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Cornell University Library
B839 .L88 1893
Elementary course of Christian phiiosoph
olin
3 1924 029 060 354
Cornell University
Library
The original of tliis book is in
tine Cornell University Library.
There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.
http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924029060354
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY
ELEMENTARY COURSE
OP
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY
BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OP
The Best Scholastic Authors
ADAPTED PROM THE PBBNCH OF
BEOTHER LOUIS OP POISSY
■SHE BKOTHEES OF THE CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS
SECOND EDITION, REVISED.
O'SHEA & CO.
NEW YORK
Bntered according to Act ot Congress, In the year 1893, by
PETBE MUTH
la the Office of the Librarian ot Congress, at Washington
4?i
yihiJ- Obsiat.
D. J. McMAHON, an
amprimatur.
•{• MICHAEL AUGUSTINE,
Archbishop of New 7aHv
New Tobk, Aug. 11. 1893.
WORKS TO CONSULT.
GoTJDiiT, — Phllosophie suivant les principes de Saint Thomas. Paris,
ohez Poussielgne.
Kleutqbn, — LaPhilosophie scolastique, exposfee et def endue. Paris,
chez Gaume.
Sansevbrtno, — Philosophia Christiana cum antiqua et nova compa-
rata. Paris, chez Lethielleux.
'• — Manuel de la Philosophic chretienne. Idem.
LiBERATOBE, — Institutiones philosophicse ad triennium accommo-
datse. Romse, uffioio della Civilta Catolica.
" — Elementa ethicae et juris naturse. Idem.
" — ^Le compose humain. Lyon, chez Briday.
" — Theorie de la connaissance intellectuelle. Paris
chez veuve Casterman.
Pkisco, — Elementi di filosofias speculativa. Paris, chez Lethielleux.
" Metafisica della morale. Idem.
Tapabblli, — Essai theorique de droit naturel. Paris, chez veuVe
Casterman.
Gonzalez, — Estudios sobre la filosofia de S. Thomas. Madrid, im-
prenta de Lopez.
" — Filosofia elemental. Idem.
Frbdault, — Traite d'anthropologie physiologique et philosophiqn*.
Paris, chez Cr. Bailliere.
ZiGLiABA, — Bumma Philosophica. Lyons, chez Briday.
De Salinis et de Scobbiac, — Precis de I'histoire de la philo-
Sophie. Paris, ohez Hachette.
All these works are worthy of high esteem ; hut we commend
especially those of Liberatore, who was among the first to recall and
restore Christian Philosophy, and of Cardinal Zigliara, who is emi-
nently trained and skilled in the teachings of St. Thomas.
To these may be added the following excellent works in English :
Harper, — Metaphysics of the School. London, Macmillan & Co.
" — Manuals of Catholic Philosophy (Stonyhurst Series).
New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago, Benziger Bros.
StOckl, — Handbook of the History of Philosophy (Pt. I.).
BRIEF OF OUE HOLT FATHER, POPE PHIS IX.
VOeeU} FUio, Fr. Aloisio de Poissy, To <mr Bekmed Son, Brother Louis
Congregationu Fratrum Sclw- of Poissy, of t?is Congregation of
hrum Ghristianarum, BiUrras. the Brotliers of tlie Christian
Schools, Beziers.
PIUS PP. IX. PIUS IX., POPE.
DiLBCTB FiLi, Salutem et Beloved Son, Health and
Apostolicam Bbnedictionbm. Apostolic Benediction.
Si sedulo cavendum est in quali- If in any art or science whatever
bet arte ant scientia, ne quoquo special care must be taken thai
modo principia deflectant a vero, principles may in no way conflict
id maxime profecto curandum est with truth, this is above all neces-
in philosophia earum duce, prse- sary in philosophy, the queen
sertim vero in tanta errorum col- and moderatrix of the arts and
luvie, quae ab ipsius nimirum cor- sciences. But especially must we
ruptione manavit. be on our guard in the great flood
of errors, of which the corruption
of philosophy has been the un-
failing source.
Gratulamnr itaque te, Dilecte We, therefore, congratulate
Pili, scientise hujus elementa tra- you. Beloved Son, on the manner
dltnrum, rejectis recentiorum in which you have treated of the
commentis, Angelicum Doctorem elements of this science. Setting
et ceteros fuisse sequutum, qui, aside the false systems of more
Ecclesia veritatis magistra prselu- recent writers, you have followed
cente, sapientia et operositate sua the Angelic Doctor and those whc,
philosophiam miriflce illustra- guided by the light of the Church,
vi BRIEF OF OUR BOLT FATBER, POPE PIUS IX
runt ; et ex iis deprompsisse doc- the Mistress of truth, have, by
trinas, quibus mentes fingeres their wisdom and diligent labor,
commissornm tibi adolesoentium. wonderfully illustrated philoso-
phy. From their works you have
drawn the doctrines by which to
form the minds of the young men
confided to your care.
Gaudemus autem, Elementarem We are glad that the Elementary
Ourmm PhUosopTim Christianm, a Course of Christian Philosophy,
te editum, probatum f uisse egregio which you have published, has
Episcopo tuo; et cum ipso tibi received the approbation of a
ominamur, ut illud in plurimo- Bishop so distinguished as yours ;
rum utilitatem vergat. and with him we earnestly wish
that it may prove beneficial to
many.
Interim vero divini favoris au- in the meantime, as a presage
spicem et paternse Nostras benevo- of the divine favor and a pledge
lentiae pignus Apostolicam Bene- of our paternal love, we very af-
dictionem tibi Dilecte Fill, pera- fectionately impart to you, Be-
manter impertimus. jgyed Son, the Apostolic Benedic-
tion.
Datum Bomse apud S. Petrum Given at Rome, at St. Peter's,
Jie 13 Martii, anno 1876, Pontifi- March 13, 1876, in the thirtieth
eatus Nostrl anno tricesimo. year of Our Pontificate.
PIUS PP. IX. PIUS IX., POPE.
APPEOBATION OF THE BISHOP OF MONT-
PELLIEE.
' MONTPELLIEK, Aug. 15, 1875.
It is with pleasure tliat we authorize Brother Louis,
Sub-Director of the Boarding-School of Beziers, to
publish for the use of his pupils his Course of Chris-
tian Philosophy hased 07i tJie Principles of the best
/Scholastic Authors, which by our order he submitted
to a careful examination. The learned priest to
whom we entrusted the revision of the work has re-
turned it with a flattering testimonial of its merit.
We shall, therefore, be glad to see it in the hands of
the young men of our schools, and to learn that its
principles have been made familiar even to the pupils
of our first classes. For it is these old philosophical
teachings which prepared our fathers to become such
good theologians, and which rendered their faith so
enlightened and their reasoning so sound.
•i" Fk. M. Anatole,
£p. of Montpellier.
TEANSLATOE'S PEEFACE.
This manual of philosophy has been translated
into English, with a view to meet the needs of a
growing- class of youth of both sexes. On all sides
they are beset with doubt and error concerning even
the primary truths that are the foundation of both
science and religion. Their critical position was
clearly perceived by the eagle glance of Pope Leo
Xni., when he penned his immortal encyclical
"Aeterni Patris." The impatient exclamation ut-
tered by a graduate of a noted American University :
" I cannot endure philosophy ; its professors are ever
wrangling about principles," is re-echoed by all who
are "carried about with every wind of doctrine."
Upon all such the illustrious pontiff who to-day
teaches the world from the chair of Peter, has urged
the study of the "wisdom of St. Thomas," whose
keen analysis of the fundamental principles of phi-
losophy and the opposite errors are an inexhaustible
mine for the students of all succeeding ages. In this
translation it is hoped that our youth will find a sure
vantage ground, whence, as far as time and talent
will allow, they may make excursions into the grand
and inspiring depths of philosophy.
Such changes have been introduced into the origi-
nal text and such additions made as the experience
of the class-room for some years past, and the phases
of thought of the last decade, especially in. this coun-
X TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
try, have rendered either necessary or advisable.
With the earnest desire that in the pages of this book
may be found a sure guide for the intellect and an
ennobling incentive for the will, the work is placed
as an offering of love at the feet of Mary Immaculate,
New Yoke, Feast of the Purification, 1893.
PEEFACE.
The aim of this work is to present, in as brief an
outline as possible, a complete course of philosophy.
Besides questions of direct utility for examinations,
we have endeavored to introduce, at least summarily,
many others of real importance, and without which
there can be no philosophy properly so called.
A few words will suifice to explain our mode of pro-
cedure and the use which may be made of this work.
Each paragraph contains an abridged formula in-
tended to be learned verhatim, and a short develop-
ment which may serve as a basis for the explanation
of the professor. The formulas will prove of great
utility to the student who takes pains to memorize
them : they classify in the mind distinctly and logi-
cally all that is indispensably required in philosophy ;
they render the preparation for an examination easy ;
and very often they are a brief, precise, and full
answer to the questions proposed. The development
usually gives in their essential outlines the principal
proofs of the foregoing formula. Comparisons, mul-
tiplied examples, detailed comments, have been pur-
posely retrenched. We have confined ourselves to
simple summaries, which will enable the student to
follow and remember the instructions of the professor.
Experience has proved that this method, apparently
somewhat abstract and barren, is, in reality, very ad-
vantageous, since it obliges the student to have re-
Xii PBEFAOB.
course to that direct and personal work without which
there can be no true intellectual formation.
Some, doubtless, may think that this work intro-
duces questions too difficult for beginners, such, for
instance, as ideas, universals, matter and form, spacp,
time, and others, which are attended with serious
difficulties even in treatises which deal with them in
detail. But, these questions being so important, it
seems to us that they cannot be altogether omitted
without leaving philosophy destitute of foundation
and consistency. This remark applies especially to
the treatise on General Metaphysics. In its present
concise form, it will, perhaps, be found too abstruse ;
still we have thought it proper to retain it, though it
should prove of no other use than to serve as a sum-
mary for those who wish to make a more profound
study of the subject.
Another charge may be brought against this course,
that of being based on the method and doctrine of the
Schoolmen. For we have, in fact, everywhere en-
deavored faithfully to reproduce the principles of the
Thomistic school, as interpreted by Goudin, Sanse-
verino, Liberatore, Kleutgen, Priseo, Gonzalez, Tapa-
relli, and others, whose text we have often merely
summarized and sometimes embodied in full. But
this reproach, were it really merited, would be assur-
edly in our eyes the best eulogy that could be be-
stowed on this modest work. The Scholastic philos-
ophy, which was adopted during many centuries by
all the universities of Europe, and the abandonment
of which has been attended with such fatal results,
has undeniably in its favor not only the prestige of
time and the authority of the greatest geniuses, but
that which to the Christian is of more value, the
sanction of the Church. Following this philosophy
PBEFAOB. xiii
we are sure never to stray from Catholic teaching;
while away from it we find only discordant, unsub-
stantial doctrines, often evidently erroneous or pro-
scribed.
But some may object that we must pay due defer-
ence to the necessities of the times, that therefore the
wisest course nowadays is, indeed, to avoid manifest
errors, but still not to return, at least openly, to these
old doctrines, which would expose us to be regarded
as not only not progressive but even retrogressive.
To this we reply that to reject the false without affirm-
ing the true is to leave the mind in suspense, not
knowing where to rest ; it is to take from it all energy
and vitality by depriving it of its proper and neces-
sary element ; it is, in fine, to deliver it over without
power or defence to the seductions of error.
May this humble work be free from that vagueness,
or, rather, absence of doctrine, too often met with in
certain elementary works on philosophy ; and may it
contribute, in its own modest way, to the diffusion of
the beautiful and fruitful teachings of Scholastic Phi-
losophy.
Shortly after the publication of the firSt edition of
this work, a Latin translation of it was made at Rome
by Mgr. Amoni, canon, at present secretary of the
Apostolic Nunciature at Vienna.
We give below the preface' of the learned trans-
lator :
" I will be brief, kind reader, but I wish that you
should know the two principal motives which have
led me to consider the publication of this 'Elemen-
tary Course of Philosophy ' as eminently opportune.
First, though distinguished by an admirable brevity,
it omits nothing necessary to a full knowledge of the
subject ; secondly, and this is much more important at
XIV PREFACE .
the present time, the method of teaching adopted<by
the French author is conformable to that of the old
Schoolmen, and his doctrines agree on all points with
those of St. Thomas of Aquin. Now, however little
you consider with what earnestness the learned Bo-
maij Pontiff Leo XIII. recommends to all the faith-
ful of Jesus Christ the philosophy of the holy Doctor,
you will easily understand that, in our day especially,
this work merits the preference over all others.
" In fact, if the love of truth should always and
everywhere move the minds and hearts of men, and if
every one should direct all his efforts to acquiring
truth, since its possession constitutes man's happi-
ness, we must apply ourselves so much the more
earnestly to the task, now that the war against
truth has become more active, and we are exposed
to greater danger of falling into error. Although
charged during seventeen years with the duty of
teaching philosophy to young men, I shall never
regret having undertaken this translation, because, in
my opinion, there can be found in no other work any-
thing more methodical, more exact, or more useful."
At the tiifie of the publication at Rome of the Latin
translation, the Osservatore Romano recommended the
work in a lengthy article, from which we extract the
following :
" He who desires to procure this work, either for
his 'own use or that of others, must not expect to find
therein anything new in matter or form. We assure
him, however, that he will find in it as pecial advan-
tage : it contains an abridged and lucid exposition
of all the parts of a sound philosophy — principles,
method, doctrine — all are conformable to, or rather
borrowed from, the most accredited and safe sources,
whether ancient or modern, of a sound philosophy.
PREFACE. XV
In short, errors are briefly exposed and so success-
fully refuted as to make young men certain of the
truth and competent to defend it against Eationalism
and Naturalism, which, in our day more than in any
other age, infect society.
"Students of philosophy should feel thankful to
the author, as well as to the learned translator, who
has favored Italy, and especially institutions of sci-
entific education, with a book entirely safe on all
points. It is also extremely useful on account of
the principles which it contains and expounds, the
matter for reflection which it offers to young men,
and the opportunity of making a fuller exposition
which it furnishes to professors of philosophy. We
believe, in fact, that it is neither useful nor advisable
to put into the hands of young students a book which
fatigues by its copiousness and the unnecessary diffi-
culties introduced, and which, moreover, renders the
oral instruction of the teacher superfluous."
A Vienna journal, the Vaterland, in the issue of
April 9, 1882, concludes in these words an article
upon the same work, translated by Mgr. Amoni :
" This work, by reason of the richness of matter
presented, must take its place among the best works
on Christian Philosophy which have appeared in
these latter times. "We do not possess in German any
manual of philosophy which, in 416 pages, contains
such a large amount of matter so happily and per-
fectly elaborated."
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Brief of His Holiness, Pope Pius IX r-
Approbation of the Bishop of Montpellier, . . . . vii
Translator's Preface, ix
Preface . . . xi
Works to Gonsulti xvi
INTKODTJCTORY.
Definition of Philosophy.— Its Excellence, Utility, and Division, xxix
RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
Its Division, i
LOGIC.
Definition of Logic. — Its Utility.— Its Division, ... 1
PART FIRST.- DIALECTICS.
Reasoning and Its Constituent Elements, 3
Chapter I. — Simple Apprehension.
Article I. — Nature of Simple Apprehension, .... 3
" II. — Ideas and Oral Terms, 4
" III. — Division of Terms, 5
" rV.— Universals, 8
, " V. — Predicaments or Categories, 10
" VI. — Properties of Terms in a Proposition, ... 12
" VII. — Means to Insure Propriety of Terms. — Definition, 15
" Vni.— Division, 16
Xviii TABLE OF 00NTENT8.
Chapter IL— Judgment.
CASB
Article I. — Nature of Judgment, 18
" II. — The Proposition and Its Elements, ... 19
" III. — Division of Propositions, 21
" rV. — Properties of Propositions, 25
Chaptbb in. — Reasoning.
Article I. — Definition and Elements of Reasoning, .
. 30
*' II. — Division of Reasoning 31
" III. — Categorical Syllogisms and Their Rules, . . 32
" IV. — Modes and Figures of the Syllogism, ... 35
" v. — Hypothetical Syllogisms and Their Rules, . . 38
" VI. — Abridged and Compound Syllogisms, or Enthy-
meme, Prosyllogism, Epichirema, Sorites, and
Dilemma 40
" VII.— Induction, 43
" VIII. — Probable or Dialectic Syllogism, .... 44
" IX. — Sophistical Syllogism, 45
" X.— Utility of the Syllogism, 48
PART SECOND.— TRUTH AND SCIENCE.
Chapter I. — Truth and the DrppBBBNT States of
THE Intellect in Respect to It.
Article I.— Truth, 49
" II. — In what Operation of the Intellect Logical Truth
is Found, 50
" III. — Different States of the Intellect in respect to Truth, 51
" IV. — Ignorance, Error, and Their Causes, ... 54
Chapter II. — Demonstration, ... 57
Chapter III. — Science. — Division op Science. — Clas-
sification OF THE Sciences, ... 60
PART THIRD.— METHODOLOGY.
Chapter I. — Method m General and Its Laws.
Article I.— Method, 63
" II. — Analysis and Synthesis, ... . . 64
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xix
Chapter II. — Different Knros of Method and
Their Laws.
FAOE
Article I. —Different Kinds of Method, 66
" II.— Special Laws of Each Method, .... 67
Chapter III. — Processes Proper to Certain Methods.
Article I. — Hypothesis, 69
" II. — Experimentation . 70
" III. — Classification, 73
IDEOLOGY.
GENERAL IDEOLOGY.
Chapter I. — Ideas in General.
Article I. — Nature of Ideas, . . > 75
" II. — Characteristics of Ideas, 77
Chapter II. — Systems concerning the Origin of
Ideas.
Article I. — Principal Systems concerning the Origin of Ideas, 78
" II.— Sensism, 78
" ni. — Critique, or Transcendentalism, .... 81
■ " IV.— The System of Innate Ideas, .... 83
" v.— Ontologism, 84
" VI. — Intermediarism, 86
" VII.— Traditionalism, 87
" VIII.— The Scholastic System, 89
Chapter III. — TJnivbrsals.
Article I. — Nature of Universals, 94
" 11. — Different Opinions on the Nature of Universals, . 96
SPECIAL IDEOLOGY.
Chapter I. — How Human Knowledge is Acquired.
Article I. — The First Operation of Intellect and the Psrcep-
tion of Essences, 99
XX TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PAOE
Article II. — How the Intellect Knows Individual Bodies, . 103
" III.— The Soul's Knowledge of Itself, . . . .104
«' IV.— How the Human Soul Knows God, ... 104
" V. — Necessity of Sensible Images for Intellection in
Our Present Life, 107
Chapter II. — Knowlbdqe of First Principles.
Article I. — Nature of Principles of Knowledge, . . . 109
" II.— The Principle of Contradiction, . . . .110
" in.— The Principle of Causality Ill
Chapter III. — Language in relation to the Ac-
quisition OP Knowledge.
Article I. — Utility of Language in Developing the Mind, . 114
" II. — Origin of Language, 115
CEITEBIOLOGT ; OR, THK MOTIVES OP CEETITUDB.
Chapter I. — The Mental Faculties as Means of
Attaining Truth.
Article I.— The Cognitive Faculties, 117
" IL— The Veracity of the Senses, 118
" III. — The Veracity of Consciousness 119
" IV. — The Veracity of Intellect and Reason, . . . 130
Chapter II. — Scepticism.
Article I. — Nature of Scepticism. — Its Different Kinds, . 133
" II. — Refutation of Scepticism, . ... 134
Chapter III. — The Ultimate Criterion op
Certitude.
Article I. — What is meant by the Ultimate Criterion of Cer-
titude, 136
" II.— The Intrinsic Principle of Certitude, . . . 126
" III.— The Extrinsic Principle of Certitude, . . .130
'" IV. — Means by which Testimony is Transmitted, . 133
" V. — Authority of Common Sense and of the Learned, 135
" VI. — Importance of Authority as a Criterion of Certi-
tude 137
TABLE OV CONTENTS. XXI
REAL PHILOSOPHY ; OR, METAPHYSICS.
PAOB
Definition of Metaphysics.— Its Utility and Division, . , 139
GENERAL METAPHYSICS ; OR, ONTOLOGY.
Definition and Division of General Metaphysics, . . . 141
BEING AND ITS PROPERTIES.
Chapter I.— Idea and Analogy of Being.
Article I. — Idea of Being 141
n.— Analogy of Being, 142
Chapter II. — The Transcendentals.
Article I. — Number of Transcendentals, .... 144
" U.— Unity, 144
" IIL— Truth, 150
" IV.— Goodness 151
" V. — Beauty. — Sublimity. — Gracefulness, . . . 156
PRINCIPLES AND CAUSES OF BEING, . .161
Chapter I. — Metaphysical Principles of Being.
Article I. — Potentiality and Actuality; or, Power and Act, . 162
" II. — Essence and Existence, 167
Chapter II. —Causes of Being.
Article I. — Division of Causes, 169
" II.— Material Cause and Specific Formal Cause, . . 170
" III. — Exemplar or Ideal Cause, 170
" IV.— Efficient Cause, 171
" v.— Final Cause 179
DIVISION OF BEING, ... 184
Chapter I. — Real Being and Logical Being.
Chapter II. — Uncreated or Infinite Being and
Created or Finite Being.
Finite Being, • 187
xxu TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Chaptek III. — Substance and Accidbnt.
Article I. — Nature of Substance and Accident,
" II. — Different Kinds of Substance,
" III. — Subsistence, Supposit, and Person,
" IV. — Accidents. — Quantity, .
" v.— Eelation,
" VI.— Quality, . . .
" VII. — Action, Passion, Time, and Place,
189
193
193
194
196
199
201
SPECIAL METAPHYSICS.
Its Division, 205
COSMOLOGY, . . . .205
Chapter I. — The World in General.
Article I.— Origin of the World 206
" II.— Perfection of tlie World, 308
" III.— Order of the Universe, . . . . . .211
Chapter II.— The World in Relation to Non-
living OR Inorganic Bodies.
Articlb I. — Primitive Elements of Bodies, .... 214
II. — Properties of Matter and Form, .... 218
" III.— The Natural Composite, 222
" IV. — Substantial Changes of Bodies, or Generation and
Corruption, 224
" V. — Properties of Bodies, 225
" VT.— Space and Time, 238
Chapter III. — The World : Living Bodies.
Article I. — Life in general 232
" II. — The Soul, or Life-Principle of Living Com-
posites, 234
" III. — The Bodies of Living Composites, .... 240
" IV.— Vegetative Life, or the Life of Plants, . . .242
" V. — Sensitive Life, or the Life of Animals, . . 243
TABLE OF CONTENTS. Xxiii
PAGE
PSYCHOLOGY ; OR, ANTHROPOLOGY. . . 249
Chapter L — Thb Human Soul and Its Faculties.
Article I. — Faculties of tRe Human Soul, .... 250
" II. — The Cognitive Sensitive Faculties. — Sensibility in
general, 251
" III. — External Sensibility in general, .... 258
" IV. — The External Senses in particular, . . . 263
" v.— Internal Senses 264
" VI. — The Appetitive Faculties. — Sensitive Appetite, . 273
" VII.— The Intellective Faculties.— The Intellect, . . 275
" VIII.— Consciousness, 282
" IX.— Attention and Reflection, 284
" X. — The Principal Functions of the Intellect. — Judg-
ment, . 285
" XI. — Speculative Intellect and Practical Intellect, 287
" XII.— Reason 287
" XIIL— Intellective Memory, 288
" XIV.— Intellective Appetite, or Will, . . . .290
" XV.— Freedom 291
" XVI.— Relations of the Will to the Other Faculties of the
Soul, 297
" XVII.— Habit 299
Appendix.
Sleep and Insanity, 802
Chapter II. — The Human Soul Considered in Itself.
Article I. — Origin of the Human Soul, 305
" IL— Spirituality of the Human Soul, . . . .306
" III. — Immortality of the Human Soul, .... 311
Chapter III.— The Human Soul in Relation to
its Body.
Article I. — Union of Soul and Body, 315
" II. — Unity of Human Soul as Substantial Form of the
Body, .319
xxiv TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PASS
Article III. — Seat or Locus of the Soul, ..... 333
' IV.— The Resurrection of the Body, . . , . 334
NATURAL THEOLOGY.
DEPrftlTION AND DIVISION.
Chaptek I. — Existence and Unity op God.
FAGB
Article I.— Proofs of the Existence of God, .... 337
n.— Atheism 331
•' UL— Unity of God, 333
" IV.— Dualism 338
Chapter II. — Attributes op God in General.
ABSOLUTE attributes.
Article I. — Attributes of God in general, .... 335
" IL— Absolute Attributes of God.— Aseity, . . .337
" in. — Infinity, Eternity, Immutability, Simplicity, and
Immensity, ....... 338
IV.— The Divine Intelligence, 339
" v.— The Divine Will 341
" VI.— The Divine Power, 343
Chapter III. — Relative Attributes op God.
Article I.— God the Creator 347
" II.— Pantheism, 350
" III.— God the Preserver, 355
" IV. — The Divine Concurrence with the Actions of
Creatures, 358
" V. — Omnipresence of God, 359
" VI.— Providence of God, 360
MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
Definition of Moral Philosophy. — Character of the Science. — Its
Excellence, Method, and Division, , . . 367
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xxv
ETHICS.
DITIBION.
Chafteb I. — The End op Human Actions.
PAQX
Article I. — Good in general as the End of Every Being, and
the First Principle of Its Operations, . . 370
" II.— The Supreme Good as the Last End of Man, . 37S
" III. — The Supreme Good in relation to Man's Life upon
Earth, 376
Chapter II. — Sttbjective Principles of Human
Actions.
Article I. — The Faculty by which Human Actions are Elicited, 378
" n.— The Passions, 383
" III.— Virtues and Vices, 385
Chapter III. — Morality of Human Actions.
Article I. — On what the Morality of Human Actions Depends, 388
" II. — Constituent Principles of the Morality of Human
Actions, 391
" ni.— Imputability 393
" IV.— Merit and Demerit, 394
Chapter IV. — Law, the Eulb of Human Actions.
Article I.— Moral Duty, 396
" IL— Right 399
" III. — Law in general, . 403
" IV.— The Eternal Law 404
•' V. — The Natural Law of Conscience, .... 404
«' VL— Sanction of Moral Law, 407
" VIL— The First Precept of the Natural Law, . . 410
" VIII. — False Systems of Morality as Derived from Their
First Moral Precept, 411
" IX Conscience, 415
Natural Law, .... 418
XX /i TABLE OF 00NTENT8.
PART I.— INDIVIDUAL LAW.
PASS
Chaptbe I. — Man's Duties to God, . . 419
Chapter II. — Man's Dtttibb to Himself.
Article I. — The Foundation of Man's Duties to Himself, . 435
IL— Man's Duties to His Soul, ..... 425
" IIL— Man's Duties to His Body 437
Chapter III. — Man's Duties to His Fellow-Men.
Article I. — Love of One's Neighbor 480
" II.— The Right of Self-Defenoe, and Duelling, . . 434
" III. — Rights and Duties in Relation to Social Good, . 436
" IV.— Contracts, 446
PART II.— SOCIAL LAW, . . .450
Chapter I. — Domestic Society.
Article I. — Nature of Marriage, .... . 451
" II. — Unity and Indissolubility of Marriage, . . 453
" III. — Reciprocal Duties of Husband and Wife, . . 454
" IV. — Duties of Parents and Children, .... 455
" V. — Duties of Masters and .Servants^ .... 457
Chapter II.— Civil Society.
Article I. — Nature of Civil Society, 459
" II.— The Social State in Relation to Man, . . .459
" III. — The Primitive Fact that Reduces to Act the Nat-
ural Sociability of Man, ..... 461
" IV.— End of Civil Society, ...... 462
«' v.— Elements of Civil Society, ..... 463
" VI.— Nature of Civil Authority, ..... 465
" VII.— Origin of Civil Authority, ..... 466
" VIII.— Diverse Polities, 468
" IX. — Manner of Transmitting Supreme Power, . . 470
" X. — Exercise of Supreme Power, 471
» XI.— Duties of the Ruler and His Subjects, . . .476
TABLE OF CONTENT a. XXV ii
PART III.— THE COMMON LAW OP NATIONS.
PAGB
Chaptbk I. — Natural Relations existing be-
tween Different Nations, . . . 478
Chapter II. — Peaceful Relations between Dif-
ferent Nations.
Article I. — The Duties Prescribed by the Love of One Nation
for Another, 480-
" II.— Commerce, 480
■' III. — Treaties and the Right of Embassy, . . . 481
Chapter III. — War.
Article I. — Nature and Justice of War 483
" II. — Duties during and after War, .... 484
Chapter IV. — The Society of Nations, . . 486
Appendix on Religious Society.
Article I. — Nature and Organization of the Church, , . 488
" II.— Rights of tlie Church, 490
" III. — Mutual Relations of Church and State, . . 492
" IV. — Relations between the Church and International
Society, 493
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, . . .495
Ancient Philosophy.
Oriental Philosophy, . 496
First Period of Ancient Philosophy, . . . „ . 498
Second Period of Ancient Philosophy, 499
Third Period of Ancient Philosophy, ..... 503
Medlsital Philosophy.
First Period .605
Second Period,
1. Arabian Philosophy, 505
Xxvili TABLE OF CONTENTS.
FAQS
2. The Philosophy of .the Schools before St. Thomas, . 507
3. Apogee of the Scholastic Philosophy, .... 510
Third Period.
Decline of Scholastic Philosophy, 512
MODBKN PhTT.OSOPHY.
First Period. 1. Epoch of Transition, ...
Second Period. 2. Philosophy of Bacon, Descartes, and Leib'
nitz, . ....
3. The Schools of Bacon, Descartes, and Leib-
nitz, ......
4. The Scotch School and the German School,
5. Present Schools in France,
6. Philosophy in England and America,
Index of Subjects,
Index of Authors referred to,
514
515
518
520
522
523
525
536
INTEODUCTOET.
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. — TIB EXCELLENCE AND UTIL=
ITY.— ITS DIVISION.
1. Philosophy is the science of things through their
highest or ultimate causes, so far as it may be attained
by the light of reason. — Whatever exists may be known
in two ways : the first is by a spontaneous, common
knowledge of things, such as every man may acquire ;
the second is by a reflex knowledge, peculiar to minds
desiring to account for things and to know them in
their principles and ultimate causes : this latter is
philosophic knowledge. But the principles of things
are partly confined to special sciences, and partly un-
derlie all human knowledge ; the former constitute
the philosophy of this or that science ; the latter
alone are the object of philosophy properly so called.
These principles or ultimate causes are investigated
by the light of reason ; and so philosophy is divided
off from Sacred Theology, which rests on divinely
revealed principles.
2. ITie excellence and utility of philosophy are mani-
fest, whether it be considered in itself, or in its relations
with the other sciences. — Since philosophy treats of
things in their highest causes, it is in itself the noblest
object that can engage the mind of man ; it teaches
him the knowledge of truth and enables him to attain
his greatest natural perfection. Eelatively to the
other sciences, it is evident that since philosophy lays
XXX INTBODUOTORT.
down their first principles, it is their foundation, and
exercises the most direct influence over their develop-
ment, as experience besides has shown.
3. Philosophy may he divided into real, rational, and
moral philosophy. — Every science may be divided into
as many parts as there are different aspects under
which the object of which it treats may be viewed. But
the object of philosophy in general is heiTig, which may
be considered under three aspects : as real and pos-
sessing attributes independent of our cognition ; as
ideal and having attributes which result from our men-
tal action ; or as moral when regarded as the term * of
voluntary action. Philosophy, then, may treat of the
ultimate principles of things either in the order of re-
ality, or of cognition, or of morality ; its divisions are,
therefore, called physical, logical, and ethical ; or, if we
use the Latin equivalents, natural or real, rational, and
moral. The ontological order, or order of existence
would require us to begin with real philosophy or
metaphysics ; we must, however, first study rational
philosophy, because it points out the laws of the hu-
man mind in acquiring knowledge, and trains it to
discern the true from the false, thus furnishing the
means to study real being more easily and securely.
* " Term in general is a boundary or limit. lu Logic, it denotes
the subject and predicate of a judgment ; the major, minor, and
middle of a syllogism. In Metaphysics, it denotes the limit of a
cause, more particularly of an efficient cause. In Ethics, the final
cause is the term, because the limit of desire." — Harfer, Metaphys-
ice of the School, vol. i. , p. 589.
RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
ITS DIVISION^
Rational Philosophy is divided into Logic, Ideology,
and Criteriology. — As rational philosophy considers
entities in respect to the knowledge which we have of
them, it ought (1) to investigate the laws which govern
the intellect, the instrument by which we know ; (2) to
treat of ideas, the means by which we know ; (3) to
determine the value of the knowledge acquired by the
intellect. Hence rational philosophy is divided into
three principal parts : 1. Logic, or the science of the
laws of thought ; 2. Ideology, or the science of ideas ;
3. Criteriology, or the science of the criteria of certi-
tude.
LOGIC.
DEFINITION OF LOGIC— ITS OTILITY. — ITS DIVISION.
1. Logic is the science of tJie laios which the intellect
must obey in order to acquire readily and surely the hnowl-
edgi truth. — The human mind in its search after
tru1 s subject to laws imposed on it by its very
nature. The ascertainment of these laws constitutes
Logic. Logic is a science rather than an art, because
it considers the laws of the mind in their intrinsic
2 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
principles and general applications, and is not con-
fined to an enumeration of practical rules.*
2. Logic is of great utility for advancing in the cogni-
tion of truth, for guarding against error, and acquiring
proficiency in any science whatever. — As Logic habitu-
ates the intellect to classify and co-ordinate knowl-
edge, it gives us great facility for progressing still
further in the acquisition of truth; moreover, by
familiarizing the mind with the nature and structure,
as also the artifices, of reasoning, it enables us easily
to discern the vices of a sophism a;nd the false appear-
ances by which error seeks to seduce the mind.
Finally, it is evident that, as the sciences can advance
only by means of reasoning, nothing is more con-
ducive to their progress and easy acquisition than
Logic, which is, in fact, the science of reasoning itself.
3. Logic is divided into three principal parts : the first
investigates tJie nature and laws of reasoning ; the second
expounds the general conditions of science ; the third deter-
mines the general rules of method. — The object of logic
is reasoning ; but in reasoning three things may be
considered : the nature of reasoning, the end of reason-
ing, which is science, and, lastly, the process or
method followed to reach this end more easily. Logic,
therefore, is divided into three parts, corresponding
to the three aspects under which reasoning may be
considered.
* Considered as " an enumeration of practical rules " for the detec-
tion and refutation of error, logic is an art. Hence, while logic is
chiefly and primarily a science, it is dependently and secondarily an
art. — Aristotle defines art as "science employed in production.''
PART FIRST.
DIALECTICS.
Reasoning and its Constituent Elements.
4. Dialectics, the first part of Logic, has reasoning for
its olyect, and treats : 1. of Simple Apprehension ; 2. of
Judgment ; 3. of Reasoning. — Reasoning is a complex
operation, whose elements are judgment and simple
apprehension. Every reasoning supposes several
judgments, and every judgment supposes the appre-
hension of two ideas. Hence, before considering
reasoning in itself, we must treat of judgment and
simple apprehension.
CHAPTER I.
Simple Appeehension.
AET. I. — ^NATUEE of SLMPLE APPEEHENSION.
5. Simple Apprehension is that first operation ofthein-
tellect hy which it seizes or perceives an object without any
affirmation or negation concerning it. — The first act of
the mind is a simple view by which it apprehends ob-
jects presented to it, without affirming or denying
anything of them. The result of this operation is an
4 RATIONAL PBILOSOPHT.
ideal reproduction of the object perceived ; this re-
production is called a mental term, concept, notion,
or idea. If the mental term is expressed orally,
it is called an oral term or word.
ABT. n. — IDEAS AND OEAL TEEMS.
6. An idea is a mere intellectual representation of an ob-
ject, by ivhich that object is known. — The human intellect
is not necessitated by its nature to know any one de-
terminate object. Now, since it is indifferent in this
respect, it must, when it actually knows an object^
be determined to know by that object. But this ob-
ject can determine the intellect to know only by being
united to it in some way. The intellect, eyidently,
cannot go out of itself to effect this union, nor can the
object in its physical reality enter the intellect. The
union of object and intellect, therefore, must be
effected by a species, form, or likeness of the object.
It is this medium of union, and therefore of knowl-
edge, that we call an idea.* It must be carefully dis-
tinguished from the sensible image or phantasm,
which is proper to sense only, and is therefore mate-
rial ; whereas the idea is spiritual and proper to in-
tellect, and represents not the sensible qualities of an
individual object, but its nature as one of a class of
objects.
1. An oral term is a conventional word which expresses
an idea. — Unlike the idea or mental term, which from
its very nature represents the object, the oral term
has a meaning only in virtue of the usage and agreer
* When viewed as the product of the joint action of object and in-
tellect, it is called a concept, and the action producing it is called
conception.
SIMPLE APPBEBENSION. 5
ment of men. It directly expresses the idea, and
througli this the object itself ; but habit leads us usu-
ally to unite the idea of the word with the idea of
the thing.
ART. m. — DIYISION OF TEBMS.
8. Ideas are concrete or abstract, clear or obscure, dis-
tinct or confused, convplete or incomplete. — Considered
with reference to the manner in which the object is
presented to the intellect, an idea is concrete when the
object is apprehended in its physical reality with all
its belongings ; as the idea of a " learned man " or a
" marble statue." It is abstract when the object is ap-
prehended apart from its real existence or its phys-
ical connections ; as the idea of " learning " or of
" whiteness."
In respect to the degree of perfection with which
the object is apprehended, an idea is clear or obscure
according as the object perceived through it can or
cannot be distinguished from other objects. The idea
we have of a "brother" or " sister," or of "virtue,"
V. g., is clear.
An idea is distinct or confused according as it does
or does not exhibit the marks by which the object is
distinguished from other objects ; the idea of " vir.
tue,".v. g., is distinct when by it we know not only
that virtue is an acquired habit, but also that it inclines
the will to act rightly.
An idea is complete and adequate or incomplete and in-
adequate according as all or only some of the con-
stituent elements of the object are known ; the idea
of " man " as a rational animal is complete.
9. An oral term is significant or insignificant, fixed or
vague, univocal or equivocal, analogous by attribution or
analogous by proportion. — An oral term is significant if
6 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
it means something, as " man ;" it is insignificant if it
has no meaning, as "tervoc."
An oral term is/a;ed if it has a settled meaning, as
" God;" it is vagtie if its meaning varies at the will of
him who uses it, as " Nature," which sometimes means
the visible universe, sometimes the essence of a thing,
etc.
An oral term is univocal when it has but one mean-
ing for the several objects to which it is applied, as
" man," which signifies the same thing when applied
to Peter and to Paul ; it is equivocal when its meaning
varies for each of several things, as " dog," when ap-
plied to a star and an animal. An oral term is anal-
ogous, if it signifies several things which are not of the
same nature, but have some similitude, as "foot,"
which is applied to a part of the animal body and to
the base of a mountain. A term is analogous by anal-
ogy of attribution when it denotes one thing, primarily
and intrinsically, and applies to others only on ac-
count of the relation which they have to the first,
either extrinsically, as when " healthy " is predicated
of food and of the animal organism ; or intrinsically,
as when " being " is predicated of God and creatures,
of substance and accident. A term is analogous by
proportion when it is applied to several things which
differ, in reality, but which bear a certain proportion
to one another ; as " principle," which has a propor-
tionate resemblance when applied to source, heart,
and point.
10. Mental and oral terms are significant by themselves
or with another term, positive or negative, concrete or
abstract, real or logical, absolute or connotative, incom-
plex or complex, transcendental or predicamental, con-
nexed or disparate, predicable or subjective, antecedent or '
consequent, collective or distributive, singular or universal.
SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 1
— ^A term, whether mental or oral, is significant by
itself when by itself it has a meaning, and there-
fore may be the entire subject or attribute of a
proposition, as " hero ; " it is significant with another
when by itself it has no meaning, and therefore can-
not alone be subject or attribute of a proposition, as
" some."
A term is positive when it signifies some entity, as
" light ; " it is negative when it denotes the absence
of some entity, as " blindness."
A term is concrete when it denotes a thing with its
belongings as it really exists, as " Peter ; " it is
abstract when it denotes a thing viewed apart from
the subject to which it belongs, and from which it has
no separate existence, as " whiteness."
A term is real when it signifies something having
existence outside the intellect, as " God ; " it is logical
when it signifies a thing which has no existence
except what intellect gives it, as " species," " genus."
A term is absolute or substantive when it denotes a
thing as existing in itself, whether the thing be really
substance, as " man," or accident, as "prudence ; " it
is connotaiive or adjective when it denotes something
accessory to another, whether the thing be accident,
as "good," or substance, as "philosopher."
A term is incomplex when it denotes one thing by a
single sign, as " angel ; " it is complex when it denotes
several realities or consists of several words, as
" poet," which denotes the man and his art ; " Julius
Caesar," which consists of two words ; the " Emperor
Charlemagne," which is complex in word and in
reality, for it embraces two words and two realities.
A term is transcendental when it signifies something
applicable to all things, as "being," "something,"
" one," " true," " good ; " it is predicamental when it
8 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
signifies something which applies only to certain
beings, as " brute."
Terms are connexed when one includes or excludes
the other, as " man and animal," "white and black; "
they are disparate when they have no relation of
exclusion or subordination, as " white and learned."
A term is predicable when it can be affirmed of an-
other ; it is subjective when another can be afi&rmed of
it ; thus, in the proposition, " God is just," God is sub-
ject and Jms^ predicate.
An antecedent term is that which another follows, as
" man " in respect to animal ; a consequent term is that
which follows another, as " animal " in respect to man.
If terms are deduced from each other, they are called
reciprocal, as " man and rational."
A term is collective when it denotes several things
taken conjointly, as " people," " nation ; " it is distrib-
utive when it denotes several things in such a manner
that it may be applied to each in particular, as
" man."
A term is singular when it signifies one thing deter-
minately, as " Aristotle ; " it is universal when it ap-
plies to several things univocally and distributively,
as " animal." In treating of universal terms, we may
consider : 1. Universal terms in themselves, and the
five Species into which they are divided ; 2. The divi-
sion of universal terms into different Supreme Genera,
called Categories.
AET. IT. — XTNTVEESALS.
11. Vniversals are terms ivhich are applied univocally
and distributively to many things. — ^When the intellect
perceives the essence of an object abstracted from the
individual characteristics of that object, it may con-
SIMPLE APPREHBN8I0N. 9
sider the mental term representing' the essence as
applicable to every being which has the common
essence ; the term is then called universal, as " man."
Its opposite is the singular term, which is applicable
to one determinate thing only, as " Socrates." A par-
ticular term is a universal affected by the sign of par-
ticularity, which limits it to a part of what the term
denotes, as " some men."
12. Universal terms have two properties : comprehen-
sion and extension, ivhich are in inverse ratio to each
other. — The essence represented by a universal term
is made up of one or of many elements ; thus, the es-
sence of man consists of " animality and rationality ; "
the comprehension or intension of a universal term is
the sum 6f the elements which it contains. The es-
sence represented by a universal term is found in a
greater or less number of subjects; thus, the essence
of man is found in every man ; the extension of a uni-
versal term is the number of beings to which it ap-
plies. The greater the comprehension of a term, the
less its extension, and vice versa.
13. There are five modes according to ivhich a universal
term may be applied to individuals of like nature ; there
are, therefore, five classes of universals, viz., genus, spe-
cies, difference, property, and accident. These universals
are also called predicables.—A universal term expresses
either the essence of a thing or something added to
the essence. In the former case, it expresses either
the whole essence or only a part of it. If it denotes
the whole essence, it is a species, and the beings to
which it is applied are called individuals, as " man."
If the universal denotes only a part of the essence,
it denotes either the part common to other species, or
the part by which the essence differs from them : in
the first case it is called genus, and in the second spe-
10 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
dfic difference; thus, " animal " expresses what is com-
mon to both man and brute, and " rational " expresses
the specific difference which distinguishes man from
brute.
If the universal denotes what is added to the es-
sence, either this attribute cannot be separated from
the essence, but is a necessary attendant of it, so that
it is always found in the whole species and in that
species only, in which case it is a property; or it can
be separated without changing the essence, and then
it is an accident ; thus, " free will " is a property,
"learning" is an accident of man. Genus, species,
and difference are divided into highest, intermediate,
and lowest or proximate, as may be seen in the fol-
lowing diagram.
Substance
/ \
Corporeal Incorpored
\
Body
/ \
Organic Inorganic
Living
Sentient Non-sentient
\
Animal
„ / \
Rational Irrational
\
Man
AET. T. — PEEDICAMENTS OE CATEGORIES.
14. Predicaments or categories are the highest genera ii
which all real entities are classified ; or, ihey are the high'
est genera of all things.—'Wh.en the intellect examines
an object, it seeks what attributes or predicates it can
SIMPLE APPREHENSION: 11
affirm or deny of that object. These predicates all
have their place under the predicables. But all the
different objects which the intellect can know, have
been arranged in logic under certain supreme genera ;
these genera are called predicaments or categories.
15. There are ten predicaments or categories : substance,
quantity, relation, quality, action, passion, time, place, pos-
ture, habiliment. — Every being exists either in itself or
in another. If it exists in itself, it is called substance;
if it exists in another as its subject, it is called acci-
dent. Accident is divided into nine genera ; for, if we
wish to know the accidents of a substance, Pope Leo
XIII., for instance, we may put the following ques-
tions : 1. How large a man is he ? the answer to which
gives quantity ; 2. Whose father or son is he ? which
implies relation; 3. What are his qualifications? qual-
ity ; 4. What does he do ? action ; 5. What does he
suffer ? passion ; 6. In what age does he live ? time ;
7. Where is he ? place ; 8. Is he sitting or standing ?
posture ; 9. How is he clad ? hahit or habiliment.
16. Comparing with one another the things arranged
under the predicaments, we may consider their opposition,
priority, simultaneity, motion, and mode of having ; these
are called post-predicaments. — Opposition is the repug-
nance of one thing to another. It may be in four
ways : as Contrary, when the two things, falling under
a common genus, are mutually incompatible in the
same subject, as " heat and cold " under the genus
temperature ; as Relative, when the repugnance arises
from a mutual relation, as " father and son ; " as
Privative, when the repugnance arises between a
thing and its privation, as " sight and blindness ; " as
Contradictory, when the repugnance is between being
and not-being, as " man and not-man."
Priority is that by which one thing precedes an-
12 RATIONAL PHILOSOPBT.
other. It is of five kinds: 1. Priority of duration,
as " an old man is prior in existence to a youth ; " 2.
Of consequence, as " man precedes rational ; " 3. Of or-
ier, as in the study of language " grammar precedes
literature;'' 4. Of dignity, as "king and subjects;"
5. Of nature, as the " sun and its rays." — Simulta-
neity is opposed to priority, hence it is also of five
kinds.
Motion is the passage from one state to another. It
is of six kinds : 1. Generation, or the passage from
non-being to substantial being ; 2. Corruption, or the
passage from being to non-being ; 3. Augmentation,
or the passage from a less to a greater quantity ; 4.
Diminution, which is the opposite of augmentation ;
5. Alteration, or the passage from one quality to an-
other ; 6. Locomotion, or the passage from one place
to another. — The modes ofJiaving are five : 1. Inherence,
as " a man has knowledge ; " 2. Containing, as " a de-
canter has wine ; " 8. Possession, as " a man has a
field ; " 4. Belation, as " a father has a son ; " 5. Juxta-
position, as " a man has a garment on."
AET. VI. — ^PEOPEETIES OF TEEMS IN A PEOPOSITIGN.
17. Terms have six properties : supposition, appellation,
state, amplification, restriction, alienation. — Supposition is
the particular signification of a word in a given prop-
osition, as, " Angel is a word." Angel here signifies
merely the word, not the nature of which the word is
the sign.
Appellation is ^e application of one term to another,
as " God is good ;" here good is applied to God.
State is the acceptation of a term for the time indi-
cated by the verb, as, " Peter sings."
Amplification is the acceptation of a term for a wider
SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 13
time than that indicated by the verb, as, " The dumb
speak."
Bestridioii is the limitation of the signification of a
term to a narrower sphere ; as, " Eve is the mother of
the living." Here the word living is restricted to men.
Alienation is the acceptation of a term in a met-
aphorical or figurative sense, as " Sun of Justice,"
used to designate the Saviour. " All nature smiles,"
is also an instance of the alienation of a term.
18. Supposition is material or formal, real or logical,
particular, collective, or distributive. — The supposition
of a term is material when the term signifies itself ; as,
" Man is a word." It informal when it denotes an ob-
ject, as, " Man is rational ; " and then it is real, if it
expresses an object as it exists in itself independently
of any mental consideration ; as, " Man is a living be-
ing:" or logical, if it denotes an object abstracted
from its individual characteristics ; as, " Man is a spe-
cies." Real formal supposition is particular when
the term signifies some only of the beings which it
can represent; as, "Some men are deceitful." It is
co^hctive when it signifies all the beings which it can
r( resent, taken conjointly; as, "The Apostles are
t^ slve ; " and distributive when it expresses all and
each of the beings which it can represent ; as, " Man
is mortal."
19. Supposition is subject to the folloiuing 7'ules : 1. A
term affected by a universal sign has a distributive or
collective supposition according to the requirement
of the predicate ; as, " All the Evangelists are saints,"
" All the Evangelists are four." 2. A term affected
by a particular sign has a particular supposition ; as,
"Some men are just." 3. When the subject of a
proposition is not affected by any sign, it has a uni-
versal supposition in necessary matter ; as, " Man is
rational ; " it has a particular supposition in con-
U BATIONAL PSILOSOPHT.
tingent matter ; as, " Men are wise." 4. In an affirma-
tiye proposition, the supposition of the predicate is
always particular ; as, " Man is mortal ; " in a negative
proposition, the supposition of the predicate is uni-
versal ; as, " Man is not a plant." 5. In every prop-
osition, the supposition of the subject is according
to the requirement of the predicate ; hence a numerical
term requires a collective supposition ; as, " The
Apostles are twelve ; " a necessary term requires a
distributive supposition; as, "Animals are sensi-
tive ; " a contingent term requires a particular sup-
position ; as, " Men are wise."
20. Appellation is material or formal. — Appellation is
material when the predicate is applied to the matter
of the subject, without regard to the form which de-
nominates the subject ; as, " The physician sings." It
is formal when the predicate is applied to the form of
the subject, i.e., to the quality or form which denomi-
nates the subject; as, " The physician cures." *
21. Appellation is subject to the follovnng rules : 1.
When the subject is a concrete term, the appellation
is material ; as, " Man is a living being." 2. When
the subject is qualified, the predicate is affirmed of the
subject only, and the appellation is material ; as, " St.
Thomas of Aquin was a disciple of Albertus Magnus."
3. When the predicate is qualified, the predicate with
its qualifier is affirmed of the subject, and the appella-
tion is formal ; as, " Thomas of Aquin was a saintly
disciple of Albertus Magnus."
*In the first example the predicate sings must be applied, not to
the form or quality of physician, but to the subject man, which the
form denominates. In the second example, cures naturally belongs
to the physician as such, and therefore is applied to the form. Form,
in general, is any determination whatever by wJmh a subject is affected.
SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 15
AET. Til. — MEANS TO INSURE PEOPEIETY OF TEEMS. — DEFI-
NITION.
22. Terms, to he perfect, must be clear and distinct.
To obtain this result, we have recourse to definition and
division. — The aim of these two processes being to
clear up what is obscure or confused, it is evident that
they should not be employed upon what is already
sufficiently clear and distinct.
23. Definition is a brief explanation of the meaning of
a term or the nature of a thing. — Whence it follows that
there are two kinds of definition, nominal and real; the
first explains the meaning of the word, the second ex-
plains the nature of the thing signified by the word.
It should be observed: 1. That the nominal defini-
tion ought to precede the real, when the nature of a
thing is in question and the meaning of the word ex-
pressing it is not understood; 2. That the nominal
definition, in reasoning, must never be considered
tantamount to the real definition'; 3. That the real
definition only is scientific.
24. There are three kinds of nominal definition : 1.
According to etymology ; 2. According to usage ; 3. Ac-
cording to the meaning which the person using it wishes to
attach to it. — A real definition is either causal or essen-
tial.— ^A nominal definition may be given according
to etymology ; as, " Intelligence (from the Latin intus
legere, to read within) signifies intimate knowledge."
We may also define a term according to usage; as,
" By the word God, all understand the Infinite Being."
Finally, we may attach to a term lohatever meaning loe
choose. In this case, however, care should be taken:
1 . Not to be so arbitrary in our choice as to become
16 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
unintelligible to others ; 2. Not to use the word in a
different sense during the discourse.
A causal definition explains a thing by means of the
principle which produces or generates it ; as, " A sphere
is a solid generated by the revolution of a semicircle
about its diameter." An essential definition explains a
thing by giving its essence ; as, " Man is a rational ani-
mal." This is the most perfect kind of definition. A
thing is sometimes explained by describing it ; such a
description is called a descriptive or oratoi'ical defini-
tion.
25. Definition should contain the proximate genus and
specific difference. — By definition the thing defined
should be distinguished from every other thing, and
should be known in its characteristics. But without
the proximate genus the characteristics of the thing
are not known ; and without the specific difference the
species to which the thing belongs is not known. In
this definition, "Man is a rational animal," animal de-
termines the proximate genus, and rational the specific
difference. This rule includes that laid down by
modern logicians, viz.. Definition must apply to the
whole of the thing defined and to nothing else.
Three rules are ordinarily given for a definition : 1.
The definition should be clearer than the thing defined ;
2. It should be convertible M'ith the thing defined ; 3.
The thing defined should not enter into the definition.
AET. VII. — DIVISION.
26. Division is the distribution of a whole into its parts.
Division is actual * or potential. — As division is the
* An actual whole is either phymal or metaphysical ; physical
when composed of really distinct parts, as body and soul in man ;
metaphysical when composed of parts that are only logically dis-
tinct, as auimality and rationality in man.
SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 17
separation of a whole into its parts, there are as many
kinds of division as there are different kinds of whole.
But a whole may be actual or potential ; hence divi-
sion may be actual or potential : actual when the whole
is divided into parts which it really has ; as, " Man is
composed of body and soul ; "potential or logical when
the whole is divided into parts which it has in virtue
of its extension ; as, " Substance is corporeal or in-
corporeal."
27. Division should be adequate, it should he made
through the more universal members, and the members
should exclude one another. — 1. The division should be
complete, and hence equal to the whole thing divided ;
thus, we should not divide triangles into isosceles and
equilateral. 2. It should proceed from the more gen-
eral parts to those which are less general ; thus, the
division of living things into plants, animals, and men
would be defective ; they should first be divided into
sentient and non-sentient. 3. The dividing members
should in some way exclude one another; that is,
one should not contain another, much less all, so as
to be equal to the whole divided ; thus man should
• not be divided into soul, body, and arms. To these
three rules may be added a fourth: The division
should be brief, that is, the members should be few in
number.
CHAPTEE n
Judgment,
abt. i. — ^nature oe judgment.
28. Judgynent is the second operation of the intellect, hy
which it predicates the agreement or disagreement of the
attribute with the subject* — By simple apprehension
tlie intellect perceives the subject and attribute sepa-
rately ; but after this operation it compares them,
and affirms or denies their agreement, that is, it forms
a judgment. The intellect, by this second operation,
perfects the first, which is initial and imperfect.
The chief division of judgments is that based on
their nature, and embraces the two classes of a priori
and a posteriori judgments.
An a priori judgment is one in which the agree-
ment or disagreement of the ideas compared is neces-
sary, and either is manifest or can become so from
their mere consideration ; as, " God is infinite."
An a posteriori judgment is one in which the agree-
ment or disagreement of the ideas compared is not
necessary, and can be known from experience alone ;
as, " Columbus discovered America."
A priori judgments are also called necessary, analyt-
ical, pure, metaphysical, absolute. A posteriori judg-
* Or with St Thomas : That action of the intellect hy which it
compounds or divides hy affirming or denying.
JUDGMENT. 19
ments are styled contingent, syntlietical, empirical, physi-
cal, hypothetical.
29. The a priori synthetical judgment of Kant must be
rejected. — In Ms " Critique of Pure Reason," Kant lays
down this third kind of judgment, the a priori synthet-
ical. He holds rightly that all a priori or analytical
judgments must fulfil three conditions : 1. The attri-
bute must be included in the subject ; 2. It must be
necessary ; 3. It must be universal. But he further
maintains that such judgments as, " Every effect must
have a cause," or " 7 and 5 are 12," are wanting in the
first condition. Now, every judgment implies the
perception by the mind of the identity or diversity
of the ideas compared. This identity or diversity
can be apprehended either from the consideration of
the ideas, and in this case the judgment is a priori or
analytical ; or from some extrinsic source, i.e., expe-
rience, and then the judgment is a posteriori or syn-
thetical. Between these there is, therefore, no middle.
Moreover, if the second and third conditions are ful-
filled, evidently the first must also be fulfilled, since
from it the other two result.
AET. II. — THF, PEOPOSmON AND ITS ELEMENTS.*
30. A proposition is the expression of a judgment in
words spoken or written. The elements of a proposition
may he reduced to two, noun and verb. — A proposition,
as being the expression of a judgment, must contain
as many terms as the judgment. But the judgment
* As Logic has to do with mental operations and their signs only
in so far as they contain or express truth or falsity, so of all the
kinds of sentence of which the grammarian treats, it is concerned
with the declarative alone. This kind of sentence is called in logic
a proposition.
20 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
is composed of three elements : subject, attribute, and
copula. To these three elements of the judgment
correspond the three elements of the proposition : two
terms, which express the subject and predicate or at^
tribute, and the copula, which unites them. The sub-
ject is generally a noun, the attribute an adjective; the
copula is a verb. The copula is called a verb, because
the word (verbum) of our mind is not complete with-
out a judgment, and judgment is formally constituted
only by the copula. The verb " to be " is explicitly
or implicitly the copula in every judgment and prop-
osition, because by it identity of subject and attri-
bute, or want of identity, is expressed, and every prop-
osition predicates one or the other. The terms con-
stitute the matter of the proposition ; the copul-a,
which gives being to the proposition, is its form.
The verb "to be, " or the copula, is often contained
in the predicate, as " I love God," which is equivalent
to "I am loving God." *
Besides the noun and the verb, Grammar recog-
nizes other parts of speech, as the pronoun, adverb,
conjunction, etc.; but Logic is not concerned with
these terms, because they do not constitute an essen-
tial element of the proposition, and because they serve
only to represent, modify, or connect nouns or verbs.
* The use of the term predieate in Logic must be carefully distin-
guished from its use in Grammar. In logic the attribute never in-
cludes the copula. Moreover, the copula, as the formal element of
the judgment, must be in the present tense, indicative mood.
Hence such propositions as, "The Martyrs suffered for the Faith,"
must be resolved into the equivalent, " The Martyrs are persons who
suffered for the Faith."
JUDGMENT. 21
AET. m. — DIVISION OP PEOPOSITIONS.
31. T/ie division of propositions is the same as that of
judgments. Hence a proposition is simple or compound
according to the nature of the judgment expressed. A
simple proposition is either simple incomplex or simple
complex. — A proposition being regarded in logic sim-
ply as tlie expression of a judgment, there are as
many kinds of propositions as of judgments. But a
judgment is simple or compound : simple when the
relation is established between only one subject and
one attribute ; compound when there are several sub-
jects or several attributes. When a judgment is sim-
ple, the attribute or the subject may be absolutely
simple, or simple hy reason of the connection between the
parts which compose it ; in the first case, the judgment
is simple incomplex or categorical ; as, " God is good : "
in the second, it is simple complex; as, "He who loves
not his neighbor, whom he sees, does not love God,
whom he does not see." Propositions, then, con-
sidered logically, are simple or compound. Gram-
marians who consider in propositions chiefly the
words of which they consist, divide them into simple,
complex, and compound ; but Logic is not concerned
with these divisions, since it contemplates proposi-
tions solely in their relation with thought.
32. A categorical proposition, considered in respect to
its quantity, is universal, particular, or singular, definite
or indefinite; in respect to its quality, it is affirmative,
negative, or infinitating ; in respect to the mode or manner
in which it asserts that the predicate belongs to the subject,
it is modal. — A categorical proposition may be divided
in the same manner as the judgment which it ex-
22 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHT.
presses. Hence according to its quantity, that is, ac-
cording to the extension of its subject, it is universal
if the subject is universal; as, "All men are mortal: "
particular if the subject is particular ; as, " Some men
are just;" singular ii ihe subject expresses only one
individual determinately ; as, " Peter is just." A prop-
osition may sometimes appear universal without in
reality being so ; as, " Men are deceptive." Proposi-
tions are called indefinite* when the subject is not
affected by a determinate sign ; as, " The Americans
are enterprising ; " and definite when the subject is
affected by a determinate sign ; as, " Some men are
deceptive."
According to its quality, that is, according to the
affirmation or negation indicated by the copula, a
proposition is affirmative ; as, " God is good : " or nega-
tive ; as, "The soul is not mortal." If the negation
does not affect the copula, but the predicate, the prop-
osition is then said to be infinitating ; as, " The human
soul is not-mortal."
A proposition is absolute when it merely affirms the
agreement or disagreement of subject and attribute;
as, " God is just : " it is modal when it expresses the
mode or manner in which the attribute is predicated
of the subject ; as, " God is necessarily just." The
attribute may be predicated of the subject according
to four modes : necessary, contingent, possible, and impos-
sible. There are, then, four kinds of modal proposi-
tion: as, "Man is necessarily rational;" "Man may
be good ; " " Man can be bad ; " " Man cannot be an
angel." The truth of a modal proposition depends
* A singular proposition is the most limited case of the particular
proposition. An indefinite proposition is universal or particulai
according as it expresses a necessary or a contingent truth.
JUDGMENT. 23
on the mode according to whicli the attribute is pre-
dicated of the subject ; thus the proposition, " Man is
necessarily bad," is false.*
33. A compound proposition is either explicit or implicit.
An explicit compound proposition is copulative, causal,
adversative, relative, or hypothetical. A hypothetical
proposition is conditional, disjunctive, or conjunctive. An
implicit or exponible compound proposition is exclusive, ex-
ceptive, comparative, or reduplicative. — A compound prop-
osition consists of several propositions expressing
several judgments which make but one by virtue of
some logical bond established between them ; as, " If
you are good, you will be rewarded." The truth of a
compound proposition depends not upon each of the
judgments, but upon the connection between them ;
as, " If the soul is material, it is not immortal." A
compound proposition is copulative when it has sev-
eral categorical propositions united by the conjunc-
tion and or the like, expressed or understood ; as,
" Time and Truth are friends."
It is causal when it states the reason why the ante-
cedent contains the consequent, by means of the par-
ticle because or a word of similar import ; as, " He is
proud, because he is rich."
It is adversative when it expresses some opposition
between its members, by means of the particles hut,
nevertheless, etc.; as, " Yirtue is persecuted, but it will
be rewarded."
It is relative when it expresses some similitude
• The mode always affects the copula in true modal propositions.
They are always capable of being reduced to another proposition of
which the word or words expressing the mode is the predicate.
Thus, "Man can be bad " is equivalent to "That man be bad is
possible."
24 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
between the propositions that compose it ; as, "As
life is, so death shall be. "
It is hypothetical when it states something not abso-
lutely, but with the proviso that something else be
verified ; as, " If you love me, you are my disciple."
A hypothetical proposition is conditional when, by
means of the particle if, it unites two categorical
propositions, one of which contains the reason or
condition of the other ; as, " If you will live piously,
you will suffer persecution." The proposition that
contains the reason is called the antecedent, the other
is the consequent. When the several component mem-
bers of a hypothetical proposition are united by the
particles either — or, or by or only, the proposition is
disjunciive ; as, " It is either day or night.'' But when
a hypothetical proposition denies that two or more
predicates can be affirmed of the same subject at the
same time, it is conjunctive ; as, "No man can serve
both God and Mammon."
Besides these compound propositions proper, there
are others really compound, though apparently cate-
gorical, and called exponihles. They are of four
kinds : exclusive, exceptive, comparative, and reduplica-
tive. The first is affected by an exclusive particle, as
only, alone, or the like ; as, " Virtue alone is praise-
worthy ;" and is expounded by the compound propo-
sition : " Virtue is praiseworthy ; nothing else is
praiseworthy." The second is affected by an excep-
tive particle, besides, except ; as, " All is lost except
honor;" which is expounded thus: "Honor is not
lost ; all else is lost." The third is affected by a com-
parative particle, expressed or implied ; as, " Gentle-
ness effects more than violence ;" which is equivalen
to : " Gentleness effects something ; violence effect
sometMng; the effect of gentleness is greater than
JUDGMENT. 25
that of violence." The fourth is a proposition whose
subject is affected by a particle which repeats it,
inasmuch as, as such, etc.; as, "Fire, inasmuch as it is
fire, burns ;" which is equivalent to this : " Fire
burns, because such is its nature."
34. Tlie propositions forming a compound proposition
maybe all principal, or some principal and otJiers inci-
dental.— A compound proposition contains several
independent judgments which may be expressed in
several propositions; as, "Patience and meekness
are virtues ;" " Charity is meek and patient." That a
compound proposition be true, all the parts which
compose it must be true ; thus the proposition,
" Men and angels are mortal," is false.
A compound proposition may be resolved into sev-
eral grammatical propositions either co-ordinate, i.e.,
simply in juxtaposition, as in the foregoing example,
or into propositions some of which are principal and
others incidental and explicative; as, "Sin, detested by
God, sullies the soul ; " which is equivalent to the
two independent judgments, " Sin is detested by
God," and " Sin sullies the soul." If the propositions
joined to the principal one are restrictive, the whole
proposition is not compound but simple.
AET. rV. — PBOPEETIES OF PEOPOSITIONS.
35. There are three properties of propositions : oppo-
sition, conversion, and equipollence.
36. Opposition is the affirmation and negation of the
same thing in the same respect.
37. Opposition is twofold, contradictory and contrary.
— Contradictory opposition is the repugnance be-
tween two propositions, one being universal and the
other particular, or both being singular.
26 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
Contrary opposition is the repugnance between two
universal propositions.
Some recognize what is called Subcontrary opposi-
tion, which holds between two opposite particular
propositions ; but this is not true opposition, since
the subjects of the two propositions may express dif-
ferent things. Still less can we consider as opposi-
tion that which is called Subaltern, and which holds
between two affirmative or two negative propositions,
the one being universal and the other particular. In
this case there is no opposition, since there is no affir-
mation and negation of one and the same thing in one
and the same respect. Of the four propositions :
"All men are wise," "No man is wise," " Some men
are wise," " Some men are not wise," the first and sec-
ond are contraries; the first and fourth, the second
and third, contradictories ; the third, and fourth, sub-
contraries ; the first and third, the second and fourth,
subalterns.
Eepresenting the universal affirmative proposition
by A, the imiversal negative by E, the particular
affirmative by I, and the particular negative by O, we
bave the following diagram :
CONTRARrES
SUBCONTRARIES
JUDGMENT. 27
38. Neither contrary nor contradictory propositions can
both be tnie, for one of the contraries or contradictories
affirms wkat the other contrary or contradictory
denies.
Of two contradictories one must be true and the other
false, since each affirms or denies just enough to make
the other false.
Contraries can both be false in contingent matter, be-
cause one not only affirms what the other denies, but
states its extreme opposite.
Subcontraries can both be true, but cannot both be false,
for then their contradictories would be true, and thus
two contrary propositions would be true.
Subalterns can both be true or both false in necessary
matter ; as, " All men are mortal. Some men are mor-
tal ; " " All bodies are infinite, Some bodies are in-
finite ; " or one may be true and the other false in con-
tingent matter ; as, " All men are rich, Some men are
rich."
39. Equipollence is the reduction of a proposition to
another equivalent in meaning. — Two propositions,
though apparently different, may have the same
meaning ; as, " Every man is a rational animal ; No
man is not a rational animal." These two proposi-
tions are said to be equipollent.
40. When the subject of a proposition is affected by a
negation, the proposition becomes equivalent to its contra-
dictory ; as, "All men are wise; Not all (some) men
are wise, and therefore, Some men are not wise."
When the predicate of a proposition is affected by a
negation, the proposition becomes equivalent to its con-
trary; as, " All men are wise ; All men are not wise,
or. No man is wise."
When the predicate of a particular proposition is af-
fected by a negation, the proposition becomes equivalent
28 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHT.
to its suhcontrary ; " Some men are wise ; Some men
are not-wise, or Some men are not wise.''
When both s^cbject and predicate of a pivposifion are
affected hy a negation, the piy'oposition becomes eqiiivalent
to its subaltern ; " All men are wise : Not-all men are
not-wise, or Some men are wise." — Tliese rules re-
sult from what has been said concerning the nature
and rules of opposite propositions.
41. Conversion is that change in a proposition by which,
icithout altering its truth, the predicate is made the subject,
and the subject the predicate. — The proposition to be
converted is called the convertend; the proposition
resulting from conversion, the converse.
42. Conversion is simple, per accidens, w by contraposi-
tion.— The conversion is simple when, the predicate
being made the subject, the proposition retains its
quantity ; as, " No man is a plant ; No plant is man."
It is /ler accidens, when, the predicate being made
the subject, the proposition changes its quantity; as,
"The Americans are men; Some men are Americans."
It is by contraposition when, the predicate being
made the subject, finite terms are changed into infini-
tating; as, "All men are animals; All not-animals are
not-men ; Only animals are men."
In effecting a conversion, the quality of the proposi-
tion must not be changed, otherwise there would be
no conversion, but simply opposition. — The following
are the rules for conversion : Universal negative propo-
sitions and particular afirmatives are converted simply;
as, " No man is an angel; No angel is a man."
Universal affirmative propositions and universal nega-
tives are converted per accidens ; as, " All men are mor-
tal. Some mortals are men."
Particular negative and universal affirmative proposi-
tions are converted by contraposition, that is, by obvert-
JUDGMENT. 29
ing- or infinitating the proposition, and then convert-
ing simply ; as, " Some men are not just ; Some unjust
beings are not not-men ; Some unjust beings are
men. *
* The rules of conversion are expressed In the mnemonic couplet :
Simpliciter fEcI convertitur, EvA per aocid (ens),
Ast O per con trap (ositionem). Sic fit conversio tota.
The capital letters in the words fEcI and EyA of the first line and
0 of the second line stand for the different kinds of proposition to bp,
oonverted, as explained on page 26.
CHAPTEE m.
Eeasoning.
abt. i. — definition aot) elements of beasoning,
43. Reasoning is the third operation of the intellect, bij
which, from the relation existing between tiuo judgments,
it infers a third as the result of tJw other two. — There are
two kinds of judgments. Some are self-evident, and
on that account are called analytical or immediate.
Others are not self-evident, and are called deductive or
mediate ; the relation between the predicate and the
subject cannot be perceived without comparing them
with a third idea. The act by which we seek to deter-
mine the relation of two terms by comparing them
with a third is reasoning. The verbal expression of a
reasoning is called an argument, and is, therefore, de-
fined as a discourse in which one proposition is in-
ferred from another.
44 Tlie elements of reasoning are three ideas and three
judgments, and the relation existing between the^e ideas
and judgments. — Every reasoning must contain three
ideas, since its end is to establish the relation between
subject and predicate by means of a third idea.
Again, it must contain three judgments : two to show
the relation of the subject and predicate with a middle
term, a third to point out the relation of the predicate
with the subject. The three ideas and the three judg-
ments constitute the matter of reasoning, their conneo
tion constitutes its form.
REASONING. 31
45. Tlie truth of a reasoning may he considered in re-
spect hotJi to matter and form. — That a reasoning may be
materially true, it suffices that the premises and the
conclusion be separately true ; but that it he formally
true, the connection between conclusion and premises
must likewise be true ; hence it is clear that a reason-
ing may be materially true and formally false, and vice
versa. Thus the reasoning, " Every man is mortal ;
every man is an animal : therefore every animal is
mortal," is materially true, but formally false ; while
the reasoning, " All substances are spiritual ; color
is a substance : therefore color is spiritual," is ma-
terially false, but formally true.
46. All reasoning is based on one of tJiese tioo axioms :
1. Tivo things which agree with a third wholly or in part,
agree with each other wholly or in part ; 2. Two things,
one of which agrees wholly or in part with a third, loith
lohich the other does not agree, do not agree with each other.
— The first axiom is the principle of affirmative reason-
ing ; the second is the basis of negative reasoning.
AET. II. — DIVISION OP EEASONING.
47. Reasoning considered in respect to its form, is de-
dv£.tive or inductive ; in respect to its matter, it is categor-
ical or hypothetical. — In every reasoning a predicate is
affirmed or denied of a subject, because, after compar-
ing each of them with a middle term, we know whether
or not the middle term contains the other two. Now,
as one thing may be in another as a part in the whole,
or as the whole in the sum of its parts, reasoning is of
two kinds, according as we proceed from the whole to
its parts, or from the parts to the whole ; that is, ac-
cording as we proceed from genera to species and from
species to individuals, or from individuals to species
32 RATIONAL PMIL0S0P3T.
and from species to genera. The first is dedtwtive
reasoning, the second is indiictive. Reasoning is also
deductive if it proceeds from effects to their cause, as
from signs to the thing signified, and it is thus we at-
tain to a knowledge of God.
Eeasoning considered in respect to the judgments
entering into it, is categorical or hypothetical according as
the judgments are categorical or hypothetical. But
whether reasoning be inductive or deductive, categor-
ical or hypothetical, the truth of the conclusion is
always mediate and deduced. Hence the regular form
of all reasoning is deduction, or the syllogism.
AET. m. — CATEGOBICAL SYLLOGISMS AOT) THEIB EDLES.
48. The syllogism is thatfoo'm of argument in ichich the
two extremes of a proposition are compared affirmatively
or negatively ivith a third term in order to conclude their
agreement or disagreement. — -It is easily seen from this
definition that the syllogism must contain three terms
and three propositions. The subject of the deduced
proposition is called the minor term or minor extreme ;
the predicate is called the major term or major extreme,
because the predicate, when not identical with the sub-
ject, has always a greater extension than the subject.
The term with which the extremes are compared is
called the middle term. The two propositions in which
the two extremes are compared with the middle term
are called pi~emises or antecedent ; that which contains
the major term is called the major premise ; that which
contains the minor term is called the minor premise.
The proposition which is deduced from the other two,
and in which the minor term is compared with the
major, is called the conclusion or consequent.
49. Syllogisms are subject to the following eight rules :
REASONING. 33
I. A syllogism should contain only three terms.
II. No term should have a greater extension in the
conclusion than it has in the premises.
m. The middle term should be taken universally
at least once in the premises.
IV. The conclusion should not contain the middle
term.
V. Nothing can be concluded from two negative
premises.
VI. Two aflSrmative'premises cannot give a negative
conclusion.
VII. The conclusion always follows the weaker
part.
Vin. From two particular premises nothing can
be concluded.
I. The first rule is derived from the very essence of
the syllogism, which consists in establishing the re-
lation between two terms by means of- a third. This
rule is commonly violated by using one of the terms
in two different senses ; as, " Every spirit is endowed
with intelligence ; but alcohol is a spirit ; therefore
alcohol is endowed with intelligence."
H. The conclusion should not be more extended
than the premises ; otherwise, we should have a con-
sequent not contained in the antecedent, an effect
which exceeds its cause ; as, " Eagles are animals ; but
eagles fly in the air ; therefore all animals fly in the
air."
III. The middle term must be taken at least once
universally ; otherwise, being twice particular, it
would be equivalent to two different terms, and we
should have a syllogism containing four terms ; as,
" Some animals are endowed with reason ; but a horse
is an animal ; therefore a horse is endowed with rea-
son."
Si RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
IV. The middle term slioTild not be found in the
conclusion ; because, being used as a term of com-
parison, for the purpose of finding agreement or
disagreement between the other two terms, its proper
place is in the premises, where this relation is estab-
lished. Its appearance in the conclusion either repeats
what has already been expressed ; as, " All crimes are
detestable ; treason is a crime ; therefore crime is
detestable : " or sometimes introduces a fourth
term into the syllogism ; as, " English Catholics
were persecuted by Queen Elizabeth ; Shakespeare
was an English Catholic ; therefore Shakespeare
was an English Catholic persecuted by Queen Eliza-
beth."
V. Two negatives give no conclusion ; for in that
case we simply see that the term chosen for the middle
cannot serve to establish any relation between the
extremes ; hence the antecedent is null, and no con-
sequent can be drawn from it; as, "Shepherds are.
not learned ; but Peter is not a shepherd." It cannot
be concluded that Peter is «r is not learned.
VI. A negative cannot b^ '\nf erred from two affirma-
tives, for two things identical with a third cannot but
be identical with each othei-.
VII. The conclusion always follows the weaker or
worse part ; that is, if one of the premises is negative
the conclusion must be negative; if particular, the
conclusion must be particular. In the first place, it
is evident that, if one of two things is identical with
a third, and the other is nol, the two things cannot
be identical with each other ; thus, in the syllogism,
" No spiritual substance is moi-tal ; the human soul is
a spiritual substance," we must conclude, " The human
soul is not mortal." In the second place, if one of
two premises is particular, the conclusion cannot be
BEASONma. 35
nniversal, otherwise it will have a term more extended
here than in the premises; as in the syllogism,
" Some men are rational animals ; some men are
poets ; therefore all rational animals are poets."
Vm. Two particulars afford no conclusion; because
if both are affirmative, the middle term is necessarily
twice particular ; as, " Some students are industrious ;
some industrious persons are successful ; therefore
some students are successful." If one of the two is
negative, the conclusion must contain a universal
term, which is particular in the premises ; as, " Some
heroes are young men ; some young men are not
pious ; therefore all heroes are not pious, or. No
heroes are pious."
All these rules may be reduced to the following
Bule of Modern Logicians : Tlie conclusion must be con-
tained in one of the premises, and the other premise must
show that it is contained therein.
AET. IV. — MODES AND FIGUKES OF THE SYLLOGISM.
50. The mode of a syllogism is its form according to
the quantity and quality of the three propositions which
enter into it. — Propositions considered in respect both
to their quantity and quality, are of four kiuds : 1.
Universal affirmative ; 2. Universal negative ; 3. Par-
ticular affirmative ; 4. Particular negative. Logicians
have designated these four kinds of propositions by
the letters A, B, I, O, respectively. It is evident that
these four propositions, combined in threes, give
sixty-four possible combinations; but applying to
these the rules of the syllogism, there will be found
only ten valid modes. These are : AAA, AAl, AEE,
All, AOO, EAE, EAO, EIO, lAI, OAO.
51. The figure of a syllogism is its form according to
36 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
the position of the middle term in the premises.— Yhe mid-
dle term may be : 1. Subject of major and predicate
of minor ; 2. Predicate of botli ; 3. Subject of botti ;
4. Predicate of major and subject of minor. There
are, then, four figures ; but many logicians mate no
account of the fourth, or turn it into the first. Each
figure is susceptible of the ten modes, if no regard is
had to the rules of syllogism, because the proposi-
tions may preserve their quality and quantity without
changing the place of the middle term.
52. There are only nineteen conclusive modes ; they are
designated by the follotving lines :
Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioqne prioris ; *
Oesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco secundse ;
Tertia Darapti, Disamis Felapion, Datisi,
Bocardo,t/eri5ow habet. Quarta insuper addit
Bramantip, CaTuenes, Dimaris, Fesapno, Fresison.
Applying the rules of the syllogism to these modes, we see that the
first figure, in which the middle term is subject of the major and
predicate of the minor, excludes : 1. Modes whose minor is nega-
tive ; 2. Modes whose major is particular ; 3. AAI, BAO as use-
less. The second figure, in which the middle term is used twice as
predicate, excludes : 1. Modes whose two premises are affirmative ;
3. Those in which the major is particular ; 3. EAO as useless. The
third figure, in which the middle term occurs twice as subject, ex-
cludes : 1. Modes in which the minor is negative ; 2. Modes in
which the conclusion is universal. The fourth figure, in which the
middle term is predicate of the major and subject of the minor, ex--
cludes: 1. Modes having an affirmative major with a particular
minor; 2. Modes having an affirmative minor with a universal
conclusion ; 3. OAO as contrary to the second rule. There remain
only the following nineteen valid modes :
1st Figure, AAA, EAE, All, BIO. 2d Figure, EAB, ABB, BIO,
AOO. 3d Figure, AAI, lAI, All, BAO, OAO, BIO. 4th Figure,
AAI, AEE, lAI, EAO, BIO.
• Or Fakofo. \ Or Dokamok.
REASONING. 37
All these modes may be converted into the four
modes of the first figure, which on that account are
called perfect. They are summed up in the four lines
already given, which, by a happy disposition of vowels
and consonants, designate at once a particular mode,
the perfect mode into which it may be reduced, and
the divers operations by which the reduction is ef-
fected. The three vowels of each word indicate the
mode ; the in:itial consonant shows to what mode of
the first figure this mode may be reduced, to that,
namely, which begins with the same consonant ; the
consonants, S, P, C, M, denote the operation to be per-
formed in order to effect the reduction. S indicates
that the proposition designated by the vowel before
it must be converted simply ; P, that it must be con-
verted per accidens ; C, that the syllogism must be re-
duced per impossihile; F, by infirdtation or obversion;
M signifies that the order of the premises must be
reversed ; P in Bramantip, that from the premises a
universal conclusion may be drawn.*
Thus the syllogism, "No material being is sim-
ple ; some simple beings are human souls ; therefore
some human souls are not material ; " is designated
by Fresison of the fourth figure ; for the mode is
seen from the three vowels E I O, and the figure is
known by the position of the middle term. This
mode may be reduced to that mode of the first figure
that begins with F, viz., Ferio. The letter S follow-
ing E and I in Fresison indicates that the premises
represented by these two letters are to be converted
simply. Hence the syllogism becomes : " No sim-
* These rules are contained in the couplet:
8 vult simpliciier verti ; P vero per aceid ;
M vult transponi; Cper impossibile duci.
38 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
pie being is material ; some human souls are simple ;
therefore some human souls are not material."
Other modes are similiarly reduced except Baroco
and Bocardo, which must be reduced per impossibile.
AKT V. — HYPOTHETICAIj SYLLOGISMS AND THEIB RULES.
53. A hypothetical syllogism is that in ivhich the major
premise is hypothetical. — If the major premise is a
disjunctive proposition, the syllogism is called dis-
junctive. If the major premise is a conjunctive prop-
osition, the syllogism is conjunctive ; if it is con-
ditional, the syllogism is conditional. A syllogism of
whatever kind, besides the rules peculiar to it, is
subject to the eight rules of the categorical syl-
logism.
54. A disjunctive syllogism is subject to the two follow-
ing rules : 1. One of tJie incompatible predicates beinCf
affirmed in the minor, all the otJiers must be denied in
the conclusion; 2. All tJie predicates but one being denied
in the minor, that one must be affirmed disjunctively in
the conclusion. — It is evident that, for the legitimacy
of the conclusion of a disjunctive syllogism, the dis-
junctive premise must make a complete enumeration
of all the predicates that can agree with the subject.
Hence this syllogism is false : " The rich must either
squander their money or hoard it ; but they should
not hoard it; therefore they should squander it."
The disjunction is not complete ; it has omitted a
third member, which is " to expend money pru-
dently."
55. A conjunctive or copulative syllogism, from the af-
firmation of one of the members, infers the negation of all
the others ; but not vice versa. — It is clear that the con-
BEASONINO. 39
clusiveness of this syllogism requires that the mem-
bers enumerated in the conjunctive proposition be
opposed to one another in such a way that they can-
not agree with the same subject at the same time ; as,
"No one can serve Qod and Mammon; but many
serve Mammon ; therefore many do not serve God."
From this example it is clear that if the minor were
negative, as, "But the spendthrift does not serve
Mammon," we could not infer the affirmative :
"Therefore he serves God,"* unless the opposition
be contradictory.
56. A conditional syllogism concludes in two ways : 1.
From the affirmation of the antecedent it infers the affir-
mation of the consequent ; 2. Frcmi the negation of the
consequent it infers the negation of the antecedent ; but not
vice versa. — In fact, the antecedent contains the rea-
son of the consequent ; therefore the affirmation of
the first implies that of the second, as the negation
of the second implies that of the first ; as, " If Christ
arose from the dead. He is God ; but He did arise from
the dead ; therefore He is God." But since an effect
may depend on several causes, the reverse of the
rules laid down would not give a logical conclusion ;
as, "If Peter is studious, he merits a reward ; but he
is not studious ; therefore he does not merit a re-
ward." It is clear that a reward may be merited for
some other reason than that of being studious. If the
antecedent is always the sole reason of the conse-
quent, then we may conclude from the affirmation or
negation of the consequent; as, "If he is a man, he
is endowed with reason ; but he is endowed with rea-
son ; therefore he is a man."
* The minor of a conjunctive syllogism always afiBrma one of the
two incompatibles expressed in the major.
40 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
AET. TI. — ^ABEIDGED AND COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS, OE EN-
THYMEME, PEOSYLLOGISM, EPIGHIEEMA, SOEITES, AND
DILEMMA.
57. An entliymeme is an abridged syllogism, (ym pre-
mise ofiohicli is understood ; as, "God is Just; there-
fore God will reward the good."
'58. A prosyllogism is a syllogism composed of tioo
syllogisms, the conclusion of the first becoming the
major of tJie second; as, "Every act of virtue will
be rewarded by God ; but humility is a virtue ; there-
fore every act of hamility will be rewarded by God ;
but the bearing of injuries is an act of humility;
therefore the bearing of injuries will be rewarded by
God."
59. An epichirema is a syllogism in which at least one
of the pj-emises is accompanied with proof ; as, " God
should be adored; but Jesus Christ is God, as His
life and miracles attest ; therefore Jesus Christ
should be adored." *
60. A sorites is a form of reasoning composed of several
propositions so connected that the predicate of the first
becomes the subject of the second, and so on, until the
predicate of the last is joined to the subject of the first. —
This form of reasoning may be separated into as
* In the days of Aristotle an enthymeme was a " syllogism drawn,
fromprobalnlities and signs of the conclusion ; " and an epichirema, a
dialectical syllogism in which the conclusion is reached after a care-
ful examination of objections and difficulties. See Logic, Stonyhurst
Series, pp. 356, 359.
REASONING. 41
many syllogisms as there are propositions less two.
It rests on the principle that whatever is said of
the predicate may be said of the subject ; as, " Sin
offends God; whatever offends God separates us
from Him ; whatever separates us from God deprives
us of the sovereign good; whatever deprives us of
the sovereign good is the greatest of evils ; therefore
sin is the greatest of evils." To be conclusive : 1.
There» should be no negative premise with the affirm-
ative premises ; otherwise in the resolution of the
sorites there would be a negative premise with an
affirmative conclusion, or the conclusion would have
a greater extension. The middle term may be nega-
tive, and hence one of the premises may be appar-
ently negative ; 2. The premise immediately preced-
ing the conclusion can be negative, and then the
conclusion will be negative; 3. All the premises ex-
cept the first must be universal, otherwise one of the.
middle terms would be taken twice particularly. If
the first premise is particular, the conclusion will be
particular.
61. A dilemma is a compound syllogism in lohich each
member of a disjunctive major premise is iahen in a minor
consisting of several conditional propositions, and serves
to conclude against the adversary. — In this form of
reasoning care must be taken : 1. That the disjunction
of the major be complete ; 2. That no member of the
minor can be retorted in an opposite sense. Ex. " A
general said to a soldier who had allowed the enemy
to pass : ' Either you were at your post or you were
not ; if you were, you deserve death for neglecting to
give notice of the enemy ; if you were not, you de-
serve death for breach of discipline.'" A dilemma
may also have for major a proposition with a disjunc-
tive consequent, the minor denying each member oi
42 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
the consequent, the conclusion, therefore, denying
the antecedent.
62. To tliese arguments may be added the Example, a
species of reasoning in which one proposition is drawn
from aTwther. to lohich it has a relation of resemblance,
of opposition, or of superiority. — This argument may
be reduced to a syllogism whose major is confirmed
by a particular fact bearing on the conclusion which
we wish to infer. Ex. 1. " Our Lord pardoned St.
Peter on account of his repentance ; therefore He will
pardon you, if, having imitated St. Peter in his fault,
you likewise imitate him, in his repentance." — 2.
" Louis XIV. and Napoleon I. caused great evils on
account of their love of war ; it is therefore desirable
that a people have a sovereign who loves peace."^3.
" Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not,
neither do they reap, nor gather into barns ; yet your
, heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not you of much
more value than they?" (St. Matt. vi. 26.) In the
first example we conclude a pari ; in the second, a
contrario or ah opposito ; in the third, a fortiori.
When the example is drawn from the words and
actions of an adversary and is used against him, it is
called argumentum ad hominem.
ART. VII. — INDUCTION.
63. Induction is that process in luhich the mind, after
affirming or denying an attribute of each part of a lohole,
pronounces the same Judgment of the ivhole. — As has been
said already, the reasoning process is twofold : it pro-
ceeds either from the whole to the parts which com-
pose it, or from the parts to the whole which they
constitute. In the first ease we have deduction, in
the second induction. " The Gospel has penetrated
REASONIWa. 43
into Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Oceanica ;
but these five Grand Divisions make up the whole
known world ; therefore the Gospel has penetrated
into all the known world," is an example of induc-
tion; whence it becomes manifest that the middle
term in an inductive syllogism is simply the enumer-
ation of the parts. These parts united are in reality
identical with the whole, though logically distinct
from it ; they can, consequently, perform the func-
tion of a middle term.
64. The legitimacy of an inductive syllogism rests on
the principle that, the sum of the parts being identical with
the whole, whatever is affirmed or denied of all the parts
may he affirmed or denied of the whole. — Hence that the
inductive syllogism may be rigorously conclusive, it
is essential that the enumeration of the parts com-
posing the whole be complete. But this enumeration
may be actually or virtually complete : actually, when
what has been predicated of the whole has been veri-
fied in each of its parts ; virtually, when the predicate
has been verified only in a certain number of the parts,
and we regard it as applicable to the others on the
principle that natural causes always produce the same
effects, since they operate necessarily, or on the prin-
ciple that the laws of nature are constant, universal, and
uniform. In virtue of this principle, the mind re-
gards that which is constant in a certain number of
beings as essential to their nature. Hence, knowing
that whatever proceeds from the nature of a being is
always verified in that being and in all others having
the same physical nature, we conclude that a quality
which has been verified in some beings must be found,
under the same circumstances, in all beings having
the same physical nature.
When induction is really incomplete and inade-
44 RATIONAL PHILOSOPSY.
quate, it does not authorize a universal and absolute
conclusion* It gires only a greater or less degree of
probability, in direct ratio to tlie number of parts in
wbich the predicate has been verified.
ART. Vm. — PEOBABLE OK DIALECTIC SYLLOGISM.
65. A probable syllogism is that in ivhich at least one of
tJie premises is only probable, and luhicli, tJierefore, gives
only a probable conclusion. — Apart from the sciences
and in the affairs of life, we cannot ordinarily arrive
at complete certitude ; we must be satisfied with
probability. The argument which is thus concerned
with contingent matter and with things known only
in part is called a probable argument, and its expres-
sion, a probahle syllogism.
66. Wliilst ive argue in probable matter, we must en-
deavor to attain the highest possible degree of probability.
— Hence : 1. We must be assured of the possibility of
the thing ; 2. We must, as far as we can, establish the
certainty of all the circumstances ; 3. We must ascer-
tain that there are more and better reasons on one side
than on the other. Used in this way, the probable
syllogism often prepares the way to complete certi-
* " In spite of this, these methods [of incomplete induction] cannot
be passed over in the present day. They are too important a factor"
in the present condition of human society to admit of our neglecting
them. . . . Besides, we must understand and appreciate them in
order to protest against their abuse. . . . Mill and his followers
drag down all the a priori laws to the level of the a posteriori, or
rather deny the existence of a priori laws at all. This is the fatal
result of the neglect of Bcholastic methods, which began at the Ref-
ormation, and has been carried further day bv day." Logic Stqny-
hurst Series, j. 387.
BEASONINQ. 45
tude and to science properly so called ; at all events^
it gives solidity to the mind, prevents it from advan-
cing anything rashly, and from judging before the
fact be well ascertained.
ABT. rs. — SOPHISTICAL SVLLOGISM.
67. A sophism is a syllogism lohich leads into error,
and yet has tlie appearance of truth. — The better to ena-
ble us to arrive at truth by means of reasoning, logic
not only lays down the rules to which a syllogism
must conform to be conclusive, but, moreover, exposes
the artifices by which our minds are liable to be led
into error, and thus enables us the better to defend
ourselves against them. These artifices are called
sophisms when they suppose in him who makes use of
them the desire to deceive ; they are called paralo-
gisms when they are employed through inadvertence
or through ignorance of the rules of reasoning ; in
either case they may be called fallacies. Taken to-
gether, they constitute the art of sophistry, which
was particularly taught and practised by Greek ora-
tors, in order that, by enabling them to support at
pleasure all causes and parties, it might be to them a
means of acquiring wealth and influence.
68. Fallacies are divided into those in diction and
those extra-diction, according as they lead into error hy
an abuse of words or by other captious arguments. — Falla-
cies in diction are six in number : (a) Equivocation, (b)
Amphibology, (c) Fallacy of composition, (d) Fallacy of
division, (e) Fallacy of accent, (f) Fallacy of figure of
diction. — Fallacies extra-diction are seven in number:
(a) Fallacy of accident, (b) Passing from the absolute to
the relative and vice versa, (c) Pretended cause, (d)
^ coding the question, or Irrelevant conclusion, (e) Fai-
46 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHT.
lacy of consequent, (f) Begging the question and vicwus
circle, (g) fallacy of many questions.
69. The principal fallacies in diction are six :
(a) Equivocation, wliicli consists in using tlie same
term with different meanings ; as, " The dog barks ;
but the dog is a constellation ; therefore a constella-
tion barks."
(&) Amphibology, which consists in making use of a
phrase in a twofold sense ; as, "I say, Pyrrhus, you
the Eomans will conquer."^ — " And thus the son his
aged sire addressed."
(c) The fallacy of composition, which arises when
things which are separately true are taken as collec-
tively true ; as, " The Gospel says the blind see ; but
that the blind should see is a contradiction ; therefore
the Gospel contains contradictions."
(d) The fallacy of division, which is the reverse of
the preceding ; as, " According to the Scriptures, the
impious shall not enter the kingdom of heaven;
therefore it is useless for the impious to repent." —
" Five is one number ; two and three are five ; there-
fore two and three are one number."
(e) The fallacy of accent, which changes the mean-
ing of a word by changing the accent ; as, " He con-
jured me not to betray my country; therefore he
practised the black art." *
(/) The fallacy of figure of diction, which consists
in assuming to be true literally that which is true
only figuratively ; as, " That is a babbling brook ;
but only children babble ; therefore that brook is a
child."
* The fallacy of accent also includes the mistaking of one word for
another having the same proniinciation but a different spelling; as
if I should say that " there were small islands in the church, because
it has many aisles."
BEA80NINQ. il
The principal fallacies extra-diction are seven :
(a) The fallacy of accident, which attributes or de-
nies to an individual a real accident that is rightly af-
firmed or denied only of the species ; as, " Spaniards
are haughty ; therefore, St. Theresa was haughty."
With this fallacy may be classed that which is called
imperfect enumeration.
{b) The fallacy of passing from the absolute to the
relative, and vice versa, which occurs when we argue
from what is true absolutely to what is true only in
some respect, and vice versa; as, "We must obey
our parents; but my parents command me not to
adore God ; therefore," etc. : or, " John is a good
penman ; therefore he is good."
(c) The fallacy oi pretended cause, which occurs when
we assign as the cause of an effect what is not really
such ; as, " Inebriety is bad ; but wine inebriates ;
therefore wine is bad."
(d) Evading the question, or irrelevant conclusion,
which occurs when we prove something which is not
in question ; as would be the case if " a minister of
state, being pressed to modify certain laws, should
demonstrate the necessity of law."
(e) The fallacy of consequent, which occurs when in
a conditional syllogism the consequent is not inferred
from the antecedent, but the antecedent from the con-
sequent; as, "If that is a man, it is an animal ; but it
is not a man ; therefore it is not an animal."
(/) Begging the question, which occurs when we as-
sume, in fact or in principle, the thing in question, or
that which requires to be proved; as would be the
case if we should undertake to prove that the earth
revolves about the sun thus : " The sun is at rest ;
therefore the earth revolves about it." When this
fallacy proves two disputed propositions, each by the
other, it is called a vicious circle; as if "after rely«
48 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
ing on the veracity of a witness to prove a fact, 1
should rely on the truth of the fact to prove the
veracity of the witness."
{g) The fallacy of many questions, or of interrogation,
occurs when several questions requiring- different
answers are asked, and the answer given to one is as-
sumed as applicable to the others ; as, " Are virtue
and vice good or evil ? " Whether we answer yes or
no, we fall into error.
We may also classify among fallacies all reasonings
in which any one of the rules of the syllogism is
violated.
AET. X.— UTILITY OP THE SYLLOGISM.
70. The use of the syllogism gives clearness, strength, and
flexibility to the mind. — By the use of the syllogism the
mind discerns more readily the value of a reasoning
and detects more easily the vices of a fallacy. As
gymnastics strengthens the body and makes it supple,
so the use of the syllogistic art gives solidity, flexi-
bility, and precision to the mind. For if the errors
that are rife to-day be stripped of their wordy cover-
ing and reduced to this severe form of reasoning, they
will appear as the rankest sophisms. It is evident,
however, that, though the use of the syllogism pre-
sents these great advantages, its abuse may easily
generate stiffness and subtlety, and impede the prog-
ress of intelligence iustead of aiding it.
LOGIC
PART SECOND.
TEUTH AND SCIENCE.
71. The second part of logic, which has for its object thb
end of reasoning, thai is, science in general, treats : 1. of
the different states of the intellect in respect to truth ; 2.
of demonstration ; 3. of science in general and of its di-
visions.— Before treating of science in itself, and the
■way in which the sciences are divided and co-ordi-
nated, it is well to examine : 1. What truth is, which
is the object of science, and what are the different
states of the intellect in respect to truth ; 2. What
produces science, viz., demonstration.
CHAPTEE I.
Tbuth and the Diefeeent States op the Intellect
m Respect to it.
AET. I. — TEUTa
72. Truth is the conformity bettveen the intellect and the
thing known by it. — ^I judge that God is good; this judg-
ment corresponds to what God is in reality ; hence it
is true. In the same way, every creature corresponds
to the idea which God has of it ; that is, every creature
is true.
4
50 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHT.
73. Truth is metaphysical, logical, or moral. — Truth is
in the thing-, in our cognition of the thing, or in
our expression of a cognition. In the first case, it is
the conformity of the thing to the divine intellect ;
this is ontological or metaphysical truth. In the second
case, it is the conformity of our intellect to the thing
known ; this is truth of cognition or logical truth.
Logical truth, according to its object, is of the spir-
itual or corporeal order, general or particular, nat-
ural or supernatural. To metaphysical and logical
truth is added moral truth or veracity, which is the
conformity of speech or other external sign to the
thought in one's mind. The opposite of moral truth
is a lie. Moral truth depends on logical truth, as the
latter depends on metaphysical truth.
