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Full text of "The Battle of Chancellorsville; the attack of Stonewall Jackson and his army upon the right flank of the Army of the Potomac at Chancellorsville, Virginia, on Saturday afternoon, May 2, 1863"

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Cornell University Library 
E 47535 H22 

Battle of Chancellorsville: the attack o 


3 1924 032 281 796 

Cornell University 

The original of tiiis book is in 
tine Cornell University Library. 

There are no known copyright restrictions in 
the United States on the use of the text. 


"Ije wbo ftocB not spcati tbe tcutb fulls 's a betrayer of tbe ttntts."— Horace. 




Formerly Lieutenant Colonel and Medical Inspector, U. S. Army 
Historian Eleventh Army Corps 




Copyrighted 1896 

Br Augustus Ohoate Hamlin. 

Baxgoe, Majnk 



\ * Page 

Thb Armies and Prewminary Movements 5 

Responsibiuty for the Disaster 19 

Germans in The Eleventh Corps 26 

Personnel of the Eleventh Corps 34 

Sickles' Fatal Reconnaissance . 48 

Warnings of Danger Unheeded 55 

Jackson Strikes the Eleventh Corps 64 

STONBvifALL Jackson's Fatal Delay 79 

AT THE Log Works— Twelfth Corps 97 



The Wounding of Stonewall Jackson i°3 

Sickles' Famous Midnight Charge ^^^ 

Where the Blame Properly Belongs 125 

Losses of the Contending Forces 131 


Notes, Correspondence and Remarks 139 

Resolutions 175 

Explanations of Maps 179 


A careful reading of the printed sheets of "The Bat- 
tle of Chancellorsville " by a keen-eyed friend of the author 
has brought to light some errors in compilation and typog- 
raphy, which are corrected as indicated below : 

P^gs 5, loth line from bottom, should read "May 3d," instead of 
"May 2d." 

39, iSthline, should read "Peissner," instead of Peisner." 

40, 19th line, and page 62, i8th line, should read "Reily," instead 
of "Riley." 

41, 23d line, should read " Ams"berg," instead of " Arnsberg." 

42, gth line, shoWd read "Bruckner," instead of " Bruenecker." 
46, 5th line, and page 172, at foot, should read " Schimmelfennig," 

instead of " Schimmelpfennig." 
51, 24th line, should read " cavalry," instead of ',' calvary." 
55, 2d line from bottom, should read " Battery I, First Ohio," in- 
stead of " Independent Battery I, of Ohio." 
88, 17th line, should read "Stine," instead of "Stein." 
loi, 19th line, should read " Forty-sixth Pennsylvania," instead of 

"Forty-sixth New York." 
124, top line, should read " Greene's," instead of " Green's." 
131, 14th line, should read "35 men were killed and wounded," 

instead of " 27 men," etc. 
133, 25th line, at end, should read " 120th New York," instead of 

"io2d New York." 
139,4th line, should read " Germanna Ford," instead of " Ger- 

mania Ford." 
153, 6th line, from bottom should read "Fesler," instead of 



much unpleasantness. But the reward has been ample, in 
the conviction that the labor has resulted in clearing up a 
great wrong in our military history. Why this injustice was 
shown to the Eleventh Corps at the time, and why it has 
remained so long uncorrected, will be apparent to the stu- 
dent of our history. Machiavelli well says: "When you 
■would discover who is the author of a crime, consider who 
had an interest to commit it." 

In the preparation of these papers, the author has been 
assisted by a great number of officers and soldiers of both 
armies, who have shown a laudable desire to ascertain the 
exact truth concerning the events occurring on Saturday, 
May ad, 1863. To the late Gen. A. B. Underwood, and to 
Col. "JTheo. A. Dodge, the first writers of the battle on the 
Federal side, many thanks are due. To the late Col. W. 
L. Candler, of Hooker's staff ; Col. Pennoch Huey, of the 
Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry ; Capt. J. H. Huntington, of 
the artillery of the Third Corps, and to many officers and 
soldiers of other corps, he is under great obligations. To 
many officers and soldiers of the Confederate army the 
thanks of the writer and the country are due. In fact, with- 
out their assistance, the narrative could not have been ac- 
complished. Many thanks are due to Gen. James H. Lane ; 
Col. W. H. Palmer, of Gen. A. P. Hill's staff ; to Col. Kyd 
Douglas and Maj. Jed. Hotchkiss, of Jackson's staff; to 
Col. Eugene Blackford ; Capt. Randolph Barton, of the 
Stonewall Brigade ; to Ves Chancellor, and especially to 
Jackson's couriers, James M. Talley and Dave Kyle. 

Bangor, Maine, 
February, i8g6. 


May 2d, 186}. 


The Armies and Preliminary Movements. 

CHANCELLORSVILLE seems to have been a tragedy 
of errors, and the terrible losses and sacrifices did not 
result in decided or satisfactory results on either side. 
The populous and powerful North could easily replace 
its loss in artillery, in equipment and in men, but with the 
South, already enfeebled and overstrained, it was far dif- 
ferent. The gain in cannon, in prisoners and in morale was 
great, it is true, but it was fearfully paid for by the victorious 
army. It may be said, with some truth, that the campaign 
was Lee's masterpiece in audacity and celerity, but his vic- 
tory was like that won in ancient times by Pyrrhus, for it 
was indeed a mortal blow to the vitality of the Army of 
Northern Virginia. And it may also be affirmed, that when 
the shot-torn flags of Jackson's Corps were planted in tri- 
umph on the crest of Fairview at g o'clock on Sunday morn- 
ing. May ad^ 1863, the culminating point of its daring and 
its stren^h had passed, never to return. The South could 
not replace the host of dauntless men who went down in the 
determined and desperate struggle. 

Both armies moved to the front with great confidence. 
The Federal army felt secure and strong in its superior num- 
bers, its splendid equipment, its devotion and its enthusiasm. 
The Confederate army, strengthened by the conscription act, 
and stimulated by the long winter's rest, also felt invincible 
under the guidance of its trusty leaders. Moreover, the 


rebels believed that their knowledge of the topography of 
the country, their skill in bushcraft and marksmanship, gave 
them a decided advantage over their opponents. Besides 
all these considerations, there was a determined resolution 
on the part of the Southrons to hurl the invade'r back at all 

The rebel Army of Northern Virginia at this time was 
a remarkable and powerful body of men, led by one of the 
ablest soldiers of the age. It was skilled in the use of 
arms, hardened in service, animated in a high degree with 
the enthusiasm of their cause and the desperate courage 
of self-defense. The convictions of most of the Southern 
army were, that they were right in their views, and their 
stubbornness in defending them, and the privations endured 
in the defense, is ample evidence of their sincerity. The 
glorious Army of the Potomac, which fought 60 per cent, 
of the battles of the war, can afford to bestow deserving 
praise on that determined and resolute body of soldiers who, 
although deficient in equipment and comforts of military 
life, and inferior in numbers, yet with a devotion, skill and 
tenacity worthy of the highest cause, kept them at bay for 
four long years, and struck down on the field of battle 
182,000 of its numbers — killed and wounded. Just and 
worthy praise to either one reflects its beams upon the 
other. Both armies will descend to posterity with military 
records of the highest rank, and history, with its impartial 
pen, will not discriminate to the credit or discredit of either. 

This Army of Northern Virginia was composed of the 
best and the bravest men in the South, and they believed 
and boasted that they carried with them not only the flag, 
but the glory and the very life, of the Confederacy. The 
South considered this army as the bulwark of secession, and 
sent to it selected bodies of their best men to represent 
them. Among them were the famous Washington Artil- 
lery, of New Orleans; the Louisiana Tigers, the renowned 
riflemen of Mississippi ; selected infantry of Alabama, 
Georgia and Tennessee, and the hardy descendants of the 


mountaineers of North and South Carolina who fought 
with Marion and Morgan in Revolutionary times. 

It is eminently proper for the Northern soldiers to con- 
sider the character and the qualifications of their antago- 
nists. At this time — 1863 — most of the Army of Virginia 
were volunteers, and comprised the best men of the South. 
Many, if not the most, of them had been Union men and 
strongly opposed to secession, but the first shot at Fort 
Sumter brought back to light all those pernicious views of 
state rights which had slumbered like the germs of a fatal 
pestilence for nearly a century, and with some show of re- 
luctance they obeyed the commands of their respective 
states. The plantations were soon left to the care of the 
women and the slaves ; the colleges and academies were 
closed, for the professors and pupils had marched away at 
the call of the drum ; and, in fact, nearly all of the men of 
the South not required for the civil service or the direction 
of the important industries enrolled themselves with enthu- 
siasm under the fascinating banner of secession. Many of 
the excessive ideas of state rights and extravagant state 
pride owed their origin to the times as far back as the 
stormy period of the early days of the Revolution of 1775, 
and some of the states openly considered their rights as 
superior to those of the North, or the country in general. 
The men of North Carolina had not forgotten that the first 
contest between England and the colonists took place there, 
and that the Declaration of Independence at Mecklenburg 
preceded that of Philadelphia by a year or more. The 
Virginians were excessively proud of the traditions which 
came to them from the earliest colonial times, and they 
recalled the immortal efforts of their ancestors in building 
up the structure of the great Republic, and the fiery and 
matchless eloquence of Patrick Henry, which aroused the 
patriotic mind with the force of actual conflict. In esti- 
mating the stamina of the Army of Northern Virginia, it is 
proper to allude to all the influences that gave it form, or 
lent it strength, and with propriety we may say that the 


most of these men of the old colonial states, when they 
matched to resist the invasion of their territory and the 
advance of the Federal troops, considered themselves as 
sincere patriots and as ardently attached to the principles 
of freedom as the men of the North. 

' ' Treason never prospers ; for when it does, 
None dare call it treason." 

The crossing of the Rappahannock River does not seem 
to have been much of a surprise to Lee, as the country had 
been carefully surveyed in anticipation of this crossing, and 
in the plans of defense, the Wilderness and broken territory 
had been regarded in the nature of natural fortifications, in 
which the rebel soldier would have superior advantages over 
his opponent. It is doubtful if Lee intended to offer any 
serious resistance to Hooker's crossing, any more than he did 
to Grant a year later. The Wilderness, with its almost im- 
penetrable thickets, was a great and natural fortress for the 
lightly armed and lightly clad Confederates. And the cir- 
cumstances of the conflict recall the remarks made at the time 
of the Revolution of 1775, when it was said in England, that 
"The old system of tactics is out of place, nor could the 
capacity of the Americans for resistance be determined by 
any known rule of war. They will long shun an open field, 
every thicket will be an ambuscade of partisans, every stone 
wall a hiding place for sharp-shooters, every swamp a fort- 
ress, the boundless woods an impracticable barrier." 

And so it proved, for the rebel in his faded uniform was 
almost invisible in the woods, and his skill as a marksman, 
his knowledge in bushcraft, certainly compensated largely 
for a considerable inequality in numbers, and in the thickets 
of Chancellorsville, and later, in the Wilderness, the rebel 
soldier was certainly superior to his antagonist, man for man, 
courage reckoned as equal. 

So confident was Lee in the strength of his army and 
his position at this time, that he had sent Longstreet, with 
two of his divisions, away down to southeastern Virginia, 
leaving at his disposal but sixty thousand men, which he 


deemed ample to meet any movement made by the Army of 
the Potomac, with double its number of men. 

At the time of the battle of Chancellorsville, the rebel 
critics state that General Lee found himself at the head of 
an army unsurpassed in discipline and all the hardy virtues 
of the soldier, strengthened by the additions of the winter, 
and the enforcement of the conscript act, and numbering 
about sixty thousand men, according to the statements of 
General Taylor and Major Hotchkiss, of Lee's and Jackson's 
staffs, and others. This estimate does not include the forces 
which had gone off with Longstreet, south of Richmond, and 
which were not available in the approaching conflict. Gen- 
eral Taylor, who was the Adjutant General of the Army of 
Northern Virginia, states that General Lee moved towards 
Chancellorsville with forty-eight thousand men, and, keeping 
Anderson's and McLaw's Divisions with him — less than 
fourteen thousand men — he hurled Jackson with the rest 
upon the flank and rear of the Federal army — or thirty-four 
thousand men. Later, Taylor qualifies his remarks by say- 
ing that Jackson had twenty-six thousand infantry, six thou- 
sand cavalry and sixteen hundred artillery, or a total of 
thirty-three thousand six hundred men. Major Jed Hotch- 
kiss, of Jackson's staff, has stated that Jackson's Corps in- 
creased in three months before the battle from twenty-five 
thousand to thirty-three thousand muskets, but from this 
estimate must be taken Early's Division, which remained at 
Fredericksburg to confront Sedgwick and his forces. There 
were one hundred and two guns attached to Jackson's Corps, 
with twenty- two hundred men, but how many of these were 
actually in action, it is difficult now to ascertain. Besides 
these, the four batteries of Stuart's horse artillery must be 
added, and also the four or more regiments of cavalry, which 
screened the movements of the rebel infantry and effectually 
picketed all the roads. A few days after the battle, and 
after the death of General Jackson, General Lee stated to 
the War Department at Richmond that each of the two corps 
had then thirty thousand men, and were too many men for 


one man to handle, and asked to have the two corps divided 
into three. 

Hooker had, with great celerity, moved the bulk of his 
army across the Rapidan and the Rappahannock Rivers, and 
on Friday morning, May ist, was moving down the Plank 
and Turnpike roads towards Fredericksburg. About two 
miles from Chancellor's his advance was checked, and 
Hooker then discovered that Lee was entrenched across his 
path, with a line of earthworks extending from the Rappa- 
hannock River southward to the Massaponax stream, and 
more than three miles in length. 

At eleven o'clock. May ist, Jackson arrived at the front, 
stopped all work on the earthworks, and prepared to hurl 
fifty thousand men upon the three columns of Hooker's 
army, then attempting to debouch from the thickets and 
rugged country in which the Union army was entangled. 
At two o'clock, or later, Jackson had turned the right flank 
of the Twelfth Corps near Aldrich Farm, on the Plank Road, 
had turned both flanks of Sykes' Regulars on the Turnpike, 
and menaced the column of the Fifth Corps, under Griffin, 
on the River Road. Sykes, at this moment, found himself 
confronted by a vastly superior force, with GrifEn, of the 
Fifth Corps, on the bank of the river three miles distant, 
with a broken and almost impassable country between; the 
Twelfth Corps a mile to his right, southward, and uncon- 
nected, and watching Posey's and Wright's Brigades march- 
ing steadily along the unfinished railroad to gain the rear 
of the Union army. 

The Eleventh Corps was on the Plank Road near Chan- 
cellor's, a mile or more in rear, while the Third Corps was 
still farther in the rear, between the White House and the 
river, two or three miles distant. 

Hooker had no alternative but to fight under great dis- 
advantage, or retreat. The broad open fields Hooker's 
enemies so strongly allude to were about three miles away, 
and, between them were strong entrenchments, and behind 
them Jackson, with fifty thousand men fresh and eager for 


the fray. The broad fields which appear on Warren's map, 
and others, were mostly covered with forests then, and are 
to-day. Major Michler's map, made with great care three 
or four years after the battle, indicates that this statement 
is correct, and to this map the reader is referred as to all 
movements connected with the battle of Chancellorsville. 
All the maps used in this paper are based on Major Mich- 
ler's surveys. 

About two o'clock Friday afternoon. May ist, Hooker 
ordered his advanced forces to return to the selected posi- 
tion near Chancellor's to entrench and remain on the defen- 
sive. From documents extant, it is clear that Hooker de- 
termined to remain on the defensive, and wait the effect of 
the strategic movements of his second army under Sedgwick, 
and his cavalry under Stoneman and Averill. And so confi- 
dent was he of his success, that he promised victory to his 
men, defying even Divine interference. Had Hooker ad- 
hered to this resolve to remain strictly on the defensive, 
and withstood the brilliant temptations held out to him in 
the fatal movement in the fancied pursuit of Lee's column 
below the Welford Furnace, to the southward, the results of 
the campaign undoubtedly would have been different. Cer- 
tainly the Eleventh Corps would not have been deprived 
of its strong reserve, nor its officers hypnotized with the 
fallacious statement that Lee and his entire army was re- 
treating with great haste towards Gordonsville. Certainly 
the line of defenses would have been kept unbroken, and 
more than twenty thousand men would have been available 
for the support of the attacked and outflanked and weakened 
Eleventh Corps. 

Late in the evening, Jackson met Lee in the woods near 
the Plank Road, a little over one mile south of the Chancellor 
House, and held a council of war. The Confederate engi-" 
neers reported upon the strength of the position to which 
Hooker had retired, and adversely to any attack upon it 
from the eastward. It was then determined to attempt a 
flank movement, and endeavor to reach the right flank and 


rear of Hooker's army, and get possession of the roads lead- 
ing from Chancellorsville to" the Ely and United States 
Fords. The movement was entrusted to Jackson, and more 
than thirty thousand men received orders to move at day- 
break, or sooner, in the direction of the Wilderness Tavern. 
Jackson was the trusty lieutenant of Lee, and all details of 
a campaign were fully entrusted to him. Between these 
officers there was a steady friendship and a sincere mutual 
regard, and in all military matters there was much of that 
complete harmony and adjustment which gave an immortal 
luster to Marlborough and Prince Eugene. Jackson had 
that great quality so necessary in desperate actions — moral 
courage and invincible determination. He was perseverance 
itself. Nothing could shake his resolution. His early ap- 
pearance in the war gave no premise of his powers, and 
Johnson's definition of genius might then be applied to him : 
"Genius is nothing but strong natural parts accidentally 
turned in one direction," and in his movements the Federal 
soldier might have applied to him the remark made by the 
Hungarian officer about Napoleon at Lodi : "He knows 
nothing of the regular rules of war ; he is sometimes in 
our front, sometimes on our flank, sometimes in the rear. 
There is no supporting such gross violations of rules. " — See 
Map No. I. 

Jackson started promptly with his men, and moved for- 
ward with that reckless abandon that he had previously ex- 
hibited in his flank movements in the Shenandoah Valley, 
and in the later campaign, which drove Pope and the Fed- 
eral army back to the shelter of Washington. At this time 
he had twenty-eight regiments under A. P. Hill, twenty-two 
under Rodes, twenty under Colston, or seventy regiments of 
infantry in all, and also many guns in the artillery battalions, 
under Colonels Crutchfield, Walker, Carter, Jones and Mc- 
intosh, etc., besides the four batteries of the horse artillery, 
under Major Bec^kham, and four regiments of cavalry under 
General Stuart. The columns of this great force filled all 
the roads and paths leading through the forest towards the 


west. They passed along the front of the Federal army in 
plain sight of the Third Corps and the Eleventh Corps, a 
mile or more to the soutward. For several hours the pro- 
cession moved in sight of and within reach of the guns of the 
Federal army, seemingly in contempt of their foes. Birney 
reported the movement to Sickles, and Sickles to Hooker. 
Finally Birney received permission to try the range of his 
guns upon the column marching past the Welford Furnace, 
about half a mile south of his front, at Hazel Grove. A few 
shots from Clark's rifled guns dispersed that portion of the 
enemy's column then in sight, and caused it to seek another 
route farther to the south, out of reach of the Federal guns, 
and out of sight of the Federal scouts. 

Berdan's sharpshooters, well supported, then advanced 
to the Furnace, and afterwards to the unfinished railroad, 
still farther south, where they captured most of the Twenty- 
Third Georgia Regiment, which was acting as rear guard to 
Jackson's fighting trains. From these captures and these 
operations sprang the fatal notion that General Lee and his 
entire army were retreating in dismay. This strange impres- 
sion was spread rapidly through the army, then halted about 
Chancellorsville, and was soon magnified into a positive 
certainty, and generally believed. However, in the Eleventh 
Corps there were many men who had fought Jackson in two 
of his flank marches before, and were not so easily deceived, 
who refused to believe the rumor, and were soon assured of 
its falsity, but they failed to convince the higher officers of 
the corps of the fact, and the impending danger, even at the 
last moment. 

At this time, Jackson's collection of fighters, trudging 
along the woods and its by-paths, would certainly have pre- 
sented a curious appearance to a martinet critic of any of 
the military schools of Europe. The first sight of the com- 
mander, in his dingy clothes, with ragged cap perched over 
his brow, astride Old Sorrel; the tattered flags — worthless 
as material, but priceless to the hearts who carried them — 
the strange appearance of the men, in ragged and rusty 
2— B. c. 


clothes, marching along carelessly, and at will, might have 
suggested Falstaff and his ragamuffins. But a closer and 
keener look would have soon convinced him that outward 
appearances do not always indicate the true measure of the 
soldier, and he would soon have seen that this shabby-look- 
ing and apparently undisciplined rabble would, at a signal 
from their trusty leader, be transformed into a resolute army, 
more than a match for any equal number of the best troops 
of the European armies in the singular contest about to com- 
mence. And it may be affirmed that thirty thousand of these 
European troops would have been as helpless before them in 
the tangled thickets of this wilderness as Braddock and his 
British regulars were before the French and unseen Indians 
in the woods near Fort Duquesne, in colonial times. The 
scene might also have recalled the remark the British offi- 
cer, Ferguson — second only to Tarleton — made when he 
noticed the mountaineers about to attack him at King's 
Mountain, in the old Revolution, and who soon cleaned him 
out, in spite of his regulars and his superior arms. In this 
very column could be found many of the descendants of the 
men whom Ferguson affected to despise as "dirty mongrels," 
and they were the sons of Scottish Covenanters, French 
Huguenots and English sea rovers — the choicest of fighting 
material. But the majority came from the descendants of 
the people who emigrated during a period of more than a 
hundred years from Scotland and the north of Ireland, and 
who made England repent bitterly of the oppressions that 
drove them across the ocean to the wilds of America. The 
influence of the descendants of those people, both north and 
south, in the late civil war, was very marked. The Cavalier 
and the Puritan may have supplied the poetic strain, but it 
was the Scotch and the Scotch-Irish, the Irish and the Ger- 
man blood, that furnished the sturdy stamina on either side. 
At about noon Jackson arrived at a point on the Plank 
Road about two miles south of the Talley Farm, where he 
met General Fitz Lee, who took him to the top of the eleva- 
tion at the Burton Farm, which gave him a view of the troops 


of the. Eleventh Corps at the Dowdall Clearing, about a mile 
distant. The Federal forces were at rest, as was most of 
the Federal army along the line, at that time. Most of the 
Eleventh Corps were in sight, at the Talley and Dowdall 
Farms, and part of those at the Hawkins Farm, about half a 
mile in the rear, but a part of Devens' Division was con- 
cealed in the woods, and the whole of Von Gilsa's Brigade, 
forming the extreme right, was in the woods, half a mile 
from the Talley House, and could not be seen by Jackson 
from this position. Von Gilsa was not discovered until the 
middle of the afternoon, when a party of cavalry and scouts 
dashed up the Turnpike, and unmasked their fire and their 

The story that Von Gilsa's men were seen by Jackson 
playing cards and carousing, is a mistake, as the entire 
body of men were enveloped by the dense woods, and could 
not be seen, either from the Burton Hill or the Luckett 
Farm, on the Turnpike on the west. Not only the Eleventh 
Corps, but the whole army, was in bivouac at this time, 
with the exception of Birney, exploring the vicinity of the 
Welford Furnace. 

It was Jackson's intention to attack the Eleventh Corps 
from the Plank Road, and that part of the Federal force in 
position between the Dowdall and the Talley Farms, but as 
he viewed the position from the Burton Hill, he changed his 
mind and ordered the Stonewall Brigade, under Paxton, to 
remain on the Plank Road about one mile and a-half from 
the Wilderness Church, and four regiments of cavalry were 
to take position at the Burton Farm, only one mile and one- 
eighth from the Dowdall Tavern, the headquarters of the 
doomed corps. The rest of the army was ordered to con- 
tinue its march to the westward, until the Luckett Farm 
was reached, on the old Turnpike, two miles west of the 
Dowdall Tavern. 

The day was hot and. dusty, but the columns pressed 
steadily onw;ard, hurried along by their impetuous leader, 
and at three p. m. Jackson, then at the Luckett Farm, sent his 


last dispatch to Lee. This dispatch is now in the State 
Library at Richmond, and reads: "Near 3 p. m., May 2d, 
1863. — Gen. R. E. Lee: The leading division is up, and 
the other two appear to be well closed. — T. J. J." Rodes' 
Division was at once placed in line of battle, and had a long 
rest of over two hours before called into action. As the 
rest of his army came up, it was placed in position, and at 
five p. M. most of it was ready for action. — See Map No. 2. 

According to Jackson's staff officers, the attacking force 
was formed in three lines of battle, with Rodes' Division 
forming the front line, with Colston's Division as the second 
line, about one hundred paces in rear of the first. The 
third line was formed by Hill's Division, a part of which 
was deployed, the other part remaining on the Pike ready 
to be deployed to the right or left, as circumstances might 
require. The two front lines presented a front of two miles 
in length, and extended more than a mile north of the Pike, 
and to the rear of the Eleventh Corps, then facing south. 
The skirmish line of Rodes' Division was composed of se- 
lected riflemen, and was led by Colonel Willis, of the 
Twelfth Georgia, and so well did he perform his duty that 
Jackson spoke highly of him in his last moments. Another 
part of the skirmish line was commanded by Colonel Black- 
ford, and Jackson's orders were carried out so accurately 
by these men that, although over ten thousand men rested 
on their arms for two hours or more within a mile of the 
right flank of the Army of the Potomac, not a man deserted 
or escaped to give jivarning of the coming storm. 

At five p. M. all was ready for the movement which prom- 
ised to wreck the unsuspecting Federal army. It seems 
incredible that an army of thirty thousand men could be 
moved directly past the front of a much larger force, and 
arrange itself in three lines of battle, within half a mile of 
the force to be attacked! 

Treachery could not have placed the faithful, obedient 
and patient Army of the Potomac in a more unfortunate and 
perilous position than that in which it found itself at this 


moment, when Sickles and a selected force of the Federal 
army was about to attack Lee's "retreating and dismayed" 
men, supposed to be at or near the Welford House; and 
Hooker, completely blinded by the brilliant reports coming 
from the front, sent word to Sedgwick that Lee was in full 
retreat, and Sickles was among his retreating trains. 

Most of the attention of the Federal army around 
Chancellorsville was then directed to this movement in 
front, below the Furnace. But Jackson, with his seventy 
regiments, and his artillery, and his cavalry, had long ago 
marched away past the front, and had completely vanished 
from the sight and- hearing of Sickles' columns, and was' 
then resting quietly in the dense forests in the rear of the 
Federal army, four miles in a direct line from the Wel- 
ford House, and about to hurl his thunderbolts with almost 
irresistible force. Jackson, as he looked over the forests 
from the Luckett Farm, and noted the columns of smoke 
of the numerous camp-fires arising in the calm evening air, 
along the extended line of the encamped Federal army, 
might well have quoted to himself, in his silent prayer, that 
significant line of the ancients; " Quos Deus vult perdere, 
prius dementat" — "Whom the gods wish to destroy, they 
first make fools." 

Jackson was in the best of feelings when he ordered 
Rodes to advance. He saw that his men, though fatigued, 
were full of enthusiasm and fight, and also, that the way 
was apparently clear for the destruction of a large part of 
the Federal army. Jackson's orders were explicit : To ad- 
vance steadily without halting, and, regardless of all obsta- 
cles, seize the position beyond Talley's Farm. The two 
lines of battle, extending with a front of two miles, were 
expected t-o envelop and crush both Devens' and Schurz's 
Divisions, and it would probably have been done, but for 
the singular conduct of Colquitt, commanding the right bri- 
gade of Rodes' Division, at the decisive moment. 

It has been stated that Jackson did not have any 
artillery in his column of attack on Saturday afternoon and 


evening; but, on the contrary, he had both Breathed' s and 
McGregor's batteries of four guns, each following on the 
Pike, and keeping pace with the front line of attack, or in 
advance of it, and these batteries were followed by Moor- 
man's battery of four guns, ready to assist if occasion re- 
quired. A little distance in rear of these guns might have 
been seen the artillery battalions of Carter and Crutchfield, 
with many cannon. Jackson's attacking force was well 
equipped with cannon, but six only of the many pieces 
available were called into action, and these were worked so 
constantly and so rapidly that the gunners became exhausted 
at times, and were replaced with fresh men from the com- 
panies in the rear. These six guns were of Stuart's horse 
artillery, and were those which the gallant boy Major John 
Pelham had so often taken into action, and in so fearless a 
manner as to win for him the highest praises from Stuart, 
from Jackson, and from Lee. After Fredericksburg, Lee 
exclaimed to Jackson: "You ought to have a Pelham on 
each of your flanks." But the Marceau of the Southern 
army was no longer here. A fatal bullet of the Federal 
cavalry, a few days before, in a fight on the Rappahannock, 
had cut short his daring career. His men and his guns, 
however, were here, and fearfully did they avenge the loss 
of their beloved and youthful leader. Two of the guns at a 
time galloped to the front line and poured their shot into 
the confused masses of the Eleventh Corps, and these in 
turn were replaced by the sections in the rear, and so a 
constant fire was kept up until Dowdall's was reached, an 
hour and a-half after the action commenced, and here they 
were complimented by Jackson in person, and relieved from 
duty by Colonel Carter, as the men or horses had not been 
fed for forty-eight hours. 


Responsibility for the Disaster. 

THE position of the Federal army at Chancellorsville, on 
Saturday morning, was as follows {see Map No. i.) : 
The Fifth Corps was strongly entrenched along a line 
extending southerly from the Rappahannock River to 
the White House, a distance of more than two miles, and 
facing to the east. The Second Corps was in position, ex- 
tending southerly and easterly from near the White House to 
a point on the Turnpike about three-fourths of a mile east of 
the Chancellor House. The Twelfth Corps was entrenched 
about one-third of a mile south of Chancellor's, connecting 
on the left with the Second Corps,, and on the right with 
Birney's Division of the Third Corps, which occupied earth- 
works at the edge of the woods on the north side of the 
Hazel Farm, and connecting on its right with the Eleventh 
Corps at Dowdall Tavern. In the rear of Birney, Williams' 
Division of the Twelfth Corps was stationed behind strong 
log works half a mile in length, and extending diagonally 
from the Hazel Grove ravine northerly to the Plank Road, 
and entirely in the woods. Berry's and Whipple's Divisions 
of the Third Corps were both bivouacked in the rear of Chan- 
cellor's House. A mile to the northwest of the Chancellor 
House, on the Ely Ford road, was stationed the division of 
regulars under Sykes. The Eleventh Corps formed the ex- 
treme right of the army, and occupied the line extending 
from Dowdall's to more than half a mile beyond Talley's, and 
covering a distance of more than a mile facing south, parallel 
with the turnpike. In front of the Fifth Corps, at tliis time, 
were the Third and Fourth Virginia Confederate Cavalry, 
picketing the paths and roads, and having as supports a 
small force of infantry stationed on the south side of Mott's 
Run, more than a mile distant from the Federal lines. In 



front of the Second and Twelfth Corps, and chiefly along the 
Turnpike and the Plank Road, Anderson's and McLaws' Divi- 
sions of the rebel army, with artillery, were deployed in a man- 
ner to exaggerate their actual strength as much as possible. 

Adjutant General Taylor, of Lee's army, gives this 
strength as less than fourteen thousand men, but there is 
reason to believe that it was somewhat larger, and not far 
from seventeen thousand men. All the rest of the rebel 
army was then moving rapidly with Jackson to the west of 
Dowdall's, with the intention of getting possession of the 
roads leading to the Ely and United States Fords, on the 
rear' and flank of the Federal army, then concentrated on 
the Chancellor fields, and acting on the defensive. And it 
was the intention of Lee to attack the Federal army in front 
of him, with Anderson's and McLaws' Divisions, as soon as 
he heard the sound of Jackson's guns in the Federal rear, 
and crush the disordered columns of the Federal army be- 
tween them. These were the instructions given to Jackson 
before his departure, but fortunately for Sickles' forces, 
stretched out along the Furnace road, Lee did not hear Jack- 
son's guns at all, owing to the peculiar condition of the 

After Hooker returned to his headquarters from his 
inspection of the line of the Eleventh Corps, accompanied by 
many of his staff, on Saturday morning, and on being in- 
formed by Sickles that a movement of troops was passing his 
front towards his flank, he issued the g.30 order, directed to 
both Howard and Slocum : 

"I am directed by the Major General commanding to say, that 
the disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to 
a front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your 
flank, he wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the 
positions you will take in that event, in order that you may be pre- 
pared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that 
you have heavy reserves well in band to meet this contingency. 
The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No 
artificial defenses worth naming have been thrown up, and there 
appears a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the General's 
opinion, as favorably posted as might be. We have good reason to 
suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your 


pickets, for purposes of observation, as far as may be safe, in order 
to obtain timely information of their approach." 

This explicit and important order was received at the 
Eleventh Corps headquarters by General Schurz, who had 
assumed command while General Howard was resting from 
fatigue in the tavern. The order was opened by Schurz, 
and by him read to the commander of the corps, and with 
him discussed. Schurz, convinced that the attack would 
come from the west, was then strongly in favor of withdraw- 
ing Devens'' Division and part of his own from the Talley 
and Hawkins Farms and the woods beyond, which he re- 
garded as faulty and untenable in case of attack from the 
direction of the Pike on the west, and placing them in posi- 
tion on a line extending from a point east of the junction of 
the Plank *and Pike roads, directly north, past the front of 
the little Church along the eastern edge of the little stream 
known as Hunting Run, facing directly to the west. This 
new position would have afforded some opportunity for 
Devens' Division to make a better defense, and given the 
artillery a chance to command both roads and to sweep with 
a broad fire the fields of the Hawkins Farm, where the left 
of Jackson's army debouched in such strong force. But 
his advice was not accepted. 

A glance at the map, showing the positions of the troops 
at this time, will explain to the observer the strength of the 
proposed position far better than any description by means 
of words. The commander of the corps, however, saw no 
need of any change, and none was made of any moment, 
save the changing of front of some of the regiments on the 
Hawkins Farm, which was done by Schurz of his own voli- 
tion. If anything else was done in accordance with this 
direct order, it does not appear clear to the investigator. 
The sending of two companies of the Thirty-third Massa- 
chusetts a mile to the north of Dowdall's, to picket the site 
of the old mill on a path to the Ely Ford, and the construc- 
tion in the forenoon of the shallow rifle pits on the Dowdall 
Farm, facing west, may have been done and accounted for in 


the message sent to Hooker, as alleged, at eleven a. m., stat- 
ing : "I am taking measures to resist an attack on the right. " 
On the exposed flank, which Devens occupied, there seems 
to have been nothing done whatever, and the defenses there 
hardly merited the name of rifle pits or earthworks, and were 
trivial compared to those made by the Second, Third, Fifth 
and Twelfth Corps, remains of which are visible to-day. 
In fact, there were no rifle pits in front of Von Gilsa's men ;. 
nothing but the slight protection afforded by the slashing 
of trees, forming a slight abatis. To whose neglect this 
defect in the means of protection is due, is not very clear, 
but Warren and Comstock were the engineers in charge of 
all defenses, and Warren had been told of the movements 
of Jackson's men after the capture of the Twenty-third 
Georgia by the Berdan Sharpshooters. It is in evidence 
that the West Point officers did not believe that the enemy 
could march in force through the thickets on the right 
flank. However, the Federal army was slowly learning the 
art of war, and soon found, to its discomfiture, that the dis- 
dained rebel rabble could march through the woods in two 
lines of battle, with a front of two miles, and in sufficient 
form to attack promptly ! 

The Eleventh Corps at this time was formed of a large 
part of the forces that had previously served under Fremont 
and Sigel in Western Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley, 
and known as the Mountain Department, or later as the 
First Corps of Virginia. The veteran part of it had been 
engaged in contests in Western Virginia, in the Shenandoah, 
and in those of the campaign under Pope, ending at the 
second battle of Bull Run. It arrived at Fredericksburg 
too late to take part in that assault, and went into winter 
quarters at Stafford Court House, under the command of 
Sigel. At this time the corps consisted of twenty-seven 
regiments of infantry and six batteries. Sixteen of these 
regiments were veteran, and the other eleven were new. 
We will review briefly the composition of this corps, and 
see whether it was entitled, or not, to any confidence what- 


ever by its new associates in the Army of the Potomac ; 
and also whether the contemptuous expressions of worth- 
lessness so freely bestowed upon it were properly placed. 

When the corps joined the Army of the Potomac at 
Fredericksburg, it certainly did not meet with that cordial 
welcome which it expected and was clearly entitled to. On 
the contrary, there is abundant testimony to show the ex- 
istence of a strong dislike and distrust, which was unde- 
served. It was spoken of as the foreign contingent, and 
hardly worthy of marching in line with the veterans of the 
old army. The historian of the Second Corps plainly stated 
the facts, when he wrote that "a feeling of contempt, doubt- 
less undeserved, had been generally entertained by the older 
corps of the Army of the Potomac toward the Eleventh 
Corps ever since it came up in the rear after Fredericksburg. 
To 'fight mit Sigel' had so long been a current jest and 
proverb, that the troops were hardly disposed to do justice 
to the many excellent regiments which were incorporated 
in this command." He also intimates that the corps had 
not taken part in any hard fighting, such as the Army of 
the Potomac had seen on the peninsula; yet, if he had 
looked over the returns of the battle of the second Bull 
Run, he would have seen that the body of men which after- 
wards formed the Eleventh Corps did see some hard fight- 
ing, and fully as severe as the Second Corps saw at the bat- 
tle of Fair Oaks, or in the seven days' battles about Rich- 
mond; and if mortality is evidence, they saw harder fighting 
than did the Second Corps at these times. There is abun- 
dant evidence to show the existence of a feeling of hostility 
throughout the army against the Eleventh Corps, and with 
no more foundation than that General Walker has men- 

Hooker was strongly urged to break up the corps, after 
the battle, and humiliate it still further by destroying its 
organizations, and it was admitted before Congress that it 
was largely due to the high price of gold, and the fear of its 
effects upon the anticipated draft, which prevented him from 


doing it. There is certainly reason to believe that there was 
a deliberate conspiracy to shift the errors of the battle upon 
the Eleventh Corps, and the statements of Hooker, Sickles, 
Warren and Birney furnish sufficient proof of the intent. 
Those who were the most implicated in the wild goose chase 
below the Furnace, and who are the authors of the misfor- 
tunes of the army, are the foulest in abuse and loudest in 

The origin of this unjust feeling, and the fostering care 
which sustained it, is still involved in some doubt. But it 
is certain that the chief of staff of our armies — whom Lin- 
coln declared to be utterly destitute of friends — had a mortal 
aversion to all foreigners desiring to serve in our armies. 
How far this disposition at the War Department affected the 
well being and efficiency of the Eleventh Corps may not 
easily or soon be determined, but it will not be forgotten 
that all supplications of the officers of the corps to speak in 
their defense after the battle of Chancellorsville were sternly 

It is often asked why the investigation concerning the 
Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville has been so long delayed, 
when so many of its members and its accusers are dead. 
The reasons are ample and proper. The evidence has not 
long been accessible to the public, and until it could be col- 
lated and examined, no one wished to encounter the storm 
of abuse which has greeted those who have attempted or 
desired to say a word of explanation or extenuation for the 
unfortunate corps. 

There were other bodies of excellent troops besides the 
Eleventh Corps in our armies who were made scape-goats 
and objects of undeserved derision, and who remained under 
ban for a long time before the truth became known. For 
twenty years the excellent division of General Prentiss was 
overwhelmed with disgrace for neglect of duty at the battle 
of Shiloh, but in 1883 General Prentiss branded the state- 
ments as false and unjust, and proved them to be so by 
ample documentary proof, which has been lately corrobo- 


rated by General Shoup, Chief of Artillery of Hardee's Corps 
of the Confederate army. General Lew Wallace, who was 
under reproach for neglect of duty at the same battle, proved 
at a public meeting at Tipton, in Indiana, in 1883, that he 
acted from first to last by direction of General Grant, and 
that when he was ordered to march, it was then too late. 

Military history has many examples of misplaced praise 
and blame, and even the last English campaign in Egypt 
affords a marked instance. The division of General Hamley, 
at Tel-el-Kebir, made the final attack at night and defeated 
the Egyptian army. But in the reports of the campaign, the 
part General Hamley and his division had taken was studi- 
ously ignored, and the men he recommended to favor for 
bravery and gallant service were not even mentioned in the 
general report. Hamley, in defending his men and claiming 
for them some of the honors of success, was forced to retire 
from the army in which he ^yas regarded as one of its ablest 

The Republic has become too great and too magnani- 
mous to allow gross errors to remain inscribed in its archives 
to aggrandize a few guilty and incompetent officers by the 
unjust treatment of many thousand worthy soldiers. The 
volunteers of 1861 and 1862, who left their workshops, their 
schools and their homes to defend the distressed Republic 
for a trifling pittance, and did their duty, or attempted to do 
their duty, to the best of their ability, are certainly entitled 
to the protection and the thanks of this government, and to 
the respect and sympathy of their fellow soldiers. In fact, 
the flag at this period of time covers alike all its volunteer 
defenders, whether Jew or Gentile, or whether descendant of 
the Mayflower or of the followers of William Penn. 


Germans in the Eleventh Corps. 

THE German troops of the Eleventh Corps, or what 
were classed as Germans, were largely composed of 
the veterans who offered their services at the comr 
mencement of the war, and after the first Bull Run 
— where they stood firm — had later been consolidated with 
other German organizations, and under Blenker sent into 
Western Virginia, where they reported to Fremont. Not 
long after their arrival, Fremont ordered a close inspec- 
tion of their condition, in consequence of their complaints of 
destitution and neglect. The Inspector, somewhat biased 
against the composition of the division, found to his' sur- 
prise an admirable body of men, many if not most of them 
American citizens by adoption or birth, well instructed as 
soldiers, and officered by men of ability, some of whom were 
officers of distinction, who had seen service in foreign wars 
and in the Mexican War. The forlorn and neglected con- 
dition of the men was plainly apparent to the Inspector. 
Gen. James Shields, in this very campaign, said, June 
yth, 1862, to his soldiers in the Luray Valley, when com- 
plaining of the want of shoes, clothing, etc. : "The Germans 
are not half as well off as you are, but they hang on the 
enemy without respite." 

The men who had left their families and their occupa- 
tions to serve the country for the paltry sum of eleven or 
thirteen dollars a month were certainly deserving of the best 
treatment from the authorities at Washington, and this they 
evidently had not received. Rosecrans, while on his way to 
the Army of the Cumberland, led this division from the Shen- 
andoah over the mountains to Fremont, and was much dis- 
turbed at the neglect shown to it by the officials at Wash- 
ington, and sharply questioned Stahel about the want of 



shoes and other things which his brigade required. Stahel 
assured him of his frequent requisitions in behalf of his men, 
and the ignoring of them by the officials in charge, which the 
Inspector found afterwards to be true. The Inspector found 
the division destitute of many things required for the com- 
fort of the soldier, and that requisitions made for these wants 
were not honored, or were not promptly filled. The men 
justly complained of their treatment, and also of the abuse 
bestowed upon them during their march across the Shen- 
andoah Valley for alleged acts of pillage on the way. From 
■what the Inspector saw, he was of the opinion that the stories 
liad been over-estimated, and he has since thought that the 
Second Corps put in the breastworks at the North Anna 
more valuables, in the shape of pianos, scientific apparatus 
and choice furniture, than Blenker's Division stole or de- 
stroyed during their march over the mountains to Northern 
Virginia. Their booty and destruction, even as exagger- 
ated, was infinitesimal, as compared to that of the Army of 
the Potomac at the capture of Fredericksburg. 

