Tanks in the great war, 1914-1918

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Tanks in the great war 1914-1918.

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TANKS IN THE GREAT WAR

TANKS
IN THE GREAT WAR

1914-1918

Brevet-Colonel J. F. C. FULLER, D.S.O.

(Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry)

NEW YORK
E. P. BUTTON AND COMPANY

1920

DEDICATIONS

I dedicate this book to the modern military scientists, that
small company oj gentlemen who, imbued with a great
idea, were willing to set all personal interest aside in order
to design a machine destined to revolutionise the science

of war.

II

/ dedicate this book to the modern armourers of the British
factories, those men and women whose untiring patriotism
and indomitable endurance in the workshops produced a
weapon whereby the lives of many oJ their comrades were

saved.

Ill

/ dedicate this book to the modern knights in armour, the
fighting crews oj the Tank Corps ; those Officers, Non-com-
missioned Officers and Men, who, through their own high
courage and noble determination on the battlefield, main-
tained Liberty and accomplished Victory.

INTRODUCTION

The following work is the story of a great and unique adven-
ture as heroic as the exploits of the Argonauts of old, and,
though the time perhaps has not yet arrived wherein to
judge the part played by tanks in the Great War, I feel
that, whatever may be the insight and judgment of the
eventual historian of the British Tank Corps, he will prob-
ably lack that essential ingredient of all true history — the
witnessing of the events concerning which he relates.

I, the writer of this book, first set eyes on a tank towards
the end of August 1916. At this time I little thought that
I should eventually be honoured by becoming the Chief
General Staff Officer of the Tank Corps, for a period extend-
ing from December 1916 to August 1918. The time
spent during this long connection with the greatest military
invention of the Great War, it is hoped, has not been alto-
gether wasted, and the story here set forth represents my
appreciation of having been selected to fill so intensely
interesting an appointment.

Besides having witnessed and partaken in many of the
events related, those who have assisted me in this book
have all been either closely connected with the Tank Corps
or in the Corps itself, they one and all were partakers in
either the creation of the Corps or in the many actions in
which it fought.

So much assistance have I received that I can at most
but consider myself as editor to a mass of information
provided for me by others. Those I more especially
wish to thank [amongst this I goodly company are the
following :

Captain£the Hon. Evan Charteris, G.S.0.3, Tank Corps,

xii INTRODUCTION

for the accurate and careful records of the Corps which he
compiled from the earliest days of the tank movement in
1914, to the close of the battle of Cambrai. Many of these
were written under, shall I say, far from luxurious circum-
stances, for Captain Charteris, I feel, must have often found
himself, in his shell-blasted estaminet, less well cared for
than the rats of Albert and as much out of place as Alcibiades
in a Peckham parlour.

When Captain Charteris forsook the " cabaret sans nom,"
for some ill-disposed shell had removed half the signboard,
Captain O. A. Archdale, A.D.C. to General EUes, took up
the difficult task and, from March 1918 onwards, kept the
Tank Corps Diary upon which Chapters XXIX, XXXIII,
XXXV, and XXXVII are founded.

Taking now the chapters seriatim, I have to thank Major
G. W. G. Allen, M.C., G.S.0.2, War Office,' for parts of
Chapter I, and also the editors of The American Machinist
and The Engineer for allowing me to quote respectively from
the following admirable articles : " The Forerunner of the
Tank," by H. H. Manchester, and " The Evolution of the
Chain Track Tractor " ; Sir Eustace Tennyson D'Eyncourt,
K.C.B., Director of Naval Construction, the Admiralty, and
Major-General E. D. Swinton, C.B., D.S.O., both pioneers
of the tanks, and indefatigable workers in the cause, for
much of the information in Chapters II and IV ; Major
H. S. Sayer, G.S.0.2, War Office, = for Chapter III ; Major
O. A. Forsyth-Major, Second in Command of the Palestine
Tank Detachment, for the reports relative to the second
and third battles of Gaza, upon which Chapters XI and
XVII are based; Major S. H. Foot, D.S.O., G.S.0.2, War
Office,' my close friend and fearless assistant, for suggestions
generally, and particularly in Chapter XVI. My thanks are
also due to some unknown but far-sighted benefactor of the
Tank Corpsfor Chapter XX; to Lieutenant-ColonelD. W. Brad-
ley, D.S.O., and Brigadier-General E. B. Mathew-Lannowe,
C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C. Tank Corps Training Centre, Wool, for

' Previously a Tank Corps engineer officer in France. a Ibid.

^ Previously Brigade Major, 2nd Tank Brigade, in France.

INTRODUCTION xiii

information regarding the Depot in Chapter XXI ; to the
relentlessly inventive Lieutenant-Colonel L. C. A. de B. Doucet,
O.C. Tank Carrier Units, and so commander of the first
supply fleet which ever " set sail " on land, for information
to be found in Chapter XXII ; to Lieutenant-Colonel
J. D. M. Molesworth, M.C., A.D.A.S., Tank Corps, who in
spite of the scholastics gave the lie to the tag Ex nihilo
nihil fit, for parts of Chapter XXIV ; to Major R. Spencer,
M.C., Liaison Officer, Tank Corps, whose unfailing charm
and insight always succeeded in extracting from our brave
Allies not only the glamour of great adventures but the
detail of truthful occurrences, for the events described in
Chapters XXV and XXXVI; to Major F. E. Hotblack,
D.S.O., M.C., G.S.0.2, War Office,^ my friend and com-
panion, who unfailingly would guide any one over wire
and shell-hole immune and unscathed, for Chapters XXVIII,
XXX:i, and XXXIV ; to Lieutenant C. B. Arnold, D.S.O.,
Commander of Whippet Tank " Musical Box," for the simple
and heroic exploit related in Chapter XXX ; to Major T. L.
Leigh Mallory, D.S.O., O.C. 8th Squadron, R.A.F., whose
energy resulted not only in the cementing of a close com-
radeship between the two supreme mechanical weapons of
the age but of a close co-operation which saved many lives
in battle, for much of Chapter XXXII ; to Lieutenant-
Colonel E. J. Carter, O.C. 17th Tank Armoured Car Battalion,
who was as great a terror to the German Corps Commanders
as Paul Jones was to the Manchester merchantmen and who
had the supreme honour to break over the Rhine the first
British flag — the colours of the Tank Corps — for Chapter
XXXVIII.

It was a great brotherhood, the Tank Corps, and if there
were " duds " in it there certainly were not old ones, for
the Commander of the Corps, Major-General H. J. EUes, C.B.,
D.S.O., was under forty, and most of his staff and sub-
ordinate commanders were younger than himself. Youth
is apt, rightly, to be enthusiastic, and General Elles must
frequently have had a trying time in regulating this enthu-
1 Previously G.S.0.2, Intelligence Headquarters, Tank Corps.

xiv INTRODUCTION

siasm, canalising it forward against the enemy and backward
diplomatically towards our friends.

We of the Tank Corps Headquarters Staff knew what we
wanted. Realising the power of the machine which the brains
of England had created, we never hesitated over a " No "
when we knew that hundreds if not thousands of lives
depended on a " Yes."

Modestly, looking back on the war from a comfortable
armchair in London, I see clearly, quite clearly, that we were
right. The war has proved it, and our endeavours were not
in vain. We were right, and youth generally is right, for it
possesses mental elasticity, its brains are plastic and not
polarised. The mental athlete is the young man : the Great
War, like all other wars, has proved this again and again.
We have heard much of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, but
they scoffed at the tank just as Wurmser and Alvinzi scoffed
at the ragged voltigeurs of the Army of Italy with which
the Little Corporal was, in 1796, about to astonish Europe.
We have also astonished Europe, we who wandered over the
Somme battlefield with dimmed eyes, and over the Flanders
swamps with a lump in our throats.

There was Colonel F. Searle, C.B.E., D.S.O., Chief Engineer
of the Corps, a true civilian with a well-cut khaki jacket
and lion-tamer's boots. He could not understand the mili-
tary ritual, and we soldiers seemed never to be able to
explain it to him. Throughout the war, in spite of his im-
mense mechanical labours, I verily believe he had only one
wish, and this was to erect a guillotine outside a certain
holy place. There was Major G. A. Green, M.C., Colonel
Searle's deputy, the father of terrible propositions, the
visitor of battlefields, the searcher after shell-holes, the
breather of profane words. The Corps owed a lot to Green ;
a firm believer in seeing things before criticising them, he
was a very great asset.

The " King of Grocers," this was Colonel T. J. Uzielli,
D.S.O., M.C., D.A. and Q.M.G. of the Corps, business-like,
and an administrator from boot to crown. Suave yet fear-
less, tactful yet truthful, the Corps owed much to his abilitv.

INTRODUCTION xv

It was never left in want, his decision gave it what it asked
for, his prevision cut down this asking to a minimum. Ably
seconded by Major H. C. Atkin-Berry, D.S.O., M.C., and
Major R. W. Dundas, M.C., the " A " and " Q " branches of the
Tank Corps Staff formed the foundation of the Corps' efficiency.
On the " G " side there was myself. Under me came
Major G. le Q. Martel, D.S.O., M.C., very much R.E. and
still more tanks, the man who " sloshed " friend or foe.
One day, in March 1918, I was at Fricourt, then none too
healthy. Martel walked down the road : " Where are you
going ? " I shouted. " To Montauban," he answered. " I
hear it is full of Boche," I replied. " Well, I will go and
see," said Martel, and off he moved eastwards. There was
Major F. E. Hotblack, D.S.O., M.C., lover of beauty and
battles, a mixture of Abelard and Marshal Ney. Were Ninon
de I'Enclos alive he would have been at her elbow ; as she is
dust, he, instead, collected "troddels " ^off dead Germans — a
somewhat remarkable character. As G.S.0.2 Training, Major
H. Boyd-Rochfort, D.S.O., M.C., from West Meath, his
enthusiasm for tanks nearly wrecked a famous corps; yet
Boyd only smiled, and his smile somehow always reminded
one of Peter Kelly's whisky, there was a handshake or a
fight in it. The two G.S.O.sS were Captain the Hon. E.
Charteris and Captain I. M. Stewart, M.C. Charteris was
the " Arbiter Elegantiarum " of our Headquarters. He kept
the Corps' records, as already stated, and without these it
would scarcely have been possible to write this history. He
was our mattre cCMtel ; he gave us beach nut bacon and
honey for breakfast, kept his weather eye open for a one-
armed man, elaborated menus which rivalled those of
Trimalchio, and gave sparkle to us all by the ripple of his
wit. Lastly, Ian Stewart of the Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders. In kilts, no girl between Hekla and Erebus has
ever been konwn to resist him ; but his efforts, whilst in the
Tank Corps, did not lie in conquering hearts but in perpetually
worrying my unfortunate self to become party to his own
suicide — for nothing would keep him from the battlefield.

' German bayonet tassels.

xvi INTRODUCTION

The first three brigadiers of the Corps were all remark-
able men. Brigadier-General C. D'A. B. S. Baker-Carr,
C.M.G., D.S.O., commanding the 1st Tank Brigade, started
the war as a gentleman chauffeur, a most cheery companion,
the Murat of the Corps, ever ready for a battle or a game.
I remember him at Montenescourt, during the battle of
Arras 1917, fighting with the telephone, at Ypres fighting
with the nnud, at Cambrai fighting with a comfortable, vacant,
rotund little man, but ever cheerful and prepared to meet
you with a smile and a glass of old brandy. Commanding
the 2nd Tank Brigade was Brigadier-General A. Courage,
D.S.O., M.C. He possessed only half a jaw, having lost the
rest at Ypres ; yet at conferences he was a host in himself,
and what a " pow-wow " must have been like before the
Boche bullet hit him is not even to be found in the works
of the great Munchausen. No detail escaped his eye, no
trouble was too great, and no fatigue sufficient to suggest a
pause. The successes of Hamel and Moreuil in 1918 were
due to his energy, and on these successes was the battle of
Amiens founded. The last of the original Brigadiers was
Brigadier-General J. Hardress-Lloyd, D.S.O., commanding
the 3rd Tank Brigade. He started the war as a stowaway.
This resulted in no one ever discovering what his substantive
rank was ; by degrees a myth as to his origin was cultivated
by innumerable "A" clerks both in France and England;
these lived and throve on this mystery, which no doubt will
at a distant date be elucidated by some future Lempri^re.
Hardress-Lloyd was one of the main causes of the battle of
Cambrai. He, I believe, introduced the idea to General Sir
Julian Byng, this away back in August 1917. Hardress-
Lloyd was a man of big ideas and always kept a good table
and a fine stable — in fact, a heau sahreur. I will leave
Hardress at that.

Above are to be sought the real foundations of the Corps'
efficiency under its gallant Commander, Major-General H. J.
EUes, C.B., D.S.O., who endowed it with that high moral,
that fine esprit de corps and jaunty esprit de cocarde which
impelled it from one success to another. These foundations

INTRODUCTION xvii

no future historian is likely to be so intimately acquainted
with as I — and now for the story.^

The history itself is purposely uncritical, because any
criticism which might have been included is so similar to
that directed against the introducers of the locomotive
and the motor-car that it would be but a repetition, tedious
enough to the reader, were it here repeated.

Human opinion is conservative by instinct, and what to
mankind is most heterodox is that which is most novel : this
is a truism in war as it is in pohtics or reUgion. It took
1000 years for gunpowder to transform war. In 1590, a
certain Sir John Smythe wrote a learned work : " Certain
discourses concerning the forms and effects of divers sorts
of weapons, and other very important matters militarie,
greatUe mistaken by divers of our men of warre in these
dales ; and chiefly, of the Mosquet, the Caliver, and the
Long-bow ; as also of the great sufficiencie, excellencie and
wonderful effects of Archers," in which he extols an obso-
lete weapon and decries a more modern one — ^the arquebus.
" For the reactionaries of his time George Stephenson with
his locomotive was the original villan of the piece ; he was
received with unbridled abuse and persecution. Most of
Stephenson's time was spent in fighting fools." ^ At the
beginning of the present century nearly every Enghsh coimtry
gentleman swore that nothing would ever induce him to
exchange his carriage for a motor-car — yet the locomotive
and the motor-car have triumphed, and triumphed so com-
pletely that all that their inventors claimed for them appears
to-day as hostile criticism against their accomplishments.

So with the tank, it has come not only to stay but to
revolutionise, and I for one, enthusiastic as I am, do not for
a minute doubt that my wildest dreams about its future
will not only be realised but surpassed, and that from its
clumsy endeavours in the Great War will arise a completely
new direction in the art of warfare itself.

1 Certain chapters of this history origiaally appeared in a privately cir-
culated series of papers entitled Weekly Tank Notes.

2 Hcmii to make Railways Pay for the War, p. 6. By Roy Horniman.

2

xviii INTRODUCTION

That the Tank had, and still has, many doubters, many
open critics, is true enough ; but there is no disparagement
in this, rather is it a comphment, for the masses of mankind
are myopic, and had they accepted it with acclaim how
difficult would it have been for it even to come, let alone stay
and grow.

The criticism directed against this greatest military in-
vention of the war was the stone upon which its progress
was whetted. Without criticism we might still have Big
Willie, but we enthusiasts determined that not only would
we break down this criticism by means of the machine
itself, but that we would render our very machine ridiculous by
machines of a better type, and it is ridicule which kills. So we
proceeded, and as type followed type, victory followed victory.
Then our critics tacked and veered : it was not the tank they
objected to but our opinions regarding it ; they were over-
statements ; why, we should soon be claiming for it powers
to boil their morning tea and shave them whilst still in
bed. Why not ? If such acts are required, a tank can
be built to accomplish them, because the tank possesses
power and energy, and energy is the motive force of all
things.

It is just this point that the critics missed ; their minds
being controlled by the conventions of the day. They could
not see that if the horse-power in a man is x, that the cir-
cumference of his activities is a circle with x as its radius.
They could not see that if the horse-power of a machine is
lOOa; its circumference will be vastly greater than that of
man's ; neither could they see that whilst in man x is con-
stant, provided the man is supplied regularly with beef,
bread and beer, in a machine x may be increased almost in-
definitely, and that if a circle with n as its circumference will
not embrace the problem, probably all that is necessary is to
add more x's to its radius. Indeed, the science of mechanics
is simplicity itself when compared with that of psychology, and
as in war mechanics grow so will psychology, in comparison,
dwindle, imtil perhaps we may see in armies as complete a
change from hand-weapons to machine-weapons as we have

INTRODUCTION xix

seen in our workshops from hand-tools to machine-tools,
and the economy will be as proportionate.

Before the Great War I was a believer in conscription
and in the Nation in Arms; I was an 1870 soldier. My
sojourn in the Tank Corps has dissipated these ideas. To-
day I am a believer in war mechanics, that is, in a mechanical
army which requires few men and powerful machines.
Equally am I a disbehever in what a venerable acquaintance,
old in ideas rather than years, said to me on the afternoon
of November 11th, 1918. These are his words, and I repeat
them as he exclaimed them : " Thank God we can now get
back to real soldiering ! "

J. F. C. F.

Langham Hotel, London, W.l.
November 20, 1919.

CONTENTS

OHAPXER

I. THE ORIGINS OF THE TANK .

II. THE INVENTION OF THE LANDSHIP .

III. MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TANKS

IV. THE MARK I TANK AND ITS TACTICS

V. THE BATTLES OF THE SOMME AND ANCRE

VI. THE GROWTH OF THE TANK CORPS ORGANISA
TION

VII. TANK "esprit DE CORPS "

VIII. TANK TACTICS

IX. THE BATTLE OF ARRAS .

X. TANK BATTLE RECORDS .

XI. THE SECOND BATTLE OF GAZA

XII. STAFF WORK AND BATTLE PREPARATION

XIII. THE BATTLE OF MESSINES

XIV. A TACTICAL APPRECIATION
XV. THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES

XVI. TANK MECHANICAL ENGINEERING

XVII. THE THIRD BATTLE OF GAZA .

XVIII. ORIGINS OF THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

XIX. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

XX. AN INFANTRY APPRECIATION OF TANKS

XXI. THE TANK CORPS TRAINING CENTRE

XXII. THE TANK SUPPLY COMPANIES I

1

18
35
49
54

60

68

73

81

90

98

103

108

113

117

125

130

135

140

154

159

166

xxu CONTENTS

CHATTEE PAGE

XXIII. THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME . .172

XXIV. TANK SIGNALLING ORGANISATION . . 178
XXV. THE FRENCH TANK CORPS . . . .184

XXVI. PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT OFFENSIVE . 199

XXVII. THE BATTLES OF HAlviEL AND MOREUIL . 204

XXVIII. GERMAN TANK OPERATIONS . • .212

XXIX. THE BATTLE OF AMIENS .... 217

XXX. THE FIGHT OF A WHIPPET TANK . . 230

XXXI. GERMAN APPRECIATION OF BRITISH TANKS . 236

XXXII. AEROPLANE CO-OPERATION WITH TANKS . 242

XXXIII. THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME AND THE SECOND

BATTLE OF ARRAS ..... 250

XXXIV. GERMAN ANTI-TANK TACTICS . . . 260

XXXV. THE BATTLES OF EPEHY AND CAMBRAI ST.

QUENTIN ...... 266

XXXVI. THE U.S.A. TANK CORPS . . . 277

XXXVII. THE BATTLES OF THE SELLE AND MAUBEUGE 283

XXXVIII. THE 17TH TANK ARMOURED CAR BATTALION . 289

XXXIX. A RETROSPECT OF WHAT TANKS HAVE ACCOM-
PLISHED ...... 297

XL. A FORECAST OF WHAT TANKS MAY DO . 308

INDEX 323

PLATE
I.

11.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PLATES

BIG WILLIE, MOTHER OR CENTIPEDE, ORIGINAL MARK I

TANK ....... Frontispiece

PACING PAHH

LITTLE WILLIE AND MARK IV TANK (fEMALE) . . 26

GROUND OPERATED OVER BY TANKS DURING THE
BATTLE OF MESSINES, SHOWING PRELIMINARY
BOMBARDMENT ON JUNE 5, 1917 : AND 'GROUND
OPERATED OVER BY TANKS IN AUGUST 1917,
DURING THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES . . 122

III. AIEDIUM MARK " A " TANK (wHIPPET) . . . 176

IV. FRENCH SCHNEIDER TANK AND FRENCH ST. CHAMOND

TANK 186

V. MARK V TANK (MALE) ...... 204

VI. FRENCH RENAULT TANK AND GERMAN TANK . . 214

VII. GUN CARRIER AND MARK V STAR TANK (fEMALE) . 220

DIAGRAMS

1. SCOTTISH WAR CART, 1456

2. VALTURIO'S WAR CHARIOT, 1472

3. HOLZSCHUHER'S battle CAR, 1558

4. SIMON stevin's landship, 1599

5. THE APPLEGARTH TRACTOR, 1886

6 and 6a. the batter tractor, 1888

7 to 15. TANK tactics .

16. GERMAN ARTILLERY TACTICS

xxiii

PAGE

3

5

6

7

10

12 and 13

75 and 77

. 115

XXIV

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

MAPS

FAOINQ PAGE

I. THE BATTLE OF ARRAS, APRIL 9, 1917 ... 84

II. THE SECOND BATTLE OF GAZA, APRIL 17, 1917 . 100

III. THE BATTLE OF MESSINES, JUNE 7, 1917 . . 110

IV. THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPEES, JULY 31, 1917 . 120

V. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, NOVEMBER 20, 1917 . 146

VI. THE BATTLE OF SOISSONS, JULY 18, 1918 . . 192

VII. THE BATTLE OF HAMEL, JULY 4, 1918 . . . 206

VIII. THE BATTLE OF MOREUIL, JULY 23, 1918 . . 208

IX. THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, AUGUST 8, 1918 . . 222

X. GENERAL MAP ..... End of Volume

TANKS IN THE GREAT WAR

CHAPTER I

THE ORIGINS OF THE TANK

In war the main problem to solve is — " How to give blows
without receiving them " ; it has always been so and is
likely always to remain so, for battles are two-act tragedies :
the first act consisting in hitting and the second in securing
oneself against being hit.

If we look back on the 4,000 years of the known history
of war, we shall find that its problems are always the same :
thus in battle the soldier has to think of four main acts :
(i) How to strike his opponent when at a distance from
him;

(ii) How to move forward towards him;

(iii) How to strike him at close quarters ;

(iv) How to prevent himself being struck throughout the
whole of this engagement.

In these four acts must be sought the origins of the tank,
the idea of which is, therefore, much older than the Trojan
horse ; indeed, it dates back to some unknown period when
aboriginal man raised his arm to ward off the blow of an
infuriated beast or neighbour.

To ward off a blow with the bare skin is sometimes a
painful operation ; why not then cover the arm with leather
or iron, why not carry a shield, why not encase the whole
body in steel so that both arms instead of one may be used
to hit with, for then man's offensive power will be doubled ?

If we look back on the Middle Ages, we find that such
a condition of fighting was actually possible and that knights
clad in armour cap-a-pie were practically invulnerable.

1

2 THE ORIGINS OF THE TANK

As regards these times th^re is an authentic record concern-
ing twenty-five knights in armour who rode out one day
and met a great mob of insurgent peasants which they
charged and routed, killing and wounding no fewer than 1,200
of them, without sustaining a single casualty themselves.
To all intents and purposes, these knights were living tanks
— a combination of muscular energy, protective armour, and
offensive weapons.

Knights in armour remained practically invulnerable as
long as the propellant for missile weapons was hmited to
the bow-string and as long as the knights fought within the
limitations which their armour imposed upon them. At
Crecy and similar battles, the chivalry of France suffered
defeat more through the condition of ground they attempted
to negotiate, than through the arrows of the English archers.
They, in fact, became " ditched " like a tank in the mud,
and being rendered immobile, fell an easy prey to the enemy's
men-at-arms. A fact which proves that it was not the
arrow which generally destroyed the knight is that the
archers were equipped with maces or leaden hammers ^ by
means of which the knight could, when once bogged or
" belHed," be stunned, rendered innocuous, his armour
opened, and he himself taken prisoner for ransom.

The true banisher of armour was gunpowder, for when
once the thickest armour, which human energy would per-
mit of being worn, could be penetrated, it became but an
encumbrance to its wearer. Though gunpowd«r was intro-
duced as a missile propellant on the battlefield as early as
the twelfth century, it was not until the close of the four-
teenth and beginning of the fifteenth centuries that its influ-
ence began to be felt, and it is interesting to note that
directly it became apparent that the hand gun would beat
armour carried by men, other means of carrying it were
introduced. These means took the form of battle cars or

1 The arrow was the means of immobilising the knight by forcing him to
dismount. Horse armour was never very satisfactory. Kegarding the
maces, a chronicler writes of their use by tl;ie archers at Aginoourt : " It
seemed as though they were hammering upon anvils."

-''^'"4"i'-iii_ ii!'ji: |.u|L! I'l, ijiL;;

jrryj

Diagram 1. Scottish Wab Cart, 1456.
3

4 THE ORIGINS OF THE TANK

mobile fortresses/ Conrad Kyeser,' in his military manu-
script, written between 1395 and 1405, pictures several
" battle cars." Some of these are equipped with lances,
whilst others are armed with cannon. A few years later, in
1420, Fontana designed a large " battle car," and the
following year Archinger another, to enclose no fewer
than 100 men. All these cars were moved by means of
muscle power, i.e. men or animals harnessed inside them.
A picture of one of these is to be found in Francis Grose's
Military Antiquities, vol. I, p. 388 (see Diagram 1). Its
crew consisted of eight men, the same as the Mark I Tank.
The following extract concerning these carts is of interest :

" Another species of artillery were the war carts, each
carrying two Peteraros or chamber'd pieces ; several of
these carts are represented in the Cowdry picture of the
siege of Bullogne, one of which is given in this work ; these
carts seem to have been borrowed from the Scotch ; Henry,
in his History of England, mentions them as peculiar to
that nation, and quotes the two following acts of parliament
respecting them; one a.d. 1456 wherein they are thus de-
scribed : ' it is tocht speidfull that the King mak requiest
to certain of the great burrows of the land that are of ony
myght, to mak carts of weir, and in elk cart twa gunnis and
ilk one to have twa chalmers, with the remnant of the graith
that effeirs thereto, and an cunnard man to shute thame.'
By another Act, a.d. 1471, the prelates and barons are com-
manded to provide such carts of war against their old
enemies the English (Black Acts, James II, Act 52, James III,
Act 55)."

With all these war carts the limitations imposed upon
them by muscular motive force must have been consider-
able on any save perfectly firm and level ground, conse-

^ The idea of a mobile fortress or battle car is very old : chariots are known
to have existed in Assyria as far back as the year 3500 B.C. The Egyptians
and Israelites both adopted them from this source. In Biblical times their
tactical utility was considerable, as the Book of Judges relates. The Chinese
as early as 1200 B.C., made use of war cars armotu-ed against projectiles.

2 Much of the following information is taken from an article entitled
" The Forerunner of the Tank," by H. H. Manchester, published in The
American Mechanist, vol. 49, No. 15.

FIFTEENTH-CENTURY WAR CARTS 5

quently other means of movement were attempted, and
during the last quarter of the fifteenth century the battle
car enters its second phase. In a work of Valturio's dated
1472, a design is to be found of one of these vehicles pro-
pelled by means of wind wheels (see Diagram 2). Ten years
later we find Leonardo da Vinci engaged in the design of

Diagram 2. Valtueio's Wab Chariot, 1472.

another type of self-moving machine. Writing to Ludovico
Sforza he says :

" I am building secure and covered chariots which are
invulnerable, and when they advance with their guns into
the midst of the foe, even the largest enemy masses must
retreat ; and behind them the infantry can follow in safety
and without opposition."

What the motive force of this engine of war was is un-
known, but the above description is that of the tank of to-
day, in fact so accurate is this description that Leonardo

o

o

SIXTEENTH-CENTURY LANDSHIPS 7

da Vinci, nearly 350 years ago, had a clearer idea of a tank
operation than many a British soldier had prior to the
battle of Cambrai, fourteen months after the first tank had
taken the field.

DiAQBAM 4. Simon Stevin's Landship, 1599.

A somewhat similar self-moving wagon was designed for
Maximilian I and in 1558 Holzschuher describes a battle car
a picture of which shows it jn action preceded by infantry
and flanked b y cavalry (se e Diagram"^

8 THE ORIGINS OF THE TANK

In 1599 Simon Stevin is supposed to have constructed for
the Prince of Orange two veritable landships ; these con-
sisted in small battleships fully rigged, mounted upon wheels
(see Diagram 4).

" The earhest Enghsh patent for a self-moving wagon
which could, if desired, be used in war, was probably that*
taken out by David Ramsey in 1634. In 1658 Caspar Schott
designed one to inclose 100 men and to be employed against
the Turks." '

All the users of these inventions were destined to disap-
pointment, for the science of mechanics was not sufficiently
advanced to render self-movement practical and it was not
until the middle of the eighteenth century that a fresh at-
tempt was made to reintroduce so essential a weapon as
the war cart. The following account of this reintroduction
is quoted from Mr. Manchester's most interesting article :

" After the practical application of steam by Watt in 1765
we "find an early attempt to apply it to land transporta-
tion in what must be considered the first steam automobile.
As early as 1769 Cugnot in France set a steam boiler upon
the frame of a wagon and succeeded in making the wagon
go. His idea was that this invention could be used in war,
and on this presumption he was the next year assisted by
the government to construct an improvement. The speed,
however, was scarcely more than 2j miles an hour, and the
machine would run only twenty minutes before it had to
stop for fifteen minutes to get up more steam. In his first
public trial he had the ill-luck to run into and knock down
part of a stone wall. This led to his being temporarily cast
into jail, and his experiments were abandoned. Napoleon
must have visualised the possibilities of Cugnot's machine
for military purposes, for when the great general was selected
a member of the French Institute, the subject of his paper
was ' The Automobile in War.' "

The " battle car " had now, at least experimentally,
evolved into the steam wagon which could run on roads; the

1 " The Forerunner of the Tank," by H. H. Manchester.

THE FOOTED-WHEEL

next step was to invent one which would move in any direc
tion across country, in other words to replace the wheels
by tracks. The evolution of the caterpi llar tractor brings
us to the fourth phase in the evolution of the'~**ibattle car."

The idea of distributing the weight of a vehicle over a
greater area than that provided by its own wheels is by no
means a novel one ; one year after Cugnot produced the
first steam automobile Richard Lovell Edgeworth patented
a device whereby a portable railway could be attached to a
wheeled carriage ; it consisted of several pieces of wood ,
which moved in regular succession in such a manner that a
sufficient length of railing was constantly at rest for the
wheels to roll upon. The principle of this device was but
a modification of that upon which the tracks of tanks now
depend, and all subsequent ideas were founded on this basis.'

The endless chain track passed through various early
patents. In 1801 Thomas German produced " a means of
facilitating the transit of carriages by substittiting endless |
chains or a series of rollers for the ordinary wheels." This
definitely cut adrift from the idea of wheels and replaced it
by that of tracks. In 1812 William Palmer produced a
somewhat similar invention, and in 1821 John Richard
Barry patented a contrivance consisting of two endless
pitched chains, stretched out and passing round two chain
wheels at the end of the carriage, one on each side, which
formed the rails or bearing surface of the vehicle.

Footed wheels were not, however, abandoned, and in
1846 a picture of the Boydell engine shows the wheels of
this machine fitted with feet. In 1861 an improved wheel-
foot was patented by Andrew Dunlop which was modified
by other inventors and by degrees evolved into the pedrail,
trials of which were carried out at Aldershot under the War
Office in 1905.

In 1882 Guillaume Fender of Buenos Aires suggested
and John Newburn patented certain improvements to end-
less tracks. Fender reahsed that the attempts to produce

1 For Edgeworth's invention and the short summary of the footed-wheel,
etc. which follows see The Engineer, August 10, 1917, and following issues.

3

10

THE ORIGINS OF THE TANK

endless travelling railways had not met with great success
owing to the shortness of the rails or tracks employed ;
he, therefore, proposed that their length should be the same
as the distance between the vehicle's axles. If it were
desired to have short links the number of wheels must be
increased ; furthermore, should the tractor be used for
hauling a train of wagons, the endless track should be long
enough to embrace all the wheels. This is the original idea
of the all-round track.

Among the many interesting patents of about this date
were the Applegarth tractor of 1886 (see Diagram 5) and

'The G-ne,in£eii.'

Diagram 5. The AppLEaARTH Teactob, 1886.

the Batter tractor of 1888. In the former the forward
portion of the track was inclined and suggests the contour
of the track as apphed to the front of tanks. The track
being raised in front gives an initial elevation when an
obstacle is met with and very greatly assists in surmounting
banks and other irregularities.

Diagram 6 depicts the Batter tractor and it clearly shows
the basic ideas which have been employed in tank trans-
mission and tank design. This tractor was patented in the
U.S.A., it was furnished with two tracks, their contour
very closely resembling those of the Medium Mark " A "
(Whippet) and gun-carrier machines (see Plates III and VII)

THE BATTER TRACTOR 11

The motive power was steam, and two separate engines, fed
by one boiler, were used, one to drive each track ; appar-
ently provision was made, if desired, for the crankshafts of
these engines to be clutched together. Each track consisted
of two endless belts, an inner and an outer ; the outer belt,
that which impinges on the ground, was composed of shoes
arranged transversely and coupled together. Between the
outer belt and the rollers ran the inner belt. The inner belt
or link was of much less width than the outer and thus
allowed the latter to swivel and adapt itself to irregularities
of the ground, whilst the working of the rollers was not
interfered with. A system almost identical with this one
has recently been adopted for tank tracks.

The rollers were alternately flanged and plain, as on tanks.
Two tails for steering and balancing the machine were fitted ;
a similar idea was adopted on Mark I machines and gun
carriers, but subsequently discarded.

The general introduction of the internal-combustion
engine and petrol as a fuel gave a further impetus to the
tracked machine. In 1900 Frank Bramond patented a
track which could be apphed to pneumatic-tyred vehicles,
either to single wheels or to two pairs of wheels. In 1907 a
Rochet-Schneider was fitted with a track by Roberts and
tested at Aldershot. This car was exhibited together with
a 70 h.p. Hornsby chain- track tractor and took part in the
Royal Review at Aldershot in May 1908. This same year
Hornsby fitted up a 75 h.p. Mercedes motor-car with a
track to demonstrate its advantages for high-speed work on
sand. " This car was run daily for five months at Skegness,
on loose sand, and it is understood that a speed of twenty
miles an hour was obtained." '

Of later years, American inventors and manufacturers
have made great progress in chain-track tractors, but prac-
tically all the principles of design were originally apphed
in Great Britain. The Holt caterpillar is the outstanding
American design for tractors which has been adopted during
the war.

1 The Engineer, ibid.

14 THE ORIGINS OF THE TANK

It is interesting to note with reference to the above in-
ventions that neither Germany nor Austria ever appears to
have contributed any basic suggestion relating to track-
driven machines.

To return now to the mihtary aspect of our subject,
gunpowder did away with armour, for if armour can be
pierced its defensive value is lost and it only becomes an
encumbrance to the wearer by reducing his mobility and
exhausting his muscular energy. Did this change the main
problem in the art of war ? Not at all, for " the giving of
blows without receiving them " remains the unchangeable
object of battle irrespective of the change of weapons, and
all that happened was, that the soldier, no longer being able
to seek protection by body-armour, sought it elsewhere^ — by
manoeuvring, by covering fire and entrenchments as typified
in the drill of Frederick the Great, the cannonades and
sharpshooters' fire of Napoleon, the fortifications of Vauban,
and later on the use of ground by Wellington as cover from
fire.

The opening of the war in 1914 saw all sides equipped
with' similar weapons and in comparatively similar pro-
portions. The great sweep of the Germans through
Belgium was followed by the battle of the Marne, a generic
term for a series of bloody engagements which raged from
Lorraine to Paris. Then came the great reaction — the Ger-
man retreat to the Aisne, the heights along which had been
hastily prepared for defence. The battle swayed whilst
vigour lasted and then stabilised as exhaustion intervened.
At first cautiously, then rapidly, did the right flank of the
German Armies and the left flank of those of the French
and British seek to out-manoeuvre each other. This led to
the race for the coast. Meanwhile came the landing of the
British 7th Division at Zeebrugge and then the First Battle
of Ypres, which closed the German offensive on the British
front for three years and four months.

The quick-firing field-gun and the machine-gun, used de-
fensively, proved too strong for the endurance of the attackers,
who were forced to seek safety by means of their spades.

MEANS OF OVERCOMING TRENCHES 15

rather than through their rifles. Whole fronts were en-
trenched, and before the end of 1914, except for a few small
breaks, a man could have walked by trench, had he wished
to, from Nieuport almost into Switzerland.

With the trench came wire entanglements — the horror of
the attack, and the trinity of trench, machine-gun, and wire,
made the defence so strong that each offensive operation
in turn was brought to a standstill.

The problem which then confronted us was a twofold one :

Firstly, how could the soldier in the attack be protected
against shrapnel, shell-sphnters, and bullets ? Helmets were
reintroduced, armour was tried, shields were invented, but
all to no great purpose.

Secondly, even if bullet-proof armour could be invented,
which it certainly could, how were men laden down with it
going to get through the wire entanglements which protected
every position ?

Three definite solutions were attempted — the first, artil-
le ry ; the se cond, gas ; and the third, tanks^ach of which
"is'^a definrEe~anFwer 'To~oaiF^'roBIem if the conditions are
favourable for its use. Thus at the battle of the Dunajec,
in the spring of 1915, the fire of Mackensen's massed artillery
smashed the Russian front ; tliis success being due as much
to the fewness of the Russian guns as to the skill of that
great soldier. At the Second Battle of Ypres the German
surprise gas attack succeeded because the British and French
possessed no antidote. At the First Battle of Cambrai,
the use of tanks on good firm ground proved an over-
whelming success, whilst at the Third Battle of Ypres, on
account of the mud, they were an all but complete failure.

All armies attempted the first method by increasing the
number of their guns, the size of their guns, and the quan-
tity of their ammunition. So thoroughly was this done that
whole sectors of an enemy's front were blasted out of recog-
nition. This, however, was only accomplished after all
surprise had been sacrificed by obvious preparation during
which notice and time were given to the enemy to mass his
reserves in order to meet the attack. Further than this.

16 THE ORIGINS OF THE TANK

though the enemy's wire and trenches were destroyed all
communications on his side of "No Man's Land " were
obliterated, with the result that a new obstacle, " the crumped
area," proved as formidable an antagonist to a continuous
advance, by hampering supply, as uncut wire had done to a
successful assault, by forbidding infantry movement.

Instead of solving the problem : " How could mobility
be reintroduced on the Western Front ? " the great in-
crease in artillery, during 1915 and 1916, only complicated it,
for, though the preliminary bombardment cut the wire and
blew in the enemy's trenches and the creeping barrage pro-
tected the infantry in a high degree, every artillery attack
during two years ended in failure due to want of surprise at
its initiation and the impossibility of adequate supply during
its progress.

The Germans attempted the second method — gas, and
from the Second Battle of Ypres the chemist fell in alongside
the soldier. That gas might have won the war is to-day
too obvious to need accentuation. Two conditions were
alone requisite— sufficient gas and a favourable wind. For-
tunately for us the German did not wait long enough to
manufacture gas in quantity ; unfortunately for them the
prevailing wind on the Western Front is westerly, conse-
quently when we and the French retaliated they got more
than they ever gave us.

The introduction of gas still further complicated the
problem, for, whilst it is easy for the defender to launch gas
clouds, it is difficult for an attacker to do so, consequently
once soldiers had been equipped with respirators the defence
gained by this method of fighting and warfare became still
more immobile.

As regards the British front the opening day of the First
Battle of the Somme, July 1, 1916, showed, through the
terrible casualty hsts which followed, how far the defence
had become the stronger form of war. At no date in the
whole history of the war was a stalemate termination to all
our endeavours more certain. The hopes of nearly two years
were shattered in a few hours before the ruins of Thiepval,

TACTICAL DEADLOCK 17

Serre, and Gommecourt, where our men fell in thousands
before the deadly machine-gun fire of the enemy. Eleven
weeks later, on September 15, a solution to the problem
became apparent, a solution due to the efforts of a small
band of men, of whose energy and endeavours the next
chapter will relate.

CHAPTER II

THE INVENTION OF THE LANDSHIP

It is not proposed in this chapter to give an answer to the
question : " Who first thought of the tank ? " The idea
of combining mobiHty with offensive power and armour,
as the previous chapter has shown, is a very old one, so old
and so universal throughout history that, when the Great
War broke out in 1914, many soldiers and civihans alike
must have considered ways and means of reintroducing
the knight in armour and the battle car by replacing muscular
energy by mechanical force — in other words, by applying
petrol to the needs of the battlefield.

During August and September 1914, armoured cars had
been employed with considerable success in Belgium and
north-western France. This no doubt brought with it the
revival of the idea. Be this as it may, in October of this
year Lieutenant-Colonel (now Major-General) E. D. Swinton
put forward a suggestion for the construction of an armoured
car on the Holt tractor or a similar caterpillar system,
capable of crushing down wire entanglements and crossing
trenches.

At the same time. Captain T. G. TuUoch, manager of
the Chilworth Powder Company, was also devoting his
attention to the possibility of constructing a land cruiser
sufficiently armoured to enable it to penetrate right up to
the enemy's gun and howitzer positions. In November the
idea was communicated by Captain TuUoch to Lieutenant-
Colonel Swinton and to Lieutenant-Colonel (now Colonel Sir
Maurice) Hankey, Secretary to the " Committee of Imperial
Defence," and later on to Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of
the Admiralty, who, in January 1915, wrote his now historic
letter to Mr. Asquith :

18

MR. CHURCHILL'S FORESIGHT 19

" My Dear Prime Minister,

" I entirely agree with Colonel Hankey's remarks on
the subject of special mechanical devices for taking trenches.
It is extraordinary that the Army in the field and the War
Office should have allowed nearly three months of warfare
to progress without addressing their minds to its special
problems.

" The present war has revolutionised all military theories
about the field of fire. The power of the rifle is so great
that 100 yards is held sufficient to stop any rush, and in
order to avoid the severity of the artillery fire, trenches
are often dug on the reverse slope of positions, or a short
distance in the rear of villages, woods, or other obstacles.
The consequence is that the war has become a short-range
instead of a long-range war as was expected, and opposing
trenches get ever closer together, for mutual safety from
each other's artillery fire.

" The question to be solved is not, therefore, the long
attack over a carefully prepared glacis of former times, but
the actual getting across 100 or 200 yards of open space
and wire entanglements. All this was apparent more than
two months ago, but no steps have been taken and no
preparations made.

" It would be quite easy in a short time to fit up a number ]
of steam tractors with small armoured shelters, in which I
men and machine-guns could be placed, which would be 1
bullet-proof. Used at night they would not be affected by >
artillery fire to any extent. The caterpillar system would ,
enable trenches to be crossed quite easily, and the weight of |
the machine would destroy all wire entanglements.

" Forty or fifty of these engines, prepared secretly and
brought into positions at nightfall, could advance quite
certainly into the enemy's trenches, smashing away all the
obstructions and sweeping the trenches with their machine-
gun fire, and with grenades thrown out of the top. They
would then make so many points d'appui for the British
supporting infantry to rush forward and rally on them.
They can then move forward to attack the second line of
trenches.

" The cost would be small. If the experiment did not
answer, what harm would be done ? An obvious measure
of prudence would have been to have started something like
this two months ago. It should certainly be done now.

20 THE INVENTION OF THE LANDSHIP

" The shield is another obvious experiment which should
have been made on a considerable scale. What does it
matter which is the best pattern ? A large number should
have been made of various patterns ; some to carry,
some to wear, some to wheel. If the mud now prevents
the working of shields or traction engines, the first frost
would render them fully effective. With a view to this
I ordered a month ago twenty shields on wheels, to be
made on the best design the Naval Air Service could devise.
These will be ready shortly, and can, if need be, be used
for experimental purposes.

" A third device, which should be used systematically
and on a large scale, is smoke artificially produced. It is
possible to make small smoke barrels which, on being lighted,
generate a great volume of dense black smoke, which could
be turned off or on at will. There are other matters closely
connected with this to which I have already drawn your
attention, but which are of so secret a character, that I do
not put them down on paper.

" One of the most serious dangers that we are exposed to
is the possibility that the Germans are acting and preparing
all these surprises, and that we may at any time find our-
selves exposed to some entirely new form of attack, A
committee of engineering officers and other experts ought to
be sitting continually at the War Office to formulate schemes
and examine suggestions, and I would repeat that it is not
possible in most cases to have lengthy experiments before-
hand.

" If the devices are to be ready by the time they are
required it is indispensable that manufacture should proceed
simultaneously with experiments. The worst that can
happen is that a comparatively small sum of money is
wasted.

" Yours, etc."

At about the time that the above letter was written,
Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton again brought the matter for-
ward and virged the desirability of action being taken, but
as it was stated that the design and building of Captain
Tulloch's machine would take a year to complete it appears
that this led to the proposals being shelved for the time
being.

COLONEL SWINTON'S PROPOSALS 21

On June 1, 1915, Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton, who had
then returned to France, submitted an official memorandum
on the above subject to G.H.Q., which was passed to Major-
General G. H. Fowke, Engineer-in-Chief, for his expert
opinion. This memorandum may be summarised as
follows :

The main German offensive was taking place in Russia;
consequently, in order to attain a maximum strength in the
east, it was incumbent on the Germans to maintain a mini-
mum one" in the west ; and, in order to meet the shortage
of men on the Western Front, the Germans were mainly
basing their defence on the machine-gun.

The problem, consequently, was one of how to overcome
the German machine-gunners. There were two solutions to
this problem :

(i) Sufficient artillery to blast a way through the enemy's
lines.

(ii) The introduction of armoured machine-gun destroyers.

As regards the second solution Lieutenant- Colonel Swin-
ton laid down the following requirements : Speed, 4 miles
per hour ; climbing power, 5 ft. ; spanning power, 5 ft. ;
radius of action, 20 miles ; weight, about 8 tons ; crew, 10
men ; armament, 2 machine-guns and one light Q.F. gun.
Further, he suggested that these machines should be used
in a surprise assault having first been concealed behind our
own front line in specially constructed pits about 100 yards
apart. In this paper it was also pointed out that these
destroyers would be of great value in a gas attack, as they
would enable the most scientific means of overcoming gas
to be carried.

The above memorandum was favourably considered by
Sir John French, then Commander-in-Chief in France, and>
on June 22, was submitted by him to the War Office with a
suggestion that Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton should visit
England and explain his scheme more fully.

While Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton and Captain TuUoch
were urging their proposals, a third scheme was brought
forward by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon in connection with

22 THE INVENTION OF THE LANDSHIP

which the Secretary of State, in January 1915, ordered trials
to be carried out with a 105 h.p. Foster-Daimler tractor
fitted with a bridging apparatus for crossing trenches. At
about the same time similar trials were made with a 120 h.p.
Holt caterpillar tractor at Shoeburyness in connection with
Captain Tulloch's scheme. Both experiments proved a
failure.

The position, therefore, in June, so far as the Army was
concerned, was as follows : Proposals had been put forward
by Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton, Admiral Bacon, and Captain
TuUoch, and submitted to the War Office. Certain trials had
been made, the result of which, in the view of the authori-
ties, was to emphasise the engineering and other difficulties
to be overcome. It was only in June 1915 that Major-
General Sir George Scott-Moncrieff, Director of Fortifications
and Works, War Office, who, throughout the initial period,
had shown a strong interest in the development of the idea,
ascertained that investigations on similar lines were being
carried out by the Admiralty ; he at once proposed that a
" Joint Naval and Military Committee " should be formed
for the purpose of dealing with the subject generally. This
Committee was constituted on June 15.

The work done by the Admiralty had so far been inde-
pendent. In February 1915, Mr. Churchill sent to Mr.
E. H. T. (now Sir Eustace) D'Eyncourt, Director of Naval
Construction, a copy of the notes embodying the proposals
set forth by Major T. G. Hetherington (18th Hussars),
R.N,A.S., for a new type of war machine. This machine
maybe described as a veritable Juggernaut, heavily armoured,
highly offensive, and capable of moving across country.

It consisted of a platform mounted on three wheels, two
driving wheels in front and the steering wheel behind. It
was to be equipped with three turrets each containing two
4-in. guns and its motive power was to be derived from a
800 h.p. Sunbeam Diesel set of engines.

The problem of design was examined by the Air Depart-
ment engineers and the following rough data, worked out at
the time, are of interest :

THE LANDSHIPS COMMITTEE 23

Armament . . .3 twin 4 in. turrets with 300 rounds per gun.

Horse power . . 800 h.p. with fuel for 24 hours.

Total weight . . . 300 tons.

Armour . . . 3 in.

Diameter of wheels 40 ft.

Tread of main wheels . 13 ft. 4 in.

Tread of steering wheels . 5 ft. in.

Overall length . . 100 ft.

Overall width . 80 ft.

Overall height . . 46 ft.

Clearance . 17 ft.

Top speed on good going 8 miles per hour.

Top speed on bad going . 4 miles per hour.

Tlie cross-country qualities of the machine it was con-
sidered would prove good. It could not be hogged in any
ground passable by cavalryl it could pass over water
obsta cle s'~Ea ^ng^^^gbod„ banks. .and from 20 ft. j^SjC^ZwidtlL
of waterway;; it could ford waterways 15 ft. deep if the
bottoms were good, and negotiate isolated obstacles up to
20TtniTgjEir~ Small obstacles such as banks, ditches, bridges,
trenches,"" wire entanglements, and ordinary woodland it
could roll over easily.

Mr. D'Eyncourt considered this proposal, but coming to
the conclusion that the machine would weigh more than
1,000 tons, it became apparent to him that its construction
was not a practical proposition. '"

Mr. D'Eyncourt pointed this out to Mr. Churchill and
suggested that Major Hetherington's machine should be
replaced by one of a smaller and less ambitious type. To
this Mr. Churchill agreed, and to deal with this question a
" Landships Committee " was formed consisting of the

following gentlemen :

Chairman.

Mr. D'Eyncourt.

Members.

Major Hetherington, Colonel Dumble, Mr. Dale

BussELL (appointed later).

Consultant.

Colonel R. E. Ckompton.

Secretary (appointed later).

Lieutenant Stern.

24 THE INVENTION OF THE LANDSHIP

Prior to the formation of this Committee another pro-
posal had been set on foot. About November 14, 1914, Mr.
Diploek cff the Pedrail Company had put forward certain
suggestions for the use of the pedrail for the transportation
of heavy guns and war material over rough ground. After
interviewing Lord Kitchener, who saw no utility in the sug-
gestion, Mr. Diploek was referred to the Admiralty and
there saw Mr. Churchill, who, taking up the matter with
interest, suggested that a one-ton truck should be brought
to the Horse Guards Parade for his inspection. Major
Hetherington undertook to arrange this, and on February 12,
1915, a demonstration of the Pedrail machine took place.

This so impressed Mr. Churchill that he decided that a
pedrail armoured car should be built.

The " Landships Committee " communicated with Messrs.
William Foster, Ltd., of Lincoln, who were already making
heavy tractors for the Admiralty, and Mr. (now Sir William)
Tritton, their manager, was asked to collaborate in evolving
two designs :

The first of the wheel tractor type.

The second of the pedrail type —
the latter being the alternative recommended by the
chairman and the Pedrail Company.

Both these designs seemed to have some promising fea-
tures. The First Lord, on March 26, approved of an order
being placed for twelve of the pedrail type and six of the
wheel type.

The design of the pedrail machine was produced by
the Pedrail Company; its length was 38 ft., its width
12 ft. 6 in., and height 10 ft. 6 in. The most interesting
feature connected with this machine was that it was
mounted on two bogies one behind the other, steering being
rendered possible by articulating these bogies in the same
horizontal plane, which gave an extreme turning radius of 65ft.

After Mr. Churchill's resignation from the Admiralty the
production of the twelve pedrail cars was abandoned in
spite of the fact that the engines and most of the material
had been provided.

MAJOR WILSON'S DESIGN 25

The design work was, however, continued under the direc-
tion of the " Landships Committee," and, a httle later on,
caterpillar tractors for experimental purposes were obtained
from America. In the meantime the question of design was
discussed with Mr. Tritton, and at the same time Lieutenant
(now Major) W. G. Wilson, an experienced engineer, was
brought in as consultant, and a design was evolved which
eventually embodied the form finally adopted and adhered
to for tanks. Thus it was through the " Landships Com-
mittee," at a moment when the nniHtary authorities were
inclined to regard the difficulties connected with the problem
as likely to prove insuperable, that the landship or " tank,"
as it was later on called, was first brought into being.

After the formation of the " Joint Naval and MiHtary
Committee " on June 15, it was agreed, as the result of cor-
respondence between the Admiralty and War Office, that
the experimental work on the landship should be taken
over as a definite mihtary service in the department of the
Master-General of Ordnance. It was further agreed that the
Director of Fortifications and Works should be president of
the Committee, that the chairman and members of the exist-
ing " Landships Committee " should continue to serve as
long as their assistance was required, and that the late
First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Churchill, should remain
in touch with the design and construction of the machines
during their experimental stage. The members nominated
for the Committee by the War Office were Colonel Bird of
the General Staff, Colonel Holden, A.D.T., and Major,
Wheeler of the M.G.O.'s Department.

Early in July, Mr. Lloyd George, Minister of Munitions,
discussed with Mr. Balfour, now First Lord of the Admir-
alty, the transference of the production of the machines
from the Admiralty to the Ministry of Munitions. It was,
however, subsequently decided that the Admiralty should
be responsible for the production of the first trial machine,
the Director of Naval Construction being responsible for the
completion of the machine. This was strongly urged by Sir
George Scott-Moncrieff.
4

26 THE INVENTION OF THE LANDSHIP

In July 1915, Lieutenant-Colonel- Swinton returned to
England to take over the duties of assistant secretary to
the " Committee of Imperial Defence." He at once took
in hand the co-ordination of the various private and official
efforts which were being made at this time in relation to
the design of caterpillar tractors. Early in September he
visited Lincoln and inspected a machine known as Little
Willie, and on the 10th of this month wrote to Major Guest,
Secretary of the " Experiments Committee " at G.H.Q., as
follows :

" The naval people are pressing on with the first sample
caterpillar . . . they have succeeded in making an animal
that will cross 4 ft. 6 in. and turn on its own axis hke a dog
with a flea in its tail. ..."

In spite of its agility this machine was rejected in favour
of Big Willie, a model of which was being constructed under
the direction of the " Joint Committee " on the hnes of the
machine designed by Mr. Tritton and Lieutenant Wilson
and the requirements of which had been outlined by Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Swinton in his memorandum of June 1.

As regards these requirements, on the day following the
above letter the " Experiments Committee " G.H.Q. sent the
following tactical suggestions, arising out of Colonel Swin-
ton's original proposal, to the secretary of the " Committee of
Imperial Defence." They are worth quoting as they embody
several of the characteristics which were introduced in the
Mark I tank.

(1) The object for which the caterpillar cruiser or armoured
fort is required is for employment in considerable numbers
in conjunction with or as an incident in a larger and general
attack by infantry against an extended front.

(2) As a general principle, it is desirable to have a large
number of small cruisers rather than a smaller number of
large ones.

(3) The armour of the cruiser must be proof against con-
centrated rifle and machine-gun fire, but not proof against
artillery fire. The whole cruiser should be enclosed in
armour.

Plate I

LITTLE WILLIE.

aas. :"i2s:i_ :- ^

JAKK IV TANK (FEMALE).

26]

THE ATTACK BY ARMOUR 27

(4) The tactical object of the cruiser is attack, its arma-
ment should include a gun with reasonable accuracy up to
1,000 yards, and at least two Lewis guns, which can be fired
from loopholes to flank and to rear.

(5) The crew to consist of six men — two for the gun, one
for each Lewis gun, and two drivers.

(6) The caterpillar must be capable of crossing craters
produced by the explosion of high-explosive shell, such
craters being of 12 ft. diameter, 6 ft. deep, with sloping sides ;
of crossing an extended width of barbed- wire entanglements ;
and of spanning hostile trenches with perpendicular sides
and of 4 ft. in breadth.

(7) The cruiser should be capable of moving at a rate of
not less than 2 J miles per hour over broken ground, and
should have a range of action of not less than six hours
consecutive movement.

(8) The wheels of the cruiser should be on either the
" Pedrail " system or the " Caterpillar " system ; whichever
is the most suitable for crossing marshy and slippery ground.

Most of these requirements had already been embodied in
the wooden model of Big Willie, which, when completed,
was inspected at Wembley on September 28. This model
was accepted as a basis on which construction was to pro-
ceed, it was in fact the first " mock up " of the eventual
Mark I machine.

Big Willie was about 8 ft, high, 26 ft. long, and 11 ft. wide
without sponsons, and 3 ft. wider when these were added.
His armament consisted in two 6-pounder guns and two
machine-guns, and the crew suggested was 1 officer and 9
other ranks.

On the following day the " Joint Committee " assembled
at the Admiralty and decided that the following specifica-
tions should be worked to : weight 22 tons, speed 3j miles
per hour, spanning power 8 ft., and climbing power 4| ft.

On December 3, Mr. Churchill addressed a paper to
G.H.Q., entitled " Variants of the Offensive," in which he
accentuated the necessity of concentrating more than we
had done on " the attack by armour," the chief purpose

28 THE INVENTION OF THE LANDSHIP

of armour being to preserve mobility. He suggested the
combined use of the caterpillar tractor and the shield. The
caterpillars were to breach the enemy's line and then turn
right and left, the infantry following under cover of bullet-
proof shields. It was further suggested that the attack
might be carried out at night under the guidance of search-
hghts. The rest of this paper dealt with " Attack by
Trench Mortars, " " Attack by the Spade," and " The Attack
on the First Line."

On Christmas Day 1915, Sir Douglas Haig, who had
recently taken over command of the Expeditionary Force in
France, read this paper, and wishing to know more about the
caterpillars mentioned. Lieutenant- Colonel H. J. EUes (later
on G.O.C. Tank Corps) was sent to England to ascertain the
exact position. On January 8 this officer reported in writ-
ing to G.H.Q., as follows :

" There are two producers of landships :

"(a) Trench Warfare working alone. ^

" (6) The Admiralty Landship Committee working with
the War Office.

" The first have not yet made a machine, but its proposed
size is 10 ft. high, 14 ft. 6 in. wide, and 36 ft. long ; the
second was in process of being made " {i.e. Big Willie).

Up to December 20, 1915, the whole cost of the experi-

^ The machine constructed by the Trench Warfare Department was the
double bogey car designed by the Pedrail Company, of which it will be re-
membered twelve were originally ordered by the " Landships Committee "
and eventually abandoned. The resuscitation of this machine arose as
follows :

During the summer of 1915 the Trench Warfare Department approached
the Pedrail Company concerning the design of a flame projector with the
capacity of 12,000 gallons of petrol. In order to carry this weapon the
Pedrail Company suggested their original design, which, though it was not
approved of by the " Landships Committee," was accepted by the Trench
Warfare Department. One machine was placed on order and built at Bath
by Messrs. Stothert and Pitt, the pedraUs being manufactured by the Metro-
politan Carriage, Wagon and Finance Co., Ltd., and the frame by Messrs.
William Arrol. The machine when built weighed .32 tons unloaded, was
equipped with two 100 h.p. Astor engines, and when tested out on Salisbury
Plain attained a speed of 15 miles an hour. Only one of these machines
was made, as eventually the idea of using mechanically driven flame pro-
jectors was abandoned.

SUPPLY OF MACHINES 29

mental work had been defrayed by the Admiralty, which had
also provided the personnel in the shape of No. 20 Squadron,
R.N.A.S., for carrying out the work. The Admiralty had
in fact fathered and been responsible for the landship since
its first inception.

On December 24 the following recommendations were
formulated at a Conference held at the offices of the " Com-
mittee of Imperial Defence " :

"Supply of Machines

" (1) That if and when the Army Council, after inspection
of the final experimental land cruiser, decide that such
machines shall be entrusted to a small ' Executive Supply
Committee,' which, for secrecy, shall be called the ' Tank '
Supply Committee,' and shall come into existence as soon
as the decision of the Army Council is made.

" (2) That this Committee shall be responsible for the
supply of caterpillar machine-gun destroyers or land cruisers
of the approved type ; complete in every respect for action,
including both primary and secondary armament. That it
shall receive instructions as to supply and design direct from
the General Staff, War Office, the necessary financial arrange-
ments being made by the Accounting Officer, War Office.

" (3) That, in order to enable the committee to carry out
its work with the maximum of despatch and minimum of
reference, it shall have full power to place orders, and to
correspond direct with any Government department con-
cerned. To be in a position to do this, it should have placed
to its credit, as soon as its work commences, a sum equivalent
to the estimated cost of fifty machines, which sum should

' This is the first appearance of the word " tank " in the history of the
machine. Up to December 1915, the machines now known as " tanks "
were, in the experimental stage, called " landships " or "land cruisers,"
and also " caterpillar machine-gun destroyers." On December 24, whilst
drafting the above report of the Conference it occurred to Colonel Swinton
that the vise of the above names would give away a secret which it was im-
portant to preserve. After consultation with Lieutenant-Colonel W. Daily-
Jones, assistant secretary of the " Committee of Imperial Defence," the
following names were] suggested by Colonel Swinton — " cistern," " reservoir,"
and " tank," all of which were applicable to the steel-hke structure of the
machines in the earlier stages of manufacture. Because it wa s less clumsy
and monosyllabic the name " tank "was decided on. J

30 THE INVENTION OF THE LANDSHIP

be increased later if necessary by any further amount re-
quired to carry out the programme of construction approved
by the General Staff. The committee should also be authorised
to incur any necessary expenditure in connection with ex-
perimental work, engagement of staff, travelling and other
incidental expenses during the progress of the work.

" (4) That as the machines are turned out and equipped
they shall be handed over to the War Office for the purpose
of training the personnel to man them.

" (5) That the Committee be reconstituted with Lieu-
tenant A. G. Stern as chairman.

" (6) That since the officers of the R.N.A.S. will cease to
belong to that service as soon as the ' Tank Supply Com-
mittee ' is constituted, arrangements shall be made now for
their payment from the same source that will bear the cost
of constructing the land cruisers and for their appointment
as military officers with rank suitable to the importance of
their duties."

The experimental machine was completed towards the
end of 1915 and its preliminary trials gave most promising
results.

On January 30, 1916, Mr. D'Eyncourt, as head of the
" Admiralty Committee," entrusted with the design and
manufacture of the trial machine, wrote to Lord Kitchener
and informed him that the machine was ready for his inspec-
tion and that it fulfilled all the conditions laid down by the
War Office, viz. — that it could carry guns, destroy machine-
guns, break through wire entanglements, and cross the
enemy's trenches, whilst giving protection to its own crew.
Mr. D'Eyncourt also recommended that a number should
be ordered immediately to this model, without serious altera-
tion, and that whilst these were being manufactured the
design of a more formidable machine could be developed.

On February 2 the first official trial of the new machine
was held at Hatfield and was witnessed by the Lords Com-
missioners of the Admiralty, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. McKenna,
and various representatives of the War Office and Ministry
of Munitions. Following this trial G.H.Q., France, on
February 8 signified their approval of the machine and

TANK SUPPLY COMMITTEE 31

asked that the Army might be supplied with a certain
number.

Arising out of the Hatfield trial it was decided to form
a small unit of the Machine- Gun Corps, to be called the
" Heavy Section," and Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton was
appointed to command it with his Headquarters in London,
a training camp being first opened at Bisley and later on
moved to Elveden near Thetford.

As the " Admiralty Committee," with the Director of
Naval Construction as chairman, had finished their work
and produced an actual machine complete in all respects
and fulfilhng all requirements, it was then decided that the
Ministry of Munitions should take over the production of
the machines. On February 10 the Army Council conse-
quently addressed a letter to the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty requesting them to convey " the very warm
thanks of the Army Council to Mr. E. H. T. D'Eyncourt,
C.B., Director of Naval Construction, and his Committee,
for their work in evolving a machine for the use of the Army,
and to Mr. W. A. Tritton and Lieutenant W. G. Wilson,
R.N.A.S., for their work in design and construction."

Two days later, on February 12, the " Joint Committee "
was dissolved and a new committee, closely following the Unes
laid down at the Conference held in the offices of the " Com-
mittee of Imperial Defence," was formed under the Ministry
of Munitions, and known as the " Tank Supply Committee."

Chairman.

Lieutenant A. G. Stern, R.N.A.S., Director of Naval Con-
structions Committee.

Members.

E. H. T. D'Eyncouet, Esq., C.B., Director of Naval Con-
struction.

Lieutenant- Colonel E. D. Swinton, D.S.O., R.E., Assistant
Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.

Major G. L. Wheelee, R.A., Director of Artillery's Branch,
War Office.

32 THE INVENTION OF THE LANDSHIP

Lieutenant W. G. Wilson, II.N.A.S., Director of Naval Con-
structions Committee.

Lieutenant K. P. Symes, R.N.A.S., Director of Naval Con-
structions Committee.

P. Dale-Bussell, Esq., Director of Naval Constructions
Committee, Contract Department, Admiralty.

Consultant.
Captain T. G. Tulloch, Ministry of Munitions.

On February 14, 1916, Mr. D'Eyncourt wrote the follow-
ing letter, which we quote in full, to Lieutenant- Colonel W. S.
Churchill, commanding 6th Royal Scots FusiUers, B.E.F.,
France, whose initiative and foresight were the true parents
of the tank as a war machine :

" Dear Colonel Churchill,

"It is with great pleasure that I am now able to
report to you that the War Office have at last ordered 100
landships to the pattern which underwent most successful
trials recently. Sir D. Haig sent some of his staff from the
front.

" Lord Kitchener and Robertson also came, and members
of the Admiralty Board. The machine was complete in
almost every detail and fulfils all the requirements finally
given me by the War Office. The official tests of trenches,
etc., were nothing to it, and finally we showed them how it
could cross a 9 ft. gap after cKmbing a 4 ft. 6 in. high per-
pendicular parapet. Wire entanglements it goes through
like a rhinoceros through a field of corn. It carries two
6-pounder guns in sponsons (a naval touch), and about 300
rounds ; also smaller machine-guns, and is proof against
machine-gun fire. It can be conveyed by rail (the sponsons
and guns take off, making it Ughter) and be ready for action
very quickly. The Ring came ^ and saw it and was greatly
struck by its performance, as was every one else ; in fact,
they were all astonished. It is capable of great develop-
ment, but to get a sufficient number in time, I strongly
urge ordering immediately a good many to the pattern
which we know all about. As you are aware, it has taken
much time and trouble to get the thing perfect, and a prac-

1 On February 8, 1915.

TANK SUPPLY DEPARTMENT 33

tical machine simple to make ; we tried various types and
did much experimental work. I am sorry it has taken so
long, but pioneer work always takes time and no avoidable
delay has taken place, though I begged them to order ten
for training purposes two months ago. I have also had
some difficulty in steering the scheme past the rocks of
opposition and the more insidious shoals of apathy which
are frequented by red herrings, which cross the main line of
progress at frequent intervals.

" The great thing now is to keep the whole matter secret
and produce the machines altogether as a complete surprise.
I have already put the manufacture in hand, under the aegis
of the Minister of Munitions, who is very keen ; the Admir-
alty is also allowing me to continue to carry on with the
same Committee, but Stern is now Chairman.

" I enclose photo. In appearance, it looks rather like a
great antediluvian monster, especially when . it comes out
of boggy ground, which it traverses easily. The wheels
behind form a rudder for steering a curve, and also ease the
shock over banks, etc., but are not absolutely necessary, as
it can steer and turn in its own length with the independent

*^^^^^- "E. H. T. D'Eyncourt."

Between its institution in February and the following
August the " Tank Supply Committee " underwent certain
slight changes of organisation, the distribution of its duties
rightly tending more and more towards centralisation. Shortly
after its formation a " Tank Supply Department " was
created in the Ministry of Munitions to work with the " Tank
Supply Committee. ' ' This Supply Department was concerned
with and was responsible for the initial output of the tanks
which figured in the Battle of the Somme.

On August 1, 1916, the following resolutions were come
to by the " Tank Supply Committee," and agreed to by the
Minister of Munitions :

" That the ' Tank Supply Committee ' should in future
be named the ' Advisory Committee of the Tank Supply
Department.'

" That a Sub-Committee consisting of Mr. D'Eyncourt,
Mr. Bussell, and the Chairman, should be appointed to decide
in questions of design and policy."

34 THE INVENTION OF THE LANDSHIP

On August 22, the Committee was dissolved on the ground
that the organisation for Tank Supply must be assimilated
to that of the other Departments of the Ministry of Muni-
tions, and the outcome of this was the formation of the
" Mechanical Warfare Supply Department," with Lieutenant
Stern as Chairman. This department continued in existence
from now on until the end of the war. Its powers were
wide, embracing production, design, inspection and the
supply of tanks, and its energy was unlimited.

Whilst all these changes were in progress the tanks were
being produced, and the personnel assembled and trained,
and on August 13, 1916, the first detachment of thirteen
tanks, being the right half of " C " Company, left Thetford
for France, to be followed on August 22 by twelve
tanks to complete the complement of " C " Company. On
August 25 the right half of "D" Company entrained at
Thetford for France, and on August 30 the remainder of
the company followed. Tanks on arrival in France were
transported to Yvrench, near Abbeville, where a training
centre had been established under the command of Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Brough, who had proceeded to France on
August 3, to make the necessary arrangements. On
September 4, Colonel Brough, having organised the training,
returned to England, and Lieutenant- Colonel Bradley took
over command of the Heavy Section.

It was now decided by G.H.Q. that tanks should take
part in the next great attack in the Somme battle on Sep-
tember 15, so, on the 7th, 8th, and 9th of this month, " C "
and " D " Companies moved to the forward area, and
established their headquarters at the Loop, a railway centre
not far from the village of Bray-sur-Somme.

CHAPTER III

MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TANKS

The following very brief account of the mechanical char-
acteristics of tanks, it is hoped, will prove sufficiently simple
and complete to give to the non-mechanical reader some idea
of the tank as a machine.

The Mark I Tank (see Frontispiece)

The first British tanl? made, and to be used, was the heavy
machine, already described i in the previous chapter, the
Mark I tank, the general outhne of which remained the
standard design for the hulls of all British heavy machines
up to the end of the war. As will be shown later, many
mechanical improvements, making for higher efficiency and
greater simphcity of control, were introduced from time to
time, but the fact remains that the profile of the Mark V
tank of 1918 was to all intents and purposes that of the
Mark I of 1916, and surely this is a striking tribute to the
genius of the designers who, without much previous data
upon which to base their work, produced the parent
weapon.

