri (July or August, 1661), and following 
up their success opened batteries against Janjira 
itself. But their weakness in sirtillery defeated their 

* I have followed Sabhasad in the above order of events. 
But Chit. 34 and 66 gives a different narrative : Shivaii's first 
Peshwa invades the Siddi's dominion, but is defeated with 
great slaughter (early 1659) — Raghunath Ballal replaces him 
in the command — both parties retire for the monsoons — during 
the time when Shivaji was besieged in Panhala (July 1660) 
Baji Pasalkar fought the Kay Savant, both being slain — Shiva 
captures Danda-Rajpuri (Aug. 1661.) The English merchants 
of Rajapur write on 10 Oct. 1659, of '*Shivaji having already 
taken the town of Danda-Rajpuri, but not the castle." (F. R. 


attempt on this sea-girt rock. Hopeless of relief from 
Bijapur, the Siddi begged for terms from Raghunath 
and formally ceded Danda-Rajpuri. Thus, no strong- 
hold was left to the Siddi on the mainland. (Sabh. 
67 ; Chit. 66.) 

But this peace could not possibly last long. To 
the Siddi the loss of the Kolaba territory meant 
starvation, and, on the other hand, it was Shiva's 
"lifelong ambition to capture Janjira" and make his 
hold on the west coast absolutely secure. Hostilities 
soon broke out again. The Siddis resumed their 
depredations on the coast, while Shiva battered 
Janjira every year during the dry season, but without 

The Maratha gains on the Kolaba coast were 
nov/ organised into a province, and placed under an 
able viceroy, Vyankoji Datto, with a permanent con- 
tingent of 5 to 7 thousand men (Sabh. 68.) He 
defeated the Siddis in a great land-battle, totally 
excluded them from the mainland, improved the 
defences of Danda-Rajpuri by fortifying a hill that 
commanded it, and built a chain of forts (such as 
Birwadi and Lingana) which effectually prevented 
Siddi depredations in that quarter. At this the Siddis, 
in order to "fill their stomachs," had to direct their 
piracy against the villages and ports further south, in 
the Ratna£;iri district, which had now come under 
Shiva's sway. The Maratha chief, therefore, resolved 
to create * navy for the protection of his coast and 

298 SHIVAJI. [CH. XI„ 

the conquest of Janjira which continued as a thorn in 
his side. (Sabh. 68.) 

§ 3. Shivaji's naoy described. 

The Marathi chronicles speak of Shivaji's fleet as 
consisting of four hundred vessels of various sizes and 
classes, such as ghurabs (gun-boats), tarandis, 
tarambes, gallivats, shibars, pagars, manchwas, 
babhors, tirkatis, pals, and dubares* Their cost is 
put down vaguely as 5 or 10 la^hs of Rupees. But the 
English reports never put their number above 160, and 
usually as 60 only. They were formed into two 
squadrons (of 200 vessels each, if we accept the 
Marathi accounts), and commanded by two admirals 
who bore the titles of Daria Sarang (Sea Captain) and 
Mai Nayak or Mian Naya^.f 

* Sabh. 68 ; Chit. 67. Ghurabs are floating batteries or 
gun-boats carrying two masts and moving slowly. Gallivats 
are vessels constructed for swift sailing. Shihars are trading 
boats, munchuas being a stronger kind of trading vessel than 
shihars. (Orme's Frag. Sec. 1.) The machwa (a round-built 
two-masted craft of from 3 to 20 tons) and the shihar {a large 
square-sterned, flat-bottomed vessel with 2 masts but no deck) 
are described in Bom. Gaz. xiii. 345-49. 

t Daria is Persian for Ocean. Sabhasad, 68, speaks of 
Daria Sarang as a Musalman and of Mai Nayak as a Hindu 
of the Bhandari caste. But a Bombay letter dated 21 Nov. 
1670 says, "The admiral of the [Maratha] fleet is one Ventgee 
Sarungee, commonly called Durrea Sarungee." Another 
Bombay letter, II Sep. 1679, speaks of 'Mia Nayak, a Bhandari 
of Rajapur.' (Orme MSS. 1 16.) Daulat Khan was an officer 
distinct from the Daria Sarang (Rajwade, viii. 27 and T. S.) 


The numerous creeks on the Bombay coast had 
developed among many low-caste Hindus of the 
region (such as the Kolis, Sanghars, Vaghers and the 
Maratha clan of Angrias) hereditary skill in seafaring 
and naval fight. The "Malabar pirates" were a terror 
even to the English. From them* Shiva recruited his 
crew, and he afterwards added to them a body of 
Muslims, notably a discontented Siddi named Misri 
and Daulat Khan. 

Shiva ji's navy immediately took to plundering the 
coast of Kanara and Goa, and brought to him vast 
quantities of booty in the manner of his land-forces. 
They often fought the Siddi fleet, but the latter 
retained its supremacy on the Tvhole. (Sabh. 68.) 
We may here record what little is definitely known 
about Shivaji's mercantile marine. Soon after getting 
possession of the ports in North Konkan, he began 
to engage in foreign trade on his own account. Early 
in 1660 he captured at Rajapur some of "the junks of 
Afzal Khan and turned them to his own use. In 
February 1663 the English at Surat report that he was 
fitting out two ships of considerable burden for trading 

* "The Bhandari [caste of husbandmen] are found in 
most parts of the Ratnagiii district, but chiefly in the coast 
villages. They supplied the former pirate chiefs with most 
of their fighting men. A strong, healthy and fine-looking set 

of men they are fond of athletic exercises and do not 

differ from the Marathas and Kunbis." (Bom. Gaz., x. 124.) 
For the Koli pirates, ix. Pt. i. 519-522; and the Angrias, i. Pt. 
ii. 87-88; xi. 145. 

300 SHIVA JI. [CH. XI. 

with Moclia (in western Arabia) and loading them at 
Jaitapur, two miles up the Rajapur river, with "goods 
of considerable value which were by storms or foul 
weather driven upon his coast." Two years later 
(1 2th March 1665), they write that from each of the 
eight or nine "most considerable ports in the Deccan" 
that he possessed, he used to "set out 2 or 3 or more 
trading vessels yearly to Persia, Basra, Mocha, &c." 
Again, we learn that in April, 1669, a great storm on 
the Karwar coast destroyed several of his ships and 
rice-boats, "one of the ships being very richly laden." 
(F. R. Surat, Vols. 2,86,105.) 

§ 4. Doings of the Maratha navy, 1664-1665. 

The rise of the Maratha naval power caused 
anxiety to the Siddis, the English merchants, and the 
Mughal Emperor alike. On 26th June, 1664, the 
Surat factors report that Shiva was fitting out a fleet 
of 60 frigates for an attack on some unknown quarter, 
probably "to surprise all junks and vessels belonging 
to that port and to waylay them on their return from 
Basra and Persia," or to transport an army up the 
Cambay creek (Sabarmati) for making a raid on 
Ahmadabad. At the end of November it was 
learnt that the fleet had been sent to Bhatkal, to 
co-operate with his army in the invasion of Kanara. 
The English President describes the Maratha vessels 
as "pitiful things, so that one good English ship 
would destroy a hundred of them without running 
herself into great danger." (F. R. Surat, 86, 26 

1665] MARATHA FLEET. 301 

Nov.) In addition to the inferior size and build of 
their ships, the Marathas on land and sea alike were 
very weak in artillery and, therefore, powerless 
a'gainst European ships of war. 

In February 1665, Shivaji's fleet of 85 frigates* 
and three large ships conveyed his army to Basrur 
for the plunder of South Kanara. (F. R. Surat, 104. 
Karwar to Surat, 14 March ; Sabh. 70 ; Chit. 69-70.) 

He had very early begun to plunder Mughal 
ships, especially those convejdng pilgrims for Mecca 
from the port of Surat (called Dar-ul-hajj, "the City 
of Pilgrimage.") The Emperor had no fleet of his 
own in the Indian Ocean able to cope with the 
Marathas. Early in 1665 Jai Singh opened his 
campaign, and, in accordance with his policy of 
combining all possible enemies against Shivaji, wrote 
to the Siddi to enter into an alliance with the 
Mughals. (Haft Anj., Benares IVIS., 78a.) Late in 
the same year, when Jai Singh w^as about to begin 
the invasion of Bijapur, he invited these Abyssinians 
to join the Mughal force, promising them mansahs.\ 

* Duff (i. 20 In) suggests that by the term frigates were 
probably meant small vessels with one mast, from 30 to 150 
tons burden, common on the Malabar coast. 

t A Siddi Sambal fought on the Mughal side during the 
invasion of Bijapur in 1666. (A. N. !012.) The informal 
connection thus established between the Emperor and the 
Siddis continued, as we find that during Shivaji's siege of 
Janjira in 1669, Aurangzib wrote to him commanding him to 
withdraw from the attempt. (Bombay to Surat, dated 16 Oct., 
1669, F. R. Surat, Vol. 105.) 

302 SHIVAJI. [CH. XI. 

By the Treaty of Purandar, the Mughals left the 
territory of Janjira adjoining Shiva's dominions to 
Shivaji, if he could conquer it. (Ibid.) Shiva also 
offered to attempt the conquest of Janjira for the 
Emperor. (Ibid, 78b. But Chit. 107, Dig. 240, and 
Tarikh-i-Shivaji, 22b, agree that Jai Singh definitely 
refused to make the Siddis give up Janjira to Shiva.) 

§ 5. Maraiha attacJz on Janjira fails. 

In 1669 Shivaji's attack upon Janjira was re- 
newed with great vigour. In the eeu-lier months of 
the year the hostile armies made almost daily 
inroads into each other's country and the warfare 
closed the roads to ail peaceful traffic. In October, 
the Siddi was so very hard pressed and Janjira was 
in such danger of being starved into surrender that 
he wrote to the English merchants of his "resolve 
to hold out to the last and then delivering it up to 
the Mughal." (F. R. Surat 105, Bomb, to Surat, 
16 Oct.) 

The contest came to a crisis next year (1670.) 
Shivaji staked cJl his resources on the capture of 
Janjira. Path Khan, worn out by the incesscint 
struggle, impoverished by the ruin of his subjects, 
and hopeless of aid from his master at Bijapur, 
resolved to accept Shiva's offer of a large bribe and 
rich jagir as the price of Janjira. But his three 
Abyssinian slaves roused their clansmen on the island 
against this surrender to an infidel, imprisoned Path 
Khan, seized the Government, and applied to Adil 


Shah and the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan for aid. 
The Mughals readily agreed, eind the Siddi fleet was 
transferred from the overlordship of Bijapur to that 
of Delhi, and Siddi Sambal, one of the leaders of 
the revolution was created imperial admiral with a 
mansab and a jagir yielding 3 lal^hs of Rupees. His 
two associates, Siddi Qasim euid Siddi Khairiyat, 
were given the command of Janjira and the land 
dominions respectively. The Siddi fleet was taken 
into Mughal service on the same terms as under 
Bijapur. The general title of Yaqut Khan was con- 
ferred rn successive Siddi admirals from this time, 
and the Government of Janjira Wcis separated from 
the admiral's charge and placed under emother Siddi, 
who was regarded eis the second leader of the tribe 
and heir to the admiral's post. (K. K. ii. 224 ; only 

This revolution at Janjira is said by Khafi Khan 
to have taken place in January or February 1671.* 
Shortly before it the Maratha fleet had met with a 

* But the date is evidently wrong. On 4th April 1674, 
Narayan Shenvi, the English agent, writes from Raigarh to 
Bombay "I have discoursed with Naraji Pandit concerning the 
peace you desired might be concluded with the Siddi Fath 
Khan." (F. R. Sural, Vol. 88.) This proves (a) that Fath 
Khan was a Siddi and not an Afghan, and (b) that he was in 
power in 1674, instead of having been deposed in 1671. Here 
Khafi Khan is proved by contemporary records to be unreliable. 
But Siddi Sambal was undoubtedly admiral of the fleet from 
1671 onwards. 

304 SHIVAJI. [CH. XI. 

great reverse. In November 1670, Shivaji collected 
at Nandgaon, 10 miles north of Janjira, 160 small 
vessels and an army of 10,000 horse and 20,000 foot, 
with full provisions for a siege, large numbers of 
mining tools (pick-axes, shovels and crow-bars), and 
victuals for 40 days. Another body of 3,000 soldiers, 
with a great number of pioneers, was kept "ready 
to embark and depart with the fleet at a minute's 
notice." His secret design was to mcirch to Surat 
by land, where the fleet would join him, and then 
the fort would be delivered to him on 29th 
November, as had been secretly agreed upon by its 
commandant. If he succeeded there, he intended 
to march on and take Broach also. 

But the plan failed. The fleet left Nandgaon on 
24th November and passed northw^ards skirting the 
Bombay island the next day and Mahim on the 26th. 
The army under Shivaji marched in the same 
direction by land. But on the 26th he suddenly 
turned back and recalled his fleet. He had dis- 
covered that the seemingly treacherous qiladar's 
promise to sell the fort to him was only a trap laid 
for him. Quickly changing his plan, he turned to 
an easier and surer prey. Early in December he 
suddenly burst into Khandesh and Berar and looted 
them far and wide. During his absence on this raid, 
his fleet met with a defeat. In passing by Daman, 
his admiral had captured a large ship of that place 
worth Rs. 12,000, bound for Surat. The Portuguese 
retaliated by capturing 12 of his ships and leaving 


the prizes at Bassein went in pursuit of the rest of 
the Maratha fleet, which, however, fled to Dabhol 
in safety. (F. R. Surat, Vol. 105, Bomb, to Surat,, 
17, 21 and 28 Nov. and 17 Dec, 1670.) 

§ 6. Abyssinians recover Danda fori, 1671. 

Siddi Qasim (surnamed Yaqut Khan), the new 
governor of Janjira, "w^as distinguished among his 
tribesmen for bravery, care of the peasantry, 
capacity, aind cunning. He busied himself in in- 
creasing his fleet and war-material, strengthening the 
defences of his forts and cruising at sea. He used 
to remain day and night clad in armour, and 
repeatedly seized enemy ships, cut off the heads of 
many McU'athas and sent them to Surat." (K. K., 
ii. 225.) His crowning achievement was the recovery 
of Danda-Rajpuri from Shivaji's men. One night in 
March, 1671, when the Maratha garrison of that fort 
were absorbed in drinking and celebrating the Spring 
Carnival (Holi), Yaqut Khan secretly arrived at the 
pier with 40 ships, while Siddi Khairiyat with 500 
men made a noisy feint on the land-side. The full 
strength of the garrison rushed in the latter direction 
to repel Khairiyat, and Yaqut seized the opportunity 
to scale the sea-wall. Some of his brave followers, 
were hurled into the sea and some sladn, but the 
rest forced their way into the fort. Just then the 
powder-magazine exploded, killing the Maratha 
commandant and several of his men, with a dozen 

306 SHIVAJl. [CH. XI. 

of the asscdlants. Yaqut promptly raised his battle- 
cry Khassu I Khassu 1 and shouting "My braves, be 
composed ; I am alive and safe, " he advanced slay- 
ing and binding to the centre of the fort where he 
joined hands with Khairiyat's party, and the entire 
place was conquered. 

Shiva had been planning the capture of Jzoijira, 
and now he had failed to hold even Danda-Rajpuri ! 
It is said that during the night of the surprise, at the 
moment the powder-magazine blew up, Shiva, who 
was 40 miles away, started from his sleep and 
exclaimed that some calamity must have befallen 
Danda-Rajpuri ! He was, however, unable to make 
reprisals immediately, as his army was busy else- 
vsrhere, in the Nasik and Baglana districts, where the 
Mughal viceroy was pressing him hard. Yaqut, 
therefore, could easily follow up his success by 
capturing seven other forts in the neighbourhood. 
Six of them opened their gates in terror of his 
prowess after his grand victory at Danda-Rajpuri. 
The seventh stood a siege for a week and then 
capitulated on terms, which Yaqut fedthlessly 
violated, enslaving and converting the boys and 
handsome women, dismissing the old and ugly 
women, and massacring all the men of the garrison. 
For some time afterwards the Marathas were forced 
to stand on the defensive in their own territory. 
(K. K. ii. 225-228 ; only authority.) 

These disasters fully roused Shiva. The recovery 
of Danda-Rajpuri fort became an absorbing passion 


as well as a political necessity, with him. To the 
end of his life and throughout the reign of 
Shambhuji, hostilities continued between the 
MarathEis and the Siddis, intermittently, indecisively, 
but with great bitterness and fury. Gross cruelty 
and wanton injury were practised by each side on 
the captive soldiers and innocent peasantry of the 
■other, and the country became desolate. The 
economic loss ■was more keenly felt by the small and 
poor State of the Abyssinians than by the Marathas, 
and the Siddis at times begged for peace, but did 
not succeed, as they were not prepared to accept 
Shiva's terms of ceding their all to him. 

In September 1671, Shivaji sent an ambassador 
to Bombay to secure the aid of the English in an 
attack on Danda-Rajpuri. But the President and 
Council of Surat advised the Bombay factors "not 
to positively promise him the grenadoes, mortar- 
pieces, and ammunition he desires, nor to absolutely 
deny him, in regard we do not think it convenient 
to help him against Danda-Rajpuri, which place if 
it were in his possession would prove a great 
annoyance to the port of Bombay." (F. R. 
Surat, 87.) 

§ 7. Naval war, 1672-1675. 

In the latter part of 1672, Aurangzib sent a fleet 

of 36 vessels, great and small, from Surat to assist 

the Siddi of Danda-Rajpuri by causing a diversion 

by sea. This squadron did Shivaji "great mischief. 

308 SHIVAJI. [CH. XI. 

burning and plundering all his sea-port towns and 
destroying also above 500 of his vessels" (evidently 
trading boats.) At this time (21st December) Shiva 
had six small frigates, which he laid up in Bombay 
harbour in fear of the Mughal armada, emd which 
the English saved from the latter by pretending that 
they themselves had attached them as compensation 
for the plunder of their Rajapur factory in 1660. 
(O. C. 3722.) Early in Janueiry next, the Mughal 
fleet visited Bombay after its successful campaign 
against the Marathas. At this time both Shiva and 
the Emperor were eagerly courting the naval help 
of the English in a war with the other side. But 
the foreign traders very wisely maintained their 
neutrality, though it was a "ticklish game." (O. C. 
3734 and 3722.) In the following August, however, 
the ship Soleil d' Orient of the new French East 
India Company founded by Colbert, arrived at 
Rajapur and secretly sold 80 guns (mostly small 
pieces) and 2,000 maunds of lead to Shiva's fleet. 
The French gave similar help in November 1679 
when they sold him 40 guns for the defence of 
Panhala. (F. R. Surat 87, Surat to Co., 12 Jan., 
1674 ; Vol. 108, Rajapur to Surat, 30 Dec, 1679.) 
The difference between the English and Shivaji 
was utilised by Reickloff Van Goen, the Dutch com- 
modore, who about March 1673 opened negotiations 
with the Maratha chief, promising him the help of 
the entire Dutch fleet (of 22 ships) in retaking 
Danda-Rajpuri, while Shivaji was to lend 3,000 of 


his soldiers for a Dutch attempt to conquer Bombay. 
Shivaji, however, durst not trust the Dutch and con- 
tinued friendly to the English, though he had by 
this time spent a vast treasure and incurred the loss 
of nearly 15,000 men in his vain attempts to recover 
Danda-Rajpuri. (O. C. 3760.) 

The Mughal fleet of 30 frigates, commemded by 
Siddi Sambal, returned from Surat to Danda-Rajpuri, 
in Mav 1673, and after passing the south-west 
monsoon (June-September) there, sailed down the 
coast, taking many Maratha trading vessels and some 
ships of war. On 10th October the Muslim fleet 
entered the Bombay harbour, sent landing parties 
to the Pen and Nagothna rivers, laid waste the 
Maratha villages opposite Bombay, and carried off 
many of the people. TTiese devastations were 
frequently repeated. But at the end of the month, 
"some of Shivaji's soldiers [from Raigarh] surprised 
a parcel of the Siddi's men as they were on shore 
cutting the standing rice in his country, and destroyed 
about a hundred of them, carrying away the heads 
of some of the chief est unto Shivaji." The great 
cruelty practised by the Siddis on his subjects and 
their burning of several small towns in his territory 
"provoked Shivaji much," and his reprisals were 
apprehended in the Mughal dominions, especially 
at Surat. (O. C. 3779 and 3870.) 

In February 1674 we learn from an English 
letter, "The war betwixt the Siddi and Shivaji is 
carried on but slowly, they being both weary," and 

310 SHIVAJI. [CH. XI- 

the President of Surat was requested by the Siddi 
"to mediate a peace between them." (O. C. 3939.) 
Next month (March 1674), however, Siddi 
Sambal attacked Shivaji's admiral Daulat Khan in 
the Satavli rii^er (i.e., the Muchkundi creek in the 
Ratnagiri district), both the admireds being ■wounded 
and the two sides losing 100 and 44 men respectively. 
The Marathas w^ere left victors, and Siddi Sambal 
withdrew to HarishwEtf, a port 21 miles south of 
Janjira. In May Shivaji, who "was resolved to take 
that castle (Danda-Rajpuri) let it cost him ■what it 
will," was reported to be daily sending down more 
artillery, ammunition, men and money to strengthen 
his siege-troops. In the course of this year he 
reduced the whole coast of South Konkan from 
Rajpuri to Bardez near Goa, but not the fort of 
Danda-Rajpuri. (F. R. Surat 88.) 

§ 8. Grand assault on Janjira, 1675-1676. 

In September 1675, we read of his making 
preparations for taking that fort by a land and sea 
attack. The cruise of the Siddi fleet along Shiva's 
coast in January and February of this year had 
proved unsuccessful. But it returned in November 
v^dth reinforcements, and sailed down the coast to 
Vingurla, plundering and burning. Maratha 
squadrons from Gheria (Vijay-durg) and Rajapur 
took the sea, seeking a fight, but the Siddi escaped 
to Janjira. (F. R. Surat 107, Bom. to Surat, 7 Sep ; 
Orme, Frag., 49, 53.) 


That island had been besieged by Shiva with a 
great force some months earlier. The neighbouring 
coast was dotted with his outposts and redoubts, 
and he also built some floating batteries and made 
Ein attempt to throw a mole across the sea from the 
mainland to' the island of Janjira.* The siege was 
raised at the end of 1675, at the arrival of the fleet 
under Siddi Sambal ; but it was renewed next year 
with greater vigour than before. The Peshwa Moro 
Pant was sent with 10,000 men to co-operate with 
the fleet and the former siege-troops (under Vyankoji 
Datto.) If w^e can rely on the puzzling Meurathi 
chronicle, the landing-place at Jajijira and two 
gzurdens (?) outside the fort were stormed and the 
Siddis were driven to seek refuge in a citadel on 
a height in the centre of the island. The place was 
wholly invested. 

But the attempt failed. Siddi Qasim arrived 
with the Mughal fleet, broke the line of investment, 
infused life into the defence, made counter-attacks, 
burnt the floating batteries and forced the Marathas 
to raise the siege (end of December 1676.) Janjira 
was saved "by the blessings of a living saint, and 

* Siege of Janjira : Orme, Frag., 48, 57. A very confused 
and obscurely written account of this struggle is given in the 
Marathi Shivadigvijay, pp. 192-196, and also in the Tarilih-i- 
Shivaji. It is evident that the last two works have transferred 
to Shivaji's reign some of the incidents of Shambhuji's siege 
of Janjira in 1681 and after. 

312 SHIVAJI. [CH. XI. 

the Maharajah's men returned disappointed," as 
the Meirathi chronicler puts it. {Shioadigvijay, 195.) 

§ 9. Naval war, 1676-1680. 

The rest of the struggle with the Siddis is given 
belov\^ in a summary form, on the basis of Orme's 
narrative {Frag., 55-88) compiled from the English 
factory records, which 1 have supplemented by a 
reference to some additional records in the India 
Office, London. 

In May 1676, Siddi Sambal who had quarrelled 
with the Mughal Government was dismissed and 
his post of imperial admiral was given to Siddi 
Qasim, with the governorship of Danda-Rajpuri. 
Qasim halted at Bombay on his way to his new 
headquEirters. But Sambal delayed handing over 
the fleet to his successor. He cruised along Shivaji's 
coast (in October) burning Jaitapur (at the mouth 
of the Rajapur river) in December, but was prevented 
from advancing further inland and returned to 
Janjira, where Qasim had already raised the Maratha 
siege under Moro Pant. 

Early in 1677 strict orders came from Delhi that 
the fleet must be delivered to Qasim. But Scimbal 
put off obeying the order for many months, till the 
rival Siddi admirals who were living in Bombay 
came to blows, and finally through the mediation 
of the English Council the quarrel was settled, and 
Qasim was installed as admiral, at the end of 
October. Sambal in disgust transferred his services 


to Shiva, carrying his family and personal retainers 
with himself, the most notably among them being 
his gsJlant nephew Siddi Misri. 

Qasim left Bombay with the fleet in November ; 
up to March next he cruised off the Konkain coast, 
making frequent leindings and kidnapping the people, 
all of whom (including the Brahman prisoners) he 
forced tO' do impure menial services. In April 1678 
he returned to Bombay to rest during the monsoons. 
Shivaji, wishing to avenge the degradation of 
Brahmans, sent his admirals Daulat Khan and Daria 
Sarang with 4,000 men to Panvel, a town opposite 
Bombay (July), with orders to cross the creek and 
bum the Siddi fleet then anchored at Mazagon in 
Bombay island. But insufficiency of boats and the 
violence of the monsoon prevented the army from 
crossing, and Daulat Khan, after vainly pressing the 
Portuguese to allow him a passage through their 
territory, retired to Raigarh. Siddi Qasim sent his 
boats and plundered the Alibagh coast. 

In October 1678, Daulat Khan was sent with a 
large army and a mightier train of artillery than 
before to renew the bombardment of Janjira ; but 
Siddi Qasim could not pay his men for want of 
remittance from Surat, and had to continue inactive 
in Bombay harbour. 

Shivaji's navy had by this time been increased 
to 20 two-masted ghurabs and 40 gallivats. "None 
of his harbours admitted ships of a great size, such 
as were used at Surat, or by the Europeans. The 

314 SHIVAJI. [CH. XI- 

(immense) treiffic from port to port of the Malabar 

and Konkan coasts had from time immemoriEil 

been carried on in vessels of shallow burden capable 
of taking close refuge under every shelter of the 
land. The vessels for fight (on) these coasts were" 
also built of the same small size, "and trusted to 
the superiority of number (and not of gun-power or 
seaworthiness) against ships of burden in the open 
sea. Shivaji did not change this system in his own 
marine." (Orme's Fragments, 77-78.) 

In February 1680, Qasim salls^ng from his 
anchorage in Bombay harbour burnt many villages 
on the Pen river and brought away a thousand cap- 
tives. Then Shiva and the English made an agree- 
ment (March) not to let the Siddi fleet winter in 
Bombay unless they promised to observe strict 
neutrality. This brings the narrative down to the 
death of Shivaji, but the same wearisome story of 
abortive attacks on Janjira by the Marathas and 
cruel devastation of the coast district by the Siddis 
continued under Shambhuji. 

§10. War with the English for Khanderi 
island, 1679. 

The difficulty of capturing Janjira set Shiva 
thinking of some other island in the neighbourhood 
which would eifford him a naval base. His choice 
fell on Khanderi ('Kennery') a small rocky island, 
1 54 miles by J4 mile, situated 1 1 miles south of 


Bombay and 30 miles north of Janjira. As early as 
April 1672 the people of Sural learnt of his intention 
to build a fort on the island. The English President 
at once decided to prevent it, bls affecting the 
interests of Bombay even more than those of Surat, 
because no ship could enter or issue from Bombay 
harbour without being seen from Khanderi. (F. R. 
Surat 87, Surat to Bomb. 22 April ; Vol. 106. 
I May 1672.) 

The progress of the Maratha engineers was very 
slow, and in September next their fortifications were 
still incomplete. The English and Siddi fleets came 
there in concert and w^arned the Marathas to stop 
their work. Shivaji's admirals, Daulat Khan and 
Mia Nayak, finding themselves opposed to very 
superior forces, withdrew from the island. (F. R. 
Surat, 106, T. Roach to Surat, 26 Sep. 1672 ; Dig. 

At the end of August 1679, Shiva again took up 
the project of fortifying Khanderi, and collected men 
and materials for the purpose at Chaul. He allotted 
one lakh of hun from the revenues of Kalian and 
Chaul to be spent on the work. On 15th September 
w^e find that 150 men of Shiva with four small guns 
under command of Mia Nayak are already on the 
island and have run up breast-works of earth and 
stone eJI (Orme MSS. 116.) A request 
from the Deputy Governor of Bombay "toi quit the 
place as it belonged to the island of Bombay," was 

316 SHIVAJI. [CH. XI. 

■declined by the Marathas in the absence of orders 
from Shivaji to that effect. The English, therefore, 
resolved that if the occupation of the island was 
persisted in and the Maratha fleet under Daulat 
Khan came there to protect the fortifications, they 
■would "repel them with force as an open and public 
enemy." (F. R. Surat 4, Consult., 4 and 15 Sep. 

The first encounter betw^een the English and the 
Marathas at sea took place on 19th September and 
ended in a reverse for the former. TTie larger 
English ships were still outside the bay of Khanderi, 
because the soundings had not yet been taken and 
they could not be brought closer to the island. 
Lieutenant Francis Thorpe, with some shibars made 
a rash attempt to land on the island, "positively 
against orders. ' The Englishmen were assailed with 
great and small shot from the shore works. The 
impetuous young officer w^as killed with two other 
men (John Bradbury and Henry Welch), several 
others were wounded, and George Cole and many 
other Englishmen were left prisoners on the island. 
The lieutenant's shibar was captured by the enemy, 
while two other shibars escaped to the fleet in the 
open sea. Next day the Marathas carried off another 
English shibar. Sergeant Giles timidly offering no 
resistance. {Orme MSS. 116.) 