The Eleventh Corps was generally supposed to be formed 
of Germans, or foreigners, and it was sometimes called the 
foreign contingent of the Army of the Potomac. Investiga- 
tion shows that the corps — probably three-fifths of it — was 
iormed of American citizens by birth, and that many of the 
remainder were naturalized citizens, and were entitled to the 
respect due to the adopted citizen. The commander of the 
corps sent to the War Department in May, 1863, a list of 
eleven regiments as exclusively German, amounting to four 
thousand men, but investigation shows, or seems to show, 
that not one of these regiments was exclusively German. 
The De Kalb, or Forty-first New York, which was regarded 
as the most exclusive, really contained several Yankees in 
its ranks, and the others contained many native-born sol- 
diers, who were classed as foreigners because they spoke 
German or French. In fact, there were a very large number 
of soldiers in this corps wrongfully classed because of their 
names, when they were really as much citizens of the coun- 


try as Admiral Ammen or Generals Rosecrans, Custer, 
Hartranft, Heintzelman, Wister, Mendenhall, Pennypacker, 
Hoffman, Roebling, and hosts of others, whose fathers and 
grandfathers were born in this country, and entitled to any 
honor that might be claimed by the descendants of the May- 

At the time of the rebellion there were in the North 
many foreign-born but naturalized soldiers who had been 
educated in the armies and the military schools of Europe, 
and they promptly offered their services in many ways to our 
distressed government. Some of these men, it is true, had 
rank and title attached to their names, but for this offensive 
stain of aristocratic birth they were not responsible, as the 
honors came from inheritance, and could not be dropped any 
more than in the case of Baron Steuben, of whom Washing- 
ton thought so much. But few of these officers, however, 
were of high title, and the chief of these, the Prince Salm- 
Salm, was deserving of military praise. The death of this 
officer, when he fell at the head of the Fourth Royal Prus- 
sian Guards, at the bloody battle of Gravelotte, in the 
French and German war, was a fitting close to his restless 

The people applauded heartily the martial bearing and 
patriotic offers of these men, when they marched promptly 
to the front, from New York or Philadelphia, under Von 
Schack, Von Weber, Blenker, Bohlen, and others. At this 
time, in the early days of the rebellion, when treason was 
seductive and danger was imminent, there was no distinc- 
tion under the flag between the naturalized and the native- 
born citizen ; all were welcome, and all stood on the same 
footing. But as the pressing danger grew less, the expres- 
sions of welcome at Washington changed also, and soon 
there was a marked contrast in the War Department to that 
hearty reception Washington gave to the French and Ger- 
man officers in the dark days of the Revolution. The coun- 
try rejoiced with great joy when it became known that the 
entire German population of the North rallied without hesi- 


tation to the support of the endangered Republic. The sup- 
port was magnificent, and deserving of the highest gratitude 
of the country. It is also remarkable that all of the revo- 
lutionists then in this country, and who had followed Kos- 
suth, Garibaldi, Sigel and Hecker, should offer their services 
to the United States. It was, indeed, a grand sight, when 
the entire mass of German-speaking and German-born peo- 
ple rose as one man. and stood firmly by the flag of the 
Republic. What would have been the fate of Missouri, Illi- 
nois and Indiana, at the commencement of the war, had it 
not been for the patriotic efforts of Sigel, Osterhaus, Schurz 
and Hecker, and their resolute German followers? Has the 
country yet recognized the importance and the full weight 
of these facts? Missouri certainly would have drifted away 
with the southern tide, had it not been for the influence and 
resistance of these gallant men. The Germans were the first 
to take up arms and attempt to save the state. The first 
three loyal regiments raised in St. Louis were Germans 
almost to a man, and when the Home Guards of Missouri 
were first formed, none but Germans joined them. This 
movement on the part of the Germans and other soldiers 
of foreign birth and other nationalities was of vast aid to 
the northern cause, and contributed greatly to its final suc- 
cess, and its influence and its value cannot be estimated with 
the gold of the nation. What was the cause of this remark- 
able support and unanimity on the part of the Germans? 
The influences which gave rise to this happy result may be 
traced back to the days and the effect of the Revolution of 
1775, and they may be reckoned as among the blessings 
derived from that distant struggle. 

Let us go back for a moment to Colonial times, and see 
how the influence of the Germans affected the condition of 
the revolted colonists. Before the blow in 1775 was struck, 
the German officer, De Kalb, rendered important aid to the 
cause of the revolutionists. This able officer was sent by the 
French Minister Choiseul to investigate the relations between 
Great Britain and her disaffected colonies, and his inspection 
3— B. c. 


was of vast importance in shaping the later policy of France 
under Vergennes, when Lafayette was sent with material and 
effective aid to the assistance of the sorely beset revolution- 
ists. De Kalb's influence in this report, though indirect, was 
probably a more powerful factor in shaping the views of the 
French government than the world is aware of. It is certain, 
however, that the love of liberty had but little to do with it, 
and that the movement was in revenge for the disasters of 
the seven years' war. It was more of a thrust at the vitals 
of England — the hereditary foe — than an honest support of 
the efforts for freedom in the English Colonies. But the 
United States, after the declaration of peace, derived aid 
and strength from an unexpected quarter, and this came 
from the much abused Hessians. 

England, during the revolt of her American colonists, 
hired about twenty thousand men from the German princes 
on the Rhine to help fight her battles, and this act, which 
was extremely offensive to the revolutionists, led to important 
benefits and results to the Republic before a century had 
passed. After hostilities ceased, many of these troops from 
the Rhenish Provinces remained behind to become citizens 
of the new Republic, and many more also returned soon after 
from Germany to settle here. There were many Germans in 
the French army with Lafayette, and between the two armies, 
quite eleven thousand men remained behind to become citi- 
zens of the new Republic. Germany, it is said, derived much 
benefit from the experience of her soldiers in the expeditions 
to America, made at the expense of Great Britain. And the 
lessons the German soldier learned in the American Revolu- 
tion were carried home and spread broadcast over the Father- 
land. And under Gneisenau and others they bore substantial 
fruit in the great struggle for German liberty in the times of 
Napoleon. It was largely due to these impressions, germi- 
nating for nearly a century, that the great majority of the 
people of the German nation supported the Union cause in 
the civil war. 

At the time of the rebellion, there were many Germans 


and families of German ancestry throughout the United 
States. In 1862 it was computed by competent authority 
that there were over one milHon people of German descent 
in the state of Pennsylvania, eight hundred thousand in New 
York, six hundred thousand in Ohio, over one hundred thou- 
sand in Missouri, and about thirty thousand in New Eng- 
land. The great Northwest was also full of people of Ger- 
man origin, but no estimate of their numbers was given at 
this time. In the state of Maryland there were one hundred 
and twenty-five thousand people of German birth or descent, 
and it was largely due to their influence that the state of 
Maryland remained in the Union, and it was also largely 
due to their loyal feeling that General Lee received so few 
recruits when he invaded Maryland in the Antietam and 
Gettysburg campaigns. 

It has also been estimated by excellent authority that 
nearly one hundred and ninety thousand soldiers of Ger- 
man birth — most of whom were naturalized citizens — were 
enlisted in the Federal armies. Besides these, there was 
a vast number of men of German ancestry, who spoke the 
language of their ancestors, but were classed as Germans 
by mistake. In the South, there were also many soldiers 
of German descent, who gave the Confederacy much trou- 
ble with their strong attachment to the old Republic, before 
they yielded to the demands and seductions of secession. 
During the war but few soldiers of German birth were 
attracted from the Fatherland to aid the southern cause, 
and although they were able and active men, like Heros 
Von Borcke and Estvan, they did not influence the Father- 
land in the least against the Union cause. 

The soldiers of the Eleventh Corps, especially the Ger- 
man troops, after Chancellorsville were hooted at on all 
sides and called in derision Dutchmen — Flying Dutchmen — 
as though the name expressed a low degree of courage. The 
term of reproach exhibited at the same time the animosity, 
the ignorance and the malice of the revilers, for the Dutch, 
known in ancient times as Batavians, were considered the 


bravest and most warlike of all the nations of northern 
Europe. And in modern times, infantry never stood firmer 
than did the Dutch at the battle of Malplaquet, or fought 
-with more heroism and defiance of death than did the de- 
fenders of the trenches of Berg-op-Zoom, or Ostend. And 
the sailors who swept the seas with Van Reuter and Van 
Tromp were never surpassed in tenacious courage, save by 
the boldest of the English sea rovers. To call a coward 
a Dutchman in contempt is a serious mistake, for it invests 
him with historic praise. A little more of the derided Dutch 
character infused into our armies might have shortened the 
days of the rebellion. The German character needs no apol- 
ogy to the student of history for lack of martial virtues. 
Since the days of the Caesars, its unquenchable warlike spirit 
has never been denied or questioned. The German nation 
from the earliest periods has been rich in patriotic feel- 
ing and love of liberty. From it sprang the noble ideas 
of ancient and modern chivalry, as well as respect for women 
and veneration for old age. In brief, civilization owes more 
of its high degree of excellence and strength to the descen- 
dants of the savages of the Hercynian forests than to the del- 
icate morals of the effete Roman Empire. Truly did Carlyle 
and Montesquieu say that the British Constitution came out 
of the woods of Germany. Truly did another of the greatest 
of modern historians say, that the fatherland of English- 
speaking people is not England, but Germany. Napoleon 
was wont to point with pride and with universal consent 
to one of his marshals as the "Bravest of the Brave" — 
Michael Ney, a German by blood. 

In the western armies, the German soldier met with 
little or no opposition, and some of their regiments, com- 
posed of Germans, or men of German descent, were regarded 
as the choicest and most reliable of all the troops in the 
West. The Ninth Ohio, composed entirely of Germans, or 
those of German descent, with the exception of one man — 
its brave commander, the gallant Robert L. McCook prob- 
ably had no superior in the western armies. In the western 


armies, however, the volunteer element asserted itself, and 
maintained its influence and its rights. In the Army of the 
Potomac it was somewhat different. West Point shaped all 
things to the interest and the wishes of its faction, and it 
may truthfully be said that in the management of this army 
patriotism was often subservient to cold ambition, and that 
selfishness sometimes proved stronger than sense of honor ; 
that "faults passed for virtues and rashness was regarded as 
proof of superior genius." As we strip away the veil of ob- 
scurity that hangs over the Army of the Potomac, and ex- 
amine the ferment of jealousy, the concealed ambition, the 
rank suspicion, and the favoritism of its leaders, the picture 
is not pleasant to contemplate or to consider. But beneath 
this dismal revelation appears the glorious array of the rank 
and file and subordinate oii&cers of the army, standing out in 
bold and clear relief, firm as its lines of steel, unsurpassed in 
the world's history in courage, devotion, intelligence and 
patriotism. And it also recalls to minci the fable which says : 
"An army of sheep commanded by lions is better than an 
army of lions commanded by sheep." 

* The Army of the Potomac was drawn from the best life 
blood of the North, embodying its intelligence and its patriot- 
ism, and though it had not the steady superiority, the obsti- 
nate obedience of Roman discipline, its courage and its de- 
votion was no less sublime, and amid all, and in spite of all 
its reckless and stupid leadership, its sadly torn ranks stood 
firm and undaunted to the last. 


Personnel of the Eleventh Corps. 

NONE of the corps of the army were so diversified in 
their personnel as the Eleventh — none had so roman- 
tic or so extended a career. Commencing its history 
at the battle of McDowell, in Western Virginia, or 
still earlier in the war, with Blenker's Brigade at Manassas, 
fighting its way down the Shenandoah Valley and over the 
mountains to the second Manassas, taking a part at Chan- 
cellorsville and Gettysburg, and from thence across the 
country to the relief of Chattanooga, the attack on Lookout 
Mountain, the relief of Knoxville, and the famous march with 
Sherman to the sea, none suffered so severely and so unjustly 
the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune." No better 
proof of its good qualities can be offered than the fact that 
it did survive the calumnies of Chancellorsville and Getitys- 
burg, and far away with Sherman, in the heart of the Con- 
federacy, showed that it contained among its survivors val- 
iant spirits, worthy of the highest commendation. 

Sigel, in April, had asked for release, and Howard had 
been assigned to the command. The one-armed soldier was 
received with kindness and attention. His 'frank, open coun- 
tenance and pleasant manners, and empty sleeve, strength- 
ened his position. But nevertheless, behind this, there was 
a silent feeling, or suspicion, that was not easily appeased. 
The exuberant religious manifestations of the new com- 
mander were not pleasing to the corps. Although there 
were among them many devout Christians, the great mass of 
the corps were untrammeled in their religious views, and 
they believed that fortune came to the big battalions, and 
that victory was the result of audacity, courage and vigi- 
lance, and was not deduced from auspices or assisted by in- 



Shortly before the battle, the intrepid Barlow had been 
sent to the corps, at the request of Howard, and assigned to 
the brigade commanded by Col. Orland Smith. The dis- 
placement was not called for, and the advent of Barlow did 
not increase the feeling of contentment or confidence in the 
brigade. Col. Orland Smith was not a whit inferior in the 
many qualifications that make the successful soldier, and his 
career proved it. Nine days before the battle, General 
Devens appeared and was assigned to the First Division, 
then commanded by General McLean, who had been asso- 
ciated with troops of the command for a long time, and was 
entitled to all the honors attached thereto. Devens had been 
taken by Hooker from a division of the Sixth Corps and ex- 
pressly ordered to the command of a division in the Eleventh 
Corps. The advent of Devens returned General McLean to 
his brigade, and Colonel Lee, then in charge of the brigade, 
returned to his regiment, the Fifty-fifth Ohio. 

The change was unfortunate, and led to disaster. It 
created considerable feeling among the troops, as McLean 
had been in command for a long time, and was familiar with 
the men. McLean was a veteran of long service, and his 
ability had never been questioned. Lincoln's maxim, "never 
swap horses while crossing a stream," was forcibly illus- 
trated in this instance. Had McLean remained in place, 
Jackson never would have surprised the flank of Hooker's 
arm}', for he had fought Jackson in his two former flank 
movements, and was aware of his manner of fighting. 

At this time the Eleventh Corps numbered about twelve 
thousand effectives, which is the estimate of General Howard 
and also that of Colonel Fox, but General Hooker stated 
before Congress that it was but eleven thousand men, and 
this is the estimate given bj' General Underwood, who made 
a careful study of the battle after the close of the war. The 
left wing of the corps, composed of the two brigades of 
Buschbeck and Barlow, and under the command of General 
Steinwehr, was stationed along the Dowdall Farm, with 
Buschbeck' s Brigade strongly entrenched on the crest of 


the southern border of the farm and facing south, and sup- 
ported by Weidrick's Battery of six guns. North of the 
Dowdall House, Barlow's Brigade was placed in reserve for 
the corps, and in the morning had constructed a shallow 
rifle pit, extending diagonally across the open field from the 
rear of Dowdall's to the woods in rear of the little Church, 
and facing west. In the same field, on its eastern edge, the 
reserve artillery of three batteries was parked. To the right 
of Buschbeck's, four regiments of Schurz's Division were 
interposed along the road facing south as far as Devens' 
Division at the Talley Farm, while the remaining five regi- 
ments were bivouacked on the Hawkins Farm, directly in the 
rear. Prolonging the right of Schurz, and extending for 
more than half a mile, were five of the regiments of Devens' 
Division, standing in the road and facing south. On the 
extreme right of this line were two regiments, deflected at a 
right angle from the pike, facing west and covering the ap- 
proach from that direction. In the angle of the line, and 
in the road, were placed two of Dickman's guns, nine hun- 
dred and sixty yards from the Talley House. The other four 
guns were placed east of Talley's, facing south, to command 
the Plank Road. The remaining regiments, the Twenty-fifth 
and the Seventy-fifth Ohio, were held in reserve, formed in 
double column, and placed in the woods in rear of the Fifty- 
fifth and One Hundred and Seventh Ohio, facing south. 
Along the front of the five 'regiments of Devens' Division 
there were no defences of strength. The fences had been 
thrown down along the southern side of the road, and piled 
up, with a little dirt thrown over them, and in the woods the 
timber had been slashed in front of the Forty-first and Forty- 
fifth New York, the two guns in the road and the two de- 
flected regiments, the One Hundred and Fifty-third Pennsyl- 
vania, and Fifty-fourth New York. The rest ' of Devens' 
Division was without protection of any kind, and, in fact, all 
the redoubts thrown up for the protection of the corps were 
rendered utterly useless by the attack of Jackson, far in their 
rear, excepting the trivial rifle pit east of the Dowdall Tavern, 


and the reports of the corps abandoning strong earthworks 
at the first fire are entirely erroneous. The only earthwork 
whatever that could furnish the least protection, and a 
chance to rally, to the broken regiments of Devens' and 
Schurz' Divisions, was the shallow and incompleted rifle pit 
in the field east of the Church and the Dowdall Tavern, and 
this could only afford shelter to a thin line of infantry lying 
down or kneeling behind it. It was so trivial in its construc- 
tion that all traces of it have now disappeared. 

The two deflected regiments of Von Gilsa, on whom fell 
the first blow of Jackson's army, were the One Hundred and 
Fifty-third Pennsylvania, a regiment of nine months men, 
mostly American citizens by birth. The other was the Fifty- 
fourth New York, an old regiment, few in numbers (about 
two hundred and fifty men), and composed mostly of Ger- 
mans, or men of German descent. It was placed a little in 
rear of the right flank of the One Hundred and Fifty-third 
Pennsvlvania, and in echelon. Neither of these regiments 
had any protection whatever, except what was afforded by 
the slashing of the timber in their front, and which delayed 
the onset of the enemy but a few moments. The nearest 
support to these two regiments was the Seventy-fifth Ohio, 
in double column, facing south, and seven hundred yards 
distant, while the regiments on the Hawkins Farm were over 
half a mile distant, far to the rear of their right flank. 

The Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville, as previously 
stated, consisted of twenty-seven regiments, of which eleven 
were new, while the remaining sixteen were old organiza- 
tions, and had been tested in the campaigns of West Vir- 
ginia, the Shenandoah Valley, and the second Bull Run, 
under Pope. The history of the veteran regiments certainly 
entitles them to the fullest confidence of their new associates 
in the Army of the Potomac. Concerning the personnel of 
the new regiments, much can be said in their praise. In the 
review of the Army of the Potomac by President Lincoln, in' 
April, just before the battle of Chancellorsville, the Eleventh 
Corps made a most excellent appearance, and the division 


commanded by General Schurz impressed the presidential 
party as the best drilled and the most soldierly of all of the 
Army of the Potomac that passed before them. 

Among the new troops in this corps, New England had 
two of its best regiments, the Seventeenth Connecticut and 
the Thirty-third Massachusetts. The Seventeenth Connecti- 
cut was well selected in its rank and file, and most of its 
officers had seen service in other organizations, one of whom 
was the brave Swede, Lieutenant Colonel Walter, who lost 
his life in this contest. Among the rank and file were the 
noted inventor, Elias Howe, and his son, and besides these 
there were many others of skill and talent, who had enlisted 
from a high sense of duty and patriotism. The Thirty-third 
Massachusetts was composed of the best soldiers of that 
patriotic Commonwealth, and New England had no better 
troops in the service than these under the command of Col. 
A. B. Underwood. From the far West, the Twenty-sixth 
Wisconsin claims special notice. It was classed as a Ger- 
man regiment, but with them there were mixed many other 
nationalities, as Scandinavians, Swiss and Americans. In 
this fight it won distinction, and afterwards became a noted 
body of troops, and was rightly reckoned by General Cogs- 
well as one of the finest military organizations in the Army 
of the United States. The Eighty-second Illinois was also 
largely composed of Germans, mixed with Swiss and Ameri- 
cans. Among the Swiss was a youth of the name of Emil 
Frey, who was a student in Switzerland at the time of the 
outbreak, but who promptly left the university, with others, 
and offered his humble services to the Republic. He first 
enlisted as a private in the Twenty-eighth Illinois, but when 
Hecker called for volunteers, Frey raised a company of his 
own, joined Hecker, and served with distinction until June, 
1865. This is the same youth whom Switzerland sent as its 
Minister to this country many years afterwards, and who is 
regarded to-day as one of its most eminent citizens. Besides 
this Swiss student, there were many others of ability in the 
corps, who left their universities, or their positions in the 


armies of Europe, to give their assistance to the Republic. 

In this regiment was a company of Jews, and to provide 
for the wants of these men and their families, the Jews of 
Chicago generously raised a large sum of money. At the 
head of the regiment stood a citizen and man of sterling 
worth, whose name will always be remembered in the history 
of the West and the cause of human liberty with respect and 
reverence. The ability, patriotism and noble qualities of this 
grand man — Frederick Hecker — had been well established in 
the revolution in Baden in 1848, and to his newly adopted 
country he offered all he had. This regiment gained a great 
and deserving reputation in the war, and here at Chancellors- 
ville the attempts it made to stop Jackson's surging masses 
show that it did have valiant men in its ranks, who were 
worthy of the highest praise. 

The One Hundred and Nineteenth New York was formed 
largely of Germans or men of German descent, and its col- 
onel was Elias Peisner. Peisner had been a revolutionist in 
Germany, but was a naturalized citizen and a professor at 
Union College, at Schenectady, New York, and a man held 
in the highest esteem. At the mention of his name at the 
great mass meeting held at Cooper Institute in 1863, in New 
York city, the entire audience rose to their feet in honor of 
the man. He was a bold and resolute officer, and had de- 
ployed his men safely, and was resisting the onslaught of the 
rebels after Devens had been compelled to retreat. At the 
first attack, Peisner fell beside his men, pierced with two 

The One Hundred and Fifty-third Pennsylvania was 
reckoned as an American regiment, although there were 
many names indicating German lineage, and it was regarded 
as an excellent body of men. The One Hundred and Thirty- 
fourth, the One Hundred and Thirty-sixth, the One Hundred 
and Fifty-fourth and the One Hundred and Fifty-seventh 
New York were all new regiments, composed of Americans, 
and well officered and worthy of confidence. The One Hun- 
dred and Thirty-fourth was commanded by Col. Charles R. 



Coster, the One Hundred and Thirty-sixth by Col. James 
Wood, Jr., the One Hundred and Fifty-fourth by Col. Pat- 
rick H. Jones, and the One Hundred and Fifty-seventh by 
Col. Philip P. Brown, Jr. 

Among the veteran regiments, there were six from the 
state of Ohio, nearly all American citizens, and equal in 
courage, intelligence and patriotism to any in the armies of 
the United States. Their reputation had been fully estab- 
lished long before the battle of Chancellorsville, in the cam- 
paigns of Western Virginia and at Cross Keys, and in the 
battle of the second Manassas, where the most of them won 
especial praise. They were the Twenty-fifth, the Fifty-fifth, 
the Sixty-first, the Seventy-third, the Seventy-fifth and the 
Eighty-second, all of which were commanded by American 
officers of acknowledged ability and courage. No words of 
praise are necessary for Colonel Richardson, of the Twenty- 
fifth, for Colonel Lee, of the Fifty-fifth, for Col. Stephen 
McGroarty, of the Sixty-first, for Col. Orland Smith, of the 
Seventy-third, for Col. Robert Riley, of the Seveiity-fifth, or 
for that noble man and officer. Col. James S. Robinson, of 
the Eighty-second Ohio Regiment. 

All of these regiments excepting the Seventy-third, then 
detached with Barlow, were in the fight, and attempted to 
do their duty, and did do it, at a terrible sacrifice of their 
men, for which adequate praise has not been given. It 
would be difficult to find six trustier regiments in all the 
armies of the United States than these. The Sixty-first 
Ohio was commanded by that sterling Irishman, Col. 
Stephen J. McGroarty, and his regiment seemed to be 
largely of Irishmen or men of Irish descent, so strong was 
the individuality of the commander. No one ever ques- 
tioned McGroarty's courage or ability, and at the close of 
the war, he could have exclaimed with Marius ; "My 
wounds are the proof of my nobility." The report of this 
gallant officer is not to be found, and its absence is a se- 
rious loss to the history of the fight around Dowdall's and 
at the Church. It is certain, however, that the brave offi- 


cer who held his regiment as rear guard until midnight 
on the deserted field of the second Bull Run did all that 
one man could do in arresting disaster in the face of ruin, 
or what appeared to be ruin. 

The Sixty-first was drawn up in line facing the west, 
waiting for the enemy, when the wrecks of Devens' Divi- 
sion, rushing down the road to escape the withering fire 
of Jackson's men, overran them and destroyed their form- 
ation, and carried a part of it away with them in the crowd, 
which continued on towards the Chancellor House. Parts 
of the broken regiment joined the line by the Church, and 
later on fell back to the Buschbeck line and fought there. 
Two of the companies attached themselves to Dilger's Bat- 
tery, and stuck to him in the retreat, and followed him to 
his position in the line of artillery at Fairview, where they 
remained until morning. 

The Forty-first New York, known as the De Kalb Reg- 
iment, was reduced by fighting and hardship to about three 
hundred men. It was formed by Von Gilsa, and it was 
said to have contained at first several hundred soldiers 
who had served with Von Gilsa in the Prussian army, and 
were well instructed men. The Forty-fifth New York was 
also a veteran regiment under Colonel Von Arnsberg, and 
although much reduced in numbers by campaigning, it con- 
tained a few more men than the Forty-first. These two 
regiments of about seven hundred men were placed in the 
road behind the two guns, on picket, and were attacked by 
the enemy in flank and rear, and were justified in retreat- 
ing as they did. As the reports of this brigade are all miss- 
ing and the commanders are dead, it is difficult to ascer- 
tain how much fighting these soldiers really did ; but there 
is no doubt, from the personnel of these regiments, that 
they would have made a determined resistance if they had 
been in a proper position, and had had any chance what- 
ever to fight. 

The Seventy-third Pennsylvania was organized at Phil- 
adelphia in June, 1861, by Col. John A. Koltes, who was a 



gallant German soldier of distinction, who had served in 
the Mexican war, and had also been a soldier in the reg- 
ular army. He was a citizen of this country, and employed 
in the U. S. Mint at the time of the civil war. His regi- 
ment was considered an excellent one, but at the time of 
Chancellorsville it had become much reduced in numbers, 
as it had suffered severely at the second Bull Run, where 
it lost both Koltes, who acted as brigade commander, and 
Bruenecker, who commanded the regiment in that sangui- 
nary contest. 

The Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania, a veteran regiment, but 
greatly reduced in numbers by two years of honorable ser- 
vice, was placed on picket south of the Dowdall Farm, and 
there it remained until it was too late to join the brigade at 
the Hawkins Farm. The men had seen, during the day, the 
movements of troops south of them and within range' of 
their guns, but were ordered to remain quiet and not provoke 
a combat. When Doles' Brigade passed between them and 
the Dowdall House, there was no way of escape but by the 
woods to the southward, as the enemy in strong force pre- 
vented returning by way of the Plank Road or the path from 
Dowdall's. The regiment was rallied, and remained for some 
time spectators of the battle in rear of them, until the troops 
held back by Colquitt, now coming up in their rear, front and 
right flank, compelled them to retire. There were but two 
hundred and fifty men in the regiment on that day, and of 
these sixty had been detailed to service at the Hawkins Farm, 
leaving but two hundred men to perform picket duty south 
of Dowdall's. Here they were attacked by Colquitt's or Ram- 
seur's men, and were soon dispersed, with a loss of fifty-nine 
killed, wounded and missing. The remainder of the regi- 
ment, reduced to one hundred and thirty men, crossed the 
stream to the southeast of Dowdall's, then in possession of 
the enemy, and escaped by following Scott's Run until they 
reached the southern edge of Hazel Grove, where they took 
the road or path leading from the Furnace to Fairview. 
They brought up the rear — not the front — of the grand ske- 


daddle which Pleasanton has described, and when they 
reached the position where the artillery was placed in bat- 
tery, they fell in behind Dilger's Battery, having retained 
their arins, and there they remained until ordered to the rear 
of the Chancellor House, late in the evening. This was 
General Bohlen's old regiment, and was formed largely of 
volunteers from men of German birth or of German ancestry, 
but among them there were many Americans of excellent 
qualities. The personnel of this regiment was of superior 
character, and it is doubtful if Philadelphia sent any better 
troops to the war. 

General Bohlen, who raised the regiment largely at his 
own expense, was a distinguished soldier long before the 
rebellion. At the age of twenty-one he was, on the recom- 
fnendation of General Lafayette, appointed on the staff of 
General Gerard, and served with him during the siege of 
Antwerp. He also served on the staff of General Worth in 
the Mexican war, and took part in several engagements. 
During the Crimean war he served in the French army, and 
was well versed in the art of war. Although born in Ger- 
many, he was intensely an American citizen, and when the 
rebellion threatened the liberties of his adopted country, he 
left the scenes of pleasure which his great wealth and social 
position gave him in Europe, and hastened at once to per- 
form his part. The men whom he 'called around him in 
forming the Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania were of a superior 
class, and their standing should not be reckoned according 
to the monthly pittance received for their services. In fact, 
the volunteers of 1861 and 1862 were from the best class of 
citizens throughout the country, east or west, and were prob- 
ably never surpassed in intelligence or patriotism in any of 
the civil revolutions of history. General Bohlen was killed 
in one of the fights preceding the second Bull Run. 

The First Division was commanded by Gen. Charles 
Devens, who had been sent to- the corps by Hooker and 
assigned to the division. Devens was an officer of ability 
and courage, who had taken part in the terrible ambuscade 


at Ball's Bluff, and had served with distinction on the Pen- 
insula ; but his displacement of McLean, and the austerity of 
his manners, did not add strength to the corps, and it is use- 
less to deny that his introduction into the corps was costly 
to Howard and fatal to the Army of the Potomac. 

The Second Division was under the command of General 
Von Steinwehr, who was a man of great distinction, and a 
notable trained and veteran soldier. He came from a dis- 
tinguished military family in Germany, and was well edu- 
cated in the military schools of that country. He came to 
this country and served as an officer in an Alabama regiment 
during the Mexican war. Afterwards he became a farmer 
in Connecticut, and was a citizen of that state when the re- 
bellion called for his services. He came to New York, as- 
sisted in forming the Twenty-ninth New York Regiment, waa 
chosen its colonel, and commanded it with credit at the first 
Bull Run battle. Steinwehr' s military reputation ranked 
high with all who knew him, his ability was never questioned, 
and he was deserving of the greatest confidence. 

The Third Division was under the direction of Gen. Carl 
Schurz, who, though not educated as a soldier, was well 
versed in military matters, and served with ability. He was 
a noted leader in the Revolution of 1848 in Germany, but 
escaped and came to the United States in 1852, and soon 
became a citizen of the Republic. He promptly offered 
his services to the government in 1861, soon rose to be a 
major general, and commanded a division with ability at the 
second Bull Run. His rare intellectual gifts assisted him 
greatly in his military career, and the record of his services 
in the war is an honorable one. 

The brigade commanders in the First Division were Mc- 
Lean and Von Gilsa. McLean was a son of Justice McLean, 
was one of the early volunteers of Ohio, and had won his 
way along the military path by sturdy fighting. He had 
recently been appointed brigadier general and put in com- 
mand of the division, but was displaced by Devens and re- 
turned to his brigade. McLean was an officer of discretion 


and firmness, but did not possess that courage which dares 
do the correct thing when the commander is clearly at fault. 
His strict obedience to his superior officer was military, but 
it was fatal to his men. 

Von Gilsa was another example of the typical German 
soldier. He had been an officer of the rank of major in the 
Schleswig-Holstein war, and soon afterwards came to this 
country and became a citizen. He was a school teacher when 
the rebellion broke out, when he came to the front at once 
and organized the De Kalb Regiment, which contained a large 
number of trained German soldiers who had served with him 
in Holstein. Von Gilsa served with credit wherever he was, 
was wounded at Cross Keys, and although he had served as 
commander of brigade and division, ye^t he was mustered out 
in 1864 as a colonel, the same rank he was given in April, 
1861. He was a marked example of the neglect of the War 
Department in the distribution of its favors and its obliga- 
tions. It was his misfortune to be placed on the extreme 
right, and to be left alone to face the full force of Jackson's 
first blow, and because he could not fight an overwhelming 
force of the enemy in his front and both flanks at the same 
time, he bore the blame of others, and the sting of injustice 
carried him to an early grave. 

The two brigade commanders in the Second Division 
were Buschbeck and Barlow. Adolph Buschbeck was the 
son of a German officer, and was educated as a soldier in the 
military schools of Germany, and at one time was an in- 
structor in the Cadet School of Potsdam. About ten years 
before the rebellion he came to this country, and became a 
citizen and a school teacher in Philadelphia. He assisted 
largely in forming the Twenty-seventh Pennsylvania Regi- 
ment, and was soon afterwards chosen its colonel, becoming 
general of brigade and division. The records show that he 
was a man of high soldierly qualities, and was well thought 
of by General Hooker and General Sherman. Gen. Francis 
Barlow was a new comer in the corps, and was but little 
known to its members. His ways were too abrupt and his 
4 — B. c. 


views too much those of the martinet to please his brigade, 
but they soon discovered that he was as intrepid as Decatur, 
and as fond of a fight as the naval hero of earlier times. 

The commander of the First Brigade of the Third Divi- 
sion was Brig. Gen. Alexander Schimmelpfennig, who had 
been an officer in the Prussian army. He came to this country 
and became a citizen, publishing soon after a history of the 
war between Russia and Turkey. At the outbreak he as- 
sisted in raising the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania Regiment, 
and remained in service during the war. He is said to have 
come from the celebrated family of that nime in Europe, and 
was considered one of the best read officers in military science 
to be found in the army. He was a man of slight figure but 
of great military ability and undaunted courage and resolu- 
tion. He felt keenly the unjust imputation of Chancellors- 
ville, and chagrin hastened his death soon after the war 

The commander of the Second Brigade, Third Division, 
was Col. Wladimir Kryzanowski, who had been exiled from 
Poland by the Revolution of 1846, and had become a citizen 
of the United States and a civil engineer by profession. But 
when Sumter was attacked, he promptly cancelled all his 
engagements and assisted in raising the Fifty-eighth New 
York Regiment, of which he became the colonel. 

Major Ernst F. Hoffman, the chief engineer of the 
corps — a Prussian by birth and military education — was an 
officer of distinction at the age of twenty-four years, whea he 
was decorated with the Order of the Red Eagle by the King 
of Prussia. Hoffman was a man of superior education, and 
more than the peer of the chivalric Heros Von Borcke, whom 
Generals Lee and Stuart thought so highly of in the rebel 
army. His life had been adventurous and romantic, and he 
had seen service with distinction with the Prussian army in 
Denmark, with the English army in the Crimea, and in 
Africa, and also on the staff of Garibaldi, in Italy. At the 
time of the war he was serving on the staff of General de la 
Marmora, in Italy, as major of engineers, and was sent by 


our Minister, George P. Marsh, to our government, with 
letters of the highest character. An eloquent tribute to the 
ability and the noble qualities of this sterling soldier may be 
found in the columns of the National Tribune of March 5th, 
1885, from the pen of his distinguished and true friend, Maj. 
Gen. James H. Wilson, of the U. S. Army. 


Sickles Fatal Reconnaissance. 

THE fatal reconnaissance toward the Furnace by Birney 
increased in proportions as he descended the road 
southward and beyond the Furnace. Whipple's Di- 
vision was then added to Birney's, and later Sickles 
called for Williams' Division of the Twelfth Corps, which 
was detached from its fortifications and added to the attack- 
ing force. Sickles also called for Berry's Division to support 
his movement, but Hooker refused to permit it to leave its 
position, and sent instead Barlow's Brigade of the Eleventh 
Corps. Barlow's Brigade of nearly ^thre £ thousand men was 
taken from its position as reserve to the Eleventh Corps at 
between four and five p. m. and sent to Sickles, increasing 
his column of attack to quite twenty thousand men. The 
taking of Barlow's Brigade by Captain Moore, of Hooker's 
staff, may be regarded as a rescinding of the order of Van 
Allen at 9.30 a. m., and also as positive evidence that at 
Hooker's headquarters there were no apprehensions what- 
ever of danger to the exposed Eleventh Corps. 

This expedition to the Welford Furnace and below is 
clearly the cause of the failure of the campaign. It is dif- 
ficult to place the authorship of this ill-timed movement on 
documentary proof, but up to ten a. m. it certainly cannot be 
ascribed to Hooker., The late General Underwood, who was 
one of the participators in its glories and a sufferer in its 
shame, declares that Sickles is responsible for it; -that he 
planned the expedition, and persuaded Hooker to allow him 
to make it, and is the person of all others accountable for 
the forlorn condition in which the Eleventh Corps was left 
when Jackson's blow came. After depriving the Eleventh 
Corps of its reserves, and assuring it that Lee and the rebel 
army was retreating and far away on the road to Gordons- 


sickles' fatal reconnaissance. 49 

ville, it seems incredible that Hooker, Birney, Sickles and 
others should attempt to lay all the blame on the defenseless 
and friendless corps. Such appear to be the facts, and more- 
over, there seems to have been a conspiracy on the part of 
the guilty ones to shift all blame and error upon the unfor- 
tunate corps, to divert attention from the real causes. It was 
stated to Congress that there was a conspiracy in the Army 
of the Potomac against Hooker, and there is certainly suffi- 
cient evidence to warrant the assertion that there was also a 
conspiracy in that army to wreck the reputation of the Elev- 
enth Corps. 

Hooker's orders all indicate a determined resolution to 
remain on the defensive, and his words of caution to Sickles 
when he went down to the Furnace with Birney' s Division 
were not to bring on a battle ; yet he permitted twenty thou- 
sand men to be detached from the entrenched lines of de- 
fense and moved forward two or three miles in a dense for- 
fest, leaving a gap of three miles between Von Gilsa's de- 
flected force on the right flank and Berry's Division, the 
nearest available force in reserve. Late in the afternoon, 
Sickles was about to attack the retreating enemy, and had 
called for Pleasanton and his cavalry to follow up the effec- 
tive blow. The leaders of this unfortunate expedition seemed 
to have been as ignorant of Jackson's whereabouts at this 
time as General Knyphausen, of the Hessians, was of our 
Revolutionary fathers, when he inquired of the captain of the 
ship if he had not sailed past in the night the place called 
America, where the rebels were. At this time or a little later, 
there was no enemy between Birney's extreme front and the 
Ohio River. Posey and Wright and their brigades were con- 
cealed on his left flank in the woods, listening for the sounds 
of Jackson's guns as the signal to attack. From his front 
Archer had long ago withdrawn his Tennesseeans, and was 
following the trail of Jackson's column, leaving the road free 
for Barlow's Brigade of the Eleventh Corps to march three 
miles south of the unfinished railroad, vainly seeking connec- 
tion with Birney's advanced force, and signs of the enemy. 


At this hour, past five p. m., Hooker, Sickles, Warren, and 
most of the other general officers, excepting perhaps Slocum, 
believed that the rebels were in full retreat, and that the 
glorious opportuuity of capturing a large part of their force, 
with cannon and trains, was rapidly passing away. So com- 
pletely did this idea take possession of their understanding, 
that they did not entertain or discuss even a suspicion that 
Jackson, instead of seeking flight, was marching for their 
unguarded rear. Sickles, away down in the woods below the 
Furnace, was so saturated with this notion of Lee's flight, 
that he refused to listen to the staff officer who brought him 
the information that the Eleventh Corps, less than two miles 
in his rear, had been fighting for more than half an hour and 
was being overpowered by greatly superior forces. - Not un- 
til after the second officer arrived, bringing details of danger 
and disaster, could he realize the absurdity of his expedition 
and the extreme peril in which his troops were then placed. 
A more ridiculous and stupid surprise did not occur in the 
'history of the civil war. It seems incredible that, when word 
came from Sickles to Hooker that he was among the rebel 
trains, Jackson was actually three miles almost directly in his 
rear, and was about to hurl the most of his thirty thousand 
men upon the feeble obstacles in his front, comprising only 
the forlorn Eleventh Corps, then deprived of its reserve bri- 
gade. It is still more incredible that, when Birney was pre- 
paring to bivouac with his powerful division below the Wel- 
ford House, two miles below the Plank Road, wondering what 
had become of the enemy, he was not aware that Jackson 
had been pulverizing the deserted and depleted Eleventh 
Corps of nine thousand men for more than an hour. 

Between the battle of Chancellorsville and that of Jena, 
where Napoleon struck down the Prussian monarchy almost 
by a single blow, there maybe found some unpleasant points of 
resemblance. The Prussian army, like that of the Potomac, 
was pronounced by its leaders the first on the planet, and 
invincible, with its inherited maxims of Frederick the Great. 
But its leaders were as stupidly confident as were Hooker 


and his lieutenants, and they exhibited alike the same 
professional prejudices, blind self conceit and ignorance 
of what the enemy was doing, and where he was. Prince 
Hohenlohe, like Hooker, sent a dispatch to his reserves 
in the rear, "I am whipping the enemy at every point;" 
yet shortly after he took to his heels and ran sixty miles 
before he thought himself safe from pursuit, far eclipsing 
the famous retrograde record of Frederick the Great at the 
battle of Mollwitz. 

It is certainly very singular that Birney, or Sickles, or 
Hooker did not suspect that Jackson's movement was to 
reach the rear of the Federal army. All the marching of 
trains and troops was in that direction, and the information 
derived from soldiers taken with the Twenty-third Georgia 
Regiment distinctly pointed in that direction, and when Lieu- 
tenant Thorp brought these men, who had been captured 
by the Berdan sharpshooters, to the rear and passed Gen- 
eral Sickles somewhere in the vicinity of the Furnace, he 
said to Sickles that Jackson's Corps was moving to the rear. 
Warren, it is said, was informed of it also, but fatuity was 
the order of the day, not only at the extreme front, but in 
the rear and in the center of the army. And so the entire 
day passed, and all about the Chancellor House was in bliss- 
full serenity. Pleasanton, with his calvary, instead of scout- 
ing on the exposed right flank, and developing the concealed 
enemy, clung to the shadow of headquarters, where he inun- 
dated Hooker, with his vain advice. Well may the Confed- 
erate soldier exclaim, "Quern Deus vult perdere." Hooker 
sat upon the porch of the Chancellor House, enjoying the" 
calm spring evening, and listening to the sounds of the dis- 
tant cannon, which were undoubtedly from Hardaway's artil- 
lery, only about one mile distant to the south or southeast of 
where he sat with Captains Candler and Russell. It was 
about half past six, or near that time, when Russell stepped 
out in front of the house, and, on looking down the road with 
his glass, exclaimed : "My God, here they come !" Hooker 
and both of his officers sprang upon their horses, rode a little 


distance down the road, and met the advance of the Eleventh 
Corps stragglers coming up the road, and from them he first 
learned of Jackson's attack. Not a sound had he or his staff 
heard of the conflict, which had been going on for nearly an 
hour. Not an officer had come to him from the front to give 
him warning, and this disaster came upon him with stunning 
effect. Although Buschbeck and Schurz were then fighting 
with all the force they could muster, it was evident to Hooker 
at a glance that his army was in extreme peril, and well he 
might quail with dismay at the situation. 

Sickles was at this moment miles away in the depths of 
the forest with twenty thousand of his best troops, and his 
destruction or capture seemed certain. Turning to Candler, 
Hooker bade him seek the Fiifst Corps, then supposed to be 
in position behind the White House, barely half a mile away, 
and bring it in person to the Fairview field in front of him. 
Candler galloped rapidly away towards the north, and had 
almost reached the White House, when Russell overtook 
him with orders to return instantly to Hooker. The com- 
mander had found out since the dispatch of Candler that 
the First Corps was not where he supposed it was, and had 
been ordered to be, but was still beyond the Rappahannock 
River, and was not available until midnight or morning. 
Candler then proceeded with new instructions to bring the 
First Corps with all haste, and to take other artillery on the 
road to assist the corps. Candler did so, and personally led 
the First Corps into a position on the Ely .Ford Road, a 
mile northwest of Chancellor's, and reported to Hooker at 
midnight that the corps was in position. Then Hooker took 
a longer breath, but the blow had been too severe and too 
sudden, and the commander did not recover from it until 
after the campaign was over, if he did then. 

At the Dowdall Tavern, the headquarters of the Eleventh 
Corps, at four p. m., all was serene, and no fear of the approach 
of the enemy was entertained ; in fact, there was nothing to 
disturb the calmness of the afternoon but the solicitude that 
General Lee might escape from the eager clutches of the 

sickles' fatal reconnaissance. 53 

Army of the Potomac. The reports from the menaced 
outer lines were unheeded, and it is possible that the im- 
portant and positive reports of Colonels Lee and Richard- 
son never passed their division commanders. It has been 
strongly asserted by members of General McLean's staff that 
the important and positive reports of Colonels Lee and 
Richardson were never sent to the corps headquarters, and, 
moreover, Howard's staff assert that they never reached 
there. And they also maintain that the only information 
they had to consider was the widely spread and widely be- 
lieved statement, coming from Sickles to Hooker, and which 
was to the positive effect that Lee was retreating, and that 
his fleeing troops were being captured in large numbers. 
This impression at the Dowdall Tavern was strengthened to 
a positive certainty when Captain Moore, of Hooker's staff^ 
came and demanded Barlow's Brigade, between the hours of 
four and five p. M., to go to the Furnace to join Sickles' bold 
and brilliant movement, and assist Birney, then supposed to 
have a firm grip on the rear of Lee's fugitive columns. 

