Frederic the Great and Kaiser Joseph: an episode of war & diplomacy in the eighteenth century

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FREDERIC THE GREAT

AND

KAISER JOSEPH

a a

FREDERIC THE GREAT

AND

KAISER JOSEPH

AN EPISODE OF WAR k DIPLOMACY
IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

BY

HAROLD TEMPERLEY

FELLOW Ot PKTSBHOCBB, OAMJKIBOB

LONDON
DUCKWORTH & CO.

3 HENRIETTA ST., COVENT GARDEN, W.C.
1916

All rights reserved.

D^B

TO

GLADYS

PREFACE

The following study had its origin nearly five
years ago at the Record Office. Incidentally
I happened to have occasion to refer to some un-
pubhshed despatches from Berhn and Vienna
in the years 1776-79. As I read them I per-
ceived that the attitude of English statesmen
towards Berlin was a relatively impartial and
detached one, and that the incidents relating
to the Bavarian Succession involved nearly
all the typical elements of eighteenth century
diplomacy : the intense personal influence of
ralers, naked aggression veiled by genealogical
pedantry, the struggle for the " balance of
power," the assertion of raison (Vetat as a plea
for all crimes, the rapier play of contending
forces, the ruthless crushing of small or neutral
Powers by the military aggression of larger ones.
In a word, here was an episode of war and
diplomacy which seemed to nje to have great
typical significance. Clausewitz maintained
that, in war, more could bfe learnt from a
detailed study of a few operations than from a

viii PREFACE

broad general knowledge. I believe the same
can be said of diplomacy in this instance, and
it is greatly to be regretted that Carlyle, in his
great study of Frederic, practically laid down
his pen after 1763.

The view taken by English diplomatists of
the events of 1776-79 was, on the whole, a
detached and impartial one, for it was to the
interest of England to be neutjal. In previous
years she had been very hostile to Frederic, but
now she became reconciled. Hence in these
few years the English diplomatic despatches
have something of the value which Ranke has
claimed for those of Venice at an earlier date.
They seize the central line of diplomatic tend-
ency and show the direction in which Europe
as a whole was moving. Ev=ery other source
— ^French, German, Russian, Austrian, Saxon,
Bavarian — ^has been explored by one foreign
historian or another, but the Enghsh comment
still remained practically unknown to them.
It seems to me that these despatches complete
the picture and place the episodes of the time
in their true relation to one another.

The despatches of Keith, Harris, and Elliot
abound in vivid portraiture and characteriza-
tion. All of them have passages which hght
up even the dreariest byways of diplomacy
with a flash of wit or insight. Each studied
his sovereigns carefully, and there are no more
striking characterizations of the great person-

PREFACE ix

alitics or events of the period than Harris's
brilliant sketch of Frederic and Catherine, or
Elliot's indictment of Bavarian foreign poHcy.
Keith is a more sober writer but not without
humour and satire, and the interview in which
he relates how Kaiser Joseph told him his
opinions of Catherine shoWs considerable
hterary art. Nor can any despatches be more
interesting than the little touches by which
he gradually builds up a full-lpngth portrait of
Kaiser Joseph — that most unfortunate and
fascinating of Austrian rulers.

The moment at which this book appears, and
the subject-matter which it tfeats, lay it open
to the charge of being written for the occasion.
As the reader may easily find a dozen curious
analogies between the Prussian militarism of
the great Frederic and that of* his imitator and
successor, it may be well to forestall criticism.
The book itself has been written for some time,
but the need of verifying details from the
enormous mass of monographic literature and
of constructing a proper apparatits critici
has delayed its appearance until now. But
the process was largely a technical one, and
the amendments purely those of detail and
minutiae. In point of fact all the chapters
except the last were written in the Royal
Library at Berlin more than three years ago.
At that moment I was enjoying the great
facilities to historical students afforded by the

X PREFACE

Prussian Government, and was deeply conscious
of my obligations to German scholarship. Under
such circumstances the opinions that were then
expressed were not likely to be biased by any
views that may be prevalent in 1914.

One word more : it has never seemed to me
the business of the historian to be non-moral
any more than it shovJd be his pleasure to be
dull. But where I have pronounced judgment
I have tried to give my reasons for so doing,
and to give ample references to contrary
opinions. I have sought also to give a truthful
presentation of the episodes selected for treat-
ment, with the comment of relatively detached
contemporaries, and the criticism of modern
historians.

My best thanks are due to the Marquess of
Lansdowne for permission to pubUsh General
Burgoyne's valuable report on the Prussian
and Austrian military systems, of which two
copies are in the MSS. at Lansdowne House.
The poem in Appendix III.- is from an old
Czechish broadside, preserved in the National
Czechish Museum at Caslar, and lent to me
for purposes of translation by the curator.
Dr. Felix Kalm. I have to thank my old
friend Professor Henrik Marczali for the gift of
a valuable original manuscript, written in 1780
by Francis Katalay, the confessor of Kaiser
Joseph, which throws considerable light on the
Emperor's personal character.

PREFACE xi

My general acknowledgments to friends are
so great tliat I must make many in the mass.
I should like, however, to select first and lore-
most Sir A. \V. \Vard, Master of my own College,
for the patience and care with which he read
the proofs and for invaluable criticism and
comment. I have to acknowledge much assist-
ance from those in other lands, most of all from
Professor Henrik Marczali of ihe University of
Budapest ; from Professor Paul Mitrofanov
of the University of Petrograd ; from Professor
Delbriick of the University of BerUn, and from
Professor R. H. Lord of Harvard University,
U.S.A. I owe much also to encouragement or
advice given me by Professor J*. B. Bury, by Mr.
G. P. Gooch, by Mr. D. A. Winstanley, Fellow
of Trinity College ; my old pupils, Mr. J. E, S.
Green, now Fellow of Trinity Hall, and Miss
Kate Hotblack, late of Girton College. To
Mr. W. F. Reddaway, the Censor of Non-
Collegiate Students at Cambridge and bio-
grapher of Frederic the Great'; I owe my first
stimulus and interest in the Prussian King,
which came to me as we tramped his Silesian
battlefields together.

In the purely military part of my study I
have to acknowledge my obligations to my
brother, Captain A. C. Temperley, now Brigade-
Major to the New Zealand ExjJeditionary Force.
The study of the Prussian military system, the
account of the Frederician strategy, and the

xii PREFACE

narrative and criticism of the campaign of
1778 raised problems which are still of con-
siderable interest and which could only be
attempted with the aid of practical military
experience. It is I hope needless to repeat that
this advice was given without reference to
present events, and was in fact embodied in a
memorandum now more than three years old.
While expressing my great obligations to all
those who have aided me, I should like to make
it clear that they must in no way be held re-
sponsible for any statements contained in this
little book.

HAROLD TEMPERLEY,
Lieut. Fife and Forfar Yeomanry Reserve Regiment.

Fenstanton,
Nov. 21, 1914.

CONTENTS

PAQB

Preface ....... vii-xii

I. Introduction to Eighteenth. Century

Diplomacy ..... 1-12

Its motives and aims — Importance of commerce —
" The balances of trade and of pow^r."

II. Austria and Prussia (1763-77) . . 13-48

Prussian Internal Resources (pp. ll-23). — Results
of the " Seven Years' War " — Personal character of
Frederic — As " Philosophic Despot " — Evils of his
despotism.

Austrian Internal Resources (pp. 23-^6). — Diversity
of peoples — Reforms in finance — Character of the
" Three Kings of Vienna," Maria Theresa, Prince '
Kaunitz, Kaiser Joseph — Reforming efforts of
Joseph.

TJie Diplomatic Situation (1763-77), pp. 36-48.
— The Polish problem — Frederic's Treaty with
Catherine (1764) — His meetings with, Joseph (1769-
1770) — Austrian claims on Poland — Frederic's
remedy— The " Partition of Poland " — Value of
acquisitions to the partitioning Powers — Joseph
annexes Bukovina — Will he annex ^avaria ?

III. Bavaria before the Storm (1763-77) . 40-80

(1) The Last Elector of Bavaria arid his Rule (pp.
49-72).— Mcdiacvalisra of Bavaria — Hugh Elliot's
report on (1776) criticism of Max Joseph — Max
Joseph's reforms and enlightenment — Hugh P^lliot
OD his foreign policy — Joseph's designs on Bavaria —

xiv CONTENTS

PAOE

Austrian intrigues in Munich : Max Joseph's hatred
of, and attempts to subvert — Death of Max
Joseph, December 30, 1778.

(2) Claim and Counterclaim on the Inheritance of
Max Joseph (pp. 72-80). — Keith and EUiot on prob-
able claimants to Bavaria — History of Karl Theodor's
rights — Claims of Joseph — ^Max Joseph's attempts
to multiply them,

IV. The Stobm Bubsts .... 81-112

Effects of Max Joseph's death.

Kaiser Joseph (pp. 83-95). — Kaunitz negotiates
the Partition-Treaty of January 3 with Ritter —
Karl Theodor accepts it — Maria Theresa's deUght —
Joseph's hopes of France — ^Louis XVI. and Ver-
gennes refuse to recognize a casus . foederis — Con-
sternation at Vienna.

King Frederic (pp. 95-112). — ^Frederic and Hugh
Elliot — The Alliance with Saxony — Frederic decides
on war.

V. The Plum and Potato War . , . 113-150

The reorganization of the Austrian'army by Lasey
and Kaiser Joseph — ^Prince Henry of Prussia as a
general — The Frederician strategy — The Austrian
plan of defence in 1778 — ^Laudon's proposal to crush
Frederic.

The Western Campaign (pp. 125-134). — Prince
Henry advances and seizes ToUenstein (July 31) —
Laudoa's hurried retreat.

The Eastern Campaign (pp. 135-14?). — ^Frederic's
advance (July S) — His refusal to force the Austrian
Unes — Retreat of the two Prussian armies — Criti-
gsm of Frederic and Prince Henry, and of Laudon —
Credit due to Kaiser Joseph and to Lascy-CLord
Sydenham on the strategic importance of the
" Plum War-'J

VI. A Neutral State in an Eighteenth Century
War: Bavaria during and after the
War (1778-79) .... 151-175

Unfortunate position of Bavaria — Character of
Kari Theodor— His first appearance, at Munich—

CONTENTS XV

TAOIl

His nttempts nt flnancial nntl military reform —
Refusal of Chnrlcs Duke of Zwcibriickcn to accept
till- Partition-Treaty — Goera sent liy I'"rc(leric to
Bavarian patriots — ICden on the distress of Karl
Thcoilor — Lehrbach triis to force him into the war —
His refusal — UiBlculties of Karl Theodor at the
Peace of Toschcn — His quarrel with Zweibriicken —
Karl Theodor arrests and banishes thg three patriots
— Consternation in Munich — Unpopularity of Karl
Theodor and admiration shown for Frederic in
Bavaria.

VII, The Peace of Teschen and Russia's En-
trance INTO Gekmany (1778-79) . . 176-212

Maria Theresa's intervention — The Braunau
negotiation — Her appeal to the Diet — Frederic's
attitude towards Russia — French^ and Russian
mediation^Hugh Elliot denounces the " Balance of
Power " as the basis of negotiatidn— Catherine's
polity — Her instruction to Prince Repnin (October
a2, 1778) — Prince Repnin reaches Breslau and
negotiates with Frederic — Attitude of Frederic —
Mediation of France in conjunction, with Russia —
Frederic criticizes Russian diplomacy to Prince
Henry — " La Vieille \'enus " at Teschen — Con-
clusion of Peace, May 18, 1779-pDiplomatic results
of the Treaty : its real significance — Russia's entry
into Germany — Moltke on the fear pf Russia — The
end of the old regime.!

APPENDICES

I. James Harris (Ist Earl Malmesbury) and
Hugh Eli.iot on the Character and
Court of Frederic the Great (Record
Office MSS.) 214-223

II. General Burgoyne's Report on the Prussian
AND Austrian Armies (1766-67) {Marquess
of Lansdowne's MSS.) . . . 228-225

XVI

CONTENT^

III. Kaiser Joseph's Impressions ofthe Empress
Catherine the Great (1780-82) (Record
Office MSS.) 225-228

\/IV. Gratitude to Kaiser Joseph (Czechish Poem) 228-230

V. Voltaire on the Causes of War in the

Eighteenth Century . . . 230-232

Notes

. 233-251

List op British Diplomatists mentioned in the

Period ....... 253-254

Note on Publications of the Papers of British

Diplomats of the Period ., . . 254-255

A Critical Estimate of the English Diplomatic

Despatches of the Period (1776-80) . . 255-265

Index

267-273

ILLUSTRATIONS

Frederic .....

PACE PASB

. FrontispifCf.

Maria Theresa ...

13

Joseph .....

81

Tmudon .....

118

Map to illustrate the War in Bohemia

. 185

Bavaria and the Palatinate ,

151

INTRODUCTION TO EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
DIPLOMACY

The motives of war and the aims of diplomacy
in the eighteenth century have been drawn for
us by a prophetic and ironic genius. " Some-
times the quarrel between two princes is to
decide which of them shall dispossess a third
of his dominions where neither of them pretend
to any right. . . . Sometimes*a war is entered
upon because the enemy is too strong ; and
sometimes because he is too meak. Sometimes
our neighbours want the things which we have,
or have the things which we want ; and we both
fight till they take ours or givc.us theirs. It is
a very justifiable cause of a war to invade a
country after the people have' been wasted by
famine ... or embroiled by factions among
themselves. It is justifiable to enter into a
war against our nearest ally, when one of his
towns lies convenient for us, or a territory of
land, that would render our dominions round
and compact . . . poor nations are hungry, and

1 B

2 FREDERIC THE GREAT

rich nations are proud ; and pride and hunger
will ever be at variance. For these reasons the
trade of a soldier is held the most honourable
of all others." How many have turned Swift's
page with a smile and dismissed it as the dis-
charge of the venom of one whose malignant
temper and misfortunes made him the enemy
of the human race !

None the less — as a summary of diplomatic
motive and military aim in the eighteenth
century it cannot be held a mere fantasy. The
injustices inflicted upon the nations that were
poor and weak — ^upon Spain, Austria, Poland,
and Turkey ; the pride and tyranny of the
nations that were strong — of France, Prussia,
Russia, and England, — ^these were grim realities.
The seizure of Silesia, the Partition of Poland,
the attempted Partition of Turkey, are but the
three most sordid incidents in a whole epoch of
duplicity and selfishness, and a long array of
state papers reveals an indictment of the un-
paralleled avarice, corruption, and self-seeking
of the age, that is almost as damning as any
which Voltaire or Swift may have drawn. The
historian has only to consult the acts of
eighteenth century rulers, in order to justify
the satirists.

But while it is unnecessary to prove the
unscrupulous character of eighteenth century
policy, it may be desirable to explain and, in
some degree, to extenuate it. The different

AND Kj\.ISER JOSEPH 8

epochs of human history have a certain under-
lying unity, the texture is the same, though the
patterns on it are different, and for this reason
it is well to bring the eighteenth century so far
as possible into comparison with our own age.
It is true that the eighteenth century was the
age of kings and dynastic wars, and the nine-
teenth the age of peoples and nattional wars. But
though it is not always the kin^s who now dream
of war, the people seem almost as ready as they
were to sacrifice justice to expediency, and in
this fact if in nothing else we are enabled to
perceive an essential unity between the ages.
In the nineteenth or twentieth century per-
suasion rather than force is the rule for internal
government, and even a despotically minded
sovereign finds it expedient to flatter popvdar
passions and ideals. In the eighteenth century
the sovereign, who possessed a strong mercenary
army and a submissive and inarticulate people,
was not afraid of taking action far in advance,
or flatly in defiance, of the latter's wishes. In
no age perhaps has power been concentrated in
so few hands, and in no age has the result been
more momentous. During the mid-eighteenth
century Europe was bound in thought by the
ideas of a few resolute and logical individual
thinkers, with Voltaire at their head ; in action
she was cquaUy bound by a few determined
and fearless individual rulers — ^led by Voltaire's
friend, enemy, and hero, Frederic the Great.

4 FREDERIC THE GREAT

Clear thought produced clear action, and power
vested in a few irresponsible rulers delivered
the fortunes of states to the mercy of individual
prejudices and passions to a degree unknown
in previous history.

But though half a dozen persons controlled
the destinies of Central Europe, it would be a
great error to suppose that their policy was
always subservient to personal or dynastic
ends. The orators of the French Revolution
delighted to exhibit the tyranny of kings, to
whom peoples were sacrificed, to point to the
wars produced by the smiles of mistresses and
to the peaces concluded by the bribery of
courtiers. Such a picture has its true side.
In the eighteenth century a prince dealt with
his own principality as a landlord with his
land. It was an age when a system not of
states but of estates prevailed in Europe, when
kings resembled tyrannous country squires.
It involved no violation of current feeling or
established right that a ruler should exchange
Bavaria for Belgium, or Lorraine for Tuscany,
without consideration for the wishes of the
inhabitants, who were handed over to an alien
ruler as freely as they were hired out to be
killed under a foreign general. For a prince
could lend his army to a foreign ruler without
committing his own state to warfare, or
despatch thousands of patient mercenaries to
shed their blood in alien lands in quarrels for

AND KAISER JOSEPH 5

which neither ho nor they cared anything.
Even Avith the most cnhghtened rulers of the
ago, the claims of their subjects and the true
interests of their states often weighed somewhat
little in the balance against their personal
wishes. Catherine, " the most.liberal of rulers,"
habitually chose her generals from among her
lovers, and Frederic, the " first servant of the
state," imprisoned the Venetian ambassador
that he might force the Doge of Venice to
send him a dancing-girl for his new opera at
Berlin !

Such incredible instances might justify im-
passioned rhetoric, and explain the savagery
of the hatred towards kings at the moment of
revolutionary vengeance. It is none the less
true that personal vagaries were not seldom
subordinated to state interests, and that most
rulers in the mid-eighteenth century, despite
occasional lapses, sought the real happiness of
their countries. For example, though personal
influences counted for much, dynastic ones
availed relatively little. The interests of Spain
were not sacrificed to those of France because
Philip V. was a kinsman of LquIs XV., nor was
Prussia the ally of England because Frederic
was the nephew of George II. It is easy to
Single out personal influences which deflected
policy in the eighteenth century, hard to dis-
cover dynastic ones ; Swift is as near the mark
when he says that " Alliance by blood, or

6 FREDERIC THE GREAT

marriage, is a frequent cause of war between
princes, and the nearer the kindred the greater
is their disposition to quarrel," as are those
historians who ascribe the union of the House of
Bourbon purely to the ties of blood, and delight
to contrast the dynastic policies of the eight-
eenth century with the national ones of the
nineteenth. The differences in the two ages
— despite the far greater infliience of the per-
sonal views of individual rulers in the eighteenth
century — are in truth more apparent than real.
The diplomatic language of the eighteenth
century is dynastic in tone. We are be-
wildered by fantastic claims of sovereign right
which are alleged to be the origin of long and
bloody wars of succession or inheritance. But
the fancifulness of these claims need not dis-
guise the reality of facts or deceive the historian.
Eighteenth century monarchs used dynastic
claims as pretexts for advancing the sub-
stantial interests of their countries, and claimed
territory in virtue of the private rights of a wife,
a niece, or a cousin, as the modern statesman
claims it in virtue of the public rights of nation-
ality, of humanity, or of necessity. The pirate
ship steers the same course with a new figure-
head in the bow and with different colours at its
masthead ; the essential objects are the same,
only the pretexts are different. No historical
claims can be more flimsy than those which
Frederic asserted in favour of his claims on

AND I^ISER JOSEPH 7

Silesia, or which Joseph brought up to defend
his Partition of Poland, yet it was not from the
Heralds' College that they dfcrived their real
arguments, but from the need of rounding off
territory, the redress of the balanee of power,
the right of force. Fantastic aiitiquarian argu-
ments were the fashion of the day and the
decorous screen for aggression, injustice, or
necessity. No one at least would be more
amused at our generation, which defends so
many acts of the eighteenth" century on the
plea of history, than Frederic of Prussia,
the cynical philosopher of Sans-Souci, who
wrote, as he was leaving to capture Silesia,
" the question of right (droit) isthe affair of the
ministers," and, at a later date, " the jurispru-
dence of sovereigns is commonly the right of
the stronger." *

The dominant thoughts, by which rulers like
Frederic the Great of Prussia and Joseph II. of
Austria were inspired, were those of intellectual
rationalism. Mysticism, sentimental religious
scruple, obtrusive morality, these were for
women and for priests. Prejudice, tradition,
prescription, the whole fabric of established
order crumbled in the crucible of reason.
" When one has an advantage," said Frederic,
"is he to use it or not ? " Arid on the hardest

• Compare the eighteenth century histori[|n with the ruler — " For
every war a motive of safety or revenge, of; honour or zeal, of right
or convenience, may be readily found in the jurisprudence of con-
querors " (Gibbon, Decline and Fall, chap. Ixv.).

8 FREDERIC THE GREAT

ground of rationalism his question was un-
answerable. Before these mechanical philo-
sophers the precepts of international law, the
respect for the neighbour's landmark, the sacred-
ness of treaties, the rights of independent
states and universal morality had little chance.
Reason dictated not an obedience to vague and
mystic conceptions of international good, but
a clear calculation of individual interests.
Reason denounced not an infringement of
treaties, but an infringement of treaties which
brought no advantage to the perjurer ; success
was the best demonstration as it was the only
canon of right. This mental attitude will
explain many of the most questionable acts
of the period, Frederic's seizure of Silesia,
Joseph's unprovoked attack upon Turkey, or
the long record of Catherine's treachery towards
Poland.

But there were causes other than those of
a scepticism sapping morality, which pushed
forward eighteenth century rulers to many
acts of aggression and perfidy. There existed
economic, physical, political forces which the
rulers could hardly control, causes which they
but dimly apprehended, pressures against which
they could hardly strive — even if they often
strove but feebly. With Louis XIV. and
Leopold I. had perished the last rulers whose
ideas were coloured and wl^w^se policy was
directed by genuine religious influences ; the

AND KAISER JOSEPH 9

influences of the mid-eighteentli century were
rather commercial or political. Rulers went to
war not over questions as to " whether flesh was
bread or the juice of a berry blood," but as to
whether the wine-tariff should be raised or the
herring-duty lowered. In those days the tariffs
or the trading companies of otlier nations could
only be reduced or abolished by an appeal to
the sword. The mercantilist creed of the age —
a creed held with an intensity and force wholly
wanting to more orthodox beliefs — declared
that foreign commerce and internal trade were
the very blood and sinews of a nation, the source
alike of wealth and of power. To injure com-
merce was to drain away the, life-blood of the
state, and any hostile power, which attempted
to do this, was a species of vampire whom it
was needful immediately to destroy. Trade
motives influenced all the Powers of Europe
towards war, especially the maritime nations
— ^the Dutch, French, and English, whose wars
in Eiirope are often but an incident in struggles
for the Indies of the East or of the West. The
motive, more dominant among more purely
continental Powers, like Austria, Prussia, and
Russia, is the need or desire for territory.

At first sight there seems little connection
between the struggle for the balance of trade
and the struggle for the balance of power ; the
unity becomes more obvious when we realize
that increase of territory in Europe meant as

10 FREDERIC THE GREAT

much wealth to a land power, as increase of
trade in America or the Indies did to a mari-
time one. Colonization was even more pro-
moted by territorial annexation than by trade.
Montcalm began by nailing fteur-de-lys on to
tree trunks in the Mississippi valley and Kaiser
Joseph by advancing boundary posts topped by
Austrian eagles into the Zips district. When
once the annexation was complete more settlers
followed Joseph into Poland than followed
Englishmen into Canada. During most of the
eighteenth century colonization was in fact
more active and successful in North and East
Europe than in North America. In Europe the
increase of territory was thought to be always
an increase of strength because, if well managed,
it meant increase of population and wealth.
The sovereign who added province to province
felt as great an addition to his wealth as does
the landowner who piles estate upon estate ;
and the thirst for adding field to field possessed
every ruler in Central Europe, from the pettiest
German prince up to King and Kaiser. But it
was produced by necessity as well as by greed.
The strategic position of Prussia, its scattered
territories, its piecemeal provinces, forced its
ruler to maintain an enormous army, kept him
constantly on the alert and almost compelled
him (had he needed compulsion) to profit by his
neighbour's necessities. The case of Austria,
whose possessions lay promiscuously along the

AND KAISER JOSEPH 11

Danube and the Rhine, and stretched from
Baltic and Nortli Sea to Adriatic, was an
even more obvious ease of goQgraphy making
conscience impossible. The smallest change in
Central or Western Europe was likely to affect
or to threaten one or other of the sporadic pos-
sessions of the Habsburg. Territorial increase
was the eighteenth century measure of safety,
and Frederic was deemed to have attained
that security for Prussia by wresting from
Austria the rich and fertile province of Silesia
(1740). It mattered not that its possession
divided Frederic's dominions even more than
before; that disadvantage wa^ outweighed by
the sohd increase of sixteen thousand square
miles of land and over a milhon subjects. In
exactly the same proportion the position of
Austria had been rendered unsafe, and the
territorial balance of power endangered. It
was no advantage that Austria severed a huge
district from the dying Polish state in 1772, for
Prussia also exacted her share* of Polish spoils.
Until it had measured out fo.r itself with rule
and line a piece of territory equal to the Silesian
province which Frederic had torn from it, the
House of Habsburg deemed itself, and was
deemed to be, unsafe.

Hence it was that Austrian statesmen cast
longing eyes on Bavaria — ^the great Catholic
state of South Germany, whose territory rounded
off the south-western corner of Austria —

MARIA THERESA.

II

AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA

(1763-1777)

Das aUe Heilige Rdmische Reich
Wie halt es noch zusammen.

Goethe.

In the winter of 1777 the chances of a European
War depended on the skill- of a Bavarian
physician. If the Elector of Bavaria died under
his hands, his blunder would give the signal for
a disputed succession and a, European War.
For Kaiser Joseph would majTch his Austrian
troops into the south of Bavaria, and King
Frederic would begin to drill his grenadiers on
the Potsdam parade-ground. It was true that
the succession ought to have been undisputed,
and that by rights the Bavarian inheritance
and possessions fell to Karl Theodor, Elector
Palatine. But undisputed successions were
not common in the eighteenth century. Legal
rights were of less avail than naked force, and
a good army always justified a bad claim. The
eighteenth century had been an age of disputed
successions : from 1702 to 17l3 was the War

13

14 FREDERIC THE GREAT

of the Spanish Succession (arid indeed of the
English also) ; from 1733 to 1735 the War of
the Polish ; from 1740 to 1748 the War of the
Austrian Succession ; in all of which history
shows the right of the stronger to have been
invoked against equity and justice. Now it was
the turn of Bavaria, and as Joseph, the Roman
Caesar, had many legions, and Karl Theodor, the
Elector Palatine, had but few, it was not sur-
prising that Austria should erect a claim to the
succession. It was clear that Austria was
ready to fight, the only questixjn was whether
the Elector Palatine was ready to resist. As
his own resources were negligible, his only hope
lay in an appeal to the justice of Europe, or —
more properly — ^to the interests of other states.
Yet it so happened that only two Powers in
Europe could, by any possibility, interfere.
England was engaged in a death-grapple with
her revolted colonies, and France was already
certain to be drawn into that struggle ; Turkey
was too distant and too weak to exercise in-
fluence, Poland was helpless, in a state of
guaranteed and consecrated anarchy, and the
opposition of lesser German states was either
not to be expected or not to be feared. Of the
other important Powers there remained only
Russia, which was just recovering from the
severe strain of a Turkish war, and Prussia.
Joseph had an " advantage " and was justified
in using it by Frederic's logic, though it by

AND KAISER JOSEPH 15

no means followed that the logician would
approve of his pupil's application. All eyes
were therefore turned towards Prussia, for it
was obvious that, in case of war, she would be
protagonist in the struggle with Austria, and
tliat upon the action of her king depended the
fate of Bavaria and the future of Germany.

1. Internal Resoprces

(a) Prussia

To estimate how far the conditions between
Austria and Prussia were equal, towards what
issue destiny seemed to point, some glimpse of
the previous history of each stq,te, of their exist-
ing resources and of the personalities controlling
them, becomes necessary. Ever since his acces-
sion in 1740 Frederic II. of Prussia had been the
disturbing genius of Germany. No one had
taught the age so many lessons in war or policy,
none had equally surprised, terrified, and con-
founded it. In the winter of 1740 he had first
attacked Austria, and conquered by force of
arms that province of Silesia, which no con-
federation of foes, no disaster in the field, and
no defeat in diplomacy could ever persuade
him to relinquish. It was not- that in this and
in other enterprises Frederic did not commit
many errors, but that his resolute will, his in-
finite resource, and his matchless energy always
enabled him to repair them. In 1746 Silesia

16 FREDERIC THE GREAT

was ceded to him in full so-\rereignty, and he
retired from a war in which every important
European Power had been engaged, but from
which none but he derived substantial profit.
Such dazzling success was dangerous, for it set
other Powers against him, and during the next
decade Nemesis was gathering for Frederic.
The King, whom no Power trusted, soon found
all continental Powers united against him, and
was called upon to face a vast, coalition, which
eventually included Austria, Russia, France,
Sweden, Saxony, and the Germanic Empire
as a whole. Conscious of the gathering danger,
Frederic was able only to strengthen himself
by an offensive and defensive alliance with
England, before the storm burst. The new
and gigantic struggle of the Seven Years' War
(1756-63) was to reveal him in a new light, to
show him tried by every adversity of fortune
and yet equal to every danger, often defeated
but always drawing victory itself out of disaster.
Before 1757 Frederic was known to be a skilled
commander, and his army believed to be superb,
after that it was known that he or they could
baffle and defy the united hosts of Europe.
No numbers could daunt the soldiers who had
won victory at Rossbach, no General could
compare with the leader who had dazzled the
world by his exploits at Leuthen. Even the
disasters of the later period of the Seven Years'
War could not dim his fame or eclipse his

AND KAISER JOSEPH 17

terrible renown. When he ciiu ifrod from the
war — exhausted but triumphiiut — he had ac-
quired an authority to whieh no German ruler
could pretend since the days of Charles V. He
had shnttercd the Austrian armies, he had
driven the French beyond the; Rhine ; and in
these two exploits he had foreshadowed the
future of Germany.

The personal character of Frederic shaped
so much of his system of administration, of
diplomacy, and of warfare, that even the most
minute research into it may be illuminating.
The portraits that we see of hihi differ so amaz-
ingly from one another that it is difficult to
believe that they are those of the same man, and
that fact is no bad index to his strange person-
ality. In the most authentic likenesses the
famous large blue-grey eyes light up the whole
expression, and lend the only touch of softness
or of human weakness to the. grim iron face.
They are all that make possible to us the story
that he let street-boys ride on his horse, that he
patted grenadiers on the shoulder and asked
them to call him " Old Fritz,^" or that nobler
tale of how he burst into tears at the Te Deum
at Charlottenburg after the close of the war.
From the hard satiric lines, from the iron-bound
jaw, from the air of ruthless Energy pervading
his face, we can read a hundred confirmations
of his bitter jests against religi^on, of his revolt-
ing meanness towards old friends, of his cold

c

18 FREDERIC THE GREAT

brutality towards one of his brothers and many
of his veterans. Despite some acts of kindness
he was not a generous man, despite hfe-long
devotion to the pubHc service he was in few
senses a good man, yet he is incontestably a
very great one. He would have fulfilled Burke's
idea of one of the " great bad men of history "
better than any man of his generation, and,
though he lacked the profound insight of a
Richelieu or the magical inspiration of a Pitt, in
all the qualities which secure immediate practi-
cal success he has had few rivals in his own
or in any age.

Frederic is important not only for his
achievements in war but for those in internal
reform and administration, and because he
created that type and model of the mid-
eighteenth century ruler — the Philosophic
Despot. He gave the world the best, though
not the first, example of the enlightened ruler,
who lived in Spartan simplicity, banished harlots
and luxury from his courts, and worked for the
general interests of his whole land irrespective
of creed, party, or privilege. The creation of
a justice which should be equal for rich and
poor, and should be without the degradations
of torture ; the codification of the law ; the ex-
tension of toleration to civil and religious
opinion ;— these Were reforms which he intro-
duced or immensely popularized throughout
Europe. The administrative machine, which

AND KAISER JOSEPH 19

he improved though he had not fashioned it,
Avas unparalleled for efficiency, smoothness,
and economy. Prussia under Frederic seemed
to Hegel the ideal of what a state should be, and
no land-agent ever knew the capacities of an
estate, or lent more effort to developing them
than Frederic gave to his kingdom. The King
himself took as eager an interest in the raising
of chickens, the price of coffee, and the manu-
facture of porcelain, as in increasing revenues,
in manoeuvring armies, or acquiring provinces.
A hierarchy of officials, entirely subservient to
the King, interfered in every activity of life,
originated or developed manufactures, intro-
duced immigrants, founded colonies in waste
places, drained marshes, cultivated deserts,
built roads, cut canals, relieved poverty, en-
couraged thrift and punished idleness. Nor did
less material interests suffer.' Frederic, said
Voltaire, was Spartan in the mtorning, Athenian
in the afternoon. Though he erected barracks
and fortresses without number, he also built
palaces for himself and academies of learning
for his subjects, attracted men of letters to
Berlin, built opera-houses, encouraged art and
patronized literature. The state still remained
in a sense feudal and mediaeval ; the nobility
still enjoyed great social and political privileges,
such as exemption from taxation and the
monopoly of posts in the army; the mass of
the agricultural population stiil remained serfs

20 FREDERIC THE GREAT

burdened with heavy imposts. But what the
people gave in one way was returned to them
in another, for organization and discipUne had
made the nobles obedient servants of the crown.
No land was safer against assailants from
without, no peasants were more certain of
justice from within. Nowhere were peace and
order better maintained, communications more
rapidly improved, or material resources more
speedily developed. One great advantage
Frederic had over almost every other state : his
economy was so great, his stewardship so care-
ful that even in the strain of war he had never
resorted to loans. England's subsidies and
his own parsimony had enabled him to pay for
everything as it fell due. Hence, though the
Seven Years' War imposed gigantic sufferings
on Prussia, it did not tax or mortgage her
resources in the future. At the moment when
Austria was labouring under mountains of debt,
Prussia, owing to Frederic's system of making
income balance expenditure, was encumbered
by no tax on posterity. Frederic likened
Prussia at the close of the war to a man bleed-
ing from a hundred wounds, but when once he
had staunched the flow of bldod, there was no
festering sore, no rankling wound, which might
reopen.

The real fault of the civil administration
lay in its success, the machin^e worked so per-
fectly that it rendered everything mechanical.

ANl) KAISER JOSEPH 21

So long as the Imnd of Frederic controlled the
machine, his mighty energy inspired and
vibrated thi'ough every part of it, but there
were not wanting signs towards the end of his
reign that even his strength was unequal to the
task, and that no single brain could foresee
tlie needs and anticipate the wishes of millions.
Prussia was stereotyped in itst routine, its very
energies were mechanical, its creative power
was gone, and this exhaustion of strength
was already perceptible about the time at
which our narrative opens (1777). It was
in that year that Hugh Elliot wrote of
it : " The Prussian monarchy reminds me of
a vast prison in the centre of which appears
the great keeper occupied in the care of his
captives." *

The defects in Frederic's civil administration,
the inelasticity of the system, the rigour which
was stifling individual energy and natural force
in the state as a whole, was even more injurious
to the army. Frederic had inherited from his
father, Frederic William I., the most perfectly
drilled infantry in the world," and had shown
that he could manoeuvre them in battle as
easily as upon the Potsdam' parade - ground,
but it can hardly be said that*he had improved

* Lady Minto's Memoir of Hugh Elliot, p. 105. Practically the
same phrase is used by Wraxall, November 9, 1777, who visited
Potsdam and Berlin in that year. He knew Elliot well, and the
reader may determine for himself the true authorsliip of the phrase j
cp. Wraxall's Court of Berlin, etc., vol. i., London, 1700, p. 205.

22 FREDERIC THE GREAT

their spirit or their discipline. During his later
years his absolutism grew, and whereas he had
once extended a wise discreticwi to his marshals
and generals, he gradually became jealous
of any show of independence or originality.
His favourite leaders were those who meekly
executed his general orders without reference
to particular circumstances, or who readily
assumed blame for disasters which they them-
selves could have averted. The individual had
become an automaton in the grip of a merciless
machine directed by a single intelligence. The
logical and inevitable result of such a system
was that the generals deteriorated in intellect,
the troops in vigour and resource. Their
mechanical drill, their automatic perfection
was still as great as ever, but the spirit, which
had inspired his soldiers at Leuthen, the train-
ing, which had made generals like Schwerin
or Seydlitz possible, were absent from his
armies in 1778. Everything in Prussia de-
pended upon the King, but Frederic was no
longer the Frederic of old, and possessed
neither in himself nor in his soldiers the vigorous
and buoyant strength which had brought them
both safe through so many disasters in the past.
Prussia was still strong in her traditions, in
her discipline, in her sovereign's immeasurable
renown, but it was the strength of one whose
muscles are still powerful when the internal
vigour is decaying. Frederic's civil adminis-

AND KAISER JOSEPH 23

tration and his military fanje were yet the
admiration of Europe, but

Power, unto itself most commendable,
Hftth not a tomb so evident -as a chair
To extol what it hath done.

(6) Austria-Hungary

No contrast could well be greater than that
between the mechanically drilled, uniform, and
united Prussia of Frederic the Great in 1778
and the mediaeval and disorganized Austria-
Hungary of Maria Theresa in 1740. Mari^
Theresa succeeded to a realm whose possessions
were even more scattered than. those of Prussia,
and some of whose inhabitants were sunk in a
barbarism compared with whiph the ignorance
of Prussian serfs was enlightenment. Her
possessions in the Netherlands and Italy, her
territories scattered like dust over South and
West Germany, were a source of danger rather
than of strength, as they offered temptations
to the greed of Spain or France. In Austria-
Hungary itself the most extraordinary diversity
of custom and administration prevailed, no-
where was mediaevalism so apparent nor order
so frequently the exception. In truth Austria-
Hungary is, and always has been, not a country
but a continent in itself, and there was as much
difference between the noble of Vienna and the
peasant of Transylvania as b^ween the grand
seigneur of Paris and the serf of Russia. The

24 FREDERIC THE GREAT

contrasts of race, of climate, and nationality,
as well as of wealth and culture, were (and still
are) amazing. The Archduchy of Austria,
Styria and Carinthia, and the Tyrol and Silesia
were mainly German in population, and con-
sequently were the easier to rule by German
methods and on uniform principles, while
their inhabitants were the most prosperous
and intelligent throughout Austria-Hungary.
Bohemia and Moravia offered totally different
problems for solution, their soil was poor, the
people were Czechs, who were wretchedly ig-
norant and rebellious towards their tyrannical
German landowners. In lUyria was a barbar-
ous and ignorant population, whose habits and
manners were as low as or lower than those
of Russian serfs. There was a wide and deep
distinction between all these districts (united
under the general title of Hereditary Provinces)
and the Hungarian Kingdom. Hungary was
an independent kingdom, strong and self-
centred, ruled by the proud and passionate
Magyar aristocrats, who clainied the right to
tax and to govern their own country, and to
exclude foreigners {i.e. Germans) from its
borders. A perfect type of a feudal aristocracy
had been, as it were, embalmed and preserved
in this country, and mediaeval Hungary con-
trasted as markedly with eighteenth century
Austria as did the Hungarian noble with his
feathered kalpag, his furred dolman, crooked

AND ICAISER JOSEPH 25

scimitar, liorcc moustache an4 long hair, with
tlie smooth-shaven, periwipfTcd; and silk-clothed
aristocrat of Vienna. It was this hopeless
complexit}' of strangely associated states that
the various European Powers, with Frederic
at their head, came to partition and despoil
in 1740. The result was the loss of Silesia,
and — bitter as was the blow — perhaps a gain
to the House of Habsburg.

The very greatness of the disaster, the
terrific impact of modern organizations and
ideas upon a system that was hopelessly
mediaeval, produced changes that were highly
beneficial to Austria - Hungary as a whole.
If they were to escape similar disasters in the
future the Habsburgs must make the most
drastic and strenuous efforts* to adapt their
states to modern conditions. By inclination
Maria Theresa was strongly conservative, but
she pushed on the work of regeneration with
resolute determination after 1748, in especial
the work of military reform. Her efficient
professional army, which confronted Frederic
during 1756-63, was by no means equal to his
own, but it was immeasurably superior to the
hired mercenaries, the rude feudal levies, or
the gallant irregulars who had served her in
the first Silesian War. A transformation had
likewise been effected in the internal govern-
ment of the state, the finances were revised,
methods of taxation improved, and the ad-

26 FREDERIC THE GREAT

ministration rendered more efficient. A council
of state — erected in 1758 — brought the hope-
lessly conflicting mass of executive boards,
committees and councils, into something like
order, and the same idea of co-ordination and
centralization was cautiously but systematically
extended throughout the Austrian domains.
In Hungary, partly from gratitude for her
loyalty in the dark days of 1740, partly from
prudence, Maria Theresa was too wise to attempt
far-sweeping change. Hungary remained an
independent unit governed by her backward
and patriotic nobles, though not entirely un-
affected by the breath of reform. The proud
Hungarian noble was flattered, was attracted
to the court of Vienna, and induced to learn
German and forget his patriarchal usages, but
no serious effort was made to tarnish or to
dim the aurea libertas which he cherished. In
Bohemia and Moravia the nobility was mainly
German and the task of centralization easier.
Accordingly these districts, instead of enjoying
a quasi-independence under the sleepy rule of
petty councils of local tyrants, were brought
within the reach of the efficient bureaucracy
of Vienna. The civil service became more
public-spirited and energetic, organization and
discipline passed from ideal into reality, in-
creased administrative efficiency doubled the
yield from the taxes, and Austria-Hungary,
which, under Charles VI., had been governed

AND KAISER JOSEPH 27

as badly as Poland, was governed in the
last years of Maria Theresa at least as well as
France.

Austria-Hungary, like Prussia, was governed
by a dynasty whose rule was intensely personal.
Yet, as was often reported after 1765, there
was only one king at Potsdani, but there were
three at Vienna. These wer6 Maria Theresa,
the Empress-Queen ; Joseph, her son, Holy
Roman Emperor ; and Kaunitz the Chancellor,
almost the Grand Vizier, of Austria-Hungary.
Among the long gallery of faces, cynical or
coarse, voluptuous or depraved, that confront
us in the mid-eighteenth century, Maria
Theresa's womanly face exercises an indescrib-
able fascination. The brow is broad and
noble, the mouth firm yet seAsitive and kind,
the eyes direct, clear and true, the whole
expression one of innocence, sincerity, and
strength. The air is noble and commanding,
and yet the dignity of the queen in no way
lessens the sweetness and motherhness of the
woman. That her face could remain thus, after
the revelations of the private vices and public
crimes almost daily forced upon her, is one
more testimony to the exquisite purity and
strength of her character. Without perhaps
the highest gifts of statesmanship, she possessed
the power of awaking enthusiasm, a resolute
will, unshaken courage at a crisis, and an un-
erring practical insight. Despite an unfaithful

28 FREDERIC THE GREAT

husband, a vicious court, and a corrupt adminis-
tration, she contrived to win the respect of her
enemies for her womanhness, her courage, and
her statesmanship, to be the one Habsburg
loved by Austrians and Hungarians ahke, and
to impart to her reign the aspect of a golden
age of happiness and renown. During her
reign the province of Silesia was lost, during
the rule of her father the Netherlands had been
added to Austria ; but no one has ever ventured
to compare his reign with hers in respect of
splendour or prosperity.

No contrast could well be greater than that
portrayed in the characters and the portraits
of Maria Theresa and of her Minister, Kaunitz.
His lean, hard, mask-like face contrasts as
markedly with her open, generous, and hand-
some one as did the exquisite finesse, the
subtlety and craft of his policy with her un-
affected simplicity, her piety, and zeal for
truth even in diplomacy. Prince Kaunitz,
the Austrian Chancellor, who exercised such
sway over his mistress, was a typical mid-
eighteenth century statesman, foppish and
aristocratic to the finger-tips, his hair always
powdered and his coat laced in the latest
fashion, his manner suave, urbane, and polished.
No one knew so well how to make frivohty and
diplomacy serve one another ; some of his most
important confidences were made in the billiard-
salon or the ball-room; many of his diplo-

AND KAISER JOSEPH 29

matic triumphs were achieved by means which
only a hbeitinc could have used. He was too
much a son of his age, had too great a scorn of
humanit>', and too much natural cynicism, not
to have imbibed the cool philosophy which
denounced priests as hypocrites and religion
as superstition. His respect for Maria Theresa
caused him to conceal the extremes of this
tendency during her reign, but no statesman
of any country showed himself at heart more
resolutely anti-clerical. As a reformer of the
internal administration he suffered too much
from the prejudices of his class, from his anti-
popular views, from his easy disbehef in human
nature, to effect very much. But as a diplo-
matist he had many of the highest qualities :
cynical self-possession, ready resource, un-
failing suavity and grace, an intelligence that
was clear if not profound, an ingenuity that
was real if somewhat fantastic. He was the
chief architect of that diplomatic masterpiece,
the coalition of Austria, Russia, and France,
which so nearly destroyed Frederic in the Seven
Years' War. But Kaunitz built too much on
coalitions, on finesse, and ori diplomacy ; if,
indeed, these could have been decisive, Frederic
would have been overthrown. The practical
realities of the situation mocked at the airy
conceptions of Kaunitz, and the result of the
struggle brought enhanced glory to the Prussian
Jdng, and somewhat dimmed the reputation

30 FREDERIC THE GREAT

of the Austrian diplomat. Austria had in-
curred an enormous debt, had strained her
resources to breaking-point, and had failed to
recover Silesia. That was the result of the
Seven Years' Struggle which ended in 1763.
At such a time it was not unnatural that Maria
Theresa might be willing to listen to other
counsels than those of her Chancellor.

It was about the year 1765- that Joseph first
came into prominence, and Austrian policy
henceforward assumes a new character for
vigour and reforming zeal, partly owing to the
pressure of events, and to the impulse of the
Empress and the Chancellor, but in no small
degree also to Joseph. His early portraits
have a deep and even a melancholy interest,
for they enable us to trace in his countenance
the qualities which made him at once the best-
loved and the best-hated of his race, which
caused him to be adored by philosophers and
detested by priests, which won him the love
of all German-speaking folk and the hatred of
all Hungarians. Some have accounted for his
striking gifts and his. no less amazing defects
by declaring that he was a Lorrainer, the child
of his father, the Emperor Francis I., and no
true son of Rudolph or Maximilian. But,
while the contour of his face is unlike that of the
Habsburgs, the eyes are characteristic of Maria
Theresa. His early portraits show a smooth

AND KAISER JOSEPH 81

oval face, open and pleasing, a mouth full,
mobile, and sensitive, the expression frank,
generous, and engaging. But his real character
is seen in those large hquid blue eyes, which
were tlie admiration of all Vienna ; whose
expression of passionate sympathy, of warm
humanity, of thoughtless eagerness, reveal the
true man. Joseph's faults were many, some
fickleness and confusion of thought, great
recklessness and misdirection of energy, much
harshness towards subordinates; but none can
deny him as warm a zeal for his people, as
genuine a care of the poor and degraded and
weak, and a heart as tender as ever beat in
the breast of a sovereign. TJie history of his
devoted efforts, of his pitiful failures are
written in those passionate eyes and upon
those tremidous lips.

The dominating characteristic of Joseph
was the imion of strong humanitarian impulses
with a rigid and mechanical' logic. He was
half a warm-hearted philanthropist, who sacri-
ficed everything to impulse and sentiment, half
a ruthless bureaucrat, who carried out pedantic
ideas with military precision and force. It is
in the former character that posterity has re-
garded him, and legend has been as busy with
him as with Haroun-al-Raschid. He loved
to travel into the remote corners of his wide
dominions, vmannounced and with a scanty
escort, wearing a plain black coat and assuming

32 FREDERIC THE GREAT

the pseudonym of Count Falkenstein ; preferring
to sleep in the village inn rather than in the
castle on the hill, to fraternize with the peasants,
and to see everything with his own eyes, like
a true father of his people. Once at an inn
near Kolin he entered hastily, dirtying with
his boots the damp brick floor which the maid
was scrubbing. " Go away ! " screamed she
furiously, but the tall young stranger smiled
and gave her a ducat. Who could throw away
so much money but the great — ^nay the greatest
— ^the Kaiser himself ? So thought the maid,
inquired accordingly, found it was he, and
was properly abashed.* On another and more
famous occasion near Briinn, taking the plough
from the hand of a Czechish peasant he drove
a furrow with it, to show his love for the peasant
and for the noblest of all industries. f In the
hearts of peasants, at least, Kaiser Joseph found
his reward, however statesmen or historians
judged him. His portrait hung in their huts
beside that of the Virgin, and a thousand
legends and songs enshrined- the memory of
the good Emperor, of the Peasants' Kaiser who
sought to free the peasants from serfdom, who
brought to so many of them, the first gleams
of hope and of sympathy, and who wished

* This story came to me from the lips of an old Czechish school-
master well versed in folk-tales.

t This is the most famous of all the stories about him, and the
original (?) plough together with a portrait of the peasant is still
shown in the Museum at Brunn.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 33

himself to be known as " I)er Schatzer der
Mensehen " (The Lover of Mankind),

On tlie death of his father in 1765 Joseph,
being already King of the Romans (1764), was
chosen as Holy Roman Emperor. He thus
became recognized head of the Germanic Body
and titular ruler of Christendom, but his
power as Emperor over Gerrftany was almost
as small as his more indefinite lordship
over the civilized world. With his usual
impetuosity he endeavoured to infuse some
energy into the withered and worm-eaten
structure of the Empire, but was met by the
most humiliating rebuffs. The organs for the
common government of G^ermany, the Aulic
Council (Reichs-Hofrath), the Imperial Court
of Justice (Hofgericht), and Reichskammer-
gericht, were outworn, inefficient, or corrupt.
Joseph's efforts to evoke some common order
and unity in the lumbering machinery of
Empire not only failed, but aj3tually produced
strong and not unjustifiable suspicions that he
was merely trying to use his Imperial position
to further Austrian aims.