74. Tlie opposite of logical truth is falsity ; metaphys-
ical truth has no opposite. — Our intellect is not the
cause of creatures, and the knowledge which it ac-
quires of them may represent them differently from
what they are. There may, therefore, exist in our
intellect logical falsity or error. The divine intellect,
on the contrary, being the cause of everything that is,
every being is necessarily such as God knows it ;
every being, therefore, must necessarily be metaphys-
ically true. Hence being and metaphysical truth are
convertible and may be affirmed of each other ; and it
may be said that whatever is is true, and whatever is
true is, and that God, the absolute Being, is also the
absolute Truth.
ART. n.— IN WHAT OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT LOGI-
CAL TRUTH IS FOUND.
75. Logical truth is, properly speaking, found only in
the act of Judgment. — Logical truth is a correspondence
TRUTH AND INTELLECT. 51
between the intellect and the thing known by it ; it
can, therefore, strictly speaking, be found only in
that operation of the intellect which perceives and
expresses this correspondence, that is, in the act of
judgment. Moreover, truth is the perfection of cog-
nition, and therefore is not, strictly speaking, to be
found in simple apprehension, which is imperfect and
inchoate cognition.
76. Truth is not properly in simple apprehension nor in
sensation. — Every cognitive faculty, put in presence of
its object, must apprehend the object as it is. Hence
by simple apprehension and by sensation, things are
known as they are, and this knowledge is materially
true or conformed to the thing. But as the intellect
has no cognition of this conformity, since there is no
judgment, it follows that there is not, in simple ap-
prehension or sensation, formal truth or truth prop-
erly so called.
AET. in. — ^DIFFERENT STATES OF THE INTELLECT IN RE-
SPECT TO TRUTH.
77. Tliere are three different states of the intellect in re-
spect to truth : 1. Certitude, 2. Opinion or probability, 3.
Doubt. — Certitude is that state of the intellect in which
it firmly adheres to a known truth without fear that
the contrary may be true.
Opinion is that state of the intellect in which it ad-
heres to something known, but with fear that the
contrary may be true.
Doubt is that state of the intellect in which it is in
suspense and adheres neither to the affirmative nor
the negative of the thing proposed. Doubt is negative
when the intellect perceives no motive to adhere
either to the affirmative or the negative.- doubt ia
62 RATIONAL PHILOSOPET.
positive wlien the intellect has as strong motiTss foi
adhering to the affirmatiye as to the negative.
78. Probability, whatever its degree, is specifically dis-
tinct from certittcde. — Probability holds a middle place
between doubt and certitude ; it is susceptible of in-
crease and diminution and may have several degrees ;
but none of these degrees, however great, will consti-
tute certitude. This latter, on the contrary, cannot
admit of degrees; it is or it is not. The calculation
of probabilities has its foundation in the ascertained
relation existing between the probable thing and its
contrary. This calculation confined within proper
bounds may become a legitimate source of knowl-
edge, on which are based certain social institutions,
such as insurance companies.*
79. ITie elements of certitude being, 1. the truth of the
object, 2. the firmness of adherence, 3. the motive which
* The following are the rules for the calculation of probabilities :
" I. A single probability of any uncertain event is ascertained by di-
viding the number of chances favorable to the event by the total
number of chances favorable and unfavorable. II. The probability
of the independent recurrence of an event is found by multiplying
together the fractions expressing the single probabilities. III. In
order to calculate the probability that an event already observed will
be repeated any given number of times, divide the number of times
the event has been observed, increased by one, by the same number
increased by one. and the number of times the event is to recur.
IV. In case of mutually dependent probabilities, or probabilities of
probabilities, the total probability is reached by multiplying together
the several single probabilities. V. In case of independent proba-
bilities the total probability is reached by subtracting each separate
probability from unity (which gives the probability of the opposite
event in each case or the probability of a probability), multiplying
the separate results together (according to Rule 4th), and subtracting
this product from unity (thus arriving at the probability of the
original compound event). "—Gregory's Practical Logic, pp. 183, 183.
See also Jevona' Principles of Science, Bk. II., pp. 234-249.
TRUTH AND INTELLECT. 53
produces this adherence, it may be divided according to
the particular element in reference to lohich it is con-
sidered.— Relatively to the truth of the object, certi-
tude is common or philosophical, immediate or mediate,
according as it is without, or with explicit cognition
of the motive of adherence, known by intuition or by
means of reasoning.
In respect to the firmness of adherence, it is to be
remarked that while this adherence always excludes
doubt, it may be more or less perfect according to the
perfection of the motive producing it ; we have, there
fore, certainty of evidence, which is produced by an
intrinsic motive, and certainty of faith, which is pro-
duced by an extrinsic motive.
Certainty of evidence is metaphysical, physical, or
moral ; for the intrinsic motive which produces it is
nothing more than the perception of the connection
existing between a subject and its attribute. But this
connection belongs either to the metaphysical order,
that is, is absolutely necessary, as, "Every effect
must have a cause ; " or to the physical order, as,
" Fire burns ; " or to the moral order, as, " Mothers
love their children." In other words, the agreement
oi disagreement of subject and attribute is necessary
according to (1) the very nature of the things, or ac-
cording to the laws (2) of the physical or (3) of the
moral world, established by God.
Of these three kinds of certainty, the most excellent
is metaphysical certainty, which being founded on the
very nature of things, whose archetypes are the divine
essence, allows of no exception. Physical certainty
is not absolute, since it is based on the supposition
that in this particular case God has not suspended
the effect of the physical laws which He freely estab-
lished. It, therefore, is perfectly consistent with
54 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
miracles. Moral certainty implies tlie condition tliat
the moral laws have been fully observed by the sub-
ject ; but as the subject is a free agent, moral cer-
tainty cannot of itself generate certitude as to the
individual, but only as to the class or species. Cer-
tainty of faith is divine or human, according as it rests
on divine authority, as the Scriptural revelation, or on
human authority, as the/acfe of history.
AET. IV. — IGNORANCE, EEEOE, AND THEIE CAUSES.
80. Ignorance is the absence of truth from the intellect. —
Ignorance and error have not been reckoned among
the states of the intellect in respect to truth, since,
instead of being cognitions of truth, they are respec-
tively its absence and its negation.
81. ITie causes of ignorance are : 1. the limited nat-
ure of our intellect ; 2. a want of intellectual culture. —
The first cause of ignorance arises from the very
nature of man, who is essentially a finite being.
To this cause may be referred the organic defects
which, in certain men, impede the cognition of
truth.
The second cause is the absence of intellectual cult-
ure. Truth is not infused into man ; he must acquire
it either by instruction from others or by his own ef-
forts. If he has not been taught and does not himself
labor to develop his intellectual faculties, he must
remain in ignorance of many truths.
82 i Error is the adhesion of the intellect to a false judg-
ment, or a ivant of conformity between intellect and object.
— Since error is an adhesion to a false judgment, it
can be found neither in the senses nor in simple ap-
prehension, but solely in the intellect in an act of
TRUTH AND INTELLECT. 55
judgment. It would be wrong to regard error, with
Cousin (1792-1867), as incomplete trutli. What he
calls incomplete truth is none the less a truth ;
whereas error is the opposite of truth.
83. The principal causes of error are : 1. Precipitancy
of judgment ; 2. Liveliness of imagination ; 3. Prejudice ;
4. Passion. — Precipitancy of judgment consists in
judging of a thing not suJSiciently considered. It is
remedied by attention and reflection.
The imagination often obscures truth by present-
ing too lively images of sensible things. Its excesses
are corrected by keeping it under a severe control of
reason.
Prejudices are judgments adopted without exami-
nation. A prudent man will weigh his prejudices in
the balance of reason ; he will not rashly reject them,
neither will he blindly follow them.
The passions are the most fruitful source of our
errors ; they obscure the intellect and present things
to it in the borrowed light of a badly regulated will.
The remedy for this evil is found in virtue alone.
To these internal causes may be added external
ones, as education, the school, the vices of language ;
all of which are remedied by a prudent scrutiny and
a sincere love of truth. Bacon (1561-1626) has di-
vided our errors into four classes : 1. Idols of tJie
tribe, errors arising from the weakness of our common
nature ; 2. Idols of the den, errors arising' from our
individual character ; 3. Idols of the market-place, er-
rors resulting from the vices of language ; 4. Idols of
the theatre, errors of the school. Evidently the
causes assigned by Bacon for our errors may be re-
duced to those already indicated.*
* See Meta/physics of the School, vol. i., p. 461.
66 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
84. Man in Ms present condition cannot invariably
avoid all error. — If man always made use of his facul-
ties in conformity with the laws imposed on him, he
would not err. But, owing to his natural weakness,
he is incapable of always conforming to these laws,
and, consequentliy^, of avoiding all error.
CHAPTEE H
Demons TEAT I ON.
85. Demonstration is a syllogism ivJiich jyroduces
science, or it is a reasoning ivhich, by the aid of premises
evidently true, gives a certain and evident conclusion. —
The sophistical syllogism is a source of error; the
probable syllogism gives only verisimilitude; the
demonstrative syllogism alone produces science, that
is, certain and evident knowledge of a truth.
86. Demonstration is necessarily preceded hy that spe-
cies of doubt called methodical, and lohich is defined as
Doubt which is supposed to attend a thesis before it is
demonstrated. — A truth to be demonstrated is first
proposed in the form of a question, and the intellect
is supposed to be in suspense between its affirmation
and its negation; that is, it is supposed to doubt.
This doubt, called methodical, bears only on the truth
or truths to be demonstrated, and not on the inde-
monstrable principles. Unlike the systematic doubt
of sceptics, or real doubt, methodical doubt is not
actual, permanent, or universal ; unlike the Cartesian
doubt, it not only admits the veracity of conscious-
ness, but also that of all the cognitive faculties, and
does not touch self-evident truths.
Methodical doubt may bear on one of these four
questions : 1. Does the thing exist ? 2. What is its
essence ? 3. Wliat are its accidents ? 4. Why does it
exist? The first question presupposes at least the
58 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
nominal definition of the thing ; the question regard-
ing its essence supposes that of its existence already
answered ; the third question presupposes at least the
notion of attribute ; and the question of the where-
fore of a thing can find its answer only in the prin-
ciples or reasons of the thing ; hence it is this last
question that properly comes under the head of sci-
ence.
87. All demonstration presupposes three notions : 1.
that of the subject ; 2. that of the predicate ; 3. that of
the middle term. — All demonstration has for its end to
show that a certain predicate agrees or disagrees
with a certain subject by comparing both with a third
term ; hence it is clear that, prior to all reasoning, we
must have the notion of these three terms.
88. The middle term of demonstration must fulfil three
conditions : 1. It must contain the reason of the thing; 2.
It must ie Tcnoiun as tlie reason ; 3. This reason must he
certain. — Demonstration produces scientific knowl-
edge by means of a middle term ; but to know a thing
scientifically, we must know the reason of it, know
that it is the reason of it, and know it with certainty ;
hence, the middle term must comply with these three
conditions of science.
89. Demonstration is divided into a priori and a pos-
teriori ; direct and indirect or ad absurdum A priori
demonstration is that which descends from cause to
effect, as when " from the existence of Providence we
infer the order of the universe ;" a posteriori demon-
stration ascends from effects to their cause, as when
" from the order of the universe we infer the exist-
ence of Providence."
Direct demonstration proves not only that a thing
is, but, moreover, why it is ; as, " The soul is immor-
tal, because it is a spirit." Mathematics abounds in
DEMONSTRA TION. 69
examples. Indirect or apogogic demonsfcra'ion simply
shows that we must admit the thing on account of the
absurdities which would flow from its denial ; as, " If
the soul is not immortal, there can be no mortal
order." This kind of demonstration serves to pre-
pare the way for science and to defend it, but it does
not constitute science.
To indirect demonstration may be referred the ar-
gument called ex datis, so designated because from
the concessions of an adversary we draw conclusions
which are evidently against him ; as, " You grant
that the world could not make itself ; then God must
have created it." The demonstration called circular
or regressive is at the same time a priori and a posteri-
ori; a posteriori, since it ascends from effect to cause;
a priori, since from the cause better known, it returns
to the effect for a better knowledge of it ; as, " The
order we behold in the world proves the existence of
Providence ; and as there is a Providence, we are cer-
•■/ain that even events unknown to us are ordained by
.t."
A demonstration is pure when the premises are ana-
lytical ; as, " An infinitely perfect being is necessary
being ; but a necessary being is eternal ; therefore
an infinitely perfect being is eternal." It is empirical
when the premises are experimental ; as, " Water
seeks its level; but this stream is water; therefore
this stream seeks its level." It is mixed when one
premise is analytical and the other synthetical ; as,
" There can be no effect without a cause ; but this
building is an effect ; therefore it must have a cause."
CHAPTEE in.
Science. — Division of Science. — Classification ob
THE Sciences.
90. Science considered subjectively, is a certain and
evident cognition of truths deduced from certain principles
by means of demonstration ; considered objectively, it is a
complete system of demonstrated truths deduced from the
same common principles. — Science considered as exist-
ing in tlie intellect, that is, subjectively, must be certain
cognition, otherwise it would not be perfect ; it must
be evident cognition, otherwise it would not account
to the mind for the subordinate truths deduced from
the principles. Finally, it must be cognition of the
truths deduced from certain principles, for the conclu-
sions cannot be stronger than the premises. Science
considered objectively, is a body of co-ordinated truths
deduced from the same principles and constituting
what is called a scientific system. It is in this latter
sense that the word science is usually understood.
91. A science must be both one and multiple ; one in re-
spect to tJie same set of principtles whence floio the truths
embraced under the science ; multiple in respect to the de-
ductions made from the principles. — Those principles
from which the mind deduces the truths contained
therein, are, as it were, the foundations of the science
and constitute its unity. This unity is formal and
not material ; for, though a science treats of objects
materially multiple, yet these objects are considered
SOIENOE. 61
under an aspect by whicli they are referred to one
and the same set of principles, and hence the science
is one.
92. Every science is specified by its object. — The formal
object of a science constitutes its unity and makes it
this or that science ; hence the sciences are distin-
guished from one another by the diversity of their
formal objects. Thus, a science is natural or supernat-
ural according- as its object is natural or supernat-
ural truth ; it is speculative or practical according as
its object is purely theoretical truth or a truth the
knowledge of which may serve as a rule of action.
Two sciences are said to be distinct when the ob-
ject of one has certain relations to that of the other,
as, " Geometry and Astronomy." They are said to be
separate when their objects have no relation to each
other, as, " Algebra and Morals."
93. Philosophy is the science that governs all the other
sciences, which may, tJierefore, be divided and classified
according to the divisions instituted in philosophy. — Phi-
losophy is the fundamental science and ranks next to
Sacred Theology ; for it treats of being in itself and
in general. But as every other science treats of
being under some particular aspect, it follows that
each has its foundation in philosophy, and from it
derives its first principles.
The division of philosophy furnishes the basis for
the general division of the other sciences, whose dig-
nity and classification should be established according
the greater or less degree of abstraction of their ob-
ject from matter. Thus, to real philosophy or meta-
physics the physical or natural sciences and mathemat-
ics are related ; to rational philosophy the philological
sciences ; to mOral philosophy, jurisprudence, (Esthetics,
and the political sciences.
62 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
But if philosophy may justly claim superiority
over all other human sciences, it is itself surpassed
by the divine science of theology, which is as far
above philosophy as the divine intelligence is above
human reason^
ILOGIC.
PART THIRD.
METHODOLOGY.
94. The third part of logic, which has for its direct the
several processes by which the human intellect arrives at
knowledge by reasoning, treats : 1. of method in general
and its laws ; 2. of the different kinds of method and
their laws ; 3. of the processes peculiar to certain methods.
CHAPTEE I.
Method in Geneeal and rrs Laws.
A5T I. — METHOD.
95. Method is the direction given to the cognitive facuU
ties, according to their nature, to enable us easily and
surely to arrive at knoioledge. — It does not suffice for
the acquisition of knowledge that we know the laws
gOTeming the intellect, and what constitutes, science
itself ; we must also know the way by which science
is acquired, the particular path by which we may
easily and surely attain to this or that science. This
way or path which leads to science is method.
96. Both reason and experience prove the great impor-
tance of metJwd. — As we speedily and surely reach the
64 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
end of a journey wlien we know the road, in like man',
ner we easily and surely arrive at the knowledge of a
science when we know the process which the mind
should pursue. Ignorance of method necessarily
causes much loss of time and often leads into error, a
truth which experience likewise confirihs. To good
method is due the rapid progress of the natural
sciences in late years ; to a faulty method followed in
philosophy in our own day, we owe the false systems
which retard its progress.
97. Metliod should he neither artificial nor arbitrary,
hut should he founded on the nature of the mind and of
the object lohich it studies. — As method has for its aim
the directing of the mind in the acquisition of knowl-
edge, it must be based upon the very nature of the
mind and of the object to be known. This is the
fundamental law of all method. It gives rise to sev-
eral others, which may be reduced to the two follow-
ing : 1. We must in every method proceed from the better
known to the less known ; 2. We must proceed with order
from one cognition to anotlier.
AET n. — ANALYSIS AND , SYNTHESIS.
98. Tloo processes are common to all methods ; 1.
Analysis, which resolves a tohole into its parts ; and 2.
Synthesis, which reconstructs the lohole from the parts. —
The mind must perform two processes in order to ar-
rive at knowledge. For either it seeks the nature of
the whole by studying its parts, and thus proceeds
from effect to. cause, from the concrete to the abstract,
from the multiple to the simple, as in abstraction and
induction ; or it studies the parts in the whole, pro-
ceeding from the cause to the effe<!t, from the abstract
to the concrete, from the simple to the multiple, as in
METHOD IN GENERAL AND ITS LAWS. 65
deduction. The first process is analysis ; tlie second,
synthesis.
But a method can be neither purely analytical, as
the Experimental and Sensualistic school pretends,
nor purely synthetical, as the Idealistic school holds.
It cannot be purely analytical, since, to constitute
science, it does not suffice that we know by analysis
the whole through its parts, or the cause through its
effects ; we must, moreover, know by synthesis how
the whole contains the parts, how the cause produces
the effect.* On the otjier hand, method cannot be
purely synthetical, since it belongs to the nature of
the mind to know the whole in its parts and the cause
in its effects. "We must, therefore, conclude that all
method, to be good, ought to be analytico-synthetical.
99. The rules for analysis are : 1. It should he com-
plete; 2. It should he as extensive as possible. — The rules
for synthesis are : 1. It should omit nothing in the con-
sideration ofthetuhole; 2. It should add nothing. — Anal-
ysis makes known the whole in the parts, the sim-
ple in the multiple, the cause in the effect, only in so
far as it investigates each of the parts and each of the
effects. If it neglect to consider any one, it is liable
to overlook one of the essential elements of the whole.
In the second place, it must divide and subdivide the
whole into a reasonable number of parts, since the
less complex a thing is, the better the mind knows it.
Synthesis should neither omit nor add anything :
for in the former case it would give only a partial or
incomplete view of the object; in the latter, it would
introduce foreign elements, and thus alter our notion
of that object.
* Our knowledge in particular oases is, however, often limited te
the mere fact that the cause produces the effect.
5
CHAPTEE n.
DiPFEBENT Kinds op Method and Theib Laws.
AET. I. — DIFFEEENT KINDS OF METHOD.
100. There are two hinds of method, tJie Inventive and
the Didactic. — The mind first endeavors to find the
truth, and afterwards to demonstrate it or communi-
cate it to others. There must, therefore, be two meth-
ods : (1) that of invention, which guides the mind in
its search after truth ; (2) that of demonstration or doc-
trine, which guides it in imparting to others the
truth that has been found.
101. The method of invention is of three hinds : 1. Ra-
tional or a priori ; 2. Experimental or a posteriori ; 3.
Mixed. — The a />Hon method seeks to discover truth
by the sole light of reason, to the exclusion of expe-
rience ; this is the method of German Idealism,
which shapes facts to ideas and transforms the most
absurd conceptions of the mind into realities.
The a posteriori method is the reverse of the fore-
going; it is exclusively adopted by the Sensist
school and ends in materialism.
The mixed method is a combination of the other
two ; it is the only sound philosophic method, as it
brings to the aid of science all the means of acquir-
ing knowledge. Although this is the only legiti-
mate method, it is none the less true that the a
DIFFERENT KINDS OF METHOD. 67
priori method ought to predominate in mathe-
matics, and the a posteriori method in the natural
sciences.*
102. The method of demonstration or doctrine is of
three kinds : 1. Deductive ; 2. Inductive ; 3. Mixed. —
The deductive method descends from axioms or princi-
ples to their consequences, from laws to phenomena.
The inductive method is the reverse of the preceding
and makes the mind of the learner pass through the
same process as is followed in arriving at truth.
The mixed method is a union of these two. The de-
ductive method is the easiest, the inductive the most
effectual ; the mixed method, being adapted to the
ordinary requirements of students, is the one most
frequently followed.
AET. n. — SPECIAL LAWS OF EACH METHOD.
103. Tlie laws of the inventive method require : 1. A
determination, at least vaguely, of the end in view ;
2. An attentive examination of known truths ; 3. A
classification of these known truths ; 4. A careful use
of definitions and divisions ; 5. Elimination of what-
ever is useless or foreign to the end in view ; 6. An
affirmation of thing^s as certain or doubtful accord-
ing as they are really certain or doubtful ; 7. Care to
avoid all rash induction ; 8. Prudence to advance
. nothing resting on what is doubtful or on inconsistent
hypotheses.
104. The laws of the didactic method require : 1. The
* As to the founders of these schools and the tenets which they
held, see Sensism, Transcendentalism, and the Scholastic Theory
of the Origin of Ideas, Ideology, chap. ii. ; also History of Philosophy,
passim.
68 RATIONAL PHIL080PHT.
use of clear terms fully explained and defined ; 2.
Care to take as a starting point only clear and evi-
dent principles ; 3. A gradual advancement from one
conclusion to another ; 4. Care to avoid digressions
which make us lose the concatenation of ideas.
CHAPTEE m.
li^ocESSES Peopee to Geetain Methods.
AET. I. — hypothesis.
105. Hypothesis is a probable assumption which is in-
tended to explain the cause and nature of a fact, but is not
as yet verified by experience or demonstrated by reason. —
The mind often cannot ascertain with certainty the
reason of facts ; it then finds it necessary to adopt
conditionally a principle that is probable. If expe-
rience and reason afterwards verify this principle, it
ceases to be a supposition or hypothesis, and becomes
a thesis.
106. In all the sciences hypotheses mthin certain limits
are useful ; in all the natural sciences tliey are necessary.
— Some philosophers maintain, with Reid (1710-1796),
that hypotheses must necessarily be detrimental to
science. This is an assertion contradicted by good
sense and experience. Others, like Condillac (1715-
1780), admit the use of hypotheses in the mathemati-
cal sciences only. But it is evident that, with the_
greatest philosophers and naturalists, we ought to
admit them, at least within certain limits, in all the
sciences, since in them there are facts not yet ex-
plained and for the explanation of which we may very
conveniently resort to hypotheses, which subsequent
observation will often transform into certain and
scientific principles. But hypotheses are useful only
70 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
in so far as they conform to certain laws ; otherwise
they are hurtful, and, by originating false systems,
are fruitful sources of error.
107. Hypotheses are subject to two sorts of rules, one
regarding the formation of the hypothesis, the other its
verification. — The rules to be observed in the forma-
tion of an hypothesis are three : 1. It must rest on the
knowledge of a great number of facts ; 2. From
among the circumstances which accompany a fact we
should select one or more, and see if they do not suf-
fice for the explanation of the fact ; 3. The circum-
stances selected ought to be such as to account for
all the others.
There are four rules to be observed in verifying an
hypothesis : 1. It should not be opposed to the fact
which it is intended to explain ; 2. It should be such
as to explain all the facts for which it has been made ;
3. An hypothesis supported by certain facts should
be preferred to one not supported by any fact; 4.
From among the hypotheses presented we should
choose the simplest. It is evident that if an hypothe-
sis conflicts with a truth known as certain, it is, by
tke fact, proved false.
ART. 11. — EXPERIMENTATION.
108. Experimentation is the act or art of producing or
modifying at will the phenomena of nature in order to
study them. — In all the sciences, and especially in the
physical or natural sciences, it becomes necessary to
make an attentive study of the phenomena of nature.
The more easily to account for these phenomena, we
modify or produce them at pleasure ; this process is
called experimentation. If we confine ourselves to
PB00BS8ES PROPER TO CERTAIN METHODS. 71
studying a phenomenon as presented in nature, we
simply make an observation.
109. The conditions of good experimentation relate, some
to what is produced in the phenomenon, others to the person
who experiments. — In regard to the phenomenon, it is
necessary to keep an exact record of all the accom-
panying circumstances, however minute ; and when it
can be done, these circumstances should be noted by
figures and exact quantities. The person who is ex-
perimenting should (1) vary the experiments ; (2)
extend them ; (3) reverse them. Above all, he should
guard in experimentation against the spirit of system,
which would make him see not what is, but what he
wishes should be.
110. As experimentation is employed to determine the
cause of a phenomenon, we must carefully look out for in-
dications which may point to the cause. — These indica-
tions are four in number : 1. When one event inva-
riably precedes another, except when the latter is
counteracted or prevented by some circumstance ; 2.
When, one event undergoing a modification, another
undergoes a corresponding modification; 3. When,,
one fact being absent, another is also absent, unless
the latter may also be produced by a different cause ;
4. When, one fact disappearing, another also disap-
pears, unless the latter can exist without the contin-
ued action of the former.*
* Compare these indications with the following experimental meth-
ods of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) :
(a) Method of Agreement. — "If two or more instances of the phe-
nomenon under investigation have one circumstance in common, the
circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or
effect) of the given phenomenon."
(&) Method of Difference. — " If an instance in which the phenome-
non under investigation occurs and another in which it does not
72 RATIONAL PBIL080PHT.
111. Experimentation of itself does not constittde
science ; it only enables us to establish principles by induc-
tion.— As experimentation does not go outside the
order of facts, it cannot of itself constitute science ;
but when well conducted, it enables us to establish
principles of experience, as, " Water slakes thirst." These
principles, to be such, must fulfil two conditions : 1.
The fact which we wish to transform into an experi-
mental principle must have been found the same in
many cases ; 2. This fact must not be accidental, but
a natural effect.
112. Saving by experimentation discovered points of
agreement among several objects, we are enabled by the
principle of analogy to infer other points of agreement :
experimentation thus abridges scientific investigations and
even makes up for impossible investigations. — When sev-
eral objects are known to agree in certain points, the
principle of analogy enables us to conclude other points
of agreement. This conclusion may be based either
upon the simple relation of qualities, or the relation
of means to an end, or the relation of cav^e to effect
or effect to cause. But it can be considered legiti-
mate only inasmuch as it rests not upon fortuitous
or accidental resemblances, but upon important re-
occur tave every circumstance in common save one, that one oocur-
ing only in tlie former, the circumstance in which alone the instances
differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the
cause of the phenomenon."
(c) Method of Conannitant Variation. — "Whatever phenomenon
varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some
particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon,
or is connected with it through some fact of causation."
id) Method of Meddues. — " Subduct from any phenomenon such
part as is known by previous induction to be the effect of certain an-
tecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the
remaining antecedent." — Mill's Logic.
PROOESSBS PROPER TO CERTAIN METHODS. 73
semblances, or, in the absence of these, upon many
resemblances.*
ART. ni. — CLASSIFICATION.
113. Classification is the distribution of Entities into
genera and species. — In every science it is necessary to
proceed with order both in the discovery and in the
communication of truth ; in this sense, then, classifi-
cation is requisite in every science. But the term is
especially applied to the distribution into genera and
species adopted in natural history.
114. The advantages of this classification are : 1. It
aids the memory and facilitates the knowledge of the ob-
jects classified ; 2. It in a ivay initiates us into the divine
plan, hy showing us the admirable order which reigns
among all creatures. — Classification, by the fact that it
puts order into the objects which we study, enables us
to know them better and to apprehend their relations ;
but, above all, it elevates the mind, by enabling it to
penetrate the admirable harmony of the divine plan.
This last result can be obtained only in so far as the
classification is based upon nature itself. An arti-
ficial classification serves only to put a certain order
into our knowledge, and is not in itself of any scien-
tific value.
115. Tlie laws of classification are : 1. It must be
complete ; 2. It must be based on the law of the subordi-
nation of characteristics. — Evidently the first condition
requisite for a good classification is that it comprise
all the objects for which it is made. But it is also
necessary, if we desire a natural or scientific classi-
fication, to base it on tlie law of the subordination of
characteristics. In virtue of this law objects in nature
"S^e Logic, §64.
74 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
have eacli a primary characteristic, to wliicli other
secondary characteristics are subordinate ; to these
latter still others are subordinate, until we finally
reach the least important characteristic. We classify
according to this law when we establish the principal
divisions according to the principal characteristics,
then subdivide according to subordination of char-
acteristics. It is easily seen that such a classification
is nothing else than the science of the objects classi-
fied. Hence, if we know to what division an object
belongs, we immediately know its nature and char-
acteristics.*
The great progress made in the natural sciences since the Kef-
ormation by the application of the experimental or a posteriori
method has led many of its advocates to bring the same method into
the iield of philosophy in its different divisions and of theology.
Bnt such a proceeding has invariably been followed by results not
only most disastrous ^o all positive religion, but even suicidal to hu-
man thought. The Church is the "pillar and ground of truth,"-
and has nothing to fear and much to gain from the daily advances
of scientific research. " Grammar, philology, archaeology, history,
ethnography, erudition, topography, aesthetics, all that makes up the
long line of rationalistic criticism, have in turn paid her a forced
homage." t The well ascertained results of science, the well-founded
hypotheses, are all in harmony with her teaching. But when any
rash conclusion is foisted on the public, the divine guardian of the
truth sounds the alarm.
* See Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., pp. 508-514, 515, 534.
t Apologie Scieniifique de la Foi Chretienne, by Canon Duilhd de
Saint-Projet, p. 105.
IDEOLOGY.
1. Ideology is a science which treats of ideas. — As
rational philosophy - treats of entities as known by
intellect, it must treat alsQ of that in which and by
which they are known, viz., ideas. Ideas 'constitute
the object of Ideology.
2. Ideology may he divided into General and Special
Ideology. — Ideology may be concerned simply with
the nature and origin of ideas in general ; then it
is General Ideology ; or it may treat of the special
nature of certain fundamental ideas and the manner
in which our mind acquires them ; then it is Special
Ideology.
GENERAL IDEOLOGY.
CHAPTBE I.
Ideas in Geneeal.
aet. i. — nature of ideas.
3. In every heing tve must distinguish the essence from
the particular conditions which individuate the essence. — :
God has given being to every creature according to
an eternal type existing in his infinite mind, and ac-
cording to which he can create an unlimited number
76 RATIONAL PHIL080PHT.
of similar beings* But each being, in realizing by
its existence the divine type, is thereby invested with
individuating conditions which make it that being
and not another. But that which reproduces the
divine type in a being and constitutes it in a determi-
nate species, that which makes it specifically what it
is, is called the essence of the being. This essence
cannot really exist without being individualized;
but it is, nevertheless, distinguishable from the con-
ditions which individualize it. These conditions are
seven in number : Form, figure, place, time, name, fam-
ily, and country.
i. An idea is a mere intellectual representation of the
essence of an object, by which that object is Jcnoivn. — ^We
not only know the concrete individual notes of sensible
objects, but we may also know their essence. The
intellect naturally perceives this essence abstracted
from its particular conditions, and forms in itself an
image or similitude which mentally reproduces the
essence. This image formed in and by the intellect
is called an idea.
5. The idea is not that which the intellect immediately
knows, but that by which it Icnoios the object. — As the
image of an object formed in the eye is not that which
the eye perceives, but that by which the visible ob-
ject becomes known, So that which the intellect im-
mediately knows by the idea is the objective essence.
But as the intellect is capable of reflecting upon
itself, it may, by a second act, perceive the idea or
mental representation by which it knows the essence.
♦ Bee MetapJiyms of the School, vol. ii., pp. 518, 519.
IDEAS IN GBNEBAL. 77
AET. n. — CHAEACTERISTICS OP IDEAS.
6. An idea is subjective inasmiccJi as it resides in the
Bvhject knowing. — The formation of an idea is a vital
and immanent act which not only proceeds from the
intellect, but is accomplished and exists in the intel-
lect itself. Now an idea considered as residing in
the subject knowing, is said to be subjective.
7. An idea is objective inasmuch as that luhicli it imme-
diately makes knoiun to us is an object.^Thai which an
idea immediately manifests to the subject knowing, is
not the idea itself, but the object perceived. Hence
an idea considered as the representation of an object,
a representation by which the object is immediately
known, is said to be objective.
8. The characteristics of an idea vary according as we
co7isider it subjectively or objectively. — An idea consid-
ered subjectively participates in the conditions of the
intellect that has the idea. Thus, if the intellect is
infinite and uncreated, the idea considered subjec-
tively is infinite and uncreated ; it is finite and created,
if the intellect is finite 'ajid created. In the same way,
an idea, considered subjectively, is singular like the
intellect itself ; but, considered objectively, it is uni-
versal like the essence which it represents.
CHAPTEE II.
i
Systems conceening the Oeigin of Ideas,
abt. i.— pkincrpal systems conceening the oeigin
OF IDEAS.
9. The principal systems concerning the origin of idea&
are the folloioing : 1. Sensism ; 2. Criticism or Cri-
tique ; 3. The System of Innate Ideas ; 4. Ontologism, ;
5. The System of Impersonal Reason ; 6. The Scholastic
System. — All other systems may easily be reduced to
one or other of these six ; because the formation of
ideas is explained either by the senses or by the in-
tellect. If explained by the intellect, only one of the
following hypotheses can be made ; either the soul
produces ideas from itself ; or God, in creating it, has
engraven them on it ; or God communicates them to it
directly ; or a substance intermediate between it and
God communicates them to it ; or, finally, God gives
it the power to form them itself in giving it the fac-
ulty of abstracting the essence of sensible objects
from the conditions which individualize it.
AET. n. — SENSISM.
10. Sensism is a system, wliich affirms sensation to he
the only origin of ideas. — According to this system, all
knowledge is merely a modification or transformation
of sensation.
SrSTBMS CON€EBNINa THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 79
11. The principal sensists among ancient philoso-
phers are Leucipptis, Democritus, and Epicur'us ; among
modern philosopJiers, Locke, Condillac, and Laromiguiere,
are most prominent. — ^The ancient sensists taught that
all bodies throw off subtle particles analogous to the
exhalations of odoriferous bodies ; these particles,
scattered through space, faithfully represent the ob-
jects from which they have been detached ; by means
of the senses they find an entrance to the soul, and
by their impressions produce sensation, memory, and
thought. This system was taught by Leucippus
(about B.C. 450.), Democritus (b.c. 470-361 ?), and Epi-
curus (B.C. 342-270). Modern Sensism holds sensa-
tion to be the only primitive act of the soul, an act
which by successive transformation produces all the
other acts of the soul and all its faculties, nay, the
sensitive faculty itself. This system, taught in an-
cient times by Protagoras (b.c. 480^11 ?), was renewed
in the seventeenth century by Locke (1632-1704), and
received its last complement from Condillac.
Besides sensation, Locke admits reflection in the
soul ; but, according, to him^ reflection is simply ob-
servant of sensitive facts, and acts only on the in-
ternal operations which had for their object external
material things.
Condillac (1715-1780) denies that reflection or atten-
tion is distinct from sensation, and regards it simply
as a more lively sensation than the others. He con-
siders memory as a twofold attention, — on the one
hand, to a past sensation, on the other, to a present
sensation. Finally, he asserts that judgment is noth-
ing more than a comparison between two sensations.
Laromiguiere (1756-1837) maintains the sense origin
of ideas ; but he considers as necessary for their for-
mation an activity distinct from sensation.
80 RATIONAL PEILOSOPHT.
Augiiste Comte (1798-1857) is the founder of that
form of Sensism which is styled Positivism. He
teaches that the object of science is the positive and
real, that only that is positive and real, which is ex-
perimental. Hence his system is the foundation of
the varied forms of unbelief that to-day infect men's
minds.*
12. Sensism, under whatever form it is considered, is
false, both because it destroys intellectual facts, and be-
cause it renders even the fact of sensation inexplicable. —
The operation and object of the intellect cannot be
reduced to the operation and object of the senses ;
for the intellect reflects on its acts, judges, and
reasons, which the senses cannot do. The object of
the intellect is the immaterial, the universal ; the ob-
ject of the senses is the material, the particular. Now,
Sensism, by identifying intellection with sensation,
destroys the true notion of the intellect and of intel-
lectual acts. It is to no purpose that Locke admits
reflection in addition to sensation ; for he limits re-
flection to the perceiving of sensations, and hence it
does not essentially differ from sensation itself.
Sensism, moreover, renders the fact of sensation in.
explicable, as is evident in the theory professed by
the ancients. It is also manifest in the modern theory,
which by asserting that sensation is the principle of
the sensitive faculty, becomes essentially contradic-
tory. Sensism is also sufficiently refuted by its con-
sequences : experience shows that it leads directly to
the negation of all science and all morality. As to Pos-
itivism, if no a priori principle is certain, no experi-
ment is possible or scientific, since it must rest upon
the certainty of some axioms, or a priori principles.
* Cf. Liberatore, vol. ii., p. 381.
SrSTEMiS OONOEBNINQ THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 81
AET. m. — OBITIQDE, OE TBANSCENDENTALISM.
13. Transcendentalism asserts that ideas are the product
of the activity of the thinking subject alone. — In this sys-
tem, which is the opposite of Sensism, thought does
not require for its exercise an object outside the mind
itself.
14. Transcendentalism originated with Kant, whose
principal disciples ivere Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.* —
Kant (1724-1804) teaches that we have within us a pri-
ori necessary forms or concepts both of the supersensi-
ble and of the sensible order ; all our cognitions re-
sult from the application of these forms to the objects
of experience. But as, according to the German,
philosopher, the a priori forms are purely subjective,
it follows that the object of knowledge, as it is in
itself, remains unknown to us.
Fichte (1762-1814) allows only one principle of
knowledge, the pure Ego, from which he evolves
all things, — God, the world, and the human mind, —
all which he considers as only conceptions of the
Ego.
Schelling (1775-1854) maintains very nearly the same
system ; instead of the pure Ego, however, he substi-
tutes an abstraction, the absolute, from which every-
thing, both mind and matter, emanates ideally.
Finally, Hegel (1770-1831) regards as the principle
* In America, Transcendentalism, according to its founders and
leaders, Dr. Channing, Alcott, and Emerson, is rather an emancipation
and reaction from the teachings of Calvinism, that man's nature is to-
tally depraved, and that he has no liberty. It received very little, if
any influence from the German system, and is rather the outgrowth of
the principle of the American Constitution, that man is capable of
self-government.
82 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
of all tilings the pure idea, in whicli the subject think-
ing- and the object thought, the ideal and the real,
entity and non-entity, are identified, and from which
all proceeds, — God, the world, and the human mind.
15. Transcendentalism is absurd ; because, if ideas are
purely sulyective,.it follows either that the directs known do
not exist, or that we can affirm nothing concerning their
reality. — In fact, if ideas are pure modifications of the
Ego, produced by the mind itself, we must hold ei-
ther that nothing exists outside the Ego, which is Nihil-
ism, or at least that we know nothing of what is with-
out us, which is Scepticism. These consequences
were vainly repudiated by Kant ; his disciples glory
in them, and with Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, re-
gard all existing things, even God himself, as a pure
creation of the human mind, or of the idea.
ABT. rV. — THE SYSTEM OF INNATE IDEAS.
16. T/ie system of Innate Ideas considers ideas as in-
fused by God into the soul from the moment of its creation.
— This system, regarding thought as constituting the
essence of the soul, supposes that the soul must always
have been engaged in thought, even from the first
instant of its creation ; and as the soul cannot think
without ideas, it also holds that ideas are innate in the
soul.
17. The upholders of this system are Plato among the
ancients ; Descartes, Leibnitz, and Bosmini, among mod-
ern philosophers. — In Plato's system ideas are the
eternal types according to which God -has ordained
all things ; they exist not only in the divine mind, but
also in the human mind, in which they are innate.
Some think that Plato held these prototype ideas to
SYSTEMS CONGEBNING THE ORIGIN' OF IDEAS. 83
be eternally existing- apart from the divine mind and
independent of it. The human intellect, Plato (b.c.
429-348) teaches, existed before the body, and recalls
these ideas according as it perceives copies made in
their likeness, that is, sensible things.
Descartes (1596-1650) holds that innate ideas are
perfect in the soul ; but besides these ideas he ad-
mits factitious ideas, or those formed by an eifort of
the imagination, as the idea of a " gold mountain ; "
and adventitious ideas, or those which come from with-
out, as the idea of the " sun."
Leibnitz (1646-1716) teaches that all these ideas are
innate, but are in our intellect in their germs ; and as,
according to Descartes, innate ideas become present
to the mind only through sensations, so, according to
Leibnitz, these germs become perfect ideas only by
occasion of sensation.
Eosmini (1797-1855), laying it down as a principle
that we ought to suppose as innate in the soul only
that which is requisite to explain the fact of cog-
nition, believed that he had found this sufficient ele-
ment in the idea of being; he admits, therefore, no
other innate idea than that of possible being. In his
system, all ideas represent nothing but being differ-
ently determined^ Hence it follows that all our ideas
are formed from the idea of being by the same means
by which we are enabled to perceive the different de-
terminations of which being is susceptible, that is, by
sensation.
18. The system of Innate Ideas, besides not accounting
for the fact of cognition, is absurd in its principles, and
leads to the same conclusions as the system of Transcen-
dentalism.— In this system the close dependence on
the senses which is shown by experience to exist on
the part of the intellect becomes inexplicable, and man
84 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
appears no longer to act, in the order of cognition, ac-
cording to the laws of his nature, which is both spirit-
ual and corporeal, but rather in accordance with the
laws of angelic nature. Hence all those who advo-
cate the doctrine of Innate Ideas err regarding the
human soul and its relations with the body. More-
over, the principle of their theory is that the essence
of the human soul consists in thought. But if
thought constitutes the essence of the soul, the act
of intellection is confounded with the essence of the
human soul; but in God alone is essence identical
with intellection. Hence there would be no need of
adding to the essence of the soul the ideas infused by
God. Finally, the system of Innate Ideas, in admit-
ting fundamentally the same principle as Transcen-
dentalism, viz., a priori subjective forms, leads to the
same consequence ; that is, it renders all knowledge
purely subjective, and thus ends naturally in Ideal
ism.
AET v. — ontologism:.
19. Ontologism regards ideas as seen in God by direct
and immediate intuition. — This system loses sight of
the subjective character of ideas ; it considers them
as the object of knowledge and as direct manifesta-
tions of God himself to our intellect.
20. ITie cJiief defenders of Ontologism are Malebranche
and Gioherti* — According to Malebranche (1638-1715),
man perceives all things by his ideas, which are only
the divine idea viewed under different aspects. And
* Some of the writings of the illustrious O. A. Brownson (1803-1876)
are unmistakably ontologistic. He accepted the primary principle of
Gioberti, Being creates exiatencea, ^nd thence deduced his argument
for the existence of God.
SYSTEMS OONGERNINO THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 85
this idea we know only in so far as God directly
manifests Himself to our mind. By our ideas we ap-
prehend the contingent, the imperfect, the finite, which
are conceived only as the privation of the necessary,
the perfect, the infinite. Hence our soul sees all in
God, even the material world. Gioberti (1801-1851)
starts with the principle of Malebranche, that ideas,
being universal and absolute, must be a direct, though
partial, intuition of absolute being, that is, of God
Himself ; he regards ideas, not as the means, but as
the very object of knowledge. He teaches that what
we see are the divine ideas themselves, that we have a
constant intuition of God, but that we are conscious
of this intuition only by reflection, which he calls on-
tological reflection.
21. Ontologism is false in its principles, contradicted by
"experience, and fatal in its consequences. — 1. Ontologists
teach that the intellect has a direct intuition of God ;
but to see the being of God is to see His essence.
We must then affirm that in perceiving ideas our in-
tellect is in a state similar to that of the blessed, who
see the divine essence directly, a conclusion which is
absurd and contrary to faith. 2. Ontologism renders
the operation of the intellect independent of that of
the senses. Such a supposition is opposed to the
nature of man, and is contradicted by experience,
which sufficiently proves that the idea is formed in
us and by us and is not derived from an intuition of
God. 3. If we must admit that ideas are not the
medium, but the objects of knowledge, it follows that
the ideal order is not distinct from the real, and as
the real order alone exists, we must conclude that
knowledge is impossible. Again, if the intellect
does not form ideas, but sees them in God, it is,
by the very fact, deprived of all activity of its own.
86 BATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
Hence Ontologism leads directly to Fatalism and
Pantheism.*
ABT. TI. — INTEEMEDIABISM.
22. Tntermediarism, or the system of Impersonal Reason,
supposes between God and man an intermediate imper-
sonal reason, hy ivliich our intellect acquires universal
ideas. — According to this system, ideas are not innate
in the intellect, they are not acquired by the mind,
they are not seen in God ; but they are seen in an
impersonal reason intermediate between God and man.
23. Theprincipal defender of Tntermediarism is Cousin,
who has done nothing more than reneiu an error of Aver-
roes. — The reason of man, says Cousin, is individ-
ual and variable, and therefore cannot acquire of
itself universal and immutable ideas. Hence man can
form his ideas only in so far as they are revealed to
him by a reason which, not being personal to him, is
called impersonal. This reason is revealed to him
from the very beginning, and the knowledge which the
mind then has is said to be spontaneous. In this
state man knows, but does not know that he knows ;
when he begins to reflect on his spontaneous knowl-
edge, he acquires reflex knowledge. The former
knowledge is always true ; not so the latter, for in it
man may fix his attention exclusively on one part of
* Nor does the fact that God is eminently intelligible, and that we
are intimately connected with Him, give support to Ontologists. For
God is eminently intelligible in Himself, and the bond by which we
are united to Him arises not from our knowledge of Him, but from
our dependence on Him. Even though we see all things through
God, forasmucli as the light by which we know is from Him, it is
Still not necessary to behold His essence, just as for perceiving any
sensible object, it is unnecessary to see the substance ojE the au«.
SYSTEMS aONGEBNINO THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 87
the truth, and thus confound the part with the whole ;
thence arises error, which, however, Cousin asserts to
be only incomplete truth. An almost analogous sys-
tem was taught by Averroes (1120-1198) in the middle
ages.
24. Intermediarism is false in its principle, in its na-
ture, and in its conseqiiences. — This system starts with
the principle that our intellect, as being individual,
cannot form a universal idea ; but thi-s is to lose sight
of the twofold aspect, subjective and objective, under
which we may consider the idea, viz., the idea itself
and that which it represents. Again, if Impersonal
Keason is anything, it must be individual, and hence
it is incapable, according to Cousin himself, of form-
ing a universal idea. Finally, this system easily gen-
erates Pantheism, since it destroys all activity proper
to the intellect of man.
AET. Vn. — ^TKADITIONALISM.
25. Traditionalism teaches that our ideas are formed
by means of speech. — This system, devised to combat
those philosophers who hold that human reason is
suificient for itself, exaggerates the impotency of
reason and asserts its dependence on speech and
tradition.
26. The principal representatives of Traditionalism are
De Bonald, Bonnetty, and Ventura. — De Bonald (1754-
1840) teaches the absolute necessity of speech for the
existence of thought, so that without speech man can
have no idea, no general notion, but only sensible
perceptions.
Bonnetty (1798- ) and Ventura (1792-1861) con-
cede the power of forming ideas of sensible things
without the help of speech, but maintain that, inde-
88 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
pendently of social teacHng, man cannot acquire
notions of the spiritual and moral order, as those of
God, the soul, duty, etc. Other philosophers admit
that man can think without speech, but they deny
that without it he can form clear and distinct ideas
and that he can reflect on his thoughts.
27. It is false to assert that speech is absolutely neces-
sary for the formation of ideas either of sensible or of
spiritual things, or for refecting on ideas already formed.
— Speech, being simply a sign, can make known an
object to the intellect only through the idea which
the intellect already has of the object ; therefore, be-
fore the intellect is fixed on the essence of a thing by
the word, it has already the idea of it. The idea of
sensible things being formed, we cannot, without
contradiction, deny to reason the power to attain to
ideas of spiritual things ; for, granting that reason
can form ideas of sensible things in virtue of the ab-
stractive power natural to it, wo cannot deny it the
power to ascend from these ideas to those of spiritual
things, since the power of deduction is not less natural
to reason than that of abstraction. Tet it is true that,
owing to the feebleness of man's reason and the diffi-
culties that beset his actual condition, but few men
could, without the aid of speech, attain to those truths
which regard God and His attributes, and even then
only after much time and labor, with an admixture
of many errors and great uncertainty. Besides, it is
certain that, without speech, man would never arrive
at complete intellectual and moral development.
But, if the intellect has the power of forming its
ideas without the aid of speech, evidently it may re-
flect on its ideas without speech, for the intellect is
essentially a reflective faculty, and requires for the
exercise of its power of reflection only the idea, the
SrSTBMS OONOEBNING THE OBIOIN OF IDEAS. 89
object of reflection. It will not do to cite in proof of
the necessity of speech for the formation of ideas
instances of deaf-mutes and savages abandoned in
forests. A more attentive examination has shown
that these facts have been imperfectly observed or
have never existed.
AET. Vin.— THE SCHOLASTIC SYSTEM.
28. The Scholastic system explains the origin of ideas
by the poiver which the intellect has of abstracting from
sensible images or phantasmata. — The Schoolmen
teach that sensible objects first impress the external
senses. The impression, passing from the external
senses to the imagination,, gives rise to an image of
the object, which, though more perfect, is individual
and material, and represents the object with the sen-
sible and concrete conditions which make it that ob-
ject and no other. As soon as this image is formed,
the intellect adverts to it, and calling into exercise its
abstractive power, which constitutes what is called
the active intellect, it illumines this sensible image,
strips it of its sensible and individual conditions, and
manifests the essence of the thing without its material
determinations. Thus the object becomes actually
intelligible, or the intelligible species is formed. The
active intellect, or abstractive power, having thus sepa-
rated the intelligible, that is, the proper object of the
intellect, the intellect proper, called the possible intel-
lect, receives the intelligible species into itself and
elicits the word of the mind (verbum mentis), or forms
the idea. These operations, though distinct, are ac-
complished at the same time in virtue of the unity
of the soul, and one cannot take place without the
other. As we shall see later, this system of the origin
90 RATIONAL PHIL080PHT.
of ideas is very closely connected witli the Scholastic
system concerning the nature of the human soul, and
follows from it as a consequence.
29. The Scholastic system has recourse to fewer a priori
principles than any other system. — It is an axiom among
philosophers that nature is as fruitful in effects as she
is sparing in causes ; hence the simplicity of a system
is a strong argument in its favor. But while the
other systems concerning ideas assume gratuitously
one or many a priori elements which may easily be
dispensed with, the Scholastic system requires for the
formation of the idea only that which is absolutely
indispensable, viz., the abstractive power, or the act-
ive intellect. This abstractive power cannot be dis-
pensed with, and it alone suffices for the solution of
the problem.
30. Tlie Scholastic system is true, because it is in per-
fect harmory with the essential laws of human nature. —
Since the formation of ideas is an effect whose cause
is the nature of our soul, a system concerning the for-
mation of ideas is true, if it is in perfect harmony
with the iiature of the soul, if it refers the effect to
its proper and adequate cause. But while the other
systems do not take into account the nature of the
human soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual,
the Scholastic system explains the concurrence of
sensible images in the formation of ideas.
It is also in accord with experience, which shows
that we do not possess innate ideas, that we do not
intue ideas in God, but that we form the idea of a thing
from its sensible perception. Thus the Scholastic
system follows as a simple consequence from the true
theory of the nature of man. According to that the-
ory, man is neither a mere animal nor an angel, but
stands, so to say, midway between them ; for if, on the
STSTEMS OONOEBNINQ THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 91
one hand, his intellect, like that of the angel, does
not intrinsically depend on an organ, on the other
hand, being the faculty of a soul substantially united
to a body, it can form the idea only after the senses
have presented the matter for its operations. Hence
the Scholastic system preserves the unity of man's
being, and yet maintains a distinction between the
soul and body ; the other systems, on the contrary,
either make the soul and body two distinct beings,
or destroy one of these two elements of man.
31. The Scholastic system rests on the authority of the
greatest philosophers. — This system, first taught, though
with a mixture of error, by Aristotle (b.c. 384-322), was
held by all the great philosophers of the middle ages,
and especially by St. Thomas, who brought it to its
full perfection. Up to the seventeenth century, it
alone was admitted by all the great Catholic univer-
sities, and after having been for two centuries almost
universally rejected, to the great detriment of philos-
ophy, it is now accepted by the most distinguished
philosophers of the present day without restriction or
modification.
82. The Scholastic system gives a satisfactory solution
to all the difficulties connected with the problem of the
origin of ideas, and in no way contradicts the facts of
common sense. — The principal difficulty connected with
the problem of the origin of ideas is the necessity of
reconciling elements apparently contradictory and
yet evidently attested by experience, in the formation
of ideas. On the one hand, there is the sensible, par-
ticular, contingent element ; on the other hand, the
intelligible, universal, necessary element. These con-
tradictory elements cannot be united. But, while
other systems avoid the difficulty by denying one of
the two elements, and thus disregard both the nature
92 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
of man and facts of experience, the Scholastic system
shows how the two elements co-exist without being
confounded ; how the sensible image furnishes the
intellect with matter for its operation ; and how the
idea, while excluding the sensible image, cannot be
formed without its concurrence. This system, ex-
plaining what is immutable and necessary in the idea
by the nature of the essence perceived and not by the
nature of the perception itself, accounts for the divine
prototype of the object of the idea without deifying
the idea itself; finally, by attributing to man the
power of forming his own ideas, it makes them depend-
ent on him both for their causality and their very
existence. At the same time, it enables us to com-
prehend the grandeur of the intellect, by showing
that its intelligible light, its abstractive power, is a
sort of participation in the light of God Himself.
Thus, everything finds its proper place in this sys-
tem, and far from excluding a single fact of expe-
rience or of common sense, it admits them all, and
explains their mutual relations.
33. Tlie ScJiolastic system entails none of the conse-
quences with ivhich its adversaries reproach it ; the objec-
tions raised against it rest on false explanations. — By rec-
ognizing the reality of the essence perceived, the
Scholastic system avoids Subjectivism and Idealism,
and it avoids Pantheism by making the idea a con-
tingent production of our intellect. Those who object
that it borders on Sensism in admitting a sensible
element in the formation of the idea, forget that this
element does not make part of the idea, but is simply
the matter on which the intellect operates in forming
the idea. The reproach that this system is contradic-
tory in making the universal proceed from the par-
ticular, can be uttered by those only who do not ob-
SYSTEMS OONOBBfTINQ THE OBIOIN OF IDEAS. 93
serve that particular beings have each a proper es-
sence, which, abstracted by the active intellect, is
capable of being considered, by another operation of
the intellect, under the relation of uiuTeraality.
CHAPTER m.
Univebsals.
aet. i. — natuee of univeesals.
34. A universal is that which is found in many or
may be affirmed of many ; it is the essence of a being or
tJie intelligible object perceived by the intellect.
35. The question of the nature of universals is closely
connected tuith that of the origin and nature of ideas. —
Ideas are uniTersal ; by them we apprehend the uni-
versal. The solution of the problem of ideas is,
therefore, closely connected with that of the problem
of universals, nor is the latter problem less important
than the former. As universals are the proper object .
of our intellectual knowledge, we can easily under-
stand the lively controversy to which the question
of universals has given rise in the history of phi-
losophy.
36. To account for the true nature of universals, we
must distinguish : 1. the direct universal, luhich is the
essence considered merely in itself, by a direct act of the
intellect ; 2. the reflex universal, which is the essence con-
sidered by a reflex act of the intellect, as common to many
individuals. — The essence of a material being ab-
stracted from its individuating conditions is the
proper object of the intellect. But the intellect may
perceive the essence by a direct act, or it may return
to consider the idea of this essence by a reflex act. In
UmVERSALS. 95
the first case, the intellect merely perceives the es-
sence with its intrinsic characteristics, without con-
sidering whether it is single or multiple, real or ideal.
Thus the intellect, by a direct act, represents to itself
the essence of man, conceives him as a rational ani- -
mal, but does not consider whether this essence is
found in a single individual or in many individuals,
whether it exists really or ideally.
Evidently the direct universal is not, strictly speak-
ing, a universal ; it is said to be so as opposed to in-
dividuals, and also as being the basis of the reflex uni-
versal, which is the universal, strictly speaking. _ In
order to form this universal, the intellect reflects upon
the essence which it has apprehended directly; it
views the idea as representing an essence common to
many individuals. Thus, after the perception of the
essence of man as a rational animal, the intellect
reflects upon the idea of this essence, and recognizes
that it expresses the human nature in v^hich all men
are alike. This distinction arms us with a ready an-
swer to the objection that the universal cannot be
drawn from the particular, since the greater cannot
proceed from the less. If the reflex universal is meant,
evidently it is not found in the particular ; but if it
be the direct universal, the answer is that this uni-
versal is actually in the particular, inasmuch as the
essence of the particular may be considered in itself
and abstractly. But, once the direct universal is ap-
prehended, nothing prevents the intellect from adding
to it the consideration of its relation to individuals,
and thus arriving at the reflex universal.
37. To perceive the direct universal, mere abstraction
by the intellect is sufficient ; to form the rejkx universal,
the intellect must regard the essence as common to all the
individuals possessing it. — The consideration of the
9<! RATIONAL PEIL080PHT.
essence in itself involves no scrutiny as to whetter
it exists in one individual or in many individuals,
whether it is real or ideal ; for its perception, the
intellect need only abstract it from the individual
characteristics. But the reflex universal contains a
relation to individuals, and hence supposes a com-
parison by the intellect as well as abstraction.
38. The direct universal has a real existence in the thing
perceived, hut not in the manner in tohich it is perceived ;
the reflex universal as such has only an ideal existence. —
The essence apprehended by the intellect in the
direct act exists really in the individuals, but not ia
the manner in which it is apprehended, that is, as
abstracted from individual characteristics ; evidently
this abstraction is the work of the intellect. In the
same way, the color of fruit is really in the fruit, but
any consideration of it apart from the taste is due to
the sight, which perceives color, and not taste. The
reflex universal as such exists solely in the intellect,
since it is universal only in virtue of the reflection of
the intellect, and this mental operation can be exer-
cised on the ideas of things, but not on the things
themselves.
ABT II. — DIFFEEENT OPINIONS ON THE NATUKE OF UNI-
VEESALS.
39. The different opinions on the nature of universals
may he reduced to three principal heads : Nominalism,
Conceptualism, and Realism. — It may be said that there
have been as many different opinions on the nature
of universals as there have been diverse systems on
the origin and nature of ideas. All, however, may be
reduced to the three opinions which gave rise to so
much cpntroversy in the middle ages.
UmVERSALS. 97
The Nominalists, headed by Eoscelin (d. 1122), and
later by Ockham, the Invincible Doctor (d. 1347), main-
tained that universals were mere words ; the Concep-
tualists, represented by Abelard (1079-1142), made uni-
rersals merely conceptions ; the Realists, however,
gave to universals a real existence outside the min'i.
But of this last class some confined themselves to
attributing reality to the essence perceived, in so far
only as it is individual and concrete ; these are the
Moderate Realists, and have St. Thomas of Aquin (1225-
1274) at their head. Others attributed reality to the
essence as qualified by the very abstraction and uni-
versality under which it is regarded ; these are the
Ultra-Realists, such as "William of Champeaux (d. 1121)
and Joannes Scotus Erigena (d. 875). Thus, according
to the Moderate Realists, the essence " man " really
exists outside the mind in individual men, but not
with that abstraction and universality under which the
mind considers it ; according to the Ultra-Realists,
the essence "man "really exists in an abstract and
universal manner.
Nominalism is manifestly the negation of all science
and the fruitful parent of Scepticism ; Conceptualism
being nothing more than disguised Nominalism, leads
to the same consequences ; Ultra-Realism directly
produces Pantheism. With Nominalism are connected
the systems of Epicurus, Locke, Condillac, Hume
(1711-1776), in a word, of Materialists, Sensists, and the
Empiricists of the Scotch school. With Conceptual-
ism the systems of the Stoics of old, of Descartes,
Berkeley (1684^1753), Kant, and all the Idealists, stand
in close relation. Finally, to Ultra-Realism belong
the systems of Plato, Averroes, Malebranche, Hegel,
and Gioberti, that is, the systems of the Oatologista
and Pantheists.
7
98 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
The chief exponents of Nominalism and Conceptualism in our As,y
are respectively John S. Mill (1806-1873) and Sir W. Hamilton (1788-
185ft). The latter explains apprehension or the formation of ideas
as a bundling together of attributes not the same, but called similar,
because, though observed in different individuals of the same class,
they produce in us the same effect as when first observed in a partic-
ular individual of that class. From this it follows in the teaching of
Sir W. Hamilton: 1. That ideas convey not absolute but relative
truth, relative, namely, to the object first perceived ; hence certitude
is impossible ; 2. Ideas are merely subjective. Here the door is
opened to Scepticism.
John Stuart Mill, following Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), holds that
the ideas of individuals belonging to the same class have nothing in
common but the name. When the mind perceives an object, in
virtue of its power of abstraction, it fixes its attention on certain
qualities to the exclusion of others, the qualities selected being those
that are recalled to us whenever we perceive another object belong-
ing to the same class. Hence it follows : 1. That the idea has no
foundation in reality, and all positive belief in the most fundamental
truths of religion is undermined; 2. That the common name ik
merely a convenience, and does not express any corresponding idea.
Hence this system is even more radically sceptical than the other.
From these principles it is easy to gather the doctrines of Moder>
Goncoptualists and Nominalists with regard to Universtils.
SPECIAL IDEOLOGY.
CHAPTEE I.
How Human Knowledge is Acquired.
AET. I.— THE FIBST OPERATION OP THE INTELLECT AND THE
PERCEPTION OP ESSENCES.
40. In (he first development of knowledge analysis pre-
cedes synthesis, that is, the first operation of the intellect is
not judgment, hut simple apprehension of essence. — Some
pMlosophers, as Eeid, Kant, and Cousin, teach that
the intellect 'first pronounces instinctive judgments,
and afterwards arrives at ideas, by abstracting- the ele-
ments contained in these judgments. But this is an
error. For (1) any power which, by its nature, is only
gradually developed, does not acquire its full perfec-
tion in its first act ; but judgment is an act of perfect
knowledge, whereas simple apprehension is merely an
act of initial knowledge ; therefore, simple apprehen-
sion precedes judgment. Moreover, (2) a judgment
presupposes a knowledge of the agreement or dis-
agreement of two terms ; but, in order to perceive this
relation, evidently we must first know the two terms.
It is (3) also a mistake to assert that the intellect
by one and the same act perceives the two terms and
their agreement or disagreement ; for, in order to per-
ceive the agreement or disagreement of two thingSj
100 BATIOMAL PHILOSOPHY.
we must first have ideas of them, and then compare
these ideas by a reflex act. Hence one and the same
act would be both direct and reflex, which is contra-
dictory. We must, therefore, conclude that the mind
begins hj analysis, and that it first apprehends the es-
sence, separating it by abstraction from the conditions
by which it is affected in nature ; then follows synthesis,
which it effects by judgment, when it establishes a
union between the terms perceived.
41. The proper object of the intellect in our present life
is the essence of material things. — As the intellect, in our
present life, can form an idea only when the imagina-
tion has presented to it a sensible image, and as this
image must have for its object something material, the
proper object of the intellect, in our mortal life, must
be the essence of material things.
42. Among the essences of material things, some are
immediately knoion, while others are Tcnown mediately, or
by means of deduction. — Certain essences, as those of
" rest, motion," etc., are self-evident ; this must be the
case, since otherwise human knowledge would be im-
possible. But, on the other hand, many essences,
even of sensible things, are known to us only by
means of reasoning; for example, the essence of
"life."
43. In the cognition of material objects there are three
degrees of abstraction employed by the human intellect ; in
the first degree, it abstracts from the individuality of the
objects and considers them only as sensible ; in the second,
it abstracts also from their sensible and mutable qualities
to regard only their quantity ; in the third, it abstracts
from matter altogether to contemplate tJie immaterial. —
The first objects of cognition in this life are individual,
sensible, material things. The intellect abstracting
Irom the individuality or thisness of the objects about
sow HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 18 AOQUIBED. 101
US in the visible M^orld, such as " stones, plants, and
animals," contemplates them merely as sensible.
It may further abstract from all the modifications
that qualify sensible objects, to regard their quantity,
and then it considers continuous quantity, as " lines,
surfaces, solids," and discrete quantity, as " number."
Lastly, it may abstract altogether from matter, and
regard only the immaterial. What is immaterial may
he negatively so, as the nature of "being, substance,
accident," etc., which though realized in sensible ob-
jects, may be abstracted from them ; or it may he posi-
tively immaterial and exclude all matter from its
nature, as the "human soul" and "God." Of these
three degrees of abstraction, the first is the limit of
the physical sciences, the second of mathematics, the
third of metaphysics.
44. In the immediate perception of essences, the intel-
lect begins luith the most universal concepts. — Although
adapted by nature to acquire knowledge, the intellect
at first knows nothing. It proceeds gradually in the
act of cognition, and does not, by its first effort, attain
to perfect knowledge. Thus, before possessing a de-
terminate and distinct cognition, it begins with a very
universal notion. It is the same with the intellect as
with the senses, which, in perceiving an animal, for
example, first perceive it as a body, then as an animal,
and afterwards as this or that animal. Experience also
confirms this truth : for the less perfect the language
of a people, the more is it wanting in precise and
definite terms ; the more perfect the language and the
more civilized the people who speak it, the richer is
it in exact and well-defined expressions.
45. The first idea formed by the intellect is that of
being. — The intellect first perceives that which is most
universal ; but since the most universal idea is that of
102 RATIONAL PBIL080PHY.
being, the first thing perceived by the intellect is the
essence of being ; other things are known only as
some determination of being. It must not, however,
be supposed that, when the intellect is once developed,
it must begin by perceiving the idea of being before
any other essence whatever, for this occurs only in
the first development of intellect ; eventually, it first
perceives some determinate essence, and afterwards
attains to more universal ideas by an analysis of its
reflections.
AET. II. — HOW THE INTELLECT KNOWS INDIVIDUAL BODIEa
46. The intellect perceives particular bodies by perceiv'
ing its own act of abstraction of the intelligible object from
the phantasm, which is always representative of an individ-
ual material entity. — The intellect judges and reasons
about particular bodies ; it must, therefore, know
them. But, as the universal alone can be the proper
object of the intellect, the knowledge which it has of
the individual is not direct, but indirect (per accidens) ;
that is, it. does not know the individual as its proper
object, but it knows it only through the act of a fac-
ulty which has the individual for its proper object.
The intellect thus apprehends the act of an inferior
power or faculty on account of the unity, of the soul,'
in virtue of which one faculty cannot act without the
next higher being apprised of its action. Hence par-
ticular bodies are known by the soul in two ways :
directly, through the senses and the imagination ; in-
directly, by the intellect, which perceives its own act
of absttacting the intelligible species from the phan-
tasms of the imagination. This manner of knowing
is called per accidens by the Schoolmen, which they
compare to that of knowing substance by sense. The
HOW HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IS AOQUIBBD. 103
eye sees color per se, the colored object per accidens.
The intellect knows the universal directly {per se), the
individual indirectly {per accidens).
47. The reflection of the intellect upon its act of simple
apprehension is both consciousness of that act and the per-
ception of the essence apprehended by the act. — The intel-
lect in reflecting on the act by which it has perceived
the essence of a sensible object must know both
the act and the object perceived by the act. Thus,
when it has the idea of a " flower," it may turn to
this idea, and then know both that it has this idea
and that the object from which it has abstracted
the essence is a flower. This reflex act of the in-
tellect receives the name of psychological conscious-
ness when it is viewed as a modification of the intel-
lect, but when it is considered as an expression of
the object known, it is called ontological conscious-
ness, or the intellective perception of the material
and individual.
48. Man knows the material and individual through
the senses ; but intellect adds something to the sensitive
cognition, since it regards the individual not rnerely as a
fact, but as the concrete realization of the essence which it
has abstracted from the individual. — When the intellect
is directed to the consideration of the individual, it is
already in possession of the idea which it has ab-
stracted from it ; hence it cannot prevent the light of
this idea from being reflected upon the individual ob-
ject, nor the individual from being presented to the
intellect as the concrete realization of the essence
perceived through the idea.
The reason of this fact is not only subjective, inas-
much as the senses and imagination have their seat
in the same soul as the intellect ; but also objective,
since the individual perceived by the senses is truly
104 RATIONAL PMIL080PHT.
the same as tliat from whicli the intellect has ab-
stracted the universal.
AET. m. — THE soul's KNOWLEDGE OP ITSELF.
49. The soul does not knoio itself immediately by its
essence, but only by its operations. — The soul has no
innate idea ; it does not, therefore, know itself from
its very origin, through its essence. But since its
essence is present to it, the soul is capable of perceiv-
ing its own existence easily without reasoning. And
it attains to this perception as soon as it becomes
conscious of any one of its operations.
50. TJie soul does not know the. nature of its essence im-
mediately, but by reasoning. — ^In order that the soul may
perceive its own existence, it suffices that it be pres-
ent to itself and perceive an act of which it is the
principle. This is not the case with the knowledge
which the soul acquires of its essence, for it attains
this by means of deduction. For in perceiving an-
other being, the soul perceives that the idea by which
it apprehends the being is immaterial ; thence it con-
cludes that the principle whence the idea proceeds is
also immaterial. From this property of immateriality
the soul afterwards deduces the other properties
which it possesses.
AET. rv. — HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS GOD.
51. The soul does not know God immediately, but it
rises from, created things to a knowledge of His existence.
— The intellect perceives directly the essences ab-
stracted from sensible things. From the perception
of these essences follows immediately a cognition of
the first principles of reason. By reflection on these
HOW HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IS AOQUIBBD. 105
acts of tlie intellect, we at once perceive our own exist-
ence and by our senses that of corporeal individuals
distinct from us. In this all other knowledge, includ-
ing that of God, has its source, and is, consequently,
only mediate knowledge.
52. 2%e first notion wjiich we acquire of Ood is that of
His existence, under the relation of first cause. — Creatures
present themselves to us as contingent beings, which,
consequently, must have a cause ; thus, by the prin-
ciple of causality we are led to assign them a first un-
created cause.
53. TJie knoivledge of God as first cause of all created
beings contains in germ all the other notions which we can
acquire of Him. — A cause must contain all the perfec-
tions which it produces in the effect and it must
exclude those imperfections of the effect which are
not due to its causality. But the First Cause, being
independent and therefore infinite, extends His power
to all possible beings, and immeasurably surpasses
all the perfections of creatures. Now, there are three
ways by which we may know the divine attributes : (1)
by the relation of cause to effect, (2) by the exclusion of
the imperfections of creatures, (3) by pre-eminent pos-
session of every perfection. By the first, that of cau-
sality, we know that God is the efficient, final, and
exemplar cause of all things, that He is their pre-
server and ordainer; by the second, that of exclu-
sion, we deny of God whatever in creatures implies
some defect, as "limitation, dependence, mutability;"
by the third, that oi pre-eminence, we attribute to God
in an infinite degree all perfections, such as " goodness,
wisdom, beauty." The union of these two ways of pre-
eminence and exclusion enables us to form the most
exalted idea that we can have of God, by conceiving
Him as absolutely pure Being, that is, as the Being
106 RATIONAL. PHILOSOPHY.
that simply is, without any augmentation or super-
added determination to the simple and pure nature
of being.
54. The idea of the finite is formed hy the union of the
idea of being with that of privation.— The finite is that
which exists, but with limits,, that is, it is affected
by a privation of being. When the intellect " looks
out upon an object external to itself," it forms the
idea of being. On instituting a comparison between
this object and objects which it knows already, it
observes what is wanting in each, and thus conceives
the idea of privation. The union of these two ideas
gives the concept of the finite. From this explana-
nation we see the error of Descartes and Malebranche,
who assert that the idea of the finite is deduced from
that of the infinite.
55. The idea of the infinite follows as a conseqiience
from the idea of first cause. — The intellect, .having
already the idea of the finite and the idea of God as
first cause, easily perceives that ■ the First Cause can-
not be limited by itself or by any other cause, and
thus conceives it without limits, that is, as infinite.
Locke and Condillac, confounding the idea of the
infinite with that of the indefinite, assert that the idea
of the infinite is obtained by constantly adding to a
given finite perfection yet another finite perfection.
But this hypothesis is absurd ; for the infinite, being
essentially without limits, is not susceptible of in-
crease or diminution ; the finite, on the contrary, is
essentially limited, and however much it may be
increased ever remains limited and, therefore, finite,
since its increment is, according to Locke, always
finite.
56. From the idea of tJie finite is derived that of the
conditional or contingent, that is, of being which does not
sow HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRED. 107
contain in itself the reason of its existence. — By the finite
is meant limited being ; but that which is ever tend-
ing to being and not to the absence of being cannot
limit itself ; it must, therefore, be limited by an ex-
ternal agent. But the external agent which gives it
limits must also give it its existence, in which those
limits are found. In other words, the , being is con-
tingent, since the contingency of a being consists
precisely in this, that it receives existence from an-
other, as from its cause. As the opposite of the finite
is the infinite, so the opposite of the contingent is the
necessary and absolute, or that which exists in virtue
of its own essence, and in which all is pure act.
AET. v.— NECESSITY OF SENSIBLE IMAGES FOE INTEL-
LECTION IN QUE PEESENT LIFE.
57. The human intellect in its present state of union ivith
the body, can apprehend no object without the aid of a sensible
representation in the imagination. — Experience teaches
uS that when the imagination is disturbed or incap-
able of acting, as in sickness or lethargy, the intellect
is likewise disturbed or powerless to produce any
idea. It further shows that when we wish to think of
anything, even if it be spiritual, we always form a
.sensible representation ; and likewise, when we com-
municate our ideas to another, we make use of figures
and sensible images. Besides this proof from ex-
perience, reason demonstrates a priori that, in our
present life, we cannot, without the concurrence of
sensible images, either form ideas or even make use
of the ideas which we already possess. For action
fdlloivs being, that is, the action is always conformed
to the essence and mode of existence of the being
that acts. But the essence of man is a soul substanti-
108 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
ally miited to a body and the intellect's present mode
of existence is in union with the sensitive faculties.
In order, then, that man may act as man, he must do
so with the concurrence of the two elements of which
he is composed ; and the action of intellect naturally
requires the co-operation of the senses. We thus see
the admirable harmony existing between the subject
that operates, the faculty by which he operates, and
the object of the operation. The subject is a com-
posite of soul and body ; the faculty is the intellect
united to sensitive 'acuities ; the object is an essence
realized ia an individual and sensible body.
CHAPTBE II.
Knowledge of Fikst Pkinciples.
aet i. — natube of pbinciples of knowledge.
58. A principle of knoiuledge is that by tuhich something
is knoion. — A principle, in general, is that from which
something proceeds. Principles aire of three kinds :
metaphysical principles, physical principles, and logi-
cal principles. The last named include all those
principles which when known lead to the knowledge
of something else. In a more restricted sense, first
priQciples of knowledge, or simply first principles,
are those propositions which are so clear and evident,
that they do not require proof. Hence they are also
called axioms or self-evident truths.
59. After the perception of essences, the intellect imme-
diately perceives frst principles. — The intellect proceed-
ing gradually in the act of knowing, first perceives
what is most elementary, viz., essences. This imper-
fect knowledge it immediately develops in observing
the relations, properties, and accidents of essences,
thus calling judgment and reason into action. Of the
judgments which it pronounces, some are formed
immediately and others mediately. The former are
called Jlrst principles.
110 KATIOMAL PHILOSOPHY.
AET n.— THE PEINCIPLE OF CONTBADICTION.
60. The first principle known hy the intellect is : It is
impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same
time. Tliis is called the principle of contradiction. — A.& in
the simple perception of essences there exists a first
universal idea, viz., the idea of being, which precedes
all others and serves as their basis ; so there must be
a first principle, on which all reasoning rests, and to
which the intellect must assent under penalty of be-
ing unable to accept any other truth whatever. This
first truth is the principle of contradiction, and is formu-
lated thus : " It is impossible for the same thing to be
and not to be at the same time and in the same re-
spect ; " or, in a more didactic form, " Being is incom-
patible with non-being." Evidently this is the first
principle which the intellect knows. For, in perceiv-
ing being, it cannot but perceive the negation of being,
or non-being. In comparing these two concepts, there-
fore, it compares its two primary concepts ; and in dis-
covering and afiirming their absolute incompatibility,
it aflirms the principle which in the order of knowl-
edge precedes all others. This principle is so evident
that it is immediately known by every intellect, and
cannot rationlly be denied.*
61. Tlie principle of contradiction is implicitly con-
tained in all other principles, even in those lohich are self-
I i
* Kant denies to the principle of contradiction all objective reality
and puts forth his doctrine of Antinomies, or the principle that con-
tradictories mayexist side hy side. The repugnance of the mind to
assent to such a principle is due, he asserts, to the limited circle of
our experience, within which contradictories exclude each other.
But in the nature of things, he maintains, there is no reason why two
and two should not make five.
KNOWLEDGE OF FIRST PBIN0IPLE8. Ill
evident ; it may he used to explain them or render them
more evident, hut can itself he proved by no other principle.
— ^Besides the principle of contradiction, there are
many other self-evident principles; but, though the
mind arrives at these by the simple perception of es-
sence, and is not obliged to recur to a higher principle,
yet in formulating them it must adhere, at least im-
plicitly, to the principle of contradiction. Thus it is
with the principle of identity, " Every being has its own
essence ; " with the principle of excluded middle, " A
thing either is or is not ;" with the principle of causality,
" There is no effect without a cause ; " with the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason, " There is nothing without a
sufficient reason." So, too, is it with all the axioms ;
as, "The whole is greater than any of its parts,"
" Two things equal to a third are equal to each other,"
etc. Although these principles do not require demon-
stration, still they are made more evident by means
of the principle of contradiction. Thus, for example,
we demonstrate that the whole is greater than any of
its parts, from the fact that otherwise the whole would
and would not be the whole.
AET. rn. — THE PEINCIPLE OP CAUSAUTy.
62. The intellect forms the idea of cause in general when
it ascends by abstraction from the knoioledge of a particu-
lar effect and a particular cause to the idea of effect and
cause in general. — In the act of sensation, of intellec-
tion, or of volition, we necessarily distinguish two
things : the sensitive, intellective, or volitive act, and
the agent which produces the act ; this is nothing but
the cognition of a particular effect produced by a par-
ticular cause. But from this particular cognition the
intellect can by abstraction form the idea of effect and
112 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
of cause in general, that is, the idea, first, of some-
thing which exists only in virtue of the action of an
agent, and the idea, secondly, of an agent by the
action of which this thing is produced. Hence the
idea of cause comprehends two elements : the percep-
tion of an agent as producing an effect by its action,
and the perception of an effect as produced by this
action.
63. When the intellect has the idea of cause and effect,
it immediately perceives the principle of causality, tohich
is expressed in the formula : There is no effect without a
cause. — This principle expresses nothing more than
the essential dependence of every effect on some
cause. But this dependence is known from the very
idea of effect ; for an effect is something that begins
to be, or that has a being that it had not. It must,
then, have received its being from itself or from
another. But it could not receive its being from it-
self, since in that supposition it would both exist in
order to give being, and not exist in order to receive
being. It must then have received its being from
another, on which, therefore, it depends, and which
is called a cause. The intellect, therefore, analyzing
the idea of effect, immediately perceives its depend-
ence on a cause ; it expresses this dependence in the
proposition : " There is no effect without a cause." *
64. To the principle of causality is referred the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason, lohich may he thus formulated :
* The word cause here means efficient cause, and is marked by tw«
characteristics, " immediate inflaence and. active in&nence." Mr. Mil]
ignores these marks when he defines cause as an invariable, uncondi-
tional antecedent. When, too, he tries to establish, by means of the
principle of causality, the Uniformity of Nature as the fundamental
principle of his Experimental school, he implies the existence of this
Tery uniformity, and thus falls into a vicious circle.
KNOWLEDGE OF FIRST PBINOIPLES. 113
Whatever is, must have a sufficient reason why it is what
it is. — This principle is only an extension of the prin-
ciple of causality, but it has a more general applica-
tion ; while the principle of causality properly ap-
plies only to things which are effects or had a begin-
ning, that of sufficient reason is applicable to the
First Cause who had no beginning. The principle of
sufficient reason has this limit, however, that with
regard to free will, it is not true if taken ohjectively
only ; for not the object but the election made by the
will is the reason why the will determines itself to the
exercise of its act.
65. The principle of causality is analytical, and not
synthetical, as Kant maintains. — A judgment is syn-
thetical when the idea of the predicate is not con-
tained in that of the subject ; as, " This wood is green."
A judgment is analytical, when the analysis of the
subject enables us to find the predicate in it. Hence
the mere analysis of the idea of effect suffices to give
the idea of dependence on a cause.
66. Hie principle of causality has an objective value,
notwitJistanding the assertion to the contrary of many
philosophers, among others Kant and Hume. — Many
philosophers, recognizing that to destroy the principle
of causality is to destroy all science, accept the prin-
ciple, but deny its objective or real value, and give it
only a subjective or ideal value. It is evident, how-
ever, that the quality of dependence on a cause, which
the effect possesses, results from its nature as effect,
and, consequently, is as real as the effect itself.
CHAPTEE in.
Language in Eelation to the Acquisition of
Knowledge.
AET. I. — UTILITY op LANGUAGE IN DEVELOPING THE MIND.
67. As men are composed of body and soul, they require
an exterior sign to communicate their thoughts to one an^
other ; the most perfect sign is that of language. — Man is
made to live in society ; but, since tis intellect is
joined to a body, he must make use of a sensible sign
to communicate his thoughts. This sign may be of
several kinds ; of these the easiest and most perfect is
language ; by it he can communicate the greatest
number of things with the greatest clearness.
68. Language is not absolutely necessary either for the
direct or the rejkx action of the intellect. — The intellect
has in itself the power, by abstracting ideas from sen-
sible images, of immediately perceiving first principles
and of deducing the consequences of its first cog-
nitions ; therefore, it is not absolutely necessary that
these cognitions and their consequences should be
communicated to the mind by language.*
69. Language is very useful, and even morally neces-
sary, for the development of the intellect and for the ac-
• Speech or language may be defined as " the communication of
our thoughts to others by means of words or articulate sounds used by
consent as signs of our ideas. "
LANGUAGE IN A0QUT8ITI0N OF KNOWLEDGE. 115
quisition of the greater part of our Icnowledge, especially of
that which relates to spiritual things and to moral truths. —
If we consider tlie intellect in itself, we see tliat it re-
quires a sensible image for the formation of the idea.
But, as experience proves, this image formed by the
imagination may also be an obstacle in speculative
operations. But speech performs the essential func-
tion of the sensible image without having its incon-
veniences ; for it furnishes a very simple sign not sus-
ceptible of being confounded with the idea, and eas-
ily concentrating the attention, since the words of a
language are uniform and constant. Hence speech is
very useful in the development of the intellect viewed
in itself. But if we consider it in relation to other in-
tellects, we must allow that speech is the principal
means by which the greater part of knowledge is
communicated in a prompt and easy manner, especial-
ly that knowledge which relates to spiritual things
and to moral truths. Besides, every science requires
the efforts and labors of many ages for its formation.
How, then, could it be transmitted or enlarged, if
language were not at the service of the savant to en-
able him to communicate to others the result of his
labors ?
AET. II.— OEIGIN OP LANGUAGE.
70. Speech is of divine origin. — This is proved : (1)
by Holy Scripture and the traditions of nations ; (2)
by the silence of profane history about the invention
of language and the time of its invention ; (3) by
facts of philological science. The fact of the origin
of language is settled, but several hypotheses are of-
fered to explain how man received the gift of speech.
Among these hypotheses, the simplest and most ra-
116 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
tional is, that man received from God the faculty of
speech as he received reason and the organs of
speech.
71. The invention of language would not have heen ab-
solutely impossible to man.— Rationalistic philosophers,
especially of the Sensist school, maintain the possi-
bility of the invention of language, but in the sense
in which they explain it, it is an absurdity. Other
philosophers, as J. J. Eousseau (1712-1778), De Bonald
and Ventura, have maintained the absolute impossibil-
ity of the invention of language. But of the reasons
which they give some are false, and others are not
wholly conclusive.* Hence many eminent philoso-
phers see no metaphysical impossibility in the hu-
man invention of language.
* These are grounds on which they base their theory : 1°. Lan-
guage is absolutely necessary for thought, and therefore for the inven-
tion of language. But since language implies society, man cannot
acquire ideas without society. 2°. Language is the eficient cause of
ideas, or at least the occasion of perceiving innate ideas. 3°. Man
cannot of himself acquire ideas and language ; he needs a revelation.
But to this we reply that the invention of language is morally, per-
haps even physically, impossible, since words have an arbitrary, not a
natural meaning. Men should indeed unite to form a language, but
language is an indispensable condition of their being united. Even
if it be granted that one man may make himself understood by oth-
ers who do not speak his tongue, it is yet true that this Is effected by
natural signs only. Since God has willed man to live in society, He
must have given him the indispensable medium of intellectual com-
munication, viz., language. This is the opinion of Humboldt and of
Cardinal Wiseman.
CRITERIOLOGY ;
OK,
The Motives of Cebtitude.
1. Oriteriology, or a treatise on the motives of certitude,
investigates the value of our faculties as means of acquir-
ing knowledge and determines the ultimate criterion of
certitude. — It would be of little use to the intellect to
have ideas and sensible images if it were not certain
that these corresponded to objective reality. Hence,
after Ideology has determined how the intellect forms
its ideas and acquires its cognitions, Oriteriology
shows : 1. That the faculties by which we know afford
us certain knowledge ; 2. That there is an ultimate
principle, which constitutes a solid foundation of the
certitude of our knowledge.
CHAPTEE I.
The Mental Faculties as Means op Attaining
Tedth.
aet i. — ^the cognitive faculties.
2. The cognitive faculties are : 1. the senses ; 2. the
intellect, including consciousness and reason. — ^We know
two kinds of objects, viz., sensible and intelligible.
The senses perceive the sensible; the intellect, the
lis RATIONAL PHILOSOPMT.
intelligible. When the intellect is considered as hav-
ing for its object the soul and its affections, or the
internal facts of the soul, it is called consciousness ;
when it is considered as inferring one truth from
another, it is called reason.
AET. II. — THE VEEACITY OF THE SENSES.
3. Sensation, considered as a modification of the sentient
svlyect, is not an illusion but a reality.— This is a primary
fact which cannot reasonably be called in question.
To say that the soul is in a state of illusion as to its
own sensation is equivalent to asserting that it feels
a sensation when there is no sensation, or that it feels
when there is nothing to feel, which is a contradiction
in terms. Sensation considered as representative of
something else may be regarded as a mere represen-
tation of an object, or as participating in the nature
of a judgment. Considered in the former way, sen-
sation cannot deceive us as to the disposition of the
sense, since it does not judge but only perceives ; and
perception, from its very nature, cannot disagree with
the thing perceived, though it may occasion error in
the intellect as to the disposition of objects. Consid-
ered in the second way, the senses are veracious, as
will be established in the following paragraphs.
4. The senses, lohen in their normal state and exercised
upon their proper sensible object, cannot deceive us. — No
cognitive faculty can be deceived in regard to its
proper object, when the conditions required for the
exercise of the power are fulfilled ; otherwise, it would
be a power that could effect nothing, which implies a
contradiction. These conditions are (1) that the faculty
be in its normal state, (2) that the proper object be suit-
ably disposed, (3) that the medium between the faculty
MEITTAL FACULTIES FOB ATTAINING TRUTH. 119
and the object be not modified. But if only one sense
be exercised upon a common sensible, i. e., upon a
quality tliat is perceived by several senses together,
then error may arise, since an integral power is not
directed to the object. An accidental sensible, i. e.,
the substance which supports the sensible qualities,
demands, in addition to sense, the action of intellect.
5. Tlie errors arising from tJie senses are not properly
attributable to the senses, but to the intellect. — Error is
found only in the judgment ; but the senses do not
judge ; therefore, the senses, properly speaking, do
not deceive us. When they are diseased, or when any
cause modifies or impairs the sensation, the senses
cannot but receive the sensation so modified or im-
paired, and transmit it as they receive it to the in-
tellect. Hence the intellect should not be precipi-
tate in judging, and should take into accdunt any
abnormal conditions under which the sensation may
be produced.
6. TJie Idealism of Berkeley is absurd ; it admits no
reality but that of spirits. — The senses operating in their
normal condition cannot deceive us ; but the senses
attest the existence of bodies ; therefore, bodies really
exist.
ART. ni. — THE VERACITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
7. The veracity of consciousness is a primary fact,
ivhich is affirmed even ivhen it is doubted or denied. — He
who doubts or denies the veracity of consciousness
either does not know that he doubts or denies it, and
therefore cannot say that it deceives him ; or else
he does know that he doubts or denies the veracity
of consciousness. But then, by what other faculty
does he know this than by consciousness, the only
120 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
■witness of tlie internal facts of the soul % Therefore,
he makes use of consciousness to deny consciousness,
and is guilty of evident contradiction.
8. It is absurd to hold with Transcendental philoso-
phers, that the testimony of consciousness is a rnere illu-
sion.— The ancient Sceptics never questioned the ve-
racity of consciousness ; the German Transcendental
philosophy alone has dared to do so, and it has thus
arrived at absolute Scepticism. According to Fichte,
" Keality all merges into a marvellous dream, without
life to dream about or spirit to dream — a dream which
is gathered up into a dream of itself." But if our
life is a dream, if the existence of spirit is an illu-
sion, there must be a subject which dreams or which
is under illusion. And this subject must, by the very
consciousness by which it knows that it dreams, know
also a spirit, which pronounces as an illusion the
knowledge of the spirit that dreams. Thus the contra-
diction of the system is evident. Moreover, since
Fichte denies all reality but the Ego, he makes con-
sciousness essentially impossible ; for every cognition
requires three realities, the knower, the known, and
the relation between them.
ART. IT. — ^THE TEEACITY OF INTELLECT AND EEASON.
9. The intellect cannot deceive us in immediate Judg^
ments luhich relate either to the rational or to the experi-
mental order. — The intellect cannot be deceived in re-
gard to its proper object, when this object is pre-
sented to it in such a way as to necessitate assent ;
otherwise, it could not know anything with certainty,
and thus it would be a faculty unable to effect any-
thing. Hence the intellect cannot be deceived in the
perception of essences ; nor can it be deceived in the
MBNTAL FACULTIES FOR ATTAINING TRUTH. 121
cognition of first principles of either the rational or
the experimental order. For these principles are self-
evident : the former, because the attribute which is
affirmed of the subject is found in the very idea of
the subject; as, "The whole is equal to the sum of all
its parts : " the latter, because they are only the ex-
pression of what this intellect sees distinctly in a sen-
sible perception. Thus in the judgment, " The sky is
blue," the intellect, by its abstractive power, separates
blueness from the sky, and then predicates blue of
the sky. Therefore, it is impossible for the intellect
to be deceived in regard to first principles, whether
rational or experimental.
10. Reason cannot deceive us in regard to conclusions
easily deduced from first principles. — The whole art of
reasoning consists in deducing from two given or
known judgments a third judgment, which is found
to be contained in them. Hence there is a necessary
connection between the conclusion and the premises.
But if the truth of the conclusion is based on its nec-
essary connection with the truth of the premises,
reasoning evidently cannot deceive us, since a truth
cannot both be and not be necessarily connected with
another truth. Hence arises the repugnance which
the intellect experiences to dissent from the conclu-
sions which follow from a principle ; also that secret
displeasure which we feel when an adversary, hav-
ing accepted certain principles, is unwilling to
allow the conclusions which are logically drawn
from them. But, on the other hand, when the con-
clusions are derived from a first principle only by
long and intricate argumentations, the reason may
be deceived, not because the reasoning in this case
deceives, but because the natural weakness of the
mind is such that it easily allows the attention to
122 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
wander and thus overlooks some of the laws of
reasoning-.
11. TJie objection raised against the veracity of reason
on account of the errors of philosophers only proves their
abuse of reason. — From the fact that the abuse of
reason gives rise to error, we must not infer that
reason cannot in any case apprehend truth with cer-
tainty. This affirmation of La Mennais (1782-1854) is
contrary to good sense and sound logic. Error should
be ascribed to lack of attention, to the violation of
the laws of reasoning, by interweaving some fallacy
with this operation, and to the abuse of reason ; but not
to the faculty itself, which by its natural act is never
in fault.
CHAPTEE 11.
Scepticism,
abt. i. — ^natuee of scepticism. — its duterent kinds.
12. Scepticism is a denial of the existence of truth or of
the possibility of knowing it with certainty.
13. Scepticism is partial or complete, modified or abso-
lute.— Partial Scepticism rejects the truth or certitude
of only a certain class of cognitions. Thus, Ideal-
ists, siich as Berkeley, reject the truth of sensible
cognitions, while Materialists or Empiricists, with
Locke and Condillac, admit as certain only facts per-
ceived . by the senses. Rationalists, like Descartes,
accept as certain only what appears evident to reason ;
the Sentimentalists, with Keid, consider as certain
only what is not repugnant to instinct, to natural
sentiment ; the Traditionalists and Fideists, repre-
sented by La Mennais and Huet (1630-1721) respec-
tively, regard as certain only traditional or revealed
truths. Partial Scepticism, as experience shows, leads
logically to complete Scepticism. Complete Scepti-
cism rejects the truth or certitude of all knowledge,
and is either absolute or modified. It is absolute
when it denies the existence of objective or ontologi-
cal truth, admits that contraries may co-exist, and
regards all things as phenomena or illusions. This
kind of Scepticism was taught in ancient times chiefly
by Gorgias (b.c. 426) and Protagoras (b.c. 440) ; in
124 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
modern times it has been disseminated hy Kant, Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel. Scepticism is modified when it
admits the existence of truth, but rejects the veracity
of the means at our disposal to apprehend truth. The
principal representatives of this phase of Scepticism
in ancient times were Pyrrhus (b.c. 380) and Sextus
Empiricus (b.c. 200) ; in modern times, Bayle and
Hume (1647-1706) are the most noted.
AET. n. — EEFDTATION OF SCEPTICISM.
14. Scepticism is contradictory ; it is logically and
practically impossible. — The consistent Sceptic ought
not to reason nor even to think ; for, in thinking of his
doubt, he affirms his doubt, and consequently is no
longer a Sceptic. Above all, a Sceptic should not
attempt to propagate his Scepticism, for in doing so
he simply uses reason against itself. The consistent
Sceptic should no longer act, for all action proceeds
from an affirmation of the mind, and thus involves the
Sceptic in self-contradiction.
15. Scepticism is absurd, since its consequence is the
negation of all science and all virtue. — Scepticism denies
truth or the possibility of attaining truth with certi-
tude, and thereby renders science impossible, for
science is nothing more than the certain knowledge
of truth. Scepticism subverts all morality, for it is a
truth that every action is either good or bad ; but if
we must deny or doubt all truth, evidently it is a
matter of indifference whether we do this or that act.
History, moreover, shows that the ages of Scepticism
have always been ages of intellectual and moral decay.
16. Scepticism is contrary to the nature of man. — Cer-
titude is the life of the intellect, as air is the life of
the body ; thus. Scepticism is a state contrary to
SCEPTICISM. 125
nature, an abnormal, exceptional state, in which the
mind can be placed only by an abuse of reason.
17. The facts brought fonvard by Scepticism against
certitude prove nothing — Sceptics bring forward in
support of their system the great variety of human
opinions and the errors into which our faculties lead
us. But if men differ in opinion on certain truths,
they all agree on fundamental truths, and our facul-
ties do not deceive us when we apply them to their
proper object and when they act under the requisite
conditions.
CHAPTEE m.
The Ultimate Oeiteeion of Ceetitude.
art. i. — what is meant by the ultimate ceiterion 01
'ceetitude.
18. The principle of certitude is the motive which pro-
duces the adhesion of the intellect to a known truth. — Every
cognitive faculty attains to a knowledge of the truth
in regard to its proper object. But truth, properly
speaking, resides solely in the intellect, which adheres
firmly to a truth only by reason of some motive.
This motive is called the principle or criterion of this
certitude. That principle on which all the others de-
pend is the ultimate criterion of certitude. It is with
this principle only that the present chapter is con-
cerned.
19. The p^'inciple of certitude is twofold, intrinsic and
extrinsic. — The intellect adheres to a proposition either
because the intrinsic truth of the proposition is in it-
self manifest, or because an extrinsic motive produces
conviction, though the intellect does not perceive the
truth of the proposition in itself. In the former case
the principle of certitude is intrinsic ; in the latter, it
is extrinsic.
AET. n. — the inteinsic peinciple oe ceetitude. '
20. Tlie intrinsic pjrinciple of certitude is the objective
evidence of the thing. — That which causes the intellect
THE ULTIMATE CRITERION OF OERTITUDE. 127
to know the truth, of an entity is that the entity mani-
fests itself to the intellect. But that which produces
in us the knowledge of truth also produces certitude,
since certitude is only the state of the intellect con-
sequent on the possession of its proper object ; in
other words, it is the repose of the intellect in the
possession of truth to which it firmly adheres. The
intrinsic principle of certitude, therefore, is the entity
itself as manifesting itself to the intellect and deter-
mining its adhesion. This manifestation of the entity
to the intellect is what is called objective evidence.
This evidence is immediate, or evidence of intuition,
when the thing becomes manifest to the intellect
immediately and by its own light ; as, " The whole is
greater than any one of its parts," " The sun is shin-
ing;" it is mediate, or evidence of deduction, when it
becomes manifest only after some mental process, and
by means of another truth.
21. Huet bases all certitude on revelation ; La Mennais,
on the authority of the common consent of mankind, or
common sense; Reid and the Sentimentalist school, on
instinct and internal sentiment ; Descartes, on the clear
and distinct idea of an object ; Leibnitz and Arnauld, on
the principle of contradiction ; Cousin, on the imperson-
ality of reason ; Oalluppi, on the testimony of conscious-
ness ; Kant, on practical reason ; Rosmini, on the idea of
possible being ; Oioberti and the Ontologists, on the intui-)
tion of the divine essence, or on the intuition of the divine
ideas. All these systems must be rejected as erroneous. —
If, with Huet (1630-1721), we doubt that which we
know by the senses, by consciousness, or by the intel-
lect, and of which we are certain only by the intrinsic
evidence of the thing, it is manifest that we must also
doubt that which is known to us by divine revelation
itself, since we can know what divine revelation
128 RATIONAL PEILOSOPHT.
teaches only by means of our senses and our intel-
lect.
Our knowledge of the consent of mankind to a
truth is obtained through the senses and the intel-
lect ; therefore, according to the very principles of La
Mennais, we are necessitated to doubt our knowledge
of this consent. Besides, mankind is made up of
individuals ; but, if certitude is impossible to the in-
dividual as such, the mere collection of the uncertain
cognitions of individuals can never produce certain
cognition.
The adhesion of the intellect, as being the state of a
rational being, cannot be determined without a mo-
tive. But the instinct and internal sentiment of Reid
are blind causes which do not make known the motive
of adhesion ; therefore, they cannot be the principle
of human certitude. Instinct is peculiar to the ani-
mal and not to an intelligent human being ; far from
explaining anything, it requires explanation itself.