There was no objection on the part of Barlow or How- 
ard to the removing of this force in reserve — the biggest bri- 
gade in the corps — which separated it from the corps and 
removed it from its important position. The brigade was 
ordered under arms, and started in the path which led 
directly south from Dowdall's. The commander of the 
corps was in the best of spirits at this time, being completely 
hypnotized by the assertion that Lee was retreating, and he 
exclaimed gaily to the men shouldering their arms that they 
were going to join Birney and capture some regiments. No 
thought or suspicion of danger is apparent at Dowdall's 
Tavern at this time, and yet there were more than fifteen 
thousand rebels resting on their arms within one mile of the 
right flank of the corps, and whose presence could have been 
determined in thirty minutes by a single company or a regi- 
ment of men. 

With Barlow went about three thousand men — or, to 
be exact, 2,950 men — and the last hope of a successful re- 


sistance by the Eleventh Corps. General's Howard and 
Steinwehr, and Major Howard and Captain Moore, of 
Hooker's staff, accompanied the troops down to the Furnace 
and some distance beyond. When they returned the net had 
been cast, the storm had burst, and the scene was enough to 
startle the stoutest heart. The roar of the battle which had 
enveloped and destroyed Devens' Division, and the yells of 
the lines of infantry from the depths of the forest extending 
two miles in front, indicated that the whole of the rebel army 
were gathered there for a mighty blow. Barlow was then 
three miles away, and Berry and his division, the nearest 
force in reserve, was over two miles distant in rear of the 
Chancellor House, in bivouac. Hooker was sitting on the 
porch of the Chancellor House as oblivious of danger as 
General Buell was at the battle of Perryville, when he lay in 
his tent and did not hear a sound of the conflict which almost 
wrecked his army, only two-and-a-half miles distant. 

Let us review briefly the condition of affairs in the 
Eleventh Corps at this time, and see if there is any reliable 
evidence to show that the situation was understood, and 
whether the officers of the exposed corps were negligent of 
their duty, and whether they are deserving of any praise or 
sympathy whatever. 


Warnings of Danger Unheeded. 

IT was not known that Jackson was moving past our flank, 
either to escape or to attack, until Saturday morning ; 
but between midnight of Friday and early Saturday 

morning Lieutenant Colonel Carmichael, of the One 
Hundred and Fifty-seventh New York, was in charge of a 
portion of the picket line. Hearing the sounds of moving 
trains past his front, he in the morning reported the same 
at headquarters, and was told for his pains that new troops 
were easily frightened. At ten a. m. some of the officers of 
McLean's Brigade, who were keenly on the alert, observed 
troops moving in the southeast and south towards their flank, 
and called McLean's attention to it. With the aid of the 
old man, Hatch, living on the Talley Farm, a diagram was 
made showing how the rebels could reach their flank by the 
routes they were then pursuing. McLean promised to in- 
form General Devens, and did so later in the day, and 
Devens reported it to Howard, who had noticed it before. 
Colonel Friend, the officer of the day of Devens' Division, 
reported to Devens that a large force of the enemy was 
passing to his rear, but Devens refused to give credit to the 
report. Friend then went to the headquarters of the corps, 
where he was rebuked for his statement, and warned not to 
bring on a panic. 

General Schurz, commanding the division in the center, 
haying observed the rebel troops marching from east to west, 
and being convinced that the flank attack would come, 
ordered Captain Dilger, in charge of the battery attached to 
his division, to look over the territory in rear of the estab- 
lished line, and be prepared to meet an attack from the rear. 
This battery, which was known as Independent Battery I, 
of Ohio, was equally composed of Americans and Germans. 



and was regarded as the best in the corps. It was a veteran 
battery, and had been well tested in Western Virginia, the 
Shenandoah Valley and the campaign of Pope. It was com- 
manded by Capt. Hubert Dilger, familiarly known in the 
army as "Leather Breeches," from the texture of his panta- 
loons. Dilger had been an officer in the Baden Mounted 
Artillery, but resigned to take part in our civil war. He had 
been thoroughly educated in the military schools of his native 
country, and was regarded as one of the best artillery officers 
to be found in our armies. Although he took part in many 
of the battles of the war, and served with distinction, and 
was recommended for promotion several times by distin- 
guished officers of the Army of the Potomac and the West, 
even by Gen. George H. Thomas, he had the marked honor 
of remaining a plain captain until the close of the war. And 
so did McDougal, of the navy, whose splendid exploit with 
the frigate Wyoming in Japan equaled that of the dauntless 
Decatur with the pirates in Tripoli in 1804. None ever 
knew Capt. Hubert Dilger but to admire, love and respect 
his manly qualities, and to such rare men, brevets and mere 
words of praise are superfluous. Dilger followed the advice 
of Schurz, and examined the fields about the Dowdall and 
Hawkins Farms with the view of repelling an attack from 
the right flank and rear. 

Early in the afternoon he determined to ride out on the 
exposed flank and see for himself what truth there might be 
in the rumors that had reached his ear that the enemy had 
appeared there in force. Mounting a trusty horse, and tak- 
ing an orderly with him, he proceeded up the Pike to the 
extreme right, where he found Von Gilsa greatly disturbed at 
the situation, and who earnestly begged him not to venture 
farther, as the enemy were in force in his front, and he would 
run great risk of being taken prisoner. Dilger promised to 
exercise great caution, and proceeded slowly until he reached 
a place north of the Luckett Farm, a little more than a mile 
from where he left Von Gilsa. Here he ran into the rebel 
army, then advancing, and was cut off hom. his line of retreat 


and pursued by a force of cavalry, narrowly escaping cap- 
ture. After wandering around among the many by-paths in 
the woods, he finally found a road which led him out to the 
U. S. Ford Road and to the rear of the Chancellor House. 
It was late in the afternoon when he reached the head- 
quarters of General Hooker, and he felt it his duty to make 
known the result of his reconnaissance. He approached a 
long-legged major of cavalry, apparently an officer of the 
staff, and told him briefly what he had seen, and that he be- 
lieved a large force of the enemy was collecting in our rear. 
The major of cavalry coolly advised him to proceed to his 
own corps and tell his yarn there. Dilger, feeling keenly the 
insulting manner of this officer, went with all speed to the 
headquarters of the Eleventh Corps and reported his adven- 
ture there, and to his disgust and indignation, his remarks 
were received without the slightest confidence, and in such a 
manner as to give him the impresssion that he had no busi- 
ness scouting out on the flank, and he was furthermore posi- 
tively informed that General Lee was retreating — in full 
retreat — and that Barlow's Brigade, with the commander 
of the corps, had gone south to fall upon the rear of the 
enemy. Poor Dilger, crestfallen and tired, rode to his 
battery near the Church, and prepared for the storm which 
he was sure was soon to come. So confident was he of the 
approaching attack that he refused to allow his horses to be 
taken to water, and had hardly got his battery in order before 
the distant rifleshots announced the driving in of the pickets. 
General Devens was repeatedly warned by his officers of 
the movements of Jackson, and the evidence is too strong to 
be denied. The statements of Colonel Lee are well fortified 
by the testimony of living witnesses. Colonel Lee was the 
commander of the Fifty-fifth Ohio, and until the untimely 
arrival of General Devens had been in command of the bri- 
gade for months. After the battle, Lee was so mortified by 
his treatment by Devens (it is so stated) that he resigned, 
and did not return again to the corps. He afterwards be- 
came the Lieutenant Governor of Ohio, and at the time of 


his death was one of the most respected citizens of that 
state. His papers, sent to the compiler shortly before his 
death, clearly describe the situation of things at the time, 
and show plainly that the division had ample time, even after 
the pickets were attacked, to change front and make a more 
satisfactory resistance, if they had been permitted to do so. 
Colonel Lee states that he ordered Captain Rollins, comman- 
der of the picket line in his front, to ascertain the truth of 
the rumor of the approach of the enemy and report to him. 

"At one o'clock a messenger came, and at two another messen- 
ger came, with information that the enemy were moving with infantry 
and artillery across our front to our right flank." He also states 
that "an hour afterwards another messenger came, and with him, 
as I had done with each of the preceeding messengers, I went to 
the headquarters of Generals McLean and Devens (both in the same 
house), and put them in possession of all the information that I was 
receiving, and from it I insisted that the evidence was satisfactory 
that we must expect the enemy on our right flank, and an attack 
upon that right flank. General McLean said but little on either 
occasion. General Devens seemed to attach very little importance 
to it, and to distrust the reliability of the report made, and to dis- 
sent from the conclusions that I insisted should be drawn from it, 
namely, that the enemy was moving to our right flank. He insisted 
that he had no information to that effect from headquarters, and 
that if such was the fact he certainly would- receive it from corps 
headquarters. He did not direct any of his staff, nor did he go him- 
self, to communicate to headquarters the information that I had 
borne to him. When the third messenger was with me at General 
Devens' headquarters, and I was urgent that disposition should be 
made to meet such an emergency, he said to me that it was ' not 
worth while to be scared before we were hurt. ' He then turned to 
his chief of staff and directed him to go to corps headquarters and 
ascertain whether there was any information there that the enemy 
was probably passing across our front to our right flank. He did 
not direct that any information that I had carried to him should be 
given to the corps headquarters. I then left, and did not return 
again to his headquarters. This was perhaps in the neighborhood 
of four o'clock in the afternoon. 

' ' I kept the commanders of my own brigade informed of the 
information that I was from time to time receiving from the front, 
and they shared with me in the belief that the enemy was passing 
to and massing on our right flank, and also, of course, shared in 
the anxieties we all naturally had as to the effect of it. I think they 
each and all made such dispositions as are usual in anticipation of 
a conflict that afternoon. We sent all our non-combatant material 
to the rear. The opinion throughout our brigade was general that 


we would soon be attacked from our right flank. Our picket line 
across our front to the southward was undisturbed, and not a shot 
heard in that direction, Shortly after the squadron of cavalry had 
reported, we began to hear firing of small arms on the extreme right 
flank. The road ran nearly westward, with heavy timber and woods 
on each side. This firing gradually increased in volume, and I rode 
rapidly out to the right flank of the army, which was only a distance 
of one division, and there I saw coming up the road a few of the 
enemy's cavalry, followed closely by a battery. I immediately went 
back to my position and awaited the result. Soon the men and offi- 
cers on our right flank began to give way, and to retreat to the east- 
ward in our rear in a disorganized form. The battery that had run 
up so close to us began to deliver grape and canister right along 
the road, and was very destructive to our line, which occupied the 
south side of the road, with a slight barricade made out of fence 
rails, with earth thrown upon them. Our line still fronted to the 
south. I immediately put my horse to his highest speed, and went 
eastward in the rear of the line to where I found Generals Devens 
and McLean, and informed them of the firing on our right flank, and 
that the enemy overlapped our rear, that our picket line in front was 
undisturbed, and inquired whether I should not change front so as to 
be able to meet the enemy. General Devens gave me no answer, 
and General McLean replied, ' Not yet.' I immediately returned to 
my poeition, and while I was gone, so destructive had been the fire 
upon my line that Lieutenant Colonel Gambee had withdrawn the line 
to the north side of the road and under cover of the timber, and 
thus put it out of the raking fire. I again returned with all possi- 
ble speed to Generals Devens and McLean, and informed them that 
our soldiers on the right were giving way and retreating, and that 
there was no enemy in front, and again awaited instructions, but 
receiving none, received from General McLean the dismissing signal, 
and I again returned to my regiment. The enemy were slowly ap- 
proaching with constant firing, and we were unable to deliver a shot. 
" In the meanwhile, in the rear of our brigade, the Twenty-fifth 
and Seventy-fifth had deployed looking toward the enemy, and the 
Seventy-fifth had gone forward somewhat, but without any support 
or any connection on its right or left, and were engaging the enemy, 
but without stopping his onward movement." 

At this time Colonel Lee was dashed to the ground and 
disabled by the wounding of his horse by grape shot, and 
when he recovered himself he found his regiment gone, and 
the division ruined. Lee, with a number of his brigade, 
rallied at the Buschbeck line and again vainly attempted to 
resist the progress of Jackson's men. 

Colonel Richardson, of the Twenty-fifth Ohio, after the 
return of his scouts, went to Devens and McLean and stated 


to them that there were large bodies of the enemy on the 
right flank, and apparently resting, but Devens replied 
sharply that General Lee was retreating, and that he knew 
it, and then with decided asperity told General McLean to 
order Colonel Richardson back to his regiment, as he was 
unnecessarily scared. 

Colonel Schimmelpfennig, of Schurz's Division, sent out 
Major Schlieter, of the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, to re- 
connoitre at about three p. m. The Major soon returned, and 
informed his superior officers that he found the enemy in 
great force, and heard the orders of the rebel officers as they 
massed their line of attack. Major Schleiter then reported 
the same at corps headquarters, and was laughed at for bis 
views, and told not to get alarmed, for the corps commander 
has already departed with the reserves to join Birney and 
capture some regiments. Late in the afternoon a squadron 
"of cavalry went out on the Pike, but soon returned, and the 
captain reported to Devens, in front of the Talley Hpuse, 
that he could go but a little ways, as he met a large body of 
infantry. Devens replied impatiently: "I wish I could get 
some one who could make a reconnaissance for me." The 
captain of the cavalry squad firmly replied : " General, I can 
go further, but I cannot promise to return." The cavalry 
were ordered to bivouac, and shortly afterward the attack 
came. Captain Culp, of McLean's staff, who was present 
when Richardson made his report and was sharply rebuked, 
says that there is no proof on record that any attempt was 
made to ascertain the truth or falsity of the reports. The 
assertion, coming from Hooker's headquarters, that Lee was 
retreating was too positive to be questioned by the humbler 
officers of the Eleventh Corps, but nevertheless, those who had 
fought Jackson in his two former flank movements in the Val- 
ley and at Manassas were not so easily convinced that the 
forces on their flank were simply a corps of diversion or obser- 
vation, and refused to believe it. They were also cautioned 
against circulating the rumors of Jackson's movements, and 
warned of the liability of causing a panic among the men. 


There were other warnings sent back from the lines from 
time to time, but all in vain to arouse a sense of danger. 
There is ample proof from men now living that not only did 
Von Gilsa and McLean have their pickets well out to the 
front, but that they were warned from time to time of the 
massing of the forces of the enemy. On the Pike, full a thou- 
sand yards west of the two guns of Von Gilsa, stationed in 
the road, were two bodies of sharpshooters. The one on 
the left of the road was under the command of Lieutenant 
Searles, and the other on the north of the Pike was under 
Lieutenant Boecke. These officers say that they sent in 
warnings to Von Gilsa, who sent them to his superior officers 
without avail. Act. Maj. Owen Rice, of the One Hundred 
and Fifty-third Pennsylvania, in command of the picket line, 
sent to Von Gilsa at 2.45 p. m. the following message: "A 
large body of the enemy is massing in my front. For God's 
sake make dispositions to receive him." Von Gilsa informed 
Rice the next day that he reported this dispatch personally 
at corps headquarters, and was repulsed with taunts. This 
statement may be found in publications of the Loyal Legion 
of Ohio of 1888. As early as five p. m., the pickets of both 
sides were exchanging shots, but the remarkable condition of 
the atmosphere prevented the sounds from being heard ex- 
cepting at a short distance. The foliage of the woods was 
so far developed at this time that it was quite impossible for 
the pickets to see but a short distance in front of them. Von 
Gilsa, it is said, asked to be allowed to testify with Major 
Rice to the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War, 
but was refused! The often repeated statements of the want 
of a picket line are not sustained, as there is abundant proof 
of a picket line well established, and on the alert, and no- 
where were the men completely surprised, as there was still 
time for all of the men of the Eleventh Corps to take their 
arms and offer some resistance to the foe, unless it was a 
company on the right of the Fifty-fourth New York, far in 
the forest. None of the corps left their arms in stack, and 
there were but few of the corps wanting arms the next day, 
5-^B. c. 


according to the report of the officer making the inspection. 
It was also stated in the mass meeting held in New York a 
month later, in protest to the abuse of the Germans without 
investigation, that Von Gilsa's Brigade lacked but seventeen 
muskets and Schimmelpfennig's Brigade but fifteen. 

In spite of all these warnings there was a remarkable 
fatuity existing with Devens and at corps headquarters, which 
can only be explained by the hypnotic effect coming from 
headquarters of the army at the Chancellor House. 

There is abundant evidence to show that the command- 
ing officers of the regiments of Devens' Division were aware 
of Jackson's presence and the danger of attack, and were 
deeply offended by Devens' refusal to listen to their advice 
and their warnings. About half an hour before the attack, 
three of the colonels of McLean's Brigade rode with Colonel 
Reily, of the Seventy-fifth Ohio, out to the front and con- 
sulted with Von Gilsa, whom they found ready for the attack. 
On their return, Colonel Reily called his men together and 
said to them with great feeling that a great battle was pend- 
ing, in which many lives would be lost. "Some of us will 
not see another sun rise. If there is a man in the ranks who 
is not ready to die for his country, let him come to me and I 
will give him a pass to go to the rear, for I want no half- 
hearted, unwilling soldiers or cowards in the ranks to-night. 
We need every man we have to fight the enemy. If a com- 
rade falls, do not stop to take him away or care for him, but 
fight for the soil on which he falls, and save him* by victory." 
This speech of Spartan firmness has been preserved by one 
of the officers who heard it, Captain E. R. Montfort. The 
colonel then told his men to lie down and rest, but not to 
leave their guns. 

Most of the regimental officers of the division were aware 
of the danger, and kept their men close to their position, and 
would have been in a far better condition to fight if Devens 
had permitted them to change front at the first alarm. But 
Devens refused to allow the change of position, as he was 
expecting an attack in front, which, however, did not come, 


in consequence of Colquitt's stupidity ; and there is no evi- 
dence to be found as yet that he gave any orders to change 
front at all, unless it was to the Seventeenth Connecticut at 
the last moment. 

Jackson Strikes the Eleventh Corps. 

(See Map No. 3.) 

AT FIVE o'clock Jackson said to General Rodes, at the 
Luckett Farm: "Are you ready?" "Yes," replied 
Rodes, who then nodded to Major Blackford, com- 
manding a part of the advanced line. Shortly -after 
the troops advanced, but soon halted for a few moments to 
allow the left wing to advance in the deep woods on the left. 
At 5.15 the signal was given in earnest, and Willis' riflemen 
struck the Eleventh Corps sharpshooters under Lieutenants 
Searles and Boecke, on either side of the turnpike. The 
bugles rang out clearly in the evening air, and a mighty roar 
of human voices shook the forest for a mile on the right and 
the left of the Pike, startling the deer and other animals from, 
their lairs in the thickets. The Federal sharpshooters fell 
back before Willis' and Blackford's riflemen, firing as they 
retreated, and giving the alarm to the forces in the rear. 
Two pieces of Stuart's horse artillery galloped past the rifle- 
men on the Pike, fired two solid shots down the road, raking 
the Pike and finally striking the ground in front of the Talley 
House, a mile distant, where Devens was lying down for rest 
at the time, having been injured in the leg the day before by 
his horse running into a tree. One of the shots bounded 
through the tree in the front yard, where some of McLean's 
staff were resting. The alarm was instantly given, and the 
troops, which were at ease, resting or eating, had ample time 
to seize their arms and take their places in position. 

Colonel Lee, commanding the Fifty-fifth Ohio, then 
drawn up in line on the Pike just beyond the Talley House, 
mounted his horse and galloped to the front, where he found 
Von Gilsa ready to receive the attack, but not anticipating 
an attack far in his rear. Colonel Lee then rode back to the 



Talley House, and found Devens and McLean mounted, and 
uncertain what to do, and asked permission to change front 
with his regiment, as there was no enemy in the direct front. 
"Not yet," was the reply, and Colonel Lee galloped back to 
the right of his regiment, where he found his regiment raked 
by the fire in his rear from the artillery and infantry coming 
down on and beside the Pike. The two regiments of Von 
Gilsa in the road, exposed to the same fire in their rear and 
without any chance to reply without a change of front, began 
to break and cross the road or come in confusion down the 
road. Lee again rode at the top of his speed to Devens and 
asked permission to change front, as his regiment was then 
suffering from the severe fire in the rear, and as yet there was 
no enemy in sight on the front. After some time, a sign of 
dismissal with the hand was all the response Lee received. 

In the meantime the enemy had marched steadily down 
the road, and in the woods had captured the two guns on 
picket, were enveloping Von Gilsa, and were then pouring a 
hot fire into the men on the Pike attempting to change front. 
The two pieces of artillery stationed in the road were fired 
several times into the masses of the Confederates advancing 
up the road, and in the woods beside it, but the officer in 
command soon saw that further resistance was useless, and 
ordered his men to limber up their guns and retreat. Be- 
fore they could escape out of range, the men of the Fourth 
Georgia Infantry shot down the horses and captured the ar- 
tillery. The two small regiments in the road facing south, 
the Forty-first and Forty-fifth New York, were exposed to a 
withering fire both in flank and rear, and soon broke up, un- 
able to return a shot to the enemy's attack. About three hun- 
dred of them crossed to the north side of the road and joined 
the rear of the One Hundred and Fifty-third Pennsylvania, 
and formed with their thin line the only force then presenting 
a front to Jackson's overwhelming army. With these men 
added to the One Hundred and Fifty-third Pennsylvania and 
the Fifty- fourth New York, Von Gilsa had only about one 
thousand men to meet Jackson's three lines of battle advanc- 


ing against him, and extending a mile beyond either flank. 
The brave and sturdy Teuton bade his men to stand firm, 
and they poured a volley into the foe so effectually that the 
first line of Rodes' Division was severely staggered, and 
stopped, so that the second line of Colston's Division ad- 
vanced and attacked Von Gilsa, but Von Gilsa's line on both 
flanks had been turned by the first line of Rodes' Division, 
and there was no alternative for the Federal troops but flight 
or surrender. Not until his troops had fired three rounds did 
Von Gilsa order them to retire, and then both of his stafi 
officers were shot down while giving the order to retreat. — 
See Map No. 4. 

Von Gilsa and the wrecks of his line of battle fell back 
through the woods on the north of the Pike until they came 
to the Seventy-fifth Ohio, drawn up in line in the woods north 
of the Pike four hundred yards in the rear. A few of Von 
Gilsa's men halted and joined the Seventy-fifth, which now 
attempted, without support, to resist the attack of two full 
brigades of the enemy. The Seventy-fifth Ohio had been 
stationed as a reserve near the Talley House, but as soon as 
the attack on Von Gilsa commenced, about seven hundred 
yards distant, the brave Colonel Reily ordered his regiment 
to change front, and without orders advanced through the 
woods to assist Von Gilsa, but on passing about two hun- 
dred yards beyond the Ely Ford path, he met the wrecks of 
the First Brigade returning, some of whom rallied with him. 
A moment after they were attacked in front and on both 
flanks by the regiments of two brigades, while two of 
Stuart's guns on the Pike raked them with canister. For ten 
minutes this brave regiment, with its few rallied supports, 
attempted to breast the attack, so as to give the division 
time to deploy in their rear, but in this short space of time, 
and in spite of a sturdy resistance, the regiment was utterly 
wrecked. The colonel was killed, the adjutant wounded 
and one hundred and fifty of the rank and file struck down 
while firing three rounds. No troops in the world could 
fight and live in such a position. 


The survivors of this brief conflict retreated five hundred 
yards in the rear, to the line then hastily formed in front of 
the Talley House. This new line of resistance was formed 
by the Twenty-fifth Ohio, which had been held as a reserve 
in front of the Talley House, and which had changed front 
and had been reinforced by some of the men of Von Gilsa's 
Brigade, and the two regiments stationed on the road facing 
south, who had been driven out of their position by the 
flanking fire along the Pike. Across the road and behind the 
Talley House the Seventeenth Connecticut was deployed, 
and attempted to cover that flank, but Jackson's artillery 
moved down the Pike, and poured out a rapid canister fire at 
short range, and three Confederate brigades enveloped both 
front and flanks. It was no longer a fight, but a massacre. 
The Federal troops had no better chance for resistance than 
had Custer and his men before the concentric fire of the 
Sioux Indians, and had they remained ten minutes longer the 
result would have been the same — annihilation. After a 
desultory struggle of ten or fifteen minutes, every mounted 
officer was struck down, and the fragments of the Federal 
line broke in confusion and retreated rapidly and tumultu- 
ously towards the Church, where General Schurz was forming 
or had formed the regiments of his division in the second 
position of defense of the corps. Flight or destruction were 
the only alternatives to the remnants of Devens' Division, 
and as they rushed down the road to escape the pitiless Con- 
federate fire they broke through the lines of two of Schurz' s 
best veteran regiments while changing front, and carried 
away with them some of the old soldiers of known bravery. 
A large part of these men rushed up the road, and were the 
men who greeted Howard's view, in front of the Dowdall 
Tavern, when he seized the colors of one of the broken 
regiments, and attempted to check the disorder. Many 
of them, from want of confidence in their commanders, re- 
fused to halt, and continued their retreat to the Chancellor 
House, two miles distant. However, a large number of 
them did rally on the Schurz and Buschbeck lines, and 


showed that they were made of sterner stuff. — See Map 
No. 5. 

In thirty minutes Jackson had wrecked Devens' splendid 
division of nearly four thousand men, and rendered it almost 
useless for further resistance, and at six p. m. he had control 
of the Talley plateau, and ordered his victorious column to 
push forward without delay. But where were the seventeen 
regiments of his right wing, who had been ordered to march 
along the Plank Road, and should have been in contact with 
the forces at the Dowdall Tavern at this very moment? They 
had been detained by the fatuity of General Colquitt, who 
commanded the right brigade of Rodes' first line of battle, 
and were not even in sight when Jackson reached the Talley 
Mansion. The remarkable delay of this great force was due 
to a trivial circumstance, and illustrates the remark that the 
fate of a campaign may depend, as it were, upon a single 
hair, as Napoleon was wont to say. Colquitt, as he advanced 
in the woods, and had almost reached the Talley and Burton 
Farms, struck a determined picket line, composed largely of 
men of the Fifty-fifth Ohio Regiment, and as he saw some 
cavalry dressed in the Federal uniform near the Burton 
Farm, he conceived the strange idea that his flank was 
threatened by Federal troops advancing from the direction of 
Welford's Furnace. He recalled the Sixth Georgia Regi- 
ment, which had almost reached the Talley Farm, halted 
his entire brigade, changed front to the south, and compelled 
Ramseur, who commanded the brigade in his rear, to do the 
same, and also to march some distance to the south in the 
woods in search of the enemy, but without finding a "solitary 
Yankee." In the meantime the four regiments of cavalry 
under Stuart, and the five ^ regiments of infantry of the 
Stonewall Brigade, then halted on the Plank Road near the 
Burton Farm, were compelled to remain quiet until Colquitt 
resumed his march, as he had the right of way, and the 
unmasking of the line of battle on that flank. So by this sin- 
gular act of stupidity seventeen regiments were held back 
forty to sixty minutes, and when they did arrive on the field 


of battle, the wrecks of the First and Third Divisions of the 
Eleventh Corps had escaped from almost certain and com- 
plete destruction or capture. 

While Devens' troops were being destroyed, the bri- 
gades of Jackson's left wing were retarded in the dense 
thickets through which they were obliged to march, and did 
not come in contact with the Federal forces of the Third 
Division, stationed at the Hawkins Farm, until some time 
after Von Gilsa was attacked. In fact, the Twenty-sixth 
Wisconin and the Fifty-eighth New York were more than 
half a mile in rear of Von Gilsa, and had ample time to pre- 
pare for the enemy. 

General Schurz was impressed early in the day with the 
weakness of his position in case the attack was made from 
the westward, and several times expressed a desire to form 
his division on the line indicated by the little stream known 
as Hunting Run, flowing directly north from the Church to 
the river. His position then would have extended from the 
Plank Road near the Church to the ruins of the old mill on 
Hunting Run, a mile to the north, and is apparently the line 
of defense indicated in the orders given to Howard and Slo- 
cum, May ist, 4.45 p. m. The military advantages of this 
position over the one adopted are very apparent, but Schurz 
was refused permission to make the change. However, 
Schurz did, of his own volition, change the front of the 
Twenty-sixth Wisconsin and the Fifty-eighth New York, and 
moved them to the edge of the Hawkins Farm, facing 
westerly, and also placed the Eighty-second Illinois to sup- 
port them. The attack on Von Gilsa was soon observed, 
and the regiments of the Third Division had ample time to 
take arms and position, for the left brigades of Rodes and 
Colston became entangled in the dense forest, and moved 
slower than those of the right of the Confederate line, and it 
was some time after Von Gilsa had been routed before the 
rebel skirmish line struck the Federal pickets, well advanced 
in the woods west of the Hawkins Farm. When the attack 
on the pickets began, and it became evident that a great 


force of the enemy was present, and that their lines extended 
far to the north of the Federal position, the two regiments 
were ordered back a short distance near the Hawkins House, 
where they made a stand, with the Eighty-second Illinois on 
their left, and the three regiments calmly awaited the onset 
of four powerful Confederate brigades. This line was at- 
tacked with great energy and the Federal regiments fought 
with resolution, but were forced back towards the woods in 
their rear, and, with the One Hundred and Nineteenth New 
York, Sixty-eighth New York, Eighty-second Ohio and 
One Hundred and Fifty-seventh New York, an|d parts of the 
Sixty-first Ohio and Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, near the 
Pike, formed a line of battle extending from below the junc- 
tion of the Plank Road and Pike, along in front of the little 
Church, to the edge of the woods on the north of the 
Hawkins Farm. This second attempt at resistance was 
strengthened by some of the soldiers rallied from Devens' 
broken division, and numbered in all, perhaps, about five 
thousand men. Its left flank was protected by Dilger's Bat- 
tery and a part of Weidrick's, and one of the reserve bat- 
teries some distance in the rear threw its shot over the heads 
of the infantry at the masses of the enemy adjusting their 
lines on the westerly fields of the Hawkins Farm, half a mile 
or more distant. The Twenty-sixth Wisconsin held their 
position as guarding the right flank with great obstinacy, and 
kept the enemy at bay for some twenty minutes of hard fight- 
ing, but were forced back into the woods, being flanked, and 
formed the right of the last position, or what is known as 
the Buschbeck line. Near the Pike, the Sixty-first Ohio, 
Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, One Hundred and Nineteenth 
New York and Sixty-eighth New York formed^ that part of 
the line in front of the Church, but were much disorganized 
by the wrecks of Devens' Division rushing wildly through 
them and carrying off in the rush many of the men, especially 
in the Sixty-first Ohio and Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, 
which were regarded as among the best troops of the corps. 
The One Hundred and Nineteenth New York was in front 


of Dilger's guns, and stood their ground for twenty minutes 
or more. It was a new regiment, and is entitled to much 
praise for remaining firm when its colonel was shot dead at 
almost the first fire, and its ranks were somewhat broken by 
the disorganized masses of Devens' Division rushing past on 
the Pike, or through its ranks. The men fired about twenty 
rounds, and fought bravely until they were overpowered and 
forced back to the rifle pit east of Dowdall's Tavern, where 
they were rallied by their youthful commander, Lieutenant 
Colonel Lockman, whose bravery was especially noticed at 
the time by General Schurz. 

Captain Dilger, shortly after the attack commenced, 
rode up the road to the Talley Farm to see if he could find a 
good position for his guns. But on arriving at the farm he 
became aware of the magnitude of the attack. He saw the 
breaking of the troops in the road exposed to the fire in their 
rear, and also that there was neither opportunity nor time to 
advance his battery. The captain thereupon galloped back 
to the Church, brought his entire battery across the road to 
the western edge of the Dowdall Farm, and thus left the road 
free for the retreat of the disordered remnants of Devens' 

As soon as Devens' Division fell back from the Talley 
field and left the road exposed in front of the Talley House 
and beyond, Dilger opened fire from his six guns at the 
enemy, then debouching from the Pike more than a thousand 
yards distant. The grove of trees in front of him was not 
tall enough then to obstruct the view, and over their tops 
Dilger poured in a rapid fire of shell. A few moments after 
Hill came with his battery in position on the left of Dilger, 
and opened fire from three-inch Rodmans upon the enemy as 
they appeared on the Talley fields south of the Pike. 
Another of the reserve batteries, supposed to have been 
Wheeler's, also opened fire from their position in rear of the 
rifle pit, north of the Dowdall Tavern. This battery did not 
open fire until the Fifty-eighth New York and the Twenty- 
sixth Wisconsin had fallen back from the western field of 


the Hawkins Farm, and then it actively shelled the rebels 
emerging from the woods apparently in masses. This was 
all the artillery in action at this time. Weidrick's Battery did 
not open until the rebels had turned the flank of the Talley 
Farm, and approached along the ravine and under cover 
of the thickets, reaching the flank and rear of Dilger's posi- 
tion and rendering it untenable. For more than half an 
hour Dilger maintained his position, and as the rebels crept 
up to the cover of the thickets in front of him he changed to 
a lively canister fire, which seemed to arrest their progress 
slightly in his direct front. Hill, at this time, having no shot 
for close range, was obliged to withdraw his battery, and it 
Tvas ordered to the Chancellor field. Up to this time no 
force had appeared on the Plank Road from the southward, 
owing to the fatuity of Colquitt, and our pickets were still in 
position south of Dowdall's, and witnesses of the battle which 
was raging in plain sight and to the north of them, and 
which deprived them of an avenue of escape in that direc- 
tion. Here they (the Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania) remained 
until Colquitt's forces came and attacked them, losing about 
fifty, killed, wounded and prisoners. The balance of the 
regiment retreated by way of the ravine and' south of Hazel 

In front of Dilger, or to his right, the Sixty-eighth and 
One Hundred and Nineteenth New York Regiments were 
placed in line of battle, and over their heads Dilger engaged 
the enemy in sight on the Pike or the Talley fields, but as 
the rebels crept closer by means of the ravines and the 
thickets, these two regiments were obliged to retire to the 
rifle pit in the rear. Dilger then swept his entire front with 
charges and double charges of canister, bat the rebels with 
great determination and enthusiasm pressed steadily forward, 
and soon convinced the artillery officer that a few moments' 
delay would sacrifice his guns. Reluctantly he gave the 
order to retire, but it was too late to save the entire battery. 
Five of the pieces were withdrawn safely, but the sixth, 
Tvith two of its horses dead and two more wounded, was 


abandoned to the enemy, after a vain attempt to drag it 
away. Dilger himself was thrown to the ground by the 
death of his horse, and did not succeed in extricating himself 
from the dead animal until Rodes' men were close upon him, 
demanding his surrender. Dilger declined to listen to their 
terms of surrender, and ran to the rear as rapidly as he could, 
escaping the shots of his pursuers. He had run about one 
hundred yards when relief unexpectedly came to him. A 
little boy by the name of Ackley, who was greatly attached 
to Dilger, missed him as his battery passed by the Dowdall 
House, and, seizing a horse, rpde directly into the front of 
the enemy in search of him. On finding his dear friend 
almost in the clutches of the enemy, he sprang from the 
horse and assisted him to mount, and both managed to 
escape. Dilger, ever grateful for this act of courage and 
love, has always described it as one of the bravest he ever 
saw. Dilger overtook the remains of his battery in the rear 
of the rifle pit, and, seeing that there was no position for the 
use of artillery there, he ordered his lieutenant to proceed 
with four of the guns to the rear and report to the first 
artillery officer he might meet; the fifth gun he retained, and 
placing it in the road between the rifle pits, he again opened 
fire upon the advancing and triumphant foe. The lieutenant 
took the four guns up the road and reported to Captain Best, 
who ordered him to take position on his right, where Dilger 
found him later. Dilger kept one gun with him, as it was all 
that he could use to advantage at the rifle pit, and this he 
planted in the middle of the road and opened a rapid fire to 
his front. While here he was supported by two companies 
of the brave Sixty-first Ohio, who stuck to him in the retreat 
and remained with him also at Fairview all night, when he 
took part in the cannonade. Buschbeck had ample time to 
recall his four regiments facing south on the Dowdall Farm 
and place them in the shallow and unfinished rifle pit facing 
west, long before Schurz's men, in battle before him, were 
forced back, and when General Steinwehr returned from 
escorting Barlow's Brigade below the Furnace, he found 


them behind the rifle pit and maintaining their position with 

The position known as the Buschbeck line was as follows : 
The pit to the south of the Plank Road was occupied by the 
One Hundred and Fifty-fourth New York, Seventy-third and 
Twenty-seventh Pennsylvania, and by some of the rallied 
men of Devens' and Schurz's commands. The Plank Road 
was defended by Dilger and his one gun, supported by the 
two companies of the Sixty-first Ohio and some of Devens' 
Division. North of the road, the Twenty-ninth New York 
was first in line, and to the right the space was filled with 
fragments of Devens' Division and some of Schurz's men, 
and to the right of them, at the edge of the woods, were the 
Eighty-second Illinois and the Eighty-second Ohio, and in 
the woods farther to the right were the Fifty-eighth New 
York and the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, of Schurz's Division. 
In the rear of the edge of the woods the One Hundred and 
Fifty-seventh New York was placed in reserve. The only 
piece of artillery in this line of defense was Dilger's single 
gun. Weidrick's Battery, which had beeoi stationed just 
south of the Dowdall House, and in front of Buschbeck, 
had been withdrawn shortly before, with the loss of two 
guns, taken by the flank movement of the enemy passing to 
the south of the Talley House. The horses of one of these 
guns had been shot and the cannoneers of the other had been 
wounded. All of the reserve artillery had been ordered to 
retreat some time previously, as there was no opportunity to 
use it in the narrow space in rear of the rifle pit and the 
dense woods. — ^^i? Map No. 6. 

In this last attempt to hold Jackson at bay, there were 
about four thousand to five thousand men only. The rest of 
the corps had gone up the road in retreat, or were left on the 
field of battle, or were three miles away with Barlow's Bri- 
gade, below the Furnace. Although parts of the corps had 
been resisting Jackson's attack for about an hour, no rein- 
forcements had reached them. This third and final attempt, 
made by the remnants of the corps caught and wrecked in 


■detail, was along the shallow rifle pits which had been dug 
in the morning by Barlow's Brigade, and which were unfin- 
ished when , Barlow was ordered down into the woods below 
the Furnace. This line of earthworks was so slight that it 
-would protect the soldier only when kneeling or lying down. 
It was constructed without provision for the use of artillery, 
and when the pit was occupied by the infantry, all of the 
artillery was ordered to the rear excepting Dilger's gun. 
The scene at this moment was not assuring to the crushed 
and overpowered Eleventh Corps. Not a soldier or a gun 
had been sent them in aid from the rest of the army, and in 
iact Hooker had but just found out from the ambulance driv- 
•ers and fugitives that the Eleventh Corps had been attacked. 
The fields and the woods in front of them seemed to be 
■swarming with rebels in lines of battle four to eight deep, 
and extending from the ravine south of the Dowdall Tavern 
across the country northward, beyond the Hawkins Farm, 
far into the woods. Along the Pike and around the Talley 
House were the batteries of Stuart's horse artillery in ac- 
tive play, and behind them could be seen a forest of bayonets 
of A. P. Hill's Division, glistening in the rays of the setting 
■sun. To the southward appeared great masses of infantry 
and cavalry pouring out of the woods into the Plank Road 
about half a mile distant, and hurrying forward to the battle 
field, as though belated. They were the men whom Colquitt, 
by his strange fatuity, had kept back until their services were 
not required. They numbered seventeen regiments in all, 
and made an imposing appearance as they debouched into 
view with a dense array of bright bayonets. 

The shallow rifle pit was completely filled with soldiers, 
and more than it could properly hold. The left part was oc- 
cupied by the four regiments of Buschbeck who, as yet, had 
not been in action, and were in perfect order, notwithstand- 
ing the tum'ult of the wrecks of Devens' Division passing by. 
Three of the regiments were veterans, and mostly composed 
of Germans ox of German descent, and had been tried in 
battle before. The fourth regiment was an American regi- 


ment, and under the command of Col. Patrick H. Jones. 
Hooker gave great praise to this brigade for its resistance, 
and it was the only drop of kindness he let fall in his bucket 
of abuse. Warren — lago like — stated to Congress that they 
made no fight worth mentioning. 

Along this line the contest raged for some time. Hooker 
states that it was an hour, but the actual fighting did not last 
over twenty minutes, probably. The front attacks of the 
enemy were repulsed, but when both flanks were turned by 
Iverson's, Nichols', Colquitt's and Ramseur's Brigades, and 
an enfilading fire from right and left flank reached the center 
of the line, the men slowly withdrew to the cover of the 
woods in their rear. Buschbeck's four regiments moved 
slowly back in perfect order, and, in complete control, halted 
in line of battle in the woods to check pursuit, but as none 
was pressed by the enemy, Buschbeck filed his columns into 
the road and marched slowly towards Chancellorsville. On 
the north side of the rifle pit, several of the regiments of 
Schurz's — the Eighty-second Illinois, Eighty-second Ohio, 
Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, Fifty-eighth New York, and the 
One Hundred and Fifty-seventh New York — retired in or- 
der into the woods north of the road, unmolested by the 
enemy. Dilger, with his single gun, retreated in the road, 
keeping the enemy out of his front by his rapid discharges 
of canister and solid shot. The two companies of the brave 
Irishmen of the Sixty-first Ohio still supported him, and 
besides these there were a number of officers of high rank, 
including both General Howard and General Schurz, who 
also wished to help the artillerymen who composed the rear 
guard of the routed corps. 

With the forcing of the Buschbeck line, the impetus of 
the enemy seemed to be broken, as there was no pressing in 
pursuit whatever. Dilger slowly withdrew into the defile, 
keeping the road in front of him free with canister and solid 
shot, and was virtually the last man in the retreat. Shortly 
after reaching the woods, Dilger ceased firing, as there was 
no enemy within range to fire at. On the north side of the 


road, in the woods, all of that part of Schurz's Division which 
fought on the Hawkins Farm also withdrew in order and in 
good spirits. This body of troops halted on the Dirt Road, 
north of the position taken by Berry, and remained there in 
line of battle until called to the rear of the Chancellor House 
late in the evening. They were in fighting condition, and 
numbered about twelve to fifteen hundred men, and were the 
Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, the Eighty-second Illinois, Eighty- 
second Ohio, the Fifty-eighth and One Hundred and Fifty- 
seventh New York, and some of the Seventy-fifth Pennsylva- 
nia. Buschbeck's men were marched up the road in order 
to the Log Works built by Williams' Division of the Twelfth 
Corps, who, however, had left them and gone south with 
Sickles to attack the rear of Lee's "retreating" army. Here 
they halted, and were forming in line of battle when they 
were ordered by a staff officer to continue their march towards 
Chancellorsville. At this time there was no enemy in sight, 
unless it was some of the groups of foragers far down the 
road, but between them and Buschbeck was Dilger, with his 
single piece of artillery and his supports, retreating slowly 
and without the slightest molestation from the foe. On ar- 
riving at the Fairview field Buschbeck turned his brigade, 
together with the rallied soldiers of the broken regiments of 
Devens' and Schurz's Divisions, to the south of the road, and 
formed line pf battle in the space in front of the batteries 
which Captain Best was then hastily placing in position in 
their rear, and between them and Chancellorsville. As soon 
as the brigade was in position, the adjutant was sent to the 
commander of the corps, on the crest of the hill in the rear, 
to inform him that the brigade was ready for duty, and to 
charge into the woods in their front, if required. Buschbeck 
and the men rallied with him were in position before Berry 
and his division arrived at the lines assumed by them on the 
north side of the road, and there they remained ready for 
action until the next morning, in front of Best's guns. 