Early in October the Maratha fleet was got 
ready to go to the succour of Khanderi. The second 
battle with the English was fought on 1 8th October, 


1679.* At daybreak the entire Maratha fleet of more 
than 60 vessels under Daulat Khan suddenly bore 
down upon the small English squadron consisting of 
the Revenge frigate, 2 ghurabs of two masts each, 3 
shibars and 2 munchuas, — eight vessels in eJl, with 
200 European soldiers on board, in addition to the 
lascars and white sailors. The Marathas advanced 
from the shore a little north of Chaul, moving so 
fast that the English vessels at anchor near Khanderi 
had scarcely time to get under weigh. In less than 
half an hour the Dooer, one of the English ghurabs, 
having Sergeant Mauleverer and some English 
soldiersf on board, with great cow^ardice struck its 
colours and vyas carried off by the Marathas. The 
other ghurab kept aloof, and the five smaller vessels 

* A full description is given in Bombay Gaz. xiii. ; Pt. ii. 
p. 478. 1 have foUowred Orme. 80-81, in addition. 

t Surat Consultation, 3 December, 1679 : "Sergeant 
Mauleverer etc., English, taken formerly by Shivaji in the 
Ghurrab Dover, being in great want of provisions and all other 

necessaries we having duly considered, and perceiving how 

cowardly they behaved themselves in the time of engagement, 
do order them to be stricken out of the muster rolls, but that 
they may not wholly perish, that some small allowance be 
made to them for victuals only, if it can be securely conveyed 
to them [in the Maratha prison.]" (F. R. Surat, Vol. 4.) 
This was in answer to a letter from Mauleverer, dated 6th 
November, begging for provisions, clothing and medicines for 
the wounded, and stating that the prisoners in the Maratha 
fort (Suragarh?) included 20 English French and Dutch, 28 
Portuguese, and 9 lascars. (Orme MSS. 1 16.) 

318 SHIVAJI. [CH. XI. 

ran away, leaving the Revenge alone in tKe midst 
of the enemy. But she fought gallantly and sank 
five of the Maratha gallivats, at which their whole 
fleet fled to the bar of Nagothna, pursued by the 
Revenge. Two days afterwards the Maratha fleet 
issued from the creek, but on the English vessels 
advancing they fled back. Such is the inefficiency 
of "mosquito craft" in naval battles fought with 
artillery that even fifty slender and open Indian ships 
were no match for a single large and strongly built 
English vessel. At the end of November the Siddi 
fleet of 34 ships joined the English off Khanderi and 
kept up a daily battery against the island. (Orme, 

But the cost of these operations was heavily 
felt by the English merchants, who also realised that 
they could not recruit white soldiers to replace any 
lost in fight, and therefore could not "long oppose 
him (Shiva), lest they should imprudently so w^eaken 
themselves as not to be able to defend Bombay itself, 
if he should be exasperated to draw down his army 
that way." Moreover, during the monsoon storms 
the English would be forced to withdraw their naval 
patrol from Khanderi, and then Shiva would "take 
his opportunity to fortify and store the island, 
maugre all our desigQS." So, the Surat Council 
wisely resolved (25th October), that the English 
should "honourably withdraw themselves in time," 
and either settle this difference with Shivaji by means 
of a friendly mediator, or else throw^ the burden of 


opposing him on the Portuguese governor of Bassein 
or on the Siddi, and thus "ease the Hon'ble Com- 
pany of this great charge." The Surat factory itself 
was in danger and could spare no European soldier 
for succouring Bombay. (F. R. Surat 4, Consult., 
25 and 31 Oct., 3, 8 and 12 Dec. 1679.) 

§11. Anxieties and devices of the English of 

The reprisal against Bombay feared from Shiva 
almost came to pass. "Highly exasperated by the 
defeat of his fleet before Khanderi," he sent 4,000 
men to Kalian-Bhiundy with the intention to land in 
Bombay by way of Thana. The Portuguese governor 
of Bassein having refused to allow them to pass 
through his country, the invaders marched to Panvel 
(a port in their own territory) opposite Trombay 
island, intending there to embark on seven shibars 
(end of October 1670.) The inhabitants of Bombay 
w^ere terribly alarmed. The Deputy Governor 
breathed fire, but the President and Council of Surat 
decided to climb down. On receiving a courteous 
letter from Shivaji sent by way of Rajapur, they wrote 
"a civil answer, demonstrating our trouble for the 
occasion his people have given the English at Bombay 
to quarrel with him about his fortifying so insigni- 
ficant a rock as Khanderi, which is not in the least 
becoming a prince of his eminence and qualifications ; 
and though we have a right to that place, yet, to 
show the candour of our proceedings, we are willing 

320 SHIVAJI. [CH. XI. 

to forget what is past, and therefore have given 
instructions to the Deputy Governor of Bombay to 
treat with such persons as he shall appoint about the 
present differences. " The Deputy Governor ■was 
"very much dissatisfied" with this pacific tone and 
held that a vigorous policy of aggression against 
Shiva's country and fleet would "give a speedy con- 
clusion to thii dispute, to the Hon'ble Company's 
advantage." But the higher authorities at Surat only 
repeated their former orders that Bombay should 
avoid a war with Shiva and "frustrate his designs 
of fortifying Khanderi either by treaty or by the Siddi's 
fleet assisting us to oppose him thereon." The two 
English captains consulted took the same view. (Ibid.) 
At the end of December the Marathas dragged several 
large guns to Thai (on the mainland) and began to 
fire them at the small English craft lying under Underi 
for stress of weather. {Orme MSS. 116.) 

But the hope of hindering the Maratha fortifica- 
tion of the island without fighting proved futile, and 
the English ships were withdrawn (January, 1680) 
from Khanderi, which, after "holding out [against 
the Siddis and the English] to the admiration of all," 
was freed from enemy vessels by the coming of the 
monsoons, and remained in Shiva's hands. (F. R. 
Surat 108, Bombay to Surat, 1 Jan. 1680.) 

But the Siddi occupied Underi ('Henery'), a small 
island about a mile in circumference, close to Khan- 
deri, with 300 men and 10 large guns, fortified it 
(9th January, 1680), and tried to silence the Maratha 


guns on Thai. Daulat Khan with his fleet came out 
of the Nagothna river and attacked Underi on two 
nights, hoping to surprise it, "but the Siddi's watchful- 
ness and good intelligence from Chaul frustrated his 
design." On 26th January Daulat Khan assaulted the 
island at three points, ready to land 2,000 men and 
conquer it. But after a four hours' engagement he 
retreated to Chaul, having lost 4 ghurabs and 4 small 
vessels, 200 men killed, 100 wounded, besides 
prisoners, and himself severely wounded. The Siddi 
lost only 4 men killed and 7 wounded, but no vessel, 
out of a fleet of 2 large ships, five three-masted 
frigates, one ketch and 26 gallivats, with 700 men on 
board." Underi continued in Siddi hands throughout 
Shambhuji's reign, and neutralised the Maratha 
occupation of Khanderi, the two islands merely 
bombarding each other. (Ibid, also 31 January.) 



Invasion of the Karnatak, 1677-1678. 

§1. The Madras coast : its wealth. 

Shivaji's grand coronation in June 1674 had 
greatly reduced his treasury. Since then he had not 
heen able to seize any very rich prize, though his 
roving bands had raided many places in Adil-Shahi 
territojy. Added to this, his wars with the Mughals 
and the Bijapuris in 1674 and 1675 and his siege of 
Ponda had been costly aflfairs, and chequered by 
defeats, while his invasion of the Sunda country or 
Kanara uplands (May 1675) had failed. In the earlier 
months of 1676 he had suffered from a protracted 
illness, which had forced on him a long period of 

He, therefore, looked about for some fresh field 
of gain. In the Mughal territory, Surat had been 
sucked dry by his two raids, while his permanent 
occupation of the Koli country of Ramnagar and 
Jawhar, close to Surat, had so alarmed that port that 
its trade and wealth were well-nigh gone. The rich 
Kanara coast had already been swept clean of booty. 
The disorder and misgovernment of the Bijapur State 
during the effete rule of the regent Khawas Khan and 
the civil war between the Afghan and Deccani parties, 
at the Court had so impoverished the central part 


of the reeJm as to make it no longer an object of 
cupidity. An attack on the heart of the Adil-Shahi 
kingdom might also have united all the factions at 
the capital in a common resistance to the invader. 

But there was an outlying province of this king- 
dom which had enjoyed many years of peace and 
prosperity and whose wealth was fabulous. The 
Karnatak plain or the Madras coast was known in 
that age as the land of gold. It was an extremely 
fertile tract, rich in agricultural produce, with a popu- 
lation that led a life of primitive simplicity and con- 
sumed very little in food and clothing. The many 
ports on the long sea-board had fostered a brisk 
foreign trade from remote antiquity, w^hile the rich 
mines of the hinterland brought wealth into the plains. 
Thus the annual addition to the national wealth was 
very large. A part of it was spent on the grand 
temples for which the land is still famous ; but most 
of it was hoarded under ground. (Dil. 1 13a.) From 
very early times the Karnatak has been famous for 
its buried treasure and attracted foreign plunderers. 

From this land Samudra-gupta and the Western 
Cbalykyas, Malik Kafur and Mir Jumla, had brought 
away vast booties. And at the end of the 17th 
century, even after the recent redds of Mir Jumla and 
Muhammad Adil Shah, Shivaji and Nusrat Jang, the 
land had still enough wealth left to tempt the cupidity 
of Aurangzib. As the Emperor wrote (about 1703) 
to his general, "Many large treasures of olden times 
are reported to be buried in the Karnatak. The 

324 sHivAji. [cH. xn. 

zamindar of Tanjore, who is worthless (be-asal) an<^ 
a grandson of Shahji, the father of Shivaji now in 
hell, is possessed of the country by usurpation. His 
kingdom is not very strong. Its revenue, according 
to the late Siddi Masaud Khan, is between 70 and 
80 lakhs of hurt. Why should it be left in his pos- 
session? Inquire into the state of the country ani 
the means of wresting it from his hands." (Ruqat, 
No. 163.) To this real land of gold Shivaji's eyes 
were now turned. An attack on this frontier pro- 
vince would scarcely rouse the Government of Bija- 
pur, as the Karnatak formed the fiefs of certain semi- 
independent nobles who alone were interested in its 
defence. Moreover, Shiva had a plausible claim ta 
a portion of it. 

§2. Vyankoji the Rajah of Tanjore and his minister 
Raghunath N. Hanumante. 

Shahji had died in 1664, leaving to his younger 
son Vyankoji his vast jagirs in the south and east 
of the Bijapur State. They practically formed a 
kingdom with Tanjore for its capital, though their 
Rajah was nominally a vassal of Adil Shah. All the 
personal property of Shahji had passed into Vyan- 
koji 's hands. His eldest son, Shivaji, had merely got 
the few small jagirs in the Puna district, which he 
had usurped in his father's life-time, but no part of 
Shahji's legacy. Whether Shiva would, of himself, 
have cared to demand his legal share of his patri- 
mony, is very doubtful. He certainly did not need 

1'676] shiva's claim to tanjore. 325 

it. As he boasted to Vyankoji's envoys, "My father 
left me a jagir of only four lakhs of hun [or 40,000 
hurt, according to Sabh. 102] a year, and now I own 
a territory yielding from 50 to 60 lal^hs, besides 
realising 80 lal^hs annually as blackmail." (T. S. 35a.) 
But he was instigated by the discontented ex-wazir 
of Vyankoji to invade the kingdom.* 

Raghunath Narayan Hanumante had ably 
managed Shahji's jagirs in the Kamatak and had 
been left by his dying master as prime-minister of 
Vyankoji. Conscious of his own ability and long 
experience in administration, the minister wished to 
keep all the powers of the State in his own hands, 
and slighted his master as an incompetent sluggard, 
— while Vyankoji, irritated by Raghunath's over- 
bearing conduct and his own reduction to impotence 
in the government of his own realm, listened readily 
to the minister's jealous rivals against his counsels. 
Raghunath, also, envied the great wealth and glory 
which other Maratha Brahmans enjoyed in conse- 
quence of their being the ministers of an enterprising 

* It is incredible that a born strategist like Shivaji could 
have really intended to annex permanently a territory on the 
Madras coast, which was separated from his own dominions 
by two powerful and potentially hostile States like Bijapur 
and Golkonda, and more than 700 miles distant from his capital. 
His aim, I believe, was merely to squeeze the country of its 
accumulated wealth and return home with the booty. The 
partition of his father's heritage was only a plea adopted to 
give a show of legality to this campaign of plunder. 


and prosperous master like Shivaji, while he stag- 
nated in the dull peaceful atmosphere of Tanjore. 
After much mutual irritation, one day there was a 
stormy scene at Court ; Raghunath praised Shivaji 
as a model king and charged his own master with 
lack of ambition capacity and spirit and with an 
ignoble love of ease, while Vyankoji retorted by 
calling Shivaji a traitor and a rebel against his lawful 
sovereign and rebuking Raghunath for his outspoken- 
ness. (Chit. 131 ; Dig. 288 ; T. S. 34b.) 

The minister in disgust threw up his post and 
left Tanjore, feigning a desire to retire to Benares. 
But he set out for Maharashtra instead, and on the 
way halted at Haidarabad, where his theological 
learning and logical skill charmed Madanna Pant, 
the Qotb-Shahi prime-minister. Here Raghunath was 
made much of, and in his far-sighted diplomacy pre- 
pared the ground for a secret alliance betw^een Shivaji 
and Qutb Shah. {Dig. 290-293 ; Chit. 133.) 

Then he went to Satara and interviewed Shiva, 
who honoiured him highly for the sake of his father 
Narayan Pant and his own great services, and in- 
quired minutely about Vyankoji's doings and aims 
and the condition of his kingdom. Raghimath is said 
to have tempted Shivaji by giving him rich presents 
from the produce of the Karnatak and describing its 
fabulous wealth and the ease with which it could be 
conquered (Chit. 134.) As he knew the ins and outs 
of the country, he was at once taken into Shiva's 
service, with a view to using his local knowledge 


during the projected invasion, the idea of which 
was matured' during Shiva's long illness at Satara in 
the earlier months of 1676. 

§3. Diplomatic preparations for the Karnatak 

The political situation in the neighbouring coun- 
tries was eminently favourable to the design. The 
Mughal Emperor had, no doubt, returned to Delhi 
on 27th March, after a two years' absence in the 
Panjab, but his best troops were still engaged in 
controlling the revolted hillmen of the N. W. frontier. 
At Bijapur the Afghan leader Bahlol Khan had seized 
the guardianship of the boy-king Sikandar (I Ith Nov., 
1675) and murdered the deposed regent Khawas 
Khan (18th Jan., 1676.) But his favouritism to his 
clansmen turned the Government into "Afghan rule" 
and roused the antagonism of the Deccani party and 
its allies, the Abyssinians. The Deccanis murdered 
Khizr Khan, the right-hand man and ablest servant 
of the new regent, and civil w^ar broke out between 
the Afghans and the Deccanis throughout the State 
(Feb.) To make matters worse, Bahlol Khan alienated 
Bahadur Khan, the Mughal viceroy, who openly took 
the side of the Deccani party and on 3 1 st May opened 
a campaign against Bijapur which was to continue for 
more than a year. The rotten and tottering Adil- 
Shahi Government was in no position to trouble 
Shivaji at such a time. 

Over the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan, Shjvaji's 


clever diplomacy won a complete triumph. Bahadur 
Kheui had now grown weary of his more than two 
years' war with Shivaji, which had been chequered 
by as many defeats as successes and which seemed 
to promise no decisive end as far as he could look 
into the future. He had already coquetted with 
Shiva for a friendly understanding and offered to 
make peace between him and the Emperor and get 
a command of 6,000 horse for his son Shambhuji, 
(June, 1675.) And now, on the eve of opening the 
Mughal campaign against Bijapur, (May, 1676), it was 
as much his interest to make friends with the Marathas 
on his right flank as it was Shiva's to secure Mughal 
neutrality in his rear during his invasion of the 
Karnatak. When two parties find a mutual advantage 
in being at peace, the terms are quickly settled. 

Shiva sent his Chief Justice, Niraji Ravji, 'a 
clever logician," to Bahadur Khan, with costly pre- 
sents to induce him to promise neutrality during his 
projected absence in the Karnatak, the conquest of 
which was expected to take one year. Bahadur 
received a large bribe for himself in secret, and a 
certain sum in public as tribute for his master, and 
made a formal peace with the Marathas. (Sabh. 85.) 

Having thus secured his flank and rear, Shiva 
made preparations for starting on this his longest 
campaign. In June, 1676, Netaji Palkar had returned 
to Maharashtra, after ten years" life at Delhi as a 
Muhammadan, and he had "now been remade a 
Hindu" by means of religious purification, and some 


important military command was most probably given 
to him, though the Maratha chroniclers are silent 
about the unhappy renegade. (F. R. Surat 89, Raja- 
pur to Surat, 24 July, 1676.) The premier (Peshwa) 
Moro Trimbak Pingle was left as Regent, assisted 
by Annaji Datto the superintendent of correspondence 
(Sarnis) and Dattaji Trimbak the chronicler (Waqnis), 
with a portion of the army to guard the kingdom. 
The Konkan districts were entrusted to Annaji Datto 
"'with strong garrisons and a large body of disposable 
infantry." (Chit. 135-6 differs from Sabh. 85-87.) 

With Golkonda tlose friendship and co-operation 
were secured. Madanna Pandit, the all-powerful 
w^azir of Abul Hassan Qutb Shah, had already made 
a subsidiary alliance with Shiva, promising him an 
annual tribute of one lakh of hun for the defence of 
the realm. Prahlad Niraji, a shrewd diplomatist, 
had been posted at Haidarabad as Maratha envoy. 
Shivaji decided to get from Golkonda the expenses 
of the campaign and the assistance of an auxiliary 
force, by promising a share of the conquest. But he 
was careful to avoid the least show of force, and 
trusted to his personal magnetism and power of per- 
suasion in winning Qutb Shah's consent. 

§4. March to Haidarabad. 

He wrote to his envoy at Haidarabad to arrange 
for a friendly interview between him and Qutb Shah. 
The indolent and gay king of Haidarabad was at 
first afraid of meeting the man who had slain Afzal, 

330 SHIVAJl. [CH. XII. 

wounded Shaista, and defied Aurangzib in the very 
midst of his Court. But Prahlad Niraji took the most 
solemn oaths in support of Shiva's honesty of purpose. 
Madanna Pandit also told the king that he was 
satisfied on that point, and most probably he also 
urged the importance of . a personal interview in 
strengthening the alliance between the two kings- 
(Sabh. 85.86.) 

Qutb Shah having agreed to receive him, 
Shivaji started from Raigarh at the beginning of 
January, 1677, and advanced due east by regular 
marches. On entering Haidarabad territory he 
issued strict orders to his men not to rob or molest 
any inhabitant of the country, but to buy all 
necessary things with the owners' consent. The 
hanging or mutilation of the first few offenders 
struck such terror among the Maratha troops and 
camp-followers that they strictly obeyed his order 
and behaved with exemplary propriety ever after, 
and the most perfect discipline was maintained among 
that horde of 70,000 armed men.* 

Haidarabad was reached early in February, 1677. 
Qutb Shah had proposed to advance from his capital 

* Sabh. 86; Chit. 136. The army that followed Shivaji 
into the Kainatak is estimated by H. Gary in a letter dated 
16th Jan. 1678, as 20,000 horse and 40,000 foot (O. C. 4314.) 
Sabhasad mentions only "a select force of 25,000 horsemen" 
(p. 85); Chitnis, p. 135, has 40,000 paga with hashm; Dig. 
p. 297, gives 30 or 40 thousand cavalry and 40,000 Mavie 
infantry; T. S. "20,000 cavalry and 12,000 infantry." 


and welcome Shivaji on the way. But the Maratha 
chief very gracefully declined the offered honour, 
saying, "You are my elder brother. You should not 
come forward to receive a junior like me." So, the 
Sultan remained at Haidarabad, but his ministers 
Madanna and Akanna with many of the highest 
citizens met Shivaji several miles before the capital 
and conducted him into it. 

§5. Shivaji' s grand entry into Haidarabad. 

The city of Haidarabad had been gaily decorated 
to welcome the great friend and protector of her 
king. "The streets and lanes on all sides were 
coloured with a thin layer of kunkarn powder and 
saffron. Maypoles and triumphal arches were erected 
and flags hung at intervals throughout the city. The 
citizens in their hundreds of thousands lined the 
roads" to gaze on the scene, while the ladies crowded 
on the balconies to bless the visitor. 

The guests responded to the city's civility. The 
Maratha army, for once, abandoned its rude simpli- 
city and magnificently attired itself. Shiva had dis- 
tributed among his captains and select soldiers strings 
of pearls (torah) for their helmets, gold bracelets, 
bright new armour, and rich accoutrements embroi- 
dered with gold, "and made the whole army look 
splendid." His generals in their equipment and 
trappings rivalled the grandeur of hereditary 


At the auspicious hour chosen for the interview,* 
the Maratha army of more than 50,000 strong entered 
the city. The citizens gazed with admiration not 
unmixed with awe at the men who had vanquished 
the greatest kings of North India and South India 
ahke, and caused wailing at the Court of Bijapur and 
consternation among the peerage of Delhi. Here 
rode the fleet hardy horsemen who had poured like 
a swift resistless flood to the farthest districts of 
Mughal Deccan and carried their raids to the very 
gates of Bijapur and Golkonda. There tramped the 
Mavle infantry, whose feats were the theme of many 
a ballad and legend throughout the Southern land, 
whose assault no fort had been able to withstand, and 
whose swords were dreaded by every foe they had 
met in battle. The leaders were men whose names 
had become household words : Netaji Palkar, once 
the Master of the Horse and surnamed the Second 
Shivaji ; Suryaji Malusare and Yesaji Kank, the 
gigantic captains of the Mavles, each able to defeat 
an elephant in single combat ; Sonaji Nayak, the 
royal door-keeper ; Hambir Rao Mohite, the dashing 
but far-sighted commander-in-chief ; and Babaji 
Dhandhere, (probably the captain of the bodyguard.) 

Nor even among such heroic figures did the 
citizens fail to notice the high brows, the bright but 
sunken eyes, and the painted foreheads of the 
Maratha Brahmans, whose administrative capacity 

* Shivaji at Haidarabad: Sabh. 86-88; Chit. 136-137; Efig. 
297-302; T.S. 36a-37b; Dil. 112-113. 


and diplomatic skill had facilitated and confirmed the 
conquests achieved by the swords of these men : 
Raghunath and Janardan Narayan Hanumante, until 
recently the uncrowned kings of Tanjore ; Prahlad 
Niraji, the resident ambassador at Haidarabad ; 
Kesho Pant, and Nilo Moreshwar and Gangadhar 
Pant the auditors (majmuadars.) With them were 
mingled the more retiring and studiously unostenta- 
tious figures of the Kayastha writers : Nila Prabhu, 
the accomplished Persian draftsman {munshi), Balaji 
Avji, that jewel of a secretary (chitnis) whom Shivaji 
loved to keep close to his person ; and also, but of 
another caste, Shamji Nayak, the Keeper of the Seal. 

But none of them attracted so much attention as 
the moving spirit of all this host. In the centre of 
a brilliant throng of ministers and generals, rode a 
short spare figure, rendered still thinner by his recent 
illness and the fatigues of an unbroken march of 
300 miles. His quick beaming eyes were glancing 
right and left, and a natural smile played on his long 
light brown face distinguished by a Roman nose. 
The assembled citizens gave cheers for "Shiva 
Chhatrapati ;" flowers made of gold and silver were 
showered on him from the balconies crowded with 
ladies and the roadside alike. Every now and then 
the women came forward and waved lighted lamps 
round his person with verses of welcome and blessing. 
Nor was Shiva less liberal. In his turn he kept 
showering handfuls of gold and silver among the 

334 SHIVAJI. [CH. Xll. 

crowd on the two sides and presented costly robes 
of honour to the chief citizens of every ward. 

§6. Interview between Shivaji and Qutb Shah. 

In this way the procession arrived at the Dad 
Mahal or Palace of Justice. There all stopped before 
the gate, keeping perfect order, while Shivaji attended 
by five of his officers ascended the stairs and entered 
the palace-hall where Qutb Shah was waiting for 
liim. The Sultan came forw^ard, embraced Shivaji, 
and seated him by his side on the royal carpet. The 
wazir Madanna was also permitted to sit down ; all 
others kept standing. The ladies of the harem looked 
on the scene with wonder through the latticed 
windows around. 

For three hours did the two monarchs hold a 
friendly conversation. After the usual exchange of 
compliments and conventional inquiries about health, 
Abul Hassan Qutb Shah listened with rapt attention 
to the stories of Shivaji's heroic feats. To the slothful 
voluptuary of Golkonda, who had never drawn a 
sword in anger nor ridden to a tented field in his 
life, it sounded like the most fascinating of romances 
when Shivaji recounted how he had slain the gigantic 
Afzal Khan single-handed and hacked at Shaista 
Khan in the bosom of his harem ; how he had 
challenged Aurangzib in full Court, what hairbreadth 
escapes he had made in his flight from Agra, how 
he had sacked Surat and stormed so many hiU-forts. 
At last he gave his royal guest and the chief Maratha 

1677] MEN AND MONEY AID. 335 

officers ornaments, jewels, horses, elephants, and 
robes of honour, and dismissed them for the day, 
after graciously anointing Shivaji with scent and 
giving him betel-leaf with his own hand, and accom- 
panying him to the foot of the staircase. 

Then Qutb Shah heaved a sigh of relief ; he now 
felt convinced of Shiva's honesty of purpose and 
determination to befriend him. The Maratha ambas- 
sador at his Court was praised and rewarded for the 
truth of his assertions. Shivaji returned with his 
army to the residence selected for him, scattering 
alms all the way. 

Next day, the wazir Madanna Pandit gave a 
grand dinner to Shivaji and his chief men. The 
Rajah's meal was cooked by the prime-minister's 
venerable mother, and Madanna and Akanna sat with 
due respect and attention before Shivaji as he fed. 
The guests were conducted back to their quarters 
with presents of elephants, horses, and clothes. 

§7. Alliance with Golkonda. 

They then proceeded to business. Abul Hassan, 
being very favourably impressed by Shivaji's personal 
charm, character and ability, and the strength and 
discipline of his army, bade his wazir grant him 
whatever he wanted. After some discussion a secret 
compact was made regarding the coming campaign. 
The Sultan was to pay Shivaji a subsidy of 3,000 han 
a day, or four and a half lakhs of Rupees a month, 
and send an army of 5,000 men in charge of one of 


his generals (sar-i-lashkar), Mirza Muhammad Amin, 
to co-operate in the conquest of the Karnatak. A 
train of artillery with material was also supplied by 
Qutb Shah, and probably a large sum of money as 
advance payment of the promised subsidy. In return 
for this aid, Shivaji seems to have promised his ally 
a share ' 'of such parts of his conquests in the Karnatak 
as had not belonged to his father Shahji." (Duff, i. 
277.) The defensive alliance against the Mughals was 
strengthened anew with solemn oaths taken by Shivaji 
in the presence of Qutb Shah, while the latter pro- 
mised to pay his annual tribute of one lakh of hurt 
regularly and to keep a Maratha ambassador at his 

While these secret negotiations were going on, 
social functions and ceremonies were also being held 
in public. Shivaji paid a second formal visit to Abul 
Hassan and was presented with "an immense quan- 
tity of jewels and ornaments and innumerable horses 
and elephants." (Sabh. 88.) The two kings sat 
down together on the terrace of the palace and 
received the salute of all the Maratha officers, who 
were rewarded by Qutb Shah with gifts according to 
their ranks and achievements. Even Shivaji's charger 
did not go unrewarded ; a string of precious stones* 
was placed round its neck, as the worthy companion 
of his glorious deeds ! 

* A necklace, reputed to be this historical one, passed 
from Satara into the possession of Mr. Purushottam Vishrairj 
Mawji of Bombay and was shown to me by that gentleman. 


Another day, the leading nohles of Haidarabad 
gave a dinner to Shivaji. Then a combat was got 
up between Yesaji Kank, the Mavle capteun, and a 
mast elephant of Qutb Shedii, for the diversion of that 
king and also as a demonstration of the valour of 
Shivaji's men. Yesaji, aifter keeping the huge brute 
at bay with his sword for some time, cut off its trunk 
and put it to flight.* 

A month was spent at Heddarabad, ostensibly in 
going through these ceremonies, but really in con- 
cluding the alliance, getting delivery of the promised 
arms money and material, and equipping the local 
auxiliary force that was to assist in the campaign. 

§8. Visit to Shri Shaila. 