It is not proposed here to enter upon the general arrange-
ment of the Mark I tank, but reference to two important
points in design is of interest. The first is that this machine
was fitted with a " tail," consisting of a pair of heavy large-
diameter wheels, mounted at the rear of the machine upon
a carriage, which was pivoted to the hull in such a manner
that the wheels were free to follow the varying contours of
the ground. A number of strong springs normally kept the
wheels bearing heavily upon the ground, whilst a hydrauhc
ram, operated by an oil pump driven from the engine, was
intended to enable the carriage to be rocked upon its axis,

35

36 MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS

in order to raise the wheels well clear of the ground on
occasions when it was necessary to " swing " the tank.

The object of this " tail " device was to provide means of
steering the machine and, to this end, the driver was pro-
vided with a steering wheel which, operating a wire cable
over a bobbin or drum, altered the path of the " tail "
wheels, and allowed the tank to be steered, under favourable
conditions, through a circle having a diameter of about sixty
yards. The disadvantages of this fitting far outweighed
any virtues it may have possessed. Countless troubles were
experienced with the ram and its pump ; the wire steering
cable was constantly stretching or slipping through the
bobbin, thus affecting the " lock " of the tail wheels ; the
driver was subjected to great physical strain in overcoming
the tremendous resistance offered by the road wheels ; the
whole device was very prone to be damaged by shell-fire in
action. Against these indictments should be recorded the
fact that the possession of a " tail " enabled the Mark I
tank successfully to span and cross a wider trench than the
later " tailless " machines of the same dimensions could
negotiate, owing to the fact that as the wheels supported
the rear of the tank over the point of balance, the risk of
" tail dive " was considerably reduced. However, at the
close of the operations of 1916, all tanks were shorn of their
tails, and no subsequent models were fitted with them.

The second point of interest regarding this early machine
relates to its sponsons. These, on both the male and female
machines (armed with full length 6-pounder and Vickers
machine-guns respectively) were planted upon and bolted
to the walls of the hull and, for entraining purposes, these
had to be removed and carried upon special trolleys which
could be towed behind the tanks. It will readily be seen
that this arrangement involved a considerable amount of
labour, and rendered the process of entraining an extremely
lengthy one ; this led to an improved form of sponson being
produced for the Mark IV machine.

The chief outstanding weaknesses of the Mark I machine,
disclosed during the first appearance in action, were :

MARK II AND MARK III TANKS 37

That the engine was provided with no silencer, conse-
quently the noise, sparks, and even flames, which proceeded
from the open exhaust pipes, passing through the roof of
the tank, constituted a grave danger during the latter stages
of an approach march. Many ingenious tank crews fitted
to their machines crude types of silencers made out of oil
drums, or adopted the plan of damping out the sparks by
using wet sacks in relays, or covering the exhaust pipe with
clay and mud.

That the observation from the inside of the machine was
bad, and efficient fire control was, therefore, impossible.

That the means provided for entering and leaving the
tank were unsatisfactory, and, in the case of the female
machine, speedy evacuation in the event of fire was difficult.

That the whole of the petrol supply was carried inside
the machine, and in a vulnerable position' — a circumstance
which added to the risk of fire in the event of a hit in the
petrol tank by armour-piercing bullet or shell. Further-
more, gravity was the only means for transferring petrol
from the main petrol tanks in the front of the machine to
the carburetter, and, therefore, it frequently happened
that when a tank " ditched " nose downwards, the petrol
supply was cut off, and consequently the dangerous
practice of " hand-feeding " had to be resorted to.

The Mark II and Mark III Tanks
These machines were produced in small numbers, and
their difference from Mark I lay in various minor improve-
ments, none of a radical nature.

The Mark IV Tank (Plate I— see p. 26)
In 1917 this tank became the standard fighting machine
of the Tank Corps, and it was used in battle throughout this
year and the following. As already stated, in outline it
' corresponded so closely with the Mark I machine that a study
here of the main features of this tank will serve generally
as an illustration of what had taken place in tank develop-
ment up to this date.

38 MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS

The machine was 26 ft. 5 in. long over all, whilst the width
of the female over its sponsons was 10 ft. 6 in., and of the
male, 13 ft. 6 in. The height of the machine was 8 ft. 2 in.,
and its weight, equipped, was 28 tons. The armament
consisted, in the case of the male, of two 6-pounder guns
and four machine-guns, and in that of the female of six
machine-guns ; it was fitted with a 105 h.p. Daimler 6-cylinder
sleeve-valve engine which, at a later date, was replaced in a
hmited number by one of 125 h.p. This increased power
was obtained by the use of aluminium pistons, twin car-
buretters, and by speeding up the engine.

Generally speaking, these engines gave very little trouble,
although somewhat under-powered for the work they had
to perform. They were, it may be added, particularly
suitable from the maintenance point of view, owing to their
" fool-proof " nature, due chiefly to the absence of the usual
poppet-valve gear, with its attendant risk of maladjustment.
Power was transmitted from the engine flywheel, through
a cone-type clutch and a flexible coupling, to a two-speed
and reverse gear-box, known as the primary gear, this being
under the direct control of the driver, who could thus obtain
first and second speeds, or reverse, without other assistance.

The tail-shaft from the gear-box carried a worm which
drove the crown wheel of a large reduction gear, this gear
also serving as a differential to enable the track driving
wheels to rotate at different speeds, as when steering the
tank on its track brakes. A device was provided, under
the driver's control, for locking the differential when it was
desired to steer a dead-ahead course, or when negotiating
a trench or other obstacle. With the differential locked,
the gear became, so to speak, " sohd " and obviated the risk
of one of the tracks slipping in bad ground, a condition very
apt to cause a tank to slip sideways into a trench and become
ditched.

Some trouble was caused through breakages of this lock-
ing muff in the earher days, but latterly the arrangement was
considerably improved and strengthened.

The gear-box tail-shaft terminated in a brake drum, the

THE MARK IV TANK 39

band of which was operated by means of a pedal at the
driver's foot. It may be of interest to point out here that
the whole of the items so far referred to, i.e. engine, gear-box,
and differential, formed the standard power unit of the
pre-war Foster-Daimler tractor, and thus provided a known
quantity around which the rest of the detail was designed.
This greatly facilitated production.

On either side of the differential case projected cross-
shafts, the outer ends of which were supported in bearings
mounted upon the outside wall of the tank, and, between
the inner and outer walls of the hull, two sHding pinions
were carried on a splined portion of the cross-shaft, one pair
of pinions on each of the right and left hand sides of the
tank.

In describing the remainder of the transmission, it will
suffice to deal only with one side of the machine, the detail
on either side being identical.

The shding pinions, already alluded to, were operated by
means of short levers by two gearsmen, whose sole duty it
was to assist the driver, who signalled to them his require-
ments from his seat in the front of the tank, the two gearsmen
being accommodated towards the rear of the machine on
seats placed over the primary gear-box. The sliding pinions
were of two sizes, known as the high-speed and low-speed
pinions, and immediately in their rear was mounted another
pinion assembly, also carrjang two gear-wheels of different
dimensions, with which the shding wheels could be engaged
at will — ^in other words, on each side of the tank there
existed what were known as secondary gear-boxes, each
offering a choice of two speeds.

Thus it will be seen that the whole arrangement provided
a range of four speeds. Assuming the secondary gears to
be at " low," the driver had the option of using either first or
second speed by manipulating the control to the primary
gear-box, whilst in order to obtain third or fourth (top)
speed it was necessary for him to signal the gearsmen to alter
their gears to " high," and to assist them in the process by
a great deal of intelligent clutch work. It need hardly be

40 MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS

pointed out that this arrangement was exceedingly clumsy,
and often involved much loss of time and temper. It might
also be mentioned here that the reverse gear, already alluded
to, was considerably higher than the lowest forward speed,
so that there was little possibihty of driving backwards,
clear of any obstruction which might have ditched the tank.

Hand-operated brakes, under the control of the tank
commander in the front of the tank, alongside the driver,
were incorporated with the secondary gear-box. These
brakes, by checking one or other track, enabled the tank to
be steered in some measure with the differential unlocked,
whilst, by locking the differential and placing, say, the right-
hand secondary gear in " neutral," the machine could be
swung to the right, practically upon its own axis, by apply-
ing the right-hand brake. To swing to the left, the right-
hand secondary gear was engaged, the left-hand being placed
in " neutral," the differential locked and the left-hand brake
applied.

From the secondary gear-box a Coventry chain trans-
mitted the power to an assembly, at the rear of the hull,
which carried, on either side of the chain sprocket, two
heavy pinion wheels, in constant mesh with the final sprocket
wheels, which in turn, engaging with the hnks of the track
plates, drove the hull along the track.

Each track was composed, normally, of ninety plates or
road shoes, the separate plates being coupled together by
means of links (two per plate) and link pins, the links them-
selves being recessed so as to engage with the driving wheels
as shown above.

The weight of the machine was carried upon the track
by means of rollers, whilst the track was supported on the
top of the hull by skids or rails.

Adjustment of track was effected by the movement of
an "idler" wheel, which guided the track over the nose of
the hull.

Refinements to the transmission were introduced in the
shape of guards to protect the driving chains from mud,
and also means were provided to lubricate the secondary

THE MARK V TANK 41

gear-wheels with oil. It is recalled that, prior to the intro-
duction of the chain-guard, the inside deck of the tanks was
often covered with a layer of liquid mud, several inches
deep, carried in by the chains, and delivered through the
secondary gears.

Petrol was suppHed to the engine in the earUer days of
the Mark IV machine by a pressure-fed system which gave
a great deal of trouble, and, being also considered dangerous,
was finally discarded in favour of the Autovac system,
which sucked the fuel from the main supply in a tank outside
of the machine and deUvered it to the carburetter by gravity.
Coohng of the engine was primarily effected by a copper
envelope radiator, which gave some trouble and was finally
superseded by a tubular type.

An efficient silencer, with a long exhaust pipe carried
right to the rear of the machine, considerably reduced engine
noise and rendered the approach march a far less hazardous
undertaking than was the case with the earlier models.

Sponsons were designed to collapse into the interior of
the machine when necessary, and the cumbersome practice
of detaching them from the hull came to an end. Short
6-pounder guns were introduced to render this change
possible.

Detachable " spuds," to provide a grip for the tracks on
difficult soil, were first introduced for this machine, as also
was a highly efficient unditching gear. The latter consisted
of a beam, rather longer than the overall width of the tank
hull, which was fastened by clips and chains to each track,
and, in passing round under the machine, actually took a
purchase from the obstruction under the belly of the tank.
Detail improvements to give easier entrance and more
rapid egress in case of emergency, as well as better and safer
vision and fixe control, were also introduced.

The Mark V Tank (Plate V— see p. 204)

With the introduction of the Mark V tank, which repre-
sents the standard British heavy tank of to-day, great
progress was made in all-round speed, ease of manoeuvre,
5

42 MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS

radius of action, simplicity of control and feasibility of
observation.

The dimensions and weight of this tank were approxi-
mately the same as those of the Mark IV, whilst the design
of the hull still closely followed the lines of the original
Mark I. Equipped with the 150 h.p. Ricardo 6-cylinder
poppet-valved engine, specially designed for tank work,
the advent of the Mark V machine called for the introduction
of new courses of instruction for the personnel of the Corps,
very few of either officers or other ranks having, at this
time, any experience of the care and adjustment of the valve
gear.

This Ricardo engine, of somewhat unorthodox design,
was highly efficient and, with proper care and attention, gave
very little trouble. From the engine, power was trans-
mitted through a plate clutch in the flywheel to a four-
speed gear-box, immediately in rear of which was the reverse
gear, providing " reverse " on all speeds. The cross-shaft,
incorporated with the reverse gear, carried at either end
(in the same relative position as the secondary gears, explained
in dealing with the Mark IV machine) an epicyclic gear.
It is not within the scope of this chapter to describe this
gear in detail, but it may be regarded as serving the double
purpose of a reduction gear and clutch, combined in one
unit.

From these epicyclic gears, the transmission of the drive
through to the tracks followed the principle of the Mark IV
machine, except that there was no second-line pinion assembly
as in the secondary gear of the earlier tank, the Coventry
chain on the Mark V passing direct from the single-unit
epicyclic gear to the pinion assembly operating the track
driving wheels.

All the items enumerated above were under tiie direct
control of the driver, who was therefore enabled to perform,
single-handed, all the operations which previously required
the work of four men. Hand levers controlled the epicychc
gears, primary gear-box, and reverse gear, whilst the clutch
and gear were foot-operated.

THE MARK V ONE STAR TANK 43

To steer the tank at any speed, the driver had merely
to raise the epicyelic gear lever on the side on which he wished
to turn. This had the effect of interrupting the drive to
that track, so that, being driven by the remaining track,
the machine would turn upon the " idle " side.

Where a sharp " swing " was necessary, application of the
foot brake would automatically check the " idle " track,
this being allowed for by means of a single compensating link
motion with which the controls were interconnected.

The engine was petrol-fed by the autovac system, as fitted
to the later Mark IV machines. Cooling of the engine was
effected by means of a tubular type radiator, the water
therein being itself cooled by air drawn from outside the
tank, through louvres in the left-hand wall of the hull, and
finally expelled through similar louvres in the right-hand wall.

Further, the engine was completely enclosed in a sheet-
iron casing, from which the hot foul air was exhausted through
the roof of the tank by means of a Keith fan.

The Mark V armament corresponded with that of the
Mark IV, whilst the sponsons were of similar design to those
fitted to the latter type.

The absence of the large differential gear, as fitted on the
earlier models, gave accommodation for a machine-gun in
the rear wall of the tank, and also allowed for large entrance
doors in the back portion of the roof.

A greatly improved type of rear cab was fitted, and thus
provided excellent all-round vision, and also rendered
possible the fitting of the unditching beam to the tracks
from the inside of the machine. This was accomphshed
through the side flaps of the rear cab of the Mark V, whereas
on previous models it had been necessary for members of
the crew to expose themselves to hostile fire, in the event
of the tank becoming ditched in action, as the beam could
only be attached and detached from outside.

The Mark V One Star Tank (Plate VII— see p. 220)
The' Mark V star machine was 6 ft. longer than the Mark V,
and the weight of the male, equipped, was approximately

44

MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS

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THE MEDIUM MARK A TANK 45

33 tons. There was no change in the nature of the arma-
ment, or in the number of the crew, which consisted of eight
all told. In addition to the crew, the machine was capable
of carrying twenty to twenty-five other troops and would
cross a 14 ft. trench, as against 10 ft. for the Mark V.

The general mechanical arrangement of this tank corre-
sponded with that of the Mark V, the same engine and trans-
mission system being adopted, with the addition of a Cardan
shaft between the flywheel and gear-box, which was ren-
dered necessary by the additional length of the machine.

The Mark V star was relatively slow to manoeuvre, owing
chiefly to the amount of track-bearing surface on the ground.

The Medium Mark A or " Whippet " Tank
(Plate III— see p. 176)

The Medium A tank, known also as the " Chaser " and
" Whippet," was the British standard hght-type machine,
and it differed altogether from its heavier relatives. Its
weight, equipped, was about 14 tons, whilst it was 20 ft.
long, 9 ft. high, and 8 ft. 7 in. wide, carrying a crew of three.
It could attain a maximum speed of about 8'3 m.p.h., and
could span a trench approximately 7 ft. in width.

On this machine the tracks were not carried " overhead "
as in the case of the heavy tanks, but the two trackways
existed as such only, and formed the road members of what
may be described as the chassis upon which the engine-
room and fighting cab were mounted. There were no
sponsons, and the tank was driven and fought from the cab
at the rear of the machine, provision being allowed for an
armament of three machine-guns.

Each machine was fitted with two 45 h.p. 4-cyUnder
Tyler engines with an autovac petrol feed, and cooled by
means of a tubular radiator provided with two fans driven
by chains from each crankshaft.

The power of each engine was transmitted through separate
cone clutches, leather flexible coupMngs, and four-speed
and reverse gear-boxes, to a casing, at the rear of the machine,
containing two worm gears.

46 MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS

The two worm-wheel shafts of these gears were in line,
with their inner ends nearly touching, and each carrying
the keyed-on half of a jawed couphng, one of which could
be slid along at will, to engage with the other, thus locking
the two shafts together.

One of the shafts carried a friction- clutch arrangement,
designed to limit the power transmitted from one shaft to
the other to about 12 h.p.

It will be seen, therefore, that either worm-wheel shaft
could be driven independently by its own engine, or the
two could be locked together so as to rotate at the same
speed, driving the tank straight ahead, provided that there
was not more than 12 h.p. difference between the developed
powers of the engines. Extensions of each worm shaft
carried a band brake, as well as a fan for forcing air into the
cab of the machine.

Returning to the details of the transmission system,
each cross-shaft from the worm case terminated in a " driving
chain pinion shaft," the outer ends of which were supported
by ball bearings mounted upon the sides of the track frames.
The chain pinion carried by this shaft transmitted the drive,
through a roller chain, to the final track-driving wheels,
which, engaging with the slots in the track links, drove
the tank along the track. Each track consisted normally
of sixty-seven plates or shoes, and rollers served to support
the weight of the tank upon the track, as well as to carry
the track over the top of the trackway. Adjustment of the
track was effected by movement of the front " idler " wheel
as in the case of the heavier nnachines.

The Whippet tank called for particular skill in driving, and
a great deal of practice was usually necessary to produce a
really efficient driver. " Stalhng " of one or both engines
was a common occurrence during the earlier stages of train-
ing. Steering was effected by varying the speed of either
engine, and the radius of movement was proportional to
the difference in the speed of the two engines, this difference
being controlled by means of a steering wheel connected to
the two carburetter throttles, movement of the wheel pro-

THE GUN-CARRYING TANK 47

ducing acceleration of one engine and deceleration of the
other simultaneously.

The Gun-carrying Tank (Plate VII — see p. 220)

Originally designed for carrying a 60-pounder gun or 6-in.
howitzer and ammunition into action, these machines during
1918 were chiefly used for the transport of supplies across
country. The engine, a 6-cylinder 105 h.p. Daimler, was
placed right at the rear of the machine, and the general
lay-out of the transmission corresponded with that of the
Mark IV modified to suit the engine, position, the primary
and secondary gears, etc., being mounted forward of the
engine in the case of this G.C. tank. The final drive to the
track was at the rear, and exactly followed the Mark IV
practice, whilst the track itself was carried on track frames,
in this respect somewhat resembhng the Medium A machine.

Four men were required to control the G.C. tank, the
driver and brakesman being separately housed in two small
independent cabs mounted one over each track towards
the front of the machine, whilst the secondary gearsmen
travelled in the body of the machine.

A system of signalling by signs from driver to other members
of the crew was adopted.

Situated between the inner walls of the hull at the front
of the tank was a " skid " or platform which could be
drawn out, and its front lowered to the ground, forming an
inchned runway up which the gun was hauled, by means
of a winding gear operated from the engine, to its travelUng
position on the machine.

Drums for carrying ammunition for the guns were sup-
ported on platforms over the tracks immediately in rear
of the two control cabs.

The first G.C. tanks were fitted with " tails," similar to
those on the Mark I machines, but these were later on dis-
carded.

The above includes the brief mechanical summary of the
various types of British tanks used during the Great War,

48 MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS

and though, undoubtedly, the future will bring with it many
improvements and may radically change the whole form of
the present-day tank, it is doubted if ever, in the whole
history of mechanics — let alone warfare, a novel machine
has been produced which has proved so efficient on first use
and required in the long run of two years of war so few
changes.

CHAPTER IV

THE MARK I TANK AND ITS TACTICS

The Mark I tank was the direct produce of the experimental
machine wliich was officially tested on February 2, 1916.
It may be defined as " a mechanically-propelled cross-
country armoured battery," the maximum thickness of its
armour being 12 mm.^

The main tactical characteristics of all tanks may be
placed under the headings of — mobility, security, and offen-
sive power, and as regards the Mark I machine the follow-
ing is a general description of these characteristics :

(i) Mobilityi — The Mark I tank could move over flat
ground at 100 to 120 yards a minute, over ground inter-
sected by trenches at 30 to 40 yards a minute, and at night
time at 15 yards a minute. It could cross all forms of wire
entanglements, crushing down two paths through them which
were passable by two single files of infantry. It could span
a trench 11 ft. 6 in. wide, surmount an obstacle 5 ft. high,
and climb a slope of 1 over 2.

(ii) Security. — The Mark I tank was proof against ordinary
bullets, shrapnel, and most shell-splinters.

(iii) Offensive Power. — ^Mark I tanks were divided into
two categories : male and female. The former carried an
armament of two 6-pou,nde r_^uns and four Hotchkiss
machine-guns, the latteF'of'^ve Vickers and one Hotchkiss
machine-guns. The normal amount of ammunition carried
was for males 20 rounds and 10,000 rounds S.A.A., and for
females 12,000 rounds S.A.A.

The chief limltafioirs'oftHe tank are connected with its
mobility. For the Mark I type these limitations were as
follows :

Its circuit in action was about 12 miles, and the fighting
1 The sponsons of the Mark I were only 10 nim..aimour and not proof
against A.P. bullets.

50 MARK I TANK AND ITS TACTICS

endurance of its crew 8 to 12 hours. It was not suited for
traversing swamps, thick woods, streams with marshy banks,
or deep sunken roads. It could be expected to cross shelled
dry ground at a slow pace, but should this ground become
sodden with rain it would find difficulty in doing so, and
might frequently become ditched.

A tactical paper on the employment of this machine was
put forward official^ in February 1916 by Colonel Swinton,
entitled " Notes on the Employment of ' Tanks,' " This
document is of special interest as it is the first tactical note
published on the use of tanks. The following are certain
extracts taken from it :

f- " The use made by the Germans of machine-guns and wire
entanglements — a combination which has such power to
check the advance of infantry — has in reply brought about
the evolution of the ' caterpillar bullet-proof chmbing motor,
or tank,' a machine designed for the express purpose of
assisting attacking infantry by crossing the defences, breaking
through the obstacles, and of disposing of the machine-guns.
It is primarily a machine-gun destroyer, which can be em-
ployed as an auxiliary to an infantry assault. ..."

" Hostile machine-guns which it is impossible to crush
{i.e. by running over them) will be attacked by gunfire. It
is specially for the purpose of deahng with these weapons
ensconced in houses, cellars, amongst ruins, in haystacks, or
in other concealed positions behind the enemy's front fine,
where they may not be knocked out by our artillery, and
whence they can stop our infantry advances, that the tanks
carry guns. Being covered with bullet-proof protection,
and therefore to a great extent immune from the hostile
•j machine-guns, they can approach sufficiently close to locate
'l^the latter, and pour in shell at- jxoint^blank ^unge,^. . ."

" As ... it is proposed that the taliks Itiouid accompany
the infantry," they should carry forward the following sig-
nalling apparatus, " small wireless sets ... an apparatus
for laying a field telephone cable either on the surface of
the ground or possibly buried 12 in. deep ..." also visual
signalliiig/apparatus and smoke rockets.

,'* The tanks will be destroyed by a direct hit of any type
ot howitzer shell.' They will probably be put out of action

SURPRISE TACTICS 51

by all except the most glancing hits of high-explosive shell
fired by field-guns. . . . They may also be blown up by
<Tnines_£ijc_l@jidrmines. ..."

" Since the cKance of success of an attack by tanks lies
almost entirely in its novelty, and in the element of surprise,
it is obvious that no repetition of it will have the same
opportunity of succeeding as the first tmexpected effort. It
follows, therefore, that these machines should not be used in
driblets (for instance, as they may be produced), but that the
fact of their existence should be kept as secret as possible
until the whole are ready to be launched, together with the
infantry assault, in one great combined operation. . . ."

" The sector of front where the machines can best operate
should be carefully chosen to comply with their .limitations,
i.e. their inabihty to cross canals, rivers, deep railway cuttings
with steep sides, woods and orchards. . . ."

Tanks should remain at the position of assembly " suffi-
ciently long for the crews to reconnoitre, ease and mark out
the routes up to the points where they will actually cross
the front defences, and to learn all that can be discovered
of the German front-line trenches, and the defence zone
behind it over which they have to advance. ..."

" The tanks, it is thought, should move forward together,
say, by rocket signal, sweeping the enemy's first-line parapet
with machine-gun fire ; and after they have proceeded some
three-quarters of the way across ' No Man's Land,' and have
succeeded in attracting to themselves the fire of the German
infantry and machine-guns in the front line, the assaulting
infantry should charge forward so as to reach the German
defences soon after the tanks have climbed the parapet
and begim to enfilade the trenches. ..."

"... unless expectations are falsified, if the machines
accompany the assaulting infantry, moving with it, or just
ahead of it . . . both will be across the enemy's front fine
and on their way to the second before the curtain of
fire descends, and the latter will be behind them. It is
hoped similarly that, owing to the prevention of the usual
checks to the advance, which the action of the tanks will
ensure, by the time the German gunners shorten the range
in. order to provide a second curtain in front of their
second line, our assault will have already swept beyond
the line.

" The above anticipations are admittedly sanguine ; but

52 MARK I TANK AND ITS TACTICS

if the tanks are employed and are successful, it is thought
that they will enable the assault to maintain most of its
starting momentum, and break through the German 'position
quickly,'''' a condition which up to the present it has not been
possible to attain, " even after immense sacrifice of hfe." . . .
" Not only, however, does it seem that the tanks will confer
the power to force successive comparatively imbattered
defensive lines, but . . . the more speedy and uninterrupted
their advance, the greater the chance of their surviving
sufficiently long to do this. It is possible, therefore, that
an effort to break right through the enemy's defensive
zone in one day may now be contemplated as a feasible
proposition. . . . This being the case, it appears that when
the tanks are used the contingency of such an extended botuid
forward being made should be most carefully legislated for
in the way of preparation to send forward reinforcements, .
gmis, ammunition, and supplies. ..."

" The necessity for the co-ordination of all arms to work
together in the offensive generally requires no remarks
here, but the desirability of the specially careful considera-
tion of the subject in the case of an operation by tanks,
requires some emphasis, since the orchestration of the attack
will be complicated by the introduction of a new instrument
and one which somewhat alters the chain of interdependence
of all. A recapitulation of this chain will make the matter
clear. The tanks cannot win battles by themselves. They
are purely auxiMary to the infantry, and are intended to
sweep away the obstructions which have hitherto stopped
the advance of our infantry beyond the German first line,
and cannot with certainty be disposed of by shell fire. It
follows, therefore, that the progress of the attack, which
depends on the advance of the infantry, depends on the
activity and preservation in action of the tanks.

" The weapons by which the tanks are most likely to be
put out of action are the enemy guns. The only means by
which we can at the earlier stages of an attack reduce the
activity of the enemy's gims, are by our own artillery fire
or by dropping bombs on them from the air.

" It follows, therefore, that in order to help our infantry
in any operation in which tanks take part . . . the principal
object of our guns should not be to endeavour to damage
the German machine-guns, earthworks, and wire, behind
the enemy's first line, a task they cannot with certainty

COLONEL SWINTON'S FORESIGHT 58

carry out, and which the tanks are specially designed to
perform. It should be to endeavour to help the infantry
by helping the tanks, i.e. by concentrating as heavy a counter-
fire as possible on the enemy's main artillery position, and
on any field or other light guns whose situation behind the
first line is known. . . ."

" In order to increase the confusion which it is hoped will
be caused amongst the enemy by an attack by tanks, and
to assist in conceahng the exact nature and the progress
of these machines, it would be of advantage if their advance
were heralded by clouds of smoke. ..."

The above quotations need no comment, and if comment
is to be sought for, the most suitable places to seek it are
the battles in which tanks eventually took part, for in these,
and the great number of lesser actions, some eighty-five
in all, it will be found that not only were Colonel Swinton's
speculations, made seven months before the first tank crossed
" No Man's Land," not mere " fiights of imagination," but
" solid facts," the value of which these battles have proved
again and again.

CHAPTER V

THE BATTLES OF THE SOMME AND ANCRE

On July 1, 1916, the battle of the Somme opened with a
successful advance on the British right between Maricourt
and Ovillers, and a check on the British left between Ovillers
and Gommecourt. From that day on to the commence-
ment of the battle of the Ancre, in November, no further
attempt was made to push forward the British left, all avail-
able troops being required to maintain the forward move-
ment of the right flank.

The ground which separates the rivers Somme and Ancre
is split up into valleys by pronounced ridges, most of which
form natural lines of defence for an enemy and could, in
1916, only be stormed after having been subjected to a
heavy artillery bombardment. The ground had conse-
quently become severely " crumped " in places ; but as the
weather, up to September 15, had been fine and dry, it
offered no insuperable difficulty to the movement of the
tanks, which were allotted to the Fourth and Reserve Armies
as follows :

Fourth Army, XlVth Corps . " C " Company (less 1 Section)
„ ,> XVth „ . " D " Company (less 1 Section)

,, ,, Ilird „ . 1 Section " D " Company .

Reserve Army . . .1 Section " C " Company ,

In G.H.Q. Reserve (all mechanically imfit)

On September 11 operation orders were received from the
Fourth Army, and on the 13th a conference was held, at
which Lieutenant- Colonel Bradley attended, to discuss the
forthcoming attack. During the 14th " A " Company
arrived at Yvrench, and at 4.30 p.m. on that day the head-
quarters of " C " Company moved to the Briquetterie near

54

. 17 tanks

. 17

»»

. - 8

19

. 7

Jl

. 10

fl

SEPTEMBER 15, 1916 65

Trones Wood, and the headquarters of " D " Company to
Green Dump.

The frontage of the Fourth Army attack extended between
the Combles ravine and Martinpuich, the intention being
to break through the enemy's defensive system and occupy
Morval, Les Bceufs, Gueudecourt, and Flers. Simultane-
ously with this attack the Reserve Army was to attack on
the left of the Ilird Corps, and the French on the right
of the XlVth Corps. The attack was to be pushed with
the utmost vigour, and was to be followed by the advance
of the Cavalry Corps, which was to seize the high ground
about Rocquigny-Villers au Flos-Riencourt-lez-Bapaume.

The general idea governing tank movements, on this
the first occasion of their use, was that they should be
employed in sub-sections of two or three machines against
" strong points." Considerable apprehension existed as to
the likeKhood on the one hand of tanks, if they started too
soon, drawing prematurely the enemy's fire, and on the
other of their reaching their objective too late to be an
assistance to the infantry. It was finally decided that they
should start in sufficient time to reach the first objective
five minutes before the infantry got there, and thus risk
drawing hostile fire. Our own artillery barrages, stationary
and creeping, were to be brought down at zero, leaving
lanes free from fire through which the tanks were to advance.
The tanks moved up from their positions of assembly to
their starting-points during the night of September 14-15.
Of the forty- nine machines allotted for the attack, thirty- two
reached their starting-points in time for the battle, the
remainder failing to arrive through becoming ditched on the
way, or breaking down through mechanical trouble.

The tanks working with the Reserve Army and the Ilird
and XlVth Corps were not a great success ; the operations
of those with the XVth Corps were as follows :

The tanks allotted to this Corps assembled on the night
of September 13-14 at the Green Dump, where the machines
were tuned up for battle, and where stores of petrol and oil
had been collected. On the night of the 14-15th the tanks

56 BATTLES OF THE SOMME AND ANCRE

moved up to their starting-points round Delville Wood.
Every tank was given the route it had to follow, and the
time it was to leave the starting-point; this was in most
cases about half an hour before zero (dawn), and was intended
to be arranged so that the tanks should reach the German
trenches ^ few minutes ahead of our own infantry. Briefly,
the orders were for eight tanks to advance on the west of
Flers, and six on the east of that village, their destination
being Gueudecourt and the sunken road to the west of it.
The tanks were to attack all strong points on their routes,
and to assist the infantry whenever held up.

Of the seventeen tanks which moved off, twelve reached
their starting-points ; eleven of these crossed the German
trenches and did useful work. One in particular gave great
assistance where the attacking infantry were held up in
front of the Flers line by wire and machine-gun fire ; the
tank commander placed his machine astride the trench
and enfiladed it ; the tank then travelled along behind
the trench, and 300 Germans surrendered and were taken
prisoners. Another tank entered Gueudecourt, attacked a
German battery and destroyed one 77 mm. field-gun with
its 6-pounders ; the tank was then hit by a shell and caught
fire ; only two of its crew got back to our hues.

This attack on September 15, from the point of view of
tank operations, was not a great success. Of the forty-nine
tanks employed, only thirty-two reached their starting-
points ; nine pushed ahead of the infantry and caused con-
siderable loss to the enemy, and nine others, though they
never caught^up with the infantry, did good work in clearing
up points where the enemy was still holding out. Of the
remaining fourteen, nine broke down from mechanical
trouble, and five became ditched.

The casualties amongst the tank personnel were insignifi-
cant. Of the machines ten were hit in action and temporarily
rendered useless, and seven were slightly damaged, but not
sufficiently so as to prevent them returning in safety.

The next occasion upon which tanks were used was during
the attacks of September 25 and 26, five being allotted to

TAKING OF THE GIRD TRENCH 67

the Fourth Army, and eight to the Reserve Army. Of these
thirteen tanks nine stuck in shell-holes, two worked their
way into Thiepval, and after rendering assistance to the
infantry met a similar fate, and one, working with the
XVth Corps, carried out the first " star " turn in the history
of tank tactics, which in the report of the XVth Corps is
described as follows :

" On September 25, the 64th Brigade, 2Ist Division,
attack on Gird trench was hung up and unable to make
any progress. A footing had been obtained in Gird trench
at N.32 d.9.1,1 and our troops held the trench from N.26 c.4.5,
northwards. Between these two points there remained
approximately 1,500 yards of trench, very strongly held by
Germans, well wired, the wire not having been cut. Arrange-
ments were made for a tank (female) to move up from here
for an attack next morning. The tank arrived at 6.30 a.m.
followed by bombers. It started moving south-eastwards
along the Gird trench, firing its machine-guns. As the
trench gradually fell into our hands, strong points were made
in it by two companies of infantry, which were following
in the rear for that purpose. No difficulty was experienced.
The enemy surrendered freely as the tank moved down the
trench. They were unable to escape owing to our holding
the trench at the southern end at N.32 d.9.1. By 8.30 a.m.
the whole length of the trench had been cleared, and the
15th Durham Light Infantry moved over the open and
took over the captured trench. The infantry then advanced
to their final objective, when the tank rendered very valuable
assistance. The tank finally ran short of petrol south-east
of Gueudecourt. In the capture of the Gird trench, eight
officers and 362 other ranks were made prisoners, and a great
many Germans were killed. Our casualties only amounted
to five. Nearly 1,500 yards of trench were captured in less
than an hour. What would have proved a very difficult
operation, involving probably heavy losses, was taken with
greatest ease entirely owing to the assistance rendered by
the tank."

The last occasion upon which tanks were used during
1916 was on November 13 and 14, in the battle of the Ancre,
1 Map reference.
6

58 BATTLES OF THE SOMME AND ANCRE

which completed the Somme operations for the year. Heavy
rain had fallen, and the difficult ground along the river Ancre
had been converted into a morass of mud. For this attack
complete tank preparations were made, reconnaissances
were carried out, and a tankodrome (Tank Park) was estab-
lished at Acheux.

On account of the bad weather the original plan, namely,
to use twenty tanks, was abandoned, and a much more
modest scheme was evolved. Three tanks were to operate
with the 39th Division opposite St. Kerre Divion. On
November 13 these moved forward, and eventually all three
stuck in the mud. North of the river Ancre two tanks were
sent against Beaumont Hamel ; these also became ditched.
Next morning three more tanks were sent out to clear up a
strong point just south of the last-named village. One of
these was hit by a shell, and the remaining two, on reaching
the German front line, became ditched. These two tanks
were, however, able to bring their 6-pounders and machine-
guns to bear on the strong point, and their fire proved so
effective that after a short time the Germans holding it
surrendered, and 400 prisoners were rounded up by the
tank crews — 2 officers and 14 other ranks.

From the point of view of the general observer it might
be said that, except for one or two small and brilliant
operations, the tank during the battle of the Somme had
not proved its value. The general observer, however, is
seldom the best judge, and when the actual conditions
imder which tanks were used, during the autumn of 1916,
are weighed and the lessons sorted, history's verdict, it is
thought, will be, that they had so far proved their value
that September 15, 1916, will in future be noted not so
much for the successes gained on that day, but as the birth-
day of a new epoch in the history of war.

What were these lessons ?

(i) That the machine in principle was absolutely sound,
and that all it required were certain mechanical improve-
ments.

(ii) That it had not been given a fair trial. It had been

LESSONS LEARNT 59

constructed for good going and fine weather ; it had been,
unavoidably, used on pulverised soil, often converted by
rain into a pudding of mud.

(iii) That, on account of the secrecy it was necessary to
maintain, commanders had little or no conception of the
tactics to apply to its use.

(iv) That sufficient time had not been obtainable wherein
to give the crews a thorough and careful training.

(v) That tank operations require the most careful prepara-
tion and minute reconnaissances in order to render them
successful.

(vi) That tanks require leading and controlling in battle,
and consequently that a complete system of communication
is essential.

(vii) That tanks, like every other arm, require a separate
supply organisation to maintain them whilst fighting.

(viii) That tanks draw away much fire from the infantry,
and have as great an encouraging effect on our own troops
as they have a demoralising one on the enemy's.

These are the main lessons which were learnt from the
tank operations which took place during the battles of the
Somme and the Ancre, and the mere fact of having learnt
them justifies the employment of tanks during these opera-
tions. Further it must be remembered that, whatever
tests are carried out under peace conditions, the only true
test of efficiency is war, consequently the final test a machine
or weapon should get is its first battle, and until this test
has been undergone, no guarantee can be given of its real
worth, and no certain deductions can be made as to its
future improvement.

CHAPTER VI

THE GROWTH OF THE TANK CORPS ORGANISATION

The word " Reorganisation " is a word which will never be
forgotten by any member of the Tank Corps Headquarters
Staff; it was their one persistent companion for over two
years. It dogged their steps through all seasons, over
training areas and battlefields in sleuth-hound fashion from
the earliest days ; and its pace was never stronger or its
tongue more noisy than when, on November 11, 1918, it
was temporarily shaken off with the armistice. Depressing
as this perpetual change often was, reorganisation is, never-
theless, an extremely healthy sign, for it shows that the
Tank Corps, a young formation, was not afraid to grow,
and that it refused to stand still ; and, when all is said and
done, should not every organisation be dynamic, should
not it move with the times, expand, grow, and absorb diffi-
culties rather than push them aside or ignore them ? What-
ever, in the eyes of others, the Tank Corps may have been,
throughout the Great War it was an intensely virile for-
mation.

In this chapter the organisation and reorganisation of
the Tank Corps, first known as the " Heavy Section," and
later as the " Heavy Branch" of the Machine Gun Corps,
will be dealt with in its entirety ; for unless we lay this
spectre in a chapter of its own it will never leave us in peace,
but will haunt our steps right through this brief history,
as was its wont when the incidents now related were taking
form in France and England.

In June 1916 the Heavy Section Machine Gun Corps
was organised in six companies — A, B, C, D, E, and F. Each
company consisted of four sections, each of six tanks with
one spare tank per company — in all twenty-five machines,

60

BERMICOURT 61

thus absorbing the 150 machines ordered.' Each section
consisted of 3 male and 3 female tanks, subdivided into
three sub-sections of 1 male and 1 female each.

The crew of a tank was 1 officer and 7 other ranks, the
total personnel of a section being 6 officers and 43 other
ranks. For every two companies was provided a Quarter-
master's estabhshment of 1 officer and 4 other ranks, and
a workshop of 3 officers and 50 other ranks.

A few days after the Heavy Section had made its debut
on the battlefield of the Somme, a suggestion was put for-
ward to organise it on the lines of the Royal Fl}ang Corps,
which, eventually, in the main was adopted. This was
undoubtedly a sound suggestion, as every new weapon
requires an organisation of its own to nurse it through its
infancy.

On September 29, Lieutenant-Colonel H. J. Elles, D.S.O.,
who, as we have seen, first came into contact with tanks
in January 1916, was appointed Colonel Commanding the
Heavy Section in France, and on the same day that his
appointment was sanctioned it was decided that 1,000
tanks should be built, and that certain improvements in
the existing design of machine should be introduced. At
this time the Headquarters of the Heavy Section were
located in one small hut in the centre of the square of the
village of Beauquesne, and as this village was not con-
sidered suitable for a permanent Headquarters, Bermicourt
was selected instead — a small village just north of the
Hesdin-St.-Pol road. At this village the Headquarters
remained until the end of the war, expanding from three
Nissen huts to many acres of buildings.

On October 8 a provisional establishment for the Head-
quarters was approved. It consisted of — a Commander
(Colonel), one Brigade Major, one D.A.A. and Q.M.G., one
Staff Captain, and one Intelhgence Officer. These appoint-
ments were filled by the following officers : Colonel H. J.
Elles, Captain G. le Q. Martel, Captain T. J. Uzielli, Captain
H. J. Tapper, and Captain F. E. Hotblack.

■ 1 The original order was for 100, this was later on increased to 160.

62 GROWTH OF TANK CORPS ORGANISATION

At about this time it was proposed to form the Heavy
Section into a Corps, giving it an Administrative Head-
quarters in England and a Fighting Headquarters in France,
and of converting the four companies in France into four
battalions, and raising five new battalions in England on
the nuclei of the two remaining companies. Though the
formation of the tank units into a Corps was not sanctioned
at the time the other proposals came into force on October 20,
Brigadier- General F. Gore Anley, D.S.O., being appointed
Administrative Commander of the Tank Training Centre,
Bovington Camp, Wool, in the place of Colonel Swinton,
with Lieutenant- Colonel E. B. Mathew-Lannowe as his
G. S.O.I. Under this organisation the 9 battalions were
eventually to be formed into 3 brigades each of 3 battalions,
a battalion consisting of 3 companies, each company of 4
fighting sections and a headquarters section. A fighting
section consisted of 5 tanks and the headquarters section
of 8. In all the battalion was, therefore, equipped with
72 machines.

On November 18, the day on which the approved estab-
lishments were issued, the companies, which had continued
in the area of operations, were moved to the area round
Bermicourt and, ceasing to exist as companies, became
A, B, C, and D Battalions Heavy Branch Machine Gun
Corps. They were located at the following villages :

A Battalion .

. Humieres, Echmeux, Bermicourt.

B

. Sautrecourt, Pierremont, St. Mar

tin-Eglise.

c

. Erin, Tilly-Capelle.

D

. Blangy.

These battalions were eventually formed into the 1st and
2nd Tank Brigades : the 1st Brigade, consisting of C and D
Battalions, on January 30, 1917, under the command of
Colonel C. D'A. B. S. Baker Carr, D.S.O.; and the 2nd Brigade,
of A and B Battalions, on February 15, under that of Colonel
A. Courage, M.C. Later, on April 27, in view of the expected

TANK PRODUCTION 63

arrival of two battalions from Wool, approval was given to
the formation of the 3rd Brigade Headquarters under the
command of Colonel J. Hardress Lloyd, D.S.O.

Meanwhile, in England, the whole question of future pro-
duction was being strenuously dealt with by Lieutenant-
Colonel Stern, who, on November 23, assembled a conference
in London at which the future production of tanks was
explained as follows :

That at the time of the conference there were 70 Mark I
machines in France, and it was hoped to deHver improved
types of this tank as follows : 50 Mark II tanks by January ;
50 Mark III tanks by February 7 ; Mark IV tanks at the
rate of 20 per week from February 7 to May 31. Further,
that Mark V tanks would be available in August and Sep-
tember 1917, and that a new light tank, called Mark VI,
would be ready for trial by Christmas 1917.

Unfortunately, on account of the difficulty of production
and the constant changes demanded in design, the above
programme never materialised, and though Mark II tanks
were sent out to France, no Mark IV machines arrived
there until after the battle of Arras had been fought
and"; won.

Early in the new year the battahons of the Heavy Branch
underwent a further reorganisation : they were slightly
reduced in size and the number of their machines was cut
down from 72 to 60 ; each company, theoretically consisting
of 20 tanks, was divided into 4 sections of 5 tanks each ;
for practical purposes, however, it was found that a section
could not deal with more than 4 tanks, so the number of
tanks was reduced to 48, of which 36 were earmarked as
fighting and 12 as training machines.

In March 1917 General Anley was appointed Administra-
tive Commander Heavy Branch Machine-Gun Corps with
his headquarters in London, Brigadier- General W. Glasgow
taking over the command of the Training Centre at Wool.
In May he was succeeded by Major-General Sir John Capper,
K.C.B., and the Tank Committee under his chairmanship
was formed to systematise and strengthen co-operation

64 GROWTH OF TANK CORPS ORGANISATION

between the Army and the Ministry of Munitions. On the
1st of this month, Colonel EUes was gazetted Brigadier-
General Commanding the Heavy Branch in France.

The experiences gained during the battle of Arras, in
April 1917, resulted in proposals being put forward for the
expansion of the Heavy Branch from nine to eighteen bat-
talions, nine to be equipped with heavy, and a similar number
with medium machines.' These proposals mark an important
stage in the development of the Heavy Branch and they
were destined to be the subject of many discussions.

On June 28, the above expansion was authorised, and the
personnel for new luiits was assembled at the Training
Centre at Wool. A month later, however, the call for man-
power became so urgent that the expansion of the Heavy
Branch had to be suspended. It was on the 28th of this
month that the Heavy Branch became known as the Tank
Corps.

During the following months, August and September, the
question of the Tank Corps expansion was held in abeyance.
On October 6 it was once again revived, and a revised estab-
hshment for the contemplated expansion to eighteen bat-
taMons was submitted. The outstanding feature of these
establishments was the abolition of Battahon Workshops
and the substitution of Brigade Workshops in their place.
This resulted in a considerable economy of man-power, and
was rendered possible by the higher training of the tank
crews ; each tank with its crew thus tended to become a
self-contained unit.

On November 27 these establishments received official
approval, and exactly one week later, on December 4, arising
out of the overwhelming success gained by tanks at the
battle of Cambrai (November 20), two new organisations
were put forward, the first known as the Lower, and the
second as the Higher Estabhshments. The Lower Estab-
lishments were eventually decided upon, and they consisted
in a revised edition of the former estabhshments with various

1 The lighter form of tank was called " medium " because the French,
by now, had produced the light Renault tank (see Plate III).

1919 TANK PROGRAMME 65

additions, which the experiences gained at the battle of
Cambrai had shown to be necessary. These estabhshments,
though made out, were never approved, and the German
offensive in March 1918 found the Tank Corps still organised
on the hnes agreed upon in October.

In April, on account of the pressing needs for infantry
reinforcements, the Tank Corps expansion was temporarily
suspended, two of the three remaining battahons in England
being reduced to cadre units, and the third converted into
an Armoured Car Battalion. In July and August the
astonishing successes gained by tanks on various sectors of
the Western Front once again brought forward the need of
increasing the British tank battalions, and the suspension
was removed, the two remaining battalions of the expansion
of October 1917 proceeding to France in September 1918.

In January 1918, from the experience gained by now in
the time necessary to carry through a reorganisation, pro-
posals were put forward for 1919. These were eventually
discussed at the Inter- Alhed Tank Committee, an assembly
of representatives of the various allied Tank Corps, which
first met at Versailles in April. The German spring offen-
sive, however, absorbed so much attention that it was not
possible at the time to do more than work out, as a basis,
the number of tanks required for a decisive tank attack
the following year. As the position of the AlHes in France
stabihsed the question first discussed at Versailles was in
July retaken up, with the result that an expansion to thirty-
four battahons was decided on and completely new estab-
lishments called for. In order to bring this work more
closely under the War Office it was also decided, at about
this time, to dissolve the Tank Directorate, first created in
May 1917, and to replace it by a new sub-branch of the
Directorate of Staff Duties. This change took place on
August 1, when a new branch known as S.D.7 was added
to the Directorate of Staff Duties at the War Office to deal
with the administration of tanks generally, and the 1919
tank programme in particular.

At the same time the Tank Committee was abolished, its

66 GROWTH OF TANK CORPS ORGANISATION

place being taken by the Tank Board, which was constituted
as follows :

Major-General the Right Honourable J. E. B. Seely, C.B.,
C.M.G., D.S.O., M.P., President (Deputy Minister of
Munitions).

Sir Eustace Tennyson D'Eyncourt, K.C.B., Vice-President
(Director of Naval Construction).

Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, K.C.B., KC.V.O., D.S.O.
(Controller Munitions Inventions).

Major-General Sir WiUiam Furse, K.C.B., D.S.O. (Master
General of Ordnance, representing the Army Council).

Major-General E. D. Swinton, C.B., D.S.O.

Major-General H. J. Elles, C.B., D.S.O. (Commanding Tank
Corps, France).

Lieutenant- Colonel Sir Albert Stern, K.B.E., C.M.G. (Com-
missioner Mechanical Warfare, Overseas and AlUes
Department).

Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, D.S.O. (D.D.S.D. Tanks : represent-
ing General Staff, War Office).

Mr. J. B. Maclean (Controller of Mechanical Warfare).

Sir Percival Perry (Inspector of Mechanical Traction).

Captain A. Earle, Secretary.

The constitution of the Board is interesting as it enabled
expert naval, military, and industrial knowledge to be
concentrated on the one subject — ^the application of naval
tactics to land warfare. The work accomplished by this
Board was considerable, it was carried out in a high co-opera-
tive spirit and with great good-fellowship, and it would,
undoubtedly, have proved a factor of no small importance
in the complete destruction of the German armies in 1919,
which was practically fore-ordained by a tank programme of
some 6,000 machines, had the war continued.

September was a month of great activity at the Training
Centre at Wool, and an extensive building programme was
commenced under the direction of Brigadier- General E. B.
Mathew-Lannowe, D.S.O., who had taken over the command

FINAL ESTABLISHMENTS 67

of the Training Centre on August I from Brigadier-General
W. Glasgow, C.M.G.

On October 22 the new establishments were received at
the War Office, and were approved of and returned to G.H.Q.
four days later. Considering that these establishments
covered ninety-six pages of typed foolscap it may be claimed
that the last reorganisation the Tank Corps experienced
dui'ing the Great War was carried through in record time.

CHAPTER VII

TANK " ESPRIT DE CORPS "

The first " Instructions on Training " were issued to battalions
of the Heavy Branch towards the end of December 1916.
They are of some interest, as the esprit de corps and the
efficiency of the entire formation was by degrees moulded
on them.

" The object of all training is to create a ' corps d'elite,'
that is a body of men who are not only capable of helping
to win this war, but are determined to do so. It cannot
be emphasised too often that all training, at all times and
in all places, must aim at the cultivation of the offensive
spirit in all ranks. The requirements, therefore, are a high
efficiency and a high moral.

" Efficiency depends on mental alertness and bodily
fitness ; the first is produced by extensive knowledge and
rapidity of thinking logically, the second by physical train-
ing, games, and the maintenance of health.

" Moral depends on esprit de corps and esprit de cocarde ;
the first is produced by discipline, organisation and skill,
the second by pride, smartness and prestige.

" Efficient instructors and leaders are essential ; indifferent
ones must be ruthlessly weeded out. Officers must not con-
tent themselves with the teaching and knowledge they gain,
but must supplement these by personal study and effort.
Further, they must exercise their ingenuity in adapting the
knowledge they have gained so that it may interest and
expand the ideas of those they teach. In mental superiority
and bodily vigour they must be examples to their men.

"As a general principle, officers and N.C.O.s, charged
with the duty of instruction of troops, should adopt the
following method : First the lesson is to be explained,
secondly demonstrated, and finally carried out as an exercise.
" Instruction must be interesting. As interest soon flags,
subjects will be changed at short intervals, though the same

68

SYSTEMATIC TRAINING 69

movements must be frequently practised on different
occasions.

" Changes should be based on a system ; thus, work which
has required brain power should be followed by work entailing
physical exertion, and vice versa. As physical training
develops muscle on a definite system, so should mental
training develop mind. It will not be easy to accomplish
this unless schemes are carefully organised and thought out,
and training is carried out according to a progressive pro-
gramme.

" Much time is often wasted by attempting long unrealistic
movements and by prolonged drill. Three to four hours a
day, divided into hourly or half-hourly periods, should be
sufficient. Ten minutes' rest intervals should succeed each
hour's work.

" All work must be carried out at high pressure. Every
exercise and movement should, if possible, be reduced to a
precise drill.

" Games will be organised as a definite part of training.

" Order is best cultivated by carrying out all work on a
fixed plan. Order is the foundation of discipline. Small
things like marching men always at attention to and from
work, making them stand to attention before dismissing
them, assist in cultivating steadiness and discipline. Each
day should commence with a careful inspection of the
billets and the men, or some similar formal parade. Strict
march discipline to and from the training grounds must be
insisted upon.

" It is an essential part of training for war that the men
are taught to care for themselves, so as to maintain their
physical fitness. To this end the necessity for taking the
most scrupulous care of their clothing, equipment and
accoutrements will be explained to them.

" The importance of obedience to orders will be impressed
on all ranks and prevention of waste rigorously enforced.

" Both in the case of officers and N.C.O.s special atten-
tion should be paid to the training of understudies for all
positions and appointments.

" The men must be brought to understand that on the
skill they gain during training will depend their lives as well
as the result of the battle. Instruction is not a matter of
getting through a definite time, but of employing that time
to the fullest advantage."

70 TANK "ESPRIT DE CORPS"

The training of the Heavy Branch was divided into the
following categories : Brigade Training, Battalion Training,
Schools, Courses of Instruction, Camps of Instruction,
Lectures and Depot Training.

Brigade and battalion training were divided into two
periods — individual training and collective training. As time
was very limited, all individual training had to be completed
by February 15, 1917.

" The object of individual training " (to quote the " In-
structions ") " is twofold : first, to impart technical knowledge
and skill ; secondly, to cultivate general knowledge so as to
enable all ranks to obtain the highest benefit from the
schemes set in collective training. These latter in their
turn are for the purpose of training units for battle. Indi-
vidual training is the keynote of efficiency. On the thorough-
ness with which it is carried out rests the efficiency of the
whole training."

The object of the collective training was :

" To apply, in conditions as near as possible to those which
will be met with in battle, the detail learnt during individual
training.

" This comprises :

" (i) Close co-operation with the other arms.

" (ii) Rapidity of movement across ground in fighting
formations.

" (iii) Selection of objectives with reference to the plan
of operations."

During January and February all officers took part in a
long indoor scheme which when completed formed a tactical
and administrative basis for future operations, and all ranks
were lectured to on discipline, esprit de corps, moral, and
leadership.

Whilst the above work was in progress a Reinforcement
Depot was formed, first at Humeroeuil, later on it was moved
to Erin, and eventually to Mers, near Le Treport. The
Depot was the receiving station of all drafts arriving for the
Tank Corps, whether from the Training Centre in England,
or from units or hospitals in France. The duty of the Depot

SCHOOLS AND REST CAMPS 71

was to hold on its strength all reinforcements until fully
trained, and when fully trained to continue refresher training
until they were required to fill vacancies in the battahons.

Besides the Depot and the schools attached to it, two main
schools — Gunnery and Tank Driving — were instituted in the
Bermicourt area. In the early summer of 1917 the first
was moved to the sea coast at Merhmont, and the second
to Wailly, a village close to the zone devastated by the
Germans during their retreat in the preceding February"
and March, which permitted of driving being carried out
without damage to crops. This school remained at Wailly
until January 1918, when, on account of the threatening
German attack, it was moved to Aveluy near Albert. As it
happened, Aveluy fell into the German hands towards the
end of March 1918, whilst Wailly remained in ours until the
end of the war.

Closely connected with the training of the men was the
general administration of the Heavy Branch. It was fully
recognised that the efficiency of all ranks depended to a
great extent on the cheerfulness and comfort of their surround-
ings, and nothing was left undone, or at least unattempted,
which could increase the men's happiness and health.

On January 1, 1917, baths and laundries were opened at
Blangy. The arrangements first made enabled 450 men
to bathe each day; this permitted of every man getting a
bath once a week. Cinema theatres were also established
at the Depot, and later on at Merlimont and elsewhere,
being bought out of funds provided by the canteens' and
supper bars. While at Erin a Rest Camp was formed to
which those men who were temporarily incapacitated for
work were sent to recuperate. This later institution was
found so useful that in the summer of 1917 a seaside Rest
Camp was established at Merlimont, the object of which was
to provide rest and change of surroundings to men who
had been in action, or whose health was impaired. This
camp could accommodate 100 officers and 900 other ranks,
and the period of rest there was usually limited to fourteen
days.

72 TANK "ESPRIT DE CORPS"

An even more popular institution than the Merlimont
Rest Camp was that of the Mobile Canteens : these consisted
in lorries fitted to carry canteen stores ; they formed the
mechanical vivandieres of the Tank Corps, following up units
to within a mile or two of our front lines or pushing forward
across the battlefield when a success had been gained. During
the dark days of March and April 1918, they played a
notable part in maintaining the esprit de corps of the bat-
■ tahons by providing comforts which would otherwise have
been unobtainable. They also formed cheerful rallying-
points where men could meet, eat, and chat, and then return
to battle refreshed and still more determined to see it
through for the honour of the Corps to which they belonged
and which, it may without boasting be said, always thought
of their needs first and generally supplied them.

CHAPTER VIII

TANK TACTICS

The training of the Heavy Branch having been laid down,
it was next necessary to discover and decide upon a common
method of tactics,^ so that directly individual instruction
had been completed collective training might be based on
it ; further, rumours were already afloat that the Heavy
Branch might be called upon to take part in the spring
offensive, so there was no time to be lost in deciding upon
suitable methods and formations of attack. This was done
early in February, when " Training Note No. 16," which will
long be remembered by many in the Tank Corps, was issued.

Though experience is the only true test of a system of
tactics, the foundations of the tactics suitable to any par-
ticular weapon are not based on experiences, but on the
limitations of the weapon, that is on its powers, and on the
fundamental principles of war. Further than this, if the
weapon concerned is to be employed in co-operation with
other weapons, the powers of these other weapons must
also be considered, so that all the weapons to be employed
may, so to speak, like a puzzle, be fitted togethe^j during
battle to form one united picture.

In thinking out a tactics for tanks, the first factors to
bear in mind are the powers of the machine, which may be
summarised in three words: "penetration with security."
Heretofore fronts had remained to all intents and purposes
inviolable to direct infantry attacks ; the tank was now
going to break down this deadlock through its ability to
cross wire and trenches imder fire with far less risk than
infantry could ever hope for. Mechanically, the machine

1 At this time, January 1917, General Swinton's notes given in Chapter IV
were not known of at the Heavy Branch Headquarters.
7 73

74 TANK TACTICS

was far from perfect, consequently, it was laid down, as a
general rule, that never fewer than two tanks should operate
together, and when possible not fewer than four.

From a military point of view the penetration o'f a line of
defence does not simply mean passing straight through it,
but cutting it in half, and then by moving outwards as well
as forwards to push back and envelop the flanks thus created
and so widen the base of operation to admit the movement
forwards of reserves and supplies, and the movement back-
wards of casualties and tired troops. A man getting through
a hedge first selects a weak spot (point of attack), he then
forces his arms through the branches (penetration), and
pushing them outwards (envelopment), forms a sufficiently
large gap (base of operations) to permit of his body (army)
passing easily through the hedge (enemy's defences).

The operation of penetration with tanks is just the same.
Take a half section, two machines ; this half section first
penetrates the enemy's defences by crossing them (see
diagram 7), then by moving outwards, say to the left, starts
enlarging the base by driving the enemy towards A, and so
makes a gap between the point of penetration and A, for
the infantry to move through. As the enemy may, whilst
the tanks are working towards A, seek refuge in his dug-
outs and " come to life " again after the tanks have passed
by, it is necessary that the tanks should be followed by an
infantry " mopping up " party which will bomb the dug-
outs and so render " coming to life " less frequent. As
the bombing party has to work up the trench with the
tank, it cannot hold the trench once it is cleared, conse-
quently another party of infantry should follow the bombers,
whose duty it is to garrison the trench on it being captured.
We therefore find that even in the smallest tank attack
two parties of infantry are required : in trench warfare
these are known as " moppers up " and " support," and in
field warfare as " firing line " and " supports." Frequently
it is as well to add another party, a " reserve," so that some
definite force of men may be held in hand to meet any
unexpected event.

Diagram 7

^ -^

Diagram 8

Diagram 9
— »~ -^ —

\

\ /

Diagram 10

Diagram 11

Diagr

am 12

\

1

75

76 TANK TACTICS

If instead of two tanks we use four, a much more effective
operation may be carried out. The tanks can either pene-
trate at one place, and wheel outwards by pairs (see diagram
8), or by pairs penetrate at two separate points and wheel
inwards, pinching on the centre (see diagram 9), or two
can wheel to a flank and two proceed straight ahead (see
diagram 10) and threaten the enemy's line of retreat. When
this latter operation is contemplated it is as well to make use
of at least six machines, better twelve, i.e. a complete com-
pany of tanks. If six machines are used they normally
should strike the enemy's line at approximately the same
place ; from there one half section should go straight forward
and one to each flank, forming what has been called the
" Trident formation " (see diagram 11). If twelve machines
are employed, then each section of four tanks strikes the
trench at a separate point, the centre section forging straight
ahead and the flanking sections moving inwards and out-
wards as depicted in diagram 12.

Particular attention should be paid to the outward move-
ments of the flanks, for, as the flanks of our own penetrating
or attacking force are generally the most vulnerable points,
if we can push forward offensive wings on these flanks we
shall not only be protecting our own flanks from attack,
by giving the enemy no time to attack in, but we shall be
protecting our central line of advance as well. The force
operating along this central line not only depends for its
movement forward on the security of its flanks, but also on
the size of the base of operations ; the broader this base the
more secure will it be, for the one thing an attacking army
wishes to avoid is getting into a pocket on the interior of
which all hostile fke is concentrated.

From the above elementary movements can be worked
out a whole series of battle formations according to the
various arms which are to be employed. The following
three were those generally used by tanks from the battle
of Cambrai onwards :

(1) An attack against trenches with an artillery barrage (see
diagram 13). — Three tanks in line at 100 to 200 yards' interval,

Diagram 13

Diagram 14

Artillery Barrage

D

D

Diagram 15

L.G.

L.G.

L.G.

L.G.

L.G.

D

D

~3

nz}

77

78 TANK TACTICS

followed by infantry in sections, each section forming an
independent fighting unit advancing in single file and attack-
ing in line, the whole forming one firing hne. Behind this
firing line should advance one tank and a certain number
of infantry sections as a support. Reserves can be added
as necessary.

(2) An attack against trenches without an artillery barrage
(see diagram 14). — One tank in advance, followed at a distance
of 100 to 150 yards by two others at 200 to 300 yards' interval,
and one tank in support. The infantry should be disposed
of as before. The advanced tank to a certain extent replaces
the artillery barrage and acts as a scout to the two behind,
which form part of the infantry firing line.

(3) The field warfare attack (see diagram 15). — In the field
attack the action of the tanks must be adapted to circum-
stances. This action falls under three headings :

(i) Moving in front of the infantry firing line.

(ii) Moving with the infantry firing line.

(iii) Moving behind the infantry firing line.

When moving with the infantry firing line, which will
generally be the most suitable formation to adopt, tank
sections should form mobile strong points or bastions,
which will not only reduce the number of infantry required
for the firing line, but which will be able to bring obhque
and cross fire to bear in front of the advancing infantry.
In order to reduce the human target as much as possible
without reducing fire effect, Lewis-gun sections should
freely be used to cover by fire the intervals between tank
sections. These Lewis-gun sections should be followed
by rifle sections which, directly opposition is broken down
by the tanks and the Lewis gunners, should move rapidly
forward several hundred yards in front of the tank and
infantry firing line, forming to it a protective screen of sharp-
shooters. This formation should then be maintained until
the rifle sections get hung up, when the tank and Lewis-gun
firing line should pass through them to renew the attack,
the rifle sections forming up in support in rear. Curiously
enough this formation resembles very closely that generally

THE TANK ATTACK 79

adopted by the Roman Velites and Hastati (riflemen),
Principes (Lewis gunners), Triarii (tanks), and Napoleon's
Light Infantry (riflemen). Infantry of the Line (Lewis
gunners). Old Guard and Heavy Cavalry (tanks).

As an infantry attack depends on the following principles
— the objective, the offensive, security, mass, economy of
force, surprise, movement, and co-operation — so does a tank
attack. The tank must know what it is after, it must act
vigorously, it must be protected by artillery just hke infantry,
it must attack in mass, that is in strength and numbers, but
not, necessarily, all in one place ; it must surprise the enemy,
move as rapidly as it can, and work hand in glove with the
other arms. On the appHcation of these principles to the
conditions which will be met with will depend the success
or failure of the tank attack.

The first condition to inquire into is the position of the
objective ; is the ground leading up to it suitable for tank
movement, is the country on the flank of such a nature as
to permit of offensive wings being- formed ? The second
is the position and number of the enemy's guns ; can these
be controlled by counter-battery work or smoke ; how will
they affect the lines of approach and their selection ? The
third is the number of subsidiary objectives before the final
one is captured. The fourth is the " springing off " position
of our own infantry, and the fifth is, how can the enemy
be surprised ? These five questions being satisfactorily
answered, the normal procedure is to divide the whole tank
force into a main body and two wings ; to take these
three forces and to divide each up into as many lines of
tanks as there are objectives to be attacked ; to divide
each objective up into tank attack areas according to the
number of tactical points each contains. Provided the
enemy does not possess tanks himself, or a sure antidote
to their use, which the Germans never did possess, a well-
considered and mounted tank, infantry, artillery, and
aeroplane attack is the nearest approach to certainty of
success that has ever been devised in the history of war.
No well-planned extensive tank attack has in the past ever

80 TANK TACTICS

failed, and each one has resulted in more prisoners having
been captured than casualties suffered. These are historic
facts and not mere paeans of praise ; they, consequently,
deserve our most careful consideration when eventually we
plan and prepare for the future.

CHAPTER IX

THE BATTLE OF ARRAS

The great battles which opened the Allies' 1917 campaign on
the Western Front were the direct outcome of two main causes :

(i) The strategical positions of the opposing Armies result-
ing from the battle of the Aisne in 1914.

(ii) The tactical position of the same Armies resulting
from the battle of the Somme in 1916.

The former placed nine-tenths of the German Army in
the west, in a huge salient Ostend-Noyon-Nancy ; the
latter a considerable portion of that Army in a smaller one,
Arras-Gommecourt-Morval. The former offered possibilities
for the Allies to get in a right and left hand blow on two
of the main centres of the German communications — Valen-
ciennes and Mezi^res ; the latter a right and left hand blow
in the direction of Queant against the northern and southern
flanks of the German Sixth and First Armies.

Had it been possible to bring off these latter blows success-
fully, such a debacle of the German forces would have
resulted that not only would the advance of the British
First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Armies have seriously threat-
ened Valenciennes, but the rush of German reserves to stop
the gap would have withdrawn pressure from before the
French about Reims, and would probably have enabled
them to advance on Mezi^res.

A plan for an attack in the vicinity of Arras had been
considered shortly before the opening of the battle of the
Somme on July 1, 1916; it was then dropped, only to be
revived in October, when the plan contemplated was to
drive in the northern flank of the Gommecourt salient. It
was hoped to employ two battalions of forty-eight tanks
each in this operation ; but, as the tanks promised in January

81

82 THE BATTLE OF ARRAS

did not materialise until the end of April, this plan had to
be continually modified.

Meanwhile a hostile operation began to take place which
bid fair to filch from us the tactical advantage we had won
during the preceding summer. Towards the end of February
it became apparent that the Germans intended to evacuate
the Gommecourt salient ; and the recent construction of
the Hindenburg Line suggested a rounding off of the right
angle between Arras and Craonne.

The German retirement necessitated certain changes in
the British plan of operations. The Fourth Army reheved
the French between the Somme and Roye ; the Third
Army, consisting of five Corps and three Cavahy Divisions,
was now to penetrate the German defences, and by marching
on Cambrai turn the Hindenburg Line from Heninel to
Marcoing ; the First and Fifth Armies were to operate on
the left and right flanks of the Third Army.

The success of the British plan of attack depended on
penetrating not only the German front-line system, but also
the Drocourt-Queant line within forty-eight hours of initiating
the attack ; for, by so doing, so severe a wound would be
inflicted that the Germans would be forced to move their
reserves towards Cambrai and Douai, and away from Soissons
and Reims, where the main blow was eventually to fall.
Time, therefore, was, as usual, the all-important factor —
could the Drocourt-Queant line be penetrated before the
enemy was able to assemble his reserves ?

Tanks, it was decided, should assist in gaining this time,
yet on April 1, after denuding the training grounds of both
England and France, only 60 Mark I and Mark II tanks
could be reckoned on for the battle.

There were three ways in which these sixty tanks could
be used, either by concentrating the whole against one
objective such as Monchy-le-Preux, if a penetration of the
centre were required, or against BuUecourt, if an envelop-
ment of the German left flank were considered necessary,
or to allot a proportion of machines to each Army or Corps
for minor " mopping up " operations.

TANK DISTRIBUTION 83

The last-mentioned course was eventually adopted and
the following allotment of machines made :

(i) Eight tanks, to the First Army to operate against
the Vimy Heights and the village of Thelus.

(ii) Forty tanks to the Third Army, eight to operate
with the XVIIth Corps north of the river Scarpe, and thirty-
two to operate with the Vlth and Vllth Corps south of
the river Scarpe.

(iii) Twelve tanks to operate with the Fifth Army.

The Third Army plan of operations was as follows : The
Vlth and Vllth Corps were to attack south of the river
Scarpe between Arras and Mercatel. Their objective ran
from a point 2,000 yards south-east of Henin-sur-Cojeul
northwards to Guemappe, thence east of Monchy-le-Preux
to the Scarpe. This objective was 10,000 yards in length
and 8,000 in depth. It contained two formidable lines of
defences :

(i) The Cojeul-Neuville Vitasse-Telegraph hill-Harp-Tilloy
les Mafflaines line, much of which had been fortified for
over two years.

(ii) The Feuchy Chapel-Feuchy line.

South of these systems was the Hindenburg Line, and east
of them Monchy-le-Preux, which dominates the whole of
the surrounding country. Three valleys lie between this
eminence and the city of Arras.