Foiled in these designs, Joseph turned his
attention to the internal development of Austria,
which he had been co-regent since 1765. His
youthful impetuosity soon broke against the
experience of Kaunitz and the caution of Maria
Theresa, but, none the less, he effected im-
portant reforms. Joseph was chiefly instru-

D

34 FREDERIC THE GREAT

mental in promoting economy and reform of
the finances, measures most urgently needed.
The one constant feature of Austria in history
has been the ever-threatening peril of bank-
ruptcy ; and after this war the situation for
a time almost portended ruin. But in 1775
the rigour of the economies actually made it-
possible for a genuine surplus of revenue over
annual expenditure to be triumphantly an-
nounced. To obtain this result Joseph had
subjected the Court to the most rigid economies,
had handed over twenty million gulden of his
private fortune, and pledged his numerous
estates in Bohemia, Moravia, Austria, and
Hungary, finally even his Duchy of Teschen,
to support the credit of the State. By these
means the interest on the State debt was re-
duced from a 6 and 5 to a 4 per cent average,
and at last credit and expenditure actually
balanced one another. It can" hardly be denied
that these measures, and these measures alone,
saved the State from bankruptcy, and that this
inestimable boon was due to Joseph more than
to any one else. It was not his only service.
Measures for the amehoration of the prisons,
for the humanizing of the criminal code by
removal of the more barbarous forms of torture,
for the promotion of education, and. for the
abolition of serfdom in the Austrian lands, owed
much, if not everything, to his eager advocacy.
Considering that many df Joseph's ideas

AND KAISER JOSEPH 85

were Avholly impracticable, owihg to the doctrin-
aire precision of his mind and to his ruthless
disregard for tradition and precedent, Kaunitz
and Maria Theresa were right in resisting a
considerable number of thern. But such an
opposition could hardly be maintained without
bitterness against a young man as ardent and
impetuous as Joseph, even tiiough he was a
most dutiful son. It was therefore with the
view of diverting his attention from other
matters that Maria Theresa placed the sole
direction of the army in his hands (1765). The
idea was ingenious but tmfortunate, for no
species of administration could have been more
hkely to encourage arbitrary 'and domineering
tendencies in him. The study of military
affairs strengthened him in the belief that
peoples could be taught to move in a given
direction as easily as regiments, that laws
Could be framed and executed with the pre-
cision of mihtary commands, and that force
availed against every species of opposition.
His energy, combined with the skill of his
friend Marshal Lascy, led, as we shall see, to
many improvements in the personnel and the
material of the army. As with the army, so
with the State as a whole. Austria-Hungary,
which had been mediaeval in 1740, was by no
means modern in 1778, but she had advanced
with great rapidity, her resources had been
greatly developed, her administration, as com-

36 FREDERIC THE GREAT

pared with previous periods, was at least
relatively efficient, uniform, and centralized.
She had neither the technical perfection nor
the immense moral prestige of Prussia, but
she was not so tied to old traditions nor so
hampered and stereotyped by success ; and
the two countries, if not equal, were at least far
more evenly balanced than at any previous
time in Frederic's reign. It only remains, there-
fore, to inquire into the history of the years
that followed 1763, to see how far the diplo-
matic situation favoured one or the other.

2. The Diplomatic Situation, 1763-77

In foreign policy Frederic had the great
advantage of exercising undisputed sway, whilst
the control of the external affairs of Austria-
Hungary was shared among three persons.
Maria Theresa was pious and honourable in all
things, and her regard for international morality
was often as much outraged by the suggestions
of both Joseph and Kaunitz as her practical
good sense was offended by the impetuous
rashness of the Kaiser or the fantastic in-
genuity of the minister. In the control of the
internal affairs of Austria she managed to hold
her own, and to dictate her pohcy to her two
chief advisers, but in foreign, policy the case
was otherwise. The position of Joseph as head
of the army and his rank as Emperor gave him

AND KAISER JOSEPH 87

great advantages for influcneirig foreign policy,
and when his \'i(n\ s were supported by the vast
diplomatic experience of Kaunitz, their union
often carried the day against Maria Theresa.
Frederic, on the other hand, treated his advisers
as mere clerks, and was able to impart complete
imity and decision both to the. conception and
execution of his designs.

The situation of Austria and Prussia after the
Seven Years' War was, in each case, critical.
Each had been abandoned by her ally ; Austria
by Russia, Prussia by Engl&nd. These two
defections determined the diplomatic situation
of Central Europe for the next twenty years.
Without an ally each of the German Powders
was unsafe. Austria clung to France, who was
pledged to her by treaty, and still a friend if
a wavering and uncertain one. Russia under
Czar Peter III. had actually deserted Austria,
and entered into an offensive alliance with
Prussia (1762). Catherine II,, his murderess,
widow and successor, had withdrawn from the
Prussian alliance, but had remained neutral, and
so enabled Frederic to close tlie war triumph-
antly, without the loss of an, inch of Silesian
territory. Events in Poland" were, however,
soon to force Catherine into closer relations with
Prussia. On October 5, 1763, King Augustus
III. of Poland died. As the Polish throne
was elective, and as the Polish nobles were
influenced by bribes and threats from outside.

38 FREDERIC THE GREAT

there was the certainty of a disputed succession
and the prospect of a long and bloody war.
Catherine, fearing that the Franco-Austrian
alliance would be hostile to her design of placing
her own nominee on the Polish throne, turned
to Frederic. A treaty was signed on April
11, 1764, between Frederic and the Czarina,
which included an eight years' offensive and
defensive alliance between the two Powers,
and a regulation of the Polish Succession accord-
ing to their wishes. The results were startling :
Russian battalions promptly terrorised the
Polish nobles, and on September 7, 1764, set
Stanislas Poniatowski, Catherine's old lover
and new servant, upon the throne of Poland.
This move was made with the moral support
of Frederic. So serious was the blow to
Austrian prestige that Kaunitz would have
advised Maria Theresa to declare war had
not the internal condition of Austria impera-
tively forbidden any such design. Worse
difficulties were to come : the Catholic reaction-
ary Poles rebelled against their tolerant and
apparently Russian King Stanislas. Catherine
supported her lover with arms, and drove his
opponents into Turkish territory. The re-
monstrances of the Russian Ambassador with
the Grand Vizier as to the harbouring of these
refugees produced his own imprisonment in
the Seven Towers at Constantinople and a
declaration of war upon the Sultan from the

AND KAISER JOSEPH 89

Czarina. Thus the direct result of the Pohsh
disturbances was a dangerous war between
Catherine and Turkey. The prentice clumsiness
which Russian and Turkish generals proceeded
to show in the war amused that supreme
military artist, Kng Frederic, as much as the
diplomatic dangers distressed him. In 1769
Russia — after giant sacrifices of men and money
—had conquered and occupied all Moldavia,
and this alteration of the balance of power not
only seriously disturbed Frederic, but almost
compelled Austria to interfere. Under these
circumstances, Austria and Prussia began to
regard one another more favourably. Kaunitz
revived a project — as old as 1766 — for securing
a meeting between King Frederic and Kaiser
Joseph, and on August 25, 1769, their world-
famous meeting took place at Neisse in Silesia.
The meeting of the old hero of Prussia and the
young hope of Austria, the soldierly familiarity
with which Frederic treated Laudon the
Austrian hero of the Seven Years' War, the
ease with which Joseph waived his Imperial
dignity to show his respect for the old King, all
these details made the meeting of Neisse famous.
But what seemed a world-event to contem-
poraries was in reality but a picturesque
incident. Joseph wrote to his mother that the
King was a genius but a rasqal, and that he
thought his ideas peaceful at the moment
merely because he dared not venture upon war ;

40 FREDERIC THE GREAT

Frederic wrote to his Minister saying the
Kaiser was full of energy and rashness, and a
firebrand who would set Europe aflame when
he had the power. The meeting had no result
in drawing the two rulers closer together, but
it frightened the Czarina, induced her to sign
a new treaty with Frederic on October 23, 1769,
and produced a Russo-Prussian Alliance which
lasted until March 1780.

A second meeting between Frederic and
Joseph at Neustadt (Moravia) at the Austrian
manoeuvres on September 30,= 1770, had really
more important results than that of Neisse. It
was memorable because Kaunitz, who had not
seen Frederic for a generation, clasped hands
with the man who had so often baffled all
his diplomatic finesse. Frederic spoke freely
to Kaunitz of the -dangers created by this
" cursed Turkish War." Each agreed that the
aggression of Russia formed a serious danger,
and, while not abandoning their respective
allies, each arranged to urge moderation on the
Czarina. Prince Henry of Prussia went on a
mission to Catherine at the end of 1770, and
heard from her that she would insist on the
Russian occupation, or at least on the complete
independence, of Moldo-Wallachia. The news
of this made Frederic write to his brother that
he disapproved the terms, ar^d was not going
to support Russia in her aggression, in order
finally "to be spitted like Polyphemus." The

AND KAISER JOSEPH 41

Austrian trio were of tlic same opinion — but
distrustod Frederic as much a§ Catherine.

The means by which this mutual distrust
among the three Powers w£^s removed, and
the Turkish difficulty adjusted, were extra-
ordinary. It was by the Partition of Poland.

The state of anarchy in Polpnd had already
caused an Austrian corps of observation to be
stationed on its borders, and Joseph without
opposition from Stanislas had already carried
out a delimitation of boundaries. He had
included Zips in Austria, a- district mainly
(ierman in speech, which had hitherto been
regarded as Polish territory. It had been
pledged to Poland by Sigismund, King of
Himgary, in 1412, and the Hujngarian Diet had
declared in favour of its re-incorporation in
Himgarian territory on many occasions and
last of all in 1756. As Poland's claims to it
were possibly disputable. King Stanislas not
only allowed, but even requested Kaiser Joseph
to annex Zips (May 1769). But it was ill
making concessions to Kaiser Joseph, for he
took the opportunity not only to occupy Zips,
but to claim also Sandez, Neumarkt, and
Gsorsztyn, to march troops irito them, and to
Surround them with boundary posts topped
with Austrian eagles. WhQ,tever may be
thought of the occupation of Zips, it can
hardly be denied that this other unjustifiable
act of aggression gave the first direct sug-

42 FREDERIC THE GREAT

gestion for immediate annexation on a larger
scale. If Austria had already acquired by
ells, why should not Frederic and Catherine
by miles ?

To Frederic in 1771 the situation seems to
have shaped itself as follows : " Russia occupies
a large part of Turkish territory and threatens
Poland, Austria holds a part of Polish territory
and threatens yet more. Each appeals to me
against the other, and at present I am in the
situation of an arbiter, who possesses no
equivalent of land to balance their proposed
acquisitions." His remedy was ingenious and
characteristic, and as early as February 1771
he was instructing Prince Henry to suggest to
Catherine a partition of Polish territory among
the three Powers. By such acquisitions each
Power could deal fairly with the other, Russia
could relinquish too extensive a spoliation of
Turkey, Austria could increase her Polish gains,
and Frederic himself be satisfied with that
modest remnant, Polish West Prussia. He
made it quite clear that Prussia could not
allow Austrian expansion in Poland, or Russian
expansion in Turkey, to proceed unchecked.
He was prepared to resist them to the last
extremity except upon these terms which he
laid down. Catherine was unwilling to re-
linquish her hold either upon Poland or Turkey,
but it was clear that persistence in her single-
handed attempt to despoil the Poles meant war

AND KAISER JOSEPH 48

with Prussia, while to rob the Turks meant
war with Austria. It was onfy at the expense
of Polai\d that Prussia, Austria, and Russia
could alike gain accessions of power, and the
oiJy solution acceptable to all three parties,
the sole way out of this maze of conflicting
interests, was to guarantee the integrity of
Turkey by securing the dispiemberment of
Poland.

Whatever may be thought; of the morality
of these transactions it was the policy of them
alone that seems to have been considered by
Frederic and Catherine. Neither do Kaimitz
and Joseph appear to have troubled their
consciences, for much as the latter loved
justice to be done to peasants he cared nothing
about it for princes. Still one obstacle re-
mained in the way of these heartless intriguers,
the conscience of Maria Theresa. Her old-
world piety, her sense of honour and of inter-
national fair-dealing, were outraged by this
shameless proposal to prevent the destruction
of one independent state by proceeding to the
dismemberment of another. But in truth her
opposition was hopeless, Joseph's seizure of
Zips and Neustadt — however insignificant in
size as compared with the wholesale acquisi-
tions proposed — had been tiie halloo which
started the chase. It was useless to call off the
hunters now that hounds were in cry and the
quarry at view. Therefore with sighs and tears

44 FREDERIC THE GREAT

and protestations, and with warnings of the
penalties which awaited international perjurers,
she gave way,

" She took though she wept," sneered
Frederic. "She carved territory from Poland
with one hand and used her handkerchief with
the other," laughed the French ambassador at
Vienna. This heartless ridicule of her motives
and attitude shows how little old-fashioned
virtue was impressive, or even intelligible, to
the diplomatist of the day. The fact that
England showed no indignation against the
partition when once commercial advantages
were secured to her, and that France made but
a feeble remonstrance, proves the stagnation
of international morality.

Hence arose the famous, or rather the in-
famous. Partition of Poland among Austria,
Russia, and Prussia. On August 5, 1772, the
treaty of partition among the three Powers
was signed, and in September the project was
revealed to the world. The historical claims,
by which the three Powers masked their aggres-
sion and which were solemnly put forward in
this document, have deceived no one except
some historians of the nineteenth century.
Even apart from the fact th^it, in advancing
hereditary claims, they only adopted a typical
eighteenth century device, the previous negotia-
tions show that their case w^s entirely based
on expediency. Apart from the injustice of

AND KAISER JOSEPH 45

the original seizures, the portioits were equitably
adjusted, the balance was he^d with an equal
hand. Frederic gained only an addition of
6i4 square geographical miles \vith 600,000 in-
habitants, but the acquisition of West Prussia to
him, by strengthening and knitting together his
scattered dominions, was of immense strategic
importance. Catherine acquiitd part of White
Russia — 1975 square miles — with 1,800,000
inhabitants, the lion's share in acreage; Austria
but 1400 square miles (including Zips), yet
with a population of 3,000,000 inhabitants,
and with control over the ri<;h salt-mines of
^Vieliscka, whose vast extent and wealth still
win admiration from the modern traveller.
In short Prussia had the advantage in strength,
Austria in wealth, Russia in quantity, and on
these grounds Frederic, with abausing cynicism,
appeared to regard the transaction as inaugurat-
ing a new era of international justice and good
feeling. The honour, found among even less
princely robbers, was at least present in the
deahngs of these rulers with one another. The
worst accusation against them indeed is not
that they dismembered Polan.d, but that they
guaranteed to her the old anarchic constitution,
and thus provided themselves with an excuse
or opportunity for further dismemberment.

These transactions can only be incidentally
noticed here, so that their bearing on the general
situation may be seen. They had decisively

46 FREDERIC THE GREAT

shown that the diplomatic cards were again
being shuffled. Austria was no longer passive
or pacific; the ardent Kaiser Joseph and the
restless Kaunitz had obviously increased their
influence over Maria Theresa, and had become
the chief directors of Austrian policy. Russia
was, for the time being, somewhat estranged
from her ally Prussia ; for Frederic had done
much to cause the Polish partition and had
thus checked the Russian absorption of Poland.
For the next few years there was some revival
of good feeling between the two German
Powers, greatly to the benefit of Austria. Their
union had already compelled Catherine to share
her Polish spoils ; it was now to force her to
disgorge many of her Turkish ones. In 1771
Austria had concluded a convention with
Turkey by which, in return for permission to
occupy Little Wallachia and for commercial
advantages, Austria had agreed to modify the
Russian demands. In 1772 a united attempt
by Austria and Prussia to summon a congress
for the settlement of Eastern affairs resulted in
failure, but at last in 1774, after a series of
disastrous defeats, the Turks signed the Treaty
of Kustchuk Kainardji under Austro-Prussian
mediation. Along the Black Sea Russia gained
largely at the expense of Turkey, but, in return
for a species of protectorate over Orthodox
Christians in the Turkish dominions, she with-
drew from Moldo-Wallachia. This evacuation

AND KAISER JOSEPH 47

was the point about which Joseph and Frccicric-
cared most, for it was here thfit the balance of
power was really most endangered. How little
either regarded the Turk as such is shown by
the fact that Joseph refused to withdraw from
the Bukowina, the north-west part of Moldavia
---on the specious plea that he had carried out
the convention of 1771 by forcing Russia's
evacuation of Moldo-Wallachia (1775). This
military occupation of the Bukowina continued
till 1786, when it was fornaally annexed to
Austria. This addition to Austrian territory
was not formally opposed by Frederic but was
viewed by him with the greatest suspicion.
Kaiser Joseph was ruling the other two
" Kings " at Vienna, and the firebrand was
already threatening Europe.

The questions of the E^st had for the
moment been settled, Poland was helpless,
Turkey quiescent, and Joseph and Kaunitz
had adroitly used circumstances to filch terri-
tory from both. But Prussia and Russia
were still allies, and now that the Polish and
Turkish problems were adjuste'd for the moment
Austria looked westwards. From 1775 onwards
Joseph's attention was turned to Germany,
where he again attempted to breathe life into
the old and nerveless Imperial machinery, in
order to further Austrian designs. But here
again he failed as he had failed before, he set
Cathohc and Protestant states against one

48 FREDERIC THE GREAT

another in the Chambers of the Diet, threatened
to impose arbitrary decisions upon them, and
frightened every one with his imperious ways
and impetuous energy. No real advance and
much genuine suspicion were inspired by these
efforts. It was natural that, in the awakened
strife between Catholic and Protestant states,
Joseph should pay attention to Bavaria, the
most powerful Catholic state in Germany after
Austria itself. With the death of the Elector
in December 1777 the whole prospect opened,
and Joseph promptly occupied the south-east
part of Bavaria with troops. "From 1763 on-
wards Austrian policy had been marked by a
good deal of aggression and thirst for territory,
gratified first at the Polish expense and then
at the Turkish. Frederic had balanced Austria's
gain in Galicia by his gain in Prussian Poland,
he had been unable or unwilling to check the
acquisition of the Bukowina. Would he now
suffer Germany to be partitioned like Poland
or Turkey ?

Ill

BAVARIA BEFORE THE STORM

(17C3-1777)

1. The Last Elector of Bavaria and
HIS Rule

In the earlier part of the eighteenth century
two different kinds of State 9,nd two opposed
ideals of government were visible in Germany.
One was Catholic, indolent, aind agrarian, the
other mihtary, energetic, and Protestant. Pro-
gressive states like Prussia under Frederic
^Villiam I. sacrificed everything to efficiency,
dressed ambassadors and ministers in rags in
order to put soldiers in uniform, and levelled
everything as flat and as bar6 as the Potsdam
parade-ground. Mediaeval states, like Austria
under Charles VI., surrendered everything to
indolence and dignity, wrung money from their
peasants for the splendours of the Court, and
dreamt only of " playing burst frog to the ox
of Versailles." By the mid-eighteenth century
Prussia and Austria had changed all this ;
Frederic had united the arts with arms, and

49 E

50 FREDERIC THE GREAT

the Habsburgs had ceased to be mediaeval.
In the lesser German States, however, fidelity
to each respective type had been sternly main-
tained, the mihtary efficiency of some was still
great, the slumbers of others were still profound.
In its mean ambitions and gigantic extrava-
gance, in the pettiness of a policy which im-
poverished a whole people to build a capital
of Dresden china. Saxony clung to a vanishing
ideal. In this respect even Bavaria was not
so representative; its capital at least felt a
breath of the new age, if the country as a whole
showed more of the mediaeval atmosphere than
any other German State. In the sunny valleys
the peasant ploughed his land,- the forester shot
his deer in the woodlands, the robber waylaid the
traveller on the highways, the official pocketed
his gains in the Chancery, just as in the im-
memorial past. There were mutterings of a
storm, there was stirring and movement of
uneasy limbs, but none the less an enchanted
sleep seemed still to hang over prince, court,
and people.

At this very moment (1776) the English
Foreign Office demanded information as to
the condition of Bavaria. Their request was
answered by a report, dealing' with the history,
constitution, and resources of Bavaria, and
presenting a picture which would read like
a satire to any one unacquainted with the
possibilities of government in the eighteenth

AND KAISER JOSEPH 51

century,* ' Tlic (H)nstitution of Bavaria — the
report declares — ^\as mediaeval in type, and
the ruler was in theory restrained by a parlia-
ment of throe estates or orders. In fact a full
meeting of the three estate^ had not been
called since 1669, and, though a committee with
representatives from each order met every
year to supervise the administration, their
duties were perfunctory and their protests
frequently disregarded. The Elector might be
a limited monarch in theory, but " the restraints
on his power are at present to be traced only in
the authors who have written concerning the
Bavarian constitution." The Elector imposed
taxes, legislated, and acted Without limitation
or restraint. He had a Cabinet Council of chief
officials for great affairs of policy, but only
consulted them when he wished ; he directed
the army with the advice of such councillors
and officers as he chose to select, and was con-
fronted with no body which .could act as an
effective check upon his wil|. Nowhere was
power more absolute, nowhere were its results
more disastrous. As to the army — which Avithin
the last century and a half had been made the
terror of Christendom by one Duke and the
scourge of Islam by another-^it had become
a laughing - stock. " I must own they (the

* Memorial, S.P.F. German States, BavaT}a,\o{.\\\,subfin. The
report is dated 177C and unsigned, but based on excellent information
and apparently written by Hugh Elliot (uide S.P.F. Bavaria, vol.
118, July 10, 1778, Eden to Suffolk).

52 FREDERIC THE GREAT

Bavarian troops) are upon the worst footing
of any I have seen in Germany," wrote Hugh
EUiot.* The memorial gave further details, it
put the standing army at some 9000 men on
paper and at about 5000 in reality, the militia
at a nominal figure of 60,000, of whom one-
tenth only could be raised within a short space
of time. The artillery was "ill - constructed
and indifferently served," the troops were "in
bad order," and while the establishment " is
loaded with supernumerary officers of all de-
nominations, there is not one name known to
the rest of Europe who has distinguished him-
self in real service " ; after which it was not
very consoling to learn that the small -arms
were numerous and in good order/j" ^

With regard to finance, of which the Elector
had again complete control, the situation was
very grave. Revenues were scarce, it was only
pensions that were abundant. There could be
little doubt that expenditure exceeded income,
and that the Elector had mortgaged all the
possessions he could alienate; there was a
general feeling that he was " avaricious," and
that the country was oppressed and " im-
poverished by the exactions of the Court." In

* S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. Ill, Ratisbon, April 1, 1776.
Elliot to Sufeolk, Private and Secret.

t These statements do not appear irreconcilable with the evidence
from Bavarian sources. Vide P. Miinnich, Geschichte der Eniwickelung
der bairischen Armeen seit mwei Jahrhunderten, Miinchen, 1863, pp.
79-115.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 58

fact, tlie chief intelligence shown by the govern-
ment's management of finance was in its refusal
to produce its accounts. Certain figures had
indeed been published, but thpse were illusory,
for the Elector and his finance minister " are
alone acquainted ^vith the real amount, and "
(quite intelligibly) " think their interest en-
gaged to conceal it." At such hands commerce
fared no better than finance, despite the fact
that the soil and resources of Bavaria afforded
excellent opportunities for producing raw mate-
rials " were the wisdom of the government or
the interest of the people eq^ial to any com-
mercial enterprise." So little had been done for
internal manufactures that some of those which
had been inaugurated had been abandoned;
so unskilful was the management of the customs
that they produced hardly any revenue.^

After these instances of governmental mis-
management, it may not be surprising to learn
that the writer of the report considered the
character of the ministers to be distinguished
only by their situation ; one was idle, another
extravagant, a third of low birth, and a fourth,
Kreittmayr, the Chancellor, being remarkable
for candour, integrity, and a mind enlarged by
study, was (not unnaturally) disgusted with the
rest of them. As for Max Joseph the Elector,
he was reputed to be wea% unsteady, and
avaricious, though the reporter adds discreetly :
" Separated from the ordinary intercom'se of

54 FREDERIC THE GREAT

society, Princes are only seen through the
medium of public transactions . . . certain it
is that those who approach the Elector of
Bavaria in his private moments will discover
many accomplishments and more virtues." *
His pubhc conduct is thrown into a strong light
by the following incident. " The inhabitants
of a small town, called Osterhoven, situated
near the banks of the Danube, have long exer-
cised a right of pasturage upon an adjacent
common of considerable extent. This spot,
which is at present in a state of nature, was
represented to the Elector as capable of im-
provement, and he ordered a division of it to
be made among the people of the place. They
complained both of the general hardship of the
measure and of the particular injustice of the
person entrusted with the execution of it —
Count Bercheim, bailiff of the district — who, it
was affirmed, had assigned the largest and most
fertile portion of it to one of his own family.
They even went so far as by open violence to
impede the partition, and to throw down the
fences that were attempted to be raised.
Upon this, the Elector ordered a Military
Execution, which was rigorously put in force.
Last week a number of the sufferers came to

* 8.P.F. German states, Bavaria,-vol.lll,'EnioVa Unsigned Report
on State of Bavaria. Liston describes in a private letter an instance
of how Elliot approached the Elector " in his private moments "
and made him diunk with punch (Minto's. Memoir of Hugh Elliot,
p. 35).

AND KAISER JOSEPH 55

jMunich, with ropes about their necks, threw
thoinsolvos upon their knees belV)re the gates
of the Palace, and implored, from the justice of
the Elector, either the redress of their griev-
ances or an immediate death. His Electoral
Highness thought proper to dismiss them, with
a promise to enquire into the ^tate of the case,
and in tlie meantime has ordered matters to
remain upon the old footing." *

Beside this grim picture we can place an en-
chanting one, for indolence in government was
balanced by energy in pleasure. Hugh Elliot
admitted that " in music and debauchery " at
least the Court was " on a par with the rest of
Europe." Nymphenburg, the summer palace
of the Elector, was a miniature Versailles, a
world of "Watteau and Dresden china. There,
driving through the woods by moonhght in
phaetons, floating on the lake in-gilded gondolas,
or wandering through the frescoed galleries,
the Elector and his gay court spent their time,
Hugh Elliot the gayest and most scandalous
of them all. In Munich the scene was equally
bright, and there was the additional joy of a
French opera and of card-parties at which huge

* Vide S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. Ill, April 27, 1770,
Munich, Listen to Eden. Italics my own. Even Liston was shocked
by this action, and pointed out that the exc,rtion of such a riglit by
the Elector might involve all uncultivated lands in his domains,
as the rights to them were only held by immfemorial possession ; the
amount thus possibly involved was said to amount to nearly a fourth
of the whole Electorate.

56 FREDERIC THE GREAT

sums could be lost. Sometimes religion over-
whelmed the Court, and the Electress, who so
often led the revels at Nymphenburg, would
direct the pieties of the capital. In company
with her chief ladies, and attended by twelve
poor girls of the town, she would lead a peni-
tential procession (entitled with a certain irony
the " Slaves of Virtue ") and visit all the
churches and chapels of Munich on foot. The
fair pilgrims assumed white dresses like those
of nuns, to show their pious simplicity, though
some of them so far remembered the world as
to wear rouge upon their cheeks. In such a
court and company it was hard to be serious
save in pleasure.*

To German historians the verdict of ElHot
in 1776 may seem somewhat surprising, for
the reign of Max Joseph (1745-77) is always
regarded as the beginning of the age of en-
lightenment, and the ruler as one of the
Philosophic Despots. To EUiot's pictures of
an indolent and luxurious tyrant they have
added another which shows fiim as a man of
feeling heart. During the terrible famines of
1770-71 Max Joseph was sedulously kept in
ignorance of the sufferings of the people by his
Ministers. But one day as he drove from his
palace gates, a crowd of wasted and famished
wretches surrounded his carriage, shrieking for
food. The kindly Max burst into tears : " Your
children shall have bread," hei exclaimed to the

AND KAISER JOSEPH 57

crowd, and he kept liis word. Two million
gulden of his private fortune were spent in
importing corn from Italy to relieve the sufferers,
and two corrupt officials were sentenced to
death." This action, as well as the fact that
he was the last Bavarian \\'ittelsbach, earned
him the title of " Vater Max " and " Der
Vielgehebte " (Much -beloved).* But history
is a sharp inquisitor, and she cannot perinit
an amiable character or isolated examples
of benevolence to excuse a ruler whose
policy tended to be harsh, indolent, or
corrupt.

Elliot's verdict on the ruler appears indeed
in some senses to be too sterri. No one could
accuse Max Joseph of not loving pleasure, but
he had some sense of restraint and economy
in its pursuit, and never imitated the Oriental
extravagance of a Saxon Augustus or a French
Louis. Considerable efforts td reduce expendi-
ture had been made, though unfortunately
most of the retrenchment wa& at the expense
of the army. Still most of the* Court offices had
been made honorary posts, and the general
Court expenditure, as compared with that of
other German states and previous Bavarian
rulers, was moderate. The chief item open to
criticism in Court expenditure was the pensions,
which cost two hundred thousand florins a year.
The largest part of this sum consisted of pensions
granted to his very numerous bastards by Max

58 FREDERIC THE GREAT

Joseph's father — ^the Emperor Charles VII.
The pensions actually granted by Max Joseph
himself were moderate, but the pension list
as a whole was unjustifiably large, and it was
much curtailed by Max Joseph's successor.®
Any one who studies either the portraits or
the policy of Max Joseph can see these char-
acteristics at once in the mild, weak, pleasant
face of the prince, or in the careless, well-
intentioned disorder of his rule. Yet Max
Joseph is not one of the apes, of Versailles, he
is entitled to a place among the enlightened
despots, though he was less enlightened and
more despotic than most of them. The be-
ginning of his reign has perhaps justly been
regarded by Bavarians as the dawn of a new
day ; its end and outcome, as pictured by Elliot,
forms a rather tragic contrast. None the less
real efforts and some progress had been made.
During the years 1751-56 Ma,x Joseph caused
his Vice-Chancellor Kreittmayr to draw up a
complete civil and criminal code upon the
approved principles of the age.' Kreittmayr
executed the project with applause, and Max
Joseph took rank as the Bavarian Justinian.
In imitation of the Codex Fridericianus this
code was termed Maximileanus, and thus be-
trayed the source and origin of its inspiration.
Max was not above taking a hint from the King
of Prussia in other respects* Frederic once
called Bavaria " a land fair as Paradise in-

AND KAISER JOSEPH 59

habited by fiends," and the denizens of his
Inferno were the Cathohe clergy. Max Joseph
did something to restrain the. excessive power
of Jesuits and priests in his land, and in the
teeth of their opposition he founded his famous
Electoral Academy of Sciences (1759).* He
also did something to introduce a scientific
spirit into education, and to improve the high
schools and Universities, an^ in especial to
benefit poor scholars. In 1771 he went further,
and instituted a universal system of compulsory
education.* * The funds necessary for so great
a project were supplied by appropriations from
the property of the Jesuits, who were dissolved
as an Order in 1773. All these reforms were
worthy of the highest praise, but they were
sketches rather than realities, and their in-
fluence and effect were not apparent at once.
Under happier auspices indeed the remembrance
or the preservation of these ideals enabled them
to be translated into reality, and in the earlier
years of the nineteenth century Bavaria became
a genuine centre of enlightenriient. The liber-
ahty of the clergy had become equal to the
learning of the scientists, and Munich derived
equal lustre from her theology and her Academy.
From this elevation Bavarians looked back and
paid a too-generous homage tb the memory of
Max Joseph.

♦ It is rather amusing that Elliot should criticize Bavarian
education as old-fashioned. In this particular respect Bavaria was
exactly a century in advance of England.

60 FREDERIC THE GREAT

In truth that ruler was happier in ideals
than in achievements, and it is the latter which
are criticized by contemporaries. Judged by
any practical or material standard a contem-
porary might well think that Bavaria had not
awakened, that she had only stirred in her
sleep. In one respect Max Joseph indeed
deserves his fame; the enlightened ruler who
humanized the law and instituted a state-
system of education at such a period, deserved
well both of Bavaria and humanity. At the
moment, indeed, the results of this policy were
not apparent, for the fruits of education ripen
slowly, though they bear a hundredfold at the
last. Apart from education, the bitter verdict
of Elliot had much truth, despite the good
intentions and occasionally well-directed efforts
of Max Joseph. In manufactures and state
control of industry there was little practical
improvement ; among the people and in the
government offices there was little diminution
of corruption, of expense, or of misery. Per-
haps one reason of the failure was the brutish
ignorance and suspicion of the Bavarian
peasants, and the obscurantist opposition of
the clergy. But no far-reaching reforms were
carried in any land at this time without serious
opposition, and the blame of failure rests to
some extent on Max Joseph. What really able
and energetic ruler wotdd have waited to be
stirred into action by the horrors of a starving

AND KAISER JOSEPH 01

multitude, or by the sight df wretches with
ropes roiuid their necks ? Wliat would not
a stern practical Frederic, or an ardent Kaiser
Joseph, afire for the betterment of his people,
have effected in Bavaria ? Ignorance of the
people may be an excuse fof- despotism, but
a tyrant, who lacks perseverance, destroys the
justification of his power. It may, indeed, be
pleaded that IMax Joseph failed by attempt-
ing too much rather than too little, and that his
very enlightenment proved his failure. Yet
everywhere else the enlightened despot intro-
duced energy into the administration and
economy into the finances, and greatly
strengthened the military forces of his state.
Max Joseph did httle to stir his sleepy and
corrupt bureaucracy into action and, though
he effected a shght improvement in the financial
system, only did so by utterly destroying the
military one. It is difficult to see how any
prince of intelligence could have permitted his
army to dwindle and to rot at a moment
when he knew a disputed succession to be
inevitable in a few years. A powerful or well-
organized force would have given Bavaria
some status and consideration in the eyes
of Europe. Without this Bavaria could have
no voice in settling her own affairs when
the succession was' disputed. At no time
and in no state was a strong army more
needed to preserve national independence and

62 FREDERIC THE GREAT

dignity, and the failure to provide it actually
lured on ambitious Powers to dismember
the country. Judged by that iron test Max
Joseph cannot be held to have deserved well
of Bavaria.

A land so governed invited annexation ; a
prince, who ruled thus in the age of philosophic
despots, deserved to lose his power. Premature
attempts at enlightenment had not wholly
failed, but for the moment served only to reveal
the stagnation. Ideals may be stronger than
armies, but as yet the soldiers were at hand
and the ideals afar off; Bavaria seemed the
very land for an ambitious neighbouring ruler
to covet, or to browbeat, to threaten, to conquer
or annex. Was not the rule of the ardent
Kaiser Joseph — with his thousand schemes for
freeing the serf, for developing commerce and
industry — ^likely to be more merciful and more
just than that of their Elector, amiable and
enlightened though he was ?

If the internal situation of Bavaria was bad,
the external aspect of her affairs was infinitely
worse. Indeed the fact that the English Foreign
Office asked for a report and information as to
the internal condition of Bavaria was, in itself,
highly alarming. The England of that day had
no commercial concern with a state which only
received £3000 worth of her goods, and had
no interest in her whatever from the abstract
or antiquarian standpoint. English interest

AND KAISER JOSEPH G3

was not excited by l};ivari;i luisiH, but because
Bavaria's Elector was the last of his race, and
because his territory was likely to be parted
amonjj the Powers on his death. On January
6, 1770, Hugh Elhot, perhaps the acutest
Enghsh diplomatist then living, who had been
sent to watch the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon
(Regensburg), reported that it- was the opinion
of most members of the Diet as well as his own
" that we are upon the eve of some great
change in the political state of Germany." *
The attempts of Joseph to revive and re-inspire
the Empire had only shown its weaknesses, and
the result of the Diet of 1776 had divided the
different states more than ever. It had served
to reveal Austria, at the head of one body of
states, bitterly opposed to Prussia at the head
of another, and each alike unchecked by the
old traditions of law and order and respect for
the Germanic body. "Where law had lost its
force, force would have its Jaw. When the
two powerful states were at variance it was
time for the smaller ones to tremble, especially
when the Bavarian Successidn came up for
settlement at the Germanic Diet. It seemed
unlikely to English diplomats that this, or one
or two other successions pending, would be
settled peacefully at the Diet. Should no such
arrangements be made " the Courts of Vienna

* S.P.F. German Slates, Bavaria, vol. Ill, Elliot to' Suffolk,
January 6, 1776,

64 FREDERIC THE GREAT

and Berlin will either proseciite their separate
claims by the sword and involve Germany in
war, or they will even extend the same system
of partition into the Empire that proved so
irresistible in Poland." * " It was of the ut-
most importance to Europe as well as to
Germany to set bounds to the hardened ambi-
tion of a monarch grown old in the arts of
conquest and acquisition, to check the aspira-
tions of a young prince fired with ideas of
military glory and aggrandisement." f But
unfortunately no power existed that could
impose these bounds on Frederic or Joseph, for
England had her eyes on America, and France
had her eyes on England, To the clear judg-
ment of Elliot it was apparent therefore that
the struggle in Germany must come soon, and
must centre round Bavaria. " Nothing could
better serve the purpose of extending, and at
the same time uniting, the dominions of the
House of Austria than its acquisition." The
statesmen of Vienna — with Kaunitz at their
head — were of no other opinion.

On military as well as political grounds
Kaiser Joseph realized the unspeakable import-
ance of Bavaria to Austria. In the wars of
1703-4 and of 1741-42 it was from Bavaria

* S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. Ill, Memorial on the Diet
of Ratisbon, 1776. That the authorship of this report also is almost
certainly Elliot's is proved by S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol.
118, July 10, 1778, Eden to Suffolk.

t Ibid.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 65

that Vienna had been threatened ; within the
last sevcMity >cars it had bcka twice proved
that a hostile Bavaria could endanger tlie very
existence of the Austrian State. Yet the
pohtics of iMuuich were so unstable that her
friendship could not be trusted, least of all in
the decade before 1778. Hence, if the danger
from this side was to be averted, it could only
be by annexation of Bavaria, Or at any rate of
a part sufficient to give strategic safety to
Austria. Command of the Innds round the
Inn would allow Austria to control the Upper
Danube ; Passau would become the bridgehead,
the Janiculum of Vienna, and a broad band of
German territory would bind Bohemia to the
Tyrol, thus increasing the Teutonic population
of Austria. On every ground the annexation,
or at least the partition, of Bavaria appeared
to be a vital necessity to Kaiser Joseph.^"
The diplomatists of Europe had all realized
the danger probable on the death of the now
ageing Elector. As early as 17=60 Kaunitz and
Frederic had been glancing towards Bavaria.
During 1776 English diplomatists were speculat-
ing on it, and drawing up lists of possible
claimants, France and Prussia were watching,
and every German Court was eagerly expectant
for the first signs of the opening storm. Only
the Court which was most af|ected seemed to
be least disturbed. " Munich," wrote Hugh
EUiot, " is perhaps the Court in Europe the

66 FREDERIC THE GREAT

least acquainted with its own interests or the
designs of others." *

Thus in the opinion of all statesmen, the
horrors of a disputed succession were soon to
hang over Bavaria, the stormy waters of diplo-
macy were soon to turn a sleepy hollow into a
whirlpool, but the Court at Munich slumbered
still. Even though its army and resources were
contemptible, a wise and firm diplomacy and
a knowledge of German politics might have
given Bavaria a prominent position. But the
Elector and his council could not be aroused
from their lethargy to take any interest or
active share in politics, even by Kaiser Joseph's
attempts to revive the vitality of the Empire,
by all his visitations and appeals, by his schemes
and his threats. So little did the Elector and
his council know of the laws of' the Empire, that
they imposed customs-duties in direct contra-
vention of them (1763 and 1770). Then when
the other German States protested, instead of
allowing the matter to be settled at the Diet,
the Bavarian Elector appealed directly to the
Emperor for his arbitration, "a step which
equally betrayed a want of resolution and of
good policy." f

Kaiser Joseph decided against him and

* S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. 112, April 3, 1776, Munich,
Elliot to Suffolk.

t S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. 112, Munich, April 14, 1777,
Private, Eden to Suffolk ; also vol. Ill, Memorial on the Diet of
Batisbon, 1776, pp. 55.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 67

ordered him to withdraw tlfe new cusioiiis-
dues. The Elector protested, shullled, refused,
but was finally frightened into submission by a
show of force (1771). " It were to l)c wished,"
adds Eden sardonically, " th'at this was the
only instance wherein the real solid interests
and happiness of this country are sacrificed to
the pride and pique of the monlent." * Hence-
forth the Elector and his ministers distrusted
Austria and pursued towards, her a policy of
mingled servility and duplicity, though without
showing any more diplomatic wisdom than
before. Even when contentions ran high at
the Diet over Kaiser Joseph's reforms, when
deputies from all Germany intrigued, fought,
and baffled one another, Bavarian ministers
took no active, intelligent part in the politics
of the Diet, though it met on Bavarian soil.
Their influence was used bHndly upon the
Austrian side without inquiry into the merits
of the disputes and without exacting conditions
of support.

The Elector himself, though accorded the
rights of a sovereign prince, degraded himself
to Austria " by making the Imperial Am-
bassador a visit and giving $im the hand in
his Palace, which certainly no crowned head
in Europe would do." So reported Stormont
on January 16, 1765 ; Elliot and Eden gave

• S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. 112, Munich, April 11,
Eden to Suffolk.

68 FREDERIC THE GREAT

equally bad reports in 1776-I.T. Count Hartig,
the Austrian Commissary in Munich, displayed
an almost regal ostentation and magnificence,
and dazzled the Elector and his Court. To the
irreverent Elliot he appeared only as a " little
decrepit man." However that was, Hartig
spared no effort or entertainment to please the
Bavarian nobles, employing spies and bribes
without number to form an Austrian party
among them. Austrian ideas had begun to
enter Munich, Austrian nobles were encouraged
to spend their money there. A Viennese
merchant had improved the manufacture of
saltpetre, Viennese bankers were ready to
accommodate Elector or courtiers with loans,
Austrian enterprise was evidently benefiting the
country. More significant even than these efforts
were the attentions bestowed by the Austrian
dynasty upon Bavaria. The Emperor Joseph II.
married Josepha the Elector's sister in 1764,
and though she died in 1767 the Austrian in-
fluence was maintained. The fat and amiable
Archduke Maximilian visited Munich in 1775,
causing some scandal by promoting festivities
in Lent and some amusement by the bourgeois
decorum of his behaviour. Then in the spring
of 1777 came Kaiser Joseph himself on one of
his usual mysterious visits, wearing his plain
black coat, bearing the pseudonym of Count
Falkenstein, bringing a train of only twenty-
eight persons, lodging as usual at the principal

AND KAISER JOSEPH 69

inn, but so tar condcscendiiig to etiquette as to
dine every day with the Elector.* No doubl all
that Josepli heard and saw tendfed to confirm him
in his design to make Bavaria- in name what it
alread>' appeared in fact — a pro^'in(•e of Austria.
Austrian diplomacy certainly did not under-
rate the weakness and ignorance of Bavarian
ministers, it understood that they were always
amenable to threats or to bribes, but it had
forgotten to consider one important factor —
the Elector himself. His own personal pride
had been cruelly wounded by the humiliations
of 1771, and for that reason, as well as for family
ones, he wished to hand down, the whole of his
territory unimpaired to his heir, Karl Theodor,
the Elector Palatine. Therefore he hated
Austria and, though afraid to show his resent-
ment, he sought everywhere for allies against
her. It was useless to turn to France, once a
faithful friend ; she was now an Austrian ally
and took so little interest in Bavaria that she
did not even always have a minister there.
For a moment the Elector thought of turning
to England, and — conscious that she was think-
ing of hiring German mercen^tries to quell the
American disturbances — sought out Hugh Elliot
and offered him his ragged tatterdemalions for
hire. The astute British repa-esentative, who

• S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. Ill, despatih of July 6,
177C. Vide also Memorial, ibid. vol. 112, Munich, Eden to Suffolk,
April 6, 1777.

70 FREDERIC THE GREAT

knew the worthlessness of the Bavarian troops,
replied with polite ambiguity. " With a view
to sound the Elector's connections with Austria
and France I pretended surprise, and said that
I had considered His Highness as too closely
united with other Powers to have been at liberty
to dispose of his troops without their con-
currence." This subtlety roused His Highness
effectually, induced him to declare his perfect
liberty to dispose of his own troops as he would,
and led him to speak " of the conduct of the
Court of Vienna with great bitterness and
enmity." His sister's (Josepha's) marriage with
the Emperor had only served as a pretence for
loading him (the Elector) with accumulated
mortifications and indignities. " He particu-
larly dwelt upon his certainty that the Emperor
sought for an opportunity of extending the
same system of envahissement into Germany
which had been so successful in Poland. The
Elector then added with great- seriousness that
what he said to me upon this occasion might
convince his (British) Majesty" of his confidence
and trust in him, as the Court of Vienna would
not fail to revenge itself of such language were
it ever to transpire. The Elector concluded
by strongly recommending to rhe not to mention
to any of his ministers his having shown a
desire to enter into subsidiary treaties with His
Britannic Majesty ; as he did not choose to
be exposed to the disagrement of having it

AND KAISER JOSEPH 71

known, witlioiit a {)rospcct ol' reaping some
advantage from it." *

Sucli was the hai)lrss plight of tlic Elector,
hating Austria, trusting no one arovuid him,
'■ in a Court so evidently sold to Austria and
France that the Prince himself thought it
proper to warn me against his own ministers."
But, weak as the Elector may have been, it was
an element of strength to him that he knew
his own weakness and that of his ministers.
Already, as a matter of fact, he had drawn up
a will, leaving everything that he could leave
to the Elector Palatine — his nearest legal heir.
He at least had enough attachment to his
nearest relative to wish to hand down his
territories undivided, and so far as possible
he made State-morality and treaty-obhgation
stand sentries for the due observance of his
wishes. Having made his will he sought, and,
as we have seen, vainly, to get allies who might
possibly support it. During 1777 he was
pushed hard by the Austrian S'linister to make
some arrangements for partitioning his territory,
but he was able to procrastinate and delay till
the end. This was not far off; on December
14, 1777, Eden the British resident reported a
shght indisposition in the Elector — measles —

♦ S.I'.F. (Jerman Slates, llav/tna,vo\. IIP, llutisbon, A|)ril 1, 1770.
Ratibbon — Elliot to Suffolk, [jrivate and secret. Klliot adds a P.S. :
" I hope this letter will not appear in my olDcial ii)rris|Kindcncr,"
of which, fortunately, no notice was taken. I'art of tliU letter is
printed in F. Kapp, Der SoldiUcn-IIandcl Deutschcr Fiir.tlrn iiach
Amerika (1776-83), Berlin, 1861.

72 FREDERIC THE GREAT

and " those of the most favourable sort" (that
is, presumably native and German). But the
physician had blundered, for it was not measles
but smallpox ; his remedies were inappropriate,
and the Elector sank rapidly. On December 30
he said to his confessor, " I dreamt that I shall
die to-night and it will be so. Good-bye, dear
and beautiful Bavaria ; beloved wife, farewell ;
dear subjects, farewell, I will pray for you the
blessing of God." * These were the last
words of this amiable Prince. Eden recorded
bitterly, " It will not be too harsh a judgment
to pronounce that the life of this prince has
been sacrificed to the bigoted ignorance of his
confidential physician, who would not at first
allow his indisposition to be — what it reaUy
was — ^the smallpox ; and who, even after being
convinced of it, still refused to aid the efforts
of his constitution by any assistance, of any
kind — ^internal or external." f But more than
the life of the Prince had been sacrificed. The
untoward suddenness of his death imperilled the
destiny of Bavaria and the future of Germany.

2. Claims and Countek-Cxaims to the
Inheritance of Max Joseph

While Bavaria stands hushed at the death-
bed of Max Joseph we may turn aside and

* Buchner, ix. 279.

t S.P.F, German States, Bavaria, vol. 112, Munich, December
30, 1777, Eden to Suffolk.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 73

imitate the publicists and slatcsiueii oJ' Europe
in considering the possible claims and <'luiniants
of the inheritance. 01" these far the most
important weie Kaiser Joseph, who claimed
portions of Bavaria both as Holy Roman
Emperor and as Austrian heir, and Karl
Theodor, Elector Palatine, >^ho claimed the
whole inheritance in virtue ofi hereditary right.
Karl Theodor's claims were embarrassed ])y
the pretensions of his nephew and heir, Charles
Duke of Zwcibriicken (Deux-Ponts). If he
consented to abrogate a portion of his rights
to other claimants, it by no means followed
that Zwcibriicken would do t»he same, and it
is on the disputes between these two that a
good deal of the Succession turns. Besides
these principals, there were minor claimants
to portions of the inheritancfe, the Elector of
Saxony and the Duke of Mecldlenburg-Schwerin,
but these were not, in the real sense, important
and need not for the moment detain us.

