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FINAL REPORT

OF

GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONATIY FORCES

WASHINGTON

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

1919

FINAL REPORT

OF

GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING

COMMANDER - IN - CHIEF
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

\

WASHINGTON
gover'nment PSINTLNG CFIICE

ds. -^v^u, Ab*-^-,!'^^^-^"

ao

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PART I.

'i

PEEIOD OF OEGANIZATION.

MiLiTAEY Situation :

1914.

1915.

1916.

Spring op 1917.
Organization Projects.

American Front and Line op Communications.
General -Staff.
Training.
Intelligence.
Summer op 1917 to Spring op 1918.

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

Geneeal Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces,

Septemher i, 1919.
To the Secretary of War.

Sir: I have the honor to submit herewith my final report as
Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in
Eurone.

PART I.
PERIOD OF ORGANIZATION.

1. I assumed the duties of this office on May 26, 1917, and, accom-
panied by a small staff, departed for Europe on board the S. S.
Baltic May 28. We arrived at London on June 9 and, after spending
some days in consultation with the British authorities, reached Paris
on June 13.

2. Following the rather earnest appeals of the Allies for American
troops, it was decided to send to France, at once, 1 complete division
and 9 newly organized regiments of Engineers. The division was
formed of regular regiments, necessary transfers of officers and men
were made, and recruits were assigned to increase these units to the
required strength.

The offer by the Navy Department of one regiment of Marines to
be reorganized as Infantry was accepted by the Secretary of War,
and it became temporarily a part of the First Division.

Prior to our entrance into the war, the regiments of our small
army were very much scattered, and we had no organized units, even
approximating a division, that could be sent overseas prepared to
take the field. To meet the new conditions of warfare an entirely
new organization was adopted in which our Infantry divisions were
to consist of 4 regiments of Infantry of about treble their original
size, 3 regiments of Artillery, 14 machine-gun companies, 1 Engineer
regiment, 1 Signal battalion, 1 troop of Cavalry, and other auxiliary
units, making a total strength of about 28,000 men.

5

b FIN'AL EEPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PEESHING.

MILITARY SITUATION.

3. In order that the reasons for many important decisions reached
in the early history of the American Expeditionary Forces may be
more clearly understood and the true value of the American effort
more fully appreciated,' it is desirable to have in mind the main
events leading up to the time of our entry into the war.

1914.

4. Although the German drive of 1914 had failed in its imme-
diate purpose, yet her armies had made very important gains.
German forces were in complete possession of Belgium and occupied
rich industrial regions of northern France, embracing one- fourteenth
of her population and about three-fourths of her coal and iron. The
German armies held a strongly fortified line 468 miles in length,
stretching from the Swiss border to Nieuport on the English Chan-
nel ; her troops were within 48 miles of Paris and the initiative re-
mained in German hands.

In the east the rapidity of the Russian mobilization forced Ger-
many, even before the Battle of the Marne, to send troops to that
frontier, but the close of 1914 found the Russian armies ejected from
East Prussia and driven back on Warsaw.

The entry of Turkey into the war, because of th^ moral effect upon
the Moslem world and the immediate constant threat created against
Allied communications with the Far East, led to an effort by the AUies
in the direction of the Dardanelles.

1915.

5. Italy joined the Allies in May and gavs their cause new
strength, but the effect was more or less offset when Bulgaria en-
tered on the side of the Central Powers.

The threatening situation on the Russian front and in the Balkans
was still such that Germany was compelled to exert an immedi-
ate offensive effort in those directions and to maintain only a de-
fensive attitude on the western front. German arms achieved a
striking series of successes in the vicinity of the Mazurian Lakes
and in Galicia, capturing Warsaw, Brest-Litovsk, and Vilna. The
Central Powers overran Serbia and Montenegro^ Meanwhile, the
Italian armies forced Austria to use approximately one-half of her
strength against them.

In the west, the French and British launched offensives which
cost the German armies considerable loss; but the objectives were
limited and the effect was local.

The Dardanelles expedition, having failed in its mission, was with-
drawn in January, 1916. In Mesopotamia the Allied operations had

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. <

not been successful. Although the British fleet had established its
superiority on the sea, yet the German submarine blockade had
developed into a serious menace to Allied shipping.

1916.

6. Germany no doubt believed that her advantage on the eastern
front at the close of 1915 again warranted an offensive in the west,
and her attack against Verdun was accordingly launched in the
spring of 1916. But Kussia was not yet beaten and early in June,
aided at the same time by the threat of an Italian offensive in the
west, she began the great drive in Galicia that proved so disastrous
to Austria.

Eoumania, having entered on the side of the Allies, undertook
a promising offensive against Austria. The British and French
Armies attacked along the Somme. Germany quickly returned to
the defensive in the west, and in September initiated a campaign
, in the east which, before the close of 1916, proved unfortunate
for Bussia as well as Eoumania.

SPRING OF 1917.

7. Eetaining on the eastern front the forces considered sufficient
for the final conquest of Russia, Germany prepared to aid Austria
in an offensive against Italy. Meanwhile, the Russian revolution
was Well under way and, by the midsummer of 1917, the final col-
lapse of that government was almost certain.

The relatively low strength of the German forces on the western
front led the Allies with much confidence to attempt a decision on
this front; but the losses were very heavy and the effort signally
failed. The failure caused a serious reaction especially on French
morale, both in the army and throughout the country, and attempts
to carry out extensive or combined operations were indefinitely
suspended.

In the five months ending June 30, German submarines had ac-
complished the destruction of more than three and one-quarter mil-
lion tons of Allied shipping. During three years Germany had
seen practically all her offensives except Verdun crowned with suc-
cess. Her battle lines were held on foreign soil and she had with-
stood every Allied attack since the Marne. The German general
staff could now foresee the complete elimination of Russia, the pos-
sibility of defeating Italy before the end of the year and, finally,
the campaign of 1918 against the French and British on the western
front which might terminate the war.

It can not be said that German hopes of &n.^\ victory were ex-
travagant, either as viewed at that time or as viewed in the light of

8 PIHAL EBPOET OF GEK. JOHN J. PEESHING.

history. Financial problems of the Allies Were difficult, supplies
were becoming exhausted and their armies had suffered tremendous
losses. Discouragement existed not only among the civil popula-
tion but throughout the armies as well. Such was the Allied morale
that, although their superiority on the western front during the
lasi half of 1916 and during 1917 amounted to 20 per cent, only local
attacks could be undertalfcn and their effect proved wholly insuffi-
cient against the German defense. Allied resources in man power
at home were low and there was little prospect of materia^lly in-
creasing their. armed «(,rength, even in the face of the probability
of having practically the whole military strength of the Central
Powers against them in the spring of 1918.

8. This was the state of affairs that existed when we entered the
war. While our action gave the Allies much encouragement yet this
was temporary, and a review of conditions made it apparent that
America must inake a supreme material effort as soon as possible.
After duly considering the tonnage possibilities I cabled the follow-
ing to Washington on July 6, 1917 :

Plans should contemplate sending over at least 1,000,000 men by next May.
ORGANIZATION PROJECTS.

9. A general organization project, covering as far as possible the
personnel of all combat, staff, and administrative units, was for-
warded to Washington on July 11. This was prepared by the Opera-
tions Section of my staff and adopted in joint conference with the
War Department Committee then in France. It embodied my con-
clusions on the military organization and effort required of America
after a careful study of French and British experience. In for-
warding this project I stated:

It is evident that a force of about 1,000,000 is the smallest unit which in
modern war will be a complete, well-balanced, and independent fighting organ-
ization. However, it must be equally clear that the adoption of this size
force as a basis of study should not be construed as representing the maximum
force which should be sent to or which will be needed in France. • It is taken
as the force which may be expected to reach France in time for an offensive
in 1918, and as a unit and basis of organization. Plans for the future should
be based, especially in reference to the manufacture of artillery, aviation, and
other material, on three times this force — i. e., at least 3,000,000 men.

The original project for organized combat units and its state of
completion on November 11, 1918, are shown in the charts appended
to this report.^ With a few minor changes, this project remained
our guide until the end.

10. While this general organization project provided certain
Services of Supply troops, which were an integral part of the

1 See pis. 9 to 15.

^ FINAL EEPOET OP GEN. JOHN J. PBESHING. 9

larger combat units, it did not include the great body of troops and
services required to maintain an army overseas. To disembark
2,000,000 men, move them to their training areas, shelter them,
handle and store the quantities of supplies and equipment they re-
quired called for an extraordinary and immediate effort in con-
struction. To provide the organization for this purpose, a project
for engineer services of the rear, including railways, was cabled to
Washington August 5, 1917, followed on September 18, 1917, by
a complete service of the rear project, which listed item by item the
troops considered necessary for the Services of Supply. Particular
attention is invited to the charts herewith, which show the extent to
which this project had developed by November 11, 1918, and the
varied units required, many of which did not exist in our Army
prior to this war.

11. In order that the War Department might have a clear-cut
program to follow in the shipment of personnel and material to
insure the gradual building up of a force at all times balanced and
symmetrical, a compreHensive statement was prepared covering the
order in which the troops and services enumerated in these two
projects should arrive. This schedule of priority of shipments, for-
warded to the War Department on October 7, divided the initial
force called for by the two projects into six phases corresponding to
combatant corps of six divisions each.

The importance of the three documents, the general organization
project, the service of the rear project, and the schedule of priority
of shipments should be emphasized, because they formed the basic
plan for providing an army in France together with its material
for combat, construction, and supply.

AMERICAN FRONT AND LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS.

12. Before developing plans for a line of communications it was
necessary to decide upon the probable sector of the front for the
eventual employment of a distinctive American force. Our mission
was offensive and it "wus essential to make plans for striking the
enemy where a definite military decision could be gained. While
the Allied Armies had endeavored to maintain the offensive, the
British, in order to guard the Channel ports, were committed to
operations in Flamders and the French to the portion of the front
protecting Paris. Both lacked troops to operate elsewhere on a
large scale.

To the east the great fortified district east of Verdun and around
Metz menaced central France, protected the most exposed portion
of the German line of communications, that between Metz and
Sedan, and covered the Briey iron re^idii, from which the enemy

10 FINAL REPORT OP GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. -

obtained the greater part of the iron required for munitions and
material. The coal fields east of Metz were also covered by these
same defenses. A deep advance east of Metz, or the capture of the
Briey region, by threatening the invasion of rich German territory
in the Moselle Valley and the Saar Basin, thus curtailing her supply
of coal or iron, would have a decisive effect in forcing a withdrawal
of German troops from northern France. The military and econ-
nomic situation o^f the enemy, therefore, indicated Lorraine as the
field promising the most fruitful results for the employment of our
armies.

13. The complexity of trench life had enormously increased the
tonnage of supplies required by troops. Not only was it a question
of providing food but enormous quantities of munitions and material
were needed. Upon the railroads of France fell the burden of
meeting the heavy demands of the three and one-half million Allied
combatants then engaged.

The British were crowding the Channel ports and the French Were
exploiting the manufacturing center of Paris, so that the railroads
of northern France were already much overtaxed. Even though the
Channel ports might be used to a limited extent for shipments
through England, the railroads leading eastward would have to cross
British and French zones of operation, thus making the introduction
of a line of communications based on 'ports and railways in that re-
gion quite impracticable. If the American Army was to have an
independent and flexible system it could not use the lines behind the
British-Belgium front nor those in rear of the French front covering
Paris.

The problem confronting the American Expeditionary Forces was
then to superimpose its rail communications on those of France
where there would be the least possible disturbance to the arteries of
supply of the two great Allied armies already in the field. This
would require the utmost use of those lines of the existing French rail-
road system that could bear an added burden. Double-track railroad
lines from the ports of the Loire and the Gironde Elvers unite at
Bourges, running thence via Nevers, Dijon, and Neufchateau, with
lines radiating therefrom toward the right wing of the Allied front.
It was estimated that these with the collateral lines available, after
considerable improvement, could handle an additional 50,000 tons
per day, required for an army of 2,000,000 men. The lines selected,
therefore, were those leading from the comparatively unused south-
Atlantic ports of France to the northeast where it was believed the
American Armies could be employed to the best advantage.^

14. In the location of our main depots of supply, while it was im-
portant that they should be easily accessible, yet they must also be at

» See plate 8.

FINAL EEPOBT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 11

a safe distance, as we were to meet an aggressive enemy capable of
taking the offensive in any one of several directions. The area em-
bracing Tours, Orleans, Montargis, Nevers, and Chateauroux was
chosen, as it was centrally located with regard to all points on the arc
of the western front.

The ports of St. Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bassens were designated
for permanent use, while Nantes, Bordeaux, and Pauillac were for
emergency use. Several smaller ports, such as St. Malo, Sables-
d'Olonne, and Bayonne, were available chiefly for the importation of
coal from England. From time to time, certain trans- Atlantic ships
were sent to Le Havre and Cherbourg. In anticipation of a large
increase in the amount of tonnage that might be required later, ar-
rangements were made during the German offensive of 1918 to
utilize the ports of Marseilles and Toulon as well as other smaller
ports on the Mediterranean.

For all practical purposes the American Expeditionary Forces were
based on the American Continent. Three thousand miles of ocean
to cross with the growing submarine menace confronting us, the
quantity of ship tonnage that would be available then unknown
and a line of communications by land 400 miles long from French
ports to our probable front presented difficulties that seemed almost
insurmountable as compared with those of our Allies.

15. For purposes of local administration our line of communica-
tions in France was subdivided into districts or sections. The ter-
ritory corresponding to and immediately surrounding the principal
ports were, respectively, called base sections, with an intermediate
section embracing the region of the great storage depots and an ad-
vance sectibn extending to the zone of Operations, within which the
billeting and training areas for our earlier divisions were located.

16. In providing for the storage and distribution of reserve sup-
plies an allowance of 45 days in the base sections was planned, with
30 dp-ys in the intermediate section and 15 days in the advance sec-
tion. After the safety of our sea transport was practically assured,
this was reduced to a total of 45 days, distributed proportionately.
When the Armistice was signed all projects for construction had
been completed and supplies were on hand to meet the needs of
2,000,000 men, while further plans for necessary construction and for
the supply of an additional 2,000,000 were well under way.

GENERAL STAFF.

17. The organization of the General Staff and supply services
was one of the first matters to engage my attention. Our situation
in this re^rd was wholly unlike that of our Allies. The French
Army was at home and in close touch with its civil government and

12 FINAL BEPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PEESHING."

war department agencies. While the British were organized on an
overseas basis, they were within easy reach of their base of supplies
in England. Their problems of supply and replacement were simple
as compared with ours. Their training could be carried out at l\pme
with the experience of the front at hand, while our troops must be
sent as ships were provided and their training resumed in France

f where discontinued in the States. Our available tonnage was in-
adequate to meet all the initial demands, so that j^riority of ma-
terial for combat and construction, as well as for supplies that could
not be purchased in Europe, must be established by those whose per-
spective included all the services and who were familiar with gen-
eral plans. For the proper direction and coordination of the de-
tails of -administration, intelligence, operations, supply, and train-
ing, a General Staff was an indispensable part of the Army.

The functions of the General Staff at my headquarters were
finally allotted to the five sections, each under an Assistant Chief
of Staff, as follows: To the First, or Administrative Section — ocean
tonnage, priority of overseas shipments, replacement of men and
animals, organization and types of equipment for troops, billeting,
prisoners of war, military police, leaves and leave areas, welfare work
and amusements ; to the Second, or Intelligence Section — information
regarding the enemy, including espionage and counterespionage,
maps, and censorship ; to the Third, or Operations Section — strategic
studies and plans and employment of combat troops; to the Fourth
Section — coordination of supply services, including Construction,
Transportation, and Medical Departments, and control of regulat-
ing stations for supply ; to the Fifth, or Training Section — tactical
training, schools, preparation of tactical manuals, and athletics.
This same system was applied in the lower echelons^ of the command
down to include divisions, except that in corps and divisions the
Fourth Section was merged with the First and the Fifth Section with
the Third.

18. As the American Expeditionary Forces grew, it was considered
advisable that, in matters of procurement, transportation, and sup-
ply, the chiefs of the several supply services, who had hitherto
been under the General Staff at my headquarters, should be placed
directly under the supervision of the commanding general. Services
of Supply. At General Headquarters, a Deputy Chief of Staff to
assist the Chief of Staff was provided, and the heads of the five

, General Staff sections became Assistant Chiefs of Staff.

The General Staff at my headquarters thereafter concerned itself
with the broader phase of control. Under my general supervision
and pursuant to clearly determined policies, the Assistant Chiefs
of Staff, coordinated by the Chief of Staff, issued instructions and

PINAL REPORT OP GE3S". JOHN J. PERSHING. 13

gave general direction to the great combat units and to the Services
of Supply, keeping always in close touch with the manner and
promptness of their fulfillment. Thus a system of direct responsi-
bility was put into operation which contemplated secrecy in prepara-
tion, prompt decision in emergency, and coordinate action in execu-
tion.

19. With the growth of our forces the demand for staff officers
rapidly increased, but the available number of officers trained for
staff duty was very limited. To meet this deficiency, a General
Staff college was organized at Langres on November 28, 1917, for
the instruction of such officers as could be spared. An intensive
course of study of three months was prescribed embracing the de-
tails of our staff organization and administration, and our system
of supply, and teaching the combined employment of all arms and
services in combat. Officers were carefully chosen for their suit-
ability and, considering the short time available, graduates from
this school returned well equipped for staff duties and with a loyal
spirit of common service much accentuated. The Staff College car-
ried to completion four courses of three months each, graduating
537 staff officers.

TRAINING.

20. Soon after our arrival in Europe careful study was made of
the methods followed by our Allies in training combat troops. Both
the French and British maintained continuously a great system
of schools and training centers, which provided for both theoretical
and practical instruction of inexperienced officers and noncommis-
sioned officers. These centers were required not only to train new
troops, but to prepare officers and soldiers for advancement by
giving them a short course in the duties of their new grades. These
school systems made it possible to spread rapidly a knowledge
of the latest methods developed by experience and at the same time
counteract false notions.

21. A similar scheme was adopted in August, 1917, for our Armies
in which the importance of teaching throughout our forces a sound
fighting doctrine of our own was emphasized. It provided for troop
training in all units up to include divisions. Corps centers of in-
struction for noncommissioned officers and unit commanders of all
arms were established. These centers also provided special training
for the instructors needed at corps schools. Base training centers
for replacement troops and special classes of soldiers, such as cooks
and mechanics, were designated. The army and corps schools were
retained under the direct supervision of the Training Section, Gen-
eral Staff. The schools mentioned graduated 21,330 noncommis-
sioned officers and 13,916 officers.

14 riNAIi EEPORT OF GEK. JOHN J. PEBSHING.

Particular care was taken to search the ranks for the most prom-
ising soldiers, in order to develop leaders for the command pi
platoons and companies. There were graduated from these candi-
date schools in France 10,976 soldiers. It was planned to have
22,000 infantrymen under instruction by January 1, 1919, graduat-
ing 5,000 to 6,000 each month. In addition, there were to be grad-
uated monthly 800 artillerymen, 400 engineers, and 200 signalmen,
making a total of about 7,000 soldiers each month. Prior to Novem-
ber 14, 1918, 12,732 soldiers were commissioned as oiRcers.

It must not be thought that such a system is ideal, but it repre-
sents a compromise between the demand for efficiency and the
imperative and immediate necessity for trained replacement officers.

22. Every advantage was taken of the experience of our Allies
in training officers. It was early recommended to the War Depart-
ment that French and British officers be asked for to assist in the
instruction of troops in the United States. Pending the organiza-
tion and development of our own schools, a large number of our
officers were sent to centers of instruction of the Allied armies. The
training of our earlier divisions was begun in close association with
the French divisions, under conditions set forth in the following
paragraph on divisional training:

Trench warfare naturally gives prominence to the defensive as opposed
to the ofEensive. To guard against this, the basis of instruction should be
essentially the offensive both in spirit and in practice. The defensive is ac-
cepted only to prepare for future offensive.

For training our Artillery units, special localities such as
Valdahon, Coetquidan, Meucon, and Souge, had to be sought, and
the instruction was usually carried on in conjunction with French
artillery followed up later, as far as possible, with field practice
in cooperation with our own Infantry.

23. The long period of trench warfare had so impressed itself upon
the French and British that they had almost entirely dispensed with
training for open warfare. It was to avoid this result in our Army
and to encourage the oflFensive spirit that the following was pub-
lished in October, 1917:

1. * * * (a) The above methods to be employed must remain or be-
come distinctly our own. %

(6) All instruction must contemplate the assumption of a vigorous offen-
sive. This purpose will be emphasized in every phase of training until it
becomes a settled habit of thought.

(0) The general principles governing combat remain unchanged in their
essence. This war has developed special features which involve special phases
of training, but the fundamental ideas enunciated in our Drill Regulations,
Small Arms Firing Manual, Field Service Regulations, and other service man-
uals remain the guide for both officers and soldiers and constitute the standard

FINAL- EEPOET OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 15

by which their efficiency is to be measured, except as modified in detaij by
instructions from these headquarters.

(d) The rifle and the bayonet are the principal weapons of the infantry
soldier. He will be trained to a high degree of skill as a marksman, both on
the target range and in field firing. An aggressive spirit must be developed
until the soldier feels himself, as a bayonet fighter, invincible in battle.

(e) All officers and soldiers should realize that at no time in our history
has discipline been so important; therefore, discipline of the highest order
must be exacted at all times. The standards for the American Army will
be those of "West Point. The rigid attention, upright bearing, attention to
detail, uncomplaining obedience to instructions required of the cadet will be
required of every officer and soldier of our armies in France. * * *

Recommendations were cabled to Washington emphasizing the
importance of target practice and musketry traii^ing, and recom-
mending that instruction in open warfare be made the mission of
troops in the United States, while the training in trench warfare
so far *s necessary be conducted in France. Succeeding divisions,
whether serving temporarily with the British or French, were
trained as thus indicated. The assistance of the French units was
limited to demonstrations, and, in the beginning, French instructors
taught the use of French arms and assisted in the preparation of
elementary trench warfare problems.

Assuming that divisions would arrive with their basic training
completed in the United States, one month was allotted for the in-
struction of small units from battalions down, a second month of
experience in quiet sectors by battalions, and a third month for field
practice in open warfare tactics by division, including artillery.
Unfortunately many divisions did not receive the requisite amount
of systematic training before leaving the States and complete prepa-
ration of such units for battle was thus often seriously delayed.

24. The system of training profoundly influenced the combat effi-
ciency of our troops by its determined insistence upon an offensive
doctrine and upon training in warfare of movement. Instruction
which had hitherto been haphazard, varying with the ideas and con-
ceptions of inexperienced commanding officers and indifferent in-
stri^ctors, was brought under h system based on correct principles.
Approved and systematic metjiods were maintained and enforced
largely by the continual presence of members of the Trainirj^ Section
with the troops both during the training period and in campaign.

INTELLIGENCE.

25. Before our entry into the war, European experience had shown
that military operations can be carried out successfully and without
unnecessary loss only in the light of complete and reliable informa-
tion of the enemy. Warfare with battle lines separated by short
distances only, made possible the early acquirement of information,

16 . FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

sucli as that obtained through airplane photography, observation
from balloons and planes, sensitive instruments for detecting gun
positions and raids to secure prisoners and documents. All such in--
formation, together with that from Allied sources, including mili-
tary, political, and economical, was collected, classified, and rapidly
distributed where needed.

26. From careful studies of the systems and actual participation
by our officers in methods in use at various Allied headquarters, an
Intelligence Service was evolved in our forces which operated suc-
cessfully from its first organization in August, 1917.

With us the simpler methods, such as observation from the air and
ground and the exploitation of prisoners and documents, have
proved more effective than the less direct means. Every unit from
the battalion up had an intelligence detachment, but only ^n divi-
sions and larger organizations did the intelligence agencies embrace
all available means and sources, including radio interception stations
and sound and flash-ranging detachments.

27. The subjects studied by the IntelUgence Section embraced the
location of the enemy's front line, his order of battle, the history and
fighting value of his divisions, his manpower, his combat activities,
circulation and movement, his defensive organizations, supply, con-
struction and material, air service, radio service, strategy and tac-
tics, and what he probably knew of our intentions. The political and
economic conditions within the enemies' countries were also of ex-
treme importance.