The XVIIth Corps was to continue the attack north of
the river Scarpe and occupy a line running from east of
Fampoux to the Point du Jour, and thence to a point 4,000
yards east of Roclincourt. The country along the northern
bank of the Scarpe was intricate, and in it many excellent
positions existed for hostile machine-guns. Further, the
railway running to Bailleul was in itself a formidable obstacle.

The First Army attack comprised the taking of the famous
Vimy Heights, Thelus and the hill north of Thelus, a position
considered one of the strongest in France.

The Fifth Army was to operate between Lagnicourt and
the right of the Third Army, driving northwards towards
Vis-en-Artois. The operation to be carried out by this

84 THE BATTLE OF ARRAS

Army was a most difficult one. Tlie destruction of the
roads and the bad weather had rendered it impossible to
move forward sufficient artillery — a sine qua non of all
attacks of this period.

The whole of the above operations were to be considered
as the preliminaries to the advance of two Cavalry Divisions
and the XVIIIth Corps south of the Scarpe, which force
was to break through at Monchy and advance eastwards
on to the Drocourt-Queant line.

The general preparations required for a tank battle will be
dealt with in another chapter, suffice it here to state that
they were divided up as follows — preliminary reconnaissances,
the formation of forward supply dumps, the preparation of
tankodromes and places of assembly, the programme of
rail movements and the fixing and preparing of the tank
routes forward from the tankodromes.

Reconnaissances were started as early as January, and
were most thoroughly carried out. Supply dumps were
formed at Beaurains, Achicourt, near Roclincourt and Neu-
ville St. Vaast. As no supply tanks were in existence,
supplies had to be carried forward by hand and, at the time,
it was reckoned that had these machines been forthcoming,
each one would have saved a carrying party of from 300 to
400 men. The railheads for the Fifth, Third, and First
Armies were selected at Achiet le Grand, Montenescourt,
and Acq respectively. The movements of tanks and supplies
to these stations were successfully carried out after several
minor hitches, such as trucks giving way, trains running
late, and, on March 22, 20,000 gallons of petrol being destroyed
in a railway accident. Incidents such as these are, however,
of little account if the plan has been worked out with fore-
sight.

The only real mishap which occurred took place on the
night of April 8-9, to a column of tanks which was moving
up from Achicourt to the starting-points. Achicourt lies
in a valley through which runs the Crinchon stream. The
surface of the ground here is hard, but under this superficial
crust lies, in places, boggy soil which was only discovered

BATTLE OF ARRAS
9*-'' April 1917.

COUPS I

I
I
I
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JJcuri&

f^-^

ZaJ^TaisvnBloTirlt/i^

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taubourg

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SHlartin

Jioish'iiJi

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ufrrUf-

2000 3000 Yards

THE VIMY HEIGHTS 85

when six tanks broke through the top strata and floundered
in a morass of mud and water. Those who were present
will never forget the hours which followed this mishap.
Eventually the tanks were got out, but too late to take part
in the initial attack on the following day.

On April 7 and 8 the weather was fine, but, as ill-luck
would have it, heavy rain fell during the early morning of
the 9th. At zero hour (dawn) the tanks moved off behind
the infantry, but the heavily " crumped " area on the Vimy
Ridge, soaked by rain as it now was, proved too much for
the tanks of the First Army, and all became ditched at a
point 500 yards east of the German front line, and never
took part in any actual fighting. The four which started
from Roclincourt had but little better luck, and though
they advanced considerably further they also ditched and
went out of action.

The artillery barrage was magnificent and the Canadians
went forward under it and took the Vimy Heights almost
at a rush, capturing several thousand prisoners. The
rapidity of this advance, due to the excellent work of our
artillery and the dash of the Canadians, rendered the co-
operation of tanks needless ; it was, therefore, decided to
withdraw the eight machines with the First Army, and send
them to the Fifth Army. Those from RocMncourt were
also withdrawn to reinforce those operating immediately
north of the Scarpe.

The four tanks which started just east of Arras had better
luck, for though one was knocked out by shell fire shortly
after starting, the remaining three worked eastwards down
the Scarpe and rendered valuable assistance to the infantry
by " mopping up " hostile machine-guns.

South of the Scarpe the infantry attacked with equal
elan. About Tilloy les Mafilaines, the Harp, and Telegraph
hill the tanks caught up with the attack and accounted for
a good many Germans, and then, pushing on, helped in the
reduction of the Blue line (Neuville Vitasse-Bois des Bceufs-
Hervin farm) and such parts of the Brown (Heninel-Feuchy
Chapel- Feuchy) as they were able to reach during daylight.

86 THE BATTLE OF ARRAS

The ground on the Harp, an immensely strong earthwork,
was much " crumped " and some of the trenches had 2 ft.
of water in them. A good many tanks belhed here.

The operations of the tanks on the 9th can only be con-
sidered as partially successful — due chiefly to the difficulty
of the ground, wet and heavily shelled, and the rapidity
of the infantry advance.

On the following day only minor operations were under-
taken, and salvage was at once started, the ditched tanks
being dug out and withdrawn to refit.

On the 11th three important tank attacks were made,
the first from Feuchy Chapel on Monchy ; the second from
Neuville Vitasse down the Hindenburg Line, and the third
against the village of BuUecourt.

The first attack was eminently successful for, though only
three of the six tanks which started from Feuchy Chapel
reached Monchy, it was due to the gallant way in which
they were fought more than to any other cause that the
infantry were able to occupy this extremely valuable tactical
position. Once Monchy was captured the cavalry moved
forward. From all accounts the Germans, at this period
of the battle, were in a high state of demoralisation, but
notwithstanding this, as long as they possessed a few stout-
hearted machine-gunners, an effective cavalry advance was
impossible, and the only arm which could have rendered •
its employment feasible was the tank — the machine-gun
destroyer — and as there were no longer any fit or capable of
coming into action the Germans found time to stiffen their
defence and to consolidate their position.

The second attack was made from Neuville Vitasse with
four tanks. These machines worked right down the Hinden-
burg Line to Heninel, driving the Germans underground and
killing great numbers of them. They then turned north-east
towards Wancourt, and for several hours engaged the Germans
in the vicinity of this village. All four eventually got back
to our lines after having fought a single-handed action for
between eight and nine hours. It was a memorable little
action in spite of the fact that its ultimate value was not great.

BULLECOURT 87

The third operation, the attack on and east of the village
of Bullecourt, is the most interesting of the three. All
previous operations in this battle had been based on the
timing and strength of the artillery barrage, the tanks
taking a purely subordinate part. In the present attack
the position of the tanks, as compared with the other arms,
was reversed; for they took the leading part, and though
the attack was eventually a failure, they demonstrated
clearly the possibility of tanks carrying out duties which
up to the present had been definitely allotted to artillery
— ^the two chief ones being wire -cutting and the creeping
barrage which, henceforth, could be carried out by wire-
crushing and the mobile barrage produced by the tank
6-pounders and machine-guns. •

The plan of attack was as follows : 11 tanks were to be
drawn up in line at 80 yards interval from each other, and
at 800 yards distance from the German line. Their task
was to penetrate the Hindenburg Line east of Bullecourt;
6 to wheel westwards (4 to attack Bullecourt and 2 the
Hindenburg Line north-west of Bullecourt), 3 to advance on
Reincourt and Hendecourt, and 2 to move eastwards down
the Hindenburg trenches. This operation was similar to
the one already discussed in Chapter VIII, " Tank Tactics,"
and called the " Trident Formation."

All 11 tanks started at zero, which was fixed at 4.30 a.m.
Those on the wings were rapidly put out of action by hostile
artillery fire; however, 2 out of the 3, ordered to advance
on Reincourt and Hendecourt, entered these villages and the
infantry following successfully occupied them.

In spite of the very heavy casualties suffered, the tanks
in the centre had carried out their work successfully, when
a strong converging German counter-attack, partly due to
the impossibility of creating offensive flanks to our central
attack, retook the villages of Reincourt and Hendecourt,
captured the two tanks and several hundred men of the
4th Australian Division. The loss of the two tanks was
unfortunate, for the Germans discovered that their latest
armour-piercing bullets would penetrate their sides and

88 THE BATTLE OF ARRAS

sponsons. This discovery led to a German order being
published that all infantry should in future carry a certain
number of these bullets.

The interest of the BuUecourt operation lies in the fact that
it was the first occasion on which tanks were used to replace
artillery. It failed for various reasons — the haste with which
the operation was prepared ; the changes in the plan of
attack on the night prior to the attack ; the unavoidable
lack of artillery support ; and above all the insufficiency of
tanks for such an operation and the lack of confidence on
the part of the infantry in the tanks themselves.

Between April 12 and 22 all tank operations were of a
minor nature. By the 20th of this month thirty of the
original machines were refitted and on the 23rd eleven of
these were employed in operations around Monchy, Gavrelle,
and the Chemical Works at Roeux ; excellent results were
obtained, but no fewer than five out of the eleven machines
sustained serious casualties from armour-piercing bullets,
which had now become the backbone of the enemy's (anti-
tank defence.

The general result of the tank operations was favourable,
though the number of casualties sustained exceeded expec-
tation. The value of the work they accomplished was
recognised by all the units with which they worked. The
casualties they inflicted on the enemy were undoubtedly
heavy; in most cases where they advanced the infantry
attack succeeded, and the highest compliment which was
paid to their efficiency came from the enemy himself, who
took every possible step to counter their activity.

The operations showed that the training of all ranks had
been carried out on sound and practical lines. The fighting
spirit of the men was high, the tanks being fought with great
gallantry. One commanding officer stated, in his report
on the battle, that the behaviour of his officers and men
might be summed up as " a triumph of moral over technical
difficulties."

This fine fighting spirit was undoubtedly due to the
excellent leadership all officers and N.C.O.s had exercised

TACTICAL LESSONS 89

during individual and collective training ; and to the full
recreational training given to the battalions during these
periods, games and sports as a fighting basis having been
sedulously cultivated.

The main tactical lessons learnt and accentuated were : — ■
that tanks should be used in mass, that is they should be
concentrated and not dispersed ; that a separate force of
tanks should be allotted to each objective, and that a strong
reserve should always be kept in hand ; that sections and,
if possible, companies should be kept intact ; that the
Mark I and Mark II machines were not suitable to use over
wet heavily-shelled ground ; that the moral effect of tanks
was very great ; that counter- battery work is essential to theil
security ; and that supply and signal tanks are an absolute
necessity.

On the evening of April 10 the Colonel Commanding the
Heavy Branch received the following telegram from the
Commander-in-Chief :

" My congratulations on the excellent work performed by
the Heavy Branch of the Machine Gun Corps during yester-
day's operations. Please convey to those who took part
my appreciation of the gallantry and skill shown by them."

CHAPTER X

TANK BATTLE RECORDS

In order to record the personal experiences of each tank
Crew Commander in battle, and to collect statistics as to
the work of the tanks themselves, shortly before the battle
of Arras was fought, a form was introduced known as a
" Tank Battle History Sheet." These sheets were issued to
Crew Commanders prior to an engagement, were filled in
by them after its completion and, eventually, forwarded to
Tank Corps Headquarters, where they were summarised by
the Tank Corps General Staff. By this means it was possible
to collect many valuable experiences from the soldiers them-
selves, information which unfortunately so frequently is
apt to evaporate when the final battle report starts on its
journey from one headquarters to the next.

Outside the material value of these reports they frequently
possessed a psychological value, and by reading them with
a little insight it was possible to gauge, with fair accuracy,
the moral of the fighting men, an " atmosphere " so difficult
to breathe when in rear of the battle line, so impossible to
create, and yet so necessary to the mental health of the
General Staff and the Higher Command.

This system of record, initiated at the battle of Arras,
was maintained in the Tank Corps up to the conclusion of
the war, many hundreds of these brief histories being written.
The following are taken, almost at random, from those
made out during the above-mentioned battle, and are fair
examples of early tank fighting.

Battle History or Chew No. D.6. Tank No. 505. Date 9/4/17.

Commanded by Libutbnai*t A

Unit to which attached .... 14th Division.

Hour the tank started for action . . . 6.20 a.m., April 9, 1917.

90

A TANK TRAP 91

Hour of zero . . . . . .5.30 a.m. (14th Division at

tacking at 7.30 a.m.).

Extent and nature of hostile shell fire . . Increasing aa tank worked

along Hindenburg Line.

Ammunition expended ..... 3,500 rounds S.A.A.

Casualties ....... Nil.

P osition of tank after action .... Caught in large tank trap

and struck by shell fire.

Condition of tank after action . . . Damaged by shell fire.

Orders received. — To attack Telegraph hill with infantry
of 14th Division at 7.30 a.m. on April 9, 1917, then proceed
along Hindenburg Line to Neuville Vitasse. To wait at
rallying- point N.E. of Neuville Vitasse until infantry ad-
vanced again towards Wancourt. To proceed with infantry
to Wancourt and assist them wherever necessary.

Report of action. — Tank left starting-point at Beaurains at
6.30 a.m., on April 9, 1917, crossed our front line at 7.27 a.m.,
attacking Telegraph hill with the infantry at 7.30 a.m. ;
then worked towards Neuville Vitasse along the Hinden-
burg Line. At a point about 1,000 yards N.E. of Neuville
Vitasse, the tank was caught in a trap consisting of a large

gun-pit carefully covered with turf. I and Sergeant B

immediately got out and went to guide other tanks clear of
the trap in spite of M.G. and shell fire.

(Signed) A , Lieut.,

O.C. Tank D.6.

Batti^ History of Cbew No. D.9. Tank No. 770. Date 9/4/17.
Commanded by 2nd Lieutenant C

Unit to which attached .... 30th Division.

Hour the tank started for action . . . 4.45 a.m.

Hour of zero ...... 5.30 a.m.

Extent and nature of hostile shell fire . . Very severe from the mo-

ment of entry into enemy
lines.

Ammunition expended ..... Unknown.

Casualties ....... Corporal wounded, since

sent to hospital.

Position of tank after action .... Ditched in C.T. near Neu-

vUle Vitasse trench.

Condition of tank after action . . . Ditched but sound.

92 TANK BATTLE RECORDS

Orders received. — To proceed from Mercatel to the Zoo
trench system through the Cojeul switch to Nepal trench,
from thence with the infantry to Wane our t.

Report of action. — Owing to mechanical trouble tank was
delayed in coming into action. Having rectified this, I
proceeded to join D.IO — D.ll as ordered.

I eventually found these tanks out of action and proceeded
alone to a further line of trenches, where I met with decidedly
severe hostile machine-gun and shell fire. I consider we
were successful in quelling one of the many sniper posts,
but on account of being ditched were prevented from pro-
ceeding. It would appear, however, that the presence of
my tank — it being on the right flank of our infantry, which
was up in the air — was a deterrent to the enemy, of whom
small bodies were still in existence in the vicinity. I caused
my 6-pounders to be manned, and we held our position for
three days, when the tank was eventually got out of her
position. As a whole, the crew worked together well and
cheerfully, but I would especially commend Corporal D — —
for unfaihng cheerfulness and devotion to duty under very
trying and disappointing circumstances.

(Signed) C , 2nd Lieut.,

O.C. Tank D.9.

Battle History ov Cbbw No. D.4. Tank No. 783. Date 23/4/17.
Commanded by Lieutenant E

Unit to which attached .... 50th Division (4th Bat-

talion Yorka. Regt.).

Hour the tank Btarted for action . . . 3.30 a.m.

Hour of zero ...... 4.45 a.m.

Extent and nature of hostile shell fire . . Shell fire heavy, practically

no shrapnel. Machine-
gun fire not excessive.

Ammunition expended ..... Approximately 40 rounda

(6-pounder).

Casualties ....... Nil.

Position of tank after action .... 0.19.b.05 (approx.).

Condition of tank after action . . . Unserviceable : both tracks

broken, probably other
damage from direct hits ;
also on fire.

SIX DIRECT HITS 98

Orders received. — To attack enemy strong point at
O.lQ.a.OT as my first objective, then to proceed to banks in
0.19.b. and return with the infantry until the Blue Line was
consolidated, as my second objective.

My third objective was to conform with an advance by
the infantry at zero plus seven hours, and to attack a tangle
of trenches in 0.21. a. & b. just in advance of the Red Line.
It was eventually left to my decision as to the possibility
of attempting this third objective.

Report of action. — Advanced with infantry, but owing to
heavy mist had great difficulty in following exact route.
Reached first objective at 5.20 a.m., having approached it
from the river side. Successfully dealt with several of the
enemy on left bank of river, causing them to retire. Cruised
about until joined by tank No. 522, D. 3. Then proceeded
towards second objective. On the way I saw our infantry
retiring, went ahead to stop enemy advance. Whilst going

forward I saw Lieutenant F 's tank, which was then

off its route. Lieutenant F — — came out of his tank and
informed me that he had lost his way. I redirected him,
and he then rejoined his tank. Almost immediately after
this (approx. 6.30 a.m.) both tanks came under direct anti-
tank gun and machine-gun fire. The latter was silenced
by my left 6-pounder gun. I manoeuvred to present as
small a target as possible to the former. The tank, however,
received about six direct hits, which damaged both tracks,
set alight the spare petrol carried in box in rear of tank,
and possibly caused other serious damage. The whole crew
succeeded in escaping from the tank unhurt. Position of
tank as stated.

I then returned to Coy. H.Q. and reported.

(Signed) E , Lieut.,

O.C. Tank D.4.

Battle History of Cbkw No. D.IO. Tank No. 784. Date 23/4/17.

COMMAITOBD BY 2nI) LIEUTENANT G

Unit to which attached .... 98th Infantry Brigade.
Hour the tank started for action . . . 4.45 a.m.
Hour of zero 4.45 a.m.

94 TANK BATTLE RECORDS

Extent and nature of hostile ahell fire . . First three houra artillery

fire not very heavy, but
from then very heavy fire
until rallying-point was
reached. No direct fire
by anti-tank guns.

Ammunition expended . . . .290 rounds 6-poiander, re-

mainder on tank could
not be used owing to the
shells sticking in shell
casings on tank. Eight
pans for Lewia-gun am-
munition.

Casualties ....... Nil.

Position of tank after action . . . Factory Croisilles, 12 noon.

Condition of tank after action . . . Good — only reqtiired refill-

ing and greasing.

Orders received. — To advance from starting-point on British
front line at T.4.b.4.5 to Hindenburg Line at point T.6.a.0.5,
from which point infantry were to bomb along Hindenburg
Line (front and support) to river Sensee at U.7.a.4.4. Tank
to assist infantry and after objective at river taken to proceed
to Croisilles.

Report of action. — I started from starting-point at T.4i.b.4.5
at zero, and made for Hindenburg wire at T.6.a.0.5, crossing
same and getting into touch with our infantry, from whom
I received report that they were held up by machine-guns
along the trench. I proceeded to this point and cleared
the obstacle. I then travelled parallel to the trench, knock-
ing out machine-gun emplacements and snipers' posts all
the way down to point U. I.e. 5.0. The infantry kept in
touch all the way down, moving slightly in rear of tank,
and after emplacements were knocked out they took the
occupants prisoners. In two cases white flags were hoisted as
soon as the emplacement was hit. The shooting was very
good. Up to point U.l.c.5.0 the shelling had been casual,
but when we reached the N. bank of the sunken road at
this point and were firing into emplacements towards the
river we were in full observation from the village and the
artillery fire became very heavy. The supply of 6-pounder
ammunition now became exhausted, and the ground on the

THE HINDENBURG LINE 95

S. side of sunken road being very bad, I decided to move
back along the trench and then crossed the wire, and crossing
sunken road at about T.12.b.5.3, made for rallying-point
at Factory at Croisilles, where I arrived at 12 noon. I was
shelled heavily all the way back to the rallying-point, but
no damage was done. I was of opinion that the Hinden-
burg front line was too bad (wide) to cross, and so could
not deal with support line and was unable to observe this
line from front line. I sent two pigeon messages at 9.30 a.m.
and 12 noon. I had only one message clip, so had to fasten
second message with cotton.

(Signed) G , 2nd Lieut.,

O.C. TankD.lO.

Battle History of Crew No. 9. Tank No. 716. Date 23/4/17.

Commanded by 2nd Lieutenant H

Unit to which attached . . 51st Division.

Hour the tank started for action . . . 5.12 a.m.

Hour of zero ...... 4.15 a.m.

Extent and nature of hostile shell fire . . Severe.

Ammunition expended .... About 220 6-povmder ; 14

drums L.G.
Casualties ....... Four.

Position of tank after action . . . H.24.b.3.9. (Sheet 51B).

Condition of tank after action . . . Bellied, right track very

slack.

Orders received. — To clear Mount Pleasant wood, Roeux,
and northern edge of village.

Report of action. — Time allowed for tanks from deployment
point to starting-point proved to be insufficient, which
delayed my start some twenty minutes. Having learnt
that the other car which was operating with me was " out
of action," I made my way alone to the railway arch, where
I was held up some few minutes owing to a number of
stretcher cases which had to be removed, and a sand-bag
barricade which I could not push down.

I soon caught up the infantry, who were held up by machine-
gun fire in Mount Pleasant wood. At their request I altered
my course and made for the northern side of the wood
running parallel with the trench which we held at the south

96 TANK BATTLE RECORDS

of the wood, and which the enemy held at the north. I
was told that a bombing party would follow me up the
trench.

Having cleared this wood, I pushed on towards the village
of Rceux, where I again met the infantry who had come
round the other side of Mount Pleasant wood, where they
were again held up by machine-gun fire which came from
the buildings.

Our barrage could only have been very slight, to judge
from the comparatively small amount of damage which was
done to the buildings. Here I used 200 rounds of 6-pounder
ammunition.

It is difficult to estimate with any accuracy the number
of machine-guns actually " put out." One of my best
targets was a party of some thirty men whom we drove
out of a house with 6-pounders, and then sprayed with
Lewis-gun fire.

I am sure that at least one 6-pounder shell dropped amongst
these — this made a distinct impression.

Another target that presented itself was a party of men
coming towards us. I do not know whether they intended
giving themselves up or whether they were a bombing party
— I took them for the latter.

Parties were frequently seen coming up from the rear,
through gaps in the buildings.

Twice an enemy officer rallied some dozen or so men and
rushed a house that we had already cleared. Here again a
6-pounder through the window disposed of any of the enemy
remaining in the buildings.

In regard to the machine-guns in the wood, we could
only locate them by little puffs of smoke at which we fired
our 6-pounders. We did not take our departure until these
puffs had disappeared, and there was in consequence reason-
able ground to suppose that the guns had been knocked out.
Finally our infantry reached the village. Apparently there
was no officer commanding our infantry in this part of the
line.
I then moved towards Roeux wood and learnt of a sniper

ARMOUR-PIERCING BULLETS 97

still left in Mount Pleasant wood and a machine-gun, which
was causing great trouble, on the railway embankment,
and I then made my way back to the railway arch with a
view to running parallel with the embankment towards the
station, but unfortunately my car bellied in the very marshy
ground by the canal.

With regard to casualties, it is my opinion that I was in
the district sufficiently long enough, some three hours, to
enable the enemy to send for a supply of armour-piercing
bullets. All four of my crew were hit whilst in the car.

The Lewis-gun mountings were bad, many targets were lost
owing to the time it took to mount the gun, and finally
we mounted the gun through the front flaps. The flap of
the present mounting does not rise high enough to clear the
foresight.

Both the 6-pounder guns worked splendidly, only giving
one misfire the whole time. There was no hostile shelling
of any kind in the village of Rceux or immediately in the
district where I was operating, but the enemy barrage
falling round the railway was of a very severe nature. When
I found that it was impossible for me to proceed towards
the railway station, I sent off a pigeon message at the request
of an O.C. requesting that one of the cars operating in the
Chemical Works district should be detailed to deal with
the machine-gun on the embankment.

I cannot speak too highly of the efficiency and general
work of the crew.

I have handed two German diaries, which came into my
possession, to the Company Intelligence Officer.

(Signed) H , 2nd Lieut.,

O.C. Tank No. 716.

CHAPTER XI

THE SECOND BATTLE OF GAZA

On account of the assistance rendered to the British infantry
by tanks during the battle of the Somme a decision was
arrived at in England to despatch a number of these machines
to Egypt to assist our troops in the Sinai peninsula, especi-
ally in the neighbourhood of El Arish, south of the Turkish
frontier. The number originally decided on was twelve,
but this was eventually cut down to eight, and, through an
imfortunate error, old experimental machines were sent out
instead of new ones as intended.

The detachment, under the command of Major N. Nutt,
consisted of 22 officers and 226 other ranks drawn from
the original E Company, and together with its tanks, work-
shops, and transport, it embarked at Devonport and Avon-
mouth in December 1916, arriving in Egypt during the
following month.

Demonstrations and schemes were at once arranged for
so that the staffs of the various fighting formations could
witness what tanks were able to accomplish. These schemes
were carried out on the sand dunes near Gilban, some ten
miles north of Kantara on the Suez Canal.

In February,' orders were suddenly received one day for
the detachment to move with all possible speed to the fighting
zone. This was carried out, and within three hours of
receiving the orders the entire detachment, with tanks and
accessories, had entrained at Gilban, and was speeding
northwards towards the area of operations. Next day a

1 Major O. A. Forsyth-Major (Second in Command of the Egyptian Tank
Detachment), on whose report this chapter is based, lost all his documents
and maps at sea in May 1918 when the ship on which he was returning to
England was torpedoed and sunk, consequently some of the dates are
missing.

Q8

DEIR EL BELAH 99

delay occurred at El Arish, which the day previously had
been captured by the Australians ; but, the same evening,
the train proceeded to Rafa, a frontier town, which had
only just been evacuated by the Turks, and early next
morning reached Khan Yunus, some fifteen miles south-west
of Gaza, an old Crusader stronghold surroimded by vast fig
groves and other vegetation ; here the detachment remained
for ten days.

During this halt the First Battle of Gaza had come to an
end, our troops having been obliged to retire and take up
a position to the south of the town owing to the appearance
of strong Turkish reinforcements from the direction of
Beersheba; these threatened the British communications.

Hostilities now ceased and preparations were begun for
the Second Battle of Gaza, which was to prove one of the
fiercest contests of the war in its eastern theatre. For this
battle, early in March, the Tank Detachment moved from
Khan Yunus to Deir el Belah.

The Turkish Army at this period, numbering some 30,000
men, was disposed along a sixteen-mile front extending
from Gaza south-eastwards to Hareira and Shekia. The
British plan of operations was as follows :

The G.O.C. Desert Column was entrusted with the opera-
tions against the Hareira front, protecting the right flank,
whilst the task of seizing the important ridges of Sheikh
Abbas and Mansara, both commanding Gaza and situated
to the south of this town, was assigned to the 52nd, 53rd, and
54th Divisions ; the 74th Division remaining in general
reserve.

The tanks of the detachment, which had been held in
G.H.Q. reserve, were now allotted to divisions as follows :

(i) 53rd Division, operating from the sea to the Cairo road,
running through Romani trench : two tanks which were to be
held in reserve until the infantry had advanced to the line —
Red House-Tel El Ajjul-Money House-the coast.

(ii) 52nd Division, operating from Kurd valley to Wadi
El Nukhabir : four tanks to support the infantry attack
on the Mansara ridge.

100 THE SECOND BATTLE OF GAZA

(iii) 54th Division, operating on a front extending from
500 yards west of Abbas ridge to the Gaza-Beersheba road :
two tanks to support the infantry attack on the Sheikh
Abbas ridge.

Z day was to be April 17. Two days prior to this the
eight tanks left Deir El Belah after dusk, two proceeding
over the Druid ridge through St. James's Park, thence by
Tel El Nujeid across the Wadi Ghuzze to Money hill ; four
from Deir El Belah in an easterly direction through Picca-
dilly Circus over the prominent ridge of In Seirat, then
eastwards to Sheikh Nebhan on the Wadi Ghuzze ; two
followed the same route as far as In Seirat, and from there
made for a point south-east of Sheikh Nebhan.

All eight tanks reached their positions of assembly before
dawn without mishap and in good condition. Meanwhile
ammunition and supply dumps had been established at
various spots close to the Wadi Ghuzze.

In the battle which now ensued the position of the tanks
in relation to the infantry varied according to the nature
of the ground and the resistance of the enemy. The attacks
of the 53rd and 52nd Divisions came as a complete surprise,
the two tanks allotted to the former moved to a position
south of Money hill on the evening of the first day, and
the four with the latter reached a point south of the Mansara
ridge. None of these machines came into action as the
Turks retired from their trenches and strongholds in complete
confusion. On the 54th Division's front both of the tanks
allotted to this Division came into action; one, however,
received a direct hit and was destroyed, but the other did
good work in clearing the enemy's trenches north-west of
the Abbas ridge, kilhng many Turks and enabhng our infantry
to occupy these defences.

On the evening of April 17, the three attacking divisions
entrenched themselves on the line running approximately
from Marine View, on the coast, through Heart hill- Kurd
hill-Mansara-Abbas, and thence south-east to Atawineh
ridge. A pause of forty-eight hours now took place wherein
to prepare for the second phase of the battle.

1 '

THE SECOND & THIRD BATTLES OF GAZA
I?*]" April 1917 & l=* November 1917.

M

!

y^ y^^h^MhJTassarv

T^h^J^a.^md

Scale of Yards

SAMPSON RIDGE 101

On the morning of April 19, this second phase opened.
The AustraHan Corps, on the right flank, was to deliver an
attack on the eastern defences of Gaza, whilst the 52nd,
53rd, and 54th Divisions were to constitute the main attack,
and to advance on a line running from the coast to the
stronghold of Ah El Muntar. Battleships were to co-operate
in this attack.

Tanks were allotted to Divisions as follows :

(i) 53rd Division, objective — ;Mazar trench to Sheikh
Redwam ; one tank to assist in the capture of Sampson
ridge. El Arish and Sheikh Redwam redoubts, and one
tank to operate against Sheikh Ajlin, Belah-Yunus-Rafa-
Zowaiid-El Burs trenches and to await further orders at
El Arish trench.

(ii) 52nd Division, objective — the enemy's trenches from
Queen's hill to Ali El Muntar. For this operation four
tanks were allotted, and their objectives, which were Outpost
hill, the Labyrinth, the Warren and Ali El Muntar, were
changed during the night of the 18th-19th. This resulted
in considerable confusion. According to the change one
tank was to precede the assault on Green hill, one to clear
Lees hill and Outpost hill, and the remaining two to be
kept in reserve at Kurd hill.

(iii) 54th Division, objective — Kirbet El Sihan and El
Sire-Ali El Muntar ridge as far as Australia hill ; one tank
to seize the redoubt west of Kirbet El Sihan.

From the above it will be seen a good deal was expected
of the tanks, in fact these seven machines were to tackle
a problem which in France would have been considered dis-
tinctly formidable for two complete battalions.

Of the two tanks with the 53rd Division one broke its
track, consequently the other — the Tiger — led the advance
alone and drove the enemy from Sampson ridge, which was
then occupied by our infantry ; it then proceeded to El
Arish redoubt, but, the infantry being unable to follow,
after six hours' action, during which it fired 27,000 rounds
of S.A.A., it withdrew to Regent's Park, all its crew having
been wounded. On the front of the 52nd Division a desperate

102 THE SECOND BATTLE OF GAZA

battle took place : the tank operating against Lees hill
and Outpost hill fell into a gully, the sides of which unex-
pectedly collapsed. Its place was taken by the tank detailed
for Green hill ; Outpost hill was reached and cleared, when
this machine received a direct hit.

The enemy's machine-gun fire was now intense, so one of
the reserve tanks was ordered up. After desperate losses
the infantry eventually captured the hill, only to be driven
off it by a counter-attack ; they then withdrew to a line
passing east and west through Queen's hill, the reserve tank
withdrawing at the same time to Kurd hill. In the attack
dehvered by the remaining division, the 54th, no better
luck was experienced. The one machine working with this
division moved on the great redoubt north-west of Kirbet
El Sihan, and reaching this work the Turkish garrison surren-
dered. The infantry then took over the position. Shortly
after this a direct hit broke one of the tracks of this tank,
and a counter-attack eventually resulted in its capture
with the infantry who had occupied the redoubt.

In spite of the fact that this battle was unsuccessful, the
work carried out by the Tank Detachment constitutes a
remarkable feat of arms. The tanks engaged were Mark I's
and II's, which, by the time the battle was ended, had each
covered on an average some 40 miles of country. Recon-
naissance, due to want of time, was practically non-existent,
and the limitations of the tank were not understood by the
infantry commanders, who expected miracles from a far
from perfect machine. The objectives allotted were not
only difficult, but too numerous, yet in spite of this the
protection which these eight tanks afforded the attacking
infantry on a five-mile frontage was considerable and fully
appreciated ; it was, however, quite inadequate on account
of the hundreds of ingeniously hidden machine-guns, to
which the Turks mainly owed their victory.

CHAPTER XII

STAFF WORK AND BATTLE PREPARATION

The foundations of the success or non-success of a battle
rest on its organisation, that is, on the preparations made
for it. This is the duty of the General and Administrative
Staffs of an Army or Formation and usually entails an
immense amount of careful work. The fact that success
depends as much, if not more, on organisation (brain power)
as on valour (nerve power) is not generally recognised,
and many an officer and man in the firing line is, through
ignorance of the causes and effects which are operating
behind, only too prone to forget what the staff is doing,
and, never more so, what the staff has done than after a
really great victory has been gained.

The more scientific weapons become the more will good
staff work decide whether their use is going to lead to
victory or defeat. This was very early realised in the Tank
Corps, and every endeavour was made by its commander
and his subordinate leaders to select only the most capable
officers for their respective staffs ; this resulted in ability
more often than seniority deciding the filling of an appoint-
ment.

The work of the Staff of the Tank Corps was often con-
siderably complicated by the fact that, the tank being a
novel weapon of war, it was little understood, not only by
the other arms, but by many members of the Tank Corps
itself. This resulted in a great deal of educational work
being required before many measures, very obvious to the
Staff itself, were accepted by others. In the early days
of the Corps the tank was generally placed by the other
arms under one of two categories — a miracle or a joke,
and this did not tend to facilitate or expedite preparations.

103

104 STAFF WORK AND BATTLE PREPARATION

The main duty of the General Staff is to foresee by thinking
ahead, of the Administrative Staff to prepare, of the Com-
mander to decide, and of his troops to act. These four hnks
go to build up a battle, and if any one of them is defective,
the whole chain is weak. On the power of thinking ahead,
that is, foreseeing conditions and events, will depend all
preparations. Decisions cannot with safety be simply
based on former experiences, codified and printed rules
and regulations ; if this were possible every intelUgent
subaltern with a good memory or a big pocket could become
a Napoleon ' in six weeks. Decisions must be based on
weapons and men moved in accordance with the principles
of war as governed by conditions existing and possible.
Possible conditions cannot be guessed at; if they could the
planchet board and not the baton would be the emblem
of a field-marshal's worth. Possible conditions can only
be guarded against or converted into allies by being prepared
to meet all eventualities, and these preparations in a for-
mation such as the Tank Corps were at first prodigious.
Little by little, however, • the knack of mechanical warfare
was cultivated, and then what had at first appeared a moun-
tain eventually turned out to be a molehill — a good sprink-
ling of molehills, and not a few mountains, however, remained
over even to the last.

In the training schemes carried out before the battle of
Arras, as mentioned in Chapter VII, no fewer than 132 headings
of various measures, all relative to the preparations requisite
for an offensive with tanks, were laid down. After this battle
this number was considerably increased and continued to grow
as each engagement added new experiences to the old ones.

The main preparations required for an offensive are the
following : (1) Movements, (2) Reconnaissances, (3) Secrecy,
(4) Supply, (5) Communication, (6) Assembly, (7) Tactics,
(8) Reorganisation.

Tank movements generally fall under the headings of rail

1 " It ia not some familiax spirit which suddenly and secretly discloses
tome what I have to say or do in a case unexpected by others ; it is reflexion,
meditation." — ^Napolbon.

BATTLE PREPARATIONS 105

movements and cross-country movements. As regards the
former it must be remembered that the tank cannot at
present move over lengthy distances under its own power.
A Mark I tank on good going could not be relied on to run
more than 12 miles on a fill of petrol, and after it had com-
pleted about 70 miles it had to be overhauled and many of
its parts renewed. Rail movements require special trucks,
and, in the early days of the Corps, special sidings and
entraining ramps. As regards the latter, cross-covmtry
routes should be reconnoitred beforehand. It will be remem-
bered how on the night of April 8-9, the night previous to
the first day of the battle of Arras, six tanks became ditched
at Achicourt on account of a bog existing under the hard
surface of the ground. Had the officer reconnoitring this
route tested the ground along the valley by pushing a stick
into it, this accident would not have occurred, for the stick
would have penetrated the crust and informed him of the
nature of the soil below it.

Before any move takes place from the position of assembly,
near railhead, to the starting-points, the points whence the
tanks will proceed into battle, the following are a few of
the subjects that a Tank Unit Commander will have to
consider : — Objectives ; strong-points ; machine-gun em-
placements ; batteries ; trenches ; wire ; infantry lines of
advance ; minimum number of tanks required for the main
objectives ; minimum of tanks required for subsidiary
objectives ; nature of ground and its probable condition at
zero hour ; where ground, soil, natural features and hostile
batteries will chiefly impede tank movements ; the lines of
least resistance for tanks through the enemy's lines to the
main objectives and the points of greatest resistance to the
infantry advance ; landmarks ; starting points with refer-
ence to lines of least resistance ; positions of deployment
with reference to starting-points ; tank routes from positions
of assembly to the positions of deployment and thence to
the starting-points ; any places on these tank routes where
delays are hkely to occur ; rallying points ; supply dumps ;
communication, etc., etc.
9

106 STAFF WORK AND BATTLE PREPARATION

So in turn must each move or preparatory measure be
dealt with, reconnaissance playing an all-important part,
not only before the battle, but during it, and immediately
after it, and if the system of communication during the battle
is not efficient the work of the reconnaissance officer will
frequently be wasted, so we find one preparation depending
for its worth on another until the whole forms a complete
and somewhat intricate chain.

Imagine now, when this chain is nearing completion what
it means to it if some new plan be evolved, or a change be
introduced or forced on to a scheme of operations — its effect
will frequently have to be carried right down the chain, and
this will not only mean new work being done, but old work
being undone. Take the following as an example : a bat-
talion of tanks is to detrain at A, a few days later it is ordered
to detrain at B instead ; this will probably entail shifting
20,000 gallons of petrol, 12,000 6-pounder shells, 300,000
rounds of S.A.A., and countless other stores. It is these
changes in operations which a good Staff guards its troops
against by foresight ; this being so, the efficiency of a Staff
may usually be gauged by' the number of amendments a
Commander issues to his orders.

Another important duty of the Staff is to assist the troops
when the period of preparation ends and action begins, and
further still to watch closely every action so that changes
may be foreseen and preparations may be improved on the
next occasion. These duties are called " Battle Liaison," a
duty which was impressed upon every General Staff Officer
in the Tank Corps as the most important he would be called
upon to carry out. At every battle from that of the Ancre
onwards, the majority of the headquarters' General Staff
Officers were present on the battlefield itself, not after the
fight had swept on but before it opened and whilst it lasted.
Each night these officers would report to their headquarters
not only what they had heard but what they had seen, a
much more rehable source of evidence. The result of this
system was that when the crash came on March 21, 1918,
though the Tank Corps was spHt up over a front of 60 miles.

BATTLE LIAISON 107

and in many places complete confusion followed the German
attack, not once from that day on to the end of the battle
did the headquarters of the Tank Corps lack information
regarding the position of all its units. This may be chronicled
as a notable "feat of staff work," and certainly as useful as
many a much more spectacular " feat of arms." It is for
this type of staff work that Staff Officers are sometimes
rewarded.

CHAPTER XIII

THE BATTLE OF MESSINES

The situation at the end of April 1917 was a difficult one
for the Allies. The failure to penetrate the Drocourt-Queant
line had rendered the whole plan of the British attack east
of Arras abortive ; this was bad enough, but indeed a minor
incident when compared with the failure of the great French
attack in Champagne. It was towards making good this failure
that the rest of the year's operations had to be directed.

The ambitious plan of cutting off the Arras-Soissons-
Reims salient having failed, the next blow was to be directed
against the German right flank. The object of this attack
was to drive this flank back sufficiently far to deprive
the Germans of the coast line between Nieuport and the
Dutch frontier, and to render their position about Lille
sufficiently insecure to force them to evacuate it and so
open the road to Antwerp and Brussels.

The possibility of such an operation as this had long been
contemplated, and, as early as the summer of 1916, prepara-
tions for it had been taken in hand by the British Second
Army. By May 1917 these were completed, including the
construction of an extensive system of railways in the Ypres
area and the mining of most of the western flank of the
Messines-Wytschaete ridge.

The operation was to be divided into two main phases,
firstly the taking of the Messines-Wytschaete ridge so as to
secure the right flank of the second phase and to deny
the enemy important points of observation, and secondly the
attack north of this ridge with the object of occupying the
coast line and of pushing forward towards Ghent. The first
phase constituted the battle of Messines, the subject of
this chapter, and the second the Third Battle of Ypres.

108

SUPPLY TANKS 109

It had been foreseen early in the year that such an attack
was possible, and that in all probability tanks would be
called upon to take part in it, consequently, as early as
March 1917, reconnaissances of the whole of the Ypres area
had been taken in hand by the Heavy Branch. In April
this surmise proved correct, and the 2nd Brigade, consisting
of A and B Battalions, was selected for this operation. In
May these two battalions were equipped with thirty-six
Mark IV tanks each.

Railheads were selected at Ouderdom and at Clapham
Junction (one mile south of Dranoutre), and though they
were within the shelled area, they fulfilled most of the require-
ments demanded of a tank railhead. Advanced parties
began arriving at these stations on May 14, and between
May 23 and 27, A and B Battahons followed them. Supply
dumps were then formed, and arrangements were made to
carry forward one complete fill for all tanks operating by
means of Supply Tanks, which were first used in this battle.
These tanks consisted of discarded Mark I machines with
specially made supply sponsons fitted to them.

The positions of assembly were selected quite close to
railheads, B Battalion tanks being hidden away in a wood,
and A Battalion's in specially built shelters representing huts.
The spoor left by the tanks, as they moved to these positions,
was obliterated by means of harrows so that no enemy's
aeroplane happening to cross over our lines this way would
notice anything suspicious on the ground.

The object of the Second Army's operations was firstly
to capture the Messines-Wytschaete ridge and secondly to
capture the Oosttaverne line, a line of trenches running
north and south a mile to a mile and a half east of the ridge.
Three Corps were to participate in this attack — the Xth
and IXth Corps, and the Ilnd Anzac Corps. To these Corps
tanks were allotted as follows : 12 tanks to the Xth Corps,
28 tanks to the IXth Corps, 16 for the ridge, and 12 for
the Oosttaverne line, and 32 tanks to the Ilnd Anzac Corps,
20 for the ridge and 12 for the Oosttaverne line. Each
battalion had two spare tanks and 6 supply tanks. The

BATTLE OF MESStNES
June 7'i' 1917.

I I I I I 1 M I

Scale of Yards

JO YE FARM 111

and 40 minutes, having engaged an enemy's machine-gun
on the way. Another tank, rather aptly named the
" Wytschaete Express," led the infantry into the village of
Wytschaete and helped to persuade the Germans defending
it to surrender, which they did in large numbers.

At 10.30 a.m. the 24 reserve tanks were moved up to
points behind our original front line, and 22 of these started
with the infantry at 3. 10 p.m. in the attack on the Oosttaverne
hne, which constituted the final objective. During this
phase of the battle the tanks rendered very great assistance
to the infantry by occupying the ground beyond the
Oosttaverne line before the infantry arrived, and so dis-
organising the enemy's defence.

At a place named Joye farm an interesting incident
occurred. Two tanks became ditched here, but, in spite of
this and approaching darkness, these machines were in a
position to repel any hostile counter-attack coming up the
Wambeke valley, so it was decided to stand by in the tanks
and resume unditching work at daybreak.

At about 4 a.m. unditching was started again, and one
tank was got out successfully, but unfortunately broke its
track soon afterwards in trying to cross the railway to advance
against an enemy's counter-attack which was developing.
An hour later the enemy was observed to be massing in the
Wambeke valley. The position of the tanks only allowed
of a pair of 6-pounders being trained in the direction of the
enemy, so the remainder of the crews, under their officers,
took up positions in shell-holes with their Lewis guns. Word
was sent to the infantry to warn them and ask for co-opera-
tion, and on a reply being received that they were short
of Lewis-gun ammunition, some was supplied to them from
the tanks.

From 6.30 a.m. onwards the enemy made repeated attempts
to advance, shooting at the tanks with a large number of
armour-piercing bullets which failed to penetrate. They
were driven off in every case with heavy casualties, until
at 11.30 a.m. our artillery barrage opened and dispersed
them.

112 THE BATTLE OF MESSINES

The battle of Messines, one of the shortest and best
mounted hmited operations of the war, was in no sense a
tank battle. Tanks took but a small part in it, except in
its final stages, nevertheless many useful lessons were learnt,
the chief of which were : the necessity of some special form
of unditching gear ; the advisability of selecting starting-
points well behind our front line (in this battle they were
chosen too close behind it, with the result that as it was still
dark at zero hour several tanks got ditched in " No Man's
Land"); the advisability of selecting rallying-points well
behind objectives, so that when tanks have finished their
work their crews may gain as much rest as possible.

CHAPTER XIV

A TACTICAL APPRECIATION

The battle of Messines may be looked upon as the high-
water mark of the artillery attack, which was first developed
by the British Army during the battle of the Somme. The
time, however, was approaching when a change of tactics
became imperative on account of the enemy having learnt
his lesson. To appreciate what this question involves is of
some interest, especially so, as in the tank was eventually
discovered a means of overcoming the counter-measures
now adopted by the enemy. ^

The main characteristic which differentiates the German
defensive tactics of 1917 from those of 1916 would appear
to lie in the grouping of their men rather than in the siting
of their trenches.

In 1916 the major portion of the German Army was
placed in the frontal defensive belt because security was
sought for in the maintenance of an unbroken front. In
1917, however, this security was more economically guaran-
teed by holding behind this front, instead of in it, a large
reserve which could strike at any opponent who broke
through.

This reversion to the " big idea " and the abandonment
of the smaller one, namely, that war is a " series of local
emergency measures," placed a further difficulty in the way
of the attacker. In 1917 it was no longer a question of
breaking through a defensive line as in 1914, or a zone of
defences as in 1915 and 1916, but of exhausting the enemy's

* This chapter is extracted from a project submitted by Headquarters
Tank Corps on June 11, 1917. It correctly visualised the Third Battle of
Ypres, and the German artillery tactics adopted during it.

113

114 A TACTICAL APPRECIATION

reserves before undertaking either of these operations with
decisive effect.

This could now only be accompKshed by hitting the enemy
at a point which he must hold on to because of its importance
or of surprising him at points where he did not expect to
be attacked. If such points were not selected all he need
do was to fall back as he had already done in March, and so
dislocate our operations, by temporarily denying us the
use of our guns.

As hitherto, the change we have always most carefully to
watch for is any change the enemy is likely to carry out
in his artillery tactics, and the following is apparently what
the German was now doing.

Having learnt in 1916 and the first half of 1917 that if
the attacker makes up his mind to do it, he can carry, by
means of artillery and infantry alone, several lines of trenches
in one bound, it stood to reason that the German General
Staff would not continue to jeopardise its artillery by so
placing it that it could be pounded to pieces during our pre-
liminary bombardment.

If now the Germans withdrew their guns further back to
a position from which, though they cannot cover their
front-line system, they can cover their second or third lines
and simultaneously be immune, or to a great extent immune
from our counter-battery fire, by accepting the loss of a
small belt of ground they would place our attacking in-
fantry in such a position that whilst it feels the full effect
of their artillery, it is receiving next to no protection from
its own.

The construction of their defensive systems in 1917 did
not altogether lend itself to these tactics, the systems were
too close together ; but should these distances be enlarged
the disadvantage to the attacker becomes apparent ; and
there were already signs that the Germans were fully aware
of the advantage of this enlargement. At Arras they had
been surprised in spite of the lengthy bombardment and
they lost over 200 guns, at Messines they lost 67, and later
on at Ypres only 25, on the first day of each attack. They

GERMAN ARTILLERY TACTICS

115

were, in fact, countering by gun fire the exploitation of
a penetration. This system of tactics can be graphically
illustrated as follows (see Diagram 16).

Suppose that AB be the German front-line system, and
that CD, their second line, be so placed that the German
guns at E can heavily shell the whole of CD, and yet, on
account of the distance away, remain practically immune
from our guns at F. Suppose also that the area ABCD
is strongly wired and well sprinkled with machine guns,
who is going to suffer most — ^the attackers from GH, who
G A CI

Direction, of

Attack

Limit Field Guns

Limit Heavy Guns

Limit Field Guns

Limit Heavy Guns

H B D

DIAGBAM 16. — GEBMAN ABTILLEBY TACTICS.

will not only be perpetually worried by the machine guns
and sharpshooters in ABCD, but who will come more
and more under the enemy's gun fire as they proceed to-
wards CD, or the enemy's machine gunners occupying
ABCD, and his infantry in dug-outs along CD ? Un-
doubtedly the former, for they present the largest target,
and against them is being thrown the greater number of
projectiles. Suppose now the attackers capture CD, then
at best they will only be able to remain there as impassive
spectators to their own destruction until such time as the
guns at F move forward, which, on account of the " crumped
area," ABCD, will take many days. This is probably

116 A TACTICAL APPRECIATION

what would have happened had the Second Army been
required to push the attack from the Oosttaverne hne to-
wards Wervicq.

Except for an attack on an objective of very Umited depth
the artillery attack was almost doomed to fail on account
of slowness of moving forward the guns, due to the de-
struction of roads and terrain during the initial bombardment.
Bearing the above possibilities in mind, it was with some
apprehension that the Heavy Branch watched the approach
of the next great battle, for though the " crumped " area
could, if dry, be crossed by tanks, whatever service they
might afford would be rendered useless on account of the
impossibility of keeping the attacking infantry supplied ;
to do so, fleets of supply tanks would be required, and these
did not exist.

CHAPTER XV

THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES

Towards the middle of May it was decided that all three
Brigades of Tanks, that is, the whole Heavy Branch, should
take part in the forthcoming operations of the Fifth Army
east of Ypres, and that two of these brigades should assemble
in Oosthoek wood and the third at Ouderdom. To initiate
preparations an advanced headquarters was opened at
Poperinghe early in June, and on the 22nd of this month
the brigade advanced parties moved to the Ypres area.

After the battle of Messines, the 2nd Brigade (A and B
Battalions) had assembled at Ouderdom, so the present
concentration only involved moving the 1st Brigade (D and
G Battalions), and the 3rd Brigade (F and C Battalions) to
Oosthoek. Seven trains were required for each of these
Brigades.

At about this time it was decided that the 1st Brigade
should be allotted to the XVIIIth Corps, the 3rd Brigade
to the XlXth Corps, and the 2nd Brigade to the Ilnd Corps ;
brigade commanders were, therefore, instructed to place
themselves in touch with these corps and commence pre-
parations.

The preparations required varied considerably from those
for former battles. The Ypres-Comines canal, running
parallel to the front of attack, formed a considerable obstacle
to tank movement ; consequently, causeways had to be
built over the canal as well as over the Kemmelbeek and the
Lombartbeek. This work was carried out by the 184th Tun-
nelling Company, which was attached to the Heavy Branch
for the purpose. The work this unit carried out, normally
under severe shell fire, was most efficient and praiseworthy.
Besides the building of these causeways and the usual supply
preparations, thoroughly efficient signalling communication

117

118 THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES

was arranged for, including the use of a certain number of
tanks fitted with wireless installations.'

The reconnaissance work of the battalions was greatly
facilitated by that already carried out by the advanced
headquarters party. Oblique aerial photographs were pro-
vided for each tank commander, and plasticine models of
every part of the eventual battle area were carefully pre-
pared, the shelled zone being stencilled on them as the
bombardment proceeded. To facilitate the movement of
tanks over the battlefield a new system was made use of
by which a list of compass bearings from well-defined points
to a number of features in the enemy's territory was pre-
pared, thus enabling direction to be picked up easily. The
distribution of information was more rapid than it had been
on previous occasions. Constant discussions between the
Brigade and Battalion Reconnaissance officers led to a
complete liaison ; in fact, everything possible was done to
make the tank operations a success ; further, there was ample
time to do it in.

The Fifth Army attack was to be carried out on well
recognised lines ,• namely, a lengthy artillery preparation
followed by an infantry attack on a large scale and infantry
exploitation until resistance became severe, when the ad-
vance would be halted and a further organised attack pre-
pared on the same scale. This methodical progression was
to be continued until the exhaustion of the German reserves '
and moral created a situation which would enable a com-
plete break-through to be effected.

The number of tanks allotted to the three attacking Corps
was as follows : seventy-two to each of the Ilnd and XlXth
Corps, thirty-six to the XVIIIth, and thirty-six to be held
in Army reserve. These were subdivided according to
objectives, namely :

Una Corps. XlXth Corps. XVmth Oorpa.
Black Line . . . 16 tanks 24 tanks 12 tanks

Green Line . . *. 24 „ 24 „ 12 „

East of Green Line . 8 „

Corps Reserve . . 24 ,, 24 ,, 12 ,,

1 At this time the German reserves totaHed about 750,000 men.

DISTRIBUTION OF TANKS 119

The Corps objectives and the allotment of tanks to Divi-
sions were as follows :

In the Ilnd Corps the 24th and 30th Divisions supported
by the 18th Division were to attack on the right, and the
8th Division, supported by the 25th Division, on the left.
The general objective of the operations was the capture of
the Broodseinde ridge, and the protection of the right flank
of the Fifth Army. The allotment of tanks to Divisions
was : twelve to the 30th Division, eight to the 18th Divi-
sion, twenty-four to the 8th Division, and four to the 24th
Division.

In the XlXth Corps the 15th Division was on the right and
the 55th Division on the left, with the 16th and 36th Divi-
sions in reserve. The objective of this Corps was to capture
and hold a section of the enemy's third-line system known as
the Gheluvelt-Langemarck line. Twenty-four tanks were
allotted to each of the attacking divisions.

In the XVIIIth Corps the 39th Division was on the right
and the 51st Division on the left, with the 11th and 48th
Division in reserve. The main objective was the Green Line ;
but should this be successfully occupied the 51st Division
was to seize the crossings of the river Steenbeek at Mon du
Rasta and the Military Road, and establish a line beyond
that river from which a further advance could be made on
to the Gheluvelt-Langemarck line ; the 39th Division on
the left conforming by throwing out posts beyond the Green
Line. Eight tanks were allotted to the 51st Division and
sixteen to the 39th Division.

The dead level of Northern Flanders is broken by one
solitary chain of hills, a crescent in shape, with its cusps
as Cassel and Dixmude. From Cassel to Kemmel hill had
been ours since 1914 ; to this the Messines-Wytschaete ridge
was added, as we have seen in June 1917 ; now all that
remained was the extension of this ridge northwards from
about Hooge to Dixmude. The territory lying within the
crescent was practically all reclaimed swamp land, including
Ypres and reaching back as far as to St. Omer, both of
which, a few hundred years ago, were seaports. All agri-

120 THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES

culture in this area depended on careful drainage, the water
being carried away by innumerable dikes. So important was
the maintenance of this drainage system considered that in
normal times a Belgian farmer who allowed his dikes to fall
into disrepair was heavily fined.

The frontage of attack of the Fifth Army extended from
the Ypres-Comines canal to Wiltje cabaret. On the left the
French were co-operating, attacking towards Houthulst
forest, and on the right the Second Army was restricted to
an all but passive artillery r61e. This frontage was flanked
by two strong positions, the Polygonveld and Houthulst
forest, which formed two bastions with a semicircular ridge
of ground as a curtain between them; in front of this low
curtain ran a broad moat — the valley of the Steenbeek and
its small tributaries.

From the tank point of view the Third Battle of Ypres
is a complete study of how toi. move thirty tons of metal
through a morass of mud and water. The area east of the
canal had, through neglect and daily shell fire, been getting
steadily worse since 1914, but as late as June 1917 it was
still sufficiently well drained to be negotiable throughout,
by the end of July it had practically reverted to its primal
condition of a vast swamp ; this was due to the intensity
of our artillery fire.

It must be remembered at this time the only means
accepted whereby to initiate a battle was a prolonged artil-
lery bombardment ; sufficient reliance not as yet being
placed in tanks on account of their liability to break down. '
The present battle was preceded by the longest bombard-
ment ever carried out by the British Army, eight days
counter-battery work being followed by sixteen days intense
bombardment. The effect of this cannonade was to destroy
the drainage system and to produce water in the shell-holes
formed even before the rain fell. Slight showers fell on the
29th and 30th, and a heavy storm of rain on July 31.

A study of the ground on the fronts of the three attacking

I BreakdowiiB in the past had for the most part been due to bad ground,
not defective mechanism.

THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES

July to November 1917.

Scale of Yards

2000 3000

4000 5000 6000 7000

NATURE OF BATTLEFIELD 121

corps is interesting. On the Ilnd Corps front the ground
was broken by swamps and woods, only three approaches
were possible for tanks, and these formed dangerous defiles.
On the XlXth Corps front the valley of the Steenbeek was
in a terrible condition, innumerable shell-holes and puddles
of water existed, the drainage of the Steenbeek having been
seriously ai^ected by the shelling. On that of the XVIIIth
Corps front the ground between our front line and the Steen-
beek was cut up and sodden. The Steenbeek itself was a
difficult obstacle, and could scarcely have been negotiated
without the new unditching gear which had been produced
since the battle of Messines. The only good crossing was at
St. Julien, and this formed a dangerous defile.

Zero hour was at 3.50 a.m., and it was still dark when the
tanks, which had by July 31 assembled east of the canal,
moved forward behind the attacking infantry.

Briefly, the attack on July 31, in spite of the fact that
there are fifty-one recorded occasions upon which individual
tanks assisted the infantry, may be classed as a failure. On
the Ilnd Corps front, because of the bad going, the tanks
arrived late, and owing to the infantry being hung up, they
were caught in the defiles by hostile artillery fire and suffered
considerable casualties in the neighbourhood of Hooge.
They undoubtedly drew heavy shell fire away from the
infantry, but the enemy appeared to be ready to deal with
them as soon as they reached certain localities and knocked
them out one by one. On the XlXth Corps front they were
more successful. At the assault on the Frezenberg redoubt
they rendered the greatest assistance to the infantry, who
would have suffered severely had not tanks come to their
rescue. Several enemy's counter-attacks were broken by
the tanks, and Spree farm, Capricorn keep, and Bank farm
were reduced with their assistance. On the XVIIIth Corps
front at Enghsh trees and Macdonald's wood several machine
guns were silenced ; the arrival of a tank at Ferdinand's farm
caused the enemy to evacuate the right bank of the Steen-
beek in this neighbourhood. The attack on St. Julien and
Alberta would have cost the infantry heavy casualties had
10

122 THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES

not two tanks come up at the critical naoment and rendered
assistance. At Alberta strong wire still existed, and this
farm was defended by concrete machine-gun emplacements
with good dug-outs. The two tanks which arrived here
went forward through our own protective barrage, rolled
flat the wire and attacked the ruins by opening fire at very
close range, with the result that the enemy was driven into
his dug-outs and was a little later on taken prisoner by our
infantry.

The main lessons learnt from this day's fighting were —
the unsuitability of the Mark IV tank to swamp warfare ;
the danger of attempting to move tanks through defiles
which are swept by hostile artillery fire ; the necessity for
immediate infantry co-operation whenever the presence of
a tank forced an opening, and the continued moral effect of
the tank on both the enemy and our own troops.

The next attack in which tanks took part was on
August 19, and in spite of the appalling condition of the
gromid, for it had now been steadily raining for three weeks,
a very memorable feat of arms was accomplished. The 48th
Division of the XVIIIth Corps had been ordered to execute
an attack against certain strongly defended works, and, as
it was reckoned that this attack might cost in casualties from
600 to 1,000 men, it was decided to make it a tank opera-
tion in spite of the fact that the tanks would have to work
along the remains of the roads in place of over the open
country. Four tanks were detailed to operate against
Hillock farm. Triangle farm, Mon du Hibou, and the Cock-
croft ; four against Winnipeg cemetery, Springfield, and
Vancouver, and four to be kept in reserve at California
trench. The operation was to be covered by a smoke bar-
rage, and the infantry were to follow the tanks and make
good the strong points captured.

Eleven tanks entered St. Julien at 4.45 a.m., three ditched,
and eight emerged on the St. Julien-Poelcappelle road, when
down came the smoke barrage, throwing a complete cloud
on the far side of the objectives ; at 6 a.'m. Hillock farm was
occupied, at 6.15 a.m. Mon du Hibou was reduced, and five

GfKOTJND OPERATED OVER BY TANKS DUHING THE BATTLE OF MESSINES, SHOWING
PKELIMINAKY BOMBARDMENT ON JUNE 5, 1917.

GROUND OPERATED OVER BY TANIiS IN AUGUST 1917, DURING THE THIRD BATTLE

OP YPRES. ■

122]

ROADS AND SWAMPS 123

minutes later the garrison of Triangle farm, putting up a
fight, were bayoneted. Thus one point after another was
captured, the tanks driving the garrisons underground or
away, and the infantry following and making good what the
tanks had made possible. In this action the most remark-
able results were obtained at very little cost, for instead of
600 casualties the infantry following the tanks only sustained
fifteen !

From this date on to October 9 tanks took part in eleven
further actions, the majority being fought on the XVIIIth
Corps front by the 1st Tank Brigade. On August 22 a
particularly plucky fight was put up by a single tank. This
machine became ditched in the vicinity of a strong point
called Gallipoli, and, for sixty-eight hours on end, fought the
enemy, breaking up several counter-attacks ; eventually the
crew, running short of ammunition, withdrew to our own lines
on the night of August 24-25.

Of the -attacks which were made with tanks in the latter
half of September and the beginning of October, the majority
took place along the Poelcappelle road, the most successful
being fought on October 4. Of this attack the XVIIIth
Corps Commander reported that " the tanks in Poelcappelle
were a decisive factor in our success on the left flank " ; and
their moral effect on the enemy was illustrated by the state-
ment of a captured German officer who gave as the reason
of his surrender — " There were tanks — so my company sur-
rendered — I also."

It is almost impossible to give any idea of the difficulty of
these latter operations or of the " grit " required to carry
them out. Roads, if they could be called by such a name
at all, were few and far between in the salient caused by the
repeated attacks during the battle. This salient had a base
of some 20,000 yards and was only 8,000 deep at the begin-
ning of October, at which date the enemy could still obtain
extensive observation over it from the Passchendaele ridge.
The ground in between these roads being impassable swamps,
all movement had to proceed along them, consequently they
formed standing targets for the German gunners to direct

124 THE THIED BATTLE OF YPRES

their fire on. One night, at about this period of the battle, a
tank engineer officer was instructed to proceed to Poelcap-
pelle to superintend the demohtion of some tanks which
were blocking the road near the western entrance to the
village. His description of it at night-time is worth
recording.

" I left St. Julien in the dark, having been informed that
our guns were not going to fire. I waded up the road, which
was swimming in a foot or two of slush, frequently I would
stumble into a shell-hole hidden by the mud. The road was
a complete shambles and strewn with debris, broken vehicles,
dead and dying horses and men. I must have passed hun-
dreds of them as well as bits of men and animals littered
everywhere. As I neared Poelcappelle out guns started to
fire : at once the Germans replied, pouring shells on and
around the road, the flashes of the bursting shells were all
round me. I cannot describe what it felt like, the nearest
approach of a picture I can give is that it was like standing
in the centre of the flame of a gigantic Primus stove. As I
neared the derelict tanks, the scene became truly appalling :
wounded men lay drowned in the mud, others were stumbling
and falling through exhaustion, others crawled and rested
themselves up against the dead to raise themselves a little
above the slush. On reaching the tanks I found them sur-
rounded by the dead and dying ; men had crawled to them
for what shelter they would afford. The nearest tank was
a female, her left sponson doors were open, out of these
protruded four pairs of legs, exhausted and wounded men
had sought refuge in this machine, and dead and dying lay
in a jumbled heap inside."

Whatever history may record of the Third Battle of
Ypres, one fact certainly will not be overlooked or forgotten,
namely : that men who could continue for three months to
attack under the conditions which characterised this most
terrible battle of the war must indeed belong to an invincible
stock.

CHAPTER XVI

TANK MECHANICAL ENGINEERING

The organisation of the " mechanical engineering " side of
the Tank Corps constituted the backbone of the whole
formation, for on its efficiency depended the efficiency of
the fighting units in as high a degree as the fighting efficiency
of a cavalry regiment depends on its horse-mastership.

In this chapter it is not intended to follow the growth of
this organisation in detail, but rather to look back on its
evolution as a whole, and then to enter upon a few particulars
of the work accomplished by it. Before doing so it must be
clearly understood that the mechanical engineering side of
the Tank Corps was as much a product of this Corps as the
fighting organisation itself, as there was in the Army no
definite Mechanical Engineering Department to draw inspira-
tions from. The nearest was the R.A.S.C, but a very wide gap
separated the R.A.S.C. system from that adopted in the Tank
Corps ; both indeed dealt with petrol engines, but the tank
and its requirements are as distinct from the lorry as the
lorry is from the aeroplane — another mechanical weapon.

Generally speaking, the experience of the engineering side
of the Tank Corps, during the two years following its incep-
tion in August 1916, has been that the most efficient organisa-
tion depends upon the maintenance of two simple principles,
namely :

(i) No repairs to be carried out in the field— i.e. by
fighting units.

(ii) All maintenance to be carried out by the crews of the
machines themselves.

When the Tank Corps was first formed, each Company of
Tanks was provided with its own workshops. At the end of
1916 Company Workshops were abolished and Battalion

125

126 TANK MECHANICAL ENGINEERING

Workshops were formed. Towards the end of 1917, after
much consideration had been given to the question, Battalion
Workshops were abolished and merged into Brigade Work-
shops, while a small number of skilled workshop men were
left with each Company. In 1918 it was realised that the
gradual withdrawal of special workshop facilities from the
Company organisation to the Brigade had resulted in a
considerable improvement in the skill and ability of the tank
crews themselves in the maintenance of their tanks. It
was decided, therefore, to go one step further, and not only
withdraw all Brigade Workshops into a central organisation
known as the Central Workshops, but also to withdraw the
special workshop men from the Companies, while tank
crews themselves were made entirely responsible for the
maintenance of their machines.

In this way it was possible to draw a clear line between
maintenance {i.e. the replacing of damaged parts, which was
done entirely by the crews) and repairs {i.e. the mending of
broken parts, which was done entirely by the Central Work-
shops). At this time the argument was frequently heard
that a man who uses a machine should be able to repair it,
and that, if all repair work is done by a different organisation
from the one which actually fights the machine, there will
be a serious loss of mechanical efficiency. This idea was
based upon a misconception of the difference between the
functions of repairs and maintenance. On the contrary, it
was found that the efficiency of the crews increased several
hundred per cent, after the crews themselves were made
responsible for the maintenance of their machines. To
carry out this system it is, however, necessary that stores
and spare parts should be readily available in the field ;
this entails an intelligent system of Advanced Stores.

One very great advantage of this centralisation of repair
work is the considerable saving in man-power effected by
employing all skilled men exclusively on one particular job.
As an example, broken unions of petrol pipes commonly
occur in all petrol engines, and if a small unit workshop exist,
the brazing out and repair of such broken unions can be

THE CENTRAL STORES 127

carried out there. In order to»do this a coppersmith must
be kept at the unit workshop, and only part of his time will
be employed in this work of brazing petrol unions. If now,
however, the unit workshops are abolished, and all broken
unions, from every unit, are sent back to a Central Work-
shop for repair, there is a suflBcient amount of work of this
description to keep one man, or possibly two or three, fully
employed all their time. These men become absolute ex-
perts in brazing broken unions, and before very long can
do in a few minutes a job of this sort which would
take a coppersmith with the unit workshop considerably
longer.

The complete organisation for the maintenance and repair
of tanks can be briefly described by tracing the itinerary of
a tank from the day it left the manufacturer until the day
it was received at the Central Workshops for repair.

From the manufacturer the tank was first sent to the
tank testing ground at Newbury, which was manned and
administered by No. '20 Squadron, R.N.A.S. From here it
was sent to Richborough and shipped across the channel
by channel ferry and received by another detachment of
No. 20 Squadron at Havre. From Havre it was sent to the
Bermicourt area, and after being put through further tests
was handed over to the Central Stores. The Central Stores
were situated at the village of Erin on the Hesdin-St.-Pol
railway, and consisted of some seven acres of railway sidings
and some six acres of buildings. These stores were built
in 1917, and at first included the Central Workshops ; in
1918, however, these workshops were installed at Teneur,
about a mile and a half away, and covered some twenty acres
of ground.

From the Central Stores tanks were issued to battalions,
and after repair at the Central Workshops were received
again at these stores for reissue as they were required.

As the battalions carried out all their own mechanical
maintenance. Advanced Stores were instituted, these being
sent out from the Central Stores into the forward area im-
mediately behind the front to be attacked by the tanks.

128 TANK MECHANICAL ENGINEERING

These stores were organised on a very mobile footing and
proved invaluable in all battles since October 1917.

Besides the moving forward of these Advanced Stores,
Tank Field Companies, originally known as Salvage Com-
panies, were despatched from the Central Workshops to the
battle areas. The duty of these companies was to take
over from the fighting units all damaged tanks, such as
those knocked out by the enemy's artillery fire ; they were,
in fact, the clearers of the battlefield so far as tanks were
concerned. Apart from salving complete tanks an immense
quantity of other material was reclaimed, such as 6-pounder
guns, machine guns, ammunition, tools, track plates, gears,
transmissions, and engine parts, etc., which in the two years
of the existence of these companies totalled in value several
millions of pounds.

The work carried out by the Tank Field Companies was
particularly dangerous, and many casualties amongst their
personnel occurred. In the actual reclaiming of machines
or parts they were constantly under shell fire, and the actual
carrying to and fro of the material made use of required
great physical strength, since the ground to be traversed was
frequently a mass of shell-holes ; incidentally a great deal
of work had to be done at night since many of the machines
to be salved were frequently situated in full view of the
enemy.

From the Tank Field Companies the salved machines were
sent to the Central Workshops at Teneur. Here they were
repaired, and this work entailed considerably more skill and
labour than the initial assembly of the machines in the
home factories on account of the shattered and burnt-out
condition many of these machines were reduced to. Much
of this repair work was carried out by Chinese labour and
at these shops over 1,000 Chinese were quartered for work,
schools being instituted for them so that mechanics, fitters,
etc., could be trained.