Descartes regards evidence as the foundation of cer-
titude ; but, according to him, evidence consists in the
clear idea of the thing, and is purely subjective ; that
is, it is merely an act of the mind, and not the mani-
festation of the object to the mind. It is, consequent-
ly, variable and changing. But the certitude which
puts us in possession of truth must proceed from an
immutable and objective principle, like truth itself.-
The clear idea of Descartes, being a pure modification
of the cognitive act, cannot be the principle of certi-
tude.*
7
* Descartes held, when his faculties were developed, that as much
of his knowledge had not been scientifically acquired, he should
doubt of everything that was not evidently certain. Though doubt-
ing of the veracity of his faculties, he professed to be unable to
doubt the principle, " I think, therefore I exist." Prom this he de-
THE ULTIMATE CRITERION OF CERTITUDE. 129
"We cannot, with Leibnitz and Arnauld (1612-1694),
base certitude on the principle of contradiction ; for
our assent to this principle must be determined by a
motive, and this motive is its intrinsic evidence.
Besides the manifest absurdity that would result
from admitting the Impersonal Reason of Cousin and
his school, we must remark that this reason, even if
supposed to be real, could not produce certitude, un-
less in virtue of some motive distinct from itself.
We cannot agree with Galluppi (1770-1846) in found-
ing certitude on the testimony of conciousness. For
consciousness testifies only to internal acts and states,
and is a purely subjective witness; hence it cannot
produce certitude regarding objects outside the mind.
The practical reason of Kant must necessarily have
speculative reason for its basis ; therefore, if the
speculative order is uncertain, the practical order will
share the same fate.
Eosmini err^i in placing the principle of certitude in
the idea of possible being ; for, aside from the falsity
of the innateness of this idea, it cannot produce certi-
tude regarding entities in the real order, since it is
purely subjective.
According to Ontologism, the intellect does not form
to itself a representation of the object known ; hence
the ideal order is destroyed, and consequently, all
knowledge a,lso. Thus, direct vision of the divine es-
rived his principle that the criterion of certitude is a clear and dis-
tinct idea. Thence he deduced the existence and veracity of God,
and consequently the veracity of man's faculties. But his " me-
thodical doubt" is contradictory, since he must rely upon intellect
for his fundamental principle. Moreover, he falls into a vicious
circle, for from the veracity of his intellect he proves God's existence,
and from the existence and veracity of God, he infers the veracity of
man's faculties.
9
130 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.
sence or of tlie divine ideas, far from being the prin-
ciple of certitude, is tlie negation of all knowledge
and of all certitude.
AST. m. — THE EXTEmSIC PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE.
22. The ultimate extrinsic principle of certitude is the
authority of him who affirms tlie fact.
23. An extrinsic principle or criterion of certitude is ei-
ther divine or human authority : the latter is mere human
authwity, if there be question of fact ; or the authority of
scientists, if there he question of scientific truths ; or the
autlwrity of common scTise, if there he question of the prin-
cipal truths necessary for our intellectual or moral life.
24. Divine authority or revelation is a perfect criterion
of certitude and superior to all others. — God neither can
deceive us nor can be deceived Himself. His infalli-
bility and veracity give us the most perfect certitude
regarding the truths which He has revealed to us.
25. Human testimony produces certitude in us when we
know that tlie witnesses cannot he deceived and do not ivish
to deceive. — The knowledge and veracity of the witnesses
are, therefore, the two essential conditions on which
human authority is based.
26. Tlie absolute impossibility of the facts testified to,
and in certain cases the improbability of the facts, argve
against the validity of the testimony. — If a fact is abso-
lutely impossible, evidently the testimony borne to it
is false. If the fact is improbable, the testimony re-
quires more careful examination. But it is sometimes
difficult to determine whether the fact is impossible ;
hence we should rely mainly on the positive indica-
tion of the knowledge and veracity of witnesses.
27. We have a certain indication of the knowledge and
veracity of witnesses, when they agree in r porting afani
THE ULTIMATE ORITEBION OF OEBTITUDE. 131
in the same way. — The testimony of a single witness
does not, of itself, afford a guarantee of truth ; but if
the witnesses are numerous and if they agree in their
testimony, we cannot call their testimony in question ;
for then we must suppose either that all are deceived
in the observation of the same fact, or that they all
agree to deceive in reporting the fact. But, on the
one hand, it cannot happen that many, men should at
the same time be subject to the same defect in their
senses ; and on the other hand, many men cannot
maintain the same error in the same way, since a lie
is produced by the passions, and the passions vary
with individuals.
But if the witnesses report facts humiliating to them-
selves ; if they are very numerous, of different ages
and conditions ; if they endure torments and even
death in support of their testimony; if they report
public facts of great importance, which are not con-
tradicted, but rather confirmed by the very persons
whom these facts condemn, then their testimony pro-
duces perfect certitude. Such is the testimony in
support of the facts on which Christianity rests.
The certitude produced by human authority is often
only moral, so that its opposite is not absolutely im-
possible but only against the laws by which the moral
world is governed ; but cases occur in which it passes
into absolute certitude, when the opposite is plainly
contradictory ; as, for example, when there is question
of a matter wherein it belongs to the providence of
God to see that no error creep in. The certitude is
also absolute when the witnesses are many and could
not, if they would, deceive in relating a fact that is
important and obvious to the senses of all.
132 RATIONAL PHILOSOPMT.
AET. rV. — MEANS B¥ WHICH TESTIMONY IS TRANSMITTED.
28. The three means by which human testimony is
transmitted are : tradition, history, and monuments.-^
Tradition is an oral account transmitted from moutli
to moutli. History is a written record of past events.
Monuments are all tlie works of men which, may serve
as signs of accomplished facts ; they comprise pillars,
inscriptions, medals, charters, etc. Their testimony
is indirect, if they afford knowledge which they were
not intended to convey ; thus, the magnitude of the
pyramids indirectly testifies to the power of the
Egyptian kings. It is direct when they make known
the fact which they were designed to transmit ; thus,
the medal commemorative of a victory bears direct
testimony to that event.
29. JVJien tradition is continuous, constant, and relates to
a public and important fact, it is a source of certitude. —
Oontemporaneous witnesses of an event give certain
information of it to those who come after them. The
latter may weigh the value of the testimony, but they
will find deception and error impossible, if the wit-
nesses to the fact are numerous. Hence, they can, in
their turn, produce in those who succeed them a certi-
tude equal to their own, and so the knowledge of the
events may be carried down to the most remote ages.
We thus see the falsity of the opinion of Locke, who
holds that a tradition gradually loses its value by the
lapse of time. It should be constant or uniform ^t
least in substance and in leading circumstances,
though it may vary in minor details. The fact should
be public and important, attested by many witnesses
and brought to the knowledge of many.
30. It is absurd to object against the value of tradition
TEE ULTIMATE OEITEBION OF CERTITUDE. 133
the errors current during many ages among different
nations. — These errors or fables have come down to us
devoid of consistency and universality, and destitute
of the essential notes of authority ; and the fact that
it has at all times been easy to show their falsity is a
proof that they cannot be confounded with true tradi-
tion.
31. Monuments are a source of certitude when we can
establish their authenticity. — A monument testifies that
at the time when it is erected, the fact whose memory
it is intended to perpetuate is certain and universally
believed. It is impossible for a counterfeit fact to
be generally believed by those who are its contem-
poraries. But if it is to make known the truth, evi-
dently the monument must really belong,to the epoch
to which it is referred, or be erected by a people to
whom a constant and well attested tradition of the
fact has come down. Doubt as to the authenticity
of a monument projiuces doubt concerning the fact
which it attests.
32. History is a source of certitude lohen it is authentic
and entire. — A historical narrative, when published, is
equivalent to a public testimony of its contemporaries.
If these receive such a work as truthful, and if it has
undergone no alteration in the lapse of ages, it merits
equal credence in all times, and is a criterion of cer-
tainty.
33. We are certain that a writing is authentic : 1.
When, by an unbroken tradition, it is recognized as such;
2. When it is in harmony with the manners and customs
of the time to which it is referred, and with the character
and the genius of the author to tohom it is ascribed; 3.
When by its nature it makes imposition impossible. — If
from the epoch to which it is referred a writing has al-
ways been recognized by the tradition of the common
134 RATIONAL PEIL080PET.
people or of the learned as the production of a partic-
ular author, if the contents of the writing be in har-
mony with the known customs of the age, and with the
life and genius as well as with the style of the author,
its authenticity cannot be disputed. For this is es-
pecially guaranteed by the moral impossibility of
publishing the writing without the immediate dis-
covery of imposture.
34. We are certain that a loriting is entire : 1. When
its component parts mutually agree both in matter and in
form ; 2. When the copies which have been made of it in
different times and places are identical ; 3. When, on ac-
count of its importance and the great number of persons
interested in it, alteration becomes impossible. — The in-
trinsic proof of the integrity of a writing is found ia
the perfect harmony of the different parts which com-
pose it : the extrinsic proof consists in the identity of
the extant copies of the writing, even though made at
different times and in different places. Finally, if the
writing interests a great number of persons, and if
they have never protested against any alteration, the
integrity of the work reaches its highest degree of
certainty.
35. The veracity of a history is established from the
very nature of the ivriting and from the knowledge and
veracity of the ivriter. — The intrinsic indications of the
veracity of a history are the notoriety of the facts re-
corded, their importance, and their relation to other
facts which occurred at the same time. The knowl-
edge and veracity of the writer are established in ac-
cordance with the rules of ordinary testimony. We
should examine whether he is unbiassed by passion
or prejudice, whether he could easily have ascertained
the facts, and especially whether he agrees with other
writers recording the same facts. To some extent,
THE ULTIMATE OmTEBION OF GEBTITUDE. 135
these rules apply in examining tlie veracity of a mon-
ument.
36. Tlie objections of Scepticism against the value of his-
toric testimony serve only to establish it more firmly. — It
is objected that many books, once received as authen-
tic, have proved later to be forgeries. But if we have
means of detecting the spuriousaess of certain writ-
ings, evidently the authenticity of others, in which
nothing of the kind can be detected, only remains the
more firmly established. In like manner, it is true
that many copies of ancient works have come down
to us with alterations. But if the parts in which
these copies do not agree prove that alteration has
taken place, the other parts, in which they do agree,
prove that the original text has been preserved in-
tact.
AET. V. — AUTHOBITY OF COMMON SENSE AND OP THE
LEAENED.
37. By the testimony of common sense is meant the gen-
eral and constant assent of mankind to some truth. — To
know this general assent, it is not necessary to ques-
tion all men ; it suffices to know the views of en-
lightened men and the opinion of nations in general.
38. Common sense is a criterion of certitude in regard
to the truths to which it bears testimony. — That men in
different times and in different places be unanimous
in affirming a thing, it is necessary that this affirma-
tion be founded in nature itself. But that which is
the effect of nature cannot deceive ; we must, there-
fore, admit the- testimony of common sense.
39. The truths affirmed by common sense are : 1. Prin-
ciples which are easily known by the use of natural rea-
son; 2. Thosemoral and religious truths the knowledge of
136 RATIONAL PHIL080PBY.
which is necessary to the moral life of man. — ^Tliere are
both immediate and mediate principles the cognition
of which is easy and requires only the natural de-
velopment of reason : as, " The whole is greater than
any of its parts." These principles, therefore, are
known by all men. The principal moral and religious
truths, however, the knowledge of which is indispens-
able to man, are not so easily known. But few minds
could have attained to them, and even then only after
much time, with an intermixture of error, and in an
uncertain manner. Consequently, if they are known
and accepted by all men, it is in virtue of a primitive
revelation made by God to the first man, and handed
down to. his descendants by unbroken tradition.
40. It is vain to object against tJie authority of common
'^ense the coo-ruption of primitive traditions among nations
<,n the course of time and the almost universal diffusion of
certain errors. — The alterations produced in primitive
traditions are neither constant nor universal ; they
are then without value. Thus, polytheism was pro-
fessed only during a certain period among different
aations, and it was not universal ; therefore it must
be attributed to the corruption of men and not to
their nature. While admitting the reality of certain
errors, like that of the revolution of the sun around
the earth, we must also observe that they are rather
the result of ignorance ; but ignorance should not
be confounded with error. Besides, to determine the
revolution of the heavenly bodies was beyond the
sphere of the commonalty, and therefore beyond the
common sense of mankind, of which exclusively is
the present question. ,
41. The authority of the learned in matters relating to
their specialties demands our prudent assent. — The au-
thority of the savant in his peculiar domain, should
THE ULTIMATE CRITERION OF CERTITUDE. 137
be respected by the unlearned, since be wbo by the
culture of his mind is fitted to apprehend a truth may
impose it on him who could not of himself attain to
its knowledge. But as the learned themselves are
competent to examine the particular truths in ques-
tion, they should judge the authority of other scien-
tists by their own reason. Hence we may formulate
the following three rules : 1. The authority of scien-
tists should be accepted so long as there is no reason-
able ground to believe it false or to suspect it ; it
should be rejected, if it is known to be false ; 2. Every
scientist is a competent judge only in the science of
which he is master ; 3. One scientist may accept the
affirmations of another, when he cannot himself as-
certain their truth or demonstrate their falsity ; * yet
he may reject them if the opposite arguments are of
equal weight.
AET. VI. — IMPOKTANCE OF AUTHOEITY AS A CBITERION
OP CEKTITUDE.
42. Authority is necessary for the complete develop^
ment of our mind and is the source of most of our knowl-
edge.—Wiihont the aid of authority, man could,
indeed, acquire the knowledge of some truths ; but,
if we except those which are sensible and elementary,
they would be very limited and bound up with many
errors. Authority develops his mind promptly and
without fatigue, enriches it with a store of knowledge
which it could never acquire by itself, either on ac-
count of its elevation or of the time required for their
* For a clear exposition of the harmony between the positive re-
sults of science and the truths of faith, consult Apologie de la Foi
Chr&Uen/ne.
138 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHT.
acquisition or of insurmountable material difficulties.
It is because authority is necessary for the normal
and complete development of the intellect, that the
mind is naturally inclined to accept authority, espe-
cially during the early years of Ufe.
REAL PHILOSOPHY
OR
METAPHYSICS.
Definition of Metaphysics — Its Utility and Division.
1. Real Philosophy, or Metaphysics, is that part of Phi-
losophy luhich treats of that which is immaterial and super-
sensible in real being. — Eational Philosopliy treats of
entities as they are in the order of cognition ; Meta-
physics studies them as they are in themselves.
2. The excellence of Metaphysics is seen both from its
own nature and from its relations to other sciences. — The
natural sciences, mathematics, and other sciences treat
only of this or that being and under a particular
aspect ; they are, therefore, subordinate to metaphys-
ics, which studies being in its highest or ultimate
causes or reasons. Although, relatively to the end of
man, moral philosophy excels all the other sciences,
and rational philosophy claims pre-eminence as a
necessary condition for advancing in any science
whatever; yet, considered absolutely, metaphysics
excels both, for it is their foundation.* Metaphysics
yields in excellence to Sacred Theology alone.
* The inferior sciences neither prove their first principles nor de-
fend them against attack; this they leave to a superior science, i.e.
ivutaphysics. Cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Th. i, q. i, a. 8.
140 BEAL PHILOSOPHY.
3. Metaphysics is divided into General Metaphysics, or
Ontology, and Special Metaphysics. Special Metaphysics
is further divided into Cosmology, Psychology, and Natu-
ral Theology. — Being, in its most general sense, when
considered in itself as Being simply, is the object of
General Metaphysics, or Ontology. "When contem-
plated in its concrete reality, it is the object of Special
Metaphysics. But Being is either created or uncreat-
ed. Cosmology treats of the created world in its most
general principles, leaving to the subaltern sciences
the study of particular things. Yet as man occupies
a place apart in creation, the study of the human soul
forms a separate branch of special metaphysics, and
is called Psychology. Lastly, the study of God and
His attributes is the object of Natural Theology,
GENEEAL METAPHYSICS
OE
ONTOLOGY.
Definition and Division of Genekal Metaphysics.
4. Oeneral Metaphysics is a science tvJiich treats oj^
ieing in general, and the common properties of being.
5. General Metaphysics treats : 1, of being and its com-
mon properties; 2, of the principles of being ; 3, of the
divisions of being.
BEING AND ITS PROPERTIES.
CHAPTER I.
Idea and Analogy of Being.
AET. I. — idea of being.
6. Being, as the object of general metaphysics, is that
which is, or at least can be. — Being * as the object of
* The term Being may be used as a participle or as a noun. The
former use implies existence, the latter need suppose only fitness to
exist. In the t§xt Being is used as a noun. As the term Being, there-
fore, means sometimes Essence only, sometimes Existence, so the
term Nothing, the negation of Being, may be used to signify Nothing
of essence, i.e., absolute nothing, or to signify nothing of existence
142 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
general metapliysies, cannot properly be defined, for
there is no more general idea than that of being.
Whatever is, whatever can be conceived, comes under
the name of being. Therefore every attempt to define
being presupposes the knowledge of its meaning,
Yet being may be described as Whatever in any way is
hnoivn in itself (per se) and positively, or, Whatever is in
itself intelligible.
7. Being is an essential predicate of everything to which
we attribute it. — ^For that which we first perceive as
belonging to the essence of any thing is that it is
a being.
8. Being is not one of the distinct formalities composing
a thing, but it is inherent in all that goes to make up the
thing. — Man, for example, is composed of " animality
and rationality ; " but being is inherent in these two
formalities ; " animality " is being, " rationality " is
being. There is nothing that may not be called being.
AET. n. — ANALOGY OF BEING.
9. Being is predicated of God and of creatures not
univocally but analogically. — A term is predicated of
several things univocally, when it has the same mean-
ing with respect to each of them ; as, the word animal
relatively to " dog and horse." A term is predicated
of several things analogically when these things have
only a certain proportion to one another; as, when
healthy is predicated of "man," of his "pulse," and of
the " food " which he eats. From this it is evident that
ms rationis, or logical being, and real being are not
\hough the existence of tlie object he possible. Of a square triangle
we must predicate nothing of essence, for it is an absolute impossi'
bility : of the mm of the twenty-first century, we predicate aotliins
ai existence.
IDEA AND ANALOGY OF BEING. 143
nw^vocal ; since the one exists solely in the apprehen-
sion of the intellect, the other is independent of our
cognition. It is also evident that created being and
uncreated being are not univocal, for God is pure be-
ing, infinite and eternal, while the creature has only-
participated being, is finite and has a beginning of
existence.
10. Being is predicated analogically of substance and
■accident. — Substance is being to which it belongs not
to be in another in which it iqheres ; accident, on the
contrary, is being to which it belongs to be in another
as subject.*
11. Being is predicated analogically of the different
things to which it is applied. — Since the term being may
be predicated, under a certain respect, of everything,
of logical being and real being, of God and creatures,
of substance and accident, the term is analogous.
*See § 111.
CHAPTEE n.
The Teanscendentals.
abt. i. — ^number op tbanscendenta18.
12. We distinguish Jive transcetidentals : Being, Some-
tliing, Unity, Truth, and Goodness. — They are called
transcendentals, because they may be affirmed of every
thing.* The transcendental properties add nothing
to being, but present it under a special aspect. Thus
a being is called one, because it is undivided in itself ;
trv£, because it is knowable ; good, because it is de-
sirable. Though all these properties are essential to
every being, yet three — Unity, Truth, and Goodness —
are the most important, and are those of which meta-
physics treats more particularly.
AET II. — UNITY.
13. Unity is indivision of being. Whatever can be
called one is a being undivided in itself. — Every being' is
necessarily one, otherwise it would not be a being, but
several beings. A being continues to exist so long as it
retains its unity, but ceases to exist when its unity
is lost. But unity adds nothing to being ; it merely
* In other words, they transcend or lie beyond all genera and
species. But the term is by no means to be understood ia the
Kantian sense of exceeding the powers of man's mind.
THE TRAN8CENDENTAL8. J 45
indicates its entity's indivision, and denies division.
Since unity is the indivision of entity, it means first
and directly, the negation of division, secondarily and
indirectly, positive entity.
14. Unity is of three kinds : generic, specific, and
numerical. — Since unity is indivision of being, there
are as many kinds of unity as there are kinds of di-
vision. But things are divided chiefly according to
genus, or species, or individuals. There are then
three kinds of unity : generic unity, which denies the
division of genus ; specific unity, which denies the di-
vision of species ; and individual unity, which denies
the division of number.
"We may also classify unity as metaphysical or abso-
lute, and physical or relative: the former not being
really separable into parts, as the " human soul ; " the
latter being divisible though not yet actually divided
into parts, as a "stone." But this second kind of
unity is not properly unity ; it should rather be called
union or unity of imitation. To these may be added
artificial unity, or that effected between things which,
though not naturally ordained for this union, are now
actually united, either physically, as are the " parts of
a building," or morally, as in " society, domestic or
civil."
15. Tlie merely individual or numerical unity and
multiplicity of substances arise from matter. — The prin-
ciple of individuation, which must not be confounded
with the seven individuating notes that serve to
distinguish one individual from another, is that by
virtue of which certain perfections belonging to the
same species differ from one another and are mul-
tiplied numerically. But this principle of individua-
tion can be nothing else than matter. For natural
composites are constituted of matter and form. Now,
10
146 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
numerical multiplicity comes originally from that
which renders a form numerically multipliable ; but
that which renders a form numerically multipliable is
proximately divisibility, a property of quantity ; but
quantity is an accident of matter ; therefore, matter
determined by quantity is the ultimate principle of
the individuation of material substances. Hence it is
evident that angels, being pure spirits, are not suscep-
tible of individual multiplicity, and that each angel
constitutes a distinct species.*
16. Accidents derive their numerical unity and multi-
plicity from the subject as acted upon by some cause which
produces the accident. — ^With respect to accidental form,
the subject holds the place of matter ; it must, there-
fore, individualize it, as explained in the preceding
article. There are, for instance, as many impressions
of the American eagle as there are pieces of bullion
impressed by the die.
17. The unity of a being brings with it a distinction
from every other being then existing. Distinction is of
three kinds, real, logical, and virtual. — From the very
fact that a being is one, it is necessarily incapable of
being confounded with any other being ; hence it is
distinct from it. Distinction is real, if it exists in
beings independently of any mental consideration;
as the distinction between "Peter and Paul." Dis-
tinction is logical, if the intellect separates, into
various concepts a thing which in itself is one;
as the distinction between " animality and ration-
* This opinion of the Thomistic school is rejected by the Scotists,^
who hold that in each individual there is a limcceity or tJiisness,
which renders the individual such apart from matter. Again, some
Schoolmen consider the whole concrete nature of the thing, whether
matter and form together, or form only, as the principle of Individ-
nation.
THE TRANSCENDENTAL8. 147
ality " in man, or between " man and rational ani-
mal."
Real distinction is subdivided into major or entita-
tive, into module and virtual. Eeal major distinction
is the " distinction of thing from thing," whether the
things be substances, or substances and accidents, or
accidents only. Modal distinction is the " distinction
of a thing from the mode by which it is affected," as
of a " line from its curvature." " Virtual distinction
is the distinction of the perfections of a thing by rea-
son of its power to exercise many functions, so that
while the thing is one it gives us a foundation for dis-
tinguishing in it several formalities according to its
different functions." Such is the .distinction of the
"vegetative and sensitive functions" of the human
soul from its " purely rational functions."
18. Metaphysical degrees are distinguished not actually
hut only by a mental operation. — By metaphysical de-
grees is meant that hierarchy of formalities * which
can be observed in everthing ; for example, in General
Sherman, the formalities of " rational being, of ani-
mal, of living being, of substance,'' etc. But before
the operation of the intellect these realities are not
distinguished actually but only virtually. For these
metaphysical degrees constitute only one and the
Same reality, which is multiple not actually but vir-
tually. The rational soul in man is not a triple soul
composed of several souls in orte ; it is one and sim-
ple, and can only virtually be called multiple. But
since one soul is equivalent in its operations to sev-
eral inferior souls, the intellect represents it actually
by several different concepts. Thus it distinguishes
* A formality is the manner in which a thing is conceived or con-
stituted by an act of the intellect.
148 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
in the human soul three degrees — vegetative, sensi-
tive, and rational.*
19. Besides transcendental unity there is also quantita.
iive 01- numerical unity. Several quantitative or numeri-
cal unities make a multitude or number properly so-called,
which is defined as Multitude measured by unity. — Nu-
merical unity is transcendental unity with relation to
number added. Unlike transcendental unity, which
is not any thing really distinct from entity, numeri-
cal unity is an accident of things which are numbered.
In other words, it is transcendental unity determined
to the category of quantity, and bears to transcenden-
tal unity " the relation of contained to the containing,
of the determined to the undetermined." For though
discrete quantity is divided in itself, it is not essen-
tial whether it be numbered or not ; this unity then
is accidental. Several quantitative unities form a
multitude or number properly so-called.f Number
* This distinction is sometimes called virtual, sometimes conoep-
tional, the foundation of which exists in the perfection of the sub-
ject. It is also known as distinction of the "mind motived" (ra-
tianis raiiocinatoe:) to mark it ofE from distinction of the ' '■ mind motiv-
ing " {rationis ratiocinaniis), where the distinction exists in the
mind only. See Metaphysics of i?ie School, vol. i., p. 354.
f " If Transcendental Unity adds nothing to Being but actual Indi-
vision, it is manifest that the Transcendental Unity of continuous
Quantity will consist in undivided continuity within the one common
limit. If that continuity be broken, Quantitative Unity is broken.
. . . . To take an illustration : There is a worm crawling before
our feet. It is cue Substance and one continuous Quantity, whose
limit gives the animal its sensible configuration. Now cut it in two.
There are two distinct living Substances ; but there are also two dis-
tinct continuous Quantities under two limits, which give to the two
animals respectively their axternal form. So separate are they now,
that one may remain in England, and the other find its way to China.
Thus, after the operation, the previous Substance (i.e. the worm) has
lost its Transcendental Unity, and has become two Entities and two
THE TBANSOMNDENTALS. 149
must not necessarily be composed of unities of the
same kind specifically. Hence it is not inaccurate, as
some affirm, to speak of " two cardinal virtues," " two
angels," etc., for one cardinal virtue and another car-
dinal virtue, one angel and another, etc., make two
numerically as well as do one line and another line
make two lines.
20. From the unity of being is derived its identity,
which is defined as The sameness of an entity luith itself. — ■
Being considered as one and undivided without ad-
dition or diminution, must be regarded as the same
with itself. This relation of a being with itself is
called identity. When several beings numerically dis-
tinct have the same essence, they are said to be specifi-
cally identical, because there is among them an iden-
tity of essence. Identity is physical when the being
remains really unchanged in itself ; it is moral when
the object is the same only in the estimation of men.
The mineral kingdom abounds in examples of the first
kind ; living bodies afi'ord instances of the second, for
though, as physiology teaches, the constituent mole-
cules are periodically changed, yet the plant or ani-
mal is reputed by man to be the same. To this iden-
tity of essence diversity stands opposed; thus, two
beings of different species, as " a tree and a horse,"
are called diverse. If several beings agree in quan-
tity, they are called equal; if they have the same
quality, they are said to be like. To equality is op-
posed inequality, to likeness unlikeness.
Unities. The continuous Quantity wliioh infornaed it has lost its
Transcendental Unity, as well as Entity ; and has hecome two Enti-
ties, two Unities. Consequently, the Unity which it conferred on the
Substance of the worm has ceased, and is replaced by two Unities,
extraneous and accidental to the substantial Essence of the two
worms." — Metaphysics of tJie School, vol. i., p. 205.
150 REAL PEILOSOPHT.
AET in. — TETJTH.
21. Truth is the conformity between the intellect and itt
object. — The truth of a being is not an entity distinct
from that being : by the very fact that a being is, it
is true. Nevertheless, truth is the being viewed not
precisely as such, but considered in its relation to in-
tellect. For truth appertains properly and primarily
to the intellect, as health belongs properly and pri-
marily to the animal ; and just as nothing is styled
healthy but with respect to the animal, so nothing is
said to be true but relatively to the intellect. But
the object of the intellect is being ; therefore every
being can be called true, because there is none that is
not placed in relation to the divine intellect. But an
object is necessarily in relation to the intellect if it de-
pends on it for its being ; it is accidentally in relation
if it is simply known by the intellect. And since
every thing depends for its being on the divine in-
tellect, its truth is found chiefly in relation to this
intellect. The conformity of beiug to the divine
intellect is called metaphysical truth. The conformity
of the human intellect to being is called logical truth.
Hence truth is not mutable nor progressive, except
in so far as man's knowledge is capable of increase.
For all creatures realize their divine prototype, and
our ideas represent the immutable essences of things.
22. The truth of the intellect taken simply is prior to
the truth of beings ; but tJie truth of the created intellect
follozvs the truth of beings. — A being is said to be true
only in as far as it is conformed to the divine intel-
lect ; therefore truth is found primarily in the divine
intellect. On the contrary, the created intellect is
said to be true, when it is conformed to the being
THE TRAIT8GENDENTAL8. 151
which is its object ; therefore the truth of being pre-
cedes the truth of the created intellect.
23. Falsity is the non-conformity hetiueen an object and
intellect. — Since every being is necessarily conformed
to the divine intellect, it is always true with respect
to God. With respect to the human intellect, a being
is said to be false when it is of such a nature as to
appear what it is not, or under a character which it
does not possess ; as for example, a " dream."* But
the object always remains true in itself. It is only
relatively that it is said to be false. Properly speak-
ing, falsity exists only in a judgiiient which is pro-
nounced by the human intellect, and which is not
conformed to the object.
AET. rv. — OOODNESS.
24. Goodness is the conformity of a thing to the will,
especially to the divine ivill. The good is defined as Being
considered as appetihle. — Every being,t as such, has a
* " Properly speaking, there can be no such thing as Ontologioal
Falsity. For all being is i/pso facto conformed to the Divine Intel-
ligence, both practical and speculative. Neither can it properly be
called, in a secondary sense, false, in regard of the human intellect.
For there is no Being, as such, which is not apt to generate in our
minds a just estimate and conform representation of itself. Bnt it
may be sometimes improperly called false, according to analogy of
attribution of the first class, inasmuch as it allures the human mind
to form a false Judgment. This arises from no defect in Being ; but
partly, by reason of the similarity of the sensible accidents of an en-
tity with those of other entities distinct from itself ; partly, by reason
of the imperfection of the human intellect, which depends in -great
measure on sensible accidents for its cognition of "Bems,.^'— Metaphys-
ics of the School, vol. i., pp. 467, 468.
f Real being includes both actually existent and possible being.
Possible being is included under real being because it is not a mere
mental creation ; moreover, it involves no intrinsic contradiction,
152 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
real existence, and is good and in some sense perfect;
since the nature of any thing is so much perfection.
But a thing is appetible by reason of its perfection,
and whatever is desirable is referred to the will. But
since the perfection of any thing depends on the
nature of that thing, its goodness can have no other
measure than its being, the good and being are one
and the same thing, and differ only in that the good
expresses a relation of conformity to the will, which
being does not express. Every being is not only good
in itself as having the perfections essential to its
nature, but also good for others, since every creature
bears some relation to some other creatures.
25. A thing is good only in so far as it refers in some
way to existence ; possible things, as such, are not good. —
Unlike the intellect which contains ideally in itself
whatever it knows, and consequently prescinds from
their existence, the will is borne toward things and
thus can properly seek them only when existing.
Hence a merely possible thing can only be called
good in a certain way, viz. , as about to exist really,
and as now existing ideally.
26. Goodness belongs to a being in its relation to its fined
came or end. — As the trath of a being is its conform-
ity with the idea which is its exemplar formal cause,
the goodness of a being is its conformity with its end
or final cause. Thus, a house is said to be good, not
because it realizes the plan of the architect, but be-
cause it offers a secure and commodious shelter to
those who live in it.
27. Goodness is divided into transcendental and moral.
— The transcendental or metaphysical goodness of an
and there are now existing beings capable of giving it physical ex-
istence. (See note, § 6.)
THE TBANSOENDENTALB. 153
entity is its capability of drawing the appetite tow-
ard itself. Moral goodness is the conformity of the
thing willed to the rules of morality.
The good is also divided into useful, honorable, and
pleasurable. For the objects sought by a rational nat-
ure are desired as a! means to some end, and then are
called useful; or for their own sake, in which case
they are called honorable ; or, finally, as giving repose
to the appetite of him who possesses them, and then
they are caMed. pleasurable.
. Good is also tru£ or apparent, according as it suits
the special tendency of the whole being, or some par-
ticular tendency not in harmony with the whole nat-
ure of the being.
28. live highest degree of the good is the perfect. — Good-
ness consists in the conformity of a being with its
end ; but because the end of a being can be attained
more or less completely, there are degrees of good-
ness. A being is said to be perfect when it has
attained its end in all its plenitude ; i.e. when " none
of the conditions requisite for its existence are want-
ing, when it possesses all the power necessary for the
exercise of its proper operation, and is thus fitted to
attain its proper end by its own operation." (Jouin.)
29. Evil, the opposite of goodness, is the privation of a
good due to a being. — Since every thing, inasmuch as it
is, is good, it follows that evil is not being, but a pri-
vation of being or of good, and that it is real only so
far as the privation of the good is real. Still, as every
privation is necessarily referred to a being, for that
which does not exist cannot be deprived of any thing,
it is said that evil is in being as in its subject.
30. Evil is divided into metaphysical or nor/iinal, phys-
ical or natural, and moral evil. For voluntary agents, it
it divided simply into the evil of sin and evil of punish-
154: REAL PHILOSOPHY.
menl— Created beings, from tlie very fact that they
are created, are deprived of some perfections. But'
since this privation belongs to their very condition as
creatures, it is not a true evil, but only a nominal
evil. All the creatures in the world have not the
same perfections ; but this inequality by which some
beings are deprived of perfections possessed by
others, far from being an evil is a true good, since it
is a condition of the admirable hierarchy of creatures
and of the order of the universe. Moreover, it is part
of the order of the universe that, besides incorrupti-
ble creatures, there should be others that may lose
some of the perfections proper to their nature. This
explains why God, though not the author of real evil,
yet permits evil in the world in view of a greater
good.
Physical or natural evil is the privation of a good re-
quired by the nature of a physical being, as " the want
of wings in a bird." * Moral evil consists in the pri-
vation of a moral good ; it is a non-conformity to the
rules of morality. This non-conformity to the rules
of morality, which can happen only in creatures en-
dowed with free will, is called the evil of sin or sinful
evil. The evil in creatures which destroys the integ-
rity of their being is the consequence of the evU of
sin, and has the character of punishment ; it is, there-
fore, called the evil of punishment or penal evil. And
because this evil is found in a special manner in
* Even pain implies the existence of a natural good, for it warns
the sufferer of tlie presence in his system of some obstacle to perfect
health ; besides, as a feeling it is a perfection, being an exercise of
sensibility. In both these senses it exemplifies the axiom, "Good
and being are convertible." It is only as being a defect in the phys-
ical integrity of man or brute that it is an evil, an absence of due
perfection.
THE TBAN8GENDMNTALS. 155
creatures endowed with free will, and because the
good of which evil is the privation- is the absolute
object of the will, it follows that, strictly speaking,
there are but two kinds of evil, the evil of sin and the
evil of punishment ; the latter is a privation of integ-
rity of being, the former of justice of action. It is
further to be remarked that the evil of punishment is
an evil only in its subject ; in its cause it is a good ;
for from a moral standpoint the order of the universe
is founded on justice, and justice requires the punish-
ment of the evil of sin.
31. Evil has no direct efficient cause, it has an (cccidental
cause, which is the^good. — Evil necessarily has a cause.
But there can be no cause without being, and every
being, inasmuch as it is, is good ; therefore the good
alone can be the cause of evil. But, although it be
the cause of evil, it is not a direct efficient cause, but
merely an accidental cause. For if the evil, as, for
instance, a " boiler explosion," is produced by a natural
agent, it is owing to some defect in the agent, as " un-
skilfulness in an engineer," or in that on which its
power is exercised, as "the thin walls of the boiler of
a steam-engine." If the evil is moral, and therefore
produced by a voluntary agent, it is owing to some de-
fect in the will. Therefore it is not the good directly
and as such that is the cause of evil, but the good acci-
dentally and as susceptible of defects.
32. Since God is the infinitely perfect Being, it is onlij
by permitting evil that He can he said to he its cause. — It
is consonant with the order of the universe that there
be certain beings which can be defective. Therefore
God, in causing the good which agrees with the
general order, causes, as it were, in certain beings, by
permitting it, bhe defect of which evil is the conse-
quence. Hence whatever of being and perfection
156 REAL PSILOSOPHT.
there is in created things should be referred to God
as to its cause ; but whatever is defective has not God
for its cause ; it is the result of the imperfection of
second causes. God is, however, the author of the
evil of punishment, by which sinners receive the
chastisement which they merit. But this evil is a' true
good, for it helps to satisfy the justice demanded by
the order that should reign in the universe.
33. It is a gross error to maintain, ivitJi the Gnostics
and Manicheans, the existence of two contrary supreme
principles, the pi-inciple of good and the principle of evil.
— A supreme evil, the cause of all evil, is an abso-
lute impossibility, for evil is nothing but a privation
of being ; if, then, any absolute evil existed, it would
be a privation of all being, and hence would be abso-
lutely nothing. The believers in two first principles
have allowed themselves to be drawn into this error
by the sight of two particular contrary effects, one
good, the other evil, which they attributed to two
particular contrary causes, but which they knew not
how to refer to a common and universal cause.
AET v. — BEAUTY. — SUBLIMITY. — GEACEFULNESS.
34. The beautiful is that ivhich pileases tvhen hnoion. —
The good is that which satisfies when possessed, the
beautiful is that which pleases when known. Hence
the good is referred to the appetite, the beautiful to
the cognitive faculties ; but because an object when
known pleases only in so far as it has harmony of
proportion, it follows that the beautiful consists essen-
tially in harmony of proportion, just as the ugly, its
opposite, consists in the absence of this harmony.
35. The means of discerning the beautiful are the cog-
nitive faculties, viz., the senses and intellect. — In treating
THB TBANS0ENDENTAL8. 157
of the beautiful, the faculties that perceive it must
first be noted ; these are the intellect and the inter-
nal and external senses. Among the external senses
sight and hearing are, strictly speaking, the only ones
that perceive the beautiful. The other senses are, so
to say, immersed too deeply in matter ; they help to
perceive the beautiful, not of themselves, but by
transmitting their impressions to the internal senses.
Of the internal senses only the common sense (sensus
communis) and imagination perceive the beautiful, the
former by receiving the image, the latter by preserv-
ing it. The union of these senses and the intellect
forms what is known as the cestlietic faculty commonly
called taste.
36. The elements of tlie beautiful are truth, order, and
life. — Two conditions are necessary to a beautiful
thing, truth and proportion ; a third condition should
be added to make the beauty perfect ; viz., life. All
beauty is founded on truth,* the natural object of the
intellect ; hence beauty is not arbitrary, but, like
truth, immutable ; for it has its eternal type in God,
the supreme beauty as well as the substantial truth.
But that a thing be beautiful, it must have not only
truth, but also unity in variety, or order and harmony
of proportion. Since splendor is the perfection of
this order, Plato could say with justice that the
beautiful is the splendor of the truth.f Lastly,
* " It is impossible that anything be beautiful in itself, if it he not
also true and good, or if it be dishonorable ; for, Order must neces-
sarily exist, inordinateness must cease to exist. . . . But there is
no being that is not true and good ; . . . and what is dishon-
orable is morally defective, and therefore repugnant to the idea of
beauty." — Zigliara, Summa Philosophica, O. 19, vii.
f "The three elements that constitute beauty are (1) the complete-
ness or perfection of the object ; for what is maimed and defective is
168 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
when life is joined to order* the beauty is perfect;
for the true, the foundation of the beautiful, is
chiefly in the intelligible. But a thing is the more
intelligible the higher its grade of being; and the
higher its grade of being, the higher the life that it
possesses. Since life is the perfection of beauty, ac-
tion, whether physical or spiritual, which is the man-
ifestation of life, must be the source of beauty. And
since life perfects beauty, the higher the life is, the
more perfect the beauty. Now, there are five kinds
of life : the vegetative, the sensitive, the intellectual,
the life of grace, and the life of glory. The last con-
stitutes the highest grade of created beauty, because it
is the most perfect reflection of the divine life, the
eternal type of all beauty. As beauty is capable of
degrees of perfection, it follows that when beauty of
an inferior order is opposed to that of a superior
order, it is really only deformity, because the su-
perior order prevails over the inferior.
37. Beauty is either ideal or real, natural or artijicial
— The ideal beautiful is that which is conceived by
the intellect as a model to realize. The real beau-
tiful is that which is found in the object itself, and is
sensible if it exists in material things, spiritual if it
is in a spiritual thing. The latter kind of beauty is
defined by Zigliara as "the order of virtual parts
with due spiritual lustre," and is intellectual or moral
according as the virtual parts are referred to an intel-
lectual or a moral standard. The natural beautiful
disagreeable or ugly ; (2) due proportion, Tmrmony, or order of parts,
for if the parts do not harmonize the object does not please but of-
fends ; (3) lustre, by which the object manifests itself wholly to the
mind." — Zigliara, S^im. Ph., O. 19, ii.
* " Order results from the subordination of particular ends to a
eommon end." See Cosmology, § 8.
THE TRANSOENDEMTALS. 169
is that whicli is presented by nature.* The artificial
beautiful is that which is an effect of art. To produce
the beautiful, art must imitate nature. Yet not every
imitation of nature, merely because it is an imita-
tion, is therefore beautiful, as realism pretends. The
reality imitated by art must also be beautiful, or art
must add to it the idea that will give it beauty.
38. The mUime is that which exceeds the intuition of
our faculties. —A. thing is called sublime subjectively
because of the weakness of our faculties, and objec-
tively because of the excellence of the thing itself. It
is the excess of light in the object that produces
obscurity in our weak mental vision. The foundation
of the sublime is the infinite, which we can never
seize in any other than a limited and imperfect
manner. As the deformed or ugly is opposed to the
beautiful, so is the mean or contemptible opposed to
the sublime.
39. The sublime is ontological, dynamical, or mathe-
Tnatical. — The sublime is ontological when its excel-
lence lies in the nature of the being known ; thus
the " angelic nature " may be styled sublime. The
sublime is dynamical when its excellence is in the
physical or moral virtue of the being known ; thus the
" falls of Niagara " are sublime, " certain acts of the
saints " are sublime. The sublime is muthematical
when it consists in the vastness of the object; thus
the " immensity of space " is sublime. The sublime
is found also in the productions of art when they
* " Natural beauty is found in eoAih species ; for since God is the
author of created nature, it is impossible that there should be either
absence of any constituent principle or of harmony among the prin-
ciples. But if we regard the essences as realized in individuals by
particular marks, they may be beautiful or ugly. For natural causes
may be impeded by one another. "^ — Sanseverino.
160 REAL PHILOSOPHT.
surpass tlie ordinary conceptions of man and reveal
something of the infinite.
' 40. Gracefulness is that quality which renders its pos-
sessor pleasing. — Gracefulness consists especially in the
excellence of the sensible, as the sublime lies in the
excellence of the intelligible. It is found in the ob-
ject that pleases and attracts us, not in that which Kes
above and beyond our grasp ; for the sublime is not
graceful. Gracefulness is various and changeable, for
it resides chiefly in the sensible, which is various and
changeable. From this point of view, then, it is true
to say that there is no disputing about tastes.
PRINCIPLES AND CAUSES OF BEING.
41. A principle is that from which anything proceeds.
Tt is also denned as That ly which a thing is, is made,
or is known. — From the latter definition it is evident
that there are three kinds of principles : principles of
composition, those of which a thing is constituted ;
principles of production, those which concur in the
making of things; principles of cognition, those by
which we attain to a knowledge of things. The last
mentioned are treated of in rational philosophy, and
the others in metaphysics ; ontology studies the prin-
ciples of composition or metaphysical principles ; cos-
mology investigates the principles of production or
physical principles.
42. Cause is defined as That on which another depends
for its heing. — This definition applies both to depend-
ence of reason or order ; as, " One proposition de-
pends on another " (but not to mere external connec-
tion, as in the proposition, "Day succeeds night");
and to dependence of nature ; as, " The fruit depends
on the tree." The definition of cause is further ex-
plained by that of efi'ect. An effect is that which is
produced, or that which passes from non-existence
into existence ; but that which is not yet existing can-
not receive existence except by the action of some-
thing else, and to this agent the name of cause is
given. Hence two conditions constitute a cause prop-
erly so called : (1) its distinction from the effect, and
(2) the dependence of the effect upon it ; distinction,
11
162 MEAL PHIL080PHT.
because that wliich is ushered into existence cannot
be the same as that which has given it existence ; de-
pendeiice, because to be brought by something from
non-existence into existence implies a dependence on
that thing. Hence it is manifest that principle is
more general than cause. For every cause is a prin-
ciple, but not every principle is a cause : that which
proceeds from the principle is very often not produced
by it ; that which begins with the cause is at the same
time produced by it. Principle implies priority of
origin only, or, as St. Thomas calls it, " order of ori-
gin ; " cause implies also priority of time, or, at least,
priority of nature, for priority of nature consists in
this that one thing depends on the nature of another
and proceeds from it.
CHAPTEE I.
Metaphysical Peinciples oe Being,
aet. i. — potentiality and actuality, or power and
ACT.*
43. The first metaphysical principles of every created
heing, those hy which it is constituted, are potentiality and
actuality. — Every created being was, before its exist-
ence, in the series of possible beings ; it had only a
possibility to exist ; it was in potentiality. Afterward
* Althougli Potentiality and Act do not generally receive so full a
treatment in text books as is given in the present manual, yet they
ire of prime importance in Scholastic philosophy, and without them
essence and existence, matter and form, soul and body, and the
origin of ideas, cannot be understood, while they underlie the prin-
tiplas of moral philosophy.
METAPHYSIOAL PBIN0IPLE8 OF BEING. 163
it existed ; then it was in actuality* The possibility
to exist and the act of being- are, therefore, the two
constituent principles of every created being. God
alone is not composed of potentiality and actuality.
Having always existed, He is pure act.
44. Act'\ is a perfection ; a thing is said to he in act
when it has its perfection. — The actuality of a thing is
that perfection by which it is not in potentiality but
in reality, not in the ideal order but in the ontologi-
cal order. Hence act gives a new being to the thing,
realizes its possibility, fills up its capacity. There-
fore, a thing is in act when it has its perfection.
45. Act is pure or not pure according as it excludes
all potentiality or is united with potentiality. — Act may
be joined to potentiality in two ways : (1) When it is
the act of some potentiality ; thus the " soul " by
which the body exists is the act of the body ; (2)
When it is itself in potentiality relatively to an ul-
terior act ; as an " angel," whose nature was at first
in potentiality relatively to existence. Act is called
pure when it is not joined to potentiality in one of
these two ways ; otherwise it is not-pure. In the lat-
ter case it is called formal act, or act of essence, if
it determines the essence to a species of being ; as
the " form of a plant," which makes it such a species
of plant ; and act of heing or of existence if it is the
being or existence itself.
46. Not-pure act is divided into first act and second
act, and either excludes or supposes another previous act.
— JFirst act is that which does not suppose any other
before it, but which prepares the entity for subse-
* The term actus originally signified operation; then by extension
it came to signify also the principle of operation.
\ " Act is the reduction of a possibility to a reality, of a power
active or passive to its complete reality." — Harper.
164 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
quent acts ; in this sense tlie soul is tlie first act of
the body. Second act supposes a first ; thus the
" operation of a faculty or power" is a second act, be-
cause it supposes the existence of that faculty from
the first act.
47. First act is divided into subsistent and non-subsist-
ent act according as it can or cannot subsist alone. — Sub-
sistent first act either subsists alone, as "ang-el," or
can subsist alone, as the " soul of man." JVon-stcb-
sistent act cannot subsist alone, as the " soul of a
brute."
48. Subsistent act is divided into complete and incom-
plete act according as it has its j>erfection in itself in
such a manner that it cannot be received into any poten-
tiality ; or though it can subsist alone, is yet destitute of
its perfection if it be without the potentiality in which it
ought to exist. — Complete subsistent act is of such a
nature that it cannot be received into any potential-
ity ; as an " angel." Incomplete subsistent act can
exist alone, but to havo its perfection it requires the
potentiality in which it can and ought to exist ; as the
'' human soul."
49. Non-subsistent act is divided into substantial act,
xohich gives being simply to its potentiality, and acci-
dental act, which presupposes being in its potentiality. —
Substantial act gives being simply to its potentiality ;
such is the " brute soul." Accidental act supposes
being already in the potentiality which it informs ;
as the " whiteness of paper," which supposes the ex-
istence of the paper before its whiteness.
50. Potentiality * is the aptitude to receive actuality ;
* Potentiality is a capability ; if acUrc, a capability of ' ' doing,
acting, energizing, working. . . . Such are the forces of nature,
bodily power, the faculties of intellect and will." If passive, it is a
capacity of " receiving, of being perfected by another . . , as ths
METAPHYSIOAL PRINCIPLES OF BEING. 165
to he tn potentiality is to he apt to receive the act which
does not yet exist. — Potentiality, a metaphysical prin-
ciple of being, is that by virtue of which a thing,
which as yet does not exist, can receive existence from
an efficient cause. The word potentiality is here a
synonym for the words possibility, capability.
51. Potentiality is logical or real according as it means
siTnply the absolute possibility of existing, or signifies that
a being already existing in some way can exist in another
way. — Logical potentiality is only the exclusion of the
impossibility of existing, and is so called because it
is only in the mind of the cause that is to bring it
into existence. Such was the state of all created
things before the power of God drew them from
nothingness. This possibility or potentiality is also
called intrinsic or metaphysical or absolute, to dis-
tinguish it from the active power that makes it
?ome into existence. In respect to this active
power it is called extrinsic or relative possibility — ■
^trinsic, because it is to be reduced to act by some
one beyond and distinct from itself; relative, be-
cause it is referred to the cause that makes the pos-
sible entity actual or real. In respect to creatures
this relative potentiality is either physical or moral,
according as the power which it implies is considered
according to the laws of the physical world or accord-
ing to those to which moral agents are subject. — Peal
potentiality supposes the being already existing in a
determinate manner ; it is therefore the possibility of
yassing from one mode of existence to another.
Metaphysical potentiality, regarded as about to .
capacity of water for receiving the form of heat. ' The Infinite, be-
ing most pure Act, has no potentiality; primordial matter being
simply and exclusively a passive potentiality', has no act.'" — Meta-
physics of the School, vol, i. , p. 585.
166 BSAL PHILOSOPHY.
come into existence by the action of some efficient
cause, is called objective. To this, subjective potential-
ity is opposed, which is nothing but real potentiality,
and is so called because only a subject already existr
ing can have it. Real or subjective pobentiality is
pure if it has no act ; and of this " primary matter "
{materia prima) is the sole example. It is not-pure if
it has a beginning of act, but tends to an ulterior
act ; as a " substance " relatively to its accidents.
52. Potentiality is divided also into proximate potenti-
ality and remote potentiality ; the former needs only the
action of the agent to pass into act, the latter needs other
active principles to render this action possible. — A man
with good eyesight is in proxiTnate potentiality with
regard to vision, for he needs only the light to see.
A blind man is in remote potentiality with regard to
vision, because before the light can act on his vision
he must be cured of his blindness.
53. An entity is absolutely and intrinsically possible
because it implies no contradiction ; it is relatively and
extrinsically possible because God is omnipotent. — A
thing is not absolutely impossible because it cannot
be done by God, but it cannot be done by God be-
cause it implies a contradiction or is absolutely im-
possible. Therefore the possible is so primarily be-
cause it implies no contradiction. But if an entity is
absolutely possible because it implies no contradic-
tion, it is relatively possible because it can proceed
from its cause. And since God is the cause of all
being, it is from Him that the relative possibility of
every being is derived, and, furthermore, everything
that is absolutely or intrinsically possible is also rela-
tively or extrinsically so.
54. From the definition of act and of potentiality this
axiom follows : A thing is perfect so far as it is in ad,
METAPBT8I0AL PBIN0IPLE8 OF BEING. 167
it is imperfect so far as it is only in potentiality.— ^ince
act is a perfection, that which is in act is perfect, and
that which is in potentiality is imperfect. From
this axiom is derived the consequent : An act ab-
solutely pure is also absolutely perfect. From the
definition of act and of potentiality the following
axioms are derived: 1. Being acts inasmuch as it is
in act ; on the other hand, it is acted upon inasmuch as
it is in potentiality ; 2. Potentiality cannot of itself re-
duce itself to act, but requires a being already in act ;
3. Every changeable being is composed of act and po-
tentiality.— For it changes, that is, it begins to be what
it was not, or ceases to be what it previously was,
only because it had the possibility to be or not to be
what it became or ceased to be.*
AET. II. — ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE.
55. In every created being we should distinguish as
constituent principles, which are conceived as actuality
and potentiality respectively, essence and existence, or the
act of existing and that which has this act. — Every thing
that is either is being itself or has being, that is, par-
ticipates in being. In that which has only participated
being we notice, when it is in act, two distinct things :
(1) that it is, or the act of being; (2) that which it
is,' or that which has the being. The former is called
existence,f the latter essence. Essence is also called
* There is also an operatise power or faculty, such as intellect and
will, which may be defined a capacity and aptitude to elicit opera-
tions. Power again is distinguished as actiiie or passive. Thus the
" vegetative powers " are active because capable of changing that on
which they act. " Marble " has a passive power of receiving the
form of a statue from an agent. See Psychology, § 3.
f According to Hume, " whatever we conceive, we conceive to be
existent ; " therefore our mere thinking gives it existence. He denies
168 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
nature, because it is the source of a being's properties
and operations ; reason of the thing, because it is the
reason .why the thing is what it is ; form, because it
determines the thing in its species. Tet there are
essences which are not pure forms ; such are essences
composed of matter and form, and in these the form
is not the whole essence.
56. In every finite and created being essence is really
distinct from existence as a potentiality from its act. —
In God, who is Being by excellence, essence is not
distinct from existence but is identical with it. But
finite and created beings are composed of essence and
existence, as of two principles of being. In fact, no
creature has being simply, for this is peculiar to God.
All created beings are composed necessarily of po-
tentiality and act. For if essence were not distinct
from existence in them, they could be said to exist by
their essence. But this is false, for creatures haviag
been drawn from nothing by the creative act of God,
have their existence not necessarily and essentially,
but accidentally and contingently.*
the reality of essence, as Locke had done before him. Mill, too, ap-
proves the teaching of Locke that essences are merely ' ' the signifi-
cations of their names." Kant, though aiming to refute the scepticism
of Hume, strays even further from certitude, for he denies that we
can know things in themselves. The eifect of such doctrines on
science, morals, and religion, can readily be inferred. See also § 96.
* See Zigliara, Summa PhilosopMca, O. 13, v.
CHAPTEE n.
Causes of Being.
aet. i. — division of causes.
57. There are in general four hinds of oauses : the ef'
fident, the final, the formal or exemplary, and the mate-
rial.— If any effect be considered in relation to its
causes, we can distinguish tlie agent that has pro-
duced it, the end proposed by the agent, the form by
which the being is constituted in a determined spe-
cies, and the matter out of which the being is made.
The agent that produces the effect is called the effi-
cient cause; the end proposed is the^XnaZ cause ; the
form by which the being is constituted in a deter-
mined species is \he formal cause, which is also styled
specific if it is considered as intrinsic in the effect,
and exemplar if it is extrinsic to it and is considered
as the idea to the likeness of which the effect is pro-
duced. Finally, the matter upon which the agent
works to produce the effect is called th^ material
cause. This cause is found in corporeal entities only
in the various changes which they undergo after
creation, not in creation itself ; in pure spirits there
is potentiality as a principle of being, but no material
cause.
170 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
AET. n. — MATEEIAIi CAUSE AND SPECIFIC FOEMAL CAUSE.
58. The requisite conditions that matter and form, he
causes are : (1) the influence of an efficient cause apply-
ing the form to the meatier, and (2) the dispositions of the
matter hoth preparatory to the reception of the form, and
concomitant with its reception to render the matter capable
of retaining the form. — Since the matter is the subject,
and the form is the term of the agent's action, it is ev-
ident that they cannot act as causes without the agent.
The dispositions also are manifestly necessary, be-
cause the matter being indifferent to all kinds of
form, needs something to determine it and fit it for
one form rather than for another, and this can be
found only in the dispositions.*
59. The proper effect of the rnatter and the form is the
entire composite. — This is evident since the matter and
the form are the causes from whose union the being
results.
AET. m. — ^EXEMPLAR OE IDEAl CAUSE.
60. The exemplar cause is necessary. It is defined as
That which the agent Jceeps in view in his work. — An
intelligent agent must possess in himself the idea,
the reason of his work; otherwise he would act
blindly, and this is contrary to his nature. This idea,
this reason of his work, which the agent has in view
in acting, is a cause, inasmuch as it is imitated by the
agent in doing the work. The idea thus understood
is no longer that by which an object is known, as is
the " idea of a flower which I have when beholding
a flower;" but it is that which the intellect by
^See Cosmology, § 36.
CAUSES OF BEING. 171
thought forms in itself to be imitated ; as the " idea
of a house, which the architect forms in his mind, and
according to which he has the house built."
61. The exemplar cause is properly reduced; to the
formal cause, 'but it may also, in some manner, he re-
duced to the efficient cause and to the final cause. — The
form is that which determines a thing to a special
kind of being. Now the idea determines the intelli-
gent agent from whom the thing represented pro-
ceeds ; therefore it determines the work also, not in-
deed in an intrinsic manner, by composing it, but in
its source or origin. The exemplar cause is also re-
duced to the efficient cause, inasmnch as it is by the
idea that the agent, who is the efficient cause, is ulti-
mately determined and directed in his work. Finally,
the exemplar cause may also be reduced to the final
cause, because the idea, like a model, is what the agent
intends to execute, and what the work is to reproduce.
AET. rV. — EFFICIENT CAUSE.*
62. An efficient cause is an extrinsic principle from
which the production of a thing proceeds. — ^The efficient
cause is styled an extrinsic principle, to distinguish
it from the matter and form, which are intrinsic prin-
ciples. Unlike the final cause, it does not merely
move to produce the thing, but is itself the agent
that produces it.
63. In respect to the effect the efficient cause is perfect-
ing, disposing, ■ helping, or counselling. — The efficient
cause is a perfecting cause when it completes the work ;
as, "when a sculptor gives the marble the artificial
form of the statue." It is disposing when it prepares
' See Special Ideology, | 67.
172 BEAL PHILOSOPHT.
the matter to receive tlie last perfective form ; as,
" wlieii a sculptor prepares the marble out of which
he is to make a statue." It is said to be helping when it
aids the principal cause ; as, " a student who helps the
artist to execute his masterpiece." . And under these
three aspects the efficient cause is a, partial cause. It
is counselling when it points out to the agent the form
and the end, and may then be called a Tnoral cause.
64. The efficient cause may he a cause in itself or hy acci-
dent, principal or instrumental, first or second, universal
or particular, univocal or equivocal. proxi'inate or remote,
free or necessary, total or partial, physical or moral, a
cause which or a cause hy which, cause in potentiality
or cause in actuality. — It is a cause in itself (per se)
when by virtue of its own power it produces the effect ;
as, " fire produces heat." It is a cause iy accident (per
accidens) when by its own nature it neither produces
the effect, nor is connected with it ; thus, " if a sculp-
tor is deformed, it is accidentally that a deformed
man has carved a statue." With the cause by accident
may be classed occasion, which is that on the presence
of which the cause is induced to act, or acts with
greater ease and perfection ; as, a " feast-day may be
the occasion of granting an amnesty;" "a bright
sunny day is an occasion of having one's photograph
taken." *
A principal cause acts by its own power ; thus " a
tree is the principal cause of another tree." An in-
strumental cause acts by the power of its principle ;
thus " the painter's brush produces the picture."
• A condition is fhat which disposes the power of the cause to act,
or removes impediments to its action; thns, "if a man wishes to
write, it is a necessary condition that the ink flow freely from his
pan."
OAUSEB OF Bsma. 173
The first cause is tliat which receives neither its
.power nor the exercise of its power from another;
" God alone is first cause." A second cause receives
both its power and the use of it from another, that is,
from the first cause ; " all creatures are second causes."
A universal cause is that whose virtue is extended
to different species of effect ; as, " the earth which pro-
duces different species of plants." K particular cause
produces only one species of effect ; thus " the oak
produces an oak."
A univocal cause produces an effect specifically like
itself ; thus " a lion begets a lion." An equivocal cause
produces an effect of a different species ; thus " the
painter produces a picture."
A pTOaa'mafe cause produces its effect immediately;
thus "fire generates heat." A remote cause produces
its effect by means of another cause ; thus " the heart
produces heat by means of the blood."
A free cause has dominion over its actions, as
" man ; " a necessary cause acts from natural impulse,
as a " plant."
A total cause is that which by itself produces the
effect ; as, " when one horse draws a wagon." A par-
tial cause is that which in conjunction with others
of the same species produces the effect ; as, " when
several horses together draw a wagon."
A physical cause is that which by its own action
directly produces the effect ; thus " an assassin is a
physical cause of homicide." A moral cause is that
which produces the effect by persuasion, threats, or
other moral means ; as, " he who counsels or com-
mands the assassination."
A cause which is that supposit which produces the
effect ; thus " a workman is the cause which of his
work ; " a cause iy which is the power by which the
174 SSAL PSIL080PET.
cause which acts ; as, " the skill of the workmaii,''
"the science of the teacher." *
A cause is in potentiality or is a cause materially
viewed, when, although able to produce its effect, it
does not produce it ; as, " when, though able to write,
one does not do so." A cause is in act, or is a cause
formally viewed, when it really produces its effect ; as,
" when one writes."
65. Substances, even corporeal, are really active and are
true causes. — Several ancient and some modem philos-
ophers, and among them Descartes and Malebranche,
have maintained that God alone is truly causative
and active, that He is the author of all the effects
which are commonly referred to created beings, but
which are simply the occasions of producing the effect.
Hence the name of occasionalism given to this system.
The absurdity of this system is manifest. For every
creature is produced by the Supreme Being, of whose ,
perfections it is an imitatiori ; but it is the property
of the First Being to be sovereignly active, because
He is wholly in act ; therefore it is the property of
* The Schoolmen speak of the radical cause, cause in remote first
act, in proximate first act, and in second act. " A cause is said to be
in its second act when it aotuall3- produces its efEect. It is said to be
in its proximate first act if no one of the conditions necessary for the
production of the effect is wanting. It is said to be in its remote first
act if either all or some of the conditions are wanting. Thus, for ex-
ample (to borrow the illustration of Taparelli), when a steam-engine
is actually propelling the vessel over the waves, it is in its second act.
When the steam is up — the cables on board — the anchor weighed —
the helmsman at the wheel— the captain on the paddle-box — the
plauk removed, but the machine not yet set in motion, it is in its
proximate first act. When the steam has been let off — the fires out —
the vessel moored — the ship's company ashore — it is in its remote firtt
act." — Metaphysics of the ScJwol, vol. ii., p. 155. The radical cause
in the example cited is merely the steam-engine as such.
CAUSES OF BEING. 175
creatures to be active, each in its own degree, because
in their own degree they are in act, and thus action
follows being as its property. Whoever denies even
to material substance the power of acting, " detracts
from the Creative Virtue of the Creator," since the
perfection of the effect determines the perfection of
the cause [as cause] ; more particularly when the
cause is only known by its effect." * He would attack
the divine Goodness, which, being diffusive of itself,
Jias made all things to imitate some perfection exist-
ing in Him eminently, not only in their mode of being
but also in their mode of acting. He would assail the
divine Liberality, which grants nothing by halves, and
which would produce only useless creatures if it did
not give them, together with existence, the active force
which is its complement. In a word, either God would
be limited in His perfections, or pantheism would
necessarily be admitted. For if it is God alone that
acts in His creatures, it is easy to conclude also that
He alone exists in them, and consequently, that God
and the world are fundamentally but one being.f
66. The two kinds of action, the immanent and the
transient, exist in corporeal sulistance. — An imhnanent
action is that whose effect remains in the agent ; a
transient action is that whose effect passes out beyond
* Metaphysics of the SqIwoI, vol. iii. , p. 35 J see also pp. 26, 27. God
in creating does not exhaust His creative power, The degree of
power manifested is determined hy His free will.
t The teachings of occasionalism have little weight to-day ; but
Hume's denial that we have an idea of efficient cause should be
flatly contradicted ; for (1) we have, as is attested by consciousness,
some idea, though generic, of efficient cause ; (2) every cause must
precontain in itself whatever perfection it gives to its effect ; (3) ex-
perience proves that no finite cause can act upon a pre-existing sub
ject unless it be mediately or Immediately present to it. Cf. Busf^
Swmma Philosophiaa, p. 192.
176 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
the agent. Thus, " when the soul elicits an intellec-
tual act, that action is called immanent^ and " when
the sculptor carves his statue, the action is called tran-
sient." Although immanent action is the property of
spiritual substances, yet as a superior being of a
secondary order should have some of the perfections
of an inferior being of a higher order, immanent action
is found, in a certain measure, in the higher living
corporeal substances. Thus animals, besides exter-
nal action, have also internal action, as in sensitive
cognition and appetition.
67. The substantial form is the first source of all
action in cor'poreal substances. — ^Action and being have
the same source and origin ; but the substantial form
is the first source of being; therefore it is also the
first source of action. Although some accidents are
principles of action, yet they derive their efficiency
from the substantial form, just as second acts proceed
from the first act.
68. Substantial form has only a radical and principal
power f 07' the production of another substantial form.—
A substantial form is that which, by itself, gives a
being the power to produce a substantial effect. Acd-
dental forms affect the substance only by participat-
ing in the substantial form. Therefore the substantial
form alone can be called the principal power for the
production of another substantial form. The acci-
dents are only secondary powers.
69. When an accidental form produces another simi-
larform, the substantial form on which the former de-
pends is the radical power, and the accidental form
the principal power in this production. — The accidental
form fulfils the conditions of a principal power with
regard to a similar accidental form, as " heat with re-
spect to the heat which it produces." This is evident,
OAUSES OF BBINQ. 177
Bince, in this case, the accidental form is the reason of
the production of the effect and contains the effect.
70. The faculties capable of producing immanent ac-
tions Tnay he regarded as principal powers in their pro-
duction.— A. faculty is defined as the proximate principle
of the operation to which it is naturally ordained. It is
a proximate principle, since the substance qualified
by the faculty is a remote principle from which the
facalty itself derives its efficacy. It is the principle
of the operation only to which it is naturally ordained,
for not all faculties are capable of producing the
same operations. Immanent actions are effects which
do not pass outside the faculties from which they
proceed ; therefore they may simply be attributed to
their proper faculties as to principal powers, and to
the substantial form as to their radical principle.
Thus the " act of understanding is attributed to the
intellect as to its principal power."
71. JVb created substance is immediately operative;
but in every creature the operative power is an accident
distinct from the substance. — In God alone operative
power is not distinct from substance. In the crea-
ture, these two elements are really distinct, the sub-
stantial form being the principle of operation, not
because it operates immediately, but because it is the
source of the operative forces which proceed from it
as properties. Thus the soul which is the principle
of the acts of the intellect, does not elicit them imme-
diately, but only by the means of the intellective
faculty. Now, the act of the faculty or power is an
accident ; this power, therefore, being ordained to its
operation, will be itself an accident ; but if it is an
accident, it is distinct from the substance in which it
inheres. Therefore this substance will operate not
immediately by itself, but by a virtue distinct from it-
178 BEAL PHILOSOPHY.
self. This truth is also proved by experience. We see,
indeed, the virtue that has emanated from the plant
and is in the seed, produce its effect, although the
substance of the plant has disappeared. Therefore it
is by virtue of properties communicated to them by
the parent-plant that the accidents evolve the sub-
stantial form and generate the new plant.*
72. Action is not exerted at a distance.^ — This truth,
which is confirmed by experience, is also proved by
reason. For action follows being ; % but the being of
* " In all instances, without exception, of tlie generation of living
things, — whether they be plants or animals, — accidents (that is to
say, things that are accidental relatively to the principal agent) are
the proximate and direct causes of the eduction of the form out
of the potentiality of the matter." — "Allowing . . . that the
accidents, in instances [as in the pollination of plants] such as have
been just detailed, effect the evolution of the substantial form and
the generation of the new living body in a state of physical iso-
lation and separation from the principal agent, how is it to be
explained, that the accidents so circumstanced can of themselves
operate an effect that is thoroughly disproportioued to their nature ?
. . . It is to be borne in mind that in the generation of living
bodies the instrumental cause (which in relation to the principal
agent is justly denominated an accident, since it forms no part of
the essence of the said agent) is in itself absolutely a substance with
its own substantial form." . . . This form, "though only pro-
visional, ... by virtue of its procession from' the principal
agent ... is endowed with the properties which continue in
their essential nature throughout the successive substantial changes
up to the ultimate development, and gradually organize the matter
for higher and higher forms of life. They have no sooner produced
by their action a more perfect organism, than tlie matter grows im-
patient of the lower form ; and the form next in order is educed by
the virtue originally impressed on the instrumental cause. " — M^ta^
physics of the Sclwol, vol. iii., Prop, ccxlvi., coxlviii.
f See Metaphysics of the School, vol. iii., pp. 352-363.
X That is, natural operation, or the second act of being, must aj
aa effect be in accordance with the first act of being, which is " oon-
CAUSES OF BEING.. 179
a natural agent exists in a determinate place ; there-
fore the action of the agent ought to be in the same
place, and it can act upon those things only which
are locally united either with itself or with the me-
dium which it modifies, and to which it communicates
its action, in view of the things which it is to modify.
AET. v.— FINAL CAUSE.
73. Final cause rnay ie defined as That on account of
which something is done. — The final cause is that which
moves the agent to act ; consequently it is that on
account of which the agent acts.*
74. TJie end is a true and real cause.— ^'he end really
infiuences the effect, since it moves the agent to act,
and since without it the effect would .not take place ;
it is, therefore, a true and real cause.
75. The end may he objective or suhjective, ultimate or
intermediate, objective or formal, tlie end of the work or
the end of the agent, principal or secondary, natural or
supernatural. — The objective end is the good which we
desire ; and the subjective end is the person for whom
we wish the good. " When a father works to enrich
stitnted existence. " " ^Natural operation is the whole course of ac-
tion by which a being tends towards the natural end of its exist-
ence ; and connotes all those faculties by means of which the said
being is enabled to energize with this intent." — Metaphysics of. the
School, vol. iii. , p. 411.
* Some scientists of a materialistic tendency loudly declaim
against the doctrine of final causes or teleology, on the ground that
it is destrtictive' of all the natural sciences. But against these views
we argue that creatures, being the effect of a Supreme Intelligence,
must have an end, and that the knowledge of this truth should stim-
ulate man, the lord of creation, to search for the particular end of
the various species.
180 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
his son, riches are the objective end, and his son the
subjective end of his labor."
The ultimate end is that for which we wish all the
rest, while we wish it only for itself ; * the intermediate
end is that which we do not seek for its own sake,
but for something else to which it leads. "When
a man prays to acquire virtue, God is the last end of
his prayer ; virtue is only an intermediate end."
The objective end, or finis qui, is the thing which
we desire ; i'hej'o'nnal end, ox finis quo, is the act by
which we possess the thing desired. Thus "riches
are the objective end, and the possession of riches
the formal end of the miser."
The end of the work {finis operis), is that to which
the work naturally tends ; the end of the agent (fini»
operoMtis), is that which he determines according to his
liking. Thus " the end of the work in almsgiving is
the relief of the poor ; the end of him who gives the
alms is sometimes God, sometimes vain glory." The
end of the work and the end of the agent may coin-
cide, since it is manifest that the agent may intend
that to which the work intrinsically tends.
The principal end is that which is intended prima-
rily and directly by the agent ; a secondary end is that
which is intended as a consequence. Thus " the
good education of children should be the principal
end of a professor ; the receiving of a fee may be a
secondary end."
The natural end is that which does not surpass nat-
ural powers ; a supernatural end can be attained by the
* The ultimate end may be so absolutely or relatively. Thus the
relatively ultimate end of a student umlergoing examination is to
" pass." The absolutely ultimate end is that which " the will seeks as
the last complement of every desire and of all life," viz., supreme
felicity.
0AU8E8 OF BEING. 181
aid of grace alone. Thus " health is the natural end
of medicine ; the beatific vision is the supernatural
end of man."
76. Only the good can have the character of end,
never the evil apprehended as evil. — There are two sorts
of good, the true good, which is really such, and the
apparent good, which though evil in itself yet seema
to be good. Now, a thing can be desired as an end
only in so far as it is regarded as good. For a thing
has the character of end in so far only as it is desir.
able ; but the good alone is desirable ; therefore it
alone has the character of end. Thus, " when a vin-
dictive man revenges himself on his enemy, he wishes
it, not because it is evil, but because it satisfies the
craving of his passion."
77. The goodness of the end has the character of causal-
ity ; the apprehension of the goodness is only a requisite
condition. — In the final cause the character of causing
consists in this, that the thing which is the end is
agreeable to the agent ; but this belongs to goodness,
and not to apprehension ; therefore not the appre-
hension, but the goodness of the end has the charac-
ter of cause.
78. The end is truly a cause, not merely from the fact
that it m,akes known its goodness, but because it moves to
act by the desire or love which it excites. — The end does
not move the will by simply making its own good-
ness known ; for knowledge appertains to the intel-
lect, and we often omit what is good, although we
both know and approve it. It is by the love which it
excites that the end moves and inclines the will
toward itself; therefore the love of the end is that
by which it actually causes.
79. Beings without intelligence, such as stones and
plants, act passively and executively for an end. — A being
182 SEAL PHILOSOPHT.
acts for an end when, in its works, all the marks of a
cause which acts for an end are discernible, and there
appears no trace of chance or disorder ; but such is
the mode of action observed in beings destitute of in-
telligence, as the contemplation of nature abundantly
proves. But as these beings cannot know their end,
they are ordained to it by Him who does know it. If
in some rare cases nature seems not to act for an end,
as in the production of monsters, this is not due to
nature itself, but to an accidental defect in the subject
by which it acts.
80. Animals tend to their end iy a certain knowledge
which they have of it, when they perceive its goodness,
and are moved to act iy this perce2}tio7i ; hut they do not
act directly and electively for the end, for they do not
know its connection with the means; their knowledge and
their ax>petites are ruled hy instinct only. — Descartes
denies to animals all life and knowledge, and con-
siders them machines set in motion by secret springs,
like a clock. But this opinion is in manifest opposi-
tion to good sense. Indeed, experience clearly proves
to us that animals tend to their end, not only because
Providence directs them to it, but also because they
have some apprehension of this end, representing it to
themselves in their imagination, desiring to possess
it if it be absent, and delighting in it if it be present.
But, though animals have a certain knowledge of
their end, it would be false to assert with some phi-
losophers, as Pythagoras (b.c. 580-500 ?), that they have
reason, and differ from man only in bodily form. For
animals do not perceive the relation of the means to
the end. As they are incapable of abstracting, they
do not know the end as such; therefore they are
guided in their acts by instinct, that is, by a natural
judgment, which is determined to a single object, and
CAUSES OF BEING. 183
is not the result of reasoning, but is the gift of the
Author of nature. It is the vis cestimativa, or esti-
mative faculty, of the Schoolmen.
81. Man acts for an end not only executively and ap-
prehensively hut also, directively and electively. — Since
man is endowed "with reason, he knows the proportion
of the means to the end ; he chooses the means which
seem good and rejects the others; therefore he acts
for an end, not only executively, like a stone, nor ap-
prehensively, like the brute, but also directively.
82. Fortune and chance are accidentally efficient causes,
that is, they produce an effect beyond the order and inten-
tion of the agent. — These two terms differ only in this,
that fortune, properly speaking, is specific, and predi-
cated of free causes only, while chance is generic, and
predicated also of natural causes. Fortune may even
be affirmed of the angels, since some things may hap-
pen beyond their intention ; but not of God. For God
as universal cause directs all particular causes, and
therefore no effect can transcend the order of His effi-
ciency nor can any second cause prevent its exercise.
83. Fate is a reality in the sense of a divine preordi-
nation or a certain disposition given to contirigsnt things
hy which God executes the decrees of His Providence. —
The Stoics denied Providence, and therefore meant by
fate a series of determinate causes which necessarily
produce their effects. Other philosophers regarded
fate as a necessity superior to all else, even to the
gods, which it was irpipossible to modify. In these
two senses fate is evidently an absurdity. But fate
understood as a preordination of God, or as a certain
disposition given to contingent beings, by which God
executes the decrees of His Providence, is a reality.
If the preordiiiation be regarded as in God, it is not
fate but providence, ,
DIVISION OF BEING.
84. JBeing is divided, 1. into real and logical ; 2. into
uncreated or infinite and created or finite ; 3. into sub-
stance and' accident. — Being exists either in the mere
apprehension of the mind, or out of the intellect ; in
the former case it is logical or ens rationis ; in the
latter, it is real. Heal being is either uncreated or
created. Created being is either substance or acci-
dent.
CHAPTER I.
Eeal Being and Logical Being.
85. Real heing is that which has existence outside of
the intellect. — Eeal being has a true existence inde-
pendently of our thought ; it exists in its proper nat-
ure ; as a " tree," a " stone."
86. Logical being is that which has no objective ex-
istence, tohich eadsts only in the intellects — This being
* A thing may be in intellect as subject, effect, or object. It exists
in it as subject if it inheres in it as an accident in Its subject ; it is
in intellect as effect if it is produced as a vital action proceeding
physically from it ; it is in intellect as object if it is merely appre-
hended by it. Of the first mode of existence, " intelligible species, or
'jrst intentions," and "intellectual habits" are examples; of the
«cond, "intellection " is an illustration. Both these modes are real.
REAL BEING AND LOGICAL BEING. 185
neither has nor can have any existence in nature ; it
exists in the intellect only; as "darkness," "chi-
meras."
87. Logical heing is either founded in reality- or not ;
in the former case it is a negation or a relation. Some
negations are properly called privations. — Logical he,-
ing founded in reality is that which has a foundation
in the very nature of real things ; as, " when we judge
the idea of animal to be more extensive than that of
rational." Logical being not fowided in reality com-
bines arbitrarily things which really have no connec-
tion ; as a " centaur." Logical being founded in real-
ity is a negation when it apprehends through being
the absence of being ; as "c^eailA," " darkness." Logi-
cal relations are all those agreements which the reason
conceives in things known ; as " the agreement of
subject and attribute." Negation is the absence in a
subject of a quality which it is not required to pos-
sess; as "absence of sight in a stone." k.privatio7i
properly so called is the absence in a subject of a per-
fection which it can and should possess ; as " blind-
ness in man."
88. Only the intellect can produce logical Heing. — Log-
ical being is produced when we consider non-being
after the manner of being; therefore it can be pro-
duced by that faculty only which apprehends the
quality of being, that is, by the intellect. The imagi-
nation forms images, fictions, but not logical beings.
Nor does the divine intellect form them, for their pro-
of the last mode, " second intentions" are an example, and hence
logical being (eras rationis) is said to constitute the formal object of
Logic. " Darkness " is logical being because it has no existence ex-
cept that which intellect gives it. " Light" is logical being if it be
regarded as abstracted from the luminous body, for an abstraction has
only an ideal existence.
186 REAL PHILOSOPET.
duction would imply a knowledge of a thing other
than it is in reality. But such cognition is imperfect,
and cannot be predicated of God, since He is infinitely
perfect
CHAPTEE n.
Unceeated oe Infinite Being and Oeeated oe Finite
Being.
finite being.
89. Uncreated Being is tliat which exists of itself ;
a'eated ieing, that which holds its heing from another. —
Uncreated Being- is none else tlian God, wlio gives be-
ing to everything and receives it from none ; He is
Being by essence, whereas the others are being by
participation. He is also called Necessary Being, be-
cause He cannot but exist, while creatures are called
contingent beings, because their non-existence is pos-
sible.
90. Uncreated Being is actually infinite, that is, it is
bounded iy no limit. — The infinite is of two kinds : the
actual infinite, which really and indeed is bounded by
no limit, and the potential infinite or the indefinite,
which is only the finite to which something can al-
ways he added. God alone is actually infinite. In
creatures there is only potential infinity. For they
cannot be actually infinite in perfection of being,
since they have being only by participation; more-
over, it is possible for them not to exist, and this im-
plies a great imperfection in their essence. No crea-
ture can be actually infinite in magnitude, because no
property of a finite substance can be infinite. Neither
can there be an actually infinite number, because a
188 REAL PHILOSOPHT.
multitude that can ever be increased is not infinite ;
but however great the multitude be supposed, it can
always be increased. Lastly, no creature can be in-
finite in the intensity of any of its qualities, because
it is impossible for a finite subject to contain an infi-
nitely perfect quality.
91. There is a potential infinity in creatures. — ^No
quantity is so great that it cannot be further in-
creased ; no creature has all perfections, since it is
essentially contingent.
92. Material entities have a limit to their STnallness,
living ieings have also a limit to their largeness. — A nat-
ural form requires a certain quantity in the matter
which it determines. A quantity may be so small
that a smaller one would not suffice for the operations
of any form whatever ; therefore such a quantity can- •
not be informed, or determined by form. With regard
to living beings, experience shows that they have cer-
tain limits as to maximum and minimum size.*
* See also Metaphymn of the School, vol. iii. , pp. 307, 314-316.
CHAPTEE in.
Substance and Accident.
aet. i. — ^natube of substance and accident.
93. Substance is heing existing in itself ; accident is
being existing in another as its subject. — Being is known
either as something which subsists in itself without
needing to be sustained by another, or as something
which needs a subject in which and by which it may
exist. In the former case, being is called substance ;
in the latter, it is called accident. Thus " Peter " is
a substance, because he exists in himself ; " white " is
an accident, because it does not exist without a sub-
stance in which it inheres. Substance is also defined
negatively as that which is not in ajwther as its subject ;
or descriptively as that which sustains accidents. But
from the fact that a substance exists in itself, we are
not to infer that it excludes the idea of a cause which
produces it, but only that of a subject in which it
inheres. To define substance, with Descartes, as " that
which exists in such a way as to need nothing else for
its existence," is to open the door to pantheism.
94. The idea of szibstance is formed from a sensible
concrete object by abstraction, by which the intellect per-
ceives in the object that xohich exists in itself and not in
another as its subject. — When the intellect contemplates
a sensible concrete object as existing, it has the power
of abstracting from it existence in itself and not in
190 REAL PHIL080PHT.
anotlier as its subject. But this perception of exist.,
ence in itself includes tliat of substance, viz., of that
which is in itself, without requiring any thing- else as
its subject ; and it is obtained by abstracting from all
the characteristics which accompany the substance
and cannot exist by themselves in the order of reality.
For when the intellect has formed the idea of sub-
stance by abstraction from a sensible concrete object,
it contemplates this idea as it is in itself, and per-
ceives that it is applicable not only to corporeal be-
ings, but also to spiritual beings that exist in them-
selves and not in another as their subject.
95. When the intellect has the idea of substance and
of accident, it immediately perceives the truth of the
proposition : Ever^y accident supposes a substance. — With
the idea of accident, the intellect possesses implicitly
that of substance. The comparison of these two ideas
results in the immediate perception that accident
cannot naturally exist without substance, since that
which does not exist in itself can exist only in an-
other being which has existence in itself. Hence the
proposition given above expresses an analytical judg-
ment.
96. The Phenomenalism of Hume, who denies the
reality of substance, is absurd, because by denying sub-
stance he maJces accident impossible. — Locke, by admit-
ting no other source of ideas than the senses, was led
to deny the reality of substance and to hold that
what is so called is in reality only a number of quali-
ties held together by a common bond. But this is
an absurd hypothesis ; for, if the bond is not sub-
stance, it must be accident, and hence, in its turn,
requires a substance to support it. The principle of
Locke led Berkeley (1684-1758) to denj' all corporeal
substance, and Hume to deny all substance, corporeal
SUB8TAN0S AND AOGIDENT. 191
and spiritual, and to assert that only qualities exist
and are known to us. The Phenomenalism of Hume,
which rejects the "very idea of substance, is absurd.
For an accident exists either in itself, or in some^
thing else ; it cannot exist in itself, for it would
then be no longer an accident ; therefore it exists in
something else. But this latter cannot be itself an
accident, for we should then have to proceed from
one accident to another ad infinitum, thus postulat-
ing an infinite series of accidents, resting on nothing,
which is absurd. Therefore eVery accident must be
supported by something wliich is not accident, that
is, by substance.
97. Accidents are absolute or modal. Some absolute
accidents can by divine power exist apart from, their con'
natural substance. — Absolute accidents are those that
directly affect substance ; modal accidents are the
various ways in which the absolute accidents affect
substance. The quantity or mass of matter of a
bullet moving through the air is an absolute acci-
dent ; the velocity of its motion is a modal accident.
Actual inhesion in their connatural subject is essential
to modal accidents, whereas most absolute accidents
demand only aptitudinal inherence. Vital actions
are an exception, however, not because of their
generic nature as absolute accidents, but because of
their specific nature requiring the actual influx of the
life principle.*
Some absolute accidents of corporeal substance can
by divine power exist apart from their substance ; for
an effect depends more on the first cause than on its
second cause. God, who is the first cause of both
substance and accident, can by His infinite power
'csofilie 8ehool, vol. ii., pp. 343, 584.
192 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
preserve the accidents after He has withdrawn the
substance by which, as by their proper cause, they
were sustained. Even then the accidents do not
cease to be accidents, since they retain their natural
aptitude to inhere in substance.
AET. n. — DIFFEEENT KINDS OF SUBSTANCE.
98. Substance is complete or i'licomplete, first or second.
— ^A complete substance is one that is not destined to
be united to another to form a substantial composite ;
as a " man," a " tree." An incomplete substance is one
that must be united to another to form a substantial
whole or specific nature ; as the " body of man."
First substance is individual; as "John," "James."
It is so called because it is that which first and by
itself sustains the accidents, and because it is the
first thing perceived by the intellect. Second sub-
stance comprises genera and species ; as " man,"
" animal." It is so called because it subsists only in
the individual with which it is identified, and because
it is known by the intellect subsequently to the in-
dividual.
AET. m. — SUBSISTENCE, SUPPOSIT, AND PERSON.
99. Subsistence is a perfection hy which a nature is
master of itself and incommunicaile to anotlier. — Com-
plete substance differs from accident and incomplete
substance, because it belongs to itself, while accident
and incomplete substance belong to another. Now,
subsistence is that perfection which makes the sub-
stance complete, and by which the substance so
belongs to itself as not to require union with another
in order to be and to act.
SUBSTANOE AND AOOIDENT. 193
100. Supposit is the concrete entity that answers to the
abstract subsistence. Person adds the character of in-
telligent nature to the supposit. — When considered as
having concirete existence in a complete substance,
subsistence is called supposit, just as life considered
in the concrete in a living thing is called a living
being. Therefore supposit is subsistence itself con-
sidered as existing concretely in a particular individ-
ual. When the supposit is endowed with reason it
is called person, which Boethius defines as "an in-
dividual substance of ,a rational [intelligent] nature."
A " stone " and a " horse " are supposits ; " George "
and " Joseph " are persons.* f
101. Subsistence is a positive entity really distinct from
nature. — It is a great perfection for a nature to have
no need of another as subject in which to inhere.
Since subsistence means this perfection, it is some-
thing positive. The distinction of. subsistence from
nature is proved by the mystery of the Incarnation,
in which the subsistence of the human nature is
wanting to this nature. J Subsistence may also be
said to differ from existence, since subsistence belongs
* An infinite teing is necessarily personal because it has all per-
fections.
f Personality is not consciousness, as Locke asserted, Tor then
personality would cease with the interruption of consciousness. But
consciousness supposes personality.
X In the Incarnation Christ's human nature, being perfected by its
hypostatic or substantial union with the divine nature, has no per-
sonality of its own. The divine nature of Christ, being infinite,
must, according to the preceding note, be infinite, and therefore
Incapable of losing its personality. Hence in our Lord there are
two natures, one human and the other divine, but there is only
one person, and that is divine. Hence the purely human actions
of Christ have an infinite merit as proceeding from an infinito
person.
13
194 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
to complete substance only, while existence is com-
mon to both accident and substance.
AET. rv. — ACCIDENTS. — QUANTITY.
102. The first accident of material substance or hody
is quantity, which consists in extension of parts hey and
parts. — When we perceive extension of parts in a sub-
stance, we perceive clearly that it has quantity, which
is defined an accident extensive of substance. Occupa-
tion of a determinate place, divisibility into parts,
and mensurability, are properties that belong to sub-
stance by reason of its quantity ; but they do not
constitute the essence of quantity, for a body must
have parts before these parts occupy place, and are
divisible and mensurable.
103. Quantity is really distinct from suistance. — Ex-
tension no more implies existence in itself than does
heat or color. For just as we conceive a body as ex-
isting in itself before being hot or white, so also do we
conceive that it should have existence in itself before
having extension. And just as a body is not changed
essentially when it is more or less heated, more or
less white, so there is no essential change when by
expansion it acquires a greater extension than it had
before. Since, then, corporeal substance is shown by
experience to be indifferent in its essence to that de-
terminate quantity which it actually has at any given
moment of its existence, quantity must be really dis-
tinct from substance. Descartes held the essence of
material substance to consist in extension ; but this
is a great error. For that to which corporeal sub-
stance is manifestly indifferent is not really of the
essence of such substance ; but physicists establish
the fact that the dimensions may and do vary with
SUB8TAN0E AND AOOIDENT. 195
changing external influences, and chemists prove that
the substantial nature of bodies perseveres under
these changes. Therefore the essence of material
substance does not consist in extension.
104. Quantity is permanent or successive ; permanent
quantity is either continuous or discrete. — Permanent
quantity is that whose parts can exist simultaneously,
as a "line." Successive quantity is that whose parts
do not exist simultaneously, but follow one another in
a continuous series ; as " time," " motion." This kind
of quantity is improperly so called ; motion and time
have no extension in themselves, but time has exten-
sion by reason of motion ; and motion, by reason of
the medium between the term whence {terminus a quo)
and the term whither {terminus ad quern). Continuous
quantity is that whose parts are contained within a
common limit ; as a " line," a " surface," a " solid."
Discrete quantity is that whose parts are not naturally
united ; as " numerical quantity, or number."
105. In the hypothesis that God preserves the accidents
of a iody after withdrawing the substance, the divine
power will he the principle of individuation of the acci-
dents; directly, of the mensurable quantity or extension,
and through this, of all the other accidents. — The sub-
stance is the principle of individuation for the acci-
dents ; when the substance is withdrawn, the divine
power supports the accidents, and is therefore their
individuating principle. It directly sustains the
mensurable quantity which now just as when the sub-
stance is present, is the principle of individuation of
the other accidents, because they are individuated
only inasmuch as they are in a subject divided off
from any other, and because division is referred to
quantity.
196 REAL PHILOSOPHT.
AET. V. — RELATION.
106. Relation in general is the respect that one entity
has to another. Relation is real or logical. Real rela-
tion is created or uncreated. Created relation is either
a relation of ieing or a relation of indication. — Real
relation is the respect or order wMcli exists among
things themselves ; thus " effect is referred to cause,"
" a part to the whole." Logical relation is the respect
established between entities by our intellect; thus
" an attribute is referred to its subject." Uncreated
relation is the respect which one divine Person has to
another. There are four uncreated relations : pater-
nity, filiation, active spiratio7i, and passive spiration.
Created relation is the respect which one created en-
tity has to another created entity or to th"e Creator.*
It is a relation of being when it is a pure respect to a
term ; as " paternity," which indicates a pure order
of one thing to another. Created relation is said to
be of indication when it is something not merely rel-
ative, but absolutely containing a respect ; as " the
arm," which indicates a respect to the whole body.
107. Relation considered as an accident or predica-
mental relation is a real created relation, which consists
* Created relation is also called transcendental, and relation of be-
ing is known as predicamental. ' ' A Predicamental relation exercises
no other office tlian tliat of simply looking to its term ; while Tran-
scendental relation' besides and primarily exercises some other ofice
in respect of its term ; for instance, of producing, of depending, etc.
Thus there is a relation between knowledge and the truth known be-
cause of the cognosoibility of the latter. As all finite being is in some
such way dependent on some other, such relation runs through all
the categories and beyond. Hence it is called Transcendental "—
Metaphysics of the School, voL i., p. 587.
SUBSTANOE AND AOOIDENT. 197
in a pure respect.— Bj this deiinition logical relations,
uncreated relations, and relations of indication are
excluded from relation considered as an accident.
108. Pi'edicaraental relation requires a real suhject, a
real foundation, a real term, and a real distinction ietween
the foundation and the term. — The subject of a relation
is the thing in which the relation is ; the foundation
is that which causes the relation ; the term is that to
which there is reference. Thus, in the relation of " pos-
session," the " man who possesses " is the subject, the
" object possessed " is the term, and the " purchase
that gives possession " is the foundation. Predicamen-
tal relation requires a real subject, else there would
be no real accident, and a real foundation; a cause,
namely, that produces the relation, because a real ef-
fect requires a real cause. There must be a real term,
because relation consists in respect to a term, and it
would not be real if the term were not real. Finally,
there must be a real distinction between the founda-
tion and the term, because there cannot be a relation
of a thing to itself.
109. The relation is really distinct from the founda-
tion and from all that is absolutely in the thing. — Two
things are really distinct when their entities are not
identical. But the entity of the foundation is not
really identical with the entity of the relation, since
the former is absolutely in the thing, while the latter
is a mere respect ; moreover, the entity of the founda-
tion remains when the relation perishes. Relation,
therefore, is really distinct from its foundation. It is
also distinct from all that is absolutely in the thing.
110. Relation is of three kinds, for it may be
founded, (1) on measure and the measurable ; (2)
on action and passion ; (3) on agreement and disagree-
ment.— Since the relation is caused by the foundation,
198 BEAL PHIL080PET.
there are as many kinds of relation as there are kinds
of foundation. Now, there are as many foundations
of relation as there are modes of referring one thing
to another. These are three : (1) As to being, when
one entity is considered the measure of another's per-
fection ; thus " a copy is referred to the model ; " (2)
As to operation, when one is cause or effect of the
other ; thus " a father bears relation to his child ; "
(3) As to agreement or disagreement ; and thus " one
white surface is referred to another white surface."
Hence there are three kinds of relation. And as the
agreement or disagreement is especially remarked in
three things, viz., substance, quantity, and quality,
this kind of relation is subdivided into relations of
identity or diversity, if the entities be substance ; into
relations of equality or inequality, if they be quantity;
and into relations of resemhlance or difference, if they
be quality. Relation is also classified as mutual or
non-mutual according as it implies reciprocity or not.
Thus there is mutual relation between "father and
son," and a non-mutual relation between " creature
and Creator." * These various kinds of relation are
further subdivided into several species. That which
constitutes two relations in the same species is unity
of foundation and of term ; that which makes them of
different species is diversity of foundation or of term.f
*"A mutual relation is tliat wliereiu there Is a real foundation
for the relation in each of the two terms ; as, for instance, in the
relation between ^father and son,' or between ' Tang and subject.' A
non-mutual relation is that wherein the foundation is real in one term
only, while it is purely logical in the other. . Such is the relation
between ' science, subjectively understood, and its object ; ' or, again,
between the ' Creator [as God] and His creature. ' " — Metaphysics of
the Sclwol, Tol. li. , pp. 157, 158.
\ The properties of relations are, says Zigliara (Art. 40) : 1°, to hare
8UBSTAN0E AND AOOIDENT. 199
111. It is impossible to know one correlative without
the other. — The knowledge of two correlatives is nec-
essarily simultaneous ; it is impossible, for instance,
to know a servant as servant without knowing also
his master as master.
AET. TI. — QTJALiry.
112. Quality is that accident which tells of what kind a
substance is. — Quality may be more exactly defined with
St. Thomas as That accident which tnodifies or deter-
mines a substance in itself. The other accidents effect
no modification of the substance in itself ; even quan-
tity extends the substance in parts, but does not
modify them ; quality, on the contrary, does modify
them, and gives them this or that manner of being,
this or that figure.
113. There are four species of quality : 1. habit and
disposition ; 2. power and impotence ; 3. passion and the
passible quality ; 4. form and figure. — There are four
species of quality, because the substance can be modi-
fied or disposed in four ways. The substance can be
disposed: (1) As to its state so as to be well or ill ;*
hence we have the species of habit and disposition ; (2)
As to its operation, hence the species oi power and im-
potence ; (3) As to the sensible alteration that consti-
tutes it in a new mode ; hence the species of passion
no contrary, but only to exclude identity of subject as subject and
of term as term ; 2°, not to be susceptible of more or less ; 3°, to be
mutually convertible, i.e., one correlative is explained only by ref-
erence to the other correlative ; 4°, to be simiiltaneous in nature ;
5°, to be simultaneous in cognition.
*That is, " well or ill," relatively to the end which by its nature
it is destined to attain ; thus man is well disposed by nature to at-
tain everlasting happiness.
200 REAL PHILOSOPHT.
and ■passible quality ; (4) As to its quantitative parts,
and hence the species oiform and ^figure.
114.' Habit is a quality inhering intimately in the sub-
ject and determining it to a good or evil state either in it-
self or its operation. When this qxiality inheres slightly
in the subject, or is easily removed, it is called disposition.
—Ordinarily a substance is indiiferent to a g'ood or
bad state either in itself or in its operation. Thus
the body is indifferent to health or sickness, the hand
to painting or not painting, the will to doing good
or evil. No>v, it is " health " that determines the body
to a good state, and " sickness " to a bad state. It is
the " ability to paint " that puts the hand in a good
disposition with regard to the work, and the "inabili-
ty " that maintains it in a bad state. It is " virtue "
that disposes the will to do good, and " vice " that-dis-
poses it to do evil.*
115. Potoer f is a quality that disposes the substance to
action or resistance. When this qiudity is feeble, it is
called powerlessness or impotence. — While habit deter-
mines a faculty to a good or bad state, the faculty
gives the substance that has it a power. Thus the
" faculty of intellect " gives the soul the power of com-
prehending, and " science " disposes it toward truth.
116. Passion is a quality which causes or follows a
sensible alteration.X When permanent it receives the
* See Psychology, § 77.
f Harper (Metaphysics of the School, vol. iii., p. 300,) renders the
potentia of the Schoolmen by natural power or faculty ; passio by
affection, and qualiias patibilis by affective quality. He Is calling at-
tention to the fact that all the species of quality but the last may be
efficient causes.
I " Material entities are subject to two intrinsic changes ; in one of
which all th^t is universally recognized as substantial remains, but
certain accidental modifications, such as sine, colour, shape, and the
Kke are changed, — that is to say, these are not the same as they were
ce
SUBSTANCE AND AOOIDENT. 201
name of passible quality.— Va-ssion, taken in this sense,
comprises the whole series of sensible qualities.
Thus "heat," "taste," and "smell" are passions.
117. Form or figure is a quality which results from
diverse dispositions of the parts of a quantity.— li is that
quality by which the parts of a quantity are disposed
and determined in this or that way, for instance, as a
pyramid" or a "triangle." For7n is applied more par-
ticularly to artificial products ;^5'wre to natural objects.
AET. VII. — ACTION, PASSION, TIME, AND PLACE.