28. To disseminate conclusions, daily publications were necessary,
such as a Secret Summary of Intelligence containing information of
the broadest scope, which concerned only General Headquarters ; and
a Summary of Information, distributed down to include the divisions,
giving information affecting the western front. A Press Review .
and a Summary of Air Intelligence were also published.

Maps showing graphically the disposition and movement of enemy
troops in our front were the bjest means for distributing information
to our troops. At the base printing ^lant and at General Headquar-
ters base maps were prepared while mobile printing plants, mounted
on trucks, accompanied corps and army headquarters. Combat
troops were thus supplied with excellent maps distributed, just be-
fore and during an attack, down to include company and platoon
commanders. Between July 1 and November 11, 1918, over 5,000,000
maps were used.

29. The secret service, espionage and counterespionage, w^s or-
ganized in close cooperation with the French and British. To pre- ,
vent indiscretions in the letters of officers and soldiers, as well as in

FINAL, EEPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 17

articles written for the press, the Censorship Division was created.
The Base Censor examined individual letters when the writer so
desired, censored all mail written in foreign languages, of which
there were over 50 used, and frequently checked up lettefs of entire
organizations.

30. The policy of press censorship adopted aimed to accomplish
three broad results :

To prevent the enemy from obtaining important information of
our forces.

To give to the people of the United States the maximum informa-
tion consistent with the limitations imposed by the first object.

To cause to be presented to the American people the facts as they
were known at the time.

There were with our forces 36 regularly accredited correspondents,
while visiting correspondents reached a total of 411.

SUMMER OF 1917 TO SPRING OF 1918.

31. In order to hinder the enemy's conquest of Russia and, if pos-
sible, prevent a German attack on Italy, or in the near east, the
Allies sought to maintain the offensive on the western front as far as
their diminished strength and morale would permit. On June 7, 1917,
the British took Messines, while a succession of operations known
as the Third Battle of Ypres began on July 31 and terminated with
the capture of the Passchendaele Ridge November 6-10. The British
attack at Ca mbrai is of special interest, since it was here that Ameri-
can troops (- fclieventh E ngineers) first participated in active fighting.

The French successfully attacked on a limited front near Verdun,
capturing Mort Homme on August 20 and advancing their lines to
La Forge Brook. In another offensive, begun on October 23, they
gained considerable ground on Chemin des Dames Ridge. These
French attacks Avere characterized by most careful preparation to
insure success in order to improve the morale of their troops.

32. ^Notwithstanding these Allied attacks on the western front,
the immense gains by the German armies in the east, culminating at
Riga on September 3, precipitated the collapse of Russia. The fol-
lowing month, the Austrians with German assistance surprised the
Italians and broke through the lines at Caporetto, driving the Italian
armies back to the Piave River, inflicting a loss of 300,000 men,
600,000 rifles, 3,000 guns, and enormous stores. This serious crisis
compelled the withdrawal of 10 French and British divisions from
the western front to Italy. The German situation on all other the-
aters was so favorable that as early as November they began the
movement of divisions toward the western front. If needed, her

151532—19 2

<^.

18 FINAL. EEPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PEESHING.

divisions could be withdrawn from the Italian front before the
French and British dared recall their divisions.

33. At first the Allies could hardly hope for a large American
Army. Marshal 'Joffre during his visit to America had made special
request that a combat division be sent at once to Europe as visual
«vidence of our purpose to participate actively in the war, and also
Asked for Engineer regiments and other special service units.

The arrival of the First Division and the parade of certain of its
elements in Paris on July 4 caused great enthusiasm and for the time
being French morale was stimulated. Still Allied apprehension was
deep-seated and material assistance was imperative. The following
extract is quoted from the cabled summary of an Allied conference
held on July 26 with the French and Italian Commanders-in-ehief
and the British and French Chiefs of Staff :

/"' General conclusions reached were necessity for adoption of purely
defensive attitude on all secondary fronts and withdrawing surplus
troops for duty on western front. By thus strengthening western front
believed Allies could hold until American forces arrive in numbers sufB-

\ cient to gain ascendency.

The conference urged the immediate study of the tonnage situation
with a view to accelerating the arrival of American troops. With
the approach of winter, depression among the Allies over the Eussian
collapse and the Italian crisis was intensified by the conviction that
the Germstns would undertake a decisive offensive in the spring.

A review of the situation showed that with Eussia out of the war
the Central Powers would be able to release a large number of divi-
sions for service elsewhere, and that during the spring and summer
of 1918, without interfering with the status quo at Salonika, they
could concentrate on the western front a force much stronger than
that of the Allies. In view of this, it was represented to the War
Department in December as of the utmost importance that the Allied
preparations be expedited.

34. On December 31, 1917, there were 176,665 American troops in
France and but one division had appeared on the front. Disappoint-
ment at the delay of the American effort soon began to develop.
French and British authorities suggested the more rapid entry of
our troops into the line and urged the amalgamation of our troops
with their own, even insisting upon the curtailment of training to
conform to the strict minimum of trench requirements they con-
sidered necessary.

My conclusion was that, although the morale of the German peo-
ple and of the armies was better than it had been for two years, only
an untoward combination of circumstances could give the enemy a
decisive victory before American support as recommended could be
made effective, provided the Allies secured unity of action. How-

FINAIi EEPOET OF GEN. JOHN J. PEESHING. 19

ever, a situation might arise which would necessitate the temporary
use of all American troops in the units of our Allies for the defen-
sive, but nothing in the situation justified the relinquishment of our
firm purpose to form our own Army under our own flag.

While the Germans were practicing for open warfare and con/
centrating their most aggressive personnel in shock divisions, the
training of the Allies was still limited to trench warfare. As our
troops were being trained for open warfare, there was every reason
why we could not allow them to be scattered among our Allies, even
by divisions, much less as replacements, except by pressure of sheer
necessity. Any sort of permanent amalgamation would irrevocably
commit America's fortunes to the hands of the Allies. Moreover it
was obvious that the lack of homogeneity would render these mixed
divisions difficult to maneuver and almost certain to break up under
stress of defeat, with the consequent mutual recrimination. Again,
there was no doubt that the realization by the German people that
independent American divisions, corps, or armies were in the field
with determined purpose would be a severe blow to German morale
and prestige.

It was also certain that an early appearance of the larger Amer-
ican units on the front would be most beneficial to the morale of the
Allies themselves. Accordingly, the First Division, on January 19,
1918, took over a sector north of Toul; the Twenty-sixth Division
went to the Soissons front early in February ; the Forty -second Divi-
sion entered the line near Limeville, February 21, and the Second
Division near Verdun, March 18. Meanwhile, the First Army Corps
Headquarters, Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett, commanding, was organ-
ized at Neufchateau on January 20, and the plan to create an inde-
pendent American sector on the Lorraine front was taking shape.

This was the situation when the great German offensive was
launched on March 21, 1918.

PART II.

OPEEATIONS.

Expediting Shipment or Tboops.

The German Offensives of 1918 and Related AT.T.nm Aobeementb.

Allied Commandee-in-Chief.

Employment of American Divisions from March to September, 1918.

Assembling the First American Army.

St. Mihiel Operation.

Meuse-Aegonne Operation :

Meuse-Argonne, First Phase.

Metjse-Argonne, Second Phase.

Meuse-Abgonne, Third Phase.
Operations of the Second Army.
American Activities on Other Fronts.
American Troops in Italy.
American Troops in Russia.
The Advance into Germany.
'Return of Troops to the United States.

21

PAKT II.
OPERATIONS.

EXPEDITING SHIPMENT OF TROOPS.

1. The War Department planned as early as July, 1917, to send
Xp France by June 15, 1918, 21 divisions of the then , strength of
20,000 men each, together with auxiliary and replacement troops,
and those needed for the line of communications, amounting to over
200,000, making a total of some 650,000 men. Beginning with
October, 6 divisions were to be sent during that quarter, 7 during the
first quarter of 1918, and 8 the second quarter. While these numbers
fell short of my recommendation of July 6, 1917, which contemplated
at least 1,000,000 men by May, 1918, it should be borne in mind that
the main factor in the problem was the amount of shipping to be-
come available for military purposes, in which must be included
tonnage required to supply the Allies with steel, coal, and food.

2. On December 2, 1917, an estimate of the situation was cabled
to the War Department with the following recommendation :

Paragraph 3. In view of these conditions, it i» of the utmost importance to
the Allied cause that we move swiftly. The minimum number of troops we
should plan to have in France by the end of June is 4 Army corps of 24
divisions in addition to troops for service of the rear. Have impressed the
present urgency upon Gen. Bliss and other American nferfibers of the con-
ference. Gens. Robertson, Foch, and Bliss agree with me that this is the
minimum that should be aimed at. This figure is given as the lowest we
should think of and is placed no higher because the limit of available trans-
portation would not seem to warrant it.

Paragraph 4. A study of transportation facilities shows sufficient American
tonnage to bring over this number of troops, but to do so there must be a re-
duction in the tonnage allotted to other than Army needs. It is estimated that
the shipping needed will have to be rapidly increased up to 2,000,000 tons by
May, in addition to the amount already allotted. The use of shipping for com-
mercial purposes must be curtailed as much as possible. The Allies are very
weak and we must come to their relief this year, i918. The year after may be
too late. It is very doubtful if they can hold on until 1919 unless we give them
a lot of support this year. It is therefore strongly recommended that a com-
plete-readjustment of transportation.be made and that the needs of the War
Department as set forth above be regarded as immediate. Further details of
these requirements will be sent later.

24 inHfAL EEPOKT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

and again on December 20, 1917 :

Understood here that a shipping program based on tonnage in sight pre-
pared in War College Division in September contemplated that entire First
Corps with its corps troops and some 32,000 auxiliaries were to have been
shipped by end of November, and that an additional program for December,
January, and February contemplates that the shipment of the Second Corps
with its corps troops and other auxiliaries should be practically completed by
the end of February. Should such a program be caried out as per schedule
and should shipments continue at corresponding rate, it would not succeed in
placing even three complete corps, with proper proportion of Army troops and
auxiliaries, in Prance by the end of May. The actual facts are that shipments
are not even keeping up to that schedule. It is now the middle of December
and the First Corps is still incomplete by over two entire divisions* and many
. corps troops. It can not be too emphatically declared that we should be pre-
pared to take the field with at least four corps by June 30. In view of past
performances with tonnage heretofore available such a project is impossible
of fulfillment, but only by most strenuous attempts to attain such a result will
we be in a position to take a proper part In operations in 1918. In view of
fact that as the number of our troops here increases a correspondingly greater
amount of tonnage must be provided for their supply, and also in view of the
slow rate of shipment with tonnage now available, it is of the most urgent
Importance that more tonnage should be obtained at once as already recom-
mended in my cables and by Gen. Bliss.

3. During January, 1918, discussions were held with the British
authorities that resulted in an agreement, which became known as the
six-division plan and which provided for the transportation of six
entire divisions in British tonnage, without interference with our
own shipping program. High commanders, staff. Infantry, and
auxiliary troops were to be given experience with British divisions,
beginning with battalions, the Artillery to be trained under Ameri-
can direction, using Fi-ench materiel. It was agreed that when suffi-
ciently trained these battalions were to be re-formed into regiments
and that when the Artillery was fully trained all of the units com-
prising each division were to be united for service under their own
officers. It was planned that the period of training with the British
should cover about 10 weeks. To supervise the administration and
training of these divisions the Second Corps staff was organized
February 20, 1918.

In the latter part of January joint note No. 12, presented by the
Military Kepresentatives with the Supreme "War Council, was ap-
proved by the Council. This note concluded that France would be
safe during 1918 only under certain conditions, namely :

{a) That the strength of the British and French troops in France are con-
tinuously kept up to their present total strength and that they receive the ex-
pected reinforcements of not less than two American divisions per month.

• The First, Forty-second, Second, and Twenty-sixth Divisions h^d arrived ; but not tlie
Replacement and the Depot Divisions.

TlSAXi EEPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 25

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVES OF 1918 AND RELATED ALLIED

AGREEMENTS.

4. The first German offensive of 1918, beginning March 21, overran
all resistance during the initial period of the attack. Within eight
days the enemy had completely crossed the old Somme battlefield
tind had swept everything before him to a depth of some 56 kilo-
meters. For a few days the loss of the railroad center of Amiens
appeared imminent. The offensive made such inroads upon French
and British reserves that defeat stared them in the face unless the
new American troops should prove more immediately available than
even the most optimistic had dared to hope. On March 27 the Mili-
tary Representatives with the Supreme War Council prepared their
joint note No. 18. This note repeated the previously quoted state-
ment from joint note No. 12, and continued:

The battle which is developing at the present moment in France, and which
can extend to the other theaters of operations, may very quickly place the
Allied Armies in a serious situation from the point of view of efCectives, and
the Military Representatives are from this moment of opinion that the aboVe-
detalled condition (see (a) par. 3) can no longer be maintained, and they con-
sider as a general proposition that the new situation requires new decisions.

The Military Representatives are of opinion that it is highly desirable that
the American Government should assist the Allied Armies as soon as possible
by permitting in principle the temporary service of American units in Allied
Army corps and divisions. Such reinforcements must, however, be obtained
from other units than those American divisions which are now operating with
the French, and the units so temporarily employed must eventually be returned
to the American Army.

The Military Representatives are of the opinion that from the present time,
In execution of the foregoing, and until otherwise directed by the Supreme
War Ctouncil, only American infantry and machine-gun units, organized as
that Government may decide, be brought to France, and that all agreements
or conventions hitherto made in conflict with this decision be modified
accordingly.

The Secretary of War, who was in France at this time. Gen. Bliss,
the American Military Representative with the Supreme War Coun-
cil, and I at once conferred on the terms of this note, with the result
that the Secretary recommended to the President that joint note
No. 18 be approved in the following sense:

The purpose of the American Government is to render the fullest cooperation
and aid, and therefore the recommendation of the Military Representatives with
regard to the preferential transportation of American infantry and machine-
gun units in the present emergency is approved. Such units, when transported,
will be under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expedi-
tionary Forces, and will be assigned for training and use by him in his discre-
tion. He will use these and all other military forces of the United States under
his command in such manner as to render the greatest military assistance,
keeping in mind always the determination of this Government to have its
various military forces collected, as speedily as their training and the military

26 FINAL REPOKT OF GEN. JOHN J. PEKSHING.

Situation perinits,_into an independent American Army, acting in concert wltb
the armies of Great Britain and France, and all arrangements made by him
for their temporary training and service will be made with that end in
view.

While note No. 18 was general in its terms, the priority of ship-
ments of infantry more especially pertained to those divisions that
were to be trained in the British area, as that Government was to
provide tl^e additional shipping according to the six-division plan
agreed upon even before the beginning of the March 21 offensive.

On April 2 the War Department cabled that preferential transpor-
tation would be given to American infantry and machine-gun units
during the existing emergency. Preliminary ' arrangements were
made for training and early employment with the French of such
infantry units as might be sent over by our own transportation.
As for the British agreement, the six-division plan was to be modified
to give priority to the infantry of those divisions. However, all the
Allies were now urging the indefinite continuation of priority for the
shipment of infantry and its complete incorporation in their units,
which fact was cabled to the War Department on April 3, with the
specific recommendation that the total immediate priority of infantry
be limited to four divisions, plus 45,500 replacements, and that the
necessity for future priority be determined later.

5. The Secretary of War and I held a conference with British
authorities on April 7, during which it developed that the British
had erroneously assumed that the preferential shipment of infantry
was to be continuous. It was agreed at this meeting that 60,000
infantry and machine-gun troops, with certain auxiliary units to be
brought over by British tonnage during April, should go to the
British area as part of the six-division plan, but that there should
be a further agreement as to subsequent troops to be brought over by
the British. Consequently, a readjustment of the priority schedule
was undertaken on the basis of postponing " shipment of all noncom-
batant troops to the utmost possible to meet present situation, and
at the same time not make it impossible to build up our own Army."

6. The battle line in the vicinity of Amiens had hardly stabilized
when, on April 9, the Germans made another successful attack
against the British lines on a front of some 40 kilometers in the
vicinity of Armentieres and along the Lys River. As a result of its
being included in a salient formed by the German advance, Passchen-
daele Kidge, the capture of which had cost so dearly in 1917, was
evacuated by the British on April 17.

The losses had been heavy and the British were unable to replace
them ientirely. They were, therefore, making extraordinary efforts
to increase the shipping available for our troops. On April 21, I
went to London to clear up certain questions concerning the rate of

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PEBSHING. 27

shipment and to reach the further agreement provided for in the
April 7 conference. The result of this London agreement was cabled
to Washington April 24, as follows :

(a) That only the infantry, machine guns, engineers, and signal troops of
American divisions find the headquarters of divisions and brigades be sent over
in British and American shipping during May for training and service with the-
British army in France up to six divisions and that any shipping in excess of
that required for these troops be utilized to transport troops necessary to make
these divisions complete. The training and service of these troops will be
carried out in accordance with plans already agreed upon between Sir Douglas-
Haig and Gen. Pershing, with a view at an early date of building up American
divisions.

(6) That the American personnel of the artillery of these divisions and'
such corps troops as may be required to build up American corps organizat
tions follow immediately thereafter, and that American artillery personnel
be trained with French materiel and join its proper divisions as soon as
thoroughly trained.

(c) If, when the program outlined in paragraphs (o) and (6) is completed,,
the military situation makes advisable the further shipment of infantry, etc.,
of American divisions, then all the British and American shipping available
for transport of troops shall be used for that purpose under such arrangement
as will insure immediate aid to the Allies, and at the same time provide at the
earliest moment for bringing over American artillery and other necessary
units to complete the organization of American divisions and corps. Provided
that the combatant troops mentioned in (a) and (6) be followed by such
Service of the Rear and other troops as may be considered necessary by the-
American Commander-in-Chief.

(d) That it is contemplated American divisions and corps when trained and
organized shall be utilized under the American Commander-in-Chief in an
American group.

(e) That the American Commander-in-Chief shall allot American troops to
the French or British for training or train them with American units at his
discretion, with the understanding that troops already transported by British
shipping or included in the six divisions mentioned in paragraph (o) are to-
be trained with the British Army, details as to rations, equipment, and trans-
port to be determined by special agreement.

7. At a meeting of the Supreme "War Council held at Abbeville
May 1 akd 2, the entire question of the amalgamation of Americans
with the French and British was reopened. An urgent appeal came
from both French and Italian representatives for American replace-
ments or units to serve with their armies. After prolonged discus-
sion regarding this question and that of priority generally the fol-
lowing agreement was reached, committing the Council to an inde-
pendent American Army and providing for the immediate shipment
of certain troops :

It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that, in order to carry the war
to a successful conclusion, an American Army should be formed as early as
possible under its own commander and under its own flag. In order to meet'
the present emergency it is agreed that American troops should be brought tO'
France as rapidly as Allied transportation facilities will permit, and that, as
far as consistent with the necessity of building up an American Army, prefer-

28 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J, PERSHING.

«nce will be given to infantry and machine-gun units for training and service
with French and British Armies; with the understanding that such infantry
and machine-gun units are to be withdrawn and united with its own artillery
and auxiliary troops Into divisions and corps at the direction of the Ameri-
can Commander-in-Chief after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of
the Allied Armies In France.

Subparagraph A. It is also agreed that during the month of May preference
ehould be given to the transportation of Infantry and machine-gun units of
six divisions, and that any excess tonnage shall be devoted to bringing over
fiuch other troops as may be determined by the American Commander-ln-Chlet

Subparagraph B. It is further agreed that this program shall be continued
during the month of June upon condition that the British Government shall
furnish transportation for a minimum of 130,000 men in May and 150,000 men
In Junei with the understanding that the first six divisions of infantry shall
go to the British for training and service, and that troops sent over in June
shall be allocated for training and service as the American Commander-in-
Chief may determine.

Subparagraph C. It is also further agreed that if the British Government
shall transport an excess of 150,000 men in June that such excess shall be
Infantry and machine-gun units, and that early in June there shall be a new
review of the situation to determine further action.

The gravity of the situation had brought the Allies to a full
realization of the necessity of providing all possible tonnage for the
transportation of American troops. Although their views were ac-
cepted to the extent of giving a considerable priority to infantry
and machine gunners, the priority agreed upon as to this class of
troops was not as extensive as some of them deemed necessary, and
the Abbeville conference was adjourned with the understanding that
the question of further priority would be discussed at a conference to
be held about the end of May.

8. The next offensive of the enemy was made between the Oise
and Berry-au-Bac against the French instead of against the British,
as was generally expected, and it came as a complete surprise. The
initial Aisne attack, covering a front of 35 kilometers, met with
remarkable success, as the German armies advanced no less than 50
kilometers in four days. On reaching the Marne that river was
used as a defensive flank and the German advance was directed
toward Paris. During the first days of June something akin to a
panic seized the city and it was estimated that 1,000,000 people left
during the spring of 1918.

The further conference which had been agreed upon at Abbeville
was held at Versailles on June 1 and 2. The opinion of our Allies as
to the existing situation and the urgency of their insistence upon
further priority for infantry and machine gunners are shown by
the following message prepared by the Prime Ministers of Great
Britain, France, and Italy, and agreed to by Gen. Foch :

The Prime Ministers of France, Italy, and Great Britain, now meeting at
Versailles, desire to send the following message to the President of the United
States :

FTN'AT^ REPORT OP GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 29}

"We desire to express our warmest thanks to President Wilson for the.
remarkable promptness with which American aid, in excess of what at one time-
seemed practicable, has been rendered to the Allies during the past moath to,
meet a great emergency. The crisis, however, still continues. Gen. Fochi
has presented to us a statement of the utmost gravity, which points out that
the numerical superiority of the enemy in France, where 162 Allied divisions
now oppose 200 German divisions, is very heavy, and that, as there is no
possibility of the British and French Increasing the number of their divisions
(on the contrary, they are put to extreme straits to keep them up) there
is a great danger of the war being lost unless the numerical Inferiority of
the Allies can be remedied as rapidly as possible by the advent of American
troops. He, therefore, hjrges with the utmost Insistence that the maximum
possible number of Infantry and machine gunners, in which respect the short-
age of men on the side of the Allies is most marked, should continue to be
shipped from America in the months of June and July to avert the Imme-'
diate danger of an Allied defeat in the present campaign owing to the Allied
reserves being exhausted before those of the enem^ In addition to this, and
looking to the future, he represents that it is im^ssible to foresee ultimate
victory in the war unless America is able to provide such an Army as vsdll
enable the Allies ultimately to establish numerical superiority. He places,
the total American force required for this at no less than 100 divisions, and!
urges the continuous raising of fresh American levies, which, in his opinion,\
should not be less than 300,000 a month, with a view to establishing a total
American force of 100 divisions at as early a date as this can possibly be done.

" We are satisfied that Gen. Foch, who is conducting the present campaign,
with consummate ability, and on whose military judgment we continue ta
place the most absolute reliance, is not overestimating the needs of the case,
and we feel confident that the Government of the United States will do every-
thing that can be done, both to meet the needs of the Immediate situation and
to proceed with the continuous raising of fresh levies, calculated to provide,,
as soon as possible, the numerical superiority which the Oommander-in-Chief
of the Allied Armies regards as essential to ultimate victory."

A separate telegram contains the arrangements which Gen. Foch, Gea
Pershing, and Lord Milner have agreed to recommend to the United States
Government with regard to the dispatch of American troops for the monthg.
of June and July.