It needs no plunge into dusty folios nor
turning of yellow parchments to decide on
the merits of the claimants. One German
historian has reckoned that 288 contemporary
books were written on the subject at the time,
since when the learned dissertations upon it
have not been few." It is, however, difficult
to conceive any research less fruitful and more
purely antiquarian in interest. The British
records preserve two reports on the probable

74 FREDERIC THE GREAT

claimants to the inheritance— each written by
an acknowledged master of diplomacy.^^ Keith
our Austrian and Elliot our Bavarian ambassador
both drew up reports in 1776,„ before the actual
claims were put forward, and their judgment
on the whole question has therefore an unusual
impartiality. It is worth noting that, though
the insight of one of these men discovered the
tract of territory that Kaiser Joseph was to
claim, all his learning had not revealed to him
the actual nature of the claim; That fact is no
bad commentary on its intrinsic value.

Lower Bavaria was the chief territory
claimed by Kaiser Joseph, and the claim first
appears in the Treaty of Partition of January
3, 1778, concluded between representatives of
Karl Theodor and Joseph, which will be
described later. There it is stated that Austria
claimed the districts round the Inn and a great
part of Lower Bavaria, in virtue of the letter
of investiture given by the Eniperor Sigismund
to Duke Albert V. of Austria iii 1426.1^ Keith
wrote acidly that such a claim was manifestly
open to contestation, as in 1430 the Emperor
gave a final decision, which divided the succes-
sion amongst the remaining branches of the
Bavarian House to the exclusion of Albert.
It was also singular that in the two " great
wars of 1700 and 1740 when all Bavaria (for
a time) was possessed by the Austrians no
mention was made of such a Right." Subse-

AND KAISiai JOSEPH 75

quently it was discovered iliat AJbcrt had
ai'tually made an Aft. uC roininciatioii ol" his
right in 1 1'JO. Facu if this Iftst Act was not
a I'orifoiy, as the Aiistriaiis declared it to be,
the original claim had lain dormant three
hundred and fifty >'cars. It Was in any case
singidarly weak. Maria Theresa does not
appear to have believed in it, and — irony of
ironies — Frederic himsell" seei^is to have had
a better claim, had he wished to urge it ! ^*

Elliot gi\'es the best comlnentary on the
whole tangle of genealogical confusion. " In
this age the cabinets of the greater Powers
dispose of the territories of the less without
much previous negotiations.'". . .* " In an
age marked with the violence of military
usurpation the future state of the Electorate
is more Ukely to be decided by the Political
arrangements of its powerful neighbours than
by the legal sentences of a tribunal of Justice." |
The real claims rested on the strength of
Joseph's army and on Frederic's view of the
necessities of the balance of power ; the real
tribunal was the battlefield.

None the less parchments and precedents
were never without some effect in the eighteenth
century ; in 1772 Joseph and Frederic had called
Up historical ghosts from the records to justify

♦ SJP.F. German Stales, Bavaria, vol. Ill, Elliot to SuHoIk, April
3, 1776.

t Ibid. Memorial on Bavaria, 1770.

76 FREDERIC THE GREAT

even the Polish Partition. When it concerned
succession to a part of the Germanic Empire this
process was much more necessary, and Austrian
and Prussian pubhcists speedily marshalled
their pale armies of precedents. For the
further understanding of the negotiations the
nature of these claims must be stated. Otto I.
— ^the first Wittelsbach Duke of Bavaria — ^had
acquired the Duchy in 1180 ; his grandson Otto
II. likewise acquired the Electorate of the
Palatinate by marriage. In 1329 these terri-
tories were divided among two. branches of the
family, by an arrangement known as the Treaty
of Pavia. The elder or Rodolphine branch of
the family (from which Karl Theodor was
descended) took the Lower and Upper Pala-
tinate with Sulzbach, the younger or Wilhel-
mine branch (from which Max Joseph was
lineally descended) taking Upper Bavaria and
Neuburg. Lower Bavaria is not mentioned
specifically in the treaty, because it was in-
herited separately by the Emperor Lewis, who
was the Wilhelmine representative in the Pavia
Treaty. But by custom, usage, and the
practice of agnation it appears to have become
well understood that neither branch of the line
could alienate their estates without consent of
the other, and that the whole territories would,
in the case of the extinction of either line, re-
vert to the other.^^ One subsequent altera-
tion had been made in these arrangements by

AND KAISER JOSEPH 77

the consent dT the Germanic Diet in Ki'^.'J, and
confirmed at the IVace of Wesiphaha in 1648 —
the Upper Pahitinate h;id l)een transferred from
the Elector Palatine to the Elector of Bavaria,
but it had hctu specially provided that this
province should revert to the Rodolphinc line
if the ^^'illu'lnune line became extinguished.
On these principles the claims of the Rodolphine
Karl Theodor — Elector Palatine — to the Wil-
helniine lands of 'Max Joseph are clear enough.
By the Treaty of Pa^ia he was entitled to Upper
Bavaria Xeuburg, Sulzbach, and the Lower
Palatinate, to the Upper Palatinate by the
Treaty of ^Vestphalia; Lower Bavaria he
claimed by the doctrine of .agnation. \Vith
regard to these dominions his rights seemed
indisputable, the only one admitting of any
question being his claim on Lower Bavaria.
But with regard to other parts of the Bavarian
dominions, not thus mentioned, the claims of
Karl Theodor were much more dubious. Since
1329 there had been a large number of acqui-
sitions and accretions made by the various
Dukes of Bavaria at different times, of which
the disposal had not been expressly regulated
by law. Some of these acquisitions were
Imperial Fiefs, which might fairly be held to
escheat to the Emperor on the death of the
last male heir of the Wilhelniine hne ; othere
were allodial properties which might be con-
sidered to descend to the nearest female relative.

78 FREDERIC THE GREAT

The heiress to these allodial properties was the
Dowager Duchess of Saxony^ who had made
over her rights to her son, the Saxon Elector.
They were not, however, very numerous or
important, and from the very- beginning it was
thought that this claim might be settled by
monetary compensation and small concessions.
The question of the Imperial Fiefs was a
different and more serious one. By custom
all feudal questions of this kind came before
the Aulic Council, but the Aulic Council could
be controlled by the Emperor, and Kaiser
Joseph was likely to give decisions on the
questions of the Imperial Fjefs in a purely
Austrian sense and interest.* The question as
to what were Imperial Fiefs might be applied
to various towns and districts, such as Mindel-
heim, once the principality of the great Duke
of Marlborough, some fiefs in the Upper
Palatinate, and the like. But the whole ques-
tion of the lordship over these fiefs, and their
acquisition by Kaiser Joseph would not be of
great importance. The real point was whether
he could advance any title to Lower Bavaria.

Max Joseph was determined to put Austria
legally in the wrong on all points. Even if he
could not hand down his possessions unim-
paired to Karl Theodor, he could at least give
him the best moral claim to them. In 1766

* S.P.F. Oerman Stales, Bavaria, vol. Ill, Anonjrmous Report
(Elliot).

AND KAISER JOSEPH 79

]\I;ix Joseph had conchidcd a secret family
compact with the KUitor Palatine, reullirming
the union of Wilhelmine and Rodolphine posses-
sions on his death. In 1769 he drew up a i'onnal
and definite will on the same basis, whieh was
kno^v^l only to a few Bavarian ministers and to
Karl Theodor and one of his Palatine coun-
cillors.^® In 1771 and 1774 iMax Joseph con-
cluded fresh compacts on the same basis, and
renewed the old treaties. To strengthen these
bonds Karl Theodor made an agreement with
Charles Duke of Zweibriicken, his own nephew
and heir, on August 5, 1777, each party
agreeing to do nothing with regard to the
succession \vithout the consen,t of the other.
Just at this moment Zweibriicken informed
Max Joseph that Karl Theodor was negotiating
secretly with Austria. The news caused the
greatest agitation to Max Joseph, and he was
looking everywhere for support against the
hated Austrian and the treaclierous Elector
Palatine, when death overcame:him.

By the death of Max Joseph, Zweibriicken,
the next heir after Karl Theodor, was left
deserted, and it appeared that his future
possessions might now be dismembered. Svich
a project he was resolved to resist, and he
looked around everywhere for support. The
day after Max Joseph's death the Duchess of
Zweibriicken, who was residing at jMunich in
the absence of her husband, received a visit

JOSEPH

IV

THE STORM BURSJS

AUein ein Pergament, beschrieben und bepragl,
Isl ein Gespatsl, vor dem sich Me scheuen.

Goethe,
(SailUess — a mil bescribbkd and dose-sealed
A phantom is from which all shrink in terror.)

The death of a sovereign always produces an
excitement quite unequal to the importance
of the event itself. That of Max Joseph,
since he was the last of his race and had left
a succession in the highest degree uncertain,
caused a confusion and amazement that were
indescribable. Crowds thronged the churches
and wept in the streets of Munich fearing for the
future and bewailing their lost Prince. Some
hours after his death the Bavarian ministers
assembled to take counsel together. Rumours
had already begun to fly, but to the Austrian
party among the ministers, at any rate, the
reality was to be more surprtsing than any
conjecture. To the universal amazement Count
Seinsheim and the Chancellor produced the will
of 1769, of whose existence scarcely any one
had known. Hardly had the councillors re-
covered from their surprise at the existence of

81 G

82 FREDERIC THE GREAT

the will, when they perceived that a codicil
on the exterior forbade it to be opened until
the arrival of the Elector Palatine. For the
moment all were astonished and embarrassed.
Suddenly the Palatine - Resident at Munich
(who was in the secret) appeared before the
Bavarian ministers and produced orders signed
by their dead and by his living master. These
required the ministers to proceed immediately
to the proclamation of Karl Theodor, and to
exact the oath of allegiance from the civil and
military. The Austrian intriguers were baffled,
and the Elector Palatine was exultantly pro-
claimed successor to the whole Bavarian in-
heritance.^ For the moment the stroke had
succeeded. Max Joseph had been more power-
ful in his death than his life, and his nearest
relative was legally and formally installed in
his full possessions. But unfortunately legal
and moral claims in the eighteenth century were
not always the strongest of titles. The shadow
of Austria already darkened the future. No
one doubted that Kaiser Joseph would send his
Whitecoats into Bavaria, all that they wondered
was when and how he would do it. So from
the first of January 1778 onwards there was
breathless expectation in Munich. Court and
beerhouse alike buzzed with incredible rumours,
couriers rode hourly through the streets with
messages, and sentinels watched anxiously from
the walls of Braunau and Straubing for the

AND KAISER JOSEPH 88

first glimmer of steel upon Ailstrian bayonets
over the border.

1. Kaiser Joseph

By whose proud siilc the ugly Furies run
Hearkening when he shall bill tliem plague Ike world.

Majilowk, Tatiiburlaine.

Great as may have been tlie anxiety, hope,
and bewilderment at jMunich, it was hardly
'ess at Vienna. " The first accovmts arrived
on Thursday, during the drawing - room of
New Year's Day." The whole nobility was
present and " the Court at' Galla " [sic).
Kaiser Joseph was suddenly accosted by an
attendant and left the room. Returning in a
few moments, he went straight up to the table
at which Maria Theresa was playing, leant over
and whispered in her ear that Max Joseph was
dead. " She instantly let fall the cards, and
rising up with evident marks of emotion, quitted
the apartment. The painful impression made
on Maria Theresa was visible to everybody."
Merriment ceased abruptly to be succeeded by
" fermentation," and since then a " thousand
various conjectures have furnished occupation
to the politicians of this capital." * It was not
till the next morning that the astonished

* S.P.F. Germany, Europe, vol. 2'2(), Japiiary 3, 1778, Minnn,
Sir R. M. Keith to Earl of Suffolk; \\ nix.ill, Cnnrt of Berlin, etc.,
1799, vol. i., pp. 800-7. Both were present and I mingle their iinprcs-
sion.s of the moment. The incident is alluded 1o in F. v. Haumer,
Beitriige zur neueren Geschichte, Leipzig, 1839; Bd. v. pp. 801-6.

84 FREDERIC THE GREAT

courtiers learnt the cause of Maria Theresa's
agitation. Clever Murray Keith, the English
Ambassador, at once sought counsel with the
Saxon minister, whose master had some minor
claims on the inheritance. But he had to
confess himself baffled in this as in other
directions ; he could see couriers riding post-
haste, troops drilling, he could hear abundant
rumours at every street corner, but for the
space of almost three weeks he found no real
information from diplomatic sources. " Upon
this (as well as upon some former occasions) "
Prince Kaunitz threw an " unsurmountable
bar in the way of all ministerial curiosity by
refusing to give any answers to questions put
to him, without express orders (from above)
and (with still more discretion) by never admit-
ting the word Bavaria in his public conversa-
tion." * At last, however, on January 20, the
Austrian Chancellor sent a communication to
Keith, revealing the course of events that had
occurred at Munich.

The news was even more surprising than
could have been imagined. The death of Max
Joseph, though unfortunate and unexpected
in its suddenness, was an event for which
Austrian statesmen had been preparing.
Kaiser Joseph and Kaunitz* had long been
determined to seize part of Bavaria by one

* S.P.F. German Empire, vol. 220, Vienna, January 19, 1778,
Keith to Suffolk.

AND IvAISER JOSia»II 85

means or another, tlicy had realized the
obstinacy of the late Eleelor, and were ahcady
communieating with his liiture sueccssor the
Elcetor Palatine. Karl Theodor was a weak
and spiritless man, without enthusiasm for the
Bavarian land or people whom he was in future
to govern. His own real anxiety, though
natural, was not entirely creditable ; he wished
to leave ample provision after his death for
his numerous illegitimate children. On this
weakness Austrian statesmen could work, and,
in return for the cession of a large part of
Bavaria, they were willing to guarantee large
sums to support Karl Theodor' s natural family.
It is difficult to see how even eighteenth
century ethics could justify a transaction,
which sacrificed a large territpry and the in-
terests of thousands of Bavairians to bastards
born in the Palatinate. An arrangement, by
which one ruler bargained for territory and
another for bastards, is, in fact, the reductio ad
absurdum of the principle of personal rule in
the eighteenth century. None the less a treaty
in this sense was being negotiated at Vienna
during the winter of 1777 between Prince
Kaunitz and Ritter, the Plenipotentiary of the
Palatinate Elector. Now it was suddenly and
most unfortunately interrupted'by Max Joseph's
death. Well might Maria Theresa look grave
at the news, and Kaunitz decline to mention
the word Bavaria in public.

86 FREDERIC THE GREAT

Kaiser Joseph thought at first that the
whole fruits of weary months of diplomacy
would be lost. It seemed that the Elector
Palatine had been deluding them, for in Max
Joseph's will, to the signature of which he had
been privy, Karl Theodor was assigned the
undivided Bavarian dominions. By his pro-
clamation and by his solemn acceptance of the
will, Karl Theodor had secured the moral
advantage ; if he was to be made to acquiesce
in the scheme of partition, there was no time to
be lost. As it happened a treaty on these lines
had already been drafted by the plenipoten-
tiaries in Vienna.^ Accordingly on January 3,
1778, the day after the Elector's arrival at
Munich, Ritter, his plenipotentiary, signed at
Vienna a treaty of Partition with Kaunitz, a
treaty subsequently ratified by Karl Theodor
on January 14 at Munich. By the terms of
the treaty the Emperor Joseph and Maria
Theresa recognized Karl Theodor's succession
to Bavaria but at a terrible loss to that ruler.
He was forced to agree that the lands granted
to Albert V. of Austria in 1426 should come
into the possession of the Austrian House.
These included nearly all Lower Bavaria and
Straubingen. With regard to territories in-
volving the rights of the Imperial or Bohemian
crown, such as Mindelheim and certain other
small fiefs and territories, Karl Theodor agreed
to submit to the Emperor's judgment in the

AND KAISER JOSEPH 87

matter. This last concession was damaging
enough, becuiuse it opened the door for adjust-
ment and exehanires of territorSjr in the Austrian
interest. But in regai'd to Lower Bavaria
and Straubingen the Austrian gains were
eN'en greater. Rather more than one-third of
Bavaria fell to Austria, and the value of this
concession far exceeded its actual size. The
new acquisition not only rendered Vienna safe
from attack in the future but gave a strategic-
ally defensible frontier to Auslyia. It was also
the most valuable and fertile part of Bavaria — -
there were situated the rich salt mines of Reichen-
hall, there was grown the corn* that fed most of
the land. The arrangement rendered Bavaria
entirely subservient to Kaiser Joseph, alike in
a strategic, political, and economic sense.

Rumours as to this treaty had already been
busy in Vienna even as early as January 6.
These were confirmed by K^launitz to Keith
iipon the 20th, though he only informed him
that an amicable treaty invQlving cession of
territory to Austria had been signed, without
giving any precise details.' Meanwhile it was
necessary to support paper by iron and to
enforce treaties by the sword. On January 15,
one detachment of Austrian troops advanced
and occupied Straubing, thus- holding the line
of the Danube and the Inn, and threatening
both Regensburg, the seat of the Imperial Diet,
and Munich, the capital of Bavaria. Other

88 FREDERIC THE GREAT

detachments occupied the Upper Palatinate,
the Bavarian troops retiring in each case before
them with protests but without firing. An
Austrian manifesto was pubhshed to the effect
that these troops were only occupying the
territory until an amicable settlement could
be adjusted. No one believed this manifesto,
every one recognized that the unscrupulous
readiness of Kaiser Joseph and Kaunitz had
won the first point in the game. Despite Max
Joseph's will Karl Theodor had been forced
into a scheme of partition,, which not only
violated all his own professions but which
realized all Austria's hopes. In addition
Austrian troops were already in possession of
important strategic points in Bavarian territory.
The Austrian troops occupied' a part of Lower
Bavaria, the granary of the whole country, in
which were situated the estates of many of
the prominent Bavarian nobles and ministers.
Hence by the threat of forbidding the export
of corn, or of ravaging the territory he held,
Kaiser Joseph could put pressure alike on the
people and on the Court at Munich. Time and
circumstance, everything indeed except one
man, seemed to favour Kaiser Joseph.

For the moment even Kaiser Joseph's thirst
for territorial aggrandizement was satisfied,
and he boasted that he had seized an oppor-
tunity which might occur but once in a hundred
years. Acting with the agreement of Kaunitz

AND KAISER JOSEPH 89

he had overborne the womanfy ftars of Maria
Theresa and the womanish cowaidicc of Karl
Theodor. The strong hand sccnicd to have
prevailed, for Karl Theodor (who had at first
demurred to the Partition-Treaty) yielded to
threats and ratified the Treaty with reluctance
on January 14. This news made even Maria
Theresa forget her fears and write to Kaunitz
that the result was due to him. Europe will
have to confess that " I possess its greatest
statesman." On January 26 Joseph was writ-
ing to his brother Leopold, Du:ke of Tuscany :
" Our decision was a good one, and will bring
as much solid advantage to us as honour and
renowTi." The Grand Duke, surveying the
diplomatic world from his lit'tle duchy with
calm, wise eyes, may well have smiled to read
the Kaiser's thoughtless paean.

We may anticipate events a little on the
Austrian side to show the diplomatic situation
with more clearness, and to explain the jubil-
ance of Joseph. The point of most importance
to the Kaiser was to make allies or friends of
Karl Theodor, of the Saxon Elector, of the
French King, and the Russian Czarina. The
Elector of Saxony was indeed a claimant to
part of the Bavarian inheritance, but Joseph
expected to win him over to the Austrian in-
terest. With regard to the two great Powers
he was hopeful. Russia — Fi'ederic's ally — had
just received an ultimatum from Turkey and

90 FREDERIC THE GREAT

was therefore incapable of active or immediate
interference. The situation of France — his own
ally — convinced Joseph that he had taken the
chance of a century. On January 29 he writes
to Leopold, his brother, in Tuscany : " France
has not yet declared herself quite clearly ; but
even if she is really angry I do not see what
she can say or do, as she finds herself on the
eve of a war with England. The King of
Prussia has still said no word ; he is very much
distressed and knocks at every door to find
some one to make common cause with him ;
but when he finds himself universally repelled
he will have to suffer alone, as he will not dare
to go forward by himself. So, unless I am
mistaken, this matter, to every one's astonish-
ment, will be settled very peacefully." It was
not the world that was to be astonished, nor
the Kaiser who was to be right.

France had been made the ally of Austria
by Kaunitz, and, as the pledge of that alliance,
Marie Antoinette, daughter of Maria Theresa,
had become Queen of France. But Louis XVI.
was not yet the slave of his Ai3.strian wife, and
his devotion to purely French interests was
strengthened by his foreign minister Vergennes,
the last considerable statesman of the old
regime. Dynastic considerations weighed little
with one who had seen and feared the ambitions
of Joseph, and who had long ago expressed the
view that it was to the interests of France that

AND KAISER JOSEPH 91

Germany should be kept tranquil by main-
taining an even balance between vVustria and
Prussia. These eonsiderations of Vergt nnes
were strengthened by recent events, especially
the paramount one that France was about to
dieclare war with England. Further, he had
recent grievances against Austria, who had
revealed very little to France of her negotia-
tions with Karl Theodor in 1777. About the
destinies of the Palatinate France was naturally
sensitive, and the secrecy of the Austrian in-
trigues had excited in her a natural suspicion.
France had her own intrigues with Zweibriicken,
and nothing that she heard from him was
favourable to Austria.*

In a moment of generosity Kaunitz had
once declared that one ally ought not to receive
an accession of power or territory without
equivalent compensation to the other. Yet
on January 8, 1778, when he announced the
substance of the Partition-Treaty to Breteuil,
the French ambassador at Vienna, Kaunitz
said nothing of benefits to France. These
actions were not likely to remove the deep-
rooted antipathy and suspicion of Vergennes.

To explain a dubious transaction, to atone for
a want of frankness, to persuade an ally against
his best interests, were tasks to baflle even
" Europe's greatest statesman." Is it wonder-
ful that Kaunitz did not succeed, especially
as Kaiser Joseph was pushing him on at

92 FREDERIC THE GREAT

every step with thoughtless eagerness ? The
cold and practical Vergennes was impervious
to blandishment ; he received the Austrian
statements with courtesy but refused to declare
himself further. Finally he was stirred into
action by the circular issued by Austria on
January 20, declaring her intentions as regards
Bavaria, and by her verbal explanations that
these met with the goodwill of her ally. On
February 2 Vergennes drew up a memorandum
for circulation to the Powers, in which he
explicitly denied that France had any share in
supporting the Austrian pretensions to Bavaria.
Joseph then played his trump card and tried to
deflect French policy by the influence of his
sister Marie Antoinette. The tears of a beauti-
ful woman might effect what the Kaiser and
Kaunitz had sought for in vain. On February
14 Marie Antoinette sought out her husband
at Versailles, and begged his aid. " I beg you,"
said she, " to put an end to the unrest in
Europe." To her amazement Louis answered
coldly and sternly, that the unrest of Europe
was due chiefly to her relatives, and that at
this very moment France was about to inform
the continental courts that she disapproved
of the Partition of Bavaria, which had taken
place against her wishes. On February 26,
just one month after his paean, Kaiser Joseph
wrote again to Leopold that affairs had an ill
outlook on all sides, that nearly all hope of

AND KAISER JOSEPH 93

peace had vanished, and that courage was
needed to meit the crisis.

By February '20 Wrirennes had practically won
over his royal master to declare Franer neutral
in the Bavarian dispute.^ This cUeision was
all the more nectssary as war with England
had already been decided on, and as its actual
outbreak may be dated from March 13. It was
more necessary than ever to encourage Frederic
to resist Austria, and to secure an even balance
in Germany. French negotiations with the
King of Prussia had already been initiated, but
Vergennes did not mean to risk anything or to
allow Frederic to improve the occasion. On
^larch 10 he informed the Prussian ambassador
at Paris that France intended to be neutral
in the Bavarian question, but that, while
friendly to Frederic, she positively declined
any close or separate alliance with him.

Of this Joseph and Kaunitz knew as yet
nothing, but their ambitions, actually grew
while their hopes of peace were lessening. Not
only were they about to ask France to give
them active assistance in case of war with
Prussia, but were going to ask her consent to a
new and very ambitious project of exchange.
By this arrangement Karl Thecidor was to hand
over all the rest of Bavaria to* Joseph, and to
obtain the Austrian Netherlands in exchange*
These proceedings were sharply checked.
Kaunitz got very little encouragement for

94 FREDERIC THE GREAT

his schemes from Breteuil, the French Am-
bassador at Vienna ; so he renewed direct
representations to Louis, demanding the assist-
ance of 24,000 French troops in accordance
with the Treaty of 1756, and requesting France
to sanction the new exchange -project. The
answer was slow in coming and Vienna was
excited. Maria Theresa was already writing
piteous letters to her son Joseph, the Kaiser
was ordering out the reserves, drilling troops,
and sleeping already in his camp-bed. Slumber
forsook him at nights, but he carried a bold face
by day. " I run no danger," said he, "if it
be my misfortune to undergo a defeat, that has
always come at the hands of the hero of this
century, but if I have success it will be so much
the more glorious for me." Kaunitz naturally
grew anxious, and pressed hard for a definite
reply to his French overtures. On March 22
at Vienna, when Breteuil hinted pretty plainly
to him that France would be neutral, the
" greatest statesman of Europe " grew warm,
refused to take any such assurance save in
writing, and parted from Breteuil in wrath.
The polite Kaunitz might well show passion
when the Franco- Austrian Alliance, that master-
piece of his diplomacy, was dissolving under
his very eyes. On March 24 Mercy at last
brought Vergennes to explanations at Versailles,
and learnt that France declined to recognize
an obligation under the 1756. Treaty, and not

AND KAISER JOSEPH 95

only reluscd active assistance to Austria in case
of war, but declared her inteiitiJon oi" observing
a strict and inOexible neutrality. This decision
was a great blow both to Kaunitz and to Kaiser
Joseph. It not only niatle the grandiose project
of exchanging all Bavaria for Belgium impos-
sible at the moment ; it rendered the Par-
tition-Treaty and the hold on Lower Bavaria
precarious in the future. The fairest part
of the dream had then vajiished ; Maria
Theresa was wringing her hahds, " Europe's
greatest statesman " was sitting mournfully
among the ruins of his famous alliance, and the
Kaiser, tossing at nights on hi^ camp-bed, was
indulging a last desperate hope that Frederic
might not take the field in person.

2. King Frederic

Who treadeth Fortune underneath his feet
And makes the mighty God of Amis his slave.

Marlowe, Tamburlainc.

The eyes of Europe, which had been fixed
upon Munich in the last fortnight of the Old
Year, upon Vienna in the first fortnight of the
New Year, turned towards Berlin at the end of
January 1778. Unless Frederic moved. Kaiser
Joseph's bid for Lower Bavaria had succeeded,
and for nearly a month all Europe waited in
breathless expectation lor the det-ision of the
grim Prussian King. Hugh Elliot was now
British Ambassador at Berlin, and it is from

96 FREDERIC THE GREAT

his despatches that we gather the breathless
suspense that prevailed from day to day, how
every look, word, or gesture of the old King
was noted, how rumour outdid rumour in
extravagance, and how all the while soldiers
went on drilling on the Potsdam parade-ground.
On January 17 Hugh Elliot reported Frederic
" in high spirits, almost unnaturally so," and
this was just after the Austrians had marched
into Bavaria. Was it that the old hero
was scenting battle, and that his spirit rose
with danger ? Hugh Elliot had a rather more
prosaic explanation : " There are not wanting
persons who ascribe this unusual appearance
to the effect of the quantity of wine (!) mixed
with too great a proportion of spice, which the
King of Prussia takes as remedy for the gout." *
In spite or because of the remedy Frederic had
an attack of gout about this time, so serious
that it was believed at one time to threaten
his life. Again the fate of Bavaria depended
not so much on physicians — for Frederic
despised and often repulsed them — but on the
health of a man of advanced age. Yet the
danger passed, Frederic recovered and set his
ministers examining the Austrian claims. So
early as February 3 Hugh Elliot — ^from whom
few diplomatic secrets were hid — ^judged it to
be the intention of the King of Prussia " to

* S.P.F. Prussia, 102,'Hugh Elliot to Suffolk, Berlin, January 17,

1778.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 97

take the field in the Spriii<r," though he could
not decide whether Frederic* meant to attack
Austria, or merely " to seize on neighbouring
territory as an equivalent."

By consummate diplomacy Hugh Elliot,
the Ambassador of a Power to which Frederic
cherished an undying hatred for abandoning
him in 1702, managed to penetrate the designs
of the old King and to advance the English
interests. Frederic had been secretly urging
FVance to support the rebellion against England
in America, and William Lee, a diplomatic
agent of the revolted Americans, was already
in Berhn. No situation could well be more
unfavourable to the new Anibassador, but
Elliot characteristically turned to his advantage
the moment of the Bavarian Elector's death,
which made England's assistance important
to Frederic in Germany. Having been coldly
received, he applied for leave; of absence, a
request which brought him an immediate visit
from Prince Henry (King Frederic's brother).
The Prince paid him eompUments, but let out
the reason of them by expressing a fear that
Elliot's request for absence wa| made with an
intention not to return. Elliot pleaded the
coldness of the King, but the Prince replied —
" que j'agissois avec trop de viyacit^." Elhot
begged leave to substitute " sensibilit6." Prince
Henry tried to smooth matters over, saying
the coldness was not personal but was due to

H

98 FREDERIC THE GREAT

England's conduct in the last peace (1763).
Elliot replied that this was long passed, and that
he knew of these matters only from history.
To the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, one of
Frederic's favourites, he used even stronger
language, saying the presence of a rebel agent
(Lee) made " forbearance difificult," and so on.*
Hugh Elliot's language was strong, but he knew
his man ; concession was useless to Frederic,
who showed " ill humour " when it could be
shown " with impunity," but was always
impressed by courage. By the middle of
February (12th) Frederic saw pretty clearly
that France was not going to interfere on the
Austrian side, and that the friendship of
England was too important an asset in the
Bavarian affair to be sacrificed. This fact
and Hugh Elliot's bold front secured two
important declarations from Frederic, first
that he would have no more to do with the
American rebels, second that, in case of war
in Germany, he would respect the neutrality
of Hanover.'' Russia, being at the moment
afraid of war with Turkey, was apparently

* S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 102, Berlin, February 22, 1778, Hugh Elliot
to Suffolk. Hugh Elliot's " forbearance " had been shown shortly
before this by breaking open the house of the said " rebel agent,"
stealing his papers and returning them only when the important
ones had been copied under his direction. He repaid the " coldness "
pf Frederic by a well-known repartee. King Frederic : " Qui est ce
Hyder All qui sait si bien arranger vos affaires aux Indes ? " Hugh
Elliot : " Sire, c'est un vieux despote qui abeaucoup piI16 ses voisins,
mais qui, Dieu merci, commence h, radoter," Vide Minto's Elliot,
p. 228.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 99

going to stand aloof, so King Frederic and
Kaiser Joseph were brought face to face.

The problem before Frederic was certainly
not settled by research into musty parchments —
that was the affair of his ministers ; he decided
by facts and Prussian interests, setting others to
make out the case from history and precedent.
To Frederic himself there were only two choices
open : either Austria must be satisfied with far
less important acquisitions than those she had
attained, or she must share some of the spoil
with Prussia by means of a partition. Poland's
Partition cast a sinister shadow, and this last
design was suggested by Elliot as the probable
solution of the difficulty.* We cannot tell
whether Frederic ever seriously considered it,
but it is obvious that no Bavarian Partition
could give to Prussia more than, an isolated piece
of territory, which it would be hard to defend.
It would be impossible to acquire anything to
act as a real balance to the inftreased strength
of Austria, and this fact may haye weighed with
Frederic. The only alternative was for him to
insist upon Austria renouncing all such claims
to Bavarian territory as gaV^e her any con-
siderable advantage or accession of power.
Now this last meant nothing else but war, and
it was natural that Frederic should ponder its
chances. His own advanced age, the possi-
bility of defeat, and the dangers of war spread-
ing over the Continent were all considerations

100 FREDERIC THE GREAT

of importance, and explain why his brother
Prince Henry vigorously counselled moderation.
On the other hand, Frederic's prestige would
suffer, he would obviously become the second
power in Germany if Austria, which he had so
humbled, was at last to be triumphant.

Whether or no Frederic was to go to war
the immediate objects were clear to him ; it
was of great importance to turn the moral
opinion of the Empire and of Europe against
Kaiser Joseph, and it was an absolute necessity
to cut htm off from all possible allies in Ger-
many. The first object was best secured by
inducing Zweibriicken to repudiate the action
of Karl Theodor, and to decline all agreement
with the Partition-Treaty. In order to secure
this Frederic sent off an envoy incognito and
post-haste to assure Zweibriicken of Prussian
support. The romantic history of that negotia-
tion will be related elsewhere; it is sufficient
here to describe its success. On February 8 the
Prussian envoy knew that Zweibriicken would
refuse to endorse the Partition-Treaty, and sent
off a letter to Frederic to that effect. Ironically
enough, the messenger who delivered it was
one of the Bavarian " fiends " {i.e. a monk),
a fact which caused the royal sceptic some
amusement.'

It remained for Frederic to secure allies,
Karl Theodor was hopeless — he was Joseph's,
body and soul. Something, however, might

AND KAISER JOSEPH 101

be done with FiTdciie Augustus, Elector of
Saxony, the third most powc rful of the Princes
of Germany. Saxony was very jiear to Bavaria,
and her Elector might well fear a similar fate
from Kaiser Joseph in the future. But he
stood in awe and suspicion of King Frederic
as well. Dresden, with its noble river and
splendid rococo palaces, had been the scat of a
great civilization under Augustus's magnificent
ancestor, who had there entertained Frederic
when Crown-Prince of Prussia with more than
Oriental profusion. In return Frederic had
treated both the land and its inhabitants with
merciless brutality during the Sfeven Years' War.
He had bled and impoverishe4 the people with
his requisitions, had impressed the Saxon troops
to serve in his army, brutally Carried off Saxon
women to people his Silesian cplonies, and even
kidnapped Saxon potters frojn Meissen and
forced them to disclose the secrets of Dresden
cliina to the factories of Potsdam.* Frederic
Augustus had forgotten such nhheard-of rigour
in view of more recent wrongs and insults
from Austria. In 1777 he had had a painful
dispute with Austria over the Schonburg in-
heritance, which culminated in the Austrian
troops forcibly expelling the Saxon ones from the
lordships of Glauchau, Waldcnburg and Lichtcn-

* It ia characteristic that, while Frederic issued these commands
from Dresden, he went every day to loolt at Kapliael's " Madonna di
San Sisto."

102 FREDERIC THE GREAT

stein, and fencing in the disputed territory
with eagle -topped boundary posts. Frederic
Augustus could with some justice complain that
the action was arrogant and high - handed.^"
He was naturally alarmed at Karl Theodor's
Partition-Treaty, which referred all the disputed
claims on the Bavarian Succession to the award
of the Emperor. After Schonburg even a less
suspicious man than Frederic Augustus might
be forgiven for doubtitig whether the Emperor's
judgment wovdd be impartial or disinterested.
His applications to Vienna were met with such
dark and discouraging answers that he at once
turned to Frederic.^^

At Dresden the English chargi noted " the
greatest consternation and very great con-
fusion " throughout January. But even diplo-
matic dangers could not interrupt the revels
of Dresden and its ruler. On February 25 we
learn that " His Electoral Highness " was
" indisposed with a violent cold occasioned
(being very fond of dancing) by over-heating
himself this carnaval." The same despatch
shows that serious business had already begun :
" A stranger arrived here last week from Leipzig,
who it is assumed is incognito at the Prussian
Minister's. It is certain from the time of that
Gentleman's arrival the Prussian Minister has
been locked up under the Pretence of being ill,
and receives no one." Some said the mysteri-
ous stranger was Prince Henry of Prussia, but

AND ICA.ISER JOSEPH 103

in the ond it turnod out tq be a Prussian
general, who liad been sent by Frederic to
reconnoitre the ground between Dresden and
Bohemia, and to give expert mihtary advice
to tlie Elector. Tliis and other evidence led
the English chargS to the correct conclusion :
" In case of a rupture Saxony enters into a
Treaty of Alliance with the King of Prussia.
Tliis is a matter of fact." * It was indeed ;
on ]\Iarch 14, the rupture seeming imminent,
Frederic despatched an envoy with full powers,
and on March 18 a Convention was signed
between Prussia and Saxony,, which pledged
them to mutual support, and was equivalent
to a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance.^"
By the end of February Frejderic had readily
guessed that he could count oh Saxony, that is
on an army of 30,000 men, in. case he went to
war. He was, as he said, " no Don Quixote,"
to sacrifice himself for petty princes, whose
troops consisted chiefly of the gentlemen of
their ante - chambers. But the aid of the
strongest army in Germany (after his own
and the Austrian) made his task relatively
simple. England, France and Russia stood
aside ; Saxony was his. It remained to see what
he could make of the other German princes.
Joseph had already frightened these gentry
— he had treated the unfortupate Karl Theo-

* S.P.F. Poland (Saxony), vol. 1 15, Dresden, February 25, March 8,
June 21, 1778, J. Milliquet to W. Eden.

104 FREDERIC THE GREAT

dor with offensive callousness, had not even
troubled to observe the conditions of the
Partition-Treaty with any strictness, and had
allowed his troops to occupy parts of Bavaria
not mentioned in that agreement.^^ Meanwhile,
Zweibriicken, with the open favour of Frederic
and the secret support of France, was trumpet-
ing his grievances to the Diet of the Empire,
An early communication from Frederic to
Vienna protested against the occupation of
Bavaria by Austrian troops. Later ones — the
most important that which reached Kaunitz
on March 9 — disavowed the Partition- Treaty
and pointed out the genealogical flaws in its
provisions. Finally, on March 16 the substance
of this letter was communicated to the Diet
of the Empire at Regensburg. The representa-
tives of Zweibriicken and the Saxon Elector
supported the protest eagerly, and the other
German princes learnt with undisguised pleasure
that Frederic had taken his stand against the
Kaiser in defence of the Liberty of Princes and
the Rights of the Empire. Kaunitz replied by
shelving (as well he might) the discussion of
claims, and spoke of Austria's desire to satisfy
every one, but refused to admit the King of
Prussia as the " umpire of her claims." *

March 16 has been called a memorable day
in the history of the Empire : it certainly had

* S.P.F. Germany, Empire (Austria), vol. 220, Vienna, Keith to
Suffolk, March 14, 1778.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 105

the result of iixing the lycs of all Gtiinany and
of Europe upon Frrilrrio. But for him, the
laws of the Empire NVt)uld have bc(;n defied, the
wishes of German pi'incehngs disregai'ded, and
the rule of Austria insolently enforced by the
threat of an appeal to the sword. Onee more
Frederic appeared as holding the balance, once
more he seemed the arbiter of Germany, but
now he was more popular and powerful than
ever ; Saxony was at his side, Hanover was
favourable though neutral, most Princes of
the Empire saluted him as the guardian of
legality and right. To Frederic the part he
played must have seemed nelw and stimulat-
ing, for no one had done more than he in his
young days to injure state morality and to
break up the Germanic Empire. Just now,
however, it was to his interesjt to appear dis-
interested, and his pose as the benign defender
of law and order throughout the Empire was
of the highest importance, in branding Austria
as an aggressor and in teaching the other
German States to regard Prussia as their
natural leader. " The hasty conduct " of the
Court of Vienna " must at the first view be
extremely alarming. If claims of obsolete date
are, in the first instance, to be decided by the
Law of Arms, there can be no security for the
weaker members of the Empire whose territories
may unfortunately be situated in the neighbour-
hood of powerful Princes, and the Constitution

106 FREDERIC THE GREAT

of the Empire will only exist in the Records of
the Diet." *

Even to England Frederic now became a
tolerable person. From 1762 till the beginning
of 1778 the despatches of English ambassadors
had frequently consisted of unbounded diatribes
against the Prussian King, now they began to
speak of his virtues, and the pious King George
even exchanged compliments with him. If
anything shows the moral advantage gained
by Frederic more clearly than the approval
of England it would be that of the Catholic
Powers of Germany (" his fiends "). Eden
records — with a certain unction indeed — that
" Protestant Powers as usual " are " favour-
able to the cause of Justice and Liberty," and
adds, " The Catholics are indeed favourable
in the present case — though their dependence
on the Court of Vienna prevents them declaring
themselves openly." " This last consideration
made Frederic dream of a League of German
Princes, which should include Catholics and
Protestants and should exclude Austria. In
the first week of April he commanded his
Ministers to consider such a project, and to
form a League of Princes under Prussian head-
ship. For one delirious moment a foreshadow-

* S.P.F. German States (Bavaria), vol. 113, St. James, Suffolk to
Eden, AprU 7, 1778 ; Munich, Eden to Suffolk, April 30, 1778 ; vide
also S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 102 ; Berlin, Elliot to Suffolk, March 3,
1778 ; St. James, Suffolk to ElUot, April 7;..1778 ; Berlin, May 30,
ElUot to Suffolk.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 107

ing of Bismarck's Gtrmany hovtrs faintly upon
a far horizon. But the project was premature,
Frederic was above all things practieul, and,
as Catholic Princes would not openly declare
against Austria, he postponed these dreams
till a time when they could' have a better
chance of realization. The reason lay, not in
him, but in those other Pririces, who were
"all fear without energy," '' the shame of the
century," and who made him " blush " for
Germany.*

For the rest the eulogies on his conduct
amused no one more than the Cynical old King.
He had of course no objection to being wor-
shipped by the minor Princes as a Don Quixote
of legality, and he took pains to sustain that
part in public, " Je ne prefererai pas mon intdret
personnel a celui de tout rempire." f In private
he let fall the mask and candidly confessed
to his brother that in the whole affair he pushed
the Prussian interest alone.

Though Frederic made his decision, and
adhered to it subsequently with inflexible
firmness, he did not make it easily, and he
delayed pushing matters to a crisis as long as
possible. Something in this tardiness may

* Frederic's expressions are from a letter to Prince Henry of
March 8, SchOning, Der Bayerische Erbfolgekrig, p. 20; cp. Rei-
mann, Pr. Gesch. ii. 78-79.

f Frederic to Sohms, Prussian Ambassador at Petrograd, March
2-1, 1778, Reimann, Preuss. Gesch. ii. 43 ; to Prince Henry, March 0,
ibid. ii. 77.

108 FREDERIC THE GREAT

perhaps be ascribed to conscious art, since he
wished to appear forced into war, but some-
thing more to genuine reluctance, and to the
approach of age, which had dulled even his
fire. He set on his publicists, with his minister
Hertzberg at their head, to produce the
pamphlets, proclamations, and letters needed
for the occasion, and a brisk paper campaign
— in which official despatches stood for the
heavy guns and pamphlets for the sharp-
shooters — preceded and did something to occa-
sion the real war. Hertzberg was a fanatical
Prussian, rash and impulsive, but also able and
determined. He possessed considerable know-
ledge of genealogy and history, and in the main
the pamphlet - literature, which he inspired,
was superior in argument and weight to the
Austrian. Kaiser Joseph took little means to
conciliate Frederic or to divide his enemies
by diplomacy. Violent pamphlets against the
Prussian King were issued in Vienna, and it was
known " that hardly a word on the Bavarian
Succession went to Press In the Austrian
Capital without being cautiously examined in
the Chancery." *

After the storms of March came a lull
during April; neither side was ready for war,
both were making ample preparations for
it. Prussian troops were pushing beyond

* S.P.F. Germany, Empire,vol. 220, Vienna, May 23, 1778, Keith
to Suftolli.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 109

BiTslaii to the border, Saxon troops were
concentrating at Dresden, and zVustrian soldiers
were ncaring the frontiers both ol' Silesia and
Saxony. Every day Kiith saw troops hurry-
ing through Viinna — Croats, Hussars, Italians,
Hungarians — accompanied by* waggons con-
taining vast stores of meat, corn, and ammuni-
tion. On April 11 Kaiser Joseph and his
brother, Archduke Maximilian, left the capital
and proceeded to Olmiitz to direct operations
for the coming war. The Kaiser was in the
field, and on the 13th, writing as it wore from
the saddle, sent a letter in his own hand to
Frederic, appealing to him to avoid war. If
Frederic would recognize the Partition-Treaty
of January 3, Austria would endeavour to
compensate the other competitors and would
recognize the succession of Frederic to the
Margravates of Ansbach and Baireuth. The
letter reached Frederic in camp at Schonwalde
on the 14th, where he was surrounded by
officers instead of by ministers. He answered
shortly " as an old soldier," disavowing any
desire for war, but declaring it impossible to
accept the Kaiser's basis of negotiation. His
own succession to Ansbach-Baireuth had no-
thing whatever to do with BaVaria or Austria,
besides, as he added ironically, " our rights
here are so unassailable that none can dispute
them." To accept the Partition-Treaty was
to acknowledge that the Kaiser was a despot

110 FREDERIC THE GREAT

in the Empire, and Frederic was personally-
resolved to defend the Laws and Liberties of
Germany. Joseph answered smartly on the
18th that the Partition-Treaty was a friendly
arrangement, which he had concluded, not in
his capacity as Kaiser, but as Elftctor of Bohemia
and Archduke of Austria. This kind of personal
dispute between royalties was hardly dignifie<i
and, after a third letter and answer, pleni-
potentiaries on each side took up the negotia-
tion. It is hardly worth while to detail their
course, because neither Joseph nor Frederic
seems to have entertained any real hope of
their success. Each of the principals seems to
have intended them as a means of deluding
his opponent until the time for action was
ready. Only the influence of Prince Henry of
Prussia on the one hand and the agonized
anxiety of Maria Theresa on the other pro-
longed the make-believe for two months. For
a moment, indeed, there was a hope, as Kaunitz
was willing that Frederic should receive Lusatia
in exchange for Ansbach-Baireuth if he would
recognize Austria's claim on Lower Bavaria.
Frederic saw the value of Lusatia, which would
knit his dominions together in much the same
way as Lower Bavaria would unite the Austrian.
But he kept his head cool and was statesman
enough to reahze that he must not throw away
his newly found asset as guardian of law and
morality. He had already been negotiating

AND KAISER JOSEPH 111

on this vory matter, and had made it clear that
he would only agree to this arrangement if the
Saxon Elector gave a free consent ; Hertzberg
soon convinced Frederic that this was wholly
out of the question, and so thetproject dropped
and with it all chances of real accommodation
(May it).!^

The English watchers at Berlin, Vienna,
Dresden, and INIunich had decided that peace
was already hopeless by the end of May, But
war had been averted so long that hopes still
lingered throughout June. Even on the 22nd
Joseph was writing to Kaunitz that a firm front
might still carry the day.^" But negotiation
was really impossible, for Frederic never swerved
from the terms of his first letter to Joseph.
On June 27 Frederic in his canip at Schonwalde
received a final despatch from Kaunitz and
resolved on war. On the same day the learned
and masculine but over-conscientious Hertzberg
sent Frederic a last new plan of ingenious paper-
exchanges and genealogical calculations. This
plan he begged Frederic to Study before he
" crossed the Rubicon." But the die was
already cast, and the old King was not
merciful to his Monsieur de la timide politique.
He returned Hertzberg's communication with
the following endorsement : " Allez vou^ pro-
mener {sic) avec vos Indignes plans, vous etes
{sic) fait pour estre {sic), le Ministre de gens
coujons comme VElecteur de Baviere, mais nan

LAUDON.

THE PLUM AND POTATO WAR *

O selig der, dem er im Siegesglanze

Die blut'gen Lorbecrn um die SclUafe mindet.' — Goethe.

Happy the man in victory's golden moment
When Death with bloody laurels binds his brow.

In the war which now began the outlook for
Austria was not so gloomy as Was imagined by
many, and especially by Maria Theresa, whose
heart was sad because she had sent three sons
to the front. In military resources the two
Powers were not very unequal, though the
Prussian army had also the Saxon one to back
it. In all the details of military equipment,
transport, commissariat, and drill, the energy
of Joseph and the organizing skill of Lascy
had produced a real revolution in the Austrian
army. Already in the Seven Years' War there
had been evidence of more science, more skill,
and more thought, and this change had been
carried much further during the years 1763-78.
There had been revolutions in every direction,

• The best modem maps of the ground are the Karte des Deulschen
Belches, Bureau des Konigl. Bach. Generalstabes, 1880, sheets 'H4-7.
liiere is a very fine old map, Carte chorogriphique el militairc de la
partie de la Saice el de la Bohime ou sont entries les Anm'c.i combindes
, , , aux Ordres de S.A. Prince Henri de Prusse en 1778, which marks
the positions of Prince Ileniy's army throughout the campaign.