Besides testing and repairing machines much other work
was carried out at the Central Workshops — " gagget " malcing,
experiments, making good minor deficiencies of manufacture

THE CENTRAL WORKSHOPS 129

and generally improving the machines. This work frequently
consisted in " panic " orders, such as the sledge and fascine
making for the battle of Cambrai. One hundred and ten
tank sledges and 400 tank fascines, bundles of wood which
will be mentioned later, when dealing with the battle of
Cambrai, were ordered on October 24, 1917. The former
required some 3,000 cubic feet of wood, weighing 70 tons, and
the latter 21,500 ordinary fascines, representing some 400
tons of brushwood and over 2,000 fathoms of chain to hold
them together. This order came on the top of a particularly
strenuous period following the tank operations round Ypres.
At the same time another order for the overhaul and repair
of 127 machines was made.

Owing to the limited amount of time allowed for the
transport of material from the base ports to the Central
Workshops and from the Central Workshops to the forward
area, extensive use was made of lorries. From November 10
to the 25th, twenty-eight lorries engaged on this work
covered a total of 19,334 miles, averaging 690 miles per
lorry, while three box ears averaged 1,242 miles each.

The part played by the 51st Chinese Labour Company,
attached to the Workshops, materially contributed to the
work being duly completed in time for the battle. Owing
to the necessity for secrecy the personnel of the Work-
shops were without knowledge of the immediate urgency'
of the work they were engaged on. In spite of this all ranks
worked with the utmost enthusiasm, accomplishing the task
in the required time. During these three weeks the Central
Workshops were working 22g hours out of every 24 with-
out a break, and had it not been for the " grit " displayed
by all ranks the battle of Cambrai could not have been
fought, and without this battle the whole course of the war
might have been changed ; for it was the battle of Cambrai,
as we shall shortly see, which demonstrated the full power
of the tank and which placed it henceforth in the van of
every battle.

CHAPTER XVII

THE THIRD BATT^LE OF GAZA

As a result of the repulse sustained by the British forces at
the Second Battle of Gaza in April 1917, the troops operat-
ing were withdrawn from their exposed position and the
Tank Detachment was concentrated in a fig grove some
2,000 yards west of Sheikh Nebhan, at which place it was
later on reinforced by three Mark IV machines.

A new plan of operations was drawn up in which the
Turkish defences from Outpost hill to Ali El Muntar, which
had resisted the combined onslaught of several divisions,
was to be turned by an extensive flanking movement west
of Gaza. This operation was to take place in conjunction
with an attack on Beersheba.

The general plan of attack was as follows :

(i) The Australian Corps and Desert Column were to
operate from Beersheba north-westwards to Hareira.

(ii) Several mounted and dismounted divisions were to
operate around Hareira and Gaza.

(iii) A composite force of French, Italians and West Indian
troops was to demonstrate by raids in the vicinity of Outpost
hill.

(iv) The XXIst Corps was to attack the enemy's defences
between Umbrella hill and the sea.

It is with the last of these four operations that this
chapter is concerned. For this attack the force detailed
consisted of the 54th Division, the Indian Cavalry Division,
and the Tank Detachment — eight machines.

The attack of the 54th Division was divided into four
phases — Blue, Red, Green, and Yellow.

The Tank Detachment left Deir El Belah on the night of
October 22-23, 1917, for the beach near Sheikh Ajhn. From

130

TANK OBJECTIVES 131

here a thorough reconnaissance of the area of operations
was carried out on horseback and by drifter, after which
this area was divided into tank sectors. To these tanks
were distributed as follows :

(i) 156th Infantry Brigade. — ■ Objective — Umbrella hill
north-westwards to the eastern portion of El Arish redoubt.
No. 1 tank was to support the infantry in their attack on
El Arish redoubt, deposit R.E. stores, attack Magdhaba
trench and cover the infantry consolidation.

(ii) 163rd Infantry Brigade. — Objective — El Arish redoubt
northwards to south of Zowaiid trench. No. 2 tank was to
attack El Arish redoubt, then Island wood, deposit R.E.
stores, and on the arrival of the infantry take a southerly
route and capture Crested rock.

(iii) 161st and 162nd Infantry Brigades. — Objectives —
Zowaiid trench to Sea Post and the Cricket valley north-
wards to Sheikh Hasan and 500 yards beyond. For this
operation four tanks were allotted.

No. 3 tank to attack Zowaiid trench, move north and capture
Rafa redoubt, rally, then proceed along Rafa trench, deposit
R.E. material, capture Yunus trench, attack Belah trench
until the arrival of infantry, thence proceed to Sheikh
Hasan, deposit more R.E. stores, and return to Sheikh Ajlin.

No. 4 tank to attack Rafa redoubt, co-operate with No. 3
tank against Belah trench, make for Sheikh Hasan, deposit
R.E. material, attack A. 6 (an isolated Turkish trench to
the north-east), and hold this until the infantry had con-
solidated it.

No. 5 tank to capture Beach Post, co-operate in the
assault on Cricket redoubt, attack Sheikh Hasan in advance
of the infantry, and deposit R.E. material.

No. 6 tank to capture Sea Post, crush down the wire as
far as Beach Post, assault Gun hill, proceed to Sheikh Hasan,
then deposit R.E. stores and capture the Turkish post A.5.

(iv) Reserve Tanks. — Nos. 7 and 8 tanks were to be held
in reserve north-east of Sheikh Ajlin ; from there they were
to follow up the attack and replace any disabled machine.

In all, the above six first-line machines had twenty-nine

132 THE THIRD BATTLE OF GAZA

objectives to attack ! That this could have been accom-
plished successfully would have demanded a miracle ; it
was consequently foredoomed to failure.

The first phase of the attack was to consist in an infantry
assault protected by a creeping barrage ; during this phase
the tanks were to move to their starting-points and be ready
to advance at 3 o'clock on the morning of November 2.

In order to ensure complete co-operation between the
Tank Detachment and the infantry, tank officers and other
ranks were attached to infantry brigades for ten days prior
to the battle. As in France, this system resulted in the
greatest benefit to both infantry and tank personnel alike.

The first phase of the battle opened at II o'clock on the
night of November 1-2, the 156th Infantry Brigade assault-
ing Umbrella hill. To this attack the enemy did not re-
spond immediately, but when he did he opened a heavy
artillery fire all down his front which endangered the for-
ward movement of the tanks to their starting-points, which,
in spite of this, they reached half an hour before the second
zero hour.

It had been hoped to make every use of the full moon
which rose in the early evening, but the smoke, resulting
from the battle, and a dense haze restricted vision so com-
pletely that the tanks had to move forward on compass
bearings. At 3 a.m. a heavy barrage was opened on the
enemy's front-line system, behind which the tanks, followed
by the infantry, moved forward. No difficulty was experi-
enced in dealing with the first objective, as the Turks were
evidently taken quite by surprise. Under cover of the
barrage our troops pushed on till they approached their
second objective, when the enemy's fire began to make itself
felt. Along the coastline the attack proceeded according
to programme, all objectives, including Sheikh Hasan, being
taken. The 161st and 163rd Brigades encountered con-
siderable opposition at Rafa trench. Island wood. Crested
rock, Gibraltar, and north of El Arish redoubt. Briefly the
operations carried out by the eight tanks of the detachment
were as follows :

WORK OF THE TANKS 133

No. 1 tank successfvilly attacked El Arish redoubt and was
penetrating the maze of trenches beyond, when owing to
the darkness it was ditched ; its crew then joined the infantry.

No. 2 tank assaulted El Arish redoubt and met a similar
fate ; eventually it received a direct hit which broke its
right track; its crew also joined the infantry.

No. 3 tank attacked Rafa redoubt, and later on, losing
direction in the mist, rallied.

No. 4 tank assaulted Rafa Junior, Yunus and Belah
trenches, and after depositing its R.E. material rallied.

No. 6 tank captured Sea Post, moved along the enemy's
trench, crushing down the wire as far as Beach Post, at-
tacked Cricket redoubt, Gun hill, and Tortoise hill, and
reaching Sheikh Hasan deposited its R.E. stores. Shortly
after this it moved forward to attack A. 5, but breaking a
track it had to be abandoned.

Nos. 7 and 8 tanks received instructions at 4 a.m. to
support the infantry attack on El Arish redoubt, and to
proceed in this direction with R.E. material. These machines
were loaded up with empty sandbags on the roof, these
caught fire, probably through the heat of the exhaust pipe,
both tanks went out of action.

On the whole the tank operations during the Third Battle
of Gaza were of assistance to the infantry. All tanks, ex-
cept one, reached their first objectives ; four reached their
second, third, and fourth, and one reached its fifth objective.
Of the eight machines operating five were temporarily dis-
abled. Casualties in personnel were very light — only one
man being killed and two wounded.

The Third Battle of Gaza closed the tank operations with
the Army of Palestine, and though the damaged machines
were repaired and put into fighting trim they were not used
again. In order to overcome the great difficulty in round-
ing up, by means of cavalry, the rearguard detachments of
the retiring Turkish Army, a mission was sent to France to
obtain, if possible, a nuriiber of Whippet machines. This
mission reached Tank Corps Headquarters in France on
March 21, the day the German offensive was launched. All

134 THE THIRD BATTLE OP GAZA

hope of procuring these machines consequently vanished.
The Tank Detachment, therefore, handed over their machines
to the Ordnance Department at Alexandria and returned to
England.

The tank operations in Sinai and Palestine conclusively
proved that tanks could be employed almost anywhere in
desert regions, and all that they required were certain im-
provements in mechanism and changes in design.

What success the Tank Detachment won during its two
years in the East was due to the determination and fine
fighting spirit displayed by its officers and men, who laboured
under the greatest difficulties, not the least being the entire
lack of knowledge displayed by the other arms in the limita-
tions of tanks and their tactical employment. When all is
said and done and every criticism rounded off, success with
tanks in battle is as much a matter of co-operation, that is,
unity of action of all arms combined, as it is of mechanical
fitness. This can only be attained by constant practice in
combined exercises on the training area long prior to the
battle even being thought of.

CHAPTER XVIII

ORIGINS OF THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

The battles of 1914 were primarily infantry battles based
on the power of the rifle, and it was not until 1915 that the
quick-firing gun and the heavy howitzer began to replace the
rifle as the reducers of resistance to the infantry attack.

In 1915, as far as the British Army is concerned, it may
be said that artillery was generally looked upon as an adjunct
to the infantry. This idea died hard, and it was not until
the battle of the Somme was half way through that it became
apparent that it was no longer a question of guns co-operat-
ing in the infantry advance,' but of the infantry itself co-
operating with the artillery bombardments. In other words
the limit of the infantry advance was the limit of the range
of the guns, particularly the 18-pounders. This meant that
no penetration of a greater depth than about 4,000 yards
could be effected unless a second echelon of guns and infantry
was launched and brought into action simultaneously with
or just before the first assault had reached the range limit
of the guns which were supporting it.

Two factors prohibited this from being done ; the first
was the heavily shelled area which usually extends over the
whole 4,000 yards of the initial advance ; the second, the
great difficulty of keeping the second echelon of guns supplied
with sufficient ammunition to maintain the second barrage.
The shelled area not only prohibited the movement of guns
for days, but produced such exhaustion on the second echelon
of infantry crossing it, that by the time it caught up with
the fu"st echelon its men were too fatigued to continue the
attack.

By some it was hoped that the tank would partially over-
come this difficulty if it were brought into action on the area

135

136 ORIGINS OF THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

over which the 18-pounder barrage was beginning to fail,
and by producing a local barrage of its own, by means of its
machine guns, that it would cover any advance from 4,000
yards onwards.

This idea, though perfectly sound in itself, was doomed to
failure as long as the conditions of ground produced by
artillery fire rendered it impossible to support these tanks by
infantry in fighting condition.

The first solution to this problem was to cease using
heavy artillery on ground to be traversed by the infantry
attackers. This, however, is at best but a half measure,
for though, in the present phase of the war, co-operation
between infantry and tanks was of vital importance, this
co-operation could not be maintained for long if one arm
has to rely on its muscular power, whilst the other relies on
petrol as its motive force. At best, the advance of 4,000 to
6,000 yards will be extended to 8,000 or 12,000 yards, when
the endurance of the infantry will reach its limit and the
advance automatically cease. This is not sufficient, for in
a war such as was being waged in 1917 (a trench war), in
order to beat an enemy, the first necessity was to prevent
him using his spade. This can only be done by maintaining
a continuous, if comparatively slow advance, that is, by
replacing muscle by petrol as the motive force. This means
the creation of a mechanical army.

In August 1917 the Tank Corps fully realised that the
creation of such an army, even on a very small scale, would
take at least a year ; further, that its creation depended on
the value of the tank being fully recognised by those who
could create such an army, and upon this army being used
in a suitable area of operations. Consequently the first thing
to do was to discover a suitable tank area ; the second, to
hold a tactical demonstration on it with tanks so as to
convince the General Staff of their power and value. These
steps it was felt would have to be taken before the petrol
engine would be accepted as the motive force of the modern
battle.

The selection of a theatre of operations depends on the

TACTICAL VALUE OF TANKS 137

objective to be gained ; the gaining of the objective on the
breaking down of the enemy's resistance. Consequently the
weapon which will most speedily overcome this resistance
must be considered first, and the area of attack in the theatre
of operations chosen must be selected as far as possible with
reference to its powers.

In the present instance we find that the chief resistance
to our infantry advance comes from the enemy's machine
guns. We dare not concentrate all our artillery on these,
for if we do, we shall release his guns, which, free, can put
up a stronger resistance than his machine guns on account
of their superior range. Further, whilst by sound and flash
ranging and aeroplane observation we can discover his main
gun positions, no means have yet been discovered whereby
his machine gimis can be located other than by advancing
on them and risking casualties. Tanks must, therefore, be
employed to do this in order to clear the way for the infantry
advance. Consequently, if sufficient tanks are forthcoming,
in order to guarantee a decisive success, it is no longer a
question of the tank as a spare wheel to the car, in case of
an unforeseen puncture in our operations, but as the motive
force of the car itself, the infantry being merely its armed
occupants ; without which the car is valueless.

The area of operations selected must firstly be suitable
to the rapid movement of tanks, and secondly, misuitable to
hostile anti-tank defences. Further, it should be chosen
with reference to the tactical characteristics of this arm.
Once chosen, all other weapons should be deployed and em-
ployed to facilitate the advance of the tank, because it is to
be used as the chief maintainer of infantry endurance, and
it is the infantry man with his machine gun and bayonet
who is going, for some time to come, to decide the battle.

Such were the views held in the Tank Corps at the open-
ing of the Third Battle of Ypres, and the following extract
taken from a paper written on June 11, 1917, is not only of
interest but prophetic of future events :

"If we look at a layered map of France we can at once
11

138 ORIGINS OF THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

put our finger on the area to select. It lies between the
Scarpe and the Oise, the Flanders swamps in the north and
the Ardennes in the south-east. It was down this funnel of
undulating country that the Germans advanced in 1914,
and it is up it that they will most hkely be driven if
strategy is governed by ground and tactics by weapons."

The main area suitable for tank operations having been
fixed upon by the Tank Corps, the next requirement was to
.select a definite objective, the attack against which would
draw the enemy's reserves towards it and so relieve the
pressure wiiich was being exerted against the Fifth Army
at Ypres. Two locahties were considered, St. Quentin and
Cambrai. The first was opposite the French area, the second
opposite the British.

The suggestion put forward as regards the St. Quentin
operation was abandonefi on account of difficulties arising
out of a British force operating in the French area ; it must
be remembered that at this time no real unity of command
existed in France.

The Cambrai project consisted in a surprise raid, the
duration of which would be about twenty-four hours. The
whole operation may be summed up in three words, "Advance,
Hit, Retire." Its object was to destroy the enemy's per-
sonnel and guns, to demoralise and disorganise his fighting
troops and reserves, and not to capture ground or to hold
trenches. It was further considered that such an operation
would interrupt his roulement of reserves and make the
enemy think twice as to replacing fresh divisions by ex-
hausted and demoralised units in those parts of his line
which were not included in his battle front. Further, it would
confuse him as to the decisive point of attack ; for any day
one of these raids might be followed by a strong offensive.

The actual area of operations selected was the re-entrant
formed by the L'Escaut or St. Quentin Canal between the
villages of Ribecourt, Cr^vecoeur, and Banteux. The going
in this area was excellent; further, the area to be raided
contained several fair-sized villages and important ground,
and was well limited by the canal, which not only made a

PROJECTED TANK RAID 139

rapid reinforcing of the area in the bend difficult, but com-
pletely limited the tank objectives.

The plan of attack was a threefold one :

(i) To scour the country between Marcoing, Masni^res,
Crevecoeur, Le Bosquet, Banteux.

(ii) To form an offensive flank between Le Bosquet and
Ribecourt.

(iii) To form an offensive flank against Banteux.

The attack was to be launched at dawn, the first line of
tanks making straight for the enemy's guns, which before,
and as the tanks approached them, were to be bombed by
our aeroplanes. The second and third lines of tanks were
to follow, whilst our heavy guns commenced counter-battery
work and the shelling of the villages and bridges along the
canal. The essence of the entire operation was to be sur-
prise coupled with rapidity of movement. The spirit of
such an enterprise is audacity, which was to take the place
of undisguised preparation.

It must be realised that both the St. Quentin and Cambrai
projects were the home product of the Tank Corps, and
they did not emanate from higher authority, which, when
approached, was unable to sanction either. In spite of this,
steps were taken to reconnoitre the Cambrai area, and for
this purpose both the Brigadier-General commanding the
Tank Corps and the 3rd Tank Brigade Commander visited
Sir Julian Byng, the Third Army Commander, at his Head-
quarters in Albert. Though it is not known whether the
Third Army Commander had already considered the possi-
bilities of an offensive on the front of his Army, in Septem-
ber it would appear that he approached G.H.Q. on the
subject, with the result that still no action outside the
Ypres area could be considered, anyhow for the present.

CHAPTER XIX

THE BATTLE OF CAMBKAI

On October 20, the project, which had been constantly in
the mind of the General Staff of the Tank Corps for nearly
three months and in anticipation of which preparations had
already been imdertaken, was approved of, and its date
fixed for November 20.

The battle was to be based on tanks and led by them.
There was to be no preliminary artillery bombardment ; the
day the Tank Corps had prayed for, for nearly a year, was
at last fixed, and its success depended on the following three
factors :

(i) That the attack was a surprise.

(ii) That the tanks were able to cross the great trenches
of the Hindenburg system.

(iii) That the infantry possessed sufficient confidence in
the tanks to follow them.

The following difficulties had to be overcome before these
requirements could be met. The tanks, on October 20, were
scattered over a considerable area : some were at Ypres,
others near Lens, and others at Bermicourt. These would
all have to be assembled not at suitable entraining stations,
as is usually the case, but at various traini^ig areas so that
co-operative training with the infantry could take place.
This was of first importance, for success depended as much
on the confidence of the infantry in the tanks as on the sur-
prise of the attack. At these training centres, tanks would
have to be completely overhauled and fitted with a special
device to assist them in crossing the Hindenburg trenches,
which were known, in many places, to be over 12 ft. wide,
and the span of the Mark IV machine was only 10 ft. This
device consisted in binding together by means of chains

140

CAMBRAI TANK TACTICS 141

some seventy-five ordinary fascines, thus making one tank
fascine, a great bundle of brushwood 4'^ ft. in diameter and
10 ft. long ; this bundle was carried on the nose of the tank
and, when a large trench was encountered, was cast into it by
pulling a quick release inside the tank. As already described
these tank fascines and the " fitments " necessary to fix
and release them were made by the Tank Corps Central
Workshops.

Before the infantry assembled for training a new tactics
had to be devised, not only to meet the conditions which
would be encountered but to fit the limitations imposed
upon the tank by it being able to carry only one tank fascine.
Once this fascine was cast it could not be picked up again
without considerable difiiculty.

Briefly, the tactics decided on were worked out to meet
the following requirements : "To effect a penetration of
four systems of trenches in a few hours without any type of
artillery preparation." They were as follows :

Each objective was divided up into tank section attack
areas, according to the number of tactical points in the
objective, and a separate echelon, or line, of tanks was
allotted to each objective. Each section was to consist of
three machines — one Advanced Guard tank and two In-
fantry tanks (also called Main Body tanks) ; this was
agreed to on account of there not being sufficient tanks in
France to bring sections up to four machines apiece.

The duty of the Advanced Guard tank was to keep down
the enemy's fire and to protect the Infantry tanks as they
led the infantry through the enemy's wire and over his
trenches. The allotment of the infantry to tanks depended
on the strength of the objective to be attacked, and the
nature of the approaches ; their formation was that of sec-
tions in single file with a leader to each file. They were
organised in three forces : trench clearers to operate with
the tanks ; trench stops to block the trenches at various
points, and trench supports to garrison the captured trench
and form an advanced guard to the next echelon of tanks
and infantry passing through.

142 THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

The whole operation was divided into three phases : the
Assembly, the Approach, and the Attack. The first was
carried out at night time and was a parade drill, the infantry
falling in behind the tanks on tape lines, connected with their
starting-points by taped routes. The Approach was slow
and orderly, the infantry holding themselves in readiness to
act on their own initiative. The Attack was regulated so as
to economise tank fascines ; it was carried out as follows. The
Advanced Guard tank went straight forward through the
enemy's wire and, turning to the left, without crossing the
trench in front of it, opened right sponson broadsides. The
Infantry tanks then made for the same spot : the left-hand
one, crossing the wire, approached the trench and cast its
fascine, then crossed over the fascine and, turning to the left,
worked down the fire trench and round its allotted objective ;
the second Infantry tank crossed over the fascine of the first
and made for the enemy's support trench, cast its fascine,
and, crossing, did likewise. Meanwhile the Advanced Guard
tank had swung round, and crossing over the fascines of the
two Infantry tanks moved forward with its own fascine still
in position. When the two Infantry tanks met they formed
up behind the Advanced Guard tank and awaited orders.

In training the infantry the following exercises were
carried out :

(i) Assembly of infantry behind tanks,
(ii) Advance to attack behind tanks,
(iii) Passing through wire crushed down by tanks,
(iv) Clearing up a trench sector under protection of tanks.
To enable them to work quickly in section single files
and to form from these into section lines, a simple platoon
drill was issued, and it is interesting to note that this drill
was based on a very similar one described by Xenophon in
his "Cyropsedia" and attributed to King Cyrus {circa 500 B.C.).
Whilst training was being arranged by the Tank Corps
General Staff the Administrative Staff was preparing for the
railway concentration, which was by no means an easy
problem.

The difficulties of concentrating a large number of tanks

TANK RAILWAY MOVES 143

in the area of operations was accentuated by the dispersion
of the Tank Corps and the shortage of trucks ; this shortage
was made good by collecting a number of old French heavy
trucks ; these, however, did not prove at all satisfactory as
they were too light. In spite of these difficulties the whole
of the units of the Tank Corps were concentrated in their
training areas by November 5.

In order to make the most of the available truckage and
the time attainable for infantry training, it was decided to
concentrate three-quarters of the whole number of tanks to
be used, i.e. twenty-seven train loads, at the Plateau station
by November 14 (Z— 6 days) ; to move these to their final
detraining stations on Z— 4, Z— 3, and Z— 2 days ; and to
move the remaining quarter, i.e. nine train loads, from the
training areas to the detraining stations on Z— 5 day. The
detraining stations selected were Ruyaulcourt and Bertin-
court for the 1st Brigade, Sorel and Ytres for the 2nd Brigade,
and Old and New Heudicourt for the 3rd Brigade. At all
these stations detraining ramps and sidings were built or
improved. In all, thirty-six tank trains were run, and ex-
cept for two or three minor accidents the move was carried
out to programme. This was chiefly due to the excellent
work of the Third Army Transportation Staff.

Supply arrangements were divided under two main head-
ings : supply by light railways and supply in the field by
supply tanks. The main dumps selected were at Havrin-
court wood for the 1st Brigade, Dessart wood for the 2nd,
and Villers Guislain and Gouzeaucourt for the 3rd Brigade,
A few of the items dumped were 165,000 gallons of petrol,
55,000 lb. of grease, 5,000,000 rounds of S.A.A., and 54,000
rounds of 6-pounder ammunition. Without the assistance
of .the light railways this dumping would hardly have been
possible. On November 30 a S.O.S. call for petrol was made
on Ruyaulcourt. A train was loaded, despatched 3'| miles,
and the petrol delivered in just under one hour. This is a
fair example of the magnificent work consistently carried out
by the Third Army light railways during the battle of
Cambrai.

144 THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

The Third Army plan of operations was as follows :

(i) To break the German defensive system between the
canal St. Quentin and the canal Du Nord.

(ii) To seize Cambrai, Bourlon wood, and the passages over
the river Sens6e.

(iii) To cut oft the Germans in the area south of the Sensee
and west of the canal Du Nord.

(iv) To exploit the success towards Valenciennes.

This operation, for its initial success, depended on the
penetration of all lines of defences, including the Masnii^res-
Beaurevoir line, which in its turn depended on the seizing
of the bridges at Masni^res and Marcoing.

The force allotted for this attack was — two corps of three
infantry divisions each ; the Tank Corps of nine battalions —
378 fighting tanks and 98 administrative machines ; a
cavalry corps, and 1,000 guns.

The attack was to be carried out in three phases. In the
first the infantry were to occupy the line Cr^vecoeur, Mas-
nitres, Marcoing, Flesquieres, canal Du Nord ; the leading
cavalry division was then to push through at Masniferes and
Marcoing, capture Cambrai, Paillencourt, and Pailluel (cross-
ing over the river Sensee), and move with its right on Valen-
ciennes ; whilst this was in progress the Ilird Corps, which
formed the right wing of the Third Army, was to form a de-
fensive flank on the line Cr^vecceur, La Belle Etoile, Iwuy ;
the cavalry were then to cut the Valenciennes-Douai Hne
and so facihtate the advance of the Ilird Corps in a north-
easterly direction. The second and third phases were to be
carried out by the IVth Corps, which formed the left wing of
the Third Army, and were to consist firstly in opening the
Bapaume-Cambrai road and occupying Bourlon and Inchy,
and secondly, in opening the Arras-Cambrai road and ad-
vancing on the Sens6e canal and so to cut off the German
forces west of the canal Du Nord.

The ground to be fought over consisted chiefly in open,
rolling downland, very lightly shelled, and consequently
most suitable to tank movement. The main tactical features
were the two canals which practically prohibited the forma-

GERMAN DEFENCES 145

tion of tank offensive flanks and so strategically were a dis-
tinct disadvantage to what was meant to be a decisive battle.
Between these two canals were two important features — the
Flesqui^res-Havrincourt ridge and Bourlon hill. A third
very important feature, known as the Rumilly-Seranvillers
ridge, ran parallel to and north of the St. Quentin canal
between Cr^vecceur and Marcoing ; without the occupation
of this ridge a direct attack from the south on Bourlon
hill could only take place under the greatest disadvantage.

The German defences consisted of three main lines of
resistance and an outpost line : these lines were the Hinden-
burg Line, the Hindenburg Support Line, and the Beaurevoir-
Masni^res-Bourlon line, the last being very incomplete. The
trenches for the most part were sited on the reverse slopes
of the main ridges, and consequently direct artillery observa-
tion on them from the British area was impossible. They
were protected by immensely thick bands and fields of wire
arranged in salients so as to render their destruction most
difficult. To have cut these bands by artillery fire would
have required several weeks bombardment and scores of
thousands of tons of ammunition.

The weather had been throughout November fine and
foggy, so much so that aeroplane observation had been next
to impossible. This foggy weather greatly assisted prepara-
tory arrangements by securing them from observation.

The artillery preparations were as follows: — Over 1,000
guns of various calibres were concentrated in the Third
Army area for the attack. None of these, however, were
permitted to register before zero hour. Briefly the follow-
ing was the artillery programme from zero hour on.

At zero the barrage was to open on the enemy's outpost
line ; it was to consist of shrapnel and H.E. mixed with
smoke shells. It was to move forward by jumps of approxi-
mately 250 yards at a time, standing on certain objectives
for stated periods. Simultaneously with this jumping bar-
rage smoke screens were to be thrown up on selected localities,
notably on the right flank of the Ilird Corps and on the
Flesqui^res ridge ; counter-battery work was to open and

146

THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

special bombardments on prearranged localities such as
bridgeheads, centres of communication, and roads likely to
be used by the German reserves were to take place.

Tank Corps reconnaissances were started as early as
secrecy would permit, but it was not until a few days before
November 20 that commanders were allowed to reconnoitre
the ground from our front-trench system. Meanwhile at the
Plateau station tanks were tuned up and tank fascines fixed.
All detrainments were carried out by night, the tanks being
moved up to their position of assembly under cover of dark-
ness. These positions were : Villers Guiglain and Gouzeau-
court for the 3rd Brigade, Dessart wood for the 2nd Brigade,
and Havrincourt wood for the 1st Brigade. At these places
tanks were carefully camouflaged.

DISTRIBUTION OF FIGHTING TANKS

Tank Bde.

rani
Bn.

Corps.

Divn.

Bde.

No. ol
Tanks.

Objective.

Exploit
towards —

Eemarks.

3rd Bde.

C

IV

12th

35th

24

4*

Blue

Cr6vecceur

Number of tanks
used for exploi-

>,

"

••

37th

12

2*

Brown

tation varied
according to con-

"

F

"

36th

24
4*

Blue

Masni^res

dition of units
after gaining

99

»»

"

36th

12
2*

Brown

Blue and Bro^vn
Lines.

9,

I

20th

61st

18

3»
12

Vacquerie

Crfivecoeur

*f

„

Blue

2»

•1

»»

>,

»

62nd

6
1*
18

Brown

A

60th

Blue

Canal, Mas-

3*

niires to

3*

Marcoing.

f»

»»

>,

"

6
1*
12

Brown

99

29th

,,

Rumilly to

2*

Nine wood

2nd Bde.

B

6th

16th

24

4*
12

2*

Blue

Marcoing.

»»

t*

,1

..

Brown

»

H

,,

71st

24

4*
12

2*

Blue

Nine wood

>r

*,

f»

»»

Brown

1st Bde.

D

III

51st

152nd

42

Blue

Fontaine

1st Bde. used all

f*

E

153rd

28

Flesquiires

Bourlon

wood,

Bapaume-

Cambrai
road

tanks in mechan-
ical reserve.

fff

62nd

186th

14

Brown

•»

G

"

185th

42

Havrincourt

Bourlon vil-
lage. Grain-
court

♦ In mechanical reserve, to replace breakdowns.

BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

November 20^.^ 1917.

Scale of Yards

NIGHT BEFORE THE BATTLE 147

The allotment of tanks to infantry units is given in the
table on page 146. Besides these, each Brigade had eighteen
supply tanks or gun carriers and three wireless-signal tanks.
Thirty-two machines were specially fitted with towing gear
and grapnels to clear the wire along the cavalry lines of
advance ; two for carrying bridging material for the cavalry
and one to carry forward telephone cable for the Third
Army Signal Service. The total number of tanks employed
was 476 machines.

On the night of November 17-18 the enemy raided our
trenches in the vicinity of Havrincourt wood and captured
some of our men, and, from the documents captured during
the battle, it appears that these men informed the enemy
that an operation was impending ; time wherein the Ger-
mans could make use of this was, however, so limited that
the warning of a possible attack only reached the German
firing line a few minutes before it took place.

The following night, that of the 19tli-20th, was broken
by a sharp burst of artillery and trench-mortar fire which
died away in the early morning, and at 6 a.m. all was still
save for the occasional rattle of a machine gun. A thick
mist covered the ground when at 6.10 a.m., ten minutes before
zero hour, the tanks, which had deployed on a line some
1,000 yards from the enemy's outpost trenches, began to move
forward, infantry in section columns advancing slowly
behind them. Ten minutes later, at 6.20 a.m., zero hour, the
1,000 British guns opened fire, the barrage coming down
with a terrific crash about 200 yards in front of the tanks
which were now proceeding slowly across " No Man's Land,"
led by Brigadier- General H. J. EUes, the Commander of the
Tank Corps, who flew the Tank Corps colours from his tank
and who on the evening before the battle had issued the
following inspiring Special Order to his men :

Special Order No. 6 '
1. To-morrow the Tank Corps will have the chance for

1 The statement made in the daily press that General Ellea' order ran —
" England expects every tank to do its damnedest," was a pure journalistic
invention and one in very bad taste.

148 THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

which it has been waiting for many months — to operate on
good going in the van of the battle.

2. All that hard work and ingenuity can achieve has been
done in the way of preparation.

3. It remains for unit commanders and for tank crews to
complete the work by judgment and pluck in the battle itself.

4. In the light of past experience I leave the good name
of the Corps with great confidence in their hands:

5. I propose leading the attack of the centre division.

Hugh Elles,
B.G. Commanding Tank Corps.

Nmjember 19, 1917.

The attack was a stupendous success ; as the tanks moved
forward with the infantry following close behind, the enemy
completely lost his balance and those who did not fly panic-
stricken from the field surrendered with little or no resis-
tance. Only at the tactical points was opposition met with.
At Lateau wood on the right of the attack heavy fighting
took place, including a duel between a tank and a 5'9 in.
howitzer. Turning on the tank the howitzer fired, shatter-
ing and tearing off most of the right-hand sponson of the
approaching machine, but fortunately not injuring its vitals ;
before the gunners could reload the tank was upon them and
in a few seconds the great gun was crushed in a jumbled
mass amongst the brushwood surrounding it. A little to
the west of this wood the tanks of F Battalion, which had
topped the ridge, were speeding down on Masnieres. One
approached the bridge, the key to the Rumilly-Seranvillers
position, upon the capture of which so much depended. On
arriving at the bridge it was found that the enemy had
already blown it up, nevertheless the tank attempted to
cross it ; creeping down the broken girders it entered the
water but failed to climb the opposite side. Other tanks
arriving and not being able to cross assisted the infantry
in doing so by opening a heavy covering fire. Westwards
again La Vacquerie was stormed and Marcoing was occupied.
This latter village had been carefully studied beforehand
and a definite scheme worked out as to where tanks should

FLESQUIERES 149

proceed after entering it. Difficult though this operation
was, each position was taken up and the German engineers
shot just as they were connecting up the demohtion charges
on the main bridge to the electric batteries.

In the Grand Ravin, which runs from Havrincourt to
Marcoing, all was panic, and from Ribecourt northwards the
flight of the German soldiers could be traced by the equip-
ment they had cast off in order to speed their withdrawal.
Nine wood (Bois des Neuf) was stormed, and Premy Chapel
occupied. At the village of Flesqui^res the 51st Division,
which had devised an attack formation of its own, was held
up ; it appears that the tanks out-distanced the infantry
or that the tactics adopted did not permit of the infantry
keeping close enough up to the tanks. As the tanks topped
the Crest they came under direct artillery fire at short range
and suffered heavy casualties. This loss would have mat-
tered little had the infantry been close up, but, being some
distance off, directly the tanks were knocked out the German
machine gunners, ensconced amongst the ruins of the houses,
came to life and delayed their advance until nightfall ; thus
Flesqui^res was not actually occupied until November 21.

In the village of Havrincourt some stiff fighting took place.
All objectives were, however, rapidly captured, and the
62nd Division had the honour of occupying Graincourt
before nightfall, thus effecting the deepest penetration
attained during the attack on this day. From Graincourt
several tanks pushed on towards Bourlon wood and the
Cambrai road, but by this time the infantry were too ex-
hausted to make good any further ground gained.

Meanwhile No. 3 Company of A Battalion had assisted
the 29th Division on the Premy Chapel-Rumilly line, one
section of tanks working towards Masnieres and another
co-operating with the infantry in the attack on Marcoing
and the high ground beyond. The third section attacked
Nine wood, destroying many machine guns there and at the
village of Noyelles, which was then occupied by our infantry.

Whilst these operations were in progress the supply tanks
had moved forward to their " rendezvous," the wireless-

150 THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

signal tanks had taken up their allotted position, one send-
ing back the information of the capture of Marcoing within
ten minutes of our infantry entering this village ; and the
wire-pullers cleared three broad tracks of all wire so that
the cavalry could move forward. This they did, and they
assembled in the Grand Ravin and in the area adjoining the
village of Masni^res.

By 4 p.m. on November 20, one of the most astonishing
battles in all history had been won and, as far as the Tank
Corps was concerned, tactically finished, for, no reserves
existing, it was not possible to do more than rally the now
very weary and exhausted crews, select the fittest, and patch
up composite companies to continue the attack on the
morrow. This was done, and on the 21st the 1st Brigade
supported the 62nd Division with twenty-five tanks in its
attack on Anneux and Bourlon wood and the 2nd Brigade
sent twenty-four machines against Cantaing and Fontaine-
Notre-Dame, both of which villages were captured.

November 21 saw, generally speaking, the end of any
co-operative action between tanks and infantry ; hence-
forth, new infantry being employed, loss of touch and action
between them and the tanks constantly resulted. Neverthe-
less on the 23rd a briUiant attack was executed by the 40th
Division, assisted by thirty-four tanks of the 1st Brigade ;
this resulted in the capture of Bourlon wood. The tanks
then pressed on towards the village ; the infantry, however,
who had suffered severe casualties in the capture of the wood,
were not strong enough to secure a firm footing in it.

This day also saw desperate fighting in the village of
Fontaine-Notre-Dame. Twenty-three tanks entered this
village in advance of our own infantry ; there they met with
severe resistance, the enemy retiring to the top stories of
the houses and raining bombs and bullets down on the roofs
of our machines. Our infantry, who were very exhausted,
were unable to make good the ground gained, consequently,
all tanks which were able to do so withdrew under cover of
darkness at about 7 p.m.

On November 25 and 27 further attacks were made by

GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACK 151

tanks and infantry on Bourlon and Fontaine-Notre-Dame
with varying success, but eventually both these villages
remained in the hands of the enemy. So ends the first
phase of the battle of Cambrai.

During the attacks which had taken place since Novem-
ber 21, tank units had become terribly disorganised, and
by the 27th had been reduced to such a state of exhaustion
that it was determined to withdraw the 1st and 2nd Brigades.
This withdrawal was nearing completion when the great Ger-
man counter-attack was launched early on the morning of
November 30.

To appreciate this attack, it must be remembered that at
this time the Ilird and IVth Corps were occupying a very
pronounced salient, and that all fighting had, during the
last few days, concentrated in the Bourlon area and had
undoubtedly drawn our attention away from our right flank
east of Gouzeaucourt. The plan of General von der Marwitz,
the German Army Commander, was a bold one, it was none
other than to capture the entire Ilird and IVth British
Corps by pinching off the salient by a dual attack, his right
wing operating from Bourlon southwards and his left from
Honnecourt westwards, the two attacks converging on Tres-
cault. Between these two wings a holding attack was to
be made from Masnieres to La Folic wood.

The attack was launched shortly after daylight on Novem-
ber 30, and failed completely on the right against Bourlon
wood. Here the enemy was caught by our artillery and
machine guns and mown down by hundreds. On the left,
however, the attack succeeded : firstly, it came as a sur-
prise; secondly, the Germans heralded their assault by lines
of low-flying aeroplanes which caused our men to keep well
down in their trenches and so lose observation. Under the
protection of this aeroplane barrage and a very heavy mortar
bombardment the German infantry advanced and speedily
captured Villers Guislain and Gouzeaucourt.

At 9.55 a.m. a telephone message from the Ilird Corps
warned the 2nd Brigade of the attack, but, in spite of the
fact that many of the machines were in a non-fighting con-

152 THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

dition, by 12.40 p.m. twenty-two tanks of B Battalion
moved off towards Gouzeaucourt, rapidly followed by four-
teen of A Battalion. Meanwhile the Guards Division recap-
tured Gouzeaucourt, so, when the tanks arrived, they were
pushed out as a screen to cover the defence of this village.
By 2 p.m. twenty tanks of H Battalion were ready, these
moved up in support.

Early on the morning of December 1, in conjunction with
the Guards Division and 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions,
the 2nd Brigade delivered a counter-attack against Villers
Guislain and Gauche wood. The western edge of the wood
was cleared of the enemy ; the tanks then proceeded through
the wood, where very heavy fighting took place. From the
reports received as to the large number of dead in the wood
and the numerous machine grnis found in position, it is clear
that the enemy had intended to hold it at all costs. Once
the wood was cleared the tanks proceeded on to Villers
Guislain, but being subjected to direct gun fire eventually
withdrew.

The counter-attack carried out by the 2nd Brigade greatly
assisted in restoring a very dangerous situation ; it was a
bold measure well executed, all ranks behaving with the
greatest courage and determination under difficult and un-
expected circumstances and amidst the greatest confusion
caused by the success of the German attack ; every tank
crew of every movable machine had but one thought,
namely, to move eastward and attack the enemy. This they
did, and it is a remarkable fact that, though at 8 a.m. on
(November 30 not one machine of the Brigade was in a fit
state or fully equipped for action, by 6 a.m. on the follow-
ing day no fewer than seventy-three tanks had been launched
against the enemy with decisive effect.

Thus ended the first great tank battle in the whole history
of warfare, and, whatever may be the future historian's
dictum as to its value, it must ever rank as one of the most
remarkable battles ever fought. On November 20, from a
base of some 13,000 yards in width, a penetration of no less
than 10,000 yards was effected in twelve hours ; at the Third

A NEW EPOCH IN WAR 153

Battle of Ypres a similar penetration took three months.
Eight thousand prisoners and 100 guns were captured, and
these prisoners alone were nearly double the casualties suffered
by the Ilird and IVth Corps during the first day of the battle.
It is an interesting point to remember that in this battle the
attacking infantry were assisted by 690 officers and 3,500
other ranks of the Tank Corps, a little over 4,000 men, or the
strength of a strong infantry brigade, and that these men
replaced artillery wire-cutting and rendered unnecessary
the old preliminary bombardment. More than this, by
keeping close to the infantry they effected a much higher
co-operation than had ever before been attainable with
artillery. When on November 21 the bells of London pealed
forth in celebration of the victory of Cambrai, consciously
or unconsciously to their listeners they tolled out an old
tactics and rang in a new — Cambrai had become the Valmy
of a new epoch in war, the epoch of the mechanical engineer.

12

CHAPTER XX

AN INFANTRY APPRECIATION OF TANKS

During the many battles and engagements in which the
Tank Corps took part many appreciative special orders and
letters were received from the Higher Commanders under
whose orders the Corps worked. These kindly words, always
appreciated, are apt sometimes to be regarded as the in-
evitable " good chits " which courtesy demands should be
addressed to good, indifferent, and bad alike after an opera-
tion has been successfully completed. Unsolicited testi-
monials, and especially such as are not meant for the eyes of
those praised, when they do, by chance, come under these
eyes, are regarded as more than mere " pats on the back,"
especially when they come from those who have fought along-
side the commended.

The following letter was written by an infantry officer
who took part in the battle of Cambrai, and addressed to a
personal friend neither in nor connected with the Tank
Corps, who, months later on, showed it to one who was.
Not only did this letter come as a pleasant and gratifying
surprise to all ranks of the Corps, for it was published as a
" Battle Note," ' but it shows such an exceptionally clear
insight into the value and possibilities of the tanks that, even
for this reason alone, it is worth publishing. Who the writer
was the Tank Corps never knew, but his sound judgment
and kindly appreciation stimulated amongst his readers that
high form of personal and collective pride which to soldiers
is known as " esprit de corps." It is on human documents
such as these, rather than on orders and instructions, that the

1 " Battle Notes " were issued from time to time by Tank Corps Head-
quarters to all tank crews. Their object was to stimtilate " esprit de corps
and moral." They were human documents for the most part, referring not
only to the tank but also to other arms.

164

MORAL EFFECT OF TANKS 155

moral of an individual or a unit grows strong, and by growing
strong places the entire Army one step nearer victory.
The letter reads as follows :

" I will first give you the opinion of one of my colonels.
In three years of fighting on this front, I have met no bat-
talion commander "to equal him in power of leadership,
rapidity of decision in an emergency, and personal magnetism.
I have met no man who would judge so justly what an in-
fantry soldier can and cannot do.

" He considers the tanks invaluable if properly handled,
either for the attack or in defence — but he realises, as I
think we all do, that until Cambrai, the tactical knowledge
shown in their employment was of the meanest order.

" One other valuable opinion I've obtained. We have
now with the Battalion a subaltern, a man of about thirty
— a very good soldier, a resolute, determined kind of fellow
who has seen a good deal of fighting. He commanded a
platoon in our — th Battalion in the big tank attack at
Cambrai and was in the first wave of the attack throughout.
He tells me that the tanks covering the advance of his bat-
talion functioning under ideal weather and ground conditions,
were handled with marked skill and enterprise in the capture
of the first two objectives covering an advance of about 3,500
yards, ^he moral effect of the support given by tanks on
the attacking infantry is very great. He says his men felt paoe,«t-c
the utmost confidence in the tanks and were prepared to
follow them anywhere?) (^he effect of the advancing line of
tanks on the enemy infantry was extraordinary. They
made no attempt whatever to hold their trenches, and either
bolted in mad panic or, abandoning their arms, rushed
forward with hands uplifted to surrender?) As long as the
advance of the tanks continued, i.e., over the enemy trench
system to a depth of from two to three miles, the total
casualties incurred by our — th Battalion (attacking in the
first wave) were four killed and five wounded, all by shell fire.
" After the fall of the second objective, the advance ceased
for some unexplained reason — (they were told some hitch
about Flesqui^res) — the attack seemed to lose purpose and
direction. Tanks on the flanks began coming back. The
battalion was ordered to attack five different objectives,
and before the necessary plans could be communicated to
subordinate commanders, orders were received cancelling

156 AN INFANTRY APPRECIATION OF TANKS

the previous instructions. In a word, chaos prevailed. The
afore-mentioned subaltern cannot speak too highly of the
work of the tank commanders — nothing could exceed their
daring and enterprise. He says he is absolutely convinced
that infantry, unsupported by artillery, are absolutely
powerless against tanks and that no belt of wire can be
built through which they cannot break an admirable passage
for infantry.

" Lastly, he makes no secret of the fact that it would
demand the utmost exercise of his determination and reso-
lution to stand fast and hold his ground in the face of an
attack by enemy tanks, carried out on the same scale as ours.
I may add that he is a big upstanding fellow, a fine athlete,
and afraid of nothing on two legs.

" I give you his opinion at some length, because they are
the ipsissima verba of a man qualified to speak, from personal
practical experience. Personally, I believe the tanks may
yet play the biggest r61e in the war, if only the Higher Com-
mand will employ them in situations where common-sense
and past experience alike demand their use. Two days
before the Hun attacked us at Bourlon wood we lost three
officers and some seventy gallant fellows trying to mop up
a couple of enemy M.G. nests — a bit of work a couple of
tanks could have done with certainty without the loss of a
man.

" In the situation described after the capture of the second
objective, why should there not have been a responsible
staff officer — G.S.0.1 say — right forward in a tank to size
up the situation and seize opportunity, the very essence of
which is rapid decision ? In the early days of the war, for-
getful of the lessons of South Africa, we put our senior officers
in the forefront of the battle — of late, the pendulum has
swung the other way — surely the employment of a tank for
the purpose outlined would enable us now to strike the
happy mean ?

r^In defence, as a mobile ' pill-box,' the possibilities of the
tank are great — any man who has led infantry ' over the
top ' knows the demoralising and disorganising effect of the
' surprise packet ' machine-gun nest — what more admirable
type of nest can be devised ? Continually changing posi-
tion, hidden from enemy aircraft by smoke and the dust of
battle, offering no target for aimed artillery fire'T)

" Half the casualties we suffer in heavy fighting after the

MACHINERY VERSUS MAN 157

initial attack come from the carrying parties winding slowly
in and out through barrage fire, bringing up ammunition to
the infantry, the Lewis and Vickers guns — all this could be
done much more rapidly, surely, with a minimum of loss, by
'tanks — for the future the tank should relieve tJie artillery
of all responsibility as regards wire-cutting. LXou know*
you can cross a belt of wire over which a tank has passed,
you hope you can pass through a wire belt on which the
artillery has played for a couple of days. As a business
proposition a tank at £5,000 will cut more wire in one journey,
even assuming it does nothing else, than 2,000 shells at £5
each, blazing away for a day — add the wear on the life of
the gunT]

" In attack, one of the most difficult problems of the
infantry is to get the Stokes guns far enough forward, with
sufficient ammunition, to come into action against machine
guns or strong points holding up the advance unexpectedly
— all this could be done by means of a tank with ease —
whilst not only could the small Stokes gun with a range of
500-600 yards be brought forward, but also the 6 in. Stokes
with a range of 1,200-1,600 yards by the same means, and
be brought into action firing from the tank.

" The tank has only one enemy to fear — the high-velocity
tank gun, firing aimed shots from forward positions. I
believe this danger can be minimised by means of escort
aeroplanes attached during an action to every tank, and
provided with smoke bombs to blind the gun position, if
unable to silence the gun by machine-gun fire or by means
of ordinary bombs heavily charged.

" I have tried to outline some of the more obvious uses
for which the tank is so admirably suitable. There is a well
of this information yet untapped, not in staff offices, but
in the minds of the platoon and company commanders who
have fought in the first waves of the attack with the tank,
who have seen the difficulties it has to overcome and how it
has met them or failed, and why. Nothing has yet been
produced in this war to equal the tank for doing by machinery
what has hitherto been done by men; nothing so well fitted
to economise our man-power and reduce the appalling
wastage which has hitherto characterised our efforts in
attack, and with gain instead of loss in efficiency.

" We want thousands of tanks, both hght and heavy,
ranging from two miles to eight miles per hour, armed with

158 AN INFANTRY APPRECIATION OF TANKS

M.G.s, armed with Stokes guns, unarmed and fast- travelling
for transport of gun teams to emergenpy tactical positions,
and lastly, a stall' of trained minds to define the tactics of
the tank — to refute criticism based on ignorance, to collect,
classify and investigate all available information and sug-
gestions, so that like an aeroplane^ — every ' new edition ' of
the tank is an improvement on the last.

" I have written at some length, but the subject is big
and attractive enough to be my excuse."

CHAPTER XXI

THE TANK COEPS TRAINING CENTRE

Early in February 1916 a Conference was held at the War
Office, to decide as to the training of the personnel for the
tank units it was now decided to raise. At this Conference,
Lieutenant- Colonel Swinton and Lieutenant- Colonel R. W.
Bradley, D.S.O., were ordered to be present.

At this time, Lieutenant- Colonel Bradley was Comman-
dant of the Motor Machine Gun Training Centre at Bisley,
and was in the position to select suitable men for the new
arm.

The number of men required for the first 150 tanks was
estimated at 1,500, or ten men for each machine, and 150
junior officers. This personnel was obtained as follows : 600
men were transferred from the reserves in training at the
Motor Machine Gun Training Centre and 900 were obtained
by special enlistment. Thirty officers were transferred from
the Motor Machine Gun Section, fifteen were detailed by
G.H.Q., France, and the remainder were obtained by calling
for volunteers from imits in England and by special selec-
tion from Cadet units.

For purposes of secrecy the new formation was " tacked
on " to the Machine Gun Corps and was christened with the
terrific name of : " Special Armoured Car Section Motor
Machine Gun Section." A month later it became known as
the Heavy Section Machine Gun Corps.

The recruiting was very successful, and this was largely
due to the untiring energy of Mr. Geoffrey Smith, editor of
The Motor Cycle, who spared neither time, trouble, nor
money in getting the men.

Towards the end of March the training camp was moved
from Bisley to BuUhouse farm, and at this camp all ele-

169

160 THE TANK CORPS TRAINING CENTRE

mentary training was carried out, recruits being taught drill,
the ways of miUtary life, and the Vickers and Hotchkiss
machine guns as well as the Hotchkiss 6-pounder.

The first estabhshment issued by the War Office provided
for 10 companies of 10 tanks each, but within a fortnight
this was changed to 15 companies of 10 tanks each, the
companies being grouped in 3 battalions. A little later this
organisation, at the request of G.H.Q., France, was again
changed to one of 6 companies of 25 tanks each.

With a further view of ensuring secrecy it was arranged
by Lieutenant- Colonel Swinton that no tanks should be
sent to Bisley, but that a training ground, far removed from
prying eyes, should be secured. Steps were at once taken to
find such a ground, and eventually Thetford in Norfolk was
visited and Lord Iveagh's estate at Elveden selected. The
necessary training ground here was taken over and was
known as " the Elveden Explosives Area " ; and round it
at 200 yards intervals were posted groups of sentries of the
Royal Defence Corps.

During the early part of April a certain amount of grum-
bHng on the part of specially enlisted men occurred at Bisley.
They had been induced to join an Armoured Car Service, and
for six weeks they had not even seen the wheel of a car.
They were asked to exercise a little patience and were pro-
mised a surprise. At Elveden the surprise was revealed to
them, and when they had got over their astonishment on
seeing the first Mark I tank approach them they set down
to work with a will, which, it is an honour to record, was
never abandoned by all ranks of the Tank Corps from this
day on to the conclusion of the war.

The camp at Elveden was placed just outside the " Ex-
plosives Area " and no one was allowed to enter the area
without a special permit. Companies, before they proceeded
overseas, however, spent their last three weeks within the
area. As soon as this necessary ground had been taken
over, three pioneer battaUons were brought to Elveden
Camp and a complete series of trenches was dug on a front
of a mile and a quarter, and to the depth of two miles. The

ELVEDEN CAMP ' 161

plan of this work was laid out by Major Tandy and Captain
Martel, both RE. officers.

Unfortunately, on account of delay in delivery of tanks,
constructional defects and repeated requests from G.H.Q.,
France, that all available tanks and crews should be sent out
to France for the September operations on the Somme, little
use was made of these trenches, for tactical training. Machine-
gun firing from tanks with ball ammunition was, however,
freely carried out, and also 6-pounder practice which, un-
fortunately, was much hampered by danger restrictions.

The tank drivers were all drawn from the A.S.C., and the
711th Company A.S.C. was formed to include these men,
the workshops, and the M.T. personnel of the Heavy Section.
The officer in command of this company and in charge of
all mechanical instruction and driving was Major H. Knothe,
D.S.O., M.C.

By the end of May the last company had completed its
training at Bisley and had moved to Elveden ; the head-
quarters, having some time prior to this, moved to this place
and established itself in the stables of Lord Iveagh's mansion
and in the new almshouses in Elveden village.

By the beginning of July training was sufficiently ad-
vanced to give the first tank demonstration ever held.
Twenty tanks took part in it and advanced in line followed
by infantry against a section of the instructional trench
system. The demonstration was a great success and many
notable persons witnessed it, including Mr. Lloyd George and
Sir William Robertson.

This demonstration was shortly afterwards followed by
a second at which the King attended. His Majesty was
most anxious that his projected visit should be kept secret,
but as it was nevertheless necessary to make certain pre-
parations it was given out at the camp that a very distin-
guished Russian general was about to visit the tanks. The
identity of the Russian general was, however, discovered by
the bulk of the men before the demonstration was concluded,
much to their pleasure and amusement.

At the beginning of August Lieutenant- Colonel Brough,

162 THE TANK CORPS TRAINING CENTRE

C.M.G., visited G.H.Q., France, to ascertain the tactics it was
proposed to employ as regards tanks. Unfortunately his visit
was fruitless, for no ideas apparently existed on the subject.
Shortly after his return instructions were received to dis-
patch the tank companies to France, and to decide on this
a conference was held at which the following officers were
present : Major-General Butler, Brigadier- General Burnett-
Stuart, both from G.H.Q., France ; Lieutenant- Colonel S win-
ton, Lieutenant-Colonel Bradley, and Lieutenant- Colonel
Brough. At this Conference it was decided to mobilise the
companies at Elveden and to dispatch them overseas by half
companies. The first to leave was C Compa,ny and the
second D Company, which, respectively, were under the
commands of Majors Holdford-Walker and Summers.

Towards the end of August Colonel Swinton was instructed
to send over to France a staff officer, but as the establish-
ments only allowed of a commander and one staff captain,
and as the latter was a very junior officer, Lieutenant-Colonel
Brough was sent over. Shortly after his arrival he found it
necessary to wire home for motor-cars, clerks, etc., for he
had been ordered to take over command of the units in
France. Captain Kingdon was thereupon sent out to assist
him, and two clerks and a motor-car were also dispatched.
By these means were extemporised an advanced headquarters,
the original headquarters of the Heavy Branch remaining
in England and never proceeding overseas.

In October 1916, as already related in Chapter VI,
Bovington Camp, Wool, was selected as the new training
centre. Here E, F, G, H, and I Battalions were raised and
trained during 1916-1917, and J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, and
R during 1917-1918, the last battalion, the 18th, saihng for
France in September 1918.

In 1917, to cope with the steadily increasing number of
tank units of all descriptions, Worgret Camp, Wareham, and
Lulworth were taken over, the Depot Reserve Unit being
established at the former and the Gunnery Camp at the
latter place.

The first schools to be formed were the Tank Drivers'

TANK SCHOOLS 163

School, the 6-Pounder School, and the Lewis Gun School,
but by degrees, as the Tank Corps grew, these developed
until at the close of the war the following schools had been
established :

Tank Drivers and Maintenance School.

Tank Gunnery School (6-Pounder and Machine Gun).

Tank Reconnaissance School.

Tank Signal and Pigeon School.

Camouflage School.

Revolver School.

Gas School.

Tank Compass School.
In July 1918 the preparations set on foot to double the
Tank Corps for 1919 threw a great deal of work on to the
Training Centre. Thirteen British, three Canadian, and one
New Zealand Battalion were to be raised, as well as a number
of subsidiary \mits. In August, in spite of shortage of
infantry reinforcements, an allotment, given precedence over
all the other arms, of 4,500 men, was made to the Tank Corps
Training Centre, so that the raising of the above new units
might forthwith begin ; besides this, nearly half a million
poiuids worth of buildings were sanctioned without estimates
being called for, so important was it now considered that not
a day should be lost in the Tank Corps preparations for 1919.
By the date of the armistice about half the building pro-
gramme was finished, and eight British and one Canadian
battalion had been raised.

The following is a summary of the total number of tank
units and reinforcements raised and trained at the Training
Centre between November 1916 and November 1918.

British Tank Battalions
Canadian Tank Battalions
American Tank Battalions
Gun Carrier Companies
Tank Supply Companies .
Tank Advanced Workshops
Tank Salvage Companies .
American Tank Salvage Companies
Various Headquarters . .

Total Tank Units raised

22 (5th to 26th).

1 (1st Canadian Tank Battalion).
3 (301st, 302nd, and 303rd).

2 ( 1st and 2ud).
5 (1st to 5th).

2 (Nos. 4 and 5).

1 (No. 3).

2 (306th and 317th).

41

164, THE TANK CORPS TRAINING CENTRE

The whole of the above units, with the exception of eight
British and one Canadian Battalion, were sent out to France
prior to the armistice.

In all, some 21,000 officers and men passed through the
Training Centre, 14,000 in formed units, and 7,000 as rein-
forcements ; besides these, 950 cadets were trained. In
October 1918 the Training Centre, which from one camp at
Bovington had grown to include Worgret, Lulworth, and
Swanage Camps, had on its strength in all ranks and service
approximately 16,000 men.

The time required wherein to raise and train a new Tank
Battalion averaged four months. The system of instruction
adopted from November 1916 onwards was to start with a
very thorough individual training and then to pass the
recruits through the various schools, leaving collective and
tactical training to be carried out in France.

Recreational training played an important part in the
above instruction, and the Training Centre gained a con-
siderable reputation in the Southern Command for efficiency
in sports and games.

In the expansion which commenced on September 1, 1918,
30 per cent, of the personnel for each new unit was sent to
the Training Centre from the trained Tank Corps personnel
in France, and this trained personnel, together with the
increased numbers of training tanks and other improved
facilities, would have gone far to effect a more efficient and
rapid training of the units, before their departure overseas,
than heretofore.

Besides raising and training new imits and reinforcements
the Tank Corps Training Oentre was intimately connected
with much of the experimental work, armament design, and
the fittings of all types of tanks from the introduction of the
Mark V and Medium " A" tanks onwards. The following
were the main improvements initiated.

The adaptation of the Hotchkiss machine gun to the tank.
The invention of the Palmer machine-gun battle-sight.
The invention of fire-control instruments.
During the spring and summer of 1917 various experiments

INVENTIONS 165

were carried out at Wool to arrive at the best method of
demolishing and removing wire entanglements. Eventually
grapnels were decided upon and were used with great success
in November at the battle of Cambrai.

The use of cloud smoke from tanks was also originated at
the Training Centre, and with the aid of an invention of the
late Commander Brock was eventually adopted for all tanks,
and was used on several occasions with effect during the
summer and autumn operations of 1918.

For purposes of general interest and education as well as
for the conversion of the mechanical heathen, a considerable
number of demonstrations, showing the power of tanks and
their co-operation with infantry, were given to officers of the
War Office, Commands and Schools throughout 1918. On
October 25 this year. His Majesty the King visited Wool to
witness one of these, and paid the Tank Corps Training Centre
the great honour of inspecting the various battalions, and
welcomed many of the men of the British and American
units assembled by walking amongst them and conversing
freely with them.

CHAPTER XXII

THE TANK SUPPLY COMPANIES

Tanks, like every other arm of the Army, require a highly
organised supply service, and being cross-country machines
they must be served by machines of similar powers of loco-
motion. This was probably realised before tanks were
originally dispatched to France in 1916, but, during the
battles of the Somme, Ancre, and Arras, it was not possible
to organise any system of cross-country supply on account
of every machine being required for either fighting or train-
ing purposes. In February 1917 the first organisation for
cross-country supply waS formulated. This consisted in allot-
ting two supply tanks to each company, but the delay in
the arrival of Mark IV machines prevented this organisation
taking form until May 1917.

Supply tanks were first employed at the battle of Messines,
the Mark I tanks, which had now been discarded as fighting
machines, being used for this purpose. These machines were
fitted with large soft steel sponsons made at the Tank Corps
Central Workshops. During this battle they were not much
used owing to the limited scope of the operations.

Between June 1917 and the opening of the Third Battle
of Ypres each tank battalion received six supply tanks,
two for each company, but during this battle they did not
prove a success on account of the appalling conditions of
the ground, the sponsons continually becoming wedged in
the shell-holes, which necessitated much digging out to
relieve them.

Just prior to the opening of this battle the fu-st of the
gun-carrier tanks arrived in France, and was dispatched to
Flanders and attached to the XVIIIth Corps for experiment.

166

INFANTRY CAIiRIER COMPANIES 167

Later on others followed, until by the end of the year forty-
four of these machines had been received.

The idea of the gun-carrier was that of mechanical artil-
lery, the machine being really a mechanical gun mounting
capable of carrying a 60-pounder or 6 in. howitzer. Its total
shell capacity without the gun was 200 6 in. shells, weigh-
ing approximately 10 tons.

Considering the difficulties of the ground very good work
was done by the gun-carriers during the Ypres operations,
several hundreds of tons of ammunition being carried for-
ward as well as a few 60-pounders.

In September a new method of supply was experimented
with ; this consisted in towing behind any type of tank three
sledges connected with the roof of the machine by a cable.
At the battle of Cambrai this method proved a great success,
and not only were tank supplies hauled forward but also
telegraph cable and bridging material.

During the autumn and winter of 1917 much careful
thought had been devoted both in France and England to
the question not only of tank supply but of being able to
carry forward infantry, particularly machine-gunners, in
armoured carrier tanks ; the result of this was the design of
a large carrier tank known as the Mark IX and the raising
of a new unit known as an " Infantry Carrier Company."

These carrier units were first formed on February 1, 1918.
The first two companies consisted mostly of Royal Engineer
personnel, and the next three of infantry. The standard of
the personnel was very good, about 60 per cent, having
already seen service overseas. The 1st and 2nd Companies
proceeded to France about the middle of May, the remaining
three arriving in June and July.

The organisation of each of these companies was as
follows :

A company headquarters and four sections, each section
consisting of six Mark IV supply tanks, or tenders, as they
were sometimes called. The object of these companies was
laid down in Tank Corps Standing Orders as follows :

168 THE TANK SUPPLY COMPANIES

" The Tank Supply Company is a unit of Brigade Troops
for the carriage of supphes, from the point where wheeled
vehicles cease, to battalions. The responsibility for main-
taining battalion supplies rests with Brigade Headquarters.
The duties of the Brigade Supply Officer will in no way
be shared by the O.C. Tank Supply Company. The Tank
Supply Company will be used as a mobile reserve of supplies
under the immediate control of Brigade Headquarters."

These supply companies were never used for carrying for-
ward infantry, as the Mark IX tank did not materialise until
October 1918 ; they proved, however, of the greatest use
during all the tank operations of the last year of the war.

During June the two Gun Carrier Companies were defin-
itely converted into Supply Companies and were attached
to the 3rd and 5th Brigades. At the battle of Hamel, on
July 4, four of these machines did excellent work, carrying
forward between twenty and twenty-five tons of R.E. material
and dumping this a few hundred yards behind the final
objective within half an hour of this objective being cap-
tured. These machines were driven by four officers and
sixteen men, and had the material they transported been
brought up by carrier parties at least 1,200 men would have
been required ; in man-power alone these four machines thus
saved 1,184 soldiers, or approximately two infantry bat-
talions at battle strength.

On arrival in France the 1st and 2nd Supply Companies
were posted to the 1st and 4th Tank Brigades, and the 3rd,
4th, and 5th were sent to Blingel Camp, in the Bermicourt
area, where good facilities existed for tank driving and main-
tenance. At about the end of July the 3rd and 5th Com-
panies were equipped with Mark IV supply tanks, and
female Mark IV machines fitted with a sledge equipment.

At the beginning of August the distribution of the various
supply units was as follows :

No. 1 Gun Carrier Comptmy . • , . 5th Tank Brigade.

No. 2 Gun Carrier Company . . . 3rd Tank Brigade.

No. 1 Tank Supply Company . . .1st Tank Brigade.

No. 2 Tank Supply Company . . . 4th Tank Brigade.

DESTRUCTION OF NO. 1 G.C. COMPANY 169

No. 3 Tank Supply Company . . . Blingel Camp.

No. 4 Tank Supply Company . . ,. 2nd Tank Brigade.

No. 5 Tank Supply Company . . Blingel Camp.

All these companies, less No. 1 Tank Supply Company and
No. 2 Gun Carrier Company, took part in the battle of Amiens.

No. 1 Gun Carrier Company suffered an unfortunate
experience on August 7. It had moved forward to an
orchard on the western side of Villers Bretonneux, each of
its machines being loaded up with explosives of various kinds.
A shell filed from a German battery in the vicinity of Chipilly
set fire to one of the camouflage nets, and the result of this
was that though six out of the twenty-two machines got
away the remaining sixteen were blown up, the explosion
being terrific.

The 3rd Tank Supply Company was allotted to the
Canadian Corps to carry forward infantry supplies such as
grenades, S.A.A., and drinking water. The female Mark IV.
tanks equipped with sledges were attached to the Canadian
Engineers for the purpose of bringing forward material in
order to repair the bridges over the Luce river. Owing to
weak cables this operation proved a failure, most of these
machines breaking down before they had covered a mile.

The policy which was first adopted of attaching a section
of six supply tanks to each battalion did not work well, the
Company Headquarters was usually left in the air, and soon
lost touch with its sections. In order to remedy this defect
from August 9 onwards company commanders were in-
structed to estabhsh " report centres " well in advance of
the battlefield. These centres were " baited " by sending
the mails there ; to obtain news from home it was conse-
quently necessary for section commanders to send runners
in to fetch them; by this means touch with the Company
Headquarters was automatically maintained.^

In the battles north of the Somme, commencing on

' From this it must not be deduced that the officers and men of the Tank
Corps would not obey orders, but that the officer in command of the Supply
Companies was a student of human nature. Why order when a simple act
like this will do the ordering ?
13

170 THE TANK SUPPLY COMPANIES

August 21, much useful work was carried out, the tank-
drivers having by now become thoroughly expert in driving
and maintenance. The sections were now properly brigaded,
each company being looked upon as a unit and not as a mere
headquarters for four separate units. Proper telephonic
communication was now established between the sections
and the company, and consequently much time was saved
not only within the company itself but by the various units
it was supplying.

During all the battles onwards from August 8 to the
capture of Landrecies the work carried out by the Tank
Supply Companies and the Gun Carrier Companies was not
only useful but of great importance, as in many places the
roads were too bad for mechanical transport. When they
were not required to bring forward tank supplies they were
engaged in carrying every sort of ammunition and engineer
stores, especially through zones which were harassed by
machine-gun fire and in which, had infantry carrying parties
been used, many lives would have been lost.

When the possibilities of these companies became realised,
infantry commanders were continually asking for their assis-
tance, preference being given to the gun-carriers on account
of their greater capacity for light stores.

The Gun Carrier Companies, besides doing excellent work
as infantry supply companies, kept both field and heavy
artillery well supplied. No. 2 Gun Carrier Company carried
out some very successful heavy sniping by carrying for-
ward a 6 in. howitzer, and by moving it from place to place
during the night it both harassed and puzzled the enemy.
Besides this, several successful gas attacks were carried out
with the aid of the gun-carriers, which transported the pro-
jectors and bombs to positions over country which wheeled
transport could not have negotiated. By using these
machines it was possible to get in three or more " shoots "
in one night and to retire out of the danger zone before dawn.

If in the days of the great Napoleon, when a soldier went
into action with frequently less than twenty balls in his
pouch and a couple of spare flints, an Army " crawled on its

GERMAN SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES 171

stomach," how much more does it crawl to-day ! When the
lessons of the war are sorted and tabulated in order of im-
portance, very near the top, if not at the top itself, will be
found that of " road capacity," in other words, that victory
rests with the side which can maintain the broadest com-
munications. To widen existing roads directly by enlarg-
ing them or to construct new roads are both works of great
labour ; they absorb not only time and men but also trans-
port of every kind, especially in a country like north-eastern
France, where suitable stone for road-metalling is practically
non-existent. To do so indirectly is best accomplished by
a cross-country tractor, that is, by a machine which can
move on or off a road. With such a machine roads can be
indefinitely widened ; paradoxically they cease to exist, for
they are no longer necessary.

The tank is, first of all, a cross-country tractor, and it is
curious that none of the contending nations appear to have
appreciated this until well towards the end of the war, in
spite of the fact that the reason for the general slowness
of the advances which followed any initial success was nearly
always due to inadequacy of supply.