118. Action is an accident hy which a cause is consti-
tuted in the act of producing its effect. Passion is an
accident hy which a thing is constituted in the act of re-
ceiving an effect. — In the production of an effect three
things are to be noted : (1) its proceeding from the
efficient cause ; (2) its reception into a subject ; (3)
its production or its passage from the state of pure
potentiality to that of act. The proceeding of an effect
from its cause is the accident that is called action.
The reception of the effect into a subject is the acci-
dent that is called passion, which must not be con-
founded with the quality that causes or follows a
sensible alteration ; the production of the effect is
called motion, which, however, is not an accident, but
is classified with that in which it terminates. Thus
the " motion productive of heat " is reduced to the
accident of heat.*
before. In the other, every thing is seen to change, — substance, nat-
ure, properties, as well as Accident ; as in the instance of sugar,
when submitted to tJie chemical action of sulphuric acid. The former
species of change goes by the name of alteration ; the latter is known
as generation." — Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., p. 275.
* "That reality which is called action is included under three Cate-
gories. According to its formal signification, by which the effect in
202 REAL PHILOSOPBT.
119. Action is transient or immanent ; immanent action
is cognitive or appetitive; transient action is artificial
or natural. Passion is divided according to the various
divisions of action. — Transient action produces some-
thing outside the agent ; as " burning : " immanent ac-
tion produces an effect which remains wholly within
the agent ; as, "understanding," " imagining." Imma-
nent action is either cognitive, and then it is divided
into sensitive and intellective, or appetitive, the subdivi-
the subject denotes the Efficient Cause, by an extrinsic denomination,
as that on which it depends ; it is in its own Category of Action. Con-
sidered as connoting a consequent relation between cause and effect,
or Subject and effect ; it is included under the Category of Kelation.
Considered as an accidental perfection really inherent in agent as
well as In Subject, it belongs to the Category of Quality. . . .
' Action, according to its formal meaning [says St. Thomas], does not
express its being m the agent, but /roOT the agent.' . . . Though
action materially denotes motion, and passion materially denotes
motion ; yet action formally connotes the Efficient Cause, while
passion formally connotes the Subject. . . . But motion for-
mally denotes the efEect in fari only ; materially, however, it con-
notes its two terms. . . . Motion, therefore, is an intermediate
between agent and Subject, but formally including neither. By the
medium of the motion, agent and Subject are united together ; be-
cause they meet in one and the same motion. The motion is truly
affirmed to be in the agent as an accident, no less than from the
agent as the termintis a quo ; because the accidental form, from
which the action proceeds and by which it is initiated, is inherent
in the agent. The terminus a quo of the transient action, as trandent,
is the body which is the Efficient Cause ; and the terminus ad qtiem,
under the same respect, is the body that is Subject of theoausal ac-
tion. The terminus a quo of the transient action, as action, is the acci-
dental form in the agent, as proximately disposed for producing the
effect ; the terminus ad quern is the completed effect. The motion is
the effect in fieri. In bodily motion there are two principal condi-
tions, or rather, elements, — to wit, continuity and succession. The
former is measured by place ; the latter, by time." — Metapliydc% qf
the Selwol, vol. iil. , pp. 877-379.
8UB8TA1TGE AND AOOIDENT. 203
sions of which are volition and sensitive appetition. Ar-
tificial action is the result of art, and natural action
the work of nature. For every action there is a corre-
sponding passion.*
120. When {quando) is an accident supervening on
lodies, inasmuch as they are in a certain period of time.^
— A body is of itself indifferent to time ; to be in one
time rather than in another, it requires an accidental
determination which is called quando, or the when of
it. This accident in bodies results from the fact that
they are dependent on time or are measured by time ;
as, to be " present," " past," or " future."
121. JJUcation, or uhiety {ubi), is that accident of lody
iy which it is determined to he in one place rather than in
another. X — ^A body is of itself indifferent to place ; to
be in one place rather than in another, it needs an
accidental determination called uhication ; as, to be
" above " or " below," to be " in Washington."
Place is defined by Aristotle as " the superficies of
the containing body considered as immovable and
immediately contiguous to the body located." The
place, for instance, of a man standing in a stream is
partly the river-bed on which he stands, partly the
watery surface in immediate contact with his body,
and the atmosphere about his head. This bounding
surface is considered immovable, for though the con-
tiguous particles of air and water are successively
displaced, the circumscribed limits remain the same.
The universe has no extrinsic place, since there is no
body outside it ; its intrinsic place is determined by
its own superficies.
The category luhere is said to be circumscriptive, be-
' See Psychology, § 3, 6, 43, 70. t See Cosmology, § 36-39.
X Ibid., § 83-35.
204 BEAL PHILOSOPHY.
cause it so determines a thing tliat it is whole and
entire in the whole place, and each of its parts is
measured by a corresponding part of place. Hence
this category is an accident of bodies only. A sub-
stance is in place definitively when it is whole and
entire in the whole place and in each part of that
place. This is proper to created spiritual beings, like
human souls and the angels, but not to God, who is
whole and entire in each and every place simultane-
ously.
122. Posture, or situation (situs), is that accident of
body resulting from the disposition of its parts in a place.
— The same body is susceptible of various disposi-
tions in the same place ; the accident that determines
it to one disposition rather than another is called
posture ; as, " standing up," " sitting down," " kneel-
ing."
123. Habiliment is that accident of hodies resulting
from the m,anner in which they are covered. — This acci-
dent is not the covering itself, but the disposition
supervening on the body from the manner in which it
is covered by the garment ; as, " to have on a mitre
or a stole," " to wear slippers."
SPECIAL METAPHYSICS.
1. Special Metaphysics treats of tlie world, of man, and
of God ; it is therefore divided into Cosmology, Psy-
chology, and Natural Theology. — While General Meta-
physics studies being in its general characteristics,
Special Metaphysics studies beings in particular.
Now, on the one hand, there is the Uncreated Being,
and, on the other, there are created beings, among
whom man, as occupying a privileged place, claims
also a special study. That part of philosophy which
treats of created beings other than man is called Cos-
mology ; that which treats of man is called Psychol-
ogy, or Anthropology, and lastly, that which treats of
God is called Natural Theology.
COSMOLOGY.
2. Cosmology is the science of the corporeal world in
its first or ultimate principles. — Cosmology is defined,
according to its etymology, as a discourse about the
world, and thus understood would embrace also a
discourse about man. But because man occupies a
place apart in creation, philosophers make him the
object of a special science, and in Cosmology study
only the first principles of the world, considered at
first in general, and then in particular with reference
to non-living and living beings, or to inorganic and
organic beings.
14
CHAPTEE I
The "World in General.
art i. — origin of the world.
3. It is a gross error to admit with Democritus, Epi=
curios, Lucretius, and the materialists of all times, that
matter is eternal, and that the world was formed iy the
fortuitous concourse of atoms, i.e., of indivisible particles
of matter, diverse in figure and size, and endowed with
motion. — -The theory of atomism has at all times pro-
voked the contempt of philosophers, and has always
been rejected by common sense, for its absurdity is
manifest. For, if the world has been produced by
the fortuitous concourse of atoms, we must admit
that it is the product of chance. But chance cannot
be the cause of the admirable order that reigns
throughout the universe among the various beings
whose special ends are all co-ordinated and all made
subordinate to one supreme and general end.
Chance* is of itself blind and indifferent ; it never
works according to universal and constant laws. How
then could the constancy and harmony of the universe
spring from such a cause ? Chance, moreover, is an
empty word which we use to hide our ignorance ; it
is because of our limited knowledge, that not know-
ing their true cause, we refer certain things to chance.
* See Ontology, § 82.
THE WORLD IN GENERAL. 207
But even supposing the production of the world pos-
sible by the fortuitous meeting of atoms, atomism
would be none the less absurd, because it is impossi-
ble to admit the eternity and independence of matter.
For such matter would necessarily be infinite. But
that cannot be, because matter is composed of parts,
each of which is finite, and no addition of finite to
finite can make the infinite.
4. It is absurd to admit, with Plato and Aristotle, an
eternal and indeterminate matter out of which Ood pro-
duces the world when He clothes it with determinate
forms.— 'Fxova. the very fact that matter cannot be
eternal and independent, the falsity of this system is
manifest. But it appears equally so if we grant the
possibility of eternity and independence in matter.
For that which is independent in its being must be
independent also in its operation, since operation
follows being ; therefore, if matter were independent
of God in its being, it would still be so when, by its
transformations, the world would be made ; whence it
would follow that God could not even have put order
in the universe.
5. God is the absolute and universal cause of the
world. — If matter is not' eternal and independent, and
if the world is not the result of the fortuitous con-
course of atoms, it is evident that it was made by the
action of God alone. ^It will not do to say that the
world made itself, for it must have being before it
can give it. Much less, in order to dispense with God
as its necessary cause, can it be asserted that the
world, though it did not make itself, yet proceeded
from an infinite series of contingent causes, i.e., from
an infinite series of beings, each of which can exist
only by the action of another being. Such a series is
only a chain of effects without a cause, and is mani-
208 REAL PHILOaOPHT.
festly absurd.* Nor can it be asserted that the world
was made out of some pre-existing subject ; for this
subject must have been either uncreated matter or the
divine substance, God Himself. But the first hypoth-
esis has been shown to be untenable and contra-
dictory. The second is equally absurd, since the
divine substance, as being infinitely perfect, is spir-
itual and therefore incapable of division. Since, then,
the teaching of both materialists and pantheists as to
the origin of the world, must be rejected, we must
admit that the world was created by God, that is, that
by His divine power He gave it its whole existence.
AET. n. — PERFECTION OE THE WOEU).
6. The world is relatively perfect, i.e., it has all that is
necessary to attain the end proposed hy its Author. — The
perfection of a work is measured by the end which
the agent proposes, and the manner in which the
means answer to the end. In both these respects the
world may be called perfect ; it is perfect as to its
end, which is none other than the glorification of
God; and perfect as to the means of attaining its
end, since the world, being the work of infinite wis-
dom and power, must have all that is suited to the
integrity of its nature, in order to attain the end
intended by its Author. Hence when the world is
said to be perfect, there is no question of absolute
perfection, but only of a perfection relative to its
nature and end. This is true optimism, and has been
embraced by the greatest philosophers, such as
Plato, St. Augustine (354-430), St. Thomas, Bossuet
(1627-1704), and Fenelon (1651-1715).
* On Creation and the End of Creation, see Natural ThecHogu,
§ 27-39.
THE WORLD IN GENERAL. 209
7. It is false to maintain, with Malebranehe and Leib-
nitz, that the present world is absolutely the best possible.
— This form of optimism was held by the Stoics, by
Abelard, and by Descartes. It is founded by Male-
branehe on the almost infinite perfection which has
been imparted to the present world by the mystery of
the Incarnation. It is based by Leibnitz on the prin-
ciple that God, who does nothing without sufficient
reason, could not have preferred the present world to
the other possible worlds, if this were not the best
possible, and therefore this is the most perfect pos-
sible. But both these forms of optimism are absurd.
(1) For even though it is metaphysically impossible
for God to raise a creature higher than He has raised
the created human nature of Christ, or even, as high
as He has raised that nature, yet this world remains
intrinsically finite, and therefore is not in every respect
the most perfect possible. (2) It is true that God, who
is sovereignly intelligent, wise, and free, does noth-
ing without a sufficient reason ; but this sufficient
reason is to be found not in the object, the term
of divine action, but in the agent, God himself;
otherwise God would not be sovereignly free and in-
dependent.
8. The world is not eternal. — I. If the world were
necessarily eternal, it would follow that, since it is
created (§ 5), God was from all eternity necessitated
to create it. But since God is infinitely perfect and
therefore sovereignly free, as will be shown in JVat-
ural Theology (§ 21), this hypothesis must be rejected.
II. The world is not contingently eternal, for the
traditions of all peoples point to its beginning. More-
over, the generally accepted nebular hypothesis, the
different strata of the earth's crust, and the fossil
remains of the animal and the vegetable kiagdom, all
210 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
imply succession, and therefore a beginning. The
exact duration implied in the nebular hypothesis is,
however, only matter of speculation ; for it must be
granted that the agencies then at work were much
more powerful than those of the present time. The
periods, also, assigned' by geologists for the forma-
tion of the earth's strata, with their embedded fossils,
are based in general upon the assumption that the
forces employed were the same, and energized with
no greater momentum and velocity than they do to-
day. But it is possible, and even probable, that in
the world's primeval age they were far greater in
momentum and efficiency.
Although the possibility of an eternal creation of the
universe is affirmed by St. Thomas, it is denied by
St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) and Petau (1583-1651),
Toletus (1532-1596) and Gerdil (1718-1802), on the
ground that thereby creation is confounded with
preservation, and that the succession of changes in
the world necessitates a beginning. Both parties
agree that the world is not actually eternal. As to
the days of creation there are three leading schools :
the Allegorical school of Alexandria, made illustrious
by the names of Clement (150-220 ?), Origen (186-253),
and St. Athanasius (296-373), taught that all creation
was simultaneous, and that the succession of the
Scriptural record is one of order only. The school of
Cappadocia held that the elements only were created
simultaneously, and that the successive transforma-
tions were real. This was the opinion of St. Basil
(329-379), and in the Latin Church of SS. Ambrose
(340-397), Hilary (300-367), Augustine (354-430), and
Gregory the Great (542-604). Finally, there was an-
other school, of which St. Ephraim of Edessa (d. 378),
and St. John Chrysostom of Antioch (347-407), were
THE WORLD IN GENERAL. 2H
exponents, that interpreted literally the Mosaic record
of creation.
As to the age of man no attested discoveries of
geology have yet invalidated the authority of the
Sacred Text, nor can they do so, since the genealogi-
cal tables of Scripture are not complete, generations
being omitted here and there, the one purpose of the
Inspired Writers being " to follow the direct line." *
ABT III. — OEDEE OP THE UNTVEESE.
9. The order of the universe has its source in the subor-
dination of the special ends of the various kinds of being
to a common end, and in the manner in which each ieing
constantly attains its own end, and thereby the common
end. — Experience proves that every being works for an
end, and reason also tells us that God, who is infinite
wisdom, must appoint an end for each of His creatures.
But experience further shows us that the special ends
of the various kinds of being tend to one universal
end ; and reason likewise shows that God, having cre-
ated the world after one single protobype, must by the
very fact have given it one single end. On the other
hand, the subordination of ends presupposes a subor-
dination of the agents that concur to these ends ; for
since the end is reached by the action of the agent,
the ends that are subordinated must necessarily be
attained by the action of agents subordinated one
to another. All creatures are, therefore, bound to-
gether by this double subordination of end and ac-
tion ; and this' bond constitutes the order and har-
mony of the universe.
10. There is a natural gradation in created entities, so
* See Avologie de la Foi Chritienne, pp. 416-433.
212 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
thit what is highest in an inferior order horders on what
is lowest in a superior order, and all < beings form as it
were a ladder iy which even from the lowest we ascend to
God. — Since all creatures are subordinated to one
another, it is evident that they must constitute a
hierarchical order and a natural gradation. Thus
man by his intellectual life is associated to the angels,
and by his sensitive life to mere animals ; brutes ap-
proach to man by sensitive life, and to plants by
vegetative life ; plants are allied to brutes by vegeta-
tive life, and to minerals by their purely chemical and
physical properties. (See Special Ideology, § 51-55).
11. The law of continuity, as set forth by Leibnitz, is
false, viz., that to unite one S2)ecies with another there
must be a species which possesses the qualities of the other
two. — These intermediate species, destined to unite
one class of beings with another, would have the
qualities essential to both, and would necessarily be
self-contradictory. Thus an animal-plant would be
both sensitive and not sensitive ; sensitive as an
animal, and not sensitive as a plant ; but such a bemg
is impossible. Without doubt, among the species of
the same genus there is such a gradation that the
intermediate serve to join the lower with the higher
species. So also the less perfect species of a higher
genus help to connect it with a genus of a lower
order. Yet in spite of these links there is always an
essential difference between one species and another,
between one genus and another; and this essential
distinction of beings is not less necessary than their
gradation, to constitute the admirable order of the
universe.
12. It is false to assert, with Geoffry SaintSilaire,
that there is unity of composition among entities, so that,
in spite of multitudinous individual differences, all are
THE WORLD IN GENERAL. 213
referred to one and tlie saw^ prototype. — Since the sys-
tem of unity of composition is only a consequence of
the law of continuity, its falsity is demonstrated with
that of the law on which it depends. Besides, the
consequences of this law suffice to show its error.
For the doctrine that there is no other than an acci-
dental difference among beings, and that all substances
are really identical, leads by logical sequence to pan-
theism. On the other hand, if there is but one proto-
type which exists in all beings, materialists are not in
error when they regard life, nay, intelligence itself,
as differing from brute matter only as the greater
from the less.
CHAPTEK n.
The World in Eelation to Non-Living oe Inorganic
Bodies.
art. i. — pkimitite eliements of bodies.
13. All the theories relative to the primitive elements of
hodies are necessarily reduced to three : Atomism, Dy-
namism, and the Scholastic system of Matter and Form.
— Bodies manifest themselves to us as endowed with
force and extension. But certain philosophers, regard-
ing- the latter as the only essential property, admit
only one principle in bodies, that of extension, and
look upon force as an accident superadded to this
principle. They are called Atomists. Others, called
Dynamists, will have it that extension is produced
by the active principle of bodies. Lastly, the School-
men, avoiding equally these two extremes, have ad-
mitted two distinct principles in bodies, matter and
form. Whatever other opinions are held as to the
principles of bodies may easily be reduced to one of
these systems. For either the body is composed of
extended atoms, or it is constituted of active forces, or
it has within it both a principle of extension and a
principle of activity.
14. Atomism is false iecause it destroys i,he substan-
tial difference hetween hodies. — The atomic theory was
taught in ancient times by Epicurus, Democritus,
NON-LIVING OR INORGANIO BODIES. 215
and Leucippus, and more recently by DescarteSj
Gassendi (1592-1655), and Newton (1642-1727). It
considers extended atoms, i.e., indivisible substances,
to be the sole constituent elements of bodies. (1)
Whether the supporters of this system hold that
the atoms are homogeneous or that they are hetero-
geneous, whether they endow the atoms with such or
such qualities, it is still evident that their theory makes
force in bodies an impossibility, since it views them as
purely passive entities without any energy of their own.
This is equally opposed to reason and experience. (2)
It is also manifest that ijx this theory there is no sub-
stantial difference among bodies. For, if all the atoms
are of the same nature, bodies will differ from one an-
other only by a greater or less degree of condeiisation
or rarefaction. Water, for instance, will differ from fire
only by a greater or less condensation of its constit-
uent atoms. If the atoms are not of the same nature
they will never constitute substantial units, and bodies
will be only accidental aggregations of atoms, which
are united by attraction or by chance. To illustrate,
water will be only the reunion of two volumes of hy-
drogen and one of oxygen ; it will have no substantial
nature, no properties of its own, but will possess only
the united substances and properties of hydrogen
and oxygen.
15. Dynmnism is false iecause it makes extension an
impossibility. — The dj'namic theory, proposed ages
ago by Pythagoras and adopted in modern times by
Leibnitz (1646-1716), Boscovich (1711-1787), and Kant
(1724-1804), maintains that the only elements of bodies
are monads, i.e., simple inextended active substances.
This theory is manifestly absurd. For by regarding
monads as simple substances it suppresses a funda-
mental property of bodies, viz., extension. For in
216 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
extension there are two elements, viz., multiplicity
and continuity of parts. But if it be maintained with
Leibnitz that the monads are placed side by side, ex-
tension is impossible, because two indivisible ele-
ments cannot come in contact without penetrating
each other. If, again, it be stated with Boscovich
that the monads are endowed with the forces of at-
traction and repulsion, extension is equally impos-
sible ; for two inextended points can never produce
extension, whatever be the relation in which they
exist. Given two points at a determinate distance,
we can never say that we have a line ; nor can any
number of separate points make a line.
16. The Scholastic system ofTnatter and form is demon-
strated hy the study of the very nature of bodies ; and it
alone explains the extension and force with which iodies
are endowed. — The system taught by Aristotle and
Plato in ancient times, and in the Christian era by
St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and generally by all the
philosophers of the Schools, admits two distinct prin-
ciples as the ultimate constituents of bodies: one
called mutter, or, as it is tevmedL, primordial ov primary
matter, to distinguish it from that out of which some-
thing is made by art, and which is called secondary
matter; the other called form, and more precisely,
substantial ^orin, to distinguish it from that which is
added to the subject after it is already complete in its
substantial entity, and which is known as accidental
form,. According to the Schoolmen, matter is nothing
but a reality indeterminate as body, and incapable of
existing by itself ; because it is not a principle of
unity and activity, but only the basis of extension.
As by reason of its indetermination it presents only a
pure aptitude to become by virtue of the form this or
that body, it is defined as a substantial potentiality, i.e.,
NON-LIVING OR INOBGANIO BODIES. 217
such a principle as though not yet a corporeal sub-
stance, is still apt to become any corporeal substance
whatever. The /brm is a simple principle and in it-
self inextended ; it constitutes each body in its own
species, and is the principle of unity and operation.
It is defined as ihejirst act of matter, because by it the
matter which has already an aptitude to become this
or that body, really becomes this or that body. An
easy proof of the existence of matter and form is
drawn from the substantial changes of bodies. For
everybody is subject to the law of change; but a
body changes "vyhen it becomes what it was not before,
and ceases to be what it was.* Hence in every change
we observe: (1) The subject which changes, and
which, not having at the beginning of the change
that which it is found to have at the end, may be
conceived as really distinct from the state that it
acquires after the change; (2) The determination
to be such a body before, and the determination to
be such a body after the change, determinations
which by their subtraction and addition produce the
change. The subject that changes is the matter
when the change is substantial, otherwise the sub-
ject of the change is the substance; the determina-
tion to be actually such a body is the substantial
form. The truth of this system of rnatter and form is
also proved by the fact that it alone reconciles what is
true in the arguments put forth by the atomists and
dynamists in favor of their theories, and is free from
the absurd and contradictory consequences of their
doctrines. For in it the imatter accounts for the ex-
* Thus, to borrow the example of Father Harper, an atom of car-
bon may be traced from the air to the grass of the field, thence to
the sheep, and later to the human body, from which it returns totho
air.
218 BEAL PEIL080PHT.
tension of bodies ; and ih.eform for their substantial
unity and their active forces.*
AET. II. — PEOPEETIES OS MATTER AND FOEM.
17. Primary matter has no existence of its own ; it is
indifferent to all modes of corporeal leing ; it indimdual-
izes the form from which it receives its perfection ; it is
the same for all hodies ; it tends naturally to the form ;
it is incapable of generation or corruption. — -Primary
matter cannot have an existence of its own, because it
has being in potentiality only ; whereas it is being in
act that really exists. It is indifferent to all inodes of
corporeal being, for if it were determined to receive a
particular form, the substantial changes that we see
in nature would be impossible. The matter individ-
ualizes the form ; for as the matter, although suscep-
tible of several forms, is yet limited by the form that it
receives, so the form, which, considered in itself, may
be applied to a multitude of beings, is determined by
the matter. The matter is the same for all bodies, as
experience shows, for we observe the same subject
passing through all the varieties of corporeal being.f
The matter tends naturally to the form, for, as a poten-
tiality, it is naturally ordained to an act. Lastly, the
matter is incapable of generation or corruption; for as
primary matter is the first subject of all substantial
changes, it excludes by that very fact every previ-
ously existing material subject. It can proceed from
nothing else, and is therefore incapable of generation,
and must be produced by creation. And as the mat
* See Metaphysics of tlie School, vol. ii., pp. 315-371, for adetailed
account of these theories with the various arguments for and against.
f Only primary matter and informing form are meant in these
two articles.
NON-LIVING OR INOBOANIO BODIES. 219
ter remains always the same from its origin, viz., by
itself a mere potentiality, it suffers no alteration, it
is incorruptible ; and as it could begin only by creation,
so it can end only by annihilation.
For a better understanding of the nature and prop-
erties of primary matter, we need only compare them
with the nature and properties of secondary matter.
Thus, when we see secondary matter, a mass of
bronze, for example, disposed to take on all artistic
forms, to become a statue, a table, or a basin, we can
conceive how primary matter is disposed to assume
all substantial forms, to become a stone, a plant, or
an animal. When we observe that this mass of
bronze cannot exist without some kind of form from
which it is really distinct, we understand how pri-
mary matter can have no existence of its own apart
from every substantial form, and how to the eyes of
reason it is still distinct from all substantial forms.
When we consider also that the bronze is indifferent to
being round or square, we infer the indifference of
primary matter to receive this or that substantial
form. And as the mass of bronze makes concrete the
round or square figure that terminates it, so we per-
ceive how the primary matter individualizes the form
by which it passes into act. Finally, the mass of
bronze remains always the same during the various
changes of form which it is made to undergo, and is
always the subject of these changes ; and so we con-
clude that the primary matter is the same for all
bodies, and that it can neither be generated nor cor-
rupted.*
18. All forms, except those that are intellective, are capa-
* Compare Metaphysics of tTie Selwol, vol. ii., pp. 187-215, a»d pp.
385-505.
220 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
hie of generation and corruption. — Substantial forms are
of two kinds, subsisting and informing. The former
exist alone without being united with matter, and of
thiese are the " angels ; " the latter have existence
only when united with matter; as, the form of an
"animal" or a "plant." The "human soul" shares
the nature of both these forms, because it can exist
with the body or without the body. But it is evi-
dent that all other forms than the angels and the
human soul are capable of generation and corruption.
For siuce it is by virtue of its form that a body is
this or that substance, it follows that in substantial
changes what was one kind of substance becomes
another kind, because the matter loses one form and
receives another. Hence, in substantial changes, the
old form is corrupted and the new one is generated ;
and as every form, except an intellective one, is sub-
ject to perish and give place to another form, every
one, except an intellective form, must be capable of
corruption and generation. *
To understand better the nature and properties of
the substantial form, we have only to compare them
with the nature and properties of the accidental form.
Thus when we consider the figure or accidental form
of a mass of bronze which, although it cannot exist
without being united to the bronze, is still distinct
from it, we understand how the informing substantial
form, although it cannot exist without the matter, is
still distinct from the matter. From perceiving how,
by the form given to it, the bronze becomes a statue
or a vase, we learn how the substantial form causes
* Intellective forms are inoapaole of eduction from the potentiality
of the matter, because they are spiritual, and spiritual being cannot
be the term of material action, since no effect can exceed the power
of its cause.
NON-LIVING on INOBGANIO BODIES 221
the matter to be actually this or that substance. If,
moreover, we observe that when a new form is given
to the bronze the old one passes away, we understand
something- of how substantial forms are corrupted
and generated.
19. The cori'uptible forms of bodies are not created, hut
they are educed hy the action of the agent from the poten-
tiality of the matter. — Corruptible forms are contained
potentially in the matter ; hence, when they are pro-
duced by the action of the agent, they cannot be said
to be made out of nothing ; but they are educed from
the potentiality of the matter, just as the form which
the sculptor gives to the marble is not said to be
drawn from nothing, but from the potentiality of the
marble to become a statue. * Of corruptible forms
only the first that informed matter have been created ;
since matter cannot exist without form, these first
forms cannot have been educed from the potentiality
of the matter. Matter and the first forms of matter
were concreated.t
* ' ' No Form strictly speaking can be corrupted. It is the com-
iposite that is corrupted ; and corruption is metonymioally predicated
of the Form. By the corruption of the substantial composite the
Form ceases to be in act. But it is not annihilated, just as it was
not created or made. It recedes then into the potentiality of the
matter ;^in other words, it is no longer actual, but virtually exists in
the matter after such sort that, should the requisite dispositions
recur, it can again be educed out of the matter." — Metaphysias of the
School, vol. ii., p. 486.
f "It is plain that the composite element was the primary and
adequate term, the matter and Form partial and secondary terms, of
the Divine act of creation.
" We say, then, with St. Thomas, that the two constituents were
concreated and that the composite was created ; — or, more accurately,
that the constituents, Form and Matter, were concreated in the crea-
tion of the composite." — See Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., prop.
184, p. 495.
222 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
AET. III. — THE NATUEAL COMPOSITE.
20. Bodies in nature are called natural composites, he-
cause they are constituted hy the natural union of matter
and form. — Neither the matter alone nor the form alone
constitutes the complete being ; but this consists in
the whole resulting from their union, which is there-
fore called a natural composite. This composite, which
is a product of nature, differs from an artificial com-
posite, which is a work of art, for the parts of the
natural composite form a unity of being and of sub-
stance, while the parts of the artificial composite pre-
serve each its own being and substance., The " stones "
in a building retain their own being and nature, and
are natural composites; the "building'' is artificial.
21. T?ie tnatter and form of the natural composite are
united immediately hy the action of the agent, without re-
quiring any intermediate Itond of connection.*' — The mat-
ter and form of the natural composite are not united
by means of a third object, as two stones are united
in a building by means of the mortar ; for potentiality
united with act is potentiality in act. Since, there-
fore, the form is united to the matter as act to poten-
tiality, nothing intervenes to unite them except the
action of the agent by which the matter is constituted
in act ; just as no medium is necessary to unite the
marble and the form of a statue given to it, the labor
of the sculptor alone being sufficient.
22. The natural compodte is not a mere collection of
two entities, matter and form ; it is a third entity distinct
from these. — The matter and form separately cannot
be called substances ; the substance is the composite
* Compare Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., pp. 616-627.
NON-LIVma OR INORGANIO BODIES. 223
that results from their union. Therefore the composite
is not a mere contact of the two entities, matter and
form, as a dozen of pens would be a collection of twelve
pens ; but it is a new entity, distinct from the matter
and form, and resulting from their union. Thus we
understand how the agent truly produces something,
although he makes neither the matter nor the form ;
for by the very fact that he unites the form to the
matter, he produces that which before did not exist,
the composite.
23. The form of a compound iody in nature, at least
when the combination is perfect, is not a Tnere mechanical
mixture of elements ; it is a substantial reality or entity
which is distinct from, the elements. — A compound (or
mixed) body * is that which is formed by the union of
several elements, as "water," which is formed by
uniting hydrogen and oxygen. When the union is
perfect — that is, when the elements are so united as to
form a substance specifically distinct, as in the case
* The phrase, mixed, liodies, as employed by the Scholastic philoso-
phers, " is specially applied to those compound bodies which are the
result of chemical combination. — Avicenna, against whom the pres-
ent Thesis is mainly directed, maintained that the substantial Forms
of the elements, or simple bodies, remain actually in the compound
substance, and that the mixture is accidental — that is to say, that
these compounds are a mere combination of the qualities proper to
the respective elements." According to Averrhoes, " the greatest of
the Arabian Peripatetics, — the forms of the elements are the most
imperfect of all substantial Forms. Wherefore, they are half-way, as
it were, between substantial and accidental Forms, so as to admit of
increase and diminution. Accordingly, in the compound they be-
come relaxed in energy by mutual reaction, and conspire toward the
production of the substantial Form of the compound." — Metaphysics
of tlie School, vol. ii., p. 675; consult entire proposition. — The dis-
tinction of modem chemists between mechanical mixture and chemi-
cal combination is clearly gathered from the statement of Avicenna's
opinion and the thesis which it opposes.
224 BBAL PHILOSOPHY.
of " water," the compound body does not consist in a
simple combination of elements, but has a proper sub-
stantial form, since from the mixture there results a
new substance, and every substance is constituted by
its proper form.
24. The substantial forms of the elements do not re-
main in compound bodies. — Two substantial forms
cannot exist together in the same matter, as may be
seen from the very nature of substantial form, which,
being the first act of matter, implies that all the
supervening forms will only give the matter a second
being after the first, and that, consequently, they will
be only secondary forms. But a compound (or mixed)
body has its own substantial form ; hence the sub-
stantial forms of the elements cannot remain in the
body. Yet, although the forms of the elements no
longer exist actually in compound bodies, they re-
main virtually, and the properties of the elements
survive the destruction of the forms which made the
elements what they were.*
AET. IV. — SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES OF BODIES, OB GENEEA-
TION AND COKEDPTION.
25. Generation and corruption are changes as to sub-
stantial forms ; generation is the gaining of a new sub-
stantial form, which with matter makes a new substance ;
and corruption is the losing of a substantial form, and
the consequent destruction of the substance. — Whenever a
substantial change takes place in a natural com-
posite, a new form is produced or generated, and the
old form passes away or is corrupted. Hence, i&
every substantial change, as matter cannot be with-
*See§19, Note 1.
NON-LIVING OR INOBGANIO BODIES. 225
out form, the corruption of ont form is the generation
of another. More strictly speaking, generation takes
place when the matter of an inferior form becomes in-
vested with a superior form ; and corruption takes
place when the matter loses a superior form and as-
sumes an inferior one.
26. In substantial corruption the substantial form of the
previous composite does not rsmain, the accidental forins
also disappear.^ Since there is only one substantial
form in the composite, when the new form supervenes,
the form of the previous composite no longer re-
mains. And because the subject which supports the
accidents ceases to exist, the accidents also pass away.
27. The accidents which precede a generated form dis-
pose the matter for the reception of this form. — The
matter cannot naturally receive the form without cer-
tain accidents which dispose it for this form. Acci-
dental forms are of two kinds : some are preparator')/
and precede the form ; others are concomitant and ac-
company the form. Thus the " degree of heat which
the wood reaches before bursting into flames, imme-
diately precedes the form of fire, and the intensity of
the heat is an accident which accompanies the form."
The preparatory dispositions cease at the moment of
generation, and are immediately replaced by the
others ; and just as the former make way for the re-
ception of the form, so the others tend to preserve its
existence in the matter.*
AET. V. — PEOPEETIBS OF BODIES.
28. There are two kinds of qualities in bodies : primary
and secondary qualities. — Experience makes known
♦ See Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., prop. 146, p. 278.
15
226 RMAL PHILOSOPHT.
to US two kinds of qualities in bodies : one constant,
permanent, and common to all bodies ; as, " extension,
figure, diyisibility, and motion ; " the other varied in
different bodies and in different states of the same
body ; as " color, sound, taste, smell, and resistance."
The former are styled primary, because they are the
basis and condition of the others. The latter are also
called secondary, because they have their foundation
•in the primary qualities.
29. The fundamental property of bodies is extension,
which results from, tlie multiplicity and continuity of the
parts. — Bodies are first manifested to us as composed
of many and continuous parts. This multiplicity and
this continuity of parts constitute the extension of
bodies. It is the property that first flows from their
essence. Tet although it is false to make it, with the
Dynamists, something merely apparent, not real, it is
none the less absurd to hold, with Descartes, that it is
the very essence of bodies. For before extension can
be had there must be the extended substance ; hence
extension, far from constituting the corporeal sub-
stance, rather presupposes it. Besides, with extension
alone the substantial unity of bodies and their active
principle cannot be explained.
30. Bodies are naturally impenetrable, that is, two
bodies cannot be in the same place at the sajne time, un-
less by th^e power of God. — This is a truth attested by
experience. Besides, impenetrability is a consequence
of extension ; for if a body in virtue of its extension
occupies a particular space, it must for that reason pre-
vent another body fiom occupying the same space.*
* Compare Russo's proposition, Sum. PhU., pp. 345-352, that "rea-
son cannot evidently demonstrate any intrinsic contradiction in
the compenetration or the multl- location of bodies, so that not even by
divine power would it be possible either for several bodies to be in
NON-LIVING OB INORGANIO BODIES. '2i'2,1
31. It is essential to the extension of hodies to have
parts that, nuxthematically considered, are always d/i-
visible. — The indivisible is inextended ; but the inex-
tended added to the inextended will never produce
the extended. Hence, metaphysically and mathemat-
ically considered, the parts that constitute the exten-
sion of a body are necessarily divisible ad infinitum.
Still this is true mathematically, not physically ; for
a part may become so small as to be insufficient for
the operations of any natural form (p. 188). It is also
to be noted that this divisibility is infinite not actu-
ally, but potentially.
32. Every hody is subject to motion. Motion is the
actual tendency of a Tnovable entity to its term. — Expe-
tte same place at the same time, or the same body to be in several
adequate places." The first part of the proposition the author proves
from the fact that a body does not cease to be a body, though it be
prevented by God from exerting its power of resistance, or from pro-
ducing any effect by that power. This is important when applied to
the miracle of Christ's resurrection and His entrance into the closed
supper-room. The second part he establishes by showing that the
unity and indivision of the body remain when the body Is present in
many places at the same time ; that its quantity is not lost, nor in-
creased, nor diminished, but its external relations are multiplied.
A contrary view is that of St. Thomas, who reasoning from the fact
that a body is in place ciroumscriptively, i.e. , so in place that ijt is
bounded by the dimensions of that place, and that no part of it is
outside the place, concludes that it is impossible even by miracle for
a body to be locally in two places at once. ^Sup. q. 85, art. 3, ad
3.] The question concerns certain facts in the lives of a few saints,
St. Alphonsus Liguori, for instance, but does not touch the presence
of Christ upon our altars. For in heaven the body of our Savloijr
exists locally or circumsoriptively, i. e. , the parts of His body cor-
respond to the parts of the place, since a body is in place by means
of its extension ; but in the Holy Eucharist His body, by the words
of consecration, is present after the manner of substance, the nature
of which is entire in the whole dimensions and in each part of the
dimensions that contain it. [iSum. Th. , iii. , q. 86. art. 3, ad 6.]
228 SEAL PHILOSOPnT.
rience proves that every body is subject to motion.
This quality undoubtedly supposes an agent that
gives an extrinsic impulse; but it also supposes in
the body an intrinsic principle of passivity in virtue
of which it receives and retains the force of the im-
pulse given and continues to move. Motion is de-
fined by Aristotle as " the act of an entity existing in
potentiality." It is an act relatively to the past and
present, but in potentiality relatively to the " future."
The meaning of this definition can be readily under-
stood, if for the moment we limit it to locomotion,
the principal species of motion. Let the movement
of a body be represented by a line, between whose
initial and final points is virtually contained " an
indefinite number of potential points." The initial
point will represent the term whence {temminus a quo),
and the final point the term whither {terrrdnvs ad
quern) ; the line itself will represent motion. At any
one of the potential points " the body in motion is
in act up to this imagined point, but is in potentiality
to the remainder of the line." *
AET VI. — SPACE AND TIME.
33. Seal space is real extension ofiodies with an added,
relation of container to contained. — Every body is ex-
tended. Now, when abstracting from bodies, we
conceive their e:^ension, we form the idea of space in
general, w;hence it is evident that real or positive
space is not in itself distinct from the extension of
bodies. And since the extension of a body is con-
stituted by the relative distance of its parts, just as
the extension between two bodies is constituted by
*See MekipTiysics of the School, vol. iii., pp. 375-280 ; 310-313, 411.
See Logic, § 16.
NON-LIVING OR INOBQANIO BODIES. 229
the relative distance of their surfaces, space cannot
be conceived without extension. Yet it by no means
follows that space is identical with extension ; it sup-
poses real extension, says Zigliara, "but it adds a
certain relation to extension, not indeed a relation of
existing corporeal things with one another and with
possible bodies, as Leibnitz holds, but a relation or
order of the parts of extension with one another.
This relation is founded on extension, and immedi-
ately arises from the distance of the continuous
parts," which space contains.
34. It is erroneous to admit with Epicurus and-Demo-
critus that vacuous space is substance. — Yacuous space
is a mere negation ; fey: we call that a vacuum which
is occupied by no body. But a pure negation is noth-
ing ; vacuous space, therefore, cannot be anything
really existing in nature. Besides, a vacuous space
distinct from bodies would necessarily be extended.
But whatever has extension needs space to contain it ;
and thus we should be forced to admit an infinite series
of spaces contained one in another, which is absurd.
35. It is an error to hold, with Newton and Clarke,
that space is the immensity of God. — Space cannot be
conceived otherwise than as extended ; therefore, were
it an attribute of God, we would be forced to admit that
God has extension. Besides, if space were an attri-
bute of God, it would be God Himself, since the divine
essence and attributes are really identical ; therefore
we would be obliged to conclude that the bodies that
fill space occupy a part of the divine essence.*
36. Time is the number or sum, of Tnotion with refer-
ence to before atid after. — Motion consists essentially in
* The source of this error is a confounding of vacuous or imagin-
ary space with real space. But the latter is essentially /miie ; tha
former is not infinite, but indefinite.
230 BISAL PHILOSOPHY.
a continuous succession of parts, one of whicli is be.
fore and the other after; that which numbers the
extent of this succession is time. But time measures
the succession in so far as it expresses the relation
of the changes which constitute the succession, and
this relation is nothing but the order of the succes-
sion. Hence time is defined as the number of motion
with reference to hefore and after.
37. Time is neither present nor existing in reference to
hefore and after, hut only in reference to the present in-
stant.— The present instant, the now, is the indivisible
that connects the hefore and after, and with them con-
stitutes the essentials of time ; and all three are ele-
ments of motion, which is implied in time. Motion
implies a substance that moves or is changed. The
now (nunc)' which always accompanies the moving
entity as its accident, cannot be considered otherwise
than as moving without destroying the very -idea of
time and going away from the truth. Mere succes-
sion is not time ; it is the number of the motion caus-
ing succession, with reference to before and after, that
constitutes time. Time resembles a sphere in constant '
motion ; if in its motion we consider it as present in a
place, disregarding the distance over which it has
passed and that which it has yet to traverse, there is
no motion, but an indivisible point of motion ; if, on
the other hand, we consider the constant motion of
the sphere from one place to another, we see existing
or rather passing motion. Hence the idea of time, as
formed by the mind when it considers succession and
abstracts from the successive things, is ohjective as to the
indivisible present which alone is real ; it is subjective
in regard to the past, which no longer exists, and the
future, which does not yet exist except in our mind.
38. They err who, with Cicero and Gassendi, regard
NON-LIVING OR INOBGANIO BODIES. 231
tinw as an incorporeal entity apart from successive things.
— Time implies siiccessive duration ; but duration in-
dependent of the things that endure is a mere ab-
straction, as is motion independent of the things that
move.*
39. Newton, Clarke, and the French Eclectic School
e?T in regarding time as the eternity of God. — Time
implies succession, and succession implies change ;
therefore if time is a divine attribute, God is subject
to change.f
* Duration Is of three kinds: eternity, which is, according to Boe-
thius, the "simultaneous, complete, and entire possession of life that
can never end " ; aevum, the everlasting existence of created spirits,
i.e., of angels and human souls; and time, which is proper to
material entities.
f Immanuel Kant, styled by admiring disciples the " Aristotle of
modern thought," will have it that our ideas of space and time are
not derived by abstraction from daily experience. In his own words :
" Time is the formal condition a priori of all phenomena whatso-
ever. Space, as the pure form of external intuition, is limited as a
condition a priori to external phenomena alone." Kant's principles,
as given in his Critique of Pure Reason, imply the rejection of pre-
viously established habits and laws of thought, and the setting up in
their stead ot forms of tliougM, i.e., subjective. conditions that are
prior to all experience, and so modify all phenomena that we can
never know essences [noumena] as they are in themselves, but only
as affected by these subjective forms. "Kant undertook the task of
constructing a foundation for scientific knowledge amid the chaotic
heap of ruins which the scepticism of Hume had left." "Xethe
utterly fails to bridge over the chasm which Hume made between
the subjective and the objective, — between thought and reality, — be-
tween human intelligence and that external world whose objective
existence is assured to us by the general voice of mankind in all ages,
by the safe instincts of common sense, and by that cogent argu-
ment of a practical necessity which scatters to the winds all mere
dreams of the study, however geometrical in construction." See
Summary of Kant's Doctrine in Metaphysics of the Sc7iool,yo\. ii., pp.
lM-135.
CHAPTEK in.
The Woeld: — ^Living Beings,
aet. i. — ^life in geneeal.
40. A living heing is one that produces or is capable of
producing immanent action. — Immanent action is action
which proceeds from a principle intrinsic in the sub-
ject, and which does not go outside the subject. But
life, considered as the principle of operation in a liv-
ing being, manifests itself by immanent action ; and
considered as a substantial element of a living being,
it produces, or is capable of producing, immanent
action.
41. The lowest degree of life is found in plants, a higher
degree in anim^als, a still higher degree in rational be-
ings, and the highest degree in God. — Two things are
necessary to constitute immanent action. First, the
action must proceed from an intrinsic principle ; sec-
ondly, it must not go out of the subject from which it
proceeds. From these two points of view the life of
plants is the least perfect. For in action we may
consider (1) the execution ; (2) the form which
determines the agent ; and (3) the end to which the
operation tends. Now a plant is active in itself in
regard to the first only of these three things; but
it does not predetermine the end of its action, nor
does it acquire by its own power the form which im-
mediately influences it to" act. It is God who has
assigned its end, of which, however, the plant has no
THE WORLD :— LIVING BEINGS. 233
knowledge ; and nature gives the form by which it is
determined to act, although it cannot direct the influx
of that form. If we regard immanence of action un-
der the second aspect, the action of the plant, it is
true, remains in the plant ; but not in the faculty that
acts. The nutritiye molecules absorbed through the
roots and leaves do not remain in the roots and leaves,
but feed the whole plant. — The life of animals is
higher than that of plants. On the one hand, since
brutes act in virtue of a knowledge acquired through
the senses, they in some sort give themselves the
form that immediately determines their action; on
the other hand, the act of sensation, which is proper
to them, remains not only in the subject, but also in
the faculty that produces it. Still, on account of the
necessary concurrence of the, material organ, this act
does not remain in the vital principle only, but in the
sense or organ, that is, in the composite, to which
sensation properly belongs. — In rational and intellect-
ual beings immanence of action is perfect. The end
of the action is not imposed on them by nature as in
the case of anitoals ; but they determine it and choose
it themselves. Besides, the intellectual act not being
exercised with the concurrence of a material organ, it
belongs entirely to the intellectual faculty alone. —
Nevertheless, it is only in God and not in created in-
telligences, that action attains the highest degree of
immanence. For the action of a created intelligence
proceeds from a substantial principle that holds its
being from God. Besides, in created intelligences the
action and the faculty are distinct from the essence of
the agent. God alone is exempt from all these imper-
fections. He has no end proposed to Him by an-
other ; but He is Himself the last end of all things.
In Him action, the power of acting, and essence are
234 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
identified. He is not only living in tlie highest de-
gree, He is life itself, the source and principle of all
life.
AET. n. — ^THE SOUL OE LIFE- PRINCIPLE OF LIYING COM-
POSITES.
42. The principle of life in living composites is the soul.
The soul is the first act of aphy.m.cal organic iody suit-
ably disposed to receive life. — The living composite can
have life only through its substantial form. The
animating form is called the soul. The soul is said
to be the first act of a body, because it is the substan-
tial form of the body, that which gives it first being
and animates it. The term physical shows that .the
soul is proper only to natural bodies, and not to arti-
ficial and mathematical bodies. The soul is called
the first act of an organic body, because the functions
of the soul being different, and each of them requiring
an organ of its own, every body united to a sotilmust
necessarily have different organs. Finally, the words,
suitably disposed to receive life, imply that the soul
cannot be the form of every body in any condition
whatever, but only of a body so disposed that it can
have life and remain in the condition necessary to
life. These words also convey the meaning that the
property of the soul is to give life actually to the
body which has only the potentiality of receiving it,
and to render it capable of the operations of life,
though not to constitute it always actually in opera,
tion.
43. There are three kinds of soul : vegetative, sensitive,
and rational. — T^iere are as many kinds of soul as there
are kinds of life. But as life exceeds the ordinary
powers of matter, there are as many kinds of life as
TSE WORLD :— LIVING BEINGS. 235
there are degrees in which vital operations surpass the
powers of matter. These degrees are^hree in number.
For there is (1)_ such action as exceeds the powers
of matter in this, that it proceeds from a principle
intrinsic in the subject in which it is manifested,
although it is produced dependently on matter and its
qualities ; this is vegetative operation. For example,
nutrition and the other actions related to it are pro-
duced not simply by means of corporeal organs, but
also by means of the physical and chemical forces
of nature. (2) There is also an operation which is
exercised by means of a corporeal organ, but not in
virtue of any quality proper to matter ; this is sen-
sitive operation. Thus, although moisture, heat, and
other corporeal qualities are required for the operation
of the senses, still the act of sensation is not produced
by means of these qualities, which are requisite merely
that the organ of sensation may be suitably disposed.
Lastly, there is (3) an operation which surpasses
corporeal nature in this, that it is not exercised
in virtue of any quality proper to matter, like veg-
etation, nor through the concurrence of material
organs, like sensation ; this is the operation of the
rational soul. As there are but three kinds of soul, so
there are three mpdes of life — the vegetative, the sen-
sitive, and the intellectual. Locomotion, it is true, is
not, strictly speaking, common to all creatures hav-
ing sensitive life. A distinction may, then, be made
between those animals that have only the sense of
touch, and perfect animals that are made aware by
their senses not only of what is near them, but also of
what is far removed, that direct themselves to these
distant objects, and consequently have also progres-
sive motion. Yet all animals have at least a power of
contraction and dilatation, and therefore some form of
236 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
locomotion. H^nce there is no need to classify loco«
motion as a special mode.
44. In all living composites, even in those that possess
several kinds of life, there is only one soul that performs
all the functions of life. — In every living being, as
in every composite, tliere is only one substantial
form.* But experience proves that it is the soul that
in the case of living composites gives first being to
the body, and is, consequently, its substantial form ;
therefore the soul must be one. In composites having
several kinds of life, there is a superior soul which
performs the operations of inferior souls, just as a
greater number contains the smaller numbers, or as
a superior active power contains in its unity the in-
ferior active powers. But, although one in itself, the
soul of the living composite is virtually multiple
and informs all the parts of the body, enabling them
to exercise the various functions of life, as the same
blowing (blast) in the different pipes of an organ pro-
duces various sounds, according to the dispositions of
the pipes.
45. The soul is indivisible. — The indivisibility of the
soul is a truth attested by experience. For when a
member of a living body is amputated, it ceases to
be animated — that is, in dividing tiie body, the soul
has not been divided, and as the soul cannot follow
the amputated member, it ceases to inform that part
of the body, which is thenceforth deprived of life.
In a great number of plants, however, and in the im-
perfect animals, the soul is accidentally divisible,!
* What gives being to an entity also gives it unity ; but the sub-
stantial form gives being to bodily substance ; therefore, if the
substantial form were not one, the body would not be one.
f In these plants and animals the specific functions are few and
the organism is simple and diffused; "but with a complex and
THE WORLD :— LIVING BEINGS. 237
like the form of minerals, whioli thomgh not divisible
in itself, is yet divisible accidentally — that is, in virtue
of the matter in which by its imperfection it is too
deeply immersed. Touching such a life principle
and such a form, the same remarks may be made as of
the affinity and the resistance of bodies, that although
inextended in themselves, they nevertheless become
extended and accidentally divisible by their entire
dependence on bodies for their being.
46. The soul does not act directly hy itself, hut through
the medium of its faculties. They are distinct from its
essence and tnay he defined as The proximate and im,-
mediate principles of the action to which tliey are natur-
ally ordained. — The essence of the soul does not
operate immediately by itself, for then it would ever
be actually producing all its vital actions, since
essence is unchangeable. Therefore, the operations
of the soul have not the essence of the soul for their
immediate principle, but faculties distinct from the
essence. In God alone the power, the operation, and
the essence are the same.*
47. Yital faculties are distinguished accwding to their
proper acts and objects. — Whatsoever entities are es-
sentially related to other entities have distinctions
corresponding to those found among the latter ; but
the vital faculties are essentially related to their
proper acts, and through these acts to certain ob-
jects ; therefore they are specified by these acts and
multifarious organism the case is very different. It takes but little
to supply the acranial head and the tail of a worm, but it would re-
quire a far more elaborate process to develop the eyes, ears, nose, a
vertebrate structure, heart, lungs, etc., out of the hoof of an ox." — •
Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., p. 654, and prop. 314.
* See Metaphysics of the Sclwol, vol. iii., pp. 305-219, and more
particularly, pp. 214^317.
238 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
these objects. Thus the eyes are intended by nature
for seeing ; they are specified by the act of seeingj
and more remotely by the objects to be seen.
48. Although the powers of the soul are multiple,
the soul itself is simple. — The powers of the soul are
necessarily multiple ; for the soul produces opera-
tions which are not reducible one to the other, and
which, consequently, require distinct faculties. But
these faculties, although multiple, do not destroy the
simplicity of the soul's essence, whence they proceed ;
for, since they are distinct from the essence, they do
not enter into it as component parts ; they are not
parts of its essence, but diverse powers determining
the activity of the soul's essence, which of itself is
undetermined. Nevertheless, these faculties, though
distinct, are not independent of one another; since
the soul is one, its faculties must be subordinated
one to another, that this unity may not be de-
stroyed.*
49. Thepovjers of the soul are hy their nature inclined
to their proper operations. — ^As each power has been
given to the soul for -the accomplishment of a special
order of actions, it must naturally be inclined to per-
form these actions. This natural inclination of the
power does not refer to this or that individual action,
but to the whole species of actions which the power
can produce. Since the action is the effect of the
power inclined to produce it, it is evident that the
more intense the inclination of the power the more
perfect will the action be. But this peculiar intensity
* That tliere is a real distinction between the essence and the
powers of the soul is manifest from our mode of speaking of them,
from the very nature of the powers and their actions, and from the
testimony of consciousness.
TH'E WORLD :—LIVINa BEINGS. ■ 239
in the inclination of one power impairs the exercise ,
of another power. For example, he who exercises
his imagination to excess will do injury to his power
of judgment. This is easily explained, because the
activity of the faculties is a participation of the activ-
ity of the soul. But since the soul is one and indi-
visible and of limited power, the concentration of its
activity with particular intensity on one faculty must
be prejudicial to the other faculties.
50. There are Jive cliff erent faculties in the soul : vege-
tative, sensitive, intellectual, appetitive, and locomotive.
—The faculties of the soul are divided according to
their formal objects and actions. Now some powers
have for their object only the body to which the soul
is united ; these are vegetative powers. The soul of
the plant, for instance, acts only on its material or-
ganism. Other powers have for objects not only the
body to which the soul is united, but everything sen-
sible. Finally, there are powers that have for object
not only everything sensible, but all being what-
soever. When the soul has for the object of its oper-
ations other beings than its own body, it may attain to
them in two ways : (1) in so far as the soul knows
them and is united to them by their image or species ;
(2) in so far as the soul is borne toward these objects.
But the soul knows sensible objects through the me-
dium of its sensitive faculties, and universal natures
by its intellectual faculties. — There are two kinds of
faculties by which the soul is united to the objects to
which it tends : the sensitive appetite and the rational
appetite, by which it is inclined to seek its connatural
good. It has also a locomotive faculty, by which it
moves the body which it informs to seek what, is use-
ful and to avoid what is hurtful.
240 REAL PHILOSOPHT.
AET. in. — THE BODIES OF LIVING COMPOSITES.
51. Ijivitig bodies differ from others in organism, ori-
gin, development, duration, mode of conservation, and re-
production.— Living bodies differ from non-living
bodies : (1) In their material constitution, because they
have organs of different conformation for the special
functions to be performed, and, therefore, they re-
ceive the name of organic hodies ; while non-living
bodies have a substance homogeneous in all its parts,
and are therefore called inorganic. An organism is
essential to the living composite, because diversity of
vital functions calls for diverse organs. (2) In their
origin, because living bodies proceed from constant
causes, to which they are at iirst substantially united
as germs ; while, on the contrary, non-living bodies
are produced by the accidental intervention oi causes
entirely external. (3) In their development, because
living bodies truly grow, developing in themselves
their proper type ; while non-living bodies simply
increase by external accretion or the addition of
parts. (4) In their duration, because living bodies
have an existence limited by their very nature ; while
the existence of non-living bodies is indefinite, and
can be destroyed only by an external cause. (5) In
their mode of conservation, because living bodies re-
pair their losses by the conversion of fresh nutriment
into their own substance, and are thus renewed with-
out losing their own individuality ; while non-living
bodies do not repair their losses, but remain such as
they were at first until they are resolved into other
substances. (6) In reproduction, because living bodies
are perpetuated in their species by their own virtue •,
THE WORLD :— LIVING BEING8. 241
while non-living bodies are multipled only by the in-
tervention of external causes.*
52. The hodies of animals differ from those of plants,
first, in having a more perfect vegetative organism.; sec-
ondly, in having sensation ; thirdly, in having a special
organism adapted to the functions of sensitive life. — Ani-
mals perform two functions, one, called vegetative,
by which, like plants, they act upon their own bodies
and grow, nourish, and perpetuate themselves ; the
other, called sensitive, by which they perceive the ob-
jects that produce a sensible impression upon them,
and determine themselves to locomotion. For the
functions of the first kind, they have organs generi-
cally like those of plants, but differing in this, that
they produce effects more varied and above those to
which the activity of plants can attain. For the funC'
tions of the second kind animals have special organs :
the nervous system as the proper instrument of sensa-
tion, and the muscular system for spontaneous motion.
* Since living bodies differ essentially from non-living bodies,
spontaneous generation in the sense of the production of life from
no pre-existing germs and by the sole agency of physical and chemi-
cal forces is an utter impossibility. Traces of this theory are found
in ancient Greek philosophy, and, in a modified form, in many of
the Schoolmen, among whom are St. Bonaventure and apparently
St. Thomas ; but the latter merely believed that God the Creator
had given to matter the power, on the presence of certain conditions,
of producing the lowest and simplest forms of life, like infusoria.
But the apparatus at the disposition of modern science and the per-
severing experiments of Flourens, Dumas, Quatrefages, and espe-
cially Pasteur, hare proved that when air and water, in which the
germs are disseminated, have been excluded no generation occurs.
Of the result of Pasteur's experiment Tyndall says, " There is no
conclusion in experimental science more certain than that." The
obstinate persistency of Tiedemans, Brenser, Poncet, and Brooa, in
asserting the truth of spontaneous generation, has only served to
bring out its falsity more clearly.
16
242 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
'^rhese organs are more or less perfect according to
the species in which they are found. In man the
animal organism attains a special perfection, because
in him sensibility is the minister and aid of the intel-
lect. This perfection is resplendent in the beauty of
man's form, in the upright posture of his body, in the
extreme delicacy of the nervous and muscular sys-
tems, and in the regularity and symmetry of all the
parts of his body.
AET. IV. — ^VEGETATIVE LIFE, OB THE LIFE OF PLANTS.
53. Tlie principal functions of the vegetative life are re-
duced to three: Nutrition, grotuth, and reproduction. — By
means of its organs, a plant exercises several func-
tions, such as absorption, circulation, secretion, florifi-
cation, fructification, etc.; but all these operations
are reduced to the three principal ones of nutrition,
growth, and reproduction. These three operations
are necessary to the plant and to -every living body.
The third is necessary that the body may be produced ;
the second, that it may attain its natural development ;
and the first, that it may preserve its being.
54. It is an error to attribute the life of plants to a
purely mechanical princijjle. — This opinion, which re-
duces the vital principle to physical and chemical
forces, easily leads to materialism. It is opposed to
the judgment of the greatest naturalists, who prove
that the vital principle is distinct from the forces of
matter, whether from the impossibility of obtaining a
living Substance 'by mere chemical combinations, or
from the diversity that exists between the laws
governing organic bodies and those governing inor-
ganic bodies.
55. It is an error to attribute sensation fojoZawfe.— This
THE WORLD :— LIVING BEINGS. 243
error has been embraced by several philosophers, as
Plato and Leibnitz, and by several naturalists, as
Darwin (1809-1882) and Bichat (1771-1802). But it is
evident that plants are destitute of sensation: (1)
because they should then have organs of sensation,
but of these we see they are deprived ; and (2) be-
cause plants are rooted in the soil whence they spring,
and therefore sensation would serve no purpose.
ART. T. — SENSITIVE LIFE, OE THE LIFE OF ANIMALS.
56. Every animal has the faculty of sensation and of
spontaneous locomotion. — Besides vegetative life, every
animal possesses sensation and motion. But this
motion is not only a change of place, produced by an
intrinsic principle, of which the plant is destitute, but
it is spontaneous ; it is not determined by nature, but
proceeds from a previous perception, and is deter-
mined by an instinctive appetition of the subject that
moves. Hence, unlike motion proceeding from nature
only, spontaneous motion is varied, multiple, without
fixed rule, and is modified according to the different
perceptions and appetitions of the animal. Spontane-
ous motion is seen in every animal ; in the imperfect
animals it consists in contraction and dilatation ; in
perfect animals it is progressiva and complete. But
because the faculty of locomotion is only a conse-
quence of Sensation, it follows that sensibility alone
suffices to specify the animal.
57. 7%e faculties of the anim,al are sensitive, appeti-
tive, and locomotive. The sensitive faculties are external
m' internal.' The external senses are five : Sight, hearing,
smell, taste, and touch. The internal senses are four :
Com/mon sense, imagination, the estimative faculty, and
memory. Appetite is concupisdble or irascible. — External
244 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
sensible bodies act on the animal. It is then neces-
sary, first, that these bodies be united to it by the act
of cognition, which takes place through the sensitive
faculties both external and internal. For the animal
at first knows sensible objects through one or more
of the five external senses ; the sensible species or
representations are transmitted to the internal sense
called common sense, and then to the imagination,
vyhich preserves them ; the estimative faculty per-
ceives what is useful or hurtful in the object, and its
perceptions are retained by the sensitive memory.
According to its knowledge of the object as useful or
as hurtful, is the animal inclined by the concupiscible
appetite to seek it or shun it. If difficulties arise in
seeking or shunning it, the irascible appetite strives
to overcome them. Incited by the appetite, the loco-
motive faculty enters into action, and, in one way or
another, the animal moves. All these faculties are
found in a state of perfection and completeness in
perfect animals. In the imperfect animals, which
have no external sense but that of touch, locomotion
is very imperfect, because motion, being the conse-
quence of sensation, is more or less developed accord-
ing to the development of sensation itself. In man
the sensitive faculties are found in admirable har-
mony and with a special perfection which they re-
ceive from the intellect. Hence it is in man that
these faculties should be more particularly studied ;
and so much the more as they cannot be well known
by him, but so far forth as he experiences them him-
self.
68. The faculties of the brute animal are organic, that
is, belonging to the composite and not to the soul only. — Sev-
eral modern philosophers, following in the footprints
of Plato, consider sensation as an act of the soul only,
TME WORLD: — LIVING BEINGS. 245
to which the body concurs only occasionally. But
this error would liken the brute soul to that of man.
For if sensation has no need of organs for its produc-
tion, it is a spiritual act, and the sensitive soul is
spiritual, which is absurd. Besides, the diversity of
the organs answering to the diverse sensitive facul-
ties, and the necessity of these organs and their
modifications for their respective sensations, prove
sufficiently that these faculties belong to the compos-
ite and not to the soul alone.
59. The principle of sensitive life in the hrute animal is
identical with the principle of vegetative life. — 1. Al-
though sensitive life and vegetative life really differ
from each other, and though in the body of the ani-
mal there are parts that do not possess both kinds of
life, yet it is one soul that causes the functions of
both in the organism which it informs. For, although
the animal grows and perceives through the senses,
it constitutes but one living being. Hence the formal
principle from which its being and its life proceed
must be one and identical. It is true that this formal
principle should have the power of communicating,
according to difference of disposition and aptitude in
the parts of the organism, either vegetative faculties
alone or both vegetative and sensitive faculties ; but
if it were not one and identical, it could never con-
stitute a subject one and identical. Now, nothing is
more evident than the unity and identity of every
animal. 2. This identity of the principle of the two
kinds of life in the animal is confirmed by the fact of
the cessation of vegetative life in an organism which
has become incapable of sensitive life, and vice versa.
It is further confirmed by the admirable harmony
that exists between the vegetative and the sensitive
organs, a harmony which makes of them but one or-
246 BEAL PHILOSOPHY.
ganic system, although varied in its different parts
according to the different functions that it exercises,
and which explains the intimate correspondence of
the two kinds of life and the reciprocal influence
which they exert. 3. The identity of the sensitive
and the vegetative principle in the animal is also
proved by the elevation which the sensitive principle
gives to the functions of the vegetative life. For,
although they are of the same genus in the plant
and the animal, they are more perfect in the animal.
60. Tke hruie soul, though simple and immaterial, is
not immortal. — The indivisibility and immateriality
of the sensitive soul are proved (1) not only from ex-
perience, (2) but also by the unity of the brute's being,
which can proceed only from a principle itself one ;
(3) from the nature of sensation, which perceives the
whole object by a single act ; (4) from the remem-
brance which the sentient subject keeps of the differ-
ent and often contrary modifications which it has ex-
perienced, and which could not be explained if the
principle were not immaterial. But the immaterial-
ity ;of the brute soul by no means implies its spiritu-
ality and immortality. For spirituality and immor-
tality suppose a soul subsisting and operating by
itself, independently of any material organ. But the
being and operation of the animal are neither of the
soul alone nor of the body alone, but of the whole
composite. Therefore the soul of the animal does
not operate without the body, and perishes with the
body. But since it is simple, it does not perish by
decomposition, nor does God annihilate it, for He
annihilates none of His works. The soul of the ani-
mal perishes in some sort indirectly, forasmuch as
the .subject is wanting without which it cannot exist.
Moreover, it is thus that all forms perish, that all
THE WORLD :— LIVING BEINGS. 247
forces and all the modifications of inorganic bodies
and of plants perish.
61. Brutes are not automata, as Descartes maintained. —
This doctrine leads to materialism, for if a mechanism
more or less perfectly constructed can produce in the
animal the marvellous acts of sensation, a few addi-
tional degrees of perfection of mechanism could pro-
duce the marvellous acts of intelligence. It is in
vain to urge in support of this doctrine that, if any
iiamaterial soul be attributed to animals, we must
thereby acknowledge in them a spiritual and im-
mortal soul. The immateriality of a soul includes
neither its spirituality nor its immortality. It is
equally vain to invoke certain analogies with the
motions of certain bodies like the magnet, or to have
recourse to divine intervention to explain the opera-
tions of the animal. These motions of bodies bear
no resemblance to the spontaneous motions of ani-
mals, , and to have recourse to the intervention of
God is to accept all the pantheistic consequences
of the system of occasional causes.
62. Epicurus and all otJier materialists err in ascribing
reason and intelligence to brides. — This system,, which
makes a man of the brute only to make a brute of
man, is contrary to experience and the unanimous be-
lief of the human race. It puts forward two argu-
ments in its favor : (1) that brutes perform their acts
in a suitable manner, as man does ; (2) that externally
they resemble man both in their organs and in most
of their actions. But these are pure sophisms.
From the fact that brutes are like man in something,
it does not follow that they are like him in all re-
spects. If brutes know, they do not understand; if
they form images, they do not attain to ideas ; if they
distinguish what is suitable to them from what is not
248 REAL PHILOSOPHT.
suitable, they are yet incapable of any moral notion.
Finally, if they are guided by natural instinct with
admirable rectitude, it is certain that they can neither
invent nor perfect anything.*
* The question is not whether the acts of brutes could not proceed
from a rational principle, but whether they cannot and should not
be traced to a sensitive principle. The instances of wonderful in-
dustry and constructive skill to be found in the animal kingdom are
not to be compared with similar habits and works of man, for the
brute acts by instinct, and acquires no experience, properly so called,
and shows no increased perfection in process of time. Father Harper
cites three classes of facts to disprove the conclusion that the brute
has the same faculties as man, " only under a, rudimentary form : "
" 1, The judgment of brutes as to what is or is not conducive to their
good is not free ; for on the apprehension of what is useful or harm-
ful their impulse is the result of natural operation ; 2, Uniformity of
operation observable in animals of the same species ; 3, Brute ani-
mals at the beginning of their life receive a natural estimation iu
order to know that which is hurtful and that which is useful, because
they cannot attain to this by their own investigation ; but man is left
to form his judgments gradually by the practical experience of life.''
— Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., pp. 666-672.
Its importance to day justifies the quotation of the following : "It
is not possible to discover a link between man and the brute in any
supposed order of men possessing a specific nature half-way between
spirit and matter ; for such a hypothesis is a contradiction in terms.
A spirit cannot be more or less spirit after the manner that matter
can be more or less organized. A form must be wholly spiritual or
wholly unspiritual ; though its faculties may be partly the one,
partly the other. Neither is it possible, for the same reason, that
there should be a common ancestry."— iJwi., p. 551.
PSYCHOLOGY.
OB,
ANTHROPOLOGY.
1. Psychology is a science ivhich treats of the human
soul, its faculties, its properties, and its relations with the
body. — ^Man is, as it were, a compendium of all crea-
tion ; for in him are found being, life, sense, reason,
and corporeal nature united to spiritual nature.
Therefore the study of man specially pertains to
philosophy. That part of philosophy which treats of
man is called Psychology or Anthropology. The name
psychology more particularly signifies the study of
tJie soul ; but because it is almost impossible to know
the soul rightly without considering it in its relations
with the body, it is necessary for psychology to study
the whole man.
2. The method to he followed in psychology is analytico-
syrdhetical, a method that joins observation to reason. —
Some philosophers, as Bacon, Locke, Reid and his
disciples, admit only the experimental method in
psychology ; but this method can never give psycho-
logical science, because it regards only facts ; it can-
not, therefore, solve problems concerning the essence,
origin, and end of the soul. Other philosophers, as
Schelling and Hegel, hold that the science of man
should be constructed a priori; but this method is
also false, because by observation the operations of
250 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
the soul are known, and by reasoning, its nature.
Hence it is by observation together with reasoning
that the philosopher should construct the science of
psychology.
CHAPTEE I.
The Human Soul and Its Faculties.
art. 1. — faculties of the human soul.
3. The human soul has vegetative, sensitive, and intellec-
tive faculties. TJie sensitive and intellective faculties are
divided into cognitive and appetitive faculties. — Since the
human soul has vegetative, sensitive, and intellective
life, it must have the faculties of these three kinds of
life. Cosmology treats of the faculties of vegetative
life, but only in a general way, leaving to subordi-
nate sciences the psychological investigation of these
faculties. Rational Psychology treats of the sensitive
and the intellective faculties, but in the consideration
of the former omits the physiological development
of their organs, which belongs properly to Empirical
or Physiological Psychology. Both the sensitive and
the intellective faculties are primarily joas.s{?;e, since
they must first be acted upon before they operate ;
but they are also secondarily active, because they are
vital powers. Strictly speaking, a power is active
when it modifies, or, so to say, makes its object, and
of this kind are the vegetative faculties ; it is passive
when it must be acted upon and moved by its object ;
and such are the senses and intellect. A faculty,
whether sensitive or intellective, is called cognitive,
when it can know an object ; it is appetitive, when it
tends to union with the object known.
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIES. 251
4. In the cognitive faculties the object known shares in
the perfection or imperfection of the subject knowing ; in
the appetitive faculties the subject shares in the perfection
or imperfection of the object to which the faculties are
directed. — The object of a cognitive faculty assumes
the conditions of the subject knowing before its union
with that subject. A stone in its physical reality is
material; but when it becomes known by the senses,
it has in them an immaterial existence; a circle is
always united to matter in the real order, but when
abstracted by the intellect, it has not only an imma-
terial, but a universal existence. But as objects in-
ferior to the subject knowing receive a new perfection
when by cognition they exist in the subject, so objects
superior to it share in its imperfection in so far as
they are objects known. It is far otherwise with the
appetitive faculties : through these the subject acted
upon tends to union with the objeqt, and in a certain
sense to be transformed into it ; through these, there-
fore, the subject shares in the perfection or imperfec-
tion of the object. The soul, for instance, is elevated
by union with the will of God, but is degraded by
attaching itself to creatures.
AET. n. — THE COGNirrVE SENSITIVE FACULTIES.
— SENSIBILITY IN GENEKAL.
5. Cognition in general is an operation hy which a
living being perceives itself or some object present to it. —
By cognition in general a living being perceives and
discerns itself, or some object present to it. Since
cognition is wholly contained within the subject
knowing, it follows that it becomes aware of external
things in so far as they are in some way present with-
252 BEAL FEILOSOPHT.
in it. But external things cannot in their own nature
enter the subject knowing, but solely through the
medium of certain forms representing them and
called intentional Si^ecies* It is, therefore, by these
species that things are known.
6. The senses are 2^assive powers hy which, the sensitive
heing perceives sensible objects. — The senses are passive
powers, because they do not act until some sensible
object has determined them to act, and principally be-
cause they do not form their object, but are informed
by it. By them the sensitive being perceives all that
is comprised under the name of sensible object. This
perception is called sensation.
7. The senses are classified as external and, internal,
according as they perceive external objects or the modi-
fications produced in the sensitive subject. — The action
of the external object on the sentient subject pro-
duces a modification in the sense, and thus deter-
mines it to perceive its object. By the internal senses
the subject perceives its external sensations.
8. Tlie senses, both external and internal, 1. reside in
a corporeal organ ; 2. cannot reflect on their sensations ;
3. can have nothing but what is materml for their ob-
ject.— 1. The senses, as is attested by experience,
are moved to act by corporeal objects. But what is
corporeal cannot act on the senses, if they are not
themselves corporeal yet vital, that is, organic. For
bodies must act according to their nature and can
produce only a material modification, since other-
wise the effect would exceed the power of its cause ;
* They are named species, because they are likenesses or forms of
the object ; they are called intentional, either because they intend, aa
it were, to represent the object, or because they tend from the object
to the various faculties that receive the impressions. — See Sum. Th.,
i., q. 78, a. 3.
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 253
but the senses could not receive this modification
if they had not a material organ. No sense, there-
fore, can be without an organ fitted to receive the
material impression which is produced by an object
external to it, and which determines the sense to act.
This material organ, because informed by the soul,
can serve the soul in the act of sensation. 2. No sense
can reflect on its own operation, because a faculty can-
not reflect on its own action, unless it wholly and en-
tirely return upon itself. But this is impossible to
the senses, for they depend on material organs, one
part of which might indeed return upon another part ;
but what is extended can never in its entirety return
upon itself. 3. Since every sense consists of a ma-
terial vital organ, it must necessarily have something
material for its object. This is equally true of the
internal senses, for they are put into exercise by
sensations received through the external senses and
accompanied by a material modification. Thus, al-
though the object of internal sensibility is not abso-
lutely material like that of external sensibility, yet
it has in it something material that enables it to re-
duce the internal senses to action.
9. The cause of sensation is not the mere activity of the
soul, as was held by LeihnitB and Fichte. — Leibnitz
maintained that the soul is the only and necessary
cause of sensation. But if the soul has sensations
necessarily, evidently it must have them always, an
assertion which is contradicted by experience. Be-
sides, if the soul alone has sensations in virtue of its
nature, how does this nature which is ever the same,
become sensible of things which are contrary to one
another or which have no bond of union ? How, if it
is sentient in itself alone, can it by sensation perceive
bodies outside itself ? Let it not be said that the pres-
254 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
ence of the external body is necessary as the condition
or occasion of sensation ; for, either the body does
not of itself really determine the soul to sensation, and
then its presence is useless ; or it does of itself deter-
mine the soul to sensation, and then the soul is not
the only cause of sensation.
Fichte, while admitting the soul to be by itself
alone the cause of sensation, considered it not a nec-
essary, but a free cause. But this is plainly con-
tradicted by experience, which shows us that our
sensations do not depend on our will ; that, on the
contrary, we often experience sensations which we
would wish not to have, and are deprived of others
that we desire.
10. The only cause of sensation is not, as JBerkeley
asserted, the action of God on the soul. — Berkeley
(1684-1753) taught that the soul, being immaterial,
could not be affected by the action of a material ob-
ject, but that since the representations of bodies in the
faculties of the soul are an undoubted fact, they can-
not otherwise be explained than by the action of God
on the soul ; he added that only spiritual beings,
exist, and that bodies are but a simple succession of
ideas formed in us by God. This theory is evidently
erroneous, for, were it true, God would be constantly
deceiving us by creating within us representations of
bodies that do not exist. Should any one insist with
Malebranche, that God by His omnipotence can pro-
duce in us the perceptions of bodies, although the
bodies do not exist, then would the omnipotence of
God be placed in contradiction to His veracity, and
God Himself would be made contradictory. Besides,
in this system it is absolutely impossible to account
for the diversity of sensations among men in reference
to the same object, as also to explain the connection
THE HUMAN SOUL AND li'S FACULTIES. 255
that exists between certain sensations ; for example,
between the sensations produced by an animalcule
according as it is or is not seen under the microscope.
Lastly, this system is based on the principle that " like
can be known only by like." But this principle is
manifestly false,* for in accordance with it materi-
alists could deny the existence of spirits, since the
perception of matter is incontestable ; and idealists
might question the existence of bodies, since the
nature of the soul is immaterial.
11. The only cause of sensation is not, as materialists
maintain, the ijnpression of the material object on the
sentient subject. — Broussais held that the impression
constitutes the whole sensation, and regarded the
brain as the sentient subject. Now, the brain is ma-
terial, and what is material is composed of parts dis-
tinct one from another. If, therefore, what is mate-
rial has sensations, we must conclude that each part
has either the whole sensation or only a part of it.
In the former case, there would be as many sensations
as there are parts in the sentient subject ; in the
latter, the sensation would never be entire, for each
part would have for itself only that part which it had
received. Now, on the one hand, experience attests
that sensation is one and indivisible, and, on the
other hand, that in its indivisible unity it represents
the entire sensible that is its object.
Cabanis (1757-1808), while agreeing with Broussais
(1772-1838) that the impression constitutes the whole
* This principle must not be confounded with the principle of as-
similation in the Scholastic theory of cognition: "Whatever, is
received is received according to the nature of the receiver." It
follows from this principle that all objects known are in the act of
cognition, which is an immanent act, assimilated to the subjact
knowing.
256 SEAL PHILOSOPHY.
sensation, regarded the soul alone as the subject of
sensation. But this cannot be, for the sensible ob-
ject can produce an impression only on the organ ;
but sensation is something very dilferent from this
purely material impression. Sensation results from
the action of the sense, whereas the impression is
passive.
12. Sensation is produced hy two causes : the mate-
rial object and the activity of the serise. — There can be
no sensation if the activity of the sense is not exer-
cised ; but, since the senses have a material object
for their term, it must be this object that' calls forth
their action. Hence sensation is both active and pas-
sive ; it is passive in so far as it presupposes the
action of a sensible object ; it is active so far as, given
this action, sensation follows from the activity of the
sentient subject.
13. The sensible object is joined to the sentient subject
by Tneans of a certain representation of itself, which is
called the sensible species. — Sensation is an immanent
action which is produced in the sentient subject, is
proportioned to it, and remains wholly within it ; but
it does not take place without a material object which
acts upon the sentient subject, and is perceived on
cognized by it.
For the production of sensation, the material ob-
ject must in some way be joined to the sentient sub-
ject. But evidently it cannot enter in its physical
reality ; it must, therefore, enter through something
which represents it ; and this is called the sensible in-
tentional species. This sensible species produced by
the object is not a simple excitation which is caused
in the sensitive faculty by its contact with the object ;
but, since it makes known the object, it is necessarily
a representation of it which renders it present to the
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 257
sensitive faculty. Thus the image formed on the ret-
ina of the eye by a body is not merely a motion, an
excitation, which leads the sight to perceive the body,
but it is a representation of it by which it is con-
joined to the sense of sight.
14. The sensible species is not the ohject of sensation,
hut the medium hy which sensation is effected. — The sen-
sible species in the subject knowing is the immediate
principle that determines the act of sensation ; hence
it could not be perceived by the sensitive faculty ex-
cept by a reflex act, which sense cannot perform. Now,
not only does reflex action suppose a previous act,
but it cannot even be effected by the senses. There-
fore the sensible species is not that which the sense
perceives ; it is the medium by which the sense cog-
nizes its object. While it informs the sense, the ob-
ject is perceived ; if, then, for any cause it remains in
the sense, though the object be absent, perception
will be had just as if the object were present, as is
the case with the insane.
15. Between the serusMe species and sensation tliere ii,
a relation of causality. — The sensible species is not
sensation, but it determines the act of sensation, so
that the senses do not act unless determined by the
sensible species. When, however, this determination
has been effected, the senses must act and thus per-
ceive the object that impressed them. Hence a rela-
tion of causality exists between the sensible species
impressed and the sensible species expressed, or sensa-
tion.*
* These vicarious species, considered as acting on tlie sense, were
called impressed species ; considered as actually received into the
sense, a§ informing it, and producing a corresponding reaction
which we call sensation, they were termed expressed, species ; " their
intention being thus far realized."
258 REAL PHILOSOPHT.
AET. m. — EXTERNAL SENSIBILITY IN GENERAL.
16. The object of the external senses is the external sen-
sihle which is present to sense and suitdbly disposed. —
The external senses are those to which the species of
external objects are referred ; hence they have mate-
rial external things for their object. But this object
must be present ; for only the internal senses can pre-
serve sensible species, and, consequently, they alone
can apply themselves to absent things. Finally, the
object should also be suitably disposed, otherwise it
could not impress the sense, that is, form in it the
sensible species.
17. There are three hinds of sensible objects : the proper,
the common, and the accidental. — Of the qualities of
bodies which we perceive, some are perceived by one
sense only, as " color " by the sight, and these are
called pro2yer sensibles. Others are the object of sev-
eral senses, as " figure," which is perceived by both
sight and touch, and these are common sensibles.
Others, again, are not perceived directly, because
they are implicitly contained in the sensible quali-
ties, as " substance," and these are accidental sensi-
bles. There are five kinds of proper sensibles, the
objects respectively of the sight, the hearing, the
sm,ell, the taste, and the touch. There are likewise
five kinds of common sensibles : " motion, rest, num-
ber, figure, and dimension." To these five common
sensibles, " time, posture, unity, distance, and proxim-
ity," are referred. The accidental sensible is what-
ever is implicitly contained in the sensible appear-
ance, and as it were naturally connected with it:
as " anger, love, hatred," etc. The proper sensible
impresses the species, the common sensible modifies
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 259
this ; thus each is represented by its own species, one
unmodified, the other modified. The accidental sen-
sible neither impresses nor modifies a species ; it is
merely connected with the objects represented by the
species, as with natural signs.
18.' Some senses need a medium through which they
receive the species iynpressed. — Sensitive knowledge is
attained only by means of a species which represents
the object in the sentient subject. In some of the
senses the production of the species is not aided but
hindered by contact of the object with the organ of
sense. Thus, for instance, an image of the object is
not formed on the retina when the object touches the
eye.
19. When the senses act in their norm,al condition,
they do not deceive us as to their proper sensibles ; hut
they may iecome an occasion of error as to common or
accidental sensibles. — Nature has given us senses that
they may each make known to us their proper sen-
sibles; hence they cannot deceive us as to these
sensibles unless there is some defect in the organ, or
the sensible is too distant, or the medium is acciden-
tally modified. But as nature has not charged one
sole external sense to cognize the common sensible
and the accidental sensible, a single external sense
may deceive us in regard to these sensibles. Thus,
in perspective, the eye deceives us in regard to the
common sensible, distance. That the common sen-
sible may be known with certainty, it must be known
through the concurrence of several senses.
20. Proper sensibles actually perceived by the external
senses, are only virtually in bodies ; they are actually in
the sentient subject. — Taste, smell, and the other proper
sensibles are not actually in bodies as they are in the
senses, otherwise the bodies would have sensations.
260 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
They exist actually in the sentient subject only.
Thus the sweet or bitter is a modification of the
organ of taste, in consequence of which it experiences
the sensation of sweetness or bitterness. Yet, al-
though these qualities which are called proper sen-
sibles are not found actually in bodies, they exist in
them yirtually, since bodies really have qualities by
which they are apt to produce corresponding sensa-
tions in the organs of sense. Thus bodies are not
sonorous, savory, or odoriferous ; but they are apt to
produce in our senses the sensation of sound, of taste,
or of smell.
21. TJie object of external sensation consists primarily
and immediately in sensible qualities, but mediately and
secondarily in the subject in which the qualities exist.
Hence the external senses perceive bodies through the
medium of their proper sensibles which exist in the bodies.
— Sensible qualities or sensibles are not, as some
affirm, mere modifications of the organs of sense, but
the object perceived by sense. But since the senses
cannot perceive their own perceptions or sensations,
being organic faculties, these must be perceived by
the internal sense called common sense (sensus com-
munis). As inhering in a substance, sensible quali-
ties are perceived by the external senses. But as
they cannot exist apart from the bodies of which they
are qualities, the senses cannot apprehend them
apart from their subject except by the process of
abstraction; but of this act they are incapable, for
they are organic faculties. Therefore they must ap-
prehend the sensible qualities in the corporeal sub-
ject in which they exist ; but this is equivalent to
saying that they apprehend both the qualities and
their subject, though not in the same way. The
qualities are their proper object ; the substance, their
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 261
object ^er accidens. From this two consequences fol-
low. The first is that the external senses perceive
bodies by perceiving- their qualities. By the sense
of sight we do not become cognizant of the impres-
sion made in the sense : this is known to be there by
reason ; while colnmon sense, or sensitive conscious-
ness, perceives the sensation ; but by the sight we
perceive color, and through it the colored body other
than ourselves. The second consequence is that the
perception of bodies is immediate, but not per se, but
per accidens; because, the external senses requiring
the qualities of bodies in order to perceive bodies
themselves, this perception takes place indirectly.
22. It is erroneous to hold with Condillac that sensa-
tions heing mere modifications of the sentient subject, tlie
soul has no perception of an object other than itself except
through the msdimn of totich. — The philosophers who
have denied that the external senses perceive bodies
immediately, have been compelled to seek by what
means the soul perceives an object distinct from it-
self. Condillac, starting with the hypothesis of the
"man-statue," says that so long as this statue is en-
dowed with only the senses of sight, hearing, taste,
and smell, it perceives nothing more than that it is
itself affected in this or that way ; but when the
statue moves and by active touch feels something that
resists it, it then perceives an object distinct from
itself, and is led to believe that the perceptions of
the other four senses also relate to an object external
to the sentient subject. Thus the touch would be a
medium by which the soul would pass to something
distinct from itself.
It is easy to see the absurdity of such a theory to
explain the perception of bodies. Besides, it rests
on an hypothesis essentially contradictory. For ac'
262 BEAL PHILOSOPHY.
cording to this theory bodies produce sensations, and
the sensations produce the sensitive faculties. But
on the one hand, sensation must be elicited by a sen-
tient subject ; on the other hand, sensation, far from
producing the sensitive faculty, supposes its exist-
ence.
23. We cannot admit with Heid, that the soul cognizes
hodies iy means of certain instinctive judgments. — Reid,
like Condillac, holds that the senses do not perceive
bodies, but merely the sensible qualities, and that
moreover sensation is purely subjective ; for, he tells
us, as soon as the senses have perceived the sensible
qualities, the intellect pronounces this instinctive
judgment : " There are no sensible qualities without
an existing material subject." But if this judgment is
instinctive, it proceeds from the natural constitution
of the soul, and consequently is purely subjective.
But a purely subjective judgment applied to subjec-
tive sensations cannot manifest an objective reality.
24. We cannot admit, with Fichte, that the soul per-
ceives hodies, not as objective realities, hut as repre-
sentations which the soul forms at will within itself. —
Deducing the ultimate consequences of the subjec-
tivism of Kant, Fichte holds that when the soul
perceives bodies, it perceives nothing more than its
own representations formed by an exercise of its will.
This theory is essentially absurd and contradictory.
For the will cannot be the cause of the representation
of bodies ; it cannot will their representation unless
they be already known. Besides, if the representa-
tion of bodies is purely the effect of the will, why is
it that the soul cannot experience at will a sensation
that it desires ?
25. It is false to assert with Cousin that sensation is
purely subjective, and that from it the soul infers with
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 263
tJve aid of the principle of causality that hodies exist. — ■
With these two premises, viz., sensation is an effect,
and every effect must have a cause, we can draw no
conclusion but that sensation must have a cause. But
there is nothing to assure us that this cause is the
body, or, as Berkeley maintained, God Himself.
ART IV. — THE EXTERNAL SENSES IN PARTICULAR.
26. The external senses are foe in number: Sight,
hearing, smell, taste, and touch. — A sensitive being must
have as many senses as are required for the preser-
vation of its existence. But for this five senses are
necessary ; for by means of sight it perceives the dis-
position of the surrounding objects; by means of
hearing, the motion of those which it does not see ;
by means of smell, it perceives the character of the
aliments that are not yet within its reach ; by the
taste it judges of them with more care before taking
them as food ; lastly, by the toioch it oversees the
state of its own body and its relation to external
things. These five senses should be found in every
perfect sensitive being. — Again, our senses are five,
because there are five formally distinct material ob-
jects to be cognized, viz., the different qualities of
bodies ; and our senses are given to us for such
cognition.
27. Among the five senses, sight is the most intellective,
touch the most necessary. — Sight is the most intellec-
tive sense, that which plays the chief part in the cog-
nition of bodies: for its exercise it requires only
light, the most subtile of material things. Hearing,
although in itself inferior to sight, yet possesses two
advantages over it : the first is that it perceives sounds
from every direction ; the second is that it operates
264 BEAL PHILOSOPHY.
even in the absence of light. Hearing is the sense
most important to man, for it is especially through it
that the intellect acquires the cognitions necessary to
its natural development. And divine faith comes by
hearing. Smell perceives even an absent body by
means of the emanations which it sends forth, and
thus it informs us where bodies are when sight and
hearing fail. This sense is necessary to the animal
to find food ; it is useful to point out what food is
suitable for it and what is not. Taste is a sense dis-
tinct from touch, its organ being the tongue in con-
nection with the palate ; for savor differs formally
from the other tactile qualities; and their objects
specify the faculties. Touch is a sense having its
organ in the whole body, especially the ends of the
fingers. Its purposes are manifold. This is the most
material of all the senses ; it is also the most neces-
sary to animal life. To preserve life, the animal must
by the medium of touch guard against what can harm
its body, just as by the taste it must perceive what
food is proper for the support of its body.
AET V. — INTERNAL SENSES.
28. The internal senses are four in nuniber : the com-
mon sense, imaghiation, the estimative faculty, and sensi-
tive mennory. — A sensitive being not only perceives the
sensible qualities of bodies, but it distinguishes them
from one another by a single act, it perceives the acts
of the senses and the sensitive state that accompanies
them whether of pleasure or pain. But for this a
sense is requisite to which the perceptions of all
the external senses are referred as to their common
centre, an internal sense which can thus cognize the
acts of the senses. This internal sense is called the
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIES. 265
comrtion sense. But the sensible being must apprehend
the sensible object, not only when it is present, but
also when it is absent. Hence it stands in need of a
faculty which can preserve and reproduce the image?
already received. This faculty is imagination. The
sensitive being might be able to seek or to shun not
only those things that produce agreeable or disagree-
able sensations in it, but also those that may be ad-
vantageous or hurtful to it in other respects. Henca
it must be able to cognize their useful or harmful
properties;, to preserve and reproduce the perceptioij
of these properties, so that in the absence of usefu?
objects they may direct themselves towards thenj
This it does by means of the estimative faculty which
perceives these properties, and the sensitive memjory
which preserves this perception. Memory recalls
all past sensations and their objects just as they oc-
curred, in which it differs from imagination.
29. It is an error to deny the com/mon sense and say,
with Hosrnini, that the soul has through its essence the
feeling of its sensations ; or, with Oondillac, that each
sense perceives its own sensations ; or, with other philos-
ophers, that the sensations of each sense are perceived hy
the intellect. — The opinion of Bosmini (1797-1855) is
false, for the soul operates through its faculties and
never directly through its essence. The x)pinion of
Condillac is also false, because a simple sensation
and the perception of the sensation are two things
essentially distinct and cannot be referred to a single
sense ; also because supposing each sense can per-
ceive its own sensations, it can neither perceive the
sensation of another sense nor its proper sensible.
Now, the fact that the sensations of all the senses are
perceived by a single faculty cannot be denied, for we
compare our various sensations. Lastly, those philos-
266 SEAL PHILOSOPST.
ophers who say that man has no need of an internal
sense, because his intellect can perceive the acts of
the external senses, are also in error ; for sensation is
a sensitive act ; the perception of the sensation, there-
fore, supposes a sensitive operation, and consequently,
a sensitive faculty. The existence of the internal
sense called sensus communis is shown not merely
by reason, but also to some extent by physiology ;
for it testifies that the nerves of all the external
senses diverge from a common source, where they
unite as in their centre. This one point of reunion
of the sensitive nerves may be regarded as the or-
gan of common sense.
30. Tlie com/mon sense * lias three functions : 1. It
perceives and distinguishes the perceptions of the different
senses ; 2. It perceives the different states of the sentient
being, whether of pleasure or pain, accompanying or fol-
lowing these pe7'ceptions ; i.e., it acts the part of sensitive
consciousness ; 3. It p)erceives thepii'oper and flie common
sensihles. — 1. The perceptions of all the senses are re-
ferred to the.common sense as to their proper faculty.
Since, then, they must all be cognized by this central
sense, it must evidently be capable of distinguishing
them from one another, but it cannot know them as
different. As each sense can perceive only its own
proper sensible, it cannot distinguish it from the
other sensibles ; for to distinguish two things, both
must be known. 2. The second function of the com-
mon'sense is to perceive the act of the senses and the
state that accompanies and follows the act. The object
of each sense is one ; but the objects of the external
senses are outside the sentient subject ; these senses,
* This faculty must be carefully distinguished from that intellect-
ual habit, or. " Saculty of .ftret principles," explained on p. 135.
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 267
moreover, cannot perceive their ovrn sensations. For
the species impressa, or form of the object impressed
on sense and through which it perceives the object, is
too close to sense to be seen by it or perceived. To
perceive the sensation of each sense is proper to the
common sense, just as to perceive the objects that
impress the senses is proper to the external senses.
3. The common sense has a third function, which is
to perceive the common sensible. Since this sensible
should be apprehended by several senses to be duly
known, it is manifestly the proper object of common
sense, since the latter perceives the sensations of all
the particular senses. For instance, to know motion
accurately, we must perceive both by touch and by
sight : but these distinct perceptions can be perceived
by the common sense alone.
31. Imagination or fancy is an internal sense which
preserves the images or sensible species of objects already
perceived iy the external senses, and reproduces them in
the absence of their objects. — The existence of this faculty -
is attested by experience, which shows us the sensitive
subject reproducing images of the sensible objects
which it once perceived ; but this it could not do if it
had hot preserved the images of these objects. By
this faculty the soul retains the images of whatever
was perceived by the external senses. They are like
the glass of the camera obscura, which preserves the
images only as long as the objects are present ; imagi-
nation is like the photographic plate, which pre-
serves the images indefinitely. As this faculty only
preserves images of objects already perceived, it is
evident that where a sense is wanting, the correspond-
ing image in the imagination will also be wanting.
Hence a man born blind can form no image of color.
Some philosophers, and among them Cousin, have
268 SEAL PHILOSOPHY.
wrongly regarded imagination as an inventive faculty
that can produce images of objects not previously
perceived. Although imagination can, it is true,
form images of objects not existing in nature, yet it
can do so only by means of objects already perceived
by the senses whose images it can divide or multiply,
contract or distend, arrange or disturb, in various
ways. But imagination not only preserves the sensi-
ble images, it can also reproduce them, and in these
images it then contemplates the objects themselves,
not in the state of immobility as on a photographic
plate, but as they are in realitj', moving, acting, and
living, though not in the same exactitude with which
they were first perceived ; for this belongs, to memory.
In the animal, the reproduction of the images cor-
responds exactly to the reality perceived before by the
senses ; man can besides unite or separate the images
in his imagination and combine them in diverse
ways. Thus, from the' image of gold and the image
of a mountain, he forms the one image of a mountain
of gold. In this way the artist becomes capable of
producing masterpieces, the poet creates his fictions,
the scientist conceives hypotheses by which he sup-
plies the facts which nature hides from him. This
special power of imagination man possesses, not as
properly belonging to the sensitive life, but in conse-
quence of the perfection which the sensitive life in
him receives from the intellectual life, a redundancy
flowing over, as it were, from the higher faculty to
that which is immediately beneath it.
32. Association of images is subject to taws which
refer partly to the nature of the soul and partly to the
nature of the vmages. — Association of images, which
modern philosophers improperly name association of
ideas, depends partly on the nature of the soul. Thus
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 269
in. virtue of the unity of the soul, just as the phan-
tasm, through the action of intellect in man, influences
his free will and necessarily determines the sensi-
tive appetite in the animal, so does the will in man,
and the sensitive appetite in the animal, call up the
image or phantasm in the imagination.
Association of images depends also partly upon the
nature of the images, which, accordiiig to the relations
existing among them, are reduced to three categories :
those of mnilarity, contrast, and contiguity whether of
space or time. These relations are at times unper-
ceived, but for all that they are real.
33. The imagination in man should he regulated, and
prudently directed iy the will, and this hy intellect. —
The imagination plays a very important part in man,
since it furnishes his intellect with material for its
operations. Hence it is necessary so to regulate it
that it may be of great service in the acquisition of
truth. In the first place, since it is an organic faculty
having a corporeal organ, it is evidently more or less
perfect according to the physical organism of the
individual and the external influences that modify
that organism. Hence man should guard against
all those influences which injure the orderly exercise
of the imagination and from which he can withdraw
himself. In the second place, since the will exercises
a direct action on the imagination, man should guide
his imagination by his will enlightened by reason, and
constantly subject it to the control of the real ; other-
wise the imagination may by compounding and divid-
ing images give a factitious existence to deceitful
phantoms, and thus become the source of many errors
for the intellect, and consequently of much wrong-
doing for the will.
34. TTie estimative faculty is an internal sense which
270 BEAL PHILOSOPHY.
perceives and distinguishes things not perceived hy the
other senses, such as the useful or hurtful. — The existence
of this sense is attested by experience, for we see that
animals seek what is useful to them and avoid what is
hurtful. It is also proved by reason. In order to
preserve its being the animal must perceive not only
what is agreeable or disagreeable, but also what is
useful or harmful. It is by this faculty that the sheep
knows that the wolf is his enemy, that the bird
chooses the straw required for its nest. To this
faculty, also, must be ascribed the marvellous skill
and sagacity shown by animals in self-preservation
and self-defence.
Man possesses the estimative faculty as well as the
brute ; but in man it is more perfect because influ-
enced by intelligence. The animal perceives the use-
ful or the hurtful in a thing by natural instinct;
man, as an effect of a sort of comparison. Thus the
estimative faculty, which in the brute is analogous to
reason, is in man called particular reason, the cogita-
tive faculty, or passive intellect.
35. Sensitive memory is an iyiternal sense that preserves
and reproduces tlie cognitions acquired through the senses,
and reproduces the sensible images with the knowledge of
their perception in past time. — A sensitive being does
more than perceive in sensible objects what is useful
or hurtful, for it also preserves these perceptions.
Thus a dog shuns the places where he was beaten.
This faculty of preserving and reproducing the per-
ceptions of the other sensitive faculties is called sensi-
tive menwry.* It differs from imagination, for it re-
produces the cognitions of sensible objects with the
condition of past time in which they took place, and
* Also, and more properly, sensile, memory.
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 271
also recognizes now as once perceived the percep-
tions recalled ; while the imagination reproduces im-
ages simply and neither with any determination of
time nor in the order of' their first appearance. For
an act of memory, therefore, it does not suffice that
the image perceived in time past be reproduced, but
there must be also the knowledge that it was per-
ceived in past time. This apprehension of time,
though more noble than that of sensible qualities, is
yet limited by two points * of a given time, and is de-
terminate and particular. Hence it cannot be the ob-
ject of intellect, which perceives only the universal as
its proper object or object per se, the individual per
accidens. Sensitive memory exists both in the brute
and in man, as experience proves ; but in man, sensi-
tive memory, besides recalling the past, may also de-
duce from what it recalls a series of connected events.