113 I

114 FREDERIC THE GREAT

improvements or changes in everything, great
and small. The erection of studs for produ-
cing cavalry chargers, of schools for educating
soldiers' children, of hospitals for invalids and
veterans, of military academies for training
young officers, all attested the diverse activities
of the new military reformers. The troops
had been constantly exercised on parade and in
manoeuvres, fortresses had been remodelled
or rebuilt, magazines formed,^ vast quantities
of food and ammunition collected, while Kaiser
Joseph had been indefatigable and ubiquitous,
inspecting barracks, paying surprise-visits to
distant garrisons, and endeavouring to infuse
energy and vigour everywhere. Defects there
undoubtedly were, some of the reforms were
too hasty or ill-considered, others failed owing
to the corruption always latent in the Austrian
bureaucracy, or to the nepotism prevalent
among its aristocracy.^ Hereditary custom
placed most of the high commands in the hands
of nobles, to whom war was not a profession
but a superior kind of sport, and this privilege
of paying the tax of blood was one of which
even Joseph dared not entirely deprive them.
But when a soldier of fortune like Laudon
could rise to high eminence, and when princes
like Liechtenstein and de Ligne could reach
a high degree of professional skill, the
practice was not as harmful as at first sight
might appear. Any ill effects were further

AND KAISER JO^SEPH 115

counteracted by the fact that Austria now for
the first time really possessed a well -organized
general staff, whose cfBcicncy was to be proved
both in this and in subsequent wars. In the
lower ranks of command there were many
Austrian veterans of distinction, and their
training, even if unequal to the Prussian, was
not such as to deprive them entirely of initiative
and resource. On the other hand, Frederic's
chief generals were dead, and their successors,
like his more subordinate officers, had been
trained to a perfectly mechanical rigidity and
precision. What had always been a serious
fault with Frederic had now become almost a
mania. Under such circumst^ces the Prussian
officer's superiority in technical skill might well
be balanced by the greater sense of independ-
ence which the Austrian officer possessed.

The Austrian army showed a better spirit,
organization, and training than at any time
in the Seven Years' War, but it undoubtedly
had one serious defect. ThoUlgh a professional
army in the main, its character was miscellane-
ous and polyglot." For example, while the
regular army was trained and organized in
ordinary fashion, there were other forces which
were not. The Hungarian nobles voted and
equipped at their own expense levies of
" insurgents," as they were called, which joined
the regulars. At this time the!re was no system
of conscription in Hungary, and the majority

116 FREDERIC THE GREAT

of its troops were still feudal levies officered by
hereditary commanders. Bravery they pos-
sessed indeed, but the Magyar feudal leaders
mixed as hardly with the German officers of
Vienna as did Prince Charlie's Highland chiefs
with his French officers. Then, again, the
Croats, who appeared to Keith " as hardy and
active soldiers as I have seen," were gallant
irregulars, but almost as hard to combine with
ordinary troops as if they had been Red Indians.
In spite of all Lascy's labours there was still
something of the air of a feudal host about
some component parts of the Austrian army.
It is true that it would not be easy to organize
the Prussian and Saxon armies as a unit, but it
was an infinitely harder task so to organize the
Austrians. Still the latter was a well-appointed
force, and its inferiority to the Prussian was one
of degree not of kind. Had it been as boldly
handled as it was well trained it might have
done much. As it was, it was the only Austrian
army between the days of Prince Eugene and
of the Archduke Charles which engaged in a
war without suffering a disastrous defeat.

As numbers, war material, and fighting
qualities were approximately equal, the real
decisions of the campaign rested with the chief
leaders. Here also at first sight the advantage
would appear to rest, though not very de-
cisively, with the Prussians. Bohemia was to
be invaded from two sides, from the Silesian

AND KAISER JOSEPH 117

side by King Frederic, Irom the Saxon side by
Prince Henry of Prussia, the brother of the
Iving. Lascy and Kaiser Joseph were to face
the King, Laudon to command against the
Prince. Prince Henry had been well known in
the Seven Years' War. In 1759, at the most
tragic moment of Frederic's fate, his admir-
able manoeuvres had restorfi'd confidence to
his brother and perhaps saved the existence
of Prussia, Even Frederic, who practised
economy in compliments, once pointed out
Prince Henry to his generals, saying : " There
is only one of us who never rpade a mistake."
Napoleon, whose military judgment overtops
even Frederic's, was of opinion that Prince
Henry had occasionally to thabk his opponents
for not revealing his mistakes, ^especially in the
year 1 759. " The faultless genei^al ' ' was, none the
less, a soldier of great renown, much experience,
and high professional skill. He was the only
Prussian general, except the great Kjng himself,
who had led Prussian troops to victory in a
pitched battle in the Seven Years' War. His
judgment was at once superlatively clear and
exquisitely cool, and he — alonte of all Prussian
generals then living — dared to face Frederic,
and declined to sacrifice his independence or his
troops at the royal command;. His fault was
perhaps that he balanced juSt a thought too
nicely, and complimented his opponent a little
too much in thinking that he. judged as aceu-

118 FREDERIC THE GREAT

rately as himself.' For Laudon, though no
contemptible opponent, was endowed with
erratic genius rather than with steady talent.
Alone of all Austrian generals in the Seven
Years' War he had shown himself capable of a
daring initiative, had inspired his troops with
dash and spirit, and had wrung compliments
as to his military capacity even from Frederic
himself. At his best, as at Kunersdorf, he had
known how to defeat even Frederic himself; at
his worst he would be unequal to Prince Henry.
The invasion from Silesia promised less
decisive results ; Frederic needed no early
success to add to his immeasurable renown,
and an early reverse might detract from it.
Moreover, the great Prussian king was sixty-
six years old, prematurely aged by hardship
and labour, tortured with gout so that he could
barely mount his horse. Old friends who saw
him were shocked at his broken-down appear-
ance, at his wrinkles and his grey hair ; it was
only in the wonderful eyes that they saw a trace
of the old energy and fire. On the Austrian
side the character of Lascy, who exercised great
influence on Kaiser Joseph, was not one to
induce him to stake all on a battle with so great
a warrior as Frederic. Lascy's great adminis-
trative and organizing talents suited him ad-
mirably for a commander-in-chief or chief of
staff, but he trusted too much to the slow
evolution of long-formed plans, and lacked the

AND KAISER JOSEPH 119

elasticity and resource, the siuldcn divination,
and the instant decision needed by a commander
in the field. Kaiser Joseph had indicd some
of these qualities which Lascy lacked, some
personal magnetism, something of initiative
and of quick, imperious resolve, but his inex-
perience in war, and his regard, for his peasants'
and his soldiers' welfare, disinclined him to
stir Lascy into activity. Indeed Lascy's whole
train of thought dissuaded him from fighting
great battles, for he had been brought up by
Daun, in that Austrian School which was to
have its greatest exponent in the Archduke
Charles, and which maintained that the holding
of fortified places, the manoeuvre and counter-
manoeuvre for favourable ground, were the
supreme ends of war. That more modern and
decisive school of strategy, which teaches that
the real object is the destruction of the enemy's
army in the field, was alien, to Lascy from
military training and conviction, and to Kaiser
Joseph also for political reasorts.*

On the other hand, Frederic had until now
been the most strenuous disciple, if not the
originator, of a very different military doc-
trine, which was afterwards to have its ablest
exponent in Napoleon. In the Seven Years'
War no one had more brilliantly proved than
Frederic how much depends on a bold initiative,
how often a thrust is the best parry in warfare,
how far more important it is to destroy an army

120 FREDERIC THE GREAT

even at a great loss than to secure a position
at a small one. That to a numerically inferior
force a daring aggression is the best defence,
had ever been one of his cardinal maxims.®
Now when his forces were, what they had very
seldom been in the past, approximately equal
to the Austrian, would Frederic uphold his own
maxims ? If he forswore them, there would be
no fighting worth mentioning on the Silesian side,
for the game would become one of stalemate.

If the two opposing armies appeared fairly
balanced in leaders and in men, the same might
be also said of the natural conditions of the
ground in which the armies were to operate.
Bohemia — the scene of the campaign — ^is a
fortress enclosed within mountain walls which
stand four-square to every wind of battle.
On the two sides from which she was now open
to an attack, from the Saxon or western side
and from the Silesian or northern one, her
barriers of rugged rock and dense forest are
exceptionally strong. Yet from these two
sides Bohemia, by universal concession and
experience, is " easy to invade." A glimpse
into the Middle Ages serves better to explain
this paradox than the dissertation of a modern
tactician. Mediaeval robber-barons had a keen
eye for planting castles upon inaccessible crags,
whence they could sally out upon unsuspecting
foes or upon peaceful merchants, and we may
trust their instinct to find the: real sluice-gates.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 121

where the rich slow-moving streams of com-
merce, or the roaring tides of war, could be
dammed or let through — at a price. There are
three gates in these Bohemian mountain walls,
two on the Saxon side, at Konigstein-Lihen-
stein and at ToUenstein, and one on the
Silesian side, at Nachod. Each of them was
guarded by a castle in the Middle Ages. South
from Dresden down the Elbe ran a road which
was blocked by the twin castles — Konigstein-
LiUenstein (twin eagles' nests on opposite
crags !) ; from Lusatia south over Rumburg the
second road was guarded by the romantic keep
of ToUenstein ; the third ran south from Silesia
over Glatz and was closed by the castle of
Nachod. Those castles — once the toll-houses
of these three entrances — were, now their sentry-
boxes. If they were to be defended in the
eighteenth century it must be by living and not
by dead walls, a fact which serves to testify to the
eternal sameness of the principles of strategy,
and to their infinite difference in application.

The broad outline of the attack and defence
will be found to be simple when these facts are
realized. It was known thait King Frederic
was preparing to lead the Silesian Army, Prince
Henry the Saxon one, each with a striking force
of some 80,000 men.* Therefore the Austrian

• The exact numbers of the striking force were, on July 1, 1778 —
Frederic, 80,000 men, 483 guns ; Kaiser Joseph, 128,000 men, 423
guns ; Prince Henry, 80,000 men, 483 guns ; Laudon (afterwards
reinforced), 70,000 men, 252 guns.

122 FREDERIC THE GREAT

plan was to make a concentration, and to keep
all their forces within as small an area as
possible, in order to strike either way at the
invader. The whole Austrian Army of about
190,000 men was to be collected in a triangle,
of which the base rested on Niemes and Jaromer,
and the apex on Zittau. The left or Saxon
wing was concentrated under Laudon at Niemes,
the centre under Lascy at JiCin, the right under
Hadik at Jaromer, the whole being under the
command of Kaiser Joseph. By this arrange-
ment all the armies were within three or four
marches of one another, and any threatened
points could be effectually reinforced at very
short notice. So long as the Austrian forces
remained unbroken Prince Henry could not
push past Niemes and on to Prague, or Frederic
past Jaromer to KoniggratZ. It was from
Silesia that the Austrians expected the real
danger. Frederic would, of course, enter
Bohemia through the Nachod gate, and display
his far-famed capacity for marching swiftly
and for striking heavy blows early in the
campaign. Speaking of this. Kaiser Joseph is
reported to have said : " When it is a question
of fighting he (Frederic) rises up earlier than
other people, but he shall never find me
asleep." * With a view to receiving his attack
the ground behind Nachod from Arnau to

* Calonne, Notes sur la vie de Josef II, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS.
27487.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 123

Jaromer had bicn cart luUy fortified against the
Prussian attack. Here lay the post of danger,
here the greatest crisis would come, thought
Kaiser Joseph. When on July 5 Frederic
passed over the border at Nadhod, the Arnau-
Jaromer line was immediately manned, the
Austrian armies of the centre and the right were
at once united under the command of Lascy
and the Kaiser. It was decided to entrust
Laudon with the army of the left as an in-
dependent command, in order that he might
make head against Prince Henry. Thus there
were now only two Austrian armies. Joseph
with the Eastern was defending the Nachod
gate against Frederic, Laudon with the Western
was to hold against Prince Henry the mountain
gate of ToUenstein and the river gate by Aussig.
In actual result — for reason^ that will sub-
sequently appear — the danger was to be for
Laudon, and during the first six weeks of the
war the interest of the campaign shifts entirely
to his army. On July 5 Laudon lay with his
main force at Niemes, where he received the
one dazzling inspiration which came to him
in this campaign. Frederic was within two
or three marches of Jaromer and Joseph, but
Laudon knew that Prince Henry's army was
located at Dresden, a good ten days' maroh
from any seemingly threatened point on his
side. Before finally deciding to go westwards
Laudon devised a brilliant scheme. He wrote

124 FREDERIC THE GREAT

from Niemes to Kaiser Joseph on July 7 point-
ing out that the Austrian armies had still the
advantage of interior lines, and could move
more quickly than the widely severed Prussian
armies. Prince Henry's movements were neces-
sarily slow and, according to the best informa-
tion, Laudon thought that he personally could
have nothing to fear until about the 15th. So
the thought came to him whether he could not
profit by this interval and with united force
(that is, by concentrating our Western and
Eastern armies) set off at King Frederic himself
and attack him, unless he stood in an entirely
unassailable position. He thought that within
four days the two armies would be united.*
Laudon himself would bring some 42,000 men
to Arnau, making the forces there up to 55,000
in all, and with these crush the King of Prussia's
right wing. Meanwhile Kaiser Joseph with
72,000 men could sally out against the Prussian
left and centre. Frederic with 80,000 would
be caught by 120,000 men, and would be
outnumbered and crushed between the two
Austrian armies. The plan was a great one,
resembling that of the Metaurus or Blenheim,
though upon a smaller scale. It meant the
leaving of a skeleton force before the first enemy
who could not readily take the offensive, and
the sudden union of two armies to destroy the
second. Had it been followed it might have
resembled Blenheim yet more, in transferring

AND KAISER JOSEPH 125

the scene of action to the enemy's frontier, in
conquering a duchy in a day, and in destroying
a long and hardly earned reputation for victory.
But so bold a plan was not for the Kaiser and for
Lascy. It was unsafe to take liberties with
Frederic, and the cautious Joseph refused this
suggestion. Laudon — after this brilliant flash of
intuitive insight — turned to the work of defence,
in which he was to prove prosa^ic enough.

Laudon had been allotted the most difficult
task in the defence of Bohemia. In the first
place he had two gates to defend, not one like
Kaiser Joseph, and in the second place he had
not in his hands the crags of Konigstein-
Lilienstein, but had to conteiit himself with
Aussig as a post from which to bar any advance
up the Elbe. Again, the area of defence was
much more extensive than that assigned to
Kaiser Joseph ; to hold both gates Laudon
had to cover a line stretching from Aussig to
Zittau, a region covered with, hills and forests
in which scouting was difficult. It was there-
fore I possible for the enemy, manoeuvring
secretly behind the lofty curtain of mountain
and wood, to fling overwhelming force upon one
gate by Aussig or on the other by ToUenstein,
before Laudon could divine their intention.
Laudon's best plan would have been to con-
centrate his army at Hirschberg, to hold Aussig
in force, and to send a suffieient detachment
to bar the gate of ToUenstein. The Hirschberg

126 FREDERIC THE GREAT

concentration would have masked his disposi-
tions, prevented Prince Henry frona discover-
ing his real intentions, and enabled Laudon to
block both entrances. As it was, he assumed
that Prince Henry was adva:ncing down the
Elbe — the most probable line of approach —
and neglected to place more than a few skir-
mishers at ToUenstein. Now, if Prince Henry
was a general whom a stroke of genius might
have deceived, he was not one in whose presence
it was safe to make any ordinary blunder.

After moving out his Saxon-Prussian Army
from Dresden Prince Henry made feints in
several directions, especially towards Dippoldis-
walde, with the view of deceiving Laudon.
Then on July 28 he crossed the left bank of the
Elbe on three bridges just above Pirna. His
intelligence — such as it was — confused and
perplexed Laudon, and made him believe that
Prince Henry was coming down both sides of the
Elbe at once. Hence he began to concentrate
his forces at Bleiswedel, from which town he
could cover both sides of the stream. There
let us leave him for a time, waiting in anxious
expectation.

Instead of going down the Elbe Prince Henry
advanced through the forests on its right bank
(July 28), and made straight for Rumburg.
Using this town as a base he purposed to seize
ToUenstein Pass, where was the only gap in
Bohemia's armour of forest and hill. The

AND KAISER JOSEPH 127

enterprise was bold in that ha advanced over
roads unused to heavy traffic and streaming
with mud from the rain, and into a country
whence he could only retreat with difficulty in
case of failure. On the 30tb, some Prussian
cavalry with Lothosel's infantry surprised and
routed a hundred Austrian ciavalry at Rum-
burg, and pursued them to the first wood-
patch outside the town. There fifty Austrian
chasseurs came to their aid, but the Prussian
infantry came on again, Prussian guns hurried
up from Rumburg, and the Prussian cavalry
took them in flank. The Austrians gave way
again and were pursued four good miles as far
as Georgenthal, where the Prussian cavalry
bivouacked. Meanwhile the advance guard
of the Prussians had filed into Rumburg, and
aill night long further reinforcements kept
arriving.

From Rumburg to ToUenstein there is a
rift in the mountains, a series of gentle slopes
studded with thick patches and clumps of dark
firs. Across this wooded plateau infantry could
advance and seize the Pass of ToUenstein. On
the next day, July 31, an advance was made
in four columns. General Belling's colvunn
marching over Georgenthal to ToUenstein to
seize the key of the whole position. Let us
advance with General Belling. The way from
Rumburg to ToUenstein lies oyer broad downs,
yeUow with the harvest of oats or green with

128 FREDERIC THE GREAT

other crops, now somewhat draggled in the rain.
Here and there BeUing's column marches be-
tween dark fir -forests, varied by more open
country towards the east. On presses the
column in hot haste, past the low-browed huts
of Schonlinde down to Georgenthal, which lies
low and flat in the valley, where the Prussian
cavalry were already awaiting them. A^ Belling
looked up and ahead he could see westwards
(to the right) the dark impenetrable forests,
through which another Prussian column was
hastening. Straight in front of him — ^not four
kilometres farther on — is the goal of his hopes.
A great ruined keep frowned at him from the
grim rock of ToUenstein, a pass winding amid
stunted hills on one side of it, on the other the
tall fir-clad mass of Tannenberg Hill, a gigantic
sentry guarding the defile that is the key of
Upper Bohemia. Behind it again rolled back
a, seemingly endless and impenetrable sea of
fir-clad summits. Those dark masses of hills
might conceal any number of troops; at any
moment hot Laudon and his hussars might be
rushing to the rescue. There was no time to
lose; Belling gave the word for advance, the
cavalry swept swiftly forward towards the Pass,
surprising a few Austrians by the way but
scattering them easily right and left. They
clattered under the keep of ToUenstein, finding
Austrian infantry in the Pass. On come the
Prussian Grenadiers for a time easily up gentle

AND KAISER JOSEPH 129

slopes, then up steeper ones, as they draw near
the Keep of ToUenstein, frowning from the
crest of its hill. A few minutes more and they
sweep round the base of the hill while shots
splutter and kill one or two in the ranks.
\Miat matter ! The handful qf Austrians fly
before the Grenadiers and the Prussian cavalry
sweep at last round the base of the hill. The
keys of Bohemia have fallen fr6m the girdle of
Laudon !

All the night of the 31st two companies of
Grenadiers stood to arms in the Pass to guard
against surprise, while Prussian cavalry pursued
the Austrians into the depth and darkness of
the woods beyond. But the precantiou was
needless, for on the fateful Slst three other
Prussian columns, marching op parallel lines,
emerged at different points and secured the
route for Belling. The most important of
these, under MoUendorf, had njarched to the
west through the thick forests and over the
higher slopes past Nixdorf. Thie woods around
there were said to be haunted and to hold
strange beasts within their depths, but they
surely never held more dreadful monsters than
MoUendorf met, fierce Croatian Irregulars.
MoUendorf pressed on through the woods over
three abattis, and, despite fierce sporadic
fighting with the Croats, reached open country
beyond Dittersbach. There he encamped for
the night, having pushed on farther than any of

K

130 FREDERIC THE GREAT

the three other columns. The parallel move-
ment of the other columns rendered everything
safe, and in the next few days Prince Henry with
the main army advanced easily over this ground
towards Gabel. The whole had been achieved
with very small loss. At Rumburg and ToUen-
stein the Saxon-Prussian army lost but four
dead and a dozen wounded, the Austrians
seventeen dead and thirty-two wounded or
prisoners. Fighting there was in this war in
which there were far more losses than this, but
for importance in result there is nothing to
equal it.

At Rumburg Prince Henry, when he heard
of the capture of ToUenstein, must have smiled
to think that he had out-generalled the best
Austrian leader by a move that was at least
as daring as it was unexpected.* His own con-
fession shows his appreciation of the feat.
" Considering the impracticable roads that we
traversed, such as no army ever crossed yet,
this expedition might seem rash. That was
the very consideration that determined us to
undertake it, on the supposition that Marshal
Laudon would never believe we would wish to
attempt it. This supposition cannot indeed
do any wrong to the intelligence we recognize
in that Marshal. If the post of ToUenstein
had been held by only two battalions, that

* It is of some interest to note that, in 1866, the Prussian army of
the Elbe advanced from Dresden, and did not descend the Elbe, but
followed Prince Henry's route over Rumburg.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 181

would have prevented the army from entering." '
Indeed it seemed a great Prussian triumph and
appeared to have opened a way to the heart
of Bohemia.

Just at this very moment poor Maria Theresa
was writing in exultation to jNIarie Antoinette
in France that " our cruel enerrly " the old King
Frederic had been checked for a month,
" wliilst from Zittau to Aussig from the side of
Prince Henry there is nothing to fear." * The
news that Prince Henry had accomplished the
unwonted march by ToUenstein and was
threatening his flank, not only bewildered Maria
Theresa, it almost unmanned Laudon himself.
Impetuous in action like a true cavalry soldier,
he reasoned quickly as to Prince Henry's
designs. The Prince's main army was now
in or near Rumburg; his @wn position at
Bleiswedel was now untenable^ so that he must
evacuate the line of the Elbe altogether and
fall back behind the Iser. Prince Henry's
advance was cautious and Laudon's retreat
speedy, so that the new positioins were occupied
without much bloodshed. On August 2 the
main body of Laudon's forces reached Hirsch-
berg, on the 4th it crossed the Iser and
concentrated at Kosmanos. Prince Henry's
columns — creeping through the woods from
ToUenstein like swift serpents — seized upon all

* Aupist 8, 1778. Maria Theresa und Marie Antoinette, Von
Ameth, Wien (1865), p. 252.

132 FREDERIC THE GREAT

the positions Laudon evacuated, and were
presently gazing at the Austrians over the Iser.
Laudon was still nervous and wrote to Joseph
in great anxiety, stating (erroneously) that he
was outnumbered, and that he had to defend
the line of the Iser, a distance of some 90
kilometres, with 70,000 men. He thought this
feat impossible and complained to Joseph,
asking to be relieved or reinforced. But for
once Kaiser Joseph proved the better military
adviser, and, judging the situation more
correctly, wrote with masterly firmness : " Since
you have lost ToUenstein, the key-point of your
new position is Turnau. Hold that — and both
you and we are safe. Lose it — and Prince
Henry has everything ; he will join hands with
his brother the King, drive you back one way,
and us another, and ruin all. After all, too,
your (Laudon's) estimate of Prince Henry's
numbers is doubtful, a strong Saxon corps has
remained behind in Dresden, and eight new
Austrian battalions will be sent to reinforce
you, and enable you to hold the Iser from
Turnau to Semil — at all costs." * Thus Kaiser
Joseph directed the dispirited Laudon, both
wisely and confidently, in the first week of
August, showing alike the great importance of
the loss of ToUenstein and of the retention of
Turnau. On August 11 the Kaiser actually

* In fact Prince Henry had only 65,000 ^ectives while Laudon
had 70,000. Criste, Kriege, p. 102, prints the letter here summarized.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 188

visited Laudon in his headquarters at IMiinclicn-
griitz, found him in gvvat dejection, and eauic
back criticizing both general and army.*

During the second week of August, just after
what Frederic called this " pretty d^but " of
Prince Henry, diplomacy suddijnly intervened.
But as this negotiation was made behind the
back of the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, and
hardly affected the military situation, it can
be noticed later. On August 15 Frederic ended
the diplomatic interlude, and all parties braced
themselves afresh to a rougher game. There is
something rather ludicrous in Laudon's attitude
of agonized apprehension behind one bank of
the Iser, especially as Prince Henry showed
remarkable caution on the other. The latter
was sensible as to the great advantage he had
gained in the past, but speculative as to the
future. He feinted towards Biidin, to pretend
that he was threatening Prague," but he intended
to take no risks. Even as it was, he put Laudon
in great apprehension, caused, him once more
to send piteous appeals for reinforcements, and
nearly induced him to abandon Miinchengratz
and the Iser. Indeed Laudon* actually issued
orders to this effect on August 29, and only
recalled them when he found the Prussians were
retiring.' Prince Henry's mjain object was
defensive, to prevent Laudon retaking Gabel
(and with it ToUenstein). " Once we lose the
roads leading to Lusatia retreat is impossible.

134 FREDERIC THE GREAT

One does not pass through this neighbourhood
unpunished twice." * Prince Henry judged
the situation as usual with exquisite accuracy ;
he had already risked his army once and
achieved an important success. He would not
endanger it once more, though it is clear from
Laudon's actions from August 26-29 that a
slightly more determined action on the part
of Prince Henry would have forced the passage
of the Iser. But Prince Henry would risk no
more : he resolved that any further move must
come from Frederic, and this determination
shifts the interest to the Prussian King and
the Austrian army opposed to him.

The situation in which Frederic found him-
self was indeed a difficult one, and this fact
may explain why he had r^nained for five
weeks, arms crossed and immovable, glaring
at the Austrians over the river, admiring though
not emulating the fine exploits of his brother.
The King had marched on July 5 through the
gate of Nachod, Just as Crown Prince Frederic
did in 1866, only to find himself checked by a
counterscarp immediately behind it. The old
King seems to have been much astonished to
find resistance so soon, and in fact appears to
have thought that the Austrian concentration
was at Olmiitz. In any case, he moved with
great slowness in his advance, and his delay of

* Prince Henry to Frederic, Niemes, August 17, 1778, quoted in
Crista, Kriege, p. 97.

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AND KAISER JOSEPH 185

two precious days enabled the Austrians to
strengthen still further their HnVs before the first
Prussian reconnaissanee. " floth (Iloheuelbe
and Arnau) would in all probability have fallen
had not the mareh of the troops, intended to
attaek them, been too much retarded." *

From Arnau to Jaromer stretched a long
fortified line held by Austrian troops. The
line was less strongly defended between Arnau
and Koniginhof, but from the last village to
Jaromer stretched a perfect wall of entrench-
ments. By Koniginhof the Elbe is very near
its source ; it is no wide stream, and its course
is not always discernible even from a short
distance. Though now fouled, by factories, it
was then a clear thin silver st,ream fordable at
many points, and flowing between banks which
are generally flat and low. It^would have been
easy for a Prussian force to cross the stream,
but it would have been extremely difficult to
secure their landing. From the wooded heights,
which rise at a distance of about half a mile
on the Austrian side and stretch right from
Koniginhof to Jaromer, wejl- placed cannon
could riddle any landing pajties. The dark
curtain of wood on the Austrian side completely
concealed guns and positiorjs, and Frederic
knew that the pupils of Daun understood the
art of entrenchment. All that, skill in choosing

• S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 102, Berlin, December 1, 1778, Elliot to
Suffolk, relying on the evidence of olUc^s taking part in the
campaign.

136 FREDERIC THE GREAT

and fortifying positions, of which Lascy was

an acknowledged master, had been lavished

upon this one,

" The walls made high and broad;.
The bulwarks and the rampires large and strong.
With cavalieros and thick counterforts."

Cannon were planted all along the lines,
trenches dug, abattis and palisades erected
at threatened points, whilst those parts of
the river where landings could be effected
were defended by triple lines of trenches
and by a specially concentrated artillery fire.
The whole line had been linked together
by special roads running parallel with the
stream, an arrangement of very great im-
portance, as the roads ran perpendicular to
the stream on the Prussian side. Hence, in
the case of any attempt to force their lines
or turn their position, the Austrian guns,
troops, and war material could be moved to
a threatened part with the greatest ease, the
Prussian only with difficulty. In fact the
Elbe — though small in volurrie — ^was almost a
better defence than the mountains behind it,
and this thin silver ribbon of a stream checked
the old King even more effectually than the
Iser restrained his brother. For six weeks
now the two armies had been watching one
another, separated by only a kilometre or two
of ground, so near that bullets and cannon balls
were frequently whistling and humming across.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 137

while in the day-tinio the ghnt of stcil was
visible, and at night the hundred watch-fires
sparkled like fireflies from opposing heights.

Frederic was never renowhed for patience,
and he now played the waiting part with a very
bad grace to the accompaniment of much pro-
fanity, silent on the part of others, vocal on
his own. He censured his officers severely,
taught one how to form a camp, with many
pungent criticisms, and said, " Go to the devil ! "
to a second, who wished to measure a distance
by trigonometry instead of by the eye. All
shrank from crossing or offending the venomous
old King, and his nephew and heir, Frederic-
WiUiam, now on his first campaign, earned
much commendation for his ridicule of his great
kinsman as " old Sourface." To his occupa-
tion of reprimanding or satijizing his officers
Frederic added others not less characteristic.
By his orders the soldiers were* given bread and
meat gratis in addition to their usual pay, twice
a week they were sold beans very cheaply, and
other provisions were on sale at or nearly at
cost price. At the same time he increased the
already iron rigour of discipline. Later in the
campaign, in the camp at Schatzlar, he showed
his Athenian side as well, and composed an
Eloge de Voltaire, just dead at Paris, whose
enmity and friendship alike had contributed
so much to his own renown. The dead satirist
himself could not have drawn a character in

138 FREDERIC THE GREAT

fiction more strange or complex than that re-
vealed by Frederic at this moment — the first
ruler and soldier in the world, brought to a
check by leaders of but ordinary talents, and
beguiling his time now by cursing his officers,
now by handling a secret negotiation, now
by improving the food of his men, now by in-
creasing their punishments, yet again by writing
a copy of bad French verses. His inaction had
much effect on both officers and men, to whom
" Der Alte Fritz " had been the model of daring
and celerity in war, and there was a " great
diminution of that confidence in his abilities
and enthusiasm for his person which inspired
the troops at their outset." * The news of
ToUenstein and the final rupture of the negotia-
tion with Austria (August 15) at length forced
Frederic into action. Unless he now took the
initiative the position must become one of
stalemate. So long as Kaiser Joseph and
Laudon could pivot their forces round the two
points of Turnau and Arnau, the Austrians
had the advantage of interior lines ; their
two armies were safe until the hinge between
these two points was broken down. As Prince
Henry had declined to cross the Iser to seize
Turnau, Frederic must seize Arnau — the

* S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 102, Berlin, Hugh Elliot to SuSolk,
December 1, 1778 ; vide also vol. 103, ih. to ib. January 12, 1779. In
each case Elliot's accounts are based on reports of participants in
the campaign. Until the end of 1778 his knowledge of the campaign
had been small ; vide Minto, Memoir of Hugh Elliot, p. 164.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 189

weakest point of tlie Austrian lines — or abandon
the campaign. To Fi'eclevic, tlie forcer of so
many lines, the victor over so piany odds, delay
in the field had always been distasteful. But
though he now (August 15) decided to move, it
was not with the old matchless rapidity and
energy. He moved cautiously and slowly,
very careful of his laurels and (in a nobler wise)
careful also of the lives of his mcn.^" But
that proud confidence in himself which had led
him to so many triumphs or* sacrifices in the
past was no longer with him.

On August 15 Frederic encamped at Burkers-
dorf not far from the historic field of Sohr,
where long ago he had beaten the Austrians
by the happiest combination of daring and
fortune. The very ground rhight have given
him inspiration. On the 16t,h he thought of
forcing Arnau, writing to Prince Henry that
his move — if successful — would compel the
Austrians to evacuate their lines and fall back
on Czaslau, and that he wag almost certain
that the Kaiser's army had been forbidden to
fight (of course by Maria Theresa) so as not to
endanger Joseph's person. ^^ Frederic's move
was not unobserved, Austrian forces at Arnau
were hurriedly strengthened. Kaiser Joseph
himself came riding up to the post of danger.
Frederic saw the reinforcenicnts advancing,
judged the task too arduous, and held his hand,
writing to his brother that "this place is the

140 FREDERIC THE GREAT

most devilish of the whole neighbourhood."
Again there was manoeuvre, march and counter-
march, and on August 27 the two armies faced
one another near Oels, Frederic with 60,000,
Joseph with 70,000 well entrenched. Once
again the old King declined battle.

After these happenings there was only one
thing possible for either Prussian army. Neither
leader was willing to risk his men in any further
venture, but retreat was a sore humiliation for
both. The country could afford no further
sustenance for either army, disease was working
sad destruction, Frederic had already lost over
10,000 men by sickness or desertion.^^ In
September retreat became inevitable for both,
and in this hard decision Prince Henry again
took the lead. At the beginning of the cam-
paign Frederic had suggested that the Prince's
line of retreat should be by Leitmeritz and up
to the Elbe, thus enabling him still to live at
the enemy's expense. Later the King had
indicated the more direct retreat over Zittau
as desirable, but Prince Henry now adopted
the original suggestion. The retreat by Leit-
meritz was, to use the military term, an
eccentric one, and involved a change of base.
It had the advantage of still further exhausting
the enemy's country, of eating it bare. It
was not very hazardous in any case, and its
unusual character might deceive Laudon. On
September 10 the main force of Prince Henry

AND KAISER JOSEPH 141

began its retreat, yet, though he executed it
with skill, his movements wne not those which
should have bi-en unnoticed or unharasscd by
a leader of unshaken nerve.* There were
extraordinary difficulties to encounter; the
weather was stormy, and the roads, at no time
good, were now streaming with mud and almost
impassable, so that horses sank to the hocks
and waggons to the axle. Heavy guns fre-
quently stuck in the morasses, and the labourers
of the country-side were requisitioned to haul
them out with ropes and cart-horses, the cavalry
had to dismount and lend; their chargers.
Hundreds of putrefying horses, scores of men
dead or fallen from exposure, shattered waggons,
and abandoned weapons marked the line of
retreat. When Prince Henry; reassembled his
forces at Dresden, he found that he had lost
in the campaign, of which the most important
engagement counted 16 casualties, nearly 8000,
or about one - eighth of his complete force.
Information or presence of mind must have
been terribly lacking to Laudon at this time,
for he completely neglected the opportunity of
displaying his old vigour in harassing Prince
Henry's retreat.

The retirement of Frederic was not so
difficult, since his route was very much shorter
and more direct. It began on September 8,

• The Saxon part of the army retreated by way of Zittau, whither
Laudon followed them, thinking them the main army.

142 FREDERIC THE GREAT

but Frederic halted near Schatzlar and re-
mained there composing his ode to Voltaire,
until he received news that Prince Henry had
reached Saxony. Again the Prussian retreat
showed the same difficulties and losses in
execution, the Austrian advance the same
hesitation. Several rearguard fights took place,
in which Wurmser on the one side and Prince
Frederic - William on the other distinguished
themselves much, but, despite the entreaties of
Hussar Officers and the almost open murmurs
of his troops. Kaiser Joseph sternly forbade
all determined attempts to harass the retreat.
After all, the great general might be luring the
Austrians to their destruction, and the genius
loci was unfavourable in a neighbourhood
where the Prussian King had vanquished
Austrian armies in the past. The terrible
renown of Frederic, garnered on a hundred
fields, still protected him in failure as it had
once done in success.

Though some of the troops murmured at the
close of the campaign, it was no small triumph
for an Austrian army, unaided by any other
Power, to have rendered it impossible for the
greatest of living generals to winter either of
his armies in Bohemia. During all the wars
of the last forty years Austria had never by
herself forced an enemy to evacuate her
territory in the first year of invasion. Kaiser
Joseph perhaps did not think of this feat as

AND KAISER JOSEPH 148

a triumph, for he was ahiiost in despair at the
cruel svifferings inflieted on the pc asants in tiie
country oeeupied by tlie Prussians. In the
matter of requisitions Prince Henry and his grim
brother "did not their work neghgently." "
But, deeply as Joseph felt for his peasants, it
may be doubted whether tlieii- sufferings were
not avenged by the blow to Frederic's military
renown. As. with curses on his lips and rage in
his heart, the old King turned- his back upon
Bohemia, he at least had lost much of what
was as dear to him as was his cottage to a
Czechish peasant. He who had always been
first in the field and famed fdr his lightning
speed in action had at last been brought to a
standstill by the pupils of Daun, that general
he had so often derided and defeated. The
astonishment of the world was immense, the
Arnau-Jaromer lines anticipated Valmy, and
first taught Europe that Prussian grenadiers
could be resisted.

Skirmishes of one kind or another went on
through the winter, and till tlie beginning of
March of the next year, but for all practical
purposes the war ended with the retreat of
Frederic from Bohemia. It is. not altogether
easy to criticize the chief movements of the
campaign because so little was actually accom-
plished. The initial blunder seems to have
been made by Frederic in dividing his two
armies in about equal parts. The result was

144 FREDERIC THE GREAT

that both he and Prince Henry were opposed
by armies whose numerical strength was almost
on an equality, while they had the great addi-
tional advantage of acting upon interior lines.
By a brilliant manoeuvre Prince Henry suc-
ceeded in turning Laudon's flank and forcing
him back on the Iser, but even this stroke did
not relieve the pressure on Frederic or deprive
the Austrian armies of their advantages of
position. The fact is that Frederic's original
plan seems to have been based on the idea that
one part of the Austrian force intended to ad-
vance on Lusatia — and so to threaten Berlin.^*
To prevent this design he sent Prince Henry
into Saxony with a sufficiently strong force to
take them in flank. It was not till after the
opening of the campaign that Frederic dis-
covered his mistake and found the main
Austrian army entrenched within a few miles
of the Silesian frontier, instead of dispersed
over a line from Koniggratz to Moravia. As
he very early discovered the difficulty of forcing
the lines at Arnau, his only real chance would
have been either to effect a formidable diversion
in Moravia, or to spur Prince Henry on to
further efforts against Laudon. Eventually
he did neither, he sent only detachments to
Moravia and good advice to Prince Henry.

In spite of his briUiant exploit Prince Henry
is really open to some criticism, for Laudon's
orders for evacuating the Iser line on August 29

AND KAISER JOSEPH 145

show that a bold offensive on his part
would have been succissful. If Laudon had
been foreed from the Iser, the position of
Kaiser Joseph at Arnau-Jaromcr would have
become untenable, and deeisive results for
Prussia must certainly have followed. The
risk in such a move is admitted, but it was the
risk that a commander of genius would have
taken. The difference between the ideas of
Prince Henry and Frederic on such a question
are admirably seen in a correspondence be-
tween them in January 1779. Prince Henry
then remonstrated with Frederic on some of
the dispositions for the coming campaign as
rash, calling up precedents of the fatal temerity
of Villeroi at Ramillies, of Cumberland at
Eontenoy, and of the Austriaij Prince Charles
at that victoire la plus inoiiie of Leuthen.
Frederic replied tartly that it was not rashness
but bad dispositions of troops or bad choice
of ground which made these cpmmanders fail.
"La guerre et la nobless (sic) ne vont pas en-
semble ; quiconque n'cntreprend rien aprds
avoir bien refl^chi sur sa besogn.e, ne sera jamais
qu'un pauvre sire. Voila ce que nous dit
Texp^rience et I'histoire de toiites les guerres.
C'est un grand jeu dc hazard, oh celui qui calcule
le mieux gagne k la langue." * The two letters
outline sharply tlie difference between a general

• SchOning, pp. 252, 254. Letter of Trince Henry, February 17,
of Frederic, February 10.

146 FREDERIC THE GREAT

of talent and one of genius. It would be diffi-
cult to better Frederic's teaching, but in this
campaign the leader had done nothing at all,
and Prince Henry had won fresh laurels, though
he had declined to make just that last bid for
victory which would have given him immortal
fame. He had not done what Frederic would
infallibly have done, had he been in his place
and a few years younger. Frederic now was
content to utter wise military saws after the
time for decisive action had passed.

But if Frederic was no longer the Frederic
of Leuthen, still less had Laudon proved the
Laudon of Kunersdorf. Always a little un-
certain, Laudon had now been almost con-
temptible, and no one can be surprised at the
comparative neglect into which he fell for a
decade. Maria Theresa had e-^en wished to dis-
miss him, but this action had been prevented
by Kaiser Joseph.^^ Prince Henry alone of
the old heroes of the Seven Years' War had
enhanced his reputation. Never losing a
chance, nor risking too much, this man of
exquisite talent had outshone the two men of
genius. As for Lascy and Kaiser Joseph their
parts had been simple but creditable enough,
and if they were no more than respectable
tacticians they had proved at least excellent
administrators. The troops had been well
organized and handled, the provisions good,
the entrenchments strong, the enemy's loss

AND KAISER JOSEPH 147

must have been \vtll over 20,000 nun. For all
this the main credit rests with Lasey, but some-
thing also falls to the Kaiser, until then untried
in the Beld.i* However muek he deferred to
the judgment of Lasey in militalry affairs, Joseph
could not, from his very nature, be a mere cipher,
and, in any case, he had done much to restore
the nerve of Laudon at the critical moment
after ToUenstein, and shown discretion and
judgment by insisting upon the' retention of the
Iser and of Turnau. That he was over-anxious
about exposing the homesteads of his peasants
and the persons of his soldiers to danger was
an amiable weakness, which is explained by his
regard for the welfare of both.*' Moreover,
even though the army grumbled at the close
of the campaign, Joseph had done much to
break the tradition of Austrian defeat and to
restore the military spirit. If he feared to ex-
pose his men, he at least did not fear to expose
himself, and when men saw a Kaiser sleeping
on the bare ground covered only with a cloak,
found him fraternizing with his men and some-
times sharing their food, or saw him riding
boldly where bullets were whistling, their
general feeling was voiced by the soldier's
utterance, " Why should I fear when the crown
of my sovereign is as exposed as my cap ? " *
On the whole the campaign well earned its

• Of. a similar saying of Josepii's ofQcet'i about their Kaiser's
conduct under fire in this campaign in Calonnc, Notes sur la vie de
Joaei II, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 27,487.

148 FREDERIC THE GREAT

nickname of the Potato or Plum War, because
the soldiers of each side devoted more time to
stealing and deserting than to fighting, and
Joseph spoke with as much truth as wit when
he said in August, " The King of Prussia stays
here to forage and I to recruit." It is the
classic instance of the war of positions, of
manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre. None the
less it was destructive to the Prussian army,
and, though no battles were fought, the story
of Prince Henry's bold seizure of Tollenstein
and the mystery of Frederic's inaction are well
worthy of military study. It is the more to be
regretted that Laudon's superb intuition at
the beginning of the campaign' was not put into
practice. His design to join forces and crush
Frederic in the early days of the campaign was
a dazzling opportunity, but, considering all,
perhaps one which the cautious Lascy and the
Kaiser were right to reject. When had Frederic
ever cared till now for superiority of numbers,
above all, what reinforcement to the Prussian
army was the renown of Frederic himself at
the beginning of this campaign ? Napoleon
estimated his personal presence on the battle-
field as equal to a reinforcement of 40,000
men, and the cautious Wellington endorsed
this view.i* When one remembers how often
Frederic had triumphed over odds, how his
name was one of fear to all Austrians and of
pride to all Prussians, it seems hard to estimate

AND KAISER JOSEPH 149

it at much less. At least, at the beginning
of the campaign his soldiers would not have
done so, when they leaincd that battle was at
hand, and watched the old King riding down
the lines in his faded blue aind red uniform,
the bent figure still firm in the saddle, the
famous crook-stick in his hand, and the thin old
eagle-face once more alight with the glow of
battle.

Prince Henry had done enough in this
campaign, King Frederic far more than enough
in a score of others, for the assurance of their
renown, and for them were to be no more the
chances of defeat or of victory: For Lascy and
Kaiser Joseph, as by a sort of tragic retribution
for their momentary success, the near future
held military disgrace and shame. As for
Laudon, the man of genius ^hose reputation
had sunk most in this campaign, he was to
know once more the joy of battle and the rap-
ture of victory, and gloriously to redeem his
fame. Ten years from now, when Austria's
hopes were at their lowest, and when his head
was already white, Laudon was to rival the
most famous exploit of Euge,ne, and to enter
Belgrade amid the thunder of guns and the
triumphant shouts of his soldiers. Te Deums
in countless churches, the prayers and the
blessings of thousands were t6 be his, and the
humbled and dying Joseph was to salute him
as the Generalissimo of all his armies. But

VI

A XEUTRAL STATE IN AN EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY WAR

BAVARIA DURING AND AFTER THE WAR

(1778-1779)

Der Ehre schhne GBtUrlust,

Die, wie ein Meteor, verschwindet.

Goethe.
Honour's godlike joy.
The meteor that a moment dances.

The story of Bavaria from December 30, 1777,
to the Peace of Teschen is the story of her
Elector Karl Theodor, whose shifts, turns,
and doublings exhibit the hapless condition of
a minor state and ruler when forced into the
current of great events by thte action of great
Powers. The diplomatic morallity of an age is
most apparent in the treatment accorded to
minor states, for a great state always has some
claim to justice because it has some show of
force behind its pretensions. In the eighteenth
century the ruler of a minor state found it
difficult to retain his own conscience, or to
hold any one else to an obligation ; and ever

since December 30, 1777, the impossibility of

101

152 FREDERIC THE GREAT

doing either of these things had become
apparent to Karl Theodor.

Though destiny was to expose him to the
ridicule of mankind, Karl Theodor was not
without merits either as a man or as a sovereign.
His portrait shows his character — ^the forehead
high, the nose hooked and prominent, a chin
coarse and sensual, but redeemed by a tolerably
firm mouth and by sharp kindly eyes which
peep from beneath high black brows. His
face is the very image of an artistic epicurean,
who took life easily and yet like Chesterfield
could be serious when occasion demanded.
Though his supper-parties were as gay as those
of Louis Quinze, though his admirers called
him " the first cavalier in the Holy Roman
Empire," he was no trifler in the science of
government or in the patronage of the arts.
He had introduced business methods and strict
supervision into the finances of the Palatinate,
and was a methodical and skilful administrator.
He had devoted the money thus saved to
industry, to learning, and to the arts. He had
encouraged commerce by cutting canals, by
improving the roads and by starting a porcelain
factory. He was himself well read in the
classics, the patron of such men as Lessing and
Schiller, the devoted friend of learning, and the
founder of an Academy of Science and Literature
at Mannheim (1766). As Heidelberg had been
ruined by the wars, he had fixed his capital at

AND KAISER JOSEPH 158

Mannheim, whicli he etnbcllislied with line
buildings, and sought to nmi<c' the home of the
arts and the Athens of the Rhine. Landseape
gardens, pictures and statuary abounded in
the capital, but it was for music that it was
most renowned. The opera was famous, the
ballet and the orchestra were the best in
Germany, and both owed nearly everything
to the personal supervision and support of
Karl Theodor. lie was a weU-read, polished
and refined man of the world, and though a
strict Catholic by no means a bigot. His sub-
jects had long ago acknowledged their obliga-
tions to his learning and taste, and he had
certainly governed the Palatinate with more
discrimination and success than Max Joseph
had achieved in Bavaria.^ In foreign policy
both princes were ineffective, but it is an irony
of history that the internal policy of the last
Bavarian Wittelsbach should be acknowledged
as admirable, \\ hile that of hi.s able and more
cultured successor is forgotten or denounced.

\Miatever had been the abilities or character
of Karl Theodor, his situation after December
30, 1777, was one in which ev^en the profound
politician might have failed. His choice lay
between a balance of opposite humiliations.
There was the menace of Austria on one side,
on the other that of Zweibriicken — backed by
Frederic. Worst of all, each side had incriminat-
ing documents by which they could publicly

154 FREDERIC THE GREAT

prove his duplicity ; in particular Zweibriicken
had a whole array of family compacts and
agreements by which he could establish that
Karl Theodor had sworn to keep Bavaria
indivisible. In 1766, 1771, 1774, as also in
connection with the will of Max Joseph, Karl
Theodor had solemnly pledged himself to the
late Elector in writing not to alienate or cede
any part of Bavaria — when he inherited it.
On August 5, 1777, Karl Theodor had made
a similar written agreement with Zweibriicken,
in which each party agreed to do nothing with-
out the other. Immediately afterwards Karl
Theodor began secretly negotiating with Kaiser
Joseph and Kaunitz in an exactly opposite
sense.^ The death of Max Joseph revealed
these numerous perjBidies. On December 30,
1778, Karl Theodor's representative at Munich
made a solemn oath and proclamation that his
master would accept the Bavarian heritage
undivided. Four days afterwards his repre-
sentative at Vienna signed an equally solemn
agreement with Kaunitz to divide it and to
cede a third of that heritage = to Austria, On
January 4 Karl Theodor arrived in Munich
and was invested with the whole Bavarian
heritage, which he swore to keep intact. On
January 14, after a show of reluctance, he
agreed to divide it by ratifying the Austrian
Partition-Treaty. On January 15, Austrian
troops invaded Bavaria without meeting any

AND KAISER JOSEPH 155

resistance from his soldiers. J^lumours of tfu-
Partition -Treaty (details of which were not
public till the third week of February) had
greatly excited the people in Munich. Even
that pitiful mediaeval shadow, the Committee
of the Estates, remonstrated with the new
ruler, and scathing pasquinades attacked his
ministers as well as the Emperor, whose slave
Karl Theodor appeared to b6. When he ac-
cepted the Golden Fleece from Kaiser Joseph,
it was regarded as the badge? of disgrace and
the price of treachery. Despite severe punish-
ments the satires redoubled, and at least one
really humorous piece of doggerel appeared :

" In other times the woolly Fleece
AY as profit to the Shearer,
The Sheep from Shearer gains increase
In our quite novel era."

One of Karl Theodor' s first measures had
been to expel almost all the Bavarian ministers
and introduce Palatine ones, the chief being
Vieregg, a man of whom " even his friends
rather choose to dwell upon the praise of
his private virtues than public capacity." *
Neither such measure nor such ministers
were calculated to win Bavarian hearts, Karl
Theodor's unpopularity was unhappily pro-
moted as much by his good actions as by his

* Vieregg appears to have been appointed by Karl Theodor to the
direction of his foreign policy, becmiBc he was a pliant man who could
be easily coatrolJed ; vide Karl Obscr, MitI, fUr Ost, Gcsclt. Bd. xviii.
489, xix. 844.