(Signed) Clemenceau,

D. IjLOYd George,
Obianbo.

Such extensive priority had already been given to the transport
of American infantry and machine gunners that the troops of those
categories which had received even partial training in the United
States were practically exhausted. Moreover, the strain on our
Services of Supply made it essential that early relief be afforded
by increasing its personnel. At the same time, the corresponding
services of our Allies had in certain departments been equally over-.
taxed and their responsible heads were urgent in their representa-
tions that their needs must be relieved by bringing over American
specialists. The final agreement was cabled to the War Depart-.
ment on June 5, as follows :

30 FINAL EEPOET OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

The following agreement has been concluded between Gen. Foch, Lord Mll-
ner, and myself with reference to the transportation of American troops in the
months of June and July :

" The following recommendations are made on the assumption that at least
^50,000 men can be transported in each of the months of June and July by the
employment of combined British and American tonnage. We recommend:

" (o) For the month of June: (1) Absolute priority shall be given to the
transportation of 170,000 combatant troops (viz, six divisions without ar-
tillery, ammunition trains, or supply trains, amounting to 126,000 men and
44,000 replacements for combat troops) ; (2) 25,400 men for the service of the
railways, of which 13.400 have been asked for by the French Minister of
Transportation; (3) the balance to be troops of categories to be determined
by the Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces.

" (ft) For the month of July: (1) Absolute priority for the shipment of 140,-
000 combatant troops of the nature defined above (four divisions minus artil-
lery "et cetera" amounting to 84,000 men, plus 56,000 replacement) ; (2) the
balance of the 250,000 to consist of troops to be designated by the Commander-
in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces.

" (c) It is agreed that if the available tonnage in either month allows of the
transportation of a larger number of men than 250,000, the excess tonnage
will be employed in the transportation of combat troops as defined above.

"(d) We recognize that the combatant troops to be dispatched in July
may have to Include troops which have had insufficient training, but we con-
sider the present emergency is such as to justify a temporary and exceptional
departure by the United States from sound principles of training, especially
as a similar course is beinc followed by France and Great Britain.

(Signed) "Foch.

" MlLNEE.

" Peeshing."

9. The various proposals during these conferences regarding
priority of shipment, often very insisteilt, raised questions that were
not only most diificult but most delicate. On the one hand, there was
a critical situation which must be met by immediate action, while,
on the other hand, any priority accorded a particular arm necessarily
postponed the formation of a distinctive American fighting force
and the means to supply it. Such a force was, in my opinion, abso-
lutely necessary to win the war. A few of the Allied representatives
became convinced that the American Services of Supply should not
be neglected but should be developed in the common interest. The
success of our divisions during May and June demonstrated fully
that it was not necessary to draft Americans under foreign flags in
order to utilize American manhood most effectively.

ALLIED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

10. When, on March 21, 1918, the German Army on the western
front began its series of offensives, it was by far the most formidable
force the world had ever seen. In fighting men and guns it had a
great superiority, but this was of less importance than the advantage
in morale, in experience, in training for mobile warfare, and in

FINAL EEPORT OP GEN, JOHN J. PERSHING. 31

unity of command. Ever since the collapse of the Eussian armies
and the crisis on the Italian front in the fall of 1917, German armies
were being assembled and trained for the great campaign which was
to end the war before America's eifort could be brought to bear.
Germany's best troops, her most successful generals, and all the ex-
perience gained in three years of war were mobilized for the supreme
effort.

The first blow fell on the right of the British Armies, including
the junction of the British and French forces. Only the prompt
cooperation of the French and British general headquarters stemmed
the tide. The reason for this objective was obvious and strikingly
illustrated the necessity for having someone with sufficient authority
over all the Allied Armies to meet such an emergency. The lack of
complete cooperation among the Allies on the western front had been
appreciated and the question of preparation to meet a crisis had al-
ready received attention by the Supreme War Council. A plan had
been adopted by which each of the Allies would furnish a certain
number of divisions for a general reserve to be under the direction
of the military representatives of the Supreme War Council of which
Gen. Foch was then the senior member. But when the time came to
meet the German offensive in March these reserves were not found
available and the plan failed.

This situation resulted in a conference for the immediate considera-
tion of the question of having an Allied Commander-in-Chief. After
much discussion during which my view favoring such action was
clearly stated, an agreement was reached and Gen. Foch was selected.
His appointment as such was made April 3 and was approved for the
United States by the President on April 16. The terras of the
agreement under which Gen. Foch exercised his authority were as

follows :

Beauvais, April 3, 1918.
Gen. Foch is charged by the British, French, and American Governments
with the coordination of the action of the Allied Armies on the western front ;
to this end there is conferred on him all the powers necessary for its effective
realization. To the same end, the British, French, and American Governments
confide in Gen. Foch the strategic direction of military operations.

The Commander-in-Chief of the British, French, and American Armies will
exercise to the fullest extent the tactical direction of their armies. Each
Commander-in-Chief will have the right to appeal to his Government, if in his
opinion his Army is placed in danger by the instructions received from Gen.
Foch.

(Signed) G. Clemenceau.

, , Petain.

F. FocH.
Lloyd George.
D. Haio, F. M.

Heney Wilson, General, 34-18.
Taskek H. Bliss, General and Chief of Staff.
John J. Pebshing, General, U. S. A.

32 FINAL EEPORT OP GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

EMPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS FROM MARCH TO
SEPTEMBER, 1918.

11. The grave crisis precipitated by the first German offensive
caused me to malie a hurried visit to Gen. Foch's headquarters,
at Bombon, during which all our combatant forces were placed at his
disposal. The acceptance of this offer meant the dispersion of our
troops along the Allied front and a consequent delay in building up
a distinctive American force in Lorraine, but the serious situation-of
the Allies demanded this divergence from our plans.

On March 21, approximately ,300,000 American troops had reached
France. Four combat divisions, equivalent in strength to eight
French or British divisions, were available — the First and Second
then in line, and the Twenty-sixth and Forty-second just withdrawn
from line after one month's trench warfare training. The last two
divisions at once began taking over quiet sectors to release divisions
for the battle; the Twenty-sixth relieved the First Division, which
was sent to northwest of Paris in reserve ; the Forty-second relieved
two French divisions from quiet sectors. In addition to these
troops, one regiment of the Ninety-third Division was with the
P'rench in the Argonne, the Forty-first Depot Division was in the
Services of Supply, and three divisions (Third, Thirty-second, and
Fifth) were arriving.

12. On April 25 the First Division relieved two French divisions
on the front near Montdidier and on May 28 captured the impor-
tant observation stations on the heights of Cantigny with splendid
dash. French artillery, aviation, tanks, and flame throwers aided
in the attack, but most of this French assistance was withdrawn
before the completion of the operation in order to meet the enemy's
new offensive launched May 27 toward Chateau-Thierry. The
enemy reaction against our troops at Cantigny was extremely vio-
lent, and apparently he was determined at all costs to counteract
the most excellent effect the American success had produced. For
three days his guns of all calibers were concentrated on our new
position and counterattack succeeded counterattack. The desperate
efforts of the Germans gave the fighting at Cantigny a seeming
tactical importance entirely out of proportion to the numbers in-
volved.

13. Of the three divisions arriving in France when the first Ger-
man offensive began, the Thirty-second, intended for replacements,
had been temporarily employed in the Services of Supply to meet a
shortage of personnel, but the critical situation caused it to be re-
assembled and by May 21 it was entering the line in the Vosges. At
this time the Fifth Division, though still incomplete, was also
ordered into the line in the same region. The Third Division was

PHfTAL REPORT OF GEK. JOHN J. PEESHING. 33

assembling in its traming area and the Third Corps staff had just
been organized to administer these three divisions. In addition to
the eight divisions already mentioned, the Twenty-eighth and Sev-
enty-seventh had arrived in the British area, and the Fourth, Twenty-
seventh, Thirtieth, Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, and Eighty-second
were arriving there. Following the agreements as to British ship-
ping, our troops came so rapidly that by the end of May we had
a force of 600,000 in France.

The third German offensive on May 27, against the French on the
Aisne, soon developed a desperate situation for the Allies. The
Second Division, then in reserve northwest of Paris and preparing
to relieve the First Division, was hastily diverted to the vicinity
of Meaux on May 31, and, early on the morning of June 1, was de-
ployed across the Chateau-Thierry-Paris road near Montreuil-aux-
Lions in a gap in the French line, where it stopped the German ad-
vance on Paris. At the same time the partially trained Third Divi-
sion was placed at French disposal to hold the crossings of the
Marne, and its motorized machine-gun battalion succeeded in reach-
ing Chateau-Thierry in time to assist in successfully defending that
river crossing.

The enemy having been halted, the Second Division commenced
a series of vigorous attacks on June 4, which resulted in the cap-
ture of Belleau Woods after very severe fighting. The village of
Bouresches was taken soon after, and on July 1 Vaux was captured.
In these operations the Second Division met with most desperate
resistance by Germany's best troops.

14. To meet the March offensive, the French had extended their
front from the Oise to Amiens, about 60 kilometers, and during the
German drive along the Lys had also sent reinforcements to assist
the British. The French lines had been further lengthened about
45 kilometers as a result of the Marne pocket made by the Aisne
offensive. This increased frontage and the heavy fighting had -re-
duced French reserves to an extremely low point.

Our Second Corps, under Maj. Gen. George W. Read, had been
organized for the command of the 10 divisions with the British,
which were held back in training areas or assigned to second-line
defenses. After consultation with Field Marshal Haig on June 3,
6 American divisions were relieved from the British area to sup-
port the French. The Seventy-seventh and Eighty-second Divisions
were moved south to release the Forty-second and Twenty-sixth for
employment on a more active portion of the front ; the Thirty-fifth
Division entered the line in the Vosges, and the Fourth and Twenty-
eighth Divisions were moved to the region of Meaux and Chateau-
Thierry as reserves.
151532—19 3

34 FINAL EEPOET OF GEN. JOHlf J. PERSHING.

On June 9 the Germans attacked the Montdidier-Noyon front in
an effort to widen the Marne pocket and bring their lines nearer
to Paris, but were stubbornly held by the French with comparatively
little loss of ground. In view of the unexpected results of the three
preceding attacks by the enemy, this successful defense proved bene-
ficial to the Allied morale, particularly as it was believed that the
German losses were unusually heavy.

15. On July 15, the date of the last German offensive, the First,
Second, Third, and Twenty-sixth Divisions were on the Chateau-
Thierry front with the Fourth and Twenty-eighth in support, some
small units of the last two divisions gaining front-line experience
with our troops or with the French; the Forty -second Division was
in support of the French east of Eheims; and four colored regiments
were with the French in the Argonne. On the Alsace-Lorraine front
we had five divisions in line with the French. Five were with the
British Army, three having elements in the line. In our training
areas four divisions were assembled and four were in the process
of arrival.

The Marne salient was inherently weak and offered an opportunity
for a counteroffensive that was obvious. If successful, such an opera-
tion would afford immediate relief to the Allied defense, would re-
move the threat against Paris, and free the Paris-Nancy Eailroad.
But, more important than all else, it would restore the morale of the
Allies and remove the profound depression and fear then existing.
Up to this time our units had been put in here and there at critical
points as emergency troops to stop the terrific German advance. In
every trial, whether on the defensive or offensive, they had proved
themselves equal to any troops in Europe. As early as June 23 and'
again on July 10 at Bombon, I had very strongly urged that our best
divisions be concentrated under American command, if possible, for
use as a striking force against the Marne salient. Although the pre-
vailing view among the Allies was that American units were suitable
only for the defensive, and that at all events they could be used to
better advantage under Allied command, the suggestion was accepted
in principle, and my estimate of their offensive fighting qualities was
soon put to the test.

The enemy had encouraged his soldiers to believe that the July 15
attack would conclude the war with a German peace. Although he
made elaborate plans for the operation, he failed to conceal fully his
intentions, and the front of attack was suspected at least one week
ahead. On the Champagne front the actual hour for the assault was
known and the enemy was checked with heavy losses. The Forty-
second Division entered the line near Somme Py immediately, and
five of its infantry battalions and all its artillery became engaged.
Southwest of Eheims and along the Marne to the east of Chateau-

PINAL KBPOET OP GEN. JOHN J. PBESHING. 35

Thierry the Germans were at first somewhat successful, a penetration
of 8 kilometers beyond the river being effected against the French
immediately to the right of our Third Division. The following
quotation from the report of the commanding general Third Division
gives the result of the fighting on his front :

Although the rush of the German troops overwhelmed some of the front-line
positions, causing the infantry and machine-gun companies to suffer, in some
cases a 50 per cent loss, no German soldier crossed the road from Fossoy to
Crezancy, except as a prisoner of war, and by noon of the following day
(July 16) there were no Germans in the foreground of tlie Third Division
sector except the dead. .

On this occasion a single regiment of the Third Division wrote
one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals. It prevented
the crossing at certain points on its front, while on either flank the
Germans who had gained a footing pressed forward. Our men,
firing in three directions, met the German attacks with counter-
attacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two German
divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners.

16. The selection by the Germans of the Champagne sector and
the eastern and southern faces of the Mame pocket on which to
make their offensive was fortunate for the Allies, as it favored the
launching of the counterattack already planned. There were now
over 1,200,000 American troops in France, which provided a con-
siderable force of reserves. Every American division with any sort
of training was made available for use in a counteroffensive.

Gen. Petain's' initial plan for the counterattack involved the entire
western face of the Marne salient. The First and Second American
Divisions, with the First French Moroccan Division between them,
were employed as the spearhead of the main attack, driving directly
eastward, through the most sensitive portion of the German lines,
to the heights south of Soissons. The advance began on July 18,
without the usual brief warning of a preliminary bombardment,
and these three divisions at a single bound broke through the enemy's
infantry defenses and overran his artillery, cutting or interrupting
the German communications leading into the salient.^ A general
withdrawal from the Marne was immediately begun by the enemy,
who still fought stubbornly to prevent disaster.

The First Division, throughout 4 days of constant fighting,
advanced 11 kilometers, capturing Berzy-le-Sec and the heights
above Soissons and taking some 3,500 prisoners and 68 field guns
from the 7 German divisions employed against it. It was re-
lieved by a British division. The Second Division advanced 8
kilometers in the first 26 hours, and by the end of the second day

' See plate No. 1.

36 FINAL EEPOBT OF GEN. JOHN J. PEESHING.

was facing Tigny, having captured 3,000 prisoners and 66 field guns.
It was relieved the night of the 19th by a French division. The
result of this counteroffensive was of decisive importance. Due to
the magnificent dash and power displayed on the field of Soissons
by our First and Second Divisions the tide of war was definitely
turned in favor, of the Allies.

Other American divisions participated in the Marne counter-
offensive. A little to the south of the Second Division, the Fourth
was in line with the French and was engaged until July 22. The
First American Corps, Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett commanding,
with the Twenty-sixth Division and a French division, acted as a
pivot of the movement toward Soissons, capturing Torcy on the
18th and reaching the Chateau-Thierry-Soissons road on the 21st.
At the same time the Third Division crossed the Marne and took
the heights of Mont St. Pere and the villages of Charteves and
Jaulgonne.

In the First Corps, the Forty-second Division relieved the Twenty-
sixth on July 25 and extended its front, on the 26th relieving the
French division. From this time until August 2 it fought its way
through the Forest de Fere and across the Ourcq, advancing toward
the Vesle until relieved by the Fourth Division on August 3. Early
in this period elements of the Twenty-eighth Division participated
in the advance.

Farther to the east the Third Division forced the enemy back to
Eoncheres Wood, where it was relieved on July 30 by the Thirty-
second Division from the Vosges front. The Thirty-second, after
relieving the Third and some elements of the Twenty-eighth on the
line of the Ourcq Eiver, advanced abreast of the Forty-second toward
the Vesle. On August 3 it passed under control of our Third Corps,
Maj. Gen. Eobert L. BuUard commanding, which made its first ap-
pearance in battle at this time, while the Fourth Division took up
the task of the Forty-second Division and advanced with the Thirty-
second to the Vesle Eiver, where, on August 6, the operation for the
reduction of the Marne salient terminated.

In the hard fighting from July 18 to August 6 the Germans were
not only halted in their advance but were driven back from the
Marne to the Vesle and committed wholly to the defensive. The
force of American arms had been brought to bear in time to enable
the last offensive of the enemy to be crushed.

17. The First and Third Corps now held a continuous front of 11
kilometers along the Vesle. On August 12 the Seventy-seventh Divi-
sion relieved the Fourth Division on the First Corps front, and the
following day the Twenty-eighth relieved the Thirty-second Division
in the Third Corps, while from August 6 to August 10 the Sixth

FINAL KEPOKT OF GEN. JOHN J. PEKSHING. 37

Infantry Brigade of the Third Division held a sector on the river
line. The transfer of the First Corps to the Woevre was ordered
at this time, and the control of its front was turned over to the
Third Corps.

Onl August 18 Gen. Petain began an offensive between Eheims and
the Oise. Our Third Corps participated in this operation, crossing
the Vesle on September 4 with the Twenty-eighth and Seventy-
seventh Divisions and overcoming stubborn opposition on the plateau
south of the Aisne, which was reached by the Seventy-seventh on
September 6. The Twenty-eighth was withdrawn from the line on
September 7. Two days later the Third Corps was transferred to
the region of Verdun, the Seventy-seventh Division remaining in
line on the Aisne Eiver until September 17. /

The Thirty-second division, upon its relief from the battle on the
Vesle, joined a French corps north of Soissons and attacked from
August 29 to 31, capturing Juvigny •after some particularly desper-
ate fighting and reaching the Chauny-Soissons road.

18. On the British front two regiments of the Thirty-third Di-
vision participated in an attack on Hamel July 4, and again on
August 9 as an incident of the allied offensive against the Amiens
salient. One of these regiments took Gressaire Wood and Chipilly
Eidge, capturing 700 prisoners and considerable materiel.

ASSEMBLING THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY.

19. In conference with Gen. Petain at Chantilly on May 19 it had
been agreed that the American Army would soon take complete
charge of the sector of the Woevre. The Twenty-sixth Division was
already in line in the Woevre north of Toul and was to be followed
by other American divisions as they became available, with the
understanding that the sector was to pass to our control when four
divisions were in the line. But demands of the battle then going on
farther west required the presence of our troops, and the agreement
had no immediate result. Due to the presence of a number of our di-
visions northeast of Paris, the organization of an American corps
sector in the Chateau-Thierry region was taken up with Gen. Petain,
and on July 4 the First Corps assumed tactical control of a sector
in that region. This Avas an important step, but it was by no means
satisfactory, as only one American division at the moment was oper-
ating under the control of the First Corps, whUe we had at this
time eight American divisions in the front line serving in French
corps.

20. The counter-offensives against the Marne salient in July, and
against the Amiens salient in August had gained such an advantage
that it was apparent that the emergency, which justified the dis-

38 FIKAL, EEPOET OF GEN. JOHN" J. PEESHING.

persion of our divisions, had passed. The moment was propitious
for assembling our divisions. Scattered as they were along the
Allied front^, their supply had become very difficult. From every
point of view the immediate organization of an independent Amer-
ican force M'as indicated. The formation of the Army in the
Chateau-Thierry region and its early transfer to the sector of the
Woevre, which was to extend from Nomeny, east of the Moselle, to
north of St. Mihiel, was therefore decided upon by Marshal Foch
and myself on August 9, and the details were arranged with Gen,
Petain later on the same day.

ST. MIHIEL OPERATION.^

21. At Bombon on July 24 there was a conference of all the Com-
manders-in-Chief for the purpose of considering Allied operations.
Each presented proposals for the employment of the armies under
his command and these formed the basis of future cooperation of
the Allies. It was emphatically determined that the Allied attitude
should be to maintain the offensive. As the first operation of the
American Army, the reduction of the salient of St. Mihiel was to
be undertaken as soon as the necessary troops and material could be
made available. On account of the swampy nature of the country
it was especially important that the movement be undertaken and
finished before the fall rains should begin, which was usually about
the middle of September.

Arrangements were concluded for successive relief of American
divisions and the organization of the First American Army under
my personal command was announced on August 10, with La Ferte-
sous-Jouarre as headquarters. This Army nominally assumed con-
trol of a portion of the Vesle front, although at "the same time direc-
tions were given for its secret concentration in the St. Mibiel sector.

22. The force of American soldiers in France at that moment was
sufficient to carry out this offensive, but they were dispersed along
the front, from Switzerland to the Channel. The three Army Corps
headquarters to participate in the St. Mihiel attack were the First,
Fourth, and Fifth. The First was on the Vesle, the Fourth at Toul,
and the Fifth not yet completely organized. To assemble combat
divisions and service troops and undertake a major operation,
within the short period available and with staffs so recently or-,
ganized, was an extremely difficult task. Our deficiencies in Artil-
lery, Aviation, and special troops, caused by the shipment of an un-
due proportion of Infantry and Machine Guns during the summer,
were largely met by the French.

» See plate No. 5. 2 See plate No. 2.

riNAL EEPOET OP GEN. JOHN" J. PBBSHING. 39

23. The reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was important, as it
would prevent the enemy from interrupting traffic on the Paris-
Nancy Eailroad by artillery fire and would free the railroad leading
north through St. Mihiel to Verdun. It would also provide us with
an advantageous base of departure for an attack against the Metz-
Sedan Eailroad system which was vital to the German armies west
of Verdun, and against the Briey Iron Basin which was necessary
for the production of German armament and munitions.

The general plan was to make simultaneous attacks against the
flanks of the salient. The ultimate objective was tentatively fixed
as the general line MarieuUes (east of the Moselle) — ^heights south
of Gorze-Mars la Tour-Etain. The operation contemplated the use
on the western face of 3 or 4 American divisions, supported by
the attack of 6 divisions of the Second French Army on their left,
while 7 American divisions would attack on the southern face,
and 3 French divisions would press the enemy at the tip of the
, salient. As the part to be taken by the Second French Army would
be closely related to the attack of the First American Army, Gen.
Petain plaCed all the French troops involved under my personal
command.

By August 30, the concentration of the scattered divisions, corps,
and army troops, of the quantities of supplies and munitions re-
quired, and the necessary construction of light railways and roads,
were well under way.

24. In accordance with the previous general consideration of oper-
ations at Bombon on July 24, an allied offensive extending prac-
tically along the entire active front was eventually to be carried
out. After the reduction of the St. Mihiel sector the Americans were
to cooperate in the concerted effort of the Allied armies. It was
the sense of the conference of July 24, that the extent to which
the different operations already planned might carry us could not
be then foreseen, especially if the results expected were achieved
before the season was far advanced. I Jt seemed reasonable at that
time to look forward to a combined offensive for the autumn, which
would give no respite to the enemy and would increase our advan-
tage for the inauguration of succeeding operations extending into
1919. J

On August 30, a further discussion with Marshal Foch was
held at my headquarters at Ligny-en-Barrois. In view of the new
successes of the French and British near Amiens and the continued
favorable results toward the Chemin des Dames on the French front,
it was now believed that the limited allied offensive, which was to
prepare for the campaign of 1919, might be carried further before
the end of the year. At this meeting it was proposed by Marshal

40 FINAL, EEPOKT OF GEN. JOHN J. PEBSHING.

Foch that the general operations as far as the American Army was
concerned should be carried out in detail by :

(a) An attack between the Meuse and the Argonne by the Second
French Army, reinforced by from four to six American divisiops.

(b) A French-American attack, extending from the Argonne west
to the Souain Eoad, to be executed on the right by an American
Army astride the Aisne and on the left by the Fourth French Army.

To carry out these attacks the 10 to 11 American divisions sug-
gested for the St. Mihiel operation and the 4 to 6 for the Second
French Army, would leave 8 to 10 divisions for an American Army
on the Aisne. It was proposed that the St. Mihiel operation should
be initiated on September 10 and the other two on September 15 and
20, respectively.

25. The plan suggested for the American participation in these
operations was not acceptable to me because it would require the
immediate separation of the recently formed First American Army
into several groups, mainly to assist French armies. This was di-
rectly contrary to the principle of forming a distinct American
Army, for which my contention had been insistent. An enormous
amount of preparation had alrea;dy been made in construction of
roads, railroads, regulating stations, and other installations looking
to the use and supply of our armies on a particular front. The in-
herent disinclination of our troops to semre under allied commanders
would have grown and American morale would have suffered. My
position was stated quite clearly that the strategical employment of
the First Army as a unit would be undertaken where desired, but its
disruption to carry out these proposals would not be entertained.