Buschbeck's Brigade numbered about one thousand men, 
and to these may be added, either on this line or close to the 
6— B. c. 


rear of Best's guns, one hundred and fifty men of McLean's 
Brigade under Colonel Lee ; one hundred and fifty of the 
Thirty-third Massachusetts, returning from picket on Hunt- 
ing Run, under Colonel Hurst ; and detachments from the 
Sixty-first Ohio, Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, Seventeenth 
Connecticut and other regiments, numbering in all about two 
thousand men, and perhaps more, making a total of quite 
thirty-five hundred to four thousand men of the corps halted 
in line of battle on the right and left of the Plank Road, 
ready to fight, and for which the corps has not received the 
slightest consideration. 

Dilger, with his single gun, slowly retreated up the road 
until he met Captain Best, who informed him that the rest of 
his battery was on the left of his artillery and in good con- 
dition. Dilger joined them and remained until morning, tak- 
ing part in the artillery firing of the night. Dilger's resolute 
action while retreating with his single gun, supported by the 
two companies of brave Irishmen of the Sixty-first Ohio, 
keeping the enemy at bay and the Plank Road free from ac- 
tive pursuit, forms one of the bright and pleasing episodes 
in this ill-fated campaign, but which has not received, even 
at this late day, the least notice whatever. 


Stonewall Jackson s Fatal Delay. 

(See Map No. 7.) 

JACKSON'S orders were at the onset to carry the posi- 
tion at or beyond the Talley Farm without halting, and 
it is clearly evident that if his command had been 
implicitly obeyed, the two divisions of Devens and 
Schurz would have been destroyed at the first blow. Col- 
quitt's error, which kept back seventeen regiments on the 
right flank for forty to sixty minutes, was a fatal one. In 
half an hour Devens' Division of quite four thousand men, 
attacked in flank and rear and in detail, was completely 
crushed. In twenty minutes more Schurz's Division, at- 
tempting to form a second line of battle, was forced back past 
the Church to the Buschbeck line on the Dowdall field, five 
hundred yards or more in the rear. At 7 or 7.15, the bat- 
tered wrecks of the Federal corps were driven out of the 
Buschbeck line into the woods eastward, and the way to the 
coveted position at the 'White House was now open to the 
victorious Confederates. For an hour and a half the nine 
thousand men of the Eleventh Corps, attacked in rear and 
flank, and in detail, without any assistance from the rest of 
the army, had endeavored to stay the impetuous march of 
Jackson's determined battalions, but had been hurled back 
into the forest, with a loss of eight guns, fifteen hundred 
killed and wounded, and about a thousand prisoners. The 
Federal army was now in extreme peril, for the important 
position at the White House was only two thousand yards 
distant, and the only force to oppose the Confederates ad- 
vancing on the single avenue to it was the twelve hundred or 
fifteen hundred men of Schurz's Division, then retreating 
upon it, north of the Plank Road; for Buschbeck' s Brigade 
and the fragments of the First and Third Divisions had 



passed up the Plank' Road to Fairview, on the Chancellor 
plateau. Berry and Hayes, with their brigades, were hurry- 
ing to the Fairview fields, by Hooker's orders, who seemed 
to have overlooked the importance of guarding the Bullock 
Road, the direct avenue to his rear. Sickles at this time, 
with twenty thousand men, was still far below in the depths 
of the forest, and as yet unconscious of the fact that Jackson, 
whom he had been seeking in vain, was then directly in his 
rear, and had been pulverizing the Eleventh Corps for more 
than an hour and a half, and that his chances of escape were 
exceedingly small. Jackson ordered his men to push for- 
ward, but Colston and Rodes, who commanded the two 
front lines of battle, urged Jackson to halt, and represented 
to him that their men were too much exhausted by the long 
march of fifteen miles, the lack of food for the entire day, 
the difficulty of marching through the dense thickets, and the 
attack on the Eleventh Corps, to advance further, and they 
advised their chief to call a halt and reform. 

General Jackson called a halt, but with great reluctance, 
for he believed, and with reason, too, that one more effort 
would place his men in command of the open field in the 
rear of the Chancellor House, and also of the only road by 
which a large part of the Third and Twelfth Corps could 
escape. Many years afterwards. General Colston stated in 
an article in the Century Magazine that the halt was not a 
mistake but a necessity, but it seems now to have been a 
fatal delay. 

At this time the only force defending the Bullock 
Road leading to the White House was about twelve hun- 
dred or fifteen hundred men rallied by Schurz, and halted 
in the woods half a mile from the White House. Jackson 
had at this time for an immediate advance five brigades 
of Colston's and Rodes' Divisions in good condition, and 
the whole of Hill's Division, standing near the Church, and 
ready for an attack. The coveted position was clearly in 
the grasp of Jackson's forces. Fairview, on the Chancellor 
plateau, was not Jackson's objective point. The position 


of Jackson's men, at the time the halt was called, was as 
follows : Doles' Brigade, the foremost of Rodes' Division, 
halted in the woods on the eastern edge of the Dowdall 
Farm, south of the road. Colquitt and Ramseur's Brigades 
rested in the rear of the Dowdall Farm House. Paxton, with 
the five regiments of the Stonewall Brigade, was drawn up 
in line in front of the rifle pit on the field in front of the 
tavern. Iverson's and Nichols' Brigades had stopped in 
the woods on the north side of the road and near the Log 
Hut, where Colston summoned his broken regiments to re- 
form. Stuart, with his cavalry, was near the Church, pre- 
paring to go with the Sixteenth North Carolina Infantry to 
guard the approach from the Ely Ford Road, and also to 
work around the rear of the Federal army in the direction of 
the United States Ford. The command to halt was not 
heard or heeded by a part of the rebel forces, and por- 
tions of three brigades, in desultory groups, slowly pushed 
up the road, or in the woods beside it, out of range of Dil- 
ger's gun, seeking for adventure or plunder. A part of this 
disorganized crowd drifted up as far as the Log Works of Wil- 
liams' Division of the Twelfth Corps, and found there four 
companies of the Twenty-eighth New York Regiment behind 
the works, who had been left in charge of the baggage, and 
who thought it best to remain. 

At this moment, while the rebels were demanding the sur- 
render of the Federal soldiers left in the Log Works of Wil- 
liams' Division, startling events occurred at Hazel Grove, to 
the south of it, and in the vista or road leading to it. The 
Grove is a small farm almost enclosed by dense forests, and 
lies southwest of the Chancellor House, and also of the 
Plank Road, about a mile distant. A narrow Dirt Road run- 
ning through the forest for a mile connects it with the Plank 
Road. On the eastern and southern sides of the farm a 
small brook, known as Scott's Run, has worn away the 
soil and formed ravines of little depth on these borders. 
The northeastern corner slightly overlooks the Fairview 
plateau, in front of the Chancellor House, where Hooker 


placed many of his batteries in the battle of Sunday, May 
3d, 1863. 

The farm consists of but few acres of cleared land, but 
there was sufficient territory to enable Stuart to plant there 
early Sunday morning thirty or forty cannon, to enfilade the 
lines of battle on Fairview with a terrific fire, and in a short 
time to determine the fate of the campaign. 

General Hooker testified before Congress, nearly two 
years after the event, that the bad conduct of the Eleventh 
Corps lost him the key to his position, and the battle. In 
answer to Hooker's remarks, it may be briefly stated that 
Hazel Grove was the position lost, and that the Eleventh 
Corps never were there, nor within a mile of it. 

At Hazel Grove, and along the paths leading to it, were 
carelessly parked several of the batteries, wagons, and other 
material belonging to the force then at the Furnace under 
Sickles. At seven P. m. everything about Hazel Grove was 
in complete repose. No one seemed to be aware that a se- 
rious engagement had taken place at the Wilderness Church, 
two miles distant, and that danger was approaching. 

Shortly before this period. Colonel Huey, of the Eighth 
Pennsylvania Cavalry, reported to General Pleasanton, whom 
he found some distance below the Hazel Grove Farm, on the 
road to the Welford Furnace, and not far from it, and then 
and there received orders from him to report to General 
Howard at the Dowdall Tavern. Colonel Huey states that 
there was nothing in the language or manner of General 
Pleasanton, when he gave the order, to lead him to suppose 
that a battle was in prospect, or that his services were soon 
to be required. Huey returned to Hazel Grove, and found 
his regiment in bivouac in the field southeast of the Hazel 
Grove House. He ordered his men to mount their horses 
and follow him. At this time the reserve ammunition train 
of the Third Corps, with seventy thousand rounds packed on 
mules, was parked in the Hazel Grove field, with many other 
trains and batteries. It was under the command of Col. 
Daniel Hall, and when he saw the Eighth Pennsylvania Cav- 


airy proceeding leisurely towards the Plank Road, he ordered 
his train to follow the cavalry, intending to resume his former 
position behind the Chancellor House, where Berry, of the 
Third Corps, was then in bivouac. 

As the cavalry and ammunition train wended their way 
among the batteries, wagons and troops halted in the open 
field, no messenger from the Eleventh Corps had reached 
the place to disturb the repose or give warning of an ad- 
vancing enemy, and inform them that the wrecks of the 
corps had passed by them to the rear. It is also strange 
that the sounds of the distant conflict were not heard, or 
were too confused and indistinct to awaken suspicion. The 
noise of the battle did not seem to extend far. Sound has 
some remarkable characteristics, and in certain conditions 
of the atmosphere fails to refract or convey its waves to any 
considerable distance. The writer at one time noticed the 
batteries on Morris Island playing upon Sumter and Wag- 
ner, and heard no sounds of the explosions, although the 
guns were less than a third of a mile distant, yet the same 
artillery not long after awoke him at Beaufort, fifty miles 
away. The failure of fog signals has also been observed 
and studied in connection with this peculiarity. 

McLaws, with his Confederate division, was waiting to 
hear the sounds of Jackson's guns before attacking Hancock 
with vigor. Posey and Wright, with their brigades con- 
cealed in the woods on Birney's flank, were listening for the 
same signal, but failed to hear definite sounds. Sickles, 
also, at the Welford Furnace, did not hear a sound of the 
fight which wrecked the Eleventh Corps, and was not aware 
of it until an hour or more after Jackson's men had driven 
the Federal troops back from the Dowdall Tavern. 

But soon after the disappearance of Colonel Huey and 
his cavalry and the ammunition train. General Pleasanton 
arrived at Hazel Grove, and the scene rapidly changed. 
The field then presented a very animated sight, in which 
portions of the Eleventh Corps took very prominent parts, 
according to the testimony of some of the narrators. 


Pleasanton at once took command, and in his report to 
Hooker brilliantly and graphically describes what appeared 
to his view : 

"I immediately ordered the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry to 
proceed at a gallop, attack the rebels, and check them until we 
could get the artillery in position. " [In fact the Eighth Pennsylva- 
nia Cavalry, with the reserve ammunition mule train of the Third 
Corps, with its seventy thousand rounds, had disappeared in the 
forest sometime before. — Compiler.'] "This service was splendidly 
performed by the Eighth, but with heavy loss, and I gained some 
fifteen minutes to bring Martin's Battery into position, reverse a bat- 
tery of Sickles' Corps, detach some cavalry to stop runaways, and 
secure more guns from the retreating column. 

"Every moment was invaluable. Fortunately I succeeded, be- 
fore the enemy's columns showed themselves in the woods, in getting 
twenty-two pieces of artillery into position, double shotted with can- 
ister and bearing upon the direction the rebels were coming. To 
support this force I had two small squadrons of cavalry ready to 
charge upon any attempt to take the guns. My position was about 
three hundred and eighty yards from the Plank Road [the actual dis- 
tance by measurement is sixteen hundred and fifty yards. — Compiter.l 
on the extreme left of the line of the Eleventh Corps, and as they 
recoiled from the fierce onset of the rebels through and over my 
guns, it was apparent we must soon meet the shock. 

"It was now near the dusk of the evening, and in rear of the 
Eleventh Corps the rebels came on rapidly, but in silence, with that 
skill and adroitness they often display to gain their object. The 
only color visible was a Union flag with the center battalion. To 
clear up the doubt created by this flag my aid, Lieutenant Thompson, 
of the First New York Cavalry, rode to within one hundred yards of 
them, when they called out to him, "We are friends, come on," and 
he was induced to go fifty yards nearer, when their whole line 
opened with musketry, dropped the Union color, displayed eight or 
ten rebel battle flags, and commenced advancing. They were then 
not three hundred yards from the guns, and I gave the command to 
fire. This terrible discharge from twenty-two pieces at that distance 
staggered them, and threw the heads of their columns back on the 
woods, from which they opened a tremendous fire of musketry, bring- 
ing up fresh forces constantly and striving to advance as fast as they 
were swept back by our guns. The struggle continued nearly an 

"It was now dark, and the enemy's presence could only be as- 
certained by the flash of their muskets, from which a continuous 
stream of fire was seen nearly encircling us and gradually extending 
to our right to cut us off from the army. Finally this was checked 
by our guns, and the rebels withdrew. Several guns and caissons 
were recovered from the woods where they fought us.'' 


Captain Martin, who commanded the Sixth New York 
Battery under Pleasanton, reports as follows : 

' ' The scene before me was one of indescribable confusion. 
The Eleventh Corps was panic-stricken, and the pack trains, ambu- 
lances, artillery carriages, etc., belonging thereto, were rushing to 
and fro, many of the carriages without drivers or teamsters. Not 
more than two hundred and fifty yards- from the battery there ran 
a line of fence, and behind this appeared a line of infantry. The 
fire of the enemy was very vigorous and well maintained. I trust 
that of my battery was equally so." 

General Sickles reports of these events thus : 

" Time was everything. The fugitives of the Eleventh Corps 
swarmed from the woods, and swept frantically over the cleared 
fields in which my artillery was parked. The exulting enemy at 
their heels mingled yells with their volleys, and in the confusion 
which followed it seemed as if cannon and caissons, dragoons, can- 
noniers and infantry could never be disentangled from the mass into 
which they were suddenly thrown. Fortunately there was only one 
obvious outlet for those panic-stricken hordes, after rushing over 
and between our guns, and this was through a ravine crossed in two 
or three places by the headwaters of Scott's Run. This was soon 
made impassable by the reckless crowd choking up the way. A few 
minutes was enough to restore comparative order and get our artil- 
lery in position. 

' ' The enemy showing himself on the plain, Pleasanton met the 
shock at short range with the well-directed fire of twenty-two pieces 
double-shotted with canister. The heads of the columns were swept 
away to the woods, from which they opened a furious but. ineffectual 
fire of musketry. Twice they attempted a flank movement, but the 
first was checked by our guns, and the second and most formidable 
was baffled by the advance of Whipple and Birney, who were 
coming up rapidly but in perfect order and forming- in lines of bri- 
gades in rear of the artillery and on the flanks. My position was 
now secure in the adequate infantry support which had arrived. 
The loud cheers of our men as twilight closed the combat vainly 
challenged the enemy to renew the encounter." 

Pleasanton, in his entertaining article published in the 
Century in 1888, a quarter of a century after the event, reit- 
erates the statements of his early report, and enlarges on 
them. He states that Lieutenant Crosby, with his battery 
of the Fourth U. S. Artillery, was placed on the right of 
Martin's Battery. Not a gun of this battery nor of the 
Eleventh Corps was at Hazel Grove, but were at thisHime 
at Fairview, a mile away. 

He estimates the attacking force of the infantry to be 


five thousand muskets, and that his artillery fire was effec- 
tive because he applied to it that principle of dynamics in 
which the angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflec- 
tion. The discharge fairly swept Jackson's men from the 
earth. He poured in the canister for about twenty minutes, 
"and the affair was over."' He also enlarges upon the stam- 
pede at Hazel Grove of the Eleventh Corps, and says that 
"beef cattle, ambulances, mules, artillery wagons and horses 
became stuck in the mud, and others coming on crushed 
them down so that when the fight was over the pile of de- 
bris in that marsh was many feet high." This statement is 
utterly untrue and extremely unjust. None of the debris was 
formed by the Eleventh Corps, for their line of retreat was 
a mile or more directly north. 

Pleasanton also says the Eleventh Corps had been en- 
camped in the woods two hundred yards distant, whereas 
the nearest of the left flank of the Eleventh Corps was fully 
one thousand yards, and the right, under Von Gilsa, was 
more than three thousand yards distant by the nearest paths. 

Lieutenant Thompson, the aid whom Pleasanton sent 
to the front to reconnoitre, in 1866 wrote that one man fired 
at him as he peered into the darkness to find out who were 
in front of him, and his narrative of how he turned, leading 
the rebel charge, and how he dodged the discharges of the 
Federal artillery, forms a very entertaining note in the Scrib- 
ner series. He also states that the enemy were mowed down 
in heaps, that the roar of the artillery was continuous, and 
the execution terrific, etc. 

Doubleday, in his work on Chancellorsville and Gettys- 
burg, one of the Scribner series of Campaigns of the Civil 
War, published twenty years after, and regarded as semi- 
official, relates the story of Keenan and his charge as follows : 
He states that when Pleasanton arrived at Hazel Grove, he 
found "all hurrying furiously to the rear." 

"There was but one way to delay Jackson; some force must 
be sacrificed, and Pleasanton ordered Maj. Peter Keenan, command- 
ing the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, to charge the ten thousand men 
in front with his four hundred. Keenan saw in a moment that if he 

STONEWALL Jackson's fatal delay. 87 

threw his little force into that seething mass of infantry, horses and 
men would go down on all sides, and there would be few left to tell 
the tale. A sad smile lit up his noble countenance as he said, 'Gen- 
eral, I will do it.' At thirty-four years of age, literally impaled on 
the bayonets of the enemy, he laid down his life and saved the army 
from capture and his country from the unutterable degradation of 
the establishment of slavery in the Northern states. History will re- 
cord the service rendered on that occasion as worthy to be classed 
with the sacrifices of Arnold Winckelried in Switzerland, and the 
Chevalier d'Assas in France." 

Doubleday also states that," Pleasanton was enabled to 
clear a space in front of him, and twenty-two guns loaded 
with double canister were brought to bear upon the enemy. 
They came bursting over the parapet they had just taken 
with loud and continuous yells, and formed line of battle 
within three hundred yards. * * * He fired into their 
masses with all his guns at once. The discharge seemed 
fairly to blow them back over the works from which they 
had just emerged." Doubleday also alludes to two charges 
in succession which reached almost to the muzzles of Plea- 
santon's guns. He also refers to the severe enfilading fire of 
Archer's Brigade, which, in spite of Keenan's charge, had 
gained the woods and the Plank Road. 

It is singular that Doubleday, with all the reports at 
his command, did not know, twenty years after the event, 
that Archer was at this time six miles or more away, on the 
Brock Road, and did not reach Hazel Grove until after day- 
light Sunday morning. 

Furthermore General Tidball, in his recent excellent 
articles on the artillery service, relates how the fugitives of 
the Eleventh Corps, rushing through another battery of 
Birney's Division, then at the front, threw them into such 
confusion as to cause them to fall into the hands of the 
enemy. This battery I am unable to trace. Neither Gen- 
eral Birney nor his Chief of Artillery mentions it. Tidball 
also describes the confusion at Hazel Grove, the heavy fire 
of musketry from the enemy, and how the batteries, entirely 
alone and unsupported, held the enemy in check, "com- 
pletely and thoroughly checked by these batteries." 


Furthermore he says: "Had it not been for the timely 
and gallant resistance offered by Huntington's twenty-two 
guns at Hazel Grove, which held the enemy in check until 
the Twelfth changed position, this corps too, would, have 
been taken in flank and rear, and would probably have 
shared the same fate as the Eleventh. It is difficult to 
estimate the value of the services of the guns at Hazel 

The Comte de Paris, in his interesting work on the 
Civil War, copies Pleasanton's descriptions of his laudable 
work and also Keenan's cavalry charge. That Pleasanton 
stops the enemy advancing in good order, and in successive 
lines ; that he dismounts the two guns brought up in the 
attack, and wounds Crutchfield of the Confederate artillery. 
Neither Crutchfield nor any of his guns were near Hazel 
Grove that night. 

Major Stein, in his late work on the Army of the Poto- 
mac, almost thirty years after the event, repeats the romantic 
story of Keenan's charge, and endorses all of Pleasanton's 
exploits, and states that the carnage that followed the dis- 
charge of the double-shotted guns would have blanched 
the cheek of "the Lion-hearted." 

Major General J. Watts de Peyster, a brilliant writer of 
the episodes of the war, lends his aid to immortalize the 
thrilling scenes, and writes in this manner: "The intrepid 
Pleasanton, with comprehensive, lightning-like glance, and a 
decision as instantaneous as the electric flash, gathered up 
his cavalry and hurled them upon the foe, until he could 
range his own rapidly collected guns upon a ridge, and then 
drove them back and saved the army. That this fearful dis- 
aster was averted is due to a feat of generalship and an 
exhibition of heroism to both of which the world can be 
challenged to produce superiors." 

Pleasanton was asked by the Committee of Congress 
what produced the panic in the Eleventh Corps, and replied : 
"The combined effect upon their imagination of the sound 
of musketry, and the increasing yells of the rebels and their 


increasing artillery fire. It was a theatrical effect that Stone- 
wall Jackson could produce better than any other man I have 
ever seen on the field of battle." 

Pleasanton also informed the committee that he ordered 
the guns not to fire until he gave the word, as he wanted the 
effect of an immense shock. "There was an immense body 
of men, and I wanted the whole weight of the metal to check 
them." When he gave the order "the fire actually swept 
the men away. It seemed to blow those men in front clear 
over the parapet." 

He also stated how he cleared behind him in a marsh the 
debris of the Eleventh Corps, piled up in great confusion. 
For this literary entertainment, Pleasanton was highly com- 
plimented, and the report reads : "Although a cavalry officer, 
he handled the artillery with exceeding great judgment and 
effectiveness. His skill, energy, daring and promptness upon 
this occasion contributed greatly to arrest the disaster which 
for a time threatened the whole army. His conduct upon 
this and many other occasions marks him as one of the ablest 
generals in our service, and as deserving of far higher consid- 
eration than from some cause he appears to have received." 

These glowing accounts of military exploits performed at 
Hazel Grove, as narrated, when compared with the facts or 
what appear to be the facts, seem at variance, and far more 
worthy of a place among the tales of the late Baron Mun- 
chausen than the serious and truthful pages of the history 
of the Armies of the Potomac and of Northern Virginia. 

It is too late for the authors of these false reports \to 
make amends to the men of the Eleventh Corps, for the most 
of them are dead ; but it is not too late to correct the inscrip- 
tions in history wherein every deserving soldier receives his 
just reward, no matter whether he carrried a musket, with 
tattered uniform, or rode at the head of a column, adorned 
with sword and stars. The history of to-day should cover 
both with equal fairness, and it should also respect the valor 
of the Confederate soldier. 

It may be safely affirmed that none of the fugitives 


breaking out of the forest with guns, caissons, ambulances 
and horses, crowding upon the artillery of Pleasanton, were 
soldiers from the defeated Eleventh Corps. There may have 
been, sometime during the evening, a few of the pickets of 
the Seventj'-fifth Pennsylvania, escaping from the forest south 
of the Dowdall Farm, seen crossing the southern border of 
Hazel Grove with guns on their shoulders. But in the disor- 
derly torrent bursting out of the wood from the northwest, to 
the astonishment of Pleasanton, there was neither man nor 
beast, neither gun, caisson, nor material of any description, 
belonging to the abused Eleventh Corps. Furthermore, it 
may be asserted that no organization of Jackson's army 
approached Hazel Grove that night, or until daylight on 
Sunday morning. And that no Confederates attacked Plea- 
santon, except a handful of foragers, numbering from one 
hundred and fifty to two hundred men, who took to their 
heels as soon as the artillery fire permitted them to rise from 
cover. The survivors to-day declare that not one of the party 
was injured by the pyrotechnic display, and examination of 
the terrain and the cover it afforded strengthens the state- 
ment. Nearly all of Jackson's Corps, at this hour and at 
this moment, was halted near the Wilderness Church and 
about the Dowdall Farm. All had been ordered to halt 
there, and none went forward except the groups of disor- 
dered troops, who slowly drifted up the road in search of 
adventure or plunder as far as the Log Works built by Wil- 
liams' Division of the Twelfth Corps, or to the western 
border of Hazel Grove. 

It may also be stated that the story told by Pleasanton 
concerning the charge of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, 
in order to give him time to place his artillery in position, is 
a fabrication. Col. Pennoch Huey was the commander of 
the regiment, and he did not receive any order to charge. 
Furthermore, the regiment had disappeared in the woods on 
its way before Pleasanton reached Hazel Grove. As the 
regiment entered the forest, which extends for about a mile 
before the Plank Road is reached, it saw, halting by the road- 


side, caissons, guns, carriages and other material belonging 
to the troops who had gone down to the Furnace. A vista 
about two hundred yards in length and twenty-five yards in 
width was cleared beside the road, and afforded sufficient ter- 
ritory for the parking of this material, with men and animals. 
As the cavalry passed this assemblage of troops and camp 
followers, none of them seemed to be aware that a conflict 
had taken place in the vicinity, or that the least danger was 
impending. Not a straggler from the line of battle had even 
then reached this secluded spot to give the alarm. And so 
Huey and his men marched gaily along, with their swords in 
their scabbards and their pistols in their holsters, closely fol- 
lowed by the Third Corps ammunition mule train. About 
a third of a mile from the Plank Road a path turns off at the 
left hand and enters the Plank Road to the westward near 
the Dowdall Tavern. As Colonel Huey reached this narrow 
road or path, he noticed some men in gray uniform moving 
about in the twilight some distance from him, but he took 
them to be some of our own scouts dressed in Confederate 
gray, and passed on. Not a straggler nor a wounded soldier 
from the routed Eleventh Corps had as yet appeared or 
crossed the path the cavalry were marching on, and this fact 
affords, or seems to afford, positive proof that the fugitives 
described by Pleasanton could not have come from the Elev- 
enth Corps. 

The Eighth Pennsylvania Regiment marched completely 
across the line of retreat of the beaten troops, and did not 
meet one of them. They had passed up the Plank Road a 
few moments before, and Dilger and his gun, with his rear 
guard, were probably at this moment passing Bushbeck's line 
of defense. Colonel Huey did not hear any shots fired at 
this time, and the reason is this : Captain Dilger, after enter- 
ing the woods with his gun and supports, stopped firing. 
The enemy followed slowly at a respectful distance, and 
neither the pursued nor the pursuers exchanged shots. 

The Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, in column of twos, 
passed on quietly until near the Plank Road, and then Col- 


onel Huey saw, to his astonishment, groups of Confederates 
moving past him across the road toward the Chancellorsville 
House, while others were approaching his left flank in the 
woods. Huey saw that he had run into some part of the 
rebel army, and that it was too late to retreat, and his best 
chance was to break through the crowd in the road, gain the 
Plank Road, turn to the right, and fight his way to the Chan- 
cellor House. He instantly ordered his men to draw sabers 
and follow him at a gallop. 

When Huey struck the Plank Road, he saw, to his 
dismay, a crowd of Confederates blocking the way on the 
right, while there were only a few in the road to the left, 
towards Dowdall Tavern. Huey led the column to the left, 
hoping to find some outlet of escape, but after he had passed 
about one hundred yards down the road he was met with a 
murderous volley from concealed troops in the woods. Major 
Keenan fell by his side, and Captain Arrowsmith, Captain 
Haddock, and about thirty others were struck down in the 
melee. Huey then turned the staggered column to the right 
of the road in the woods and passed along to the eastward, 
until he had flanked the Confederates in the road. He then 
struck the old mountain road, and led the men who followed 
him to the batteries in the road, where he met Captain Best 
placing the artillery in position, and requested him not to fire 
his guns down the road, as many of his men were still in the 
woods, trying to work their way out. The rear of the Eighth 
Pennsylvania Cavalry, hearing the attack on the head of the 
column, turned from the Hazel Grove road to the right and 
made their way through the woods and over or past the Log 
Works of the Twelfth Corps to the Fairview plateau, where 
they joined the rest of the regiment, supported the artillery, 
and acted as provost guard. 

Such is the history of the charge of the Eighth Penn- 
sylvania Cavalry. Colonel Ruey, who was in command of 
the regiment, received no order from Pleasanton to charge, 
and gave none until he was enveloped by the enemy, a mile 
distant from Hazel Grove. 


The ammunition train of the Third Corps, following the 
Eigiith Pennsylvania Cavalry, was also fired into by the 
Georgia foragers coming up in the woods on their left flank. 
Col. Daniel Hall attempted to retreat to Hazel Grove, but 
a wild panic seized all parties in the vista, and the mule 
train soon became irretrievably mixed with the disorded mass 
of men, animals, guns and caissons, and dispersed. These 
were the runaways represented to have been fugitives of the 
Eleventh Corps. 

Who were the men who attacked Hazel Grcfve and its 
twenty-two cannon so fiercely on Saturday evening, imper- 
iling the safety of the Union army ? There was an attack, 
for one man was killed and five wounded on the Union side, 
while engaged in this desperate combat at short range. The 
narratives mention immense masses of men in successive 
lines of battle, but the slaughter on the Union side does not 
indicate that the Confederates were well armed, if they were 
present in great force. After long inquiry among the sur- 
vivors, and search among the archives of both armies, I can 
find but one report relating directly to Hazel Grove, and that 
is the one made by Lieutenant Colonel Winn, of the Fourth 
Georgia, written six days after the fight. 

Winn states that when Doles' Brigade had halted at the 
edge of the woods beyond Dowdall's, "I ordered the battal- 
ion forward, and with the colors and left wing advanced 
through this thicket to a field, compelling the abandonment 
of one gun and two caissons, etc., etc., en route. The right 
wing of the regiment, taking direction from other regiments 
of the brigade, was halted on reaching the woods last men- 
tioned. When I reached the field (which was the field in 
which the attack on the enemy was begun May 3d), I found 
two regiments of the enemy, with artillery, posted about three 
hundred yards obliquely to the teft of the entrance of the road 
into the field. Here I ascertained that as senior officer pres- 
ent, I had with me about two hundred men of various com- 
mands. I formed line behind a slight rail barricade, formed 
by throwing down the fence. Just as the line was formed, 
7 — B. c. 


the officer commanding the Federal troops, which were stand- 
ing in line exhibiting no purpose to attack, rode toward me. 
Though I ordered the men not to fire, when he got to within 
one hundred yards of me two of the men excitedly fired at 
him, whereupon he rode rapidly back to his command, and 
immediately a terrible artillery and infantry fire was opened 
upon us. The men under my command gallantly returned 
the fire until their small supply of ammunition was ex- 
hausted. Shortly after the cessation of our firing, the enemy 
ceased to fire, and my little force retired by right and left 
flank to rejoin their respective commands." 

Colonel Winn furthermore briefly states that "After re- 
joining our brigade we bivouacked on the field until seven a. m. 
May 3d." No other Confederate troops approached Hazel 
Grove that night, unless it was a small party under Colonel 
Mercer, of the Twenty-first Georgia, of the same brigade. 

Colonel Mercer says, in his report, written three days 
after the event : "The brigade was ordered to halt and form 
line in the edge of the field (Dowdall's). This command n'ot 
having been heard, the colors and a portion of the Twenty- 
first Georgia entered the thick pine woods in front and 
advanced to within three hundred yards of a battery, which 
opened fire and caused them to halt and protect themselves 
by lying down, until a favorable opportunity was presented 
for retiring." 

The survivors of the attacking party declare that they 
received no support ; that Colonel Mercer and his small party 
were not in sight or in support. Colonel Mercer and his party 
probably advanced to the pine woods, two or three hundred 
yards to the right rear of where Colonel Winn was, but as 
they were not in sight of Winn and his party, and took no 
part in the attack, their whereabouts is not of much conse- 

General Stuart's Adjutant' General states in his book 
that Colonel Mercer supported the left of Colonel Winn 
but this officer was not present at the time, having gone 
with Stuart to Ely Ford, and did not return until midnight. 


A Staff officer of Doles' thinks, this remark applies to the 
attack of May 3d, and not to that of May 2d. 

The men in gray whom Colonel Huey saw in the by- 
path on the left of the Hazel Grove Road were pirobably 
Colonel Winn and his foragers, approaching the vista where 
the cannon, caissons, etc., were at rest. Bursting upon the 
men guarding this material with fierce yells and desultory 
firing, they stampeded them without difficulty. It was this 
crowd, routed by Winn, that burst out in disorder upon Hazel 
Grove, and for which the men of the Eleventh Corps have 
been given undue credit, as none of them took part in it. 
Winn's force was so feeble or so demoralized by its situation 
that it did not attempt to carry off the cannon or any of the 
material, which it had captured in the vista, fairly won, and 
could have easily removed. As to the numbers forming 
the attack, I believe Winn's estimate should be accepted, 
although some of the survivors think there was not over one 
hundred and fifty men engaged or present. 

The incident recalls the remark General Pichegru made 
to his trembling followers : "Courage! Cowards look big in 
the dark." And so a hundred resolute men, dancing among 
the trees in the dusk of evening, firing at random and yelling 
lustily, might readily give rise to the belief that a large force 
was present. Braddock and his British regulars, in the woods 
at Fort Duquesne, thought the woods were filled with Indians, 
whereas in reality there were but few present. 

The; artillery at Hazel Grove comprised four batteries, 
one of which, Martin's, was under the direction of Pleasanton. 
The other three batteries belonged to the Third Corps, and 
were under the command of a cool, resolute officer, Maj. J. F. 
Huntington, whose capacity and firmness had been tested a 
year before, in the desperate fight of Port Republic. At the 
first sign of a disturbance, Huntington placed his batteries in 
position, and ordered them to fire into the woods when the 
rebel foragers fired at Lieutenant Thompson. He received 
no orders from Pleasanton or any one else, but managed his 
own affairs without interference, save the annoyance caused 


by the cavalry riding in disorder among his guns, and by the 
firing into his rear by the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsyl- 
vania Infantry. The casualties of these four batteries of 
twenty-two guns, fired into in front by the enemy and in 
rear by the supporting infantry, amounted to one man killed 
and five wounded. If the contest lasted about an hour, as 
Pleasanton states, this report of casualties would indicate 
that the Confederates were very poor r.arksmen, or that they 
were very few in number, or were destroyed without a return 
fire. Certainly some credit ought to be given to the infantry 
of the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania, who poured a 
volley directly into the rear of these batteries ! 


At the Log Works — Twelfth Corps. 

THE irregular groups of Colston's and Rodes' men 
halted at the Log Works constructed the day before 
by Williams' Division of the Twelfth Corps. These 
works were stout barricades of logs, with abattis on 
the western side, and extended from the ravines in front of 
Fairview westerly and northerly to about two hundred feet 
from the Plank Road and about sixty yards easterly of the 
entrance of the Dirt Road leading from Hazel Grove. 

Along the line of these barricades, four companies of the 
Twenty-eighth New York and camp followers had been left 
to guard the baggage of Williams' Division of the Twelfth 
Corps, which had gone southward with Sickles in pursuit of 
General Lee. The Twenty-eighth New York reports that it 
deployed its men behind the works, and halted many of the 
stragglers of the Eleventh Corps, but that they fled at the 
first fire. General Williams, deriving information from the 
same source, and chagrined at the loss of his baggage and 
the conduct of his men, increases the number of halted strag- 
glers to two thousand men, and states that they promptly 
receded at the first volley. It is certainly very doubtful if 
any of the Eleventh Corps men remained at this place after 
Buschbeck and his rear guard passed by, as they called in all 
fugitives, and so closely that none remained on the south side 
of the Plank Road to warn Colonel Huey and his cavalry of 
impending danger. Captain Dilger, with his rear guard, as 
he passed the Log Works, keeping the road free from close 
pursuit with his single gun, did not see any of the Eleventh 
Corps remaining near the works, but noticed a small and 
scattered body of infantry behind them, a short distance from 
the road, and appearing to have come up along the line from 
the southward. At this time the enemy were not within can- 



ister range of Dilger's gun, and there was ample time for 
the men of the Twenty-eighth New York to have escaped, 
had they desired to do so, but they were ordered to remain in 
place by their commanding officer. 

A few moments later, Colston's and Rodes' foragers 
came up and, getting into their rear, demanded their surren- 
der. From the evidence thus far obtained, it is doubtful if 
any resistance was made, or any volleys of musketry were fired 
on either side. If there had been any resistance, Colonel 
Huey and his men, then passing within one hundred yards, 
would have heard the musketry. But they heard no sounds 
of a conflict on their right flank. The official returns, also, 
do not indicate that there was any fight whatever at these 
works. The place was a fatal one to many of Knipe's Bri- 
gade, for a little later on in the evening three more of his 
regiments became strangely entangled, confused and broken 
up, with a loss to the brigade of about four hundred prisoners. 

About seventy of the Twenty-eighth New York threw 
down their arms and surrendered, while the rest retired 
rapidly through the woods in the rear, joining in their flight 
the broken cavalry, seeking escape, and the camp followers 
left in the works. Near the western border of these woods, 
the Thirteenth New Jersey, of the Twelfth Corps, had been 
left in reserve, and when this demoralized crowd burst out 
of the woods, shouting that the enemy were upon them, the 
Thirteenth New Jersey promptly joined them. About this 
time the frightened horde of fugitives whom Pleasanton has 
so minutely described at Hazel Grove, together with groups 
of cavalry that bothered the artillery of Huntington, and 
guns, caissons, ambulances, beef cattle, mules, etc., came 
tearing up the ravine with great force, but none of these 
guns, caissons, ambulances, carriages or material of any kind 
belonged to the Eleventh Corps, as is stated by Maj. J. F. 
Huntington in the Century Papers, and as he was commander 
of three of the batteries at Hazel Grove his statement is 

They rushed past and through some of the regiments 


of Knipe's and Ruger's Brigades of the Twelfth Corps, then 
rapidly returning to their old positions. The reinforced mob, 
as it rushed over the Fairview field to the Chancellor House, 
must have presented an alarming sight, and perhaps war- 
ranted the contemptuous statements of Captains Osborne and 
Winslow, of the artillery, who pictured them as, "aghast and 
terror-stricken, heads bare and panting for breath, they 
pleaded like infants at the mother's breast that we would 
let them pass to the rear unhindered." 

These reports have been copied far and wide, and alluded 
to with much emphasis at times. In fact, it would seem as 
though the meetings of some of the New Jersey troops, even 
to recent dates, lacked inspiration until the Falstaffs had 
described the disgraceful rout, and heaped it all upon the 
unfortunate Eleventh Corps. These garlands were promptly 
assigned to the Eleventh Corps, and they have meekly worn 
them to the present day. — See Map No. 6. 

Much has been said about the rout of the Eleventh 
Corps, and that it rushed past the Chancellor House with 
the force of a cyclone and the disorder of a blind stampede, 
and that in this disorderly mob the whole of the corps was 
included. Careful investigation seems to show that the ad- 
vance of the routed part of the corps was much exaggerated, 
and also that the frantic and tumultuous crowd, fired into by 
Hooker's staff, and ridden down by the artillery and cavalry, 
was really that picturesque phalanx described by Pleasanton, 
which came from Hazel Grove, about a mile distant, and in 
which the Eleventh Corps took no part. The routed ad- 
vance of the Eleventh Corps had three miles to run before 
reaching Chancellor's, and if they are the ones described, they 
must have possessed wonderful strength and endurance. In 
the stream of fugitives which passed the Chancellor House, 
or stopped in front and rear of it, there could not have been 
over three thousand men of the corps, or one-fourth of it, 
instead of the whole corps. The number of the corps was 
estimated at twelve thousand men, and deducting from it the 
three thousand men detached with Barlow, and not in the 


fieht, the two thousand five hundred killed, wounded and 
missing, and the three thousand five hundred or four thou- 
sand rallied to the west of the Chancellor House, either on 
the field of Fairview or in the woods north of it, there re- 
mains twenty five hundred to three thousand to be accounted 
for in the routed portion at the Chancellor House. 

Investigation seems to show that this historic emeute 
was mostly composed of men and camp followers of the 
Third and Twelfth Corps, and that none of the Eleventh 
were in it excepting perhaps a few of the pickets escaping 
from the south of Dowdall's. In fact, the retreating portion 
of the Eleventh Corps had passed the Chancellor House some 
time before, and were then being halted in rear of it and 
along the road leading to the White House. It can be 
shown that eight or nine thousand of the full strength of the 
corps, reckoned at twelve thousand men, were not at the 
Chancellor House in this rout, but were in line of battle, 
under Best's guns, or on the right flank of Berry, or left 
killed, wounded and prisoners on the Dowdall fields, or in 
the brigade of Barlow, in search of Lee, three to five miles 
south of Chancellor's. The remaining portion of three thou- 
sand or less men have been reckoned and described as the 
entire Eleventh Corps, and the whole corps denounced as 
cowardly Dutchmen, without caring to separate the native 
born Americans from the naturalized soldier of foreign birth. 
The closest scrutiny is invited to the causes aild the actual 
conditions of the rout of this part of the Eleventh Corps, 
and attention is also called to the self laudations of the 
Fartstaffs who rushed forward to fill the gap, and hurled 
Jackson back into the woods where Jackson's Corps did not 
appear. There was no enemy in pursuit at this time. 
Nearly all of Jackson's men had halted at Dowdall's, two 
miles away. The cannon shot that fell among the trains of 
troops in this vicinity came from Hardaway's guns, on the 
Turnpike, southeast, and the Plank Road, south, about a 
mile distant. These batteries belonged to Anderson's and 
McLaws' Divisions, and were ordered to make this diversion 


in connection with Jackson's attack. Breathed's battery, 
with Jackson, was at the Dowdall Tavern, two miles distant, 
and their short range guns could not reach the Chancelloir 
field, and did not try it. 

It is quite impossible to give an estimate of the number 
of rebels who went-forward to the Log Works. They were too 
much broken, disorganized and tired to form a line of battle, 
and after the capture or dispersion of the four companies of 
the Twenty-eighth New York, there were no Federal troops 
visible to attack. At this time General Rodes galloped up 
the Plank Road some distance, and satisfied- himself that 
there was no line of battle this side of the Chancellorsville 
heights, Buschbeck and his men being concealed from view 
by the woods on the right, and Berry and his division not 
being in sight, or coming up in the woods on the left. Major 
Cobb, of the Forty-fourth Virginia, did the same, and sent 
the information to Jackson. While the prisoners and 
property of Williams' Division were being secured, the Fifth 
Connecticut and Forty-sixth New York came groping, in the 
gloom, along the Log Works, in search of their former posi- 
tion and their property. The rebel foragers promptly fired 
into them and demanded their surrender, and, after a slight 
resistance, about one hundred and fifty more prisoners were 
added to the list, while the rest promptly retired. The flash 
and reports of this musketry was probably that which at- 
tracted Pleasanton's attention, at Hazel Grove, one thousand 
yards or more to the southward. The Confederate foragers 
shortly returned to the rear, where the corps had halted, 
carrying with them many prisoners and some booty. • The 
Log Works of General Williams' Division were then com- 
pletely abandoned, although Rodes says his men did not 
leave them until relieved by Lane's Brigade ; but Lane de- 
clares that none of Rodes' men were found by him in front. 
General Hill warned Lane not to fire into Rodes' men, as 
there might be some in front. But after forming the line, the 
regimental commanders, as well as Colonel Avery, command- 
ing the skirmish line, informed Lane that they had seen none 


of Rodes' men. The Adjutant General of Lee's army states 
that Rodes' men had retired some time before. Lane is un- 
doubtedly correct, for some of the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania 
advanced and found the works deserted, and they remained 
so until after the artillery fire of Captain Osborne had ceased, 
when Lane advanced, which took place "after eight p. m. 


The Wounding of Stonewall Jackson. 

AT this time the position of the Federal troops was as 
follows : Pleasanton retained his position at Hazel 
Grove unmolested, with no Confederates nearer than 
Colston's line, attempting to reform at the Log Hut 
near the Plank Road, about half a mile from Dowdall's east- 
ward, and more than a mile from the batteries at Hazel 
Grove. Behind Pleasanton, Whipple's Division was press- 
ing forward, and Birney's was far in their rear. Berry's two 
brigades occupied the space from the Plank Road to, at or 
near the Bullock Road. Williams' Division of the Twelth 
Corps had mostly returned, and was occupying the gap be- 
tween Pleasan ton's right and Berry's left. In the rear of 
this line stood Buschbeck, with his brigade and detachments, 
in front of Best's batteries. To the right of Berry, in the 
woods on the Bullock Road, stood the Twenty-sixth Wiscon- 
sin, Eighty-second Illinois, Eighty-second Ohio and One 
Hundred and Fifty-seventh New York, of Schurz's Division, 
and fragments of the other Eleventh Corps regiments, num- 
bering in all, with Buschbeck' s troops, more than three 
thousand men. In rear of Berry, Hays' Brigade of the 
Second Corps was moving to take position about four hun- 
dred yards distant in the rear. 