And, as a child holding one end of the thread easily
unwinds the spool, so man sees in his memory a long
series of events and consequences which a first
thought has recalled. This operation is called remi-
niscence, and demands also the exercise of reason.
36. The efficiency of memory depends partly on nat-
ure and partly on the tnnemonic art. This art has
four laws : 1. The representation hy similitudes of the
objects to be retained ; 2. A methodical classification of
the objects; 3. An effort to retain them; 4. Continued
reflection on the objects. — Beadiness of memory de-
pends first of all on nature. Since memory is an or-
ganic faculty, it is evident that the more perfect the
organ, the more perfect also will be the faculty.
Hence in men the degrees of perfection of memory
* That Is, by that moment in the past in which the object was per-
ceived, and by the present moment in wliioh it is recalled.
272 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
are as various as the organisms themselves, and these
degrees vary even in the same individual according
to diversity of age and of organic conditions. But
man's memory may also be cultivated and helped by
art. For, unlike the brute, which remembers only
from natural means, and is determined by physical
causes, man remembers not merely in consequence of
physical causes, but also with the help of artificial
means, which he uses at will.
The first of these means is the representation by
similitudes of the objects to be retained. The use of
these similitudes will be the more eflicient in propor-
tion to their more striking character. Thus in order
to recall a great grief, it may be fixed in the memory
under the image of a sword. — The second means is
a methodical classification of the objects which we
wish to recall. This means is based on the very
nature of the mind, which passes from one remem-
brance to another in virtue of the numerous relations
existing among things. Nothing in the universe is
isolated; so also in the mind, all its cognitions are
bound together, and form by their connection a sort
of network, so that one thread cannot be touched
without affecting all the others through their rela-
tion more or less direct with the part affected.
Thus is explained the extreme ease with which the
mind passes from one object to another without the
bidding of the will, and even in spite of the will.
But, if the association of images often takes place
in an involuntary manner, it may also be regulated
by reflection and directed by the will. This asso-
ciation is based either on purely accidental rela-
tions or on logical relations. The former are chiefly'
those of similarity, contrast,, and contiguity in space
and time. It is especially by these that children re-
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 273
tain, and hence they have a very superficial memory.
The principal logical relations are those of principle
and consequence, of cause and effect, of means and
end, of substance and accident. By these relations
the memory brings back within itself the real nat-
ural connections of things, it acquires consistency,
strength, and unity, and the collection of its recol-
lections is raised to the dignity of science. This,
however, is the effect, not of sensitive but of in-
tellectual memory. — The third mnemonic means is
attention to the object and an effort to fix it in the
mind. This effort impresses things deeply in the
memory, and thus enables it to recall them with ease.
— The fourth means is continued reflection on the
object to be retained. We easily recall what we have
well considered. Reflection makes our recollection
clear and more distinct ; it supplies in advanced
years the force and intensity which the newness of
the object gives to the recollections of the early years
of life.
AET. YI. — THE APPETITIVE FACULTIES.
— SENSITIVE APPETITE.
37. Sensitive appetite is a tendency to good perceived
hy the senses. — The tendency of a being is proportioned
to its nature. A sensitive being knows through
the senses the sensible objects necessary for preserv-
ing its existence. Hence it has a natural tendency to
seek sensible goods and be united with them. This
tendency is called sensitive appetite.
38. Sensitive appetite is divided into two distinct fac-
ulties : Concupiscible appetite and irascible appetite. —
Goncupiscible appetite is a faculty by which the animal
is led to seek what is useful to it, and to shun what is
18
274 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
harmful. Irascible appetite is a faculty by which the
animal is roused to acquire a good that is difficult to
attain, and to remove any evil that would destroy this
good or prevent its attainment. By his concupis-
cible appetite, a dog seeks proper nourishment and
avoids what is injurious ; by his irascible appetite he
is angered and attacks the animal that tries to de-
prive him of his food.
These are two distinct faculties, for it often happens
that they are opposed to each other. Thus anger
takes away the need of sleep, as, in turn, the want of
rest lessens the heat of anger. At times the closest
relations exist between the irascible appetite and the
concupiscible ; the former may even be regarded as
the defender of the latter, since it combats whatever
opposes the good sought by the concupiscible ap-
petite, or whatever causes the evil that it shuns.
Hence all the movements of the irascible appetite
begin from those of the concupiscible, and are re-
ferred to the same.
39. A sensitive being when urged on by its appetite
transports its body from one place to another. The faculty
by which it does this is called locomotive facidty. — Des-
cartes and his school denied this faculty. He attrib-
uted locomotion in the animal to the perfection of
its bodily mechanism,* and in man to the action of the
will. But reason and experience prove the existence
of this faculty. For when an animal apprehends a
useful or a hurtful object, it has need of a power to
approach the one and withdraw from the other ; and,
in fact, we see i that this does happen. It is evident
* The opinion that brutes are mere automata is refuted on p. 247.
With this falls also the deduction that animals have no power of
locomotion.
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 275
that this faculty is distinct both from the sensitive
appetite and the will, for we often shun the sensible
good which the appetite craves, and, again, are often
unable to produce the motion which the will desires.
Like all the other sensitive faculties, it is organic,
that is, it resides in an organ and Cannot operate with-
out the organ.
AET. VII. — THE INTELLECTIVE FACULTIES.
— THE INTELLECT.
40. The proper object of the intellect, the intelligible,
is the immaterial, the essence of things-^Ks the proper
object of the intellect is such because of its relation to
the intellect, it is rightly called the intelligible. It is
the immaterial, the essence of things. For intellect,
as the name indicates, is a faculty which penetrates
the inner nature of things, that by which they are
what they are, viz., their essences. It is without reason
that certain philosophers have denied the possibility
of knowing the essences of things, and by essences
have consequently understood whatever is unknown
to us in things. The essences of things are known
to us, since we define things and specify them ; for
they can be defined and specified by their essences
. only. More than this, essence cannot be known
merely in part, for it is indivisible ; to know only a
part of it, is to be ignorant of it.*
41. J'he proper object of intellect is the immaterial and
universal. Its adequate object is entity, whatever is or
can be. Its proportionate object, in its actual condition, is
the essence of sensible things. — Every faculty is sp^ified
* Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Mill, and Hegel have all either denied
the ohjectiye reality of essence or at least wrongly defined essence.
276 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
by its actions and its object. Since the intellect per-
forms operations that exceed the power of matter,
since they attain to the immaterial and the spiritual,
it must itself as the cause of these operations be spir-
itual. The adequate object of intellect is that which
it can apprehend, if it be considered in its own nature.
Now, since the intellect is a spiritual faculty and can
have a mode of existence independent of matter, it
can know every entity, that is, truth. But if the
intellect be viewed as a faculty that requires a pre-
vious operation of the sensitive powers in order to
act, its proportionate object is the essence of sensible
things.
42. The intellect is an inorganic faculty, and Tience
needs no organ for its action. — Since the object of the
intellect is the essence of things, and essence is al-
ways immaterial, we know the intellect must likewise
be immaterial * and independent in its operation of
any bodily organ.
43. 8i7ice the intellect is an inorganic faculty, the
system of phrenology must he considered ahsurd.—Vhxe-
nologists, headed by Gall (1758-1828) and Spurzheim
(1776-1832), regard all the faculties of the soul, sensi-
tive, intellectual, and moral, as residing in bodily or-
gans. They teach that protuberances exist on the
surface of the brain and the skull, that each of these
is the organ of one of the soul's faculties, and that in
proportion as the protuberances are more or less de-
veloped, the faculty is also more or less developed.
The number of these faculties varies with each phre-
nologist. Gall allows twenty-seven ; Spurzheim,
* Essence is said to te immaterial, not tliat it is not sometimes
joined to matter, but in that it is not necessarily joined to it, and is
viewed apart from the individual conditions that determine it in any
individual body.
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIISS. 277
thirty-seven. This theory, if consistent, must end in
materialism and fatalism. It is, furthermore, contra-
dicted by experience, which time and again has shown
how slight is the relation between this or that pro-
tuberance and the corresponding faculty. It is con-
tradicted by science, which proves that there is no
constant relation between the protuberances of the
skull and the surface of the brain.*
44. An abstractive power must he allowed in the soul.
— Every being must have in its nature whatever is
required for its proper operation. But the proper
operation of the human intellect in its present con-
dition has for its first and immediate object the
essence of sensible things. Now, since this essence
is individualized in the concrete conditions that en-
viron it, it cannot be apprehended by the intellect,
which is an inorganic faculty, unless it be stripped of
its individuating conditions. Therefore, that the soul
may apprehend the essence of sensible things, it must
have a faculty capable of ideally separating the es-
sence from its individuating notes. This faculty is
called active intellect {intellectus agens).
45. The abstraction of the essence from its individual
conditions does not entail any ei^or in cognition. — A cog-
* "The fundamental error of the phrenological school lay in the
idea that a science of mind can be founded in any shape or form
upon the discoveries of anatomy. Their error lay in the notion that,
physiology can ever be the basis of psychology ; and this is an error
and a confusion of thought that survives phrenology." — Duke of
Argyll, quoted in American Caf/iolic Q;u.arterly Beview, vol. 11., p.
134.
Tet the influence of body on soul cannot be denied any more than
that of soul on' body. The most that can be granted is that phre-
nology may point out certain tendencies in man. These tendencies
may be due to heredity or to environment. It fails to appreciate
the spirituality of man's soul and his freedom of will.
278 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
nition is false when we affirm of an object what does
not belong to it, or deny of it what belongs to it.
Thus the intellect, viewing the essence in itself
abstracted from individual conditions, would err were
it to affirm that the essence actually exists in the
object separated from these individual conditions.
But, since it is restricted to contemplating the es-
sence by itself without any affirmation, and not con-
sidering it as really apart from its individuating
notes, the abstraction which it makes no more implies
error than does silence imply deceit.
46. The abstraction of the essence is possible, whether
we consider the abstracted essence in itself, or the condi-
tion of the intellect making the abstraction. — Although
the essence cannot exist physically without an in-
dividual determination, yet in itself it does not imply
a necessary existence in this or that individual ;
otherwise it could never be found in any other than
this individual, and consequently there could be but
one individual in each species. But this is evidently
false in regard to sensible objects. Therefore there
is nothing in the essence to prevent its being ab-
stracted from the individual in which it subsists, that
is, its being considered apart. As to the intellect, if
in the act of intellection it must be conformed to the
object which it cognizes, it is by no means necessary
that it be conformed to it as to the mode of cogniz-
ing. Thus, if the mode of existence of the essence is
concrete in the real order, nothing prevents its being
abstracted in the ideal order.
47. The act of abstraction is prior in nature, but not in
time, to that of intellection. — ^When two forces concur
to the production of one effect, their operation must
be simultaneous ; for every concurrence, while it does
not exclude priority of nature, yet implies simulta-
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIES. 279
neity of time. But the abstractive faculty and the
faculty that perceives essence concur in the produc-
tion of the single effect of intellective knowledge of
the essence of material things : the first faculty ab-
stracting the essence, and the second perceiving it.
Therefore the act of abstraction is only in nature
prior to the act of intellection.
48. The power that abstracts the esseiice is distinct
from that which perceives the essence. — When two ac-
tions are exercised upon a single object in two ways
specifically distinct, these two actions must be spe-
cifically distinct, arid consequently not reducible to
the same power ; but to abstract the essence and to
perceive it are two acts specifically distinct ; there-
fore they demand two distinct powers. Besides, the
essences of sensible things are not actually intelli-
gible ; but it is only actual beiiig" that can effect the
passage of an entity from potentiality to act ; hence
the soul requires besides the faculty by which it
comprehends the intelligible, and which is necessarily
in potentiality with respect to all intelligibles, a fac-
ulty which when in act renders the essences of sensi-
ble things actually intelligible, by disengaging them
from the material conditions in which they exist.
The Schoolmen call this faculty the active intellect
{intellectus agens) ; the other faculty, the possible intel-
lect {intellectus possibilis).
49. For the production of the act of intellection, intel-
ligible species are required; or likenesses of the intelligible
object, which inform the cognizing intellect. — Intelligible
sp)ecies {species intelligibilis) is a likeness of the intel-
ligible object, which informs the intellect, and by
means of which it can cognize the object. It is with-
out ground that modern philosophers have denied
the existence of intelligible species. To acquire
280 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
knowledge, it is necessary tliat the object known enter
in some way the subject knowing. But it cannot be
said that the subject knowing contains already in
itself the object known, and in the act of cogni-
tion does nothing but contemplate it : for this would
identify the subject knowing and the object known.
Hence it must be admitted that the object known is
communicated to the subject knowing. But it cannot
be communicated in its physical substantiality, be-
cause it exists outside the subject knowing. Hence
it can be communicated to the subject knowing only
by means of a representation erf itself, and this is
called the intelligible species. The intelligible species
is named by the Scholastic philosophers the impressed
species {species impressa), if it is considered as simply
received by the intellect, and as the medium by which
the object determines the intellect to the cognitive
act. It is called the expressed species {species expressa),
if it is considered as the effect in the intellect of the
action of intellect after perceiving the impressed spe-
cies, which action produces complete cognition.
50. T/ie intelligible species is not that which the intel-
lect hiows, but that by which it knows. — If the intelligi-
ble species were the object known, it would neces-
sarily constitute the term of the intellective act ; but
since it is a form inhering in the intellect, it must be
apprehended by a reflex act ; therefore it is only in
reflex cognition that it is the object known. In direct
cognition it is the means by which the intellect
knows.*
* ' ' The main root of difference between adversaries and ourselves
[as to the objective validity of ideas in general], is that they will in-
sist contrary to us, in regarding knowledge as primarily not a knowl-
edge of things but of ideas. They imagine that what we first of all
know are always subjective affections as such — signa ex qiiihis and
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIMS. 281
51. The act of intellection resulting after the itnpression
of the intelligible object on the intellect by means of the
impressed species, is always the proper act of intellect
itself. — The intellect is called passive or possible,
because it is in itself indifferent to this or that act,
and consequently requires some determination to be
given to it by the object before it can act. Its act is
called immanent because it remains in the acting sub-
ject and modifies it. It is easily seen (1) that the in-
tellect is first passive, because it is in itself indifferent
to knowing this or that object ; and (2), because it
, knows an object only when determined to it by the
object, that it is also active, because it is the intellect
that knows. The intellective act must be elicited by
an intrinsic vital principle. But a faculty is active
when it elicits its own acts, and (3) that intellection
is an immanent act, because it remains in the faculty,
which it ennobles and perfects, and does not change
or modify the object. It must be noted that the con-
ditions that make the possible intellect passive are
not found in the acting intellect. Hence that intel-
lect is exclusively active.
52. The term of the act of intellection is called the
mental word. — The intellect, after receiving the im-
pressed species, the intelligible species that determines
it to action, produces as its term the mental word.
This does not really differ from the idea. Yet the
word idea expresses the concept of the mind in
aigna quibus. . . The mind perceives through ideas, not in the
sense that it looks at ideas first, and then passes on to infer things ;
but in the sense that the mind, at least under one aspect, begins as a
tabula rasa, and only in proportion as it stores itself with ideas is it
rendered by them cognizant of objects. . . A world of miscon-
ception would be saved if \he right view of the office of ideas were
acquired." — First Principles, Stonyliurst Series, pp. 335, 336.
282 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
its relation with the object, while the mental word
points out in addition the relation of the concept to
the principle whence it proceeds, affirming to itself,
as it were, the truth it knows. In its word the intel-
lect perceives the object, just as in a mirror the eye
beholds not. the mirror, but the object reflected by
the mirror. The term of the act of vision, considered
as an action, is truly the mirror ; but considered as
cognition, it is the object. So too the term of the
act of intellection considered as the effect of the intel-
lect, is the mental word ; but, under the aspect of
cognition, it is the object of which the word is as it
were the image.
AET. Tin. — CONSCIOUSNESS.
53. Consciousness is the knowledge which the soul has
of its present affections. — Man not only has sensitive
and intellective cognitions, but he also knows that he
has them. The faculty by which the soul is cog-
nizant of its sensations, is the common sense, some-
times called sensitive consciousness. But the knowl-
edge which the soul has of its intellective affections
and of itself is properly called consciousness. And
because these affections- may be viewed either in
themselves or in their moral character of goodness or
malice, a distinction must be made between psycho-
logical consciousness, which perceives the existence of
the affections, and moral consciousness, which tells
whether the acts are good or bad. This latter is
generally called conscience. It is only with the
former that psychology is concerned. The cognition
afforded by consciousness, which is of a special kind,
should not be confounded with intellective cogni-
tion in general. For by intellective cognition the in-
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FA0ULTIE8. 283
tellect apprehends an essence, or by judgment or
reasoning affirms or denies something- of an essence ;
while consciousness has for its object this very act
of apprehension, judgment, or reasoning, that is, the
present affections of the thinking subject. Besides,
the operation of consciousness depends entirely on
the soul's activity. To confound it with cognition in
general would therefore be to fall into the error of
Fichte, who from the simple act of consciousness
drew the creation of all intelligible objects, the Ego,
the world, and even God.
54. Consciousness is habitual or direct, actual or re-
flex.— Habitual consciousness is the disposition of
the soul to see its own affections by the mere fact
of being present to itself. Actual consciousness is
the knowledge which the soul here and now has of
its affections. The former accompanies all the intel-
lective acts of the soul, because the soul is always
present to itself; the latter is consciousness now
exercised upon its present affections. "Direct con-
sciousness," says Balmes, " is the presence of a phe-
nomenon to the mind, whether that phenomenon be a
sensation or an idea, an act or an impression, in the
intellectual or the moral order." Reflsx consciousness,
which alone is consciousness properly so called, is
the act whereby the intellect explicitly adverts to the
phenomenon present in it.
55. Consciousness suffices to make us certain of the
existence of the soul, but not to mahe known its nature.
— Many philosophers, and among them Hume and
Kant, have attacked the testimony of consciousness.
Others with Reid have admitted the value of con-
sciousness, but have maintained that the existence of
the soul cannot be known except by means of an
distinctive judgment. Cousin pretended that the
284 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
existence of tlie soul can be perceived in no other
way than by reasoning made by the intellect conse-
quent on the testimony of consciousness. But, what-
ever philosophers may assert, it is evident that, as
the soul is present to itself in its operations, it must
by consciousness perceive itself operating. Again,
consciousness in perceiving the acts of the soul, can-
not but perceive them as in the soul ; therefore
in perceiving these acts it perceives the existing
soul itself. Yet though consciousness is competent
to perceive the existence of the soul, it is not comp'e-
tent to perceive its essence. For it is one thing to
perceive the soul in action, and quite another thing
to know that it has this or that nature. This latter
knowledge is the result of reasoning, and is proper to
the learned, while the former pertains to all men.
56. Gonsciousness is not a faculty distinct from, intel-
lect — Several modern philosophers, with Descartes
and Eeid, make of consciousness a special and dis-
tinct faculty. But it is easy to prove that it is not
distinct from the intellect. That two faculties be dis-
tinct, their acts or their objects must be not reducible
one to the other. But the object of consciousness is
reducible to that of intellect, for consciousness being
an intellectual faculty can apprehend its object only
under the form of its immateriality. In like manner,
the act of consciousness is reducible to that of intel-
lect ; for consciousness properly so called is nothing
else than the intellect knowing its own operations
here and now.
AET. IX. — ATTENITON AND REFIjECTION.
57. Attention is an act iy which, the intellect is con-
centrated on a single object. Reflection is an act of con
THE HUMAJV SOUL AND ITS FAOWLTIES. 285
centrating the intellect on itself and its own acts. — Sev-
eral philosophers, following in the footsteps of "Wolf
(1679-1754), have distinguished between attention and
reflection, saying that by the former the mind is fixed
on a single object, while by the latter it passes suc-
cessively from one object to another. But this dis-
tinction is false, for it is a necessary condition of
every cognitive act tTiat it can perceive but one object
at a time, and that it can know several objects only
successively. If a distinction be made between other
cognitive acts and the acts of intellect, it must be
made in accordance with the different modes in which
they are accomplished. Hence we must say that at-
tention is an act by which the intellect considers one
object alone among many ; and that reflection is an
act by which the intellect concentrates its power as
itself and its own acts, or reconsiders an object.
AET. X. — THE PEINCIPAIi FUNCTIONS OF THE INTELLECT.
— JUDGMENT.
58. Judgment is an act of the intellect iy which it
predicates the agreement or disagreement of two ideas ; or
ly which it affirms or denies that something is. — The in-
tellect may perceive an object without affirming or
denying anything of it, or it may proceed to affirm
or deny something of that object. In the latter
case it is said to judge. This act of judgment does
not, as is evident, require a distinct faculty. It is an
effect of the imperfection of our intellect, which, un-
like the understanding of the angels, does not attain
its perfection immediately in passing from potential-
ity to act, but acquires complete cognition only by
compounding or dividing different ideas or concepts.
59. Every judgment is necessarily comparative. The
286 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
instinctive judgments of Reid must he rejected. — Judg-
ment is a complete cognition, since by it the intellect
cognizes not only the essence, but also what does or
does not belong to the essence. It must, therefore,
be performed in the manner required by a complete
cognition. But the perfection of intellectual cogni-
tion in a judgment requires not only that the attri-
bute be affirmed or denied of the subject, but also that
the reason of this affirmation or negation be likewise
known. But this reason consists in the agreement or
disagreement of the attribute with the subject, and
hence they must be compared to find the reason.
Therefore every judgment necessarily implies a com-
parison. The impulse which nature has given to
intellect can be nothing else thaii a tendency to act,
but not a tendency to perform an act of perfect and
complete cognition like that of judgment.
60. The comparison instituted preparatory to a judg-
ment is between the idea of the attribute and that of the
S2ibject. — The intellect cannot compare attribute and
subject unless it knows them ; consequently it must
compare the idea of the attribute with that of the
subject. Besides judgment is an immanent act which
is accomplished in the soul that judges ; but the soul
cannot judge of things external to itself unless they
are in some way present in it ; this can happen only
through their concepts. Therefore a judgment is
formed by a comparison of the concepts of subject
and attribute. This, however, does not deprive the
judgment of objective validity, because the concepts
of the subject and attribute are themselves objective,
since they have for their immediate term the subject
and attribute as they are in themselves.
THE HUM AW SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIES. 287
AET. XI. — SPECUIiATIVE INTELLECT AND PEACTICAL
INTELLECT.
61. The speculative intellect is that which contemplates
the true without any reference to its practical application.
The practical intellect is that which, regards the true as the
rule of action. — The human intellect may stop at the
mere consideration of the true ; but it may also apply
the known truth to action, considering it as the di-
rective rule of action. In the former case, it is called
speculative ; in the latter, practical.
62. Tke speculative intellect and the practical intellect
are not two distinct faculties, but only two functions of
the same intellect. — The object of the intellect is the
true. But whether truth be speculative or practical,
it is still truth, and does not constitute a specifically
distinct object of intellect. The whole difference be-
tween the act of knowing- speculative truth and that
of knowing practical truth consists in this, that the
consideration of practical truth is as it were an exten-
sion of the consideration of speculative truth.
ABT Xn. — EEASON.
63. lieason is that act of the intellect iy which it
deduces otve truth from another. — An angel perceives
truth at once without amy need of reasoning; but
man comes to the knowledge of most truths step by
step, passing from one truth to another. When the
intellect compares the attribute with the subject and,
perceiving their agreement or disagreement, predi-
cates the same, it judges ; when it perceives their
agreement or disagreement by means of a third term,
and concludes the same, it 7'easons.
288 SEAL PBILOSOPRT.
64. Season is not a faculty distinct from intellect.—'
Modern philosophers make reason a distinct faculty ;
but it is evidently only a function of intellect. For to
deduce one truth from another, an act of reflection
is sufficient, by which the intellect, considering atten-
tively a cognition, perceives there a greater or less
number of truths. But the intellect is an essentially
inorganic faculty, and hence suffices to accomplish
this act. Thus, in passing from one truth to another,
reason is to intellect what motion is to rest ; and since
it is the same body that is in motion or at rest, so it
is one and the same faculty that understands and
reasons.
AET. XIII. — INTELLECTIVE MEMORY.
65. Intellective memory is tJie poioer which the intellect
has to preserve and reproduce intellective cognitions tJiat
have already been acquired. — When the intellect has
perceived its object, it ought to be able to preserve it
in memory, and, if need be, reproduce it. This is
necessary both for science and for practical life : for
science, because no conclusions can be drawn from
truths already known unless memory actually re-
produces their cognition ; for our daily Hfe, because
it is guided by the history of the past, and that
history memory alone can preserve.
Three conditions are requisite for an act of intellec-
tive memory : (1) That the intellect be able to pre-
serve an intellective cognition acquired in the past ;
(2) That the intellect be able to distinguish the time
when the cognition was formed; (3) That the in-
tellect be able to recognize the cognition that is now
reproduced as having been acquired in the past.
Now, it is evident that the intellect can preserve its
intellectual acts, for they are immaterial and inherent
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIES. 289
m an immaterial subject, and hence are not subject to
corruption; secondly, the intellect, as being an in-
organic power can apprehend not merely the intellec-
tive acts, but also the time when they took place;
thirdly, the intellect can recognize a particular cog-
nition as had in past time, because, as it preserves a
knowledge of its intellective acts just as they were
elicited, that is, in the past, and is endowed moreover
with the power of comparison, it can in their repro-
duction recognize them as elicited in past time.
66. Intellective memory is not a distinct faculty from
the possible intellect. — A power which by its nature is
referred to a general object cannot be diversified by
the particular differences of the object. Thus the
faculty of sight, which is referred in general to color,
is not different from the faculty that perceives green
or orange. But the object of the intellect is the in-
telligible in general or the universal. Consequently,
a power like memory which has for its object the in-
telligible perceived in the past, cannot be different
from the intellect itself.
67. Intellective memory differs essentially from sensitive
memory. — In the first place, sensitive memory re-
produces sensitive perceptions ; intellective memory
reproduces intellective cognitions. Secondly, sensi-
tive memory reproduces the past as its proper and
immediate object ; intellective memory reproduces it
only so far as, in perceiving the intellective act, it
perceives also the time when the act was elicited.
Several modern philosophers make no distinction
between these two kinds of memory.* This is a
* With tiiese may be reckoned Dr. Maudsley and Herbeit Spencer.
But all conceptualists and nominalists, all, in fact, who fail to
divide off accurately the sensible image from the idea, must, if con-
Bistent, identify the sensitive memory with the intellective.
19
290 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
gross error, as even experience can show, because one
man may often recall sensible things with ease, but
intelligible objects with difficulty, while the contrary
is true of another individual. The same phenomenon
is manifest also in the same individual at different
periods of his life under different conditions.
68. The laws of the development and exercise of
intellective memory are the same as those of the devel-
opment and exercise of sensitive m,emory. — The sole
difference is that sensitive memory resides in an
organ, and depends for its perfection on that of the
organ ; intellective memory is an inorganic faculty,
and has only indirect dependence on the state of or-
ganism, in so far, namely, as the intellect requires the
concurrence of the sensitive faculty to furnish matter
for its operation.
ABT. XIV. — THE INTELLECTIVE APPETITE, OR WILL.
69. The will is an intellective appetite, or a tendency
toward the good as apprehended hy the intellect. — When
the intellect has apprehended the good, the soul seeks
to be united with the good. The faculty by which it
tends to the good is called the will. But whatever is
may be apprehended as good ; therefore whatever
exists, the reprobate excepted, may become the ob-
ject of the will, /ind as the will and its act are good,
they too may become the object of the will. Thus we
can love not only external creatures, but also our
own will and the love to which it determines us.
70. The ivill differs from the sensitive appetite in its
object and its made of action. — The sensitive appetite
depends oathe senses, and has for its object the sen-
sible and material ; the will depends on the intellect
and has for its object the universal good, and seeks
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 291
either material objects under their universal charac-
ter of good, or immaterial objects. Secondly, the
sensitive appetite acts like the will so far as it is the
intrinsic principle of its own act, but it cannot pro-
pose to itself an end. That an agent may propose to
itself an end, it is necessary that it be able to return
upon itself and consider itself in relation to its end.
Now the sensitive appetite depends on material
organs, which are incapable of reflection ; but the in-
tellect, as being intrinsically independent of organs,
and, therefore, capable of complete return upon itself,
can both present the good to the will, and cause it to
consider the good as its end and perfection. Lastly,
the sensitive appetite is incapable of choice and is
necessarily determined to its act ; but the will can
choose its own means to attain its end.
AET. XV. — FEEEDOM.*
71. Freedom is divided into freedom from coaction,
freedom from necessity, and freedom from law. Freedom
from, necessity is divided into freedom of contradiction,
freedom of contrariety, and freedotn of specification. —
Frfeedom from coaction excludes all external constraint ;
thus a prisoner in his cell is without this freedom,
which is possessed by the beasts of the forest. Free-
dom from necessity excludes all internal constraint ;
of this the insane man and the beast are destitute.
Freedom from law excludes all dependence on a law
* "Preedom is used where emphasis is laid upon large opportunity
given for the exercise of one's powers ; or where the previous or
iiossible restriction has been or is legal or moral. . . . Liberty
has more in mind protection from external constraint or from the ag-
gressions of power ; hence, in civil affairs, liberty is freedom as out
lined and protected by law. " — Century Dictionary.
292 REAL PEILOSOPST.
imposed by a superior ; God alone enjoys this free=
dom. Man naturally possesses freedom from coac-
tion ; but to constitute free choice, by whicli the "will
chooses the means to attain its end, freedom from
necessity suffices. This is called freedom of contra-
diction, when one is free either to will something or
not will it. It is called freedom of co7itrariety, when
one is free to will either good, or evil under the ap-
pearance of good. It is called freedom of specifica-
tion, when one is free to will this, that, or some other
object or act. It is to be remarked that freedom of
contrariety, far from being necessary to constitute
free will, is rather an imperfection ; and just as it is
a defect in the reason to draw false conclusions from
principles, so it is an imperfection in the free will not
to choose the means proper to attain the end.
72. Free choice belongs essentially to ths will of man ;
it is the power of the, will to choose the means iy directing
them to the end. — The will is necessarily determined by
its nature to universal good, and when the intellect
points out to it this good, it cannot but love and seek
it. But the same is not true of particular goods : the
will may or may not seek any one of them as a means
to attain its end, which is universal good ; it is free to
choose between them.* Some philosophers, with
Locke, make this freedom consist in the physical
power of the will to execute what it desires ; but this
is an accident of freedom which may be wanting,
while freedom of the will properly so called still ex-
ists; as is the case with the paralytic who is unable to
move his arm. Other philosophers, following Ock-
ham, have maintained that the will may or may not
* Consult the valuable article by J. Gardair, Le Libre Arbit/fC
/Lnncdes de la PhUosopJde OhrStienne, April and June, 1889.
THE HCTMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 293
desire a tiling without any necessity of its being ap-
prehended as good. But this is tantamount to saying
that the will is free because it is free. Moreover, such
a doctrine contradicts the true nature of the will, which
is a blind faculty, and cannot desire any object unless
the intellect points it out as good. Others, again, as-
sert that the apprehension of good, which is the mo-
tive of an act of the will, is a mere condition ; that,
given this condition, the will may still elicit an act
or not, may desire one thing rather than another.
According to these philosophers, freedom is the prop-
erty of the will to act or not act, or to act in one way
rather than in another, when the necessary conditions
for acting are present. This view is correct.
To apprehend the nature of the will, one must keep
well in mind that it is a blind faculty and can never act
until the good, which is its object, has been shown to
it by the intellect. But since the will is directed tow-
ards this or that particular good by the intellect, it
follows that the free exercise of the will requires as a
necessary condition a previous act of intellect. Now,
reason and experience prove that the intellect is really
indifferent to knowing this or that particular good,
since every thing that is good for the will is also
true for the intellect. "When, therefore, the intellect
has pronounced this or that to be a particular good,
the will is free to choose whichever particular good
pleases it. Hence freedom may not, as some affirm,
be defined as the free judgmeivt of reason ; for it is a
property, not of reason, but of the will ; and the judg-
ment of the intellect regarding a particular good
imposes no necessity on the will of choosing that par-
ticular good rather than another.
73. The existence of this freedom is proved frem tTie
mrv nature of the will, from the testimony hoth of con/-
294 REAL PB1L080PHY.
sdousness and of conscience, from the common sense of
mankind, and from, the absurd consequences of its denial.
— 1. The will has for its proper object the absolute
good, and as to this good it is not free ; thus man
cannot but will to be happy. But as to the particular
goods which are the means of attaining the absolute
good, the will is necessarily free ; because if the abso-
lute good, as completely satisfying the tendencies oj'
the will, inevitably determines it, particular goods,
as lacking some perfections, may under this aspect
be viewed as evil, and so be rejected by the wiU.
Thus, while we necessarily will to be happy, we
may yet, according to our liking, choose virtue or
riches as a means to attain happiness. 2. Conscious-
ness attests the existence of freedom. For we clearly
distinguish in ourselves indeliberate movements fropa
those that depend for their existence on our will and
reason. In a multitude of cases we not only recog-
nize a principle of activity which we can determine
at will, but we also exercise it at pleasure ; it is thus,
for example, that 1 move my arm or my hand for the
mere pleasure experienced in exercising my freedom.
The reality of free will and its constant exercise are
so evident, that we may say with Feneloii that no man
in his senses can practically doubt it. 3. We have
the irresistible conviction of being the responsible
cause of certain actions which we regard as our own,
and which we esteem worthy of praise or blame.
Before performing these actions we examine whether
we can do them ; and we experience remorse if they
are criminal. On the other hand, conscience re-
proaches us for moral evil, but never for physical evil.
4. The freedom of the will is a truth universally ad-
mitted by men, as is attested by all languages, by the
civil and religious institutions of all peoples, and the
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 295
means employed in every age to instruct and educate
man. 5. Finally, if the freedom of the will be denied,
it must be admitted as a consequence that there is
neither good nor evil, that remorse is a mere fiction,
that laws are useless and absurd, that deliberation is
nonsensical, and that God is the cause of all existing
evil.
74. It is absurd to urge against free will, as do fatal-
ists, the action of God upon Tnan, His foreknowledge of
events. His goodness and power, and the influence of mo-
tives and temperament. — In ancient times fatalism
formed the basis of every religion and every philo-
sophical system. It was continued in some of the
heretical doctrines of the first ages of the Ch\irch,
and Mahometism inoculated it into the manners of
the Oriental peoples. In modem times it has been
renewed as a doctrine by Protestantism, and later by
Jansenism ; it is an immediate consequence of the
two chief errors that in our day divide non-Catholic
philosophy, namely, materialism and pantheism.
The objection drawn from the action of God upon
the will of man has no weight ; for although God, as
the first cause of all motion, moves man's will also,
yet the will, as second cause, is a real cause of its
own actions. Moreover, the action of God upon the
will is so far from destroying its liberty that it rather
protects it ; for He always intervenes in the actions of
all creatures in a manner conformable to their nature.
Therefore He does not prevent their action, but pre-
serves it to them together with its proper character-
istics, that is, freedom in man's action. If the par-
ticular action of grace be cited, it is evident that^ as
grace is simply a help, it does not destroy our liberty ;
on the contrary, it perfects it, since it is an aid to
avoid moral evil, which is an abuse of our liberty.
296 SEAL PHILOSOPHY.
When grace proposes to the will the means it should
choose to attain its end with certainty, it does for the
freedom of the will what the skilled teacher does for
the reason of his pupils when he enables them to
draw true conclusions from given principles. To
those who put forth the divine foreknowledge as an
objection, the reply is that God is infallible, and hence
the particular free act which He has foreseen will
happen infallibly, not necessarily. To God the
future is present, and His foreknowledge influences
our acts no more than our vision changes the nature
of the objects which we see. Nay, this foreknowledge
rather confirms our liberty than destroys it, for if God
foresees that such an act will be done freely, and His
foreknowledge is infallible, the act will be done not
otherwise than freely.
Some philosophers have pretended to see a con-
tradiction between God's goodness and the existence
of evil which results from free will ; but it is evident
that a world in which free creatures are subjected to
trial, and personally merit happiness, cannot be op-
posed to the divine goodness. Besides, although God
has permitted the evil, He has not willed it ; He has
set fixed limits to it, and in His wisdom He knows
how to draw greater good from it. — The objection
that the power of God in its government of the world
would be restricted by the liberty of man, is refuted
by answering that God, like a wise king, knows how
to attain His ends by leaving to each man his liberty.
He reserves to Himself certain extraordinary events
to show forth His power ; but He ordinarily conceals
His action under the general laws by which He
directs all things, and He makes the very exercise of
liberty by intelligent creatures concur in the accom-
plishment of His will.
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIBS. 297
The philosopher Collins (1676-1729) pretended that
motives necessitate the will, just as the weights placed
in the scales of a balance bear down the side in which
the heavier weight has been placed. Undoubtedly
the will does not act without some motive proposed
by the intellect, but the motive imposes no necessity
on the will, as has been shown. — The influence exerted
on the will by climate, temperature, the conformation
of the brain, and other similar causes, cannot be con-
tested, but it can be easily explained by the union of
soul and body; besides, the will has power to resist
their influence, and often acts contrary to it.
AET. XVI. — EELATIONS OF THE WILL TO THE OTHER FACUL-
TIES OF THE SOUL.
75. The will has a certain dominion over all the
oilier faculties of the soul. — The will has the universal
good of the person for its object, while the other fac-
ulties have each its own particular good for theirs.
Thus the good of the imagination is restricted to
sensible images by which it is perfected ; that of the
intellect, to the true, which is its life and nutriment ;
the will has, on the contrary, for its object whatever is
good for the whole being, for all the faculties, and
hence it can wish the particular good of each faculty
as contained in the universal good. Therefore, that
the will may be enabled to seek the particular good
proper to each faculty, it must exercise a certain con-
trol over that faculty, and consequently over all the
faculties. This control is attested by experience. It
is exerted, (1) over the external senses in either fur-
nishing them with their object, or directing them to
it; (2) over the internal senses in rousing them to
action, and in taking complacency in their action ; (3)
298 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
over the sensitive appetite, which, although it in-
clines the will to this or that action, may in its turn
be ruled and repressed by the will; (4) over the
motive faculty, which executes the motion ordered
by the will. — If the intellect moves the will when
it presents to it the good as its object, it is in turn
moved by the will, inasmuch as the true, the object
of the intellect, is a good, and the will excites the in-
tellect to seek this good. Thus the intellect exerts
on the will a determination of specification when it
presents the object to it, and the will has over the
intellect a dominion of exercise by applying it to its
action.
76. Considered absolutely, the intellect is more noble
than the will ; hut relatively, the act of the will may he
more noble than that of the intellect. — 1. The nobility of
a faculty is in proportion to that of its object; but
the object of intellect is the true. Now, the true is
good, and the good is our end, and our end is happi-
ness. Therefore, as the truth must be perceived
before the will can tend to it as a good, so the per-
ception of the supreme ' truth is the attainment of
supreme happiness ; and consequently that faculty by
which we attain this is the noblest of aU. But this,
faculty is the intellect. 2. It is more noble also, if
considered as to the mode in which the two faculties
are moved. For the intellect, it is true, is moved by
the will to exercise ; but it, on the other hand, deter-
mines the will as to its specification, it enlightens
and directs it, so that the will depends for its act
upon the intellect. 3. The intellect is more noble, be-
cause it brings its object in some way to itself and
keeps it there, whereas the will tends outward toward
its object, and moves the whole man to it. Still, as
some things have a nobler mode of being in them-
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 299
selves than in our intellect, it is better to will them
than to know them ; thus in this life it is better to
love God than merely to know Him.* Will is more
noble than intellect also in that it has dominion over
the other faculties, and moves them to act.
AKT. XVII. — HABIT.
77. Habit is a permanent quality inherent in the intel-
lective powers and inclinitig them to act well or ill. —
Habit is a kind of supplement added to a faculty,
enabling it to acqomplish acts of the same kind with
ease. It must be permanent in the faculty, otherwise
it would not incline it constantly to produce the same
kind of acts. It can be found in the intellective fac-
ulties only, for beings that by their nature are neces-
sarily determined to their operation cannot modify
or change it ; therefore only such beings and faculties
as are masters of their own acts are susceptible of
habit. Still, as in man the sensitive nature is subject
to the intellective, and he can impress on the sensitive
faculties a certain constant mode of acting ; so, in vir-
tue of his dominion over animals, he can by training
form habits in them which may eventually become
hereditary instincts. Lastly, habit has the effect of
inclining the faculty to act well or ill according as it
imparts a good or a bad quality. Thus virtue per-
fects the will, while vice degrades it.
78. Every habit, whether good or bad, produces ease,
constancy, and pleasure in acting. — Constancy in pro-
ducing the same kind of acts results from the fact
that habit is a permanent quality. Tet it must be
observed that this constancy never develops into
See page 251.
300 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
necessity, because habit is but a quality superadded
to the faculty, and hence has less extension than the
faculty itself. Therefore the faculty can always per-
form an act to which the habit does not concur, and
consequently can even act contrary to the habit.
Facility and promptitude result from the fact that
the habit inclines the power to action. Lastly, the
pleasure experienced by the agent is owing to the
fact that habit is a second nature, and the conformity
of the action with the nature of the agent is the very
cause of his pleasure.
79. Habits are natural, infused, or acquired. — A nat-
ural habit is one bestowed in the natural order by
the Author of nature. Thus the disposition of the
intellect to know first principles is a natural habit.
This is sometimes called the "habit of first princi-
ples." Others admit no natural habit, but call it
disposition. An infused habit is one given by God in
the supernatural order ; thus " faith, hope, and
charity" are supernatural and infused habits. An
acquired habit is one formed by man's activity ; thus
" science " is an acquired habit. The difference be-
tween these three kinds of habits is, that natural
habits are simple dispositions ; but, far from deter-
mining the faculty to the act, they 'must themselves
be determined by some external principle. The other
habits, on the contrary, of themselves dispose the fac-
ulty to act easily and promptly.
80. Acquired Tiabits are formed hy repeated acts of the
same kind ; they are weakened and lost hy the cessation
of the acts that have forvfied the habit or by eliciting con-
trary acts. — Experience affords sufficient proof that
acquired habits are formed only by a repetition of
the same acts. The destruction or weakening of
habit is the result of a long cessation of the acts that
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 301
formed it, and of a repetition of acts proper to form a
contrary habit. It may also be a consequence of
obstacles to a natural disposition ; but, in the case of
the intellective faculties, it is to be noted that the
obstacle to their disposition must be indirect. Thus
insanity puts a stop to the habit of knowledge, by
affecting not the intellect, but the sensitive faculties,
which supply the intellect with matter for its opera,-
tious.
APPENDIX.
Sleep and Insanity.
81. Sleep is a repose of the senses intended for the
Tiealth of animals. — Sleep is a cessation of action in
tlie senses ; but the mere inaction of one or several of
the senses is not sleep, for this may be the effect of
disease. Sleep is produced when the sensitive
faculty called the common sense is impeded in its
operation. Since the common sense (sensus com-
munis) depends on the activity of the external senses
for its object, when they are no longer active it too
is at rest. Sleep is necessary for animals, because
the sensitive faculties, being limited by their nature,
cannot continue always active, but require rest at
stated intervals.
82. The cause of sleep is the exhaustion and fatigue of
the sensitive nature hy which communication through the
nervous system is interrupted. — After excessive or pro-
longed labor, and above all during the process of di-
gestion, the senses must rest, that all the vital energy
may be given to the digestive and recuperative action
then going on; from this results the repose of the
senses, or sleep. First the sense of sight ceases to
act, then that of taste, of smell, of hearing, and last
of all, the sense of touch. The senses also awake
successively, but in a reverse order.
83. 8omnamhulism is an imperfect sleep in which all
communication hetween the common sense and the exter-
SLEEP AND INSANITY. 303
nal senses, is not interrupted. It happens in those per-
sons in whom there is a s^iperdbundance of vital spirits.
— In this state, in consequence of an abnormal con-
dition of the system, if the individual has an abun-
dance of vital spirits, the images produced in his
imagination can act as in a waking state. But as he is
in a state of sleep, he is not conscious of his acts, and
though he may recall the images that troubled him,
he will forget the consequent motions, because they
have left no trace in him.
84. Dreams and deliria have three causes : tJie activity
of the imagination, the state of the iody, and physical
impressions received from without. — Dreams and de-
liria are produced in the imagination, and hence the
matter of dreams and deliria has always previously
been in some way present to the external senses.
Dreams " are in some respects akin to states of
reverie which occur during waking life. In dreaming
the imagination assumes the part played in waking
life by the external senses. During sleep the activ-
ity of these , latter falls into abeyance ; volitional
control over the course of thought ceases ; the power
of reflexion and comparison is suspended ; and the
fancy of the dreamer moves along automatically
under the guidance of association." The chief char-
acteristics of the dream are " (a) its seeming reality,
(b) its incoherehce and extravagance, (c) its posses-
sion of a certain coherence amid this inconsistency,
and (d) the exaggeration of actual impressions."*
* " (a) The apparent reality of the dream is, in great part, a conse-
quence of the cessation of the action of the external senses. In
sleep the images of the fancy which may arise within us are not sub-
ject to the correction which the presentations of the senses are ever
furnishing during waking life. . . (b) The inconsistency of the
dream seems to be due to its course being left entirely to the guid-
304 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
85. Insanity and its different degrees, as Jvallucination,,
monomania, etc., are nothing hut a derangement of the
organ of imagination, in consequence of which it sees
images that correspond' to no reality. — Insanity is a sort
of waking dream. Its cause is to be sought either in
the disorder of the brain functions, due to poisonous
materials present in the blood, or in some organic
disease of the brain.
86. Insanity affects the intellect indirectly through the
itnagination. — Insanity injures only the sensitive fac-
ulties ; yet, as these faculties supply the intellect with
matter for its operations, insanity reaches the intel-
lect indirectly. But just as the sight is not injured
when we look through a colored glass, although it is
deceived as to the color of the objects, so in cogniz-
ing and in reasoning from a false image, the intellect,
although deceived, suffers no injury in itself.
anoe of the fortuitous associations modified by the interference of
accidental sensations at the moment. The absence of control over
our thoughts disables us from reflecting upon the ideas which arise
spontaneously, and prevents us from comparing them with past ex-
perience or with each other. . . (c) The coherence of the dream,
in so far as it occasionally exists, probably results in part from an
orderly succession of previously associated ideas, in part from a faint
power of selection exerted by a dominant tone of consciousness at
the time, which may be able to reject striking eccentricities. — (d)
The exaggeration of occasional real impressions is accounted for by
the fact that while the great majority of external sensations are ex-
cluded, those which do find entrance are thereby in a, peculiarly
Tavorable position. They are in novel isolation from their surround-
ings ; their nature is vaguely apprehended ; and they cannot b»
confronted with other experiences. . . . Another striking feat-
ure of dreams is the extraordinary rapidity with which trains o\
thought sometimes pass through the mind." — (Psychology, Stonyhursl
Series, pp. 176-170.)
CHAPTEE n.
The Human Sotil Consideeed in ItselE;
abt. i. — oeigin of the human soul.
87. The human soul comes im,mediately from God h^
creation. — A produced substance is either drawn from
nothing- by creation, as in the case of the first man and
of all substances at the beginning of the world ; or it
comes from another substance by suhstantial change,
as in non-living beings, when, for instance, wood is
converted into ashes, then into clay ; or it comes from
alike substance by generation, as in living beings, such
as the plant, which comes from a like plant. Some
both of the old and of the more recent philosophers,
to explain more easily the transmission of original
sin, taught that the human soul is produced by gen-
eration. But this by no means explains the trans-
mission of original guilt, for, if this opinion were
admitted, we would have to conclude that every man
inherited likewise by transmission the sins of all his
ancestors. Again, this opinion is evidently false ; for
the soul being independent of matter, cannot come
from the body, which is material. Nor can it come
from another soill, because the soul is indivisible and
therefore incapable of communicating a part of itself.
It is evident, therefore, that the soul of each man
comes from God immediately by creation.
306 REAL PHILOSOPHT.
AET. II. — SPIRITUALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL.
88. The soul of man is not only simple and indivisible,
like that of plants and hrutes, hut it is also spiritual ;
that is, it is in itself independent of mutter and can sub-,
sist apart from the body. — The spirituality of the soul,
that is, its intrinsic independence of matter and its
power of subsisting apart from the body, is demon-
strated by its specific operations, which are intellec-
tion and volition. The operation of a being is accord-
ing to the nature of the being itself. Now, a faculty
that depends on a material organ for its exercise, can
attain to that only which impresses this organ, and is,
therefore, concrete and material. But intellect and
will may attain to the abstract and immaterial ; there-
fore the soul itself must also be independent of matter.
Another argument is furnished by exp erience. For. the
organs of the sensitive faculties are impaired by im-
pressions that are too lively or too prolonged, and
their alteration involves that of the corresponding
faculties ; but the intellect and the will become more
perfect as the truth is better known and the good
;more loved. In the second place, the very nature of
intellective acts proves their independence of all
material organs. For our ideas and their correspond-
ing appetitions are universal, and independent of time
and place ; and the intellect and the' will have a sort
of infinity in virtue of which they are always capable
of knowing and loving yet more ; but if the intellective
faculties were exercised in concurrence with organs,
they would be limited and determined in their power
THE HUMAN SOUL 00N8IDERED IN ITSELF. 307
and their acts by the organs themselves, which by
their nature are always limited.*
* According to the tenets of evolutionism, the spirituality of the
human soul is an impossibility. " The real initiators of this system
were Lamarck (1744-1829), who was the most profound, Goethe the
boldest, and Darwin the most ingenious and popular." They teach
that in the beginning there were but one or two types, " possessed of
marvellous creative energies," and tending to develop into a higher
state. In his PMlosopMe Zodlogique, which appeared in 1809, just
fifty years before Darwin's Origin of Species, Lamarck adopts three
conditions as factors of evolution, — adaptation, heredity, and time.
Darwin accepts the same principles, but gives them a more scientific
form. Observing the variations attested in the history of cultivated
plants and domestic animals, he compiled his laws of adaptation,
correlation, growth, divergence of characteristics, etc. As a second
element he places the struggle for life, which is most violent among
the species most closely related, whereas the most opposite varieties
have the best chance to live and tend to depart more and more from
the common type. Holding that the vegetable and the animal king-
dom increase in geometrical progression, while their means of sub-
sistence increase in arithmetical progression, he concludes that only
the best and strongest individuals survive and are perpetuated by
natural selection, the marvellous results of which are preserved to
future generations by Jieredity. Lastly, time is an essential condition.
But this theory is metaphysically impossible. For, says St.
Thomas i^Swm. Th. i. , q. 118, a. 3 ad 2), "No substantial form
receives either more or less, but the superadditiou of a greater per-
fection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity
makes another species in number. But it is impossible that a form
numerically one and the same should belong to diverse species." It
is also contradictory in its process. External circumstances, says
Lamarck, produce wants, wants create desires, desires generate cor-
responding faculties ; and these in turn develop a suitable organism.
Now, in the words of Cardinal Zigliara {Psycliologia, 10, iv.), "That
circumstances may produce wants, desires, etc., they must affect a
subject capable in itself of such wants and desires, that is, a subject
which either experiences all these things or is in potentiality to ex-
perience them ; therefore our adversaries tacitly but necessarily
suppose a vital subject in all these circumstances."
Although a general view of the earth's history seems to favor
308 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
89. Materialism is refuted as absurd in its methods,
its principles, and its consequences. — The spirituality of
the soul is an evident truth universally recognized.
Many philosophers have, indeed, attempted to defend
the cause of materialism, but it is only to the practi-
cal consequences that flow from it they have gained
disciples. Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, and
Lucretius were the principal supporters of material-
ism in ancient times. Bacon, Locke, and Condillac
have favored it by their doctrines, and it has been pro-
fessed with all its consequences by several philoso-
phers, as Hobbes (1588-1679), d' Holbach (1723-1789),
Darwinism, yet an analytical and searcliiiig study of each epoch
tends to remove this impression. Thus, in geology, the more per-
fect forms of animal organism, as the trilobite, are found among the
primitive fauna, and are preceded by no transitional forms ; among
the secondary fauna appear the cephalopods. Again, the physiologis'
asks, Why is it that species of diverse structure exist in the same
surroundings ? " How could a fish sustain the struggle for life, or
even live, during the slow and gradual transformation of branchial
respiration into pulmonary, since at that time and for long genera-
tions it was neither aquatic, nor terrestrial, nor amphibious ? "
Again, the supporters of evolutionism ' ' have practically ignored the
formal and efficient causes by which, according to a different order
of causality, each nature is essentially constituted, and have based
their theories exclusively on the material cause." They seem
" wedded to the strange hypothesis that the organism constitutes the
Form (the species), rather than that the Form constitutes the organ-
ism. . . . They do not account for Ufe. They begin with
organism ; but organism connotes life. ... If matter evolves
itself spontaneously into life without the aid of formal or efficient
cause , why have not the metamorphio ro oks through all these eons
of time shaken ofE the incubus of their primitive passivity, and
wakened up into protoplasm, and thus secured to themselves the
privilege of self-motion, internal growth, reproduction?" — Meta-
physics of the School, vol. 11., p. 747.
See also ApoUgie Scientifigue de la Foi Chreiienne, by Canon F.
Dnllhfi de Salnt-Projet, pp. 264-308.
THE HUMAN SOUL 00N8IDEBED IN ITSELF. 309
Helvetius (1715-1771), Lamettrie (1709-1751) ; by sev-
eral physiologists, as Bichat (1771-1802), Cabanis
(1757-1808), Broussais (1772-1838); and in our own
day materialism finds many adepts in the schools of
philosophy and medicine.
This error, already refuted indirectly by the argu-
ments that prove the simplicity of the brute soul,
and especially by the argument that demonstrates the
spirituality of the human soul, is also refuted directly
by showing the falsity of its method and its prin-
ciples. For materialists pretend that experience alone
is sufficient to build up the structure of science, and
that nothing should be admitted that does not rest on
observation. But, on the one hand, experience, as has
been seen in Methodology,* is insufficient to constitute
science ; on the other hand, materialists contradict
themselves when they assert a priori that man has
only sensations. They know very well that if they
observed the human soul faithfully, they would find
acts tha tare by no means reducible to sensations.
The absurdity of materialism is further revealed by
the falsity of its principles. They may be reduced to
three : (1) That it is possible for matter to think ; (2)
that the development of thought corresponds to that
of the organs ; (3) that there is an analogy between
the organism and the acts of man, and the organism
and acts of the brute. The capability of matter to
think, although admitted by Locke, cannot be sus-
tained, because contrary properties cannot exist in
the same subject. Thought, in its indivisible unity,
embraces the whole object ; but if thought were a
property of matter, it would follow that the material
thinking subject, because extended and composed of
' See page 66.
310 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
many parts, would with each part think either a por-
tion of the object or the whole object. In the former
case, there would no longer be any unity in the
thought ; in the latter case, there would be as many
whole thoughts as there are parts in the njatter,
which is absurd. It is of no avail to urge with Locke
that it is possible for God to endow matter with the
faculty of thinking, although this faculty is distinct
from the properties of matter ; for, if God were to
give matter the power of thinking without making
this a property of matter, this faculty would then nec-
essarily exist in an intelligent substance that is dis-
tinct from matter and independent of it.
The refutation of Locke's hypothesis avails also
against the theory of those physiologists who pre-
tend that all the intellective acts of man are nothing
but a secretion of the brain. In support of this absur-
dity they appeal to the evidence of experience, which,
it is true, attests how much the state and develop-
ment of the organism affect also the development of
the intellect. But they are greatly in error ; for (1)
Many facts prove that there is not a constant de-
pendence between the state of the organism and that
of the intellect ; (2) Even if this dependence were
admitted, we cannot conclude the identity of the
organism and the intellect any more than we can in-
fer an identity of the musician with the instrument
on which he depends for his art ; (3) The influence
of the organism on the intellect is easily explained
by the union of the soul and body, and by the need
which the intellect has of sensible images for the
matter of its operations.
The analogy between man and brute cannot furnish
an argument to the tnaterialist who denies even the
simplicity of the soul, since, as has been shown, the
THE HITMAN SOUL CONSIDERED IN ITSELF. 311
soul of the animal is also simple and indivisible.
Besides, this analogy does not really exist. Physi-
ologists agree in recognizing in the organism of man
specific characters proper to him alone, and experi-
ence proves that the brute has not freedom, and if at
times it acts in a marvellous way, it is still incapable
of progress and of invention, which are properties of
man's intellect.
Lastly, materialism is again refuted by its conse-
quences ; for, if there be nothing but matter, there is
no longer any God, any liberty, any moral law, any
eternal life ; there remain only the fatal laws of mat-
ter. But such consequences are rejected by the good
sense and moral conscience of all men, for in all times
they have had a horror of materialism in its doctrines
and its consequences.
AET. III. — IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL.
90. Ths spirituality of the human soul implies also its
immortality. — 1. The spirituality of the human soul
requires that it subsist in itself independent of the
body; hence the dissolution of the body does not
entail that of the soul, which is therefore extrinsically
{per accidens) incorruptible. It is true that in this
life the soul stands in need of the sensitive faculties,
for they supply it with matter for its operations ; but
when once the bond which unites it to the body has
been broken, it possesses the existence proper to
separate forms and operates with the intellect alone.
2. Nor is the soul of man intrinsically corruptible, for
not being composed of parts, it is simple and con-
tains in itself no germ of dissolution. It is idle to
object to the incorruptibility of the soul the fact that
God who has made it from nothing can also annihi-
312 REAL PHILOaOPHY.
late it. This is merely an absolute possibility, which
will never be reduced to act. God does not contra-
dict Himself, and, as creator of all things. He does
not deprive them of what their nature demands. It
was possible for Him not to have created the soul ;
but having created it with an immortal and incor-
ruptible nature. He cannot consistently with His in-
finite perfection annihilate it, and, so to say, by an
act of His power destroy the work of His wisdom.
91. The iTumortality of the soul is also proved : (1) Jiy
its inborn desire of happiness ; (2) by its desire of per-
petuating its memory ; (3) by the idea which we have of
vibe and virtue ; (4) by the unanimous consent of aU
nations. — The end of man is happiness, and happiness
without limit ; hence his desire of happiness is inborn
and necessary. Since this desire is natural to man, it
has been given him by the Author of nature. But
man cannot find here below the happiness that he
desires ; we must therefore conclude that he will find
this happiness in an immortal life, unless we wish to
say that God deceives man, that He proposes to him
an end impossible to attain, and that while all other
creatures reach their end, man cannot arrive at his.
Secondly, all men, not excepting those that reject the
doctrine of immortality, wish to perpetuate their
memory. But this desire would be inexplicable with-
out a conscioiisness of our immortality ; for who
would desire to live in the memory of others if he
will himself be a mere nothing ? Thirdly, we are all
persuaded that virtue merits a reward, and vice a
punishment. But, in this life, the just man is often
persecuted, while the wicked man triumphs ; there
must, therefore, be another life where the moral
order is reestablished. Undoubtedly, peace of con-
science is even now a reward of virtue, and remorse a
THE BUMAN SOUL 00N8IDEBED m ITSELF. 313
punishment of vice; but, besides the fact that the
virtuous man is often troubled in soul, and the
wicked man succeeds in stifling all remorse, it is
certain that this peace and this remorse have no
other foundation than faith in the immortality of the
soul. Lastly, the unanimous belief of the human
race at all times in the immortality of the soul con-
firms all the proofs that have been given. The tradi-
tions of all nations, and in particular the honor paid
to their dead, manifest this belief, which, besides, has
been held not only by the vulgar, but even by the
greatest geniuses of mankind.*
92. The two pnndpal errors regarding the immortal-
ity of the soul are palingenesis and metempsycJiosis. —
Pantheistic philosophers, whether of ancient or mod-
em times, regard the soul as a part of God's substance,
and hold that it is immortal, because, on the dissolu-
tion of the body, it loses its personality and identifies
its life with that of God. This error is called palin-
genesis. Other pantheistic philosophers, considering
the soul as too imperfect to be identified immediately
with God, have not hesitated to declare that after this
life it passes through a series of transformations and
probations, migrating from one body to another until
it is sufficiently perfect to be identified with God.
* still it must be granted that not all Catholics admit that the
arguments of pure reason adduced to prove the soul's immortality
are conclusive. They say that for this effect you must first establish
the evidence of faith, which teaches that the soul is truly immortal ;
the other arguments they regard as merely confirmatory of the
teaching of faith. With these men may be named the illustrious
Alfonso Muzzarelli, the friend of Pius VII. , and F, Casto Ansaldi,
the eminent Dominican. Even Cajetan and Suarez will not pro-
nounce the demonstration of St. Thomas to be rigorously conclusive.
—See Immortality of the Soul, by Monsignor Corcoran, American
Catholic Quarterly Review, vol. ii., p. 347.
S14 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
This is the error of metempsychosis, taught of old by
Pythagoras and in our own days by J. Eeynaud.
93. The absurdity of palingenesis appears from the
two principles on which it is hased, mz., that the human
soul is part of the divine substance, and that to obtain
immortality it must lose its personality. — It is absurd
to affirm that the substance of God and the substance
of man are identical, because, in that case, the divine
attributes also should pertain to man, thus identify-
ing the absolute and necessary with the contingent.
On the other hand, man is a person, and the immor-
tality of his soul springs from his personality ; other-
wise we would accept the doctrine of palingenesis.
If his personality is destroyed, his immortality is
also destroyed.
94. The doctrine of metempsychosis ignores the sub-
stantial union of soul and body ; it renders expiation
impossible ; it cannot harmonize with the true idea of
immortality. — In the hypothesis of metempsychosis
the soul is united to the body for the sole purpose
of expiating the faults of a previous existence ; there-
fore its union with the body is contrary to its nat-
ure. But this is refuted both by reason and expe-
rience. Again, this hypothesis pretends to explain
the miseries of this life by representing the soul as
united to the body solely to expiate the faults of a
previous life. But to make atonement one must be
conscious of the evil for which he is atoning; now it
is evident that no one remembers having sinned in
a previous life ; under these conditions, therefore, no
expiation is possible. Lastly, as this series of atone-
ments must have an end, the soul will either survive
or not survive its last body. In the latter case, it has
no immortality ; in the former, we ask why it could
not have made atonement in its first body.
CHAPTEE III.
The Human Soul in Eelation to its 'Body,
aet. i. — union of soul and body.
95. Since the intellective soul is the substantial form
of the body, it constitutes with it a substantial and per-
sonal union, so that from this union there results a single
substance and person. Hence, as the soul without the
body is not perfect in its operations, so the body without
the soul has no subsistence of its own. — ^In living- com-
posites the soul is the substantial form of the body;
that is, the soul is so united to the body that through
it the body receives and possesses subsistence and life,
and that from the union of these two principles there
results a single substance. So it is with man. From
the union of his body and soul, from their intimate
compenetration, there results a third substance which
is neither body alone, nor soul alone, nor a simple
contact or mixture of the two, as in a mixture of silver
and gold. Still the soul in this union does not lose its
own essence : although united to the body in unity of
substance, it nevertheless remains distinct from the
body ; and since it performs certain acts indepen-
dently of the body, it follows that it preserves its
spiritual nature intact. The union of soul and body
does not, then, mean a confusion of the two, but re-
quires only that they complete each other. And as
the single substance that results from the union of
316 BEAL PHILOSOPHT.
soul and body constitutes an individual of a rational
nature, we must conclude that the union constitutes
not only a substantial unity, but also a personal unity.
The person is, therefore, not the body alone, not the
soul alone, but the soul united to the body, as is
further witnessed by language, which permits us to
say: /hear, /understand, /desire, /run.
96. There are four striking errors regarding the union
of soul and hody : 1. The system of occasional cazises ;
2. That of preestablished harmony ; 3. That of plas-
tic medium ; 4. That of physical influence. — Several
philosophers, and among them Plato of the ancient
school, and Descartes of the modern, have denied the
substantial unity of body and soul, and the reciprocal
and immediate action of the soul on the body, and of
the body on the soul. But as evidence shows the in-
timate relations existing between the soul and body,
they have attempted to explain these relations. Now
if, instead of regarding the soul and body as one
clock, the hands and wheels of which are parts of one
and the same mechanism, we regard them as two dis-
tinct clocks that go in accord, we may form four
hypotheses analogous to those that would be formed
for the two clocks. For either the clockmaker is
always present to keep up the accord between these
two clocks; or he may wind them up once for all,
so that thenceforth there is perfect agreement be-
tween them ; or this may be maintained by the aid
of an intermediate mechanism ; or, lastly, it may be
the result of a physical influence exerted by one
clock over the other in virtue of some secret power.
Thus four systems have tried to explain the relations
between the soul and body : the system of occasion-
alism, of preestablished harmony, of plastic medium,
and oi physical influence.
THE HUMAN SO UL IN RELA TION TO ITS BODY. 317
97. It is false to hold with Malehranche that soul and
iody form, two distinct substances ; that God takes oc-
casion from the motions of the iody to produce corre-
sponding acts in the soul, and takes occasion from the acts
of the soul to produce corresponding '^notions in the body.
This system hads to pantheism, fatalism, idealism, and
scepticism. — -Tlie system of occasionalism, advocated by
Malebranche, is a consequence of his false principle,
that God alone is a true cause and that creatures of
themselves produce no effect. It results also from the
false notion which, after Descartes, he had formed of
the human soul and body ; for he regarded them as two
distinct substances forming only an accidental union.
To hold with Malebranche that God alone establishes
relations between soul and body, is to assign Him
a ridiculous office, opposed equally to His holiness
and His wisdom. For if God alone acts, we are des-
titute of all entity ; this is downright pantheism.
Now, if man be not the principle of his actions, we
must admit that his acts are not free, and this is
fatalism. Lastly, if all our thoughts are but the play
of God upon our intelligence, if they have no direct
relation with external reality, the material world and
our bodies are for us as though they did not exist,
and this is idealism. And since in invincibly believ-
ing ourselves to be the principle of our acts we are
in a constant illusion, we can no longer be certain of
anything ; this is scepticism.
98. We cannot admit with Leibnitz that . God, at the
mmnent of their union, secures the constant relations
existing between body and soul, in virtue of a preestab-
lished harmony. — This system involves nearly the
same consequences as occasionalism. Leibnitz has
not denied to second causes an activity of their own,
but, like Malebranche, he has failed to recognize a
318 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
true reciprocity of action between body and soul.
According to him, before God united the soul to the
body, He so constituted them that the motions of the
body would be constantly in harmony with the actions
of the soul. This system ascribes to God a less ridic-
ulous office ; for it does not destroy all action on the
part of the creature. But as it asserts that all acts,
whether of soul or body, are invariably predeter-
mined by an inevitable law, it is manifest that it leads
directly to fatalism, idealism, and scepticism.
99. It is absurd to admit vdth certain philosophers
something intermediate hetween soul and body,. called the
plastic medium, hy which the soul acts on the hody and
the hody on the soid. — This theory to explain the rela-
tions of soul and body, attributed to the English phi-
losopher Cudworth (1617-1688), supposes that there
exists as a bond of union between soul and body a
substance that is at once material and immaterial,
which holds communication with the body through
its material part, and with the soul through its imma-
terial part. But, in the first place, such a substance
is metaphysically impossible ; and, in the second
place, the reciprocal action of matter on spirit and
spirit on matter in this intermediate substance re-
mains to be explained.
100. The system of physical influence either is noth-
ing but materialism or it explains nothing. — The Eng-
lish school, in setting up this system oi physical influ-
ence, considers the soul as extremely subtile matter,
and from this infers that the action of the soul on the
body is analogous to that of fire on wood. But this
is evidently pure materialism. Those philosophers
also who, while admitting physical influence, defend
the spirituality of the soul, are likewise at fault ; for
they regard the soul and body as two distinct beings.
THE HUMAN SO UL IN BEL A TION TO ITS BOD Y. 319
Moreover, their system explains nothing, for it sim-
ply teaches that the soul exerts an influence on the
body and the body on the soul.
ABT. n. — UOTTY OF THE HUMAN SOUL AS SUBSTANTIAL
FOEM OF THE BODY.
101. There is hut one human soul, which is the sub'
stantial form of the iody. This soul is intellective, and,
besides intellective life, possesses also sensitive life and
vegetative life. — By the very fact that in eveiry natural
composite it is the substantial form that gives being
to the composite, this form must be unique ; for, if
there 'wrere a plurality of forms, there would also be a
plurality of beings, and the composite would lose its
substantial unity. Hence in the living composite,
and more particularly in man, the rational soul must
be the unique form of the body, since it is its sub-
stantial form. Without doubt, the difference be-
tween the acts performed by one and the same living
being, would seem to necessitate the referring of
them to distinct principles. But it is with forms as
with numbers : just as any number includes the units
of a lower number, and one or more units besides, so
every form has, besides its own specific virtue, that
of the inferior forms also. Thus it is with the human
soul, which is at once vegetative, sensitive, and in-
tellective. This truth is confirmed by experience and
common sense : by experience, which testifies that in
each individual it is always the same person that
wills, sees, and is nourished; by common sense,
which as expressed in language does not point to
distinct principles of action in man. But it must be
observed that when the intellective soul is called the
form of the body, we thereby mean simply that the
320 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
three kinds of life — ^vegetative, sensitive, and intellec.
tive — have in man a single principle ; not that the
soul communicates all its powers to the body. It
communicates those only that require organs for their
exercise, and reserves to itself the intellect and will,
which are independent of the body. Hence the
human soul is the form of the body inasmuch as it
contains the virtue of the vegetative and the sensi-
tive principle : not as being the rational principle in
man.
102. A plurality of souls, taught iy several ancient
philosophers, makes the unity of the human composite
iruexplicdble. — Several ancient philosophers, disregard-
ing the substantial union of soul and body in man,
were forced .to attribute several souls to him. For if
the soul is united to the body as the motor to the mov-
able object, there is nothing to prevent the existence
of many media between the motor and the object,
even of many motors, especially if the movable object
be impelled in different ways. By such reasoning
was Plato drawn into distinguishing three souls in
man — a vegetative, a sensitive, and an intellectual
soul.
But this system is erroneous ; for, as each soul has
a distinct life and distinct operations, it should be
independent of the other souls in its operations, and
thus the unity of man would be destroyed. Besides,
experience contradicts this doctrine ; for it shows us
that the acts of the vegetative and the sensitive life
affect those also of the intellective life, and vice versa.
It is useless to assert that the union of the three
souls would be established by the body which would
contain them in itself, as a bookcase holds many
TOlumes. Since the body has its being only through
the soul, it is the soul that contains the body, and not
THE HUMAN SOUL IN RELATION TO ITS BODY. 321
the. body that contains the soul. Nor can it be said
that one soul is the substantial form of the body, and
that the others are united to it accidentally. For this
were tantamount to asserting that man is accidentally
intelligent, or sentient, or "vegetative, just as he is
accidentally tall, learned, or courageous ; but this is
absurd.*
103. The modern theory of the " vital principle " is in
substance only a reproduction of the error of a plurality of
souls. The proofs and experiments on which it is based
are valueless. — The different systems by which it has
been attempted in modern times to explain the life-
principle in man refer to the question of the unity of
the human soul. The three principal theories are, (1)
the Animism of Stahl (1660-1734), according to whom
the intellective soul through its inferior forms pre-
sides over the organic functions ; (2) Organicism, held
by Descartes, who regarded the organs themselves as
the cause, through their physical forces, of the vital
acts ; (3) I>uodynamism, formulated by Barthez (1734-
1806), propagated by the school of Montpellier, and
advocated in Germany by Giinther (1785-1863) ; it is so
called because it supposes two distinct principles in
man, the soul to preside over intellectual functions,
and the vital principle to regulate organic life.
In his system Stahl only reproduces, though with
some errors, the doctrine of the substantial union of
* The doctrine of Photius that man has two souls, one rational,
the other irrational, and that sin is the act of the latter, was con-
demned by the Fourth General Council of Constantinople (869). In
the middle ages the error was revived by Ockham, and only thirty
years ago by a German Catholic, Dr. Gtlnther. — The General Council
of Vienne condemned as erroneous and un-Catholic the denial that
"the substance of the rational or intellectual soul is truly and in
Itself the form of the human body. "
21
322 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
soul and body. The materialistic system of organ-
icism is too much opposed to the data of physiology
to claim disciples any longer.
The same is not true of the vitalism of Montpellier,
which has seduced many by a specious appearance of
elevated spiritualism. The duodynamists rest their
arguments, first, upon the corruptibility of the sensi-
tive life, which they claim cannot be referred to the
intellective principle, for the intellective as such is
incorruptible. This difficulty is removed by saying
that nothing prevents an incorruptible substance from
exercising corruptible functions ; just as a king may
for the nonce be soldier or judge. But if vital acts
and intellectual operations must be ascribed to dis-
tinct principles, owing to the essential difference be-
tween them, we must still further multiply the num-
ber of souls in man ; for the act of understanding
differs essentially from that of willing, the act of per-
ceiving from that of moving, and so of many other
acts. The duodynamists also argue that, as the vital
acts are accomplished without the knowledge of the
intellective soul, therefore the intellective soul cannot
be the principle of said acts. But though nature has
willed that the vital functions be performed uncon-
sciously, in order to their more secure fulfilment, it is
none the less certain that the soul is made aware of
these functions when they are attended with suffering.
Lastly, the duodynamists invoke experience and bring
forward certain phenomena, as, for example, the con-
tractions sometimes observed in individuals imme-
diately after death. But these phenomena are very
rare, and may easily be explained by purely physical
causes. Besides, if it were necessary to admit the
conclusions drawn by these philosophers, we should
eventually be compelled to allow that the body can
THE HUMAN 80 UL IN BEL A TION TO ITS BOD T. 323
continue to live after its separation from tlie souL
Sucli an issue no duodynamist would dare to sustain.
ART. III. — SEAT OE LOCUS OF TEIE SOXJL.
104. The soul is in its essetice entire in tlie whole hody
and in every part of the hody ; hut it does not exercise all
its functions through corporeal organs, and it does not
esxrcise the same functions in each corporeal organ. —
Several modern philosopjiers, from denying the sub-
stantial union of soul and body, bave been led to ex-
amine what part of tbe body is the seat of the soul.
Some have asserted that it is the brain, others that it
is the heart, and still others that it is this or that part
of the brain. All these statements fall wide of the
mark. For (1) the soul is the principle of life in the
body ; now all the parts of the body are living ; there-
fore the soul is in every part of the body. (2) The
same conclusion is drawn from the fact that the soul
is the principle of sensation, and that it is sentient in
each part of the body.
On the other hand, as the soul is indivisible, it
must be entire wherever it is ; therefore the soul is
entire in every part of the body. But, although the
soul is in its essence entire in:every part of the body,
it does not exercise all its functions through bodily
organs, because the functions that require the con-
currence of an organ necessarily vary with the differ-
ent nature of the organs themselves. The peculiar
action of the soul experienced in the brain and in the
heart is easily explained by the fact that these two
parts of the body are the principal organs of sensibil-
ity and life, respectively.
Some philosophers object that if the soul be in
every part of the body, it is extended, and therefore
324 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
material. This is readily answered. Bodies are m
place circumscriptively, since they "are circumscribed
in their dimensions by the place which they occupy ;
immaterial creatures are in place determinatively,
since they are not measured by it but only so deter-
mined that they exercise their power in this place,
and cannot be at the same time in another place.
Thus the soul is in the body, not because the body
contains it, measures it, or circumscribes it, but be-
cause the body is the subject of its operations, and
because the soul contains it, so to say, by giving- it
being and unity.
AET. lY. — THE EESUEKECTION OE THE BODY.
105. Since the soul is made to he united with the hody,
it will again ie united to it after having heen separated
from it for a time. This reunion is demanded not only
Jy the very nature of man, hut likewise iy the moral order,
according to which the body will share in the reward or
'punishment of the good or evil of which it shall have heen
the instrument. — Man is neither soul alone nor body
alone ; his being is complete only when his soul -is
substantially ijnited to his body. Undoubtedly the
human soul is subsistent in itself ; but God has placed
it lowest in the order of intelligences, and on account
of its weakness it requires the body for the perfec-
tion and integrity of its specific operations. Since,
then, the body is an integral part of man's nature, it
must be resuscitated ; otherwise we should be obliged
to say that man, the work of divine predilection,
would remain forever in a state contrary to nature.
But this cannot be. God has allowed sin to subvert
for a time the order of His Providence, but not to
triumph forever over the laws that He has established.
TRE HUMAN SOUL IN BELA TION TO ITS BODY. 325
To this reason, derived from man's nature, may be
added another, drawn from the end for which the
body was originally created immortal. "When God
made the soul subsistent in itself, in order to propor-
tion the matter to the form He willed, by a special
gift, to make the body share in the soul's immortality.
But, if by the fall the body has become mortal, the
soul is none the less immortal, and therefore the
cause for which an immortal body had at first been
given to it still exists.
Therefore, in order hot to change the end for which
He first made the body immortal, God in a manner
owes it to Himself to restore to it for the soul's sake
the primitive privilege of incorruptibility. Hence
it is evident that the resurrection of the body is not
something outside the laws of the natural order ; but
that it is, on the contrary, the restoration of the
order originally establishjid by God. If there is any
miracle in the resurrection, it is only in view of the
cause that will work it, which can be nothing but the
power of God, and not in view of the natural exigency
which we have just explained. These arguments foi
the resurrection of the body are confirmed by reasoni»
drawn both from the moral order, which require*
that the body, the instrument of the good or evil
wrought by the soul, should share in its reward O]
punishment ; and from the order of nature, wher«
everything is unceasingly dying to resume a ne^n
life, and where man would be an exception withoui
explanation, if he should die to live no more.
106. It is absurd to object against the resurrection of
the body that it is impossible for the scattered elements of
the body to be reicnited, or that it is impossible for the soul
to resume its former body, which will have been trans-
formed into an infinity of other substances : for in the
326 BEAL PHILOSOPHY.
former case, we put limits to God's power ;' in the latter,
we forget that identity of molecules is not necessary to
constitute identity of hody. — To assert with materialists
that when the elements of the body have once been
separated, it is impossible to unite them again to re-
constitute the body, is to put limits to the power of
God, who was able to draw the body out of nothing-
ness, and who a fortiori can reform it with its primitive
elements. But some philosophers raise the objection
that since the body is transformed into an infinity of
other substances, it can no longer be reconstituted
with molecules numerically the same, and that, as
God thus gives a new body to the soul, all the reasons
alleged in support of the resurrection lose their value.
The objection falls ; for, in the first place, it is not im-
possible for God to reconstitute the body with the
same molecules that it had before ; and, in the second
place-, identity of molecules is by no means necessary
to secure identity of body. For science has shown
that the body, properly so called, is not constituted of
the molecules that enter into it, since these molecules
are renewed day by day and are all changed in the
space of about seven years, while the body remains
ever the same.
NATURAL THEOLOGY.
Definition and Division.
1. Natural Theology is tliat part of philosophy wMcTi
treats of God and His attributes, as far as they can he
known iy the light of reason. It differs from Sacred
Theology, in that this latter studies God and His attri-
butes by the light of divine revelation.
2. Natural Theology is divided into three principal
parts: the first treats of the existence and unity of God,
the second treats of the attributes of God in Himself;
the third treats of the attributes of God in relation to the
world or to creatures.
CHAPTEE I.
Existence and Unity of God.
art. i. — peoofs of the existence of god.
3. The esnstence of God is not immediately evident to
us ; but it can be demonstrated by the effects which He
has produced. — The existence of God is not immedi-
ately evident, because we do not behold the divine
nature ; but it can be proved by the effects which we
know, for from any effect whatever we can prove the
existence of a cause.
4. The existence of God is first proved by a metaphysi-
cal argument, which consists in deducing the existence of
328 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
a Necessary Being from the existence of contingent heings.
— The beings in the world are contingent, that is,
they have not given themselves existence. Eor it is
manifest by experience that the human soul, as wel!
as the beings that compose the sensible world, have
had a beginning. Now, that which begins to exist
must owe its existence to its own action, or to the
action of another, or to nothing. Bat it cannot owe
its existence to its own action, because before acting
it must first exist ; it cannot owe its existence to noth-
ing, because that which is without existence cannot
give it ; therefore it must receive existence from a
being distinct from itself. But this being, in turn,
either is or is not contingent. If it is contingent, it
also must have received existence by the action of
another being ; and so on indefinitely, until we arrive
at a being that holds its existence from itself. Among
the contingent beings of the world is man, who is in-
telligent and free, as has been proved in Psychology.
Therefore the self-existent Being frOm whom man
holds his existence and perfections must also be in-
telligent and free. But such a being is not only
necessary but personal ; he is God ; therefore the ex-
istence of the world proves the existence of God. It
is to no purpose to urge the possibility of an infinite
series of contingent beings which would produce one
another without the existence of a necessary being as
their cause. This hypothesis is absurd, because con-
tingent being is an effect; but an infinite series of
effects without a cause is a contradiction ; by multi-
plying the number of effects we make the existence
of the cause more necessary. Equally futile are the
arguments of materialists, pantheists, and evolution-
ists against the personality of God. The spirituality
of man's soul being once established, the Christian
EXISTENCE ANB UNITY OF OOD. 329
dogma of a personal God is a necessary consequence
of the application of the principle of causality to the
existence of contingent intelligence.
5. The existence of God is also proved T)y a physical ar-
gument, which consists in deducing from the order that
eosists in the world the existence of a supreme Ordaining
Cause. — Order reigns in the world, as is proved by
the relations existing between objects the most diverse,
and by the subordination of the special end of each
being to one single and supreme end. Now, order is
an effect which supposes an ordaining cause. This
cause, it is evident, cannot be found in the series of
ordered beings, because then it would be itself an
orderly effect. Moreover, the inherent forces of mat-
ter are utterly inadequate not only to produce the
phenomena of life, as has been proved in Psychology,
but even to account for the order reigning in the inor-
ganic world ; for every material force requires a pre-
vious adaptation of the particles of matter in order to
produce an orderly effect. But if it is outside this
series it must have a different nature. Since, then,
they are contingent, their ordaining cause must be
necessary Being. By the argument given in § 4,
this necessary Being is shown to be" a personal God.
The existence of evil is sometimes opposed to this
physical argument. But, admitting for the moment
that evil constitutes a disorder, it would be only ac-
cidental, and would not destroy the general order.
Therefore the argument remains in all its force.
When God has thus been proved existing as ordaining
cause, reason then tells us that it is only because of
our ignorance that any thing appears to constitute a
real disorder.
6. The third principal argument in favor of the exist-
ence of God is a moral argument, drawn from the assent
330 REAL PBILOSOPHY.
given to this truth iy all men in all times. — There is no
truth in favor of which the unanimous consent of the
human race is more explicit or striking than that of
the existence of God. Civilized peoples as well as the
most barbarous, modern as well as the most ancient,
have all believed the existence of God, as is proved
by the history, the traditions, and the monuments of
all ages and of all countries. Now, this universal be-
lief cannot be a fiction of men, nor an invention of
priests or princes. If it were a creation of men, evi-
dently we should know the time and the place in
which it arose ; but no one has been able to discover
this. On the contrary, the oldest traditions of man-
kind represent the world as coming from the hands, of
God, and all accounts attest that the nearer we draw
to Asia, the cradle of the human race, the more clearly
is the existence of God professed. Neither can it be
said that belief in the existence of God is an invention
of princes or priests ; for princes could not have given
religious sanction to their laws if the people did not
already believe in God ; as to priests, the exercise of
their functions evidently supposes this belief. Since,
then, the unanimous assent to the existence of God is
not of human origin, we must conclude that it is the
result of a primitive tradition, and can have only God
for its author. Even if some barbarous tribe should
be discovered without religious ideas, which, however,
has not as yet happened, it would no more invalidate
the moral argument for God's existence than does the
denial of atheists, materialists, pantheists, evolution-
ists, and the so-called progressive minds of to-day.
The argument is based upon the fact that the belief
has been professed by the great mass of mankind of
all ages and nations.
EXISTENCE AND UNITY OF OOD. 331
AET. n. — ATHEISM.
7. Atheism is either positive or negative; positive
atheism is either theoretical or practical. — The doctrine
which denies the existence of God is called atheism.
Atheism is positive when it denies directly the real-
ity of the supreme and divine Being ; it is negative
when it consists merely in ignorance of this divine
Being.
Positive atheism is either theoretical or practical ;
the former teaches doctrinally either that God does
not exist, or that we cannot know that He exists, and
is therefore distinguished as dogmatic and sceptical
atheism, or agnosticism, ; the latter is manifest in the
conduct of those who live as if there were no God.
Practical atheism is professed by a great number of
men ; but the same is not true of theoretical atheism
and negative atheism. History and the accounts of
travellers prove that there is no people, however
ignorant and savage, that does not admit the exist-
ence of some divinity. It is manifest that those
philosophers and writers who have gloried in teach-
ing and professing atheism have not been sincere,
and that they have proposed no other end than to
favor the corruption of morals and to overthrow social
order.
8. Atheism is a most absurd doctrine, most degrading,
and TTWst fruitful in fatal consequences. — The partisans
of atheism are wont to call themselves freethinkers
{esprit forts). Yet their doctrine is the very annihila-
tion of intelligence, for the consistent atheist, not
finding in his system the explanation of either his
own existence or that of the sensible world, falls
necessajAy into the most complete scepticism ; and
332 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
this is the negation of all thought. Moreover, if God
does not exist, there is no longer either good or evil,
man may follow at will his most perverse inclina-
tions, society is without foundation, and the law of
might alone prevails. History, besides, bears witness
that all the epochs of atheism have been epochs of
intellectual debasement, of moral corruption, and of
great social upheavals. As for the agnostic who says,
" Git)d may or may not exist, I cannot know His ex-
istence with certainty," his position is shown to be
untenable by the first, or metaphysical, argument for
the existence of a Supreme Intelligence. The objec-
tion that any attributes of God that we may learn
from the consideration of creatures are too imperfect
to be possessed by Him, only serves to bring out in
stronger relief the excellence of His perfections and
personality. Moreover, the Christian theist is con-
tent to know of many of God's perfections that they
are, without attempting to fathom them. As to the
manner in which we rise from creatures to a knowl-
edge of God, see pp. 104, 105.
AET. m. — UNITY OP GOD.
9. The unity of God is clearly inferred from the very
notion of God. — The unity of God may be shown by
three principal arguments. 1. God being a pure act,*
His individuality is identical with His nature; but
individuality is intrinsically incommunicable ; there-
fore it is impossible that there be several gods.
2. God 'has all perfection ; but if there were many
gods, there would necessarily be some difference
among them, and one would be deprived of what
* See page 163.
EXISTENCE AND UNITY OF GOD. 333
another would possess ; but he who would be want-
ing in something would not have all perfection, and
therefore would not be God. 3. All creatures are
ordained for one another. As they differ one from
another, they would not conspire to effect unity of
order, if they were not governed by a being at least
morally one : therefore the first Being who directs all
to one and the same end must be absolutely one.
ART. rV. — DUALISM.
10. Dualism is a useless hypothesis ; it is ahsiird in
itself, and it does not explain the fact for which it was
assumed. — The unity of God is a truth so evident that
no philosopher dares to-day call it in question ; it
has been denied only in ancient times by polytheists
and dualists, or Manichees.* Polytheism is so gross
an error that it is superfluous to refute it. Dualism
consists in admitting two principles, one good, the
other evil, and is equally absurd. Tet it has led many
minds astray, at different times, especially at the
beginning of the Christian era and during the middle
ages. But considered as a mere hypothesis, this sys-
tem is destitute of all the characters that an hypothe-
sis should have to be accepted. For an hypothesis
should be necessary ; it should not be absurd ; it
should explain the fact for which it was assumed.
Now, (1) the hypothesis of dualism is useless, for its
* Mani or Manes (Babylon, third cent.) derived from tlie Persians
the doctrine of two principles, and from the Gnostics that of the^
hatefulness of matter. His sect observed three seals : that of the
mouth, for his followers were forbidden to eat meat or eggs, to drink
wine or milk ; of the hands, for they were forbidden to kill any
animal or destroy any plant ; that of the bosom, for they were for-
bidden to marry.
334 . REAL PBILOSOPHT.
partisans formed it only because they thouglit tlie
existence of evil irreconcilable with the goodness of
God ; but it is easy to prove that the existence of
evil is not repugnant to the idea of an infinitely good
God. (2) This hypothesis is absurd, for evil inasmuch
as it is a privation of good, is also a privation of be-
ing, since good and being are convertible; therefore
absolute evil would be absolute nothingness. (3) The
hypothesis of dualism, far from explaining, on the
contrary, destroys the fact for which it was assumed ;
for the Manichees had recourse to a twofold prin-
ciple to explain by one the existence of good, and by
the other the existence of evil. But these two prin-
ciples either possess equal power or they do not ; in
the latter case, the possessor of the less power would
not be God ; in the former, the two principles would
destroy each other's work, and the result of their
reciprocal action would be nothingness.
CHAPTEE n.
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD IN GENERAL.
Absolute Atteibutes. ,
aet. i. — attbibutes op god est geneeal.
11. There are two kinds of attributes in God, absolute
and relative. — Although human reason cannot compre-
hend God, it can, however, acquire a knowledge not
only of His existence, but also of some of His attri-
butes. These attributes are of two kinds : some be-
long to God considered in Himself, and these are
absolute attributes ; the others belong to Him as Cre-
ator of the world, and. these are relative attributes.
12. The divine attributes are not known by us directly,
but we attain to a knowledge of them from the perfections
which we discover in creatures. — The cause must pos-
sess, if not in a superior degree, at least in an equal
degree, all the perfections of the effect; otherwise
the effect would excel its cause, which is absurd.
Hence, as we infer the existence of the cause from the
existence of the effect, so from the perfections of the
effect we ascend to those of the cause. Therefore,
since God is the absolute cause of all the perfections
in cteatures, it is from the knowledge of these perfec-
tions that we come to know those of God. Now, as
creatures possess finite being, their perfections are
also finite or limited ; but as God, on the contrary, is
336 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
infinite in being, His perfections must likewise be in-
finite. It is, therefore, necessary, before attributing
to God any one of the perfections of His creatures,
to take from it all limit and to consider it then as
found in God in an eminent manner, as absolutely
infinite.
13. As God is pure act, infinite Being, and perfectly
sitnple, the divine attributes are identical witTi one an-
other, and with the divine essence. If we distinguish them,
it is because of the limitations of our mind. — In creatures
the attributes arise from the essence, but are not
identified with it. Thus man's liberty, though hav-
ing its principle in his essence, is really distinct from
it. In like manner, in creatures one attribute is dis-
tinct from another; in man intellect is one thing, will
is another. These distinctions are not found in God.
For since God is perfectly simple, to admit any dis-
tinction whatever between His attributes and His
essence would be to destroy His perfect simplicity,
since all distinction supposes a certain composition
in that in which it exists. Now, if the divine sub-
stance were composed of parts, either each of these
parts would be infinite, and then there would be as
many gods as there would be parts, which is con-
trary to the divine unity already proved ; or the in-
finite would result from a collection of finite parts,
the perfect from the imperfect, which is absurd.
Moreover, if the divine perfections were really dis-
tinct, as are thosp of creatures, they would no longer
exist in an infinitely perfect manner in God ; for, that
two things be distinct, it is necessary that one be
without some quality that the other has, and conse-
quently all distinction is necessarily a principle of
limit and imperfection. From this, however, it would
be wrong to conclude that as the plurality of divine
ABSOLUTE ATTRIBUTES. 337
attributes depends on the mode in whicli our intel-
lect knows God, these attributes do not really exist in
Him. It is one thing to say that the perfections
which we attribute to God do not exist in Him, and
it is quite another thing to assert that in Him they
are not distinct as our intellect conceives them. The
perfections which we predicate of God are really in
Him, but not with that distinction which our limited
intellect establishes among them.
AET. II.— ABSOLUTE ATTBIBUTES OF GOD. — ASEITY.
14. Aseity is an attribute hy which God is of Himself
or from Himself. It is the primitive attribute from
which we can deduce all the others. — The divine attrib-
utes are manifold. But among them we can distin-
guish one to which all the others may, in our way of
thinking, be reduced. This is aseity, that is, the per-
fection by which God is the absolute and indepen-
dent Being who holds from Himself all that He has
and all that He is. It is by this attribute that God
defined Himself when He said, " I am who am." In
this attribute philosophers have placed the meta-
physical essence of God, because it is the principle
and foundation of all the other perfections attributed
to Him. For if we could conceive anything in God
prior to aseity, we could conceive a self-existent being
as dependent on another being. Since, then, God is
independent in His being, and since He holds His
essence from Himself alone, we very easily perceive
that He possesses all possible perfections. Aseity,
further, affords the primary reason for which God is
distinct from every other being ; for other beings have
finite perfections, while God possesses infinite per-
fections. But it is evident that other beings than
2%
338 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
God liave finite perfections, for the very reason that
they do not hold their being from themselves ; and
that the perfections of God are infinite because He is
the absolute Being who holds all from Himself and
depends on none.
AET. m. — ^nraiNiTY, eteenity, immutability, simplicity,
AKD immensity.
15. God is infinite, that is, He has all possible perfec-
tions, and without limit. — If God is of Himself, He
must have all possible perfections, and there can no
more be a limit in His being than in His perfections.
All perfections are either self-existent or contingent;
that is, either uncaused or capable of being caused.
The former God possesses formally, or in their own
specific nature ; the latter He as First Cause must be
able to produce, and therefore possesses virtually or
equivalently with His creatures, and also eifmnently as
being an infinitely perfect cause.
16. Ood is eternal, that is. He had no beginning and
will have no end ; He lives in a perpetual present. —
Since God is of Himself, He never began to be ; He
is eternal, and eternity excludes not only beginning
and end, but all succession as well ; for God possesses
all perfections, and without limit. In God there is
neither past nor future ; there is nothing that has
been, nothing that will be ; all is in an indivisible and
perpetual present. Moreover, since eternity implies
existence which is essentially without beginning, it is
proper to God alone ; for even could a creature have
existence without beginning, such existence would be
always contingent.
17. Ood is immutable, that is. His perfections can
neither be increased nor diminished ; He is subject to
ABSOLUTE ATTBTBtJTES. 339
no alteration or change. — Since there is no succession
in God, there can be no change in Him. Besides, if
He changed, He would acquire or lose some quality,
and this is contrary to His infinity.
18. God is absolutely simple, that is, there cannot he
in Him any kind of composition.— God is absolutely
simple, because all composition supposes an imper-
fection. Thus God is not merely exempt from all
material composition, but His perfections are identi-
fied with one another and witli His essence. If in
God there were attributes distinct from one another,
each of these attributes would necessarily be limited
and therefore finite ; but the finite added to the finite
can never give the infinite.
19. God is immense, that is. He is in His essence pres-
ent to all things. — Since God is infinite or without
limits, He is everywhere infinitely — in Himself, in the
world, and even outside the world — in that He can
fill all possible space extended ad infinitum, without
the least circumscription of His being.*
AET. IV. — THE DIVINE INTELLIGENCE.
20. Ood knows Himself perfectly ; He knows all things
outside Himself, all future contingent and possible things.
— The intelligence of God is infinite like His being.
God knows Himself and eternally affirms Himself
It is this eternal and unchangeable affirmation oi
Himself that constitutes truth in itself, absolute and
essential truth, the prototype and supreme norm of
all truth. God in knowing Himself perfectly, knows
through His essence all other beings. He knows
them in their eternal types, which are nothing but
* See page 203.
340 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
His knowledge of the various degrees in whicli His
divine essence can be imitated and represented out-
side Himself, none of whicli, however, is adequate to
the divine essence itself. God has a perfect knowl-
edge of all real beings, because it is He who created
them with their essences and perfections. Since God
by His knowledge is the cause of all things, His
knowledge and His power have the same extent ; and
since He is the cause of all that exists in every in-
dividual, it follows that His knowledge embraces all
beings also in their individuality. God knows all
things possible, for, knowing His own power, He
knows all its terms, both real and possible. He knows
the good, and with it the evil that is its privation. As
He knows all that can exist either by an effect of His
power, or by the action of creatures. He knows all
future contingencies, and this from all eternity and
with certitude, because all things are eternally present
to God. Lastly, as there is no succession in God, His
knowledge is not discursive, but He comprehends all
things simultaneously ; and since His knowledge is
nothing else than His essence, it is absolutely im-
mutable.*
* Since God's knowledge Is Infinite, He knows not only all actions
of all creatures, but also all possible actions and all possible con-
sequences of those actions. This knowledge does not, however,
destroy man's freedom. It is because man will do an action that
God, whose knowledge is infallible, foresees it. But since His
knowledge is infinitely perfect, He must foresee not only the action,
but also its nature, viz.,/reeif proceeding from free agents, necessary
if produced by a necessary cause. Otherwise God's knowledge
would destroy what His creative act had effected, He would contra-
dict Himself, be no longer immutable, and therefore no longer
God.
ABSOLUTE ATTRIBUTES. 341
AET. T. — ^THE DIVINE WILL.
21. God has a perfect will ; He loves Himself neces-
sarily, all else He loves freely. — Intelligence supposes
will ; therefore God has a perfect will, as He has an
infinite intelligence. God primarily loves Himself
absolutely as His own proper end; He loves His
divine goodness absolutely and necessarily, just as
we necessarily desire happiness ; therefore God has
no free will in this respect. As it enters into the per-
fection of the will to communicate the good which one
possesses, so it is consonant with the divine good-
ness to be in some way diffusive of itself to others.
But God does not will this absolutely and necessarily,
because, being infinitely perfect. He needs nothing
external to Himself ; therefore as regards creatures
He has free will. To say that God gives them exis-
tence by a necessity of His nature, would be equiva-
lent to affirming that He is not self-sufficient, or that
He created without intelligence and will ; in a word,
that He is not God. Yet, though God's decrees in re-
gard to His creatures are free, they are eternal, since
there is no sufficient reason for delay ; and irrevocable,
since God's knowledge is infinite, and therefore more
perfect knowledge or " a fuller consideration of the
matter and circumstances " as motives of repeal, is an
utter impossibility.
22. The divine will is immutable ; yet it does not make
contingent effects necessary. — The divine will is immut-
able, as are the divine substance and intelligence ; and
it is always accomplished in all that it desires. But
from this it does not follow that it renders necessary
all that it wills. It renders necessary the effects that
it has made dependent on necessary causes, and it
342 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
leaves contingent tlie effects that it has made de-
pendent on contingent causes ; for, as the divine will
is sovereignly efficacious, whatever God wills is ac-
complished and in the way in which He wills. Hence
God, in willing effects to be contingent, has subjected
them to contingent causes which may or may not
produce them. Among these contingent causes there
are some that do moral evil, which consists in choos-
ing a good which is forbidden in preference to another
good that is enjoined by the moral law, and of which
consequently one deprives himself. It is evident that
God can in no way will moral evil, because it is opposed
to His goodness, and because there is no other good
that He can will more than His goodness. Yet it is
not repugnant that God should sometimes will physi-
cal evil, which is an imperfection of nature or a pun-
ishment ; this evil He wills indirectly, and only in view
of the good to which it is attached.