A further conference at Marshal Foch's headquarters was held on
September 2, at which Gen. Petain was present. After discussion the
question of employing the American Army as a unit was conceded.
The essentials of the strategical decision previously arrived at pro-
vided that the advantageous situation of the Allies should be ex-
ploited to the utmost by vigorously continuing the general battle and
extending it eastward to the Meuse. All the Allied armies were to be
employed in a converging action. The British armies, supported by
the left of the French armies, were to pursue the attack in the direc-
tion of Cambrai; the center of the French armies, west of Eheimg,
would continue the actions, already begun, to drive the enemy be-
yond the Aisne ; and the American Army, supported by the right o±
the French armies, would direct its attack on Sedan and Mezieres.

It should be recorded that although this general offensive was fully
outlined at the conference no one present expressed the opinion that
the final victory could be won in 1918. In fact, it was believed by
the French hi^h command that the Meuse- Argonne attack could not

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 41

be pushed much beyond Montfaucon before the arrival of winter
would force a cessation of operations.

26. The choice between the two sectors, that east of the Aisne
including the Argonne Forest, or the Champagne sector, was left to
me. In my opinion, no other Allied troops had the morale or. the
offensive spirit to overcome successfully the difficulties to be met in
the Meuse-Argonne sector and our plans and installations had been
prepared for an expansion of operations in that direction. So the
Meuse-Argonne front was chosen. The entire sector of 150 kilo-
meters of front, extending from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle,
west to include the Argonne Forest, was accordingly placed under
my command, including all French divisions then in that zone. The
First American Army was to proceed with the St. Mihiel operation,
after which the operation between the Meuse and the western edge
of the Argonne Forest was to be prepared and launched not later
than September 25.

As a result of these decisions, the depth of the St. Mihiel opera-
tion was limited to the line VigneuUes - Thiaupourt - KegnievUle.
The number of divisions to be used was reduced and the time short-
ened. 18 to 19 divisions were to be in the front line. There were
4 French and 15 American divisions available, 6 of which would be
in reserve, while the two flank divisions of the front line were not
to advance. Furthermore, 2 Army Corps headquarters, with their
corps troops, practically all the Army Artillery and Aviation, and the
First, Second, and Fourth Divisions, the first two destined to take
a leading part in the St. Mihiel attack, were all due to be withdrawn
and started for the Meuse-Argonne by the fourth day of the battle.

27. The salient had been held by the Germans since September,
1914. It covered the most sensitive section of the enemy's position
on the Western Front ; namely, the Mezieres-Sedan-Metz Railroad
and the Briey Iron Basin; it threatened the entire region between
Verdun and Nancy, and interrupted the main rail line from Paris
to the east. Its primary strength lay in the natural defensive fea-
tures of the terrain itself. The western face of the salient extended
along the rugged, heavily wooded eastern heights of the Meuse ; the
southern face followed the heights of the Meuse for 8 kilometers
to the east and then crossed the plain of the Woevre, including within
the German lines the detached heights of Loupmont and Montsec
which dominated the plain and afforded the enemy unusual facilities
for observation. The enemy had reinforced the positions by every
artificial means during a period of four years.

28. On the night of September 11, the troops of the First Army
were deployed in position. On the southern face of the salient was
the First Corps, Maj. Gen. Liggett, commanding, with the Eighty-

42 FINAL EEPOBT OF GEN. JOHN J. PBESHING.

second, Ninetieth, Fifth, and Second Divisions in line, extending
from the Moselle westward. On its left was the Fourth Corps, Maj.
Gen. Joseph T. Dickman, commanding, with the Eighty-ninth,
Forty-second, and First Divisions, the left of this corps being op-
posite Montsec. These two Army Corps were to deliver the principal
attack, the line pivoting on the center division of the First Corps.
The First Division on the left of the Fourth Corps was charged with
the double mission of covering its own flank while advancing some
20 kilometers due north toward the heart of the salient, where 4t was
to make contact with the troops of the Fifth Corps. On the western
face of the salient lay the Fifth Corps, Maj. Gen. George H. Came-
ron, commanding, with the Twenty-sixth Division, Fifteenth French
Colonial Division, and the Fourth XHvision in line, from Mouilly
west to Les Eparges and north to Watronville. Of these three divis-
ions, the Twenty-sixth alone was to make a deep advance directed
southeast toward VigneuUes. The French Division was to make a
short progression to the edge of the heights in order to cover the
left of the Twenty -sixth. The Fourth Division was not to advance.
In the center, between our Fourth and Fifth Army Corps, was the
Second French Colonial Corps, Maj. Gen. E. J. Blondlat, command-
ing, covering a front of 40 kilometers with 3 small French divi-
sions. These troops were to follow up the retirement of the enemy
fi'om the tip of the salient.

The French independent air force was at my disposal which, to-
gether with the British bombing squadrons and our own air forces,
gave us the largest assembly of aviation that had ever been engaged
in one operation. Our heavy guns were able to reach Metz and to
interfere seriously with German rail movements.

At dawn on September 12, after four hours of violent artillery fire
of preparation, and accompanied by small tanks, the Infantry of the
First and Fourth Corps advanced. The infantry of the Fifth Corps
commenced its advance at 8 a. m. The operation was carried out
with entire precision. -Just after daylight on September 13, elements
of the First and Twenty-sixth Divisions made a junction near Hat-
tonchatel and VigneuUes, 18 kilometers northeast of St. Mihiel. The
rapidity with which our divisions advanced overwhelmed the enemy,
and all objectives were reached by the afternoon of September 13.
The enemy had apparently started to withdraw some of his troops
from the tip of the salient on the eve of our attack, but had been
unable to carry it through. We captured nearly 16,000 prisoners, 443
guns, and large stores of material and supplies. The energy and
swiftness with which the operation was carried out enabled us to
smother opposition to such an extent that we suffered less than 7,000
casualties during the actual period of the advance.

FINAL EEPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PEESHING. 43

Durijig the next two days the right of our line west of the Moselle
Eiver was advanced beyond the objectives laid down in the original
Orders. This completed the operation for the time being and the
line was stabilized to be held by the smallest practicable force. ^

29. The material results of the victory achieved were very im-
portant. An American Army was an accomplished fact, and the
enemy had felt its power. No form of propaganda could overcome
the depressing effect on the morale of the enemy of this demonstration
of our ability to organize a large American force and drive it success-
fully through his defenses. It gave our troops implicit confidence in
their superiority and raised their morale to the highest pitch. For the
first time wire entanglements ceased to be regarded as impassable
barriers and open-warfare training, which had been so urgently in-
sisted upon, proved to be the correct doctrine. Our divisions con-
cluded the attack with suck small losses and in such high spirits
that without the usual rest they were immediately available for em-
ployment in heavy fighting in a new theater of operations. The
strength of the First Army in this battle totaled approximately
500,000 men, of whom about 70,000 were French.

MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION.i

30. The definite decision for the Meuse-Argonne phase of the great
allied convergent attack was agreed to in my conference with Marshal
Foch and Gen. Petain on September 2. It was planned to use all
available forces of the First Army, including such divisions and
troops as we might be able to withdraw from the St. Mihiel front.
The Army was to break through the enemy's successive fortified zones
to include the Kriemhilde-Stellung, or Hindenburg Line, on the front
BrieuUes-Eomagne sous Montfaucon-Grandpre, and thereafter, by
developing pressure toward Mezieres, was to insure the fall of the
Hindenburg Line along the Aisne River in front of the Fourth French
Army, which was to attack to the west of the Argonne Forest. A
penetration of some 12 to 15 kilometers was required to reach the
Hindenburg Line on our front, and the enemy's defenses were virtu-
ally continuous throughout that depth.

The Meuse-Argonne front had been practically stabilized in Sep-
tember, 1914, and, except for minor fluctuations during the German
attacks on Verdun ih 1916 and the French counteroffensive in Au-
gust, 1917, remained unchanged until the American advance in 1918.
The net result of the four years' struggle on this ground was a Ger-
man defensive system of unusual depth and strength and a wide
zone of utter dev3,station5 itself a serious obstacle to offensive
operations.

> See plate No. 4.

44 FINAL KEPOBT OP GEN. JOHN J. PEESHING.

31. The strategical importance of this portion of the line was sec-
ond to none on the western front. All supplies and evacuations of
the German armies in northern France were dependent upon two
great railway systems — one in the north, passing through Liege,
while the other in the south, with lines coming from Luxemburg,
Thionville, and Metz, had as its vital section the line Carignan-
Sedan-Mezieres. No other important lines were available to the
enemy, as the mountainous masses of thfe Ardennes made the con-
struction of east and west lines through that region impracticable.
The Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres line was essential to the Germans for
the rapid strategica,! movement of troops. Should this southern sys-
tem be cut by the Allies before the enemy could withdraw his forces
through the narrow neck between Mezieres and the Dutch frontier,
the ruin of his armies in France and Belgium would be complete.

From the Meuse-Argohne front the perpendicular distance to the
Carignan-Mezieres railroad was 50 kilometers. This region formed
the pivot of German operations in northern France, and the vital
necessity of covering the great railroad line into Sedan resulted in
the convergence on the Meuse-Argonne front of the successive Ger-
man defensive positions. The effect of this convergence can be best
understood by reference to plate No. 3. It will be seen, for example,
that the distance between " no man's land " and the third German
withdrawal position in the vicinity of the Meuse River was approxi-
mately 18 kilometers; the distance between the corresponding points
near the tip of the great salient of the western front was about 65
kilometers, and in the vicinity of Cambrai was over 30 kilometers.
The effect of a penetration of 18 kilometers by the American Army
would be equivalent to an advance of 65 kilometers farther west;
furthermore, such an advance on our front was far more dangerous
to the enemy than an advance elsewhere. The vital importance of
this portion of his position was fully appreciated by the enemy, who
had suffered tremendous losses in 1916 in attempting to improve it
by the reduction of Verdun. As a consequence it had been elaborately
fortified, and consisted of practically a continuous series of positions
20 kilometers or more in depth.

In addition to the artificial defenses, the enemy was greatly aided
by the natural features of the terrain. East of the Meuse the domi-
nating heights not only protected his left but gave him positions
from which powerful artillery could deliver an oblique fire on the
western bank. Batteries located in the elaborately fortified Argonne
forest covered* his right flank, and could cross their fire with that
of the guns on the east bank of the Meuse. Midway between the
Meuse and the forest the heights of Montf aucon offered perfect obser-
vation and formed a strong natural position which had been heavily
fortified. The east and west ridges abutting on the Meuse and Aire

FINAIi EEPOET OF GEH". JOHN J. PEESHING. 45

River valleys aflForded the enemy excellent machine-gun positions
for the desperate defense which the importance of the position would
require him to make. North of Montfaucon densely wooded and
rugged heights constituted natural features favorable to defensive
fighting.

32. When the First Army became engaged in the simultaneous
preparation foj- two major operations, an interval of 14 days sep-
arated the initiation of the two attacks. During this short period
the movement of the immense number of troops and the amount of
supplies involved in the Meuse-Argonne battle, over the few roads
available, and confined entirely to the hours of darkness, was one
of the most delicate and difficult problems of the war. The concen-
tration included 15 divisions, of which 7 were involved in the
pending St. Mihiel drive, 3 were in sector in the Vosges, 3 in
the neighborhood of Soissons, 1 in a training area, and 1 near Bar-
le-Duc. Practically all the Artillery, Aviation, and other auxilia-
ries to be employed in the new operations were committed to the
St. Mihiel attack and therefore could not be moved until its success
was assured. The concentration of all units not to be used at St.
Mihiel was commenced immediately, and on September 13, the
second day of St. Mihiel, reserve divisions and Army Artillery
units were withdrawn and placed in motion toward the Argonne
front.

That part of the American sector from Fresnes-en-Woevre, south-
east of Verdun, to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, while
nominally under my control, did not actively become a part of
my command until September 22, on which date my headquarters
were established at Souilly, southwest of Verdun. Of French
troops, in addition to the Second French Colonial Corps, composed
of 3 divisions, there was also the Seventeenth French Corps of 3
divisions holding the front north and east of Verdun.

33. At the moment of the opening of the Meuse-Argonne battle,
the enemy had 10 divisions in line and 10 in reserve on the front
between Fresnes-en-Woevre and the Argonne Forest, inclusive. He
had undoubtedly expected a continuation of our advance toward
Metz. Successful ruses were carried out between the Meuse Eiver
and Luneville to deceive him as to our intentions, and French
troops were maintained as a screen along our front until the night
before the battle, so that the actual attack was a tactical surprise.

34. The operations in the Meuse-Argonne battle really form a
continuous whole, but they extended over such a long period of
continuous fighting that they will here be considered in three phases,
the first from September 26 to October 3, the second from October 4
to 31, and the third from November 1 to 11.

46 FIHAL KBPOET OP GEK. JOHN J. PERSHING.

MBTJSE-AEGONNE, FIRST PHASE.

35. On the night of September 25, the 9 divisions to lead in the
attack were deployed between the Meuse River and the western
edge of the Argonne Forest. On the right was the Third Corps,
Maj. Gen. BuUard commanding, with the Thirty-third, Eightieth,
and Fourth Divisions in line; next came the Fifth Corps, Maj. Gen.
Cameron commanding, with the Seventy-Ninth, Thirty-seventh, and
Ninety-first Divisions; on the left was the First Corps, Maj. Gen.
Liggett commanding, with the Thirty-fifth, Twenty-eighth, and
Seventy-seventh Divisions. Each corps had-1 division in reserve
and the Army held 3 divisions as a general reserve. About 2,700
guns, 189 small tanks, 142 manned by Americans, and 821 airplanes,
604 manned by Americans, were concentrated to support the attack
of the infantry. "We thus had a superiority in guns and aviation,
and the enemy had no tanks. .

The axis of the attack was the line Montfaucon-Eomagne-Buz-
ancy, the purpose being to make the. deepest penetration in the
center, which, with the Fourth French Army advancing west of the
Argonne, would force the enemy to evacuate that forest without
our having to deliver a heavy attack in that difficult region.

36. Following three hours of violent artillery fire of preparation,
the Infantry advanced at 5.30 a. m. on September 26, accompanied
by tanks. During the first two days of the attack, before the enemy
was able to bring up his reserves, our troops made steady progress
through the, network of defenses. Montf aucon was held tenaciously
by the enemy and was not captured until noon of the second day.

By the evening of the 28th a maximum advance of 11 kilometers
had been achieved and we had captured Baulny, Epinonville, Sept-
sarges, and Dannevoux. The right had made a splendid advance
into the woods south of BrieuUes-sur-Meuse, but the extreme left
was meeting strong resistance in the Argonne. The attack continued
without interruption, ineeting six new divisions which the enemy
threw into first line before September 29. He developed a powerful
machine gun defense supported by heavy artillery fire, and made
frequent counter-attacks with fresh troops, particularly on the front
of the Twenty-eighth and Thirty -fifth Divisions. These divisions
had taken Varennes, Cheppy, Baulny, and Charpentry, and the line
was within 2 kilometers of Apremont. We were no longer engaged
in a maneuver for the pinching out of a salient, but were necessarily
committed, generally speaking, to a direct frontal attack against
strong, hostile positions fully manned by a determined enemy.

37. By nightfall of the 29th the First Army line was approxi-
mately Bois de la Cote Lemont — Nantillois— Apremont — southwest
across the Argonne. Many divisions, especially those in the center

FINAL, KEPOET OF GEN. JOHN J. PEKSHING. 47

that were subjected to cross-fire of artillery, had suffered heavily.
The severe fighting, the nature of the terrain over which they at-
tacked, and the fog and darkness sorely tried even our best divisions.
On the night of the 29th the Thirty -seventh and Seventy -ninth Divi-
sions were relieved by the Thirty-second and Third Divisions, respec-
tively, and on the following night the First Division relieved the
Thirty-fifth Division.

38. The critical problem during the first few days of the battle
was the restoration of communications over " no man's land." There
were but four roads available across this deep zone, and the violent
artillery fire of the previous period of the war had virtually de-
stroyed them. The spongy soil and the lack of material increased
the difficulty. But the splendid work of our engineers and pioneers
soon made possible the movement of the troops, artillery, and sup-
plies most needed. By the afternoon of the 27th all the divisional
artillery, except a few batteries of heavy guns, had effected a pas-
sage and was supporting the infantry action.

39. At 5.30 a. m. on October 4 the general attack was renewed.
The enemy divisions on the front from Fresnes-en-Woevre to the
Argonne had increased from 10 in first line to 16, and included some
of his best divisions. The fighting was desperate, and only small
advances were realized, except by the First Division on the right of
the First Corps. By evening of October 5 the line was approximately
Bois de la Cote Lemont-Bois du Fays-Gesnes-Hill 240-Fleville-
Chehery, southwest through the Argonne.

It was especially desirable to drive the enemy from his command-
ing positions on the heights east of the Meuse, but it was even more
important that we should force him to use , his troops there and
weaken his tenacious hold on positions in our immediate front.
The further stabilization of the new St. MUiiel line permitted the
withdrawal of certain divisions for the extension of the Meuse-
Argonne operation to the east bank of the Meuse Kiver.

40. On the 7th the First Corps, with the Eighty-second Division
added, launched a strong attack northwest toward Cornay, to draw
attention from the movement east of the Meuse and at the same time
outflank the German position in the Argonne. The following day
the Seventeenth French Corps, Maj. Gen. Claudel commanding,
initiated its attack east of the Meuse against the exact point on which
the German armies must pivot in order to withdraw from northern
France. The troops encountered elaborate fortifications and stub-
born resistance, but by nightfall had realized an advance of 6 kilo-
meters to a line well within the Bois de Consenvoye, and including

48 FINAL, EEPOET OP GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

*

the villages of Beaumont and Haumont. Continuous fighting was
maintained along our entire battle front, with especial success on
the extreme left, where the capture of the greater part of the Argonne
Forest was completed. The enemy contested every foot of ground
on our front in order to make more rapid retirements farther west
and withdraw his forces from northern France before the interrup-
tion of his railroad communications through Sedan.

41. We were confronted at this time by an insufficiency of re-
placements to build up exhausted divisions. Early in October com-
bat units required some 90,000 replacements, and not more than
45,000 would be available before November 1 to fill the existing and
prospective vacancies. We still had two divisions with the British
and two with the French. A review of the situation, American and
Allied, especially as to our own resources in men for the next two
months, convinced me that the attack of the First Army and of
the Allied Armies further west should be pushed to the* limit. But
if the First Army was to continue its aggressive tactics our divisions
then with the French must be recalled, and replacements must be
obtained by breaking up newly arrived divisions.

In discussing the withdrawal of our divisions from the French
with Marshal Foch and Gen. Petain, on October 10, the former
expressed his appreciation of the fact that the First Army was
striking the pivot of the German withdrawal, and also held the
view that the Allied attack' should continue. Gen. Petain agreed
that the American divisions with the French were essential to us
if we were to maintain our battle against the German pivot. The
French were, however, straining every nerve to keep up their at-
tacks and, before those divisions with the French had been released,
it became necessary for us to send the Thirty-seventh and Ninety-
first Divisions from the First Army to assist the Sixth French
Army in Flanders.

42. At this time the First Army was holding a front of more
than 120 kilometers; its strength exceeded 1,000,000 men; it was
engaged in the most desperate battle of our history, and the burden
of command was too heavy for a single commander and staff.
Therefore, on October 12, that portion of our front extending from
Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle, to Fresnes-en-Woevre, south-
east of "Verdun, was transferred to the newly constituted Second
Array with Lieut. Gen. Robert L. BuUard in command, under whom
it began preparations for the extension of operations to the east in
the direction of Briey and Metz. On October 16 the command of
the First Army was transferred to Lieut. Gen. Hunter Liggett, and
my advance headquarters was established at Ligny-en-Barrois, from
which the command of the group of American Armies was exercised.

FINAL. EEPORT OP GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. . 49

43. Local attacks of the First Army were continued in order par-
ticularly to adjust positions preparatory to a renewed general as-
sault. The First and Fifth Divisions were relieved by the Forty-
second and Eightieth Divisions, which were now fresh. An attack
along the whole front was made on October 14. The resistance en-
countered was stubborn, but the stronghold on Cote Dame Mari^
was captured and the Hindenburg Line was broken. Cunel and
Eomagne-sous-Montfaucon were taken and the line advanced 2
kilometers north of Sommerance. A maximum advance of 17 kila-
meters had been made since September 26 and the enemy had been
forced to throw into the fight a total of 15 reserve divisions.

During the remainder of the month important local operation?
were carried out, which involved desperate fighting. The First
Corps, Maj. Gen. Dickman commanding, advanced through Grand-
pre; the Fifth Corps, Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall command-
ing, captured the Bois de Bantheville; the Third Corps, Maj. Gen-
John L. Hines commanding, completed the occupation of Cunel
Heights; and the Seventeenth French Corps drove the enemy fron»
the main ridge south of La Graiide Montague. Particularly heavy
fighting occurred east of the Meuse on October 18, and in the further
penetration of the KriemhUde-Stellung on October 23 the Twenty-
sixth Division entering the battle at this time relieved the Eight-
eenth French Division.

44. Summarizing the material results which had been attained'
by the First Army by the end of October, we had met an increasing
number of Germany's best divisions, rising from 20 in line and'
reserve on September 26, to 31 on October 31; the enemy's elab-
orately prepared positions, including the Hindenburg line, in our
front had been broken; the almost impassable Argonne Forest was.
in our hands; an advance of 21 kilometers had been effected; 18,600
prisoners, 370 cannon, 1,000 machine guns, and a mass of material
captured; and the great railway artery through Carignan to Sedan,
was now seriously threatened.

The demands of incessant battle which had been maintained day by
day for more than a month had compelled our divisions to fight tc
the limit of their capacity. Combat troops were held in line and
pushed to the attack until deemed incapable of further effort because
of casualties or exhaustion ; artillery once engaged was seldom with-
drawn and many batteries fought until practically all the animals
were casualties and the guns were towed out of line by motor trucks^
The American soldier had shown imrivaled fortitude in this continu-
ous fighting during most inclement weather and under many dis-
advantages of position. Through experience, the Army had de-
veloped into a powerful and smooth-running machine, and there-

151532—19 4

50 FINAL BEPOBT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

was a supreme confidence in our ability to carry through the task
successfully.

While the high pressure of these dogged attacks was a great strain
on our troops, it was calamitous to the enemy. His divisions had
been thrown into confusion by our furious assaults, and his morale
had been reduced until his will to resist had well-nigh reached the
breaking point. Once a German division was engaged in the fight,
it beeame practically impossible to effect its relief. The enemy was
forced to meet the constantly recurring crises by breaking up tactical
organizations and sending hurried detachments to widely separated
portions of the field.

Every member of the American Expeditionary Forces, from the
front line to the base ports, was straining every nerve. Magnificent
efforts were exerted by the entire Services of Supply to meet the
enormous demands made on it. Obstacles which seemed insurmount-
able were overcome daily in expediting the movements of replace-
ments, ammunition and supplies to the front, and of sick and
wounded to the rear, j^ It was this spirit of determination animating
every American soldier that made it impossible for the enemy to
m'aintain the struggle until 1919jJ

MEU8E-AEG0NNE, THIRD PHASE.

45. The detailed plans for the operations of the Allied Armies on
the western front changed from time to time during the course of this
great battle, but the mission of the First American Army to cut the
great Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres Kailroad remained unchanged.
Marshal Foch coordinated the operations along the entire front, con-
tinuing persistently and unceasingly the attacks by all Allied Armies;
the Belgian Army, with a French Army and two American divisions,
;.advancing eastward ; the British Armies and two American divisions,
TvitTi the First French Army on their right, toward the region north
of Givet; the First American Army and Fourth French Army, to-
ward Sedan and Mezieres.

46. On the 21st my instructions were issued to the First Army to
prepare thoroughly for a general attack on October 28, that would be
decisive if possible. In order that the attack of the First Army and
that of the Fourth French Army on its left should be simultaneous,
our attack was delayed until November 1. The immediate purpose
of the First Army was to take Buzancy and the heights of Barricourt,
to turn the forest north of Grandpre, and to establish contact with
the Fourth French Army near Boult-aux-Bois. The Army was
directed to carry the heights of Barricourt by nightfall of the first
day and then to exploit this success by advancing its left to Boult-
aux-Bois in preparation for the drive toward Sedan. By strenuous

FINAL EEPOET OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 51

effort all available artillery had been moved well forward to the
heights previously occupied by the enemy, from which it could fully
cover and support the initial advance of the Infantry.