Jackson was at the Dowdall Tavern, chafing under the 
delay, and ordered A. P. Hill to push his division to cover 
the front, and prepare for a night attack, while Colston and 
Rodes were reorganizing their disordered columns in the 
rear. General Hill then ordered Lane and his brigade to 
advance to the front, but before Lane put his troops in 
motion Crutchfield sent two Napoleons and one Parrot gun 
up the Plank Road about half a mile from Dowdall's, and 
opened fire upon the Federal batteries, supposed to be about 



twelve hundred yards distant, at eight p. m. The Feueral 
artillery then in position or coming into position numbered 
forty-three guns, and from the batteries commanding the 
Plank Road Captain Osborne ordered eight or ten guns of 
his command to reply. Lane had moved up to the rear of 
Crutchfield's guns, when the rapid return fire of Osborne's 
artillery raked his column in the road, and forced him to 
seek cover on the left side of it. Lane refused to deploy 
until the artillery fire ceased, and asked General Hill to stop 
it. Colonel Crutchfield, after a delay of about fifteen min- 
utes, was ordered to stop firing, and Osborne ceasing to fire, 
Lane proceeded to form line of battle near the Log Works 
built by Williams' men, of the Twelth Corps. Here he threw 
forward on the right and left of the Plank Road the entire 
Thirty-third North Carolina as skirmishers, and deployed 
the Seventh and Thirty-seventh North Carolina on the abattis 
side of the Log Works, on the right of the Plank Road, and 
placed the Eighteenth and Twenty-eighth North Carolina in 
line of battle on the left of the Plank Road a few yards in 
advance of the right wing, on the right of the Plank Road. 
Lane did not see the Log Works until after his men had been 
placed in front of them, and this is the reason why they were 
placed on the abattis side. He did not throw any pickets in 
the direction of Hazel Grove, being in blissful ignorance of 
the "terrific struggle" that had taken place there shortly 
before, according to the statements made by Pleasanton. In 
fact. Lane's right flank and rear were unguarded and open to 
an attack from Hazel Grove. None of the Confederate lead- 
ers were aware of the imminent dangers that were lurking at 
Hazel Grove, and there was not a solitary picket on Lane's 
right to prevent Pleasanton from marching up the Dirt Road 
to McGowan's Brigade, resting in rear of Lane on the Plank 
Road, and inquiring the time of day. The brigade was 
finally placed in position without any opposition whatever. 
Captain Braxton was stationed, with his two or three guns, 
in the road between the two wings of the brigade. Neither 
Jackson, nor Hill, nor Lane was aware of Berry's line of 


battle in front, but supposed the infantry were in rear of the 
guns at Fairview. Instead of Berry's hurling Jackson's men 
back at the point of the bayonet, the evidence shows that 
Jackson's men did not know that Berry was in front of the 
Federal batteries. 

The nearest position of Jackson's line of battle to that 
of the Federals was seven hundred yards west of Berry, with 
dense woods intervening. It was known to the Confederates 
that there was a strong line of skirmishers in front of them, 
and the ringing of axes later in the night indicated the con- 
struction of fortifications. Lane, in placing his regiments, 
had cautioned all of them to keep a sharp lookout for the 
enemy, as he was far in advance and alone, and that they 
must be in readiness to repel an attack. As soon as the line 
of battle was established, General Lane rode back to the 
road for his final orders, as he understood General Hill to 
say that he was to prepare for action. When Lane reached 
the road, it was too dark to distinguish persons, and he 
called out for General Hill, and the reply he got came from 
General Jackson, who recognized the voice of his old pupil, 
and called him to his side. Lane found Jackson at or near 
the meeting of the Hazel Grove and Bullock Roads, and in 
rear of the three guns placed on picket. Jackson was at 
that time alone, neither Hill nor any of his staff being visi- 
ble. Lane reported for final orders, and Jackson, raising his 
arm in the direction of the enemy, exclaimed' briefly : "Push 
right ahead, Lane; right ahead!" Lane knew his old in- 
structor too well to ask for any further instructions (he had 
been a student under Jackson at the Virginia Military Insti- 
tute), and at once rode along his line to prepare for the ad- 
vance, and he had reached the extreme right of his position 
and was about to give the signal, when Lieutenant Colonel 
Hill, one of his bravest officers, came to him and begged 
him not to give the order until he could ascertain what 
forces were moving on his right and rear, and whether they 
belonged to the army of Lee or Hooker. At this time dis- 
tinct sounds of troops and trains could be heard in the 


woods, both in front and on the right flank, which was 
totally unprotected. In fact, neither Jackson nor Hill nor 
Lane had heard of the conflict as described by Pleasanton 
and Sickles, and were not aware of any danger impending 
from that quarter. General Lane was so ignorant of the 
presence of the enemy in that direction that he had not 
placed a single picket on the right of the Log Works, behind 
which his men were then standing, nor even on the Hazel 
Grove road in his flank and rear, and neither was he aware 
of the cannon, caissons, and trains of the Third Corps left 
in that road in the stampede caused by the Georgia foragers 
an hour or more previously. While General Lane and Colo- 
nel Hill were discussing the causes of the sounds in the 
woods on their right, a Federal officer came up along the 
Log Works from the right flank, waving a handkerchief and 
demanding to know what troops were in front of him. The 
officer proved to be Colonel Smith, of the One Hundred and 
Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment, which had come up 
from the expedition from the Furnace, and was trying to find 
in the darkness the baggage and former position of the regi- 
ment in the Log Works. He was promptly seized by some 
of the men of the Seventh North Carolina and brought before 
General Lane, who was then standing in the Log Works near 
by. After a moment's conversation with the prisoner, Gen- 
eral Lane ordered Colonel Hill to send a squad of soldiers 
into the woods and ascertain how much of a force was then 
threatening their right flank and rear, concealed by the dark- 
ness of the night. Lieutenant Emack, of the Seventh North 
Carolina, was detailed, with four men, to advance into the 
forest whence Colonel Smith had emerged. About this time 
a Federal officer (undoubtedly General Knipe) rode up in 
the woods in front and called out for General Williams, the 
commander of the division. Sergeant Cowan, of the Thirty- 
third North Carolina, commanding that part of the skirmish 
line, ordered his men to fire upon the Federal officer, and 
instantly the nearest picket fired, followed by others of the 
skirmish line. The shots were promptly returned by the 


Federal pickets, not far distant, and part of the Seventh 
North Carolina, standing in front of the Log Works, fired a 
volley in the direction of the Federal officer and, unthink- 
ingly, into the rear of that portion of the Thirty-third North 
Carolina then drawn up as a skirmish line directly in their 
front. The picket fire became more animated, and rolled 
along both picket lines to the northward and past the Plank 
Road, and was increased by a volley from the Seventy-third 
New York, the left regiment o^ Berry's line of battle, sta- 
tioned on the Plank Road, and also by a desultory fire from 
a part of the First Massachusetts Regiment, on the right 
of the Plank Road, which killed and wounded three of its 
own skirmishers. 

This random firing took plack at 9.10, org. 15, and is 
clearly the cause of the accident to General Jackson. When 
Lane left Jackson, he was in the road near where the Bul- 
lock Road comes into the Plank Road, and he was alone, 
and such was the distribution of his troops at this moment 
that a Federal scouting party could have come up the Hazel 
Grove Road and seized him as a prisoner of war. Even as 
late as nine p. m. it was totally unguarded, and Major Jed 
Hotchkiss, of Jackson's staff, rode down the road to the 
Hazel Grove field at this hour without meeting a solitary 
soldier of either army, and in fact he did not know that 
Lane's men were deployed between him and Chancellors- 
ville, perhaps a hundred yards distant. General Hill and 
some of ihis staff soon joined Jackson, and then Jackson gave 
Hill his orders in the brief sentence : "Press them ; cut them 
off from the United States Ford, Hill; press them." A. P. 
Hill replied that none of his staff were familiar with the 
country. Thereupon Jackson turned to Captain Boswell, who 
was well acquainted with all the roads and paths, and ordered 
him to report to Hill. Soon after, the party turned to the left, 
to the space in the forest where the Bullock and Mountain 
Roads came into the Plank Road, and were passing up the 
Mountain Road when a courier from General Stuart, who 
had gone to Ely Ford with his cavalry, rode up to Jackson 


and delivered a message. Jackson ordered the courier to 
wait for a reply. This cavalryman, named Dave Kyle, was 
born at the White House, in the rear of Chancellor's, and 
was perfectly acquainted with every path and road on the 
plateau of Chancellorsville, and it is by him that we are able 
to trace every footstep from this time until the fatal event. 
The Mountain Road is an old road, which comes out of the 
Plank Road about half a mile from Chancellor's, and runs 
parallel with and north of it from sixty to eighty yards dis- 
tant, and again comes into it, together with the Bullock 
Road, opposite the road from Hazel Grove. Although long 
out of use, it is still distinctly visible to-day. It is certain 
that Jackson and his party passed along the Mountain Path, 
and not up the Plank Road, past the guns placed in battery. 
Furthermore, the two officers of the Eighteenth North Caro- 
lina Regiment, stationed on the Plank Road, have declared 
that Jackson did not pass by them, but turned off to the left 
of their rear, and passed out of view in the forest. Jack- 
son was well aware that the Plank Road was swept by the 
fire of the Federal cannon at Fairview, and that the bat- 
teries were ready to open fire at the first sign of a move- 
ment by the enemy. Moreover, there was nothing to call 
him on the Plank Road, for Fairview was not his objective 
point, but the White House, and the path he was then upon 
led directly to it. For the first one hundred yards the Bul- 
lock and Mountain Roads are blended together, and up this 
roadway, about nine o'clock in the evening, the party of Con- 
federate officers passed along, with their chieftain riding in the 
advance. About one hundred yards from the entrance of the 
paths into the Plank Road the party passed quietly through 
the ranks of the Eighteenth North Carolina Regiment, then 
drawn up in line of battle extending to the north for some 
distance, and awaiting for the signal of advance from Gen- 
eral Lane. They passed so quietly through the Eighteenth 
Regiment that Major Barry, stationed on the left wing of the 
regiment, did not notice them, and was not informed of their 
passage. They continued slowly along the Mountain Road 


towards the Thirty-third North Carolina Regiment, then 
drawn up in a strong skirmish line, extending across the 
Plank Road into the forest some distance north of it, ^nd 
from two hundred to three hundred yards in front of the 
Eighteenth North Carolina Regiment. They passed on, 
almost to the line of the Thirty-tljird North Carolina skir- 
mishers, and halted. Jackson listened for a moment to the 
sounds coming from the Federal lines — the ringing of the 
axes in building the fortifications and the words of command 
being distinctly audible — and then turned his horse in silence 
and slowly retraced his steps back to the place where the 
Mountain, the Bullock, and the Hunting Roads, or paths, 
come together, about sixty to eighty yards from where the 
Eighteenth North Carolina Regiment was standing in the 
woods, and about sixty to seventy yards from where the 
Jackson monument now stands. Jackson then stopped, and, 
again turning his horse towards the Federal lines, was appar- 
ently listening to the sounds from the front, and for Lane's 
signal for the advance. Gen. A. P. Hill and his Adjutant 
General Colonel Palmer, again joined them. The group of 
horsemen gathered together in his rear," and all were stand- 
ing still and in silence, when suddenly a single rifle shot rang 
out distinctly in the evening air, and at some distance south 
of the Plank Road. The fatal shot was that fired by the 
skirmishers of the Thirty-third North Carolina at the call of 
General Knipe. It was instantly replied to, and as the fir- 
ing rolled along the line of the skirmishers of both armies, 
and was increased in volume by the volleys of the Seventy- 
third New York, part of the First Massachusetts (Federal), 
and a part of the Seventh North Carolina (rebel), both lines 
of battle became keenly on the alert. At this moment Colo- 
nel Purdie and the adjutant of the Eighteenth North Carolina 
had gone forward on the Plank Road about two hundred 
yards, to consult with Colonel Avery, of the Thirty-third 
North Carolina, near the old Vanwert Cabin, about the ap- 
proach of the enemy on the right flank and rear, and while 
engaged in this conversation, the picket firing broke out in 
8— B. c. 


their front. Purdie and his adjutant immediately turned 
and rushed with all their speed down the Plank Road toward 
their position at the head of the Eighteenth North Carolina 
Regiment. The sounds of their footsteps startled the Con- 
federate soldiers, already aroused by the roar of musketry 
in front, and as Major Barry, on the left of the Eighteenth, 
some distance in the woods, heard these sounds of rapid 
approach from the front, and suddenly saw a group of 
strange horsemen moving about among the shadows of the 
trees eighty yards in his front and to his right, he in- 
stantly gave the order to fire and repeat the firing. 

The fire of the rifles of the North Carolina mountaineers 
was fearfully effective, and every one of that group of horse- 
men v/ent down or disappeared before its fatal aim except 
Jackson. The chieftain, although grievously wounded, kept 
his seat in the saddle, even when Old Sorrel, startled by the 
confusion around him, dashed across the path into an oak tree, 
whose branches nearly swept his rider to the ground: A mo- 
ment after the horse continued on toward the Plank Road, but 
finally stopped a few yards from it, where some of the officers 
who had escaped the destructive fire found him. Tenderly 
lifting Jackson from the saddle, they laid the wounded chief- 
tain under a pine tree. Soon after Gen. A. P. Hill came to 
his side, and sent for aid, but as Jackson could walk, he was 
assisted to his feet, and taken to the Plank Road, and turned 
toward the Dowdall House. As the party walked down the 
road the number was increased by the officers who desired to 
offer some assistance, and the enlarged group of men, both 
mounted and on foot, attracted the notice of Captain Osborne, 
who had charge of the two Federal guns placed at the foot of 
the hill on picket, about seven or eight hundred yards dis- 
tant. It was then bright moonlight, and objects could be 
seen a long distance on the broad road. Osborne at once 
opened fire, and it was regarded by the batteries in the rear 
at Fairview as a signal that the enemy was advancing in 
force, and in a moment after, at 9.30 p. m., forty-three guns 
in all were directing a terrific fire down the Plank Road. At 


this time the entire road below the Hazel Grove Road was 
filled with battalions of Confederate artillery and brigades of 
infantry, amounting to quite twenty thousand men, ready 
to take part in the advance movement. The Federal fire 
raked the road with fearful effect, and Jackson's bearers were 
struck down twice. It was in the midst of this tempest of 
bursting shell that Jackson delivered his last order to his 
army. It was to General Pender, whose column was being 
torn to pieces by the Federal shot and shell, and who ex- 
pressed a doubt of his ability to hold his brigade in their 
present position under the murderous fire. The dying chief- 
tain aroused himself, and exclaimed emphatically: "Pender, 
you must hold your ground ! " 

In the tumult and wild commotion which ensued, ana 
which for a while threatened to break up the two exposed 
divisions of infantry, much damage was done to them and to 
the artillery battalions, and many men and officers were 
struck down, among them Colonel Crutchfield, Chief of Ar- 
tillery, and Colonels Nichols and Mallory. The Fifty-fifth 
Virginia was involved in the melee, and thinking itself at- 
tacked, one of its wings poured a volley into an imaginary 
foe. Major Pegram fired a few shots from two of his guns 
over the heads of those around him, but as both of these 
parties were in rear of Lane's line of battle, and also Mc- 
Gowan's and Pender's Brigades, it is not easy to see how 
they attacked or repulsed the enemy, and especially as no 
Federal force advanced at this hour to attack anywhere along 
the line. All reports of fighting by various regiments of 
Jackson's Corps during the evening, excepting those of 
Lane's Brigade, are erroneous. Lane's and Pender's Bri- 
gades held the front line of battle until after Sickles' "mid- 
night charge," and no infantry passed their lines that night. 
There was some desultory infantry firing at times, both by 
some of Lane's regiments (but only by the Eighteenth 
North Carolina, and part of the Seventh North Carolina), and 
some of the regiments in the rear of Lane, but they were ran- 
dom shots at imaginary foes, excepting the brief and feeble 


midnight attack from Hazel Grove. The skirmishers of the 
Thirty-third North Carolina, two hundred or three hundred 
yards in front of Lane, were compelled to rush forward to 
seek shelter when a part of Lane's line of battle fired its des- 
ultory volleys, and this rushing forward gave the impression 
that the rebels were making a charge, and caused some of 
the Federal regiments in Berry's and Williams' Divisions to 
fire into the woods to repel a threatened attack. Three times 
Colonel Avery re-established during the night his broken line 
of skirmishers. To the spectators near the Federal batteries 
at Fairview, the sharp musketry and the tall swearing and 
vociferation heard in the woods in front gave an impression 
that a severe fight was raging in the woods, but the lines 
of battle did not come within seven hundred yards of each 
other, excepting during the Hazel Grove episode. 

In the meantime General Lane, at the extreme right of 
his brigade, was anxiously awaiting the return of the scouting 
party sent into the forest on his flank. In a few moments 
Lieutenant Emack, with his four North Carolina soldiers, 
returned with one hundred and fifty or more Federal soldiers 
of the One Hundred and Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Regi- 
ment, who had become bewildered in the dark forest, and 
yielded to the summons of the Confederate officer. As the 
party came up to the Log Works, where General Lane was 
standing. Colonel Smith refused to admit the surrender of his 
men, as a violation of the handkerchief of truce, and an 
earnest discussion arose over the question of right, when 
suddenly the artillery fire of the Federal batteries burst upon 
them, and to escape the tempest of destruction both Federals 
and rebels instantly sprang over to the shady side of the Log 
Works, and lay side by side in temporary brotherly love. 
But as soon as the Federal fire ceased. General Lane ordered 
the Federal soldiers to be conducted to the rear as prisoners 
of war. Shortly after. General Pender came to General 
Lane, still in the forest, and informed him of the accident to 
General Jackson, and also of the wounding of General Hill by 
the Federal artillery fire, and advised Lane not to advance. 


The fatal shots came from the left wing of the Eighteenth 
North Carolina, and the whole brigade has been involved 
in the severe denunciations hurled upon them in this 
unfortunate affair. When Mahone's Brigade of Virginians, 
in broad daylight, on the 6th of May, 1864, fired repeat- 
edly into their own corps, killing General Jenkins and his aid 
Doby, and wounding General Longstreet and many others, 
nothing was said about it. The mistake in daylight was 
more inexcusable than the error in the darkness of night. 
Barry ordered his men to fire, for he was not aware of any- 
one passing in his front except the pickets, and they were 
not mounted. Major Barry was an officer cool and brave, 
and neither Jackson, nor Lane, nor Hill ever blamed him for 
his fearful error. As to the charge of being panic-stricken, 
there is no evidence of it to be deduced from the particulars. 
On the contrary, there is much to be admired in the conduct 
of Lane's Brigade at this time. The entire brigade had been 
warned by its commander to be on the alert, keenly on the 
alert, as they were in front of the Federal army, and without 
immediate support. The charge that there was no picket line 
established is completely untrue, for the entire Thirty-third 
North Carolina Regiment was stretched across the Plank 
Road, above and below it, and far in advance of where Jack- 
son stood when fired upon. This brigade faced the Federal 
front in line of battle, and although twice exposed to the fire 
of forty-three cannon, it never faltered nor called for help, 
until its flank and rear were threatened by Sickles about mid- 
night. The history of this command, under its dauntless 
leader, throughout the war, and ending at Appomattox, will 
always be admired and respected by those who believe in 
American manhood. And the student who seeks to discover 
a higher degree of courage and hardihood among the military 
organizations of either army will look over the true records 
of the war for a long time, if not in vain. Investigation 
shows that the brigade was composed of young men, of the 
best stock the Old North State contained, and sent to rep- 
resent it in that bulwark of secession, the Army of North- 



ern Virginia. The records of the war show that it was in all 
of the principal battles of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
and that its blows were severe and its losses were frightful. 
In the battles around Richmond, in 1862, the brigade lost 
eight hundred men killed and wounded. At Chancellorsville 
it also lost nearly eight hundred men killed and wounded, and 
of its thirteen field officers, all but one were struck down. 
At Gettysburg it formed the left of Longstreet's charge, and 
although it had lost nearly forty per cent, in its three days' 
fighting, it ^marched off the field in excellent order when 
Pickett was routed, and took position in support of the rebel 
batteries, which some of the brigades of that charge did not 
do. This organization was among the last soldiers of Lee's 
army -to recross the Potomac, after both Antietam and 
Gettysburg. North Carolina furnished more men than any 
other state of the Confederacy, and lost more in action than 
any of its sister states, and the records show, or seem to show, 
that her mountaineers struck many of the hardest blows the 
Army of the Potomac received from the Army of Northern 

While Jackson was being carried down the road Gen. A. 
P. Hill returned to the front of the Eighteenth North Caro- 
lina, and was soon after wounded by a fragment of a Federal 
shell. At ten o'clock Captain Adams was sent to Ely Ford 
by^ Major Pendleton, of Jackson's staff, to recall General 
Stuart to take command of the army. Why Jackson felt im- 
pelled to take this step, and overlook the deserving claims of 
some of his able division commanders, is not yet clear. 
Rodes felt indignant at the want of confidence shown in 
him, and expresses his feeling of grievance briefly in his 
report of the battle. The others are silent. Stuart belonged 
to another arm of the service, was a stranger to the corps, 
and unknown personally to many of its officers. His Adju- 
tant General complains of the lack of support received on his 
arrival, and states that not one of Jackson's staff, with the 
exception of Pendleton, reported to him that night. 

Captain Adams started for Ely Ford about ten p. m., and 


Stuart did not arrive until midnight, or after the midnight 
reconnaissance of Sickles, and in the meantime Jackson's 
victorious corps was adrift — almost as much adrift as the 
Army of the Potomac was when Hooker was disabled. For 
more than two hours no oiBcer felt at liberty to take any de- 
cisive action, and the golden opportunity rapidly passed 
away. General Heth took command of Hill's Division, and 
declined to take any active steps. He ordered Lane to with- 
draw his two regiments from the left of the road to the right 
of the road, and keep quiet. Pender was placed in Lane's 
place on the left of the road, and bivouacked in the woods, 
eight hundred yards from Berry's line of battle, molested no 
one, and was not molested during the night. 

The wounding of Jackson. was a most fortunate circum- 
stance for the Army of the Potomac at this moment, and it 
was certainly fraught with bitter disappointment to the Con- 
federate cause. At nine o'clock the capture or destruction of 
a large part of Hooker's army seemed inevitable. Thirty 
minutes later all was changed by Jackson's carelessness or 
rashness. There was at this time great uncertainty and a 
feeling akin to panic prevailing among the Union forces 
around Chancellorsville, and it may be said truthfully that 
there was considerable of this feeling among the rebels them- 
selves, though flushed with victory. It may be said, with 
due respect to both armies, that the bravest of men are 
liable to night terrors, not excepting Caesar's or Napoleon's 
hardened veterans. 

The advance of Lane's Brigade, even as late as ten 
p. M.' attacking Berry's and Knipe's Brigades in front, while 
Pender and McGowan, with their brigades, slipped by the 
Federal right flank, leaving Heth's Brigade in reserve for 
Lane, would probably have resulted in serious disaster to the 
Federal army, then concentrated on the Chancellor plateau. 
The regiments of the Eleventh Corps, the Eighty-second 
Ohio, Eighty-second Illinois, Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, One 
Hundred and Fifty-seventh New York, and fragments of 
other regiments which remained halted on this road in line 



of battle for some time, had been withdrawn to the rear of 
the Chancellor House shortly before this hour, and no force 
had been sent to take their place. Hays' Brigade rested on 
the Plank Road in rear of Berry. Sykes and his regulars 
were far to the rear on the Ely or U. S. Ford Road, and ap- 
parently there was no force, no obstacle, to prevent Pender 
from marching directly to the field in the rear of Chancellor's. 
Jackson undoubtedly felt at seven and at nine p. m. 
that he was "accompanied by the god of fortune and of 
war," and after his successful flanking movement directly in 
front of the Federal army, that nothing could be too absurd 
or too difficult for him to attempt. At the hour of nine p. m. 
Jackson must have felt sure of success, for the field at the 
White House was about one thousand yards distant, with 
only the feeble remnants of the beaten Eleventh Corps and a 
regiment of Berry's Division to oppose him on the direct 
avenue of approach. It is in evidence that while Lane's 
strong brigade was to engage the attention of the enemy at 
Fairview, Jackson intended to slip up the Bullock Road with 
Pender's, McGowan's, Heth's and other brigades, which were 
then close at hand a:nd in readiness to advance, and this ex- 
plains why Jackson and Hill were at the junction of the Bul- 
lock and Mountains Roads instead of being on the Plank 
Road. The broad Plank Road in their rear was crowded for 
a long distance with several battalions of Confederate ar- 
tillery and their ammunition trains, all ready to advance. 
The broken brigades of Colston's and Rodes' Divisions were 
also sufficiently reformed to support Hill's attack. Williams, 
at this time, had returned to strengthen the Federal position 
at Fairview with his division of the Twelfth Corps, but 
the most of Sickles' force was at or below Hazel Grove, 
and Barlow's stout brigade was far below and lost in the 
darkness. When we consider the position of the Federal 
army at Chancellorsville at this moment, and how many im- 
portant battles have been won by trivial flank attacks — how 
Richepense, with a single brigade, ruined the Austrian army 
at Hohenlinden by a flank attack, etc. — we must admit that 


the Federal army was in great peril when Jackson arrived 
within one thousand yards of its vital point with more than 
twenty thousand men and fifty cannon, and the only obstacle 
in the way a handful of beaten soldiers of the wrecked 
Eleventh Corps, and a regiment of the Third Corps. 

Jackson was absolutely fearless, like Admiral Nelson, 
and he had the power of imparting his intrepidity to those 
around him. He was at the same time strangely reticent, 
abstruse, subtle and mysterious, and none of his officers were 
in his complete confidence. It appears from what evidence 
now remains that his objective point was the White House 
in rear of Chancellor's, and once there, with the aid of the 
surrounding forest, which would serve as a fortress — a forti- 
fied camp, to which he could retire and from which he could 
emerge at will — he would have maintained his position with 
as great certainty as he did at Groveton the year previous. 
The audacity and experiences of the campaign of 1862 
greatly strengthen this view. 


Sickles Famous ''Midnight Charge." 

AT Hazel Grove, nearly a mile to the south and right of 
the Plank Road, two divisions of the Third Corps, 
returning from the chase of Lee's forces far below the 
' Furnace, were, on arrival, marshaled into columns of 
attack to retake the Dirt and Plank Roads, and to recover 
missing guns, caissons and the mule train. Birney's Division 
was selected for this difficult movement. Ward's Brigade 
formed the first line of assault, and Hayman's the second. 
On the left of this force the Dirt Road led to the Plank Road, 
and here were placed the Fortieth New York, Seventeenth 
Maine and Sixty-third Pennsylvania, and pushed forward by 
column of companies. On the right of this column the rest 
of the brigades, numbering eight regiments, moved in line 
of battle toward the Plank Road; but soon most of them 
inclined to the right, toward the position held by the Twelfth 
Corps. — See Map No. g. 

Sickles says that orders were given not to fire a gun until 
the Plank Road was reached; that the advance, in spite of 
a terrific fire of musketry and twenty guns at Dowdall's 
Tavern, was successfully executed ; that the line of the 
Plank Road was regained ; that Howard's rifle pits were 
reoccupied; that all of their guns, caissons, etc., were re- 
covered ; that two guns and three caissons of the enemy 
were captured, and that Jackson was then wounded ; that the 
enemy, thrown into confusion by this attack on his right 
flank, then advanced on their left and center and attacked 
Berry's Division, but were repulsed. Sickles also states that 
the enemy were so completely surprised that they fell back, 
leaving the communications open. 

The attacking column was formed with the Fortieth New 
York in the lead, with the Seventeenth Maine supporting, in 



column of companies, and the Sixty-third Pennsylvania as 
reserve. On the right of the Fortieth New York, the Third 
and Fourth Maine, the Thirty-eighth New York, and the 
Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania advanced in line of battle, fol- 
lowed by the First New York, the Third and Fifth Michigan, 
and the. Thirty-seventh New York. The Fortieth New York, 
which was the famous Mozart Regiment, and of excellent 
reputation, proceeded with guns uncapped up the road or 
vista, which was wide at first, but soon became narrow, and 
on arriving at a point about five hundred yards from the 
Plank Road, found the Twenty-eighth North Carolina and 
the Eighteenth North Carolina barring the way and deployed 
in line of battle. These regiments stopped further progress 
with a tremendous volley, which threw the Fortieth New 
York in confusion upon the Seventeenth Maine, which in 
part, also broke and retreated. The rear companies of the 
Seventeenth Maine remained firm, and the regiment was soon 
reformed by Adjutant Roberts, and faced westerly instead of 
northerly, and here it remained unsupported, until Mc- 
Gowan's Brigade of South Carolinians was brought up to 
protect General Lane's flank, when General Ward called it 
back to the Hazel Grove field. The Seventeenth Maine, in 
returning, brought back with them the gun and three cais- 
sons which a part of the Third Corps had previously left in 
the vista. The line of battle on the right of the vista found 
its way impeded by the dense woods and the darkness of the 
night. The Third Maine Regiment ran into parts of the 
Eighteenth and Twenty-eighth North Carolina, and were 
driven back with the loss of several prisoners and their flag. 
The flag was captured by Captain Neven Clark's company, 
and afterwards burnt during the evacuation of Richmond. 
The rest of the assaulting force deviated to the right, and 
soon attacked portions of the Twelfth Corps, taking them to 
be Confederates. 

Parts of Knipe's and Ruger's Brigades of the Twelfth 
Corps regarded the noisy crowd in front of them to be rebels, 
and returned the compliment with a severe fire of musketry 


and shell, and for a time the useless contest raged with great 
vigor with both parties. Some bf the reports of this mid- 
night encounter are missing, and their publication will throw 
much light upon its details. On the Federal side it was un- 
doubtedly a mixed up mess, and some of the regiments com- 
plain of being fired into from the front and both flanks. Lane 
regarded the attack simply as a reconnaissance, as it was so 
easily repulsed by the Eighteenth, Twenty-eighth, and a part 
of the Thirty-third North Carolina Regiments. Just then the 
guns at Fairview opened again, and swept the Plank Road 
and its vicinity with a terrific fire. Had Birney's column 
succeeded in driving Lane from his position, the Federal fire 
from the forty-three guns would haye prevented him from 
reaching the Plank Road. As soon as this artillery fire ceased 
Lane, finding that there was no force whatever defending his 
right flank, and that there was a wide gap between his right 
and Colston's line, reformed in the woods some distance to 
the westward, and went to General Heth and requested him to 
send some troops to take position on the right of the Twenty- 
eighth North Carolina, and protect his flank and rear from 
another attack from Hazel Grove. Lane led McGowan's 
Brigade into this position, and until this time — past mid- 
night — there was no rebel force between Lane's Brigade and 
Colston's Division. Skirmishers were then thrown out before 
the new line, and they encountered the pickets of the Seven- 
teenth Maine Regiment, with whom shots were exchanged. 
This ended all movements on the Confederate side that night, 
or until the arrival of Archer and his brigade of Tennessee- 
ans, which was about two a. m. Sunday morning. 

Investigation seems to show that Sickles and his forces 
did not succeed in reaching ground within a mile of How- 
ard's earthworks, or even reach the Plank Road, and that 
his attack was easily repulsed by two regiments of Lane's 
Brigade,^ with trifling loss. It is not easy to see where the 
•cannon shots that he encountered came from, as there were 
-no guns stationed on the Dirt Road. Furthermore, it is ex- 
tremely doubtful if twenty guns at Dowdall's Tavern, a mile 


away, opened fire at all. Many of them, at this time, were 
repairing damages received in the 9.30 cannonade from 
Best's Artillery. Another reason why they did not fire was 
because they could not throw their shot safely a mile through 
the woods wherein Colston's and Rodes' broken columns 
were reforming and taking position for the morning's attack. 
And another equally potent reason is the fact that the rebels 
did not know that Sickles was making the desperate attempt 
he describes. In fact, the Confederates were utterly unaware 
of the magnitude of Birney's attack until they read the glow- 
ing accounts of its prowess in the northern press, long after 
the event. The claim of wounding Jackson is weakened by 
the fact that he had been wounded two hours or more before, 
and was at this time miles distant. The guns and caissons 
he captured were his own, which had been left in the road 
when Winn and his foragers stampeded the Third Corps 
crowd left resting in the vista ; but the mule train had long 
ago gone, to be credited to the disgrace of another corps. 
The redoubts claimed to have been captured were those con- 
structed by Birney's Division of the Third Corps. 

When Winn and his Georgians left in haste, after the 
cessation of Pleasanton's, or rather Huntington's, artillery 
fire, he neglected to take with him these guns, caissons, etc., 
and so they remained under the nose of Pleasanton for four 
hours, and no rebel within five hundred yards of them until 
after ten P. m. Birney not only failed to open the desired 
avenue of travel, but lost a number of men, of whom many 
were missing ; it is a mystery where the missing went. The 
Eighteenth North Carolina captured but three, the Twenty- 
eighth North Carolina several, and the Thirty-third none. 

The roads leading to the United States Ford have been 
reported as filled with stragglers of the Eleventh Corps, but 
General Meagher, who was in charge of the Provost Guard 
on the Ford Road, says they were not all Eleventh Corps 
men. Moreover, General Patrick, who was in charge of the 
Provost Guard at the United States Ford, was quoted at the 
mass meeting held in New York, June 2d, 1863, as saying 


that the stragglers arrested there were not Eleventh Corps 
men. Birney lost the flag of one of his best regiments, a fine 
horse, several officers and men, and retired his troops the 
next morning through the swampy place leading to Fairview, 
where Pleasanton saw the great pile of debris of a corps that 
did not go within half a mile of it. 

In relation to the attack on Berry, as described by 
Sickles, it may be said that Pender's Brigade was deployed 
in front of Berry, at the distance of eight hundred yards. 
The dense woods that intervened gave Pender's men a feel- 
ing of security, and they tried to sleep, and succeeded after 
the midnight cannonade ceased. Pender's Brigade made no 
attack whatever on May 2d, 1863, but on the morning of the 
3d of May, at seven a. m., it struck its first blow since the 
battle of Fredericksburg, and swept the First Brigade of the 
Third Corps out of its entrenchments without hesitation, and 
in quite as brief a space of time as when Rodes' rebel divi- 
sion overwhelmed Von Gilsa's Brigade (without entrench- 
ments or supports) the evening before. The reports of 
Berry and his men causing Jackson's Corps to halt are erro- 
neous. Berry did not go within a mile of the positions lost 
by the Eleventh Corps, and neither Colston nor Rodes, Lane 
nor Hill knew before 9.30 p. m. that Berry and his men were 
in the woods at the foot of the hill where the batteries were 
placed, four hundred yards in the rear. 

The statement made that the First Corps, arriving late 
at night, occupied some of the positions abandoned by the 
Eleventh Corps, is erroneous. The position to which the 
First Corps was led by Captain Candler, of Hooker's staff, 
was two miles or more distant from Buschbeck's line of battle, 
and more than three miles from the place where Von Gilsa 
attempted to fight. None of the First Corps saw Dowdall's 
Tavern, excepting those carried there as prisoners of war. 

Birney's Division of the Third Corps was one of the best 
in the Federal army, but this midnight adventure, so bril- 
liantly described at the time, appears now to have been one 
of the most comical episodes in the history of the Army of 



the Potomac, and if the suppressed reports can be found this 
view may prove to be correct. At all events, after reading 
the reports of General Sickles at the time, and his statement 
a year afterwards to Congress — the brilliant array of gallant 
troops in the moonlight — the bold attack — the quick return 
of one of the columns, to be stopped by the bayonets of the 
Sixty-third Pennsylvania — the advance of the other column, 
deflecting to the right until it met General Slocum in per- 
son — certainly there is a slight occasion for a smile on the 
part of the reader. And this smile may be lengthened on 
reading the story of General De Trobriand, who was a par- 
ticipator, or the account left by Colonel Underwood, of the 
Thirty-third Massachusetts, who, returned from the depths 
of the Wilderness in time to witness and describe the ludi- 
crous scene. 

But all the comicality was not witnessed at Hazel Grove. 
When the woods resounded with the imprecations and the 
heavy tread of Birney's veterans, the men of the Twelfth 
Corps, under Knipe and Williams, were aroused by the ap- 
proaching noises, and fired artillery and musketry into the 
darkness, causing severe loss to the Federal troops, according 
to the views of General Slocum, who had not been informed 
of the intended movement. The Twenty-seventh Indiana 
reports an attack with terrific yells, and the Third Wiscon- 
sin was fired into before and behind without a rebel appear- 
ing in sight. The Thirteenth New Jersey, wishing to take 
some part in the pyrotechnics, being in the second line of 
battle, fired into the Third Wisconsin, broke it up partly, 
and again for the second time during the evening took to its 
heels. In the meantime, the left half of Lane's Brigade, 
lying flat on their faces to escape the shot and shell of Best's 
artillery, wondered what was going on in their right front. 
No enemy appeared to challenge them, but the yells and 
strange noises indicated a breaking loose of pandemonium, 
and caused some trepidation to the superstitiously inclined. 
But even to this day, most of Lane's survivors are ignorant 
of what caused the circus in front and on the right flank. 

At eight p. M. that evening there was a broad gap of 


more than half a mile in width, extending from Green's Bri- 
gade of the Twelfth Corps northwest to the Confederate 
troops of Lane's Brigade, on and near the Plank Road. 
Through this gap and up its ravine the grand skedaddle, 
which Pleasanton and others have so elegantly described and 
erroneously credited to the Eleventh Corps, took place. 
Through this wide gap Williams' Division of the Twelfth 
Corps had no difficulty in squeezing, on returning from the 
front early in the evening, and it seemed broad enough for 
Sickles and his men to pass without attempting to open the 
Hazel Grove road. In fact, his troops finally reached the 
Fairview Plateau by this pathway in the ravine, and not a 
man of them went by way of the Plank Road. This broad 
gap remained open to the Federal arms until sunrise of the 
next morning. May 3d, when Hazel Grove and its approaches 
were seized and held by Archer's Brigade of Tennesseeans. 
A useless sacrifice of Lane's and Ramseur's Brigades of 
North Carolinians was made on Sunday morning, before 
Stuart recognized the vast importance of Archer's capture. 
Then about forty cannon were placed in battery in the field 
at Hazel Grove, which enfiladed the Federal batteries and 
redoubts at Fairview with a rapid and withering fire, and 
with the assistance of Hardaway's guns, to the south and 
east of Chancellorsville, rendered the plateau utterly unten- 
able, deciding the fate of the campaign in about an hour. 
The inoffensive midnight charge of Sickles and Birney at the 
Hazel Grove Farm, and the terrific cannonade at the same 
time from the Federal batteries at Fairview, closed the even- 
ing's entertainment. Stuart artived about this time, and, un- 
certain what to do in the absence of Hill and Jackson, and 
all the members of his staff but one, commanded rest and 
silence. The tired Confederates soon sank to sleep, and 
nothing disturbed the oppressive stillness of the evening air 
save the renewed songs of the startled whip-poor-wills and 
the subdued sounds of the Federal troops building barricades 
for the inevitable conflict of the next morning. 


Where the Blame Properly Belongs. 

THE findings of this inquiry show, or seem to show, 
that warnings of the massing of the enemy's forces 
on the flank and rear of the Eleventh Corps were sent 
at different times to the headquarters of the First Di- 
vision and to the corps, but we have not found any evidence 
to show that they were forwarded to army headquarters at 
Chancellor's. Neither do we find any evidence to show that 
either Devens, Howard or Hooker took any measures after 
midday to ascertain if the right flank of the Army of the 
Potomac was free from danger. There is, however, abundant 
testimony to prove that General Devens, commanding the 
exposed flank, was warned again and again, by several of his 
officers, of imminent danger from the presence of a large 
force of the enemy massing on his flank and rear. But the 
commander of the First Division utterly refused to listen to 
the admonitions and the advice of his officers, and even after 
the attack was commenced, he declined to allow his regi- 
ments attacked or threatened in flank and in rear to change 
front while there was time to change. Furthermore, it ap- 
pears that the resistance of this division, placed in such ad- 
verse circumstances and overwhelmed by a vastly superior 
force, was all that could reasonably be expected of it. To 
have remained fifteen minutes longer would have resulted in 
capture or destruction. The hurried retreat of some of the 
survivors of this division broke the formation of some of the 
best regiments of the Third Division — Schurz's — then drawn 
up in line of battle in the rear to receive the impending at- 
tack. Nevertheless, it appears that the rest of the Third 
Division, with many rallied from the wreck of the First Di- 
vision, did make a stand, and resisted the enemy until 
overwhelmed and outflanked by superior numbers. It also 
9— B. c. (125) 


appears that many of the men of the First (Devens') and 
the Third Divisions (Schurz's) did rally at the unfinished rifle 
pits of Barlow, and did resist with Buschbeck's Brigade, in 
the presence of more than twenty thousand men, until both 
flanks were turned and retreat or capture was inevitable. It 
also appears that the retreat from this third and last attack 
was conducted in an orderly manner, and that Buschbeck's 
Brigade retired in complete order. It seems that there was 
no active pursuit by the enemy at this time, and that the 
rear guard, with Dilger, and one gun in the road, and Busch- 
beck's Brigade in battle order, retreated unmolested down 
the road to Fairview, where Buschbeck's Brigade formed 
in line of battle in front of the Federal guns, and remained 
there until Sunday morning. 

It also appears that a large number of the soldiers of 
the Third Division halted, by order of General Schurz, on 
the Bullock Road, north of the Plank Road, and protected 
for several hours that approach to the rear of the Chancellor 
House. Beside these, there were several hundred of the 
Eleventh Corps men halted behind the batteries at Fair- 
view, where some of them remained during the night. All 
these positions were taken before Berry's Division reached 
the position taken by it, about four hundred yards in advance 
of the Federal cannon and on the Plank Road. The attack 
on the Eleventh Corps at Von Gilsa's position commenced at 
5.30 p. M., and ceased at 7 or 7.15, when the Federal troops 
retreated from the Buschbeck line, and then Jackson ordered 
his tired and disordered battalions to halt at and around the 
Dowdall Tavern, two miles distant from the Chancellor 
House. The statements that Berry's Division of the Third 
Corps, and that Huntington's guns at Hazel Grove, halted 
the victorious rebels, are erroneous ; for no line of battle of 
Jackson's army at the time, or during the night, approached 
within seven hundred to one thousand yards of Berry, with 
dense woods intervening. And all the infantry that appeared 
in Pleasanton's front and in front of Huntington's guns was 
a group of foragers from Doles' Brigade, who promptly took 


to their heels without the loss of a man, when the artillery 
ceased firing, leaving behind thejn the cannon and caissons 
they had fairly won in the vista. 

In fact, all the resistance Jackson's army met with on 
Saturday afternoon and evening, up to the time he was 
■wounded — except the few cannon shots from Osborne's guns 
at Fairview at eight p. m. — was from the broken three divi- 
sions of the Eleventh Corps, numbering but nine thousand 
men, and attacked in flank and rear and overwhelmed in 
detail. Analysis shows, or seems to show, that this resist- 
ance, in three attempts, was commendable under the circum- 
stances, and that no other body of equal or even much larger 
numbers of troops of the Army of the Potomac could have 
held the flanked positions much longer and escaped complete 
destruction. Furthermore, it appears that this resistance of 
the Eleventh Corps cost them nearly sixteen hundred men, 
killed and wounded, or more than five hundred more men 
than the British army lost at the bloody battle of Bunker 
Hill, and that it retarded the progress of Jackson's army for 
an hour and a half after it struck Von Gilsa, only about one 
mile distant from the last position assumed by the wrecks of 
the Eleventh Corps at the Buschbeck line, near the Dowdall 
Tavern. This delay of one hour and a half of the enemy 
late in the afternoon, near sunset, was of extreme importance 
to the safety of the Army of the Potomac entrenched in front 
of Chancellor's, and especially of the twenty thousand men 
who had gone with Sickles down in the dense forests, two or 
three miles south of the Plank Road, in search of the "re- 
treating" foe. 