23. God toves Himself with a love equal to Himself,
that is, infinite as He is; He loves all otJier heings in so
far as they are good, and because they come from Him. —
Since God has a will, He loves, for love is the first act
of the will, and without it the will cannot be even
thought of. God loves Himself first with a love equal
to Himself, a love which has absolute goodness and
holiness as its object, the source and type of all good-
ness and holiness. Secondly, God loves all existing
creatures, because they are good and come from Him ;
and He loves them the more the better they are, for
they are better simply because God wills them to
have more good. So while with us it is the goodness
of things that determines us to love them, with God
it is His love that is the cause of their existence and
of the measure of goodness that He imparts to them.
ABSOLUTE ATTRIBUTES. 343
ART. VI. — ^THE DIVINE POWEB.
24. God is omnipotent, that is, He can do every thing
that does not imply a contradiction. — The power of any
being to operate has its principle in the essence of
that being ; consequently this power is always pro-
portionate to the nature of the being. But God is
infinite in essence ; therefore He is infinite in power.
Since He is omnipotent, He can do all that is intrin-
sically possible ; for whatever is intrinsically possible
can be, and divine power requires only this possibility
in order to give existence to being. The disciples of
Descartes hold that God by His omnipotence can also
produce what involves a contradiction, as a " square
circle." This doctrine is essentially absurd, for a con-
tradiction being the affirmation and negation of the
same thing at the same time, is equivalent to nothing.
As God cannot produce a contradiction, so He cannot
do evil ; for the possibility of doing evil is only the
possibility of a defect in acting, and this is repugnant
to omnipotence.
25. God alone can work m,iracles. — A miracle is a
sensible, unusual, and supernatural work, exceeding
the powers of created nature. It is evident that God,
who freely established the order of nature, can dero-
gate from it when He wishes, either by producing
directly, without the concurrence of second causes, the
effects proper to those causes, or by producing effects
of which secondary causes are not capable. The
angels of themselves cannot work true miracles ; they
can do extraordinary things, but only those that
are preternatural, not supernatural. A miracle is
defined a " sensible " work, because the' change which
it implies must be perceptible by the senses ; an
344 BEAL PHILOSOPHY.
" unusual " work, because it is opposed to the ordi-
nary course of nature ; a " supernatural " work, because
although a divine work, it is not required to com-
plete the natural existence of either man or any in-
ferior creature. Thus in the raising to life of the
widow of Nairn's son, there is a sensible change from
a dead body to a body in the vigor of health ; an
" unnsual " work, in that the dead youth is restored
to life ; a " supernatural " work, since it was by no
means due to the young man's natural existence ;
and it "exceeded the powers of created nature,"
since God alone could work it, though often God's
servants are intercessors or instruments.
26. Animal magnetism is the art of producing wonder-
ful pJienomena, especially in man, by either physical or
moral means. — This theory is called mesmerism from
its author, Mesmer (1733-1815), and magnetism because
he first used this influence to produce the phenomena,
which, occurring chiefly in sentient beings, gave tc
this art the epithet animal. Its aim is to deny the
existence of miracles, or at least to weaken their
evidence.*
27. Magnetism is common, transcendental, or hypnotic. —
The first species of magnetism makes use of sensible
means, such as gestures, fixed gaze upon a bright ob-
ject, stroking the limbs, etc. The second is also called
spiritism. It provokes the intercourse of men with
spirits, with angels, or departed souls, who are called
up by determinate signs, or of their own accord pre-
sent themselves to the magnetizer. The third species
originated with Braid (1843), and differs from the first
in this only, that the magnetic sleep or hypnotism is
* These four numbefs have been abridged from Zigliara, Sum
Phil., C. 34, 35.
ABSOLUTE ATTRIBUTES. 345
produced by fixing the eyes intently upon some
bright object.
28. The phenomena of magnetism are m,echanical, physi-
ological, cognitive, and transcendental. — The mechanical
phenomena are rotations, attractions, elevations, and
other motions of bodies. The physiological phe-
nomena are : (1) spasm or tremor, and convulsion of
the members in the subject operated on by the mag-
netizer; (2) dilation and contraction of the pupil and
nerves ; (3) magnetic sleep in which the subject holds
exclusive communication with the operator and obeys
him in all things; (4) lucid somnambulism, in which
the subject has extraordinary powers, such as seeing
with closed eyes, with his stomach, hands, or feet.
The phenomena of cognition comprise the power of
knowing the inner affections of the soul, of predict-
ing future contingent free events, of examining the
internal structure of the human body, of discovering
remedies for disease, of treating of scientific matters,
speaking all languages, etc. The transcendental
phenomena include all those already mentioned, but
they are effected by the conjuring of spirits, who
speak to men through a person called a medium, and
who is only a passive instrument of 'their operations.
These phenomena include apparitions, voices, writ-
ings, scientific dissertations, etc.
29. Five theories have been framed to explain these
phenomena : the theory of material causes, of imagination,
of animism, of spiritism, and spiritualism. — The first
theory ascribes the phenomena of mesmerism to a
certain magnetic fluid which issues from the body of
the operator and enters that of the subject. But such
a cause is purely material, and is therefore incapable
of producing spiritual phenomena. Nor can such
phenomena be the effect of imagination, which is also
§46 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
material, and is common to man and oeast. — The
theory of animism is a disguised materialism, whether
we say that vibrations in the ma^netizer's soul are
communicated to external objects and thereby to the
soul of the subject, or that a subtile matter, Od, is
communicated to the soul of the subject, and thus
produces the phenomena. — Of those who ascribe the
effects to spirits, some are spiritists and hold the doc-
trine of metempsychosis, or transmigration of human
souls. Their assumption is gratuitous, and has been
refuted in Psychology (§ 94) ; moreover, they can as-
sign no valid reason why departed souls should be
subject to the will of man. — Lastly, spiritualists are
they who attribute the phenomena, not to departed
souls, but to angels. But manifestly these angels
cannot be good spirits, since their answers often in-
flame the passions and attack revealed truths. They
must, therefore, be evil spirits or demons.
CHAPTEE in.
Eelatite Atteibutes op God.
aet. i. — god the cbeatob.
30. God has created, that is, draiun from nothing, all
that exists, ivJiether spiritual or corporeal. — God being
infinitely perfect, is eminently sufficient for Himself.
Yet it was fitting His goodness that others, viz.,
creatures, participate in His perfections ; and there-
fore He created, that is, He drew out of nothing,
all that exists.* When God is said to have made
the uniyerse out of nothing, the meaning is, that He
caused the universe, which was not yet existing, to
receive existence. Therefore it is by no means to be
inferred, as some philosophers maintain, that nothing
is the source out of which God brought all creatures ;
for then we could well apply the axiom : " From noth-
ing nothing comes." But although creatures did not
always actually exist, yet they were from all eternity
in the divine intellect, which knew them in their es-
sence and their individuality. Therefore, when God
wished to actualize these beings which He knew, the
world, in virtue of the divine power, passed from the
state of pure possibility to the state of actuality;
* " Creation is a production of a thing according to its whole sub-
stance, nothing being preBupposed, whether created or increate."
Sum. Th., i.,q. 65, a. 3. c.
348 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
it is precisely in this that creation consists. Hence
by creation God does not, like man, bring- about a
mere modification of substances : by His infinite
power He makes the substance itself. As to the time
of creation, it would be vain to ask why God created
the world so late ; for time began with creation. In
God there is no time, because there is no succession ;
there is no early, no late, no when, no hefore, no after
in the divine eternity, which is a single and indivis-
ible now. Moreover, God alone can create; for as
St. Thomas argues {Contra Gent, ii. 21) : " Since the
order of actions is according- to the order of agents,
because a nobler action is proper to a nobler agent,
the primary action must be proper to the primary
agent. But creation is the primary action, because it
presupposes no other action, and all others presup-
pose it. Therefore creation is an action proper to
God alone, for He is the primary agent."
Another proof may be drawn from God's absolute
independence of all creatures. As He alone possesses
an absolutely independent existence, to Him alone
can that action be referred which requires no pre-
existing subject on which to operate for the produc-
tion of an effect. But such action is creation. There-
fore creation is proper to God alone.
31. The act of creation is an essentially free act of
the divine will. As God is eminently sufficient for Him-
self He is in this act hoxcnd l)y no necessity, whether ex-
ternal or internal. — To hold that God made the world
not by an act of His free will but from an irresistible
impulse, is virtually to hold that God does not suffice
for Himself, that He is not infinite, that He is not
God. Moreover, this opinion would imply that every
thing in the world is as necessary as the principle
whence it emanated, and that, consequently, there is
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF GOO. 349
no liberty either in man or in God. The objection
that it is impossible to reconcile a free creation with
the simplicity and immutability of God is idle, for
the impossibility exists only in appearance. The
act by which God wills creatures may be considered
either in regard to Him or to creatures. In reference
to Him, the act is eternal ; therefore it does not affect
His immutability ; and since this act exists in God
before He creates. He receives no new quality on the
passage of creatures from non-existence into existence.
Creatures alone acquire a new perfection by creation.
32. The end which God proposes to Himself in creat-
ing the world is the manifestation of His perfections, or
His own glory. — God, being infinite wisdom, must have
had an end in the act of creation, and this end must
be the manifestation of Himself and His perfections,
particularly His power, His wisdom, and His good-
ness. But since God is infinite, He can acquire noth-
ing further for Himself, and the glory that accrues to
Him from creation is purely accidental and extrinsic.
It is fitting, therefore, that in the series of created
beings there be some that can recognize this manifes-
tation of God in the world. Such creatures must be
intelligent. Undoubtedly irrational creatures oper-
ate for an end, which, however, they cannot know ;
nor can they raise themselves to Him who leads them
to that end. Only intelligent creatures can propose
to themselves an end in their acts, and only they can
know the end which God proposed to Himself in
creating. From this it is evident that intelligent
creatures should hold the foremost rank among cre-
ated beings, all other creatures having been made for
them. Man is, therefore, the true king of the visiblo
creation ; everything in the visible world was made
for him, since he alone can refer all to God.
350 REAL PMILOSOPHT.
AET. II. — ^PANTHEISM.
33. Pantheism is the negation of creation ; it consists in
recognizing no substance hut God, and in identifying the
world ivith Him. — Those philosopliers who, while re-
jecting the truth of creation, are yet unwilling to
accept the absurd system of independent eternal
matter, have been constrained to regard the world
as an emanation from the very substance of God.
This error, which is called pantheism, is as old as
philosophy itself. It is the last term to which every
philosophical and religious error necessarily and
logically leads>
34. There are two principal forms of pantheism, realistic
pantheism and idealistic pantJieism. — In the most dis-
tant times pantheism was professed in India, where
it infected not only the minds, but likewise the relig-
ion and morals of a whole nation. Later on panthe-
ism was openly taught by several schools of Greek
philosophy — ^by the Pythagorean, for example, and
also by the Stoics, who declared that God was the
soul of the world. In the first centuries of the Chris-
tian era it was propagated by many Neo-Platonic
philosophers ; in the twelfth and thirteeth centuries,
by Arabian philosophers ; in the fourteenth and fif-
teenth centuries, by false mystics, and especially by
Scotus Erigena (d. 875), and Giordano Bruno (d. 1600).
In recent times it has been renewed and reduced to a
system by Spinoza and the German philosophers,
who have propagated it in Europe, where it infects a
great number of minds. Although they teach one-
ness of substance in God and the world, yet panthe-
ists, one and all, seek to reconcile their system with
the variety of phenomena which nature presents, and
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF aO£>. 551
have fabricated divers modes in whicli the world has
emanated from God. The multiplicity of these modes
has given rise to the different forms of pantheism,
which may, however, be reduced to two : realistic
pantheism, invented chiefly by Spinoza, and idealistic
pantheism, taught by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.
The pantheism of Spinoza originated in a false
definition of substance. Descartes had said that sub-
stance is that which has need of nothing else in order
to exist. Adhering to this definition Spinoza easily
demonstrated that there can be no other substance
than the divine substance, because that alone needs
no other being for its existence. Whatever we now
consider as existing outside of God 'is, according to
Spinoza (1632-1677), only a mode of the divine attri-
butes. And as all that is in the world manifests it-
self to us as endowed either with thought or exten-
sion, thought and extension are, in Spinoza's system,
the essential attributes of the infinite substance. This
substance, it is said, acts necessarily. As a thinking
substance it produces the different series of intellect-
ual operations which constitute the minds of men ;
as an extended substance it produces bodies with all
their various modifications. Therefore the aggre-
gate of finite things is, he asserts, a necessary devel-
opment of the attributes, thought and extension,
which belong to the infinite substance.
Fichte (1772-1814), applying certain principles of
Kant to the pantheism of Spinoza, endeavored to
■ prove a jyriori how mind and matter, which he calls
the Ego and the non-Ego, originate in the successive
development of a single substance. To reach this
he rises by abstraction to the pure Ego, that is, to
thought, having no relation either to the thinking
subject or the object thought of. This pure Ego is
352 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
the infinite, or God. But, says Fichte, the pure Ego
is necessarily conscious of itself. In virtue of this
necessity it thinks or posits itself, and in thinking or
positing itself it distinguishes seK as subject from self
as object. As subject, it is the human mind ; as ob-
ject, it is matter. This development of the Absolute
under the form of mind and matter is accomplished
by an internal operation, and this is consciousness.
Mind and matter are only the internal representation
which the Absolute or the pure Ego makes of itself to
itself. — Schelling (1775-1854) adopted the pantheism
of Fichte, and considering God as the sole substance
from whom mind and matter emanate ideally, he de-
fined it as the indifference of the differentiated. Lastly,
Hegel (1770-1831) set forth the whole system with
scientific method and with all the appurtenances of a
theory rigorously demonstrated. He substituted the
Idea for the pure Ego of Fichte, and explained the
origin of all creatures by the ideal motion of the Ab-
solute.
As is evident, realistic pantheism teaches that the
world exists by a necessary emanation from the divine
substance, in much the same way as the web comes
from the spider. Idealistic pantheism considers the
world as emanating from God by an internal and im-
manent action. The former admits an Absolute in
act, containing in itself all the various beings of the
world, which it produces by necessary and external
evolution of itself. In the latter system, the Absolute
is in potentiality, and, in developing and completing
itself by an internal and necessary motion, it mani-
fests itself now under the form of matter, and again
under that of mind, and so begets the series of exist-
ing things, which are not realities, but mere appear-^
ances, pure phenomena. But, whatever may be thft
RELAl'IYB ATTRIBUTES OF OOD. 353
- diTergencies of the pantheistic systems, the essential
characters may be reduced to two : (1) oneness of sub-
stance between God and the world ; (2) negation of all
liberty in the act by which God creates the world.*
35. Pantheism refutes itself , first, because the principle
of a single substance is contradicted hoth by reason and
experience ; secondly, because the denial of the liberty of
the creative act is the destruction of tlie very notion of
the Absolute ; and, lastly, because it leads to fatal con-
sequences.— The fundamental principle of pantheism
is that there is but one substance, and that divine.
Now, on the one hand, experience tells us that there
are many substances ; on the other, reason finds in
the idea of substance nothing requiring it to be
unique. Without doubt, he who admits, with Spinoza,
that substance is that which depends on no cause for
its being, must hold that there is no other substance
than the divine. But this is not implied in the true
idea of substance, which should be defined: "That
which does not require another as subject in which to
inhere." Thus the idea of substance does not imply
independence of another subject, but excludes in-
herence in another as its subject. — It may also be
shown that if only one substance, God, the Absolute,
exists, this substance necessarily entails a contradic-
tion. For if the Absolute contains many beings in
itself, it lacks that unity which we conceive to be an
essential quality of an infinitely perfect being ; if, on
* " The historical development of pantheism shows that it was the
product of religious imagination in the Orient, that it ^ras abstract
with the Greeks, and physical with the Roman stoics, was couched in
the mysticism of mediaeval times, became ontologioal in Spinoza,
ethical and subjective in Fichte, objective and ideal in Schelling,
and attained its consummation in the dialectical processes of Hege-
U»n metaphysics." — American Encydopcedia, sub. Pantheism.
354 BEAL PHILOSOPHT.
the other hand, it does not contain the collection of
the various beings in the world, they could never have
oome forth froih it.— Finally, if God and the world
are but one substance, it follows that God is the world
and the world is God ; or, in other words, that the
infinite is the finite and the finite is the infinite. The
contradiction is even more manifest in the Absolute
as understood by the German philosophers. For this
Absolute, which, as Absolute, should actually possess
all perfections, has them only potentially, and acquires
them by successive developments. Moreover, the
manifestation which the Absolute makes of itself in
creatures is deceitful, and these creatures are only
appearances or phenomena. But an Absolute which
deceives and a potential Absolute are pure contradic-
tions. Therefore contradiction is the term to which
every system of pantheism necessarily leads. And
pantheists are far from denying it ; for they admit as
a principle the identity of contraries* and make this
principle the foundation-stone of their logic and of
all their science.
The absurdity of regarding the world as a neces-
sary emanation of the divine substance may from this
be easily perceived, The Absolute, if Absolute, ought
to be most perfect and wholly sufficient for itself.
But to assert that the creation of the world is neces-
sary, is to admit that the Absolute has need of the
world ; and thus the very idea of the Absolute is de-
stroyed.
But the absurdity of pantheism is manifest not
only from the falsity of the principles on which it rests,
but also from the fatal consequences to which it leads.
* Or, as Kant expressed it, the doctrine of Antinomies (See note,
110).
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 355
For the God of pantheists is an imperfect God, subject
to blind necessity ; therefore he is not God, and pan-
theism is atheism in disguise.
With equal logical consistency is fatalism deduced
from pantheism. If man has no substance of his own,
he has no liberty, no activity of his own ; all his act?
are illusory phenomena, which a blind Absolute fatally
performs ; there is no longer either good or evil, and
the whole moral law is destroyed. Likewise, if the
principle of the identity of contraries, the foundation
of the logic of pantheists, be admitted, there is no
longer either true or false, and the most complete
scepticism becomes the sole rule of the human mind.*
AET. III. — GOD THE PEESERTEE.
36. The creatures of Ood stand in need of His contin-
ual active preservation. — Every effect depends on its
cause for all that it has from it. Now, the efficient
cause either creates, or simply gives a new form to
what is already existing. Therefore, if the effect is
nothing but a new form informing pre-existing mat-
ter, it will be referred to the cause for this form only.
But if the effect be the whole existence of a being.
* Pantheism is the real principle of rationalism, which in turn has
given birth to positivism and agnosticism. Positivism, inaugurated
by Comte, was propagated in the name of reason and science by
Llttre, Taine, Kenan, Sainte-Beuve in France, by Lewes and Harrison
in England, by Emerson in America. Rejecting the supernatural as
unknowable, it studies only positives, i.e., natural phenomena with
their " relations of coexistence and succession." It may be traced to
three causes : " metaphysical scepticism, due to the Critique of Kant,"
the "too exclusive use of the experimental method," and the
" material tendencies of the age." Littr6 died in 1881, a convert on
his bad of death.
356 REAL PSILOSOPHT.
I
matter and form, it will depend on the cause for its
whole existence, for both matter and form. But God
is the first cause of all the beings of the universe,
since He has given them existence by creating them ;
therefore they cannot cease to depend on Him for
their existence ; and they continue to exist only so
long as He preserves it to them. For if creatures
cannot come into existence of themselves, it is because
they are contingent ; as they do not cease to be con-
tingent, they require for the continuance of their
existence a divine act of the same nature as that
which drew them forth from nothing. The necessity
of this divine act is such that God Himself could not
make creatures capable of preserving themselves by
their own nature ; because unless God created a con-
tradictory being He could not make a creature not
contingent.
37. God preserves His creatures hy a positive act, which
does not differ actually from that hy ivhich He created
them ; so that p7'eseroation may ie called a continued
creation. — The preservation of a being is of two kinds :
it is positive and direct, if the being continues in
existence by a positive and direct act of God ; it is
negative and indirect, if the being merely continues
to exist, inasmuch as God does not destroy it, and
removes the causes that could effect this. Now as to
the act by which God preserves creatures, only posi-
tive and direct preservation can be meant ; and so all
the great philosophers have understood it. Evidently
it could not be otherwise, for creatures are always
contingent, and consequently always in need of that
which was needful at the first moment of their exist-
ence. God has drawn the world from nothing by an
act of His will ; He continues to will that the world
exist, and so the world continues to exist. Therefore
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 357
the act by wMch. God created the world and the act
by which He preserves it, are identical ; and in all
truth we can say that the divine preservation is a
continual creation. The difference between the crea-
tion and the preservation of creatures consists not in
the act but in .the term of the act : by creation God
draws things out of nothing ; by preservation He
keeps from nothingness the things He has made. If
one were to accept the opinion of some philosophers,
that God preserves creatures by a negative and indi-
rect act, he would be obliged to admit that creatures
could not return to nothing except by a positive act
of God. But it is impossible for nothing to be the
term of any act whatever. Therefore, to admit the
indirect preservation of creatures is to deny to God
the power of annihilating the things He has made:
But in the doctrine of direct preservation the annihi-
lation of creatures is easily explained by the cessation
of the act which keeps them in existence.
38. Although God can annihilate creatures, yet it is
certain that Me will never annihilate even one of them. —
Since God has created freely, He can also, if He wills
it, annihilate His creatures. But this is only a meta-
physical possibility which will never be realized ; for
the gifts of God are without repentance, and having
willed to give being to creatures, God, in a sense, owes
it to His wisdom, His immutability, and His glory,
to preserve them. The existence of creatures is a
proof of the power of Him who made theru ; but that
a thing after having existed should return into noth-
ing, would be contrary to the manifestation of God's
power, which shines forth especially in the preserva-
tion of creatures. The world will doubtless undergo
transformations and does undergo them every day ;
but it will not cease to exist. It is certain also, as we
358 REAL PHILOSOPHT.
daily see, that the accidents of things and the very
forms of living beings other than man, do cease to
exist; but these accidents and these forms are not
complete beings, since they are not substances. The
name of being is imperfectly applied to them ; and
yet, such as they are, they are not absolutely annihi-
lated, not that any part of them subsists, but because
there is always a potentiality in the subject or in the
matter, from which they can be educed.
AET. IV. — THE DIVINE CONGUEEENCE WITH THE ACTIONS
OP CBEATUEES.
39. God concurs directly in all the acts of creatures. —
God not merely exerts an influence on creatures in-
asmuch as He preserves their being ; He also influ-
ences their operations. For just as the creature as
second being depends on God as first being, so the
creature as second cause depends on God as first cause.
40. There are two prijicipal systems to explain the
divine influence on the actions of creatures : the sys-
tem of physical premotion and the system of simul-
taneous coTicurrence. — Physical premotion or predeter-
mination, is an influence by which God applies the
cause to action, firstly, actively, and intrinsically.
The divine influence on the actions of creatures as
explained by physical premotion has been taught by
the Scholastic philosophers generally, and particu-
larly by St. Thomas. They regarded God as moving
and applying secondary causes, actively and physi-
cally, by an internal inclination which determines
them definitively to their action, as the heart gives to
the other members of the body a predetermining force
that stimulates them and makes them thoroughly
capable of their functions.
RBLATirE ATTBIBUTMS OF GOD. 359
Simultaneous concurrence is the influence by which
God helps second causes, producing with them one
and the same effect. This system originated with
Molina (1535-1600) toward the end of the sixteenth
century. He taught that the entire effect is to be
ascribed to God and creatures ; but that neither God
nor second causes are the total cause of the effect, but
each is a partial cause requiring the concurrence of
the other — just as a boat ^owed by two men receives
its entire motion from both together. In this system
is also admitted, particularly in the order of grace,
that concurrence of God called moral motion, which
consists in a moral influence exercised on the will,
either external, as by preaching and good example,
or internal, as by inspiration and good thoughts.
Still, in whatever way the divine influence upon the
action of creatures be explained, it by no means
destroys free will; for although God concurs with
free acts. He never concurs with what is defective
in them. Similarly, although the motion of a lame
man's leg must be attributed to the soul, the defect
in his walk is due to the defect in his leg.*
AET. v.— OMNIPEESENCE OF GOD.
41. Omnipresence is an attrxbute'hy which God is pres-
ent in all creatures. — The attribute of omnipresence
differs from that of immensity, for the latter is that
perfection by which God is present by His infinite
essence in all things that exist, and can be in all pos-
sible worlds ; while the former is merely that perfec-
fection by which He is actually present in all places
and in all creatures. This is, therefore, a relative at-
tribute ; the other is absolute.
*Cf. Zigliara, Summa Philotophiea, T., § 30.
360 REAL PHILOSOPET.
42. Ood is in all creatures in three ways: hy His
pmuer, iy Sis presence, and hy His essence. — God is m
all creatures by His power, for He acts in them ; by
his presence, for He actually knows them ; by His es-
sence, for His essence is not distinct from His powei-
and His knowledge. — God is in all beings by His
power, because He has created them and continues
the creative act by preserving them. God is in all
creatures by His presence, for all that He produces
outside Himself He produces freely according to
eternal prototypes ; therefore, as creative and pre-
serving cause of all things, He must have them ever
present to His intelligence. Lastly, God is in ail be-
ings by His essence. Wherever God's power is exer-
cised, there is His essence whole and entire ; but God
is in all places by His power ; therefore He is also
there by His essence.* Our imagination, accustomed
as it is to represent to itself material things, cannot
represent the divine substance present in all things
without picturing it as mingled with their sub-
stances; but reason rejects such a representation.
The essence of God is no more confounded with the
essences of creatures with which He is present than
the soul is identified in its substance with that of the
body to which it is substantially united.
AET. VI. — PKOVIDENCE OF GOD.
43. The Providence of God is the care thai He take»
of creatures, especially rational creatures. — Considered
in God, providence is the reason of the order by which
* " He is in all things by His power in that all depend npon
Him, and by His presence, inasmuch as all things are ' naked and
open to His eyes ; ' He is in all by His essence, because He is with
all as the cause of their existence." — Sum. Th., i., q. 8, art. 3.
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF OOD. 361
all things are conducted to their end; and in this
sense providence is exercised immediately over all
things. Considered in its eifects, providence is the
execution of the order which God conceived in creat-
ing the world, and in virtue of which all things an-
swer their end. In this sense providence is exercised
only mediately, for it governs the inferior by the
superior, not that it needs an intermediary, but that
in the exercise of its goodness it may give the dignity
of cause to creatures.
44. The existence of Providence is proved hy an a priori
argument drawn from the very idea of God. — An intelli-
gent and free agent must operate with a view to some
end. God must have proposed some end in creating
the world, and this can be no other than the manifesta-
tion of His goodness. But this end could not have
been attained, if at the same time God had not put
order into the world when He created it. And since
order implies the disposition of beings in view of an
end, the order of the world supposes a providential
design. Therefore, if the idea of God as cause of the
world be once admitted, the attribute of providence
cannot be denied him. This attribute may also be
deduced from the other divine perfections. For God
is essential goodness ; but it pertains to the good-
ness of a being to care for the effects that it has pro-
duced. Why, then, should the government of the
world be denied to God ? Not from want of power ;
if He could create the world and determine its end,
with greater reason can He direct it to its end. Not
from want of will ; if He willed the end, it is absurd
to say that He does not will the means. Not from
want of wisdom ; for what would then become of the
infinite wisdom of God? To deny providence is,
therefore, to deny God Himself.
362 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
45. The existence of Providence is also proved iy an a
posteriof'i argument drawn from the admirable order
that 7'eigns in the universe. — ^The universe presents to
us a multitude of beings whicli, though essentially
different, are all governed by constant laws. It shows
us also the ensemble of the particular ends of these
beings conspiring toward a supreme, single, and uni-
versal end ; so that each being taken separately pur-
sues a particular end, which in turn is subordinate to
another end, and so on to the supreme end toward
which all others converge. But the admirable con-
stancy of the world's physical laws, the subordination
of particular ends to a general end, which gives so per-
fect a unity to the world, must be the effect of blind
necessity, of chance, or of a supreme reason. But
necessity cannot govern creatures, since they are evi-
dently contingent ; nor can chance direct them, for it
cannot make constant and invariable laws. There-
fore the order of the world must be the effect of an
ordaining reason, and is nothing else than divine
Providence. The evidence of this conclusion will be
more striking when we bear in mind that many creat-
ures are destitute of reason, others are of opposite nat-
ures, and yet all concur to the supreme end assigned
to the world. How can beings destitute of intelli-
gence tend to an end, if they are not directed by an
intelligent cause ? How can those whose particular
ends are opposed to each other concur to the general
order, if they are not subjected to a supreme Being
who disposes all things at will ? It is of no avail to
object that we know but a small part of the creatures
of the world. What we know suffices to demonstrate
rigorously the necessity of Providence, and the neces-
sity of Providence once shown, it is easy to infer
order even in that portion that is unknown to us.
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF OOD. 363
46. The existence of Providence is also proved by a
moral argument drawn from the unanimous consent of
all peoples in all ages. — The truth of a Providence has,
under one form or another, constituted a fundamental
dogma in all ages. The greatest geniuses have pro-
claimed the trutlj, and not a few have written excellent
works describing the admirable care that God takes
of His creatures, and especially of man, the lord of
creation.
47. The principal objection against God's providence
is drawn from the existence of evil. — If God is just and
good, He cannot but detest evil; if He is infinite-
ly wise, He knows how to prevent evil; if He is
almighty, he can actually prevent evil. Believing it
impossible to reconcile the existence of God with
that of evil, some men have denied the existence of
God, and are, therefore, atheists; while others have
denied the existence of evil, and are fatalists. Others
again have referred the evil to an evil principle dis-,
tinct from God and independent of Him ; of this class
are the Manichees. And yet others, seeing that all
these systems, far from settling the difficulty, only
increased it and added glaring absurdities, believed
it the wiser course to doubt the existence both of
God and of evil ; these are sceptics. — All these, errors
spring from false notions of the nature and origin of
evil, and of the divine plan in permitting it. If evil
is not being, but a privation of being, evidently it
cannot be found in God, who possesses being in all
its plenitude. It has also been proved that there
can be no absolute evil, no supreme principle of evil.*
It is idle for fatalists and sceptics to deny or doubt
the existence of evil in the world; it is, indeed, a
*Seep. 156.
364 REAL PHILOSOPHY.
fact that we cannot understand, but not all our nega-
tions and all our doubts together are able to destroy
it.
48. The objection against Providence drawn from the
existence of evil may lie refuted indirectly hy showing,
first, that these two truths must he held as certain, even
though they cannot he reconciled with each other ; and
secondly, that the existence of evil cannot he explained
without admitting a divine Providence. — When reason
recognizes two truths as certain we may affirm, on the
principle that truth never contradicts itself, that
these two truths harmonize. Now, the existence of
Providence is a truth demonstrated by reason ; the
existence of evil is a fact attested by experience. If,
then, we are unable to discover their connecting link,
we must ascribe it to the imperfection of our minds ;
for it would be as absurd to deny the one or the
other as it would be foolish to deny the existence of a
circle or a square, because one could not point out
their common measure. Besides, it can be shown
that the existence of evil in the world is so far from
destroying divine Providence, that it can have no ex-
planation without Providence. What, indeed, is evil ?
A privation of good, a deviation from order. There-
fore evil is not possible unless the existence of good
and of order be granted. But good is the effect of a
good cause, and order presupposes Providence ; there-
fore evil, far from militating against the goodness and
providence of God, rather proves their existence.
Therefore, instead of saying : Evil exists in the world,
therefore there is no God ; we should rather say :
Evil exists in the world, therefore there is a God and
a Providence.
49. The objection against Providence drawn from the
existence of evil may he refuted indirectly hy showing
BBLATIVE ATTBIBUTEa OF GOD. 365
that eml only serves to manifest in a more striking
way the wisdom and goodness of divine Providence. —
There are, according to some, three kinds of evil-
metaphysical, physical, and moral. But metaphysi-
cal, evil cannot be an objection against Providence,
for it is nothing but the necessary imperfection of
every creature. Therefore, properly speaking, it is
not evil at all, and is reduced to the axiom, "The
finite is not infinite." Only pantheists have been
able to deny this nominal evil. — Physical evil has
been denied by the Stoics. But the physical dis-
orders that do not depend on the libertjr of man are
either a particular effect of the general laws that give
harmony to the world, or they are destined to afford
man an occasion of gaining merit, or, lastly, they are
a consequence and a punishment of moral evil. — The
only difficulty, then, with regard to Providence, must
come from moral evil. This evil consists in the in-
ordinate act of a free agent, and is denied particularly
by fatalists.- The principle of chis evil is liberty.
But how can we suppose, some will ask, that a good
God can have endowed His creatures with a privilege
which for a great number results, on the one hand, in
a resistance to the divine will, and consequently, in
an attack upon the glory and holiness of the infinite
Being ; and, on the other hand, entails such chastise-
ments that nothingness would be a benefit to the
creatures subjected to them ? Since God knew those
who would break His law, why did He draw them
from nothing and grant them a liberty that was to
render them so guilty and so unfortunate ? *
* This objection really comes from disguised anthropomorphism.
It likens God to a bungling artisan, who begins a work but fails to
fit It for its destined purpose, and then throws it aside to make
another attempt with new material. Whoever says that God should
366 REAL PEIL080PST.
These difficulties are such as to move the imagina-
tion and the sentiment, but they are not founded in
reason. For that God has created a world in which
free creatures are subjected to trial and personally
merit their happiness, is not contrary to God's good-
ness. If in consequence of this trial evil becomes
possible, God first in His goodness places limits to
evil, and by His wisdom and His power triumphs over
it, and even draws good out of it. If to this be added
the teachings of faith on the dogma of original sin and
on that of the Incarnation, the moral evil that abounds
in the world is easily explained, and the good, in a
sense infinite, that results from the permission of evil,
is better understood.
create those only whom He knows will be saved, thereby limits His
power, His knowledge even, and His wisdom. He supposes that
God has decreed to create A, for instance, but foreseeing that his
career will end in eternal misery, He changes His decree and de-
termines to create B. If He foresees that B will not prove a failure,
He will create B. The objection is then plausible and insidious,
but if sharply scrutinized becomes most absurd. When God creates
He sees not only the actual career that will be lived by His creature,
but likewise all possible contingencies. To suppose that He can fail
in His work ^s to assert that He is not God ; to say that He changes
His decrees is to deny that He knows from all eternity the whole
life of creatures, and to attack both His wisdom and His Immutability.
God gives to every creature the means to attain its epd ; more than
this it cannot Of right demand. The creative act, creatures, and the
end of creatures are all good ; eternal woe is the legitimate conse-
quence of the creature's perversion of free will. See A Skeptical
Difficulty against Greation, by R. F. Clarke, S. 3., American Catlwlio
Quarterly Eemew, vol. ii., p. 278.
MOEAL PHILOSOPHY.
Definition of Moral Philosophy. — Charactee of the
Science. — ^Its Excellence. — Its Method. — Its Di-
vision.
1. Moral philosophy is a science which treats of the free
actions of man, and directs them to his final end.
2. Moral philosophy is a practical science, because it
serves to direct the luill. — Unlike Logic and Metaphy-
sics, whicli require only acts of intellect, Moral Phi-
losophy requires, besides, acts of the will. Hence,
while they- are speculative sciences, it is called a
practical science.
3. The excellence of Tnoral philosophy follows from its
very nature, and from its relatione luith the other sciences,
particularly tvith the practical sciences, lohich it furnishes
with their first principles. — In itself moral philosophy
is conversant about all that regulates and relates to
man's will. Now, what is of greater importance to
man than the proper direction of his will, since it is
by this faculty that he is to attain the end of his exist-
ence ? As to the relations of moral philosophy with
the other sciences, on the one hand, it is manifestly *
the end of the speculative sciences, ■ since the true
should be known only with a view of thereby better
practising the good ; and, on the other hand, it lays
down for the practical sciences, like jurisprudence,
political economy, and aesthetics, those fundamental
368 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
principles without which they become deceitful and
hurtful.
4. The method of moral philosophy is to seek out the
laws of tnorality hy the light of reason guided hy faith
and history. — The principles of moral philosophy
should be founded on the natural light of reason aided
and sustained by the teachings of faith. Revelation,
which directs our feeble intelligence in the way of
truth, is the more necessary in the study of morals, as
the tumult of passions often so disturbs the judgment
that the good is not duly esteemed, and the will is
weak in putting that good into practice.
Moral science receives great help also from the
study of history, which shows that the leading prin-
ciples of justice and honor, in spite of many errors,
have been maintained constant and uniform, through-
out all ages and among all people.
There are three principal errors as to the method
to be followed in the study of morals. Rationalism
will have no other basis than independent reason.
Such a pretension is opposed to the native imperfec-
tion of reason, and even to affirmations of experience.
Traditionalism, going to the other extreme, holds that
reason is unable to discover the moral laws, and
knows them only by a primitive revelation from God,
which has been handed down by tradition. This at-
tacks the natural powers of reason, and thus does
injury to God, from whom both reason and revela-
tion proceed. In the last place, the historical scliool
whose principles are illustrated in the writings of
Savigny (1779-1861), Mebuhr (1776-1831), Eichhorn
1781-1854), instead of seeking the rule of morality
in the nature of things, pretends to find it by induc-
tion in the study of history ; " and therefore," says
Liberatore, "they hold that the equity of all laws is
DEFINITION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 369
to be judged from the times, inclinations, instincts,
and different development of powers, and other cir-
cumstances that led to their enactment." * By this
very fact it gives to morality a basis without consist-
ency, and takes away from justice those characteris-
tics of absolute and eternal which are its distinguish-
ing property.
5. Moral Philosophy is divided into two parts, Ethics
and Natural Law ; or, according to some, into General
Ethics and Special Ethics. — A human action may be
viewed under two aspects, either abstractly and under
the general conditions that constitute its morality,
or concretely and in relation to the particular obliga-
tions that result from the order established by nature.
The study of human actions from the former stand-
point belongs to Morals or General Ethics ; from the
latter, to Natural Law or Special Ethics. Although
distinct, the two sciences are closely united, standing
in the relation of principles to their application.
* Inititutiones Philosophicm, vol. iii., p. 17.
U
ETHICS.
Division.
6. Ethics examines the moral goodness of huTnan acts,
and therefore should study : 1, the external objective
cause of human actions, that is, their end ; 2, the in-
ternal suhjective cause, that is, the faculty that elicits
them ; 3, the constitutive principles of the morality of
human actions ; 4, the rale of human actions.
CHAPTEE I.
The End of Human Actions.
ibt. i. — good in geneeal as the end op eyeey being,
and the eikst pbinciple of its opekations.
7. Every being has an end, which is the first principle
of its operations. — Every being has received from God
with its existence a power to operate, a tendency to
action, in harmony with its nature. This power can-
not exist withoiit an end or term ; otherwise it would
be a tendency tending to nothing. The term of the
operations of a being is called its end. Such a term,
such an end, has necessarily been given to every creat-
ure by the Supreme Ruler of the world ; for He is
infinite wisdom, arid, therefore, cannot create any-
THE END OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 371
thing without fixing- its end and giving it the means
to attain that end. The end of a being is, therefore,
the first principle, the external objective principle, of
all its operations.
8. The end of each being is one, as its nature is one. —
Unity is an essential property of every being. Since
the end is proportionate to the nature, every being
has, strictly speaking, but one end. When a being is
thought to have several ends, then its last end has
been confounded with the subordinate ends, which
are rather to be called means.
9. The operative poiuer of a being is in perfect agree-
ment with its nature ; hence, as tlve nature varies, so luill
there be a difference in the manner of attaining the end. —
Whatever is destitute of intelligence tends to its end
by a blind impulse. Animals tend to it through sen-
sitive perception ; but, being unable to abstract, and
consequently to know the relations of things, they
cannot consider the object of their operation as an
end ;, their appetite is moved, not by a judgment on
the fitness of the act, but by mere natural inclination.
Man, on the contrary, can know the relations of
things, considers the object as the end of his opera-
tions, and chooses freely the means of attaining his
end.
10 The good of each being is in its end. — The opera-
tive power of a being is imperfect so long as the end
is not attained ; but when that is compassed it is in
repose, because it has obtained its natural perfection.
The natural perfection of a being is its good ; there-
fore the good of each being is found in its end. But
since the idea of good is intimately connected with .
that of end, the true good of a being does not consist
in this or that subordinate end, but in the one end
properly so called ; and this good is but one, as ths
372 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
end is but one. This, however, is so far as it is ob-
jectively considered.*
11. Good is honorahle, pleasurable, or useful. — The
good if considered as end is called honoraile or virtic-
ous if it is sought for its own sake and agrees with
right reason ; if considered in respect to the satisfac-
tion which it affords its possessor, it is caXleA. pleasur-
able ; if considered as the means of attaining the end,
it is called useful. Hence the useful is willed as
means, the pleasurable as a consequence, but the
honorable alone for itself. The same good may un-
der different aspects be at the same time useful,
pleasurable, and honorable. A useful good should
be sought only as leading to an honorable good ; a
pleasurable good, only as resulting from an honora-
ble good.
12. Order, as being a participation of the divine in-
telligence and will, is the last reason explaining the good.
— The true good of a being is always the good of
order, because it is this good that befits the being ac-
cording to its nature, that is, according to the place
which God has assigned it in the general order of the
universe.f Now, the order of the universe which re-
sults from the subordination of the special ends of
each being to a single end is essentially good be-
cause it is the realization of the essentially good idea
of the divine intelligence. Thus the last reason for
which a being attains good in attaining its end is
* " Good takes the nature of end Inasmuch as it objectively moves
the will to act. . . . Whence end is only mentally distinguished
ft-om good " (Russo, Pradectiones Philoaophicm, p. 10, § 13). But good
as a means is not end ; therefore not every good has the nature of
end.
f See Metaphysics of the School, vol, i. , pp. 500, 501, 506.
THE END OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 373
found in the intelligence and will of God, tlie infinite
Good*
ABT. II. — THE SUPKEME GOOD AS THE LAST END OP MAN.
13. Rational good is the good proper to man's nature.
— Man is composed of body and soul, and hence there
are for him two kiiids of good. By his sensitive ap-
petite he is drawn toward sensible good ; by his in-
tellectual appetite, toward spiritual good. But as
these goods are often opposed, and as everything
should conform to the order established by the
Author of nature, the sensitive appetite should be
subject to the intellectual appetite. Therefore the
good proper to man is intellectual good. The sensi-
ble good is a true good if it is in conformity with
reason ; otherwise, although it be a good with regard
to the body, it is an evil to the whole man, inasmuch
as he is a being disposed with order ; ■ and if man
tends to good not conformable to right reason, he
does evil.
14. The supreme good is man's last end. — The lasi
end of a being is but one ; therefore the last end of
man and the good that constitutes that end are but
one. It is easily seen that this good can be nothing
else but the supreme good, since it must be pro-
portioned to man's nature. For as the intellect tends
not to the particular true, but to the universal true,
so the will tends not to the particular good, but to
* The end of a being "depends on the divine wisdom and good-
ness. For the natures and relations of things are dictated by the
divine intellect contemplating the divine essence. Therefore, be-
cause the morality of human actions depends immediately on the
order of things, it depends mediately on the divine wisdom and
goodness." Liberators. Institutiones Philoaophicm, iii., p. 50.
374 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
the universal, unlimited good. This tendency is
so powerful in the will, that it always subsists, even
when the will seems to follow a particular good.
Besides, the repose, the happiness, which results
from the end obtained, i. e., the good possessed, shows
clearly what that good is whose possession procures
perfect happiness. Now, perfect happiness should
(1) fully satisfy the innate desires of the heart ; (2) be
immutable ; (3) be eternal. But what good is there
the possession of which can confer such happiness
except the supreme good, the good than which noth-
ing greater can be conceived ?
15. Pleasure cannot be man's supreme good.* — Plea-
sure is either corporeal or spiritual. Corporeal pleas-
ure is not proportionate to man's intellectual nature.
Spiritual pleasure or joy may be either limited and
imperfect, or perfect. In the latter case it must result
from the possession of the supreme good, but is not
the supreme good itself; for pleasure or joy is sub-
jective, the good that causes it objective.
16. Knowledge and virtue attamable in this life cannot
he man's supreme good. — Knowledge and virtue in this
life are great blessings and to be sought with dili-
gence, but, aside from the imperfect way in which
they are always possessed, they demand much labor
and many sacrifices ; hence they cannot be man's
supreme good.
17. Neitlier can hnoidedge and virtue together ivith pleas-
ure he man's supreme good. — In the first place, expe-
rience proves that this union is never complete and
permanent in this life. In the second place, a col-
lection of limited goods can never give more than a
* The contrary would be true were there no error in the dictum of .
Paley, ' ' Pleasures difEer in nothing but in continuance and intensity."
THE END OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 375
limited good, and therefore cannot satisfy the bound-
less desires of man.
18. God alone is the supreme good. — If the supreme
good be not an empty abstraction, if man's desire for
it be not an illusion of nature, we must admit that'
the supreme good is God, who alone is infinite, im-
mutable, and eternal, and the knowledge and posses-
sion of whom can alone confer upon man supreme and
perfect happiness.
19. The supreme good is possessed radically hy an act
of the intellect. — The will enjoys the good because it
is present and possessed, but it is not possessed
because the will takes complacency in it. It is the
intellect that directly apprehends and possesses the
object that constitutes the good; the enjoyment is
the consequence of possession, not the possession
itself.
20. The human soul dedres to enjoy the supreme good
in union with the hody. — The human soul is made to
be united to a body ; hence it has a natural desire of
resuming the body after being separated from it.
Therefore, when the soul possesses the sovereign good,
though it is then fully satisfied as to the object pos-
sessed, it is not so as to the manner in which it
desires to possess it, which is in union with the body.
And as this ' desire comes from nature, it will be
satisfied. This argues for the resurrection of the
body.
376 MORAL PHILOSOPSr.
ART. III. — THE SUPREME GOOD IN RELATION TO MANS
LIFE UPON EARTH.
21. Man cannot possess the supreme good in this life,
but he ought to tend to attain it in the life to come. — The
knowledge that man has of God in this life is imper-
fect; hence his love of God and his happiness are
also imperfect. But as his end cannot change its
nature, man should so subordinate this life to the
future as to attain in the latter the perfect possession
of the supreme good.
22. Man in this life must tend to the supreme good iy
his will. — In this life man cannot possess the supreme
good; but he should tend to it unceasingly, and in
this his real perfection consists. But it is chiefly by
the will that actions tend a,nd are directed to an end.
Therefore it is especially by the will that man attains
his perfection in this world ; as it is especially by the
intellect that he will possess the supreme good in the
other.
23. The tendency of the will ought to he directed hy the
moral law. — God, having created the world, must have
proposed to Himself an end. The realization of this
end constitutes the order of the world. This order,
which is styled physical or moral, according as it
refers to irrational or to rational beings, consists in
this, that every being should remain in its place, act
according to the laws imposed on it by God, and regu-
late its motions in harmony with those of other beings.
Therefore the observance of this order constitutes
the natural perfection of each being. As the physical
order is fixed, irrational beings cannot disturb it ; but
the moral order man can depart from by the free elec-
tion of his will. But because God cannot but will
THE END OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 377
that the order established by Him be maintained, it
follows that if man wishes hereafter to possess God,
the supreme good, he ought to direct and regulate his
will according to the laws of the moral order.
24. Conformity to the moral order constitutes for man
an imperfect happiness in this life* — Order for man
consists chiefly in knowing and loving God. Now, as
he will one day enjoy perfect happiness by the perfect
knowledge and love of God, so by the knowledge and
love of God which he will acquire in this life will he
enjoy a sort of participation of the happiness of the
other life, a happiness which hope will enable him to
possess by anticipation.
* Yet for the enioyment of the imperfect happiness attainable in
this life man needs also not only a certain perfection of body and
external goods as well, but naturally the society of friends. Of.
. Zigliara, SumTna PhUosophiaa, M. 7, v. vi.
CHAPTBE II.
SUBJECTIYE PeINCIPLES OP HUMAN ACTIONS.
AET. I. — THE FACULTY BY WHICH HUMAN ACTIONS ABE
ELICITED.
25. A human action is one that proceeds from a delib-
erate will. — Intelligence and liberty constitute the
specific difference between man and the rest of the
visible creation. But since the actions by which a
being attains its end are in harmony with the consti-
tutive principles of its nature, human actions are,
strictly speaking, those which proceed from a delib-
erate will, those which are elicited freely and with
knowledge of the end. Actions that are not free are
called actions of vfian, not human actions.*
26. Twelve successive steps may ie distinguished in
huTnan actions : 1, a sim,ple apprehension of the good ;
2, a simple volition to acquire it ; 3, a judgment that the
good is possible ; 4, an intention of taking the msans to
attain it ; 5, an examination of these means ; 6, consent
of the will to these means ; 7, discernment of the fittest
means ; 8, a choice of this msans ; 9, an indication of
what is to he done for the execution of the action ; 10,
an impulse given to the faculties or powers destined to
* A voluntary action is done with knowledge of tlie end ; a free
action is done so that the same conditions remaining it need not
have been done. A human action is therefore both voluntary and
free. Man's desire of happiness is voluntary, but not free.
SUBJEOTIYB PBINGIPLE8 OF ACTIONS. 379
eooecute the action ; 11, the exercise of these faculties or
powers ; 12, delectation of the will. — The first principle
from which every human action proceeds is a neces-
sary tendency of the will to good in general, just as
every demonstrated truth is derived from a first inde-
monstrable truth. This natural impulse of the wiF
being presupposed, the following order obtains among
the successive steps of the intellect and will which con-
stitute a human act : 1. The intellect proposes under
the general form of good the end to be attained. 2.
The will takes complacency in this good as good,
and bids the intellect see whether the good is suit-
able and possible. 3. The intellect judges of its
possibility. 4. The will is borne toward the end to
be attained, really desires it, and bids the intellect
seek the mean's. 5. The intellect points out the
■means. 6. The will approves of them and orders the
fittest to be sought. 7. The intellect points it out.
8. The will chooses it and commands the intellect to
prepare the means of executing the action. 9. The
intellect indicates these means. 10. The will moves
the faculties or powers that elicit the action. 11.
These faculties or powers execute the command of the
will. 12. The will rests in the completion of the
action and in the end attained.
Of these subordinate actions the first four refer to
the end of the action, considered, first, in a general
way, then determinately and particularly ; the next
four have as their object the means, which are first
examined in general, and then the best is chosen ; the
last four have for their object the execution of these
means, and the repose and pleasure of the will in the
accomplished action. In these subordinate actions,
five judgments influence the will, which thereupon
applies the intellect to new researches. To the fifth
380 MORAL PHILOSOPHT.
action of the will the action of the eliciting power
responds, and to this, in turn, the repose of the will
In this series of subordinate actions liberty is exer-
cised every time the will acts. The human action
subsists in all its essence when the will is making its
election, its free determination ; but it subsists in all
its integrity only when the action willed is executed.
To sum up these results, every human action may be
resolved into three principles : (1) An impulse of the
will to good in general ; (2) knowledge of a particu-
lar good ; (3) liberty in the choice of this good.
Without the first condition the will could not act ;
without the second, it would have no direction ; with-
out the third, it would not act conformably to its
nature.
27. A voluntary actio?i is perfect of imperfect, direct
or hidirect, express or tacit, elicited or im.perate. — A
voluntary action is perfect if it proceeds from an en-
tire inclination of the will ; it is imperfect if it is
done with a certain repugnance, or without a perfect
knowledge of what is done. It is direct if it is
actually produced by the will ; it is iixdirect if it
happens through the omission of an action. It is
formal or express if it proceeds from a proper action
of the will ; it is virtual or tacit if it is willed not in
itself but in something else. It is elicited if it is the
action of the will itself ; it is imperate if it is elicited
by other faculties at the command of the will.
28. Violence, when absolute, renders the action invol-
untary ; when conditional, it maJces it less voluntary. —
Since a voluntary action must be produced by an in-
trinsic principle, it no longer exists when the action
proceeds from an extrinsic principle, such as absolute
violence. Violence is defined as " an action proceed-
ing from an extrinsic principle and opposed by the
SUBJECTIVE PBINOIPLEa OF ACTIONS. 381
subject."* If the Tiolence is only conditional or moral,
it is absolutely possible not to do what is demanded,
and hence the action is voluntary, though only par-
tially so. Violence, be it noted, can be exercised only
over imperate actions and never over actions elicited
by the will.
29. Fear makes the action less voluntary, hut not ab-
solutely involuntary. — Fear is an impression resulting
from a threatening evil difficult to avoid. This evil,
it may indeed be said, does us a sort of violence, but
the violence is purely conditional ; free will is not
destroyed, but only lessened.
30. Ignorance, when invincible, and opposed to the
action of the will, renders the action involuntary. — There
is no voluntary action without knowledge ; an action
is, therefore, more or less voluntary according to the
less or greater degree of ignorance. Ignorance is of
three kinds : antecedent if it is in nowise willed and
the action would not be done if there were knowledge ;
consequent if it is willed either expressly or implicitly ;
concomitant when knowledge is wanting, yet so that
the action would be done if there were knowledge.
Antecedent ignorance excludes all exercise of the
will, because no knowledge is had of the object ; con-
sequent ignorance is willed implicitly, and hence
does not entirely exclude knowledge ; and the same
is to be said of concomitant ignorance. Consequent
ignorance is either affected i:, by a direct act, one
chooses to remain in ignorance, or crass if the means
of acquiring the knowledge necessary to act with pro-
priety are neglected, f
*Liberatore, Instttutiones Philosophias, lib. iii., p. 66.
■f Antecedent ignorance is called invincible, "because though all
the means be employed which can humanly speaking be employed it
cannot be dispelled." Hence consequent ignorance is vincible, since
382 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
31. Concupiscence does not make the action involun-
tary, hut rather makes it more voluntary. If it precedes,
it diminishes the free will, hut not if it follows. — Concu-
piscence is a movement of the sensitive appetite
toward a pleasurable good ; therefore it inclines the
will to this good and gives greater intensity to the
voluntary action. But when concupiscence precedes
the voluntary action, it does a sort of conditional
violence to the liberty of the trill and consequently
diminishes it ; when, on the contrary, it follows the
voluntary action, liberty remains, since the action
ha,s been freely elicited. Concupiscence even aug-
ments the moral value of the action if the will calls
it expressly and intentionally to its aid.
AET. 11. — THE PASSIONS.
32. Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite,
proceeding from, an apprehension of good or evil, and
accompanied with some alteration of the hody. — The
human soul, being substantially united to a body,
possesses, besides the will or intellective appetite,
sensitive appetite or an inclination to sensible goods.
The sensitive appetite is the seat of the passions.
The cause which actually produces a passion is the
good or evil apprehended by imagination: The par-
ticular note or character that accompanies it and dis-
tinguishes it from a purely voluntary motion is a
physical, bodily change, which is due to the fact
that the sensitive appetite resides in a corporeal
organ.
33. There are six passions of the coneupiscible appe-
it can be dispelled when those means are employed which can and
should be employed. Cf. Zigliara, Summa Philosophica, M. 19, vi.
SUBJECTIVE PBINGIPLE8 OF ACTIONS. 383
tite: Love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and
sadness. There are five passions of the irascible appe-
tite: Hope and despair, daring and fear, and anger. —
The passions are movements of the sensitive appetite,
the divisions of which they therefore follow. Now,
the sensitive appetite is concupiscible if it has for its
object sensible good and evil taken absolutely ; and
irascible if it seeks good and evil as being arduous and
difficult, in the one case to gain, in the other to avoid.
The passions of the concupiscible appetite are six in
number : Love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and
sadness. For when good is present, we love it ; love
begets desire if the good be absent; joy is repose
in the possession of good. So, in the presence of
evil, we first experience hatred; hatred engenders
aversion, if the evil be absent ; and when the evil here
and now affects us, we feel sadness. There are five pas-
sions of the irascible appetite: Hope and despair,
daring and fear, and anger. Hope lifts the mind
toward a good that is difficult of attainment ; de^air
casts it down at sight of the difficulty ; daring faces
the evil ; fear shrinks from it ; anger inflames us
against the cause of the evil. All the passions of the
irascible appetite proceed from a passion of the con-
cupiscible part, and end in it. These two kinds of
passion differ from one another, for those of the con-
cupiscible appetite are all opposed in their object, but
not all those of the irascible appetite. Anger has no
opposite. All the secondary passions may be re-
duced to these eleven principal ones.*
* ' ' Modern Psychology is accustomed to treat of several species of
Feeling and Feelings in its theory of the third Facnlty. We accord-
ingly have discussions regarding the sympathetic, intellectual, aes-
thetic, moral, and religious emotions ; and also of the feeling or
sense of right, of the beautiful, of the noble, and of moral good, o(
384: MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
34. The passiotis are in themselves morally neither
good nor had ; these qualities depend on their subjection
to the empire of reason. — The passions are movements
of the irrational appetite, and hence are without either
reason or liberty, the two conditions of all morality.
If, however, the passions be considered as subject to
of aesthetic, moral, and religious feeling. If we admit no special
Feeling-power, besides the faculties of Cognition and Conation [Ap-
petite], where shall we dispose of these states ? It is not very diffi-
cult to find a place for them, if we only get a clear notion of what is
meant by these names. The sympathetic emotions are, in general,
joy or sorrow over the weal or woe of others. Those feelings are
styled '.Esthetic ' which are awakened in the soul in the presence of
the aesthetic excellence of the creations of human genius. Under
the phrase 'Intellectual Feelings' are signified those agreeable or
disagreeable affections, the cause and object of which is an activity
of our intelligence in harmony or confiict with that intelligence.
Finally, Moral and Religious Feelings are the appetencies of the soul
in the presence of ethical good and ill with reference to the super-
natural order. . . The sense of the Beautiful and the Good, or
.aesthetic and Moral Sentiment, is not a (special) energy, not a faculty
of the soul, but simply the first attribute of every created spirit,
Raiionaliiy. Rationality embraces a two-fold element. Our soul is
rational on the one hand because its understanding is necessarily de-
termined by Eternal Wisdom's laws of knowledge ; on the other, be-
cause there is impressed upon Its appetency a natural bent towards
what agrees with these laws of knowledge and with Uncreated Good-
ness, that is, towards the physically perfect and the ethically good,
and therefore towards the Beautiful. This rationality, for reasons
assigned elsewhere, does not manifest itself in all men in equal per-
fection, but in its essence it is present in all. Accordingly, in so far
as no other agencies interfere, every man naturally knows and
recognizes the Good, the Right, the Noble, the Beautiful, and the
Great ; towards these he is impelled, these he embracss, these he
loves these he enjoys. On the other hand, Wickedness, Meanness,
Ugliness, are for every man the object of aversion and displeasure."
— Jungmann, Das Oemuth und das OefuTdsvermogen, cited in Pty-
chology, Stonyhurst Series, pp. 417, 418.
SUBJEOTIVE PRINGIPLES OF ACTIONS. 385
tiie empire of the reason and the will, they share In
the morality of voluntary actions.
35. Tlie passions of man should he controlled hy rea-
son.— Order requires that the sensitive part of man's
being should be directed by the intellect, which is
superior. Therefore the passions should be subject
to reason. Besides, the passions of themselves are
blind, and in man, because of the help they receive
from intellect and will, have a tendency to possess
their object indefinitely in intensity and duration.
Therefore reason should control them that it may
establish them in order, whether as to their object or
as to the manner in which they tend to it. Thus con-
trolled, the passions attain their natural end, which
is to facilitate the practice of virtue, and to excite and
sustain man in the accomplishment of good.
ART. ni. — VIRTUES AND VICES.
36. Mahit is a permanent quality residing in the powers
of the soul, and inclining them to certain determinate
actions. — The will is not only roused to action by the
apprehension of good and by the passions, it is also
powerfully stimulated and aided by habit, i.e., a per-
manent quality which inclines the powers of the soul
to certain determinate actions. Experience shows that
habit gives not only perspicacity to the intellect, and
promptitude to the memory, but likewise a great facil-
ity to the will in eliciting its acts.
37. Good habits are called virtues ; had habits, vices. —
As the will is free, it can form habits inclining it
either to good or to evil ; in the former case, the habits
are said to be good ; in the latter, to be bad. Good
habits constitute what are known as virtues ; bad
habits are called vices. Therefore virtue is defined
2a
386 -MORAL PniLOSOPHT.
as " a perfection by which the will is constantly in-
clined to good actions ; " and vice as " an imperfec-
tion of the will constantly inclining it to bad actions."
38. Man needs virtue to act perfectly. — ^To be disposed
with perfect order to the accomplishment of good,
man must be able to do it constantly, promptly, and
with pleasure. Now, so to act is the property of
habit. Therefore vixtue, which is merely a good
habit, is necessary to man for the accomplishment of
good in a perfect manner.
39. Virtues are naturally acquired only by frequent
acts. — The will is of itseK indifferent to this or that
particular good. Therefore, to incline it by prefer-
ence to the moral good, there must be a special in-
clination added to its nature, forming, as it were, a
second nature. This inclination is acquired only by
a repetition of acts, as experience proves.
40. Virtue lies in the mean. — Virtue is such when it
maintains human actions in conformity with right
reason ; but this conformity lies in the mean between
excess and deficiency ; therefore every moral virtue
lies in a mean.
41. There are four principal moral virtues : Prudence,
justice, temperance, and fortitude. — ^As in man there are
two principles of action, so there are also two gen-
eric classes of virtue. Every virtue that perfects the
intellect, as " wisdom " and " science," is called an in-
tellectual virtue. Every virtue that perfects the ap-
petite, whether rational or sensitive, is a moral virtue.
There are as many principal moral virtues as there
are faculties that concur in the moral action and may
be the subject of habit in reference to the action.
But these faculties areiour in number: reason, will,
and sensitive appetite, which latter is divided into the
concupiscible and the irascible appetite. Hence there
SUBJECTIVE PRINOIPLES OF A0TI0N8. 387
are four principal virtues : prudence, whicli enligM-
ens the reason as to what should be done ; justice,
which inclines the will to render to everyone his due ;
— ^for in what regards himself man does not need this
virtue, since he naturally always desires his own
good sufficiently ; temperance, which regulates the
concupiscible appetite and checks the inordinate
pursuit of sensible goods ; fortitude, which perfects
the irascible part when there is difficulty either in
acquiring good or avoiding evil.
CHAPTEE in.
MOEALITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS.
4ET. I. — ON WHAT THE MOEALITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS DE«
FENDS.
42. The morality of human actions consists in their rela-
tion to the end of man. — Human actions are morally
good when they lead man to his end ; they are
morally bad when they turn him from that end. For
it belongs to every moral agent to act according to
order, that is, with due subordination of means to its
ultimate end.*
43. The ultimate external criterion of morality is the
good of order apprehended hy reason. — Man's perfection
consists in attaining his end, and his actions are the
means by which he tends to that end. But, since God
has given man both his being and his end, and since
there is an intimate connection between the end and
the means to attain it, it follows that these means are
also given to man, and do not, in their relation to his
end, depend on his free choice. But this close depend-
ence of the means on the end constitutes the good of
order, which, however, does not become the term
* Pantheists must logically deny the existence or the possibility of
moral action, for they assert that God alone acts in creatures. Men,
therefore, can he neither responsihle nor free. A like conclusion
must be drawn from the doctrines of those materialists who teaoh
that morality is but a function of the brain.
MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 389
of a voluntary action until apprehended by reason.
Therefore a human action is morally good when it
is conformed to the good of order apprehended by
reason, and it is morally bad in the contrary case.
What constitutes the morality of an action is, then,
something independent of man, and there is an in-
trinsic and objective difference between good and
evil.*
44. T/ie ultimate criterion of morality is not education,
as Montaigne held ; nor the opinion of peoples, as /Saint-
Lambert pretended ; nor human laws, as Hobbes asserted ;
nor the good pleasure of Ood, as Puffendorf taught. —
The good of order which requires that each being
should tend to an end conformable to its nature, is
immutable like God himself, who being infinite wis-
dom cannot create a being destitute of an end, or with
an end contrary to its nature. Therefore morality
is immutable in its fundamental principles. But edu-
cation, the opinion of peoples, and human laws are
changing and variable ; therefore they cannot be
sources of morality. Besides, we judge of opinions,
laws, and systems of education as to whether they are
good or bad ; therefore opinions, laws, and educa-
tional systems imply a higher principle on which
they depend. As to the good pleasure of God, it is
evident that, whatever Descartes (1596-1650) and Puf-
fendorf (1632-1694) may say, what God could have
willed otherwise than He does will, cannot be the
source of morality, which is essentially immutable,
since God having created man for a determinate end
cannot but will honorable actions as leading to that
* This conclusion overthrows the doctrine of Antinomies, set fortt
by the Transcendental School of Germany in its application to
moral science.
390 MORAL PHILOSOPET.
end, and detest sinful actions as averting from that
end.*
45. The judgment of the Tuorality of actions helongs to
intellect and reason alone. — Trutli is the proper object
of intellect and reason ; but, whether truth be spec-
ulatiye or practical, its nature does not change,
since the difference is only accidental. Since, then,
the judgment of the morality of actions is only a
judgment about practical truth, it belongs to in-
tellect and reason. Whatever sceptics may say, rea-
son cannot be deceived as to first practical prin-
ciples and their immediate consequences, any more
than it can be deceived as to first speculative prin-
ciples and the truths derived from them directly.
The greater opposition manifested to first practical
principles is explained by their end, which is to con-
trol the passions and subject them in all things to
right reason.
46. It is absurd to say, with the Scotch school, that the
judgment of the morality of actions helongs to a spiritual
sense ; still less is it to he admitted, with the 'materialists,
that it helongs to a corporeal sense. — The spiritual sense,
as understood by the Scotch, philosophers, Eeid (1710-
1796), Hutcheson (1694-1747), and Adam Smith (1723-
1790), is a blind inclination that makes us judge spon-
taneously of moral good or evil. But man is intel-
ligent and free, and can by no means be absolutely
subject to the impulse of blind instinct. It is evi-
* " No power in heaven above, nor on earth beneath, can dispense
from any portion of the Natural Law. For the matter of the nega-
tive precepts of that law is . . something bad in itself and
repugnant to human nature, and accordingly forbidden by God ;
while the matter of the positive precepts is something good and
necessary to man, commanded by God." — Moral PhUoaophy, Stony
hurst Series, p. 149.
MORALITY OF HUMAN A0TI0N8. 391
dent that the corporeal sense of the Sensists, Locke
(1632-1704), Helvetius (1715-1771), Bentham (1748-
1832), etc., cannot form moral judgments that are in
themselves immutable and universal, for every sen-
sation is essentially variable and particular.
ABT. n. — CONSTITUENT PRINCIPLES OP THE MOEALITY OP
HUMAN ACTIONS.
47. Tlie ohject of volition * apprehended hy reason is the
first principle of the morality of an action. — The good of
order is the foundation of morality. But the object
presented to the will by reason, and viewed not simply
but as agreeing with right reason, is the term of the
action and specifies it. Therefore, according as this
object is conformed to good order or not, the action
will be good or bad, and the object will be the first
constituent principle of the morality of the action,
and by it the objective intrinsic difference between a
good action and a bad one will be established. There-
fore the object may be called ih.e formal principle of a
moral action, since it is, as it were, its substantial
form; the free act or election of the will may be
called the matter of a moral action.
48. The circumstances of an action are the constituent
principle of its accidental morality. — The object of the
action and the unchatigeable relation of the object to
absolute order constitute the substance of the moral-
ity of an action ; the accompanying circumstances are
as the accidents of that morality. The perfection of
the nature of beings depends not only on their sub-
stance, but also on their accidents ; so, too, will the
* The object of volition includes both the end willed and the
means to the end.
392 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
moral action be more or less perfect not only from its
substance, but also from the accidents tliat accom-
pany it, i.e., the circumstances. The principal circum-
stances are : The person who acted, what he did, hy what
means, in what manner, in what place, and at what time.*
49. The end of the subject operating is causally the con-
stituent principle of the suhjective morality of the action.
— ^Besides the natural end of the action (finis opsris),
there is the end depending on the subject operating
(finis opefrantis), which may be identical with the
former or different from it. If the object of the ac-
tion is conformed to order, but the end of the subject
is opposed to order, the end vitiates the action by the
evil that it contains ; in the contrary case it perfects
it. If the object of the action is opposed to order, the
end of the subject operating, even if it be conformed
to order, will never make good what is intrinsically
bad. This end, depending only on the will of the
subject operating and distinct from the natural end of
the action, determines the subjective morality of the
action; the object and the circumstances constitute
its Directive morality.
50. That an action may he good, it must he without de-
fect in its object, in its ch^cum,stances, and in its end. — The
three constituent principles of the morality of an ac-
tion are the object, end, and circumstances ; hence an
action is good when each of these three principles is
conformed to order (Bonivm ex integra causa). If even
* It must be borne in mind that these circumstances are not ele-
ments essential to the physical integrity of a human action, for such
elements are contained in its olyect ; but they are accidentaUy con-
nected with the causes of the action. The priestly character of a
person, for example, may affect the morality of an action. So, too,
theft acquires a new species of malice when the object stolen is one
consecrated to God.
MORALITY OF BUM AN ACTIONS. 393
one of these principles is contrary to order, the action
will be bad, at least in part (Malum ex quocumque de-
fectu).
51. Although abstractly there may he indifferent ac-
tions, in the concrete there can he nons. — It is the object
that specifies the action. Now, as there are objects
indifferent in themselves, i.e., presenting neither
agreement nor disagreement with order, there are,
therefore, actions indifferent in themselves. But in
the concrete every action is vested with morality be-
cause of its circumstances, or, at least, of its end
For every action elicited with advertence of reason *
is either ordained to an end or it is not. If it is so
determined, it will necessarily be either good or bad.
If it is not determined, it will in so far be bad, because
every action ought to be in the order of reason, and
reason demands that everything be conducted to its
proper end. The external act that follows the action
of the will, though in itself not free, and therefore not
possessing a morality of its own, may yet accidentally
affect the morality of the action of the will, since it
gives to it greater intensity, implies a greater affec-
tion, for it, and a fuller advertence to it.
AET. in. — IMPUTABILITY.
52. Imputability is that qiuility in virtue of tvhich
every free action is attributed to some one as its author,
just as an effect is referred to its cause. — The man who
acts freely is the true cause of the action ; it is, there-
fore, with reason that every free action is attributed
* The discussion turns solely upon human actions, and therefore
actions that are indeliherate, or necessary, or supernatural are ex-
cluded.
394 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
to him who does it. This attribution is called im-
putability, and although always joined to morality is
yet distinct from it, since it does not constitute the
morality of an action, but is rather a consequence
of it.
53. From the imputahility of human actions arises the
reason of praise or blame. — When a moral action is im-
puted to a man, he is considered as the author of the
resultant g-ood or evil, and is therefore judged worthy
of esteem or contempt, of praise or blame. To praise
or blame anyone is nothing but to impute to him the
goodness or malice of his action.
ART. IV. — MERIT AND DEMERIT.
54. Merit is that iy which an action desej'ves recom-
pense ; demerit is that hy which it dese7'ves punishment.
— Conscience testifies to us that according as an ac-
tion is good or bad it deserves to be rewarded or
punished. Merit and demerit are, therefore, quali^
ties that flow from an action as a consequence of its
morality. The good merited is called a reward if
preceded by no compact, otherwise it is pay. The
evil merited is punishment, which, however, not all
men may inflict upon those who injure them, for in
most cases recourse should be had to the tribunals
lawfully established foi- that purpose.*
55. Man hy his actions may merit or demerit from his
* Merit is condign (de condigno) if it is founded in the very work
that is freely done, or in some compact. It is congruous if founded
In the benevolence or liberality of him who bestows the reward.
The conditions requisite for acquiring merit or demerit are : 1 °
That the action be free ; 2° that It benefit or Injure some other person
than the agent ; 3° that it be not obligatory from some previous
contract
MORALITY OF HITMAN ACTIONS. 395
fellow-man. — Man may do a good action tliat profits
his fellow-man, or an evil action that injures him.
Order requires that in the former case he receive a
recompense in return ; and, in the latter case, a pun-
ishment, that there may be a proportion between
what he gives and what he receives.
56. Man hy Ms actions may meiit or demerit from
society. — Every man is a member of society. There-
fore whoever does good or evil to his neighbor
should receive a reward or a punishment not only
from him, but from society, because to benefit or in-
jure a member is to benefit or injure the whole body.
If one does good or evil directly to society, he should
first be rewarded or punished by it, and afterward by
its members. If one even does good or harm to him-
self, he should likewise receive recompense or incur
penalty from society, because he is a member.
57. Man m^ay hy his actions acquire merit or demerit
lefore God. — It is a duty for man to tend to God.
Therefore if by his actions he departs from God, he
deprives God of the glory due Him as the supreme
good, and consequently he should be punished.
Again, God is the sovereign legislator of the universe.
Therefore an action merits or demerits before Him in
proportion to its conformity or non-conformity to the
universal order.
CHAPTEE IV.
Law, a?HE Edle of Human Actions.
ART. I. — MOEAL DtTTY.
58. Moral duty is the moral oUigation resulting from
the connection of the last end vnth the means necessary to
attain it. — Man is obliged to tend to his last end. But
as it is necessary to take means to reach this end, it
follows that these means are imposed on him as well
as the end. The obligation of employing these means
constitutes moral duty. If the means are conformed
to the end, but not necessarily bound up in it, they
are not imposed by an obligation in the strict sense of
the word ; if a man uses them he does a moral action,
but he does not perform a duty, properly so called.
Therefore a moral action is honorable when it is not
commanded ; it is just when it is obligatory. If the
action be indifferent to the attainment of the end, it is
then called lawful.
59. Moral duty is primitive or derivative, negative or
'positive. — Primitive duty is that which is founded in
man's necessary and essential relations to his end;
such is the obligation "to love God." Derivative
duty is that which arises from a primitive duty in
consequence of some fact dependent on our liberty ;
as the duty " to fulfil an engagement one has made."
Negative duty is that which forbids something ; thus
are we bound "not to lie." Positive duty is that
LAW, THE BULB OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 397
which commands something ; as the duty of " loving
our parents." When a duty answers to some one's
right, it is called juridical ; such is the duty of " pay-
ing our debts."
60. The obligation of duty harmonizes with free will,
because it is moral and n/jt physical. — A being is not
free when subjected to physical violence ; but when
man apprehends by reason the necessary connection
between means and end, he preserves' in his will
the power to employ these means or not. There-
fore he remains free, and is under a moral obligation
only.
61. Duty is absolute, im,mutable, and universal. — Duty
is absolute like man's end, since it is the necessary
means of attaining the end. But though absolute as
to the obligation that it imposes, it has degrees rel-
atively to the greater or less moral perfection which
it imparts to man. Thus duties to God are more
perfect than any others; and duties to ourselves take
precedence of those that we owe our neighbor. By
the very fact that duty is absolute, it is clear that it
must be universal and immutable; for all men have
the same nature, which can no more change in its
end than in its essence.
62. When several duties conflict, the most perfect is
binding. — Thus if, in a given case, a duty to God and a
duty to ourselves cannot be accomplished without the
sacrifice of one of them, it is patent that the second
should be sacrificed. So, too, if a duty to ourselves
conflicts with a duty to our neighbor, the latter should
be sacrificed ; for the bond of identity with ourselves
is more intimate than that of likeness with our neigh-
bor, which is the basis of our duties to him. Hence,
in general, the perfection of a duty is determined
from the dignity of the power that imposes it, or
398 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
from the gravity of its matter, or tlie strength of ii»
motive.*
63. In certain cases, necessity excuses from duty. —
The necessity is extreme, grave, or common, accord-
ing as a man cannot fulfil the duty without exposing
himself to an extreme evil, as death, or a grave evil,
as loss of health, or an ordinary evil, as a slight loss
of fortune. This last necessity never excuses from
duty. The other two necessities do not excuse from
a primitive and negative duty, because the natural
law forbids what is essentially evil ; and as no circum-
stance can change the nature of the evil, so is it
equally incapable of rendering it lawful.f But if a
duty is positive, an extreme or grave necessity may
entirely exempt from it if the transgression of a nega-
tive dut^r is not thereby involved,! or allow one to
put off fulfilling it to a more suitable time, because a
positive duty does not always oblige us to perform
the action commanded, but only in a fitting time and
occasion. When the duty is derivative, excepting a
few cases that are easily recognized,§ necessity ex-
* Cf. Russo, Be PMlosopliia Morali Prcelectiones, p. 106, § 145.
+ "Therefore negative precepts oblige always and at ail times {sem-
per et ad semper), as the Schoolmen expressed it, that is, in every
place, at all times, and in every circumstance ; . . . positive
precepts oblige always . . . but not at all times, so as thereby
to oblige a man, for instance, at all times, in all places and circum-
stances to perform a prescribed act of virtue." — Zigliara, Sum. Phil.,
M. 30, v:
X For valid exemption, however, the necessity must be "a) inde-
pendent of our will, . . . b) extreme or at least grave, . . .
such as a notable loss of reputation, health, or material goods." —
Russo, De Pm. Mot. Prm., p. 107, § 147.
§ As included in these few cases Liberatore mentions neglect of
duty when the public welfare or the security of the state would be
menaced or impaired thereby ; or the breaking of a contract the ob-
LAW, THE RULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 399
cuses from fulfilling it, because then the matter is in-
different in itself, and is binding only by reason of a
circumstance freely posited by man.
AET. n. — EIGHT.
64. The obligation of duty implies an inviolable moral
power in respect to the actions and things necessary to ful-
fil the duty. This rnoral power is a right. — If the obli-
gation of attaining his end imposes a duty on man, it
thereby grants him a right, that is, a moral power in
respect to the necessary actions or things to fulfil the
duty. This power is called moral, because it is found
in moral beings only, and also to distinguish it
from physical force. It is called inviolable, because
as it rests upon order, no one can prevent its exercise.
Lastly, this power is said to be exercised upon actions
or things to indicate what the right is applied to,
viz., action or the matter of action. Four things en-
ter into the consideration of every right : a " subject in
which that power is moral and inviolable ; a term in
respect to which that power is inviolable and which
is bound not to injure it ; a title which both produces
that power in a subject and manifests it to others, by
whom it is to be respected ; " and the matter.*
65. Absolutely, right precedes duty ; 7'elatively, duty
precedes right. — Considered in itself right precedes
duty, for it is from God's sovereign right over us
that every duty flows. But if right and duty are con-
sidered relatively, i.e., as both are found in man,
then we must say that duty precedes right, because
servance of which would involve some danger, provided this diffi'
culty had heen supposed as reasonably included in the contract.
* Russo, He Philosophia Morali PrcAeetionea, p. 99, § 134.
400 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
man enjoys rights only in so far as lie is bound to at-
tain an end, for tlie gaining of whicli he must have
the power to exercise his activity and to make use of
many things.* When a duty is obligatory only be-
cause a right is actually exercised, then actual right
precedes actual duty.
66. Right is necessary or arbitrary, connatural or
acqxdred, negative or positive, rigorous or not rigorous,
personal or delegated or real. — Eight is necessary or in-
alienable when it is the sole indispensable means of
fulfilling a duty ; such is the " right of a father to the
respect of his son," corresponding to the father's duty
of educating his son. Eight is arbitrary or alienable
when one may or may not exercise it without violat-
ing duty ; as the " right of a creditor to be paid by his
debtor." Right is connatural when it is founded in
the very nature of man ; as the " right to defend one's
life." — Connatural rights, says Eusso (p. 102, § 139), are
chiefly four: Man's right of tending to his ultimate
end, arising from his personal dignity ; the right to
preserve his life unharmed; the right to indepen-
dence in the lawful exercise of his faculties ; the right
to his own perfection. Right is acquired when it is
founded on a fact freely caused either by one's own
action, as the " right of dominion arising from occu-
pation," or by the action of another person, as the
" right of a child or minor," or from both together, as
a " master's right to be served by his domestics." —
Negative right is that which imposes on others no
obligation but that of not violating it, as the " right
* This statement allows some exceptions. " A man may haye a
right conjoined with a duty not of justice, of course, but of some
other virtue — not to use that right. Such are sundry rights of the
rich trenching on the poor."— jKflra/, PMosophy, Stony hurst Series,
p. 248.
LAW, TMB RULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 401
of property." Positive right is that which imposes
an obligation of doing or giving something, as the
"right to be paid by one's debtor."— ^t^oraws oi per-
fect right is that which rests on an evident title and
has determinate matter ; such is the " right to be paid
a definite sum acknowledged by the debtor." If the
matter be not determinate, the right is imperfect, as
the " right to pity or friendship." A right is more
or less rigorous according to the greater or less deter-
mination of the title and matter of the right. — Eight
is personal when it is inherent in the person of its
possessor. It is delegated when it has been communi-
cated to another. It is real when it is considered as
inherent in some thing which a person possesses.
67. Every right is essentially coactive. — If intellect
and will can act in virtue of right, they can likewise
move the inferior powers to operate. Therefore, if in
virtue of some right the will of a person can be mor-
ally compelled to some thing, so can the executive
powers residing in the organism be compelled to
some thing, and this is nothing else than coaction. It
is to be noted, however, that coaction can be exer-
cised only when the right is perfect ; but very often in
civil society it cannot be exercised by the possessor of
the right, and then recourse should be had to the law-
fully appointed guardian of the rights of the citizens.
68. In a conflict of rights * the less right yields to the
* Viewed abstractly jights cannot conflict, but in their actual ex-
ercise one may impede another. If the conflict has been caused vol-
untarily, then its author loses his right. If the conflict is invol-
untary and the rights are equal, then he whose right is oldest
prevails ; if the rights were acquired at the same time, then might
decides the conflict, unless the matter of the rights be divisible. If
the rights are unequal, the more perfect should prevail. Cf. Russo^
DePliU. Mm-. Prod., pp. 104, 105.
26
402 MORAL PHILOSOPHT.
greater. — Thus, as divine right excels human, so
should it prevail. But when the conflict ceases, the
less right regains its power, because the order whence
it is derived also exists.
69. Every right surpassing its natural limits is sub-
versive of order. — Absolutely, duty is the foundation
of human right ; if, therefore, a right passes the
limits fixed by duty, which is its foundation, it is no
longer according to order. Whence it happens that
a right may have for its matter, (1) the means without
which the end cannot be attained ; (2) the means that
lead to the end of the law, but not those that avert
from the end and are evil ; (3) finally, everything that
one is bound by another person to preserve.*
ABT. III. — LAW IN GENEEAL.
70. To the idea of right and of duty answers the idea
of law. — ^Where duty is, there also is necessarily a
law which imposes it ; just as where right is present,
there is a moral power over an action or a thing, there
also is necessarily a law which gives this right and
commands it to be respected by others.
71. Zaw in general is a rule hy which ieings are di-
rected to their proper end. — ^In every created being
there is a necessary connection between its nature and
its end. Therefore, for every creature the directing
of itself toward its end constitutes the rule of its per-
fection or its law.
72. Moral law is the direction toward its end im~
parted to a rational creature hy his superior. — The term
law is applied to the tendencies flowing from the nat-
ure and constitution of irrational creatures and man-
* Cf. Zigliara, 8umma PJiUosophica, M. 28, viii.
LAW, THE BULW OF SUM AN ACTIONS. 403
ifested, except on occasion of divine interference, in an
invariable uniformity of " coexistence and succession,
connecting certain effects with certain causes, so that
when the conditions are present the effect invariably
follows ; " this is physical law. But the term has an
application special to Ethics ; for, besides the con-
dition of all law, which is to direct any being what-
ever to its end, moral law implies, first, the idea of
obligation, and this idea supposes superiority in him
who binds and dependence in him who ought to
obey ; secondly, moral law implies freedom in the
subject, who is bound to obey not by physical neces-
sity but by moral obligation.
73. Imw is divine or human. Divine law is eternal,
natural, or positive. Human law is ecclesiastical or
civil. — The eternal law is the imprescriptible order of
what is to be done, such as it exists from all eternity
in the divine mind. Natural law is a participation of
the eternal law, by which the reason of man is enlight-
ened and can discern good from evil. Positive law de-
termines certain things that are according to the nat-
ural law indifferent.* It is defined as A prescription
of reason for the common good proTnulgated hy him who
has the care of the community. When positive law is
made by man it is called hum,an, and is either ecclesi-
astical or civil according as it proceeds from the au-
thority of Church or State.
74. The necessity of law for men arises from two
causes : one objective, the creative act ; ths other subjec-
tive, the nature of man. — Every creature, by the fact
that it has received its nature from God, has also re-
ceived its law from Him. But besides his nature of
* Those actions are said to be indifferent which are " not deter-
mined by the natural law, and are in conformity with it." Zigliara.
404 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
mere creature, man has a rational principle, by which
he perceives the intimate connection existing between
his nature and his end, and his obligation of tending
to that end by means that really lead thereto.
ART. IV. — THE ETEENAL LAW.
75. Above all otiier laio is the eternal law ; from it
all other laws derive their force. — Since all law implies
direction to an end, and since God is above all other
ends, being the supreme end to which all others are
subordinate, it follows that there is also a law on
which all other laws depend. This is the eternal or
divine law.
76. Tlie eternal law is the imprescriptible order of
what is to he done, as it exists from all eternity in the di-
vine mind.*—Ovdi.eic exists in the world ; but this order
supposes the intelligence of God which conceives it,
and His will which causes it to persist. The eternal
law is only the order so conceived and willed by God
from all eternity.
77. The eternal law is the first fundamental principle
oftnorality. — -The distinction between good and evil is
founded on the unchangeable relations of things ; but
these relations are only the external realization of
order as it exists from all eternity in the divine mind
and will.
ART. v. — ^THE NATURAL LAW OF CONSCIENCE.
78. The natural law of conscience is a participation of
the eternal law in a ratio7ial creature, enabling him to
discern good from evil. — Man no sooner perceives or-
* St. Augustine defines it: " The reason or will of God bidding
the natural order to be kept, and forbidding it to be disturbed."
LAW, THE RULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 405
der than he conceives it to be the expression of a will
essentially right and just, and so he rises to a knowl-
edge of God as the supreme legislator of this order.
Therefore, as the law of order considered in God is
the eternal law, so viewed as it is in human reason it
is the natural law of conscience. These two laws dif-
fter as to the intellect that knows them, and as to their
object ; that of the eternal law being universal, that
of the natural law being particular because referred
exclusively to man.
79. Tke law of conscience has three princijml marks :
it is necessary, absolute, and universal. — It is necessary
because it rests on the necessary relation of nature to
end, which has been determined from all eternity by
the divine mind. It is dbsohite and immutable, be-
cause the ideal relations of things, being founded on
the very essences of such things, are absolute and
immutable. It is universal, because it is imposed
upon all intelligent and free creatures, applies to all
their free actions, extends to all times and places ; for
being founded on the very nature of rational beings
it must prevail wherever that nature exists.
80. Conscience and the universal assent of mankind
attest the existence of the natural law. — Every man
hears within him a voice telling him that such an
action is good or evil ; this voice he may disregard,
but he can never completely silence. So all peoples
in all times have admitted a distinction between jus-
tice and injustice, and upon it have based all their
legislation.
81. T/ie existence of the natural lata is also proved
from the nature of the human will and from our idea of
divine wisdom. — A faculty cannot act unless it be de-
termined to action by its object. But the determin-
ing principle of the will must be a law or moral obli-
406 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
gation' that moves it without doing it violence. But
since the will can be determined by law only, this
law must necessarily be in reason, the faculty that
directs the will. Besides, since God wishes man's
good, He must have given him the means of attaining
it ; but in view of man's free will this means must be
the command to do what is right and shun what is
wrong.
82. It is an error to sustain, with rationalists, the
autonomy of reason. — If God exists, we must neces-
sarily depend on Him. But if we are unwilling to
admit the existence of God, evidently our reason can-
not impose an obligation on us, since it is not above
us; for an obligation, says Li'beratore, implies an
exercise of jurisdiction and power on the part of him
who obliges, and therefore supposes a real distinction
between superior and subject. Therefore, to admit
the autonomy of reason is to destroy all morality.*
83. The natural law is known naturally iy reason and
conscience.— ^o oblige, a law must be known and pro-
mulgated. But the natural law has for its proper ob-
ject the first principles of morality, and for its second-
ary object the consequences of these principles. The
first principles of morality, like the first principles of
thought, are known by the intellectual light of which
the human intellect is possessed, and which is a re-
flection of the intellectual light of God Himself. The
application of these first principles to particular ac-
tions is made by reason. To aid his reason God has
given man an interior voice that approves his conduct
* This theory has been styled Independent Morality, and hy Kant,
who professes it, the Oategorical Imperative. Kant's doctrine makes
the human intellect absolutely independent of all law, and henoa
man is no longer a creature, but is identified with God.
LAW, THE RULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 407
when lie does good and reproves him when he does
evil. This interior voice is called conscie?ice.
84. The natural law is the foundation of the positive
law. — The positive law is of force only when it obligee
to the observance of the positive precepts of God oi
those that proceed from lawful human authority and
are not contrary to the commandments of God. Now,
it is a principle of the natural law that we must obey
God and those to whom He has communicated a share
in His authority. Besides, the precepts of the posi-
tive law are most frequently only particular applica-
tions of some precept of the natural law,. or determi-
nations of what is undetermined by the natural law.
AET. VI.— SANCTION OP MOKAl LAW.
85. Sanction of moral law is the reward determined hy
the lawgiver for those who observe the law, and thepvn-
ishment decreed for those who transgress it.*
86. Moral law necessarily has some sanction.^Susiice
demands that for the merit inherent in good, and the
demerit inherent in evil, there should be a correspond-
ing recompense or penalty. Moreover, the sanctity
of God requires that He should practically distin-
guish good from evil by rewarding the former and
punishing the latter. Fiually, the wisdom of God de-
mands that He have means for securing the fulfill-
* "It is true that human law specifies no particular reward for
obedience to it, because obedience to the law is sufficiently rewarded
hv the good which it does for the whole community and for every
one in the community ; nor is it possible for human government
otherwise to reward obedience to its laws. It is, perhaps, from this
oircumstance that some authors are led to conceive that the whole
sanction of law consists in punishment." — Hill, Moral Philosophy,
pp. 154, 155.
408 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
ment of the law ; but this can be effected only by re-
wards and punishments.
87. The sanction of the Tuoral law is of three kinds :
that of conscience, that of society, and that of God. — The
free actions of man refer to himself, to society, and
to God ; therefore sanction must be of three kinds.
In the individual order there is remorse or peace of
conscience ; in the social order there are rewards and
punishments established in society ; and in regard to
God there is the reward or punishment that He re-
serves for those that keep or break His law.
88. An adequate sanction of the natural law can he
found only in the life to come. — It is evident that neither
the testimony of conscience nor the punishments and
rewards of this life are a sanction proportionate to
moral good and evil. For this good or evil has a
direct or indirect reference to the infinite good ; there-
fore the reward or punishment must be in some way
infinite ; but this cannot be here below. Besides, it is
often necessary to give up one's life in the practice of
good, or to expose one's self to great sufferings ; there-
fore there must be another life where good receives
its recompense. So, too, the commission of evil often
brings temporal goods in its train ; therefore it must
be punished in a life to come.*
89. The sanction of the law consists chiefly in the pos-
session or the loss of the sovereign good. — Good actions
are so many steps by which man tends to the sover-
eign good ; whereas by evil actions he withdraws far-
ther and farther from this good. Therefore it is meet
that the just attain the end to which they tend, and
' A perfect sanction should always correspond to the degree of
virtue or vice, and should outweigh both the evil incurred in observ-
ing the law and the good to be gained in breaking it. Cf. RussOi
De Mar. PhU. Prcd., p. 87, § 119.
LAW, THE RULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 409
rejoice in its possession, and that the wicked be de-
prived of that good. Since there are different degrees
in the goodness of the former and in the malice of the
latter, it is also just that there should be a diversity in
their rewards and punishments respectively.
To those who object that everlasting punishment
is unjust, the answer may be given that punishment
is not merely " medicinal," or for the amendment of
the culprit, but it is also detetreni, an example to the
community, and retributive, as affording satisfaction
to the injured party. Now, eternal punishment is
the reparation due to God for a grievous transgres-
sion of His law. The justice of punishment is not
to be estimated by its duration, but by its propor-
tion to the offence. But the gravity of the offence
is determined by its nature and by the dignity of the
offended party. Now, God is the greatest of all
beings, and sin is the greatest of evils. For, says St.
Thomas,* " In the judgment of God the will is taken
for the deed ; for as men see what is done externally,
so God beholds the hearts of men. Now, he who for
a temporal good has turned away from his ultimate
end, which is possessed forever, has preferred the
temporal enjoyment of that temporal good to the
everlasting enjoyment of his ultimate end. Whence
it is evident how much more he would have wished
to possess that temporal good everlastingly/. There-
fore in the judgment of God he ought so to be
punished as if he had sinned everlastingly. But it
is unquestionable that an everlasting sin merits an
everlasting punishment. Therefore everlasting pun-
ishment is due to him who has turned away from his
ultimate end."
* Contra Oentes, \. iii., o. cxliv., n. 4; cf. Russo, De Mor. PhU.
PraU., p. 90 et seq.
410 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
AET. VII. — THE FIRST PRECEPT OF THE NATURAL LAW.
90. AU the precepts* of the inoral law are reduced to
07ie fundamental precept called the Oategoi'ical Impera-
tive.^— All the precepts of the moral law Ijave a com-
mon element in which they are identified, and from
which they draw all their force. This element, this
first principle, must be known to give order and unity
to moral science.
91. The first principle of the moral law mMst he irre-
ducible ; it must be evident and universal. — The first
moral precept must be irreduciMe, otherwise it would
be neither the first nor the supreme principle. It
must be evident, for it is destined to account for all
other moral precepts. It must be universal, since it
must include what all other moral principles implicitly
contain, and serve as their foundation.
92. The first precept of the moral law is. Do good and
avoid evil. — As whatever is apprehended by the intel-
lect has the note of being, so whatever is sought by
the will has the nature of good. Every agent acts for
an end, and this end is good. Therefore tl^e first
principle of practical reason is founded in the good,
and is this : " Good is that to which all things tend."
* Law differs from precept in that tlie former looks to the common
good ; the latter to some individual benefit. Again, law refers to the
end to be attained, whereas a precept refers only t,o means to that
end. Cf. Zigliara, Sum. Phil., M. 33, vl.
f The Categorical Imperative, as here understood, is the funda-
mental principle of the moral law which obliges all men. Hence it
is not exposed to the absurdities of Kant's Categorical Imperative,
which, in the words of Joseph Rickaby, S. J., "makes the reason
within a man not the promulgator of the law to him, but his own
legislator.''
LAW, THE RULE OF HUMAN AOTIONS. 411
The first precept of the law is, therefore, "Do good
and avoid evil." This principle cannot be reduced to
any other principle, it is evident and universal. From
it is derived the norm of moral excellence. Since man
is constituted with reason, and order answers to
reason, human good lies especially in order. From
the first precept of the law is derived the precept of
observing order.
ART. Vm.— FALSE SYSTEMS OP MOEALITY AS DEEIVED FEOM
THEIE FIRST MORAL PRECEPT.
93. Since the first moral precept is the basis of the
whole moral science the various systems of morality may
he classified according to their first precept. — Every sys-
tem is determined by its principle ; therefore an ex-
act division of the systems of morality can be made
according to the principle on which each rests. But
ihe first moral precept is to do good ; therefore sys-
tems of morality vary according to the diverse ways in
which they understand the nature of that good to
which man should tend. All subjective systems, says
Zigliara,* are based on the principle that man is the
measure of morality as he is the measure of the truth of
things.
94. Utilitarianism,, the system of interest, in which the
only good is the useful, is false, because it excludes a con-
stituent element of the good, i.e., the absolute. — In Utili-
tarianism the only good is the useful, whether with
respect to the individual or to society. The system
of personal interest or individual utilitarianism was
taught of old by Aristippus (e.g. 425), and in modem
times by La Rochefoucauld (1613-1680) and Bentham
* Summa Philosophica, M. 11, i.
412 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
(1748-1832).* The System of general interest has had
Hume (1711-1776) for its principal master. It is evi-
dent that these systems lack the essential marks of
moral duty, i.e., universality and immutability, since
both public and private interest are relative and vari-
able. In these systems, therefore, there is no duty,
no moral law, and it is impossible to account for great
deeds of disinterestedness. Egotism and might be-
come the sole rule of human actions, and anarchy or
despotism will be the normal state of society. The
criterion of Utilitarianism is, therefore, inadequate
vague, and arbitrary.
95. Hedonism, or the moral systein of pleasure, in
which the sole good is tlis pleasurable, is false, because it
confounds a consequence of the good with the good itself.
— Materialistic and sensistic schools base morality
upon love of pleasure and fear of pain. Epicurus
(B.C. 340-270), among the ancients, Hobbes * (1588-
* other utilitarians of a recent date are the two Mills, father and
son, John Austin, and George Grote. Against the principle which
they advocated it may be argued : (a) It takes the sign and indication
of moral evil for the evil itself. . . It places the wickedness
of an act in the physical misery and suffering that are its conse-
quences, (b) " Mill tells us that ' utilitarian moralists have gone be-
yond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do
with the morality of the action. ' " (c) It does away with the distinc-
tion between harm and injury, "injury being wilful and unjust
harm ; " it confounds physical and moral evil, and ignores the mean-
ing of a human action, (d) It " sees in virtue a habit of self-sacrifice
useful to the community but not naturally pleasant," .... in
fact, " a natural evil, inasmuch as it deprives him of pleasure, which
natural evil by habit is gradually converted into a factitious and arti-
ficial good." — Moral Philosophy, Stonyhurst Series, pp. 177-189.
* " If every thought," as Hobbes holds, "is but a compound of
sensations, then good and evil can be only expressions for agreeable
or disagreeable sensations ; they have no absolute character, but
mean simply personal pleasure or pain, and the highest motive of
LAW, TBS MULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 413
1679), Helvetius (1715-1771), and Saint-Lambert (1716-
1803), among modern moralists, are tlie most faithful
interpreters of this system. To confound duty with
pleasure is to reverse the very notion of good, of
which pleasure is a consequence, but not the essence.
It is to contradict reason and conscience as well as
the common sense of mankind. Besides, materialists
generally understand by pleasure only what is sensi-
ble and material, and despise those higher pleasures
that have their source in the culture of the true and
the exercise of virtue, and those also Tvhich we ex-
perience at the sight of good in our fellow-men.
96. The moral system of sentiment, in wMcTi good or
evil is that which is perceived as such iy a moral sense, is
false, hecause the existence of such a sense as a distinct
faculty is a mere hypothesis, and iecause a sentiment of
sympathy for good, far from heing a principle of that
good, presupposes its idea. — The Scotch school, design-
ing to combat those who place morality in interest or
pleasure, sought the basis of morality in a disinter-
ested principle. This it claimed to have found in a
certain instinct or moral sense, which in man would
be a special faculty ordained to judge what is good
and what is evil, not only in general but also in par-
ticular. Shaftesbury (1671-1713), Adam Smith, Hutch-
eson, and Eeid, are the principal upholders of this
system. To admit their doctrine is to assert that man
is led by instinct, by a blind principle ; but this is
unworthy of a rational being. Besides, it bases mo-
rality on a variable and uncertain principle, takes
life must be to attain the one and avoid the other. Moreover, as
man does not determine for himself the law of sensation and the
conditions of pleasure and pain, it follows that he is absolutely sub-
ject to circumstances, and the creature of necessity." American En-
cydopmdia, sub. Hobbes.
. 414 MORAL PHIL080P3T.
away from good and evil their essential distinction,
and eliminates their objective nature. In a word, it
confounds effect with cause, since the sentiment ex-
perienced in presence of good or evil is only a conse-
quence of our idea of good and evil.