On this occasion and for the first time the Army prepared for its
attack under normal conditions. We held the front of attack and
were not under the necessity of taking over a new front, with its
manifold installations and services. Our own personnel handled
the communications, dumps, telegraph lines, and water service; our
divisions were either on the line or close in rear; the French artil-
lery, aviation, and technical troops which had previously made up
our deficiences had been largely replaced by our own organizations;
and our army, corps, and divisional staffs were by actual experi-
ence second to none.

47. On the morning of November 1, three Army corps were in
line between the Meuse Eiver and the Bois de Bourgogne. On the
right the Third Corps had the Fifth and Ninetieth Divisions; the
Fifth Corps occupied the center of the line, with the Eighty-ninth
and Second Divisions, and was to be the wedge of the attack on the
first day; and on the left the First Corps deployed the Eightieth,
Seventy-seventh, and Seventy-eighth Divisions.

Preceded by two hours of violent artillery preparation, the Infan-
try advanced, closely followed by " accompanying guns." The Artil-
lery acquitted itself magnificently, the barrages being so well co-
ordinated and so dense that the enemy was overwhelmed and quickly
submerged by the rapid onslaught of the Infantry. By nightfall
the Fifth Corps, in the center, had realized an advance of almost
9 kilometers, to the Bois de la Folie, and had completed the cap-
ture of the heights of Barricourt,. while the Third Corps, on the
right, had captured Aincreville and Andevanne. Our troops had
broken through the enemy's last defense, captured his artillery posi-
tions, and had precipitated a retreat of the German forces about to
be isolated in the forest north of Grandpre. On the 2d and 3d
we advanced rapidly against heavy fighting on the fronts of the
right and center corps; to the left the froops of the First Corps
hurried forward in pursuit, some by motor trucks, while the Artil-
lery pressed along the country roads close behind. Our heavy artil-
lery was skillfully brought into position to fire upon the Carignan-
Sedan Kailroad and the junctions at Longuyon and Conflans. By
the evening of the 4th, our troops had reached La Neuville, opposite
Stenay, and had swept through the great Foret de Dieulet, reach-
ing the outskirts of Beaumont, while on the left we were 8 kilometers
north of Boult-aux-Bois.

The following day the advance continued toward Sedan with in-
creasing swiftness. The Third Corps, turning eastward, crossed the

52 FINAL KEPOET OF GEN". JOHN J. PEESHISTG.

Meuse in a brilliant operation by the Fifth Division, driving the
enemy from the heights of Dun-sur-Meuse and forcing a general
withdrawal from the strong positions he had so long held on the
hills north of Verdun.

By the 7th the right of the Third Corps had exploited its river
crossing to a distance of 10 kilometers east of the Meuse, completely
ejecting the enemy from the wooded heights and. driving him out into
the swampy plain of the Woevre; the Fifth and First Corps had
reached the line of the Meuse River along their respective fronts
and the left of the latter corps held the heights dominating Sedan,,
the strategical goal of the Meuse-Argonne operation, 41 kilometers
from our point of departure on November 1. We had cut the enemy's
main line of communications. Eecognizing that nothing but a ces-
sation of hostilities could save his armies from complete disaster, ha
appealed for an immediate armistice on November 6.

48. Meanwhile general plans had been prepared for the further em-
ployment of American forces in an advance between the Meuse and
the Moselle, to be directed toward Longwy by the First Army, while
the^Second Army was to assume the offensive toward the Briey Iron
Basin. Orders directing the preparatory local operations involved
in this enterprise were issued on November 5.

Between the 7th and 10th of November the Third Corps con-
tinued its advance eastward to Remoiville, while the Seventeenth
French Corps, on its right, with the Seventy-ninth, Twenty-sixth,
and Eighty-first American Divisions, and 2 French divisions, drove
the enemy from his final foothold on the heights east of the Meuse.
At 9 p. m. on November 9 appropriate orders were sent to the First
and Second Armies in accordance with the following telegram from
Marshal Foch to the Commander of each of the Allied armies :

" The enemy, disorganized by our repeated attacks, retreats along the entire
front.

It Is important to coordinate and expedite our movements.

I appeal to the energy and the initiative of the Commanders-in-Chief and of
their armies to malce decisive the results obtained."

In consequence of the foregoing instructions, our Second Army
pressed the- enemy along its entire front. On the night of the
lOth-llth and the morning of the 11th the Fifth Corps, in the First
Army, forced a crossing of the Meuse east of Beaumont and gained
the commanding heights within the reentrant of the river, thus com-
pleting our control of the Meuse Eiver line. At 6 a. m. on the 11th
notification was received from Marshal Foch's headquarters that the
Armistice had been signed and that hostilities would cease at 11 a. m.
Preparatory measures had already been taken to insure the prompt,
transmission to the troops of the announcement of an Armistice.
However, the advance east of Beaumont on the morning of the lltk

FINAL EEPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 53

had been so rapid and communication across the river was so difficult
that there was some fighting on isolated portions of that front after
11 a. m.

49. Between September 26 and November 11, 22 American and
4 French divisions, om the front extending from southeast oi
Verdun to the Argonne Forest, had engaged and decisively beaten
47 different German divisions, representing 25 per cent of the enemy's
entire divisional strength on the western front. Of these enemy
divisions 20 had been drawn from the French front and 1 from the
British front. Of the 22 American divisions 12 had, at different
times during this period, been engaged on fronts other than our own.
The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 in killed and
"wounded. It captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon, 3,000 machine
guns, and large quantities of material.

The dispositions which the enemy made to meet the Meuse- Argonne
offensive, both immediately before the opening of the attack and
during the battle, demonstrated the importance which he ascribed to
this section of the front and the extreme measures he was forced to
take in its defense. From the moment the American offensive began
until the Armistice, his defense was desperate and the flow of his
divisions to our front was continuous. The rate at which German
divisions were used up is illustrated by plate 7, which shows an in-
crease of 27 divisions on the American front during the battle.

. OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND ARMY.

50. Under the instructions issued by me on November 5, for opera-
tions by the Second Army in the direction of the Briey Iron Basin,
the advance was undertaken along the entire front of the army and
continued during the last three days of hostilities. In the face of
the stiff resistance offered by the enemy, and with the limited num-
ber of troops at the disposal of the Second Army, the gains realized
reflected great credit on the divisions concerned. On November 6
Marshal Foch requested that 6 American divisions be held in readi-
ness to assist in an attack which the French were preparing to
launch in the direction of Chateau-Salins. The plan was agreed
to, but with the provision that our troops should be employed under
the direction of the commanding general Second Army.

This combined attack was to be launched on November 14, and
was to consist of 20 French divisions under Gen. Mangin and the
6 American divisions under Gen. BuUard. Of the divisions desig-
nated for this operation the Third, Fourth, Twenty-ninth, and
Thirty-sixth were in Army reserve and were starting their march
eastward on the morning of November 11, while the Twenty-eighth
and Thirty-fifth were being withdrawn from line on the Second
Army front.

54 . .FIITAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

AMERICAN ACTIVITIES ON OTHER FRONTS.

51. During the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne battle, American
divisions were participating in important attacks on other portions
of the front. The Second Army Corps, Maj. Gen. Eead, command-
ing, with the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth Divisions on the British
front, was assigned the task in cooperation with the Australian
Corps, of breaking the Hindenburg line at Le Cateau, where the St.
Quentin Canal passes through a tunnel under a ridge. In this at-
tack, carried out on September 29 and October 1, the Thirtieth
Division speedily broke through the main line of defense and cap-
tured all of its objectives, while the Twenty-seventh progressed until
some of its elements reached Gouy. In this and later actions from
October 6 to 19, our Second Corps captured over 6,000 prisoners and
advanced about 24 kilometers.

52. On October 2-9 our Second and Thirty-sixth Divisions assisted
the Fourth French Army in its advance between Rheims and the
Argonne. The Second Division completed its advance on this front
by the assault of the wooded heights of Mont Blanc, the key point
of the German position, which was captured with consummate dash
and skill. The division here repulsed violent counterattacks, and
then carried our lines into the village of St. Etienne, thus forcing the
Germans to fall back before Rheims and yield positions which they
had held since September, 1914. On October 10 the Thirty-sixth
Division relieved the Second, exploiting the latter's success, and in
two days advanced, with the French, a distance of 21 kilometers, the
enemy retiring behind the Aisne River.

53. In the middle of October, while we were heavily engaged in
the Meuse-Argonne, Marshal Foch requested that 2 American divi-
sions be sent immediately to assist the Sixth French Army in Bel-
gium, where slow progress was being made. The Thirty -seventh and
Ninety-first Divisions, the latter being accompanied by the Artillery
of the Twenty-eighth Division, were hurriedly dispatched to the Bel-
gian front. On October 30, in continuation of the Flanders offensive,
these divisions entered the line and attacked. By November 3 the
Thirty-seventh Division had completed its mission by rapidly driving
the enemy across the Escaut River and had firmly established itself
on the east bank, while the Ninety-first Division, in a spirited ad-
vance, captured Spitaals Bosschen, reached the Scheldt, and entered
Audenarde.

AMERICAN TROOPS IN ITALY.

54. The Italian Government early made request for American
troops, but the critical situation on the western front made it neces-
sary to concentrate our efforts there. "When the Secretary of War

FIlTAIi REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 55

was in Italy during April, 1918, he was urged to send American
troops to Italy to show America's interest in the Italian situation and
to strengthen Italian morale. Similarly a request was made by
the Italian Prime Minister at the Abbeville conference. It was
finally decided to send one regiment to Italy with the necessary
hospital and auxiliary services, and the Three hundred and thirty-
second Infantry was selected, reaching the Italian front in July,

1918. These troops participated in action against the Austrians in
the fall of 1918 at the crossing of the Piave Eiver and in the final
pursuit of the Austrian Army.

AMERICAN TROOPS IN RUSSIA.

55. It was the opinion of the Supreme War Council that Allied
troops should be sent to cooperate with the Eussians, either at Mur-
mansk or Archangel, against the Bolshevist forces, and the British
Government, through its ambassador at Washington, urged Ameri-
can participation in this undertaking. On July 23, 1918, the War
Department directed the dispatch of three battalions of Infantry and
three companies of Engineers to join the Allied expedition. la
compliance with these instructions the Three hundred and thirty-
ninth Infantry, the First Battalion, Three hundred and tenth Engi-
neers, Three hundred and thirty-seventh Field Hospital Company,
and Three hundred and thirty-seventh Ambulance Company were
sent through England, whence they sailed on August 26.

The mission of these troops was limited to guarding the ports
and as much of the surrounding country as might develop threaten-
ing conditions. The Allied force operated under British command,
through whose orders the small American contingent was spread
over a front of about 450 miles. From September, 1918, to May,

1919, a series of minor engagements with the Bolshevist forces oc-
curred, in which 82 Americans were killed and 7 died of wounds.

In April, 1919, two companies of American railroad troops were
added to our contingent. The withdrawal of the American force
commenced in the latter part of May, 1919, and on August 25 there
was left only a small detachment of Graves Kegistration troops.

THE ADVANCE INTO GERMANY.

56. In accordance with the terms of the Armistice, the Allies were
to occupy all German territory west of the Ehine, with bridgeheads
of 30 kilometer radius at Cologne, Coblenz, and Mayence. The zone
aissigned the American command was the bridgehead of Coblenz
and the district of Treves. This territory was to be occupied by an
American Army, with its reserves held between the Moselle-Meuse
Rivers and the Luxemburg frontier.

56 FINAL, REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

The instructions of Marshal Foch, issued on November 16, con-
templated that 2 French infantry divisions and 1 French cav-
alry division v?ould be added to the American forces that occupied
the Coblenz bridgehead, and that 1 American division would be
added to the French force occupying the Mayence bridgehead. As
ithis arrangement presented possibilities of misunderstanding due to
■difference of views regarding the government of occupied territory,
It was represented to the Marshal that each nation should be given
a, well-defined territory of occupation, employing within such terri-
story only the troops of the commander responsible for the particu-
lar zone. On December 9 Marshal Foch accepted the principle of
preserving the entity of command and troops, but reduced the
American bridgehead by adding a portion of the eastern half to
♦.he French command at Mayence.

57. Various reasons made it undesirable to employ either the First
or Second Army as the Army of Occupation. Plans had been made
2bef ore the Armistice to organize a Third Army and, on November 14,
this army, with Ma]. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman as commander, was
designated as the Army of Occupation. The Thii^d and Fourth
Army Corps staffs and troops, less artillery, the First, Second, Third,
IFourth, Thirty-second, and Forty-second Divisions, and the Sixty-
sixth Field Artillery Brigade were assigned to the Third Army.
This force was later increased by the addition of the Seventh Corps,
Maj. Gen. William M. Wright commanding, with the Fifth, Eighty-
ninth, and Ninetieth Divisions.

The advance toward German territory began on November 17 at
S a. m., six days after signing the Armistice. All of the allied forces
from the North Sea to the Swiss border moved forward simultane-
ously in the wake of the retreating German armies. Upon ar-
rival at the frontier, a halt was made until December 1, when the
leading elements of all Allied armies crosse'd the line into Germany.
The Third Army Headquarters were established at Coblenz and an
Advance General Headquarters located at Treves. Steps were im-
mediately taken to organize the bridgehead for defense, and dispo-
sitions were made to meet a possible renewal of hostilities.-

The advance to the Khine required long arduous marches, through
«old and inclement weather, with no opportunity for troops to rest,
refit, and refresh themselves after their participation in the final bat-
tle. The Army of Occupation bore itself splendidly and exhibited a
iine state of discipline both during the advance and throughout the
period of occupation.

58. The zone of march of our troops into Germany and the line of
communications of the Third Army after reaching the Rhine lay
through Luxemburg. After the passage of the Third Army, the oc-
cupation of Luxemburg, for the purpose of guarding our line of

FINAL EEPOKT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 57

communications, was intrusted to the Fifth and Thirty-third Divi-
sions of the Second Army. The city of Luxemburg,- garrisoned by
French troops and designated as the headquarters of the Allied Com-
mander-in-Chief, was excluded from our control.

Upon entering the Duchy of Luxemburg in the advance, a policy
of noninterference in the affairs of the Grand Duchy was announced.
Therefore, when the French commander in the city of Luxemburg
was given charge of all troops in the Duchy, in so far as concerned
the "^administration of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg," my in-
structions were that our troops would not be subject to his control.
Later, at my request, and in order to avoid possible friction, Marshal
Foch placed the entire Duchy in the American Zone.

RETURN OF TROOPS TO THE UNITED STATES.

59. On the day the Armistice was signed, the problem of the return .
■of our troops to the United States was taken up with the War De-
partment and, on November 15, a policy recommended of sending
home certain auxiliaries so that we could begin to utilize all available
shipping without delay. On December 21 the War Department an-
nounced by cable that it had been decided to begin immediately the
return of our forces and continue as rapidly as transportation would
permit. To carry this out, a schedule for the constant flow of troops
to the ports was established, having in mind our international obli-
gations pending the signing of the treaty of peace.

60. While more intimately related to the functions of the Services
of Supply than to Operations, it is logical to introduce here a brief
recital of the organizations created for the return of our troops to
America. Prior to the Armistice but 15,000 men had been returned
home. Although the existing organization was built for the efficient
and rapid handling of the incoming forces, the embarkation of this
small number presented no difficulties. But the Armistice suddenly
and completely reversed the problem of the Services of Supply at
the ports and the handling of troops. It became necessary immedi-
ately to reorganize the machinery of the ports, to construct large
embarkation camps, and to create an extensive service for embark-
ing the homeward-bound troops.

Brest, St. Nazaire, and Bordeaux became the principal embarka-
tion ports, Marseilles and Le Havre being added later to utilize
Italian and French liners. The construction of the embarkation
camps during unseasonable winter weather was the most trying prob-
lem. These, with the billeting facilities available, gave accommoda-
tion for 55,000 at Bi-est, 44,000 at St. Nazaire, and 130,000 at Bor-
deaux. Unfortunately, the largest ships had to be handled at Brest,
where the least shelter was available.

58 FINAL REPOKT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

To maintain a suitable reservoir of men for Brest and St. Nazaire,
an Embarkation Center was organized around Le Mans, which
eventually accommodated 230,000 men. Here the troops and their
records were prepared for the return voyage and immediate demobili-
zation. As the troops arrived at the base ports, the embarkation
service was charged with feeding, reclothing, and equipping the hun-
dreds of thousands who passed through, which required the main-
tenance of a form of hotel service on a scale not hitherto attempted.

61. On November 16 all combat troops, except 30 divisions and a
minimum of corps and army troops, were released for return to the
United States. It was early evident that only limited use would be
made of the American divisions, and that the retention of 30 divisions
was not necessary. Marshal Foch considered it indispensable to
maintain under arms a total, including Italians, of 120 to 140 divi-
sions, and he proposed that, we maintain 30 divisions in France until
February 1, 25 of which should be held in the Zone of the Armies,
and that on March 1 we should have 20 divisions in the Zone of the
Armies and 5 ready to embark. The plan for March 1 was satis-
factory, but the restrictions as to the divisions that should be in
France on February 1 could not be accepted, as it would seriously
interfere with the flow of troops homeward.

In a communication dated December 24 the Marshal set forth the
minimum forces to be furnished by the several Allies, requesting
the American Army to furnish 22 to 25 divisions of Infantry. In
the same note he estimated the force to be maintained after the
signing of the preliminaries of peace at about 32 divisions, of which
the American Army was to furnish 6.

In reply it was pointed out that our problem of repatriation of
troops and their demobilization was quite different from that of
France or Great Britain. On account of our long line of communi-
cations in France and the time consumed by the ocean voyage and
travel in the United States, even with the maximum employment of
our then available transportation, at least a year must elapse before
we could complete our demobilization. Therefore, it was proposed
by me that the number of American combat divisions to be main-
tained in the Zone of the Armies should be reduced on April 1 to 15
divisions and on May 1 to 10 divisions, and that in the unexpected
event that the prelimi'naries of peace should not be signed by May 1
we would continue to maintain 10 divisions in the Zone of the Armies
'until the date of signature.

The Allied Commander-in-Chief later revised his estimate, and, on
January 24, stated to the Supreme War Council that the German
demobilization would permit the reduction of the Allied forces to
100 divisions, of which the Americans were requested to furnish 15.
In reply, it was again pointed out that our problem was entirely one

FINAL EEPOET OP GEN. JOHN J. PBESHING, 59

of transportation, and that such a promise was unnecessary inas-
much as it would probably be the summer of 1919 before we could
reduce our forces below the number asked. We were, therefore, able
to keep our available ships filled, and by May 19 all combat divisions,
except 5 still in the Army of Occupation, were under orders to pro-
ceed to ports of embarkation. This provided sufficient troops to
utilize all troop transports to include July 15.

62. The President had informed me that it would be necessary for
us to have at least one regiment in occupied Germany, and left the
details to be discussed by me with Marshal Foch. My cable of July 1
summarizes the agreement reached:

" By direction of President, I have discussed with Marshal Foch question of
forces to be left on the Rhine. Following agreed upon : The Fourth and Fifth
Divisions will be sent to base ports immediately, the Second Division will com-
mence moving to base ports on July 15, and the Third Division on August 15.
Date of relief of First Division will be decided later. Agreement contemplates
that after compliance by Germany with military conditions to be completed
within first three months after German ratification of treaty, American force
will be reduced to one regiment of Infantry and certain auxiliaries. Request
President be informed of agreement."

As a result of a later conference with Marshal Foch, the Third
Division was released on August 3 and the First Division on Au-
gust 15.

PAET III.

Supply, Oooedination, Munitions, and
Administeation.

THE SEEVICES OF SUPPLY.

COOKDINATION OF SUPPLY AT THE FKONT. TRANSPORTATION COBPJS.

Pdkchasing Agency. Quaeteemasteb Cobps.

Ocean Tonnage. Signal Coeps.

Replacements of PeeIsonnel. Motob Tbanspoet Cobps.

Bemotjnts. Renting, IIeqtiisition, and Claims^

Reclassification of Peksonnel. Sebvioe.

CONSTETJCTION BY ENGINEEB CoEPS.

MUNITIONS.

Oednance. Tanks.

Aviation. , Chemical Wabfabe.

administeation.

Medical and Sanitaey Conditions. Militaby Justice.

Recoeds, Peesonnel, and Mail Seevice. Pbovost Maeshal General's Depaeis

Inspections — Discipline. ment.

61

PAET III.

SUPPLY, COORDINATION, MUNITIONS, AND ADMINIS-
TRATION.

THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY.

1. In February, 1918, the Line of Communications was reorganized
under the name of the Services of Supply. At that time all stajff
services and departments, except The Adjutant General's, the In-
spector General's, and the Judge Advocate General's Departments,
were grouped for supply purposes under one coordinating head,
the Commanding General, Services of Supply, with a General Staff
paralleling, so far as necessary, the General Staff at General Head-
quarters.

The principal functions of the Services of Supply were the pro-
curement, storage, and transportation of supplies. These activities
were controlled in a general way by the commanding general
Services of Supply, the maximum degree of independence being per-
mitted to the several services. This great organization was charged
with immense projects iri connection with roads, docks, railroads,
and buildings; the transportation of men, animals, and supplies by
sea, rail, and inland waterways; the operation of telegraph and tele-
phone systems; the control and transportation of replacements; the
hospitalization necessary for an army of 2,000,000 men ; the reclassi-
fication of numerous officers and men; the establishment of leave
areas and of welfare and entertainment projects ; the liquidation of
our affairs in France ; and the final embarkation of our troops for
home.

The growth of the permanent port personnel, the location near
the base ports of certain units for training; and other considerations
led to the appointment of a territorial commander for the section
around each port who, while acting as the representative of the com-
manding general Services of Supply, was given the local authority
of a district commander. For similar reasons, an Intermediate Sec-
tion Commander and an Advance Section Commander were ap-
pointed. Eventually there were nine base sections, including one in
England, one in Italy, and one comprising Rotterdam and Antwerp,
also one intermediate and one advance section.^

> See plate No. 8.

63

64 FINAL KEPOET OF GEN. JOHN J. PEKSHINGt

The increasing participation of the American Expeditionary-
Forces in active operations necessitated the enlargement of the re-
sponsibilities and authority of the commanding general Services of
Supply. In August, 1918, he was charged with complete responsi-
bility for all supply matters in the Services of Supply, and was au-
thorized to correspond by cable directly with the War Department
on all matters of supply not involving questions of policy.

In the following discussion of the Services of Supply the subjects
of coordination of supply at the front, ocean tonnage, and replace-
ments are included for convenience, though they were largely or
entirely under the direct control of General-Staff Sections at my
headquarters.

COOBDIJfATION OF StJPPLY AT THE FRONT.

2. Our successful participation in the war required that all the-
different services immediately concerned with the supply of combat
troops should work together as a well-regulated machine. In other
words, there must be no duplication of effort, but each must perform,
its functions without interference with any other service. The-
Fourth Section of the General Staff was created to control impartially
all these services, and, under broad lines of policy, to determine ques-
tions of transportation and supply in France and coordinate our
supply services with those of the Allies.

This section did not work out technical details but was charged
with having a general knowledge of existing conditions as to sup-
ply, its transportation, and of construction affecting our operations
or the efficiency of our forces. It frequently happened that several
of the supply departments desired the same site for the location of
installations, so that all plans for such facilities had to be decided ia
accordance with the best interests of the whole.

3. In froftt of the advance depots, railroad lines and shipments to
troops had to be carefully controlled, because mobility demanded
that combat units should not be burdened with a single day's stores
above the authorized standard reserve. Furthermore, accumulations
at the front were exposed to the danger of destruction or capture and
might indicate our intentions. Each combat division required the-
equivalent of 25 French railway car loads of supplies for its daily
consumption to be delivered at a point within reach of motor or-
horse-drawn transportation. The regular and prompt receipt of
supplies by combatant troops is of first importance in its effect upon,
the morale of both officers and men. The officer whose mind is pre-
occupied by the question of food, clothing, or ammunition, is n6t
free to devote his energy to training his men or to fighting the-
enemy. It is necessary that paper work be reduced to an absolute-

FINAL REPOBT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 6&

minimum and that the delivery of supplies to organizations be
placed on an autonuitic basis as far as possible.