At last, his objects having been all gained, Shivaji 
left Haidarabad, early in March 1677, and marched 
due south towards the Krishna. This river was 
crossed at the Nivritti Sangam where the Bhavanashi 
flows into it, 24 miles north-east of Kamul. This 
spot "is considered by the Hindus a most holy place 
of pilgrimage." Here and also in the whirlpool of 
Chakratirtha, a short distance below the junction, the 
Rajah bathed, performed the religious ceremonies of 
a pilgrim, and then made a rapid journey 37 miles 
due east to Shri Shaila, lightly attended, while his 

* T. S. 37a. But Chitnis, 136, says that to Qutb Shah's 
question, "How many famous elephants have you?" Shivaji 
answered by parading several thousands of his well-built Mavle 
infantrymen and saying, "These are my elephants." 



army waited for him at Anantpur (44 m. east of 

As the Krishna winds its way eastwards to the 
sea, it forms some 70 miles below Kamul a sharp 
loop northwards, flowing through a wide and steep- 
sided trench of nearly a thousand feet in depth. 
Here, in the heart of the uninhabited Nallamala 
forest, surrounded by rugged hills and a desolate 
fever- haunted belt of land, rises a plateau 1563 feet 
high, overlooking the river, on which stands the 
famous Shiva-temple of Shri Shaila, "the most ancient 
and sacred in Southern India."* Ejitering the plateau 
by a large archway (now no more) called the Kailash- 
dwara (or Gateway of Shiva's Heaven), the pilgrim 
sighted the temple enclosure, an oblong space, 660 
feet by 510, surrounded by thick walls varying from 
20 to 26 feet in height, built of large hewn blocks 
of greyish stone exactly squared and laid together, 
and elaborately sculptured with a profusion of 
accurately designed figures of elephants, horses, 
tigers, hunters, warriors, and yogis, as well as 
numerous scenes from the Hindu epics and reUgious 
books. In the centre of this enclosure is the square 
temple of Mallikarjuna (linga), the chief deity wor- 
shipped here, the walls and roof being entirely 

* Shri Shaila : Karnool Dist. Manual 14, 144, 181-183. 
Shivaji's visit: Sabh. 88; Chit. 137-138; Dig. 302-303; T. S. 
37b. Sanads and Letters, iv. No. 20 records Shiva's endowments 
for puja here; but the date, April, 1677, is impossible; hence, 
it may be a forged grant. 


covered with gilded brass plates presented by Krishna 
Dev, the victorious Rajah of Vijaynageir (1513.) 
There is a smaller temple dedicated to Shiva's con- 
sort. A flight of stone steps, built by a Vijaynagar 
queen, leads down from the plateau to the bed of 
the Krishna, called Patal-Ganga, and a ford called 
Nila-Ganga, a little below, both of which are consi- 
dered as sacred bathing-places. 

Shivaji ascended this difl&cult plateau, bathed in 
the Krishna and spent some ten days at Shri Shaila 
doing religious rites. The quiet and secluded beauty 
of the scenery and the spiritual atmosphere of the 
place penetrated his soul, and he believed that he 
would find no purer spot to die in. So, he attempted 
to cut off his own head before the goddess ; but his 
ministers restreuned his religious frenzy and recalled 
him to a sense of his duty to his subjects and the 
Hindu world at large. Here he built a ghat, named 
Shri-Gangesha, a monastery, and a dharmashala, fed 
a lakh of Brahmans, and gave away large sums to 

Then, leaving Shri Shaila, he overtook his army 
by rapid marches and, entering the Karnatak pkiins 
in April 1677, hastened southwards. In the first 
week of May, he arrived at PeddapoUam, about 
seven miles from Madras city, and halted there for 
some time. On 14th May the English received a 
letter from him, brought by his Brahman agent, 
Mahadji Pant, asking for some cordial stones and 
counter-poisons. The Madras Council gave him 


presents worth 60 hurt, with 3 yards of broad-cloth- 
and 4 Veece of sandal wood for Mahadji, in fear of 
his army "continuing now at 2 to 5 Gentu leagues 
from this place and like to do so yet [for] some 
time." On 25th May Shivaji wrote to thank them 
for the presents and to ask for a fresh supply, offering 
to pay for them ; but the English merchants on 18th 
June gave him the presents at a cost of 52 hun to 
themselves. A Madras letter dated 19th June tells 
us that his men had already looted the English godown 
at Timmery in Vyankoji's territory to the value of 
2,000 hun. {Records of Fort St. George : Diary and' 
Consult., 1677, pp. 112.115 ; O. C. 4266.) 

§9. Capture of Jinji. 

By means of Raghunath Narayan Hanumante,. 
many of the local chieftains, great and small, of the 
Kamatak were won over and their possessions were 
peacefully occupied by Shivaji. 

In this way the impregnable fortress of Jinji was 
secured, without a blow, from Rauf Khan and Nasir 
Muhammad Khan,* the sons of the late Bijapuri wazir 

* Sabh. 88-89. Duff calls them the sons of Ambar Khan, 
which is wrong. Dig, 305, names the qiladar Ambar Khan 
{T. S. giving Khawas Khan) and tells a long story about the 
fort being seized by treachery, which is unreliable and abso- 
lutely unsupported by £iny contemporary authority. The letter of 
a contemporary Jesuit priest of Madura says that "Shivaji fell 
upon the place like a thunderbolt and carried it at the first 
jissault." (La Mission du Madure, as quoted in S. A. Gaz. 


Khan-i-Khanan (probably Khawas Khan), in return 
for money and jagirs elsewhere. As soon as Shivaji 
with 10,000 cavalry arrived in its environs and 
encamped at Chakrapuri on the bank of the Chakra- 
•vati river, Jinji opened its gates to him (end of May.) 
The captured fort was placed in charge of a 
Mavle captain named Ramaji Nalge, and the sur- 
rounding district under Vithal Pildev Garud as 
-viceroy, assisted by a sabnis and a Public Works 
-oflficer. The military and revenue administration 
established by Shivaji in Maharashtra was introduced 
here without any change. (Chit. 139 ; Dig. 304-6.) 
He "constructed new ramparts round Jinji, dug 
ditches, raised towers and bastions, and carried out 
all these works with a perfection of which European 
■skill would not have been ashamed." (Letter of 
1678 by the Jesuit priest Andre Freire in Mission du 

§10. Contest with Sher Khan for Vellore 
and Tiruvadi. 

Sher Khan Lodi, a brave Pathan officer of 
Bijapur, was the local governor of the Trinomala 
district which included the forts of Vellore and 

350 n.) Madras Consult, of 9th May 1677 says, "Shivaji is 
now upon his march to fall upon Jinji, with 20,000 horse and 
40,000 foot, the Van whereoof, being about 5,000 horse, already 
passed Tripati and Kalhastri, and [is] this night expected at 
Conjeveram." In June the Madras Council report to Bantam 
sthat Shivaji had already taken Jinji. 


Tiruvadi. With his contingent of 5,000 horse and 
abundance of elephants and war-material, he offered 
an obstinate resistance to the invaders. Ami (defended 
by Vedo Vaskar) seems to have been invested in 
May, and we find it holding out till the beginning of 
October, 1677. (Chit. 142 ; Dig. 330.) 

Shivaji laid siege to Vellore about the middle 
of May, 1677. On the 25th of that month, we find 
him present in person before the fort. The attack 
was entrusted to Narahari Ballal Sabnis. He opened 
trenches around it and began to bombard it, after 
mounting batteries on two neighbouring hills, which 
he fortified and named Sazra-Gozra. Vellore was 
one of the strongest forts in the Karnatak. A deep 
wet ditch, swarming with crocodiles surrounded it. 
The outer ramparts were wide enough for two carts 
to be driven abreast. It had four concentric lines of 
circumvallation. (Sabh. 90.) It defied the Marathas 
for 14 months and fell only in Aug. 1678. 

At the end of the next month Sher Khan suffered 
a decisive defeat. In the night of 26th June he 
attempted to escape from the fort of Tiruvadi, 13 m. 
west of Cuddalore, towards Tevenapatam (or 
Devenapatam, a suburb of Cuddalore.) The Maratha 
horse, getting scent of the design, gave chase and 
drove him into Akala Nayak's wood, w^hich lay in 
the way. Five hundred of the Khan's horsemen 
offered battle and held up the pursuers for two hours. 
Then the moon set and Sher Khan ran away with 
some of his cavalry and elephants to the south of the 


wood. The Marathas continued the pursuit in the 
darkness and captured from him 500 horses, 20 
camels, two elephants, and many oxen, tents and 
war drums. The Khan fled with a broken remnant 
of only 100 cavalry to the town of Bowanigiri, 22 miles 
southwards, on the Vellar river, still pursued by the 

But the fort of Tiruvadi continued to hold out 
under Sher Khan's father-in-law. Leaving Babo 
Sahib, Savanumwar ( ?) and some of Nasir Muham- 
mad's horse to invest the place, Shivaji himself 
encamped three miles south of Tevenapatam, while 
a party of his cavalry was' pushed up towards 
Bowanigiri. Thither Shiva went in person about the 
middle of July, to make an end of Sher Khan. Here 
he received Nellor Ramana, an envoy of the En^ish 
factory of Madras, who presented him with a second 
supply of "Maldiva cocoanuts, beazar, and cordial 
stones and other sorts of good counter-poisons," 
which the Rajah had solicited from Madras.* 

§11. Shivaji marches south towards Tanjore. 
Then after a time, he marched south across the 
Vellar and cantoned his army for the rainy season at 
Tirumalavadi, on the north bank of the Kolerun 

* Contest with Sher Khan : Factory Records, Fort St. 
George, Vol. 27. "Letter from our Brahman Wardapa from 
Shivaji Raja's camp, 27 June, 1677." "Letter from our 
Brahman Nellor Ramana from Shivaji Raja's army, 16 luly." 
Also Z. C. 

344 SHIVAJl. [CH. XII. 

river, 10 miles due north of Tanjore. Here an envoy 
from Chokka-natha, the ruler of Madura, the chief 
ally of Vyankoji, waited upon Shivaji, who demanded 
from him one ^rore of Rupees " for the present, for 
his expenses," arguing that the Nayak bore the sign 
of being worth nine^es. The envoy "answered 
that part of his master's country the Nayak of Mysore 
had taken and part Vyankoji, and that if he (Shiva) 
would restore him the said country, the Nayak of 
Madura would give him seven lakjis. The Nayak 
sent all his family away from Chartanapalli 
(Trichinopoly), where they were before, to Madura 
[for safety] ; and while the river Kolerun remained 
full he feared nothing [from the Marathas.] " (Letter 
to Governor of Madras, 16 July 1677.) But shortly 
afterwards Raghunath Pant came from Maharashtra 
and was cordially welcomed by Shivaji, who then sent 
him to Madura with the Nayak's envoy to settle the 
amount of the blackmail by negotiation. The Nayak 
agreed to pay six lakhs of hurt, out of which 1 Yz lal^hs 
were delivered immediately, and Shivaji promised to 
retire with his army. (Nellor Ramana to Madras, 
J 6 July.) 

§ 12. Interview between Shivaji and Vyankoji. 

In the meantime, messages had been passing 
between Shivaji and his half-brother Vyankoji for 
a meeting.* At Shivaji's request, the Rajah of 

* Meeting between SKivaji and Vyankoji : F. R. Fort St. 
George, Vol. 27, Letter from Nellor Ramana. 27 July, 1677. 


Tanjore had sent his ministers for a preliminary 
discussion. They returned to their master with three 
of Shivaji's ministers carrying a letter of invitation 
from him. Reassured by their report and Shiva's 
solemn promises of safety, Vyankoji arrived at 
Tirumala-vadi about the middle of July, with an 
escort of 2,000 horse. Shiva advanced to Tripatur 
(6 m. n. e.) to welcome him on the way. The brothers 
spent eight days together exchanging gifts and feast- 
ing each other. Then Shivaji opened his business. 
He demanded three-fourths of whatever Shahji had 
left at his death, — money, horses, jewels, and 
territory, — offering to let Vyankoji enjoy the remain- 
ing quarter. The latter declined, at which Shivaji 
burst into anger and rebuked him for being a lazy 
v\forthless and covetous fellow. That night Vyankoji 
fled to Tanjore across the Kolerun, accompanied by 
only five horsemen, (about 25th July.) 

Shivaji learnt of his brother's flight next morning 
and, ascribing it to the advice of the Tanjore 
ministers, — Jagannath (the son of Vyankoji Datto), 
Konher Mahadev and Shivaji Shankar (two 
majmuadars) and Niloji Nayak (a merchant), he 
placed them under arrest and threatened to send 
Janardan Narayan Hanumante to take possession of 
the kingdom of Tanjore. He was rightly indignant 

Dil. 113-114. The Marathi accounts are much later and less 
reliable: Sabh. 89—90; Dig. 306-313; Chit. 139—140 
(deliberate falsification); T. S. 38a; Zedhe Chronology. 


at his brother's conduct, as it implied distrust of his 
solemn pledge of safety, and cried out in open Court, 
"Was I going to imprison him? My fame has spread 
over the sea-girt earth. I asked for my father's 
property, only because one should keep his heritage. 
If he does not wish to part with it, he is under no 
compulsion to give it. Why did he flee for nothing? 
He is very young and has acted like a child." 
(Sabhasad, 90.) 

After a time the captive ministers of Vyankoji 
were set free, and sent back to Tanjore with presents 
and robes of honour. Thus Shiva ji cleared himself 
in the eyes of the public. But though he gave up 
the idea of invading the Tanjore territory south of the 
Kolerun, he seized the whole Karnatak north of that 
river, both the jagirs of Vyankoji and those of Sher 
Khan.* The few forts that held out were conquered 
by the end of September. 

§13. Shivaji's pilgrimages. 

These campaigns were varied, as was Shivaji's 
usual practice, by pilgrimages to holy places. At 
the end of July, 1677, leaving Waligonda-puram (37 
miles north of Trichinopoly), he crossed the Vellar 
river at Tittagudi (16 miles north-east of Waligonda- 
puram), and thence he sent his army to Elavanasur 
(22 miles due north) while he himself "with Simaji 

* F. R. Fort St. George, Madras to James and Chamber- 
laine, 24 Aug., 1677. 


Nayak and others of his great men" turned 16 miles 
north-east to worship at the great Shiva temple of 
Vriddhachalam. Here the chief of the Dutch factory 
of Tevenapatam (Cuddalore) waited on him with 
presents of "scarlet silk stuffs, sandal wood, rose 
water, Maldiva cocoanuts, cloves and sword blades." 
(Nellor Ramana's letter, 2 Aug.) 

On 22nd September Shivaji was at Vaniam- 
vadi, (40 miles s. w. of Vellore) and wrote to the 
English governor of Madras: "In the Kamat 
country...! intend to build new works in several forts 
and castles. You may likely have with you such men 
as know hoVv to make great carriages for guns and 
how to contrive mines. We have need of such men 
at present, especially those that know how to make 
mines and to blow up stone- walls. If there be any 
such men with you that know how to make mines, 
you would be pleased to send some 20 or 25, or at 
least 10 or 5 such men, for I shall pay them very well 
and shall entertain them in several of my forts." 
(F. R. Fort St. George, Vol. 27.) The English 
politely declined the request, saying that, being 
merchants, it was their duty to maintain strict 
neutrality. On 3rd October, Shivaji was within two 
days' march of Madras. (Love, i. 371 .) Shortly before, 
he had pillaged Porto Novo, and made himself master 
of the South Arcot district. (Love, i. 357.) In 
October Arni surrendered to him, and so also did 
some other forts in the North Arcot district. 


§14. Shioaji's conquests in the Karnatak, and 

Then, at the beginning of November, 1677, he 
himself with 4,000 cavalry marched away from the 
Karnatak plains, leaving the bulk of his army in 
occupation of his new conquest and "promising to 
return quickly." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 107, Madras 
letter of 20 Nov. 1677.) Ascending the Eastern Ghats 
into the tableland, he took easy possession of 
his father's jagir districts, — Kolar, Uskota, Bangalore, 
Balapur and Sera, in the eastern and central parts of 
the present kingdom of Mysore, repressed the 
turbulent poligars of that No Man's Land, and then 
returned home through the Bellary and Dharwar 
districts, reaching Panhala in March, 1678. (Sabh. 
91; Chit. 141 ; Dig. 317.) 

Early in August 1678, the fort of Vellore 
surrendered to Shivaji's forces after a siege of 14 
months, "Abdullah Khan, the Captain, that held 
it out all this time, having behaved himself very 
resolutely therein. But his men from 1,800 foot 
and 500 horse, being by the extremity of the siege 
and sickness reduced to 200 foot and 100 horse, and 
no supplies sent from Bijapur,...he could not hold 
it longer, and therefore delivered it upon condition to 
have 30,000 pagodas in money, a small fort and 
country worth 30,000 pagodas per annum." (Diary 
and Consult. 1678-79, p. 105.) The bribe paid by the 
Marathas to Abdullah is put at 50,000 hun in the 
Bijapur history. (B. S. 418.) 

1677] shiva's gains in madras. 349^ 

The territory annexed by Shivaji in the Kamatak 
was estimated to 3deld 20 lalzhs of hun a year and in- 
cluded a hundred forts, taken or built by him. (Sabh> 
90.) In August 1678, the Madras factors write, "Shivaji 
by his deputies has a full and quiet possession of all 
these countries about those two strong castles of 
Jinji and Vellore, which are worth 22 lakh of pzurdoes. 
or 550 thousand pounds sterling per annum, at five 
shillings the pardoe, in which he has a considerable 
force of men and horse, 72 strong hills and 14 forts 
[in the plain] , — being 60 leagues long and 40 broad." 
(Diary and Consult. 1678-79, pp. 105-106.) But gold, 
and not land, was his chief object. The whole of 
the Karnatak was "peeled to the bones" by his 
system of organised plunder and exaction, which is 
thus described in the Madras President's letter of 
19th June, 1677. "He has ordered letters to be wrote 
to all this part of the country, the sea-coast especially, 
to borrow money to the amount of 200 thousand 
pagodas, whereof 50,000 [is] from Palicat and as 
much" from hence [Madras.] The moneyed men all 
about the country shift out of the way as fast as they 
can, he having taken a minute account of all such as 
he passed by within 2 leagues and 2J/^ of the place." 
(O. C. 4266.) The booty carried off in this expedition* 

"With a success as happy as Caesar's in Spain, he came, 
saw and overcame, and reported so vast a treasure in gold, 
diamonds, emeralds, rubies and wrought coral that have 
strengthened his arms with very able sinews to prosecute his. 

350 SHIVAJl. [CH. XII. 

was so vast as to stagger the imagination of the 
Maratha chroniclers, and they made no attempt to 
compute its value. 

Over the Karnatak plains thus conquered, he 
at first placed Shantaji, a natured son of Shahji, 
as viceroy with Jinji for his headquarters, assisted by 
Raghunath Narayan Hanumante as diplomatist and 
local adviser, and Hambir Rao as commander of the 
army of occupation. The tableland of Mysore 
was placed under Rango Narayan as viceroy, but 
subject to the higher jurisdiction of Jinji. 

§15. Struggle with Vyankpji renewed. 

But the new conquest was not to enjoy peace 
in the absence of his master mind. Vyankoji, on 
returning to Tanjore, set on foot intrigues with the 
Nayaks of Madura and Mysore "and other woodmen" 
(as the English called the poligars), and even appealed 
to the Court of Bijapur and the Muslim nobles in 
his neighbourhood, to organise "a confederacy for 
regaining their own." The Nayak of Madura, how- 
ever, remained neutral, and no help seems to have 
come from Mysore or Bijapur. About 25th November, 
Vyankoji, at the head of 4,000 cavalry and 10,000 
infantry of his own and of the allied poligars, crossed 
the Kolerun, and attacked Shantaji, who boldly 
resisted with his 12,000 men from morning to nightfall. 

further victorious designs.** (H. Gary to Co., dated Bombay, 
16 Jan., 1678. O. C. 4314.) "Peeled to the bones*' in Madras 
records of Oct. 1677. 


At first Shantaji was worsted and fled for two 
miles. The Tanjore horsemen, after pursuing him 
for a mile, returned to their tents to rest from the 
day's fatigue. But Shantaji, on reaching his camp,* 
"consulting with his captains what the importance 
and shame [of the defeat] would be, resolved to 
dress and saddle their horses again, and so 
immediately rode away by other ways, and in the 
dead of night surprised them fast at rest after so 
hard labour, their horses unsaddled, and made a 
great slaughter of them, taking nigh 1 ,000 horse, the 
three chief commanders, the tents and all their 
baggage, and 100 horses more taken by woodmen 
^vho fell to share the plunder. The rest fled over 
the river Kolerun for Tanjore." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 
107, Madras letter of 20th and 29th Nov., 1677 ; Z. C.) 
The victors gave chase. Vyankoji, unable to 
resist, sued for peace, and Shivaji consenting, a treaty 
was rnade through the mediation of Raghunath 
Narayan Hanumante. The terms are given in 
Shivadigvijay, 328-332. 

* Sabhasad, 91, describes the batde dius; "Vyankoji's 
army was four times as large as that of Hambir Rao, but the 
latter defeated the former, capturing 4,000 of his horses; 
besides elephants, jewels, ordinary officers, and Vikaji and 
Pratapji (two natural sons of Shahji) and other officers of high 
rank." Shivadigvijay, 314, says that the battle took place at 
Waligonda-puram and that Shivaji's army was commanded 
by Bahir Rao Mohite, and not by Shantaji. Chitnis, 143, 
gives Waligonda-puram. 


Shivaji, after nearly one year of occupation, 
restored the Karnatak plain to Vyankoji, retaining 
only the forts in his own hands, as well as edl the 
tableland of Mysore which had once belonged to 
his father. In May 1678, the English at Madras report 
that Vyankoji had got his territories back by paying 
three lakhs of hun in cash to his elder brother. 
(Madras to Surat, F. R. Surat, Vol. 107.) 

The army of occupation* under Hambir Rao 
was recalled to Shiva's side, and Raghunath 
organised a local force of 10,000 horse (both paga and 
silahdar), for the defence of the country, and con- 
tinued to act as regent and adviser to Vyankoji. But 
he retained his old antipathy to that Prince, and 
there was constant friction between the two. Shivaji 
had repeatedly to write to both, counselling amity 
and moderation, and it was only the fear of his strong 
personality that kept the peace between the two, 
and made Raghunath recognise that Vyankoji must 
be master in his own realm. (T. S. 38a and b ; 
Dig. 326-335, 362 ; Parasnis Tanjavar-chen Raj- 
gharane, 36-38 and 42-43.) 

* From Madras Consult., dated 19 August, 1678, we learn : 
"Yesterday there came news from Conjeveram that 1000 or 
1500 of Shivaji's horse under his brother Shantaji appeared 
before that place. This day other persons from Conjeveram 
came and reported that the 1000 horsemen of Shiva came 
thither in pursuit of some Bijapuri foot that was intended to 
relieve Vellore, vrhich has been besieged by Shiva's forces 
these 14 months." (Diary and Consult. Book, 1678-79, p. 105.), 

His Last Years. 

§1. Adventures during return from the 

After his marvellous success in the invasion ol 
the Karnatak, Shivaji left the Madras plains (about 
November, 1677) and entered the Mysore plateau, 
conquering its eastern and central parts.* 

Froih Sera in the heart of the Mysore kingdom 
(December, 1677), he marched to Kopal, 125 miles 
north, the fort of which he took, then turned 35 miles 
westwards to Gadag, and 24 miles south of the latter 
to Lakshmishwar in the Dharwar district, (capturing 
the forts at both these places.) The desai of Mulgund, 
half way from Gadag to Lakshmishwar, had 
evacuated his fort in terror, and it was occupied by 

* His route is thus given in Sabhasad, 91 : Kolhar — 
Ballapur — Kopal — Lakshmishwar — Khangauda desai chastised — 
Sampgaon district — Balvada desain invested, captured, and 
"taught a lesson" — Panhala. Chitnis, 142 : — Srirangapattan 

— Gadag — Lakshmishwar — Khangaada desai fled — Gadag — 
Balved desain Mai Bai besieged for 27 days, captured and 
released. Shivadigvijay , 347-357 : Savitri Bai of Belvadi 
besieged — Gadag — Lakshmishwar — Gaunda desai fled — Balved 
desain loots transport, is besieged and captured. I cannot find 
Khangaada in the maps, but only Mulgund and Naoalgund^ 
(the last being 20 m. n. w. of Gadag.) 



the Marathas. Bankapur, 20 miles s. w. of 
Lakshmishwar, was besieged unsuccessfully, about 
the middle of January, 1678. (O. C. 4314.) From 
this place Shiva ji retraced his steps northwcirds, and 
arrived near Sampgaon in the Belgaum district. At 
Belvadi, a small village 12 miles s. e. of Sampgaon 
and 30 miles s. e. of Belgaum, Savitri Bed, the 
Viridowed lady proprietor, plundered some transport 
bullocks of Shiva's army when passing by. Her 
fort was at once besieged, but she defended it most 
heroically for 27 days, after which it was carried by 
assault and she herself was captured. * 

This long check by a woman, before a petty 
mud-fort, greatly lowered Shivaji's prestige. As 
the English merchants of Rajapur write on 28th 
Feb., 1678: "He is at present besieging a fort 
where, by relation of their ow^n people come from 
him, he has suffered more disgrace than ever he 
did from all power of the Mughal or the Deccans 

* T. S., 38a, thus describes her fate : "A woman named 
Savitri was the patelni (proprietress) of Belvadi. From the 
shelter of her fort she fought Shiva for one month. On her 
provisions and munitions running short, she made a sortie, 
demolished all the siege trenches, and dispersed and slew 
many of the besiegers. For one day she kept the field 
heroically, but at last fled vanquished, was captured and 
greatly dishonoured. Sakhuji Gaikwar vi^as the doer of this 
evil deed. Shivaji, on hearing of his act, put out both his eyes 
and thus gave him his deserts. He was imprisoned in the 
village of Manauli." 


'( = Bijapuris), and he who hath conquered so many 
kingdoms is not able to reduce this woman Desai ! ' ' 
(F. R. Surat, 107.) 

Soon afterwzirds Shivaji had another and very 
great disappointment, — ^the greatest in his life, which 
we describe in the words of the Rajapur factors in 
their letter dated 3rd April. "Jamshid Khan, since 
the death of his master the Nawab [Bahlol Khan, on 
23rd Dec, 1677], found himself incapable of longer 
holding out, agrees with Shivaji to deliver up [the 
fort of Bijapur and the person of Sikandcir Adil Shah] 
for 600,000 pagodas. Siddi Masaud, having intelli- 
gence of this, feigns a sickness, at last death, and 
causes a handol publicly to be sent away with part 
of the army to Adoni, the residue (of his troops) about 
4,000 sent to Jamshid, pretending that since the 
leader was dead, if he would entertain them they 
would serve him. He presently accepts their service 
and receives them into the Fort, who within two days 
seized his person, caused the gates to be opened and 
received the Siddi in alive, (2Ist Feb., 1678.) 
Shivaji upon his march hearing this news returns, 
and is expected at Panhala in a short time." (F. R. 
Surat, Vol. 107.) 

In an age when almost every man had his price, 
Shivaji cannot be blamed for trying to make gains 
by bribery. The fort of Bijapur was for sale, and 
he only made a bid for it, and took his chance with 
other competitors for the position of keeper of the 
puppet Adil Shah, even as Shahji had been the 


keeper of a puppet Nizam Shah. Masaud and 
Bahlol were not more disinterested, but certainly less 
efficient than he would have been as Regent of 

The news of the transfer of the Adil-Shahi 
capital to Siddi Masaud (2 1st February) reached 
Shivaji on his way from Belvadi through Turgal to 
Bijapur, and he swerved aside to the ■west and 
returned to his own stronghold of Panhala at the 
end of March or in the first week of April, 1678. 

§2. Maratha activity in 1677. 

At this stage we may conveniently inquire into 
what happened in Maharashtra during Shivaji's 
absence in the Karnatak. In November, 1676, an 
army was sent under Shambhuji to annex some 
Portuguese territory near Goa. He demanded 60 
villages from the Portuguese on the ground that they 
belonged to the fort of Ponda, which was now in 
Shivaji's possession ; but on meeting with a refusal, 
he made a rash assault on the Portuguese forces, who 
beat him off. Then the Marathas left the district for 
Daman, hoping to find less opposition there. But 
no permanent gain resulted from this campaign. 
(Dutch Rec, Vol. 34, No. 844.) 

During this period (December, 1676 — March, 
1678), the army left at home under Moro Trimbak 
in the Desh and Annaji Datto in Konkan, naturally 
confined itself to the defence of the realm, without 
venturing to make any aggression. In November 


1677, however, Dattaji taking advantage of the crush- 
ing repulse of Dilir and Bahlol by the Golkonda 
troops (September) roved the inland parts of Kanara 
and looted Hubli. E^rly in January, 1678, Moro 
Pant "plundered Trimbak, Nasik and other consider- 
able places in the Mughal territory." Dilir Khan 
hastened there with the remnant of his broken army, 
(middle of February.) (F. R. Surat 107, Rajapur to 
Surat, 8 Dec, 1677 ; Bomb, to Surat, 21 Feb., 1678 ; 
O. C. 4314. Surat 89, Surat to Co., 21 Jan., 1678.) 

§3. Conquest of the Tungabhadra bank- 

Shivaji's return home (March, 1678), revived 
Maratha activity. The districts that he retained 
in Central and Eastern Mysore as the result of his 
Karnatak expedition, had to be connected with his 
old dominions by the conquest of the southern corner 
of the kingdom of Bijapur, which consisted of the 
Kopal region north of the Tungabhadra opposite the 
Bellary district, as well as part of the Dharwar and 
Belgaum districts intervening between Kopal and 
Panhala. This country was held by two Afghans, 
Husain Khan Miana of Sampgaon (Belgaum) and his 
brother Qasim Khan of Kopal. They were fellow, 
clansmen of Bahlol Khan, and it seems probable that 
on the death of that chief and the ruin of his family, 
the defence of these tracts, formerly included in his 
jagir, was entrusted to them. 