The investigation clearly shows that the story of the 
fearful panic and disordered retreat of men and animals, with 
cannon, etc., which startled Pleasanton at Hazel Grove, and 
was ascribed by him as belonging to the Eleventh Corps, was 
entirely misplaced, for it is proved that not one of the men, 
animals or vehicles seen in this picturesque tumult belonged 
to the Eleventh Corps. Furthermore, it can be shown that 
the fearful panic which Hooker has described in front of the 


Chancellor House and on Fairview was caused by and very 
largely composed of the troops of other corps, who came up 
from the southward and from Hazel Grove, where the Elev- 
enth Corps had never been. In fact, the stragglers and 
wrecks of the Eleventh Corps had reached the rear or vicin- 
ity of the Chancellor House some time before these stam- 
pedes took place. And at the time of the panic, the rear 
guard and fragments of the crushed corps were then actually 
in line of battle behind Dilger's guns and the Federal bat- 
teries on Fairview, or with Buschbeck's Brigade in front of 
the batteries or in position on the Bullock Road, nearly a 
third of a mile north of the Plank Road, while Barlow's Bri- 
gade of nearly three thousand men of the Eleventh Corps 
were three or four miles south in the woods, searching for the 
enemy and for Birney's Division of Sickles' Corps, and un- 
conscious of the disasters that had taken place in their rear. 
The abundant abuse heaped upon the members of the corps 
of a German name or descent does not appear to be at all 
justified by fact, and'it can be shown that with few exceptions 
they fought as well as many other troops fought under similar 
conditions, and that the typical German organization known 
as Buschbeck's Brigade acted with great firmness, and re- 
treated in perfect order in the face of the victorious enemy. 

The investigation clearly proves that the disastrous re- 
sults of the battle of Chancellorsville cannot be justly as- 
cribed to the want of vigilance and soldierly conduct on the 
part of the rank and file of the Eleventh Corps. Further- 
more, we may properly say that these unjust imputations 
and imprecations, which have been scattered far and wide 
over the land for the last thirty years, blighting the honor and 
embittering the life of ten thousand deserving soldiers, ought 
to have been righted long ago.and would have been if some 
of the West Point officers in command in the Army of the 
Potomac had shown common fairness, or if the War Depart- 
ment had ordered an impartial investigation, which was 
earnestly asked for by some of the officers of the corps. 



Losses of the Contending Forces. 

THE losses of the Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville have been 
variously estimated, and given by the official records, as 2,412 
killed, wounded and missing — 1,438 killed and wounded and 974 
missing. The statement of Howard of May 13, 1863, made the 
loss 2,508, which was the estimate given by Hooker to Congress two 
years afterward. It is evident, from the state records completed since 
the war, that the ofiScial estimate of loss was not accurately given, that 
the actual loss in killed and wounded was much greater than at first 
given, and that the entire loss of the corps on the 2d of May, 1863, was 
more than 2,600 men, of which 130 were officers killed and wounded. 
The official records of Ohio give to the four regiments of that state in Mc- 
Lean's Brigade a loss of 119 greater than is shown by the official returns 
at Washington. The official records show that but 9 men were killed in 
the 55th Ohio, but it is now shown that 27 men were killed or mortally 
wounded, and that the number reported as wounded was much too small. 
Many of those who were reported at first as missing are now known to 
have been killed. Surgeon Suckley, the Medical Director of the corps, 
remained at the Dowdall Tavern to look after the wounded. Suckley was 
an old army officer, and, being of a jovial disposition, had been a favor- 
ite with many or most of the rebel officers who had left the regular army 
to join the Southern cause. They were delighted to find their old 
comrade at the Dowdall Tavern, and treated him with great distinction, 
placing the Federal wounded under his charge, not only of his own 
corps but probably some of those of other corps wounded on Sunday, as 
he stated to one of his assistants that he had 1,100 wounded under his 
care, but did not state from what corps. Surgeon Suckley lost his horse 
in the melee about the Dowdall Farm, but General Stuart ordered a 
special search for the lost animal, and soon restored it to him. When 
Suckley was relieved from his duties and returned to his corps at Staf- 
ford Court House, he appeared in the full new uniform of a rebel col- 
onel, having made an exchange of clothing during the hilarity of the 
last meeting with his old associates of the regular army then in the 
Army of Northern Virginia. 

The losses of Jackson's forces in this contest of Saturday will never 
be accurately known, as nearly all of the regiments reckoned their 
losses collectively for the whole campaign. General Rodes, in mention- 
ing his severe loss, intimates that quite a proportion of it occurred on 



the first day. General Colston also admits a loss. Some of the attack- 
ing regiments admit severe loss — the 12th Alabama 76 men, and the 
loth Virginia about 50 killed and wounded, including some valuable 

Certainly the dense masses of Jackson's infantry must have lost 
many men during the canister fire of Dilger's Battery, even if they had 
escaped the musketry of the Federal infantry at the three successive 
lines of resistance. General Doles, whose brigade led the attack, 
states (p. 967) : " In this engagement — Saturday — we lost many gal- 
lant men killed and wounded." We may form some estimate of their 
losses from he admitted casualties among the officers known to have 
fallen in the fight with the Eleventh Corps. And in this list we find the 
names of Colonels Cook, Hobson, Stalling and Warren ; Majors Bryan 
and Rowe ; also Captains Bisel, Credille, Allen, Green, Burnside, 
Phelan and Watkins. 

The estimate of the casualties in the Confederate army in the 
whole campaign, as given in the official records, is believed to be much 
less than the actual loss. Many of the slightly wounded are not given, 
by Order No. 63 of General T,ee. In Colston's return they are not esti- 
mated, and Rodes also omits them. Trivial scratches with the old 
soldier frequently proved to be serious or fatal wounds in a brief space 
of time. It was frequently stated in the South after Chancellorsville — 
and to the writer by competent authority — that the loss of the Army of 
Northern Virginia in that battle was enormous, and was not far from 
17,000 men, but the official returns show only a loss of about 13,000 
men, though in this return there are seven brigades which make no 
return of any missing. Longstreet, in his late work on the Army of 
Northern Virginia, states that " General Lee was actually so crippled by 
his victory that he was a full month restoring his army to condition to 
take the field." 

It may be proper to note that in the return of the losses in Colston's 
Division, he gives his loss as 1,859 killed and wounded, without counting 
the slightly wounded. (Page lOoS, Vol. XXV. ) 

Rodes also (page 949), in a foot-note to his list of killed and 
wounded, numbering 2,976, adds : "This list does not embrace the only 
slightly wounded." General Lee, in his Order No. 63 (Vol. XXV., 
Part II., page 798), forbids the mention of those wounded who are 
able to be placed on duty. 

The North Carolinians lost in this battle 2,721 men killed and 
wounded. General Lane lost 739, Pender 693, Iverson 370, Ramseur 
623, and two regiments of North Carolina troops lost 296 more. The 
Georgians in the brigades of Thomas, Doles and Colquitt lost 736 men. 
Virginia, in the four brigades of Heth, Paxton, Jones and three regi- 
ments of Colston, lost 1,532 men. 

According to the official returns, the losses of the Eleventh Corps 


are as follows, but they are mucli larger according to later returns : 

Von Gilsa's Brigade lost 133 men killed and wounded : 41st New 
York, killed and wounded, 30 ; 45th New York, killed and wounded, 
32 ; 54tli New York, killed and wounded, 25 ; 153d Pennsylvania, killed 
and wounded, 46. Total loss of brigade, killed and wounded, 133 men. 

McLean's Brigade : lyth Connecticut, killed and wounded, 42 ; 
2Sth Ohio, 121 ; 55th Ohio, 96 ; 75th Ohio, 74 ; 107th Ohio, 59 killed and 
wounded. Total loss of McLean's Brigade, killed and wounded, 393 

Buschbeck's Brigade : 29th New York, 57 ; 157th New York, 87 ; 
27th Pennsylvania, 37 ; 73d Pennsylvania, 74. Total loss of Buschbeck's 
Brigade, killed and wounded, 225 men. 

Schimmelpfennig's Brigade : 82d Illinois, 107 ; 68th New York, 
21 ; 157th New York, 79; 6ist Ohio, 60; 74th Pennsylvania, 22. Total 
loss of Schimmelpfennig's Brigade, killed and wounded, 289 men. 

Kryzanowski's Brigade : 58th New York, 11 ; 119th New York, 78 ; 
75th Pennsylvania — on picket — 8 ; 26th Wisconsin, 158. Total loss of 
Kryzanowski's Brigade, killed and wounded, 254 men. 

The Sad Ohio, 56 ; batteries and staff, 39. Total loss of corps, killed 
and wounded, 1,419 men, not including Barlow's Brigade, not in the 
battle. Corrected accounts make the total loss as exceeding 1,500 
killed and wounded men. 

Official returns of the losses of Revere's Brigade, Third Corps, dur- 
ing the campaign : 70th New York, 15 ; 71st New York, 16 ; 72d New 
York, 42 ; 73d New York, 34 ; 74th New York, 25 ; io2d New York, 53. 
Total loss of Revere's Brigade, killed and wounded, 186 men. 

Ward's Brigade of the Third Corps : 20th Indiana, 20 ; 3d Maine, 21 ; 
4th Maine, 18 ; 38th New York, 18 ; 40th New York, 41 ; 99th Pennsyl- 
vania, 17. Total loss of Ward's Brigade, killed and wounded, 135 men. 

Hayman's Brigade, Third Corps : 17th Maine, 75 ; 3d Michigan, 53 ; 
5th Michigan, 50 ; ist New York, 21 ; 37th New York, 114. Total loss 
of Hayman's Brigade, killed and wounded, 313 men. 

Knipe's Brigade, Twelfth Corps : 5th Connecticut, 20 ; 28th New 
York, 7 ; 46th Pennsylvania, 18 ; i2Sth Pennsylvania, 13. Total loss of 
Knipe's Brigade, killed and wounded, 58 men. 

Devens' two brigades of nine regiments lost 526 men killed and 
wounded, while two brigades of eleven regiments of Birney's Division 
lost but 448 killed and wounded ; or, the two brigades of Revere and 
Ward, of twelve regiments, lost but 321 killed and wounded, while the 
two brigades of Schurz's Division of nine regiments lost 543 killed and 

The entire Third Corps lost at the battles of Fair Oaks or Seven 
Pines but 1,154 men killed and wounded. The Second Corps lost at the 
same time but 1,095 men killed and wounded. 

At the battle of Williamsburg, where Hooker fought with his divi- 


sion, which Heintzleman said mustered 9,0x1 men, and where he fought 
more or less during the day, he lost but 1,215 men killed and wounded. 
The 9,000 men of the Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville, attacked in 
flank and rear, lost in one hour and a half 1,500 or more men killed and 

It has been stated that the men of the Eleventh Corps had not seen 
any hard fighting before it joined the Army of the Potomac, but the 
records seem to show that the First Corps, which afterwards formed the 
Eleventh, lost at the second battle of Bull Run 1,656 men killed and 
■ wounded out of the twenty regiments and nine batteries, while the 
Third Corps, out of fifty regiments and fifteen batteries, lost 3,448 men 
killed and wounded, and should have lost 4,140 men to have equaled the 
loss of the twenty regiments of the First Corps, estimating by regiments. 

It has been said that the artillery of Devens' Division retired with- 
out firing a shot, but the evidence shows that the rebels were greeted 
with a. severe fire from artillery somewhere from the Federal front, 
and as there were no guns stationed on the front line but the two on 
picket, the grape and canister must have come from the two guns of 
Dieckman, stationed in the angle of Von Gilsa's line, in the Turnpike, 
and from no others, as Dilger's Battery could not have come into action 
until his front was cleared of Devens' infantry, which was not until 
about half an hour afterwards. The other four guns of Dieckman's 
Battery, according to some accounts, ran away, and did not stop to take 
part in the action. Others say that the men ran away and left the guns 
in position, where they were taken by the enemy. But the accounts are 
so conflicting that the compiler is at loss what to accept, and the records 
are so incomplete that it is difficult to even form an opinion. It is cer- 
tain, however, that the guns were placed in battery to command the 
Plank Road, and as there was no enemy appearing on the Plank Road, 
there was nothing for them to fire at, and in order to reach the enem}' 
attacking on the Pike in their rear, they would have had to fire through 
the 17th Connecticut, who were drawn up to their right flank and rear. 
What became of these guns is a matter of much uncertainty to the 
compiler, and he does not surely know whether they remained 
where they were placed or were lost in the rush that followed the wreck- 
ing of Devens' Division. The report is lost, and the records of the 
Ordnance Department cannot solve the mystery. General Hunt, the 
Chief of Artillery of the Federal army, says that the Eleventh Corps 
lost but 8 guns and the rest of the army 6, or 14 in all General 
Lee claims but 13, and his Chief of Ordinance reports only 13, and 
describes them. We know that Archer captured, on Sunday morning, 
4 guns from the Third Corps, and later Jastram's Battery, of the same 
corps, lost another, or 5 guns in all. • But who lost the sixth ? Possibly 
the Eleventh lost 9 guus instead of 8. From the reports we are unable 
to solve the problem, and the Ordinance Department at Washington can- 


not decide the question. There is much confusion in the reports, and if 
we accept the reports of Jackson's army verbatim, we will find that they 
captured from the Eleventh Corps alone 24 guns, while General Lee 
claims but 13 in the campaign. One battery of the reserve artillery in 
the field north of the Dowdall House came into action when Schurz's line 
fell back from the western edge of the Hawkins Farm, half a mile north 
of Devens' men, but they could fire only solid shot or shell over the 
heads of the lines of infantry drawn up in front of them at a distance of 
more than half a mile on the Hawkins Farm and to the northwest of the 
little Church. The shallow rifle pit constructed in front of the reserve 
artillery left but little space for the artillery to manceuver, and the three 
batteries were withdrawn and sent to the rear before or when Bush- 
beck's line came into action. There was but one piece of artillery iit 
action in the Bushbeck line, and that was Dilger's. There are conflict- 
ing accounts as to the condition of the artillery when it appeared at 
Fairview. Some, and, for instance. Hunt, the Chief of Artillery, and 
Warren, state that it cargie off in good conditon, and was used in the Best 
line at Fairview. There seems to be no reason why it should not arrive 
in good condition, as there was no pursuit in its rear, and the line of 
infantry along the Bushbeck rifle pit remained fighting some time after 
the guns were ordered to the rear. Dilger, retreating with his one gun, 
found the remains of his battery in line with Best's guns, and was com- 
plimented by Best on its condition. 

The loss of material by the Army of the Potomac is a matter of 
interest to the student who seeks details of the campaign. General 
Ingalls called for the losses of knapsacks by the corps engaged, and the 
First Corps reported that the Third Brigade, mostly New Jersey men, 
threw away about one half of their knapsacks, estimate, 1,000 ; Second 
Division about 80. First Brigade, Third Division, 7 ; Second Brigade, 
Third Division, about 300 — 1,387. The Second Corps reports a loss of 
2,195. Rusling, of the Third Corps, judges that the corps lost only 700 
knapsacks, but as Revere reports a total loss of knapsacks by his bri- 
gade of six regiments — the First Massachusetts a loss of 157 more, and 
the Sixteenth Massachusetts all of theirs — the loss of the corps must 
have been 3,000 or more — say 3,000. The Fifth Corps reports a loss 
of 5,381 ; the Sixth Corps 8,787 ; the Eleventh Corps 6,009 ; t^ie Twelfth 
Corps 4,614, making a total of 31,374 knapsacks lost by the Army of the 

In estimating the loss of the Eleventh Corps, it should be borne in 
mind that quite one-half of the whole loss was sustained by Barlow's 
Brigade, who deposited their knapsacks in the Dowdall Field when they 
went south two or three miles to support Birney below the Furnace, and 
did not return. 




General L£e not Surprised. 

AS to the claim that Hooker surprised General I<ee by his flank 
movement, by moving up the river, there is some doubt about 
it. Pleasanton states in Scribner's Magazine (Vol. III., p. 173), 
that he captured at Germania Ford an engineer officer of Gen- 
eral Stuart's staff, with a big diary, in which it was stated that 
the first week in March a council of war had been held at General 
Stuart's headquarters, that Jackson, Hill, Ewell and Stuart were present, 
that the conference lasted five hours, and that it was there decided 
that in their opinion the next battle would take place at or near 
Chancellorsville. General Colston also has stated in his article in 
Scribner's Magazine that General Lee was not surprised by Hooker's 
movement, but expected the attack to come from the direction of the 
United States Ford. Longstreet states in his late work that it was 
originally the intention of the Confederates, if attacked, to remain in 
their entrenchments around Fredericksburg until he could return with 
his force from south of Petersburg, and it was estimated that the 60,000 
men entrenched were equal to Hooker's entire army. 

NOTE NO. 2. 

Strength of the Two Armies. 

The Army of the Potomac had on its rolls, the 30th of April, 
just before the advance movement, about 130,000 men, "for duty and 
equipped," exclusive of the Provost Guard. The exact number of sol- 
diers under Hooker's command and actually present, May 1st, it is not 
easy now to determine, but it probably amounted to 120,000 men, or 
about double the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia. 

A few days before the advance, President Lincoln visited Hooker 
and the army at Falmouth, and while in his tent alone with Noah 
Brooks, Lincoln took from his pocket a scrap of paper and handed it 
to Brooks. On this scrap were written these figures : " 216,718 — 146,000 
— 169,000," which Lincoln said represented the number on the rolls, the 
actual available force, and the last the strength to which the force 
might be increased. 



Hooker assured Lincoln at the time that he was going straight to 
Richmond, if he lived, but his bravado impressed the President with 
very serious misgivings, and he exclaimed to one of his confidential 
friends: "It is about the worst thing I have seen since I have been 
down here." It is, perhaps, proper to state that of Hooker's force, the 
time of service of more than 20,000 men would expire in a few days, 
and that a marked discontent and insubordination had been rife among 
some of the regiments of one of the Northern States — so much so as to 
excite the fears of Franklin, Bumside, and others. 

Ivongstreet gives the number of men in the Army of the Potomac 
available for line of battle as 113,838, as taken from Return Records 
(Vol. XXV., p. 320), and gives the number in the Confederate army as 
59,681 as the effective aggregate for the month of March, and adds that 
possibly 1,000 more returned to the army during April. 

NOTE NO. 3. 
Discontent and Jealousy. 

The feeling of discontent and jealousy among the higher officers of 
the army at this time was disgraceful, and the fact of such a condition is 
well established by many observers. In the article published in Scrib- 
ner's Magazine (Vol. XIX.), by Henry J. Raymond, editor of the New 
York Times, who was well qualified to judge on the subject — having 
served on the staff of the French Emperor at Montebello and Solferino, 
in Italy — it is shown that there was an incredible want of patriotism 
among many of the officers high in command. Burnside stated to him 
that Generals Franklin, Smith, Hooker, Newton, Sturgis and Woodbury 
— all West Pointers — had done everything they could to thwart him in 
his movements ; that Hooker was in the habit of abusing all in authority 
over him, to the scandal and the serious injury of the service ; also that 
he (Hooker) had denounced him as incompetent, and the President and 
Government at Washington as imbecile and played out. Burnside 
stated to Raymond that he thought of removing several of these selfish 
officers, and that if Hooker resisted he would hang him before night. 
After Burnside was relieved, several of these officers were also relieved 
of their commands, or were sent away with the Ninth Corps. Raymond 
believed that the mass of the army was loyal and sound, and that the 
whole demoralization was with the oificers. This unfortunate condition 
of things has been clearly proved by other authorities. General Walker, 
in his History of the Second Corps, gives much information on the sub- 
ject at this period of the war. General Walker clearly states the con- 
dition of feeling in the army when he remarks' that at the time, and 
later on, as Doubleday bluntly stated : " There always has been a great 
deal of favoritism in the Army of the Potomac," In fact, the army, up 


to the time of the Wilderness battles, was highly fermented with jeal- 
ousy and rank suspicion. Birney, Howe and Pleasanton did not hesitate 
to say that they had no confidence in Meade as commander. Butterfield 
told the Committee of Congress (p. 83) that there was a conspiracy 
among the corps commanders against Hooker. Hancock said to the 
committee that the Eleventh Corps had never been considered a part of 
the original Army of the Potomac, and that not much dependence had 
been placed upon it. Hooker was urged after the battle by several offi- 
cers of rank to break up the Eleventh Corps, and .the reason why he did 
not do so was that gold was very high, the draft was coming on, and the 
question might precipitate an unpleasant subject upon the Administra- 
tion. Walker also states (p. 10) that the Eleventh Corps had never been 
greatly depended upon in the plans of the commanding general, and 
that after the battle the troops of the corps were hardly regarded even 
as reserves. Hooker, in his letter to Lincoln of May 7, 1863, says that a 
glorious victory would have crowned his efforts but for one corps — 
meaning the Eleventh. Warren spoke the truth when he affirmed that 
the whole army needed reorganization. 

NOTE NO. 4. 
Characteristics of Jackson and Lee. 

Jackson was singularly reticent, and his maxim was: "Mystery is 
the secret of success in war, as in all transactions of human life." None 
of his staff were informed of his intentions that night, but his laconic 
instructions to General Hill to press the enemy and cut them off from 
the United States Ford ; and the detailing of Captain Boswell, of his own 
staff, to show him (Hill) the way to the rear of the Chancellor House ; 
and the brief order to General Lane to attack, are sufficient evidence to 
show what Jackson's intentions were. Between Jackson and his able 
lieutenant. General A. P. Hill, the relations were somewhat strained, 
for Jackson had placed Hill under arrest two or three times during pre- 
vious campaigns, and the good services of General Lee were required to 
adjust the difficulties. Hill was wounded by the Federal artillery half 
an hour before Captain Adams was sent for General Stuart, and we have 
no evidence that Jackson was prejudiced against Hill in this selection 
of his succe-ssor in command. 

General Robert E. Lee stood in the old Federal army as one of the 
ablest, if not the ablest, officer in it, and his withdrawal from it at the 
call of his native state was regarded as a serious loss to the Union cause. 
Lee was admirably qualified, both by art and nature, as a leader of men. 
Envy was unknown to him and suspicion loathsome to his nature, and 
in his influence over the southern Hotspurs, he showed much of that 
admirable tact which distinguished the great Marlborough. 
10 — B. c. 




The Cavalry, and Results. 

Hooker expected much from his two cavalry expeditions under 
Averill and Stoneman, and he had ample reason to complain of the 
ridiculous results. Our cavalry exercised an important influence in 
several of our campaigns, and made victory possible. Appomattox 
would not have been known but for the cavalry. At Winchester the 
horsemen turned the tide of battle, and at Fisher's Hill the victory would 
have been far more decisive if Averill had led his horsemen to the attack 
of the routed enemy instead of ordering them into bivouac — which 
Sheridan resented with Averill's dismissal. It was a mere handful of 
resolute horsemen which dashed into the rear of Early's army, retreat- 
ing from Cedar Creek with their spoils of the Federal army, and 
captured single handed more than forty pieces of cannon — one of the 
greatest feats in the war. Hannibal gained all his victories by his 
Numidian horse. Napoleon won many of his great battles with his 
heavy cavalry, and Marlborough decided with his German dragoons 
the famous battles of Blenheim, Ramillies, and Malplaquet. 

NOTB NO. 6. 
Sickles' Blunder. 
Sickles, chafing under the sight of Jackson's men marching under 
his nose with utter indifference, obtained permission from Hooker to 
send Birney and his division down to the Furnace to harass the column, 
and a little later he took Williams' Division of the Twelfth Corps, and 
later the Barlow Brigade from the Eleventh Corps, both, according to 
Hooker, without his permission. Advancing without much opposition, 
he found the head of his column below the Welford House at the hour 
of seven p. M. The enemy had completely disappeared, and apparently 
there was nothing to oppose his troops between Hazel Grove and the 
Ohio River. Birney was preparing to bivouac at or below the Welford 
House, and Sickles told the Committee of Congress that he was about to 
attack the rear of Jackson with his whole force when an aid of Howard's 
told him that our men were retreating, which he would not believe, as 
he had heard no sounds of battle. Sickles was completely hypnotized 
with the idea that Lee was retreating, and urged Hooker to send him 
Berry's Division, which, however, was refused. Sickles sent for 
Pleasanton and his cavalry to assist, for everything indicated the most 
brilliant success. He felt very indignant at the officer who informed 
him of the rout of the Eleventh Corps, and was very much surprised 
when assured that Jackson was directly in his rear. Sickles stated to 
Congress that the cause of the failure of the campaign was due " to the 


giving way of the Eleventh Corps on Saturday,'' which was very true, 
and it is also true that there were no 9,000 men in the Army of the 
Potomac who could have stopped the overwhelming numbers of 
Jackson's army. Sickles further stated to Congress that he lost but one 
gun — stalled — stuck in the mud. 

NOTE NO. 7. 

Warnings of the Enemy's Movements. 

Abundant evidence has been laid before the compiler to convince 
him that the picket line was fully established and on the alert. Captain 
Searles, of the Forty-first New York, has shown him the position he oc- 
cupied that afternoon with a body of sharpshooters, quite a thousand yards 
in advance of Von Gilsa's line, on the Pike. On the right of Searles was 
another body of sharpshooters under Lieutenant Boecke, and warnings 
were sent back by them to the commanding oflScers in the rear several 
times. While retreating to the main line Searles lost one of his men 
by the Federal fire. There is abundant evidence to show that the line 
•was extended completely around the exposed flank. The people at the 
l^awkins Farm brought in several wounded Federal soldiers who had 
been wounded as pickets in the woods, far to the flank and rear of Von 
Gilsa's line. The Signal Officer, Castle, states that he was stationed on 
the right of the Eleventh Corps, and reported all movements of the 
enemy to Howard at Locust Grove (Dowdall's). At 4.30 P. M. he re- 
ported an attack on the pickets. At five p. M. he states that the main 
force of the enemy swept down en masse. In less than fifteen minutes 
they were within forty rods of his position, and then he retreated to 
Locust Grove (Dowdall's), about two miles west of Chancellor's, 

Acting Major Owen Rice, One Hundred and Fifty-third Pennsyl- 
vania Regiment, in command of a part of the picket line, sent to Von 
Gilsa warning of a great body of the enemy massing in his front, at 
2.45 P. M. Von Gilsa told Rice the next day that he personally presented 
this dispatch to Howard, and was repulsed with taunts. (See page 379 
of Vol. I. of the Loyal Legion of Ohio, 1888.) Von Gilsa, in 1864, re- 
quested that he and Rice be allowed to testify before the Committee on 
the Conduct of the War, but was refused (p. 379). Shortly before the 
attack the entire line of pickets was inspected by a staff officer, and 
found to be in place. 

Col. J. C. Lee, of the Fifty-fifth Ohio, published an account of what 
he saw and did, in the National Tribune of March 19th, 1885. He 
affirmed that he sent out Captain Rollins to the picket line to ascertain 
the meaning of the movements of the enemy in his front, and that be- 
tween eleven A. M. and four p. M. three messengers were sent by him to 
Colonel Lee, stating that artillery and infantry in heavy force were pass- 


ing in front to the right flank of the Federal army. Colonel Lee took 
these scouts to Devens and McLean, and insisted that some action should 
be taken, but was rebuked. After this event more scouts were sent out, 
and brought back the information that a large body of the enemy were 
on our right flank, and apparently resting on their arms. Captain Gulp, 
who was attached to the staff of General McLean, states that there is no 
proof on record that any attempt was made to ascertain the truth or 
falsity of the reports sent in from the picket line, and he doubts if any 
of them ever reached the headquarters of the corps. 

Surgeon Robert Hubbard, of the Seventeenth Connecticut, a man of 
distinction and of strict integrity, was present at the Talley House, some- 
times called the Hatch House, for several hours after noon, and has 
given the compiler much information of what occurred there during this 
time. He was present both times when Colonel Lee came to inform 
Devens of the massing of the enemy on his flank. The second time he 
came he brought a farmer and several scouts, who informed Devens that 
the rebels were advancing, but Devens refused to believe it, and said to- 
Colonel Lee with decided emphasis, "You are frightened, sir !" Devens 
was at the time lying down on his back on a sofa nursing his leg, which 
had been injured by his horse running into a tree the day before. As 
Surgeon Hubbard left the house, and had crossed the road to the north 
side, one of the first cannon balls fired by the enemy struck the ground 
between him and the Talley House. Devens, according to Hubbard's 
statement, was then lying on the sofa in the farm house, and there is. 
other evidence to show that this statement is correct. 

NOTE NO. 8. 

Ftirther Warnings. 

The warnings given at various times to the higher officers of the 
corps were numerous. Lieutenant Colonel Carmichael, of the One Hun- 
dred and Fifty-seventh New York, stated in writing in June that he and 
Colonel Lockman went on picket the night before the attack, heard 
Jackson's preparations, and went to corps headquarters and gave the 
information, and received as reply : "You are new troops, and more 
frightened than hurt." Major Schleiter, of the Seventy-fourth Penn- 
sylvania, was ordered to reconnoitre at three p. M., and soon returned 
with the information that the enemy was massed for an attack, and was 
sent by General Schurz to report the same to Howard. He did so to 
his staff, and was told not to be alarmed. Schleiter heard the orders 
of the rebel ofiicers as they massed their lines of battle, and in 1885 
published an account of it in Vn^ National Tribune. Colonel Richird- 
son, of the Twenty-fifth Ohio, brought in four scouts, and reported to 
Devens that the enemy -fras massing heavily a mile distant on the 


right and rear of the Hatch House — Talley's. Devens refused the in- 
formation, and told General McLeau to order him back to his regi- 
ment, according to the testimony of Captain Culp, who was present, 
and a member of McLean's staff. Colonel Friend, who was officer 
of the day of Devens' Division, reported to Devens that the enemy 
was massing on his right, and afterwards stated to Colonel Hurst that 
the commander was not in a condition to realize the danger. Friend 
then went to corps headquarters, and was insulted and warned not to 
bring on a panic, and to go back to his regiment. Friend returned 
to the picket line, and again at two P. M. went to corps headquarters, 
and was called a coward, and ordered to his regiment, with the re- 
mark that the enemy was retreating. 

Col. J. C. Lee says in his article {National Tribune of March 19, 
1885) that he showed General McLean, about ten a. m., Jackson's troops 
moving in the southeast towards our flank, and made a diagram of roads 
showing how our flank could be reached. Lee affirmed that Jackson 
was moving to our rear, and McLean promised to inform General 
Devens. Captain Rollins, commander of the picket line, was ordered 
to ascertain the meaning of this movement, and sent back between 
eleven a. m. and four p. m. three messengers to Lee, stating that artil- 
lery and infantry in heavy force were passing in front around to our 
right flank. Lee took these three scouts to McLean and Devens, and 
insisted that some action should be taken. Devens urged that he had no 
such ittformation from army or corps headquarters, and said with impa- 
tience that " it was not worth while to be scared before we were hurt." 
After this event some more scouts were sent out, and soon returned, 
stating that a large body of the enemy were on our right flank, appa- 
rently resting. Colonel Richardson, of the Twenty-fifth Ohio, and 
Colonel Reily, of the Seventy-fifth Ohio, were informed of the facts, 
and made preparation to receive the attack. Shortly after, a squadron 
of cavalry went out, and soon returned, and the captain in command re- 
ported to Devens, in Lee's presence, that he could go but a. little way, 
as he met a large body of infantry. Devens said impatiently : " I wish 
I could get some one who could make a reconnaissance for me." The 
•Captain firmly replied : "General, I can go further, but I can't promise 
to return." Lee states that Von Gilsa and men were ready, but not ex- 
pecting an attack in the rear. 

NOTE NO. 9. 

Colquitt's Blunder. 

A few moments after the advance had commenced, Colquitt struck 
a strong, determined picket reserve, and noticed some cavalry on his 
right front, and conceived the singular idea that Sickles had moved his 


forces to the right, and was then threatening his flank. Why he should 
entertain this idea is very strange, as Stuart with his cavalry and the 
Stonewall Brigade of infantry were both on the Plank Road to his right, 
and guarding it from all attacks from that quarter. Besides this force, 
the brigades of Archer and Thomas were still iu the rear, guarding the 
trains, and Colquitt ought to have known that Sickles could not have 
reached him without first disposing of these forces. This suspicion, 
unfounded as it was, can be credited indirectly to the movement below 
the Furnace, and it seems to be the only good that can be even distantly 
accredited to that brilliant expedition, excepting the capture of about 
300 prisoners at a fearful cost. The men who made this resistance, 
which proved of such great importance to the Federal army, belonged 
of the Fifty-fifth Ohio, but the cavalry Colquitt saw were probably some 
of Stuart's, dressed in the United States uniform, who were halted at the 
Burton Farm, for no evidence can be found of any cavalry of ours sta- 
tioned at that point. At all events, Colquitt was alarmed, and recalled 
the Sixth Georgia, which had quite reached the Talley Farm, and 
changed his brigade to front south. He also compelled Ramseur, with 
his brigade, to change front and meet the enemy. ' Ramseur did so re- 
luctantly, and marched for some distance to the south without findinga 
solitary Yankee. On the Plank Road, Stuart's cavalry and the Stone- 
wall Brigade of five regiments were compelled to remain quiet until 
-Colquitt had unmasked the line of battle, as he had the right of way; 
and so for forty to sixty minutes, seventeen regiments were kept from 
performing that important part of the plan which Jackson had entrusted 
them with. When Colquitt and the forces that his fatuity had kept 
back arrived at Dowdall's, the wrecks of Devens' and Schurz's lines 
had escaped or were escaping, and the golden opportunity for complete 
victory had gone forever. There is certainly reason to believe that if 
Colquitt had followed his orders with the same alacrity the rest of his 
associates did, Devens' Division would have been captured almost to 
a man, and thit Schurz's Division would have been rolled up before it 
could have fairly formed, and Jackson would have been in ,the field in 
the rear of Chancellor's House before Sickles knew of his attack. And it 
may be said, with some appearance of truth, that it was to Colquitt's* 
want of comprehension, or to his stupidity, that Jackson's plans failed 
greatly in their intentions, and that indirectly the great .soldier lost his 
life. Ramseur complains of Colquitt's action in his reports, but beyond 
this but little can be gleaned of what the Confederates thought of Col- 
quitt. Apparently it was fortunate for Colquitt that Jackson did not live 
to demand the reasons of his delinquent and stupid subordinate. Col- 
quitt was soon relieved and sent South, where he remained until near 
the end of the Petersburg campaign. 


NOTE NO. 10. 
The Federal Army in Extreme Danger. 

At about seven P. M., or a few minutes after, Bushbeck's line of 
defense of the Eleventh Corps was flanked and forced, and the Union 
ani'y was at this moment in imminent danger. The nearest support to 
the defeated corps, then retreating through the forest, was Berry's Divi- 
sion, two miles away, and then hurrying to take position in the edge 
of the forest on the right of Fairview. The center of the army had gone 
two or three miles south, with Sickles, below the Welford Furnace, to 
observe the forced flight of General Lee, then supposed to be retreating 
to Gordonsville. Lee and his men, however, had not fled, and the idea 
of flight had not been entertained by them. Their only thought, at this 
time, was to get at close quarters with the foe. Jackson and his seventy 
regiments had marched past the front with indifference, and at this 
moment, after a hot and dusty circuit of fifteen miles, was performing 
his part with energy and rapidity in the rear of the Eleventh Corps and 
on the flank of the Federal array. No one remained behind to further 
amuse Sickles, excepting some artillery of Brown's. 

Opposite the Furnace, across the Run, however, concealed in the 
woods, Lee was read> to hurl Posey's and Wright's Brigades upon the 
exposed flank of Birney as soon as the guns of Jackson's attack were 
heard. Birney was preparing to bivouac, yet the unsupported wrecks of 
the Eleventh Corps had been vainly attempting to resist Jacks 3n and his 
30,000 men for an hour and a half, with a loss of quite 2,500 men. 
Sickles refused to credit the first officers who announced the defeat of 
the Eleventh Corps. Barlow and his brigade of 3,000 men — the reserve 
of the Eleventh Corps — had been taken from its proper position, and 
marched southward two miles distant, and halted in the dense forest, not 
far from Birney. Here it afterwards became lost, and escaped in the 
night with much difficulty. A little in the rear of Birney, Whipple's 
Division of eight regiments was halted, while on the other side of 
Scott's Run, to the eastward, in the dense woods, Williams' Division of 
thirteen regiments amused the active skirmishers of Anderson's Divi- 
sion of Lee's army. 


Colonel Candler's Statements. 

Colonel Candler, formerly of the First Massachusetts, and one of 
Hooker's favorite aids, was much interested in the work of the compiler, 
and assisted him greatly in the investigations. And in fact all of the 
researches up to the time of the untimely death of this noble ofiicer 


were freely exposed to his criticism, and in turn all the papers of Col- 
onel Candler were generously confided to the writer, and were in his 
possession at the time of Candler's death. In November, 1892, Colonel 
Candler stated to him that late on Saturday afternoon General Hooker, 
with his two aids, Candler and Russell, sat on the veranda of the Chan- 
cellor House, enjoying the summer evening, calm and sober. Up to 
this time all had gone well. Sickles was crowding the rear of the 
retreating foe, and Pleasanton had gone also with all of his cavalry to 
harass the retreating trains. Now and then a shot came from the far dis- 
tance, where the rebels on the Plank and the Pike Roads, on the left and 
south, were making a show of resistance, but nothing occurred to awaken 
the slightest anxiety among the officers resting at the Chancellor Tavern. 
Not a sound of the fighting at the Talley Farm, or even at the Wilder- 
ness Church, had reached them. Not an officer from the attacked forces 
had come to them for aid, or to warn them of the impending danger, and 
so the hours passed until 6.15 to 6.30 — and Colonel Candler was very 
positive that this was the exact time — when the sounds of distant cannon- 
ading came to their hearing, which they attributed to the movements of 
Birney and his forces. They were all listening attentively, and specu- 
lating upon the results of the conflict, when Captain Russell stepped out 
in front and turned his glass in the direction of the Dowdall Tavern, far 
to the right. A moment after he suddenly shouted to General Hooker : 
"My God, here they come!" Hooker and his aids sprang upon their 
horses and rode some distance down the Plank Road before they reached 
the ambulances and fugitives from Devens' Division, and learned from 
them that the whole rebel army had broken loose upon the flank and 
rear of the Federal army. 

NOTE NO. 12. 

Williams' Log Works. 

About half a mile from the Dowdall Tavern eastward, a line of Log 
Works stretched from near the Plank Road southward and eastward, 
connecting with the entrenchments of the Twelth Corps at Fairview. 
They were strongly built, and commenced at a point about two hundred 
feet from the Plank Road, south of it, running parallel to the Hazel 
Grove Road for some distance, and then turned to the eastward, facing 
the Hazel Grove position. They were intended to hold the entire divi- 
sion of Williams, of the Twelfth Corps, and when this division moved 
to join Sickles four companies of the Twenty-eight New York were left 
to guard the baggage and intrenchmeuts, and were behind the Log 
Works a hundred yards or more south of the Plank Road when the 
wrecks of the Eleventh Corps retreated towards Chancellorsville. The 
survivors of the Bushbeck line halted near these works, and were form- 
ing a line of battle to dispute Jackson's advance when they were ordered 


to Fairview by a staff officer, who rode up and stopped the attempt. 
The enemy were not in sight when the men of the Eleventh Corps filed 
into the road and marched again towards Chancellors ville, and the four 
companies of the Twenty-eighth New York could have escaped at that 
time, as Dilger and his rear guard were still between them and the 
enemy. After Dilger and his gun had passed by, calling on all strag- 
glers to fall in with him, the acting adjutant of the Twenty-eighth New 
York rode to the Plank Road and, noticing groups of the rebels advanc- 
ing in and beside the road, he galloped back a hundred or two yards 
south of the road and informed Colonel Cook of his danger, but Cook 
refused to retreat without orders, and a few moments after the rebels 
closed in on his front and right rear and demanded his surrender. The 
four companies of the Twenty-eighth made no resistance, but threw 
down their arms, and but three men made their escape. But other 
reports indicate that a larger part of this force did escape, and joined 
the rout with the Hazel Grove crowd. At this moment the Eighth 
Pennsylvania Cavalry were marching on the Hazel Grove Road in front 
of these Log Works, a hundred yards or more distant in the woods, and 
totally ignorant of the presence of the enemy or of any impending 

NOTE NO. 13. 

Buschbeck's Final Position. ^ 

When Buschbeck came into position in front of where Captain Best 
was forming his battery. Berry's Division had not arrived to take posi- 
tion on the right of Buschbeck. Colonel Huey, of the Eighth Pennsyl- 
vania Cavalry, states that he found no infantry in his retreat on the 
north of the Plank Road, and Captain Carpenter, of the same regiment, 
says he got to Fairview Field some time before Berry came up. The 
information collected by General Underwood shows that Berry did not 
get into position until after Buschbeck had established his line and was 
ready with the rallied men of Schurz's Division on the Bullock Road, 
to repel the enemy if he advanced, which he did not until the next 

NOTE NO. 14 

The Hazel Grove and Fairview Stampedes. 
The crowd which appeared at Fairview, coming from the southward, 
started from the vista at the time the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry were 
fired into by the rebel skirmishers. In this vista were halted one or two 
batteries, with their trains, pack trains, ambulances and material, mostly 
belonging to the brigades of the Third Corps which had gone south with 
Sickles in search of Jackson's army, and when Winn and his Georgian 


foragers suddenly fired into them without warning, the whole col- 
lection of men and animals broke into utter confusion- and plunged 
headlong down the vista toward Hazel Grove. Here the mass of fugi- 
tives and material was largely increased by additions from the artillery, 
infantry and cavalry in bivouac at this farm, and at a high rate of 
speed sought safely in the direction of the Fairview Field, distant half 
a mile or more to the northeast. As the terrified mass of men, ani- 
mals and material tore through the ravine leading to Fairview, it was 
increased in volume and energy by the men escaping from the Log 
Works of Williams' Division, and also by many members of the Twelfth 
Corps, just then returning from their support of Sickles near the Fur- 
nace. In the reports of the battle at this hour, much can be found to 
show the composition of this interesting movement, and also to prove 
that none of the berated Eleventh Corps were in it. 

General Kni_pe, of the First Brigade of the Twelfth Corps, says (Vol. 
XXV., p. 686) that as he emerged from the swamp to approach his old 
position he met the Eleventh Corps falling back in disorder. The 
Eleventh Corps had fallen back to the rear some time before, most of 
them half an hour previously, and none of them did he meet at this place 
or time. Knipe further says : "A number of my men became mixed 
up with the fleeing troops, and were unable to join their comrades until 
I sent a staif officer to bring them forwai'd." Colonel Quincy, of the 
Second Massachusetts, of the Third Brigade, Twelfth Corps, says (p. 714) : 
" Some confusion and panic at this point." The Thirteenth New Jer- 
sey, of the same brigade, broke and joined the rabble. Colonel Diven, 
of the One Hundred and Seventh New York, of the same brigade (p. 
718), admits that his regiment was also broken in fragments. A portion 
of this regiment rallied with the Twenty-seventh Indiana, and also two 
hundred of the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania, of the Third 
Corps, which had left Hazel Grove at a high rate of speed, also came to 
the Twenty-seventh Indiana without a field officer, and stayed under the 
command of Colonel Cosgrove all night. There are many reports miss- 
ing of the Third Corps and Twelfth Corps and the cavalry under Plea- 
santon, which, if brought to light, would clear up some of the obscurities 
attending the skedaddle from Hazel Grove up the ravine to Fairview, 
and they will undoubtedly add to the proof that the Eleventh Corps was 
not a part of it, but that the procession was composed almost entirely 
if not entirely, of men and material of others corps. 

NOTE NO. 15. 
Major Huntington's Views. 