By the end of March 1918 the German attack " petered
out " for want of supplies ; by the end of May it again did
likewise for a similar reason. Had the Germans possessed
on March 21 and May 27 5,000 to 6,000 efficient cross-
country tractors, each of which could have carried five tons
of supplies, all the hosts of brave men, which the United
States of America could have poured into France, could not
have prevented a separation of the British and French
Armies from being effected. Had such a separation taken
place it is impossible to say what the result might not have
been ; but what is possible to say is that had the Germans
" scrapped " half their guns and replaced them by cross-
country tractors they would have gone nearer winning the
war than they did.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

With the close of the battle of Cambrai the British Army
abandoned the offensive, which had been initiated on
April 9, and a period of passive defence was developed. At
this time all three Tank Brigades had assembled at or near
Bray-sur-Somme, where extensive hutments existed and
where the old devastated area offered excellent facilities for
training. Towards the end of December a request was made
by the Tank Corps to establish at Bray a large tank and
infantry school, so that co-operation between these two arms
might be secured; further, as artillery ranges were near at
hand it was felt that a complete tactical unity of action
between tanks, infantry, artillery, and aeroplanes could now
be established : besides this. Bray formed an excellent
strategical centre to the Somme area should the Germans
at any time launch an attack between the Oise and the
Scarpe.

Early in January 1918 orders were, however, received
that in place of remaining assembled at one spot the Tank
Corps was to form a defensive cordon stretching from about
Roisel to a little south of Bethune — a frontage of some sixty
miles. In February this line was taken up, tank uiaits being
distributed as follows :

Fifth Army, 4th Tank Brigade . . 1st Bn. Doingt wood.

,, ,, H.Q. Templeux La Fosse 4th Bn. Buire wood.

„ ,, . . . . . 5th Bn. Buire wood.

Third Army, 2nd Tank Brigade . . 2nd Bn. Velu wood.

„ „ H.Q. Thilloy . . .8th Bn. Fremicourt.

,, ,, . . . . . 10th Bn. Fremicourt.

3rd Tank Brigade 6th Bn. Wailly.

G.H.Q. Reserve, H.Q. Henincourt . . 3rd Bn. Bray.

,, ,, 9th Bn. Bray.

,, ,, 5th Tank Brigade . . 13th Bn. Bray (unequipped).

H.Q. Bray,

172

MARCH 21, 1918 173

First Army, 1st Tank Brigade . . 7th Bn. Boyefflea.

„ ,, H.Q. Boia d'Olhain . . 11th Bn. Bois des Alleux.
„ „ 12th Bn. Bois de Verdrel.

It will be seen that by this date the Tank Corps had grown
from three to five brigades, in all thirteen battalions ;
machines, however, were short, and the total fighting strength
in tanks at this time was only 320 Mark IV and 50 Medium
A Tanks (Whippets) fit for action.

The general plan was that tank units should co-operate
with Army and Corps reserves in the deliberate counter-
attack against tactical points in what was known as the
battle zone, a belt of ground running several miles in rear
of and parallel to the forward or outpost zone ; no retire-
ment from this zone was to be contemplated. Prior to
March 20 the weather had been fine, the ground was good
and a thorough reconnaissance had been made of some 1,500
square miles of country ; supply dumps had been formed
and communication by wireless, cable, dispatch rider and
runner established throughout the units of the Tank Corps.

On March 21 at 5 a.m. the German bombardment opened
on a front roughly running from La Fere to the river
Scarpe, with a break round the old Cambrai battlefield. The
first tanks to be engaged were three forward sections of the
4th Battalion north-west of St. Emilie, north-west of
Peiziere, and at Geninwell copse. These came into action
about noon and fought most gallantly against heavy odds.
The first section, supported by two companies of the 2nd
Royal Munster Fusiliers, recaptured a battery of guns near
Esclairvillers wood ; later on in the day this section assisted
in the counter-attack of the Connaught Rangers on Ronssoy
wood ; meanwhile the second section cleared the bridge
and cutting north-east of Peiziere. Whilst these actions
were being fought in the Fifth Army area, on the Third Army
front one company of the 8th Tank Battalion co-operated with
the 57th Infantry Brigade in a counter-attack on the village
of Doignies. Zero hour was fixed at 6.40 p.m., but the attack
was delayed and it was almost dark before the objective
was reached. The village was cleared of the enemy, but on

174 THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

account of the darkness it was never completely occupied by
our own men and eventually passed back into German hands.

On the following day, March 22, an Advanced Tank Corps
Headquarters was opened at Hamencourt, a mile east of
Doullens, in order to facilitate the battle liaison duties of the
staff. On this day a most successful and gallant action was
fought by the 2nd Tank Battalion in the neighbourhood of
Vaux Vraucourt and Morchies. At 2.45 p.m. orders were
issued for the 2nd Tank Battalion to advance and counter-
attack the enemy, who had broken through the line Vaux
Vraucourt-Morchies and was pushing forward towards
Beugny. Two companies of infantry were detailed to sup-
port the tanks, but as eventually these could not be spared
the tanks went into action alone. The counter-attack began
to develop around Beugny at about 4.30 p.m. Concentrated
artillery fire was brought to bear on the tanks, but in spite
of this they advanced amongst the enemy, put a field battery
out of action, and by enfilading several trenches full of Ger-
mans inflicted heavy casualties on them. The enemy was
eventually driven back behind the Vaux Vraucourt-Morchies
position, which was then reoccupied by our infantry. Thirty
tanks took part in this action ; seventeen of these were hit
and 70 per cent, of casualties suffered by their crews. Heavy
though these losses were the enemy had suffered severely,
and more important still his plan of action was upset.

On the Fifth Army front the penetration effected by the
enemy caused a rapid withdrawal of our troops, and to cover
this the 4th and 5th Tank Battalions moved eastwards on
either side of the Cologne river, which joins the Somme at
Peronne ; the village of Epehy was cleared of the enemy and
much valuable time was gained at Roisel and Hervilly by
tank counter-attacks. The German infantry would not
face the tanks, and broke whenever they saw them ad-
vancing.

On March 23 no tank action was fought on the Third
Army front. On the Fifth Army front, the 1st Tank Bat-
talion, which had not yet been engaged, took up a position
on the reverse slope west of Moislains with machine-gun

TANK LEWIS-GUN UNITS 175

posts pushed out on the forward slope. The enemy, however,
would not attack the line of tanks but worked round their
flanks — the 1st Tank Battalion eventually withdrew towards
Maricourt. The 4th and 5th Tank Battalions covered the
withdrawal of our infantry on either side of the Cologne river,
and by the evening ten tanks of the 4th Battalion had con-
centrated at Clery and those of the 5th Battalion at Brie
bridge, three miles south of Peronne. Shortly after their
arrival here this bridge was blown up and the whole of the
5th Battalion tanks, except three, had to be destroyed for
lack of petrol. Of these three, one succeeded in crossing the
bridge after the explosion and the remaining two effected
their escape via Peronne. All three were lost on the next day.

The following day, the 8th Tank Battalion was engaged
in a most successful action south-east of Bapaume. Two
companies advanced against Bus and Barastre, while a third
covered the 6th Infantry Brigade's consolidation of a line
of trenches. All tanks came into action and inflicted heavy
casualties at close range, the enemy was checked for a con-
siderable time and the 2nd Division was thus enabled to
extricate itself from a most difficult position with little loss.
The enemy was in force, but as was always the case, he
would not face the tanks, and if he could not work round
their flanks his advance halted until his guns could be brought
up to deal with them.

It was on March 24 that a considerable number of Lewis-
gun sections were first formed during this battle out of
tank crews who had lost their machines. The 9th Tank Bat-
talion handed its machines over to the 3rd Battalion and
moved out as a Lewis-gun Battalion from Bray to assist
the 35th Division and the 9th Cavalry Brigade in the defence
of Montauban and Maricourt. The instructional staff of the
Tank Driving School which, in February, had moved from
Wailly to Aveluy, was rapidly formed into Lewis-gun sec-
tions, and with such tanks as were fit for action held a defen-
sive line from Fricourt to Bazentin, covering the Albert-
Bapaume road. The 5th Tank Battalion, south of the
Somme, now without machines, was also formed into a

176 THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

Lewis-gun Battalion as crews were collected. This battalion
in particular carried out most gallant and useful work,
forty-five Lewis-gun groups being kept continuously in
action. Several of these groups lost touch with their head-
quarters, but continued fighting with any troops in their
vicinity until March 31.

On March 25 two companies of the 10th Tank Battalion
came into action at Achiet-le-Grand and Achiet-le-Petit.
At the first-named village, with the 42nd Division, one of
these companies attacked the enemy, who, in large numbers,
had broken through near Bapaume, and delayed his advance
for several hours. By this date no fewer than 113 Lewis-gun
groups had been posted in the La Maisonette — Chaulnes, Bray
and Pozieres — Contalmaison — ^Montauban — Maricourt areas,
and during the night twenty more were sent out to hold the
crossings over the river Ancre between Aveluy and Beau-
court. At this time Grandecourt and Miraumont were already
in the enemy's hands and the position was raost precarious.
These groups held these crossings for several days and in-
flicted heavy casualties on the enemy each time he attempted
to force a passage.

March 26 is an interesting date in the history of the Tank
Corps, for, on the afternoon of this day, the Whippet Tanks
made their debut. Twelve of these machines, belonging to
the 3rd Tank Battalion, moving northwards from Bray were
ordered to advance through the village of Colincamps to
clear up the situation, which was very obscure. About 300
of the enemy were met with advancing on the village in
several groups ; these were taken completely by surprise, and
on seeing the rapidly moving tanks fled in disorder, making
no attempt at resistance. The Whippets then patrolled
towards Serre and after dispersing several strong enemy
patrols withdrew, having suffered no losses in tanks or per-
sonnel. This action was particularly opportune, as it checked
an enveloping movement directed against Hebuterne at a
time when there was a gap in our line.

Save for a few minor tank engagements on March 27, 28,
29, 30, and 31, so far as the Tank Corps was concerned, the

w

Hi

B

EH

i„ _ ,_„•' tjyjt^a. -v* . . --

THE GREATEST LESSON OF THE WAR 177

Second Battle of the Somme had come to an end, and,
before closing this chapter, it is of interest to deduce the
main lessons learnt from these the first defensive operations
the Tank Corps had ever taken part in.

On March 21, tanks were too scattered ever to pull their
fuU weight. To hit with them as they then were distributed
was like hitting out with an open hand in place of a clenched
fist, and when the blow fell there was no time to hit and
simultaneously close the fingers. Out of a total of some
370 tanks only 180 came into action. The continual with-
drawal of tanks by infantry formations in place of moving
them forwards amongst the enemy resulted in many machines
being worn out before they had fired a shot ; this was a
faulty use of an offensive weapon.

The two main lessons learnt were : firstly, that speed and
circuit are the two essentials for an open-warfare machine ;
and secondly, one which has already been mentioned but
which is so important that it is worth mentioning again,
namely, that no great Army, such as the Germans massed
against us on March 21, can depend on road and rail supply
only. Consequently unless these means of supply are
supplemented by cross-country mechanical transport, that
is, transport which is independent of road and rail, the
greatest success will always be limited by the endurance of
the horses' legs. Men without supplies are an incumbrance,
and guns and machine guns without ammunition are mere
scrap iron. Had the Germans after March 26 been able to
supply their troops mechanically across country, there can
be little doubt that their advance would have been continued,
for we could not have stopped it, and they might well have
won the war. Fatigue may stop an advance gradually, but
lack of supplies will stop it absolutely — this is the second and
greatest lesson of the Second Battle of the Somme, if not
of the entire war.

CHAPTER XXIV

TANK SIGNALLING ORGANISATION

In battle, co-operation between the commander and his
troops, and between the troops themselves, depends very
largely on the efficiency of the signal organisation. In a
formation such as the Tank Corps, the chief duty of which
was close co-operation with the infantry, the necessity for a
simple though efficient communication was fully realised by
Colonel Swinton as far back as February 1916, when he
wrote his tactical instructions for the use of tanks, extracts
from which have been given in Chapter IV. Though time
for instruction was limited, special wireless apparatus was
prepared and men trained in its use, but as orders were
received not to equip the tanks with this apparatus they
were dispatched to France in August 1916 without it.

On September 11 the first instructions relative to tank
signals were published with the Fourth Army operation
orders ; they read as follows :

" From tanks to infantry and aircraft :

Flag Signals

Red flag . . . Out of action.

Green flag . . . Am on objective.

Other flags . . . Are inter-tank signals.

Lamp Signals

Series of T's . . Out of Action.

Series of H's . . . Am on objective.

A proportion of the tanks will carry pigeons."

The use made of these signals is not recorded, and no time
was available, until after operations were concluded in
November, wherein to organise more efficient methods.

178

MEANS OF COMMUNICATION 179

In January 1917 steps were taken to introduce into the
Heavy Branch some system of signaling in spite of the many
difficulties, the chief of which were :

(i) No personnel other than the tank crews could be
obtained.

(ii) At most only two months were available for training.

(iii) Neither the Morse nor semaphore codes could be read
by infantry.

The whole question, after careful consideration, was fully
dealt with in " Training Note No, 16," already mentioned.

The entire system of field signalling was divided under
three main headings :

(i) Local. — Between tanks and tanks and tanks and the
attacking infantry ; also between the Section commander
and the transmitting station, should one be employed.

(ii) Distant. — Between tanks and Company Headquarters,
selected infantry and artillery observation posts, balloons,
and possibly aeroplanes.

(iii) Telephonic. — Between the various tank headquarters
and those of the units with which they were co-operating.

The means of signalling adopted were as follows :

For local signalling coloured discs — red, green, and white.
One to three of these signals in varying combinations could
be hoisted on a steel pole. In all thirty-nine code signals
could thus be sent, e.g. white = " Forward " ; red and white
= " Enemy in small numbers " ; red, white, green = " Enemy
is retiring." These codes were printed on cards and distri-
buted to tank crews and to the infantry. Besides these
" shutter signals " were also issued, but as they entailed
both the sender and reader understanding the Morse code
they were seldom used. The chief local system of com-
munication was by runner, and it remained so until the end
of the war.

Distant signalling was carried out by means of the Aldis
daylight lamp, and as message-sending was too complicated
a letter code was used, thus — a series of D.D.D. . . D's
meant " Broken down," Q.Q.Q. . . Q's " Require supplies."
Generally speaking, until November 1917, distant signalling

180 TANK SIGNALLING ORGANISATION

was carried out by pigeons, which, on the whole, proved
most rehable as long as the birds were released before sunset ;
at a later hour than this they were apt to break their journey
home by roosting on the way.

In February 1917 Captain J. D. N. Molesworth, M.C., was
attached to the Heavy Branch to supervise the training in
signalling. This officer remained with the Tank Corps
until the end of the war, and in 1918 was promoted to the
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and appointed Assistant Director
of Army Signals in 1918. Under his direction classes in
signalling were at once started and considerable progress was
made in the short time available before the battle of Arras
was fought.

In this battle the various means of communication laid
down were put to the test of practical experience. The tele-
phone system was described by the 1st Tank Brigade Com-
mander as " heart-breaking." " Many times it was totally
impossible to hear or to be heard when speaking to Corps
Headquarters at a distance of five to six miles." Pigeons
were most useful, the Aldis lamp was found difficult, and
many messages were sent from tank to tank, and in some
cases to infantry with good results, by means of the coloured
discs.

The experiences gained pointed to the absolute necessity
of allotting sufficient personnel to battalions for purposes of
signalling and telephonic communication.

The result of these experiences was that in May the first
Tank Signal Company was formed, the personnel being pro-
vided from those already trained in the tank battalions, to
which a few trained Signal Service men were added. The
formation of this company was shortly followed by that
of the 2nd and 3rd Companies, the 2nd Company taking
part in the battle of Messines.

In May the first experiments in using wireless signalling
from and to tanks were carried out at the Central Workshops
at Erin, various types of aerials being tested. In July a
wireless-signal officer was appointed to the Tank Corps
and he at once set to work to get ready six tanks fitted

SIGNALLING AT CAMBRAI 181

with wireless apparatus for the impending Ypres opera-
tions.

These signal tanks, when completed, were allotted to the
Brigade Signal Companies, and in isolated cases, during the
battle, came into operation, but in the main they did not
prove a great success on account of the extreme difficulty of
the ground. Eventually these tanks were placed at different
points along the battle front and were used as observation
posts by the Royal Flying Corps, wireless being employed
to inform the anti-aircraft batteries in rear whenever enemy's
aeroplanes were seen approaching our lines. Many wireless
messages were sent and much experience was gained by means
of this work.

By the end of September, on account of signalling equip-
ment being obtained, it was possible to carry out training
on much better lines than heretofore. This was fortunate,
for it enabled intensive signalling training to be carried out
prior to the battle of Cambrai. During this battle a much
more complete system of signals was attempted, and wire-
less signalling proved invaluable in keeping in touch with
rear headquarters and also in sending orders forward. On
the first day of this battle a successful experiment in laying
telegraph cable from a tank was carried out, five tons of
cable being towed forward by means of sledges, the tank
carrying 120 poles, exchanges, telephones, and sundry
apparatus from our front line to the town of Marcoing.

The signalling experiences gained during the battle of
Cambrai proved of great value, the most important being
that it became apparent that it was next to useless to at-
tempt to collect information from the front of the battle
line. Even if this information could be collected, and it was
most difficult to do so, it was so local and ephemeral in im-
portance as to confuse rather than to illuminate those who-
received it. Collecting points about 600 yards behind the
fighting tanks were found to be generally the most suitable
places for establishing wireless and visual signalling stations.

At these stations officers were posted to receive messages
and to compile them into general reports, which from time

182 TANK SIGNALLING ORGANISATION

to time were transmitted by wireless to the headquarters
concerned.

After the battle of Cambrai the 4th Brigade Signal Com-
pany was formed. This Company was the first one to have
a complete complement of trained Signal Service officers and
men allotted to it. It carried out exceptionally good work
during the operations in March 1918.

At this time the complete organisation of signals in the
Tank Corps raay be shown graphically as follows :

A. D. Signals

(Technical Instructions, Posting of Officers and Men,
Control of all Signal Stores)

Ist Tank Brigade

2nd

1

3rd

1
4th

Wireless

1
Repau'

Headquarters

Signal Company

(Tank Bde. Signals

Coys).

Section.

Section.

(administration,

discipline.

stores, erection

and mainten-

ance of lines.

W.T. Stations).
1

1 1

.a

1
§ .

1

i.

1

a . o

i i

->-l 01
-3 g

'■% "

.+i

Disp
iders

ructi

rty.

II

+3 ^

il

s

.2 a

Ik

02

g T3

2 «

h
H

Early in 1918 the type of wireless apparatus as used in
the signal tanks was changed to C.W. (continuous wave) sets,
these being more compact, and greater range of action being
possible with the small aerials the tanks had to use.

Eight of these C.W. sets were issued to each Brigade
Signal Company, and training in their use was carried out
up to the commencement of the August operations. On
the whole they proved a success and justified their adoption,
but as experience was gained it became evident that some-
thing better and stronger was wanted.

GROUP SIGNAL COMPANIES 183

In September a scheme was devised" whereby the entire
signal organisation of the Tank Corps was to be recast so as
to fit in with the new tank group system, which was then
being worked out for 1919. This organisation included
Group Signal Companies and much larger Brigade Signal
Companies than had hitherto been used, and the main type
of apparatus that this organisation was to use was wireless.
Only one set of wireless to each tank company was to be
employed actually in tanks, the other stations being carried
forward in box cars so as to render them more mobile.

The importance of signalling in a formation such as the
Tank Corps cannot be over-estimated, and this importance
wiU increase as more rapid-moving machines are introduced,
for, unless messages can be transmitted backwards and
forwards without delay, many favourable opportunities for
action, especially the action of reserves, will be lost. Making
the most of time is the basis of all success, and this cannot
be accomplished unless the commander is in the closest
touch with his fighting and administrative troops and
departments.

CHAPTER XXV

THE FRENCH TANK CORPS

The existence of the French Tank Corps was due to the untiring
energy of one man — Colonel (now General) Estienne. On
December 1, 1915, this officer, then commanding the 6th
French Divisional Artillery, addressed a letter to the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the French Armies in which he expressed
his firm belief that an engine of war, mechanically propelled
and protected by armour, capable of transporting infantry
and guns, was the solution to the deadlock on the Western
Front. The idea of the machine in Colonel Estienne's mind
was the result of his work throughout the year 1915, during
which period he had seen Holt tractors in use with British
artillery units.

On December 12, 1915, Colonel Estienne was given an
interview at G.Q.G., the French General Headquarters,
where he set forth his theory of mechanical warfare. On
the 20th of this month he visited Paris to discuss the details
of his machine with the engineers of the Schneider firm ;
but it was not until February 25, 1916, that the Department
for Artillery and Munitions decided to place with this firm
an order for 400 of these armoured vehicles.

Meanwhile, Colonel Estienne returned to his command,
the 3rd Corps Artillery, before Verdun, but still kept in un-
official touch with the manufacturers. Two months later
he learned that a similar number of cars, but of a different
pattern, were to be made by the St. Chamond works. These
machines were of a heavier type with a petrol-electric drive.

In June 1916 the French Ministry of Munitions, which had
meanwhile been created, decided on an experimental and
instructional area at Marly-le-Roi. Later on, a depot for the
reception of stores was established at Cercottes. On Sep-

184

GENERAL ESTIENNE 185

tember 30, Colonel Estienne was promoted to the rank of
General and gazetted " Commandant de I'Artillerie d'Assaut
aux Armees " and was appointed the Commander-in-Chief's
delegate to the Ministry of Munitions in matters connected
with tanks ; he thus became the official connecting link
between the armies in the field and the constructional
organisation of the Ministry.

In October a training centre was established at Champlieu
on the southern edge of the forest of Compi^gne, and it was
here that the first tank units were assembled on December 1 ,
1916. During the succeeding months, Schneider (see
Plate IV) and St. Chamond (see Plate IV) machines con-
tinued to arrive, and training was carried out at this camp
until the German offensive of 1918.

On June 20 a tank establishment was sent to the Ministry
of Munitions and was approved of a month later. This
establishment comprised four Schneider battalions and four
St. Chamond battalions, and the creation of two tank train-
ing centres besides Champlieu, namely, Martigny and Mailly
Poivres.

Meanwhile, General Estienne in June visited England,
and having seen the British Mark I machine was convinced
of the necessity of a lighter tank. This tank was the result
of an idea he had in mind, namely, of producing on the
battlefield waves of skirmishers in open order ; each skir-
misher to be clad in armour, and to be armed with a machine
gun which could be used with uninterrupted vision in all
directions. The weight of armour necessitated an auxiliary
means of motion ; this, in its turn, gave rise to the necessity
for another man to drive the machine. These views General
Estienne laid before the Renault firm in July 1916, and at
the same time he urged the Ministry to accept his proposed
light tank, but without success. Complete designs were,
however, prepared and on November 27 General Estienne
was able to propose to Marshal Joffre the construction of a
large number of light tanks for future operations and to
inform him of the existence of the design of such a machine ;
in fact, 150 had already been ordered as " Command " tanks
14

186 THE FRENCH TANK CORPS

for the heavy battaUons (see Plate VI). Still the Ministry
was not convinced, and it was not until further trials had
taken place that, in May 1917, an order for 1,150 was
authorised. This number was increased in June to 3,500,
when a new sub-department of the Ministry of Munitions
known as " Le Sous-Direction d'Artillerie " was formed to
deal with the production and design of tanks.

In spite of all General Estienne's endeavours, he was still
experiencing from certain adherents of the old school, the
thinkers in " bayonets and sabres," that unbending opposi-
tion which had proved so formidable an antagonist to the
progress and expansion of the British Tank Corps, and it
was not until the battle of Cambrai had been fought, in
November 1917, that the French Ministry of Munitions was
finally convinced of the value of the tank. Opposition now
ceased, and in order to accelerate the output, the firms of
Renault, Schneider, and Berliet were all engaged in the
manufacture of light chars d'assauts.

In December 1917 it was decided to form 30 light tank
battalions of 72 fighting and 3 wireless signal machines
each. Of these 30 battalions 27 were in the field and the
remaining 3 undergoing their preliminary training at Cer-
cottes on the date of the signing of the armistice.

The operations of the French Tank Corps may be divided
into three well-defined periods :

(i) First period, 1917, birth and infancy of the Schneider
and St. Chamond types.

(ii) Second period, first half of 1918, adolescence and
maturity of the Schneider and St. Chamond, and the infancy
of the Renault type.

(iii) Third period, second half of 1918, adolescence and
maturity of the Renault machine.

During the first period three battles were fought :

On April 16, 1917, the French tanks fought their first
engagement, taking part in the operations of the Fifth
French Army in the attempted penetration on the Chemin
des Dames. Eight Schneider companies were employed.
Three of these were to operate between the Craonne Plateau

Plate IV

TKENCH SCHNEIDER TANK.

.«> i -_b1£r-j^eiJK

FRENCH ST. CHAMOND TANK.

180]

ST. CHAMOND AND SCHNEIDER TANKS 187

and the Miette, and five between the Miette and the Aisne.
The former companies failed to get into action and suffered
heavy losses from the enemy's artillery, which from the
heights of the Craonne plateau commanded their advance.
The latter companies succeeded in crossing the second and
third lines of the enemy's defences, but in spite of their
remaining for a considerable time in front of the infantry
these troops could not follow owing to the enemy's heavy
machine-gun fire. At nightfall the tank companies were
rallied, having sustained serious losses in personnel and
materiel. Bodies of infantry had been specially detailed to
escort the tanks and prepare paths for their advance, but
their training had been limited and their efforts were in-
effectual.

On May 5 one St. Chamond and two Schneider companies
took part in a hurriedly prepared operation with the Sixth
Army. The Schneider companies led the infantry in a
successful attack on Laffaux hill, and of the sixteen St.
Chamond tanks detailed for the action only one crossed the
German trenches.

Between May and October preparations were made by
the Sixth French Army fqr an attack on the west of the
Chemin des Dames, and for this attack infantry were trained
with the tanks at Champlieu and special detachments,
known as troupes (Taccompagnement, were instructed in the
ways and means of assisting the tanks over the trenches.

The attack, which became known as the battle of Mal-
maison, was fought on October 23. Five companies of tanks
took part in it under the orders of Colonel Wahl, who had
recently been appointed to command the Artillerie d'Assaut
with the Sixth Army. This command was the origin of
what later became a Tank Brigade Headquarters, which
corresponded with a Group Headquarters in the final
organisation of the British Tank Corps.

In this battle the Schneider company operated with
success, but the St. Chamond machines were a failure, only
one or two reaching the plateau. On the 25th the St.
Chamonds were used again.

188 THE FRENCH TANK CORPS

Generally speaking, it was considered that the French
heavy tanks had justified their construction, nevertheless
many stiU doubted their utility when the victory of Cambrai,
on the British front, dispelled all doubts in the French mind.

The second period now opened and defensive reconnais-
sances were undertaken along the French front in view of
the expected German offensive.

In March 1918 all available tanks were concentrated
behind the front of the Third French Army as counter-attack
troops, and in this capacity took part in the following minor
operations, which were chiefly undertaken to recapture
features of local tactical importance : on April 5 at Sau-
villers ; on April 7 at Grivesnes ; on April 8 at Senecat
wood, and on May 28 at Cantigny in co-operation with
American troops.

Following the great blow struck at the junction of the
British and French Armies in March the German General Staff
decided to attack the French on May 27. It would appear that
this attack was at first intended only to secure the heights
south of the river Vesle, but that by the 29th, owing to its
astonishing initial success, it was decided to push it forward
with the ultimate intention of capturing Paris and so ending
the war before America could develop her full strength. In
support of this intention there is evidence that a council of
war was held in the recaptured area at which the Kaiser,
Crown Prince, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were present
and at which it was decided to exploit the success gained to
its utmost, not, however, losing sight of the original plan,
which was to include the capture of Reims. This offensive
may be considered to have worn itself out by June 4, on
which date the Germans had developed a salient forty kilo-
metres deep on a forty kilometres front. The old capital
of France, however, remained in French hands and its
occupation denied to the German forces holding the salient
a most needed line of supply.

On June 9 the attack was extended, being directed against
the Third French Army between Noyon and Montdidier.
Behind this Army four heavy tank battalions had been

JULY 15, 1918 189

assembled. The first and second lines soon fell into the
enemy's hands, and the French troops, which had been
detailed for counter-attack, were rapidly absorbed in the
defence. On the 10th reinforcements were hurried forward,
and on the 11th General Mangin launched his tank and
infantry counter-attack. This battle continued until the
13th, and in spite of the many difficulties 111 out of the 144
tanks assembled started at zero hour. Losses in machines
were heavy and about 50 per cent, of their crews became
casualties, but in spite of this and the fact that the tanks
rapidly outdistanced the infantry, a heavy blow was in-
flicted on the enemy, whose offensive definitely broke down.

In the action of June 11 the Schneider and St. Chamond
tanks reached the zenith of their career. From now onwards,
though they continued to be fought, they gradually ceased
to be used as units, becoming mixed with Renault machines
until finally, in October 1918, the two remaining mixed bat-
talions were armed with British Mark V star tanks ; these
two battalions, however, never took the field.

In order to stop the enemy's onrush on May 27, two
battalions of Renault tanks were hurried up by road to the
north-eastern fringes of the forest of Villers-Cotterets, and
on May 31 they made their debut, two companies co-operat-
ing with colonial infantry on the plateau east of Cravangon
farm. From this date on to June 15, these two battalions
continued to act on the defensive with tired troops ; never-
theless they succeeded in preventing a further advance of
the German Armies. This closes the second period.

During the first fortnight of July the 3rd and 5th Renault
Battalions were moved to the battle area, the former being
attached to the Fifth French Army, south of Dormans, and
the latter to the Tenth. These machines came into action
on the 15th, 16th, and 17th of the month.

On July 15 the Germans launched their final great attack
of the war, the blow falling between Chateau-Thierry and
Reims. The French Armies involved in this battle were
holding the following sectors :

(i) The Tenth Army, between the Aisne and the Ourcq.

190 THE FRENCH TANK CORPS

(ii) The Sixth Army, between the Ourcq and the Marne.

(iii) The Fifth Army, between the Marne and Reims.

(iv)' The Fourth Army, east of Reims.

The warning order to concentrate his units was received
by the G.O.C., French Tank Corps, on July 14. At that time
the G.O.C. Tenth French Army had at his disposal five heavy
battalions and three light, and the Fifth and Sixth French
Army respectively now received one heavy and three light
battalions. The total number of tank battalions available
was, therefore, seven heavy battalions and nine light ones.

The main attack was to be made by the Tenth French
Army, whilst the Sixth and Fifth Armies were to intervene,
when the time was ripe, in order to harry the enemy in a
retirement which would be inevitable if the attack of the
Tenth Army was successful. The entire operation was to
be based on tanks, which were to be engaged to the last
machine. As this was the greatest French tank battle
fought during the war it is interesting to enter, in some
detail, into the operations of the tanks allotted to the French
Tenth Army.

On July 14, when orders were issued for the concentration
of tanks on the Tenth French Army front, Colonel Chede-
ville, commanding the 2nd Tank Brigade, was with the
Third French Army. He had at his disposal three St.
Chamond battalions, the 10th, 11th, and 12th, two Schneider
battalions, the 3rd and 4th, and one complete Light Brigade
comprising the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Renault battalions, and the
1st Schneider battalion. Of these the first five were in the
First and Third French Army areas, and had suffered severely
in the counter-attack of June 11. Having received his
orders. Colonel Chedeville at once assembled his battalion
commanders and explained to them the situation. At 6 p.m.
a further conference was held at which the proposed sectors
of attack were allotted for reconnaissance. These recon-
naissances were completed by 6 p.m. on the following day,
and on them was based " Army Operation Order No. 243,"
in which tank units were allotted as follows :

DISTRIBUTION OF FRENCH TANKS

1st Corps

191

3rd Heavy Tank Battalion

(27 tanks).

Allotted to 153rd Division.

12th Heavy Tank Battalion

(30 tanks)
11th Heavy Tank Battalion

(30 tanks)
4th Heavy Tank Battalion

(48 tanks)
1st Heavy Tank BattaUon

(48 tanks)

XXth Corps

Allotted to 2nd American Division.

„ ,, 2nd American Division.

„ ,, Moroccan Division.

„ „ 1st American Division.

XXXth Corps

Allotted to 38th Division.

10th Heavy Tank Battalion
(24 tanks)

In Army Reserve in the region of V illers-Cotterets — Fleury

1st Light Tank BattaUon (45

tanks)
2nd Light Tank Battalion (40

tanks)

3rd Light Tank Battalion (45
tanks)

The assembly positions from north to south of the various
units were as follows :

3rd Heavy Tank Battalion
12th Heavy Tank BattaUon
11th Heavy Tank Battalion

4th Heavy Tank BattaUon
1st Heavy Tank BattaUon

10th Heavy Tank Battalion
1st Light Tank Battalion

2nd Light Tank BattaUon

3rd Light Tank BattaUon

Bavine south-west of Montigny-Lengrain.

Ravine north of Mortefontaine.

Two Companies Bavine Longavesne and

Lepine farm, 1 Company ravine 1 kilo-
metre north of Soucy.
Northern fringes of the forest of Villers-

Cotterets south-east of Vivieres.
Maison Forestiere, 200 metres north of the

railway on the road from Villers to

Soissons.
Cross-roads south-east of the Cordeliers

cross in Villers- Cotterets forest.
Northern edge of Villers- Cotterets forest,

south-west of Vivieres, ready to attack

in the wake of the Moroccan Division.
Northern edge of forest south-west of

Vivieres ready to follow 2nd American

Division.
St. George's cross, ready to support either

the 48th Division or the Xlth Corps.

192 THE FRENCH TANK CORPS

Owing to the failure of the Military Transportation
Authorities great delay was occasioned in the arrival of
several units, and in some cases tanks had to be left behind.
Generally speaking, detraining stations were not far enough
forward ; this resulted in the 1st and 3rd Light Battalions
arriving late at their destinations.

During the night of July 17-18, the various units pro-
ceeded to their starting-points in rear of their respective
lines of attack.

3rd Heavy Tank Battalion .-> Bandry-Saconin et Breuil-Vauxbuin.

153rd Division . . ./ "^

11th Heavy Tank Battalion .-i

12th Heavy Tank Battalion . vCutry — Missy aux Bois Ploisy.

Ist American Division . .)

4th Heavy Tank Battahon . |g^ j,.^^^^ Aigle-Chaudun-Villemontoire.

Moroccan Division ./

1st Heavy Tank Battalion .\Chavigny — Beaurepaire Forest — Vierzy —

2nd American Division ./ Tigny.

10th Heavy Tank Battalion . -i Longpont — Villers Helen — Le Plessier

38th and 48th Divisions ./ Huleu.

The attack was launched at 4.35 a.m. in a slight fog which
accentuated its surprise. There was no artillery bombard-
ment. At 7.30 a.m., owing to the difficulties in communica-
tion and the rapidity of the advance, the Light Tank Bat-
talions in Army reserve were placed at the disposal of the
XXth and XXXth Corps in order to support the Divisions
which had penetrated the deepest.

In this attack the enemy's resistance was not unusually
stubborn and the tanks and infantry advanced to a con-
siderable depth without difficulty. Several tanks of the
12th Heavy Battalion fell out by the way, but those of the
10th succeeded beyond expectation in negotiating the diffi-
cult ground in the neighbourhood of Longpont. Of the
Renault battalions only the first came into action, being
launched at 7 p.m. in an attack on Vauxcastille ravin in
which it succeeded in leading the infantry forward to a
depth of three to four kilometres.

Of the 324 tanks which were concentrated in the Tenth
French Army Sector, 225 were engaged on July 18. Of these

BATTLE OF SOISSONS

July le*:^ I9i8.

^ Scale^ of Yards

2000 4000 6000

JULY 18, 1918 193

102 became casualties, 62 being put out of action by artil-
lery fire. In personnel the losses were about 25 per cent, of
the effectives engaged.

On July 19, composite units were formed and 105 machines
took part in this day's fighting, which consisted in divisional
attacks on limited objectives launched at various hours
during the day. By now the enemy's resistance had in-
creased so much that several of the tank battalions
suffered heavily. The 3rd Heavy Battalion had, by the
end of the day, lost all its remaining tanks save two, but in
sustaining these casualties it had pushed the line forward
to the Chaussee Brunehaut. In the 12th Heavy Battalion
only one machine reached its final objective. In spite of
this severe resistance the attack was a great success. Of the
105 tanks operating fifty were hit by shell fire, and casualties
amongst crews totalled up to 22 per cent, of the personnel
engaged.

On the following day only small local counter-attacks were
carried out; in these thirty-two tanks took part, of which
seventeen were hit and no less than 52 per cent, of their
crews became casualties.

On July 21 the XXth Corps carried out a prepared attack,
the first objective being the line Buzancy — eastern edge of
Concrois wood — Hartennes wood, and the second the line
of Chacrise. The attack was launched without artillery
preparation and the villages of Tigny and Villemontoire were
captured, but later on retaken by the enemy. During this
day's fighting 100 tanks were engaged, of which thirty-six
were hit ; losses in personnel amounted to 27 per cent, of
effectives.

On the evening of the 21st it was decided to withdraw
all tanks into Army reserve so that they might refit for a
projected attack on the 23rd. This attack was launched at
5 a.m., the XXth and XXXth Corps taking part. The chief
characteristic of this day's fighting was that the attack was
made against an enemy occupying a defensive position
supported by a very strong force of artillery. The result of
this was that no fewer than forty-eight tanks out of eighty-

194 THE FRENCH TANK CORPS

two were hit. It, however, must be remembered that during
the six succeeding days of battle the tank units, attached
to the Tenth French Army, had exhausted themselves, having
practically fought to the last machine and last man. On
the evening of the 23rd they were withdrawn in Army re-
serve, and three days later were placed in G.H.Q., reserve.

Meanwhile the Sixth French Army had conformed to the
requirements of the main attack. The tank units of this
Army were, on the evening of July 14, placed under the
orders of Commandant Michel ; they comprised the follow-
ing battalions :

503rd Renault Regiment : 7th, 8th, and 9th Battalions.

13th St. Chamond Battalion.

On July 15, company commanders reconnoitred the front
of attack, the tanks meanwhile being got ready for entrain-
ment. On July 18 all units were in position with the in-
fantry units to which they had been allotted, as follows :

7th Light Battalion . . .2 Companies to the 2nd Division.

8th „ „ ... 3 ,, „ 47th

9th „ „ ... 1 „ ,, 164th

2 „ „ 63rd

13th Heavy Battalion . . 1 „ ,, 47th

2 Companies in Army reserve.

The 2nd and 47th Divisions were in the Ilnd Corps, whilst
the 63rd and 164th Divisions were in the Vllth Corps.

At zero hour plus thirty minutes the tanks left their
starting-points. The 7th and 8th Light Battalions operated
effectively in the capture of the heights west of Neuilly St.
Front and hill 167. The attack of No. 325 Company of
the 9th Light Battalion, operating with the 47th Division,
was brilliantly executed north of Courchamps.

In the evening the tanks rallied, the attack being con-
tinued with all available machines on the following morning.

As a general rule a section of five tanks was affiliated to
each attacking battalion. This policy continued to the end
of the operations on July 26, when the regiment was with-
drawn to rest, worn out more by " trekking " than by
fighting. The casualties in this sector were extremely light.

When the front of the attack, launched by the Germans,

BATTLE OF SOISSONS 195

on July 15, became known to the French Higher Command,
a Light Regiment of tanks, consisting of the 4th and 6th
Battahons, was hurriedly dispatched from the Sixth French
Army area to the Fourth Army east of Reims. The 5th
Battalion engaged one company with the 73rd Infantry
Division of the Sixth' French Army in the recapture of
Janvier wood, south of Dormans, on July 15, and two com-
panies on July 16 and 17, in " mopping up " in the direction
of Bois de Conde, east of Chateau-Thierry.

When it was realised that the German attack east of
Reims had failed, the 4th and 6th Battalions were hurriedly
transported by road, between July 16 and 19, south of the
Marne, south-west of Reims, to take part in local counter-
attacks. These attacks were entrusted to the Ninth French
Army, which had taken over command of all French troops
south of the Marne, and had at its disposal the 4th, 5th, and
6th Light Tank Battalions, and two companies of heavy
tanks, which had been rapidly sent up by train from St.
Germaine between Epernay and Reims.

Two sections of the 4th Light Battalion were engaged on
July 18 with two battalions of the 7th Infantry Regiment ;
two on July 20, with the 97th and 159th Regiments ; and
one on the 19th, with the 131st Division — all in the neighbour-
hood of the Bois de Leuvrigny south of the Marne. Later,
on July 23, sections of the 4th Battalion were employed
with British troops — the 186th Infantry Brigade in the
attack on Marfaux and with the 56th and 60th Battalions
of the chasseurs- a-pied at Connetreuil, whilst, on the same
date, two sections of the 6th Battalion attacked with units
of the 15th British Division between Espilly and Marfaux,
and two more were employed unsuccessfully with the 37th
Infantry Regiment against Fauants farm.

So ends the account of the tank actions in the battle of
Soissons.

This great victory, from a tank point of view, had a stu-
pendous influence on succeeding operations, owing to :

(i) The eagerness with which Infantry Commanders now
clamoured for tanks.

196 THE FRENCH TANK CORPS

(ii) The speeding up of the formation and training of new
tank battalions.

From this date on, battalions of Renault tanks became
available at the rate of one a week ; this resulted in tired
battalions being speedily replaced by fresh ones, consequently
they were never so completely worn "out as was the case in
the British Tank Corps, which only received two fresh
battalions between August and November 1918, one of
which arrived too untrained ever to go into action.

The operations from now on will be very briefly described,
as space does not permit of elaboration. It is, however,
of interest that these tank actions should be enumerated,
for they show that, without the assistance of the tank, a
deadlock would have re-occurred.

On August 1, 45 French tanks took part in an engage-
ment at Grand Rozoy. Then came the great British tank
attack of August 8, in which the First and Tenth French
Armies co-operated, 110 French tanks taking part on this
day and the following, 80 advancing with the infantry a
distance of 18 kilometres on the south of the Roye-Amiens
road, whilst 30 made a 5-kilometre advance near Montdidier.
Between August 16 and 18 the attack developed west of
Roye; here 60 Renault and 32 Schneider machines were
engaged ; co-operation with the infantry was, however,
difficult on account of the broken nature of the old battle-
field across which the attack was now being pushed.

The next operation was a continuation of the Tenth
Army's offensive ; it took place between the Oise and the
Aisne, beginning on August 20, and being continued inter-
mittently up to and including September 3. On the 20th
and 22nd, 12 Schneider, 28 St. Chamond, and 30 Renault
tanks were engaged north of Soissons.

During the week commencing August 28, three Light Bat-
talions advanced five kilometres between the Aisne and the
Aillette, 305 machines being employed at different times
during these operations.

The next operation in which tanks were engaged was the
cutting off of the St. Mihiel salient, French tanks being

TANKS FOR SALONIKA 197

used with the Second French and American Armies. During
the two^days' fighting, September 12 and 13, some 140 tanks
took part in the battle.

On September 14, the Tenth French Army resumed its
offensive east of Soissons, eighty-five Renault tanks co-
operating between the 14th and the 16th. Ten days later
an extensive joint attack was made by the Fifth and Second
French Armies in conjunction with the American Army com-
mencing on the 26th ; this attack continued until October 9.

The Fourth Army attacked on a 15 -kilometre front in
the Champagne, and in all 630 Renault and 24 Schneider
actions were fought. Meanwhile the Second French Army
and the American Armies attacked on a 12-kilometre front
between the Argonne and the Meuse, and advanced during
the seven battle days some 15 kilometres ; 350 Renault, 34
Schneider, and 27 St. Chamond actions were fought in con-
nection with this advance.

At the urgent request of the Sixth French Army Com-
mander, whose command had joined the " Grand Army of
Flanders " after its work in the Soissons area had been
concluded in July, a Renault battalion, less one company,
and some heavy tank units were entrained for Dunkerque,
the third company of this battalion having already been
sent on detachment to Salonika at the urgent request of
General Franchet d'Esperey. On September 30 and
October 3 and 4, 55 tanks were employed north-west of
Roulers, and from the 14th to the 19th, 178 tank engage-
ments were fought, in which the enemy was driven back
some 15 kilometres. This advance was continued on the
31st of this month in the direction of Thielt, and on this
and the two following days 75 ta,nk engagements took place.

From the end of September onwards, operations generally
had consisted in following up the enemy all along the line
and pressing back his rearguards. On September 30, a
minor tank action was fought between the Aisne and the
Vesle ; on October 16 another on the eastern bank of the
Meuse, and between October 17 and 19 yet another north-east
of St. Quentin, in co-operation with the British attack further

198 THE FRENCH TANK CORPS

north. In this last attack the French Army advanced ten
kilometres on a three-kilometre front. The last actions
fought by French tanks took place between October 25 and
31, the first south of the Oise and in the direction of Guise,
when, on a front of five kilometres, an advance of no fewer
than fifteen was made, the second north-west of Rethel,
and the third north of Cruyshantem in Flanders.

In conclusion, it is interesting to summarise the statistics
available and compare them with those of the British Tank
Corps given at the end of Chapter XXXVII.

In August the strength of the French Tank Corps was
14,649 all ranks, approximately the strength of an infantry
division. During 1918, 3,988 individual tank engagements
were fought : 3,140 by Renault, 473 by Schneider, and 375
by St. Chamond tanks. Tanks were employed on 45 of the
120 days which elapsed between July 15 and November 11.
In personnel the casualties between these dates were approxi-
mately 300 officers and 2,300 other ranks.

Finally it may be stated that as there can be no doubt
that July 18 was the second greatest turning-point in the
war on the Western Front, the first being the battle of the
Marne in 1914, so can there be no doubt that the battle of
Soissons would never have been won had not the French
possessed a powerful force of tanks whereby to initiate
success. The German General Staff, which should be the
best judge of this question, candidly admit that the French
victory was due to the use of " masses of tanks." Neither was
the General Commanding-in-Chief of the French Armies
reticent, for on July 30 he issued the following special order
of the day to the French Tank Corps : " Vous avez bien
merite la patrie," whilst General Estienne, to whom so
much was due, received the Cravat of the Legion d'Honneur
and was promoted to the rank of General of Division for the
great services he had rendered to his country.

CHAPTER XXVI

PEEPAKATIONS FOR THE GREAT OFFENSIVE

As soon as the position resulting from the great German
attack of March 21 began to stabilise steps were taken by
the Headquarters of the Tank Corps to reorganise and refit
its battalions. This work was most difiicult on account of
the reopening of the German offensive in the Lys area, which
necessitated converting the 4th Tank Brigade into a Lewis -
gun unit and dispatching it north to assist in stemming the
German advance. Besides this, towards the middle of April
instructions were received that on account of the difficulty
of finding the required number of infantry reinforcements
the number of tank brigades was to be reduced from six to
four ; this meant the disbanding of the 5th Brigade in France
and the breaking up of the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th Tank
Battalions in England. Yet another difficulty was the
question of re-arming, many machines had been lost during
the retirement, nevertheless, on account of insufficient trans-
port, it was not found possible to ship out to France the
new Mark V tanks, the production of which in England
was now in full swing.

All these difficulties were eventually overcome, with the
result that during June and July four brigades of the Tank
Corps were re-armed ; but before this question is dealt with
it will be necessary to hark back to the various operations
which bridge the period between April 4, the date upon
which the Second Battle of the Somme ended, and August 8,
when our own great offensive was begun.

On April 9 the Germans launched their second great attack
between Festubert and Fleurbaix against the British front.
It succeeded, so it is thought, even beyond their expecta-
tions, and by the 11th the enemy's line roughly ran as follows :

199

200

PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE

East of Ploegsteert — Armentieres — Steenwerck — Estaires —
Lestren — Vieille Capelle, through Festubert to Givenchy, with
the apex of the sahent near Nieppe. This attack in all
probability was meant as a feint directed against a weak
spot in our line in order to threaten the coalfield round
Bruay and so cause Marshal Foch to weaken his reserves in
Champagne and on the Somme. Succeeding as it did at
first, it appears that the German command attempted to
develop it from a feint to a decisive attack, with the result
that their own reserves, of which they had none too many,
were involved as well as those of the Allies.

In order to meet the requirements of the new situation
on April 11 detachments of the 7th and 11th Battalions of
the 1st Tank Brigade were dispatched to hold a line west
of Merville. Two days later the 4th Tank Brigade, now con-
sisting of the 4th, 5th, and 13th Battalions, was turned into
a Lewis-gun Brigade. On the 13th the 5th Battalion moved
to Berthen, on the 16th the 13th Battalion to Boescheppe,
and on the 17th the 4th Battalion to the same place.

By April 17 the distribution of the Tank Corps was as
follows :

let Tank Brigade
H.Q. Bois D'Ohlain

nth Battalion
7th
12th

N.E. of Busnes.

Molinghem.

Simencourt.

2nd Tank Brigade
H.Q. Saulty

6th Battalion
10th

BaUleulval.
La Cauohie.

3rd Tank Brigade

H.Q. Molliens-au-Boia

3rd Battalion
9th

1st

Toutencourfc.

Merlimont.

Freohencourt.

4th Tank Brigade

H.Q. Godewaersvelde

4th Battalion
5th
13th

Boescheppe.

Berthen.

Boescheppe.

5th Tank Brigade

H.Q. Monchy Cayeux

2nd Battalion
8th

Blangy.
Humieres.

The fighting carried out by the Lewis-gun units was of a
severe nature, so much so that the casualties sustained

FIRST TANK VERSUS TANK BATTLE 201

caused the greatest anxiety at the Tank Corps headquarters,
as reinforcements from England were exceedingly limited ;
further, as it was still hoped to save the battalions at home
to the Corps, it was especially desirable not to call upon
them for drafts.

Early on April 24 the enemy attacked south of the river
Somme on a front from Villers-Bretonneux to the Bois de
Hangard, Thfs attack is of special interest as it was the
first occasion upon which the Germans employed tanks of
their own manufacture against us/ By means of these
tanks the enemy penetrated our front, captured most of the
extensive village of Villers-Bretonneux and advanced as far
as the Bois de I'Abbe. Prior to this attack, at 1 a.m., a
section of tanks of the 1st Battalion, hidden in the Bois
de I'Abbe, moved east of the wood owing to the excessive
gas shelling. At 8.30 a.m. this section, under the orders of
the 23rd Infantry Brigade, moved forward to secure the
Cachy switch trench against the enemy's threatening attack ;
exactly an hour later two of our machines, both females,
came into view of a hostile tank and were put out of action
by its gun fire — it should be remembered here that female
tanks are armed only with machine guns. Shortly after-
wards a British male Mark IV machine hove into sight,
and speeding into action there then took place the first
tank versus tank duel to be recorded in history. This male
soon scored a direct hit on its antagonist, whereupon the
enemy evacuated their tank and fled. By this time three
more enemy tanks had appeared ; these the Mark IV machine
engaged, and was in the process of driving off the field of
battle when it received a direct hit from a field-gun shell
and was put out of action.

South-west of Villers-Bretonneux, seven Whippet machines
were sent out at 10.30 a.m. to clear up the situation east of
the village of Cachy. Whilst proceeding round the north-
east side of this village they suddenly came upon two bat-

1 The German reports published in April asserted that tanks were used
against the British Army on March 21. As nothing is definitely known of
their effect they probably failed to come into action.
15

202 PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE

talions of Germans massing in a hollow preparatory to
making an attack. Without a moment's hesitation the
seven Whippets formed line and charged down the slope right
on to the closely formed infantry. Indescribable confusion
resulted as the Whippets tore through the German ranks,
the enemy scattered in all directions, some threw themselves
on their knees before the machines, shrieking for mercy, but
only to be run over and crushed to death. In a few minutes
no fewer than 400 Germans were killed and wounded. The
Whippets, having now completed their task, viz. " clearing
up the situation," returned, one machine being put out of
action by artillery fire on the journey home ; in all only five
casualties amongst the crews were suffered during this action.

The two most remarkable features of this little engage-
ment are : firstly, the helplessness of some 1,200 infantry
against seven tanks manned by seven officers and fourteen
other ranks ; and, secondly, that the tanks left their start-
ing-point, which was 3j miles from the scene of action, at
10.30 a.m., covered ten miles of ground, fought a battle, and
were back home again at 2.30 p.m.

On April 25 further minor tank operations took place in
the Villers-Bretonneux area, chiefly east of the Bois d'Aquenne
and the Monument, and, on the next day, British tanks for
the first time in their history co-operated with the French
Army, four tanks of the 1st Battalion being ordered to assist
the Moroccan Division in an attack on the Bois de Hangard.
This attack was not a success, due to two quite exceptional
reasons ; two trees were cut down during the night, which
were to have acted as landmarks for the tanks, and the
smoke barrage was in error put down to the east instead of
the west of the German line ; consequently the tanks not
only lost their direction but were subjected to an intense
machine-gun fire when nearing the German position ; this
prevented the French infantry co-operating with them.

The month of May was chiefly spent in re-sorting the tank
battaUons and resting the men. The embargo on the im-
portation of tanks from England had now been removed,
and Mark V tanks were arriving in France at the rate of

BATTLE PREPARATIONS 208

sixty a week. This machine, very similar in shape to the
Mark IV or Mark I, was a great improvement on all former
types, it being a much more mobile and handy weapon. A
new system of tactics was at once got out to cover its in-
crease in power, and training was started so as to accustom
all ranks to its use.

At about this time a considerable number of French
troops were billeted in and around the Tank Corps area and
it is a pleasure to record their extreme keenness to learn all
they could about tanks and their tactics. General Maistre,
commanding the Tenth French Army, with its headquarters
then at Beauval, particularly asked that tank demonstra-
tions should be held for the units of his command. This
was done, and right through May and June two or three of
these demonstrations were given weekly. Besides French
troops, units from the 1st, Xlth, Xlllth, XVIIth, and
XVIIIth English Corps and the Canadian and Austrahan Corps
also attended, the greatest benefit resulting to all taking part.

From the beginning of June onwards preparations were
set on foot to have all tank units ready by August 1 for any
eventuality. This necessitated intensive training, re-arm-
ing and re-equipping. Sledges for supply haulage were
prepared, bridges for the passage of light tanks over wide
trenches were made, cribs were constructed for the heavy
tanks — these were large hexagonal crates which served the
same purpose as the tank fascines did at the battle of Cam-
brai ; wire-pulling apparatus was got ready, smoke apparatus
ordered, and portable railway ramps made. It was alto-
gether an excessively busy time on the training ground and
in the workshops, and, as matters eventually turned out,
it was extremely fortunate that this work was taken up at
this early date, for, as a future chapter will show, when the
Tank Corps was next called upon to make ready for an
extensive operation only eight days were obtainable to
prepare in.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE BATTLES OF HAMEL AND MOREUIL

During June and July three tank actions were fought : the
first was a night raid on June 22-23, the second the battle
of Hamel, and the third the battle of Moreuil or Sauvillers.

The night raid is interesting in that it was the first occasion
in the history of the Tank Corps in France upon which
tanks were definitely allotted to work at night. The raid
was carried out against the enemy's defences near Bucquoy
by five platoons of infantry and five female tanks. Its object
was to capture or kill the garrisons of a series of posts. The
raid took place at 11.25 p.m. A heavy barrage of trench-
mortar and machine-gun fire was met with at a place called
Dolls' House in " No Man's Land " : here the infantry were
held up, and though reinforced were unable to advance
further. The tanks, thereupon, pushed on and carried out
the attack in accordance with their orders. It is worthy
of note that not a single tank was damaged by the trench-
mortar barrage, which was very heavy. The tanks encoun-
tered several parties of the enemy and undoubtedly caused
a number of casualties. One tank was attacked by a party
of the enemy who were shot down by revolver fire ; later
on this tank rescued a wounded platoon commander who
had been captured by the Germans.

This raid is interesting in that it showed the possibility of
manoeuvring tanks in the dark through the enemy's lines,
and also the great security afforded to the tank by the dark-
ness.

The battle of Hamel, which was fought on July 4, was the
first occasion upon which the Mark V machine went into
action. Much was expected of it, and it more than justified
all expectations. The object of the attack was a twofold

204

Plate V

BATTLE OF HAMEL 205

one — firstly, to nip oft a salient between the river Somme
and the Villers-Bretonneux — ^Warfusee road ; secondly, to
restore the confidence of the Australian Corps in tanks, a
confidence which had been badly shaken by the BuUecourt
reverse in 1917.

As soon as the attack was decided on the training of the
Australians with the tanks was commenced at Vaux en
Amienois, the headquarters of the 5th Tank Brigade. Tank
units for this purpose were affiliated to Australian units and
by this means a close comradeship was cultivated.

The general plan of operations was for the 5th Tank
Brigade to support the advance of the 4th Australian Divi-
sion in the attack against the Hamel spur running from the
main Villers-Bretonneux plateau to the river Somme. The
frontage was about 5,500 yards, extending to 7,500 yards
on the final objective, the depth of which was 2,500 yards.
The main tactical features in the area were Vaire wood,
Hamel wood, Pear-Shape trench, and Hamel village. There
was no defined system of trenches to attack except the old
British line just east of Hamel, which had been originally
sited to obtain observation eastwards. The remainder of
the area was held by means of machine-gun nests.

Five companies of 60 tanks in all were employed in the
attack ; these were divided into two waves — a first-line
wave of 48 and a reserve wave of 12 machines. Their dis-
tribution was as follows :

6th A.I. Brigade . .... 2 Sections (6 tanks).

4th A.I. Brigade ... 1 Company (12 tanks).

11th A.I. Brigade ... .6 Sections (18 tanks).

Liaison between 4th and 11th Brigades . . 1 Company (12 tanks).

Reserves ... . . 1 Company ( 12 tanks).

The co-operation of the artillery was divided under the
headings of a rolling barrage and the production of smoke
screens. Behind the former the infantry were to advance
followed by the tanks, which were only to pass ahead of
them when resistance was encountered. This arrangement
was not a good one and was an inheritance of the BuUecourt
distrust. The latter were to be formed on the high ground

206 BATTLES OF HAMEL AND MOREUIL

west of Warfusee-Abancourt and north of the Somme and
south of Morlancourt. Once the final objective was gained
a standing barrage was to be formed to cover consolidation.
As the entire operation was of a very limited character
an extensive system of supply dumps was not necessary, so
instead each fighting tank carried forward ammunition and
water for the infantry and four supply tanks were detailed
to carry R.E. material and other stores. Each of these
eventually delivered a load of about 12,500 lb. within 500
yards of the final objective, and within half an hour of its
capture. The total load delivered on July 4, at 40 lb. per
man, represented the loads of a carrying party 1,250 men
strong. Th© number of men used in these supply tanks was
twenty-four.

The tanks assembled at the villages of Hamelet and
Fouilloy on the night of July 2-3, without hostile interfer-
ence. On the following night they moved forward to a
line approximately 1,000 yards west of the infantry starting-
line under cover of aeroplanes which, flying over the enemy,
drowned the noise of the tank engines.

Zero hour was fixed for 3.10 a.m. and tanks were timed
to leave their starting-line at 3.2 a.m. under cover of artil-
lery harassing fire, which had been carried out on previous
mornings in order to accustom the enemy to it. This fire
lasted seven minutes, then a pause of one minute occurred,
to be followed by barrage fire on the enemy's front line for
four minutes. This allowed twelve minutes for the tanks to
advance an average distance of 1,200 yards before reaching
the infantry line at zero plus four minutes, when the barrage
was to lift. All tanks were on the starting-line up to time,
which is a compliment to the increased reliability of the
Mark V machine over all previous types.

As the barrage lifted the infantry and tanks moved for-
ward. The position of the tanks in relation to the infantry
varied, but, generally speaking, the tanks were in front of
the infantry and immediately behind the bursting shells.
The enemy's machine-gunners fought tenaciously, and in
several cases either held up the infantry, or would have in-

-jroo^ '93S7yjnaj^—^Q(^n9iaio^j.^-suarjfr^

<2

I-
<
00

MOBILITY OF MARK V TANK 207

flicted severe casualties on them, if tanks had not been there
to destroy them. The manoeuvring power of the Mark V
tank was clearly demonstrated in all cases where the in-
fantry were held up by machine guns, it enabled the tanks
to drive over the gunners before they could get away. There
were a great number of cases in which the German machine
guns were run over and their detachments crushed. Driv-
ing over machine-gun emplacements was the feature of this
attack ; it eliminated all chance of the enemy " coming to
life " again after the attack had passed by.

Tanks detailed for the right flank had severe fighting
and did great execution, their action being of the greatest
service. The tanks detailed to support the infantry bat-
talions passing round Vaire and Hamel woods and Hamel
village guarded their flanks whilst this manoeuvre was in
operation.

The tank attack came as a great surprise to the Germans
and all objectives were taken up to scheduled time. The
enemy suffered heavy loss, and, besides those killed, 1,500
prisoners were captured. The 4th Australian Division had
672 officers and other ranks killed and wounded, and the
5th Brigade had only 16 men wounded and 5 machines hit.
These tanks were all salved by the night of July 6-7.

The co-operation between the infantry and tanks was as
near perfect as it could be ; all ranks of the tank crews
operating were impressed by the superb moral of the Aus-
tralian troops, who never considered that the presence of
the tanks exonerated them from fighting, and who took
instant advantage of any opportunity created by the tanks.
From this day on the fastest comradeship has existed
between the Tank and Australian Corps. BuUecourt was
forgotten, and from the psychological point of view this
was an important objective to have gained prior to the great
attack in August.

The second battle in which the Tank Corps took part in
July was the battle of Moreuil or Sauvillers ; it is of particular
interest, for it was the only occasion during the war in which
our tanks, in any numbers, operated with the French Army.

208 BATTLES OF HAMEL AND MOREUIL

Another interesting point connected with this attack was
the rapidity with which it was mounted.

At 2.30 p.m. on July 17 the 5th Tank Brigade Commander
was informed that he was to prepare forthwith to co-operate
in an attack to be made by the IXth Corps of the First
French Army, and, for this purpose, the 9th Battahon of
the 3rd Tank Brigade was to be placed under his command
and that he and this battahon would come under the orders
of the 3rd French Infantry Division.

The object of the operation was a threefold one :

(i) To seize the St. Ribert wood with the object of out-
flanking Mailly-Raineval from the south.

(ii) To capture the German batteries in the neighbourhood
of St. Ribert or to force them to withdraw.

(iii) To advance the French field batteries eastwards in
order to bring fire to bear on the ridge which dominates the
right bank of the river Avre.

The three French Divisions attacking were the 152nd
Division on the right, the 3rd in the centre, and the 15th
on the left. Their respective frontages were 950, 2,000, and
800 metres. The greatest depth of the attack was 3,000 metres.

The operation was to be launched as a surprise, after a
short and intense artillery preparation ; the main objectives
were to be captured by encircling them and then " mopping "
them up.

There were three objectives : The first included Bois des
Arrachis, Sauvillers, Mongival village, Adelpare farm and
Ouvrage-des-Trois-Bouqueteaux ; twelve tanks and four
battalions of infantry were detailed for this. The second
included the clearing of the plateau to the north of the
Bois-de-Sauvillers and the capture of the south-west corner
of the Bois-de-Harpon ; the number of tanks allotted to
this objective was twenty-four, with four fresh infantry bat-
talions. The third, known as the Blue Line, an outpost hne
covering the second objective, was to be occupied by eight
strong infantry patrols and all available machines.

The attack was to be preceded by one hour's intensive
bombardment, including heavy counter-battery fire. The

BATTLE OF MOREUIL OR SAUVILLERS

July 23'"'' 1918

BATTLE OF MOREUIL 209

creeping barrage was to consist of H.E. and smoke shells
and was to nxove at the rate of 200 metres in six minutes
up to the first objective, after this at the rate of 200 metres
in eight minutes.

Tanks were to attack in sections of three, two in front
and one in immediate support, the infantry advancing in
small assaulting groups close behind the tanks.

Directly the orders were issued preparations were set on
foot. On July 18, Lieutenant-Colonel H. K. Woods, com-
manding the 9th Battalion, and his reconnaissance officers
visited General de Bourgon,^ the Commander of the 3rd
French Division, who explained to them the scheme ; on
the next day these officers reconnoitred the ground over which
the battalion would have to operate, and tactical training
was carried out with the French at the 5th Tank Brigade
Driving School at Vaux-en-Amienois. On the 20th and 21st
training continued, and further examination of the ground was
made, and on the 22nd details of the attack were finally
settled. In spite of the continuous exertion of the last few
days all ranks were in the greatest heart to show the 3rd
French Division what the British Tank Corps could do.

Meanwhile headquarters were selected, communications
arranged for, supplies dumped, and reorganisation and
rallying-points worked out and fixed.

The move of the 9th Battalion is particularly interesting
on account of its rapidity. On July 17 it was in the Bus-les-
Artois area ; on the 18th it moved 16,000 yards across
country and entrained under sealed orders at Rosel, de-
training at Conty. On the night of the 19th-20th it moved
4,000 yards from Conty to Bois-de-Quemetot ; on 20th-
21st, 9,000 yards to Bois-de-Rampont ; on 21st-22nd, 7,000
yards to Bois-de-Hure and Bois-du-Fay ; and on 22nd-23rd
4,500 yards from these woods into action with thirty-five
machines out of the original forty-two fit to fight.

The country over which the action was to be fought was
undulating, and with the exception of large woods there

1 General de Bourgon was a great friend of the Tank Corps ; he presented
its Headquarters mess with a charming trophy.

210 BATTLES OF HAMEL AND MOREUIL

were few tank obstacles. Prior to the operations the weather
had been fine, but on the day of the attack heavy rain fell
and visibility was poor, a south wind of moderate strength
was blowing.

The preliminary bombardment began at 4.30 a.m., and,
an hour later, the tanks having been moved up to their
starting-points without incident, the attack was launched.
The tanks advanced ahead of the infantry, Arrachis wood
was cleared and Sauvillers village attacked, the tanks occupy-
ing this village some fifteen minutes before the infantry
arrived. At Adelpare farm and Les-Trois-Bouqueteaux the
enemy's resistance, as far as the tanks were concerned, was
light, and the German machine-gun posts were speedily over-
rim. From Sauvillers village, at zero plus two hours, the
tanks advanced on to Sauvillers wood, which, being too
thick to enter, had to be skirted, broadsides being fired into
the foliage. Whilst this was proceeding other tanks moved
forward to wards, the Bois-de-St.-Ribert, but as the infantry
patrols did not appear they turned back to regain touch
with the French infantry. About 9.30 a.m., whilst cruising
round, six tanks were put out of action in rapid succession
by direct hits fired from a battery situated to the south of
St. Ribert wood. At 9.15 a.m. an attack on Harpon wood
was hastily improvised between the O.C. B Company, 9th
Battalion, and the commander of one of the battalions of the
51st Regiment. This attack was eminently successful ; the
French infantry, following the tanks with great elan, estab-
lished posts in Harpon wood. After this action the tanks
ralUed.

In this attack the tank casualties were heavy in personnel:
11 officers and men were killed and 48 wounded, and 15
tanks were put out of action by direct hits. The losses in
the French Divisions were : 3rd — 26 officers and 680 men ;
15th — 15 officers and 500 men ; 152nd — 20 officers and 650
men. It should be noted that though the 3rd, with which
tanks co-operated, had to attack the largest system of
defences, its casualties approximately equalled those of each
of the other divisions.

GENERAL DEBENEY 211

The number of prisoners captured was 1,858, also 5 guns,
45 trench mortars, and 275 machine guns.

After the attack, when the tanks had returned to their
positions of assembly. General Debeney, commanding the
First French Army, paid the 9th Battahon the great honour
of personally inspecting it on July 25, and of expressing his
extreme satisfaction at the way in which the Battalion
had fought. As a token of the fast comradeship which had
now been established between the French troops of the 3rd
Division and the 9th Tank Battalion, this battalion was
presented with the badge of the 3rd French Division and
ever since this day the men of this unit have worn it on
their left arm.

CHAPTER XXVIII

GERMAN TANK OPERATIONS

In spite of the fact that throughout the war the Germans
never had at their disposal more than some fifteen tanks of
their own manufacture and some twenty-five captured and
repaired British Mark IV machines, their employment of
these machines is worth recording.

As already mentioned the Germans learnt little from the
Mark I machine they captured and held for several days
during the battle of the Somme. In fact, they appear to
have treated the tanks generally, during these operations,
with scorn. The machine was indeed mechanically indif-
ferent, but the German, who is essentially a stupid (dumm)
man, could not apparently differentiate between the defects
of mechanical detail and the advantages of fundamental
principles, such as mobility, security, and offensive power,
which indeed the whole " idea " of the tank represented.

The action at Bullecourt, it is thought, opened the Ger-
man eyes to the possibilities of a tank attack, that is an
attack in which tanks are used as the resistance-breakers
in advance of the infantry. If two tanks could accomplish
what the two Mark I's did on April 11, 1917, there was no
reason why 200 should not win a great victory, and 2,000
end the war. Be this as it may, it was at about this time
— the spring of 1917 — that the first German tank construction
was begun at the Daimler works near Berlin, and the result
of this was the production of fifteen machines known as
" Type A.7.V." (see Plate VI), some of which first took
the field in March 1918.

The chief characteristics of this tank were : its good
speed on smooth ground, on which it could attain some
eight miles an hour ; its inabihty to cross almost any type

212

THE GERMAN A.7.V. TANK

218

of trench or shelled ground on account of its shape. In
weight it was about 40 tons, it carried very thick armour
especially in front, capable of withstanding A.P. bullets at
close range and field-gun shells, not firing A.P. ammunition,
at long ; it was, however, very vulnerable to the splash of
ordinary bullets on account of the crevices and joints in its
armour. The most interesting feature of this otherwise
indifferent machine was that its tracks were provided with
sprung bogies. The use of sprung tracks in so heavy a tank
was the only progressive step shown in the German effort
at tank production.

The German tank was 24 ft. long and 10 ft. 6 in. wide ;
its armament was one 1*57 mm. gun and 6 machine guns ;
its crew, one officer, eleven N.C.O.s, and four private soldiers
— exactly twice the strength of the crew of a British Mark
IV tank. This crew comprised three distinct classes, drivers
(mechanics), gunners (artillerymen), and machine-gunners
(infantrymen). These three classes remained distinct, little
co-operation existing between them.