4. The principle of flexibility had to be borne in mind in planning
our supply system in order that our forces should be supplied, no
matter what their number, or where they might be called upon to
enter the line. This high degree of elasticity and ' adaptability was
assured and maintained through the medium of the regulating sta-
tion. It was the connecting link between the armies and the services
in the rear, and regulated the railroad transportation which tied
them together. The regulating officer at each such station was a
member of the Fourth Section of my General Staff, acting under in-
structions from his chief of section.

Upon the regulating officer fell the responsibility that a steady
flow of supply was maintained. He must meet emergency shipments
of ammunition or engineering material, sudden transfers of troops
by rail, the hastening forward of replacements, or the unexpected
evacuation of wounded. All the supply services naturally clamored
to have their shipments rushed through. The regulating officer, act-
ing under special or secret instructions, must declare priorities in
the supply of things the Army needed most. Always informed of
the conditions at the front, of the status of supplies, and of military
plans and intentions, nothing could be shipped to the regulating sta-
tion or in front of the advance depots except on his orders. The
chiefs of supply services fulfilled their responsibilities when they
delivered to the regulating officer the supplies called for by him,
and he met his obligation when these supplies were delivered at the
proper railheads at the time they were needed. The evacuation of
the wounded was effected over the same railroad lines as those carry-
ing supplies to the front, therefore, this control had also to be cen-
tralized in the regulating officer.

The convenient location of the regulating stations was of prime
importance. The}' had to be close enough to all points in their zones
to permit trains leaving after dusk or during the night to arrive at
their destinations by dawn. They must also be far enough to the
rear to be reasonably safe from capture^ Only two regulating sta-
tions were actually constructed by us in France, Is-sur-Tille and
Liffol-le-Grand, as the existing French facilities were sufficient to
meet our requirements beyond the reach of those stations.

As far as the regulating officer was concerned, supplies were di-
vided into four main classes. The first class constituted food, forage
and fuel, needed and consumed every day; the second, uniforms,
shoes, blankets and horse shoes, which wear out with reasonable"
regularity; the third, articles of equipment which require replace-
ment at irregular intervals, such as rolling kitchens, rifles and escort

151532—19 5

66 FINAL EEPOET OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

wagons; the fourth class covered articles, the flow of which de-
pended upon tactical operations, such as ammunition and construction
material. Articles in the first class were placed on an automatic
basis, but formal requisition was eliminated as far as possible for
all classes.

5. In order to meet many of the immediate needs of troops com-
ing out of the line and to relieve to some extent the great strain on
the railheads during active Jighting, a system of army depots was
organized. These depots were supplied by bulk shipments from
the advance depots through the regulating stations during rela-
tively quiet periods, They were under the control of the chiefs of
the supply services of the armies and required practically no con-
struction work, the supplies being stored in open places protected
only by dunnage and camouflaged tarpaulins.

6. The accompanying diagram ^ illustrates graphically the supply
system which supported our armies in France. The Services of
Supply can be likened to a great reservoir divided into three main
parts — the base depots, the intermediate depots and the advance
depots. The management of this reservoir is in charge of the com-
manding general, Services of Supply, who administers it with a
free hand, controlled only by general policies outlined to him from
time to time. Each of the supply and technical services functions
independently in its own respective sphere; each has its share of
storage space in the base depots, in the intermediate depots, and in
the advance depots. Then comes the distribution system, and here
the control passes to the chief of the Fourth Section of the General
Staff, who exercises his powers through the regulating stations.

PURCHASING AGENCY.

7. The consideration of requirements in food and material led to
the adoption of an automatic supply system, but, with the exception
of foodstuffs, there was an actual shortage, especially in the early
part of the war, of many things, such as equipment pertaining to
land transportation and equipment and material for combat. The
lack of ocean tonnage to carry construction material and animals at
the beginning was serious. Although an increasing amount of ship-
ping became available as the war progressed, at no time was there
sufficient for our requirements. The tonnage from the States reached
about seven and one-half million tons to December 31, 1918, which
was a little less than one-half of the total amount obtained.

The supply situation made it imperative that we utilize European
resources as far as possible for the purchase of material and supplies.
If our Services of Supply departments had entered the market of

» See plate No. 6.

iriNAIi EEPOKT OP GEN. JOHN J. PEKSHING. 67

Europe as purchasers without regulation or coordination, they
would have been thrown into competition with each other, as well as
with buyers from the Allied armies and the civil populations. Such
a system would have created an unnatural elevation of prices, and
would have actually obstructed the procurement of supplies. To
meet this problem from the standpoint of economical business man-
agement, directions were given in August, 1917, for the creation of a
General Purchasing Board to coordinate and control our purchases
both among our own services and among the Allies as well. The
supervision and direction of this agency was placed in the hands of
an experienced business man, and every supply department in the
American Expeditionary Forces was represented on the board.
Agents were stationed in Switzerland, Spain, and Holland, besides
the Allied countries. The character of supplies included practically
the entire category of necessities, although the bulk of our purchases
consisted of raw materials for construction, ordnance, air equipment,
and animals. A total of about 10,000,000 tons was purchased abroad
by this agency to December 31, 1918, most of which was obtained in
France.

The functions of the Purchasing Agency were gradually extended
until they included a wide field of activities. In addition to the co-
ordination of purchases, the supply resources of our Allies were recon-
noitered and intimate touch was secured with foreign agencies; a
Statistical Bureau was created which classified and analyzed our re-
quirements; quarterly forecasts of supplies were issued; civilian
manual labor was procured and organized ; a Technical Board under-
took the coordination, development, and utilization of the electric
power facilities in France; a Bureau of Eeciprocal Supplies viseed
the claims of foreign governments for raw materials from the United
States ; and a general printing plant was established. Some of these
activities were later transferred to other services as the latter became
ready to undertake their control.

The principles upon which the usefulness of this agency depended
were extended to our Allies, and in the summer of 1918 the General
Purchasing Agent became a member of the Interallied Board of
Supplies. This Board undertook, with signal success, to coordinate
the supply of the Allied armies in all those classes of material neces-
sities that were in common use in all the armies. The possibility of
immense savings were fully demonstrated, but the principles had not
become of general application before the Armistice.

OCEAN TONNAGE.

8. Following a study of tonnage requirements, an officer was sent
to Washington in December, 1917, with a general statement of the
shipping situation in France as undeistood by the Allied Maritime

68 FINAL EEPOBT OF GEN, JOHN J, PEESHING.

Council. In March, 1918, tonnage requirements for transport and
maintenance of 900,000 men in France by June 30 were adopted as a
basis upon which to calculate supply requisitions and the allocation
of tonnage.

In April the Allied Maritime Transport Council showed that re-
quirements for 1918 greatly exceeded the available tonnage. Fur-
ther revisions of the schedule were required by the Abbeville Agree-
ment in May, under which American infantry and machine-gun
units were to be transported in British shipping, and by the Ver-
sailles Agreement in June.

In July, a serious crisis developed as the allotment for August
made the Amei'ican Expeditionary Forces by the Shipping Control
Committee was only 575,000 dead-weight tons, afterwards incrfeased
to 700,000, whereas 803,000 tons (not including animals) were actu-
ally needed. It was strongly urged by me that more shipping be
diverted from trades and that a larger percentage of new shipping
be placed in transport service.

9. Early in 1918, a scheme had been proposed which would pro-
vide priority for essential supplies only, based upon monthly avail-
able tonnage in sight. Although it was the understanding that calls
for shipping should be based upon our actual needs, much irregu-
larity was found in tonnage allotments, as shown by the following
cables sent September 14, 1918.

" The following variations from cable orders are noticeable :

Q. M. supplies cabled for, for August delivery, 182,287 short tons.

Q. M. supplies actually received during August, 231,850 short tons.

T. D. supplies (rolling stock, etc.) called for, for August delivery, 113,482
short tons.

T. D.. supplies actually received during August, 67,521 short tons."

" You must prepare to ship supplies we request, instead of shipping excessive
amounts of supplies of which we have a due proportion."

"An increase in the allotment of tonnage must be made, even for September.
It is imperative. I can not too strongly urge that the allotment be recon-
sidered in the light of the above showing of our deficiencies. * * * " "At
the present time our ability to supply and maneuver our forces depends
largely on motor transportation * * *. We are able to carry out present
plans due to fact that we have been able to borrow temporarily large num-
bers of trucks and ambulances from the French * * *. The shortage of
ambulances to move our wounded is critical * * *. We have reached the
point where we can no longer improvise or borrow. The most Important
plans and operations depend upon certainty that the home Government will
deliver at French ports material and equipment cabled for. It is urged
that foregoing be given most serious consideration and that tonnage allotted
for supply of Army in France be sufficient to deliver material and equipment,
properly proportioned in kinds and amount, to meet the needs of our
troops * * *."

The following is a brief summary of the tonnage asked for and the amount
actually received in France during the critical period from July to October,
1918:

FINAL EEPOET OF GEN. JOHN J. PEESHING.

69

Month.

Cabled lor Received
by Ameri- in France

can Ex- ' from
pertitionary United

Forces. States.

Shortage.

July

i4'!0,8Ql
700,527
809, 43S

1,022^135

438,047
511.261
5'9,0tS
623,689

42,844
ISO 266

Auei^st

330, 420

3PS,446

Total

3,072,991

2,112,015

960,976

' Tons ot 2,003 pounds.

REPLACEMENTS OF PERSONNEL.

: 10. Under the original organization project there were to be two
divisions in each corps of six divisions which were to be used as
reservoirs of replacements. One half of the Artillery and other
auxiliaries of these two divisions were to be utilized as corps and
army troops. They were to supply the first demands for replace-
pients from their original strength, after which a minimum of 3^000
men per month for each army corps in France was to be forwarded
to them from the United States. It was estimated that this would
give a sufficient reservoir of personnel to maintain the fighting
strength of combat units, provided the sick and wounded were
promptly returned to their own units upon recovery. .

■ The Thirty-second and Forty-first Divisions were the first to be
designated as replacement and depot divisions of the First Army
Corps, but the situation soon became such that the Thirty-second
Division had to be employed as a combat division. For the same
reason all succeeding divisions had to be trained for combat, until
June 27, when the need for replacements made it necessary to
designate the Eighty -third as a depot division.

11. By the middle of August we faced a serious shortage of. re-
placements. Dii'isions had arrived in France below strength, and
each division diverted from replacement to combat duty increased
the number of divisions to be supplied and at the same time de-
creased the supply.

On August 16 the War Department was cabled, as follows :

"Attention is especially invited to the very great shortage In arrivals of re-
placements heretofore requested. Situation with reference to replacements is
now very acute. Until sufficient replacements are available in France to keep
our proven divisions at full strength, replacements should by all means be sent
in preference to new divisions."

At this time it became necessary to transfer 2,000 men from each
of three cQmbat divisions (the Seventh, Thirty-sixth, and Eighty-
first) to the First Army, in preparation for the St. Mihiel offensive.

By the time the Meuse-Argonne offensive was initiated the replace-
ment sitijation had become still more acute. The Infantry and Ma-

70 PINAL EEPOET OP GEN. JOBN J. PEKSHING.

chine gun units of the Eighty-fourth and Eighty-sixth Divisions,
then in the vicinity of Bordeaux, were utilized as replacements, leav-
ing only a cadre of two officers and twenty-five men for each company.
To provide immediate replacements during the progress of the bat-
tles new replacement organizations were formed in the Zone of
Operations ; at first, as battalions, and later, as regional replacement
depots.

12. On October 3, a cable was sent the War Department, reading
as follows:

" Over 50,000 of the replacements requested for the months of July, August,
and September have not yet arrived. Due to extreme seriousness of the re-
placement situation, it is necessary to utilize personnel of the Eighty-fourth and
Eighty-sixth Divisions for replacement purposes. Combat divisions are short
over 80,000 men. Vitally important that all replacements due, including 55,000
requested for October, be shipped early In October. If necessary, some divisions
in United States should be stripped of trained men and such men shipped as
replacements at once."

Altogether seven divisions had to be skeletonized, leaving only one
man per company and one officer per regiment to care for the records.
As a further measure to meet the situation, the authorized strength
of divisions was reduced in October by 4,000 men, thus lowering the
strength of pach Infantry company to approximately 174 men. The
30 combat divisions in France at that time needed 103,513 Infantry
and machine-gun replacements, and only 66,490 were available.

Attention of the War Department was invited on November 2 to
the fact that a total of 140,000 replacements would be due by the end
of November, and the cable closed by saying :

" To send over entlr* divisions, which must be broken up on their arrival in
France so we may obtain replacements that have not been sent as called for, is
a wasteful method, and one that makes for inefficiency ; but as replacements are
not otherwise available, there is no other course open to us. New and only
partially trained divisions can not take the place of older divisions that have
had battle experience. The latter must be kept up numerically to the point of
efficiency * * *."

REMOUNTS.

13. The shortage of animals was a serious problem throughout the
war. In July, 1917, the French agreed to furnish our forces with
7,000 animals a month, and accordingly the War Department was
requested to discontinue shipments. On August 24, however, the
French advised us that it would be impossible to furnish the number
of animals originally stated, and Washington was again asTied to
supply animals, but none could be sent over until November, and then
only a limited number.

Early in 1918, after personal intervention and much delay, the
French Government made requisition on the country, and we were

FINAIi EEPOET OP GEN. JOHK J. PEESHING. 71

able to obtain 50,000 animals. After many difficulties, the Purchasing
Board was successful in obtaining permission, in the summer of
1918, to export animals from Spain, but practically no animals were
received until after the Armistice.

Every effort was made to reduce animal requirements — by in-
creased motorization of artillery and by requiring mounted officers
and men to walk— but in spite of all these efforts, the situation as
to animals grew steadily worse. The shortage by November exceeded
106,000, or almost one-half of all our needs. To relieve the crisis in
this regard, during the Meuse-Argonne battle. Marshal Foch requisi-
tioned 13,000 animals from the French Armies and placed them at
my disposal.

RECLASSIFICATION OF PERSONNEL.

14. An important development in the Services of Supply was the
reclassification system for officers and men. This involved not only
the physical reclassification of those partially fit for duty, but also the
reclassification of' officers according to fitness for special duties. A
Humber of officers were found unfit for combat duty, and many in
noncombatant positions were found unsuited to the duties on which
employed. An effort was made to reassign these officers to the advan-
tage of themselves and the Army. A total of 1,101 officers were
reclassified in addition to the disabled, and 270 were sent before effi-
ciency boards for elimination. 962 woimded or otherwise disabled
officers were reclassified, their services being utilized to release officers
on duty with the Services of Supply who were able to serve with
combat units.

CONSTRUCTION BT ENGINEER CORPS.

15. Among the most notable achievements of the American Expe-
ditionary Forces was the large program of construction carried out
by our Engineer troops in the Services of Supply and elsewhere. The
chief projects were port facilities including docks, railroads, ware-
houses, hospitals, barracks, and stables. These were planned to pro-
vide ultimately for an army of 4,000,000 men, the construction being
carried on coincident with the growth of the American Expeditionary
Forces.

The port plans contemplated 160 new berths, including the neces.-
sary facilities for discharge of cargo, approximately one-half of
which were completed at the time of the Armistice. Construction of
new standard-gauge railroad track amounted to 1,002^ miles, consist-
ing mainly of cut-offs, double tracking at congested points, and
yards at ports and depots. Eoad construction and repair continued
until our troops were withdrawn from the several areas, employing

72 FINAL, EEPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

at times upward of 10,000 men, and often using 90,000 tons of stone
per week.

Storage requirements necessitated large supply depots at the ports
and in the intermediate and advance sections. Over 2,000,000 square
feet of covered storage was secured from the French, but it was
necessary to construct approximately 20,000,000 square feet addi-
tional. The base hospital centers at Mars and Mesves, each with
4,000-bed convalescent camps, are typical of the large scale upon
which hospital accommodations were provided. The hospital city
at Mars, of 700 buildings, covered a ground space of 33 acres and in-
cluded the usual road, water, sewerage, and lighting facilities of a
municipality.

16. Advantages of economy and increased mobility caused the
adoption of the system of billeting troops. Billeting areas were
chosen near the base ports, along the line of communications, and in
the advanced zone, as strategical requirements dictated. The system
was not altogether satisfactory, but with the number of troops to be
accommodated no other plan was practicable. Demountable barracks
•were used for shelter to supplement lack of billets, 16,000 barracks
of this type being erected, particularly at base ports where large
camps were necessary. Stables at remount stations were built for
43,000 animals. Other construction included refrigerating plants,
such as the one at Gievres with a capacity of 6,500 tons of meat and
500 tons of ice per day ; and mechanical bakeries like that at Is-sur-
Tille with capacity of 800,000 pounds of bread per day. If the
buildings constructed were consolidated, with the width of a standard
barrack, they would reach from St. Nazaire across France to the
Elbe Kiver in Germany, a distance of 730 miles.

In connection with construction work, the Engineer Corps engaged
in extensive forestry operations, producing 200,000,000 feet of lum-
ber, 4,000,000 railroad ties, 300,000 cords of fuel wood, 35,000 pieces
of piling, and large quantities of miscellaneous products.

TRANSPORTATION CORPS.

17. The Transportation Corps as a separate organization was new
to our Army. Its exact relation to the supply departments was con-
ceived to be that of a system acting as a common carrier operating
its own ship and rail terminals. The equipment and operation of
port terminals stands out as a most remarkable achievement. The
amount of tonnage handled at all French ports grew slowly, reaching
about 17,000 tons daily at the end of July, 1918. An emergency then
developed as a result of the critical military situation, and the capac-
ity of our terminals was so efficiently increased that, by November
11, 45,000 tons were being handled daily.

FXNAL. REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING; 73

•The French railroads, both in management and material, had
■dangerously deteriorated during the war. As our system was super-
imposed upon that of the French it was necessary to provide them
with additional personnel and much materiel. Experienced Ameri-
can railroad men brought into our organization, in various practical
capacities, the best talent in the country, who, in addition to the
management of our own transportation, materially aided the French.
The relation of our Transportation Corps to the French railroads
and to our own supply departments presented many difficulties, but
these were eventually overcome and a high state of efficiency estab-
lished.

18. It was early decided, as expedient for our purposes, to use
American rolling stock on the French railroads, and approximately
20,000 cars and 1,500 standard-gauge locomotives were brought from
the United States and assembled by our railroad troops. We assisted
the French by repairing with our own personnel 57,385 French cars,
and 1,947 French locomotives. The lack of rolling stock for Allied
use was at all times a serious handicap, so that the number of cars
tind locomotives built and repaired by us was no small part of our
contribution to the Allied cause.

- QTIAKTERMASTEE COKPS.

19. The Quartermaster Corps was able to provide a larger ton-
nage of supplies from the States than any of the great supply
departments. The operations of this corps were so large and the
activities so numerous that they can best be understood by a study
of the report of the commanding general Services of Supply.

The Quartermaster Corps in France was called upon to meet con-
ditions never before presented, and it was found advisable to give
it relief. Transportation problems by sea transport and by rail
were handled by separate corps organized for that purpose, and
already described. Motor transport was also placed under an organi-
zation of its own. The usual routine supplies furnished by this der
partment reached enormous proportions. Except for the. delay early
in 1918 in obtaining clothing and the inferior quality of some that
was furnished, and an occasional shortage in forage, no army was
ever better provided for. Special services created under the Quarter-
master Corps included a Kemount Service, which received, cared
for, and supplied animals to troops; a Veterinary Service, work-
ing in conjunction with the remount organization; an Effects Sec-
tion and Baggage Service; and a Salvage Service for the recovery
and preparation for reissue of every possible article of personal equip-
ment. Due to the activities of the Salvage Service, an estimated
saving of $85,000,000 was realized, tonnage and raw material were

74 FINAL EEPOET OP GEN. JOHN J. PEKSHING.

conserved, and what in former wars represented a distinct liability
was turned into a valuable asset.

The Graves Registration Service, also under the Quartermaster
Corps, was charged with the acquisition and care of cemeteries,
the identification and reburial of our dead, and the correspondence
with relatives of the deceased. Central cemeteries were organized
on the American battle fields, the largest being at Komagne-sous-
Montfaucon and at Thiaucourt in the Woevre. All territory over
which our troops fought was examined by this service, and, generally
speaking, the remains of our dead were assembled in American cem-
eteries and the graves marked with a cross or six-pointed star and
photographed. A few bodies were buried where they fell or in
neighboring French or British cemeteries. Wherever the soldier
was buried, his identification tag, giving his name and Army serial
number, was fastened to the marker. A careful record was kept of
the location of each grave.

SIGNAL CORPS.

20. The Signal Corps supplied, installed, and operated the gen-
eral service of telephone and telegraphic communications through-
out the Zone of the Armies, and from there to the rear areas. At
the front it handled radio, press, and intercept stations; provided a
radio network in the Zone of Advance ; and also managed the meteoro-
logical, pigeon, and general photographic services. Our communi-
cation system included a cable across the English Channel, the erec-
tion of 4,000 kilometers of telephone and telegraph lines on our own
poles, and the successful operation of a system with 215,500 kilome-
ters of lines.

MOTOR TRANSPORT CORPS.

21. The quantity and importance of gasoline-engine transportation
in this war necessitated the creation of a new service known as the
Motor Transport Corps. It was responsible for setting up motor
vehicles received from America, their distribution, repair, and main-
tenance. Within the zone of the Services of Supply, the Motor Trans-
port Corps controlled the use of motor vehicles, and it gave technical
supervision to their operation in the Zone of the Armies. It was
responsible for the training and instruction of chauffeurs and other
technical personnel. Due to the shortage of shipments from America,
a large number of trucks, automobiles, and spare parts had to be
purchased in France.

RENTING, REQUISITION, AND CLAIMS SERVICE.

22. A Renting, Requisition, and Claims Service was organized in
March, 1918, to procure billeting areas, supervise the quartering of

FINAL EEPOKT OF GEN. JOHN J. PEESHING. 7.5

troops with an organization of zone and town majors, and to have
charge of the renting, leasing, and requisitioning of all lands and
buildings required by the American Expeditionary Forces. Under
the provisions of an act of Congress, approved in April, 1918, the
Claims Department was charged with the investigation, assessment,
and settlement of all claims " of inhabitants of France or any other
European country not an enemy or ally of an enemy " for injuries to
persons or damages to property occasioned by our forces. The pro-
cedure followed was in accordance with the law and practice of the
country in question. The efficient administration of this service had
an excellent effect upon the people of the European countries con-
cerned.

23. The various activities of the Services of Supply which, at its
heighth on November 11, 1918, reached a numerical strength in per-
sonnel of 668,312, including 23,772 civilian employees, can best be
summed up by quoting the telegram sent by me to Maj. Gen. James
G. Harbord, the Commanding General, Services of Supply, upon my
relinquishing personal command of the First Army :

" I want the S. O. S. to know how much the First Army appreciated the
prompt response made to every demand for men, equipment, supplies, and
transportation necessary to carry out th& recent operations. Hearty congratu-
lations. The S. O. S. shares the success with It."

MUNITIONS.

ORDNANCE.

24. Our entry into the war found us with few of the auxiliaries
necessary for its conduct in the modern sense. The task of the
Ordnance Department in supplying artillery was especially difficult.
In order to meet our requirements as rapidly as possible, we accepted
the offer of the French Government to supply us with the artil-
lery equipment of 75's, 155 mm. howitzers and 155 G. P. F. guns
from their own factories for 30 divisions. The wisdom of this
course was fully demonstrated by the fact that, although we soon
began the manufacture of these classes of guns at home, there were
no guns of American manufacture of the calibres mentioned on our,
front at the date of the arniistice. The only guns of these types pro-
duced at home which reached France before the cessation of hostili-
ties were one hundred and nine 75 mm. guns. In addition, twenty-four
8-inch howitzers from the United States reached our front and were
in use when the Armistice was signed. Eight 14-inch naval guns of
American manufacture were set up on railroad mounts, and most
of these were successfully employed on the Meuse-Argonne front
tinder the efficient direction of Admiral Plunkett of the Navy.