Extract from a letter from Maj. J. F. Huntington, whb commanded 
three of the batteries at Hazel Grove, May 2, 1863 : 


As to the battle of Chancellorsville, allow me to say that in my 
opinion, no occurrence of the war has been more utterly and persist- 
ently misrepresented, to use a mild term, than has the behavior of the 
Eleventh Corps on the right, and, also, in a smaller way, that of the 
artillery at Hazel Grove, di Saturday evening. I presume there are 
many, even among those who think themselves pretty well up in war 
history, who believe that th'e right wing gave way before Jackson's 
onslaught without offering any resistance worth mentioning, and that 
the defeat of the -Army of the Potomac was largely due lo that fact. 
I trust and believe that Colonel Hamlin, in his forthcoming history, will 
do much to remove that groundless impression from the minds of the 
general public. There are those who, regarding the affair at Hazel 
Grove, still accept as gospel the apocrypha of Pleasanton , to the effect 
that on the approach of the enemy the artillery then fled in wild dis- 
order, drivers cutting their traces, and all that sort of thing. When, 
suddenly Pleasanton appeared " Deus ex machina," and, as one version 
has it, cried in a voice of thunder : " Align those pieces!" Instantly the 
confusion ceased, the panic stricken cannoniers, gaining fresh courage, 
obeyed that extraordinary order. To enable them to do so, General 
Pleasanton had previously ordered the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry to 
make a charge that may well be called desperate, for it involved scaling 
a high fence into a dense wood where were the "seething ranks of a 
victorious enemy." There, as we are told by General Doubleday in his 
work on Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, fell Maj. Peter Keenan, 
"literally impaled on the bayonets of the enemy, " That is a poetical 
description of the death of an officer who was killed by a musket ball 
about a mile from the spot in question. General Doubleday goes on to 
say : "Thus saving the army from destruction, and the country from the 
unutterable degradation of the establishment of slavery in the Northern 
States." The pages of history will be searched in vain for the record of 
another charge of a small regiment of cavalry that produced such stu- 
pendous results. After this glowing description, how tame and com- 
monplace do the real facts seem! The fact is that the charge of the 
Eighth Pennsylvania was made far out of sight and hearing of Hazel 
Grove, and had no more bearing upon the defense of that position than 
it had upon the defense of Bunker Hill. That so far from having been 
ordered by General Pleasanton, he was ignorant that a charge had been 
made till informed of it by Colonel Huey, commanding the regiment, 
on Sunday morning ; that the guns at Hazel Grove, instead of having 
been rallied and aligned by a distinguished cavalry general, were put 
in battery within a few yards of the spot where they had previously been 
parked, under the direction of a humble captain of artillery, as it hap- 
pened to be in the line of his duty as Division Chief of Artillery. Truly, 
it is easier to fight battles than it is to dig out lies about them after they 
have become fairly imbedded in history. 

Yours truly and fraternally, 

J. F. Huntington. 

Major Huntington also stated in 1880, in the public press, that his 
batteries were ready for action before the enemy fired a shot, and con- 
cerning the assertion of General Pleasanton, he says that "A more im- 
pudent and unfounded claim was never made." 


NOTE NO. l6. 

Sickles' Midnight Charge. 
General Sickles said to the committee <£ Congress that he charged 
Jackson entirely with the bayonet and drove him back to our original 
line, reoccupied Howard's rifle pits, recovered several pieces of artillery 
and some caissons abandoned during the day, killed Jackson in this at- 
tack, and hed the line until about four in the morning. He further 
stated in his report to Hooker (page 390) that " It is difficult to do justice 
to the brilliant execution of this movement by Birney and his splendid 
command. The night was very clear and still ; the moon, nearly full, 
threw enough light in the woods to facilitate the advance and, against a 
terrific fire of musketry and artillery, some twenty pieces of which the 
enemy had massed in the opening (Dowdall's) where General Howard's 
headquarters had been established, the advance was successfully ex- 
ecuted, the line and the Plank Road gained, and our breastworks reoc- 
cupied. All our guns and caissons and a portion of Whipple's mule 
train were recovered, besides two pieces of the enemy's artillery and 
three caissons captured." Furthermore, he states that after being 
thrown into hopeless confusion in front, the enemy advanced upon 
Berry's Division and was repulsed. 

In reply to this erroneous statement, it may be said that Jackson's 
men were not driven back one foot by his charge ; that he did not come 
within two thousand yards of Howard's rifle pits, and that the guns he 
captured were those of his own corps which Winn and his handful of 
Georgians had stampeded in the vista three or four hours before ; that 
Jackson had been wounded two hours before, and was then miles away 
in the rear ; that instead of the enemy massing twenty guns and firing 
from the Dowdall Tavern, they did not fire a single shot, because there 
were two lines of battle then forming, of Colston's and Rodes' Divisions, 
between Hazel Grove and the Tavern. Furthermore, they did not fire 
a. gun, because they were not aware of Sickles making an attack at this 
time, and did not learn of its magnitude until informed of it by the 
Northern papers long afterward. Moreover, it can be proved that in- 
stead of Berry's Division repulsing Jackson's forces, they did not — ex- 
cepting skirmishers— come within eight hundred yards of him that night. 

General Ward, of Birney's Div-ision, states (Vol. XXV., page 429, 
Rebellion Records) that his brigade started about 11.30 p. m., supported 
by another brigade, and that the advance was a brilliant sight ; that he 
soon drove the enemy out of his old barricades, taking them com- 
pletely by surprise, leaving open our communications with the main 
army. In the meantime the Fortieth Kew York and Seventeenth 
Maine, advancing up the road — the vista— captured two field pieces 
and five caissons which had been taken by the enemy that afternoon. 
Colonel Hayman, who commanded the brigade in support of Ward, says ■ 


he was ordered to charge with the bayonet, and after advancing some 
quarter of a mile carried the rifle pits — his own — encountering a terrible 
fire both from the front and both flanks, and from friend and foe. The 
Third and Fifth Michigan charged into the woods, and soon found that 
they had attacked the Twelfth Corps. — {Report of Byron Pierce. "X The 
Third Michigan lost twenty- two wounded and missing, and the Fifth 
Michigan lost about thirty. The First New York were fired into, both 
flanks and front, and retired with a loss of five killed, eleven wounded, 
and one hundred and two missing. — {Report of Colonel Leland.'] The 
Thirty-seventh New York advanced, but meeting with a warm reception, 
fell back to the starting point. — {Major DeLacy.'\ The Fortieth New 
York, supported by the Seventeeth Maine, were ordered to advance up 
the vista leading to the Plank Road and force a passage by the bayonet. 
They passed a short distance northward, when the Fortieth New York, 
known as the Mozart Regiment, approached the Twenty-eighth North 
Carolina, of Lane's Brigade, stretched across the way. The first volley 
of the Twenty- eighth North Carolina overthrew the Fortieth New York, 
marching in column of companies, and in retreating in confusion it 
upset the most of the Seventeenth Maine, marching in the rear. The 
Seventeenth Maine rallied, however, and were formed in line by Adju- 
tant Roberts in the vista, but facing west instead of north, where 
Lane's men were awaiting them. Shortly afterward McGowan's Bri- 
gade took position on their right flank and front, and after the exchange 
of a few shots, General' Ward recalled the regiment to Hazel Grove, to 
which it retired, taking a gun and two caissons left in the vista when 
Winn, with the Georgians, stampeded the forces left there in bivouac. 
Slocum, in his report, states that about midnight a portion of Birney's 
Division advanced to attack the enemy in front of Williams' Division, 
but as he had not been informed of the intent he mistook the movement 
to be an attack upon Williams' Division, and at once opened upon his 
threatened front with artillery. General Williams, taking the same view, 
also fired upon all who made their appearance in his front. Slocum also 
states that the losses suffered by our troops from our own fire must have 
been severe. General Ruger was not informed of Sickles' attack, 
but, anticipating it, ordered his brigade not to fire unless fired into. 
The Third Wisconsin was fired into from the front and also from the 
rear by the Thirteenth New Jersey, which soon afterwards took to its 
heels. Colonel Colgrove, of the Twenty-seventh Indiana, of the same 
brigade, says the rebels attacked him with terrific yells, but he repulsed 
them, yet at the same time Lieutenant Colonel Feshler, of the same 
regiment, reports "occasonal firing on the right of the regiment, but 
excepting stray shots there was none in front (page 713) ; and Colonel 
Quincy, of the Second Massachusetts, in the same line of battle, reports : 
"Our lines were not under fire until morning" (page 715). 

In the work entitled " Michigan in the War,'" published in 1882, the 


reader may find, on page 242, the following account of the Michigan 
regiments in this charge of Sickles': "At midnight, participated in that 
bold, dashing, and successful bayonet charge on the enemy, which stands 
unsurpassed in this war." 

NOTE NO. 17. 
Abuse of the Eleventh Corps. 

The blame of the disaster at Chancellorsville was thrown upon the 
Eleventh Corps, and chiefly upon the German regiments. The denun- 
ciation became extreme, and soon passed the bounds of decenc}-. Some 
of the Northern papers were for shooting the whole corps, and the Ger- 
mans were described as a worthless lot, and as coming from the ragged 
scum of a foreign and vicious population. The demands of the abused 
men to be heard in self-defense were refused. In the great public dis- 
tress at this moment, when Lee was mustering his battalions to invade 
the North, the complaints and the wrongs of 10,000 men were of little 
consequence. The loyal Germans of New York held a mass meeting at 
the Cooper Institute a month afterwards, and protested in strong lan- 
guage against the unjust treatment of the soldiers of German descent. 
At this meeting it was stated on the authority of General Patrick, the 
Provost Marshal at the United States Ford, that none of the Eleventh 
Corps fled there that night, and General Meagher, who was the Provost 
Marshal at the White House, in the rear of Chancellor's, and who 
stopped the fugitives at that point, made a speech in defense of the 
Germans, and stated that in the crowd of fugitives his men arrested, 
there were but few Germans recognized by him. But no notice of this 
meeting or its demands was taken by the government, and, in conse- 
quence, the voluntary enlistment of the better class of Germans and 
other foreign nationalities almost entirely ceased. 

After the battle the entire corps was denounced on all sides, and no 
one seemed to care to investigate and see if there were any circum- 
stances to explain the disaster to the corps. Hooker and some of his 
staff joined in the abuse, and the whole corps, both Americans, Ger- 
mans, French, Italians, Hungarians, Swiss, Irish and Welsh, were 
massed together as a worthless lot, and described as " Dutchmen." The 
Third Corps especially have made themselves conspicuous in the tirade, 
and have continued to do so up to recent times. Their regimental his- 
tories are full of abuse and denunciation of the Eleventh Corps and the 
prowess of their own in this battle. Their often-repeated falsehoods 
and self-laudation are remarkable when placed in view of the actual 
facts. It is useless to deny that the morale of the corps was seri- 
ously affected by the indifference, the hootings and the virulent invec- 
tives of its associates. The terms of reproach lavishly and unjustly 


hurled upon them from all sides became household words ia the land, 
and linger yet. Nowhere were words of comfort offered to them, or the 
hand of friendship extended, save the solitary instance of a New York 
battalion presenting arms to some of the dejected wrecks of the corps 
marching past on Sunday morning. 

To the earnest appeals of some of the officers to be heard in defense 
of their soldiers, the War Department and Congress declined to listen. 
West Point was in serious danger, a victim was needed, and as the chief 
of Hooker's staff has truly said, the Eleventh Corps was made the 
scapegoat. For thirty years these unjust imputations have been scat- 
tered over the world wherever military records are read, blighting 
the honorable reputation of an entire corps and embittering the life of 
many a gallant soldier. Nothing affects the soldier like ridicule or 
scorn, and in time it bends the bravest heart and wrecks the strongest 
resolution. It has the same destroying power, whether it attacks the 
patriot soldier like G. K. Warren, or the traitor like Benedict Arnold. 
Human nature bends and blights before its infernal influence. 

In looking over the articles printed in the reports of Congress, in 
the encyclopasdias, and various popular magazines throughout the 
country, concerning the particulars of the battle of Chancellorsville, we 
are forcibly reminded of the strange remark of the English wit and 
writer, Sir Horace Walpole, when he said : " Read me anything but his- 
tory, for I know that is false. ' ' So when we read in the report of Con- 
gress how Pleasanton, under great inspiration, placed twenty-two guns 
in battery and blew the exultant and advancing masses of Jackson's 
army into fragments and out of the ramparts abandoned by the 
Eleventh Corps, and saved the Army of the Potomac from capture or 
destruction ; when we read in Ihe same report the testimony of Birney 
and Warren, to the effect that the Eleventh Corps made no defense, but 
ran away ; when we read that both Hooker and Sickles laid the blame of 
the disaster to the Eleventh Corps, because that corps did not, single- 
handed, and without the aid of a gun or a man from the rest of the Army 
of the Potomac, resist and annihilate Jackson's vastly superior forces, 
three times its numbers ; when we read in the encyclopedias that 
Berry's splendid division, after the rout of the Eleventh Corps, rushed 
to the front and plunged with the bayonet into the immense masses of 
the advancing foe and, after a bloody struggle, hurled them back into 
the forest again and again, defeated and dismayed ; when we read these 
and many other similar articles scattered over the land, and compare 
them with the actual facts, we can then estimate the force, the truth and 
the significance of Walpole's remark, and must then admit the justice 
of the objection of the Confederate soldier to the acceptance of military 
history composed in this reckless and ridiculous manner. 

The evidence seems to show that none of Jackson's forces ap- 
proached the guns of Pleasanton at Hazel Grove that night excepting a 


few foragers of Doles' Brigade, who promptly fled without the loss of a 
man when the guns ceased iiring. The evidence also decidedly shows 
that Berry's Division, instead of hurling Jackson back into the forest 
and stopping his advance, did not really see Jackson's line of battle until 
the next morning. And instead of the Eleventh Corps running away at 
the first fire, the evidence shows that it resisted and retarded Jackson's 
men for more than an hour and a half, without the aid of a man or a gun 
from the reserves of the Army of the Potomac, and that all the resist- 
ance Jackson's men met with up to eight p. M. — nearly an hour after the 
halt had been ordered — was from the men of the Eleventh Corps, fight- 
ing and wrecked in detail. 

The contemptuous statement of General Sickles to Congress, that if 
the Eleventh Corps had held its ground, victory would have followed, 
is, on reflection, the highest praise that could possibly be bestowed upon 
the nine thousand men of the Eleventh Corps in action. In other 
words, if the nine thousand men of the Eleventh Corps, though attacked 
in rear, had whipped Jackson's army, thirty thousand strong, all would 
have been glorious, and the Army of the Potomac would not have been 
attacked in front by the same force on the next day, and would have 
escaped defeat and humiliation. This is the plain logic of it. 

The abuse heaped upon the Eleventh Corps after Chancellorsville 
seems almost incredible, as we investigate the actual condition of things 
as they existed at that time. It is apparent that much of this abuse 
originated with the Third Corps, and it is also still more painfully true 
that the calumnies and falsehoods have been kept alive and circulated 
since that time by the Falstaffs and the historians of their regimental 
and other organizations. 

NOTE NO. 18. 
Examples of Calumny and Falsehood. 

For brief examples we will offer but two from the great number 
extant : The historian of the Eleventh New Jersey stated at their May 
meeting, 1885, and without contradiction, that the Eleventh Corps fled 
like frightened hares before the yelping hounds, and that their divi- 
sion (Berry's) checked the enemy, and moreover the Eleventh Corps 
lost the battle. Captain Blake, of the Eleventh Massachusetts, of the 
same brigade, indulges in the following outrageous falsehoods in his 
history of his regiment, page 178: In the attack "a spectacle of 
shameful cowardice was witnessed, which can be rarely paralleled in 
the history of civilized warfare. The corps, composed mainly of Ger- 
mans, was stationed behind strong earthworks, and broke a few min- 
utes after four P. M.;" that " the Germans basely fled without receiving 
a volley, and rushed pell-mell by thousands upon the road to the ford. 
Officers of other corps made themselves speechless by striving to 


rally the Flying Dutchman, who was no longer an illusion but a despi- 
cable reality," etc. " The Germans thought to escape the censure whichi 
the whole army justly bestowed upon them by tearing the badges from 
their caps — for the crescent was recognized as the insignia of a poltroon. ' '' 
For another example we will take a description from the authorized 
work published by the State of New Jersey [J. Y. Foster, editor], re- 
lating to the Thirteenth p.egiment of that state, in the Twelfth Corps, 
to show how little care was taken by its editor to relate the truth : "The 
Thirteenth New Jersey bravely and steadily obeyed the order to stand 
firm as the masses of fugitives swept down from the woods, behaving 
admirably throughout. So immovable was our line, and so terrible 
the fire of Best's guns (not the Third Corps, as represented in cotempo- 
rary accounts), that the headlong advance of the enemy was speedily 
checked ; that the division, with Hooker, Sickles and Berry at the head, 
moved at double-quick, with a shout, amid the booming of cannon and 
crackle of musketry, upon the rebels, slowly driving them from the 
ground lost by the Eleventh Corps in the morning, and recovering 
several abandoned guns and caissons. Repeatedly during the night he 
renewed the contest — again repulsed with great slaughter. In both of 
these combats the fighting was grand, of the most desperate character, 
and the scene was grand and almost fearful in its sublimity." 

For the truth of this narrative the reader is respectfully referred to 
the reports of the commander of this regiment, who plainly states that 
the regiment broke before the enemy came in sight and joined the his- 
toric skedaddle, credit for which has largely been bestowed upon the 
Eleventh Corps. Furthermore, on reading the report of Ruger's Brigade 
of the Twelfth Corps, it appears that this same regiment, when Sickles 
made his brilliant midnight charge, again becoming animated, fired into 
the Third Wisconsin Regiment, thirty paces in front of them, and broke 
up the right wing of the regiment, and again took to its heels. At the 
time there was no enemy attacking. It is proper, however, to say that 
the Thirteenth New Jersey, although behaving very strangely on Sat- 
urday night, did on Sunday morning fight with gallantry, and is deserv- 
ing of the strongest praise. Investigation will also show that there was 
no fighting in front of that regiment, save the Sickles episode, and that 
no guns or grounds lost by the Eleventh Corps were recovered by any 
body of troops that night or at any other time. 

General De Trobriand, in his interesting memoirs, gives a correct 
view of the feelings of the Army of the Potomac at this time, when he 
says: " The Eleventh Corps was the object of a general hue and cry, no- 
body stopping to ask if there were not some extenuating circumstances 
— so quickly does injustice germinate in adversity." The Eleventh 
Corps was then considered as lawful dumping ground for errors and mis- 
takes, and all kinds of burdens and humiliations were heaped upon it, 
varying in degree from the grand accusation of not having destroyed 
II— B. c. 


Jackson's much larger army, to the lesser and meaner one of stealing 
the Third Corps' beef. After the battle, there was no one in authority 
found brave enough, generous enough, or just enough, to say a word 
in justice or in kindness concerning the corps, and since that time but 
two of the high oflScers of the Army of the Potomac — Couch and 
Doubleday — have dared to speak a word kindly and openly in its favor. 
Howard, at the midnight conference held by Hooker and his corps 
officers on Sunday night, stated to the conference that "the situation 
was due to the bad conduct of his corps, or words to that effect, "ac- 
cording to the report of the meeting as given by General Couch. This 
unfortunate and unjust remark was accepted by Hooker and repeated 
by him at the hearing before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
two years afterwards, and it has since been accepted far and wide as an 
ofl&cial statement. It now appears that the fault lay not with the troops, 
but in the fault of the position, for which the rank and file of the corps 
are not in the least responsible. Eminent officers of Jackson's Corps 
freely state to-day that they did not consider that th e corps was wrecked 
from any fault of its own, but from the inexcusable fault of its position, 
in which the bravest troops in the world could not have resisted, with- 
out certain destruction, longer than did the Eleventh Corps. The simple 
fact that it took Jackson's men one hour and a- half to march one mile 
and a-quarter after the attack began, is positive evidence of serious 
resistance. I/Ongstreet's column of assault at Gettysburg, tinder Petti- 
grew and Pickett, numbering quite fifteen thousand men, marched the 
same distance and was wrecked in thirty minutes. 

The loss of the campaign was due to some cause, and that cause 
has been generally assigned to the want of resistance of the Eleventh 
Corps. Howard, its commander, so stated in the midnight conference, 
and Hooker repeated the statement in his report to Congress. Since 
then it has been spread broadcast over the world, to the detriment of 
the unfortunate corps. There surely was a cause for the defeat of an 
army by another army of greatly inferior strength. There was a cause 
and a responsibility for the disaster, and as the French historian well 
says : "Responsibility cannot exist without a name." 

Hooker, it seems, was anxious to have Howard take command of 
the corps, and in his letter to Stanton he plainly shows the reasons why 
he does so. It is chiefly the desire to get rid of, Schurz, then in 
temporary command. And it is not hazarding much of an opinion in 
saying that the letter, hatched in a spirit of dislike, was the cause of 
much disappointment and disgust. Hooker had a dislike of the corps, 
but why is not known. The men of the corps were fond of him, and 
freely filled him up with their best vintages when he made them a visit ; 
but he disliked the corps nevertheless. Sickles said he did to Congress, 
and there is other proof. The look of sardonic disdain which he wore 
when he said to Howard : "I give you the Eleventh Corps, which you 


know is the best in the army, ' ' betrayed the feelings and the sincerity of 
the man. Hooker's sending Devens to the corps to displace one of its 
veterans settled his fate. Both of these appointments were of Hooker's 
own seeking, and the responsibility rests with him. Officers testified to 
Congress that the Army of the Potomac had no confidence in the corps 
when it' came to join it at Fredericksburg, and there is much evidence 
to show the existence of this objection, but no evidence to show any 
real cause for it. 

Hooker denounced the corps freely, and said in California as late as 
1872 that the corps left guns, knapsacks and everything, and ran like 
a herd of buffaloes, and that some of his staff rode among them and shot 
a number of them, to prevent extension of the panic. He evidently had 
forgotten the battle at Williamsburg, where he had nine thousand men 
under his command — according to Heintzelman — and where he gained 
the name of fighting Joe Hooker, but yet in spite of all the so-called 
terrific fighting there during the day, he did not lose as many men 
tilled and wounded as the despised nine thousand men of the Eleventh 
Corps lost in an hour and a half at Chancellorsville when attacked in 
flank and rear. 

Hooker's hatred of Howard was so strong that he did not discrim- 
inate between the men of the corps and the principal object of his dis- 
gust. His statement of his staff shooting fugitives is not sustained. 
Colonel Candler denied it in toto, and showed that he and Captains 
Russell, Dahlgren and Moore were away on duty, and knew nothing of 
such action. As near aS could be ascertained, this barbarous and untrue 
story arose from one of the Falstaffs loitering around headquarters. 
And as for the cavalry stopping fugitives of the Eleventh Corps, it ap- 
pears that they had nearly all reached or passed the Chancellor House 
before the cavalry arrived on the scene, and the skedaddlers the cavalry 
stopped were from the Hazel Grove crowd, and not members of the 
Eleventh Corps. 

Hooker was one of the old, stalwart regulars who believed in the 
immortality of West Point, and did not realize or admit that the soldier, 
like the poet, is born and not made by a course of academical study. 
He also, like many of the veteran regulars, both North and South, be- 
lieved in strong potations and stronger expletives. His positive and 
profane assertion to his followers of certain victory, and his defiance of 
the God of battles to prevent him was certainly improper and unworthy 
of the soldier and the man. Hooker, when his mind was clear, was a 
superior man in tact and popular diplomacy. His personal accomplish- 
ments and his military bearing gave him prestige with those of his sol- 
diers who were wont to measure the qualifications of their heroes by 
their stature. His management of the army after the demoralizing and 
useless slaughter at Fredericksburg, the courage and harmony which he 
infused into his men, and the celerity and promptness with which he 


moved a large part of his army across the river into the enemy's terri- 
tory, certainly stamp him as a soldier of energy and skill. But on Sat- 
urday evening Hooker underwent a great change ; his mind seemed 
paralyzed by the rout of the Eleventh Corps, and despondency took the 
place of the hopes which he so defiantly proclaimed shortly before. 

General Hooker, on assuming command, asked for the assignment 
of Gen. C. P, Stone as his Chief of Staff but the War Department refused, 
and sent Gen. Daniel Butterfield instead. Butterfield was a man of great 
energy and sagacity, and probably much of the improved condition of 
the army after Hooker took command was really due to the efforts of 
the Chief of Staff rather than to the officer in command, who has re- 
ceived the praise due another. 

NOTE NO. 19. 
General Birnefs Statements. 

General Birney stated to Congress a year after the battle that he 
sent Graham's Brigade to Howard to strengthen the Eleventh Corps on 
Friday afternoon, the day before the battle, but that Howard refused it. 
Investigation seems to show that this statement was an afterthought, 
and mostly gratuitous. Graham arrived near the Chancellor House 
about noon, and then received orders to picket Hunting Run, near Dow- 
dall's. At or about the same time Howard received orders to follow 
Slocum and the Twelfth Corps, and support it in the movement towards 
Fredericksburg, so that at the time Graham received his orders to move 
to the Dowdall Tavern, there was no one left there to guard that part of 
the Federal line. The Eleventh Corps had not proceeded far on its way 
when it was ordered to return to its former position, and it arrived there 
before Graham reached the position assigned to him. At this time the 
flank movement of Jackson was not contemplated, and all of the rebel 
infantry was east of Sykes, then more than a mile east of the Chancellor 
House. There were no rebels near the position of the Eleventh Corps 
at this time ; the scouting parties testing the flanks and positions of 
their opponents did not reach the Plank Road in front of Talley's until 
late in the afternoon or at dusk. The nearest rebel infantry was, at this 
time, that of Posey's and Wright's Brigades, which flanked Slocum near 
Aldrich's, between three and four P. M. 

Birney also stated to the committee of Congress at this time, that 
the Eleventh Corps suffered no loss in the battle except in prisoners, as 
it ran away ; and he also distinctly states that the disaster of the cam- 
paign was due to the bad conduct of the Eleventh Corps. Why this 
excellent officer of the Third Corps should deliberately state these false- 
hoods a year after the battle is incomprehensible. A little investigation 
or inquiry would have shown him that the nine thousand men of the 


Eleventh Corps, while attempting to hold Jackson's army at bay until 
reinforcements from the reserves could reach them — and which never 
came — lost in one hour and a half more men killed and wounded than the 
whole Third Corps lost in the seven days' battles around Richmond, or 
in the severe fighting of the two days' struggle at Fair Oaks or Seven 
Pines. And it appears, or seems to appear, that the neglected Eleventh 
Corps, attacked in flank and rear, lost out of its nine thousand men 
more, comparatively, than the splendid Third Corps of double the num- 
ber, or eighteen thousand men, lost on Sunday morning, when attacked 
in front, protected by defenses and the fire of thirty cannon, and assisted 
by parts of the Second and the Twelfth Corps. To have equaled the loss 
of the Eleventh Corps, comparatively, which Hooker stated to Congress, 
two years after the battle, was twenty-five hundred men, and which 
inquiry shows to be correct, the Third Corps, with twice the number of 
men, should have lost quite five thousand men. Hooker stated the loss 
of the Third Corps to have been 4,039 in the entire campaign, but 
inquiry shows that it was about 4,123, and from this estimate some two 
or three hundred must be subtracted as the loss of the previous day and 
evening, making a total loss of less than four thousand men on Sunday. 

The Eleventh Corps have no objection to critical comparisons of 
regiments or brigades in this battle with those of the Third Corps on 
Saturday night, or even on Sunday morning, position and all circum- 
stances to be considered in the comparisons. 

The writer has no desire to play the part of the harsh censor, or to 
mingle sarcasm with the sting of truth, but he must say that the details 
of the midnight charge of Bimey's Division, or the resistance of Berry's 
Division Sunday morning, offer no well-founded evidence for claims of 
superior action, but the evidence seems to show that Von Gilsa, with 
his thousand men, without support, stood the assaults of Rodes' and 
Colston's Divisions quite as long as the front line of Berry's Division did 
before Pender's Brigade on Sunday morning. Von Gilsa had but two 
guns to protect him, while Revere had more than twenty cannon, well 
protected, to cover his flank and rear. The minutes of the Revere 
court martial do not furnish any pleasant reading to the Federal 
soldier, although the New York Herald of May 10, 1863, says : 
"They [Revere's Brigade] fought like tigers wherever placed, and 
never wavered." 

Only a few weeks after Birney made these remarkable and unjust 
statements, he found himself in temporary command of the grand old 
Second Corps, which had at one time over forty-six thousand soldiers on 
its rolls, and which seems from its history to have been the " Legit) 
Fulminans " of the Army of the Potomac ; and at this time— June 22d, 
1864— he was attacked in flank, and lost four guns and .seventeen hun- 
dred men. His position appears to have been much stronger than that 
of the Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville, and Barlow, who commanded 


the assaulted division, reported that whole regiments surrendered to an 
inferior force. Later in August, the same corps was again tapped on the 
flank, and lost nine guns and twenty-three hundred men, and yet the 
corps was not savagely denounced for these disasters, as was the Eleventh 
at Chancellorsville. There is abundant evidence in the history of the 
Army of the Potomac to show that flight and confusion happened to 
some of the strongest corps when attacked in flank or in rear. Lieuten- 
ant General Hill, of the Confederate army, in his paper on Chickamauga, 
declares that American troops will not stand flank and rear attacks. 

General Sickles, nearly a year after the battle, went before Congress 
and unblushingly laid the defeat of the campaign to the flight of the 
Eleventh Corps. He lauds his own movements surprisingly, and among 
other false statements, he said that he lost but one gun —stalled — and nc 
prisoners, but gratuitously adds that the' Eleventh Corps lost heavily in 
prisoners, and that the Twelfth Corps was partially engaged. Tie facts 
seem to be that the stalled gun was pulled out by Bowman's men and 
restored to Huntington, and that Jackson's men went off with four or 
five of Sickles' cannon, and that he lost over a thousand men as 
prisoners, or more than the Eleventh Corps lost. And instead of the 
Twelfth Corps being partially engaged, the records indicate that it was 
severely engaged, and that the most of it fought with great distinction. 
Moreover, he describes events which did not take place, but which 
appear to his advantage, and he is silent on the remarkable rout of his 
favorite troops when Pender attacked them early on Sunday morning, 
and which placed the artillery on Fairview and the Twelfth Corps on 
its left in extreme jeopardy. He also defends the wild-goose movement 
below the Furnace, which took quite twenty thousand men out of the 
center of the army and left the Eleventh Corps in the air without sup- 
port, and two miles distant from the nearest troops. Yet Sickles stated 
that the flight of the Eleventh Corps left a long gap in the line. Where 
that gap was it is now diflScult to ascertain, as there were no Federal 
troops this side of the Rapidan, and Jackson's battalions filled the space 
between the river and Chancellorsville. 

NOTE NO. 20. 

Sickles and Warren. 

Major General Underwood, who was in Barlow's Brigade at this 
time, made a study of the battle, and who in 1881 published a work on 
its events, is very plain in his statements concerning the part Sickles 
took in this imfortunate affair, and he distinctly states: "No one 
was more responsible than he for leaving that corps (Eleventh) utterly 
isolated and beyond the power of help when the attack came ; and if he 


was in a critical position when Jackson passed around his right and rear, 
what of the Eleventh Corps, which he left alone with half his number of 
men ? The movement which he made was of his own planning. He 
pursuaded Hooker to let him make it, and begged for one division after 
another until he had three, and wanted another, and had sent to him all 
the cavalry which Hooker had, and dreadfully needed, too, elsewhere. 
His ill-timed movement, away from the main body, on his own account, 
did as much as any one thing to produce the result." 

Furthermore, Underwood states that Hooker told him that he never 
authorized Sickles to tate Williams' Division from the Twelfth Corps, 
or Barlow'is Brigade from the Eleventh Corps. But if he did not per- 
mit Sickles to do this, how came Moore, of his staff, down at the Dow- 
dall Tavern, demanding Barlow's Brigade, and leading it in person down 
to Sickles, at or below the Furnace? It is very difficult to decide how 
much of Hooker's statements on these subject should receive credence, 
for in investigating his remarks, his reports and his correspondence since 
the battle, it is certainly charitable to believe that Hooker's head was 
severely injured at the Chancellor House, as well as his back. 

General Warren went before Congress a year after the battle and 
testified that the Eleventh Corps made no fight worth mentioning, that 
the infantry deserted the artillery, and that the enemy's infantry hardly 
made any attack on that part of the front where he was, which must 
ha\e been at the Dowdall Tavern. It is evident that Warren did not stop 
long to assist, or he would have seen that the infantry remained in the 
rifle pit at Dowdall's some time after the artillery had been withdrawn, 
excepting the one gun of Dilger's. He would also have noticed that the 
infantry, in the presence of an overwhelming force of the enemy, did 
make considerable defense on the Hawkins Farm and then on the Busch- 
beck line, which Hooker highly praised. He also stated contemptuously 
that the first he saw of the rout of the Eleventh Corps was ambulances, 
mules, etc. What else did he expect to see? These impedimenta 
were ordered off the field soon after the attack, as there was but one 
road for retreat, and when the immense forces of the enemy were un- 
masked it was apparent to all that retreat was inevitable. What Warren 
met and saw, as he rode down the road, cannot fairly be placed to the 
discredit of the corps. If so, what corps is free from the same coui 
temptuous imputation ? 

He also stated that the First Corps came up and took the position 
of the Eleventh Corps at dark, and also that the fire of Pleasanton's and 
Sickles' guns soon stopped Jackson's progress and killed him. He also 
sent a dispatch to Sedgwick at midnight on Sunday, that all was snug 
at Chancellorsville, that the lines were contracted a little, and the last 
assault was repelled with ease. The accuracy of Warren's remarks and 
his knowledge of affairs may be estimated by the facts that the guns of 
Pleasanton and Sickles did not stop Jackson, because Jackson stopped 


before the guns were fired, and nearly all of his corps had halted at 
Dowdall's Tavern, out of range and sight of the Federal artillery ; that 
the First Corps did not come into position until after midnight, and then 
they were three miles away from the position lost by the Eleventh 
Corps; that when he sent the dispatch to Sedgwick, Hooker's army had 
been penned tip and badly defeated, with a loss of thirteen guns and 
many thousand prisoners. 

This deceptive and dangerous dispatch to Sedgwick may be excused, 
perhaps, in war, but it was false, and Warren was aware of it. Warren's 
actions in this battle awakened the suspicions of Hooker's friends, and it 
is stated on good authority that Warren asked Hooker for the return of 
his reports to correct them, and that they were not changed for Hooker's 
benefit. Furthermore, it is stated that Warren recalled letters written 
after the battle, and destroyed them, for some reason not now known. 
Hooker, in July, asked Seth Williams, the Adjutant General of the Army 
of the Potomac, to send him the reports of the battle of Chancellors- 
viUe, and Williams replied that he would send him on that day — July 28th 
1863 — by I/ieutenant Taylor, all the reports received at date, and would 
send Warren's report, with map, as soon as received. Warren's report, 
although dated May 12th, 1863, was not then in the hands of Williams 
on July 28th, and its absence is certainly singular. The map joined 
to the report, and as published by the War Department, is erroneous, 
and highly injurious to Hooker's defense. The broad open fields shown 
by the map did not exist then, nor do they appear to-day. It is evident 
from Williams' letter that all the reports were not then sent in — nearly 
three months after the battle — and it is also evident that the present 
absence of these reports iu the national archives cannot entirely be laid 
to Hooker. The absence of these important reports is a serious loss to 
the student of our military history, and it is certainly suggestive of 
gross negligence or malevolence somewhere. More than two-thirds of 
the reports of the Eleventh Corps are not to be found, and although 
rewards have been offered and diligent search made for them during the 
past five years, not one of them has been brought to light. Many other 
reports of other corps are also missing, and their absence evidently 
indicates a wise selection on the part of the abstractor. 

The remarks Warren made before Congress concerning Sickles and 
the composition of the Third Corps, seemingly in derogation, and his 
disgruntled views in general of affairs and men, are not calculated to in- 
crease the respect the student may have for his abilities or his candor. 
West Point is clearly his Mecca, whence all good and perfect things 
must come. The Third Corps, notwithstanding Warren's malicious 
views, was certainly an admirable corps, and contained some of the 
best personnel to be found in the Army of the Potomac, even if some of 
its regiments did fierform comical movements at times. The bravest 
men sometimes have moments of discretion, as happened to the intrepid 


Frederick the Great, when he took to his heels at MoUwitz and rode 
twenty miles before he was overtaken by the messenger of the dauntless 
Schwerin, who had stuck to the field, and finally won the battle. 

If the powerful Third Corps, entrenched behind strong works, pro- 
tected by the fire of thirty cannon and firmly supported by other troops 
of the Second and Twelfth Corps, numbering altogether quite thirty 
thousand men, could not resist Jackson's forces without the inspiring 
presence of Jackson, why expect the depleted Eleventh Corps to destroy 
them with Jackson in command, when attacked under great disadvan- 
tage, and when it could not muster over five thousand men to form line 
of battle, either at the Church, or later at the rifle pits ? All fair-minded 
soldiers will at once see that the remark: "If the Eleventh Corps 
had stood firm, the campaign would have ended in a great victory," is a 
very comical observation. And it must be apparent to any one who will 
examine the situation and the circumstances of the attack, that the 
resistance of the troops of the Eleventh Corps, under these circum- 
stances, was all that could be reasonably expected of them. 

The story General Doubleday relates of Von Gilsa going to Howard 
for aid, and being told that he must trust in the Lord, as he had no 
reinforcements to send him, is clearly erroneous, for the reason that 
Howard was not at the Dowdall House, and had not returned from the 
Furnace when Von Gilsa was attacked ; also, that Von Gilsa had not 
time to ride back to headquarters — more than a mile distant — to call for 
aid ; also, because Von Gilsa knew that it was perfectly useless to call 
for aid, either from Devens or Howard. 

Upon close investigation, it appears that the offense of the Eleventh 
Corps was chiefly that it did not, single-handed, pulverize Jackson and 
his greatly superior army for their presumption in attacking the 
Eleventh in the rear and far away from any support ; that it did not 
change front and fortify without permission from its superior officers ; 
that it did have in its ranks many volunteers of German birth or of other 
nationalities who had offered their services in defense of the govern- 
ment ; that it did also contain a number of naturalized officers of foreign 
birth, highly educated in military affairs, and whose abilities could have 
been easily demonstrated in competitive comparison with many of those 
who claimed superior knowledge of the arts of war, and who lost no 
opportunity to exhibit their dislike and their jealousy. These were the 
potent reasons. It is quite certain that the composition of the corps had 
much to do with the fierce and unrelenting denunciations hurled upon 
it by those really at fault, and who sought to escape censure by declaring 
the men of the Eleventh Corps as the scapegoats, and whose amazing 
self-conceit and shameless selfishness prevented them from exercising 
the common dictates of fairness and humanity. For some of these 
shortsighted men history has in store a terrible indictment, and time 
does not always soften the vengeance of her pen. 


Justice and words of commendation will come too late for many- 
thousands who have been mustered out by death, and with the convic- 
tion that they had been deeply wronged by the authorities at Washing- 
ton and their fellow soldiers, and it will be of little moment to many of 
the survivors, whom long continued abuse has steeled to indifference. 
But it is not too late to correct the inscriptions in our national history, 
and Hooker spoke the public mind when he wrote to his aid. Colonel 
Candler, in 1878 : "In my judgment it is never too late to correct an 
error. ' ' 

In military life, trivial incidents, improperly related and exagger- 
ated, gather force rapidly, and may enhance worthless characters, and 
as rapidly impair or destroy worthy reputations. Falsehoods in military 
affairs seem to travel faster, cling closer, and sting deeper than in any 
other profession. Often repeated, they assume form, and become almost 
as stubborn as facts. 

NOTE NO. 21. 
Abuse of the Germans. 

The German portion of the corps so savagely denounced for alleged 
cowardice appears, on investigation, to have fought well wherever they 
had a fair chance. Von Gilsa's Brigade certainly could not have fought, 
or attempted to fight, much longer than it did, attacked in the rear. 
The next German regiments Jackson's men approached were the 
Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, the Eighty-second Illinois, and the Fifty-eighth 
New York, and there is no question that they fought desperately, re- 
treated in battle order north of the road, and halted in Jine of battle on 
the right of Berry's position. The next German regiment in Schurz's 
line was the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, one of the best in the whole 
Corps, but it was disabled in the rush of Devens' broken division, and 
could not be collected together in battle order, yet it seems to have done 
about as well as the American regiment next to it, the Sixty-first Ohio, a 
most admirable regiment. The Sixty-eighth and One Hundred and 
Nineteenth New York Regiments, next in line, seem to have made a 
creditable fight. The Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania, on picket south of the 
Dowdall Tavern, with only one hundred and eighty men, certainly could 
not be expected to stand its ground and resist the seventeen regiments 
Colquitt let loose upon it. The remaining three German regiments were 
in Buschbeck's Brigade, fought steadily, retreated in perfect battle order, 
and won applause from every one except Warren. 

Of the three German batteries, Dilger's, Dieckman'sand Weidrick's, 
no fault can be justly found. Dilger and Weidrick stood to their guns 
as long as their positions were tenable. The two guns of Dieckman, on 
picket, were served as long as they could be worked, with a loss of thir- 
teen men to the section. The other four guns at the Talley House were 


in a faulty position, and had no opportunity whatever to fight, the 
enemy being completely in their rear, and flight or surrender were the 
only alternatives. The investigator fails to find cause for blaming the 
Germans in the battle of Chancellorsville. On the contrary, he finds 
much worthy of praise, and that the denunciations against them are 
extremely unfair and unjust, and arose from ignorance, from malice or 
from prejudice. 

NOTE NO, 22. 
Berry's Division not in Action. 

Although the histories of the war teem with glowing accounts of 
how Berry's Division stopped the advance of Jackson's Corps, and, as 
Hooker affirms, hurled Jackson's men back at the point of the bayonet, 
the compiler is unable to find any evidence that Jackson's men ap- 
proached nearer than seven hundred yards — except pickets — to Berry's 
line of battle. Up to ten p. M. the nearest rebels were those of Lane's 
Brigade, seven to eight hundred yards in front of Berry, with a dense 
forest intervening. After ten P. M. Lane's left wing was withdrawn to 
the south of the road, and Pender's Brigade took the vacant place north 
of the road, and he says that his skirmishers were thrown out and 
remained until Sunday morning, and that there was no fighting, and 
no firing except artillery shelling. — (Page 935.) 

General Revere, of the Second Brigade of Berry's Division, and in 
the front line, reported (page 461) that he was ordered to charge with 
the bayonet on arriving at the front, but there was no enemy in front to 
charge except pickets. Captain Poland, Chief of Staff, placed the troops 
in position by order of General Berry, and reports at nine p. M. that the 
enemy was distant three hundred yards in front, and does not mention 
any fighting whatever. Colonel Burns, of the Seventy-third New York, 
on the left of the Plank Road, reports that he repulsed two attacks of the 
enemy, but as Lane's men were behind the Log Works of Williams, a 
thousand yards distant, and from which they did not move until Sunday 
morning, it is very evident that Burns mistook the picket firing for that 
of a line of battle. With the exception of the First Massachusetts, none 
of all the regiments of Berry's Division report any fighting during the 
night or in the evening, when they advanced to check Jackson's victori- 
ous columns, which did not appear until Sunday morning. This regi- 
ment reports two men killed and one wounded during the evening, and 
it seems that those were shot when a part of the regiment fired into its. 
own skirmishers. 

NOTE NO. 23. 
General Couch's Statements, Etc. 
Couch's statements concerning affairs at Chancellorsville are not 


very favorable to Hooker. He assured Couch that he had I,ee just where 
he wanted him, and that Lee must fight him on his own ground ; but 
Couch then believed the battle would be lost. Afterwards he informed 
Couch that L,ee was in full retreat, and that he had sent Sickles to cap- 
ture his artillery. Couch states that at the midnight meeting of the 
4th of May, Howard was for fight, admitting that the situation was due 
to the bad conduct of his corps — the Eleventh, General Couch has since 
the battle affirmed that no corps surprised as the Eleventh was at this 
time could have held its ground under similar circumstances. 

When Sickles started on his expedition south of the Furnace, Gen- 
eral Hooker was adverse to commencing the attack, and his last words 
were: "Don't bring on a fight. Sickles." Pleasanton states that the 
Eleventh Corps was in a miserable position, and he testified that Hooker 
sent for him and told him that Lee was retreating to GordonsvUle, and 
he wanted him to follow the rebels up and do all the damage possible. 
Generals Warren and Hancock both testified to Congress that it' was 
generally supposed in the army that General Lee's army was running 
away. Hooker also stated to the same committee that his telegram to 
Sedgwick was based upon a report sent in from General Sickles that the 
enemy was flying. When Sickles asked for his Third Division he also 
asked that Pleasanton and his cavalry be sent to him, that his forces were 
In position, and he was about to open his attack in full force. 