97. The moral system of rationalists which exaggerates
the idea of honorable or virtuous good, and excludes the
notion of useful and pleasurable good, is false, because it
is exclusive. — The Stoics of old, Kant* in modern
times, and the philosophers of the contemporary
French school; in their efforts to frame a purer code,
have perverted the nature of morality. Their first
moral principles are all subjective, because the specu-
lative principles of which they are the application
are subjective. Kant said, " So act that the rule of
your actions may be a law for all men." This princi-
ple is defective, because it does not apply to good
actions that are not obligatory, and because it points
out rather what is to be avoided than what is to be
done. Moreover, Kant fails to state the principle
in virtue of which man should impose a law on his
will, and even why man should be guided by law.f
Jouffroy (1796-1842) and Damiron (1794-1862) took as
their first principle: "Perfect yourself." They for-
got that human perfection is an effect of morality,
and does not produce it ; besides, their principle is
too vague, obscure, and comprehensive. Cousin laid
down as his primary principle, " Follow the light of
your reason." Now, reason is either personal or im-
personal. In the former case we are led into the in-
consistencies of Kant's system ; in the latter case,
the principle is an abstraction, a creation of reason,
and therefore incapable of imposing an obligation,
* See pp. 81,83. \ Cf. Zigliara, Summa Philosophica, M. 12, vi.
LAW, THE RULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 415
Fichte adopted for the basis of his moral system the
principle of absolute independence, and for the basis of
his social system the principle, " Love thyself above
all things, and other men for thy own sake."
AET. rx. — CONSCIENCE.
98. Conscience is a practical judgment of reason, de-
termining in a given case what is good and what is evil.
— It is not suiScient to consider the natural law the-
oretically, it must be applied practically. To do this
is the work of conscience. It is a judgment upon an
action to be done or to be avoided. This judgment is
the conclusion of a syllogism, of which the law is the
major, and the action to be done the minor. For in-
stance, it is a law that " evil should not be done ;" if,
therefore, this particular action, as perjury, be evil,
practical reason dictates the judgment, " This action
of perjury should not be done." This syllogism is
not always explicitly made by the intellect, but it is
none the less real.
69. The judgment of conscience, though not an objective
norm, is the subfective norm of a?i agent's moral actions.
Therefore it is necessary to conform to the dictates of
conscisnce. — Conscience is not the moral law, but sup-
poses it, as a consequent supposes its antecedent.
To make conscience the sole foundation of the moral-
ity of obligations, as do rationalists, is to confound
the application of the law with the law itself. It is
even to attribute infallibility to conscience, and thus
to contradict both faith and reason. It is certain that
conscience is a subjective rule to which man is bound
to conform, for law would be useless if not applied.
But it can be applied by conscience only, and there-
fore the judgments of conscience should be followed.
416 MOBAL PHILOSOPHY.
100. Since conscience viewed as a faculty does not
really differ from intellect, its various states in respect to
its matter will correspond to the various states of the in-
tellect in respect to truth. — Conscience, says Zigliara,*
is true when its judgments are true ; otherwise it is
false or erroneous. It is right when it dictates what
reason would prudently judge to be good, though the
judgment may be materially false ; otherwise it is not
right. It is invincibly erroneous when it judges ac-
cording to principles which it holds to be true, and
which, morally speaking, it could not have known to
be false. But if it could have examined the principles
more attentively, and ought to have done so, then con-
science is vincibly erroneous in its judgment. It is
certain when its judgment is free from doubt or fear
of error. It is probahle when its judgment rests on
reasons which, though solid, do not exclude all danger
of error. It is doubtful if it remains in suspense be-
tween two decisions. Conscience is scrupulous when it
fears for trivial and groundless reasons that an action
is wrong. It is perplexed when it fears evil whether
an action be done or omitted. A lax conscience seeks
to justify to itself an evil action ; a rigorous conscience,
on the contrary, tries by refined reasoning to persuade
itself and others that a good action is evil.
The rules of conscience are : " We are bound to obey
a conscience that is true and certain, or even an invin-
cibly erroneous conscience. We are not to act if con-
science is doubtful as to the morality of the action
viewed concretely. If we are bound to attain a cer-
tain end, and doubt as to the means to be taken, we
may use those means that most avert the danger of
not gaining the end." f
* M. 13, iy. \ Russo, De Morali PhUosophia Prmlectiones, § 110
LAW, THE RULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 417
In the case of vincible error it is forbidden both to
follow one's conscience and act against its judgment.
We miist suspend the action and examine to rectify
the error, provided, however, that the thought or sus-
picion of such an obligation occurs to our mind. But
if there be no such thought or suspicion, conscience
is actually invincibly erroneous, and therefore must
^be obeyed.
27
NATUEAIi LAW.
1. Natural Law is the study of the rights and dutieo
that are derived from the law of conscience. — Law {jus)
in its widest meaning- is in tlie moral order all that is
conformed to law. So considered, it is divided into
moral obligation and moral power ; because the law
in permitting or imposing an action gives the power
to take means to do the action. Moral obligation is
called duty, and moral power right. If the term
" law " just defined, be taken in its widest meaning,
and the term of the definition in its most restricted
sense, natural law, the science that considers human
actions in the concrete, includes not only the rights
but also the duties that are derived from the law of
conscience.
2. Natural Law is divided into Individual Law, So-
cial Law, and the Common Law of Nations. — The
rights and duties of man are derived simply from
his nature, or they arise from society, where man is
no longer considered alone, but as united with his
fellow-men in the pursuit of a common end. Individ-
ual Law treats of rights and duties under the first
aspect ; Social Law and the Common Law of Natiomg
consider them from the second point of view.
FART I.
INDIVIDUAIi LAW.
o. The rights and duties pertaining to individual law
refer to God, to our neighbor, and to ourselves. — Man in
his own regard, and apart from society, has moral re^
lations with God, with himself, and even with his fel-
low-men, inasmuch as they are united to him by a
likeness of specific nature. Hence the three kinds of
right and duty for man outside his social life.
CHAPTEE I.
Man's Duties to God.
4. Natxiral Law obliges man to acknowledge his de-
pendence on God as the Supreme Being, Sovereign Truth
and Goodiiess, and to ex2wess by external actions this in-
terior and voluntary acknowledginent of his dependence.
— The sum of the duties by which man acknowledges
interiorly his dependence on his Creator and ex-
presses this dependence in external actions is called
Religion.
5. Man depending on God as Necessary Being owes
Him adoration. — Man is a contingent being, and there-
fore depends by nature on God, who is Necessary
Being. And since this dependence is natural, man
420 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
should acknowledge it by adoration, whicli consists
in attributing excellence of Being to God.
6. It is morally evil either to refuse to adore God, or
to adore Him in an unfitting manner, or to adore another
ieing. — To refuse to adore God is impiety ; to adore
Him in a manner that expresses false relations be-
tween God and man is superstition ; to ador6 false
gods is idolatry. Impiety, superstition, and idolatry
are not only moral disorders, but are based on meta-
physical absurdities ; for it is intrinsically absurd
that there be no Supreme Being, or that the Supreme
Being be without the attributes proper to such a
being, or that there be more than one Supreme
Being.
7. Man depending on God as absolute Truth owes
Him the homage of faith. — Man as an intelligent being
is bound by his nature to adhere to the known truth
and to tend to a fuller possession of that which is but
imperfectly known. "When, therefore, God, who is
truth itself, speaks, man owes Him faith, that is,
he should assent to God's word. So, too, if man,
though aware that a divine revelation has been
made, yet does not know the truths revealed, he
is bound to make the necessary efforts to attain this
knowledge.
8. The assertion- of some philosophers that revelation is
impossible is intrinsically ahsurd. — Some philosophers
pretend that God cannot speak to us ; others, that so
to do would be contrary to His dignity ; some declare
that He cannot reveal mysteries to us ; others, that He
cannot deny us the right to examine what He reveals ;
others, again, that if He makes a revelation He ought
to make it in this or that way. All these pretensions
are as absurd as they are impious. For why should
God, the Almighty, be unable to do what a child can
MAN'S DUTIES TO GOD. 421
do, that is, manifest its ideas ? How would He debase
Himself by enlightening our minds, since He it was
who moulded the clay of which our bodies were
formed? And since our intellect is so limited that
besides the mysteries of nature that meet us at every
step, all is mystery in the supernatural order, why
cannot God reveal to us these truths called mysteries,
which although in themselves incomprehensible to
us, yet enrich and elevate our intellect ? But to say
that if God reveals mysteries, we have the right to
examine them by our reason, — is not this admitting
the absurdity that truth can be erroneous ? Lastly,
if God wills to speak to man, is it not unreasonable
to assign Him this or that means of revelation, and to
pretend, for instance, that He ought to speak to all
diredtly and not to most men indirectly through
others ? All these pretensions of rationalistic philos-
ophers are manifestly absurd, even from the stand-
point of reason.
9. The assertion of some philosophers that revelation is
useless is ielied hoth iy experience and hy reason. — Be-
sides the truthg which the human intellect can know
naturally, there are others to which it cannot of itself
attain. Since man has been raised to a supernatural
state, it was necessary that God reveal supernatural
truths. But it was also fitting that He should reveal
even certain natural truths ; for otherwise but few
men would have become acquainted with them, the
greater portion of mankind being prevented by their
wants, their occupations, and particularly by their
lack of intellectual aptitude. And even the privi-
leged few would attain to a knowledge of these
truths only with a great admixture of doubt and er-
ror, and after long and difficult studies. Moreover,
history shows into what moral and religious darkness
422 MORAL PSILOSOPHT.
those nations, and even great geniuses, fell who were
either deprived of the light of revelation or had re-
jected it.*
10. Man, depending on God as absolute Goodness,
owes Him love. — The good is amiable ; but God is
sovereignly good ; therefore He is amiable above
all other good. Besides, all other good is referred to
God as the supreme good ; therefore man should
refer to God all other good that he loves. Lastly,
man's happiness and perfection proceed from God as
the supreme good ; but man should seek his own per-
fection and happiness ; therefore man should, love
God. If he loves God as supremely good in Himself,
his love is perfect ; but if he loves Him chiefly as the
source of his own perfection and happiness, his love
is imperfect.f %
11. Man owes God ioth internal and external worship.
— Man is composed of body and soul ; therefore, to
the interior homage of his soul he should add the ex-
terior homage of his body. This exterior homage is
* The objection that the revelation of mysteries to be believed
impedes the progress of the human intellect must be categorically
denied. Since the object of the intellect is truth, the progress of
the human intellect must be measured by the fulness and perfec-
tion in which it possesses the truth. Though the nature of mysteries
is beyond man's comprehension, yet the facts or truths so revealed
often throw much light upon truths of the merely natural order.
f Kant aflirms that God is transcendental being, meaning thereby
to insinuate that He is beyond the reach of human reason ; whence
he infers that man cannot possibly love God. But he fails to dis-
tinguish between comprehensive or adequate love and adhesive or
inadequate love. Cf. Zigliara, M., 33, viii.
:j; The love that man owes to God does not impose on him an obli-
gation of always actually thinking of Him, but only of acting in
virtue of that first intention that has God and eternal happiness in
view.
MAN'S DUTIES TO GOD. 423
a necessity because of man's twofold nature; hence
at all times this external worsliip has been paid by
all people. In the second place, man has received
from God his body as well as his soul, therefore he
should do homage for both. Lastly, the external
actions favor the accomplishment of the internal
actions which they intensify ; therefore we should
perform them as a help and stimulus to internal
worship. Some philosophers have said that God
being a pure spirit demands the homage of the heart
only ; but they have not reflected that the necessity
of external worship is founded in the inviolable order
of nature, the maintenance of which God must neces-
sarily require. In other words, it is a necessity not
for God, who is self-existent, but for man, who is
essentially dependent.*
12. Public worship is due to God. — Society, or the
union of men for a common good, must necessarily be
directed to the sovereign good. But to labor to-
gether for the acquisition of the sovereign good; men
must so act that all the members of society seek to
possess it. For this end it must be made known to
them and revered by them ; to make known the
supreme good is to praise it ; to have it revered is to
have all depend on it, subjecting all things to it, and
sacrificing to it all sensible good. Therefore a
public worship consisting chiefly in praise and sacri-
fice is due to God from society. Besides, as without
external worship internal homage soon fails for want
of support, so without public worship religion fast
* The Manichees rejected external worship, on the ground that the
human body proceeds from a supreme principle of evil. A like op-
position to external worship has been manifested by some members
of the Eclectic French school, and is consistent with the principles of
German Tranicendentalism. Gf. Zigliara, M., 84, iii.
424 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
disappears from society and its constituent members.
Since, then, society cannot subsist without religion,
public worship is a duty no less from the stand-point
of social order than from that of our relations with
God.
CHAPTEE II.
Man's Duties to Himself.
ART. I. — ^THE FOUNDATION OF MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF.
13. The foundation of man's duties to himself is in
the excellence and perfectibility of his nature. — God has
giTen man a nature of great excellence ; therefore
man is bound, in order to conform to order, to respect
the excellence and dignity of his nature. And since
God has made this nature capable of perfection, man
is bound to tend to perfection.
14. The supreme p^'inciple of all man's duties to him-
himseJf is. Love thyself with a well regulated love. —
Man should love himself, but with a love that con-
forms to order. This precept of well-ordered love of
self may be expressed thus : Man is hound to presei've
and perfect himself in order to his last end.
ART. n. — man's duties to HIS SOUL.
15. Man is hound to cultivate his intellect, to apply
himself to the study of those truths the knowledge of
which is necessary to him for attaining his , last end. —
Man is made to know truth; but he cannot attain
truth without labor and the cultivation of his intel-
lect ; therefore he is bound to this labor and culti-
vation. There are some truths that every man should
know in order to reach his end ; there are others
426 MORAL PHILOSOPMY.
more abstract and more difficult, which are necessary
under certain conditions. Every man is bound to
the acquisition of the former; the latter must be
known so far as is required by one's employment or
duties. The obligation of cultivating the intellect
also imposes the duty of cultivating the sensitive fac-
ulties, the concurrence of which is necessary for the
development of the intellect itself. From the obliga-
tion of man to cultivate his intellect we conclude that
it is false to hold with J. J. Eousseau that the progress
of the arts and sciences naturally leads to the deprav-
ity of man. But it is equally absurd to look to the
progress of the arts and sciences for the remedy of all
the evils of humanity. Experience and reason show,
on the contrary, the fatal consequences of intellectual
development without equal moral development.
16. To the duty of cultivating the intellect correspond
the rights of being instructed and of teaching. — Intel-
lectual culture is acquired only by instruction, which
is gained chiefly from teaching. Therefore the right
of teaching is derived from that of being instructed,
and this in turn springs from the duty of cultivating
the intellect. But these, like all rights, should be
kept within the limits of order. If they pass these
limits they degenerate into pretended liberties, such
as the so-called liberty of thought, liberty of the
press, liberty of examination, liberty of conscience,
liberty of worship, etc., which, in the sense intended
by several modern philosophers, constitute not a
right, but a veritable violation of right, and therefore
should be punished by civil magistrates as soon as
they manifest themselves in any overt act prejudicial
to the good of society.*
* Cf. Eusso, De Phihsophia Morali Prcdectmies, pp. 372, 273.
MAWS DITTIES TO HIMSELF. 427
17. 3Ian is hound so to perfect his will as to render it
strong and constant in the practice of duty. — The will
should always act conformably to order, whatever it
may cost, because order is absolute and immutable.
But it is evident that the will can remain inflexible in
the practice of duty only in so far as it is endowed
with strength and constancy, in a word, as it is per-
fected by virtue. And since there are four kinds of
moral virtue necessary to the perfection of the will,
man should strive to acquire them, so that by pru-
dence he may judge justly what should be done or
avoided, and this is an intellectual operation; hy jus-
tice he may give every one his due ; by fortitude
he may strengthen the sensitive appetite to over-
come difficulties ; by temperance he may hold it in
check and regulate its tendencies. The pretension
of such modern reformers as Fourier (1772-1837)
and Saint-Simon (1760-1825), that man may freely
follow all his inclinations, is as immoral as it is con-
trary to reason.
ART. in. — man's duties to his body.
18. Man is hound to watch over tlie preservation of his
body. — Man cannot fulfil his destiny in this life with-
out his body ; therefore he should watch over its
preservation. And since health of body is necessary
for the development of the soul's faculties and the
fulfilment of many of man's duties, it follows that
man should have a prudent care of his health, that he
should preserve it by conforming to the rules of tem-
perance and sobriety, and restore it when it has been
impaired.
19. Suicide is a crime against nature, against society,
and against God. — Every creature naturally shrinks
428 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
from death. This dread of death is, therefore, a uni-
Tersal instinct. Man consequently violates the laws
of nature when he takes his life. At the same time
he injures the rights of society, which he deprives of
the help afforded by one of its members, and he tres-
passes on the domain of justice, to which alone the
punishment of crime pertains. Lastly, suicide vio-
lates the rights of God, who is the sole master of life
and has constituted it a means of attaining man's des-
tiny. Therefore the man who destroys his life sub-
verts the designs of God in his regard, and arrogates
to himself the supreme dominion of the Master of
Ufe.
20. TJie arguments in favor of suicide are groundless.
— Some philosophers, and among them J. J. Bous-
seau (1712-1778) and d'Holbach (1723-1789), have at-
tempted to offer an apology for suicide. They say
that at times life is such a misfortune that instinct
prompts us to make away with it ; that society is not
injured when he who takes his life is a useless mem-
ber ; that invariably it loses its right over the wretch
who is weary of life ; and that God Himself provides
a remedy against misfortune in the possibility for
each man to take his own life. Passing over the
absurdities contained in these assertions, we may re-
fute them by saying : (1) Life is never a misfortune,
since even in the greatest adversities man can always
tend to the sovereign good and increase the sum of
his merits and their corresponding rewards ; (2)
Conceding to one unfortunate the right to take his
life is conceding a like power to all ; and thus all
order would be destroyed by the natural law it-
self.
21. The natural law does not ahoays forbid an action
that leads indirectly to death, for in certain cases this is
MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF. 429
an act of virtue and even of duty.^ — The natural law
forbids any action that leads indirectly to death,
when the action is willed positively as destroying-
one's life. But when such an action is willed in view
of a good superior to life, then one does not so much
will to take his life as allow it to be taken, and he
does not break the natural law. Moreover, to expose
one's self to death is often a duty imposed by justice,
or at least an act of heroism inspired by charity, and
redounds to the glory of its author.
22. It is in conformity with the natural law to prac-
tise mortification, in order to repress the passio7is and
facilitate the control of reason over the senses. — Some
philosophers have stigmatized the austerity of life
and the mortification of the saints as contrary to the
natural law;. But this is false, for experience proves
that moderate austerities do not injure health ; on
the contrary, they help greatly to preserve it. Again,
even though austerities should shorten life, they
would still be commendable, because they enable
man to attain a greater moral perfection, and because
life is but a means that should be referred to man's
last end.
* In these cases man does not dispose of his life against the will of
God, who must approve what is nobler. If one cannot fulfil his
duty otherwise than at the sacrifice of his life, then duty must be
preferred to life ; but if duty requires ona to preserve his life, then
33 it unlawful for him to lay it down.
CHAPTEE III.
Man's Duties to His Fellow-Men.
ART. I. — LOVE OP one's NEIGHBOE.
23. Even apart from civil society tnen are hound to
reciprocal duties in virtue of tJie likeness of their specific
nature and tJie identity of their end. — All men have the
same specific nature, the same orig-in, and the same
end. This establishes a kind of affinity among them
which, apart from civil society, imposes on them re-
ciprocal duties.
24. The foundation of all duties to one^s neighior is
the precept, TJiou shall love thy neighbor as thyself. —
Love of one's neighbor is not a mere natural inclina
tion resulting from likeness of specific nature, but it
is a precept of reason. For order demands that as
other men have the same human nature as ourselves,
we should wish them the blessings that we desire for
ourselves. Yet because the bond of identity or sub-
stantial unity is stronger than that of likeness of
specific nature, we should indeed love our neighbor as
ourselves, but not as much as ourselves. — The pre-
cept of loving our neighbor imposes both negative
and positive duties. The former are contained in the
maxim, " Do not to others what you would not h'ave
them do to you ; " the latter, in the maxim, " Do to
others as you would that they should do to you."
25. From love of one's neighbor results the duty of
MAJ^'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEN. 431
doing nothing that injures his moral dignity, or wnpedes
or perverts the lawful exercise of his free will. — The
moral dignity of one's neighbor is impaired by scandal,
which gives him an occasion of falling into evil ; by
seduction, which deceives him in order to draw him
into evil ; in a word, by whatever turns him from his
duty. All these acts are a manifest violation of the
love of justice due to our neighbor. But if a man of
evil habits have a good name, and thereby take occa-
sion to injure the rights of others, it is lawful to reveal
his true character, but so far only as is necessary to
protect the innocent. Hence, adds Eusso pertinently,
we may judge how far are justifiable the revelations
made by newspapers, at the time of elections, of a
man's public and private character.
26. From the love of one's neighbor arises the duty of
doing no violence to his intellect hy deceitfully leading him
into error. — Veracity is indispensable to society. Take
away from speech its nature as sign of thought and
you destroy all intercourse among men. Besides, even
if lying would not harm society, it would still be an
evil, for God has given speech to man as a means of
expressing his thoughts and communicating with his
equals ; therefore, to use it to deceive is to oppose
nature. Hence lying is never permitted. But when
the matter is such that it is unlawful to reveal
it, then is it not only justifiable but obligatory to
use equivocal terms, provided the following condi-
tions enumerated by Busso * are present : " (1) that
the questioner have no right to know the matter
which we conceal ; (2) that equivocal words, whether
such in themselves or in their circumstances, are
used only when there is a proportionately grave
*De Phil. Mor. Prcd., p. 140.
432 MORAL PHIL0S0P3T.
cause for uttering them ; (3) that the speaker intend
the true sense, though the hearer attach another
meaning to them, when he could avoid this erroi
by attending to the existing circumstances." And
the author further explains : " When there is a pro-
portionately grave cause for concealing the truth,
and a question is proposed concerning it which must
be answered, because one's very silence would be a
manifestation of the truth ; two rights come into
conflict : in one person, the right and at times even
the duty, of concealing the truth, and in the other
the right to keep his intellect free from the infection
of error. One of these rights must be suspended;
but which? Certainly the right of him who is the
cause of the conflict. But the hearer is the one
who by unlawful questioning caused the conflict;
therefore his right must be suspended." The author
further distinguishes between words essentially equiv-
ocal and words which though having in themselves
but one determinate signification may from certain
circumstances acquire another. Of this latter kind
of equivocation he cites two instances : if a man be
questioned as to something which he knows by incom-
municable knowledge {sub secreto) and answers, " I do
not know," his reply means ignorance simply, but if
the circumstances be considered, it means ignorance
of incommunicable matter. If a prisoner answers the
judge, " Not guilty," though his words taken by them-
selves signify innocence, yet viewed in connection
with the circumstances they signify that he has not
committed a crime of which he is bound to make him-
self his own accuser.*
27. From love of one's neigJihor results the duty of not
* Cf. Rusao, pp. 144, 145.
MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEN. 433
attempting his life or maltreating his hody. — Life is a
most precious boon to man, for it enables him to work
out his present destiny and to prepare for his future
state ; hence homicide is one of the greatest crimes
that can be committed. The interdict laid upon
homicide extends to every action that impairs the in-
tegrity of the human organism, such as mutilations,
wounds, and blows.
28. From love of one's neighbor arises the duty not
merely of doing him no harm, hut even of doing him
good. — ^We ought to love our neighbor as ourselves ;
now, we wish not only that others do us no evil, but
also that they do us good. Hence besides negative or
perfect duties, we have also positive or imperfect duties
toward our neighbor. We should enlighten his
mind, strengthen his will in the practice of good,
help him in need, and defend his good name. Posi-
tive duties are either humane or 'beneficent. They are
duties of humanity if they are rendered our neighbor
without any personal sacrifice ; they are duties of
beneficence if, they involve some personal incon-
venience or loss. They are, therefore, more merito-
rious than the former class. Yet though both kinds
of positive duty are commanded in a general way,
they do not constitute a determinate obligation in this
or that particular case ; their obligation being only
moral and not juridical, no one can be forced to ful-
fil them. They become a strict and imperative duty
only in case of our neighbor's extreme need, owing to
the presence of imminent and deadly evil to soul or
body.
29. Both negative and positive duties of loving our
neighbor oblige us in regard to our enemies. — The love
due to our neighbor is not founded in his personal
merit, but in his dignity and specific nature as man
28
434 1 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
Hence, although it is permitted to detest the wrong'
done us by an enemy and to demand satisfaction, it is
not lawful to pursue with hate the author of this evil
and to neglect in his regard the duties that bind us
toward other men as such.*
AKT. II. — THE BIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE, AUD DUELLING.
30. It is lawful to repel force iy force, even to the Tail-
ing of the unjust aggressor, provided the moderation of
blameless defence he observed. — The moderation of
blameless defeace has five conditions : (1) that there
be no other means of defence from the aggression
but force ; (2) that violence be offered only in the act
of aggression ; (3) that no more evil be done the ag-
gressor than is here and now necessary to nullify the
aggression ; (4) that the evil done the aggressor be
proportionate to the good that is the object of aggres-
sion ; (5) that the evil be done in self-defence and not
in revenge. When these conditions are present, it is
evidently lawful to repel an unjust aggression by
force even to the killing of the aggressor. For he
who has the right to possess a good has also the right
to remove even by force the obstacles to the posses-
sion of that good. Undoubtedly, in the case of ag-
gression, the aggressor suffers loss when violently re-
pulsed ; but since one of the two adversaries must
suffer loss, it is just that he should suffer who exposed
himself to this risk and in a measure willed it. Besides,
man is not bound to love his neighbor more than
* Although, brutes as being irrational creatures have no rights, yet
man is forbidden, says St. Thomas, to exercise cruelty upon them,
both because such action disposes him to act similarly to his fellow-
men, and because it opposes the order and end established by God i»
treating brutes.
MAIL'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEW. 435
himself ; but this he would do were he to lose his own
goods in order to save his neighbor's. Yet though
man has the right to repel by force an unjust aggres-
sion, he may forego its exercise, and he will then at
times perform an act of heroic virtue ; but he is bound
to use his right, says Liberatore, when he knows that
he is himself in mortal sin, or that his own death will
imperil the common safety.
31. DuelUtig is a violation of the natural law. — ^The
natural law forbids duels, or single combats in which
two persons engage of their own private authority,
after previously agreeing upon weapons, judges, and
the time and place of combat. For by duelling (1) One
exposes himself without lawful motive to give or re-
ceive a mortal wound, and is thus guilty of both
homicide and suicide ; (2) He commits a crime against
society, since he deprives it of one of its members and
contemns its laws; (3) He sins against reason and
justice, since there is no proportion between death
and the vain motives invoked by adversaries, and no
relation between the honor at stake and the skill or
chance on which the issue of the duel depends. — It is
idle to object that honor should be preferred to life,
and that when challenged one should always accept in
order not to pass for a coward. For it is evident that
while real honor is preferable to life, it cannot be kept
by the duel, the issue of which depends not on jus-
tice, but on skill or force or chance. He that refuses
a duel does not prove himself a coward, for there can
be no cowardice in not doing a bad action ; and be-
sides, it is not courage, but skill, force, or chance that
decides a duel. Reasonable men find as miioh cour-
age as good sense in him who rejects a challenge to
combat.
436 MORAL PSIL0S0PH7.
AET. m. — BIGHTS AND DUTIES IN EELATION TO SOCIAL
GOOD.
32. Social good is that which a man enjoys as a mem-
her of a constituted community. — Man is composed of
soul and body. The social blessings that pertain to
the life of his soul are honor and reputation, and
consist in the good opinion in which he and his
qualities are held ; those that benefit the life of his
body are property or wealth.*
33. Man is hound to guard his honor and reputation.
— Man ordinarily must live in society to attain the
end of his existence. But if his reputation be in-
jured, he loses a part of that benefit which he would
otherwise derive from society ; therefore he must see
to it that he does not compromise his reputation.
Tet his care for his good name should have a just
limit, and so far is one from being obliged always to
make known his good parts, that he often proves his
virtue by concealing them.
34. Man has a natural right to Ms honor and reputa-
tion.— No man may of right demand to be honored
by others with positive marks of consideration unless
in virtue of some legitimate dignity added to that of
his nature as man ; but every man may demand that
no one shall injure his natural dignity.
35. From love of one's neighbor arises the duty of not
injuring his honor. — Honor or reputation is one of
* Wealth is here taken to inchide " all useful things that can be
appropriated and exchanged." Its sources are God's bounty and
man's labor. It is Tiater'aZ if it supplies man's natural wants; as do
food, clothing, and lodging. It is artificidl if it is merely an inven-
tion of human skill to facilitate interchange of commodities ; as, for
instance, money.
MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEN. .437
man's most precious possessions ; to injure it without
lawful motive is to violate one of his dearest rights.
Therefore does the natural law forbid unjust sus-
picion, rash judgment, contempt, false testimony,
detraction, and calumny.
36. Every man is hound to procure for himself the
material goods necessary for life. — Since man is bound
to preserve his life, and cannot live without the mate-
rial means of food, clothing, and lodging, it is evident
that he must provide himself with these means.
37. Every man is oiliged to labor. — The obligation of
procuring the goods necessary for life imposes the
law of labor, since it is by labor only that we can
procure these goods. Labor is also a duty for this
reason, that it is an essential condition of man's moral
and intellectual development. Again, labor is obli-
gatory on every man, because in no other way can he
render himself useful to society, in which he is called
to live.
38. Man is permitted to acquire riches. — Riches sup-
ply food to man's activity ; therefore their acquisi-
tion is a condition favorable to the development of
his faculties. They enable him to satisfy his wants
more perfectly, and are therefore conformed to order,
which requires him to have care of his existence,
Eiches are also useful to society ; they afford a means
of remedying the inevitable inequality of the fortunes
of its members ; they are an element of public pros-
perity, and, by exciting the intellectual activity as
well as the labor of individuals, they contribute to
order and the general well-being. Yet one should
not forget that they are but a means of attaining
man's end. When pursued immoderately, and when
turned from their true end, they produce idleness,
Inxury, and all kinds of evil.
438 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
39. To man's duty of preserving his life and promot-
ing his well-being, there is the correspondent right of
property, which originates in nature. — Viewed abstractly,
property is exclusive dominion over some corporeal
thing- ; * viewed concretely it is the object possessed.
Its possession supposes that the object can confer
some advantages, and the exclusion of every other
person from its possession supposes that the benefits
to be derived are limited in nature. If the object can
serve all equally and without detriment, it cannot be-
come property. Dominion is perfect or imperfect ac-
cording as it implies the possession of the object and
the enjoyment of its fruits, or the possession of the
object without its fruit, or the fruits without the ob-
ject. Dominion is transitory or permanent, according
as it is temporary or lasting.
Transitory dominion evidently arises from nature.
It is man's duty to procure whatever is necessary for
his life and well-being ; but these things cannot serve
him and others also; therefore he has the right to
their exclusive use. It is also certain that permanent
property is of natural right. For by the conditions
of his nature man is obliged to provide for the future ;
otherwise he would fall a victim to the inevitable vicis-
situdes of life, such as sickness, old age, and the ca-
prices of fortune, and, moreover, being restrained by
his material wants, he could not give himself up to
the nobler occupation of intellectual pursuits. Sec-
* Dominion over a person is called jurisdiction. Russo (§ 209)
distingnishes between the right to property, which he defines as " a
general moral power by which man is made capable of acquiring do-
minion, the matter of it being indeterminate ; " and the right of
property, " the moral power of disposing of any determinate thing to
the exclusion of others." The former right springs from nature ;
the latter is founded in some contingent fact.
MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEW. 439
ondly, man is naturally active and industrious ; it
would be unjust tliat the fruits of his labors should
fall to others. Thirdly, the family, which is an insti-
tution of nature, cannot subsist, if the father or head
does not by permanent property provide for the future
wants of his children. Fourthly, the social state, or
civil society, is morally necessary for human nature ;
but without -respect for property society cannot pros-
per, cannot even exist. Lastly, stability of property
is characteristic of all nations and of all times ; so
universal a fact must rest upon a law of nature.
40. The nght of permanent property extends not only
to the necessaries of life, hut also to its liixuries. — ^AU the
arguments establishing the right of property show
also the legitimacy of man's right to the luxuries of life.
Besides, to put limits to the right of property is to
destroy it, because, since it is impossible to determine
these limits, the denial of the right to the necessaries
of life becomes a natural consequence. To attack the
right of property, whatever its object be, is to attack
man's liberty and to arrest all development, all indi-
vidual and social progress. It is idle to object that
all men being equal, all have a right to an equal share
of property. Men are indeed equal in their specific
nature, but not in their individual natures ; and as
inequality of possessions arises from the natural in-
equality of individual men, their equality in specific
nature demands not that every rhan should have
equal wealth with his fellows, but that all men's
justly acquired possessions should be equally re-
spected.
Man's ownership of objects is always subject to
God's supreme dominion, and extends only to their
use as means of attaining his destiny both in the
natural and in the supernatural order. In this sense
440 MORAL PHILOSOPHT.
it is true tliat man has only tlie usufruct of these
objects. It is also true that in the beginning all
material things were, negatively, in common ; that is,
the natural law does not determine them to any
individual, but leaves them open for his appropriation
by impressing his personality upon them and so mak-
ing them his own. "Private property," says St.
Thomas,* " is necessary to human life for three rea-
sons : first, because every one is more solicitous to
look after what belongs to himself alone than what is
common to all or many; . . . secondly, because
human affairs are handled more orderly when on each
individual is the care of managing something ; . . .
thirdly, because thereby a peaceful state of society
Is secured, while each one is content with his own."
Even landed property does not belong to govern-
ment, since, as will be shown farther on,f the State
naturally originates in the propagation of families
from a common stock, and therefore its right, if any,
of property must preexist in the head of the family.
But the State has the right of eminent domain, or
dominion " over all the property within the State, by
which it is entitled by constitutional agency to any part
necessary to the public . good, compensation being
given for what is taken. "J Since, then, landed prop-
erty is not apportioned by the natural law, and it does
not belong naturally to government, it must be divided
by " positive convention." Since, moreover, for men
as now constituted, in a fallen state, the division of
landed property is morally necessary to enable them
to tend to their due perfection as members of society, ,
this apportionment must be made by public authority,
to which alone it belongs, to determine the just con-
* Sum. Th., i-ii., q. 66, a. 3. f § 74. % Century Dictionary.
MAJY'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW- MEN. 441
ditions that establish a legal title to land, since to
civil government pertains the office of securing the
temporal good of the community.* Communism, the
doctrine that forbids all private property and would
vest all dominion in government alone, must be re-
jected.
An equally pernicious theory is Socialism, "the
quintessence of which is the double proposition that
inequality of conditions — the distinction of rich and
poor, masters and servants — is the principal cause of
misery and crime ; and secondly, that the maximum of
temporal welfare will be gained by the State becom-
ing the owner of all means of production, reducing all
industries to branches of the public services, and all
workers to be public servants paid by the State, "f
Such a doctrine fails to consider that civil authority
is vested in human beings, who as such are liable to
err ; that man's highest end is not to produce, but to
contemplate the truth. Besides, it means stagnation
of art, science, and literature, and precludes the de-
velopment both of political life and industrial arts." J
Mr. Henry George also ascribes vice and misery to
inequality of conditions, but " attacks only one class
of rich people, not all, and would confiscate not every
kind of difference, but only one." His scheme is the
nationalization of the land, the taking by the State of
" all difference due to the law of diminishing returns
from land." " He assumes, like the Socialists, a won-
derful piety and moderation among those who would
have the handling of the goods taken from the rich ;
but he has to extend his piety and moderation to the
* Cf . authorities cited in Hill's MorM Philosophy, pp. 339-246.
f Devas, Political Economy, p. 478.
% Ibid., p. 393.
M2 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
delicate relations of buyers and sellers, of masters
and workmen ; and thus he combines the delusions
of those who worship competition and those who ex-
ecrate it. Finally, his proposal bids us do what is
impossible. For we have seen that in all old coun-
tries, owing to long continued cultivation and use of
land, and to the frequency of the realization of differ-
ences, it is practically impossible to ascertain the
amount of the difference (or rent, as he calls it), or if
the amount could be ascertained, to ascertain who is
getting it. Hence this scheme of social reform is a
scheme of taking nobody knows how much from
nobody knows whom." *
Inequality of condition is a law of nature. Hence
every scheme of social reform should aim not at the
destruction of either the poor class or the rich, but
at the permanent establishment of harmonious rela-
tions between them, so that they may, " as it were,
fit into one another, so as to maintain the equilibrium
of the body politic. Each requires the other ; capital
cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital."
The most powerful means of securing this happy
result is religion. It " teaches the laboring man and
the work man to carry out honestly and well all equita-
ble agreements, freely made, never to injure capital,
nor to outrage the person of an employer ; never to
employ violence in representing his oavq cause, nor
to engage in riot and disorder ; and to have nothing
to do with men of evil principles, who work upon
the people with artful promises, and raise foolish
hopes which usually end in disaster and in repentance
when too late. Religion teaches the rich man and
the employer that their work-people are not theii
* Devas, p. 483.
MART'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MSN. 443
slaves ; that they must respect in every man his
dignity as a man and as a Christian ; that labor ia
nothing to be ashamed of, if we listen to reason and
to Christian philosophy, but is an honorable employ-
ment, enabling a man to sustain his life in an upright
and creditable way ; and that it is shameful and in-
human to treat men like chattels to make money by,
or to look upon them merely as so much muscle or
physical power." It imposes upon him likewise the
duty of seeing that the workman have time for " the
duties of piety ; that he be not exposed to corrupting
influences and dangerous occasions ; and that he be
not led away to neglect his home and family or
squander his wages. Then, again, the employer must
never tax his work-people beyond their strength, nor
employ them in work unsuited to their sex or age.
His great and principal obligation is to give to every
one that which is just ; ... to make one's profit
out of the need of another is condemned by all laws,
human and divine." *
The State is bound to protect the rights of all its
citizens ; but because the rich have many means of
self-defence, of which the poor are deprived, it is
particularly bound to safeguard the rights of. the
poor, of the workman and laborer. These are in
truth the bone and sinew of the nation, and without
their cooperation the State cannot prosper. Hence
it should see to it that the hours of labor are not too
long whether in relation to the workman or the nature
of the work or the season of the year ; that the work
is not too hard ; and that the wages are sufficient.
Now "a man's labor has two notes or characters.
First of all, it is personal ; for the exertion of indi-
* Bncyolical Letter ou the Condition of Labor.
4M MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
vidual power belong'S to the individual who puts it
forth, employing' this power for that personal profit
for which it was given. Secondly, man's labor is
necessary ; for without the results of labor a man can-
not live." Wages, therefore, should be sufficient
for the support of the workman, his wife, and two
or three children. " As a rule, workman and em-
ployer . . . should freely agree as to wages;
. nevertheless, there is a dictate of nature more imperi-
ous and more ancient than any bargain between man
and man, that the remuneration must be enough to
support the wage earner in reasonable and frugal
comfort."* Whenever these rights of the workman
are trespassed on by the employer, the workman has
the right to strike, and further, is entitled to the active
support of the State, to which it belongs to institute
tribunals of arbitration.
41. It is absurd to hold with ITeinecius (1681-1741),
Gh-otius (1583-1645), and Puffendorf (1632-1694), that
the right of permanent property arises from compact. —
Some philosophers have maintained that by the di-
vine law all things were at first held in common by
men, but that when the human race increased in
numbers they were divided by common compact.
This assertion is contradicted by history, which has
preserved no record of this agreement ; it is opposed
to reason, since, were it true, the savage state would
be more conformed to nature than the civilized state.
Finally, this assertion favors communism ; for, if all
things are held in common by the natural law, the
compact of our ancestors cannot be binding on us,
and we have the right to return to the primitive state
of mankind.
* Eno/olioal Letter on the Gondiiion of Labor.
MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEN. 445
42. It is equally absurd to hold, with Hobhes, Benthain,
and Montesquieu (1689-1755) that the right of permanent
property arises from civil laws. — Some philosopliers
derive the rig-lit of property from civil laws. This
opinion is based on the false hypothesis that the
savage state was the primitive state of man ; it makes
the civil laws on property the rale of justice, and it
leads easily to communism, for if civil law has es-
tablished the right of property, it can also destroy it.
43. The primitive fact determining the right of prop-
erty is the exercise of ■?nan's activity. — Man's action is,
as it were, a development of his personality, and what
results from his action is thus stamped with the seal
of his personality. He who first takes possession of
a thing that belongs to no one, and declares his
intention of keeping it, thereby contracts with it a re-
lation that makes it his. A fortiori, should such an
object belong to him if, while in possession of it, he
improved it by his labor ; to deprive him of it would
be robbing him of the product of his activity.
44. A father has the right to will his property to his
children. — The right of property evidently gives the
right to use it and dispose of it ; therefore a father
has the right to transmit his property to his children.
Again, a father owns an object, because he has im-
pressed upon it the seal of his personality ; but his
personality is continued in his children ; therefore
the right of property is alro continued in them
Liberatore adds that a will drawn up to this effect
is unnecessary, that children may succeed to their
father's possessions ; yet Blackstone seems to judge
it a civil right.
45. From, love of one's neighbor arises the duty of not
injuring his property. — Theft is an injustice to the in-
dividual, whom it deprives of a lawful possession ; it
446 MORAL PBILOSOPHT.
is an attack upon society, of which respect for prop-'
erty is one of the firm foundations, for men are unit-
ed in society as well for the protection of their prop-
erty as for the defence of their lives. The natural
law in forbidding theft forbids also all that is dis-
guised theft, as fraud and usury. It also forbids one
to keep stolen goods, and commands them to be re-
stored.*
ABT. IV. — CONTEACTS.
46. A contract is a " consent of two or more wills to iht
sarae object, manifested iy some sensible sign and produc-
tive of an obligation in at least one of the consenting par-
ties."'\ — No man can suffice for himself, hence the
necessity of an exchange of goods and services among
men, a necessity imposed as well by love of self as by
love of one's neighbor. But to effect an exchange
among two or more persons, their consent is neces-
sary ; this consent is called a bargain. When the
bargain produces an obligation in at least one of the
consenting parties, it is called a contract.
47. The validity of a contract depends on five condi-
tions : (1) knowledge of the object ; (2) liberty of the con-
tractants ; (3) thsir mutual consent ; (4) the possibility
of the ojbect of contract ; (5) its moral goodness. — That
* In extreme need one may take as much, of another's goods as is
necessary to sustain life ; for God, who is the Supreme Lord of the
earth and all it contains, has commanded man to preserve his life.
But the following conditions should be present : (1) The need should
he absolutely or relatively extreme ; (3) There should he at hand no
other means of satisfying it ; (3) Only so much should be taken as is
really necessary ; (4) He from whom it is taken should not thereby be
placed in the same need. Gf. Liberatore, Instituiiones PhUosopliioOf
vol. iii., p. 179.
f Zigliara.
MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEN. 447
a contract be valid, its object must be known, be-
cause an action done in ignorance is not voluntary ;
hence deceit and fraud render a contract null. Sec-
ondly, it must be free, else it cannot be considered
an effect of the will ; hence drunkenness, insanity,
childhood, and violence, nullify a contract. Thirdly,
there must be mutual consent, and this is of the very
essence of contract ; hence he who promises is legally
boimd only when his promise is accepted. Fourthly,
the object-of contract should be possible, for no one
is bound to the impossible. Lastly, the object should
be lawful, for no contract can ever remove man's ob-
ligation of shunning moral evil.
48. Colfitracts are unilateral or synallagmatic, commu-
tative or aleatory, gratuitous w onerous, consensual or
real, principal or accessory, solemn or not solemn, explicit
or hnplicit. — A unilateral or unequal contract is one in
which only one of the contractants assumes an obli-
gation. A " loan of money " and a " promissory note "
are instances. A synallagmatic, Mlateral, or equal
contract is one in which both the parties are bound to
fulfil some obligation toward each other, as in " pur-
chase and sale," " rent and hire." A contract is com-
mutative when each of the contractants makes an en-
gagement which is considered an equivalent for what
he receives, as in " purchase and sale ; " it is aleatory
when the equivalent consists in the mutual chance of
gain or loss owing to some uncertain event ; of this
the " lottery " is an instance. A contract is gratuitous
when one of the parties confers some advantage on
another without requiring a corresponding recom.
pense, as a " simple promise ;" it is owerows when eacl
of the contractants assumes an obligation.
A consensual contract is one that is perfected by the
mere consent of the parties ; a real contract requires
448 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
in addition the delivering' over of something, as a
"deposit." A principal contract is one that exists
independently of any prior .contract ; an accessory
contract is one made to assure the fulfilment of a
prior contract, without which it could not have been
made, as a " mortgage."
A contract is soleinn or rwi solemn according as it
is or is not subject to certain particular forms. An
explicit or fm^mal contract is one wherein the par-
ties state their obligations in precise terms ; an
implicit or virtual contract is one in which from a
purely voluntary action of one party there results
an obligation to a third party, and sometimes a
reciprocal obligation of the first and second parties ;
when, for instance, one person receives the money or
goods of another he is virtually bound to deliver
them to the owner.
49. The obligation arising from a contract ceases : (1)
Wlien the engagement Tnade has been fulfilled ; (2) Wh^n
he in whose favor the contract was made consents, if the
contract is unilateral, or if the contract is bilateral, when
both parties consent ; (3) When the object of contract be-
comes impossible ; (4) When one of the contractants does
not fulfil the stipulated conditiotis. — The dbligation of a
bilateral contract ceases on the consent thereto of the
parties, unless the contract be indissoluble either in
itself or by the law. If the impossibility that nullifies
a contract originates in the will of one of the contract-
ants, he is bound to make a proportionate compensa-
tion to the other party.
A loan is " an onerous contract whereby one party
so transfers something of his to another, that it im--
mediately becomes the receiver's with the obligation
of afterwards giving back the same, not numerically,
but in kind and quality " (Zigliara). It immediately
MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEN. 449
becomes the borrower's, because it is consumed in its
use, and it must be returned in kind, because other-
wise the contract would be, for example, " purchase
and sale."
The grounds on which the demanding of interest is
lawful are four : the loss of the lender in loaning the
money ; the profit that he might make by retaining
the money, and which he foregoes by making a loan ;
the risk to which he exposes himself of not having
the sum repaid ; and the benefits thereby accruing to
Bommerce and to society in general ; hence the State
should fix a legal rate of interest. Yet it is unlawful
not only to demand a rate of interest higher than
that fixed by civil law, but even to demand any inter-
est at all in virtue only of the money loaned- For as the
use of the thing is here not really distinct from the
thing itself, were the lender of the money to require
in addition to the repayment of the principal the pay-
ment of a sum for its mere use, he would virtually sell
the same thing twice.
" Usury is properly interpreted to be the attempt
to draw profit and increment without labor, without
cost, and without risk, out of the use of a thing that
does not fructify " (Leo X., in Fifth Council of Vati-
can, 1615).
PAKT II.
SOCIAL LAW.
50. Human society is a union of minds, wills, and
powers for a common good. — Human society should
contain all that is proper to man in his specific nat-
ure and in his relations with his fellow-men. But
man is essentially a being having mind and will con-
joined in unity of person with a material organism.
On the other hand, minds do not unite without a
common truth, which being proposed to their wills,
impels them with common accord to the same good.
For the acquisition of this good men are morally
united only when they join their moral forces by the
help of material means, as language, cohabitation,
etc. Therefore human society unites minds and wills
which concur to the common good by the help of ma-
terial means.
51. The essential elements of society are multitude,
unity, end, and meaois. — Multitude constitutes the
quasi-material part of society; unity, which is ef-.
fected by authority, is the formal part. Society is
the more perfect, the more numerous the elements
that are united, the more complete their union, the
more universal the good sought after, and the more
efficacious the means of attaining it.
52. The foundation of all society lies in the good
which its Tnemhers should wish one another. — The obli-
gations upon men which result from association, are
DOMESTIO SOOIETY. i51
only the confirmation, the determination of these
general obligations which result from their likeness
in nature. But the foundation of the latter consists in
this, that each is bound to love the others and to wish
them whatever good he wishes for himself. Such,
then, must also be the foundation of society. Hence
society should never depart from the moral order,
for the good that we should wish for ourselves
or others should be no other than the honorable
good.
53. Perfect society is divided into domestic, civil, and
religious society. — Society is either perfect or imper-
fect. It is perfect when it has for its end the general
good of its members and all that can procure their
perfection. Society is imperfect if it pursues a par-
ticular good ; as literary and industrial societies, etc.
Perfect society is of three kinds : domestic, civil, and
religious, according as it seeks the perfection and
propagation of individuals, or has for special end the
good proper to this life, or the life to come.
CHAPTEE I.
Domestic Society.
akt. i. — natdee oe mabeiage.
54. Marriage"^ is the society of man and woman united
in a community of existence and life. — Marriage is a
natural contract by which the spouses engage to give
themselves to each other. The society which results
* The one marriage may, according to the different aspects in
which it is viewed, be called a natural contract, a social or c/iml con-
tract, a religious contract, and a sacrament.
452 MORAL PBILOSOPST.
therefrom is not transitory, but it is a stable union,
whicli has for its end : (1) the propagation and edu-
cation of the human species ; (2) the mutual hap-
piness of the married couple. Before Christianity
marriage was only a natural association, though of
divine institution; in the Church of Christ it is a
sacrament.
55. Marriage is one of the most important acts of
inan's life. — In ordinary engagements man stipulates
for his private interests, as arbiter of his fortune ; in
marriage he stipulates not for himself only, but for
others. He engages to become, as it were, a second
providence for the new family to which he will give
existence ; he stipulates for the State and for human-
ity. Hence the multiplicity of protective forms sur-
rounding it in both the civil and the religious order ;
hence likewise the religious law consecrating among
almost all peoples the nuptial tie.
56. Marriage derives from civil authority only its-
purely civil effects ; for the rest it is indebted to religion.
— rCivil society supposes domestic society, whose
rights it does not create, but recognizes and safe-
guards. Hence what regards the constitution of the
family does not depend on the State. Such is the
case with marriage, which is the foundation of the
family. Secondly, civil society supposes religion,
which is essential to man as man ; now marriage is
matter of religion, for it is consecrated by its end,
which is to give existence to a being made in the like-
ness of God and destined to glorify Him. Therefore,
among all peoples, even among barbarians, marriage
has always been attended with sacred rites. Besides,
marriage has been raised by Jesus Christ to the dig-
nity of a sacrament ; and since the sacraments come
from ecclesiastical authority, it follows that marriage
DOMESriO 800IETT. 453
can depend on the State for none but its purely civil
effects.*
57. Celibacy kept from love of virtue is a more ele-
vated state than marriage. — By celibacy kept from
love of virtue, man attains a very great intellectual
and moral perfection, and puts himself in a condition
to reach his last end more surely and more perfectly.
The nobility of virtuous celibacy is also manifest from
the admiration felt by the people and sages of all
times.f
ABT. n. — UNITY AND INDISSOLUBILITY OF MABEIAGE.
58. Nature wills that marriage should he a union be-
tween one man and one woman.X — It is manifest that
unity of marriage is demanded by the good of the
married couple and by that of society ; therefore it is
consonant with nature. Besides, it is rigorously de-
manded in the law of Christ, where marriage has been
brought back to its primitive perfection.§
* " The dependence [of marriage on the State] is entirely extrin-
sic and presupposes a marriage already contracted and a family, or
domestic society, already constituted ; for if there were no marriage,
it could have no relations to civil society " (Zigliara, Summa Philo-
mphica, M. 44, iv.) ; but " the marriage tie is in no way subject to
civil power." (vii.)
f Marriage is of precept for mankind in general, but not for the
individual unless the human race be in imminent danger of becoming
extinct. It is beyond question that Christian celibacy gives the in-
dividual greater liberty for the contemplation and pursuit of truth
and the practice of virtue, and thereby confers untold blessings
upon society. (Zigliara, § M. 42, viii.)
X Polyandry opposes the principal end of marriage ; polygamy
breeds jealousy, strife, and dissension. Cf . Zigliara, M. 43, x. , xi.
§ The polygamy of the patriarchs of the old law is an apparent ex-
ception ; bat two explanations may be given in harmony with the
natural law from which God cannot dispense without contradicting
454 MORAL PHILOaOPBT.
59. Divorce is absolutely contrary to the perfection of
marriage. — The dissolubility of the marriage tie would
despoil, so to say, those who are united, of the glo-
rious titles of husband and wife, father and mother.
It is opposed to the children's interest and to the
well-being of the State. In the evangelical law mar-
riage having been raised to the dignity of a sacra-
ment and signifying the indissoluble union of Christ
and Hi|S Church, has been re-invested with a stability
such as nothing can destroy.
AET. m. — EECIPEOCAIi DUTIES OP HUSBAND AND WIPE.
60. The authority in domestic society resides in the
husband. — Marriage is a society in which an authority
is necessary. But to whom can it belong but to him
on whom the Author of nature has bestowed the
double authority of physical strength and of reason ?
Civil legislations have acknowledged this superiority
Himself. One explanation " would suppose that mankind beginning
in monogamy, from passion and ignorance leaped quickly into polyg"
amy ; that the patriarchs in good faith conformed to the practice of
their time ; and that God, in their case as with the rest of mankind,
awaited His own destined hour for the light of better knowledge
to break upon the earth. Whether, meanwhile, by some darkly
intelligible stretch of His power He legitimized their unions, who
can tell ? " Or again, " God by His supreme dominion can dissolve
any marriage. By the same dominative power He can infringe
and partially make void any marriage contract without entirely un-
doing it. The marriage contract, existing in its fulness and integ-
rity, is a bar to any second similar contract. But what, on this
theory, the Lord God did with the marriages of the patriarchs was
this : He partially unravelled and undid the contract, so as to leave
room for a second contract, and a third, each having the bare essen-
tials of a marriage, but none of them the full integrity." — Moral Phi-
losophy, Stonyhurst Series, p. 273.
DOMESTIC SOCIETY. 455
by imposing upon the wife the duty of listening to
her husband and following him ; and in this they are
in accord with the Sacred Scriptures.
61. In domestic society the wife is not the slave, hut the
aid and associate of her husiand. — "Woman has a nat-
ural dignity equal to that of man, and although she
is subject to him, she yet retains all her natural
rights. She is the indispensable aid of man, and
shares with him the family cares and duties. She is
his associate, because she is one of the contracting
parties, and by the matrimonial contract she has been
provided with a husband and protector, not a despot.
ABT. IV. — DUTIES OF PARENTS AMD CHILDREN.
62. Education is the principal duty that results from
paternity ; this duty is common to father and inother. —
Education, in its most extended meaning, comprises
all the cares whether corporal or spiritual, by which
the child is developed, physically, intellectually, and
morally. Thus understood, it is certainly a duty im-
posed on parents by nature, by society, by God Him-
self; by nature which, making the child incapable
of preserving and perfecting itself, charges with this
care those who have given it existence ; by society,
which can be preserved and can prosper only on con-
dition that its members have received a suitable
physical and moral development ; by God, who by
giving children to parents evidently charges them
with the duty of making them useful members of
civil society and of the Church. The duty of educa-
tion is common to father a*id mother, because both
concur in giving existence to the child, and because
this is required by the very end of education, the
harmonious development of body, mind, and heart.
456 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
The duties of parents to their children also oblige
masters, who are the representatives of parental au-
thority. As to moral education, it is essential that
parents and those who in any way represent them,
offer in their own person models worthy of imitation,
for children follow more readily what they see than
what they hear.
63. From the duty of educating follows the right of
parents to direct this education personally. — The right
of parents to direct the education of their children is
founded in the natural law and is therefore inviolable.
Hence it is without reason that some moralists con-
\ine to the State the right of education. It is in-
deed true, that as the children of the family are
one day to be members of society, the State has in
self-defence and pursuance of its end, which is the
temporal good of the community, the right to de-
mand that they be suitably trained to fulfil their future
duties as citizens. But this by no means implies that
education, or even secular instruction, belongs to the
State exclusively. The right of the State in this re-
gard is limited to affording parents ample facilities
for the proper training of their children ; its inter-
ference can be justified only in individual cases of
manifest neglect. For the rest, the natural love of
parents for their offspring will more effectually pro-
vide for their education than State control, which in
itself is purely temporal, and often with no higher
end in view than utility.
64. The child owes its parents obedience, respect, love,
and assistance. — The voice of nature, of religion, and
of gratitude, unite in bidding man honor those who,
after God, are the authors of his life. Children owe
obedience, respect, and love to those also who in
their regard represent their parents.
DOMESTIC SOOIETT. 457
65. The authority of parents over their children is
limited in the extent and duration of its exercise. — Edu-
cation is the end for which nature gives parents
authority over their children. What is required by
this education should therefore regulate the exercise
of this authority, which, in consequence, will be less
exercised as the child advances in years. The child
may even withdraw entirely from it when he becomes
of age, yet ever fulfilling toward his parents the
duties of love, respect, and gratitude. He may also
be released from obedience to them in the choice of a
state of life ; for in this matter his parents may direct
and counsel him, but not oppose or constrain him.
66. The children of a family owe one another affection
and assistance. — Consanguinity and community of ed-
ucation and life produce among brothers and sisters
those sweet and lasting bonds which cannot be
broken without violating the law of nature.
AET. v. — DUTIES OF MASTEBS mj> SEEVANTS.
67. The society of masters and servants is lawful:- —
This society is founded in the inequality of the condi-
tions of life and the reciprocity of social needs. It is
indeed constituted by the free consent of man; but
though not directly derived from nature, it is never-
theless in perfect conformity with the natural law.
68. The society of masters and servants is an extension
of the family, and thus, in a measure, gives rise to the
same series of duties. — Servants owe their masters re-
* A servant " is one bound by an onerous contract to do work useful
to another and determined by Ms will ; =• master is one who has a
personal right of exacting from another work useful to himself and
determined according to his own will, with the obligation of paying
him in return the wages agreed upon." — Eusso, § 316.
458 MOBAL PHILOSOPHY.
spect, obedience, service, and fidelity ; masters, in turn
owe tlieir servants aiFection, care for their spiritual
and temporal interests, and fidelity to tlieir contracts.
The extent of these reciprocal duties is determined by
the nature of the engagements.
69. Slavery is not absolutely in contradiction to nature.
— The state of domestic service is free ; slavery, on
the other hand, is a state of perpetual subjection in
which a man in exchange for the necessaries of life is
bound to give all the profit of his labor to him who
supports him. Such a state, though less suited to
man's dignity, is not, strictly speaking, contradictory
to his nature ; for man has the right to serve his fellow-
man under the reserve of his essential rights. But if
slavery be understood to deprive a man of all his
rights, to degrade him to the level of the brute, and
to give to his master the power of life and death over
the slave, then is it absolutely opposed to the natural
law, since it is essentially destructive of the slave's
inalienable rights.
CHAPTEE n
Civil Society,
aet. i. — natuee of civil society.
70. Civil society is the permanent union of independent
families associated to enjoy in comTnon the same rights
and privileges. — Man does not find in the family com-
plete satisfaction of his wants. , He needs a more ex-
tended society comprising the family itself, in which
he may find the necessary assistance to enable him to
attain the perfection proper to his nature. This union
of families is called civil society, or if viewed in rela-
tion to the ruling power, political society.
ABT. II. — THE SOCliL STATE IN EELATION TO MAN.
71. The social state is natural to man. — 1. This truth
is proved by history, which teaches that in all times
and in all places men have lived in society ; now, so
universal a fact must be due to a law of nature. 2.
Unlike the brute, man is not equipped by nature with
all that is necessary for the preservation and develop-
ment of his being ; it is only society that can satisfy
his physical, intellectual, and moral needs. 3. Man
is naturally endowed with the faculty of language,
but this faculty would be useless were men not called
to live in society. 4. Man is naturally inclined to
communicate with his kind, to share their sentiments,
460 MOBAL PHILOSOPHr.
and to help tliem in need. 5. Man is naturally per-
fectible ; now, it is manifest that without society he
cannot attain the perfection of which he is capable,
particularly in the intellectual and the moral order.
6. Reason bids man realize, as far as in him lies, the
good of order ; now order, both in the culture of sci-
ence and the practice of virtue, is most resplendent in
society.
72. It is absurd to say with Hobbes that the natural
state of man is perpetual war, and that inen united in
society only to free themselves from this state. — The so-
cial system of Hobbes is a consequence of his mate-
rialistic principles touching the nature of man. "Were
his system true, we must necessarily grant that man
is inferior to brutes, which are never seen in strife
with those of the same species. But experience proves
that man is inclined to show benevolence to his
neighbor, unless his passions have perverted his in-
stincts ; again, reason bids us keep order. Order is
manifestly peace and not war. The falsity of Hobbes's
system is also proved by its fatal moral and social
consequences ; for it legalizes all crime and des-
potism.
73. The opinion of Rousseau, that Tnan is anti-social,
and that by force of circumstances he passes froTn the
savage to the social state, is false. — This theory is based
on an absurd hypothesis. (1) Nowhere has man lived
in the solitary and savage state. (2) Rousseau aflSrms
that man is born good, that he is endowed by nature
with sensitive faculties and with liberty,* and that
society depraves him by giving him the use of reason
and the development of intelligence ; but these are
* Liberty, however, as Liberatore observes, cannot even be con'
•eived without reason.
OIVIL SOCIETY. 461
absurdities so manifest that it is needless to refute
them. (3) The hypothesis of the compact makes so-
ciety impossible; for how could men in the savage
state have the notions necessary to comprehend the
nature of the social state and realize it by the help of
a contract ? (4) This contract would be without
force ; whence it follows that men would be free to
Jjreak it when it seemed good to them.
ART. ni. — THE PEIMITIVE FACT THAT BEDUCES TO ACT
THE NATUEAL SOCIABILITY OP MAN.
4. By the very fact of his existence man is constituted
in society. — Since men have the same end, the same
law, they form a universal society under the authority
of God. Yet this society is too general, too abstract ;
individuals need for the satisfaction of their wants a
less extensive society, having a visible sanction and a
positive form. This society is civil society.
75. The natural and primitive fact that gives rise
to civil society is the multiplication of families coming
from the same stock. — The causes which actually pro-
duce a political association vary according to time,
place, and person. In one place it may be a con-
tract between several families of different origin ;
again, it may result from the domination of some
powerful man. But these are fortuitous and variable
events. The fact which naturally gives rise to civil
society is the multiplication of families coming from
a common source. For as families are multiplied,
their homes must also be multiplied ; as new rela-
tions are established, the city is formed, and with it
civil society is constituted, at least in its essentials.
462 MORAL PHILOaOPHT.
AET. IV. — END OF CIVIL SOCIETY.
76. The end of civil society is the common external good,
regulated so as to procure the individual internal good qf
all the Tnembers, and subordinated to their last end. —
Nature always furnishes tlie means to fulfil the duties
which she imposes ; but she does not give society the
means to know and to act directly upon the interior ;
therefore society can procure only the common exter-
nal gpod of its members. But this is a good only so
far as it is a means of arriving at their internal good
and future good. Therefore society ought to procure
their external good so as to facilitate the acquisition
of their internal and future good. When it is said
that society should pursue a common good, such a
good must be understood as may be shared by all
the members of the society. Social justice would be
violated if even one member were excluded from par-
ticipating in the common good.*
77. It is an error to hold with Kant that the end of
•political society is the reciprocal limitation and harmony
of the liherty of its members. — This principle, which is
only a consequence of the theories of rationalism on
the native independence of man, is false, because it
gives society rather a negative than a positive end,
and leads directly to egotism and despotism. 1. For
if society is limited to preventing any one from using
his liberty to the detriment of that enjoyed by others,
* Russo (§ 330) places the end of civil society in the easier and
fuller attainment of the security, well-being, and perfection of
the citizens. By security he means immunity from the evils pro-
ceeding from physical and moral causes ; by weU-heing, an abun
dance of material goods ; by perfection, the development of the Intel,
lectual and moral faculties of the citizens.
CIVIL 800IETT. 463-
it will not unite individual forces for the pursuit of a
common good, and each one will act in isolation from
the others ; or if it unites its forces for the pursuit of
a determinate good, it can do so only by the help of a
despotic power. 2. The principle of Kant, besides,
results in the ruin of public morality and in indiffer-
entism of the State in religious matters; for many
crimes, such as blasphemy, suicide, etc., etc., do not
encroach upon the liberty of others, and to prescribe
a public profession of faith would be to restrain the
liberty of each one more than is demanded by respect
for the liberty of others. Besides, though liberty in
the abstract is not limited, yet in the concrete it is
limited both by its object, whose order and end it may
not change, and by the duties of the person who is to
exercise liberty.*
AET. V. — ELEMENTS OE OmX SOCIETY.
78. The essential elements of society are Tuultitude
and authority, i.e., subjects and superiors. — Society forms
a moral body ; but in every body there must be the
members that compose it and the principle that unites
them. In the social body, the members are the per-
sons that enter into it ; they are called the rnultitude ;
the principle which produces unity and order among
these members is authority. ■\ Multitude and authority
considered in the concrete are the subjects and supe-
riors.
* See Liberatore, p. 335.
f " Civil authority consists in the right of establishing order in a
multitude with a view to attain the end of the state ; civil subjection
lies in obedience and in the duty of following the direction given by
authority for the attainment of the end. Hence it follows that
authority differs widely from dominion, and civil subjection from
464 MORAL PHILOSOPHT.
79. The social multitude results proximately from the
family, not from the individual. — Kousseau, basing
his statement on tlie hypothesis of the state of nature
and on the social contract, conceived society to be a
union of individuals, and not of families. This asser-
tion is contrary to the progress of nature, which pass-
ing from the imperfect to the perfect, first gives birth
to domestic society and then produces civil society.
Domestic rights are anterior to civil rights ; they are
more restricted, more indissoluble. Civil society is
bound to protect them, but it cannot modify them.
Since, then, individuals belong to the family before
they become members of civil society, they form civil
society only inasmuch as they are already constituted
in the family. Besides, the laws are here in accord
with reason, since they admit the child to the full
enjoyment of his civil rights" only when he has at-
tained his majority and has thus passed from domes-
tic to civil society.
80. The natural constitution of society should he or-
ganic and not Tnechanical. — Society is a whole whose
servitude. For dominion . . . consists in the power of dispos-
ing at will of something for one's own use. Now dominion is con-
cerned with things, not persons ; its use proceeds from liberty, not
duty ; its end is the utility not of others, hut of the owner. Au-
thority, on the contrary, is directly concerned with persons ; its
exercise is prescribed by reason ; it regards not the profit of the
superior, but the good oi the whole community. Now the slave as
such is compared to things ; he depends absolutely on the will of his
master ; in his actions he intends not his own profit, but that of his
master. But nothing of this is found in the subject, who even as
such retains his personal dignity and right, is directed not by the
caprice of another but by law, . . and acts not for the private
good of the ruler, but for the common good of the whole social body
of which he is a part." — Liberatore, Insidtutiones EtMoB ei Jiiiii
Xfaturalii, p. 341.
CIVIL SOaiETT. 465
parts are not inert beings having only the artificial
movements imparted to the whole, but intelligent
and free beings, each with his own activity and end.
And not only of individuals severally is it true that
they have their own life and activity, but also of par-
ticular associations entering into civil society, such
as industrial or scientific unions, and especially those
which originate in the family. Therefore the consti-
tution of society should be organic. Hence it is
easily seen how contrary to the order of nature is
that exaggerated centralism which robs individuals
and societies of all spontaneity, and makes all social
activity proceed from a single principle.
AET. VI. — NATURE OF CIVIL AUTHOEITY.
81. Civil authority is the moral power, one and inde-
pendent, to direct the actions of the citizens to the com-
mon good. — 1. The civil authority is called moral to
distinguish it from purely physical force, and also to
mark the fact that it is founded in the rational order
of things. 2. This authority should be one, other-
wise it would not establish unity and order in the so-
cial body. Nevertheless, this unity of authority does
not exclude a multiplicity of instruments by which
the authority functions ; thus, under the supreme
head, there are ministers, magistrates, officers, etc.
3. The civil authority should be independent; if it
were dependent on those whom it governs, it could
not direct them toward the common end. But this
independence of authority does not imply that it be
unlimited; it is necessarily subjected to the moral
order and circumscribed in its sphere of action by its
proper object. 4. The authority should direct the ac-
tions of the subjects toward the common good. Yet, as
30
466 MORAL PHILOSOPBT..
in the man clothed with public authority we must
distinguish the individual from the authority with
which he is vested, it is certain that this individual
as such can also seek his particular good.
AET. TII. — ORIGIN OF CIVIL AUTHORITY.
82. Civil authority in itself proceeds directly from
God. — Civil society is natural to man, and authority
is an essential element of this society. Therefore su-
preme power is a right proceeding from nature itself.
But what proceeds from nature has God for its imme-
diate author; therefore supreme power in society
proceeds immediately from God. Besides, in virtue
of the natural law, God wills the maintenance and
observance of order. But order is maintained in so-
ciety only by authority. Therefore authority is willed
by God and proceeds directly from Him.
83. The cause that primarily determines tJie subject of
supreme power is accidentally the consent of the memiers
of society ; hut, naturally, it is found in the pre-existent
authority of domestic society. — In certain cases, the
consent of society determines the man who is to pos-
sess civil authority, a power that in itself has pro-
ceeded directly from God. This happens when, for
example, a society is suddenly formed by the union
of several independent families,* or when, a dynasty
becoming extinct, society is for the time without a
ruler. But these cases are purely accidental ; accord-
ing to the order of nature the supreme power is of it-
self constituted in civil society by the very principle
of the society. For civil society cannot be conceived
without the authority that directs it ; therefore the
— *■ «
* As in some of the early settlements in America.
OiriL SOCIETY. 467
principle ot this authority is identical with the princi-
ple of civil society. But civil society is, so to say,
only a development of domestic society ; for the state
supposes towns or villages, which in their turn have
originated in the septs or clans that are the develop-
ment of the family ; therefore civil authority itself is,
as it were, a kind of development of domestic author-
ity.
84. It is an error to say, with Hohhes, that war hdng
the natural condition of mankind, they have established
among them to stop it a supreme power, invested with all
their rights and with unlimited jurisdiction. — Accord-
ing to Hobbes, civil power is of purely human institu-
tion, like society ; the latter, inasmuch as it is a moral
person, is absorbed, and ceases to be anything, while
the monarch is all. This theory sanctions the most
degrading despotism.*
85. It is an error to say, with Rousseau, that the civil
authority, de jure and de facto, has its origin in social
compact. — This theory is false in its principle that
human liberty is inalienable, i.e., incompatible with
civil subjection, and it makes society radically -im-
possible. For, on the one hand, since all men enjoy
the same rights, the collective will which establishes
public authority should be unanimous ; but this
unanimity is absolutely impossible of realization.
On the other hand, even if unanimity of particular
wills were possible, it would never be other than
momentary and transitory, because fathers cannot
contract for their children, and also because the right
*From the principle of Hobbes enunciated in §95 (Moral Philoso-
phy), p. 412, it follows that " Nature dictates to every man the right
to seek his own happiness, the highest end of his being, at what-
ever expense to his fellow-njen. The state of nature, therefore, !s a
state of warfare among men." — New American Gyclop(Bdia.
468 MORAL PHILOaOPHT.
of the multitude being inalienable, according to Rous-
seau's teaching, it can break the contract when such
action seems good to it. Therefore, the theory of
Kousseau, as experience has indeed proved, is pro-
ductive of only anarchy and disorder.
It is replete with absurdities. It puts forth as a
means of preserving liberty intact the spoliation of
all individual and personal rights. It destroys moral-
ity, since it recognizes no law superior to the multi-
tude, and it leads to socialism and communism.
AKT. Vin. — DrVEESE POLITIES.*
86. The three forms of government to which all others
may l)e reduced are monarchy, ansloeracy , and democ-
racy.— Supreme power is essential to society ; but
the subject of this power varies with the times, the
places, and the persons. But the subject of supreme
power is either a physical person, i.e., an individual ;
or a moral person, i.e., a union of several individuals
for a common end. In the former case, it is a mon-
archy ; in the latter it is an aristocracy if those
banded together to govern are the most notable in-
dividuals of the society ; or it is a democracy \ if the
people govern themselves by representatives whom
they name. To these three forms of government all
others may be reduced.
87. Every polity that rests upon a just title is in it-
self legitimate and capable of procuring the happiness
of the people. — The civil power, although primarily
* " The distribution of power in the state, and especially of the
sovereign power, is called the polity.'' (Aristotle.)
f This is representative democracy as opposed to pure democracy.
The latter is rarely workable, for it implies that all the mejnbers of
the community share directly in the government.
OiriL 800IETT. 469
derived from domestic power, is yet susceptible of
several modifications. Reason demands a polity for
every society, but not this or that particular polity.
"Therefore, if the power resides justly in one or in
many, it is legitimate. It is also suited to procure
the happiness of the people, because to this end three
things suflice : light of intellect, rectitude of will, and
strength of execution ; but these three things may, be
present, whether the power resides in a single in-
dividual or in many persons.
88. With respect to a particular people, the polity
which suits it iest is that which corresponds most per-
fectly to its inanners, its character, and its degree of
civilization. — It is with the happiness of society as
with that of individuals ; the same kind of rule does
not suit all. The best for each is that which is most
adapted to his age, his temperament, and his situa-
tion.
89. The polity that best suits a people is the most
legitimate for it. — The happiness of a people lies
chiefly in order and peace. But that there may be
order, everyone must know with certainty who has
the right to govern. Nothing will better produce
this certitude than evidence of legitimate title in him
who governs. In general, says Zigliara, "that polity
is best which best secures the end of society and is
shown by history to be most firm and lasting."
90. The goodness of a polity depends not so much
upon the form of government, as upon the probity of
those ivho govern. — The form of government is like an
instrument which by force or skill may be used for
good or evil. This is proved by experience ; and
hence the great political problem should be to seek
out the moral means to hold those who govern to
integrity of conduct, rather than the material force
470 MORAL PHILOSOPHT.
that is to keep tliein to duty. Such a means is
religion.
91. Absolutely speaking, simple monarchy is the most
perfect polity ; yet in view of human weakness, monarchy
with aristocracy, or monarchy with democracy, is more
advantageous. — It is evident that the more a govern-
ment is one, the more perfect it is, because greater
order reigns in the State. But no unity can be more
perfect than that of an absolute monarchy. But, on
the other hand, the most advantageous polity is that
which pleases the people most, and which offers the
most safeguards against abuse. But, in view of
human weakness, such a polity is monarchy when
tempered with aristocracy or democracy ; for, on the
one hand, all have the pleasure of sharing more or
less in the jjower, and on the other hand, the ruler
is less exposed to act unjustly, being limited in his
authority and aided by many counsellors.
AET. IX. — MANNEE OF TEANSMITTING SUPEEME POWER.
92. The supreme power is possessed iy right of heredity,
by right of election, or by right of victory. — 1. Transmis-
sion by right of heredity is well adapted to procure
the good of the people. It admits modifications ac-
cording to the usages of the country, which should be
respected ; thus, in certain lands, women are entitled
to succeed to power, and in itself this is not contrary
to the natural law. 2. When the power is communi-
cated by election, the election should be made by those
only whose knowledge and prudence fit them to make
a good choice. 3. Lastly, the acquisition of power
by right of victory, is legitimate only when it is the
result of a just war, and when the good either of the
conquered or of the other nations demands a change
OIVIL 80GIETT. 471
of government, or a forfeiture of their independence
by the conquered people. In all other cases, he who
would take possession of the power, would be a
usurper.
93. A usurper cannot acquire hy force either legitimate
possession or political authority ; iut he ought to he
obeyed in the exercise of his civil mdhorly. It may even
happen that a Mnd of prescription in the usurpation ren-
ders the expulsion of the usurper illegitiTnate. — It is evi-
dent that a usurper cannot by force render the pos-
session of power legitimate, for "usurper" means
one who unjustly has possession. Neither has he
right to distribute political powers among different
social bodies, for, not possessing the rights, how can
he dispose of them? But although a usurper pos-
sesses civil authority illegitimately, the authority is
just in itself, since society cannot exist without it ;
therefore society should obey this authority, which,
in the case of usurpation, can have no other organ
than the usurper. And if it should happen that with
time he would so strengthen himself that his expul-
sion would involve the subversion of social order, it
would then be unlawful to atterhpt to drive him out.
This the good of society demands ; and in such a case,
the legitimate head ought to forego his rights, or at
least to suspend their exercise, because evidently he
ought not to sacrifice the general good to his private
interest.
ABT. X. — ^EXERCISE OF SUPREME POWER.
94. Supreme power includes three powers which are es-
sential to it : legislative power, executive power, and judi-
ciary power. — Legislative power is the right to impose
on subjects rules of conduct to instruct them in what
472 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
ihej ought to do and what not to do in the interest
of social order. Executive power is the power to
oblige the members of society to observe the laws im-
posed on them. Judiciary power is the right to
judge what is in conformity with justice and what is
not, and to apply the law to particular cases. These
three powers are essential to supreme power ; with-
out the first it cannot give direction to the social
body ; without the second this direction would be de-
prived of all efficacy ; without the third it would re-
main abstract and without application. Although
both executive and judiciary power are subordinate
to legislative power, yet each of these three powers
is absolute in its sphere.
95. The legislative power cannot touch the constitution of
the State ; it can he exercised over all those external ads
which may he necessary or useful to the public good. —
Since the legislative power can be exercised qnly in
virtue of the rights which it holds from the constitu-
tion of the society, evidently it cannot touch the con-
stitution itself. Existence, says the axiom, precedes
action. Constitutive right belongs both to the people
and to the supreme power ; therefore every change
in the constitution must be made by the whole social
body and not bj^ the power alone. Outside of what
affects the constitution of the State, the legislative
power extends to everything that can procure the
good of the society. But it is clear that it can be ex-
ercised directly upon external acts only, for purely in-
ternal acts do not come under human authority ; nor
can it, as civil authority, interfere in what concerns
religious authority, except to give concurrence and
support.
96. The laws enacted hy the legislative power should
he honorable, useful, universal, and suitable. For this
CIVIL SOCIETY. 473
end the legislative power should know the wants of the
people and choose wise and prudent men to judge of the
fitness and goodness of the laws. — The laws enacted by
the legislative power should be honmable, otherwise
they would deviate from the universal end of man,
which is the moral good. They should be useful, for
they would not otherwise refer to the particular end
of society, which is the external good of its members.
They should be universal, i.e., they should embrace all
the individuals, not excepting the law-giver himself in
his capacity of private person. They should be su'it-
able, i.e., they should be adapted to the customs of the
people for whom they are made. Hence he who ex-
ercises legislative power, must have the means of
knowing the wants of the people and must be sur-
rounded by men whose wisdom and probity will be a
help to him in judguig of the fitness and morality of
the laws.
97. The executive power should he faithful, strong, and
prudent. — (1) The executive power should he faithful,
i.e., subject to the laws.* If it were used arbitrarily
and against the law, it would be despotism. (2) It
should be strong, otherwise it would be without effi-
cacy. The force with which it should be endowed,
requires, first, that there be a perfect subordination in
all those who concur in the administration of the
State, so that the movement proceeding from the su-
preme power may be communicated promptly and
faithfully even to the last instruments of power. On
the other hand, the executive power should be able to
exercise sufficient coercive power to repress or pre-
vent the resistance offered to the law. (3) The execu-
' But this fidelity is perfectly consistent with reprieve or even par-
don In individual oases, if such exception tend to the common good.
474 MOBAL PHILOSOPHY.
tive power should he prudent, lest it becqme odious.
Since the subjects enjoy liberty, they should be di-
rected not by violence, but with such wisdom that
they will voluntarily obey the law.
98. The judiciary power _ is divided into civil and
criminal. The former should he easy of access and such
that the judgment may he given surely, promptly, and with
the least possihle expense to the parties. The latter should
punish evil in such a way that the penalty he as expiatory,
medicinal, exemplary, and moderate as possible. — The ju-
diciary power, which, rigorously, may be regarded as
part of the executive power, is divided into civil and
criminal. The civil judiciary power judges the col-
lisions of rights which arise among the members of
society. That it may answer the needs of society, it
is evident (1) that it should be of easy access, particu-
larly to those of the lowest ranks in society. (2)
There should be certainty in the judgment, and for,
this purpose there must be several judges, who should
be capable and honest ; within certain limits, appeal
to higher tribunals should be possible. (3) It is
necessary that justice be administered promptly. and
with the least possible expense to the litigants, be-
cause order demands that a violated right should be
restored as soon as possible, and that the reparation
should not be too onerous to the litigants.
The criminal judiciary power punishes crime as
being a disturbance of the social order. The punish-
ments which, it inflicts should be necessary and suf-
ficient : necessary, otherwise they would not safeguard
the rights of all nor even those of the guilty ; suf-
ficient, otherwise they would not establish society in
security. They will be such if they are reparatory of
the troubled order, medicinal for the guilty, or at
least exemplary for others, and lastly, as moderate as
OiriL SOCIETY. 475
possible. But this moderation does not furnish an
argument against capital punishment. For whatever
several modern philosophers, as Beccaria (1738-1794),
Bentham, and Ahrens (1808-1874) say against this
punishment which has been inflicted at all times and
among all peoples, it is not only just, but very often
necessary ; because certain crimes are of such a nat-
ure that the punishment of death is just and propor-
tioned to their enormity, and this punishment is de-
manded by the public security to impress a salutary
fear upon the wicked. On the other hand, if author-
ity has the right to punish, even with the penalty of
death, it has also the power to grant pardon. This
power is limited only by the rights of the injured
persons or those of social order.
99. The three functions of supreme authority consid-
ered in their exercise demand different sxibjects ; consid-
ered in their source and principle, they require hut one
subject. — The three principal functions of supreme
authority are operations of different nature and
demand diverse qualities, which can with difficulty
be found in the one individual. Besides, in view of
human weakness, the union of these functions in a
single person would easily occasion great abuses. It
is, therefore, necessary that they be exercised by dif-
ferent persons. But it is with these functions as with
the operations of the soul, which, although necessarily
performed by different faculties, are, nevertheless, one
in their principle, which is the soul. In like manner,
the functions of the supreme power must be one in
the principle from which they emanate, otherwise
there would be disorder in society. Those who, fol-
lowing Montesquieu, have boasted so much of the di-
vision of powers, have paid too much attention to
possible abuses and not sufficient to society's absolute
need of order and peace
476 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
AET. XI. — DUTIES OF THE EULEE AND HIS SUBJECTS.
100. The ruler ought: 1. To know th^ art of govern-
ing ; 2. To practise the art with an upright loill ; 3. To
choose for office instructed and prudent men ; 4. To pro-
tect the rights of the citizens, especially of the loeak and
poor; 5. To increase daily the public prosperity ; 6. To
assure intellectual and, above all, moral and religicas
progress ; 7. To remove the causes of material calamity
and, in particular, those that favor tlie propagation of
error, vice, or irreligion. — These duties are derived from
tlie very nature of supreme authority. Since public
authority exists in society only to maintain it in order,
and to enable it to attain all the perfection of which it
is capable, it is evident that the ruler, both in himself
and through those whom he has associated with him-
self in the exercise of his power, should do all that is
possible to procure the threefold perfection, physical,
intellectual, and moral, of his subjects both as indi-
viduals and as a social body. To this end he will
establish an efficient system of police for the preven-
tion of crime ; he will enact salutary laws prohibiting
the spread of doctrines opposed to the primary truths
of religion, and the publication of aught that offends
good motals. He will protect the national industries,
and try to secure to all a moderate competence, al-
ways tempering the rigor of the law with the clem-
ency befitting his dignity and the occasion.
101. TTie duties of subjects are : 1. Resped for their
ruler ; 2. Obedience to the laws and to the magistrates
charged with their execution ; 3. Love of country. — The
authority of the ruler is a participation of God's
authority ; therefore it must be honored and respect-
ed. Authority is always sacred and inviolable ; the
CIVIL 800IETT. 477
qualities of the person who is its depository may dim
6r enhance its lustre, but they do not change its nat-
ure. Secondly, subjects should obey the laws and
the magistrates charged with their execution. Power
holds from God the right to command and to make
laws ; therefore, not to obey the laws is to resist God.
But when the laws are evidently opposed to the divine
will, the right to command ceases, and obedience, far
from being obligatory, would be sinful. In the doubt
the presumption is in favor of the power.* The Ihird
duty of subjects is love of country. The social body
to live and prosper demands the services of those who
compose it. Therefore the State has the right to de-
mand these services in order to attain its end ; but
love of country is a duty common to all, without being
the sa,me for all. In the love of country a twofold
error is to be avoided : the one is seen in those who
not limiting themselves to finding their country dearer
to their heart than any other, exalt it beyond measure
and believe that they should attribute to it all kinds
of perfection. The second is the error of pagans, who
make their country a kind of divinity to which they
must sacrifice everything, even the personality of the
individual, all duty and justice.
* On resistance to de facto government, Balmez {History of Euro-
pean OivUization, chap. 54), writes : 1. " We cannot, under any circum-
stances, obey the civil power when its commands are opposed to the
divine law. 3. When laws are unjust, they are not binding in con-
science. 3. It may become necessary to obey these laws from mo-
tives of prudence ; that is, in order to avoid scandal and commo-
tions. 4. Laws are unjust from some one of the following causes :
When they are opposed to the common weal — when the legislator
outsteps the limits of his faculties— when, although in other respects
tending to the good of the common weal, and proceeding from com-
petent authority, they do not observe suitable equity ; for instance,
when they divide unequally the public imposts." See also Zigliara,
M. 55, xvii.
PART III.
THE COMMON LAW OF NATIONS.
102. Nations attain the perfection proper to them only
when they constitute a universal society. — Man tends nat-
urally at all times to enlarge the circle of his social
relations ; the ultimate term of this tendency is the
universal association of people. The collection of
rights and duties resulting from this universal asso-
ciation constitutes the common law of nations, which,
like individual and social law, has its foundation in
nature itself.
CHAPTEE I.
Natural Eelations existing between Dippeeent
Nations.
103. Among independent societies, considered abstractly,
there exists a perfect equality of rights and duties ; in-
equality can arise only from concrete facts. — Indepen-
dent societies, considered abstractly, are only the so-
cial nature reproduced many times ; but reproduction
is not change ; therefore they are perfectly equal.
But three kinds of concrete fact, viz., origin, consent,
and right, may produce inequality among the socie-
ties. Thus, colonies depend on the mother country
by origin ; the weak consent from need to submit to
NATURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS. 479
the powerful ; those who have acted unjustly are
punished in virtue of violated right.*
104. International love is the hasis of all the duties of
nations to one another. — If nature imposes on individ-
uals the duty of loving one another, with much
greater reason does it impose this duty on nations,
who represent man in a state of greater perfection.
But while the love that we owe others must be recon-
ciled with that which we owe ourselves, the love
which one nation owes another must be in harmony
not only with that which it owes itself, but also with
that which is due to its citizens.
105. The mutual relations hetween nations hind their
rulers directly, and all the individuals mediately. — This
results from the fact that rulers represent the societies
which they govern.
* ' ' The common law of nations, or t\iejus gentium of the old schools,
comprised certain principles or rules of justice, which were recognized
as laws in all or nearly all nations; not, however, by any compact either
expressed or implied which they entered Into. These laws were
common to nations . . . not by convention but by coincidence
of judgment. To this kind of law was referred the division of prop-
erty ; also, the introduction of slavery ; the transferring of supremo
authority from the multitude, to which it is primitively and naturally
given, to a ruler, who, for the ends of government. Impersonates
the multitude ; the punishment of certain enormous crimes with
death, etc. This common right of nations was understood to include
not only general laws regulating internal order among the citizens of
each nation ; but other laws also which governed the intercourse of
nations with each other. . . . International law as a special and
complex department of jurisprudence, is of more recent origin."—
Hill, Moral Pliilosophy, pp. 327, 338.
CHAPTEE II.
Peaceful Eelations between Dipfeeent Nations.
art. i. — ^the duties peesceibed by the love of one
nation foe anothee.
106. Nations are hound in justice to respect the inde-
pendence and the territory of other nations, and to put no
ohstacle to their perfectio7i. — A nation as such lives in
virtue of its own independence ; to deprive it of
this is to cause its death politically. So, to violate
its territory is to violate its right of property, a right
more sacred in a nation than in an individual. Last-
ly, to foment discord in the bosom of another people
and to propagate vice or error in it, is also opposed
to the law of nations.
107. Nations ought in benevolence to aid one another,
but only in so far, hoivever, as will not injure themselves. —
The duties of benevolence bind nations no less than
individuals. Therefore they ought to aid one another
to acquire intellectual and moral perfection, and to
oifer assistance in civil troubles and public calamities.
ART. II. — COMMEECE.
108. Commerce is necessary to procure the good which
nations ought to wish one another. — Nature produces
different products in each country ; therefore, that
every country may have all that is necessary or use-
ful to it, the different nations should exchange their
PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS. 481
products with one another. This exchange not only
develops the material prosperity of nations, but also,
as experience shows, singularly favors their progress
in civilization.*
109. Every nation has the right to establish commerce
with those nations who may wish to exchange their
products with it; it has also the right to prohibit the
exportation of its own merchandise or the importation of
foreign merchandise and to subject the latter to^ imposts.
— It would consequently be contrary to international
law if one nation should arrogate to itself the right to
establish commerce to the exclusion of other nations.
It would also be contrary to international law if one
nation should be denied its right of prohibiting the
importation or the exportation of merchandise and.of
subjecting them to various taxes. This right has its
foundation in the independence of the nation and in
its duty of warding off whatever may injure its ma-
terial or moral well-being.
AET. III. TREATIES AND THE EIGHT OF EMBASSY.
110. Treaties are contracts between nations, and are
subject to the same laws as contracts between indi-
viduals.—
* Commerce "develops intelligence by the number and variety of
the objects which it examines, the sight of distant places to which,
thanks to interchange of commodities, it conducts man by land and
8ea, by its constant incentive to the intellect to contrive new ways
of extending trade, by the mutual communication of minds which
it brings about, by contact with diverse manners, whence arise
mutual moderation and greater development of resources." Yet
care should be taken that the liberty given to commerce have just
limits; that the rich and powerful do not oppress the weak and
Indigent; that occasion be not taken to introduce evil morals and
overstock the market with useless articles; that exportation hi
not excessive. Cf. Liberatore, vol. iii., p. 344*
31
482 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
Treaties are valid only in so far as their object and
end are conformed to justice and good order ; they
are dissolved by the same causes that remove the ob-
ligation of contracts between individuals. Treaties
are equal or unequal according as the terms are equiv-
alent or not. They are personal or real according as
they directly and primarily regard the ruler himself
or the State.
111. The right of embassy is necessary to p^-eserve the
relations that sTwuld exist among nations. — Peoples and
their rulers cannot preserve the relations which they
should have with one another without the aid of
persons to represent them ; therefore the right of
embassy is founded in nature, as are also the relations
which the nations should preserve with one another.
112. The principal duty of embassadors is loyalty ;
their principal prerogative is inviolaiility. — Since the
mission of the embassador is to maintain the peaceful
relations existing between two nations, he can do
nothing that would be a subject of legitimate com-
plaint, and should strive unceasingly to strengthen
the bonds that unite them. On the other hand, the
nature of his office claims the privilege of inviola-
bility and the liberty of communicating at will with
the government that he represents. Hence he is not
subject to the nation to which he is sent.
CHAPTEE m.
Wab.
abt. i. — ^nature and justice op war.
113. War is a state of two or more nations contending
hy violence to maintain their right. — Nations have
rights as well as individuals ; therefore, as individ-
uals may maintain their rights by force, so also inay
nations ; yet with this difference, that individuals
may through virtue sacrifice their right, while nations
in most cases cannot do so without failing in their
duty to the citizens. War is said to be a state, because
it includes the whole period of hostile feeling
and action between the two nations. It is called a
conflict of nations, for they are the subject and term
of war. The definition adds iy violence, to distinguish
war from peaceful contention ; and to maintain tJieir
right, to mark the end of just war.
114. War is either offensive or defensive. — It is offen-
sive when it attacks an enemy in peace ; it is defen-
sive when it repels the invasion of an enemy that has
first attacked.
115. 7%at a war he just, it is necessary : 1. that the
cause he just f 2. that the war he truly inevitable ; 3.
that it be made hy puhlic authority ; 4. that it he made
with the purpose of procuring an honorable peace ; 5.
that it he puhlicly proclaimed ; 6. that it he lawful in
the means which it employs. — 1. The motive of war
should be the repairing of an important right vio-
484 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
lated in a determinate manner, and not a motive of
glory or utility. 2. It should be inevitable: the evils
brought on by war are so great that to make it legiti-
mate all means ought to have been employed previ-
ously to settle the dispute peacefully. 3. Since war
is a social act, it should be made by the authority
of him who represents the society. 4. It should be
made only in view of peace, since it is itself a state
contrary to nature, and hence lawful only as a neces-
sary means of restoring harmony between nations.
5. It should be preceded by a public proclamation,
at least on the part of the aggressor, otherwise -he
would act as a pirate and not as a civilized man. 6.
War should employ none but legitimate means.*
ART. II. DUTIES DURING AND AFTER WAR.
116. During the war'no more damage should he done
than is necessary to repulse the enemy and oblige him to
repair the violated right j the laws of justice and humavr-
ity should he observed not only ivith neutral peoples, hut
also with the enemy.— 1. No violence should be used
upon neutral States, unless they are bound by some
preceding treaty. 2. The license of soldiers should
be held in check, so that they may cause no harm to
inoffensive individuals, nor give themselves up to pil-
lage and conflagration, nor outrage morality or relig-
ion.f 3. Faith should be kept in conventionsj armis-
tices, etc. 4. Peace should always be proposed as
* War begun to spread religion is unjust, but not war under-
talien to defend it against evU aggressors.
t Hence it is forbidden to use means not necessary to repel the
enemy and affecting those also who offer no violence; as the poi-
soning of water and food supplies, and the causing of pestilence.
WAR. 485
end, and should not be rejected when it can be
granted on jnst conditions.
117. After the war, the conq%eror shovid demand
nothing more than is necessary to assure an honorable
peace and to compensate for the damage caused hy the
war. — The conqueror should be quided by the rules
of justice and equity, and should not forget the ties
of mutual love that still bind nations, even when one
of them has been unfaithful to its duty.* Yet if the
peace of his own nation or of other states require it,
he may, if the war has been just, deprive the con-
quered nation of its independence.
* Killing in war is always indirect, as in cases of self-defence.
Consequently, a similar train of reasoning is to be applied. In
capital punishment only is the killing direct
CHAPTEK IV.
The Society of Nations.
118. 'I%e nations are destined iy nature to unite under
« new and more extended form of society. — The nations,
finding themselves in contact with one another, are
obliged to aspire to a common good, which consists in
order ; it is, therefore, the design of nature that they
form a universal society. The same conclusion is
drawn from the need which nations experience of
associating for their material, intellectual, and moral
development.
119. The universal society of nations, far from injur-
ing their independence, is its surest guarantee. — As civil
society is the most powerful protection of the domes-
tic order, s6 the universal society of nations is des-
tined to assure the national independence and upright
government of each of the associated peoples.
120. The authority destined to rule this universal
society is naturally polyarchical, hut it may also he mon-
archical.— Nations are in themselves equal, therefore
they all naturally share the authority in the person
of their representatives who are united in a general
assembly. Yet it depends on their will to delegate
the whole power to one, as happened in the empire of
the middle ages.
121. The associated nations should apply themselves to
the gradual formation of a government endowed in the
highest degree with unity and efficacy ; and this govern-
THE 800IETT OF NATIONS. 487
■ment should have threefold power, legislative, executive,
and judiciary. — The goYernment of this universal
society should possess the conditions of all govern-
ment. The more it is one and efficacious, the more
will harmony reign among the nations. If all inter-
national controversies and all the abuses of power by
those who govern could legitimately be summoned to
its tribunal, there would soon be an end of all inter-
national or civil war.
APPENDIX ON EELIGIOUS SOCIETY.
ABT. I. — NATUEE AKD OEGAOTZATION OF THE CHURCH.
122. Besides domestic and civil society man also needs
religious society. — Just as man is impelled by the in-
stinct of his nature and by his reason to form domes-
tic and civil society, so also is he solicited to place
himself in religious society. For there lies upon all
men a necessity to meet together to manifest the in-
most sentiment of their hearts, namely, the religious
sentiment, and to help one another both in the belief
and the practice of religion. To this natural inclina-
tion there is added the precept of reason, which pre-
scribes to man to pay worship to the divinity in his
totality as an individual and as a social being. If
from the natural order one rises to the supernatural,
then the necessity of religious society appears even
more evident. For man cannot attain his super-
natural end if he is not a member of that visible
society, the Church, which Christ established to unite
within its pale all the peoples of the earth.
123. jReligious society has for end to render God the
worship due to Him and to enable men to arrive at eternal
happiness. — Eeligious society has no other end than
that of religion itself, i.e., divine worship and the
happiness of man in the other life. This end, which
belongs necessarily even to natural religion, is, in the
Church of God, of a more elevated order, the order of
grace. But religion enables us to attain not only the
RELIGIOUS SOOIJBTT, 489
happiness of the other life, but, as appears from both
reason and experience, it is the most certain means of
assuring in the present life the happiness of the in-
dividual and of society.
124. Since the end of religious society depends neither
on persons nor on places, hut solely on the immutable and
universal relation of men loith God, it is in its nature one
and universal. — This unity and universality, though
resulting from the very essence of religion, yet, in
view of the diversity of the character and manners of
nations, would be impossible to the unaided powers
of nature. But God by His grace has remedied the
defect of nature, and has established unity and uni-
vorsality in His Church.
125. The form of government in the Church of God
is a simple monarchy, tempered in the exercise of its
power with aristocracy and democracy. — The form of
government in the Church is a simple monarchy, since
the supreme power resides in a single person, who is
the Sovereign Pontiff. It is tempered in the exercise
of its power by a kind of aristocracy ; for, in the
councils, the bishops, in union with the Pope, exercise
supreme jurisdiction, and in their own dioceses they
are true spiritual princes, making laws and exercising
all the other functions of power. But, besides this,
there is in the Church an element of democracy, in
this sense that no one is excluded from even the
highest ecclesiastical functions. Thus, even from a
rational point of view, the Church may be styled the
most perfect of governments : it has the unity of
monarchy, the expansive action of democracy, and
with all this the temperament of a strong aristocracy.
126. The Church is a true spiritual kingdom, established
by God among men, entirely distinct from the civil power,
and of a much nobler order. — The Church is distinct from
490 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
the civil power. For its members are spread over the
whole world, its end is supernatural, the form of its
government proceeds directly from God, it exercises
a direct influence on the moral order ; while civil
society is. restricted to a particular country, its end
is temporal and natural, its actual polity depends on
the liberty of men, its influence is exercised directly
only upon the external order of things. Hence it is
evident, that the Church is of a more elevated order
than civil society.
ABT. n. — BIGHTS OF THE CHUECH.
127. The Church has the right to spread through the
whole world and does not need the consent of the civil
power. — This right evidently arises from the duty
which Christ has imposed upon the Church of preach-
ing the Gospel in the whole world.
128. The Church has the right to constitute itself
wherever there are faithful, and to establish mijiisters as
the organs of its spiritual authority. — The faithful are
the subjects of the Church, whom it should direct
and govern wherever they are to be found. It can
accomplish this duty in so far only as it has the right
to constitute itself according to the order of its divine
hierarchy in every place where the faithful are.