156 FREDERIC THE GREAT

bad ones. He had brought with him De
Hompeche, who was made President of the
Chamber of Finances. This individual was
" said to have merit as a Financier, he was
soon proved to possess all the unfeelingness
of one ... by his little menagement of indi-
viduals in the regulations which have taken
place. Reforms without doubt were necessary,
but they might have been made with a more
distinguishing hand. Many Families being now
reduced to Misery ; the Pensions granted by
the late Elector to some of his Favourites with-
drawn, and even those given to the Natural
Children of the Emperor Charles VII. greatly
diminished." * Considering that Karl Theodor
had bartered a third of Bavaria for a pension
to his own bastards, it was unfeeling to be
niggardly to those of his predecessors. Further
projects for a more equitable scheme of taxa-
tion thoroughly alarmed the nobles of Bavaria,
who were to be made to share some of the
financial burdens with the people. Even the
people were not conciliated, because they were
threatened with a system of universal military
service. So great was the alarm occasioned
by these wider plans that even trifling reforms
were viewed with suspicion. An effort to
reform the discipline of the troops caused
frequent desertions and general dissatisfaction.

* Quoted from S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. .113, Munich,
January 22, 25, 29, February 12, 22, April 23 ; Ratisbon, July 10.
Eden to Suffolk.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 157

Discontent was apparent cvcFywhcre, and the
national and popular rtscntnvnt at I5;ivaria's
humiliation was greater than could have been
imagined.*

Unfortunately for Karl Theddor his arbitrari-
ness at ^Munich could not conceal his subservi-
ence at Vienna, and even the rhost unobservant
noted his deference to the Imperial Commissary.
Kaiser Joseph had indeed sent him the Order
of the Golden Floccc, but otherwise treated him
with great contempt. Joseph, began by viol-
ating the Treaty of January 3, and sending
Austrian troops into parts of the Bavarian
territories not ceded in that agreement. In
February he for a moment showed a desire
for still more ambitious projects of exchange
than that in the Partition- Treaty, and dangled
before Karl Theodor's eyes the prospect of a
crown and kingdom in Galicia, in return for
further Bavarian territory to Austria. When
this scheme dropped, the Kaiser, who had pre-
viously guaranteed neutrality to Karl Theodor
in case of war, actually tried to force him
to join Austria at the end of April. This
proposal was more than eveft Karl Theodor
could endure, and he refused in spite of the
severe pressure which was put upon him.
Perhaps he was not altogether uninfluenced
by the fact that his soldiers, would probably
have refused to fight for the Austrians.*

Karl Theodor quite realized the importance

158 FREDERIC THE GREAT

of gaining over his nephew and heir, Charles
of Zweibriicken, to his Partition- Treaty. Ac-
cordingly on January 22 he wrote a private
letter to the Duke of Zweibriicken, informing
him that he had done the best he could for
the honour of himself and the safety of his
country, and that, in accepting the Treaty
of January 3, he had yielded to superior force.
With a judicious disregard of the pensions to
his bastards, he declared that he had paid more
attention to the common interest than to his
own, and finally urged his nephew to forgive
him.* It remained to be seen whether his
nephew would accept this explanation.

A great deal of high policy was now to depend
upon the decision of an obscure country squire,
whose chief occupation was hunting, and who
ruled a territory no bigger than an English
estate. Zweibriicken had his own plenipoten-
tiaries with the great Powers, and his favour
was courted by three great sovereigns. It was
to the King of France that he inclined, for a
long residence in that country had made him
an ape of its methods and ideas. He wished
to turn Zweibriicken into a miniature Versailles,
and had chosen a petty Du Barry for himself in
the shape of Madame d'Esebeck, the wife of his
chief adviser. He copied Lo,uis XV. both in
vice and in extravagance, and for the last
reason became not only the imitator but the
pensioner of France. The receipt of an annual

AND KAISER JOSEPH 159

income from Louis X\'I. of 300,000 livres made
him a political as woU as a financial subordinate.
But, though idle and extravagant, he was not
entirely contemptible. His portraits show a
stout, dark-t, yed man, with a sensitive mouth
and chivalrous bearing. He; was admitted
to have a sense of honour that was high in that
age, and he was to show considerable firmness
in the crisis.

The news of Max Joseph's dekth reached him
on January 31, 1778, while out hunting at
Zweibriicken, but he did not immediately
come to Munich, The initiative was taken
by the all-observant Frederic, who at once sent
off an emissary (Count Eustace Goerz) first
to Munich to see Karl Theodor and, if possible,
to wean him from Austria. If that scheme
failed Goerz was to work on the elements of
opposition in Munich, and to use every effort
to prevent Zweibriicken acceding to the Parti-
tion-Treaty. Goerz divided his time between
Regensburg and Munich. In the latter city he
found a congenial ally in Maria Anna, the
Dowager Duchess of Bavaria, who had been
bitterly opposed to any partition of the country,
and was ready to use any means to defeat
and discredit Karl Theodor.** She possessed

• This Dowager Duchess is not to be confounded with Max
Joseph's widow, the Dowager Electress. Maria Anna was a daughter
of the Palsgrave Karl von Sulzbach, and had married (act. 15) Duke
Clement of Bavaria. The latter had been, nearest heir of Max
Joseph, but had died in 1770 at the early age of forty-one.

160 FREDERIC THE GREAT

valuable advisers in three Bavarian patriots,
Andre, her confidant, and Obermayer and Lorij,
who were both Privy Councillors. These com-
municated much secret intelligence to Goerz,
which was of the greatest value to him at this
crisis.^

On February 6 Goerz suddenly returned to
Munich incognito, and took up his residence
in a summer-house in the grounds of the
Duchess. That evening he held a secret con-
sultation with her and with Zweibriicken, who
had just arrived in the capital. On February 7
Zweibriicken, primed by their instructions,
went to see Karl Theodor at his palace, and
discussed the Partition- Treaty in the presence
of the Austrian minister Lehrbach. The inter-
view was satisfactory to neither party, and on
February 8 Goerz, from his hiding-place, wrote
exultantly to the Dowager that Zweibriicken
was safe, and would do nothing without consent
of France or Frederic. Events followed fast ;
on February 14 Zweibriicken politely declined
the Golden Fleece, which Kaiser Joseph had
sent him ; on the 28th he definitely refused to
sign the Partition- Treaty.* Early in March he
submitted a lengthy appeal to the Diet, in
which he proved that Karl Theodor had been
false to four separate agreements, that the

* On the day before (February 27) Zweibriicken had received a
friendly letter from Louis XVI., confirmingihim in his resolution and
promising the continuance of his pension. Cp. Reimann, Preuss,
Gesch. ii. 74-75.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 161

Partition-Tivaty was in defiance of the peace of
Wcstplialia, and lliat the Kniyer was ossailing
the liberties and riglits of Ilavavia. On Mareh
16, in full session of the Germanic Diet, King
Frederic added to Zweibriiclien's claim the
formal weight of his authority and the real
support of his sword.''

As has already been described, the effect of
these manoeuvres was to give the complete
moral victory to Frederic. During the summer
this advantage was mercilessly pressed home
by the Bavarian Dowager, by Frederic, and by
Zweibriicken, who incessantly itispired Bavarian
discontent with Karl Theodor, and sent anti-
Austrian pamphlets and protests to the Diet,
The account of these communications may
be shortly summarized. In December 1778
Frederic published a copy of the secret letter
of Karl Theodor of January 22, 1778, to
Zweibriicken (in which he admitted that he
had signed the Treaty of January 3, 1778,
under compulsion). An even more deadly
blow was dealt on the advice of the Dowager
and her Bavarian councillors. Austria claimed
Lower Bavaria in virtue of Albprt's Investiture
of 1126. Frederic now published to the Diet
that Albert had formally reno\|nced this claim
in 1429, and that the original Act of Renuncia-
tion still existed. If it did n©t, Zweibriicken
asserted that the Austrians had destroyed it.
This was a bombshell. It was in vain that the

M

162 FREDERIC THE QREAT

Austrian ministers shuffled and declared at the
Diet that the Act of Renunciation was a
forgery. The Dowager Duchess and her ad-
visers had plausible proofs that the Act had
existed : two highly respectable witnesses were
brought forward by them to swear to its exist-
ence, or at any rate to the existence of authentic
copies but a few years before. Clear evidence
was advanced to show that the archives at
Munich had been badly kept of recent years,
and strong suspicion was levelled against
Austrian diplomats of having purloined or
destroyed the original document. Heathcote
did not scruple to suggest that Austria would
have purloined the original if it had been
to advantage ; Suffolk, with less insinua-
tion, mildly described the Prussian arguments
as " unanswerable ".* ® Unquestionably, the
Dowager and her advisers had worked behind
the scenes with deadly effect. Throughout the
whole period Zweibriicken stood firm claiming
his inalienable rights, while Frederic's repre-
sentatives at the Diet and in the press brought
forward their solemn and convincing proofs
of the utter worthlessness of Austria's claims,
impugned her good faith, and injured her
reputation. All the evidence was not mar-
shalled till the beginning of 1779, but in the
first half of 1778 there was already enough to

* S.PJ'. Archives, vol. 45, Ratisbon, July 26, Axigust 5, 23,
September 6, 13, 23, Heathcote to Fraser.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 168

bring deep discredit alike upon Karl Thcodor
and Kaiser Joseph. On October 21, 1778, the
Russian Ambassador at Vienna dared to tell
Prince Kaunitz that the RusSian Government
adhered solely " k I'opinion g6n6ralemcnt re-
pandue et accr^dit^e du peu de validity des
pretentions de la Cour de Vienne." * The
Dowager had aimed her shaft well.

It is time to return to Karl] Theodor. Diffi-
culties of all kinds threatened the hapless
Elector, nor is it at all surprising that he proved
unequal to the crisis. Even Morton Eden,
forbidden by the " respect due from individuals
to persons of his elevated rank " to coincide
in the many censures passed on his conduct,
could not find that in a " political light " his
character bore " any marks of qualities either
good or striking." Under the stress of his
anxiety the spirits of poor Karl Theodor had
already given way by April 23,; 1778 ; he " grew
pale and his legs swelled." By November 1
not only " his body but his le'gs and his hands
considerably swelled." [Truly a plague of
sorrow and sighing it blows a man up like a
bladder.] " He shows an ajv-ersion to busi-
ness (which yet he formerly loved) ... he
is haunted by a perpetual anxiety ; ... he
drinks every evening to excess." It is small
wonder that he sought to dissipate his cares,
but it is rather surprising that at this stage

♦ Martens, Sbomik, IxV. 76.

164 FREDERIC THE GREAT

there should have come to him " a kind of
dawning conviction that he has acted with
imprudence and precipitation, if not even with
weakness and impropriety." " His Electoral
Highness appears to regret the lost affections
and confidence of his subjects, he finds himself
coldly served by his ministers ; and, above all,
he is said to be extremely concerned at that
silent contempt, with which he is treated by
the very Monarch (Frederic), who has drawn
the sword in his cause,* By this last circum-
stance he is more particularly affected, as it is
not alleviated by any attention shown either
to his person or sentiments (eVen at this critical
conjuncture) by the other Powers of Europe.
I am assured, that he has very lately in con-
fidence complained of this neglect with great
bitterness, adding these strong expressions :
' Je ne desire pas mieux, que de sortir de
I'embaras [sic], oh je me trouve — mais que
faire ? on me laisse seuL' This article of being
left alone (by which His Electoral Highness
means the not having any foreign minister near
him to whom he could explain himself, and who
should be authorized to hear him), joined to the
impolitic insolence of behaviour adopted by

* Frederic's comment to Goerz was, " Quaut k I'EIeoteur Palatin,
il faut I'abandonner entiferement h, son sort, p'est son propre ouvrage
. . . apr^s I'extreme foiblesse qu'il a eue de se laisser emb6guiner
par la Cour de Vienne, ce, seroit [sic] peine perdue que de vouloir
seulement tenter de la ramener." — February 12, 1778, Goerz, M^.
Hist. Frankfort, 1812, p. 109.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 165

the Austrian minister (Lehrbach) at Munich,
has principally contributed to o\Kn his eyes
to the error of his conduct. Add to all this,
that the total disregard paid by the Imperial
Court to his repeated representations relative
to the one and twenty bailliagcs (the keeping
possession whereof is a manifest injustice even
upon the principles of the Treaty of the 3rd of
January) has made him tremble for the certainty
of that establishment of his natural children, to
secure which was perhaps one of his principal
motives, which induced him to sign it. I ought
not to omit remarking, that it is on this side
undoubtedly, that the Elector Palatine is the
most vulnerable ; and the only person, to
whom, during my stay at Munich I saw him
address himself with any appearance of pleasure,
was his (illegitimate) daughter the Princess
Isembourg." * The whole scene would be one
of comedy were it not for a certain pathos
running through it, which makes it a classical
illustration of the way in which great Powers
may deprive small states andt their rulers first
of territory, then of dignity, and last of respect.
After operations in the field closed in-
decisively in September 1778, Kaiser Joseph
sought help on every side for the ensuing
campaign of 1779. Accordingly, in the third
week of November Lehrbach, the Imperial

* S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. 110, Eden to Suffolk, July
10, 1778. S.P.P. For. Arch. Bavaria, vol. 45, Ratisbon, November
8, 1778, Heathcote to Fraser.

166 FREDERIC THE GREAT

minister at Munich, again renewed the question
of Bavaria's neutrality and tried to force the
Elector to depart from it. Lehrbach's argu-
ments were of the simplest. He produced
statistics (not in point of fact accurate) to
show that in the coming campaign Prussian
forces would be greater than those of Austria,
ergo Bavaria must join the Igitter and violate
her neutrality. This demand Karl Theodor
had again firmness enough to refuse, but
Lehrbach then pressed him to vote in the forth-
coming Diet against the reunion of Ansbach
to Prussia. To this request the Elector at
first yielded.' Then after consideration he
began to doubt, he had already repented his
partiality to Austria, and now she was evidently
weaker than before. At last he came under the
influence of better counsels, of the polite Vieregg
who had at length become anti- Austrian,
and of Kreittmayr the Chancellor, who had
always held these views, though he had been
afraid to express them until now. Finally,
Karl Theodor revised his decision, and informed
Lehrbach, with some firmness, that he would
take his own course without previous engage-
ment or pledge.

Though he had not been free from vacillation
or weakness even in this last negotiation, Karl
Theodor emerged from it without much loss.
He had only broken one promise, had shown
relative dignity, and for a moment must have

AND KAISER JOSEPH 167

enjoyed an unwonted feeling of self-respect.
But the negotiations for pcauc, which bcTfaii
to be seriously discussid at the end of I lie ycai-,
forced him in the end to drjnk even deeper
draughts from the cup of humiliation than those
to which his misfortunes had driven him of
evenings. His conviction that he had been
the dupe of Austria led him to play a more
independent part ; he succeeded only in making
an original and characteristic" though by no
means an impressive, appearance. First of all
his representative arrived at Teschen without
powers and instructions, and the whole Peace
Conference was kept waiting' while a special
courier was despatched to Munich to procure
them. The instructions which arrived were
startling enough, because they contained Karl
Theodor's refusal to satisfy the allodial claims
of Saxony by a payment of four million florins,
and asserted that he would not pay more than
one million. This resolution very nearly broke
the Congress, because Frederic thought that
Karl Theodor took this bold stand with the
collusion of Austria, and possibly of France.
The chancelleries were alarmed, peace hovered
in the balance, and Frederic despatched a
courier to Vienna demanding a categorical
answer as to whether or no the Viennese Court
would guarantee the Saxon claims to the four
millions. Their Imperial Majesties at Vienna
replied evasively to Frederic, approving though

168 FREDERIC THE GREAT

not guaranteeing the Saxon claim, and de-
cisively dissociating themselves from any
concert with Karl Theodor. The last part of
this answer sufficed once again to discredit
the unfortunate Elector. For a moment he
had impressed the Congress, because it was
thought that one, or even two, great Powers
stood behind him. Directly it was realized
that only his own opposition was in question
he was disregarded.^"

The difficulty, which was raised by Karl
Theodor in this case, was probably due to the
fact that he had not been sufficiently consulted
in the settlement of the preliminaries, in which
there was another article that he was prepared
hotly to contest with his nephew of Zweibriicken.
This was the arrangement by which Austria
yielded up her pretensions to Bavaria, on
condition of the cession of Burghausen to her.
As Karl Theodor had signed an agreement in
1778 to cede one-third of Bavaria to Austria
it seems a little difficult to see why he should
refuse to sign one in 1779 which ceded only
one-sixth of his territory. His heir, the Duke
of Zweibriicken, had indeed more reason for his
protest and his indignation, and the Duchess
Dowager of Bavaria now advised him to refuse
consent to the cession of Burghausen and
appealed to France. Zweibriicken's friends
drew up a plan to regulate, his conduct at
Teschen, which described Karl Theodor as

AND KAISER JOSEPH 169

the slave of Austria, nnd insistnl on tlic in-
divisibility of Bavaria. The* paper was sent
by Zwoibriickcn to the Freiich and Russian
reprcscntativis at the Congress. Both replied
evasively, advising him to " apply to the
Elector Palatine for some gratilieation, by way
of indenmifying tlie loss, "\\*hich a country,
where His Highness was the presumptive Heir,
was going to suffer by the Cession to be made
to the House of Austria : promising in case of
necessity , . . mediation and support " ! The
Duke decided to ask Karl Theodor for the
Principalities of Neuburg and Sulzbach, " or,
if that was thought too exorbitant . . . the
sum of 300,000 German Crowns, and demanded
these by a Courier who arrived in Munich
on April 6th." " The Elector received this
despatch whilst at dinner, and, for the first
time throughout the whole business of the
Bavarian Succession, betraydd strong marks
of surprise and indignation." His nephew had
already plagued and insulted him sufficiently,
and poor Karl Theodor seems to have thought
it the worst insult of all, that,the Duke — after
objecting to a division of Bavaria among
foreigners — should wish to divide it among
legitimate kinsmen. At any rate he returned,
the very same afternoon, in a; letter "couched
in language sufficiently warm, a flat and
positive refusal to comply with so unreasonable
and ill-timed a request." "

170 FREDERIC THE GREAT

Karl Theodor was in future so indignant
with Zweibrucken that it was thought extremely
probable that, despite all his numerous pledges
to the contrary, he might '"' dismember the
remainder of the Bavarian Succession in favour
of his illegitimate children." So Zweibrucken
spared no pains to get an article inserted in the
Treaty of Teschen, which would bind the
elastic Karl Theodor to fulfil the pledges of
the Pacts of 1767, 1771, and 1774, and leave
his estate indivisible. This object he eventu-
ally attained, and an article to that effect was
inserted in the Treaty, ^^ so that even if Karl
Theodor broke his thrice - pledged word, he
could be brought to order by the two foreign
guarantors of the Peace of Teschen, and by the
Germanic Diet as a whole. Such an obligation
even Karl Theodor was unable to elude, and
the solemn treaty compulsion laid upon him
yet one more humiliation. It had needed all
the German States and two foreign Powers to
reconcile the two kinsmen to" an arrangement
to which they had both agreed on August 5,
1771. Never was there greater justification
of Swift's savage epigram : " Alliance by blood
or marriage is a frequent cause of war between
princes, and the nearer the kindred the greater
is their disposition to quarreL"

After the end of the negotiations at Teschen
it might have been thought that the Elector
would sink into insignificance, but he was

AND KAISER JOSEPH 171

destined, for a moment, again to startle the
diplomatic world. In June 1779 the great
Powers learnt with astonishment that three
distinguished Bavarians had been seized, and
imprisoned under the authority of lettres de
cachet issued by Karl Theodor." Of these
Andr^, the special confidant and friend of the
Dowager Duchess of Bavaria,- was conducted
as a prisoner of state to the castle of Rothen-
burg ; Obermayer and Lorij, also her advisers
and both Privy Councillors, were deprived of
their rank and emoluments, their papers seized,
and the one exiled to Ambej-g, the other to
Xeuburg. All Munich was thrown into con-
sternation and alarm by this act, and Prussia
immediately and peremptorily remonstrated.
However, for once Karl Theodor stood on firm
ground; he was not to be intimidated, and
treated Frederic's angry rerhonstrance with
indifference. He punished the three offenders
in question, because they had principally con-
tributed to the discrediting of Austria's claim to
that part of Bavaria ceded to her in his Treaty
of January 3, 1778. It was they also who had
ehcouxaged Zweibriicken in his attitude of
stern and steady condemnation. One of the
many ironies which befell Karl Theodor was
that he was now punishing the men who had
discredited Austria in 1778, though he himself
was bitterly at variance with her in 1779. The
simple truth is that he punished somebody in

172 FREDERIC THE GREAT

order to gratify his general resentment at the
hundred humiliations to which he had been
subjected. It must have been some satisfac-
tion to him to hurt the feelings of the Dowager,
to insult Zweibriicken, and to defy King
Frederic. Towards Andre, the special con-
fidant of the Dowager Duchess, Karl Theodor
soon showed signs of relenting, perhaps from
fear of Prussia. He released him speedily, and
allowed him to go to a country house of the
Duchess near the Tyrol. However, Andre was
soon recommitted, because some of his papers
fell into the hands of Karl Theodor and re-
vealed the extent of his secret transactions.
The last mention of the fate of these men is on
September 19, 1779; Andre's sentence, it was
thought, would be irrevocable, Obermayer and
Lorij still remained in enforced banishment.*^*
Having accomplished all which Karl Theodor
set off for the Rhine, to visit his opera and
his ballet -girls at Mannheim, very glad to
leave the new dominions where he had experi-
enced so much degradation, unpopularity, and
failure.

As he left Munich for Mannheim Karl
Theodor might well have reflected upon the

* S.P.F. For. Arch. vol. 45, Heathcote to Fraser, September 19,
1779. Lorij had much to do with founding the Academy of Sciences
at Munich. After his exile, when asked by the Government to write
an historical introduction to a book on coins, he replied that he could
only do so if he consulted archives at Munich. He never saw his
beloved city again and died at Neuburg in 1787.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 178

vory singular result which his latest action
would produce upon his Bavarian subjects.
For the three men whom he hiid imprisoiird or
exiled were precisily the three most popular
men in Bavaria. They had done more than
any other Bavarians to expose the designs of
Vienna, to avert the Partition^, and to reduce
Austrian acquisitions from one-third to one-
sixth of Bavarian territory. Their reward for
these services was imprisonment, exile, or
disgrace, from the hand of one who had sacri-
ficed the interests of Bavaria to those of Palatine
bastards. To this unhappy pass was the small
state in Germany brought by the weakness of
a ruler and the injustice of the great Powers.
On the whole situation the words of the English
representative may serve as a fit comment and
conclusion, in the style of the old Greek chorus :
" Well may it therefore create just matter of
astonishment, that they, whose labours have
so principally contributed to save their country
from ruin, should meet with* a recompense,
which the rectitude of their intentions gave
them so little reason to expect."

" It is impossible to describe the consterna-
tion and discontent, which the issuing of these
lettres de cachet has occasioned at Munich. No
one is secure of his liberty a moment ; and by
a combination of circumstances, strange to
conceive, each individual feels himself obliged
to tremble for his safety, in proportion as he

174 FREDERIC THE GREAT

thinks he has discharged the duty of a faithful
servant to his Master." ^^

Any one in high position who was known to
be opposed to Karl Theodor became popular
with the Bavarians. The Dowager was saluted
as a heroine and her name was blessed through-
out the land, while her councillors became the
martyrs of the people. Zweibriicken was
praised for his firmness and applauded when-
ever he came to Munich. King Frederic even
attained the dignity of a saint in the land
which he had declared to be peopled by
fiends and swine. On one occasion the Watch
stopped and presented arms before Frederic's
picture in a shop window ; the anniversary of
his birthday was celebrated in Munich with
illuminations, dinners, and dances. Peasants
in the country erased the last name in the
famous prayer beginning, " Jesus, Maria,
Joseph" and replaced it by that of Frederic,
and prayed before his picture as before that of
the Virgin. The passionate national feeling
of the Bavarians found its output in these
strange ecstasies, because it could have no
reverence for their foreign prince, whose refined
tongue could not be reconciled to their speech,
and whose foreign policy was so ominous for
their future. It was an obvious expedient to
lay all the blame on the shoulders of Karl
Theodor. Yet this execrated ruler gave to
Munich the most beautiful of its gardens, and

AND KAISER JOSEPH 175

to Bavaria an improved system of finance and
the beginnings of a national army. But despite
everything the Bavarian people suspected, and
rightly, that Karl Theodor did not care for them,
and would exchange Bavaria for the Nether-
lands without a pang, if ever the opportunity
came. Therefore the nation loaded his name
with curses, mourned the less competent Max
Joseph as a great ruler, and made a Joan of
Arc out of Maria Anna, and a Barbarossa out
of Frederic. A score of years later, when the
hapless Karl Theodor lay gasping on his death-
bed, the churches remained empty, and the news
of his death was the signal for public rejoicings.
For it was a son of the steadfp,st Zweibriicken
who now became Elector, and who was one
day to be the first King and the most popular
ruler that the Bavarian land had known.

VII

THE PEACE OF TESCHEN AND RUSSIA'S
ENTRANCE INTO GERMANY

. (1778-1779)

Solemn Majesties all . . . on thrones rich as Ormuz with their treaties,
war-treaties . . . and finance-schemes . . . not to speak of innumer-
able little German Dukes, mith their sixteen quarterings, their stiff
Kammer Herrs and thick quilted ceremonials', — Good Heavens, they are
gone like ghosts and with an unmusical screech. — Cablyue.

To a war which had produced no decisive
results succeeded a peace which was to bring
forth many. The first essays at negotiation
had been originated by the womanly fears of
Maria Theresa, even before the war had well
begun, and with unhappy results. In the
direction and control of war those women who
have been great rulers have rarely showed to
advantage, however great their subtlety or
wisdom in time of peace. Elizabeth of England
sent at least one worthless lover to command
her armies, Catherine of Russia sent many,
Maria Theresa — no unworthy rival of either
in greatness — outdid them also in littleness.

176

FREDERIC THE GREAT 177

Having entrusted her darling son with the
command of her army, she first suggested that
it should not fight a battle so as not to endanger
his person, and then negotiated secretly behind
his back with the enemy. Criticism of Maria
Theresa's statesmanship in this or any particu-
lar might be reckless, were it hot for the fact
that she is herself her sternest, judge. In her
agonized letters to Marie Antoinette during this
time she over and over again confesses that her
mother's love, her anguish and foreboding for
the fate of Joseph and his two brothers, now
confronting the " wicked man " — " our cruel
enemy " — have completely robbed her of all
statesmanlike instincts. Her sole anxiety is
to see her darling sons safe back from the war,
and to this consideration she has sacrificed
everything. " I draw on myself the shame of
great pusillanimity — I confess it, my head
turns ; my heart is long since already
withered." * It was indeed only ten days after
the war began that she wrote with her own
hand to King Frederic, without the knowledge
of Joseph, offering terms of peace, and making
a personal appeal to his honour. It was on
July 16 that she wrote this* appeal to the
honour of one of whom she had written but two
months before (May 17) that " no prince in
Europe had escaped his perfidies." Frederic

• Maria Theresia und Marie Antoinette, Btiefwechsel von Arneth
(Paris, 1865), p. 254.

N

178 FREDERIC THE GREAT

was not unwilling to negotiate, but he was not
the man to be generous, to fail to take advantage
of divided counsels, secret negotiations, of a
mother's love or a son's ignorance. In the
interval preceding direct negotiation Prince
Henry obtained his startling success at ToUen-
stein, and Kaiser Joseph learned of Maria
Theresa's secret diplomacy with mingled wrath,
amazement, and despair. The Austrian nego-
tiator appointed to discuss definite terms with
Frederic was Baron Thugut — a favourite of
Maria Theresa's and one day to be Chancellor
of Austria — " plain, unaffected, and steady,"
said Keith, but hardly tactful enough for so
delicate a negotiation. The terms which he
eventually offered to Frederic at the conference
of Braunau (August 13-15) were that Austria
should retain a part of the Bavarian Succession
productive of about a million florins revenue
a year,* give equivalents for any further claim,
and arrange due settlement for the whole in the
Aulic Council. In return the- Austrian Court
promised to make no opposition to Frederic's
succession to the Margravates of Ansbach and
Baireuth. These proposals were not such as
Frederic was likely to favour ; he was resolved
to settle the question of the succession of
Ansbach entirely without reference to Austria.

* This was interpreted by Thugut as a line stretching from
Kufstein along the Inn to Wasserburg over Lankvat, Mildenau, and
Retz to Waldmiinchen. Possession of this territory would have
united Austria to the Tirol and Italy.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 179

It was not only that the raising of this question
was inconvenient for Prussia, but that, by
doing so, she would confess that the Bavarian
Suecossion was to be regulated, not according
to principles of law but according to the
doctrines of bargains and equivalents. There-
fore to Frederic, eitlicr as Prussian King or as
defender of the rights and liberties of the
Germanic body, this proposal was inadmissible.
As for Austria's existing claim to Bavaria,
he saw no real alteration in her demands ; she
still desired the strategic command of too large
a part of Bavaria. Last of all, being already
in the field, Frederic thought, himself justified
in insisting upon more, rather than upon less,
of his original demands.^ Accordingly, on
August 16 he broke off furtlier negotiations,
and Thugut returned to Vienna. It is by no
means clear that Frederic's action was wise,
because Austria had more to lose over the whole
matter by delay than he had. Joseph was
naturally enraged, so that it led to a breach
with his mother — " a little humour " as she very
euphemistically called it to Marie Antoinette.
The whole negotiation had been a complete
failure, and Maria Theresa bewailed in secret
to her sympathetic daughter how much this
step of directly addressing " our cruel enemy "
had cost her.*

The negotiation at Braunau, though ill-

• Maria Theresia und Marie Antoinette, Arneth, p. 258.

180 FREDERIC THE GREAT

timed and rash, marks a highly significant stage
in Austrian policy. Ever since the Partition
of Poland (1772) the influence of the unscrupu-
lous Kaunitz and the autocratic Joseph had
been the main forces in the foreign policy of
Vienna. The proceedings at the Diet of 1776,
the negotiations over the Partition-Treaty of
January 3, 1778, and the subsequent diplomacy
until the end of June evidently bear the impress
of the ruthless diplomat and the impetuous
Kaiser. Now, for the first time since 1772,
comes a revolt on the part of Maria Theresa,
and with it a return to less harsh methods,
a recognition of the moral opinion of Europe,
of the rights of treaties and obligations, which
is quite foreign to the policy which had intimi-
dated Karl Theodor. The concessions offered
and the attitude assumed at Braunau conspired
with the logic of events to support Maria
Theresa. Had France shown any desire to
assist, had Kaiser Joseph won a decisive victory
in the field, he and Kaunit:2 might have re-
covered their ascendancy, readopted their
drastic methods of settling the Bavarian Succes-
sion, and adhered to the Partition-Treaty of
January 3. The result of the campaign was
not indeed discreditable to Austria, but it was
not such as to permit her statesmen to adopt
this attitude of proud assertion. The poUcy
of force had failed, and with it. fell the Partition-
Treaty of January 3.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 181

During July, AuEfust, and September rela-
tions bctwotu Austria and Prussia liad been
fvuthcr cmbittcrt'tl by an angry wrangle at
the Diet, which had continued to sit at Regens-
burg during the war. The dispute concerned
Albert's Act of Renunciation of Lower Bavaria,
which the representatives of Austria pro-
nounced with passion to be forged, and that
of Prussia asserted, with reason, to be genuine.
After the Braunau negotiations and the in-
decisive campaign, Austrian policy entered a
new phase. The first results were secret and
were seen in an appeal to France to act as
mediator. On August 20 the Cabinet of Ver-
sailles addressed a letter to their minister (M.
Haussen) at Berlin, which outlined a scheme
and offered French mediation to secure it.*
Frederic replied unfavourably, and a month
afterwards Austria disclosed the course of
negotiations and renewed her offer to Germany
as a whole. On September 23 the members
of the Diet received a Representation and
Request from Austria. The; Imperial Court
described the Braunau negotiations, and men-
tioned their desire for a satisfactory peace,
and their willingness to submit their claims to
the judgment of the Diet. It then explained
its new proposals (which had already been
made to Prussia by French mediation). For
the sake of public tranquillity, Austria formally
renewed the offer to the Germanic Diet as a

182 FREDERIC THE GREAT

whole. The Imperial Court was ready to
restore and evacuate all Bavarian territories,
to abrogate the Partition-Treaty, provided that
there the Prussian King renounced the succes-
sion to Ansbach and Baireuth. Finally, the
Diet of the Empire was asked to interpose its
good offices to persuade Frederic to accept
these terms .^

The Josephine policy of force, which rode
roughshod over existing rights, was thus suc-
ceeded by the Theresan one of conciliation and
respect for the old order. At any rate this
was the first impression upon the members
of the Diet, All the minor states naturally
desired peace, because, so long as there was war,
their neutrality and their existence were equally
endangered. The Austrian " Representation "
now suggested to them that it was Frederic,
and not Joseph, who was now standing in the
way of peace, and therefore it was regarded
as a " Master stroke in Politicks " at Vienna,
and such for the moment and for the Diet it
was. Frederic, who had risked so much for
the general interest, now seemed to be acting
adversely to it by refusing to negotiate on these
terms. In truth he was somewhat hardly used,
for his succession to Ansbach had no direct
bearing on the Succession to Bavaria, but
Austria had manoeuvred so cleverly as to bring
it under discussion. The proposal was indeed
hardly ingenuous, because, if Frederic were

AND KAISER JOSEPH 188

induced to resign his claim to Ansbach it would
be by moral pressure, whenas, force alone had
induced the Court of Vienna to resign its eluini
to Bavaria. Frederic had sacrificed much for
the common cause, yet, if he did not give up
Ansbach, he might incur the; full odium and
blame of prolonging the war and seeking his
own ends. " After having announced himself
as the Protector and Defender of the Germanic
System, he may (over and above the expenses
he has incurred) find himself reproached, de-
serted, perhaps attacked {sic) even by his
friends, as the grand enemy and disturber of
the Publik TranquiUity." A curious reversal
had taken place in the partSk which he had
played as the Defender, and Kaiser Joseph
as the Invader, of the Rights of the Empire.*

Thus, by a clever diplomatic manoeuvre,
Austria had placed Frederic in a somewhat
dangerous situation. However, he was not
^vithout resources or sympathy,.his combinations
had already been working for his advantage,
and he was to be rescued from this quandary by
his ally, who had deserted him at the beginning
of the war. He had felt strong enough to
reject the French mediation in August, for the
French army was not to be feared. There was
only one Power in Europe which could inter-
vene with effect at the moment — a Power already
gaining vastly in importance, Still more in its
sense of importance, under the- direction of the

184 FREDERIC THE GREAT

most whimsical, vicious, and brilliant woman
then living. Catherine the Great of Russia was
herself a German princess by birth, and her
friendship and alliance with Frederic had
heightened her interest in German affairs.
During the early months of 1778 she had been
daily expecting an ultimatum from Turkey,
and therefore had neither the power nor the
desire to interfere in Germany. By the middle
of the year this danger had passed, and she
had leisure to contemplate the politics of the
West. France was now at war with England,
and therefore unable to interfere in Germany
with effect, so that a dazzling prospect opened
for Catherine. Campaign and negotiation had
each failed to produce any real change in the
balance of power between Austria and Prussia,
but, if Catherine intervened and offered her
good of&ces to bring about peace, she might
be the mediatrix of Germany and the arbitress
of the West. Half a dozen years before,
Austria and Prussia had interfered with her
regulation of Poland ; it would be a fine return
to interfere with their regulation of Germany.
The glory of the part she designed to play, the
consciousness of the strength given her, alike
by her armies, by her reputation, and by the
voices of her flatterers, strengthened her desire
for fame and her confidence of success.^

The idea of a Russian mediation had crossed
the minds of diplomatists before the outbreak

AND KAISER JOSEPH 185

of war, and, singularly enough, it had been
stimulated, perhaps even suggested, by a diplo-
matic ruse on the part of Frederic. Catherine
and her ministers had denied that the war with
Austria formed a casus joederisAn their alliance
\vith Prussia, but had openly expressed their
sympathy with Frederic's attitude in the
Bavarian question. To the general surprise
Frederic had shown himself aterse from their
interference, and had even dropped his usual
practice of communicating to them his diplo-
matic plans — more especially' those relating
to the negotiations of Bavaria.. The vanity of
Catherine, and of Count Panin IJier minister, was
stvmg by this apparent neglect and clumsiness
on the part of Frederic. In rea:lity the shrewd
old King had played a master-stroke, apparently
with full intention and calculation. His in-
attention commanded attention ; roused their
activity and directed their irnmediate glance
to Germany. In the meantime Frederic won
over to his side by many promises — and " lured "
on Prince Potemkin with the expectation of
the Duchy of Courland — the brilliant and power-
ful favourite of Catherine. Frederic had also
an ally in the Grand Duke Paul, Catherine's
son, who maintained a great admiration for
him, while the tears of the Grand Duchess, and
the persuasions of Potemkin, helped to decide
Catherine and Panin upon interference.*

The result of these manoeuvres soon ap-

186 FREDERIC THE GREAT

peared. Prince Kaunitz had been living in
a fooFs paradise, for he had been assured at
the beginning of the campaign that Russia
did not regard the Bavarian War as a casus
foederis. Hence he communicated the Repre-
sentation and Request to Petrograd, and asked
for the good offices of Russia, in conjunction
with those of France. His suggestion coincided
— or rather actually interfered — with Russia's
design for intervention, and Panin showed his
annoyance. He answered the Austrian over-
ture at first ungraciously, hinting pretty strongly
that, under certain circumstances, Russia might
become a party in the war herself.' Shortly
afterwards a corps of 30,000 Russians was
ominously moved into West Poland in the
direction of Austria. Before Kaunitz had done
wondering at this startling move of Russian
diplomacy, Frederic had turned not only his
own but Austria's ally to good account. " Not
content with having secured to himself the
certain assistance of Russia, in case of a con-
tinuation of the war, he attempted a step still
more difficult, but in which it should appear
he has proved equally successful : that of
creating a mistrust between France and Austria,
and renewing the coolness which had so long
subsisted between France and Russia. For
this purpose, he took advantage of the senti-
ments the Court of Versailles expressed to him
in the month of August, and in answer to their

AND KAISER JOSEPH 187

offer of becoming mediators, said he was ready
to accept their mediation, as he sliould be that
of the Empress of Russia, in ease she should
think proper to propose it, I^rance, convinced
that the King of Prussia acted on sure grounds,
and desirous, from every kind of reason, of
drawing towards this Court, immediately made
here (Petrograd) the proposals of the joint-
mediation, and as in consequence of the King
of Prussia's advice a similar offer had been
sent from hence to Paris (fbe two couriers
actually crossing on the road), it was accepted
without hesitation ; no time was lost in making
their mutual intentions known to the Court of
Vienna." * With the exception of the last
sentence Harris's account may serve as a true
picture of Frederic's feat, and §hows the clever-
ness with which this old King, though brought
to a dead halt in war, found his way out of
his difficulties by diplomacy. Some time neces-
sarily elapsed before the joint-mediation could
be arranged ; Kaunitz, baffled and furious, was
a little brusque in his communications with
Petrograd ; ^ Catherine and her foreign minister
Panin were not on the best terms with Ver-
sailles. Catherine, womanlike, showed a good
deal of caprice, impatience, and hesitation,
according as her fancy favoured Panin the
lukewarm or Potemkin the ardent friend of
Frederic. However, she was clear - sighted
enough to see that J'rance could not be very

188 FREDERIC THE GREAT

effective as a mediator if she was engaged in war
with England, and that the real glory of interven-
tion would belong to Russia. In the first week
of November France made known to Petrograd
her willingness to act as co-mediator.^" The
only stipulation which she made in consenting
to act as co-mediator, was that each mediating
Power should act as umpire, not as ally. The
stipulation was to be fairly observed by France
but hardly by Russia ; the one was to be a weak
judge, the other a strong advocate.

French diplomacy was not content with a
stipulation for guiding the mediators, it laid
down also a principle for guiding the media-
tion, which is so characteristic of the age as
to deserve attention. In the present state of
affairs in Germany, when Force is opposed to
Force, the original rights can have no effect,
and any discussion of them could only tend to
prolong the war : " Que la Convenance et non
les Droits reels des Parties interessees devroit
faire la Base de la Negotiation." "A most
extraordinary principle to be laid down by the
chief guarantor of the Peace of WestphaUa,"
rightly commented Elliot." Austria seems
quite willing to have adopted this view, indeed,
by introducing the Ansbach question into pre-
vious negotiations, had expressly committed
herself to doing so, and Prussia, though more
hesitatingly, seems to have acceded. It was
Just as well that some protest should be made

AND KAISER JOSEPH 189

against principles, which appeared to dissolve
society into its natui'al eknients in order to
rearrange them according to the system of the
Balance of Power. To France the dissolution
of the Germanic Empire, which she had done
so much to accomplish in the past, could hardly
appear an evil, but to both England and
Hanover it was naturally the worst of calami-
ties, for it endangered the security of the one
and the existence of the other. Hence English
diplomacy was induced to adopt a line in
accordance with high international morality,
a Une, it must be admitted, not always to be
discerned in her policy at this period. From
the Enghsh representative at Regensburg came
an even more impressive indictment than had
come from EUiot.* " Much reasoning has
been advanced . . , derived from the notion
of a certain Ballance of Power. The partizans
of the Imperial Court have continually urged
the necessity of setting bounds to the aggrand-
izement of the House of Brandenbourg, those
of Prussia have not less insis.ted on the same
necessity against that of Austria ; and both
have been forward to hold forth this mode of
argument, as more conclusive and more likely
to influence the general vote, than any plea of
real right founded in the justice of their re-
spective pretensions. This lajiguage has been

* SJ'J'. Archives, Bavaria, vol. 45, RatisboD, Heathcote to
Frascr, November 15, 22, 1778.

190 FREDERIC THE GREAT

heard with too much complacency. It has
been forgotten, that the Germanic Body is
a PoHtical System, whose basis rests on Laws
and Treaties ; Laws, made by universal con-
sent, and Treaties guaranteed by some of the
principal Powers of Europe, and that conse-
quently it is to these Laws and these Treaties,
and to these only, that all reasoning relative
to this System, is to be referred, and, by which
every Dispute arising therein ought to be
decided. From this just and only true point
of view the States of the Empire have been
artfully diverted ; and, wandering from the
remembrance of their own inherent conse-
quence, have been led to think and act, as if
the only object they had or ought to have in
view was to ballance the Court of Berlin against
that of Vienna. But this is surely a Doctrine
by no means adapted to the spirit or the
interests of the Germanic Constitution, for
it not only exposes the members of this Con-
stitution to be the indiscriminate supporters
or opposers of any cause whatever, whether
just or unjust, but is utterly subversive of every
principle and every tie, on which their Political
Dignity and even Existence ultimately depends.
Its influence, however, notwithstanding this
obvious reflection, has been but too general ;
so much so, that when the Empress-Queen in
her last Negotiation with the- King of Prussia
offered to keep possession of such an extent of

AND KAISER JOSEPH 191

territory only, as should pro{l.ucc a revenue of
one million of florins per annum, and that hjj
xvay of equalling the acquisition which the
Prussian Monarch would make in the Mar-
grnviates of Ansbach and Baircuth, many did
not scruple on that very account to pronounce
the proposal reasonable." "- It is so unusual
to hear the wind of moral indignation sweep-
ing through the diplomatic chancelleries in the
eighteenth century, that such sentiments de-
serve emphasis. They were adopted by the
Home Government, and so far as England's
weight went — unfortunately no great distance
— it was flung into the scale, of establishing
rights by law and by precedent, not by pre-
tension and power.

The adoption or rejection of the sentiments
of morality depended apparently on the joint-
mediators, but in fact upon Russia. France
was a guarantor of the Treaty of Westphalia,
but at war with England at the moment ;
Russia was for the first time, introduced into
German affairs, and behind her negotiators
stood the vast mass of the Russian army.
France could not go to war for her ally Austria,
Russia could for her ally Frederic. Breteuil,
the French negotiator, was a shrewd and able
diplomat, with moral force o^ly behind him ;
Prince Repnin was not only the Russian Pleni-
potentiary, but had 30,000 troops under his
command. That fact was the essential differ-

192 FREDERIC THE GREAT

ence between the two mediators. Catherine,
herself one of the finest of diplomats, thoroughly
understood the situation, and used every art
to enhance the Russian influence and procure
the Russian triumph. Her sentiments were
seen in her long instruction sent to Prince
Repnin (October 22, 1778), whom she had
chosen as Russian Plenipotentiary in the coming
Congress. Catherine showed a strong Prussian
bias, denounced the claims of Austria as against
law and justice, blamed Joseph for his violence
in invading Bavaria, and for the shock given
to all the smaller Powers, and praised Frederic
for his attempt to maintain the rights and
liberties of the Germanic Empire. Panin had
already written that " Germany, as much by
its position as by its power, is the centre of all
the affairs and all the interests of Europe,"
and that every change in its constitution con-
sequently affected all other nations. Catherine
drove home this view in her instruction, and
added that the maintenance of the existing
Germanic Constitution accorded with Russian
interests. Austria must therefore be informed
that Russia could no longer remain an in-
different spectator. Catherine did not intend
to enter too deeply into juridical questions,
though she thought a general support and
flattery of the minor German potentates was
desirable. Neither England nor France, at
war with one another, could, well oppose the

AND KAISER JOSEPH 198

Russian lead. " In this way wc shall have
the honour, in the eyes of all Germany, of
liaving produced the ncctssary denouement,
and perhaps even of having united many
princes in one system. This result will produce
for Russia the advantage it has so long desired,
of being named Guarantor for the future of
the Germanic Constitution, a position to which
France owes its preponderant influence in
affairs." As, however, it was dangerous to
allow the war to continue, and as flattery and
moral sentiments might not stop it, Russia was
prepared to give substantial aid to Frederic, and
to enforce peace by sending an auxiliary army
to assist Prussia in the spring. Nothing, how-
ever, was to be risked, for Catherine still feared
a Turkish invasion. The Russian army was
not to join Frederic in Silesia^ but would only
make a diversion in Galicia and Lodomeria.^'
The whole instruction is a masterly state-
paper, full of shrewd insight and cool calculation.
It must have given Catherine exquisite pleasure
to think that she, the once= despised petty
German princess, was now as Russian Empress
about to mediate between the two greatest of
German sovereigns.

A subsequent confidential note from Panin
to Repnin made it quite clear that Russia was
determined to exact a price for. her aid. Panin
said Frederic had rejected too sharply Kaunitz'
suggestion that Austria should make her with-

o

194 FREDERIC THE GREAT

drawal from the Partition-Treaty contingent
on her recognition of Frederic's succession to
Ansbach-Baireuth. Austria must receive some
slight compensation to soothe her vanity.
Repnin was to start from " the principle of giv-
ing something," and not too much, and always,
be it carefully understood, in return for the con-
firmation of Frederic in the Ansbach-Baireuth
Succession.!* The policy of high virtue and
justice was thrown over altogether, that of
equivalents and expediency was dominant. It
looked as if it was to be one of the old Con-
gresses, where

" Diplomats' dinners take place in fine weather,
And they cut up their mutton and Europe together."

In fact, the whole negotiation was to turn on
the question of how large a slice of Bavarian
mutton Joseph was prepared to accept.

On November 19 Prince Repnin, as repre-
senting the Czarina, left Petrograd ; he reached
King Frederic at Breslau in December. On the
19th he opened negotiations on the basis out-
lined by Catherine, and promised the support
of an auxiliary Russian corps in the next cam-
paign. Prince Repnin had been commander
of the 30,000 Russians who had been moved in
the direction of Lublin by the Austrian border
in November. He now left his army behind,
but had the same policy as then, for his character
was " by no means gentle.'* Frederic took
care to flatter him much, but he could not have

AND KAISER JOSEPH 195

found all his communications agreeable, thougli
glad to find that Repnin held the Austrian
demand for over a third of Bavaria to be un-
tenable. But if Frederic was a little annoyed
■svith his ally, his resentment Was as nothing to
that which Austria had for France. Through-
out the war the French policy had been not
unjustly suspected by Austria, and as was now
to be seen the French plan of pacification was
unquestionably unfriendly to Austria.^' Their
memorial (January 21), which was agreed to
by Russia, proposed, in substance, that Austria
should limit her pretensions to the triangle
formed by the junction of Inn and Danube,
including Neuburg, Braunau, hnd Burghausen,
but excluding the salt mines of Reichenhall.
Austria was to recognize the complete rights of
Karl Theodor to the whole Bavarian territory
apart from this district, and to Mindelheim,
and to arrange for a monetary compensation
to the allodial heir, the Elector of Saxony.
She was also to recognize the rights of Frederic
to the eventual succession of Ahsbach-Baireuth.
These articles, which were td" be ratified by
the Imperial Diet, formed the basis of the
Preliminaries. The formal peace was to be
arranged by a conference of Principals and
mediators at Teschen."