Husain Khan was as high and powerful a noble 
as Bahlol Khan, a brave general renowned for his 


martial spirit, and commanding 5,000 Pathan archers, 
lancers, musketeers and artillery-men. The fort of 
Kopal was secured by Moro Pant from Qasim Khan 
for a price. Husain Khan is said by Chitnis (p. 142) 
to have opposed Shivaji's return by the Kopal-Gadag 
route and to have been repulsed. Some time after- 
wards he was defeated and captured by Hambir Rao 
near Sampgaon, but dismissed by Shivaji with honour. 
According to a late tradition (T.S. 33b), Husain Khan, 
being a man of a delicate sense of honour, took his 
disgrace to heart and swallowed poison. This is 
untrue, as we have contemporary evidence of Husain 
Miana deserting from Bijapur to the Mughals on 
11th March, 1683, (B. S. 445 ; M. A., 225.) The 
Maratha troops who had won these triumphs under 
Hambir Rao and Moro Pant were, on their return, 
reviewed by Shivaji and highly praised and rewarded. 
(Chit. 146.) 

"Kopal (105 miles due south of Bijapur and a 
slightly greater distance south-east of Belgaum) is the 
gate of the south," and its possession enabled the 
Maratha dominion to be extended to the bank of 
the Tungabhadra river and even across it into the 
Bellary and Chittaldurg districts. Many of the local 
chieftains, who had long defied the Bijapur Govern- 
ment and withheld taxes in this ill-subdued border 
country, were now chastised by the Marathas and 
reduced to obedience, — among them being the poli- 
gars of Kanakgiri (25 miles n. e. of Kopal), Harpan- 
halli (40 miles s. of Kopal), Raydurg, Chittaldurg, 


Vidyanagar (? old Vijaynagar), and Bundikot 
(? Gudicota, 45 miles e. of Harpan-halli.) This 
country was now formed into a regular province 
of Shivaji's kingdom and placed under Janardan 
Narayan Hanumante as viceroy.* 

In the meantime, a few days after Shivaji's 
return to Panhala, his troops attacked Mungi-Pattan, 
on the Godavari, 30 miles south of Aurangabad. 
(M. A. 166.) It was probably next month that they 
made a second attempt to get possession of Shivner. 
They invested the village (of Junnar) at its foot, and 
at night tried to scale the fort. "Three hundred 
Marathas climbed the fort-walls at night by means 
of nooses and rope-ladders. But Abdul Aziz Khan 
was an expert qiladar. Though he had sent away 

*The Mianas: Sabh. 80-81; Chit. 142, 146, 179; Dig. 285, 
339; T.S. 33a & b; B.S. 406 {one sentence only.) Dig. 335 
speaks of a Yusuf Khan Miana. Is it a misreading of Husain 
(Isab for Hasen)} Sabh. 6.5. and T. S. place the Maratha 
expansion into the Kopal district before, and Ch^tnis and Dig. 
after, Shivaji's invasion of the Karnatak. The latter view is 
more probable. The conquest and consolidation must have 
taken more expeditions than one and a pretty long time. The 
narrative in Chit. 179 and Dig. 285-287 seems to me to be 
confused and unreliable. Z. C. asserts that in January 1677 
Hambir Rao defeated Husain Khan near Yelgedla (?=Yelburga) 
in the Gadag district and took 2,000 horses and some elephants 
from him; in May 1678, Shivaji after gaining the Gadag district 
returned to Raigarh ; in March 1679 Moro Pant, by sending 
back the captive son of Husain Khan, secured the fort of 
Kopal ; he released Husain Khan, who now entered his service. 


his sons and followers to reinforce the jaujdar 
Yahiya Khan in the village, he personally with a few 
men sle'w all the infantry of Shiva who had entered 
the fort. Next morning he hunted out the few who 
had concealed themselves in the hill [side] below 
the fort and among rocks and holes, and released 
them with presents, sending a message to Shivaji 
to the effect, 'So long as 1 am qiladar, you will never 
take this fort.' " (Dil. 157.) 

§4. The Mughals, Bijapur, and Shivaji, 1678. 

A rupture novir took place betw^een Shiva and 
Qutb Shah, and the diplomatic system so patiently 
built up by Madanna Pandit fell to the ground. 
Qutb Shah's indignation had been rising as he found 
himself made a mere cat's paw of Shiva in the 
Karnatak adventure. He had borne all the expenses 
of the expedition and supplied artillery and an 
auxiliary force for it. But not one of the conquered 
forts was given to him, not one pice of his contribu. 
tion was repaid out of the fabulous booty carried 
away by Shiva from that land of gold. And now the 
Maratha plot to capture Bijapur by treachery destroy- 
ed the last trace of patience in the Golkonda king, 
especially as he had been playing for some years 
past the flattering role of a chivalrous friend and 
protector of the boy Adil Shah. So, Abul Hassan 
arranged for a peace between the new Bijapuri 
regent, Siddi Masaud, and his rivals (especially 
Sharza Khan), helped him with money to pacify the 


unpaid mutinous soldiery, and bound him to wage 
war against Shiva and "confine him to Konkan." 
The Adil-Shahi nobles prepared to open the campaign 
in October next, with about 25,000 cavalry and 
numerous infantry. But Dilir Khan spoiled the whole 
plan. (O. C. 4266 ; F. R. Surat 107. Rajapur to 
Surat, 3 April, 1678 ; G. Robinson to Surat, 31 Aug.) 
Dilir Khan had exacted heavy and humiliating 
concessions from Siddi Masaud when he made peace 
with him at Kulbarga (Nov. 1677.) The odium of 
that treaty fell on the new regent, and all the disorders 
in the State and all the sufferings of the people were 
laid at his door. Distracted by domestic factions, 
daily insulted and threatened by the Afghan soldiers, 
and hopeless of preventing "Shiva's boundless 
violence and encroachments" with the resources of 
the ruined, divided and bankrupt State, Siddi Masaud 
wanted to come to terms with Shivaji ; but Dilir Khan 
forbade it, assuring him that the imperial army was 
ready to help him in fighting the Marathas. Masaud 
was, however, too bewildered by the disturbances in 
all parts of the country to listen to this advice. He 
•wrote to Shiva, "We are neighbours. We eat the 
same salt. You are as deeply concerned in [the 
welfare of] this State as I am. The enemy [i.e., 
Mughals] are day and night trying to ruin it. We 
two ought to unite and expel the foreigner." 

§5. Shambhuji deserts to the Mughals. 
At the news of these negotiations, Dilir Khan 


grew angry and set himself to conquer Bijapur. Only 
respect for treaties had kept him from doing so 
before ; but Masaud's breach of faith absolved him 
from the obligation to spare Adil Shah. (B. S. 408, 
414.) And he now received a most unexpected 
accession of strength. Shivaji's eldest son Shambhuji 
was the curse of his old age. This youth of nineteen 
was violent, capricious, unsteady, thoughtless and 
notoriously depraved in his morals. For his outrage 
on a married Brahman woman he had been confined 
in Panhala fort, but escaped with his ^vife Yesu Bai 
and a few comrades to join Dilir Khan. Shivaji sent 
a force in pursuit, but was too late. Dilir Khan, 
on getting Shambhuji's letter, had detached from 
his camp at Bahadurgarh 4,000 men under Ikhlas 
Khan (the commander of his Vanguard) and Ghairat 
Khan (his nephew) to advance and escort the fugitive. 
They met him 8 miles south of Supa, and Dilir 
himself joined them at Karkamb, 12 miles further 
north-east. Dilir Khan was thrown into transports 
of joy at the desertion of Shivaji's heir to his side. 
'He felt as happy as if he had conquered the whole 
Deccan!" (B. S. 415.) "He beat his drums in joy 
and sent a report to the Emperor. Shambhu was 
created a 7-hazari and a Rajah and presented with an 
elephant." (Dil. 159.) This happened in November, 
1678. The Khan with his valuable new ally halted 
at Akluj (50 miles south of Bahadurgarh) for some 
time to prepare for the invasion of Bijapur. 


§6. Maratha plot to seize Bijapur. 

In this danger Siddi Masaud immediately asked 
for help from Shiva, as agreed upon. The Rajah 
sent six to seven thousand well-armed cavalry to- 
guard Bijapur. Masaud could not fully trust his eJly, 
he asked 'the Maratha contingent to halt beside the 
stream of the village Itangihal (5 m. n. w. of the 
city), but they came nearer, encamped at Khanapur 
and Khusraupur, and demanded that one of the gates 
and towers of the fort should be entrusted to them. 
Masaud wisely declined. Then they moved to 
Zuhrapur and encamped on the plain just outside 
the walls, thus increasing Masaud's suspicion. Soon 
the allies began to quarrel openly.* The Marathas 
■were detected in trying to smuggle arms and men 
into the fort, by concealing the arms in sacks of 
grain and disguising themselves as drivers of the 
pack-oxen ! Then Shiva threw off the mask. He 
began to plunder and devastate Adil-Shahi territory 
again. His men looted the suburbs of Bijapur, — 
Daulatpura ( = Khawaspura), Khusraupura and 
Zuhrapura, and carried off the rich banias for ransom. 
Near the tomb of Shaikh Ahmad Khawas-Khani, they 

* "It is reported that Shivaj'i has in person plundered 
Shahpur, the suburbs of Bijapur, and had hked to have got 
into the royal city, the conquest whereof is his sole aim, lest 
it should fall into the Mughal's hands, and then he knows he 
could not long subsist." (Bombay to Surat, 4 April 1679, in 
Orme MSS. 116.) 


slew Ali Raza and wounded Siddi Yaqut. But when 
they reached the tomb of Ibrahim Adil Shah, west 
of the city, a shot from the fort-guns killed the 
Maratha commander and the men fled away. Masaud 
now made peace with Dilir Khan. 

A Mughal force was invited to Bijapur, royally 
welcomed, and sent off with a Bijapuri army under 
Venkatadri Murari (the confidant of the regent) and 
other officers, against the Marathas. They reached 
Tikota (13 miles w. of Bijapur), when spies brought 
the report that Shiva himself had arrived at Selgur 
(55 miles w. of Bijapur and the same distance east of 
Panhala) with 7 to 8 thousand men and wanted to 
make a night-attack on the Mughal or the Bijapuri 
army, whichever would advance first. But a new 
quarrel between Masaud and Sharza Khan paralysed 
the power of Bijapur. (B. S. 415-418.) 

§7. Di7r> captures Bhupalgarh. 

Dilir Khan next marched to the fort of Bhupal- 
garh,* which Shivaji had built as a storehouse of his 
property and the refuge of the families of his 
subjects in the neighbourhood during his w^sirs with 
the Mughals. By great labour the imperialists 

* Shambhuji"s desertion to the Mughals and capture of 
Bhupalgarh . B. S. 415, 418-19, 430 (best.) Dil. 159-163 
(reliable.) F. R. Sural, Vol. 108, Rajapur to Surat, 16 Dec, 
1679, Bombay to Surat, 1 Jan., 1680 (return.) Sabh. 93-94; 
Chit. 172-'4; Dig. 263-269 (legend.) T. S. 39a (confused.) 


dragged some guns to the top of a neighbouring 
height during the night and next morning began to 
batter the walls and towers. The assault was 
launched about 9 A. M. and the Mughals fought with- 
vigour till noon, when they captured the fort after 
heavy slaughter on both sides. Vast quantities of 
grain and other property and large numbers of people 
were captured by the victors. Seven hundred 
survivors of the garrison were deprived of one hand 
and then set free ; the other captives were evidently 
sold into slavery. 

Before this Shivaji had sent 1 6,000 horse to relieve 
the fort. They arrived too late, but hovered on the 
four sides of the Mughals. Suddenly they learnt 
that Iraj Khan and Bajaji Rao [Nimbalkar] were 
bringing provisions from Parenda to the besieging 
army, and then they immediately hastened to in- 
tercept the convoy. But Dilir Khan detached Ikhlas 
Khan with 1,500 cavalry to the aid of Iraj Khan. 
Twelve miles from Bhupalgarh he overtook the 
Marathas. Ikhlas Khan's small force was envelop- 
ed and he took refuge in a walled village and 
repelled the Maratha assault with his back to the 
wall, doing great havoc among the enemy with his 

Bhupalgarh, 20 m. n.w. of Jath, 45 m. s.w. of Pandharpur, 
and 10 m. s.e. of Khanapur in the Satara district; the modern 
name of the village is Banur {Atlas, 40 N. E.); described in 
Bom. Gaz. xix. 455-456. 


artillery, and slaying nearly one thousand of Shiva's 
men. Then large reinforcements arrived from Dilir 
Khan, at whose approach the Marathas fled. Dilir 
then went back to Bhupalgarh, burnt everything that 
he could not carry off, dismantled its fortifications, 
and returned to Dhulkhed. (B. S. 418-419 ; Dil. 
160 ; Chitnis, 176 differs.) 

The fugitive Marathas, how^ever, scored a 
success. Near Karkamb (30 miles south of Parenda), 
they fell in with Iraj Khan, looted all his grain and the 
property of his troops, and forced him to flee with a 
few men into a small fort hard by, where he was 
afterwards relieved by his kinsman, Mir Muhammad 
Khan, the qiladar of Parenda. (Dil. 161.) 

The fall of Bhupalgarh took place in April, 1679. 
Then followed a period of puzzling intrigue and 
counter-intrigue between the Mughal viceroy and the 
Bijapur nobility, and also quarrels between Masaud 
and Sharza Khan, Masaud and Dilir, and Masaud 
and his favourite Venkatadri. About the middle of 
this year Shivaji sent to Aurangzib a well-reasoned 
and spirited letter of protest against the jaziya, which 
was drafted by Nila Prabhu in eloquent Persian. 

§8. Shivaji's letter on religious toleration. 

To the Emperor Alamgir — 

"This firm and constant well-wisher Shivaji, 
after rendering thanks for the grace of God and the 
favours of the Emperor, — which are clearer than the 


Sun, — begs to inform your Majesty that, although 
this well-wisher was led by his adverse Fate to come 
away from your august Presence without taking leave, 
yet he is ever ready to perform, to the fullest extent 
possible and proper, everything that duty as a servant 
and gratitude demand of him 

"It has recently come to my ears that, on the 
ground of the war with me having exhausted your 
wealth and emptied your treasury, your Majesty 
has ordered that money under the name of jaziya 
should be collected from the Hindus and the imperial 
needs supplied with it. May it please your Majesty 1 
That architect of the fabric of empire, [Jalaluddin] 
Akbar Padishah, reigned with full power for 52 
[lunar] years. He adopted the admirable policy of 
universal harmony (sulh-i-k.ul^ in relation to all the 
various sects, such as Christians, Jews, Muslims, 
Dadu's followers, sky-worshippers (falakia), malakia, 
materialists (ansaria), atheists {daharia), Brahmans 
and Jain priests. The aim of his liberal heart was 
to cherish and protect all the people. So, he became 
famous under the title of Jagat-Gura, 'the World's 
spiritual guide.' 

"Next, the Emperor Nuruddin Jahangir for 22 
years spread his gracious shade on the head of the 
world and its dwellers, gave his heart to his friends 
and his hand to his work, and gained his desires. 
The Emperor Shah Jahan for 32 years cast his blessed 
shade on the head of the world and gathered the 
fruit of eternal life, — which is only a synonym for 


goodness and fair fame, — as the result of his happy 
time on earth. (Verses) 

He who lives with a good name gains ever- 
lasting wealth, 

Because after his death, the recital of his good 
deeds keeps his name alive. 

"Through the auspicious effect of this sublime 
disposition, wherever he [Akbar] bent the glance of 
his august wish. Victory and Success advanced to 
welcome him on the 'way. In his reign many king- 
doms and forts were conquered [by him.] The state 
and power of these Emperors can be easily under- 
stood from the fact that Alamgir Padishah has failed 
and become distracted in the attempt to merely 
follow their political system. They, too, had the 
power of levying the jaziya ; but they did not give 
place to bigotry in their hearts, as they considered all 
men, high and \oyf, created by God to be [living] 
examples of the nature of diverse creeds and tempera- 
ments. Their kindness and benevolence endure on 
the pages of Time as their memorial, and so prayer 
and praise for these [three] pure souls will dwell for 
ever in the hearts and tongues of mankind, among 
both great and small. Prosperity is the fruit of one's 
intentions. Therefore, their wealth and good fortune 
continued to increase, as God's creatures reposed 
in the cradle of peace and safety [under their rule] , 
and their undertakings succeeded. 

"But in your Majesty's reign, many of the forts 
and provinces have gone out of your possession, and 

1679] POPULAR MISERY. 369 

the rest will soon do so too, because there will be 
no slackness on my part in ruining and devastating 
them. Your peasants are down-trodden ; the yield 
of every village has declined, — ^in the place of one 
lakh [of Rupees] only one thousand, and in the 
place of a thousand only ten are collected, and that 
too with difficulty. When Poverty and Beggary have 
made their homes in the palaces of the Emperor and 
the Princes, the condition of the grandees and 
officers can be easily imagined. It is a reign in 
which the army is in a ferment, the merchants com- 
plciin, the Muslims cry, the Hindus are grilled, most 
men lack bread at night and in the day inflame their 
own cheeks by slapping them [in anguish.] How 
can the royal spirit permit you to add the hardship 
of the jaziya to this grievous state of things? The 
infamy will quickly spread from west to east and 
become recorded in books of history that the Emperor 
of Hindusthan, coveting the beggars' bowls, takes 
jaziya from Brahmans and Jain- monks, yogis, 
sannyasis, bairagis, paupers, mendicants, ruined 
wretches, and the famine-stricken, — that his valour 
is shown by attacks on the wallets of beggars, — that 
he dashes down to the ground the name and honour 
of the Timurids ! 

' 'May it please your Majesty ! If you believe in 
the true Divine Book and Word of God {i.e., the 
Quran), you will find there [that God is styled] Rabb~ 
ul-alamin, the Lord of all men, and not Rabb-ul- 
musalmin, the Lord of the Muhammadans only. 


370 sHivAji. [CH. xin. 

Verily, . Islam and Hinduism are terms of contrast. 
They are [diverse pigments] used by the true Divine 
Painter for blending the colours and filling in the 
outlines [of His picture of the entire human species.] 
If it be a mosque, the call to prayer is chanted in 
remembrance of Him. If it be a temple, the bell 
is rung in yearning for Him only. To show bigotry for 
any man's creed and practices is equivalent to alter- 
ing the vsrords of the Holy Book. To draw new lines 
on a picture is equivalent to finding fault with the 


"In strict justice the jaziya is not at all lawful. 
From the political point of view it can be allowable 
only if a beautiful woman wearing gold ornaments 
can pass from one province to another without fear 
or molestation. [But] in these days even the cities 
are being plundered, what shall 1 say of the open 
country? Apart from its injustice, this imposition of 
the jaziya is an innovation in India and inexpedient. 

"If you imagine piety to consist in oppressing 
the people and terrorising the Hindus, you ought first 
to levy the jaziya from Rana Raj Singh, who is the 
head of the Hindus. Then it will not be so very 
difficult to collect it from me, as I am at your service. 
But to oppress ants and flies is far from displaying 
valour and spirit. 

"I wonder at the strange fidelity of your officers 
that they neglect to tell you of the true state of things, 
but cover a blazing fire with straw ! May the Sun 


of your royalty continue to shine above the horizon 
of greatness!" (History of Aurangzib, iii. 325-329.) 

§ 9. Dilir invades Bijapur. Shivaji aids Adil Shah. 

On 18th August, Dilir crossed the Bhima at 
Dhulkhed, 40 m. due north of Bijapur, and opened 
a new campaign against Masaud. That helpless 
regent begged aid from Shivaji, sending to him an 
envoy named Hindu Rao charged with this piteous 
appeal : "The condition of this royalty is not hidden 
from you. There is no army, money, or ally for 
<Jef ending the fort and no provision at Eill. The enemy 
is strong and ever bent on war. You are a hereditary 
servant,, elevated by this Court. And, therefore, you 
will feel for this house more than others can. We 
cannot defend the kingdom and its forts without your 
aid. Be true to your salt ; turn towards us. Command 
what you consider proper, and it shall be done by 
us." (B. S. 427.) 

Shiva undertook the defence of Bijapur,* ordered 
10,000 of his cavalry to reinforce Masaud, sent from 
his forts 2,000 ox'loads of provisions to the city, and 
bade his subjects send grain and other necessaries 
to Bijapur for sale, so that the citizens and soldiers 
there might not suffer scarcity. His envoy Visaji 
Nilkanth brought to Masaud his cheering message, 

* Shivaji as the ally of Bijapur in 1679: B. S. 426-429, 
432; Chit. 175-179. Sabh. (silent.) F. R. Fort St. George, 
Vol. 28, p. 34 (Vira Raghav from Golkonda to Madras, 14 
January, 1680.) 

372 SHIVAJI. [CH. XUI.. 

"You hold the fort. I shedl go out and punish Dilir 
Khan as he deserves." Visaji reported to the regent 
that 5,000 Maratha troopers had reached Ainapur 
(20 m. s. e. of Miraj) and 5,000 others Bhupalgarh, 
waiting for his call to come, when needed. (B. S. 427.) 

The Mughal general Sujan Singh took Mangalvide 
from Shiva's men about September (M.A. 182), emd 
came nearer to Bijapur. Masaud conciliated Sabaji 
Ghatge and sent him with the army of Turgal to 
Indi (28 m. n. of Bijapur.) This detachment had a 
skirmish with Shambhuji who w^as out foraging ; 
about fifteen men were slain on each side ; Sabaji 
was wounded but captured 50 horses, 50 oxen, and 
4 camels from the enemy. Shivaji's envoy now 
reached Bijapur with Anand Rao at the head of 
2,500 horse. They were welcomed by Masaud and 
stationed in the Nauraspura suburb. Bajaji [Nim- 
balkar] , now in Mughal service, laid siege to the 
fort of Akluj, but a Bijapuri general named Bahadur 
marched up from Sangula (32 m. s.) and drove him 

But on 15th September, Dilir Khan left his camp 
at Dhulkhed and came very close to Bijapur, reaching 
Baratgi, 6 m. n. e. of the city, on 7th October. Here 
he halted and held palavers with Masaud's envoys. 
On 30th October Shivaji arrived at Selgur, midway 
between Panhala and Bijapur, with 10,000 cavalry. 
His first detachment left Nauraspura next day to 
welcome him there. Shiva wanted to visit Adil 
Shah ; Masaud permitted him to come with an escort 


of 500 men only. But the Peshwa Moro Trimbak 
dissuaded Shivaji from falling into the power of 
Masaud by entering the fort. 

So, on 4th November, 1679, the Maratha king 
divided his army into two bodies : he himself with 
6 or 9 thousand troopers started by the road of 
Muslah and Almala, and Anand Rao with 10,000 
cavalry by way of Man (? probably Jat) and 
Sangula, to raid the Mughal dominions and recall 
Dilir from the environs of Bijapur. But Dilir Khaui, 
to whom the capture of Bijapur seemed easy, paid 
Tio heed to the Maratha plunder and devastation of 
those provinces, which was a familiar annual evil, 
and hoped for the highest rewards from the expected 
conquest of the Adil-Shahi capital. So, he pressed 
liis attack on it, without retreating. 

§10. DiZiV's ravages. Return of Shambhuji. 

But his siege of Bijapur was a failure. After 
■vainly trying to make peace with Masaud, he left 
the environs of the city on 14th November and 
marched westwards, intending to invade the Miraj- 
Panhala region and create a diversion there, which, 
would quickly recall Shiva home. The scheme 
seemed promising, as Shambhuji bragged of his 
ability to capture forts quickly vfithl his Maratha 
followers and thus make the progress of the imperial- 
ists easy, while the petty chiefs (Nayak-wars) of Miraj 
had been already won over by a Mughal agent. 


But his first work was to ravage the Bijapuri 
territory with insane cruelty. By way of Bahmanhali, 
Maknapur, and Jalgeri, he reached Tikota (13 m. w. 
of Bijapur), a rich and populous village, where the 
wealthy men of the neighbourhood had taken refuge 
with their families. "The Mughals were utterly 
unexpected. When Ikhlas Khan with [Dilir's] 
Vaiiguard arrived there and began to plunder it, 
the wives of the Hindus and Muslims with their 
children jumped into the wells near their houses and 
committed suicide. The village was utterly sacked. 
Nearly 3,000 men, both Hindus and Muslims, were 
taken prisoner [for being sold into slavery.] ...Leaving 
Tikota on 18th November, by way of Honvad and 
Telsang, ravaging the country and carrying off the 
people as slaves, the imperialists reached Athni (43 
m. w. of Bijapur.)" Here, according to the English 
factory records, a breach took place between the 
Mughal general and his Maratha ally. Athni, "a 
considerable mart," was burnt down and Dilir pro- 
posed to sell the inhabitants who were all Hindus. 
Shambhuji objected to it, but was overruled, and 
began to grow sick of his associates. (F. R. Surat 
108, Bomb, to Surat, I Jan., 1680.) On 21st November, 
Dilir left Athni for Ainapur, 12 miles westwards, but 
learnt on the way that Shambhuji had fled away to 
Bijapur. {B. S. 428-430.) 

Since his coming over to the Mughals in 
November 1678, Shambhuji had been constantly 


approached by Shivaji's agents with all sorts of per- 
suasions and promises to return to his father. Even 
Mahadji Nimbalkar, his brother-in-law, though now 
a Mughal servant, censured him for his act of deser- 
tion. (Shambhu reported the matter to Dilir, who 
put Mahadji in confinement for some days. Dil. 160.) 
But by this time Shambhuji had made up his mind 
to leave the Mughals.* In the night of 20th 
November he slipped out of the camp with his wife 
Yesu Bai disguised in male attire and only 10 troopers 
for escort, rode hard to Bijapur in the course of the 
day and was warmly received by Masaud. Dilir 
promptly returned towards Bijapur on learning of 
Shambhu's flight on the 21st, and sent an agent, 
Khwajah Abdur Razzaq, to that city to bribe the 
regent to capture the Maratha prince (28th.) In the 
night of the 30th, Shambhuji, getting scent of the 
matter, issued in secret from Bijapur, met a body of 
cavalry sent by his father to escort him, and galloped 
away to Panhala, which he reached about the 2nd 
of December. 

§11. Last campaign of Shivaji. 
We shall now trace the history of Shivaji's 

* According to Sabhasad, 93, Aurangzib wrote to Dilir to 
arrest Shambhu and send him a prisoner to Delhi ; but the 
Mughal general, to keep his word to his guest, informed' the 
Maratha prince of the letter and' connived at his flight: Un- 
likely story. B. S. 430 says that Aurangzib summoned 
Shambhu to his Court. 


movements from 4th November, 1679, when he 
marched out to raid the Mughal dominions in order 
to create a diversion for the relief of Bijapur. The 
campaign was not an unbroken success for him. As 
the Bombay Council wrote on 1st. Jan., 1680, "He 
hath both lost and gained." Near Bijapur he was 
attacked (middle of November) and utterly routed by 
Dilir Khan, who captured from him 2,000 horses, 
besides prisoners. The defeated Rajah fled to Patta- 
garh* (Vishram-garh) with only 500 cavalry, having 
lost the greater part of his army, and summoned 
Moro Trimbak and Annaji Datto to a council of war 
there. The Peshwa had himself just suffered a 
reverse in advancing towards Surat ; he had been 
defeated and driven back by Ranmast Khan, a 
Pathan general, with the loss of 2,000 men killed 
and 400 horses captured. (F. R. Surat, 108. Bom. 
to Surat, 29 Nov., 1679.) 

As Dilir Khan was advancing westwards from 
Bijapur (middle of November) and seemed intent on 
laying siege to Panhala, and the presence of 
Shambhuji in the enemy's camp threatened a civil 
war in the Maratha State, Shivaji tried to convert 
Panhala into an impregnable refuge by removing to 
it the guns of many of his other forts, besides 40 pieces 
bought from the French. As early as 24th November 

* Putta, 20 m. s. of Nasik, and 20 m. e. of Thai Ghat. 
{Ind. At, Old Sheet 38.) 19-42 N. 73-54 E. B. S. is strangely 
silent about this defeat of Shiva. 

1679] SACK OF JALNA. 377 

he had sent Somaji, the brother of Annaji Datto, to 
remove about 30 pieces of artillery from the forts of 
Ankola, Karwar, Someshwar, and Ponda, and drag 
them to Panhala "by the strength of men and 
buffaloes." {F. R. Surat, 108, Rajapur to Sural, 
30 Dec, 1679 ; Karwar to Surat, 24 Nov.) 

A grand attempt was made to retrieve the two 
disasters of the middle of November. Towards the 
end of that month, a fresh army of 12,000 men was 
assembled near Rajapur in S. Konkan. They looted 
and burnt that town (26th) and set out (28th) for 
Burhanpur ; but on the way they turned aside to 
the right towards Malkapur. Shivaji had been greatly 
relieved by the return of his prodigal son Shambhuji 
to Panhala (2nd December.) At the head of 20,000 
horse he set out and overtook his army. The 
Maratha flood swept into West Khandesh, plundering 
Dharamgaon, Chopra, (4th — 6th Dec), and other rich 
trade centres, and then turning sharply to the south 
entered Balaghat, and reached Jalna, a populous 
town only 40 miles due east of Aurangabad. (Ibid, 
Rajapur to Surat, 6 Dec, 1679 ; Vol. 4, Consult, at 
Surat, 8 Dec.) 

Here the godly saint, Sa5Tfid Jan Muhammad, 
had his hermitage in a garden in the suburbs. As 
Shivaji always speired the holy men and holy places 
of all religions, most of the wealthy men of Jalna 
had taken refuge in this hermitage with their money 
and jewels. The raiders, finding very little booty 
in the town and learning of the concealment of the 


wealth in the saint's abode, entered it and robbed 
the refugees, wounding many of them. The holy 
man appealed to them to desist, but they only abused 
and threatened him for his pains. (K. K. ii. 271 ; 
Dil. 165 ; T. S. 39a.) Then the man of God, "who 
had marvellous efficacy of prayer," cursed Shiva, 
and popular belief ascribed the Rajah's death five 
months afterwards to his curses. 