Both the tanks of German manufacture and the captured
British tanks were divided into sections (Abteilungen) of
five machines each, the personnel establishment of which
was as follows :

Oerman Tanks. Captured Tanks.

Captain Commanding .... 1 1

Lieuts. or 2nd Lieuta.

5 5

Drivers

81 81

Machine-gunners

48 20

ArtiUerymen

22 14

Signallers

12 12

Medical Corps

1 1

Orderlies, etc.

6 6

Total

176 All ranks. 140 All ranks

This establishment was a very extravagant one when
compared with that of a Mark IV section of five tanks,
namely, six officers and thirty-five other ranks.

Besides the " A.7.V." machines the Germans employed,

214 GERMAN TANK OPERATIONS

during their various offensives of 1918, a number of cater-
pillar ammunition carriers known as " Munitions Schlepper,"
or " Tankautos." These could proceed across country as
well as by road.

The moral of the German Tank Corps was not high, and
as regards the personnel of the captured Mark IV Tanks it
was decidedly low, the Germans having made considerable
efforts to prove to their own troops, by means of demonstra-
tions, that this type of tank was both vulnerable and ineffec-
tive. The training of this Corps appears to have been
indifferent; a certain number of Assault Divisions were
trained with wagons representing tanks, and in a few cases
it is believed that actual tanks were used with infantry in
combined training.

The tactics of the German tanks simply consisted in the
" mopping up " of strong points. On several occasions
they did get in front of the attacking infantry, but they do
not appear in any sense to have led the attack. The follow-
ing extract from the German G.H.Q. instructions, " The
Co-operation of Infantry with Tanks " (!), indicates that no
real co-operation was ever contemplated. It reads :

" The infantry and tanks will advance independently of
one another. No special instructions regarding the co-
operation with tanks will be issued. When advancing with
tanks the infantry will not come within 160 yards of them
on account of the shells which will be fired at the tanks."

In all, there are nine recorded occasions upon which the
Germans made use of tanks, the first of which was in their
great offensive which opened on March 21, 1918. In this
attack about ten German and ten captured British machines
were used, and although they accomplished very little they
were much written up in the German press.

A little over a month later, on April 24, the only success-
ful German tank attack during the war was carried out. On
this occasion, which has been referred to in Chapter XXVI,
fourteen tanks were brought forward, and of these twelve

FEENOH RENAULT TANK.

214]

GERMAN TANK.

CAPTURE OF VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 215

came into action and captured Villers-Bretonneux, a point of
great tactical importance ; a counter-attack carried out by
the Australian Corps and a few British tanks, however,
restored the situation.

A month later a few tanks were used by the Germans
a^gainst the French on the opening day of the great Aisne
offensive, namely May 27. None of these machines, how-
ever, succeeded in passing a large trench in the second
defensive system known as Dardanelles trench.

On June 1, fifteen operated with little success in the
Reims sector, eight being left derelict in the French lines.
Similar unsuccessful operations were carried out on June 9
and July 15.

On August 31, three German tanks approached our lines
east of Bapaume ; two were knocked out by our guns and
eventually captured.

On October 8, some fifteen captured British machines were
used against us in the Cambrai sector. Of this action the
German account states that these tanks were employed
defensively to fill up a gap in their line ; whether this was
so or not, they undoubtedly produced a demoralising effect
amongst our own men, equilibrium only being re-estab-
lished when two of them were put out of action. Three days
later, on the 11th, a few tanks were used at St. Aubert; this
was the last recorded occasion upon which the Germans
made use of tanks in the Great War.

Indifferent as were the German tank tactics as compared
with our own, one fact was most striking, this being that the
British infantry no more than the German would or could
withstand a tank attack. The reason for this is a simple
one, namely, inability to do so. So pronounced was this
feeling of helplessness that when, during our own retirement
in March 1918, rumours were afloat that German tanks were
approaching, our men in several sectors of the line broke
and fell back. During the German retirement a few months
later on we find exactly the same lowering of moral by
self-suggested fear, fear based on the inability to overcome
the danger. This moral effect produced by the tank was

216 GERMAN TANK OPERATIONS

appreciated by the Germans, for in a note issued by the
XVIIth German Army we find :

"Our own tanks strengthen the moral of the infantry to
a tremendous extent, even if employed only in small num-
bers, and experience has shown that they have a consider-
able demoralising effect on the hostile infantry."

CHAPTER XXIX

THE BATTLE OF AMIENS

On July 15 the renewed German offensive on the Chateau-
Thierry — ^Reims front had been launched and failed. Strate-
gically and tactically placed in as unenviable a position
as any army well could be, the Crown Prince's forces re-
ceived a staggering blow on the 18th, when Marshal Foch
launched his great tank counter-attack against the western
flank of the Soissons salient.

At the time of this attack the brigades of the Tank Corps
were distributed defensively along the First, Third, and
Fourth Army fronts, in order to meet by counter-attacks
any renewal of the enemy's offensive against these Armies.

Ever since the dramatic coup-de-main accomplished on
July 4 by the 4th Australian Division and the 5th Tank
Brigade in the battle of Hamel, the general interest in tanks
had become much more conspicuous. The great tank attack
at the battle of Cambrai, convincing in worth as it was to
all who had taken part in it, had been somewhat, discredited
by the recent German offensive on the Somme front, which
was seized upon by certain soldiers of the old school to rein-
force their assertion — that the day of the tank had come
and gone, and that to fight a second battle of Cambrai was
too great a gamble to be worth risking. Now a series of
projects were asked for which embraced various areas of
operation ; in the Fourth Army against the Amiens salient ;
in the Third Army against Bucquoy and Bapaume ; in the
First Army against the Merville salient and in the Second
against Keromel hill. The only one of these projects which
offered prospects of a decisive success was the first.

On July 13 the Fourth Army Commander was asked by
G.H.Q. to submit a scheme for an attack on his front. This
16 217

218 THE BATTLE OF AMIENS

was done on the 17th, when a limited operation, with the
object of capturing the Amiens outer defence Kne, running
from Castel through Caix to Mericourt, was outlined. The
force suggested for this attack was three corps and eight
battalions of tanks. On the 21st a conference was held at
the Fourth Army headquarters at Flixecourt when, on the
suggestion of the Tank Corps, the number of tank battalions
was raised from eight to twelve ; this comprised the whole
Tank Corps less the 1st Tank Brigade, which was still armed
with Mark IV machines, and which at this time was engaged
in training its personnel on the Mark V tank.

On July 27, zero day was fixed for the 10th, but on August 6
this was changed to the 8th. All this time, in order to
maintain secrecy, no mention of the impending attack was
permitted, and the only preparation which could be under-
taken was to send one officer of the Tank Corps General
Staff to the area of operations to study the ground. On
July 30 a conference was held at the 5th Tank Brigade head-
quarters at Vaux, at which the Fourth Army Commander
explained the plan of operations. From this day on pre-
parations were begun, the railway moves being issued the
same evening.

As already stated, the original proposal was a limited
operation, the centre of the attack being carried out by the
Canadian and Australian Corps. The right of the Canadians
was to be covered by the French First Army attacking east
and south-east of the Luce river. The left of the Aus-
tralians was to be protected by two divisions of the Ilird
Corps operating towards Bray. On July 29 the scope of
the operation was extended as follows :

To disengage the Amiens-Paris railway by occupying the
line Hangest — ^Harbonni^res — Mericourt.

To advance to the line Roye — Chaulnes, driving the enemy
towards Ham, and so facilitate the advance of the French
on the line Noyon-Montdidier.

The force placed at the disposal of the Fourth Army con-
sisted of the following Corps :

(i) The Canadian Corps — 4 divisions.

DISTRIBUTION OF TANKS 219

(ii) The Australian Corps — 4 divisions,
(iii) The Illrd Corps — 2 divisions.

(iv) General Reserve — 3 divisions, to be supplemented by
further divisions as soon as possible.

(v) The Cavalry Corps — 3 cavalry divisions.
Tank battalions were allotted to the 3 infantry corps as
follows :

(i) Canadian Corps, 4th Tank Brigade — 1st, 4th, 5th, and
14th Battalions.

(ii) Australian Corps — 5th Tank Brigade — 2nd, 8th, 13th,
and 15th Battalions.

(iii) Ilird Corps — 10th Battalion,

(iv) General Reserve — 9th Battalion (still refitting at
Cavillon).

(v) Cavalry Corps. 3rd Tank Brigade — 3rd and 6th Bat-
talions.

The 3rd and 6th Battalions were equipped with 48 Whippet
tanks each ; all the other battalions were heavy units
equipped with 42 Mark V machines each (36 fighting and
6 training tanks), except the 1st and 15th Battalions, which
were each equipped with 36 Mark V One Star machines.

As in the battle of Cambrai the initiation of the attack was
to depend on the tanks, no artillery registration or bom-
bardment being permitted prior to the assault. In all,
some 82 brigades of field artillery, 26 brigades of heavy
artillery, and 13 batteries of heavy guns and howitzers were
to be employed. The following is a summary of the artil-
lery instructions :
(i) No artillery bombardment.

(ii) The initial attack to be opened by a barrage at zero,
(iii) The majority of the heavy guns and howitzers to
concentrate on counter-battery work.

(iv) The field-artillery brigades to be prepared to move
forward and offer the closest support to the attacking in-
fantry.

(v) Special noise barrages to cover the approach of the
tanks.

The first object of the Cavalry Corps was to secure the old

220

THE BATTLE OF AMIENS

Amiens defence line and hold it until relieved by infantry
units. The second, to push forward on the line Roye —
Chaulnes. For this purpose the 3rd Cavalry Division with
one battalion of Whippets was placed under the command
of the Canadian Corps, and one cavalry brigade, supported
by one company of Whippets, under that of the Australian
Corps.

On July 30, the date on which preparations were begun,
the Tank Corps was distributed as follows :

lat Tank Brigade

7th Battalion Merlimont.

H.Q. Estmvalle

11th

, Merlimont.

12th

, Merlimont.

2nd Tank Brigade

10th

, Bouvigny.

H.Q. Bois D'Ohlain

14th

Mont St. Eloi.

15th

, Simencourt.

Srd Tank Brigade

Srd

, Toutencourt.

H.Q. Wavrana

6th

, Merlimont.

ith Tank Brigade

1st

, Coullemont.

H.Q. Couturelle

4th

, La Cauchie.

5th

, BaUleulval.

5th Tank Brigade

2nd

, Querrieu wood.

H.Q. Vaux

8th

, Blangy (east of Amiens)

13th

, St. Gratien (near to).

9th

, Cavillon.

In order to facilitate co-operation and staff work it was
decided to break up temporarily the 2nd Tank Brigade and
to allot the 10th Battalion to the Ilird Corps and the 14th
and 15th Battalions to the 4th and 5th Tank Brigades re-
spectively. Besides these units five Supply and Gun Carrier
Companies were allotted for the transport of tank and
infantry supplies.

Briefly the general preparations were carried out as fol-
lows : the 1st, 4th, 5th, 10th, 14th, and 15th Battalions were
concentrated by rail in the Fourth Army area, detraining at
Poulainville, Saleux, Prouzel, and Vignacourt between July~31
and August 5. The 3rd and 6th Whippet Battalions moved
to Naours by the night of August 2-3, and thence to the
Boulevard Pont-Noyelles in Amiens on the night of the
6th-7th, where they lay hid under the trees. Tanks were
got ready commencing on July 31, on which date the for-
mation of supply dumps was begun. The 9th Battalion,

FLATE Vll

^^ ♦ V*

GUN-CAKKIEK.

MAEK V STAB TANK (FEMALE).

220]

THE CANADIAN CORPS 221

which had been withdrawn to Cavillon after the battle of
Moreuil, was allotted to the Canadian Corps for training ;
the training of the Australian Corps continuing as heretofore
at Vaux. Considering the short time available for prepara-
tion the speed with which this great battle was mounted
redounds to the credit of all ranks taking part in it. It
was a triumph of good staff work.

The detailed preparations of the four groups of tanks —
3rd, 4th, and 5th Brigades, and the 10th Battalion, are
interesting and were as follows :

Fourth Tank Brigade. — This brigade established its ad-
vanced headquarters at Dury. Its battalions were distri-
buted as follows : the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 15th Battalions to
the 4th, 1st, 3rd, and 2nd Canadian Divisions respectively.

No. 3 Tank Supply Company was split up amongst the
divisions of the Canadian Corps ; three forward wireless
stations were arranged for as well as one back receiving
station ; assembly positions and rallying-points were fixed,
and the 2nd Tank Field Company was detailed, once the
battle began, to clear all obstacles off the Berteaucourt-
Thennes road and to prepare crossings over the Luce river
between Hangard and Demuin.

The plan of the Canadian Corps attack was as follows :

The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Canadian Divisions were to make
good the Red Line on zero day, except the left of the 2nd
Division, which was to push on and occupy the Blue Line.
The advance of the 3rd Canadian Division was timed to
start at zero plus four hours, the time it was considered the
initial attack would leave the Green Line. The 4th Canadian
Division was to follow the 1st and 3rd to the Blue Line and
then to the line Moreuil — Demuin — Marcelcave. The 1st Tank
Battalion was allotted to this division, and arrangements
were made for each of its tanks to carry forward two Lewis
and two Vickers gun-teams besides the crew, these units
being intended to assist the cavalry on the Blue Dotted Line.
Besides the above an independent force, consisting chiefly
of Canadian motor machine guns, was to operate down the
Roye road.

222 THE BATTLE OF AMIENS

Fifth Tank Brigade. — The 5th Tank Brigade estabhshed
its advanced headquarters at Hospice Fouilloy with a report
centre at the north-west corner of Kate wood. Its bat-
tahons were distributed as follows : the 2nd Battalion and
one company of the 13th Battalion to the 2nd and 5th
Australian Divisions; the 13th Battalion less one company to
the 3rd Australian Division ; the 8th Battalion to the 4th ;
the 15th Battalion was split into halves of eighteen tanks
each, one half operating with the 4th and the other with
the 5th Australian Divisions.

As regards supply arrangements, No. 1 Gun Carrier Com-
pany was allotted to the Australian Corps for transport
work. Two forward wireless stations and one back receiv-
ing station were fixed, and assemblyandrallying-points settled.

The general plan was that the tanks were to advance to
the first objective under an artillery barrage. On reaching
the second objective all tanks were to rally except those of
the 15th Battalion, which were to push on to the Blue Dotted
Line carrying machine-gunners forward.

Tenth Battalion. — The whole of the tanks of the 10th Bat-
talion, less one section, were to operate against the first
objective and then push on to the second, aifter which they
were to rally west of the first objective.

Third Tank Brigade. — The 3rd Tank Battalion was allotted
to the 3rd Cavalry Division and the 6th Tank Battalion to
the 1st Cavalry Division. The objective of these two bat-
talions was to secure the ai-ea between the Red Line and the
old Amiens defence line. The advance of the 3rd and 1st
Cavalry Divisions was to take place at zero plus four hours.
Before the Red Line was reached the cavalry scouts were
to precede the Whippet tanks and discover crossings over
the Luce river at Ignaucourt and Demuin. If crossings were
found the Whippets were to use them ; otherwise they were
to advance eastwards near Caix. The formation to be
adopted by these two battahons was one company to act
as a screen in front of the cavalry with 200 yards interval
between tanks, one company in support, and one company
in reserve.

BATTLE OF AMIENS

Augusts*'' 1918.

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Scale of Yards

AUGUST 8, 1918 223

The country between our front line and the hne Roye —
Frise was in every respect suitable to tank movement. East
of the Roye — Frise line began the French portion of the old
Somme battlefield ; the ground here in places had been
heavily shelled, but was quite negotiable by heavy tanks.
The flanks of the attack were the two difi&cult points. Neither
permitted of the use of offensive wings and both offered good
defensive positions for the enemy's machine-gunners.

Zero was at 4.45 a.m., when 415 fighting tanks out of 420 '■
went into action ; this in itself was a notable feat of
mechanical efficiency. The attack was an overwhelming
surprise and, though the enemy was holding his line in
strength, little opposition was met with except in a few
locahties. At the battles of Hamel and Moreuil the German
machine-gunners had learnt to appreciate what the in-
creased mobility of the Mark V tank enabled it to accom-
phsh, and not being anxious to be crushed under its thirty
tons of steel they gave less trouble during this battle than
on any previous occasion. In spite of this, many hostile
machine-gun posts were hunted out of the standing corn and
run over. Co-operation was throughout good, especially on
the Canadian and Austrahan fronts, where the attack swept
on irresistibly. On the Ilird Corps front the attack started
in a state of some confusion, due to the fog and the uncertain
state of the line, the Germans having attacked the Ilird
Corps on the 6th, and the Ilird Corps having retaken most
of their lost trenches on the 7th. This undoubtedly compli-
cated the attack on the 8th.

South of the river Somme all objectives were taken up to
time ; on the right flank the difficult valley of the Luce was
crossed by all except two tanks ; this was a high comph-
ment to the crews working on this flank, for the approach of
the tanks was rendered most difficult on account of fog.

Both battahons of Whippets were engaged with their re-

' Nine heavy battalions with 324 machines and two medium battalions
with 96. Besides these tanks, there were 42 in mechanical reserve, 96 supply
tanks, and 22 gun-carriers. In all, and not counting the machines of the
9th Tank Battalion, there were 580 tanks.

224 THE BATTLE OF AMIENS

spective cavalry divisions and had a considerable amount
of fighting to do in the neighbourhood of Cayeux wood, Le
Quesnel, east of Mezi^res, at Guillaucourt and the railway
south of Harbonni^res, which was held with great deter-
mination by the enemy as far as the Rosi^res-Vauvillers road.
During this day's fighting a total of 100 machines were
temporarily put out of action chiefly by the enemy's fire
from the Chipilly ridge, which, on account of the partial
failure of the Ilird Corps attack, was held by the enemy for
several days after August 8. On the evening of the 8th
the tanks rallied; the crews, however, were so exhausted
by the great distance covered, the maximum penetration
effected being about 7| miles, and the heat of the day,
that it was necessary to resort to the formation of composite
companies for the next day's operation, few reserves remain-
ing in hand, and the 9th Tank Battalion, which was now
moving eastwards from Cavillon, was not in a position to
take the field for at least forty-eight hours.

On the night of August 8-9, the front line of our attack
from north to south ran approximately as follows : along the
outer Amiens defence hne to Proyart — west of Rainecourt —
east of Vauvillers — east of Rosi^res — east of Meharicourt —
east of Rouvroy — east of Bouchoir. South of the Amiens-
Roye road the line was continued by the French, who had
captured Hangest, Arvillers, and Pierrepont.

Up to 6 o'clock on the morning of August 9, some 16,000
prisoners had passed through the British and French cages,
and over 200 guns had been counted. Many prisoners
testified to the rapid advance of the tanks which, appearing
suddenly out of the mist, rendered all resistance useless. It
is interesting to record that those prisoners who had seen
tanks before all noticed that they were up against a new
type which moved faster and manoeuvred better than the
old ones.

On the evening of the 8th orders were issued that the
attack should be resumed on the following morning with a
view to advancing it to the Hne Roye — Chaulnes — Bray-sur-
Somme — Dernancourt, particular attention being paid to the

INFANTRY CO-OPERATION 225

left flank. A strong position was to be established north of
the Somme in order to form a defensive flank to the Fourth
Army.

On August 9, north of the Somme, the 10th Battahon put
sixteen tanks into action with the 12th and 58th Divisions.
The attack was, however, at first held up by machine-gun
fire from the woods roimd Chipilly, and the work entailed in
engaging these weapons by means of tanks was found most
difficult on account of the steep valleys in this sector and
the close nature of the woods. Later on in the day, objec-
tives were gained, but only after five tanks had been put
out of action.

South of the Somme the 5th and 4th Tank Brigades
attacked the front Framerville-Rosieres-Bouchoir with 89
tanks. Near Lihons five machines received direct hits, but
in the action round Framerville out of the 13 tanks engaged
only 1 was hit. The fewness of tank casualties here was un-
doubtedly due to the excellent infantry co-operation, rifle-
men working hand-in-hand with the tanks and picking off
the enemy's gunners directly the machines came under hostile
artillery observation.

The 3rd Tank Brigade's action with the Cavalry Corps
was disappointing, the tanks being kept too long at their
Brigade Headquarters. At Beaufort and Warvillers the
Whippets rendered great assistance to the infantry by
chasing hostile machine-gunners out of the crops and shoot-
ing them down as they fled.

On this day in all 145 tanks went into action, of which
39 were hit by hostile gun fire.

On the night of August 9-10, the attack had reached the line
Bouchoir — Warvillers — Rosieres — Framerville — Mericourt.
On the 10th the Fourth Army orders were to continue the
advance with the object of gaining the general line Roye —
Chaulnes — Bray-sur-Somme — Dernancourt. New French
forces were also going to attack on the front south of Mont-
didier.

On the morning of August 10 the 10th BattaMon co-oper-
ated in two small attacks carried out by the 12th Division.

226 THE BATTLE OF AMIENS

Seven tanks took part and attacked the enemy north of
Morlancourt and along the Bray- Corbie road. This was the
last action fought on this front by this battalion.

South of this, the 5th Tank Brigade carried out a minor
night operation against Proyart, and the 4th Tank Brigade
with 43 tanks supported the 32nd Division, fresh from the
general reserve, and the 4th Canadian Division in an attack
on the line Roye — Hattencourt — Hallu ; owing to the late
issue of orders, the hour of attack was altered, and even-
tually the advance took place in daylight without smoke. A
stubborn resistance was met with, and out of the 43 tanks
operating no fewer than 23 received direct hits.

The Whippets with the cavalry fared equally badly on
this day. They were ordered to capture Parvillers, but
neither the cavalry nor Whippets reached this spot owing
to the old trench systems and the broken nature of the
ground. The edge of the old Somme battlefield had now
been reached, and the time was rapidly approaching when
the shelled area would offer as great an obstacle to the
attack as it would an assistance to the retiring enemy.

During the 10th some 67 tanks in all were engaged, and
of these 30 received direct hits.

On August 11 no appreciable change took place on the
British front., Lihons was, however, captured by the 1st
Australian Division, assisted by ten tanks of the 2nd Bat-
talion, otherwise most of the tank operations consisted in mop-
ping up strong points. On the evening of this day the 4th
and 5th Tank Brigades were withdrawn from action to refit.

During the next few days it was decided that, whilst
pressure should be kept up south of the Somme, a new
battle should open to the north of this river on the Third
Army front, and that three Tank Brigades should co-operate
in this attack ; this necessitated the transfer of the 4th
Tank Brigade to the Ilird Corps north of the Somme and
the withdrawal of the 10th, 14th, and 15th Battalions from
the Fourth Army area ; this left the 4th Tank Brigade with
the 1st, 4th, and 5th Battalions, and the 5th Tank Brigade
with the 2nd, 8th, and 13th Battalions.

GERMAN LOSSES 227

On August 17 the general situation was as follows : A
total of 688 tanks had been in action on August 8, 9, 10, and
11 ; 480 machines had been handed over to Salvage ; very
few of the remaining machines were actually fit for a lengthy
action, and all required a thorough overhaul ; four days, as
we shall see, were only possible for this, for the next battle
was scheduled to open on August 21.

,The great battle of Amiens was now at an end. A tre-
mendous physical, and above all, moral blow had been dealt
the enemy ; not only had he lost 22,000 prisoners and 400
guns, but also all hope of winning the war by force of arms.
On August 16 the Fourth Army Commander, General Sir
Henry Rawlinson, issued the following Special Order, which
sums up the reason for this great victory:

" The success of the operations of August 8 and succeed-
ing days was largely due to the conspicuous part played by
the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Brigades of the Tank Corps, and I
desire to place on record my sincere appreciation of the
invaluable services rendered both by the Mark V and the
Mark V Star and the Whippets.

" The task of secretly assembling so large a number of
tanks entailed very hard and continuous work by all con-
cerned for four or five nights previous to the battle.

" The tactical handling of the tanks in action made calls
on the skill and physical endurance of the detachments
which were met with by a gallantry and devotion beyond
all praise.

" I desire to place on record my appreciation of the
splendid success that they achieved, and heartily to con-
gratulate the Tank Corps as a whole on the completeness of
their arrangements and the admirable prowess exhibited by
all ranks actually engaged on this occasion.

" There are many vitally important lessons to be learned
from their experiences. These will, I trust, be taken to
heart by all concerned and made full use of when next the
Tank Corps is called upon to go into battle.

" The part played by the tanks and Whippets in the battle
of August 8 was in all respects a very fine performance,"

The success of the operations may be attributed to —

228 THE BATTLE OF AMIENS

surprise, the moral effect of the tanks, the high moral of
our own infantry, the rapid advance of our guns, and the
good roads for supplies.

The main deductions to be drawn from this battle are :

(i) That once preparations are well in progress it is
almost impossible to modify them to meet any change in
objective.

(ii) That the staying power of an attack lies in the general
reserve. In this attack the tank general reserve was very
weak, consequently after August 8 tank attacks began to
" peter out."

(iii) That the heavy tank is an assault weapon. Its role
is in trench warfare. Once open warfare is entered on
infantry must protect tanks from artillery fire.

(iv) That the endurance in action of heavy tanks may, at
present, be put down as being three days, after which they
require overhaul.

(v) That the supply tank is too slow and heavy ; a hght
machine such as a cross-country tractor should replace it.

(vi) That at present wireless and aeroplane communica-
tions cannot be relied upon ; the safest means of communica-
tion and the simplest is by galloper.

(vii) That the attachment of tanks to cavalry is not a
success ; for, in this battle, each of these arms in many
ways impeded rather than helped the other. During the
approach marches the Whippets frequently were reported
to have been unable to keep up with the rapid movement of
the cavalry; during actual fighting the reverse took place.
By noon on August 8, great confusion was developing behind
the enemy's lines, by this time the Whippets should have
been operating five to ten miles in advance of the infantry,
accentuating this demoralisation. As it was, being tied
down to support the cavalry, they were a long way behind
the infantry advance, the reason being that as cavalry
cannot make themselves invisible on the battlefield by
throwing themselves flat on the ground as infantry can,
they had to retire either to a flank or to the rear to avoid
being exterminated by machine-gun fire. Close co-opera-

TRIUMPH OF MACHINE-POWER 229

tion between cavalry and tanks being, therefore, practically
impossible, both suffered by attempting to accomplish it.

The outstanding lesson of the battle of Amiens as far as
tanks are concerned is that neither the Mark V nor the
Whippet machine has sufficient speed for open warfare.
Had we possessed a machine which could have moved at an
average rate of ten miles an hour, which had a radius of
action of 100 or more miles, in this battle we should have
not only occupied the bridges across the Somme between
Peronne and Ham by noon on August 8, but, by wheeling
south-east towards Noyon, we should have cut off the entire
German forces south of the Amiens — Roye — Noyon road and
inflicted such a blow that in all probability the war would
have ended before the month was out. Both from the
positive and negative standpoint, this battle may be summed
up as " a triumph of machine-power over man-power," or,
if preferred, " of petrol over muscle."

CHAPTER XXX

THE FIGHT OF A "WHIPPET TANK

In this history space has forbidden any extensive reference
to individual tank actions, though when all is said and done
it was on these actions that not only was the efficiency of
the Tank Corps founded but victory itself.

Prior to the battle of Amiens it will be remembered that
the 3rd and 6th Whippet Battalions were allotted to work
with the Cavalry Corps, and that this did not prove a great
success owing to the difficulty of combining the_action~^f~
steel melchanicany~ariven "wTEETio^eflesh. The account of
the action given TJelovTls that of a single machine, working
well in advance of the attack against the enemy's com-
munications, as it is and was considered at the time in the
Tank Corps that all the light tanks should have been. This
account is so interesting and instructive that it is quoted in
full. The pluck shown by the crew of one officer and two
men, though not exceptional in the Tank Corps, is worthy
of the highest praise. These three men, like the Argonauts
of old, launched their landship on an expedition faced by
unknown dangers ; they fought their way through countless
odds and faced single-handed the whole of the rear of the
German Army. But for an unfortunate accident they might
have returned unscathed to safety. In spite of the misfortune
which eventually overtook them, at the lowest computa-
tion they must have inflicted 200 casualties on the enemy,
and at the price of one man killed.

If still there are to be found doubters in the power of the
tank, and in the superiority of mechanical warfare over
muscular, surely this heroic incident will alone suffice to
convince them :

230

ONE TANK VERSUS FOUR GUNS 231

" On August 8, 1918, I commanded Whippet tank ' Musi-
cal Box,' belonging to ' B ' Company of the 6th Battalion.
We left the lying-up point at zero (4.20 a.m.) and proceeded
across country to the south side of the railway at Villers-
Bretonneux. We crossed the railway in columm of sections,
by the bridge on the eastern outskirts of the town. I reached
the British front line and passed through the Australian
infantry (2nd Australian Division) and some of our heavy
tanks (Mark V), in company with the remainder of the
Whippets of ' B ' Company. Four sections of ' B ' Com-
pany proceeded parallel with the railway (Amiens — ^Ham)
across country due east. After proceeding about 2,000
yards in this direction, I found myself to be the leading
machine, owing to the others having become ditched. To
my immediate front I could see more Mark V tanks being
followed very closely by Australian infantry. About this
time we came under direct shell fire from a four-gun field
battery, of which I could see the flashes, between Abancourt
and Bayonvillers. Two Mark V tanks, 150 yards on my
right front, were knocked out. I saw clouds of smoke
coming out of these machines, and the crews evacuate them.
The infantry following the heavy machines were suffering
casualties from this battery. I turned half left and ran
diagonally across the front of the battery, at a distance of
about 600 yards. Both my guns were able to fire on the
battery, in spite of which they got off about eight rounds
at me without" damage, but sufficiently close to be audible
inside the cab, and I could see the flash of each gun as it
fired. By this time I had passed behind a belt of trees
running along a roadside. I ran along this belt until level
with the battery, when I turned full right and engaged the
battery in rear. On observing our appearance from the
belt of trees, the gunners, some thirty in number, abandoned
their guns and tried to get away. Gunner Ribbans and I
accounted for the whole lot.^ I cruised forward, making a
detour to the left, and shot a nimaber of the enemy who
appeared to be demoralised, and were moving about the
country in all directions. This, detour brought me back to
the railway siding N.N.W. of Guillaucourt. I could now
see other Whippets coming up and a few Mark V.s also.
The Australian infantry, who followed magnificently, had
now passed through the battery position which we had

1 This waa borne witness to by British troops near by.

282 THE FIGHT OF A WHIPPET TANK

accounted for and were lying in a sunken road about 400
yards past the battery and slightly to the left of it. I got
out of my machine and went to an Australian full lieutenant
and asked if he wanted any help. Whilst talking to him,
he received a bullet which struck the metal shoulder title,
a piece of the bullet casing entering his shoulder. While he
was being dressed, Major Rycroft,^ on horseback, and Lieu-
tenant Waterhouse, in a tank, and Captain Strachan of
' B ' Company, 6th Battalion, arrived and received con-
firmation from the Australian officer of our having knocked
out the field battery. I told Major Rycroft what we had
done, and then moved off again at once, as it appeared to
be unwise for four machines (Lieutenant Watkins had also
arrived) to remain stationary at one spot. I proceeded
parallel with the railway embankment in an easterly direc-
tion, passing through two cavalry patrols of about twelve
men each. The first patrol was receiving casualties from a
party of enemy in a field of corn. I dealt with this, killing
three or four, the remainder escaping out of sight into the
corn. Proceeding further east, I saw the second patrol
pursuing six enemy. The leading horse was so tired that
he was not gaining appreciably on the rearmost Hun. Some
of the leading fugitives turned about and fired at the cavalry-
man, when his sword was stretched out and practically
touching the back of the last Hun. Horse and rider were
brought down on the left of the road. The remainder of the
cavalrymen deployed to the right, coming in close under
the railway embankment, where they dismounted and came
under fire from the enemy, who had now taken up a position
on the railway bridge, and were firing over the parapet,
inflicting one or two casualties. I ran the machine up until
we had a clear view of the bridge, and killed four of the
enemy with one long burst, the other two running across
the bridge and so down the opposite slope out of sight. On
our left I could see, about three-quarters of a mile away, a
train on fire being towed by an engine. I proceeded further
east still parallel to the railway, and approached carefully
a small valley marked on my map as containing Boche hut-
ments. As I entered the valley (between Bayonvillers and
Harbonni^res) at right angles, many enemy were visible
packing kits and others retiring. On our opening fire on the
nearest, many others appeared from huts, making for the

' Captain of the company to which thia tank belonged.

BLOCKING THE ENEMY'S ROADS 233

end of the valley, their object being to get over the embank-
ment and so out of owe sight. We accounted for many of
these. I cruised round, Ribbans went into one of the huts
and returned, and we counted about sixty dead and wounded.
There were evidences of shell fire amongst the huts, but we
certainly accounted for most of the casualties counted there.
I turned left from the railway and cruised across country, as
lines of enemy infantry could be seen retiring. We fired at
-these many times at ranges of 200 yards to 600 yards. These
targets were fleeting, owing to the enemy getting down into
the corn when fired on. In spite of this, many casualties
must have been inflicted, as we cruised up and down for at
least an hour. I did not see any more of our troops or
machines after leaving the cavalry patrols already referred
to. During the cruising, being the only machine to get
through, we invariably received intense rifle and machine-
gun fire. I would here beg to suggest that no petrol be
carried on the outside of the machine, as under orders we
were carrying nine tins of petrol on the roof,^ for refilling
purposes when well into the enemy lines (should oppor-
tunity occur). The perforated tins allowed the petrol to
run all over the cab. These fumes, combined with the
intense bullet splash and the great heat after being in action
(by this time) nine to ten hours, made it necessary at this
point to breathe through the mouthpiece of the box respira-
tor, without actually wearing the mask. — -~—

"At 14.00 hours, or thereabouts, I again proceeded east,
parallel to the railway and about 100 yards north of it. I
eould see a large aerodrome and also an observation balloon
at a height of about 200 ft. I could also see great quan-
tities of motor and horse transport moving in all directions.
Over the top of another bridge on my left I could see the
cover of a lorry coming in my direction. I moved up out of
sight and waited until he topped the bridge, when I shot
the driver. The lorry ran into a right-hand ditch. The
railway had now come out of the cutting in which it had
rested all the while, and I could see both sides of it. I could
see a long line of men retiring on both sides of the railway,
and fired at these at ranges of 400 yards to 500 yards, in-
flicting heavy casualties. I passed through these and also
accounted for one horse and the driver of a two-horse canvas-
covered wagon on the far side of the railway. We now
1 This was contrary to Tank Corps " Standing Battle Orders."
17

234 THE FIGHT OF A WHIPPET TANK

crossed a small road which crossed the main railway, and
came in view of a large horse and wagon lines, which ran
across the railway and close to it. Gunner Ribbans (right-
hand gun) here had a view of the south side of railway, and
fired continuously into motor and horse transport moving
on three roads (one north and south, one almost parallel to
the railway, and one diagonally between these two). I fired
many bursts at 600 yards to 800 yards at transport blocking
roads on my left, causing great confusion. Rifle and machine-
gun fire was not heavy at this time, owing to our sudden
appearance, as the roads were all banked up in order to
cross the railway. There were about twelve men in the
middle aisle of these lines. I fired a long burst at these.
Some went down and others got in amongst the wheels
and undergrowth. I turned quarter left towards a small
copse, where there were more horses and men, about 200
yards away. On the way across we met the most intense
rifle and machine-gun fire imaginable, from all sides. When
at all possible we returned the fire, until the left-hand re-
volver port cover was shot away. I withdrew the forward
gun, locked the mounting, and held the body of the gun
against the hole. Petrol was still running down the inside
of the back door. Fumes and heat combined were very bad.
We were still moving forward, and I was shouting to Driver
Carney to turn about as it was impossible to continue the
action, when two heavy concussions closely followed one .
another and the cab burst into flames. Carney and Ribbans
got to the door and collapsed. I was almost overcome, but
managed to get the door open and fell out on to the ground,
and was able to drag out the other two men^ Burning
petrol was running on to the ground where we were lying.
The fresh air revived us and we all got up and made a short
rush to get away from the burning petrol. We were all on
fire. In this rush Carney was shot in the stomach and
killed. We rolled over and over to try to extinguish the
flames. I saw numbers of the enemy approaching from all
round. The first arrival came for nie with a rifle and
bayonet. I got hold of this and the point of the bayonet
entered my right forearm. The second man struck at my
head with the butt end of his rifle, hit my shoulder and
neck, and knocked me down. When I came to, there were
dozens all round me, and anyone who could reach me did
so, and I was well kicked ; they were furious. Ribbans and

GERMAN BRUTALITY 235

I were taken away and stood by. ourselves about twenty
yards clear of the crowd. An argument ensued, and we
were eventually marched to a dugout where paper ban-
dages were put on our hands. Our faces were left as they
were. We were then marched down the road to the main
railway. There we joined a party of about eight enemy,
and marched past a field kitchen where I sighed for food.
We had had nothing since 8.30 p.m. on the night previous
to the action and it was 3.30 p.m. when we were set on fire.
We went on to a village where, on my intelligence map, a
Divisional H.Q. had been marked. An elderly stout officer
interrogated me, asking if I was an officer. I said ' Yes.'
He then asked various other questions, to which I repUed,
' I do not know. ' He said, ' Do you mean you do not know
or you will not tell me ? ' I said, ' You can take it which-
ever way you wish.' He then struck me in the face and
went away. We went on to Chaulnes to a canvas hospital,
on the right side of the railway, where I was injected with
anti-tetanus. Later I was again interrogated with the
same result as above, except that instead of being struck, I
received five days' solitary confinement in a room with no
window and only a small piece of bread and a bowl of soup
each day. On the fifth day I was again interrogated, and
said the same as before. I said that he had no right to give
me solitary confinement and that unless I were released I
should, at the first opportunity, report him to the highest
possible authority. The next day I was sent away and
eventually reached the camp at Freiburg, where I found my
brother. Captain A. E. Arnold, M.C., Tank Corps. The con-
duct of Gunner Ribbans and Driver Carney was beyond all
praise throughout. Driver Carney drove from Villers-
Bretonneux onwards." '

(Signed) C. B, Arnold, Lieut.,

6th Tank Battalion,
January 1, 1919.

1 This report was written by Lieut. Arnold after his return from Germany.
The tank was eventually found close to the railway on the eastern side of
the Harbonnieres-Rosieres road.

CHAPTER XXXI

GERMAN APPRECIATION OF BRITISH TANKS

The tardy development of both tanks and anti-tank de-
fences has been referred to ; from this it is evident that the
Germans did not take kindly to the tank idea. In the tank
they apparently only saw a cumbersome machine, a land
Merrimac ; they were unable to read the writing in iron or
to xmderstand the message that this machine brought with
it on to every battlefield, namely, " the doom to all mus-
cular warfare." Why they took so little interest in tanks
may have been due to the feeling that time lacked for their
development ; it may have been due to the extremely low
opinion held by the German Higher Command of our general-
ship, which prejudiced them against a purely British idea.
These, however, are trivial reasons, and there must have been
a deeper and broader foundation to their prejudice. The
two following extracts from documents issued by the German
General Staff appear to supply the real reason :

(i) From an account of the German offensive of 1918 :

" The use of 300 British tanks at Cambrai (1917) was a
battle of materiel. . . . The German Higher Command
decided, from the very outset, not to fight a battle of
materiel."

(ii) From an order issued by the German G.H.Q., similar
to many others issued during the war :

" The Higher Command is continually hearing that men
who are classified as ' fit for garrison duty ' are of the opinion
that there is no need for them to fight and that officers hesi-
tate to demand that they should do so. This totally erroneous
assumption must be definitely and rigorously stamped out.

236

CANNON-FODDER 237

Men in the field who are classified as fit for garrison or labour
duties, but who can carry a rifle, must fight."

Such was the German tactical policy : masses of men
rather than efficiency of weapons, quantity of flesh rather
than quality of steel.

The pohcy of drafting into first-line formations men who
could only just carry a rifle began in 1915. Since this date
it was the constant complaint of the German regimental
officer that he was obliged " to carry " in his unit an ever-
increasing number of useless men — men who, for physical
or moral reasons, were unfit to fight, who never intended to
fight, and who never did fight.

The best men went to the machine-gun units and to the
assault troops. In many cases the remainder of the infantry
were of little fighting value, though many of these men might
otherwise have been usefully employed in a war, which if
not one of materiel, was at least one in which economic
factors such as man-power played an important part.

By abiding by this policy of " cannon-fodder " the Ger-
man Higher Command was able to look at an order of battle
totalhng some 250 divisions — on paper a terrific muscular
force. Being pledged to a policy of emplojang masses of
men for fighting, the Germans were not in a position to find
labour for the construction of additional weapons such as
tanks. It now seems clear that this policy, at least as far
as tanks were concerned, was regretted before the end of
the war, as the following extracts and quotations will show :

In July 1918 General Ludendorff wrote : " In all the open-
warfare questions in the course of their great defensive
between the Marne and the Vesle, the French were only able
to obtain one initial tactical success due to surprise, namely,
that of July 18, 1918. It is to the tanks that the enemy
owes his success." A similar remark was made in an order
of the List Corps on July 23, 1918 : " As soon as the tanks
are destroyed the whole attack fails."

The tank victory at the battle of Amiens brought forth
a rich crop of appreciative comments from the Germans.
Ludendorff on August 11 wrote :

238 GERMAN APPRECIATION OF TANKS

"Staff officers sent from G.H.Q. report that the reasons
for the defeat of the Second Army are as follows : 'The fact
that the troops were surprised by the massed attack of
tanks, and lost their heads when the tanks suddenly ap-
peared behind them, having broken through under cover of
natural and artificial fog . . . the fact that the artillery
allotted to reserve infantry units . . . was wholly insuffi-
cient to establish fresh resistance . . . against the enemy
who had broken through and against his tanks.' "

A 2 1st Infantry Divisional Order dated August 15 con-
tained the following :

" Recent fighting has shown that our infantry is capable
of repelling an unsupported hostile infantry attack and is
not dependent on our protective barrage.

" On the other hand, a massed tank attack, as put in by
the enemy during the recent fighting, requires stronger artil-
lery defensive measures.

" The duty of the infantry is to keep the enemy advanc-
ing under cover of the tanks (whether infantry, cavalry, or
aeroplanes) away from our artillery in order to give the
latter freedom of action in its main r61e, viz. : the engage-
ment of tanks."

This clear statement that the main duty of the artillery
has become the engagement of tanks is noteworthy, especi-
ally when compared with previous orders which stated that
the allotment of artillery to tank defences must not inter-
fere with defensive barrages and counter-battery work.

This document continues :

" Counter-attacks against hostile infantry supported by
tanks do not offer any chances of success and demand un-
necessary sacrifices ; they must, therefore, only be launched
if the tanks have been put out of action."

Thus two of the mainstays of the former German defence,
i.e. " the protective barrage " and " the immediate counter-
attack," were abandoned in the event of tank attacks.

FRENZIED ANTI-TANK DEFENCE 239

Yet one more order is interesting, that issued on August 12
to the Crown Prince's Group of Armies :

" G.H.Q. reports that during the recent fighting on the
fronts of the Second and Eighteenth Armies, large numbers
of tanks broke through on narrow fronts, and pushing
straight forward, rapidly attacked battery positions and the
Headquarters of Divisions.

" In many cases no defence could be made in time against
the tanks, which attacked them from all sides.

" Anti-tank defence must now be developed to deal with
such situations."

" Messages concerning tanks will have priority over all
other messages or calls whatsoever " is the last extract we
will here quote, this order being sent out on September 8,
1918. These few words alone are sufficient to show that
the enemy at last had awakened to the danger of the tank
and was now making frenzied efforts to organise, at all
costs, an efficient anti-tank defence.

It was now no longer the pluck of our Royal Air Force,
the courage of our infantry, or the masses of our shells, it
was the tank which threatened the German with destruction
and against which he now concentrated all his energy.
These efforts were, however, so belated that even the
schemes and orders issued were contradictory and lack-
ing in co-ordination ; the actual practice was, needless to say,
still more diverse.

From August 1918 onwards the success of almost every
Allied attack was attributed to tanks in the German official
communiques. The Alhes were stated to have captured
such-and-such a place " by means of masses of tanks "
even on occasions when very few tanks had actually been
used. This explanation of any German lack of success by
reference to tanks soon produced very marked results both
in the German soldier and the German public.

Since the German Higher Command could explain away
failure in the event of tank attack the German regimental
officer very naturally came to consider that the presence of

240 GERMAN APPRECIATION OF TANKS

tanks was a sufficient reason for the loss of any position
entrusted to his care. His men came to consider that in
the presence of tanks they could not be expected to hold
out. Most German officers when captured were anxious to
explain that their captiire was inevitable and that they had
done all that could be expected of them. From this time
onwards their explanations generally became very simple :
" The tanks had arrived, there was nothing to be done."
The failure of the Higher Command to produce tanks to
combat those used by the Allies began to undermine the
faith of the troops in their generals.

As a result of the " massed tank attacks," so frequently
referred to in the communiques, the leading German mili-
tary correspondents dealt with the tank question at con-
siderable length. They pointed out the vital importance of
tanks and inquired what the German Higher Command
proposed to do about it, or reassured their readers that the
situation was well in hand and that a German tank would
shortly make its appearance in adequate numbers. So
nervous did the press grow that the War Ministry found it
necessary to offer an explanation.

General von Wrisberg, speaking for the Minister of War
in the Reichstag, made the following statement :

" The attack on August 8 between the Avre and the Ancre
was not unexpected by our leaders. When, nevertheless,
the Enghsh succeeded in achieving a great success the
reasons are to be sought in the massed employment of tanks
and surprise under the protection of fog. . . .

" The American Armies also should not terrify us. We
shall also settle with them. More momentous for us was the
question of tanks. We are adequately armed against them.
Anti-tank defence is nowadays more a question of nerve
than materiel."

On October 23 the German Wireless published the follow-
ing statement by General Scheuch, Minister of War :

" Germany will never need to make peace owing to a
shortage of war materiel. The superiority of the enemy

HINDENBURG'S LACK OF FORESIGHT 241

at present is principally due to their use of tanks. We
have been actively engaged for a long period in working at
producing this weapon (which is recognised as important)
in adequate numbers. We shall thus have an additional
means for the successful continuance of the war, if we are
compelled to continue it."

This statement was obviously made in reply to public
criticism, but the statement that efforts were being made
to produce a large number of tanks appears to be true.

It is doubtful, however, if it were true to say that they
had been actively working on tanks for a long time. It is
credibly reported that when Hindenburg visited the German
Tank Centre near Charleroi in February 1918, he remarked,
" I do not think that tanks are any use, but as these have
been made they may as well be tried." This remark of the Ger-
man Commander-in-Chief was typical of the general feeling of
the German Great General Staff towards tanks up to August 8,
1918. In our own Army it also expressed precisely the
feeling of a section of our Higher Command. It is hoped
that, as this chapter shows the. Germans were eventually,
though too late, cured of their want of foresight, we have
also been. As to this the future alone will enlighten us.

CHAPTER XXXII

AEROPLANE CO-OPERATION WITH TANKS

Prior to July 1, 1918, no definite aeroplane and tank co-
operation had been organised, though the want of such
co-operation had been long felt, and in one of the attacks
on Bourlon wood, during the battle of Cambrai, aeroplanes
had proved their value in protecting tanks from the enemy's
field guns.

The assistance which aeroplanes can afford tanks falls
under the two main headings of information and protection ;
in the future, no doubt, those of command and supply will
be added.

Prior to the battle of Arras, in February and March 1917,
certain experiments were carried out in communication
between tanks, aeroplanes and captive balloons by means
of the Aldis daylight signalling lamp, as already mentioned
in Chapter XXIV ; these experiments did not prove a
success. During the battle of Messines aeroplanes, with
considerable accuracy, reported the whereabouts of tanks on
the battlefield. At the Third Battle of Ypres this useful
work was continued, and again at the battle of Cambrai,
but during these last operations the days were usually so
misty as to forbid much useful work being accomplished.

After the battle of Cambrai every endeavour was made
by the Tank Corps to get this co-operation regularised and
placed on a sound footing, but except for some remarkable
tests carried out by the 1st Tank Brigade in the vicinity of
Fricourt, in February 1918, in which it was conclusively
demonstrated that low-flying aeroplanes could render the
greatest protective assistance to tanks, nothing was done to
institute a definite system of co-operation. To do so, only
one thing was required — namely, the attachment of a flight

242

NO. 8 SQUADRON, R.A.F. 243

or squadron of aeroplanes to the Tank Corps for experi-
mental purposes. At length on July 1, 1918, some five weeks
before the battle of Amiens began, No. 8 Squadron, R.A.F.,
equipped with eighteen Armstrong- Whitworth machines, was
attached to the Tank Corps, for the purpose of co-operating
with the tanks and carrying out experiments with a view
to future development. This squadron was under the
command of Major T. Leigh-Mallory, D.S.O., and it was due
to the energy of this officer that, in the extremely short
time available, such extensive progress was made in aero-
plane and tank co-operation, especially in contact work.
The benefit which resulted from this co-operation cannot be
over-estimated .

Early in June, No. 42 Squadron, R.A.F., had already
carried out experiments with smoke flares and Very lights
which were successful, whilst No. 22 Squadron attempted
wireless telephony, and No. 15 Squadron visual signalling
communication by means of discs swung out from the fusel-
age. These experiments formed the basis of the work
which No. 8 Squadron now started on with the 1st, 3rd, and
5th Tank Brigades, continuing it up to the opening of the
August offensive.

The account of the co-operation of No. 8 Squadron may
be conveniently divided into three periods :

(i) The period of preparation, July 1 to August 8.

(ii) The battle of Amiens.

(iii) The battle of Bapaume to November 11, 1918.

During the last-mentioned period No. 8 Squadron was re-
inforced by No. 73 Squadron, which, being equipped with
Sopwith-Camel machines, was able to deal effectively with
the enemy's anti-tank guns.

The first essential of successful co-operation being com-
radeship, a firm alliance was at once established between
the flights of No. 8 Squadron and the tank units with which
this squadron was working. This was carried out by at-
taching tank officers to the flights, these officers frequently
flying, whilst pilots and observers were given rides in the
tanks.

244 AEROPLANE CO-OPERATION

The battle of Hamel, on July 4, was the first occasion
upon which aeroplanes were definitely detailed to work
with tanks, C Flight of No. 8 Squadron being attached to
the 5th Tank Brigade for this operation. The morning was
a peculiarly dark one, with clouds at 1,000 ft. ; nevertheless
one aeroplane managed to get off at 2.50 a.m. and a second
at 3 a.m. These two machines flew low over the enemy's
lines with the object of drowning the noise of the approach-
ing tanks. Later on another machine, flying down into the
smoke of the artillery barrage, silenced some guns which
were giving considerable trouble. Altogether the assistance
that No. 8 Squadron rendered the Tank Corps, on this the
first occasion upon which these two mechanical arms co-
operated, boded well of the future.

After the battle of Hamel, tests and training were con-
tinued, " B " Flight concentrating on wireless telegraphy
and telephony with the 1st Tank Brigade, and " A " Flight
on visual signalling with the 3rd Tank Brigade.

The wireless telephony tests, though of exceptional in-
terest, did not prove very successful. Under very favourable
conditions speech could be heard in a moving tank from an
aeroplane flying at an altitude of 500 ft. and not more than
a quarter of a mile away. It was consequently decided
that, for immediate use, wireless telephony was not a prac-
tical means of communication.

Towards the end of July a series of most successful tests
were carried out in wireless telegraphy, tanks clearly receiv-
ing messages from aeroplanes at 2,500 ft. altitude and
9,000 yards away. Successful as ithese experiments proved,
they were destined to be still-born, for time was insufficient
to develop them or to apply them during active opera-
tions.

The disc signalling carried out by " A " Flight was insti-
tuted as a means of directing Whippet tanks on to their
objectives. By degrees a complete code of signals was
evolved so that the aeroplane was able to communicate both
the nature and direction of the target. In conjunction
with disc signalling, various kinds of smoke bombs and

CONTACT WORK 245

Very lights were experimented with, and by means of these
several very successful manoeuvres were carried out at the
Tank Gunnery School at Merlimont.

In spite of the fact that the period of preparation was
too short to enable the results of tests to be applied in battle,
pilots and observers had got to know a great many of the
tank officers with whom they were going to co-operate, and
in addition had learnt much concerning the limitations of
tanks, and the kind of information required by their staffs
and crews during action.

The programme of work for No. 8 Squadron on the open-
ing day of the battle of Amiens was as follows :

(i) Machines to fly over the line for the last hour of the
tank approach march in order to drown the noise of the
tank engines.

(ii) Contact and counter-attack patrols to keep tank units
constantly informed, by dropping messages at fixed stations,
as to the progress of the battle.

(iii) All machines were instructed to help the tanks when-
ever an opportunity arose.

On August 5 the Squadron concentrated at Vignacourt,
" C " Flight being detailed to work with the 5th Tank Bri-
gade and " B " and " A " Fhghts with the 4th and 3rd
Brigades.

At 2.50 a.m. on August 8 three machines " took off " to
cover the tanks during the last hour of the approach march.
The morning was dark and the clouds appeared high. Each
of these machines dropped six 25 lb. bombs, at intervals,
over the enemy's lines. Between 4.50 a.m. and 5 a.m. the
first four tank-contact patrol machines " took off." The
valleys were already coated with thick mist and within an
hour the whole country for miles was obscured. By flying
very low and making use of gaps in the mist, one of these
machines was able to report that tanks had passed through
Demuin, and consequently it was known that the bridge
there must be intact. The first message to be dropped at
the Advanced Headquarters of the Tank Corps read as
follows :

246 AEROPLANE CO-OPERATION

" To Advanced H.Q. Tank Corps
" (per aeroplane).
"W.4. 8th.

" Machine landed 8.30 a.m. reports AAA 6.15 a.m. 4 tanks
seen in action on a line SCO yards west of road through C.lT.b,
C.ll.d, C.12.a AAA 7.15 a.m. 4 tanks seen together heading
E on road beyond Hourges at C.ll central AAA 3 tanks seen
together in C.6.d uncertain AAA 7.20 a.m. Green Line taken,
tanks rallying to move off again AAA Foregoing report
applies to 5th Tank Battalion Sector AAA 7.45 a.m. 4 tanks
on road leading north out of Demuin V.25.C.4.8 AAA 1
tank at D.l.c central AAA 4 tanks at C.ll.d.3.8 heading
east AAA 7.45 a.m. French infantry seen in large numbers
on western outskirts of Moreuil wood and French barrage
on a line C.17.C C.23.a, & C.29.a & 28.D AAA Motor trans-
port probably armoured cars seen on road in U.26 near
Domart AAA German balloon observed up just east of Caix
about 8 a.m. at 1,200 ft. AAA Bombs dropped in W.22.d
south of Harbonni^res, target guns AAA Addressed 22nd
Wing 3rd, 4th and 5th Tank Bde. Advanced Hqrs. AAA.

" Sent by aeroplane to dropping ground Advanced H.Q.
Tank Corps.
" Note added.

" Cavalry and tanks in large numbers proceeding east at
8 a.m. south of Bois d'Aquenne.

" Intelligence Oflficer,

" 8th Squadron, R.A.F.
" 8.50 a.m."

Many other such messages were dropped during the day,
the Tank Brigade Headquarters being well posted with in-
formation as the attack proceeded.

On the following three days of the battle the enemy's
resistance in the air became much more marked. On
August 9 and 10 good targets were observed from the air
in the form of large parties of infantry and transport. On
the 10th, Captain West and Lieutenant Haslam were co-
operating with tanks near Rosieres when movement along
the roads was noticed in the neighbourhood of Roye. Al-
though some 8,000 yards from our lines Captain West im-
mediately flew his machines in that direction and with great

NO. 73 SQUADRON, R.A.F. 247

effect bombed and fired on the enemy's transport moving
eastwards. Just as he turned to fly back he was attacked
by seven Fokker biplanes. With almost the first burst one
of the hostile machines, which had got above Captain West's
right-hand wing, shot his left leg off between the knee and
the thigh, three explosive bullets hitting it. In spite of
the fact that West's leg fell amongst the controls and that
he was wounded ih the right foot he managed to fly his
machine back and land it in our lines. For this act of gal-
lantry he was awarded the Victoria Cross.

During the battle of Amiens aeroplane co-operation had
been chiefly confined to contact and counter-attack patrols.
The tanks had, however, during this battle, suffered heavily
from the German field guns, so, in the next great battle, the
battle of Bapaume, it was decided to make counter-gun
work a feature of aeroplane co-operation.

Instead of sending all machines up on contact and counter-
attack patrol, as many machines as possible were reserved
for counter-gun work. From this time onwards the ten-
dency was to concentrate more and more on this important
duty, and as fresh experiences were gained this work grew
more and more successful. Fortunately, just before the
Third Army, attack began, on August 21, No. 73 Squadron
(Sopwith-Camels) was attached to the Tank Corps for this
form of co-operation.

The tactics adopted in this counter-gun work are inter-
esting. To send down zone calls was useless, as the German
gunners opened fire, as a rule, when the tanks were but 1,000
yards away. Immediate action was, therefore, necessary,
and this was taken by bombing and machine-gunning hostile
artillery until the tanks had run over the emplacements.
The method of locating the hostile gun positions consisted
in carefully studying the ground prior to the attack by
consulting maps and air photographs, and from this study
to make out a chart of all likely gun positions. On Sep-
tember 2 a most valuable document was captured which set
forth the complete scheme the Germans had adopted in
connection with the distribution of their guns for anti-tank

248 AEROPLANE CO-OPERATION

work ; further, in this document were described the various
types of positions anti-tank gunners should take up. By
the aid of this document and a large-scale map it was pos-
sible to plot out beforehand the majority of possible gun
positions. As each of our aeroplanes had only about 2,000
yards of front to watch, the result was that all likely places
were periodically bombed. In this way, by selecting the
Hkely places beforehand, a great number of anti-tank guns
were spotted as soon as they opened fire, and thus immense
service was rendered to the tanks.

August 21 was the most disappointing day No. 8
Squadron experienced whilst attached to the Tank Corps.
The morning was very foggy and it was quite impossible for
the machines to leave the ground imtil 11 a.m., a little over
six hours after zero, which was at 4.55 a.m. In spite of this
the counter-gun machines were not too late to carry out
useful work against several batteries ; this work was chiefly
carried out by No. 73 Squadron, which was quite new to
the work. The value of the experience gained on this day
was amply demonstrated by the effective work carried out
by this Squadron on the 23rd, when many hostile guns were
attacked and their crews scattered. A good example of the
valuable work carried out by No. 73 Squadron occurred on
September 2.

A gun was observed being man- handled towards Chaufours
wood ; 800 rounds were fired at it, the gun crew leaving the
gun and seeking security in the wood. A little later on this
crew, emerging from the wood, attempted to haul the gun
into it ; fire was once again opened by the aeroplane, but in
spite of it the crew succeeded in their object. Bombs were
then dropped on the wood, and no fxirther movement was
observed.

On September 29 a wireless-signal tank was used as a
dropping station. This proved a most useful innovation,
for one aeroplane dropping its message at this station found,
on its return home, that this message had been received by
the headquarters to which it was directed within a few
minutes of it having been dropped, in fact, far quicker than

MESSAGE DROPPING 249

it would have been had the aeroplane dropped it at the
headquarters itself.

The dropping of messages to tanks in action was also
successfully accomphshed during the 29th. One of these
messages sent down the information that the Germans
were still holding the village of Bony; a group of tanks,
receiving this, at once wheeled towards Bony and attacked it.

On October 8 aeroplanes once again carried out useful
co-operation with the tanks. The following account is
taken from the report of an aeroplane the pilot of which
observed the tanks attackmg Serain :

" As the tanks were approaching we dropped bombs on
various parties of Germans who were in the village. The
tanks were then surrounding the village, one going right
into the centre of it ; a second attacked the orchard to the
south, mopping up parties of Germans ; whilst a third came
round the north of the village and was approaching a small
valley in which were 200 to 300 Germans covered by a
stretch of dead ground. On seeing the tank approaching
the Germans fled eastwards, whereupon we flew towards
them firing our machine guns, doing great execution."

Such actions as these were of daily occurrence and they
only went to prove what the headquarters of the Tank
Corps had long held — namely, that the co-operation of
aeroplanes with tanks is of incalculable importance, the
aeroplanes protecting the tanks and the tanks protecting
the infantry. In the future, no doubt, not only will mes-
sages be dropped and hostile guns silenced, but the com-
manders of tank battahons will be carried in the air, these
officers communicating with their machines by means of
wireless telephony, and supplies of petrol will be transported
by means of aeroplane for the replenishment of the tanks.

18

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME AND THE SECOND BATTLE OF ARRAS

The operations which took place between the conclusion of
the great battle of Amiens and the signing of the armistice
may conveniently be divided into three periods :

(i) The battle of Bapaume and the Second Battle of Arras
— August 21 to September 3.

(ii) The battles of Epehy and Cambrai St. Quentin —
September 18 to October 10.

(iii) The battles of the Selle and Maubeuge — October 17
to November 11.

The first comprises the fighting in the devastated area,
the second the breaking through of the Hindenburg system
of trenches, and the third open warfare east of this system.
Each of these periods will be dealt with in a separate chapter,
in which most of the detail of battle preparation will be
omitted so as to avoid a repetition of descriptions of work
which had by now been reduced to a routine in the Tank
Corps.

Towards the end of the battle of Amiens it became apparent
that the enemy was commencing to withdraw his troops in
the Pusieux-Serre area opposite the Third Army front, and
that, in all probability, this retirement was only part of a
general withdrawal on the entire front south of the Scarpe.
It was, therefore, decided on August 13 that the Third Army
should prepare an attack on the German front north of
the Somme, whilst the Fourth Ai'my continued to press the
enemy south of this river. Consequent on this decision the
3rd, 6th, 9th, 10th, 14th, and 15th Tank Battalions were
withdrawn from the Fourth Army area, and concentrated
in that of the Third. On August 15 to these battaUons were
added the 7th, 11th, and 12th of the 1st Tank Brigade. These

250

AUGUST 21, 1918 251

moves necessitated a complete reshuffling of Tank Brigades,
which on August 19 were constituted as follows :

(i) In the Third Army Area :

Ist Tank Brigade

3rd Battalion

Medium A.

7th

Mark IV.

10th

MarkV.

17th

Armoured oars

2nd Tank Brigade

6th

Medium A.

12th

Mark IV,

15th

Mark V Star.

3rd Tank Brigade

9th

Mark V.

11th

Mark V Star.

14th

Mark V.

(ii) In the Fourth Army Area

;

4th Tank Brigade

1st Battalion

Mark V Star.

4th

Mark V.

5th

Mark V.

5th Tank Brigade

2nd

Mark V.

8th

Mark V.

13th

Mark V.

On the Third Army front the attack was to be launched
on August 21 and, if successful, this attack was to be pushed
forward and the front extended by an attack delivered by
the Fourth Army south of the Somme. The general plan
was as follows :

The Vlth, IVth, and Vth Corps of the Third Army were
to attack on the line Beaucourt-sur-Ancre — Moyenneville, a
frontage of 17,000 yards, with the object of driving the
enemy eastwards across the Arras-Bapaume road and of
forcing him from the Somme area. Tanks were only to
operate between Moyenneville and Bucquoy, as the ground
south of this frontage was unsuited to tank movement ; for
this reason no tanks were allotted to the Vth Corps.

The allotment of tanks was as follows :

Vlth Corps . . 2nd and 3rd Tank Brigades.

IVth Corps . . 1st Tank Brigade.

Owing to the little time available and the necessity for
maintaining secrecy it was not possible to carry out any
training with the divisions of the Third Army ; many of
these, however, had previously attended demonstrations at

252 BATTLES OF BAPAUME AND ARRAS

Bermicourt, to supplement which notes were now issued and
as many lectures as possible given prior to this attack.

Another difficulty was reconnaissance, time for which was
most limited. Again previous work came to the rescue ; for
many officers in the Tank Corps had carefully studied the
area of attack prior to the Second Battle of the Somme and
had fought over it during the German spring offensive.

On the Fourth Army front the Ilird Corps, on the left
of this Army and north of the river Somme, was to attack
between Bray and Albert. The 4th Tank Brigade was to
assist in the attack and its machines were allotted to divisions
as follows :

4th Battalion . 10 tanks to 12th Division.

,, ,, .4 tanks to 18th Division.

5th Battalion . 10 tanks to 47th Division.

1st Battalion . 15 tanks to Fourth Army reserve.

South of the Somme the 5tli Tank Brigade was ordered
to co-operate with the Australian Corps on the front Herle-
ville — ChuignoUes ; the object of the attack being to capture
these villages and the rise running east of them. Tanks
were allotted as follows :

8th Battahon . 12 tanks to 32nd Division.

2nd Battahon . 12 tanks to 1st Australian Brigade.

13th Battahon . 12 tanks to 2nd AustraUan Brigade.

The battle of Bapaume, which began on August 21, is of
particular interest in that it was the first attack launched
against a new tactical system of defence recently adopted
by the enemy, namely, the holding of his reserves well in
rear of a lightly held outpost line. In conformity with the
principles of this system of defence in depth the Germans
had withdrawn their guns behind the Albert- Arras railway ;
this eventually complicated the tank attack, for had they
remained forward, as so frequently they had heretofore done,
they would have been surprised and captured during the
first phase of the battle ; as it was, they accounted for
many of our machines during the third phase.

In consequence of the enemy's new system of defence and

GERMAN FEAR OF THE TANK 253

the varying powers of the three marks of machines used by
the 1st and 2nd Tank Brigades, tanks were disposed in
echelons as follows :

(i) Two battalions of Mark IV tanks to operate as far as
the second objective.

(ii) One battalion of Mark V and one of Mark V star
machines to operate against the second objective and pro-
ceed as far as the Albert- Arras railway.

(iii) Two battahons of Whippets to operate beyond the
Albert- Arras railway line.

Zero hour was at 4.55 a.m. The Mark IV battalion moved
forward and successfully cleared the first objective and
pushed on towards the second. Once again the attack was
a surprise, perhaps not so much through it being unexpected
as through the inability of the Germans to meet it, especially
as their guns had been withdrawn. To illustrate how com-
plete this surprise was it is only necessary to mention that
candles were found still burning in the trenches when we
crossed them, and papers and equipment scattered broad-
cast gave evidence of the hurried flight of the enemy. The
second echelon and the Whippets had, however, a far more
difficult task to accomplish. The Albert- Arras railway had,
previous to the attack, been turned into a strongly defended
line of machine-gun nests covered by the German guns east
of it. Unfortunately the thick ground mist, which had
shielded the approach of the first echelon, now began to lift •
this enabled the German artillery observers to direct a
deadly fire on the tanks, in fact, each individual tank became
the centre of a zone of bullets and bursting shells. Avoiding
these zones, our infantry pushed on with few casualties.
During this day's fighting many parties of the enemy, some
over a hundred strong, surrendered en bloc directly the tanks
were seen approaching. Such action on the part of the
German infantry was becoming a stereotyped procedure in
all tank attacks. On the 21st, of the 190 tanks which took
part in the attack, 37 received direct hits.

On August 22 the Ilird Corps launched its attack on a
front of some 10,000 yards with complete success. The

254 BATTLES OF BAPAUME AND ARRAS

tanks, which had been instructed by the Ilird Corps to pro-
ceed in rear of the infantry, in actual fact led the attack
the whole way, effecting a penetration of about 4,000 yards.
All objectives were gained, and at the end of the day our
line ran east of Albert, east of Meaulte, east of the Happy
Valley, and through the western outskirts of Bray-sur-
Somme.

On the following day the attack of the Illrd Corps was
continued in conjunction with that of the Third Army to the
north and the Australian Corps to the south. The Ilird
Corps captured Tara and Usna hills, employing six tanks of
the 1st Tank Battalion in this action. On the Australian
front the thirty-six machines of the 5th Tank Brigade de-
ployed and led the infantry right on to their objective, which
was successfully occupied. On reaching this the machines
of the 2nd and 13th Battalions exploited north of ChuignoUes
with the 3rd Australian Brigade, whilst those of the 8th
Battalion rallied. During this attack the enemy put up a
stout resistance, his machine-gunners fighting with great
spirit and in many cases continuing to fire their guns until
run over by the tanks. Curiously enough, in comparison with
this, on the previous day the enemy's machine-gunners on
the Ilird Corps front scarcely put up any fight at all, and
when asked why they had not done so replied : " Oh ! it
would not have been any good."

The following is a typical battle-history sheet depicting
the tank fighting at this period ; it was written by a tank
commander who took part in the above attack.

" At 4.25 a.m. on the 23rd instant, I proceeded with my
female tank ' Mabel ' (No. 9382) in front of the infantry. I
made a very zigzag course to the wood in the south-west
edge of the village of ChuignoUes, where I encountered an
anti-tank gun which was eventually knocked out by the
male tank commanded by 2hd Lieut. Simmonds, who was
operating on my right. I then worked up the south side
of the village, heavily machine-gunning all the crops and
copses, and dislodged several machine-gun crews of the
enemy. I next came back to the village and mopped up the

A MOONLIGHT ATTACK 255

enemy on the outskirts until it was clear. Then, emerging
from the smoke of two shells which dropped short, I found
myself in the midst of a battery of whizz-bangs. The gunners
of this battery I at once proceeded to obliterate with good
success, after which I came behind another battery and
proceeded with the same operation. Then I started to take
infantry over to the high ground south of Square wood
in L.35d, when I was called back by an Australian colonel
to attend to some M.G. nests which had been left in the
centre of the village ; here I mopped up twelve M.G. nests
and then started to catch up the remainder of the tanks
and the barrage, but while at the top of a very steep bank,
approximately R. 10. b. 30. 50, I received a direct hit from
a whizz-bang on the front horns, which sent me out of con-
trol to the bottom of the bank, where I found it had broken
one plate of my left track. After repairing this, the barrage
having finished, and as tanks were coming back to rally, I
brought my tank back to the rallying-point at Amy wood."

In the Third Army the attack was re-opened on August 23
'by a moonlight operation, starting at 4 a.m., carried out
against the village of Gomiecourt. The 3rd Division, sup-
ported by ten Mark IV tanks of the 12th Battalion, attacked
this village and carried it. A little later the Guards Divi-
sion with four Mark IV. s captured the village of Hamelin-
court.