These Prehminaries could hardly cause satis-
faction at Vienna. On New Year's Day, 1779,
the Empress-Queen, as on the previous anniver-

196 FREDERIC THE GREAT

sary, showed marks of anxiety and depression,
while " care and dissatisfaction " marked the
brow of Kaunitz." Keith did not note the
expression of Kaiser Joseph, but it was certain
that the whole negotiation had caused him
intense mortification. However, the pressure
was too strong, the French ally had proved
faithless to them, the Russiafi ally but too
faithful to Frederic, and the " three kings of
Vienna " were not in a position to resist. The
cautious eye of Keith noted a slackening of
military preparations, which served as a politi-
cal barometer. On February 16, 1779, the
Court of Vienna declared its acceptance of the
Preliminaries, to which Frederic and the two
mediators had already agreed, and peace ap-
peared upon the horizon. The consent of
Karl Theodor, Elector of Bavaria, and of the
Duke of Zweibriicken, had not been formally
obtained, but the protests of these distinguished
potentates, in so far as they affected their
family affairs, have already been related. Karl
Theodor's objections to the compensation to
be paid to the Elector of Saxoiiy for a moment
attained international importance, but in general
their complaints and objections ruffled the
surface, without diverting the current, of the
streams flowing towards peace.

While it is not needful to discuss in detail
the actions of the smaller Powers at the Con-
gress of Teschen, some attempt must be made

AND KAISER JOSEPH 197

to estimate the motives of the great Powers.
With so many contraeting parties, and with
so miicli disputable matter, the Congress could
not pass off in complete harmony. The Aus-
trian attitude does not need rhuch further out-
lining; the diplomacy of the Court of Vienna
had made the essential concession, agreeing
to abrogate the Partition-Treaty in return for
the district of Burghausen, but it had made
it with a bad grace. Kaunitz and Kaiser
Joseph had not yet done wondering at the
unfriendly attitude of Russia, they felt that
they acted under coercion from the mediating
Powers, and accordingly they were not con-
ciliatory or obliging in the subsequent negotia-
tions.

The objects and policy of Frederic — after the
Prehminaries — had become perfectly simple and
precise. In September the Austrian offer of
restitution had for a moment made him appear
an aggressor. But his skilful manoeuvres
brought Russia and France go quickly to his
aid that he had been able oncp more to expose
Austria to defeat. He was determined to
restrict Austrian pretensions to Bavaria to the
insignificance of the Inn-Danube triangle. He
steadfastly refused to yield his* own pretensions
on Ansbach, and was unshakfen either by the
Austrian threat of refusal to recognize them
or by her offer to consent to that succession at
a price. At the same time he was acute enough

198 FREDERIC THE GREAT

to leave the game to be played by the two
mediating Powers, and practically to limit his
action to promoting their union. Now and
again he interfered, sometimes with a compli-
ment, sometimes with a threat, sometimes by
demanding a categorical answer from Vienna,
or even by an order to set his troops in motion.
But, for the most part, he stood as he had
done opposite Arnau, not himself attacking the
enemy, but with arms crossed and immovable,
admiring the fine exploits of some one else. In
diplomacy this masterly inaction was as success-
ful as it had been fruitless in the field.

Of the two negotiating Powers France had
by far the most difficult part to play, and
Vergennes, her minister at Paris, and Breteuil,
her Plenipotentiary at the Congress, woiild
have found it hard in any case to act without
duplicity. France was the ally of Austria,
but she had almost openly sympathized with
Zweibriicken's claims, and had not remon-
strated with Frederic for going to war. Her
reason was that, locked as she was in a death-
struggle with England in the New World,
France could not intervene with effect or with
commanding force in the Old. Under these
circumstances her interests Were best served
by the smallest possible disturbance to the
existing arrangements in Germany. Such were
the views of Vergennes at Paris and the in-
structions of Breteuil at Teschen, and both

AND KAISER JOSEPH 199

were carried out with dexterity and effect.
Vergennes smoothed the way for Russian diplo-
macy at Constantinople by mollifying the Turks,
and sent the French plan of pacification for
Germany to Petrograd in company with flattery
of the most subtle and agreeable kind.^* So
successful was this policy, so gratified was
Count Panin by the flattering unction so freely
poured forth, that he even extoUed French
diplomacy and politeness in unmeasured terms
to the British Ambassador at Petrograd. Harris
Ustened in great disgust, and,* when he replied
by hinting some doubts as to French good
faith, Panin overwhelmed him "by a long
Reasoning, drawn, I am convinced, from His
Prussian Majesty's Letters." At any rate, it
embodied Frederic's favourite; idea of a union
of France, Russia, and Prussia, though dis-
creetly omitting the latter from the argument.
" The Purport was that France would ever be
jealous of the aggrandizement of the House of
Aiistria ; and that, as long as it was in the
power of Russia to assist France in keeping
the Court of Vienna within bounds, they always
should have an influence over that of Versailles.
He (Count Panin) talked as if he had entirely
forgot that France was at war With us, and as a
person who, with one favourite object in his
head, makes all others subservient to it."

The note struck in this passage is entirely
characteristic of Russian diplomacy at the

200 FREDERIC THE GREAT

moment. Catherine and Panin were so in-
toxicated by the splendour of their position,
by the alternate flatteries of Frederic and
Vergennes, by the submission of Austria, that
they dreamed a " golden dream " of a humbled
Germany receiving peace from the hands of
the Empress of the East. In the beginning
their interest in the negotiation was absorbing ;
" the small proportion of time Count Panin
devotes to Business is wholly employed on this
subject," and Catherine, between one flirtation
and another, looked " with uncommon satisfac-
tion " on the progress of a pacification of which
she regarded herself as the sole promoter.^'
The result of this conduct was to make lookers-
on, even the most acute of them, imagine that
Russian diplomats misused their opportunities —
even Frederic thought they suffered by com-
parison with the French. " Les Frangais sont
foibles, mais ils agissent rondement. . . . Les
Russes sont d'une gaucherie dans les affaires,
comme si les negociations ouvraient pour eux
une carriere toute nouvelle. Soyez persuad6
que ce n'est pas le moindre de mes embarras,
que celui de leur desiller les yeux et de les
empecher de faire des sottises." * Frederic
flattered himself too much,= Catherine's in-
struments were Russian and did not always
behave in a Western and diplomatic fashion.

* Schoning, p. 226, Frederic to Prince Henry, Jan. 10, 1779 ; cp.
June 8, 1779, Harris to Weymouth.

AND ICAISER JOSEPH 201

Panin could be boastful, Repnin could be crude
in his diplomatic methods. Yet if their diplo-
matic technique was at fault, the main purpose
and object of Russian policy- was grasped by
them with masterly firmness* Behind Panin
was Catherine, and behind Repnin were thirty
thousand men, a combination which proved
irresistible in the end.

It was not to be expected that, even after
the signature qf the Prehmiriaries, the Court
of Vienna could submit without a struggle.
Even though Kaunitz and Joseph had been
forced to abandon their origiital design of get-
ting Lower Bavaria, they intended to pursue
their subtle attempt to drag in the question
of Frederic's claim to Ansbach. Therefore
they had no intention of making the cause
of mediation easy, or of giviilg way on minor
points during the negotiations leading to the
final peace. Keith watched their movements
with the greatest attention, feeling their pulse
almost from day to day. The activity or
otherwise of military preparations was his
great political barometer, and on February 20,
four days after the acceptance of the Pre-
liminaries at Vienna, he notedjwith great satis-
faction that the " Mules from Italy, the In-
surgents from Hungary, and all the Levies
from Transylvania and the other distant pro-
vinces are countermanded." This might have
seemed decisive, but on March 3 he was again

202 FREDERIC THE GREAT

alarmed by rumours : " Never did there exist
so strange a mixture of warfare and negotia-
tion." ^ As late as February 28 a skirmish
took place along the frontier, and till March 7
no truce was proclaimed. The Congress did
not meet at Teschen till the second week of
March ; Frederic described it as follows :
" Teschen n'est pas le lieu le plus agreable.
C'est un triste s^jour dont une vieille Venus de
soixante-dix ans, fait tous les delices. M. de
Breteueil s'en est expose, et cette divinite preside
a toutes leurs assemblees " (Schoning, p. 268).
These not very thrilling diversions were stimu-
lated by some diplomatic excitements. The
Court of Vienna had indeed ceased to co-operate
with Karl Theodor, but it showed him just
sufficient countenance to make the other Powers
suspect a secret understanding without giving
him sufficient support to achieve any substantial
result. In the same way it lent some counten-
ance to a host of minor claimants, who hastened
to put in their pretensions before the whole
question of the inheritance was definitely
decided at the Congress. Such pretensions
were in any case unlikely to be granted, because
the Preliminaries had already marked the
limits of distribution. But none the less, the
Duke of Wiirtemberg, the Archbishop of Salz-
burg, and the Bishop of Augsburg produced
claims, none of which were very good either in
law or fact. Heathcote satirically remarked

AND KAISER JOSEPH 208

that the claims of the lust named on Mindcl-
heim Avcre much inferior to those which the
existing Duke of Marlborough might have put
forward. Other pretensions "vyere on the same
level, and all were regarded as "so many-
secret engines employed by the Court of Vienna
in order to perplex the question of the Bavarian
Succession." *^ However, these claimants and
this opposition were gradually swept aside by
the strong forces compelling peace. There
was none the less much suspicion and frequent
alarm. At last Keith was cheered by the sight
of the Croatian regiments returning home
through Vienna, and this tin^e the barometer
was not at fault. Peace was finally signed on
May 13 — ^Vienna rejoiced, Te Deums were sung
— and Prince Repnin and Breteuil, the two
representatives of the mediating Powers, each
received from Maria Theresa Ijer picture " very
magnificently set round with Diamonds."*

The final arrangements did not materially
differ from the Preliminaries, despite the opposi-
tion of Austria, the resentment ©f Karl Theodor,
and the angry buzzing of the swarm of minor
claimants. Austria received Burghausen, and
renounced any further rights on Bavaria. The
Elector of Saxony in compensation of his claims
as allodial heir obtained thd Principality of

• Frederic gave Repnin his picture " very richly set (to be worn
at the buttonhole) estimated at 20,000 dqllars," and Breteuil " a
very fine box but not of equal value." — Letters of Earl MaXmcabury
(1870), i. 407.

204 FREDERIC THE GREAT

Mindelheim and four million florins. The rest
of the Bavarian dominions were guaranteed
to Karl Theodor, Elector Palatine, and by
the eighth article the whole was to descend
indivisibly to his nephew and heir, the Duke
of Zweibriicken. The King of Prussia triumph-
antly asserted his rights to the direct succession
to Ansbach, and in return Austria was recog-
nized as having some reversionary rights on
Lusatia, in case of the extinction of the Saxon
Line. These arrangements were accepted by
Austria and Prussia, were to be supported by
them for ratification in the Diet of the Empire,
and were solemnly guaranteed by France and
Russia. Every species of legality was pressed
into the service to defend them : Prussia and
Austria supported the tottering fabric of the
Empire like two pillars against danger from
within ; it was defended from without by two
buttresses in the shape of Russia and of France.
Diplomatically the results of the peace
must be considered a triumph for Frederic,
whom Joseph called the " Anti-Kaiser, sup-
ported by Russians," though his gains were
negative in character. At the beginning of the
dispute he had disavowed any idea of acquiring
territory at the expense of the Empire, a dis-
claimer that was as astonishing as it was new
from the invader of Silesia and recent parti-
tioner of a foreign country. He had taken
up arms, ostensibly to prevent any acquisition

AND KAISER JOSEPH 205

of territory within the Empire by n Power
without consent of the Diet and regard for
the Law, really to prevent the disturbance
of the balance of power. In cither case he
had kept his word and achieved his object.
He had not gained his way by arms — his
soldiers had done nothing but steal plums ;
but his diplomacy had prevented Austria steal-
ing provinces. Alone and unaided, save by
Saxony, he had first asserted the rights of the
Empire to limit the pretensions of Austria,
and then induced other Powers to intervene,
who had solemnly confirmed and supported
his actions. At the end also t^ had stubbornly
held out for full compensation for Saxony ;
privately convinced that it was unwise to
abandon Prussia's only German ally, and pub-
licly asserting his zeal for tjie Laws of the
Empire. It is true that the respect for Ger-
manic Liberties and the Diet was more apparent
than real, for the sohd arrangements dated
from the Peace of Teschen, not from its con-
firmation by the Imperial Dietj, None the less,
the Diet was treated with far rft'ore respect than
it had been at other times and other seasons
by Frederic himself. The minor states, as a
whole, were grateful to Frederic for uphold-
ing their rights and standing forth as their
champion, and their moral support was of the
greatest possible value to him. Weymouth,
at the EngUsh Foreign Office, spoke of " the

206 FREDERIC THE GREAT

very noble, dignified, and disi^terested manner
in which His Prussian Majesty has acted." 22
Peasants in Bavaria hung his portrait in their
huts beside those of the Virgin and lighted a
candle before each ; it would be difficult to
say whether the tribute of minister or rustic
was the more spontaneous or important as
marking the achievement of Frederic.

In future Frederic was able to point to
Kaiser Joseph as the tyrant who wished to
crush the ancient Liberties of Germany, and
to himself as their defender. In this peace
and in this attitude is to be found the strength
of Frederic in the last years of his life, which
enabled him to defeat every scheme of Kaiser
Joseph to secure further territory in Germany.
The formation of the Fiirstenbund (the League
of Princes) to resist Joseph in 1785, the last
diplomatic achievement in Frederic's life, has
its origin in the events of 1778-79. But it was
not only in Germany that Frederic had suc-
ceeded in isolating Joseph, though such a
success would have been quite serious enough
in itself. Frederic had isolated Austria in
Europe as well as in the Empire, and his action
was to be the problem and the pivot of European
politics in the immediate future.

The general moral influence and aspect of
the Treaty of Teschen is perhaps of most
interest, for it marks the decisive defeat of an
attempt at Partition which had few parallels

AND IvAISER JOSEPH 207

even in eighteenth century history. The
Partition of Poland — ^the most typical of the
age — had indeed exhibited the unscrupulous
lengths to which diplomats cpuld go. But at
least there was the excuse that there was
anarchy in Poland, that the seijse of nationality
was dead, and that the Act violated only the
general obligations of international right. None
of these excuses could be advanced for the
Treaty of Partition by which Kaiser Joseph
was to obtain Lower Bavaria. No plea that
Bavaria was in a state of anarchy or that
its people were incapable of resenting foreign
occupation could apply to this case. Here
there was no vague injury to the vague and
indefinite sanctions of international obligation,
but a precise one to the sharp and defined rules
and Laws of the Germanic Empire. The Kaiser
— the Head of the Law and the Empire —
was deliberately assaihng both, with dubious
genealogies as his sole excuse. A dozen Laws
and a dozen Treaties were dehberately torn
up, and a peaceful tenitory invaded, by the
soldiers of the Kaiser. It is difficult to con-
ceive any case in which the restraint of law
was less operative and the licence of force more
evident. The niles which the" Kaiser applied
to the territory of a German prince were such
as a modern European Power might apply to
that of a native African chief. Desiring to
increase or round off its possessions at his

208 FREDERIC THE GREAT

expense, it would offer him the option of war
or of cession of the desired territory, and con-
firm its rights by a treaty published to the
world. This was precisely the method of
Kaiser Joseph, except that he veiled his aggres-
sion by a claim, dug from the mediaeval records,
which deceived few, least of all himself. Such
actions have their precedents, but not their
justifications, in Europe.

A Partition of Germany on the lines of the
Partition of Poland had been constantly feared.
To this such a measure as the Partition of
Bavaria was the obvious prelude, and it was
in fact averted by two of those very Powers
which had taken their share of Polish spoils.
That Catherine and Frederic were hardly the
rulers best calculated to protest against parti-
tions and infractions of international morality
mattered little ; that they did actually so pro-
test and enforced their argument by arms or by
the threat of them mattered infinitely much.
Whatever may have been their private reasons,
Catherine suffered something and Frederic
much for a cause in which they appeared
disinterested. England, which in this matter
may seem fairly impartial, gave unstinted
praise to the way in which they had supported
the liberties of Germany and the law of nations.
In this way some real advance was made,
because the whole tendency of the diplomacy
was to demonstrate that Austria had gone too

AND KAISER JOSEPH 209

far in her aggressive schemes. Kaiser Joseph
is indeed interesting for this very reason, that he
always represented his age in its extreme tend-
encies. In tlie Partition-Treaty of January 3
and the subsequent diplomacy he displayed
the qualities of cynicism, of aggression, of
tliirst for territory in their most naked form,
and the logical tendency of his mind gave a
memorable completeness to this policy. It was
for this reason that he was defeated. Logic went
too far, boldness overreached itself, and the
stretched bow broke. That there were limits
even to the scruples of diplomacy under the old
regime, it was the fate of Kaiser Joseph to
establish.

If traced to the root, the objection to the
action of Kaiser Joseph will be found to have
consisted far less in the violation of right than
in the acquisition of power which he purposed
for himself. Frederic and France acted as
they did because the Balance of Power was
endangered, England approved their action for
the same reason, Russia acted both from reasons
of state and for glory. None the less at the
Congress the phrases of morality and fair deal-
ing were on the lips of all, and; their reality was
occasionally present. The Peace of Teschen
did not deal absolute justice : it gave Austria
part of the disputed territory in virtue of claims
that were flimsy, but it stopped the more
marked display of force. It protested with

210 FREDERIC THE GREAT

effect against unbridled aggression. The helpless
Bavaria had received some justice, the stronger
Austria some condemnation, from the " juris-
prudence of princes." For Germany the omin-
ous sign was that even the strength of Prussia
had not availed to protect her against Austria.
Frederic had at last been baffled in war, and,
though he attained success in diplomacy, the
price was a dreadful one. It was the diplo-
matic introduction of Russia into Germany, and
it brought before Germans that terrible un-
known power which has remained a standing
menace to Teutonism ever since. " An English
officer once congratulated Moltke on the splen-
did army which he had created and led. The
marshal shook his head, and replied that the
German army was a terrible burden on the
country, but that the long Russian frontier
raade it a necessity." * The Treaty of Teschen
for the first time revealed that danger, and it
was brought about by the great predecessor of
Moltke.

^r ^F ^r ^n T* T*

Whatever its shortcomings, the Peace of
Teschen was one of the few Treaties in that — or
indeed any — ^generation which provided for the
restoration, and not for the division of territory,
which was summoned to compel restitution and
not to sanction annexation. For that distinct
achievement, even without its vaguer and more

* Acton, Modern History, p. 195,

AND KAISER JOSEPH 211

indefinable influences, it was. and deserved to
be, memorable.

In the story of the settlement of the Bavarian
Succession almost every elenicnt and motive
tj-pical of the old regime appeared. The
personal force of rulers, dominating their
peoples, is seen in Frederic, Joseph, and
Catherine ; the shameless claim, backed by
forgeries and supported by arms, the resistance
to it by one who had dismembered the Empire
of old and who now posed as its champion;
the war which ruined the peasa,nts of Bohemia
for objects of which they knew* or cared nothing,
the peace which made half-Oriental Russia a
guardian of the sanctity of Germanic treaties ;
last of all the piteous spectacle of Bavaria her-
self, ruled by one ready to betray her, hurled
this way and that in the eddies of diplomacy,
imable or afraid to lift a sword in her own
defence at the moment that her very existence
was in the balance. It was silch incidents and
such rulers that caused the shame and the
splendour, the glory and the misery, of the old
regime.

The days of the old regipie were indeed
already numbered. The despots were soon to
prove themselves unable to ^tem the tide of
revolutionary vengeance, and the armies which
Frederic and Joseph had trained were to go
down in utter ruin before the MarsHllais^ and
the ragged volunteers of France. Already, too,

212 FREDERIC THE GREAT

there was playing among the Corsican rocks a
boy who was to teach the world that it was
not only the despots who dreamt of war, and
that the armed champion of the rights of the
people could plan partitions more shameless
than those of Poland and conquests more
extensive than those of Bavaria.

APPENDICES

I HAVE ventured to print some; extracts from the
British despatches, a report from the Lansdowne MSS.
on the Prussian army, and a poem on Joseph, found
by me at Czaslau in Bohemia, which I had translated
from the Czech. These all afford excellent contem-
porary views of the personalities in q-uestion. Sir James
Harris and Hugh Elliot in their three despatches give
a living picture of Frederic the Great and of his nephew
and heir, Frederic-William, afterwards King Frederic-
William II., and of their surrouildings literary and
social. Burgoyne's report shows ihe condition of the
Prussian and Austrian armies. In Keith's despatch
Kaiser Joseph tells his impressions of Catherine the
Great ; whilst a Czech peasant's' poem reveals the
popular impression of Kaiser Joseph.

I. Sir James Harris (Lord Malmesbury) and Hugh
Elliot (Lord Minto) on Frederic the Great — his
character and court.

(o) March 18, 1776. Charactef sketch of Frederic
the Great and his successor.

(b) May 18, 1780. Hugh Elliot on Frederic's

hterary diversions.

(c) August 13, 1776. Harris on the visit of the

Grand Duke Paul of Russia (afterwards
Paul I.) to Berlin.

II. General Burgoyne's report- on Austrian and
Prussian armies, c. 1766-67.

213

214 FREDERIC THE GREAT

III. Kaiser Joseph's impressions of Catherine the
Great, 1782.

IV. A Czechish peasant's impressions of Kaiser
Joseph, 1785 {?).

APPENDIX I

(a) Sir James Harris (Lord Malmesbury) on
THE Character and Court of Frederic the
Great.

Berlin, Monday, 18th March 1776.

Harris to Suffolk

The Basis of His Prussian Majesty's Conduct,
from the Time He mounted the Throne, to this day, ,
seems to have been the considering Mankind in general,
and particularly those over whom He was destined
to reign, as Beings created merely to be subservient
to His Will, and conducive to the carrying into execu-
tion whatever might tend to augment His Power,
and extend His Dominions — Proceeding on these
Grounds, He has all along been guided by His own
Judgment alone, without ever consulting any of His
Ministers or superior Officers ; not so much from the
low opinion He entertains of their abilities, as from
a Conviction, from His own Feelings, that if He im-
ployed them otherwise than as simple Instruments,
they would in time assume a Will of their own ;
and instead of remaining Accessories, endeavour to
become Principals. To persevere in this System, it
was necessary for Him to divest Himself of Compassion
and Remorse ; of course of Religion and Morality.
In the room of the first. He has substituted Super-
stition ; in the place of the latter, what is called in
France Sentiment ; and from hencp we may, in some

AND ICAISER JOSEPH 215

measure, account for that motley Composition of
Barbarity and Humanity which so strongly mark His
CiiaracttT. I have seen Him weep at Tragedy ;
known Him pay as much care to if, sick Grey Hound,
as a fond jNlother could to a favourite Child : And yet
the next day. He has given Orders for the devastating
a Province : or by a wanton increase of Taxes, make
a whole district miserable ; and what will perhaps
appear still more contradictory, contribute to His
own Brother's Death [August-Wilhelm, father of
King Frederic- William II.], by continuing to him
Marks of His displeasure the whble Time of his last
Illness. Again, He is so far from being sanguinary,
that He scarce ever suffers a Criminal to be punished
capitally, imless for a most notorious Offence : Yet,
the last War, He gave secret Orders to several of His
Army Surgeons, rather to rvm the risk of a wounded
Soldier's dying, than by the Amputation of a Limb,
increase the Number and Expence of His Invalids.
Thus, never losing sight of His Object, He lays aside
all Feelings, the moment that is, concerned : And
although as an Individual, He often appears and
really is Humane, Benevolent, and Friendly ; yet,
the Instant He acts in His Royal Capacity, these
Attributes forsake Him, and He carryes with Him,
desolation. Misery and Persecution, where ever He
goes. From an easy Transposition of the same
erroneous principle, to the internal Government of
His Dominions, we may easily see, why He never can
be taught to believe, that a large Treasure laying
dormant in His Coffers impoverishes His Kingdom.
That Riches increase by Circulation ; That Trade
cannot subsist without reciprocal Profit ; That
Monopolies, and exclusive Grants, put a Stop to
Emulation, and of course to Industry ; and in short.

216 FREDERIC THE GREAT

that the real Wealth of a Sovereign, consists in the
Ease and Affluence of His Subjects. These Errors,
however capital they are, have rather served to
augment the Misery of these Subjects, than impede
the Progress of His own Grandeur : If He has failed
in several points, Resolution and Cunning, imployed
as the Occasion required, and always supported by
great Abilities, has carried Him, with Success, through
almost every important Undertaking He has at-
tempted. We have seen Him end a War, with almost
all the great Powers of Europe, by an advantageous
Peace : And since We have seen Him gain such an
Ascendency over those who were His most natural
Enemies, as to make them contribute to the Execution
of His ambitious Projects. His iinmense increase of
Revenue, the gigantick Army He maintains ; And the
wonderful preponderance He bears in Europe, will,
in future History, appear incredible. He foimd, on
His Father's Death a Revenue of 13,000,000 of
Crowns ; a Treasure of 16,000,000 ; no debts ; and
an Army of 50,000 Men [in fact it was nearer
100,000] ; And, at the time, this was reckoned as
the greatest Effort of Oeconomy. He has now an
Income of 21,000,000 of Crowns ; three times that
Smn, at least, in His Coffers ; and near 200,000
effective Men. He undoubtedly owes this, in great
measure to His superior Talents ; Yet, I think, We
may find another Cause, in the Character and
position of His Subjects. In general they are poor,
vain, ignorant, and destitute of Principle : had they
been rich. His Nobility could never have been brought
to serve as Subaltern Officers, with Zeal and Ardour :
Their Vanity makes them think, they see their own
greatness in the Greatness of their Monarch ; Their
Ignorance stifles in them every notion of Liberty and

AND KAISER JOSEPH 217

Opposition ; And their want of, Principles, makes
them ready Instruments to execute any Orders they
receive, without considering whether they are founded
on Equity, or not. — His Prussian Majesty has well
known how to take advantage of this Character, by
keeping them at a most awful distance : They con-
sider a Word or a Smile from Him as a Boon, and by
never rewarding them according to their Merits, they
are taught to believe they have no merit at all. The
superior Indowments Nature has" given Him over
them, and the Preeminence which He constantly
affects, makes them look up to Him as a divinity ;
And although they feel the Rod of Iron with which
they are governed, yet few repine, and none venture
to murmur. At those moments when He lays aside
the Monarch, and indulges Himself in every kind of
debauchery, that a depraved Imagination, and worn
out Constitution, can devise, H6 never suffers the
Instruments, or partakers of these Excesses, to have
the smallest Influence over Him,? some few He has
rewarded, discarded several, but left most of them in
the Situation He found them. Having said thus
much, it is perhaps less wonderful than it generally
appears, that such a Sovereign, governing such a
people, should have raised to sO great a pitch of
Glory, a Country which, from itst geographical Posi-
tion, its Climate, and its Soil, sfems to have been
calculated to act a very secondary Part amongst the
European Powers ; And it is nqt very difficult to
foresee, on its changing Masters, that its preponder-
ance will greatly sink, and as this' Event is certainly
not very distant, I hope I shall not trespass on Your
Lord's time, in turning my Thoughts, for a moment,
to the futme State of these Dominions.

Having already spoken to Your Lordship very

218 FREDERIC THE CREAT

fully to the Character of the Princfe of Prussia [after-
wards King Frederic- William II.], I can now only add,
that I am confirmed in what I then wrote. His style
of Life, at the Moment when He was at the Eve of
becoming King, convinces me that when He actually
is so, He wUl never change it, of course that He will
neither be an active Monarch, or His own Minister ;
That He will look upon Business as a Task, and seek
pleasure with avidity. The Nation aware of this turn,
have been in a constant Ferment, from the Moment
His Prussian Majesty's Illness h^s carried with it a
serious Aspect ; and there is not an insignificant
Conseiller de Province who does not aspire to some
important post under the new Reign. Unused to
be allowed to think or reason for themselves, the
Art of intriguing and forming Court Cabals sits
very awkward on them : The Apprehension they
are under of incurring the King's displeasure, by
paying open Court to the Prince of Prussia, and
that of offending the Prince by behaving to Him
as they have hitherto done, makes it difficult to
follow their Motions or to know exactly what they
would be at.

On the whole, however, I thipk we may divide
those who expect to be future Ministers, with any
degree of probability, into three Sets. At the head
of the first is Prince Henry, whose Creatures are
Kiiiphausen who was in England ; The Wruch
Family, and several Favourites of His Royal Highness,
who have no other Merit than their fair Complexion,
and extreme good nature. The second is composed
of M'- de Hertzberg, one of the present Ministers of
the foreign Department, a Man of great Application
and sound Sense ; M'- de Schulembourg, who has the
direction of the Bank, also a Man of Parts, and their

AND KAISER JOSEPH 219

dependants ; and this is undoubtedly tho Party the
best Cidculated to constitute a Klinistry, adeqnutc
to the Goveninient of this Country. The most likely
to succeed, however, though they, by no means, come
under the same description, are tljose who look upon
themselves as the Prince's Favourites ; Amongst the
first of whom stands M'- de Humboldt, formerly a
Commissary in the Allied Army, afterwards Chamber-
lain to the Princess Elizabeth now at Stettin ; a Man
of plain Understanding, and fair Character, and who
owes the good Will the Prince bears him, to the Assist-
ance he has given His Royal Highness in pecuniary
Matters ; M'- de Horst, whom His Prussian Majesty
lately dismissed from the Head of the Department
of Trade, an enterprizing Genius-, lively Parts, but
totally void of Judgment ; and a Number of young
Officers, partakers of His Royal Hjghness's Pleasures,
who, tho* they have no desire to become active
Ministers, all expect Employmenjts, Decorations, or
Pensions.

It is easy to be foreseen, that whichever of these
Sets should come into place, or even supposing what is
next to impossible, that the future Sovereign of this
Country should take the Reias of Administration into
His own Hands, that the essential difference there
will be ia the first case, between it^ being governed by
many Ministers, who necessarily must be biassed by
private Views and family Connexions ; and in the
second, by a young Prince, scarce known in Europe
but by His Pleasures, instead of having at its Head
a Monarch of tryed Abilities, and good Reputation,
that it will be no longer the same great Nation, formid-
able to its Neighbours, and whose* Alliance is almost
universally courted ; It will gradually sink to its
natural Bulk, and, in the course of a few Years, have

220 FREDERIC THE GREAT

no right to be reckoned amongst the leading Powers
of Europe.

(6) Hugh Elliot on King Fkederic's
Literary Diversions

Bekmn, 13 May 1780.
Elliot to Stormont

Notwithstanding the assiduity with which the
King of Prussia continues to preside over every
Department of the State, His Majesty still finds
opportunities to cultivate Letters and the Conversa-
tion of men of genius. Ever attentive to attach to
His service those whose talents may be profitable
or ornamental to His Court, He admits to private
Interviews the Strangers who frequent it, and has, in
several instances during the course of His reign,
selected those of the greatest celebrity for the Com-
panions of His leisure hours. — ^His Majesty has of
late made choice of the Marquis of Lucchesini, an
Italian, to attend His person at Potsdam. — To an
extensive knowledge and agreeable address this Gentle-
man is said to add a strong resemblance to the late
Count Algarotti, and to have attracted the King's
attention by this circumstance. He was last week
named one of His Majesty's Chamberlains, with a
Pension of 2000 Crowns a year and is since gone to
Potsdam.

Out of Cypher it would be imprudent not to approve
of His Prussian Majesty's Choice though in reality it
is considered as the Effect of Whim and Caprice.
The Marquis Lucchesini is a young Man, and rather
possessed of a plain sound understanding, and happy
Memory, than of any bright Genius, or entertaining
Talents. There are few of His Prussian Majesty's

AND KAISER JOSEPH 221

anemployed Subjects of the same Rank in Life, who
ore not hurt at tlio Preference shewn to a Stranger,
whose Name is hitherto unknown to the PubUck.

Mr. Liston has been upon an iiitniuate Footing with
the Marquis, before my arrival ; arid I may reap some
Benefit from his near Approach to- the King.

Smce the Company of professed Men of Letters
seems to be as necessary to the King as Connections
of a different Nature to the Heir apparent, it is perhaps
riot mifortunate that neither of these Places are, as
usual, occupied by French Subjects ; for the Prince
has of late frequented an Italian. Mistress. If how-
ever any Conjecture may be formed from prior
Examples, neither of the Favourites can flatter them-
selves with a long Reign, as it is difficult to determine,
whether the King of Prussia is more inconstant to
His learned Friends, or The Prince to his female ones.

The only Circumstance of any Importance, that
has come to my Knowledge, since I had the Honour
of writing to Your Lordship, is, that it is intended,
that The Prince of Prussia shall riiake a Journey to
Petersburg, in the Month of October.

(c) Harris on the Visit of the Grand Duke
Paijl (afterwards Czar Paul I.) to Berlin

Private. Berlin, Aug. 18, 1776.

Harris to Eden

I am heartily glad our bustle is over, I have now
leisure to write to you, and it has furnish'd me with
^laterials to make my letter less insipid than usual.
I forbore in my Official Correspondence, giving a
circumstantial Account of our Magnificence and
Splendour, not only from such Festivitys being much
less delightful in description than in reality, but

222 FREDERIC THE GREAT

because I felt my Pen would be greatly inferiour both
in style and accuracy to those of the Gazettees du bos
Bhin and other Continental news-writers : I must
indeed do them the justice to say that on this occasion
they have been very exact, and as far as regards the
descriptive part of the Ceremony have scarce in a
single instance deviated from the truth : I shall
therefore not interfere in their department, but
mention only such collateral facts as may have
escap'd their observation.

Paul Petrovitch were names as you may suppose
written on every triumphal arch — that must be wrong
says the Mayor of a Bourg in Pomerania, the Grand
Duke is certainly a Gentleman — put Paul von Petro-
vitch.

All the Domesticks belonging to the Imperial
Family in Russia have military rank — the Grand
Duke's Coachman and He of His Prussian Majesty
going one evening to drink together a dispute arose
about Precedence — " What is your rank ? " says the
Prussian. " Lieutenant Colonel," says the other.
" Ah 1 but I am a Colonel," answers the German
and walks first into the Alehouse. The Fact came to
y« King's ears — ^the Colonel was sent for three days
to Prison to receive fifty Coups de Canne.

When the Grand Duke left Berlin it rain'd and
thunder'd — Cannons were continually firing — a
German Poet with an Imagination bolder than that
of the Frenchman, remark' d, that Angels join'd their
tears to those of the People for the departure of
H.I.H., and that Jove and Frederick accompany'd
him with their Thunder.

Seventy thousand Horses and thirty thousand
Peasants were employ'd to convey the Grand Duke
from Memel to Berlin. Prince Henry in talking to

AND KAISER JOSEPH 228

one of them said, '• You certainly cannot join in the
publick joy, but imprecate a journey which takes you
from your HarAcst and other necessary occupations."
'• No," rephed the courtierlike boor, " we are all happy
to be employed on this occasion, since we foresee it will
prevent us and our horses from being kill'd in future
times by dragging Artillery and other complements
of war."

Formey the Honest Secretaire perpetuel of the
Academy of Sciences in haranguing the Grand Duke
made use of this expression, " C'eit I'homme Men plus
que le Prince que noits admirons et ce a qui V entree
de nos coeurs est Men plus ouverte que celle de ce
lieu" — the entry of the Academy is a Porte cochere —
for the rest of the Bathos in this speech, I refer you
to the original whicli I enclose ; this same good Formey
on the death of the late King of Sardinia said in one
of his Academical discourses, " Mettons plus de ferveur
que jamais dans nos prieres pour la conservation des
jours de Notre auguste Souverain — il est devenu le
doyen des Rois il est dans la breche — L'ange de la mort
tient le glaive suspendu sur sa tetej' You may guess
whether such a language however ^ell intended gave
pleasure.

APPENDIX II

Obskbvations on the present Military State of
Prussia and Austria by General Burgoyne,
c. 1766-67 (" Shelburne Papers," Lansdowne
MSS. vols. 42 and 137).

The excellence of the Prussian troops appears the
more extraordinary when we consider the disadvan-
tages attending them unknown to other States. The

224 FREDERIC THE GREAT

ranks are filled up perhaps more than a third part
with strangers, deserters, prisoners, and enemies of
various countries, languages, and religions. They
cannot therefore be actuated by any of the great
moving principles which usually cause extraordinary
superiority in armies ; they have neither national
spirit nor attachment to their prince, nor enthusiasm
nor hopes of fortune, nor even prospect of comfortable
old age to inspire them.

In an army thus composed it is wisdom and sound
policy to sink and degrade all intellectual faculties,
and to reduce the man as nearly as possible to mere
machinery, and indeed as nature has formed the bulk
of the King of Prussia's subjects that is not very
difficult . . . many of his disciples suppose his
necessity to be his choice . . . the vigour of the army
is in the subalterns and non-commissioned officers
who undoubtedly are the best in the world. It
seems to decline as the ranks ascend, and as other
qualifications than those of mere execution become
requisite.

The greater part of the present set (of generals)
have recommended themselves by their assiduity on
parade, and are men of very confined education.

Prussian officers by length of time and experience
only become more expert artificers to prepare and
sharpen a fine weapon, diligent and proud to deliver it
into the hands of their master in perfect order,
awkward and ignorant if compelled to employ it
themselves.

If this survey of the Prussian army is just it will
be found . . . that its most forniidable power exists
in the King or in his Brother, Prince Henry. All the
energy of action and expedient is ih them ; and when-
ever they fail and the direction of that stupendous

AND KAISER JOSEPH 225

machine fulls to Priiicos of the common Cast, it must
soon appear that immediutcly the principles of de-
cline are extended and interwoven with its apparent
strength.

The army is more harassed with precautionary
guards against their own soldiers, than against the
enemy.

Desertion in peace supposed to = a fifth ; after
defeat " the number missing usually trebles the
number to be accounted for by death or capture."

The Emperor's army shows all the natural advan-
tages the Prussians want : the sources of men and
money are great and natural, the officers have liber-
ality, the soldiers have national spirit. There is
sufficiency and excellency in every- part of the basis —
it is the superstructure alone which has hitherto been
defective.

[Burgoyne ends by commending Lascy and praising
Laudon.]

APPENDIX III

Kaisek Joseph's Impressions of the Empress
Catherine the Great 1(1780-82)

Two years after his famous visit to Catherine, a
characterization of her was given by Kaiser Joseph.
" Walking alone in the Augarten (at Vienna) on
August 19, 1782," he confided to Keith the British
ambassador his own impressions of Catherine and
Russia * : — The Emperor asked me who was the

• Foreign Office, Austria, vol. 5, Vienna, October 19, 1782, Kritli
to Grantham, " most secret and confidential." Keith writes in the
first person and calls the reported conversaj^ion " a faithful extract
of my notes."

Q

226 FREDERIC THE GREAT

successor of Sir J. Harris at that court (St. Petersburg),
I said I had every reason to believe that he would
remain there. — Kaiser Joseph. Your Ministry judge
well. Sir James (Harris) possesses the Talents,
Activity, and Adroitness which qualify him for that
Mission, and I fancy that his situation at Petersburg
has of late grown much more comfortable. — Keith.
I hope so. Sir, but the part a Foreign Minister has
to act there, is accompanied with great difficulties,
owing to the continual fluctuation of Politicks in that
Cabinet. — Kaiser Joseph. Yes and No. The great
Art is to enter into the Empress's Character, and to
humour it. She is no doubt a Princess of distinguished
Genius, but she cannot do everjrthing. Whoever
has to deal with her must never lose sight of her sex,
nor forget that a woman sees things and acts differ-
ently from one of our sex. I speak from experience in
saying the only way to keep well with her is ni de la
gater ni de la heurter de front ; to give her her way in
matters of little consequence, to render every necessary
Refusal as palatable as possible, to let her perceive
a constant desire of pleasing, yet at the same time a
firm adherence to certain essential Principles, and a
just sense of one's own Right. When She expresses
a wish for a thing that can be granted without de-
parting from these Principles, to indulge her with that
complaisant Attention which is ever due to a Lady,
but when She insists on what ought not to be com-
plied with, to make her sensible that tho' She may
often lead. She cannot drive. Iji this manner one
may hope to live upon a fair footing with her, guarding
against the Heat and Impetuosity of her feelings, and
convincing her that in essential Points, every sovereign
has an unquestionable Right to draw the great line
of his own Conduct, and to adhere to it strictly.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 227

The singular Misfortune of the Empress is that of
having no IVrson about her who dares to restrain,
even to repress, the first effusion of her Passions.
Count Osternian (X'ice-CiianccUor) is un hoiinnc dr.
PaiUe ; he does nothing, ;iud hus.no weight. As to
M. Besborodko,* he is an Upstart ; he was a low
scribe, a mere Interpreter, under M. Romanzow, and
he retains the Sentiments of that class of Men. To-
gether with some Ability he poss&ses the routine of
his o^Mi Business, but he has read little and knows
nothing of the great Scale of Politicks, or of the per-
manent Interests of Princes. When his Sovereign
calls for his Pen and dictates the Strongest and often
the wildest expression of her feelings of the moment,
the Secretary has not the Firmness, and perhaps not
the Inclination, to repress her halsty effusions, but
writes down in their full Energy all her crude Ideas, and
probably says to himself, " Ce n'est pas mon Affaire
de peser ou de remontrer sur des Consequences. Que
le Roi de France, de I'Angleterre, ou VEmpercur se
iirent de ce mauvais pas comme Us pourront." This
is the case with the Empress, and 'Whoever is engaged
in any important Transaction with her, must keep
these circumstances in his mind.

Keith [con expressione]. It is an unhappy thing
for Princes that they are forced to give their con-
fidence to men of low Birth, sordid Education and
loose or timid Principles ; but has not the Empress
Prince Potemkin for a Confidential Counsellor, since
the Disgrace of Count Panin ? — Kaiser Joseph. O
Yes, and a very insufficient Counsellor he is. He has
little knowledge, joined to great Indolence, and even
the Empress affects to treat, or at least to speak of
him as a Scholar of her own in Politicks, and con-
• Alexander Andrejevic Besborodko, first secretary to Catherine.

228 FREDERIC THE GREAT

sequently as a man who is more likely to need a Guide
than to become one. It is a favourite Phrase of hers
to say, "II est mon SUve. C'est a Moi qu'il doit toute
la Connoissance des Affaires." You will easily Con-
ceive that when the Empress talked in this manner,
the Person She spoke of did not push his frankness
so far as to say, " Oui, Madame, il est votre Eleve, et
en viritS il vous fait tres peu d'honneur."

Keith. Does it then appear. Sir, that Prince
Potemkin's Weight and Influence are diminished ? —
Kaiser Joseph. Not at all, but in Politicks they have
never been what the World imagined. The Empress
of Russia does not wish to part with him, and from
a thousand Reasons, and as many Connections, of
every sort, She could not easily get rid of him ; if even
She harboured the wish of doing so. One must have
been in Russia to comprehend all the particulars of
the Empress's Situation.

[Compare with this Joseph's conversation with
Verac, in Corberon, Journal (Paris, 1901), 257 n.]

APPENDIX IV

Gratitudk to Kaiser* Joseph
Poem by a Czechish Peasant (written about 1785)

Thanksgiving to the great and illustrious father of
our dear Country — to Joseph the Second.

Gratitude from an unworthy subject, Wojtec
Kotera ; written in the year of our Lord, 17[85 ?],
and printed by Frantisek Vinience Korec at Kutna
Hora [Kuttenberg].

Rejoice with me you nations and listen to the many
truths and thanksgiving, that I am going to tell you.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 229

in praise of the wisdom from wlych sprang blessing
and joy in our country, and which has done away
with many sufferings.

When our great monarch, Joseph the Second, suc-
ceeded to the throne as tiie ruler of our country, he
reigned wisely, guided by wisdom, love and righteous-
ness, all over the world ; but especially over his dear
subjects.

As an eagle tries to soar towa|rds the sky, so his
heart longed for righteousness and. wished to do away
with many wrongs, and this hope strengthened his heart.

He hoisted the flag of the Imperial Eagle, visited
all the departments of state in person, and degraded
many officials whom he found unworthy of their office.

His zeal for justice was not to be deceived, his
sharp eye saw in the darkness, he rnade many changes
among the evil-livers and well rewarded the righteous.

He walked among his subjects with a loving heart,
and enchanted all of them vnth his kindness. People
laid before him the wishes and desires of their hearts,
and all found support in his might}^ spirit of goodwill.*

Many a poor tradesman could have found his
fortune had he sought it in anothet district, but could
not leave as he must redeem his bondage from his
lord. How grateful then were they to their sovereign,
when they were permitted to go freely wherever they
could find their living.f

This good-hearted monarch considered all the taxes,
for he wished to tax all equally, and found out him
who tried to conceal his riches or to speak falsely
about his estates, and also him who oppressed his
fellow-men.

♦ In the Controlor-Gang in his Imperial Palace at Vienna Joseph
received all his subjects without disUnction.,

t Refers to the Kmancipation of Serfs in Austria and the break-up
of the Gild-system.

230 FREDERIC THE GREAT

Oh, who would not submit to such good teaching,
the aim of which was to survey the land. God was
pleased with our sovereign's penetrating eye, with
his judgment, his zeal for learning and his enlighten-
ment.

The numerous schools which he built show with
what attention this loving father sought to awake
his peoples to better morality. Mindful was he that
teaching should progress, especially that little children
should learn.

In old times people spent long in learning, yet when
they grew up knew not why they came into the world.
And, even if they learned to read, understood not
what they read, and remained in darkness as before.*

Princes came from all quarters of the earth to give
him honours, and to meet him in his splendid palace.

Take my thanks, O mighty sovereign, for thou
lovest the simplicity of my speech" m.ore than fine art.
I invoke the blessing of our Lord and His protection
for our dear Emperor — ^Joseph the Second !

APPENDIX V

VOLTAIRE ON THE CAUSES OF WAK IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

(Article "La Guerre" in Dictionnaire philosophique.)

[This marvellous effort of wit was originally written
in 1764, as a reflection on Frederic's conduct in
the first Silesian War, which caused that monarch
considerable annoyance. As, in fact, it might serve

* An attack on the Jesuit educational system, wUch Joseph
supplanted.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 231

as a history of tlie War of the Bavarian Succession,
I have inserted it here.]

" Un genealogiste prouve k un prince qu'il descend
en droitc Ugne d'un comte dont les parents avaient fait
un pacte de famille, il y a trois qu quatre cent ans,
avec une maison dont la m^moire meme ne subsiste
plus. Cette maison avait des pretentions ^loign^es
sur une province dont le dernier possesseur est mort
d'apopl^xie : le prince et son conseil concluent sans
diffieult6 que cette province lui appartient de droit
divin. Cette province, qui est k quelques centaines
de lieues de lui, a beau protester qu'elle ne le connait
pas, qu'elle n'a nulle envie d'etre gouvern^e par lui ;
que, pour donner des lois aux gens, il f aut au moins avoir
leur consentement : ces discours he parviennent pas
seulement aux oreilles du prince, dont le droit est in-
contestable. H trouve incontinent un grand nombre
d' homines qui n'ont rien k faire ni rien k perdre ; il
les habille d'un gros drap bleu a cent dix sous I'aune,
borde leurs chapeaux avec du grqs fil blanc, les fait
toumer k droite et a gauche, et ma^clie k la gloire. Les
autres princes qui entendent parlet de cette 6quip6e y
prennent part, chacun selon son pouvoir, et couvrent
une petite ^tendue de pays de plus de meurtriers
mercenaires que Gengis-Kan, Tamerlan, Bajazet,
n'en train^rent k leur suite."

That there is no undue satire ift the description of
the claims advanced by a sovereign is shown by the
Bavarian Succession, as well as the following delight-
ful extract, which satirizes Joseph as much as Voltaire
satirized Frederic, " Advices frorh different Quarters
continue to give Hints and to mention Circumstances,
which suppose ambitious projects, on the part of the
Emperor (Joseph), and an intention sooner or later
to disturb the tranquillity of the Empire. From

232 FREDERIC THE GREAT

Vienna we are told that His Imperial Majesty has
lately adopted the Plan long in Contemplation by
Prince Kaunitz, of extending his Dominions towards
the South, and that the Archives have been searched
anezv, and Titles made out to different territories of the
Bepublick [sic] of Venice.*

* S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 103, Listen to Fraser, Berlin, November
30, 1779.

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS

S.P.P. state Papers Fort'lgii—uupubllflhed foreign coViegpondenco preserved at the

KriUsli Record Om.-o.
Ad. ^SS. Additional Manuscripta pivseiTcd at the BMtlah Museum.
Sbornii:. Bussiau Imperial Historical Soi-iety Publication of Archives.

CHAPTERS I AND II

These two chapters are based on material so familiar to historians
that I have not thought it needful to give detailed references. For
these chapters, as for the whole period, the best general bibliography
is Dahlmann - ^aitz, Quellenkunde der deiUschen Geschichte, 8te
Auflage, Leipzig, 1912.

It may be worth while to mention a few of the main works below.

AoBtria. Akneth. Maria Theresia. 10 Bde. Vienna, 1879.
Himgary. Mahczali, H. Hungary in the Eighteenth Century.
Cambridge, 1910.
The most up-to-date documentary study on Joseph II. is that by
P. V. MrrROFANOv. 2 Bde. German translation. Vienna
and Leipzig, 1910.
Pmsaia. Kcser, R. Konig Friedrkh der 'Grosse. 2 Bde. Stutt-
gart and Beriin, 1903 and 1913.
Reim^vnn, E. Neuere Geschichte des preussischen Slaates [Gcsch.

der europ. Staaten]. 2 Bde. Gotha, 1888.
A very suggestive comparison of Austriah and Prussian adminis-
trative methods may be found in

HiNTZE, Otto. Der osierrcichische und der pretissische Beamteii-
Slaat. Historische Zeitschrift. Bd. j.*
Oeneral. Ranke, L. Die Deutschen Mdcht eund der FUrstenbund,
2 Bde. Leipzig, 1871-72.