Retribution visited the Maratha army very much 
sooner. Jalna, both town and suburb, was thoroughly 
plundered and devastated for four days. Then as 
the Marathas, loaded with booty consisting of 
"countless gold, .silver, jewels, cloths, horses, 
elephants and caniels", were retreating, an enterpris- 
ing Mughal officer, Ranmast Khan*, attacked their 
rear-guard, (near Sangamner according to Duff, i. 
289.) Shidhoji Nimbalkar with 5,000 men opposed 
him for some days, but was at last slain with many 
of his men. In the meantime, the Mughals had 
received very heavy reinforcements from Auranga- 
bad, (20,000 men), and they no'w threatened to 
envelop and cut off the entire Maratha army. Under 

* Ranmast Khan, brother of Khizr Khan Pani, received a 
robe of honour from the Emperor on 18th September, 1682, 
and was created Bahadur Kh&n in August next (M. A. 222, 
235.) T. S. speaks of him as thanahdar or qiladar of Jalna 
at this time. We afterwards meet him as thanahdar of Akluj 
{Dil.) For the sack of Jalna and the battle following it : 
F. R. Surat 108, Rajapur to Surat, 30 Dec, 1679; Dil. 165; 
K. K. ii. 270-271; T. 5. 39a; Sabh. 92-93; Chit. 176 


the guidance of Bahirji, his chief spy, Shivaji, after 
three days and nights of anxious and ceaseless march- 
ing, escaped from the ring of his enemies by an 
obscure path.* But he had to sacrifice much of his 
booty, besides losing 4,000 cavalry killed and Hambir 
Rao, his commander-in-chief, wounded. This 
happened towards the end of December, and Shivaji 
retired to Panhala to meet his recovered son. 

The credit of this victory over the Marathas 
must be given to the troops immediately under 
Prince Muazzam, the viceroy of Aurangabad, who 
had returned to the Deccan "with a vast army" 
(M. A, 169) in November, 1678. Dilir Khan was 
too far away in the south, near Bijapur, and too 
closely engaged with the enemy there to have taken 
part in the fighting near Jalna.f 

* According to Sabh. 93, Shiva wanted to retreat by the 
Jagdiri route. 

' t Sabhasad mentions no Maratha military enterprise 
between Shiva's battle with Ranmast Khan and his death. 
B. S. contradicts the theory that the Marathas at all opposed 
Dilir Khan during these four months. The English records 
are silent. But Chitnis (176-177) says that Shiva on his return 
from Jalna expelled Dilir Khan from Bijapuri territory, recovered 
Bhupalgarh and Bahadur-binda (2 m. s. of Kopal), and sent 
Moro Pant with 20,000 men to invade Baglana and capture 
27 forts from the Mugheils there. All these exploits in 
January or February, 1680, appear to me improbable, as Shiva 
was then pre-occupied with domestic troubles. F. R. Surat 108 
(Chopra to Bombay, 7 Aug., 1680), however, says that Bahadur 
Khan was then laying "siege to a castle which Shivaji took 
last year, HamTnattgarh, bordering upon these parts." Now, 


§12. Domestic troubles of Shivaji. 

The recent rebellion of Shambhuji had revealed 
the serious danger that threatened the newly founded 
Maratha kingdom. The character of his eldest son 
filled Shiva with the gloomiest anticipations of the 
future. A profligate, capricious and cruel youth, 
devoid of every spark of honour, patriotism or 
religious fervour, could not be left sole master of 
Maharashtra. And yet, the only eJtemative to 
Shambhu was Raja Ram, a youth of 18, whose 
accession would have meant a regency. But there 
was such mutual jealousy and discord among the 
old ministers of the State, especially between Moro 
Trimbak, the premier, and Annaji Datto, the viceroy 
of the West, that a council of regency would have 
broken up in civil war and the ruin of the State as 
surely as the Puna council of ministers did a century 
later. A division of the kingdom between the two 
princes was then contemplated, but the idea was 
very wisely given up. (Chit. 181-182 ; Sabh. 94, 102.) 

Shivaji tried hard to conciliate and reason with 
Shambhu. He appesJed to all the nobler instincts 
of the prince as well as to his self-interest, read him 
many a lecture, showed him his treasury, revenue 
returns, list of forts and muster-rolls, and urged him 

we leain from Dilkfisha that Bahadur Khan at this time be- 
sieged Ahivant without success. Hummuttgaih, therefore, 
seems to be Ahivsinl and not Himmatgarh or Hanumantgarh. 
If so, the Marathas had conquered Ahivant between April" 1679 
and March 1680. 


to be worthy of such a rich heritage and to be true 
to all the high hopes which his own reign had raised 
in the Hindu world. (Sabh. 94 ; Chit. 174.) But a 
born judge of character like Shivaji must have soon 
perceived that his sermons were faJling on deaf ears, 
and hence his last days were clouded by despair. 
(Sabh. 102-103.) 

The evil was aggravated by intrigues within his 
harem.* At the age of 47 he had made the mistake 
of marrying three young women, though he had two 
or three other wives and two sons living. His old 

* According to Sabh. 72, Shivaji married six wives besides 
the mother of Shambhuji. Mr. Rajwade (Vol. iv. Intro. 53) 
infers from the Life of Ravndas that Shiva had three wives 
and two concubines. On 27th May, 1674, Mr. Henry Oxinden 
wrote from Ra'garh. "The Rajah was, and is still so busy 
about his coronation and marriage with two other [blank in 
the MS. record] women, that it was yesterday before we had 
audience." Under 8th June, 1674, he writes, "The Rajah was 
married to a fourth wife." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 88.) From a 
letter of Narayan Shenvi to the Deputy Governor of Bombay, 
dated 4 April, 1674, we learn, "I arrived at Rairi on 24th 

March An order [came] from Naroji Pandit that I 

should remain in his house until the time of mourning -was 
over for the death of Rajah Shivaji's wife, which I did, resting 
there five days." (/bid.) So, one wife of Shiva died in 
March 1674. Rajwade, in his Sankima-Iekh-Sangraha reprinted 
from Granthmala, gives Shivaji eight wives on the authority 
of a paper found in a private house at Tanjore. This docu- 
ment (of unknown date and authority) gives the names of six 
of the wives and of their fathers, but does Tiot name the other 
two, who were evidently concubines. 

382 SHIVAJI. [CH. Xlll. 

wife, Soyra Bai, the mother of Raja Ram, felt herself 
neglected by her husband and tried all kinds of 
charms and love-philtres to win back his Eiflection 
from her more youthful rivals. Shivaji's harem was, 
therefore, a scene of veiled warfare, — the queens 
plotting against one another through their maids, 
doctors and magicians, and the poor husband trying 
to find some quiet by sleeping outside. (Dig. 
455-458.) The question of succession, which was 
constantly discussed during the earlier months of 
1680, intensified this conflict of wives. After 
December, 1679, Shivaji's health seems to have de- 
clined (Chit. 180), and he seems to have had a 
premonition of the approach of death. (Sabh. 101.) 
This fact made the choice of an heir a live issue, and 
the plots and counter-plots in the harem and cabinet 
thickened in consequence. (Dig. 459-462.) 

§13. Death of Shivaji. 

On 24th March, 1680, the Rajah was seized 
with fever and dysentery. The illness continued 
for twelve days. Gradually all hopes of recovery 
faded away, and then, after giving solemn charges 
and wise counsels to his nobles and officers, and 
consoling the weeping assemblage with assurances 
of the spirit's immortality in spite of the perishable- 
ness of the body, the maker of the Maratha nation 
performed the last rites of his religion and then fell 
into a trance, which imperceptibly passed into death. 

1680] DEATH OF SHIVAJI. 383 

It was the noon of Sunday, 5th April, 1680, the full 
moon of the month of Chaitra.* 

He had not yet completed 53 years of age. The 
Muslim world ascribed his premature death to the 
curse of the saint Sayyid Jan Muhammad of Jalna. 
In Maharashtra there were some whispers of his 
-wife Soyra Bai, the mother of Raja Ram, having 
administered poison to him to prevent his giving the 
throne to Shambhuji. 

The oldest Marathi bakhar, that of Sabhasad, is 
silent on the point, and with good reason. A servant 
of Raja Ram, in a book written by order of that 
king and for his eyes, could not possibly h^ive 
mentioned his mother's murder of her husband even 
if it had been true. Chitnis tells us that Shambhuji 
on his accession put Soyra Bai to death on the charge 
of having poisoned Shiva, but it was in all pro- 
bability a false pretext for wreaking vengeance on his 
step-mother for her late attempt to crown her own 
son. Readers of Macaulay's account of the death 
of Charles II. will remember how^ at that very time 
in Europe hardly a sovereign died without the event 
being ascribed to poison. 

*Last illness and death of Shivaji : Sabh. 101-104; F.R. 
Sural 108, Bombay to Sural, 28 April, 1680 (followed by me); 
M. A. 194; Dil. 165 (one sentence only); K. K. ii. 271 (one 
sentence); Sforia, ii. 231; Chit. 180-183. T. S. 40b. (one 
sentence) and Dig. 462-467 aire "loose, traditional" works; 
both charge Soyra Bai with murder. Orme's Frag. • 89.' 


Shivaji and the English merchants of the 
West coast. 

§1. English factors of Rajapur h.ept in prison, 

We have described in Chapter X how the 
Marathas came into collision with the English traders 
of Rajapur early in 1660, and how the same factory- 
brought upon itself the vengeance of Shivaji by 
giving unofficial assistance to the Bijapuri army 
besieging the Maratha chief in the fort of Peinhala 
five months later. In the following December 
Shivaji surprised Rajapur, plundered the English 
factory and carried off four of the factors, namely 
Henry Revington, Richard Taylor, Randolph Taylor, 
and Philip Gyffard, as prisoners to Raigarh. 

While they were still at Rajapur, the Brahman 
agent of Shivaji told the prisoners that his master 
would give the English a fine port named Meate 
Bandar,* on the coast, if they helped him in taking 
Danda-Rajpuri ; but they declined to "discourse 

* Meate Bandar is not the name of i place, but a general 
term for salt-ports, it being a compound of the Marathi \YOrd 
mith, salt, eind Persian bandar, port. The term occurs in 
old Marathi letters. (Vide Rajwade, viii. 22, and Sanads and 
Letters, 57.) 


about it" unless he set them free. Then Shivaji laid 
a ransom on the captives, and sent them to Waisati 
fort. Many other persons — Hindu merchants 
{banians), Indian Muslims, Persians and Arabs — ^were 
kept there in his prison in a miserable plight and 
beaten to extort ransom. 

The Englishmen steadily refused to pay any 
ransom and tried to secure their liberty by feigned 
negotiations for helping the Marathas with English 
ships in capturing Danda-Rajpuri, but taking care 
to impose such terms as always left the English "a 
hole to creep out of their obligation" after recovering 
liberty. Then they tried the effect of threat by saying 
that if they were not released their countrymen at 
Surat would grant Aurangzib's desire by transporting 
a Mughal army into the Deccan [f. e., the Konkan 
district] by sea. {Orme MSS., Vol. 155, pp. 1-21, 
letter from the English prisoners at Songeirh, 28 June 

Raoji Pandit had been sent by Shivaji to take 
charge of all the prisoners in Songarh and "do with 
them as he thought fit." The four Englishmen 
were well-treated. But their captivity was prolonged 
past endurance. To the demand for ransom they 
replied that they could pay nothing, having lost their 
all in the sack of Rajapur. Shivaji's absence on an 
expedition near Kalian (Juiie, 1661) also delayed the 
progress of negotiations about an eJliance with the 
English against the Siddis. The "disconsolate pri- 
soners in Raigarh," after more than a year's 



confinement, lost their temper and wrote in 
disrespectful and abusive terms to the President and 
Council at Sural, charging the latter with making no 
exertion for their release. The reply of the Surat 
Council was a stern but well-merited rebuke (dated 
10th March, 1662) : "How you came in prison you 
know very well. 'Twas not for defending the 
Company's goods, 'twas for going to the siege of 
Panhala and tossing balls with a flag that was known 
to be the English's. None but what [is] rehearsed 
is the cause of your imprisonment." {Ibid, also 
Surat to the Prisoners in Rairi castle, 10 March, 
1662, F. R. Surat, Vol. 85.) 

h seems that the four Englishmen made an 
attempt to escape from Songarh, but were caught 
and sent off to Raigarh to be kept in "closer con- 
finement." Towards the middle of 1662, when 
their captivity had lasted a year and a half, the 
Council at Surat, finding all appeals to Shivaji and 
his suzerain fruitless, commissioned some of the 
Ejiglish ships to make reprisals by capturing on the 
high seas Deccani vessels, whether belonging to the 
king of Bijapur or Shivaji or any merchant of the 
country, especially the one bringing the Dowager 
Queen Bari Sahiba back from Mecca. They hoped 
that such a success would compel the Bijapur 
Government to put pressure on Shivaji to release the 
Englishmen. But no good prize offered itself to the 
Ejiglish privateers. The Surat Council also influenced 
the Mughal governor of Surat to write to Shaista 


Khan, who was then reported to be pressing Shivaji 
hard (about November 1662), to importune him to 
move for their release. (Surat to R. Taylor, 17 May, 

1662, F. R. Surat, Vol. 85 ; Surat Consult., 21 July, 
F. R. Surat, Vol. 2 ; also under 21st July, 19th August 
and 14th November in Vol. 85.) 

On 3rd February, 1663, the Council commissioned 
the captain of H. M. S. Convertite to capture two 
vessels of considerable burden which Shivaji was 
fitting out at Jetapur for Mocha and loading with 
"such goods as were driven by storms upon his 
coast, which was of considerable value." (F. R. 
Surat, Vol. 2.) But such a step became unnecessary, 
as Raoji Pandit, the Maratha governor of Rajapur, 
sent for the four captives from Raigarh and set them 
free (about 5th February) with solemn assurances 
from Shivaji that the English would enjoy his protec- 
tion in future. (Rajapur to Surat, 6th February, 

1663, in F. R. Surat, Vol. 103.) The Council at 
Surat say that they "had desisted from calling that 
perfidious rebel Shivaji to an account, because they 
had not either conveniency of force or time." They 
were still resolved to avenge the wrong done to their 
masters' property and the sufferings of their "loving 
brethren," but sadly realised that "as yet we are 
altogether uncapable for want of shipping and men 
necessary for such an enterprise, wherefore patience." 
(Surat Council to R. Taylor, 9 Oct., 1663, in F. R. 
Surat, Vol. 2.) 

Therefore, instead of resorting to force, they 


began negotiations with Shivaji for compensation for 
the loss done to their factory at Rajapur. These 
were protracted for many years till the hearts of the 
Englishmen grew sick. Even when Shivaji agreed as 
to the amount of the damages and admitted his 
liability for it, the actual payment was repeatedly 
put off and never fully carried out. With the help 
of the Factory Records preserved in the India Office, 
London, we can clearly trace the history of these 
negotiations through their successive stages, — the 
alternate hopes and disappointments of the English, 
their diverse tactics, their series of embassies, and 
their final conviction, at the close of Shivaji's life, 
that they would get nothing at all from him. The 
records of this long-drawn diplomatic intercourse 
afford striking examples of the perseverance and 
patience of the English traders, though one is apt to 
smile when he reads how they held diametrically 
opposite views of Shivaji's character and feelings at 
different stages of the negotiations, as they hoped or 
despaired of a settlement of their claims. Our 
psychology is naturally coloured by our emotions. 

Shivaji's encounter with the Elnglish during his 
two raids on Surat (in 1664 and 1670) and the dispute 
between them in connection with his fortification of 
the Khanderi island have been dealt with in earher 

§2. Negotiations jor Rajapur factory damages. 
The policy of the English traders is thus clearly 


set forth in a letter from the Deputy Governor and 
Council of Bombay to the President and Council of 
Surat, dated 25th November, 1668 : 

"According to your commands, we shall at 
<;onvenient time enorder such as we employ to treat 
Shivaji's servants civilly wherever they meet them, 
but not to enter into any contract with them, letting 
them know the great damage the Hon'ble Company 
hath suffered and the abuses offered to our people 
on several occasions, for which we expect satisfac- 
tion and reparation before we enter into any league 
with their master, — all of which, we suppose, will 
come to his ears by one or more of his servants, 
though we are not of opinion that ever he will be 
brought to a peaceable treaty till he be forced to 
it.'" (F. R. Surat, Vol. 105.) 

In a letter from the same to the same, dated 1 7th 
March, 1669, we read, "Shivaji Rajah having by his 
servants requested a favour of no great import, not 
exceeding Rs. 300,... we... having much occasion for 
a good correspondence with his people on the main 
|-land] from whence most of provisions come hither, 
and wood [i.e., fuel] in special, (which is not to be 
Jiad other where), we were the more ready to gratify 
Shivaji Rajah." (Ibid.) 

On 5th March, 1670, the President and Council 
at Surat instruct the Deputy Governor of Bombay 
thus : "The war broke out between Shivaji and 
the Mughal hath put a check to some overtures 


which were made to the President of an accommoda- 
tion with Shivaji touching the Company's demands 
on him ; but we hope they will yet go forward,... but 
we would not have you appear too forward lest you 
undervalue our pretence [ = lawful claim] and make 
him cool." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 3.) 

In October Shivaji tried to put the English of 
Bombay in distress, evidently because they refused 
to sell him war-material (esp. lead) for his contest 
with the Siddi of Danda-Rajpuri. Bombay writes 
to Surat on 14th October, 1670 : "A few days since 
we, as usually, sent our boats to the main [ -land] 
for wood to burn our chunam with ; but... our boats 
returned empty, being forbid by Shivaji's people to 
cut any more wood in those parts." (F. R. Surat, 
105.) On 1 2th August 1671 Bombay writes to Surat, 
"The Deputy Governor [of Bombay] received an 

answer from Shivaji by which your Honour, etc., 

will see how he slights our friendship." (Ibid.) 

But in September 1 67 1 Shivaji sent an ambassador 
to Bombay to treat with the English. His chief motive 
was to secure English aid against Danda-Rajpuri, 
especially a supply of "grenadoes, mortar- pieces and 
ammunition." The Bombay Council immediately 
realised that unless he obtained these war-materials 
he "would not pay a penny" of compensation for 
the loot of their factory at Rajapur. The President 
of Surat sent the following instructions to the factors 
at Bombay : "Let him know that if he gives us 
such encouragement that we settle in his port, he 


may obtain from us those advantages that other 
nations do in whose ports we trade. But we would 
not positively have them [the English representatives 
in these negotiations] promise him those grenadoes, 
mortar-pieces and ammunition he desires, nor 
absolutely deny him, in regard we do not think it 
convenient to help him against Danda-Rajpuri, 
which place if it w^ere in his possession, would prove 
a great annoyance to the port of Bombay ; and on 
the other side, our denial is not consistent at present 
with our interest, in respect we believe the keeping 
in suspense will bring him to a speedier conclusion 
of the treaty, hoping thereby to be furnished with 
those things he desires." (F. R. Surat, 87.) 

The negotiations, as might have been expected 
from the diverse aims of the two parties, could 
not possibly end in an agreement. They were pro- 
tracted till December, when Shivaji was out on his 
forays and "now not easily to be found or treated 
with." The English proposed to send Lieut. 
Stephen Ustick to treat directly with Shivaji. (F. R. 
Surat, 106, Bomb, to Surat, 8 Nov. and 15 Dec, 
1671.) This envoy was directed to "set out in a 
handsome equipage befitting the Company's honour," 
with Ram Shenvi, the Company's interpreter. 
(F. R. Surat, 87, Surat to Bombay, 30 Sep., 1671.) 

As early as the end of November, the Council 
of Surat lost all hope of a settlement. They write 
to Bombay (30th November, 1671), "Ram Shenvi 
hath private [ly] discoursed with us [as to] what 


Shivaji proposes to us by way of accommodation and 
■what he demands from us in order to the supply of 
his wars against Danda-Rajpuri, in both which we 
find so much subtility, self-policy and unsecure in- 
constancy on his part, and so great difficulties and 
apparent hazard on the Company's to deal with him 
on these terms, that we begin to despair of bringing 
the business to any issue in the way it is now carried. 
...We do confirm our former resolution that till the 
matter of satisfaction for the Company's and nation's 
former losses be first determined, we cannot with 
honour or safety concede to any thing which he 

The instructions to Lieut. Ustick were "that he 
endeavour to end the dispute touching satisfaction of 
past damages..., as also to procure his [i.e., Shivaji's] 
general qaul or farman for us to trade with freedom 
and security in all the ports of his country and inland 
cities whatsoever, paying 2 per cent, custom." (F R. 
Surat, 87.) 

The Maratha envoy had brought with himself 
to Bombay Rs. 6,000 worth of the cloth looted at 
Surat in October 1670, consisting of katanis, rumals, 
etc., and asked the English to buy them ; but "they 
being not commodities proper for the Hon'ble Com- 
pany to deal in " the factors refused to buy them. 
(F. R. Surat, 87, Surat to Bombay, I January, 1672.) 
But as Shivaji had presumably no ready money to 
spare, the English were prepared to accept these 
goods in part payment of "what shall be agreed on 


to be due for satisfaction of our former losses, pro- 
vided that the commodities were not over-rated, but 
cheap and good in their kind." {Ibid, 30 November, 
1671.) A compromise was, however, made with the 
Maratha ambassador ; the English lent him Rs. 1,500 
upon his goods payable at two months' time. Lieut. 
Ustick was to have set out on his embassy on 15th 
January, 1672, but was detained at Bombay by a 
message from Shivaji saying that he was too busy 
fighting the Mughal generals in Baglana to receive 
the envoy then. (F. R. Surat, 106, Bombay to Surat, 
13 and 20 January, 1672.) 

§3. Mission of Lt. Ustick to Shiva fails, 1672. 
At last Lieut. Ustick was sent on his mission on 

10th March, 1672, and came back on 13th May, 
"with failure. "He, after a long and tedious attend- 
ance, had half an hour's discourse with him 
(Shivaji) and his Brahmans to little effect, but at last 

[Shivaji] proffered 5,000 pagodas towards our losses, 
and promiseth, if your Honour will please to settle 
a factory at Rajapur, to show all kindness and civility 
imaginable to the said factory." (Bombay to Surat, 

13 March and 14 May, 1672, F. R. Surat, 106.) 

The negotiations broke down on the question 
of the amount of the indemnity. A Bombay letter 
to the Company, dated 21st December, 1672, {O. C. 
3722) states, "We demanded one hundred thousand 
Rupees, they offered 20,000, declaring that Shivaji 
never made more advantage by what was robbed of 


the English ;... that what was taken in the chests, 
trunks and warehouses of particular men (i.e., 
European private traders), it may be was plundered 
by his soldiers, but he never had anything thereof, 
and therefore would not satisfy for it ; but what 
(booty) was received and entered into his books he 
was willing to restore and make satisfaction for... 
While these things were transacting, Shivaji was 
engaged in a great design against the Koli country, 
whereupon the (Brahman) minister appointed to- 
treat (with Mr. Ustick) being called away, Mr. Ustick 
also returned to Bombay." But the English factors 
deliberately held off from pressing the negotiations 
to a close. As they write, "We have a hard and 
ticklish game to play, for the King (Aurangzib) being 
highly enraged against Shivaji, should he understand 
that we... hold any correspondence with him, it might 
probably cause him to order some disturbance to 
be given to your general affairs, not only in these 
parts but in Bengal also. On the other hand, we are 
forced to keep fair with Shivaji also, because from 
his countries we are supplied with provisions, timber 
and firewood, and likewise your inhabitants of 
Bombay drive a good trade into the main [-land] , 
which would be a great prejudice to your island if 
it were obstructed. On these considerations we 
judge it your interest to suspend the treaty at 
present.... We shall have great difficulty to recover 
anything for those gentlemen (i.e., private traders) 
who suffered particularly in that loss at Rajapur, for 


Shivaji... by the merchants of Rajapur hath under- 
stood what did belong to the Company and what to 
particular men ; the latter he disowns totally.... Had 
it not been for our standing on some satisfaction for 
them, we had ended the dispute before now." 

§4. Embassy of Thomas Niccolls, 1673. 

Between May and December 1672 two envoys 
were sent by Shivaji to the English factors at Bombay. 
In February 1673, a third envoy, Pilaji, came from 
Shivaji, but was dismissed without effecting anything. 
In May the Bombay Council resolved "to send Mr. 
Thomas Niccolls with a Banian broker to make a 
final demand of the damage done us at Rajapur, and 
now lately by his forces in Hubli."* (F. R. Surat, 
Vol. 3, Surat Consultation, 24 May, 1673.) 

On 19th May, Niccolls left Bombay with 37 
persons in all for Rairi castle, which he was permitted 
to ascend on the 23rd. He interviewed Shambhuji 
on the 24th in the absence of Shivaji on a pilgrimage. 
On 2nd June Shivaji returned to the castle, and next 
day Niccolls was received in audience. The Rajah 
took the English envoy by the hand and showed 
him where he should sit, which was on the left hand 
near one of his side-pillows, and then asked him 
his business. But in spite of the kindness of his 
manners, Shivaji did nothing to settle the dispute 

* The latter amounted tc 7,894 pagodas, or £3,500. 


and on the 6th dismissed Niccolls, saying, "He would 
send on an answer to the President by one of his 
own people named Bhimaji Pandit, a day or two 
after me. " So Niccolls returned to Bombay (17th 
June) without achieving anything. (Niccolls' diary 
in O. C. 3787.) 

Soon afterwards Bhimaji arrived at Bombay (21st) 
and after some discussions left with Narayan Shenvi 
(the interpreter of the English) to represent matters 
to his master. Late in September the two returned 
to Bombay with the following letter (O. C. 3952) : — 

From Shivaji Rajah to the Hon hie Gerald 
Aungier, Governor of Bombay: "I received your 
Honour's letter by Bhimaji Pandit and Narayan 
Shenvi, who manifested the good correspondence 
that your Honour doth use with me ; likewise they 
treated with me about the business of Rajapur which 
1 have answered and do send them agedn to treat 
with your Honour, my desire being only to keep the 
same correspondence which your Honour doth with 
me. 1 shall not say more but desire you that there 
may be no difference in our friendship, for I am very 
well acquainted of your Honour's prudence. I sent 
your Honour a present, which I desire you to accept 

A Committee of the Bombay Council was 
appointed to meet on 1st October and receive 
Shivaji's objections to the Company's demands. On 
3rd October the Maratha envoy offered 7,000 pagodas, 
which was refused. Later he increased it to 10,025 


pagodas, to be allowed in custom duties, etc. (O. C 
3758 ; F. R. Surat, Vol. 106, Bombay to Surat, 29 
September, 1673.) 

Surat agreed with Bombay (10 July, 1673) "to 
accept so small a sum as eight to ten thousand 
pagodas, which is not the quarter part the damage 
the nation sustained in Rajapur ;" of this amount 
8,000 pagodas were to be paid in money or goods, 
and the balance in the form of exemption from all 
custom duties at the port of Rajapur for five or at 
least three years. (F. R. Surat, Vol. 3.) 

The evasions of Shivaji thoroughly disgusted the 
English merchants. As the Surat Council records 
(F. R. Surat, Vol. 3, 19 July, 1673), "Seeing there is 
no probability of security from such a heathen, who, 
while we are in treaty with him for satisfaction for 
our losses at Rajapur, gives orders for the robbing 
our factory at Hubli, we can think of no better way 
to recover the Hon'ble Company and nation's right 
than by taking what vessels belong to his ports." 
A little earlier, on 24th May, they had concluded, 
"It is absolutely necessary to break with him, but 
not at this time when we have war with the Dutch." 
But by 1st October an amicable settlement was in 
sight, "Shivaji holds a fair understanding with us and 
we with him, the old difference of Rajapur being in 
a manner concluded upon honourable terms, to our 
advantage and reputation." (O. C. 3779.) The 
hopes of the English ran high ; on 23rd October 
Bombay writes to Surat (O. C. 3870), "We are near a 


conclusion with our neighbour Shivaji for the old 

wrongs of Rajapur The new controversy 

touching Hubli we have reserved for another time, 

so that if Shivaji attempts Surat you may be 

somewhat the safer, though we advise you not to 
trust him, yet we daresay if he hath a kindness for 
any nation it is for the English, and we believe he 
will not disturb any house where the English flag is. " 
But the treaty though fully agreed on between 
Shivaji's envoy and the English in the third week of 
October was not signed and confirmed by Shivaji 
himself for more than two months afterwards, as he 
was absent on a long campaign (O. C 3910, Bombay 
to Co., 13 December, 1673.) 

§5. Embassy of Henry Oxinden, 1674. 

The English, therefore, decided to send a formal 
embassy to Shivaji to conclude the business, especially 
as his grand coronation was to take place in June 
1674. Mr. Henry Oxinden was chosen for the 
mission, and Narayan Shenvi was sent to Raigarh 
(arriving there on 24th March), "to prepare business 
against Mr. Henry Oxinden's arrival to him." (F. R. 
Surat, Vol. 3, Surat Consult., 16 April, 1674.) 

The story of Oxinden's mission to Shivaji, from 
13th May to 16th June, is graphically told at great 
length in his Letters and Memorial or Narrative which 
also give valuable details about Shivaji's coronation, 
the course of the negotiations, and the final 


Shiva held out for some time on the question of 
restoring to their owners the ships of the English or 
of the inhabitants of Bombay wrecked on his coast, 
but on II th June Naraji Pandit sent word to Qxinden 
that "the Rajah had granted all our demands and 
articles, except our money passing current in his 
country." On the 1 2th all the ministers {ashta 
pradhan) signed the treaty, which was formally deli- 
vered to Oxinden at Narayan Pandit's house. (F. R. 
Surat, Vol. 88.) 