76 FINAL REPOKT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

AVIATION.

25. In aviation we were entirely dependent upon our Allies, and
here again the French Government came to our aid until our own
program could be set under way. From time to time we obtained
from the French such planes for training personnel as they could
provide. Without going into a complete discussion of aviation ma-
teriel, it will be sufficient to state that it was with great difficulty that
we obtained equipment even for training. As for up-to-date combat
planes, the development at home was slow, and we had to rely upon
the French who provided us with a total of 2,676 pursuit, observa-
tion, and bombing machines. The first aeroplanes received from
home arrived in May, and altogether we received 1,379 planes of
the De -Haviland type. The first American squadron completely
equipped by American production, including aeroplanes, crossed the
German lines on August 7, 1918. As to our aviators, many of whom
trained with our Allies, it can be said that they had no superiors
in daring and in fighting ability. During the battles of St. Mihiel
and Meuse-Argonne our aviators excelled all others. They have
left a record of courageous deeds that will ever remain a brilliant
page in the annals of our Army.

TANKS.

26. In the matter of tanks, we were compelled to rely upon both
the French and the English. Here, however, we were less fortunate
for the reason that our Allies barely had sufficient tanks to meet
their own requirements. While our Tank Corps had limited oppor-
tunity, its fine personnel responded gallantly on every possible occa-
sion and showed courage of the highest order. We had one battalion
of heavy tanks engaged on the English front. On our own front
we had only the light tanks, and the number available to participate
in the last great assault of November 1 was reduced to 16 as a result
of the previous hard fighting in the Meuse-Argonne.

CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE.

27. The Chemical Warfare Service represented another entirely
new departure in this war. It included many specialists from
civil life. With personnel of a high order, it developed rapidly
into one of our most efficient auxiliary services. While the early
employment of gas was in the form of clouds launched from special
projectors, its use later on in the war was virtually by means of gas
shells fired by the light artillery. One of the most important duties
of the Chemical Warfare Service was to insure the equipment
of our troops with a safe and comfortable mask, and the instruc-
tion of the personnel in the use o^ this protector. Whether or

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 77

not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture,
but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never af-
ford to neglect the question.

ADMINISTRATION.

MEDICAL AND SANITARY CONDITIONS.

28. The general health of our armies under conditions strange
and adverse in many ways to our American experience and mode of
life was marvelously good. The proportionate number of men in-
capacitated from other causes than battle casualties and injuries
was low. Of all deaths in the American Expeditionary Forces (to
September 1, 1919) totaling 81,141, there were killed in action,
35,556 ; died of wounds received in buttle, 15,130 ; other wounds and
injuries, 5,669; and died of disease, 24,786. Therefore, but little
over two-sevenths the total loss of life in the American Expedition-
ary Forces was caused by disease.

Our armies suffered from the communicable diseases that usually ,
affect troops. Only two diseases have caused temporarily excessive
sick rates, epidemic diarrhea and influenza, and of these influenza
only, due to the fatal complicating pneumonia, caused a serious rise,
in the death rate. Both prevailed in the armies of our Allies and
enemies and in the civilian population of Europe.
. Venereal disease has been with us always, but the control was suc-
cessful to a degree never before attained in our armies, or in any
other army. It has been truly remarkable when the environment
in which our men lived is appreciated. The incidence of venereal
disease varied between 30 and 60 per thousand per annum, averaging
under 40. Up to September, 1919, all troops sent home were free
from venereal disease. The low percentage was due largely to the
fine character of men composing our armies.

29. Hospitalization represented one of the largest and most diffi-
cult of the medical problems in the American Expeditionary Forces.
That the -needs were always met and that there was always a surplus
of several thousand beds, were the results of great effort and the
use of all possible expedients to make the utmost of resources avail-
able. The maximum number of patients in hospital on any one
day was 193,026, on November 12, 1918.

Evacuation of the sick and wounded was another difficult problem,
especially during the battle periods. The total number of men evac-
uated in the Zone of the Armies was 214,467, of whom 11,281 were
sent in hospital trains to base ports. The number of sick and
wounded sent to the United States up to November 11, 1918, was
14,000. Since the Armistice, 103,028 patients have been sent to the
United States.

78 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

30. The Army and the Medical Department were fortunate in
obtaining the services of leading physicians, surgeons, and specialists
in all branches of medicine from all parts of the United States, who
brought the most skillful talent of the world to the relief of our
sick and wounded. The Army Nurse Corps deserves more than pass-
ing comment. These women, working tirelessly and devotedly,
shared the burden of the day to the fullest extent with the men,
many of them submitting to all the dangers of the battle front.

EECOEDS, PEESONNEIi, AND MAIL SEEVICE.

31. New problems confronted the Adjutant General's Department
in France. Our great distance from home necessitated records,
data, and executive machinery to represent the War Department
as well as our forces in France. Unusually close attention was paid
to individual records. Never before have accuracy and completeness
of reports been so strictly insisted upon. Expedients had to bo
adopted whereby the above requirements could be met without
increasing the record and correspondence work of combat units.
The organization had to be elastic to meet the demands of any force
maintained in Europe.

A Statistical Division was organized to collect data regarding the
special qualifications of all officers and to keep an up-to-date record
of the location, duties, health, and status of every officer and soldier,
nurse, field clerk, and civilian employee, as well as the location and
strength of organizations. The Central Eecords Office at Bourges re-
ceived reports from the battle front, evacuation and base hospitals,
convalescent-leave areas, reclassification camps, and base ports, and
prepared for transmission to the War Department reports of indi-
vidual casualties. Each of the 299,599 casualties was considered as
an individual case. A thorough investigation of the men classed as
" missing in action " reduced the nun\ber from 14,000 at the signing
of the Armistice to 22 on August 31, 1919.

32. In addition to printing and distributing all orders from Gen-
eral Headquarters, the Adjutant General's Department had charge of
the delivery and collection of official mail and finally of all mail.
The Motor Dispatch Service operated 20 courier routes, over 2,300
miles of road, for the quick dispatch and delivery of official com-
munications. After July 1, 1918, the Military Postal Express Serv-
ice was organized to handle all mail, official and personal, and op-
erated 169 fixed and mobile post offices and a railway post-office
service.

While every effort was exerted to maintain a satisfactory mail
service, frequent transfers of individuals, especially during the hur-
ried skeletonizing of certain combat divisions, numerous errors io

FINAIi EEPOET OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 79

addresses, hasty handling, and readdressing of mail by regimental
and company clerks in the Zone of Operations, and other conditions
incident to the continuous movement of troops in battle, made the
distribution of mail an exceedingly difficult problem.

INSPECTION^^DISCIFLINE.

33. The Inspector General's Department, acting as an independent
agency not responsible for the matters under its observation, made
inspections and special investigations for the purpose of keeping com-
manders informed of local conditions. The inspectors worked un-
ceasingly to determine the manner in which orders were being car-
ried out, in an effort to perfect discipline and team play.

The earnest belief of every member of the Expeditionary Forces
in the justice of our cause was productive of a form of self-imposed
discipline among our soldiers which must be regarded as an unusual
development of this war, a fact which materially aided us to or
ganize and employ in an incredibly short space of time the extraor-
dinary fighting machine developed in France.

Our troops generally were strongly imbued with an offensive spirit
essential to success. The veteran divisions had acquired not only this
spirit, but the other elements of fine discipline. In highly trained
divisions, commanders of all grades operate according to a definite
system calculated to concentrate their efforts where the enemy is
weakest. Straggling is practically eliminated ; the Infantry, skillful
in fire action and the employment of cover, gains with a minimum of
casualties; the battalion, with all of its accompanying weapons,
works smoothly as a team in which the parts automatically assist
each other; the Artillery gives the Infantry close and continuous
support ; and unforeseen situations are met by prompt and energetic
action.

This war has only confirmed the lessons of the past. The less
experienced divisions, while aggressive, were lacking in the ready
skill of habit. They were capable of powerful blows, but their blows
were apt to be awkward — teamwork was often not well understood.
Flexible and resourceful divisions can not be created by a few maneu-
vers or by a few months' association of their elements. On the other
hand, without the keen intelligence, the endurance, the willingness,
and enthusiasm displayed in the training area, as well as on the battle
field, the successful results we obtained so quickly would have be«n
utterly impossible.

MILITARY JUSTICE.

34. The commanders of armies, corps, divisions, separate brigades,
and certain territorial districts, were empowered to appoint general
courts-martial. Each of these commanders had on his staff an officer

80 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

of the Judge Advocate General's Department, whose duty it was to
render legal advice and to assist in the prompt trial and just punish"
ment of those guilty of serious infractions of discipline.

Prior to the signing of the Armistice, serious breaches of disciplini&
were rare, considering the number of troops. This was due to the
high sense of duty of the soldiers and their appreciation of the seri-
ousness of the situation. In the .period of relaxation following the
cessation of hostilities, infractions of discipline were naturally more
numerous, but not even then was the number of trials as great in
proportion to the strength of the force as is usual in our service.

35. It was early realized that many of the peace-time methods of
punifihment were not the best for existing conditions. In the early
part of 1918, it was decided that the award of dishonorable dis-
charge of soldiers convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude,
would not be contemplated, except in the most serious cases. To
remove these soldiers temporarily from their organizations, division
commanders were authorized to form provisional temporary de-
tachments to which such soldiers could be attached. These detach-
ments were retained with their battalions so that offenders would
not escape the dangers and hardships to which their comrades were
subjected. Wherever their battalion was engaged, whether in front-
line trenches or in back areas, these men were required to perform
hard labor. Only in emergency were they permitted to engage in
combat. Soldiers in these disciplinary battalions were made to un-
derstand that if they acquitted themselves well, they would be
restored to full duty with their organizations.

All officers exercising disciplinary powers were imbued with the
purpose of these instructions and carried them into effect. So that
nearly all men convicted of military offenses in combat divisions
remained with their organizations and continued 'to perform their
duty as soldiers. Many redeemed themselves by rendering valiant
service in action and were released from the further operation of
their sentences.

36. To have the necessary deterrent effect upon the whole unit,
courts-martial for serious offenses usually imposed sentences con-
siderably heavier than would have been awarded in peace times.
Except where the offender earned remission at the front, these sen-
tences stood during hostilities. At the signing of the Armistice,
steps were at once taken to reduce outstanding sentences to the
standards of peace time.

PUOVOST MARSHAL GENERAL's DEPARTMENT.

37. On July 20, 1917, a Provost Marshal General was appointed
with station in Paris, and later the department was organized as
an administrative service -with the Provost Marshal General func^

FINAL EEPORT OP GEN", JOHN J. PERSHING. 81

tioning under the First Section, General Staff. The Department was
developed into four main sections — the Military Police Corps which
served with divisions, corps, and armies and in the sections of the
Services of Supply; the Prisoner of War Escort Companies; the
Criminal Investigation Department; and the Circulation Depart-
ment. It was not until 1918 that the last-mentioned department
became well trained and efficient. On October i5, 1918, the strength
of the Corps was increased to 1 per cent at the strength of the
American Expeditionary Forces, and provost marshals for armies,
corps, and divisions were provided.

The military police of the American Expeditionary Forces de-
veloped into one of the most striking bodies of men in Europe.
Wherever the American soldier went, there our military police were
on duty. They controlled traffic in the battle zone, in all villages
occupied by American troops, and in many cities through which our
traffic flowed; they maintained order, so far as the American sol-
diers were concerned, throughout France and in portions of Eng-
land, Italy, Belgium, and occupied Germany. Their smart appear-
ance and military bearing and the intelligent manner in which they
discharged their duties left an excellent impression of the typical
American on all with whom they came in contact.

151532—19 6

PART IV.

MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS.

Peisoners of Wab.

Civil Administkation of Occupied TekritOby.

Execution of iAemistice Teems.

United States Liquidation Commission.

Relations with the Allies.

Welfare Woek :

Allied Food Commission.

Socxeties.

Iieaves and Leave Aeeas.

Religious Woek.

Educational Work.

Stars and Steipes.
Appeeciation.

83

PAET IV.

MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS.

PRISONERS OF WAR.

1. All prisoners taken by the American troops were kept at least
30 kilometers behind our lines under guard by the Provost Marshal
General's Department, except wounded or sick prisoners who were
immediately sent to hospitals for treatment. Arrangements were
made with the French and British that prisoners taken by our units
operating with them should be sent to American enclosures. The
Provost Marshal General was instructed to follow the principles of
The Hague and the Geneva conventions in the treatmient of prisoners,
although these were not recognized by the United States as binding
in the present war. Prisoners were organized into labor companies,
and were employed on work which had no distinct bearing on mili-
tary operations. The officer prisoners of war were accorded the same
treatment as received by American officers confined in Germany. A
Prisoner of War Information Bureau was established in the Central
Records Office. Under a mutual understanding with the German
Government, payments were made to prisoners in the form of credits,
and, subject to censorship, they were allowed to send and receive let-
ters and packages. Eeligious meetings were held by prisoner chap-
lains, assisted by our Army chaplains and welfare workers.

2. From June, 1918, to the end of March, 1919, a total of 48,280
enemy prisoners were handled by the Provost Marshal General's De-
partment, of whom 93 died and 73 escaped and were not recaptured.
At the request of the French Government, 516 prisoners, natives of
Alsace-Lorraine, were released after examination by a French com-
mission. In accordance with the provisions of the Geneva conven-
tion, 59 medical officers and 1,783 men of the sanitary personnel,
including 333 members of the German Bed Cross, were repatriated.
On April 9, 1919, we commenced to repatriate enemy prisoners who
were permanently unfit for further military duty and those who
could not perform useful labor.

3. Through the Berlin Bed Cross and the International Bed Cross
at Geneva, an American Bed Cross committee at Berne received lists
of all American prisoners taken by the German troops, to each of
whom, when located, was sent a package containing food, tobacco,

85

86 FINAL EBPOET OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

clean underclothing and toilet articles, and thereafter two packages
a week. By a system of return post cards, it was determined that
85 per cent of these packages were received.

As soon as the Armistice was signed the Germans released large
numbers of Allied prisoners who inunediately started toward the
Allied lines. Four American regional replacement departments were
established, to which all returning Americans were sent until proper
records could be made. Those in good physical condition were
sent to their commands, while the others were sent to hospitals or to
leave areas for a rest.

An Allied commission was formed in Berlin early in December,

1918, for the repatriation of Allied prisoners, with representatives
from each of the American, British, French, and Italian Armies.
American prisoners were evacuated through Switzerland in fully
equipped trains, including hospital cars, provided by the Swiss Gov-
ernment and paid fo^ by our Government. These were met by Amer-
ican trains at the- Swiss border. It was planned to withdraw all our
prisoners by this route, but a number had already been withdrawn
through the northern ports and taken to England in British ships.

The Allied Commission obtained a statement of moneys paid Amer-
icans while in German prisons; investigated co&iplaints concerning
treatment of Americans; obtained possession of effects of prisoners
who had died in captivity, or which had been left behind by~^ those
repatriated ; and also located the graves of the American dead.

4. On November 11, 1918, there were 248 American officers and
3,302 men in the hands of the Germans, all of whom were evacuated
by February 5, 1919. None of our prisoners were condemned to death,
although 1 officer and 20 men died in captivity.

5. An Inter- Allied agreement on January 13, 1919, created a com-
mission for the control of Eussian prisoners in Germany. The British
and American representatives, aided by small unarmed detachments,
were charged with the administration of the Russian prison camps,
and succeeded in discharging their duties despite the civiL disorders
in Germany.

Early in January, 1919, the Eed Cross outlined a plan to send a
commission to Germany to assist in caring for and feeding Russian
prisoners, and an American officer was detailed to assist and accom-
pany this commission. The Red Cross being financially unable to
furnish the necessary food, arrangements were finally made with
the French Government to furnish funds for its purchase from our
Army sfores, without any responsibility being assumed by the Army,
as was desired by the Allied Food Commission. Such supplies as
could be spared by the Army were sold to the French, and American
officers were detailed to assist in their distribution. On April 10,

1919, the Supreme Allied War Council decided to give the German

FINAL REPORT OP GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 87

Government complete freedom in repatriating Russian prisoners of
war, stipulating only that none should be repatriated by force, and
that all who left must be provided with sufficient food for the journey.

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY.

6. To insure law and order, it was necessary that an American
civil administration be created in the occupied territory. Different
policies were adopted toward Luxemburg and occupied Germany,
the former being a disarmed neutral and the latter occupied enemy
territory. In both regions we issued proclamations defining our
attitude toward the inhabitants.

In accordance with the precedent of our Government under similar
circumstances, the local civil government remained in full possession
of its former power, and retained jurisdiction over all civil matters.
The organization of our civil administration in occupied territory
provided for the control of civil affairs by the Officer in Charge of
Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory, under whom Army, corps, and
division commanders detailed suitable officers in local charge of civil
matters. In the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, civil affairs were
regulated by a corresponding representative with an office in the
city of Luxemburg.

7. The principle of requisitioning supplies was exercised exten-
sively throughout the area, always under central control and with-
out abuse of the privilege. Under a board of appraisal payment was
made for all property requisitioned, the money being obtained from
the German Government under the terms of the Armistice. Food
and forage were not requisitioned, and during most of the period of
occupation our officers and men were not allowed to purchase any
German food and were forbidden to eat in the restaurants and cafes.

In Luxemburg, billeting arrangements and payment therefor
were provided for by an agreement with the Government of Luxem-
burg.

Under instructions from the State Department, the interests of
American citizens found in occupied Germany were referred to the
American Embassy in Paris ; in Luxemburg to the American Lega-
tion at The Hague.

8. We insisted upon the Germans maintaining all public utilities.
After being inspected, measures were taken to assure priority of fuel
supply in case of coal shortage due to strikes in the Ruhr and Saar
districts or other causes. One of our chief problems was the main-
tenance and repair of roads and highways, and this at first neces-
sitated the employment of soldier labor. As soon as possible a satis-
factory system of road preservation and improvement was inau-
gurated, utilizing German civil labor.

88 PINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

To control and supervise the movement of funds and securities,
all banks and banking houses were required to submit monthly rcr
ports. Trade and blockade regulations were controlled through the
American Section of the Inter-Allied Economic Committee.

9. The Civil Administration issued instructions relative to courts.
Army, corps, and divisional commanders were authorized to convene
military commissions and appoint superior provost courts for their
respective districts; and commanding officers of each city, town or
canton, appointed an inferior provost court. All of these courts
were for the trial of offenses against the laws of war or the Military
Government. Our legal machinery was simple, and successful results
in maintaining law and order were due to uniform and strict en-
forcement of such few regulations as proved necessary.

Strict censorship was maintained over postal, telephone and tele-
graphic communications. Passes and circulation were first handled
by the Department of Civil Affairs, but on January 24, 1919, the
Third Army took charge of those 'matters.

In connection with the reconstruction work in France and Bel-
gium, the Department of Civfl Affairs prepared a record of all recov-,
ered stolen property and measures were taken to protect it against
deterioration or unauthorized removal. • •

10. The fraternization problem was sharply raised by the sudden
transition from the rigors of war conditions in France to the com-
forts of undisturbed German cities and homes, but a realization by
our troops of their position in enemy territory and of their duty
to maintain the dignity of their own country reduced infractions
of rules on the subject to a minimum.

EXECUTION OF ARMISTICE TERMS.

11. The first Armistice agreement provided for supervision by a
Permanent International Armistice Commission to function under
the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.
The United States, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Italy and Ger-
many were represented on the Permanent International Armistice
Commission. The chairmen of this commission and of the five main
committees were French. These committees were organized to care
specifically for the work in connection with material, transportation,
prisoners of war, entretien, and restitution. The United States was
represented on each of these main committees.

12. The Germans unsuccessfully attempted to enter the Permanent
International Armistice Commission on- the basis of negotiation.
Many adjustments were made because of the difficulties under which
the German authorities were working, but, in general, they were
held strictly to the spirit of the terms of the Armistice agreement.

FINAL, REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

89

Time of delivery was often extended, but penalties were imposed
for failure to comply with the conditions. All aeroplanes were not
obtained until a penalty was imposed of 20 horses for each unde-
livered plane. Evacuation of occupied territory, and repatriation
of civilian inhabitants and of prisoners of war, were begun imme-
diately and carried out promptly.

13. In the distributioH among the Allied Armies of ordnance and
aeroplanes surrendered by the enemy, the Belgian Army received
one-tenth, American Army two-tenths, British Army three-tenths,
and French Army four-tenths. Our share was 720 field guns, 531
heavy guns, 589 trench mortars, 10,356 machine guns and 340 aero-
planes. Railway rolling stock was divided according to the needs
of the railway systems serving the different armies.

14. The question of expense of maintenance of the armies of oc-
cupation caused considerable discussion among the Allies and pro-
tests from the Germans. This was due to the diversity of opinion
as to the items properly chargeable to the expense of an army of
occupation. My policy was that, pending final settlement by the
Peace Conference, Germany would be liable for all expenses of the
American Army of Occupation; that any payments made by Ger-
many for this purpose were to be considered as partial payments
on account of the whole sum, and not as a liquidation of any specific
expenses. Money was deposited in Coblenz banks to the credit of
the United States, in ariiounts notified as necessary, to cover all
expenditures made in the occupied area. The total expense as cal-
culated by the different Allied Armies, before any of our troops
were withdrawn, was based on the effective strength as shown by
their Tables of Organization, and appears as follows :

Armies.

Officers.

Men.

Horses.

Cost per montli
in francs.

Freacli

11,570

1,834

12,000

12,368

35,500

39,430

240,000

275,617

116,100
11,600
70,000
58,755

175,948,815.00

30,195,142.60

127,936,000.00

269,068,184.10

British

United States..

Total

603, 147, 141. 70

UNITED STATES LIQUIDATION COMMISSION.

15. In February, 1919, upon my recommendation, the Secretary
of War appointed the United States Liquidation Commission, War
Department, which had charge of the liquidation of our affairs in
France, the sale of our property and installations and the settle-
ment of claims exclusive of those arising out of torts, which were
handled by the Eenting, Requisition and Claims Service. While not
under my supervision, the Liquidation Commission played such an
important part in the closing chapter of our activities that some

90 FINAL REPOET 0¥ GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

mention of it should be made in this report. With the dissolution of
the American Expeditionary Forces we were confronted with the
problem of disposing of large port and other installations and
immense quantities of transportation, materiel, supplies and equip-
ment. Much of this was of an immovable nature and the shipping
situation forbade the transfer to the United States of most of the
movable effects. There was little or no demand for many of the
articles to be disposed of, and the expense of maintaining a force
of caretakers until the market improved would have been prohibi-
tive. The successful negotiations of the Commission led to the
liquidation of our affairs with France by the payment of a lump sum
to the United States by the French Government.

RELATIONS WITH THE ALLIES.

16. Our troops arrived in Europe after France and Great Britain
had been fighting desperately for nearly three years, and their re-
ception was remarkable in its cordiality. The resources of our Allies
in men and material had been taxed to the limit, but they always
stood ready to furnish us with needed supplies, equipment and
transportation when at all available. We were given valuable assist-
ance and cooperation in our training program by both the French
and British armies, and when the shortage of labor personnel in our
forces became acute the French Government rendered material as-
sistance in the solution of this problem.

It was our good fortune to have a year in France to organize and
train our forces. When ovir troops entered the battle the veteran
soldiers of France and England gave them moral and physical sup-
port. The Artillery of our Allies often supported the advance of
American troops; British and French tanks frequently cooperated
with our Infantry ; and their aviators fought in the air to assist the
American soldier.

Throughout France our troops have been intimately associated with
the French people, particularly the French peasant, and the rela-
tions growing out of these associations assure a permanent friend-
ship between the two peoples. The small force of Americans serving
in Italy was accorded a warm welcome and established with the
Italian people the most friendly relations. The hospitable reception
of those of our forces who passed through England has impressed
upon us how closely common language and blood have brought to-
gether the British and ourselves.