CHAPTER III

' Memorial S.P.F. German Stales, Ilmaria, vol. Ill sub fin.
The date is 1776 and, though unsigned, the report is based on good
information. It is undoubtedly written by Hugh Elliot. Cp.
S.P.F. Bavaria, vol. 113, July 10, 1778, Eden to Suffolk.

' These statements of Elliot's should be compared with those
233

234 FREDERIC THE GREAT [chap.

of Schreiber, Max Joseph III., Miinchen, 1863, pp. 193-98, and of
Munnioh, Gesckichte der Entwiekelung der bairischen Armee, Munchen,
1863, pp. 79-115. Both writers base their evidence on the archives,
which witness to the numbers, but not to the efficiency, of the army.
Heigel, whose works are an honour to Bavarian history, touches only
briefly on this period. The best modern' account is in Doeberl,
Entwickelungsgesckichte Bayerns, Miinchen^ 1912, ii. pp. 254-331,
with good general bibliographies. It should be remembered that
I am not concerned solely with Max Joseph's internal policy, and
that my criticism of him is largely based on the fact that he had no
external policy worth the name.

' See Elliot's unsigned Memorial, apud 1776. S.P.F. German
States, vol. Ill (passim). I have softened the rhetoric of some of his
denimciations, but its conclusions seem on the whole sound.

Buchner, Geschichte von Baiern, Miinchen, 1853, Bd. ix. 241, fol-
lowed by Hoffman, pp. 149-69, mentions instances of some improve-
ment in the principles of taxation. Buchner, ix. pp. 250-51, ascribes
the failure to improve the agriculture to the suspicion of the peasants,
and blames the ignorance of the Bavarian populace for the relative
failure of the attempts to start factories and introduce foreign
artisans. Only one manufacture, that of- beer, responded to the
enlightened poUcy of the princes, especially under Maximilian the
Great. That worthy is usually renowned for his acquisition of the
Upper Palatinate and the Electoral title in 1623, but his encourage-
ment of beer is his chief merit in the eyes of an anonymous writer.
For that " the Elector can glorious be, and the whole land will
reverence his undertaking so long as the world lasts. Nowhere now
save in this land does one drink such good and health-giving beer."
Indeed Munich still holds its reputation. (Emil Struve, Entwiekelung
des bayerischen Braugewerbes in XIX. [Schmoller, ii. Heft 1, p. 11].)

For general econornic conditions, see J. Kaizl, Der Kampf um
Gewerhereform und Gewerbefreiheit in Bayern (1799-1868), Leipzig,
1880, p. 47, where he accounts for the failure of Bavarian industries
in the eighteenth century by the exhaustion produced by the wars.

L. Hoffman, Okonomische Geschichte Bayerns untcr Montgelas,
Erlangen, 1885, gives a study of later economic developments with
a useful retrospective sketch.

On the extraordinarily primitive conditions of the Bavarian
peasants in the country districts, see Wraxall, Memoirs of the Counts
(1777-79), London, 1779, vol. ii. p. 199. He considers them very
inferior to the Saxons in intelligence, wealth, and physique. Like
so many backward races — compare the Slavs in the Balkans of
to-day — the Bavarian peasant possessed a natural and beautiful
peasant art, as the remains in the Bayerisehe National Museum still
show.

m] AND KAISER JOSEPH 235

* Minto's Memoir pj Hugh Elliot. V. J'. Lipowsky, Max Joseph,
pp. 1S8-03, shows Uirtt the charitable efforts were not wholly
speetacuhvr. Ho gives insUinccs of llic foundind of hospitals for
waifs aiul strays ; nnd Biuhner, pp. 25:2-53,,mcntion8 the allowances
made to poor students at the universities.

A good study of Nymphenburg, in its histoiieol and artistic
aspects, is given by K. T. Hcigel, Neue hist'. Vorlriige, Munich, 1883,
pp. 287-308.

' The incident is related by Buchner,. Geschichte Bayerns, ix.
pp. 254-55 ; other amiable traits of Max Joseph are given on p. 240.
Compare Rothanimer, Leben Max Joseph von Bayern, MUnchen,
1785 ; L. Westenrieder, Gesch. von Baiern fUr das Jugend und das
J'olk, ii. pp. 660-70, Miinchen, 1785 ; F. 3. Lipowsky, Leben und
thaten Max Joseph, Miinchen, 1838 (well Written, but based chiefly
on official acts), esp. ii. pp. 238-80.

The work based on most modem reseofph is that of F. A. W.
Schreiber, Max Joseph III., Munich, 1863.

For reasons given in the text, I find myself unable to agree with
Buchner's view or with that of more recent historians. The study
which holds the scale most evenly is L. II., Pfah-Baiem gegen Ende
des IS. Jahrhunderts [F. v. Raumer, Hist. Taschenbuch, Leipzig,
1864]. Doeberl is the best among recent historians.

* Krennek, Fr. von. Finanzxustand in den Jahren 1777, 1792,

1798-99, 1880. Miinchen, 1803.
BucHNEK, ix. pp. 253-55. Cp. Lipowsky, Max Joseph, pp.

165-67, 279-81.
Seyfbied, J. E. VON. Gesch. der standischen Gerichtsbarkeit

in Bayem. 2 vols. Pest und Leipzig, 1791-98.

S[eyfried], J. E. VON. Zur Geschichte bairischer Landschaft

und Steuem. Miinchen, 1800.

Elliot (Memorial, 1776, SJPJ'. German SlaUs, vol. 111) reckons

the average income at 3,376,000 florins (excluding the customs,

which brought in little in his day), but exyiift'sslyiadds that these are

"ordinary computations," and tliat the Elector concealed the real

state of the finances, though expenditure certainly exceeded income.

In 1803 a Bavarian balance-sheet of the year 1777 was published

by Franz von Krenner, an old financial official. According to him

the income was 4,381,427 florins, the expenses 4,453,379 florins, and

the deficit, therefore, 71,932 florins. The Cpurt cost 729,822 florins,

of which 173,976 florins went in pensions. Buchner put the pension

item at 200,000 florins. As German rulers went at this time, the

expenditure of the sixth of the total on the Court was moderate.

Timeschange, and between 1801 and 1867tlieexpense8 of the Bavarian

Court were reduced to one-fifteenth of the national income. Other

financial statistics of Bavaria under Max Joseph are quoted by L. H.

236 FREDERIC THE fiREAT [chap.

in Pfalz-Baiern gegen Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts [F. v. Raumer,
Historisches Taschetibmh, 4te Folge, 5ter Jahrgang, Leipzig, 1864,
314-15 sqq.).

No one will deny that Max Joseph made" some financial improve-
ments (Buchner, ix. 233-85, 241 ; Elliot, Memorial). The most
important of these was the establishing of a Sinking Fimd, which
reduced the debt from forty million florins to sixteen. None the
less, the evidence seems to me conclusive that Max Joseph was less
skilful as a financier than Karl Theodor. By 1792 the latter had
wiped out all deficits, and had a surplus of over fifteen thousand
florins. See on the whole subject Ludwig- Hoffman, Geschichte der
direJiten Steuern in Baiern adii. - saiiii, [SchmoIIer's Forschungen,
Bd. iv. Heft 5, Leipzig, 1883, pp. 149-218, with Bibhography].

' Cp. Schreiber, Max Joseph III. 135-53. On the code and
judicial system see A. von Bechmann, Kreittmayr, Der oberbayerische
Kanzler, Festrede, Mtinchen, 1896. This lecture deals chiefly with
his legal reforms. Compare the biography in Deutsche allgemeine
Bibliographie. The French commend hira for his talents, Reetieil
des instructions, Baui&re Palatinat, Dews Pords, Andr6 Le Bon, Paris,
1899, pp. 322, 331, and pension him for his services, p. 345. Elliot
does him full justice in the English despatches {e.g. Memorial, 1776,
S.P.F. German States, vol. Ill), where he says he " is not more
remarkable for a mind enlarged by study, than for candor and
integrity, occupied with the duties of his office, perhaps disgusted
with the men in power, or averse from the measures prescribed, he
meddles little in political business"). We shall see later on that
when he did so meddle the part he played was fairly creditable.

' Buchner, ix. 258. Compare L. Westenrieder, Geschichte der
Akademie der Wissenschaft, Bd. i. 196-218 ; " Aus den Handschrift
nachlassen L. W." (Abkand. der Miinchner Akademie, Bd. xvi.).
Westenrieder, a critic partial to Bavaria, admits that its general level
of culture (c. 1770) was poor. Cp. Schreiber, Max Joseph, pp. 226-53.

' Lipowsky, Geschichte der Schulen in Bayern (1825) ; Buchner,
ix. 271 sqq. ; August KZuckhohn, " Der Freiherr von Ickstatt und das
Unterrichtswesen in Bayern unter dem Churfiirsten Max Joseph HI."
(Vortrag in der offentlichen Sitzung der Koniglichen Akademie der
Wissenschaften am SS. Juli 1868), Miinchen, 1869. The ecclesiastical
and educational reforms are shortly described in Schreiber, Max
Joseph, 199-252. Max Joseph displayed a certain amount of
liberality with regard to the press - censorship, and inaugurated
a freedom, strictly qualified indeed, but one which was a great innova-
tion on the previous Press restrictions. Cp. K. T. Heigel, Neue
historische Vortrdge und Aufsatze, Miinchen, 1883, 236-45.

" That, after 1772, the main initiative in the designs on
Bavaria lay with Joseph and not Maria Theresa is abundantly clear

xnl AND KAISER JQSEPH 287

from Arneth, Geschicble -l/nrtii Tlieresias, Viiiuio, 1870, BU. x. 201
sgq. It sif ins ncnlli-ss Ui prove u uiiiveisfilly (ibvious propoHition.
The most important single documents are Kiifmitz, " Dinksclnifl iiljcr
Baiern, December -"2, 1770," Arcliivfilr Gut. (.'(sch. Bd. xlviii., N'icnna,
1872. Kr»-dcric's views may be found in! Wuvres (edition, 1780),
vol. iii. pasxiiii. and Nugent reports an interview witli liim on the
subjeit on May 0, 1770, tu .Maria Theresa (May 25, 1770) ; see Arneth,
Maria Theresa, viii. r)7:j-7(i, and E. Hcimann, Preuss. (n'sch. ii. 008.
The instruction of \'crgennes to the Chevalier de la Luzeruc, French
envoy extraordinary to Uu\ario, of December, 1770, is a masterly
summary of the situation at the very moment before tlie crisis
(see Heciteil des inslniclions, Baviirr Palatinat, Deux Fonts, par
Andr* Le Bon, Paris, 1880, pp. 300-78).

" Cp. Sboniik, Ixv, 301-14, which giVes the view of Zwei-
briicken. The best modern discussion of the claims is to be found
in E. Reimann, Geschichle des bairischen Erbfolgekrieges, Leipzig,
1809, pp. 101-108, with more modern treatment in his Neucrc
preusisisclie Geschichte, Bd. ii., Gotha, 1888^ His view is generally
favourable to Prussia. .\ good study of the Pact of 1721 is in K. T.
Heigel, Geschkhtlkhe Bildcr und Sh-izzcn, Miincheii, 1897 ; Die
wittelsbachische Uaui-Uiiion von 17 C 4, pp. 1*1,1-74 (ii(/f infra, nn. 11,
13, 14, etc.); and Bitterauf, Die v^ilielsbacldsche Ilaus-Union von
1746-1747, Munich, 1903. A. Beer, "Zur Qeschichte des bairischen
Erbfolijekrieges," Hist. Zeit. Bd. xxxv., [1876], is anti-Austrian.

" SJ'.F. German Stales, Bavaria, vol. Ill, Elliot to Suffolk,
April 3, 1776 ; see also Report on Bavaria^by ElUot. The second
report is by Sir R. Murtay Keith, British Ambassador to Vienna, and
is contained in SJ'.F. Germany, vol. 218, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk,
December 22, 1770. Keith plumes himself much on the learning
of his essay and the accuracy of his forecasts, cp. S.P.F, Germany,
vol. 220, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk, Januajy 3 and 21, 1778. Cp.
Vergennes, Instructions i De la Luzerne, December 1776, Recueil
des instructions, Baviirc, Paris, 1889, pp. 307-78.

" S.P.F. German Empire, vol. 220, Vienna, January 6, 1778,
Keith to Suffolk ; see also 1776 Elliot's report, S.P.F. German States,
vol. 111.

" For Maria Theresa's view see Arneth, Maria Tlicresin und
Joseph II. Hire Korrespondenz, Bd. ii. Vienna, 1807, p. 171 , M. T, an
Joseph, January 2, 1778 ; " Si mdmc nos pretentions sur la BaviOre
fetaient plus constat^eset plus sohde8f|u'ellcsneSont, on dcvraitliteitcr,"
and so on in the same strain. See also Bricfr, Maria Tlicresin an Hire
Kinder und Freunde, M. T. an Leopold, March 12, 1778, Vienna,
1881, Bd. i. pp. 88: "Nous ne pouvons . . . avouer notre faute."
Hertzberg's views on the superior justice of Frederic's claimi may
be found in A. Unzcr, Ilerlzberg'a Anteil an der preuaaisch-dstcr-

238 FREDERIC THE GREAT [chap.

reichischen Verhandlungen, 1778-1779, Frankfort a. M., 1890, 26,
130-31.

IB Definite family compacts, laying down the principle of
reciprocal inheritance between the Wilhelmine and Rodolphine
branches, had confirmed this practice at different times [1524, 1618].
It had also been ratified by several Emperors and by the Peace of
Osnabruck (1648). The Family Compacts had been renewed in
1673, 1724, and in 1766, 1771, and 1774, during the Ufetime of Max
Joseph. See Keith's Report and K. T. Heigel, Die wittelsbachische
Haus-Union von 17S4 (Gesch. Bilder und Skizzen, Miinchen, 1897),
pp. 141-74, and Sbornik, Ixv. 301-307, note of Hohenfels " touchant
la garantie des trait6s et pactes de famille de 1766, 1771, et 1774."

^' Text of will is in Buchner, ix. 280. A more detailed history
of these negotiations may be found in Chapter VI.

CHAPTER IV

1 For the whole account here, see S.P.F. German States,
Bavaria, vol. 112, Munich, January 1, 1778, Eden to Suffolk. It is
not altogether fanciful to compare this succession scene with that by
the bedside of Queen Anne in England in 1714. There was the same
baffling of intriguers, the same excitement and confusion, the same
dramatic close. Note, Karl Theodor, being already Elector Palatine,
was not allowed at the subsequent Peace of Tesehen to assume
the title of Elector of Bavaria, and Bavaria's Electoral vote was
abolished.

2 The transaction with Karl Theodor is obscure. Bitter's full
powers were signed by Karl Theodor on No.vember 29, 1777, and
on December 14 he appeared in Vienna. He appears to have been
ignorant of the Facte of 1774 between Max Joseph and Karl Theodor,
See A.Unzer, "Die Entstehung des Pfalz-osterreichischen Konvention,
Januar 8, 1778," Mitteil. des Instituis fiir osterreichische Geschichte
Bd. XV., Vienna, 1894, p. 102, and the whole article for detailed
study. The leading general authorities are : Austrian, Arneth, Maria
Theresia, Vienna, 1879, Bd. x. pp. 294-318 ; and Prussian, E,
Reimann, Neuere Geschichte des preussischen Staates (Gesch. der
europaischen Staaien), Gotha, 1888, Bd. ii. pp. 23-33, and Appendix,
681 - 98. Reimann criticizes Arneth somewhat severely, but has
pointed to some positive errors of fact both in his account and that
of Beer. There is some useful criticism of Arneth in A. Erhard,
" Hcrzogin Maria Anna von Bayern und der Teschener Friede," Ober-
bayrisches Archivfur valerlandische Geschichte, Bd. xl. pp. 6-8. The
public documents connected with this whole crisis are most of them
given in E, F, v. Hertzberg, Recueil des didttctions manifestes traitis
etc., publics par la cow de Prusse, 3 vols., Berlin, 1789.

.V] AND KAISER JOSEPH 239

• The full text wns only publislu'il on Februnry 10, see S.P.F.
Bavaria, vol. 113, Kdon to Suffolk, I'cljnmry i!2, 1778. The pensions
to the bnstonls of Kiirl Theoiior were not BfHciflcully niiincd in tlie
treiity, but may reiisomibly be infLrroil froni tlie evidence. Sec
SJ'.F. Havana Archiws, vol. xlv., Katisbon, Novtiiibcr 8, 1778,
Ileathi-otc to FrnsiT, sio Frederic, Qiuvre.i posthumis [1789), iii. p.
314. His informntion was based on Goer/, (letlcr to Kridoric,
April 1778, Mill, dts Iiisl. fiir osl. Gcsclt. xviii. p. 489) and on tlie
evidence of Duchess Maria Anna, February 6, ,1777, quoted in Goerz,
Xlihnoire historiquc de la nfgociation en 177^ pour la succession de
BavUre, Frankfort, 1812, pp. 78-79. Cp. Edelsheim to Finckenstiin,
January 10, 1778 : " Quant 4 I'Electeur il ne paralt rien avoir |)lug
fortement h cocur que I'ttablissemcnt de 7 b4tards d6clar6s auxquels
il souhaite de pouvoir assurer un sort brillant aprds sa raort. S'il
est \Tai qu'il se propose d'en rcconnaitre deux autres dans peu ses
embarros 4 cet £gard n'en feraient qu'augmenter davantage," K.
Obser in Mitt, des Inst, fiir ost. Gesch. Bd. xix?. p. 845.

• Hitter and Karl Theodor had, in fact, ^e^•ealcd most of the
negotiations to Vergennes, see A. Unzer, Friede von ieschen, Kiel,
1903, pp. 36-41. Karl Theodor's letter to Zwelbriicken, admitting
the compulsion under which he had signed the treaty, was not known
to Russian diplomats until December 1778. See Imperial Russian
Historical Society Archives (Sbomik), vol. Ixy. pp. 84-85, Dolgorukov
(BerUu) to Bariatinsky, Paris, December 13, 1778.

• For the neutrality of France the best general account is
A. Unzer, Der Friede von Teschen, Kiel, 1903, pp. 1-101 ; see also
Tratchewsky, " La France et I'Allemagne sous Louis XVI," Revue
hiatmique, tome xiv. Breteuil's news cart be found in F. von
Raumer, Beilrdge zur neueren Geschichie, Leipzig, 1839, Bd, v. pp.
301-46 ; for those of Vergennes, see Flassan, Hist, g^nirale de la
diplomatie franfaise, ii. 189 sq., vii. pp. 13!S-40 (2nd edition) ; see
also Bailleu, Revue critique. No. 31, 1881 ; and Rccucil des Instruc-
tions donnies aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France, Baviire
Palatinat, Dnux Fonts, A. Le Bon, Paris, 1889, pp. 306-78, 527-30.
For the Austrian view of French policy, see Arneth, Maria Theresia,
X. pp. 41-48, 663, 665 ; and Ameth et Flammermont, Correspondance
secrite du Comte de Mercy- A rgenteau avec Fenipereur Joseph II,
tome ii. pp. 520-26 ; Ameth et Geffroy, Correspondance secrite entre
Marie TMriae et le Comte de Mercij-Argenleau, iii. 10-18, 151-53 ;
Ameth, Marin Theresia und Marie Antoinette, Ihr Brirjwechsel 1777-
1780 (Paris and Vienna, 1865), pp. 215-50.

• Frederic and France, see the short notice in Frederic, (Euvres
postkumes, iii. pp. 810-19, and Unzer and other authorities as before,
with the addition of Kozer's classic Biography of Frederic, Berlin,
1908, Bd. ii. S17-30, and Reimann, Ncuerc Geschichie des preussiachen

240 FREDERIC THE GREAT [chap.

Staaies, Gotha, 1888, Bd. ii. Frederic's Poliiische Korrespondenz
has as yet been published only till 1774.

' Frederic seems to have cherished a hope that Hanover might
actively assist Vienna as late as June 28, K. W. v. SchOning, Der
bayerische Erbfolgekrieg, Beriin, 1854, p. 57.

8 S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 102, Berlin, Elliot to Suffolk, February 3,
1778. Cp. S.P.F, German States, Bavaria, vol. 112, Ratisbon,
January 9, 1777, Listen to Eden, and Max Joseph's utterance to
Elliot, April 1, 1776 (vide supra). Frederic's letter, February 16, 1778,
to Prince Henry disclaims all aggrandizement or acquisition
(Sehoning, p. 16), and indicates a line of action which was consistently
adhered to.

* O. Eustache de Goerz, Mimoire historique de la rUgodation en
1178, Frankfort a. M., 1823, pp. 88-84, and vide infra Chap. VI. passim,

i" Over the Sohonburg affair, cp. Arneth, Maria Tkeresia, Vienna,
1879, Bd. X. pp. 278 et seq. and note 11, infra. Alvensleben (Prussian
ambassador to Saxony) writes to Frederic, March 6, 1778: "C'est
vraiment depuis ce moment (the raising of the Schonburg question)
que je date le changement de la Cour et de la Nation en faveur de
votre Majesty, car jusqu'^ cette 6poque ils nous craignoient," quoted
by E. Reiinann, " Friedrich August IH. and Karl Theodor," Neues
Archivfiir sacksische Geschichte (Dresden, 1883), Bd. iv. p. 316.

" S.P.F. German Empire (Austria), vol. 220, Vienna, January
28, 1778, Keith to Suffolk ; A. Beer, " Zur Geschichte des bayrischen
Erbfolgekrieges," Hist. Zeit. Bd. xxxv. (1876) ; see also E. Reimann,
" Friedrich August und Karl Theodor," Neues Archiv fiir sdchsische
Geschichte und Alterihumskunde, Dresden, 1883, Bd. iv. pp. 316-39.
The last pages contain a severe criticism of Arneth, who is charged
with " grosse Parteiliehkeit."

'2 Saxon-Prussian Alliance, see S.P.F. Poland (Saxony), vol.
115, Dresden, February 25, March 1, 8, April 8, 12, J. Milliquet to
Eden. Cp. E. Reimann, " Friedrich August III. und Karl Theodor,"
Neues Archiv fiir sdchsische Geschichte, Bd. iv., Dresden, 1883 ; vide
also A. Unzer, Hertzberg's Anteil an den preussiseh-osterreichischen
Verhandlungen 1778-1779, Frankfort a. M., 1890, pp. 10-11, 15, 19-20,
and A. Beer, Hist. Zeitschrifi, Bd. xxxv. p. 110.

1' S.P.F. Bavaria Archives, vol. 45, Ratisbon, November 8,
1778, Heathcote to Fraser, see also December 16, 1778, which gives
Karl Theodor's letter of January 22, 1778 to Zweibriieken on this
very subject.

" S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. 113, Ratisbon,
Morton Eden to Suffolk, July 10, 1778. Further evidence of this
fact is to be found in Germany (States), Cologne, vol. 155, April 6,
1778, Bonn, Cressemer to Lord Suffolk, " By what I learn in Dis-
course with the Elector (of KO'n) most of the Electoral Princes and

V] AND KAISER JOSEPH 2H

states of tlie EUnpiro secretly wisli the IIoiinc of AuHtriii may not
kctp wtint tlicy hiivc token of the Succession of the laic l-llcclor of
Bavarin, as that wouki render the l.nipcror too powerful," etc. etc.,
cp. Heimann, Preuss. (If.ich. ii. 78-7!).

" Keiniann, Pretissischc Htxchichlc, ii. pp. 02-l)t ; A. Unzer,
Ilerlsberg's Antril, pp. 39-tl ; ibid., Neues Archiv fiir siiclm. Gcsch.
iii. W2j-ii ; A. Beer, Hist. Zeil. Bd. xxxv. p. 145. (p. l-iedeiic in
(Euvres poi/Awmfs (1789), tome iii. pp. :i2l-22; the correspondence
l^tween Frederick and Joseph is gi\en on pp. 305-80. Note S.P.F.
Archives, Heathcotc to Fraser, July 12, 1778.

" .\. Beer, Hist. Zeil. Bd. xxxn. p. 141*. I should not like to
give the impression that Hertzberg was worthy of the contempt
here bestowed on him by Frederic. He wa.s a fanatical Prussian,
and at times too rash and eager, but he was a resolute and thoughtful
statesman, whom Frederic esteemed as welf as derided. See Study
by Bailleu, Hist. Zeil. Bd. xlii., and Leben, hy A. T. Preuss, Berlin,
1908.

CHAPTER V'

• Calonne, Nok$ sut la vie de Josef II, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS.
27487. Cp. Oskar Criste. Kriege unter KaisfT Josef II., Wicn, 1904,
pp. 8-15. Nosinieh, Kaiser Josef als Fcldkerr, ^^'ien, 1885, is
less document than Criste. Cp. a very important MS. report in Lord
Lansdowne's MSS. vol. xlii., by Burgoyne (of Saratoga), Appendix
II., which criticizes the Prussian army on the lines mentioned in the
text, and praises the Austrian. See also SJ'.F. Empire, vol. 220,
Vienna, Keith to Suffolk, February 15, 17, 1778.

« SJ'.F. German Empire, vol. 220, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk,
April 8, 1778. There is a good deal of information as to the re-
organization of the Austrian army betwecnJ1768 and 1778 scattered
through Keith's despatches. In a Memorandum written after the
war Laudon (see Janko, Loudon's Lebeft„ ^^■ien (1869), 394-97)
criticized the Austrian War OfQce for not having built enough
fortresses in Bohemia, for a shortage in hospital requisites, for the
absence of a properly organized general sfaff, and for a deficiency
in light troops.

• The miUtary ability of Prince Henry deser\-es more study
and attention than it has received. As a, strategist he appears on
the whole as an advocate of the Austrian S<;hool {vide nn. 4 and 5).
There is no first-rate modem study of the Bavarian War from the
German side. SchGning, Der baycrische ErbfolgckricU. Berlin, 1854,
is antiquated, but valuable for the corresfjondcncc of Frederic and
Prince Henry. R. Koser, " Prinz Heinrieh und General MOllendorf
im bayrischen ErbfolgckrieR " (Fofrsch. z. bjrand. und preuss. Gesch.,
\-ol. xxiii.). Thicro is a fairly good anonymous account in Kampagne

U

242 FREDERIC THE GREAT [ohap.

des Prinzen Heimich, 1778-79, Bde. Ixiv., Ixv. [Zeit. fur Kunst,
Wissenschaft und Geschichle des Krieges, Berlin, 1845].

« The Austrian School was at least intelligible and consistent
in appljdng the principle that fortification, choice of ground, and
manoeuvres for position were the real ends of war. These conten-
tions were strengthened by the natural caution and indolence of
the Austrian temperament, and by the exercise of control over
armies in the field by the War Office at Vienna. It is worth noting
that the most successful Austrian generals ofthe eighteenth century,
Eugene and Laudon, were those who paid least attention to Vienna,
and who were least bound by the traditional Austrian tactic and
strategy. The typical Austrian general of the mid-eighteenth century
is Daun or Lascy. Between the latter and Laudon an interesting
comparison was made in 1778 by Wraxall, Mem. Courts of Berlin,
Vienna, etc. (1799), vol. i. pp. 331-44.

6 In these sentences I raise the whole question of the strategy
and tactics of the Frederician period. The extreme view is put thus
by Lord Acton :

" Even in his own army, on his own staff, in the royal family,
there were two opinions. There was a school which taught that
actual fighting must not be resorted to until the use of brains has
been exhausted, that the battle comes in when the manoeuvre has
failed, that the seizure of a strategic position, or a scientific retreat
... is the first defence of armies, so that a force which is tactically
inferior may be strategically superior. Frederic was, I believe, the
first great soldier to reject this doctrine, and to act on the principle
that nothing can destroy the enemy except a pitched battle, and
that the destruction of the enemy, not the weakening of the enemy,
is the right object in war. His battles were very numerous and very
sanguinary, and not always decisive. Napoleon followed in his
footsteps, manoeuvring less, as he grew older, and fighting more.
It is the adopted teaching of the Prussian School, since Clausewitz
and Moltke." — ^Lord Acton, Lectures on Modern History, Loudon,
1906, p. 298.

The assumption appears to be that Frederic emancipated war
from the theories of what I may call the Austrian School (the school
which advocated warfare of manoeuvre for positions), and initiated
the theory of the Clausewitz School, in which the supreme object of
the campaign is to lead up to a decisive battle and to ensure the
destruction of the field-army of the enemy*

The question has been hotly discussed in Germany by historians
and military experts. The controversy is well summed up by
Professor Hans Delbruck in his articles " tJber die Verschiedenheit
der Strategic Friedrichs und Napoleons," and in " General von
Clausewitz" (Historische und politische Aufsdize, 2te Auflage, Berlin,

V] AND KAISER JOSEPH 248

IB08, i>p. 205-301). His miun contention ia thnt in the cixlitccnth
century {i.e. before 1780) certain fundimiental diffiTcnccH |irtvcntcd
tJic waging of a lampaijjn on tlie linis favoured liy Niipoleon or hy
Clausewitz. Tliese differences are (1) the mueli snialier number of
troops which could be conccntrateil in a siiiigle theatre of wur. In
such concentrations Frederic never assembled more tlian 100,000,
Napoleon often three or four times tliat, total. (2) The hetero-
geneous character of the troops, half of Frederic's being non-Prussian,
and pressed or hired men vrilh no special enthusiasm. This necessi-
tateil an iron discipline, for to many of the troops appeals to nation-
ality and national pride would be meaningless. The stick and not
the flag was therefore the military symbol, and Frederic liimself
lays down that it is necessary to make troops respect the bftton and
fear their own officers more than the enerny. Tliis rigid discipline
necessitated close linear formations and prevented the use of tirail-
leurs. (3) The difficulty of procuring supplies for the troops under
Frederic contrasts strongly with the Napoleonic method. Under
Napoleon large portions of a French national army could be detached
to make " requisitions." Under Frederic only a few trusted regi-
ments could be allowed to forage, the main Jjody being concentrated
to prevent escape or desertion on the part of any of the heterogeneous
troops. Accordingly, the Fredcrician host was strictly tied to a
long Une of communications and magazine^. Its movements were
slow in proportion, victories could not quickly be followed up, nor
retreats rapidly accomplished. The Fredcrician army was like a
diver in the sea, its movements strictly limited and tied by the long,
slender communicating tube which gave it life.

If these fundamentals be granted as to (1) The smallness of the
Fredcrician armies in actual numbers, (2) their denationalized charac-
ter, (3) their difficulties as to supply, certaih conclusions necessarily
follow. Under Frederic there could not be the same available
margin for risks, the same power of inspiring the masses with
enthusiasm, or the same power of rapid advance and concentration
as under Napoleon. Accordingly for the} Prussian a battle was
neither as necessary nor as decisive an incident in a campaign as it
was for the French emperor.

Considerations like these solve the question of the differences
between the warfare of the mid-eighteenth century and that of the
early nineteenth. The Austrian military scliool under Daun under-
stood these considerations to impose great cjiution on a commander.
They made warfare chiefly an affair of oapturing fortresses and
convoys, and forbade him to risk a battle except when he was certain
to win. Frederic's utterances on the sulijeet are not altogether
consistent ; he can be quoted as lending some support both to the
Austrian School and to the Napoleonic. lie understood, as Clause-

244 FREDERIC THE GREAT [chap.

witz did not, the real conditions of eighteenth century warfare,
and knew that for armies such as he led, the lightning advance, the
unexpected concentration, the decisive battle, and the fall of the
enemy's capital were only ideals. Where Frederic differs, and differs
decisively from Prince Henry, Daun, Lascy, and other commanders
of his age, is in recognizing the moral advantage of inspiring troops
with enthusiasm, and the unique opportunity which a battle gives
for this purpose. The Frederician method is illustrated best by the
battles of Rossbach and Leuthen, when he frankly appealed to the
nobler instincts of his soldiers and boldly resolved on a decisive battle.
In significant contrast, however, to Napoleon, Frederic manoeuvred
more and fought less as he grew older, as .is markedly seen in the
1778 campaign.

The general result of his investigation may be summed up as
follows. The Austrian School advocated the scientific manoeuvre
for position, and regarded the supreme object as the destruction
of hostile supplies and the occupation of strategic points. The
school of Napoleon and Clausewitz has since advocated the scientific
manoeuvre in order to force a decisive action, regarding the supreme
objective as the destruction of the hostile-army in the field. The
ardent genius of Frederic drove him in the direction of Clausewitz,
but his common-sense recognition of the limitations which a semi-
mereenary army and the diificulties of supply imposed on him,
prevented any complete acceptance of that strategy. He fought
battles oftener than the Austrian School considered right, and less
decisively than Clausewitz would have expected. The explanation
is to be found in the conditions of the age, which did not allow
Frederic to revolutionize the art of war, though his genius broke
through the precise rules of the existing school, and formulated
military axioms for another age to carry out. (The subject may
be further studied in R. Koser, " Preussische Kriegfiihrung im
7jahrigen Kriege," Hist. Zeit. xcii.; R Bernhardi, Delbruck,
Friedrich der Grosse und Clausewitz, Berlin, 1892 ; Bonnal, L'Esprit
de la guerre moderne, Paris, 1903 ; Treitschke, c. 23, Politik, Eng.
trans., 1914.)

« Criste, 83-84. Judged by a modern military criticism, Laudon's
suggestion would be sound and right, but not entitled to the special
commendation given in the text. I think, however, a study of the
conditions of contemporary warfare (cp. n. 5 and Delbriick) shows
that the enterprise was a daring one for any eighteenth century com-
mander to propose. It was specially daring in an Austrian general,
and in an enterprise directed against the Prussian master of warfare.

' S.P.F. Prussia, 102, Berlin, EUiot tb Suffolk, August 4, 11,
1778. This letter of Prince Henry's is not printed elsewhere, but
the positive affirmation of Elliot leaves no doubt as to its genuineness

v) AND KAISER JOSEPH 245

(cp. one from Henry to Frcileric of August .'i. quoted by ScliOning,
/Vr bayrrischf Krbfolgekrieg, IJiTlin, \HM), lOil). Klliut speaks at
till- ^iiolo ns n " nuircli tlmt does lionoiir to llio military tiilcniN even
of Prince llonry."

Cp. " Kiunpnj^nc dcs Prin7.cn Ileinrich (1778-70)," Zeilnchrifl
fiir Kunst, }yissenschafl und Geschichle des Krieges, Berlin, IS'IS,
Bd. Ixiv., pp. 102-68, which gives details bf the dilliculties of the
marcli. Consult also Gruf Lippe on MOUendorf, Jahrbuch fiir die
deutsche Annee, Bd. eix.

« Criste, 90-96, 97, 102. The defence of Laudon is undertaken
by W. E. von Janko, Loudon's Leben, i^ach Original-Artni des
K, K. Haus- Hof- Stoats- und Kriegs-Archivs, Correspondciizen uiul
Qttenen, Wien, 1869, pp. 373-98. G. B. Malleson's Life of Laudon,
London, 1887, is merely a summary of Janko. Both speak of
" masterly raanoEuvres," on the part of Laudon, but neither attempts
to defend his neglect to strengthen Tollepstein. Note review of
Janko by Schaefer, Hist. Zeit. Bd. xiii.

' Criste, 103-4, 132-33 ; Janko, 388, 390-91. Laudons action in
ordering this retreat puts the finishing touch on his feebleness in
this campaign. In justice to him it should be mentioned that his
information appears to have been very imperfect, and in liis subse-
quent memorandum on the campaign (J^nko, 304), Laudon em-
phasizes the inadequacy of the scouting system and the absence of
a general staff.

»• Keimaim, Preussische Geschichle, ii. 166.

" Schoning, Der bayerische Erbfolgekrieg, 115-16.

" The losses of the Prussian army have been variously reckoned,
and it is difficult to separate those of Prinfce Henry from those of
Frederic. Prince Henry admits a loss of 2000 men by September 30
(SchOning, pp. 159-64). Janko, Loudon's Leben, p. 383, puts
Frederic's losses alone up to September at 12,000 killed, wounded,
and sick ; Nosinich (p. 189) at 14,000 ; .lanko puts losses of both
Henry and Frederic at 20,000. Criste, p. 1 1 1 , puts the totul Prussian
losses at 18,000, and Nosinich, p. 241, reckons the Austrian losses
at about the same. There are only two relatively impartial esti-
mates — that of Prince Charles of Hesse, himself a general and a volun-
teer in this campaign, though not an absolutely trustworthy witness,
whoputs I-'rederic's losses alone at over20,00(}(Mft«ot>f >.■, Copenhagen,
1801,pp. 80, 86, lOe) ; and that of Sir John Stepney, British Minister
at Dresden, who, on the strength of authentic knowledge, puts
Prince Henry's losses at 7000 to 8000 men. (SJ'.F. Poland {SaMny),
vol. 115, September 23, October 28, 1778,;Stcpney to Suffolk.) I
think, therefore, that we may reckon Prussia's total loss at at least
25,000, or about one-seventh of her forces.

" In a speech to his ofTicers on April 3, 1778, at Berlin, Frederic

246 FREDERIC THE GREAT [chap.

enjoined " humanity to unarmed enemies," as a " most sacred duty
... in every situation," but he certainly did not spare their pro-
perty. Here are one or two illustrations. Requisitions of 10,000
rixdales from the seigniory of Neuschlosif; beer, wine, and pro-
visions from the district. From Reic^enberg-Kuhendorf, 200
ducats, 80,000 rixdales, 2500 boisseaux of corn, and the same of
forage ; 80 fat bvdloclcs, 100 oxen, 150 cows. From the circle of
Satz, requisition of 132,000 florins {Supp. Exf"- a la Gazette de
Vienne, August 10, 1778). There is an interesting account of the
treatment of the small village of Kuesdorf in this war. According
to the village schoolmaster all the potatoes were dug up ; the young
shrubs cut down, and much firewood requisitioned ; 136 beasts
(horses, oxen, and cows) were taken ; and the total damage done was
estimated at 60,712 fl. \ kr. ; while some men of the village were held
to ransom and others requisitioned for service (" Zur Geschichte des
Kartoftel - Krieges," Mittheilungen des Vereins fur Geschichte der
Deutschen in Bohmen, Prag, Leipzig, and Wien, 1879, pp. 58-61),
There is no better account of the sufferings of peasants in eighteenth
century warfare, and it reveals a striking absence of patriotic
Austrian feeling, vide n. 17.

" See the April campaign scheme of Frederic quoted in Nosinich,
Kaiser Josef (Wien, 1885), 109. Frederic's omission to plan any
real advance into Moravia seems to have been due to a belief in
the speedy intervention of Russia, to which he clung with much
persistence. See Schoning, 132 ; Reimann, Preuss. Gesch. 144, 161 ;
Unzer, Friede von Teschen, 151 sqq.

The scheme quoted above throws the best light on the whole
action of Frederic in this campaign, which is still somewhat of a
mystery, and not cleared up by his own account or utterances.
There can, however, be no doubt that he intended originally to
attain decisive results and not to play a game of mere inaction.
Prince Charles of Hesse, not altogether a trustworthy witness,
declares that Frederic explained his inaction at Oels by the gout
(MHnoires de mon temps, p. 109). There can be no doubt that the
Braunau negotiations and poUtical conditions generally hampered
Frederic's military decision. But age, illness, and a very curious
political situation are hardly sufficient to account for his inaction.
The effort made by Frederic to increase the mobility of the army after
1778 shows that the slowness of the movements of the troops may
have been a contributory cause, and tMs is borne out by evidence
from Elliot, S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 104, June* 4, 1780.

Of one military criticism that is sometimes made it is best perhaps
here to dispose. It is stated that Prince Henry might have joined
forces with Frederic by marching north of Turnau. He could then
have broken through the Austrian centre, and forced the evacuation

V] AND KAISER JOSEPH 2t7

of the Arnnu-Jaroiucr line. It iippcars, liuwcvcr, crilaiii Hint bftd
roniU, hill, unit forest renilcreil it imiinssibk- to transport guns tlirough
tlieso roifions, and decisively viloivl tlic pmjrct iix n whole.

The best Miodern teclinieiil critique of tlie war iind its military
lessons is in Xosinieh, pp. 2K)-1:j, though. there is more detail in
Criste.

" Criste, 101. Older authorities, e.g. Janko, .'!8.5, say that
Lnudon wished to harass Prince Henry's retreat, but was forbidden
by Joseph. Criste, 133, ap|)ears to diseredft this view, and makes
Lnudon responsible for his own inaction.

" The modern military critic would assail the whole of Lascy'a
scheme on the ground that it was one for defence and not for \ictory.
This charge is unquestionably true, as may be seen from the Defen-
siottsplan drawn up by Lascy, .\pril 28, 1778 (given in Criste,
2(U)-H2). The whole plan was in accordahce with the traditional
Austrian strategy, and its adoption explt\ins why Joseph refused
to allow Laudon to join forces with him to crush Frederic at the
beginning of the campaign, and also to permit serious rearguard
actions at the close.

" Lascy was undoubtedly the most important military in-
fluence on the Austrian side. Prince Charles of Hesse (Mimoires,
109) quotes an instance of the confusion ,into which Joseph was
thrown by having to take a decision in the absence of Lascy. La.scy
seems to have reaped the chief credit at Vienna among the populace.
Laudon was still the hero of Bohemian peasants, who received liim
with shouts of joy and passed by Joseph and Lascy in silence (Janko,
377). Joseph was regarded by these peasants with mingled feelings,
as was shown when he went on an expedition to Maxen in disguise
with four oflBcers at the end of 1779. " On their return His Imperial
Majesty, being very inquisitive, got into a dispute at Guisuble
(Giessbubel) with some Peasants of that Place, and without the
very mild and prudent interposition of one of the Company it would
have ended in blows. That part of the Country having suffered
greatly during last Year's Campaigns, the Cpmmon People of course
are much exasperated against the Emperor ; they knew him, yet
would have used him very ill, under the Pretence of being ignorant
who those five officers were." Could irony or ingratitude further
go ? S.PJ". Poland, vol. 115, Dresden, December 29, 1779, Milliquet
to Fraser.

" Acton, Lectures in Modern History,, p. 298. "During the
French campaign of 1814 Napoleon said to Miirmont, ' Wc are still
100,000.' ' No,' said the marshal,' ' only on.ooo.' ' l-^xaetly,' Napoleon
replied, ' and myself, that is 100,000.' " Cp. t'roker, Diaries, \o\. iii.
p. 277. Wellington endorsed this estimate with his usual cautious
reservation.?. See Stanhope, Conversations lOith Wellington, 9, 81-83.

248 FREDERIC THE GREAT [chap.

For evidence of dissatisfaction of Prussian troops at the close of
the campaign, see Koser, 534 ; Criste, 111 ; Arneth, x. 534.

CHAPTER VI

1 The chief work on Karl Theodor as a ruler is K. T. dessen
Leben und Taien, F. J. Lipowsky, Sulzbach, 1828. This is antiquated,
as is A. Buchner, Geschichte von Baiern, Munich, 1853, Bd. ix.
HSusser, Geschichte der Rheinpfalz, 2 Bde., 1868 ; and Pftdz-Baiern
gegen Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts (Raumer's Historisches Tasckenbuch,
1865), give general histories of the Palatinate. Consult also K.
Hauck, Karl Theodor Kurfilrst von Pfah-Baiern ; Manuheimer,
GeschichtsblcUier, i. ; K. T. Heigel, Neue hist. Vortrage, Munich,
1883, pp. 304-6, is one of the few Bavarian historians who gives
credit to Karl Theodor for throwing open the artistic treasures of
Munich to the people, and who compares him, not unfavourably in
this respect, even with the beloved Max Joseph. Cp. also Heigel,
Geschichtliehe Bilder (Mimioh, 1897), p. S73. Doeberl, Entmicke-
lungsgeschichte Bayerns, vol. ii. p. 295, n. 2, quotes the evidence of
courtiers who favoured Karl Theodor.

» S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. 113, April 30, 1778,
Eden to Suffolk ; cp. Chap. IV. n. 3, for authorities. The chief are
A. Unzer, " Die Entstehung der Pfalzkonvention," Mitt, des Inst,
fur ost. Gesch. Forsch., Innsbruck, 1894, Bd. xv., and E. Reimann,
" Karl Theodor und Karl August," Neues Archiv fiir sdchsische
Geschichte, Bd. iv. pp. 316-39.

' Karl Theodor's own defence of his conduct in these negotia-
tions was that Bavaria had no army, and that his measures prevented
it becoming the seat of war. See his account in Buchner, Geschichte
Baierns, Bd. ix. pp. 128-31.

The characters of Vieregg and Hompfeche are also described in
the despatches of Edelsheim to Finckenstein, see Karl Obser, Mitt,
fiir 6st. Gesch. Bde. xviii. and xix., where Vieregg is represented as
having been appointed to direct foreign policy because he was pliable
and easily controlled.

• S.P.F. German States, Bavaria, vol. 113, Munich, January 22, 25,
29 ; April 23 ; Ratisbon, July 10, 1778. Eden to Suffolk.

s S.P.F. Bavaria Arch. vol. 45. Heathcote to Praser, June 6,
1779. Karl Theodor's letter to Zweibrucken (January 22, 1778) is
in id. to id. December 16, 1778. Cp. comment of Prince Dolgorukov
(Berlin), December 2, 1778, Sbornik, vol. Ixv. pp. 84-85,

The chief authorities on the mysterious and complicated negotia-
tions between Zweibriioken and Frederic, the Dowager Duchess, and
Karl Theodor are as follows ; A. Eckhart, " Graf du Moulin, Zwei-

v.] AND KAISER JOSEPH 249

briickcn und \'orsiiilles." Nine Ileidclberger Jahrbikher, Bd. v.,
1804 ; Th. v. Iloigcl, " Dio nrzieluinpcii Karl Aui^'ijst unci Max
Josef und Zwcibriickcii /u PrcuBScn," I'rniss. Hist, I' in I., Leipzig,
1900, Bd. iii. pp. '-'T-IH ; (iocra, ft. ICustuclie'von, Mtmoire liistorique
de la nfgociation en 177t! pour la sticcession de liavidrc, I'riinkfort
u.M., 1S2;1 ; A. I'.rhard, " Maria .\nna von Baycrn und der Teschener
Friede," Oberbaynsches Archiv, Bd. xl. (cp. also Allgem. Zeilung,
1SS2, No. 302) has a useful bibliography ; H, Meissner, M. A. v. B.
und der pretisaischer liciclisgesandler von ScfiwaTzenau, Jauer, 1890
(contains little save an important letter of Goertz, February 8, 1778).
Cp. also \. Viizer, "Zwcibriicken und die Sendung des Grafen GOrtz,"
Mitleilung des Inst, fiir dsterreichische GeschicMe, Bd. xviii., and
K. Obser, " Zur Sendung des Grafen GOrtz an den Zweibriicfcen Hof,"
ib. Bd. xix.

• V. Goerz, M&m. Hist. 83-100 j Meissner, Xl.A.v. B. und Schwarze-
nau, p. 9 ; A. Erhard, M. A. v. B. und der Teschener Friede, pp.
10-11.

' Reimann, Pr. Gesch. ii. 63-67.

• SJP.F. Archives Bavaria, vol. 4.i, Rafisbon, July 26, August
5, 23, September 6, 13, 23, Heathcote to Fraser.

• SJJ'. Arch, vol, 45, November ^, December 6, 1778,
Heathcote to Fraser.

10 SJ>.F. Prussia, vol. 103, Berlin, March 27, AprU 7, 1779,
Elliot to Weymouth. For a sketch of the conduct of Karl Theodor
during the period see Sbomik, vol. Ixv. pp. 3Q2-63, Galitzin to Repnin,
March 23, 1779.

" S.P.F. Arch. vol. 45, April 11, 1779, Heathcote to Fraser,
and Sbomik, vol. Ixv. pp. 407-08.

" Article VIII. of the Traits de Paix between Maria Theresa
and Frederic, Martens' Recueil des Trait^s, Petrograd, 1875, p. 70.

" SJP.P. For. Arch. vol. 45, Heathco'te to Fraser, June 10,
1770 ; sec SJP.F. Prussia, vol. 103, Beriin, August 1, 1779, Liston
to Fraser.

" SJ'.F. For. Arch. vol. 45, September 10, 1779, Heathcote to
Fraser.

" Jb. June 16, 1770, id. to id.

CHAPTER VII

1 S.P.F, Russia, vol. 102, Petrograd, Harris to Suffolk, August
14, 1778; S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 1 02, Berlin, Elliot to Suffolk, September
8, 1778 ; Adolph Beer, " Die Sendung Thuguts an Braunau und der
Friede zu Teschen," Hist. Zeitschrifl (1871), Bd. xxxviii. pp. 421-48.

250 FREDERIC THE GREAT [ohap.

For general study of the whole negotiations, consult Martens,
Papiers du Prince Repnin, in Sbornik, vol. Ixv., Petrograd, 1888 ;
and A. Unzer, Der Friede von Teschen, Kiel, 1903. The former gives
the papers from the Russian Archives ; the latter the results of the
latest study of the archives of BerUn, Dresden, Munich, Vienna, and
Paris. The papers of the British diplomats, which arc quoted in
the present volume, are the only considerable source yet unexplored.
The text of the Treaty is in Martens, TraiUs et conventions conclus
par la Bussie, Petrograd, 1875, tome ii. pp. 61-96, with useful com-
ments. Note for French policy Journal de Corberon, par L. H.
Labande, Paris, 1901, esp. ii. 200 n.