In November Shivaji's request for being sold 50 
great ordnance from 40 to 60 cwt. weight and 2 great 
brass guns, was politely declined by the English as 
"so public an action as that must needs provoke this 
king" [Aurangzib.] (Surat to Bombay, 13 November 

§6. English traders of Rajapur interview 
Shivaji, 1675. 

In the terms of the above agreement, the English 
factory at Rajapur was re-opened in 1675, with some 
difficulty, as the following letter from the Rajapur 
factors to Surat, dated 6th February 1675, shows : — 

"It was thought fit to send the broker with the 
President's letter to Annaji Pandit and the Subahdar, 
giving them notice of our arrival. Mr. Ward being 
earnest for our old house, Annaji told him that he 
should not have it, and that he did not care whether 
we stayed here or no ; if we did not, his master 
would save 1,000 pagodas by it ; and further will 


have it [that] the house was allowed for in that sum 
granted us by his master towards satisfaction for our 
losses. He is not only one of Shivaji's great favourites 
but Governor in Chief of all Konkan, so that we 
cannot settle in any place but it is under his jurisdic- 
tion." (F. R. Surat, 88.) 

In March next the factors of Rajapur had an 
audience with Shivaji of which a detailed and very 
interesting report has been preserved (Rajapur letter, 
20 April 1675. F. R. Surat, 88):— 

"The Rajah came on the 22nd [March] about 
midday, accompanied with abundance of horse and 
foot and about 150 palankins. So soon as we heard 
of his near approach, we went out of our tent and 
very near met him. He ordered his palankin to 
stand still, called us very near him, seemed very 
glad to see us and much pleased [that] we came to 
meet him, and said the sun being hot he would not 
keep us now^, but in the evening he would send for us. 

[23rd March ?] The Rajah came. He stopped 
his palankin and called us to him. When we were 
pretty near him we made a stop, but he beckoned 
with his hand till 1 was up close with him. He 
diverted himself a little by taking in his hand the 
locks of my periwig and asked us several questions ; 
at length asked us how ■we liked Rajapur and said 
he was informed we were not well pleased there, 
but bid us not be in the least dissatisfied for what 
[had] passed. He would order things for the future 
to our full satisfaction, and that we might be sure 

]&25] shiva's friendly attitude. 4Q\ 

tkat reasonable request we should make to 

hiirar woviW he deny us 

The next morning f25th March] we were sent 
foT again in the Rajah's name. We were admitted 
into his presence. I was placed so near him on his 
right hand that 1 could touch him. With him we 
continued about two hours, which was most part 
spent in answering many of his^ questions. At lengdi' 
we presented him our paper of desires [previously 
"translated into the country language"], which after 
held been read to him with a little pause, seriously 
looking on- us, [hej said that it was all granted' us. 
He would give us a fecrman for aU." But the siege 
of Ponda, which Shivaji began immediately after- 
wards, delayed the granting of such a farman. 

§'7. Historg' of the Kajopar indemnity. 

In September 1675 Mr. Samuel Austen went to 
Raigadi on an- embassy from Bombay to demand 
satisfaction for the damage done to the Company's 
factory at Dharamgaon in Khandesh. This Shivaji 
refused to pay, saying that the factory was looted by 
"vagabonds and scouts without order or the know- 
ledge of his general." He, however, "after a strict 
debate" gave his qaul (assurance of safety), to all the 
English factories "to prevent like injuries. "^ (O. C 

But the Rajapur damages long continued unpcud. 
On 1 9th July 1.676 Surat wrote to Bombi^j^ suggesting 


that a "discreet and sober" Englishman with Giridhar- 
das should be sent to dun the Rajah for the money, 
as Narayan Shenvi was dilatory. 

On 1 1th October news was received from Narayan 
Shenvi at the Maratha Court, that Shivaji was willing 
to satisfy his debt to the Company in "vairats or 
batty," and the Council agreed to accept them if no 
better terms could be secured. Six days later the 
Surat Council in disgust order the Rajapur factory to 
be v/ithdrawn, since, ' so long eis that pirate and 
universal robber [Shivaji] lives, that hath no regard 
to friend nor foe, God nor man, there can be no 
security in any trade in his country." This was only 
a threat to Shivaji's ministers, and the factory was 
dissolved only in 1 68 1 . 

Early in 1677 the patience of the English seemed 
to have been exhausted. Surat wrote to Bombay on 
26th January 1677, "If Shivaji still continues to baffle 
you, we desire you to seize and make prize of some 
of his vessels belonging to Dabhol, Chaul or Kaliem 
or any other of his ports, letting the men have their 
liberty and taking care that none of the goods be 
embezzled or made away, for this will be the only 
way to make him rightly understand himself." (F. R. 
Surat, 89.) The threat, however, was not carried out. 
The people of Bombay were entirely dependent on 
Shivaji's territory on the madnland for their fuel, 
timber, fresh provisions, and cattle, and he could 
also have effectually stopped the passage of their 
export merchandise across the Konkan and Kanara 


coast-Strip, the whole of which was now in his hands. 
He, on his part, depended on Bombay for salt. 

In January 1678, as we learn from a Sural letter, 
"for Shivaji's former debt, they [i.e., the Rajapur 
factors] are forced to take betel-nuts as Shivaji's 
ministers will rate it at." (F. R. Surat, 89.) But 
even thus the indemnity was not paid. The Surat 
Council, in April, May and July, express their indig- 
nation at the deceitful fair promises of Shivaji's 
ministers and that Rajah's evasion of the demands 
made upon him, and decide to withdraw the factories 
at Karwar, Hubli and Rajapur, if matters did not 
improve. (Ibid.) On 18th March 1680 Bombay 
writes to Surat, "We are very glad the management 
of the business with Shivaji is to your liking. He hath 
confirmed all... A hundred hj^andi of betel-nut is sent 
us on account of our demand for satisfaction of the 
two vessels lost." (F. R. Surat, 108.) On the 5th 
April following, the Rajah died. 

Shivaji never paid the promised indemnity in full 
as long as he lived, and the Rajapur factory was 
closed in Shambhuji's reign (December 1682 or 
January 1683.) (F. R. Surat, 91.) 

In 1684, after Richard Keigwin, the usurping 
Governor of Bombay, had m^de a treaty with 
Shambhuji, the latter wrote to his subahdar of Raja- 
pur : ' 'Captain Henry Gary and Thomas Wilkins, 
ambassadors, and Ram Shenvi, interpreter, on behalf 
of the English, came to me earnestly desiring peace 
with me, intimating that my father Shivaji Rajah did 

404 SHJVAJl. [CH. XIV- 

contract to pay them 10,000 pagodas. PadsWhi on 
account of gOQids taken from them, of which aiceoimt 
3367 being paid, there remains 6633, requesting me 

to pay the same I have promised thero to satisfy 

what remaina unpaid of the said 10,000 pagodas." 
(To be paid in kind by rebuilding the English faclory- 
house at Rajapur, and in cocoa-nuts betel-nuts, &c., 
by degrees.) (F..R. Surat, 109.) 

Government, iNStiTuTioNs and Policy. 

§ I. Extent of his k'ng<ioTn and dependencies. 

At the time of his death Shivaji's kingdom 
included all the country (exc«pl the Portuguese pos- 
sessions) stletchijig from Ramnagar {modern Dharam- 
pur Stat€ in the Surat Agency) in the north, to Karwar 
or the Gangavati river in the Bombay district of Kan- 
ara, ia the south. TTie eastern boundary embraced 
Baglatia in the north, then ran southwards along an 
irregular shifting line through the middle of the Nasik 
and Puna districts, and encircled the whole of the 
Satara emd much of the Kolhapur districts. This 
tract formed what the Marathi documents describe as 
his swaraj or 'own kingdom' and the Persian accounts 
as his 'old dominions.' Here his ownership was 
recognised as legally established and beyond ques- 
tion. A recent but permanent acquisition was the 
Western Kamatak or the Kanarese-speaking country 
extending from Belgaum to the bank of the Tunga- 
bhadra opposite the Bellary district of the Madras 

This, the consolidated portion of his kingdom, 
was divided into three provinces, each under a 
viceroy. The northern tfivision, including the Dang 
and Baglana, the Koli country south of Surat, Konkan 

406 SHIVAJI. [CH. XV, 

north of Bombay, and the Deccan plateau or Desk 
southwards to Puna, was governed by More Trimbak 
Pingle. The southern division, which was made up 
of Konkan south of Bombay, Savant-vadi and the 
North Kanara coast, — formed the viceroyalty of 
Annaji Datto. The south-eastern division, ruled by 
Dattaji Pant, covered the Satara and Kolhapur dis- 
tricts of Desh and the Kamatak districts of Belgaum 
and Dharwar to Kopal west of the Tungabhadra. 
(Sabh. 77 ; Parasnis MS. ; a Persian MS. roll of 
Mr. Rajwade ; English summary in Mawjee, /. Bo. 
B. R. A. S.) 

Shivaji's latest annexation was the country 
extending from the Tungabhadra opposite Kopal to 
Vellore and Jinji, i.e., the northern, central and 
eastern parts of the present kingdom of Mysore and 
portions of the Madras districts of Bellary, Chittur 
and Arcot. His two years" possession of them before 
his death was too short to enable him to consolidate 
his gains here, and this province was really held by 
an army of occupation and remained unsettled in 
1680 ; only the forts garrisoned by him and as much 
of the surrounding lands as they could command, 
acknowledged Maratha rule. 

Besides these places there was one region where 
the contest for mastery was still undecided at the 
time of his death. This was the Kanara highlands, 
including the South Dharwar district and the princi- 
palities of Sunda and Bednur. Shivaji had inflicted 
some defeats upon the local Nawab, a vassal of 


Bijapur ; but Bankapur, the capital, was still un- 
conquered when he breathed his last. So also was 
Bednur, which merely paid him tribute. (Struggle for 
Savanur, in Dig.) 

Outside these settled or half-settled pEirts of his 
kingdom, there was a wide and very fluctuating belt 
of land subject to his power but not owning his 
sovereignty. They were the adjacent parts of the 
Mughal empire (Mug/i/af in Marathi), which formed 
the happy hunting-ground of his horsemen. In these 
he levied blackmail (khandani, i.e., ransom, in 
Marathi), as regularly as his army could repeat its 
annual visit to them. The money paid was popularly 
called chauth, because it amounted to one-fourth of 
the standard assessment of the land revenue of a 
place. But as this paper assessment was always 
larger than the actual collection, the real incidence 
of the chauth was considerably more than one-fourth 
of what the peasants paid to their legitimate sovereign. 
The payment of the chauth merely saved a place 
from the unwelcome presence of the Maratha soldiers 
and civil underlings, but did not impose on Shivaji 
ans'' corresponding obligation to guard the district 
from foreign invasion or internal disorder. The 
Marathas looked only to their own gain and not to 
the fate of their prey after they had left. The chauth 
was only a means of buying off one robber, and not 
a subsidiary system for the maintenance of peace and 
order against all enemies. The lands subject to the 

408 SHIVAJI. [CH. XV. 

■cbatdh cannot, dieuefore, be rightly called spheres of 

The iterritory, old and new, under Shivaji con- 
tained 240 forts, out of which 79 were situated in 
Mysore and Madras. (SabK. 98-101 ; Chit. 152-157 
names 280 forts.) 

§2. His revenue and hoarded treasure. 

His revenue is put by bis courtier Sabhasad 
(p. 102) at the round figure of one k^ore of hun* while 
the chauth when collected in full brought in another 
80 lakhs. (T. S. 35a.) If these statements are cor- 
rect, Shivaji 's theoretical income at its "highest was 
nine ^rores of Rupees. The sum actually realised 
was considerably less than this paper-estimate, — 
probably sometimes falling as low as one-tenth of it. 

The treasure and other valuable things left behind 
by Shivaji are enumerated in great detail by Sabhasad 
<95-96) and the Tarikh-i-Shivaji (42-44.) But we can- 
not be sure that all the figures have been correctly 
copied in the MSS. of these two works that have 
come down to us. Moreover, the gold and silver 
coins were of such an immense veiriety of denomina- 
tions countries and ages, — a faithful index to the wide 
range emd thorough character of Shivaji's looting cam- 
paigns, — ^that it is impossible to reduce the total value 
of his hoard to any modern currency with even 

* Chit., 157, speaks of 10 krores of tihazinah; but it is 
not clear whether he means Rupees or huna, nor whether he 
is speaking of the annual income or the hoarded treasure. 


tolerable accuracy. The curious English reader is 
referred to my translation of T. S. in the Modem 
Review for JaTOiaary 1910 and to Manker's translation 
of Saibhasad. 

§3. Streng^ of his army. 

TJie growth of hi« anmy is thus recorded : at the 
outset of his CEffeer he had 1 ,200 household cavalry 
ipaga) and 2,000 silahdars or mercenary horsemen 
pcFovided with tiieir own arms and mounts. ^Sabh. 6.) 
After the conquest of Javli (1655) the ntmiber was 
increased to 7,000 paga, 3,000 silahdars and 10,000 
Mavle 'infantry. (Sabh. 11.) He also enlisted 700 
Pathaias from the disbanded soldiery of Bijapur (Chit. 
33 ; T. S. I5b.) After the destruction of Afzal Khan 
{1659) he raised his forces to 7,000 paga, 8,000 silah- 
dars, and 12,000 infamtry >(Sabh. 27.) At the time of 
his death (1(660), his army consisted of 45,000 paga 
(under 29 coJonds), 60,000 sAahdars (under 31 
coflonels) and one lakh of Mavle infantry (under 36 
colonels.) (Sabh. 96-97.) But T.. S. states that he 
left 32,000 horses in his stables, besides 5,000 given 
to the bargirs. 

The core of his army was, therefore, formed by 
30 to 40 thousand regular and permanently enlisted 
cavalry in his own service, and about twice that 
number of irifantry fnilitia (hasham), w^hom he used 
to withdraw from the cultivation of their fields during 
the campaigning seeison only, as in England under 
King Alfred. The infantry geirrisoning his forts were 

410 SHIVAJI. [CH. XV. 

permanently recruited, though they were given fields 
in the neighbourhood. The number of the silahdars 
who hired themselves and their horses out to him 
varied greatly from year to year, according to his 
need, their expectation of plunder in the impending 
campaign, and the demand for their services in the 
neighbouring States at a particular time. In the 
earlier stages of his career, local chieftains with their 
retainers used to join him in his raids {e.g., Surat, 
1664) and swell his army by the adhesion of a body 
of irregulars. But he soon learnt to do without such 
allies of dubious military value. 

His elephants numbered 1 ,260, according to 
Sabhasad (p. 97) ; but T. S. gives 125 and Chit. 300, 
which are more likely figures. The camels were 
3,000 (T. S.) or 1,500 (Chit.) The number of his 
artillery-pieces is not mentioned. Chitnis (a doubtful 
authority) tells us that 200 guns were kept ready for 
field service and the rest were placed in the forts. 
Each piece of ordnance had some elephants and a 
battalion of infantry attached to it. 

§4. Council of Eight Ministers. 

His earliest administrative Council, in the days 
of Dadaji Kond-dev, was composed of four officers 
only, viz., the Peshwa, the Majmuadar, the Dabir, 
and the Sabnis (Sabh. 7.) When, in 1647, Shiva 
became his own master, he added a commander-in- 
chief (Sar-i-naubat) and a second DabtT to the above 
four (Sabh. 8.) In 1655, after the conquest of Javli 


(which practically doubled his territory) the Council 
was further expanded by creating a Surnis and a 
Waqnis and two distinct commanders for the infantry 
and cavalry arms (Sabh. 1 1 .) After his return from 
Agra (1667) he appointed a Lord Justice to try all 
suits in the kingdom according to the Sanskrit law- 
books (Sabh. 57.) By 1674 the number of ministers 
had risen to eight {Ibid. 83), which continued till his 

This Council of eight ministers, ashta pradhan, 
was in no sense a Cabinet. Like Louis XIV and 
Frederick the Great, Shivaji was his own prime- 
minister and kept all the strings of the administration 
in his own hands. The eight pradhans merely acted 
as his secretaries : they had no initiative, no pow^er 
to dictate his policy ; their function was purely 
advisory when he was in a mood to listen to 
advice, and at other times to carry out his general 
instructions and supervise the details in their respec- 
tive departments. It is very likely that Shivaji never 
interfered with the Ecclesiastical and Accounts 
departments, but that was due entirely to his low 
caste and illiteracy. The Peshwa's position at Court 
was, no doubt, higher than that of the other pradhans, 
because he was closer to the king and naturally 
enjoyed more of his confidence ; but they were in no 
sense his subordinates. The solidairity of the British 
Cabinet, as well as its power, was wanting in the 
Maratha Council of Eight. 

The eight ministers were the following : — 

412 SHIVAJI. [CH. XV. 

1. The prime-minister, (Persieui Peshwa, Sans- 
krit Mukhya Pradhan.) His duties were to loo^k after 
the welfare of the State in general terms, to represent 
the king in his absence, an<i to keep peace among 
the other officers, so as to promote harmony in the 
administration. Ail royal letters and charters had to 
bear his seal below the king's. 

2. The auditor, (Persian Majmuadar, Sanskrit 
Amatya.) He had to check all the accounts of 
piiblic income and expenditure and report them to 
the king, and to countersign all statements of 
accounts both of the kingdom in general and of the 
particular districts. 

3. The chronicler, (Persian Waqia-navis, Sans- 
krit Mantri.) His duties were to compile a daily 
record of the king's doings and Court incidents, and 
to watch over the kirtg's invitation-lists, meals, com- 
panions, &c., so as to guard against murderous plots. 

4. The superintendent, (Persian Shuru-navis, 
Sanskrit Sachio.) He had to see that all royal letters 
were drafted in the proper style, to revise them, and 
to write at the head of charters the words Shuru 
shud, or 'here begins.' He had also to check the 
accounts of the mahals and parganahs. 

5. The foreign secretary, (Persian Dabir, 
Sanskrit Sumant.) He was the king's adviser on 
relations with foreign States, war and peace. It was 
also his duty to keep intelligence about other coun- 
tries, to receive and dismiss foreign envoys, and 
maintain the dignity of the State abroad. 


6. Tlie commandier-in-ehief, {Persian Sar-i- 
rtanbat, Sanskrit Senapati.) 

7. The ecclesiastical head, (Marathi Pandit Rao 
andi Danadhyakska.) It was his function to honour 
and reward learned Brahmans on behaK of the king, 
to decide theological questions and caste disputes, to 
fix dates for religious ceremonies, to punish impiety 
and heresy, and order penajices, &e. He was Judge 
of Canon Law, Royal Almoner, and Censor of PuUic 
Morals combined. 

8-. The chief justice (Sanskrit Nyiayadhish.) He 
trred civil and criBainal cases according to Hindu law 
and endorsed all judicial decisions, especially about 
rights to land, village headmanship, 6cc. 

All these ministers with the exception of the 
commander-inrchief, ■were of the Brahman, caste, and 
all of them, with the exception of the last two, had 
also to take the cotn-niaind of eirmies and go out on 
expet^tions when necessary. All royal letters, char- 
ters- and treaties had to bear the seals of the king 
emdi the Peshwa and the endorsement of the four 
ministers other than the Commander-in-chief, the 
Ecclesiastical Head, and the Chief Justice.* 

The actual work of State correspondcnee was 
conducted by Kayasthas^ of whom two were feimous, 
viz., Balaji Avji the chitnis and Niloji the munshi 
or Persian secretary. The muster-rolls of the army 

* So say» Chitnis. But Oxinden's letteis imply that all 
the ministers endorsed Shivaji's treaty with die English. 

414 SHIVAJI. [CH. XV. 

were written and the pay-bills drawn up by a class 
of officers called sabnises, who corresponded to the 
bakhshis or paymasters of the Mughal army, but 
occupied a much lower rank. (Sabh. 83 ; Chit. 167- 
168 ; Sanads and Letters.) 

§5. Army organisation. 

We now turn to Shivaji's civil and military 

Every fort or thanah (outpost) was placed under 
three officers of equal status, viz., the haoladar, the 
sabnis and the sar-i-naubat, who were to act jointly. 
"No fort was to be left solely under a havladar, lest 
a single traitor should be able to deliver it to the 
enemy. The havladar and the sar-i-naubat were 
selected from the Maratha caste and the sabnis from 
the Brahmans," — so that one caste served as a check 
upon another. The stores and provisions in the forts 
were in charge of a Kayastha officer called the 
karkhanah-navis, who wrote the accounts of their 
incoming and expenditure. In the larger forts, where 
the bounds were extensive, the walls were divided 
into five or six sections, and each of these was 
guarded by a special tatsar-i-naubat. The environs 
of a fort were watched by men of the Parwari and 
Ramushi castes. 

The havladar of a fort was empowered to change 
the lower officers and to write official letters and 
seal them with his own seal. All letters from Govern- 
ment were to be addressed to him. He was to lock 


the fort-gates at sunset and open them at sunrise, 
carry the keys with himself and sleep with them 
under his pillow. He had to make frequent tours of 
inspection in and outside the fort, pay surprise visits 
to the sentinels, while the sar-i-naubat had to inspect 
the work of the patrolling parties and the night-watch. 
Minute written instructions were given by Shivaji for 
keeping in each fort munition, provisions, building- 
materials, and other necessary stores adequate to its 
size, and for keeping proper watch ; and these 
regulations were rigidly enforced. 

All soldiers, whether musketeers, spearmen, 
archers or swordsmen, were recruited only after a 
careful personal inspection by Shivaji himself and 
taking security for every new soldier from the men 
already in his service. 

In the State cavalry (paga), the unit was formed 
by 25 troopers (bargirs) ; over 25 men was placed one 
havladar, over 5 havladars one jumladar* and over 
1 jumlas or 1 ,250 men one hazari. Still higher ranks 
were the 5-hazaris and the supreme commander or 
sar-i-naubat of cavalry. For every twenty-five troopers 
there were a water-carrier and a farrier. 

The silahdars were organised on a different plan, 
but were under the orders of the same sar-i-naizbat 
of cavalry, and ranked lower than the paga horsemen. 

* Chit., 81, says that there was an intermediate officer 
called sahahdar in command of 5 jumlas, below the hazari. 
Here I read two (don) for ten {daha) of the printed text. 

41:6 sHivAji. [cH. XV. 

In the infantry, whether fort'-garrisoa» or Mavle 
militiamen, there was one corporal (nayaih^ to every 
nine privates (paiks) ; over 5 nayaka one havhdar, 
over two (or three) havladiara one jumladar, and over 
10 jumlaxiars one hazari* There seems to have been 
no 5-hazari among the infantry, but only l-ha^aris, 
over whom was the sar-i-naubut of infantry. Shivaji's 
Guard; brigade of 2,000 select Mavle infantry was 
splendidly equipped dressed and armed at great 
expense to the State. (Sabh. 58.) 

The paga jumladar had a salary of 500 hun a 
year and the right to use a palki. Attached to him 
was a majmuadar on !00 to 125 hun. A hazari drew 
1,000 hun a year ; under him w^ere a majmuadiar,, a 
Maratha l^rbhari (manager or steward), and a 
revenue-writer {jama-nat>is) of the Kayastha caste, 
for whom 500 hun was assigned. The accounts of 
military income and disbursement had to be made' 
up with the signature of all the four. A commander 
of 5,000 drew 2,000 hun and had the same three civil 
officers attached- to his office. Karkuns (collectors), 
reporters, couriers and spies were posted to every 
higher command down to a hazari, under order of 
the sar-i-naubat. 

An infantry jumladar drew 100 hun a yeeir, and 
had a safanis (muster-writer) on 40 hun. A hazari 
drew 500 hun and his sabnis 100 to 125 hun. 

* Chit., 83, gives one jumladar over five havladars and 
one hazari over five jumladars. 


It was Shivaji's settled policy to use his , army 
to draw supplies from foreign dominions every year. 
"TTie troops were to go into cantonments in the 
home territory during the rainy season (June — 
September.) Grain, fodder and medicines were kept 
in stock for the horses, and the huts of the troopers 
were kept thatched with grsiss. On the day of 
Dasahara (early in October) the army should set out 
from the camp for the country selected by the Rajah. 
At the time of their departure a list was made of all 
the property that every man, high or low, of the 
army carried with himself. The troops were to 
subsist in foreign parts for eight months and also 
levy contributions. No woman, female slave or 
dancing-girl was to be allowed to accompany the 
army. A soldier keeping any of these was to be 
beheaded. No woman or child was to be taken 
captive, but only men. Cows were exempt from 
seizure, but bullocks might be taken for transport 
only. Brahmans were not to be molested, nor taken 
as hostages for ransom. No soldier should mis- 
conduct himself [during a campaign.] 

Eight months were to be passed in such 
expeditions abroad. On their return to their own 
frontier in Baishakh (April) the whole army was to 
be searched, the property found was to be compared 
with the old list, and the excess was to be deducted 
from their salary. Any one secreting any booty was 
liable to punishment on detection by the general. 

The generals on their return should see the 


418 SHIVAJI. [CH. XV. 

Rajah, deliver their booty in gold silver jewels and 
costly cloth to him, present their accounts, and take 
their dues from the Treasury. The officers and men 
were to be promoted or punished according to their 
conduct during the late campaign. Then they would 
again remain for four months in camp." (Sabh. 

§ 6. ReOenue system and administration. 

"The land in every province was to be measured 
and the area calculated in chavars. The measuring- 
rod was 5 cubits and 5 muthis (closed fists) in 
length. A cubit was equal to 14 tansus, and the 
measuring-rod was [therefore] 80 tansus long. 
Twenty kathis (reds) square made a bigha and 120 
bighas one chavar. The area of each village was 
thus ascertained in detail. An estimate was made 
of the expected produce of each bigha, three parts 
of which were left to the peasant and two parts 
taken by the State.* 

"New ryofs who came to settle were to be given 
money for seeds, and cattle, the amount being re- 
covered in two or four annual insteJments. The 
revenue should be taken in kind at harvest time." 

* Captain Robertson in 1820 and 1825 gave a different and 
more complicated account of Shivaji's revenue system. (Bom. 
Gaz., xviii. Pt. ii. pp. 321-322.) It is quite probable that the 
system was not so simple and uniform as Sabhasad represents 
it; but we do not know the Captain's authorities and have no 
meeins of testing his statement about a system nearly two 
centuries old and under a dynasty which had passed away. 


Shivaji wanted to sweep away the middle class 
of revenue farmers and come into direct relations 
with the cultivators. "The ryots were not subject to 
the authority of the zamindars, deshmuk.ha, and 
desaia, who had no right to exercise the powers of 
a political superior (overlord) or harass the ryots." 

"In the Nizam-Shahi, Adil-Shahi and Mughal 
territories annexed, the ryots had formerly been 
subject to patils, kulkarnis and deshmukhs, who 
used to do the collection work and pay what they 
pleased to the State, sometimes only 200 or 300 hun 
for a village yielding 2,000 hun as revenue. These 
mirasdars (hereditary landlords), thus growing 
wealthy, built forts enlisted troops, and grew power- 
ful. TTiey never waited upon tlje revenue officer of 
Government and used to show fight if he urged that 
the village could pay more to the State. This class 
had become unruly and seized the country. But 
Shivaji dismantled their castles, garrisoned the strong 
places with his own troops, and took away all power 
from the mirasdars. Formerly they used to take 
whatever they liked from the ryots. This was now 
stopped. Their dues were fixed after calculating the 
(exact) revenue of the village, and they were 
forbidden to build castles." (Sjibh. 32-33.) 

Similarly, military fief-holders were given no 
political power over their tenants. "The sar-i- 
naubats, majmttadars,]zuns and the officers in 
the Rajah's personal service were given assignments 
on the revenue {tankha barat) for their salary. The 

420 SHIVAJI. [CH. XV, 

lands cultivated by them were subject to assessment 
like the fields of the ryots, and the amount of the 
revenue due 'was deducted from their pay. For the 
balance they got orders on the Treasury of the 
capital or the districts. Men serving in the army, 
the militia or the forts were not to be given pro- 
prietory {mokosa) rights over any village in entirety. 
Their dues were to be paid either by assignment of 
revenue or by cash from the Treasury. None but 
the karkuns had any jurisdiction over the land. All 
payments to the army were to be made by the 
karkuns. The grant of molzaaa rights would have 
created disorder among the peasants ; they would 
have grown in strength and disobeyed the Govern- 
ment collectors ; ^and the growing power- of the 
ryots would have ended in rebellion at various 
places. The mo^asa-holders and the zamindars if 
united would become uncontrollable. No molzasa 
was to be granted to any one." (Sabh. 30-31.) 

Over two mahals, yielding a revenue of from 
75,000 to 1,25,000 hun in the aggregate, a subahdar 
on 400 hun and a majmuadar on 100 to 125 hun a 
year were appointed. The subahdar was to have 
a palki allowance of 400 hun. All civil and military 
officers with a salary of 125 hun or more were given 
the right to hold parasols {a)tab-gir) over their heads, 
with an allowance from the State for bearers (Sabh. 
31.) Where necessary, a subahdar was posted over 
a tract yielding only one lakh of Rupees. To the 
disturbed provinces across the frontier, a military 


force weis sent with the collectors of blackmail. 
(Sabh. 32.) TTie subahdars were all BreJimans, under 
the Peshwa's supervision (Sabh. 77.) 

§7. Religious policg. 