At 11 a.m. the Vlth Corps, assisted by fifteen Whippets,
attacked in the direction of Ervillers — Behagnies — Sapignies,
and by noon were east of the Bapaume-Arras road. Near
Sapignies heavy machine-gun fire was encountered, which
prevented our infantry moving forward ; notwithstanding
this the Whippets continued their advance. In one machine
the officer and sergeant were killed; the remaining man,
however, after placing the corpses in a shell-hole, continued
single-handed to follow the other tanks, and when a target
offered itself, locked his back axle and fired his Hotchkiss
gun. Although Sapignies and Behagnies were not captured
the operation was successful in securing a large number of
prisoners. This attack materially assisted that of the
IVth Corps on Achiet-le-Grand and Bihucourt, which were

256 BATTLES OF BAPAUME AND ARRAS

captured by the 37th Division and six Mark V tanks of the
1st Tank Brigade.

At 5.7 a.m., in spite of a very heavy gas barrage which
took place between 2 a.m. and 4 a.m., eighteen tanks of the
11th BattaUon and eight of the 9th Battalion co-operated
with the 52nd and 56th Divisions in an attack on the Hamel-
incourt-Heninel spur. Both these objectives were carried
with small loss.

On August 24 the attacks of the Third and Fourth Armies
were pushed with vigour, the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Tank Brigades
co-operating.

At 2 a.m. on the IVth Corps front four Mark IV machines
assisted the 37th Division west of Sapignies ; later on, seven
Mark IV tanks and nineteen Whippets attacked with the
New Zealand and 37th Divisions on Grevillers, BiefviUers, and
Loupart wood, which were captured. On the front of the
56th Division a bloody engagement began at 7 a.m. for the
ownership of the line St. Leger — ^Henin-sur-Cojeul, eleven
tanks of the 11th Battalion co-operating after an approach
march of 10,000 yards. All objectives were gained. At 2 p.m.
this attack was continued, two tanks leading the infantry
north of Croisilles as far as the Hindenburg Line, which was
strongly held. Both these machines had particularly excit-
ing experiences. One received a direct hit which rendered
the officer commanding it unconscious ; recovering his
senses, he at once took charge of his machine and pushed on.
In the other the crew were forced to evacuate the tank on
account of the enemy surrounding it with phosphorus
bombs ; before leaving it the officer in command turned the
tank's head towards home and then, getting out, walked
between the front horns of the machine until the fumes had
cleared away. All this time the tank was surrounded by the
enemy. This attack failed ; it is interesting, however, to
note that one tank of the 11th Battalion covered during this
operation 40,000 yards in some twenty-six hours.

At 3.30 p.m. five tanks of the 9th Battalion took part in
an attack on the line Mory copse — Camouflage copse. At first
there was not much opposition, but after Mory copse was

CAPTURE OF BRAY-SUR-SOMME 257

reached the enemy put up a stout resistance and, refusing to
surrender, was killed almost to a man, one party of about
sixty being put out of action by four rounds of 6-pounder
case shot.

At dawn this day on the Fourth Army front five tanks of
the 1st Battalion assisted the 47th Division in the recapture
of the Happy Valley, which had been lost on the previous
afternoon. This attack was entirely successful, and besides
the Happy Valley the extensive village of Bray was added
to our gains.

On the evening of August 24 the 3rd Tank Brigade was
transferred from the Third Army to the Canadian Corps of
the First Army for the forthcoming attack on the First
Army front, which was to initiate the Second Battle of
Arras. This entailed a lengthy night march of 29,000 yards
from Blaireville and Boisleux-au-Mont to Moyenneville,
thence to Achicourt.

On August 25 minor tank attacks were carried out on
the IVth Corps front against Favreuil, Avesnes, Thilloy, and
Sapignies, and on the 26th tanks of the 9th Battalion, some
of which had moved 37,000 yards since the night of the
24th-25th, attacked with the Guards Division north of
Mory. This attack was not a great success, due to the dense
mist, which made co-operation almost impossible and the
maintenance of direction most difficult. During this engage-
ment one tank had five members of its crew wounded by
anti-tank rifle bullets.

On the Canadian Corps' front an attack was carried out
opposite Fampoux and Neuville-Vitasse, the 2nd and 3rd
Canadian Divisions operating with tanks of the 9th and 11th
Divisions against Wancourt, Guemappe, and Monchy-le-
Preux. Near Monchy several tanks were knocked out, the
crews joining the infantry to repel a local counter-attack.
The sergeant of one crew, hearing that the enemy had cap-
tured his tank, collected his men and charged forward to
recover it, arriving at one sponson door of the machine as
the enemy were scrambling out of the opposite one.

On the following day, the 27th, operations continued east

258 BATTLES OF BAPAUME AND ARRAS

of Monchy-le-Preux, and in the Guemappe-Cherisy area, but
ceased altogether as far as tanks were concerned until the
29th. On this day minor tank operations were carried out
on the Third Army front south-west of Beugnatre by the
1st Brigade, the enemy having evacuated Thilloy and
Bapaume. This Brigade, on the 30th, co-operated with the
5th British and New Zealand Divisions against Fremicourt,
Beugny, Bancourt, Haplincourt, and Velu wood, whilst the
2nd Tank Brigade attacked Vaux-Vraucourt. All these
attacks were successful.

On the last day of August 1918, probably the most deci-
sive month in the whole war, nine Mark IV. s of the 12th
Battalion and four Whippets of the 6th Battalion attacked
the Longatte trench, Moreuil switch, and Vraucourt trench,
taking all these objectives, and on the following day, Sep-
tember 1, Whippets of the 6th Battalion completed the
above operations by establishing the infantry on the slopes
east of Vaux-Vraucourt.

The Second Battle of Arras reached its zenith on Sep-
tember 2 when the famous Drocourt-Queant line, which we
had failed to reach in April 1917, was broken. Starting
from the south the 1st Tank Brigade operated with the 42nd
and 5th Divisions against Beugny and Villars-au-Flos. To
the north of this attack the 2nd Tank Brigade assisted in
the Vlth Corps operations against Moreuil, Lagnicourt, and
Morchies. This attack was made in conjunction with those
of the Canadian and XVIIth Corps against the Drocourt-
Queant line. This line was attacked by the 1st and 4th
Canadian Divisions and the 4th Division, together with as
many tanks as the 9th, 11th, and 14th Battalions of the
3rd Tank Brigade could muster. The assembly of these
machines was difficult owing not only to the intricate nature
of the Sensee valley but to the fact that active operations
were taking place throughout these preparations.

The Drocourt-Queant line, built in the spring of 1917, was
protected by immensely strong belts of wire entanglement,
and it was expected that every effort would be made on the
part of the enemy to hold these defences at all cost ; never-

PRISONERS CAPTURED 259

theless, on the whole, less opposition was encountered than
had been anticipated. Except for anti-tank rifle fire, which
was especially noticeable at Villers-les-Cagnicourt, the tanks
met little opposition. It is estimated that in this attack one
company of tanks alone destroyed over seventy hostile
machine guns, the German gunners surrendering to the tanks
as they approached.

On the next day, the enemy falling back, the Whippet
tanks pushed forward to Hermies and Dermicourt. Thus the
Second Battle of Arras ended in an overwhelming success
by the piercing of the renowned Drocourt-Queant line. A
blow had now been delivered from which the enemy's moral
never recovered.

Since August 21, in all, 511 tanks had been in action, and
except for one or two minor failures every attack had cul-
minated in a cheap success — cheap as regards our own in-
fantry casualties, especially so when it is remembered that
during the fortnight which comprised the battle of Bapaume
and the Second Battle of Arras no fewer than 470 guns and
53,000 prisoners were captured. Thus in a little less than
one month the German Army had lost to the First, Third,
and Fourth British Armies 870 guns and 75,000 men with-
out counting killed and wounded.

CHAPTER XXXIV

GERMAN ANTI-TANK TACTICS

From September 1916 onwards to the conclusion of the war,
German anti-tank tactics passed through three phases.
Firstly, the enemy had no anti-tank defence at all, or what
he devised he based upon a misconception of what the
tank could accomplish. Secondly, having learnt but little
about tanks, he considered that only a small expenditure of
effort and materiel was required to deal with weapons of so
limited a scope. Thirdly, from August 1918 onwards, he
took panic and over-estimated their powers ; his efforts at
anti-tank defence became feverish and he appeared to be
wiUing to make any and every sacrifice to combat this
terrible weapon.

Captured documents clearly show that the introduction
of tanks was as great a surprise to the German General Stalf
as to their fighting troops. It is true that certain vague
rumours had been circulated that the Allies might use some
new weapon, but, as such rumours have throughout the war
been current on all sides, no particular importance was
attached to them. In spite of the fact that tanks were used
on several occasions between September 15 and November 13,
1916, and that the enemy held in his possession near Gueude-
court a captured tank for some fourteen days, he formed a
most inaccurate idea of it.

During the winter of 1916 and 1917 instructions were
issued on anti-tank defence. These were based on the
following entirely erroneous ideas :

(i) That tanks were largely dependent on roads.

(ii) That tanks would approach the German lines in day-
light.

(iii) That tanks were impervious to machine-gun fire.

300

GERMAN LACK OF JUDGMENT 261

These led to the Germans depending on road obstacles
such as pits and indirect artillery fire ; as a matter of fact,
at this time the most potent weapon which could have been
used against tanks was the machine gun firing A. P. bullets.
That the Mark I tank was not proof against these bullets
was not discovered until April 1917, after the British failure
at Biillecourt. This discovery was of little use, for by the
time the next battle was fought, Messines, a tank with thicker
armour, the Mark IV, had replaced the Mark I.

It is evident that throughout this period the German
Higher Command gave little thought to the tank question
and quite failed to appreciate the possibilities of the machine.
Prisoners were questioned and rough sketches, many gro-
tesque in the extreme, were obtained from them and published
for information. What information they imparted was mis-
leading ; in fact, the whole attitude of the German General
Staff, during this period, may be summed up as " stupidity
tempered with ridicule."

During 1917 the German grew to realise that artillery
formed the chief defence against tanks. Great prominence
was given to indirect fire by all types of guns and howitzers,
and in spite of several dawn attacks the enemy laid great
tress on what he called "Distant Defence." As actual
operations proved, indirect artillery fire produced little effect
save on broken-down machines. Partially learning this, the
Germans resorted to special anti-tank guns, and on an
average, two, protected by concrete, were emplaced on each
divisional front ; these were in certain sectors supplemented
by captured Belgian and old German guns. Fixed anti-
tank guns proved, however, of little use, for though a few
tanks were knocked out by them, notably at Glencorse wood
on the first day of the Third Battle of Ypres, they generally
were destroyed by our terrific initial bombardments. Curi-
ously enough, though both indirect fire and fixed guns proved
a failure, little consideration was, at this time, given to the
simplest form of artillery action against tanks, namely —
direct fire by field guns.

Infantry anti-tank defence, during 1917, was negligible

262 GERMAN ANTI-TANK TACTICS

and chiefly consisted in instructions how to " keep its
head " and to leave the rest to the artillery ; the use of
bundles of stick bombs was recommended, and though A.P.
bullets received no great support, the effect of the splash of
ordinary S.A.A. was not realised in the least degree.

Prior to the battle of Cambrai (November 1917) the true
anti-tank defence had been mud, mud produced by gun fire
and rain. At this battle the enemy was caught completely
unawares, his anti-tank defence was slight ; but a feature of
the operation was the improvised defence put up by a few
of the enemy's field guns, which inflicted heavy casualties on
tanks, especially at Flesquieres. In general, however, the
enemy realised the ineffectiveness of his anti-tank defence,
yet curiously enough he at present showed no decided
inchnation to adopt direct field-gun fire as its backbone.
In spite of the fact that the incident of a German battery,
served by an officer, putting a considerable number of tanks
out of action had received mention in the British dispatches,
still the enemy* remained oblivious to the utility of direct
fire, and in place of praising his gunners, as we did, he praised
troops from Posen who had put up a determined resistance
against tanks in I'ontaine Notre Dame.

The German counter-attack on November 30, 1917, which
resulted in the capture of a considerable number of tanks,
seems to have entirely allayed any anxiety created by the
attack on the 20th ; for though the question of anti-tank
defence was given rather more prominence than heretofore,
no greater practical attention was paid to it during the
winter of 1917-1918 than during the one previous to it.

The German offensive in the spring of 1918 put all defen-
sive questions into the background. This period, however,
produced a new weapon, the German anti-tank rifle.

This rifle was first captured during the battle of Hamel on
July 4. It had only just been issued to certain divisions;
other divisions were equipped with it later on,

This weapon was 5 ft. 6 in. in length, it weighed 36 lb.
and fired single shots, using A. P. ammunition of '530 calibre.
It was too conspicuous and too slow a weapon to be really

LUDENDORFF'S ANXIETY 263

effective against tanks, though it could easily penetrate
them at several hxindred yards range. Its chief disadvantage
was that the German soldier would not use it ; not only
was he not trained to do so, but he was afraid of its kick,
and still more afraid of the tanks themselves. It is doubt-
ful if 1 per cent, of the anti-tank rifles captured in our tank
attacks had ever been fired at all.

The French counter-attack between the Aisne and the
Marne in July, followed by the British victories of Amiens and
Bapamne in August, struck through the opacity of the German
General Staff like a bolt from out the blue, with a result
that a complete volte face was made as regards tanks. The
instructions now issued gave anti-tank defence the first place
in every project ; the eyes of General Ludendorff were now
opened, and, reahsing the seriousness of the tank problem,
on July 22 he wrote as follows :

" The utmost attention must be paid to combat tanks —
our earher successes against tanks lead to a certain con-
tempt for this weapon of warfare. We must, however, now
reckon with more dangerous tanks."

This is a more human document than those subsequently
issued by the German Chief of the General Staff. Luden-
dorff now clearly realised that anti-tank defence had been
neglected ; he probably realised also that this neglect would
be difficult to explain to the army and the pubUc, which, as
a result of failures, were about to become far more critical
of their leaders than ever before.

It is not clear, however, whether Ludendorff realised a
still more serious aspect of the tank problem, namely, that
it was now too late to organise an efficient defence against
the " more dangerous tanks." Such a defence might have
been created before these tanks were available in effective
numbers ; it could not be organised now unless the pressure
the AUies were now exerting could be reheved. This was
impossible, for the motive force of this pressure was the tank.

The steps which the German General Staff now took to

264 GERMAN ANTI-TANK TACTICS

combat the tank are interesting. Special officers were
appointed to the staffs of Groups of Armies, Corps, Divisions,
and Brigades, whose sole duty it was to deal with anti-tank
defence within these formations. The field gun was at
length recognised as the most efficient anti-tank weapon
available. These guns were organised as follows :

(i) A few forward and silent guns in each divisional sector
— outpost guns.

(ii) Sections from batteries in reserve were allotted definite
sectors. On a tank attack taking place, they would gallop
forward and engage any tank entering the sector allotted
to the section. These sections of guns proved the backbone
of the German anti-tank defence.

(iii) All batteries (howitzers included) were ordered to
take up positions from which advancing tanks could be
engaged by direct fire. The most effective range for this
purpose was first considered to be over 1,000 yards ; this was
gradually reduced to about 500.

Batteries in (i) and (ii) were to be employed for anti-tank
work only, in (iii) they were available for other work, but
in the event of a tank attack the engagement of tanks was
their chief task.

The duty still allotted to the infantry was " to keep their
heads " or "to keep calm," actions which at this period
were impossible to the German Higher Command directly
tanks were mentioned. Other orders laid down that in the
event of a tank attack " infantry should move to a flank."
How this was to be done when tanks were attacking on
frontages of twenty to thirty miles was not explained. A.P.
ammunition had to a great extent fallen into discredit, and,
curious to record, the effect of " splash " as a means of bhnd-
ing a tank was still hardly realised, and this after two years
of tank warfare.

As artificial obstacles had proved of little use from the
end of July, when the Germans withdrew behind the rivers
Ancre and Avre, until the signing of the armistice every
effort was made to use river lines as a defence against tanks.
Road obstacles and stockades were still in use, but though

ANTI-TANK DEFENCES 265

they proved a hindrance to the movement of armoured cars
they proved none to tanks.

A great deal of energy and explosive material was ex-
pended in laying minefields. At first, special mines in the
form of a shallow box were used ; later on these were re-
placed by shells. Lack of time, however, prevented the
enemy from developing sufficiently large minefields to pro-
duce an important result.

The idea of combining the various forms of anti-tank
defence under one command in such a way as to form an
anti-tank fort had been dealt with on paper, but was only
in a very few cases put into practice. The idea was a sound
one, and if well combined with natural obstacles it would
have formed the best defence against tanks that the enemy
could have created with the means at his disposal.

An anti-tank fort was to consist of : »

Four field guns, 2 flat-trajectory minenwerfer, 4 anti-tank
rifles, and 2 machine guns firing A. P. ammunition. The fort
was to be sited several thousand yards behind the outpost
guns and close to the main line of defence.

Throughout the last two years of the war occasional
successes were gained by the Germans by various means of
anti-tank defence, these usually being due to a combination
of the following circumstances :

(i) The use of tanks outside their limitation.

(ii) A hitch or failure in carrying out the plan of attack.

(iii) An exceptional display of resource, initiative, and
courage on the part of some individual German soldier.

In general the keynote of the German anti-tank defence
was lack of foresight, the development of tanks not being
appreciated. Among the very large number of captured
orders dealing with anti-tank defence there is no recorded
instance of any anticipation of superior types of tanks to
those already in use. The German General Staff lacked
imagination and the faculty of appreciating the value of
weapons that had not been explained to them whilst at
school; obsolescence dimmed their foresight.

19

CHAPTER XXXV

THE BATTLES OF EPEHY AND CAMBKAI — ST. QUENTIN

On September 4 all Tank Brigades were withdrawn from
Armies and placed in G.H.Q. reserve to refit and reorganise.
When this had been completed Tank Brigades were con-
stituted as follows :

1st Tank Brigade

7th BattaUon

Mark IV.

nth

Mark V Star.

12th

Mark IV.

15th

Mark V Star.

2nd Tank Brigade

10th

Mark V.

14th

Mark V.

3rd Tank Brigade

3rd

Medium A.

6th

Medium A.

9th

Mark V.

17th

Armoured cars

4th Tank Brigade

1st ,

Mark V.

4th

Mark V.

5th

Mark V.

301st American Battalion

Mark V Star.

5th Tank Brigade

2nd Battalion

Mark V.

8th

Mark V.

13th

Mark V.

At 7 a.m. on September 17, in a heavy storm of rain, the
Fourth and Third Armies initiated the battle of Epehy by
attacking on a front of some seventeen miles from Holnon
to Gouzeaucourt, the First French Army co-operating
south of Holnon.

On September 18 the 4th and 5th Tank Brigades were
released from G.H.Q. reserve and allotted to the Fourth
Army, the 2nd Tank Battalion having been transferred to
this Army on September 13.

On this day the battle of Epehy continued on the front
Epehy-Villeret, some 7,000 yards long. In this attack
twenty tanks of the 2nd Battalion assisted the Ilird Corps,

266 '

BATTLE OF EPEHY 267

Australian Corps, and IXth Coi-ps. On the Ilird Corps front
heavy machine-gun fire was encountered and overcome,
many machine guns being destroyed. On that of the IXth
progress was slow, and the Australians, meeting with little
resistance, captured Ronssoy and Hargicourt.

After two days' rest the attack was continued on the
21st, nine tanks of the 2nd Battalion operating on the Ilird
Corps front against the Knoll and Guillemont farm. Two
of these machines carried forward infantry, but the machine-
gun fire was so heavy that it was not possible to drop them.
During this day the enemy put up a most determined resis-
tance and there were not sufficient tanks engaged to silence
his machine guns. Another two days' rest followed, and
then again was the attack renewed on the IXth Corps front
against Fresnoy-le-Petit and the Quadrilateral, nineteen
machines of the 13th Battalion attacking with the 1st and
6th Divisions. So heavy was the enemy's gas barrage on
this day that some of the tank crews were forced to wear
their respirators for over two hours on end. In spite of the
enemy being in great strength eighteen machines assisted the
infantry. Thus ended the battle of Epehy and though the
advance was not great nearly 12,000 prisoners and 100 guns
were added to the " bag."

Preparations were now set in hand for an extensive attack
against the Hindenburg and auxiliary lines of defence, which
together formed a zone of entrenchments for the most part
very heavily wired and extending over a depth varying from
8,000 to 16,000 yards. This attack entailed another hasty
reorganisation of tank battalions, which was completed by
September 26, when the battle order of Brigades was as follows :

1st Tank Brigade

7th BattaUon

Mark IV

BuUeoourt.

H.Q. Bihuoourt

11th

Mark V Star

Barastre.

12th

Mark IV

W. of Ruyaulcourt.

1st T.S. Coy.

S. of Velu.

2nd G.C. Coy.

Bancourt.

2nd Tank Brigade

10th Battalion

Mark V Star

Auchy les Hesdin.

H.Q. Gomiecourt

14th

Mark V

Winnipeg Camp.

15th

Mark V Star

Hermies.

2nd T.S. Coy.

Gomiecourt.

1st G.C. Coy.

N.W. of Vaux-Vrauoo

268 BATTLES OF EPEHY AND CAMBRAI— ST. QUENTIN

3rd Tank Brigade

5th Battalion

Mark V

E. of Cartigny.

H.Q. Barleux

6th

Medium A

S. of Tincourt.

9th

Mark V

S. of Tincourt.

3rd T.S. Coy.

S. of Tincourt.

4th Tank Brigade

1st Battalion

Mark V

Manancourt.

H.Q. Templeux-

4th „

Mark V

S. of Manancourt

la-Fosse

301st American

Mark V Star

S. of Manancourt.

Battalion

4th T.S. Coy.

S. of Manancourt

5th Tank Brigade

2nd Battalion

Mark V

Suzanne.

H.Q. Bois-de-

3rd

Medium A

S. of Roisel.

Buire

8th

Mark V

S. of Tincourt.

13th

Mark V

S. of Tincourt.

16th

Mark V Star

S. of Tincourt.

17th

Armoured
Cars

Buire.

5th T.S. Coy.

S. of Tincourt.

The rapidity with which these changes were made would,
a few months back, have bewildered both the Tank Corps
Headquarter Staff and the Brigade and Battalion Comman-
ders themselves ; now the knack of rapid movement had
been mastered, and though great energy had to be exerted
during such reorganisations, they were generally accom-
plished in time and efficiently.

On September 27 the great battle began, comprising the
First, Third, and Fourth Armies on a front of sixteen miles.
The battlefield was divided into two main sectors, to the
north that of the First and Third Armies, between the Sensee
river and Gouzeaucourt, with the object of capturing Bourlon
hill, and to the south that of the Fourth Army with the
capture of the Knoll, Guillemont farm, and Quennemont
farm as its objectives.

East of the First Army front line ran the canal Du Nord,
a formidable obstacle to tanks in spite of the fact that it
was dry, having never been completed. This canal varied from
36 to 50 ft. wide at the bottom, and was 12 ft. deep, and the
slopes of its sides were in many places steep. The enemy,
evidently suspecting that tanks might attempt to cross it,
had at certain places rendered this temporarily impossible,
so it was thought, by cutting in its bank a vertical wall 9 ft.

THE CANAL DU NORD 269

deep for several hundreds of yards along the eastern side
between Moeuvres and Inchy. In the Maquion-Bourlon
sector the enemy had made little anti-tank preparation,
probably considering that the canal itself formed a sufficient
obstacle. In the Beaucamp sector, however, anti-tank
preparatiors were exceptionally thorough, many anti-tank
rifles being placed in position here.

Sixteen tanks of the 7th Battalion, all Mark IV. s, some
of which had fought over very nearly the same ground in
November 1917, were allotted to co-operate with the Cana-
dian Corps. In spite of the formidable great ditch which
lay in front of them, fifteen of these machines crossed the
canal Du Nord near Moeuvres, and attacked Bourlon
village and the western edge of Bourlon wood. Of these
fifteen machines only three were put out of action, one by a
mine placed in a road leading through a gap in the canal and
two by a battery near Deligny hill.

On the Third Army front Corps were disposed from north
to south as follows : XVIIth, Vlth, IVth, and Vth Corps.

Twenty-six tanks of the 15th Battalion operated with the
XVIIth Corps south of Bourlon wood, and with the Vlth
Corps against Flesqui^res and Premy Chapel. A fine per-
formance was here carried out in crossing the canal, and
although more than one attempt had to be made by' several
of the tanks the 9 ft. wall was successfully surmounted.
This attack was an overwhelming success in spite of the
heavy tank casualties, 11 out of the 26 machines operating
being hit on the extreme objectives. On the IVth Corps
front 12 machines of the 11th Battalion attacked between
Gouzeaucourt and Trescault: this operation was, however,
only partially successful.

On the front of the Fourth Army the 27th American
Division, supported by twelve tanks of the 4th Tank Bat-
talion, carried out a preparatory attack on the Knoll, Guille-
mont and Quennemont farms, the object being to advance
the front line so as to be in a better position to attack in
force on the 29th. The Germans holding this sector of their
line were reliable and well led troops, and in spite of the fact

270 BATTLES OF EPEHY AND CAMBRAI— ST. QUENTIN

that the tanks and infantry reached their objectives a counter-
attack drove them back, with the result that up to zero-hour
on the 29th the actual location of our front line was very
uncertain.

On September 28 a small local attack, which was com-
pletely successful, was carried out against Raillencourt and
St. Olle ; in this six tanks of the 7th Battalion took
part.

On the following day seven tanks of the 11th Battalion
co-operated with the Vth Corps in the capture of Gonnelieu
and Villers Guislain in spite of strong resistance put up by
the enemy.

On the Fourth Army front an important battle of con-
siderable magnitude was fought on the 29th, involving some
175 tanks. The object of this battle was to, force the Hin-
denburg Line between Bellenglise and Vendhuile. Along
this front is situated the St. Quentin canal, and as, between
Bellicourt and Vendhuile, this canal runs underground
through a tunnel, it provided the German garrisons of this
sector of their line with good underground cover. An
operation on this sector had been the subject of careful
study by the Tank Corps General Staff both in England and
France ever since the summer of 1917, as this tunnel and a
shorter one just north of St. Quentin provide the only
negotiable approaches for tanks over the canal. It was fully
realised that the enemy would put up a most determined
resistance to secure his retention of the tunnel, for should
it be occupied by us the whole of the Hindenburg defences
north and south of it would be threatened.

The attack was to be carried out by four Corps, the IXth
Corps on the right, the American and Australian Corps in
the centre, and the Ilird Corps on the left.

The American Corps was to capture the first objective,
the strongly entrenched system east of Bony ; the Aus-
tralian Corps was then to pass through the gap made
and be followed by the American Corps exploiting north
and south. The IXth Corps was to clear the west bank of
the St. Quentin canal under cover of the southern wing of

GUILLEMONT FARM 271

the American exploitation force, whilst the Ilird Corps was
to move forward with the left of the American Corps.

Tanks were allotted to Corps as follows :

3rd Tank Brigade, 5th, 6th, and 9th Battalions, to the IXth
Corps.

4th Tank Brigade, 1st, 4th, and 301st American Battalion,
to the Australian Corps.

5th Tank Brigade, 8th, 13th, and 16th Battalions, in Army
reserve.

The 301st American Battalion was attached for opera-
tions to the 27th American Division.

A thick mist covered the ground when the tanks moved
forward at 5.50 a.m. It will be remembered that the situa-
tion opposite the Knoll and the two farms of Guillemont and
Quennemont was very obscure. This attack, which was to
break the well sited and highly organised Hindenburg Line,
was necessarily a " set piece " attack in which objectives,
allotment of tanks, etc., had to be carefully worked out
beforehand. The plan of operations was based on the
assumption that the line — the Knoll — Guillemont farm —
Quennemont farm — would form the " jumping off " line. The
resistance put up by the enemy in this sector was far greater
than ordinary, with the result that up to the time of the
attack the above line was still in German hands. This
meant that the artillery programme would have to be hastily
changed or left as it was. The latter course was decided
on so as to obviate confusion, and this necessitated the
infantry attackers starting at a considerable distance in
rear of the protective barrage. As events turned out the
task set the Americans proved too severe, nevertheless with
great gallantry they pushed forward, some of them actually
forcing their way through the German defences. The
majority, however, were mown down by the exceptionally
heavy machine-gun fire which was brought to bear on them.
The attack failed.

Meanwhile the 301st American Tank Battalion met with
a disaster, for, whilst moving forward from near Ronssoy,
it ran into an old British minefield west of Guillemont farm

272 BATTLES OF EPEHY AND CAMBRAI— ST. QUENTIN

laid in the previous February ; ten machines were blown up
and only two succeeded in assisting the infantry. This
minefield consisted of rows of buried 2 in. trench-mortar
bombs, each containing 50 lb. of ammonal; the explosions
were terrific, the whole bottom of many machines being torn
out ; in nearly all cases the crews of these tanks suffered very
heavy casualties.

In the south, tanks of the 4th and 5th Brigades cleared
Nauroy and Bellicourt and broke through the Hindenburg
Line. The mist now began to lift, and consequent on the
failure of the northern attack, the attackers were placed,
tactically, in a very dangerous situation, for the enemy was
now able to fire into their backs. Several tanks, which had
been allotted to later objectives, on realising the seriousness
of the situation went into action on their own initiative with-
out either artillery or infantry support. This very gallant
action undoubtedly saved a great many infantry casualties,
though the tanks themselves suffered heavy losses.

On the right the attack of the IXth Corps was a complete
success ; in the first rush the 46th Division crossed the
canal, a magnificent performance, and captured Magny and
Etricourt with 4,000 prisoners. The tanks operating with
this Corps, being unable to cross with the troops, who waded
and swam the water in the canal, moved on Bellicourt, a
difficult operation in the dense fog. From this place they
swung south, working down the bank of the canal, and arrived
in time to take part in the capture of Magny. During this
action the enemy's artillery fire proved very accurate ;
which was, however, to be expected, for this was the third
tank assault on the Knoll — Guillemont — Quennemont posi-
tion; consequently the German gunners had become
thoroughly drilled in the defence of this sector.

On the following day eighteen tanks of the 13th Battalion
worked up the Hindenburg and the Nauroy — Le Catelet lines,
but on account of some misunderstanding the infantry did
not follow, consequently the operation did not prove of
much value.

On the First Army front six tanks of the 9th Battalion

TANK SMOKE CLOUDS 273

operated with the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions against
Cuvillers, Blecourt, and Tilloy ; they crossed the Douai-
Cambrai road near Sancourt and greatly helped the infantry
by overcoming the determined machine-gun resistance which
was encountered throughout this attack. On the next day
further tanks of this Battalion assisted the 32nd Division
in occup5ang the Fonsomme line east of Joncourt. In this
action smoke clouds were used from tanks to cover their
approach from the observation of the German gunners ;
this proved very successful and undoubtedly reduced loss
by gun fire. One tank had a curious experience : a smoke
bomb having burst on the top of it, the crew were forced to
evacuate the machine on account of the fumes being drawn
inside. The tank commander, having put the fire out, was
unable to find his crew ; as time was short he got inside the
tank and continued his advance alone ; on his way forward
he took on board an ofiicer and two men of the Manchester
Regiment. The tank then went into action against a
machine-gun nest ; as the improvised crew was ignorant
of the Hotchkiss gun each time a jam occurred the tank
commander had to leave the driver's seat to rectify it.
Shortly afterwards the truant crew turned up, so the tank
commander, having first driven his newly-made comrades to
cover, dropped them, and then proceeded on his way.

On October 3 an attack was launched against the Seque-
hart-Bony front in which twenty machines of the 5th Tank
Brigade proved of very great assistance to the 32nd and
46th Divisions. Sequehart was cleared and so was Rami-
court and Doon copse, but Montbrehain remained uncap-
tured.

On the 4th, the 3rd Tank Battalion was transferred from
the 5th to the 3rd Tank Brigade, and a day later the 16th
Tank Battalion from the 5th to the 4th Tank Brigade. The
8th, 9th, and 13th Battahons were withdrawn into G.H.Q.
reserve. On the 5th the first phase of the battle of Cam-
brai — St. Quentin opened with a failure to take Beaurevoir
in which attack six tanks of the 4th Tank Battahon attempted
to assist the 25th Division. Co-operation in this action was

274 BATTLES OF EPEHY AND CAMBRAI— ST. QUENTIN

indifferent, due chiefly to the fact that the infantry of this
division had never been trained to work with tanks. This
failure was partially retrieved by a brilliantly executed
attack by the Australians supported by twelve tanks of the
16th Battalion against Montbrehain. This village was held
by the enemy in strength, and many good targets at close
quarters were obtained for 6-pounders firing case shot. The
co-operation throughout was excellent, as, since the battle
of Hamel, had always been the case when operating with
the Australian Corps — tank commanders constantly getting
out of their tanks and talking to the infantry.

The second phase of the Cambrai — St. Quentin battle
opened on the morning of October 8 on an eighteen miles
front — -it was entirely successful. Tanks were allotted as
follows, eighty-two in all being used :

Ist Tank Brigade 12th Battalion 1 Company to IVth Corps.

1 Company to Vlth Corps.
1 Company to XVIIth Corps.
11th BattaUon To Vth Corps.

4th Tank Brigade 1st Battalion To Xlllth Corps.

301st American Battalion To Ilnd American Corps.
3rd Tank Brigade 3rd Battalion To Ilnd American Corps.

6th Battalion To IXth Corps.

The attacks, carried out by the 12th Tank Battalion on
the front Niergnies — La Targette, were successful, the in-
fantry universally testif3ang to the assistance rendered by
this battalion. An interesting encounter now took place,
the enemy counter-attacking from the direction of Awoingt
with four captured British Mark IV tanks, one male and
three females. The counter-attack was speedily dealt with,
the renegade male being knocked out by a 6-pounder shell
fired by one of our own tanks and one female put out of
action by a shell fired from a captured German field gun
by a tank section commander ; the remaining two females
fled on the approach of one of our machines of the same sex.
So ended the second tank encounter as successfully as the
first, which it will be remembered was fought near the village
of Cachy on April 24, 1918.

FIELD WARFARE 275

The other actions fought on this day were briefly as fol-
lows :

One Company of the 11th Battahon assisted the 32nd
Division against Villers-Outreaux, another company operated
with the 21st Division and the third company with the 38th.
This last company was of great assistance, as the infantry
had been held up by a broad belt of wire which they were
unable to cross until the tanks crushed down pathways
through it.

The 6th Tank Battalion, operating with the Ilnd Ameri-
can Corps, carried out its programme, one of its machines
putting three batteries of field guns out of action in Fraicourt
wood ; and the 3rd Battalion came into action in the neigh-
bourhood of Serain. This village was very strongly defended,
the enemy holding it to cover his withdrawal.

On October 9 the attack continued along the whole front,
eight tanks of the 4th Battalion coming into action east of
Fremont and the 17th Armoured Car Battalion, under orders
of the Cavalry Corps, operating around Maurois and
Honnechy. Two days later, on the 11th, five tanks of the
5th Battalion operated with the 6th Division north of
Riguerval wood ; this was the last tank action fought in
this battle.

The battle of Cambrai — St. Quentin was at an end. The
Hindenburg Line had now to all intents and purposes ceased
to exist as an obstacle. It had been broken on a front of
nearly thirty miles, on which frontage a penetration of some
twenty miles had been effected, and no fewer than 630 guns
and 48,000 prisoners captured during the last fourteen days.
The effect of this great battle, coupled with the successes of
the French in the south and the operations east of Ypres and
round Courtrai, fought by the British, French, and Belgians
in the north, resulted in the withdrawal of the German
forces in the Roubaix, Lille, and Douai area, and with this
withdrawal the whole of the British forces in France from
north of Menin to Bohain, seven miles north-west of Guise,
were faced with field warfare ; open country stretched
before them, uncut by trench, unhung by wire. The period

276 BATTLES OF EPEHY AND CAMBRAI— ST. QUENTIN

of exploitation had arrived — that period all our endeavours
had been concentrated on attaining during four years of the
most desperate and relentless war in history.

Considering the comparative weakness of the British
Army, the time of the year, and the nature of the fighting,
it had truly been a notable performance on the part of the
English and the Dominion infantry, to have fought their
way so far. To carry out a rapid pursuit was beyond
their endeavours, for the German Army, though beaten, was
not yet broken. For cavalry to do so was unthinkable, for
the German rearguards possessed many thousands of
machine guns, and as long as these weapons existed, pursuit,
as cavalry dream it to be, is utterly impossible. One arm
alone could have turned the present defeat into a rout — the
tank, but few of these remained, for since August 8 no fewer
than 819 machines had been handed over to Salvage by
the tank battalions, and these battalions themselves had
lost in personnel 550 officers and 2,557 other ranks, a small
number indeed when compared with the number of actions the
Corps had been engaged in, yet a severe loss out of a fighting
state of some 1,500 officers and 8,000 other ranks.

Had it been possible at this crisis to put into the field
two fresh brigades of medium tanks, that is about 300
machines, the cost of which would be approximately
£1,500,000, or one-fifth that of one day's cost of the war,
the greatest war in all history might have closed on or near
the field of Waterloo in a decisive victory ending in an un-
conditional surrender or an irretrievable rout.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE U.S.A. TANK CORPS

On April 2, 1917, the United States of America entered the ■
Great War. Up to this date tanks had not aceomphshed
much. British machines had taken part in the battles of
the Somme and Ancre, and the first French ones had made
their appearance on the training ground in October 1916.

In June 1917, Lieutenant- Colonel H. Parker was detailed
to inquire into the military value of tanks, and in the follow-
ing month he forwarded his report on this subject to the
Operation Section of the Infantry Committee of Colonel
C. B. Baker's Commission.

Lieutenant- Colonel Parker's report makes good reading;
not only is it virile but sound. It was indeed a great pity
that it was not more completely acted on. The following is
an extract from it :

" 1. A hole 30 k. wide -punched through the whole German
formation deep enough to uncover a line of communication
to a flank attack.

" This hole must be wide enough to assure the passage of
lighter equipment — the divisional machine-gun companies
can follow the tanks because the tanks will make a road for
them.

" The wave of machine guns — divisional companies — must
turn out to right and left, supported by a second line of
tanks, to widen the breach.

" The wave of machine guns must be followed by cavalry
— ' hell for leather ' — ^if the hole is once punched through,
and this cavalry must strike hnes of communication at all
hazards. Possibly motor-cycle machine guns may be better
adapted to this use than cavalry, but I am a believer in
the cavalry. Support it with Jitney-carried infantry and
machine guns as quickly as possible.

277

278 THE U.S.A. TANK CORPS

" 2. The problem is thai of passing a defile. Nothing
more. It is like trying to force a mountain pass, where the
sides are occupied by enemy who can fire down into the pass.
The ' pass ' is some 30 k. in length, and we must have some-
thing that can drive through. Then turn to the sides and
widen the breach. Assail 100 k. to cover assault.

" It is the old ' flying wedge ' of football, with interference
coming through the hole in the line. The ' tanks ' take the
place of the ' line buckers ' who open the hole ; the ' Divi-
sional Jitney machine guns ' are the ' interference,' the
' cavalry ' will carry the ball as soon as the hole • is opened,
i.e. ride through and hit the line of communication.
" 3. The operation works out this way :
(a) A cloud of fighting avions at high altitude, to clear

the air.
(6) A cloud of observation avions at low altitude, just
in front of the line of tanks, dropping bombs and
using machine guns on the trenches.

(c) Our long-range artillery blocking the German artillery.

(d) Our lighter artillery barraging the front to prevent

escape of the Germans in their front lines.

(e) Our mobile machine guns following up the tanks at

about 500 yards, covering them with canopy fire,

step by step.
(/) Our Divisional Jitney companies of machine guns

driving in ' hell-bent ' after the tanks and widen-
ing the breach,
(g) Our cavalry riding through this breach as soon as

it is opened for them and swinging out d la Jeb.

Stuart around McClellan's Army. Sacrificed ? of

course, but winning results worth the sacrifice.
(h) Jitney or truck-transported infantry following as

fast as gasoline can carry it to support the success

and make our foothold sure.
(i) Truck- transported — or tank- transported — artillery

following as fast as possible.

" I BELIEVE SUCH A PLAN WILL WIN. FrITZ HAS NOT THE
RESOURCES TO ADOPT SUCH A PLAN. We HAVE. We SHOULD

DO IT AND DO IT NOW as far as preparation goes in material.
It will take time to get ready."

Shortly before this report was written, Colonel Rocken-
bach, the commander designate of the American Tank

AMERICAN TANK TRAINING 279

Corps, landed in France and proceeded with General Per-
shing to Chaumont, the U.S.A. General Headquarters.

On September 23, 1917, a project for a Tank Corps was
approved. The Corps was to consist of 5 heavy and 20
light battahons, together with headquarter units, depots
and workshops, while in the United States a training centre
comprising 2 heavy and 5 hght battalions was to be main-
tained. In May 1918 the establishment of the Corps was
expanded to 15 brigades, each brigade to consist of 1 heavy
and 2 light battalions, the former to be armed with the
Mark VIII and the latter with the Renault tank.

Meanwhile an immense constructional programme was
developed for both Mark VIII.s and Renaults, yet, in spite
of this, by November 11, 1918, one year and seven months
after America entered the war, only some twenty odd
American-built Renault tanks had been landed in France.
The slowness in American construction is very apparent
when it is remembered that a similar period only elapsed
between the first sketch drawing of the British Mark I tank,
in February 1915, and the landing of this machine in France
in August 1916.

The lack of machines in the American Tank Corps ren-
dered the training of its personnel impossible, consequently
at the beginning of 1918 two training camps were started,
one at Bovington — the British Tank Training Centre — and
the other at Bourg in the Haute-Marne, where training was
carried out under French supervision. The history of the
units trained at these two centres will be dealt with separ-
ately as follows :

By February 1918, 500 volunteers from various branches
of the American Army were assembled at Bourg for instruc-
tion. On March 27, 10 Renault machines were taken over
from the French, another 15 being sent to Bourg in June.
In August, 144 Renault tanks arrived, and 2 light bat-
talions were at once mobilised under the command of Colonel
G. S. Patten and were railed to the St. Mihiel area, where
they operated with the First American Army, which attacked
the famous salient on September 12.

280 THE U.S.A. TANK CORPS

From a tank point of view this attack was a disappointing
one. From railhead both battalions moved 20 kilometres
to their positions of assembly, but on the first day of the
attack, owing to the difficulties of ground in a well-estab-
lished defence area, they never succeeded in catching up
with the infantry. These troops moved forward rapidly,
for it must be remembered that the enemy's resistance was
very feeble, the salient having already been partially evacu-
ated by the enemy. Owing to lack of petrol the tanks did
not participate in the second day's fighting, and on the third
they appear only on one occasion to have come into contact
with the enemy and to have collected a number of prisoners.
The following day these two battalions were withdrawn
practically intact, only three machines being left behind
damaged or broken down.

The American tanks next appear fighting side by side
with French tank units in the Argonne operations. Pro-
fiting by their previous experience, although infantry and
tanks had never met on the training ground, the two Ameri-
can tank battalions materially assisted their infantry.

On the first day of the Argonne attack, September 26, it
had been intended to keep a reserve of tanks in hand for
the second day's operations, but owing to the infantry being
held up these went into the attack about noon.

From this date until October 13 these battalions were
continually placed at the disposal of the infantry comman-
ders, but were not often called upon to take an active part
in operations. Frequently they were moved many miles, to
the detriment of their tracks and engines and without
achieving any great result ; they were also used independently
for reconnaissance work and for unsupported attacks de-
livered against positions the infantry had failed to capture.

On October 13 the remains of these two battalions were
withdrawn and a provisional company was formed which
accompanied the advance of the American forces until the
cessation of hostilities on November 11, 1918.

The 301st U.S.A. Heavy Tank Battalion arrived at Wool
on April 10, and continued training under British instruction

27TH AMERICAN DIVISION 281

until August 24, when it embarked for France. Soon after
its arrival in this country it was attached to the 1st British
Tank Brigade.

On September 29 the 301st American Tank BattaUon took
part in the important attack carried out by the 27th and
30th American Divisions against the Hindenburg Line run-
ning east of the Bellicourt tunnel. The attack started at
5.50 a.m. in a thick mist, and though the 30th American
Division reached the Bellicourt tunnel to time, the 27th on
its left was held up. On the front of the last-named Divi-
sion only one tank succeeded in crossing the tunnel, the
others running foul of an old British minefield as described
in Chapter XXXV. Of the thirty-four tanks which took part
in this attack only ten rallied.

On October 8, when the Fourth Army resumed the offen-
sive, the 301st Battalion was allotted to the Ilnd American
Corps, which was attacking a position some 3,000 yards
north-west of Brancourt with the IXth British Corps on its
right and the Xlllth on its left. This attack was a com-
plete success ; the 301st Battalion fought right through to
its final objective, rendering the greatest assistance to the
infantry, who worked in close co-operation with the tanks.
One tank in particular did great execution : it advanced,
firing both its 6-pounders at the railway cutting between
Beaurevoir and Montbrehain, the ground being littered with
German dead.

Nine days later, on the 17th, the attack was continued,
the 301st Battalion again being attached to the Ilnd Ameri-
can Corps, the objective of which was a line running west
of Busigny — eastern edge of La Sabli^re wood (south of
Busigny) — west of Bohain. In this operation the crossing
of the river Selle, south of St. Souplet, was a most difficult
problem, as the river ran through " No Man's Land " ;
nevertheless, by means of low-flying aeroplanes reconnais-
sance and night-patrol work was carried out, crossings were
selected, and on the actual day of the attack no fewer than
nineteen tanks out of the twenty operating successfully
crossed the stream.
20

282 THE U.S.A. TANK CORPS

The next and last attack carried out by the 301st Bat-
tahon during the war took place on October 23, when nine
tanks of this unit assisted the 6th and 1st British Divisions
in an attack in the neighbourhood of Bazuel, south-east of
Le Cateau. This operation was part of the Fourth Army's
attack, the objectives of which were the high ground over-
looking the canal de la Sambre et Oise, between Catillon,
and Bois I'Eveque and the villages of Fontaine-au-Bois,
Robersart, and Bousies.

All nine tanks moved forward at zero hour behind the
barrage, and from the report of an observer who saw these
machines in action it appears that they cleared up the whole
of the ground as far as the Bazuel-Catillon road. Very
little opposition was met with, but in spite of this, owing to
the poor visibility and the enclosed nature of the country,
the infantry were slow in following the tanks and great
difficulty was experienced in maintaining touch with them.
Nevertheless all infantry commanders expressed themselves
well pleased with the work the tanks had accomplished,
which had chiefly consisted in reducing strong points and
breaking paths through the hedges. Of the nine tanks which
took the field all rallied ; no casualties other than five men,
slightly gassed, were suffered. The attack on this day was
altogether a fitting conclusion to the brief but conspicuously
gallant career of the 301 st American Tank Battalion.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE BATTLES OF THE SELLE AND MAUBEUGE

On October 12, the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, and 15th Battalions
were withdrawn and placed in G.H.Q. reserve, and on the
following day the 6th Battalion was transferred to the 4th
Tank Brigade; meanwhile the retiring enemy endeavoured
to form a defensive line on the east side of the river Selle.

On this front, on October 17, the Fourth Army and the
First French Army attacked from Le Cateau southwards to
Vaux Andigny on a front of about twelve miles. The 4th
Tank Brigade was the only brigade in action, and its bat-
talions were allotted as follows :

1st Tank Battalion . To the IXth Corps, on the right.

301st American Battalion. To the Ilnd American Corps, in

the centre.
16th Tank Battalion . To the Xlllth Corps, on the

left.

The 6th Tank Battalion was held in Fourth Army reserve.

The chief obstacle was the river Selle, the course of which
roughly approximated to the starting line in " No Man's
Land," consequently reconnaissance of this obstacle was
extremely difficult. In spite of this tapes were laid across
the stream at night time, when it was discovered that the
river had been dammed in places in order to render the
crossing of tanks over it more difficult.

The early morning of the 17th was so foggy that tanks
had to move forward at zero hour (5.30 a.m.) on compass
bearings. Each of the forty-eight machines used carried a
crib, and by casting these into the Selle north of St. Souplet
and at Molain the 1st and 16th Battalions and the 301st
American Battalion crossed this river safely. The resistance

283

284 BATTLES OF SELLE AND MAUBEUGE

offered by the enemy was not great, the Germans appar-
ently having considered the flooded river a certain obstacle
against tanks.

Three days later the Third Army attacked between Le
Cateau and the Scheldt canal, four tanks of the 11th Bat-
talion co-operating with the Vth Corps against Neuvilly and
Amervalles. Again the chief difficulty was the crossing of the
Selle : this was successfully effected by means of an under-
water sleeper bridge constructed by the Royal Engineers at
night time : being under water the bridge was not visible
to the enemy during the day. The attack was entirely suc-
cessful, all four tanks crossing the river and reaching their
objectives.

About the middle of October the 2nd Tank Brigade was
reconstituted, the following battalions being allotted to it :
6th, 9th, 10th, 14th Battalions, and the 301st American Tank
Battalion. All these units were short of men and very short
of machines.

On October 23, thirty-seven tanks took part in a successful
moonlight attack at 1.20 a.m. carried out by the Third and
Fourth Armies north and south of Le Cateau, with the
object of securing the whole line from the Sambre along the
edge of the forest of Mormal to the vicinity of Valenciennes.
In this attack the following battalions took part :

301st American Tank Battalion, allotted to IXth Corps.

10th Tank Battalion, allotted to Xlllth Corps.

11th and 12th Tank Battalions, allotted to Vth Corps.

In spite of the darkness, mist, and a considerable amount
of gas shelling, all objectives were reached. Many good
targets presented themselves, especially for case-shot fire,
and in all some 3,000 prisoners were captured. In this
attack tanks were of considerable help in crushing down
hedges and so opening gaps in them for the infantry to pass
through.

The attack was continued on the following day, six machines
of the 10th Battalion co-operating with the 18th and 25th
Divisions in the neighbourhood of Robersart. Near Renuart

BATTLE OF MAUBEUGE 285

farm great assistance was rendered to the infantry, and a
German ammunition dump exploded by a 6-pounder shell
threw the enemy into great confusion and inflicted many
casualties on him.

With this attack the battle of the Selle came to an end
and with it 475 guns and 20,000 prisoners were added to
those already captured.

The battle of Maubeuge opened on November 2 with an
attack carried out by the IXth Corps west of Landrecies.
This attack was supported by three tanks of the 10th Bat-
talion and it was carried out in order to improve our position
near Happegarbes preliminary to a big attack on the 4th.
All objectives were taken, but unfortunately lost again
before nightfall.

November 4 witnessed the last large tank attack of the
war, large only in comparison with the number of machines at
this time fit for action. The attack was on a broad front
of over thirty miles, extending from the river Oise to north
of Valenciennes. On the British section of this front thirty-
seven tanks were used and were allotted as follows :

Third Army Vlth Corps 1 Company 6th Tank Battalion.

IVth Corps 2 Sections 14th Tank Battalion.

Vth Corps 1 Company 9th Tank Battalion.

Fourth Army Xlllth Corps 5 Sections 14th Tank Battalion.

2 Companies 9th Tank Battalion.
2 Sections 14th Tank Battalion.
17th Armoured Car Battalion.
IXth Corps 4 Sections 10th Tank Battalion.

From the above distribution of tanks it will be seen how
exhausted units had become, sections now taking the place
of companies and companies of battalions.

Zero hour varied on the Corps fronts from 5.30 to 6.15
a.m. Briefly the action of the tanks was as follows :

Those of the 10th Tank Battahon assisted in the taking
of Catillon and Happeharbes; the capture of the former
village was an important step in securing the crossing over
the Oise canal. Generally speaking the tanks operating
with the Xlllth Corps had a successful day, especially in

286 BATTLES OF SELLE AND MAUBEUGE

the neighbourhood of Hecq, Preux, and the north-western
edge of the forest of Mormal. Although supply tanks ^ are
not meant for fighting purposes, three, which were carrying
forward bridging material for the 25th Division, came into
action near Landrecies. On approaching the canal they
found that our infantry were still on its western side, hung
up by machine-gun fire. One tank being knocked out, the
section commander decided to push on with the other two ;
this he did, our infantry following these machines as if they
were fighting tanks, with the result that the machine-gunners
surrendered and the far bank of the canal was secured.

The following day, November 5, saw the last tank action
of the war, eight Whippets of the 6th Tank Battalion taking
part in an attack of the 3rd Guards Brigade north of the
forest of Mormal. The country was most difficult for com-
bined operations, for it was intersected by numerous ditches
and fences which rendered it ideal for the rearguard opera-
tions the Germans were now fighting all along their front.
Either the Whippets had to go forward and so lose touch with
our infantry or remain with the infantry and lose touch with
the enemy. In spite of these difficulties all objectives were
taken, and the last tank action of the war was a success.

During the next few days refitting continued with a view
to building up an organised fighting force from the shattered
remnants of the Tank Corps ; as this was in progress the
signing of the armistice terms on November 11 brought
hostilities to an end.

Ninety-six days of almost continuous battle had now
taken place since the great tank attack at Amiens was
launched by the Fourth Army on August 8, since when many
of the officers and men of the Tank Corps had been in action
as many as fifteen and sixteen times. During this period no
fewer than 1,993 tanks and tank armoured cars had been
engaged on thirty-nine days in all ; 887 machines had been
handed over to Salvage, 313 of these being sent to the Central
Workshops, and 204 having been repaired and reissued to
battahons. Of the above 887 tanks, only fifteen had been
1 A supply tank is armed with one Lewis gun.

SIR D. HAIG'S FINAL DISPATCH 287

struck off the strength as unsalvable. Casualties against
establishment had been heavy : 598 officers and 2,826 other
ranks being counted amongst killed, wounded, missing, and
prisoners ; but when it is considered that the total strength
of the Tank Corps on August 7 was considerably under
that of an infantry division, and that in the old days of the
artillery battles, such as the First Battle of the Somme, an
infantry division frequently sustained 4,000 casualties in
twelve hours fighting, the tank casualties were extraordinarily
light. It was no longer a matter of twelve hours' but of
thirty-nine days' fighting at twelve hours a day. From this
we may deduce our final and outstanding lesson from all these
battles, namely, that iron mechanically moved is an econo-
miser of blood, that the tank is an economiser of hfe — the
lives of men, men being the most valuable asset any country
can possess.

The determination of Sir Douglas Haig had at length
been rewarded, and the endeavours which failed at Passchen-
daele won through finally and irrevocably at Maubeuge. A
fitting conclusion to all these operations is to be found in
the last dispatch of the Commander-in-Chief of the British
Armies, which hands down to posterity a just judgment on
the value of the work carried out by the British Tank Corps
during the ever-memorable months of August to November
1918. In these dispatches are to be found the following
three paragraphs, which are worth pondering over when the
time comes for us to consider the future :

" In the decisive contests of this period, the strongest and
most vital parts of the enemy's front were attacked by the
British, his lateral commimications were cut and his best
divisions fought to a standstill. On the different battle
fronts 187,000 prisoners and 2,850 guns were captured by us,
bringing the total of our prisoners for the present year to
over 201,000. Immense numbers of machine guns and
trench mortars were taken also, the figures of those actually
counted exceeding 29,000 machine guns and some 3,000
trench mortars. These results were achieved by 59 fight-
ing British divisions, which in the course of three months of
battle engaged and defeated 99 separate divisions."

288 BATTLES OF SELLE AND MAUBEUGE

" Since the opening of our offensive on August 8, tanks
have been employed on every battlefield, and the importance
of the part played by them in breaking up the resistance of
the German infantry can scarcely be exaggerated. The
whole scheme of the attack of August 8 was dependent
upon tanks, and ever since that date on numberless occa-
sions the success of our infantry has been powerfully assisted
or confirmed by their timely arrival. So great has been the
effect produced upon the German infantry by the appear-
ance of British tanks that in more than one instance, when
for various reasons real tanks were not available in sufficient
numbers, valuable results have been obtained by the use of
dummy tanks painted on frames of wood and canvas.

" It is no disparagement of the courage of our infantry,
or of the skill and devotion of our artillery, to say that the
achievements of those essential arms would have fallen
short of the full measure of success achieved by our armies
had it not been for the very gallant and devoted work of the
Tank Corps, under the comnaand of Major-General H. J.
Elles."

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE 17th tank armoured car battalion

In March 1918 the 17th Tank Battahon was in process of
formation at the Tank Training Centre at Wool, when the
German spring offensive resulted in so great a demand being
made on the home resources that it was converted into an
Armoured Car Battalion on April 23. On the following day
the drivers were selected, and sixteen armoured cars, which
were earmarked for the eastern theatre of war, were handed
over to it, the Vickers machine gims being replaced by
Hotchkiss ones.

On April 28 the cars were embarked at Portsmouth, and
on the 29th the personnel, under the command of Lieutenant-
Colonel E. J. Carter, left Folkestone for Boulogne. Thus in
six days the whole battalion was formed, equipped, and
landed in France.

Immediately on landing the 17th Battalion was attached
to the Second Army and ordered to proceed to Poperinghe,
but the tactical situation improving these orders were can-
celled and it was first sent to the Tank Gunnery School at
Merhmont for instruction, and later on to the Tank Depot
at Mers.

After some ten days' training the 17th Battalion joined
the Fourth Army and went into the line at La Hussoye, being
attached to the Australian Corps. A few days later the
battalion was transferred to the XXIInd Corps, which was
then resting in G.H.Q. reserve, immediately behind the right
flank of the British Army, and battalion headquarters were
established at Pissy. Here training continued until June 10,
when at 9.30 a.m. instructions were received by Lieutenant-
Colonel Carter to report to the headquarters of the First
French Army at Conty.

289

290 THE 17TH TANK BATTALION

At Conty orders were issued for the battalion to proceed
to Ravenel near St. Just. The battahon was notified of
this by telephone, and, although the night was very dark
and wet and the roads crowded with traffic, it reached Ravenel
by 5 a.m. on June 11, after a sixty-mile journey, and went
into action with the Tenth French Army in its counter-attack
at Belloy on that day. In this battle two sections of
armoured cars engaged the enemy with machine-gun fire,
but the quantity of debris scattered on the roads, and the
fragile nature of the chassis of the cars, prevented their being
freely used. On the conclusion of these operations the
battalion returned to the XXlInd Corps.

On July 18 the 17th Battalion was ordered to join General
Fayolle's Army, but did not come into action on account of
delays on the road due to congested traffic. Ten days later
it was attached to the 6th French Cavalry Division, which
was operating north of Chateau-Thierry following the retreat-
ing enemy towards the river Ourcq. On this river the Ger-
mans took up a defensive position, covering its approaches
by machine-gun fire ; this brought the French cavalry to a
halt, but not the armoured cars, which were able, on account
of their armour, to approach quite close to the bridges and
open fire on the enemy's machine-gunners. At Fere-en-
Tardenois the battalion greatly aided the French by moving
through the main streets of the village, which was held by
Germans. Similar assistance was rendered to the Americans
at Roncheres.

When the 6th French Cavalry Division was withdrawn to
rest the 17th Battalion proceeded to Senhs, and at 9 a.m.,
having just entered this town, it received orders to proceed
forthwith to Amiens, and report to the headquarters of the
Austrahan Corps. Amiens, which was nearly 100 miles dis-
tant, was reached the same night.

On arriving at Amiens Lieutenant- Colonel Carter was in-
formed that his unit was to take part in the projected p,ttack
east of this town. The chief difficulty foreseen in an armoured-
car action in this neighbourhood was the crossing of the
trenches. Although only one day was available wherein

WORK OF THE 17TH BATTALION 291

to find a solution to this difficulty, it was accomplished by
attaching a small force of tanks to the battalion. These
tanks were used to tow the armoured cars over the obstacles,
or rather, along the tracks the tanks formed through them.
This solution proved eminently successful.

For the Fourth Army operations the 17th Armoured Car
BattaKon was placed under the orders of the 5th Tank
Brigade. On the morning of August 8 the battahon moved
forward with its accompanying tanks, which successfully
assisted all its cars over " No Man's Land." Beyond War-
fusee, several large trees, felled by shell fire, had fallen across
the road, entirely blocking it ; these were speedily removed
by the towing tanks, thus clearing the road not only for the
armoured cars but for our guns and transport. After this
delay the cars moved rapidly forward and passed through
our attacking lines about twenty minutes before the infantry
were timed to reach their final objective. To accomplish
this the cars had to run through our own artillery barrage ;
this they did without casualty.

The road was now clear and the cars proceeded through
the enemy's lines, scattering any infantry they found on the
road. They made for the valley near Foucaucourt, where
the headquarter troops of a German Corps were known to be
encamped. These troops were completely surprised and
many casualties were inflicted on them by six cars moving
through the valley. The confusion caused soon developed
into a panic, the enemy scattering in all directions, spreading
the alarm.

Whilst this surprise was developing, several sections of
armoured cars turned south and north off the Amiens-Brie
road. The former met large columns of transport and
mounted officers and teams of horses apparently belonging
to the German headquarters at Framerville. These were
fired on at short range, four officers being shot down by a
single burst of fire. Shortly after this the German head-
quarters were reached, and the Australian Corps flag, which
had been carried in one of the cars for the purpose, was run
up over the house which, until a few minutes before, had

292 THE 17TH TANK BATTALION

been occupied by the German Corps Commander. At about
this time one car came in sight of a German train : the engine
was fired at and put out of action ; later on the cavalry
arriving captured it.

The cars which had turned northwards entered Proyart
and Chuignolles, two moving up to the river Somme. At
Proyart the cars found the German troops at dinner ; these
they shot down and scattered in all directions, and then,
moving westwards, met masses of the enemy driven from
their trenches by the Australians. In order to surprise these
men, who were moving eastwards, the cars hid in the out-
skirts of Proyart, and, when the enemy was between fifty
and one hundred yards distant, they rapidly moved forward,
shooting down great numbers. Scattering from before the
cars at Proyart the enemy made across country towards
Chuignolles, only to be met by the cars which had proceeded
to this village, and were once again fired on and dispersed.
Near Chuignolles one armoured car obtained " running prac-
tice " with its machine guns at a lorry full of troops, and
kept up fire until the lorry ran into the ditch. There were
also several cases of armoured cars following German trans-
port vehicles, without anything unusual being suspected,
until fire was opened at point-blank range.

Although more than half the cars were out of action by
the evening of the 8th there were no casualties amongst their
personnel sufficiently serious to require evacuation.

After repairing the damages sustained on August 8, the
17th Battalion was transferred to the First Army, and on
August 21 took part in the operations near Bucquoy. At
the entrance of the village a large crater had been blown in
the road, over which the cars were hauled after a smooth
path had been beaten down across it by a Whippet tank.
The cars then made their way through the enemy's lines and
reached Achiet-le-Petit ahead of our infantry, where several
machine guns were silenced by them. In this action two of
the cars received direct hits, one of them being burnt out
and destroyed.

On August 24 the battalion operated with the New Zea-

WITHIN THE ENEMY'S LINES 298

land Division in the attack on Bapaume, the cars penetrat-
ing to the Arras-Bapaume road, where severe fighting took
place.

In the attack of September 2, the 17th Battalion operated
with the Canadian Corps in the assault on the Drocourt-
Queant line. In this action four cars were hit by shell fire,
but two squadrons of aeroplanes co-operating with the cars
attacked the German battery so vigorously that the crews
of the disabled cars were able to escape being captured.

On September 29 the armoured cars operated with the
Australian Corps and the Ilnd American Corps in the attack
on the Hindenburg Line near Bony ; here numerous casual-
ties were inflicted on the enemy and four cars were put out
of action by being burnt. This position was captured by
the Australians on the following day.

On October 8 the armoured cars were attached to the
Cavalry Corps, which was operating from Beaurevoir
towards Le Cateau. On this day the cars kept touch with
the cavalry, but on the following morning they moved for-
ward through Maretz. About two miles beyond this village
a section co-operated with South African infantry and drove
the German machine-gunners from a strong position they
were holding. The cars were able to run right through the
hostile machine-gun fire, and by enfilading the enemy's
position killed the German machine-gunners and captured
ten machine guns and two trench mortars.

A section of cars made a dash to cross the railway bridge
on the Maretz-Honnechy road, but the enemy's demolition
party saw them coming and, lighting the fuse, fled. The
leading car, however, got across safely, the charge exploding
and blowing up the bridge immediately this car had crossed
and thereby cutting it off from the second car, which was
some fifty yards behind. The leading car then went through
Maurois and Honnechy, all guns firing ; both of these villages
were crowded with troops. Near Honnechy church the car
ran into a by-road by mistake ; at the same moment a
group of Germans came out of a house and the car accounted
for five of them in the diaorway. This incident was de-

294 THE 17TH TANK BATTALION

scribed with enthusiasm by a French woman, the owner of
the house, to Lieutenant-Colonel Carter on the following
day. After passing Honnechy the car was run towards a
bridge which was known to exist. Profiting by his pre-
vious experience the commander of the car determined to
save the bridge from demolition and so not only effect his
retreat but secure it to the British Army. To accomplish
this the car rapidly moved round a corner of the road leading
to the bridge, with its guns pointing in the direction where
the demolition party would probably be. This action proved
successful, the demolition party being scattered by a burst
of bullets before the charge could be fired. The bridge was
thus saved and proved of great importance to the British
forces later on. The car then crossed the river and pro-
ceeded to the spot where the second car had been unable to
cross, picking it up ; both cars returned to report their
action, one at least having accomplished a very daring and
useful journey.

On November 4 the armoured cars were attached to the
XVIIIth Corps and were detailed to operate with the 18th
and 50th Divisions in the forest of Mormal. In this district
the roads are narrow and at this time of the year were very
slippery ; armoured-car action was therefore most difficult.
On the next day the cars of the 17th Battalion, now much
reduced in numbers, were operating with no fewer than five
divisions simultaneously. On the 9th all cars were concen-
trated and attached to the Fourth Army advanced guard to
assist in the pursuit of the retiring enemy. In the action
which followed the cars were cut off from the advanced
guard by all the river bridges being destroyed, but in spite of
this they were able to continue advancing on a line parallel
to the pursuit. At Ramousies and Liessies three complete
trains of ammunition were passed and numbers of heavy
guns, lorries and artillery transport, the enemy being in
full flight and in a high state of demoralisation.

On November 11 the armoured cars were reconnoitring
towards Eppe-Sauvage and Moustier (twelve miles east of
Avegnes), near the Belgian frontier, some seven or eight

OCCUPATION OF COLOGNE 295

miles in advance of the nearest British troops, when at 10.30
a.m. an officer from the 33rd French Division informed the
officer in command that he had heard rumours of an armis-
tice ; a few minutes later a dispatch-rider corroborated this
information, stating that hostilities were to cease at 11 a.m.
Firing went on until about three minutes to eleven, when it
ceased, breaking out in a final crash at eleven o'clock — then
all was silence ; a silence almost uncanny to the men of the
17th Tank Armoured Car Battalion, who had not been out
of gunshot since July 17, the date upon which the battalion
opened its eventful history with the French Army on the
Marne.

Dramatic as had been the short and brilliant career of the
17th Armoured Car Battalion, its work was not yet ended.
On November 13 it assembled at Avesnes, and joining the
cavalry of the Fourth Army moved forward towards the
Rhine. On the 26th four sections of cars were ordered to
Charleroi to deal with a reported disturbance. In this town
they were received with the greatest enthusiasm by the
inhabitants, and at Courcelles were surrounded by excited
townsfolk who, having collected all available brass instru-
ments, crowded round the cars playing the British National
Anthem at a range of about five yards.

From Charleroi, the 17th Battalion joined the Second
Army, moving on Cologne, and were attached to the 1st
Cavalry Division. On December 1 the German frontier
was crossed at Malmedy, whence the battalion was immedi-
ately sent on with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade to deal with dis-
turbances which had broken out in Cologne. Five days
later, on the 6th, the cavalry halted outside the town, and
the G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry Brigade, escorted by cars of the
17th Battalion, proceeded to the Rathaus to discuss the
administration of the town with the burgomaster. Cologne
was entered at midday, the crews of the armoured cars being
the first British troops to enter. That afternoon the western
end of the Rhine bridge was occupied, and the colours of
the Tank Corps run up to flutter over the famous river.
The record of this battalion is a truly remarkable one. It

296 THE 17TH TANK BATTALION

was formed, equipped, and landed in France in the short
space of six days. In six months it fought in ten separate
battles with English, Australian, Canadian, New Zealand,
South African, French, and American troops, and was three
times mentioned in German dispatches. Every car was
hit and some of them many times, and yet the total losses
in killed in action throughout this period was only one officer
and four other ranks. At the cost of these five men and
seven cars totally destroyed, this battalion must have in-
flicted scores if not hundreds of casualties on the enemy.
That the British Army was not equipped with many more of
these units will be a problem which will doubtless perplex
the minds of future military historians.

CHAPTER XXXIX

A RETROSPECT OF WHAT TANKS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED

Like all other human energies, war may be reduced to a
science, and had this, throughout history, been better under-
stood, how many countless thousands of lives and millions
of money might not have been saved, and how much sorrow
and waste might not have been prevented !

Science is but another name for knowledge — knowledge
co-ordinated, arranged and systematised — from which art,
or the application of knowledge to existing and ever-changing
conditions, is derived and built up on unchanging principles.

The fundamental difficulty in the art of war is in the
application of its theories in order to test their values. Like
surgery and medicine, it demands its patients or victims as
its training-ground, and without these it is most difficult
to arrive at expert judgments and conclusions. It is an art
which is neither directly commercial, materially remunera-
tive, nor normally applicable, consequently it has generally
been looked upon as a necessary evil, an insurance against
disaster rather than the application of a science which should
have as its main object the prevention of the calamity
of war.

As an applied science, war is half human, half mechanical ;
it is, therefore, pre-eminently a live or dynamic science, a
science which must grow with human understanding itself,
so that its means of action, materialised in the soldier, may
not only keep level with progress but absorb it to its own
particular ends. When we look back on the history of war,
what do we see ? A school of pedants fumbling with the
past, hoodwinked against the future, seeking panaceas in
past victories, the circumstances under which these were
won being blindly accepted as recurring decimals. Thus do

21 297

298 WHAT TANKS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED

they lumber their minds with obsolete detail, formulae and
shibboleths, precepts and rituals which are as much out of
place on the modern battlefield as phlogiston or the philo-
sopher's stone would be in a present-day laboratory.

Time and again has it been asserted that war itself is the
sole test of a soldier's worth and that on the battlefield alone
will the great be sifted from the little.