^ Sbornik, vol. Ixv. pp. 120-27. Soma valuable extracts from
Breteuil's despatches are in " F. v. Raumer, 1763-83," Beitrdge sur
neueren Geschichte, Leipzig, 1839, Bde. iii.-v.

" S.P.F. Archives, vol. 45, Ratisbon, September 27, 1778, Heath-
cote to Fraser.

* S.P.F. Archives, vol. 43, Ratisbon, September 27, Heathcote
to Fraser. S.P.F. German Empire, vol. 220, Vienna, September,
30, 1778, Keith to Suffolk.

^ Solms attributed the Russian intervention to Potemkin and
the tears of the Grand Duchess Paul, see Harris to Suffolk. S.P.F.
Russia, vol. 102, October 2/13, 1778.

« S.P.F. German Empire, vol. 220, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk,
June 24. S.P.F. Russia, vol. 102, Petrograd, Harris to Suffolk,
August 3/14, October 2/13, December 20/81, 1778 ; Harris twice
states that Frederic won over Potemkin. Cp. Unzer, F. von T., 208 ;
Arneth, Maria Theresia, x. 598 ; and Sbornik, Ixv. passim.

' S.P.F. Russia, vol. 102, Petrograd, September 21, October 2,
October 2/13, October 5/16, 1778, Harris to Suffolk.

8 S.P.F. Russia, vol. 102, Petrograd, Harris to Suffolk, October
2/13, December 20/31, 1778 ; Sbornik, vol. Ixv., November 10/21,
1778, Vienna, Galitzin to Panin.

• Sbornik, vol. Ixv., Vienna, Galitzin to Panin, November 10/21.
On November 19 at an interview with the Russian ambassador,
Prince Galitzin, he showed " extreme embarrassment " and " extra-
ordinary perplexity and agitation." PrinCe Galitzin spoke of the
peu de validiU of the Austrian pretensions to Bavaria, to which
Kaunitz replied his Court must choose between an entire sacrifice of
its dignity or run the risks of a murderous and perhaps general war.
Galitzin : " It would be infinitely glorious for the humanity of the
Empress Queen to renounce even evident and legitimate rights to spare
effusion of blood."

>» S.P.F. Russia, vol. 102, Petrograd, October 5/16, November
6/17, 1778, Harris to Suffolk.

u S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 102, Berlin, November 24, 1778, Elliot

vn] AND KAISER JOSEPH 251

to Suffolk. Cp. Kniinitz' luigry reply tii llrctiiiil's rcncctioriH of
October 18 : " to n'ost pas sur dcs conveniihces siir dcs tilns cl ties
droits ijuo la muisou <rAiitriclie s'c^t ^irrangfc," etc.

" S.P.F. Foreign .Irchivcs, Mil. t.j, Ratisboii, November l.'j,
Noveiubor 22, 177S, Heatln'olo lo Fnuser.

" Slioniik, Ixv. pp. 30-40 ; (.'alhuiiiit-'N report is dated October
27 : for Puiiin's letter to Galitzin of September 21, see p. 106.

>* Sboniik; Ixv. pp. 30-50.

" vS'.P.f . German Empire, Vienna, vol.* 220, Keith to Suffolk,
December 211, 1778. S-PJ". Archives, BoEvaria, vol. 15, Munich,
Hcftthcotc to rr:\MT, January 21, 1770.

" S.P.F. Archives, Bavaria, vol. 45 ; Munich, January 21, 1770,
Heuthcote to Fraser.

" S.P.F. German Empire, vol. 221, Vienna, January 2, 1779,
Keith to Suffolk.

" Impression had already been made before the Preliminaries,
see Panin to Bariatinsky, Russian ambassador at Paris, December 8,
1778. Sbornik, Ixv.

" SJ'J'. Russia, vol. 108, Petrograd, December 28, January
8, 1778-70, Harris to Suffolk. See also December 20/31, 1778 ;
January 11/22, 1779 ; last two quoted ip Malmesbury's Diary,
220-26.

"> S.P.F. German Empire, vol. 221, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk,
February 20, March 3, 1779. Cp. Frederic to Prince Henry, Febru-
ary 24, 1779, SchOning, p. 257.

n SJ'.F. Archives, vol. 45, April 4, 1779^ Heatheote to Fraser.
SJ'J'. German Empire, vol. 221, Vienna, May 10, Keith to Wey-
mouth.

" SJ'.F. Prussia, vol. 103, St. James's, May 28, 1779, Earl of
Weymouth to Elliot. Weymouth was acting for Suffolk, being the
other principal Secretary of State.

LIST OF BRITISH DirLOI\Ix\TISTS
MENTIONED IN THIS- PERIOD

Principal Secretaries of State

1775-82. Kaiiliern Department. — ^Thomas, 3rd Viscount
Weymouth (afterwards Marquis of Bath).

1771-79. Southern Department. — Henry Howard, 12th
Earl of Suffolk and Bcrksliire.

1779-82. Southern Depaiimeiit. — David Murray, Viscount
Stormont (afterwards Earl of Mansfield).

1779-82. Under Secretary (Southern Department). —
William Eraser.

A'MBASSADOHS

Austria and Empire —

17G.3-72. David Murray, Viscount Stormont.

1772 02. Sir Robert Murray Keith, K.C.B.
France —

1772-78. David Murray, Viscount Stormont.

Other Ministers and Envoys

Russia —

1771-70. Robert Gunning (afterwards Sir R.) (envoy
extrfiordinary and minister pleni-
potentiary).
1770-83. J. Harris (afterw.ords Sir R. and Earl
Malmesbury) (minister plenipotentiary).
253

254

FREDERIC THE QREAT

Prussia —
1772-76.

1776-82.
Saxony —

1775-83.
Bavaria —

1773-76.

1776-79.

1779.
1780.

1781-83.
1773-76.

James Harris (afterwards Sir R. and Earl

Malmesbury) (envoy extraordinary).]
Hugh Elliot (envoy extraordinary).

Sir John Stepney (envoy extraordinary).

Hugh Elliot (afterwards Sir H.) (minister
plenipotentiary to Bavaria and minister
to Diet of Ratisbon).

Moreton Eden (afterwards Sir M. and Lord
Harley) (minister plenipotentiary to
Bavaria and minister to Diet of Ratis-
bon).

Richard Oakes (minister to Diet of
Ratisbon).

Hon. J. Trevor (minister plenipotentiary to
Elector Palatine and minister to Diet of
Ratisbon).

Ralph Heathcote (minister plenipotentiary
to Elector of Koln).

Robert (afterwards Sir R.) Liston {charge
at Munich, 1776-79 at Berlin).

NOTE ON PUBLICATIONS OF THE PAPERS
OF BRITISH DIPLOMATS OF THE PERIOD

Elliot, Hugh, Memoir of. By Lady Minto. London, 1853.

Keith, Sir Robert Murray, Memoirs and Correspondence of.
Ed., Mrs. Gillespie Smith.. 2 vols. London, 1849.

Letters of the 1st Earl of Malmesbury to Family and
Friends. Ed., Earl of Malmesbury. 2 vols. London,
1870.

Political Diaries and Correspondence of 1st Earl of Malmes-
bury. Ed., Earl of Malmesbury. 4 vols. London,
1844.

AND KAISER .lOSEril 255

Memoirs of the Courts of Ucrlin, Ditsdcn, \Vaisiuv, and
Vieniui. 1777-71). N. W. W'nixrill. London, 1799.

Flight to A'luvnnes and othci' llislorical Kssaj's. Oscar
Browning [contains two good tssuys on Hugh EUiotJ.

Of the above worlds the first three aic largely personal
in chivractcr. Tlio Political Diaries o| Lord Malmcsbury
include some political information mixed up with still
more personal gossip and scandal. They contain a picture
of Catherine and her Court, overdrawn and jet alive and
interesting. The work of \Vraxall, who knew Keith,
EUiot, and Harris, is of the same kind, but of a lower order
of merit. It has, however, far greater \'alue than the
English Memoirs associated with his name.

A CRITICAL ESTDL\TE OF THE ENGLISH
DIPLOMATIC DESPATCHES OE THE PERIOD

(1776-1780).

There has not often in our history been a trio of
abler British ambassadors than Keith, Elliot, and Harris.
It is certain that at no time in Enghsh diplomatic history
did such a distinguished trio of ambassadors narrate and
criticize the same series of events, ajid it is upon their
despatches that our commentary on the Bavarian Succes-
sion and the Russian Mission is mainfy based.

Each of these three ambassadors had already made his
name known to the world by a striking feat of diplomacy
before 1778. Keith was in Denmark at the time of the
grim tragedy of the fate of Queih CaroUne Matilda
(George III.'s sister), and it was onjy his powerful in-
fluence, exerted under circumstances^ of dramatic force,
that saved the Queen from life-long imprisonment and
perhaps even a darker fate (177'2). This feat won Keith
a K.C.B. from George IH. and the admiration of all
England. Harris was already renowned for a great
diplomatic coup in 1770, when liis admirable firmness at

256 FREDERIC THE GREAT

Madrid averted war between England and Spain. Hugh
Elliot had startled the world in 1777 by secretly purloin-
ing the papers of the American agent Lee from Berlin,
copying them and returning them to the owner under cover
of darkness. But none of their exploits ended here. Keith
was to raise both his own fame and that of his country to
the highest pitch by the peace of Sistova, 1791, the fitting
cover to a long diplomatic career. Hugh Elliot was to be
the hero of wild and daring exploits, yet again to break
his cane over Kuyphausen and fight a duel with him, to
deport the Court of Naples to Sicily despite Queen Caroline
of Naples, and to be assured by Gustavus III. that he alone
had been the saviour of the Swedish Monarchy. Harris
was to be the chief inspirer of the foreign policy of Pitt, the
architect of the Great Triple Alliance of 1787, and to close
his career as the Nestor of EngUsh diplomacy, at whose
feet the greatest of EngUsh foreign ministers, George
Canning himself, was to sit. Enough has been said to show
that their exploits and their reputation were, in each case,
remarkable, and to indicate that their commentary on the
diplomatic events of 1777-80 is hkely to be of interest.

In order to estimate the probability of bias in their
narratives, a close examination of their individual tempera-
ments is needed. During the period 1777-80, Harris and
Elliot were still young men, the first in the thirties, the
latter actually yet in the twenties. Their despatches
have, therefore, an interest and a fire, which is quite un-
usual among diplomatists. Their private correspondence,
in each case, is filled with mirth, satire, and pungency,
which often overflows into their diplomatic communica-
tions and profanes the solemnity associated with des-
patches. Harris has more brilhancy of literary style,
Elliot more mordancy of wit ; the one has more epigram,
the other more knowledge. Each Was an adept at diplo-
matic intrigue, and knew how to extract a secret by a
judicious bribe or confidence. Elhot, however, was less
scrupulous than Harris, and his reckless courage and

AND KAISER JOSEPH 257

biting tongue sometinus placed him in nwkwnrd situations.
He wtis never afraid of provoking a crisis, of exceeding his
instructions, or of abandoning orthodox mcthf)ds. Thus
he was occasioniUly rebuked from home, he was publicly
censured for copying Leo's papers* (though privately
praised and rewarded with £500), and his repartees to King
Frederic can hardly always have benefited his country.
Harris, on the other hand, erred in exactly the opposite
way : though in private his opinions were expressed with
extraordinary freedom, he was always discreet and
polished to the highest degree in public or to officials.
He also had a strong will, but he trusted to adroitness and
flattery rather than to boldness, to ciarry him through a
diplomatic crisis. Thus, while the results Elliot secured
were great or disastrous, those of Harris were neither, and
he failed in his great object of winning Russia over to an
aUiance with England diuing these years (1778-80), for
all his cleverness and despite his great personal triumph
at the Court of Petrograd. The truth is that in diplomacy
it is possible to be too diplomatic, and brusqueness of
manner is sometimes more effective ithan suavity. The
general result of the difference between Harris and Elliot
seems to be this : Harris is unsurpassed at unraveUing an
intrigue, Elliot at judging a diplomatic situation. Each
has great political insight, but the ojne excels in finesse,
and the other in force. For this purpose they could
hardly have been better placed than in Berlin and in
Petrograd, the one to estimate the iron nature of Frederic
and the adamantine strength of his policy, the other to
foUow the caprices and intrigues of Catherine through all
their labyrinthine windings. Elliot judged the general
situation of the Bavarian Succession and the actions of
Frederic in most masterly fashion, he nealized more clearly
than any one that the claims of Austria or Bavaria were
not a question of right but of force, he divined sooner than
any one that Frederic would fight rather than yield to
them. In general his judgment on the dynamics of the

S

258 FREDERIC THE GREAT

situation during the war, and of the readjustments made
by the Peace of Teschen, are of the highest value. On
the other hand, for estimating and discovering the im-
portance and narrating the course of such a diplomatic
intrigue as the Mission of Count Falkenstein and of the
Prince of Prussia, Elliot was not the equal of Harris,
who understood better than any one the secrets of the
backstairs and the closet. The genius of the one was for
estimating a situation, of the other for describing a court.
It is not an accident that the commentary of Harris on
the German events of 1778, and that of Elliot on the
Russian events of 1780, is relatively of more importance
than the rest of their despatches. It was the natural
result of the temperaments and gifts of each individual.
The difference is, however, only relative, for each had many
of the best diplomatic qualities.

Their relative accuracy is hard to estimate, each was
occasionally led into exaggeration by desire for epigram
or effect; one cannot believe Catherine so foolish or
Frederic so cruel, nor their courtiers or ministers such
blockheads as one or the other sometimes pictures them
to be. But, on the other hand, the general accuracy of
their estimates is hard to dispute. Harris unquestionably
had the most varied sources of information, but was by
no means always able to distinguish between gossip and
act.* He had not a mind entirely accurate in detail,
and he rather subordinated particular facts to general
descriptions.

The diplomatist who sentences or characterizes in-
dividuals or events on the evidence of the day with pre-
cision and an air of finality has more claims on our sense
of pleasure than on our sense of belief. It is hardly possible

* We may quote here one example of his inaccuraoy, e.g. Malmes-
bury Diaries, i.p. 2. He tells us (1767) that Frederic raised the army
of Prussia from 70,000 to 150,000, and (1776) p. 143, gives the figures
" 50,000 to near 200,000," The inaccuracies are relatively slight
in the first (and for us most important) volume but they abound in the
fourth.

AND KAISER JdSEPH 259

to accept judgmciUs of tliis kind as wc do those of the
historian, writing from the accumulated testimony of
years. ^Vh^Io for hvintj interest and vivid power of
niuration few despatches can compare with those of
Harris, a word of caution must be addressed to accepting
their confident pronouncements. He is too resolved to
find chaos, caprice, and corruption everywhere not to
succeed in his wish. Still he had- access to so many
sources of information, was a man of such strict honour
and integrity, so incapable of misrepresenting what he
behevcd to be facts, that even wheij we differ from him
we must always do so with great diffidence. His biases
are ob\'ious — he hates and despises the Russian Court for
its alien French levity and its native Slav barbarism, he is
shocked by its moral laxity, and scornful of its notions of
statesmanship, and he is induced by his Uterary skill to
make the most of these contrasts and defects. In addition
he has a fierce hatred of Prussia and all its influences at
court and an easy tolerance of Austria. When we allow
duly for these biases, and for an occasional inaccuracy of
detail, or over-emphasis of phrase, we are in a position
to form a picture of the Russian Court and policy, in a
detail and with an accin-acy that it is quite unusual to
obtain from diplomatic communications.

EUiot's sources of information at Berlin were by no
means so ample as those of Harris at Petrograd. He never
slipi)ed out from a ball to talk pohtics with Frederic in a
dressing-room, nor was he in the habit of calling upon
Finekenstein or Hertzberg when they were in bed. Prussia
and its chief personages, both from their hatred of Eng-
land and from remembrance of his celebrated coup in
copying Lee's papers, regarded ElUot with by no means
unjustified suspicion. But Elliot triumphed over many
difficxdties. With the king he could never hold any really
cordial relations, and they hardly ever met save on public
and formal occasions, when their conversation was chiefly
limited to repartees in which the king was not always the

s2

260 FREDERIC THE C^REAT

winner.* In the eighteenth century it was of the greatest
possible importance to obtain direct knowledge of the
ruler from personal intimacy and acquaintance, and the
greatest triumphs of Keith and Harris were achieved by
this means. It was of more importance to know Frederic
with intimacy than any other sovereign, for no ruler was
so independent and so uninfluenced by others. As he
was unable to do this, Elliot started with a serious dis-
advantage, which he parried as well as he could. He
bribed some of the body-servants of the king, who gave
him valuable information; his attache Listen knew in-
timately at least one savant who was a royal confidant,
Elliot himself knew well Keith, Earl Marischal of Scotland
— ^the Jacobite transplanted to Berhn — ^than whom none
was more intimate with the old king. With Frederic-
WiUiam, Prince of Prussia, and Prince Henry, he was as
friendly as it was possible to be with princes, but less with
the former than the latter. He also knew well the
Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, who " enjoys the ear, the
favour, and the confidence " of Frederic, t Both EUiot
and his friend Liston were intimate with Hertzberg, whom
the latter visited on his estate, and found in aU his glory
a true Prussian Junker, like a " Cincinnatus from the
plough," wearing a round hat and unpowdered hair,
selling his own milk to peasants, and pressing strong brown
beer of his own brewing upon viators. J EUiot's irre-
sistible address in society gained him many advantages
also, and he drew valuable military information from
ofiicers who were friends of his. In a coimtry which
depended so absolutely on its monarch, the most skilful

* E.g. : Frederic. What do they think of my new ambassador
in England ? (a notoriously objectionable man).

Elliot (bowing). Digne r^pr^sentatif de votre majesty, [etc. etc.]

t See especially S.P.F. Prussia, vol. 102, Beriin, February 22,
"private and secret," and another "secret" ; for relations with Prince
Henry, see ib. May 30, June 2, all Elliot to Suffolk; for relations with
Prince Frederic- WUliam, see ib. 104, Elliot to Stormont, 1780.

J See for above details Minto's Elliot, p. 191.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 261

diplomatist was at a disadvantage when he was not
only not intimate with the ruler, but when that ruler's
whole influence was exerted to deprive him of adequate
sources of information. The character of his disclosures,
therefore (despite his great coup in purloining the papers
of Lee) is not in ;:;cneral as striking as* that of Harris. He
confessed himself (September 13, 17.80), " I cannot pre-
tend to any direct knowledge of the secrets of the Cabinet
of Potsdam." He did not discover any signs of Joseph's
mission to Russia in 1780 till long after it was known to
Hiuris ; his information on the affaii]s of Bavaria in 1778
was inferior to that of Keith. On the other hand, his
knowledge of German courts and diplomacy was wide
and deep; he had delved in charters and chronicles to
elucidate Joseph's claims on Bavaria. From personal
knowledge he thoroughly understood the working of the
Imperial Diet at Ratisbon. The Extent of his actual
knowledge, combined with the accuracy of his judgment,
often suppUed the place of more precise information. To
give an example or two. It was on February 8, 1778, that
he judged that Frederic would fight -Joseph, anticipating
accurately the decision which the Prussian king himself
made later. Again, when he makes the general statement
in discussing Bavarian claims that in this age force, not
justice, decides questions of prescriptive right, his evidence
as characterizing the diplomacy of the age is of great and
unusual weight, for in such matters it surpasses the more
partial insight of Harris or the massive common sense of
Keith. In the same way the various reports (which are
certainly his) upon Bavaria, and iipon the Imperial
system in the year 1776, are masterly gtate-papers, models
of lucidity and wisdom, and his criticism of Frederic's
internal administration is admirable.

The bias of Elliot is equally obvious, though not as
great as that of Harris. The latter (^escribed the Russian
nobles as " monkeys grafted on bears " ; the former said
that in Prussia he found " nature plunged in sand and

262 FREDERIC THE GREAT

mankind in slavery." He found the, men of the country,
for the most part, rude, and even the women seemed to
him grenadiers. He had sufficient of eighteenth century
sentiment to protest against the rudeness and coarseness of
the life around him, enough of EngUsh feehng to resent
a despotism however hberal and intelligent. Moreover,
he was convinced that England's interests had suffered
in the past by showing too much deference to Frederic's
feelings and by supineness to his repeated attempts to do
her an ill turn. All these feelings infected his despatches,
and made him darken the colours in = which he portrayed
Frederic, in order that he might stir his own Government
to more vigorous action and to approval of his own deter-
mined poHcy. ElUot's character was hardly so scrupulous
or honourable as that of Harris, and we may suspect an
occasional over-emphasis that is not; quite unintentional.
He denounces the " restless ambition " of the Prussian
king, his " deep-rooted iU-will " and " most violent
disUke," " implacable and unprovoked resentment " to
Great Britain, such that he refuses. " to repeat the ex-
pressions he (Frederic) is sometimes heard to let faU."
At the same time he pronounces him " precipitate," and
denies him " any regular plan of politics." He was con-
tinually enraged by Frederic's " evident predilection for
France." * All this did not induce him to favour Frederic,
At the same time, he is sometimes driven to admit that
Frederic worked ceaselessly for the welfare of his people,
and even in diplomacy he testifies td the strength of his
wiU, the ingenuity of his devices, and his extreme resource-
fulness. He attributes endlessly base motives to Frederic
at different times, but he by no means succeeds in always
bringing them home to him. Yet in the incidents of
our period Frederic is treated with much less partiality
than at a later date. Owing to the Umitations of his
knowledge Elliot's accounts are seldom complete; owing

* S.P.P. Prussia, vol. 102, Berlin, January 10, February 22,
November 7, 1778 ; vol. 104, May 13, June.4.

AND KAISER JOSEPH 268

to his bias they arc sometimes unfair to Frederic, but
as summaries of the events of diplomacy during these
years, as judgments of poUtical situations by a contem-
porary these despatehes have rare and unusual merits.

The despatelies of Listen, Elliot's friend and cicerone,
have simihu- qualities and defects, though they are more
doll and detailed, and show somewhat less masterly grasp.
The repUes to the despatches of both, by the Secretaries
of State at St. James's, are occasionally of some interest.
Stormont was a really learned minister, who knew diplo-
macy abroad as few men of that day did, and his judg-
ments are often of the greatest value and weight, but
they agree, on the whole, with the sentiments of EUiot
and Harris. Those of Suffolk, " tl^e Arch Pecksniff "
of diplomacy, are perhaps of more interest, because his
knowledge appears to have been sUght, and accordingly
his judgments are interesting and unaffected by precon-
ceptions. They record the opinions pi a fairly able man,
relatively ignorant of continental affairs, who, while
condescending to adopt a tone of unction in certain re-
spects, usually judges with a singularly unbiased mind.
In its way his judgment on the Austrian claims to the
Bavarian Succession is a masterpiece of grave and half-
conscious irony — " I am not sufficiently versed, either in
Imperial Genealogies, or German Law, to remove the
DifEculties you find in conjecturing the Grounds on which
the Court of Vienna may have formed its Pretensions,"
nor, he naively adds, "will this diflSculty be removed by
the manifesto — proclaiming their rights — that has just
been received." *

It would be a gross injustice to Keith to compare him
to Suffolk, either in point of knowledge or in diplomatic
capacity. But, in fact, his massive solid understanding
has more in keeping with that of the heavy Earl than

♦ SJPJ'. German States (Bavaria), vol. 118, St. James's, Suffolk
to Eden, February 3, 1778. Eden'8 despatches are valuable and
accurate. For the general sketch of Bavaria, see passim.

264 FREDERIC THE GREAT

with those of the volatile Harris or the witty Elliot.
Keith had not the brilliance and the natural abiUties of
either, but his industry and persistence, his immense
diplomatic experience (he was at Vienna twenty years),
his strong will and sound judgment eventually carried
him as far as either of the others. His task was almost
equally difficult with that of Elliot, for Kaunitz feared
and hated England almost as much as Frederic did, and
it was only by personal acquaintance with Kaunitz,
Joseph, and Maria Theresa that Keitii could hope to learn
much of the secrets of Austrian policy, then the most
closely guarded in Europe. Much could be learnt
from actual indiscretions of utterance from Frederic or
Catherine; at Vienna Keith had to form his judgment
from the frowns or smiles of Joseph or Maria Theresa.
He does not seem to have been specially acquainted with
nobles of the Court, the Prussian and French ambassadors
naturally avoided him, from the Russian he could learn
little, and he depended on the envoys of minor courts,
such as that of Saxony, on spies, and on the pubUc news-
letters and journals for much of his information. Accord-
ingly his despatches of the years 1778-80 must be held
as on the whole inferior in interest to those of Harris or
Elliot. He had not the youthful enthusiasm, which led
each of the others occasionally to summarize the whole
diplomatic situation or characterize the Court to which
they were accredited, and (comparing the relative ease of
his position for obtaining information) the actual amount
of information he got was less. Both Harris and Elliot
criticized and described the earlier and later stages of the
Bavarian Succession negotiation with more relative fulness
of detail. On the other hand, when Keith does utter a
judgment or opinion it is usually of weight, and small as
were his opportunities of obtaining information on passing
events as compared with his colleagues, its quality some-
times far exceeded their quality. Of this we have an
excellent test in the matter of the famous Russian mission

AND KAISER JOSEPH 265

of Joseph in ITSO. Of this c\'int llnlris fjuvc a full diary,
and Elliot a fur more I'ircumstuiitial account tlian Kcilli,
while each spcculatccl much on its i^csult. Yet the con-
tribution of either to the knowUiliri* of that event can
hivrdly compare with Keit li's eommunifation to tlic F(irci;,'n
Otlice of Kaiser Jostph's own verbal narrati\'e of the
whole affair (sec Appendix II.). It is true that it was
not obtained till tMo years after the event, but the whole
conversation threw a most valuable! hght on the future
pohcy of Czarina and Kaiser as well p,s on tlic past. The
steady patience of Keith enabled him, to accompUsh much,
and fmaJly to gain confidential personal interviews with
both Maria Theresa and Joseph, which, though few in
number, were often of the greatest service.

All these diplomatists quoted sometimes make admis-
sions as to Prussian pohcy, ^vhich show that the interests
of England required a certain impartsiahty of view at this
time. The result is that, despite' the hatred which Prussia
and England had felt for one another since 1763, the
English despatches of 1776-80 giva the decisions of a
relatively neutral umpire. Frederic is probably more
fairly judged at this time by Enghsh diplomats than at
any other period of his career. On the whole their
diplomatic judgments on the merits of the Bavarian
Succession are the most impartial that we find in the
Archives of any great Power. Aqd of all these des-
patches the weightiest in judgment are certainly those of
Sir Robert Keith.

INDEX

Albert V. (Duke of Austria,
l-tll-39, anii EUnperor, 1437-
1439), invested with Lower
Bavaria (1420), 74 ; Act of Re-
nunciation (1420), 75, 16I-'2,
180-81

Andrt, 160 ; arrested, 170-71

Augustus Frederic II. (ICing of
Poland and Ejector of Saxony,
1734-68), death, 37

Augustus Frederic III. (Elector
of Saxony, 1763-1806 ; King,
1806-1827), claims on Ba-
varia, 73, 89 ; negotiation and
Treaty with Frederic (March 1 8 ,
1778), 101-8 ; SchOnburg dis-
pute with Austria, 101 ; ap-
peals to Diet, 104 ; proposed
compensation to, 167-8, 195-6 ;
actual, 208-5

AiMust - Wilhelm (Prince of
Prussia), 215

Austria. See Joseph, Maria
Theresa, etc.

Bavaria. Ste Max Joseph III.
and Karl Theodor

Belling, W. S. (Prussian Lieu-
tenant-General), 127-9

Bercheim, Count, 54

Breteuil, Baron de Louis- Auguste
le Tonnelier (French Ambas-
sador at Vienna and Pleni-
potentiary at Teschen), 91 ;
negotiations with Kaimitz, 94 ;
at Teschen, 191 ; his policy
there, 198-9 ; attracted by a
Venus, 202 ; receives presents,
203

Brunswick, Charles William
Ferdinand, Hereditary Prince
of (Dukeof, 1780-1806), 98, 260

Burgoyne, Lieutenant - General
Sir J., report on Austrian and
Prussian armies (1706-67),
App. II. 223-5

Burke, £., quoted, 18

Canning, George, 256

Catherine II. (the Great, Czarina
of Russia, 1762-96), her char-
acter, 183, described by
Emperor Joseph, App. III.
22:j-8,; her foreign policy
(1762), 87 ; Treaty (1764)
with Frederic, 38-0 ; renewed
alliance, 40 ; designs on
Turkey and Poland, 42-8 ;
shares in Partition, 45 ; her
Turkish poUcy, 46 ; at first
neutral in Bavarian Succession
but influenced by Frederic,
184-5!; her views on media-
tion, 187 ; her Instruction to
Prince Repnin, 191-3 ; her
policy, 199-200 ; mentioned,
5, 8, 176, 199, 210

Charles (Archduke of Austria),
116, ^9

Charles (Prince of Hesse), on
Hertzberg, 112 n., 245 n. 12,
240 n. 14

Charles VI. (of Austria, and
Empea-or, 1711^0), 49

Charies VII. (of Bavaria, 1726-
1745, and Emperor, 1742-15),
58, 156

Codex Fridericianus, 58

Codex Maximileanus, 58

Cumberland, William, Duke of,
145

Daun (Austrian Field-Marshal),
119, 186, 148

267

268

INDEX

Deux-Ponts (Charles, Due de).
See Zweibriicken, Duke of

Eden, Morton (Minister Pleni-
potentiary to Bavaria and
Minister to Diet of Ratisbon,
1776), views on Karl Theodor,
163-4 ; quoted, 51 n., 55 n., 60
n., 67 n., 68 n., 71 n., 72 and n.,
70-80, 105-6, 156 n., 165, 252-3
sqq. 263 n.

Elliot (afterwards Sir), Hugh
(1773-76, Minister Plenipoten-
tiary to Bavaria and Diet of
Ratisbon; 1776-82, Envoy
Extraordinary to Prussia), on
Frederic, 21 and n. ; report on
Bavaria in 1776 quoted, 50-53,
and passim Chap. Ill, ; makes
Max Joseph druok on punch,
54 n. ; on German foreign
policy in 1776, 63, 65-6; on
Max Joseph's offer of Bavarian
troops for America, 69-71 ; at
Berlin, 95 ; negotiates with
Frederic] over Bavarian Suc-
cession, 96-9; his famous re-
partee to Frederic, 98 n., 99;
on his policy, 105-6 ; letters
on Frederic's campaign, 135,
138 and n. ; denounces the
" Balance of Power " as a
principle for regulating the
Treaty of Teschen, 189-91 ; on
King Frederic's literary diver-
sions, 220-21 ; critical estimate
of, 252-63

Francis I., Emperor (1745-65), 49
Frederic Augustus III. (Elector
of Saxony, 1763-1806 ; King,
1806-1827), claims on Bavaria,
73, 89 ; negotiations and alli-
ance with Frederic (Match 18,
1778), 101-3 ; Schonburg dis-
pute with Austria, 101 ; ap-
peals to Diet, 104 ; proposed
compensation to, 167-8, 195-6 ;
actual, 203-5
Frederic the Great (King of
Prussia, 1740-86), character
and achievements till 1777,
15-23, 214-20; Treaty with

Catherine, 1764, 38 ; meeting
with Joseph at Neisse (1769)
and Neustadt (1770), 39-40;
views on Austrian and Russian
foreign policy (1771), 42-3 ;
share in Partition of Poland,
42-5 ; claim on ^Bavaria, 75 ;
negotiations with France over
Bavarian Succession, 93, and
with England, 95-8 ; views on
Bavarian question, 98-9 ; offen-
sive and defensive alliance
with Saxony (March 18, 1778),
101 - 3 ; supports protest
against Austrian claims in
Germanic Diet (March 16,
1778), 103-5 ; considers pro-
ject of a League of Princes,
106-7 ; real reasons of his
defence of Bavarian independ-
ence, 107 ; correspondence
with Joseph, 109-10 ; rejects
proposals of Kaimitz and de-
cides, on war. 111; rebukes
Hertzberg and invades Bo-
hemia (July 5), 112 ; military
character and ideas of, 118-20,
145-6*; forces of, in 1778 cam-
paign, 121 and n. ; Austrian
plans' against, 124-5 ; his ad-
vance in Bohemia and check
before the Axnau- Jaromer line,
134 - 40 ; composes ode on
Voltaire, 137-8 ; his retreat,
141-3 ; criticism of his cam-
paign, 144-5 ; his correspond-
ence with Prince Henry, 145-6;
his negotiations with Zwei-
briicken, 160-61 ; appeals to
Diet (December 1778), 161-2 ;
opinion of Karl Theodor, 164
n. ; his popularity in Bavaria,
173 - 4 ; corresponds with
MariaTheresa, 176-7 ; negotia-
tion of Braunau, 178-9 ; em-
barrassed by Austrian appeal
to Diet, 182-8 ; turns to
Catherine of Russia, 183-5 ;
his negotiation, 186-7 ; the
Russian reply, 192-3 ; meets
Prince Repnin, 194 ; motives
in the Treaty, 197-8 ; letter to
Prince Henry, 200, 202 ; gains

INDEX

269

from Pence of Tesehcn, 203-0 ;
thcpriifof Hiissiaiimctliutidit,
200-10 ; skoUli of liis char-
aetor by lliirris, App. I. -1 t-
220, tuid of his literary diver-
sion byKlliot,-"2l)-21,nii(lrliar-
actcr, 2;)7-ii.'l ; UiirKoyne on his
armv, 222-5; mentioned, ;!,
5, 7,"S, 11, 11, 15, 2U, 3T, 48, 01,
frt, 75. 89. (15, 101, 115-10, US,
131, 15:!, 160, lot, 107, 175,
191-2, 199, 201, 208 ; receives
visit from Grand Duke Paul,
221-3; satirized by Voltaire,
App. V. 230-31 ; the Freder-
ician strategy, 2 12-3 n. 5

Frederic-William (Crown Prince
of Prussia, afterwards Frederic
\Vil)iam II.), in the campaign
of 1778, 135, 137, 142 ; char-
acter drawn by Harris, 218-
221 ; mentioned, 215, 260

Frederic \ViUiara I. (King of
Prussia, 1712-^0), 49

Galitzin, Prince D.'M. (Russian
Minister at Vienna), negotiates
with Kaunitz, 250 n. 9

George II. (King of Great Britain
and Elector of Hanover, 1727-
1765), 5

Gibbon, Edward, quoted, 7 n.

Goerz,Courrt J.Eustace (Minister
of Frederic to Z weibriicken ,
1778), 159-61

Harris, James (afterwards Sir J.,
and Ist Earl of Malmesbury ;
1772-70, Envoy Extraordinary
at Berlin ; 1776-83, Envoy Ex-
traordinary and Minister Pleni-
potentiary at Pctrograd), 177 ;
details Frederic's negotiation
with Catherine, 180-7 ; objects
to French influence on Panin,
199 ; on character and court
of Frederic the Great, 214-20 ;
on Grand Duke Paul's visit to
Berlin, 221-3; criticism of,
2.-.2-fJ3.

Hartig, Count (Austrian Com-
missary in Bavaria), 68

lIaussen,.IM. de (French Minister
at Itcrlin), 181

Ueiithcotc, Ualjih (1781-83,
iMinisHiir Plciiipolc-ntiary to
Elect(|r of KOIn), on Austriun
clainH, 102, 11)5 ;i. ; on Karl
Theodor's conduct, 172-4 ; on
evils of BaliiMcc of Power, 189-
101

Henry (Prince of Prussia ; d.
1802), Ills mission to Russia
(1771), 40, 42 ; interviews
Hugh, Elliot, 97-8 ; tries to
avert war with Austria, 110 ;
military chanietcr of, 116-18 ;
forces.of, in campaign of 1778,
121 and n. ; plans and effects
seizure of ToUcnstein, 126-30 ;
liis letter on it, 130-31 ; im-
portance of this success, 131-
133 ; refuses to cross the Iser,
134 ; retreats via Leitmeritz,
140-41 ; losses in the campaign,
141, 245 n. 12 ; estimate of his
military success, 144-5 ; corre-
sponds with t'rederic, 145-6 ;
further criticism of, 147-50 ;
letter from Frederic to, 200 ;
influence on Frederic, 210 ;
mentioned, 102, 123-5, 138,
143, 177-8, 224, 241 n. 3, 244
n. 7, 215 n. 12, 260

Hertzbel-g, Count E. F. (Prussian
Minister; d. 1795), character,
108, 2i;o ; sharply rebuked by
Frederic, 111-12, 218

Hompfrdhe, Baron de (Hompesch,
F. K. ; d. 1800), made Finance
Minister in Bavaria (1778),
156, 1,73

Isembiu'g, Princess, 165

Joseph JI. of Austria (Holy
Roman Emperor, 1765-90),
character, 80 - 33 ; attempts
to reform Empire, 33, and
Austrta, 33-4 ; improvements
in the Austrian Army and
Finariccs, 85-0; meets

Frederic at Neisse, 89, and at
Ncustadt, 40 ; annexes Zips
district of Poland, 41 ; atti-

270

INDEX

tude on Polish Question (1771-
1772), 42-3 ; annexes Bukovina
(1775), 47 ; views on import-
ance of Bavaria to Austria,
64-6; action in 1771, 67;
visits Bavaria (1777), 68-9;
nature of his claims on Bavaria,
73-4, 78 ; hears of Max
Joseph's death, 83 ; his gains
by Partition - Treaty (Janu-
ary 3, 1778), 86-7 ; invades
Bavaria, 87-8 ; letters to his
brother Leopold, 88-9, 90, 92-
93 ; further Partition schemes,
93-4 ; ill-treatment of Saxony
over Schonburg affair (1777),
102 ; fails to prevent Saxony
joining Frederic, 103 ; corre-
spondence with Frederic at
Schonwalde, 109 ; effects of
his reforms on the Austrian
Army, 113-16 ; forces of, in 1778
campaign, 121 and n,, 122 ;
Austrian concentration and
plan of campaign of, 122-3 ;
criticizes Laudon for his failure
to hold Tollenstein and for the
state of his army, 131-3 ;
checks Frederic at Arnau, 139-
140, and forces him to retreat,
141 ; but forbids a pursuit in
force, 142-3 ; credit acquired
by him during the campaign,
146-9 ; sends Golden Fleece
to Karl Theodor, 154 ; his
arbitrary behaviour towards
Bavaria, 157 ; anger at the
Braunau negotiation, 178-9 ;
Maria Theresa's influence on,'
182 ; his defeat at Teschen,
203-5 ; a representative of his
age, 208-9 ; designs on Venice,
231-2 ; his own accoimt of his
interviews with Catherine, 225-
228 ; Czechish peasant's poem
to, 228-30 ; mentioned, 7, 8,
10, 12, 14, 36, 47-8, 61-2, 75,
80, 82, 84, 95, 103, 108, 112,
138, 145, 150, 160, 165, 167,
172, 174, 180, 182, 183, 197,
206, 207, 211, 231-2
Josepha (sister of Max Joseph of
Bavaria), married to Kaiser

Joseph (1764), 68, and ill-
treated by him, 70

Karl Theodor (Elector Palatine,
1743 ; afterwards also ruler
of Bavaria, 1777-99), 69, 71,
73; character and abilities as
a ruler, 150-53 ; claims on
Bavaria, 76-8 ; family com-
pacts with, 79 ; death of Max
Joseph, 71-2 ; succeeds to
Bavarian inheritance, 82 ; his
representative signs Partition-
Treaty with Austria, 85-7
ratified under compidsion, 89
conduct on his accession, 154
attempts at reform, 154-7
ill-treatment by Austria, 158
fails to win Zweibrucken, 159
161 ; his anxieties, 163-5
Frederic's view of, 164 n. ; re-
fuses to abandon neutrality,
165 ; blimders at Congress of
Teschen, 167 ; quarrels with
Zweibriicken, 168-70 ; arrests
Andr6, etc., 171-4 ; objects to
Repnin's proposals, 195 ; gains
from Treaty of Teschen, 203-4 ;
mentioned, 13-14, 100, 102-3,
151, 196

Kaunit?, Prince A. W. P. (Chan-
cellor of Austria; d. 1794),
character, 28-30 ; attitude
towards Prussia (1764), 38 ;
views on importance of
Bavaria, 65 ; action on Max
Joseph's death, 84 ; negotiates
Partition-Treaty with Bavaria
(January 3, 1778), 85-7, 88 ;
French policy, 90 ; his further
Partition schemes, 93-4 ; his
reply to Protests in the Ger-
manic Diet, 104 ; his last pro-
posal to Frederic before the
war, 110-11 ; Partition-Treaty
with Karl Theodor, 154 ;
Russian Ambassador dis-
counts his Bavarian claims,
163 ; Maria Theresa's influence
upon( August-September 1778),
180; his proposed terms to
Diet, 181-2 ; much astonished
atRiisianattitude,185; forced

INDEX

271

to ncoopt joint-nicdinlion of
Riissii) and l-'nincc, 1H7 ; de-
&ijfits on Venice, '1,\2 ; mcn-

tiomxi, 2T, aa, as-ii, iro, ids,

107. 2li-t

Keith, Sir Robert Mumiy (Ara-
bnssador at Vieiinii, 1772-02),
memorandum on Austrian
claims in Hiivaria, 7-4-5 ; de-
scribes Austriiin policy in
Bavaria (January 1778), 83 ;
praises Croat soldiers, IKi;
on the Teschen negotiation,
195,2t)l-2: characterized, 255-
256, 2(i3-5 ; mentioned, 87,
109, 195-6, 225

Kreittmayr, W. A. (Chancellor
of Bavaria; d. 1790), character,
53, 58, 166

Lascy (Austrian Field-Marshal),
35 ; hia reforming influence on
Austrian array, 113-16 ; mili-
tary character of, 118-19; plans
campaign of 1778, 122-3 ;
estimate of his success, 147-9 ;
BTeat influence on Kaiser
Joseph, 247 nn. 16 and 17 ;
praised by Burgoyne, 225 ;
mentioned, 242 n. 4

Laudon(Austrian Field-Marshal),
meets Frederic, 39 ; military
character of, 117-18 ; his share
in campaign of 1778, 122-3 ;
scheme for crusliing Frederic,
123-5 ; difficulty of his t;isk,
125-6 ; fails to defend Tollen-
stcin, 130-31 ; retires to Iser,
131~1 ; fails to harass Prince
Henry's retreat, 141 ; military
criticism of, 144-5 ; praised
by Burgoyne, 225 ; mentioned,
114, 138, 144, 149-50

Lee, William (American agent in
Europe), 97, 98 n., 256-7

Lehrbach (Austrian Conmiissary
at Munich), IfiO, 105-7

L/eopold (Grand Duke of Tuscany,
1705-90; afterwards Emperor,
1790-92), receives letter from
Joseph, 89, 00, 92-3

Lessing, patronized by ICarl
Theodor, 152

LIston, Bobert (afterwards Sir
U. and Lord Ilarlcy, chargi at
Munich and at Berlin), on
Bavaria and Max Joseph, 51-5
and n. ; mentions Joseph's
designs on Venice, 281-2, 252-8
S(^q. ; estimated, 261, 268

Loni, J. O. von (Bavarian Coun-
cillor), 160 ; arrested, 171-8

LothOsel (Prussian General), 127

Louis XIV. (King of France,
1643-1715), 8

Louis XV. (King of France,
1715-74), 5, 152, 158

Louis XVI. (King of France,
1774-93), attitude towards
Austrian policy in Bavaria,
00 ; d^linee to be influenced
by Marie Antoinette, 92-8 ;
declares, French neutrality,
93 ; letter to Zweibriicken,
160 n. j mentioned, 159

Maria Anna (Dowager-Duchess
of Bavaria), 159 and n., 160,
162, 168, 168-9 J her coun-
sellors fl'rrested, 171-74 ; men-
tioned, 175

Maria Theresa (Empress-Queen
and ruler of Austna-Hungary,
1740-800, character, 25-7 ; re-
sults of her reign, 27-8 ; con-
duct over the Polish Partition,
43-4 ; admits the weakness of
Austrian claims on Bavaria,
7.S ; fears war, 110 ; letter to
Marie Antoinette on war, 131,
177, 179 ; to Frederic, 177 ;
initiates peace negotiations at
Braunau, 178-9 ; her influence
towardssettlement at Teschen,
180-82; presents to Repnin and
Breteuil, 208 ; mentioned, 28,
33, 35, 86-7, 88, 85, 95, 189,
105, 208

Marie Antoinette (daughter of
Maria Theresa and Queen of
France), fails to influence
French policy, 92-8 ; letters
from ^!aria Theresa, 177-9

Maximilian, Archduke (son of
Maria ^heresa and Archduke
of Austtja), 68

272

INDEX

Maximilian Joseph III. (Elector
of Bavaria, 1745-77), character
and internal rule. Chap. Ill,
passim ; foreign policy, 64-7 ;
offers Bavarian troops for
America, 69-71 ; claims on
his inheritance, 72-80 ; family
compacts with Karl Theodor,
79 ; death, 71-2, 81, 82 ; men-
tioned, 1S3-4, 175

Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Frederic
the Kind, Duke of, claims on
Bavaria, 73

Mercy, Comte de (Austrian Am-
bassador at Paris), 94

Milliquet, J. (British chargi at
Dresden), quoted, 102-3

MoUendorf, W. J. H. (Prussian
Field-Marshal ; d. 1816), 129-
130

Moltke, Count H. K. B. (Prussian
Chief of Staff), on Russia, 210

Obermayer (Bavarian Council-
lor), 160 ; arrested, 171-2

Palatinate. See Karl Theodor
Panin, Count N. I. (Foreign

Minister of Russia), 186-7;

letter to Prince Repnin, 193-4 ;

negotiations at Teschen, 199-

200 ; mentioned, 251 n. 18
Paul, Grand Duke (afterwards

Czar Paul I., 1796-1801), 183 ;

his visit to Frederic described

by Harris, App. I. 221-3
P€ter III. (Czar of Russia, 1762),

allies himself with Frederic, 37
Philip V. (King of Spain, 1700-

1745), 5
Potemkin, Prince G. A., his

influence on Catherine, 185

and n. ; how influenced by

Frederic, 185 ; described by

Joseph II., 227-8
Prussia. See Frederic the Great

Repnin, Prince N. V. (Russian
Plenipotentiary at Tesohen),
instruction from Catherine,
192-3 ; from Panin, 193-4 ;
peaches Breslau and meets
Frederic, 194 ; proposes Pre-

liminaries, 195 ; concludes
Peace, 203 ; value of his
papers as a source, 250-51 ;
passim

Ritter, Baron (Plenipotentiary
of Karl Theodor at Vienna),
negotiates with Kaunitz in
1777, 85-6 ; forced to sign
Partition-Treaty (January 3,
1778), 86-7

Russia. See Catherine the Great

Saxony. See Augustus Frederic
II. and III.

Schiller, J. W. von, patronized
by Karl Theodor, 152

Sohwerin (Prussian Field -
Marshal), 22

Seydlitz, Freiherr F. W. (Prussian
Cavalry General), 22

Stanislas II. (Augustus Ponia-
towski ; King of Poland, 1764-
1795), how elected, 38 ; asks
Joseph to annex Zips, 41

Stepney, Sir J. (Envoy Extra-
ordinary to Saxony, 1775-83),
on Prussian losses in the war,
245 n. 12

Stormont, David, 7th Viscount
(Secretary of State Southern
Department, 1779-82), 67,
252-3 sqq., 263

Suffolk, Henry, Earl of (Secretary
of State Southern Department,
1771-79), 162, 252-3 sqq., 263

Swift, Jonathan, quoted, 1-2, 170

Thugut, Baron (Austrian nego-
tiator at Braunau, afterwards
ChanceUor), 178-9

Venus, appears at Teschen, 202
Vergennes, Comte C.G. de (iS-ench
Foreign Minister, 1774-87),
attitude towards Austrian
Partition-Treaty with Bavaria
(Januarys, 1778), 90-91 ; Or-
cular to Powers, 92 ; declares
French; neutrality, 93 ; nego-
tiates with Frederic, 93 ; with
Mercy, 94-5; views at Teschen,
198, 199
Vieregg, Baron, made Councillor
of Bavaria, 155 and n., 166

INDEX

273

Villcroi, V. de Noiifville, Duo do
(bYcneh Miirshiil), 115

Voltiuro, F. A. de (dentli 1778),
degv on, com^msoil by
Freaeric, 1M7-8 ; his satire on
Frederic nnd oiLTlitccnth een-
tury wiir, "230-31 ; mentioned,
2, 8, 19

Wtfymouth (Thomas, \'iscount,
aJfterw-ards 3rd Rlarquis of,
Bath ; Soorotarv of State
NorUi Department, 1775-82),
203, 251 n. 22

Zweibrucken (Deux-Ponts),
Charles, Duke of, character.

78, 70, 1B8 ; refuses to sign
rartition^Troaty, 100 ; ap-
peals to Geniinn IJiit, 104 ;
rehitions «itli Karl Tlicodor,
1 "it ; nef;<iti:ites with Frederic
through (Joerz, 159 ; refuses
Golden I'leeee and Partitiori-
Treiitv, 100^01 ; supported by
Frederic at Diet, 101-2 ; re-
fusrs to accept I'reliminaries
of Teschen, 108 ; quarrels
with Karl Theodor, 169 ; ac-
cepts Peace of Teschen, 170 ;
his policy at Teschen, 196-
198 ; mentioned, 153, 171, 172,
175
ZweibrUcken, Duchess of, 79-80

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