Shivaji's religious policy, was very liberal. He 
respected the holy places of all creeds in his raids 
and made endowments for Hindu temples and 
Muslim saints' tombs and mosques alike. He not 
only granted pensions to Brahman scholars versed 
in the Vedas, astronomers and anchorites, but also 
built hermitages and provided subsistence at his own 
cost for the holy men of Islam, notably Baba Yaqut 
of Kelshi (4 m. s. of Bankot on the Ratnagiri coast.) 
(Sabh. 33.) "The lost Vedic studies were revived 
by him. One maund of rice was (annually) present- 
ed to a Breihman who had mastered one of the 
books of the Vedas, two maunds to a master of two 
books, and so on. Every year the Pandit Rao used 
to examine the scholars in the month of Shravan 
(August) and increase or decrease their stipends 
according to their progress in study. Foreign pandits 
received presents in goods, local scholars in food. 
Famous scholars were assembled, honoured and 
given money rewards. No Brahman had occasion 
to go to other kingdoms to beg." (Chit. 85, 43.) 

Shivaji's spiritual guide (gurv) was Ramdas 
Swami, one of the greatest saints of Maharashtra, 
(bom 1608, died 1681.) An attempt has been made 

422 SHIVAJI. [CH. xv_ 

in the present generation to prove that the Maratha 
national hero's political ideal of an independent 
Hindu monarchy was inspired by Ramdas ; but the 
evidence produced is neither adequate nor free from 
suspicion.* The holy man's influence on Shivaji 
was spiritual, and not political. After the capture 
of Satara, (1673) Shivaji installed his gwu in the 
neighbouring hill-fort of Parli or Sajjangarh, and 
guides still point to the credulous tourist the seat on 
the top of Satara hill from which Shivaji used to hold 
converse with the saint, across four miles of space ! 
A charming anecdote is told, that Shivaji could not 
understand why Ramdas used to go out daily on his 
begging tour, though his royal disciple had made 
him rich beyond the dreams of avarice, and that he 
next day placed at his feet a deed making a gift of 
all his kingdom to the saint. Ramdas accepted the 
gift, appointed Shivaji as his vicar, and bade him 
rule the realm thenceforth not as an autocratic 
owner, but as a servant responsible for all his acts 
to a higher authority. Shivaji then made the tawny 
robe of a Hindu sannyasi his standard, bhagwe 
jhanda, in order to signify the livery of his ascetic 
lord paramount, and conducted himself "As ever in 
his great Taskmaster's eyes." 

* Shivaji and Ramdas : Chit. 44-53, also his Shambhuji 
Bak,har, 5-6 ; Prof. Bhate's Shivaji ani Ramdas ; the publica- 
tions and now-defunct monthly magazine of the Ramdasi 
coterie of Dhulia (notably Mr. Rajwade.) Dig. 226 (doubtful.) 


§8. Effect of Shivaji's reign. 
So much for Shivaji's regulations in theory. 
But in practice they were often violated except 
where he was personally present. Thus, the asser- 
tion of Sabhasad and Chitnis that his soldiers had 
to deliver every item of the booty taken by them 
to the State, is contradicted by the sack of Dharam- 
gaon (1679), where the English factors were robbed 
of many things without these being entered in the 
official papers of the Maratha army or credited to 
Shivaji's Treasury (Ch. XIV.) Shiva ji could not be 
eversnvhere and at all times ; hence it was impossible 
for hrn to prevent private looting by his troops and 
cam]>followers. In the wake of the Maratha army, 
ganjs of private robbers took to the road. The 
Pindiaris were the logical corollary of the Maratha 
solder, to whom rapine was a normal duty. 

Shivaji justified his spoliation of his neighbours 
by sasdng, as he did to the Mughal governor of 
Sur.t (1672), "Your Emperor has forced me to keep 
an irmy for the defence of my people and country. 
Thi army must be paid by his subjects." (P. 240.) 
Sua a plea might have been true at the beginning 
of Is career and in relation to Mughal territory only, 
but cannot explain his raids into Bijapur and 
Goionda, Kanara and Tanjore. It fails altogether as 
a cifence of the foreign policy of the Peshwas. 

But whatever might be the moral quality of 
themeans he employed, his success was a dazzling 

424 SHIVAJI. [CH. XV. 

reality. This petty jagirdar's son proved himself 
the irrepressible opponent of the MugheJ empire 
and all its resources. This fact deeply impressed 
the minds of his contemporaries in India and abroad. 
Aurangzib was in despair as to how he could subdue 
Shiva. A significant statement is made in a news- 
letter of his Court in 1 670 that the Elmperor read a 
despatch from the Deccan, recounting some raids of 
Shiva and then "remained silent." In tie inner 
council of the Court he often anxiously asked whom 
he should next send against Shivaji, seeing that 
nearly all his great generals had failed in the 
Deccan, and Mahabat Khan irreverently replied 
with a sneer at Abdul Wahab's influence over the 
Emperor, "No general is necessary. A decree fom 
the Chief Qazi will be sufficient to extinguish Shivi ! ' ' 
The young Persian king. Shah Abbas II., sen a 
letter taunting Aurangzib, "You call yourself a 
Padishah, but cannot subdue a mere zamindar Ike 
Shiva. I am going to India with an army to tech 
you your business." 

To the Hindu world in that age of renewd 
persecution, Shivaji appeared as the star of a nw 
hope, the protector of the ritualistic paint-mark (tilk) 
on the forehead of Hindus, and the saviour pf 
Brahmans. (Bhushan's poems.) His Court and is 
son's became the rallying-point of the opposition :o 
Aurangzib. The two rivals were both supermfl, 
but contrasts in character. 


§ 9. Portraits of Shivaji. 

We have reliable information about Shivaji's 
personal appearance in 1664, when he was seen by 
some Englishmen at Surat. The chaplain Escaliot 
writes, "His person is described by them who have 
seen him to be of mean [= medium] stature, lower 
somewhat than I am erect, and of an excellent 
proportion. Actual [ = active] in exercise, [he] 
seems to smile, a quick arid piercing eye, and whiter 
than any of his people." The cultured Frenchman 
Thevenot, who travelled in the Deccan from 
November 1665 to February 1667, says of him, 
"The Rajaih is small [in size] and tawny 
[in complexion] , with quick eyes which in- 
dicate abundance of spirit." It is a pity that 
neither the English factor of Rajapur whose wig 
Shivaji examined with his fingers in cvuiosity (March, 
1675), nor Henry Oxinden, the English envoy present 
at Shivaji's coronation, has left any description of 
his personal appearance. 

There is a contemporary and authentic portrait 
of Shivaji preserved in the British Museum, viz., 
MS. Add. 22,282 (Picture No. 12.) "It bears a 
Dutch inscription, 'Shivaji the late Maratha prince.' 
This volume of Indian portraits evidently belonged 
to some Dutch owner who had written the name of 
each person in Dutch on the portrait before 1707, as 
Aurangzib's portrait is inscribed, 'the present Great 
Mughal'... 1 should, therefore, say the portraits 

426 SHIVAJI. [CH. XV, 

were true to life so far as the artist could make 
them. They are well executed, in the usual style. 

"No. 12, Shivaji. — Three-quarter length, looking 
to right, — same face as in Orme's Fragments. Black 
beard and moustache — long hair at sides — gold pagri 
— jewelled aigretts — black plume — ^white jigah 
(pearls?) — flowered coat with white ground — ^purple 
silk scarf thrown across shoulder — w^orked sash — 
peshqabz (dagger) sticking out from waist on left side 
— right hand hidden in hilt of a pattah or rapier — 
left hand holding a dhup or straight sword." (Note 
supplied to me by Mr. W. Irvine, lOth March, 1904.) 
The portrait of Shivaji given in Constable s 
edition of Bernier's Travels (p. 187) follows an en- 
graving in F. Valentyn's Oud-en Nieuw Oost-Indien 
( i 724-26), the pictures in which w^ere most probably 
acquired by the Dutch E. 1. Co.'s mission to the 
Mughal Court in 1712. 

The Italian traveller Manucci in 1 706 presented 
to the Venetian Senate a volume of 56 portraits 
drawn for him by Mir Muhammad, an artist in the 
household of Shah Alam, before 1686. TTiis volume 
(now at Paris) contains a portrait of Shivaji (No. 39 
in Blochet's list), which Mr. Irvine has reproduced 
by photography in his edition of the Storia do Mogor, 
Vol. 111., picture No. XXXV. Earlier and less 
faithful woodcuts of it are to be found in Langles' 
Monuments Anciens et Modernes (Paris 1821) and 
De Jacigny and Raymond's Inde (Paris, 1845.) 


Shivaji's achievement, character and 
place in history. 

§1. Shivaji's policy how far traditional. 

Shivaji's State policy, like his administrative 
system,* was not very new. From time immemorial 
it had been the aim of the typical Hindu king to set 
out early every autumn to "extend his kingdom " 
at the expense of his neighbours. Indeed, the 
Sanskrit law-books lay down such a course as the 
iiecessary accomplishment of a true Kshatriya chief. 
(Manu. vii. 99-103, 182.) In more recent times it 
had also been the practice of the Muhammadan 
sovereigns in North India and the Deccan alike. But 
these conquerors justified their territorial aggrandise- 
ment by religious motives. According to the 
Quranic law, there cannpt be peace between a 
Muhammadan king and his neighbouring "infidel" 
States. The latter are dar-ul-harb or legitimate 
seats of war, and it is the Muslim king's duty to slay 
and plunder in them till they accept the true feuth 
and become dar-td-islam, after which they will 
become entitled to his protection.! 

* For an earlier parallel and possible model, see the Adil- 
Shahi rules given in B. S. 333. 

t For a detEiiled account and authorities, see History of 
Aurangzih, iii. 284-293. 

428 SHIVAJl. [CH. XVI. 

The coincidence between Shivaji's foreign policy 
and that of a Quranic sovereign is so complete that 
both the history of Shivaji by his courtier Krishnaji 
Anant and the Persian official history of Bijapur use 
exactly the same word, mulkrgiri, to describe such 
raids into neighbouring countries as a regular politi- 
cal ideal. The only difference was that in theory 
at least, an orthodox Muslim king was bound to spare 
the other Muslim States in his path eind not to spoil 
or shed the blood of true believers, while Shivaji 
(as well as the Peshwas after him) carried on his 
mulk-giri into all neighbouring States, Hindu no less 
than Islamic, and squeezed rich Hindus as merci- 
lessly as he did Muhammadans. Then, again, the 
orthodox Islamic king, ii theory at least, aimed at 
the annexation and conversion of the other States, 
so that after the short sharp agony of conquest was 
over the latter enjoyed peace like the regular parts 
of his dominion. But the object of Shivaji's military 
enterprises, unless his Court-historian Sabhasad has 
misrepresented it, was not annexation but mere 
plunder, or to quote his very words, "The Maratha 
forces should feed themselves at the expense of 
foreign countries for eight months every year, and 
levy blackmail." (Sabh., 29.) 

TTius, Shivaji's power was exactly similar in 
origin and theory to the power of the Muslim States 
in India and elsewhere, and he only differed from 
them in the use of that power. Universal toleration 
and equal justice and protection were the distinctive 


features of the permanently occupied portion of his 
sWaraj, as we have shown elsewhere. 

§2. Causes of Shivaji's failure to build 
an enduring State. 

Why did Shivaji fail to create an enduring 
State? Why did the Maratha nation stop short of 
the final accomplishment of their union and dissolve 
before they had consolidated into an absolutely 
compact political body? 

An obvious cause was, no doubt, the shortness 
of his reign, barely ten years after the final rupture 
with the Mughals in 1670. But this does not furnish 
the true explanation of his failure. It is doubtful if 
with a very much longer time at his disposal he 
could have averted the ruin which befell the Maratha 
State under the Peshwas, for the same moral canker 
was at work among his people in the 17th century 
as in the 18th. The first danger of the new Hindu 
kingdom established by him in the Deccan lay in 
the fact that the national glory and prosperity 
resulting from the victories of Shivaji and Baji Rao I. 
created a reaction in favour of Hindu orthodoxy ; 
it accentuated caste distinction and ceremonial purity 
of daily rites which ran counter to the homogeneity 
and simplicity of the poor and politically depressed 
early Maratha society. Thus, his political success 
sapped the main foundation of that success. 

In the security, power and wealth engendered 
by their independence, the Marathas of the 18th 


century forgot the past record of Muslim persecu- 
tion ; the social grades turned against each other. 
The Brahmans living east of the Sahyadri range 
despised those living west, the men of the hills 
despised their brethren of the plains, because they 
could now do so with impunity. The head of the 
State, though a Brahman, was despised by his other 
Brahman servants, — because the first Peshwa's great- 
grandfather's great-grandfather had once been 
lower in society than the Desh Brahmans' great- 
grandfathers' great-grandfathers ! While the Chit- 
pavan Brahmans were waging social war with the 
Deshastha Brahmans, a bitter jealousy raged 
between the Brahman ministers Eind govern'ors and 
the Kayastha secretaries. We have unmistakable 
traces of it as early as the reign of Shivaji. "Caste 
grows by fission." It is antagonistic to national 
union. In proportion as Shivaji's ideal of a Hindu 
swaraj was based on orthodoxy, it contained within 
itself the seed of its own death. As Rabindranath 
Tagore remarks : 

"A temporary enthusiasm sweeps over the 
country and we imagine that it heis been united ; 
but the rents and holes in our body-social do their 
work secretly ; we cannot retain any noble idea long. 

"Shivaji aimed at preserving the rents ; he 
wished to save from Mughal attack a Hindu society 
to which ceremonial distinctions and isolation of 
castes are the very breath of life. He wanted to 
make this heterogeneous society triumphant over all 


India ! He wove ropes of sand ; he attempted the 
impossible. It is beyond the power of any man, it 
is opposed to the divine law of the universe, to 
establish the swaraj of such a caste-ridden, isolated, 
internally-torn sect over a vast continent like 

Shivaji and his father-in-law Gaikwar were 
Marathas, i.e., members of a despised caste. Before 
the rise of the national movement in the Deccan 
in the closing years of the 1 9th century, a Brahman 
of Maharashtra used to feel insulted if he was called 
a Maratha. "No," he would reply with warmth, 
"I am a Dak.shma Brahman." Shivaji keenly felt 
his humiliation at the hands of the Brahmans to 
whose defence and prosperity he had devoted his life. 
Their insistence on treating him as a Shudra drove 
him into the arms of Balaji Avji, the leader of the 
Kayasthas, and another victim of Brahmanic pride. 
The Brahmans felt a professional jealousy for the 
intelligence and literary powers of the Kayasthas, 
•who were their only rivals in education and Govern- 
ment service, and consoled 'themselves by declalring 
the Kayasthas a low caste not entitled to the Vedic 
rites and by proclaiming a social boycot of Balaji 
Avji who had ventured to invest his son with the 
sacred thread. Balaji naturally sympathised with 
his master and tried to raise him in social estimation 

* From his Riae and Fall of the Silih Power, as tieuislated 
by me in Modem Review, April 1911. 

432 SHIVAJI. [CH. xvu 

by engaging Gaga Bhatta who "made Shivaji a pure 
Kshatriya." The high-priest showed his gratitude 
to Balaji for his heavy retainer by writing a tract 
[or rather two] in which the Kayastha caste w^as 
glorified, but without convincing his contemporary 

There was no attempt at well-thought-out 
organised communal improvement, spread of educa- 
tion, or unification of the people, either under Shivaji 
or under the Peshwas. The cohesion of the peoples 
in the Maratha State was not organic but artificial, 
accidental, and therefore precarious. It was solely 
dependent on the ruler's extraordinary personality 
and disappeared when the country ceased to produce 

* Not has he succeeded in convincing posterity. Only 
two years ago, Mr. Rajwade, a Breihman writer of Puna, 
published a slashing attack on the Kayasthas {Chaturfha Sam. 
Britfa), on the plea of editing this tract. He has provoked 
replies, one of which, Rajwade's Gaga Bhatta by K. T. Gupte, 
makes some attempt at reasoning and the use of evidence, 
while another. The Twanging of the Bow by K. S. Thakre, 
belongs to the same class as Milton's Tetrachordon or Against 
Salmasius ] This is happening in the 20th century, and yet 
Mr. Rajwade and Prof. Bijapurkar (who called Shivaji's 
descendant at Kolhapur a Shudra) are nationalists, even 

It was with a house so divided against itself that the 
Puna Brahmans of the 18th century hoped to found an all- 
Indian Maratha empire, and there are Puna Brahmans in the 
20th century who believe that the hope failed only through 
the superior luck and cunning of the English ! 


A Government of personal discretion is, by its 
very nature, uncertain. TTiis uncertainty reacted 
fatally on the administration. However well-planned 
the machinery and rules might be, the actual con- 
duct of the administration was marred by inefficiency, 
sudden changes, and official corruption, because 
nobody felt secure of his post or of the due apprecia- 
tion of his merit. TTiis has been the bane of all 
autocratic States in the East and the West alike, 
except where the autocrat has been a "hero as king" 
or where a high level of education, civilisation and 
national spirit among the people has reduced the 

§3. Neglect of the economic factor by the Marathas. 

The Maratha rulers neglected the economic 
development of the State. Some of them did, no 
doubt, try to save the peasantry from illegal exac- 
tions, and to this extent they promoted agriculture. 
But commerce was subjected to frequent harassment 
by local officers, and the traders could never be 
certain of freedom of movement and security of 
their rights on mere payment of the legal rate of 
duty. The internal resources of a small province 
with no industry, little trade, a sterile soil, and an 
agriculture dependent upon scanty and precarious 
rainfall, — could not possibly support the large army 
that Shivaji kept or the imperial position and world- 
dominion to which the Peshwas aspired. 

The necessary expenses of the State could be 



met, and all the parts of the body-politic could 
be held together only by a constant flo'w of money 
from outside its own borders, i.e., by a regular 
succession of raids. As the late Mr. G. K. Gokhale 
laughingly told me when describing the hardships 
of the present rigid land assessment in the Bombay 
Presidency, "You see, the land revenue did not 
matter much under Maratha rule. In those old 
days, when the crop failed our people used to sally 
forth with their horses and spears and bring back 
enough booty to feed them for the next two or 
three years. Now they have to starve on their own 

TTius, by the character of his State, the 
Maratha's hands were turned against everybody and 
everybody's hands were turned against him. It is 
the Nemesis of a Krieg-staat to move in a vicious 
circle. It must wage war periodically if it is to get 
its food ; but war, when waged as a normal method 
of supply, destroys industry and wealth in the invad- 
ing and invaded coimtries alike, and ultimately 
defeats the very end of such wars. Peace is death 
to a Krieg-staat ; but peace is the very life-breath of 
wealth. The Krieg-staat, therefore, kills the goose 
that lays the golden eggs. To take an illustration, 
Shivaji's repeated plunder of Surat scared away 
trade and wealth from that city, and his second raid 
{in 1670) brought him much less booty than his first, 
and a few years later the constant dread of Maratha 
incursion entirely impoverished Surat and effectually 


^ried up this source of supply. Thus, from the 
economic point of view, the Maratha State had no 
stable basis, no normal means of growth within itself. 

§4. Excess of finesse and intrigue. 

Lastly, the Maratha leaders trusted too much to 
finesse. They did not reEdise that without a certain 
amount of fidelity to promises no society can hold 
together. Stratagem and falsehood may have been 
necessary at the birth of their State, but it was 
continued during the maturity of their power. No 
one could rely on the promise of a Marsitha minister 
or the assurance of a Maratha general. Witness the 
long and finally fruitless negotiations of the English 
merchants with Shivaji for compensation for the loss 
of their Rajapur factory. The Maratha Government 
could not always be relied on to abide by their 
treaty obligations. 

Shivaji, emd to a lesser extent Baji Rao 1., 
preserved an admirable balance between war and 
diplomacy. But the latter-day Marathas lost this 
practical ability. They trusted too much to diplo- 
matic trickery, as if empire were a pacific game of 
chess. Military efficiency was neglected, war at the 
right moment and in the right fashion was avoided, 
or, worse still, their forces were frittered away in 
unseasonable campaig^is and raids conducted as a 
matter of routine, and the highest political wisdom 
was believed to consist in raj-ltaran or diplomatic 
intrigue. TTius, while the Maratha spider was weaving 

436 SHIVAJl. [CH. XVI. 

his endless cobweb of hollow alliances and 
diplomatic counter-plots, the mailed fist of Wellesley 
was thrust into his laboured but flimsy tissue of 
state-craft, and by a few swift and judicious strokes 
his defence and screen was torn away and his power 
left naked and helpless. In rapid succession the 
Nizam was disarmed, Tipu was crushed, and the 
Peshwa was enslaved. While Sindhia and Holkar 
were dreaming the dream of the overlordship of all 
India, they suddenly awoke to find that even their 
local independence w^as gone. The man of action, 
the soldier-statesman, always triumphs over the mere 
scheming Machiavel. 

§5. Character of Shioaji. 

Shivaji's private life was marked by a high 
standard of morality. He weis a devoted son, a 
loving father and an attentive husband, though he 
did not rise above the ideas and usage of his age, 
which allowed a plurality of wives and the keeping 
of concubines even among the priestly caste, not to 
speak of warriors and kings. Intensely religious from 
his very boyhood, by instinct and training alike, he 
remained throughout life abstemious, free from vice, 
devoted to holy men, and passionately fond of hear- 
ing scripture readings and sacred stories and songs. 
But religion remained with him an ever fresh fountain 
of right conduct and generosity ; it did not obsess 
his mind nor harden him into a bigot. The sincerity 
of his faith is proved by his impartial respect for 


the holy men of all sects (Muslim as much as Hindu) 
and toleration of all creeds. His chivalry to women 
and strict enforcement of morality in his camtip was 
a wonder in that age and has extorted the admira- 
tion of hostile critics like Khafi Khan. 

He had the born leader's personal magnetism 
and threw a spell over all who knew him, drawing 
the best elements of the country to his side and 
winning the most devoted service from his officers, 
vrhile his dazzling victories and ever ready smile 
made him the idol of his soldiery. His royal gift of 
judging character was one of the main causes of his 
success, as his selection of generals and governors, 
diplomatists and secretaries was never at fault, and 
his administration, both civil and military, was un- 
rivalled for efficiency. How well he deserved to be 
king is proved by his equal treatment and justice to 
all men within his realm, his protection and endow- 
ment of all religions, his care for the peasantry, and 
his remarkable forethought in making all arrange- 
ments and planning distant campaigns. 

His army organisation was a model of 
efficiency ; everything was provided for beforehand 
and kept in its proper place under a proper care- 
taker ; an excellent spy system supplied him in 
advance with the most minute information about the 
theatre of his intended campaign ; divisions of his 
army were combined or dispersed at will over long 
distances without failure ; the enemy's pursuit or 
obstruction was successfully met and yet the booty 

438 SHIVAJl. [CH. xvu 

was rapidly and safely conveyed home without any 
loss. His inborn military genius is proved by his 
instinctively adopting that system of -waxiare which 
was most suited to the racial chstracter of his soldiers, 
the nature of the country, the weapons of the age, 
and the internal condition of his enemies. His light 
cavalry, stiffened with swift-footed infantry, was 
irresistible in the age of Aurangzib. More than a 
century after his death, his blind imitator Daulat Rao 
Sindhia continued the same tactics when the English 
had galloper guns for field action and most of the 
Deccan towns were walled round* and provided wtb 
defensive artillery, and he therefore failed 

§6. Shioaji's political ideal and difficulties. 

Did Shivaji merely found a Krieg-staat, i.e., a 
Government that lives and grows only by war? Was 
he merely an entrepreneur of rapine, a Hindu edition 
of Alauddin Khilji or Timur? 

I think it would not be fair to take this view. 
For one thing, he never had peace to work out his 
political idea!. The whole of his short life w^as one 
struggle with enemies, a period of preparation and 
not of fruition. All his attention was necessarily 
devoted to meeting daily dangers with daily expedi- 
ents and he had not the chance of peacefully 
building up a well-planned political edifice. His 

* Owen's Selections from Wellington's Desp., 284, 289. 


record is incomplete and we cannot confidently 
deduce his political aim from his actual achievement. 
It would be more correct to conjecture it from 
indirect sources like his regulations, though this class 
of materials is scanty and often inconclusive. 

In the vast Gangetic valley and the wide Desh 
country rolling eastwards through the Deccan, 
Nature has fixed no boundary to States. Their size 
changes with daily changes in their strength as 
compared with their neighbours*. There can be no 
stable equilibrium among them for more than a 
generation. Each has to push the others as much 
for self-defence as for aggression. ELacb must be 
armed and ready to invade the others, if it does not 
wish to be invaded and absorbed by them. Where 
friction with neighbours is the normal state of things, 
a huge armed force, sleepless vigilance, and readi- 
ness to strike the first blow^ are the necessary 
conditions of the very existence of a kingdom. The 
evil could be remedied only by the establishment 
of a universal empire throughout the country from 
sea to sea. 

Shivaji could not for a moment be sure of the 
pacific disposition or fidelity to treaty of the Delhi 
Government. The past history of the Mughal 
expansion into the Deccan since the days of Akbar, 
was a warning to him. The imperial policy of 
annexing the whole of South India was unmistakable 
to Shiva as to Adil Shah or Qutb Shah. Its comple- 
tion was only a question of time, and every Deecani 


Power was bound to w^age eternal warfaure with the 
Mughals if it wished to exist. Hence Shivaji lost no 
chance of robbing Mughal territory in the Decccin. 

With Bijapur his relations were somew^hat 
different. He could raise his head or expand his 
dominion only at the expense of Bijapur. Rebellion 
against his liege-lord was the necessary condition of 
his being. But when, about 1662, an understanding 
was effected between him and the Adil-Shahi 
ministers, he gave up molesting the hesirt of the 
Bijapur kingdom. With the Bijapuri barons whose 
fiefs lay close to his dominions, he had, however, 
to wage war till he had wrested Kolhapur, North 
Kanara and South Konkan from their hands. In the 
Kamatak division, viz., the Dharwar and Belgaum 
districts, this contest was still undecided when he 
died. With the provinces that lay across the path 
of his natural expansion he could not be at peace, 
though he did not wish to challenge the central 
Government of Bijapur. This attitude weis changed 
by the death of Ali II. in 1672, the accession of the 
boy Sikandar Adil Shah, the faction-fights between 
rival nobles at the capital, and the visible dissolution 
of the Government. But Shivaji helped Bijapur 
greatly during the Mughal invasions of 1679. 

§7. His influence on the spirit. 

Shivaji 's real greatness lay in his character and 
practical ability, rather than in originality of concep- 
tion or length of political vision. Unfailing insight 

shiva's genius and influence. 441 

into the character of others, efficiency of arrange- 
ments, and instinctive perception of what was 
practicable and most profitable under the circums- 
tances, — these were the causes of his success in life. 
To these must be added his personal morality and 
loftiness of aim, which drew to his side the best 
minds of his community, while his universal 
toleration and insistence on equal justice gave 
contentment to all classes subject to his rule. He 
strenuously maintained order and enforced moral 
laws throughout his own dominions, and the people 
were happier under him than elsewhere. 

His splendid success fired the imagination of 
his contemporaries, and his name became a spell 
calling the Meiratha race to a new life. His kingdom 
was lost within nine years of his death. But the 
imperishable achievement of his life was the welding 
of the Marathas into a nation, and his most precious 
legacy w^as the spirit that he breathed into his 

TTie mutual conflict and internal weakness of 
the three Muslim Powers of the Deccan were, no 
doubt, contributory causes of the rise of Shivaji. But 
his success sprang from a higher source than the 
incompetence of his enemies. I regard him as the 
last great constructive genius and nation-builder that 
the Hindu race has produced. His system was his 
own creation and, unlike Ranjit Singh, he took no 
foreign aid in his administration. His army was 
drilled and commanded by his own people and not 


by Frenchmen. What he built lasted long ; his 
institutions were looked up to with admiration and 
emulation even a century later in the palmy days 
of the PeshwEis' rule. 

Shivaji was illiterate ; he leamt nothing by 
reading. He built up his kingdom and Government 
before visiting any royal Court, civilised city, or 
organised camp. He received no help or counsel 
from any experienced minister or general.* But his 
native genius, alone and unaided, enabled him to 
found a compact kingdom, an invincible army, and 
a grand and beneficent system of administration. 

Before his rise, the Maratha race was scattered 
like atoms through many Deccani kingdoms. He 
welded them into a mighty nation. And he achieved 
this in the teeth of the opposition of four mighty 
Powers like the Mughal empire, Bijapur, Portuguese 
India, and the Abyssinians of Janjira. No other 
Hindu has shown such capacity in modern times. 
The materialistic Maratha authors of the bakhars 
have given us a list of Shivaji's legacy, — so many 
elephants, horses, soldiers, slaves, jewels, gold and 
silver, and even spices and raisins ! But they have 
not mentioned Shivaji's greatest gift to posterity, 
viz., the new life of the Maratha race. 

* His early tutor, Dadaji Kond-dev, was a Brahman well 
versed in the Shastras and estate management. He could only 
teach Shivaji how to be a good revenue collector or accountant. 
Shivaji's institutions, civil and military, could not have been 
inspired by Dadaji. 


Before he came, the Marathas were mere 
hirelings, mere servants of aliens. They served the 
Slate, but had no lot or part in its management ; 
they shed their lifeblood in the army, but were 
denied any sh2ure in the conduct of war or peace. 
They were always subordinates, never leaders. 

Shivaji was the first to challenge Bijapur and 
Delhi and thus teach his countrsrmen that it was 
possible for them to be independent leaders in war. 
Then, he founded a State and taught his people that 
thev were capable of administering a kingdom in 
all its depeirtments. He has proved by his example 
that the Hindu race can build a nation, found a 
State, defeat enemies ; they can conduct their own 
defence ; they can protect eind promote literature 
and art, commerce and industry ; they can maintmn 
navies and ocean-trading fleets of their own, and 
conduct naval battles on equal terms with 
foreigners. He taught the modem Hindus to rise to 
the full stature of their growth. 