And why ? Because, until to-day, we have never emerged
from what may be called the " alchemical " epoch of war-
fare, the compounding of illusions without knowledge, the
application of actions without understanding ; we have
not reduced war to a science founded on definite principles
nor learnt that 99 per cent, of victory depends on weapons,
machinery placed in the hands of man so tlnat he may kill
without being injured.

Galen was a great physician and so was Paracelsus, but
who to-day would apply their methods when they can
employ those of Pasteur and Lister ? Where we have been
so wrong and will continue to remain so wrong, unless we
radically change our peace methods of warfare, is that we
possess no process of producing great peace soldiers — scien-
tists for war. We do not realise that an army is formed to
prevent war, that it is composed of human points, that the
good player will not lose many of these points, and that
the bad player will go bankrupt. That the loss or gain
depends on superiority of brains and of weapons and not
necessarily superiority of rank and numbers of men. When
we do realise this, then shall we cast the ancient balsams,
solvents, and coagulants to the winds and set about develop-
ing the mental and mechanical sides of war in days of peace,
so that, should wars become inevitable, we may win them
with the minimum of human loss.

Soldiers have laughed at Joly de Maizeroy, Massenbach,
and Maurice de Saxe for suggesting " victory without fight-
ing," " wars without battles " ; but seldom are their eyes
dimmed with a tear when they read of a victory which cost
thousands of lives, and a victory which might have been
won at the cost of a few hundreds. Yet surely is the saving

1870 TACTICS 299

of men's lives and limbs as great an attribute of good leader-
ship as the taking of those of the enemy ; is it not in fact
endurance, or the staying power in human lives, which is
the backbone of victory itself ?

In August 1914 the Great War opened to all intents and
purposes as an exaggerated 1870 operation. The doctrine
of the contending armies was 1870, its leaders were saturated
with 1870 ideas, its weapons were improved 1870, it was
1870 in complexion, in tone, in manner, in thought, in tactics,
and in movement. If this be doubted read the text-books
prior to the war and compare them with those of 1872 and then
with the events of the war itself. Take any great army of
1918 and place it over the same army of 1914 : the sides do
not coincide. What is the one great difference ? Mechanical
progress in weapons, not numbers of men, for men potentially
had in numbers decreased ; yet any 1918 equipped army
would have beaten a 1914 one because of guns, heavy guns,
super-heavy guns, mortars, shells, bombs, grenades, gas,
machine giuis, machine rifles, automatic rifles, range-spotters,
sound-detectors, smoke, aeroplanes, lorries, railways, tram-
ways, armoured cars, and tanks.

What to-day would be thought of a mechanical engineer
who applied 1870 methods ? Nothing ; he would go bank-
rupt in six weeks if he started business on 1870 lines. This
is exactly what the armies of 1914 did; they tactically went
bankrupt because they were sufficiently big, or the area of
operations was sufficiently small, to deny to them strategical
movement. Could this have been foreseen ? Given the
numbers, given the weapons, and given the area of operations,
a simple rule-of-three sum can be worked out, the answer to
which is siege warfare and the tactics of which is the frontal
attack of penetration ; ^ yet every Field Service Regula-
tions, in 1914, favoured envelopment and paid but a pass-
ing attention to trench warfare.

Inevitably the preordained tactics of penetration were

' See " The Tactics of Penetration," by Captain J. F. C. FvJler, Journal
of the Boyal United Services Institution, Novemhei 1914. This article was
written in April 1914.

300 WHAT TANKS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED

forced on the contending parties, and human points were
thrown over the parapets in handfuls ; as if men, armed
with a rifle and bayonet, who could only secure their existence
by remaining underground, had any chance whatever of
attaining a decisive victory by forsaking their shelters and
facing weapons in the open which had previously forced
them to earth. What was the result ? The Germans failed
at Ypres and Verdun; the French in the Champagne, at
Verdun, and at Reims ; and we at Neuve Chapelle, Loos, the
Somme, Arras, and Passchendaele. Between 2,000,000 and
3,000,00ft casualties on one side of the balance sheet and a
few square miles of uninhabitable ground on the other was
the sum-total of these united endeavours, and all because
no single army had, since 1870, realised the mechanical side
of the science of war. In October, ten weeks after the war
had opened, as the second chapter of this book has already
related, the mechanical side was realised and a solution was
found in the production of a chariot not so very dissimilar
to that depicted on the " Victory Stele of Eannatum "
of Lagash, 3,000 years B.C. — no very novel mechanical
invention !

Time, a few months, was, however, requisite for the sub-
stitution of the petrol engine for the horses of the Assyrians,
and as time could not be wasted other mechanical lapses
were made good which might have well been foreseen had
penetration and not envelopment been diagnosed as the
leading tactical act of the war.

At first each contending nation in turn passed through
its barbed-wire crisis, its gun shortage and its ammunition
scandal. Millions of miles of wire were produced, thousands
of guns were made, and ammunition was manufactured not
by thousands of rounds, but by hundreds of thousands of
tons. Had any one side been able to fire at the other, in
September 1914, 100,000 tons in a couple of days, that
side would have, probably, won the war. This is practically
what happened at the Dunajec in 1915 — the Russians were
out-weaponed and consequently defeated.

On the Western Front, as the artillery competition was

GUNS, TANKS, AND GAS 301

more or less mutual, stagnation became still more complete.
In place of hurling men against uncut wire, shells were hurled
instead, the bombardments being sufficiently long to enable
the Germans to transport troops from the east of Poland to
France in time to meet the assault. As the frontage of this
assault was usually under ten miles, the total battle-front
being over 500, the operation may be compared with that of
attempting to take the life of a rhinoceros with a hat-pin.
These tactics inevitably failed, not only through the impos-
sibility of economically wearing away the enemy's reserves,
but on account of the impossibility of rapidly moving forward
our own ; for in the act of destroying wire, simultaneously
did the guns create an area so difficult to move over that,
had it been possible to advance the infantry, it would never
have been possible to feed or supply them.

That stationary warfare should have increased in endur-
ance as the gun-power of each side was multiplied was not
necessary ; this was clearly proved during the first two Ger-
man battles of 1918. By this date, on all sides, had artillery
attained its zenith, but the Germans, by threatening a front
of nearly 250 miles — practically from the Channel to the
Meuse — and then, after an intense bombardment lasting but a
few hours, attacking on a comparatively wide front of some
fifty miles, were able to develop their machine power to its
fullest effect, that is to say, with the least opposition.

It took nearly three years from the date of the battle of the
Dunajec before the use of the gun as a weapon of surprise
was grasped ; this will probably prove one of the most
astounding tactical anomalies of the war. During this
period two other weapons were devised which were destined
in most respects to outclass the gun ; the idea of both must
have arisen at approximately the same time.

For years before the war the French and ourselves had
been the leading mechanical engineers of Europe ; in a
similar respect the Germans were its leading chemists.
Both, once a deadlock had arisen in the war, sought aid from
the sciences they best understood during peacetime, and
from which, had they understood war as a science, they

302 WHAT TANKS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED

would have looked for assistance years before its present
outbreak.

The first stroke of genius delivered in the war was the use
the Germans made of gas on April 22, 1915, and the second
the use we made of tanks on September 15, 1916 ; both
failed through want of a scientific grasp of war. They were
tentative attacks, not delivered in strength or mass, yet
curious to relate both were delivered by armies which,
having been brought up in the 1870 school of thought, were
fully conversant with the old precept of " superiority of
numbers at the decisive point " ; but, thinking in muscular
terms only, they failed to apply it to the mechanical and
chemical contrivances now placed at their disposal.

By many soldiers even to-day it is not realised that gas

is a missile weapon following directly along the evolutionary

path of all projectiles. A solid shot has to hit a target in

order to injure it ; as targets became difiicult to see it became

necessary to increase the radius of effect of the solid shot

by replacing it by a hollow one filled with explosive. By

means of this shell, a target might be missed by the shell

yet hit by a flying fragment ; the danger zone of the solid

shot was increased many hundreds of times. Once targets

not only become invisible but disappear into under-earth

shelters, the shell has but little effect unless days are spent

in bombardment, consequently the most effective manner

of hitting them is to replace the shell by a gas inundation

which will cover extensive areas and percolate into trenches

and shelters. Gas has, in fact, multiplied the explosive

radius of action of a shell indefinitely, and had it been used

in quantity by the Germans before the Allies could protect

themselves against it, the enemy might well have won

the war.

Gas, whatever its possibilities were before this protection
was obtained, remains but a projectile evolved as above de-
scribed. Tanks were a " creation," and the introduction of
the petrol-driven cross-country tractor on the battlefield,
it is thought, will mark a definite close to the " alchemical "
epoch of warfare. All war on land, in the past, has been

SCIENCE AND WARFARE 308

based on muscular energy ; henceforth it will be based on
mechanical. The change is radical, and Wilson's " Big
Willie " will one day pass into legend alongside Stevenson's
" Rocket." As steam, applied as a motive force, in 150 years
changed the world more than it had previously been changed
since the days of palaeolithic man, so, before the present
century has run its course, may as great a change take place
in the realms of war. The cause of both is the same : as the
invention of the steam engine rendered obsolete to a high
degree the hand-tool and replaced it by the machine-tool,
so the apphcation of petrol to the battlefield will force the
hand-weapon out of existence and replace it by the machine-
weapon. That the tank will continue in its present form is
as unlikely as it would have been to expect, in 1769, that
Watt's pumping engine was the " Ultima Thule " of all such
engines. It is not the form which is the stroke of true
genius, but the idea, the replacing of muscular energy by
mechanical force as the motive power of an army.

Had the combatant nations- of the Great War possessed
more foresight, had they thought of war as a science in
place of as an insurance policy, they could have had a steam-
driven tank thirty years ago and a petrol-driven one im-
mediately after the South African War. The Batter tractor
existed, anyhow in design, in 1888, and during the South
African War Mr. W. Ralston drew a comic picture entitled
" Warfare of the Future : The Tractor Mounted Infantry
in Action," to say nothing about the story by Mr. H. G.
Wells. But no, the breath of ancient battles had to be
breathed, and whilst military students were studying Jena,
Inkerman, and Worth, the commercial sciences were daily
producing one invention after another which a little adjust-
ment would help win the next war more speedily than the
study of scores of Jominis and Clausewitzs.

To show how unscientific the soldiers of the 1870-1914
epoch had become it is only necessary to quote that after
the battle of the Somme in the highest German military
circles the machine was considered as a veritable joke.
Apparently it could not be seen that, though the Mark I

804 WHAT TANKS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED

tank was far from perfect, it, being able to reintroduce
armour and to provide the soldier with a mobile weapon plat-
form, revolutionised the entire theory of 1870 warfare.

On July 1, 1916, the opening day of the battle of the
Somme, the British Army sustained between 40,000 and
50,000 casualties. On September 25, one single tank forced
the surrender of 370 Germans at a cost of five casualties to
ourselves, yet in July 1917 the Mark IV tank was still
considered but as a minor factor. Its design was not suffi-
ciently rehable, its true powers were more or less a matter
of conjecture ; the troops were not fully accustomed to it,
nor would they place sufficient faith in it to accept it in Heu
of artillery support, in fact, in its present state of develop-
ment the tank was but an adjunct to infantry and guns.
Such were some of the views held regarding it when, like a
bolt from the blue, the battle of Cambrai shot across the
horizon of 1870 battles.

At Cambrai it was the Mark IV tank which was used, the
same which had existed in July ; the Tank Corps had not
increased materially in size ; the infantry were for the most
part used-u^ troops — some had received a few days' training
with tanks, others had never even seen these machines. The
assault was an overwhelming success : at the cost of some
5,000 infantry casualties an advance was made in twelve
hours which in extent took ninety days at Ypres, and which
in this last-named battle cost over a quarter of a miUion
men. Yet, in spite of this astonishing success, so conserva-
tive had the Army grown to the true needs of victory that
there were certain soldiers who now stated that the tactics
employed at Cambrai could never be repeated again and
that the day of the tank had come and gone.

Then came the " crowning mercy " — the attack on Hamel.
Something had to be done to reinstate the credit of the
Tank Corps. There were but three suitable locahties to do
it in : the first, against the Merville sahent — the ground
here was bad, being intersected by dikes and canals ; the
second, eastward from between Arras and Hebuterne — the

INFLUENCE OF THE TANK 305

ground here was much cut up, and the tactical objective
was not suitable ; the third, eastwards from Villers-Breton-
neux — the ground here was excellent, but the Australians, who
held this sector, had little confidence in the tank.

Human prejudice is, however, not difficult to overcome
to the student of psychology. After tactful persuasion the
Australian Corps was induced to accept sixty machines, as
an " adjunct " to their operations. The tanks (Mark V.s)
were drawn up 1,000 yards in rear of the attackers, yet,
nevertheless, within a few minutes of the attack being
launched, they caught up with the leading wave and carried
this wave and those in rear right through to the final objec-
tive. The loss of the 4th Australian Division was insignifi-
cant ; their prejudices vanished and a close comradeship
between them and the Tank Corps was established which
redounds to their gallantry and common sense.

Hamel, minor incident though it was, was of more im-
portance to the immediate problems of the British Army
than Cambrai itself. General Rawlinson, commanding the
Fourth Army, saw his opportunity, and the result was that
from Hamel onwards the war became a tank war. The
machine had made good in spite of prejudice and opposition.
The Germans lost their heads, and with their heads they lost
the war. That the war might have been won without tanks
is quite possible, but that fifty-nine British divisions would,
without their assistance, have beaten ninety-nine German
ones in three months is extremely unlikely.

What had the influence of the tank really been ? Let us
examine this question and so close this retrospect.

The effect of the tank's mobility on grand tactics was
stupendous. Between the winter of 1914 and the summer
of 1918, to all intents and purposes, the Allies waged a static
war on the Western Front. During these three and a half
years various attempts were made to wear down the enemy's
fighting strength as a prelude to a decisive exploitation or
pursuit, but these battles of attrition were mutually de-
structive and the Allies undoubtedly lost more casualties than
they inflicted. Attrition without the possibility of surprise

306 WHAT TANKS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED

or mobility is a mere " push of pikes," it is a muscular but
brainless operation. At the Third Battle of Ypres it cost
us a quarter of a million men. Then came the tank, and true
attrition was rendered possible ; in other words, in tank battles
the enemy lost more in human points than we did : it is
doubtful whether in killed and wounded we lost, between
August 8 and November 11, 1918, as many men as the
prisoners we captured. This was only possible by our
possessing the means of putting the grand tactical act of
penetration into operation, by breaking down the " in-
violability" of the German front, and by so doing render-
ing envelopment a reality.

In minor tactics it was possible, by means of the tank,
to economise life by harmonising fire and movement and
movement and security ; the tank soldier could use the
whole of his energy in the manipulation of his weapons and
none in the effort of moving himself forward ; further than
this, sufficiently thick armour could be carried to protect him
against bullets, shrapnel, and shell splinters. Human legs
no longer controlled marches, and human skin no longer was
the sole protection to the flesh beneath it. A new direction
was obtained, that of the moving firing line ; the knight in
armour was once again reinstated, his horse now a petrol
engine and his lance a machine gun.

Strategy, or the science of making the most of time for
warlike ends, had practically ceased since November 1914.
Even the great advances of the Germans in 1918 came to
an abrupt stop through failure of road capacity, and roads
and rails form the network upon which all former strategy
was woven. The cross-country tractor, or tank, widened the
size of roads to an almost unlimited degree. The earth
became a universal vehicle of motion, like the sea, and to
those sides which relied on tanks, naval tactics could be
superimposed on those of land warfare.

With the introduction of mechanical movement every
principle of war became easy of application and, to-day, to
pit an overland mechanical army against one relying on
roads, rails, and muscular energy, is to pit a fleet of modern

TIME THE CONTROLLING FACTOR 307

battleships against one of wind-driven three-deckers. The
result of such an action is not even within the possibility of
doubt : the latter will for a certainty be destroyed, for the
highest form of machinery must win, because it saves time,
and time is the controlling factor on the battlefield as in the
workshop.

CHAPTER XL

A FORECAST OF WHAT TANKS MAY DO

Accepting war as a science and an art, that it is founded
on definite principles which are apphed according to the
conditions of the moment, we may scientifically reduce it
to its component elements, which are : Men, weapons, and
movement. A combination of these three is an army, a
body of men which can fight and move.

Tactics, or the art of moving armed men on the battlefield,
change directly in accordance with the nature of the weapons
themselves and the mobility of the means of transport.
Each new or improved weapon or method of movement
demands a corresponding change in the art of war.

Tools, or weapons, if only the right ones can be discovered,
form 99 per cent, of victory. Strategy, command, leader-
ship, courage, discipline, supply, organisation, and all the
moral and physical paraphernalia of war are as nothing to
a high superiority of weapons ; at most they go to form the
1 per cent, which makes the whole possible. Indeed, as
Carlyle writes, " Savage animalism is nothing, inventive
spiritualism is all."

To-day the introduction of the tank on the battlefield
entirely revolutionises the art of war in that :

(i) It increases mobility by replacing muscular force by
mechanical power.

(ii) It increases security by rendering innocuous the effect
of bullets through the feasibility of carrying armour plate.

(iii) It increases offensive power by relieving the man
from carrying his weapons or the horse from dragging
them, and by facilitating ammunition supply it increases the
destructive power of the weapons it carries.

In other words, an army moved by petrol can obtain a

308

THE EVOLUTION OF WEAPONS 309

greater effect from its weapons in a given time with less loss
to itself than one which relies on muscular energy as its
motive force. Whilst securing its crew dynamically a tank
enables it to fight statically, it is in every respect the " land-
ship " it was first called.

These are our premises and from them we may deduce
the following all-important fact : That in all wars, and
especially modern wars — wars in which weapons change
rapidly — ^no army of fifty years before any date selected
would stand a " dog's chance " against the army existing at
this date, not even if it were composed entirely of Winkel-
rieds and Marshal Neys. Consider the following examples :

(i) Napoleon was an infinitely greater general than Lord
Raglan ; yet Lord Raglan would, in 1855, have beaten any
army Napoleon, in 1805, could have led against him, because
Lord Raglan's men were armed with the Minie rifie.

(ii) Eleven years after Inkerman, Moltke would have
beaten Lord Raglan's army hollow, not because he was a
greater soldier than Lord Raglan, but because his men
were armed with the needle gun.

From this we may deduce the fact, which has already
been stated, namely, that weapons form 99 per cent, of
victory, consequently the General Staff of every army
should be composed of mechanical clairvoyants, seers of
new conditions, new fields of war to exploit, and new tools
to assist in this exploitation. Had Napoleon, in 1805,
offered a prize of £1,000,000 for a weapon 100 per cent,
more efficient than the " Brown Bess," it is almost a cer-
tainty that, by 1815, he would have got it ; for the want
of a little foresight and for the want of the understanding
that progress in weapons of war is a similar problem to pro-
gress of tools in manufacture, he might have saved his
Empire and ended his days as supreme tyrant of Europe.

The whole history of the evolution of machine tools is
that of the elimination of the workman and the replacement
of muscular energy by steam, electricity, or some other form
of power. " Fewer men, more machines, higher output "
has during the last hundred years been the motto of every

310 A FORECAST OF WHAT TANKS MAY DO

progressive workshop. Likewise we believe that from now
onwards in every progressive army will a similar motto be
adopted. Further than this, we believe that those nations
which have proved their ability in the past as leaders of
science and mechanical engineering will in the future be those
which will produce the most efficient armies, for these armies
will be based on the foundations of the commercial sciences.

Accepting that the main factor in future warfare will be
the replacing of man-power by machine-power, the logical
deduction is that the ideal army to aim at is one man, not
a conscripted nation, not even a super-scientist, but one
man who can press a button or pull a plug and so put into
operation war-machines evolved by the best brains of the
nation during peacetime. Such an army need not even
occupy the theatre of operations in which the war is to be
fought ; he may be ensconced thousands of miles away, per-
haps in Kamtchatka, fighting a battle on the Western Front.
Is this impossible ? Not at all ; even in the late war we can
picture to ourselves a one-armed cripple sitting in Muravieff-
Amourski and electrically discharging gas against the Hin-
denburg Line directly his indicator announces a favourable
wind.

So far the chemist, but is man going to be controlled by
gas, are human destinies to be limited by a " whiff of phos-
gene " ?

" Certainly not," answers the soldier mechanic. "It is
true that the future may produce many unknown gases
which, as long as they remain unknown to the opposing side,
are unlikely to be rendered innocuous by means of a re-
spirator ; I, however, will scrap the respirator and place my
men in gas-proof tanks, and whenever my indicator denotes
impure air, the crews will batten down their hatches, their
engines will be run off accumulators, and they themselves
will live on oxygen or compressed air. I will apply to land-
warfare naval methods undreamt of before, I will produce
a land machine which will, so to speak, submerge itself when
the gas cloud approaches, just as a submarine submerges in
the sea when a destroyer draws near."

BRAIN AND BODY WARFARE 311

There is an answer to every weapon, and that side which
has most thoroughly thought these answers out during days
of peace is the one which is most Hkely to produce a steel-
shod Achilles for days of war.

Without journeying so far as Amourski let us imagine
that war was to break out again three years hence and that
we were equipped with a tank 200 per cent, superior to our
at present best type — a machine travelling at fifteen miles
an hour in place of five, and that the Germans sitting behind
their Hindenburg Line were still backing personnel against
materiel, numbers of men against perfection of weapons.

An army is an organisation, comparable, like all other
organisations, very closely with the human body. It possesses
a body and a brain ; its fighting troops are the former, its
headquarters staffs the latter. In the past the usual process
of tactics has been to wage a body warfare : one body is
moved up against the other body and like two boxers they
pummel each other until one is knocked out. But suppose
that boxer " A " could by some simple operation paralyse
the brain of boxer " B," what use would all boxer " B's "
muscular strength be to him, even if it rivalled that of
Samson and Goliath combined ? No use at all, as David
proved !

Now apply this process to the battle of 1923. The tank
fleets, under cover of dense clouds of smoke, or at night-
time, move forward, not against the body of the enemy's
army but against his brains ; their objectives are not the
enemy's infantry or the enemy's guns, not positions or
tactical localities, but the billets of the German headquarters
staffs — the Army, Corps, and Divisional headquarters. These
they capture, destroy or disperse ; what then is the body
going to do, for its brain is paralysed ? Who is going to
control it, feed it with reserves, ammunition, and supplies ?
Who is going to manoeuvre it to give it foot play ? Either
it will stand still and be knocked out, or, much more likely,
it will be seized by panic and become paralysed to action.

What is the answer to this type of brain ^warfare ? The
answer is the tank ; the brains will get into metal skulls or

312 A FORECAST OF WHAT TANKS MAY DO

boxes, the bodies will get into the same, and land fleet will
manoeuvre against land fleet.

The growth of these tactics may be slow, but eventually
they will become imperative. It may be urged that the
field gun is master of the tank in the open, just as a land
battery is master of a ship at sea. This is only true as long
as the gunner can see his target, and no known means at
present exist whereby sight can penetrate a dense cloud of
smoke. It may also be urged that a heavy machine gun
will enable the infantry to protect themselves against tanks.
But to be mobile the weight of the machine gun is limited to
the carrying power of two men — about 80 lb., and there is
no known reason why a tank should not be armoured to
withstand the bullets of such a weapon. If a heavier machine
gun is made it will be forced to take to a mounting, and for
choice to a mechanical one ; it will in fact become a tank or
a tank destroyer.

The necessity of armour in war has always been recognised,
and its general disuse only dates from the sixteenth century
onwards. When armour could not be used other means
of protection, all makeshifts, were sought after — earth- works,
entrenchments, use of ground, manoeuvre, and covering fire,
and as regards the last-named substitute it is interesting to
go back a little into history, for, even from a cursory study,
we may better understand the present and foresee the
future.

In the days of our Henry VIII a body of arquebusiers
had to stand twenty-five ranks deep in order to obtain
continuity of fire ; that is to say, that once the first rank had
fired and doubled to the rear it would only be ready loaded
again when the twenty-fifth rank was about to discharge
its pieces. By the days of Gustavus Adolphus, the art of
musketry and the musket had so far improved as to permit
of these twenty-five ranks being reduced to eight. As im-
provement went apace we find Frederick the Great reducing
them to three, and WeUington in the Peninsula to two. Even
in the early period of the revolutionary wars it was found
necessary for light infantry to reduce the human target they

THE ARMOURED FIRING LINE 313

offered to the enemy's fire by making use of extensions. In
1866 extensions became more feasible on account of tb^
Prussians being armed with a breach-loading rifle ; in 1870
they became more general ; in 1899 they have grown to
between ten and fifteen paces, which may be taken as the
maximum for a man, armed with the magazine rifle, to
dehver one round per yard of front each minute. In 1904
trenches are made use of on an extensive scale, for as ex-
tensions cannot be increased if fire effect is to be maintained,
some other form of protection must be sought, and men, not
being able to carry armour, must carry spades instead and
so still further immobilise themselves. In 1914, after a
brief hurry-scurry of open warfare, all sides take; to earth
and the spade reigns supreme.

Then comes the reintroduction of armour with the tank,
and what do we see ? Not only mobility and direct protection,
but the reinstitution of the firing line, not now morcelated
at fifteen paces interval between the men composing it,
but at 150 to 300 paces between the tanks, the mechanical
skirmishing fortresses of which it is built up. A tank with
a crew of 6 men can deliver fire at the rate of 300 rounds
a minute, or equivalent to 30 riflemen at a South African
War extension, and being armoured they suffer practically
no loss and can consequently challenge not only 30 rifle-
men but 300, any number, in fact, who are sent against them.
The logical conclusion to be drawn from this is that exten-
sions are useless, trenches at best but static makeshifts,
the infantryman must don armour and, as he has not the
strength to carry it, he must get into a tank. If this is
common sense, let us attempt to visualise what a tank war
of the future may entail.

In the mechanical wars of the future we must first of all
recognise the fact that the earth is a solid sea as easily
traversable in all directions by a tractor as a sheet of ice is
by a skater ; the battles in these wars will therefore more
and more approximate to naval actions. As trenches, as we
know them, and the ordinary field obstacles now constructed
will be useless, it may become necessary during peacetime
22

314 A FORECAST OF WHAT TANKS MAY DO

to turn the great strategical centres— manufactories, rail-
ways, stores, seats of government, etc., into defended land-
ports or protected power, fuel, and control stations. The
fortifications of these will probably consist of immense dry
moats and extensive minefields which will constitute a
direct protection against tank attacks. Water obstacles
will be useless, for the tank of a few years hence will un-
doubtedly be of an amphibious nature. To protect these
centres from the air, barracks, storehouses, mobilisation
stores, tankodromes and aerodromes will all have to be con-
structed well beneath the surface of the ground — in fact, the
future fortress will approximate closely to a gigantic dugout
surrounded by a field of land mines electrically manipulated.

Near the frontier these defended ports will probably be
equipped with and linked up by lethal gas works — gas-pro-
ducing and storage plants, lodged below the surface, which
on war being declared can instantaneously be set operating
electrically by one man stationed hundreds of miles away
if needs be. When this type of warfare is instituted, mobi-
lisation will not consist in equipping with weapons a small
section of the community, but in providing such of the
civil population as cannot be rapidly evacuated from the
area it is proposed to inundate, or placed in gastight shelters
safely underground, with anti-gas appliances. Under these
circumstances the defence of frontiers will be organised
according to prevaihng winds, and signs of war will be looked
for not amongst military but civil movements.

As the gas-storage tanks are opened and the gas-producing
plants set operating, fleets of fast-moving tanks, equipped
with tons of liquid gas, against which the enemy will probably
have no means of protection,' will cross the frontier and
obliterate every living thing in the fields and farms, the
villages and cities of the enemy's country. Whilst life is
being swept away around the frontier fleets of aeroplanes

1 During the war the normal system of detecting new gases was to ex-
amine captured respirators, and from the chemicals they contained in-
versely deduce the gases they would protect their wearers against. In
peacetime no such means of detection will be possible.

POSSIBILITIES OF INVASION 315

will attack the enemy's great industrial and governing
centres. All these attacks will be made, at first, not against
the enemy's army, which will be mobilising underground, but
against the civil population in order to compel it to accept
the will of the attacker.

If the enemy will not accept peace terms forthwith, then,
wars in the air and on the earth will take place between
machines to gain superiority. Tank will meet tank, and,
commanded from the air, fleets of these machines will man-
oeuvre between the defended ports seeking each other out
and exterminating each other in orthodox naval fashion.
Whilst these small forces of men, representing perhaps 0'5
per cent, or 1 per cent, of the entire population of the
country, strong through machinery, are at death-grips with
their enemy, their respective nations will be producing
weapons for them ; so, in the future, as military fighting
man-power dwindles must we expect to see military manu-
facturing man-power increase.

Are we safe in this little island of ours against the future ?
If at times, during the " alchemical " period of warfare, we
have been threatened and invaded, we may be certain that
during the scientific period we shall be less secure than we
have been in the past.

From the present-day tank to one which can plunge into
the Channel at Calais at 4 in the morning, land at Dover at
six o'clock, and be outside Buckingham Palace for an early
lunch will not probably require as many as the fifty-two
years which have separated the Merrimac from the Tiger
or the Queen Elizabeth. If this is too remote a period for
the present generation to grow anxious about, there is no
reason why four or five years hence ships should not be
constructed as tank-carriers, these machines being conveyed
across the ocean and launched into the sea near the coast
carrying sufficient fuel to move them 300 or 400 miles inland.
From ships as carriers it is but one step to aeroplanes as
supphers and lifters, and another to aeroplanes as tanks
themselves.

If the evolution of war, in the past, has been slow, do not

316 A FORECAST OF WHAT TANKS MAY DO

let us flatter ourselves that it is likely to remain so in the
future. From the gliders of the Wright Brothers the aero-
plane rapidly evolved, and from a 40 H.P. engine of ten or
twelve years back to-day the Porte " Super-Baby" triplane
carries five engines of 400 H.P. each and the Tarrant
triplane has a span of 131 feet and to drive it six Napier
" Lion " engines are used, developing no less than 3,000
horse-power. The tank is still in its infancy, but it will
grow and one day in mechanical perfection and efficiency
catch up with the super-Dreadnought and the Handley Page,
and what then ? A close co-operation between the great
mechanical weapons, the seaship, the airship, and the
landship — or, if preferred, of boat, aeroplane, and tank — will
take place. These weapons will approximate and unify,
evolving one arm and not three arms, which will require one
defence force and not three. This, even to-day, is becoming
more and more apparent, and the sooner the brains of the
future Defence Force are developed the better for this
nation, for to-day we are thinking, like mediaeval magicians,
in separate terms of air, water, and earth, and some of us
in those of gabions, lances, and blunderbusses.

If great wars can be restricted or abolished by word of
mouth or written agreement, the above gropings into the
future, even if possible, may never materialise ; but even if
this be so, many small wars lie in front of us, for Europe
politically, since 1914, has practically gone back 400 years,
the frontiers of the smaller nations approximating closely to
those of the later Middle Ages. The more nations there are
in the world the more wars there will be in the making, and
as half the smaller nations of central and eastern Europe
consider war a national sport there is little likelihood of
agreements being kept or peace being maintained ; in fact,
all agreements which cannot be compelled by brute force are
likely to be treated as " scraps of paper."

To enforce peace, power and the means of applying it
will be needed by the greater nations who by law will never
quarrel ; here the mechanic steps forward and presents the
nations concerned with the tank and the aei'oplane as a

THE TANK IN SMALL WARS 317

means towards this end. He is perfectly right ; the general
introduction of mechanical weapons must bring with it the
end of small wars if not also of civil disturbances.

Take the case of the defence of India. What has always
been the great, difficulty in our frontier expeditions ? Not
our enemy or his weapons, but the country which enables
the Afghan to evade our columns and impede our advance.
It is the resistance offered by natural obstacles which we
have to overcome and not those imposed upon us by weapons
which generally are vastly inferior to those with which our
men are equipped.

Take the case of a punitive expedition starting from
Peshawer and proceeding to Kabul. The force will consist
of three bodies of troops — a small fighting advanced guard,
a large main body protecting the transport, and strong flank
guards protecting the main body. On account of the tactics
which have to be adopted the advance is excessively slow.
The main body proceeding along the roads, which almost
inevitably coincide with the bottoms of the valleys, has to
be kept out of rifle shot, consequently the flank guards have
usually to " crown the heights " on each side of the road,
which necessitates much climbing and loss of time. If the
advance were over an open veldt land, as in South Africa, in
place of in a hilly country, movement would be simplified,
but still will the flank guards have to be thrown out because
the main body, consisting of men and animals, is pervious
to bullets. This perviousness to bullets is the basis of the
whole trouble, and unless bullet-proof armour can be carried,
when it does not matter whether the rifle is fired at a range
of two yards or two miles, the only means of denjang effect
to the rifle is to keep it out of range of its target.

Though up to a short time ago the carrying of armour
was not a feasible proposition, now it is, and there are few
more difficulties in advancing up or down the Khyber with
a well-constructed tank than across the open. Armour, by
rendering flesh impervious to bullets, does away with the
necessity of flank guards and long stragghng supply columns,
and our punitive expedition equipped with tanks can reach

318 A FORECAST OF WHAT TANKS MAY DO

Kabul in a few days, and not only reach it hut abandon
its communications, as they will require no protection. If
tank supply columns, which are self-protecting, are con-
sidered too slow, once the force has reached Kabul its supply
and the evacuation of its sick (there will be but few wounded)
can be carried out by aeroplane. The whole operation
becomes too simple to be classed as an operation of war.
Once impress upon the Afghan the hopelessness of facing
a mechanical punitive force and he will give up rendering
such forces necessary.

In our many small wars of the past we have frequently
been faced with desert warfare, a warfare even more difii-
cult than hill and mountain fighting. Here again the chief
difficulty is a natural one — want of water, and not an arti-
ficial one — superiority of the enemy's weapons. In 1885
Sir Henry Stewart started from Korti on the Nile to relieve
General Gordon : his difficulties were supply difficulties, and
it took him twenty-one days to reach Gubat, a distance of
180 miles. A tank moving at an average pace of ten miles an
hour could have accomplished the journey in two days, and
being supplied by aeroplane could have reached Khartum
a few days later. One tank would have won Maiwand,
Isandhlwana, and El Teb ; one tank can meet any quantity
of Tower muskets, or Mauser rifles for aught that ; one tank,
costing say £10,000, can not only win a small war normally
costing £2,000,000, but render such wars in the future highly
improbable if not impossible. The moral, therefore, is — get
the tank.

From small wars to internal Imperial Defence is but one
step. Render rebellion hopeless and it will not take place.
In India we lock up in an unremunerative army 75,000
British troops and 150,000 Indian. Both these forces can
be done away with and order maintained, and maintained
with certainty, by a mechanical police force of 20,000 to
25,000 men.

What now is the great lesson to be learnt from the above
examples ? That war will be eliminated by weapons, not
by words or treaties or leagues of nations ; by weapons-^

SCIENTIFIC WARFARE 319

leagues of tanks, aeroplanes, and submarines — which will
render opposition hopeless or retribution so 'terrible that
nations will think not once or twice but many times before
going to war. If the civilian population of a country know
that should they demand war they may be killed in a few
minutes by the tens of thousands, they will not only cease
to demand it but see beforehand that they are well prepared
by superiority of weapons to terrify their neighbours out of
declaring war against them.

Weapons we, therefore, see are, if not a means of ending
war and ridding the world of this dementia, a means of
maintaining peace on a far firmer footing than hitherto it
has been maintained by muscular power. To limit the
evolution of weapons is therefore to limit the periods of
peace. An Army cannot stand still, it must develop with
the civilisation of which it forms part or become barbaric.
To equip pur Army to-day with bows and arrows would not
reduce the frequency of war, it would actually increase it,
for according to his tools, so is man himself, and as an Army
is built up of men, if these men are armed with bows and
arrows they will in nature closely approximate to the age
which produced these weapons, the age which burnt Joan
of Arc. Equally so will the Army of to-day, if in equip-
ment it be not allowed to keep pace with scientific progress,
develop into a band of brigands, for in 2019 the rifle and
gun of to-day, and the civilisation which produced them, wiU
be as uncouth as the arquebus, the carronade, and the manners
of the sixteenth century.

If a millennium is ever to be ushered in upon earth it will
be accomplished through the development of brain-power
and not through it becoming atrophied. If war is to be
rendered impossible the process will be a slow evolutionary
one, the desire of war gradually slowing down, and its motive
force energising some other ideal. To restrict war by main-
taining soldiers as ill-armed barbarians is to prevent it
working out its destined course. Human nature, in spite
of Benjamin Kidd, does not change in a generation, and the
tendencies which beget war will out until human nature has

320 A FORECAST OF WHAT TANKS MAY DO

outgrown therri. The world has a soul, and like that of a
man it mus^ass through years of love, hate, striving and
ambition before attaining those of wisdom and decay.

There may yet be many wars ahead of us, but one thing
would appear to be certain, and this is that small wars will
disappear and great ones become less frequent, science
rendering them too terrible to be entered upon lightly.

To-day we stand upon the threshold of a new epoch in
the history of the world — war based on petrol, the natural
sequent of an industry based on steam. That we have
attained the final step on the evolutionary ladder of war is
most unlikely, for mechanical and chemical weapons may
disappear and be replaced by others still more terrible.
Electricity has scarcely yet been touched upon and it is not
impossible that mechanical warfare will be replaced by one
of a wireless nature, and that not only the elements, but
man's flesh and bones, will be controlled by the " fluid "
which to-day we do not even understand. This method of
imposing the will of one man on another may in its turn be
replaced by a purely psychological warfare, wherein weapons
are not even used or battlefields sought or loss of life or limb
aimed at ; but, in place, the corruption of the human reason,
the dimming of the human intellect, and the disintegration
of the moral and spiritual life of one nation by the influence
of the will of another is accomplished.

Be all these as they may, one fact stands out supreme in
all types and conditions of war, and this is, that the strongest
and most efficient brain wins, which applies equally to all
nations as it does to all individuals.

Animal superiority over animal is based on muscle, human
superiority over human is based on brain. The nation
with the supreme brain will eventually rule the world, and
so long as war continues the Army with the best brains (which
also means the best weapons) will accomplish victory with
the least loss. Our Army from to-day must step forward ;
" to advance is to conquer," and this apphes in greater force
to brain-power than to muscle-power, for brains control
muscles. To stand still is to retrogress ; to glance back-

THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE 321

wards is to lose time, and if we pause now we are lost in
the future. Do not, therefore, let us mark time on our own
graves, do not let us hark back to 1914 with its rifles and its
ammunition boots, its sabres and its horseshoes, and all its
muscular barbarism ; let us plan and let us think, thus shall
we penetrate the veil of the future, thus shall we learn how
to equip our Army with a brain and with a body which
united, if war be ever again forced upon us, will compel
victory at the smallest possible cost. Surely this is an
ideal worthy of a great nation and of a great Army, the
object of which is to prevent war and to maintain peace, to
prevent war by science and not by nescience, by progress
and not by retrogression.

INDEX

Abancoiirt, 206, 231

Abbas Ridge, 100

Abb6, Bois de 1', 201

Abbeville, 34

Abelard, xv

Acheux, 58

Aohieourt, 84, 105, 257

Achiet-le-Grand, 84, 176, 255

Achiet-le-Petit, 176, 292

Acq, 84

Adelpare, 208, 210

Admiralty, the, 18-20, 22, 25, 27-33

Aginoourt, 2

Aillette, the, 196

Aisne, the, 14, 81, 189, 196-7, 215

Albert, 71, 175, 252-4

Alberta, 121-2

Aldershot, 9-11

Alexandria, 134

AliElMuntar, 101, 130

Allen, Major G. W. G., M.C., xii

Alleux, Bois des, 173

Alvinzi, xiv

American Army, 270-2, 275, 277-84,

290
American Machinist, The, xii, 4
American Tank Corps, 268, 271-2,

274, 277-82, 284
Amervalles, 284
Amiens, 169, 217-29, 237, 243, 245,

247, 290
Ancre, the, 54, 57-9, 176, 196
Anneux, 150

Anti-tank tactics, 87-8, 260-5
Antwerp, 198
Applegarth tractor, 10
Aquenne, Bois d', 202
Archdale, Captain O. A., xii
Archery in warfare, 2
Aichinger, 4
Ardennes, the, 1
Argonne, the, 280
Armentieres, 200
Arnold, Captain A. E., M.C., 235
Arnold, Lieutenant C. B., D.S.O., xiii,

235
Arrachis, Bois des, 208, 210
Arras, 81-9, 105, 108, 114, 144, 166,

250-3, 257-9

Arrol, Messrs. William, 28

Atawineh Ridge, 100

Atkin-Berry, Major H. C, D.S.O.,
M.C., XV

Australia Hill, 101

Australian Corps, 87, 99, 101, 109-10,
130, 203, 205, 207, 215, 217-9,
221-3, 226, 231-2, 252, 254-5, 267,
270-1, 274, 289, 290-2, 304

Aveluy, 71, 175-6

Avesnes, 257

Avonmouth, 98

Awoingt, 274

Bacon, Admiral Sir Reginald, K.C.B.,
K.C.V.O., D.S.O., 21-2, 66

Bailleul, 83

Bailleulval, 200

Baker, Colonel C. B., 277

Baker Carr, Brig^-Gen. C. D'A. B. S.,
C.M.G., D.S.O., xvi, 62

Balfour, Right Hon. A. J., 25

Bancourt, 258

Bank Farm, 121

Banteux, 138-9

Bapaume, 55, 144, 175-6, 216, 243,
247, 250-2, 293

Barastre, 175

Barry, John Richard, 9

Batter tractor, 10-13, 303

Bayonvillers, 231-2

Bazentin, 175

Bazuel, 282

Beach Post, 131

Beaucamp, 269

Beaucourt-sur-Ancre, 176, 251

Beaufort, 225

Beaumont Hamel, 58

Beauquesne, 61

Beaurains, 91

Beaurevoir, 144-5, 273, 281

Beauval, 203

Beersheba, 99-100, 130

Behagnies, 235

Belah, 101

Bellenglise, 270

Bellicourt, 272, 281

Belloy, 290

Berliet, 186

323

324

INDEX

Bermicourt, 61-2, 71, 127, 141, 168,
252

Berthen, 200

Bertincourt, 143

Beugny, 174,258

Biefvillers, 256

Big Willie, 267, 303

Bihucourt, 255

Bird, Colonel, 25

Bisley, 31, 159-61

Blangy, 62, 71, 200

Bleoourt, 273

Boescheppe, 200

Bois des Bceufs, 85

Bois d'Olhain, 173

Bois I'Eveque, 282

Bony, 249, 293

Boulogne, 4

Bourg, 279

Bourgon, General de, 209

Bourlon Wood, 144-6, 149, 150-1,
156,269

Bovington Camp, see Wool

Boyd-Rochfort, Major H., D.S.O.,
M.C.,xv

Boydell engine, 9

Boyeffles, 173

Bradley, Lieut.-ColonelD.W.,D.S.O.,

xii, 34, 54, 154, 162
Bramond, Frank, 1 i
Brancourt, 281
Bray-sur-Somme, 34, 172, 175-6, 218,

225-6, 252, 254, 257
Brie Bridge, 175
Briquetterie, the, 54
Brock, Commander, 165
Broodseinde Ridge, 119
Brough, Lieut.-Colonel, C.M.G., 34,

161-2
Bruay, 200
Brussels, 108
Bucquoy, 204, 292
Buire Wood, 172

Bullecourt, 86-8, 205, 207, 213, 261
Bullhouse Farm, 159
Burnett- Stuart, Brig. -Gen., 162
Bus, 175

Bus les Artois, 209
Busnes, 200

Butler, Major-Gen., 162
Buzancy, 193

Byng, General Sir Julian (afterwards
Lord), xvi, 139

Caohy, 201-2, 274
Caix, 218

California Trench, 122
Cambrai, xvi, 15, 64, 82, 129, 138-53,
155-8, 165, 167, 173, 181, 186, 215,

217, 219, 237, 242, 250, 273-6, 304

Canadian Corps, 85, 163-5, 169, 20^
218-21, 223, 257-8, 269, 273

Cantigny, 188

Capper, Major-Gen. Sir John, K.C.B
63

Capricorn Keep, 121

Carney, Driver, 234-5

Carter, Lieut.-Colonel E. J., xiii
289-90, 294

Cassel, 119

Castel, 218
, I Catillon, 282, 285
4;7 Cavalry Corps, 219-20, 225, 230
\r"Ca Villon, aa* ~

Cayeux Wood, 224

Cercottes, 184, 186

Chacrise, 193

Champlieu, 185

Charleroi, 241, 295

Charteris, Capt. the Hon. Evan, xi,
xii, XV

Chateau- Thierry, 189, 195, 290

Chaufours Wood, 248

Chaulnes, 176, 235

Chaumont, 279

Chauss^e Brunehaut, 193

Chedeville, Colonel, 1 90

Chemin des Dames, 186-7

Chinese Labour Company, 51st, 128-9

Chipilly, 169,224-5

ChuignoUes, 252, 254, 292

Churchill, Right Hon. Winston, 18-
20, 22, 24-5, 27-8, 32-3

Clapham Junction, 109

CI6ry, 175

Cockcroft, the, 122

Cojeul, 92

Colincamps, 176

Cologne, 295

Cologne, river, 1 74-5

Combles, 55

Comines, 116

Concrois Wood, 193

Connaught Rangers, 173

Contalmaison, 176

Conty, 289-90

Courage, Brig.-Gen. A., D.S.O., M.C.,

xvi, 62
Courcelles, 295
Courchamps, 194
Craonne, 82, 186-7
Crested Rock, 131-2
Crevecoeur, 138-9, 144-6
Cricket Valley, 131, 133
Crinchon, river, 84
Croisilles, 94-5, 256
Crompton, Col., R.E., 23
Cugnot, 8-9

INDEX

325

Cuvillers, 273
Cyrus, 142

Dalby-Jones, Lieut.-Colonel W., 29

Dale-Bussell, P., 23, 32-3

Debeney, General, 211

Deirel Belah, 99-100, 130-1, 133

Deligny HUl, 269

Delville Wood, 56

Dermicourt, 259

Desert Column, 130

Dessart Wood, 143, 146

Devonport, 98

D'Eyncourt, Sir Eustace Tennyson,

K.C.B., xii, 22-3, 30-4, 66
Diplock, Mr., 24
Dixmude, 119
Doignies, 173-4
Doingt Wood, 172
Dolls' House, 204
Doon Copse, 273
Dormans, 189, 195
Douai, 82
Doucet, Lieut.-Colonel L. C. A. deB.,

xiii
Doullens, 174
Dranoutre, 109
Drocoiu-t- Queant Line, 82, 84, 108,

258, 293
Druid Ridge, 100
Dumble, Colonel, 23
Dunajec, the, 15, 300, 301
Dundas, Major R. W., M.C., xv
Dunlop, Andrew, 9
Durham Light Infantry, 15th, 67

Earle, Captain A., 66

Eclimeux, 62

Edgeworth, Richard Lovell, 9

El Arish, 98-9, 101, 131-3

El Burs, 101

EUes, Major-Gen. H. J., C.B., D.S.O.,

xiii, xiv, xvi, 28, 61, 64, 66, 147-8,

288
El Sire, 101
Elveden, 31, 160-2
Engineer, The, xii, 9
Epehy, 174, 250, 266-72
Epp6-Sauvage, 294
Erin, 62, 70-1, 127, 180
Ervillers, 255
Esoaut, the, 138
Esclairvillers Wood, 173
Espilly, 195
Estaires, 200

Estienne, General, 184-6, 198
Etricourt, 272

Ex-Crown Prince, the, 188, 217
Ex-Kaiser, the, 188

Experiments Committee, 26

Fampoux, 83

Fanny's Farm, 111

Favreuil, 257

FayoUes, General, 290

Fender, Guillaume, 9

Ferdinand's Farm, 121

Fere-en- Tardenois, 290

Festubert, 200

Feuchy, 85

Feuchy-Chapel, 86-87

Flers, 55-6

Flesquieres, 144-9, 155, 262, 269

Flos, 55

Foch, Marshal, 200, 217

Fonsomme, 273

Fontaine-au-Bois, 282

Fontaine-Notre-Dame, 150-1, 262

Fontana, 4

Foot, Major S. H., D.S.O., xii

Forsyth-Major, Major O. A., xii, 98

note
Foster, Messrs. William, 24
Foster-Daimler tractor, 22, 39
Foucauoourt, 291
Fouilloy, 206

Fowke, Major-Gen. G. H., 21
Fraicourt, 275
Framerville, 225, 291
Frechencourt, 200
Frederick the Great, 14
Freiburg, 235
Fremicourt, 172, 258
French, Field-Marshal Sir John

(afterwards Lord), 21
French Tank Corps, 184-98
Fresnoy-le-Petit, 267
Frezenberg, 121
Fricourt, XV, 175, 242
Fuller, Brevet-Colonel J. F. C, D.S.O.,

xi, 66, 299 note
Furse, Major-Gen. Sir William,

K.C.B., D.S.O., 66

Gallipoli, 123

Gas, Poison, 17, 30, 314-5

Gauche Wood, 152

Gavrelle, 88

Gaza, 98-102, 130-4

Geninwell Copse, 1 73

George V, His Majesty King, 161, 165

German, Thomas, 9

German Tank Corps, 201, 212-6, 241

Gheluvelt, 119

Ghent, 108

Gilban, 98

Gird Trench, 57

Givenchy, 200

326

INDEX

Glasgow, Brig.-Gen.W.,C.H.G., 63, 67
Glencorse Wood, 261
Gommecourt, 17, 81-2, 255
Gonnelieu, 270
Gordon, General, 318
Gore-Anley, Brig.-Gen. F., D.S.O.,

62-3
Gouzeaucourt, 143, U6, 266, 268-9
Graincourt, 146, 149
Grand Bois, 110
Grand Ravin, 149-50
Grand Rozoy, 196
Grandeeourt, 110, 176
Green, Major G. A., M.C., xiv
Green Dvimp, 55
Green Hill, 101-2
GreviUers, 256
Grivesnes, 188
Grose, Francis, 4
Guards' Division, 152, 255, 257
Guemappe, 257
Guest, Major, 26
Gueudecourt, 55-7, 260
Guillaucourt, 224, 231
Guillemont, 267-70
Guise, 198
Gun Hill, 131, 133
Gunpowder, introduction of, 2

Haig, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas

(afterwards Earl), 28, 32, 287-8
Ham, 220
Hamel,xvi, 168, 217, 204-5, 207, 244,

262, 304-5
Hamelet, 206
Hamelincourt, 256
Hamencourt, 174
Hangard, Bois de, 201-2
Haplincourt, 258
Happegarbes, 285
Happy Valley, 254, 257
Harbonnieres, 224, 232, 235
Hardress Lloyd, Brig.-Gen. J., D.S.O.,

xvi, 63
Hareira, 95, 130
Hargicourt, 267
Harp, The, 83, 85-6
Harpon, Bois de, 208, 210
Hartennes Wood, 1 93
Haslam, Lieut., 246
Hatfield, 30-1
Havre, 127

Havrincourt Wood, 143, 145-7, 149
Heart Hill, 100
Heavy Section Machine Gun Corps,

31, 159
Hebuteme, 176,304
Hecq, 286
Hendecourt, 87

Henincourt, 172

Heninel, 82, 85-6, 256

Henia-sur-Cojeul, 83, 256

Herleville, 252

Hermies, 259

Hervilly, 174

Hervin Farm, 85

Hesdin, 127

Hetherington, Major T. G., 22-4

Heudicourt, 143

Hillock Farm, 122

Hindenburg, Marshal, xiv, 188, 241

Hindenburg Line, 82, 83, 86, 87, 94-5,

141, 145, 250, 256, 267, 270-2, 275,

281
Hindenburg Support Line, 145
Holden, Colonel, 25
Holdford-Walker, Major, 162
Holnon, 266

Holt caterpillar tractor, 11, 22
Holtzschuhler, 6-7
Honnechy, 275, 293-4
Honnecourt, 151
Hooge, 119, 121
Homihan Roy, xvii
Hornsby tractor, 1 1
Hotblack, Major F. E., D.S.O., M.C.,

xiii, XV, 61
Houthulst Forest, 120
Humieres, 62, 200
Humeroeuil, 70

Imperial Defence Committee, 26

Inchy, 144

India, defence of, 317-8

Indian Cavalry Division, 130

In Seirat, 100

Inter- Allied Tank Committee, 65

Island Wood, 131

Italian Army, 130

Iveagh, Lord, 160-1

Iwuy, 144

Joffre, Marshal, 185

Joint Naval and Military Committee,

22,.25
Joly de Maizeroy, 298
Joncourt, 273
Jones, Paul, xiii
Joye Farm, 111

Kantara, 98

Kemmel, Moimt, 110, 119
Kemmeli5eek, the, 117
Khan Yunus, 99
Kidd, Benjamin, 319
Kirbet El Sihan, 101, 102
Kitchener, Field-Marshal Lord, 24,
30,32

INDEX

327

Knoll, The, 267-70
Knothe, Major H., M.C., 161
Kurd Hill, 100-2
Kurd Valley, 99
Kyeser, Conrad, 4

La Belle Etoile, 144

Labyrinth, the, 101

La Cauchie, 200

La Fere, 173

LaiTaux Hill, 187

LaFolie, 151

Lagash, 300

Lagnicourt, 83, 258

La Maisonette, 176

Landrecies, 170, 285-6

Landships Committee, 23-5, 28

Langemarck, 119

Lateau Wood, 148

La Vacquerie, 148

Le Bosquet, 139

Le Cateau, 282

Le Catelet, 272, 283-4

Le Quesnel, 224

Lees Hill, 101-2

Leigh-MaJlory, Major T., D.S.O., xiii

Lenclos, Ninon de, xv

Leonardo da Vinci, 5, 7

Les-Trois-Bouqueteaux, 208, 210

Lestren, 200

Leuvrigny, Bois de, 195

Liessies, 294

Lihons, 225-6

LiJle, 108

Little WiUie, 26

Lloyd George, Right Hon. D., 25, 30,

161
Lombartbeek, the, 117
Loop, the, 34
Luce, the, 169
Ludendorff, Greneral, xiv, 188, 218,

222-3, 237-8, 263
Lulworth, 162
Lys, the, 199

Magdhaba, 131
Macdonald's Wood, 121
McKenna, Right Hon. Reginald, 30
Mackensen, Field-Marshal von, 15
Maclean, J. B., 66
Magny, 272
MaUly Poivres, 185
Maistre, General, 203
Malmaison, 187
Mahn6dy, 295
Manchester, H. H., 4 note, 8
Manchester Regiment, 273
Mangin, General, 189
Mansara, 99-100

Maquion, 269

Marcoing, 82, 139, 144-6, 148-50, 180

Maretz, 293

Marfaux, 195

Maricourt, 54, 175-6

Marly-le-Roi, 184

Marne, the, 14, 190, 195

Martel, Major G. le Q., D.S.O., M.C.,

XV, 61, 161
Martigny, 185
Martinpuich, 55
Marwitz, General von der, 151
Masnieres, 139, 144-6, 149-51
Massenbach, 298
Mathew-Lannowe, Brig.-Gen. E. B.,

C.M.G., D.S.O., xii, 62, 66
Maubeuge, 250, 285-8
Maurice de Saxe, 298
Maurois, 275, 293
Maximilian I, 7
Mazar Trench, 101
Meaulte, 254
Menin, 276
Mercatel, 83, 92
Mercedes tractor, 1 1
Mericourt, 218, 225
Merlimont, 72, 200, 245, 289
Mers, 70, 289
Merville, 200, 304

Messines, 108,113-4,166,180,242,261
Metropolitan Carriage, Wagon and

Finance Co., 28
Meuse, the, 197
M^zieres, 81
Miette, the, 187
Military Antiquities, 4
Miraumont, 176
Mceuvres, 269
Moislains, 174-5
Molesworth, Lieut.-Colonel J. D. M.,

M.C., xiii, 180
Molinghem, 200

Monchy le Preux, 82-4, 88, 257-8
Moncrieff, Major-Gen. Sir George

Scott-, 22, 25
Mon du Hibou, 122
Money Hill, 99-100
Montauban, xv, 175-6
Montbrehain, 273-4, 281
Montdidier, 188, 196
Montenescourt, xvi, 84
Monument, the, 202
Morchies, 174,258
Moreuil, xvi, 204, 207-8, 258
Morlancourt, 206
Mormal, Forest of, 284-6
Morval, 55
Mory Copse, 256-7
Motor Cycle, The, 159

328 INDEX

Mount Pleasant Wood, 95-7
Moustier, 294-5
Moyenneville, 251, 257
Munitions, Ministry of, 25, 30-4
Murat, xvi
Musketry, art of, 312-3

Nancy, 81

Napoleon, xiv, 8, 104, 170-1, 309

Nauroy, 272

Nepal Trench, 92

Neuville St. Vaast, 84

Neuville-Vitasse, 83, 85, 86, 91, 257

Neuvilly, 284

New Zealand Division, 258, 292-3

Newburn, John, 9

Newbury, 127

Ney, Marshal, xv

Nieppe, 200

Nieuport, 15, 108

Nine Wood, 146, 149

Nord, Canal du, 144, 268-9

Noyelles, 149

Noyon, 81, 188,229

Nutt, Major N., 98

Oise, the, 138, 172, 285
Oosthoek, 117
Oosttaveme, 109, 111, 115
Ostend, 81
Ouderdom, 109, 117
Ourcq, the, 189-90, 290
Outpost Hill, 101-2, 130
Ovillers, 54

Paillenoourt, 144

Pailleul, 144

Palmer, William, 9

Palmer gunsight, 164

Parker, Lieut.-Colonel H., 277-8

Parvillers, 226

Passchendaele, 287

Patten, Colonel G. S., 279

Pedrail Co., 24, 27-8

Peiziere, 173

P6ronne, 229

Perry, Sir Percival, 66

Pershing, General, 279

Pierremont, 62

Pissy, 289

Ploegsteert, 200

Poelcappelle, 122-4

Point du Jour, 83

Polygon veld, 120

Poperinghe, 117, 289

Porte triplane, 316

Pozieres, 176

Premont, 275

Premy Chapel, 269

Preux, 286

Proyart, 226, 292
Pusieux, 250

Quadrilateral, the, 267
Queen's Hill, 101-2
Quennemont Farm, 268-9, 271

Rafa Trench, 99-101, 131-3

Raglan, Lord, 309

Raillencourt, 270

Ralston, W., 303

Ramicourt, 273

Ramousies, 294

Ramsey, David, 8

Ravenel, 290

Rawlinson, General Sir Henry (after-
wards Lord), 227, 305

Reims, 81-2, 108, 188-90, 195, 215,
217

Reincourt, 87

Renuart Farm, 281

Ribbans, Gunner, 231, 233-4

Ribecourt, 138-9

Ricardo engine, 42

Richborough, 127

Riencoxirt, 55

Riguerval Wood, 275

Robersart, 282

Roberts tractor, 1 1

Robertson, General Sir William, 32,
161

Rochet-Schneider tractor, 11

Rookenbach, Colonel, 278-9

Roclincotirt, 83-5

Rocquigny-Villers, 55

Roeux, 88, 95-7

Roisel, 172-4

Romani Trench, 99

Roncheres, 290

Ronssoy Wood, 173, 267

Rosieres, 225, 246

Roulers, 197

Royal Air Force, 239, 242-9

Royal Engineers, 284

Royal Flying Corps, 61

Royal Munster Fusiliers, 173

Royal Naval Air Service, 29-30

Roye, 82, 196, 229

Rumilly, 145, 148-9

Ruyaulcourt, 143

Rycroft, Major, 232

St. Aubert, 215

St. Emihe, 173

St. Julien, 121-4

St. Leger, 256

St. Martin- Eglise, 62

St. Mihiel, 196-7, 279

St. OUe, 270

INDEX

329

St. Omer, U9

St. Pierre-Divion, 58

St. Quentin, 138, 197-8, 250

-St. Quentin Canal, 270

St. Ribert, Bois de, 208, 210

St. Souplet, 281, 283

Salisbury Plain, 28

Salonika, 197

Sambre, the, 284

.Sampson Ridge, 101

Sancourt, 273

Sapignies, 255-7

Sautrecourt, 62

Sauvillers, 188, 204, 207-8

Sayer, Major H. S., xii

Scarpa, the, 83, 85, 138, 172-3, 250

Scheldt Canal, 284

Scherpenberg, 110

Scheuch, General, 240-1

Schott, Caspar, 8

Sea Post, 131, 133

Searle, Colonel F., C.B.E., D.S.O., xiv

Seely, Major-Gen. Right Hon. J. E. B.

66
SeUe, the, 250, 281, 283-5
S6n^cat Wood, 188
Senlis, 290
Sens6e, the, 144, 268
Senate Valley, 258
Sequehart, 273
Serain, 249, 275
SeranvUlers, 145, 148
Serre, 17, 176,250
Sforza, Ludovico, 5
Sheikh Abbas, 99-100
Sheikh Hasan, 131-3
Sheikh Nebhan, 100, 130
Sheikh Redwam, 101
Shekia, 99
Simenoourt, 200
Simmonds, 2nd Lieutenant, 254
Smith, Geoffrey, 159
Smythe, Sir John, xvii
Soissons, 82, 108, 195, 197-8, 217
Somme, the, 16-7, 33-4, 54, 58-9, 81,

98, 134, 166, 169, 172-7, 199-201,

205-6, 212, 223, 225-6, 251-2, 287,

303-4
Sorel, 143

South African Brigade, 293
Spencer, Major R., M.C., xiii
Spree Farm, 121
Springfield, 122
Steenbeek, the, 110, 119, 121
Steenwerck, 200
Stephenson, George, xvii, 303
Stern, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Albert,

K.B.E., C.M.G., 23, 30-1, 33-4,

63, 66

23

Stevin, Simon, 7-8

Stewart, Sir Henry, 318

Stewart, Captain Ian M., M.C., xv

Stothert & Pitt, Messrs., 28

Strahan, Captain, 232

Suez Caneil, 98

Summers, Major, 162

Swanage, 164

Swinton, Major-Gen. E. D., C.B.,
D.S.O., xii, 18, 20-2, 26, 29, 31,
50-3, 66, 72 note, 159-60, 162

Symes, Lieut. K. P., 32

Tandy, Major, 161

Tank Armoured Car Battalion,
Seventeenth, xiii, 289-96

Tank Corps : esprit-de-corps, xvi, 68-
72 ; Headquarters Staff, xiv-xv
60-2, 65, 103-7, 113, 174, 199, 218
270 ; formation of iirst unit, 31
first appearance in action, 54-6
capture of the Gird Trench, 57
reorganisation, 62-7 ; training
centres, 62, 66-7, 159-65; methods
of training, 67-71 ; mobile can-
teens, 72 ; tank tactics, 73-80, 87,
89, 104-7, 111-6, 136-43, 252-3,
276-8 ; at the battle of Arras,
81-97 ; at the Second Battle of
Gaza, 98-102 ; at the battle of
Messines, 108-12 ; at the Third
Battle of Ypres, 117-24 ; mechani-
cal engineering side, 125-9 ; at the
ThirdBattleof Gaza, 130-4; at the
battle of Cambrai, 140-53 ; issue
of " Battle Notes," 154 ; growth in
numbers, 172-3 ; at the Second
Battle of the Somme, 173-7 ; re-
duction in numbers, 199; first en-
counter with German tanks, 201 ;
preparations for the Great Offen-
sive, 202—3 ; first experience of
night warfare, 204 ; at the battle
of Hamel, 204-7, 304-5; opera-
tions with the French Army at the
battle of Moreuil, 207-11 ; at the
battle of Amiens, 218-29 ; exploits
of Whippet Tank " Musical Box,"
230-5 ; co-operation with the
Royal Air Force, 242-9 ; at the
battle of Bapaume, 250-7 ; at the
Second Battle of Axras, 257-9 ; at
the battle of Epehy, 266-7 ; at the
battle of Cambrai — St. Quentin
268-75,304; heavy casualties, 276
287; atthebattleoftheSelle,283-5
at the battle of Maubeuge, 285
last action of the War, 286

330

INDEX

tribute from Sir Douglas (now Earl)
Haig, 287-8

First Tank Brigade, xvi, 62,
117-22, 146, 150-1, 168, 173, 200,
218, 220, 242-4, 250-1, 256-8,
266-9

Second Tank Brigade, xvi, 62
109, 117-22, 146, 150-2, 172-3,
200, 220, 251, 266

Third Tank Brigade, 63, 117-23,
139, 146, 172, 175, 200-2, 208-11,
219-20, 222, 225-7, 243-4, 251,
256-8, 266, 271-4

Fourth Tank Brigade, 168, 172,
174-6, 199-200, 219-21, 225-7,
251-2, 256-8, 266-9, 271-4, 283-6

Fifth Tank Brigade, 168, 172,
200, 205, 208, 216, 219, 222, 226-7,
243-6, 251-2, 254, 266, 271-4
Tank Gun Carrier Companies, xii, 168

71
Tank Park, 58

Tank Signal Companies, 178-83
Tank Supply Companies, 33-4, 109-

10, 166-71, 286
Tanks : their early origin, 1-2 ;
armoured knights as living tank3,
2 ; fifteenth- and sixteenth-century
battle-cars, 2-8 ; Cugnot steam
car, 8 ; endless chain, 9-13 ; in-
vention of the landship, 18-29 ;
how the name " tank " was chosen,
*29; first official trial, 30; taken
over by the War Office from the
Admiralty, 31 ; order placed for
the first hundred, 32 ; their first
appearance in action, 54-6 ; more
successful on their second appear-
ance, 56-7 ; lessons learnt from
their early operations, 58-9 ; limi-
tations of early tanks, 105 ; first
use of supply tanks, 109 ; intro-
duction of cloud-smoke apparatus,
165 ; French tanks, 184-98 ; Ger-
man tanks, 212-6 ; not successful
when attached to cavalry, 228-9 ;
how they impressed the Germans,
236-41 ; their co-operation with
aeroplanes, 242 ; German defence
against, 260 ; American tanks,
279-82 ; retrospect of what they
have accomplished, 297-307 ; fore-
cast of what they may do, 308, 321

Mark I Tanks, 35-7, 44, 49-53,
63, 82, 89, 102, 105, 109-10, 166,
185, 203, 213, 261

Mark II, 37, 63, 89, 102, 110

Mark III, 37, 63, 82

Mark IV, 37-41, 44, 63, 109-10,

122, 130, 141, 167-8, 173, 201, 203,.
212, 214, 253, 255, 258, 261, 267,
269

Mark V, 41-3, 199,202-3,206-7^
219,223, 227, 231, 253, 256, 267
Mark VStar,43, 219,227,253,267
Mark VIII, 279
Mark IX, 167-8

Medium Mark A (" Chaser" or
"Whippet"), 10, 44-7, 164, 173,
176,201-2, 219, 223-4, 226-9, 244,.
253, 255, 258

Daimler Type A.7.V., 212-3
Renault, 185-6, 279
St. Chamond, 184-5
Schneider, 184-6
Tank No. 505, 90-1 ; No. 716,_
95-6 ; No. 770, 91-2 ; No. 783,
92-3 ; No. 784, 93-4 ; " Mabel,"
254-5; "Musical Box," 230-5;.
" Tiger," 101 ; " Wytschaete Ex-
press," in
Tapper, Captain H. J., 61
Tara Hill, 254
Tarrant triplane, 316
Telegraph Hill, 83, 91
Tel El Ajjul, 99
Tel EI Nujeid, 100
Templeux la Fosse, 172
Teneur, 127-8
Thelus, 83
Thetford, 34
Thielt, M7
Thiepval, 57
Thilloy, 172, 257-8
Tigny, 193

Tilloy les Mafflaines, 83-5, 273
Tilly-Capelle, 62
Tortoise Hill, 133
Touteneourt, 200

Trench Warfare Department, 28-&
Trescault, 269
Triangle Farm, 122-3
Tritton, Sir William, 24-6, 31
Trones Wood, 55

Tulloch, Captain T. G., 18, 20-2, 32^
Tunnelling Company, 184th, 117

Umbrella Hill, 130-2
Usna HiU, 254

UzicUi, Colonel T. J., D.S.O., M.C •
xiv-xv, 61

Vaire Wood, 205, 207
Valenciennes, 81, 144, 284-5
Valturio, 5
Vauban, 14

Vaux-Vraucourt, 174, 258
Vaux Andigny, 283

INDEX

331

Vaux en Amienois, 205, 209

Velu Wood, 172, 258

Vendhuile, 270

Verdrel, Bois de, 1 73

Verdun, 184

Vesle, the, 188

Vieille Capelle, 200

Vignacourt, 245

Villemontoire, 193

Villers-au-Flos, 55, 258

Villers-Bretonneux, 169, 201-2, 205,

215, 231, 235
Villers-Cotterets, 189, 191
Villers-Guislain, 143, 146, 151-2, 270
Villers-les-Cagnicourt, 259
Villers-Outreaux, 275
Vimy, 83-5
Vis-en-Artois, 83

Wadi El Nukhabir, 99

Wadi Ghuzze, 100

Wahl, Colonel, 187

Wailly, 71, 172, 175

Wambeke Valley, 111

Wancourt, 86, 91-2, 257

War Office, 9, 22, 25, 29-30, 32, 158-9

Wareham, 162

Warfus^e, 205-6, 291

Warren, the, 101

Warvillers, 225

Waterhouse, Lieutenant, 232

Waterloo, 276
Watkins, Lieutenant, 232
Watt, James, 8, 303
Wellington, 14
Wells, H. G., 303
Wembley, 27

West, Captain, V.C, 246-7
West Indian Detachment, 130
Wheeler, Major G. L., 25, 31
Wilson, Major W. G., 25-6, 31-2, 303
Wiltje, 120

Winnipeg Cemetery, 122
Woods, Lieut.-Colonel H. K., 209
Wool Tank Corps Training Centre,
xii, 62-4, 66-7, 162-5, 279-81, 289
Worgret Camp, 162
Wright Brothers, 316
Wrisberg, General von, 240
Wurmser, xiv
Wytschaete, 108-11, 119

Ypres,xvi, 14-6, 108-9, H3rao(e, 114,
117-24, 129, 138-9, 153, 166, 242,
261, 304, 306

Ytres, 143

Yunus Trench, 101, 131, 133

Yvrench, 34

Zeebrugge, 14

Zoo Trench, 92

Zowaiid Trench, 101, 131

PBOTTBD BT

RAZELL, WATSON AND VINBr, Ln.,

LOiroON AND AYLESBURY,

HNGLAND.