The cooperation of our soldiers with the French, British, Bel-
gians and Italians was decisive in bringing the war to a successful
conclusion, and will have an equally decisive effect in welding to-
gether the bonds of sympathy and good will among the peoples of
these nations and ourselves.

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 91

WELFARE WORK.

ALLIED FOOD COMMISSION.

17. At the request of the Allied Food Commission a selected per-
sonnel of 320 officers and 464 men was placed at the disposal of the
Commission. There was no other American personnel in Europe or
elsewhere available for this necessary work. Our officers were sent
to various countries in charge of food distribution, and were every-
where received with the utmost friendliness. These officers and
men, by their executive and administrative ability and their energetic
resourcefulness, were in a large measure responsible for the manner
in which these foo<i supplies were delivered to the various peoples in
central Europe during a period of civil unrest or complete disorder.
By their disinterested conduct of this charitable work, they won for
the American Army the admiration of the populations whom they
served.

SOCIETIES.

18. In their respective spheres of activity the Red Cross and Y. M.
C. A. undertook the burden of supplying the needs of the entire
American Expeditionary Forces. Their efforts were in many re-
spects limited by a lack of tonnage. But shortage in tonnagte, trans-
portation, or personnel, meant inability to carry out completely their
appointed tasks ; whereas with the smaller societies it meant inability
to expand. In order to avoid duplication of effort, it was directed in
August, 191Y, that the Eed Cross confine its activities to relief work,
and the Y. M. C. A. to amusement and recreation. The Knights of
Columbus and the Salvation Army were later, given official recogni-
tion. The Y. W. C. A., Jewish Welfare Board and American Li-
brary Association conducted their activities through one of the estab-
lished societies. *

19. The American Eed Cross maintained within our zones a sys-
tem of " Line of Communication Canteens," which* furnished refresh-
ments and relief to troops in transit and^became a valuable feature of
the Red Cross work. The statistical work of the searchers attached
to statistical sections and to hospitals obtained much information
for relatives. This society also aided in locating American prisoners
to whom it sent food from Switzerland.

20. To avoid depleting our personnel, the Y. M. C. A. agreed to
operate our canteens and was at first allotted 208 ship-tons per
25,000 men per month to bring supplies from the United States, but
the requirements of other services later made it necessary to reduce
this allotment to 100 tons. This materially reduced the valuable
service the Y. M. C. A. might have rendered in this work. The ter-

92 FINAL KEPOET OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

mination of hostilities made it possible to relieve the society of this
responsibility.

21. The need of greatly expanded welfare work after hostilities,
such as athletics and education was at once recognized, and the co-
operation of the welfare societies in all these activities was of ines-
timable value. Immediately after the Armistice steps were taken to
provide diversion and entertainment for our troops. Entertainment
officers were appointed in all units, and the Y. M. C. A. Entertain-
ment Department furnished professionals and acted as a training and
booking agency for soldier talent. Approximately 650 "soldier
shows " were developed, which entertained hundreds of thousands of
soldiers, who will remember this as one of the pleasant and unique
enterprises of the American Expeditionary Forces.

The athletic program in the spring of 1919 culminated in the Inter-
Allied games in June, held in the concrete stadium erected by our
Engineers near Paris, the necessary funds being contributed by the
Y. M. C. A. In number of participants and quality of entry, these
games probably surpassed any of the past Olympic contests.

LEAVES AND LEAVE AREAS.

22. A leave system announced in general orders provided for a
leave of seven days every four months, but it was necessary to sus-
pend the privilege during active operations. In the leave areas free
board and lodging at first-class hotels were provided for soldiers,
and the Y. M. C. A. furnished recreational and amusement facilities.
A number of new areas were opened by the Services of Supply
immediately after the Armistice, improved transportation accommo-
dations were eventually secured, and arrangements were made
whereby men could visit England, Belgium and Italy.

It was my desire that every man in the American Expeditionary
Forces should be given an opportunity to visit Paris before returning
to the United States, but the crowded condition of the city during
the Peace Conference, transportation difficulties, and other reasons,
made it necessary to limit the number of such leaves.

EELIGIOUS WOHK.

23. Religious work in our Army before the war was carried on by
chaplains, one to each regiment. To meet the greatly increased size
of regiments, legislation was recommended by me to provide not less
than one chaplain for each 1,200 men. Although such act was passed
in June, 1918, there was a continuous shortage of chaplains with the
fighting units and in the hospitals and camps in the rear areas.
This was largely met through the ready cooperation of the Welfare
Societies who sent ministers and priests where most needed. Reli-

riNAL KEPOET OF GEST. JOHN J. PERSHING. 93

gious workers in the Y. M. C. A. and Knights of Columbus and Red
Cross also aided in the work, the Red Cross sending chaplains to the
States with units in many instances.

The religious work was directed and coordinated by a Board of
Chaplains at general headquarters, of which Bishop Charles H. Brent
was the head. With great devotion to duty this work was main-
tained despite a lack of transportation and other facilities. Chap-
lains, as never before, became the moral and spiritual leaders of their
organizations, and established a high standard of active usefulness in
religious work that made for patriotism, discipline and unselfish
devotion to duty.

EDUCATIONAL WORK.

24. Prior to the Armistice, educational work was conducted through
the organization of voluntary classes under the Y. M. C. A., the
popular subjects studied being French language, French history, and
the causes of the war. After the Armistice, measures were taken for
a systematic organization of non-military educational training.

The formal school work began January 2nd, with post schools.
Then divisional educational centers gave the equivalent of high-
school instruction and specialized on vocational training. The
American Expeditionary Forces University at Beaune carried on
undergraduate and graduate work for the technical professions, while
postgraduate work was provided by the entrance of our officers and
soldiers into French and British universities. Special schools were
organized to meet demands, such as the Practical Agricultural School
at AUery and the Art Training Center at Paris, for painting, sculp-
ture, architecture and interior decoration, advanced students being
entered in the best ateliers of Paris. Active instruction was carried
on in the base hospitals and convalescent camps.

An important branch of the educational work was the field insti-
tute of short courses and educational extension lectures, organized
to meet conditions due to the rapid repatriation of our soldiers and
the constant movement of troops. At least half of our forces were
reached by this means with brief intensive courses in business, trades,
engineering, agriculture, occupational guidance, and in citizenship.

25. On April 15 all educational work came under the complete
control of the Training Section of the General Staff. The advantage
of this change in management was at once apparent in the better
coordination of the work of an excellent body of educators. The
total attendance in the organized school system of the American
Expeditionary Forces was 230,020, of which number 181,475 at-
tended post schools, 27,250 educational centers, 8,528 the American
Expeditionary Forces University at Beaune, 367 Art Training Cen-
ters, 4,144 Mechanical Trade Schools, 6,300 French universities and

94 FINAL EEPORT OP GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

1,966 British universities. The attendance upon the institute short
courses totaled 690,000 more, and at the extension lectures 750,000,
giving a grand total of attendance at all educational formations of
1,670,020.

" The educational work in the American Expeditionary Forces was
of undoubted value, not only in improving morale, but in concrete
benefit to the individual officer and soldier. It demonstrated satis-
factorily that a combined military and educational program can be
carried out in the Army with little detriment to pure military train-
ing and with decided advantage to the individual.

STARS AND STRIPES. I

26. The Stars and Stripes was a weekly newspaper conceived
with the idea of increasing the morale of American troops by pro-
viding a common means of voicing the thought of the entire Amer-
ican Expeditionary Forces. Edited and managed by enlisted men
who declined promotion, preferring to remain in the ranks in order
better to interpret the spirit of the Army, it was a great unifying
force and materially aided in the development of an esprit de corps.
It lent loyal and enthusiastic support to Army athletics and to the
educational program. In leading the men of our Army to laugh at
their hardships, it was a distinct force for good and helped to create
a healthy viewpoint. The ^campaign it conducted for the benefit
of French orphans resulted in a fund of 2,250,000 francs.

APPRECIATION.

27. In this brief summary of the achievements of the American
Expeditionary Forces it would be impossible to cite in detail the
splendid ability, loyalty and efficiency that characterized the serv-
ice of both combatant and non-combatant individuals and organiza-
tions. The most striking quality of both officers and men was the
resourceful energy and common sense employed, under all circum-
stances, in handling their problems.

The highest praise is due the commanders of armies, corps and
divisions, and their subordinate leaders, who labored loyally and
ably toward the accomplishment of our task, suppressing personal
opinions and ambitions in the pursuit of the common aim; and to
their staffs, who . developed, with battle experience, into splendid
teams without superiors in any army.

To my Chiefs of Staff, Mhj. Gen. James G. Harbord, who was later
pluced in command of the Services of Supply, and Maj. Gen. James
"SY. McAndrew, I am deeply indebted for highly efficient services in
a post of great responsibility.

FINAL EEPORT OP GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 95

The important work of the staff at General Headquarters in organi-
zation and administration was characterized by exceptional ability
and a fine spirit of cooperation. No chief ever had a more loyal
and efficient body of assistants.

The officers and men of the Services of Supply fully realized the
importance of their duties, and the operations of that vast business
system were conducted in a manner which won for them the praise
of all. They deserve their full share in the victory.

The American civilians in Europe, both in official and private life,
were decidedly patriotic and loyal, and invariably lent encourage-
ment and helpfulness to the armies abroad.

The various societies, especially their women, including those of
the theatrical profession, and our Army nurses, played a most im-
portant part in brightening the lives of our troops and in giving aid
and comfort to our sick and wounded.

The Navy in European waters, under command of Admiral Sims,
at all times cordially aided the Army. To our sister service we owe
the safe arrival of our armies and their supplies. It is most gratify-
ing to record that there has never been such perfect understanding
between these two branches of the service.

Our armies were conscious of the support and cooperation of all
branches of the Government. Behind them stood the entire Ameri-
can people, whose ardent patriotism and sympathy inspired our
troops with a deep sense of obligation, of loyalty, and of devotion
to the country's cause never equaled in our history.

Finally, the memory of the unflinching fortitude and heroism of
the soldiers of the line fills me with greatest admiration. To them
I again pay the supreme tribute. Their devotion, their valor and
their sacrifices will live forever in the hearts of their grateful coun-
trymen.

In closing this report, Mr. Secretary, I desire to record my deep
appreciation of the unqualified support accorded me throughout the
war by the President and yourself. My task was simplified by your
confidence and wise counsel. I am, Mr. Secretary,
Very respectfully,

John J. Pershing,
General, Comm<mder-im,-GMef,
America/n Expeditonary Forces.

o

INDEX TO PLATES.

Plate 1. — ^Map of the second battle of the Marne.
Plate 2. — ^Maj) of St. Mihiel offensive. Daily front lines.
Plate 3. — Map showing successive German defensive systems. '
Plate 4. — Map of Meuse-Argonne offensive. Daily front lines.
Plate 5. — Map showing sectors held and ground advanced over by American divisions.
Plate 6. — Diagram illustrating the flow of supplies in the A. E. F.
Plate 7. — Diagram showing the absorption of German divisions by American Meuse-
Argonne offensive.
Plate 8. — Map showing principal French ports and railroads used by A. E. F.
Plate 9. — Chart A. Graphic chart showing general organization project of July 11,

1917.
Plate 10. — Chart B. Graphic chart showing organization of services of supply troops,

service of the rear project of September 18, 1917.
Plate 11. — Chart C. Graphic chart showing organization and status of combat troops

of the A. E. F. Period of armistice. General headquarters troops.
Plate 12. — Chart D. Graphic chart showing organization and status of combat troops

ot the A. E. F. Period of armistice. Army troops.
Plate 13. — Chart E. Graphic chart showing organization and status of combat troops

of the A. E. F. Period of armistice. Corps troops.
Plate 14. — Chart F. Graphic chart showing organization and status of Services of

Supply troops of the A. E'. F. Period of armistice.
Plate 15. — Chart G. Graphic chart showing organization and status of combat troops.

Period of armistice. Combat and depot divisions and summary.
Plate 16. — Map of France superimposed on that of the United States showing relative

distances and the extent of railroad systems used by the A. E. F.

151532°— 19

Plate 1

•f/C

V t EPERHAY^ — ^__ _

"t ^ To NANCY

//%? J^eC'f Inr iSDi v jn /me m.'h
J "'Di V July J 5 JuJydO

"THE SECOND 5ATTLE
OF THE MARHE**

MAP SHOWIHG SECTORS HELD

AHD OROUHD ADVANCED OVER

BY AMERICAN DIVIS10M3

IHFORMA HON FROM Da TA A vailac>l!L in JizcoRD3
ofG-3, G./i.Q

Colored SectJons Jndicafc ground gamed bu
American Di vim on 3 Their jumping off Jjn c
and line upon which IheiJ were relieved ore
3hown wi)h dates Colored lines jndicole.
jec/orj occupied bij American Divisions

When American Iroops brigaded wi/h Allies
units are indicated as having made gams it
means that the combined forces mode /he:
garni and not /he American froops a/one

3atti£- /.//vc or /^Ai? 21 . /s/a

= DoTTLF L//VC or July /a , /9/e

*7Div Ju\

Scale. im Kilomltres

5 )0 15 20

25

\

the Zl"^ Division was brigaded, mdico/ed
bij red 'B'.Ihe combined forces hio/dmg
the front shown m green from Julu 10'^^
to Jul (J 20'^. Prom Julg ZO'^ /o Aug I'l
\/he same Division was fiolding /he 6
Milometers of front shown m green as a unit On Aug I''
the Division advanced and on Aug 6'" // hod reached

^A?J'?n„^'''^d^°'f^ i""^ ^""^^"- ^^'^ ^'ne It held un/jl
Aug 10 '" when the Division was re/ie ved

EXTRACT OF MET

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Prinfed af Bsse Print/ng Plant, 29fh Engwer^i. U.S. Army, I3JS

MAP SHOWING 5

GROUND ADV

BYAM£RIC

Information Takcn From Data

OfOJS M/<TCH/N6 INDICATn C/fC

In au cAses etctPTiNs in IHnn
TmeP'^v OffiNsives whck Aaifi

JUMPlh'a OFF IINC AND LINE UFO
SHOWN miTN DATFS • COLOPCD Llh

AMcmcAN DitmoMs. ropNcusc-.
Thicrry Offfnsivfs it has BEt

PPOPdLt PIPRFSFNT ON A MAP

GAINED BY American Division.

THE OVER LAPPING OF DIVISION,
SIDE- SHITTING AND IN SOME <
OF THE FPONT LINES -rO If INFO

offensive actions, peferencl
sefara-te maps which have £
ei^titlEP 'Msuse-Afgonne Offe

ON A SCALE OF /■ 10.000 INOtVINIr
l/NES FOP THE VARIOUS DiVISI

Of The Mapnc' o/y a seals of

SAINEd ■

I¥hen American troops ap/ff>

INDICA^C:) AS HAVING M40E CA
COMB!\CO FOFfCFS A4ADe TH£
TfrOOFS ALOAIC-

BATne LINE 0.

BATTLE LINE 0/

To I
WAS 6

COMBIl
IN GFt
JUL Y Z,
NOIO/N

GREEN,
AOVAHi
TME ill
HELD .
IfAJ ^.

AL
LO,

OCHAUMONT

^ ^^ SD/y...Wnripif
5i£lvjuMLM

*

^^ B Z9D/V.Jiih

2 3l>IV.Ai,f<

VESOUL

Plate 5

MAP KNOWING ^f:CT0R5 MELD AND
GROUND ADVANCED OVER
BY AMERICAN DIVJ5I0N3

iNrc/tMA J I on Tahcn r^OM Data Avail ABi 5 Jn R/co/^oi Or GJC/f^

OfOJS »/ITCHIN6 IWICATfJ CffOU/iD 641 NCn B^ AMimCAIi D.y/3/S//S

In au cascs [tee f Tins w Mrvst-AjfsonNc, Sr '4imisl i CturiAV-

TmlPOY OrflNJIVfS KtHtn AMfFICAN DltmOrtS ACVANCtO . TH[IR
JUMPi^S O.'F l//t[ AND UNI UfOn WHICH T»[Y WCPC PCLICVfO APC
MOUy ^ITH DATrS • COiORCC UK[5 INDICATZ StCTtVlS OCCUP/fD OT

.Am[/hcah Dirisio/1!. roR Mcusi-Aikonnc -St Mihi[l &C»ATeAU-
TnicRgy Orrensivfs it has aefN fvund imppacticabu to
pffoprtLt PCPPese.vT on a map or this scalc thc GfOUNO
GAiNCo BY A/nemcAfi Divisions in this manncp owins to
THE ovrRLAPPiNS or Divisional scctops, thcir rPEsyfNT

5lDC-SMIf7IN6 AND IN JOMC CASCS THE LACK Or CONTIMUITY

or THE rPONT LINE! -For ineormation on these three

OfENJIvC ACTIONS, REEERrnCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE
SEPARATE MAPS WHICH HAVE BEEN ISSLIEO ON A LAPSER SCALE
ENTITLED 'MEI/SE-Ap60NNE OEEENSIVE' &'ST MiMIEL OrEENSIVE'
ON A SCALE or / $0,000 SHOhflNa THE DAILY POSITION OE FRONT
l/NES roR THE VARIOl/3 DIVISIONS SNSAOEDl SECOND BATTLE

Of The Marne' OAf a scale or i.iooooo jNomsi e/fru.-io

SAiNED ■

Mien Americ-an troops sr/saded t^/rn Allied units are

iNDlCATfo AS HAVINe MADE HAMS, IT MEANS THAT THE
COMBr^EC rORCes MADE TH5 CFA/f^ AND NOT T^f AMERICAN
TROOPS /^iONE •

BATTLE LINE OP JULY IB 1318.

battle: line or nov // 191B.

DIV DIVISION
li ILLUSTRATE. IN THE r 16 LIRE. THE 27 DIVISION
WAS BRICAOED. INDICATED BY RED "B ' THE
COMBINED rORCES HOIOINLf THE r/fONT SHCWN
IH ORE EN fROM JUL'' 10 V TO JULY ZOTt ■ FkOM
JULY EOCE TO MUa ISr THE SAME CU VISION WAS
NOLO! NO THE e K'LOMErERS OP PRONT SHOWN IN
SREEN, AS A UNIT- On AuSUST /L' THE DIVISION
ADVAHCEn AND ON AuCuST 6T! IT HAD /fEACNfO
THE LINE INDICATED /iuS 6-IO- ThiS LINE IT
HELD UNTIL /luei/ST/OS'.trHEN 77/F DIWSWN
WAS RELIEVED-

ALSACE
LORRAINE

STRASBOURG

► COLMAR

I MULttOUSE

VESOUL

Plate 6

Diagram Illustrating

THE r LOW or Supplies

IN THE.

American Explditionary Forces

.Tiequisi tion c U 5 by CO 505

45 Dqu Level

30DaLt Level

15 Dau Level

Base Depots

i nt ehm edi ate
Depot s

90Day3 Supplies in France

I Advance
Depots

Purchases in France
by GR4 ^or CO 50!)

Distnbates Supplies
into Dejpots of 505

t9ZQ. r-A-

y'

t^ ,,-

■

fl '

\

" -'

\ tiiG
• ^ Of r

_t'

r^

B .

A

N

art '^

1-

I'^^AkM) ' 2'^AftTiY ^i^AI^rlT DETACHED IHlT.S

A- Pneumatic Duffer'- Storage at Regulatina 5tation5 sufficient only to overcome unavoidable irregularity
of shipment from Depots and to insure uniform flow at Pailheads^ Permits no over- accumulation.
R-T?ailhead5 Pointi at which supplies are delivered to •organizations.

PLATE 7

rroo Srltlih Front

rroa FrcDCb Front
ui4 ritura.

froa

fr«Bob

Soot

Fron
Froach

-^l.D] Front
Aleact

gg* Pi LorralD*

fn-a HIT a toa l3T~iJI [fcTrolliiB cl lest di G~ISI Eo^
m^ fnij f33~&l p-jj [m~al 1106 tgi( faiTD] (iFalJ IxoT^ [" 1 ^3

DlTlelOD* klrsftd; in llo* or IookI reearr*
Aacrlowi tToDt. S«pt, Z£nd. 1919

ABSORBTION OF GERMAN DIVISIONS BY AMERICAN MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE.

-i»^?I^r'^l' ^^^l^ includes two divlQious from the ea-^tern front which actually went into line oppo-
Jf .K a"^™?*"*"^.®^"** ^^h ^."' ^*'*'y relie/ed twodiVi<ion^ which went immerliatelv to the front
Of tne American First Army, and their appearance can be credited only to the Meuie-Argonne offensive.

151532—19

Plate 8

PRinClPAL TREnCH PORTS AMD RAILROADS
U5LD BY AMERlCAn EXPLDlTIOnART FORCES

:!LnCRAL nCAOOOABTLRS ® "-C SERVICL5 Of SOPPlV • PRINCIPAL P0RT5 O StCOMDARY P0RT5

■* MA'r^ LINES nui o mm a, srcOND Lints cnt^^Tnwo slKLi

O IMPORTANT TOWNS
s—x"****- OTHER LIMES

General Organization Prouect

Arm{/ Troops

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161582— 1»

PLATE 9

RouEGT, Ap^proved Julv IIth. 1917.

CHART A

CORPS AND CORP5 TROOPS

Cdrpjttcodguor/crj D /feacftjuar/erj TroopU
4 COMBAT DIVI5ION5^ffff/7o/<r;
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D D a D

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P L V T R O

mb er /6 th, J 9J 7

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PLATE 11

Organization and 5tatus of Combat Troop5 or tme American Expeditionary Torcels

ShowJng unJ/j in £uropc, on 5hippJng Program and required fo compJc/e organizaNon at fhePerJod of //leJJg/i/ng of Ihe j^rwhiJce

Commander in Cmicf and 5TArF 1X1
/feod^guar/erj AaffiiJjon IS
3 Armies
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G.M.aTROCLP5

CHART C

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LEGEND
nu/vfjnccesjargfocojjopfcfe.guo/a according fo TabfcJ of Organization or Projecfs.
^Unit5 on Jihipping program fo Jan. I-st, J319 orJnprocejj of Orgon/zafjon in rrancc

^ Unif J assigned ujindica fed. ^ ., . ... ^^ ■ ^■^

BCfnifjavalfabie Cin reserve. /raining or femporanJu serving mffi of her organjzafjons)

NOTE

3ee Chori "D'fordefoifs of Armies and
Army Troops

151532—19

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Medical Dcipt

Amb Jec//on f/ZJec/Jon
Jani/cru Tra/r Mo/ Coj /fcrscCo Afof C oj /forjcCo Co/np Infirm MedJupl/ni/

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-*-_._0/)fe.,_E«>..JII/)(i..IIk,__n

20 Ammuni/ion Jupp/y Coj

^<'---n^-.J2*.-JIl*__JIl^.__J3^_..IIife..Il*..Xlofoi_Il(^JIl

X

;. //ence,Jn

LEGEND

n C/nJ/j necejjari/ Jo comp/ele guo/o according /o TobJes ofOrganizo//on orProjcc/j CS Uni/j ojjJgnec/oj jnd/ca/Gc/.

^ Unil^ on j/i Jpp J ng program foJan Jj/, /9J9 orJnproccjj ofOrganizoIJon jn fran ce H Un//j ayaJ/obJeOn rejeryeJrajnJnQ or /c/nporarj/ij jervJ ng with o/her oroanJza/Jonj.

PLATE 12

ES-.'vN ARMIE:5 and ArMV TROOP6

^e Arm}5/Jce. November JJ fh, J3/3.

CHART [)

"W

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-H - , .Pt^^on Co

IS

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5 C O R P 3 (^ee no/e)
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LEGEND

UC/nJ/j necGJjari/ /o complete guo/o cccordmg/o TbbJej o/ Or<7onjzaL on or firoye c/s. iZl Un//j assjgned oj yndJca/ed

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161032—19

Org A N I Z AT I O N

AND 5

m Lurope,

TATIJ5 OF 5ERVIC
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PLATE 15

Organization and Status or Combat Troop5 or tme American EIxpeditionary Forces

onowjng'^unj/j jnLuropcon JhiwJng Program and required to compJe/c organizafwn at Ihe Period of fhe Signing of Ihc Arfni3/jce

' ~ CHART G

SUMMARY

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