He hsis proved that the Hindu race can still 
produce not only jamaitdars (non-commissioned 
officers) and chitnises (clerks), but also rulers of men, 
and even a king of kings (Chhatrapoti.) The 
Emperor Jahangir cut the Al^shay Bat tree of 
Allahabad down to its roots and hammered a red- 
hot iron cauldron on to its stump. He flattered 
himself that he had killed it. But lo. ! in a year the 
tree began to grow again and pushed the heavy 
obstruction to its growth aside ! 


Shivaji has shown that the tree of Hinduism is 
not really dead, that it can rise from beneath the 
seemingly crushing load of centuries of political 
bondage, exclusion from the administration, and 
legal repression ; it can put forth new leaves and 
branches ; it can agcun lift up its head to the skies. 


The Character of the Marathi records 
about 3hivaji. 

The Marathas in the 17th century were a poor 
and rude people, dispersed through many States, 
and with no literature of their own except folk-songs 
and religious poetry. Shivaji for the first time gave 
them peace wealth and an independent national 
Court, without which it is not possible to produce 
literature or store official records. But this happy 
state of things lasted barely 18 years, from his last 
rupture with the Mughals in 1671 to the death of 
Shambhuji in 1689. Thereafter every Maratha fort 
and city was occupied by the Mughals and the 
Maratha State records were burnt or .dispersed, 
exactly as Elphinstone's library was destroyed by 
the Marathas when they captured his Residency in 
1817. Even during these 18 years of power and 
prosperity the Marathas were more busy with the 
sword than the pen ; no literature proper, no long 
history or biography was produced then. Both of 
Shivaji's Court-poets were foreigners. Office records, 
revenue returns and copies of letters sent and 
received were, no doubt, kept, and might have 
supplied us with valuable raw materials of history 
if they had survived. 

It is significant that not a single State-paper or 


official despatch of Shivaji's time (except three 
letters concerning Tanjore ciffairs) has been unearthed 
after the devoted searcK of nearly half a century. 
(Rajwade, xv. does not rccJly go against this view.) 
But thousands of private legal documents, deeds of 
grant, decisions of law suits, orders on petitions, 
etc., have been collected, Eind for the sufficient 
reason that they were kept not in the State archives 
(where they would have perished long ago) but in 
private families, which carefully preserved them as 
title-deeds. Hence, the Maratha kingdom before the 
Peshwa period utterly lacks the State-papers, detailed 
official histories, contemporary memoirs, and letter- 
books with which Mughal history is enriched. 

The only contemporary records of Shivaji's and 
even Shambhuji's times that now survive axe in 
English and Persian and none at all in Maraihi. In 
point of time the sole Marathi record of his reign, 
— if we may apply this dignified title to Sabhasad's 
brief and confused recollections written in 1694, — 
occupies the third rank, euid in point of accuracy and 
authenticity its position is lower still. As regards 
Shambhuji's reign the situation is worse still. His 
earliest and only Marathi history is one of 10 short 
pages written more than 1 20 years after his death ! 
On the other hand, the Persian (and to a lesser 
extent English) sources were absolutely contem- 
porary, promptly recorded, fully detsiiled and dated, 
and carefully preserved. TTieir writers also belonged 
to a higher intellectual type than the Marathi 


chroniclers, as is clearly borne in upon us when 
we study the records in the three languages in the 

In this state of things it may be patriotic to 
prefer the Marathi accounts (always long posterior 
to the events and very often full of legends and 
garbled or entirely false traditions) to the accurate 
and contemporary Persian and English sources ; but 
it would not be honest history. 

In the late 18th and, if my surmise be correct, 
the early 19th century also, many Marathi works on 
5hivaji's times were composed. These are the 
baJ^hars flaunted by uncritical nationalists in the face 
of an ignorant public. But what is their value, their 
source, their literary character? Their utter lack 
of dates, their confusion in the order of events 
(known correctly from non-Marathi sources), their 
abundance of supernatural episodes, in short, their 
gossipy character and poor literary merit, at once 
mark them out for worthless collections of modern 
traditions. They are not history in any sense of the 

Even the Sabhasad Bakhar, though written by a 
contemporary of Shivaji, is not based on State-papers 
and written notes, because it was composed while 
Raja Ram was closely besieged in Jinji fort, to 
which he had escaped from Meiharashtra by the skin 
of his teeth, leaving everything behind, and after 
roving hither and thitlter in constant risk of capture. 
Such a master and his servants, running with their 

448 SHTVAJl. [CH. XVI. 

lives in their hands, before relentless pursuers, could 
not have burdened themselves with papers during 
their perilous flight across the entire Deccan 
peninsula. Sabhasad's work, therefore, is entirely 
derived from his memory — the half-obliterated 
memory of an old man who had passed through 
many privations and hardships. Malhar Ram Rao 
Chitnis had no State-papers of Shivaji's or 
Shambhuji's times, because, as 1 have shown above, 
cJl such had perished during the ravages of the long 
Mughal wars. He does not cite a single document, 
and he derives all his facts from Sabhasad, thereby 
proving that he had no other source of information. 

Internal evidence shows that all the so-called 
"old balzhars" uncritically accepted or published by 
Rao Beihadur D. B. Parasnis (and his English 
mouthpiece, Mr. Kincaid) have the same litereury 
characteristics. They contain "loose traditions," 
often palpably false, a meiximum of legends super- 
natural marvels and bazar gossip, with a minimum 
of facts and dates. (The cities of Bijapur and 
Golkonda are founded in consequence of exactly 
the same prodigy 1 Javlikar More-yanchi chhoti 
Bakhar.) All are anonymous and of unknown date. 

TTiese so-called bakhars are evidently the pro- 
duction of some ignorant credulous dull-brained 
writers, and not the work of any clever minister of 
State or scholarly author. They do not make the 
least pretence of being based upon contemporary 
written records or authentic State-papers. They 


carry on their faces the suggestion that they were 
composed after the intellectual brilliancy caused by 
the Peshwas' rule had passed away, and before the 
rise of the modern school of sound and critical 
Marathi historians under Khare and Sane, Rajwade 
and Sardesai. I hazard a guess that they were 
written between 1820 and 1840 or '50, — though the 
kernel of some of them (almost equally legendary or 
inaccurate) may have been put down in writing 
about 1770-1790. 


A- Marathi. 

101. Shioa-chhatrapaii-chen Charitra by Krish- 
naji Anant Sabhasad, written In 1694 at Jinji, by 
order of Raja Ram ; ed. by K. N. Sane, 3rd ed. 
1912. A small book of barely 100 pages, composed 
from memory without the help of written memoranda 
or documents. The events are not arranged in the 
order of time, and the frequent expression 'then' 
(pute) does not mean chronological sequence, as Mr. 
Rajwade was the first to* point out. Some of the 
statements are incorrect. Weak in topography, no 
dates. Language very condensed and sometimes 

But the most valuable Marathi account of 
Shivaji and our only source of information from the 
Maratha side. All later biographies in the same 


450 SHiVAji. [biblio. 

language may be dismissed as they have copied this 
Sabhasad Bakhar (at places word for word), and the 
additional matter they furnish is either incorrect or 
trivial, often mere "loose traditions." None of them 
is based on any contemporary document, though 
a few have recorded some correct traditions of true 
events (as we know from non-Marathi sources.) But 
they have padded out their source (Sabhasad) by 
means of Sanskrit quotations, miracles, rhetorical 
flourishes, emotional gush, eind commonplace 
remarks and details added from the probabilities of 
the case or from pure imagination. 

Translated into English by J. L. Manker as Life 
and Exploits of Shivaji (Bombay, 1st. ed. 1884, 2nd 
ed. 1886.) 

102. Chitra-gupta Bakhar, composed about 
1760 ; contains merely Sabhasad's facts (and even 
language), interspersed with copious extracts from 
the Sanskrit Scriptures. 

103. Shiva-chhatrapati-chen Sapta-prakaran- 
atmak Charitra, by Malhar Ram Rao, Chitnis, ed. by 
N. J. Kirtane, 2nd ed. 1894. Incorrect, rambling or 
pure guess-work in many places. No State-paper 
used, no idea of correct chronology. Muhammadan 
names grossly incorrect and anachronistic. Moro 
Pant is perpetually conquering and having to conquer 
again "twenty-seven forts in Baglana &c." (pp. 41, 
71, 124 £uid 176)1 The editing is unscholarly and of 
no help to the reader. 

104. Shivadigvijay, ed. or published by P. R. 


Nandurbarkar and L. K. Dandekar, (Baroda, 1895.) 
FeJsely described as written by Khando Ballal (the 
son of Shivaji's secretary Balaji Avji) in 1718. The 
published version was evidently fabricated at Baroda 
by a writer familiar with the style of modem 
vernacular novels written by imitators of Bankim 
Chandra Chatterji. Too much gush (esp. pp. 453, 208, 
444), rhetorical padding and digression. The author 
speaks of an English general being present at Shivaji's 
coronation (p. 435) and of goods from Calcutta being 
used in decorating his hall in 1674 (p. 417) ! ! ! Shiva 
bow^s to his mother two years after her death 
(p. 296)! Tanaji Malusare visits Haidarabad seven 
years after his death ! (p. 301 .) 

But the kernel of the book is some lost Marathi 
work composed about 1760-75 and containing, 
among many loose traditions, a few facts the truth 
of which we know from contemporary Factory 
Records. This lost source was also the basis of the 
Persian Tarikh-i-Shioaji, which agrees with Shiva- 
digoijay in many passages. 

105. The Raigarh Life. Original Marathi text 
lost. English translation (badly made and worse 
printed, esp. as regards proper names), published in 
G. W. Forrest's Selections from the Letters &c. in 
the Bombay Secretariat, Maratha Series, Vol. I. 
pp. 1-22. (1885.) "A loose traditional work" of no 
authority. Adversely criticised by Telang. 

106. Shivapratap (Baroda), an utterly worthless 
modern fabrication ; does not even claim to be old. 

452 sHivAji. [biblio. 

107. Shrimant Maharaj Bhonsle-yanchi Bakhar 
[of Shedgaon], pub. by V. L. Bhabe (Thana, 1917.) 
Utterly worthless expansion of Sabhasad with forged 
letters and imaginary details. Probably composed 
under the patronage of the Rajah of Satara (circa 

108. Two alleged old bakhars (called More- 
yanchi Chhoti Bakhar and Mahabaleshwar-chi Juni 
Mahiti) pub. in Parasnis's Itihas Sangraha, Sfuta lekh, 
i. 21-29 and ii. 9-12. Full of palpable historical errors 
and deliberate fabrication (probably of the same 
factory and date as No. 107.) 

109. Zedhe-yanchi Shakavali, ed. by B. G. 
Tilak in Chaturtha Sammelan Britta (Puna.) A bare 
record of events with dates, kept by the Zedhe 
family. Frorn the nature of the work, it was written 
by different hands at different times. Its value 
depends on the fidelity with which these different 
memorandum-sheets were copied for the MS. that 
has come down to us. There are some evident 
mistakes, which we can detect with the help of the 
English and Persian sources ; but they were due to 
the copyist and not to any deliberate fabrication. 
Contains some correct dates which no forger could 
have known. TTie dates are given in the Hindu 
luni-solar era of the Deccan and defy conversion to 
the Julian calendar, except approximately. 

110. Sanads and Letters, ed. by P. V. Mawjee 
and D. B. Parasnis (1913) and 

111. Marathyan-chya-Itihasachin-Sadhanen, ed. 


by V. K. Rajwade and others ; Vols, viii and 
xv-xxiv contain a few political letters and a vast mass 
of private legal documents and charters of Shivaji 
and his times. Some of them are clearly forgeries 
made to deceive the Inam Commission and other 
judicial bodies. Some others seem to have been 
faked to support "popular" history or family prestige. 
If we could be always sure of their genuineness and 
the correctness of the editor's transcription, they 
w^ould enable us to trace the growth of Shivaji's 
power in Desh and Konkan with minute accuracy 
and exact dates. The editing leaves much to be 

Stray documents of this class have been also 
printed in the Annual Proceedings {Varshik, Itibritta) 
and Conference Reports (Sammelan Britta) of the 
Varat Itihas Samshodhak Mandali of Puna, Itihas 
Sangraha, ed. by Parasnis, and several other Marathi 
periodicals. AH letters published before 1915 are 
noted with exact references in Sardesai, Vol. 1. 

112. Powadas, or Marathi ballads, collected by 
H. A. Acworth and S. T. Shaligrcim, 2nd (really 3rd) 
ed., 1911. Mostly legendary and of a much later 
date than Shivaji's life-time. TTie Afzal Khan ballad 
is probably the oldest, and belonged to Shambhuji's 
reign. Touches only two incidents of Shivaji's life. 

English trans, of ten of the ballads (with an 
excellent introduction), by Acworth (Longmans, 

113. G. S. Sardesai's Marathi Riyasat, Vol. I. 

454 SHIVAJI. [biblio. 

2nd ed., a painstaking and accurate compilation and 
guide to sources ; but lacks knowledge of all original 
sources except Marathi. Valuable for the history of 
literature, religion and noble families. Genealogies 
a speciality. 

I have not seen the 96-qalmi bal^har, which 
appears to belong to the same cleiss as No. 107 

B. Hindi. 

114. Bhushan's Granthaoali, ed. by Shyam 
Bihari Mishra and Shukdev Bihari Mishra (Nagri 
Pracharini Sabha, Benares, 1907.) 

Fulsome adulation of Shiva, by means of an 
infinite variety of similes and pareJlels from Hindu 
scriptures and epics ! No history, no date. But 
shows us the atmosphere and the Hindu mind of 
the time. 

115. Chhatra-prakflsh by Lai Kavi (Nagri 

Pracharini Sabha, Benares.) Canto xi deals with 

Chhatra Sal's visit to Shiva. English trans., in 

Pogson's History of the Boondelas, (Calcutta, 1826.) 

C. Persian. 

Most of the Persian sources have been described 
and discussed in my History of Aurangzib, Biblio- 
graphies I. and II. at the end of Vols. ii. and iii., 
and for convenience of reference I here give them 
the numbers which they bear in that work. 

2. Padishahnamah, by Abdul Hamid Lahori. 

4. Amal-i-Salih by Keimbu. 

5. Alamgir-namah by Mirza Md. Kazim. 


6. Maair-i-Alamgiri by Saqi Mustaid Khan. 

9. Muntakhab-ul-Lubab, by Khafi Khan. 

10. Nuskha-i-Dilkasha by Bhimsen Burhanpuri. 

1 1 . Fatuhat-i-A lamgiri by Ishwardas Nagar. 
29. Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-muala. 

116. Muhammad-namah (or History of Muham- 
mad Adil Shah) by Md. Zahur, the son of Zahuri, 
(my own copy made from the KapurtheJa MS.) 

27. Tarikh-i-Ali Adil Shah II. (only the 1st ten 
years of his reign), by Saj^rid Nurullah, (copy made 
for me from the India Office MS.) 

25. Basatin-i-Salatin, by Md. Ibrahim AI 

19. Tarikh-i-Shioaji. India Office Persian MS. 
1957, (Ethe No. 485), same as Rieu i. p. 327. "The 
work of a Hindu based on Maratha tradition." 
Trans, by me in Modern Review, 1907 and Jan. '10. 

16. Adab-i-Alamgiri by Qabil Khan. 

44. Haft Anjuman by Udiraj Tala-yar, Paris 
MS. and Benares MS. A complete and good copy 
heis recently been secured by Prof. A. Rahman. 

45. Faiyyaz-ul-qawanin. 

39. Khatut-i-Shioaji, R. A. S. MS. 

21. Ahkam-i-AIamgiri by Hamid'-ud-din Khan, 
tr. by me as Anecdotes of Aurangzib. 

33. Ruqat-i-Alamgiri, lithographed bazar ed. 

117. Parasnis MS. — ^A volume in which some 
Persian letters from the Mughal Government to 
Shivaji emd his descendants have been copied 
(evidently for the use of Grant Duff) by order of the 

456 SHIVA ji. [biblio. 

Rajah of Satara. Some of the dates are wrong. 

There is a MS. English tremslation in another volume. 

D. English. 

118. Original Correspondence (O. C), India 
Office MS. records. TTiis series includes letters from 
Surat and Bombay to the E. 1. Co., (London) and 
letters between Surat and Bombay and the sub- 
ordinate factories. There is a catalogue of these, 
giving wrriter, place and date, but very little 
indication of the contents. In most cases there is a 
volume for every year. The O. C. volumes deal 
indiscriminately with all parts of India where the 
Company had factories. From 1682 to 1689 they 
contain little beyond duplicates of w^hat is given in 
the F. R. [The English records are extremely 
valuable, being absolutely contemporary with the 
events described and preserved without any change 
or garbling. The English traders sometimes 
engaged spies to get correct news of Shivaji. TTiere 
is no such old or authentic materijj in Marathi.] 

119. Factory Records (F. R.), India Office MS. 
records. There is a distinct series for each principal 
factory, such as Rajapur, Surat, Bombay, Fort St. 
George, &c. They include (a) Consultations at these 
factories and (t>) copies of letters received and dis- 
patched by them (some being repeated in O. C.) 
There are several gaps in the period 1660-1689 and 
the existing volumes are unindexed. 

Surat Consultations — none extant for 1636-'60, 
64, 67, 68, 71, 73, 75, 76, 78, 80, 81, and 84-96, but 


the gaps are partially filled by the Letters received 
and dispatched and the O. C. Only four volumes 
have survived for 1660-1683. 

Surat Letters — about 20 volumes for the period 
in question. 

Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Con- 
sultation Book, for 1672-78 and 1678-79, printed at 
Madras, in 1910 and 1911. A few others are given 
in Love's Vestiges of Old Madras, 3 vols. 

Orme MSS. in the India Office Library (cata- 
logued by S. C. Hill) contain copies of several 
factory records the originaJs of which have perished. 

After 1683 the English factory records are very 

Diary of W. Hedges, ed. by Yule, (Hakluyt 
Soc.) Vol. 11. p. ccxxvi gives Surat to Co., 20 Nov. 

120. Dutch Factory Records preserved in the 
India Office, London. Vols. 23-29, covering 1659-70, 
are in ELnglish translations, while Vols. 30-42, covering 
1670-89, are in Dutch. They are very disappointing 
to the historian of Shivaji and contain very few 
references to the Marathas. The volumes from 1671 
onwards contain scarcely any remarks on the affairs 
of Western India. 

121. Storia do Mogor or travels of Manucci, tr. 
by W. Irvine, 4 vols. 

122. Bemier's Travels, ed. by Constable. 

123. Tavernier's Travels, ed. by Ball, 2 vols. 

458 SHIVAJI. [biblio, 

124. J. Fryer's New Account of East India, ed. 
by W. Crooke, 2 vols. (1909.) 

125. Orme's Historical Fragments of the Mogul 
Empire &c., London (1805.) 

126. J. Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas, 

The Madras District Manuals are the old ed., 
while the Gazetteers are the new ed. 

English translations are mentioned under their 
Marathi Persian or Hindi originals. 

E. Portuguese. 

127. Vida e accoens do famoso e felicissimo 
Seoag'1/...escrita per Cosme da Guarda, natural de 
Murmugao. (Lisbon, 1730.) Composed in 1695 
(p. 40.) Contains 168 pages. Full of gross in- 
accuracies, mistakes of persons, useless digressions, 
bcizar gossip and things known to us from other 
sources. It may more properly be styled 'The 
marvellous romance of Shivaji,' as it contains a 
minimum of facts dates and proper names and a 
maximum of words and general descriptions. It tells 
us nothing new that is historically true. 

Dr. D. G. DcJgado of the Academy of Sciences, 
Lisbon, informs me that there are no Portuguese 
State-papers relating to Shivaji at Lisbon. "I have 
not been able to find any document, in any of the 
Archives I have consulted, with reference to 
Shivaji. To my mind the reason of this is that w^e 
take more notice of our enemies than of our friends. 


and Shivaji was a friend of tlie Portuguese." 
(15 Feb. 1919.) 

J. H. da Cunha Rivaia's Archivo Portttguez 
Oriental, fasc. 6, does not contain any reference to 


A. N. — Alamgir-namah (Persian.) 

Bom. Gaz. — Bombay Gazetteer, 1st ed., by Sir 
J. Campbell. 

B. S. — Basatin-i-Salatin (Persian.) 

Chit. — Chitnis Bakhar of Shivaji (Marathi.) 

Dig. — Shivadigvijay (Marathi.) 

Dil. — Nuskha-i-Dilkflsha, by Bhimsen (Persian.) 

F.R. — English Factory Records (India Office.) 

H. A. — Haft Anjuman (Persian.) 

Ind. At. — Indian Atlas (1 inch = 4 miles) Survey 

of India. 
K. K.— Khaifi Khan's Muntakhab-ul-Lubab. 
M. A. — Masir-i-Alamgiri (Persian.) 
O. C. — Original Correspondence of E. I. Co. 

(India Office MSS.) 
Raj. — Maratha Itihas Sadhan, ed. by Rajwade 

and others. 
Shed. — Bakhar of the Bhonslas of Shedgaon. 
Storia — Storia do Mogor, tr. by W. Irvine, 

4 Vols. 
T. S. — Tarikh-i-Shioaji (Persian.) 
Z. C. — Zedhe-yanchi Shakaoali (Marathi.) 


4 vols., Rs. 3-8 each. 

Based entirely upon original sources, (mostly in 
manuscript), — viz., contemporary Persian histories. 
State-papers, memoirs and letters, Marathi chronicles 
and letters, English Factory Records, etc. Public and 
large private libraries in India and Europe exhaust- 
ively searched for Persian MSS. 

Vol. I. Lessons of Aurangzib's reign — materials 
— Aurangzib's boyhood and education — early viceroy- 
alties — marriage and family — war in Central Asia — 
sieges of Qandahar — second viceroyalty of the Deccan 
— invasions of Golkonda and Bijapur-— Shivaji's early 
conflict with Aurangzib — illness of Shah Jahan — 
character and doings of his sons — Aurangzib's prepara- 
tions for contesting the throne. 

Vol. 11. Defeat of Jaswant Singh — defeat of Dara 
— pursuit, capture and execution of Dara — capture of 
Dara's eldest son — struggle with Shuja — war in Bengal 
— tragic end of Shuja — captivity and execution of 
Murad — grand coronation of Aurangzib — long and 
critical bibliography of authorities in Persian. 

Vol. III. Aurangzib's sons, sisters, and chief 
ministers — relations with the outer Muslim world — 
strict moral and religious regulations, — "bturial of 
Music" — captivity, sufferings and death of Shah Jahan 
— conquests of Kuch Bihar, Assam, Chittagong, &c. 
— rebellions of frontier Afghans — persecution of the 
Hindus, — temple destruction, — Jaziya tax fully dis- 
cussed — war with the Rajputs — annexation of Jodhpur 
— Durgadas and Ajit Singh — peace with Maharana — 
Hindu reaction — Satnamis — Sikh gurus Tegh Bahadur 
and Guru Govind Singh — Shivaji's letter on religious 
toleration — Tod's Rajasthan criticised — correct chrono- 
logy of Aurangzib's reign, ist half — second Persian 

Vol. IV. Keynote of Deccan history in 17th 
century — ^rise of Shivaji — Afzal Khan affair, — Shivaji 
and Shaista Khan — Jai Singh's war with Shivaji — 
Treaty of Purandar — invasion of Bijapur 1666 — decline 
of the Adil-Shahis — Shivaji's adventures, conquests, 
reign, character and achievements — Shambhuji's ac- 
cession — Prince Akbar in the Deccan — Deccan wars 
1682-1685 — siege and fall of Bijapur — decline of Qutb- 
Shahis — capture of Golkonda^-Shambhuji's war with 
the Portuguese — capture and execution. The only 
complete history of Shambhuji in any language. 

OPINIONS : Vincent A. Smith.— "I repeat with 
all sincerity that I have the highest opinion of your 
learning, impartiality, and critical ability. I trust that 
you may be long spared to continue your good work 
of giving honest history." 

Sir R. C. Temple. — "The first connected authentic 

account of these two reigns of the greatest 

assistance to the students of this period." 

Sir E. D. Ross. — "The author seems to me to 
have used all the available Persian materials and to 
have used them with discrimination and care. His 
manner of treating the subject might well serve as 
a model." 

English Historical Review. — "The author has been 
indefatigable in consulting all accessible authorities, 

many of which are still in manuscript He writes 

graphically in an easy, flowing style." 


Second edition, enlarged, Rs. 4. 

A new and fuUy detailed critical study of Shivaji's 
life and character, based on an exhaustive use of all 
available original materials — Persian, Marathi and 
English — most of which were unknown to Grant Duff. 
The complex interaction of Deccan pohtics clearly 
shown by references to the Mushm powers. The most 
comprehensive and correct narrative of the rise of the 
Marathas, with minute details and exact dates. 

Sir R. C. Temple. — "This new historical study- 
by Mr. Sarkar has come out at an opportune time, 
and I have no hesitation in saying also in an oppor- 
tune manner... The book is indeed History treated 
in the right way and in the right spirit... He is able 
to approach the subject with the necessary detach- 
ment, and has access to the best information and the 
linguistic knowledge and capacity to use them." 

/. R. A. S. — "A conscientious presentation of 

recorded facts Bold and deliberately provocative 

book, merits the closest study A sound critical 



Twenty-two Historical Essays, on 

Conquest of Chatgaon. 
A Muslim Heroine. 
Nemesis of Aurangzih. 
A Hindu Historian of 

Aurangzih . 
An Indian Memoir-writer 

of lyth Century. 
Khuda BakhsH. 
William Irvine. 
Education in Mughal 

Art in Mughal India. 
Oriental Monarchies. 

Daily Life of Shah Jahan. 
Wealth of Ind, 1650. 
Companion of an Empress. 
Who built the Taj ? 
Life of Aurangzih. 
Aurangzih' s Daily Life. 
Education of a Mughal 

Aurangzih' s Revenue 

Orissa in the ijth Century. 
Shaista Khan in Bengal. 

Feringi Pirates of Chatgaon 

V. A. Smith. — "The essays are charming and with 
constant practice your style has attained ease and 
flexibility." (29 Dec. 1919.) 

Times of India. — "The book under review con- 
tains valuable sketches of Mughal times written by 
one of the few competent contemporary writers on the 
great period of Aurangzih." (3 Jan. 1920.) 

Athenaeum. — "This should prove a useful handbook to 
students of Indian History." (18 Jan. 1913). 

Asiatic Quarterly Review. — "A series of essays on 
Aurangzib and his times of the most entertaining description. 
First comes a life of Aurangzib, succinctly, yet attractively 
written. It sets out the perfect tragcedia of Aurangzib's 
career." (Apr. 1913). 

Indictn Antiquary. — "All the essays are brightly written, 
and several contain information not hitherto available to the 
English student." (June, 1913). 


Persian text of Ahkam-i-Alamgiri, with an 
English trans., notes, and a life of Aurangzib. 

An extremely rare fragment containing 72 anec- 
dotes, pithy sayings, and rules of government of 
Aurangzib, — discovered and first published by Prof. 


2nd ed. 

Chaitanya (1485 — 1533), the greatest saint of 
Bengal, preached the creed of bhakti or personal 
devotion to Krishna, which conquered Bengal, Orissa 
and Assam, and also established its stronghold at 
several other places, notably Brindaban. His con- 
temporary Bengali life is here translated. The 
most authoritative and unvarnished account of 
Chaitanya 's wanderings and preachings exactly as 
known to his comrades and personal disciples, without 
any modem gloss or interpolation. Possibly many of 
his very words have been preserved here. 

The volume thus forms a very genuine human 
document and affords materials for correctly studying 
one of the most striking characters that India has ever 
produced. There is also a reproduction of a very old 
portrait of the Saint. The book also gives a picture 
of Society in Northern India, Orissa, and Madras 
about 1500 A. D, 

C. F. Andrews. — "The translation is lucid, clear 
and simple, and the book is remarkably well printed. 
...As historical documents of a rehgious society of the 
middle ages in Bengal of surpassing value." 


Fourth ed., thoroughly revised and enlarged : 
pp. 384, Rs- 3- 

Jules Sion. — Ce petit livre est le meilleur travail que 

nous possedions sur I'etat economique de 1' Inde Pour les 

questions essentielles on trouvera un expose tres concis, 

mais tres substantiel, nourri de faits et de chiffres, et d'allure 

tres personnelle Pour tout les problemes economiques 

qui passionnent actuellement I'lnde, on voit ici la position 
prise par un reformiste impartial, pratique, et d'une singuiliere 
largeur de vues." {Annales de Geogra.) 

Sir Theodore Morison. — "The author of the present book 
appears to possess the further essential qualifications of courage 
and independence. 

The conscientious investigation of detail is no less evident 
in the present economic treatise. Sarkar's reflections upon the 
rise in the standard of comfort (Ch. IV.) are shrewd and con- 
vincing, and are fortified by some interesting personal 
observations " 

Modern Review. — ^The book contains u mass oj useful 
matter, brought together, for the first time we believe, within 
the compass of a single. ..volume. ..An indispensable vade 

J. R. A. S. — "A good little book on a big topic." 


An original study, based on Persian MSS. and 
official records, minutely describing the Mughal 
administrative system, its officers and their functions, 
procedure of various offices, principles and aims of the 
Government, treatment of peasantry, merits and 
defects of Mughal rule, and causes of the downfall 
of the Mughal empire. 

Contents : — The Government, its character and 
aims. The Sovereign and the Departmental Heads : 
their power and functions. MS. sources of information 
in Persian, described and criticised. The Treasury 
and Imperial Household departments, the work of 
their heads. Provincial administration, its various 
officials and their duties ; villagers and Government. 
Taxation of land ; abwabs described in detail ; 
condition of the peasantry. Mughal rule, its achieve- 
ments and failure ; the lessons of Indian history.