129. The power of the Church is threefold — legislative,
executive, and judiciary. — Since this triple power ap^
pertains necessarily to every society, it should belong
also to the Church. But because this power in the
Church is of divine institution, it possesses this triple
power without division, and nothing can prevent its
exercise.
130. , The Church has the right to use coercive power,
and even material force. — If the Church had not
EELiaiOUS SOOIETT. 491
this right, its authority would be vain. Eecourse to
material force is often necessary to the Church to
repress culpable external acts of men. Moreover,
because the swerving of the will takes its rise in the
senses, it is necessary to act upon the senses to restore
the equilibrium of man's moral nature.
131. The Church has the right of permanent property
and can possess temporal goods. — This right belongs
naturally to every society; therefore it belongs to
the Church. Without permanent property, it could
not provide for its subsistence and would lack the
necessary means to attain its end.* Hence in the
designs of Providence the Temporal Power acquired
by the Popes was a means to secure "the free
and undisturbed development of their sublime pre-
rogative." t Ever since they were despoiled of their
possessions in 1870, they have not ceased to claim
" that freedom be again restored to the Holy See by
the recovery of the temporal power." J
132. The Church has the right to institute religious
orders or associations, in which the faithful profess a
m,ore perfect life with determinate rules, under the gov-
ernment of a special authority lohich is dependent on the
Church. — This right is only a consequence of that in
virtue of which the Church develops freely within the
limits of its proper activity and its proper end. This
belongs to the Church, just as to the State appertains
the right to establish particular associations, such as
armies, academies, etc., which serve to defend it and
make it prosperous. To impair this right of the
* See Propositions xxvi., xxvii., of the Syllabus.
f American Catlwlics and the Temporal Power of the Pope, by
Joseph F. Schrofeder, D.D., American Gatholic Quarterly Bemew, ToL
xvii., p. 72.
X Encyclical Inscrutabili, April 21, 1878.
492 MORAL PMILOSOPHT.
Church is to impair the rights of the citizens, whom
no human authority can prevent from taking- the
means to attain their end with the greatest security.
AET. ni. — MUTUAL EELATIONS OF CHUECH AND STATE.
133. The Church is entirely independent of the State. —
The Church has for its object the supernatural and
divine order, while the State has for its object the
natural and human order. Therefore, unless it be
granted that the divine order is subordinate to the
human, the Church cannot be subordinate to the
State. Secondly, the Church is immutable ; therefore
it cannot be subject to the State, which by its nature
is various and changeable.
134. In the present condition of society the temporal
power is necessary to tlie independence of the Church. —
To protect the independence of the Church, it is in-
dispensable that the Pope reside in a place where no
other power reigns ; otherwise he could be harassed
in the exercise of his ministry, or at least doubts could
be raised as to the full liberty of his acts. And since
there is no middle term between prince and subject,
it follows that the Pope can be independent in that
place only in which he is also temporal prince.
135. The State cannothe separated from the Church. —
The end of the State cannot be separated from the
end of the Church, since the former is a means to at-
tain the latter. Secondly, were the State to separate
from the Church, there would be great embarrassment
for the conscience of subjects if the State should
impose laws contrary to those of the Church, which
would not fail to happen frequently. Hence as the
Church comes to the aid of the State in maintaining
the citizens in the love of duty and in obedience to
BBLIQIOUS SOCIETT. 493
leg-itimate authority, so the State should lend support
to the Church in defending its rights, in facilitating
the exercise of its ministry, and in repressing those
who might wish to impede its action.
136. AWiougli the State is independent in the exercise of
the power proper to its institution and end, yet absolutely
it is subordinate to the Church.— Just as the Church
should be supreme in the order of religion, so the
State should be supreme in the civil order, because
it also constitutes a perfect society, distinct in its
origin, end, and means. Men should, therefore, obey
the State in temporal matters, but the Church in spi-
ritual matters. But because the end of the Church is
much more elevated than that of the State, the State,
absolutely, should be subordinate to the Church. If
there be a collision of rights, that of the Church
should prevail.
4.ET. IV. — BELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND INTEB-
NATIONAL SOCIETY.
137. 77ie Church naturally gives rise to a universal so-
ciety among nations. — Without religious association
the universal society of nations is impossible, because
union cannot exist among men differing in belief and
customs. Besides, owing to the passions of men, union
cannot long subsist where the powerful restraint of
religion is wanting to keep them in bounds. Kelig-
ious association, on the contrary, leads naturally to
temporal association. Thus, from the religious com-
munion which the Church establishes among the na-
tions subject to her, there naturally follows a union
of even temporal interests. But the universal society
which the Church naturally establishes, although es-
sentially united to the Church and subsisting in the
494 MORAL PHIL080PEY.
Church, is, nevertheless, a society distinct from the
Church in nature, formation, end, and means.
138. Although the authonty in this universal society
is naturally poly archie, yet from its nature it is fitting
that it should he vested in the person of the Sovereign
Pontiff. — The temporal rights of nations remain com-
pletely independent of the Church; therefore each
has a right to share in the authority which is to-
govern the universal society. But this authority
naturally tends to revert to him who is the best fitted
to secure the social good ; therefore it will be f oiind
especially in the person of the Sovereign Pontiff, who
on account of the influence of his religious authority
and the moral power inherent in his office, is the most
proper person to secure order, peace, and mutual as-
sistance among the nations.
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
The history of philosophy goes back to the very
origin of the human race. In all times man has
sought to know the cause of the phenomena of which
he was witness. Neviertheless, if we except the monu-
ments of Oriental philosophy, to which it is difficult
to assign a precise date, authentic works are not older
than the sixth century before the Christian era. It is
only from this date that we can follow without inter-i
ruption the progress and succession of philosophical
•Yorks down the ages. The long intervening period
may be divided into three general epochs : the first
epoch, that of ancient philosophy, begins with Thales
(B.C. 600) and ends with the death of Proclus (a.d.
485). Oriental philosophy, though anterior by some
centuries, is included in this epoch ; the second, that
of the middle age, extends from Boethius (a.d. 500) to
Gerson (1395) ; the third, that of modern philosophy,
begins with the movement of the Benaissance in the
fifteenth century.
AliTCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
Oeiental Philosophy. ,
Oriental Philosopliy comprises all that is known af.
tiie speculations of the human mind in the Orient, and
principally in India, China, and Persia. The oldest
writings in which we can trace the primitive philoso-
phy of India are the sacred books known as the
Vedas, the compilation of which is attributed to
Vyasa about the twelfth century before Christ.
Pantheism is the basis of the religious system con-
tained in these books, yet it is especially in the
Vedanta, a philosophical work also attributed to
Vyasa, that it is presented in its greatest metaphysi-
cal precision and accepted with its most exaggerated
consequences. Ancient India has likewise produced
a great number of philosophical works in which the
most contradictory systems are in turn exposed.
The strangest theories of our days — materialism, ide-
alism, scepticism, and others — have thqir counterpart
in the Hindoo philosophy. The rules of reasoning,
those of the syllogism in particular, are presented
with such precision and detail that we know not
whether it is to Greece or to India that the priority
of the science of logic belongs. Yet, in spite of this
variety of philosophical systems, it is pantheism that
predominates in the Hindoo religion and literature,
and from it several sects have deduced not only ideal
but even moral arid practical consequences.
ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 497'
It is likewise in the Kings, the sacred books of
China, that we must seek the first traces of its phi-
losophy. The Kings date back to the remotest anti-
quity ; they contain principles that deviate little from
the true primitive traditions, and embody remarkable
ideas of God, of man, and of the relations existing
between Creator and creature. About the sixth cen-
tury before the Christian era these books gave rise to
two schools of philosophy, which at the same time
constitute two religious sects. One is metaphysical,
that of Lao-Tseu : his doctrines greatly resemble
those of Pythagoras and Plato. The other school,
founded by Confucius, is chiefly moral. It is the
peculiar character of his doctrine that it reduces all
the virtues to filial piety, from which, again, it derives
all duties, whether toward family, country, or God
Himself. This doctrine, apparently so beautiful, has
exerted a fatal influence upon China. By confounding
family and country, Confucius has made the Chinese
nation a race of children, blindly subject to their sov-
ereign. About the thirteenth century of the Christian
era a new school was formed in China, and by this
materialistic pantheism was propagated.
The doctrines of ancient Persia are contained in
the writings known as the Zend-Avesta and attributed
to Zoroaster. The dominant idea of the Zend-Avesta
is dualism ; it bases everything in the universe on the
antagonism between Ormuzd, the principle of good,
and Ahriman, the principle of evil ; men are good or
bad according as they follow the one or the other of
these principles.
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
PiKST Period (e.g. 600-400).
Greek Philosophy may be divided into three pe-
riods. The first (e.g. 600-400) extends from Thales to
Socrates. It comprises five distinct ■ schools : the
Ionic, the Italic, the two Eleatic schools, and the
school of Sophists. All the philosophers of these
different schools proposed to themselves above all
else to solve the problem of the origin of things.
The Ionic school, of which Thales of Miletus (B.C.
587) is the founder, studied the universe from a phys-
ical stand-point and began with the observation of
phenomena. Thales said that water was the origin
of things, that God was the intelligence who together
with water forms beings; Anaximander (e.g. 560) de-
rived all things from the slime of the earth ; Anaxi-
manes (e.g. 530) assigned the air as their principle ;
whereas Heraclitus (e.g. 500) asserted that it was fire.
According to Anaxagoras (e.g. 475) the primitive
elements of bodies are of several different species,
but attract one another in proportion as they are
like in nature. He returned to the idea of God, which
Thales had taught, but his successors had cast into
oblivion. — Empedocles (e.g. 450) combined all these
systems ; he admitted four elements, water, earth, air,
and fire, and a motive principle to unite and divide
them.
ANGIENT PHILOSOPHY. 499
The Italic school was founded by Pythagoras (b.c.
540). He taught that numbers were the principle
of all things, and as all numbers begin from unity, he
concluded that absolute unity is the first principle.
In his doctrine, he did not, like the Ionic school, con-
fine himself to the physical order, but included the
moral order and established the subordination of
matter to spirit. — The principal, disciples of Pythag-
oras were Timseus of Locris, Ocellus of Lucania, and
Archytas of Tarentum.
The two schools of Elea followed the steps of the
Ionic and the Italic school. One of these, the atom-
istic, had for its leaders Leucippus and Democritus
(B.C. 590), who explained everything by eternal atoms
infinite in number. The other, the metaphysical
school, had three chief representatives : Xenophanes
(B.C. 536), Parmenides (B.C. 465), and Zeno of Elea
(B.C. 450), who denied finite realities and professed
the most formal pantheism.
The last school is that of the Sophists, the most
celebrated of whom are Gorgias (b.c. 430), and Pro-
tagoras (B.C. 422). These sceptics, in presence of the
contradictions of the philosophers who had preceded
them, concluded that there was no absolute truth and
that man could not arrive at any certain knowledge.
Second Period (b.c. 400-200).
In the fourth century before Christ, Socrates (B.C.
399) opened a new era of philosophy. Eejecting the
speculations and systems of preceding schools, he
aimed to give philosophy a practical end, and ap-
plied himself to the study of man and of the moral
world. He taught that the soul contains the germs
of truth, but so choked up by the vain opinions to
500 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPBT.
wHcli tlie passions give birtli, that for their de-
velopment it is necessary to begin by freeing it
from these false notions. And such was the method
adopted by Socrates in teaching, and since called
Socratic induction.
Immediately after Socrates come four schools of
little importance : 1° The Cynical school, founded by
Antisthenes (b.c. 380), which placed virtue in a haughty
independence of external things. — Diogenes (B.C. 324)
was the most complete representative of this school ;
2° The Cyrenaic school, founded by Aristippus (b.c.
380), which taught that the end of life consists in the
pleasures of sense ; 3° The Sceptical school, founded
by Pyrrho (B.C. 288), who referred all philosophy to
virtue, inferred the inutility of science, and sought
to prove its impossibility; 4° The Megaric school,
founded by Euclid (b.c. 400), whose philosophy was
the doctrine of Xenophanes modified by Socratic
influence.
These schools had little power ; but not so the
four great schools that produced the philosophic de-
velopment promoted by Socrates : 1° The school of
Plato, or the Academy ; 2° The school of Aristotle, or
the Lyceum ; 3° The school of Epicurus ; 4° The
school of Zeno, or the Portico.
Plato (B.C. 388) is one of the greatest geniuses of
antiquity. In his numerous works he has developed
great and sublime truths whenever he takes the tra-
ditional beliefs for his basis, but he falls into error
when he accepts no other guide than his own reason.
Thus he has erred upon most of the great questions of
philosophy : on the origin of ideas, on the criteria of
certitude, on the nature of the union between soul and
body, on the unity of the soul, its origin and destiny.
The principal writings of Plato are : Orito, on the duty
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHT. 501
of the citizen ; Phmdo, on immortality ; the First Ald-
iiades, on the nature of man ; the Second Alcibiades, on
prayer ; Gorgias, on the end of rhetoric and of justice ;
Protagoras, on sophists ; the Republic, on the plan of an
ideal city ; and the Laws. As to form, the works of
Plato display an admirable perfection ; it is through
this especially that the philosopher has exercised so
profound and extensive an influence both in ancient
and in modern times.
Aristotle of Stagyra (b.c. 331), a disciple of Plato,
surpassed his master in the depth and extent of his
knowledge. Metaphysics and natural history, logic
and physics, and poetry, he has embraced all. The
theory of the syllogism comes from him, and has re-
ceived from him a complete exposition. His works
on physics and natural history were for centuries a
recognized authority. On the nature of bodies, on
the soul and its faculties, on ideas, he has taught
doctrines that are full of deep truths and were the
basis of the great labors of the Scholastic philoso-
phers. Nevertheless, he has fallen into very grave
errors, especially in morals and politics, for he was
buried in the darkness of paganism. — Of the Peri-
patetics, or disciples of Aristotle, the chief are The-
ophrastus (b.c. 322) and Straton (b.c. 289).
Epicurus (B.C. 309) professed the atomistic doctrine
of Democritus. Egoism and skilfully calculated
pleasures — such is the summary of his morality,
which all ages have justly branded with disgrace.
When introduced into the Roman empire, Epicurean-
ism found an eloquent interpreter in the poet Lucre-
tius (B.C. 50), who contributed not a little to propa-
gate its tenets.
Zeno (B.C. 300), the founder of Stoicism, taught a
doctrine which, in its physical theories, touched on
502 HISTORY OF PHIL080PHT.
Epicureanism, and, ia its morals, on Platonism. In'
his opinion there is nothing but body ; everything is
subject to the laws of fatality ; all cognition is derived
from sensation. As to ethics, justice should be the
sole motive of man's actions ; to be truly wise, one
must repress all the emotions of the soul ; .justice is
the only good, injustice is the only evil ; sickness and
death are neither good nor evil. From this it is evi-
dent that Stoicism is contradictory in its principles
and in its morality. — The principal Stoics were Chry-
sippus (B.C. 230) ; and later Seneca (b.c. 30), Epictetus
(B.C. 50), and the emperor Marcus Aurelius (a.d. 161).
The school founded by Plato had been styled the
Academy. By the name of the Old Academy that
epoch has been designated during which Plato's dis-
ciples respected his doctrines ; by that of the Second
or Middle Academy, the epoch that witnessed the first
reform of Plato's teaching' ; and by that of the New
Academy, the epoch in which a second reform was
attempted. — Arcesilas (b.c. 260) was the founder of
the Middle Academy^ : he reduced all human certitude
to probability under the name of acatalepsy. — Carne-
ades (B.C. 180) founded the New Academy. According
to him, objective truth exists, but man is incapable of
attaining anything beyond a more or less probable
conjecture. The principles of the New Academy were
spread in the Roman world, and found their most il-
lustrious exponent in Cicero (b.c. 43), who formulated
no system of his own, but faithfully reproducied the
doctrines of the Greek philosophy. In his philo-
sophical writings he has treated all the great ques-
tions, sometimes with positiveness, and again with
doubt.
About this same epoch there was a g^asi-resurrec-
tion of the old school of Pyrrho ; doubt was again
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHT. 503
systematized and presented as the necessary term of
all philosophic labors. — ^nesidemus (b.c. 20) pro-
fessed a positive and rigorously formulated scepti-
cism. But it was Sextus Empiricus (a.d. 180) who,
of the ancients, exposed scepticism with most science
and extensiveness ; he attacked all the doctrines of
his predecessors and strove to convict them of un-
certainty.
Thibd Peeiod (a.d. 200-500).
The third period of ancient philosophy begins with
Christianity and ends with the invasion of the barba-
rians. It, may be divided into three distinct schools :
1° The Gnostic school ; 2° The Neoplatonic school ;
and 3° The Christian school.
Gnosticism is a mixture of Oriental doctrines and
Christian dogmas ; it gave birth to divers systems, all
of which, however, may be reduced to two, pantheism
and dualism. Pantheism is seen in the systems of
Apelles (150), Valentinus (160), and Carpocrates (170).
The speculations of Saturninus (120), of Bardesanes
(160), and of Basilides (130), spring from the principle
of dualism. The Gnostic ideas developed by these
systems concurred to produce the doctrine of Manes
(274) or Manicheism, a combination of Persian dual-
ism and Hindoo pantheism with the dogmas of Chris-
tianity: this doctrine exercised a powerful influence
for several centuries. Eventually the Gnostic systems
were transformed, and their principles became the
basis of various heresies, such as Arianism, Nestori-
anism, and Eutychianism.
The Neoplatonic school, called also the school of
Alexandria, from the name of the city which was its
chief asylum, had for its leading professors : Ammo-
504 HISTOBT OF PHILOSOPHY.
nius Saccas (200), Plotinus (245), Porphyry (290), Jam-
blicus (300), Hierocles (400), and Proclus (450). These
philosophers undertook to unite Oriental and Greek
philosophy. A like attempt had been made in the
first century by Jewish philosophers, among others by
Philo (40) ; but, properly speaking, the head of the
Neoplatonic school was Plotinus. These Alexandrians
devoted themselves for the most part to occult prac-
tices of theurgy ; they were the sworn enemies of
Christianity, from which, however, they borrowed not
a little.
The principle Christian philosophers of the first
centuries are : St. Denis the Areopagite (95), St. Justin
(160), St. Irenseus (200), Athenagoras (200), Tertullian
(240), Clement of Alexandria (210), Origen (250), Lac-
tantius (320), and St. Augustine (480). These writers,
grounding their teachings on the dogmas of religion,
attained to the highest and best founded speculations.
Their ideas, even in purely philosophical matters, far
excel all the conceptions of their predecessors among
the philosophers. Moreover, they gave a practical
end to their vast labors, for, on the one hand, they
combated the false doctrines of the pagan and heret-
ical philosophers ; and on the other, they always
contemplated science in its relation to virtue. Most
of them had been disciples of the Greek philosophy ;
they borrowed thence whatever was true, and strove
to apply it to the truths of religion. Their writings
have served as a preparation and groundwork for the
labors of Christian philosophy.
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
FiBST Peeiod (6th to 9th Centuey).
The disordered state of society which followed the
invasions of the barbarians interrupted the great
philosophic movement of the first ages of Christianity.
From the sixth to the ninth century there were few
philosophers : in the West, Boethius (525), Cassio-
dorus (575), Claudian Mamertus (474), Isidore of
Seville (636), and Bede (735) ; in the East, John Philop-
onus (650), and especially St. John Damascene (754).
Boethius forms the link between ancient and medise-
val philosophy. He sought to reconcile whatever was
true in the Greek philosophers with the dogmas of
Christianity. He became a high authority for the
following centuries ; his writings, and among others
his book On the Consolation of Philosophy, were for a
long period used in the school-room. St. John Dam-
ascene, like Boethius, united the study of philosophy
to that of theology ; at a later date his works also had
great credit in the schools of the East.
Second Peeiod (9th to 13th Century).
aeabian philosophy.
Under the reign of the caliphs Haroun-al-Easchid
and Al-Mamoun, the Arabs bisgan to cultivate the
science of philosophy. The principal masterpieces of
506 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHT.
Greece were translated into their tongue ; the books
of Aristotle in particular were much studied. — The
most ancient of the Arabian philosophers is Alkendi
(800), who merely commented upon Aristotle. Al-
Farabi, who lived about a century later, made logic
the principal object of his labors. — In the tenth cen-
tury appeared Avicenna, who was long counted in the
first rank of the masters of medicine, and is still re-
garded by the Orientals as one of their chief philoso-
phers. He commented on the logic and metaphysics
of Aristotle, but considerably modified several of the
Stagyrite's important theories. — Al-Gazel, who lived
in the eleventh century, employed his entire resources
in dialectics to destroy all systems of philosophy ; he
held that one could escape doubt only by having re-
course to the revelation of the Koran. In the East
the attempt of Al-Gazel infiicted a blow on philosophy
from which it could not recover. But this was the
very time when it was cultivated with more eagerness
than ever in. the Academies which the caliphs had
founded in most of the cities subject to the Saracens.
Far difierent from Al-Gazel was Avempace (1138), a
native of Saragossa, who taught that philosophic
speculation was the sole means by which man could
know himself; his doctrine tended to exclude the
supernatural. Avempace had among his disciples
Thofail (1185), whose system is pantheism. — But of all
the philosophers that Islamism has given to Spain,
the most celebrated is unquestionably Averrhoes
(1168). He made extensive commentaries on jail the
works of Aristotle. He composed, besides, several
original treatises, of which the substance is Peripa-
teticism, but carried to consequences which Aristotle
would have disclaimed. In the opinion of Averrhoes,
there is none but a universal intelligence, in which all
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. 507
intelligent beings share without haying an intelli-
gence of their own. By this and other doctrines he
opened the way to pantheism, so that even the -Mus-
sulmans condemned his works. Some of his Peripa-
tetic ideas were developed by a disciple of his, Moses
Maimonides (1209), a Jewish philosopher and the
greatest light of the Hebrew people since the preach-
ing of the Gospel. A century previous, another Jew,
Avicebron, also gained great renown as a philosopher ;
he taught doctrines whose consequences were panthe-
istic.
The Philosophy of the Schools befoee St. Thomas.
With Charlemagne the culture of the sciences and
literature was begun anew with ardor in the West.
Alcuin (804) was the principal instrument in the hands
of the emperor to create new schools and make them
prosper. Under Charles the Bald, Scotus Erigena
(886) became famous ; he was of Irish birth, but passed
the greater part of his life in France. His doctrines
are pantheistic, and he labored in vain to reconcile
them with the Christian dogmas. About the middle
of the eleventh century great philosophic works began
to be published. St. Anselm (1033-1109) wrote his
two treatises, the Monologium and the Prosologium, in
which, with no aid but reason, he rose to the highest
conceptions of the divine essence.
It was at this epoch that philosophy was brought
back to a problem with which it had formerly been
engaged, the problem of universals, of genera and
species. Plato had thought that universals had an
existence in themselves apart from particular indi-
viduals ; Aristotle had regarded them as concepts of
the intellect corresponding to the essences contained
508 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHT.
in the existing- entities ; however, he did not present
his opinion with sufficient clearness, and it may re-
ceive different interpretations. Toward the end of
the eleventh century, Eoscelin, a canon of Compiegne,
revived the question. He maintained that the univer-
sals contained in generic and specific ideas were mere
words and consisted in names only : hence the desig-
nation of nominalism given to his theory. St. Anselm
was one of his most ardent adversaries, and victo-
riously combated the heterodox consequences which
Eoscelin drew from his system. William of Cham-
peaux (1121) considered the universals as essences
common to several individuals, which were, therefore,
distinguished from one another by merely accidental
differences. This doctrine, which gave an objective
reality to universals as such, was called ultra-realism.
Abelard (1142) attacked the theory of his former
teacher, William of Champeaux, and invented a third
system, conceptualism, which regarded universals as
mere concepts of the mind, and was, after all, only
disguised nominalism. Nominalism and conceptual-
ism tended to serious errors, even to atheism and
materialism ; hence they were generally rejected by
the Catholic schools. As to realism, it is of two
kinds : one considers the essence as having an indi-
vidual subsistence apart from the mind and receiving
its universality in the intellect ; the other regards the
essence as possessing an abstracted and universal
reality apart from any mental operation. The former
is m,oderate realism, and was accepted and defended by
St. Anselm and the other great philosophers of the
Schools ; the latter is ultra-realism, which was sus-
tained by several, among others by Gilbert of Porree
(1154), bishop of Poitiers, and has been solemnly con-
demned by the Church.
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. 509
One of those who shone with greatest lustre in
these philosophic disputations was Peter Lombard
(1159). His chief work is the book entitled The Mas-
ter of the Sentences, in which he has collected the sen-
timents of the Fathers on the principal points of the-
ology and philosophy. This book exerted a powerful
influence ; it was for a long period a text-book which
the professors explained in their schools.
At this epoch the dissemination of the complete
works of Aristotle within the universities, which till
then had known them only in part, and the appear-
ance of the Arabian philosophy, gave a new impulse
to philosophic studies. Unfortunately the ardor which
then carried minds away, and the enthusiasm for Aris-
totle'and his Arabian commentators which then fired
them, weakened religious faiith and submission to the
authority of the Church. Amaury of Chartres (1209)
and David of Dinant (1220) taught, the one, idealis-
tic pantheism, the other, materialistic pantheism, and
thus drew upon themselves the anathemas of the
Church. But while the works of Aristotle and the
Arabian philosophers brought trouble into the schools,
two religious orders sprang up destined to furnish
illustrious defenders of the truth. The Franciscan
Alexander of Hales (1245) and the Dominican Albert
the Great (1280) became celebrated as much by the
depth and extent of their learning as by the orthodoxy
of their teaching. Their works, together with those
of "William of Auvergne (1248), bishop of Paris, were
a preparation for the immortal masterpieces to be
produced by Bonaventure and Thomas of Aquia.
510 HI8T0RT OF PHILOSOPHY.
Apogee op the Scholastic Philosophy (13th Cek-
tuby).
Around William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales,
and Albert the Great was grouped a great number of
illustrious philosophers and theologians, as Vincent
of Beauvais (1264), whose Speculum Majus (General
Mirror) was a kind of encyclopaedia of all the sciences ;
Henry of Ghent (1295), sumamed the " Solemn Doc-
tor," from the authority of his doctrines ; and Roger
Bacon (1294), whose vast intellect foresaw some of
the most important discoveries of modern science.
But among all these, two men became especially
famous in the thirteenth century; they soared by
their genius above all their contemporaries; they
are St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas of Aquin.
St. Bonaventure was bom in Tuscany in 1221. He
entered the order of Franciscans and studied at Paris
under Alexander of Hales ; by his sanctity, as well as
by his science, he merited to become the general of
his order. He was made bishop and cardinal by
Gregory X., and assisted at the second council of Ly-
ons, where he died in 1274. St. Bonaventure's princi-
pal philosophic work is his commentary on The Master
of the Sentences. He teaches that all science comes
from God and should lead to God; therefore he
makes all the cognitions of reason concur to the ser-
vice of the divine science, and in all things he seeks
the hidden element by which they are referred to
God ; hence the elevation and sublimity to be re-
marked in his writings, and that have won for him
the surname of " Seraphic Doctor."
His rival in learning was St. Thomas of Aquin,
sumamed the "Angel of the Schools." He was born
MEDIEVAL PniLOSOPHT. 511
in the kingdom of Naples in 1227, and embraced the
religious life in the order of St. Dominic. After
studying philosophy and theology at Bologna under
Albert the Great, he followed him to Paris, where
he subsequently taught with great distinction. He
died in a monastery of Italy in 1274. His philo-
sophic ideas are embodied chiefly in the Theological
Sum, the 8um against the Gentiles, the Commentaries
on all the parts of Aristotle's philosophy, and several
special treatises on questions of metaphysics and
morals. Pope John XXII. declared that St. Thomas
of Aquin diifused more light in the Church than all
the other doctors together. In fact, in his numerous
works are to be found arguments to defend all truths
and to combat all errors. Hence they have at all
times possessed the greatest authority in the schools
and among the learned, and the Theological Sum,
merited a place on the same table with the Bible at
the Council of Trent. By his vigorous attacks on
the Arabian philosophy, St. Thomas destroyed its
credit and reduced it to complete impotence. He
took from Aristotle whatever was true, refuted his
errors, rectified what was defective and incomplete ;
by thus enlisting the philosophy of the Stagyrite in
the defence of the truth, he put an end to the perni-
cious influence which it had long exercised in the
schools. By a luminous distinction he cleared up
the difficult problem of universals. He showed that
the essence has a different manner of being accord-
ing to whether it is considered as having a real ex-
istence or as having an ideal existence, and thus he
avoided the error of both nominalists and realists.
He threw light upon the most difficult questions of
metaphysics ; and his doctrines on God, the nature
of spirits, the composition of bodies, the origin of
612 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHT.
ideas, the rights and duties of man, have even to this
day lost none of their authority. Moreover, it is
from St. Thomas of Aquin that philosophers as well
as theologians most frequently borrow their argu-
ments for the defence of truth.
Thied Peeiod (14th and 15th Centuries),
decline of scholastic philosophy.
The teaching of St. Thomas was continued by his
disciples, among others by Egidio Oolonna (1316).
But in the face of this body of doctrine, which had its
principal defenders in the Dominican order, there
arose another in the Franciscan order whose solutions
differed on several points. Its founder was Duns
Scotus (1308), called the "Subtle Doctor," whose
numerous works give proof of his remarkable power
and his great subtility in dialectics. But this subtil-
ity was nowhere carried further than in the Com-
hinatory Art of Eaymond LuUy (1315), who pre-
tended that by logical procedures a mechanical
means is given to the intellect for the solution of
all questions.
While Durand de Saint-Pour§ain (1334) appeared
in the order of St. Dominic as the adversary of St.
Thomas, Will? am Ockham (1347) among the Francis-
cans opposed both St. Thomas and Duns Scotus, and
revived the nominalism of Eoscelin, in which action
he was followed by John Buridan (1360) and Peter
d'Ailly (1420). Thus it happened that lively discus-
sions were raised in the universities, and they led to
such errors that many a time the Holy See was
obliged to interfere.
MEDIEVAL PHILOaOPHT. 513
,0n the decline of scholasticism several philoso-
phers made a name for themselves by remarkable
■works ; among them should be noted the chancellor
Gerson (1429), who in some of his writings restored
intuitive and mystic philosophy.
3S
MODEEN PHILOSOPHY.
1. FiBST Period (End of 15th, and 16th Centubt).
EPOCH OP TRANSITION.
At the end of the fifteenth century, and during the
sixteenth, many writings were published relating' to
philosophy without strictly constituting a system.
The Greeks, Theodore of Gaza (1478), George of
Trebizonde (1486), and Cardinal Bessarion (1472),
published commentaries on the books of the ancient
philosophers ; Angelo Poliziano (1474) in Italy, Ulric
Ton Hutten (1523) and Erasmus (1536) in Germany,
attacked the Scholastic philosophy ; Marsilio Fici-
no (1499), the Florentine," became the panegyrist of
Plato; Pico della Mirandola (1494) in Italy, and
Reuchlin (1522) in Germany, taught doctrines that
were a mixture of theology and cabalistic ideas.
Yet some philosophers gave a systematic form to
their conceptions. Cardinal Nicholas de Cusa (1464)
distinguished himself by his depth and originality.
He restored certain Pythagorean ideas to honor and
anticipated the exposition of the Copernican system
of the earth's motion. Paracelsus (1541) taught a
kind of illuminism which was subsequently professed
by Van Helmont (1664) and Boehme (1&25). All three
derived the science of the physical world from theos-
ophy. Telesio (1588), on the contrary, excluded God
from his theory of the world. Thomas CampaneUa
MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 615
(1639) was one of Bacon's precursors, and explained
the whole man by the faculty of sensation. Pom-
ponazzi, or Pomponatus (1526), taught among other
errors that the soul is mortal and destitute of all
liberty. Jerome Cardano (1576) became noted by his
most extravagant doctrines. Giordano Bruno (1600)
professed a pantheistic system and prepared the way
for Spinoza ; he regarded the world as an infinite or-
ganism, of which God was the soul. Vanini (1619)
was burned at Toulouse as an atheist. Peter Ramus
(1572) undertook a reform of logic, and combated to
the last extremity the philosophy of Aristotle. Mon-
taigne (1592) regarded the reason of man as naturally
incapable of arriving at certitude ; in this he was in
part followed by his disciple Charron (1603).
2. Second Period.
philosophy of bacon, descabtes, and leibnitz.
Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, was born at London
in 1561. He played an important part in the affairs
of his country and was made baron of Verulam by
James I. He died in 1626. His principal work is
Novum Organum Scientiarum. In this work he as-
sails the philosophy of Aristotle, and seeks to replace
it by a new system. After a criticism of the syl-
logism, he gives a classification of the sources of
errors, dividing them into four categories, which in
bis own quaint language he designates as idols of the
tribe, the prejudices common to all men ; idols of tJve
den, individual prejudices; idols of the Tnarket-place,
prejudices due to language and the commerce of men ;
and idols of (he theatre, prejudices due to the authority
516 HISTOBT OF PSILOSOPET.
of masters. Bacon then assigns a practical end to
science ; he lays down the laws of experimentation,
and gives the method of observation and induction
as the means of progress in the sciences. The soul
of Bacon's philosophy is the principle that sensations
are the only constituent in the formation of human
cognitions. This principle, developed by his disciples,
was destined gradually to insure the triumph of ma-
terialistic doctrines.
Descartes was bom in 1596 at La Haye, in Tou-
raine. He at first embraced the military state ; then,
after travelling in several countries of Europe, he
withdrew to Holland, where he devoted himself ex-
clusively to works, the plan of which he had already
conceived. He made important discoveries in phys
ics and mathematics. In philosophy he desired to
effect a reform, and he made a vigorous attack on the
theories of Aristotle. Having drawn persecution upon
himself by his doctrines, he sought refuge with Queen
Christina, at Stockholm, where he died in 1650. His
principal philosophical work is the Discourse on
Method. It contains six parts. The first comprises
his criticism of the science handed down by the
schools. In the second, after proclaiming the insuf-
ficiency of the syllogism, he formulates his method,
which he reduces to the famous four rules : 1° Ac-
cept as true only what is evidently such ; 2° Divide
every question into as many parts as possible ; 3°
Proceed from the easy to the difficult, from the simple
to the composite ; 4° In enumerations take care to
omit nothing. These rules have been much praised
for depth and originality, but they are pointed out
by nature, and were known and put in practice long
before Descartes published his Discourse. In the
third part, while awaiting the solutions which hia
MODERN PHILOSOPHY. ' 517
reason was to furnish him, he makes provisional rules
of thought and conduct. In the fourth part, he re-
jects by the methodical doubt all his previous opin-
ions, and formulates the celebrated enthymeme : 1
tJmik, therefore I am, on which he pretends to raise
the structure of science. In the fifth part, he de-
scribes the leading ideas in his system of cosmology ;
and in the sixth, he indicates by what means the
sciences may effect new progress. In this discourse,
the value of which has been greatly exaggerated,
and also in his other works of philosophy, Descartes
teaches many errors, which have been made the foun-
dation of most of the modern false systems. And so,
while aiming to create a new philosophy, he has
fallen into error on the great questions of certitude,
of substance, of the union between soul and body,
and others of equal importance. It is to be remarked,
however, that Descartes did not shape his conduct by
these systems, for he showed himself a good Chris-
tian, though his doctrines have been the occasion of
bitter attacks upon the Church.
Leibnitz was born at Leipsic in 1648. His vast in-
tellect embraced all the sciences. In mathematics he
established the basis of infinitesimal calculus, and he
wrote extensively on history, constitutional law, phi-
losophy, and theology. He died in 1716. His prin-
cipal philosophical works are his Essays on Theodicy
and his New Essays on the Human Understanding.
Leibnitz holds that all substances, even material, are
forces ; that matter has its principle in simple and ir-
reducible forces, perfectly analogous to the simple
and irreducible forces that constitute spirits : these
forces he calls monads. The monads cannot act upon
one another ; however, they correspond exactly in
their evolutions in virtue of a harmony pre-established
518' HISTORY OF PHIL080PHT.
by God. In theodicy, he professes optimism, and be-
lieves that this world is the best possible.
3. The Schools of Bacon, Descaetes, and Leibnitz.
The principal disciples of Bacon's school are:
Hobbes, Gassendi, Locke, Condillac, Helvetius, d'Hol-
bach, and Hume. Hobbes (1679) in his works, and more
particularly in the Leviathan, denies the existence of
spirits, reduces the end of man to pleasure, and in pol-
itics acknowledges no rights but those of power and
force. Gassendi (1655) is celebrated on account of the
apology which he makes in various works for the
philosophy of Epicurus. — Locke (1704), in his Essay on
the Human Understanding, recognizes two sources
of ideas : sensation, which furnishes all the elements,
and reflection, which forms from them various com-
posites ; he asserts that it is impossible to demon-
strate the spirituality of the soul, and that perhaps
matter is capable of thought. — Condillac (1780) de-
velops the theories of Locke in his Essay on the Origin
of Human Knowledge and in his Treatise on Sensation.
He takes away reflection as a source of ideas and ad-
mits only sensation. He explains all the operations
of the soul by transformed sensations. From his doc-
trines it is easy to deduce the negation of liberty, of
the soul, and of the existence of God — in a word, scep-
ticism.— Helvetius (1771) applied the principles of
sensism to morals, and reduced virtue to self-interest.
D'Holbach (1789) in his System of Nature supported
the opinion that only material beings exist. — Hume
(1776) drew from sensism a complete system of scep-
ticism.
The principal philosophers of Descartes' school
are : Malebranche, Arnauld, Bossuet, Fenelon, Pascal,
MODEBN PEIL080PHT. 519
Berkeley, and Spinoza. The most noted works of
Malebranclie (1715) are the Search for Truth, the
Chnstian and Metaphysical Meditations, and the Con-
versations on Metaphysics. In these he proves himself
a superior writer and at times a profound philosopher,
but at the same time he teaches erroneous systems
which have justly discredited his works. For in-
stance, it is his theory that we see all in God, even
the material world ; that the soul is only the occasional
cause of the movements of the body. His philos-
ophy tends to idealism and contains the germs of
pantheism. — Antoine Arnauld (1694) made a great
name by his Art of Thinking, commonly known as the
Port-Royal Logic, which he wrote in a week with Ni-
cole (1695), each writing half. — Bossuet (1704) has left
but one work that treats specially of philosophy, the
Treatise on the Knowledge of God and Oneself, in which
he summarizes what is most useful in the science of
God and of the soul. — Fenelon (1715) wrote the Dem-
onstration of the Existence of God, in which he dis-
plays his great depth and originality : in the first
part, he proves the existence of God by final causes ;
in the second, he deduces it from the idea of the infi-
nite.— Pascal (1662), in his Thoughts, aims alternately
to exalt and to humble man at the sight of his great-
ness and his miseries. — Berkeley (1753), in the attempt
to destroy materialism, falls into an opposite excess ;
he denies the existence of the material world and
sinks into complete idealism. — Spinoza (1677), in his
Ethics, revives materialistic pantheism. He gives an
exposition of his system according to the geometrical
method, and forms his theories into a closely linked
chain of reasoning, but he begins with an unsound
principle. It is the false definition of substance given
by Descartes, " Substance is that which exists by it-
520 HISTORY OP PHILOSOPHY.
self (par soij." In his work, Spinoza (1677) sets him-
self to demonstrate : 1° That there is but one sub-
stance, the Infinite Being; 2° That all finite beings
are only modes or attributes of this Infinite Sub-
stance. The famous sceptic Bayle (1706) may also
be placed in the school of Descartes ; in his Critical
Dictionary he impugns the certainty of all human
knowledge.
The influence of the philosophy of Leibnitz was
felt by nearly all the German schools of his epoch, and
inclined them to idealism. Thomasius and Wolf are
its leading exponents. The doctrine of Thomasius
(1655) presents a singular combination of sensism and
mysticism. Wolf (1764.) was the continuator of Leib-
nitz, whose doctrines he coordinated into one great
system of philosophy.
4. The Scotch School and the Geeman School.
Even in England the doctrines of Hobbes and
Locke had encountered marked opposition. Hut-
cheson (1747) strove to banish sensism from the
domain of morality, though he allowed it to remain
as the basis of psychology. But Eeid (1710-1796) at-
tacked it as a false theory not only of morality, but
likewise of the human mind. He taught for a long
period in the University of Glasgow, in Scotland, and
he is regarded as the founder of the Scotch school.
His chief work is the Essay on the Intellectual Poioers
of Man. He there demonstrates with much justice
and sagacity the insufficiency of sensation to explain
all psychological phenomena, but he also inculcates
some errors on method, certitude, the faculties of
the soul, etc. One of the special characteristics of
his philosophy is his doctrine of instinctive judg-
MODERN PHILOSOPHY. {>91
ments, the truth of which, though not intellectual-
ly perceived is necessarily to be admitted under
pain of drifting into scepticism. Dugald Stewart
(1828), a pupil of Eeid's, continued in his teaching
and his works to apply the method of his master.
He distinguished himself by his spirit of obser-
vation in the study of the phenomena of the human
mind. -
Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) was the founder of th«
German school. He taught for many years at Koenigs-
berg. The most celebrated of his works is the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason, wherein he establishes the prin-
ciples of the philosophical reform which he had begun.
Although he proposed to combat scepticism, yet in
his works he lays the foundations of a complete scep-
ticism and of the most monstrous errors ; but he is
inconsistent with his system and admits the g-reat
truths of the existence of God, the liberty and immor-
tality of the soul.* The chief philosophers connected
with his school are Fichte (1814), Schelling (1854),
and Hegel (1831) ; all three, pushing the ideas of their
master to their utmost limit, drew the logical conse-
quence of an idealistic pantheism which numbers
many adherents in Germany to-day. f
* That is, as postulates of practical reason and because of practical
necessity ; but he affirms that they are unattainable by theoretical or
speculative reason.
f Prom the denial of philosophic certitude, Strauss went a step
farther and denied the historic certitude of the books of the Bible.
In his Life of Jesus (1835) he asserts that Christ is but a myth, his
Gospel but a bundle of myths, embellished by poetic Imagination^'
called miracles. It is from him that Beuan has borrowed most w
his blasphemies
522 HISTOBT OF PBTLOSOPBT.
5. Present Schools m Feance.
Besides tlie German school, strictly so called, there
are many schools at present : 1° The eclectic ration-
alistic; 2° The progressiye; 3° The positivistic and
materialistic ; 4° The ontologistic ; 5° The tradition-
alistic ; 6° The Thomistic. The founder of eclecticism
is Victor Cousin (1866). Among those who prepared
the -way for him are Laromiguiere (1837), Maine de
Biran (1824), and Eoyer CoUard (1825). His principal
disciples are Jouffroy (1842) and Damiron (1864). The
eclectics adopt in general spiritualistic doctrines, but
they reject the supernatural and recognize no au-
thority but that of reason. — The progressive school is
so called because it professes to believe in indeiinite
progress. Its leaders are La Mennais (1854) and Pi-
erre Leroux (1871), whose tenets lead to pantheism. To
this school may be referred the humanitarian and
socialist systems of Fourier (1837), Saint-Simon (1825),
and others, whose utopian schemes have excited the
contempt of all sensible persons. The positivistic
and materialistic school is chiefly represented by Au-
guste Oomte (1857), Littre (1881), and Taine (b. 1828),
who have striven, but in vain, to make the progress
of modern science subservient to the defence of the
degrading doctrines of materialism. — The ontologis-
tic school, renewing the error of Malebranche, has
overlooked the distance that separates man from
God, and teaches that all our ideas are but partial
intuitions of God. This error, which logically ends
in pantheism, has been specially inculcated by Gio-
berti (1852) and Eosmini (1855). — The traditionalistic
school exaggerates the feebleness of human reason,
in the belief that the authority of tradition ahd reve-
MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 523
lation is strengthened thereby ; it has exposed itself
to the attacks of incredulity and atheism, which it
aimed to combat. Its leaders were De Bonald (1840)j
La Mennais (before his fall), and Ventura (1861).
6. Philosophy in England and Ameeica.
The great impetus given to the study of the natural
sciences in this century has led many philosophers,
so called, to give undue importance to the methods
of observation and experiment, and even to apply
them to the solution of some of the gravest questions
in philosophy. Thus, " Mill and his followers drag
down all a pnori laws to the level of the a posteriori,
or rather deny the existence of the a priori laws at
all."* The manifold errors of English philosophy
to-day may be traced more or less directly to this
deplorable confusion of principles. In the domain of
logic, the conceptualism of Sir W. Hamilton and the
nominalism of John Stuart Mill are the result of a fail-
ure to discriminate between the intellectual idea and
the sensible image in the imagination. Both men have
attacked the fundamental principles of knowledge :
Ha;milton asserts that not the principle of contradic-
tion, but the principle of identity, which he formu-
lates as A is A, is the first of all ; Mill declares that
the principle of contradiction is " one of our first and
most familiar generalizations from experience," and
reduces the principle of causation to " invariable and
unconditioned antecedence." In psychology empir-
icism prevails and is supported by Mill, Lewes,
Spencer, and Bain, in England ; by Draper and Fiske,
in America. Now it takes the form of positivism, and,
* Logic, Stonyhurst Series, p. 387.
524 HIST OUT OF PHILOSOPHT.
as its name indicates, accepts as positive only what is
attested by scientific observation and experiment. Of
this school George H. Lewes is the exponent in Eng-
land. Again, it becomes evolutionism and teaches
that "all material and spiritual substances are but
force, or a collection of correlated forces." Herbert
Spencer is the father of this system ; with him Darwin
and Huxley may be associated. In ethics and poli-
tics the same spirit is at work, as may be seen in the
utilitarianism of Mill, the moral system of Herbert
Spencer, and the religion of humanity inculcated by
the school of Comte. As for general metaphysics, it
is all but absolutely rejected as being a series of un-
intelligible, unprofitable, and often unmeaning specu-
lations. Agnosticism is but the negative side of
positivism, for it defines that " the ultimate cause and
the essential nature of things are unknowable, or at
least unknown " — a sad commentary on the enlight-
enment of a Huxley and a Romanes, who profess such
ignorance of what it most intimately concerns man to
know. The German transcendental school has also a
following in England and America.
Since the condemnation of ontologism and tradi-
tionalism by the Church, the Thomistic school alone
remains among Catholic philosophers. This school,
which has never wanted illustrious representatives in
Catholic universities, counts among its prominent sup-
porters, Sanseverino (1873), Kleutgen (1883), Liberatore
(1898), Gonzalez, and Cardinal Zigliara (1893). By their
learned works, these philosophers and their disciples
have repulsed the attacks of error and restored to honor
the grand Scholastic philosophy, justly styled Chris-
tian or Catholic, because as a course it has been
praised, encouraged, and, it may be said, sanctioned
by the Church herself, the infallible guardian of truth.
INDEX OF SUBJECTS.
Numbers refer to pages.
Abhorrence (see Aversion).
Absolute — term, 7 ; proposition, 22 ;
scepticism, 123 ; accidents, 191,
really distinct from substance, 191,
194.
Abstraction, 89 f., 95, 100 f., 277 f.
Abstractive faculty, 89, 100, 277 f.
Academy, 502.
Accent, Fallacy of, 46.
Accessory contract, 448.
Accident, predicable, 9; predica-
ment, 11, 143, 155, 189 f. ; abso-
lute and modal, distinct from sub-
stance, 191, 194; fallacy of, 47.
Act, 163, 163 ; pure and not-pure,
163; first and second, 160; sub-
sistent and non-subsistent, 164 ;
complete and incomplete subsist-
ent, 164 ; substantial and acci-
dental non-subsistent, 164 ; po-
tentiality and, 167 ; of being, 167,
and formal, 163 ; remote and prox-
imate first, 174 (note) ; first, of
matter, 217 ; first, of body, 234 ;
pure, 163, 333.
Action, predicament, 11, 135, 164,
201 (note), 202 (note); transient
and immanent, 175, 177, 202 ; hu-
man, 378 f . ; voluntary, 380 ; elic-
ited and imperate, 380.
Activity, Principle of (see Soul), 314.
Actuality (see Act).
Adversative proposition, 23.
./Esthetics, 61 ; eesthetic sense, 157.
.^vum, 231 (note).
Affirmative proposition, 22.
Age — of man, 211 ; of the world,
209 f.
Aggressor, Unjust, 434.
Agnosticism, 331, 534.
Agreement, Method of, 71 (note).
Ahriman, 497.
Aleatory contract, 447.
Alienation, 13.
Alteration, 13, 201.
Amphibology, 46.
Amplification, 12.
Analogy — of attribution and of pfi»
portion, 6 ; of being, 143.
Analysis, 64, 99 f . ; rules of, 65.
Analytical judgment, 18.
Anger, 383.
Animals, 232 f., 241 ; faculties of,
243 f., 247.
Animism, 331.
Antecedent — of proposition, 34 ; of
judgment, 32.
Anthropomorphism, 365 (note).
Antinomies, 110 (note).
Appetible, 151.
Appetite, 373, 374 ; sensitive, 373 f. ;
rational, 290, 291 ; passions and
sensitive, 383.
Apprehension, Simple, 3, 51, 99, 103.
Ajrgument, 30, 43.
Aristocracy, 468, 470.
Art, 3 (note).
Aseity, 337.
Association of images, 368.
Atheism, 331.
Atom, 306.
Atomic system, 214 f .
Attention, 284 f.
Attribute (property), 10, of proposi-
tion, 18 ; divine, 335 ; absolute
and relative, 335 ; not known di-
rectly, 335; identical with divine
essence, 336. '
Attribution, analogy of, 6.
Augmentation, 12.
Authenticity, 133.
Authority — of common sense, 135,
136 ; as a criterion of certitude,
137 ; of parents over children, 457 ;
in conjugal society, 454; element
of society, 463 ; in the society of
nations, 486.
Autonomy of reason, 466.
Automata, Brutes not, 247,
Axioms, 109 ; of reasoning, 31.
526
INDEX OF SUBJECTS.
Beatitude, 373 f.
Beauty, ] 56 ; elements of, 157 ; real
and ideal, natural and artificial,
moral, 158.
Being, Idea of, 100 ; first formed, 101 ;
being in general, 141 f.; real and
logical, 184 f . ; uncreated and
created, infinite and finite, 187 ;
unity and, 144 ; truth and, 150 ;
goodnesB and, 151 ; contingent and
necessary, 328 ; mutable, ai7, 230 ;
immutable, 338 f.
BUocation, not absolutely impossible,
227 (note).
Blame, 394.
Blessed Sacrament, substance and
Accident, 191, 195, 325 (note).
Bodies, Cognition of , 100 f . ; cognition
of individual, 102 ; accidents of,
194 f. ; first elements of, 214 f . ;
properties of, 225 f.; animate and
inanimate, 240 : animal and plant,
241.
Body, Human, Union of soul and,
315 f.; unity of, 319 f.; resurrec-
tion of, 324 f.; duties of man
toward his, 437 ; suicide, 427 f . ;
mortification benefits, 438 f.; du-
ties toward the bodies of others,
432 f.
Book (see Writing).
Brain, not the sentient subject, 2.55 ;
Irregularities of surface, indicative
of aptitudes and character, 276.
Brutes (see Animals).
Cartesian Doubt, 128 (note).
Categorical proposition, 21 ; kinds
of, 21, 22 ; syllogism, 32.
Categories, 10 f.
Causality, Principle of, 111 f.; ob-
jectivity of principle, 113.
Causal proposition, 33.
Cause, 113, 161; species of, 169;
First, 105, 173, 179 f; of creation,
349 (see End) ; formal, 170 (see
Form); efficient, 11 3 (note), 171 f.;
species of : per se a>ndper accidens^
principal and instrumental, 172 ;
first and second, universal and
particular, univocal and equivo-
cal, proximate and remote, free
and necessary, total and partial,
physical and moral, cause which
and cause hy which^ cause in po-
tentiality and cause in act, 172
f.; exemplar, 170 f.; material,
170 (see Primary Matter) ; final
cause, 179 f . ; species of : subjec-
tive, objective, and formal, ulti-
mate and intermediate, end ot
work and end of agent, principal
and secondary, natural and super-
natural, 179 f.; causes of igno-
rance, 54 ; of error, 55 ; fallacy of
pretended cause, 47.
Celibacy, 453.
Certainty (see Certitude).
Certitude, Species of : common, phil-
osophical, immediate, mediate, of
evidence, of faith, metaphysical,
physical, moral, 53 ; sources of,
117, 133 f . ; ultimate criterion of,
126 ; intrinsic criterion, 126 f. ; ex-
trinsic criterion, 130 f.
Chance, 183, 206.
Change (see Mutation and Motion,
Generation and Corruption).
Children, Duties of, to parents, 456
f . ; to one another, 457.
Chinese philosophy, 496 f.
Christian philosophy, 504.
Church, 488 ; end of, 488 ; indepen-
dent of, 489; polity of, 489; a
spiritual kingdom, 489 ; rights of,
490 f . ; relations with State, 492 f . ;
with nations, 493 f.
Circle, Vicious, 47.
Circumscriptively in place, 303.
Circumstances of human actions,
391 f .
Classification 73 ; advantages of,
73 ; laws of, 73.
Coaotion, property of right, 401 ;
freedom from, 291 ; voluntary
actions and, 380.
Cognition, 351 ; faculties of, 117 ;
begins from material objects, 100
1, 103 ; of individual bodies, 103 ;
the soul's, of itself, 104 ; of God,
104 ; principle of, 109, 161 ; direct
and refiex, 285 (see Universals,
Consciousness ; also Idea, Judg-
ment, and Reason).
Commerce, 480 f.
Communism, 440 f.
Commutative contract, 447.
Compact, Rousseau's Social, 460.
Comparative — proposition, 24 ; judg-
ment, 385.
Comparison 386.
Composite, Natural, 332 ; not a me-
chanical mixture, 323; has only
one substantial form, 233 ; if liv-
ing, has only one soul, 336.
Composition, Fallacy of, 46 ; prin-
ciples of, 161 (see Potentiality and
Act, Essence and Existence, Mat-
ter and Form).
INDEX OF saBJEOTS.
527
Compound—proposition, 31, 33 f.;
syllogism, 40 i.
Comprehension of idea, 5.
Concept, 4 (note) (see Idea).
Conceptualism. 96 f.
Concomitant Variation, Method of,
73 (note).
Concord School, 81.
Concrete idea, 5.
Concupiscence, 382.
Concurrence of efficient cause, 172;
Divine, 359.
Condition, 172 (note).
Conditional proposition, 34.
Conflict of rights, 401.
Conscience, 41.5 f. ; proves free will,
394; rules of, 416 f.
Consciousness, 282 ; object of, 383 ;
Veracity of, 119 f.; not ultimate
criterion of certitude, 129 ; psy-
chological and ontological, 103,
282 ; habitual and actual, 283 ;
testifies to existence, not nature
of human soul, 283 ; not really dis-
tinct from intellect, 284.
Consensual contract, 447.
Consent of mankind, not ultimate
criterion of certitude, 137 ; nature
of, 135 ; as criterion, 135 ; of what
truths, 136, 294, 313, 329, 363;
objections against, 136.
Consequence (see Syllogism).
Consequent of conditional proposi-
tion, 24 ; of syllogism, 34 ; fallacy
of, 47.
Conservation of creatures (see Pres-
ervation); of living bodies, 240.
Constitution of society, 464 ; of
bodies, 314 ; of living bodies, 240.
Contiguity, Kelation of, 272.
Contingent being, 107, 337 ; element
of ideas, 91 f .
Continuity, Law of, 313.
Continuous quantity, 195 ;
Contract, 446 ; conditions of, 446 ;
species of, 447; obligations of,
448.
Contradiction, Principle of, 110;
liberty of, 392.
Contradictory opposition, 11, 25, 36.
Contrariety, Liberty of, 392.
Contrary opposition, 11, 25, 26.
Conversion of propositions, 88;
modes of, 38.
Copula, 30.
Copulative proposition, 33.
Correlatives, 199.
Corruption, 12; substantial, 334 f.;
of books, 133 f .
Created — relation, 196; being, 187.
Creation of the world, 306 f . ; a free
act, 348 ; end of, .349 ; possibility
of eternal creation, 210; creation
and pantheism, 350 f .
Creatures, 337 f.; lead us to Grod, 104
f . ; preservation of, 355 f . ; concur-
rence with Creator, 358.
Criteriology, 117.
Criterion of certitude, 136 f.; intrin-
sic, 136 f . ; extrinsic, 130 ; of mo- •
rality, 388 f .
Critique, 81.
Cult (see Worship).
Culture, Intellectual, 435 ; want o^
54.
Cynical School, 500.
Cyrenaic School, 500.
Daring, 383.
Deduction, 33.
Definite proposition, 23.
Definition, 15 ; species of : nominal
and real, etymological, essential,
genetic, and 'descriptive, 15, 16 ;
rules of, 16.
Definitively in place, 204, 324.
Delectation, 379.
Delight, 383.
Deliria, 303.
Demerit, 394 f.
Democracy, 468, 470.
Demonstration, 57 ; preceded by
methodical doubt, 57 ; presup-
poses three notions, 58 ; conditions
of middle term, 58 ; species of :
a priori and a posteriori, direc**
and indirect or apogogic — pure,
empirical, and mixed, 58 ; method
of, 66 f.
Desire, 383.
Despair, 383.
Development — of man's facultic»s
(see Duty) ; of memory, 271 f.
Dialectic syllogisms, 44.
Dialectics, 3.
Diction, Fallacies in, 46 ; species of :
equivocation, amphibology, fal-
lacy of composition, fallacy of
division, fallacy of accent, fallacy
of figure of diction, 46.
Didactic method, 66 f.
Difference, Specific, 10 ; methoi o^
71 (note).
Dignity, 12.
Dilemma, 41 .
Diminution, 12.
Discrete quantity, 195.
Disjunctive proposition, 34
Displeasure, 383.
528
INDEX OF SUBJE0T8.
Disposition, 200, 300.
Distinction, 146 ; species of : real
and logical, of mind motived and
mind motiving, 147 f.
Division, 16 ; species of, 16 f ; rules
of, 17 ; fallacy of, 46.
Divorce, 454.
Dreams, 303.
Dualism, 333.
Duel, 435.
-Duration, 231 (note); of bodies, 240.
Duty, 396 ; species of : primitive
(natural) and derivative (adventi-
tious), negative and positive, 396 ;
free will and, 397 ; properties of,
397 ; conflict of, 397 ; necessity
exempts from, 398 ; to God, 419 f . ;
to oneself, 425 f. ; in soul and
body, 425 f. (see Suicide, Labor);
to one's neighbor, 430 ; founda-
tion of, 430 ; nature, 430, 431 1,
436, 445 ; of husband and wife,
454 f.; of parents and children,
455 f. ; of masters and servants,
457 f . ; of ruler and subject, 476 ;
of nations, 480 ; during and after
war, 484.
Eclectic School, 522.
Education, 455 ; not criterion of
morality, 389 ; right of parents to
direct their children's, 456.
Effect (see Cause, Efficient), 111,
112.
Efficient cause (see Cause).
Ego, 81, 351 f.
Eleatic School, 499.
Election, 378; determining subject
of civil authority, 470.
Elements of judgment, 18 ; of prop-
osition, 19 ; of reasoning, 30 ; of
beauty, 157 ; of society, 450 ; of
civil society, 463.
Elicited action, 380.
Emanation from Divine Substance
{see Pantheism).
Embassy, 482 ; duties and privileges
of, 482.
Eminently, 105, 175, 338.
Emotion, 333 (note).
Empirical — judgment, 19 ; school,
97.
End (see Final Cause), 179; only
Good can be, 181, 371 ; all beings
act for an, 181 f., 370 f.; unity of,
371 ; operative powers differ ac-
cording to mode of attaining, 371 ;
Supreme Good is man's ultimate,
373 f.; of agent as principle of
morality, 393 £.; duty and, 396 ;
of civil society, 462 ; of Church,
488 f .
Enthymeme, 40.
Epichirem, 40.
Equal contract, 447.
EquipoUence, 27 f.
Error, 50, 54 ; causes of, 55.
Essence 9, 167 ; distinct from exist'
ence, 168; origin of ideas and,
91 ; cognition of, 99 f., 295 ; di-
vine, and ontologism, 84 ; soul
does not directly know its, 104.
Estimative faculty, 265, 269.
Eternal, World, not, 209 f., 231.
Eternity of God, 231, 338.
Ethics, 369 (see Moral Philosophy) ;
division of, 370.
Eucharist (see Blessed Sacrament).
Evidence, criterion of certitude,
126.
Evil, 153 ; Species : metaphysical or
nominal, physical or natural, and
moral, 154; of sin and of punish-
ment, 1.54 ; cause of, 155 ; not God
155 ; no supreme principle of. 156
Divine Providence and, 360 f.
actions, 391 f.
Evolution, 307, 308 (note) (see Law
of~Continuity ) .
Examination of means to end, 378 f.
Example, 42.
Excellence of polities, 469.
Exceptive proposition, 24.
Exclusive proposition, 24.
Exemplar cause (see Cause).
Exercise, Liberty of (see Contradic-
tion, Liberty of) ; dominion of,
298 ; of sovereign power, 471.
Existence, 167; distinct from es-
sence, 168 (see First Act) ; of
God, 104 f.; proofs of God's,
327 f .
Experience, Judgment from, 72;
method of, 66, 74 (note).
Experimentation, 70 ; conditions of,
71 f.; methods of, 71,72 (note);
not science, 72 ; principle of anal<
ogy and, 72.
Explicit contract, 448.
Extension of ideas, 9; of bodies
195, 326.
Extra-Diction, FaUaoies, 47.
Extreme, Major and Minor, 32.
Eutychianism, 503.
Faculty, 167 (note) ; as producing
immanent action, 177; distinct
from substance, 177 (see Power,
Operative) ; distinguished by its
action and object, 337 : in relation
INDEX OF SUBJECTS.
529
to soul's simplicity, 238; and its
natural operation, 238; species of:
vegetative sensitive, intellectual,
appetitive, and locomotive, 239;
of brute anipal, 243 f . ; of human
soul, 250; cognitive and appeti-
tive, 251 ; cognitive, as source of
certitude, 117 f . ; sensitive appeti-
tive, 273; and functions, 273 f. ;
locomotive, 274 ; organic (see Veg-
etative and Sensitive Faculties) ;
inorganic (see Intellect and Will) ;
relation of will to other, 297 f.
Faith due to God, 420.
Fallacy, 45 ; species of, 45 ; of dic-
tion, 46; of extra-diction, 47.
Falsity, 50; no metaphysical, 50,
151 (see Error).
Fatalists, 295; and pantheism, 355;
objections of, against Providence,
360 f.
Fate, 183.
Fear, 381, 383.
Figure of syllogism, 35 f. ; species
of quality, 199 f.
Filiation, 196.
Finite, 187 f . ; cannot produce the
Infinite, 106; leads to knowledge
of Infinite, 105 ; and contingent
being, 106 f. (see Infinite).
Form, 14 (note), 170 f. ; species of,
176, 216 ; species of quality, 201 ;
substantial, first source of action in
bodies, 176,217, productive of an-
other substantial form, 176; sepa-
rate, 145 ; Scholastic theory of
matter and, 216; every, except
intellective, capable of generation
and corruption, 219 f . ; corruptible,
and substantial change, 221 ; in
natural composite, 222 f . ; in chem-
ical compounds, 224; generation
and corruption of substantial, 224
f . ; substantial, of human Isody,
234, 319 f. (see Soul) ; of govern-
ment (see Polity).
Formal cause, 170.
Formality, 147 (note).
Formally, 338.
Fortitude, 387.
Fossils, 209.
Foundation of relation, 197 ; of every
society, 450; of man's duties to
himself, 425 ; to his neighbor,
430; of morality, 404; of positive
law, 407; of the reciprocal ' duties
of nations, 479.
Free Will, 291 f.; proof of, 293 f.;
objections against, 295 (see Will,
Liberty, Voluntary Action, Vio-
lence).
Freedom (see Liberty).
Functions — of plant life, 242; of
animal life, 242 (see Sensation) ;
of intellect (see Abstraction, Ap-
prehension, Consciousness, Judg-
ment, Memory, Reason).
Fundamental attribute of God (see
Aseity) ; principle of morality,
410.
Future (see Time).
Generation, 12, 201 (note) ; pri-
mary matter incapable of, 218; of
forms, 219 f.
Genus, 9.
Gnostics, 503.
Good, 144; and being, 151; possibla
being not, 152; and end, 152,
181, 371; species of, 152 f. (sea
Evil) ; indirectly cause of evil,
155 ; supreme, and supreme evil,
156; sensible, 273; rational, 290;
rational, suited to man, 373; su-
preme, man's end, 373 f. ; su-
preme, possessed by act of intellect,
375; enjoyed by soul and body,
375 ; will should tend to supreme,
876 (see Virtue) ; the common,
end of civil society, 462.
Goodness, God's, moved him to cre-
ate, 348.
Government (see Power, Civil, and
Polity).
Gracefulness, 160.
Gratuitous contract, 447.
Greek philosophy, 498.
Growth, 240, 242.
Habit— predicament, 11, 204; qual-
ity, 200, 299, 385; properties of,
299; species of, 300; acquired,
300 (see Virtue and Vice).
Harmony — of world, 211 f. ; pre6s-
tablished, 316 f.
Hatred, 383 (see Enemy).
Having, Modes of, 12.
Hearing, 263 f.
Hedonism, 412.
Hindoo philosophy, 496.
History, 132; criterion of certainty,
133; veracity of, 134; objections
against, 135 ; of Philosophy, 495.
Honorable Good, 153.
Human — actions, 378 f. ; law, 403;
not a criterion of morality, 389.
Hypothesis, 69 ; necessity of, 69 ;
rules .-f, 70; Nebular, 209.
Hypothetical proposition, 24; syllo-
gism (see Conditional Syllogism).
530
INDEX OF 8UBJE0T8.
Idea, 75 f . ; species of, 5 ; properties
of, 9 ; characteristics of, 77 ; origin
of, 78 (see Sensism, Transcendeu-
' talism. Innate Ideas, Intermediar-
ism, Traditionalisni, Scholastic
system; also, Universals, Knowl-
edge, Mental Term, Concept).
Ideal being, xxx. (see Logical being).
Idealism, 119, 530 (see Transcenden-
talism).
Identity, 149 ; principle of. 111.
Ideology, General, 75 ; Special, 75,
99.
Ignorance, 54 ; causes of, 54 ; species
of, affecting morality : antecedent,
consequent, concomitant, vincible,
and invincible, 381 and note.
Images, Necessity of sensible, 107 ;
association of, 268. |
Imagination, 265, 267 f . ; control of,
269.
Immensity, Divine, 339 ; not omni-
presence, 359.
Immortality of human soul, 311 ;
proofs of, 312 ; errors concerning,
313 f. (see Materialism and Sens-
ism).
Immutability of God, 338.
Impenetrability, 226.
Impossibility (see Possibility).
Impotency, 200.
Incarnation, 193 (note 3), 209.
Incidental proposition, 25.
Incomplete term, 5.
Incomplex term, 5.
Incorruptibility (see Immortality).
Indefinite proposition, 32.
Indication, relation of , 196.
Indifference of primary matter, 318 ;
and liberty, 293 ; of differentiated,
3.53 ; of human actions, 393.
Indissolubility of marriage, 454.
Individuating notes, 76.
Individual 9; bodies, cognition of,
102 f.; law, 419 f.
Individuation, principle of, 145.
Inductive — reasoning, 32 ; syllogism,
43 (Experimentation).
Infinitatirig proposition, 23.
Infinite, 165 (note) ; idea of, how
formed, 106 (see Finite) ; species
of, 187 JE. ; quantity cannot be, 187 ;
God is, 338.
Influence — of efficient cause, 170;
mutual, of soul and body, and
erroneous theories, 315 (see Simul-
taneous Concurrence and Physical
Promotion).
Inherence, 12.
Innate Ideas, Theory of, 82.
Insanity, 304.
Instinct, 182, 248, 269 (see Estima-
tive Faculty).
Intellect, Nature and ^object of, 100
f., 275 f.; powers of (Intellectui
I aqens and Intellectus p ossibilis) , 89,
377 f., 279 1; veracity of, 120 (see
Abstractive Faculty, Cognition,
Cognitive Faculty ; Ideas, Origin
of, and Universals).
Intellection, 379 f . ; analysis precedes
synthesis in, 99.
Intelligible, 275 ; species, 279 f, (see
Species).
Intelligence — faculty of cognizing
first principles, 109 ; divine, 339.
Intentions, First — ideas as consid-
ered in Ideology and Psychology,
75, 89.
Intentions, Second — ideas as cousid^
ered in Logic, 4 f .
Interest, 419.
Interpolation of books, 134.
Intuition (see Principles, First).
Inventive method, 66.
Ionic School, 498.
Italic School, 499.
Judgment, 18, 285 £; species of:
aprioriy a posteriori^ necessary,
analytical, pure, metaphysical,
absolute, contingent, synthetical,
empirical, physical, hypothetical,
a priori synthetical, 19; logical
truth found in, 50 ; instinctive, 99,
286 ; practical (see Conscience).
Judiciary Power, 472 ; species of,
474 ; subject of, 475 ; of Church,
490.
Justice, 387.
Juxtaposition, 13.
Kings, 497.
Kingdom, Church a spiritual, 489
(see Monarchy).
Knowledge, Order of human, 99 f.;
of individual bodies, 102 ; soul's, of
itself, 104 ; of God, 104 ; of finite
and contingent being, 106 f.; of
first principles, 109 f . ; relation of
language to, 114 f.
Labor, 437.
Land, 440.
Language, Utility of, 114 £; origin
of, 115 f.
Law, 402 ; species of, 403 ; species of
divine, 403 f. ; species of human,
403 ; necessity of, 403 ; eternal, the
foundation of morality, 404 ; notes
of natural, 405; existence of
INDEX OF SUBJECTS.
631
natural, 405 f. ; foundation of posi-
tive, 407 ; sanction of natural, 407
f . ; primary precept of natural, 410 ;
false precepts, 411 ; human, not a
criterion of morality, 389 ; division
of natural, 418; individual, 419 ; so-
cial, 450 ; common, of nations, 478.
Legislative power, 473 f. ; of Church,
490.
Liberty, 291 ; species of : from coac-
tion, from necessity, from law,
291 (see Free Will) ; of contradic-
tion, of contrariety, of specifica-
tion, 292 ; existence of, 293 ; ob-
jections against, 295 ; of God's love
for creatures, 341 ; of creation, 348
(see Human Action and Violence) :
harmony of, not end of political
society, 462.
Lie, 50 ; morally evil, 431.
Life, 100, 1,57, 233 ; degi-ees of, 232 ;
principle of, 234 ; and species, 234
f. (see Soul); vegetative, 242; sensi-
tive, 243 f . ; unity of, in animal, 245
(see Psychology) ; rational, 833 ;
man's supreme good in this, 376;
complete sanction of natural law in
another, 408 ; of grace and of
glory, 158.
Limits of right, 403.
Living and non-living beings com-
pared, 240.
Loan, 448.
Locomotion, 12, 234, 243, 374.
Locus of soul, 323.
Logic, 1 f. ; division of, 2 ; compared
with Metaphysics, 139 ; and Moral
Philosophy, 367.
Logical — being,184 f. (see Litentions,
Second); principles, 109; term, 7;
truth, 50 f.; potentiality, 165; re-
lation, 196.
Love (see Will) — Grod's, of Himself
and others, 341 f., 383 (see Pas-
sions); of God, 433; of oneself,
374; of others, 430 (see Duty);
foundation of society, 450; of
children for parents, 456 ; of chil-
dren for one another, 4.57 ; of na-
tions for one another, 479.
Luster, 158 (note).
Lyceum, 500 f.
Magnetism, Animal(see Mesmerism),
344 f.
Magnitude cannot be actually infi-
nite, 187.
Major — extreme, 33 ; premise, 33 ; of
hypothetical syllogism, 38; of pro-
syllogism, 40 ; of dilemma, 41.
Malice (see Evil and Morality of AO"
tions).
Man, 140, 305, 349 (see Body and
Soul, Senses, Intellect, and WiU);
actions of, 378 ; rational good of,
373 ; ultimate end of, 373, 376 ; im-
perfect happiness of, 377 ; duties
of— to God. 419 f.; to himself, 435
f.; to his neighbor, 430 f.; social
state natural to, 459 ; right of, to
material goods, 437.
Marriage, 451 f . ; relation of, to civil
power, 453 ; celibacy and, 453 ;
unity of, 453 ; indissolubility of,
454; duties consbquent on, 454
(see Duties of Parents and Chil-
dren).
Masters and Servants, 457.
Material — element of idea (see
Genus) ; of society (see Multi-
tude).
Material Things, Essence of, proper
object of intellect in this life, 150,
27.5 ; how known, 100 ; degrees of
abstraction in cognition of, 100.
Materialism, 97 f., 388 (note), 522 ;
refutation of, 308 (see Hedonism,
Sensism, Utilitarianism).
Mathematics, 61, 101, 139, 187.
Mathematical Sublime, 159.
Matter — primary, 166, 216, 318 (see
Composite, Matural; Generation
and Corruption); of reasoning, 30.
Mean, Virtue in the, 386.
Mediate judgment, 30.
Megario School, 500.
Memory, Sensitive, development of,
265, 270 f.j intellective, 288— not
really distinct from possible in-
tellect, 289 ; but essentially from
sensitive memory, 389 ; develop-
ment of intellective, 290.
Merit, 394 ; with other men, society,
and God, 394 f.
Mesmerism, 344 f. ; species^ of ; com-
mon, transcendental, and hyp-
notic, 344 f. ; criticism of, 345.
Metaphysical degrees, 147.
Metaphysics, 101, 139 ; compared
with other parts ' of philosophy,
139 ; division of, 140 ; General, 140
(see Ontology) ; Special, 140.
Metempsychosis, 313 f.
Method, Treatise on, 63 ; impor-
tance of, 63 ; general laws of, 64 ;
processes in, 64 ; species of, 66 ;
special laws of, 67 f. ; of Psy-
chology, 249 ; of Moral Philosophy,
368 ; of agreement, of difference.
532
INDEX OF SUBJECTS.
71 (note) ; of concomitant varia-
tion, of residues, 72 (note).
Methodical Doubt, 57 ; of Descartes
(see Cartesian Doubt).
Middle term, 30 f., 35.
Minor — extreme, 33 ; premise, 33.
Miracle, 343.
Mixture — Mechanical, 233 (note) ;
perfect, 233 (see Chemical Com-
pound and Natural Composite).
Modal — proposition, 22 : accidents
191.
Mode — of syllogism, 35 f.; of hav-
ing, 12 (see Modal Accident).
Moderate — realism, 97 ; scepticism,
133.
Molecule, constituent of atom (see
Atom).
Monarchy, 468, 470 ; in Church, 489.
Moral — Philosophy, 367 ; being, xxx. ;
truth, 50 ; certainty, 53 ; urity,
145 ; goodness, 153 ; evil, 154 ;
cause, 172 f.; order, 376 f.; action
(see Human Action) ; systems,
false, 411 f.; consciousness (see
Conscience).
Morality of human actions, 388;
false criteria of, 389; judgment
on, 390 ; constituent principles of,
393 ; object, end, and circum-
stances of, 391 f.
Motion — species of, 13; of atoms,
206 ; of bodies, 195, 202 (note), 337
f. (see Time).
Multitude, 145, 148; elements of,
450, 463 ; results from families,
464.
Mutual relation, 198.
Mysticism, 520.
Name, 76.
Nations, Common Law of, 478 ; re-
lations of, 478 f. (see Commerce,
War) ; society of, 486.
Natural — science, 61, 74 (note), 101,
139 ; hypotheses in, 69 (see Classi-
fication) ; beauty, 158 ; end, 180 ;
composite (see Composite) ; The-
ology, 327 ; Law, 368, 73, 78, 418 ;
primary precept of, 410 ; state of
man, 4.59 f., 467 ; origin of so-
ciety, 461 j constitution of society,
464 ; relations of nations, 478 f .
Nature, 168; foundation of logical
being in, 185 (see Relation) ; or-
der of, 306, 211.
Necessary — modal proposition, 23 ;
efficient cause, 173 ; action, 183,
347 ; being, 107, 327 ; love of Him-
self, God's, 341.
Necessity, Liberty from, 391; of
speech, 114 ; of creation (see Fate,
Pantheism).
Negation, 185 (see Nothing) ; of
propositions, 27.
Negative — ^idea, 7 ; proposition, 23 ;
duty, 396, 433 ; right, 400.
Neoplatonism, 503.
Nerves, 266.
Nestorianism, 503.
Nihilism, 83.
Nominalism, 97 f., 508, 513.
Notes of ideas, 76, 145.
Nothing, 141 (note).
Noumena (see Transcendentalism).
Now, 230 (see Time).
Number, 148, 499.
Numerical Unity, 145.
Objectivity of Knowledge (see Ve^
racity).
Object — formal, 61, specifies faculty,
275 f.; material, 60 f. (see Sensi-
ble, Intelligible) ; of moral action
(see Morality).
Obligation of contract, 448.
Observation, 71.
Occasionalism, 174, 317, 519 (see
Ontologism).
Omnipotence (see Power, Divine ;
Miracle, Possibility).
One (see Unity).
Onerous contract, 447.
Ontological — sublime, 159 ; con-
sciousness, 103.
Ontologism, 84, 97, 522.
Ontology, 141.
Opinion, 51.
Opposition, 25 ; species of, 25 ; re«
lation of, 373.
Optimism, 308 f.
Order— of world, 306, 211 f., 329,
361, 373 f , 376 f. (see Divine Prov-
idence); priority of, 11 f.
Organs of sense, 252 r.
Oriental philosophy, 496.
Origin — of ideas (see Ideas) ; priority
of, 162.
Ormuzd, 497.
Pantheism, 97, 350 f., 388 (note),
496 f., 503, 506, 519, 521 ; forms of,
350 f.; refutation of, 353 ; of Spin-
oza, 351 ; of Pichte, 351 ; of Sohel,
ling, 353 ; of Hegel, 353.
Paralogism, 45.
Parents, Duties of, 455 (see Educa-
tion); rights of, 456 ; authority of,
457.
Particular proposition, 22.
Passion, quality, 300 ; act of sensi-
INDEX OF SUBJECTS.
533
tive appetite, 383 f. (see Affection
and Sensitive Appetite).
Passive faculties, 852.
Passivity, 328 (see Potentiality).
Past, 339 f .
Paternity, 196.
Perfection, 153; of God, 105 (see
Divine Attributbs); of polities,
469 f .
Permanent quantity, 195.
Person, 193; of Christ, 193 (note);
of God, 838 ; relation of divine
(see Relation).
Phantasm (Sense-image), 103, 256 f .
Phantasy, 103, 367 (see Senses and
Imagination).
Phenomena, 70 f.
Phenomenalism, 190.
Philosophy, xxix ; excellence of,
xxix. ; schools of, 495 ; division
of XXX.
Phrenology, 376.
Physical — term, 6 ; cause, 173 ; iden-
tity, 149; evil, 154 (see Natural
Sciences ; Potentiality, Real).
Physics, 61 (see Experimentation);
method in, 67 ; hypothesis in, 69.
Place, 303.
Pleasure, not man's end, 374 (see
Hedonism).
Polity, Species of, 468 ; excellence
of, 469 f .
Polyarchy, 494.
Polygamy, 453 (note).
Poor, 443.
Portico, 500 f.
Position (see Posture).
Positivism, 80 f., 533.
Possession (see Property).
Possibility, intrinsic and extrinsic,
165.
Possible things as such notgood,153.
Post predicament. 11.
Posture, 11, 204. '
Potential Infinite, 187.
Potentiality, 164; species of, 165 f.;
an imperfection, 167 ; cause in,
174 (see Essence and Existence,
Faculty and Operative Power).
Power, quality, 300; operative, 167
(see Faculty); passive (see Senses
and Intellect); divine, 343 f. ; civil,
465 ; origin of civil, 466 ; theories
of Hobbes and Rousseau on civil,
467; transmission of civil, 470 f.;
exercise of civil, 473 ; legislative,
472 ; executive, 473 ; judiciary,
474 f.
Precept, 410 (note); primary, of
natural law, 410 ; false primary,
411 (see Utilitarianism, Hedonism,
Sensism, Rationalism).
Predicable, 9.
Predicament, 10 f. (see Substance
and Accident).
Predicate, 18, 31, 36 ; supposition of,
13 f. (see Conversion).
PreSstablished Harmony, 316 f.
Premise, 33 f., 36, 40.
Premotion, 358.
Prescience, 339 (see Intelligence,
Divine).
Presence of God, 360 (see Place and
Omnipresence).
Present, 339 f. (see Time).
Principal— proposition, 25 ; contract,
44S.
Principle, 161 ; species of, 161.
Priority, 11 ; species of, 13.
Privation, 185 ■ of good (see Evil).
Probability, 53 (see Opinion, Hypo-
thesis).
Probable syllogism, 44.
Production, Principle of, 161.
Progressive school, 533.
Property — attribute, 10 ; of ideas,
9 ; of terms, 13 ; transcendental,
144 ; of natural law, 405 ; of duty,
397 ; right of, and right to, 438 f. ;
origin of right to, 444 f.
Proposition, 19 ; species of, 30 f.
Propriety of terms, 15.
Prosyllogism, 40.
Proximate — potentiality, 166 ; effi-
cient cause, 173; first act, 174
(note) ; principle (see Facility) ;
end (see Cause, Pinal).
Providence, 360 ; proofs of, 361 f . ;
objections against, 363 f.
Prudence, 387.
Punishment, Evil of, 154 ; sanction
of, 408 ; everlasting, 409.
Quality, 11, 199 ; species of, 199.
Quando, 203.
Quantity, 11, 1 94 ; really distinct
from substance, 194 ; species of,
195.
Quiddity, 168 (see Nature or Es-
sence).
Rational — good, 373 ; Philosophy,
XXX.
Real — term, 7; being, 184 (see On-
tology) ; distinction, 135, 146 ;
beauty, 158 ; potentiality, 165 ;
relation, 196 f.
Realism, 97 ; species of, 97, 508.
Reason, 387 ; not really distinct from
intellect, 288.
534
INDEX OF SUBJEGT8.
BeaiSoning, 30 ; elements of, 80 ;
truth of, 31 ; axioms of, 31 ; divi-
sion of, 31 (see Syllogism).
Reduplicative proposition, 25.
Reflection, 284.
Relation, 11, 196 ; species of, 196 ;
properties of, 198 (note).
Religion, 419.
Religious society, 488 ; end of, 488 ;
polity of, 489; rights of, 490 f.;
independent of state, 492.
Reminiscence, 271.
Renaissance, 514.
Residues, Method of, 73 (note).
Restrictive proposition, 25.
Revelation, Possibility of, 420 ; util-
ity of, 421.
Roman Pontiff, Temporal power of,
493 ; authority of, 494.
Ruler, 466, 471 (see Usurper) ; duties
of, 476.
Sanction of natural law, 407 f. (see
Punishment Everlasting).
Scepticism, 84, 123, 499 , species of,
133 ; refutation of, 134 (see Cogni-
tive Faculties and Criteria of Cer-
titude) ; school of, 467.
Scholastic philosophy, 507-613.
Science, 2 60 ; specified by its ob-
'" ' Heetrol (see Method, Hypothesis,
Experimentation) .
Selection, Natural (see" Spontaneous
Generation).
Sensation, 118; cause of, 253 f.;
medium of, 857 (see Cognitive Fac-
ulty, Senses, Sensitive Appetite,
Passion, Emotion).
Sense, Common, 865 ; functions of,
266 ; of mankind, 135 f.
Senses, 118, 353 ; external, 358 f.; in-
ternal, 853, 264; veracity of, 118 f.
Sensibility, Intensity of, 259 ; ob-
ject of, 261.
Sensible, 118, 253, 256 ; joined by
species to sense, 256 ; external,
258 f.
Sensism, 78, 518, 520 ; species of, 79 ;
refutation of, 80 ; morality of, 413.
Sensitive appetite, 373 f.
Sight, 263 f .
Sign of Thought (see Idea, Oral
Term, Speech).
Simple— proposition, 31 ; conversion,
38.
Simplicity (see Unity, Metaphysical);
of soul, 336, 338; of brute soul,
346 ; of human soul, 306.
Singular — term, 8 ; proposition, 83.
Bleep, 303.
SmeU, 263 f.
Socialism, 441.
Society, 450 ; elements of, 4.50 ; foun-
dation of, 450 ; division of, 451 ;
domestic, 454 (see Marriage) ;
herile, 457 (see Master and Ser-
vant) ; civil, 459 f . ; universal,
478 f.; religious, 488 f.
Somnambulism, 303.
Sophism, 45 (see Fallacy).
Sophist, 45, 497.
Sorites, 40.
Soul, 334 ; species of, 234; vegetative,
243; sensitive, 243 ; rational, 350,
305 ; simplicity of, 236 ; spiritual-
ity of human, 306 f.; immortality
of human, 311.
Space, 328 t ; vaenous, 229.
Species, 9 ; intentional, 256 ; sensible,
356 f . ; expressa and impressa, 257 ;
intelligible, 279 f .
Speech — and traditionalism, 88 ■ ori-
gin of, 115.
Spiritism, 346.
Spiritualism, 346.
Spiritual (Incorporeal), 10, 306.
Spirituality of human soul, 306 f.
Spontaneous generation, 241 (note).
State, 12 ; Church superior to, 489 t.
(see Civil Society).
Stoics, 97, 183, 501.
Strata of earth's crust, 309.
Subaltern — opposition, 26 ; rules of,
37; propositions, equivalence of, 28.
Subject — of proposition. 80 ; suppo-
sition of, 13 f. (see Conversion) ;
of accidents, 143.
Subjectivism (see Idealism).
Subordination of sciences, 61.
Subsistence, 193 f. ; distinct from
nature, 103 ; of Word, 193.
Substance, 11, 189 f.; first and sec-
ond, 193 (see Subsistence, Suppo-
sit. Body, Person) ; absolute acci-
dents may by divine power exist
apart from their connatural, 191 ;
idea of, 190 ; created, a cause, 174 ;
no created, immediately operative,
177.
Suicide, 427 £ (see Duel).
Supposit, 193.
Supposition, 12 ; species of, 13 ; rules
of, 13.
Syllogism, 31 ; species of, 31 ; rules
of, 33 ; modes of, 35 ; figures of,
35 f.; hypothetical, 38; disjunc-
tive, 38 ; conjunctive, 39 ; con-
ditional, 39 ; imperfect and
abridged, 40 f.
INDEX OP SUBJECTS.
536
Syndereais, 410.
Synthesis, 64 ; rules of, 65 (see Judg-
ment).
Synthetical judgment, 18, 131 ; a
priori, 19.
Taste, 263 f.; aesthetic, 160.
Teleology, 179 (note) (see Pinal
Cause).
Temperance, 387.
Term, 4 ; mental- (see Idea) ; oral, 4 ;
species of oral, 5 f . ; properties of,
12 ; middle, 32 f . ; of intellection,
281 ; of creation and of preserva-
tion, 356 ; whence and whither,
195, 202 (note) (see Relation).
Theology, Natural, 337.
Thomistic school, 510.
Touch, 263 f.
Tradition, 132; a source of certi-
tude, 133.
Traditionalism, 87, 532 ; forms of,
87 ; refutation of, 88 (see Lan-
guage, Origin of) .
Tnith, 49 ; species of, 50 ; opposite
of, 50 ; logical, found in judgment,
50 ; not m simple apprehension,
51 ; states of intellect in respect
to, 51 f.; metaphysical, 150; di-
vine, 150 ; logical, 150 (see Lie)-,
Tyranny (see Traiismission of Civil
Power, Duties of Ruler).
Ubioation, Ubiety, 203.
Ubiquity, 359.
Union, 145.
Unity, 144 ; species of, 145 ; of acci-
dents, 146 ; and distinction, 146 ;
principle of, 148; and identity,
149.
tJniversal— term, 8 f., 13, 94 ; prop-
erties of, 9 ; kinds of (see Predi-
cable, Predicament, Transcenden-
tal) ; proposition, 23 ; and opposi-
tion, 26 ; middle term, 33 ; premise
of sorites, 41 ; element of idea, 91
f . ; direct and reflex, 94 f . ; opin-
ions on, 94 f. (see Idea, Intellect,
Conceptualism, Nominalism, Real-
ism) ; object of intellect, 101 f.
Usury, 449.
Variation, Method of concomitant,
72 (note).
Veda, 496.
Vedanta, 496.
Vegetation, 232, 234, 239, 243; and
sensation, 241 f.; not produced by
mechanical principle, 242.
Veracity of senses, 118; of conscious-
ness 119 ; of intellect and reason,
120.
Verbum mentis, 281.
Vice, 385 (see Habit).
Virtually, 338 (see Distinction, Vir-
tual) ; voluntary action, 380.
Virtue, 385 (see Habit) ; necessity
of, 386 ; how acquired, 386 ; lies in
the mean, 386 ; not man's end, 374.
Vital faculties, 237.
Vitalism (see Duodynamism).
Voluntary action, 380 ; species of,
380 ; -violence affects, 380 ; fear
and, 381 ; ignorance and, 381 ; con-
cupiscence and, 383 (see Human
Action, Wm).
When, 203.
Whole, 16 f. ; species of, 16.
Will, Human, distinct from sensitive
appetite, 290 (see Liberty, Good-
ness, Evil) ; relation of, to other
faculties, 297 f. ; divine. 341 f.
Word, 4 (see Tf/M, Oral ; Lan-
guage).
Writing, authentic, l}k ■ entire, \Zi.
Zend-Avesta, 497,
EfDEX OF ATJTHOES EEFEEEED TO
Numbers refer to pages.
Abelard, 97, 209, 508.
AeneBidemus, 503.
Ahrens, 475.
d'AiUy, Peter, 513.
Albert the Great, 509.
Alcott, 81 n.
Alouin, 507.
Alexander Hales, 509.
Al-Farabi, 506.
Al-Gazel, 506.
Alkendi, 506.
Aniaury of Cbartres, 509.
Ambrose, 210.
Anaxagoras, 498.
Aaaximander, 498.
Ansaldi, 313 n.
Anselm, St., 507.
Antisthenes, 500.
Apelles, 503.
Arceriilas, .503.
Archytas, 499.
Aristippus, 411, 500.
Aristotle, 3 n., 9, 40 n., 307, 316, 501,
511.
Arnauld, 139, 519.
Athanasius, St., 210.
Athenagoras, 504.
Augustine, St.. 208. SJIO, a6, 404 n.,
504._
Aurehus, Marcus, 503.
Avempace, 506.
ATerroes, 87, 97, 223 n. 596.
Avicebron, 507.
Avicenna, 333, 506.
Bacon, Francis, 55, 349, 308, 515.
Bacon, Roger, 510.
Bain, 533.
Bardesanes, 503.
Barthez, 3S1.
Basilides, 503.
Bayle, 134, 520.
Beccaria, 375.
Bede 505
Bentham,'391, 411, 445, 475.
Berkeley, -97, 123, 190, 254, 519.
Bessarion, 514.
Biohat, 2431,309.
Biran, Maine de, 532.
Boehme, 514.
Boethius, 193, 231 n., 505.
Bonald, de, 87 116, 533.
Bonaventure, St., 210, 215 n., 51C
Bonnetty, 87.
Bosoovich, 315.
Bossuet, 519.
Braid, 344.
Brenser, 315 n. ^
Broca, 341 n.
Broussais, 355, 309.
Brownson, 84 n.
Bruno, 350, 515.
Buridan, 512.
Cabanis, 355, 309.
Cajetan, 313 n.
Campanella, 514.
Cardano, .515.
Carneades, 503.
Carpocrates, 503.
Cassiodorus, 505.
Champeanx, William of, 97, 506.
Channing, 81 n.
Charlemagne, 507.
Charles the Bold, 507.
Charron, 515.
Chrysippus, 503.
Chrysostom, St. John, 310,
Cicero, 230, 503.
Clarke, 239, 331.
Clarke, R. P., 366 n.
Claudian, Mamertus 505.
Clement, 310, 504.
CoUard, Royer, 523.
Collins, 297.
Comte, 80, 355 n., 533.
Condillac, 69 79, 97, 106, 133, 518.
Confucius, 497.
Corcoran, Mgr., 213 n.
Cousin, 55, 86, 99, 129, 368, 267,383,
414, 532.
Cusa, Nicholas de, 514.
INDEX OF AUTHORS REFERRED TO. 637
Damiron, 414, 532.
Darwin, 243, 534.
David de Dinant, 509.
Democritus, 79, 214, 339, 308 499.
Denis, St., the Areopagite, 504.
Xescartes, 57, 83, 97, 106, 123, 138,
174, 182, 189, 194, 309, 315, 336,
347, 343, 351, 889, 516.
Diogenes, 500.
Draper, 523.
Dumas, 341 n.
Egidio, Colonna, 513.
Eichhorn, 368.
Emerson, 81 n., 355 n.
Empedooles, 498.
Empiricua, Sextus, 124, 503.
Bphraim, St., 210.
Epictetus, 503.
Bpionrns, 79, 97, 314, 229, 347, 308,
413, 501.
Erasmus, 514.
Brigena, Sootus, 97, 350, 507.
Euclid, 500.
Fe'nelon, 308, 394, 519.
Piohte, 81, 134, 254, 363, 283, 351,
531.
-Fioino, Marsilio, 514.
Piske, 523.
Elourens, 241 n,
Fourier, 437, 522.
Gall, 376.
GaUuppi, 139.
Gardair, 292 n.
Gassendi, 215, 518.
George of Trebizond, 514.
Gerdil, 210.
Gerson, 513.
Gilbert of Porre, 508.
Gioberti, 85, 97, 129, 523.
Gonzalez, 534.
Gorgias, 123, 499.
Gregory, 52 n.
Gregory, St., the Great, 210.
Grotius, 444.
Gunther, 321 n.
Hamilton, 98, 523.
Harper, 55 n., 74 n., 76 n., 148 n.,
151 a, 163 n., 164 n., 174 n., 175
n., 188 n., 191 n., 196 n., 198 n,,
200 n., 303 n., 217-219 n., 221-
233 n., 225 n., 228 n., 231 n., 237
n., 248 n., 307 n 372 n.
Haroun-al-Raschid, 505.
Harrison, 355 n.
Hegel, 81, 97, 124, 349, 351, 531.
Heinecius, 444.
Helvetius, 309, 391, 413, 518.
Henry of Ghent, 510.
Hierooles, 504.
Hilary, St., 310.
Hill, 407 n.
Hobbes, 308, 389, 413, 445, 460, 467,
518.
d'Holbach, 308, 428, 518.
Huet, 124.
Humboldt, 116 n.
Hume, 97, 113, 124, 167 n., 175 n.,
190, 331 n., 383, 518.
Hutcheson, 390, 413, 530.
Huxley, 524.
Irenaeus, St., .504.
Isidore, St., 505.
Jamblicus, 504.
Jevon, 53 n.
John Chrysostom, St. , 310.
John Damascene, St., 505.
John Philoponus, 505.
Jouffroy, 414, 522.
Jungmann, 384 n.
Justin, St., 504 n. /
Kant, 19, 81, 97, 99, 110 n., 113,
134, 168 n., 215, 231 n., 862, 351,
3.55 n., 4l4, 462, 521.
Kleutgen, 524.
Lactantius, 504.
Lamarck, 307 n.
La Mennais, 123, 138, 622 f.
Lamettrie, 309.
Lao-Tseu, 497.
La Rochefoucauld, 411.
Laromiguiere, 79, .532.
Leibnitz, 83, 129, 209, 213, 215, 229,
243, 2.53, 317, 517, 520.
Leroux, 532.
Leucippus, 79, 215, 308, 499.
Lewes, 355 n., 524.
Liberatore, 80 n., 369 n., 373 n., 381
n.,524.
Littre, 355 n., 523.
Locke, 79, 97, 106, 133, 167 n., 190,
193 n., 349, 293,308,391,518.
Lucretius. 308, 501.
Lully, Raymond, 513.
Maimonides. Moses, 507.
Malobranohe, 84, 97, 106, 174, 309,
354, 317, 519, 522.
Maudsley, 389 n.
AIsBinsT 344
Mill, J. Stuart, 44 n., 71 u., 98, 113
n.. 168 n., 523.
Molina, 359.
Montaigne. 389, 515.
Montesquieu, 44.5, 475.
Muzzarrelli, 313 n. 4
Newton, 315, 229, 231.
Niebuhr, 368.
Ocellus, 499.
Oekham, 97, 293, 331 n., 5131
538
INDEX OF AUTHORS BEFEBBED TO.
Origen, 210, 504.
Paley, 374 n.
Paracelsus, 514.
Parmenides, 499.
Pascal, 519.
Pasteur, S41 n.
Petau, 210.
Peter Lombard, 509.
PhUo, 504.
Photius, 321 n.
Pico della Mirandola, 514.
Plato, 82, 97, 157, 207 f., 216, 243,
316, .500.
Plotinus, 504.
Poliziano, Angelo, 514.
Pomponazzi, 515.
Poncet, 241 n.
Porphyry, 504.
Proclus, 495, 504.
Protagoras, 123, 499.
Puffendorf, S89, 444.
Pyrrho, 124, 500, 502.
Pythagoras, 182, 215, 314, 499.
Quatrefages, 241 n.
Ramus, 515.
Reid, 69, 99, 123, 128, 249, S62, 283
f., 286, 390, 413, .520.
B6uan, 355n.,521 n.
ReuchUn, 514.
Reynaud, 314.
Romanes, 534.
Roscelin, 97, 508.
Bosmini, 83, 129, 265, 522.
Rousseau, 116, 428, 460, 464, 467.
Russo, 175 n., 226 n., 372 n., 398 n.,
399 n., 401 n., 408 n.
Saccas, Ammouius, 503.
Sainte-Beuve, 355 n.
Saint-Hilaire, 212.
Saint-Lambert, 389, 413.
Saint-PourQain, 512.
Saint-Projet, de, 74 n., 137 n., 311 n.
Saint-Simon, 437, 522.
Sanseverino, 159 n., 524 n.
Satuminus, 503.
3avigay, 368.
Schelling, 81, 124, 249, 353, 531.
Scotus Erigena, 97, 350, 507.
Seneca, 502.
Shaftesbury, 413.
Smith, Adam, 390, 413.
Socrates, 499.
Spencer, 289 n., 524.
Spinoza, 350 f 519.
Spurzheim, 276.
Stahl, 321.
Stewart, 521
Straton, 501.
Strauss, 521 n.
Suarez, 313 n.
Taine, 355 n., 523.
Telesio, 514.
Tertullian, 504.
Thales, 495, 498.
Theodore of Gaza, 514.
TheophrastUB, 501.
Thofail, 506.
Thomas Aquinas, St., 18 n., 91, 97,
129 n., 146 n., 162, 308, 210, 316,
226 n., 227 n., 241 n., 352 n., 347
n., 360 n.
Thomasius, 520.
Tiedemans, 241 n.
Timseus, 499.
Toletus, 210.
Valentinus, 503.
Van Helmont, 514.
Vanini, 51.5.
Ventura, 87, 116, 523.
Vincent of Beauvais, 510.
Von Hutten, 514.
Vyasa, 496.
William of Auvergne, 509.
William of Champeaux, 97, 50a
Wiseman, 116 n.
Wolf, 285, 520.
Xenophanes, 499.
Zeno, 500, 502.
Zigliara, 168 n., 198 n., 329, 344 n..
359 n., 377 n., 382 n., 398 n., 40£
n., 403, 524.
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