NOTB NO. 24. 

Report of Major General Carl Schurz, U. S. Army. 

Stafford Court Hodsb, May j2, 1863. 
* * * In closing this report, I beg leave to make one addi- 
tional remark. The Eleventh Corps, and, by error or malice, especially 
the Third Division, has been held up to the whole country as a band of 
cowards. My division has been made responsible for the defeat of the 
Eleventh Corps, and the Eleventh Corps for the failure of the campaign. 
Preposterous as this is, yet we have been overwhelmed by the army and 
the press with abuse and insult beyond measure. We have borne as 
much as human nature can endure. I am far from saying that on May 2, 
everybody did his duty to the best of his power. But one thing I will 
say, because I know it : These men are not cowards. I have seen most 
of them fight before this, and they fought as bravely as any. I am also 
far from saying that it would have been quite impossible to do better in 
the position the corps occupied on May 2nd ; but I have seen with my 
own eyes troops who now affect to look down upon the Eleventh Corps 
with sovereign contempt behave much worse under circumstances far 
less trying. 


Being charged with such an enormous responsibility as the failure 
of a campaign involves, it would seem to me that every commander in 
this corps has a right to a fair investigation of his conduct, and of the 
circumstances surrounding him and his command on that occasion. I 
would, therefore, most respectfully and most urgently ask for permis- 
sion to publish this report. Every statement contained therein is 
strictly truthful, to the best of my information. If I have erred in any 
particular, my errors can easily be corrected. But if what I say is true, 
I deem it due to myself and those who serve under me that the country 
should know it. 

I am. General, most respectfully, your obedient servant, 


Major-General, Comdg. Third Div. Eleventh Army Corps. 
Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard, 

Commanding Eleventh Army Corps. 

Schurz Objects to a Transfer. 

May 21, 1863. 

General — The arrangement spoken of between yourself and the 
Secretary of War with regard to my transfer to another army is not ac- 
ceptable under present circumstances. You remember that about seven 
weeks ago I expressed a desire to leave with my troops, for the reason 
that I anticipated difficulties which would be apt to impair the efficiency 
of the corps. The disaster which befell us on the 2nd of May has 
brought about a state of things which seems to justify my apprehensions 
in a much larger measure than I expected ; nevertheless, it is now im- 
possible for me and my troops to agree to an arrangement which for- 
merly we would have been happy to accept. 

My reasons are these : I have been most outrageously slandered by 
the press. Ridiculous as it may seem, my division has been made re- 
sponsible for the defeat of- the corps ; my officers and men have been 
called cowards. If we go now, will it not have the appearance as if we 
were shaken off by the Army of the Potomac ? Would it not, to a cer- 
tainty, confirm the slanders circulated about me ? Would it not seem as 
if I voluntarily accepted the responsibility for the disaster of May 2nd ? 
To such an arrangement, under such circumstances, I can never consent. 

I have asked for oae of two things : Either the publication of my 
official report, or a court of inquiry, so that the true facts may come to 
light, and the responsibility for the disaster be fairly apportioned. For 
this, and nothing else, have I asked, and I shall urge this with all pos- 
sible energy. Although under all other circumstances I should be wil- 
ling to go to some other theater of war, under these circumstances I am 
satisfied with my command as it is and where it is. I consider it a duty 


to myself and my men to stand right here until the mist that hangs over 
the events of the 2nd of May is cleared up. 

Besides, I had a conversation -with General Hooker, in the course of 
which this subject was incidentally touched, and he pronounced him- 
self decidedly opposed to my going, either with or without my troops. 
I am. General, most respectfully, yours, 


Major-Generai< O. O. .Howard, Major-Genexal. 

Headquarters Eleventh Corps. 

Schurz Wanted His Report Published. 

Camp Near Stafford Codrt-Hodse, 

May 18, 1863. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

Sir — I would respectfully ask for permission to publish my report 
on the part taken by my division in the action of the 2nd of May. My 
reasons for making this request are the following : The conduct of the 
Eleventh Corps, and especially of my division, has been so outrageously 
and so persistently misrepresented by the press throughout the country, 
and officers, as well as men, have had and still have to suffer so much 
a,buse and insult at the hands of the rest of the army, that they would 
seem to' have a right to have a true statement of the circumstances of 
the case laid before the people, so that they may hope to be judged by 
their true merits. 

It is a very hard thing for soldiers to be universally stigmatized as 
cowards, and is apt to demoralize them more than a defeat. Without 
claiming for the officers and men of my command anything that is not 
due to them, I would respectfully represent that, in my humble opinion, 
it would be but just, and greatly for the benefit of the morale of the 
men, that the country should be made to understand the disastrous 
occurrence of the 2nd of May in its true character. 

If the publication of my report should seem inexpedient to you, I 
would respectfully ask for a court of inquiry, to publicly investigate the 
circumstances surrounding my command on the 2nd of May, and the 
causes of its defeat. 

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant, 

C. Schurz, 
Major-General, Comdg. Third DiiL Eleventh Army Corps, 

Headquarters Ei,eventh Army Corps, 

May 18, 1863. 
Respectfully forwarded. 

O. 0. Howard, 
Major-General, Cotntnanding. 

notes, correspondence and remarks. 17i 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

May 18, 1863. 
Respectfully forwarded. I hope soon to be able to transmit all the 
reports of the recent battles, and meanwhile I cannot approve of the 
publication of an isolated report. 

Joseph Hooker, 
Major-General, Commanding. 

A Court of Inquiry Asked For. 

Camp near Brooke's Station, Va., May jo, 1863. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

Sir — To my application for permission to publish my report of the 
part taken by my division in the battle of Chancellorsville, I received, 
through the Adjutant General, the reply that " It is contrary to orders to 
publish the reports of battles except through the proper official chan- 

In accordance with this, I would, for the reasons enumerated in my 
letter of the i8th instant, respectfully request you to publish my report 
when it reaches the War Department through the proper channels. 

I would also most respectfully repeat my request that if the publi- 
cation of my report should seem inexpedient to you, a court of inquiry 
be granted me, for the purpose of publicly investigating the circum- 
stances surrounding my command on the 2nd of May, the causes of its 
defeat, and my conduct on that occasion. 

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant, 


Major-General, Comdg. Third Div. Eleventh Army Corps. 

(Indorsements. ) 
Headquarters Eleventh Army Corps, May 30, 1863. 
Respectfully forwarded. With reference to the court of inquiry 
asked for, I recommend that the request be granted. I do not know of 
any charges against General Schurz from an official quarter, but I do not 
shrink from a thorough investigation of all the circumstances connected 
with the disaster of May 2nd. 

O. O. Howard, 
Major-General, Comtnanding. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, fune i, 1863. 
Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant General of the army. 

Joseph Hooker, 
Major- General, Commanding. 


June 4, 1863. 
Publication of partial reports not approved till the general com- 
manding has time to make hie report. 

W. H. Hai,i,ECK, 

General-in- Chief. 
[Hooker never made any official report, and Halleck has stated that 
he never received any official information, either of his plans or their 
execution. — Compheb..] 

General Shimmelpfennig' s Protest. 
Headquarters First Brigade, Third Division, 

Eleventh Army Corps, May 10, 1863. 

General — The officers and men of this brigade of your division, 
filled with indignation, come to me with newspapers in their hands, and 
ask if such be the rewards they may expect for the sufferings they have 
endured and the bravery they have displayed. The most infamous 
falsehoods have Been circulated through the papers in regard to the con- 
duct of the troops of your division in the battle of the 2nd instant. It 
would seem as if a nest of vipers had but waited for an auspicious 
moment to spit out their poisonous slanders upon this heretofore 
honored corps. Little would I heed it were these reports but emana- 
tions from the prurient imaginations of those who live by dipping their 
pens in the blood of the slain, instead of standing up for their country, 
sword and musket in hand ; but they are dated " Headquarters of Gen- 
eral Hooker," and they are signed by responsible names. 


General, I am an old soldier. To this hour I have been proud to 
command the brave men of this brigade ; but I am sure that unless these 
infamous falsehoods be retracted and reparation made, their good- 
will and soldierly spirit will be broken, and I shall no longer be at the 
head of the same brave men whom I have had heretofore the honor to 
lead. In the name of truth and common honesty, in the name of the 
good cause of our country, I ask, therefore, for satisfaction. If our 
superior officers be not sufficiently in possession of the facts, I demand 
an investigation ; if they are, I demand that the miserable penny-a- 
liners who have slandered the division be excluded, by a public order, 
from our lines, and that the names of the originators of these slanders 
be made known to me and my brigade, that they may be held respon- 
sible for their acts. 



Maj. Gbn, Carl Schurz, Brigadier- General, Commanding. 

Commanding Division. 


12 — B. C. 


Whereas, Doubts have heretofore existed as to the 
conduct of the Eleventh Army Corps of the Army of the 
Potomac in the battle of Chancellorsville, on the evening 
of May 2nd, 1863; and 

Whereas, Colonel A. C. Hamlin, of Bangor, Maine, the 
historian of said corps, after long years of careful research, 
has demonstrated by his history of said corps, now ready for 
publication, that it was free from fault in said battle, when 
meeting the flower of the Confederate army, under its most 
able and distinguished commander. Lieutenant General 
Stonewall Jackson, who came down upon the right flank of 
the Eleventh Corps with more fearful odds than was ever 
known in any battle of the Civil War ; and 

Whereas, The soldiers of said Eleventh Corps gallantly 
and desperately met said charge, and stood up bravely 
against it, but had no chance for victory, and were forced to 
retire, completely outflanked and outgeneraled by over- 
whelming numbers ; and 

Whereas, Their commanders sought to conceal their 
incapacity by causing reflections to be cast upon the sol- 
dierly conduct of the members of said Eleventh Corps ; and 

Whereas, Colonel Hamlin has fully vindicated the honor 
and courage of the soldiers of said Eleventh Corps, as 
appears at length in his able history of said battle; now 
therefore be it 

Resolved, By the Society of the Officers and Soldiers of 
said Eleventh Army Corps, at its annual meeting, held in 
the city of New York on the 19th day of December, 1895, 
as follows, to wit : 

I. That the earnest and hearty thanks of this society 
are hereby unanimously tendered to Colonel A. C. Hamlin, 
the historian of said corps, for the able manner in which he 



has SO fully vindicated the honor and soldierly courage of 
the Eleventh Corps in the battle of Chancellorsville, on May 
2nd, 1863. 

2. That we unanimously express our admiration for the 
untiring efforts of Colonel Hamlin, who, without reward or 
compensation, but from a sense of duty and affection for 
his comrades, has, after years of labor, made plain the true 
history of the conduct of the Eleventh Corps in the battle 
of Chancellorsville, and has demonstrated beyond question 
that its conduct was that of gallant soldiers doing their full 
duty upon the field of battle. 

3. That we especially commend the literary ability of 
Colonel Hamlin in the preparation of this work, and recom- 
mend that every surviving officer and soldier of the Eleventh 
Corps procure a copy thereof as soon as the necessary funds 
for its publication have been raised. 

4. Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions be trans- 
mitted to Colonel Hamlin by the secretary of this society. 





Position of Federal Troops Saturday Morning. 
AP No. I represents the position of the Federal troops at eight 
o'clock Saturday morning, May ad, 1863. All the roads and by- 
paths in the forest and the railroad cut were filled -with Jack- 
son's men and fighting trains, marching rapidly to the west, to 
the rear and flank of the Eleventh Corps, 

MAP NO. 2. 
Position of Both Armies at j p. m. 
This map shows the positions of the two armies at the hour of five 
o'clock Saturday afternoon. May 2d, 1863. Jackson's line of battle 
stretched more than a mile to the rear of the unprotected Eleventh 
Corps, most of the regiments of which faced south, instead of to the 
west to meet the enemy. Birney's Division, with Barlow's Brigade of 
the Eleventh Corps, were marching south in search of Jackson, while 
Whipple's and Williams' Divisions were threatening Anderson's Divi- 
sion of General Lee's army. The Third Corps works at Hazel Grove 
were abandoned, and the Log Works of the Twelfth Corps, Williams' 
Division, had but four companies of the Twenty- eighth New York to 
protect them. There was no suspicion of Jackson's position at this time 
at the Federal headquarters at the Chancellor House. 

MAP NO. 3. 
Jackson's Attack. 
This map shows the positions at 5.30 to 5.45 p. M. Jackson had 
enveloped Von Gilsa's men. Colquitt had halted and ordered his bri- 
gade to face to the south. 'Birney, with his division of the Third Corps, 
was still marching to the south in search of Jackson, while Barlow's 
Brigade of the Eleventh Corps marched in the same direction, protect- 
ing the right flank of the column. The positions of the regiments of the 
Eleventh Corps were unchanged, mostly facing south, except the 
Twenty-fifth and Seventy-fifth Ohio, in reserve at the Talley Farm, 
which were then changing front without orders. Williams' and 
Whipple's Divisions were still in front of Anderson's Division of Lee's 
army, and at the Chancellor House there were, as yet, no suspicions 
of danger. 



MAP NO. 4. 
Jackson's Progress. 
This map sbows the positions at 5.45 to 6.10 p. m. Von Gilsa's Bri- 
gade had been wrecked, and alone the Seventy-fifth Ohio, with some of 
the men from Von Gilsa's line, two hundred yards west of the Dirt 
Road, were attempting to hold back several brigades of the enemy, who 
enveloped them on three sides. The left wing of Jackson's force was 
about to attack the right of Schurz's Division, whose left was attempting 
to change front in the rush of Devens' routed men. Barlow and Birney 
were still marching south, unconscious of Jackson's attack. Whipple 
and Williams, with their powerful divisioas, were yet amusing the skir- 
mishers of Anderson's Division, and at the Chancellor House all was 
serene. Hooker and two of his staff were seated on the veranda enjoy- 
ing the summer evening, unconscious of the fact that Jackson had been 
destroying Devens' Division, less than three miles distant. Colquitt 
had turned his brigade, without orders, to the south, and, with 
Ramseur's Brigade, was vainly seeking Federal troops, while Paxton 
and Lee, with nine regiments, were obliged to remain passive spectators 
of the fight in front of them ; seventeen regiments withheld by Col- 
quitt's folly. 

MAP NO. 5. 
The Attack on Schurz's Division. 
This map represents the positions at 6.10 to 6.30 p. m. Devens' 
Division had been destroyed, and Schurz's Division, with the rallied 
men of Devens, was making a stand. Colquitt had found out his error, 
and had turned his brigade again to march to the support of Jackson's 
right flank, but too late. Seventeen rebel regiments detained from the 
first and second attacks. Barlow and Birney were still marching south, 
unconscious of the massacre in their rear. Hooker is at last aware of 
the presence of the enemy, but Whipple and Williams still amuse 
Anderson, near the Furnace. All serene at Hazel Grove, where there 
are three regiments of cavalry, one regiment of infantry and four bat- 
teries, with trains in bivouac, unconscious of the fighting only a, mile 
and a half away. 

MAP NO. 6. 
The Attack on Buschbeck. 
Map of positions at 6.30 to 7 or 7.15 p. m. The Buschbeck line, 
or the third position of the Eleventh Corps, attacked and flanked by 
Jackson's men, Colquitt, Ramseur and Paxton having joined the attack- 
ing force. Barlow and Birney are still hunting for Jackson below the 
Railroad Cut. Williams warned by Slocum to retire. Berry ordered to 
advance. At Hazel Grove all is serene, the Eighth Pennsylvania 


Cavalry starting to join Howard at Dowdall's. Batteries and regiments 
of cavalry and infantry in bivouac, and unaware of danger. Anderson 
and Mcl/aws still unaware of Jackson's attack, and ready to press their 
front as soon as they were sure of it. 

MAP NO. 7. 
Jackson's Army Halting at Dowdall's. 
This map represents the positions at 7.15 to 7.45 p. m. Jackson's 
Corps had all halted at Dowdall's, with the exception of the men who 
had gone forward without orders as far as the Log Works of Williams' 
Division, or the vista, near Hazel Grove. The Eighth Pennsylvania 
Cavalry, with the ammunition mule train of the Third Corps, had passed 
out of Hazel Grove, and the head of the column had run into the groups 
of rebel foragers near the Plank Road, The dotted line shows the 
route of the cavalry, and where Huey and survivors came out into the 
Plank Road, and before Berry had reached his position. Buschbeck had 
already taken his position in front of the batteries which Captain Best 
was endeavoring to form into line, and which he held until the next 
morning. To the north of the Plank Road the wrecks of the right of 
Schurz's Division had formed a line of defense on the Bullock Road, 
which they maintained for some time. The foragers under Winn 
stampeded the trains, batteries and men resting in the vista leading from 
Hazel Grove, and the frightened crowd, as it sped over the field of 
Hazel Grove, was increased from the organizationsihalted there, and as 
the stream of frantic fugitives (not of the Eleventh Corps) hurried up 
the ravine, it gathered in some of Williams' Division of the Twelfth 
Corps, then hurrying back to their former position, including the Thir- 
teenth New Jersey entire, with groups of men from the Twenty eighth 
New York, and others from the Log Works of Williams. As the mass of 
men, animals, vehicles, cavalry, infantry and camp followers rushed up 
the Fairview field towards Chancellor's it presented a scene never to 
be forgotten. It has been described as the rout of the Eleventh Corps, 
when there were none of the corps in it. The wrecks of the Eleventh 
Corps long before this event had passed up the Plank Road, or to the 
north of it, to the vicinity of Chancellor's. Birney was still below the 
Furnace, hunting for Jackson, while Barlow had disappeared far below 
the railroad. Stuart and the rebel cavalry were starting with a regiment 
of infantry for Ely Ford and the rear of Hooker's army. Anderson and 
McLaws were yet ignorant of the success or the position of Jackson's 
forces, and did not press their opponents as vigorously as the plan of 
attack intended. 

MAP NO. 8. 
Jackson's Forces Rejorming, 
Time, nine to ten p. M. Stuart and one regiment of infantry had 


gone to Bly Ford. Jackson's forces were halted or reforming at or near 
the Dowdall fields. Lane's Brigade had deployed in front, with Pender 
in column, some distance in the rear. McGowan was at the Log Hut^ 
farther in the rear, and Heth's Brigade to the west of them. Colquitt, 
Ramseur and Paxton were ready to move forward, while the broad road 
was crowded with battalions of artillery. Both Rodes' and Colston's 
Divisions were formed, ready to assist Hill's Division. Lane's right 
flank and rear were totally unprotected, as he was unaware of the enemy 
at Hazel Grove. The dotted lines show where Jackson went aftt r part- 
ing with Lane, and where he was when shot. The monument to Jack- 
son stands at the junction of the Dirt-and the Plank Roads, sixty yards, 
more or less, south of the place where he was fired upon. Buschbeck's 
Brigade of the Eleventh Corps was still in position in front of Best's 
guns, and the rallied parts of Schurz's Division were on the Bullock 
Road, to the right of Berry's men. Sickles andBirney were returning 
to Hazel Grove, while Barlow was trying to find his way back in the 
darkness and tangled paths of the forest. 

MAP NO. 9. 
Position of both Armies at the Midnight Charge. 
Time, ten p. m. to twelve midnight. Jackson's army in position. 
Lane, by command of Heth, had withdrawn the two regiments from the 
north of the Plank Road, and deflected his right to cover the road 
coming from Hazel Grove, in time to meet the reconnaissance of the 
left of Birney 's Division — known as the Midnight Charge. Barlow found 
his way out of the woods, and arrived at Hazel Grove just in time to 
witness the rapid return of many of Birney's Division when fired into by 
Lane's North Carolinians. Buschbeck's Brigade of the Eleventh Corps 
was gtill in position in front of the Federal batteries. The rallied parts 
of Schurz's Division, on the Bullock Road, had been withdrawn. The 
dotted lines represent the Federal artillery fire, both at 9 30 P. M., after 
the wounding of Jackson, and also at the time when Birney made his 
midnight charge. 




Miiy 2tl 18li3. Timi' S A.M. 


Mnp No. 1 



Ackley mentioned 73 

Adams, Captain (Confederate), sent to recall General " Jeb " Stuart . 114 

Anderson's Division (Confederate), mentioned 100 

Archer (Confederate) captures Federal artillery 134 

Archer, J. J. , and Brigade of Tennesseeans -withdrawn 49 

' " " mentioned 120 

Army of the Potomac, position of. May ist, p. 10 ; position of ... 19 

" perilous position of 16, 17 

' ' composition of 33 

" management of 33 

' ' and Prussian army at Jena, comparisons ... 50 

" extreme peril of 79,80,115,147 

" First Corps arrived at Chancellorsville . 122 

" resistance to Jackson's army 127, 128 

' ' losses of knapsacks 135 

" strength of 139, 140 

Army of Northern Virginia, described, pp. 6, 7, 8 ; position of . 19, 20 

" " " " sentiments of men of 7,8 

strength of 8,9,139,140 

" " " " losses of 132 

Amsberg, George Von, mentioned 41 

Avery, Colonel, 33id North Carolina, mentioned 109 

Barlow, F. C, assigned to corps 35i 45. 46 

Barlow's Brigade sent to Birney's assistance 49, 53, 54 

" " and rifle pits mentioned 75i 99i 100 

Battle, sounds of, not heard by Hooker or Sickles, etc 83 

Batteries at Fairview open fire no, 120 

Barton, Randolph, Stonewall Brigade, mentioned iv 

Barry, Major, i8th North Carolina, orders his men to fire . . . 110,113 

Berry's Division, Third Corps, position of 103, 126, 149, 167 

" " " " " " unknown to rebels . . . 122 

Berdan Sharpshooters capture 23rd Georgia Regiment 13 

Best's guns 77, 78 


l86 INDEX. 

B» continued. 

Birney, D. B., Third Corps advances to Furnace 13,48 

" " ignorant of attack on Eleventh Corps 50 

" Division, mentioned 123, 152 

" " " preparing to bivouac . 147 

" " statements to Congress ... 160, 161 

" " loss in command of Second Corps in 1864 162 

Blackford, Col. Eugene, mentioned iv 

Borcke, Heros Von, mentioned 31, 46 

Boecke, Lieutenant, of picket-line, quoted 143 

Bohlen, Gen. Henry, mentioned 43 

Eoswell, Captain (Jackson's staff), mentioned 107 

Braddock and British regulars mentioned 14) 95 

Breathed's Battery at Dowdall Tavern, mentioned loi 

Braxton, Captain (Confederate), mentioned 104 

Buell, General, battle of Perryville, mentioned 54 

Bullock and Mountain Roads described 107, 108 

" Road defended by Schurz's men 80 

Burns, Colonel, reports repulse of enemy 167 

Burnside's views of Hooker 140 

Buschbeck, Adolph, mentioned, p. 45 ; forms third line of battle, 

pp. 73, 74 ; retreats to Fairview, pp. 76, 77, 126 ; final position 149 
Butterfield, Gen. Daniel, mentioned, p. 160; mentions conspiracy 
against Hooker 141 


Candler, Col. W. L,., mentioned, pp. iv., 51, 122 ; sent to escort First 

Corps, p. 52 ; statements of 147 

Capture of 23rd Georgia (rebels) 51 

Carmichael, I/ieutenant Colonel, reports movements of rebels . 55, 144 
Carter, Colonel, artillery battalion of (Confederate), mentioned . . 18 

Castle, Signal Officer, reports advance of enemy 143 

Cavalry, uses and results of, Federal army and other armies . 142 

Chancellor, Ves, mentioned ... . iv 

Chancellorsville, battle of, comparison with that of Jena 50 

" panic at 115 

Cobb, Major, 44th Va. (rebel), mentioned loi 

Coggswell, Gen. Wm. , praises 26th Wisconsin 38 

Colquitt, H. H. (rebel), mentioned ... 42, 68, 79 

Colquitt's blunder 146 

Colston, Gen, R. E, urged Jackson to halt, p. 80; losses 132 

Colston's and Rodes' foragers 97. 98 

Confederate foragers retreat to Dowdall's 101 

Connecticut Regiment, 17th (Federal), mentioned 38 

INDEX. 187 

C, continued. 

Connecticut Regiment, 5th (Federal), ambushed lor 

Cosgrove, Colonel, mentioned 150 

Couch, General, statements concerning the battle 167 

Cowan, Sergeant (rebel), fires on General Knipe 106 

Crutchfield, Colonel (rebel) , opens fire with artillery 103 

" " " wounded . iii 

Culp, Captain, reports warnings to Devens 60, 144 


Devens, Gen. Chas., assigned to Eleventh Corps, mentioned 43, 44, 125 
" " " warned of movements of the enemy . . 57,58,60 

" " declined to change front ... 62 

' " " refused to credit Eidvance of enemy . . . . 144,145 

" " " abuses Colonel Lee 144, 145 

Devens' Division attempts to resist rebels, p. 67 ; destroyed . . 68, 69 

Dilger's Battery mentioned, p. 41 ; inaction. 7ii 72 

Dilger, Capt. Hubert, discovers the enemy advancing 57 

" " " warns headquarters of Hooker and Eleventh 

Corps 57 

" " " mentioned 97 

" " " loses a gun, and narrowly escapes .... 72,73 

" " " with one gun, forms rear guard .... 76,78 

" " " complimented by Best 135 

Diven, Colonel, Twelfth Corps, mentioned 150 

Dodge, Col. Theodore A., mentioned iv 

Doles, staff ofiBcer of, quoted 95 

Doubleday, General, describes attack on Hazel Grove 86, 87 

Douglass, Col. Kyd (Confederate), mentioned iv 

Dowdall Tavern, all serene at, at 4 p. M 52 

Dutch infantry and sailors, mentioned 32 


Eleventh Corps, history of, pp. 22, 34 ; conspiracy against ... 24 

men derided, p. 3 1 ; strength of 35 

position of, pp. 35, 36; review of, by President Lincoln 37 
New England troops in, p. 38 ; loss of arms . 61, 62 

last attempt at resistance 74i 75. 76 

final rally, pp. 78, 127 ; loss of 79, 131, 133, 134 

stragglers not at Hazel Grove . . . 91 

rout unjustly described, p. 99 ; time of attack . 126 

resistance of, retarding Jackson's army one hour and 

a-half ... . 127 

l88 INDEX. 

E, continued. 


Eleventh Corps, resistance of, of great importance to safety of the 

army I27> 128 

" " rank and file unjustly treated 128,154,166 

" " loss at Second Bull Run i34 

" " made scapegoat of I55 

" " blamed by Howard, p. 158; praised by Couch and 

Doubleday 158 

" " abused by Hooker 159 

" " invites comparison of conduct in battle 161 

" " offense of , p. 165 ; many reports of missing . . . 164 

Emack, Lieutenant (rebel), captures part of a Federal regiment . . 1 12 

Explanation of Maps . . 179 


Fairview, panic at, described 99, 100, 149 

Federal troops captured at Log Works loi 

" stragglers, described by Generals Meagher and Patrick . . . 121 

Fighting of Eleventh and Second Corps compared 23 

France, policy of, in Revolution 30 

Frederick the Great mentioned . 50, 51 

Friend, Colonel, reports advance of rebels to General Devens . 55, 145 
Frey, Emil, mentioned 38 


Georgia, loss of troops 132 

German character and history mentioned 32 

Germans, so-called, but American-born 27, 28 

" loyal support of the government, p. 29 ; number of, in U. S. 31 

German soldiers in Union army, p. 31 ; in Western armies . . . . 32 

" blood mentioned, p. 14 ; troops unjustly abused . 128,165,166 

' ' mass meeting in New York 154 

troops defended by General Meagher 154 

" influence in Missouri and the West 29 

" batteries mentioned 166 

" troops described, inspected by Fremont 26 

" " not exclusively German 27 

Gilsa, Leopold Von, and troops, mentioned . . 22, 41, 44, 45, 166 

" " " aware of the advance of the enemy 56 

" " " resisting attack 65,66 

" " " asked for permission to testify to Congress . 61,143 

Graham's Brigade sent to Howard 160 

Griffin, General, Fifth Corps, mentioned 10 

INDEX. i8g 


Hall, Daniel, and ammunition train Third Corps at Hazel Grove . 82, 93. 

Halleck, General, refuses to publish reports of battle 172- 

Hamley, and Division (English army) abused in Egypt 25 

Hardaway's guns (rebel) mentioned 100, 124 

Hayman's Brigade, losses of 133 

Hazel Grove, fugitives of, p. 90; Hazel Grove and vista, etc., de- 
scribed 81, 91 

" attack on, by rebels, p. 93 ; stampede at 95i 15° 

" " artillery at, pp. 82, 95, 96 ; panic at 99,100,123 

" " capture of, by Archer's Brigade (rebel) 124 

Hecker, Gen, Frederick, mentioned 29, 39 

Hill, Gen. A. P., orders Lane to advance for night attack . 103, 105 
" " " mentioned, p. 109; with Jackson when wounded . no 

" " " wounded 114, 141 

Hill, Lieut. Gen. D. H., quoted 162 

Hill, Colonel, stops Lane's attack 105 

Hohenlohe, Prince, Prussian army, mentioned 51 

Hohenlinden, battle of, flank attack 116 

Hooker, General, 9.30 order to Howard 20 

" " urged to break up Eleventh Corps 23, 141 

" " ordered Sickles not to bring on a fight . . . . 49,168 

" " forced to retreat 10, 11 

" " sends word to Sedgwick, Lee in retreat 17 

" " praises Buschbeck's Brigade 76 

" " states that Eleventh Corps lost the battle . . 82,141 

" " boasts to Lincoln, p. 140 ; abuse of other ofiScers 140 

" " asked Stanton for Howard to command corps . . .158 

" " subsequent hatred of Howard 159 

" " calls for reports of the battle 164 

" " letter to Colonel Candler 166 

" " believed Lee to be retreating 168 

" " never made a report of the battle 172 

Hoffman, Maj. Ernest P., mentioned 46 

Hotchkiss, Maj. Jed, rides to Hazel Grove . . 107 

Howard, Gen. O. O., assigned to corps 34 

" " " went with Barlow's Brigade to join Birney. . . .54 

" " " at Dowdall's, tries to rally troops 67 

" " " at midnight conference 158 

Howe, Elias (the inventor), mentioned 38 

Hubbard, Robt., present whenLeeinformedDevens of rebeladvance . 144 
Huey, Col. Pennock, mentioned ... . .... iv., 90, 95, 97, 98 

" " " Pennsylvania Cavalry, 8th, ordered to report to 

Howard 82, 83 

I go 


Hf continued. 

Huntington, Maj. J. F., mentioned . iv., 95 

" " " mentions rout at Hazel Grove 98 

" " " letter concerning Hazel Grove . ... 151 

Huntington's guns, mentioned ... 88 

Hunt, General, Chief of Artillery, quoted 134. '35 

Hurst, Colonel, mentioned 78 


Irish descendants and influence 

... 14 

Jackson, Gen. J. T., instructions to, froiti General Lee 12,20 

" checked Hooker's advance, May 1st .... .10 
" estimate of military qualities .... 12 

" force described 12, 13, 14 

" personal appearance of 13 

" at Burton Farm, p. 14 ; last dispatch of . 15.16 

" forms his line of battle . . 16 

" orders to advance, p. 17 ; artillery in action . 18 

' ' final attack on Eleventh Corps 75 

' ' delay and halt at Dowdall Tavern 80 

100, 103, 126 

Jackson's army, condition and position of 80, 81, 90 

Jackson, Gen. J. T., orders General Hill to make a night attack . . 103 

" ' orders General Lane to attack io5 

" " " gives General Hill final orders to attack . 107 

" " " rides up Mount. Road, pp. 108, 109; whereshot 109 

" " " wounded, p. no ; troops ready for night attack .111 

" " " last order to General Pender in 

Jackson's army adrift, p 115 ; chances of success, p. 116 ; position of . 116 
" point of attack, p. 116 ; characteristics of, pp. 117, 141 ; posi- 
tion at Groveton in 1862 mentioned ... .... 117 

' ' army, nearest approach to Berry's Division 126 

" " losses of 132 

" intentions at Chancellorsville, p. 141; instructions to and 

relations with Gen. A. P. Hill 141 

" army, resistance to, up to 8 P. M 155 

Jews, company of, mentioned 39 


Kalb, Baron de, inflvience of, in Revolution 29, 30 

Koltes, Gen. John A., mentioned 41. 42 

INDEX. igi 

IC» continued. 

Knipe, General, Twelfth Corps, quoted, p. 150; Knipe's Brigade 

mentioned 98 

" " losses of, p. 133 ; calls for General Williams on picket . 106 

Krzyauowski, Wladimir, mentioned ... . 46 

Kyle, Dave, Stuart's courier, mentioned, p. iv. ; reports to Jackson . 108 

Lane, Gen. James H. (Confederate), mentioned iv 

Lane's Brigade ordered to the front loi, 103 

Lane, General, finds Jackson on Plank Road 105 

Lane's Brigade, described, pp. 113, 114 ; puzzled by Birney's attack . 123 
" " loss at Chancellorsville, Richmond and Gettysburg . 114 

Lane, General, calls for protection of his right flank 120 

Lee, Col. John C, mentioned, pp. 40, 64, 65, 78 ; insulted by Devens, 

and resigned, p. 57 ; warned Devens of enemy's approach, 58, 59, 145 
Lee, Gen. R. E., plan of attack, p. 20 ; in council with Jackson . . 11 

" "' " claims capture of 13 guns 134 

" " " not surprized by Hooker, p. 139 ; characteristics of 141 

Lincoln's maxim never to swap horses . . 35 

' ' opinion of Hooker 140 

Lockman, Col. John T., mentioned .... 71 

Longstreet, General, estimate of losses of Lee's army 132 


Mahone's Brigade of Virginians, wounding Longstreet 113 

Martin's Battery mentioned 85 

Maine 3rd Regiment and'i7th Regiment 119 

Mallory, Colonel, wounded iii 

Marsh, Geo. P., U. S. Minister to Italy, mentioned 47 

Massachusetts 33rd Regiment, mentioned . . 38 

" nth " history of, quoted 156 

Map No. I, Description of, position of Federal troops Saturday A. M. 179 

" 2, " " position of both armies at 5 p. M 179 

"3, " " Jackson's attack 179 

' ' 4, " " Jackson's progress . 180 

"5, " " the attack on Schurz's Division 180 

" 6, '• " the attack on Buschbeck 180 

" 7, " " Jackson's army halting at Dowdall's . . .181 

"8, " " Jackson's forces reforming, etc 181 

"9, " " position of both armies at the midnight 

charge 182 

McCook, Robt. L., mentioned . 32 

iga INDEX. 

!M. continued. 


McDougal, Captain, U. S. Navy, mentioned 56 

McGroarty, Colonel, mentioned 40 

McLaws' Division (Confederate), mentioned 100 

McLean, General, mentioned 35. 44 

" " warned General Devens 55 

Mercer, Colonel, reports action . . 94 

Michler's, Major, maps mentioned 11 

Montfort, E. R., heard speech of Colonel Riley 62 

Mountain Road described 108 

Mozart Regiment mentioned 119 

Munchausen, Baron, mentioned 89 


Ney, Michael, French Marshal, a German 32 

New Jersey, nth Regiment, history of, quoted 156 

" " 13th " dispersed, pp. 98, 157; history of . . . 157 

" " troops abusing Eleventh Corps 99 

New York 28th Regiment, mentioned 97, 98, 149 

" 46th " ambushed . .101 

" " " Herald," praise of Revere's Brigade, no foundation for . 161 

Nichols, Colonel, wounded in 

Notes and Remarks 139 

North Carolina, 33rd Regiment, on picket 113 

" " troops in the war 114 

" " losses in the war, p. 114; losses in the battle . . , 132 


Ohio Regiments in Eleventh Corps, mentioned 40 

" 6ist Regiment, mentioned . 76, 78 

Osborne, Captain, mentioned .... gg, 102 

" " replies to Crutchfield's guns 104 

" " fires upon Jackson's party no 

Osterhaus, patriotic efforts of 29 


Palmer, Col. W. H., mentioned iv., 109 

Panics at Hazel Grove and Fairview 127, 128 

Paris, Comte de, describes Pleasanton's exploit 88 

Patrick, General, Provost Marshal, quoted 154 

Pegram, Major, mentioned lU 

Peisner, Col, EHas, mentioned 39 

Pelham, Maj. John, mentioned 18 

INDEX. 193 

Pf continued. ' 

Pender, General, informs General Lane of the wounding of Jackson 112 

" " attacks Third Corps 122 

Pennsylvania, 75th Regiment, mentioned, p. 42 ; position of .... 72 

" 8th Cavalry, line of advance described 9I1 92 

" " " charge of 92 

" iioth Regiment, mentioned 150 

Peyster, J. Watts de, endorses General Pleasanton 88 

Pichegru, General, remarks of 95 

Picket line 55th Ohio Regiment mentioned 68 

" " Eleventh Corps established 143 

" firing between the two armies mentioned . 107 

Pleasanton, General, called for by Sickles, p. 49 ; mentioned, 51, 121, 122 

" " reports battle at Hazel Grove 84 

before Congress 88,89 

" " attacked by rebel foragers 126 

Poland, Captain, Chief of Staff Berry's Division, reports . . 167 

Prentiss' Division at Shiloh mentioned .... . . . .24 

Pnrdie, Colonel, i8th North Carolina (rebel), mentioned 109 


Quincy, Colonel, Twelfth Corps, quoted 150, 153 


Ramseur's Brigade halted by Colquitt 68, 146 

Raymond, Henry J , account of condition of Army of Potomac . . 140 

Rappahannock River, crossing of 8, 10 

Rebel council of war before battle 139 

" foragers, advance of loi 

Revere, General, Berry's Division, reports no enemy in front . . . 160 

Revere's Brigade, losses of . . . . 133 

Resolutions of Eleventh Corps to Colonel Hamlin 175, 176 

Responsibility for the disaster 19 

Rice, Maj. Owen, commander of picket line, reports enemy advanc- 
ing 61, 143 

Richardson, Col. W. P., warns Devens of the approach of the 

enemy ... 59. ^o, 145 

Riley, Col. Robt., speech to regiment, p. 62 ; mentioned 40 

" " " 75th Ohio, resisting General Jackson 66 

Robinson, Col. James S., 82nd Ohio, mentioned 40 

Rod6s, Gen. R. E., led the advance, p. 64; mentioned loi 

" " " objects to General Stuart, p. 114; admits heavy 

losses 132 

194 ' INDEX. 

R, continued. 


Rollins, Captain, of picket line, gives warning of the rebel advance . ■ 

58. 145 

Russell, Captain, Hooker's staff, mentioned 51 

" " discovers retreat of Eleventh Corps 51, 148 

Ruger's Brigade fires into Birney's men 119 


Salm-Salm, Prince Felix, mentioned . 28 

Schimmelpfennig, General, mentioned, 46; protest 172 

Schleiter, Major, reports enemy massing in rear Eleventh Corps . 60, 144 
Schurz, Gen. Carl, receives Hooker's 9.30 order, 21 ; mentioned . . 44 

" " " patriotic efforts of .... 29 

" " " advises change of position at Dowdall's . . . 21,69 

" " " observes the rebels flanking the army 55 

Schurz's Division attacked by General Jackson 69,70,71,77 

" " of soldiers complimented by Lincoln ... 38 

Schurz, Gen. Carl, halts his men on Bullock Road 128 

" " " asks permission to publish report . . . 169,170,171 

" " " " Secretary of War for court of inquiry . .171 

Scotch, descendants of, in war 14 

Searles, Lieutenant, on picket, reports enemy advancing . . 61, 64, 143 

Second Corps, loss at Fair Oaks, p. 135 ; under Birney . . . 161 

Sickles, Gen. Daniel E., responsible for Welford expedition .... 48 

" " " " no suspicion of General Jackson's flank ' 

movement 50 

" " " " refuses to believe attack on Eleventh Corps 

50, 142 

" " " " reports rebel attack at Hazel Grove . . . .85 

Sickles' midnight charge described .... 118, 119, 120, 121, T52, 153 

Sickles attacks Twelfth Corps by mistake . . . 122 

" losses in midnight attack . 121 

" blames Eleventh Corps for loss of battle . 143 

' ' sent for General Pleasanton and cavalry 142 

" states to Congress that Eleventh Corps lost the battle . . . 156 
Sickles' midnight charge, reports of General Ward, Colonel Leland, 
Colonel Pierce, p. 153 ; reports of Slocum, Williams, 
Ruger, p. 153 ; Colonels, Colgrove, Feshler, Quincy, re- 
ports of 153 

' ' midnight charge, Michigan in the War, p. 153 ; Michigan 

in the War, history of . . . 154 

Sigel, Franz, mentioned 29, 34 

Slocum, General, mentioned 123, 153 

Smith, Col Orland, mentioned 35, 40 

INDEX. 195 

S, continued. 

Smith, lieutenant Colonel, captured by Confederates, p. 106 ; ob- 
jects to surrender of his men . . . . .112 

Stahel, Gen. Julius, complains of neglect 27 

Stein, Major, describes General Pleasanton's exploits . . 88 

Steinwehr, Adolph Von, mentioned 44 

Stonewall Brigade mentioned . 15, 68 

Suckley, Medical Director Eleventh Corps, mentioned 131 

Summary of battle 125 

Stuart's horse artillery commenced the battle 64 

" cavalry mentioned 68 

Stuart and cavalry leave for Ely Ford 81 

Stuart's Adjutant General quoted 94 

Stuart took command of Jackson's army 124 


Talley, James M., General Jackson's courier, mentioned ... . iv 

Third Corps, loss of at Fair Oaks, Williamsbtirg and second Bull 

Run 134, 135 

" " artillery losses . . ... 134 

" " resistance to Jackson compared to that of Eleventh 

Corps .... 161,. 165 

Tidball, Captain, describes effect of artillery fire at Hazel Grove . 87, 88 
Thompson, Lieutenant, mentioned, p. 84 ; reports attack at Hazel 

Grove 86 

Trobriand, Gen. De, mentioned, p. 123 ; quoted ... 157 

Twelfth Corps, position of May ist, p. 10 ; attacked by Birney's 

Division of Third Corps . . 123 

" " Log Works described 97 


Underwood, Col. A. B., mentioned iv., 38 

" " " asserts that Sickles was responsible for the 

expedition to Welford Furnace . . 48 

" " asserts that Sickles was responsible for the 

disaster .... ... . 162, 163 

" " •■ mentions Birney's retreat after midnight 

charge ........ 123 


Virginia, losses of 132 

Volunteer element in Army of the Potomac, p. 33 ; Western 
armies 3^ 

ig6 IN±)EX. 



Walker, Francis A., states prejudice against Eleventh. Corps .... 23 

" ' ' " opinion of the j ealousies of the army . . .140 

" " " belittles the Eleventh Corps 141 

Walpole, Horace, English historian, quoted 155 

Wallace, Gen. I,ew, Division at Shiloh, abused 25 

Walter, Col. Chas., the brave Swede, mentioned 38 

War Department refused investigation of Eleventh Corps . 24, 128 

Warren, Gen. G. K., informed of General Jackson's flank movement 22 

" " " states to Congress that Eleventh Corps made 

no resistance 163 

" " " sends false dispatch to General Sedgwick . .164 

" " " asks for return of his reports 164 

" " " believed General Lee to be retreating 168 

Warnings of enemy's movements 143, 144, 145 

Ward's Brigade, Third Corps, losses of 133 

West Point officers alluded to . 128 

" prestige in danger 155 

Where the blame properly belongs ... 125 

Williams' Division, Twelfth Corps, Log Works of, mentioned . 77, 148 
Williams, General, Twelfth Corps, unjustly blames Eleventh Corps . 97 

Williams' Log Works abandoned loi, 102 

Willis, Col. Edward (rebel), mentioned . . 16, 64 

Wilson, James H., Major General!*. S. Army, mentioned 47 

Winn, Colonel, 4th Georgia (Confederate), attacks Hazel Grove 93, 94, 95 
Winslow, Captain U. S. Army, mentions panic at Fairview .... 99